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dc.contributor.advisorVierkant, Tillmann
dc.contributor.authorHiggins, Joseph Bernard
dc.date.accessioned2014-03-18T15:07:33Z
dc.date.available2014-03-18T15:07:33Z
dc.date.issued2012-11-28
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1842/8404
dc.description.abstractA somewhat overlooked upshot of the ‘hypothesis of extended cognition’ (HEC) is that cognitive states can extend, reciprocally, from one individual to another (Tollefsen). Such extension allows some cognitive states (e.g. beliefs) to be jointly held amongst individuals, thus creating a novel kind of cognitive system. I call such a system an ‘interactor cognitive system’ (ICS). Building on Tollefsen’s (2006) work, I propose that an ICS approach provides the most robust defence of HEC, withstanding criticisms regarding (i). the distinctive nature of internal cognition, (ii). cognitive integration and parity, and (iii). the need for a persisting locus of cognition.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherThe University of Edinburghen
dc.subjectextended cognitionen
dc.titleA Defence of the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition by Appeal to Interactor Cognitive Systems.en
dc.typeThesis or Dissertationen
dc.type.qualificationlevelMastersen
dc.type.qualificationnameMSc Master of Scienceen
dcterms.accessRightsRestricted Accessen_US


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