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dc.contributor.authorLeslie, Hild Margaret Werburghen
dc.date.accessioned2018-01-31T11:46:58Z
dc.date.available2018-01-31T11:46:58Z
dc.date.issued1998en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1842/28420
dc.description.abstracten
dc.description.abstractThe remarks reported in Lectures and Conversations, make it clear that Wittgenstein thought both there to be "a way of thinking" in Freud's work that needed combatting, and also there to be something valuable that needed preserving. This thesis explores what underlies these remarks. The negative part of the thesis examines exactly what are the "ways of thinking" that need combatting. I argue that these include the confusion of reasons with causes and the related confusion of the "grammar" of physiology with the "grammar" of psychology. The positive part of the thesis argues that Freudian psychoanalysis can be better understood by a proper understanding of the way patients are persuaded to see their behaviour as falling under new descriptions, descriptions which are secondary or metaphorical applications of the ordinary language.en
dc.description.abstractIn the course of my argument I examine and criticise the claims made by such writers and would -be defenders of Freud as Donald Davidson and Marcia Cavell. I further explore the work of David Pears and Jean -Paul Sartre on self -deception, and the bearing that their views have on an understanding of Freudian psychoanalysis. I also invoke contributions by Sabina Lovibond and Peter Winch to illuminate my thesis that psychoanalytic explanations can be true, even though parasitic on acceptance by the patient.en
dc.description.abstractOthers who have written on these matters have tended to focus on the direct, though elliptical, comments reported in Wittgenstein's Lectures and Conversations. I contend, however, that some of the fundamental ideas of Wittgenstein's later thinking, notably in the Philosophical Investigations and The Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology are also crucial to a proper understanding of Freudian psychoanalysis.en
dc.publisherThe University of Edinburghen
dc.relation.isreferencedbyen
dc.subjectAnnexe Thesis Digitisation Project 2017 Block 16en
dc.subject.classificationWittgensteinen
dc.subject.classificationFreuden
dc.subject.classificationDavidsonEN
dc.subject.classificationPearsEN
dc.subject.classificationSartreen
dc.subject.classificationWinchen
dc.subject.classificationreasons and causesen
dc.subject.classificationthe homonculus fallacyEN
dc.subject.classificationthe unconsciousen
dc.subject.classificationself -deceptionen
dc.subject.classificationsecondary meaningen
dc.subject.classificationpersuasionen
dc.titleFreud after Wittgenstein: a re-evaluation of Freudian psychoanalytic conceptsen
dc.typeThesis or Dissertationen
dc.type.qualificationlevelen
dc.type.qualificationnamePhD Doctor of Philosophyen


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