Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorMcCarthy, David
dc.date.accessioned2007-11-09T12:46:02Z
dc.date.available2007-11-09T12:46:02Z
dc.date.issued2007-11
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1842/2092
dc.description.abstractThe priority view has become very popular in moral philosophy, but there is a serious question about how it should be formalized. The most natural formalization leads to ex post prioritarianism, which results from adding expected utility theory to the main ideas of the priority view. But ex post prioritarianism entails a claim which is too implausible for it to be a serious competitor to utilitarianism. In fact, ex post prioritarianism was probably never a genuine alternative to utilitarianism in the first place. By contrast, ex ante prioritarianism is defensible. But its motivation is very different from the usual rationales offered for the priority view. Given the untenability of ex post prioritarianism, it is more natural for most friends of the priority view to revert to utilitarianism.en
dc.format.extent338176 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectphilosophyen
dc.subjectmoral philosophyen
dc.titleUtilitarianism and prioritarianism IIen
dc.typeArticleen


Files in this item

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record