Now showing items 11-20 of 105
Meaning and Other Non-Biological Categories
In this paper I display a general metaphysical assumption that characterizes basic naturalistic views and that is inherited, in a residual form, by their leading teleological rivals. The assumption is that intentional ...
(John Benjamins Publishing, 1997)
The paper has a negative and a positive side. The negative side argues that neither the classical notions of narrow nor wide content are suitable for the purposes of psychological explanation. The positive side shows how ...
Extruding Intentionality from the Metaphysical Flux
(Taylor and Francis, 1999)
On the Origin of Objects is, at heart, an extended search for a non-circular and nonreductive characterization of two key notions: intentionality (the content or "aboutness" distinctive of mental states) and computation ...
Meaning, Dispositions, and Normativity
In a recent paper, Paul Coates defends a sophisticated dispositional account which allegedly resolves the sceptical paradox developed by Kripke in his monograph on Wittgenstein's treatment of following a rule (Kripke, ...
Explaining Actions With Habits
(North American Philosophical Publications, Inc., 2006)
From time to time we explain what people do by referring to their habits. We explain somebody’s putting the kettle on in the morning as done through “force of habit”. We explain somebody’s missing a turning by saying ...
Putting Concepts to Work: Some Thoughts for the 21st Century (a reply to Fodor)
Fodor’s theory makes thinking prior to doing. It allows for an inactive agent or pure reflector, and for agents whose actions in various ways seem to float free of their own conceptual repertoires. We show that naturally ...
That Special Something: Dennett on the Making of Minds and Selves
(Cambridge University Press,, 2002)
Dennett depicts human minds as both deeply different from, yet profoundly continuous with, the minds of other animals and simple agents. His treatments of mind, consciousness, free will and human agency all reflect this ...
Perceptual Experience and Its Contents
(The Institute of Mind and Behavior, 2002)
The contents of perceptual experience, it has been argued, often include a characteristic “non-conceptual” component (Evans, 1982). Rejecting such views, McDowell (1994) claims that such contents are conceptual in ...
Connectionism, Moral Cognition, and Collaborative Problem Solving
(MIT Press, 1996)
How should linguistically formulated moral principles figure in an account of our moral understanding and practice?