Now showing items 1-10 of 66
(Taylor and Francis, 2002)
In this paper I attempt to develop a notion of responsibility (semantic responsibility) that is to the notion of belief what epistemic responsibility is to the notion of justification. 'Being semantically responsible' ...
Sensorimotor Chauvinism?” Commentary on O'Reagan, J. Kevin and Noë, Alva, “A Sensorimotor account of vision and Visual Consciousness”
(Cambridge University Press, 2001)
While applauding the bulk of the account on offer, we question one apparent implication viz, that every difference in sensorimotor contingencies corresponds to a difference in conscious visual experience.
Reinventing Ourselves: The Plasticity of Embodiment, Sensing, and Mind
(Taylor and Francis, 2006)
Recent advances in Cognitive Science and Cognitive Neuroscience open up new vistas for human enhancement. Central to much of this work is the idea of new Human-Machine interfaces (in general) and new Brain-Machine interfaces ...
The main goal of this paper is to show that Pettit and Smith’s (1996) argument concerning the nature of free belief is importantly incomplete. I accept Pettit and Smith’s emphasis upon normative constraints governing ...
Explaining Actions With Habits
(North American Philosophical Publications, Inc., 2006)
From time to time we explain what people do by referring to their habits. We explain somebody’s putting the kettle on in the morning as done through “force of habit”. We explain somebody’s missing a turning by saying ...
Putting Concepts to Work: Some Thoughts for the 21st Century (a reply to Fodor)
Fodor’s theory makes thinking prior to doing. It allows for an inactive agent or pure reflector, and for agents whose actions in various ways seem to float free of their own conceptual repertoires. We show that naturally ...
That Special Something: Dennett on the Making of Minds and Selves
(Cambridge University Press,, 2002)
Dennett depicts human minds as both deeply different from, yet profoundly continuous with, the minds of other animals and simple agents. His treatments of mind, consciousness, free will and human agency all reflect this ...
Perceptual Experience and Its Contents
(The Institute of Mind and Behavior, 2002)
The contents of perceptual experience, it has been argued, often include a characteristic “non-conceptual” component (Evans, 1982). Rejecting such views, McDowell (1994) claims that such contents are conceptual in ...