Now showing items 1-10 of 66
(Taylor and Francis, 2002)
In this paper I attempt to develop a notion of responsibility (semantic responsibility) that is to the notion of belief what epistemic responsibility is to the notion of justification. 'Being semantically responsible' ...
Sensorimotor Chauvinism?” Commentary on O'Reagan, J. Kevin and Noë, Alva, “A Sensorimotor account of vision and Visual Consciousness”
(Cambridge University Press, 2001)
While applauding the bulk of the account on offer, we question one apparent implication viz, that every difference in sensorimotor contingencies corresponds to a difference in conscious visual experience.
Reasons, Robots and The Extended Mind
A suitable project for the new Millenium is to radically reconfigure our image of human rationality. Such a project is already underway, within the Cognitive Sciences, under the umbrellas of work in Situated Cognition, ...
Minds, Brains and Tools
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2002)
The selected texts for this discussion were two recent pieces by Dennett (“Things About Things” and “Making Tools for Thinking” – henceforth TAT and MTT respectively) and one oldie-but-goodie (“Styles of Mental Representation”, ...
Making Moral Space: A Reply To Churchland
(University of Calgary Press, 2000)
Like those famous nations divided by a single tongue, my paper (this volume) and Professor P.M. Churchland's deep and engaging reply offer different spins on a common heritage. The common heritage is, of course, a connectionist ...
Word and Action: Reconciling Rules and Know-How in Moral Cognition
(University of Calgary Press, Alberta, Canada, 2000)
Recent work in Cognitive Science highlights the importance of exemplar-based know-how in supporting human expertise. Influenced by this model, many accounts of moral knowledge now stress exemplar-based, non-sentential ...
Perceptual Experience and Its Contents
(The Institute of Mind and Behavior, 2002)
The contents of perceptual experience, it has been argued, often include a characteristic “non-conceptual” component (Evans, 1982). Rejecting such views, McDowell (1994) claims that such contents are conceptual in ...
The Twisted Matrix: Dream, Simulation or Hybrid?
(Oxford University Press, 2004)
“The Matrix is a computer-generated dreamworld built to keep us under control” Morpheus, early in The Matrix. “ In dreaming, you are not only out of control, you don’t even know it…I was completely duped again and again ...
Actions, Habits and Constitution
In this paper I offer a critique of the view made popular by Davidson that rationalization is a species of causal explanation, and propose instead that in many cases the explanatory relation is constitutive. Given ...