Now showing items 1-10 of 18
(Istituto Universitario Orientale, 1997)
There is a compelling idea in the air. Both contemporary philosophers of mind and philosophers of language are engaged in developing theories of (mental or linguistic) content that are naturalistic. The stand has been ...
Twin Pleas: Probing Content and Compositionality
(Department of Philosophy. Brown University., 1997)
So called dual factor theories are proposed in an attempt to provide an explanation of the meaning of our utterances and the content of our mental states in terms that involve two different theories, each one serving ...
(Taylor and Francis, 2002)
In this paper I attempt to develop a notion of responsibility (semantic responsibility) that is to the notion of belief what epistemic responsibility is to the notion of justification. 'Being semantically responsible' ...
Sensorimotor Chauvinism?” Commentary on O'Reagan, J. Kevin and Noë, Alva, “A Sensorimotor account of vision and Visual Consciousness”
(Cambridge University Press, 2001)
While applauding the bulk of the account on offer, we question one apparent implication viz, that every difference in sensorimotor contingencies corresponds to a difference in conscious visual experience.
Perceptual Experience and Its Contents
(The Institute of Mind and Behavior, 2002)
The contents of perceptual experience, it has been argued, often include a characteristic “non-conceptual” component (Evans, 1982). Rejecting such views, McDowell (1994) claims that such contents are conceptual in ...
How do we know how?
(Taylor and Francis, 2007)
I raise some doubts about the plausibility of Stanley and Williamson’s view that all knowledge-how is just a species of propositional knowledge. By tackling the question of what is involved in entertaining a proposition, ...
(John Benjamins Publishing, 1997)
The paper has a negative and a positive side. The negative side argues that neither the classical notions of narrow nor wide content are suitable for the purposes of psychological explanation. The positive side shows how ...
(Department of Philosophy. Stockholm University, 2002)
It is sometimes said that humans are unlike other animals in at least one crucial respect. We do not simply form beliefs, desires and other mental states, but are capable of caring about our mental states in a distinctive ...
Naturalism and Causal Explanation
(Communication and Cognition, Ghent, 1999)
Semantic properties are not commonly held to be part of the basic ontological furniture of the world. Consequently, we confront a problem: how to 'naturalize' semantics so as to reveal these properties in their true ...
Doing Without Representing?
Connectionism and classicism, it appears, have at least this much in common: both place some notion of internal representation at the heart of a scientific study of mind. In recent years, however, a much more radical view ...