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Actions, Habits and Constitution
In this paper I offer a critique of the view made popular by Davidson that rationalization is a species of causal explanation, and propose instead that in many cases the explanatory relation is constitutive. Given ...
The Rationality of Habitual Actions
(University of Durham and University of Bergen, 2005)
We are creatures of habit. Familiar ways of doing things in familiar contexts become automatic for us. That is to say, when we acquire a habit we can act without thinking about it at all. Habits free our minds to think ...
Blackburn's Ruling Passions: A Partial Reply
(University of Durham Department of Philosophy, 1998)
Ruling Passions is Simon Blackburn’s latest attempt to defend a theory of practical reason which he calls “expressivism”.2 In the first three chapters Blackburn outlines an account of how we should understand statements ...
Explaining Actions With Habits
(North American Philosophical Publications, Inc., 2006)
From time to time we explain what people do by referring to their habits. We explain somebody’s putting the kettle on in the morning as done through “force of habit”. We explain somebody’s missing a turning by saying ...