Now showing items 1-8 of 8
(Taylor and Francis, 2002)
In this paper I attempt to develop a notion of responsibility (semantic responsibility) that is to the notion of belief what epistemic responsibility is to the notion of justification. 'Being semantically responsible' ...
Sensorimotor Chauvinism?” Commentary on O'Reagan, J. Kevin and Noë, Alva, “A Sensorimotor account of vision and Visual Consciousness”
(Cambridge University Press, 2001)
While applauding the bulk of the account on offer, we question one apparent implication viz, that every difference in sensorimotor contingencies corresponds to a difference in conscious visual experience.
Perceptual Experience and Its Contents
(The Institute of Mind and Behavior, 2002)
The contents of perceptual experience, it has been argued, often include a characteristic “non-conceptual” component (Evans, 1982). Rejecting such views, McDowell (1994) claims that such contents are conceptual in ...
How do we know how?
(Taylor and Francis, 2007)
I raise some doubts about the plausibility of Stanley and Williamson’s view that all knowledge-how is just a species of propositional knowledge. By tackling the question of what is involved in entertaining a proposition, ...
(Department of Philosophy. Stockholm University, 2002)
It is sometimes said that humans are unlike other animals in at least one crucial respect. We do not simply form beliefs, desires and other mental states, but are capable of caring about our mental states in a distinctive ...
Modularity, Relativism, and Neural Constructivism
(Hermes Science Publications, 2002)
Fodor (1983) claims that the modularity of mind (the relatively encapsulated, insulated, special-purpose nature of the psychological mechanisms of perception) helps undermine relativism in various forms. I shall show ...
Commentary on J.K O’Regan and A Noe: A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness
O'Regan and Noe present a wonderfully detailed and comprehensive defense of a position whose broad outline we absolutely and unreservedly endorse. They are right, it seems to us, to stress the intimacy of conscious content ...
The main goal of this paper is to show that Pettit and Smith’s (1996) argument concerning the nature of free belief is importantly incomplete. I accept Pettit and Smith’s emphasis upon normative constraints governing ...