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Title: Modularity, Relativism, and Neural Constructivism
Authors: Toribio, Josefa
Issue Date: 2002
Citation: Toribio, J., “Modularity, Relativism, and Neural Constructivism”. Cognitive Science Quarterly. Vol. 2 (1) 2002, pp. 93-106.
Publisher: Hermes Science Publications
Abstract: Fodor (1983) claims that the modularity of mind (the relatively encapsulated, insulated, special-purpose nature of the psychological mechanisms of perception) helps undermine relativism in various forms. I shall show first, that the modular vision of mind provides insufficient support for the rejection of (most forms of) relativism, and second, that an alternative (‘neural constructivist’) model may, in fact, provide a better empirical response to the relativist challenge.
Keywords: philosophy
encapsulation
modularity
neural-constructivism
perception
plasticity
relativism
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1842/1391
Appears in Collections:Philosophy research publications

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