Information Services banner Edinburgh Research Archive The University of Edinburgh crest

Edinburgh Research Archive >
Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, School of >
Philosophy >
Philosophy research publications >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1842/1368

This item has been viewed 15 times in the last year. View Statistics

Files in This Item:

File Description SizeFormat
MeaDispNorm.pdf290.59 kBAdobe PDFView/Open
Title: Meaning, Dispositions, and Normativity
Authors: Toribio, Josefa
Issue Date: 1998
Citation: Toribio, J., “Meaning, Dispositions, and Normativity”. Minds and Machines, 9 (3), 1999, pp. 399-413.
Publisher: Springer
Abstract: In a recent paper, Paul Coates defends a sophisticated dispositional account which allegedly resolves the sceptical paradox developed by Kripke in his monograph on Wittgenstein's treatment of following a rule (Kripke, 1982). Coates' account appeals to a notion of 'homeostasis', unpacked as a subject's second-order disposition to maintain a consistent pattern of extended first-order dispositions regarding her linguistic behavior. This kind of account, Coates contends, provides a naturalistic model for the normativity of intentional properties and thus resolves Kripke's sceptical paradox. In this paper I argue that Coates' second-order dispositional account cannot solve the sceptic's problems regarding meaning and normativity. My main contention is that in order for second-order dispositions to be able to effectively regulate the coordinated responses constitutive of first-order dispositions, those first order dispositions must be independently identifiable. Yet that's precisely what Kripke's sceptical argument calls into question. I shall also argue, in a more positive fashion, that Coates' own appeal to practical breakdowns may suggest a different —and more effective— response to the sceptic's concern.
Keywords: philosophy
dispositions
mistake
normativity
sceptical paradox
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1842/1368
Appears in Collections:Philosophy research publications

Items in ERA are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

 

Valid XHTML 1.0! Unless explicitly stated otherwise, all material is copyright © The University of Edinburgh 2013, and/or the original authors. Privacy and Cookies Policy