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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1842/1359

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Title: Free Belief
Authors: Toribio, Josefa
Issue Date: 2003
Citation: 16. Toribio, J., “Free Belief”, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2003, 2 (2), pp. 327-336.
Publisher: Kluwer
Abstract: The main goal of this paper is to show that Pettit and Smith’s (1996) argument concerning the nature of free belief is importantly incomplete. I accept Pettit and Smith’s emphasis upon normative constraints governing responsible believing and desiring, and their claim that the responsibly believing agent needs to possess an ability to believe (or desire) otherwise when believing (desiring) wrongly. But I argue that their characterization of these constraints does not do justice to one crucial factor, namely, the presence of an unreflective, sub-personally constituted, ability to spot the kind of situations in which the reflective critical abilities constitutive of responsible believing (and desiring) should be deployed.
Keywords: philosophy
belief
critical pop-out
evidential norms
recognitional capacity
responsibility
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1842/1359
Appears in Collections:Philosophy research publications

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