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dc.contributor.authorClark, Andy
dc.date.accessioned2006-06-28T17:05:18Z
dc.date.available2006-06-28T17:05:18Z
dc.date.issued2000
dc.identifier.citation"Word and Action: Reconciling Rules and Know-How in Moral Cognition" in R. Campbell and B. Hunter (eds) Moral Epistemology Naturalized: Canadian Journal Of Philosophy Supp. Volume 26 (2000) (University of Calgary Press, Alberta, Canada) p.267-290en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1842/1322
dc.description.abstractRecent work in Cognitive Science highlights the importance of exemplar-based know-how in supporting human expertise. Influenced by this model, many accounts of moral knowledge now stress exemplar-based, non-sentential know-how at the expense of the rule-and-principle based accounts favored by Kant, Mill and others. I shall argue, however, that moral thought and reason is an intrinsically complex achievement that cannot be understood by reference to either of these roles alone. Moral cognition -- like other forms of ‘advanced’ cognition -- depends on the subtle interplay and interaction between multiple factors and forces and especially (or so I argue) between the use of linguistic tools and formulations and more biologically basic forms of thought and reason.en
dc.format.extent112347 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherUniversity of Calgary Press, Alberta, Canadaen
dc.subjectphilosophyen
dc.titleWord and Action: Reconciling Rules and Know-How in Moral Cognitionen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.typeBook Chapteren


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