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POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN MID-VICTORIAN
GLASGOW, 1846-1886.

Iain George Campbell Hutchison

Doctor of Philosophy
University of Edinburgh
1974
ABSTRACT

Despite the impression of stability and placidity which is conveyed by the virtually uninterrupted Liberal monopoly of its parliamentary representation between 1846 and 1886, Glasgow presents a useful case study of the interaction of political ideas and behaviour with socio-economic movements and institutions in mid-Victorian Britain especially as it was the second largest city.

Class was not the basis of political allegiance, and indeed relations between the social classes were generally harmonious. Nevertheless, the economic foundations of the city were transformed after about 1860 with the decline of the textile industry and the rise of heavy engineering, shipbuilding and metal manufacturing sectors, and this shift created important social changes. As a rule, too, economic interests groups were not politically homogeneous, but there is evidence that religious issues provided a significant, (though not definitive), factor in shaping political allegiances.

The Glasgow Liberal party consisted of three broad strands: the Whigs, the Dissenting Radicals and the working-class Lib-Labs. Each espoused distinctive facets of Liberalism: the upper-class Whigs, the historic traditions of reform; the more middle-class Radicals, an evangelical interest in temperance, disestablishment and social regeneration based on Christian principles; the Lib-Labs, the political, social and intellectual elevation of the common man. Yet while there was no monolithic unity here, there were wide areas of shared doctrine - free trade and, above all, the commitment to
constitutional and political advance - which acted to bind them closely together. Thus, while important social changes occurred to produce alterations in the relative strength of the factions, any fissiparous tendencies could be contained within the framework of common ideals.

The Conservatives put no emphasis on such social or economic issues as social reform or tariff reform, but rather appealed to the strong ultra-Protestant sentiments prevalent in Glasgow. This was typified by the party's semi-official liaison with the Orange Order. In addition the Tories also began in this era to establish themselves as the patriotic party.

Neither party organisation was active in dealing with technical matters like registration, but each played a different role in promoting their party's prospects. As befitted a minority party, the Conservative Association strove to sustain the spirits of the converted and to propagandise others. The Liberal body in contrast served as a vehicle whereby the various factions sought to secure control over the choice of candidates or to win endorsement for their sectional credos. Hence a powerful caucus emerged, manipulating the mass Liberal movement in order to legitimise the demands of faction.

Before 1886, the solidarity of the two major parties left the sizeable Irish element unable to deploy its voting power in order to wring concessions from either. The difficulties of the Irish nationalists were further compounded by a series of obstacles encountered both within their own community and amongst non-Irish Glaswegians. Socialism, too, was powerless, for it only attracted
a handful of lower-middle-class young intellectuals, who failed to dent the massive loyalty displayed by the working-classes to Liberalism.

At the time, the Home Rule split of 1886 did not appear an irreparable breach and only in retrospect did it take on the semblance of finality. It was not the culmination of a long succession of policy divergences among Liberals leading inevitably to a rupture, nor did it create a class-based realignment of politics. The issue was argued between protagonists as a genuine disagreement over the principles of Liberalism, and only very gradually did the position adopted by the Liberal Unionists harden into one of permanent opposition to the Gladstonian Liberal party, before which there were numerous re-conversions to the latter. However, the mould in which mid-Victorian politics in Glasgow had been set was shattered.
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CHAPTER ONE

Economic Development, Social Change and Class Relations in Mid-Victorian Glasgow
It was a commonplace among local Victorian writers that "few cities in the world, during their past progress, have experienced more changes than Glasgow, particularly during the last years of its existence".\(^1\) The first half of the century was a period of exceptionally rapid population growth for Glasgow as, increasing by over 25% every decade, it rose from 77,385 in 1801 to 344,986 in 1851 - an overall growth of 345.7%. Moreover, Glasgow was fast becoming the great wren of Scotland, for while the country's population only grew by 79.9% in the period, Glasgow contained 11.4% of the nation in 1851, as against 4.8% in 1801.\(^2\)

At mid-century contemporaries were confident that this momentum would be sustained. John Strang, the city Chamberlain and an assiduous gatherer of statistics, after surveying the city's evolution up until 1850, predicted that "Glasgow still seems destined to advance in a ratio as prodigious as heretofore . . . hundreds are flocking from all quarters of the land, full of hope or of enterprise, to join the congregated crowd of eager competitors for labour or for gain".\(^3\) Forty years on, one of his successors confirmed Strang's optimism when reviewing the period from 1886 to 1891: "in every department of the City's well-being . . . evidences of conspicuous advance

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present themselves."¹ The population had surpassed the half-million mark by 1881, and at 658,077 in 1891, it was exactly double the number of inhabitants in 1851. As the population of Scotland had grown by only 39.4% between 1851 and 1891, Glasgow had by the latter date acquired an even greater concentration of the country—16.3%.²

Commensurate with this demographic rise went a progressive expansion in the wealth of the city. The rental of Glasgow, which stood at £1,084,000 in 1851, increased by over 200% by 1891 to £3,456,000, which in absolute terms placed it second only to London. The Clyde itself seemed to manifest the most impressive—because the most visible—evidence of this advance in wealth and size. In 1801, only 382 yards of quay facilities were available at Glasgow and by 1851 the docks already covered 3,591 yards. With continuing extensions such as the Stobcross and Princes Docks, completed in 1877 and 1897 respectively, the yardage had quadrupled by 1901 to 15,109.³ Contemporary writers vied with each other in attempting to portray the congested, bustling port scene conveyed by these statistics.⁴ In every department of economic or social activity, however, the evidence of progress was overwhelming and biographers

2. By 1891, London contained 14.5% of England's population.
3. J. Cunnison and J. B. S. Gilfillan, Glasgow (Glasgow, 1958), tables 59 (a), (b) and 61.
of the city delighted in producing a spectrum of figures to indicate the transformation wrought on Glasgow by the improvements of the century.¹

But the picture of an uninterrupted chronicle of upward and onward throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century, which such data tend to portray, is most misleading, for fundamental shifts in the economic pattern of the city occurred in this period which substantially altered the social structure and influenced political relations between class groupings.

1. Changes in the Economic and Occupational Structure

Glasgow's growth in the first fifty years of the century was founded upon textiles. With ideal natural resources at close hand, a labour force already experienced in the manufacture of linen and an adventurous and aggressive body of merchants, the rise of cotton was ensured, so that by the middle of the 1830's three quarters of all Scottish cotton factories were sited within a 25-mile radius of the city.² Then it rivalled Manchester as the capital of the industry, but this proved the peak for the West of Scotland's textile sector: stagnation set in over the next twenty years as Lancashire

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2. R. H. Campbell, *Scotland since 1707* (Oxford, 1965), pp. 104-11 is the most recent treatment of this phase of the industry.
established a monopoly in cheaper fabrics and simultaneously foreign competition made heavy inroads into Glasgow's overseas outlets. This setback was obscured at the time by the rapid rise of the sewed muslin branch of the industry, of which Glasgow was the centre. The euphoria this engendered in the early 1850's, when many new factories were opened up, led to overproduction and risky financial ventures which were exposed with the failure of the Western Bank in 1857. Three of the largest houses had to close and the production of muslin was instantaneously halved.¹

Some signs of recovery were seen, but they were quickly stifled by the impact of the American Civil War, which drastically curtailed supplies of raw cotton. Imports at Glasgow fell from 172,000 cwt. in 1861 to 7,000 cwt. in 1864 and the consequent closure - or at best restricted output - of factories seriously crippled the industry.² At the end of the decade it appeared to regain some buoyancy as the flow of raw materials increased, while the Franco-Prussian war distracted the main European rivals. In 1871, John Robertson opened what was claimed to be the world's largest factory at Newhall, and according to the Glasgow Herald's annual review of commerce for that year, cotton had not done so well in ten years.³ But this was only

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a temporary respite: the spinning side dwindled steadily to only 7 factories in 1881, and although weaving fared better, the expressions of optimism grew fainter as historic establishments closed down. ¹
Survival in the last quarter of the century depended upon concentrating on the fancy fabrics end of the market, where Glasgow's lower labour costs gave an edge of advantage in fine quality products, but this was a highly volatile market to cater for, and further casualties occurred. ²

The decline of Glasgow's textile industry between 1861 and 1891 was dramatic, as the number of factories fell by one-third. As Appendix II shows, employment went down in absolute terms by 32·6%, while the total labour force of the city grew by 57·3%. Within textiles, the decline was most marked in cotton: whose percentage of the whole sector fell from 51·2 in 1861 to 33·9 in 1891. Several factors lay behind the collapse of the former staple. ³ The reliance on female workers, who increased from 61·0% of all employees in the sector in 1861 to 74·3% in 1891, compelled the industry to concentrate on the hazardous fancy goods because women could not, unlike the male

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1. In 1874 Monteith's Barrowfield site was closed down, except for its printing side; in 1875 Graham's Lancefield premises were sold as a building site.

2. "The bulk of the plain calico-weaving trade is gone, and it is only in the finer goods, known as 'fancies', that Glasgow has been able to hold her own as yet." M. H. Irwin, "Women's Industries in Scotland", Procs.Phil.Soc.Glas., 27 (1895-6), p. 73. Also, British Association, Notices of some of the Principal Manufactures of the West of Scotland (Glasgow, 1876), pp. 192-5; A. MacLean, Local Industries of Glasgow and the West of Scotland (Glasgow, 1901), pp. 135-46.

operatives of Lancashire, work on sufficient looms to produce plain goods. When Lancashire began in the 1890's to manufacture coarser imitations, the death of the Scottish quality product was nigh.¹

In addition, there was the all too evident loss of entrepreneurial drive among the mill-owners. Many were relieved to use pretexts such as a fire to close down their businesses, and several followed the example of the Houldsworths by moving into new areas of activity.²

The machinery in textile factories was condemned in 1901 as "archaic", while the appointment of managers removed the element of direct supervision and involvement typical of earlier generations. In some cases the owners, having made a substantial fortune, were no longer interested in maintaining their concerns at maximum efficiency; for others the lure of newly expanding industries was too powerful, whereas in Lancashire no such alternatives were available, and so the industry there was always abreast of modern techniques.³ What might have been achieved by modern and progressive business methods was shown by the success of the Glasgow Cotton Spinning Co.⁴

Two ancillary branches of textiles also displayed resiliency and open-mindedness. Calico printing and turkey red dyeing became

¹ Irwin, "Women's Industries", pp. 73-7 stresses this point.
specialities of the area, even attracting the custom of Lancashire
merchants, because the proprietors were alert to technical develop-
ments. In carpet weaving exploitation of the economics of mass
production and standardised design put firms like James Templeton in
the forefront of the industry. But these pockets of prosperity
were isolated, and could not compensate for the dismal decay of the
parent industry, which threatened to leave several parts of the city
in straitened circumstances as their traditional source of employment
was removed.

It was Glasgow's great good fortune that in the very decade when
the foundations of the textile sector began to disintegrate, a new
and even more dynamic generator of prosperity - the heavy engineering
and metal manufacturing industries - received a decisive forward
impetus. By 1870 the economic basis of the city had been materially
transformed, a conversion intimated by the perpetual noise and din
emanating from countless workshops. This physical reminder impressed
visitors and locals alike: the thud of hammers on anvil disturbed
the daily dawn devotions of the Rev. Norman MacLeod in his manse
some two miles from the shipyards. It was indeed the shipyards

1. British Association, Notices, pp. 190-1: "The dyeing and print-
ing of Turkey-Red is now, so far as regards Great Britain, almost peculiar to the West of Scotland."

J. H. Young, A Century of the Carpet Family of Templeton (Glasgow, 1939).

reprinted in G. Herald, 18 Nov. 1876. Also Muir, Glasgow in 1901, pp. 5, 8-9, 20, 24 for references to the "incessant clang".
which formed the most eloquent testimony to Glasgow's altered condition. The industry had been growing steadily in the 1850's, and a careful witness stated in 1852 that 6,210 men were employed in the Glasgow yards alone, with about 2,000 more engaged in direct subsidiary work. His prediction that it "is destined to become one of the great sources of employment and wages in the West of Scotland" came to rapid fruition. 1

In 1852, 78 ships were launched on the Clyde with a gross tonnage of 52,900, but in 1863 the total was 170 ships, grossing 123,700 tons, and thereafter output rose sharply, despite occasional lean years. The peak was attained in 1881-3, during which three years some 900 ships, of over 1,000,000 tons in all, were built. The Clyde's mastery of the U.K. industry was then firmly proclaimed: the river's share of national output seldom fell below 40% over the twenty years after 1870. Moreover, its proportion of the most advanced sections, firstly iron and then steel construction, was still larger, so that one expert in the early 1880's stated that three-quarters of all British steel ships were Clyde-built. Its leadership in these metals meant that its share of the bigger ships was also high: in 1884, of the 138 vessels exceeding 4,000 tons which had then been constructed in the world, 79 had their provenance there, for "the Clyde is supreme in this quantitative aspect of

steamship production", while the other British centres could together muster only 40 in this league.¹

With over twenty yards, Glasgow was at the centre of the Clyde shipbuilding industry, whose supremacy was due to several factors.² There was firstly close proximity to ample supplies of the main raw materials from Lanarkshire and Ayrshire, as one contemporary observed, "these great elements, iron and coal, being the active agents in this rapid rise ..."³ The last forty years of the nineteenth century marked the high point for production of these basic commodities in the Scottish Lowlands, and by the 1900's leadership, notably in steel, had shifted to the North-East of England.⁴ Again, the role of the river as a shipping centre was a major contribution. By 1840 the river had been deepened to fifteen feet as far as Glasgow, so that the city could become a major port, and subsequent improvements maintained and extended its capacity to take ships. As already noted, the berthing and quay facilities at Glasgow were handsomely increased during the century. As a result, the volume and value of trade handled at the port increased commensurately: TABLE 1.1.

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2. C. R. Fay, Round and About Industrial Britain 1830-60 (Toronto, 1952), pp. 129-70 is a lucid analysis.


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<td>6750.4</td>
<td>9244.5</td>
<td>9995.7</td>
<td>13929.5</td>
<td>19983.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clyde Navigation Trust Revenue (£000's)</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>688.8</td>
<td>1057.7</td>
<td>1641.9</td>
<td>2480.6</td>
<td>3545.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonnage of Ship Arrivals, Glasgow (000's)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1446.6</td>
<td>1504.2</td>
<td>2049.7</td>
<td>3057.5</td>
<td>3375.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Tonnage of Goods shipped on the Clyde (000's)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1367</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>3053</td>
<td>4477</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Marwick, *The River Clyde*, App. I & II.

More pertinently, Glasgow shipowners were also making headway after 1850: TABLE 1.2. While the rise in their share of the total U.K. tonnage was impressive enough, growing from 4.2% in 1850 to 16.0% in 1890, in the most advanced form of shipping, steamboats, Glasgow's proportion was much higher still: moving from 9.8% in 1860 to 21.3% in 1890. Most of the initial impetus for the shipbuilding industry came from local shipowners, such as David MacBrayne, who co-operated with J. and G. Thompson, and their appreciation of the potential offered by the use of iron served as an incentive to experimentation by shipbuilders. Even when the Clyde had established its international reputation, the bedrock of its prosperity remained in meeting the demand requirements of city shipping lines.

Thirdly, the zeal and foresight of Glasgow merchants was matched by the inventive and entrepreneurial flair of the shipbuilders themselves. An unceasing flow of technical innovations were developed on the river, the most notable perhaps being Elder's pioneering of the compound engine between 1853 and 1867. His engine permitted fuel savings of 50% and so demonstrated the superiority of steam over sail in long-distance shipping, and thus justified the local commitment first to iron, and then to steel, in the face of opposition from conventional experts. A survey made in 1865 concluded: "to the Clyde shipbuilders may be referred some of our most important

TABLE 1.2  Glasgow Shipping 1810-1891

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Glasgow - Registered Ships: Number</th>
<th>Glasgow - Registered Ships: Tonnage</th>
<th>Great Britain Tonnage ('000)</th>
<th>Glasgow as share of British Tonnage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1810</td>
<td>1830</td>
<td>1851</td>
<td>1861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,856</td>
<td>39,342</td>
<td>145,684</td>
<td>218,682</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

constructions, and there is probably no part of the United Kingdom where greater energy and enterprise in this branch of industry is displayed.\textsuperscript{1} This entrepreneurial acumen, taken with skilled craftmanship and economical production techniques, goes far to explain the Clyde's mastery.

In addition, there were short-term factors which dictated the 1860's as the decade of breakthrough. The Clyde's share in the construction of blockade-runners for the Southern States is well-known, but the conversion of existing steamships to this purpose necessitated their replacement, and in the 12 months from April 1862, some 30 Clyde-built vessels were so removed from service. There was also a natural growth in mercantile shipping demand, as the Cobden Treaty of 1860 stimulated trade with France. Glasgow merchants, cut off by the Civil War from the United States markets, entered the Far Eastern and African sphere, and the longer voyages called for larger ships than the transatlantic run. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 fortified the Clyde's position, for it destroyed the remaining advantages enjoyed by the clippers over her speciality, steamboats.\textsuperscript{2}

Although shipbuilding lay at the core, there were other sizeable ancillary components of the new industrial structure of the city.

\textsuperscript{1} W. Fairbairn, Treaties on Iron Shipbuilding (London, 1865), quoted in Fay, Industrial Britain, pp. 154-5.

\textsuperscript{2} Pollock, Modern Shipbuilding, pp. 187-9. H. Dunlop, The Cotton Trade: Its Importance, Difficulties and Future (Glasgow, 1862) shows the interest in new markets shown by city traders at this time.
An obvious connection with shipbuilding was the extensive number of auxiliary engineering and metal products, which, by their high degree of specialisation, assisted in maintaining the efficient craftsmanship so crucial to the Clyde's pre-eminence. Heavy iron castings and forgings were undertaken at some six centres like Lancefield and Beardmore's of Parkhead, with their enormous steam hammers, the only ones capable of building the shafts of the 'Great Eastern'. Other establishments concentrated on boiler-making, or on rivetting machines, or on machine tools and perfected their operations in each branch, while about fifty brassfoundries and coppersmithing concerns also worked in conjunction with the shipyards, as too did manufacturers of cranes and hoisting apparatus, other Glasgow specialities.¹

Numerous as these departments of general engineering were, they were by no means exhaustive. From the pre-shipbuilding era there were still legacies: several firms made textile machinery for power-loom and printing manufacturers; the old West India trade connection gave Glasgow an interest in sugar-making machinery which by the 1870's had developed into something approaching a world monopoly in their manufacture. In addition, there was extensive production of colliery, blow-pumping, agricultural and woodworking machinery carried on in Glasgow. Locomotive engineering was yet another Glasgow virtuosity.

¹ This paragraph and the next one are mainly based on: Bremner, Industries of Scotland, pp. 53-7; British Association, Notices, pp. 65-141 - an especially useful survey; Thompson, "Workshops of Glasgow", pp. 138-53; MacLean, Local Industries, pp. 93-117. Also, Byres, Scottish Economy, I, pp. 331-59.
Dubs', whose works were "the most important of its kind in the country",\(^1\) and Neilson's had both moved beyond supplying Scottish railway companies and were world-famous. Light iron castings were equally prominent in the range of metal and engineering activities for which the city was renowned. "Nearly everything that can be done in iron is done, from such undertakings as forging a shaft for the 'Great Eastern' . . . down to casting the pot in which Tom, Dick and Harry have potatoes boiled for dinner."\(^2\) A large concern like Walter MacFarlane's Saracen Foundry at Possilpark turned out the whole gamut of domestic and ornamental iron appliances.\(^3\) Because the light castings used in this sector were similar to American sewing-machine castings, Singer's settled in the city in the 1860's with the result that Glasgow promptly became the centre of European production.

The new sector of economic activity soon dominated Glasgow, for, as the employment figures in Appendix II show, by 1891 it contained nearly one-third of the manufacturing labour force. But the diversity of specialisations developed under this heading made it less monolithic than the statistics imply: in 1891 there were almost 500 factories engaged in these products, including 127 foundries and 129 machinery makers.\(^4\) In addition the city had a full repertory of other trades

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2. R. Gillespie, Glasgow and the Clyde (Glasgow, 1876), p. 27.
and the 1,877 factory premises detailed in the 1891 survey were spread across something over 300 different types of industry. This was a greater spectrum than even London could boast, and indeed it was boldly claimed that "no other city in the United Kingdom presents such a variety of manufacturing interests".

Important though manufacturing was in promoting the growth of Glasgow, two other factors in its economic life were also of great consequence: its vitality as a mercantile-commercial centre, and the ever-increasing needs and services demanded by the urban agglomerate itself. A handbook of the period warned against facile subscription to the myth that Glasgow relied solely on industry for its greatness, since in reality there existed "a congeries of magnificent commercial enterprises, each carried out on a scale of magnitude quite unparalleled in the annals of modern industry".

Overseas trading had of course long been a Glasgow speciality, but it reached new heights in this era. The ingenuity and skill displayed by city merchants was both prodigious and irrepressible. Sometimes, as with the Finlay and Graham concerns, what had begun as a commercial adjunct of textile manufacturing became more important than the parent interest, and the former became proprietors of tea estates in India, while the latter developed a lucrative wine trade


2. Irwin, "Women's Industries", pp. 71-2. [4.1], p. 307

with Spain. Again, even the enforced sale of their assets after the collapse of the City of Glasgow Bank, T. D. Finlay and Co. resumed its business links with Burma.\(^1\)

The search for profits took Glasgow merchants into all parts of the world, and some, notably the East India merchant houses, concentrated on specific regions, whereas others preferred, like one agent, to "control a splendid connection throughout China, Burmah, India, South Africa, South America and the West Indies, in each of which territories able correspondents are employed".\(^2\) Besides such well-developed contacts with the old colonies and the informal Empire, much interest was also evinced in the commercial prospects opened up by the "New Imperialism", and Glasgow was strongly represented in the Imperial British East Africa Charter Company floated by a local shipowner, Sir William MacKinnon.\(^3\) Indeed the shipping and trading sectors were intertwined, with much mutual encouragement. As one instance, Mathew Arthur, a textile wholesaler, joined with other city businessmen to set up the Clan Line, managed by William Cayzer, in order to carry their goods more cheaply throughout the world.\(^4\) The growth of Glasgow's tertiary employment sector owed much to its mercantile enterprise, particularly the clerical and service occupations, which showed a sustained increase over the period.

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As in its general economic pattern, "if you compare Glasgow with other large ports, perhaps its most distinguishing feature is the comprehensive nature of its trading".¹ Much of the traffic was the export of finished goods, along with coal and iron, while imports consisted of raw materials. Glasgow thus became the main distribution centre for Scotland, and the wholesale trade was another profitable form of commerce, reaching its peak in the years between 1850 and 1890. Until the latter date manufacturers did not use brand names, and so were wholly dependent on bulk orders from wholesalers to keep their machines operating. As well as controlling that end of the market, wholesalers could dictate prices and policies to the retail outlets, most of whom had been financed at the outset by the middlemen. After the 1880's this too changed as the retailer secured independence through advertising, so that public demand, not the supplier, determined selling lines.²

In addition the existence of the mass market formed by the city itself stimulated both wholesale and retail department stores, and city traders were in the van of every new selling technique, so keen was competition. Early in the century J. and W. Campbell had been the first shop to abandon higgling in favour of fixed prices, and the multiple store concept was fully developed with some vast warehouses, such as Campbell's, employing over 1,000 of a staff. A wide range

¹. Muir, Glasgow in 1901, pp. 112-4.
of goods were sold directly to the public, and the principle adopted was that of low profits on a quick turnover of cash only sales.\footnote{1} When Thomas Lipton pioneered outrageous advertising stunts in the late 1870's this was taken as further evidence of the liveliness of the Glasgow business community, and he soon had many imitators.\footnote{2} The remarkable size of the retailing and distributive labour force (Appendix II) shows how important the supply of goods in the urban situation had become to the overall economic life of the city.

Another industry which catered exclusively to the internal demands of the city was the building sector. The continuous population expansion, the spread of the business zones at the centre, the massive slum clearances and redevelopment schemes all combined to maintain the building workers in the position of the second or third largest employment category over the second half of the century. Despite fluctuations in building activity, the importance of this sector thus remained considerable.\footnote{3}

Some industries flourished by using the twin opportunities offered by a mass consumer market to hand, and access to raw materials thanks to an excellent transportation network. The food industry was a beneficiary in this respect. Flour-milling was extensively

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{1}{P. Mathias, \textit{Retailing Revolution} (London, 1967), pp. 41-72, 96-124 for the Scottish \textit{grocery} multiples.}
\item \footnote{2}{Sir Thomas Lipton, \textit{Leaves from the Lipton Logs} (London, n.d.) and A. Wilson, \textit{Walter Wilson, Merchant} (Glasgow, 1920), cover the two best examples.}
\item \footnote{3}{A. K. Cairncross, "Fluctuations in the Glasgow Building Industry, 1856-1914", in \textit{Home and Foreign Investment 1870-1914} (London, 1953), pp. 12-36.}
\end{itemize}
carried on at Partick, where the transatlantic wheat cargoes were landed, and hence Glasgow bakeries were very large undertakings, frequently with branches all over Britain at a time when this was normally still a highly localised trade. Such links were clearly seen when Thomas Dunlop, a grain merchant, joined with James Neil, a biscuit manufacturer, in 1868 to form a shipping line to import grain and flour from North America. Confectioneries and preserves were also produced on a large scale because Glasgow was an important depot for sugar imports. Since the port of Glasgow could carry heavy bulk freight, it became the head of the Scottish pottery industry and as a by-product glass was also manufactured. In the 1820's there were three factories making earthenware and glass, by mid-century there were twenty and in 1891 over thirty.

2. The Social Structure of the Electorate

Although the analysis of the occupational and industrial composition given in Appendix II does show the decisive swing in the economic system of the city between 1861 and 1891, it does not necessarily reflect the true political weight within it, even in sheer polling power, still less does it portray the size of the relative classes in Glasgow. Appendix III attempts to remedy this.


It is important at this point to describe and identify the social classes who did hold the vote, especially as the effect of the Second Reform Act was to shift the weight of voting strength markedly towards the working classes – and more so, proportionately, towards the lower working-class. The political pattern of the succeeding years was largely determined by the class and social relations which would facilitate or militate against the perpetuation of middle-class domination, and which would also shape the response of the middle classes to the demands of directing and inspiring the new electoral forces.

Because of the lack of relevant data, it is impossible to hope to quantify or even to adduce precision in discussing the nuances of class and status in such a large and complex socio-economic entity as mid-Victorian Glasgow, but some suggestive outline of the main headlands of social classification may be gleaned from the impressionistic reportage of contemporaries, together with some scraps of evidence about group behaviour and conduct. Thus several aspects of the city's upper class are apparent, although it would be reckless to try to estimate the numbers embraced by this description. Firstly, it was a purely local elite, facing no interference from such outside forces as the neighbouring aristocracy. Until the 1820's several peers – Montrose and Argyll especially – had kept town houses in Glasgow and sought to influence politics, but by mid-century these had all been abandoned, and their power evaporated. Thus, hardly any of the titular offices in local societies were filled by the nobility, unless they had an acknowledged interest in the cause, and instead
local notables were appointed.¹ In this respect Glasgow was different from Edinburgh and Liverpool, where meddling from peers could occur.

The second feature of the urban elite was succinctly defined by a local writer: "Glasgow cannot lay claim to a hereditary aristocracy. She has, however, what is infinitely better for the purpose of commercial, political and social progress - an aristocracy of energy, talent and moral worth. There are very few of her merchants and manufacturers who are not architects of their own fortune. The pioneers of her industrial prosperity do not build their aspirations and hopes upon a few broad acres, or a pedigree stretching backwards to the time of William the Conqueror."² The relative openness of admission to the top echelons was an important emollient against the potential social tensions created by the changes in industry. The Virginia merchants who had constituted an exclusive burgher aristocracy had been swept away by an earlier shift in economic fortunes, and by 1835 the social mobility at the top was a matter of self-congratulation, as "the absurd distinction of rank in a manufacturing town has disappeared".³ So the mid-Victorian upper class of Glasgow were almost entirely first or second generation, and could not well resist the infiltration into their number of later recruits who had risen by the same methods. Drive and enterprise were rewarded by social acceptance,

1. Hence the appointment of Shaftesbury as Hon. President of the Glasgow and West of Scotland Working Men's Sabbath Protection Society.


and this no doubt encouraged the powerful dynamic qualities shown by the business world, as detected by a German visitor in "the spectacle of tireless industry, unceasing energy and unremitting progress by means of persistent labour towards higher achievements".¹

Concrete measurement of the composition of this elite is not straightforward, but some indications may be derived from TABLE 1.3, showing the occupational background of the Lord Provosts of the city, since the office was the highest badge of status which could be bestowed by fellow-Glaswegians. By dividing the seventy year span at 1871, when the ascendancy of the new industries was initiated, the relative openness of - and the shifting weight within this class is seen. Moreover, the essential unity of the upper-middle classes reflected in this table, for there was no cleavage between merchants and manufacturers, as sometimes happened in other places.²

Both the higher liberal and financial professions are also included in this social group, and both grew rapidly in the century. The latter had risen in prominence to meet the extended and more sophisticated needs of the city's trade and business community. The local Stock Exchange was formed in 1844; as the joint stock principle spread, accountants became more indispensable; banking and insurance facilities expanded as commerce grew in scope.³ The

¹. G. Herald, 18 Nov. 1876.
³. Records of the Glasgow Stock Exchange 1844-98 (Glasgow, 1898); J. MacClelland, The Origin and Present Organisation of Chartered Accountants in Scotland (Glasgow, 1869).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>1833-71</th>
<th>1871-1901</th>
<th>1833-1901</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Textile Manufacturers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron &amp; Coal Masters</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Manufacture</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, Industrial</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shipowner</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publisher</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale Merchant - Textile</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; - Stationery</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; - Food</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, Commercial</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance, Stock Broker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, Professional</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1850's marked a new phase for Glasgow lawyers, for reforms in the local Sheriff Court procedure attracted more business away from the Court of Session, and the number of practising writers had doubled by 1850. There was no conflict between the lawyers and the businessmen, for the former were wholly dependent on the latter for custom, whilst in Edinburgh, where the Court of Session and Parliament House existed as national institutions, the independence of the legal profession permitted it to assert political and social claims which the mercantile interest bitterly opposed. This enmity formed the basis of much of the capital's political disputes in the nineteenth century, but was not present in Glasgow.

The homogeneity of Glasgow's elite was promoted by virtue of its members often holding, as secondary business pursuits, directorates of banks, railways, and insurance companies with local connections. These boards drew together men with different interests and skills, and gave them a common perspective on many matters. This solidarity and group-consciousness were defined most explicitly in the style of living enjoyed by these men, the main feature of which was the opulent display of the wealth brought by "the gulf stream of commercial prosperity". Unity was strengthened by the close proximity in which


2. Thus, of the Lord Provosts in Table 1.3, 5 had bank, 9 had railway, 3 had shipping and 3 had insurance directorates.

they lived, for there were only two upper-class residential areas: the elegant terraces of the West End, or the villadom of Pollockshields on the south of the river. Only a very few could afford houses or small estates in the country.

Their domestic environment was on the most lavish scale, both in decoration and furniture, and this stimulated the mushrooming of fine art dealers, interior decorators and quality furniture makers which contemporaries noted. Refinement and good taste were the obsessions of the merchant princes in their attempts to rub off the rougher edges left by their dizzy rise in the social scale. Patronage of the arts was enthusiastically taken up, particularly painting which, as some cruelly pointed out, could always fill the blank walls of a palatial drawing-room; extended world holidays; the pursuit of expensive recreations like yachting - these were all aspects of the desire to acquire gentility. Sheriff Alison complained that few of the Glasgow Bailies who dined with MacAulay in 1854 on his installation as Rector of the University "could read Greek, or had even heard of the Athenian orators", and a noticeable trend of the period was to send children to public schools, so that by the end of the century it was a matter of comment if one of the elite still possessed a Scottish accent.¹

Yet the class, notwithstanding its distinctiveness from other Glaswegians, was still essentially urban, for privatisation of the haute bourgeoisie had not yet begun. The merchant princes continued to attend to their businesses in the city centre, and the Exchange remained the focal point of intercourse, business or social, in daytime, while in the evenings they patronised the clubs, which now reached the heights of their popularity.¹ Every social, charitable or public association had a sprinkling of this class at the head, and reports of meetings always began with a list of the notables forming the platform party. Thus in this period they still held sway and set the tone within Glasgow, but after 1900 this changed swiftly. The motor car gave mobility and many moved out to dormitory towns. Again amalgamations such as the creation of the Calico Printers Association and the United Alkali Co., as well as the tendency to appoint managers and to form limited companies all reduced the personal participation of the elite in the city, so far as economic matters went. By the Edwardian age, no Bairds, Tennants or Campbells were actively engaged in the enterprises which bore their names, and all had moved far from Glasgow.

Next to the upper middle class came the lesser middle class, which contained four separate elements. Smaller businessmen, often little more than self-promoted journeymen employing a few hands, were

¹ Muir, Glasgow in 1901, pp. 173-6.
part of this category, but their size and development are uncertain. Retailers and shopkeepers were a second constituent of this grouping. The largest non-manufacturing occupational sector, it grew as the urban process created increasing subdivisions and complexities. The lower professions also formed part of this class, and the main sources of their growth lay in the numbers engaged in teaching (doubtless a product of the 1872 Education Act) and in the arts. The fastest growing portion, however, were the clerical workers, for whom commercial clerks accounted for the greatest increase: 2,685 in 1861, 12,981 in 1891. In income and life-style all these lower-middle class groups were at a broadly similar level. Mostly they stayed in the smarter tenements or the less ostentatious terraces, their houses quietly but comfortably furnished. They were seldom prominent in public affairs, but they formed the backbone of many organisations at the more humdrum levels. In general, most contemporaries held that this class sedulously aped those above them in social mores and values, although an exception to this observation was in questions of local taxation or municipal extravagance, when shopkeepers might revolt against grandiose schemes because the rating

1. This comprised all those not in the high liberal professions and the more important business professions - e.g. schoolteachers, artistic and literary specialists, land agents, surveyors and the like.

2. In 1861 there were 537 teachers, in 1891, 2,720. Musicians and music teachers grew from 207 in 1861 to 918 thirty years after.

system bore especially hard on them.¹

"Beneath the shopkeeping class we touch the working-man",² and Glasgow was most emphatically a working-class city. Within the working-class as an entity, however, Glasgow had the distinction of possessing a large artisan or skilled stratum. Many of the most highly skilled were employed in engineering and metal manufacturing, where they formed the preponderance of the labour force.³ That was the biggest category of employment in the city, and the next biggest male manual group was building, which also provided a substantial number of craftsmen - masons, joiners, bricklayers and the like. In lesser industries, craft workers were to be found in numbers, and printing, baking, furniture-making and pottery all had their quota to swell the artisan ranks. Moreover, the size of the upper working-class was accentuated by the absence of a large semi-skilled male labour force in the textile industries. Women formed the bulk of Glasgow's textile workers, and men were found either in the most skilled stages of production, such as power-loom tenting, or labouring in the factories. Unlike Lancashire, the semi-skilled occupations were not filled by men.⁴ Again, while mechanisation brought a

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¹ This happened over the City Improvement Scheme: see below pp.115-6

² Gillespie, Glasgow and the Clyde, p. 17; Muir, Glasgow in 1901, pp. 188-98.

³ Dubs, the loco-builders, had only 517 unskilled men among 3,000 employees, and at Fairfield's shipyard, 400 out of 6,000 workers were unskilled. R.C. on Labour, P.P. 1892,XXXVI (Part III), Return of Trades Unions, Employers, Etc., Group A, Nos. 161, 284.

⁴ Irwin, "Women's Industries", pp. 72-3.
deterioration in the standing of shoemakers in England from the 1870's, in Scotland the slower pace of technological change preserved their craft position for a further generation.¹

The artisan element were, on the whole, prospering in these years. Between 1860 and 1900 wages rose by up to 40% for most skilled workers - far outstripping price rises.² Hours of work fell and living standards improved markedly as the rise of a unique Glasgow phenomenon, the multiple grocery stores, showed. Lipton's, Templeton's, Massey's, Cochrane's and Galbraith's, established in the 1870's and 80's, all catered for the essentially working-class market by offering nutritionally superior foods, notably fresh groceries.³ Throughout the period the artisans remained the largest socio-economic group to use the Savings Bank - a further indicator of their affluence.⁴ Although progress was always relative in Glasgow, the health and housing standards of this class also improved steadily. The skilled working class brackets were probably the main beneficiaries of the rebuilding and clearance work undertaken by the City Improvement Trust and by the railway companies, for they could afford the rents charged for "the newly erected industrial tenements in the city, (which) may

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2. A. Bowley, "Notes on Glasgow Wages in the Nineteenth Century", Report of the British Association 1901, p. 754, shows that wages index for the decade 1860-70 (1890-1900 = 100) for Building workers was 70; for Engineering, 72; Compositing, 75.
be called New Glasgow, built under the Police Act of 1866. ¹ A survey by the city M.O.H. disclosed that in the decade 1870-80 the death-rate for this "New Glasgow" fell to a greater degree than for the most prosperous part of the city. ²

Two attributes typified the 'superior' portion of the working-class in the eyes of contemporaries - their independence and respectability. ³ Sobriety, honesty and thrift were their watchwords, and with them went earnestness and a desire for self-improvement expressed in support for such causes as temperance, education and savings banks. ⁴ These attitudes made them receptive to middle-class values, and not simply at the superficial level mocked by observers: "the orderly working man, his wife and his bairns, or his sweetheart, is fond of parading on Sunday dressed in his best; and a very respectable looking personage he has become since he has got over the hallucination that a 'claw-hammer coat', as he terms it, is an indispensible article of out-of-door apparel on 'high-days and holidays'." ⁵

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1. J. B. Russell, The Vital Statistics of the City of Glasgow (Glasgow, 1886), pp. 74-5. The stress is in the original.
2. Ibid., Table II on p. 76; cf. R.C. on Working-Class Housing (Scotland), P.P. 1884-5, XXXI, q.q. 19570-2.
5. Gillespie, Glasgow and the Clyde, p. 21.
Nevertheless, a strong sense of independence could be asserted if the occasion demanded it. All assaults by middle class ideologists on trades unions were sternly resisted by members, most of whom were of artisan status, since, A. J. Hunter of the Bakers' union explained to a middle class audience, these bodies alone counteracted the natural advantages possessed by the employer and thus it was only these institutions which allowed the men to trust the masters.  

Attempts to make inroads into the traditional liberties of ordinary Glaswegians were equally vehemently opposed. The Corporation made several efforts to infringe on the open area of Glasgow Green, for long the recreational and leisure preserve of the working class, but they were defeated by displays of mass hostility to such encroachments as the siting of a fever house or the widening of a boundary street. 

By the turn of the century, however, contemporaries claimed to discern the passing of the sturdy artisan of the Victorian era, as working men turned from debating societies, geological rambling clubs and self-education to football and music-halls, sure signs of "effeminacy". It seemed that the "superior" working class was...

1. T.N.A.P.S.S. (1860), pp. 875-6, also the speeches by Caw, Fraser and Allan at pp. 876-8. Also, ibid., p. 762, where the objects of Trades societies are defined as "the protection and elevation of such societies and the amelioration of the working classes in general".

2. See the "Accounts of the Committee opposed to the widening of Greenhead Street" in the Moir Papers. Moir, an ex-Chartist Councillor, led some working-men on to the grass of the newly opened West End Park in 1856, contrary to Corporation regulations, and so secured the right to walk at will in the park grounds.

3. Recollections of William Hammond, a Glasgow Handloom Weaver (Glasgow, n.d.), pp. 106, 99-100, 88-9. Also Muir, Glasgow in 1901, pp. 199, 182-3, says of the "older type": "he is the pink of respectability . . . He is the backbone of the working classes."
drawing away from the lower middle class and coming nearer to the rest of their own class. Little evidence is available about the lower working classes. The semi-skilled included machinists, factory operatives, workers in declining or low-paid occupations like weaving and tailoring, superior transport workers as well as non-manual workers, including the police and administrative functionaries. The unskilled section embraced general labourers, to be found in a variety of industries, casual workers and also porters, dock and general transport workers whose numbers expanded with the increasing volume of trade passing through Glasgow.

The overall standard of living for these two groups, if it did rise, certainly did not advance as markedly as the artisans. Although their wage rates rose in the same ratio as for skilled workers, the absolute difference widened, and in any case the non-craft workers suffered more from unemployment. Their housing problems were not greatly ameliorated. J. B. Russell found that two-thirds of those displaced by the Improvement Trust's operations in the worst sanitary areas were unskilled labourers, but the need for casual workers to be close to their place of work meant that most moved into other one-roomed houses nearby, the rents of which rose by 20%, due to the pressure of demand upon a reduced supply. Politically these two


2. R.C. on Working Class Housing (Scotland), P.P. 1884-5, XXXI, q.q. 19410-3, 19590-2; cf. J. B. Russell, Public Health Administration in Glasgow (Glasgow, 1905), pp. 122-6 for displacements. For rents, ibid., pp. 96-101, 113-21.
strata of the working class were heavily under-represented, although after 1868 they composed a sizeable share of the electorate.

3. Class Relations in mid-Victorian Glasgow

Much recent research has suggested that certain salient aspects of the economic and industrial pattern of a city could affect its social attitudes and political development. Briggs summarises these factors as: "first, the range of occupations in the city; second the size of industrial undertakings; third, the character of local industrial relations; fourth, the extent of social mobility; and fifth, the vulnerability of the community to economic fluctuations." Manchester and Birmingham form a fruitful juxtaposition to illustrate these themes. In the former, a cotton factory might employ up to three thousand hands of similar skills and earnings levels, and no operative could aspire to rise into the millowning class with the result that relations between the classes were tense and highly charged. Such polarisation was absent in Birmingham, where small workshops of about twenty men was the norm. There were numerous gradations and specialisations within the artisan class, and this together with small-scale units of organisation made advancement from journeyman to employer status not uncommon. In the political context,

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Birmingham was noted for its class co-operation, while in Manchester class conflict was an important element.\(^1\)

Glasgow, however, came somewhere between these two extremes. In part this was because it was not dominated by a single industry which could stamp its peculiar features on the whole life of the city. The diffuseness and versatility of Glasgow's economic and occupational range must be reiterated: "Glasgow unites within itself a portion of the cotton-spinning and weaving manufactures of Manchester, the printed calicoes of Lancashire, the stuffs of Norwich, and shawls and moulton lines of France, the silk-throwing of Macclesfield, the flax-spinning of Ireland, the carpets of Kidderminster, the iron and engineering works of Wolverhampton and Birmingham, the pottery and glass-making of Staffordshire and Newcastle, the shipbuilding of London, the coal trade of London and the Wear - with all the handicrafts connected with, or dependent on, the full development of these. Glasgow also has its distilleries, breweries, chemical works, tanning works, dye works, bleachfields and paper manufactories, besides a vast number of staple and fancy handloom fabrics, which may be strictly said to belong to that locality."\(^2\)

While Glasgow thus had an extensive span of occupations which blurred the stark lines of class often created by single-industry

\(^1\) Ibid., pp. 184-7.

centres, there were still several instances of large units of production, the second of Briggs' criteria. The shipbuilding yards and the major engineering works had a workforce as large as any Lancashire cotton mill. Fairfields at times had 5,000 men on the wage-roll, the locomotive builders upwards of 2,000, foundries around 1,500.¹ But working-class solidarity in these vast workplaces was diluted in two ways. Firstly, a very high degree of craft-consciousness was prevalent: there were over a dozen different skills employed in iron shipbuilding, and accordingly demarcation disputes were rife.² Much of the men's energies went into preserving their craft rights against rivals and into resisting dilution by apprentices or half-trained workmen, rather than into forging a united front against their employers.³ Thus the bitter six-month strike of the Clyde shipworkers in 1877 was as much about pay differentials as it was about wage cuts, and the employers were able to play on these craft jealousies in forcing through their demands at wage negotiations.⁴

Secondly, and linked to the foregoing, these workers were not herded together, as in textile works, sharing identical conditions

¹ Bremner, Industries of Scotland, gives factory sizes.
² Ibid., pp. 70-5 for the range of crafts; de Rousier, Labour Question, pp. 266-90, Strang, Progress . . . of Steamboat Building, pp. 12-13 also bring this out.
³ Cf. R.C. on Labour, P.P. 1893, XXXII, q.q. 21435-7, 23453-8, 23558-9, 21217-19, 22016-20; P.P. 1893-4, XXXII, q.q. 22407 for evidence on this.
⁴ Pollock, Modern Shipbuilding, pp. 189-91; P.P. 1893-4, XXXII, q.q. 21414-7.
and performing identical processes, all of which tend to promote class unity. Instead, in shipbuilding and engineering there were separate departments and workshops, where different stages of the production process were undertaken, and this fragmented unity.¹ The key workers in shipbuilding yards were organised into units of four to six men - the "black squad". The squad, composed of rivetters, caulkers and holders-on, worked as a team with little reference to the remainder of their workmates, and indeed were not united amongst themselves, because of wide ranges in pay and craft status.² Fragmentation and specialisation in every production stage were typical of the whole engineering sector, and were widely regarded as the cause of the city's pre-eminence in the field.³

Labour relations in Glasgow, as reflected in the answers given by both sides to the investigations of the Royal Commission on Labour, seem to have been, on the whole, relatively amicable.⁴ As we have seen, even the most obvious exception in the period, the shipyard strike of 1877, was not simply a confrontation between capital and

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3. The Hydepark Loco Works, for instance, is described as a huge, confusing complex where 1400 men produce and assemble 5416 different parts for every engine. See Thompson, "Workshops of Glasgow", pp. 148-53.

4. P.P. 1892, XXXVI (Parts III-VI), "Return of Trades Unions, Employees etc. as to wages and conditions of work."
labour generated by mutual class hostility. In part, harmonious relations prevailed because trade unionism in Glasgow was not particularly strong. Again, the general buoyancy of the city's economy promoted conciliation as the demands of both parties could be accommodated by growing prosperity. But more significantly, there was a strongly-held ideological belief among workmen's organisations that strikes and industrial conflict worked to the detriment of master and man alike. Two years after the shipbuilding strike, the Trades Council avowed that its purpose was emphatically not to "unnecessarily hamper or unduly interfere with the interests of capital"; and it endorsed acquiescence in the heavy wage cuts enforced in 1878-9: "however, it is gratifying to know that in the large majority of cases the workmen have accepted these reductions with good grace." It went on to hope that "the greatness of our country . . . will be increased and strengthened by both employer and employed recognising the mutuality of interests and the just claims of capital and labour." Thus community, not class, was the principle consideration of the unions, and when the leader of the Ironmoulders could boast in the mid 1890's that relations with the employers' confederation were excellent, it is evident that the fundamental transformation in class-consciousness which created the Clyde Workers' Committee had still to occur.

While there were always some cases in Glasgow of rapid upward social mobility - the fourth factor - these were not particularly frequent, and for most working-men, especially in the metal and machinery trades, the prospects of becoming a master were slender, given the immense size of these concerns, so that the highest advancement to be hoped for was to be made foreman. In this respect, Glasgow conformed to the Manchester typology, which, as in the case of Oldham, meant exacerbated class conflict. However, in the period Glasgow did not follow this pattern. One reason may be that while vertical mobility was heavily restricted, lateral mobility was not. There is abundant evidence that men switched from one firm to another and from one branch of their trade to another with ease. In 1883, the union secretary reported that brassfounders were moving out of shipbuilding yards into the manufacture of gas-fittings for house builders, and in 1884 many were going in the loco engineering sheds. Although the skilled metal workers were well-placed to shift their jobs, some of the building trades also had the opportunity. Joiners, and, to a lesser extent, painters, glaziers and plumbers, worked in the ship construction sector as an equally lucrative alternative to the building side.

Such job mobility may have compensated for the lack of status improvement, and so may have helped to avert the pressures and tensions caused elsewhere by low social mobility. It is instructive that the one available autobiography of a Glasgow working craftsman of the time makes it clear that he moved in 1860 from Thomsons' yard to Napier's of his own volition and with no difficulty, with the object simply to change his working environment rather than to increase his earnings.\(^1\) This may explain one unusual feature of Glasgow's residential pattern, for the working-classes preferred to live in the centre and commute out to their workplaces.\(^2\) Living in the centre made job mobility easier in terms of geographical accessibility than a suburb. This train extended down to the lowest and least skilled workers, as a shipping manager complained: "many of our dock labourers go to the shipbuilding yards, and in the wintertime, when some of the work falls off a little, and the men who are less regularly employed are apt to be left out, a number go and get employment in the foundries and do not come to the quays at all."\(^3\)

These outlets were not available to the unskilled workers of London, who accordingly became regarded as a potential threat to order and society.\(^4\)

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3. R.C. on Labour, P.P. 1892, XXXVI (Part II), q. 1279.
It has been argued that the final consideration, the vulnerability of the city's industry to cyclical fluctuations, could be a shaping force in politics. In Birmingham, master and man were equally affected by a recession, and so co-operated to find a solution. In Manchester, the entire burden was shouldered by the operatives, and mass unemployment drove them either to seek radical remedies or to become demoralised.\(^1\) Glasgow was saved by its broad base, as the President of the Chamber of Commerce acknowledged in 1883: "Glasgow is particularly fortunate in having a greater number of trades than any other commercial centre in the country . . . so that when a period of dull trade comes it is seldom they are all depressed at the same time."\(^2\)

The practice of flitting between jobs has just been discussed, and its relevance to this point is apparent. It served to mitigate the dangers inherent in Glasgow's over-dependence on export staples, the sector of the economy most prone to cyclical movements in world trade. The brassfounders, the joiners and the dock labourers all benefited in this respect.

But the spread of manufacturing types could only cushion the impact of a recession, and could not give total protection in the worst crises, of which there were four between 1850 and 1890. The responses to these incidents reveal much about class relations in the period. In each case there were special features which made them

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appear to employers, employed and unemployed alike as isolated events caused by individual acts rather than as inevitably occurring due to the operation of the trade cycle. The cotton famine of 1862-4 could be summarily dismissed as attributable to political rather than economic factors. In 1857-8 relief was given to 10,051 heads of families after the failure of the Western Bank ruined many large firms. Blame for the slump was placed on the bank legislation introduced by Peel in 1844-5 by both the Chamber of Commerce and the city's first M.P. to be elected with working-class support, George Anderson. The serious depression of 1878-9, after the failure of the City of Glasgow Bank, put, a pilot survey estimated, 20% of the working class out of work. Responsibility was pinned by the Trades Council on "reckless and dishonest speculators", viz. the Bank Directors, whose prosecution and conviction demonstrated to everyone's satisfaction that they alone bore the guilt. Both labour and capital agreed that the slump of 1883-5 was caused mainly by foreign tariffs, although the first signs of new divergent interpretations appeared. The men also pointed to overproduction stimulated by new

1. W. O. Henderson, "The Cotton Famine in Scotland", pp. 154-64. R. Harrison's attempt to show that the famine and the U.S. Civil War sharpened class cleavage in Glasgow is marred by his weak and misleading handling of the local context: Before the Socialists (London, 1966), pp. 50-2, 56, 61-3.


mechanised techniques being introduced by businessmen anxious to boost their profits regardless of the consequences for the labour force. The masters preferred to see the Factory Acts as the real culprit, as they were overprotective of labour and injurious to Britain's competitive position. The recovery in 1886, however, bridged the incipient gap.

There is, then, little evidence that fluctuations in the level of economic activity adversely affected class relations in Glasgow. There were occasional expressions of fears of violence and disturbances by the unemployed, but these were generally unfounded. In 1886, when unemployed workers rioted in London, Leicester and even Birmingham, Glasgow remained absolutely quiet, although John Burns addressed a demonstration organised by the Social Democratic Federation on the same lines as elsewhere. In part strict police precautions calmed the atmosphere, but the consensus of co-operation and shared effort was in the ascendant. The tone of mutual benefit was well caught in the Trades Council's review of 1882, a year conspicuous for industrial peace. "This is certainly a matter for hearty congratulation, showing as it does a year of hearty progress in all that tends to the material well-being of our members and the advancement in every way of all classes of the community."


2. Alison, My Life and Writings, II, pp. 191-212 for the 1857 alarm.


4. Suburban Growth and Residential Segregation

As politically divisive as the relations obtaining between master and man in the work situation was the process of residential segregation and the consequent deterioration in social and community ties between classes. The physical manifestation of this distancing was the rise of the suburbs, a phenomenon common to all the larger British cities after 1870.\(^1\) Glasgow, with its continuing rapid population growth and its new industrial basis, was no exception to this trend. As Map A shows, even as late as 1840, the perimeter of

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the built-up area remained remarkably close to the outline of the medieval burgh. Beyond lay scattered private mansions, and semi-rural villages like Springburn and Parkhead were quite distinct entities.

After mid-century, however, Glasgow spread out in all directions with increasing momentum. In 1846 the municipality was enlarged from 2,373 to 5,063 acres by the incorporation of the burghs of Anderston, Calton and Gorbals, and the provision of a unitary administrative framework contributed to the development of the intervening territories. Within twenty years this annexed area had been fully built up and the city's population density had nearly returned to the high level of 1841. ¹ The years after 1861 witnessed Glasgow's suburban boom, and one expert estimated the outlying areas grew by 100% in each of the next two decades. ² By 1888, 187,122 people were said to be resident in the peripheral outskirts. ³ These places had no economic or social life independent of Glasgow, as one Kelvinside inhabitant stressed: "we are all city men, living by the city, having our businesses in the city, and our interests are

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1. Density: 1841, 108 persons per acre; 1851, 65—1861, 78; 1871, 94. Thereafter it remained around 94 until the incorporation of 1891.

2. J. Pagan, Glasgow Past and Present (2nd ed., Glasgow, 1884), p. lxv, Note I. These notes were written by John Carrick, City Engineer. This book and J. F. S. Gordon, Glasghu Facies (Glasgow, n.d.) are useful surveys by contemporaries of this phase in the city's growth.

entirely in the city."¹ As, moreover, 23 of the 48 City Councillors resided in the suburbs by 1888, a further boundary extension was inevitable. In 1891 the acreage of Glasgow was doubled to 11,861 by the absorption of most of the outlying towns, so adding some 100,000 to the city's population.²

Along with the evolution of Glasgow to its recognisably modern size by 1890, the social geography of the city became clearly delineated. Kelvinside and Hillhead - the "West End" - formed the main upper middle class quarter, as did the Pollockshields-Langside district on the South Side. Dennistoun, Garnethill and Mount Florida met the requirements of the lower middle classes. The status gradations within the working classes were maintained in a range of neighbourhoods which moved from 'respectable artisan' sectors like Govanhill and St. George's Cross, by way of 'rough' areas such as Cowcaddens, where "the inhabitants belong chiefly to the unskilled working class", and finally descended to the notorious slums of the Wynds.³

The old compact city had been dispersed and its social heterogeneity dissolved. Two instances seemed particularly symbolic to contemporaries of the changed urban pattern of Glasgow. Since its foundation the University had been sited near the Cathedral in the

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¹ Boundary Commission, Vol. II, Evidence, P.P. 1888, XLVII, q. 5499; cf. q.q. 5559-65 (Hillhead), 5677-82 (Pollockshields), 7095-8 (Plantation), 14757 (Govanhill).

² The only exceptions were Govan and Partick, which remained independent until 1912.

³ Russell, Vital Statistics of Glasgow, pp. 13-46, 73-6. This provides a convenient analysis of the city in 24 socio-medical districts, but does not include the communities incorporated in 1891.
High Street, which by 1850 had degenerated into the worst slum area of Glasgow. The University authorities, alarmed at the physical and moral dangers thrust upon staff and students as they made their way to the dilapidated inadequate College buildings, were delighted to sell the property to the Union Railway Company in 1864. The proceeds went to building the new edifice on Gilmorehill, close by Hillhead, and there were many who regretted that the move to a select residential area would emphasise the exclusive social nature of the University's intake. Thus William Smart argued: "Since the University left its historical seat in the High Street and took its abode in the extreme West, there has been a kind of divorce between it and a large section of the citizens . . . As a consequence there is considerable bitterness and hostility towards the University." 

Secondly, the changes in the character of once fashionable areas after their original inhabitants had fled to the suburbs was another reminder of growing social exclusiveness. The decline of the Bridgegate was the most striking case to those who could remember it in the era of the first Reform Act, when the city's elite - Campbell of Blythswood, Sir John Bell, Provost Aird - had their town mansions

3. W. Smart, Toynbee Hall (Glasgow, 1886), p. 20.
there. The influx as these eminent citizens evacuated was of the
most wretched kind. "These people go into cast-off houses just as
they wear cast-off clothes", commented J. B. Russell, the city's
M.O.H. in his survey of the city's sanitary districts undertaken in
1881. The Bridgegate came bottom of his list: "we find a population
the like of which for social and moral degradation is not to be found
in the city." This transformation was epitomised in the Lord
Provost at the time of Russell's survey, John Ure, who had been born
in Bridgegate Street in its heyday but who now lived in the West End.

Fears lest this separation might have deleterious results was
first raised by the Rev. Norman MacLeod in 1863. At a public address
"On East and West", the minister of the Barony (which covered the
east-central part of Glasgow) pointed to "the gulf which was every
day becoming wider between class and class." Concern at this
estrangement was heard increasingly in the next two decades, and the
difficulties met in filling the Provostship in 1883 were ascribed to
the general loss of interest in municipal life by the wealthy business
class now smugly ensconced in the suburbs.

Another analysis made at this time was equally stark: "Those
whom people here used to own as their natural leaders were kent folk

1. Lord Provosts of Glasgow, pp. 374-6; A. Aird, Glimpses of Old
Glasgow (Glasgow, 1894), pp. 54-5; Gordon, Glasghu Facies, I,
p. 465.

2. Russell, Vital Statistics, pp. 45-6; cf. Alison, My Life and
Writings, I, p. 526.


4. Pagan, Glasgow Past and Present, I, pp. lvii-lx. In 1886, the
Provost-elect, James King, was a councillor of only three months
standing.
who found in Glasgow, kirk and market, the centre of their interests in business and out of business. Every year the notables in our city grow more strangers in the place that they live by; spend fewer hours in its smoke and din; outside their own little circle are more and more unknown... The class that used to have the power, those who stand first socially and commercially, are drifting away from their fellow-citizens, and power is ebbing away from them, for the people will not follow leaders whom they do not see and know... Everywhere the joints on which the body politic used to work, supple and strong, are being dislocated. ¹

Any assessment of the truth of such assertions ultimately rests on two factors: the motive behind the movement to the suburbs, and the actual degree of physical segregation which occurred. Firstly, it would make a difference whether this was a voluntary process. "Pull" elements clearly operated in middle class suburbanisation, for the amenity attractions were considerable. After the serious cholera outbreak of 1848, the desire to find more spacious living areas was strong, so that both the West End and South Side suburbs bordered on large corporation parks, which, besides being lungs for the city, guaranteed that no overbuilding would happen. ² Pull also contributed to the outward spread of working class areas, but the crucial stimulus was more often purely economic - the desire to be

1. Old Country Houses of the Old Glasgow Gentry, pp. xv-xvi, cf. xi-xiii. Smart, Toynbee Hall, p. 23 agrees, although representing the other end of the political spectrum.

close to work. Thus Tradeston and Kinning Park housed the workers of the numerous engineering shops sited on the south bank of the Clyde; Govanhill was the location of Dubs' huge locomotive factory; Possilpark was built by Walter MacFarlane to accommodate his foundry-workers; Bridgeton expanded to the east as more engineering factories rose up until it linked up with Parkhead, itself grown enormously to meet the need of the two thousand employees at Beardmore's forge. Nevertheless, while the middle classes may have opted to leave the city for health reasons, the working classes were reluctant to follow suit. As already mentioned, many preferred to live in the city centre and travel to work, for instance to the Govan and Partick shipyards or to Singer's factory at Dalmuir. When J. and G. Thomson (later John Brown's) moved to semi-rural Clydebank, they were forced to run a daily steamer service from the Broomielaw for their workmen.

"Push" influences, however, also contributed to the exodus. The first westward shift by the better-off was to Blythswood Holm in the 1830's, but this area soon became a coveted tract of land as the central business district advanced steadily in the next decade away from the Tron and Tontine (the twin haunts of the early nineteenth

1. Boundary Commission, Evidence, P.P. 1888, XLVII, q.q. 7211-23 (Tradeston); 14748-60 (Govanhill); Gordon, Glasghu Facies, IV, pp. 1138-40 (Possilpark). For Bridgeton and Parkhead, D. Hobbs, Robin Hood, the Bridgeton Pastor (Edinburgh, 1894), p. 62; Aird, Glimpses, pp. 24-5; Pagan, Glasgow Past and Present, I, p. lxii, Note E.

2. R.C. on Working Class Housing (Scotland), P.P. 1884-5, XXI, q.q. 19443-8.
The historical context of urban development in 19th century mercantile class) to the Exchange in Buchanan Street. From there professional firms led the march further west, and by 1875 private dwellings had been ousted from all below Blythswood Square.\(^1\) Unable to compete with the inflated property values, the only alternative for the middle class was to move again.\(^2\)

For the working classes the main outward propellants were the actions of the railway companies and the Improvement Trust. Between them these agencies were responsible for clearing away the worst fever-spots in the city, for widening streets and rebuilding whole areas, but in the process many mainly working class houses were demolished in the inner city zone and not replaced.\(^3\) The results on residential patterns, though indirect, were evident, as Russell explained in 1888: "I made special investigations with the view of seeing what actually became of the people who were turned out of their houses by these operations, and we found that a very small fraction of the actual people disturbed by the operations of the Trust found their way outside our borders - from 1 to 2 per cent, the total effect of the central displacement was to push out a still larger proportion of the people who were living near the borders."\(^4\)

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2. Thus, when Sir James Campbell left his town house at 129 Bath Street, he sold it to the Glasgow School Board for £7,200.


Thus the movement was involuntary and gradual, which shows the great difficulty in determining to what extent suburbanisation was motivated by a desire for homogeneous class districts.

The location of these districts, in the case of Glasgow, qualifies the claim that they both reflected and encouraged social alienation. Among the major British cities, the suburbs of Glasgow were unique in being so close to the heart of the city that Kelvinside, Hillhead and Pollockshields were all under three miles, or half a hour's travelling time, distance from the centre. There was, then, little severance of ties with Glasgow in these districts. While it was customary for businessmen to remove their families to holiday resorts for the duration of the summer, and themselves commute on weekdays, the railway companies were quite unsuccessful in developing these as dormitory towns until after 1900.¹

The remarkable physical compactness which the proximity of the suburbs gave Glasgow² also prevented the complete breakdown of social ties because of the close juxtaposition of residential zones serving different classes. Often only a street or two separated a wealthy from a working class district. So, Kelvinside quickly sheered off into the mixed industrial area of Maryhill; and Hillhead soon ran into the shipyard workers in Partick; Kinning Park and Tradeston


₂. Compare Kellett, Impact of Railways, pp. 354-5: "Indeed Glasgow never developed symptoms of the suburban sprawl so typical of many other cities until well into the twentieth century, and remains an extraordinarily compact and densely populated city."
verged on Pollokshields. In none of these cases was there any gradual transition: the different social areas directly abutted with no intermediate residential zones to moderate the jump. This could be advantageous, as when the wealthy Park area residents discovered that the nearby Anderston-Finnieston complex of shipbuilders' tenements provided a supply of female domestic servants. This propinquity made it difficult for the affluent to insulate themselves from their fellow Glaswegians, particularly as their own suburbs failed to develop separate institutions, so that they still used the central facilities for most of their activities. Despite the distinctive characteristics which most of these communities evolved - shown by different accents, sporting or social interests - there were factors which helped maintain a general commitment to the city. The fact that until 1885 the parliamentary representation of Glasgow was on a city-wide basis, with no separate area constituencies, may have played a part in keeping this spirit alive in the sphere of politics.

1. For some of these, Muir, Glasgow in 1901, pp. 159-63, 248-51. Also Cunnison and Gilfillan, Glasgow (3rd S.A.), pp. 772-7.
CHAPTER TWO

Relationships between Party Politics and Leading Ideas and Institutions of mid-Victorian Glasgow
Within the context of the economic pattern and the social relations existing in the city, it is important to identify the main issues and quasi-political factors which shaped politics in Glasgow. A major stimulus to political involvement at all times has been the desire to protect and promote interest group demands, and it forms a helpful prelude to a full discussion of political developments not simply to determine what the key interests of the period were, but also to establish their relative influence in the creation of party alignments.

1. Religion and Politics

As it was the paramount preoccupation of most Victorians, religion was a prime factor in politics. The journal of one major Scottish sect explained in considering "Theological Aspects of the General Election" (of 1865), that there were compelling practical and theoretical questions at stake: "A doubt has been expressed respecting the propriety of interrogating a candidate for parliamentary honours on his theological views. Many will think that a man's qualifications to be a member of Parliament must very much depend at all times on his religious character as an index of his principles, but as long as the union between Church and State is maintained, there will always be before the House of Commons so large a proportion of ecclesiastical business, that it will be impossible to discharge aright the duty of a senator without more theological knowledge than is possessed even by the majority of well-educated men."¹ In discussing the ways

whereby religion impinged on politics, three areas will be explored: the relative sizes of the churches; the evidence for asserting that religious affiliation affected party choice; and the political implications of ecclesiastical questions.

(a) The Strength of Sects

It is tempting to assert that the real difficulty in establishing the strength of the various churches is that there is too much evidence, for apart from the official census conducted in 1851, there were at least 7 comprehensive estimates of the religious beliefs of Glasgow made between 1868-92. These are reproduced in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. Yet for a variety of reasons it is impossible to regard this run of statistics as providing an accurate, continuous record for the half century. Firstly, the drawbacks to utilising the 1851 returns for Scotland are even more extensive than for England. Although in the latter the census was to be compulsory, it was decided that in Scotland it would be voluntary, with the result, in Mann's words, that "the enumerators were less careful after this announcement to deliver forms, and parties were less willing to supply the information". Moreover, the absence of local registration officials prevented the subsequent inquiries which in England eliminated errors and repaired deficiencies in the original figures.  

### TABLE 2.1 Membership of the Three Main Protestant Churches in Glasgow

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<tr>
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<th>(ii) Free Church</th>
<th>(iii) United Presbyterian</th>
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<td>Average</td>
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<td>1891</td>
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<td>43,124</td>
<td>731</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources for TABLES 2.1 and 2.2

1851 Census of Great Britain 1851. Religious Worship and Education Scotland, P.P. 1854, LXIX, Table C, Glasgow, morning attendance.
1868 J. Johnstone, Religious Destitution in Glasgow (Glasgow 1870), p. 21.
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1876 N.B.D.M., Religious Census, 8, 15, 22, 29 Mar.; 5 Apr. 1876.
1882 Ibid., 18 Jan. 1882. Estimates only.
1879 R. Howie, The Churches & Churchless in Scotland (Glasgow, 1893).
1886 The Distribution and Statistics of the Scottish Churches (Edinburgh, 1886).
1891 Howie, Churches and Churchless.
TABLE 2.2  Attendance at the Three Main Protestant Churches in Glasgow

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>(i) Church of Scotland</th>
<th>(ii) Free Church</th>
<th>(iii) United Presbyterian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Churches</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13,953</td>
<td>558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>24,800</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>28,458</td>
<td>477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>35,600</td>
<td>424</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: see under TABLE 2.1.
enumeration of the Free and United Presbyterian Churches, but only two-thirds of the Established Churches submitted data.

The other statistics were equally open to criticism, particularly as some dealt with membership, while others listed attendance on a given day. The former method was held to favour the State Church, whose membership standards were less exacting, and where the two criteria can be directly compared (1870; 1876), there is indeed a discrepancy of about one-third to that church's advantage, whereas both sets of figures for the other two main churches virtually coincide. Again, others tried to base their calculations on baptism and marriage rates, a method extremely benevolent to the Church of Scotland. But attempts to establish actual attendance as the truer guide foundered on the dual criticisms that the census takers were denominationally biased, and the means of conducting their counts was never clearly spelled out. Many of the census were taken either to prove or disprove the case for disestablishment (e.g. 1876; 1882), and the Established Church felt particularly injured on this point, for it was alleged that the Dissenters carefully drummed up the congregation for the census Sabbath. Other tabulations aimed to show the extent of irreligion in the city, and so might well understate the figures of attendances in order to shock (1868, 1870).

A final and insuperable difficulty remains, viz. the statistics relate to different areas, and so comparisons over time cannot be effected. Howie (1892) considered only the registration districts of Glasgow; the Mail (1876; 1882) took an undefined Glasgow and suburban region; others tried to work from parishes, but these did
not coincide for all denominations. In the light of this, therefore, Tables 2.1 and 2.2 present respectively membership and attendance at various points in time, the only attempt to offer a comparative yardstick being the average per church.

Flimsy though these figures may be for detailed analysis, taken as a whole they do provide some clues to the two major issues relevant here: the relative support enjoyed by the sects, and the trends in their distribution of strength. All the enumerators agree in putting the three main Presbyterian Churches at almost equal size, with the Established Church slightly out in front, and the other two running neck and neck behind. This near-parity was not typical of the position for Scotland as a whole, but it was close to that of large urban areas, as Table 2.3 shows. But even here, the very large support in Glasgow for the Voluntaries is apparent (almost one-quarter of the membership and one-third of the funds of the entire U.P. Church originated in the city), as is the weakness of the Free Church, which, proportionately, fared worse than the Established Church. Thus in respect of the two Dissenting churches, Glasgow stands apart not just from Edinburgh and Dundee, but even from Greenock, which of all Scottish towns it most closely resembled in economic and ethnic composition.

But the relative support given to the churches was not static, and long term changes in this area could evoke political repercussions. There was a widespread consensus among contemporaries that over this period the Church of Scotland was making the most headway (or at any rate losing the least ground) while the progress of the other two
TABLE 2.3 Relative Strength of the Three Main Protestant Churches in Four Scottish Cities, 1886

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Church of Scotland</th>
<th>Free Church</th>
<th>U.P. Church</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>Numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLASGOW</td>
<td>459,000</td>
<td>56,069</td>
<td>41,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDINBURGH</td>
<td>239,000</td>
<td>31,807</td>
<td>15,831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUNDEE</td>
<td>123,000</td>
<td>14,174</td>
<td>8,971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREENOCK</td>
<td>39,368</td>
<td>8,971</td>
<td>5,796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCOTLAND</td>
<td>3,756,000</td>
<td>540,061</td>
<td>329,541</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Numbers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Church of Scotland</th>
<th>Free Church</th>
<th>U.P. Church</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>% of City Total</td>
<td>Proportion between 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLASGOW</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDINBURGH</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUNDEE</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREENOCK</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) % of City Total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Church of Scotland</th>
<th>Free Church</th>
<th>U.P. Church</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>% of National Level</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLASGOW</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDINBURGH</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUNDEE</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREENOCK</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on The Distribution and Statistics of the Scottish Churches (Edinburgh, 1886). All church figures relate to membership, not attendance.
became increasingly slower and more hesitant. The Mail's 1882 census showed that the national church could boast an increase of 25% in worshippers over the previous count taken in 1876, while the Free Church could only muster a gain of 10%, and the Voluntaries one of 12½%. The recovery of the Church of Scotland from its depleted position after the Disruption seems to have occurred in the mid-1860's, but the other churches reached their peaks slightly earlier. This would be one conclusion to be drawn from the evidence of church building achievements in the city, as presented in Table 2.4. The Free Church's performance in this field is illusory, for reasons suggested below, and only stemmed from its compulsion to emulate fully the Church of Scotland in parochial activity. This is confirmed by its declining average of followers per church (Tables 2.1 and 2.2). The causes of these differing growth records are both part of nationwide developments and of specifically Glasgow factors, but the main elements seem to be questions of finance and organization on the one hand, and the response to new currents in theology on the other.

After 1843, the Established Church had adopted a highly conservative stance on theological matters, but as its old moderate leadership died out in the next two decades, a new liberal approach emerged in the middle 1860's, known as Broad Churchism, in deference to its similarities to that party in the Anglican Church. Critical and rational, rather than dogmatic in their approach to religion, the

### Table 2.4: Church-building in Glasgow 1850-90

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Church of Scotland</th>
<th>Free Church</th>
<th>U.P. Church</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Existing in 1850</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net additions 1851-60</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861-70</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871-80</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881-90</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing in 1890</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
new men assigned conscience as high a place as logic in their analytical tools, attempting to introduce philosophical and scientific concepts into the defence of Christianity. The Scriptures could no longer be blindly obeyed, and this, as the biographer of the leading Broad Churchman says, "left them free to accept the guidance of the spirit in every age as fresh knowledge and experience created new conditions in the spiritual life of men". In consequence, even the Westminster Confession could be called into question as being framed by seventeenth century men for seventeenth century conditions which were no longer necessarily applicable in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Although proponents of the new theology were to be found scattered all over Scotland, notably Tulloch in St Andrews and Lee and Wallace in Edinburgh, a strong group of liberal clergymen flourished in the Glasgow district. One reason was the presence at the Barony Church of Norman MacLeod, who although of an older generation, upheld similarly advanced ideas and propagated them with great flair. His periodical Good Words circulated widely despite Evangelical attacks on its secular contents, for "He could see no good reason for leaving the wholesome power, the discussion of questions in physical and social science, together with all the humour and fun of life to serials which excluded Christianity from

their pages." He rejected the more repressive aspects of Presbyterianism, most notably in the controversy aroused by his opposition to the sabbatarian decrees put out by Glasgow Presbytery, which he denounced as cant and hypocrisy. As well as his campaign against "the narrow, exclusive, hard hyper-Calvinist schools (which) repel me and made me nervously unhappy", MacLeod displayed great concern for the poor and the working classes. He reminded the Church of its social responsibilities, and his mission churches to industrial areas were staffed by like-minded clerical and lay enthusiasts. 1 While the Presbytery of Glasgow remained somewhat conservative in outlook, MacLeod's presence encouraged men like John Caird and R. H. Story in their endeavours to liberalise the theology and practice of the Church. 2 There can be little doubt that their progressive doctrines helped retain the allegiance of many middle-class Christians who were at once alienated by the rigidities of orthodox Calvinism and also disturbed by scientific challenges to their faith.

Just at the time when Broad Church ideas were gaining in currency, the financial position of the Established Church received a great fillip with the creation in 1874 of the Baird Trust, an endowment of £500,000 given by James Baird of Auchmedden to the Church for the purpose of building churches and staffing them.

2. Warr, Caird, pp. 161, 172, 234-9; Principal Story, pp. 42-9; Oliphant, Tulloch, pp. 217-20 for MacLeod's impact on the rising generation.
Baird's highly conservative theological beliefs rendered the operations of the Trust suspect at first in the eyes of the Broad party who feared that only evangelicals would be put in the pulpits of Trust-financed churches, but eventually they were forced to admit that no discrimination occurred in practice.¹ The consequence of the availability of the Trust's resources in extending the Church's influence may be measured by the increase of 50% in the number of city churches during the first decade of its existence. In addition, the benefits of the Patronage Act of 1874 made a decisive impact in that it liberalised one aspect of ecclesiastical government which had placed the Church of Scotland at a disadvantage with the Dissenters. By abolishing the patron's right of presentation, and transferring that power to all male communicants in the congregation, the ostensible cause of the Disruption was removed; but in Glasgow at any rate the expected influx of Free Church men did not happen. Nevertheless a grave disability had been removed, and a more democratic foundation established for the Church to build on.

By contrast, the period which saw the resurgence of the State Church was less happy for the Free Church. There were financial difficulties, for these decades saw the death of many of the first generation who had come out and who had been most generous donors in

¹. Principal Story, pp. 129-31 for Broad Church fears; Warr, Caird, p. 248, says: "It was widely repeated and generally believed that James Baird, the influential coal magnate, actually founded the Baird Lectureship in 1873 to counteract the pernicious teaching of Caird, whom he held in the most profound distrust." Also, G. Herald, 1 Apr. 1875.
the early years of their Church's work in Glasgow. While there were still men in the locality ready to support the Church, the lavish munificence of the previous era was not easily rivalled. There were even hints from hostile quarters that the moves for Union were in part activated by concern at the Sustentation Fund's prospects; and certainly in 1877 it was shown that twenty-six out of seventy Free Church congregations in the city were not even self-supporting and many others could not contribute materially to the Fund. The data for 1886 reveal that while the average contribution per member in Glasgow was above the Scottish level, it was almost 50% below the Edinburgh and 35% below the Dundee levels.

In these years too, the spirit of the Free Church was being sapped. Firstly, the Union crisis absorbed much valuable energy and effort in an inconclusive but acrimonious internal wrangle which split the Glasgow Free community profoundly. The faction opposed to Union formed a powerful and vehement element prepared to launch strong attacks on the pro-Unionists in the city (directed especially against Dr Buchanan, a fervent anti-Voluntary in the first ten years crisis but now Convener of the Union Committee), and they made serious threats to break up the Free Church by legal action rather than submit

1. The Position of the Free Church of Scotland in Glasgow and Suburbs from a Commercial and Practical Point of View (Glasgow, 1877), pp. 10-11; cf. pp. 7, 8.

2. Contributions per member per annum: Scotland £1. 10. 6; Glasgow, £2. 2. 3; Edinburgh, £3. 6. 3; Dundee, £2. 17. 8; Greenock, £2. 2. 1. Based on Distribution and Statistics of the Scottish Churches (Edinburgh, 1886).
to joining the United Presbyterians. 1 The Unionists retaliated by preventing a prominent Glasgow anti-Unionist, Dr Samuel Miller, from being elected to the Moderatorship in 1872. 2 This growing rift was perpetuated in the 1870's by the Disestablishment agitation and by the support given by the "Use and Wont" Free Church party to Established Churchmen in the School Boards, so defeating other Free Church candidates. 3

The unbending theological attitude of the Free Church was clearly evinced in the Robertson Smith case, where its illiberalism contrasted with the Established Church which permitted the authors of Scotch Sermons, published at the height of the case, to go unpunished for no less heterodox opinions. Although the supporters of Robertson Smith did hold a rally in Glasgow, it was not very well attended, which was quite in keeping with the ultra-conservative image of the Church in the city. 4 Walter C. Smith, a poetry-writing and progressive clergyman, was tried for heresy at the instance of the Glasgow Presbytery, and although in Marcus Dods the Free Church possessed, according to the objective testimony of James Mavor, the

1. The Union Question. Speeches delivered by Several Members of the Free Church on May 11th 1868 (Glasgow, 1868), pp. 3-11 for an attack on Buchanan by Simon MacLennan. Free Church of Scotland Defence Association, Speeches delivered at a Meeting of Free Church Office-Bearers Held in the Evening of 3rd March 1870 (Edinburgh, 1870) for a Glasgow meeting, especially a speech by Kidston where he declared that he would not let Park Church, Helensburgh (which he financed) fall into the hands of the U.P. Church "until the whole question of property is decided in the House of Lords" (p. 48).


3. See below, pp. 379-84 for this.

4. G. Herald, 1 Nov. 1881; also the correspondence in ibid., 3 June 1881 and after.
most liberal Presbyterian divine in Glasgow, there was always the spectre of William Kidston to contend with. Kidston, the acknowledged leader of the Constitutional Use and Wont party in the city, was a skilful and ruthless ecclesiastical politician, and even when his anachronistic views were being ridiculed, there was a touch of awe: "A Covenanter of the Seventeenth century masquerading in the stove-pipe hat of the Nineteenth century and striving to import the fanaticism of Drumclog into the life of to-day."

These were some of the problems confronting the Free Church which became the focus of anxious debate in the late 1870's. In 1878 the Presbytery appointed a committee "to inquire into lapsing from Membership in connection with coming into the city from the country and flitting from one district in the city to another". Exhaustive researches showed "that the evil in question is of great magnitude", and some ministers claimed that a loss of up to one half could occur when changes of abode took place. It is revealing that the committee is here concerned not with reaching the godless masses but with lapsing amongst erstwhile adherents of the church. A major miscalculation was the decision in the 1870's to embark on a programme of church-building at a time when the needs and resources

2. Clydeside Cameos, 2nd Series, XV (1885-6); cf. Bailie, Men You Know 23 (26 Mar. 1873): "Mr Kidston is a Mahomedan. His cry is 'Accept the faith as it is in KIDSTON or out of the way'." G. Herald, 22 Feb. 1889 for obituary. A more favourable opinion is in A. Aird, Glimpses of Old Glasgow (Glasgow, 1894), pp. 424-6.
of the church did not warrant it. In 1877 it was pointed out that studies "clearly show that the Free Churches in our city and immediate surrounding districts are not well filled. On the contrary, they are on average less than half-filled", for 37 of the 70 churches, with a congregation of under 400, had an average attendance of 264, and too many of these churches were in depopulated areas to be viable. Rationalisation was necessary since "the Free Church, without endowments and with the largest proportion of the poor and working class amongst its members is administering its resources in a most improvident manner", and this could best be done by closing down 22 churches (i.e. one-quarter) which were uneconomic. The keynote of the paper and the subsequent discussion it stimulated is defensive in tone, and suggestive of a near crisis in the Church which not even the beneficient efforts of Moodie and Sankey could permanently alleviate: "Undoubtedly we had such a blessing when Mr Moodie was here lately, the results of which, however great in other directions, have not manifested themselves in filling our Churches."3

The state of the United Presbyterian Church fell somewhere between the other two churches. Like the Free Church, it suffered somewhat through the loss of exceptionally generous local supporters.
in these years. The church in the city was, however, still wealthy: Glasgow subscribed 30.5% of the national income, and per capita it gave the most of all towns, outstripping Edinburgh by 25%, and Dundee by 40%. For the Voluntaries the Union question was not at all disruptive, as almost all were ardent advocates of the project. Theologically, too, the United Presbyterians had a very quiet time of it; a head-on collision between the die-hards and the radicals over a call for the revision of the Westminster Confession was averted by the appointment of a committee composed of both wings. The resultant compromise, the Declaratory Statement of 1878, was the first Presbyterian revision of the standards to be carried through with no controversy or schism, possibly because the committee was manned by, *inter alia*, traditionalists like Harper and Cairns. The more conservative forces seem to have been Edinburgh based, while the leader of the revisionists, Fergus Ferguson and David MacRae, both held Glasgow charges, and indeed these two were the only casualties of the whole episode. Both were impeached for heresy; Ferguson was acquitted, but MacRae was expelled and joined the Evangelical Union.

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1. Contributions per member per annum: Scotland, £1. 18. -; Glasgow, £2. 12. 1; Edinburgh, £2. 1. 8; Dundee, £1. 15. 11; Greenock, £2. 9. 7. Based on Distribution and Statistics of the Scottish Churches.


Yet this placidity and avoidance of internal division may have been won at the cost of expansion, as judged by the record of church building, for these were above all years of consolidation in the United Presbyterian Church. The Glasgow U.P. Elders Association began a project in 1871 to build Extension churches among "the careless and neglected", but very soon had to fold up in the face of financial burdens.¹ The Presbytery assumed responsibility for the churches built, which numbered only 6, in contrast to the 9 churches produced by an earlier Mission Churches scheme of 1852-63. Voluntaryism could only function in the more middle class areas, such as Belhaven in the West End, opened in 1875 in "a part of the town where better class families were settling down". It cost £12,000 to construct, double the cost of the dearest Extension Church being built in the working class areas, and the stipend it could offer was £600, while the average in the Extension Churches was £250.² Thus the financial considerations imposed a limit on the natural growth of the church, which appeared to have been reached by this time, for most of the new church building outside the Extension scheme was simply to adjust to the migratory habits of the middle class congregations - e.g., Dennistoun, opened in 1869, clearly fell into this category.


². R. Small, History of the Congregations of the United Presbyterian Church from 1733 to 1900 (Edinburgh, 1904), II, pp. 105-10, 78-90, 110-1, 104.
(b) The Politics of the Churches

While it is apparent that religious issues were very much to the fore in shaping political attitudes, it is by no means clear what direct influences there were between the churches and the voters. Reviewing elections down to 1868, the editor of the *Scotsman* did not regard clerical pressure on congregations as heavy, and moreover felt it was actually receding in recent contests. In general if ministers spoke from the pulpit, he said, it was in favour of a party, but not for an individual candidate, and this was the limit of their involvement: "They do not canvass the people, but harangue a little." 1 Certainly very few of the Glasgow clergy took much direct part in politics: none sat on any political association's committee (although some appeared on election committee lists); and the leading Free Church minister, Robert Buchanan, declined to attend a meeting in support of disestablishing the Church of Ireland, explaining that "in merely political meetings I have never taken any part during all the five and thirty years of my ministry in this city". 2 It would appear that, wherever possible, political initiatives were left to the laity, so that although Rainy led the disestablishment agitation throughout the country, his biographer could write: "It should be noted that Dr Rainy never himself took to do with the adoption of Disestablishment in the party's organisation." 3 And when that

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1. Select Committee on Parliamentary and Municipal Election, P.P. 1868-9, VIII, q. 5872; also q.q. 5871-7, 5881-3, 5914-6.
2. N.B.D.M., 1 Apr. 1868.
crisis was at its height, on both sides laymen were the leading political protagonists, with only one or two eminent clerics publicly participating.

The only instances were the churches were directly used for electoral purposes were the School Board contests, as they acted as "a convenient machinery for electing members". This was an area in which hotly sectarian beliefs mingled with pride in the power of each church's vote, with the result, as the secretary to the Glasgow School Board stated, "It has become almost a proverb in Scotland that the men with the best chance to get into the School Board are those that have either a Kirk or a work; that is to say either a clergyman or an employer of labour. Church organisations are used for the purpose, even those who will work together on the board have used the Church organisation in canvassing, the members of one church working in one organism, the members of another in another . . ."¹ Increasingly in the 1880's there was created the impression of greater political activity undertaken by city clergymen, notably several who addressed the Conservative Association. But such lectures were invariably on quasi-religious topics, and indicated the affiliation of an individual (who happened to be a minister) to a particular party, rather than any undue clerical influence on parishioners.

For, as Russell stated, that type of pressure in Scotland was "nothing

¹ Select Committee on School Board Elections (Voting), P.P. 1884-5, XI, q. 3580; also q.q. 3552-4, 3640-1, 3646 (evidence of Wm. Kennedy, Clerk to the Glasgow School Board).
like Ireland or even England", because "I do not think that in Scotland they are much afraid of ministers in that way. I mean there is no parallel between the position of, say, a Scottish Free Church minister and of an Irish priest; he has not the same sort of influence at all . . . and at any rate they have not the same spiritual terrors in Scotland."¹

The clearest indicator of the religious basis of Scottish politics has often been held to be the analysis of voting in the two Scottish Universities seats in 1868. G. W. T. Omond summed up the data: "In both these elections, therefore, a large majority of the Established clergy voted against the Liberals and a large majority of the Non-conformists in their favour."² It would, however, be misleading to extrapolate from these figures and conclude that party support was so ubiquitously sectarian. Firstly, at least as far as Glasgow's share in the seat it twinned with Aberdeen is concerned, there were particular reasons why the religious cleavage was so acute in this contest. It was a common complaint among Dissenting circles that they were totally excluded from any position of significance at Glasgow University. In 1864, for instance, the Rev. Dr. Robert Buchanan lost to Lord Kinloch in the election for the Assessorship to the Court, and the defeat of the Free Church cleric was entirely attributable to the heavy poll of Established Church divines against

¹ P.P. 1868-9, VIII, q. 5871, also q.q. 5882-3.
him. This was taken as a direct blow against the non-State church elements, since "As the case at present stands, the University Court is composed exclusively of Members of the Established Church."¹ A further affront was felt when John Caird replaced Barclay as Principal in 1873, both because he was, like his predecessor, a Church of Scotland minister and also because of Caird's liberal theological views.² As late as 1877 a member of the State Church noted that "the Free Church party have long felt sore that they have had so little say in University matters", exemplified by their having only one adherent sitting on the seven-man Court.³

The 1868 election, coming in the middle of this era of bad feelings, encouraged full polarisation since the Liberal candidate was James Moncrieff, the leading Free Church lawyer, while his opponent, E. S. Gordon, was a staunch supporter of the Church of Scotland who as Disraeli's Lord Advocate was to put through the Patronage Act in 1874 which greatly benefited his church and mightily outraged the Dissenters.⁴

¹. R. Buchanan to Lord Dalhousie, - Nov. 1862, Dalhousie Muniments, SRO GD 45/14/688. G. Herald, 18 Nov. 1864, printed a full list of the polling: Kinloch got 474, Buchanan, 359 votes. Laymen voted 183 for Kinloch, 171 for Buchanan; Established clergy gave 291 votes for the former, Non-Established ministers in support of Buchanan numbered only 188. Cf. N. L. Walker, Robert Buchanan, D.D. An Ecclesiastical Biography (London, 1873), pp. 508-9 where the sectarian element is also reported.

². R. S. Candlish to W. E. Gladstone, 6 Mar. 1873, Gladstone Papers, B.M. Add. MSS. 44,438, f. 138 used these arguments to press the superiority of Buchanan over Caird for the Principalship.

³. Prof. G. G. Ramsay to W. P. Adam, 28 Nov. 1877, Gladstone Papers, B.M. Add. MSS. 44,095, f. 45.

⁴. Moncrieff to Gladstone, 2 Oct. 1868, Gladstone Papers, B.M. Add. MSS. 44,416, f. 33 gives his analysis of the election contest.
That there was substantial voting motivated by sectarian and not party political grounds is suggested by the pattern of voting at the 1869 by-election for the seat, necessitated by Moncrieff's appointment as Lord Justice-Clerk. Gordon stood again, but this time the Liberal was James Smith, a Glasgow-born mathematics don who also belonged to the Established Church. The uniqueness of the 1868 contest is brought out by comparing the clerical vote in both elections, as given in Table 2.5, where the fall in the Free Church vote for the Liberal in 1869 is striking. A singular illustration that support for the two candidates in 1868 was tightly organised along church lines arose when Edward Caird announced publicly that he would give his vote to Gordon. Although he was a Vice-President of the committee of one of the Liberal candidates for the city of Glasgow constituency, Caird felt compelled to use his University franchise in protest against dragooning by the Free Church leaders on behalf of Moncrieff.  

In the 1869 by-election, however, Caird was one of the sponsors of Smith's candidacy, which he had mooted in 1868.  

As well as the exceptional background to the University fight, it was in any case generally accepted that ecclesiastics were more committed than their congregations to one party or other because of religious issues. Two prominent Free Church laymen, both Conservatives, felt this to be true: "Sir William MacKinnon came into tea. Had some talk with him about the Disestablishment question. He agreed  

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TABLE 2.5  Clerical Voting in the Scottish Universities Seats, 1868 and 1869

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1868-Both Seats</th>
<th>Glasgow &amp; Aberdeen Seat Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cons.</td>
<td>Lib.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established</td>
<td>1221</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Church</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.P. Church</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Episcopalian</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Nonconformist)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>1368</td>
<td>1512</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Omond, Lord Advocates, p. 245, fn. 1; G. Herald, 29 Nov. 1869.
with me that Providence had not opened the door for such a change, and that the people of the Free Church could not be said as a body to be prepared to follow their ecclesiastical leaders.¹ A State Church minister likewise rebuked the Glasgow local committee to end patronage on the grounds that "the movement which has been originated is clerical rather than popular".²

There are, then, some qualifications to be made to the stark picture presented by Omond. In Glasgow the Liberals drew much support from Church of Scotland communicants, although the Conservative party's long-standing commitment to maintaining national institutions made it the obvious political harbour for many adherents of the state church principle. This natural predisposition was reinforced by the Disruption crisis, when the Tory government was hailed for having helped defeat the challenge posed by the non-Intrusionists and the Voluntaries. Two broad bands, however, stayed outside this trend to form the group often termed Liberal Churchmen. One was strong in the Whig wing of the party, and had considerable influence in Glasgow politics. Advocates of the cause of reform from the 1820's, these men did not see any reason to abandon the party, so that such men as Sir James Watson, Sir James Lumsden and Sir Charles Tennant remained loyal to both the Church of Scotland and Liberalism all through their lives. The importance of this section derived from

². Principal Story, pp. 99-100.
its social position in the mercantile aristocracy of the city and the political power it exercised, especially as Watson and Tennant were the only two regular Glasgow correspondents with Gladstone and thus could urge the claims of the Established Church upon their party leader.¹

A second, younger element of Liberal Churchmanship was the Broad Church movement. Liberals alike in theology and politics, their emergence in the 1860's was a sign of the growing confidence of the Church of Scotland in its own independence, for unlike progressive clergy of an older generation - e.g. Norman MacLeod - they felt no ties of loyalty to the Tory party. Tulloch, Story and John Caird all proclaimed their political faith, and had many followers.² Caird was particularly influential, firstly during his ministry at Park Church, Glasgow, from 1857 onwards, and increasingly so after he assumed the Principalship of the University in 1873. A brilliant preacher and teacher, Caird made a lasting impact on his audiences, and as most of the professoriate shared his advanced views, a wide circle of business and professional men were gradually influenced by his views.³ Prominent lay Liberal Churchmen in this category were David Murray, James Grahame of Auldhouse and Professor G. G. Ramsay,

1. E.g., Watson to Gladstone, 17 Aug. 1858, Gladstone Papers, B.M. Add. MSS. 44,390, f. 113; Tennant to Gladstone, 19 Dec. 1879, B.M. Add. MSS. 44,461, f. 265.

2. Oliphant, Tulloch, p. 238: "Himself during his whole life a consistent Liberal as in all things else . . .", and pp. 449-52. Principal Story, pp. 172-4, "In politics he was always a Liberal."

all of whom contributed much to the Liberal party locally, thanks to their intelligence and eloquence.

Of the small number of Episcopalians in the city - probably about 2,000 in all - most seem to have been Conservative in inclination, but again a substantial and influential portion belonged to the Liberal party. Pre-eminent among these latter were Alexander Crum, A. B. McGrigor, J. O. Mitchell and Andrew MacGeorge, and the reasons for their Liberalism were similar to those of the Church of Scotland Liberals.

The belief that the Free Church was totally Liberal is also open to reservation, although the assumption gains strength from such cases as the splits in the Campbell and Burns families. Sir James Campbell of Stracathro and his elder son, James Alexander, were perhaps the most consistent supporters of both the Established Church and the Conservative party in the Glasgow area; while Sir James's brother and business partner, William Campbell of Tullichewan, came out in 1843 and politically was a staunch Liberal, and in both respects his son James followed him. Sir George Burns, a founder of the Cunard and other shipping lines, was a Conservative and an Episcopalian, and both beliefs were inherited by his son John, later Baron Inverclyde.

1. For Sir James Campbell, Memoirs and Portraits of One Hundred Glasgow Men (Glasgow, 1886), I, pp. 69-74; J. S. Jeans, Western Worthies (Glasgow, 1872), pp. 57-62; G. Herald, G. News, 12 Sep. 1876 for his obituary. For William, One Hundred Glasgow Men, I, pp. 75-8; G. Herald, 4 Apr. 1864. Clydeside Cameos, 2nd Series, XXIV, XXXI (1885-6) for J. A. Campbell and James Campbell of Tullichewan respectively.
On the other hand, Sir George's brother and business colleague, James, was an ardent Liberal and a keen promoter of all Free Church interests, two traditions maintained by his son, James William.¹

Although many Free Churchmen were drawn to the Liberals, if only because the Tories so patently espoused the cause of the Established Church, a substantial minority did not do so, and instead were Conservative in politics. This Tory tradition had its origins with Chalmers himself, and those who retained their belief in the principles of 1843, as these related to the need for a purified, non-Erastian state-supported national church, did not waver. The Union movement, which threatened this very pillar of their Church by seeking to join with the Voluntaries, only revealed the strength of this "constitutional" party in the Free Church. Although the anti-Unionists were led in the country at large by two clergymen, Begg of Edinburgh and Kennedy of Dingwall, the Glasgow branch was notable both for its size and for the role of the laity. On the General Committee of the Free Church Defence Association, Glasgow provided 24 of the 52 lay members (45%), but only 12 of the 61 clerical members (19%).

The opponents of Union held several vast meetings in the city, and were generally more energetic in presenting their case than the Unionists, but the latter had the support of leading local ministers - especially Buchanan - while no city minister emerged on the other side

¹. E. Holder, Sir George Burns (London, 1892); for James, Rev. H. MacMillan, James Burns, Esq. of Kilmahew and Bonhill (n.p., 1872) and One Hundred Glasgow Men, I, pp. 59-68. Clydeside Cameos, 1st Series, I (1884-5) for John.
to rank in stature with Begg or Kennedy. The return of Glasgow Free Presbytery on the Union question in 1870 showed the balance of clerical and lay forces. In all, 63 voted in favour of recommending the Union terms and 40 voted against; but whereas the clergy voted 36 for, only 20 against, the laity were much more evenly divided, with 27 in favour of and 20 opposed to Union.¹

The lay leadership thrust forward in Glasgow by the Union conflict included William Kidston, William Mitchell and James MacMichael, and as well as adhering to the Establishment principle they were Conservative in politics. After the Union crisis they were even more closely identified with the Church of Scotland Conservatives when they joined together to fight the School Board elections, which were first held in 1873. What united the Free and State Church Conservatives was the principal of 'Use and Wont' in religious education, while the Liberal Churchmen, Voluntaries and pro-Union Free Churchmen all wanted, in varying degrees, greater secularisation of the school curriculum.²

The United Presbyterian Church does, however, conform much more closely to the stereotype, for its members were solidly attached to the Liberal party as it was seen as the most likely political vehicle for attaining the ultimate Voluntary goal of the complete separation

1. Union on the Basis of the Standards explained and vindicated by Rev. Dr. Buchanan and Rev. Dr. Adam (Edinburgh, 1870) gives the figures in an appendix.

2. For a fuller discussion of these arguments, below pp. 179-81 and 379-82.
of church and state. To be sure, one or two exceptions were to be found, such as Duncan Stevenson of Riddrie Park, who was a leading city Conservative, but these were remarked upon as quite atypical, and it was normally assumed by both sides until the Home Rule split that Voluntaries would be Liberal.

Of the other Protestant churches, all were too small to possess any influence as a voting block, and only occasionally produced an individual of political moment. The largest, the Congregational and Evangelical Union churches (which merged in 1894) had relatively liberal clergymen: Fergus Ferguson, Albert Goodrich, George Gladstone and William Pulsford were all active in several social and political reform currents; but their only lay figure of any prominence, W. P. Paton, died in 1867. The smaller Baptist church, although growing steadily in size, produced only Robert Kettle, of the Total Abstinence Society, and William Quarrier, the philanthropist, who were both Liberals. Methodists, of any form, were quite insignificant in Glasgow, and so were the Quakers. The latter, numbering only 100 or so, were too small ever to have had the profound impact on city affairs which they achieved in Birmingham, Bristol and Manchester. Only the

1. Bailie, Men You Know 615 (30 Jul. 1884): "Of the U.P. persuasion, he is yet a stout defender of the Auld Kirk."

2. E.g. U.P. Magazine, 13 (1869), p. 48: "where the Dissenters are united - whether in municipal or parliamentary elections - Conservatives and Churchmen are completely swamped."


5. S. Isichei, Victorian Quakers (London, 1971) is a recent survey.
Smeal brothers were much engaged in public life, and their special cause, negro slave emancipation, was virtually achieved by the 1860's, when both were old men.

Perhaps the Unitarians came nearest of all the lesser sects to equalling the disproportionate contribution made elsewhere by the Quakers. Although there were never more than 1,000 members, two successive ministers of very high calibre helped to identify the church with progressive causes. There had long been much antipathy to the 'Socinians' - for instance there was opposition to H. W. Crosskey joining the Philosophical Society of Glasgow, although he was an expert geologist - and when the Unitarian Church sent its good wishes to the Rev. P. Hately Waddell on his forming a breakaway liberal church in 1861, it confessed it did not wish to publicise its support lest this should harm the new church in the eyes of other sects.¹

The Revs. H. W. Crosskey and J. Page Hopps held the Unitarian charge from 1852 to 1867 and 1869 to 1877 respectively, and they set about improving the reputation of the church by throwing themselves into a wide spectrum of liberal causes, both religious and secular. As befitted Chamberlain's future chaplain, Crosskey championed numerous radical demands, including female suffrage, negro emancipation and Italian nationalism. He also worked steadily for the Liberal party so that as one activist recalled: "It is difficult to overestimate

the importance of Dr Crosskey's services to the Liberal cause in Glasgow.\footnote{1}

Hopps unhesitatingly adopted the same course as Crosskey, and both were especially anxious to encourage the revision of the doctrines of Scottish Presbyterianism in a progressive direction. As Hopps stated when accepting the Glasgow ministry, "I have long believed that, in Scotland, great theological changes must sooner or later take place. Intelligently broad and liberal in politics, it cannot continue perversely narrow and illiberal in theology, and as Liberal Christians we have surely our work to do in hastening, and to some extent, directing the changes that must come."\footnote{2} In this context, both men seized on the need for public non-sectarian education as the key to social and religious advancement. Crosskey worked in the Public Schools Association in the 1850's, and Hopps won a place on the first School Board on the identical platform, namely a fully secular education provided in rate-paid schools.\footnote{3}

By pledging themselves on such a range of forward-looking issues, Unitarians won greater social acceptance: "Henry Crosskey made Unitarianism respected in Glasgow . . . Indeed Crosskey raised

\begin{enumerate}
\item Armstrong, Crosskey, p. 140, quoting Professor Young; also pp. 68-71, 104-11.
\end{enumerate}
Unitarianism to its greatest heights in Glasgow.¹ When he left the city he received a fulsome testimonial from the Glasgow Sentinel on behalf of its working-class readership, asserting that "he was as familiar and trusted among the working men as he was among professional and eminent men".² The most influential lay Unitarian was George Jackson, who masterminded every working-class Liberal movement of the period. Others included William Teacher, the distiller and Liberal activist, and A. L. Knox, another Liberal politician of the 1870's and 80's.

(c) Religious Issues in Politics

While it is apparent that religious issues could influence political allegiance, the precise weighting to be given to this factor is less easy of resolution. The disestablishment question is a useful test-case, since it was a religious matter which clearly had profound political ramifications and since it was always a topic of debate in this period.³ It has, moreover, been identified as the major contributory factor in the attachment of middle-class Dissent to the Liberal party in England, dating from the sustained campaign conducted from the mid-1850's by the Liberation Society to disestablish

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1. Short, Pioneers, p. 107; Unitarian Church, Minute Book, 4 Mar. 1864, records that the Glasgow Examiner had praised the Unitarians, which would have been unthinkable thirty years before.

2. Armstrong, Crosskey, pp. 143, 139-40.

the Church of England. It was, further, this issue which drove several Scottish Liberal Churchmen out of the party: thus Story, hitherto a staunch Liberal, came out in the elections of 1880 and 1885 against the party because it had "chosen to ally itself with destructive Radicalism"; and Tulloch, appalled by the trends in the Liberal party, became "a man driven from the party to which all his early prepossessions had attached him by a course of action which he considered unworthy of statesmen and of Christians", so that by 1880 he promoted pacts with Conservatives to protect the interests of the Church. Yet in Glasgow, where the Established Church was in an extremely weak position in relation to the combined might of the Dissenters, very little occurred to parallel these developments elsewhere, and the reasons for this were in part peculiar to the city, in other respects common to national patterns.

A significant difference from the English experience was the conspicuous lack of headway made by the Liberation Society before 1875 or so, and thereafter progress was still relatively hesitant. The Voluntaries had seen the Disruption of 1843 as proof of the incompatibility of the principle of free government in the churches with the maintenance of the state connection, and quickly called on the Free Church, because they recognised that its doctrines were in


effect voluntaryism, to join in abolishing the privileged status of the crippled Established Church. The Free Church was reluctant to acknowledge the force of this argument, and when branches of the Liberation Society were formed in Scotland in 1853, only Voluntaries were involved. These initial bodies were ill-supported, and within three years, a new association was being set up in Glasgow, but this was an inauspicious moment, for in 1857 the political eclipse of Dissent in the city destroyed the practicability of the agitation — indeed in 1858-9 there was even discussion in Glasgow as to how the Established and Free Churches might be re-united. The weakness of the Liberation Society north of the border was revealed by the collapse of all its efforts throughout the 1860's to reconstruct a Scottish wing. A projected conference to discuss Scottish problems had to be abandoned; no funds could be raised to support an agent; and so efforts in this decade were concentrated on England and Ireland with the Society's secretary merely paying one visit a year to Scotland to meet sympathisers.


2. The first branch was formed in Aberdeen: Liberation Society, Minute Book 2, M. 1075, p. 540 (10 Jul. 1853), London County Record Office (hereafter L.C.R.O.), A/LIB/1. G. Chronicle, 13 Apr. 1853 for a visit to Glasgow to form a branch, ibid., 26 Nov. 1851 for an address by Baines and Miall on the principles of the Association.

3. G. Chronicle, 20 Feb. 1856, and below pp. 184-7. For the State-Free Church union: MacLeod's speech to Glasgow Presbytery, 1859, MacLeod, Norman MacLeod, II, pp. 84-7; J. Watson to Gladstone, (4, 17 Aug. 1858), Gladstone Papers, B.M. Add. MSS. 44,390, ff. 76, 113.

Yet these years were not without moves towards creating a situation where disestablishment would gain prominence. The Union negotiations begun in 1863, would produce this result, as the U.P.'s noted: "Perhaps the English voluntaries look more at the political aspect of the questions, while the Scotch voluntaries look more at its religious aspects", and they concluded: "The cause of union and the cause of liberation point in the same direction."\(^1\) Although the amalgamation was finally obstructed in 1873, certain decisive matters were clarified in the process which pointed the way forward to the next phase of the disestablishment campaign. The major stumbling-block had not been in dogmatics, but arose over the question of the state connection, and the acceptance by the Unionist Free Church party of the logic of their de facto voluntaryism was a crucial turning-point. Buchanan, made several influential and persuasive speeches to justify this spectacular volte-face: "most especially am I sure that, in speaking of Church establishments and State endowments, we assigned to them a position of importance and indispensableness which we are very far from assigning to them now", since "in his judgment the political and religious condition of England (sic) were such as to hold out no prospect whatever of any satisfactory state alliance."\(^2\) Thus the end of the union proceedings merely shifted the focus of attention back to the political arena, as the Mail argued, because

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2. Walker, Buchanan, pp. 440, 430.
the attack on the Church of Scotland's state links was a central element in the newly-formed alliance of Dissenters.¹

The transfer of activity to political means was also stimulated by the disestablishment of the Church of Ireland in 1869. This measure was welcomed by the voluntary circles in Glasgow as a spur to achieve similar legislation in Scotland, and several public meetings were held to urge this course of action.² Some of these were promoted by the Glasgow Liberation Society branch, evidently as part of the London office's strategy by which it hoped that Scottish voluntaries "could be induced to consider the best means of creating such a sentiment in Scotland as would prepare the way for an attack on the Scotch Establishment when the abolition of the Irish Establishment has taken place".³ The Glasgow branch, however, only lasted from 1866 to 1871 and their hopes were not fulfilled. There was a widespread acceptance of the case for Irish disestablishment, for even the Tory Norman MacLeod could say: "As to the Irish Establishment I am on this point out and out for Gladstone."⁴ It was contended that this step would in fact strengthen the other state churches, as it would remove the patently indefensible position of privilege of the

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¹ Thus N.B.D.M., 29 Dec. 1873: "The Disestablishment movement is to take the place of the Union movement." U.P. Magazine 18 (1874), pp. 568-9.


⁴ Macleod, Norman Macleod, II, pp. 294-5. A Free Church opponent of Scottish Disestablishment recorded: "Division of Gladstone's motion about the Disestablishment of the Irish Church one of the most striking evidences of opinion against unlimited preference to indiscriminate endowments", Diary of Sir Michael Connal, p. 135 (8 Apr. 1868).
Irish Church through which all establishments could be attacked. Moreover, advocates of the state church principle argued, the Irish measure was at root political (in that it sought to remove an injustice and thus to settle the grievances of the Irish) but it in no manner marked a triumph of voluntary principles.¹ Irish disestablishment thus failed to provide the incentive in Scotland which the Liberationists were seeking, but a renewed appreciation of the possibilities of progress through parliamentary avenues developed amongst Dissenters, who then lobbied in support of MacLaren's Church Rates Abolition Bill in 1870 and petitioned in favour of Miall's English Disestablishment Bill of 1871.²

By about 1873, then, a transitional stage had been reached, and with the collapse of the Union negotiations the U.P. Church swung into an open anti-establishment agitation. In 1872 the Synod appointed a Disestablishment Committee which was chaired by Rev. Dr. George Hutton, a skilled lobbyist who ensured that "Nothing that could be thought of was left untried so to direct the public mind and influence the Government and parliament that religious grievances, whether in connection with Church or education, should be redressed."³ The Free

Church was at this point less militant, and formed the Scottish Disestablishment Association to put forward its case. This, as Rainy tortuously explained, differed from the pure voluntaryism of the U.P.'s: "He would not take the voluntary position that establishment is in itself wrong and that therefore all claims to it — in 1843 or any other time — are necessarily indefensible ... his ground was that of a Disestablishment man on the grounds of high, general principle, not a voluntary man on the grounds of the voluntary principle." The rather lukewarm interest over the question which the Free Church displayed annoyed the more aggressive disestablishers in Glasgow.

It is ironic that the stimulus given to the weak disestablishment agitation emanated from the Church of Scotland, with the passage of the Patronage Act in 1874. That church, regarding the Union moves as a scheme to destroy the national church since only enmity of it bound the two Dissenting churches together, had from 1869 built up a determined campaign to protect its resurgence of the 1860's by removing the cause of the Disruption. By so doing, the Church could claim to have opened the way for the Free Church to rejoin the Establishment, and thus promote the approach to full Presbyterian union, but it is uncertain how genuine this motive was. For only

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1. Scottish Disestablishment Association, Statement by the Executive Committee (Edinburgh, 1874) and the four tracts in Information for the People (Edinburgh, 1874) state the Free Church position.


3. E.g., N.B.D.M., editorial, 2 June 1873.
the Constitutional wing of the Free Church would be attracted; but there was little prospect of reconciliation with the pro-unionists with whom relations were irretrievably broken. The sentiments of a leading State Church minister in Glasgow towards a Free fellow-cleric were trenchantly expressed: "Veritas has got Dr. B. (uchanan) in a trap. But like other rats in a like enviable situation he will try and get rid of it at the expense of a foot, or he will run off with it bodily into his hole. He is a fanatical dog."¹

The Patronage Act was one of the first pieces of legislation relating to Scotland carried by Disraeli's administration, and extremists in both parties used it to contend that all state churchmen stood to gain most from the Conservatives since the rejection by Gladstone of earlier petitions for such a bill was proof of the political influence enjoyed among the Liberals by Dissent.² It would, however, be a distortion to say that the passage of the act marked a political-religious alignment. Many Liberal (and some Conservative) Churchmen opposed the bill, and this must have swayed Gladstone. Whigs, often old Moderates, disliked the ultra-democratic implications of congregational rule, and they were also alarmed at tampering with property rights - as indeed were some thoughtful Tories.³ Broad

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¹ Rev. Dr Gillon to J. Watson, 3 June 1870, enclosed in Veritas, The Church of Scotland and the Free Church: their Relation to Patronage, Spiritual Independence and the Civil Courts (Glasgow, 1870), Glasgow University Library, Mu. 39-b.25.


³ Minto to Rosebery, 31 May 1874, A. Russel to Rosebery, 31 May 1874, Rosebery Papers, NLS Box 56, G. Herald, editorial, 3 June 1874.
Churchmen were aghast at the vista opened up: not only might there be the re-entry of the most reactionary Free Churchmen, but also elective control over the ministry would be vested in the hands of a backward laity. "It would be the signal", declared Tulloch, "for such an onslaught upon all the growing forces of liberal thought and reasonable freedom, as would drive all progress from the bosom of the Church, and bring in a reign of narrow vehemence and rigid doctrinalism, as had been the bane of the Church of Scotland."¹

All opponents of the bill within and without the Church were unanimous that its passage would spur the disestablishment cause as nothing else, but less expected was the response of those who were being wooed by it. The Constitutionalists rejected the overture and very few returned to the Established Church. In Glasgow, only one congregation came back, and its minister, Peter MacNaught, was rather disreputable anyway.² Some, like Begg and Kidston, felt that the Church of Scotland was too corrupt in theology and worship and did not believe that the spiritual independence of the church was yet secured.³ Others held that the Established Church should have shown greater magnanimity and admitted the correctness of the Free Church's decision in 1843: "I cannot be a party to Disestablishment, as, on the other hand, I cannot join the Establishment . . . But for the existence and prosperity of the Free Church, she would never have got

1. Oliphant, Tulloch, pp. 243-4; Principal Story, pp. 97-100 for similar.
rid of Patronage, and the State has never acknowledged the wrong she did to the party who left in 1843."¹

The failure of that aspect of the Patronage Act merely accentuated the gravity of the challenge to the Church of Scotland, for the Unionists had a clear pretext for joining with the Voluntaries in calling for full disestablishment as the only logical conclusion of the Act's premises. "The point I wish you to notice is this", said Rainy, "that nothing has done more to develop a disestablishment movement in the Free Church, as this movement on the part of the Establishment"; and he concluded: "if we are not prepared, as most of us are not, to recommend a reunion with the state on any terms, nothing remains but to recommend that the state withdraw from us all, and leave us alone, which is disestablishment."² In June 1874, the Liberation Society sent its secretary, Carvel Williams, to sound out the developing situation. He attended a conference where a pledge to raise £10,000 was made, but more significantly, "perhaps the most noticeable feature of the meeting was that, for the first time, leading Free Churchmen met on the same platform and advocated the same views as their Dissenting brethren".³ After his trip, Williams predicted that "the passing of the Church Patronage Act will lead to a general Disestablishment movement in Scotland", and accordingly the Society

1. Diary of Sir Michael Connal, p. 161 (22 May 1876).


agreed to appoint a Scottish agent, Rev. Edwin Heath, with instructions "to adopt all reasonable means of securing the co-operation of the members of the Free Church".¹

A succession of meetings held at the end of 1874, Heath reported, "indicated a decided progress of the movement in Scotland", and the Glasgow meeting successfully united U.P. and Free leaders, lay and clerical, in demanding the disestablishment and disendowment of the Church of Scotland.² But after this promising start, the agitation faded very quickly. A Glasgow Disestablishment Society was formed by "leading Nonconformists" in January 1875, but no more was heard of it.³ By the end of that year, the issue seemed becalmed: the Liberation Society warned that the struggle would be protracted, while opponents claimed that lack of interest among the Free laity had destroyed it.⁴ The likelihood of reform seemed slight: the Tories were entrenched in office for five or six years; there was a reaction in the Liberal party against the 'faddism' which had helped lose the general election; and the replacement of Gladstone, whom many had regarded as friendly to the Scottish Dissenters after his stance on the Patronage Bill, by the more moderate Hartington was ominous. A further setback came with the resignation in October 1875

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¹ Minute Book 6, Mm. 274 (11 June 1874), 290 (2 Jul. 1874), 420 (21 Jan. 1875), L.C.R.O., A/LIB/5.
² Ibid., M. 396 (17 Dec. 1874); G. Herald, 11 Dec. 1874 for the meeting.
³ G. Herald, 12 Jan. 1875.
of Heath, on grounds of ill-health, and it is indicative that he was not replaced.¹

The revival of the campaign came in 1877. In May, a Scottish Liberation Council was formed in Glasgow, with the aim of bringing the position of the minority Church of Scotland to the attention of the legislature.² In November, Hartington came to Scotland where, having informed Rosebery that "I expect you to give me a safe sentence or two on Scotch Church matters", he explained to a deputation of disestablishment bodies that "while in his opinion, the question was not yet ripe for legislation, as soon as Scottish Liberal opinion respecting it was sufficiently formed the Liberal party would be prepared to deal with it, irrespective of the possible consequences to the English Establishment."³ As the Liberation Society added, "his Lordship's declaration has produced a very favourable impression on the Society's supporters", who not unnaturally took it as an invitation to convert the Scottish Liberal party.⁴ In Glasgow, action was speedy, and within four weeks of Hartington's promise, a meeting of 2,000 city Nonconformists affirmed that "the question of disestablishment has now become a question of practical politics",

and called on the Liberal party to adopt the policy "henceforth".  

After reporting in April 1878 that it could detect "more encouraging signs that disest. was becoming the primary question in that part of the kingdom", the Scottish Liberation Council in July urged all supporters to ensure that their voices were heard in all constituencies and in the Liberal party.  

The formation of the Glasgow Liberal Association in 1878 seemed part of this policy, for its founders included leading disestablishers, and the demand was written into its initial constitution. This advance, however, proved only temporary, for a countermove by other Liberal groups led to the scrapping of the policy programme in January 1879. This reversal was confirmed in July 1879 when a strong Church Liberal was unopposed at a city by-election. These events showed that many disestablishment Liberals still preferred to put party before any one issue, as instanced by the warnings issued by the ultra-Radical Mail against coercing Church Liberals. Instead, the paper argued, the first priority was to return a strong united Liberal party to office, for then reforms would come when "timely".  

Party unity also prevailed at the general election of 1880 at the expense of sectional interests. Although the Scottish Liberation  

4. For more on these episodes, below pp. 302-5.  
Council stressed that "the Church and Tory party have thrown down their challenge . . . with the Tories and Churchmen making common cause, the final neutrality of Liberals is impossible"; a careful survey of the views of Liberal candidates concluded "it will be seen that the almost universal desire of Liberal candidates was to express no definite opinion on the subject". Only 11 out of 60 declared themselves to be in favour of immediate action, and although the three Glasgow candidates were all in principle disestablishers, only one, R. T. Middleton, openly stated this. The Glasgow contest was not marked by any internal squabbling among the Liberals, despite the replacement of Tennant by Middleton, for city Church Liberals expressed themselves well satisfied with Gladstone's policy line.

Some alarm had been felt at his utterances on the church question during the Midlothian campaign in 1879, and Tennant warned him "there is some danger of our losing some support" in consequence. Gladstone soon allayed their fears, as the change in the editorial attitudes of the Herald showed. In November 1879, it defined his view of the Scottish Church thus: "it is that of keen but repressed hostility - a hostility that waits with impatience for the moment of attack"; but by the following March it was satisfied with his


pronouncements: "we do not suppose that any except very extreme Churchmen will have much fault to find ... we cannot say that exception can now reasonably be taken to his attitude on our ecclesiastical affairs." In the 1880 election the main preoccupation of city Liberals was to devise the voting system which would overcome the hazards of a three-cornered seat, and with policy disputes in abeyance, all sections of the party could participate in solving the problem.

In Gladstone's second administration, little occurred to satisfy the disestablishment element. At a parliamentary level, bills were introduced in 1882 and 1884, but were not carried. In response to mounting pressure to act, Gladstone resorted to his favourite device of emphasising the necessity of first removing the major obstructions to a wide range of reform measures. To a deputation of eminent Scottish Dissenters he argued, firstly, "as respects all difficult and complex legislation, the minority is masters (sic) of the House of Commons", and then, he stated, the franchise bill was the overriding objective, behind which lay the problem of the Lords, and only after that could action on other matters proceed. Even in the constituencies the disestablishers were disappointed. In 1882 attempts to whip up a popular agitation led by Rainy, Cairns and Hutton proved ill-judged and simply produced the National Church


2. Gladstone Papers, B.M. Add. MSS. 44,629, ff. 125-42, 146-9. This is a verbatim account of a meeting held on 29 Aug. 1884.
Defence Society which linked together Conservative and Liberal Churchmen.¹ The Scottish Liberal Association was firm in rejecting any statement of intent on the issue in the face of pressure from Glasgow delegates, on the grounds that "this association has never taken up or tried to advance any political question".² In Glasgow, however, the city Liberal Association did pass a resolution in favour of disestablishment in 1882. While this provoked the resignation of the President, the Episcopalian A. B. McGrigor, and some others, they all remained fervent Liberals and admirers of Gladstone, and the motion had no direct results beyond weakening the strength of the organisation.

In 1884-5, the issue came to the fore of Scottish politics at the instance of the Dissenters, as they felt increasingly irritated at the government's handling of them, the faithful backbone of the Liberal party. A Glasgow Liberationist voiced this: "The time had now come to stir up the country and rest in silence no more . . . He had previously voted straight as a Liberal without regard to that question, but he would do so no longer and he believed that others would follow his example (Applause). Unless the Liberal party brought that question to the front they would find serious difficulties awaiting them."³ Four months later the Scottish Disestablishment Association echoed this impatience: "the answer to the question of

¹ Oliphant, Tulloch, pp. 413-5; Principal Story, pp. 198-9, 398-400.
² Scottish Liberal Association, Minute Book, p. 10 (5 Jan. 1882).
disestablishment must be given at the polling-booth". October 1885 was the climax of this phase of the campaign. In that month came Chamberlain's Scottish tour, which included several speeches interpreted as promoting disestablishment, thus exciting Dissenters and causing apprehension among Church Liberals; the Scottish Liberal Association cast off its erstwhile neutrality and passed a resolution calling for disestablishment; and Gladstone received a memorial from Cairns purporting to show that a majority of all the Scottish clergy were in favour of breaking the state connection and urging him to commit the party to this policy, for ecclesiastical and political reasons. In Glasgow, where most of the seven Liberal candidates were in agreement with such a step being taken, polarisation seemed complete when a large public meeting was held in that same month in support of the National Church and conspicuously attended by leading city Liberals.

Yet none of these strains forced a rupture on the part of the Church Liberals in Glasgow, because each could be explained away. At Glasgow, Chamberlain - who had told Rosebery, "I must say something but I will try to do as little harm as possible" - refuted any

3. Church of Scotland. Report of Meeting of Scottish Laymen of Different Religious Denominations opposed to the Disestablishment and Disendowment of the Church of Scotland held in the St Andrew's Hall, Glasgow (Glasgow, 1885).
suggestions that the question would be decided in the life of the next parliament, and most Church Liberals were placated, despite some worrying phrases in a published letter from Chamberlain to Taylor Innes, a leading disestablisher.¹ The S.L.A. resolution, it was claimed, was the result of careful preplanning by Taylor Innes, while "the Church Liberals, as usual, took no interest, did not go into the thing heartily, and the result was that an overwhelming majority of strong Disestablishment men turned up".² But it could not be termed a representative meeting, and thus did not commit the Scottish party. The Church Defence movement was, for some Church Liberals, equally bogus: "the Church defence meeting at Glasgow was 80 p.c. Tory, although the platform was strongly Liberal. They put the Liberals on the platform and shoved the Tories into the arena."³ Others, such as Professor Ramsay, explained that these meetings were not at all political, and did not in any way undermine their Liberalism.⁴

Ultimately, however, all Church Liberals looked to Gladstone to reaffirm the assurances he gave in 1880 that a "real reference" to the wishes of the people of Scotland would first have to be taken, and he was warned of the disastrous impact on the unity and electoral prospects of Scottish Liberalism which any deviation from this stance

¹ Chamberlain, The Radical Platform, pp. 29-33, for the passage in his Glasgow speech on this.
² G. W. T. Omond to Rosebery, 24 Oct. 1885, Rosebery Papers, NLS Box 62.
³ Ibid.
would have. Gladstone responded in suitably convincing terms in a speech delivered on 11th November, in which he indicated that disestablishment was "at the end of a long vista", and since it was impossible in England, it could not be applied in Scotland. This drew a heartfelt response from the Church Liberals, for it was the guarantee they sought and so they were quite content in voting for their party, while the disestablishment upsurge was quelled. As the sweeping Liberal triumph at the polls showed, all factions had voted solidly for the party, and Glasgow had done famously in returning a full Liberal complement for the seven city seats.

Thus the Church Liberals remained generally loyal to their party, and were remarkably confident of containing the disestablishment thrust. After the 1885 election the case for a Liberal anti-Disestablishment organisation was presented on the grounds that the Church Defence Association had fallen into the hands of Tory agents while there was a need to check the claims of the Dissenters that they spoke for all Liberals. A body was then formed to watch over the situation and to advance this cause in the constituencies, if necessary by providing suitable candidates. Its promoters conceived

3. C. Cooper to Rosebery, 11 Nov. 1885, Rosebery Papers, NLS Box 9; cf. editorials in G. Herald, 12, 13, 15 Nov. 1885.
its role to be merely one of deterrence, and were surprisingly sanguine of success: "As regards the constituencies, it will probably be sufficient in the first instance to secure a corresponding Secretary who would be ready should occasion require it to organise a Liberal Committee. In many cases there would be no need to do anything, the sitting Member's views in that question being quite satisfactory. In others, the mere existence of such a Committee would be sufficient to prevent the Member going over to the Disestablishment party. In others it would be necessary to organise and fight, but the probability is that it would not be so in many. The effect of this organisation I believe would be to keep Candidates from bringing forward the question - this would certainly be desirable."¹

In Glasgow, the failure of the disestablishment wing to shake the allegiance of Church Liberals is noteworthy, for in Glasgow the State Church was exceptionally vulnerable. Yet its upholders in the Liberal party never wavered, unlike those elsewhere who abandoned the party in the early 1880's. Thus the Glasgow delegates on the National Church Society were all Tories, and the Herald, the Liberal Churchmen's organ, deplored the formation of this society. It was untimely and too overtly political for the paper, which rebuked the Conservatives for exploiting the issue for party gain and warned that Church Liberals would no more be deceived by these manoeuvres than by Radical

¹ L. Mackersy to D. Murray, - Jan. 1886, Glasgow University Library, Mu 44-e.20. Also, Constitution of the Liberal Anti-Disestablishment Association for Scotland (n.p., n.d.).
schemings. Part of the explanation lay in the weaknesses of the disestablishment campaign in Scotland. Unlike England, it was seriously hampered by the split, which was not mended until 1886, into the Liberation Society and the Scottish Disestablishment Association. Moreover the strains within the Free Church prevented the latter from deploying its weight to the full. The Liberation Society claimed many supporters in Scotland, yet its financial difficulties were acute: a deficit of £600 was incurred by the Scottish Council in its first year and led to a heavy curtailment of its work. But money remained a recurrent problem and finally drove the Liberation Council towards merging with the Scottish Disestablishment Association.

But even in this weak movement, Glasgow seemed to lag, especially when contrasted with Edinburgh, where the offices of both agencies were sited and where were to be found the leaders of the agitation, both lay - Duncan MacLaren, Dick Peddie, Taylor Innes - and clerical - Rainy, Cairns and Calderwood (although Hutton was in Paisley). Glasgow, however, lacked the great grievance which afflicted Edinburgh Dissenters. The Annuity Tax was an ideal rallying-point: it was levied to support the mainly Tory Established Church, but the entire city population was liable, although half was outside that church. Worst of all, the only exemptions were the heavily Tory and strongly

3. Minute Book 7, Mm. 288 (18 Nov. 1878), 1236 (11 Oct. 1880); Minute Book 8, Mm. 354 (11 Jul. 1884), 734 (15 Mar. 1886), L.C.R.O., A/LIB/7, 8.
Church of Scotland legal profession, along with State Church clergy.\textsuperscript{1} Glasgow had no such glaring abuse, and although the Corporation gave £2,000 annually as a contribution to the upkeep of the Established churches in the city, efforts to arouse opposition were unsuccessful, because the money was not raised by a separate assessment but came out of the general rates fund, and thus was not such a visible affront to Dissenting susceptibilities as the Annuity Tax.\textsuperscript{2} Again, in Glasgow many earnest Dissenters put the Temperance question foremost. It is probably more than coincidence that the headquarters of the main Temperance organisations were in Glasgow, unlike the disestablishment pattern.\textsuperscript{3} As is discussed below, the Temperance organisations played a central part in the resurgence of Dissenting Radicalism in Glasgow in the early 1870's, at a time when the disestablishment movement was quite insignificant. Thereafter their influence in the city's Liberal party was always considerable, so diverting energy and attention from the other cherished reform of the Dissenters.

For these reasons Liberal Churchmen in Glasgow felt less apprehensive about their position than elsewhere. In addition, many felt they could not easily desert the party, for they had nothing in

\begin{enumerate}
\item Mackie, MacLaren, I, pp. 178-210 for the Annuity Tax struggle in Edinburgh.
\item Social Reformer, 12 (1877-8), pp. 32-3 claimed that the Church of Scotland was a lesser evil than drink, and so it was wrong of the Liberation Society to give priority to an attack on the former.
\end{enumerate}
common with the Church of Scotland Tories in Glasgow, who were reactionary and Orange in outlook, and, as has been shown, as intolerant of the Broad Churchmen as any evangelical Dissenter. The furthest they were prepared to go was laid down by McGrigor in 1885: "while I - and I speak, I believe, for thousands of true-hearted Liberals throughout the country - am not prepared to support by my vote the party against whom I have consistently and honourably contended throughout my life, I am not prepared to aid by that vote to swell the number of those who will vote for the resolution of Dr. Cameron. (Cheers)."¹

More than this, however, kept them in the fold. The Glasgow Church Liberals felt secure from the blasts of local infighting, since they could always by-pass that level and go straight to the party's leadership. Thus Tennant wrote to Gladstone at the peaks of the agitation to urge him not to commit the party to disestablishment, and because the only city correspondents of Gladstone and Rosebery were such-minded men, their views could be expected to prevail.² The Liberal Association's stance on the issue seemed of little weight beside this, and Church Liberals in any event dismissed it as an ultra-Radical caucus, quite unrepresentative of opinion in the constituency as a whole. Church Liberals were also protected by the reluctance of the disestablishers to split the party irrevocably

². E.g., Tennant to Gladstone, 15 Dec. 1879, Gladstone Papers, B.M. Add. MSS. 44,461, f. 245.
on this question, and loyalty to Gladstone would guarantee that most Radicals would accept his policy statements. Thus while religion had a distinct influence on political alignment, it was not always the determining factor, as the disestablishment debate revealed: party loyalties also had other sources of commitment, as McGrigor acknowledged. This was confirmed by the Home Rule crisis, for the split which then took place cut across the cleavage which the church question had created.

2. Economic Interests in Politics

In contrast to religious issues, questions of an economic nature seldom seem to have acted as primary agents in shaping political attitudes in this period. Hardly any candidates of either party alluded to such topics in their election addresses except in broad generalisations. Thus in 1868, the Radical Dalglish sweepingly promised to work "To secure Economy in Public Expenditure, especially a Reduction in the Army and Navy Estimates", while the Conservative said "I should advocate economy in all branches of the public service, in so far as is consistent with the maintenance of our position as one of the Great Powers of Europe." In their campaign speeches

1. "I would say, do not make this question (disestablishment), under all the circumstances, an indispensible test and condition of your support", Chamberlain pleaded with his Glasgow fellow-Radicals, in The Radical Platform, pp. 32-3.

candidates barely expanded their views beyond this broad level: in book form, the economic content of the speeches of one of the Conservative candidates in 1885 constituted only 5 out of some 80 pages. As a major industrial centre, Glasgow was a constituency where such topics might be expected to be to the fore, and its apparent retardation is surprising. For it has been shown that in the 1880 election the Liberals exploited the adverse impact of the economic recession to considerable advantage in the North of England, yet in Glasgow the Liberal candidates did not refer once to the industrial depression then prevalent in the district.

While, however, this was the case at the higher planes of political debate, it is not inconceivable that economic interest-groups may still have taken party sides for more mundane reasons. One instance of this came in the 1880 election, when William Pearce, the Conservative candidate, argued that as he was a large employer of labour whose shipyard annually brought thousands of pounds to the city, he should be returned to Parliament to further the interests of Glasgow. This blatant appeal, however, drew forth much criticism and Pearce was heavily defeated at the polls.

(a) Business and Politics

The main voice of the Glasgow business community was the Chamber of Commerce, which had fulfilled this role since the late eighteenth

1. Political Speeches by James Somervell of Sorn (Glasgow, 1885).
century. By the 1870's it had about 1,000 members, representing all the trades, industries and business professions carried on in the city region, with a heavy bias towards large and middling concerns as affiliates. All shades of political opinion were present in the Chamber, but it never commented directly on party political matters, instead concentrating on issues over which all could unite, such as currency and banking reform.1 Moreover, unanimity was to be found on most potentially divisive subjects. All sides agreed on the benefits of free trade and deplored any moves to reimpose tariffs; on labour legislation, the entire Chamber held that the Factory Acts were injurious to capital and labour alike.2 Conservative and Liberal members spoke with one voice on such matters, which could therefore scarcely have been the basis of political commitment.

There were, however, some who felt that the Chamber was not functioning very well at this time. Often only a handful turned up at meetings, and even when reforms were suggested to revitalise the Chamber, only 140 members out of 1,040 took pains to attend. This event gave fuel to those who protested that the views aired by the small coterie of directors who actually ran the Chamber were not in full accord with the true business interests of affiliated members.3 Many thus felt that the Chamber had declined from its eminence in the first half of the century, and this was partly because the economy of Glasgow had become so diversified that it was difficult for the

Chamber to take an aggressive line on contentious topics and still reflect the full spectrum of the membership.

A more direct involvement in party politics might be anticipated in specific industrial interests which felt threatened by, or derived benefit from, legislation. As Glasgow was held by contemporaries to owe its vast and rapid rise to prosperity to the extension of free trade, there was a natural proclivity towards the Liberals. On the other hand, the shipping interest, which had never forgiven the abolition of the Navigation Acts, was in general staunchly Conservative, and this tendency was confirmed in the 1870's and 80's by pressure for the revision of mercantile marine legislation to the detriment of the owners' interests. This agitation was mainly inspired by Liberal politicians, and firstly Plimsoll's bills, then Chamberlain's proposals, angered city shipowners.\(^1\) In 1884 they formed the Clyde Shipowners' Protective Association with the aim of presenting a united front to the Royal Commission on Shipping appointed by Chamberlain, but the new body issued no direct instructions on voting, nor did any other business lobby.\(^2\)

The one commercial interest which felt itself drawn into politics was the drink trade, and Gladstone's ascription of his defeat in 1874 to its hostility is well known. Although H. J. Hanham has argued that the political influence of the publican at that election was

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exaggerated, the situation in Scotland was so different as regards licensing laws, trade organisation and political traditions that a full treatment of the question seems justified.¹

In the first place, Bruce's Licensing Act of 1872, which is held to have thrust the drink trade totally into the Conservative fold did not have any impact in Scotland, where different legislation applied. Drinking habits were regulated for the entire period under discussion by the Forbes Mackenzie Act, which had been passed in 1852. This did not, admittedly, prevent outbursts against Bruce's measure from the organ of Scottish publicans: "this first and foulest attempt of the Gladstone government to manacle the trade was quite sufficient to show the spirit by which it was activated and to destroy all confidence in its integrity, no matter what subsequent protestations may have been made."² But these cries were rather synthetic, for it also confessed that the worst threat the bill could carry for Scotland was that it might prove "the thin end of the Permissive wedge".³ This was hardly a sound footing for following the English example. There was, however, some real discontent at another aspect of Gladstonian government, for the operation of the Malt Tax (a specifically Scottish grievance) was deemed unjust in that the commodity could be held in bond until used, rather than levying tax at the time of purchase.⁴


³. Ibid., 15 Apr. 1871.

⁴. Ibid., 4 Feb. 1871: "Maltsters, Brewers, Distillers, Publicans have become the chief prey of his reign." Also, 4 Dec. 1869, 12 Mar. 1870.
Nevertheless, at this time there was a direct political challenge to the licensed community in Scotland which arose from the Temperance movement's decision to intervene in municipal elections from about 1868.\(^1\) The object of the teetotallers was to get control of the Licensing Courts through the medium of the Bailieships, and thus to control the consumption of alcohol more stringently. Soon the publicans were levelling allegations of arrogance, harrassment and even of 'ultra vires' acts against the local magistrates, and it is this which seems to have driven the drink lobby more than Bruce's bill against the government: "let it be loudly proclaimed that every vote which our interest can influence will be given to the Conservative party in retaliation for the neglect of the Trade by the so-called Liberals, and for their standing idly by while the municipalities rioted in our persecution."\(^2\) While this was a powerful stimulus towards organisation, it also highlighted some of the difficulties the trade had to overcome before it could be effective. As this was a municipal struggle, it made a nationwide resistance hard to co-ordinate, for the strength of the Temperance electoral bid varied widely from town to town, and where their offensive was slight, publicans felt little need to aid other, more hard-pressed areas. Glasgow was one of the first places to feel the Temperance onslaught, and the local trade organisation had to respond to clauses

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1. For these developments in Glasgow, see below pp. 209-13.

in the 1869 Municipal Extension Bill "which would have enacted that the Magistrates, and they alone, were to be empowered to grant licences within the city, thus abolishing the Justices' Appeal Court . . . The Directors were opposed to any alteration on the grounds that the avowed policy of a number of the Magistrates was a drastic reduction of licences, and that, therefore, the Appeal Court was necessary to ensure justice to all concerned."¹ But moves by Glasgow to pool the resources of the trade in the whole of Scotland into one defence body in 1871 foundered, mainly because Edinburgh was less subject to "temperance tyranny".²

This geographical split was reinforced by an internal divide which was even more of a barrier to unity, for the drink industry was organised along different lines in Scotland from England. Unlike England, the brewery firms did not operate a tied-house system, and so the municipal battle over the Licensing Courts did not directly affect them, for so long as a reasonable number of retail outlets were maintained, the plight of individual licence-holders was not so important. This meant the absence of the financial and organisational power which stiffened the English trade's campaigns, and of course there was no voice in Parliament like Bass, whose triumph in the East Surrey by-election of 1871 evoked wistful contrasts in Scotland.³

³. Ibid., 2 Sep. 1871. See the letter by 'G.M.' (George Miller?), ibid., 12 Aug. 1879, accusing the manufacturing and wholesale sections of failing to help the retail side in its fight.
In addition, the different drinking habits in Scotland meant that the distillers made a greater contribution to the Scottish economy and were in rivalry with beer, so that there was no clear leadership from the top.

On top of these weakening factors, the retail trade was not unified. The licensed grocers, the "upper ten", were often accused of standing back from the vast bulk of the trade, the publicans. The grocers were less penalised by the licensing authorities, probably because most of them sold for consumption off the premises and so were less openly responsible for the prevalence of drunkenness than the publicans and hoteliers, who were prone to claim that this was class discrimination since the grocers served mainly middle-class customers (including, it was hinted, not a few magistrates).\(^1\) The number of licences held in 1858 and 1878 shows this trend:\(^2\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1858</th>
<th>1878</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hotels</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>-34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Houses</td>
<td>1414</td>
<td>1519</td>
<td>-7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grocers</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>+62.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1622</td>
<td>1799</td>
<td>+10.9</td>
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Grocers had no serious objections to the existing licensing system, and looked down on the publicans as little better than shebeeners. Thus it was natural that they should form their own organisation,

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1. Ibid., 24 Feb. 1872, 26 Feb. 1881, 9 June 1873.
the Glasgow and West of Scotland Licensed Grocers Association, in 1874 and leave the rest of the trade to their own devices.

The publicans had in fact set up in 1863 the Glasgow and West of Scotland Wine, Spirit and Beer Association, whose objects were to "protect the trade from improper interference"; to secure a reduction in the "exorbitant" spirits duty; and to keep a general watch over trade interests.¹ But, given the disarray of the drink interest, it was only moderately successful, and the trade journal repeatedly called for a proper defence organisation such as obtained in England.² There was for instance no paid agent or secretary to advise the Association on legal aspects of licensing, whereas in England George Candelet filled this post most effectively, representing the trade and putting its case forward to the public. When the Association did employ an advocate - and it was not until 1878 - he was able to demonstrate to the Appeal Court that the magistrates had been acting illegally in refusing to sanction the transfer of licences, but by then this abuse had been going on for ten years.³ In 1880 a Defence League was finally appointed by the Association "with a view to the better organisation of the trade throughout the country . . . for the defence of their own local rights and for parliamentary purposes".⁴ But it

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¹ MacDowell, Glasgow . . . Trade Defence Association, p. 5.
² Scottish Standard, 9 Jan. 1869, 3 Dec. 1870, 2 Sep. 1871, 6 June 1874.
³ Ibid., 1 Jul. 1871, 4 May 1872, 5 Apr. 1873, 19 June 1875, 22 June 1878.
⁴ MacDowell, Glasgow Trade Defence Association, p. 19.
still took a further nine years to appoint a Parliamentary Agent in London. There did exist the Scottish Standard, a weekly which aired the viewpoint of the trade, but its own history is part of the general weakness of the interest—which it attacked vociferously. Begun in Glasgow in 1869 by Walter Parlane, it never enjoyed a healthy circulation, and Parlane was soon complaining of lack of support from the cause he championed. Despite the success of its racing column, ownership of the Standard had to be transferred to another publisher in 1879, and in 1881 the paper finally closed. Thus the trade quite lacked the organisation and unity which inspired the Temperance reformers.

Three other impediments to the success of the drink interest's political influence are also relevant. Firstly, its electoral power was of decreasing significance, secondly, the local Conservatives were not necessarily more sympathetic to their cause than the Liberals, and thirdly, there was no way of maintaining voting solidarity at elections. Publicans liked to consider they constituted a powerful electoral block—and their opponents sometimes agreed—but this is doubtful in the case of Glasgow. In 1858, when the electorate was some 18,700, there were 1,622 licences held in the city, and it may be assumed that nearly all had the vote, since the average value of licensed premises was £40. 16. -d. While 8.7% of the electorate is sizeable, the number of licences was in fact slightly declining (in

1853 it had been 2,053) whereas the number of voters had risen from its 1853 level of 15,355. As the licensing policy practised by the magistrates remained restrictive, the number of licences granted between 1873 and 1890 steadily fluctuated around 1,800, although it should have risen with the population increase to 3,250 by 1890. The electorate, however, moved from 47,000 in 1868 to 70,000 by 1885, when the trade then consisted of under 3% of all voters. Unlike Edinburgh, there were few votes in the brewing and distilling industries, for they were small employers of labour in the city context. About 1,000 worked in the industries, of whom some 800 were adult males.

Even when it seemed to be at its strongest in numerical terms, the weakness of the trade's electoral leverage was shown in 1857, when it decided to seize the opportunity of a by-election to run a candidate in its interest against a respected Whig, Walter Buchanan. The Scottish Licensed Victuallers Association met, and "we resolved to make a determined effort to have the Forbes Mackenzie Act repealed or amended". They persuaded James Merry to run. Merry, a wealthy ironmaster and successful racehorse owner, had never displayed any great interest in the cause of the trade, and not much more in politics. He lost the contest, getting only one third of the poll and the 2,900 votes cast for him were a mere 1,000 more than the licence-holders in

1. These figures are derived from the Vital, Economic and Social Statistics of Glasgow between 1853 and 1890.
the city, thus refuting the claim that the trade had an influence considerably larger than the simple publican vote. 1

On the whole, however, this direct intervention was an aberration, for until 1874 the interest had little reason to be dissatisfied with the Liberal representatives of the city. In the general election of 1857 a temperance M.P. had been ousted; in 1865 a wine importer defeated an Islay distiller for the vacant seat; and in 1868 all three Liberal M.P.'s declared their opposition to the Permissive Bill. In 1874 the position had altered, with a fully-fledged prohibitionist standing as a Liberal, and the trade paper opted for the two Conservatives in no uncertain manner, but it is noteworthy that the Scottish Standard had already committed itself before the temperance advocate announced his candidature. 2

But this did not mark the full conversion of the trade to Conservatism. Many of the leading local Conservatives were strong Temperance advocates, as hostile to the trade as any Radical. 3 William Kidston, a powerful figure behind the scenes in the city party, had helped to lobby for the passage of the Forbes Mackenzie Act. 4 Three prominent members of the Church of Scotland Temperance Association were J. Wyllie Guild, a Vice-President of the Glasgow

2. Scottish Standard, 31 Jan. 1874. The Conservative Whitelaw was the only candidate to advertise in the paper.
3. This was not unusual among Scottish Tories: Forbes Mackenzie himself was a Conservative; and in 1876 Sir Wyndham Anstruther introduced a temperance bill.
4. A. Aird, Glimpses of Old Glasgow (Glasgow, 1894), pp. 424–6 for this side of Kidston.
Conservative Association; W. C. Maughan, the Treasurer of the Conservative Association from 1881 to 1885, and a candidate for the Blackfriars and Hutchesontown seat in 1885; and, above, all, John Neilson Cuthbertson, perhaps the most popular local Tory in the 1880's, who stood for St. Rollox in 1885 and who frequently spoke in favour of licensing reform at party meetings. There was thus an influential volume of party opinion at odds with the drink trade, and in the 1880 election they were in part responsible for the nomination of Sir James Bain as candidate for the city. Bain had long been an enthusiastic Temperance supporter, and in his election address he stated his commitment to the extreme Permissive Bill. This left the Trade Association in the position of having only one candidate who fully agreed with them, the other Conservative, William Pearce.

At the meeting which resolved to support only Pearce, there emerged the final difficulty encountered by the trade in its efforts to influence Glasgow politics. This was the total lack of unity, however grave the crisis, and many of those present were unwilling to support Pearce. Some, like Duncan Wallace, were reluctant through fear of loss of trade: "We should keep in mind our bread and butter (Hear, hear)." But there were also ardent Liberals, in the trade:

2. "I recognise the right of ratepayers to control the granting of licences and to prevent the establishment of public houses in their neighbourhoods. I would support the resolution of Sir Wilfrid Lawson in favour of 'local option' and would back a bill carrying the resolution into practical and beneficial effect." G. Herald, 10 Mar. 1880.
3. Scottish Standard, 10 Apr. 1880 for this meeting.
a publican sat on the Liberal Association Executive in the 1880's, and William Teacher, the distiller, was also active on the Liberal side. Moreover, few licensees were at all prominent in the Conservative party. The Trade Association could not direct the entire drink interest as to how it should vote, for only about 40% of all license-holders subscribed to it in 1878. Accordingly, in 1874 24 were to be found on the Committee of the Liberal candidate hostile to prohibition, as against 66 on the Conservative Committee. The Standard blamed the defeat of one of the two Conservatives on "some disaffection (the usual) in the trade". In 1880, when no Conservative was returned, the situation was little better, despite the creation of a Defence League. In his summary of the League's first year, the secretary reported that he had circularised all the publicans in the city, "pointing out the unfortunate but unavoidable necessity of sinking their political proclivities, and of voting, where practicable, only for those candidates of either party who recognised the legitimate interests of the Trade with which they were concerned. It is to be regretted that the suggestion contained in this address was not more generally acted upon."

This all suggests that the drink trade was really not a very weighty element in Glasgow politics, notwithstanding claims that there was an extensive body of sympathisers upon whom the interest

1. 744 out of 1814 licencees in the city.
2. 7 Feb. 1874.
could count. As the episode with Merry in 1857 showed, they had little pull on their own, and it was only when a bigger tide of public opinion moved in their direction that their aims could be attained. Thus the general election of 1857, coming only two months after the by-election contested by Merry, witnessed the defeat of a Teetotal candidate when nearly 12,000 expressed their dislike of faddism by returning a moderate Whig who held no strong views on the drink question. Again, rather than the strength of the trade, its achievement in containing the Temperance campaign to dominate municipal affairs in the early 1870's might be attributable to a widespread distaste for the narrow-mindedness of the Teetotallers.

(b) Organised Labour and Politics

The business world had little incentive to take political action to preserve their interests so long as there was general adherence to the consensus upon the validity of the economic and social precepts by which the mid-Victorian system functioned. For labour, however, the need to intervene was more urgent, even to attain the modest goals of legal protection for its institutions and equality in law with employers. Glasgow was a promising centre to find such currents, not simply because after 1867 the working class preponderated in electoral weight. In addition, it had been a pioneer of the Trades Council movement which had steadfastly campaigned from its inception

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1. Ibid., 27 Mar. 1880, for such a claim.

2. E.g., G. Herald, 11 Oct. 1873; G. News, 18 Nov. 1874; G. Sentinel, 5 Nov. 1870 for evidence of this feeling.
in 1858 for the rights of labour. The first success of the Glasgow Trades Council was the agitation to repeal the iniquitous Master and Servant Act.¹ From the inception in 1863, the Glasgow committee guided the national movement to the triumphant annulling of the Act's discriminatory clauses.² When pressure was being directed in the early 1870's against the Criminal Law Amendment Act, Glasgow was again to the fore. A committee of the Trades Council, the Glasgow Repeal Association, which claimed to represent 140,000 men in 62 trades throughout the West of Scotland, held the largest demonstration in Glasgow since the Second Reform days.³

The political militancy which the Trades Council displayed in the early twentieth century has been traced back to its role in instigating a franchise reform body in 1861. Its tone was uncompromising: "We are aware that many are opposed to trades meetings being mixed with politics. We cannot coincide with such views so long as trades societies are amenable with the law."⁴ The Council went on to claim that it was merely reviving the Chartist demands after a decade of


neglect. Other evidence also suggests the Council was politically aware. It was formed in 1858 with only limited objectives, viz: "taking into consideration the necessity of petitioning the authorities, both local and national, to assist in adopting some means whereby the widespread distress at present existing among the labouring classes of the community can't be mitigated by emigration or otherwise."¹ These were soon broadened out to comprise "the moral and social elevation of the operative classes and the consideration of all such questions as affect the social and political interests of labour."²

The Council interpreted its power under the constitution in very wide terms. Early in its life it discussed the issue of manhood suffrage, and it continued to display a close interest in many political topics of the day.³ Motions were passed calling for disestablishment of the Church of Scotland, for land law reform, protesting at Disraeli's handling of the Eastern Question, and so on.⁴ It agreed to accredit a veteran member, Daniel Ferguson, as its delegate to the 1875 Peace Association Congress in Paris, "with a view to strengthening the representative nature of the delegates".⁵ In this period regular debates took place as to what should be the Council's attitude to the

3. G. Saturday Post, 6 Nov. 1858 for manhood suffrage.
4. G. Herald, 10 June 1880 for disestablishment; ibid., 30 Aug. 1883 for land law reform; ibid., 17 May 1877, 4 Apr. 1878 for the Eastern Question.
5. G. Herald, 2 Sep. 1875. It also sent delegates to a Scottish Peace Congress in 1873; ibid., 19, 20 May 1873.
Permissive Bill agitation. It voted to support petitions but declined to accept repeated invitations to attend meetings sponsored by the Permissive Bill Association, and its sympathies emerged very clearly when, in considering attempts to alleviate the unemployment problem in the mid-1880's, it pointed "with something like diffidence" to the British workman's annual drink bill of £40 million.¹

Despite these displays of political involvement, two questions require resolution. Firstly, although it is a relatively straightforward matter to pass resolutions of such a nature in the Council's meeting-room, whether they could be carried into effect was a crucial issue for the Council's credibility as a forum for working-men's opinions. Then it must be asked whether these motions were typical or atypical of the Council's normal approach to political questions.

The apparent paradox of the failure to secure any direct labour representation in these years has been explained as the result of the financial difficulties besetting any bid to return working class M.P.'s.² The most determined effort came after the passage of the Third Reform Act, when the Council convened a series of meetings of delegates from 24 trades to consider action. R. C. Grant, the President, argued that as the two workingmen M.P.'s in the Commons had done their work as diligently as any other Member, there was no


reason why more should not be returned, and one meeting calculated that two of the seven Glasgow seats should by rights be occupied by working men. After a resolution was passed that "the time has arrived when the working classes of Glasgow ought to be represented by practical working-men", a Labour Representation League was set up. The League selected the industrial constituency of Camlachie as the best prospect and invited the interested trades to choose a candidate from five leading local trade unionists.

This was a very confident bid mounted by the Council, and it was made clear that the new League was no catspaw of the orthodox Liberal party. "If in this matter they were to become a mere appendage to the Liberal Association", said Carson of the Plate workers, "he would have nothing to do with it. He understood that the intention was to establish an organisation for the purpose of sending representatives to parliament to advance labour interests and not to coalesce with any particular body, but to take from either party." However the project failed (even although the Council had shrewdly chosen a seat where no official Liberal had yet been picked), and no candidate was put up. The 1886 election showed no advance and the Council had to be content with a weak alternative: "The Council did not at that

1. G. Herald, 5 Mar. 1885.
2. Some three weeks previously George Anderson, who enjoyed the support of the Lib-Lab section, had resigned his seat and been replaced by a manufacturer.
4. G. Herald, 14 May 1885, also speeches by W. Drummond and H. MacLauchlan.
time find themselves in a better position than they were in the November election previous to do anything in the way of running a Labour Candidate, and resolved to issue to those seeking parliamentary honours a series of questions relating to matters that affect the everyday life of the parties they represent.\textsuperscript{1}

In explaining the collapse of this venture, the Annual Report indeed found the major problem to have been financial, and this accurately reflected the preoccupation of most speakers at the League meetings. To provide for the salary of a working-man M.P., John Battersby produced a scheme to raise £1,000 by a 1/- subscription from each of the 20,000 men represented in the League. This was a considerable scaling-down of an earlier scheme, which called for £6,000 to be raised and the investment income of £200 to be applied to maintaining an M.P.\textsuperscript{2} The less ambitious scheme was approved, but could not be executed, for the financial difficulties were considerable in the mid 1880's, which were not good years for many Glasgow industries.

The Council itself was weak in certain vital aspects. Its annual income over the period 1882-86 varied between £53 and £61, a minute sum compared to other local quasi-political organisations.\textsuperscript{3} This

\begin{enumerate}
\item Annual Report 1885-6, p. 10.
\item G. Herald, 14 May, 5 Mar., 23 Apr. 1885 for Battersby's schemes; and speeches by R. C. Grant, Ibid., 5 Mar. and - MacLaren, 14 May. Also Annual Report 1884-5, pp. 8-9.
\item The Liberal and Conservative Associations each had about £800 in annual income; the Temperance societies, £2,000 and £6,000 apiece.
\end{enumerate}
defect was due to the restricted support the Council enjoyed from organised labour. In 1882, it contained 71 delegates from 31 trades (a net gain of 4 trades from 1881) and was struggling to regain the size it had been before the 1878 recession: "Still we don't disguise from ourselves for a moment that there are many of trades in Glasgow that are still standing aloof from us, although we have an idea they would find some difficulty to tell us the reason why." Only in the building sector, with its 14 delegates, was there adequate representation on the Council, while the big engineering crafts were mainly absent—notably the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, the Boilermakers, the Foundry Workers and the Patternmakers. The Council was well aware of these deficiencies: in 1876 it circularised all unrepresented trades and in 1879 it held a series of discussions on how best both to promote trade union organisation in poorly-unionised occupations and to improve co-ordination among the existing unions. The contrast between the emaciated Council of the early 1880's and that of 1899 is an indication that the rapid growth in trades union consciousness and solidarity only developed in the last decade of the century:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Delegates</th>
<th>Trades</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>£ 54</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>£171</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>81</td>
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It is hard, however, to accept finance as the sole impediment to direct political intervention by the Council, for there were two local elective bodies which did not present the difficulties of supporting the upkeep of the representatives. The Trades Council seems to have displayed no desire to secure seats on the Corporation, possibly because of the experience of George Jackson, then a member of their Executive, in 1869. For the first School Board elections, held in March 1873, the Trades Council made thorough preparations, and close examination of this incident is illuminating. In October 1872 the Council, determined to win five out of the fifteen seats for working-class representatives, appointed a committee to co-operate with kindred associations.\(^1\) As in the parliamentary context some twelve years later, there was a resolute conviction that working-men had a right to participate. "While they had full faith in what he might call the commercial and aristocratic connections of the city", said Simon Martin, "they also had full faith that they had among their own number many men who were quite capable, not only in a financial but in a business point of view, to carry out the Education Bill in its entirety with economy to themselves and to the good of the general community."\(^2\) It was thus decided that 'real' workingmen would be put up as candidates, but since the Council's programme - compulsory, undenominational secular education - was very close to that of the

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2. Ibid., 5 Mar. 1873, and speeches then by A. Boa, A. Tait and A. Turner.
Scottish National Education League, it was agreed to merge forces. A joint list of eight candidates was presented, four from each side.¹

The poll was a great disappointment, for only one of the eight was elected, and it was especially humiliating for the Trades Council that he was the Rev. Walter C. Smith from the League's ticket. About 52,000 individuals voted, and while 4,200 voted for the four League candidates, a derisory 2,000 (3.9%) voted for the Council's four.² Contemporary opinion was most surprised at the results, not least because the School Board electorate, to a far greater extent than the parliamentary electorate, was preponderantly working-class. In addition the Council had organised exhaustively. The decision to fight the elections had been endorsed by a meeting of delegates from 52 workshops and trades; public meetings had been held to expound their programme and information had been issued on the operation of the cumulative vote; and collections in factories and shops had met all election costs. It had been accepted that the united candidates would win mass working class support since they were "the best organised and most compact of the parties soliciting the vote of the electors".³


2. The Trades Council put up George Jackson; John MacCalman, a joiner and veteran unionist; John Borrowman, manager of the Glasgow Co-operative Society; and John Ure, a grain miller interested in social and sanitary reform.

This setback seems to have been due to two related causes, with finance not at all relevant. Firstly, the obvious but often overlooked fact was that many active trade unionists were not in accord with the Lib-Lab viewpoint. Charles Lang, a lifelong reformer, revealed that he had declined to stand for the Board elections since "they must remember they had to encounter a good deal of hostility among themselves". The extent of this internal division had been highlighted three weeks earlier when the Council was debating whether to fight in the parliamentary contest: "an animated discussion took place with reference to what would have to be the religious opinion of the candidate, a Conservative delegate stating that he could not sacrifice his religious feeling for the sake of all the trade unions in the country. As he had a conscience, and as eternity was before him, he could not give his aid to return a secularist workingman candidate." There was quite a rump of Conservatives on the Council led by William MacAllister of the Ironmoulders, who later became a full-time Conservative lecturer and organiser. accordingly, the efficacy of the Council in political matters was weakened, as one of its senior members recognised when he advised against making any intervention in the 1879 by-election. "The Council was not an electioneering body and if they adopted an electioneering policy,


2. G. Sentinel, 6 Dec. 1873, other speeches by J. Battersby and Baird. G. Herald, 4 Dec. 1873 identified the quoted speaker as Ross.
they would undoubtedly run their heads against a rock, and some of them would be split."¹

There was, moreover a stronger doctrine than simple partisanship which sought to remove the Council from political activity, and this was put forward by many people who were not necessarily hostile to radicalism. Thus the Council was chided for its sponsorship of the reform agitation in 1861 by the working-class newspaper, the Glasgow Sentinel, even although its editor served as chairman of the Master and Servant Act Repeal campaign organised by the Council. The Sentinel objected that "within these bodies their efforts should be entirely directed to forwarding and promoting the purposes for which they were formed".² This argument of 'ultra vires' was always invoked when the Council verged on contentious areas of discussion, as when Boa attempted to tie it to the Temperance movement.³ Indeed the Council itself was reluctant to appear too political. It withdrew very soon from the 1861 reform agitation once it had brought a committee into being, and Boa felt it necessary to defend at length the Council's decision to fight the School Board elections.⁴

The restricted role of the Trades Council in politics was seen most clearly at general elections. It also emerged then that the

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¹ D. Ferguson in G. Herald, 10 Jul. 1879.
² G. Sentinel, 23 Nov. 1861.
unions as such had little influence over the voting preferences of their rank-and-file membership, who carefully distinguished between the unions' authority in labour and political issues. Their sovereignty in the former was accepted, their fallibility in the latter was recognised. In 1868, the first election held with a majority of the electorate working-class, the Council took no direct part, but its leading members endorsed the candidate put forward by the Reform League. By 1874, however, the Council's militancy and confidence had mounted, mainly because of its involvement in the Association to Repeal the Criminal Law Amendment Act.

Formed in 1873 as a committee of the Trades Council, the Glasgow branch proved a catalyst in the political outlook of many. It received little support from two of the three sitting Liberal M.P.'s, and at the same time it was felt that little trust could be placed in the local Tories. The Repeal Association showed that it could mobilise the local union movement when it organised an enormous demonstration in November 1873, and followed this up by holding conferences with the different trades. The Association felt sufficiently confident to issue a clear warning that it intended to put the question well to the fore at the next contest. "Signs are

1. G. Herald, 6 Feb. 1873 for its formation.

2. G. Herald, 6 Feb. 1873 reports the Repeal Association's conferences at which the M.P.'s declared their opinion: only Anderson indicated his approval. G. Sentinel, 1, 8 Nov. 1873 for distrust of the Tories.

not wanting that by the date of the forthcoming election a unanimous and determined general agitation will have taken the place of isolated agitation, and the ballot box will then show the views held by working men on laws affecting combined labour, and make manifest their determination to have such made more in consonance with an equitable administration of justice free from class prejudices and distinctions and less liable to be converted by capital into readily repressive agents."

In October 1873, the Trades Council accordingly took up the question of how best to "devise the means of ascertaining" whether there would be support for a candidate "directly representing labour". Andrew Boa, the chairman of the Repeal Association, moved a resolution calling for a plebiscite to establish the demand for a labour candidate. Gladstone's unexpectedly early dissolution, however, came before the Council had been able to organise their canvass of opinion among the trades, but a candidate was found who accepted the Repeal body's demands. This was P. S. MacLiver, a radical journalist from Bristol with Glasgow connections. Having been endorsed by the Trades Council, and publishing his address before any other candidate, MacLiver seemed well-placed to succeed when, only six days before

4. MacLiver claimed to be related to Lord Clyde, the military hero of the Crimean War, who had been brought up in Glasgow.
polling, the Repeal Association convened a meeting of trades' delegates to examine the four Liberal candidates on their attitude on questions affecting working-men. At the end of the meeting, the delegates produced a surprise by voting the two orthodox Liberals top of the list, and putting MacLiver at the bottom, beneath the third man, a local worthy of no merit.\(^1\) Although the Repeal Association pledged to continue to fight on his behalf, MacLiver's position was hopeless and he withdrew three days later, leaving the Council with no option but to support Anderson and Cameron, the regular Liberals.\(^2\) While these two were the only successful Liberals, they felt no obligation to the Council, since their campaigns had been begun well before it announced its support. Thus the Council suffered a major rebuff to its political pretensions.

Despite brave noises in the interval - MacLiver was declared to be still a candidate in 1877, and in 1876 the Council was pressed to draw up a programme for the next election - reality prevailed at the next two contests.\(^3\) At the by-election in 1879 a suggestion that the Council 'homologate' the unopposed Liberal candidate was rejected as too political. Instead, a series of questions were put to the candidate who responded in a satisfactory manner, and a similar procedure was adopted at the general election in 1880 when the Council

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2. G. Herald, N.B.D.M., 2 Feb. 1874, for this incident.
3. N.B.D.M., 28 Sep. 1877, for MacLiver; G. Herald, 30 Nov. 1876 for the political programme.
expressed itself to be well pleased with the position of the three Liberal candidates on labour issues. 1

1879 and 1880 marked a severe reduction in status from that of putting forward parliamentary candidates to the level of seeking interviews in competition with other pressure groups. The Trades Council did not make any real headway until the 1890's when it succeeded in getting three of its delegates on to the municipal Council, and also won three places on the School Board. But that development marked a turning point from the Trades Council's position in the 1880's, when it was reduced to wringing its hands helplessly over the 1885 fiasco: "it would not be unfair to infer that a mistake was made in thinking that there was any great desire among the working classes to send their own class to Parliament."

Working men did not mediate their political affiliation through trades unions, but preferred to erect quite distinct associations by which to exercise influence on the parties. Even although continuity in personnel from the labour to the political organisation might be substantial, this rigid separation of powers undoubtedly reduced the overall effectiveness of the working-class in every direction.


3. The Place of Party Politics in Municipal Government

In many Victorian municipalities - Birmingham and Liverpool are perhaps the best examples - it was accepted as an integral aspect of the Council that it was divided along party lines, and this trend became particularly pronounced from around 1870. Inside the council chambers, it was contended, the discipline and unity of party was necessary to provide positive direction in policy matters, and often indeed the attainment of a specific policy was initial motive for a political group entering local government, as witness the education issue and the intervention of the Chamberlain Liberals in Birmingham. From the vantage point of the party caucus rooms, the advantages of such participation were considerable. Firstly, party organisation was kept at an efficient level by being utilised annually, and without this exercise it might become rusty over the seven-yearly intervals between parliamentary contests. Also, the rank-and-file were kept actively engaged in the routine tasks of canvassing, registering, holding meetings, so giving them a continuing sense of involvement which could be worked upon at general elections, while simultaneously the local party leaders were made aware of shifts in political feelings in the various city wards at regular intervals. Equally important, a successful career in the corporation could be the best possible


entree to representing the city in parliament. To be mayor was a useful method of attracting the attention of the electorate, while the lessons in the political arts and the chance to practise speech-making which the council offered were invaluable preliminaries to Westminster.¹

However, for the entire period under review there is no evidence of such factors operating in Glasgow. Party affiliation was never alluded to as a factor in council proceedings, a point underlined by the Herald: "... In Glasgow, unlike many of her sister municipalities throughout the kingdom, a sharply defined line has always fenced off the field of politics in matters civic from the field of politics in matters imperial."² Thus, although the Liberals outnumbered the Conservatives by two to one at parliamentary elections, they did not monopolise appointments to the Lord Provostship, and in fact, five of the ten occupants of that office between 1860 and 1889 were Conservatives.³ Most of the Provosts were elected unanimously, but when a contest did occur in 1866 between James Lumsden (a Liberal) and William Rae Arthur (a Conservative), Councillors voted quite at variance with their 'imperial' party alignments, for instead the argument was conducted solely over the questions of the respective

1. J. Chamberlain's letter to D. Fortune, of the Glasgow Liberal Association, given in G. Herald, 6 Dec. 1884, makes this point.

2. G. Herald, 12 Nov. 1880.

3. These were: Peter Clouston (1860-3); Wm. Rae Arthur (1869-71); James Bain (1874-7); Wm. MacOnie (1883-6); James King (1886-9).
abilities and length of term of service on the council of the two candidates. Outside commentators also adopted a non-partisan stance: the Whiggish Herald preferred Lumsden, whereas the radical Sentinel supported Arthur, on account of their different attitudes to municipal expenditure.¹

The possibility of any political associations colouring the Provost's conduct of business was frequently and publicly discussed: "In politics Mr. Clouston has throughout identified himself with the Tory or Conservative party, but eschewing extreme partizanship . . . He thus adhered rigidly to the statement made by him on his election as Lord Provost, viz., that during the coming three years service, he would entirely dissever politics from his municipal duties."²

In 1889 John Muir echoed this: "I have resolved insofar as politics are concerned, to follow the course adopted by my predecessor, Sir James King, viz.:—to attend no political meetings within the city of Glasgow during my term of office . . . My earnest wish is to keep politics outside of this Town Council, and that the full energies of everyone should be devoted to promoting the best interests of the city we all love so much." Accordingly Muir forthwith resigned the chairmanship of the Central Division Liberal Unionist Association.³

³ Lord Provosts, p. 446.
It follows that municipal election contests were not fought under party labels, as the current Provost confirmed in his survey of the Corporation in the mid-1890's: "... the spirit of party politics is scarcely ever imported into municipal contests sufficiently to give the elections any degree of political significance."¹ The isolated breach of this practice came in 1869, when the 'Advanced Liberal and Working Men's Candidates' trespassed into two ward contests in the hope of appealing to the new electorate. Their experience is indicative of the general current of opinion on municipal politics. George Miller, a skilled engineer and secularist who was an office-bearer in the Glasgow Working Men's Association, a body of political and social reformers, fought Ward 14 (the West Gorbals or Tradeston area) against a non-political figure.

More interest attached to the First (Bridgeton) Ward, where George Jackson stood against Rae Arthur. The circumstances were most auspicious for Jackson, for the ward had a strong working-class constituency and was an old centre of radicalism and Chartism.² Jackson was secretary of the Scottish National Reform League and had been instrumental in securing the return of three Liberal M.P.'s in the 1868 election. Arthur, however, seemed the antithesis of the community he sought to represent: a textile manufacturer, an old


². J. Greig and T. Harvey, Report on the State of Education in Glasgow (Edinburgh, 1866), pp. 17-33 describes this area.
Tory and a keen upholder of the Church of Scotland in a stronghold of Dissent. Jackson ran a vigorous campaign, calling for tighter control of municipal expenditure and for a more democratic representation on the Council in order to end middle-class rule. He stressed that participation in local government was a natural extension of the political gains recorded in 1867.¹

At the poll, Jackson lost to Arthur by 1,132 votes to 1,739 (Miller went down by 661 to 1,225). This defeat Jackson and his supporters found hard to explain, and hints that undue pressure had been exerted against his candidacy were not seriously followed up.² A more plausible explanation is that public opinion was hostile to this intrusion, for even the radical Sentinel (admittedly hostile to Jackson for other reasons), while agreeing with many of Jackson's proposals, found his candidacy "particularly ungracious" since Arthur was the Provost-elect. It argued that to oppose Arthur simply because he was a Conservative was irrelevant, because in Glasgow there had never been political bias in municipal affairs.³ This feeling of relief was shared by other, less radical observers, for it meant the perpetuation of the old non-partisan principle.⁴ No candidate


4. Lumsden Diaries, 2 Nov. 1869: "The new constituencies have done better than I expected - both the 'Working Men's' candidates have been rejected." Cf. G. Herald, 3 Nov. 1869.
wearing a political label ever again stood in our period, and when
Jackson was eventually returned to the Council in 1878 for the
socially mixed 11th ward, he did not use any party description.

In the absence of any party ties or organisation, wards were not
always contested: generally in the 1860's to 1880's well under half
of the sixteen wards would go to the polls, with the exception of
1868 and 1869, when enfranchisement and the resultant redistribution
made for uncertainty. There seem to have been various ways of
choosing a candidate in this situation. One was self-nomination,
at which James Martin, the scourge of the Council, was an expert.¹
Another, more respectable, method was by requisition, as happened to
James Lumsden: "Today I was presented with a requisition to allow
myself to be brought forward."²

This way overlapped with the third process of selection by ward
committee. These ward committees had no official or legal status,
and only occasionally emerge from the shadows of obscurity, but they
were the liaison agency between the councillors and their electorate
in the ward.³ Councillors frequently reported back to the committees
on their discharge of municipal business, and often the committee met
to pronounce upon contentious council matters: thus the City
Improvement Scheme was given close scrutiny in several districts.

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1. J. Colquhoun, My Reminiscences of Glasgow Town Council (Glasgow,
   1904), pp. 4-5.
2. Lumsden Diary, 10 Oct. 1862.
3. Bell and Paton, Glasgow, pp. 66-8 is the only printed account.
At other times the committees would summon public meetings to sound out local opinion: a notable example here being the orchestration by ward committees of the resistance by the East End to corporation schemes to encroach on Glasgow Green for a variety of lucrative projects. In addition, these ad hoc bodies frequently met to determine who should be the ward representatives on the Council, and once they had chosen an individual they threw their whole support behind him. Thus the Third Ward committee (an East End region) voted against the re-nomination of James Wilson in 1868 because he had been convener of the Council's Green Committee. The ward committee's nominee defeated Wilson at the poll by 1,335 votes to 1,111. In 1863 one ward committee informed the Council whom they wished to represent them after the death of a sitting Councillor, and the Council acquiesced in their choice.

Apart from holding annual meetings it is difficult to discern how these committees operated, but they were evidently powerful influences, even although the Herald called them unrepresentative cliques. The political complexion of the committees was quite mixed: "Happily, in the interests of local government, these committees are, in general, associated with no political organisation.

1. The accounts of this campaign of the 1860's are in the Moir Papers.
3. Lord Provosts, p. 221; G. Herald, 6 Nov. 1863 for the committee meeting.
Their bond of union is strictly municipal."¹ The second ward committee, for example, included Hugh Dale, a Tory with Orange connections, and Thomas Thompson, a radical republican. While the ward committees were a useful means of maintaining checks and controls over Councillors, because they had no sanctions to impose, other pressures could assert themselves in municipal affairs from time to time. All that was necessary was a degree of organisation and an issue to campaign over. In 1873, the Catholic Association of Glasgow was stated to be working noiselessly to get places on ward committees and also to support pro-Catholic candidates, but this came to little.²

A more sustained struggle was that between the drink and temperance interests which dominated local elections from 1869 to 1877. Both sides had election committees to run campaigns for their candidates with the result that the whole election in 1871 was summed up as "Good Templar versus Good Tippler."³ By the late 1870's a condition of stalemate had been reached, and both sides withdrew from the local polls. This episode showed that where interests were at stake (in this case, control of the licensing system), there would be electoral activity, but not under the umbrella of party politics.

¹ Bell and Paton, Glasgow, p. 66.
² G. Herald, 5 Nov. 1872.
This absence of partisanship was not, however, an ancient tradition, nor did it pass uncriticised by some party members. The decade and a half after the Municipal Corporations Reform Act was a period of intense party rivalry for control of the city council.¹ The Whigs dislodged the old Tory rulers in 1833, and to symbolise their new ascendancy installed as first Lord Provost under the democratic franchise the veteran reformer, Robert Grahame of Whitehill, who had helped defend Thomas Muir and Baird and Hardie and who had been involved in all the reform movements of the era. In 1839 the Conservatives briefly won back control of the Council, but then religious and political upheavals weakened the party. By 1848 it was no longer customary to talk of party gains or losses at municipal elections: "Throughout the day apathy and indifference seemed the rule, and the 'Free Municipal Institutions' regarding which there had been so much clamour a few years before, were sadly at a discount."²

The Conservatives were the first party to show signs of reviving this earlier practice. Shortly after forming a political association in 1869, a speaker at one of their meetings defined its aims as being firstly to place Conservative M.P.'s in the Commons, and secondly to influence municipal politics, but no direct action was

¹. New Statistical Account, vol. VI, p. 215 deplores the very recent rise of party spirit in municipal life. The N.S.A. for Glasgow was written in 1834-5.

². Lord Provosts, p. 107. Cf. Lumsden Diaries, 5 Nov. 1850 on the municipal elections: "except in two wards it has been a very dull affair, little or no excitement, quite different from what it once was."
taken over the latter aspect. In the early 1880's, interest turned again to this topic with the Secretary of the Association arguing that it was much harder to keep organisation 'sharp' in Glasgow because, unlike Liverpool and Manchester, there was no party conflict in the Council. This theme was reiterated by a speaker from Manchester later in the year who stressed how much municipal politics had stimulated the Conservatives in England. Nothing came of this, and although there were rather more Conservatives sitting on the Council in the 1880's, none of them stood on party grounds.

Liberals seemed in general to be less concerned with municipal representation, but at the end of 1884 their Association debated the case for so doing, apparently because they were alarmed at the mounting number of Tories on the Council. A letter from Chamberlain was read out at one meeting which urged intervention in local government politics, and the full Six Hundred voted for a motion that: "the time has come when the Liberal electors should consider how far it is desirable to take into account the political opinions of all candidates for the Town Council, with the view of securing a municipal representation more in harmony with the political views of the great body of the constituency." There was, however, a

1. Speech by W. Morier, G. Herald, 5 Nov. 1872.
well-argued opposition within the Association which held that the only relevant question was whether a Councillor was performing his duties efficiently, for: "... there was one respect in which Scotland was superior to England - namely, that politics were never introduced into municipal affairs." By the time of the next municipal elections - November 1885 - the parliamentary contests preoccupied the energies of the Liberals. It was only in the late 1890's that party lines began to be drawn up in municipal politics, a process which accelerated as the Irish and the I.L.P. sought election.

The prevailing approach was most aptly stated by an unexpected source. James Moir, who had been a Chartist leader and then advocated radical political reforms for the next thirty years, sat almost continuously on the Council from 1848 to 1880. "Moir had a grain of common sense", he reflected in 1877, "and that taught him that there was a time to speak about the Charter and a time to hold his tongue about it. As the Town Council was not the place for urging the six points of the Charter, he very seldom spoke about it, so that the precautious (precocious?) prophesying of his old opponents were entirely dissipated." 2

Why, if party political advancement played no part, did men undertake the onerous duties of the Council? The burdens of office

1. E. M. Scott, G. Herald, 30 Sep. 1884, also Councillors Gray and Morrin.

were especially apparent on those who took the Lord Provostship, for it involved much hard work - including frequent trips to Westminster to attend to the Corporation's legislative interests - and moreover a great deal of time and expense had to be spent on entertaining. The eulogy of one retiring Provost noted, as a natural fact, "He had been called upon to exercise liberality, and also hospitality, to a very large extent, and he had done so to the honour of the city and to himself."¹ There were indeed objections raised against the appointment of Collins as Provost in 1877 on the grounds that his teetotal principles would curb the scale of hospitality. It was sometimes difficult to persuade a Councillor to become Lord Provost: in 1866 James Lumsden was genuinely reluctant to take the position through dislike of the "badgering and annoyance" of the office. At last he relented: "I am most unwilling to accept, but I fear I will be forced into it."² In 1883 no-one wanted to become Lord Provost, and William MacOnie eventually consented after succumbing to a great deal of pressure. In 1886, however, the situation was so desperate that James King became Provost after being drafted into a vacant council seat only five months previously.³ The benefits of becoming


² Lumsden Diary, 31 Jul. 1865, 26 Jul. 1866.

³ Colqhoun, My Reminiscences, pp. 1-2; Lord Provosts, pp. 386-7, 405-6 for MacOnie. For King, Lord Provosts, pp. 429-32.
the first citizen of Glasgow which could be set against these drawbacks were intangible, but nevertheless substantial. A knighthood was regularly bestowed on the retiring Provost, and the attractions of such social status were enhanced after King was made a baronet and also awarded an honorary doctorate by the University. Thereafter, there were always those willing to occupy the Provost's chair.¹

An alternative explanation for participation in council politics - jobbery or graft - does not seem applicable to Glasgow, for there is little evidence that such practices were rife.² There were plenty of critics of any council decision, but few allegations of corruption. Significantly, the most publicised accusation seriously backfired when the Lord Provost and some leading citizens won their suit for heavy damages against the North British Daily Mail which had charged them with malpractices in property transactions connected with the City Improvement Scheme.³ The conduct of council meetings in public and the thorough press reports - both innovations following the 1833 Act - may have helped to remove any suspicions of taint in this field. What seems to have brought the more dynamic among the councillors into municipal affairs was some desire to assist in the social advancement of Glasgow. As one Lord Provost explained,

¹ Colqhoun, pp. 2-3; Mavor, My Windows, I, p. 54.
² The G. Herald observed, 3 Nov. 1880, that there was, as compared to the days of the closed corporation, "less jobbery . . . less quiet squaring of conflicting individual interests." Cf. W. Smart, "Glasgow and its Municipal Industries", Quarterly Journal of Economics 9 (1895), pp. 193-4.
"social questions are, indeed, the touchstone in the election of Town Councillors in Glasgow", and his successor exhorted: "Gentlemen, I am sure that we are all united in the one common desire to do what we can in order to make this city purer in every sense of the word, and happier and more comfortable for the lives of the great mass of the people." To these ends - the Glasgow equivalent of Birmingham's civic gospel - all could unite, irrespective of party, as was seen when James Bain, a strong Conservative, was the first to propose the municipalisation of the gas supply.

From the foregoing, it is evident that service on the Council was a concern purely internal to the city, and carried no implications of a parliamentary future for those who held high municipal office. From the general election of 1847 to the splitting of the city into seven separate seats, there were 23 different parliamentary candidates for Glasgow, and only 3 were councillors. Of the three, William Dixon came bottom in 1847; Alexander Hastie, Lord Provost 1846-8, was the only success, sitting as M.P. from 1847 to 1857; and Sir James Bain, Lord Provost 1874-7, failed in 1880. For all the rest, including 10 M.P.'s, lack of municipal experience was not a disadvantage. In the light of later argument, it is instructive to note that, in the short period from its inception in 1873 until 1885, the Glasgow School Board should provide four candidates, three of whom

(Whitelaw, Middleton and Russell) were returned to Parliament. It would be reasonable to conclude that the issues over which the Education Board contests were fought were of greater relevance to the central preoccupations of mid-Victorian politics.
CHAPTER THREE

Components of Liberalism
1. **Urban Whiggery**

The parliamentary and municipal reform acts of 1832 and 1833 meant the end of the old Tory dominance in the political life of Glasgow, and power in both these spheres passed to the Whig Reformers.\(^1\) Their control was tight for over a decade, until the ecclesiastical upheaval of 1843 produced evangelical unity against erastianism. This was seen firstly in the Council Chambers, where James Anderson and Alexander Hastie were successive Lord Provosts from 1846 to 1851, the first Voluntaries to hold that office. Full retribution, however, was reserved for the general election of 1847 when the Dissenting interest returned its two men, Hastie and MacGregor, over the two Whigs, John Dennistoun (the retiring M.P.) and William Dixon of Govanhill. A new, radical middle-class movement had swept aside the Whig burger aristocracy: as the student of this era in Glasgow politics puts it, "Politically the eighteenth century ended in 1847".\(^2\) Contemporaries also rejoiced at the extinction of the rule of Whiggery: "The old clique, now happily broken up, was odious enough before among the more earnest class of reformers in Glasgow."\(^3\)

That this was not merely a temporary setback for, but a rout of the Whigs seemed confirmed by subsequent events. Within four months

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3. G. Chronicle, 30 June 1847; also N.B. Mail, 29 Jul. and G. Saturday Post, 10 Jul. 1847.
of the electoral defeat the Whigs closed down their organ, the Glasgow Argus. The paper claimed it was doing so because it had now seen the achievement of all the reforms (except the ballot and shorter parliaments) which it had set out to advocate in 1832.\textsuperscript{1} But the real causes of its demise were the running losses of £30 a month and the falling circulation which had shed 100 subscribers (about one-fifth) since the start of the election.\textsuperscript{2} The Whigs were thus left practically voiceless in trying to disseminate their opinions through the city press, for they could count only on the fitful support of Peter Mackenzie's Reformer's Gazette, over which they had, unlike the Argus, no proprietorial control.\textsuperscript{3} Soon after came another sign of the party's decline when George Crawfurd, the political agent and election manager of the Glasgow Whig interest, left active political life to become Clerk to the Sheriff of Lanarkshire - an indication of the despair which even the most devoted Whigs felt. William Dixon also confirmed this disarray when after only one session, he abandoned his bid to purify the electoral roll, which was intended to be a prelude to his standing again.\textsuperscript{4} Early in 1848 he resigned

\begin{enumerate}
\item G. Argus, 29 Nov. 1847. Cowan, The Newspaper in Scotland, pp. 80, 142-3, 221-3 for the Argus, which he regards as the best Glasgow paper of its time.
\item Glasgow Argus Proprietors' Minute Book, 15 Nov. 1847. The editor, Charles MacKay, had been dismissed in June for supporting the anti-Whig candidates and no adequate replacement could be found. Minute Book, 9, 11 June 1847; C. MacKay, Forty Years' Recollections of Life, Literature and Public Affairs (London, 1877), I, pp. 404-16.
\item Cowan, The Newspaper, describes Mackenzie as "an ardent Palmerstonian on all issues", (p. 288), but refers to his mercurial attitudes. Cf. A. Aird, Printers and Printing in Glasgow, 1830-1890 (Glasgow, n.d.), p. 17, for Mackenzie's "hot and irrepressible" conduct.
\item G. Saturday Post, 24, 31 July, 21 Aug. 1847.
\end{enumerate}
from the Town Council on the grounds, as a sympathiser claimed, that he had been systematically excluded from important office by the new rulers.¹

Clear corroboration of the eclipse the Whigs found themselves to be in came with the general election in July 1852. Disaffection between the two sitting M.P.'s, Hastie and MacGregor, had resulted in them running separately with autonomous committees and this split encouraged the Whigs to try for one seat, but in so doing they only revealed their low condition. John Dennistoun's old supporters got up a requisition in mid-April, but he declined to come forward, explaining that as he still refused to oppose the Maynooth grant, a majority of the electorate would be hostile. Critics pointed out that attendances at the preliminary meetings of Dennistoun's friends were "not numerous" and that only lukewarm interest was evinced in discussing whether a fight should be made. With the failure of this effort to form an impressive display of Whig strength before Hastie and MacGregor could marshall their supporters, in the hope that one of them would abandon the contest, the advantage now passed to the two sitting M.P.'s.²

After two months of prevarication, a further meeting of the same Whig individuals - this time only a fortnight before polling day - chose Lord Melgund to be their nominee. This was very much

¹ Ibid., 1 Jan. 1848.

² Lumsden Diaries, 15 Apr. 1852: "John Dennistoun's friends meet to-morrow so Hastie must do something decisive now, either by issuing an address or giving up." For the Whig moves, G. Herald, 19 Apr.; G. Courier, 15, 17, 22 Apr.; G. Citizen, 17 Apr., 1 May; Scotch Reformers' Gazette, 24 Apr.
a last minute scramble on both sides: others had declined before
Melgund was induced to fight; Melgund, who had been ousted at Greenock
by Murray Dunlop and the Free Church-Voluntary alliance in full cry,
had considered Edinburgh and Ayrshire before looking to Glasgow.
Indeed by early June Melgund, despite his status as brother-in-law to
Lord John Russell, had concluded that his tolerant views on Maynooth
precluded his winning any Scottish seat, added to which was "the very
limited assistance which it is in my power to give in defraying
election expenses".1 Pressed by the city's influential Whigs into
standing, Melgund found a woeful lack of organisation. His committee
could only muster some 110 names, whereas in 1847 over 450 served on
the Whig committee, and about the same in 1857. Only the hard core
of Whiggery was out in 1852. As an unknown individual holding
strong and unpopular views on the two key issues of education and
religious endowments, Melgund merely drove the other two Liberals
closer together in an attempt to prevent the Conservative candidate
from cashing in on the Liberal disunion. In addition, many were
antagonised by what they saw as an attempted revival of clique rule
in putting Melgund forward. At a general meeting of his committee
on the eve of polling, Melgund was informed "that all the elder men
of experience and judgment voted for the withdrawal of your Lordship,
and that nearly all those who were opposed to it were either hot-headed

1. Minto Papers, NLS 135/2 for Melgund and the Edinburgh seat:
letters from Geo. Combe, 7, 13 May, 13 June 1852 and from Jas.
Simpson, 2, 8, 14 June; also Melgund to Major Moir, 18 June.
For Ayrshire, ibid., Melgund to J. Campbell and R. Gilmour, 7,
9 June. For the Greenock struggle, NLS 136/2, passim.
men or very young". The latter prevailed and Melgund stood, only to suffer the humiliation of being withdrawn from the contest at 11 o'clock by his committee, who instructed their supporters to switch their votes to beat the Tory. Melgund got a derisory 354 votes, against 3,209 and 3,140 for the successful Liberals (and 1,681 for the Conservative). These figures, together with the strategic miscalculations and feeble organisation revealed during the election campaign, led to the conclusion drawn by contemporaries: "The old Whig party in this city has, in this election, received its death-blow." 2

Yet the elections of 1857 provided a total refutation of this downward cycle by the Whigs. In February 1857, MacGregor, already losing support in the city, went bankrupt and resigned his seat. He was replaced at the by-election by Walter Buchanan of Shandon who easily defeated James Merry, an eccentric ironmaster and racehorse owner. Buchanan possessed the full Whig credentials: an old reformer of the 1830-32 era, he had begun his career in the Catholic Emancipation agitation; he had been chairman of the local Anti-Corn Law League Association and had sat on the board of the 'Argus'; and he had been Vice-chairman of both Dennistoun's 1847 and Melgund's 1852 committees. As one notice of his life put it, "For long he


2. G. Constitutional (a Tory paper), 10 Jul. 1852; also G. Chronicle (Radical), 14 Jul. and Lumsden Diaries, 7, 9 Jul. 1852.
was one of the ruling Whig body of 'Clique' as it was called". ¹

That Buchanan's victory in 1857 thus marked a reversion to the Whig element was understood and deplored by many radicals: "he has not of late taken any conspicuous part in public life, and the opinions he expresses on the questions of the present day are certainly not a little short of our mark . . . The guidance of his committee too, seems to have fallen this time completely into the hands of the old clique leaders". ² Nevertheless, many were prepared to countenance Buchanan since Merry's main appeal was directed to those very elements which the anti-Whig Liberal Dissenters most detested: "He calculates on all the spirit dealers' influence, and also a large portion of the popish constituency." ³ In this way the Chronicle, a journal of Voluntary views, could claim that Buchanan was not the tool of any clique, but represented a true and broad Liberalism. ⁴

However, the general election, which was held within five weeks of the by-election, showed that the Whigs had fully recovered without needing the support of the more radical Liberals. In a three-cornered contest, Buchanan topped the poll with 7,087 while Hastie came third with 5,053 - a handsome victory at the expense of the group which had

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² G. Saturday Post, 28 Feb., 21 Mar. 1857. Also Commonwealth, 28 Feb., found Buchanan's politics "at once immature and unsatisfactory", as did the new G. Argus, 28 Feb. All these, however, were radical papers.


⁴ 4 Mar. 1857; G. Courier, 3 Mar., states that the Temperance voters chose Buchanan as "the best(sic) man of the two".
been triumphant ten years earlier. To deepen the Dissenters' chagrin, the other successful candidate, Robert Dalglish, despite his radical stance on franchise extension, was in many ways close to Whiggery. He remained true to his suffrage principles throughout his parliamentary career, and was among the forty-strong 'Tea Room party' of Liberals who helped carry Disraeli's Reform act in 1867. On most other issues Dalglish was rather a moderate Liberal: for instance, he supported the South in the American Civil War, and entertained the South's Commissioner to Britain at his estate in 1862; and he was also hostile to Temperance or ecclesiastical radical demands. Moreover, with his large estate at Kilmardinny, his ownership of the largest calico works in Scotland and his lavish dinner parties, he was very close to the Whig social pattern, and after some initial suspicion over his views on the franchise, many regarded him as a fellow Whig.

The 1859 election passed off with no contest, both Dalglish and Buchanan being unopposed amid general indifference to have a fight. For, as the Herald observed, an election "unhinges business, unsettles the community, excites animosities and lets loose angry passions which are not soon allayed". But the Whigs still dominated, as Dalglish's explanation why he was anxious to avoid a contest revealed: "I think the best game for true reformers is to try to pledge any candidate to a liberal measure rather than start an extreme

1. One Hundred Glasgow Men, I, pp. 97-8; The Bailie, "Men You Know" 7 (4 Dec. 1872); J. Jeans, Western Worthies (Glasgow, 1872), pp. 36-41; G. Herald, 21 June 1880 for his obituary.

2. G. Herald, 22 Apr. 1859; cf. Lumsden Diaries, 5 Apr. 1859: "a general election always interferes with business"
man at the present election — if any extreme man is started against a moderate (i.e. a Whig) they will probably start a second candidate — and the result will be that no care on my part can prevent my being classed with the Ultra, and in that event lose my election."

Even the general election of 1865, fought nationally against the background of imminent parliamentary reform, passed off quietly in Glasgow, and to the contentment of the Whigs. Buchanan was compelled to stand down because his East India house had run into grave financial problems, but as his substitute there appeared another typical Whig, William Graham. Graham was the son of the founder of the Lancefield mill, one of Glasgow's giant cotton-spinning factories, but had himself also branched out into wine importing and the East India trade.2

His political aspirations were doubtless bequeathed to him by his uncle Alexander who "throughout his life was a staunch supporter of Whig policies and was among the foremost in every reform movement".3

In his election address William referred to his own experiences in the struggles for Catholic Emancipation, parliamentary reform and free trade; displayed a proper Whiggish caution about further enfranchisement; and claimed to be Buchanan's successor.4

1. Dalglish to James Moir, 5 Apr. 1859, Moir Papers.
3. G. Herald, 22 May 1860; C. B. Gribble, Records of the late Alexr. Graham, Esq., of Lancefield (Glasgow, 1860) reprints many of his political speeches.
4. G. Herald, 12 June 1865 prints his address; his campaign speeches were reported from 28 June to 27 July.
committee was very similar to Buchanan's and he topped the poll with 8,170 votes, Dalglish trailing with 6,766. The third candidate, John Ramsay of Kildalton, gathered only 5,830 votes and so his challenge to Graham failed, partly because he was unknown in the city and partly because the Whigs' power was still overwhelming. Even the drastic changes in the electorate brought about by the Second Reform Act could not immediately dislodge the Whigs and Graham entered into a compact at the 1868 contest with other sections of the party to guarantee the return of three Liberals.

The occasion for the Whigs to regain political representation came in 1857 mainly through internal dissensions among their rivals, but that the Whigs were able to seize on the exploit this opportunity requires some explanation, particularly in the context of the obituaries previously written for them. In some measure, their social composition and the attractions of their moderate ideological standpoint in a period of muted political debate (both discussed below) contributed, but what gave these features both point and outlet were what may be termed firstly their sense of civic patriotism towards Glasgow, and secondly the quality of their bearing at public occasions, which was bestowed on them by their life-style.

As Briggs has shown,¹ a feeling of pride in and duty towards the way they made their fortune was common to many Victorian provincial

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businessmen, and their manifestation of these sentiments took differing forms in different cities. In Glasgow, because the Whigs were associated with the stirring events of the reform era, they tended to regard politics as their natural vehicle of expressing civic pride. It was their efforts, after all, which had given the city two M.P.'s in place of the quarter-share previously allotted, and which had also placed control of municipal affairs in the hands of the electors. It seemed only appropriate that those who had been the spearheads of change should then direct the control of these matters. The Whig contribution to the City Council was far greater than any comparable group, for they were efficient and progressive in office. Thus the two major projects of municipal enterprise in the Victorian era were both Whig inspired. The Loch Katrine water-works were largely the creation of Robert Stewart of Omoa and Murdostosn, who as Lord Provost from 1851 to 1854 persisted in pressing ahead with the venture in the face of numerous obstacles. Stewart's business office was the venue for organising Buchanan's candidacy in 1857, and he was Vice-chairman of the committee. The City Improvement Scheme was promoted by Lord Provost John Blackie who, while never an intimate Whig, supported Buchanan in 1857 and Graham in 1868. The genesis of the scheme was the purchase of old property by a group of Whiggish individuals led by James Watson and James

1. For the change in Glasgow municipal politics after 1833, see the speech by W. Gilmour in Lord Provosts of Glasgow, 1833-1902 (Glasgow, 1902), pp. 4-5.

2. For Stewart, see Lord Provosts of Glasgow, pp. 145-8; and obituary in G. Herald, 13 Sep. 1866. For the committee meeting, Lumsden Diaries, 24 Feb. 1857.
Lumsden, who were anxious to improve the city centre by redevelopment and who transferred their buildings to the Corporation Trust. It is interesting to contrast the concern displayed by the Whigs with the response of the Dissenting Radicals to these urban problems. Although the latter generally modelled their politics on those of Joseph Chamberlain, they were very critical of the Improvement Trust whose operations in Glasgow substantially influenced their hero's municipal work in Birmingham. Immediately after launching the Trust, Blackie lost his council seat to a leading Temperance Radical, J. L. Lang, on the charge of extravagance with the rates. William Collins, another Temperance Radical, entered the Council in 1868 on similar grounds along with two minor Radical figures, Robert Simpson and Thomas Dick. All alleged that the workings of the Improvement Trust involved excessive expenditure, criticisms in which the Radicals' organ the North British Daily Mail, joined in loudly. This position is identical to the "Economist" municipal faction in Birmingham to whom Chamberlain was implacably opposed.

This devotion to the good of the city possessed by the Whigs was stressed by one of the last of their number, J. O. Mitchell, in his various historical and antiquarian writings on the social life of


2. N.B.D.M., 30 Nov. 1868 for an open-air meeting of up to 2,000 addressed by Lang on the topic. See also the section on radicalism below.
Glasgow. Even allowing for nostalgia, as well as his distaste for the new rulers of Glasgow in the 1880's and 1890's as having coloured his expressions, there remains some shrewd analysis in those passages where he lamented the withdrawal from public life by some of the older burgher aristocracy and the decline in that contact between classes which had previously held the community together. In his study of the great Whig family, the Stirlings of Cordale, Mitchell called for a return to the "old-fashioned virtues" of class sympathy and civic involvement which these men had displayed. Again, in the evocatively titled Old Country Houses of the Old Glasgow Gentry, he had a long elegiac passage on the departure of that class and bewailed the situation instead obtaining in the 1880's, which he saw as one of impending social conflict.

In the terms of parliamentary politics, this spirit expressed itself in a desire to see Glasgow, 'the second city', well and fittingly represented in the national legislature. Here the confidence and personal contacts which their whole social situation afforded placed the Whigs in a superior position to the other sections of the city's social and political structure. A good part of the

1. J. O. Mitchell, Old Glasgow Essays (Glasgow, 1905), pp. xvi-xxix for his biography. His middle name - Oswald - reflects his place in the Whig tradition, for James Oswald of Shieldhall sat as Whig M.P. for Glasgow from 1841 to 1847.

2. Old Glasgow Essays, pp. 10-13 (written in 1880); cf. pp. 334-5, 340-1. Mitchell wrote many of the notices in One Hundred Glasgow Men, which often point to the public spirit displayed by the older breed.

reformers' case before 1832 had been that one fourth share in the Clyde Burghs seat was not representation commensurate with a city of Glasgow's wealth and importance, and this sense of prestige has been identified by several authorities as a prominent element in the first Reform movement.\(^1\) Accordingly many city notables were acutely worried at the calibre of the parliamentary performances of both Hastie and MacGregor. MacGregor hardly presented the best advertisement for the high commercial principles with which Glasgow believed itself to be identified, for he was deeply implicated in the fraudulent Royal British Bank which finally failed in 1856 with debts of some £600,000.\(^2\) Nor did he make much impression on the Commons: MacGregor's Highland accent (he came from Inverness) apparently worked against him and by 1856 the press were reporting that he was the sole comic performance left at Westminster consequent upon the death of Colonel Sibthorp.\(^3\) Hastie, while never accused of financial manipulation, spoke seldom in the House, and rather haltingly at that.\(^4\) Given these two "lumberers" and "voiceless noodles", more than one contemporary was


moved to observe that Glasgow had exercised more influence in Parliament when Kirkman Finlay had sat for the Clyde Burghs in the unenfranchised era.¹

There were two broad views of what was wanted from the representatives of Glasgow. One school of opinion tended to see the ideal city M.P. as being primarily hardworking and effective in promoting the interests of the locality. Robert Dalglish and George Anderson both performed this role to perfection, meeting municipal delegations, sitting on relevant Commons committees and scrutinising legislation to ensure that Glasgow was not adversely affected.²

Another sector of thought wanted an eloquent or prestigious politician worthy of sitting for Glasgow. Thus Layard was invited to stand in 1852, and Palmerston was also approached in that year, so rumour went.³ In 1865 the leader of an influential party of city Liberals who were taking soundings as to the likelihood of Gladstone running stated this line of thinking succinctly: "His acceptance of Glasgow would, in my opinion, be an unmingled benefit to us in every respect, and give us the weight in Parliament justly due to this great city."⁴

In similar vein, "Young Glasgow" inserted a press notice in 1859 calling for Cobden to be returned as M.P. for Glasgow: "Then indeed we might

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2. There is a good account of Dalglish's usefulness as a local M.P. during the period of Lumsden's Provostship (1866-9) in his Diaries; and even the Conservative News praised Anderson's zeal in local matters - e.g. 27 Mar. 1884.


turn to the columns of the 'Times' and read our members' speeches and feel that at length Glasgow had an orator in Parliament to make known its grievances and to give expression to its opinions and wishes. At present Glasgow and its members can only be found in the Division Lists . . . It is time that we should emerge from our obscurity and gain a little reputation. We may yet found a Glasgow school of politicians not less famed than the Manchester School, but we can only do so by bestirring ourselves and departing from the usual method of electing a gentleman belonging to the locality.¹

But these hopes were unlikely to be realised, for the travelling, the cost and the volume of work involved in representing Glasgow were too great to induce such individuals to represent the city (to say nothing of the volatile and extreme views of the electorate, to which the wretched Melgund could testify), and so suitable, but second best, men had to be found within the city. And here the Whigs were well positioned to stake their claims, for by universal consent, Buchanan and Graham had rhetorical gifts, at least in comparison to their contenders. Buchanan's accomplished delivery, as befitted a seasoned public speaker of twenty-five years experience, won favourable comments during the 1857 campaign.² Graham was put forward by his supporters as one whose great eloquence would redeem

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Glasgow's reputation and place it in the van of public opinion. After being given the honour of seconding the Queen's address in 1866, Graham rather fell away and the high expectations entertained of his parliamentary prospects were never fulfilled; indeed his speeches now read as typically overblown and artificial mid-Victorian utterances.  

It is abundantly plain from contemporary allusions that this skill in public speaking was highly esteemed and formed an important piece of equipment whereby the Whigs could dominate city politics. Moreover, it went hand in hand with other facets of their superior social status which also contributed to their mastery. They were, after all, not alone amongst Glaswegians in having wealth enough to meet the cost of holding a large urban seat, which could be very heavy. But they, and they alone, were also accustomed to mixing in metropolitan upper class circles and so possessed that social polish and confidence which made such an impact on their fellow citizens whose horizons were strictly provincial. Whig families like the Crums, the Tennants, the Parker-Smiths and the Grahams were sending their sons to the great English public schools and then to Oxford or Cambridge. Again, many married into prominent landed and political families: the Grahams into the Hoggs; the Dennistouns


into the Onslows and the Sellars\(^1\); the Tennants into the Ribblesdale, Lyttleton and Asquith families.

The sense of equality with this elite of 'natural leaders' which regular and easy intercourse must have impressed on the Whigs may help to explain why they were able to lead in their own city. For instance, Mrs Sellars (nee Dennistoun) gives a vivid account in her autobiography of life on her Highland estate to which Scottish and English aristocrats came up as regular visitors.\(^1\) Margot Asquith (a Tennant) in her adolescent years in the 1870's and 1880's was accustomed to meet Gladstone, Salisbury, Hartington, Curzon, Balfour, Bret Harte, Alma Tadema, Jowett and Lord Randolph Churchill, either when they were staying at her father's country home or when dining in London during the 'season'. Rosebery, the leader of the Scottish Whigs and a rising force in the Liberal party, was a particular friend of the Tennant family.\(^2\) The pattern of life followed by this upper bourgeois Liberal class as revealed in their memoirs - frequent trips to London for social functions, resorting to their large estates to enjoy county society for the duration of the summer - provided the experience and facility to participate in politics at the level of Westminster.\(^3\)


3. Asquith, *Autobiography*, I, p. 16: "He (Sir Charles Tennant, her father) was fond of a few people - Mark Napier, Ribblesdale, Lord Haldane, Mr Heseltine, Lord Rosebery and Arthur Balfour."
Of themselves, style and panache will not suffice to account for twenty years of dominance by the Whigs, and stress must also be placed upon both their social background and the ideological climate of these years. Shifts in these two areas would affect the delicate balancing procedure through which the Whigs prevailed. The absence of poll-books makes it impossible to compile a total picture of those who voted for the Whig candidates, but the printed committee lists offer an analysis of the activists. The core of Whig supporters, as the earlier account of the group suggests, were those who sat on Melgund's 1852 committee. Taking those of Melgund's 110-strong committee who also appeared on either the 1847 or 1857 Whig lists indicates a nucleus of 66. As TABLE 3.1 shows, the weight of the textile interest is striking and its predominance is reinforced when the inner ring of Glasgow Whiggery is considered. Of the seven candidates put up on the Whig ticket between 1847 and 1874, all except two (Dixon and Melgund) were intimately associated with the industry. Of the 28 Chairmen and Vice-chairmen of these committees, 14 were in the textile business; 4 in chemicals; 5 in iron and steel and coal mining; and 5 in other pursuits. Admittedly, 'textiles' covers many activities, from great spinners like the Grahams, Galbraiths and Higginbothams, sewed muslin manufacturers like the Andersons and Browns to calico printers and dyers like the Crums and Stirlings, as

1. Charles Tennant was returned for the city in 1879, but is not included in these figures because he stood in the name of all Glasgow Liberalism and not as the representative of only the Whig section.
### TABLE 3.1

**Occupations of the 'Nuclear' Whigs in Glasgow**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Textile Manufacturers and Merchants</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron and Coal Masters</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Manufacturers</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undefined Manufacturers and Merchants</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Manufacturers and Merchants</strong></td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writers</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountants, Bankers, Stockbrokers</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editors</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Professions</strong></td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous, Gentleman, Not Given</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>66</td>
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well as cotton manufacturer-merchants such as the Dennistouns and Buchanan. Nevertheless, the essentially historic nature of Glasgow Whiggery emerges, for it embraced those who had prospered during the first stage of the city's industrial revolution. Besides the range of textile industries, the Tennants of St Rollox, representing chemicals and iron and coal masters like Dixon of Govanhill, Dunlop of Tollcross and Wilson of Dundyvan - all established in the pre-1850 era - were the leading exponents of Whiggery.

But increasingly from about 1860 economic power moved away from these sectors to the engineering and metal-based industries, and here the Whigs were crucially weak. Of the 66 'nuclear' whigs, only one, James Aitken, an engineer and millwright, could be said to stand for the new order. The last Whig committee, that of 1874, included 37 textile manufacturers and 12 iron and coal masters, as against only 10 in the rising areas: 2 shipbuilders, 2 engineers, 2 ironfounders, 2 iron tube-makers and 2 machinery and boiler-makers. This clearly reveals the failure of the Whigs to expand and recruit outside their traditional fields, confirming the perception of Whiggery as a particular social and historic position as much as anything else. The only significant exception to the stagnation of Whiggery was the rather unusual adhesion in the late 1860's of some Liberals amongst the University professoriate, as discussed below. As the older generation died out and some of the younger generation showed less interest in (or appetite for) political battle, while simultaneously their economic base was eroded, the plight of the old reformers deepened. The crisis was given a further adverse twist by new
clashes over policies and party ideas with other Liberal groups which became apparent in the same period.

The peculiar attraction of Whiggism to the Glasgow electorate helps to make comprehensible the power of that wing. As already observed, this appeal consisted in part of rehearsing their key role in past reform movements: Buchanan's address to the electorate in 1857 enumerated for the younger voters his part in the Parliamentary and Free Trade struggles. Graham in 1865 likewise told the beads of reform: Catholic Emancipation; the East India Company monopoly; the Slave Trade; the Anti-Corn Law League, etc. Alexander Crum, the Whig candidate in 1874, put it thus: "Alike by birth, training and conviction I have always been associated with the Liberal Party."

There was little evidence that their thinking had advanced much beyond these earlier days, as Buchanan candidly observed, "It is now several years since I have mixed much in politics". Generally they all counselled steady and moderate progress in such contentious matters as suffrage extension, licensing laws, Church and State relations and so on. Graham proclaimed the yardstick for judging issues to be not abstract theories but "practical experience and honest consideration". 1

This cautious pragmatism infuriated more radical spirits who sought M.P.'s more in tune with advanced politicians of the Cobden and Bright mould. But "vague and Whiggish" notions struck a response in the electorate, for most interpreters ascribed Buchanan and Dalglish's

victory in 1857 to a rejection of the twin poles of extremism. On the one side, the Sabbatarian, Temperance and Voluntary stance of Hastie had been swept aside, while on the other the demagogic, disreputable MacGregor had been removed.1 This moderate trend in Glasgow was also seen in the general approval voiced at the defeat in England of the radical leaders of the Anti-Corn Law League days, whom Glasgow merchants had differed with very soon after 1846. This via media suited the mood of Glasgow, especially since, as seen above, there was a considerable body which disliked the passions inflamed by election contests and their detrimental effect on business activity. This non-partisan approach reached its logical conclusion in 1865 when Graham ran as a Liberal-Conservative candidate. His committee chairman was Archibald Orr-Ewing of Ballikinrain, the turkey-red dyer who sat for Dumbartonshire as a Tory from 1868 to 1892, and other leading Conservatives on his committee included 6 future Vice-presidents of the G.C.A. and two future parliamentary candidates. In his campaign utterances Graham constantly emphasised that acute party differences were ended and that the political gap on most issues of the day had closed.2

1. G. Herald, 1 Apr. 1857: "He (Hastie) was the impersonation of a party in the city of gloomy and impracticable views as regards social matters of everyday life." Supporters (Scottish Guardian, 3 Apr., G. Chronicle, 1 Apr.) and opponents (G. Sentinel, 4 Apr.) agreed.

2. Morning Journal, 5 Jul. 1865 said Graham "is believed by many of his friends to be what is called an 'independent conservative'; but then it supported his rival. N.B.D.M., 13 Jul., also refers to Graham's Tory leanings. At the next election, moreover, Graham maintained that the 1865 contest had been fought on personality, not principle - G. Herald, 30 Oct., 17 Nov. 1868.
This consensus of subdued political debate, while it unquestionably benefited the Whigs, cannot fully explain their survival, for in the issue-laden 1868 election they were able to combine in harmony with other Liberal sections and maintain their share of the representation. Because the Whigs shared extensive regions of agreement with the other two party camps, this helped bind them all together during this period. Commitment to free trade principles was of course common ground to all three, but this issue tended to bulk larger in the outlook of the middle-class Whigs and radical Liberals, as reflected in the proceedings of the Chamber of Commerce. Both were also linked and at once marked off from the Lib-Lab group by their dislike of organised labour. John Matheson, Junior, the last representative of the old Whig family, the Stirlings of Cordale, was an emphatic advocate of this laissez-faire school. In a review of Britain's economic performance he argued that "the only practical conclusion I can draw from this (survey) is that we have strayed from the direct line of material progress in two ways, namely in our labour laws and the action of the trade unions". Matheson contended that the Factory acts and strikes alike broke economic laws and helped our competitors overseas, and others voiced similar opinions on these two matters: for instance the radical Stephen Mason, who sat for Mid-Lanark from 1885 to 1888,

1. John Matheson, Jr., The Spread of Manufacturing Industry (Glasgow, 1874), pp. 23-9. For Matheson, see One Hundred Glasgow Men, I, pp. 219-22; and obituary in G. Herald, 14 Nov. 1878.
wrote a pamphlet vindicating this approach. This analysis was in direct conflict with Lib-Lab thinking, for the latter defended the unions from all charges of either tyranny or of flying in the face of economic facts.

The most important linkage between Whigs and Lib-Labs operated through the education question. Both groups—and they alone—were agreed on the desirability of a national, unsectarian and secular system of education. Melgund had written a pamphlet in 1848 arguing for a truly "national" system, and followed this up by introducing two abortive bills in the Commons. Locally, the Glasgow Secular School Society of the 1850's was run by Whiggish figures like Walter Crum and John Tennant and excluded all religious instruction from the class-room. With this background, the alliance became firmly forged when the education question emerged as a live issue after 1867, for the Scottish National Reform League had identified the improvement of working class education as virtually its sole concrete objective after suffrage reform. In the period from 1867 until the Act of 1872, a succession of meetings were called to promote these

1. S. Mason, The Agricultural and Industrial Depression (Glasgow, 1885); cf. the speech of William MacEwen, the Vice-Chairman of Crum's Committee in 1874, reported in the Chamber of Commerce Ann. Rep. 1881, pp. 20-22. For other Whig views, see the bitter attack by James Stirling, Trades Unionism (Glasgow, 1866), especially pp. 43-6; and also the speech by Sir James Watson in T.N.A.P.S.S. (1874), pp. 687-8, where he fears lest the Clyde shipbuilding industry may be destroyed by trade unionism, as had happened on the Thames.


educational goals, culminating in the formation of the Scottish National Education League in January, 1870.¹

This Scottish League was quite distinct from the parent English association in one vital respect: despite similar policy objectives, it was neither Nonconformist-led nor inspired — and indeed rather faced hostility from Glasgow Dissenters, as discussed below. One component part of the Education League was the Reform League leadership of George Jackson, James Moir and William Govan, together with other prominent Lib-Labs such as John MacCalman, George Miller, Andrew Boa and John Inglis. A second element comprised well-known Whigs: the Galbraith brothers, Archibald and Andrew; Alexander Crum; Andrew Bannatyne; A. B. McGrigor and W. R. W. Smith. R. S. Cunliffe, who had sat on the committees of Buchanan in 1857 and of Graham in 1868, was chairman of the Education League.² A new factor was the participation in the movement by several of the University professoriate. Edward Caird was a regular speaker at most National Education meetings; Sir William Thomson (later Lord Kelvin) chaired several; Professor John Nichol sealed this broad alliance by addressing the Glasgow Working Men's Association, a body of radical trades unionists and Lib-Labs, on the topic of 'National Education'.³ It is not entirely


2. G. Herald, 13 Jan. 1879 for the obituary of Cunliffe, who had also been prominent in the Secular School Society.

clear why so many dons threw themselves into this issue, since they had been conspicuously absent from previous political and social currents in the city, but in part they seem to have been moved by a concern to raise general levels throughout the whole educational system as well as a quickening instinct for social reform felt by one or two individuals, notably Edward Caird.¹ The League's lack of success in the Board elections does not detract from the significance of the coalition of political forces which it embodied.² Moreover, until the Home Rule crisis, all of these professors remained active in the Whig camp, providing a useful reinvigorating spirit.

During the heyday of the Whig hegemony, such potentially divisive issues as the franchise, disestablishment and temperance were not pressing. The potential weakness of the Whigs in an issue-laden era was initially obscured by the passing of the Second Reform Act without a prior dissolution, which probably saved Graham from humiliation. He, like Buchanan, had been unwilling to go below a £5 franchise, but the reform agitation only emerged after his election in 1865 and was settled before the 1868 contest. In 1868, the desire amongst the reformers to reach a pact so as to ensure that

¹. See Sir Henry Jones and J. H. Muirhead, *The Life and Philosophy of Edward Caird* (Glasgow, 1921), pp. 96-101 for the motives of one don. Ibid., pp. 112-4 alludes to one of these occasions as: "'The only public meeting,' he (Professor Watson) had ever known, 'called by Professors, and at which they were the chief and almost the only speakers'." See also the letter from Prof. William Thomson to Mrs Tait (11 Apr. 1871), S. P. Thompson, *The Life of William Thomson, Baron Kelvin of Largs* (London, 1910), II, pp. 589-91.

². See above, pp. 132-3 for the results.
only three Liberals ran, kept Graham safe, although there were
stirrings of discontent by some radicals at having to vote for one
whose attitude to reform had been so lukewarm.  

The Whigs were perhaps the most vehement opponents of temperance
legislation, for, as discussed elsewhere, the Tories had a good
number of abstainers in their number. A blistering attack on the
failure of the Forbes Mackenzie Act of 1853 to improve the drinking
habits of the Scottish people was made by James Stirling in 1859,
who argued that all such legislation was equally doomed. Buchanan,
Graham and Crum all reiterated their hostility to prohibitive measures
during their election campaigns, and the Whiggish Herald was always
scathing in its comments on the Permissive Bill.

At the time of the Disruption conflict their non-intrusionist
evangelical critics denounced the Whigs for their erastianism, and
they retained this approach to Church and State relations. With
very few exceptions they were attached to the Established or
Episcopalian churches, and generally they were inclined to the more
liberal theological circles within these bodies. They resisted
all demands for disestablishing either the English or Scottish
Churches, although they admitted the case against the Church of
Ireland to be overwhelming. Graham was an atypical Whig in that

1. Speeches of Alexander MacDonald and Charles Lang at Scottish
Reform League conference, G. Herald, 8 Jul. 1868.
3. See above, pp. 80-2.
he belonged to a Dissenting sect, the English Presbyterian Church, but, although nominally in favour of voluntaryism, he denied its relevance to the existing ecclesiastical situation in 1868. The arguments he used follow the normal Whig line of pragmatic moderation: "Holding, as I do, all official connection between Church and State to be a mistake, I nevertheless distinctly separate the case of the Irish Church from that of the English and Scottish Establishments, and believe that, however questionable on principle these seem to be, they do no violence to the nation's conscience, but on the contrary have a strong hold on the regards of the people."\(^1\)

But by the time of the 1874 election many of the elements in the structure which had maintained Whiggery in Glasgow were weakening. Widespread economic and social changes stemming from the late 1850's were steadily draining power and prestige from their grasp. Moreover, the appeal of Whig political views was diminishing. After the School Board election rebuff of 1873, the Lib-Labs lost interest in the education question, and when Rosebery came in 1876 to inaugurate the Glasgow Public School Union, which took up the Education League's banner, none of the erstwhile working class adherents were present although a full array of Whig notables was listed.\(^2\) The working class had turned to new questions, unfortunately for the Whigs.

For in the 1874 contest, the question of the labour laws was at the

\(^1\) \textit{G. Herald,} 26 Sep. 1868, for his election address.

\(^2\) \textit{G. Herald,} 2 Feb. 1876; also \textit{ibid.,} 14 Oct. 1875.
forefront of Lib-Lab issues, and close interrogation of Alexander Crum by leading trades unionists on the Criminal Law Amendment Act revealed that the Whig candidate would not agree to their demands for its repeal. In addition since 1868 there had occurred a remarkable rise in the vigour of the Dissenting interest in Glasgow. This upsurge first manifested itself as a political force through the Temperance movement, and then in the mid-1870's moved on to embrace disestablishment as a prime political demand. In this period of flux, the Whigs were vulnerable on several fronts simultaneously, with the result in the 1874 election, their nominee Crum came only fifth in the field, trailing well behind the first three. In order to discern the full causes for this reversal of the electoral tide of the previous seventeen years, developments in the other two Liberal sections must be traced.

2. Dissenting Radicalism

Although the Disruption emphatically placed the Church of Scotland in a minority in the city, the early hopes held by many Dissenters of a permanent non-Established political rule in Glasgow were not borne out. The election victory in 1847 reflected only a temporary backlash against a common enemy, but thereafter deep divisions of opinion emerged. Strict Sabbath observance and opposition to Maynooth had been the main props of the Dissenters'
platform then, but the Free and Voluntary churchmen reached these agreed positions by different reasoning. The latter were against all state grants and hence also opposed the *Regium Donum* given to Protestant churches in Ireland, while the Free Church merely resisted subsidising Popery. Voluntaries were not prepared to invoke the civil magistrate to enforce Sabbatarianism, essentially a matter for the individual, but the Free Church had no such qualms. But these were not splits of practical substance: the Commons were never likely to withdraw the Maynooth grant, and Sabbatarianism ebbed in the 1850's; more fundamental were the attitudes adopted to the various Education Bills introduced in the next decade. Legislation was felt to be necessary, firstly because of the crisis in all aspects of the parochial system after the Disruption, and secondly because of the collapse of the Free Church Education scheme by about 1850. The latter factor made the whole question one of sectarian significance when consideration was given to tackling the widely admitted inadequacies of Scottish education.

When Lord Advocate Moncrieff (a Free Churchman) tried to legislate to such ends, rifts soon grew in the education reform movement, with alarming consequences for Glasgow Dissenting politics. Obviously the Established Church would fight all legislative efforts which it conceived likely to destroy its role, but it was not easy to frame a bill which satisfied the other sects, and any weakening of their unity would play into the hands of the Church of Scotland. While the bulk of the Free Church supported Moncrieff's proposals of 1853,
1854 and 1856,¹ the Voluntaries failed to agree: some, mainly in Edinburgh and led by Duncan MacLaren, gave their approval to the bills, but most Glasgow U.P.'s remained critical. Exception was taken to the religious oath being retained as well as to the whole conception of government intervention in education — and particularly to the continuing provision of religious instruction in schools.²

Throughout 1854-6 the Glasgow Chronicle, the local Voluntary organ, in arguing against these bills clearly widened the gap by predicting the destruction for a generation of voluntary principles if it were passed. It denounced those renegades who agitated within the U.P. church in favour of the Bill: "He must be defective in mental vision who does not see that the whole movement is in the direction of Free Church interests and Free Church principles . . . The Lord Advocate's Bill is a decidedly anti-Voluntary and a decidedly Free Church measure."³

Meetings held by both camps served to emphasise the cleavage, but equally divisive was the voting behaviour of the two Glasgow Voluntaries who were M.P.'s. Sir James Anderson (M.P. for the Falkirk burghs) and Hastie opposed the various bills — in the company

1. "We are preparing for a public meeting here in support of your Educn. Bills, but cannot well get on without having them before us. Will they be printed soon?" Rev. R. Buchanan to Moncrieff, 12 Apr. 1856, Lord Advocates' Papers, Box 8: Crown Office, SRO AL8.

2. See State Education at Variance with Civil and Religious Freedom (Glasgow, 1855); other meetings of similar outlook: G. Examiner, 13 May 1854; N.B.D.M., 8 Apr. 1856.

of Established Church supporters - in part out of principle, in part out of distaste for Moncrieff's Free Church bias. As Anderson explained: "I began lately to be rather unfond of the measure, and to doubt if, as a sound Voluntary, I could with consistency continue to give it my support, especially as all attempts on our part to get objectionable clauses amended had failed. I at last came to the resolution to oppose it and voted against the third reading . . . Mr Hastie and one or two other friends acted in the same way . . . I am strongly of the opinion that if the bill passes it will create strife and debate among our own Ministers and people, and not answer the good end intended by it. If I had voted for it, I could no longer have the face to oppose Maynooth and suchlike grants." The political alliance, which had been seriously strained by the promotion of a Conservative by a section of the city's Free Churchmen in 1852, now seemed irretrievably dissolved in the light of the different attitudes taken towards the issue of voluntaryism in education. The rejection of Hastie in the election of 1857 formally recognised the end of the alignment created in the aftermath of 1843.²

The return of the Whigs in 1857 kept the Dissenting population out of any share in the representation of Glasgow until 1874, by which time the city was evidently following the national trend in the larger urban aggregates towards militant radicalism. Nevertheless,


2. The Establishment G. Gazette ascribed Hastie's defeat to his vote on the Education Bill (4 Apr. 1957), as did G. Chronicle, 1 Apr. (a Voluntary paper) and the Free Church Scottish Guardian, 3 Apr.
there were certain local factors which marked out in a particular form Glasgow's radicalism from that of, say, Birmingham. The regeneration of Dissenters as a political force in Glasgow came quite shortly before 1874. In the 1865 contest for instance, the U.P. Magazine admitted the quiescence of the electorate on matters closest to the Church's heart: "The most extreme Voluntary among them does not, so far as we know imagine that the time has arrived when it would be wise to provoke a parliamentary discussion on the separation of Church and State." It held out hopes of speedier progress once a wider franchise was granted, and in assessing the next election, it pointed to the political and ecclesiastical significance of anti-Establishment unity: "In Scotland the existence of the Free Church has completely turned the table, and where the Dissenters are united - whether in municipal or Parliamentary elections - Conservatives and Churchmen are completely swamped."\(^1\)

There was no indication of any concerted effort by this part of the electorate to bring forward a candidate for Glasgow in 1868, and so it would look as if the momentum of advanced Liberalism was built up in the following five year period. The framework which provided a fruitful ground for this process was undoubtedly the attitudes and expectations stimulated by the negotiations to effect a union between the Free and U.P. Churches which began in 1863.\(^2\)

2. See above, pp. 91-2.
This rapprochment was probably facilitated by the departure, through death or retirement, of the leading lay personalities in both churches who had been involved in the rancorous controversies of the 1830's, when the animosities were formed which prevented co-operation after 1843. Between 1860 and 1870 the Free Church lost its seven most prominent and generous adherents in Glasgow,¹ and the U.P. losses were equally great.² With their removal leadership of the laity in both churches passed to a younger generation which had not participated in the earlier conflicts and which felt impelled to joint action.

As most of the debate on union was conducted within the Free Church there was restricted scope for combined meetings, especially as the internal conflict heightened after 1868,³ but the contribution made by these ecclesiastical movements to political developments was important, if only in creating an atmosphere of understanding and a clearer perception of the similarities between the two churches — most of all in relation to the civil magistrate and the principle of Establishment, later to be the basis of their united challenge to the forces of established Liberalism.

1. These were:— W. Campbell (d. 1864), who gave £90,000 to religious causes; H. Dunlop (d. 1867), a close friend of Dr Buchanan; N. Stevenson (d. 1867), also an associate of Buchanan; H. Tennant (d. 1864), who built Wellpark F.C. for £7,000 and gave £3,000 p.a.; J. Burns (d. 1871), a generous donor to the Church; W. Towers-Clark (d. 1870) and J. Playfair (d. 1866) who both contributed to the Free Church ventures.

2. Including:— Sir Jas. Anderson (d. 1864) and Alex. Hastie (d. 1864), prominent defenders of the U.P. cause in public; J. Henderson (d. 1867), said to have given £30,000 p.a. to the Church; J.H. Young (d. 1871), a large subscriber; as was W. MacLean (d. 1867).

3. Union Soiree (n.p., n.d.) reports such a meeting in 1863; also G. Herald, 9 Jan. 1866 and 17 Apr. 1868.
While the union proceedings laid the groundwork for the upsurge of this powerful new radical force in city politics, the more direct impetus came from other, associated influences. These can be broadly termed "evangelical" both in their motives (to secure the moral regeneration of society) and in their methods. Numerous suggestions can be made as to why this movement emerged so dramatically in the late 1860's - partly it may have been the revival of religious interest sparked off by the union issue. More problematically, the epidemic scares of 1866-74 may have contributed. Historians have attempted to identify cholera outbreaks as creating a psychological climate favourable to political and religious upheavals in the nineteenth century,¹ and certainly the Glasgow outbreak of 1848-9 (which killed 3,293 people in four months) preceded a similar evangelical frenzy. The impact of these scares was not simply psychological, however; the cholera of 1848-9 had shown itself no respecter of class barriers,² and the 1866 recurrence was met by the formation of groups for house to house visitations to disseminate information regarding sanitary precautions. These groups were formed at the instance, not of the medical officers of the city, but of concerned clerical and lay leaders³ and out of their work

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2. "Whereas that (epidemic) of 1832 chiefly affected the lower classes, that of 1848-9 attacked a much larger proportion of the well-to-do classes inhabiting better houses, with presumably better sanitary surroundings." J. Glaister, "Epidemic History of Glasgow during the Nineteenth Century". Procs.Phil.Soc.Glas., 17 (1885-6), pp. 287-8.

3. G. Herald, 2 Jan. 1867 praised the churches for their efforts in organising the groups, for whose activities see 4, 13, 25 Sep., 2 Oct. 1866.
came an awareness of the extent (and worse, the dangers) of the housing problem in the city, epitomised in two articles published in the Herald in November 1866.\(^1\) The Sanitary Visitation Committee remained operative until mid-1867, when the threat of an epidemic was judged to be passed, investigating the black fever spots of the East End. At the end of 1869 it was re-formed to face the new challenge of fever.\(^2\) The overlap of personnel, of techniques of organization, of the descriptive language employed, all present in this sanitary phase and found in the other movements discussed here is striking.

Two other possible contributory causes to this reawakening were the reports of the special inspectors appointed by the Argyll Education Commission, on the state of educational provision in Glasgow.\(^3\) Their detailed revelations of the low level of schooling facilities available seemed cause for alarm to many who felt that without adequate standards of literacy, religion would never reclaim the lapsed masses. Thus, in 1871 one body put as the first hindrance to mission work among the 100,000 Protestants "who are deliberately and systematically living in neglect of public religious ordinances" the problem of "Want of Education among the

\(^1\) Ibid., 27, 28 Nov. 1866.


\(^3\) Thus the R.C. on Education in Scotland's Report on the state of Education in Glasgow, P.P. 1867, XXV found only one-third of children were at school.
masses, even of the most elementary kind".¹ Again, it may be that the passing of the second Reform Act stimulated concerned Dissenters who were anxious to introduce a more Christian tone into political affairs. Whether they saw a mass electorate as a potentially grave threat to this objective, or as basically sympathetic to their aims, there was a clear incentive to mobilise resources in an effort to win over the new voters. In general, the expectations entertained were favourable, as for instance the reaction of the Temperance movement shows: "The Act is likely to prove eminently favourable to the progress of the Permissive Bill Movement... A fresh and hopeful interest will be awakened in the minds of the enfranchised themselves, in all legislation affecting their social progress and prosperity, and the new Parliament will be naturally more disposed than the old to entertain and consider important social questions."² This belief was sustained by the conviction that the new voters would contain a strong Voluntary element: "But we all wish to see the elective franchise extended to as many as can use it with due intelligence and independence. Surely many of the members of our Churches who are now excluded could be safely trusted with this power."³

This religious impulse of the late 1860's was marked by its concern over social problems, which were seen as obstacles to a true Christian revival, and while many were eager to work through the various rescue agencies and missions founded in this period, these same individuals were, in varying degrees, aware of the political dimension as a part of this effort. By 1871, unease at the absence of "the spiritual necessities of the city", publicised by pamphleteers who put the number of irreligious at about one-fifth of the population, produced action. In April, a meeting of evangelical office-bearers established the Association for the Religious and Social Improvement of the City. In its report on the extent of religious destitution, it recommended co-operation and co-ordination among the sects in order to spread missionary labours as widely and efficiently as possible - a good indication of the mood of interdenominationalism current. Equally significantly, the Association saw the most challenging problems to be social - lack of education and intemperance - with lack of church accommodation, the stock solution in the past, placed third.¹ In November of that year, clearer evidence of this resurgence came when firstly the U.P. Elders' Association set up a committee to combat irreligion in the city, which included John Burt, William Melvin and William Brown, all prominent Radicals active in Cameron's 1874 election campaign and later in the formation of the Glasgow Liberal Association. The Free Church also launched its

¹ Report on the Religious Condition of Glasgow, pp. 6-8, 8-10.
mission scheme that month with a meeting addressed by Dr Buchanan, who explained its objects as being: "to bring the gospel of love and peace to homes and to heads where vice and misery reign - to bridge over that gulf which ominously divides the rich from the poor, the intelligent from the ignorant, the godly from the godless - and thus to strengthen and to multiply those bonds of brotherhood and mutual sympathy that would sweeten the whole breath of society, and deliver it from the danger which may otherwise in some evil hour break forth in disorders that would dissolve society itself in ruin".¹

But the revival of these years went broader than mere church-building and mission founding. The meeting of material wants and worldly needs were also covered with the same end in view. Thomas Corbett, a wealthy merchant, set up the Western Cooking Depots in the early 1860's to provide cheap and nourishing meals for working men who would otherwise succumb to the temptations of the public house. Corbett (whose son Alexander fought the city constituency in 1885 as a Liberal before becoming a Unionist) ploughed the profits - said to be £20,000 - from this venture into other charitable efforts, and one such brought him into close contact with a central figure in this whole movement, when he became involved in the Quarrier's Homes Scheme.²

¹. Rev. R. Buchanan, The City's Spiritual Wants and the Christian Church's Duty (Glasgow, 1871), p. 20. G. Herald, 9 and 29 Nov. 1871 for the U.P. and F.C. meetings respectively.

². Corbett's achievement is in Clydeside Cameos, 2nd Series, XLI; cf. G. Herald, 30 Dec. 1861, 28 Apr. 1862, 31 Aug. 1864, for progress reports. When Gladstone came to the city in 1866, he had lunch at one of the depots, and insisted on eating an ordinary workman's meal in place of the special plates cooked for him.
William Quarrier, who emerges as one of the key men behind Charles Cameron's political career as the spokesman of Radical Dissent in Glasgow, was a classic Victorian entrepreneur who, after starting work at the age of six, became the successful proprietor of a large shoe-making business, incidentally marrying his employer's daughter. Converted to the Baptist Church as a youth, he toyed in early manhood with entering the ministry, but waited instead on God showing his intentions to him. Influenced by the work with destitute children of Dr Guthrie in Edinburgh and by Müller's Bristol Orphan Homes, Quarrier began his rescue work with the Shoeblack Brigade in 1864, followed by a Parcels Brigade, both of which were deemed successful. He was spurred in 1871 to propose a home for the destitute children of the city (he estimated there were 11,000 of these) and the first donation, of £2,000, was sent in by Corbett who became a trustee of the Bridge of Weir Home which opened in 1878 after £100,000 had been raised. In his campaigns to raise support for his projects Quarrier struck the authentic note of the concerned Dissenters. He was moved to organize the Shoeblacks after a meeting with a street match-boy, for "he had got a fresh glimpse of the Egypt from which he himself had been mercifully delivered, and thoughts of its misery and horror laid fresh hold upon his soul".


2. Urquhart, Life-Story of Quarrier, pp. 49-50.
the Saltmarket shows of his childhood days which "to many of my companions proved a snare which led them to ruin", and this inspired his labours: "The dirty and overcrowded streets and lanes of the city have, as before, been the scenes of our labours, and from them we have gathered many a rough but precious jewel which will, we have no doubt, shine brightly in the crown of our blessed Saviour."¹

This approach, taken with the excessively sentimental anecdotes used by Quarrier to show the need for, and the results of, "social reclamation", chimed in very well with the religious appetites of his readers.

A further tie in this relationship can be seen in the broad field of revivalism at this time: "In evangelistic work in Glasgow, Mr Quarrier was, for many years, a powerful force. He made no claim to be a preacher himself, but he was able to bring to this city those who could gain the ear of the masses. The financial and other respity (sic) for these campaigns was undertaken either by himself alone or with the assistance of friends."² These tours were a feature of the period: Quarrier was instrumental in bringing to the city Joshua and Mrs Poole, to be followed by others. The climax of these occasions came with Moody and Sankey's first triumphal visit to Britain in 1873-4, reaching Glasgow in a crescendo of emotionalism at the beginning of February 1874, simultaneously

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1. Quarrier, A Narrative of Facts ... (1872), p. 3; (1874), p. 32.
with the general election and the return of Cameron. Their work was deemed satisfactory: "... the City was stirred to a remarkable degree; and there was not only a pronounced quickening in the spiritual life of the Churches, but in numerous instances a large accession to their membership through the reclamation of many who had either lapsed or been formerly outside their pale".¹

The first half of 1874 was characterised by the follow-up to their tour, with emotional revival meetings held on the Green and in church halls all over the city. At one meeting in late February, "one hundred and one young men stood up in Ewing Place Church and before a crowd of witnesses, professed themselves seekers of salvation", which was followed by nine months of daily prayer and led to the formation of the Glasgow United Evangelistic Mission. The Mission was the apogee of the evangelistic aims and aspirations: "The mission was the means of begetting throughout the Christian community a new sense of responsibility and deeper compassion in relation to the spiritual and temporal needs of the City's poor and its social outcasts."

In pursuit of its objectives of the "Evangelisation, Edification, and Amelioration" of these lapsed classes a wide range of work was started. Bible classes and prayer meetings for young men and women; a tent for services on the Green; free breakfasts given to derelict

sleepers-out prior to the services; rations to the poor in bad winters; leaflets distributed in drinking saloons. It came close to Quarrier in its efforts to minister to the "spiritual wreckage" of street children in its Sabbath Schools and its Day Refuges for Destitute Children. ¹ Three of the seven trustees of Quarrier's Orphan Home served on the United Evangelistic Association – Alex Allan, the temperance shipowner who assisted rescued children to emigrate to Canada and whose wife was deeply immersed in all such work; J. C. White (later Lord Overton) a lawyer and chemical manufacturer, a pillar of the Free Church and president of the Glasgow Liberal Association; and J. H. N. Graham, a local merchant.²

This mounting evangelical passion and involvement only explains the background to the political changes which occurred in 1874. Three further requisites were necessary: a suitable candidate had to be found; an efficient organisation to mobilise full voting strength had to be established; and a medium to publicise the new opinions and proselytise the electorate had to be instituted. It was extremely adventitious that the solution to the first and last of these problems should be combined in the person of Dr Charles Cameron. Most of the leaders of local Radical Dissent were rather

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2. Clydeside Cameos, 1st Series, XIV and A. Aird, Glimpses of Old Glasgow (Glasgow, 1894), pp. 398-400 for Allan; for White, Glasgow Contemporaries at the Dawn of the XXth Century (Glasgow, 1901), pp. 100-1 and Who's Who in Glasgow (Glasgow, 1909), pp. 163-5 (under 'Overton'). All these notices stress the impact of Moody and Sankey on the two men.
too middle-aged to embark on a political career, whereas Cameron
when elected was only 33.\(^1\) Furthermore, few of them were effective
public speakers with little training in the art and lacked platform
presence,\(^2\) but Cameron, who had trained as a barrister, was a fluent
and commanding speaker. But Cameron's appeal lay on much surer
foundations: he was proprietor of the North British Dail Mail, and
it is perhaps not too much to say that this paper played a similar
role in the formulation and expression of the new movements, like
other provincial newspapers at different period of political reform
- e.g., the Leeds Mercury in the 1830's and the Manchester Guardian
in the 1900's. The Mail had been started in 1847 by his father and
John Gunn as the first Glasgow daily paper, and despite financial
and editorial vicissitudes, it outlasted all its bi- and tri-weekly
competitors except the Herald, which only survived by going daily
itself in 1859.\(^3\)

In 1864 or so, Charles became sole proprietor and editor of the
paper and shortly afterwards the style and content changed markedly
(although it had always been Liberal in politics and favourable to
dissent in church affairs). A more aggressive reporting technique
was developed within the paper and simultaneously its columns were

1. Ages in 1874: Allan, 48; Collins, 57; Lamberton, 56;
Melvin, 63; Quarrier, 48; Torrens, 66. Only White (31) and
Selkirk (37) could rival Cameron.

2. A critic described Collins as "Ungainly in appearance, limited
in the range of his ideas and sympathies, bigoted in his opinions
and prejudices, poor in speech and infirm in thought." Clydeside
Cameos, 1st Series, XXIV; also G. Herald, 28 Sep. 1880.
Compare Gammie, Quarrier: "He made no claim to be a speaker
himself" (p. 40).

3. A. Aird, Printers and Printing in Glasgow 1830-90 (Glasgow, n.d.),
pp. 19-21; A. McL. Ewing, History of the Glasgow Herald (Glasgow,
opened for evangelicals to preach to the paper's readership. The most famous of the former were three series exposing the Truck system in the west of Scotland mining areas by a "Special Mail Commissioner" in 1869-70. But much more space was given to regular articles on the social problems of Glasgow. A letter in October 1868 opened this plea by denouncing - after a description of "the Night Side of Glasgow" - "the gross injustice perpetrated by those who co-operate for the conversion of Jews at £150 a piece and other expensive mission work in foreign lands, while a home heathendom, so rampant and so gross, and a destitution, so utter and so clamant, exist in our very own midst."¹ This formed a prelude to a barrage of articles, about 97 of which appeared between July 1869 and June 1874, and between March 1876 and the end of 1879 a renewed spasm gave over 40 stories. The Mail probed conditions in prisons and lunatic asylums, as well as overcrowding, distress through unemployment and sanitary problems, all of which while displaying a lively social conscience were but a part of the paper's investigations.

More pertinent were the articles it carried touching on the objects of evangelical concern. Thus reports on drink and drinking dens were printed and others analysed the extent of prostitution - a topic in which Quarrier and his co-workers were very much involved, holding suppers for fallen women to meet itinerant evangelists, and so on. In addition there were articles on criminals and their

haunts; destitute children and street Arabs; the lapsed masses and the "Dark Side of Glasgow"; and also baby-farming and opium eating in the city. All were written in the lurid yet slushy style to be found in most of the writing at this time on such problems. But the publication of these items evidently stimulated the Mail's circulation, and equally important, it won the enthusiastic support of the religious social reformers who were also gratified at the coverage given to their own activities. The United Evangelistic Association ascribed a good part of the success of its operations to the Mail's "frequent friendly notices of our work". Quarrier was even warmer in his tributes when in 1871-2 the Herald, in which his first public appeals had appeared, refused him space (although, as he noted, it still found columns available for sporting intelligence). "The Christian public have a right to expect different treatment of religious questions in the columns of their journals, but they have it in their own hands to bring about a different state of matters. We long to see the press as a whole more in harmony with the great truths of the gospel." The drift of these remarks was made clear by his comments in that same year: "We take this opportunity to thank the conductors of the North British Daily Mail for the practical help they have given to the whole work since its commence-ment and thus trust that their labours for this, as well as all their other efforts for the social and moral good of the community, will be appreciated by the Christian public."1 A similar eulogy was

1. Evangelistic Ass'n., 1st Ann. Rep. (1875), pp. 3-4, 7; and later Reports. Quarrier, A Narrative of Facts... (1873), pp. 11, 48; cf. Urquhart, Life-Story, pp. 69-71.
included in all successive reports which also contained lavish extracts from the paper's reports of Quarrier's work, and indeed it is evident that Quarrier and his associates contributed several of these articles.¹

Cameron now became closely associated with Quarrier and his schemes; in 1876 he presided over the meeting celebrating the opening of the City Orphan Home, thus earning the plaudit "a warm and constant friend of the work from its commencement"; and when in 1882 a city priest accused Quarrier of converting Catholic children the Mail sprang to the defence.² It is also possible that the bond was cemented by the shared attitude of all these groups to the Town Council establishment and the City Improvement Scheme. In October 1872 the Mail alleged that between 1861 and 1866 eight city notables had joined to buy up thirty one decayed properties which were sold to the Improvement Trust in 1867 at a profit of £2,181. Three of the individuals were future Provosts and one of them, John Blackie, was the prime mover of the Corporation's Scheme and Lord Provost at the time of the sale. The Mail had to retract these allegations and pay damages and costs of £575, for which a public subscription was organized. This target was reached within a fortnight aided by

¹. E.g., "At Midnight with the Fallen", 3 Apr. 1876 is by Quarrier.

². Urquhart, Life-Story, pp. 182, 259-73; Gammie, Quarrier, pp. 70-2; Quarrier, A Narrative of Facts ... (1877, 1881). It is appropriate that when the erection of the fountain dedicated to Cameron which stands at Charing Cross was mooted, "It was due to Mr Quarrier, more than anyone else, that this memorial was erected. By his personal efforts, he was largely instrumental in the necessary sum being raised and the movement being carried to a successful conclusion." Gammie, p. 175.
a £100 donation from J. H. Watt, a leading evangelical associated with Quarrier, who himself appeared on the list with other evangelicals. Quarrier had at this time quarrelled bitterly with Blackie and the Improvement Trust. Blackie, a Free Church elder who had been engaged in social work for many years, had joined the Shoeblack Brigade Committee in 1864, but shortly afterwards he voted in the Council to reject Quarrier's request that the municipal authorities should co-operate in reclaiming 'street children', and so was removed from the committee. In 1873-4 Quarrier felt moved to protest at the "obstructive policy" of the Improvement Trust when he was forced to raise his offer for a Trust-owned property by £700 to outbid an "insolvent property speculator".1 As we have seen, other Radicals felt similarly ill-disposed towards the Trust, and the martyrdom of the Mail enhanced both its own and its editor's stature in their eyes.

Even given the existence of a newly confident and militant Dissenting body; a vehicle for propagating their opinions; and, as it turned out, a potential candidate in Cameron; all of this was still not enough to guarantee victory at the polls. It was also vital for success to have a disciplined organisation which could mount and sustain an election campaign. And it is here that the most vibrant and alive of all radical causes, Temperance, came into full play. The movement was in no sense new to Glasgow - the British campaign had begun in the city, and had always been well-supported

1. Quarrier, A Narrative of Facts . . . (1875), pp. 34-6; Gammie, Quarrier, pp. 67-8; Urquhart, Life-Story, pp. 51-5, 76-9.
Electorally, it had, however, made little impact and indeed many attributed the defeat of Hastie in 1857 to a reaction against the teetotal support for him. Until the late 1850's, moreover, the Temperance reformers were not very interested in a political approach, preferring to emphasise the need for moral suasion and personal self-discipline as the best means to removing the drink problem. Thus, in 1854 the Glasgow Abstainers' Union was created to counter the attractions of the public-houses by running Saturday evening concerts and Saturday afternoon excursions ("to spend an occasional Summer Saturday evening in a healthful and rational manner"). The Union also opened a Temperance library; ran Domestic Missions which gave classes on sewing and cookery; and in due course held Band of Hope meetings. In 1873, as the logical conclusion to their strategy of counter-attraction, they opened public-houses with no alcoholic drinks served (only tea and coffee), but it was soon "found that competition with the drink shops was well-nigh impossible". The Abstainers' Union retained close links with the older Scottish Temperance League (STL) - all the executive of the former being directors of the League - but the League was more interested in legal restraints, such as the Forbes Mackenzie Act of 1853. Yet this was not vigorous enough for a section of the movement which in 1858 broke away to form the Scottish Permissive Bill

1. E. Morris, *History of Temperance in Glasgow* (Glasgow, 1855) covers the early stages.

Association (SPBA). This body was the Scottish wing of the United Kingdom Alliance, which from 1853 had been advocating the case for local option, and it too argued that "other treatment" was necessary beyond the agencies, missions and legislation which absorbed Temperance effort up until then. Drink was an offence against society, said the SPBA, which should suppress it by positive means (rather than by total abstinence, which was irrelevant in the face of existing evil). So, legislation was needed, and it should go well beyond restrictions on licensing legislations, which would always prove 'insufficient'. Instead, "Prohibitive Legislation alone can be effectual against the public sources of Intemperance"; and this was best attained by Permissive Acts "rendering the adoption or not of prohibition a matter for local determination". But over the next ten years no temperance wing had any impact on Glasgow politics; even in the 1868 contest there were only gloomy prospects, as the League saw it: "In the coming contest, temperance reformers cannot form a distinct or exclusive party. We cannot make our views a turning-point on which the elections will hinge. We are only a small minority and therefore cannot anticipate that the larger sections of the electorate will defer to us. Some, too, of the most devoted friends of our movement are so deeply in other questions, that the candidates' views of these subjects, rather than those of

temperance, will decide their votes." The only crumbs of comfort that the militant SPBA could wrest from the results were that the three city M.P.'s had moved slightly, albeit with "ill-concealed reluctance", towards the local veto.¹

Despite this, Cameron's victory in 1874 was hailed by all sides as, in essence, the work of the temperance movement - a remarkable transformation. Several reasons made this possible. The second Reform Act by itself had not been enough, although it did enfranchise those most favourable to prohibition (or so it was claimed). The ballot was heralded as the real breakthrough: "It is not yet realised that in the ballot we have a trusty ally, and that until a general election comes upon us, the power which, under its secrecy, we shall be able to put forth will not be fully recognised. Alone with God in the polling-booth, the Christian must pause ere he casts his vote in favour of 'the trade' . . . and he who once had to bend to the implied mandate or customer will now with joy exercise his emancipated vote in the way that God and conscience will approve."² However, the exuberance of that claim merely reflects the growth in confidence of the movement and its realisation that the momentum of events was flowing in its favour.

Several components of this drive may be suggested. Firstly there were the beneficial side-effects accruing to the temperance campaign from the general evangelical awakening. In particular, the

². Social Reformer, 7 (Feb. 1873), p. 145.
Moody and Sankey tour provided a great impetus since both were abstainers: "Although their mission is not distinctly to promote the temperance cause, it has operated powerfully in this direction . . . The increase in the temperance reformation manifested in connection with the great religious revival which Glasgow and other parts of Scotland experienced in the earlier months of 1874 has not only continued but increased in intensity and extent, and become more pronounced with the lapse of months."¹ The magnitude of the change can be traced in the finances of the SPBA. Subscriptions in 1865-6 yielded £752, in 1870-71 £1,224 and at the end of the next quinquennium £2,037, a figure which was not substantially advanced on for another decade; and the League's total income over the decade 1865-75 moved from £6,500 to £7,700, a peak never regained in this period. The League's membership mounted steadily from 6,845 in 1867 to 8,759 in 1878, with 1875 and 1878 showing the biggest single increases.²

In addition to the expansion of the two main temperance bodies there were new developments in this period, underscoring the vitality of the agitation. In 1871 the Scottish Bank of Hope was begun and by 1879 184 societies were affiliated to it. More significantly, the Scottish Grand Lodge of the Independent Order of Good Templars was established in 1870 and within one year had 10,000 adherents in 96 lodges, almost one half in the Glasgow area, and by 1876 62,334

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² In 1878, there were 1,872 members of the League with Glasgow addresses. The SPBA published no membership lists, but about 300 donors were Glasgow-based.
were in 804 lodges.\textsuperscript{1} The full importance of the Templars is discussed shortly, but their contribution to the wave of temperance feeling is undeniable and made itself felt in the other movements. The rise of the Templars revealed another train of this phase in temperance agitation - a closer harmony prevailed among the various associations. The death in 1873 of the League's President Robert Smith, who had been associated with the squabbling which accompanied the secession of the prohibitionists in the late 1850's, and the accession of William Collins to the presidency revived the League's confidence. His election was warmly applauded by the SPBA because of his "strong and progressive opinions",\textsuperscript{2} but this was only one of several signs of co-operation. The League had been making such suggestions in the late 1860's, and when meetings and conversazioni did begin about 1870, it described them in enthusiastic terms: "the spirit that prevailed was earnest, conciliatory and brotherly".\textsuperscript{3} There was moreover an overlap of sufficient directors and key office-bearers to maintain good relations; and in addition both were linked with the Templars.\textsuperscript{4}

\begin{itemize}
\item 1. T. Honeyman, Good Templary in Scotland (Glasgow, 1894), pp. 27-30, 12-4; Winshill, Temperance Movement, III, p. 208.
\item 4. There were five who held office in both, including four future stalwarts of the Glasgow Liberal Association - John Burt (President), Alex. MacDougall (Secretary), Hugh Lamberton and Wm. Govan.
\end{itemize}
Despite these friendly overtures, it is clear that the advantage lay with the SPBA: as seen above, measured by its funds, it was striding ahead in the decade after 1865. A pointer to this was the publication of a monthly, the Social Reformer, from April 1866, on the grounds that English journals like the Alliance News, although adequate, yet "these organs cannot satisfactorily meet the requirements of the Scottish movement at this stage in its progress".\textsuperscript{1} Equally important, the SPBA, which by the nature of its programme was more interested in political action, began in the late 1860's to shift the emphasis of its agitation towards electoral strategy. Hitherto most of its work had been of the missionary or propaganda type - an agency was set up with the help of the Alliance, monthly meetings were held and the whole of Scotland was preached to. But around 1870 the campaign was switched to big cities from small villages and to direct political ends: "the great truth should ever be kept in view that all temperance affords should culminate at the ballot box. Moral suasion is a great principle, but it does not meet all the wants of this particular question." The move into politics was seen as part of a long plan: "At the outset of the agitation they had to press the question upon the consideration of a too ignorant and prejudiced community. But as misconceptions cleared away, objections were repelled, ignorance was removed, the progress of the

truths which they proclaimed became evident. ¹

There had been efforts to form a temperance electoral action group before 1867 but as noted earlier the wider franchise was regarded as the necessary prelude to success. Attention was first directed to municipal contests as part of a campaign launched by the League in its 1865 Programme to curb the number of licences and public houses and it met with considerable success. By 1871 a motion at the Town Council petition in favour of the Permissive Bill won 14 votes (against 19), and the leading temperance advocates were returned to the Council. ² This clearly betokened considerable electoral organization, but it is revealing that the first essay by the SPBA was relatively unsuccessful. Auxiliary committees were to be set up in each ward "for the purpose of organizing and registering the sentiment already successfully created in favour of the overthrow of the liquor traffic by a Permissive Bill". ³ The rest of the year saw several ward committees being constituted and confidence was expressed as to their prospects, but the 1871 Council contests provided a setback, with four sitting temperance men being ousted and only one gain being notched up in compensation. It was generally agreed in anguished post-mortems that the "old patriotic activity


and earnestness" had evaporated and the decay of the ward auxiliaries, due to differences of opinion between reformers, was much regretted. Reconstruction was at once embarked on, but now the aid of the Good Templars proved crucial.

The rebuff of 1871 spurred the temperance wing to new heights of activity. A municipal electoral association was formed to prosecute the ends of temperance, and an attempt by John MacCalman, a sympathetic working man, to include the question of working-class representation in its remit was summarily rejected. Publicity was given throughout 1872-3 to the necessity to register and to organize all electors friendly to the cause in order to bring home to politicians the resolute convictions of the movement: "A duty then plainly devolves upon us - the duty of coming to a thorough understanding with members of Parliament and of thoroughly removing from their minds any uncertainty regarding our political strength." It was appreciated how this could best be attained: "This can only be shown through electoral organization. Till we make our political power triumphant at St Stephens, success will never finally range herself on our side." This political consciousness was sharpened at the A.G.M. of the SPBA in September 1872 when numerous resolutions were passed calling for immediate electoral organization.

months later, the Social Reformer reported that they were now ready to fight an election on the issue of drink, as they now had a complete electoral organisation. This was in April 1873, ten months before the general election.  

The Association over the preceding winter had produced a draft of rules for a model electoral association to be adopted in all constituencies, and followed this up with "Hints and Suggestions" as to the mode of operating an electoral association, which show how the association almost certainly worked in the Glasgow contest of 1874. Each canvasser was to visit twenty electors on the roll to ascertain their position; from this a register of friendly individuals would be kept and regularly revised; and streets would be checked at intervals for changes of address; while supporters would be aided to register if omitted. M.P.'s would be made aware of the strength of the Permissive Bill vote and entered into correspondence with on all relevant matters. Regular monthly meetings would be held and papers presented to rally the faithful, but the object was to be ready for an election: "IV: Electors should never wait until candidates turn up, they should be diligently sought after and should always if possible, be generally acceptable to the electors. The hour should never come and find the Electoral Association without a candidate. No Member should pledge himself to any candidate till a special meeting of the members has been held and a deliberate resolution arrived at. This will secure that unity, influence,
strength which, at such a critical period is victory itself.

V: . . . On the eve of electoral changes, the candidates should be communicated with at the earliest moment and an interview requested. Prompt action here is of the utmost importance . . . "1

In the building up of this machinery, which had begun in Glasgow in 1872, the Permissive Bill lobby was greatly helped by the Templars, to whom they were very close in policy. In the municipal elections of 1870, the Templars claimed the credit for having disciplined the anti-drink voters and so helped J. L. Lang regain his seat. In that year a Templars' Electoral Association was formed and for 20 years the Grand Electoral Superintendent was James Hamilton, a post in which "... he did splendid service. A keen politician, he took a lively interest in every scheme brought forward to secure temperance legislation".2 In December, 1873, the Templars took an unprecedented step in issuing a manifesto to the members of the Order instructing them to do their utmost to obtain and return candidates favourable to the restriction of liquor licences; and called on all members to secure unity of action among Temperance reformers. This was justified because alternative, indirect pressure had failed: "Hitherto, in no small degree we have begun at the end. We first voted for men hostile to the Permissive Bill

1. These appeared in every Annual Report from the 15th (1872-3) onwards. Also, Social Reformer, 7 (1872-3), pp. 139, 162 and cf. pp. 143-5.

and then petitioned them to pass the Bill. We propose to alter all that. The temperance question being of all questions before the country the most momentous, we urge that it shall have a first place."\(^1\)

With this political militancy, enthusiasm for the cause and a highly-developed organisation present by the start of 1874, the extreme Temperance wing held a strong vantage-point. Robert McKay, Secretary of the SPBA made this point in retrospect: "An electoral committee to every Temperance Society is indispensible. The active work required will be in consonance with the interest which most people take in political affairs . . . Committees formed for such a patriotic purpose have found pleasure in the arduous work pertaining to electoral effort. They have been signally successful at local elections. They have also been able to secure local candidates and place them at the top of the Parliamentary poll. What has been done by such committees in the early days of the agitation (i.e., the 1870's) can be done as easily at least to-day. Canvassing was carried on then in a way which elicited the admiration of Social as well as Temperance reformers."\(^2\)

The powerful machinery which the SPBA and the Templars claimed to have established is clearly a vital link in the victory of


\(^2\) Hayler, Prohibition Movement, pp. 264-5. Mackay was singled out for special commendation at Cameron's celebration meeting in 1874 as the man "who had worked almost day and night since the election began." - Torrens, in G. Herald, 6 Feb. 1874.
Cameron in 1874. On the other hand, it is surprising that they should have endorsed him, for while the Mail was friendly to most evangelical reforming currents, it was lukewarm to the Permissive Bill proposals. In 1869 an editorial had rejected the idea, preferring to see the existing laws fully worked, but the fullest onslaught came only four weeks before the 1874 election in response to the Templars' election manifesto. Although it was a good cause, the Mail held, it was "a long step from such an admission to the acknowledgement that an acceptance of the Permissive Bill was the one needful thing in British politics", and alleged that "they wish to constrain or entrap every candidate for Parliamentary honours whom they can possibly influence into an adoption of their peculiar policy". Furthermore, "it is a most unwise policy ... the proposal now urged is an utter and radical mistake" which would backfire by driving neutrals into the other camp. The Mail used exactly the same arguments as the moderate Liberals were to deploy in succeeding years against "faddism" in the local party: it was "intolerable" that one policy should overwhelm all others, instead they should be "forbearing" for no "special clique" had the right to "excommunicate" others; and so the Permissive Billites were acting contrary to Liberal values.¹

It is impossible to explain Cameron's bewildering volte-face in the space of four weeks, but the unexpectedness of the dissolution

¹ N.B.D.M., 8 Jan. 1874; also 24 Nov. 1869.
may be a factor. This left the Temperance wing quite unprepared to select a candidate, yet it also prevented the existing Liberal groupings in the city from hammering out a compromise on the lines of the 1868 system (which had then effectively precluded the Temperance lobby, even had it been organised, from making headway). Now, in a hectic scramble with seven men being seriously put forward as Liberal candidates – as well as a Catholic candidate – the tight voting discipline of the Temperance party became decisive because it was unparalleled. Cameron, who had earlier been plugging Disestablishment in the Mail as the major reform still outstanding, demoted it in his election campaign – in part because it was not, by general consensus, a leading issue – and instead played up his support for the local veto.

When his address was published the response of the Prohibitionists to his promise that "I would distinctly vote for its principles" was prompt. The SPBA reported thus: "This straightforward and manly avowal evoked the energy of the whole Temperance party; and at a meeting unprecedented for enthusiasm, numbers and influence the following resolutions were carried with rounds of cheering:– 'That this meeting adopts Dr Cameron, editor of the North British Daily Mail, as a candidate for the representation of the city, recommends him to the united and hearty support of all temperance and social reformers, and pledges itself to use every effort to secure his return.'

"Dr Cameron, having pledged himself to the influential deputation that waited upon him, the moral and social reformers of Glasgow
wrought nobly for him - leaders and led vieing in each with the other for his return. The result was his elevation to the senior membership of Glasgow, the polling standing as follows:— Cameron, 18,455; Anderson, 17,902; and Whitelaw, 14,134."¹

This account seems, so far as other printed sources convey, an accurate and full account of the relationship. Torrens said he had not known Cameron until just before his candidacy was announced, and Cameron stressed that he had only come forward after presenting himself "to a large and influential body of my supporters, in return for the promise of their support".² While he did talk in his campaign of other matters (notably his paper's role in exposing social abuses and his commitment to franchise and electoral reform), it is plain what his supporters placed uppermost. No committee lists were published, but those who were listed as attending his meetings most frequently were James Torrens (chairman of the SPBA); Quarrier; Thomas Dick (vice-chairman of the SPBA); and William Collins (President of the STL). These were all present on the platform at 5 or more of the 7 election meetings held; those who were at 3 or 4 meetings numbered 10, of whom at least 6 can be identified as Temperance leaders.

Thus in 1874 Radical Dissent won a foothold in the parliamentary representation of Glasgow, striking a parallel with the shift which

². N.B.D.M., 3 Feb. and 31 Jan. 1874 for Torrens and Cameron; cf. James Hamilton: "I scarcely could say I knew Dr Cameron if I met him in the street." Ibid., 31 Jan. 1874. Hamilton was President of the SPBA until his death in 1884.
took place in the politics of the major English urban areas at this time, a shift personified by Chamberlain. Indeed the Cameron contingent identified themselves with Chamberlain, the Birmingham N.L.F., and Birmingham-style Radicalism. But there were considerable differences in the language and context of the Glasgow variety which marked it out as a distinct political grouping. The essential feature of Birmingham's Advanced Liberalism was the entrance in the late 1860's of a group of prosperous industrialists and businessmen, generally owning large concerns, into the political life of the city. Inspired by the "civic gospel" preached by a handful of very influential Dissenting clergymen, they saw municipal service as part of their Christian duty; and their concern at the provisions of the 1870 Education Act impelled them into action at both the local and national level, culminating in the return of three Radicals to the Commons to press their views. In almost every detail, this is contrary to the Glasgow pattern, and reveals very clearly the continuing bias which peculiarly Scottish influences could still produce in apparently "national" trends.

Perhaps the most fundamental difference lay in the religious basis to political radicalism. There was no-one in Glasgow to proclaim the message of the civic gospel. As initially developed by Dawson, this stressed a non-theological approach, preferring to

accentuate pragmatic moral principles and good conduct as the Christian life, and self-consciously depreciating the role of a pastoral minister by lecturing rather than sermonising. This low-keyed, non-Evangelical form of religion had no affinity with the intensely emotional and highly-charged revivalism behind the resurgence of the Glasgow Dissenters. The label 'Dissenter' had different shades of meaning in Scotland where it covered mainly the Presbyterian sects outwith the Establishment between whom the variances lay in nuances of policy, whereas in England Dissent embraced a far wider range of theologies, all however quite distinct in both doctrine and government from the Anglican Church. As noted earlier, the non-Presbyterian sects were weak in the city, and so although they had some liberal ministers, none filled the role occupied in Birmingham by the Congregationalist, R. W. Dale. It is revealing that although the Unitarian clergymen were ecclesiastical pariahs in Glasgow, in Birmingham the same men fitted naturally into public life: Crosskey was Chamberlain's political confidant and Page Hopps served on Bright's election committee in 1865.

A direct consequence of the restricted area of "Dissent" in Scotland was that the education question was of little importance in politicising this pressure-group. The unanimity with which Birmingham Nonconformity assailed the intrusion of religion into state education was not repeated in Scotland, as the events of the 1850's would suggest. The U.P. Synod decided not to resist the use

of rates to support religious instruction in schools, preferring to leave it to local boards, always provided the conscience clause remained in force. But, "There is no disguising the fact that our Church is not united on the question": in Edinburgh the Voluntaries took the Birmingham line, their Glasgow brethren were less committed.¹ When the Scottish National Education League was set up, with its base in Glasgow, its support did not come from the sects. Instead, as we have seen, it was a coalition of working-class reformers, University men and Whigs, all interested in secular education. Contemporaries commented on the absence of Voluntary involvement in the League, and it is instructive that when a meeting of Dissenters opposed to any religious instruction was finally convened (in April 1872, only three months before the bill became law), it was attended only by relatively minor Voluntaries. The main address was by R. W. Dale, and his platform party were mostly Edinburgh Dissenters, for it was confessed that the whole project was Edinburgh-inspired.² At the School Board elections in 1873, no Voluntary candidates stood as such, although a group of "eminent citizens" had strong undertones. In the event only three of these six were placed, all clergymen, and with a very low number of actual voters.³ Equally striking was Cameron's election campaign which was conducted without the education question being alluded to once, and when the Mail was covering the

³. About 8,500 individuals voted for them: rather less than the Catholics (9,300) and only one half of the Use and Wont 18,500.
next School Board contest it denounced the "secularist candidates", who espoused a Birmingham-style policy.¹

The business background of the Glasgow Radicals was also pronouncedly different to that of Birmingham, where Chamberlain led a clutch of eminent entrepreneurs and manufacturers accustomed to thinking on a big scale and to making major and costly decisions. None of the leaders of their Glasgow political counterparts were engaged in the dominant, central industries of the city, and only Collins employed a large labour force. The rest were professionals (J. L. Selkirk, accountant), merchants (J. Burt, leather factor), in peripheral industries (Quarrier, shoemaking; H. Lamberton, confectionery) and small tradesmen (J. Torrens, housepainter). The only two apparent exceptions were Alex. Allan, a major shipowner, and Wm. Govan, a textile manufacturer who had long retired from this declining industry.

Thus there were few of the direct and natural industrial contacts with the working class which gave the English Radical businessmen an important link in their political strength. There were in Glasgow none of what Harrison has called the "New Model Employers", such as S. Morley and A. J. Mundella who, sympathetic to their political and social demands, helped convince the working-class to trust in the Liberal party.² When the Trades Council wished to discuss labour relations with an employer, they had to invite Mundella as there was

¹. N.B.D.M., 27, 30 Mar. 1876.
no-one in the city of like opinions. Later, when the Radicals became more numerous, some large employers in leading industries were prominent (W. Lorimer of Dubs Locobuilders; W. MacFarlane of the Saracen Foundry; J. Wilson of the Govan Tube Works), but their preoccupations were with Disestablishment or Temperance or Ireland, and they never betrayed any anxiety to win the confidence of the labour movement. Cameron's campaign reflected this: although he accepted the need to repeal the Criminal Law Amendment Act, the topic was little raised in his speeches. He defined very plainly his overall attitude to Trade Unions when he stated that the Dublin office of his printing firm "is open to Trades' Union men but they don't choose to come into it (Laughter and cheers) . . . All I contend for is justice and I say if union men have a right to fight against offices, offices have a right to fight against union men (Cheers)."¹

This was far removed from Mundella's stand-point, and it seems just to say that the political working men were never very happy dealing with the Dissenting Radicals, as the tangled relations between their two organisations, discussed below, indicate.

The experience and vision which the Birmingham business class brought to city government, imprinting it with the two distinctive qualities of social concern and civic pride which further fostered social and political solidarity, were quite absent from the Glasgow Radicals. Many of them indeed held ideas on the scope and functions of municipal government not far removed from the economists

¹. N.B.D.M., 2 Feb. 1874.
whom Chamberlain and his allies had ousted. As already noted, the objections to the Improvement Trust were led by Temperance spokesmen, and in keeping with this, Collins' spell as Lord Provost from 1877-80 was not marked by any notable achievements. Indeed, one (admittedly critical) observer's resume of his term of office reads like the very obverse of the Birmingham model: "The reign of Lord Provost Collins in fact has been one of petty economies and little makeshifts instead of policy. Large municipal affairs are in a mess and need a much stronger arm than that of Mr Collins to put them in order."¹ This last was an allusion to the inability of the Council to agree on how to proceed with the new Municipal Buildings project, and later, too, it was discovered that the Improvement Trust had run into serious difficulties in this period. It was in accord with this approach that when three lay Radical Dissenters finally won seats on the School Board in 1882, they did so on the grounds that they could cut costs and salary bills, which they accused the Use and Wont party of failing to control. There was no mention of any drastic changes in the content of education to be purveyed (even in regard to Bible instruction), and this seems the ultimate contrast with the Birmingham Radicals.²

Thus while there was an undoubted irruption of militant Dissent in 1874 which conformed to a national trend, there were very


substantial differences of emphasis in Glasgow. These were to have repercussions for the future: for, given its foundations, the Radicalism of Glasgow would be preoccupied with a narrow range of issues, predominantly temperance and ecclesiastical, and would be poorly placed to embrace labour and social questions. Hence the ties which kept working-class loyalty to the Liberal party elsewhere would be easier to dissolve in Glasgow, where there was no deep or lasting record of broad based, middle-class radicalism. What kept the former in the Liberal camp was their own attachment to its goals and philosophy; when those were eroded, the path to Red Clydeside was open precisely because of the fatal flaws which were not present in other strongholds of Liberalism. The seedbeds in which the New Liberalism of the 1900's could flourish in places like Lancashire were not available in Glasgow.

3. Working-Class Liberalism

On 7 July 1868, the Scottish National Reform League convened an electoral conference in Glasgow which was attended by some two hundred "Reformers, delegates of trades, public works and other societies". This representative assembly of the new voters chose

1. The Moir Papers contain a handwritten "Programme of Business for Electoral Conference, Trades Hall, Glasgow. 7th July, 1868". G. Herald, G. Evening Post, 8 Jul. 1868 give the fullest reports.

2. Over 30 trades and 15 factories, drawn from all sectors of economic activity, were listed as participating. In addition, the Trades Council, the Glasgow Working Men's Association and the Scottish Permissive Bill Association were represented.
George Anderson as a "fit and proper person to represent the Reformers and Workingmen of Glasgow". Anderson ran and was elected at the general election in November. This made Glasgow somewhat atypical of the overall pattern of the results, for the English League was generally unsuccessful in securing the return of its own candidates, and indeed it has recently been shown that the Secretary, George Howell, arranged compacts with existing political groups in many seats which simply consolidated the status quo, while in Scotland Glasgow was unique.¹ That Anderson was not a working-man - he had recently retired as managing partner of a large flax-spinning firm in the city - and had not been especially prominent in the activities of the Scottish League does not affect the conclusion that the League alone was responsible for his victory. For Anderson was second choice, only invited to run under the League's auspices after the President, the ex-Chartist James Moir, had declined. In his election address, Anderson uncompromisingly stressed the provenance of his support: "I have been much in contact with the Working Classes, their position having always engaged my attention", and he alone of any candidate spoke to meetings of trade's societies.² George Howell, who sabotaged similar enterprises in England, seemed to recognise the distinctiveness of the Glasgow situation when he congratulated the local secretary, "I am right glad to find you have adopted 'your own candidate!'".³

2. N.B.D.M., 12 Jul. 1868 for the election address; G. Herald, 5 Sep., 5 Nov., for speeches to the Operative Masons and the Ironmoulders respectively.
3. G. Howell to G. Jackson, 13 Jul. 1868, Howell MSS.
The promotion of a candidate in the League interest was not, of course, unique to Glasgow. In Manchester the existing Liberal groups invited the local working-class and League bodies to put up a nominee for the third city seat, but the presence of a fourth Liberal at the poll destroyed Ernest Jones' bid. The prospects of a Liberal split at Glasgow were foreseen and provided for by the July conference, for it made the sponsoring of Anderson conditional upon an arrangement being reached with the other two Liberal candidates in order to maintain unity. The reasons for the success of the Lib-Lab element in Glasgow are indicated not only in the ability of the League to provide the organisational experience to carry through the election campaign, but also by the absence of any qualms displayed by the other two Liberals about sharing their platform with Anderson. In other words, the power over, and the efficient organisation of, the recently enfranchised working classes which the League exercised enabled it to press its claims to a stake in the representation of the city while its moderate political viewpoint made harmony between the various branches of the party a straightforward matter. Thus the Lib-Labs were smoothly integrated into the mainstream of Liberalism.

The impact of the League on Glasgow politics was all the more powerful because in the twenty years prior to its formation working


class franchise reform movements had been conspicuously short-lived. With the collapse of Glasgow Chartism in the riot and bloodshed of April 1848, subsequent reform agitations were sporadic.¹ In 1852, a Parliamentary Reform Association was set up to support Joseph Hume's legislative proposals, but founded with the defeat of Hume's motion in the Commons.² A revival of interest occurred in December 1858 when John Bright came to Glasgow on his nationwide reform tour, and the Glasgow Parliamentary Reform Association was formed. But by the end of one year's existence it was clearly dying: when only 50 out of 1,400 members turned up at a policy conference, chairman James Moir lamented: "it went to demonstrate the difficulty of impressing on the minds of the people the vast importance of this question".³ Even at such a short period prior to the launching of the League as early as 1862, the Trades Council attempted to initiate a new reform association, but this was a signal failure. Attendances at meetings were so small that discussion of the draft constitution had to be twice postponed, and within three months of its inception it was moribund.⁴ There was thus no background of a generation-

1. Some residual Chartist flutterings were recorded in Glasgow until 1856, but these were of no significance - e.g. G. Sentinel, 31 Jan. 1852, 17 Mar. 1855; N.B.D.M., 3 Apr. 1856. For the final phase of Chartism in Scotland, see L. C. Wright, Scottish Chartism (Edinburgh, 1953), pp. 202-6; and A. Wilson, The Chartist Movement in Scotland (Manchester, 1970), pp.243-53.


long commitment to the struggle for enfranchisement upon which the Reform League might build in the mid-1860's. But some continuity of involvement by the leading reformers was sustained, and the names of James Moir, William MacAdam, W. P. Paton and Thomas Brown recurred throughout these years.

In the absence of any strong local tradition of militancy, the impetus behind the League may be presumed to derive from the national forces which promoted the upsurge for reform in 1865, and it is noticeable the radical organisations formed locally in the 1850's were not spontaneous, but came in the wake of a major national initiative. The Scottish National Reform League was founded on September 17, 1866 and absorbed the Glasgow Reform Union after a year of attempts to reconcile policy differences between the English League and the Glasgow Union. While the Union had enjoyed more support than previous ventures - 3,000 attended its conference and 29,000 signed a reform petition - the success of the new League was instantaneous. Exactly one month after its inauguration, it convened the largest demonstration seen in Glasgow since the first Reform crisis when 38,000 marched to the Green from the centre, disrupting all business and closing the roads and bridges for three hours. Orators including Edmund Beales and Ernest Jones spoke from


2. The Glasgow Union stood for a rating qualification, the English League for a residential franchise: G. Howell to G. Newton, Secretary of the Union, 27 Nov. 1865; 24 Feb. 1866, Howell MSS.
six platforms to "one vast heaving sea", and that evening Bright was presented with an address from working-class admirers. ¹ Within four months, the Scottish League claimed to have enrolled 6,354 members, most of whom were in Glasgow, organised in fifty branches. This was a most impressive performance, as in May 1867, after two years' existence, the Reform League had 65,000 members in 600 branches throughout England, Scotland and Ireland. ²

The most striking feature of the League in Scotland was the efficiency and professionalism with which its affairs were conducted. Thus organisation of the mass meeting of October 1866, despite the absence of recent precedent, was flawless, as the apprehensive Lord Provost was compelled to admit: "Everything passed off well yesterday and was highly creditable to the parties." ³ The degree of careful preplanning which had gone into the occasion can be seen in the press reports that in the preceding month five hundred subscription sheets were placed in city workshops, and each workshop also received an outline of the League's plans from delegates, while house-to-house visitations were carried out in working-class areas. ⁴ After building up branches by such means, the strength of the Scottish League was maintained by visits from speakers in the cause, the most notable

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1. Scottish National Reform League, Great Reform Demonstration at Glasgow - Tuesday 16th October 1866 (Glasgow, 1866) is a full account. W. Freer, My Life and Memories (Glasgow, 192), pp. 125-6 for the presentation to Bright. Cf. J. C. Gibson, The Diaries of Sir Michael Conna1 (Glasgow, 1903), p. 129 (18 Oct. 1866).


being William Lloyd Garrison's address in July, 1867, while regular conferences kept up the spirit of unity.\textsuperscript{1} George Howell was enthusiastic: "I am glad to find Scotland so well up in her work for reform. I wish Ireland was equally so", and in June 1868 the London Executive Council passed a resolution warmly approving Scotland's achievements.\textsuperscript{2}

It was evident to contemporaries that the credit for the League's progress in Scotland lay with the Secretary, George Jackson, a journeyman jeweller who later went into business on his own account. When the League replaced the Glasgow Reform Union, Jackson was the only new office-bearer and the effect of his appointment was immediately obvious. Although only in his mid-twenties, Jackson possessed organisational dynamism and a grasp of detail, but he also brought a highly sophisticated sense of political manoeuvring to the movement. It was these administrative qualities (he was referred to as the 'Glasgow Schnadhorst') rather than his pedestrian speech-making which placed Jackson at front of the Glasgow working-class political world until his early death in 1885.\textsuperscript{3} Howell lavished encomia on his work as secretary: "You are going on first rate . . . You really conduct your business so well that I can suggest no improvements", and he accordingly left Jackson a completely free

\textsuperscript{1} G. Herald, 20 Jul. 1867 for Garrison, also Howell to Jackson, 23 Jul. 1867, Howell MSS. G. Herald, 23 Jan., 6 Feb. 1867; Howell to Jackson, 24 Aug. 1867, Howell MSS.

\textsuperscript{2} Howell to G. MacEwen, of Kilmarnock, 10 Oct. 1867; Howell to Jackson, 26 June 1868, Howell MSS.

\textsuperscript{3} G. Herald, 31 Aug. 1885 for a full obituary; \textit{Bailie}, Men You Know, 229.
hand to administer the Scottish League, so confident was he of the latter's ability.¹ Howell, moreover, seems to have taken a liking to Jackson and tried to guide his political education by sending those books and articles which had shaped the older man's principles.²

This liaison with Howell, and Jackson's art at political machinations, were best evinced in the methods whereby the League was able to earmark one of the Glasgow seats for its own choice. From the summer of 1867 Jackson was sounding out Howell on the official League policy regarding the running of candidates in competition with other Liberals. Glasgow, because it was receiving an extra seat, was open to a bid by the League without disturbing existing interests. At a conference held in September 1867 to review the first year's progress in Scotland and to celebrate the recent passing of the Reform Act, the final resolution pledged the League to retain its organisation at full strength until its programme was met in its entirety,³ and further affirmed that the League would only support candidates endorsing these points.⁴ Thereafter on several occasions Jackson discussed the question of a League-promoted candidate with Howell, but the latter could find no-one available and suitable,

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1. Howell to Jackson, 5 Sep. 1867, 17 Dec. 1866, Howell MSS.
2. G. Herald, 31 Aug. 1885; Howell to Jackson, 17 Dec. 1866, 2 Jan. 1867, Howell MSS.
3. I.e., the ballot; a fair redistribution of seats; full manhood suffrage.
4. Howell to Jackson, 14 Sep. 1867, Howell MSS. G. Herald, N.B.D.M., 17, 18 Sep. 1867 for the conference and associated meetings. See too N.B.D.M., 2 Aug. 1867, where the object of the conference is stated to be to secure the return of appropriate candidates.
although Goldwin Smith and A. J. Mundella were both floated. Finally, in May 1868, after an exchange lasting six months, Howell confessed, "we have but few men we can call 'League Candidates'" and they were all allocated seats.¹ This firmly thrust the responsibility back to Glasgow, whereupon the Scottish League moved speedily and within two months had settled on Anderson.

With great skill the League now simultaneously placated the sitting M.P.'s and made Anderson the inevitable and only extra Liberal in the field. Having selected Anderson well before the dissolution and then established his credibility as a potential M.P. by holding a succession of election meetings in August and September, the League had effectively staked its claim to a share in the representation of the city, thus outflanking other groups, such as the Temperance lobby, who were unable to act once the contest proper began with the dissolution of Parliament.² For the League always insisted its support for Anderson was conditional upon a united front being constructed by the three Liberals, and even before their own man was chosen, the League Committee reiterated its "hearty support" of Dalglish and Graham.³ These two, on the other hand, were eager to work with the League, since that body had shown at the mass


2. G. Smith (Dalglish's agent) to W. Melvin, 24 June 1868, Murray Letterbooks; G Herald, 2 Oct., 6, 13 Nov. 1868, for the dilemma of the Temperance reformers.

3. G. Herald, 26 June 1868.
demonstration of October 1866 that it had political control over the working men now coming on to the register. Through the organisational channels of trades and workshop delegates, the League had a ready-made electoral machine which could not be emulated, and so when Jackson produced the 'levelling-up' voting scheme there could be no valid objection to the League's overtures.\(^1\) The combination of forces proved irresistible both to the Conservative challenge and to any potential breakaway Liberal group, and the result was a decisive majority for all three.

The acceptance of an electoral compact was made easier for the other city Liberal interests firstly because of their appreciation that the League did not intend to pull them all over some fearful political or social Niagara, and then, more broadly, because of their growing perception that the ideological tenets of the working class politicians were almost identical to their own on several points. The Scottish Reform League called for manhood suffrage, with a variety of other constitutional changes - the ballot, redistribution and so on, but, despite occasional vague generalisations, there were really only three concrete points beyond these issues.\(^2\) The first, disestablishment of the Church of Ireland, was subscribed to by all

1. *G. Morning Journal*, 19 Sep.; *G. Herald*, 5, 11 Nov. 1868. For the levelling-up scheme, see section 2 of the chapter on Liberal organisation.

2. The League's policy is in Scottish National Reform League, *Address by the Executive Council to the People of Scotland* (Glasgow, 1866); the resolutions passed in the Great Reform Demonstration and the discussions reported in *G. Herald*, 2 Feb., 21 Aug., 17, 18 Sep. 1868.
the Glasgow Liberal candidates in 1868 (and by not a few Conservatives, too). Secondly, the League did call for a revision of the laws relating to capital and labour, but this was a nebulous formulation compared to the clear demands of the Glasgow-based agitation to repeal the Master and Servant Act.¹ There was little overlap of leading personnel and scant co-operation between these two labour movements, although they flourished concurrently in the city. In 1868 relations deteriorated gravely after the Repeal Committee invited the Tory M.P., Lord Elcho, to a celebratory dinner in the face of protests from individuals connected with the Reform League.²

The third issue which the League, and its precursor, the Reform Union, was always emphatically in favour of was a system of national, unsectarian education: Anderson made it the leading topic after the franchise in his election address, and most of the League's activists were prominent in the Scottish National Education League, set up in 1869 to attain these ends. But, as already noted, other Liberals shared this position, so it posed no threat to a political alliance. In any event, at the School Board election of 1873, the working-class decisively rejected their erstwhile political mentors, which suggests that the Reform League's sole attraction lay in its advocacy of an extended franchise.


2. W. H. Fraser, "Trade Unions, Reform and the Election of 1868 in Scotland", SHR, 50 (1971), pp. 143-51, is a recent account of this squabble. The Glasgow Sentinel, edited by the chairman of the Repeal Committee, was hostile to Anderson throughout this election.
The arguments used by the League to justify their demands for a wider vote were not revolutionary but extremely old-fashioned in tone.1 "We only ask a restoration of our original rights as men and Britons", said the League's Address of 1867, alluding to the "ancient constitution".2 References to Magna Charta, to the liberties of the Anglo-Saxons were frequent, as befitted an organisation whose chairman drew his political theories from his reading of such seventeenth writers as Puffendorf.3 The eighteenth century theme of no taxation without representation was also voiced, as when the Council singled out the greatest anti-working-class abuse practised by the Commons to be its right to levy taxation on working men without their exercising any check on its extent or disposal.4 The more modern point that the wealth of the country was created as much by the working as the middle classes was occasionally made, but the main lines of the argument were of the older vintage. Considerations of prestige and status were uppermost, not radical economic or social demands. As they had to obey the laws of the land, working men should have a say in their framing, especially as their institutions were as efficiently run as any managed by their social superiors. The working man had advanced steadily over thirty years, and the orderliness of the great

1. In addition to the references in footnote 2, p. 233, see also the views reported in G. Herald, 6, 9 Oct. 1866. G. Sentinel, 24 June, 23 Sep. 1865, 27 Feb., 2 Mar. 1867.
2. S.N.R.L., Address, unpaginated.
3. See the booksellers' accounts in the Moir Papers.
1866 demonstration showed their self-discipline, as did the willingness of those attending it to sacrifice an estimated £9,000 in wages. The recurring theme throughout was the demand for the admission of working-men to full citizenship rights in their own country; and the image repeatedly used was of "redemption from political serfdom", or emancipation from slavery - a motif highlighted by the address given by Garrison.

There was seldom any expectation of any further or fundamental changes consequent upon the granting of the full suffrage, as Jackson's exposition of the League's argument shows: "Manhood suffrage means an educated people, as the latest intelligence from New South Wales informs us it has done. Manhood suffrage means impartial laws, the greatest good for the greatest number, increase of national prosperity, a greater demand for the products of the farmer and of the manufacturer, less money paid for the support of State drones and blunderers, more money paid to the shopkeeper and sickness and old age provided for."¹

In this context, the ease with which the new voters embraced orthodox Liberalism in 1868 was not surprising, but nonetheless gratified apprehensive observers: "The workingmen, the mass of the newly-enfranchised voters, have done themselves infinite honour. They have exhibited, unmistakeably, that their principles, their

¹. Letter by Jackson, G. Herald, 30 Jan. 1867. The last phrase clearly refers in context to the greater possibility for voluntary savings which the increase in the wealth of the country would allow, rather than to any idea of state provision.
objects and their own idea of their interests are the same as those cherished by the bulk of the middle-class and that they possess in their unity a degree of strength which is really unassailable." 1

Moreover, Lib-Labism had ties of affinity with both the Whig and Radical wings, and so tended to occupy a middle position. "These are some of the red-letter days in our calendar", Jackson told a working-class audience in 1869, itemising such reform measures as Catholic Emancipation, the 1832 Reform Act, the repeal of food taxes, Jewish Emancipation, the abolition of the newspaper stamp duty and the disestablishment of the Church of Ireland. 2 This was an almost identical list of the central pillars of Liberalism as those indicated by the Whiggish William Graham in his speech at the 1868 hustings. 3

And on specific issues, the Lib-Labs, as already seen, could cooperate very closely with the Whigs in the promotion of the cause of national unsectarian education.

Sometimes, too, even when they agreed with Radicals on a policy objective, it was for different reasons. Thus, while united in favour of Disestablishment, Lib-Labs tended to see it as a form of economy in government expenditure and for Radicals it was a spiritual necessity. Radical links with the working-class Liberals were improved by their shared approach to the Contagious Diseases (Women)

1. N.B.D.M., 18 Nov. 1868.


Acts, demands for the abolition of which were a feature of Glasgow politics from 1869 (when the acts were tightened) until their removal in 1883. This campaign joined together libertarians, who disliked the acts because their operation affronted principles of personal freedom, and devout evangelicals, who regarded the sanctioning by the state of prostitution as evidence of the moral decay prevalent in society.¹ A Glasgow branch of Josephine Butler's repeal organisation was very active in the 1870's, holding meetings, drawing up petitions and lobbying local M.P.'s, and their agitation reached a crescendo when there was a move to apply the acts to Maryhill, where the city barracks were. On the committee were the stalwarts of Cameron's election team: Collins, Burt, Quarrier and Torrens, as well as Cameron himself; while the four principal office-bearers of the working-men's section were all leaders of the Lib-Lab political group - William Hammond, John Crichton, Duncan Campbell, John MacCalman. All were combined to ensure "that this legislation shall not be suffered to find entrance to Scotland, the land of Bible truth and freedom".²

Against this background of shared values, the decision of the Reform League to run Anderson in 1868 becomes less capricious. A

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realistic appraisal dictated the impossibility of returning one of their own number. Moir, a moderately successful tea merchant, turned down the League's invitation to stand because: "his present circumstances did not permit him to entertain the prospect". With an overall budget of under £700, the League could not very easily maintain an M.P., even if the conscientious objections held by some to such a practice could be overcome. Again, Glasgow was not dominated by a single industry, so no one union was all-powerful, and therefore there was little prospect of a Lib-Lab being returned along the lines of MacDonald and Broadhurst in 1874. In any case, the most obvious institution to promote such a candidate, the Trades' Council, did not interfere in politics. Apart from Moir, there was no working-man of the calibre to be an M.P., for Jackson was still too young, and the others had little talent for public speaking. Thus, as Fraser argues, money factors lay behind the decision to run Anderson: as a retired businessman, he presumably had a reasonable competency. Anderson's financial embarrassments during most of the sixteen years he sat for the city suggest that the League was indeed right to be reluctant to support a working-man. Despite his wealth, Anderson was almost bankrupted in 1878 when the Emma Mine, an American silver mining speculation, of which he was a director, failed. He was rescued by his father-in-law, who settled his debts ("he has cost

1. G. Herald, 8 Jul. 1868.
me far above £30,000"), but he remained in difficult circumstances until he was appointed Deputy Governor of the Australian Mint in 1885. ¹

Anderson, although relatively unknown in public life, had written papers on two social problems of the day: arrestment of wages, and the promotion of working-class education. ² When the July 1868 election conference was informed of Anderson's authorship of these works, one reformer cried out: "in that case there could not be a better candidate for the working-class (Cheers)", and the meeting at once moved that Anderson be invited to address them. ³ Having been unable to induce their own President to stand, the League had then opted, not for a working-man qua working-man, but preferred to pick someone sympathetic to working-men's problems who had good prospects of being elected in liaison with the sitting M.P.'s. This was not social deference - the conference had opened with a ringing declaration from Moir that they were no longer slaves - but arose from their total commitment to Liberalism, which they placed above class-consciousness.

These characteristics of Lib-Labism in Glasgow in the period after the Second Reform Act may in part be explained by the whole-hearted support of European nationalist movements which, after the decline of Chartism, became the focus of political activity for


2. The Arrestment of Wages: An Exposure (Glasgow, 1853); and "The Education of the Working Classes and the best means of Promoting it", Procs.Phil.Soc.Glas. 4 (1855-60), pp. 82-93.

3. George Ross, the veteran Chartist, in G. Herald, 8 Jul. 1868.
working-class reformers until the formation of the Reform League. The impact of this twenty-year long involvement affected their general political outlook considerably. Louis Blanc, Kossuth, Mazzini and Karl Blind were all effusively welcomed when they gave their frequent addresses in the city on the topic of political liberty in their respective countries. Meetings were also held to express support for the causes of Polish and Danish independence, and the despotic governments of Imperial Russia, France and Austria-Hungary were regularly denounced. In addition, there was strong commitment by the same men to the abolitionist side in American Civil War, which was interpreted as another instance of the struggle for liberty by oppressed peoples. Above all, Garibaldi captured the imagination of the city in both his bids to secure Italian liberty and unity. In 1859, a fund was organised to help finance his campaign after mass meetings were held to discuss how best to promote his cause, and raised £2,668 in twelve months. Some two hundred and sixty Garibaldi Volunteers left Glasgow to join his army, and the city was described by one participant as "the head-centre of


Garibaldi's sudden departure for Italy thwarted a demonstration arranged in 1864 by the workingmen's committee to aid Garibaldi which would have equalled those staged for Bright and Gladstone in 1865.2

This cause was supported by many of the Reform League leaders, including Burt and Moir, the two Presidents; John MacAdam, an ex-Chartist who corresponded with all of the continental nationalists and who piloted the Garibaldi movement in Glasgow; and John MacCalman and Charles Wright, two influential trades unionists. This carry-over of personnel helps to clarify the Reform League's standpoint on questions of ideology and of political relations with other classes. The ideas behind these liberal nationalist agitations were essentially to gain constitutional changes, with little concept of sweeping economic or social reforms, and Glasgow supporters were sympathetic to this emphasis. They seem to have regarded the nationalist risings in the same light as British reformers had viewed the early stages of the French Revolution, namely, as Europeans repeating past British struggles, rather than as a radical new departure. A clergyman called Garibaldi "the Wallace of Italy", and John MacAdam compared the events of 1859-60 in Italy to the 1640's in Britain.3 These

1. Recollections of William Hammond, Handloom Weaver (Glasgow, 1904), p. 64.


rather limited political principles were widely subscribed to in Glasgow, as a Lib-Lab activist recalled: "We were all hero-worshippers in those days. Thomas Carlyle was spreading the cult of the heroic man. Joseph Mazzini had for years been hammering at thrones and systems, and at the same time inspired thousands with his religious-political theories, while Kossuth in Hungary and Garibaldi in Italy were doing what Kosciusko had previously attempted in Poland. They were great days to be young in."¹

One minor instance of this influence on the League was seen when Riccardo, Garibaldi's son, visited the city in September 1867 and was made a Vice-President of the League.² The link was most decisively stated in the Reform League's Address to the People of Scotland, published in 1867, where it formed the clinching argument in the case for reform: "We have just seen the freedom and unity of Italy accomplished, Germany enfranchised, the serfs of Russia emancipated, the attempt of Spain to destroy the Negro Republic of Haiti frustrated, the efforts of the slaveholding aristocracy of America to found there a Slave Empire, and that of European despotism to establish Imperialism in Mexico, baffled by the power of freedom. Under such circumstances, the success of our cause is inevitable."³ With these models as its inspiration, it is little surprise that the League possessed very few concrete measures beyond the political emancipation of the British working-man.

¹. W. Freer, My Life and Memories (Glasgow, 1926), p. 125; also Recollections of William Hammond, pp. 60-4.
². G. Herald, 10 Sep. 1867.
³. S.N.R.L., Address, unpaginated.
Besides bequeathing a limited perception of the boundaries of legitimate political demands, the movement of sympathy for European liberty also predisposed the Reform League to accept the support of and to co-operate with middle-class elements. Walter Buchanan, the Whig M.P. for the city, chaired several of these meetings, while the brewer, Hugh Tennent of Wellpark, offered the use of his launch to bring Garibaldi from London to Glasgow for the projected working-men's presentation. The Garibaldi Aid Fund had a middle-class section, which raised most of the money - one single donation of £200 came from a wealthy manufacturer, W. G. Langdon - while the working-men's section concentrated on raising volunteers. An ardent supporter of all European struggles was the Rev. H. W. Crosskey, and his interest in other social reforms made him a useful bridge between the classes. While some middle-class evangelicals were animated by the hope that political independence in Italy would destroy the power of the Papacy, others were genuinely committed to the cause. The experience of working closely with these middle-class reformers over the political issue of the greatest moment to working-class radicals immediately prior to the second reform agitation must have made collaboration after 1867 very much smoother, and hence suggests why Anderson was accepted with little demur.

1. G. Saturday Post, 20 Nov. 1858 for Buchanan.
The Garibaldi Aid movement may also have contributed to the organisational strength of the Reform League, for the plans for the working-men's reception in 1864 were prepared by a body of trades' delegates, and the League fully exploited this network of contacts after 1866 in building up branches and in reaching decisions which their grass-roots supporters would endorse. It is also suggestive of the close ties which have just been argued to exist that as the excitement over Garibaldi passed and the franchise agitation got under way, interest in the European situation rapidly waned and meetings held on the subject in 1866 and 1867 were poorly attended.\(^1\)

But the internationalist strain was not entirely dead: in the 1870's it took the form of the Workmen's Peace Association, which called for international arbitration and an end to all wars. The Glasgow branch was formed in 1873 and included the leading Lib-Labs - Andrew Boa, Daniel Ferguson, William Hammond and John Battersby. It was sufficiently strong to be able to afford sending Ferguson to the Paris conference of peace movements held in 1875. In 1878 it sponsored two mass meetings against Disraeli's handling of the Bulgarian crisis, but thereafter it fell away, the last press report being one in 1881.\(^2\)

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Lib-Labism in Glasgow, then, was firmly set within the framework of the existing Liberal party because the working-class politicians had secured, and were able to maintain, Anderson as their elected representative. Not only did ideology, as elsewhere, place Lib-Labism squarely within the confines of the Liberal party, but, unlike other constituencies, there was no squabbling over power-sharing. This made attempts by disaffected working-class interests to disturb the Liberal status quo doubly difficult. The rejection of MacLiver's candidacy in 1874 by trades delegates, despite the backing he received from the Criminal Law Amendment Repeal Committee, is a good case in point. Orthodox Liberalism in the guise of Cameron and Anderson triumphed, and MacLiver's campaign committee was in disarray. ¹

MacLiver had little option after this but to withdraw from the contest, and the Repeal Committee was wound up in 1877 after its demands were met in legislation - well before the next election in Glasgow. In this same period, however, there was revealed the sharp distinction between the orthodox Liberalism of the working-class and the desire to press for separate labour representation. Typifying the second, the Trades Council in November 1876 accepted a motion that: "It is highly desirable that a Parliamentary programme be prepared on such subjects as affect the working-man," ² and such other steps be taken so

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1. For this incident, above pp. 136-8.

2. These were detailed: the Compensation Bill, the Patent Laws, the Truck System, longer polling hours, Plimsoll's Bill and the establishment of a Stipendiary Magistrate for Glasgow.
that we may be prepared for any contingency, such as the dissolution of Parliament or the resignation of a member.\(^1\) In 1877 it was publicly confirmed that MacLiver was still a candidate for Glasgow in the labour interest.\(^2\)

In 1876, however, a powerful counter-blown to such notions of independency was struck by the formation of the Liberal Working Men's Electoral Union, the first overtly political working class body since the end of the Reform League. The Electoral Union strove to convert working men to Liberalism, not to advance working-class objectives within the party. "The principles of the Union", ran its constitution, "are those of the Liberal party". It listed eight 'principles', all of them quite common demands; disestablishment, economy of government expenditure, reform of the county franchise, land law reform, etc. Even when, as only the fifth point of all, labour issues were raised, the phrasing was in the most anodyne of terms: "The consideration in legislation of the interests of the working classes equally with the interests of other classes."\(^3\) The primacy of loyalty to the party was emphasised above all else. Simon Martin, the Union's first secretary, warned that sectional demands could not take precedence over the general good of the party: "he pointed out the necessity for the loyal adherence on the part of working-men to the

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3. The objects and principles of the Union were reprinted in *G. Herald*, 1 Apr. 1878; cf. *N.B.D.M.*, 3 Jul. 1876, for speeches by John Battersby and Simon Martin.
L4J-

Liberal party, which had done the most to promote the march of intellect and the progress of civilisation." No desire to run candidates outwith the general party consensus was expressed, and care was taken to appoint as honorary office-bearers local middle-class notables drawn from all shades of Liberal opinion. ¹

The principal self-defined function of the Electoral Union was to combat what was conceived to be the degeneracy in the spirit of Liberalism, and the lectures held with the purpose of redressing this decline adhered to conventional definitions of the party's philosophy and policies. ² The national politicians from whom the Union drew inspiration were Bright and Gladstone, rather than the newer, more radical men like Dilke or Chamberlain. The Union organised a monster meeting in the city which was addressed by Gladstone during his first Midlothian campaign, but did not attend a rally addressed by Chamberlain in the same year. ³ The Union consistently pledged full support for all the major policy decisions of Gladstone's second

¹. G. Sentinel, 8 Jul. 1876; N.B.D.M., 16 Oct. 1876. Also the speech by Battersby, N.B.D.M., 3 Jul. 1876: "The chief object in the formation of the Union, and the present meeting, was to cultivate acquaintance with each other, and when the opportune occasion presented itself, that each should cooperate in the realisation of Liberal principles which were based upon truth and justice."

². E.g., speeches by Martin, G. Sentinel, 8 Jul. 1876; N.B.D.M., 16 Oct. 1876. Also, G. Herald, 8, 15, 22 Dec. 1880 for further comments.

administration, in contrast to the misgivings many Liberals in the city felt at one time or another.¹

Against this picture of almost unquestioning fidelity to the party shown by working-men, the abortive bids by the Trades Council to put forward Labour candidates in the elections of 1885 and 1886 are explicable. The Council concluded, after an appeal for funds to support a planned intervention in the Camlachie seat had been unsuccessful, that "it would not be unfair to infer that a mistake has been made in thinking that there was any great desire among the working classes to send men of their own class to Parliament".² The collapse of Liberal solidarity was not to occur until after the period under review, during which there were no signs of social cleavage opening up between middle and working class Liberals.

The Electoral Union was thus content to maintain its conformity to Liberalism, and most of the causes of friction which arose between it and other local party bodies were occasioned by a feeling that the Union had been slighted. Such social and status sensitivity were in accord with the whole tenor of Lib-Labism from the days of the Reform League's call to end the servile position of working men, which was reiterated in the opening sentence of the statement of the

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Union's objects: "The Union aims at the political and social elevation of workmen."¹ For instance, in 1879 the Union complained loudly that the Liberal Association had taken over the arrangements for Gladstone's visit to the city because, so the Union alleged, the Association did not believe that working-men could organise such an event.² This squabble reduced relations between the two bodies to a low level, and the attempts made by the Association to exclude the Union from representation on the Executive of the Scottish Liberal Association in 1882 reinforced the feelings of implied inferiority harboured by the latter. John Battersby, as spokesman for the Electoral Union, intimated that: "we protest at Liberal injustice, tyranny and malice, and we feel confident that neither slander nor misrepresentation will alter our policy nor change our views as to Liberalism."³ Once, however, the susceptibilities of the Union had been appeased in these incidents, it reaffirmed its complete confidence in the Liberal party's principles.

A Labour Aristocracy?

One of the most persuasive explanations for the political passivity of the working class in middle and late Victorian Britain is contained in the concept of an aristocracy of labour. The term refers to the

¹. The constitution of the Union is printed in G. Herald, 1 Apr. 1878.
². G. Herald, 11, 16, 22, 24 Dec. 1879 for the Gladstone episode. See also below pp. 366-7
supposed existence from the middle of the nineteenth century of "certain distinctive upper strata of the working class, better paid, better treated and generally regarded as more 'respectable' and politically moderate than the mass of the proletariat".\(^1\) As discussed in Chapter 1, the city's industrial and occupational pattern was fully consistent with the indicators pointing to the existence of a working class elite.\(^2\) Other criteria normally invoked to confirm the existence of a labour aristocracy apply in the case of Glasgow.\(^3\) Wage differentials between craftsmen and unskilled workers were maintained as firmly as elsewhere (cf. TABLE 3.2). Another factor which endowed the artisan with a superior social position was the far greater control he exercised over the pace of work and his volume of output. Among shipyard workers an observer noted this: "They are nominally fellow-workmen, but they are actually taskmaster and serf . . . there is no instance in which the plater does not receive at least three times as much as the helper."\(^4\)

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2. For a full discussion, see above pp. 30-2.


TABLE 3.2 Wage Differentials, 1860-1900

I. GLASGOW

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1860</th>
<th>1870</th>
<th>1880</th>
<th>1890</th>
<th>1900</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Masons/Labourers</td>
<td>1:68</td>
<td>1:61</td>
<td>1:61</td>
<td>1:63</td>
<td>1:56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platers, Rivetters/Holders-up</td>
<td>1:54</td>
<td>1:72</td>
<td>1:69</td>
<td>1:72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacksmiths/Strikers</td>
<td>1:67</td>
<td>1:62</td>
<td>1:66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fitters/Labourers</td>
<td>1:58</td>
<td>1:58</td>
<td>1:58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ironmoulders/Labourers</td>
<td>1:52</td>
<td>1:46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. ENGLAND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1850</th>
<th>1860</th>
<th>1870</th>
<th>1877</th>
<th>1883</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>London Building crafts/Labourers</td>
<td>1:50</td>
<td>1:65</td>
<td>1:68</td>
<td>1:85</td>
<td>1:58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester Masons/Labourers</td>
<td>1:41</td>
<td>1:50</td>
<td>1:50</td>
<td>1:61</td>
<td>1:65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures represent the ratio of weekly earnings of unskilled and craft workers, the latter always expressed as 1.

Sources:  
II. R. Harrison, Before the Socialists, p. 31.
Security and regularity of employment were better for the craftsmen: as the recession of 1878-9 showed, the last to lose their jobs were the skilled workers.\(^1\) In addition, the craftsmen were the most unionised and best organised, for of the 71 delegates sitting on the Trades Council in 1881-2, 52 were from skilled trades.\(^2\)

Although this artisan elite undoubtedly existed, the social subservience and unquestioning acceptance of the ongoing social and economic system often ascribed to it were not universally found in Glasgow, where a strong current of independent pride and critical observations on conventional wisdom could be widely detected.\(^3\) Andrew Boa, a stonemason and a central figure in the Glasgow labour movement in the early 1970's, seems a typical aristocrat.\(^4\) He constantly stressed his great objective to be the social elevation of working-men, and he identified "that greatest of all tyrants, strong drink, which bound them severally" as inhibiting their progress more than any legislative fetters. On his departure for New Zealand in 1875 he was given a presentation by the Radical Dissenting group of Collins and Quarrier, at which it was stressed that contributions had come from the Chamber of Commerce, merchants and shopkeepers, as well as from working-men.\(^5\) Yet Boa, who had tried to convert the

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2. These included 19 in engineering and metal manufacture; 14 in building trades; 14 in wood and furniture; and 5 in other skilled crafts.
3. Above, pp. 32-3.
Trades Council to the Permissive Bill, could speak in another tone: "He was convinced that labour organisations had reached a stage at which there was a necessity of re-modelling their weapons. Hitherto their weapons had been those of defence, now they must be those of attack. The privileged classes possessed the wealth of the country, and depend upon it, they would endeavour to keep it." At about the same time, a leading Lib-Lab William Hammond told a meeting of the shipbuilding trades that all working-men should combine together "with the view of taking the entire trade of the country into their own hands and working it thoroughly. (Cheers)."

This rather less than craven outlook must be borne in mind when considering the role of the aristocracy in shaping working-class political attitudes. It is held that the elite stamped their collaborationist view of class relationships on the whole working-class electorate. This spirit of harmony derived from their social position, which was much closer to those above than below them, so that the mid-Victorian values of self-elevation and self-reliance appealed because, in their experience, these were relatively valid. Hence, in the political context, the strength of Lib-Labism stemmed from the special position of the labour aristocracy.

2. Ibid., 9 Nov. 1874; also speeches by Jas. Grant (a joiner), Geo. Miller (an engineer) and Hugh Watson.
The political leaders of the working-class in Glasgow were indeed drawn from this elite stratum. The executive of the Liberal Workmen's Electoral Union was as follows:—4 Printers; 6 Building Crafts; 1 each Handloom Weaver, Tailor and Ropespinner; and 2 not identified. Yet the correlation is not perfect, since not all the components of the aristocracy were represented, and the preponderance of the building trades is apparent. Joiners, masons, bricklayers and painters provided about one-half of the identifiable labour politicians, including John MacCalman, Andrew Boa, Duncan Kennedy, R. C. Grant and James Proudfoot. The lack of similar participation by the metal and engineering crafts is interesting: only John Inglis and John Crichton (both blacksmiths), and, briefly, George Miller (an engineer) were active politically. By contrast, the much smaller printing industry produced three activists: John Battersby, William Govan and W. H. Drummond.¹ In this period then, the engineers were not politically conscious, and did not develop any such traits until the beginning of the next century.²

Political involvement does not seem to have been associated as closely or as totally with craft status and values as is sometimes assumed. An equally formative influence may have been the traditional radicalism of certain occupations or districts. This is seen in the

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¹ Other minor trades included the Bakers and the Tailors, with two political leaders apiece.

² J. H. Muir, Glasgow in 1901 (Glasgow, 1901), pp. 188-99 discusses the changing outlook.
case of William Hammond, and also that of William Freer, both of whom were textile workers and important Lib-Lab figures. Hammond in particular was the archetype of such men: for a while he was President of the Trades Council, and served as President of the Electoral Union for the duration of its ten years' life. In addition he was interested in European nationalist questions, and was later prominent in the Workmen's Peace Association and in the campaign against the Contagious Diseases Act. Largely self-educated, he belonged to the Bridgeton Rambling Club, which explored nearby areas of archaeological or geological interest, and also played a full part in the Glasgow Campbell Club, a reading and debating gathering of workingmen.\(^1\)

With his abhorrence of strong drink and of wasteful pastimes like football, Hammond displayed all the stout radical virtues which observant contemporaries discerned as the key characteristics of the Victorian workingman in Glasgow.\(^2\)

Hammond's political creed was formed by his upbringing in the Bridgeton district of the East End of the city. There his closest friend was James Norval, another weaver, whose brother had been imprisoned after the Bonnymuir rising in 1820, while the handloom weavers' union organised by Hammond in the 1840's was a front for "Chartist meetings, pure and simple".\(^3\) The radical traditions were

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3. Recollections, p. 31.
sustained down the years in this locality. William Freer, whose family had been socialists in the 1820's, remarked of the deaths in the Chartist riot of 1848: "the incident was long remembered in the East End of the city".\textsuperscript{1} There was similar anger when in 1869 a textile manufacturer referred to the East End voters as a 'shirtless crew'. "It was true that a good many of them were without shirts, but the Bridgeton folk resented such a slight upon their poverty. They were descendants of the Weavers and the Chartists, and their standard of excellence was brains, not clothes."\textsuperscript{2} In an era when politics were based on community-type interests, and not on class lines, these factors were of greater relevance in creating a political leadership than simply belonging to the elite of labour.\textsuperscript{3} Nor was this confined to the weavers, it applied to many who hailed from the East End, such as A. J. Hunter, the bakers' leader, who was Secretary of the Electoral Union and became a Liberal Councillor in the 1890's; and also Peter Henrietta, the tailors' spokesman. There is thus a marked contrast between this rather cultural matrix of politicisation which functioned in the Victorian era and the more openly class factors

\begin{enumerate}
\item Freer, \textit{My Life}, p. 16. Also J. Campbell, \textit{Recollections of the Radical Times} (Glasgow, 1884) testified to the popular memory of the Chartist era.
\end{enumerate}
which became ever more prominent in the early twentieth century, coinciding with the entry of engineering and metal workers into labour politics, a transformation which was much commented upon at the time.¹

It has also been held that although the labour aristocracy provided the leadership of and claimed to speak for the entire working-class, in fact the elite stratum was not truly representative of the opinions of the class as a whole, but instead tended to act as a moderating, rather conservative brake on the more advanced aspirations of many workingmen.² In Glasgow, however, much of the evidence indicates that between 1865 and 1885 it was the political activists who wished to move in a more radical direction, but were checked by the rank-and-file's complete allegiance to orthodox Liberal politics.

Four instances make this cleavage apparent, and as they are discussed elsewhere, may be briefly treated here. Firstly, the candidature of two workingmen Advanced Liberals in the municipal election of 1869 resulted in their heavy defeat.³ Jackson's rejection at the hands of the Bridgeton voters did not arise out of deference to a large employer of labour,⁴ but out of dislike both for Jackson's

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1. Contrast the Recollections of William Hammond with autobiographies of the next generation - e.g., W. Haddow, My Seventy Years (Glasgow, 1940); T. Bell, Pioneering Days (London, 1941); W. Gallacher, Revolt on the Clyde (London, 1936); D. Kirkwood, My Life of Revolt (London, 1935).


3. Above, pp. 143-5.

aggressively class-based campaign and for his injection of party labels into local government.¹ Next, in 1873, there was the combined intervention in the first School Board elections by the Education League and the Trades Council, fighting for the Reform League's objective of a national, non-sectarian system of schooling. As noted, this group fared badly at the polls, particularly the working-class reformers among them. Jackson came 31st out of 38 in the field, and John MacCalman, the joiners' leader, finished in 33rd place.² The School Board was therefore dominated by sectarian interests while the bid to end the religious element and concentrate on providing a full secular curriculum was cast aside.

A third incident, already discussed in this chapter, occurred when moves by the local trades unionists in 1874 to launch a parliamentary candidate on a labour platform was firmly squashed by the rank-and-file delegates, who opted instead for Anderson and Cameron, both middle of the road Liberals. A decade later, the Electoral Union staked out a claim for a share in the seven city seats in a resolution in March 1885 which "contained an expression of opinion to the effect that the time had arrived when the working-class should be represented by men of their own class".³ Jackson

¹. First Ward Municipal Election. George Jackson's Address . . ., unpaginated; G. Sentinel, 6 Nov. 1869; Lumsden Diaries, 2 Nov. 1869.

². See above pp. 132-3.

³. G. Herald, 7 Mar. 1885.
than announced his intention to offer himself as Liberal candidate for the Central Division, and, as he informed the Union, he was standing on a working-class platform: "I include in my calculations for the future, if elected, of strengthening and acting with the Labour party in the House, now consisting directly of our good friends Messrs. Broadhurst and Burt. My whole experience of life since its commencement with yourself and others as a worker in obtaining the enfranchisement of the workingmen would of itself lead to this course; and also to hope that the labour party may be largely increased in the new parliament, and that at least one direct workmen's representative may be sent by Glasgow." ¹ The Union endorsed Jackson's stance, but when he died four months later all attempts to find another working man were unavailing. A switch of activity to Camlachie was fruitless, and seven middle-class Liberal M.P.'s were returned for the city. Despite the desires of the working-class political leadership, and the co-operation of the Trades Council, the latter were driven to confess their failure. ²

It would seem, therefore, that the attachment on the part of the working classes to the Liberal party sprang not from the undue and misleading influence exercised by the labour aristocracy by virtue of its peculiar economic and social position, but rather from a

¹ Jackson to W. Hammond, G. Herald, 17 Mar. 1885.
² Above, pp. 128-30.
genuine commitment to the principles of Liberalism which extended beneath the elite and which had as its source other, deeper wellsprings.
CHAPTER FOUR

The Evolution of Liberal Organisation
The means whereby political parties seek to organise their support is the product of an interaction between the technical considerations involved in the working of the electoral system and the sub-groups within the party anxious to attain some political or social end. The history of the development of Liberal organisation in Glasgow is a good instance of this process. Prior to the 1867 Reform Act, organisation was formed on an *ad hoc* basis, only springing into active existence at election times, otherwise lying dormant. This set-up ideally met the requirements of the dominant political interest, the Whigs, for they saw politics as an extension of their social pre-eminence, and thus needing no special structures, while their political demands were on the whole individualistic. Moreover, technical factors did not necessitate a more permanent framework, but between 1867 and 1877 this loose, informal arrangement came under dual pressure. Firstly there were the consequences of the inflation of the electorate in 1867 by some 250%, which called for tighter techniques of discipline and disposition of strength - a problem intensified by the introduction of the ballot in 1872; and secondly there was the rise of clamant pressure groups operating inside the party to achieve their goals through legislative action. The phase after 1877, with an elaborate, constitutional organisation enunciating and executing Liberal policies in the city represented the establishment of a new style of politics.
1. **Before the Second Reform Act**

In this period, informality and discontinuity appear the keynotes of Liberal organisation, and this flexibility encouraged allegations of rule by clique. For it is apparent that there did exist a smallish number of men of political weight who provided the mainsprings of party activity and who directed the Liberal interest in major decisions. Thus when John MacGregor, then at the Board of Trade, decided in 1845 to solicit opinion in the city as to his prospective candidacy, he wrote to the Whig leader, Walter Buchanan, "a gentleman who (sic) I believed to be acquainted with the state of public feeling in Glasgow", as he described Buchanan's influence. The reply neatly explained the distribution of power: "THE BRINGING OF CANDIDATES AND MATTERS REGARDING ELECTIONS HAVE BEEN MANAGED HERE, AS I SUPPOSE EVERYWHERE ELSE, BY A COMPARATIVELY SMALL NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS."\(^1\) Clearly, a group of men of similar social status, meeting regularly in the city on the 'Change, in clubs and at dinner-parties had little need for a firm unit of organisation.\(^2\)

At elections, when something more was called for, committees to promote the return of a candidate would be formed. It is misleading

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1. City Election. Correspondence of John MacGregor, Esquire, Secretary to the Board of Trade, with Walter Buchanan, Esquire, relative to the retirement of Mr. Oswald and the Future Representation of Glasgow (Glasgow, 1847), pp. 3-4; Buchanan to MacGregor, 15 Dec. 1845, pp. 5-6. The capitals are in the original, but the pamphlet aims to prove that Buchanan was part of the Whig clique alleged to have ruled Glasgow politics since 1832.

2. The Lumsden Diaries give a useful picture of this social interchange and of the regularity with which a small elite section met. For evidence of similar informal control, P. Whitaker, Liberal Organisation in Manchester from the 1860's to 1903 (Ph.D. Thesis, Manchester University 1957), pp. 30-9, 252-3; N. Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel (London, 1953), pp. 193-202.
to regard these bodies as mere fronts for ambitious candidates, as is revealed in the account of the choice of Walter Buchanan in 1857 given by one of the prime movers in his nomination. Several possible contenders for the seat vacated by MacGregor were floated on the Exchange floor, but finally: "the general feeling seemed to be that if Buchanan would stand, there would be no opposition. A meeting was held in Robt. Stewart's office, of about a dozen, when it was resolved that a requisition should be got up, and a deputation having waited on B. he stated after some reluctance that if a numerously signed requisition were presented he would stand. A deputation was then sent to HCE to state this and ask him to support. Mr Chas. Gray and I were sent to Provost to ask him, A.O., to be the Chairman of the Committee, which he said he would be most happy to be."¹ Similarly, Melgund was invited to stand on the initiative of a local group in 1852 and he accepted only after much hesitation;² while the most nakedly self-appointed candidate of this period, James Merry, stood against Buchanan after the Licensed Victuallers pressed him to run at a meeting where "we there and then formed ourselves into an election committee".³ Committees were responsible for the running of the campaign and often displayed considerable independence and

1. Lumsden Diaries, 24 Feb. 1857. HCE is Humphrey Crum-Ewing; AO is Sir Andrew Orr.

2. "One really does not see how yr friends can ever have brought you forward", Lady Melgund to Melgund, 12 Jul. 1852, Minto Papers, NLS 135/2.

3. This account of Merry's candidature appeared in Scottish Standard, 16 Mar. 1872, and is confirmed by contemporary reports - e.g., Lumsden Diaries, 25 Feb., 5 Mar. 1857.
self-will in their decisions as to policy. In Melgund's case, a meeting of his committee disregarded the warning lights of the canvass returns, overriding "all the elder men of judgment and experience (who) voted for the withdrawal of your lordship, and nearly all those who were opposed to it were either very hot-headed or very young". 1 Equally, the decision as to whether Buchanan should run jointly with Hastie at the general election of 1857 was settled not by Buchanan on his own, but by his committee at a prolonged and stormy meeting. 2 After he was returned, however, an M.P. had greater control over his committee as to future contests. "It is my duty however to be prepared", wrote Dalglish in 1859, "and I have requested Mr. Geo. Smith to arrange a committee, I know your feeling towards me and I have no doubt you will do what you can to assist me should a contest arise." 3

Once a committee was composed, the pattern of electioneering was fairly stereotyped. While the candidate faced public scrutiny and a barrage of heckling over his speeches, the all-important canvass took place to ascertain support and to induce voters to pledge

1. J. Higginbotham to Melgund, 10 Jul. 1852, Minto Papers, NLS 135/2; cf. Lumsden Diaries, 9 Jul. 1852: "It is a great pity he was not withdrawn last night as he would have been but for the stubbornness of some of the Committee who would not hear of it."


themselves. As important as anything else, however, was the publication in extenso of the candidate's supporters in the press. These lists could be very lengthy indeed — containing as much as 10% of the final poll — and their object seems to have been to impress uncommitted voters by the quality, as well as the volume, of the backing enjoyed. It is also possible, as Vincent has shown, could happen in Lancashire, that the lists were an attempt to encourage exclusive dealing with those named (who were mainly shop-keepers or tradesmen) either by wealthy patrons or by non-electors. This practice was associated with the older political style, with its weight on personalities and influence, and after 1868 it went quite out of favour on the Liberal side. Anderson then merely identified his top twenty supporters; in 1874 only the Whigs Bolton and Crum put out a detailed list of over 600 names, while Cameron, the epitome of the new political system, trumpeted his committee's refusal to publish more than the Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen in order, he said, "that there should be no attempt to influence the community by


2. William Graham in 1865 had about 480 of a Committee, in 1847 William Dixon had 450 names, but generally around 200 names were listed.

3. Thus, "Candidates usually published the names of his leading supporters, and as much attention was paid to his list as to his address." J. Devon, "The Calton Fifty Years Ago", Trans. Old Glasgow Club, 6 (1930-1), p. 35.

the publication of a long list of names of a committee (Applause)."1
In 1880 the Liberals restricted themselves to simply printing the
heads of the divisional committees. One advantage of this organisa-
tional method was that the cost of electioneering was kept fairly
low: hard figures are not easily come by, but in the mid-1840's it
was stated that a contest could cost £1,000 and a walkover only £150
to £200.2 If anything this probably fell as treating became less
common, and certainly registration expenses (put at £300 in the
1840's) were not a factor after 1856 as is shown below.3 Frequently
candidates had part of their expenses met by their supporters - this
happened to the very wealthy Dalglish in 1857 and 1865; in the cases
of MacGregor (1847, 1852) and Melgund (1852) it was said that they
could not otherwise have stood.4

Thus at very low cost the Liberals controlled city politics and
with the minimum of activity, for between contests the friends of an
M.P. or an intending candidate kept a watching brief on developments.5

1. N.B.D.M., 6 Feb. 1874.
   W. B. Gwyn, Democracy and the Cost of Politics in Britain
treating at Glasgow elections from 1837 to 1847.
4. E.g., Melgund to Lady Abercromby, - Apr. 1852, and to J. Campbell
   and R. Gilmour, 9 June 1852, Minto Papers, NLS 135/2.
5. R. Dalglish to J. Moir, 5 Apr. (1859), and 8 Mar. 1859, Moir
   Papers; cf. City Election, pp. 5-6.
Apart from correspondence with their political confidants, M.P.'s were kept fully informed of local public feeling by the curious and unique Glasgow custom, viz. the annual review of proceedings in Parliament given by the sitting members to an open meeting of constituents.¹ The practice was begun as the result of an election pledge by John MacGregor, given in 1852 to prove that he would not be an absentee representative, as previous occupants of the Glasgow seat had been. M.P.'s were under no legal obligation to convene these meetings, but their political survival demanded that they went through with this ordeal every year, the only acceptable excuse being illness. The custom was observed until 1885, although the value of these occasions was frequently questioned: respectable opinion was shocked at the rude reception given to unpopular conduct by M.P.'s, and also at the persistent interrogation they were subjected to, as it was held to demean the status of city members and to frighten off national statesmen from taking one of the seats. The advantage of these meetings was to permit citizens to judge the speaking ability and voting record of their M.P. at regular intervals, and to ascertain his opinions by close questioning on an astonishing range of topics—e.g. Temperance, Sabbath observance, foreign policy, dog-licences. It was also a very democratic institution: non-electors and opponents

¹. Vincent, Formation of the Liberal Party, p. 100, notes meetings of non-electors were held at election times in Rochdale, but the Glasgow arrangement was quite different.
could attend and make their feelings known, and so feel part of the
city's political life. Again, while the vote of confidence at the
end of each meeting had no binding force, it was no formality, for
if it went against them, it was taken seriously as an ill omen by
commentators.¹

This weak, informal structure was quite suited to the general
desires of the electorate. There were no great pressure-groups
seeking to control an M.P.'s voting behaviour, and the easy social
intimacy between a member, his committee directors and other prominent
citizens was enough to ensure that most local interests affected by
legislation, whether as individuals or corporate bodies, were
handled sympathetically.² After 1868, it was less easy to maintain
this network, faced with the rise of new political demands and the
enlargement of the electorate, yet even before then the relative
backwardness of Liberal organisation in the city is notable when
compared with Birmingham and Manchester where Liberal associations
had existed from 1865 and 1868 respectively. A possible factor in
this retardation may be certain technical features of the registration
procedure in Scottish burghs which reveal defects in the First Reform
Act (Scotland). These defects were very serious, inasmuch as while

¹ Normally held at the end of every January, these meetings were
fully reported in the press.

² See Lumsden Diaries, 1866-9, passim. During these three years,
his service as Lord Provost brought him into frequent contact
with Dalglish and Graham so as to settle parliamentary business
affecting municipal affairs.
the failings noted by Ferguson relate mainly to voting in counties, they were particularly felt in urban constituencies, the main beneficiaries of 1832.  

J. A. Thomas has shown that in England the growth of constituency organisations was stimulated by the need to oversee the registration process set up in 1832. The supervision of enrolment, the submission of, and objection to, claims for admission to the register all fostered the creation of permanent bodies to perform these tasks efficiently and these became the nuclei of local party organisations.

This steady evolution proved impossible in Scotland because of the delay of some thirteen years in applying to Scotland the provisions of an English act remedying a glaring error in the Reform legislation. The 1832 Act did not provide for the automatic removal of enrolled voters who, for whatever reason, were no longer qualified to vote, thus making it difficult for party agents to gauge the true size of the electorate. The 1843 measure repaired this oversight in England, and the roll was pruned to its true size, which afforded the incentive to enter extra registrations as these could then affect the balance of parties. The result of neglecting to carry similar legislation for Scotland was to make the condition of the registers by the mid-

1850's grossly unsatisfactory. It was especially acute in the larger burghs with a substantial roll: in 1854 it was claimed that only 5,000 of the 20,000 voters entered on the roll for Glasgow were properly qualified - a lower figure than in 1832.\(^1\) With the disintegration of the local Conservative party in 1846, interest in registration had become minimal on both sides: "The Glasgow register roll has never been thoroughly purified since it was first enjoined on the passing of the Reform Bill, simply because it was not the duty of any man to keep it accurate."\(^2\)

Beginning in 1854, however, an agitation was built up to end this abuse, and as the pressure mounted, many reformers - notably the Temperance section - became vociferous in their criticisms.\(^3\) They introduced to public notice another deficiency of the Reform Act by pointing out that one half of those eligible did not bother to go on the roll, for it was still necessary in Scotland for a voter to pay a fee of 2/6 to the Town Clerk on being first placed on the register. As this fee had to be paid every time a change of address occurred, it affected the less affluent most: in Edinburgh, with a far more stable population than Glasgow, this rule was

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estimated to cause 600 disfranchisements a year. In addition, the cumbersome and prolonged procedure still in force at the Scottish registration courts deterred many - trivial objections were often made; the intending voter had to attend in person; and a law agent was often necessary. Against this background, party management was almost impossible: it would cost, by one estimate, £450 to rectify the state of the rolls, yet without this purification they were too inaccurate. As one agent complained, "The expense of getting rolls of voters at elections is enormous, and when got, they are unmanageable." No matter how great a registration drive might be contemplated, its success could never be assured under this system.

These grievances were remedied by the Registration of Burgh Voters (Scotland) Act of 1856, but it is paradoxical that this very act may have counteracted any tendency to form registration associations as in England precisely because it was so successful and effective in its operation. All were agreed on its merits, and the accuracy with which the 19,000 genuine Glasgow voters were

1. D. MacLaren to the Lord Advocate, 2 Jul. 1856, Lord Advocates' Papers, Box 29: Elections, Bundle 1, SRO AL 29; J. Low to same, 18 Feb. 1854, ibid. Compare G. Herald, 23 June 1851, 23 Jul. 1852 for more on this.


3. J. L. Lang, quoted in N.B.D.M., 4 Dec. 1855; J. C. Brodie to the Lord Advocate, 28 June 1856, Lord Advocates' Papers, SRO AL 29, makes the same point.

listed was praised: "It may be said Glasgow has now an entirely new constituency", and, furthermore, a qualitative gain was anticipated: "The tendency of the new Act will be to add to the roll, it is believed, many thousands of respectable persons of a moderate political way of thinking who have not hitherto thought it worthwhile to subject themselves to the trouble of being put on the roll."¹ The Act, utilising the framework offered by the 1854 Lands Valuation Act, - viz., a comprehensive and authentic record of rental values - empowered the Burgh Assessor with the responsibility of compiling the electoral register on the basis of the valuation rolls already prepared by him.

A clear timetable was laid down for lodging claims and appeals against omissions; the process whereby the Sheriff heard these was simplified; and the other impediment to full-scale registration - the cost - was swept aside, for all charges were to be met out of the municipal assessment.² This was a more thorough and competent arrangement than in England, and so circumvented the need for parties to appoint local legal agents to tidy up the rolls. The results were fairly summarised by a later Glasgow City Assessor: "These claims have always been comparatively few in number when the number of voters on the register is taken into account."³

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2. **Two Elections: 1868 and 1874**

The rudimentary nature of Liberal organisation in Glasgow before 1867 is remarkable: even the preparation of the electoral rolls for canvassing was non-existent. "On previous occasions", Dalglish was informed by his agent, "these street lists have been hurriedly got up on the spur of the moment and have consequently been found very imperfect giving rise to much dissatisfaction, and it is worthwhile trying to perfect them."¹ Even after the Second Reform Act, however, change was not instantaneous, despite the inflation of the electorate to over 45,000. It took a further ten years for any clear Liberal organisation to emerge, and then only in special circumstance, with the object being not so much efficient administration as the seizure of the right to select candidates, although the 1874 election fiasco had revealed the need for action four years previously.

A variety of factors impeded any moves to tighter organisation in this interim period. In the 1868 contest the major aim was to ensure that the natural Liberal majority in the electorate spread its two votes each over the three candidates so as to return them all, and this problem was aggravated by the lack of any polling experience among three-fifths of the voters. While the other cities faced with this task found themselves either outwitted by its magnitude or trusting to the management of a Liberal Association, Glasgow

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¹ G. Smith to R. Dalglish, 1 Mar. 1867, Murray Letterbooks. The electoral roll was compiled in alphabetical order and required to be re-formed in street sequence for an efficient canvass.
avoided either choice. The decision of the two sitting M.P.'s, Dalglish and Graham, to run again simplified matters as it was virtually automatic for those holding a seat to be returned. In part this was because they had committees which could be readily re-activated,¹ but also because propriety demanded it. As a result, only one vacancy was left to be filled on the Liberal slate. The Dissenting interest, still in political limbo after the rout of 1857, and much involved in the Union question, had little taste for a contest, more especially as Graham, a communicant of the English Presbyterian Church, could be regarded as maintaining their presence. The adroitness with which the working-class reformers built upon the success of the Reform League to corner the third candidacy was decisive. The League, it seemed in 1868, could control and speak for the very men who would be voting for the first time and who had turned out to its mass demonstrations, while its existing branch structure, if smoothly operated, would obviate the need to create a separate Liberal organisation.² As described earlier, by July George Anderson had been chosen as the League's nominee, and he shrewdly established himself as a serious contender by the time of the dissolution in October.³

¹ R. Dalglish to J. Moir, 1, 5 Apr. 1859, Moir Papers, for evidence of this.
² For these points, above pp. 229-34.
³ G. Herald, 1 Aug. 1868, described Anderson's address as "very creditable ... excellent".
A dominant theme in Anderson's public addresses in this phase was, besides expounding his political standpoint, to present the case for Liberal unity. This had been achieved by all three candidates agreeing to run a joint campaign, as it would reduce costs and also make possible the implementation of a complex voting scheme which depended on full unanimity amongst Liberals of all shades. Consequently the old-fashioned speechifying and campaigning techniques were very much played down: only four or five meetings were held by each of the three in the fortnight prior to the poll - in the past normally at least one a day had been held - and no full list of committees appeared. Much of the speeches which were held concentrated on the need to follow faithfully the voting instructions, and all the energies of the canvassers were directed to explaining the operation of the scheme to householders. The plan, devised by a League supporter, relied on the aspect of open voting which made it possible to determine the state of the poll at regular intervals. After the first hour's voting was known, it was proposed that Liberals should be instructed to vote for the two bottom party candidates, and, one further hour later, that they should now vote for the new bottom pair, and so on.

While ingenious in its simplicity, the plan was fraught with hazard. At a philosophical level, it could be seen to deny the liberty and freedom so loudly demanded by the same reformers a year

1. This device was adopted also at Manchester: Whitaker, Liberal Organisation, pp. 64-6, but proved less successful.
before. A Tory advertisement played on this: "Wanted, at the TRADES HALL, ONE MILLION AUTOMATON LIBERAL ELECTORS, to vote as they are directed on the Election Day. N.B. - No Elector with a mind of his own need apply. ONE OF THE DICTATORS." The Liberals countered by arguing that those who voted in the first hour would be exercising their free choice, and anyway, it was more important to guarantee the return of three Liberals, even at the expense of some freedom. Equally grave doubts were raised as to the practicality of the scheme, viz. could it be organised efficiently; would the voters understand it; and would they submit to this direction? The most serious concern was expressed lest voters should break the plan in order to make certain their favourite got in, or to thwart a candidate they were particularly averse to. In spite of the publicity efforts mounted by the Liberals, the only test came at the polls and here the plan proved completely successful. Mounted messengers carried news of the shifts in the polling order at hourly intervals to each of the forty booths in the sixteen wards, and the voters behaved according to rule, the candidates rotating in order through the day.

1. This first appeared in G. Herald, 7 Nov. 1868.

2. An advertisement to this effect was inserted in G. Herald, N.B.D.M., 14 Nov. 1868; cf. G. Herald, 29 Oct. 1868 for speeches by Dalglish and Moir.

3. N.B.D.M., 13 Nov. 1868; G. Herald, 11 Nov.; G. Saturday Post, 31 Oct. 1868 all express these doubts in editorial comments.
TABLE 4.1: Voting at Various Hours, 1868 Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>8.30</th>
<th>10.30</th>
<th>12.30</th>
<th>2.30</th>
<th>4.00</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anderson</td>
<td>1,438 (3)</td>
<td>7,763 (3)</td>
<td>12,081 (2)</td>
<td>15,548 (2)</td>
<td>17,804 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalgliesh</td>
<td>1,579 (2)</td>
<td>8,317 (1)</td>
<td>11,513 (3)</td>
<td>15,154 (3)</td>
<td>18,281 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graham</td>
<td>2,038 (1)</td>
<td>7,963 (2)</td>
<td>12,135 (1)</td>
<td>15,965 (1)</td>
<td>18,090 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campbell</td>
<td>1,631</td>
<td>5,712</td>
<td>8,075</td>
<td>9,699</td>
<td>10,814</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: G. Herald, 18 Nov. 1868.

The polling booths opened at 7.30 a.m. and closed at 4.00 p.m. The positions of the three Liberal candidates vis-a-vis each other is shown in brackets.
At the close only 400 votes separated the three candidates in this display of discipline, and the Herald summed up the general opinion: "we could scarcely have believed that it was possible to bring about this in such a mass of electors . . . It is wonderful and certainly shows a certain genius for organisation among the leaders of the working-class and a singular aptitude for carrying into effect."¹

The ease with which the Tory was trounced bred over-confidence and no permanent body emerged, despite James Moir's suggestion in December 1868 that a general Liberal Committee be formed "to promote and watch over the interests of political and social reformers, and to co-operate with kindred organisations for this end".² In view of later developments it may have been that no action followed because the emphasis of Moir's resolution was political, not organisational. This reluctance to prepare more carefully led to a serious set-back for Liberal fortunes in the 1874 election, for in the intervening years not only did new pressures arise, but, more directly relevant, the equilibrium fabricated in 1868 was undermined at three vital points. Firstly, the Ballot Act of 1872, the long-sought goal of the Radicals, rendered nugatory the simplicity of the earlier arrangement. This was not so much, as the Tories claimed, because the ballot freed men from the tyranny of Liberal employers and fellow-

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2. G. Herald, 8 Dec. 1868.
workers, but more because hourly calculations of the state of the poll were no longer possible. The ballot of itself did not make every scheme inoperable (as the 1880 election showed), but it demanded greater preparation to yield the same results, and this would in turn call for closer co-operation between the various groups than the loose federation of 1868.¹

Thus the defeat of 1874 was more precipitated by the removal of the other two pillars of 1868. On the one hand, the power of the Reform League had been quite eroded since 1868, as it had become apparent that the League leaders did not have the vice-like grip on the working-class that all had assumed. There was the rebuff administered to Jackson in the 1869 municipal contest, followed by the failure of the Scottish National Education League to retain the working-class support given to its precursor, the Reform League. The School Board election results, coming in March 1873, finally destroyed any claims by the League leaders to manage the working-class section of the electorate, although Anderson's popularity seemed likely to guarantee his safe return.

The other key element of 1868 was removed when both Dalglish and Graham intimated at the dissolution that they would not submit themselves for re-election. Graham had not been a success in the

House, and had recently lost a favourite son; Dalglish was well advanced in years; but beside these reasons uncertainty as to the outcome of any contest in the changed circumstances also weighed with them. Their decision provided the final ingredient for confusion. Lumsden confessed in his diary: "Both Dalglish and Graham have positively refused to come forward so we are quite at sea. I believe almost anyone of fair ability if well-known would succeed . . . Everyone taken aback by the declaration of both Dalglish and Graham." ¹

As both stood down simultaneously, the openness of the situation was heightened, for the chain of continuity on the Whig side was completely broken, and while they thrashed about to find replacements in the ten days allowed them by Gladstone's sudden dissolution, other individuals could stake their claims. This produced a rash of candidates, some patently irrelevant, but the more serious candidates reflected changing currents of opinion. The Irish Nationalists, hitherto loyally Liberal, brought forward F. E. Kerr in their interest, and all supporters were instructed to plump for him. The Criminal Law Repeal Association, representing the Trades' Council, put up P. S. MacLiver on the one issue of altering labour legislation. As discussed earlier, Cameron suddenly came out as the voice of militant Dissent. All of these men announced their candidacy and issued addresses before the Whigs could settle on their replacements; and

¹. Lumsden Diaries, 26, 27 Jan. 1874; G. Herald, 28 Jan. 1874 opined that while Dalglish's retiral was anticipated, Graham's was not.
when they finally did alight upon a choice, they made a blunder in selecting two candidates.¹ Others already in the field regarded this belated decision as arrogance and accused the Whigs of ignoring changes in the political balance within Liberalism. There were then seven candidates wearing Liberal colours (plus the Home Ruler) and soon a winnowing process began to clear out the surplus.

The drift of opinion was clearly towards Anderson and Cameron:² a meeting of trades' delegates, convened by the Criminal Law Amendment Committee, rejected the Committee's nominee, MacLiver, in favour of the two front-runners. MacLiver then withdrew, and two other forlorn hopes also retired, but this occurred only three days before the poll. A series of tense meetings to reduce the remaining Liberals from four to three ran into difficulties when Cameron refused to participate since, with the Temperance electoral machinery behind him, he was pretty confident of victory. He insisted that one of the two Whigs should stand down, but they refused, claiming that they were the inheritors of the two vacant seats. Anderson's committee, which had been favourable to some party compact, also pressed for a reduction in the Whigs, and as most of the influential supporters of the withdrawn candidates gave their allegiance to either

¹. MacLiver announced his candidacy on 26 Jan., Cameron and Anderson on 28th, Neill, Crum and Bolton on 29th; Kerr on 27th.

². Thus, Lumsden Diaries, 30 Jan. 1874: "Cameron who, besides Anderson, is the only real opponent" (to Bolton and Crum).
Anderson or Cameron, the conclusion was inevitable. On the eve of polling the Whig committee met and: "About 12 today it was resolved to withdraw Mr. Bolton as after the canvass yesterday it was found he had no chance." But this realistic appraisal came too late to permit some voting pact to be contrived, and so while moderate Liberals threatened to cast their second votes for a Conservative, the committees of both Anderson and Cameron issued voting instructions which ignored Crum's presence and urged all their supporters to use their two votes for both of the leading Liberals. The poll put Cameron and Anderson comfortably on top, but Crum trailed behind the two Conservatives, a fitting reward for his section's contribution to Liberal disunity. A press post-mortem pointed out the reason: "The want of a Central Committee has made them a disorganised mob, scrambling for success."

General gloom oppressed city Liberals as they surveyed the aftermath of one week's internecine strife. The Liberal majority was cut from three to one, and so Disraeli's three-cornered clause in the Second Reform Act had eventually worked, and this explains why the abolition of the device became a standard point in any local Liberal speech. The animosity among Liberals seemed to promise prolonged dissension. The radicals accused the moderates of playing

1. Ibid., 3 Feb. 1874; G. Herald, 2, 5 Feb. 1874.
2. Lumsden Diaries, 3 Feb. 1874: "I will not vote for either Anderson or Cameron and many more have the same feeling."
into the hands of the Tories by their "exclusive" and "dilatory" conduct, and a leading Whig retaliated: "The result of the polling yesterday was a disgrace to Glasgow, to think such men as Cameron and Anderson should be at the head of the poll. I am glad Whitelaw is in, but very sorry for the other two."\(^1\) There were, however, grounds for optimism. Firstly the party had been jolted out of its complacency which had previously led it to shun all pleas to prepare electoral machinery.\(^2\) Secondly, analysis of the voting pattern gave grounds for hope that if a serviceable organisation were erected there existed an adequate reservoir of Liberal votes to put three of the party back in Parliament. Despite pre-poll threats,\(^3\) Crum's voters crossed the party line in very small numbers: only 671 (9.0%) voted Conservative, as did 900 (4.9%) of Cameron's voters and 506 (2.8%) of Anderson's. Moreover, equally few used the other, less drastic method of displaying dissidence: plumpers for Crum numbered 453 (6.0%); for Cameron 529 (2.9%); and for Anderson, 140 (0.8%).

The lesson was that fundamental loyalties were still unshaken and that therefore good management would win the day, an appraisal further confirmed by analysis of the total votes.


3. Lumsden Diaries, 30 Jan. 1874: "for my own part I would rather see one of the Conservatives in than Cameron . . ."; also Evening Citizen, 2 Feb., G. Herald, 4 Feb., G. News, 7 Feb. 1874 for more such assertions.
### TABLE 4.2: Distribution of Votes, 1874 Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Plumps:</th>
<th>Second Votes</th>
<th>Lib.</th>
<th>Con.</th>
<th>RC/Ir.</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* Anderson (Lib.)</td>
<td>140:</td>
<td></td>
<td>17,161</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>17,902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolton (Lib.)</td>
<td>19:</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Cameron (Lib.)</td>
<td>529:</td>
<td>16,862</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>164</td>
<td></td>
<td>18,455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crum (Lib.)</td>
<td>453:</td>
<td>6,271</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter (Con.)</td>
<td>442:</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>12,113</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td>12,536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerr (R.C./Irish)</td>
<td>4,003:</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Whitelaw (Con.)</td>
<td>182:</td>
<td>1,741</td>
<td>12,113</td>
<td>96</td>
<td></td>
<td>14,132</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = Elected

**Summary:**

- "Pure" Lib. 21,356
- Split Lib./Con. 2,095
- "Pure" Con. 12,337
- Split Lib./RC 318
- "Pure" RC/Ir. 4,003
- Split Con./RC 123

**Source:** G. Herald, 5 Feb. 1874.
'Pure' Liberal votes were 21,356; if evenly distributed over three candidates this would yield 14,238 each, a comfortable margin of 2,000 over the Conservatives and leaving room for some slack, even disregarding the 4,000 Home Rulers who were presumably Liberal-inclined.

The third crumb of comfort for Liberals was that the conduct of the campaign marked a watershed in electioneering techniques. Only the Crum-Bolton committee clung to the old ways and published a very long list of supporters, with 631 names on it (8.6% of Crum's vote), but neither Cameron nor Anderson followed this practice. In rejecting the established methods still deployed by the Whigs, both men by their success pointed the way forward for a Liberal central organisation which could be speedy and economical as well as competent. They relied on enthusiastic volunteers in place of ward committees, canvassing, advertising and press publicity. Cameron's committee claimed to have distributed 53,000 circulars by voluntary labour, and one supporter (later to be the secretary of the G.L.A.) testified how on the South Side of the city he and two or three of his friends had worked on one evening to communicate with about one hundred acquaintances who gathered the next day to sort and deliver 4,000 letters to voters in the locality - and all of this was achieved by enthusiasts at no cost.¹ Anderson clearly relied on the network of trades' and workshop delegates to keep his supporters alert, and in

¹. Speeches by A. MacDougall and J. Stewart at Cameron's committee soiree, N.B.D.M., 6 Feb. 1874, stress this factor.
his message of thanks he pointed the moral plainly if inelegantly. His "disinterested friends have set an example to the whole country by proving that profuse expenditure on agents, committee rooms, canvassing, advertising and placarding which have so lavishly been had recourse to by most of the other candidates have but little weight with an intelligent constituency. Probably no election was ever gained with so little aid from any of these questionable means, or even from the newspaper press."  

This point was strengthened with the publication of the election expenses. Excluding official charges, Bolton and Crum spent £3,143 12/6 apiece; Cameron, £926 11/3; and Anderson, £378 4/6. The two Conservatives, fighting a similar campaign to the Whigs, spent £7,119 each and this confirmed the conclusion that in terms of cost-effectiveness the new style clearly had more to offer. Eager unpaid workers were now the best means for advancing the party's organisation, for as Cameron could claim in explaining his victory: "And not merely, gentlemen, did I find chairmen and bill-stickers - (Laughter) - we had supporters willing to devote themselves for twenty-four hours at a stretch in folding and addressing circulars, thus accomplishing the work which for other candidates was left undone by the Post Office."  

1. Anderson's letter thanking his supporters was inserted in G. Herald, N.B.D.M., 6 Feb. 1874; also his speeches at his committee's victory rally, G. Herald, 9 Feb. 1874.  

2. Return of Charges made to Candidates, P.P. 1874 LIII, "Glasgow". No breakdown of the total sums are given.  

3. The Formation of the Glasgow Liberal Association

Despite the glimmers of evidence favourable to the Liberals which could be discerned in the debacle of 1874, subsequent movement towards coherent organisation was slow and crab-like. For almost two years, the clarion calls of the morning after notwithstanding, no overt moves to greater unity took place. These were, in national terms, dog-years for Liberal fortunes as Disraeli appeared to be on the crest of the wave of popular opinion while Hartington strove to ease himself into Gladstone's seat. The deep divisions in the Glasgow Liberal camp made any local overtures still more inopportune, and so organisation remained at the normal inter-election low level during 1874 and 1875. True, Cameron's committee assumed some responsibility for making the electoral register available for inspection and for assisting claimants to lodge their papers, but otherwise Anderson's observation at the January 1875 meeting with constituents summed up the prevailing mood of fatalism: "It appears to me that the normal state of the Liberal party is a sort of disorganisation." 

In December 1875, however, there were initial moves towards improved organisation which, although premature, set the tone for later events. As happened subsequently, the impetus was extraneous, with Glasgow Liberals responding to the situation rather than acting spontaneously; and a further shadow was cast inasmuch as the

promotion of organisational reform was intimately connected with the attainment of certain policy objectives. The Reform Union of Manchester convened a national conference in that month to discuss the formulation of a new Liberal programme and it invited the Scottish National Reform League to send delegates. As that body had been inactive for over six years, its secretary instead called a meeting of about fifty city Liberals "to consider the present position of the Liberal party and recent communications from the Reform Union". Two decisions were taken at this meeting: firstly George Jackson and Stephen Mason were appointed to attend the conference; and secondly, an interim general Liberal committee was formed "to watch events and to initiate action". There was no dissent from the speech of the chairman, James Moir, deploring the absence of a body "that could at any time be called upon to give expression to the common sentiments of the city".¹ When the two delegates delivered their report a fortnight later on the proceedings at Manchester, the interim committee was instructed to confer with the committees of Anderson and Cameron "and other bodies favourable to the promotion of Liberal objects" with a view to sinking differences and working for the return of a third Liberal M.P.² Office-bearers were chosen, members were promptly enrolled and in the next six weeks the committees of both M.P.'s professed their willingness to co-operate.³ Despite

this auspicious start, "no further public action was taken to form a Liberal Association", a statement made three years later by its successor claimed.1 Given such reserve, there is little direct evidence to say why this attempt foundered, but from utterances at the time and also from the history of the next, more successful, venture, a suggested explanation may be offered.

In part, the time for a national Liberal resurgence had not yet arrived, and the Manchester conference did little to stimulate it. But in the specifically Glasgow locale, there were other difficulties. Both the December meetings held in the city were dominated by the Anderson-Reform League group led by Jackson and Moir, and they were thus able to outvote a strong demand from Temperance reformers at the first meeting to make the local veto part of the new Liberal programme. This was the first clash in what was to be a continuing fight between those who wished to promote single issues and those who were anxious to establish party unity above all. Accordingly, "the general feeling of the speeches being strongly in sympathy with the view of the Temperance party, but they considered it a mistake to instruct the delegates to take any decided course of action".2

The conflict was re-opened when the delegates reported back that the conference had listed four points of policy: viz., full household suffrage; more liberal land laws; religious equality; and popular

control of licences (the local veto). Again at the second meeting the Anderson contingent carried the day, and calls from the Temperance wing that the new interim committee for Glasgow should put up candidates solely on the Manchester platform was voted down. That platform, it was contended, consisted of points for discussion and no more; the overriding desideratum was deemed to be unity. The chairman of the second meeting, Edward Alexander (a deputy chairman of Anderson's 1868 committee), carefully defined the issues: "The majority of practical Liberals in Scotland have invariably declined the introduction of administrative reforms into any organic reform of the Liberal party, and it remains to be determined whether that policy is to be adhered to in the future." ¹

Anderson's committee, naturally, endorsed this stance and the M.P. himself confirmed it at the annual constituents' meeting where he complained that there were "too many side-issues" in the Manchester programme, whereas he would prefer to go simply for the franchise reform, from which all other measures would inevitably stem. ² Cameron's committee, by contrast, enthusiastically accepted the Reform Union platform "as subjects for immediate legislation" as well as "a fitting bond of union" for the entire Liberal party, and this time Bailie John Burt, who had raised the local veto question at

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1. Alexander's letter in N.B.D.M., 25 Dec. 1875, was part of a controversy conducted through the Mail's correspondence columns - e.g., 18 (A. MacDougall); 20 ("A.D."); 28 (J. Rough); 29 (MacDougall); 31 (R. MacKay) Dec. 1875.

2. G. Herald, 14 Jan. 1876; ibid., 11 Jan. 1876 for his comments at his committee's annual meeting.
the December meetings, was warmly applauded when he reiterated his arguments. This was the last occasion when the Manchester policies or the general interim Liberal committee were alluded to. Thus the first bid to patch the party up had failed over what was to be a recurring point of contention, and there were those who alleged that Cameron's Temperance allies had deliberately sabotaged this scheme because their cherished crotchet had been rejected.

No further moves occurred until the spring of 1878 and by then much had altered in the country at large, as well as in Glasgow, to make the prospects for organisational union more propitious. The Liberal recovery was now under way as criticism mounted over both the government's failure to arrest economic stagnation and its handling of the Eastern question. The latter especially evoked concern in Glasgow and the meetings protesting at the Bulgarian Atrocities were said to have attracted the largest audiences ever seen in the city. As well as the revival in Liberal spirits, new advances in organisation were well publicised by the extension of the successful formula of the Birmingham Liberal Association into the National Liberal Federation, which immediately spread throughout the bigger cities from its formation in 1877. These national developments would seem adequate


explanation for the formation of the Glasgow Liberal Association in 1878, particularly as Chamberlain addressed the inaugural meeting, so stressing the Birmingham influence. But other uniquely local features contributed to and indeed affected more decisively the nature and progress of the G.L.A., even although its external appearance conformed to the national pattern.

In the new momentum being gathered by the Liberals in 1877, two significant but contrary courses emerged to influence the Glasgow situation. As discussed earlier, Hartington's visit to Scotland in the autumn of that year stimulated the disestablishment element in the party by his implication that their demand was an immediate political issue.¹ Now that they had been given the greatest incentive to try to capture the Liberal party in Scotland, disestablishers in Glasgow could combine with local Temperance reformers (there was in any case a great overlap of personnel), who were threatening to destroy George Anderson because of his vote against the Permissive Bill motion at the end of 1877.² But just as these events made the Radical faddists more alert, they had to face the challenge of the re-entry into active politics of the local Whiggish section. This


2. R. MacKay (Secretary of the S.P.B.A.) wrote thus to N.B.D.M., 13 Nov. 1877; A. MacDougall's letter, ibid., 15 Oct. 1877 is critical of Liberal politicians who ignore the drink problem.
group had by and large dropped out of involvement in party affairs after their rebuff at the election, but the mishandling of the Eastern crisis brought them back and the public meetings on the Bulgarian matter were notable for the presence of all the components of Liberalism acting in harmony. Moreover many moderate Liberals were determined to fight within the party to stem any acquiescence by the leadership in disestablishment. With this clash over church policy emerging, and after Gladstone and Hartington had defined the nature of the contest, it was apparent that there would be a scramble for control of seats as the most direct method of evincing "the will of the nation" referred to by the leaders. It was in this context that the question of organisation for the city occurred, as ever since Gladstone's presence at the N.L.F. inaugural meeting had conferred the badge of orthodoxy on that body, it had been clear that the formation of an association in Glasgow styled on the Birmingham model could claim legitimacy in the selection of candidates. This would avert a repetition of 1874 as the Radical Mail was quick to notice: "Liberals everywhere could not adopt a more effective method of promoting the cause they have at heart than by at once following their (Birmingham's) excellent examples."¹

The impetus among advanced Liberals of the Mail stamp to erect such a body was enhanced by the existence of two rival Liberal organisations. The Liberal Association of West and South-West

¹. N.B.D.M., 4 Apr. 1878.
Scotland (LAWS) was formed in January 1877 with carefully restricted objectives. It existed "to consolidate and otherwise strengthen the Liberal party", but would not "in any way whatever" interfere with the "independent action" of constituency associations; rather it would "afford all information or assistance" to them and take only "general steps" to promote Liberal ends. As Kellas shows, this rather weak definition was kept to, yet to many Glasgow Radicals there were still grounds for misgivings. Although the city fell within its province, initially no direct Glasgow representation on the Association was accepted, on the grounds of "the constituency being so large and its position so exceptional".

A more pertinent cause of Radical concern was the insistence by the founders on the rigorous exclusion of any specific policies from the constitution of the LAWS. This was pressed for by R. T. Middleton, soon to be a driving force in the G.L.A., but he was opposed as it would be too divisive to adopt contentious questions. Issues such as disestablishment or the Permissive Bill, said George Elder, the Chairman, - although himself in favour of them - should be "relegated" to "private advocacy or general discussion", since in the interest of party unity such extreme topics had to be subordinated.

In this respect the LAWS showed itself quite unlike the early G.L.A., hence the hostility of the Glasgow Radicals to the pusillanimity of the former. This dislike was intensified by the prominence on the LAWS of leading local Whigs such as Crum, Bolton and Lumsden; and a city Whig, James Grahame, was widely credited with initiating the Association. The Mail argued "the keynote is pitched so low that we are afraid, if the whole future action of the Association be in harmony with it, the growth and influence (of Liberalism) will be hindered rather than helped". Further, in April 1878, just at the time of the first manoeuvres to set up the G.L.A., the LAWS opened offices in Glasgow, which must have seemed a blatant threat to the Advanced section, who already blamed it for excessive meddling in constituency affairs which only increased Liberal disarray, and they expressed fears lest its strength might overwhelm local Glasgow bodies.

There was also within the city a prior formal organisation to the G.L.A., and which too impinged on the latter's evolution. In 1876 the Glasgow Liberal Workmen's Electoral Union had been formed, composed of some leading members of the Trades' Council and one or two of Anderson's committee. As noted earlier, its function seems

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1. N.B.D.M., 23 Feb. 1877; W. P. Adam to Gladstone, 23 Nov. 1877, Gladstone Papers, BM Add. MSS. 44,095, f.40 warns of "jealousy" among West of Scotland Liberals, especially in Glasgow.


to have been primarily educational, and in this it seemed little threat to an all-embracing Glasgow Liberal organisation, as its very title suggests its limited role. Nevertheless it posed a challenge to the Radicals. The Union agreed, like the LAWS, that issues such as the Permissive Bill should not be brought to the fore, since they damaged unity. Moreover, simply because it was the sole such entity, it was establishing itself as the representative body in Glasgow: it convened public meetings on the Eastern question; it invited Gladstone and Harcourt to address it; and it sent petitions of city Liberals to the party leaders. The Union also talked of more direct action, as the secretary John Battersby stated at the outset: "The people had now a large amount of political power, and they ought to utilise it, and as the working-men could not at present get gentlemen representing their views in Parliament, they should make preparations to obtain those who could."¹

The build-up of this intricate situation, as it obtained in early 1878, demanded some response from the Dissenting Radical camp - and there had indeed been signs of restiveness in 1877 - but with two or three years until a likely general dissolution, there seemed ample time to prepare. The formation of the G.L.A. was, however, greatly precipitated by the announcement on April 6th, 1878 that George Anderson was about to be declared bankrupt as he owed debts of £10,000. Anderson, the third Glasgow M.P. in twenty years to

¹. Ibid., 3 Jul. 1876.
face acute financial embarrassment, had been director of the Emma Mine, a shady American enterprise which had finally folded up, leaving him to face angry creditors. As a bankrupt, Anderson would be ineligible to sit in the House and so a by-election was imminent. The reaction of the Radicals was instantaneous, and the Herald, while hostile to the faction, scarcely exaggerated some years later in describing the G.L.A. as having "originated a few years ago in a cab, a four-wheeler, containing at the utmost no more than the same number of individuals as there were wheels. They were in search of a candidate, on the supposition that a vacancy was about to occur in Glasgow, and it need hardly be said that their first run was to the Knight (Sir William Collins)."\(^1\) When Collins declined, several others were approached, but all this frenzy was stilled when the press reports proved premature, for Anderson, although in financial difficulties, had managed to settle with his creditors, and so retained his status as an M.P.

At this juncture, the thwarted Radicals formed a Provisional Committee after discussing "the untoward position of the party in Glasgow, in consequence of there being no representative body in existence which could legitimately take action either in view of a vacancy in the parliamentary representation of the city or invite to the consideration of political or public affairs the Liberals of Glasgow."\(^2\) From this stemmed the G.L.A., but it must be stressed

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1. G. Herald, 29 Oct. 1883, also 11, 12-Apr. 1878 for these events; cf. ibid., 15 Oct. 1879 for an identical allegation.
that for over two years after its inception it was never so dominant or so representative as its title implies, and its eventual assumption of the position as the main party unit in the city involved considerable modifications in the original blueprint for the Association.

Because the initial impulse had come from the faddists, meeting in the house of John Burt, and because they had made such a naked bid for power, the self-styled Provisional Committee's appeal for a conference of all Liberals was treated suspiciously by the other sectors, most of whom withdrew from the subsequent discussions as they felt their misgivings being confirmed. At the first conference, held on April 18th, 1878, three of the six groups indicated their discontent and opted out. These were the committees of Anderson and of Crum plus the LAWS, all of whom objected to the presence of the Liberation Society in the company of themselves, Cameron's committee and the Workmen's Union, for they felt only truly political movements should attend. They also voiced unease at the random distribution of invitations and the consequent absence of many leading party figures. When a motion by the delegates of Anderson's and Crum's committees that a small sub-committee should hammer out in private an acceptable basis of union was rejected by 22 votes to 11 in favour of a call by Cameron's committee for a public meeting, the three defeated groups announced they would pull out, as they feared an open meeting could easily be packed. ¹ As they had sought a

purely organisational union, while the majority had insisted on the inclusion of policy matters, the minority's belief that the meeting had all been a manoeuvre by the Advanced Liberals was stiffened. While the G.L.A., once formed, was to look to Birmingham and Chamberlain for political inspiration and guidance, it is ironic that the seceding minority urged that the best way to proceed at this stage was by following the Birmingham model of organisation rather than working in a policy-oriented direction.1

When the discussions to form an association resumed two weeks later, only thirty were present, although each of the three remaining groups was to send fifteen delegates. This residue voted to adopt "substantially" the points settled at the 1875 Manchester conference as its programme and only then turned to shaping an organisation to execute these aims.2 By late August, draft rules and regulations were ready, using the Birmingham structure of ward committees and delegates elected thence to the Executive; and an interim Executive was then appointed to hold meetings in the wards in order to elect their committees.3 At this point the Electoral Union left the projected Association because it disagreed with a provision in the constitution which gave the Executive the right to appoint thirty

1. D. Murray to A. MacDougall, 17 Apr. 1878; Murray to J. M. Robertson, 1 May 1878, Murray Letterbooks.
individuals to serve on it without any public nomination, and also because it preferred general to ward meetings.\(^1\)

It was thus a very weak and narrow-based Association which began operations in January 1879 with its first Executive meeting after ward elections in December. Almost at once, however, it began to seek to extend its appeal by jettisoning much of the trappings which allowed its critics to decry it as the mere catspaw of the militant Radicals.\(^2\) At the preliminary ward meetings speakers from the floor repeatedly returned to the argument that the programme of the Association presented an obstacle to the professed aim of unity. The prominent Whig, Charles Tennant, delivered an address at the very first such ward meeting which sounded the theme of party unity before issues as the overriding necessity.\(^3\) On other evenings those who had inserted the programme admitted under questioning that it was not in fact one of the objects of the Association, so that no obligation to support the attainment of these measures was imposed upon any member joining the G.L.A.\(^4\) The local veto and disestablishment items were the main difficulties in the programme, but the advocates of these causes - who were in the main the founders - put up a strong resistance when the Executive came under heavy pressure to amend or drop the

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2. Cf. G. Herald editorial, 30 Dec. 1878: "its present aspect, which is that of a Teetotal clique".

3. 5th Ward meeting, G. Herald, 19 Dec. 1878.

4. E.g., A. Borland (8th ward), G. Herald, 31 Dec. 1878; J. M. Robertson, (10th and 11th wards), G. Herald, 8 Jan. 1879.
offending document. Their threat to withdraw, which would of course seriously weaken the electoral machinery of the Association was countered by the claim that if it were abandoned, the supporters of Crum and Anderson would join instead of remaining outside.¹

As the wrangling continued into February the Secretary called for a speedy resolution of the conflict as enrolment had virtually ceased because of it. Under the fear of the Association being still-born, a suitable face-saving formula was soon found: "inasmuch as by the rules of the Association the carrying out of its policy is devolved upon the executive, by whom the Liberal measures will therefore fall to be promoted, the use of the programme is no longer necessary, therefore it falls to be omitted from the constitution and laws of the association".² At a special meeting on March 24th, the programme was duly deleted in the face of protests by the faddists who "considered that the association had gone to the dogs altogether", but they could only muster 16 votes against the changes.³ This was unquestionably a great set-back for the sectional pressure groups behind the origins of the G.L.A. For, as William Borland explained, the programme had been framed as an obvious response to Hartington's request that the Scottish Liberals should voice their opinions on, specifically, disestablishment, and thus to cast it out could suggest only one interpretation of Glasgow's position on the issue.⁴

While this accommodation, made to win wider appeal, did attract many new supporters, the G.L.A. was still only in a position of parity with the other Liberal groups in the city. This status was revealed by the events leading up to the selection of a Liberal candidate for the by-election occasioned by the death of Whitelaw in July 1879. It was not the G.L.A., but J. Guthrie Smith, the secretary of the LAWS, who initiated moves by summoning representatives of the four Liberal elements to a conference in his offices. This meeting confined itself to agreeing on the need for unity, but re-convened the following day to choose Charles Tennant as candidate after learning that the G.L.A. Executive was favourable to both him and Middleton, the Liberationist, and was planning to call a meeting of the full Six Hundred to decide between the two. Tennant issued his address, which was studiously evasive on the crucial questions of disestablishment and Temperance, to which Middleton was fully committed.

Middleton was not yet out of the race, but in the interval the Workmen's Union met to choose Tennant "in the interests of unity", being allegedly misinformed that Middleton had withdrawn his candidacy. Thus when the G.L.A. "special united meeting of the Six Hundred" did meet the next day, the main decisions had been taken and with the Electoral Union now committed to him, Tennant seemed safely home.


2. G. Herald, N.B.D.M., 4-16 Jul. 1879 for the election manoeuvres; Social Reformer, 14 (1879-80), pp. 79-81, provides a full survey of developments, written from the Prohibitionist standpoint.
The Temperance reformers had in the interim held two meetings at which they were unable to reconcile the desire for party unity, and back Tennant, with the demand to put up a stronger prohibitionist than the Whig, and so there was little prospect of Middleton getting total support from this quarter.\(^1\) The G.L.A. mass meeting therefore decided to support Tennant over Middleton by 127 votes to 119 - in itself a commentary on the strength of the Association. It would, in truth, have been difficult for the G.L.A. to have rejected Tennant and run anyone against him, since he was its President, but there were many who felt that the Association had had its hand forced, and much bad feeling was directed against the LAWS. After the Six Hundred vote, however, the G.L.A. swung behind Tennant and he was returned unopposed.\(^2\)

Although there was complete agreement at the by-election on the need for unity - this was the argument used to coerce the G.L.A. into endorsing Tennant - it was by no means clear that the Association would necessarily be the chosen vehicle. In the following winter it quarrelled bitterly with both the LAWS and the Electoral Union, so that disunity still prevailed on the eve of the general election in March 1880. In October 1879 the G.L.A. organised a conference of Scottish Liberals "in order to foster union among Liberals and promote combined effort to relieve the country from the misgovernment

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of the present administration". ¹ This seemed an infringement of the domain of the LAWS, which retaliated by urging Liberals outside the city not to attend, since only the extremist fringe of Glasgow was involved in the conference, and released a letter from Adam, the Chief Whip, counselling against holding such an assembly. ² Neither the Electoral Union nor Anderson's committee were invited to attend, and they too voiced their displeasure at the G.L.A.'s exclusive tactics. "At no time", said Battersby, "since the passing of the last Reform Bill has the breach in the Liberal party been wider since the Glasgow Liberal Association came into existence (Applause)."³ If anything, indeed, the G.L.A. seemed to be creating unity by driving its rivals closer together: Anderson consented to become President of the Electoral Union about this time.

Further friction arose from an abusive exchange between the secretary of the Association on the one hand and, on the other, the L.W.E.U. and the Trades' Council. This arose from allegations of unfair allocation of tickets for Gladstone's public meeting held in December 1879 under the auspices of the Electoral Union. The ins and outs of the squabble are impossible to disentangle, but in its course MacDougall of the G.L.A. called the Trades' Council "the self-

² The letter was printed in full in G. Herald, 16 Sep. 1879, and provoked a spate of correspondence (16-25 Sep.).
³ G. Herald, 4 Oct. 1879 for the Electoral Union meeting; ibid., 6, 9, 14 Oct. for pronouncements by the Union.
styled representatives of the working-men of Glasgow.". He also contrasted his organisation with the Electoral Union: "Its (G.L.A.'s) roll contains a larger number of working men than any other political organisation in this city and is not a subsidised body under the control of its subsidiser"; to which the Electoral Union retorted in kind. Finally Tennant had to step in and disassociate the G.L.A. from MacDougall's remarks, but on the same day George Jackson deplored the Association as a "costly mistake" from the start.¹

The accession to supremacy was only achieved by the G.L.A. after it had successfully handled the organisational problems of winning all three city seats at the 1880 election. It had formidable obstacles to face: the hostility and suspicion towards it, bred by two years' strife, were still potent, so that Anderson and the Electoral Union were most reluctant to surrender their independence to it. In addition, Tennant withdrew from the city contest only a fortnight before polling to fight Selkirkshire, leaving his replacement Middleton with little time to emerge from relative obscurity and impress his personality on the electorate. On top of these difficulties, the complexity of devising a foolproof voting arrangement which would work in the polling-booth presented a final and apparently insuperable challenge. In March 1880, the Electoral Union, infuriated by G.L.A. suggestions that it should disband and merge into the Association, set up an Electoral Arrangements Committee chaired by George Jackson.

¹ G. Herald, 11-25 Dec. 1879 for this dispute; MacDougall's opinions are in ibid., 15 Dec. 1879.
Since he was the organiser of Anderson's election campaigns, the committee would obviously act in Anderson's interest, and this organisational backing put the M.P. in a strong bargaining position during the election negotiations for unity as he now had adequate means to carry the seat on his own.¹

Despite these preliminary moves, the first week of the contest (from March 8th to 14th) was marked by a general willingness on all sides to discuss the prospect - if not the reality - of united action, and here the G.L.A. acted as the initiator. MacDougall had in the summer of 1879 circulated a memorandum demonstrating that even the 1874 result indicated that the Liberals could win all three seats. He had also devised a scheme of splitting the voters into three equal alphabetical blocks in order to achieve victory. To allay the doubts voiced, similar to those aired in 1868, as to whether the scheme was acceptable to the voters, a trial canvass of three wards was undertaken by the G.L.A. which confirmed that Liberal voters "generally were willing to follow any scheme which might be adopted to secure the return of three Liberals".² On the announcement of the dissolution, the G.L.A., filling the role of the LAWS in 1879, invited the other five Liberal bodies to send three delegates to a unity conference, and this Joint Committee of 18 set up a sub-committee to report on a suitable voting scheme which could be implemented. At this stage,

¹ G. Herald, 6 Mar., 20 Apr. 1880.
a precarious harmony reigned: "The Liberals are performing amongst broken bottles with as much grace as possible”, a contemporary noted.¹

But the retirement of Tennant on the 14th destroyed the balance, even although Middleton emerged as his successor smoothly and naturally enough, having been the other contender for the vacancy in 1879. To emphasise that there was no split among the Liberals, Tennant served on Middleton’s interim committee, but this was not enough to avert unease. Anderson was worried not merely at the problem of getting the new man well known to the public, essential as that was to make any plan of unity work, but he also feared that the substitution of a Dissenting Radical for a Moderate Liberal would make any scheme, however skilfully conceived, inoperable because the Whiggish portion of the constituency would be most reluctant to conform to party loyalty when all three candidates were of a relatively advanced stamp. Cameron and his committee suppressed such scepticism and remained favourable to unity, agreeing to accept any course of action recommended by the Joint Committee. Anderson’s advisers, however, merely promised to give "full consideration" to the Joint Committee’s proposals, but refused to be bound in advance of their publication. By the 22nd Anderson seemed to be definitely striking out on his own with the publication of his address, but on that same day the Joint Committee produced its voting scheme. This was at once accepted by Cameron, as he was honour-bound to do, and by

¹ G. Herald, 13 Mar. 1880.
Middleton, whose only hope lay in getting in on the coat-tails of the other two by just such a plan. But Anderson only consented after much hesitation, for he still believed 1874 was the typical and 1868 the aberration in voting patterns, and he was sacrificing the near-certainty of re-election if he ran independently for a dubious gamble. It was not until March 25th, only eight days before polling, that accord was finally reached. Then the committees of the individual candidates were dissolved and a composite United Liberal Committee was formed which thenceforth managed the campaign: it issued a single address, arranged meetings and so forth.¹

The role of the G.L.A., although not that of masterminding the campaign, was still crucial since "this Joint Committee had control of the Election, but the work of the canvass was left to your Association".² This task it performed to perfection when the Joint Committee, having decided to issue voting instruction cards to every Liberal voter, but fearing the Post Office might not manage to deliver these to all 58,000 voters in time, entrusted this duty to the G.L.A. A call by the Executive for assistance yielded 2,463 voluntary helpers who canvassed the electorate at high speed, minimal cost and great accuracy. MacDougall made an eve-of-poll prediction, based on a partial survey of some 40,000 voters, that 48,000 would cast their votes, and that the three Liberals would average 23,354 apiece.³

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1. This paragraph is based on G. Herald, N.B.D.M. and News, 9 Mar.-3 Apr. 1880.
3. Ibid., pp. 1-3.
In actuality, 47,512 voted, the Liberal average was 23,678. The instructions had been successfully delivered: only 1,019 (2.8%) cross-voted, while 35,082 stayed loyally Liberal and adhered to the alphabetical division formulated by the Joint Committee with the result that only 650 votes separated the top and bottom Liberals. This was a resounding triumph for the Liberals, on the scale of 1868, and not unnaturally the G.L.A. pointed the moral that in providing the essential mechanics of victory this constituted "the best proof of the soundness of Representative Liberal Associations, through which the desires of the constituency are expressed and its loyalty secured."¹ Thus Glasgow's experience runs counter to the recently expressed view that "the organisational leviathan of 1880 might have less grip than the pothouse committee of 1832".²

This was the great breakthrough sought by the G.L.A., for it could no longer be dismissed in the words used by one of its keenest supporters in 1879: "they might be a Liberal Association in Glasgow, but they would not be the Glasgow Liberal Association."³ Now it was "recognised" on all sides as the leading Liberal body and praised for having united "so many interests and so many sects".⁴ Having thus vindicated the case for preparation and maintaining a standing

¹. Ibid., p. 5; cf. East and North of Scotland Liberal Association, Minute Book, 29 Jan. 1881.
². Vincent, Formation of the Liberal Party, p. 82.
organisation, the G.L.A. proceeded to consolidate its advantage. Whigs began to play a greater part in the Association; Professor G. C. Ramsay and A. B. McGrigor became Presidents in 1880 and 1882 respectively, and in the latter year it was stressed by both McGrigor and his Radical colleagues that his election served to demonstrate the "broadness" of the Association.¹ After having consistently rejected affiliation to the LAWS, the G.L.A. now effected a rapprochement with the successor body, the Scottish Liberal Association, in 1881. This move seemed to indicate a new spirit of harmony and of confidence in the G.L.A.'s position, since "they believed that the co-operation which would result from their joining hand in hand with the other Liberals in Scotland would be such as to bring about much better feeling in connection with Scottish Liberalism than had hitherto existed".² Given the bad relations previously obtaining and the still predominantly Whiggish colour of the S.L.A., this decision is more noteworthy than the G.L.A.'s simultaneous affiliation with the National Liberal Federation, to which it was much more akin in politics.

¹ Report of the Annual General Meeting of the Glasgow Liberal Association held . . on February 4th 1882 (Glasgow, 1882), pp. 10-14 for McGrigor, 6-8 for J. Colquhoun; also G. Herald, 24 Apr. 1880.

The problem of easing tensions with the Anderson-Electoral Union wing was not so tractable. After the election Anderson's committee met and maintained the intransigent stance it had adopted during the pre-poll negotiations by trying to by-pass the G.L.A. Instead it called for the re-constitution of the United Liberal Committee, established to run the campaign, as a truly representative body which could act as a standing Liberal committee in the city, after concluding that the G.L.A. was not sufficiently representative to fulfil this task. Relations deteriorated in October 1880, when a dispute arose over the election expenses. The G.L.A. accused Anderson of reneging on his promise to share in full all costs, and the conflict was only settled, after much slanging on both sides, when the Association President gave a full apology to the M.P. A second major row broke out over affiliation to the S.L.A., when the Electoral Union charged the G.L.A. with trying to prevent it from joining the national Association so that G.L.A. would become the sole Glasgow voice in the Scottish body. After more mutual abuse, the S.L.A. decided to permit the Union to affiliate, accepting that Glasgow was still an exceptional case to the rule of recognising only one representative institution for each constituency. This

1. G. Herald, 20 Apr. 1880, gives the motion in full; for a similar resolution passed at the Electoral Union's annual meeting, ibid., 1 May 1880.

2. G. Herald, 29 Sep., 1, 4, 5, 6, 9, 11, 12 Oct. 1880 for the exchanges, Ramsay's apology appeared on 26 Oct.

state of affairs remained, but the C.L.A. became increasingly powerful within the city, as events after the departure in 1885 of Anderson to the Australian Mint revealed. The choice of a successor candidate was taken by the G.L.A., while neither Anderson's old committee nor the Electoral Union took any part in the process, although they might be expected to have regarded this as their right.

Thus the G.L.A. had become in 1880 the exact semblance of the Birmingham Liberal Association, thanks to its administrative ability. But having begun as a sectional movement, with clear policy objectives, it was an open question whether the G.L.A. would accept the passive role in which it had triumphed.
CHAPTER FIVE

The Glasgow Liberal Association in Operation
1. **The Activities of the G.L.A.**

The performance of the G.L.A. once it was securely established as the sole unit of organisation in the city casts an interesting light on Glasgow Liberalism and also on the *raison d'être* of the Association itself. Unlike its Conservative equivalent it never extended itself, even exiguously, into any social or instructional realms. There was never any discussion on the provision of reading-rooms or clubs for working-men, one of the most common organisational devices of the era deployed by both parties.¹ The frequent ward and district meetings much favoured by the G.C.A. as a medium for transmitting party principles and expounding Conservative policy on current topics was not, apparently, taken up by the Liberals, and the only meetings at ward level to be reported were the statutory annual elections of office-bearers. The first annual report of the G.L.A. does allude very briefly to its educational role, but thereafter little reference is made to this work, apart from one year when the Executive was reported to have circulated pamphlets on questions of the day.² From whatever source Liberal electors imbibed party doctrines, the filtering agency was not the G.L.A. Equally striking


is the tardiness in setting up the classic urban political-cum-social institution for the upper classes of the community: a Liberal Club. While the city Conservatives had theirs by 1880, it was almost a further decade before the Liberal one was set up and that only after the Liberal Unionists had opened an Imperial Union Club.¹

This difference of emphasis from the Tories is made more apparent in comparing the major public activities of the two bodies. For the G.L.A., its main duties were to sponsor conferences and to arrange the delivery of speeches in the city by party leaders. Each activity fulfilled a different, but vital, function in the life of the party. The conferences were evidently regarded by the Association as pivotal: for no sooner had the G.L.A. been formed than it planned to have a meeting of representative Liberals in Scotland to advance unity. This conference, held in October 1879, is illustrative of the reasons why the G.L.A. favoured this technique, for it proceeded with the scheme, in the face of opposition from Adam, the Chief Whip. He argued: "I venture to point out that in my view the advisability and usefulness of such a conference at this time is somewhat doubtful", and he felt a more appropriate mode of advancing the Liberal cause was to cement unity in individual constituencies and to spread efficient machinery to every seat.² The reason why Adam blew so

¹. G. Herald, 10 Sep. 1880, contains an advertisement notice calling for the formation of a club, but no action followed. P. Whitaker, Liberal Organisation in Manchester from the 1860's to 1903 (Ph.D. Thesis, Manchester University, 1956), pp. 135-50 discusses the role of the Manchester Reform Club, founded in 1867.

cool and the G.L.A. persisted was that the conference, attended by about 150 delegates from 37 towns, did not content itself with uttering bromides about unity. It went on to discuss the best means of "galvanising" the electors - i.e., the introduction of social reforms - and it also accepted that representative associations contributed to Liberal action and unity by reason of giving scope for the stating of opinion on public affairs. There were some dissentient voices raised to query the need for such advanced radicalism, but the ideal on which the conference modelled itself was the N.L.F., and indeed the suggestion was made to set up a similar body for Scotland.¹

This episode reinforces the general conceptualisation behind the G.L.A., from its inception, viz. that the erection of an efficient political machine enabled the party preferences of the constituency to be met by securing the election of an M.P. who would in return have to support the measures favoured by the representative association.²

In this sense the supplanting of personal committees by such associations was not just mere tactics on the part of the Radicals, but an integral part of their political theory. It accorded well with the plebiscitary concepts underlying the two main policies they advocated: the local veto lobby, which placed a similar weight on kindred electoral processes; and the disestablishment agitation,


which had been encouraged by the party leaders to adduce evidence of
the drift of public opinion. Hence the desire to pass resolutions
on most issues of the day which permeated all layers of the G.L.A.
Meetings of the Six Hundred were really local conferences ready to
declare their ideas on all matters from the Irish question to
educational endowments; and even the Executive found time from its
business matters to hand down judgements on government legislation.¹

In pursuance of this strategy, the Association acted as host to the
N.L.F. Annual Conference in 1883, organised a mass franchise
demonstration in 1884 and took a prominent part in Chamberlain's tour
of Scotland in 1885, which was intended to stir up Scottish radicalism
to make new demands on the party. There was in all this work no
need for providing the groundwork of education, for that was assumed
to exist already, so that all that was now necessary was the clear
articulation of opinion by means of resolutions, public meetings and
the like.

The role played in the Association's work by addresses from
great political figures was different as they were designed to
stimulate party loyalty and to kindle enthusiasm.² Generally one
rally was held every year, and Gladstone, Harcourt, Forster and Dilke
all appeared on different occasions to sustain the faithful. Some
cynics, however, drew attention to the proviso that only paid-up

¹. Ibid., I, pp. 351-2 for pertinent remarks.
². G. Anderson to W. E. Gladstone, 22 Jul. 1878, Gladstone Papers,
BM Add. Mss. 44,457, f. 218.
members of the G.L.A. could attend these oratorical feasts and they speculated whether this was not all a ruse to boost the Association's funds and its paper strength. "There must be thousands who would willingly give ten shillings to hear Mr. Gladstone, just as there are others eager to pay seven-and-six pence to see Miss Langtry", said the Herald, accusing the G.L.A. of 'farming' the speakers for profit. While it is true that the Conservatives were also ready to bring up their front-rank politicians, for them it was only one part of a carefully constructed hierarchy of speakers which included local men and middleweight party figures in an effort designed to propagandise the electorate.

The Association did not devote much of its resources to registration work, for, as already noted, this was not a vital factor in maintaining an efficient machine. The Assessor did his work most competently, and with a Liberal majority of two to one in an electorate of 50,000, the handful of gains recorded in the early 1880's (about 80 a year) hardly mattered. The Association placed copies of the register in its ward rooms merely to aid the correction of minor omissions, as it confessed: "While the results make little appreciable difference in the relation of Parties in the constituency, it is admittedly a great convenience to the electors generally . . ."


2. For this factor elsewhere, Whitaker, Liberal Organisation, pp. 70, 82-6, 170-5; N. Blewett, "The Franchise in the United Kingdom, 1885-1918", Past and Present 32 (1965), pp. 30-42.

There was, however, one area in which the G.L.A. developed a fairly orthodox structure, for its Junior Association was very much akin to the Conservative Young Men's Association. Formed in September 1880 under the auspices of the G.L.A., it had two primary objects: the inculcation of Liberal principles; and "the co-operation in electoral contests, etc., with all associations having for their object the advancement of the Liberal cause". ¹ The two goals were related, for the large squad of young enthusiasts had been decisive in the great canvassing exploits undertaken by the G.L.A. at the general election earlier in the year, and so it was deemed desirable to foster their zeal, for which purpose the new association appeared ideally designed. It would provide the necessary grounding in party principles, as these were now conceived to be the only generator of political involvement in large constituencies because "whatever spirit is exhibited on either side must arise from attachment to principles rather than to individual men". Further it would create a fitting social and psychological context for political action: "The society will distribute through its members that additional consciousness of strength which the knowledge of working in concert with others who share their views gives. Organisation, besides securing the benefit of limited action, exorcises the depressing spirit of weakness which individual isolation nourishes." ²


After some teething troubles, the Junior Liberal Association began to work to those ends, meeting regularly—once a month—to hear speeches from outsiders or to hold debates among the members. The topics included current affairs (Reciprocity, Ireland), or central aspects of Liberalism (Local Option, Suffrage Reform, Land Laws), or broader historical facets of the cause (Cobden and Bright, the First Reform Bill).¹ A long-entertained vision was realised in February 1882 when reading-rooms were opened in Bothwell Street to let members congregate and so stimulate the goals of loyalty and zeal.² The Junior Association seems to have been fairly successful, as membership settled around the 500 mark, helped by a low annual subscription of one shilling. Besides providing a forum for the exposition of and initiation into Liberalism, it met a social need which was acutely felt in Glasgow, unlike Edinburgh. "Then, the Glasgow youths have always had their evenings free, as commercial clerks never go back to their offices, whereas law clerks generally do. There are besides in Edinburgh many debating societies and comparatively few in Glasgow."³ That the Junior Association was intended to cater for this sphere of political activity in which the G.L.A. did not interest itself is suggestive of the differing purposes the two bodies served. Certainly the parent organisation could easily have run similar services with

1. G. Herald, 14 Mar. 1881; 17 Apr. 1882; 14 Apr. 1883; 8 Apr. 1885 for the A.G.M.s of the Junior Liberals.


3. J. K. Donaldson to Lord Rosebery, 20 Apr. 1881, Rosebery Papers, NLS Box 57.
an annual budget four or five times that of the Junior Association, which ranged between £100 and £150.¹

Given this innate impulse of the G.L.A. to pronounce upon policy, the new-found unity forged by the 1880 election always promised to prove fragile. The militant element was not likely to accept the quiescent role of a voting machine wishfully assigned to the Association by the moderates. One such Radical, infuriated by pressure to suppress any debate on divisive motions, declared that if major issues were not to be discussed, it would not be worth going on with the Association since it would no longer be a genuinely 'Liberal' Association.² And indeed, the more successfully the G.L.A. managed the organisational aspects of its operations, the greater became the appeal of moving on to new areas, in order to retain interest, and so policy matters tended to re-emerge. These strains became glaringly apparent during 1882. In that year, A. B. McGrigor, a central pillar of city Whiggery, was elected President in a gesture openly stated on all sides to be in the interests of full Liberal unity. McGrigor accepted office well aware of these motives and in his opening address put forward the standard moderate Liberal view of the Association's role. He praised at length the organisational advantages afforded by the G.L.A. in the existing electoral system,

1. G. Herald, 14 Apr. 1883 for financial details.

but while he also claimed that unity did exist because Liberals could still co-operate and would sink their differences in a great crisis, he issued a clear warning against the danger of 'Jacobins' dictating to the rest of the party unless vigilance and tolerance were upheld by all sectors.¹ Four months after these scenes of amity the Six Hundred passed a resolution calling for the disestablishment and disendowment of the Church of Scotland "forthwith", as the present set-up was an "injustice" to both civil and religious liberty. Mcgrigor (an Episcopalian) vacated the chair to make an impassioned plea against passing a motion which would put Church Liberals into "a situation which would be in antagonism to their highest aspirations and association in relation with religious policy". He lost at the vote, and at once resigned from the Association, as did another Whig ex-President, Professor G. G. Ramsay, and the founder of the LAWS, James Grahame of Auldhouse.²

This incident was interpreted by many as a calculated move to humiliate Mcgrigor and his Whig allies. Why else had the issue been brought forward during his incumbency, when it was no more pressing than in previous years? Why was the motion proposed by ex-Bailie Burt, who three years before had been instrumental in persuading the G.L.A. to drop this very item from its programme by using identical

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arguments to those put forward by McGrigor? Why, if (as the victorious group pointed out) the resolution in no way bound the G.L.A. or committed individual members, why then go to the trouble of passing that particular motion, which called for immediate action, and reject a compromise resolution which conceded the case for disestablishment but regarded it as "inexpedient" to press for it at the moment, when other matters were of higher priority?¹ Such suspicions were hardened by a violent editorial in the Mail accusing the Whigs of always having detested the representative character of the Six Hundred: "This is what the Dreepdailly clique of armchair politicians in the West End, who dictated the constituency down to 1874, cannot forgive. The Six Hundred will never please these gentlemen, any more than these gentlemen will ever be able to understand how it is that an association 'broad-based upon the people's will' view with equanimity the secession of dilletante (sic) Liberals and yet remain stronger than before. And so the sum total of the whole matter is that the Liberals of the A. B. McGrigor type have got a 'down-setting' which was much needed and which lifts the drag on the wheels of Glasgow Liberalism".²

Since those responsible for carrying the disestablishment motion were the close political allies of Cameron, the proprietor of the

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Mail, some wondered aloud if this were not all a carefully-conceived plot. To substantiate this belief, it was pointed out that after Burt had sought leave at the Executive meeting beforehand to lay his resolution in front of a specially convened meeting of the Six Hundred and had been turned down, the anti-disestablishment element had naturally relaxed their vigilance. There was, however, no way of stopping him from bringing the motion forward at the regular meeting of the Six Hundred, which he duly did. There were those, both before and after this meeting, who alleged that it had been thoroughly packed to ensure its passage, and moreover it was stated that Burt had circularised all his sympathisers to attend a private meeting one week in advance of the public assembly, presumably with the object of planning tactics. 1

Inevitably the cry of rule by 'caucus' was raised after these events and it is worth investigating how far the operations of the G.L.A. merit this appellation. The findings might cast light on the argument about the degree of genuine democracy existing in the Birmingham-style mass political organisations of this period. The topic attracted much attention at the time and ever since, but the classic critical position was stated at the turn of the century by Ostrogorski. His study of its history served "to make it clear that the democracy inscribed on the standard of the Caucus was only

a painted banner or a coarse sign . . . the Caucus has contrived to attract only the enthusiasts, the bigots of the party and the busy-bodies. The great mass remained outside, sunk in its apathy and its indifference."

Amongst Glasgow contemporaries the label of caucus was frequently applied to the G.L.A., but here, as elsewhere, this did not always have the pejorative connotations it now carries. Thus MacDougall, the Secretary and often accused of being one of the caucus leaders, used the term simply as an alternative title: "Anyone who cared to take the trouble to look into the history of the Glasgow caucus during the past six years would find a steady adherence to Liberal principles from the beginning to the end." At the same meeting, however, a dissident provided a more orthodox description when typifying reactions to the conduct of G.L.A. business by its leaders: "There was a feeling, rightly or wrongly - he did not express an opinion on the matter - that the Association was managed by a knot of men who year after year were elected or got themselves elected, and that the real feeling of the Glasgow Liberals was not fairly represented." 2

In refuting such allegations, officials of the Association stressed its truly representative structure and especially pointed


out that full sovereignty lay with the Six Hundred, too large a body to be controlled by a handful of men. With pride it was claimed that the enrolled membership was the largest of any Liberal Association in Britain, proof of its democratic basis. But this was only one part of the whole picture: TABLE 5.2 reveals that compared to the Glasgow Conservative Association, there was a much lower ratio of participation in the party organisation. Disappointing though this was - the target aimed at by the G.L.A. was 5,000 members, but it was never reached - the Association was still considerably bigger than its nearest local rival, the Workmen's Electoral Union, which claimed only 1,200 to 1,400.

There were, however, those who alleged that the G.L.A.'s membership was artificially inflated, as noted above, by its insistence that only members could attend major speeches. There is no indication how true this was, but there does seem to have been a high turnover in members - as many as 750 to 1,000 were mentioned in different years as having come on to the rolls of the Association. This meant that one-quarter of the total membership were new recruits, and such a rapid and sizeable annual movement would tend to concentrate control in the hands of the central core who were permanently and regularly active, and so had built up experience in running the Association at all levels. It is not clear how many of the members were activists, but it is perhaps indicative that of the 2,463 helpers in the 1880 election canvass, 1,077 (43.7%) were non-members of the G.L.A., and the 1,386 members who also canvassed constituted 45.6% of the full strength of the Association. Thus the evidence from
membership is inconclusive in proving the existence of a caucus, particularly as size by itself tells very little about the vitality of a political unit.

On the other hand, the payment of an annual subscription (minimum one shilling), which was not levied in Birmingham, may have had a democratising effect, although at first sight the Birmingham practice was more open. Most of the money available to the G.L.A. for its everyday purposes came from these small fees - which all could afford - and it was not beholden to a few substantial donors. "It is a matter of general remark", stated the President in 1882, "that our wealthiest citizens do not take the interest in our Association that could be desired." He then provided a breakdown of subscriptions which amounted to £446 15/- and, with the profit of £115 on Harcourt's meeting, made up the Association's total income for 1881. Of the 2,966 members, 2,748 (91.7%) paid under 5/-; 165 (5.5%) between 6/- and one guinea; and only 53 (1.8%) above that. In this respect the Liberals compared well with their local rivals, for "ordinary" G.C.A. membership fees never exceeded £200, and only handsome honorary subscriptions of some £450 a year helped to put the Tories on financial parity. This weakness probably restricted the independent-mindedness of the G.C.A. rank-and-file in contrast to the Liberals, but nonetheless when the latter wished to stretch themselves,

1. W. MacFarlane, Report of Annual Meeting ... 1882, p. 5.
they had to rely on large individual donations. To meet the cost of mounting the 1880 election campaign, donations of £500 from Charles Tennant and £397 from Col. William Clark, the President, were necessary, demonstrating that the freedom of movement open to the Association was only relative when it came to ambitious projects.¹

Perhaps the decisive area for determining whether the G.L.A. was caucus-dominated would be the distribution of power between the constituent agencies of the Association. The Constitution set up a three-tier structure, closely modelled on the Birmingham example. "The basis of local organisation" was to be settled on the 16 city wards, each of which annually elected a committee of up to 35 (Rules 2; 3). From each ward, the convener and secretary, along with three more of the ward committee, sat on the Executive, which also consisted of the President, up to 20 Vice-Presidents "and such additional members of the Association (not exceeding 30 in number) as they shall annually elect" (Rules 3; 4). The third layer was the "United Meeting of the Executive and all the Ward Committees", the official term for what was usually referred to as the Six Hundred (Rule 6). Authority was likewise carefully stratified to accord with this representative pyramid. The Ward Committees, the most directly democratic had vague but purely local duties - "the promotion in the Ward of the objects of the Association" (Rule 3(4)). Oversight of

ward activities, as with all other ordinary business matters, lay with the Executive in its assigned role of carrying out the policy of the Association (Rules 5; 7). The determination of policy, and other major matters, was the province of the Six Hundred, which also had the power to select parliamentary candidates as well as meeting "for purposes of conference" to discuss any questions referred to it by the Executive (Rules 6; 7).

The representative element scrupulously integrated into each of the hierarchical grades of the Association was always regarded by its apologists as a great advance on the old rule by clique. This change was seen as part of the national historical process, namely the displacement of a feudal aristocracy as rulers of a great commercial nation, and the rise in their stead of industrial, democratic legislators. Nevertheless, it is apparent that there was still ample room for a new form of dictation by a few within the framework of the Association's rules. The amount of control vested in the Executive was the main channel whereby a caucus could direct the party. Because it met monthly, whereas the Six Hundred had only two statutory meetings - and the wards one - a year, and because it handled all regular business, the Executive was potentially a very threatening force to the balance of power as prescribed in the


2. Whitaker, Liberal Organisation, pp. 67-70; Ostrogorski, Democracy, I, pp. 337-8: "It controls everything that goes on and makes up the life of the Association and its ward branches".
Constitution, especially as it could submit resolutions for consideration to the Six Hundred. Given this lynch-pin position occupied by the Executive, its relations will be discussed with, firstly, the Six Hundred both as regards general policy and the specific issue of selecting candidates; and, secondly, the Ward Committees, in an attempt to establish the direction in which power flowed within the Association.

2. The Executive and the Six Hundred

With its function as arbiter of policy, the Six Hundred stood at the apex of the Association, and two traits are apparent in the Executive's handling of the large assembly. On the one hand, it frequently by-passed the Six Hundred, at other times it carefully arranged the business at the 'United Meeting' to ensure success. Quite often the Executive passed resolutions on policy issues without troubling to ascertain the views of the Six Hundred. Thus at the September 1880 monthly meeting of the Executive, opposition to educational endowments was affirmed, and a resolution calling for a firmer British line towards the Turks was also passed, yet neither topic had been aired at the Six Hundred meeting in July.1 While irregular, such motions were innocuous and would doubtless have been heavily endorsed at a full United Meeting, but a more serious usurpation was held to have occurred over the question of affiliation

to the Scottish Liberal Association in 1881. Not only did the Executive take this decision on its own, it also chose the twelve delegates to sit on the S.L.A. Committee without any consultation with the policy-making body. This procedure aroused clamour because the G.L.A. leadership was endeavouring to exclude the Workmen's Electoral Union and other Glasgow bodies from a place in the S.L.A., in order to substantiate the assertion that the sole legitimate Liberal organisation in Glasgow was the G.L.A. This manoeuvre was, however, stubbornly and successfully resisted by the Union and by Anderson's committee who feared that their section of the party would be crushed by the 'Radical caucus' when the next election came up. Thus it was only in these exceptional circumstances that the transgressions of the Executive came to light: there may have been other instances of a less controversial nature.

But even when United Meetings were held, the initiative lay with the Executive. Apart from the obligatory six-monthly meetings, a Special Meeting of the Six Hundred could be summoned if the Executive deemed it necessary, or if at least two Ward Committees requisitioned the Executive. While the Executive summoned six Special Meetings of the Six Hundred between 1880 and 1885, no requests came up from the Ward Committees. This seems to indicate where the main decisions were taken, and indeed the conduct of the proceedings at all Six

Hundred meetings suggests a high degree of management by the Executive beforehand. Most of the resolutions to be presented were prepared and discussed by it in advance, a practice obviously open to abuse since meetings could then be packed and cabals organised to gerrymander the voting.  

It is in addition striking how little real debate took place at gatherings of the Six Hundred, despite its ostensible deliberative function. In general they served merely as large assemblages convened to support resolutions which, in line with the thinking behind the formation of the G.L.A., could then be presented as declarations of opinion intended to influence policy.  

The President, Walter MacFarlane, conveyed this view at one of the most important meetings, held to show support for Gladstone's Irish legislation: "As one of the largest industrial constituencies and the largest Liberal Association in the kingdom, they were naturally expected to have a tolerably clear view of the leading political questions of the day, and he felt assured that an expression of their views at the present time would tend largely to develop and mature public opinion on this all-important question . . . And they might rest assured that in thus exercising their thoughts they were building up a power for good that would largely conduce to the benefit not only of their own city but to the development of political thought throughout the kingdom."  

As was to be expected after this introduction, voting

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2. Whitaker, Liberal Organisation, pp. 93, 123-4, for similar.

3. Report of a Special Meeting of the Glasgow Liberal Association to Consider the Irish Land Bill . . . 1882, p. 3.
on the two motions presented on this occasion was unanimous, as was
typical of all meetings called to consider "crisis" resolutions.
On more ordinary policy matters, there was room for disagreement and
so some disunity over, e.g., Poor Law reform, was not damaging to
the image the G.L.A. wished to present.¹

A further lever wielded by the Executive was its retention of
the nomination of thirty extra members to sit on itself. The Six
Hundred were simply presented with a list of names which it could do
little to alter, and there was much unease over this power of co-option
(which embraced one-fourth of the Executive) as it reinforced the
grip of the inner circle sitting on the Executive. The Electoral
Union had broken off negotiations on this very point, as they wanted
these thirty to be appointed at a general meeting of all members of
the Association; and in 1882 some members protested at the ward
meetings against this custom, but to no avail.²

These rumblings of discontent remained largely subterranean and
rarely surfaced, but after the disestablishment fracas of 1882 charges
of wire-pulling were openly and repeatedly made.³ An interesting
proposal was mooted by the 13th Ward Committee with the aim of
preventing a repetition of the notorious preliminary secret meeting
held by Burt to organise his supporters in advance of the "spontaneous"

1. G. Herald, 8 June 1881 for the Poor Law debate.

reporting the 14th Ward annual meeting.

3. A letter from "A Ward Secretary", G. Herald, 19 June 1882 is
explicit.
motion. The Executive was requested to hand topics down to the wards for deliberation before submitting them to the Six Hundred, in order to stimulate "fuller expression of opinion" as well as stopping snap decisions from being taken.¹ Stephen Mason, an old reformer, summed up a good deal of this current of sentiment when he said: "there is no use continuing to ignore the fact that a very large proportion of both the moderate and advanced Liberals take no interest in the deliberations of the Six Hundred".² Although Mason was admittedly feeling aggrieved because the G.L.A. had just unilaterally removed him from their Vice-Presidential roll, on the grounds that more prestigious individuals were now available to supplant him, he was typical of a sizeable sector of city Liberals, having been a short-lived candidate in 1874 and later sitting for Mid-Lanark from 1885 to 1888. But it is more germane to note that these attacks did nothing to alter the course adopted by the Executive (albeit it behaved a little more circumspectly thereafter), nor did they shake its control over the Six Hundred.

The one specific right which the Six Hundred enjoyed under the Constitution was that of selecting parliamentary candidates, but here too the Executive allowed the United Meetings no more leeway than on general policy matters.³ The first vacancy, caused by the death of Whitelaw, came in July 1879, when the Association was in its infancy.

2. Letter by Mason in N.B.D.M., 6 Nov. 1883.
After protracted discussions, the Six Hundred chose Tennant over Middleton by only 8 votes, but this open decision was not the democratic triumph it looked. Firstly, the Executive at a prior meeting had narrowed the choice to these two, and the plenary body was invited only to pick one or the other, without any consideration of other names. Also, as already seen, Tennant had emerged as the front-runner by the time of the Six Hundred meeting, and since he had the backing of other influential Liberal groups the G.L.A. was left with no real option unless it wished to split the party (so denying its objective) and afford the Tories a chance to slip in, as in 1874.\(^1\) In that situation the Association was not sovereign, although the Six Hundred's decision greatly promoted unity.

In 1880, too, the range of action open to them at the general election was restricted by force of events. When Tennant moved to fight Selkirkshire, Middleton was the logical successor, but even then proceedings at the meeting of the Six Hundred which duly accepted him brought out their subservience to the Executive. The conference was held the day after Tennant withdrew in the midst of doubts being voiced in public and in the press as to the wisdom of substituting a Radical for a Moderate, as this might drive away the Whig voters. At the Six Hundred meeting a ward delegate stressed the force of these considerations and urged a delay in the selection of the candidate

in order that the Executive might use the respite to produce alternative suggestions. The Chairman of the Executive firmly squashed this by announcing that no other names would be forthcoming and the meeting then proceeded smoothly, endorsing Middleton.¹

A few months after the election, Middleton became ill, and it was reported that his illness "has assumed an acute form of monomania, necessitating continual attendance upon the part of his friends. The most serious consequences are apprehended", and he was committed to an asylum.² It is indicative of the weakness of the Six Hundred that the question of removing Middleton from his seat and finding a replacement was never raised at any of their half-yearly meetings over the next four years, although it was public knowledge that his condition was unlikely to improve. The first moves to dislodge him began in early 1884 when it came to light that some of the Executive were hoping to persuade Middleton to resign so that the newly-appointed Attorney-General, Sir Henry Jones, could occupy a safe seat.³ This news led to a series of angry exchanges at the next regular Six Hundred meeting, with the Executive being accused of planning a 'hole-in-corner' job and of trying to short-circuit the full constitutional process in ignoring the plenary body. This rare display of independent grass-roots spirit was not as spontaneous as

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it appears, for there was evidently an influential lobby within the Executive itself anxious to thwart the sponsoring of Jones (who was something of a Whig) and to bring forward instead a Radical of like kind to Middleton. Even with this support the Six Hundred were unable to assert their autonomy. The meeting passed a resolution entrusting the Executive and its Consulting Committee with full powers to act in the matter of the third candidate and rejected a more democratic proposal to have preliminary canvasses of the voters and a full meeting of the Six Hundred before any final choice was made.1 At its next meeting the Executive confirmed its dominance by rejecting a request from the 11th Ward association that the third candidate be selected by the entire Six Hundred.2

The erosion of the power of the mass plebiscitary body was further pointed up when the Executive invited the sitting members to choose two 'warm and comfortable' seats from the seven given to the city by the Redistribution Act of 1885, for it did this without any mandate from or consultations with the Six Hundred.3 One month later, in March 1885, the last occasion for returning an M.P. for the single Glasgow constituency arose when Anderson vacated his seat on being appointed Deputy Master of the Australian Mint. The Executive wheeled forward for the approval of the Six Hundred, Thomas Russell,

2. G. Herald, N.B.D.M., 1 Apr., 27 May 1884.
Vice-president of the Association and a business partner as well as the brother-in-law of Walter MacFarlane, a past President. Protests were made at this decision on two broad grounds, but the outcome reflected the full control possessed by the Executive over the Six Hundred. Objections to the procedure of selection were rebutted by blank denials: the Consulting Committee, it was stated, had solicited various people before alighting on Russell; and claims that the vacancy had been kept secret until the new candidate was chosen were dismissed out of hand.¹ Similar brusque treatment was meted out to the complaints that Russell was a mediocrity and that his Liberalism was shadowy and lukewarm. When it came to the vote only some half a dozen hands were raised against the Executive's nominee, despite the rough-shod riding endured by the Six Hundred.² After redistribution responsibility for the selection of candidates passed from the central to the divisional associations of the G.L.A., but at no time could the Six Hundred be said to have acted as more than a rubber-stamp.

3. The Executive and the Ward Associations

Even if the Executive stand convicted of stage-managing the transactions of the Six Hundred in order to endow their own decisions with a mandate of wide popular support, this of itself would not

¹ For instance, the meeting of East End Liberals, G. Herald, 17 Mar. 1885.

² G. Herald, 3 Feb. 1885 for the Six Hundred meeting to endorse Russell.
prove the caucus allegation. For in theory both the Executive and the Six Hundred were substantially drawn from the Ward Committees, and so long as the last were firmly rooted in a democratic setting, popular control by rank-and-file activists would still be exercised. It was upon the vitality and the conduct of the ward associations that the whole question of caucus would be settled.

As already observed, there is, unlike the Conservative case, no evidence that any meetings of the wards (either singly or in groups) were held beyond the statutory annual election of office-bearers. It may be assumed that this dearth is not due to neglect on the part of the press, since two of the three city papers were Liberal and they yet reported Conservative meetings in full. There is indeed very little impression of life in the Liberal ward organisations, and even the annual meetings seem perfunctory.¹ From the press accounts of these yearly events a consistent picture emerges to confirm the view that the Executive closely directed the operations of the Ward Committees, which generally had a rather shadowy existence.² All of these ward meetings conformed to a stereotype in two major respects. Firstly, several members of the Executive other than the local ward delegates would always be present on the platform. These were the key individuals in the association for they also sat on the major sub-committees and spoke regularly at meetings of the Six Hundred.

¹. Whitaker, Liberal Organisation, pp. 70, 108-9 concurs for Manchester.
². Approximately 75% of all possible annual ward meetings in the period from 1880 to 1884 are reported in one or other of the G. Herald, N.B.D.M. and G. News.
Generally the same group of the leadership attended a good portion of the ward meetings in any one year, and they invariably gave the main speeches of the evening in which they urged loyalty to the Association and support for the party as whole. While their presence could be interpreted as an attempt to maintain a close liaison with the rank-and-file and also to deliver pep-talks, the absence of animated discussion and the uniformity of proceedings suggest that the effect was to stamp the will of the Executive on the ward meeting.

This interpretation is strengthened by the second characteristic of the ward meetings, namely the unchanging form taken by the resolutions passed every time after the election of the committee. These invariably spoke of approval of certain topical but contentious aspects of the Liberal Government's policies, and were identically worded in each ward. In 1885, for instance, every ward passed motions expressing confidence in the home and foreign policies of H.M. Government and looking for legislation to reform local government, to improve social conditions, to redistribute seats and to extend the county franchise. These demands closely mirrored the points being put forward on a nation-wide front by the N.L.F., and so contributed to the groundswell ably exploited by Chamberlain and his Radical allies. But in Glasgow all semblance of spontaneity had already been destroyed by the casual mention at a previous year's meeting that all the motions had been drawn up in advance by the Executive.¹

¹. G. Herald, 26 Jan. 1881, at the 3rd ward annual meeting.
The impression created by the reports of these meetings was one of listless formalities carefully preplanned and not very well supported. This made the wards easily controlled, but it also rendered them vulnerable to a concerted assault by a well-drilled group of dissidents, as happened in 1882 when Irish Nationalists disrupted several meetings. These incidents were merely one phase of the convoluted relations between the Home Rulers and the Liberals in Glasgow, discussed fully below, and reflected the former's alienation from Gladstone's handling of the Irish situation at that point. At the earliest ward meetings in 1882 critical comments were aired about the Irish parliamentary rebels and the Irish were held responsible for the Government's difficulties. This seems to have provoked at least seven Irish counter-demonstrations, beginning with the meeting of the radical Second Ward, in the East End of the city, where the first stereotype resolution - approving the government's home and foreign record - was opposed by a motion of no confidence from an Irish contingent. The result of the voting was a tie of 68 apiece, and uproar ensued, ending with the departure of the orthodox Liberals, whereupon the gas was turned out on the remaining Irish who demonstrated their disaffection by giving three groans for Gladstone and "Buckshot" Forster. The 14th Ward meeting, held three days later, was equally noisy and the police were finally called and the hall was closed amidst chaos. The 4th Ward saw similar scenes, but at other meetings the Irish were less effective: several times they could only muster about 20 and were easily voted down, so that they
left after abortive attempts to storm the platform. The Executive declared these meetings either to be not fully constitutional or else to be adjourned, and therefore reconvened them. At all the second sessions, despite acrimonious wrangles (two men were arrested at the new 4th Ward meeting), loyal Liberals turned up in sufficient droves to swamp the renewed Irish challenge.

The significance of this local obstructionist campaign by the Irish, in the context of this chapter, was that it showed up some of the cracks in the democratic facade presented by the G.L.A. It revealed how straightforward it was for a tightly-knit group to force its opinions on the ward meetings, mainly because very few were present. The tie in the 2nd Ward, with 68 on each side, would indicate that only one quarter or so of the membership normally attended in this politically-conscious district. At other wards attendance was far lower: the 15th Ward defeated a token Irish confrontation by 38 to 8 and since all Ward Committees were 35 strong, this looks very like a self-perpetuating clique. Other evidence, not restricted to this year, indicates that turnout in most wards seldom exceeded 70, which means that the Six Hundred were elected by around one thousand.

The 1882 episode also brought out the unreliability of membership figures, as it was claimed that many of the Home Rulers had enrolled just before the meetings in spite of the clear stipulation that all dues had to be paid by the previous year-end to qualify for membership of the G.L.A. The Executive used this argument to disbar several of the Irish activists from attending the second meetings.¹ In this connection, it was also pointed out by critics that the sole requirement for membership of the G.L.A. was approval of its objects, on which basis non-electors could join and so influence the Association on matters from which they were legally excluded. To prevent a recurrence of this, the Association tightened up its membership rules.² After this contretemps with the Home Rulers, Ward meetings were well-regulated in future years and no recurrence of these upheavals took place. But that they had happened and had so dislocated the routine of the Association is a good pointer to the normal state of the Ward Committees.

In terms of social composition, it would not be accurate to state that the Ward Committees (and hence the Executive) were truly representative of the total Liberal electorate in the city, notwithstanding G.L.A. claims to the contrary. TABLE 5.1 reveals the normal Liberal activists were drawn from shopkeepers, professional or


². *G. Herald*, 28 Feb. 1882 for the revision of this rule at the Six Hundred A.G.M.
### TABLE 5.1: Social Composition of G.L.A. Executive, 1880 and 1882

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Avenue of Recruitment:</th>
<th>Ward Committees</th>
<th>Co-Opted</th>
<th>Presidents &amp; Vice-Presidents</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class A - l</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class B - n</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class E, D, E  - u, v, z</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the definition of the classes, Appendix III.
middling business-men, with the top honorary posts earmarked for the city elite. 1 Hardly any working-men were involved apart from seven trades union officials, 2 but it is significant that these latter all served on the co-opted section of the Executive and were not elected by the wards, where the more middle-class elements dominated. The presence of the union Secretaries on the Executive, it seems fair to deduce, stemmed from a desire on the part of the G.L.A. leadership to display by such tokens that the Association contained the full breadth of Liberal interests. They were chosen primarily because of their status as officials of working-men's organisations and it was evident that they would not prove troublesome members of the Executive. None of the seven had an impressive record of participation in working-class political movements, the real leaders of which were steadfastly by-passed for these posts. This social exclusiveness contrasts unfavourably with the G.C.A. on whose comparable ward committees several working-men sat in their own right. In the light of TABLE 5.2, the basis of the accusations by Liberal working-men that there was a middle-class caucus behind the G.L.A. becomes comprehensible, as does their consequent animus towards that body.

1. For a general impression, H. J. Hanham, The Reformed Electoral System in Great Britain 1832-1914 (London, 1968), pp. 18-23; Ostrogorski, Democracy, I, p. 346, where "shopkeepers, clerks and superior artisans" are described as the mainstay of Associations, also pp. 333, 342-7.

2. Apart from John Crichton, an ex-President of the Trades Council, they were all Secretaries of the unions, viz., Blacksmiths; Bricklayers; Carpenters and Joiners; Ironmoulders; Masons and Tailors.
The subservience of the ward committees and the Six Hundred was confirmed by the low attendances normal at G.L.A. meetings of the Executive and the Six Hundred. Attendance at meetings was never directly stated - it was policy not to keep records of those present - but this can sometimes be gleaned from voting results. Voting at only two of the fourteen meetings of the Six Hundred is given, because, as already seen, unanimity generally prevailed. The assembly of 12 June 1882, which passed the disestablishment motion and sparked off serious allegations of caucus-manipulation, had only 167 members (27.3%) in attendance. This meant that the 97 delegates (15.9%) who carried the motion committed the full Six Hundred, and, at one remove, 35,000 Liberal voters in the city. This was one of the most momentous meetings in the development of the G.L.A., on a leading issue which aroused the greatest passions on both sides of the argument and was potentially the most divisive, yet only one-quarter of those eligible participated. In the previous year, a more humdrum Six Hundred approved five resolutions on Poor Law reform; ratepayers' franchise; the Affirmation Bill; the Contagious Diseases (Women) Acts; and Forster's handling of the Irish situation. For this fairly average bill of fare, 94 (15.4%) turned up to cast their votes.¹

Attendance at Executive meetings - for one half of which details are available - was better, but still far from satisfactory. Of the maximum possible of 131, the highest recorded figure was 79 (60.3%),

¹. G. Herald, 13 June 1882, 8 June 1881 for these respective occasions. Whitaker, Liberal Organisation, pp. 123-4 for Manchester.
but apart from that and one other of 65, the number customarily ranged between 42 and 50 (roughly 30 to 40%), and on one occasion it fell to 33 (24.2%). Those meetings for which details exist covered a broad sample of the range of business dealt with by the Executive, spanning both routine sessions and, for instance, the crucial meeting in 1879 which decided upon the revision of the Association's Programme—attended by 42 members. Even the re-organisation proposals enforced by the redistribution of seats in 1885 could only attract 65, exactly one half of those entitled to be present, although a serious diminution of the G.L.A.'s central role was under consideration.

The low level of participation conveyed by these figures indicate that it was no difficult task for a small group to dominate the whole Association by their control over its central agency. This is in accord with all the other evidence about the working of the G.L.A. in practice (in contradistinction to its democratic frontage). The whole body of evidence would thus seem to bear out the allegations made at its inception that the Association was simply a vehicle designed to permit a radical caucus to direct the entire Liberal party in Glasgow.


CHAPTER SIX

Elements of Glasgow Conservatism
Although the first Reform Act ended the firm control of Glasgow politics which the Tories had exercised from time immemorial, they still remained an active force in the city for another decade. They contested all the six election contests in the city between 1832 and 1841, and as the initial enthusiasm for the Whigs waned, they built up their support. Their best performance came in 1841 when Sir James Campbell came within 327 votes of success, although it was alleged that the Tory vote was artificially augmented by Chartist votes.¹ Thereafter, however, the party almost disappeared from the political life of the city for some twenty-five years, only fighting one of the next six elections, while its organisation became quite defunct.

The speed and extent of this disintegration was a commonplace among commentators by the mid-1840's. Registration work was only undertaken by the Liberals or by individuals acting on their own initiative, and in 1846 the Herald attributed the unsatisfactory state of the voters roll to "the apathy of the Conservative party, which we lament but we can neither defend nor explain it".² So complete did the eclipse appear that the decisions not to put up candidates at these elections elicited little public comment. In 1847 the main Conservative journal declared itself uninterested in the "narrow and sectional" Glasgow fight and a meeting of Tory electors

¹ A List of Tories, Churchmen and Chartist united at the Late Glasgow Election and Voted for James Campbell and George Mills, (n.p., n.d.) lists 280 names.

could not agree on any course of action.¹ In the two elections of 1857, the party "never for a moment" considered a contest, and no further involvement occurred in 1859 or 1865.² The sole occasion on which a candidate stood was in 1852, and was really a response to internal Liberal divisions rather than a sign of a Tory recovery.³

In the event, as the Tory Constitutional pointed out, success was denied them because of the delapidated state which their organisation had fallen into over the past ten years.⁴

The main reasons for the decline of Conservatism in Glasgow were the issues of free trade and the Disruption. The former split the Tories sharply: some sections remained protectionist in outlook, notably the shipping and West Indian interests. They petitioned against the abolition of the Navigation Laws and the sugar tariffs, and organised the Glasgow Reciprocity and Industrial Association to present their case.⁵ On the other hand many prominent Conservatives were free traders, including the two most recent candidates, Sir Robert James Campbell and Monteith, as well as Henry Dunlop, the first Tory Lord Provost after 1833. The party candidate in 1852,

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3. See above, pp. 158-60.


Peter Blackburn, found himself in a dilemma over this matter. Although he owned substantial West Indian plantations, and although the cry of Protection formed the central pillar of Derby's election campaign, Blackburn found the drift of party opinion so strong in the city that he had to deny he was a protectionist. The Constitutional reminded Blackburn that the Glasgow Tories wanted their representatives to be "staunch Protestants and Free Traders".

The Disruption simultaneously fractured party unity, for many of the Conservatives who came out in 1843 had been disaffected by Peel's handling of the crisis. After the schism, most of the energies of men like William Kidston, Hugh Tennent and Henry Dunlop were focussed on the problems of setting the Free Church on firm foundations, to the neglect of politics. In addition, the failure of the Conservative Operatives' Association in 1843 was partly attributable to the Disruption, for the Association's decision in 1842 to call for the immediate abolition of patronage led to a sudden drop in membership, making it financially impoverished.

Given this quarter-century of moribundity, the revival of the Conservative cause, which is to be dated from 1868, is striking.


Starting from scratch, a promising poll of over 25% in the 1868 election was followed by the establishment of a party organisation, and in 1874 the first Conservative M.P. for forty years won a seat. Although never more than approximately one third of the electorate before 1886, the liveliness of Glasgow Conservatism was a matter of comment, especially as much of the growth in support was held to derive from widespread working-class adherence to the party's principles. There were many who echoed John Scott of Hawkshill, who observed in 1883: "He remembered that ten or twelve years ago the very existence of a Conservative artisan or a Conservative labourer was doubted ... They were scouted as a political impossibility, and a man who preferred Conservative principles was held up as a sort of enemy of his class." ¹

This is not to claim that the Conservative vote was overwhelmingly working-class (still less vice versa), for about three thousand were claimed to have voted in the Tory poll of nine thousand in 1868.² The policies and doctrines by which the Conservatives sought to win votes is worthy of analysis in order to try to establish the forces which impelled men to take political sides, given the progress they made among all social groups.


². N.B.D.M., 5, 6 Apr. 1869, letter by J. Fraser, late interim chairman of the G.W.C.A.
1. **Social Reform** Perhaps the most obvious means by which Conservatives might hope to appeal to the post-1868 electorate in industrial Glasgow would be by advocating the social reform ideas associated with the Tory radical tradition expounded by Oastler, Disraeli and Lord Randolph Churchill.¹ Recent work by Smith and Blake has demonstrated convincingly that these concepts were not a major part of Disraeli's Conservatism, but both have concentrated on the parliamentary level, and it is possible that in the large urban seats, social reform was a popular cry.² Indeed the Conservative M.P.s who displayed an interest in these matters mainly sat for city seats, e.g. S. R. Graves (Liverpool), J. Laird (Birkenhead) and Richard Cross (S.W. Lancashire).

It is not difficult to find in Glasgow assertions like that of Hugh Shearer: "He would like the members to point out that almost all the measures passed for the amelioration of the conditions of the working-classes had been passed by Conservatives and Conservative Governments (Applause)."³ While there were many other references to the party's record, both on this same plane of high generalisation, and also in singling out specific measures from the legislation of the 1840's and 1870's, some caveats must be entered.⁴ None of

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3. G. News, 9 Jan. 1883; cf. 30 Apr. 1883 (Dr Fairlie).

these allusions were the sole, or even the most important, element in the argument at any meeting, but were subsidiary to the main theme. At no time before 1886 did the Conservatives hold a single meeting specifically devoted to the issue of social reform.

It is noteworthy that eulogies of Disraeli after his death seldom adverted to his social reform ideas. When W. C. Maughan, a party office-bearer, lectured to several party branches in 1881 and 1882 on "Disraeli, his life and career", he barely alluded to these principles, and instead discerned the basis of his political conduct to have been "patriotism and justice and peace with honour". Again, a working man, James MacManus, informed Salisbury in 1884 that Disraeli's influence on the working class derived from his foreign policy at Berlin and his defence of the Established Church, but MacManus never commented on his social legislation.

In their campaigns the Conservative candidates revealed the true extent of the local party's commitment to social reforms. Between 1868 and 1880, three of the five candidates - Sir George Campbell, James Hunter and William Pearce - failed to mention the topic at all in their comprehensive election addresses, and one, Sir James Bain, only touched on it in passing. The single candidate to discuss


social reform was Alexander Whitelaw, who stated in 1874: "If sent to Parliament, I would earnestly consider, and so far as able, willingly assist in the solution of Social and Sanitary questions involving the Improvement of the Habits, Homes and Happiness of the People of this County."\(^1\) When questioned, however, he seemed less than enthusiastic, refusing to support the two main labour reforms, the Nine Hours Bill and the repeal of the Criminal Law Amendment Act.\(^2\)

Once elected to Parliament, his record did not improve. He spoke five times in the House, and four were very short contributions: on the Crosshill Burgh extension Bill; an amendment to the Church patronage Bill was rejected; he seconded Dr Cameron's motion to stop the establishment of a chair of Teaching Practice at Edinburgh University; his addition of two clauses to a Licensing Bill was accepted.\(^3\) But he did not speak once on any of the social reform legislation which was the feature of the early years of this Parliament. His sole speech of any size was to second the motion on the Queen's Speech in 1875. Whitelaw first surveyed foreign, Imperial, colonial and Irish matters before turning to domestic reforms, and although he dwelt at some length on better housing standards, he clearly regarded social questions as of secondary importance in political priorities: "The need for such legislation is clamant, and it is well that Parliament, should, in the absence

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of exciting politics, devote itself to this problem."¹

The attitudes of Glasgow Tories to social reform was, moreover, sharply divided by topic: sanitary legislation received a generally favourable regard, but on labour questions there was no sympathy. Housing and public health was for instance, approved of not only by, as we have seen, Whitelaw, but also by the Glasgow News, the local organ of the Conservative party, whose editorials may be held to represent the views of the proprietors, who were all prominent party members.² Its commitment was rather lukewarm, and in January 1877 it commented on a speech by its political arch-enemy, John Bright: "The pregnant moral of his speech is that of late years Parliament has done much for the working man, and now by thrift and temperance, by educating their children in our elementary schools, by reading newspapers and other cheap publications with a view to self-improvement working-men must help themselves. It is high time they ceased to be treated as grown-up children who must always be looking to the State or to other people for aid when things go wrong, or when any effort out of the common has to be made. And the first condition of an approach towards it is to get rid of the notion that much more is to be gained from legislation."³

In his Queen's Speech performance Whitelaw had attacked the agitation to repeal the existing trades union laws as unrepresentative, and this attitude was reiterated by the News. "Our views on capital and labour may be extreme" it said, and it rejected all

¹. Ibid., CCXXII, 46-53, with quotes at cols. 50, 52-3.
². See below, pp. 463-73.
³. G. News, 5 Jan. 1877. For some of its attitudes to sanitary matters, cf. 3 Mar. 1874, 19 June 1875 etc.
attempts to artificially restrict hours of work or to extend the legal protection of workers.¹ But it was labour unrest which drew most of the paper's fire. Strikes were consistently denounced as dangerous, misguided and self-defeating. Dangerous because they merely let foreign competitors take up business missed through the strike; misguided because it was impossible to resist economic laws, and would price Britain out of the world markets; and self-defeating because they only increased hardship among their own class.² In addition, it found strikes to be threatening because of the tyrannical power the unions were seen to wield. The News agreed both that the trades bodies were "despotic and reckless . . . a drag upon commerce and an element of danger to social and domestic order"; and that the stance taken by the union leadership was quite atypical of the opinions held by the rank and file.³

The reasons for this antagonism to organised labour and general insensitivity to working-class demands is accounted for by the absence among Glasgow Conservatives either of progressive businessmen who were interested in the welfare of their workforce and sympathetic to their aspirations or of landed aristocrats hostile to the new middle-class. These were the sources of radical Toryism and in the


former category came Lord Elcho, a mine-owning Tory M.P. who co-operated amiably with West of Scotland trades unionists in their campaign against the Master and Servant Act. To celebrate the success of the agitation he was given a dinner by the labour leaders, and the working-class Glasgow Sentinel contrasted Elcho's behaviour with that of local employers, who shunned the issue. Yet Elcho only came once to Glasgow to speak under Conservative auspices, for the industrial interests most inclined to Conservatism were coal, iron, steel and shipping, all of which enjoyed poor relations with their workforce.

In the coal and iron industry, industrial relations were extremely tense: truck was still prevalent and the trades union movement faced bitter opposition from the masters at all times. Yet this industry produced three of the five candidates from 1868 to 1880, some half-dozen Vice-Presidents of the Glasgow Conservative Association and, in James Baird of Cambusdown, the wealthiest supporter of the party whose firm was among the most notorious exploiters of their men. Many shipowners were Conservative — perhaps a legacy of the protectionist days — and in this period, their main preoccupation was to resist all efforts to legislate for


the safety of British seamen. Plimsoll's bills and Chamberlain's Merchant Shipping Bill of 1884 were vehemently attacked for this reason by John Burns, who was often hailed as a potential Conservative candidate for the city. 1

There were clearly no aristocratic Tories in Glasgow politics, but the opportunities for exploring this line of communication with the working-class were revealed by Sheriff Sir Archibald Alison. Significantly an Edinburgh lawyer, Alison was a Tory of the old school who regretted the passing of the first Reform Act, opposed the rigours of the Scottish New Poor Law and championed the ten-hour day in the 1830's. Because of his leanings to the side of labour, he was invited by the united trades of Glasgow to address them in 1859 and again in 1861. Each time he justified unions and strikes as necessary checkweights to the might of Capital, and instructed workmen to take action only when the situation was ripe for success, as prices were rising. 2

With his burial in 1867, which was the occasion of a vast display of mourning by the Glasgow working classes, no local proponents of his version of Conservatism were left. Sometimes the News did step into this stance, as when it refuted radical assertions that bad housing was the creation of greedy landlords: "The labouring


classes were taught by those who used them that the landowner was their natural enemy. They may come to learn that the country gentlemen, who is not a manufacturer, nor dependent on manufactures, is their only possible protector."¹ At another time it accused the Liberals of promoting the Irish Land Bill in 1881 in order to distract "the artisan and the clerk" from conditions in their own cities, as part of the general Liberal strategy of proferring constitutional reforms to distract those classes whose interests were "diametrically" opposed to those of their political leaders, the manufacturers.²

That these outbursts, however, were only aberrations is suggested by the response in Glasgow to Lord Randolph Churchill's "Tory Democracy", which consisted in good part of an assault on "bourgeois" Conservative elements in an attempt to yoke together the aristocracy and the proletariat in a common political cause. No member of Churchill's "Fourth Party" came to the city in the course of their extensive speaking tours in the early 1880's, and the News reflected the prevailing scepticism: "The high aims of Lord Randolph may end either in the fashion of Icarus or Pitt, but judging from the rash beginning, the classical prototype seems the more likely."³ Hugh S. Thomson, a leading Conservative in the working-class East End concurred by pointing out that the defeat sustained by a radical

². Ibid., 23 Aug. 1881.
Tory at a Liverpool by-election afforded a lesson to other large constituencies like Glasgow that they should "bring forward men of the right stamp — men who were thorough-going Conservatives and not candidates who designated themselves Democratic Tories".  

2. Electoral Reform As a corollary, there was little enthusiasm for any franchise extension, since there existed no confidence that the new working-class electors would vote Tory in the expectation of securing improved social conditions. Very few party speakers recalled that credit for the second Reform Bill lay with the Conservatives, who had persevered in the face of Liberal resistance.

The three-cornered seat, the obstacle introduced by Disraeli himself to mass democracy in large burghs, was stoutly defended until the 1884-5 reorganisation created single-member seats. Again, the ballot was rejected by local Conservatives, with only one dissentient, because it introduced a most unconstitutional mode of voting "altogether foreign to the character of the British people".

On the vexed question of extending polling hours beyond 4 pm, Whitelaw was hostile to a reform which would clearly benefit working men.

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3. Tariff Reform  If a concern for ameliorating the position of
the working-classes was not prominent in Glasgow, another area of
electoral appeal, which was developed with some success elsewhere
by the Conservatives, was that of tariff reform or reciprocity.
Revived in the late 1870's after thirty years of neglect, this phase
of the protectionist movement made inroads into free trade beliefs
because it linked its case to the recession of the time and could
attract both the business and working-class.¹

The News first raised the topic in July 1878, and argued that
Cobdenite principles were irrelevant for Britain now that her rivals
had abandoned them. Anyway, free trade was not the real cause of
the prosperity enjoyed since 1845: "our markets depend not upon a
Free Trade propaganda, or the advent of a millenium of arbitration,
but upon the vigour and success with which we vindicate our
Imperial position".² The Tories decided to woo the working-classes
after the Trades Council called in October 1878 for countervailing
duties against the bounties to sugar producers given by other
nations.³ Free trade was charged with responsibility for bad
trade, wages cuts and high unemployment, and meetings were held to
propagate this interpretation.⁴ But the cause made little headway

¹. B. H. Brown, The Tariff Reform Movement in Britain 1880-95
   (New York, 1944) is the standard account.
³. Ibid., 18 Oct. 1878, 14 Jul. 1880, 30 June 1881.
⁴. Between 11 June and 11 Aug. 1884, the paper ran 11 editorials on
   this theme.
among organised labour once the Trades Council drew a distinction between ending the foreigners' advantages under the bounty system - which it accepted as necessary - and the general unjustifiability of imposing tariffs.¹ Popularity was also lost when a Fair Trader, James MacNair, was sent to the Trades Union Congress in 1881 as a Glasgow delegate, but instead he attended the Fair Trade conference which was held simultaneously.² Later meetings to spread the protectionist message among the working classes drew attendances which on the News's own admission were "not numerous".³

No greater impact was made before 1886 on the attachment of the Glasgow business community to free trade. Brown identifies the industries most favourable to tariff reform ideas as shipping, West Indian interests, textiles, metal work and iron and steel, and it is instructive to examine these sectors in the Glasgow context.⁴ The Clyde shipowners, despite their protectionist antecedents, made few demands for tariff reform. In 1883 the Conservative Nathaniel Dunlop, of the Allan Line, went so far as to cite the experience of the United States, where protective duties had destroyed her mercantile shipping, as a warning to Britain. Instead, like Burns, he blamed

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the difficulties of British shipping mainly on the crippling of enterprise by excessive legislation which protected seamen and caused delays by insisting on the over-inspection of vessels. "The British shipowner," he concluded, "asks only a fair field and no favour." 1

The West India Association of Glasgow, which had demanded protection in the 1840's, was still thriving in the 1870's. 2 Despite its concern at the effects of foreign sugar bounties on production in its plantations, it declined to join the Anti-Bounty League which was formed in 1880 by the London West India Committee to seek countervailing duties. 3 When London invited them to join the campaign again in 1884, the refusal was decisive: "After some discussion the Secretary was to write to Mr Ohlson (the Association's London agent) that the Association are not prepared to urge any system of countervailing duties, as they did not see how any such system would be practicable, and that they regret that they have no funds at present to contribute towards the National Anti-Bounty League." 4

Most commentators on the declining fortunes of the textile industry accepted the analysis made in 1883 by James Robertson, the proprietor of the largest cotton factory in Glasgow. He identified the problems confronting the industry as purely internal in character: better workmen, newer machinery, efficient managers were all canvassed

by Robertson, but he did not mention protection as a solution. \(^1\)

While the shipbuilding industry also went through bouts of depression, these were attributed to the cyclical factor of shipowners not ordering boats, which, it was argued, protection could not remedy. \(^2\)

The most prestigious forum in Glasgow for expressing the mind of the business world was the Chamber of Commerce, and so obvious was its commitment to free trade that it seldom pronounced on it. In 1878, however, it stated its beliefs: "Protection is considered by the Directors of this Chamber to be unsound in theory and unsuccessful in practice. The immense increase in the wealth and progress of Great Britain since 1846, when the principle of protection was abandoned, and still further since 1860 when it was entirely discarded, is the best proof of the extent of the success of Free Trade." \(^3\)

Moreover, one of the strongest defences came from J. N. Cuthbertson, the Conservative candidate for St Rollox in 1885: "On this point the Chamber would be at one – that whatever the conduct of foreign nations, there should be nothing in the shape of retaliatory measures (hear, hear), that having raised the standard of free trade (applause) they must stand by it, and that they hoped and expected that by-and-by foreign nations would see the folly of their conduct and eventually

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take perhaps to free trade.  "1 Speeches in a similar vein were made in the Chamber by other Conservatives, notably James King and James Bain.

It may be concluded that in this era tariff reform ran counter to the economic and political instincts of city Conservatives. Rather, many were accustomed to acclaim Peel's liberalisation of trade as evidence that Conservatism was a progressive force, and boasted of their participation in the Anti-Corn Law League. 2 The issue was seldom discussed at Conservative Association meetings before 1884, and was not raised in the 1880 election, although elsewhere it featured in the campaign.

The start of the conversion of Glasgow businessmen to protectionism appears to date from 1887. In that year the Chamber of Commerce passed a resolution calling for relief by fiscal changes from foreign bounties. The motion was introduced by Nathaniel Dunlop, reversing his position of 1883, and carried by 80 votes to 50, a very low turnout. 3 The same year saw the formation of the British and Irish Free Trade Association which held meetings to advocate fiscal reciprocity against foreign bounties. Apart from the secretary, W. V. Jackson, who was a Liberal Unionist, most of the activists were Conservatives like William Laird and John Cunningham,

both iron masters. Also involved were two erstwhile free traders cited above, Cuthbertson and Bain. ¹ The Association sought to propagandise more than business circles by distributing pamphlets among the working classes, but some five years later, a third convert to tariff reform, Sir James King, was still pessimistic: "I wonder when the folly of our one-sided system of Free Trade will become apparent to our working-man, for from him only do I expect a reversal of our present idiotical policy." ² There were, then, clearly few votes in tariff reform before 1886.

4. *Imperialism, Nationalism, Jingoism and Militarism* Recent historians of Conservatism in this period have tended to see the party's appeal as reposing in part in its claim to be the "national" party by inheriting Palmerston's mantle and by identifying itself as the patriotic party. ³ The most obvious instance of this was Disraeli's exploitation of imperialist sentiment, and this would have especial relevance in Glasgow, as so much of the city's prosperity was dependent on colonial trading links. No simple correlation between economic interest and political allegiance can be drawn, for while Tory colonial merchants can be found, there were

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². J. King to G. Readman, 29 Jan. 1892. King MSS.

just as many in the Liberal party - especially those who were involved with the East India Association, which had broken the East India Company's monopoly in the 1830's.

But the appeal of Imperialism lay beyond narrow financial bounds for it possessed emotional dimensions too. The response in Glasgow to Disraeli's speeches of 1872 which established the Conservatives as the party of Empire was slight: throughout the 1870's Imperialism was raised only once by the Conservative Association, and then in reference to the Eastern Crisis.⁴ It did not merit a word in the election addresses of 1874 or 1880. At the most, occasional asides were made regarding the necessity of preserving the routes to India as the kernel of Imperial policy.² After 1880 local Conservatives mounted more frequent attacks on Gladstone's pusillanimity and blundering in South Africa, Egypt and Afghanistan. But the impression derived from these speeches is not one of a positive, almost mystical belief in Imperial destiny, but of using the crises to score points off the Liberals.³ The only elevated appraisals of Empire came from outside speakers like Ashmead-Bartlett, who proclaimed Britain's Imperial mission to civilise: "we believe that these interests are identical with the

1. G. News, 10 Jan. 1877 (M. Forsyth).
2. G. News, 21 Nov. 1878, 5 Nov. 1879.
interests of humanity (cheers)."\(^1\) In 1876 Whitelaw conveyed the importance of imperialism for Glasgow Conservatives. In his solitary reference to the topic, while discussing why working men should vote Conservative, he placed it below such factors as "the preservation of the national institutions, their social privileges, their Protestantism and their Sabbath".\(^2\)

It is equally difficult to ascertain how successful at the grass roots level in Glasgow was Disraeli's attempt to establish patriotism as the copyright of the Conservative party. A good testing-ground is the Bulgarian Crisis of 1876-8 which aroused inflamed party feeling on both sides.\(^3\) Although Disraeli's handling of the difficulty was faithfully defended from the outset in the leader columns of the News, the Conservative Association moved with considerable slowness and reluctance to mobilise opinion.\(^4\) In its review of 1876, it reported: "Having regard to the critical aspect of the Eastern Question, and being satisfied that the famous agitation inaugurated during the recess by prominent members of H.M. Opposition would react in favour of H.M. Government, your committee after mature deliberation resolved to avoid taking public notice of the injudicious clamour and mischievous asertions against H. M.


\(^4\) G. News, 10 June, 30 Sep. 1876, 14 Jan., 10, 23 Jul. 1878.
Government . . ." and in 1877 it confirmed the subdued tone: "in no other year since its formation has there been so little to excite attention and discussion in politics". ¹

This silence may be because several leading city Conservatives were hostile to Disraeli's policy. At the first protest meeting, held in September 1876, among those on the platform were John Burns, H. A. Long, the Orangemen's hero, and D. S. Cargill, treasurer of the G.C.A. ² By 1878 these splits were smoothed over, and the C.C.A. organised a petition signed by three thousand in support of the government, and at the A.G.M. in January 1879 John Burns moved a motion of unconditional approval of the government's settlement of the crisis. ³ Yet there were no public demonstrations in favour of Disraeli in 1878 - even after the Berlin Congress - which was a year of many exuberant nationalistic meetings throughout the country. ⁴ J. A. Campbell identified "the extraordinary violence of the opposition to the Conservative government" over foreign policy as the second major reason - after the economic recession - for the party's defeat in the election of 1880. ⁵

Despite this evidence that jingoism was not a vote-catching issue in Glasgow, after 1880 appeals to wounded national pride were made by Conservatives protesting at Gladstone's weakness in the face of foreign powers.\(^1\) As these themes of the dishonour and discredit being brought to Britain's international standing were developed, the elevation of Disraeli to new heights of veneration occurred. As noted earlier, Maughan singled out as the fundamental principles of his political conduct, "patriotism, justice and peace with honour".\(^2\) Nevertheless, foreign policy was generally a subordinate factor in local speeches, and was only treated at length as a central issue by outside speakers, particularly Northcote and Salisbury.

Another indication of patriotism was the Volunteer movement, which, from its inception in 1859, absorbed much of the attention of Glaswegians. The organisation, which stemmed from alarm at the prospect of a French attack on an unprepared Britain, was always strong in the West of Scotland, where the Clyde was reckoned to be quite defenceless.\(^3\) As well as patriotic reasons, however, it should be noted the Volunteers attracted men for other reasons: officers could give themselves military titles, and several used them

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1. J. Somervell spoke on Egypt 6 times, and on general foreign policy 9 times, in the course of 23 speeches delivered between February and June 1884: Political Speeches by Mr James Somervell of Sorn to the Glasgow Electors, February and March 1884 (Glasgow, 1884), Chaps. 1 and 4.


constantly — e.g. Lt.-Col. James Reid Stewart, Col. D. Matheson — doubtless for enhanced social status. At a lower level, they were also social and recreational units, as the formation of the Third Lanark football team testifies.

The Volunteers were by no means exclusively Conservative, for George Anderson, A. B. McGrigor and Col. William Clark, all prominent Liberals, were officers of local brigades. But much of the ethos of the movement fitted in with the concern voiced by local Conservatives at the flimsy state of Britain's defences, such as when Col. Campbell of Blythswood predicted dire consequences at the G.C.A.'s annual soiree in 1871 for Britain arising from the Franco-Prussian war unless her military preparedness was improved and her Volunteers well-equipped. ¹ Analysis of two early brigades does reveal a high preponderance of Conservatives. In the 1st Lanarkshire Rifle Volunteers, the first of all in the city, all 5 Lt.-Colonels and 6 of 9 Majors in this period were Conservative; Captains and Lieutenants show a similar bias, and the Quarter Master, the Surgeon and the Chaplain were all in the same party. ² The 1st Lanarkshire Artillery Volunteers, also of 1859 vintage, had prominent Conservatives as their first three C.O.'s — William Houldsworth, W. S. C. Crawford of Milton, and James Reid Stewart — and this pattern was continued at the junior officer level. ³ This movement may have been one of the

3. A. C. Scott, "Our Brigade" (Glasgow, 1886), Chaps. 4ff.
channels by which the Conservatives implanted in the national consciousness their claim to be the patriotic party, but there is little evidence that this was one of the main roots of their strength in Glasgow before the 1890's.

5. **Religion** While certain of these aspects of Victorian Conservatism discussed above may have contributed, in varying degrees of effectiveness, to the party's electoral appeal in Glasgow, they do not, jointly or severally, seem to offer a sufficient framework to hold the party together and to inspire it to fight on, despite its minority position. The binding factor which was permanent and central for all city Tories was the importance ascribed to the religious element in political issues. This has long been a characteristic of British Conservatism, but in Glasgow it was given a distinctive shape and colour by focussing on the question of the establishment and by representing the fundamentalist theological viewpoint in politics.¹

Commitment to the defence of the establishment principle stemmed from the integral relationship assumed to exist between the Protestant Establishment and the Revolution settlement of 1688. One of the first party bodies, the Conservative Operatives' Association, stated its object to be "to maintain to the utmost of its power, the British Constitution as established at the era of the Revolution in 1688", and it introduced an added dimension when it

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intimated to Peel that it was "warmly attached from principle to our
glorious Constitution in Church and State, under which the nation has
been elevated to a pinnacle of prosperity". 1

These arguments were echoed on every subsequent occasion where
the party's principles, as they were seen in Glasgow, were enunciated,
and were particularly deployed by candidates at election times. 2
Support of the endowed territorial Church was made a principal tenet
of the G.C.A., enshrined in its objects as second only to upholding
the prerogatives of the Crown. 3 From its inception, the Association
pledged itself to resist disestablishment, and every year there would
be addresses on some aspect of the Protestant religion and its place
in the Constitution. In 1872, for instance, five of the seven
lectures given to the members were on this theme, upholding the
promise given in the review of the first year of the Association,
_viz:_ - "it continues to hope and labour to the end that religion -
The Protestant Religion - be nationally maintained within the
institutions of the country." 4

"The Protestant Religion" was indeed, to judge from the evidence
of speeches and lectures, the one issue of abiding interest and
concern to the party faithful, as the _News_ emphasised on its first

1. Glasgow Conservative Operative's Association, Minute Book,
   10 Feb. 1837; 23 Dec. 1836; cf. also 3 Oct. 1837, 17 Feb. 1841,
   10 Mar. 1842.

2. _G. Courier_, 3, 6, 13 Jul. 1852 for Blackburn on this; also
   _G. Examiner_, 10 Jul., 21 Aug. 1852. _G. Herald_, 23 Oct. 1868,
   30 Jan. 1874 for the addresses of Campbell and Hunter.

   the objects.

day of publication in 1873. In trying to characterise the specifically Glasgow brand of Conservatism, it argued that "there is one point upon which public feeling here is deeper than in the East. Now, as in the past, Glasgow is the head and heart of Protestantism in Scotland, and also keeps firmly and unwaveringly in the 'old patterns', despite all the lecturings of the new lights".¹

Even visiting speakers, no matter how prominent, had to make concessions to the strength of feeling in Glasgow on the topic. In his speech to the city Association in 1873, Disraeli took consideration of this, for he had just received a memorial from the G.C.A. on the necessity of keeping Protestantism firmly associated with the State. In the peroration, Disraeli's theme was the imminence of a European struggle between spiritual and temporal power (i.e. what was termed the "Papal aggression"), and he promised to defend British Protestantism against this "sacerdotal usurpation".² That Disraeli should devote much of his speech to these matters only a year after his famous Crystal Palace address (the themes of which were scarcely mentioned) is illuminating, as it may be assumed that he had been well briefed as to the best means of maximising Conservative support in Glasgow.

This commitment to the Protestant cause was not of itself unusual: it had been one of the determinants of the party in the 1830's and 1840's. 1 What makes Glasgow relatively atypical was that this remained the predominant issue, quite overshadowing the trends which elsewhere were providing new bases of support for the party. 2 Although the Liberal party in Glasgow was also devoutly Protestant, it was precisely the distinctive feature of Conservative Protestantism that prolonged its significance. The establishment principle alone was not enough, for as already noted, there were the Liberal Churchmen, but what marked the Conservative out from the Liberal Churchman was, as the News stressed, the "old patterns" to which the former resolutely clung. While Liberal Churchmen were generally Broad Churchmen, there was no bitterer opponent of such modern theological trends than James Baird, who did so much to promote the Conservative cause in the city. His hostility was reiterated by the News which consistently attacked liberal theology. 3

Thus the fusing of a fundamentalist evangelical Protestantism with establishmentarianism determined the nature of the religious influences at work in Glasgow Conservatism. Moreover, this permitted the anti-Unionist Free Church element to co-operate with those they


had left in 1843 against the common enemies of voluntaryism and creed reformism.¹ As noted earlier, the laity were particularly strong in the anti-Union Free movement in Glasgow, and to a man they were active in Conservative politics.² There is a discrepancy between the political conduct of the Highland anti-Unionists, who voted solidly Liberal, whereas their Glasgow brethren were Conservative. But this may be explained by reference to the different timing of the politicisation of the two groups. The "Highland Host" lacked political weight until enfranchised by Third Reform Act, by when the land question pushed all else into shade. The enemy was the landlord, who belonged in any case to the State Church and had often shown outright opposition to the Free Church. In Glasgow, where the suffrage extension had come in 1867, other factors shaped the political consciousness of the anti-Unionists.

What served to affirm this unity between the anti-Unionist Free Churchmen and the Establishment Tories was the question of religious instruction in state schools which had a substantial impact on the development of Conservatism in Glasgow. The 1872 Education Act posed a grave challenge to clerical control of Scottish schooling by setting up a national system of popularly elected school boards enjoying full management powers, subject to central supervision. Not only was the Established Church to lose control over staffing

¹ Full Report of the Great Free Church Public Meeting of those upholding Free Church Principles and Unfavourable to Union on the Proposed Basis (Glasgow, 1871), pp. 9-13 for a speech to this effect by Kidston.

² See above, pp. 82-4.
and curriculum, but in Glasgow it seemed likely that the Dissenting interest would take over the running of the state schools, since the national church was particularly weak in the city.

The first School Board elections, held in March 1873, accordingly concentrated on two related questions. In one sense, the contest was virtually a test of strength between the voluntary and establishment camps. As the former had been growing in confidence in recent years, a victory in the largest Scottish city would fortify the case for disestablishment, just as a fresh agitation to achieve this was being got up. The issue through which this conflict of principles was filtered was the place of religious education in the new schools. Those on the establishment side were firmly resolved to keeping the existing practice, whereby Bible readings and catechism were an integral part of the education process, or as they termed it, Use and Wont. They argued that without this scriptural instruction, secular education would lack the necessary moral ingredient, and that it was necessary to combat heathenism and sinfulness among the Scottish people. It would stop criminal tendencies and be conducive to good order and obedience in society, whereas recent events in France had shown the dangers of wholly secular schooling. Thus the anti-Unionists could claim to be yet again cleaving to the principles laid down by Chalmers in 1843. The clearest political overtones emerged

1. National Education. The Bible in the School (Glasgow, 1870); Scottish Education Bill. The Bible in the School (Glasgow, 1871). A. Whitelaw, National Education (Glasgow, 1871).
2. J. Begg, Recent Education Struggles in Scotland (Edinburgh, 1872) argues this.
in the argument propounded by some that, deprived of classroom religious instruction the people would be less resistant to the message of Catholicism and, indeed, this would make possible the severance of the link between the Crown and Protestantism, upon which the entire palladium of British liberties were held to repose. ¹

Hence fears that the voluntaries, on the analogy of the English Nonconformists, would seek to abolish such religious teaching roused the anti-Unionists in particular, for in their eyes it summed up the whole trend towards error opened up by the Union proposals. Kidston put it trenchantly, as ever: "The obstacle in the way of getting proper security for religious instruction in the bill, according to use and wont, arises not from irreligious secularism, which has no power in this country, but from religious voluntaryism run mad (hear, hear). These are the practical secularists in Scotland."² The momentum impelling the anti-Unionists had been built up at two vast public meetings held in Glasgow in 1870 and 1871 in defence of their claim to be the only true adherents to "the principles of 1843".³ It was a natural progression for the anti-Unionists to join with the Establishment Tories in forming the Scottish Educational Association

1. Speech by W. Fraser in Scottish Education Bill . . . , p. 44.
2. Ibid., p. 28. See too, W. Kidston, The Captious and Ensnaring Question, (Glasgow, 1871), where he says that on National Education "their Voluntaryism is driving them over to practical Secularism".
3. Free Church of Scotland Defence Association. Speeches Delivered at a Meeting of Free Church Office-bearers (Edinburgh, 1870), especially pp. 10-17 (W. Mitchell), 37-43 (Dr J. Gibson); also Full Report of Great Free Church Public Meeting, pp. 9-13 (Kidston), 45-53 (W. Fraser).
at whose crowded meetings in Glasgow there was unanimity over the necessity to retain the use and wont principles.¹

In the 1873 contest, six candidates were put forward on the Use and Wont ticket, and the result of the poll was a vindication of their policy, for all except one was returned. Moreover, the voluntary challenge had been decisively defeated, for they secured only three of the fifteen seats. Although it was then doubted whether the results were an accurate reflection of public opinion, because forty-two candidates stood, subsequent elections merely confirmed the strength of the Use and Wont party, while the voluntaries made no appreciable advances.²

The relevance of the use and wont question went beyond the School Board, for it affected the Conservative party's fortune in three directions. Firstly, it helped to project to public prominence some new local leaders, as well as asserting the position of well-established figures like Kidston and J. A. Campbell. For Whitelaw, who had previously been quite unknown, his success as first Board chairman proved the passport to his candidacy in the 1874 election. J. N. Cuthbertson, the darling of the party in the 1880's, first caught attention on the School Board.

¹ Report of a General Meeting of the Members of the Scottish Educational Association (Edinburgh, 1871); Report of a Meeting of the Scottish Educational Association to Receive and Dispose of the Report of the Acting Committee (Edinburgh, 1872).
² School Board election campaigns and results are reported in the press during March of the relevant years.
Then, the results brought out quite clearly the part religious
questions played and could play in the party's fortunes. The anti-
Unionists were now firmly cemented to the political cause of
Conservatism. The G.C.A. itself became heavily immersed in the
fight for religious education, holding several meetings on the topic
between 1870 and 1872. The importance assigned to the issue was
conveyed in the report for 1871 which recorded that "the most
important effort of your Association has been in conjunction with
other agencies, in defence of THE BIBLE IN THE SCHOOL". This
build-up came to a crescendo in the general election of 1874 when
the two Conservative candidates put the use and wont topic at the
head of their electoral addresses, along with the establishment
principle, and Whitelaw in his annual report to his constituents,
always spoke at length on the subject. In addition, the religious
aspect was stressed because the School Board results provided the
first indication that the monolithic control hitherto exercised by
the trades unions and the Reform League over the working-class vote
could be fractured.

The third result of the Board contest was that it provided
organisational implications. It can be little coincidence that the

1. J. A. Campbell, The Education Question (Glasgow 1871);
   G. Herald, 5 Nov. 1872; 11 Mar. 1873 for Sir Wm. Carmichael-
   Anstruther and Rev. W. Turnbull respectively.
3. G. News, 28, 30 Jan. 1874 for the election addresses: ibid.,
   14 Jan. 1875; 20 Jan. 1876 for constituency meetings.
4. See above, pp. 132-3.
the first Conservative Registration Council was formed in the summer of 1873, for the School Board vote suggested many party voters could be put on the parliamentary roll.\(^1\) Also, at later Board elections, attempts were made to discipline the use and wont voters, notably the bid in 1882 by the 'Knoxites' to construct a pyramid effect by dint of each member recruiting twenty voters who would follow voting instructions in order to return Protestant candidates.\(^2\) It is probable that the machinery thus created was made available to the Conservatives at parliamentary elections, for the Knoxites were composed of Orangemen and sympathisers, with whom the Conservatives had exceptionally close ties.

6. **Orangeism** Perhaps the most striking pointer towards the importance of religious impulses behind support for the Conservatives is to be found in the power exerted in party circles by the Orange Order. For its influence affected the party's appeal to the electorate in a very decided manner, since the stridently Protestant tone carried over into the party's utterances meant the virtual jettisoning of the hopes entertained by some local Tories of winning over Whiggish Liberals as evidence mounted that wild Radicals controlled that party. But moderate Liberals would scarcely abandon their historic party because it had fallen under the sway of extremists only to join a party dominated by another set of ultras.

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The most apparent evidence of the weight of Orangeism was the election of 1880, when the Order was able to thrust its chosen candidate upon the party, in the face of the manifest reluctance of the influential section of the G.C.A. to accept the nominee. Sir James Bain was a wealthy ironmaster and ex-Lord Provost with no pretension to political activity of even the most modest sort until the first public mention of his running for Parliament as Conservative. This came at the 17th annual Orange soiree, when the leading Orange cleric said: "it would be a grand thing if the Protestants could send up Sir James Bain for Glasgow to Parliament and the Edinburgh people such a man as the incomparable Dr Begg". At the next soiree, Bain, who was in the chair attired in an orange sash, was praised as the Orangemen's candidate. On polling day, a notice was inserted in the press instructing Orangemen to vote for the other Conservative candidate as well as Bain. This was signed by George MacLeod and F. Y. Henderson, Provincial Grand Master and Secretary of the Order respectively. Most prominent Orangemen sat on Bain's committee, with MacLeod acting as a vice-chairman.

Bain had volunteered to run with J. A. Campbell, who had already been selected, when the G.C.A. began soundings to find two candidates in 1879. There was much opposition to Bain who, it was alleged, had been foisted on the Association, and he was only adopted by 61

2. N.B.D.M., 8 Nov. 1879.
votes to 51 in December 1879. Unease lingered on, and surfaced when Campbell opted to fight the safer Universities seat. The News, in which Campbell had a large stake, claimed he had done so in part because of "a pronounced and incurable" rift with Bain, and alleged that as many would not work for Bain because of "conscientious scruples", he should stand down. No one, despite a flurry of meetings, could be found to go forward with Bain until William Pearce consented to run only a fortnight before polling-day. Even then, animosity was present and for nine days each ran separate campaigns, only endorsing each other a few days before the vote.

By then, it was too late, and it is improbable that the Conservatives would have won under more advantageous circumstances, but nevertheless the split had wider relevance. Some of the hostility towards Bain was explicable in terms of his ineptness as a candidate - he was a poor speaker and his address was roundly denounced by the Press. But it went beyond this level, for he was disapproved of by the moderate respectable local party leadership; as a correspondent informed one of the most respected city Conservatives


3. G. News, 15 Mar. 1880 remarked "a more reckless and suicidal address was never penned by man"; G. Herald, 11 Mar., called it "an offence".
(who had himself declined to stand), "Bain is a disgrace to our city and our party". A study of the committees of the two men reveals the one-sided stance taken by the notables. Of those on the central election committee in 1874 - a useful indicator of local influentials - 74 served on Pearce's committee alone, 23 on both Pearce's and Bain's, and only 31 on Bain's alone. These were 18 vice-presidents of the G.C.A. in 1880: 14 supported Pearce, 2 Bain and 1 both. Of those who became vice-presidents in the next 20 years, 10 were for Pearce, 2 for Bain and 3 for both. Since Bain's main distinction was that he was the Orangemen's choice, the impact which this body had on the party - forcing the official leaders firstly to accept their man, and then to run the official candidate in tandem with him - requires explanation.

After its proscription in 1836, the Orange movement did not display new activity for a decade, but by the late 1840's it had revived in Ireland. Glasgow, where there had been a cell in the earlier phase, did not, however, have any lodges until 1860, and even then it made slow headway. As late as 1868 only 600 turned up for the 12th of July procession, but after the international meeting of the Order was held in Glasgow in 1873 recruitment boomed,

1. H. Craik to James King, 15 Mar. 1880. King MSS.
2. H. Senior, Orangeism in Ireland and Britain 1795-1836 (Dublin, 1966) covers the first phase.
3. G. Saturday Post, 10 Nov. 1860 is the first report. G. Sentinel, 18, 25 Feb., 1 Mar. 1862, reports an abortive missionary campaign in Glasgow by the Order.
with 3,000 new members claimed in that year.\(^1\) The upswing in the movement during the 1870's was everywhere apparent: the July walks drew up to 10,000, and the disproportionate share taken by the city in the non-Irish side of the institution was reported in 1878: "At the present moment the numerical strength of the brotherhood in this country is 90,000. There are altogether 600 lodges in England and Scotland in full operation . . . In Glasgow alone there are a hundred lodges and a membership of from 14,000 to 15,000."\(^2\)

Concomitant with this increase went a greater involvement in politics. As early as 1862, an Orange publicist had avowed this: "Popery he considered a political as well as a religious error, and he was in favour of a political order like Orangeism to keep it in check . . ."\(^3\) In the later 1860's the lodges became overtly pro-Conservative: at the simplest level, Lodge No. 690 styled itself the "Beaconsfield Purple Guards" to make the link explicit. More profoundly, every Orange meeting included speeches and resolutions affirming these bonds, as the leading West of Scotland Orangeman showed in 1874: "They had returned a Conservative member for Glasgow . . ., they had also got a good sound solid Conservative Government - (cheers) - in place of a mixty-maxty government made up of Churchmen,


\(^2\) G. News, 13 Jul. 1878; also speech by W. Yuill to Lodge 110 in ibid. 5 Jan. 1875, claiming a doubling of size since 1866.

\(^3\) Brother Gas in G. Sentinel, 18 Jan. 1862.
Ritualists, Quakers, Jews, Infidels and Papists . . . Every sound Orangeman was a Conservative; if there were any Radicals in their ranks they were as rare as black swans."¹

As the Order's central *raison d'être* was to uphold the Protestant constitution, its mounting participation in politics was a reaction to threats to the religious settlement which it believed were being launched by Catholics, voluntaries and secularists from the 1860's. Firstly there was the agitation to disestablish the Church of Ireland against which the Glasgow lodges organised counter-demonstrations. ² Then the education question stirred the Orangemen, who co-operated with the Conservatives in publicising the case for use and wont. ³ At the 1873 election, their candidate, Harry Alfred Long, topped the poll, receiving the votes of 4,000 more individuals than any other. Long retained his huge personal votes over the next four triennial elections, revealing the power of the Orange vote as directed through his own society, the Knoxites. ⁴ Hereafter the Order was firmly bound to the Conservatives, supporting them in the 1874 election and defending Disraeli's Eastern policy at lodge meetings, while Gladstone's handling of the Irish problem in his second administration confirmed their earlier predilections. ⁵

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The growing politicisation of the Order is not in itself an adequate explanation as to why the Conservatives embraced Orangeism. For to many in the party it was an undesirable influence in public affairs, as the resistance to Bain in 1880 indicated. Orangeism was only embraced when the alternative tactic of wooing the moderate Whigs had patently failed. As discussed earlier, this approach had little substance in it at the time of the 1874 election, and by 1878 the prospects for such a realignment had grown even slighter. The redoubtable solidarity of the Liberal voters in 1880 hastened the lurch by the Conservatives towards the Orange movement.

In this context, then, the pull enjoyed by the Order was understandable, especially when considered in its social basis. Tables 6.1 and 6.2, which analyse the social composition of the Conservative committees in 1874 and 1880, reveal two advantages accruing to Bain. Firstly, his committee had far more newcomers compared to Pearce, who relied on those who had already served in 1874. This could imply that Bain's standpoint reached a hitherto untapped source of Conservative support. A second gain for Bain was that he had a far larger working-class support on his committee than the others, and it is striking how many of Pearce's working-men were shared with Bain. With the temporary demise of the policy of converting moderate Liberals of the middle class, the existence

1. "Disgusted Orangeman" in the Conservative Scottish People, 16 Jul. 1887 for an attack.
2. See above, pp. 284-303.
### TABLE 6.1 Social Analysis of Conservative Candidates' Election Committees, 1874 and 1880

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Class</th>
<th>1874: Joint</th>
<th>1880: Bain</th>
<th>1880: Pearce</th>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Group I</td>
<td>455</td>
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<td>60</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group V</td>
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<td>6.1</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Identified as % of 'true' Cons. votes: 9.6% 8.4% 13.4%

Note: See Appendix III for the definition of the social groups.
TABLE 6.2  Continuity & Recruitment in the Election Committees of the Conservative Candidates, 1880

A.  Committee of Sir James Bain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Class</th>
<th>Continuity from 1874 Committee</th>
<th>Recruitment to 1880 Committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bain and Pearce</td>
<td>Bain Alone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group I</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group II</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group III</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group IV</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group V</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>91</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B.  Committee of Wm. Pearce

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Class</th>
<th>Continuity from 1874 Committee</th>
<th>Recruitment to 1880 Committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bain and Pearce</td>
<td>Bain Alone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group I</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group II</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group III</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group IV</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group V</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>91</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of this working-class Conservative electorate brought to light by Bain was an inevitable alternative channel of strength.

After 1880 this was made evident by the acceptance on the part of city Conservatives of the Order's right to a role in party matters. The re-organisation scheme for the G.C.A., put through in the autumn of 1880, was stressed by several speakers to be an attempt to widen the party's net and to re-establish contact with working-class sympathisers.¹ To this end some of Bain's supporters were made vice-presidents, and more of his men got on to ward committees, even drawing complaints that: "Orangeism is the prevailing sentiment in some of these committees ..."² Fusion between the two bodies, however, continued to grow apace. In October 1881, the Orange Institute of Scotland convened a meeting with the object, according to Thomas Wetherall, the Orange office-bearer and Tory activist, that "they were met that night to endeavour to consolidate the parties belonging to the Conservative interest and to bring them together in a firm and compact body in spite of all opposition".³ Speakers like Cuthbertson and Col. Campbell alternated between party and lodge meetings in the early 1880's, and the process of integration seemed complete on the occasion of Salisbury's visit to Glasgow in 1884, when he was presented with an address from the Grand Orange Lodge


3. Ibid., 27 Oct. 1881; cf. 29 Mar. 1881.
of Scotland immediately after one from the G.C.A., and before any other body.¹

Orangeism was a vigorous force because it accorded well with certain ideals and prejudices which were widespread in Victorian Britain, and quite pronouncedly so in Glasgow. It was the political arm of what G. F. A. Best has dubbed "Popular Protestantism", and so represented a coherent part of a certain nineteenth-century world-picture.² It was not, despite the reputation it gained over time, simply a cloak for lawlessness, nor a vehicle for the intimidation of and discrimination against Irish Catholics. It is true that Glasgow knew sectarian clashes and disorders in this period. These "party battles" often occurred when one or other side might enter hostile territory while celebrating an annual march, as for instance in 1878 when a Home Rule parade proceeded from Townhead into Orange Bridgeton, whereupon a riot ensued, with church windows of opposing denominations being smashed.³ Sectarian gangs also date from this era, but it would not be fair to accuse either faction of direct responsibility for these outrages. Both emphasised to their followers the need for discipline at all times, and when trouble did arise, each apologised to the offended community.⁴ It should be


noted that anti-Catholic manifestation had been known before the emergence of Orangeism. In 1860 a serious incident was only narrowly averted when an over-enthusiastic Free Church minister was restrained by the authorities from open-air preaching in the Catholic Bridgegate after the threat of civil disturbances.¹

The renewal of Orangeism may have been stimulated by the return of Clydeside shipyard workers from Belfast, whither they had been imported in the late 1850's by William Harland in order to teach native Ulster labour the skills involved in iron ship construction. Belfast shipyard workers were the most violently Orange section of that city, and a Glasgow contemporary noted that Partick shipyard workers were strongly Orange too.²

Another contributory element was the role of the Ulster Protestant community in Glasgow. This group, often overlooked in discussing the Irish factor in the city, was of considerable size, and although it is not possible to apportion Irish-born inhabitants of Glasgow on denominational lines, circumstantial evidence is suggestive. Table 6.3 shows that the preponderant majority of Irish immigrants to Scotland came from Ulster, and, within that province, the four most Protestant counties gave the bulk. These figures


2. "There appears to be a considerable body of 'the brethren' among the numerous workmen engaged in the shipyards": N.B.D.M., 12 Jul. 1869; cf. 9 Aug. 1875.
give no indication of the religious affiliation of the migrants, nor of their relative distribution in Scotland. Moreover only the years from 1876 to 1881 are covered, although the massive influx into Glasgow in the first post-Famine decade may well have been drawn from the more Catholic areas, where the destitution was greatest. Even granted these qualifications, the numerical data leads credence to the evidence provided by more literary evidence of a sizeable and thriving Irish Protestant population. It is interesting that the two men who, in their disparate ways, epitomised much of the thrusting spirit of Victorian Glasgow were of Ulster Protestant stock: Thomas Lipton, and William Thomson, Lord Kelvin.

By the 1880's there was an Irish Protestant Association and an Antrim and Down Association, both containing important Orange and Conservative members. A good example of this influence is Thomas Wetherall, already mentioned, who was born in Waterford and came to Glasgow in 1860 where he became a Deputy Master of the Orange Lodge and a leading Conservative party worker.⁠¹ Another was the Ulster-born Robert Gault, the first clergyman to encourage the Order in Glasgow, at whose meetings he became a regular speaker, as well as being Superintendent of the Free Church Anti-Popish Mission in the city.² Other Orangemen with Irish Protestant backgrounds included James Wylie, Professor Macklin, James Hamilton and William Cadman.

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2. G. Herald, 13 Jul. 1868; N.B.D.M., 13 Jul. 1869; G. News, 12 Nov. 1873, 6 Nov. 1884. Also, R. Gault, Popery, the Man of Sin and Son of Perdition (Glasgow, 1853).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To: Scotland</th>
<th>To: England &amp; Wales</th>
<th>To: Elsewhere</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>42,297</td>
<td>53,079</td>
<td>242,857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>338,233</td>
<td>388,751</td>
<td>66,717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>388,751</td>
<td>66,717</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Emigrants**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From: 9 Counties of Ulster Province</th>
<th>From: the 4 Protestant Ulster Counties*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>35,194</td>
<td>(24,811)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>(58.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17,447</td>
<td>(13,518)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>(25.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64,654</td>
<td>(28,388)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>(11.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>(31,839)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117,295</td>
<td>(58,200)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>(19.7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The 4 Protestant Counties are Antrim, Armagh, Down and Londonderry.

In 1881, Glasgow contained 30.7% of all the Irish-born resident in Scotland.

All of these men were deeply involved in the Conservative party: indeed Cadman was credited with providing the initial impulse to forming the G.C.A.

While it is tempting to assume that the spread of Orange precepts among the Scottish portion of Glasgow was little more than a variant of nativism, some reservations must be expressed. The period when resistance and hostility to the Irish would have been most probable was the immediate post-Famine years, when the inflow was most conspicuous, whereas by the 1860's the size of the Irish-born component was stabilising. In any case, there was likely to be less job rivalry in Glasgow, with its high ratio of skilled jobs for which the immigrants could not compete, but in the Lanarkshire mining areas where there was competition, sectarian trouble was always endemic. Nor were the strong Orange areas, so far as they can be determined, always contiguous with the main Catholic sectors of Gorbals, Bridgegate, Cowcaddens and Townhead. There were few lodges on the south of the river, and more activity was to be found in Anderston, Bridgeton and Parkhead. At no time, moreover, did any speaker indulge in anti-Irish phrasemongering along the sort of racist lines which, as L. P. Curtis has recently demonstrated, was not uncommon in Victorian Britain. Indeed this would have been a dangerous approach, since many of an Orange audience would be Ulster Irishmen.

The political standpoint of Orangeism seemed not illogical to those who subscribed to the popular Protestant creed, and this was perhaps the most direct means of access to the Scottish population. Such sentiments were strong in the city before the advent of Orangeism. Thus in 1852 the Glasgow Protestant Layman's Association, "viewing Popery and Infidelity as the two chief evils of the age", was set up.¹ The warm reception given to such anti-Catholic lecturers as Gavazzi by Glasgow in the 1850's and 1860's is equally indicative of this opinion.²

Indeed, anti-Popery could extend to radical reformers as they devoted their energies in the post-Chartist era to supporting European nationalist movements, for it was often the Pope or his allies who appeared to be the main obstacles to the success of these risings in Italy, Hungary and Poland. When Kossuth returned to tour Scotland in the 1860's, his main topic was no longer solely the Hungarian struggle, as in the previous decade: now he also talked of the evils of Catholicism.³ On the other side of the coin, the local organiser of the Garibaldi Fund was presented at an Orange meeting in 1867 with 20 guineas collected from members, and there was thunderous applause when Gault predicted that Garibaldi would soon be in Rome.⁴

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¹ The 27th Ann. Rep. (1879) of the Protestant Layman's Association outlines its history and objectives.
² Handley, Irish in Modern Scotland, pp. 96-9 for these itinerants.
⁴ G. Herald, 2 Nov. 1867.
It was therefore not always easy for Radicals to resist the ultra-Protestant approach. James Adams, a veteran Chartist and republican, held a meeting to expose Popery in the midst of a franchise reform agitation.¹ Even Alexander Campbell, co-operator and editor of the Glasgow Sentinel, drew a careful line between his approval of the principles of Orangeism and the conduct of members in practice, which he found unChristian.² While such skilled debaters and able thinkers could maintain these distinctions, it may be wondered where there were many so well-equipped among the ordinary working-class of Glasgow.

These proclivities towards anti-Catholicism were given added impetus by what was interpreted as a revival of that religious challenge to the Protestant state in a decade starting from the late 1860's. The Syllabus of Errors and the doctrine of Infallibility, it was argued, united the whole Roman community of the world behind the Pope which might destroy the civil and religious liberty of British Protestants. These world-wide trends took on local immediacy in 1867 when a threatened Fenian meeting at which violence was anticipated was only abandoned after much pressure.³ The re-establishment of the Catholic hierarchy in Scotland in 1877 seemed even more serious, for it was "full of significance as to the growing pretensions of the Church of Rome."⁴

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1. G. Saturday Post, 19 Feb. 1853.
2. G. Sentinel, 18 Jan., 1, 8 Feb. 1862.
3. See below, pp. 471-72
The riposte in Glasgow to this apparent onslaught was the formation of several associations to combat the waxing strength of Catholicism and atheism, all with overlapping personnel and close ties with the Orange order. In 1872, some prominent Protestants, "deeply impressed with the insufficiency of existing agencies" organised to face the Catholic challenge. After merging with the Protestant Layman's Association in 1877 and the Protestant Missionary Society in 1884, it became the Scottish Protestant Alliance. This body of middle-class men held mass meetings to protest against Ultramontarianism, Vaticanism, the restoration of the Scottish hierarchy, and also published pamphlets on 'No Priests' and on 'Convent Inspection'.

Of the 10 vice-presidents, 6 were office-bearers in the G.C.A., and only 2 were Liberals. Most of the directors were Conservatives with close Orange links, like James Haitton and J. S. Wylie (both Ulstermen), W. C. Maughan, F. Y. Henderson and A. M. Stewart.

A less polished body purveying the same message was the Glasgow Working Men's Evangelistic Association, formed in 1870 "by pious operatives to stem the tide of Popery in Glasgow and offer effective opposition to the infidel propaganda coming to Glasgow at select intervals from London". It proved the vehicle for the pivotal

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2. Vaticanism (Glasgow, 1875); Papalism (Glasgow, 1876); 1st Ann. Rep. (1873-5), pp. 9-16.

individual in this politico-religious network, H. A. Long, who came to Glasgow in 1859 as auxiliary at St Silas's, an Episcopalian Church with strong leanings to the Low Church side. He left to become Director of the Association, which he ran from premises in the Saltmarket, an unsavoury area near the Green. Aside from some social work in feeding and clothing the poor, he devoted his efforts to grappling with religious error.\footnote{ibid., 12th and 14th Ann. Reps. (1881, 1883), N.B.D.M., 12 Apr. 1876 for the Association's activities. H. A. Long, \textit{Transubstantiation} (n.p., 1864) for his theology.} Although he attracted audiences of up to 3,000 to his anti-papal meetings, his work was supported by men of no social eminence, except for a few in honorary positions - but these again provide a link-up with kindred interests, for Cuthbertson and Wetherall were presidents, and Rev. R. Gault a frequent attender at soirees. Members of this Association first put forward the idea of creating the Knoxites, the semi-clandestine voting machine whose contacts with the Orange movement have been touched on.\footnote{12th Ann. Rep. (1881), p. 6.}

Long himself was the most regular of speakers at Orange meetings, and he published a series of tracts addressed to Orangemen, as well as running for the School Board as the Orange candidate.\footnote{H. A. Long, \textit{The Orangeman's Anti-Papal Tract} (n.p., n.d.).} He was very near to being a demagogue, for, as a critical observer put it, he was "not without a certain gift of rude eloquence", and displayed

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these talents on Glasgow Green. After his triumphal topping of the poll in the School Board election, his popularity spread widely and with it his influence. In 1874 he was called by acclamation to address an East End audience on behalf of the Conservative candidates, and his endorsement of Bain in 1880 was crucial for the latter's credibility. Soon after Long was made a vice-president of the G.C.A. and spoke frequently at branch meetings of the party.

This elevation of Long to an honorary post in the official party organisation symbolised the power of the forces he represented, and which the party could no longer resist. Thus the Conservative party swung in the post-1880 years towards the political version of Popular Protestantism, but in so doing it ran the grave risk of alienating middle opinion. Electorally the latter had greater say in parliamentary contests, since the School Board results, based on near-universal suffrage, revealed that men like Long drew their support from a lower stratum of society. What let the Conservatives escape from this prospective political cul-de-sac was the Liberal split of 1886, rather than efforts on their own part.


CHAPTER SEVEN

Conservative Organisation
1. The Evolution of the G.C.A.

Much weight has been given in recent studies of Disraelian Conservatism to the state of the party's organisational efficiency as an influence on its electoral performance, and it has been identified by Blake as a more decisive factor than any ideological element. (1) The significance of the Glasgow Conservative Association in this context would appear obvious: the 1874 election victory was due (the Association claimed) to "the very prominent part" it had played in arranging candidates and organising the contest campaign; and similarly the defeat in 1880 was ascribed to internal feuding which also led to serious discussion about disbanding the body. (2) In fact, as discussed above and below, the 1880 result did not necessarily reflect declining Conservative support, and indeed the 1874 election was a freak triumph. Yet the history of the Association, besides casting doubt on the importance of organisations in assessing electoral performance, is invaluable for providing an anatomy of the life-style and behaviour patterns of Victorian Conservatism in one urban environment.

The low strength of the Conservatives after the mid-1840's destroyed all the vestiges of organisation which had existed in the 1830's, and the impetus to form a permanent organisation stemmed


from the 1867 Reform Act and the ensuing General Election. These revealed the opportunities presented by the enlargement of the electorate as much as they emphasised the necessity for organising to capitalise on this support and so avoid the difficulties and errors met with in the 1868 contest. Although the dissolution was announced in June 1868, city Conservatives showed themselves slow to mobilise and choose their candidates. After discarding two proposals (Wm. Kidston and Sir Archibald Alison, the Sheriff's son), a meeting in August invited Col. Campbell of Blythswood to run, but on his declining to stand, their next choice, Sir George Campbell of Garscube, agreed to come forward. These meetings were convened by the "Glasgow Constitutional Association", whose president was the veteran party stalwart, Sir James Campbell of Stracathro. According to a Liberal paper, "the main object of the society is to exercise a conservative influence in the choice of candidates at the approaching General Election", and other papers stated that "what might be termed moderate Liberals" were involved in this body. (1)

Sir George finally emerged as the candidate after this prolonged sounding-out process on 15th October, only four weeks before polling. The choice of Sir George can only be explained in terms of *pis aller*: virtually his sole positive quality was his Glasgow links - he was a large landowner on the north-west boundary of the city. His other claim to fame was his distinguished

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service at Balaclava as a 23 year-old captain, but this scarcely compensated for his inexperience in public life which was reflected, as hostile commentators pointed out, in his ill-constructed and poorly-delivered speeches. (1) He made numerous gaffes, of which the most damaging was his appeal at his inaugural meeting to large employers of labour to use their influence "fairly and honestly". This evoked indignant responses from the representatives of organised labour who rallied ever more solidly behind the Liberals. At this same meeting he confessed his ignorance of most issues of the day, since he had only become a candidate four or five days previously. (2)

Despite this rather inept performance by the candidate, the Conservatives showed signs of strong organisation and careful planning: 7 meetings were held in the four weeks available, which was more than two of the three Liberal candidates addressed in the same period. Regular advertisements appeared in the press — particularly striking being a long questionnaire, headed "Look Here, Brother Electors", which contrasted the performance of past Liberal and Conservative administrations; and it was stated there was a plan to distribute a litho-graphed letter from Sir George to every voter, accompanied with a stamped addressed envelope asking the elector to indicate if he would support the candidate. Like


2. *Herald*, 21 Oct. 1868. See also this meeting for J. S. Fleming's account of the procedure whereby Campbell was selected.
the other candidates in this election, no full list of committee and supporters appeared: only the Chairmen and six Vice-Chairmen were published, with the rider "and others too numerous to print". Instead much of the space taken in the papers was used to re-emphasise the point often touched on in the campaign, viz. the importance of plumping for the Conservative and not promising the other vote to any Liberal as "Their coalition and Tactics render Split Votes given to them hazardous to Sir George and probably useless to the candidate intended to be favoured". On polling the message was summed up succinctly: "Electors! Plump for Sir George and plump early!" (1)

While Sir George came a poor fourth, the remarkable solidarity of the Conservative vote seemed promising. About 90% of his poll came from plumpers (9,587), (2) which indicated that a firm basis—approximately one-quarter of those voting—was already committed to the party, and was not drawn, as many Liberal organs had predicted, from disgruntled Liberals using their second vote to thwart one of their own candidates whose views they were particularly opposed to. (3) That many of those who had


3. Evening Citizen, 14 Nov., Evening Post, 28 Oct., G. Sentinel, 14 Nov. all agreed that Anderson was particularly vulnerable to this cross-voting; cf. Herald, 21 Oct., urging "Moderate Liberals to back Campbell if no man stood to their taste".
scrupulously obeyed voting instructions were working-men (at least 3,000, according to one estimate) suggested that the most likely outlet for further expression lay in carrying the message to them, by improving the party machinery.

These two desiderata—organisation and education—were the expressed motives in the formation of the Glasgow Working-Men's Conservative Association (GWCA), the first to be established in Scotland, although of course several antedated it in England. At one of Campbell's election meetings the idea of setting up a Conservative Operatives' Association modelled on the recent Preston body was aired by C. C. MacKirdy, a wealthy merchant who in the early years took a great interest in the Association's affairs. Thus they would reach those "independent working-men" described by W. J. Davidson, another merchant involved in the first period of the Association, as the great hope for the Conservatives. (1)

Within a fortnight of the election the first steps had been taken:-
"This Association owes its origin to an advertisement inserted in the Newspapers of November 1868 by Mr Cadman a working man convening his fellow workmen for the purpose of forming among them a Conservative Association. The result was the constituting of the present Association at a public meeting of Conservatives held in the Merchants' Hall on Wednesday evening, 20 January 1869 under the chairmanship of Jas. A. Campbell, Esquire." (2)


It is not apparent how spontaneous this was: the preliminary meeting held on 1 December was notable for the absence of all leading Conservatives. Nevertheless, Cadman can hardly be classed as a working man, for he is almost certainly the same Cadman who appeared in the 1874 and 1880 (Pearce) committee lists, a leather merchant (these men frequently had begun as journeymen shoemakers) living in Park Place, the most desirable residential area of the city. Again, recalling five years later the circumstances surrounding the setting-up of the Association, James Martin of Auchindennan, a Vice-President and prosperous merchant, implied that it was not without encouragement from the top: "it was felt that it would be most unfortunate to lose all the organisation and local knowledge then developed". (1)

Certainly the January 1869 inaugural meeting was dominated by prominent Conservatives rather than working-class unknowns. The two themes alluded to were stressed: firstly, want of organisation was blamed for the election failure; but all speakers also highlighted the necessity of both spreading the Conservative gospel, as A. K. Murray, the first Treasurer, put it "to set the people right as to what a Conservative really was", and also of consolidating and deepening existing Conservative tendencies among working men. (2)

Despite this early and propitious start, the approach to constructing a viable structural framework within which the aims of the Association might best be achieved was a protracted process,


covering three clear phases. Initially, the problems were, C. C. MacKirdy declared at the outset, to discipline the party's followers in the manner of the Reform League, and to spread the Conservative message in Glasgow. (1) After the climax of this organisational stage came with the election victory of 1874, the machinery, for various reasons, became increasingly inefficient, and as a result of the 1880 setback the third stage set in, with a radical reconstruction which was widely held to have placed the Association on a firm footing.

A study of the first phase of the Association indicates a rather shadowy insubstantial body with little organisational efficiency which was given a boost by its role in the return of Whitelaw. Because of the restricted contents of the early Annual Reports and the lack of press coverage, it is difficult to ascertain the structure of the G.C.A. The executive body was the General Committee, consisting of some 40 or so individuals, who appear to have been elected at the A.G.M. or else co-opted; but the 17 Vice-Presidents, comprising the leading city Conservatives, undoubtedly were the driving force, along with the President. The general membership was speedily built up: "It has been the business of the Association" said the 1869 Report, "to organise the Conservatives into branch Associations in all the Wards and Districts of the City", and there were Branches in the Eastern, Southern and Central parts of the city. (2) Formed "for working purposes", the preference for

1. Herald, 26 Feb. 1869
Districts to Wards as the units of organisation is a sign that the early objectives were not registration but rather to spread the doctrine of the party and to dispel false views, a theme reiterated by many speakers, notably J. A. Campbell, who compared the members to "a small standing army" and stated the prime intention of the G.C.A. to be that "of promoting an intelligent study of political questions". (1) The District Branches were to meet fortnightly, and as each was claimed to have 500 members, this suggests that they were conceived of in terms of audience potential, for with no organic ward structure it is difficult to see how registration work could have been carried out in the early stages.

The Committee professed itself well pleased with the headway recorded at the start, each year claiming a rise in membership, although the first figure to be disclosed was in 1874, when 2,800 were enrolled. Some contemporaries were sceptical as to the real weight exercised by the Association: the Bailie (a self-styled Tory journal which in fact eschewed serious politics) scathingly described the plans by the GWCA to celebrate the installation of Disraeli as University Rector as including a procession of "The Members of the Association (eleven in number) marching in Indian file". (2) More serious criticisms were voiced shortly before the 1874 election. The Association's preparedness to fight the seat


2. Bailie, 4 Dec. 1872; cf. 8 Jan. 1873.
was called into question by a correspondent asking "Is the Conservative Party in Glasgow Asleep?", who predicted that unless speedy and decisive moves were made, the changes in political opinion which had taken place since 1868 would not be capitalised upon in Glasgow. (1)

In the event the election fight was hailed by the Association as the fullest possible vindication of its existence and conduct, for it manifested "the rapid continuous change in political opinion in this constituency caused, no doubt, to a very large extent by the influence and co-operation of your Association". The Annual Report explained how, upon the announcement of the dissolution, the Secretary circularised the influential Conservatives and set up an enthusiastic committee which selected the two candidates, Whitelaw and Hunter. (2) The combined action of all involved helped to return Whitelaw - the first Tory since the 1832 Act, "and no-one, excepting only a few earnest and zealous men, who have striven hard to secure this result, believed in the possibility of such a triumphant success" commented the News. (3) Commentators favourable to the Liberals also agreed that Conservative organisation played an important role in their success. "In respect of discipline and organisation the Conservatives have had

an undoubted advantage over their opponents whose voting power in consequence was less strong and reliable than it might have been."(1)

The true situation was much less promising than it looked in the tumultuous rejoicings which greeted the declaration of the poll, when the oversight of two aspects in particular was to provide the nucleus of much of the later disappointments suffered by the G.C.A. Firstly the organisation was defective, most of all in the selection of candidates. Authority for this does not seem to have been the sole prerogative of the G.C.A.: the Secretary had to contact "the leading Conservatives in this part of the country", and it was reported that a powerful group under James Baird met independently of the Association to discuss candidates. In addition to this confusion, it was difficult to settle on the second candidate to run with Whitelaw, who was picked instantly, and before the final choice of Hunter at least four others declined to stand.(2) Moreover for a few days a semi-independent Conservative, with Orange backing - Hector MacLean of Carnwarth - entered the fray and only withdrew when Hunter 'emerged' to join Whitelaw.(3) While the G.C.A. was able to compel MacLean to stand down, which shows it exercised a considerable degree of discipline and loyalty, the

1. Herald, 5 Feb. 1874; cf. Evening Citizen, 31 Jan. 1874; "As matters stand, the Liberals face, with an undisciplined and disorganised force, a well-drilled phalanx of the enemy thoroughly under command".


time taken from the declaration of the dissolution to the presentation of the two candidates to the electorate took a week and so left only 5 clear electioneering days to polling.

This selection problem was to be a recurrent issue, but in 1874 it was of less moment because of the nature of the Conservative victory, which constituted the second danger for the future. The Conservative vote did indeed go up from the 1868 level of 10,824 to 14,132, but this in itself was not enough to displace the third Liberal. TABLE 4.2 clearly shows the decisive natural Liberal majority which was only denied by internal divisions which led to a proliferation of candidates. If this were remedied the Conservatives would slip back, for as the News ruefully commented some years later: "The polling in 1874 shows that the Liberal vote in Glasgow, properly managed, would have carried three members and beaten us by two thousand each". (1) Thus it is apparent that Glasgow's contribution of a net gain of two to the Conservative victory was much less attributable to organisational improvements at any level than to the success of Disraeli's minority representation clause in the Second Reform Act, (2) together with the Ballot.

In the heady euphoria of February 1874, however, these considerations were cast aside as the G.C.A. exulted in its performance, and planned to consolidate its new strength by an ambitious expansion in several directions. One, registration work,

1. News, 8 March 1880.

2. Blake, Disraeli, pp. 473-4 discusses the minority clause.
is dealt with below, but two other areas deserve note. Firstly the G.C.A. reacted favourably and speedily to the unexpected enthusiasm displayed in the wards during the contest: "The Ward Committees who acted in the Conservatives interest were called on to extend the usefulness of your Association, and the rules were re-modelled in order to give the various wards a more direct interest in your Association than hitherto. With this view it was resolved that thirty-two of your General Committee should be chosen annually by the Ward Committees, being two representatives from each ward . . . (1) These alterations were approved at a Special General Meeting held in April 1874 where it was also agreed that the Association had a duty to organise and maintain these committees in each ward. (2) This shift away from the 'District' basis may be held to represent a change in the objects of the Association as it moved from propaganda to efficient organisation, for registration work was stressed as the main role of the ward committee.

Another new move was the institution of a Young Men's Conservative Association. Since it was a perennial claim of the party that the bulk of the lodger vote - predominantly young men starting out in trade or business - was Conservative, this was an attractive idea. After some correspondence in October 1875, the formation of the Y.M. Association was agreed at a meeting held a month later, where its functions were seen as auxiliary to, and not

overlapping, the parent body. (1) Weekly meetings were to be held: sometimes they were addressed by 'senior' Conservatives - e.g. Sir James Ferguson on 'The Theory and Practice of Conservatism'; but more often members read papers to each other on current political issues. (2) The discussions which followed the presentation of such papers and the regular essay competitions, show that the Young Men's Association was, as was claimed, providing "a fair political education", but it was largely in terms of debating powers that success was measured, rather than any canvassing or other normal ward-level work. (3) After the first session, 200 members were enrolled, and the regular meetings, with the customary annual dinner, suggest that it was in a healthy state. But in its third year difficulties seem to have arisen: fewer meetings were reported in the press, and at the January 1878 A.G.M. a slight deficit was reported, the Treasurer and Secretary both resigned. (4) This was the last meeting of the Young Men (apart from a dinner held in November 1879), and even when the G.C.A. revitalised itself after 1880, it was not restarted, despite some pleas in the correspondence of the News in 1881. (5)


2. Eg. News, 27 Jan. 1877 for Fergusson; weekly meeting 2 Feb - 26 Apr. 1876 are reported; also after 27 Sep. 1876 for the next session's activities.

3. News, 29 Apr. 1876 - speech by C. Wallace, President of the Y.M.C.A. of W. Brownlie's definition of the Association as "educational, not merely political", 27 Sept. 1876.


This indicates it was not very successful, possibly because, as one *News* writer put it, "a former association died for the want of support"; for this was a general problem besetting all Conservative bodies in 1877-8. But perhaps too the activities offered were not relevant: the Glasgow Parliamentary Debating Society, formed in 1876, easily met the requirements of most aspiring orators in the city - for instance Bonar Law began his political life here; and the failure to secure 'big name' speakers, the key note of the Liberals Junior Association's success, may confirm this point. But in its short life the Young Men's Association did bring forward some who were to be active in the senior party - notably Andrew Harkness, a young lawyer who became Assistant Secretary from 1881 to 1886.

But the bright prospects of 1874-5 gradually dwindled in the ensuing five years. The Annual Reports disclose fewer and fewer events and activities initiated by the G.C.A. Partly this is only in accord with the national current of opinion which began to turn away from the Conservatives during 1878 for a variety of reasons, mainly in the realm of economic and foreign policy matters; but this movement was intensified in Glasgow by peculiar local factors. One was the loss sustained by the deaths in 1876 of three leading figures, Sir James Campbell, James Baird and Alexander Ewing. This was not just a loss of major personalities, they were the most generous subscribers to the G.C.A. and this forced a curtailment

in activities and lectures. (1) This declaration hampered the party's momentum, and is reflected in the air of regret at the political calm of these years imparted by the Association's annual review; "in no other year (1877) since its formation has there been so little to excite attention or discussion in politics"; particularly, it continued, as the Church of Scotland leaders had vetoed any raising of the Disestablishment question which the Association's desire to defend the Church might provoke. (2) Morale was further sapped when Whitelaw died in 1879: this removed the one concrete achievement of the Association, and the decision not to contest the by-election, justified on the grounds "that the wisest course was to reserve strength for the approaching General Election", (3) had the ring of defeatism to it, although it was the only realistic policy once it was clear that there would be Liberal unity behind their sole candidate.

The fruits of this unhappy condition were seen in the contest of 1880. The deep antagonisms which lay behind the candidature of Bain and Pearce, discussed earlier, created confusion and dismay amongst rank and file. As late as three weeks before polling, a

1. GCA 8th Ann. Rep. (1876) unpaginated. The 1876 level of income was not passed until 1881.

2. 9th Ann. Rep. (1877); cf. 10th (1878) pp. 3-4, 11th (1879) for further instances of inactivity. Also F. E. Wicks to W. Blackwood, 10 May 1877, Blackwood Papers, NLS MSS. 4367, ff. 193-4 on the general lack of political incidents.

3. 11th Ann. Rep. (1879) p. 3; cf. NBDM 3, 7 Jul. 1879, Herald, 10, 11 Jul. 1879. The 'News' was reduced to taunting the Liberals with spurious unity, 7, 16 Jul. 1879.
meeting of the G.C.A. committee could not settle on how to handle Bain's candidacy: a motion that "in view of the division of opinion now existing, it is inexpedient to take further action with reference to the approaching election" was put forward but finally the Electoral Committee was instructed to try to choose a partner for Bain. (1)

It is a sign of the slackness and decay in the G.C.A.'s strength that it was unable either to prevent Bain thrusting himself forward or to compel him to withdraw. A month before the dissolution one Conservative had expressed concern at the party's efficiency level: "It is high time we were doing something to organise ourselves for the general election, which cannot now be far distant, and I hope that arrangements will be made to have meetings without delay in every ward in the city." (2)

While in the face of a united and well-drilled Liberal organisation the Conservatives were powerless to retain the seat, the failure to even increase their voting record over 1874 was disappointing, as the Association confessed: "Discouraged by the defeat then sustained, it was seriously considered whether the Association should be temporarily discontinued, or an attempt made to reorganise it on a wider basis. So anxious was your esteemed President (Col. Campbell of Blythswood) to maintain the Association that his energetic representation infused fresh hope with the determination that it should be thoroughly reorganised." (3)

2. James Hamilton to Secretary of GCA, News, 18 Feb. 1880.
pertinacity is impressive, and its results and causes as they impinged on the G.C.A. needs examination.

As the last quotation indicates, the problem was seen to have two aspects. One was faulty organisation which needed overhauling in the light of the election shambles, as Cuthbertson observed a year later: "I think I may say this much, that for the result that followed we ourselves were very largely to blame (Applause). I think it becomes us to acknowledge not only that we have been defeated but that our defeat was partly caused by our own want of organisation on that trying occasion."(1) But it was not simply an administrative issue; there was a need to re-establish liaison with those elements which had apparently drifted away, as the President observed: "One thing he noticed during the past few years was that the Conservative Association - and he regretted it extremely - from previous circumstance has not been sufficiently en rapport with the great masses of working men."(2)

It was the re-kindling of spirit at this level which decided the new structure of the G.C.A., and this movement seems to have been fairly spontaneous. It began in the Eastern District (Wards 1, 2 & 4), an area of textile and engineering works with a strong Orange presence and perhaps the most working-class of all Glasgow districts. As Hugh Dale, the District Chairman, stated, it was formed "in the midst of the deepest depression after the

2. Ibid., 10 Nov. 1880 for Col. Campbell of Blythswood.
Conservative party had been so terribly overthrown at the general election and when it seemed as if the party was about to be extinguished . . . In these circumstances a few earnest friends of the Conservative cause met and resolved, after a full discussion of the position and prospects of the party, to form a Conservative association in the East end of the city". Its success was heartening: "In the East End there had been formed the nucleus of an association which it was hoped would gather strength from day to day until it became a felt power in the community (Applause)."(1) Soon after this, District Associations were set up covering the whole city, and these seem to have been instigated by the Association itself. At a Special General Meeting summoned in November 1880 alterations in the Association's roles were adopted, reflecting the new current of grass-roots enthusiasm. (2) In a welter of self-criticism, the meeting endorsed the new structure: there would be 5 District Associations (Article III), while the 16 wards meeting, like the Liberals, in January, would elect their own committees with 3 from each sitting on their District Committee (Article IV). The District Committees would be affiliated to the G.C.A., and would "in their work, receive the assistance of the Secretary of the Association" (Article V).

1. News, 8 Oct. 1880; cf. Dale on this theme in ibid., 27 Jan. 1883; and 27 Feb. 1884, where he maintained firstly that it was mainly working-men who were behind the revival, and secondly that it began in the East End.

2. GCA 12th Ann. Rep. (1880), p. 4 claims it "took up more seriously" this work in October, and by spring the other four districts had been established. The Special General Meeting is in ibid., p. 4 and News, 10 Nov. 1880.
Central administration was also tightened up simultaneously with an attempt to eradicate the 'narrowness' which had stunted the Association's previous performance. The General Committee was to meet monthly and was given clearly defined duties and objectives, which had been less precise before. Changes in the two executive posts were for the better. Robert McGowan replaced P. W. Dixon as Secretary, W. C. Maughan became Treasurer in lieu of D. S. Cargill. For the first time a lawyer became secretary of the Association, marking the start of the professional expertise of the Conservatives in organisational matters, a process which reached its peak with Lewis Shedden at the end of the century. McGowan had been Bain's agent in 1880 and he proved more energetic than his predecessor in visiting and addressing wards, and the Association agreed to appoint a Clerk and Assistant, Andrew Harkness (also a lawyer and Bain supporter) to promote the work of the organisation. Maughan was a C.A. and active ultra-Protestant who spoke frequently at District Associations and fought two parliamentary contests, whereas Cargill participated minimally in party affairs and was self-effacing in his role. This sense of drive and direction at the centre contributed greatly to the Association's recovery. But endeavours to bring within the orbit of the G.C.A. the various shades of Conservatism which, all agreed, the 1880 election had shown to be at odds were more fraught. Several new Vice-Presidents, mainly

Bainites, were added at the S.G.M. on the motion of an erstwhile critic of Bain, J. Brooks Wright, "in order that the association might show it was being reformed on a basis to meet the views of 'all parties' and thus close the ranks". The democratisation of the Association was also extended by the revised constitution of 1880, whereby the ward-elected section of the General Committee (now 48) outnumbered the 32 Vice-Presidents, and no co-opted members were provided for, an important advance on even the reforms provoked by the 1874 election.

The case of the Glasgow Working Men's Conservative Association of 1880 provides confirmation that the G.C.A. had re-established good relations with the grass roots by the end of the year. It is not easy to find much about this new body, especially as it was disapproved of by 'official' Conservatives, and hence got scanty treatment in the press. Its organiser was Townsend Sadler (or Sadleir), whose occupation is unknown since he does not appear on the Electoral Register, but he may well be the same Sadler who spoke on Glasgow Green in defence of Disraeli in the late 1870's, and certainly he helped Bain in the election contest. At a meeting to launch the Association in Springburn, Sadler defended the right of working men to be Conservative, for they had got religious and political liberty thanks to the party, and outlined the Association's scheme for weekly meetings and essay competitions at branches to be established all over the city, while the central

1. News, 10 Nov. 1880; for Wright, see p. 454, fn 1.
club would contain an extensive political library which members might consult for the purpose of "deciding knotty questions arising in the course of their debates". For the first five days of November, an advertisement promised a great Conservative Demonstration organised by Sadler to be addressed by two of the Fourth Party, Drummond-Wolff and Churchill, with Bain in the chair.

This display of Tory Democracy was never held: no reason was given for the cancellation and at the end of November a general meeting of the Working Men's Associations removed Sadler from office. Favourable opinions were expressed towards the G.C.A. and allegations that the working men Conservatives were hostile to the rest of the party were refuted by the new secretary. The whole tenor of the meeting indicated a rejection of the position taken up under Sadler's regime, and when the Association at its next meeting unanimously resolved to affiliate with the G.C.A., no more was heard of it.

By the end of 1881 there was general agreement that the reorganisation had been highly successful, as the G.C.A. reported: "There has not perhaps been a year of greater activity and enthusiasm in the Association". Neilson Cuthbertson estimated

1. News, 18 Sept. 1880. For Sadler, see A Silent Philosopher, The Glasgow Green Philosophers (np, c.1878) p. 6, where he is described as Cork-born.

2. H. Houston speech in News, 26 Nov. 1880 sums up the feelings towards the GCA; last meeting of the Association in ibid., 13 Dec. 1880.

the Conservative organisation to be as efficient as that of the Liberals in the city, and on another occasion he stated: "They could congratulate themselves that the organisation of the party at present in Glasgow was in a much more advanced state than at any previous election. He distinctly remembered the three previous elections . . . (and) he could say that never at any previous period was the Conservative party so well organised as at present". (1)

There were criticisms made, but few of these were substantial: mainly they concentrated on the need to be ready for a snap general election, and warned against a repetition of the 1880 situation. In fact the G.C.A. tried to provide for this by creating a Vigilance Committee in 1882 with the remit of co-ordinating activity in the event of a dissolution. (2) The ever-present difficulty of selecting a suitable candidate proved no easier of solution by the new G.C.A., and, despite repeated pressure from wards and individuals, no decision was reached until 1884, but it is arguable that the obstacles here lay with the prospective candidates, and were not of the G.C.A.'s making.

The most successful motor in the re-organised G.C.A. seems to have been the District Committees with their vital intermediary

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2. A letter from C. T. Grant triggered off a long correspondence in which the GCA's efficiency was called into doubt, News, 12 Jul. - 10 Aug. 1882. Gilbert Heron discussed the Vigilance Committee at the AGM, News, 16 Feb. 1882.
place between the wards and the central committee. They were a more reasonable size than the wards for many grass-roots activities, notably the meetings which became a recurrent feature of the Districts (the more effective ones aimed at 6 p.a.). Now speakers could be got with the assurance that the catchment area for the audience was much larger than a single ward, and this removed the problem of attracting interested party members to meetings which could previously only be held in the centre, which many were reluctant to journey to. Similarly, the provision of Reading Rooms became less debatable, and these became regarded an integral elements in the emerging pattern of political life in the Districts. Pooling of finances meant more efficient use of resources and the elimination of duplication of effort among the various wards, and to promote this end, the central committee gave grants on a District, not Ward, basis. (1) The Wards still kept much of the canvassing duties, but registration was now handled by the Districts - a good instance of the blending of local expertise and economies of scale which the new system could offer. (2) The Districts encouraged a greater coherence in their areas among party faithful, and also permitted them to adapt the Conservative gospel to local situations.

The East End District Association showed up both points very clearly: in addition to its normal work, it held annual soirees

1. John Shearer's speech to the South Side District, News, 9 Jan. 1883, is revealing.

2. GCA 13th, 14th Ann. Reps. (1881, 1882) pp. 3; 3-4 respectively.
which mixed speechifying with light entertainment, and it also participated in the activities of the Eastern Parliamentary Debating Association. Another annual event was a summer trip to the country estate of a leading Conservative, which could attract up to 300 members and their families. This provided a valuable social ingredient remedying in small degree the absence of Conservative Working Men's Clubs associated with northern industrial areas. The East End District, by its selection of speakers and topics, also reveals some clues about the nature of Conservatism in this area. Many of the talks were on religious or ecclesiastical issues, or the failings of Gladstone's second ministry, and the most popular speakers were Cuthbertson, Maughan, Croston and Touchstone. This tends to underline the point that this was a rather pro-Bain area now operating within the G.C.A. framework, but left fairly free to decide on most matters. The Dennistoun and South Side Districts tended to be similar, while the West and Central areas had less of these activities. The latter two were more Conservative inclined anyway (TABLE 7.1) and may have stood in less need of revitalising.

A final positive gain recorded by the District system, albeit fortuitously, was that it laid a useful framework for operating the 7-constituency system necessitated by the Third Reform Act, so that


2. Various meetings are reported in the News, e.g. 3 Jul. 1881, 14 Oct. 1882; 21 Dec. 1883 etc.
## Table 7.1 Voting in 1868 Election, by G.C.A. Districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District (Wards)</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Liberal (Average)</th>
<th>Conservative as % of Liberal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dennistoun (3, 6, 9, 10)</td>
<td>2,108</td>
<td>3,770</td>
<td>56.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East End (1, 2)</td>
<td>2,166</td>
<td>3,765</td>
<td>57.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Side (4, 15, 16)</td>
<td>2,557</td>
<td>4,480</td>
<td>57.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central (5, 7, 8, 12, 13)</td>
<td>1,428</td>
<td>1,768</td>
<td>80.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West End (11, 14)</td>
<td>2,534</td>
<td>4,281</td>
<td>59.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>10,793</td>
<td>18,064</td>
<td>59.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only the 1868 election can be used, as, after the ballot, individual ward returns are not given. Ward numbers refer to the pre-1869 boundaries.
the G.C.A. could refer to the 7 Divisional Constituency Associations as "a development of the principle of Divisional Local Government and local effort". (1) This placed them at an advantage over the Liberals, whose centralised system had to be broken up rather more sharply, giving rise to squabbling within their new constituency associations.

It is less easy to find objective criteria to measure the advances claimed for the G.C.A. after 1880, but two possible markers may be inspected. Membership figures are an immediately obvious yardstick: before 1880 numbers are not recorded (except to say they were rising steadily), but in 1873, 2800 were said to be paid-up members. The next available figures are:

1881 - 3456 1888 - 3236
1882 - 5317 1889 - n.a.
1883 - 4873 1890 - n.a.
1884 - 6854 1891 - n.a.
1885 - n.a. 1892 - 3700
1886 - n.a. 1893 - 4500
1887 - 2500 1894 - 5000

It is at first sight surprising that the 1882 and 1884 figures, when Conservatism was not in the ascendant, should not be surpassed in the next decade, when the party was more successful. These two years, however, were artificially inflated by the visits of Northcote

and Salisbury which enticed many to join in order to secure tickets for their addresses. (1) This device fell rather out of favour in the late 1880's, perhaps because the rapid turnover in membership which it caused could be very disruptive of smooth organisational development. Setting members as a proportion of electoral support, as in TABLE 7.2, argues a very high degree of participation by present-day standards, and compares favourably with the local Liberals' figures. On the other hand, it may be argued that the Conservatives needed to display greater solidarity and enthusiasm by virtue of their minority position. Nonetheless, there is no gainsaying the dramatic growth in the party's strength in the early 1880's, and the rhythm of organisational fluctuations suggests that the city yet again was not very typical of Britain as a whole.

Finance is a second area for assessing the G.C.A.'s strength. The early Reports were very vague about the financial strength of the Association, but by the end of its 5th year it was able to boast of being in balance, mainly because honorary subscribers were up "to some extent". In the late 1870's the level of subscriptions stayed between £300 and £330, and although sufficient to cover expenditure, this betrayed some grave weaknesses. The level of total income was far too low to permit of any proper organisation and propaganda, in contrast to other pressure groups. (2) Most

1. GCA 14th, 16th Ann. Reps. credit these two visits with "greatly augmenting" numbers.

2. Thus in 1877 the West of Scotland Protestant Alliance's income was £300; the Scottish Permissive Bill Association's income in 1878, £2,176; and the Glasgow Liberal Association could draw on £640 in 1879.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Conservative Membership</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
<th>Liberal Membership</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>12,337</td>
<td>1:4.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>3,456</td>
<td>11,069</td>
<td>1:3.2</td>
<td>3,040</td>
<td>35,092</td>
<td>1:11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>6,854</td>
<td>26,470</td>
<td>1:3.9</td>
<td>3,675</td>
<td>36,317</td>
<td>1:9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>3,700</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 1886 and 1892 elections are not comparable because of the Liberal Unionist presence, which meant that Conservatives stood down in several seats.
of the subscriptions came from honorary members, but this was shown to be precarious in 1875 when several deaths among the honorary members meant the withdrawal of "the considerable pecuniary aid of their ample annual subscriptions". This seriously threatened to compel a curtailment in activities, but the "increased liberality of 2 Vice-Presidents restored the loss". (1) The recession following the City Bank failure meant a drop in income of 10%, forcing a rigorous pruning of lectures, and 1880 brought the absolute nadir when subscriptions fell by one-quarter from 1879: only swingeing economies - the removal of the central office to a quiet back lane, the cancelling of journals - kept the G.C.A. in balance.

Several solutions were open to the Association: broadly it could expand its revenue or re-order its outgoings, and it did both. Income grew healthily as subscriptions flowed in during the post-1880 revival. Honorary members gave very handsomely - between £400 and £500 p.a. - raising income to about £600 every year. Grants and subsidies by other political bodies helped meet the cost of arranging large public demonstrations: the Conservative Club Political Committee donated £287 between 1882 and 1884 for this purpose. With a doubled income, the G.C.A. was enabled to deploy its budget over a wider range. The Assistant Secretary, Andrew Harkness, was hired in 1881 at a salary of £125 p.a.; and this meant, as has been discussed, greater efficiency and expertise at

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1. GCA 8th Ann. Rep. (1876); but it also lamented the reluctance of sympathisers to subscribe, especially as "the wealth represented by the Members of this Association is vast".
the centre. The abandonment of full-scale registration work released £50 to £70, or 10% of the budget, and this, with the extra revenue, was devoted entirely to two types of expenditure. Charges such as printing, papers and miscellaneous expenses moved very little; but the rental of offices constituted about 25% of all expenditure, and the cost of meetings generally came to about £60 p.a. These two items show the switch in approach taken by the G.C.A. after 1880, for not only were mass meetings developed as a propaganda device, but the breakdown of expenditure between the centre and the Districts is revealing. The costs of the latter were 3 or 4 times as great, and this well indicates the relative importance of these new creations.

One item is strikingly missing from these accounts: election expenses were entirely met by the candidates, whereas in 1880 the G.L.A. paid for the contest and then recouped a proportion from the candidates. This had important implications for the power of the G.C.A., for if it had no role in the financing of a candidate's campaign, it could scarcely exercise much say in the choice. The G.L.A. claimed and exercised the right to take full part in the process of selecting candidates, and it vitally influenced the choosing of all prospective Liberal contenders after its inception. The G.C.A. by contrast, never asserted any form of prerogative in this matter, and may be held to mark the distinction between the Liberal and Conservative attitudes to relations between leaders and the rank and file. In the selection of Whitelaw and Hunter, the G.C.A. played no part beyond co-ordinating the effort to decide upon
two appropriate candidates. (1)

The furore over Bain's candidacy revealed the limited role of the Association. From statements made at that time, it appears that an Electoral Committee was formed after the 1874 contest, and was re-convened on Whitelaw's death. The G.C.A. Executive Committee had met in September 1879 and received a letter from Bain offering to run with J. A. Campbell (who had already assented). This offer was agreed to over an amendment requesting that Sir James be invited to disclose his political principles, but evidently there was still unease amongst sections of the G.C.A., and accordingly:

"Your Committee, in order that the whole question might be maturely considered, agreed to take the advice of the influential (Conservative Electoral) Committee... and they, by a majority, approved of Sir James Bain's candidacy". The complainants were still dissatisfied:

- "It was however considered by some members of this Association that your Committee had exceeded their powers in delegating such a question to a body not recognised by your Constitution". The objections were based on the claim that many of the extra-constitutional committee were not in the G.C.A., and it was alleged that anyway the voting went: for Bain 17; against 5; abstained 9 - hardly decisive in Bain's favour. A General Meeting had to be held in December to ratify Bain's candidacy by 61 to 51 and in the next month he was invited to stand by a joint message from the Association and the

Electoral Committee. (1)

Who sat on the Committee is unknown, although it may be surmised that its position of importance derived from the 'influential' individuals on it, as well as the financial resources they could call on and their social contacts in affecting the selection of candidates. The amended constitution of 1880 showed the impact of these turbulent events, for Article VII defined that matters falling within the competency of the Association "shall include the selection of Parliamentary Candidates". After some 2 or 3 years of effort by the Association, James Somervell of Sorn was nominated as prospective candidate, but, unlike the local Liberal Association, no General Meeting was summoned to approve this choice. Thus in this important area, progress towards conferring a full range of responsibilities on the G.C.A. was very tentative.

2. The Activities of the G.C.A.

(a) Registration Historians of Victorian politics have commented that one of the primary duties performed by constituency party associations was in the oversight of the electoral registration system. Indeed, registration work has been seen as the originating raison-d'être of local party units, and also as an ideal way of not only recruiting new voters but also of maintaining a high degree of participation by grassroots party activists between the feverish

excitement of General Elections. \(^{(1)}\) Clearly there is *prima facie* evidence to suggest that this sphere would bulk large in the G.C.A.'s overall operations: as already noted inspection of the voters' lists had been effectively dropped by the party in the 1840's, and in the altered circumstances created by the favourable events of 1867-8 it would be desirable to ensure that all their supporters had their franchise rights. Accordingly, at an early Association meeting the appointment of an Electoral Committee was announced, with instructions to place on the roll "lodgers, partners and others holding Conservative opinions". \(^{(2)}\) Little success seems to have attended its efforts, which are not mentioned by the party again, and press references to registration claims did not distinguish between parties. \(^{(3)}\)

That this early project soon foundered is confirmed by the announcement in 1873 to the effect that "An entirely new but important feature in the operation of your association has been undertaken this year". In July Sir George Campbell presided over a meeting which voted to form the Glasgow Conservative Registration Council, and the Council published "rules agreed on for the guidance of ward agents and committees". \(^{(4)}\) It is not certain what animated this movement - it may have been advice from London; perhaps

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2. Herald, 10 Sept. 1869.


Campbell was anxious to learn the lesson of 1868 and yet also to avoid giving the Liberals a chance to counter the following year, he delayed bringing this council until the last likely registration court before the dissolution. The Conservatives at any rate advertised their intention to help get electors on the roll by setting up an advisory committee with a legal agent in attendance. The Post Office was used to send circulars to those considered eligible, and unlike the Liberals who were galvanised belatedly and ineffectively into action, the Conservatives made special mention of their interest in "Lodgers and Partners of Firms". As a result the Conservatives claimed a net gain that year of 82 and it was predicted in Liberal quarters that this might presage a Tory election triumph.

Despite this initial success, the Council was wound up after 15 months' existence as too expensive and unwieldy in operation. By September 1874 it had incurred debts of £100, as the involvement of 16 Law Agents and 32 members of the General Committee in its work proved "cumbrous and divided". The G.C.A. assumed both the debt and responsibility for the roll, "as part of its regular business",

1. It is also conceivable that the Glasgow Conservatives were inspired by the great preparations being made for the Renfrewshire by-election of September 1873, won by Col. Campbell of Blythswood for the Conservatives. Campbell's agent, W. J. Easton, was active in the G.C.A.

2. Herald, 18-24 Sept. 1873; also G. Sentinel, 20 Sept.: "In the city of Glasgow the Tory agents have been very active, and it is asserted that they will have a large increase of Tory voters in the city".
and the Secretary, Robert MacGowan, agreed to act as registration agent. (1) For a period this arrangement appeared satisfactory: on the publication of the electoral lists, the Association's Committee Rooms were kept open to permit their scrutiny, and clerks were on hand to help intending applicants fill up and submit claim forms. A setback encountered in 1876, when for the first time in four years Liberal enrolments exceeded Conservatives, only led to a determination to redouble efforts. The committee announced that this was "engaging its serious intention" and it would shortly remind ward committees of their duties in this matter. In the next year it was sufficiently confident to reject outright the proposal put forward by Cameron's agent that both sides should hold back from registration court contests. Not only could Cameron's agent not bind other Liberals to abide by such a pact, but the Conservatives felt it would be unfair to their supporters who regularly used ward offices to consult the register. (2)

As the prospect of a general election grew ever more imminent, the next two years saw intense activity by both sides with the Liberals having slightly greater success because they were only now entering the field. After the election, however, the whole process was dropped after a bilateral agreement: "The representations made on behalf of your Association to your political opponents, with a view to keeping down the expenses incurred by canvassing for and supporting these claims in the Courts had until this year unfortunately


failed, but were repeated this summer with such effort that an arrangement was entered into between the Agents of both parties, under which both agreed to abstain from canvassing, and to support only such claims as were voluntarily lodged at the Distinct Committee Rooms opened in the City". Hereafter this aspect of the Association's work was almost totally wound up as it merely provided assistance for those omitted from the roll, and a general balance between the parties obtained at the Courts. (1)

This shortlived indulgence in registration work by an Association which was in no way moribund may be accounted for in several ways. Firstly it was fairly expensive - £60 to £100 p.a. (or about one-fifth of total expenditure), after 1880 it dropped to about £20 each year. With the reduction of the size of this outlay, as already noted, the Association was able to diversify its activities. But even after 1880, when revenue mounted to 50% above the level of the late 1870's, there was no return to registration work which suggests that there were other reasons for discarding it. Firstly it was rather costly - between 8 and 15 shillings per voter enrolled - and so not a very efficient way of gaining support: and alternative ways of attracting heavier enrolments were rejected in 1879 as they "would be both cumbrous and expensive". Moreover, the number of recruits so won was infinitesimal when placed against the total city electorate: as TABLE 7.3 shows the overall position was not altered

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Electorate</th>
<th>Cons. Gains</th>
<th>Lib. Gains</th>
<th>Net Cons. Gain</th>
<th>% of Electorate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td>54,374</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>(0.15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>56,727</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>(0.17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>58,004</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>(0.05%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>60,576</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>-69</td>
<td>(0.11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1877</td>
<td>60,582</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>-112</td>
<td>(0.19%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>61,069</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>-119</td>
<td>(0.19%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>57,882</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After 1879 a registration pact operated until:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cons. Gains</th>
<th>Lib-Unionist Gains</th>
<th>Lib. Gains</th>
<th>Cons. + Lib-U Majority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1887</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>1,037</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>1,653</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>887</td>
<td>972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>2,315</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>1,104</td>
<td>1,549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>2,971</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>1,271</td>
<td>2,161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>3,315</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>1,196</td>
<td>2,704</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
by more than 0.2% in any given year. What made this so peripheral was the efficiency with which the official registration system functioned in Glasgow, as discussed elsewhere, so that the 'Herald' explained the reason for the truce of 1880 to be that the roll prepared by the City Assessor was "of the most exhaustive character and that it is as nearly perfect as can be". (1)

The only scope for action lay with the lodger franchise, since claims for voting under this qualification had to be renewed annually in Scotland, and moreover were not covered by the Assessor's compilation. A manual of Scottish electoral procedure, produced under Liberal auspices, pointed out the significance of this category: "Note: A large number of persons can usually be registered by attention being directed to this franchise". (2) The city Conservatives were always aware of this sector, which was often claimed to be exceptionally favourable to the party. As already noted, it was part of the brief given to the 1869 Electoral Committee, and it was remarked in 1873 that they were making headway here. In the period of its registration drive, repeated references to the lodger class were made by the G.C.A., with, as TABLE 7.4 reveals, some success,


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cons.</th>
<th>Lib.</th>
<th>Lib-U</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td>n.g.</td>
<td>n.g.</td>
<td>n.g.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>n.g.</td>
<td>n.g.</td>
<td>n.g.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1877</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>n.g.</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>n.g.</td>
<td>1,165</td>
<td>1,206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>n.g.</td>
<td>n.g.</td>
<td>n.g.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>n.g.</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>n.g.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>n.g.</td>
<td>n.g.</td>
<td>n.g.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>n.g.</td>
<td>n.g.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 7.4  Lodger Registrations 1873-94
but during the truce of the early 1880's very little mention was
made of this untapped reservoir of support. (1)

The great breakthrough only came after the late 1880's. Partly
this was due to the arrival at the G.C.A. offices of Lewis Shedden
who was for many years an energetic and astute secretary, well
apprised of the advantages of efficient registration. (2) Equally
important was the division of Glasgow into 7 constituencies in 1885:
this gave the incentive to maximum registration effort lacking under
the old arrangement. Now, with majorities much closer, annual gains
or losses could have the effect of gradually transferring the balance
of electoral power in a given seat, and here lodger votes were
prominent: "There are about now as many Conservative lodgers in the
College Division as the Gladstonian Liberals have in the whole city
of Glasgow" it was claimed in 1889. (3) As an indication of the
earnestness with which this was pursued, most constituency
associations began appointing Organising Secretaries (whose primary
duty lay in the field of registration), a quite new development. (4)

1. For the GCA and lodgers, see Herald, 10 Sept. 1869; 16 Sept.
   1873; GCA 8th, 10th, 11th Ann. Reps. (1876, 78, 79) unpaginated;
   pp. 5-6; p. 5, respectively. In the 1880's, only R. McGowan,
   News, 31 Jan. 1883, comments on the lodger vote.

2. For Shedden, see D. W. Unwin, "Development of the Conservative
ten to over emphasise Shedden's role - cf. the obituary
   of M. M. W. Baird, Herald, 15 Oct. 1915 for his contribution to
   registration.

3. College Division, GCA 21st Ann. Rep. (1889): there were 301
   Conservative lodger votes enrolled that year in the constituency;
   the total Glasgow Liberal lodger registration was 306. Also

4. GCA 21st Ann. Rep. (1889) records 2 such appointments, and
(b) Propaganda There is a clear connection between the structure of the G.C.A. and its success in propagandising the electorate, and the latter took several forms. One approach adopted was the provision of reading-rooms, supplied with suitable instructional literature. This was a harking-back to the techniques of the Operatives' Association, which had devoted an increasing amount of its energy to a Reading-Room project begun in 1839. When in 1843, however, "the revenue of the room having been inadequate to its support said committee had resolved to discontinue it", this was part of the foundering of the whole Association. (1) Despite this earlier setback, the zeal which the new association worked up suggests that the rooms met a real need. By September 1869, it was reported by a sub-committee that the Old Glasgow Town Hall had been obtained as premises for a club containing reading-rooms and a library; and branch reading-rooms followed quickly. The annual subscription was 2/6, giving entry from 9 a.m. till 10 p.m., and was evidently popular, for by 1872 the large attendance at the Halls served to "convince your Committee that the Institution is appreciated by those for whose benefit it was originally called into existence, and is still kept in operation". (2) Significantly, use of the club tapered off when the central rooms were moved westward from the Trongate in 1877 to George Square and then to West Nile Street.


The Executive closed the premises down in December 1880, whereupon the Eastern Division made strong representations and got reading-rooms opened in their own locality in January 1881.\(^{(1)}\) J. N. Cuthbertson, who opened the halls, promised that if these were successful, the G.C.A. would provide them throughout the city, and after it was learned that between 60 and 110 attended the Calton rooms daily, this pledge was honoured. Between 1882 and 1884 the South Side, Western and Dennistoun Districts opened premises, and it was claimed that the facilities they offered helped to boost membership in the regions.\(^{(2)}\) High hopes were accordingly entertained as to their value: "It is expected that these rooms will not only form centres from which the principles of the Constitutional party may be disseminated, but will also become useful and agreeable places of resort during the few hours of leisure allotted to the working classes".\(^{(3)}\)

The reading-matter provided included copies of speeches and meetings of a Conservative nature, normally obtained for free distribution at the expense of wealthy well-wishers.\(^{(4)}\) Also provided were newspapers and periodicals, but as funds were evidently

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1. GCA 9th, 11th, 12th Ann. Reps. (1877, 1879, 1880) unpaginated, pp. 5; 4-5 respectively.


4. Whitelaw in 1870 paid for the publication or purchase of pamphlets on the Great Bible Demonstration; Prof. Berry's lecture on Liberal foreign policy; and the literature of the Manchester Educational Association - GCA 2nd Ann. Rep. (1870).
low, only Glasgow journals were obtained, and appeals were made for
members to pass on their used copies - preferably of London papers;
and the Dennistoun branch acknowledged gifts of American papers and
the Belfast Weekly News from sympathisers. Other reading material
too was available:- scientific and literary works were kept in the
libraries, and Dennistoun recorded gifts of the Waverley novels, a
selection of Turkish literature and a bust of Disraeli. (1) It is
instructive to compare the restricted range of activities at these
branch rooms with those undertaken by their English counterparts,
where a great variety of pursuits were encouraged, not necessarily
political, in an attempt to create a general ambience within which
Conservatism might thrive. (2) The Glasgow meeting rooms seem
austere by contrast, and it might be possible that the Orange Lodges
or the ultra-Protestant religious societies discussed earlier
provided the congenial social context for the assimilation of
Conservative principles.

For whatever reason, the initial euphoria soon died, and the
report for 1884 strikes a rather testy note. The District Rooms
were well attended for lectures, "but the members do not take
advantage of the Rooms, which are well-supplied with newspapers,
to the extent which might be anticipated. As these Rooms form a
considerable item of the expenses incurred, it is hoped that the
local Committees will make increased efforts to get new subscribers,

1. GCA 13th, 14th Ann. Reps. (1881, 1882), pp. 3; 3; News,
20 Sept. 1884.
so as to diminish the amount drawn from the funds of the Central Office". (1) A step to improving the amenities in the reading rooms (which were still regarded as very useful) was the formation in 1888 of a 30-strong Draughts Club in the St. Rollox Association. The motives behind this indicates some deficiencies felt in the earlier arrangements: "its objects are to improve the attendance at the Rooms by providing a healthy recreation for Members; to improve our financial condition by adding new Members; and, above all, to promote an acquaintance amongst the Members who come to the Rooms, a most important matter in any political organisation". (2) Other constituency divisional associations took up this venture, and most of them, especially those with a working-class preponderance, still felt the rooms occupied a central place in local organisation.

The other major means of Conservative evangelisation was the medium of speeches or lectures, since they simultaneously met several needs. They were an efficient means of reaching a large audience, compared to literary propaganda, and the G.C.A. regarded it as highly effective to hold "frequent meetings whereat Conservative policies have been lectured on and discussed to liberate conservatism from the misrepresentation which has hitherto done it injustice". (3) J. A. Campbell expanded on this when he assessed the value of the first year's series of talks: "It embraced lectures on several

2. St. Rollox in GCA 19th Ann. Rep. (1887); also Blackfriars and Hutchesontown and Bridgeton, 1887 etc.
subjects of political interest, the treatment of which in that form must have presented you with a fuller and more comprehensive view of them than could easily have been obtained in any other way". He went on to claim that lectures inculcated more rational debate than mere "oral discussion". (1)

The speeches fell into two broad types:— these given by local men, and the visits of 'national' Conservative politicians. The former were of course more frequent, but also had a different objective, "all more or less having a bearing on conservatism in its most extended and truest sense". (2) In the first years of the G.C.A. they were largely expository, dealing with topics such as foreign policy; political aspects of religious questions; education; the distinction between Conservative and Liberal policies and principles; interspersed with talks in a lighter vein, as Col. W. Hozier's talk on "Ghosts". These meetings, it was claimed, drew in new members and kept the Association thriving; but after the 1874 election a change was introduced — the non-political elements were dropped, and a reduced number of lectures, but "decidedly good" ones, were to be given. The number did decline, partly due to the economic recession which compelled the suspension of lectures in 1878. (3) After 1880, the lectures given by local politicians reveal a discernible trend towards constant attacks on the Liberal administration, rather than

1. J. A. Campbell, The Education Question (Glasgow 1871), p. 3.
the exposition of Conservative principles. It is as if the first stage had succeeded in winning conversions to the party, and the new tactic was to keep up party loyalty and fervour.

Speeches by national figures were less frequent than those delivered by local men, but were more lengthy and all-embracing in their content. A considerable portion were made by Tories outside the highest ranks of the party and were presumably invited for their own popularity or to deliver addresses on topics of especial interest to Glasgow Conservatives. Of these 'non-officials', Ashmead-Bartlett, M.P., was the most popular, performing three times in as many years, generally on foreign policy and Liberal misgovernment. Bartlett was also the editor of *England*, a Tory journal which one enthusiastic Glaswegian acclaimed as the most persuasive party organ read by working-men in the city, and this, together with his Orange leanings, gave him an obvious attraction. The increasing preoccupation among Glasgow Conservatives in the 1880's with the Irish issue (natural enough, given the Orange tinges discussed earlier) was mirrored in visits from speakers with Irish connections, such as Lord George Hamilton, M.P., and David Plunket, M.P. (1)

In addition another group of external speakers comprising what looks like semi-professional party lecturers would from time to time turn up to talk in the city. That these were less important is suggested by their speaking to branches (while the bigger fish

appeared under the auspices of the G.C.A.), and by the absence of supporting speakers to help sustain the meeting. Some of these speakers were Edinburgh lawyers with political ambitions, e.g. J. H. A. MacDonald, a future Lord Advocate, spoke in 1875 on Conservative and Liberal politics; but very few of the landed interest so dominant in the Scottish party spoke in Glasgow. Two Manchester men, William Touchstone and James Croston, spoke regularly to G.C.A. districts: both had first attracted the attention of Glasgow Tories through their involvement in the education struggle of 1870, and in the 1880's they regularly spoke on a range of topics from the church question to Liberal maladministration at home and abroad. (1)

Much wider and deeper significance attached to the political visits of leading Conservative politicians, (2) of which there were three in this period - Disraeli in 1873, Northcote in 1882, Salisbury in 1884 - for these events fulfilled several functions. Local party supporters were vouchsafed a glimpse of their leaders, and given a sense of belonging to the mainstream of national politics by the presence of statesmen expounding at great length their interpretation of the current political situation. This was a very important fillip to Glasgow Conservatives, for as a minority they were rarely able to make a direct contribution to the parliamentary struggle. These visits were also felt to be an integral part of


2. On some occasions politicians might come to Glasgow for non-political purposes. Thus Cross came in his capacity as Home Secretary in 1876, and studiously avoided formally addressing the local party.
the campaign to spread Conservative doctrines in Scotland, for as Reginald MacLeod, the party's Scottish organiser, explained to Lord Cairns, "The Liberal press (in Scotland) is so strong, and, I must add so unscrupulous that much energy on our part is needed to lay the truth before the people". (1) With this in mind, MacLeod arranged for Northcote to go to Edinburgh, Salisbury to Glasgow and Cairns to Aberdeen, and the Glasgow News concurred with this policy, arguing that speechifying a la Gladstone was the best way to counter Liberal propaganda.

These major meetings were further sought after as a means of stimulating interest in the association, in part because they were great demonstrations which aroused much excitement: when Salisbury came, vast crowds, put at over 12,000, gathered at the station to greet his arrival, and the East End Conservatives organised a torchlight procession through the city centre in his honour. (2) Hence the G.C.A., trying to recover from the shattering experience of the general election of 1880, recorded its desire to hold as early as possible a large demonstration of this sort: "the desirability, if not necessity, of having a great public meeting to invigorate the party has been much felt". (3) The vast audiences at these meetings (it was necessary to hold an overflow meeting for

1. R. MacLeod to Cairns, 22 July 1884, Cairns Mss PRO.30/51/20.
the 1,000 unable to hear Salisbury in 1884) directly helped boost the membership of the G.C.A. A fall of 500 enrolments in 1883 was attributed to the absence of a big name speaker, while the previous year's increase was given a "great stimulus" by Northcote's address; and equally Salisbury's sojourn was given credit for the "greatly augmented" membership in 1884. After a further fall in 1887, the Committee considered sponsoring a further demonstration: "This they think, will be the means of inducing many new Members to enrol for the coming year", and A. J. Balfour's appearance duly repeated dividends. (1)

For the Disraeli visit of 1873, it was decided that tickets should only go to members of the Association. After this isolated incident, however, the Conservatives were exonerated from resorting to this device to artificially inflate membership size, and the Herald castigated the Liberals for not doing the same. Reviewing this facet of its work, the G.C.A. saw its relevance in a broad context: "These demonstrations have had a most distinct effort in largely strengthening the Association, not only in the number of its membership, but in its influence throughout the city, by clearly exposing the unfulfilled promises, the vacillating policy and the increased expenditure of the present Administration in striking contrast to the wise statesmanship and patriotic achievements of the late Government". (2) Whether the impact of these mass meetings

was lasting is open to doubt, but they were well suited to the
general approach in political persuasion being adopted after 1880
by the GCA, and their use displays the wider battery of tactics
being used by the revamped and increasingly confident Association.

(c) Relations with other Conservative Bodies

The spread of provincial political clubs in the 1870's and
1880's has been identified as an important means of encouraging
party feeling in a social setting, and also providing pleasant
surroundings for receiving visiting party dignitaries. As Hanham
points out, the institutions were more attractive to Conservatives,
in the minority in most large cities,\(^{(1)}\) and in Glasgow the
Conservative Club was started in 1879 while the Liberals only formed
their club in 1890, when they were no longer so commanding in city
politics. The first public discussion as to the desirability of
a Conservative Club came in early 1874 when the *News* carried a
report of a preliminary meeting of the "Glasgow Carlton Club", at
which it was planned to settle quite shortly on a site for the
premises.\(^{(2)}\) In fact the club was only opened almost 6 years later
(3 years after Edinburgh acquired the Scottish Conservative Club),
with a prime site in Bothwell Street, adjacent to Central Station
and convenient for the westward-spreading business community.

\(^{(1)}\) Hanham, *op.cit.*, pp. 102-4.

\(^{(2)}\) *News*, 12 Mar. 1874.
The Club seems to have been mainly social in function, holding dinners like any other club, the only difference being the occasional Conservative toasts proposed.\(^{(1)}\) In March 1881, J. N. Cuthbertson explained to the G.C.A. that the Club would work in conjunction with the Association, but the nature and commencing date of this cooperation were left unstated. The Club proceeded to create in that year a Political Committee to handle such issues, thus carefully differentiating between the two aspects of the Club. When Salisbury came to Glasgow in 1884 he stayed at the Club, and there received a delegation from the Political Committee which in passing explained its structure: "The Political Committee of the Conservative Club is composed of members of all the various local associations of the West of Scotland".\(^{(2)}\) It normally made financial contributions to help the weaker local associations supplement their activities rather than initiate any moves on its own, which may be seen either as demonstrating satisfaction with the existing organisations or reluctance to upset their *amour propre*. It was the boast of the Committee that its funds were carefully and to good effect.\(^{(3)}\)

The headings under which the money was used were firstly in getting up speakers for mass meetings - most notably the Salisbury (1884)

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1. Ibid., 10 Feb. 1881 for the 3rd House Dinner of the GCA; also speeches at its opening, 26 Feb. 1880.
2. *News*, 2 Oct. 1884; Cuthbertson's speech is in *ibid.*, 1 Mar. 1881.
3. For a general conspectus of the Club's political work, see the speech of Sir James Buchanan in Report of Proceedings at the Presentation of Portraits of Sir Archibald Campbell of Blythswood to the Conservative Club Glasgow, and to Lady Campbell (Glasgow 1888), pp. 6-7.
and Iddesleigh (1885) visits were combined operations. (1) Secondly it defrayed the expenses of public petitions - one against the abolition of Parliamentary Oaths (signed by 23,325) and another urging the immediate relief of Gordon (16,758 signatories). (2) Among other bills met by the Committee was the distribution of Conservative literature to branches.

The restricted scope indicates that the Committee served as little more than a local equivalent of the National Union, but it is perhaps significant that the upper and middle-class Conservatives preferred to put their money at the party's disposal locally through this body rather than via the G.C.A. whose 'democratic' overtones after 1880 were not always popular with this class. The Chairman of the Committee was J. Brooks Wright, a wealthy E. India merchant, and one of the leading supporters of Pearce in 1880. His obituary asserted that "he was a good deal consulted by the leaders of the Conservative Party in Scotland, and was one of the founders of the Conservative Club in Glasgow", and although he was a Vice-President of the G.C.A. from 1879, he took little part in its affairs. (3) It is impossible to be certain whether the Political Committee was seen as a means of curbing the constituency party's independence

by its financial power, for while the G.C.A. was chronically short of funds, the Committee's work was not sufficiently extensive to have held much sway.

Glasgow Conservatives, in their embattled position, might be expected to look for assistance from outside sources in those parts of Scotland where the party was stronger, or had a greater continuity and experience than the fledgling G.C.A. Such help might come either from institutions or from individual party members, but the overall weakness of Scottish Conservatism is suggested by the Scottish National Union being formed in 1882, some 13 years after the English National Union. Prior to this the only body purporting to represent more than constituency level Conservatives was the Scottish National Constitutional Association, formed in 1867, but it was widely regarded as ineffectual. Its expenditure in 1882 was £515, not much more than G.C.A., and its allotted duties were not particularly dynamic: the President, the Earl of Dalkeith, pointed out that its central office was useful for "diffusing" information not otherwise available throughout the country, but this was the extent of its work: "A central office was a nucleus from which action emanated, but was not intended to supersede local associations, on the contrary one of its chief duties was to assist them".1

Constitutional Association "did a great deal of good" is rather vague, and certainly no G.C.A. Annual Report cites any help coming from that quarter.

The formation of the Scottish National Union of Conservative and Constitutional Associations in 1882 seemed to herald better prospects of a co-ordinated programme of propaganda and electoral organisation. (1) Perhaps significantly, its inaugural conference was held in Glasgow, and the chairman was James A. Campbell of Stracathro. The Scottish Union, it emerged, had been mooted in early 1882, and was modelled on the English body, with already 57 constituency association affiliations. "The objects", as Campbell defined them, "are to establish means of communication between the different associations in Scotland, to assist in forming new associations where they are required, and to assist also in arrangements for public meetings and lectures, with the view of promoting the exposition, the defence and the promotion of Conservative principles in Scotland. These objects are to be aimed at by the Union without in any way interfering with the independent action of local associations". (2) This does not appear to be very much wider in scope than the ill-fated Constitutional Association, which now passed away, and indeed the News criticised the new body as "ornamental" and for failing to undertake serious organisational work. (3)


2. Scottish National Union of Conservative and Constitutional Associations, Minute Book 1, 4 Oct. 1882; cf. 1 Nov. 1883.

But there are indications of the greater trust placed in it by Glasgow: 5 Glaswegians, including Campbell, were present in the Council of 24; and whereas the S.N.C.A. had only 'corresponding Agents' in Glasgow, one of the National Union's two secretaries was the Glasgow lawyer and political agent, W. J. Easton. The Union grew steadily in size, and was soon spending well above its predecessor's puny level, as well as distributing sound advice on electoral matters, such as the implications of the 1883 Corrupt Practices Act for canvassing techniques, and the best way of organising lodger votes. Even so, although the G.C.A. affiliated at once, there is only brief mention of the Union in its reports, and then the assistance was mainly financial. Naturally, in its infancy the Scottish Union could do little of material value, and the benefits were only really effective in the 1890's and so the G.C.A. in this period was still left to its own devices.

Glasgow's isolation with the Scottish party is underscored by the marked abstention from involvement in the G.C.A.'s operations by prominent Scottish Conservatives. Only two Scottish Tory M.P.s - Sir Wyndham Carmichael Anstruther in 1872 and Lord Elcho in 1883 - gave addresses to the city party, and none appear to have attended the Association's annual soirees, which normally would have been a fitting occasion to display party solidarity. The only event which would lure M.P.s into Glasgow would be when a party leader from Westminster was present, and an impressive row of luminaries was deemed obligatory, both to impress the audience and to gratify the visitor. While it is true that the M.P.s mainly sat for Eastern
or Border seats, and so were less accessible to Glasgow than Edinburgh, even the Ayrshire M.P.s kept at a distance. Of the three main social bases of Conservative strength in Scotland, the leading Tory peers - Buccleuch, Richmond, Galloway, Lothian, Seafield and Strathmore - all had their areas of territorial influence well outside Glasgow's vicinity. (1)

The gentry who (as the report of 1876 published by Crapster clearly reveals) (2) were the backbone of the Scottish party, were involved in the city's politics only within a very limited frame of reference, even if they lived in the Glasgow area. Only those who had immediate or past links with Glasgow, either through commerce or landownership, participated in city politics. Thus, in Renfrewshire, Col. Campbell of Blythswood, who gave his estate's name to the fashionable city part owned by him, and Allan Gilmour of Eaglesham, whose family was one half of Pollock and Gilmour, an important city mercantile house, were highly involved in city politics (Campbell was President of the G.C.A.); while Shaw-Stewart of Ardgowan, an equally ardent Conservative without any Glasgow ties, was not. In Dunbartonshire, Colquhoun of Luss and Smollett of Bonhill, both candidates for the county, kept out of Glasgow matters, while Findlay of Boturich and Martin of Auchendennan, with city business interests, were prominent in the G.C.A.; and in Lanarkshire

1. Probably the most influential peer in Glasgow was Argyll, a liberal in politics.

Hozier of Maudslie and Lockhart of Milton, although as near the city as Gordon of Aikenhead or MacCall of Daldowie, lacked their industrial connections and were not regular attenders at G.C.A. meetings. Again, James Somervell of Sorn, whose family had long been in the Glasgow W. India Trade, was one of the few Tory gentry from Ayrshire, a county noted for its Conservative leanings, to mix in Glasgow politics.

The third social category strongly represented in the party was the Edinburgh legal profession, for whom politics was an important source of patronage and career advancement. From time to time one would address the Glasgow Tories - J. H. A. MacDonald and C. S. Dickson often undertook this task - but these were rare incidents, for despite their polished delivery and style, the type of Conservatism advocated by these outsiders had little attraction for Glasgow Tories. Indeed the reaction of the latter was sometimes pungent: as C. T. Grant, a Glasgow colonial merchant, stated in outlining a projected article on 'Conservatism North of the Border': "I wd. deal principally with what I think, are our two great weak points. One being within the circle, the other without, viz. 'Conservative lawyers' and 'Dissenting Clergymen'."

The News in its first editorial elaborated on this theme by observing that while patronage at Parliament House dictated Edinburgh politics, in Glasgow "there is scarcely a man who would be pecuniarily benefitted by any change of Ministry". From there it moved on to give a fuller

1. C. T. Grant to W. Blackwood, 30 Nov. 1885, Blackwood Papers, NLS MSS. 4470, f. 145.
distinction which explained the isolation of Glasgow in Scottish Tory politics: "But there is one point on which public feeling here is stronger than in the East. Now, as in the past, Glasgow is the head and heart of Protestantism in Scotland . . ."(1)

As we have seen, this Protestantism was the defining element for Glasgow Conservatism, and few of the other Scottish party supporters who lacked the local contacts or experience had the interest or the proclivity to get embroiled in the rough-and-tumble political environment which uniquely characterised Glasgow. Local Tories had little taste for the intellectual subtleties of the lawyers' debates on the nature of Conservatism, and the agrarian social order which shaped the lairds' Toryism was irrelevant in the Glasgow context. It is not surprising to find that interest in the city was more held by Conservatives from similar large urban areas - particularly Manchester, where a strong Protestant-based Conservative movement had emerged in the early 1870's. As already discussed, Touchstone and Croston were frequent lecturers, presumably because of the immediacy of their topics, which were politico-religious; and in addition several speakers with an Ulster background contributed on a similar range of issues. Another pointer to Glasgow's exclusion from the general Scottish Conservative movement was that all the honorary office-bearers of the G.C.A. were city men - no other figure seemed sufficiently in accord to become a Vice-President.

3. **The Conservative Press**

An important development in the attempts by the Glasgow Conservatives to spread their doctrines was the attempt to run a journal serving as their mouthpiece. In an era of increasing literacy and leisure, the value of a regular daily vehicle as an instrument for political opinion-forming was acknowledged to be incalculable, as pamphlets were going out of fashion, and speeches had by comparison a limited audience and impact. In its initial burst of activity, the G.C.A. set up a committee with the remit both to encourage Conservative literature and to promote the interests of the Conservative press in Scotland. (1) There was at this time good cause for concern at the plight of the Tory press, especially in Glasgow, where there existed no advocate of the party's cause. The Constitutional, which in the 1850's, had been the most consistent and pugnacious Conservative journal, closed in 1857; leaving only the ailing Courier to be openly partisan. Its circulation and influence had fallen well before its demise in 1866 (indeed its heyday had been in the 1820's and 1830's when it had been the organ of the W. Indian lobby), and its closure was attributed to the reluctance of prominent West of Scotland Conservatives to give financial backing to the owners' project to run it as a daily. (2)

By the early 1870's there were signs that city Tories were beginning to regret not having sustained the Courier, for the only

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1. Herald, 10 Sept. 1869.

daily Conservative paper appearing in Scotland was the Edinburgh Evening Courant. Moreover, the Herald, which had been vaguely inclined to the right of centre, moved in the late 1860's to adopt a more markedly liberal stance, a shift associated with the appointment of William Jack as editor on the death of James Pagan in 1868. It was to meet this need that the Glasgow News was launched in September 1873. The two main figures involved were James Baird and J. A. Campbell - the former providing most of the capital, but the latter was probably the instigator - and others interested included James King of Levernholm and William Kidston. As early as 1870, Campbell had publicly expressed his regret at the dearth of Conservative papers in Scotland, and a cartoon of him at this time clearly shows him to be behind the News. (1)

The floating of the News was a well-prepared and costly venture. As early as October 1872, press rumours alleged that plans were so well advanced that an editor was being actively sought. (2) In June 1873 Robert H. Patterson was appointed editor, and this seemed a good start; he was an experienced journalist who had edited the Conservative Edinburgh Advertiser in the 1850's. The first issue of News came out amid much self-congratulation: it pointed out that the Scottish press had maintained its readership and successfully excluded the London press from enjoying a wide circulation north of the Border (by virtue of its superior literary talents,

1. Bailie, Men You Know 41 (30 July 1873); Clydeside Cameos, 2nd Series, no. XXIV.
along with "the energy and administrative skill" of its management, and equally important, the electric telegraph). Yet, it stated, the variety of Scottish papers had declined, and the News proclaimed its intention to rectify this position by advocating "wise and moderate Conservatism". (1)

The paper began by eliciting favourable responses - it was praised by the G.C.A. in 1876 for its beneficial work in propagating the party's cause, and also for driving other dailies to improve their coverage of topics related to Conservatism; (2) but it was never successful, and in February 1886 it merged with the Evening Courant to become the Scottish News, only to fold up finally exactly two years later.

The reasons for this shortlived venture are worth discussing for the light they cast on both the role of the local press in politics and the nature of Glasgow Conservatism. The root of the problem lay in its weak circulation. In its first year, 11 to 13,000 copies were sold daily, but when the commission paid to newsagents was reduced, circulation fell to 9,000, and although there is no direct evidence of circulation thereafter, there is little indication of a substantial upward trend. (3) The early 1870's were a difficult


3. R. H. Patterson to W. Blackwood, 25 Nov. 1873, Blackwood MSS. 4310, ff 43-4; but letter of 26 Feb. 1874, MSS. 4324, ff 48-9 put the circulation down to 9,000.
time for dailies in Glasgow: the Herald's circulation grew by only 500 over the entire period 1870-5, while in each of the preceding 5 years it had gained 2,000 issues. Nor could the News' circulation catch up with the Herald's, which moved from just over 30,000 at the beginning of its second rival up to 42,000 in the late 1880's. (1) Figures for the Mail are not available, but circumstantial evidence suggests it would be nearer the Herald's level than the News'. In size the number of pages, and columnar spacing, the News was closer to the Mail than the larger Herald, but while the Mail was widely held to cater for the lower middle and artisan classes of the city, the News evidently aimed to draw on higher classes. Yet the News never made major inroads into the Herald's hold on the Glasgow upper class readership, for it could not give as extensive treatment to topics, and the Herald's superior coverage of commercial affairs was probably a relevant factor here.

Low circulation led to serious difficulties in retaining advertisements, and without this additional revenue, the financial viability of the News was precarious. For instance while the Herald's circulation remained static between 1870 and 1875, an increase of advertising fees of £13,500 helped to buoy up the paper, as profits fell from £19,699 to £12,981. (2) By contrast, the


2. Ewing, op.cit., pp. 36, 52-3.
advertising revenue of the News was running at about £15,000 p.a. (only one-third of the Herald's level of £44,000), and several efforts were made to alter this undesirable position. (1) The News stressed its special advertising appeal; since it "Circulates throughout Scotland as the organ of the Conservative party", it pointed out that "Advertisers whose announcements do not appear in the Glasgow News fail to address the Conservative party in Scotland". (2) From this there were moves to involve Conservative sympathisers more directly in the struggle to build up the paper's advertising competitiveness, as the editor argued in 1877: "What is most needed is that landed proprietors should insist on their factors and dependents advertising in Conservative journals and nowhere else". (3)

This suggestion for exclusive dealing was taken up in 1880, when the N. B. Daily Mail reprinted a letter from Col. Campbell of Blythswood which had come into the paper's possession, and its authenticity was never denied. Campbell explained that earlier in the year "An Association has been formed in London the general object of which is the dissemination of Conservative policies in Scotland, and as a primary and most important means of accomplishing this object it is proposed that the directors of the association should mainly be directed to the improvement of the Scottish Conservative press".

1. Patterson to Blackwood, 25 Nov. 1873, Blackwood Papers, NLS MSS. 4310, ff. 43-4; and 26 Feb. 1874, Mss. 4324, ff. 48-9.
3. F. C. Wicks to W. Blackwood, 10 May 1877, Blackwood Papers, NLS MSS. 4367, ff. 193-4.
"It is proposed that the above objects should be attained by:

I The establishment of a central office in London by which news of all kinds may be obtained and supplied to the 'Edinburgh Courant', 'Glasgow News', 'Aberdeen Journal', and also to the county papers.

II The improving, strengthening and increasing the weekly and bi-weekly county papers.

III The establishing new county papers where necessary through the three daily papers.

IV The obtaining increased circulation for all the Conservative newspapers.

V Increasing the advertisements in all the papers."

After meetings in May and June, a General Council with representatives from every county and major burgh in Scotland was set up to implement these objectives: "The General Council will take an active interest in the affairs of the association, and will in their respective counties and burghs - (a) be the medium of communication with Conservatives in endeavouring to get them to advertise in the Conservative press; (b) to advise as to pushing circulation; (c) to collect subscriptions". (1) Despite these valiant outside efforts, the News could not capture a large enough portion of advertising, although ironically its evening stablemate, the Evening News, was doing very well in this market. The evening

paper was the natural place for small classifieds, but for larger insertions, the Herald's superior circulation carried weight. (1)

Another aspect covered in Campbell's letter relevant to the News's fortune was that of finance. The association explained that if its aim were to be carried out "thoroughly and efficiently", there was a need for "a considerable sum of money", and to be guaranteed for 4 years £30,000 was to be raised, and it was pointed out that if every Conservative landowner gave £2 for every £1,000 rental, £9,000 would be obtained. There is no further evidence of the success of the Association, but the scale of money required reflects the high cost of maintaining a newspaper in existence. At the outset the News had £30,000 sunk in it (from 200 shareholders) and even then a further £10,000 had to be borrowed to meet all overheads. (2) Despite further capital being called upon, the News was still in a weak position: the death of Baird removed one source of additional capital, and at the end of the decade, J. A. Campbell handed over control of the paper to William Pearce, who pumped in a further injection of capital (said to be £100,000), but this was still not enough to save the paper.

A demoralising factor was the inexperience of the Directors, as evidenced by their appointment of Patterson as first editor.

1. Wicks to Blackwood, 15 Feb. 1888, N.L.S. Mss. 4527, ff. 190-1: "The Evening News is going up fast and the advertisers are coming in without solicitation."

2. Patterson to Blackwood, 1874, N.L.S. Mss. 4324, ff. 60-1 give these figures, Sinclair, op.cit., p. 164 concurs.
He was no more than a hack journalist, a not very good one at that. Three months before his appointment he had confided that he had lost confidence because none of his recent articles had been accepted for publication, and, alarmed about his future in the light of his advancing years and declining literary powers, he was placing his main hopes in non-literary projects.\(^1\) Within six months of the inception of the \textit{News} friction between the Directors and Patterson was great, as Baird complained to Blackwood, who had secured the position for Patterson: "I am sorry to say that we have found Mr Patterson very difficult to deal with, and a considerable obstacle to the success of our paper".\(^2\) Patterson claimed that the Directors were looking for a return on capital too early, and the crisis came when they decided to reduce the level of expenditure, while he felt spending should be high in the initial phase. The upshot was the departure of Patterson in March 1874, to be replaced by Frederick C. Wicks, the manager of the paper.\(^3\) Wicks, who had worked on the \textit{Times} since leaving University, and had written a book on the British Constitution, ran the paper until its shutdown in 1888, and then remained with the \textit{Evening News} until 1894. He seems to have been an efficient editor and manager (if at times, in the eyes of his rivals, also unscrupulous), but the damage inflicted by the upheavals at the outset of the paper's life must have weakened staff morale.

\begin{itemize}
\item 3. Patterson to Blackwood, 6, 26 Feb.; 5, 14 Mar., no date, 1874 - \textit{N.L.S. Mss.} 4324, ff. 45-61; \textit{cf. NBDM}, 16 Mar. 1874.
\end{itemize}
In attempts to widen its readership, the News diversified in new directions. In 1874, a Weekly News, modelled on the Weekly Herald and Mail, was launched: aimed at working men for whom the weekend afforded leisure time, it contained a precis of the week's news along with stories and feature articles. More significant was the success encountered in starting the Evening News. Earlier efforts in 1865 by the Herald and Mail in this sector had been failures, and only the Evening Citizen maintained unbroken existence, but in the 1870's this form of journalism caught on. Although they were slender in size and slight in news content (4 pages only, much of the column space given to advertising) and unattractive in layout, they were popular with working-men in particular who were seeking something brief enough to be read at night. (1) The News was the best of the evenings in the city, as over the following decades it built up a powerful team of light feature-writers, with Neil Munro at the centre of its popularity.

By 1888 its audited circulation was advertised to be 72,950, and its morning colleague ruefully explained that "The paper of the hour and the future is the Evening paper - the Halfpenny Evening Paper"; and so in view of "the decided preference shown by the public for our evening paper as compared with our penny morning", it announced the closure of the Glasgow News. (2) Thus in 1888 the Glasgow venture to found a Conservative organ collapsed, for the evening

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1. The widespread reduction of the working day by 1 hour in the early 1870's may also have altered the situation.

paper was non-partisan, as Wicks himself confirmed "The Evening News is going up fast... The character of the paper is of a low type, but it happens to suit the popular taste and it is quite untainted by a strong party reputation". (1)

The final blow to the morning paper, however, was the Herald's advocacy of the Liberal-Unionist standpoint, which, taken with its firm opposition to Disestablishment, effectively made it more Conservative-inclined; now there seemed neither a space nor a need in the spectrum for the News. Contemporary verdicts on the failure of the News stressed its lack of a broad base; as the Bailie, a sympathetic paper, put it: "The scandal of the Conservative prints in Scotland is that they live not by the will of the public but by the unwilling subscriptions of, it may be one or it may be a knot, of wealthy subscribers". (2) Others felt that the News failed to establish sufficient weight and authority: "it missed its chance because even ardent patriotism insists on correct type-setting; because it failed to grasp its position as a great national organ dealing adequately with the questions of the day; and because the public respect is not to be secured by simply slewing round the gun and firing ridicule far more energetically into the friendly camp than upon the position of the enemy". (3)


2. Bailie, 26 Sept. 1883, Cf. Sinclair, op.cit., p. 164: "previous to about ten years ago (i.e. the 1880's) it was difficult to start or to keep in life, Conservative newspapers, although great sums and expensive nursing were spent on them..."

While it is true that the News was often petty and uninspired, the problems of setting up a morning paper in an already fully exploited market, as regards readership and advertising, were equally contributory factors.
CHAPTER EIGHT

Fringe Politics
1. **Irish Nationalism**

Throughout the nineteenth century the Catholic Irish portion of the population of Glasgow constituted a separate community within the city's social system, segregated by a whole bundle of distinguishing characteristics - race and accent, religion, occupation, residence and politics. In preserving their identity they were akin to the Irish settlements in any other large British city, but the Glasgow case was differentiated by size (they constituted the largest Irish contingent next to Liverpool outside the metropolis) and consequently they could expect to effect a considerable impact on political and social trends in the city. At the same time, the attempts of the Irish to gain their appropriate influence in public affairs was severely hampered by the very factors which conditioned their social isolation and solidarity.

Centuries-old links between the Scottish Lowlands and the North of Ireland provided a tradition of migration, and the rapid improvements in transport in the early nineteenth century conveyed an increasing flow of Irish to the industrialising Clyde Valley belt. Initially a movement of relatively skilled men pulled by the good prospects, the famine of the 1840's transformed this into a flood of unskilled

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rural labourers.\textsuperscript{1} The precise number of those in the Irish community is exceptionally difficult to ascertain, for three main reasons. Firstly, the census does list birth-places, but this only provides evidence for first-generation migrants, while their children were counted as Scottish. Yet the latter were a full part of the Irish colony, as a local statistician noted: "The real number of inhabitants who are imbued with Irish characteristic habits, feelings and religious sentiments is infinitely greater";\textsuperscript{2} and so the impression left by the census returns that the Irish numbers remained throughout the second half of the century at around 60,000 is a serious understatement of the true position.

Even if, however, some notional figure is added to cover the Scottish-born Irish, the second difficulty remains, for it is essential to divide the Irish into Protestant and Catholic. This had political repercussions since the former, as we have seen, supplied a firm Orange backing to the Conservatives, while the latter were Home Rulers. The census gives no religious data, but since the incidence of migration from Ulster to Scotland was at times as high as 79.7\% of the total, it may be assumed that the Protestant quota was fairly substantial. Handley puts it at a quarter of all the

\textsuperscript{1} J. E. Handley, \textit{The Irish in Scotland 1790-1845} (Cork, 1943) and \textit{The Irish in Modern Scotland} (Cork, 1947) are the main studies.

\textsuperscript{2} J. Strang, \textit{Report on the Census of the City of Glasgow for 1851} (Glasgow, 1851), pp. 20-1.
Irish at mid-century and other evidence tends to confirm this estimate. On the other hand, recourse to statistics on Catholics will not yield a direct answer, since the non-Irish element is not specified. Most of these were Highlanders, but there was also a smattering of converts who, together with some English and Lowland recusants, produced the socially respectable members of Catholicism—such as the Marquis of Bute and Henry Monteith of Carstairs, one of the old cotton-spinning dynasty. By the late 1860's the local diocese claimed either 75,000 or 125,000 adherents in the city (the range of error indicates the problems faced even by the Church authorities), and Protestant calculations at this time reckon the Roman Catholic total to be around the 100,000 mark. The number does not seem to have moved much forward by 1891, when 110,000 to 120,000 are stated to be in the Church by both favourable and hostile sources.

It would seem that the Irish Catholic population was stabilising at around 80 or 90,000—roughly one-quarter to one-fifth of the


2. A paper, "Western District of Scotland: Educational Statistics" gives 74/76,262 Roman Catholics in Glasgow in 1869. Archdiocese of Glasgow Archives (hereafter AGA), Box marked "Education." 125,000 is in "From a paper sent to Propaganda, giving the number of souls in Scotland in 1867", in AGA, Box "Western District Scoto-Irish Troubles 1860-9". A Protestant estimate is in Association for Promoting the Religious and Social Improvement of the City, Report upon the Religious Condition of Glasgow (Glasgow, 1971), p. 8.

population - the generally accepted proportion amongst contemporaries.\(^1\) Yet this large, ethnically distinctive grouping failed to influence city life to any extent in the period under review: they could get no Town Councillor elected; they were unable to persuade local Liberals from undeviating loyalty to the national party line on Home Rule; and their representation on the School Board simply encouraged militant Protestants to assert more firmly their educational doctrines. Three factors inhibited their advance: the hostility of local clergy to political involvement by their congregation; the social and political ostracism practised by the "Scottish" Glaswegians; and the technicalities of the electoral system, which bore especially hard on the Irish.

Relations between the Irish and their clergy reflected a basically racial cleavage, for the latter, as was common in England and Scotland, were of indigenous stock and used to ministering to a minority which differed from the rest of the population only in religion. The Scottish priests were antipathetic to the mass Irish immigration, yet very few Irish clergy were appointed to cope - as late as 1867 there was only one Irish-born parish priest in Glasgow\(^2\) - and the laity alleged that the Scottish priests took all the plum

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2. "I am the only Irish Pastor, or if you will, P.P. in this vast city for several years", Rev. J. Buchanan to Apostolic Visitor, 7 Nov. 1867, AGA, Box "Apostolic Visitation 1867".
financial and administrative posts, whilst neglecting the care of their parishioners.

These simmerings came to a crisis in 1867-8 over the Free Press affair and, related to it, the Fenian prisoners incident. From the welter of accusation and counter-accusation, it appeared that the extremist political statements emanating from the Glasgow Free Press, which was edited by two Irishmen, together with its sustained vendetta against the clergy of the Western Diocese drove Bishop Grey to suppress the journal by having a denunciation read from every pulpit in early 1868.1 The preliminary to this ban had been the differing responses of the two parties to the Fenian trials in late 1867. The Free Press group eagerly espoused the cause of the 'Manchester Martyrs', bringing the notorious Father Lavelle to the city in October - when he advocated violent action - as well as organising a torchlight procession to the Green in protest against the execution of the Martyrs. Grey co-operated fully with the civic authorities to avert any outbreak of violence in Glasgow, and he was accused by a "humiliated" Fenian supporter of prohibiting two Irish priests from attending a meeting of sympathy with the Martyrs.2 More importantly, when in December a massive pro-Fenian demonstration was planned, which the magistrates feared might result in a riot, Grey ordered a statement

1. Handley, Irish in Modern Scotland, pp. 47-92 gives an account of this. There is much on the incident in AGA, Boxes "Western District. Apostolic Visitation 1867" and "Western District. Scoto-Irish Troubles 1860-9".

which interdicted Catholics from participating to be read out at masses on the eve of the march.¹

The Bishop's intervention was widely credited as the major reason why the procession was an anti-climax, but in the eyes of the authorities reflected not just his belief in law and order, but also in his opposition to their political aspirations. And there was some truth in this interpretation, for Grey informed Cardinal Manning that the appointment of Irish clergy would impede the great task of converting the native Scots, the long-term policy of the Catholic Church in Scotland to which the Irish influx was an irritating interruption; and therefore, he concluded, there should be no pandering to Irish demands.²

The attitude of the ecclesiastical authorities was thus to promote the Catholic cause above all other considerations, so that while this could mean co-operating with the Irish Nationalists for religious purposes, never would they involve themselves in straightforward political matters affecting the Irish. Grey's predecessor was praised in the Herald's obituary for concentrating on church-building: "Bishop Murdoch wisely refrained from meddling in politics."³

After an apostolic visitation to investigate the 'Scoto-Irish Troubles' by Manning, Grey himself was removed in 1869 and his replacement Eyre

¹. Lumsden Diaries, 12, 14, 15 Dec. 1867; Lord Advocate to Home Secretary, 12 Dec. 1867, Lord Advocates' Papers, Box 117, SRO AL 117.
². "Memorandum for the Apostolic Visitor", AGA, Box "Apostolic Visitation".
conciliated the Irish element by appointing new clergy but his standpoint in political issues was little removed from that of Grey.¹

Two incidents revealed this order of priorities among the hierarchy. A public rally of the Glasgow Irish was planned to celebrate the centenary of Daniel O'Connell's birth in August 1875; but whereas the Church wished to commemorate the social and religious benefits accruing to Catholics from Emancipation, the Home Rulers linked their current political aims with the struggles of O'Connell's era and insisted on a resolution being submitted to the meeting demanding an amnesty for Fenian prisoners. This difference of emphasis was unresolved, and so two marches took place on the same day, with rather more turning out for the clergy-inspired procession. That audience was reminded by a Scottish priest that O'Connell had advised the Irish always to follow their "natural leaders", the clergy; and the Protestant John Ferguson was denounced for intervening in a primarily Catholic issue and for injecting politics into the occasion. Many Catholic nationalists defied the Church and rallied to Ferguson's support at a soiree and presentation in his honour two months later, but the ensuing debate showed the clergy's concern at the non-religious influences to which many were succumbing in the Home Rule party.²

This distinction between Irish and Catholic outlooks also emerged over the School Board elections. In the first contest of 1873 the

¹ Bailie, Men You Know, 10,(25 Dec. 1872).
three Catholic candidates who stood were elected, and the clergy were ready to support F. E. Kerr, the lay Catholic member of the Board, in the parliamentary contest of 1874 because he put religious issues at the head of his address. But the church's position became clearer in 1876 when the leading Scottish-born priest in the city, Fr. Munro, predicted at a celebration of that year's School Board elections that Glasgow would one day have a Catholic (but not necessarily Irish) M.P.1 In 1885, Munro was again at the centre of a squabble with local nationalists who alleged he had announced - without first consulting them - that two Catholics would be put up at the general election, and neither of them was Irish.2

The Irish-born Fr. Murphy was the one cleric to espouse the Home Rule cause with zeal and he came under great pressure from his superiors on that account. Murphy had attended some of the pro-Ferguson meetings in the O'Connell centenary dispute and four years later Ferguson claimed that Bishop Eyre had commanded Murphy not to preside at a meeting on the land question addressed by Parnell.3 In 1882 Murphy carried his dissidence further when he ran for the School Board with the backing of the Irish Nationalists in protest against the monopoly of the Catholic ticket since 1873 by Scottish clergy and laity alike. He came fifth overall at the poll, ahead

1. N.B.D.M., 22 Apr. 1876.
2. G. Herald, 25, 26, 27, 29 May 1885 for the exchange between Munro and O. Kiernan.
of the three official Church nominees, one of whom indeed was not elected; and it was claimed that Murphy had once more incurred the open opposition of his superiors for aligning with the political wing against the clerical. The prevalence of this barely concealed tension between the Church and the Home Rulers in this era made the political effectiveness of the latter less certain than mere numbers would indicate.

A more obvious impediment to their full impact being felt was the position occupied by Irish Catholics in the social structure of the city. The lowly position of the Irish in nineteenth century Greenock has recently been analysed and there seems little reason to doubt that the findings for that city apply to their Glasgow compatriots in respect of their predominance in the unskilled occupations, their low upward social mobility and their social isolation expressed in mainly endogenous marriages and great overcrowding in restricted ghetto-like areas of the city. A perspicacious French observer made the point about the jobs taken by the Irish in Glasgow: "The Irish are not usually very amenable to the influence of environment and find it difficult to acquire the habits of self-respect and persevering energy of which they have examples before their eyes. The Highlanders are more easily roused to ambition, and to the desire to better themselves, and they become modified by

contact with those influences which were lacking in the solitude of their mountain or island homes. The Irish generally remain mere labourers, as do their children after them. It can be no coincidence that the only union represented at Irish political demonstrations was the United Labourers of Glasgow.

As also obtained in Greenock, there was a marked tendency for the Irish to congregate in certain districts, and for these to be the most densely populated and insanitary parts of the city. J. B. Russell's investigative work as M.O.H. for Glasgow in the 1880's clearly established such a correlation and he confirmed the unquantified conclusions of contemporaries that the major concentrations of the Irish were in the Bridgegate, Cowcaddens, Gorbals, Maryhill, Anderston and sectors of the East·End (cf. TABLE 8.1). This occupational and residential segregation naturally prevented the Irish Catholics from easily assimilating into the life of the city. The religious difficulty was, as the strength of Orangeism testifies, also a powerful barrier, but other factors contributed. The Irish were seen as feckless, pugnacious, drunken, criminal and poverty-sricken, and so they were not accepted by respectable elements in the working-class: "The Irish were looked upon as an inferior race, hewers of wood and drawers of water, who should be treated with consideration but kept in their place.

"The less we had to do with them the better. Their religion was not our religion, which was the best; and their customs were

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Population (000's)</th>
<th>% Irish-born</th>
<th>% of 1 and 2-roomed houses</th>
<th>Death-rate per 1,000</th>
<th>Order of healthiness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Springburn and Maryhill</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Dundas</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anderston</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Andrews Square</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorbals</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Street West</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brownfield</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Glasgow</strong></td>
<td><strong>22.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td><strong>89</strong></td>
<td><strong>30.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>23</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cowcaddens</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Street East</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridgegate</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City as a whole</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>26 districts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only areas where over 16% of the population was Irish are considered.

different from ours, as was their speech. Doubtless there were good
folk among them, but the unruly and turbulent ones showed us what we
might become if we did not keep to our own people." ¹

Only one Irishman in this period played a full role in trade
union circles: Peter Henrietta, the Tailors' leader, who sat on the
Trades Council in the 1860's and 70's and who also participated in
the reform movements. The isolation of the Irish was emphasised by
their inability to secure a representative on the Town Council, even
although they were a large section of the constituency in several
wards. Sporadic efforts were made to remedy this defect, but even
the most sustained bout of activity - in 1872 and 1873 - yielded
nothing, despite careful preparations. ² Success only came in the
1890's, with the election of John Ferguson in 1893, while the first
Catholic magistrate since the Reformation was Patrick O'Hare, made
a bailie in 1903. ³ By 1883, the Jewish community, then numbering
some 300, had produced a councillor, but the 80,000 Irish had none.
As already noted, there was also a long tradition of political
antipathy to the Irish after they sponsored recruits to the Papal
Volunteers in 1860 to fight against Garibaldi, in whose army several

1. J. Devon, "The Calton Fifty Years Ago", Transactions of the Old
Glasgow Club, 6 (1930-1), p. 31. Compare the letter of the
Catholic apologist J. Walsh in G. Herald, 30 Sep. 1875 acknow-
elding the prevalence of poverty and criminality among the
Glasgow Irish: "It must be admitted that the Catholics as a
body belong to the working-classes, and the very poorest portion
of the working-class."


3. G. Herald, 10 Nov. 1917 for O'Hare. Ferguson became a bailie in
1898.
Glasgow men served and whose cause was dear to the working-class of the city. Some years later, too, the violent actions of the Fenians deeply offended the constitutionalism of the local working-class, then pressing for franchise reform.

Thus the Irish Catholics, cut off at every point from other Glaswegians, retained their individual identity and sustained it by creating their own cultural and quasi-religious associations, but this only confirmed their weak position. Even within Catholic circles, the non-Irish laity seemed to do better: they it was who sat on the School Board and their exclusive Caledonian Catholic Association, founded in 1876, perpetuated this gulf. The failure of the Irish to produce an outstanding leader from within their own ranks left them beholden either to non-Catholic Irish like John Ferguson or to non-Irish Catholics, such as F. E. Kerr, their parliamentary candidate in 1874.

Despite these hindrances, the turning-point for the Irish as a political force in the city came in the early 1870's, and three factors can be seen at work. The Second Reform Act had enfranchised many - the precise number was not clear until the election of 1874 - but they were no longer the puny voting interest of earlier years, when only a few hundred of the more successful Catholics had been empowered to poll. Nationally, too, the movement for Home Rule began to reassert itself at this point under the leadership of Issac

Butt, and Glasgow was one of the first mainland places to follow this direction, thanks in good part to the emergence of John Ferguson at the head. Ferguson was to be the commanding figure in the Scottish wing for the rest of the century, for very good reasons. Like Butt and Parnell, he was a Protestant and this made him an appealing leader, since, as he did not speak from a religious predisposition, his arguments might carry greater weight with the non-Catholic Scottish. Ferguson embraced the nationalist cause only when he settled in Glasgow in the 1860's, where he became a successful wholesale stationer. Besides conferring respectability and status, this comfortable financial background was vital, since it meant he was able to devote more time to politics and also provided stability at the top of a party plagued by a highly mobile rank and file.

The mood amongst the city Irish was changing also: St. Patrick's Day had hitherto been celebrated by singing Irish songs and toasting various aspects of Catholic progress; political overtones were quite lacking from this cultural and religious occasion and as late as 1869 commentators noted the absence of party feeling.¹ In the next year, however, the transition began when the long-standing Catholic apologist, James Walsh, called from the chair for Irish Protestants to support the cause of Irish freedom, as had the patriots of 1798. By 1872, March 17th had become a fully-fledged political event, organised by the local Home Government Association, with Ferguson,

¹ N.B.D.M., 18 Mar. 1869: "an indication that party spirit in and around Glasgow does not run to such an extent as it does across the Channel or on the other side of the Tweed". Also, ibid., 22 Mar. 1865.
branch President, in the chair and lengthy addresses on Irish freedom and independence delivered by two M.P.'s. ¹

Ferguson's work was considerably assisted by the improvement in lay-clerical relations at this juncture. It was not simply that Eyre was more circumspect than his predecessor, but the rise of the education question pulled all Catholics together. As they believed that the proposed legislation threatened to force the closure of the (Catholic) Poor Schools and drive the children educated there into state schools, clergy and laity united: "They are fully convinced that the circumstances of Scotland would render a purely national system intensely Protestant, and most prejudicial to Catholic interests."² At a meeting in 1871, a Catholic Education Crisis Fund was formed to combat this threat by agitating to maintain the right of denominational schools, if inspected and efficient, to receive grant and rates support and to regulate their own religious instruction.³ Meetings of clergy and laity were held to reaffirm this position, and when the Act became law the Catholics, who had all along approved of the cumulative voting system because it would protect minorities, organised to get their representatives elected

2. Petition of Catholic Clergy and Laity of Scotland Protesting against the Parochial School (Scotland) Bill, (n.p., n.d.) in AGA, Box 'Education'.
to the School Boards. By restricting themselves to three candidates they were able to exploit the 15 votes per elector to full advantage: all three being returned in second, third and fourth places.

This great success, while it was essentially clerical in inspiration and leadership, with no direct bearings on Irish nationalism, gave an invaluable fillip to that political movement. It suggested new hopes of electoral power, although these had been dashed the previous October when a leading Catholic, James Lynch, had run for the Council but lost.\(^1\) It was a sign of the growing political consciousness of the Irish in Glasgow that, under the guidance of Ferguson, the momentum of the School Board victory was incorporated into the growth of the Home Government Association as a movement with broader aims. For at the outset the School Board fight was one further incident in the long history of sectarian struggles conducted inside the city with little reference to national political currents. Thus in 1852 there had been set up a group of Catholic Electors who aimed to vote against the Voluntary Hastie because of his opposition to the Maynooth grant.\(^2\) In 1867–8 allegations of religious discrimination against Catholic children in the city's House of Refuge gave rise to an agitation to secure fuller representation on the Council.\(^3\) But such outbursts had never carried beyond the specific issue in contention, whereas in the mid 1870's the new impetus was sustained and capitalised upon.


The strategy of the Irish Home Rulers in these formative years had three main sides. It was first necessary to organise and educate sympathisers in the principles of the cause; then the size of the Irish vote could be firmly established; and from this the best tactics to be deployed in the context of the balance of power in city politics would emerge.

The Glasgow branch of the Home Government Association was launched in November 1871, when Butt delivered an address on Home Rule.\(^1\) At once it proved a most active organisation and within a year it reported that it had acquired premises at 14 East Nile Street, which contained committee offices, a library and a room for social meetings.\(^2\) Its membership remained unstated, but the unit of branch organisation evidently followed the boundaries of the seven Catholic city parishes.\(^3\) Frequent meetings were held by these branches, but more importance was placed on the public demonstrations and mass meetings which were developed as a political technique by the Irish to a greater degree than any other political movement. These meetings fell into three categories, and each served a different purpose.

The most colourful occasions were the gala festivities which mixed political with social functions. These were held on St Patrick's

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1. *G. Herald*, 15 Nov. 1871. The actual formation of the branch did not, however, take place at this meeting, at Butt's insistence.
3. The contingents at the 1873 August procession are listed by the names of parishes (*G. Herald*, 18 Aug. 1873), and it is significant that there were seven branches, as there were seven parishes.
day and on 17th August, the Irish Catholic parallel to the Orange 12th of July celebrations, and characterised by similar high spirits. The large crowd (up to 10,000 was customary), many of whom wore patriotic colours and sported Irish favours, was led by bands from the city centre through friendly districts to an open-air venue. Once assembled there, the gathering, with political posters and slogans prominent, listened to speechifying on the Irish cause, passed appropriate resolutions and then dissolved. The speakers were normally local leaders, and the whole atmosphere was generally holiday-like, although violence was an ever-present menace. Returning stragglers might be assaulted by Orange gangs as they passed near hostile territory, and in 1876 two Volunteers who accidentally shot two of the crowd while on rifle practice were severely beaten up in the belief that they were Orangemen in disguise.\(^1\)

The primary aim of these events seems to have been to bring together Irishmen in the various districts of the city at least twice a year, and it may be significant that the August meetings began in 1873, shortly after the politicisation of the St Patrick's day soiree.

That type of meeting was, however, rather an inward-looking practice, designed to meet local needs, whereas the other forms operated to promote the integration of the Glasgow Irish into the total struggle for self-determination. This was done by bringing in outside speakers to give lectures which were mainly educational.

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in content, such as the address on "The Duty of Irishmen to Home Rule", delivered by Rev. I. Nelson in 1873.\(^1\) In addition, sympathy and indignation meetings were a regular feature of Irish political tactics. In 1873 they met to protest at the imprisonment of Daniel MacAleese, a Belfast editor; Dr Mulcahy, "the illustrious patriot and ex-Fenian convict" talked in 1876 on his spell in gaol; in 1878 the released prisoners Davitt, O'Brien and Chambers came to recount their experiences; and the arrest of Parnell in 1881 provoked several demonstrations of outrage.\(^2\) Besides the obvious propaganda gains, these sorts of meetings not only stiffened the resolve of the city Irish to fight for Home Rule, but they also encouraged them to relate to events outside the sectarian situation existing in Glasgow into which they might otherwise, as in the past, relapse.

To maintain this perspective, regular visits from the national heroes helped. Leaders such as Butt, Biggar, Parnell, Davitt and Redmond came every second or third year to reaffirm the principles of Irish nationalism.\(^3\) They were inevitably given a delirious reception by the enthusiastic Glasgow Irish community, and it is interesting that the profit on Parnell's trip was £111, as much as the G.L.A. made from Gladstone's visit.\(^4\) A further sign of the involvement of

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3. Butt came in 1871, 1873 and 1876; Parnell in 1877 and 1881; Davitt in 1879, 1882 and 1884.

the Glasgow branches in the larger movement was their speedy name-
changes and affiliations to the different bodies which sprang up.¹
For a long spell, too, John Ferguson sat on the Central Board of the
Home Government Association and its successors, thus making the links
between Glasgow and the national movement even closer.

Despite the importance of these various types of meetings, party
organisation remained especially critical for the Irish, since previous
ventures had foundered either over personality clashes or over the
difficulty of coping with a mobile Irish population which made
continuity of officials and personnel well-nigh impossible. In this
respect, Ferguson proved invaluable, because he provided a permanent
fixture which permitted the movement to survive the inevitable
doldrums as well as the turnover of supporters. It was partly his
commanding presence which helped the Glasgow Irish to adjust smoothly
from one phase of the nationalist agitation to another without serious
dissension. When Butt, who had been revered on his appearances in
Glasgow in the company of Ferguson, began to topple under the
challenge of Parnell and Biggar, Ferguson presided at meetings which
unanimously resolved that Butt's censure of Parnell and Biggar was
regrettable, and that all M.P.'s who did not support the obstructionists
"have forfeited the confidence of the Irish people". Six weeks later,
Parnell was rapturously received by a capacity audience in the City
Hall, and branches of the Parnellite party were then formed, conforming

¹. G. Herald, 19 Mar. 1872, 13 June 1881.
to the pattern of their predecessors, with identical leaders. 1 When the Land League came to the fore, those engaged in forming a steering committee for a Glasgow branch were prominent Home Rulers, led by Ferguson, himself one of Davitt's closest British correspondents. 2

While Ferguson was able to lead a united party in this resolute manner, he was also able to beat off attacks from extremists. The fiery language of the Fenian days, when Father Lavelle had come to Glasgow calling for violence to achieve their ends, had passed and because that approach had failed, it was conclusively rejected. 3 Occasional signs of a recrudescence of that spirit, such as a motion to end petitioning parliament because it was "useless and degrading", as well as the Phoenix Park assassinations, drew forth instant condemnation from the Glasgow League. 4 On the latter occasion, Ferguson wrote to Gladstone to express his abhorrence of violence, repudiating such "illegitimate methods" as "dynamite, the dagger and all such means of violence as weapons of reform" and he warned that "they must not deteriorate, as Greeks and Italians did, from patriots into brigands". 5

Unity was important since it enhanced the potential influence of the Irish in city politics: if they constituted a sizeable voting

2. N.B.D.M., 2 Nov. 1880.
5. G. Herald, 20 Mar. 1883, also ibid., 8, 23 May 1882.
block, they might exercise considerable pressure on the main parties. The 1873 School Board elections seemed to clarify the size of the Irish electorate, for the Catholic candidates received the votes of about 9,500 electors, and, assuming that the non-Irish Catholic element in that were balanced out by non-Catholic Home Rulers, this might be taken as their strength. As only 51% of the voters had turned out, Ferguson felt secure in talking in terms of up to 15,000 Irish voters in the city.1 Emboldened by the 1873 results, F. E. Kerr stood in the general election of 1874 in the Catholic-Irish interest, and his vote sadly dented their confidence, for he drew only 4,444 of which 4,003 were plumpers. This implied that only 10% of the electors were in fact Home Rule-inclined, and at first sight also suggested that many Catholics - about one-half - disapproved of the nationalist cause.

The answer to the discrepancy, however, lay in the different qualification for admission to the School Board and Parliamentary electoral rolls, for well over 100,000 were on the former, and only 60,000 on the latter. To get on the Parliamentary role under the occupier franchise, payment of rates was a prerequisite, but: "the School Board electors are principally male and female occupiers who do not pay rates . . . The average number of male occupiers of houses in Glasgow under £10 of rent since 1868 who have not paid rates

being about 25,000 a year."¹ As the Irish were generally to be found among the poorer sections of society, John Ferguson's claim in 1877 that there would be 10,000 Irish voters if only defaulters paid their rates seems reasonable.²

Other restrictions imposed by the socio-economic standing of the Irish in Glasgow further checked their strength in the Parliamentary ballot-box. Thus, occupiers had not only to have paid poor rates, they also had to reside in that property for twelve months prior to being registered. But one of the features of the Glasgow housing system was the high turnover in tenants - about one-third could change house in one year - and these were normally in cheaper sector of the market, where the preponderance of the Irish were. Because they filled the unskilled, casual, seasonal jobs, the Irish were the more prone to move around in search of work or in response to economic changes. The Clerk to the School Board observed: "there is a very large shifting (Irish) population constantly shifting to and from . . . The assessor assures me that accounts for 10,000 or 15,000 names that will get on the school board list that will never get on the Parliamentary list, as the people are so migratory in their habits."³

It is likely, too, that the difficulties in the way of securing the


² G. Herald, 20 Aug. 1877.

parliamentary lodger franchise was especially felt by the Irish. It is probable that many Irishmen were lodgers - the incidence of overcrowding suggests considerable doubling-up of Irish families, and the disproportionately high number of single Irish-born young men (a characteristic of all immigrant groups), taken with evidence from elsewhere in Britain, indicates that the urban Irish still retained the extended family pattern of household.¹

Ferguson's reaction to the divergence revealed in 1874 was to announce his intention of at once getting the missing parliamentary voters put on the roll, so that he could command 10,000 Irishmen at the next election. Two years later he summed up the progress made: "At the last election they had shown partly what they could do; but since then they had been registering, their people had been educated into their political rights and at the next election Mr Anderson might find that 7,000 or 8,000 Irish votes plumped against him (Loud Cheers)."² Thereafter he regularly talked in the realms of 7 to 8,000, but it is difficult to determine what truth lay in Ferguson's claim.³ The authorities cited immediately above refer to the 1880's, which implies little progress was made. The Parliamentary electorate fluctuated over the years: in 1880 it was 3,856 higher than in 1874, but this was a drop of over 3,000 from 1876, when Ferguson made his

³ E.g., G. News, 18 Aug. 1879.
claim. The decrease was attributable to the recession of the late 1870's, which probably affected the Irish to a great extent. Variations in the Catholic poll at the School Board contests bear this point out: 9,300 in 1873; 10,300 in 1876; 8,500 in 1879; 10,300 in 1882; 12,200 in 1885. All in all, it is doubtful if the parliamentary voting power of the Irish ever exceeded 6 or 7,000.1

The smallness of the actual Irish vote was not the sole factor which threatened to weaken the bargaining position of the Irish nationalists in the balance of city politics. Equally pertinent was the question whom these voters looked to as their leaders - the clerical or political spokesmen for their community. If it was the former, then the pressure the latter could exert on the mainstream of politics would be very slight. In 1874, F. E. Kerr had had the support, tacit and overt, of the clergy. He was already the single lay Catholic member of the School Board, several priests sat on the platform of his campaign meetings, and the first point in his election address was not Home Rule but religion: "I will zealously watch over all measures affecting Catholic interests at Home and Abroad."2

Thus, so long as the priesthood favoured separate Catholic representation for Glasgow, it was impossible to say what motivated Irish voters.


2. G. Herald, 4 Feb. 1874 for the address, and also his sole reported meeting.
The politicians' position became clearer at the 1882 School Board contest, when, as already noted, Fr. Murphy stood with the backing of the Home Rulers and in the face of the hostility of the hierarchy. Although Murphy got more votes than any of the official Church candidates, this in itself was not evidence of very much, for analysis shows that in terms of individual voters (as distinct from cumulative votes) Murphy was not so strong: cf. TABLE 8.2. The results could also be interpreted as showing that just under one half of the Catholic voters obeyed the instructions of their religious leaders, about one-fifth totally defied their orders by plumping for Murphy, and one-third were prepared to give a share of their votes to the rebel. This was most encouraging for the politicians, since education was above all a religious matter, and the church candidates had run unchallenged in the three previous elections. Loyalty to the Church's slate might be expected to be reinforced by the intrusion of a fourth contender, since this threatened to destroy the careful calculation of voting power upon which three-man Catholic representation was based. That many were prepared to take this risk, which could have left the Church defenceless in the face of Presbyterian schemes to end the separate identity of Catholic schools was a boost for the supporters of Murphy. As a contemporary noted, the election "shows that Archbishop Eyre has to reckon with the power of Parnell", and by extension this meant that the hands of the Glasgow Home Rulers were stiffened in their relations with existing political parties.  

TABLE 8.2 Analysis of School Board Contest Results, 1882

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position In Poll</th>
<th>Total Votes</th>
<th>Actual Electors</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fr. H. Murphy</td>
<td>47,521</td>
<td>1,789</td>
<td>3,678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fr. A. Munro</td>
<td>42,038</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>7,158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fr. C. Wood</td>
<td>33,204</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>6,396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Henry*</td>
<td>23,535</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>4,213</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Henry was not elected, as only 15 sat on the Board.

Assuming, as is probable, that there was no overspill, so that these four candidates won all the Catholic votes cast, the breakdown is:

- **Loyal Nationalist**: 1789 (Plumps for Murphy)
- **Loyal Catholic**: c4850 (Plumps + Residue after deducting Murphy's spread)
- **Split Loyalties**: c3700 (Murphy's spread votes)

**Source**: G. Herald, 25, 27 Mar., 1 Apr. 1882 gives the results and the distribution of votes between candidates.
With the defects and impediments to the total exercise of their power by the Irish set in perspective, their part in the political processes of the city can be assessed. Their attenuated strength was more circumscribed by the basic impossibility of carrying out the well-known balancing tactic, whereby the Irish sought to play off the promises of the major parties in return for their block vote. It was really very difficult to see Glasgow Conservatives ever accepting any pact with the Irish, given the strong Protestant foundations upon which they were based. Total and unwavering opposition to any concessions to the Home Rule party was displayed by local Tories, and the choice of Bain, with open Orange backing, as their candidate in 1880 was a correct picture of their attitude. Ferguson always sounded rather luke-warm when threatening that his followers would defect to the Conservative side, especially as these overtures were scornfully rejected by the Tories.¹

Ferguson, however, saw this manoeuvre as only a small part of his general strategy, which was to win over the Liberals to support Home Rule, and he contemplated working with the Tories only the utmost extremity, since "he would do it with the greatest possible dislike and repugnance". He hoped to persuade the Liberals by a mixture of propaganda and agitation to make concessions to Irish demands. The Liberals, he claimed, were more likely to respond

than the Conservatives, because the Irish requests were in full accord with the principles of Liberalism, and so he believed that the politically educated section of the party would come to acknowledge the justice of the Irish case. Accordingly much of the initial effort of the Home Government Association went into disproving that it was sectarian. Irish Protestants spoke at their meetings, stressing the movement's purely constitutional objectives, and a popular theme for lectures was the prominence of Protestants in the Irish national movement from Grattan and Wolfe Tone onwards.

This strain of argument disappeared for a spell after 1875, possibly because of the discreditable feuding over the O'Connell centenary. The failure to persuade by argument drove the Irish to apply more direct action with the intention of forcing concessions out of the Liberals. While disruption and heavy pressure were standard elements of the policy of the Irish nationalists both in Parliament and in the constituencies, the pattern of relations in Glasgow was as much related to local events as to the centrally directed campaign. For despite Ferguson's conviction that the Glasgow Liberals would prove conciliatory, for the entire time until the first Home Rule bill was introduced they remained almost provocatively intransigent.


Ferguson also claimed that the withdrawal of the Irish vote would be an important consideration for the city Liberals, and all these factors combined to induce the sponsoring of an Irish candidate in 1874.  

Firstly, as has been seen, excessive optimism, engendered by the School Board results, meant that the Irish vote was substantially overestimated. Then Gladstone's refusal to release the Fenian prisoners antagonised the Home Government Association, and a pledge was taken at Glasgow, as elsewhere, to oppose all candidates who approved of this decision.  

Finally, at the local level, George Anderson's refusal to attend a meeting to be addressed by Butt, because he disagreed with its objects, drew forth an outburst: "there were 10,000 votes in Glasgow which would have to be considered at the next election, and these 10,000 votes would unmistakeably tell George Anderson that he ought, within these two years, to have understood what Home Rule was (Loud Applause)."

Hence the Irish were committed to trying to realise Ferguson's prediction that "probably a good staunch Home Ruler would be the third M.P. for Glasgow". This experiment proved a failure, although the volume of plumping for Kerr indicates that most Irish Catholic electors heeded the clear instructions given to back him alone. Nevertheless, Kerr's vote of rather over 4,400 meant that the Irish

2. G. Herald, 18 Aug. 1873, when Ferguson said: "He (Col. Mure) was a supporter of Gladstone and the cry was 'War with Gladstone' (A voice, 'To the knife', and Loud Cheers)."
were not directly responsible for the loss of a Liberal seat in Glasgow. Their influence would not then count for very much once the disunity in the Liberal party was repaired, for as the 1880 election confirmed, there was a handsome Liberal majority in the city, irrespective of the Irish vote. After 1874, the Liberals could increasingly afford to be offhand with the Home Rulers, and so the latter were not invited to the discussions preliminary to the formation of the Liberal Association. Cameron, and more so Anderson, steadily voted against every Home Rule motion put forward by the nationalists, and at the 1880 contest the three Liberal candidates blithely ignored the presence of the Irish vote. The Irish themselves admitted their irrelevance to the outcome by first intimating that they would vote against the Liberals, but finally relented and reluctantly recommended their followers to vote Liberal.¹

In Gladstone's second administration relations deteriorated. After their resounding success in the election, the Glasgow Liberals felt secure now that the bluff of the Irish had been exposed, and Ferguson's request later that year that the G.L.A. might care to join the British Anti-Coercion movement was brusquely dismissed.² The general line adopted by the Liberals was that the Land Act of 1881 fully met the legitimate grievances of the Irish tenant farmers, and

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2. G. Herald, 30 Nov. 1880.
was moreover "a faithful redemption of the pledge given to the country" in the election. Therefore, the question had been satisfactorily settled in accordance with the long Liberal tradition of ameliorating economic conditions and of raising a "downtrodden nationality". The refusal of the Irish to endorse this interpretation infuriated city Liberals, who were yet more incensed by the tactics adopted of parliamentary obstruction and of agrarian outrages in Ireland. On the one hand, the challenge to the operation of democratic institutions was strongly deplored, especially by Whigs, and the extreme steps of cloture and coercion were held to be justified by the need to maintain "liberty and order". Others, mainly Radicals, were angry that the unreasonableness of the Irish in persisting with their demands after the passage of the Land Act was preventing the Liberal government from moving forward to deal with pressing topics in Scotland, such as disestablishment, temperance and social reform.

The willingness of the Liberals to tolerate coercion, and their insensitivity to the indignation felt by the Irish at the arrest of their political leaders, including Parnell, in 1881 goes far to explain the growing gulf. An extra source of friction, however, was

1. Report of a Special Meeting of the "Six Hundred" of the Glasgow Liberal Association for the Consideration of the Land Law (Ireland) Bill held on 22nd April, 1881 (Glasgow, 1881), pp. 4, 8 for the resolutions.


the manner in which some Liberals sought to exploit the Irish, because they were politically impotent, in the local intra-party squabbling. Allegations were made on two occasions that the Radical faction was flirting with the nationalists with the aim of using them to overwhelm internal opposition in the G.L.A. The first came in July 1879, when Ferguson published a letter he wrote to the secretary of the G.L.A., explaining that he would not join since Tennant was President and he had firmly resisted all Irish demands.¹ Then in 1883, the Association's office-bearers were accused of condoning Ferguson's attendance at the annual National Liberal Federation conference as a delegate of the Glasgow Irish, even although formally relations were at a low ebb between the two bodies.²

There is no way of substantiating these charges, which were made in the press columns and at Association meetings, but they may be partially accurate. The Irish disliked not just Tennant, but all Whigs: "Scottish Whiggery still dominates the action of the Liberal party in Glasgow, and Scottish Whiggery was always narrow and indolent."³ They had little time for the Lib-Labs, both because Anderson had consistently attacked any concessions to the Irish, and because the Workmen's Electoral Union was no more sympathetic, as they discovered when a motion at one of the Union's meetings which expressed opposition to coercion found no seconder.⁴ Those were the

¹ G. Herald, 31 Jul., 1, 2 Aug. 1879 for the exchange of letters.
² Ibid., 1, 8, 9, 20, 21, 23 Nov. 1883 for this episode and reactions to it.
⁴ G. Herald, 29 Apr. 1882.
very enemies of the Radicals too, and the timing of the two incidents is suggestive. The first followed very soon after the Whig and Lib-Lab alliance had expunged the programme drawn up by the Dissenters from the constitution of the Association, and it was claimed that the defeated section was trying to redress the imbalance by calling in new forces. The situation had changed by 1883. In the previous year most of the Whigs had departed, so that the Anderson group was in a weak position to resist a combined onslaught which the Radicals could launch in conjunction with the Irish.

While the motives of these moves must remain little more than speculations, what is apparent is the contemptuous treatment meted out to the Irish by all groups of Liberals, and this increased their sense of futility. Two responses were adopted, one destructive, the other more positive, but the net result was to emphasise the isolation of the Irish in the Glasgow political system. The first tactic was to create noisy scenes at Liberal meetings. Initially this was confined to intensive interrogation on Irish matters at the annual meetings held by M.P.'s with their constituents, and these interjections were normally greeted with good-natured badinage by the audience, although the questions were firmly rebuffed by the Members.¹

This tactic was drastically stepped up in January 1882. Irish feeling had been running high since the arrest of Parnell in the

1. Thus questions were asked between 1875 and 1879 on the release of Fenian prisoners. G. Herald, 21 Jan. 1875 (P. Henrietta), 14 Jan. 1876 (W. McDade), 18 Jan. 1877 (T. Kelly), 17 Jan. 1879 (P. Shields).
previous October, when an indignation meeting denounced Gladstone and the Liberal government. The Glasgow branch of the National Land League then sponsored a petition allegedly representative of "16,000 householders and 100,000 inhabitants" protesting at the arrests.¹

In this situation it was less than tactful on the part of the G.L.A. to submit to the annual ward meetings, held only one month later, resolutions which unreservedly approved the government's handling of home and foreign policy and deplored parliamentary obstruction. At the first two of these meetings the trouble was compounded by the main speakers roundly assailing the Irish for their intransigence.²

The Irish Nationalists were provoked beyond endurance, and seven of the subsequent ward meetings were subjected to disruption by them, as described above.³ While the Irish undoubtedly caused much embarrassment to the Liberals by these acts, the latter had no trouble in quashing the dissident resolutions.

The ease with which the Liberals had overcome this head-on challenge made the alternative policy the best hope for the Nationalists of making any impact. This consisted of an attempt to link up the Irish with the nascent Highland agitation.⁴ With a substantial

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2. G. Herald, 19 Jan. 1882, speeches by Cllr. Stuart and J. Colquhon at wards 1 and 16 respectively.

3. See above, pp. 343-5.

Highland population in Glasgow itself, it seemed a promising avenue, especially as Davitt, who did much to inspire the Highland crofters, was a close friend of Ferguson and a regular speaker to the city's Irish. Moreover, as the Glasgow Home Rulers had formed branches of the Irish Land League in 1880 - in line with the changes in the nationalists' course of action - they were in a good organisational position to join with the Highlanders.

The first branches of the Scottish Land Reform bodies were formed in Glasgow in 1881, and co-operation soon flourished. The Irish passed motions at their meetings deploring the evictions in Scotland along with their normal nationalist aspirations, and promised to render all possible aid to their Highland brethren. Scotsmen increasingly occupied platform places at Irish League meetings: at one John Murdoch, the veteran Chartist and leader of the crofter agitation, appeared attired in full Highland regalia; and they moved motions on both Irish and Scottish grievances. At this time Ferguson boasted that the majority of the Irish League's Glasgow committee was either Protestant or Scottish. It is not clear how

1. T. W. Moody, "Michael Davitt and the British Labour Movement", TRHS, 5th series, 3 (1953), pp. 61-2. For Davitt in Glasgow, G. Herald, 5, 11 Feb. 1884. He became President of the Glasgow Young Ireland Society, and a city branch of the Land League was named after him.


4. E.g., G. Herald, 8, 13 June 1881 for Glasier and Shaw Maxwell, ibid., 6 Nov. 1883 for A. Sutherland and D. Campbell. Also G. Herald, 4 June 1882 for Murdoch in Highland dress.

5. G. Herald, 15 Jul. 1881 for his views.
far the Irish promoted and subsidised the Scottish land law reformers in Glasgow. At the very first inaugural meeting the chair was taken by Ferguson's business partner, Duncan Cameron, but he vigorously denied that the Irish had offered any concrete assistance, as did Murdoch some 18 months later.\textsuperscript{1} It is improbable that much in the way of financial aid was forthcoming, for the Glasgow Irish were not a wealthy political force.\textsuperscript{2}

Ferguson rationalised this liaison by proclaiming that the objectives of the Irish League were to show that the Irish problem was not insulated from broad currents of British politics and also to pose a threat to the complacency of established Liberalism in Glasgow. But the projected marriage of the Scots and Irish was never really likely to come off. Firstly, the Irish were at all times intent on their single goal, and their involvement in the Highland agitation was merely a manoeuvre towards that end, which could be discarded if the circumstances altered. This was proven in the 1885 elections when the Irish faithfully obeyed the instructions issued by Parnell to vote Conservative, despite the candidacy of two prominent Scottish Land Restoration Leaguers standing in the most Irish seats in Glasgow. Moreover, the initial sympathy and respect felt by the Scots rapidly evaporated after the Phoenix Park murders,

\textsuperscript{1} G. Herald, 9 June 1881, N.B.D.M., 16 Dec. 1882.

\textsuperscript{2} Crowley, "The Crofters' Party", p. \textsuperscript{\textendash}, states that £1,000 was given by the Irish Land League to the Scottish organisation.
despite Ferguson's unequivocal denunciation of the outrage.\(^1\)

Antagonism against the Irish was fanned by an explosion in 1883 which destroyed a Glasgow gas-works, killing several people. At their trial, the dynamitards freely confessed to being Irish revolutionaries, so discrediting the whole Irish movement.\(^2\)

As well as this drift by the Scots land reformers away from the Irish, there were powerful grounds why the former should look to the local Liberals for a favourable attitude, rather than, as Ferguson anticipated, repudiation. Interest in land law reform among radical circles was of old standing, for all the city Liberal candidates in 1874 called for sweeping liberalisation of the laws relating to game, entail, primogeniture and hypothec. Dr Cameron took a particularly prominent part in expounding and upholding the crofters' case in and out of parliament. From 1881 onwards he chaired and spoke at most major meetings in the question in the Glasgow constituency, and others who were active included Gilbert Beith, David Fortune and Alexander Cross.\(^3\) The G.L.A. itself called on several occasions for a full and just settlement of the Highlanders' demands, and it was instrumental in passing a resolution at the first conference of the National Liberal Federation of Scotland which sought to apply the Irish Land Acts to Scotland.\(^4\) Thus there was more to be gained by Scottish


\(^{2}\) C. T. Couper, *The Trial of the Dynamitards* (Glasgow, 1884) spares no detail.

\(^{3}\) For some of Cameron's activities, see G. Herald, 2 Dec. 1881, 12 Jan., 5 Dec. 1883, N.B.D.M., 5 May 1884.

land law reformers from remaining in touch with the Liberals rather than going wholeheartedly with the Irish. It is noticeable that the Liberal press regarded the two Land League candidates as Liberals who were committing an error of judgment in standing, but did not denounce them as renegades, or as semi-socialists or as covert Irish nationalists.¹

After the election of 1885, the plight of the Glasgow Home Rulers seemed, if anything, even more acute. Their conduct in the polls had signalled the bankruptcy of the approach to the Scottish land agitation, while it also left them totally anathema in the eyes of the Liberals. The Conservatives were not prepared to pay any attention to them, since the Irish vote had still not been enough to swing a seat away from the Liberals. Only the Home Rule crisis brought them back into the centre of Glasgow politics.

2. The Early Socialist Movement

Despite the reputation gained by Glasgow in the first quarter of the twentieth century as the centre of the most militant socialist manifestations in Britain, it would be difficult to discern any indications of this in the period before, at least, 1890. It is true that socialist or quasi-socialist groups did spasmodically appear, but there was little continuity between them and they met with strikingly little support, except when they were involved in issues which attracted interest for other reasons.

As elsewhere in Britain, the tail-end of the Chartist movement produced some socialist currents in Glasgow. A Glasgow Communist Society was formed, and Lloyd Jones came up from London to lecture to it in 1850, but since Chartism in Glasgow had always been noted for its moderation and respectability, the communists made little headway and nothing further is reported in the press of the organisation or the individuals involved. 1

Although it has been shown that in some places the radical republican groups of the early 1870's constituted a bridge the socialist peaks of the 1840's and 1880's, there is scant evidence to sustain this interpretation in the case of Glasgow. 2 The Republican Club was not launched in the city until January, 1872, nearly three years later than London, and after Dundee and Edinburgh, and even then only after assistance from the London Republican Association. 3 Moreover, the club was apparently inactive by the end of the year, and it can hardly have been well-supported, to judge from its first half-yearly report, which recorded a total income of £7 11s. 5d. 4

Given its belated formation, small size and speedy demise, it is not surprising that no unorthodox political ideas were advocated


3. N.B.D.M., 10 Jan. 1872; cf. ibid., 9 Dec. 1871 for London assistance, and 13 Nov. 1871 for a letter by "Young Republican".

by the club, and there is no sign of the "proletarian left" which emerged in London, supporting the full rights of trade unions, defending the Paris Commune and calling for the end of the monopoly in landownership. Instead, its programme showed that Glasgow republicanism stayed firmly within the area of political Radicalism which Dilke represented. The manifesto called for the abolition of the monarchy, an end to all State churches and full adult male suffrage. Except for the republican form of government, all of these demands were common currency amongst advanced Liberals in the city. Even there, republicanism was held to be "adapted to the requirements of the age" since it was "vastly superior in point of efficiency and economy", rather than because of any egalitarian social philosophy. The essential Radicalism, as distinct from socialism, of the Club was evinced by the two "events" of its existence. These were the visits of Dilke and Bradlaugh, both of whom gave addresses exposing the cost of maintaining the monarchy, while the third hero of the members was George Anderson, otherwise a pillar of the centre of the Liberal party, who had supported Dilke's republican motions in the Commons.

4. G. Herald, 1 Oct. 1872 for Dilke, 2 Apr. 1872 for Bradlaugh. Dilke filled one-third of the City Hall. P. Henrietta praised Anderson as "the only man of original mark and note the new House of Commons had returned", N.B.D.M., 12 Jan. 1872.
Nor did the leading members of the Republican Club participate in later socialist agitations. The Irishman Peter Henrietta, an official of the Tailors' Union, carried some weight in working-class political circles, but aside from his republican views he belonged securely in the mainstream of Lib-Lab politics. Also prominent was Duncan Cameron, John Ferguson's business partner, but his subsequent politics were in the land agitation, and he had nothing whatever to do with the embryonic socialists of the 1880's. The Republicans lingered on, half defunct, into the late 1870's, when they occupied a stance on the Green where they were a source of entertainment along with the no-popery blacksmith and the apologist for the Tichborne claimant. ¹

The socialist revival of the early 1880's originated in London, but the founders soon began to seek to spread their message to the provinces. ² One of the more propitious places to start seemed to be Glasgow, for it was both a strong centre of radical Liberalism, which was enthusiastically responding to Henry George's quasi-socialist ideas, and it also had a large working-class population, whose living conditions were a vivid indictment of capitalist economics. ³ As early as March 1882, Helen Taylor delivered a long address to a city

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audience under the auspices of the Democratic Federation, at which she was accompanied by Hyndman, George and three local land law reformers, Ferguson, J. Shaw Maxwell and Angus Sutherland.¹

Although a branch was formed at the meeting, the S.D.F.'s progress in Glasgow was slow, and within two years had virtually disappeared. In May 1884, a local sympathiser stated that "the branch of the Democratic Federation in this city has done little work for many months past . . .", and an attempt to resuscitate it in June failed.² By November, amidst complaints of "lethargy", Glasgow socialists were asked "is it not disgraceful that in a city like this you cannot form a branch of the S.D.F.?"³ In December 1884 the breakthrough came: the S.D.F. branch was re-constituted after two lectures on scientific socialism by Hyndman and Morris which "mark definitely the beginning of public socialist propaganda in Glasgow".⁴ Almost immediately, however, the repercussions of the Hyndman-Morris schism were felt when about one half of the Glasgow S.D.F.'ers broke away to form a branch of Morris's Socialist League. Included in the League were important figures like J. Bruce Glasier and James Mavor, who found Hyndman's personality too overweening,

2. Justice, 31 May, 28 June 1884.
3. Ibid., 8 Nov. 1884, letter by Scheu; cf. Moses McGibbon's letter, 1 Nov.
and the League proved more dynamic than the rump of the S.D.F. The latter limped along uncertainly, held together by the secretary, W. J. Nairne, a dour teetotal day labourer of rigid Marxist doctrines, but it made little visible impact, apart from holding weekly open-air meetings on the Green.¹

The difficulties in establishing a branch of the S.D.F. in Glasgow is surprising, especially in the light of the virile growth experience by the Edinburgh branch. It was more galling still when Andreas Scheu, the leader of the Edinburgh socialists, undertook to revitalise the Glasgow branch late in 1884.² The obstacles to the progress of socialism in Glasgow were to be found in both political and social determinants. There were three political groupings from whom the socialists hoped to gain conversions: the Irish nationalists, the Scottish land leaguers and the advanced Liberals. Some instances of this did occur - Moses McGibbon, who was responsible for the Irish assault on the G.L.A. in 1882, and Shaw Maxwell are illustrations - but examination of each of these potential recruiting areas reveals that such cases were the exception.

As has been seen, the Irish were only loyal to the goal of national liberty and they displayed no interest in socialist ideas

¹. Pelling, Origins, pp. 27-32 discusses the split; for Glasgow, Glasier, Morris, pp. 15-17, Mavor, My Windows, I, pp. 177-80. For Nairne, see Glasier, p. 33: "He, more than any other, was the founder and pioneer of the Social Democratic Federation in Scotland"; cf. H. W. Lee and E. Archibold, Social-Democracy in Britain (London, 1935), pp. 140-1, 91.

². E.g., Justice, 31 May 1884: "so far Edinburgh has outstripped Glasgow in its zeal for the cause".
as such. They were, however, ready to widen the base of their own campaign by securing the support of local socialists for land nationalisation in Ireland, but the latter soon despaired of converting them fully.

The land issue in its Scottish dimension was the main approach by which the socialists counted on winning native support in Glasgow. Scheu found the failure of the S.D.F. "hardly explainable", given the city's interest in the land question, but this very factor may paradoxically have explained why pure socialist ideas were resisted, although it is normally assumed that there was a natural progression from one to the other.¹ The Scottish Land and Labour League - the S.D.F.'s own creation - was purely Edinburgh-based and had no branch in Glasgow, where more moderate bodies like the Land Restoration League flourished.² The failure of the socialists to make any inroads in Glasgow is explicable in two ways. Firstly, as the Irish also learned, there was the participation of the radical wing of the city Liberals in the land campaign, which meant that the Land Leaguers could look to finding a solution within the framework of the existing party system, so diminishing the pull of the socialist case. But besides a genuine desire to improve the economic and social position of the crofter (and incidentally gain the support of the electorally significant Highland population in Glasgow), these Radicals conceived

¹ Justice, 8 Nov. 1884 for Scheu.
of the land issue as furthering the cause dearest to their hearts, disestablishment. This made their commitment to the land law agitation illusory as a guide to their willingness to accept the rest of the fundamental reforms demanded by the socialists.

The standpoint of the Radicals was clearly put by Gilbert Beith, the leading layman in the West of Scotland disestablishment movement. A Highlander and son of a Disruption worthy, Beith had conspicuously identified himself with every phase of the crofters' struggle, and in 1884 he defined the essence of the problem in his analysis:

"The Established Church question in the Highlands is a crofters' question, bound up with the crofters' land question. You cannot deal practically with the one injustice and leave the other untouched. The two questions together represent a struggle for civil and religious liberty in which the people have been worsted and overthrown."¹ Thus the issue was still seen as part of general Gladstonian Liberalism which concentrated on constitutional reforms. Beith's approach was far removed from that of Hyndman, which he adumbrated in the same year: "Landlordism and capitalism are now being attacked and both must stand or fall together."²

Moreover, relations between the Land Leaguers and the socialists in Glasgow were quite cool. Because they had been organised before

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² Justice, 3 May 1884.
the S.D.F., the impetus lay with those preoccupied with the land question. Their political preferences are displayed in *The Voice of the People*, edited by Shaw Maxwell himself. The paper's Manifesto, published in November 1883, called for the abolition of the monarchy, substantial land law reform (but not nationalisation), disestablishment, free education, payment of M.P.'s and manhood suffrage. It was emphatically not socialist, and in one issue it praised Gladstone's genius in rendering Liberalism appealing to the working-classes and in another it singled out Dilke, not Hyndman, as the champion of the downtrodden. It printed the manifesto of the S.D.F. with the caveat: "It must be well understood that we in no way stand pledged to the statements contained in it."\(^1\) Glasier seems justified in lamenting that, in 1883, "I did not know of anyone who was inclined to take part in forming a socialist society."\(^2\)

The Glasgow Land Leaguers refused to advance beyond the doctrines proclaimed by Henry George, who was extremely popular in the city.\(^3\) By the middle of 1884, however, the S.D.F. was completely at odds with the Georgeites, both nationally and locally. Moses McGibbon

\(^1\) *Voice of the People*, 24 Nov. 1883 for Manifesto; 13 Oct., for Gladstone; 3 Nov. for Dilke; 10 Nov. for S.D.F. manifesto.

\(^2\) Glasier, *Morris*, p. 20. But see *G. News*, 22 Sep. 1882 for an item on a nihilist-socialist "Democratic Den" in the Calton called "Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité". It was attended by poorly-dressed people, and on the walls were portraits of Paine, Mirabeau and Voltaire, the News ominously reports.

\(^3\) H. George, *Moses* (n.p., 1885) and *Scotland and Scotsmen* (Glasgow, 1884) contain reports of his two major speeches in the city. Also, E. P. Laurence, *Henry George in the British Isles* (E. Lansing, 1957), pp. 19, 34, 37, 78.
denounced the Scottish Land Restoration League and warned Glasgow socialists to have no truck with it shortly after the correspondence columns of *Justice* had been filled by an extended exchange between H. H. Champion, Hyndman's assistant, and J. M. Cherrie, a local Land Leaguer, on socialism and the land question.\(^1\) By the end of 1885 the S.D.F. was scathing about George and his followers: "The author of 'Poverty and Progress', in spite of his ardent sympathy with the oppressed, has little real knowledge of the economical cause of the oppression - more's the pity".\(^2\) Accordingly there was no contact or co-operation during the general election of 1885 between the Land League candidates and the local S.D.F., and the relatively strong showing of the former served to emphasise the isolation and weakness of the socialist contingent in Glasgow.

This last point is confirmed by the early failure of these initial socialist ventures. Within six years the more active Socialist League was virtually defunct, after a period of intense but unsuccessful effort. "In Glasgow it is doubtful if it claimed more than a score adherents, who carried on the crusade from a tenement house in a dim South-side street. They held forth at windy street-corners and one remembers the sparse and listless audiences, and the difficulty of hawking for a penny *The Commonweal*.\(^3\) Until well

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1. *Justice*, 1 Nov. 1884 for McGibbon, and August passim for the Champion-Cherrie debate.


into the 1890's, the general reaction of the Glasgow working-class to the new teaching was one of resounding indifference, not to say positive hostility, and Glasier admits that their meetings were attended only for their curiosity value; with no credibility achieved before 1889. The preponderant mass of the working-class electorate remained staunchly Liberal, and suspicious of any departures from radical individualism. The Liberal Workmen's Electoral Union acknowledged receipt of a circular from the Democratic Federation outlining its policies, but: "the general impression of the members was that the programme contained elements of too wide and revolutionary a nature." This opinion was shared by an old secularist Chartist who told Glasier: "Na, na, it hasna' come in my day, and it'll no come in yours; and it'll no come at a' if you're going to wreck the Liberal party as some of your friends are trying their best to do."

This inability to attract a working-class following is reflected in the composition of the Socialist League. There were, of course, some working-men, like Pollack, a brass-finisher, but several were in fact emigres with a long history of activity in socialist circles, such as Leo Melliet, a Communard. Indigenous working-class adherents

1. Glasier, Morris, pp. 87-8. Note that Shaw Maxwell's *Voice of the People* was too radical and folded after only six editions.
were treated with a mixture of possessive brotherliness and amused condescension by the rest of the League members, who were mainly middle or lower-middle class in origin. They included clerks like Mavor, businessmen like the Stevenson and the Muirhead brothers, and educationalists like Jolly, a school inspector, and MacLaren, an assistant professor of Greek at the University. The leadership of Morris doubtless explains the presence of a strong artistic group amongst whom were Pittendrigh MacGillivray, the sculptor, and Craibe Angus, the art dealer.¹

Indeed, the early interest in socialism in Glasgow appears to have been as much aesthetic in its roots as derived from Marxist economic doctrines. Many of Morris's visits to the city, by Glasier's account, took the form of literary or artistic discussion circles rather than political meetings. For the young educated man of the decade, embracing socialist ideas was part of the rejection of the repressive materialistic environment around them. Shaw Maxwell and Glasier were office-bearers in the Sunday Lectures Society, which sought to break the Sabbath gloom of the city by bringing speakers on a range of topics, and it was under the Sunday Society's auspices that Morris made his first visit to the city. The Glasgow Ruskin Society, formed in 1878 to propagate Ruskin's views, provided several recruits to the Socialist League as a logical

extension of his critique of Victorian civilisation, and the Society's
president, William Smart, adopted a posture of benevolent neutrality
to socialist theories.¹ A decade after the creation of the League,
Mavor summed up this aspect of its background concisely: "It is thus
that the various forms of socialism . . . found a lodgment not only
in the minds of the working class, but in the first instance especially
in the minds of members of the universities and others who felt that
material progress was indeed vain if it did not involve an obvious
elevation in life all round. A great and manifest increase of
general happiness was to be expected and must be secured.²

By the date when Mavor wrote that passage, changes in the
political attitudes of the Scottish working-classes were beginning to
be seen, but it is relevant to the argument here that these manifesta-
tions first took place in the mining districts, and the conversion
of the Glasgow working-class to anything beyond token involvement in
socialism did not occur for yet another decade. Indeed Glasgow was
remarkably belated, for a major industrial city, in breaking away
from the Liberal stance, since before 1914 only one Labour M.P. sat
for a Glasgow seat, and he was an orthodox Lib-Lab. In this context
it would be hard to place any great significance on the stirrings of
the 1880's.

¹. Glasier, Morris, pp. 20, 25-6, 40-1, 61-7, 84-94 and Mavor,
My Windows, I, pp. 133-6. W. Smart, Second Thoughts of an
Economist (London 1916), pp. xii-xix for his thinking at this
time.

². J. Mavor, "Labour and Politics in England", Political Science
Quarterly, 10 (1895), p. 503. Cf. "Militant Socialism" on the
emergence of the I.L.P.: "The romance of the movement, which
had attracted eager youth, seemed to be shed; idealism seemed
to evaporate with the noise entry of the proletariat." G. Herald,
25 Jan. 1918.
CHAPTER NINE

1885–86 in Glasgow
1. The Effects of the Third Reform Act in Glasgow

The provisions contained in the act to extend the franchise had little impact in Glasgow. The electorate did rise slightly, by about 3,000, but this was simply due to a small extension of the parliamentary boundaries on the north of the city. In addition, the improvement in trade that year, as always, swelled the numbers paying rates or moving out of double occupancies into their own households, and who therefore qualified for the franchise. A more profound alteration which the reform legislation effected on Glasgow politics lay in the redistribution of constituencies. Three recommendations of significance were made by the boundary commissioners.\(^1\) Firstly, Glasgow was given seven M.P.'s; secondly, it was proposed that the city-wide representation be ended and single-member seats be instituted; and thirdly, the boundaries of the new constituencies were determined. (Map B)

In settling the shape of the seven seats, the primary calculation appears to have been equality of electoral size rather than social, economic or geographical unity. Camlachie, the smallest, had 9,220 voters, the largest, Central, had 13,208, while the average was 10,756. Yet to achieve near parity of numbers, some ill-matched areas were cobbled together. The crescent-shaped College seat included not only the elite of the West End, but also the semi-slum

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The Seven Glasgow Seats, 1885
Cowcaddens, while on the South Side, Tradeston contained a similar social conjunction. St. Rollox embraced the loco engineering and railway workers of Springburn and the lower-middle class Dennistoun area, and Central held both a large business vote and the shipbuilding workers of Anderston. Only Camlachie and Bridgeton had a reasonable degree of cohesion, for both consisted of solid working-class electorates, and both covered between them the East End, integrating traditional communities like Calton and Parkhead into the new structure. The most ramshackle creation was Blackfriars and Hutchesontown, which contrived to straddle both banks of the Clyde, lumping together the worst problem area in the city, just to the north of the river, with the respectable working-class district to the east of the Gorbals.

The reactions of the two political parties to the proposals was one of unstinted enthusiasm, and both associations claimed that their desires had been met by the report.\(^1\) The granting of four extra seats rectified the long-felt injustice that great cities were grossly under-represented in Parliament. Conservatives felt that the Liberal monopoly could not be maintained, and looked to win three seats, while the Liberals entertained hopes of returning a full complement.\(^2\) The creation of separate divisions pleased the Liberals, with whom Disraeli's concept of the minority vote and three-cornered

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2. G. Herald, 24 Feb. 1885 for speeches on this theme by A. MacDougall et al.
seats had rankled from the outset. The Tories, too, calculated that their chances of pulling out higher polls in single seats were greater, since the citywide preponderance of the Liberals might be attenuated in specific constituencies, especially if there did develop the splits which many (including Liberals) expected to result either from a scramble over the selection of candidates or from a clash over policies. In general the boundaries of the new seats were approved by both parties, although some merchants in the Blackfriars constituency objected to a central business ward being bracketed with Hutchesontown. Their fears were soothed and the principal objector, H. R. Taggart, chaired the inaugural meeting of the constituency Liberal Association. 3

The changes in organisation necessitated by the redistribution presented a difficult choice for the two parties, as they were reluctant to relinquish the unitary framework, with its strengths and skills laboriously built up from long experience. Yet there was an awareness that initiative and enthusiasm generated in each constituency division were equally essential for successful party effort, and the solutions reached showed the underlying differences between the systems which each party had developed since the Second Reform Act.

The Liberal Association presented its members with two schemes for their consideration. Scheme I would simply have replaced the

2. G. Beith alluded to the threat of an "unseemly and disastrous" rupture after redistribution, G. Herald, 24 Feb. 1885.
wards with the constituency as the basic unit of organisation, leaving the rest of the structure of the G.L.A. intact. An important concession, however, restricted the selection of candidates to members in the relevant division. The more radical Scheme II proposed "complete autonomy" for each electoral division in the running of its own affairs, including the choice of candidates. The plebiscitary functions of the old G.L.A. were to be retained by means of the seven divisional associations federating into a 'United Liberal Association' - or 12001 which would deal with the general interests of city Liberals, mainly "by conference, or expressing a united opinion on questions of Provincial, National or Imperial importance".2

Scheme II was supported by those who complained that dictation from the centre would otherwise be maintained. This would stifle animated divisional associations, just as ward associations were "feeble" bodies, "galvanised" by the Executive from time to time when needed.3 The other scheme was defended by many who were identified with the ruling caucus on the grounds that it was more economical to run one association, rather than seven. In addition, they stressed the enormous difficulties which had attended the formation of the G.L.A. and worried lest a repetition of these unfortunate events should occur, since "the second scheme proposes

1. Each division would sent 160 delegates, and office-bearers would attend.


that the association commit *felo de se*.\(^1\) Despite this weighty pressure, all of the divisions except Camlachie reported that they were unanimously in favour of the second scheme, and so the G.L.A. was wound up.\(^2\)

This decentralisation was clearly in sympathy with the democratic theory which vindicated the formation and activities of the G.L.A., and it sprang from a confidence that the full fighting strength of the party would not be diminished by separation. But while the Liberals plumped for home rule for their constituency associations, the Conservatives would not advance beyond local government. As with the Liberals, the Conservative Association consulted the ward committees as to "the desirability of at once forming seven thoroughly independent Associations for the different Divisions, or, as an alternative, adopting some modification of the existing system".\(^3\) The wards opted for the latter, and accordingly they were merely fused into Divisional committees, but the G.C.A. was otherwise untouched. The Conservatives, who had been patiently reconstructing their organisation after the debacle of 1880, were aware that their strength was more patchy than the Liberals, so that central co-ordination and direction were still demanded.

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2. The General Election of 1885

In Glasgow, this contest principally revolved around a series of questions regarding the Liberal party. Success for the Liberals depended partly on whether every one of the divisional associations, only just initiated, possessed the capability to mobilise their electoral support as skillfully as the old G.L.A. Equally pressing was the question whether the Liberal electors would be willing to turn out and vote. Unease amongst party supporters might arise from two sources. Many might feel that the new associations were still the products of caucus manipulation, and the internal feuding of the past years would be resumed. Secondly, others might withhold their vote from disapproval of the policies contained in the Liberal platform. The Conservatives' best hope lay in being prepared to act decisively should a serious rift occur in the party with a natural majority.

On the whole, the new Liberal associations were formed amicably, with agreement by all that they should strive to secure comprehensive support within the party. In Camlachie, for instance, a proposal to designate the new body as the "Camlachie Radical Association" was turned down because, in the chairman's words, "to incorporate the word Radical in its title would have the effect of alienating moderate Liberals". Instead a motion was passed that the association should aspire to be "so broad and Liberal in its basis as to embrace all classes of Liberalism".¹ In almost every other seat this approach

¹. Col. Clark and A. Paterson, G. Herald, 29 Apr. 1885; these views were repeated at the next constituency meeting, ibid., 28 May 1885.
was closely echoed, and in only two divisions - Central and Blackfriars - was dissidence voiced. ¹

In the Central constituency, A. B. McGrigor contended that, despite the desire of an initial meeting that the association be founded on the broadest basis, circumstances had come to light which suggested to him that it would in practice be restrictive in representation. It is not apparent from the limited evidence available what McGrigor had in mind, but the committee of the Association, once established, was not lacking in fellow Whigs, such as James Grahame, Sir James Watson and Professor Roberton.² More interestingly, there was also friction here with the Lib-Labs on two matters. Firstly, it was decided to levy an annual subscription of 1/- in disregard of a motion by R. C. Grant, the President of the Trades Council, that no fee be charged. Then four politically prominent working-men protested at the date and hour chosen for the meeting to ratify the draft constitution, for it was being held on the annual flitting day in the early afternoon, thus making it doubly difficult for working-men to attend. Claims that the majority had overruled the protesters' case in committee were rejected by the public meeting, which then elected a full executive.³

At Blackfriars, some Land Leaguers, led by one William MacKechnie, objected to caucus wirepulling in allegedly producing a constitution

¹ G. Herald, 15 Apr., 12, 19 May 1885 for St. Rollox, Tradeston and Bridgeton respectively.
³ G. Herald, 16 Apr., 29 May 1885.
without holding a prior public meeting. A meeting to form a branch of the divisional association in the Hutchesontown section, where the Irish Electoral Union was well-organised, was totally disrupted by MacKechnie and his followers. After the lights were turned out by the departing orthodox Liberals, "that gentleman mounted a seat and proceeded to dilate against the actions of what he termed the caucus".¹

These small irritations apart, the transition to the divisional framework passed off smoothly. Doubtless this was facilitated by the lines of the constituency boundaries, which cut across existing wards in only one case, the third. Thus the basic structure of the old G.L.A. - the wards - remained unchanged in personnel and function, as is seen in the Central seat. Here registration and canvassing work was handled at the ward level, as before, which in lieu of sending five delegates to the G.L.A. Executive, now sent five delegates to the constituency Executive.² No comparison of membership before and after the demise of the G.L.A. is possible because of lack of evidence, so it is not possible to determine whether the optimists or the pessimists were correct in their predictions about the effects of the reorganisation.

Perhaps the most decisive test of the efficacy of the new associations came over the selection of candidates. There were risks, both of letting a clique dominate if the associations were not

¹. Ibid., 20 May, also 20 Apr. 1885.
truly representative and of a proliferation of candidates if the associations could not impose their will on party voters. Another indication of the efficiency of and the support enjoyed by an association was how quickly it reached a decision on a candidate without injuring the democratic processes. In three seats, a choice was agreed on with despatch and harmony, and one other was belated only through extraneous circumstances, but in three constituencies the selection was protracted and hotly disputed.

By the first week in May — before the creation of the divisional association — Tradeston Liberals had chosen A. Cameron Corbett, the son of a wealthy city merchant and well-known philanthropist, after he had delivered an address to them. As the sitting M.P., Cameron was given the pick of any seat, and he chose College, for which he was endorsed in late August, despite some reluctance on the part of the Church Liberals to swallow his disestablishment views. In October, he was confirmed as candidate, however, with only two dissentients. Bridgeton operated a more open selection system by having the four contenders state their opinions to the constituency Liberals at weekly intervals. Then, at the end of August, they opted for E. R. Russell, the editor of the Liverpool Daily Post. Blackfriars did not find its man until the third week of October, but this was only because the first choice, Lord Edward Fitzmaurice,

1. G. Herald, 30 Mar., 5 May 1885.
2. Ibid., 21 Aug., 7, 8 Oct. 1885.
who had in fact been adopted at the start of July, belatedly decided that ill-health compelled him to stand down. Within days of Lord Edward's announcement, he was replaced by Mitchell Henry, a Manchester merchant with a large Irish estate, who was unopposed.  

In the other three seats, the process of selecting candidates proved embarrassing to Liberal unity. In Camlachie, which had been the focus of the Trades Council's abortive bid in early summer to put up a working-man, the Liberal Association moved slowly. R. B. Cunningham Graham, Lewis Morris, a London politician, and Hugh Watt, a Glasgow-born merchant, addressed the party, but none were convincing enough, and in early October local men were approached. While these soundings were going on, Watt held a public meeting of electors at which he was endorsed as Liberal candidate. This disregard of its authority stung the Liberal Association, which frantically sought to find a man of their own preference, but after a fortnight's efforts to persuade either Alexander Cross or Michael Simons to offer themselves, they had to concede defeat. At the very end of October, therefore, Watt was accepted as the official Liberal candidate at a general meeting of the Association, despite the airing of deep misgivings as to his suitability and his conduct.  

3. G. Herald, 2, 3, 16, 28 Oct. for these developments.
In mid-March George Jackson had pre-empted the contest in Central by intimating to the Liberal Association's secretary that he intended presenting himself as the party candidate. This "masterstroke" (as the Herald termed it) placed the stigma of splitting the party on any rival for the nomination, and he had prepared the ground well by obtaining a written undertaking from his main rival, ex-Provost Ure, that he would not oppose Jackson.\(^1\) As Jackson had been hostile to the G.L.A. since its inception, his forcing himself upon the association was resented by many, and by August it was apparent from press reports that he would not be allowed a completely free run.\(^2\)

Jackson's death at the end of that month entirely transformed the situation. The Liberal Executive at once formally recommended that Ure be invited to stand after a public declaration of his principles, but Ure declined to address the party, for he stated that he believed he could not unite all sections of the Liberal electorate. The Executive next decided to invite Gilbert Beith, the Association's President, and William Miller, a London-based Glaswegian, to give addresses as a preliminary to a selection. Moderate Liberals protested vehemently, claiming that Ure had been ditched because he placed temperance reform well ahead of disestablishment, whereas Beith was the principal lay champion of the latter in Glasgow. It was alleged that crucial information had been suppressed

\(^1\) Ibid., 13, 14 Mar.
from Ure, notably that a requisition signed by 1200 Liberals was being circulated in his favour.\(^1\) Beith gave his speech first, and Miller withdrew shortly after making his, because a Conservative had emerged, so that Beith was chosen as Liberal standard-bearer.\(^2\)

The squabble for the Liberal nomination at St. Rollox was the most anarchic of the seven. By September, there were four in the field for the Liberal Association to choose from. At a general meeting, 232 members voted for James MacCulloch, a Wigtownshire land agent; 124 for B. F. C. Costelloe, a barrister with strong Catholic and Glasgow connections; 37 for Edward Tennant, the son of Charles Tennant; and 31 for James Caldwell of Campsie, a large calico-printer. Caldwell and Tennant both denounced the vote as unrepresentative, alleging that Home Rulers had packed the meeting, and declared that since they had been the first in the field they would continue to campaign.\(^3\) Immediately after the vote the Association refused a request from W. G. Blackie that Sir William Collins be invited to run as a non-divisive candidate and instead voted to persevere with MacCulloch. Thereupon, Blackie, Collins (the Hon. President) and the chairman, Thomas Wilson, all resigned


2. G. Herald, 12, 21, 27, 28 Oct.

3. Ibid., 30 Sep. for the vote, and 29 Sep., 1 Oct. for objections, also N.B.D.M., 29 Sep.
in protest against Mac Culloch's candidacy. To restore some semblance of unity, Collins and his friends agreed to retract their resignations provided a plebiscite of all Liberal voters (i.e., not just members of the Association) was held to settle the matter.

The Liberal Association urged all its members to vote for MacCulloch, who narrowly defeated Caldwell by 2475 votes to 2419 in a test ballot held only a week before election day, and so he became the official Liberal candidate.

Each of these three seats revealed different defects in the organisational scheme adopted by the Liberals. Central came closest to the typical caucus manipulation, but Camlachie revealed that one determined individual could railroad his candidacy through, whatever the opinion of the Association. St. Rollox was more complex, but it is interesting that the three main employers of labour in the constituency who were also the leaders of the local Liberal party - Blackie, Collins and Tennant - could not impose their united will upon the Association, and it was rather amusing to hear these leaders raising the cry of caucus against their own creation. Nevertheless, even here the Conservatives' calculation that the Liberals would disintegrate in the competition for seats proved false. In all


2. G. Herald, 30, 31 Oct., 14, 19 Nov. for preparations, 23 Nov. for the ballot results.
these seats party loyalty brought a closing of the ranks at the end. At Camlachie, the Association finally adopted Watt; in Central, all except the recalcitrant W. V. Jackson agreed to work for the return of Beith; and in St. Rollox too, antagonisms were quelled in the face of the Conservative challenge.

The other area of likely Liberal conflict from which the Conservatives expected to profit, that of policy differences, was equally barren for them. Land law reform and disestablishment were the two most probable splitting points, but divisions over the former in Glasgow were much obscured by the presence of two Land Restoration League candidates at Bridgeton and Tradeston. In the light of the extreme demands for heavy land taxation and an end to private land-ownership advocated by the League men, orthodox Liberal candidates, whatever the radicalism of their stance on the land question, appeared relatively moderate, and so the less advanced sections within the party were satisfied.

The church issue, however, was what the Tories pinned their firmest hopes on. As the election campaign began, the omens seemed propitious: several prominent Liberals joined the Church Defence Political Committee set up in June 1885 by the Glasgow Church of Scotland Presbytery. The numerous Church Defence League meetings held in the city were well attended by Church Liberals like A. B.

1. Above, pp. 103–6.

2. Glasgow Presbytery Church Political Defence Committee, Report (Glasgow, 1885).
MacGrigor and Walter Paterson. The climax came with the great public meeting held on 20th October, at which upwards of a dozen leading Liberals proclaimed that they would abstain from voting if disestablishment became a plank in the Liberal programme. Elated by this demonstration, the News predicted that by polling day Liberal Churchmen would be compelled to actually vote Conservative because their own party candidates were so hostile to Establishments.

Gladstone's disavowal of the disestablishment demand, which he made in mid-November, taken with Chamberlain's deferral of the issue when in Glasgow two months earlier, ended the Tory dreams. Glasgow Liberal Churchmen who had been openly swithering now re-entered the party fold. In a public letter, they announced that they would now vote Liberal, "on the understanding, sanctioned by our leader, that the question of Establishments is not one of the test questions at that election", so that any vote by M.P.'s in the new Parliament could not be interpreted as an expression of Scottish public opinion on the matter. The News reflected the mood of the Conservatives when it found the Church Liberals' decision "inexplicable", and it accused them of sacrificing their church principles to their political allegiance by their last-minute defection.

1. The Church of Scotland. Report of the Meeting of Scottish Laymen of Different Religious Denominations opposed to the Disestablishment and Disendowment of the Church of Scotland held in the St. Andrew's Halls, Glasgow (Glasgow, 1885).


It had become apparent that the two major props in the Conservative election campaign were the negative ones of Liberal disunity in organisation and policy. With these knocked away, the threadbare remnants were clearly exposed, and the insufficiency of the party's resources to stretch evenly over all seven constituencies was especially glaring. In the majority of Glasgow seats signs of any coherent Conservative organisation were well-nigh invisible, and the selection of candidates in these instances was both belated and inappropriate.

While all of the Liberal Associations had been busily engaged over the summer in setting up party machinery and in choosing candidates, in early September the News deplored the absence of Conservative activity apart from Tradeston and St. Rollox. It issued a clear warning of the necessity for a healthy local base: "The electors, as a rule, will not be stirred to enthusiasm solely by ideas enunciated at a distance, or by persons with whom they have no direct connection. If seats are to be won, they are to be won by incessant work. From this point of view, the political situation in Glasgow is not as satisfactory as we could wish."\(^1\) Eight weeks later, and only one month before polling, the paper found things somewhat better, although in College and Central it opined that it was too late to do very much, for organisation in each was still highly rudimentary.\(^2\) In reviewing the electoral performance of the party, the News concluded

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1. Ibid., 3 Sep.
2. Ibid., 28 Oct.
that one of the greatest drawbacks had been the short period permitted to adjust organisation after the redistribution.¹

The paper also felt, however, that all had not been right with the candidates. While it is true that in most seats both parties selected their men in close time proximity, there were important differences. The Liberals had reached a mature decision after due deliberation and exposure of the prospective nominees to scrutiny by the party faithful. In almost every case the Conservatives had frantically drummed up a name with very little public debate. At most, discreet notices appeared in the press at intervals to intimate that approaches were being made to certain individuals. Indeed, great difficulty was encountered in persuading party supporters to let their names go forward: in Camlachie two large employers of labour there, Isaac Beardmore and R. A. Napier, declined; and in Bridgeton Duncan Stewart did likewise.²

This meant that the quality of candidates was unsatisfactory, for only Somervell at Tradeston, Cuthbertson at St. Rollox and Maughan at Blackfriars (who all emerged well before the election scramble) were locally eminent Conservatives. The others were quite unknown. Arnot Reid, a journalist on the News, was finally brought in for Camlachie, and two landed gentry - Elphinstone Vans Agnew Maitland and Sir William Cunningham - were picked for Bridgeton and College respectively. The only enterprising choice of the last-minute

¹. Ibid., 29 Nov.
selections was J. G. A. Baird at Central, for he had strong local connections as a representative of the mighty Gartsherrie dynasty. Although the Liberals also put up several non-Glaswegians, these men had been in open competition with local figures and had been approved by the constituency associations with a semblance of democracy rather than been clumsily shoved forward by the self-appointed Conservative cabal.

The election contest itself was a rather tame affair, for the Conservatives had plainly lost heart, and the results were a remarkable Liberal triumph. The entire representation of Glasgow was Liberal - "We are seven", the new M.P.'s cabled Gladstone - and it was the only large city in which the Conservatives failed to secure even a bridgehead. Yet although they had done poorly in terms of seats won, in votes gained the Conservatives had performed creditably. (TABLE 9.1) Their percentage of the poll had almost doubled from 1880 so that the 'swing' to them reached 20%. By winning over two-fifths of the total votes cast, the Conservatives had far exceeded their 'annus mirabilis', 1874, when they had captured one-third of the poll. Nonetheless, the 1885 results possessed a considerable element of freakishness which must be taken into account before deciding on their true significance.

Firstly, to the Liberal tally should be added the Land League vote, which almost certainly went Liberal at other elections, and as already noted the two candidates were widely regarded as maverick Liberals. Indeed Shaw Maxwell was sufficiently well entrenched in the G.L.A. to have been nominated for one of the Vice-Presidentships
**TABLE 9.1 Party Voters for 1868-86**

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<th>1880</th>
<th>1885</th>
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<td>N.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>26,940</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>21,574</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>35,082</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other non-Conservative</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4,003</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative/Unionist</td>
<td>9,578</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>12,337</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>11,069</td>
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"Swing" to (+) or against (-) Cons. from previous election

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<td>+6.3%</td>
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The figures for 1868, 1874 and 1880 represent only "true" party voters, and voters crossing party lines are excluded. These numbered: in 1868, 1,037; in 1874, 2,218; in 1880, 1,019.
earlier in 1885. The Land Leaguers only subtracted from the Liberal side, but the Irish vote artificially boosted the Conservatives.

In 1880, as has been seen, the Irish found themselves forced to go for the Liberals, but in 1885 this was not the case. Long before Parnell finally decided on his electoral strategy, the Glasgow Home Rulers had committed themselves to opposing any links with formal Liberal candidates. Instead, they wholeheartedly supported the two Land Leaguers, who had elected to fight constituencies where the Irish vote was heaviest and best organised rather than stand in those seats which had the highest Highland electorate. Shaw Maxwell and Forsyth both strove throughout their campaign to link the Irish and Highland land crises, and also promised to support the granting of Home Rule "to the fullest extent". Prominent Irish politicians sat on the platform of their meetings, including Davitt, Ferguson and MacGhie, the Scottish organiser of the Irish League. Maxwell was particularly well-favoured because of his long association with the Irish movement (he had been the first Scotsman to join the Irish League in Glasgow) and because the orthodox Liberal candidate,


2. In 1891 the percentage of Scottish Caelic speakers was highest in Central, Tradeston and College seats and lowest in Bridgeton and Camlachie. (Census of Scotland 1891, Part I Table V, p. 174: P.P. 1893-4, CVII).


Mitchell Henry, was a renegade Parnellite M.P. who owned extensive estates in Galway.¹

This independent action by Glasgow was not approved of by the Irish League Executive, and visits from T. P. O'Conor, Biggar and Redmond in October and November served to forcefully remind the local Irish that they were to be guided at the polls solely by instructions issued by Parnell, and therefore they should avoid giving prior pledges to any party.² When Parnell published his letter urging the Irish to vote Conservative, Redmond returned to the city to underline this message: "The duty Irishmen in Glasgow were now called upon to perform was to adhere to the manifesto of their leader - (cheers) - and give their solid vote for the Conservative candidates."³ Despite protests from some Irishmen that Shaw Maxwell at least should be accorded Parnell's endorsement, the Executive was adamant: no exceptions were to be permitted in Glasgow; and the local nationalist newspaper published an editorial immediately before the poll explaining why Parnell's policy should be faithfully followed, and this doubtless influenced the outcome.⁴ Most press observers were agreed that the Irish did vote solidly for the Conservative candidates, and several members were expelled from the League for helping Maxwell and Forsyth. In Blackfriars, a meeting of Catholic electors was told to vote for

¹ G. Observer, 31 Oct., 14 Nov. for animosity to Henry.
³ G. Herald, 26 Nov.
⁴ G. Observer, 28 Nov.
Maughan, even although he was a leader of the Glasgow Orangemen; in Bridgeton the League pasted a poster recommending Maitland; and in every seat where they were numerous, the Irish were reported actively soliciting support for the Conservatives.  

While there is little reason to doubt that the Conservatives received what the News called "the adventitious aid" of the Irish vote, its size has to be determined. It seems likely that there was a good turn-out of Irish electors, for careful canvasses were conducted before the poll and liaison committees set up in several seats in order to execute Parnell's instructions to the full. The actual numbers are, however, harder to establish. In 1874, 10.5% of the poll went to the Catholic candidate and it may be reasonable to assume that between 10 and 12% of the poll in 1885 represented the Irish Home Rule vote, since the difficulties earlier discussed of placing the Irish in the register were considerable. This would put the Irish vote roughly between 6,000 and 7,500, quite close to the figure suggested earlier. Since, however, it seems that probably in Blackfriars, and possibly in Bridgeton, some did defect to the Scottish Land Leaguers, the lower figure would be a safer estimate of the Irish vote on behalf of the Conservatives. In that case,

3. G. Observer, 21 Nov. 1885 for the canvass, 28 Nov. for the liaison work in Camlachie.
the true Conservative vote numbered around 20,000, which was 33-34% of the poll, a share almost identical with that of 1874, and indicating that the party had no more than restored the damage sustained in 1880.

There is little evidence of any social grouping shifting decisively to the Conservatives, for in five seats their poll was almost identical with the overall city average. In Central, with its large business vote, the Tories did do better, but only marginally, and here it was believed that some Church Liberals voted against Beith out of abhorrence for his disestablishment zeal. In St. Rollox, where the Conservatives came closest to victory, other factors were at work. Cuthbertson was an ideal candidate, being local and well-known and there existed a good organisational foundation in Dennistoun and also in Springburn, where William MacAllister led a sizeable working-class Tory movement. It is striking, however, that these two seats were the scenes of the only bitter and prolonged rows within the Liberal party, and they were patched up very shortly before the poll. Here the Conservative strategy had come nearest to fulfilment, but 1885 still confirmed Glasgow's reputation as the most Liberal city in Britain.

3. The Home Rule Crisis and the General Election of 1886

It is tempting to assume that because the Liberal party split in 1886, it was bound to do so sooner or later, although not necessarily over Home Rule. It is, however, easy to exaggerate the fissile nature of the party, and after all, dissent over policy is a
normal characteristic of reforming parties. Moreover, the beginning of 1886 heralded a dwindling of division on the contentious issue of disestablishment, partly of course because Gladstone had effectively vetoed any parliamentary action. The Church Liberals then showed that they were as much Liberals as Churchmen by forming the Liberal Anti-Disestablishment Committee because the Church Defence Association was becoming a tool of the Conservative party rather than a genuine instrument for the protection of the interests of the State Church. ¹

When the issue of Home Rule produced a rift in the Glasgow Liberals, the stages by which the Liberal Unionists moved out and away from the Gladstonians were gradual, not sudden. The contents of the bill were not unknown, thanks to assiduous leaking, and many had already made up their minds to oppose it. The Herald gave notice of this as early as February when it regarded with "great anxiety" the appointment of John Morley as Chief Secretary for Ireland, since he was the strongest advocate of Home Rule in the Liberal party.² The paper also warmly applauded Chamberlain and Trevelyan when they left the Cabinet rather than betray their principles a fortnight before the publication of the bill.³ Most of those who declared for the Union instantaneously were associated


² G. Herald, 4, 6 Feb. 1886.

³ Ibid., 29 Mar.
with the Herald's moderate Liberalism. The first protest rally, held some ten days after Gladstone's bill came out, was dominated by the Whigs of Glasgow, with the star speaker the arch-Whig Argyll.\(^1\) Only a few Whigs, led by Tennant and Campbell of Tullichewan, resisted the stampede into Unionism. Radical Unionists were less immediate in their response, and this reflected a bewilderment present even in the Gladstonian camp. A survey taken on the day the contents of the bill were announced by the N.B. Daily Mail sought the opinions of 34 local Liberals, none of whom were identified with the Whig wing. It found that these men were divided into three equal parts, for, against and uncertain.\(^2\)

In May, however, positions hardened and in particular the Radical Unionists defined their stance with greater precision. This was because the Liberals loyal to Gladstone regrouped to good effect. Initially the Mail regarded the bill as a regrettable pis aller: "it is not that anybody is very much in love with Mr Gladstone's bill" it declared, but it could discern no alternative method of solving the problem.\(^3\) By the end of April the paper was aggressively seeking to rally support for Gladstone, now firmly convinced of the rightness of his measure.\(^4\) Several factors helped the recovery of the Home Rule Liberals. Firstly, five of the seven

1. G. Herald, 22 Apr.
2. N.B.D.M., 10 Apr. Contrast too the differing tones of the initial editorial reactions of the Herald and the Mail to the bill.
3. N.B.D.M., 13 Apr., also 9, 12 Apr.
4. Ibid., 27 Apr., 1, 6 May.
city M.P.'s pronounced in favour of Gladstone, only Corbett and Henry preferring a Unionist solution. Even more importantly, in the fortnight from April 20th, all the city Liberal Associations met and voted to support the bill by substantial majorities which ranged from 3 to 1 up to 10 to 1. Then the National Liberal Federation of Scotland met in Glasgow on April 30th and voted heavily to back the bill, while the counter-blow to Argyll's address was delivered that evening by Morley. 2

As it became apparent during May that Chamberlain was not going to be accommodated within the Liberal party, the Radical Unionists grew more conspicuous. Significantly, in mid-May the Liberal Unionist Association cancelled its advertisements in the Herald and the Scotsman, both Whig papers, and inserted fresh copy in the politically more advanced N.B. Daily Mail. 3 At the same time, the Association mooted plans to bring up Chamberlain to speak in the city. 4

As Unionist opinion hardened in May, it took on a firmer shape with the formation of the West of Scotland Liberal Unionist Association (W.S.L.U.A.). This move was perhaps precipitated after the rebuff administered by the city Liberal Associations to any hopes of weaning the existing party organisations away from Gladstonianism. Set up

1. Cf. TABLE 9.4 below.
2. N.B.D.M., 1 May.
3. Executive Committee of the West of Scotland Branch of the Liberal Committee for the Maintenance of the Legislative Union between Great Britain and Ireland, Minute Book, 12, 17 May 1886.
4. Ibid., 13 May 1886.
by May 10th, within one month the W.S.L.U.A. had 800 members, and by
the election at the start of July, around 2,000 adherents were
claimed.¹

This was a most impressive display of the strength of Unionist
sentiment in Glasgow, although it had still to be tested at the polls.
Investigation of the causes of this secession affords a helpful
insight into the significance of the Home Rule crisis. It is some-
times suggested that Glasgow, and the West of Scotland as a whole,
were exceptionally favourable to Unionism because of the religious
aspects of Home Rule, partly because geographical proximity gave the
region a large Ulster Protestant element, and also because the
Voluntaryism of the U.P. Church, so strong in the city, was the
nearest of all the three main Scottish variants of Presbyterianism
to the standpoint of the Irish Presbyterian Church.² These ties are
held to explain the adhesion of many Glasgow Radicals in particular
to the Unionist party.

There is, however, very little evidence of such influences
affecting the Unionists. Firstly, many of the Ulster Protestants in
Glasgow were, as has already been seen, Conservative, but it does
seem likely that most of the small number of Ulster-born Liberals

¹. W.S.L.U.A. Executive Minute Book, 10 May, 7 June 1886; Report
by the Executive of the West of Scotland Branch of the Liberal
Committee for the Maintenance of the Legislative Union between
Great Britain and Ireland (1 Aug. 1886), p. 10.

². J. G. Kellas, The Scottish Liberal Party 1885-1895 (Ph.D. Thesis,
London University 1962), pp. 363-93; D. C. Savage, "Scottish
Politics 1885-6", S.H.R. 40 (1961), pp. 132-3; MacCaffrey,
were swayed by this consideration. Thus Professor Sir William Thomson, hitherto a moderate Liberal, became President of the Liberal Unionist Association because of his "fierce hostility" to Home Rule on these grounds.¹

Nevertheless, almost all of the utterances which equated Home Rule with Home Rule came from the Conservative, rather than the Unionist, side.² The three meetings convened to expose the religious implications of Home Rule confirm this. Immediately after Gladstone's bill was introduced, "Roaring Hugh" Hanna, the leading Belfast Presbyterian minister, attacked the threat of Catholic domination in Ireland before a Glasgow audience composed entirely of the "popular Protestant" wing of the Conservative party, with no Liberal Unionists present.³ An Orange meeting some nine days later only reiterated this theme of preaching to the converted, as did a third public meeting, held just before the election and addressed by another Belfast Protestant cleric, Magill, at which the Orangeman Macklin explained that a vote for a Liberal was a vote for the Pope.⁴ This crude demagoguery had little appeal to either Whig or Radical Unionists.

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² G. News, 9 Apr., 25 May for two instances in the editorial columns.

³ G. News, 15 Apr.

⁴ G. Herald, 24 Apr.; G. News, 1 Jul. respectively.
Irish Presbyterians did approach James Colquhoun, a Radical Unionist and Free Church elder, with the intention of organising a meeting in the city to publicise their position to all Liberals, but nothing ever came about in that shape. Instead of the projected public address, these Ulsterman met privately with a selected group of Liberal Unionists to explain their fears of "Romish ascendancy". This meeting was not very significant in shaping opinion, for it was held much later than the planned public one, and by then - May 26th - most Liberal Unionists had already declared themselves. Nor were by any means all of the leading Dissenting Unionists present at this meeting; and it is instructive that none of those who expressed opposition to the bill in the Mail's survey adverted to the religious aspect. Indeed many of the non-Established Presbyterians seem to have remained loyal to Gladstone, although some claimed that this was because of a quid pro quo deal involving Scottish disestablishment.

Economic interests, and particularly the fear of loss or markets if Ireland imposed protective tariffs under Home Rule - as Parnell promised - have been pointed to as forming a substantial element in the swelling of the Unionist ranks. If these were important considerations, Glasgow was clearly likely to possess them in plenty,

1. G. Herald, 29 Apr., 12 May for the private meetings; N.B.D.M., 27 May for the public.


for the city had strong shipping and commercial connections with Ireland, and specially with Ulster. Only ten days after the bill was published, the Chamber of Commerce passed by a large majority a resolution, spoken to entirely by Liberal Unionists, which "desires to express its opinion that such a measure would be prejudicial to the commercial interests of the United Kingdom". A petition was then sent by the Chamber to parliament conveying its alarm at the large-scale disruption of Glasgow-Irish commerce and its fears that the resultant withdrawal of credit from Ireland would only deepen the agricultural and industrial depression there. Although this was one of the earliest public responses to the bill, it does not offer conclusive proof of the economic basis of Unionism, for the arguments of the supporters of the resolution were not pre-eminently slanted to such factors. The proposer, McGrigor, and the third speaker, Sir James Watson, were more concerned that the surrender to rebellion would create lawlessness, but the seconder, MacEwen, did mention the damage to trade which Home Rule would wreak. After this occasion, moreover, arguments about trade and commerce were scarcely raised again by Unionists.

There was, however, one other economic aspect of Gladstone's proposals: the plan to buy out existing landowners at a cost of up to £50 million, and this aroused greater concern than the commercial

2. Ibid., pp. 16-7.
implications among Unionists of both wings. It was not only aired at the Chamber of Commerce, but, at the first mass rally of all Unionists against the bill, the objection to the financial responsibility imposed upon the British taxpayer by the scheme formed the burden of the second of the two resolutions passed. But disagreement with the land purchase bill was felt with equal vehemence by Gladstonians, and the Mail noted that every one of those whose opinions it canvassed were against it, regardless of their position on Home Rule. The suggestion that the economic perspective of Home Rule did not occupy a large part of the Unionist case is borne out by the composition of the Executive of the Association in 1886. Of the 13 members, 4 were lawyers, 2 University professors and 1 a clergyman, so that the majority were not businessmen, and of the 6 who were, none had obviously identifiable links with Ireland.

Nor can too much proof of a developing class alignment in politics be read into the social status of the Liberal Unionist leadership. It is true that most of these men were drawn from the upper middle class, but this remains an equally valid observation with respect to the Gladstonian party elite. The background of the parliamentary candidates chosen by both sides is a revealing pointer to this

1. "The defeat of the Home Rule Bill, in Radical constituencies especially was largely, if indeed in many cases not wholly, owing to its being necessarily accompanied by a Land Purchase Bill", St. Rollox Division Glasgow, Address of James Caldwell, M.P., to the Electors (Glasgow, 1892), p. 7; also pp. 3-5.

2. G. Herald, 22 Apr. 1886.

3. N.B.D.M., 10 Apr., and its editorial, 17 Apr., makes the same point.

continuing homogeneity (TABLE 9.2). There is no clear indicator of how the Liberal working class responded, but certainly almost all the prominent Lib-Labs stayed loyal to Gladstone. Yet one old activist of the Second Reform agitation claimed that the leaders of that movement, although now dead, would have been on the Unionist side. There is, however, no further evidence to suggest how widespread this attitude was.

It is true that there were some Liberals for whom, as has been argued by others, Home Rule was the occasion rather than the cause of their political transfer of loyalties. In the case of Professor Nichol, this was the convenient point of exit for which he had been looking for some time: "He started as an advanced Liberal, but he was never a zealot, and when the party into which he was born... broke away from what he regarded as the policy of right reason, his affection not only cooled, but he went (only by slow degrees, it should be remembered) to the other side." For another professor, Home Rule was the culmination of a series of "profound shocks" administered to his political beliefs by Gladstone's conduct in the Boer and Sudanese wars.

2. Letters of George Miller in G. Herald, 4 May 1886.
TABLE 9.2  Candidates’ Occupations, 1885-1886

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lib. 1885</th>
<th>Lib. 1886</th>
<th>Cons. 1885</th>
<th>Cons./U. 1886</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mercantile, Industrial</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Professional</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Landed</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There is perhaps no need to look for exceptional factors to account for the strength of Liberal Unionism in Glasgow, or even for the Radical contingent. After all, of the four heroes of the latter, three had come out against the fourth, and MacLaren, Bright and Chamberlain constituted a powerful trinity whose lifelong devotion to radical causes was as great as Gladstone's. Many of the up-and-coming Radicals strove to emulate Chamberlain, and it seems probable that his grounds of dissent were fully endorsed by his followers in the city, so obviating the need to search for other causes. For if the evidence of the public professions made on behalf of the Unionists' case is to be trusted, the constitutional question was the essential issue at stake for them in Glasgow, as it was for like-minded Liberals in Birmingham and elsewhere.

Concern at the implications of Home Rule, which were held to threaten a fundamental and irreparable breach in the Imperial arrangements of the United Kingdom was the motif in the overwhelming majority of speeches and addresses delivered at every meeting of Liberal Unionists.¹ This argument formed the substance of the initial meeting of the Liberal Unionists, and it remained the gravamen of the charges leveled at Gladstone by Hartington and Goschen on their visits to the city.² In the Mail's pilot survey, conducted before any external influences were felt, all of those hostile to or

¹. Lyons, Ireland since the Famine, pp. 175-8, and P. Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain (London, 1966), pp. 81-111 discuss this aspect.
². G. Herald, 22 Apr., 26 June, 2 Jul. 1886.
uncertain about the bill identified the challenge to Imperial unity as their reason.¹ When the College Division Liberal Unionist Association heard four addresses at the start of 1887 on their political principles, three were on variants of this theme; and when the Chamber of Commerce dealt with the topic, the main burden of the first resolution took this approach too.² Moreover, this preoccupation with the constitutional implications of Home Rule were much more characteristic of the Liberal Unionists than the Conservatives, who, if the editorial columns of the News are any guide, were more obsessed with the prospect of lawlessness which would flow from the transfer of power in Ireland to Parnell. For the Liberal Unionists, therefore, it is illuminating to observe, fitted this into their interpretation of the Liberal Party as the bringer of constitutional progress and reform, which Gladstone was now betraying, for his proposals would in the words of McGrigor, "form nothing less than the apotheosis of rebellion".³

Accordingly, the most manifest feature of Liberal Unionism was, firstly, the emphasis on its Liberalism in every other issue except the Union, and, consequently, its unwillingness to contemplate its electoral compact with the Conservatives as more than a strictly

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1. N.B.D.M., 10 Apr.


ad hoc measure. Even in the middle of May, the Herald could not yet bring itself to envisage the return of Salisbury with anything but disquiet. The Unionist Committee was equally reluctant to break with the party, for it postponed making any electoral arrangements until Gladstone's speech on the second reading of the bill, which finally dashed all lingering hopes of compromise. The Executive of the Unionist Association explained that its objective all along had been to maintain Liberal unity by organising to defeat Gladstone's bill. It was in accord with this belief that at a meeting to inaugurate a Liberal Club, held at the end of May, 7 of the 16 present were Unionists, and confidence was there expressed that membership would swell as soon as the present divisions were resolved, even although the Unionists were at that very time coordinating with the Conservatives.

The Unionists recurrently adopted the line that they had not jettisoned the party but were upholding its true principles while others had succumbed to a personal worship of Gladstone which blinded them to the fundamentals of the philosophy of Liberalism. The obituarist of one Liberal Unionist insisted on this: "He was an advanced Liberal working for the Reform Bill and every subsequent

4. G. Herald, 25 May 1886, also 29 Apr.
5. E.g., G. Herald, 7 June.
measure in the constitutional evolution of his country, but when Gladstonism came to be the measure of men's fitness to be recognised as a Liberal, he could not accept the terms, though if ever a man was by mental condition and natural temperament a Radical, he was."¹

This attitude was widespread and not by any means confined to Radical Unionists. Eight months after the split, a leading Unionist, of the high Whig position, could still revile the "spurious" Liberalism generated by the crisis, and affirm: "But Liberalism in its genuine historic form - the Liberalism which as controlled and directed the progressive policies of the last fifty years - is not so easily destroyed."²

The liaison entered into with the Conservatives at the 1886 contest was done as an extreme act, and was not to be cemented into a permanent alliance. The Herald thus urged all Unionists to support J. G. A. Baird, the Conservative candidate for the Central seat, "whom we regard as a Unionist and nothing more", and it soon afterwards contended that since the election was solely about Home Rule, Liberal Unionists could vote for Conservatives without qualms.³ The News also recognised that there was no real lasting bond between the two anti-Home Rule groups, and it was continually fretting lest

² J. Guthrie Smith, Home Rule in Ireland, the Colonies and the United States. An Address delivered in the College Division, Glasgow on December 17th, 1886 (London, n.d.), p. 16.
³ G. Herald, 2, 5 Jul. 1886.
the Liberal Unionists should fail to live up to their threats once they were in the polling booth. It pleaded, "we want these candidates elected, and we ask each Unionist to vote for the Unionist candidate without regard to his opinions on anything else but the maintenance of the Union". 1

The absorption of the Unionists into the Conservatives was thus slow to develop until the failure of the Round Table Conference of 1887 to establish a basis for reuniting the Liberal party stimulated the process. 2 In December 1887, a major step came with the opening of the West of Scotland Imperial Union Club, whose objective was to permit Unionists of all shades of party to congregate together. The Whig James Grahame indicated that all the opponents of Home Rule were now coming closer: "Union, alas! is not now the sole reason for our alliance. We are now bound fast and firm with our Conservative friends to maintain law and order against misrule and anarchy, against rapine and murder." 3

Confirmation of the monocausal origins of the schism and its subsequent gradual hardening into permanency may be derived from the fact that each of the first three Liberal Unionist M.P.'s for the city returned to the fold of the Liberal party as other issues came to oust Home Rule from paramountcy. The first to revert was James

3. West of Scotland Imperial Union Club, Report of Proceedings at the Opening Dinner held on December 14th 1887, pp. 11-12; also the speech by J. Cuninghame, pp. 20-1.
Caldwell in 1892. Addressing his constituents, Caldwell affirmed that, apart from the Union question, he had always held radical opinions, as had the St. Rollox electorate. As proof, he pointed to his Commons voting record, where he had gone twice as often through the Opposition as through the Government lobbies.¹ He resolutely rejected the contention that the Liberal Unionists were a separate political party, and he further argued in February 1892 that they had gained their objective, for it was apparent to him from Gladstone's recent utterances that future Irish legislation promoted by a Liberal administration would not endanger the Union.² Anticipating that the Liberal Unionists would now dissolve and rejoin their erstwhile colleagues, Caldwell announced his intention of fighting as a Liberal at the next election.³ Although he ran unsuccessfully against Corbett in Tradeston (as did a third Glasgow Unionist candidate of 1886 - Bennett Burleigh - now wearing a "Labour" ticket), Caldwell won the Mid-Lanark seat in 1894 and remained an orthodox Liberal M.P. until his retiral in 1910.

A. C. Corbett remained a Unionist until his Temperance beliefs were strained beyond breaking point in the 1906-10 period by the Conservative party's policies on the drink question. He went back

1. Address of James Caldwell, M.P., pp. 4-5, 12. Also: "The Unionists were prepared to go on with every Liberal measure mentioned in the Liberal programme of 1885", G. Herald, 20 Jan. 1887.

2. Address, pp. 3-4, 21-3, 24.

to Liberalism in 1910, and retained his seat. Alexander Cross, who won Camlachie in 1892 and held it as a faithful Unionist until the Liberal Government of 1906, exposed the problems implicit in his political position: "Though fighting loyally under the Unionist flag, so far as dismemberment of the Empire by the granting of Home Rule to Ireland was concerned, Mr. Cross on all other questions held Liberal opinions, and he was a strong supporter of Free Trade."

His dissidence over Tariff Reform and his approval of Lloyd George's Budget meant that "by 1909 it became evident he had not the whole-hearted support of the Unionists in the division", and so he fought the seat in 1910 as a Liberal, but was unsuccessful.

The outcome of the election of 1886 in Glasgow, it soon became apparent, would be determined by the interplay of three forces: the size and discipline of the Liberal Unionist vote; the willingness of the Conservatives and the Liberal Unionists to sink their policy differences; and the extent to which the Gladstonian Liberals could recover from the secessions recently sustained.

For the Gladstonians, the main problem lay in the depletion of leading influential figures, particularly the loss of many experts on the legal aspects of electioneering which made attempts to restore the organisational fabric in three months exceptionally difficult. Their task was alleviated in two respects. Firstly, four of the


five retiring M.P.'s loyal to Gladstone decided to re-run, and this spared the party from searching at very short notice for a full complement of candidates. The significance of this was seen in the difficulties met in securing candidates for the three unfilled seats, which were only settled in the final fortnight before the poll. A. D. Provand of Manchester took Blackfriars, P. S. MacLiver of Bristol returned after twelve years to fight St. Rollox and Professor Meiklejohn of St. Andrews was selected to fight Tradeston. None of these three were local men, all were chosen well after the Unionists had picked their men, and in two of these seats—St. Rollox and Tradeston—the Home Rule Liberals went under.

The second aid on the side of the orthodox Liberals was the unstinted electoral backing given by the Irish nationalists, who were overjoyed at the conversion of Gladstone and the discomfiture of the local Liberals. In the days before the election, two Irish Home Rule M.P.'s, J. J. O'Kelly and J. A. Blake, spoke in all the city seats, and each branch of the Irish nationalists pledged to back the Liberals. ¹ On polling day, the Irish, who had made a full canvass of their supporters, gave their utmost. In Blackfriars and Hutchesontown, "the members of the William O'Brien branch of the I.N.L. worked like tigers, and we have been informed that nearly three hundred Irishmen sacrificed their day's earnings and volunteered their services to Mr. Provand's committee". ²

The strength of the Liberal Unionist organisation, and their determination to prevent the return of Gladstonian candidates were their main assets. Most of the leading organisers of the Glasgow Liberal party had deserted, including James Grahame, the founder of the West of Scotland Liberal Association, David Murray and Wm. Borland, both experienced election agents. Money was readily forthcoming, so that in four months the Unionist Association had £1,200 to deploy. Because the Unionists were in an embattled position, facing attacks both from Gladstonian Liberals for defecting and from Conservatives for having previously encouraged Gladstone in his radicalism, they brought great drive and energy to endeavour to secure the Union, as the distribution of over one million pieces of political literature in four months witnessed.¹

Although the Conservatives and the Liberal Unionists shared the same common objective, there was still ample scope for friction. The former felt aggrieved at the assumption of the Liberal Unionists that they had the prerogative of "securing the seats of all Liberal members who would vote against the Bills from disturbance from the Conservatives", heedless of the lonely furrow which the Conservatives had ploughed in these constituencies.² Conservatives were also highly sceptical of the confident claims made by their new allies that their followers would vote in decisive numbers for Tory candidates.

¹. Report by the Executive, p. 16.
². Ibid., p. 13.
The News was alarmed that in his eve-of-poll address in the city Goschen did not instruct his supporters to vote everywhere against Home Rule candidates, since "it is an open secret that there is still some doubt whether the Unionist poll in Glasgow will be a complete one". Moreover, some of the Liberal Unionist candidates in the city strained the patience of the Conservatives to the utmost. In Camlachie, J. Bennett Burleigh proclaimed extreme radical views, and James Caldwell at St. Rollox was denounced by the News as still a Gladstonian in every other respect.

Both anti-Gladstonian party organisations were evidently concerned at the possible duplication of candidates, and on June 1st, a joint committee was formed "for the purpose of advising on all delicate questions of negotiation and arrangement". Convened on the initiative of the Conservative Association, the committee's task in hammering out settlements was greatly eased by that party's undertaking to support all Liberal Unionist candidates chosen under this procedure. In the two seats of Blackfriars and Tradeston, where the retiring M.P.'s, Henry and Corbett, offered to stand as Unionists, agreement was speedily reached. In the other five seats, joint meetings finally selected three further Liberal and two Conservative Unionist candidates, and the united front was sealed by a

1. G. News, 2 Jul. 1886, also 4 June.
2. Ibid., 12 June.
3. W.S.L.U.A. Executive Minute Book, 11 June 1886, also 1 June.
public joint meeting attended by the chosen seven at which all political organisations loyal to the unity of the Empire pledged their full support. 1 Besides Burleigh and Caldwell, the Liberal Unionists put up R. V. Campbell in College Division. An advocate, Campbell had been a leading Liberal Churchman and founder of the Liberal Anti-Disestablishment Association. 2 The small number of seats taken by the Conservatives is striking, and it would have been less had not John Ure decided after renewed deliberation not to fight Central as a Liberal Unionist. Instead, J. G. A. Baird was unanimously invited to be re-nominated, and in Bridgeton, the other Conservative-contested seat, Colin Mackenzie, a retired merchant, was put forward.

The election campaign ran for about a fortnight and was fought exclusively on the issue of Home Rule. The anti-Gladstonians concentrated on bringing out their maximum vote by imploring all Unionists to set aside old party differences. In this spirit the District Master of the Orange Lodges in College called on the brethren to enrol at R. V. Campbell's committee rooms. Although otherwise a Liberal, because of views on the Irish question, "it is our duty to support him to a man". 3 To encourage other dissidents to turn out, lists of nearly one thousand Unionist Liberals were printed regularly

1. G. Herald, 2 Jul. for the meeting; Report of the Executive, pp. 8-9 for the negotiations.
2. R.V.C., Scottish Liberals and Disestablishment for his views.
in the newspapers. With their recently established compact and with the financial power of the Liberal Unionist funds, the Unionist campaign was vigorous and aggressive, culminating with visits from Hartington and Goschen.\footnote{G. Herald, 26 June, 2 Jul.} The Home Rule Liberals fought on more ragged and less confident lines. They defended their policy as "the just acknowledgment of the national existence of Ireland", while the Unionists' remedy of coercion would only worsen the situation.

An attempt to drive a wedge into the Unionist alliance was contained in the argument that if the Irish difficulty were solved, as Gladstone proposed, the major obstacle to progressive Scottish legislation would be removed, whereas if the Unionists were victorious, Scotland would be ruled by English Tories.\footnote{N.B.D.M., 5 Jul.} Much effort went into patching up gaps in the constituency organisation, but it seemed an ominous symbol when a meeting in the city addressed by Gladstone was plunged into chaos upon the failure of the gas lights, which appropriately happened just as he was reading a quotation from Thomas Chalmers.

The election results, however, were reasonably favourable to the Gladstonians, as they retained the majority of city seats, unlike the other great cities, where the Unionist alliance swept aside orthodox Liberals. As distinct from 1885, there was no uniformity in the voting trends across the constituencies, so that any conclusions must be highly tentative. (TABLE 9.3) Thus there is no correlation between the strength of pro-Unionist feeling as
TABLE 9.3  Share of Poll and Turnout, 1885 and 1886

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Share of Poll</th>
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<th>Swing to (+) Cons.</th>
<th>Turnout</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1885</td>
<td>1886</td>
<td>Cons./U.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Blackfriars</td>
<td>Lib. 61.0% (1)</td>
<td>Cons. 39.0%</td>
<td>Lib. 55.7%</td>
<td>Cons. 44.3%</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>77.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridgeton</td>
<td>56.8 (2)</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>+1.8</td>
</tr>
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<td>78.8</td>
</tr>
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<td>Camlachie</td>
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<td>St. Rollox</td>
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<td>49.4</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>Tradeston</td>
<td>57.7 (4)</td>
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<td>83.2</td>
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<td>76.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City as a whole</td>
<td>56.6%</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>77.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:  
(1) Includes 14.3% polled by a Land League candidate.  
(2) " 12.2% " " " " " " 
(3) " 2.1% " " an Independent candidate.  
(4) " 0.9% " " a Land League candidate.
revealed in the constituency Liberal Association's vote on Home Rule and the Unionists' performance in the election. (TABLE 9.4)

It is also difficult to discern any clear shifts in electoral behaviour explicable in terms of class alignment. For instance, while Central, the seat with probably the largest business and middle-class share of the electorate, showed a "swing" to the Unionists of almost double that of the city-wide movement (11.7% against 6.3%), the next most middle-class seat, College, had a below average swing of 4.2%. Of the two kindred East End seats, Camlachie's swing of 7.0% was about the average, but Bridgeton only shifted by 1.8% away from the Liberals. In the three seats gained by the Unionists, the nearest factor to a common denominator was that known candidates tended to fare better than fresh faces. In only two of the six fights where an incumbent was re-stand ing was he defeated, and there were exceptional circumstances at play in both cases. Moreover, the seventh, St. Rollox, where MacCulloch (who had approved of Gladstone's bill) retired, was won by the Unionist Caldwell, the runner-up in the contentious battle for the Liberal nomination in 1885, against a newcomer.

Of the two seats which failed to return the sitting member, Blackfriars' rejection of Henry was for straightforward reasons. Not only did it have the largest Irish element of the seven electorates - possibly 20% of the total - but they were better organised than in the rest of the city, through the agency of the 14th Ward Irish Electoral Union. As already noted, there was implacable Irish hostility towards Henry, and their transfer to the Gladstonian camp
<table>
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<th>L.A. Vote on Home Rule Bill</th>
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<tr>
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<td>For</td>
<td>Against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blackfriars</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridgeton</td>
<td>Unopposed</td>
<td>29 Apr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camlachie</td>
<td>(a) 65</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) 130</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>(a) 130</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) 70</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Rollox</td>
<td>Virtually unopposed</td>
<td>26 Apr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradeston</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
would more than counterbalance Liberal Unionist defections. Baird's
defeat of Beith in the Central seat was achieved with the highest
swing in the city. In addition to the normal Unionist portion, there
was disaffection with Beith among the remaining Liberal ranks, as
even the Mail had to confess.¹ The Irish nationalist organ confirmed
that, despite Beith's enthusiasm for Home Rule, it was true that
Baird, "as far as capabilities were concerned, has the advantage".²
The News also stressed that other factors than the immediate issue
of Home Rule lay behind Beith's defeat: "The Unionists had all the
more reason to be hopeful on account not only of the adhesion of
many Liberals to their cause, but because of the votes Mr. Beith
gave in the last Parliament, particularly on the volunteer question,
which roused an adverse feeling against him as an M.P."³

The third Unionist victory was the return of Corbett for Tradeston.
In this instance loyalty to a sitting M.P. was buttressed both by his
careful organisation and preplanning and also by Liberal disarray.
Corbett conducted a plebiscite of 3,430 electors, about one half of
his poll in 1885, who were reported to have voted by a margin of
4 to 1 in favour of his stance. He thereupon embarked on a thorough
canvass and addressed the electors assiduously for four weeks prior
to polling, while the Liberals, who could only agree upon their
candidate 12 days before the election, were too slow in mobilising
their following.⁴

¹. Ibid., 6 Jul.
². G. Observer, 10 Jul.
⁴. N.B.D.M., 5 June, 6 Jul.
The Liberal Unionists indicated that they calculated that two-fifths of all Liberal voters in 1885 were in sympathy with their opposition to the Home Rule bill, but the election figures do not entirely bear this out. The overall Unionist vote in 1886 was 2,412 higher than the Conservative poll in 1885 and after allowing for the switch of perhaps 6,000 Irish voters this would indicate that about 8,500 Liberals were Unionist, which was around 25% of the party's 1885 total. On the other hand, the net loss of Liberal strength in 1886 was some 11,500, or 33% of the previous year, and it may be that the difference of 3,000 is to be ascribed to Liberal Unionist abstentions. The second election, it is true, was held on a year-old register which may have damaged the Liberals' prospects more than the Conservatives', but there is no direct link between a fall in turnout and a high swing to the Conservatives, as Table 9.3 shows.

In 1886 the balance of financial resources swung heavily against the Liberals, as TABLE 9.5 shows. But the relationship in individual seats between the amount expended and the result is not clear-cut. Thus although the Liberals outspent the Unionists at St. Rollox, they could not keep the seat, while the Conservative candidate in Bridgeton, who spent £448 against the Liberal's £142, could only register the second smallest swing in the city. Expenditure under specific heads tends to indicate that advertising was less significant than the use of messengers and clerks in determining the outcome, and also that agents played very little part. This is shown by the breakdown of the parties' outlays in the two most surprising results:
TABLE 9.5  Candidates' Election Expenses, 1885 and 1886.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lib. 1885</th>
<th>Lib. 1886</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Cons./U. 1885</th>
<th>Cons./U. 1886</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total, 7 seats</td>
<td>£3,904</td>
<td>£2,853</td>
<td>-26.9%</td>
<td>£3,464</td>
<td>£3,887</td>
<td>+12.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Including:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agents</td>
<td>£742</td>
<td>£455</td>
<td>-38.8%</td>
<td>£665</td>
<td>£696</td>
<td>+4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks, Messengers</td>
<td>£652</td>
<td>£573</td>
<td>-12.1%</td>
<td>£383</td>
<td>£632</td>
<td>+65.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advertising &amp; Printing</td>
<td>£1,461</td>
<td>£1,272</td>
<td>-13.0%</td>
<td>£1,493</td>
<td>£1,943</td>
<td>+30.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Return of Candidates' Election Expenses, P.P. 1886, LII.
Although variations in the seven seats make it impossible to be
dogmatic, the pattern revealed by these statistics is, as suggested
earlier, that technical matters like registration were not very
relevant. Indeed, it rather looks as though efficient organisation
on the day of polling - as indicated by the use of clerks and
messengers - was the overriding element, while propaganda was only
of secondary importance.

On the whole, then, the 1886 election did not necessarily mark
a fundamental readjustment of the parties along social lines in
Glasgow, if only because for most of the Liberal Unionists the issues
involved were central parts of the Liberal tradition, and so did not
mark the emergence of new questions into the political arena: this
did not really occur until the first decade of the twentieth century.
Nevertheless, the old Liberal hegemony had been challenged, and a
new pattern was set up by the Home Rule split. The conditioning
elements of the mid-Victorian era in Glasgow politics were removed.
APPENDICES
Parliamentary Election Results, Glasgow 1846 to 1886

From 1832 to 1868 the Glasgow constituency returned 2 M.P.'s, and from 1868 to 1885, the constituency returned 3. From 1885, the city was divided into 7 single-member constituencies.

(1) The Glasgow Constituency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Election Type</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 July, 1847</td>
<td>General Election</td>
<td>John MacGregor (Lib)</td>
<td>2,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Alexr. Hastie (Lib)</td>
<td>2,082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Wm. Dixon (Lib)</td>
<td>1,872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>John Dennistoun (Lib)</td>
<td>1,748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 July 1852</td>
<td>General Election</td>
<td>Alexr. Hastie (Lib)</td>
<td>3,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>John MacGregor (Lib)</td>
<td>3,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Peter Blackburn (Cons)</td>
<td>1,681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Viscount Melgund (Lib)</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 March 1857</td>
<td>By-election on resignation of MacGregor</td>
<td>Walter Buchanan (Lib)</td>
<td>5,792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jas. Merry (Lib)</td>
<td>2,943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 April 1857</td>
<td>General Election</td>
<td>Walter Buchanan (Lib)</td>
<td>7,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Robt. Dalglish (Lib)</td>
<td>6,765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Alexr. Hastie (Lib)</td>
<td>5,044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 April 1859</td>
<td>General Election</td>
<td>Walter Buchanan (Lib)</td>
<td>Unopposed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Robt. Dalglish (Lib)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 July 1865</td>
<td>General Election</td>
<td>Wm. Graham (Lib)</td>
<td>8,171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Robt. Dalglish (Lib)</td>
<td>6,713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>James Ramsay (Lib)</td>
<td>5,832</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
18 November 1868 General Election

Robt. Dalglish (Lib) 18,287
Wm. Graham (Lib) 18,062
George Anderson (Lib) 17,803
Sir George Campbell, Bt. (Cons) 10,824

Electorate 47,854

16 February 1874 General Election

Dr. Chas. Cameron (Lib) 18,455
Geo. Anderson (Lib) 17,901
Alexr. Whitelaw (Cons) 14,134
Jas. Hunter (Cons) 12,533
Alexr. Crum (Lib) 7,453
Hon. Francis E. Kerr (R.C.) 4,444
J.C. Bolton (Lib) 169

Electorate 54,374

16 July 1879 By-election on death of Whitelaw

Chas. Tennant (Lib) Unopposed

Electorate 61,069

2 April 1880 General Election

Geo. Anderson (Lib) 24,016
Dr. Cameron (Lib) 23,658
R.T. Middleton (Lib) 23,360
Wm. Pearce (Cons) 11,622
Sir James Bain (Cons) 11,071

Electorate 57,920

11 March 1885 By-election on resignation of Anderson

T. Russell (Lib) Unopposed

Electorate 70,878

(2) The Seven Glasgow Constituencies

(a) Blackfriars and Hutchesontown

27 November 1885 General Election

Mitchell Henry (Lib) 3,759
W.C. Maughan (Cons.) 3,137
J. Shaw Maxwell (Land League) 1,156

Electorate 9,725

5 July 1886 General Election

A.C. Provand (Lib) 4,201
Mitchell Henry (Lib.-U.) 3,337

Electorate 9,725
(b) Bridgeton

27 November 1885 General Election

E.K. Russell (Lib) 3,599
E. Vans Agnew Haigland (Cons) 3,478
W. Forsyth (Land League) 978

5 July 1886 General Election

E.K. Russell (Lib) 4,364
Colin MacKenzie (Cons) 3,567

(c) Camlachie

27 November 1885 General Election

Hugh Watt (Lib) 4,047
Arnot Reid (Cons) 2,883
James Martin (Ind) 154

5 July 1886 General Election

Hugh Watt (Lib) 3,467
J. Bennett Burleigh (Lib.U) 3,308

(d) Central

27 November 1885 General Election

Gilbert Beith (Lib) 5,846
J.G.A. Baird (Cons) 4,779

5 July 1886 General Election

J.G.A. Baird (Cons) 5,779
Gilbert Beith (Lib) 4,423

(e) College

27 November 1885 General Election

Dr. Cameron (Lib) 5,662
Sir William J.M. Cuninghame (Cons) 4,139

Electorate

10,058
9,220
13,208
11,934
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Election Type</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 July 1886</td>
<td>General Election</td>
<td>Dr. Cameron (Lib)</td>
<td>4,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>R.V. Campbell (Lib.-U.)</td>
<td>4,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) St. Rollox</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 November 1885</td>
<td>General Election</td>
<td>John MacCulloch (Lib)</td>
<td>4,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>J.N. Cuthbertson (Cons)</td>
<td>4,824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 July 1886</td>
<td>General Election</td>
<td>James Caldwell (Lib.-U.)</td>
<td>4,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>P.S. MacLiver (Lib)</td>
<td>4,669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) Tradeston</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 November 1885</td>
<td>General Election</td>
<td>A. Cameron Corbett (Lib)</td>
<td>4,354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>James Somervell (Cons)</td>
<td>3,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>R.W. Greaves (Land League)</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 July 1886</td>
<td>General Election</td>
<td>A.C. Corbett (Lib.-U.)</td>
<td>3,878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Prof. J.M.D. Meiklejohn (Lib)</td>
<td>3,174</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Electorate 11,934
Electorate 11,926
Electorate 11,926
Electorate 9,222
Electorate 9,222
APPENDIX II

Occupational Classification of Glasgow, 1861 and 1891 Censuses


2. It should be stressed that this does not purport to be a totally accurate tabulation, due to ambiguities in the census figures themselves. Thus clerks are not always differentiated from manual workers, and traders are sometimes bracketed with producers (e.g. "Tobacconist, tobacco manufacture" in 1891). Moreover, the classification varies from census to census: so "Ironmoulder, founder" in 1861 is transmuted into "Iron Manufacture" in 1891. Despite these imprecisions, the classification does convey the general occupational pattern of the city.

3. The census classification is however, occupational rather than industrial in the strict sense. For instance, no estimate of the number of engineers and blacksmiths engaged in shipbuilding can be made.

4. The figures are for all ages employed, as the objective is to provide an outline of the full size of each activity.

5. Only the censuses of 1861, 1881 and 1891 use consistent criteria for establishing occupation. The 1851 census does not deal with individual towns; and 1871 only gives totals for sub-groups, which is too broad a basis to be reworked. 1861 and 1891 were used as the nearest approximations to the starting and terminal years of the study.
6. The 1891 Census enumerated two Glasgow areas: the municipal and the parliamentary burgh. Although the latter comprises the same area as the 1861 Census, the extended municipality of 1891 has been preferred because, as discussed in Chapter 1, this was a truer reflection of Glasgow's natural economic identity by then.

To have used the restricted parliamentary burgh figures would produce an underrepresentation of the Professional, Mercantile and Clerical elements. The actual numbers affected are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1891 Parliamentary Burgh</th>
<th>1891 Municipal Burgh</th>
<th>Increase</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>182,704</td>
<td>207,751</td>
<td>25,047</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>85,720</td>
<td>98,873</td>
<td>13,153</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>268,424</td>
<td>306,624</td>
<td>38,200</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Sources: Census of Scotland 1861, Vol. II Sec. III P.P. 1864 LI

" 1891, Vol. II Pt. II Sec. XV

P.P. 1893-4, CVIII
### TABLE 1 Occupational Classification of Glasgow, 1861 Census

(Municipal and Parliamentary Burgh)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>1,860</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Government &amp; Administration</td>
<td>1,495</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Army &amp; Navy</td>
<td>1,077</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>3,629</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Financial, Mercantile</td>
<td>1,950</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>4,561</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Retail, Distribution</td>
<td>18,383</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(32,955)</td>
<td>(16.8)</td>
<td>(26,438)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Building</td>
<td>10,469</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Metal &amp; Engineering</td>
<td>17,511</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Textile Manufacture</td>
<td>41,404</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>5,199</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Printing &amp; Paper</td>
<td>3,354</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Clothing, Boot &amp; Shoe</td>
<td>21,624</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Furniture &amp; Wood</td>
<td>4,682</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Food &amp; Drink Manufacture</td>
<td>3,854</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Glass &amp; Pottery</td>
<td>2,711</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Precision Industry</td>
<td>1,788</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Mining &amp; Quarrying</td>
<td>1,999</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Shipbuilding</td>
<td>1,587</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Miscellaneous Manufacturing</td>
<td>4,328</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Undefined Manufacturing</td>
<td>7,180</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(127,690)</td>
<td>(65.3)</td>
<td>(82,477)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Domestic Service</td>
<td>18,291</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>Porters, Dockworkers</td>
<td>7,247</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>Labouring &amp; General Manual</td>
<td>7,416</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Seaman (Merchant)</td>
<td>2,174</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(35,128)</td>
<td>(17.9)</td>
<td>(16,248)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>195,773</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>125,163</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX II/

#### TABLE 2 Occupational Classification of Glasgow, 1891 Census (Municipal Burgh)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Total No.</th>
<th>Total %</th>
<th>Males No.</th>
<th>Males %</th>
<th>Females No.</th>
<th>Females %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agriculture</td>
<td>1,398</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1,192</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Government &amp; Administration</td>
<td>2,952</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2,699</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Army &amp; Navy</td>
<td>1,180</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1,180</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Professional</td>
<td>8,005</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>5,076</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2,929</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Financial, Mercantile</td>
<td>2,531</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2,521</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Clerical</td>
<td>18,011</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>16,270</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>1,741</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Retail, Distribution</td>
<td>30,721</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>20,561</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>10,160</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(64,798) (21.2) (49,499) (23.8) (15,299) (15.4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Building</td>
<td>16,056</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>15,991</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Metal &amp; Engineering</td>
<td>39,469</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>39,124</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Textile Manufacture</td>
<td>27,903</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>7,170</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>20,733</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Transport</td>
<td>15,624</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>15,598</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Printing &amp; Paper</td>
<td>9,143</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>5,128</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4,015</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Clothing, Boot &amp; Shoe</td>
<td>28,481</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>8,906</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>19,575</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Furniture &amp; Wood</td>
<td>7,337</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>5,717</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1,620</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Food &amp; Drink Manufacture</td>
<td>9,057</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>5,261</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3,796</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Glass &amp; Pottery</td>
<td>3,341</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2,193</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1,148</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Precision Industry</td>
<td>2,838</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2,595</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Mining &amp; Quarrying</td>
<td>2,977</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2,914</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Shipbuilding</td>
<td>1,963</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1,961</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Miscellaneous Manufacturing</td>
<td>8,003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>21. Undefined Manufacturing</td>
<td>8,347</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>5,564</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2,783</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(180,539) (58.9) (124,859) (60.1) (55,680) (56.3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>22. Domestic Service</td>
<td>29,322</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>3,988</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>25,334</td>
<td>25.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>23. Porters, Dockworkers</td>
<td>13,508</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>11,042</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>2,466</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Labouring &amp; General Manual</td>
<td>15,105</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>15,047</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Seamen (Merchant)</td>
<td>3,352</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3,316</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(61,287) (19.9) (33,393) (16.1) (27,894) (28.2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>306,624</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>207,751</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>98,873</td>
<td>100</td>
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</table>
APPENDIX III

Socio-Economic Classification of the Glasgow Parliamentary Electorate, 1867-8 and 1868-9

Notes. 1. The principles and methods adopted in determining these groups are given in W. Armstrong, "The Uses of Census Information regarding Occupations" in E.A. Wrigley, Nineteenth Century Society (London 1974), pp. 198-225. In one important respect, however, his categories have been modified: clerical workers and minor functionaries are placed in Group II. This leaves Group III confined to the skilled working-class. The rearrangement seems to reflect more accurately the realities of social homogeneity in Glasgow, as described by contemporaries. This revision also highlights the impact of the Second Reform Act on the social composition of the electorate.

2. The socio-economic categories are as follows:

Group I Large employers; mercantile and higher financial occupations (banking, insurance, accountancy, shipping, stockbroking); property owners; the liberal professions (Church, law, medicine, architecture, military, civil service).

Group II Smaller employers; dealers, retailers and wholesalers; lesser professions (teaching, surveying); artists, entertainers; subordinate clerical and commercial occupations.

Group III Artisan craftsmen; skilled workers; higher class domestic servants.

Group IV Semi-skilled or intermediate workers; non-manual, low-skilled workers.

Group V General unskilled workers; labourers.
3. A simple random sample of 10% of the electoral register was used - i.e. every tenth name was taken from the Electoral Rolls for each year. The registers also recorded the occupation of every voter, but in cases of doubt (particularly in determining whether the elector was an employer or an employee), recourse was had to the Post Office Street and Trades Directory.

APPENDIX III/

TABLE 1 Socio-Economic Groupings of the Glasgow Electorate, 1867-8 and 1868-9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>1867-8</th>
<th>1868-9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group I Upper Business and Professional</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group II Lesser Business and Professional, and Clerical</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group III Skilled Manual Workers</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group IV Semi-skilled Manual</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group V Unskilled Manual</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Electorate</strong></td>
<td>1,836</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PLAN OF BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. MANUSCRIPT SOURCES

1. Personal Papers
2. Records of Institutions, etc.

B. PRINTED SOURCES

1. Primary Sources
   (a) Official Papers
   (b) Registers and Directories
   (c) Newspapers and Journals
   (d) Annual Reports
   (e) Reports of Speeches, Addresses, Meetings, etc.
   (f) Biographical Works
   (g) Other Primary Printed Sources

2. Secondary Sources
   (a) Relating to Glasgow
   (b) Other Books
   (c) Articles in Learned Periodicals

C. UNPUBLISHED THESIS
A. MANUSCRIPT SOURCES

1. Personal Papers


Campbell-Bannerman Papers, Papers of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, British Museum.


Dalhousie Muniments, Papers of the Earls of Dalhousie, Scottish Record Office, Edinburgh.

Gladstone Papers, Papers of W.E. Gladstone, British Museum

Howell Mss., Papers of George Howell, Bishopsgate Institute, London.

King Papers, Papers of Sir James King, by courtesy of Sir James G. le N. King, King's Sombre, Hampshire.

Lumsden Diaries, Diaries of Sir James Lumsden, by courtesy of the late Sir James Lumsden, Arden, Dunbartonshire.

Minto Papers, Papers of the Earls of Minto, National Library of Scotland.

Moir Papers, Papers of James Moir, Mitchell Library.

Muirhead Papers, Papers of R.E. Muirhead, Baillie's Institution, Glasgow.

Murray Letterbooks, Letterbooks of David Murray, by courtesy of D. Murray, Esq., Glasgow and Cardross, Dunbartonshire.

Rosebery Papers, Papers of the 5th Earl of Rosebery, National Library of Scotland.

Note: Inquiries made of descendants of the following local political figures revealed that they have left no private papers:-

James Baird; J.C. Bolton; Sir Charles Cameron; Col. Archibald Cameron, 1st Baron Blythswood; J.A. Campbell; Sir William Collins; Alexander Crum; W. Graham; W. Kidston; A.B. McGrigor; W. Quarrier; Sir Charles Tennant; Sir James Watson; Alexr. Whitelaw.

In addition, attempts to trace the descendants of many other Glasgow politicians proved unsuccessful.

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