This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree (e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following terms and conditions of use:

- This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated.
- A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge.
- This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author.
- The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author.
- When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given.
Refiguring the Sicilian Slave Wars: from Servile Unrest to Civic Disquiet and Social Disorder: Volume One

Peter Morton

PhD in Classics
The University of Edinburgh
2012
Signed declaration

This thesis has been composed by the candidate, the work is the candidate's own and the work has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification except as specified.

Signed:
Contents
Volume One

Abstract iv
Acknowledgments v
Abbreviations vi

Introduction Understanding Second Century B.C. Sicily 1
Chapter 1.1 Negotiations of Power – The Coinage of King Antiochus 12
Chapter 1.2 Negotiations of Power – The Decline and Fall of Inland Sicily 47
Chapter 2 Eunus – The Cowardly King 65
Chapter 3.1 Understanding An Anachronism in Diodorus’ Narrative – The Anachronism 101
Chapter 3.2 Understanding An Anachronism in Diodorus’ Narrative – The Narrative Function 105
Chapter 3.3 Understanding An Anachronism in Diodorus’ Narrative – Damophilus, Eunus and the Sicilian Insurrection 115
Chapter 4.1 Antiquus Socius Fidelissimus – Athenion, Verres and Cicero 123
Chapter 4.2 Antiquus Socius Fidelissimus – Sicily in the Verrine Orations 131
Chapter 5 Divination and Discord – The Characters of Salvius and Athenion 150
Chapter 6 Nicomedes, P. Licinius Nerva and Sicily: The Origin(s) of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War? 163
Chapter 7 A Society in Decay – Sicily at the End of the Second Century B.C. 173
Conclusion Renegotiating Sicilian History 197
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appendix 1</th>
<th>The ΦΙΛΙΠΗΙΟΝ Gold Coinage</th>
<th>205</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 2</td>
<td>The Sicilian Coinage c. 210 B.C. to the First Century B.C.</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 3</td>
<td>Sicilian Coinage 250 B.C. to c. 210 B.C.</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 4</td>
<td>Sicilian Coinage in the Fourth Century B.C.</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 5</td>
<td>Text and Translation of Diodorus’ Account of the Sicilian Insurrection</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 6</td>
<td>Merely a Slavish Copyist?</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 7</td>
<td>King Antiochus’ Title in Diodorus</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 8</td>
<td>The Elogium of Polla</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 9</td>
<td>Slaves in Ancient Warfare</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 10</td>
<td>The Definition of a Slave War</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 11</td>
<td>Athenion’s Slingshots</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 12</td>
<td>Text and Translation of Diodorus’ Account of the Sicilian Stasis</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 13</td>
<td>Honours for Victory</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figures</td>
<td></td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td></td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abstract

This study argues that the so-called Sicilian Slave Wars are best understood as two differing instances of civic disquiet, social disorder and provincial revolt in Sicily, rather than as slave wars. Both events are reconnected to their Sicilian context geographically, politically and socially, and shown to have arisen from those contexts. This thesis is demonstrated in seven chapters. Chapter I reassesses the principle evidence for the kingdom established by the rebels in the first war: their numismatic issues. This evidence is best understood in the context of contemporary Sicilian numismatics and emphasises the Sicilian nature of the uprising. It is argued that the insurgency was contingent on the support of certain parts of the (free) Sicilian populace. Chapter II presents a reinterpretation of Diodorus’ text from a narratological point of view. The text is shown to be highly rhetorical and constructed with a view to demonise the leaders of the first war, Eunus and Cleon, through reference to Hellenistic stereotypes of femininity, cowardliness, magic and banditry. Chapter III argues that Diodorus’ explanation of the origin of the war is anachronistic and shows evidence of narratorial intervention and invention, thereby rendering his interpretation unreliable. Chapter IV considers Cicero’s Verrine Orations and shows that his engagement with the two wars in the text cannot be used as a reliable indicator of historical fact because of the text’s continual engagement with history. Chapter V argues that the two leaders of the so-called Second Slave War, Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion, were described using the same matrix of ideas that were present for Eunus and Kleon, for the same rhetorical and narratological effect. Chapter VI analyses Diodorus’ narrative of the origin of the war, and shows that Diodorus only provides a chronology of coincidental events, and beyond a single connective narrative line, demonstrates no connection between these events. Finally, Chapter VII suggests that the best context in which to understand this war is that of a general breakdown of social order on Sicily at the end of the second century B.C. caused by internal political problems in the cities of Sicily. Further, the insurgency led by Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion is shown to be only part of a broader crisis on Sicily that stretched from 106-93 B.C., part of an extended stasis for the island. In sum, I argue that the events typically referred to as the Sicilian Slave Wars are better understood through a focus on the historical contexts provided by the Hellenistic milieu in which the wars arose and the development of the Roman provincial system – rather than through the (preconceived) lens of slavery: instead of servile unrest, there was civic disquiet, social disorder and provincial revolt on Sicily in the 2nd century BC.
Acknowledgments

There are more people who deserve my thanks for supporting me throughout this PhD than I can realistically mention here. In the first instance, I would like to thank all the various funding bodies and institutions that have made this study possible. The School of History, Classics and Archaeology funded my MSc and the College of Humanities and Social Sciences awarded me a full studentship for my PhD; without either of these awards this thesis would never have been written. The Baldwin Brown Travelling Scholarship twice funded research trips to Sicily, both of which provided valuable stimulus for my research. The Wiedemann Trust Fund, as well as the CA (twice), the international conference on Diodorus Siculus in Glasgow, and the Triennial Conference in Cambridge all offered me bursaries to help attend conferences and pursue research in the libraries of London; these opportunities have aided my academic development immensely. Dr Alexander Meeus invited me to Lampeter to be part of a workshop on Hellenistic narrative and historiography, which proved a thought-provoking environment for discussing my research. Finally, Drs Benet Salway and Simon Corcoran at Projet Voltera offered me work at the project that helped to fund an extended stay in London, during which time a large portion of this thesis was written; for this I thank them both very much.

I owe a number of personal debts as well. First and foremost, my supervisors, Dr Ulrike Roth and Prof. Keith Rutter, deserve the warmest thanks. Both have been not only inspirational academically, but profoundly supportive of my studies. I know that without their careful, patient and expert guidance I could never have even started this project, let alone seen it through to submission. My decision to change degree to Ancient History at undergraduate level, the first step that led me to writing this thesis, I owe entirely to the exciting teaching I received that year from Dr Nick Fields and Dr Sandra Bingham. In many ways, this thesis started then. In addition, a number of academics have freely given up their time to talk to me about my research, all of whom deserve my thanks: Prof. John Marincola; Dr Lisa Hau; and Prof. Catherine Steel. My fellow postgraduates at the University of Edinburgh, as well as the postgraduate community in London, all provided helpful feedback at various postgraduate seminars, as well as much needed time not talking about Classics at different stages. Finally, I would like to thank my family, especially my mother, for their unending support, and Nicole Cleary, for always making life better when research becomes unbearable. This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my father, who I hope would be proud of what I have achieved, and who has always been my inspiration to continue studying.
Abbreviations

All classical authors are, wherever possible, abbreviated according to the Oxford Classical Dictionary system. All texts used are those of the *Thesaurus Lingua Graecae* or *Packard Humanities Institute PHI Latin Library*, and all translations are my own. Apart from the exceptions listed below, no modern author is abbreviated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Introduction: Understanding Second Century B.C. Sicily

**Enim vero et servilium armorum dedecus feras...**

‘One can tolerate, indeed, even the disgrace of a war against slaves...’ Flor. 2.8.1.

In 136 B.C., and again in 104 B.C., Sicily broke out in two of the largest slave revolts of antiquity – so the literary sources tell us. On each occasion thousands of slaves seized the opportunity to claim their freedom and violently resisted the Roman authority’s attempts to stop them. The rebels, in a perverse imitation of the society they strove against, chose from among their numbers men to be kings, who affected the look and ideology of Hellenistic kings. Indignant ancient writers seethed over the defeated Roman praetors and consuls, their camps captured, and grudgingly admitted that the slaves even succeeded in taking several important cities of Sicily. In each event, Rome regained control of the province only through the application of large-scale military force. From these events writers drew clear warnings of the dangers of excessive arrogance, luxury and greed, and developed them into carefully composed moral tales (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2 and 36.1-10; Val. Max.2.7.3, 2.7.9, 4.3.10, 6.9.8, 9.12.1). For some the collapse of Sicilian society into slave revolts was an intrinsic part of the gathering speed with which the Roman Republic hurtled headlong into autocracy (Flor. 2.7; App. B Civ.1.9). With the addition of Spartacus in 73 B.C., these three events constitute an oddity in the history of antiquity: never again in the ancient world did slaves rise up in such numbers, nor resist their masters for such lengths of time. The lesson, so it seems, had been learned.

The same basic narrative regarding the events that struck Sicily in the 130s B.C. and again some thirty years later is found in the standard reference works for the ancient world. For example, in Volume IX of *The Cambridge Ancient History* the events of the two wars are, essentially, a rewording of the ancient narrative given

---

in Diodorus, Florus and various other authors from antiquity. In the brief account given in the *CAH*, we find all of the features that are prevalent in other modern accounts. For example, there is a stress on the chain-gangs supposedly working in Sicily in this period (26), the moralising tone of the main ancient narrative is noted (26), and the importance of the actions of the free poor in Sicily during the conflicts is suppressed (26-7), often quite dismissively (27): ‘Although poor Sicilians became involved, their activities were marginal…’ Throughout the rest of the volume the two ‘Sicilian Slave Wars’ are then given as evidence of the availability of slaves in the second century B.C. and the growth of their numbers in Italy (55, 605); of the escalation of violence and corruption in Roman politics (60-1); of the ‘land problem’ in Italy in the mid-second century B.C. brought on by excessive use of slave labour, and combated by the Gracchi (73); of the gradual worsening of slave treatment in the second century B.C. in Italy (605); and finally, of the rise in the importance of the villa economy in Italy (620). In short, the two ‘Sicilian Slave Wars’ are considered, throughout the *CAH*’s treatment of the second century B.C., to be a key aspect of interpreting the development of Italy’s agriculture and society, although interestingly only a very short section is given over to consideration of the relevance of the wars to Sicily (25-7). Most noteworthy of all, however, is the certainty with which the information given in the brief account is expressed, in particular when dismissing the importance of the poor Sicilians to the revolts. In this case Lintott confidently states that the actions of the free poor were (27) ‘…contrary to the aims of the leaders of the rebels.’

Despite the notice given in various sources for both conflicts, and the certainty of the interpretation expressed in the *CAH*, there is in fact very little evidence for either of the two so-called Sicilian Slave Wars. In terms of literary evidence we rely for the most part on the fragmentary narrative of books 34-6 of Diodorus’ *Bibliotheke* and the short account of Florus. Other authors record a few details, typically in unrelated and chronologically hard to place anecdotes or short impressionistic narratives: in this category we find the *Periochae* of Livy, Valerius Maximus’ tales, Strabo’s geographical narrative, Orosius’ history and Cicero’s *Verrine Orations*. It is an indication of the paucity of the literary evidence that our
main account of the conflicts preserved in Diodorus survives only in an epitome written by Photius in his Bibliotheca, and in the excerpts ordered by Constantine Porphyrogenitus. To this collection of literary evidence we can add only the material evidence of a handful of coins from the first of the two conflicts and a collection of slingshots from each event. The evidential basis for understanding the events in question is so poor that it is unclear not only when and with what forces Roman commanders were assigned to the provincia, but also when the so-called First War began.2

In spite of, or perhaps rather because of the problems with the evidence for both events there has been considerable scholarly interest in them in the past. That interest has been focused, in essence, on two distinct spheres: slavery3 and Sicily. Each of these two spheres of interest has attracted its own unique set of methodological problems.

In the first sphere of interest the main emphasis has been on explicating the problems with the literary evidence, and on recovering as far as possible the historical context of the outbursts of servile insurrection. Bradley (1989: ix) noted in his preface that he considered there to be

…a need…for a straightforward narrative of the slave rebellions, set within their immediate context, that at the same time is related to the wider background of modern slavery studies.

He went on to comment on his hope that his monograph would contribute to the history of ‘...Roman social relations in particular and to the history of slavery in broader compass’. Bradley’s intention to find the ‘immediate context’ for the conflict is quite typical of the majority of scholarship on the subject, and can be found in any attempt to explain the peculiarities of the literary evidence. To this end, a number of

---

2 For discussion of the dating of the outbreak of this conflict see: Bradley (1989), 152-7 and 170-83; Brennan (1993), 153-84; Keaveney (1998), 73-82; and my discussion in Chapter I.1 no. 67.

3 I exclude from this category any work which is not directly interested in engaging with the evidence for the two so-called Sicilian Slave Wars: a great many articles and books refer to the two conflicts, but typically only to comment on the topic that is more immediately relevant to the work; see e.g. the account given in CAH2 XI, 25-7, and discussed above.
contexts have been drawn on including Syrian nationalism amongst the enslaved (Vogt 1965: 41-3), modern theories of maroonage (Bradley 1989: xiv-xv; 123-6; Bradley 2011b: 365), as well as numerous efforts to understand the particular social requisites necessary for widespread servile discontent, often with a focus on the religious characteristics of the leaders of each revolt. One commonplace has been to look for explanatory and contextual foundations further afield than the location of the events in Sicily; indeed, and as we shall see throughout this thesis, for many of the analyses cited above the most ‘immediate context’, that of the island itself, has been missed. In addition, all of these approaches have foregrounded the literary evidence for the conflicts, and display a general reluctance to analyse the other, non-literary evidence preserved, such as the limited amounts of numismatic or epigraphic material. In spite of the emphasis given to the literary evidence, scholars have been hesitant to subject it to detailed study because of its fragmentary nature, leading Bradley (1989: 136) to conclude that ‘…it requires too great an act of faith to believe that the excerpts now extant [of Diodorus] preserve evidence of literary ingenuity…’ This has led to interpretations that have accepted too readily the assertions made by the literary sources because of an assumed lack of creativity on the part of the main literary source, Diodorus Siculus.

What is more, it has been demonstrated in a series of articles by two scholars that it is precisely the careful scrutiny of the literary sources, combined with the integration of the non-literary sources studied in their geographical context, that can lead to developments in our understanding of the conflicts. For the first ‘Sicilian Slave War’, Manganaro argued in a series of articles (1967; 1980; 1982; 1983; 1990a; 1990b; 2000) that it is only by incorporating the numismatic evidence into our study of the conflict that we can begin to understand the rebel movement on its own terms. He showed (1982; 1983) that these issues derived their meaning from the context of Sicilian numismatics in the second century B.C., and that they strongly implied that the rebels, whoever they were, attempted to appeal to the people of

---

4 This category encompasses the majority of the works on the two events: see Pareti (1927); Westermann (1945); Westermann (1954), 63-9; Green (1961); Toynbee (1965), 316-27, 405-7; Canfora (1985); Dumont (1987), 197-268; Sacks (1990), 144-9; Callahan and Horsley (1998); Mileta (1998); Shaw (2000); Wirth (2004) and (2006), 125-8; Urbanczyk (2008a) and (2008b); Strauss (2010).
Sicily in their struggle (1990a; 1990b). This is not clear from the literary evidence alone. Rubinsohn (1982) later argued, through a close reading of Diodorus’ text and a consideration of the broader historical context of the Mediterranean, that the explanation of the second ‘Sicilian Slave War’ as a slave war (436) ‘does not do justice to the rather complex phenomena covered by it.’ He noted (449-51) that Diodorus’ narrative preserves telling evidence of internal disorder among the free of Sicily, and in particular (450) ‘between the influential bourgeoisie and the poor.’ Most importantly, both Manganaro and Rubinsohn acknowledged the importance of understanding the evidence for both conflicts in their immediate chronological, geographical and political contexts. Regardless of the point of view taken on the conflicts by the scholars other than Manganaro and Rubinsohn, all have under-appreciated these geographical, cultural and political contexts of the events that took place in Hellenistic Sicily.

In the second sphere of interest, the main emphasis has been to use the evidence of the two events to define watershed moments in the history of Sicily. This particular approach has, itself, two distinct focuses. In the first – comprised of Verbrugghe (1972; 1974) and Manganaro (1982; 1983; 1990b; 2000) – the evidence of the ‘Sicilian Slave Wars’ is reinterpreted as indicative of provincial revolts against Rome. For example, Verbrugghe argued that the main literary source’s purported opinion that herdsmen were the chief culprits of the so-called First Sicilian Slave War was inaccurate because Sicily’s main agricultural produce was grain, something focused on by Livy and Cicero. Moreover it is assumed that there could not possibly have been 200,000 rebels involved had they all been slaves (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.18). Yet, even for Verbrugghe, the use of the Sicilian context is only to disprove the thesis that the event in question was a slave revolt; he suggests no reason for a Sicilian revolt beyond a history of rebelliousness (1972: 53-8), and does not suggest why, in the mid to late second century B.C., a revolt would have taken place.5 Furthermore, Verbrugghe, despite his aggressive attacks on certain details in

5 A similar criticism could be made of Manganaro’s arguments.
Diodorus’ narrative, accepted without question Diodorus’ assertions regarding the nationality and character of Eunus.\(^6\)

The more common focus for scholars interested in Sicily is the one seen in recent work on the maintenance of Sicily’s strong Hellenistic civic culture and all of the civic structures that are part of this.\(^7\) Here, the two ‘Sicilian Slave Wars’ are commonly noted as a watershed moment in the development of Sicilian history, but usually with at most cursory analysis devoted to the evidence. As such, the two events are poorly integrated into the narrative of Sicilian history. Moreover, the evidence for the two conflicts is often cited as testimony contrary to the development of Sicily noted in the archaeological and epigraphic evidence, typically without asking why this distinction appears to exist. While this will be discussed in detail throughout the thesis and in particular in Chapter I.2 and the Conclusion, a brief demonstration is appropriate here.

Wilson (2000: 134-60) studied the Sicily of Cicero’s *Verrine Orations* from an archaeologist’s perspective. He demonstrated the substantial material remains of Sicily that showed an island with a powerful economy capable of supporting a provincial elite that was politically active, and financially prospering from Rome’s stewardship (137-57). However, when moving onto the archaeological evidence for the development of Sicily’s agriculture, Wilson noted the following (159):

One thing which is strikingly clear from Cicero’s accusations is the apparent prevalence of farmers with small- to medium-sized estates, and this provides a striking contrast to the picture provided by Diodorus and others of the Sicilian countryside being dominated by vast estates (*latifundia*) with huge slave run ranches. There must have been plenty of examples of the latter in Sicily – otherwise the island would never have experienced two slave wars at the end of the second century BC – but that they coexisted with small- and medium-sized estates at the time of Verres’ governorship (and no doubt before) seems certain.

He earlier noted that while the archaeological field survey evidence is far from complete for Sicily, it is nonetheless the case that in areas that have been surveyed,

---

\(^6\) Verbrugghe (1974) is not alone in accepting without question Diodorus’ account of Eunus: for references see Chapter II.

\(^7\) For a more detailed look at these studies, see Chapter I.2.
the pattern of land-use is complex, even if (149) ‘…the limited amount of field survey evidence…suggests the presence in the countryside of plentiful smallholdings in the first half of the first century BC’. Both Heraclea Minoa and Himera, for example, seem to have had only small scale farms, giving way to larger estates in the early Empire (160), and in general Wilson comments on the development of large estates in Sicily by the late Republic, but only scantily, if at all, at an earlier date (147-60). What is interesting to note is the assumption made that Diodorus’ narrative requires the presence of ‘latifundia’ to make sense, and that therefore ‘there must have been plenty of examples of [these] in Sicily’. This lack of examination of the Diodoran evidence is problematic.

This tendency to leave unexamined the evidence we have for these watershed moments in Sicilian history is further demonstrated by another author. In two articles, Serrati (2000a; 2000b), in the same volume as Wilson noted above, considered the manner in which Rome slowly established its control over the province. In particular, Serrati looked at the lex Rupilia promulgated after the first ‘Sicilian Slave War’ by P. Rupilius (2000a: 112-3; 2000b: 121-2). He argued (2000a: 112-3) that the reforms regulated the administration of the province and dealt with a wide variety of issues including (113) ‘agriculture, ports, imports and exports, poverty and the law courts.’ Later Serrati (2000b: 121-2) stated that the lex Rupilia was a true lex provinciae, and therefore marked the transition of Sicily from (121) ‘an area of Roman administration and control to a provincia in the late republican and imperial sense.’ Yet, in none of this did Serrati consider why it was in 132 B.C. that this took place, nor did he explain the broader historical context of the lex Rupilia beyond naming the two conflicts. Therefore, he did not engage with the evidence that Diodorus and the other sources for the two ‘Sicilian Slave Wars’ provide for the condition of Sicily in this period.8 Even when included in La Sicilia antica – a series of monographs aiming to document the development of Sicily throughout history – and placed within the section on ‘La provincia romana’ (Manganaro 1980: 411-61), the two ‘Sicilian Slave Wars’ were, nonetheless,

---

8 We might note that Serrati, like Wilson above, assumes the existence of (2000a), 112, ‘massive slave-run farms’ in the period of the two ‘Sicilian Slave Wars’.
discussed as entirely separate incidents from the rest of Sicily’s history, with almost no consideration given to how they related to the history before and after (435-41). This approach is particularly problematic, because by treating the two events as separate from the rest of the island’s history the importance they held for the development of the province is missed. Both these approaches, and the ones I outlined above concerning scholars interested in slavery rather than Sicily, fail to engage fully with the evidence that we have for the two conflicts in question: as I will show, this renders their analyses less convincing.

Thus, I propose to take a different approach in this thesis to those outlined above. This change in direction is inspired by the careful work of Rubinsohn and Manganaro noted already. I do not think it possible to understand the two ‘Sicilian Slave Wars’ without placing them into their geographical, cultural and political contexts in Hellenistic Sicily; nor is it possible to comment on Hellenistic Sicily without fully understanding how the two conflicts reflect on the social and cultural factors that drove the island to have such great problems. In essence, I want to bring together and develop our understanding of both the events in question and the general development of Hellenistic Sicily, subjects which have been typically treated in isolation from each other in the past. This is only possible through a thorough study of both the literary and numismatic evidence for the two conflicts, analysed in their most immediate contexts – Hellenistic Sicily and the literary culture of the Mediterranean more broadly – and a reintegration of this evidence into the narrative of Sicily’s development as a provincial partner with Rome.

To this end, this thesis is divided into seven chapters, each of which deals with a specific aspect of the evidence for the two conflicts. In the first chapter I provide a reassessment of the evidence for the kingdom established by the rebels in the so-called First Sicilian Slave War: their coins. This chapter argues that when viewed in the context of Sicilian numismatics of the second century B.C., the coins produced under the authority of King Antiochus, the leader of the rebels, are best understood as emphasising the Sicilian nature of his uprising. Moreover, this suggests that King Antiochus was aiming to rouse the people of Sicily in a united
In turn, it will be argued that it is entirely plausible that many Sicilians would have been sympathetic to this cause, and that Diodorus’ narrative preserves evidence of this (34/5.2.48): in other words, that this event was not, uncomplicatedly, a ‘slave war’, but something more complex that reflected and was contingent on the support of certain parts of the (free) Sicilian populace. In Chapter II I present a new interpretation of Diodorus’ text from a narratological point of view. First, I demonstrate that the character of Eunus, the leader of the so-called First Sicilian Slave War, is constructed with Hellenistic stereotypes of femininity, cowardliness and magic. Second, the character of Kleon, Eunus’ subordinate, is shown to be connected to violent banditry as a counterpoint to Eunus. Finally, I argue that if we view Diodorus’ narrative from a rhetorical and narratological viewpoint we can see Diodorus acting as a covert external and omniscient narrator who sought to carefully influence his readers’ reactions to certain key events in the narrative. This, combined with Diodorus’ deliberate portrayal of Eunus through stereotyped character traits, questions how much we can rely on Diodorus’ narrative for an accurate portrayal of the events in question. In Chapter III this conclusion is built upon with an analysis of Diodorus’ explanation of the origin of the ‘First Sicilian Slave War’. This origin narrative is, I argue, based upon a notorious anachronism that illustrates the fact that Diodorus was not describing events that he already understood, but was rather striving to link a series of unconnected events through his narrative. From this it is concluded that we must reject Diodorus’ causal explanation for the event, and reinterpret the episodes of the main narrative in the context of a Sicilian insurrection against Rome rather than a ‘slave war’.

In Chapter IV the only other near to contemporary source for the events in question is considered: Cicero’s *Verrine Orations*. Because of the nature of the text – a speech aiming to convict a corrupt governor of Sicily – this text must be approached from a different perspective. First, Cicero’s various uses of both the ‘Sicilian Slave Wars’ and their leaders as comparatives for Verres and his lieutenants in Sicily are discussed. It is noted that Cicero engages more directly and completely with the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War and its leader Athenion than with the prior war and its leader King Antiochus. Second, this conclusion is furthered through
demonstrating Cicero’s approach to history throughout the *Verrine Orations*. Through a study of Cicero’s understanding of Sicily’s history vis-à-vis Rome, and the Roman general M. Claudius Marcellus, it is shown that Cicero was willing to misrepresent historical data. It is concluded that Cicero’s preference for the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War as a comparative over the first was caused by rhetorical constraints: the latter event was more problematic for Cicero’s thesis that Sicily was Rome’s *antiquus socius fidelissimus* because it was not, as is commonly thought, simply a ‘slave war’.

Chapters V, VI and VII then focus on the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War. First, in Chapter V the two leaders of the war, Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion, are shown to have been described using the same matrix of ideas that were present for Eunus and Kleon. Therefore, Salvius/Tryphon is implied to be effeminate and lacking military nous, while Athenion is described as a charlatan prophet and a brave soldier. I then argue that these character portraits set up the narratives of both men so that the subsequent events are read in the correct context. In Chapter VI, Diodorus’ narrative of the origin of the war is studied. I argue that the narrative in Diodorus only provides a chronology of coincidental events, and beyond a single connective narrative line, demonstrates no connection between these events. We must therefore look beyond the text of Diodorus for the origins of the revolt. Finally, Chapter VII provides the context that I argue was lacking for the events of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War in Chapter VI. I show that the narrative of Diodorus for the event provides evidence for a general breakdown of social order in Sicily at the end of the second century B.C. This was caused by internal political problems in the cities of Sicily, a growing number of landless free people, and an over-reliance on the authority of the Roman governor to maintain the status quo. The insurgency led by Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion, the element of the conflict in Sicily in this period typically foregrounded as demonstrating the ‘servile’ nature of the disorder, in turn is shown to be only one part of a broader crisis in Sicily that stretched from 106-93 B.C. This period, rather than being a single moment of servile insurrection was in fact an extended time of *stasis* for the island which represented far larger problems than those exemplified by the ‘kingdoms’ of Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion. Finally
I demonstrate that Salvius/Tryphon’s insurgency had the aim of establishing a politically active society at Triocala. The actions of Athenion, by contrast, lacked any coherent social form. Therefore the ancient authors typically foregrounded Athenion at the expense of Salvius/Tryphon.

The aim throughout these chapters and this thesis is to show that it is only by engaging in detail with the evidence for the conflicts and understanding them in their various contexts that we can begin to understand the complex and important events that took place in Sicily during the second century B.C. Furthermore the aim is to formulate important questions that have yet to be asked about the events under consideration: what did it mean for Sicily and the Sicilian people that the island twice in the space of forty years descended into conflict and warfare in the second century B.C.? And how did these events shape the development of Sicily as a province and a politically active Hellenistic culture, and the island’s relationship with the imperial centre at Rome? First, however, Antiochus’ kingdom.

9 As such, the revolt led by Spartacus, Crixus and Oenomaus from 73-71 B.C. will not be discussed except where strictly necessary.
I. Negotiations of Power 1:
The Coinage of King Antiochus

‘But Eunus’ coins...are best understood as a mechanism to cultivate solidarity among the slave dissidents. Their depiction of Demeter is a reminder that the goddess’s cult had been manipulated earlier in Sicilian history for political purposes and even anti-Roman purposes. But it would be illogical to assume at once that a rebellion of slaves was now a rising against Roman rule.’ Bradley (1989), 120.

‘The types and legends of an ancient coin normally had two functions, first to identify the authority responsible for the coin, second to proclaim the message, if any, which that authority wished to put out. The first function is clearly the more important.’ Crawford (1983), 51.

Introduction

The literary accounts concerning the so-called First Sicilian Slave War are heavily biased against the kingdom established by King Antiochus.\(^{10}\) Investigation of the aims and intentions of the insurgents in the war against Rome is made difficult by this bias, and even the make-up of these rebels is all too easily reduced to ‘slaves’,\(^{11}\) with some free-booting poor taking advantage of the situation on the island for their own gain. However, it is still possible to gain knowledge about the kingdom of Antiochus through a body of original primary evidence that has survived the passage of time from his kingdom, and by a thorough appreciation of how this evidence fits into the context of Mid/Late Hellenistic Sicily. The body of evidence in question is numismatic: the short-lived kingdom of Antiochus produced four issues of coinage that have left a trace for posterity. The interpretation of these issues in the correct context is of paramount importance in understanding what his kingdom represented in the negotiation of power between Sicily and Rome in this period. The following pages will show that this negotiation between the island and Rome was not wholly one-sided, and that at critical moments in this chapter of Sicilian history its people challenged the authority of the Romans outright. In turn, this challenge forced concessions from Rome that affected the course of the Roman dominance of the island until its reorganisation by

---

\(^{10}\) See Chapter II for a discussion of this bias, and its consequences for our interpretation of the literary sources.

\(^{11}\) By using the term ‘slave’ to describe the insurgents involved both on the side of King Antiochus and in the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War, modern scholars have accepted the biases and preconceptions engrained in the primary sources. This vocabulary serves only to skew analysis away from objective results. In an effort to correct this tendency, the terms ‘insurgents’ and ‘rebels’ will be used, wherever possible, to describe those fighting against Roman interests in both conflicts.
Augustus. Perhaps more important than this, the evidence for the Kingdom of Antiochus challenges persuasively the accounts of the literary sources about Mid/Late Hellenistic Sicily, and forces a reconsideration of the role that Sicily played in the burgeoning Roman empire.

In order to avoid the preconceptions and biases mentioned above and to investigate the evidence from Antiochus’ kingdom in a neutral manner, in the following analysis of the evidence I will try as far as possible to avoid bringing the literary sources into the discussion. By doing this we will also be better able to understand how King Antiochus wanted himself to be seen. Furthermore, by separating the numismatic evidence from the literary we will be able to connect the numismatic evidence to contexts other than those given in the literary sources, which will broaden our understanding and create a more nuanced picture of the actual events in question. As a basis for analysis I will in the first instance present the four surviving issues of coins produced by King Antiochus, and where necessary provide a short discussion of the different interpretations of what is displayed on them. As far as possible the images will be connected to ones that correspond to them in other Sicilian coinages that are contemporary or as close as possible to contemporary, although historical correspondences will also be discussed. Following on from this introductory presentation of the surviving numismatic evidence, the coins will then be analysed in two sections. In the first I will try to reconstruct the circulation of coinage in Sicily in the second century B.C. This will allow us to understand the immediate relevance of King Antiochus’ coinage in the context in which it would have been viewed and used. In the second the types chosen by King Antiochus will be reconnected to the numismatic context from which they arose in order to investigate if the types chosen held any special significance. This will also help us to assess the way in which King Antiochus was presenting himself: as a man aware of and influenced by Sicilian culture, and displaying this awareness in an effort to garner the support of the Sicilian people. With these conclusions in mind, I will, finally, demonstrate that previous interpretations of what the coinage of King Antiochus represented have been inadequate because they have invoked the wrong contexts for understanding these coins, and that this inadequacy was the result of placing the study of the coinage into a quite different argument, consequently misinterpreting that evidence.

I. The Coins
There are four issues of bronze coinage that can be attributed to King Antiochus.¹² Without exception all of the coins are of a very low weight, produced in differing values, and are of uniformly poor quality. The significance, if any, of the imagery placed on the coins will be dealt with later, but possible precedents in other Sicilian coinages that may help to understand the images of King Antiochus’ coinage will be discussed here.

**FIGURE KA1 (Campana, Enna 11)**

Figure KA1  
Obv: Male head right, bearded and diademed.  
Rev: Winged thunderbolt; ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ upwards at left, ANTIO downwards at right.  

a) 10.05g Cammarata 1 = Calciati 9

I am aware of reference to this coin in three catalogues.¹³ The head has been identified as that of King Antiochus, although Campana (1997: 155) also suggested that it could be Zeus or Herakles as there is no inscription. The poor quality of the coin means that a definite identification is not possible. Because of the lightning bolt design on the reverse, an identification of the head as that of Zeus is plausible.¹⁴ This parallels one known elsewhere in Sicily: the town of Centuripae minted coins featuring Zeus on the obverse and a winged lightning bolt on the reverse (Figure 1). These types continued from the third century B.C. until the mid-second century B.C.¹⁵ However, if we consider regal types from Sicily then we can find perhaps the best identification of the head. Hieron II placed the head of his son

---

¹² For a discussion of the two gold issues that have been attributed to King Antiochus, but which I think are either forgeries or unrelated to King Antiochus see Appendix 1: The ΦΙΛΙΠΠΙΩΝ Gold Coinage.  
¹⁴ Graf, OCD³, ‘Zeus’, 1638.  
¹⁵ According to Head (1911), 135, Centuripae continued this type till some point after 241 B.C., however in HN³ Sicily there are coins with this type from Centuripae until much later: 150 B.C. See also Calciati III, p169-72, nos. 3-4, and SNG Morcom 572-4. I am grateful to Prof. Rutter for kindly allowing me to see a copy of a draft of Historia Numorum, Sicily. Any further mentions of HN³ Sicily refer to this draft.
Gelon on the obverse of coins that had on the reverse a winged thunderbolt, and Hieronymus did the same for himself (Figures 2 and 3 respectively). In both cases their heads are diademed. This particular affectation of placing their head on the side of the coin usually reserved for Zeus was common among Hellenistic kings, and we need not draw on examples only from Sicily to demonstrate this tendency, nor assume that it was a Sicilian one. But the examples used above suffice to show that perhaps the most likely choice for the head on the obverse is that of King Antiochus himself.

FIGURES KA2a-i (Campana, Enna 12)

Figure KA2b

Obv: Male head right, bearded and diademed.

Rev: a) Quiver; ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΑΝΤΙΟΧΟΥ downwards at right.
   b) Quiver; ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ upwards at left, ΑΝΤΙ downwards at right.

Var. a) CNG 37/1996, 98, 10.00g; Cammarata 2, 7.40g; Cammarata 2a, 7.60g; Cammarata 2b = Calciati 10, 7.35g.

Var. b) Cammarata 4, 5.40g; Cammarata 4a, 4.70g; Cammarata 4b, 5.00g; Cammarata 4c, 3.75g; Cammarata 2c, 4.80g.

Both series, of which four specimens of Variety a survive, and five of Variety b, have a reverse design that is difficult to identify. Campana (1997: 156) describes it as a lit torch on a pedestal, while Manganaro has variously identified it as a club (1982: 237), as a bunch of grapes (1983: 405), and most recently as a quiver with a cap and swollen base (1990a: 418). The latter is the most likely as Manganaro’s comparison with other quivers on coins of Demetrius I Soter and a coin from Halaesa dateable to after 241 B.C. has shown (Figures 4

---

16 Fleischer (1996), 38, described this phenomenon among Hellenistic kings as one of a number of aspects of their repertoire of imagery on coinage and he called this aspect ‘affinity to gods’. Others he listed were affinity to Romans (37), militarism (31-6), and dynastic affectations (31). Divine patrons were a well-established motif of justifying claims to kingship; see Lund (1992), 162.

17 A suggestion also proffered by Lorber (1994), 2.


19 HN³ Sicily.
and 5 respectively). This leaves the coins as something of a puzzle. Usually the presence of a quiver, in the absence of a club (which would indicate a link to Herakles), would be combined with an obverse image of Artemis, which is indeed the case on the coin from Halaesa. Clearly, however, the head on the obverse is male. Manganaro (1990: 418-9) considered that the obverse head was that of Herakles.\(^\text{20}\) He then inventively argued that these coins were paired with Figure KA3, and that each coin had an obverse that complemented the reverse type of the other. I do not think we need to be so inventive. First, as a type, Artemis is not so rare in Sicilian numismatics. Coins from Halaesa, Syracuse, and Morgantina (Hispanorum) all feature Artemis on coins dating from after 210 B.C. (Figures 5, 8, and 9 respectively).\(^\text{21}\) In terms of Sicilian numismatics the quiver is an intelligible design, clearly linked to Artemis, and we need not link the type to the obverse of another issue of coins; the problem that remains is that of the obverse head. If the head is not diademed then it could be Herakles, but that does not answer the question as to why King Antiochus put these two types together. Comparison with Figure KA1 provides the most likely explanation: the head on the obverse of this coin looks very similar to the head on the obverse of Figure KA2a-i: the lips, eyes, and face shape are almost identical. Furthermore, while it is hard to tell from the pictures if the head on the obverse of Figure KA2a-i is wearing a diadem, Manganaro, who saw the actual coins, definitely identified a diadem (1990: 418), which constitutes a further similarity with Figure KA1.\(^\text{22}\) The temptation, therefore, is to suggest that it is King Antiochus on the obverse of this coin also, as the coin lacks any other mark to help identify the head.

**FIGUREs KA3a-b (Campana, Enna 13)**

---

\(^{20}\) One could argue that the head is that of Apollo given his association with the bow and quiver as symbols on coinage. However, two aspects of this issue of coins argue against this suggestion. First, the most common reverse types associated with Apollo on Sicilian coins are the tripod and the lyre (Figures 6 and 7). Second, Apollo is, in the vast majority of cases, depicted laureate on the obverse (see again Figure 6). The issue of King Antiochus (Figure KA2a-i) does not fulfil either of these criteria, and therefore I conclude that the coins are not invoking Apollo, nor showing any ‘affinity’ to Apollo on King Antiochus’ part.

\(^{21}\) Halaesa after 241 B.C.: *HN³ Sicily*, SNG ANS 3 1191; Syracuse after 212 B.C.: *HN³ Sicily*, SNG ANS 5 1104; Morgantina (Hispanorum) c. 150-50 B.C.: *HN³ Sicily*, SNG ANS 4 481.

\(^{22}\) It should be noted that Herakles is depicted wearing a lion’s skin on the majority of Sicilian coinage, although a minority show him wearing a *tainia*, which looks very much like a diadem. Therefore the presence of a diadem does not confirm that the head is that of King Antiochus. However, because otherwise the head is so similar on both coins, I think that this identification is the most likely. For Herakles wearing a lion’s skin: Aluntium (*SNG ANS 3*: 1193), Cephaloedium (*SNG ANS 3*: 1332), Thermae (*SNG ANS 4*: 190), Menaenium (*SNG ANS 4*: 288), Messana (*SNG ANS 4*: 396), Mamertini (*SNG ANS 4*: 417), Panormus (*SNG ANS 4*: 605), Selinus (*SNG ANS 4*: 716), Solus (*SNG ANS 4*: 735); For Herakles wearing a *tainia*: Agyrium (*SNG ANS 3*: 1167), Centuripae (*SNG ANS 3*: 1327), Syracuse (*SNG ANS 5*: 732), Tauromenium (*SNG ANS 5*: 1133).
Campana (1997: 156-7) suggests that the obverse head on this series, of which two specimens are attested, is Ares because of the helmeted design, while he suggests that the club invokes Herakles. However, there are other possibilities. The town of Agyrium had historical links with Herakles, and if the head on the obverse were to be taken as female, and the quality of the coins does not completely rule out this possibility, then a series from Agyrium bearing a helmeted head of Athena on the obverse, and the club of Herakles on the reverse does provide a precedent, although the date, c. 339 B.C. for the series, is rather early. Another coin from Agyrium has been suggested to show the helmeted head of Ares on the obverse, and a club on the reverse (Figure 10). The quality of this coin is very poor though, and the date is again rather early, in this case 345-300 B.C., and so this precedent cannot be taken without reservation. We can be fairly certain that the club is a reference to Herakles from several examples of coinage from Aluntium, Caleacte, Centuripae, Cephaloedium, and Menaenum, all of which minted coins with Herakles on the obverse, and a club on the reverse dated from 241 B.C. to the second century B.C. (Figures 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 respectively). This leaves the obverse as the more difficult image to identify, although Agyrium perhaps suggests a link. There is, however, a better, more general precedent. If the head on the obverse is identified with Athena rather than Ares, given the goddess’ links in mythology to Herakles, then the general importance of Herakles to Sicily could be seen as the reason for the choice of the imagery. This is a far more intelligible reason for choosing

---

23 Bell (1976), 18-19.
24 Head (1911), 125.
the images on the coin, as opposed to a specific precedent like Agyrium.28 Furthermore, according to Florenzano (2005: 27), Athena represented part of the nucleus of deities typical to Hellenistic monarchy. I argued above that King Antiochus represented himself on the previous two coins in a manner typical of Hellenistic kings, and therefore the identification of Athena on the obverse is consistent with Hellenistic monarchical coinage.

FIGURES KA4a-c (Campana, Enna 14)

Figure KA4a
Obv: Head of Demeter right, veiled.
Rev: Ear of barley; ΒΑΙ upwards at left, ΑΝΙ downwards at right.
a) Cammarata 5 = Calciati 11, 3.65g; London, BM, 3.43g.

There are three surviving specimens of this coin. Owing to a similar coin type from Enna minted at some point after 340 B.C., which also has a head of Demeter on the obverse and an ear of barley on the reverse, the identification with Demeter is sound.29 The image of Demeter associated with corn is present on coins of Centuripae, Hybla Magna, and Leontini into the second century B.C. (Figures 16, 17, and 18 respectively).30 Cicero confirms that Enna had a close association with Demeter by describing a major shrine to Demeter there (Verr. 2.4.111-2). Unlike the previously mentioned coins, this coin is easy to understand in the historical context of Sicily under discussion here, especially in the famously fertile grain lands of southeastern Sicily, which were considered in the ancient world to have been the place of origin of wheat (Cic. Verr. 4.48.106; Diod. Sic. 5.2.4; De Angelis 2006: 33).

Thus far the short presentation of the numismatic evidence. With the coins and their imagery now understood, I will proceed with my analysis of this evidence in two different

---

28 Malkin (1994), 207-17); Diod. Sic. 4.23-4. The coin could even be a reference to the Sicilian poet Stesichorus’ poem Geryoneis, which, as argued by Dunbabin (1948), 330, was an effort for the ‘…glorification of the brave Greeks who were winning new lands for Greek settlements’, suggesting that Antiochus himself was achieving the same goal.

29 Head (1911), 137; Robinson (1920), 175-6; Verbrugghe (1974), 53.

contexts. First, I will outline the wider context of coin circulation in Sicily in the period of the rule of King Antiochus,\textsuperscript{31} and consider how his coinage related to this context. Once this is established I will consider what significance the types chosen for the coins held in relation to Sicilian history and culture. These two analyses will show that properly understanding the numismatic and cultural contexts of King Antiochus’ coinage is imperative to understanding the historical significance of his kingdom.

\subsection{i.i. Context: Circulation}

In this section of the chapter I will attempt to recreate, as far as possible, the circulating coinage of our period of interest in Sicily. This context will allow us to appreciate the immediate relevance of the coinage produced by King Antiochus in the context of circulating coinage among which it would have been viewed originally. It is generally accepted that in Sicily under Roman rule there was a flourishing of localised production of coinage.\textsuperscript{32} This is true in essence, and a glance through any \textit{Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum} will provide ample evidence for the widespread production of localised bronze coinage.\textsuperscript{33} Consequently, scholars concerned with the coinage of King Antiochus have interpreted the few remaining coins within the context of this flourishing of localised coin production. However, in what follows I will take a closer look at the wider contexts of coin circulation in Sicily with a view to arguing that these small local productions did not have a major impact on the circulation of coinage in Sicily. This affects the manner in which we view the coinage of King Antiochus in a significant way.

In order to assess the circulation of coinage in this period, I have collated coin hoard deposits from the time after the Roman takeover of the Kingdom of Syracuse, roughly 210 B.C., until the middle of the first century B.C., the latest coin hoard being dated to just into the second half of the first century B.C. The analysis is split into three sections.\textsuperscript{34} In the first, I will discuss the findings of coin hoards and strata deposits in Morgantina as an example of a

\textsuperscript{31} See Chapter II and Appendix 7: King Antiochus’ Title in Diodorus for a discussion of the chronology of King Antiochus, and in particular for evidence that he ruled in Sicily in the second century B.C.

\textsuperscript{32} Hill (1903), 204-23; Crawford (1985), 115; Frey-Kupper and Barrandon (2003), 414; Prag (2007a), 99.

\textsuperscript{33} As an example, taken from \textit{HN² Sicily}, it can be shown that Acrae, Aetna, Agrigentum, Agyrhum, Aluntium, Assorus, Caleacte, Catana, Centuripae, Hybla Magna, Ietas, Leontini, Lilybaeum, Messana (Mamertini), Menaenum, Morgantina (Hispanorum) Petra and Segesta all certainly produced bronze coinage under the Roman Republic.

\textsuperscript{34} For a full breakdown of the hoard information see Appendix 2: Sicilian Coinage c. 210 B.C. to the First Century B.C.
thoroughly excavated, eastern Sicilian site. In the second section, I will analyse the coin hoards from the rest of Sicily as a whole, and in the final section I will combine both totals to provide an overall analysis. For these analyses I rely on the material published in: *An Inventory of Greek Coin Hoards; Roman Republican Coin Hoards; Morgantina: The Coins*; and the journals *Coin Hoards* and the *Numismatic Chronicle*, both of which collected together the latest coin hoards discovered since the publication of *The Inventory of Greek Coin Hoards*. There are a total of thirty one hoards: thirteen from Morgantina, and eighteen from the rest of Sicily. Certain coin hoards could not be used because of inadequate information regarding their contents, and where this is the case it has been noted in Appendix 2: Sicilian Coinage c. 210 B.C. to the First Century B.C. Furthermore, following the methodology laid out by Lockyear (1999: 220), I have chosen not to use deposits that number above 1000 coins in order to avoid the problems that can be associated with large coin deposits. 35 With this in mind, the largest coin hoard used in the following analysis holds 648 coins (*CH 8*: no. 334), whereas I could have opted to use a single hoard of 60000 identical Hieron II coins (*IGCH*: no. 2222); but that would have skewed the analysis and made it useless. I have then determined what particular mints, if any, dominated the picture at that time, as far as the data reveals. To provide a local, eastern Sicilian context close to that of King Antiochus, it is best to start with the evidence from Morgantina.

**I.ii. The Coins from Morgantina**

As I stated above, there are thirteen hoards and strata that date to the relevant period for Morgantina. These thirteen hoards contain 1201.5 coins. 36 The largest hoard (*CH 8*: no. 329) has 274.5 coins, while the smallest (*Morg*: no. 40) has only 6. Of the 1201.5 coins, 906.5 came from only five mint authorities, which is 75.45% of the total. Of the remaining 295 coins, 42 are illegible, and 116 are from a single collection of Carthaginian coins (*CH 8*: no. 329), 37 leaving 137 from the rest of Sicily: 11.40%. The breakdown of the five major hoards reveals further details of the overall picture:

---

35 Lockyear (1999), 220, argued that in spite of the statistical logic that states that a larger coin hoard should represent the general circulation of coins, owing to the manner in which they are often formed (i.e. often of a single coin issue), they are in fact less useful for determining circulation than hoards of up to a few hundred coins.

36 Certain hoards contain half denarii and half Poseidon flans. I have counted these as .5 coins each.

37 In no other hoard in Morgantina, or indeed in the east of Sicily, is there such a large number of Carthaginian coins. I would explain this anomaly by the date of the hoard, c. 210 B.C., which is right on the edge of my chronological limits, and the historical circumstances that surrounded Morgantina at this time. The city had recently rebelled against Rome, under the influence and encouragement of the Carthaginians, and so it is
Syracuse (Hieron II onwards) - 413 coins = 34.37%
Rome - 224.5 coins = 18.68%
Catana - 129 coins = 10.74%
Hispanorum - 87 coins = 7.24%
Mamertini - 53 coins = 4.41%

Graph 1: Sources of Morgantina Coin Finds

Apart from Rome, all of the dominating mints represented in the coins from Morgantina are eastern Sicilian. This information provides some clarity regarding the Mamertini coinage. Särström’s 1940 study of the coinage of the Mamertines identified twenty-three series of their coinage, which, she argued, ran until the late first century B.C. In *HN³ Sicily*, twenty-three different types alone are attributed to the period after 210 B.C. In spite of this production, appearing considerable in the analysis of Särström (1940: 37, 134-5) and in the catalogue of *HN³ Sicily*, the coins of the Mamertines only account for 4.41% of Morgantina’s coins, despite the proximity of the two towns. The situation is perhaps more interesting with regard to the coins with the legend HISPANORUM. After the sack of Morgantina in 211 B.C. (Livy

understandable that large quantities of Punic coinage would be found in a hoard from this period (see Liv. 24.37 for the influence of the Carthaginians in this rebellion). Owing to the anomalous nature of this deposit, I have not included Carthage in the list of major mints for the Morgantina hoards, even though the 116 coins representing Carthage account for 10.04%. All the other dominating mints are present in multiple deposits.

Särström (1940), 37, 134-5.
26.21), for which there is considerable archaeological evidence, the Romans repopulated the town with Spanish mercenaries, and thus the Hispanorum coins are generally regarded as having been minted in Morgantina itself by the mercenaries. This particular coinage is an example of the local bronze coinages I mentioned at the start of this discussion, and yet they only account for 7.24% of the coinage analysed here. Otherwise a considerable dominance is displayed by Catanian and Syracusan coins: 45.11% of all the coins found in Morgantina come from these two places. If we add the Roman coins to this figure, then we can see that 63.79%, nearly two thirds of all the coins found in Morgantina came from just three mints. All three of these mints produced their coinage in enormous quantities. Furthermore, all the silver coinage found there, barring a negligible number of Siceliote coins, was produced by Rome. Overall, with the exception of Rome, the coinage appears to be very localised, with every mint representing a major percentage being eastern Sicilian, and close to Morgantina:

Map 1 Ancient Sicily (copyright Frances Morton)

39 Sjöqvist (1958), 158-60; Stillwell (1959), 169, 171; Sjöqvist (1960a), 133; Stillwell (1963) 169-70; White (1964), 273-7.
42 This also ignores the 116 Carthaginian coins that were silver, but as explained above in no. 36, these coins are being ignored as anomalous in the assessment of the coinage.
see Map 1: Ancient Sicily. This data certainly does not suggest that the flourishing of localised coinage production across Sicily resulted in any wide circulation of those coins, as the coin evidence from Morgantina is dominated either by very large productions of coinage that date back into the third century B.C. (i.e. those of Catana, Syracuse, and the Mamertini), completely local coinage minted during the period in question (Hispanorum), or the coins of the great economic power of the period (Rome). In short: this analysis has shown that the circulation of small coin productions remained local.

I.iii. Other Sicilian Coin Hoards

From the rest of Sicily there were eighteen coin hoards with a total of 1874.5 relevant coins. The largest hoard (*CH 8*: no. 334) holds 648 coins, and the smallest (*CH 8*: no. 354) 3. In the wider context of Sicily, two mints, Rome and Syracuse, dominated the total quite conspicuously. These two mints account for 1641.5 out of the 1874.5 coins: 87.57% of the total. The next biggest mint, that of the Mamertines, accounts for only 61 coins, totalling 3.25% of the total. Otherwise, discounting the 27 coins minted in Palermo (*RRCH* no. 137), but under Roman authorities, we have only 145 coins from the rest of Sicily combined: 7.73% of the total. The figures break down as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coinage Type</th>
<th>Number of Coins</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syracuse Hieron II onwards</td>
<td>723 coins</td>
<td>37.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman precious metals</td>
<td>634.5 coins</td>
<td>26.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman bronze</td>
<td>284 coins</td>
<td>11.16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

43 However, if we were to remove a single entry, *CH 8*: no. 334, from the equation, the numbers change quite drastically. This hoard, from c. 210 B.C., is at the edge of my prescribed chronological limits, and is rather anomalous in that it has 648 coins, all of which are of Hieron II. If this hoard is ignored, then the Syracusan share of the coinage plummeted, and Roman coinage dominates with 918.5 of 1226.5 coins: 74.89%. Syracuse would have a more modest 75 of 1226.5 coins, or 6.11%. I have chosen to keep the hoard in, as it represents the end of the period, from 250 to the end of the third century B.C. in which Syracusan coins made up 60.56% of all coin hoards in Sicily, and is therefore representative of a closely related period of Syracusan numismatics to the period under study here; see Appendix 3: Sicilian Coinage 250 B.C. to c. 210 B.C.for the breakdown of the figures.
Graph 2: Sources of Sicilian Coin Finds

As is evident from the table, I have split the categories of Roman coins into two separate sections: precious metal coins and bronze coins. If we consider the proportions of bronze coinage alone, then Roman coins make up 284 out of 1240 coins, or 22.90%, while Syracusan coins make up 58.31%, which combined is 81.21%; regardless of whether we consider the coinage as a whole, or separately in bronze and precious metals, Syracuse and Rome still dominate the total by at least 80%. Some other small points should be noted, especially regarding differences between the data across time. In total there were 233 coins from the rest of Sicily. However, only 63 of these were found in hoards that featured after 150 B.C. As I noted above, Mamertine coinage was produced on a very large scale, but in spite of this all 61 of the Mamertine coins found in coin hoards from across Sicily are in hoards dated from 208 to 150 B.C., which would certainly suggest that Mamertine coinage ceased to be important on a grand scale by the mid-second century B.C. (RRCH nos. 122, 127). Even the Syracusan coinage, post-150 B.C., only accounts for 68 coins, and this is from a total of 509.5 coins. If we continue with this statistical analysis, it can be shown that Rome accounts for 378.5 coins, or 74.29%, of the total post-150 B.C., whereas every other source of coinage combined, including Syracuse, accounts for only 25.71%. This is in marked contrast to the statistics prior to 150 B.C., in which Roman coinage accounts for only 540 of 1365 total coins, which is 39.56% of the total. The most noticeable feature of this analysis is that it suggests that the coinage of Syracuse, so dominant in the late third and early second century B.C., becomes a marginal coinage much like the other local coinages in

44 This includes 61 coins from the Mamertines, and 2 from Catana.
Sicily, and Roman coinage becomes almost completely dominant. It is clear, moreover, that despite the flourishing of a variety of individual, local Sicilian mints, the overall circulation of coins in Sicily by the late second century B.C. was dominated by Roman coinage.

A consideration of the geographical find spots of the various coin hoards supplements this picture of a strong Roman influence through. Of the hoards from the rest of Sicily, two cannot be considered geographically because their find spot can only be listed as ‘Sicily’ (CH 7: no. 201; CH 8: no. 334). Of the rest, only two are from the west of the island (RRCH: nos. 135, 137), catalogued as ‘West Sicily’ and ‘Bisacquino’ respectively. Three are from the middle of the island (RRCH: no. 198; CH 8: nos. 328, 377), catalogued as Manfria, Agrigento and Enna respectively. The rest are from the east of Sicily (Map 2: Modern Find Sites of Ancient Coin Hoards). While this does not give a particularly good representation of western Sicilian deposits, certain features of the distribution do become noticeable. The two western hoards contain only coins from Rome or Panormus. The furthest west any coin from the east of the island is found is in Manfria, in the south of the island (RRCH: no. 198). The other two sites from the centre of the island, Agrigento and Enna, contain only coins from Agrigentum and Rome respectively. The coins of the Mamertines, Catana and Syracuse are all found in eastern coin hoards, and while the number of hoards does not allow definite conclusions to be
made, the evidence does at least suggest that the majority of coin circulation was fairly localised in Sicily, with the clear exception of Roman coinage, which is found island-wide, thus confirming the conclusions reached above from the comparison of mints.

I.iv. Interim Conclusions

We can draw some interim conclusions from these analyses: the data sets show that on the whole Sicily, certainly by the end of second century B.C., if not by 150 B.C., was largely Romanised in terms of its coinage. This is in spite of the evidence from Morgantina that local, large scale bronze coinages, like the Mamertini issues, could have an impact on circulation for a brief time. It can certainly be argued that since five mint authorities (Syracuse, Messana, Morgantina, Catana and Rome) account for 84.88% of the combined total of coins from both Morgantina and the rest of Sicily, minor, local mints did not play any significant part in the circulation of coinage in Sicily. In fact, between Syracuse and Rome, 74.09% of the coins are accounted for, and Rome alone accounts for 37.16% of all the coinage; however as I have shown above, this statistic hides the fact that Roman coinage came to dominate the wider Sicilian financial system throughout the second century B.C. Overall, we can say that in at least 75% of all cases during the second century B.C., a coin in Sicily either proclaimed its authority as stemming from Rome, or from a dead monarch. Only in 25% of cases did it proclaim anything else, and of this 25%, 10% would have been proclaiming authority from Spanish mercenaries (the Hispanorum coinage of Morgantina), the Mamertines or the city of Catana. However one views the dialogue between the

45 It need not surprise us that such a small number of mints could dominate the context so completely. In the 4th century B.C. The coinage of Pegasi that was either from Corinth, or based upon the coinage of Corinth, became the main coinage of Sicily. A study of hoard deposits in Sicily at this point shows that from 43 hoards, containing in total 5196 coins, 73.61% (3825 coins) were Pegasi: see Appendix 4: Sicilian Coinage in the Fourth Century B.C. Furthermore, Kraay (1969), 54, stated that his study of thirty substantial coin hoards from the fourth century B.C. showed that only two had a proportion of Corinthian coinage below 70%. Talbert (1971), 55-7, argued that the principal reason for this dominance was that all Greek cities knew that Pegasi were accepted in Sicily at this point, owing to the Corinthian expedition there led by Timoleon (see Finley (1968), 94-100, and Plut. Tim. and Diod. 16), and so exchanged their currency for Pegasi before going to Sicily to trade. It could be argued that this single-state dominance of Sicilian trade could be compared to the Roman dominance of Sicilian grain exports after the 2nd Punic War, and that this could therefore be one reason to explain the large quantities of denarii and asses in Sicily during this period.

46 A useful point to consider here is the comparison with Thessaly in the fourth and third centuries B.C. Martin (1985), 46, 164-5, and 153-6, argued that the various mints of Thessaly ceased to produce silver coinage not because they were forbidden to by Philip II of Macedon and Alexander the Great, but because Macedonian silver was by that time convenient and well-known, and Thessaly itself had suffered an economic downturn that prevented the importation of silver bullion for minting. The situation bears a number of similarities with Sicily in the second century B.C. Furthermore, Martin (1985), 166-94, showed that this situation existed for a number of other Greek cities in the period of Macedonian domination.
Mamertines and the Greeks of the city of Messana\textsuperscript{47} (and the legend on their coinage is in Greek) it is nonetheless the case that they were originally foreign mercenaries who settled in Messana, as were the Spanish mercenaries who were settled in Morgantina. Sicily had not, on any noticeable scale, produced a new coinage with a Greek legend, proclaiming Greek authority on the island since the coinage of King Hieron II. With this wider context in mind, the coinage of King Antiochus takes on an added significance.

Crawford (1983: 51) argued that in the Roman world the typical user of a coin did not care especially for what was on the coin except for the legend or portrait that expressed the authority by which that coin was guaranteed, and with some reservations I do not see any reason to doubt that the same goes for the Greek world too.\textsuperscript{48} With this in mind, along with the wider context just described, King Antiochus’ coinage takes on hitherto unsuspected importance. In Sicily at this point a large proportion of legends on coins were either in Latin, or were proclaiming a long dead authority. Furthermore, the production of coinage was seen in the Greek and Roman worlds as a ‘mark of sovereignty (Crawford 1983: 51). The very act of producing coinage established the aura and constructs of kingship around King Antiochus;\textsuperscript{49} but we can go further than this in understanding the significance and, perhaps, purpose of this coinage. From all we know, it had been sixty years since Sicily had seen a Greek king. King Antiochus’ declaration of his royal status, and therefore his authority to produce coinage, would stand in a direct contrast to the Roman economic dominance of the island. In terms of imagery, to which I shall turn in a moment, the coins did not stand out as being in any way particularly remarkable, although that in itself will show something very important about this coinage; yet, the legend represents a reversion to older patterns in the political make-up of the island. In the specific historical context, that is the growing conflict between this new Greek monarch and the Roman state, it would be very clear that this new monarchy was not ‘pro-Roman’. I will argue in Chapter I.2 that this evidence relates to the

\textsuperscript{47} Crawford (2006), 524, argued that ‘the process of negotiation between [the Greeks of Messana and the Mamertines] was a complex one’ and that it is not something that can be concluded adequately from current evidence, although later (2007), 278, he argued that by the time of Cicero the people of Messana ‘called themselves Mamertini and they spoke Greek’, thus essentially ending the process of negotiation between the Oscan and Greek speakers of Messana.

\textsuperscript{48} Erhardt (1984), 41-54, challenged the conclusions of Crawford as going too far in the direction of scepticism. He, rightly, pointed out that the images on coins could be aimed at certain groups of society, such as the military or public servants (46), and that these groups most likely did notice the imagery placed on the coins. His arguments provide an important corrective to Crawford’s assertion (1983), 54, that the only types noticed were typically very common and devoid of programmatic elements. However, in the context of the Roman Empire, Crawford’s position (1983), 58, that the majority of people saw any new issue of coins only as a ‘tiny part of a mass of issues covering a century or more’ is vitally important.

\textsuperscript{49} Green (1961), 16; Finley (1968), 114; Bradley (1989), 116, 120; Shaw (2001), 84; Urbainczyk (2008a), 42.
development of Roman provincial control of Sicily, but it is enough to say now that the emergence of a new king, and therefore a new *kingdom* in Sicily, would upset the system put in place in Sicily by the Romans, and the coinage is evidence for (and medium of) one part of this disturbance.

*I.v. Context: Imagery*

I highlighted above that there is some debate about the importance of what is depicted on coins in the ancient world. While in essence I agree with Crawford (1983: 51, 54-5) about the lack of significance of images on coins, I do not believe that they can be completely ignored, nor that their more programmatic elements reveal nothing about the authority from which they arise. The debate about the importance of imagery on coinage essentially hinges on the context of that imagery: I think that neither the position of Crawford (1983), nor that of Erhardt (1984), is applicable to all situations. It would be incorrect to think that the situation in the imperial period was the same as that in Sicily during the second century B.C., but it can be said that the number of people involved in the episode of Sicilian history under discussion here, and the short time span of it argue that the significance of the imagery would not have been diluted in the manner stressed by Crawford, nor delayed in its reaching the people of Sicily as much as would have been the case in the imperial period (Crawford 1983: 58). Therefore, I would like to assess another context in which to consider the coinage of King Antiochus, one briefly touched on above: imagery. In keeping with my previous analysis of the circulation of coins in Sicily I will now consider how the imagery on the coinage of King Antiochus relates to its contemporary historical context, in an attempt to understand if the images on his coinage would have stood out. I will also try to understand, where possible, what the historical significance of the different designs may be with relation to the wider Hellenistic, and especially Sicilian, history: to this end I will consider the imagery on the coinage of King Antiochus in relation to the dominant coinages identified in the previous section. This analysis will show that King Antiochus was trying, through his coinage, to portray himself as a Hellenistic monarch with strong ties to Sicilian culture.

---

50 Liv. 25.40.1 notes that Marcellus, on capturing Syracuse, made a settlement of affairs in Sicily, and dealt with the various towns of Sicily as they deserved from their conduct in the war.

A good place to start is a comparison with the other recent monarchical power of Sicily: the dynasty of King Hieron II. There were three major designs of coins produced under Hieron II. The first was a bronze issue, minted in two different forms – a wide flan series and a small flan series – that showed the head of Poseidon on the obverse, and a trident on the reverse (Figure 19). If we consider the figures of the coin deposits in Morgantina detailed above, from which the most accurate account of the hoards can be gathered, these Poseidon flan coins accounted for 103 out of the 239 Syracusan coins found there, or 43.10% of the total. The second major bronze issue produced by Hieron II had on the obverse his head, and on the reverse a horseman (Figure 20): Rutter (1997: 178) noted that these two issues, actually minted not long after the First Punic War, were both enormous and represented a large part of the bronze coinage of Hieron II. The final important design, used often throughout Syracusan history and adapted continually, showed a *quadriga* on the reverse and a head of Arethusa on the obverse (Figure 21). This coin design was minted until the end of the Syracusan monarchy in 212 B.C., and copied across Sicily. The head of Arethusa was replaced with the head of Kore on later issues of this type (Figure 22), especially under the reign of Hieron II, although earlier also under Agathocles (Rutter 1997: 175, 178). If we compare these three coin designs with those of King Antiochus then we can say with certainty that there is no overlap of imagery (beyond the use of Kore on the obverse of a limited number of Syracusan coins) between these important types of the dynasty of Hieron II and those of King Antiochus. We can, therefore, quite categorically say that despite being a Greek king in Sicily, Antiochus was not trying to represent himself as continuing specifically in the tradition of the former Kings of Syracuse. We might therefore see the obverses of Figures KA1 and KA2a-i, which showed, as I argued above, the head of King Antiochus, as demonstrating King Antiochus’ position as a Hellenistic king in Sicily, rather than striving to see a close, directly Syracusan inspiration for them.

Can we make a similar comparison with the other important mints identified in the analysis above? If we accept that the Hispanorum coinage was peculiar to Morgantina, as the coin hoard evidence suggests, then we have three remaining major mints: Catana, the Mamertines, and Rome. We shall start with Catana.

---

52 This ignores the coins from *CH* 8 no. 333 because the listing of the coin hoard did not give details of what Syracusan coins were found in the hoard.

53 Kraay (1976a), 293; Rutter (1997), 177-9.
Again, looking to Morgantina, where the majority of the coinage of Catana was discovered in the coin hoards discussed above, 129 coins from Catana were found. Of these 120, or 90.02% were of a single type, which had on the obverse a head of Apollo, and on the reverse Isis (Figure 23). The other types of Catana constitute such a small group statistically, nine in all the hoards of Morgantina, that they do not warrant detailed attention in this context, but include the Catanean brothers, Serapis and Zeus among their images. The Mamertine coinage also has a variety of images (Figures 24, 25, and 26 respectively). A study of the issues minted after 210 B.C. shows (according to HN³ Sicily) that the coins have several important similarities to each other overall. Of the twenty three issues minted after 210 B.C.,54 nine have a reverse with either a warrior or horseman standing or charging, ten have a standing figure of a god or goddess (Apollo, Artemis or Nike), while the remaining four types have on the reverse a variety of designs that do not relate to one another; one should note that this still leaves nineteen of the twenty-three with a design featuring a standing figure. Rather unsurprisingly, all twenty-three types feature an obverse design showing the head of either a god or goddess. It should be noted, however, that only three of the obverses show any gods other than Zeus, Apollo, Ares and Herakles, and Apollo accounts for nine of the twenty coin obverses with these four gods on them; the three remaining coins feature Aphrodite and Artemis (Särström Series XIV Group D, Särström Series XV Groups D and F respectively). If we compare the images typical to Mamertine or Catanian coinage to those of King Antiochus, once again we can see that the types are quite different. No piece of Antiochan coinage features standing figures on the obverse, and there is certainly no heavily martial element to his designs. While there is some overlap of obverse designs, this should not really surprise us, and there is no subsequent overlap in the combination of types from obverse to reverse. To complete this analysis, Rome’s bronze coins will be considered.

The vast majority of the Roman bronze coins found in Sicily in this period are asses, and as such feature the Janus-head on the obverse, and a ship’s prow on the reverse (Figure 27), and indeed the other bronze coins feature the designs one might expect of their different weights.55 It should elicit no surprise, therefore, that these types do not correspond to those of King Antiochus, given his Sicilian, and thus non-Roman, position.

55 Sutherland (1974), 60 and 60 no. 74.
If the types of Antiochus do not correspond especially to those of the major mints I identified as dominating to a greater or lesser extent Sicilian circulation in this period, can a correspondence be found elsewhere in Sicilian numismatics, for example among the abundant small scale productions in the Roman Republican period? I noted when describing the coins at the beginning of this chapter that the types do relate to certain other coins from a Sicilian context, and it is this that I would like to examine further. We shall start with Figures KA2a-i, the coin showing the head of King Antiochus and a quiver. We can see that this type, while being in some way original for having his head on the obverse, had on the reverse a type that invoked Artemis, a goddess who was very typical in eastern and northern Sicily: the towns of Aleasa, Syracuse and Morgantina (Hispanorum) all used imagery similar to that on this coin. This same similarity can be seen with Figure KA1. While the types on this coin can be considered to have been inspired by typical Hellenistic monarchical practices with regard to imagery, they still nonetheless have certain correspondences to sites in the east of Sicily: Caleacte and the monarchy of Syracuse both used similar types relating to Zeus on their coins. Figures KA3a-b has the strongest links to a widespread group of Sicilian towns, with its strong typology connected to Herakles: Aluntium, Caleacte, Centuripae, Cephaloedium, and Menaenum all minted coins bearing similar types, once again spread across the east and north of the island. Finally, we have Figures KA4a-c, on which are images relating to the goddess Demeter. This image had close ties to a very narrow area of Sicily, with Enna, Leontini and Hybla Magna as towns that also utilised this image. If we consider all four issues of King Antiochus together, then something very important should become apparent. While none of the types used on the issues could be called specific to any one town in Sicily, and often the types are quite generic to the Sicilian context (e.g. Figures KA3a-b and KA4a-c), all the types arose only in contexts specific to eastern Sicily (Map 3: Correspondences in Sicily). With the exceptions of Cephaloedium and Halaesa, all the towns that used similar imagery are clustered around either the fertile grain lands of eastern Sicily, or in the north-east of the island, with the majority situated around the eastern grain lands. Furthermore, the imagery of King Antiochus’ coinage is very Greek, one might almost say deliberately so, and is based in Sicilian culture and history as Manganaro has shown. Yet, as we have seen above, it does not correspond to certain mints of Sicily that had been very important

economically. In what follows, I would like to comment on this aspect of the imagery and its implications.

As we have seen above, King Antiochus’ types closely relate to the history and culture of Sicily. It is certain that these types would have been recognised and understood by the people of Sicily, particularly of eastern Sicily. These connections should also lead us to ask who the coins were aimed at. Manganaro (1982: 243) concluded that they were designed to elicit a response from the people of Sicily in support of their revolt, but we can see that King Antiochus, if this was his aim, was not appealing to all of Sicily: the correspondences between the types used on the coinage of King Antiochus, and those used on previous Sicilian coinages are all with coinages of cities and towns in the east of Sicily. We might remember that whoever King Antiochus was, his rise caused a conflict with Rome, and his coinage seems to stress the continuity that he represented even as he challenged Rome: he was, in regard to his coinage, a Hellenistic monarch representing a piece of the culture and history of Sicily to which he belonged. Bearing in mind all the difficulties concerning the
survival of the numismatic evidence, the problem is in identifying why he chose to avoid some images, and embraced others, and what these choices were intended to convey about King Antiochus. The answers, I will suggest, lie in a quite different war: that of Rome against perhaps its most fearful enemy: Hannibal.

I.vi. Sicily Before Antiochus

On the death of Hieron II in 215 B.C. his grandson Hieronymus took the throne of Syracuse. His initial advances to Carthage in the wake of the battle at Cannae were cut short by his assassination, but owing to Rome’s brutal sack of the town of Leontini the pro-Carthaginian party in Syracuse won out, and a siege ensued in 214 B.C. (Liv. 24.4-7, 29-32; Poly. 7.2-8). After the initial revolt at Syracuse, several other towns are recorded as having gone over to the Carthaginian side: Helorus, Herbessus, and Megara Hyblaea, of which Megara Hyblaea was then sacked and devastated by the Romans (Liv. 24.35). Not long after this the town of Morgantina sided with the Carthaginians against the Romans, and this event triggered, so Livy tells us, a wave of betrayals of Roman garrisons across Sicily (24.37). In an effort to stem this problem, and specifically a suspected betrayal by Enna, the Roman commander L. Pinarius pre-emptively massacred the men of Enna by tricking them into gathering in the theatre of the town in order to discuss their grievances and then turning on them and the city more generally. Marcellus, the overall Roman commander on the island, hoped that this would deter other towns from rebelling (24.37-9). The effect was the opposite, and because, as Livy tells us, the Sicilians felt that the town of Enna was sacred to Demeter and this act was therefore sacrilegious, it meant that it resulted in a widespread eruption of disaffection (24.39).

In the series of revolts that followed, Livy informs us that Morgantina, once recovered, revolted again (26.21), as did Heraclea Minoa (26.41), Ergetium, Hybla and Macellum (26.21) in addition to the towns already mentioned. Furthermore, Livy mentions, but frustratingly does not name, 66 other towns that also had to be recovered by the Romans. We must also keep in mind that Syracuse also opposed Rome, and these 66 towns, plus the

57 See also Finley (1968), 118-9. It is possible that Livy records later Roman misgivings about this particular action of the Second Punic War in the speech that he credits to L. Pinarius before the massacre. In the speech (24.38) Pinarius invokes the goddesses Ceres and Proserpina (Demeter and Kore) to side with his men, as they are acting to prevent a greater evil. That Livy felt it necessary for Pinarius to try to justify what he was about to do, in a city sacred to Demeter, by a plea to the goddess, perhaps suggests the misgivings that Livy and his audience felt about the action.
named ones also mentioned by Livy, indicate a widespread and heartfelt dislike of Roman domination amongst the Sicilians.\(^{58}\)

The Roman reaction to the revolts was severe. Enna, pre-emptively punished, had suffered a ruthless loss of citizenry. Agrigentum and Morgantina, once recovered, were repopulated: most of Agrigentum’s population was sold into slavery (Liv. 26.40), while Morgantina, as noted before, was retaken and then handed over to Spanish mercenaries (Liv. 26.21). The other towns, most likely out of self-preservation following the collapse of the Carthaginian and Syracusan cause in Sicily, quietly surrendered (Liv. 26.40). However, we should focus much more on the Sicilian reaction, and how important to the events the cult of Demeter was. Cicero noted that the towns of Catana and Enna both held important shrines to Demeter (Verr. 2.4.99-100, 111-2). He even commented on the fact that the shrine at Enna was central to the religious life and identity of the Sicilians (Verr. 2.4.106-8). Essential, indeed critical, to the massive spread of disaffection with Roman control of Sicily was their inopportune insult to the sacred ground of Demeter. As we shall shortly see, there is numismatic evidence that suggests that this cult was very important not only to Sicily in general, but also specifically to the military efforts against Rome among the Sicilians at this point.

A number of coins have been found in Sicily with the legend ΣΙΚΕΛΙΩΤΑΝ on their reverses. Their reverses also regularly feature Nike driving a quadriga or biga, although one type has instead a galloping horseman. The obverse type is uniformly a wreathed head of Persephone, with the exception of one type that features Zeus (Buttrey, Erim, Groves and Holloway 1989: 31-4). The issue has been dated, from hoards finds and stylistically, to 212 B.C.\(^{59}\) Starting with Sjöqvist (1960b: 61), several scholars have linked these coins to the resistance displayed by Sicilian cities to Roman rule. Sjöqvist (1960b: 62-3) argued, from personal comments from two different sources,\(^{60}\) that no coin bearing this legend had been found with a provenance other than Morgantina or Enna, indicating that they were linked to

---

\(^{58}\) Finley (1968), 117-21.

\(^{59}\) Sjöqvist (1960b), 55-7, identified them as stylistically similar to Hieronic or Syracusan democracy coinage while Buttrey, Erim, Groves and Holloway (1989), 33, noted that hoard finds in Morgantina in addition to stylistic similarities placed the date of the coins to c. 212 B.C.

\(^{60}\) One source was a landowner in the area around Aidone, who reported that his estate had, at some prior date, unearthed a coin with the ΣΙΚΕΛΙΩΤΑΝ legend in an area that is now known to be the area of Morgantina’s agora. The second source was that of the collection of Dr Joseph V. Caltagirone of New York, who owned a private collection of antiquities, all of which had been discovered on the Serra Orlando ridge (the site of ancient Morgantina), in which collection there was a coin with the ΣΙΚΕΛΙΩΤΑΝ legend. See Sjöqvist (1960b), 62-3.
the resistance to Roman rule, although he accepted that many of the examples had no recorded provenance. Bell (2007a: 197-8) considered the possibility that under Roman rule there was a κοινόν of Sicilian cities that had centralised funds and wondered if this had arisen from a prior κοινόν of Greek cities that had produced the ΣΙΚΕΛΙΩΤΑΝ coinage. In an article documenting the use of the cult of Demeter in Sicily as a political instrument, White (1964: 271-3) saw the use of Demeter on the ΣΙΚΕΛΙΩΤΑΝ coinage as a very appropriate image, and also linked this significance of the cult to its subsequent treatment by the Romans. He noted that in the period of the suppression of the revolt, or immediately after, archaeological evidence suggests that the cult centres of Demeter were affected directly. Specifically, there is archaeological evidence that the shrine to Demeter at Morgantina was destroyed in the sack of 212 B.C. Thereafter it ceased to function as a sanctuary, which White considered to indicate the strength of the Roman response against the cult. Furthermore, he commented that the sanctuary at Agrigentum ceased to operate after the end of the third century B.C., although it was not brutally destroyed like the shrine at Morgantina. White noted, however, that Agrigentum was taken in 210 B.C., and he linked this cessation of activity at the shrine to the repopulation of the city, and supposed the suppression of the cult to have been quieter and less violent than that of Morgantina’s. It has also been argued that in the period of Roman rule the number of offerings to Demeter and Kore are drastically fewer than in earlier periods (Hinz 1998: 243). This is in spite of the fact that the number of mints producing coinage bearing the images of either Demeter or Kore is much greater in this period than in any previous, and this change in quantity of votive offerings is linked to the Roman domination of Sicily at this point (Florenzano 2005: 11, 27). I would suggest that this is further evidence of Rome’s engagement in a widespread reduction, if not suppression, of the cult of Demeter, and that this might be due to the importance of the cult in the Sicilian resistance movement against Rome.

---

61 Sjöqvist (1960b), 59, also argued that the unusual symbol on the coins, which appears to be a T atop an M, but both turned on their side, represented a symbol for Morgantina. Buttrey, Erim, Groves and Holloway (1989), 33, did not consider the argument to be strong enough to account for the unusual symbol.

62 However, Prag (2009b), 89, while not dismissing Cicero’s suggestions (Verr. 2.2.103, 112; 2. 4.138; Att. 10.12.2) that there was a form of Sicilian conventus or concursus, argued that for the period preceding Hieron II there was no explicit evidence of a Sicilian κοινόν.

63 Stillwell (1959), 169, 171; Sjöqvist (1960a), 133; Stillwell (1963) 169-70; White (1964), 276; Verbrugghe (1974), 54-5.

64 Marconi (1933), 108-9; White (1964), 273; Verbrugghe (1974), 54-5.

65 Both Ciaceri (1911), 187, and Florenzano (2005), 6, agree that the cult of Demeter/Kore was one that appealed to all the Greek inhabitants of Sicily, and could therefore be termed a ‘popular’ cult.
If we look at the coinage of King Antiochus in this light, then we can begin to make sense of the problems posed by its iconography. I suggest that we can now understand why he seems to be connecting to some parts of Sicily through his coinage, whilst avoiding connecting to others. This, in turn, will allow us to gain a better understanding of what his coinage was saying about him. His coinage, in general, appears to be emphasizing his position as a Greek, eastern-Sicilian monarch through its use of types typical to eastern Sicilian coinages of the period, and its elements that characterized Hellenistic monarchical coinages. However, the sites that, in the subsequent numismatic history of Sicily after the Second Punic War, were the major producing mints of Sicily were Catana, Messana, and Rome. The two that were not Roman both flourished under Rome. Another town that benefited from Roman control of the island was Tauromenium, which according to Cicero held a special treaty with Rome down to his own day (Verr. 2.2.160; 2.3.13; 2.5.49-50). We could term these cities pro-Roman, and we should note, as implied above, that King Antiochus avoided the types used by these cities in spite of the fact that the literary sources confirm that he held two of them (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.20-2. 43; Strabo 6.2.6; Oros. 5.9.5).

Considering the context of the production of the coinage – a new Greek kingdom in the east of Sicily that came into conflict with the Romans – the use of Demeter as a type is very important. The last invocation of the cult, centred on the events in Enna, was in the Second Punic War, in an effort to unite disparate eastern-Sicilian forces of Sicily against Rome. It is

---

66 Catana: Rizza (1976), 442-3; Messana: Scibona (1976), 998-9. Finley (1986), 156-7, noted that archaeological evidence indicated that Catana and Messana were both populous and wealthy cities under the Romans.

67 The chronology of the so-called First Sicilian Slave War is difficult enough to fix, and it would be impossible to fix any date for the production of the King Antiochus’ coinage. However, we must not assume that it was only produced once the conflict between the new kingdom and Rome had already begun. Manganaro (1990a), 418-9, (followed by Sánchez León (2004), 224) has argued that the date of the coinage of King Antiochus is split into two distinct phases: the first, comprising Figures KA1 and KA4a-c were then followed in the second phase by Figures KA2a-I and KA3a-b, although there is no way to decide the dates of these issues within the period of King Antiochus’ kingdom. For discussion of the dating of the outbreak of the conflict itself, see: Green (1961), 10-29; Forrest and Stinton (1962), 22; Astin (1967), 133 no. 5; Verbrugghe (1973), 27-9; Manganaro (1980), 435-40; Bradley (1989), 152-7 and 170-83; especially Brennan (1993), 153-84, who has the fullest discussion and has, I think, conclusively shown that the first major encounters between Rome’s praetors and the forces of King Antiochus took place in 135 B.C. This does not preclude actions such as raiding and banditry taking place in the year 136 B.C. prior to the full-scale outbreak of war, but Brennan’s chronology was the first that took full account of all of the problematic names of praetors given by Florus 2.7.7. Keaveney (1998), 73-82, added further reasons for putting the start of the conflict to 135 B.C. while also criticising Brennan’s methodology. However, it would seem clear to me, from all the evidence, that any ‘start date’ derived from the written accounts is always based on when Rome responded with considerable military force, and therefore views the conflict from an entirely Romano-centric viewpoint. It is perhaps more important to stress the highly conflicted nature of Sicily in the period prior to increased Roman involvement, especially considering Hopwood’s contention (1989), 172-5, that much banditry in the ancient world was indicative in fact of proto-revolutionary protest from discontented poor. In this light, if the conflict, as it will be argued below, was indeed about the manner in which Sicily was to be run in future, then the rise of banditry could rather be considered the opening of the war, in contrast to the strict attention paid to the Roman response seen in the scholars above. This will be considered further in Chapter III.
not credible to think that the people of Sicily would fail to see the implications of this choice, ideologically loaded as it is and with a history of exploitation for political purposes, and it is equally not credible to think that King Antiochus was unaware of the history of this image. Therefore it must be considered that King Antiochus’ aim, partially achieved through his invocation of this cult and informed by the ideological and political implications that the cult had, was to unify the people of eastern Sicily, and to consolidate his own rule; in doing this he became another in a line of Sicilian monarchs going back to Agathocles to utilise the cult of Demeter for these purposes.\(^{68}\)

The picture emerging from the numismatic evidence for what is typically called the First Sicilian Slave War is very much two-sided: on the one side are towns and cities that benefited from Roman control, and which had a history of Roman sympathies, and on the other is King Antiochus reaching into Sicilian culture and numismatic traditions to present himself as a Hellenistic monarch with close ties to Sicilian religious history. Regardless of how one might read the evidence regarding the origins of his kingdom,\(^{69}\) it cannot be denied that the coinage of King Antiochus betrays a strong influence from Sicilian culture, and that it reflected this influence with purpose and intent. Furthermore, the ways in which the coinage’s types interact with Sicilian types and culture suggests that they were aimed at people who would understand these references, that is to say, people as steeped in Sicilian culture as those producing the coins. We can therefore say that not only was King Antiochus trying to display himself as a monarch with a strong base in Sicilian culture, but also that he was demonstrating these ties to fellow Sicilians. In sum, although the origins of King Antiochus himself may still remain an open question, the effect of his rise was a native Sicilian movement against Rome: what we can now call, in the context of Roman republican history, the Sicilian Insurrection.

**II. Earlier Treatments of King Antiochus’ Coinage**

Having now demonstrated what the surviving coinage of King Antiochus represented and how it fitted into its Sicilian context, we can put to rest a number of contentions brought forward in the past by other scholars. Here I would like to briefly analyse how the approaches that each scholar used when studying the Sicilian Insurrection affected their interpretations of

---

69 This will be considered in Chapter III.
the coinage of King Antiochus, and furthermore demonstrate how the conclusions reached above show these interpretations to be inadequate.

II.i. Slave Kings and Maintaining Rebellion

The discussion of the coinage of King Antiochus goes back to the early publications of the coins as they were first linked to the Sicilian Insurrection. Robinson (1920: 175-6) noted that a coin attributed to a King Antiochus of Syria showing Demeter and an ear of grain (Figure KA4a), but found in Sicily, had been wrongly considered Syrian, when in fact it could more easily, and sensibly, be attributed to King Antiochus, the leader of the Sicilian Insurrection. Since that starting point, various efforts have been made to understand the significance of King Antiochus’ coinage. The publication by Manganaro (1982; 1983) of another coin showing grapes on the obverse (Figure KA2a; he later (1990a), 418, amended his identification to that of a quiver, which I share; see above), and finally the work of Calciati (1987) that published the remaining two issues (Figures KA1 and KA3a-b) meant that by 1987 all the now known evidence was available. In spite of this, the majority of discussion of the coins considers only Figures KA4a-c, and this is the most widely published coin.

We may begin this discussion from a basic starting point. Commonplace among scholarship are the statements that the coinage represent merely some form of advertising by the ‘slaves’ of their success, often linked directly to the city of Enna, or that they represent the institutions of kingship being established around King Antiochus. For example, Green (1961: 16) stated that once he was firmly established King Antiochus was able...

Appropriate indeed, but we have seen above that this choice of image has implications and connections across eastern Sicily, and not just to Enna. Finley (1968: 141), Goldsberry (1973: 250), Dumont (1987: 217-8) and Berk and Bendall (1994: 7-8) saw the coinage in a very similar light: in Finley’s case as part of the royal insignia adopted by King Antiochus, in Goldsberry and Dumont as choices appropriate to a kingdom centred on Enna and in Berk

---

70 A further publication of the four types was done by Campana (1997), and a full publication, including examples of every specimen of each of the four issues known, was released by Manganaro in 1990a.
and Bendall’s case as a method by which King Antiochus kept his name before his ‘slave’ subjects. In a similar vein, Bradley (1989: 120) acknowledged that

…the fact that Eunus minted coins could be urged as evidence of an aspiration on his part toward a highly formalized monarchy.

However, the simple production of coinage was seen in the Greek and Roman worlds as a ‘mark of sovereignty’ (Crawford 1983: 51) and this statement should be taken as a starting point for understanding the coinage, as opposed to concluding that this aura of kingship was the sole purpose. Making this the conclusion of any analysis risks underplaying the other avenues of investigation and avoids the question of what kind of aura, what kind of monarchy, the coins are establishing; we have seen above that it connected very firmly with Sicilian history and culture more generally, something that cannot be established if we were to content ourselves with the above conclusions.

In addition to the idea of King Antiochus’ kingship, the study of the coinage, rather than trying to understand what the insurgents’ aims were in minting the coinage, is often aimed at confirming the scholar’s considerations of the rebels’ intentions. Returning to Bradley (1989: 120), his overall thesis was that the ‘slave wars’ were essentially aberrant forms of normal slave resistance, with particular reference to maroonage, and therefore did not contain ‘grandiose objectives’ (1989: xiv-xv):

The slave wars were…not the outcome of resistance to a particular political dispensation but to the reality of slavery and the material conditions it imposed…the wars were essentially aberrant extensions of [more common forms of resistance to slavery].

His book contained a whole chapter on ‘The Maintenance of Rebellion’, and it is in this chapter that he discussed the coins, notably outside his discussion of the narrative of the conflict. The analysis of the coins was placed into his examination of the use of kingship as a method of maintaining a rebellion, an analysis that emphasised the limitations inherent in the kingship claimed by the ‘slave’ leaders because of their ‘servile’ status (116-20). Consequently, Bradley never looked beyond the limits of his chosen context – the slave context – when considering the coins, and as his overall thesis dictated that ‘slaves’ did not rebel for grandiose objectives, and he was concerned with maintenance of ‘slaves’ with only

---

71 Shaw (2001), 84, saw the coin showing Demeter to be an advert of ‘slave autonomy’ but went no further with his analysis.
such a limited outlook, it is not surprising that his analysis of the coins focused so closely on supply. By way of example, he dismissed the imagery on the coins as recalling (Bradley 1989: 120)

...the slaves’ concerns with ensuring adequate supplies of food for themselves, re-establishing as a result the importance attached to the practical aspects of resistance.

By understanding the coins in this way he thereby misunderstood the potential significance of the images on the coins, and demoted the insurgents from holding ideals or aims any higher than survival and sustenance. Furthermore, it would seem too simplistic, once the links to Sicilian numismatics have been shown, to conclude that these coins could represent the concerns of the slave for grain and grapes. Bradley would appear to be aware of this problem, but does not follow his own logic through. In a telling passage, he highlights the potential importance of the imagery on the coins, but then argues away the implications of this (1989: 120):

But Eunus’ coins...are best understood as a mechanism to cultivate solidarity among the slave dissidents. Their depiction of Demeter is a reminder that the goddess’s cult had been manipulated earlier in Sicilian history for political purposes and even anti-Roman purposes. But it would be illogical to assume at once that a rebellion of slaves was now a rising against Rome rule. (my emphasis)

As this quotation shows, Bradley acknowledged that the cult of Demeter had been manipulated in the past for political and anti-Roman purposes, and that the coinage of King Antiochus was a reminder of this; but a reminder to whom? One wonders, as the manipulation of the cult was so central to Sicilian culture and history as has been shown above, and the slaves were a disparate group, why King Antiochus would have bothered to put a reminder of this importance of Demeter’s cult onto his coins for the benefit of the slaves, who could not, one assumes, have known the full significance of this. In contrast to Bradley’s statement, it would seem to be illogical to assume that a reminder that was so culturally and historically loaded could have been meant for anyone but the Sicilians, and therefore we must question if the revolt was just a ‘rebellion of slaves’, and if it might not have been instead ‘a rising against Rome rule’.

72 This same argument can be found in Bradley (1983), 450, although less fully developed.
The tendency to acknowledge a potentially important implication of the coinage and then subsequently fail to follow the thread of logic through can also be seen in Urbainczyk’s study of slave wars in antiquity (2008a). Her overall argument was that slaves in the ancient world planned their rebellions and aimed at wide-scale rebellion (29-50). When she brought the coins into the argument she was engaged in disproving Bradley’s view (1989: 120-5) that slave rebellions represented slaves running away from their masters on a massive scale, and did not show slave intentions to go to war with their masters. Urbainczyk (2008a: 42) argued that

(h)ere, then, we see signs that the slaves were organized, had definite ideas about how their campaign should proceed and seem to have had long term plans. Issuing coins is not the action of people hoping either to escape attention or to run off elsewhere. The slaves at least appear to have seen their hope in attracting as many of the slaves of Sicily to their side as possible.

This is an excellent point, and it is true that the production of coinage does not suggest a group of individuals keen to abandon their location or cause; interestingly, however, her position is essentially the same as that of Bradley (1989: 120-5) in spite of her critical engagement with his ideas: while they disagree about the aim of the coins in terms of attraction of followers, both agree that their primary function was maintenance. However, we must ask, if the coinage is intended to attract followers, how it set about achieving this? Can we identify any culture that the imagery related to? We saw above that the coins, with their close ties to Sicilian culture and history, cannot be realistically attached to anyone other than the people of Sicily. Urbainczyk’s argument does not go far enough in following its own logic: if we are to claim that the coinage is aimed at attracting followers it is imperative to then try to understand who the target group might be.

Il.ii. Syrian Nationalism and Kingship

A second theme employed by scholars when discussing the coinage of King Antiochus stems from Diodorus. On two occasions Diodorus makes direct use of the term Σύρος to describe the rebels. On the first occasion (24/5.2.24) he merely comments that Eunus called himself Antiochus, and named his rebels Syrians. On the second occasion (34/5.8), which is separated from the rest of the narrative of the Sicilian Insurrection, he notes that oi Σύροι oi δραπέται τῶν αἰχμαλώτων amputated the arms as well as the hands of their captives. These passages,
along with the eastern elements of Eunus’ character in Diodorus (34/5.2.5-9), were used by Vogt (1965: 29-30, 40-3) to argue that the rebellion represented a nationalistic uprising of Syrian slaves held in Sicily during this period, which he considered to be influenced by the Maccabean war of liberation. Indeed, he went so far as to say that (43)

(w)enn das Unternehmen des Eunus, seinem Ursprung nach religiös, den Charakter eines nationalen Freiheitskampfes annahm, dann ist die Fernhaltung der sizilischen Städte von diesem fremdherrschaftlichen Gebilde erst ganz verständlich.

By making the connection to the Maccabean War, Vogt also saw the role of the cult of Atargatis as a uniting religious force for the new kingdom. He described how the cult spread to Delos because of the slaves that were sold there, and then considered that (41)

(g)ewiß haben die syrischen Sklaven, wenn sie die Verehrung ihrer heimischen Göttin nach Sizilien brachten, in ihrem Kult dieselbe active Rolle gespielt wie auf Delos.

As part of his justification for the stress he laid on Syrian elements in the revolt, especially Atargatis, Vogt (1965: 40) considered that the coinage of King Antiochus represented his attempt to integrate Seleucid practices into his court. The coins were given no separate study, but considered only in light of the dominant position given to the eastern practices and names. This position cannot be maintained in light of what I have argued above. The coinage of King Antiochus does not contain any features that would link him or his kingdom to Seleucid practices apart from his name and the title ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥϹ, indeed he depicts himself through his coinage as positively Sicilian.

73 Central to his argument was the supposition that the majority of the slaves in Sicily at this point were Syrian (42), a position also adopted by Shaw (2001), 9. This position cannot be maintained. As noted by Verbrugghe (1974), 51-2, this would require not only that there were large numbers of Syrian slaves on the market at all times, but also that Sicilian land-owners favoured these slaves over any other on the market (for the figures of those enslaved between 262 B.C. and 133 B.C. see Toynbee (1965), 171-3). It also ignores that the terms Syrian and Assyrian were roughly interchangeable and referred to people from anywhere in the Syrio-Palestine region (Millar (1993), 227, 454-5; Dickie (2001), 110; Steel (2001), 50; Strabo 2.1.31). Furthermore, there are only two passages that refer to the rebels being called Syrian in book 34/5 of Diodorus: 34/5.2.24 and 34/5.8. The latter passage does not necessarily come from the account of the Sicilian Insurrection, the only link being the reference to ‘Syrian’ runaways echoed in 34/5.2.24. However, the former passage is clearly an addition by Photius (see Appendix 6: King Antiochus’ Title in Diodorus) and so cannot be trusted to necessarily reflect information from Diodorus’ narrative. Otherwise, in the narrative given either by Photius or the Constantinian excerpts, there is no reference to Syrian slaves anywhere, and it seems best, given the evidence presented in this chapter, to err on the side of caution regarding the Syrian nature of the revolt. See also Dumont (1987), 218-9, 256, for the difficult argument that Eunus chose the title Syrian for the slaves to reflect this typical slave name in New Comedy.
However, the concept of a close tie between slave religion on Delos and its subsequent spread to Sicily was picked up by Kunz (2006: 329-348) in her book discussing the history of religion on Roman Sicily. Given the nature of her work it is hardly surprising that she focussed on the references to eastern religious practices. Like Vogt, Kunz looked to Seleucid history to provide justification for large parts of her argument, and also stressed (2006: 338-341) that large-scale movement of slaves from the east to the west of the Mediterranean provided widespread knowledge of cult practices for the participants to utilise. For Kunz, Atargatis was vital to the unity of the insurgents and the construction of Eunus’ kingship. When she reached the coinage, however, Kunz had to account for the fact that the coinage did not fit the context she had constructed, and she so dismissed the evidence in two pages (346-7), by claiming that (346)

(i)n bezug auf die Motive können keine eindeutigen sizilischen Parallelbelege angeführt werden...Für eine zweifelsfreie Interpretation bleibt eine eindeutige lokale Zuordnung der Münzmotive aber der einzige Schlüssel.

She went on to claim that (367)

(d)ie Sklaven in Sizilien hatten kein besonderes Verhältnis zu den Kulten der Demeter und des Zeus Aitnaios.

She thus dismisses the Sicilian Insurrection as the reason for the Roman delegation sent to fence off the shrines of Zeus Aitnaios in 135 B.C. (Obsequens 26 and Orosius 5.6.2); her alternative explanation of this action and the fencing off of the areas by the Romans appears to be rather anachronistic:

Zur Vorsicht vor etwaigen Erdstößen, Lavaströmen oder Ascheregen könnte eine Umzäunung entlang des Ätna fremde ortsunkundige Besucher abgehalten haben, die Kultstätten aufzusuchen und sich in Gefahr zu begeben. Man hätte damit den üblichen Pilgerstrom aus Sicherheitsgründen auf Zeit unterbunden.

She did not consider why King Antiochus' coinage carried the images that it did. However, as we have seen above, unambiguous local parallels in terms of imagery can be found, and as such Kunz’s conclusions regarding the religious and cultural background to the war are redundant. In short, none of these scholars have tried to understand the coinage of King Antiochus in a Sicilian context; but we have seen through the analysis carried out above that their conclusions regarding the coinage can be discarded.
II.iii. Between Slave and Free

A different approach was taken by Manganaro (1982, 1983, 1990a). He considered, when first publishing the coin – that he then thought to show grapes (Figures KA2a-i) – that the coins known to him seemed to relate to Sicilian types and culture. He argued (1982: 240-3; 1983: 405-7) that the types chosen reflected an interest in the culture and lives of the people of Sicily, and were designed as part of an effort to garner support for the rebellion from the people of Sicily, not the slaves. He concluded, from the coin evidence and from passages in Diodorus which detailed the actions of certain free people during the war (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.48), that this appeal was successful, and that free people did indeed join forces with the slaves against Rome. He finally argued (1990a: 419) that

(q)ueste emissioni costituiscono un’affermazione di potere e la risposta a una esigenza «economica» dell’area territoriale controllata dal re Antioco (Euno), il quale appare l’ultimo defensore della independenza dei Sicelioti (o almeno di alcune città come Enna, Morgantina, Katane e Tauromenium) contro Roma.

Manganaro’s aim was to connect a coin found in Sicily with a historical context in which to understand it, and in this he differed quite markedly from all the approaches discussed above, because he felt the context that would best enable an understanding of the coinage was that of Sicilian culture, history and numismatics. Others have since picked up on this idea. Guzzetta (2006: 190-1), following Manganaro closely, noted that

(i) loro tipi che si riferiscono a «divinità agrarie di antica tradizione siceliota» come Demetra sarebbero la testimonianza di istanze religiose tipiche non dei gruppi servili ribelli ma del mondo contadino siceliota che partecipava alla rivolta.

Thereby he also connected the coinage with the history and culture of Sicily. An unusual view was taken by Sánchez León (2004), who combined the approaches of Manganaro (1982, 1983, 1990a) and Vogt (1965). Sánchez León concentrated very closely on two aspects of the coinage: the title on the coins, and the image of Demeter. He correctly insisted that the coinage had not been rightly integrated into the study of the Sicilian Insurrection (223), but

---

74 This approach was foreshadowed by Verbrugghe (1974), 53-4, in which Verbrugghe correctly linked Figure KA4a-c to the cult of Demeter in Sicily, and suggested that this showed, following White (1964), that King Antiochus was appealing to prior Sicilian history. However, Verbrugghe failed to connect King Antiochus himself to Sicily, in spite of this.

75 Here quoting Manganaro (1983), 406.
while his work stressed the Sicilian nature of the types on the coin showing Demeter (224), his other focus on the title on the coins, which he viewed as eastern in type, led him to stress the alternative, eastern nature of King Antiochus’ monarchy (225-6), seemingly in contrast to the clearly Sicilian types on the coins. What is interesting to note is that while no-one other than Bussi (1998 discussed below) has found fault with Manganaro’s conclusions, and in the case of Bussi the arguments against Manganaro are not convincing, scholars writing strictly on the ‘slave wars’ tend to brush over his work, if they note it at all. Bussi (1998: 24-5) noted that the coinage of King Antiochus was minted on the same weight system as the coinage circulating at that point, but concluded in her work that the similarities to Sicilian coinage were purely pragmatic (25):

…se le monete emesse da Euno si integrano, a loro volta, nel sistema monetario in corso, ciò significa che egli le coniò con l’interno che esse avessero una reale circolazione e che servissero agli schiavi per le transizioni commerciali loro necessarie durante I lunghi anni della loro «egemonia» sulla Sicilia.

And that therefore (25)

(n)on è quindi necessario pensare ad un sollevamento di Siciliani di ispirazione anti-romana per spiegare la presenza di Demetra, della spiga e del grappolo d’uva sui bronzo di Euno.

Furthermore, she did not see the participation of free people in the revolt as a result of the coinage, and therefore as a ‘rivolta anti-romana’, but as a result of opportunism by the poor to react against the system that had been put in place by Rome (27). In her view ‘che Roma ne era l’artefice’, she thought it natural that those seeking to alter the system would have fought against the Romans: it was only a ‘rivolta anti-romana’ because the upholders of the system were Roman. However, Bussi’s argument that the images on the coins can be explained as practical choices to facilitate trade is not entirely convincing. First, as shown above, some of the images are ideologically and politically very loaded. Second, and most importantly, Sicilian numismatics in this period was dominated by a very small number of coin types,

---

76 The stress placed on the coin showing Demeter (Figures KA4a-c) seemed to lead Sánchez León from considering adequately the place of the other issues in the productions of King Antiochus, with his analysis of these coins consisting of a consideration of how they enriched the knowledge of the religious variety among the ‘slaves’.
77 Urbainczyk (2008a) did not include Manganaro (1982; 1983; 1990a) at all, and as I noted above, barely considers the coins. Bradley (1989), the only other major work on the ‘slave wars’ since two of Manganaro’s articles, did include them in his bibliography, and included one reference in a footnote (116, no. 22) but did not engage with the arguments, nor acknowledge that his own argument was fundamentally challenged by the conclusions of Manganaro.
none of which was imitated by King Antiochus: if his intention had been to have his coinage easily accepted then his most sensible course of action would have been to have mimicked the coinage of, for example, Catana, Syracuse or Rome. That he did not, as I have shown above, is most telling.

**Conclusion**

As we can now see, once the coinage of King Antiochus has been reconnected with the historical, numismatic and cultural contexts from which it arose, the contentions brought forward in the past about the coins can be dismissed. It should now be quite clear that study of the coins depends heavily upon context. In this chapter the context chosen was that of Sicilian history in the third and second centuries B.C. This context has allowed some very useful correspondences to be noted. Sicilian numismatics in the second century B.C. was largely dominated by only four mints: Messana, Catana, Syracuse and Rome. The emergence in the second century B.C. of numerous small-scale local mints had little effect on the overall circulation of coinage in Sicily, and by the end of the second century B.C. Roman coinage largely dominated. When considered against this background, the coinage of King Antiochus stood out. His coinage, in contrast to all the other coinages in the island at the time, proclaimed a new authority that stood apart from, and was aligned against, the Roman system in place: a new Greek king, and therefore a new Greek kingdom with all that could go with that. Comparison of the types of the coinage showed that, while the legend would have stood out in Sicily at this time, the imagery was completely intelligible in a Sicilian context, and that the types chosen related very closely to Sicilian religious culture and history. Most importantly, the use of images of Demeter suggested very strongly that the issuing authority was trying to mobilise and unite the people of eastern Sicily under a new venture against Rome, led by King Antiochus as a Greek monarch in Sicily, by invoking a cult that had been central to the last efforts to resist Rome in the war against Hannibal. Importantly, it is much easier to understand the coins as relating to the free people of Sicily than the slaves that Diodorus claimed were the main protagonists of what we should better refer to as the Sicilian Insurrection to which the evidence discussed here is typically attributed. However, it is important to understand how King Antiochus, and the kingdom he was attempting to create, fit into the context of Sicily in the second century B.C., and this will be the subject of the next section of this chapter.
I. Negotiations of Power 2: The Decline and Fall of Inland Sicily

‘The frequent revolts and resistance on the part of individual Sicilian poleis down to 210 B.C. are strongly suggestive of a lively sense of independent political – and military – identity …the activity evidenced in post 210 B.C. Sicily is no less suggestive of such a lively sense of identity.’ Prag (2007a), 76.

Introduction

In the first section of this chapter the only evidence to come directly from the kingdom of King Antiochus, his coinage, was considered in the context of Sicilian history up until his reign. It was shown that the coinage is best understood as arising from, and linked to, the culture and history of eastern Sicily. As a corollary to this conclusion, it was necessary to acknowledge that the people most likely to respond to the iconographic choices made for the coinage were the free people of eastern Sicily. It is one thing, however, to argue that King Antiochus was appealing to the people of eastern Sicily; it is quite another to answer the question of why Sicily was discontented enough with Roman ‘provincial’ control of the island to align itself with a Greek monarch whose existence was a cause for potential conflict with Rome. The aim of this section is to provide a context for understanding the rise of King Antiochus’ kingdom that sets it firmly into the world of mid-second century B.C. Sicily.

The following will demonstrate that Sicily in the mid-second century B.C. was experiencing complex socio-political and economic problems. Several contexts will be developed to argue this. First, the development of the Roman provincial system will be considered, following Richardson’s (2008) argument that Rome, in the second century B.C., did not view the provincia assigned to its officials to be territorial possessions. They were, rather, spheres of influence through which Rome could affect its international policy. Moreover, Prag (2007a) has shown that this necessitated a much more loose form of control in Sicily, which involved strong local oligarchies and a gymnastic culture that enabled Sicilian soldiers to police Sicily. Second, Rome’s interests in Sicily will be demonstrated to have been principally with the taxation of the province. This was causing a declining inland and a burgeoning coastal region. Through a comparison with another provincial context in
which taxation caused considerable problems between an imperial power and its provincial subjects – the period leading up to the American War of Independence – it will be shown that Sicily’s taxation by Rome could have been the catalyst for an insurrection by the people of Sicily, especially those in the declining interior. This section will conclude that the Kingdom of King Antiochus represents a pivotal moment in the negotiation of power between Rome and Sicily, and an episode that confirmed the downward spiral of inland Sicily.

**I. Mid to Late Hellenistic Sicily**

In recent scholarship there have been important advances in the understanding of how Rome controlled its provincial interests, and in relation to Sicily several recent works have stressed the considerable degree of autonomy afforded to the island by Rome. Detailing this critical context will provide important tools to help explain the events surrounding the rise and fall of King Antiochus.

**I.i. Roman Practice of Empire**

An important place to start this discussion is with the general concept of how Rome controlled areas in which it had been successful in its wars. A recent consideration of this policy proposed by Richardson (2008) has demonstrated that Rome did not consider itself to ‘own’ the provinciae of its officials, or indeed territories of defeated enemies, but sought to control from a distance the political and economical policies of defeated enemies. In his words (24):

78 The naming of an area as a provincia did not (so far as we can tell) alter its legal status or constitute a Roman assertion of sovereignty, any more than the omission of an area from the list of provinciae in a subsequent year meant a de-annexation of a previous Roman “territory”.

As an example of Roman practice Richardson (2008: 24-5) focussed on Macedonia. He argued that Rome never sought, in the aftermath of the initial conflicts with King Philip, to annex the territory of Macedonia. Even after King Perseus was defeated, Rome actually withdrew forces from Macedonia, and contented itself with reorganising the territory into

78 In general agreement with Crawford (1990), 91-2, and Lintott (1993), 22-4, although in Richardson’s case the statement was much more forceful in its conviction.
four distinct Republics, which subsequently were only required to pay tax back to Rome. In this period Macedonia was on the list of *provinciae* only when military forces were required there: an example of this would be the war against Andricus in 149 B.C., when Roman forces were sent to suppress his movement having not been present since 167 B.C. (Zonar. 9.28.4). Richardson's argument hinged on the interpretation that the term *provincia* merely denoted the task or area within which a magistrate could exercise his *imperium* (16-9), and formulated this further, saying that (43)

In this interpretation he departed from the opinion held by Brennan (2000: 182-90) who maintained a distinction between certain *provinciae*, such as Sicily after 241 B.C., that were ‘fixed’, and ‘special’ *provinciae* that were assigned as, when, and where needed. Brennan actually titles the ‘fixed’ *provinciae* the ‘Ordo Provinciarum’, but as Richardson has shown (2008: 16-9), this concept in Brennan is based upon a single passage of Livy that cannot support it (Liv. 27.22.4-6).

This understanding of what the Romans meant by a *provincia* is important when considering the implications of the conflict between Rome and King Antiochus in Sicily. Before we move on to consider Sicily specifically during the Roman Republic, it is worth considering again Macedonia. As Richardson (2008: 24-5) has shown, Rome only intervened with a military force, or even a governor, when the settlement that it had created in Macedonia was under threat from Andricus. In fact it is notable that it was precisely once Macedonia had been reorganised by L. Aemilius Paullus that Rome ceased to send troops there. This suggests two very important facts about Rome’s involvement in Macedonia. First, Rome’s only concern with Macedonia was taxation and an end to a military threat; apart from that they had no involvement in the area. Secondly, had Andricus not attempted to take Macedonia there is no guarantee that Rome would have entered the area for any other

---

79 Although, as Richardson (2008), 25, notes, some ancient authors considered this to be an act of annexation; see *Liv. Per*. 45.

80 The passage in Livy records the list of *provinciae* for the praetors of the coming year (208 B.C.) and then describes the prorogations of *imperia* which applied to them. Richardson (2008), 19, stated that arguing for a concept of ‘fixed’ provinces on the evidence of one passage of Livy that seemed to suggest different practices for certain provinces, was not credible given the other possible readings of the passage possible.

81 *Liv*. 45.18.1-8 and 29.4-14.
reason: by way of example of an area that remained unchanged, the cities of Thessaly
remained a union of free cities until the end of the Republic, in spite of their proximity to
Macedonia (Lintott 1993: 24). In sum, it was the end of the status quo in Macedonia on
Roman terms that led to Roman intervention, not an attack on a Roman ‘territory’.

So how do these broader ideas about Roman attitudes to provinciae relate to Sicily?
Crawford (1990: 93) argued that in 241 B.C. the Senate in Rome was expressing its desire to
administer Western Sicily in the future: that is that they wanted to ‘annex’ the territory and
make it into a provincia in the traditional sense.\footnote{Although he noted that he could not prove this hypothesis.} I think that the most important point here is
the definition of ‘annexation’. It is undeniable that Rome sent regular if not annual praetors to
Sicily, and a recent list compiled by Prag (2007c: 287-310) has shown that from 210 B.C. to
100 B.C. there were 65 consuls or praetors, many of them prorogued, assigned to Sicily, and
it must be noted that these are only the known examples: it is most likely that Sicily had an
annual magistrate of at least praetorian rank. However, this does not necessarily constitute
military control, nor close control of Sicilian administration. Elsewhere Prag (2007a: 71-6)
has argued against the assumption that the annual magistrate in Sicily necessarily had
garrison forces assigned to him from Rome, or indeed Italy, and argued that the evidence at
the very least suggested that the forces used to patrol Sicily were from the island itself. His
argument warrants special attention, as it has other important implications about Roman
attitudes to Sicily in the period of interest here.

It is clear that during the Second Punic War there were regularly Roman troops in
Sicily: its status as a warzone necessitated this. As Prag (2007a: 73) said ‘(i)t is what follows
that is of most interest here’. He noted (73) that at first levies of troops made up of Latins and
Italian allies were dispatched with governors, in 200 B.C. (Liv. 31.9.9), 198 B.C. (Liv.
32.8.5-8), and perhaps again in 193 B.C. (Liv. 34.56.7-8). An emergency levy of Sicilians in
192 B.C. was also used, in this case – and, Prag argued, indicative of the purpose of the other
levies – to protect the coastal towns against an invasion from Antiochus III: an external
invasion, rather than an internal rebellion. The last mention of troops in Sicily from the
literary sources comes in 188 B.C., when Sicily was decreed to a praetor ‘sine supplemento’
(Liv. 41.21.3). From this evidence Prag (2007a: 74) tentatively suggested that the use of Latin
and Italian allies as a garrison force was phased out by 188 B.C.\footnote{In this he followed Brunt’s (1987), 683, argument that while the evidence of Livy could imply the existence of a force in Sicily already, it was better to be prudent regarding the evidence.} Prag (74-6) then argued that the evidence for the period after 188 B.C. until the foundation of veteran and colonial settlements in Sicily by Augustus in 21 B.C. (\textit{Res Ges.} 28) did not indicate a ‘standing-force’ during the second century B.C. in Sicily. In what followed this statement, Prag (76-99) argued that Rome’s shortfall in manpower in Sicily was made up by using Sicilian troops to guard and patrol the province, on land and sea, utilizing the gymnastic culture prevalent in Sicily in this period. Critically, he argued that (76)

\begin{quote}
(t)he frequent revolts and resistance on the part of individual Sicilian \textit{poleis} down to 210 B.C. are strongly suggestive of a lively sense of independent political – and military – identity...the activity evidenced in post 210 B.C. Sicily is no less suggestive of such a lively sense of identity.
\end{quote}

When related to the evidence of Roman practice as regards the controlling of Macedonia, some useful observations can be made. As in Macedonia, although with an undeniably different, localised style, Rome chose the method of least resistance for controlling Sicily. No doubt Rome maintained friendly oligarchies in the cities of Sicily, as they preferred to do in the Greek east;\footnote{Finley (1968), 126.} but it is very important to remember, as Prag (2007a: 82-7) has shown, that the Sicilian levies used to police the island and protect it from pirates were often led by \textit{Sicilian} officers. That the Roman governor sent to Sicily was not accompanied by levies of even Italians, let alone Roman legionaries, indicates that his primary function was largely related to taxation and legal matters, a matter to which we shall return shortly.\footnote{We should note here that the only known effect of the ‘reorganisation’ of Sicily by P. Rupilius after the Sicilian Insurrection was a clarification and emendation of the legal system in Sicily; see Cic. \textit{Verr.} 2.2.32.} It is notable that when Rome does send additional troops, of any kind, into Sicily during the second century B.C. it is only to deal with situations that were a threat to the peaceful taxation of the province: the wars that we typically know as the First and Second Sicilian Slave Wars.

\textit{I.ii. Sicily’s Vibrant Culture}

As a corollary to this laissez-faire approach in terms of the military, the evidence from other fields of study confirms that Sicily had a vibrant Hellenistic culture during the second and first centuries B.C., and one that was afforded a certain level of autonomy. It is useful to start with epigraphic evidence. Manganaro (1996: 129-44) has demonstrated that the epigraphic
habits of Mikrai show a strong civic activity and identity in the town, and also (1999: 76-7 and 141) that the town of Halaesa possessed a strong civic centre, evidenced by civic document seals in lead found there. Similarly Prag (2007b: 257-9) also noted that in the second and first centuries B.C. Sicily had a strong Hellenistic epigraphic culture. He argued in particular that the sites of Segesta and, once again, Halaesa, with (258) ‘…formal agora, statue bases, honorifics, gymnasium-related material, building inscriptions, the presence of Romans etc.’ were ‘paradigmatic’ of Sicilian towns in this period. Perhaps most important for the focus here, Prag noted (260) that there was a concern in ‘Sicilian’ epigraphy outside the island to stress the ‘civic identity’ of the people named on the inscriptions, displayed alongside the generic ethnic Siculus, and that this implied ‘…an interesting tension between the externally imposed «Sicilian» of, for instance, Cicero and the internal emphasis in the epigraphy on civic or sub-civic identity.’ Related to these arguments based on epigraphic evidence, which underscore the importance of civic identity and civic life, the concern in the primary literary sources for the make-up of the ruling bodies of Sicilian cities, with their frequent references to Roman officials called in to determine the dispensation of the ‘senates’ of the towns, also point up the general interest among some Sicilians in the running of their cities, and the importance that they placed on these administrative bodies.

Archaeological evidence further supports this general trend. In a recent summary of archaeological fieldwork Wilson (2000: 144-5) reflected that the evidence from a number of towns indicated that Sicily had a ‘buoyant’ economy, and that ‘…local elites, even after paying off their tithe to Rome, still had money to spare to invest in new construction’, an interpretation backed up by Campagna (2006: 15-34) and Bell (2007b: 118). In particular Wilson noted (140-50) the towns of Soluntum, Ietas, Segesta, Tyndaris and Halaesa as places that demonstrated considerable prosperity during the Roman Republic. All these locales had important civic buildings: active theatres, stoai, and most importantly bouleuteria. In a departure from previous scholarship, recent studies have also suggested that

---

86 In 197 B.C. the town of Agrigentum had its population bolstered by order of the Senate, and in 193 B.C. the governor of the province specified the rules of cooptation into the Agrigentine senate, with the stipulation that the new settlers could not constitute a majority in the senate; see Cic. Verr. 2.2.123. Again in 95 B.C the city of Halaesa asked the Roman Senate to resolve the disputes over the same issues in its senate, and again was supplied with new regulations; see Cic. Verr. 2.2.122.
90 Bernabò Brea and Cavalier (1965).
91 Prestianni Giallombardo (1998); Scibona (1971); Wilson (1990), 46-8.
important cultural buildings, like some theatres in the thriving centres of Sicily, were actually constructed during the Roman Republic, and not in the fourth century B.C. as previously thought. Of course, it would be wrong to think that cities across the island were prosperous, and there is considerable evidence for the decline of hill-top sites, such as Leontini, Morgantina, Megara Hyblaea and Heraclea Minoa (Wilson 2000: 137-9), as well as certain sites on the coast, such as Camarina and Selinus (Bell 2007b: 118). This should not cause any real surprise: as Wilson noted (2000: 137), it makes little sense to live atop a hill if there are no aggressive armies to stay away from. What is perhaps surprising is that some sites on hill-tops flourished under the Romans, most notably Centuripae. The most likely explanation for this is that Centuripae, along with Halaeas, Segesta, Panormus and Halicyae, was declared a free community and tax-exempt under the Romans, and so unlike the other hill-top towns mentioned (and in particular Leontini that lost most of its land to the Romans as ager Romanus; see Cic. Verr. 2.3.109), Centuripae was not economically stressed by the necessity to relinquish a portion of its harvests to Rome (Cic. Verr. 2.3.13). I shall return to this particular subject shortly, but it is important to note now that one of the few exceptions to the general rule of hill-top towns in Sicily declining under the Romans had a special dispensation from taxation from them. On the whole, however, the coastal towns of Sicily generally appear to have flourished under Rome, and in the latest archaeological studies, the second and first centuries B.C. represent a ‘buoyant’ time for the economy of Sicily; and with the mention of ‘economy’ we come to the final body of evidence that demonstrates the vibrancy of Hellenistic Sicily: coinage.

As I have mentioned before, under Rome local coinage flourished. Crawford (1985: 115) attributed this to ‘…a deliberate encouragement of local autonomies’. This impression has been confirmed by Frey-Kupper (2006: 27-56). While the basic pattern from this evidence is undeniable – i.e. that a widespread group of Sicilian towns and cities were given free rein to produce their own coinage – certain aspects of this trend should be noted that downplay this outline. It has been stated on more than one occasion by Crawford (1985: 113-
5; 1987: 48-9) that this new burst of coinage was aligned with Roman coinage in terms of weight and standard, and we must not over-emphasise the Sicilian autonomy displayed in producing local coinages at the expense of the more important fact that Rome dominated Sicily economically during this period. Furthermore, the results of the analysis given in the previous section of this chapter implied that these local coinages, however widespread, were very small and local in terms of circulation: I shall return to these coinages again shortly.

In sum, the island of Sicily can be seen, through its epigraphy, archaeology and coinage, to have been a vibrant, politically active, and in some cases rich area with a strong Hellenistic culture that was still very much Greek. Furthermore, Rome utilised this vibrancy in its own policing of the island, allowing the cities of Sicily to furnish the praetor with men for protecting the island against pirates. The main question to address now, given the conclusions drawn from the coinage of King Antiochus, is how to interpret the way in which King Antiochus and his kingdom fit into this wider picture of Sicily during the Roman Republic. While a Hellenistic monarch fits perfectly into the context of a vibrant Hellenistic culture, it does not fit so well with the situation as it existed between Sicily and Rome. Furthermore, the subsequent conflict with Rome, normally interpreted as a slave war, that I have shown to have drawn on support from the people of Sicily, is at odds with the picture sketched above of a ‘buoyant’ economy thriving under the Roman economic dominance and a strong civic culture. Or is it? In spite of the general reluctance among scholars of provincial Republican Sicily to discuss the events of the Sicilian Insurrection, they are, by their very nature, central to understanding the interrelationship between Rome and the people of Sicily during the second century B.C. The answer to how this kingdom fits into the picture of late Hellenistic Sicily lies in Rome’s principal interest in Sicily, and the discrepancies in Sicily that this created: taxation.

II. King Antiochus’ Sicily

I earlier emphasised that when Rome intervened in Macedonia, it was because of a threat to the status quo that they had arranged there: it was not that Rome stood to lose territory, but financial gain and political and military control. This situation is a persuasive paradigm for Rome’s military interventions in Sicily. An analysis of the rhetorical stratagems employed by Cicero in his Verrines (Steel 2001: 23-4) has revealed that Cicero’s speech, albeit published for the most part having never been delivered, was designed to climax with Verres’ most
horrible crimes – in the Roman mind at least – and so therefore finished with a description of his crimes relating to Roman citizens.\(^{97}\) In this scheme, with the smallest crimes coming first, and the worst at the end, the mismanagement of the grain tithe in Sicily was third out of five sections of the second speech. We should note that the theft of art was considered by Cicero to be more shocking to a Roman audience than the embezzlement of Sicilian grain. Finley (1968: 130) implied that the reason that Verres was eventually brought to court was because of ‘his inability to leave the Romans in Sicily alone’, and elsewhere (129) declared that when the Roman Senate had to choose between a corrupt governor and hard-pressed provincials, their personal ties to their fellow ruling class ‘normally overrode all other considerations’. It was to this tendency that Cicero played in the Verrines, and this implies that Rome’s principal interest in Sicily was getting the grain out; how it was done did not really matter, and it is noteworthy that Cicero went to great lengths to discredit Verres’ achievements in squeezing grain and profit out of Sicily (Cic. Verr. 2.3.40-9): clearly this could have been an important argument against Cicero’s case.\(^{98}\) I would therefore suggest that, in a manner similar to Roman affairs in Macedonia, Rome would not have become involved militarily in Sicily unless their primary interest in the island was under threat: the *status quo* that provided their easy access to grain. It is, therefore, with the relevant tax that we should begin to consider the behaviour of Rome in Sicily.

We have seen (Wilson 2000: 137-9) that the majority of hill-top towns in Sicily, mostly located in the interior of Sicily, went into decline during the second century B.C.\(^{99}\) One of those that did not decline, Centuripae, was also one of the few cities in Sicily that was exempt from the Roman taxation, which had to be a major advantage. It is, to an extent,

---

\(^{97}\) As Steel (2001), 24, puts it: ‘From a Sicilian point of view, Cicero moves from actions which had the greatest ill-effects on the province, to conclude with a series of events which affected only a small number of people; but for his Roman audience, the worst is saved until the end.’ In terms of rhetorical strategy, Cicero’s tactic is absolutely valid; he acknowledges that the topic of grain tithes is boring (Verr. 2.3.10-11), and so does not make it the climax of his argument. Vasaly (2002), 95, also noted that Cicero was aware that crimes against Roman civilians were more likely to stir Roman sympathies than those against provincials. Frazel (2009), 202-17, moreover argued that Cicero’s main thrust in the third speech of the second Actio was to demonstrate that it did not matter whether Verres had provided Rome with a large supply of grain during his praetorship, but that he had endangered the long-term supply through his actions.

\(^{98}\) Steel (2007), 39, commented that this reference to a potential defence, obviously never given, for Verres’ actions, placed so early in this particular section of the speech, was designed to counter the potential belief in the people reading the speech that ‘…the most important aspect of the grain supply was that Rome was efficiently supplied with sufficient quantities of grain’ and that the same people thinking this might ‘…simply ignore the evidence of the cost of this efficiency to the inhabitants of Sicily’. This has also been noted by Vasaly (2002), 99; Lintott (2008), 97; and Frazel (2009), 210-3.

\(^{99}\) Perkins (2007), 50, has questioned this interpretation, asking why, if certain hilltop towns could flourish under Rome, others did not? He suggested that ‘(p)erhaps it is necessary to look for further causes.’ In what follows, I hope to suggest some ‘further causes’.

uncertain when Rome instituted the 10% tax on grain (in accordance with the practice of Hieron II in his kingdom in south-east Sicily) across Sicily as a whole, which included an optional enforced purchase of a further 10% at a fixed price decided by the senate. However, it is unlikely to have happened immediately after Rome’s acquisition of Western Sicily at the end of the First Punic War. In any case, it is certain that Rome either extended or had extended the scheme across Sicily at some point soon after the Second Punic War, if not before, in some manner, in Western Sicily. This extension instituted a fixed taxation that may not have been experienced by the central and western cities of Sicily. Certainly Rome’s main concern, especially immediately after the Second Punic War, was with Sicily’s regeneration as a productive agricultural region (Liv. 26.40.13-16; 27.5.1-5; 27.8.18), and this seems to have led some scholars to assume a benevolent attitude from Rome: Serrati (2000b: 123-4) commented that ‘Sicily was so productive that a second tithe was often requisitioned by the Roman government to feed its legions’. We should not, however, confuse practicality (Rome wanting to maximise profits) with benevolence. For example, I think it to be highly unlikely that Rome held back from taking the second tithe when the harvest in Sicily was poor, especially since this poor harvest in Sicily would have adversely affected Roman taxation, and therefore the grain supply in Rome itself. Garnsey (1988: 16), in his analysis of the regularity of food crises in the ancient world, argued that ‘…inasmuch as communities lacked the capacity to exploit other peoples, or did not enjoy stability of government over long periods of time, they were endemically vulnerable to food crisis through a combination of human and natural causes.’ Sicily, in this period, was a ‘community’, in the broadest sense, unable to ‘exploit other peoples’, and indeed was itself exploited; one can imagine that losing a fifth of a poor harvest, for a nominal sum of compensation for a tenth of it, would have caused considerable shortages of food in Sicily. While this is somewhat an argument from

---


101 Comparatively, Jones (1940), 217-8, noted the large number of sitones attested in Hellenistic and Roman period cities, that is magistrates for grain commission, leading Garnsey (1988), 15, to argue that the ‘alleviation of food crises by private benefactors was so regular as to be an institutionalised feature of the society’. In spite of Sicily’s fame for grain production, this must have been offset for the Sicilians themselves by the tax: an area producing an average yield of 8:1 for grain harvested to grain sown is as profitable as an area producing an average yield of 10:1 but taxed at 20%. Furthermore, Pritchard (1970), 360, noted that the *lex Hieronica* contained stipulations that the grain paid in the tax had to be approved, and therefore constituted the better part of the farmers’ crop (Cic. Verr. 2.3.73.171 and 2.3.74.172); the obvious corollary of this is that the Sicilian farmers were left with the poorer quality, and therefore less valuable, grain they produced each year. We should also bear in mind the calculations in Garnsey (1988), 10-1, that wheat as a crop was susceptible to failure, and even taking his lower estimates of crop failure (roughly 25%) as applicable for Sicily, that still leaves a significant failure of the wheat every four years. In addition to this, subsistence farmers, who would have made
silence, it is not surprising that the ancient sources typically do not record any details of grain shortages in Sicily: their focus is on Rome. As Erdkamp said (1998: 196) ‘(t)axation of this kind [Roman tax in Sicily] ensured a more stable access to agricultural production at the cost of agricultural producers and landowners’ (my emphasis).

Yet Rome’s exploitation of Sicily was more complete than merely taxation of the grain. We should also remember that, along with the land of Leontini, which was often farmed by the Centuripans who were supposedly renowned as tenant farmers of other cities’ land (Cic. Verr. 2.3.108), a large part of the best agricultural land in Sicily was made into ager publicus (Cic. Verr. 2.3.109). Furthermore, a passage from Polybius (28.2.17), in which he records a special dispensation in 169 B.C. from the senate allowing the city of Rhodes to trade with Sicily, implies that Sicily itself had trade restrictions imposed upon it: while certain towns (notably coastal towns) thrived under the Romans, it is clear that the Roman taxation and control of commerce did negatively affect some areas of Sicily. As I have shown, the coinage of King Antiochus suggests that he was appealing to the people of eastern Sicily, but that he avoided the types of certain major towns: I argued that this was because they were typically pro-Roman. The evidence from archaeology, epigraphy and coinage suggests that these areas flourished under Rome, whereas the areas appealed to by King Antiochus, i.e. those containing a number of declining hill-top towns, were not flourishing under Rome. King Antiochus’ Sicily was not the rich coast, and its tax-free ‘allies’ of Rome, up the majority of farmers in Sicily (see below no. 103), typically aimed to store enough grain to survive lean seasons and crop failures; compare the case of farmers in East Africa in the 1960’s who aimed to overproduce in good seasons by 40% (Allan (1965), 38). When this is also taken into consideration, the loss of 20% of a crop could have had a significant impact if it took place for several poor seasons in a row. Furthermore, even in ancient times it was acknowledged that for sowing seed had to be at most two or three years old, but ideally one year (Theophrastus Hist. Plant. 8.11), a further strain on the production of Sicilian farmers. Finally, a lack of technology, and the low labour productivity of subsistence farming both contributed to the ‘small and moreover vulnerable surplus production’ (Erdkamp (1998), 190), a surplus then taxed and taken away by Rome (see also Braudel (1972), 244, and Finley (1973), 169).

The single time that we do hear of grain shortages in Sicily is precisely because a Roman was involved in alleviating the problem: Cicero in the De lege agraria (2.83) records that during the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War M’. Aquilius was required to donate grain to Sicilian towns because of a shortage there. For further discussion on this point see Chapter VII.

It was noted by Casson (1954), 182, that this implied a limitation in Sicilian trading before the dispensation to Rhodes. It should be considered, however, that the limitation would not have affected the majority of farmers in Sicily who would have been farming at subsistence level, and therefore not producing for export, but would have affected large-scale farmers producing for export; see Carandini (1981), 249-60, and Garnsey (1980b), 41-3. De Angelis (2006), 46-7, has recently argued for a re-evaluation of the make-up of Sicilian exports, with a greater stress on the export of wine and oil: if this is the case then these trade restrictions would have been very frustrating for the export farmers involved. Furthermore, given the importance of Rhodes for the grain trade of the Mediterranean, even after the creation of Delos as a free port (see Casson (1954), 171-82, for discussion of both Rhodes and Delos), if Sicily was cut-off from both Delos and Rhodes, and therefore the eastern markets of the Mediterranean, this could have been a significant issue for the exporting farmers and merchants of Sicily.
but the declining centre. Moreover, Rome’s attitude to governing Sicily was not based on tight control, but the method of least resistance. Local levies supported the governor, and cities were largely free to run themselves on a local scale, even if some appealed to Rome for help in doing so: this is evidenced by the number of bouleuteria excavated in Hellenistic sites in Sicily. King Antiochus’ kingdom is a logical, Hellenistic, extension of this comparative freedom.

The situation in Sicily in the second century B.C. is also mirrored, mutatis mutandis, by that among the thirteen colonies of America before the American War of Independence. In the years preceding the outbreak of open warfare between the British Empire and the American colonies, a series of economic disputes regarding taxation soured the relationship between the two sides. The Stamp Act crisis of 1764-65, followed by the resistance to the Townshend Program of 1767 and culminating in the Boston Tea Party of 1773, saw an articulation of American awareness of their exploitation by an imperial power that was, politically, unanswerable for its actions.\(^{104}\) The duties charged on British imports by these acts, combined with the British monopoly on American trade, was viewed on the British side as the Americans shouldering their share of the burden of supporting British troops in the Americas,\(^{105}\) but to the Americans, who at this time remained British citizens, this was exploitation of a captive market against which they had no direct political recourse.\(^{106}\) It was, in particular, the tax on tea which remained after the general withdrawal of the Townshend Program that forced the issue, since this was a product that affected all the colonials.\(^{107}\) After

---

\(^{104}\) Of particular note was the Stamp Act Congress in New York during October 1765. At this congress the delegates from various American colonies resolved that, as British citizens, any taxation of American colonists required their representation in parliament, and the right to collect their own taxes: see Cogliano (2000), 33-5, for details and also see 36 no. 6 for further bibliography. A detailed analysis of the various reactions among the American colonists to the taxation is not possible here. Morgan (1992) outlined in general terms the colonial conclusion that they could not accept taxation without representation. See Breen (2004), 235-53, for the primary evidence, and a detailing of the stress laid among American writers of the time on the link between unfair taxation and a loss of liberty, and especially the link that existed between resisting British imports as a form of solidifying and protecting American liberty.

\(^{105}\) For a full account of the Townshend Program see Thomas (1987), but also Jensen (1968), 215-38, Cogliano (2000), 38-44, and Breen (2004), 239, for further comments on the aims of this program.

\(^{106}\) The First Continental Congress on September 5th, 1774, outlined very clearly the perceived problem regarding taxation of the colonies and representation of their interests. In the Declaration of Rights and Grievances, the Congress stated that the foundation of 'English liberty' was the 'right in the people to participate in their legislative council: and as the English colonists are not represented, and from their local and other circumstances, cannot properly be represented in the British parliament, they are entitled to a free and exclusive power of legislation...' and that taxation of the 'subjects in America' could not be enacted 'without their consent'. For the text see Hunt and Ford (1904-37), 1: 67.

\(^{107}\) Breen (2004), 304-6, argued that the choice of tea on the British part as the remaining product to be taxed also enabled all colonists to take part in the non-importation and non-consumption protests. Moreover, the fact that Britain taxed the colonists, in spite of their ardent protests, worsened the developing separation between the
the Boston Tea Party the harsh British measures against the town united the colonies in resistance, and in many ways precipitated the war, but continually the American colonists stressed their desire to remain loyal citizens and subjects, provided they received better representation, and alleviated tax conditions. Indeed, in many cases the only people to resist the importation embargo were the merchants, who were benefitting from British trade.

The comparison with Sicily in the second century B.C. is instructive. Wheat, albeit alongside barley, was one of the staples of the ancient diet, and a product that had an impact on every inhabitant of Sicily, much like tea in the colonies. We also know from Cicero that Rome taxed the other produce of Sicily (Verr. 2.3.18-9), olive oil, wine and other minor crops: these were also staples of the ancient diet. Moreover, as we saw above, there is evidence that Sicily had limitations placed on it by Rome as to who it could trade with, just as the colonies could only import British goods. While the form of tax was different from that which caused the conflict between the colonies and Great Britain – a tax on comestibles produced in Sicily rather than on goods imported into America – it was nonetheless a tax that could not be avoided, and provided Sicily with almost nothing in return; indeed, we could argue that it provided Sicily with less than the American colonials received. Sicilian soldiers still policed the island, the cities still decided their own internal affairs, and maintained their own navy to patrol the coast. The Sicilians had no representation in Rome, and even needed a Roman patronus in order to protest legally against any abuse of the province by its praetorian governors, a situation mirrored very clearly by that between the American colonists and the ‘distant English government that seemed to have squandered [the colonists’] trust and affection’.

108 The port of Boston was closed to all commerce until the value of the tea destroyed was reimbursed to the East India Company, the city’s town meetings were limited to one meeting a year, and the constitution of the city was altered; the details are cited in Thomas (1976), 76.
109 See no. 106 for references to the primary evidence. It is noteworthy that some communities, even up until the final weeks before the start of the revolution, pleaded with the British government to remember that taxation of and unfair trade agreements with the colonies damaged the colonists as much as they profited the Empire; for citations of this evidence see Nourse (1894), 304-5.
110 See especially Jensen (1968), 265-87, but also Schlesinger (1918), 106-31, and Breen (2004), 245.
111 See Polybius (28.2.17) and no. 103.
112 Indeed, unlike the citizens of the colonies, Sicily could not just embargo Roman imports, but would have had to refuse to pay tax, an altogether more problematic form of protest.
113 Butler (2000), 231, noted that the colonial assemblies of the colonies in America would have been incapable of sustaining the protest of 1763-76 a hundred years earlier, but had by 1763 developed the ‘institutional experience’ required for such acts.
114 See Chapter III for a discussion of the dates and forms of the Roman alterations to the courts that heard repetundae cases against governors.
colonies and the British government. In short, Sicily had very similar, if not worse problems to another much better evidenced provincial context, albeit one from much later in history, and these same problems in the later context led to a military conflict between the provincials and the overarching imperial centre. There is evidence, furthermore, that Sicily had internal problems that were exacerbated by the Roman presence on the island.

In the account of the Insurrection in Diodorus, at the end of the Constantinian excerpts, the text describes the deep divisions in Sicilian society, although the roots of these divisions are inadequately explained in the passage. At an unspecified time in the Insurrection, an outbreak of violence by free people is recorded (34/5.2.48):

When many great evils fell upon the Sicilians, the popular mob was not only unsympathetic to all these, but on the contrary rejoiced, since they begrudged their unequal fate and irregular way of life. For envy turned quickly from a prior pain into joy, when the mob saw that the glorious fate had changed into a form formerly overlooked by them. Most terrible of all, the rebels, exercising rational forethought concerning the future, neither set fire to farm houses nor damaged the stock in them and the harvest lying in store, and held off from those who had turned to farming. The populace, however, because of their envy, and behind the pretext of the runaways, went out into the countryside and not only plundered the estates, but even set fire to the farm houses.

Two aspects are immediately clear. First, ὁ δημοτικὸς ὁλός, 'the popular mob', is characterized as worse than the rebels following Antiochus; indeed, by comparison, the rebels

---

115 If we look to the American situation the position is mirrored. A New Yorker who referred to himself as A.B. argued (New-York Journal; or General Advertiser, 23 November 1769) that the colonists had to 'prevail with those who are represented in the British Parliament, and may be supposed to have some influence there, to exert themselves in our Behalf and make our Cause their own.' See also Cogliano (2000), 40-1, and Breen (2004), 242.

116 Although the location of the fragment at the end of the recorded Constantinian excerpts suggests after, rather than before, the outbreak of widespread conflict.

117 The term ὁδημοτικὸς is, in Diodorus, a term that can have a range of feeling behind it. The word is used 19 times in Diodorus, and the tone of the word is entirely dependent on context: the two uses of it as an adverb (5.60.5; 8.30.1) are both positive; on nine occasions the noun is used in a non-pejorative context (10.28.2; 13.2.2; 13.48.3 and 7; 13.91.5; 15.40.2; 18.21.6 and 8; 37.2.2); on eight occasions the noun is used in a clearly pejorative context (13.92.3; 18.10.2; 18.65.6; 18.66.6; 18.67.5; 19.9.2; 34/5.2.48 twice). The noun is used with ὁλός four times (including the passage under discussion), and of these two are clearly in a pejorative context (13.92.3 and 34/5.2.48) and two are clearly non-pejorative (13.48.3 and 15.40.2).
are pragmatic and rational. Second, the passage makes a clear distinction between Σικέλωται, ‘Sicilians’ and other members of Sicilian towns only referred to as ο δημοτικός ὄχλος, ‘the popular mob’. This vocabulary is problematic, and the passage itself is notable for the comparative lack of discussion it has elicited. It is typically commented that it displays divisions in Sicilian society, but we must go further than this and ask why there were divisions. The passage is implicitly propertied in its outlook: the poor, called ο δημοτικός ὄχλος, are denigrated as acting only through envy. There is no effort to understand why this loss of social order took place beyond the reference to envy; but we might be able to form a better understanding if we look at other evidence, and most importantly that concerning the aftermath of the revolt.

After the war, we know that P. Rupilius, with a commission of ten senators, reorganised the province. Only one aspect of this reorganisation is certain, and it concerns a reform of the legal systems of Sicily (Cic. Verr. 2.2.32). These reforms ensured that the correct court was set up for each case heard, which Finley (1968: 127) argued was designed to clarify the way in which legal trials were carried out between the increasingly diverse statuses of those in Sicily. Yet there is another explanation. Cicero (Verr. 2.2.32) makes clear that Sicilian farmers and tax collectors could sue one another in Sicilian courts if either side attempted to cheat the other; a large part of Cicero’s attack on Verres in the second and third speeches of the second Actio was devoted to outlining how Verres had subverted these

118 Farrington (1936), Green (1961), Verbrughe (1972; 1973; 1974; 1975) and Bradley (1989) all fail to mention the passage; Vogt (1965), 31, noted that the passage argues against any communist/marxist interpretation of the Sicilian Insurrection; Urbainczyk (2008a), 13 and 40, merely noted the passage, but did not consider its importance to the narrative of events, likewise Goldsberry (1973), 245; Yarrow (2006), 337-8, considered this passage to represent Diodorus’ condemnation of the elevation of lower social classes (c.f. Diod. Sic. 34/5.25); Dumont (1987), 247, argued that this passage is evidence of the problems caused among the free by the excesses and injustices of the Sicilian, Roman and Italian landowners in Sicily; Perkins (2007), 245, similarly to Dumont, considered the passage as evidence of the divisions in Sicilian society only made plain during times of conflict; Manganaro (1980), 438, viewed the passage as indicative of free people joining with the rebels, and not merely taking advantage of the situation afforded by the rebels. Canfora (1985), 160, argued, contra Manganaro above, that the passage demonstrates the definite division between the slaves and the free people, characterising the episode as ‘una esplosione di ribellismo’.

119 Serrati (2000a), 112-3, chronologically misplaces the reform to after the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War, but more importantly assumes that the reforms were regulations for the administration of the province that dealt with (113) ‘agriculture, ports, imports and exports, poverty and the law courts.’ He does not consider the context of the institution of Rupilius’ reforms, nor note that in terms of poverty (not least), the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War demonstrates that had the reforms tackled this problem, they were not successful: see Chapter VII.

120 Although see Capozza (1956-7), 91-2, for a more imaginative recreation of the actions of Rupilius, that ran along the lines of the Gracchan attempts at reform in Italy in the same period. There is no evidence to support this supposition. See also Pinzone (1999), 393, for a sceptical view of any imaginative recreation of Rupilius’ reforms. Crawford (1985), 115, and (1987), 48, suggested that the flourishing of local coinages across Sicily took place in the second half of the second century B.C. and that this was linked to Rupilius’ reforms. It is possible that these coinage reforms were a form of concession to the cities of Sicily.
courts in his, and his cronies’, favour (Verr. 2.2.37-44; 2.3.38, 92, 117, 123, 147). It is to be assumed, from Cicero’s argument, that the courts, in their Rupilian form, worked to the benefit of the Sicilian farmers, and formed an internal mechanism of relieving legal disputes in the province that may have been created by abuses of the taxation system. The timing of these reforms, immediately following a major conflict on the island, throughout which King Antiochus aimed to unite the people of eastern Sicily in a kingdom aligned against Rome, is certainly suggestive of a need to correct a problem that had been in place before, and had perhaps caused the Insurrection. Regardless, it is clear that Rupilius saw that there was a problem with the legal system as it stood. As Finley (1968: 126) noted, Rome encouraged, in the eastern Mediterranean, pro-Roman oligarchies, and he considered this to have been a likely practice in Sicily (and certainly the occurrences of Sicilian towns asking Rome to restructure their senates is indicative of this inter-dependence).\footnote{121} If these same rich Sicilians had been colluding with corrupt Roman praetors in this period to abuse the collection of the grain tax, as Verres colluded with tax collectors in his infamous governorship, then it is likely that they used a similar system of legal conniving to that which Verres engaged in so famously. We might then expect an outburst of violence to be directed at these men in the event of a breakdown of social order, which the passage above appears to outline. There is nothing to prevent those involved in this destruction being part of Antiochus’ forces.\footnote{122}

This context provides us with a firm framework to understand King Antiochus’ place in Sicily in this period. We cannot hope to reconstruct any negotiations that took place between Rome and Sicily in the period prior to the conflict, if indeed there were any. If the paradigm presented by Verres’ actions holds true, the praetors in Sicily would not have been sympathetic, and Rome itself had little reason to listen to the Sicilians. If we allowed ourselves to widen our vista through the model provided by the American War of Independence – itself not directly relevant for an understanding of events two millennia earlier, but offering historically plausible ideas and view-points – it seems quite probably that the Sicilians only resorted to physical resistance once it was clear that negotiation would

\footnote{121 See also Rizzo (1980); Prag (2003); Pittia (2005); and Campagna (2006), 21, 32-4, for details of the elite’s role in Hellenistic Sicily.}

\footnote{122 This analysis disagrees with Canfora’s (1985), 60, otherwise excellent discussion of the passage in question on one important point. While Canfora is correct that the passage of Diodorus stresses the fact that the free people running riot were doing so under the πρόφασις of the slaves, this does not preclude their complicity with the rebels: it is merely the interpretation of the text, a text which we will see is constructed in such a way as to create contexts and draw connections for events that are not as accurate as they appear at first view. Canfora does not address, for example, why the text differentiates the two parties, οἱ Σικελίωται and ὁ δημοτικὸς δῆλος, in the manner that it does, nor why there were division in Sicilian society in this period.}
achieve nothing. It is, therefore, significant that one of the two traceable results of the breakdown of communication and order on the island was a typical Greek reaction to conflict: alliance under a Greek monarch, a much more potent form of negotiation. Naturally the cities and people that benefitted from the Roman domination sided with Rome in the conflict, but it is clear from the passage of Diodorus discussed above (34/5.2.48) that large portions of the population of Sicily did not feel this way, and, more importantly, understood who those colluding with Rome were. King Antiochus’ coinage, with its clear Greek legend, proclaiming a Greek monarchy in Sicily, was a direct challenge to Roman authority on the island and those who supported it, in a gesture that is in many ways symbolically similar to the American declaration of independence.

King Antiochus represents the turning point in Republican Sicilian history, and the last effort by the inland cities of Sicily to improve their position. The cities that fought against him and that he subsequently took or attacked – Catana, Tauromenium, Agrigentum and Syracuse\textsuperscript{123} – were all successful under Rome subsequently, while Enna and Morgantina faded as settlements after this. That we do not know more about the disposition of the cities of Sicily in the conflict is a great loss, but this consideration of the wider context of Sicily, further illuminated through comparison with a similar provincial context from another time in history, confirms the conclusions reached from the numismatic evidence in the previous section: Sicily in the mid-second century B.C. was divided by its different stances towards Rome. King Antiochus, rather than being a slave-king, was, instead, a Greek reaction to difficult socio-political and economic circumstances, representing an effort by them to better their position and a testing of the boundaries that Rome was starting to negotiate in Republican Sicily. That, from a Roman perspective, King Antiochus and his people went too far is not in question; and their major crime, in Roman eyes, was their military and political challenge to the Roman supported \textit{status quo} on the island in the form of the Sicilian Insurrection.

\textsuperscript{123} It is possible that King Antiochus’ forces also attacked Syracuse. In a disconnected passage that is dateable to 133 B.C., Diodorus (34/5.9) records that a group of people suffered both in reality and in history because they ate sacred fish. This has been connected to the sacred fish of Arethusa at Syracuse (Bradley (1989), 60, 110), and therefore to the forces of King Antiochus. Given that Diodorus had in book 5 of his \textit{Bibliotheke} promised to record examples of those times when the taboo on eating the sacred fish at Syracuse had been broken, it seems likely that the passage refers to this particular pool: see Malitz (1983), 158 no. 182 and 182; Bradley (1989), 60; Rubincam (1989), 41; Urbainczyk (2008a), 89-90. However, it is unclear who it is eating the fish in the extract, and therefore why they had to do so, and thus it remains impossible to say what caused this anecdote to be recorded, or to say for certain that King Antiochus’ forces did make an attempt on Syracuse.
Conclusion

Sicily, in the mid-second century B.C., was faced with fundamental problems. From corruption among the ruling elite, complicit with the governors placed over the province from Rome, to the annual taxes which were removed from the island it is far from surprising that some of the Sicilians felt the need to negotiate a change in their circumstances. Considered in the context of provincial unease over taxation without representation such as was also the case for the American colonies before the American War of Independence, Sicily’s unrest is completely explicable. Viewed in this light, King Antiochus’ kingdom represented a central moment in the negotiation of power between Rome and the Sicilians, a negotiation that challenged Rome, but ultimately confirmed the trend of a declining Sicilian inland, and a burgeoning, privileged coast – which holds true up to this day. Yet, the textual tradition concerning the Sicilian Insurrection emphasises the role of slavery in the conflict, and does not describe a conflict between two states, but of one state internally divided between slaves and masters. How this apparent disconnect between the literary and numismatic accounts can be resolved is the subject of the following two chapters. There is still a need, it would seem, for a (Bradley 1989: ix) ‘straightforward narrative of the [Sicilian Insurrection], set within [its] immediate context.’
II. Eunus: The Cowardly King

‘It is difficult to say anything definite about the individuals who led the revolts, but we can say that the sources attributed to them all the powers, abilities, wisdom, and cunning that challenges to the status quo had to have in order to succeed.’ Urbanczyk (2008a), 74.

Introduction

We have seen in the previous chapter that King Antiochus went to great lengths to connect his kingdom with the culture and history of Sicily through his coinage. However, the character of King Antiochus – called Eunus in the ancient literary sources – in the way he is presented in Diodorus in many ways contradicts the evidence that came from the kingdom of King Antiochus discussed before. Furthermore, Diodorus’ narrative of events does not correspond with the reconstruction of events in Chapter I. The focus of this chapter is how we can reconcile these two narratives. Owing to the low regard in which Diodorus is held amongst modern scholars, relatively little attention has been paid to his historiographic setting, i.e. his debt to other historians in his narrative of the Sicilian Insurrection in general, and his description of the character of Eunus in particular. When approaching the narrative of the Sicilian Insurrection in Diodorus, modern scholars hastily focus on the historicity of the events related by him. In turn, they underplay other parts of his narrative:

124 A version of part of this chapter has been accepted for publication by Classical Quarterly.
125 A full text of the narrative, together with a translation, is given in Appendix 5: Text and Translation of Diodorus’ Account of the Sicilian Insurrection. The text of Diodorus is not preserved in its original state, but in the epitome of Photius and in the Constantinian excerpts. These two collections differ in the manner in which they preserve Diodorus. Matsubara (1998), 11-7, argued that the Constantinian excerpts are normally verbatim, with changes made: for explanation; to omit information the excerptor was not interested in; through misreading or a different manuscript tradition; and through abbreviations, for a similar reason to omissions. With regard to Photius, Matsubara (1998), 17-29, argued that Photius typically preserves a good summary, with some parts verbatim that were of particular interest, noting in particular the description provided for Eunus (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.5-9). To this I think we can add the following: where it is possible to compare the Constantinian version of a passage to the Photian for both of the so-called Sicilian Slave Wars, the Constantinian version is usually more detailed. In this category we should note: 34/5.2.10 (Photius) vs 34/5.2.34-38 + 24b (Constantinian); 34/5.2.1-3 (Photius) vs 34/5.2.27-31 (Constantinian); 36.2 (Photius) vs 36.2a (Constantinian); 36.6 (Photius) vs 36.11 (Constantinian); and finally 36.9.1 (Photius) vs 36.9.2 (Constantinian). On each occasion that there are parallel accounts of an episode, both will be noted, and their differences discussed.
126 See Appendix 6: Merely a Slavish Copyist? for a discussion of Diodorus’ source for the Sicilian Insurrection.
127 Throughout this chapter I will use the name of Diodorus Siculus to refer to the text of Diodorus and the historical tradition that it represents. I will not be engaging with the Quellenforschung surrounding the Sicilian Insurrection narrative other than where it is essential. For notable contributions on the textual issues see e.g.: Sacks (1990); Matsubara (1998); Green (2006); Hau (2006) and (2009).
they privilege the historical interpretation over a narratological assessment. In contrast to this approach, I will foreground the narrative thread over the historical one in this chapter. By doing so I will show the careful literary construction of the character of Eunus, the purpose of this construction in the narrative, and how the narrative of Diodorus sought to be understood by his ancient readers. This, in turn, will reveal many of the descriptions offered by Diodorus (and used by modern scholars) to write the history of the Sicilian Insurrection as unsuitable for historical reconstruction. The aim of this chapter, then, is to expose the narrative context in which Eunus was created. Only once this is achieved can we begin to use Diodorus’ text in our quest to understand the history of Sicily in the second century B.C.

To this end, it will be necessary, first, to look at the important passages of Diodorus relating to Eunus’ election to, and the conclusion of, his kingship. As we shall presently see, these passages clearly show Diodorus’ conception of Eunus’ (un)suitability for kingship, and therefore reflect more widely on his character and on the rebellion that he led. This analysis will show that Diodorus, by carefully constructing a character for Eunus based on cowardice, military inexperience, and luxurious accoutrements, aimed to undermine the figure of Eunus in his narrative, and thereby undermined the cause for which he fought. These character traits will be shown to be based on stereotypes and literary *topoi* peculiar to the Hellenistic world, and Diodorus’ own *Bibliotheke*. Furthermore, I will show that Eunus’ character was constructed following a circular narrative composition that strove to connect his character with that of his master, Antigones. The analysis will then focus on how Diodorus’ use of terms relating to wonder-working (τερατεύμενος; μάγος) placed another layer of Hellenistic stereotypes onto the character of Eunus in order to further separate his character from a positive model of kingship. This section will also consider how this connection to wonder-working, along with Eunus’ unique position in relation to his master, separated him from his followers, and introduced further questions concerning his suitability to rule. Following this I will discuss how Eunus’ choice of general reflects on his integrity as a king.

---

128 Diodorus had his own expectations of who his audience would be. The following discussion follows Pelling (2000), 15-6, in arguing that ancient authors, like Diodorus, would have constructed the meaning in their narratives from how this imagined audience thought. This is also based on a reader-response form of audience reconstruction (Slater (1990), 5-7) in which the reader imagined has the (Slater (1990), 6) ‘minimum knowledge of linguistic, cultural, and literary background to elicit meaning from the (text)’. Diodorus imagined that his history would inspire the leadership of the ancient world to undertake noble deeds (1.1.5) and also be relevant to those men who were inspired by history to found cities, revise law and push the boundaries of science (1.2.1). He also suggested that his work had benefited from being written in Rome (1.4.2). Moreover, regardless of the authorship, the text, written in Greek, and in particular the narrative under discussion, relied on an implicit understanding of Hellenistic culture and literary *topoi*: this would suggest at the very least literate Greeks but perhaps also Hellenised Romans.
The character of Kleon will be discussed as an example of the ways in which Diodorus was capable of creating a negative character for a military figure, in the clear absence of the relevant qualities in Eunus himself. Finally, a fresh look at the text, considering it as an overtly rhetorical text, will show that Diodorus, consciously or unconsciously, was working his text in a rhetorical fashion and through narratological devices in order to connect with his reader to make a clear point: it is the recognition of authorial intervention and narratological devices in Diodorus that will help to explain the dichotomy between the evidence of Diodorus and the coinage of King Antiochus.

I. King of the ‘Slaves’

I.i. The Coronation

Eunus is introduced into Diodorus’ narrative as (34/5.2.5) τις οἰκέτης Ἀντιγένους Ἐνναίου, Σύρος τὸ γένος ἐκ τῆς Ἀπαμείας,129 ἀνθρωπος μάγος καὶ τερατουργός τὸν τρόπον, ‘…a certain household slave of Antigenes of Enna, a Syrian from Apamea, a magician and wonder-worker in manner’. His reputation in Sicily as a prophet (one who, we shall see, was a charlatan) led to the slaves of Damophilus turning to him to receive consent from the gods for their rebellion (34/5.2.10-1, 24b). At his exhortation they then seized the town of Enna, and in the aftermath proclaimed him king. Modern scholars have seen Eunus’ coronation as a high-point in Diodorus’ characterisation of Eunus; it is in many ways the pivotal moment of Eunus’ career in Diodorus’ narrative of the Sicilian Insurrection. Yet, on closer inspection, the passage defines Eunus’ character and the unlikelihood of his continuing success: it is the lynchpin of his whole relationship to his subjects. After the sack of Enna and the execution of various notable slave-owners, Diodorus relates the following (34/5.2.14):

Then, Eunus was chosen king, and not because of his courage, nor his generalship, but only because of his knowledge of wonders and his setting of the revolt in motion, but also at the same time because his name seemed to hold some favourable omen with regard to the goodwill of his subjects. After the sack of Enna and the execution of various notable slave-owners, Diodorus relates the following (34/5.2.14):

Then, Eunus was chosen king, and not because of his courage, nor his generalship, but only because of his knowledge of wonders and his setting of the revolt in motion, but also at the same time because his name seemed to hold some favourable omen with regard to the goodwill of his subjects.

In the first case, we should note the negative assessment this passage suggests of Eunus’ suitability for kingship. The passage implies that he has neither ἀνδρεία, ‘bravery’, nor

---

129 The formulation of the phrase Σύρος τὸ γένος ἐκ τῆς Ἀπαμείας is similar to those found on manumission inscriptions for slaves at Hellenistic Delphi: see Lewis (2011), 93-8.

---
στρατηγία, ‘generalship’. It seems that Diodorus did not have a high opinion of Eunus’ worth, and in this case it appears that he also judged the critical faculties of the men selecting Eunus to be very poor: he was elected for superficial reasons based on his name, his wonders – I shall return to both later - and the fact that he had incited the revolt. For the moment, we should look more closely at the apparent failings in Eunus’ character, to assess in greater detail not only what Diodorus is saying, but how he is saying it.

It is important to note that the phrasing of this passage is typical for Diodorus, although in this case with an interesting twist: in his history Diodorus consistently used expressions based on the phrase ἀνδρεία τε και στρατηγία to denote the qualities of generals and kings whom he considered to be exceptional leaders. In some variations of the expression ἀνδρεία is replaced with ἄρετή, ‘valour’, or στρατηγία is replaced with στρατηγικός, ‘general-like’. However, the meaning remains essentially the same: ‘brave and a good general’. This expression, in all combinations of ἀνδρεία and ἄρετή with στρατηγία or στρατηγικός, features 28 times throughout the Bibliothèque, and is reserved for such notable men as Herakles (4.53.7), Epameinondas (15.39.2, 88.3), King Philip II of Macedon (16.1.6) and Fabius Cunctator (26.3.3) among others whom Diodorus felt were noteworthy for their military prowess. Furthermore, the wide chronological spread of the uses in the Bibliothèque suggests that this was a favoured expression of Diodorus himself, and not one lifted from his sources. Yet, the use of this phrase for Eunus is the only occasion, out of a total of 28, in which the expression is given in the negative. Notwithstanding the fragmentary nature of Diodorus, it appears that Eunus is rhetorically set up as the antithesis of all the previous leaders described with this phrase. Therefore, we should look more closely at why these two attributes were associated with ‘good’ leaders in order to understand better the choice of an implied negative for Eunus.

We must first consider Hellenistic ideals of kingship, and in particular why bravery and generalship could be picked out by Diodorus as emblematic of a ‘good’ leader. In surviving works on Hellenistic kingship, courage and a warlike ability are often noted as

---

130 It is possible that Eunus’ name was one of the few features over which he had no control: perhaps the name came from his master.

131 Descendants of Scythes (2.43.4); the Dioscuri (6.6.1); Leonidas (11.4.2); the citizens of Athens (11.62.2, 85.2); Geron (11.67.2); Pericles (12.39.3); King Agesilaus (15.31.3); Timotheus (15.36.6); Chabrias (15.69.4); Pelopidas (15.80.1); Dion (16.6.3); Nysius (16.18.1); Diophantes and Lamius (16.48.2); Timoleon (16.65.2); Memnon of Rhodes (17.7.2); Charidemus (17.30.2); Antiphilos (18.13.6); Scipio Africanus (29.20.1); Viriathus (33.21a.1); Cleptius (36.8.1); Sulla (37.25.1).
important. While there were acknowledged limits to this aspect – preferably a king was πολεμικός, yet if he was φιλοπόλεμος this was not desirable (see Philod. On the Good King according to Homer col 9.13-5 and Murray 1965: 169) – it was nonetheless an important aspect of a king’s role and character.132 The election, or acclamation of a king in the Hellenistic period, like the episode including Eunus above, was directly linked to the ideology of how a king was meant to behave. From authors as early as Xenophon it is possible to trace the development of this ideology, and its component parts.

For Xenophon a good leader was one who achieved excellence through unremitting effort (Memorabilia 2.1.212-34; noted by Beston 2000: 317), and in his Cyropaedia he contrasted this quality in Cyrus with the attitude of Cyaxares, who often counselled the less brave or adventurous tactic (see Cyr. 1.3.20-3; 2.1.1-9, 4.13; 3.3.13-20, 46-7). This idea was maintained in Xenophon’s opinion that men desert pathetic figures when presented with a better alternative: for example in the Cyropaedia, when the Medes, given a choice between following their king, Cyaxares, or following Cyrus, the superior man, chose to obey Cyrus, thereby breaking from their own king (5.1.24-6). In other authors this same idea is expressed, notably in Polybius (5.40.1-2) and in Diodorus (33.22.1). Austin (1986: 457) showed that kings were often proclaimed after military victories: see, for example, Alexander the Great after the battle of Gaugamela (Plut. Alex. 34); Demetrius Poliorcetes after his victories in Cyprus against Ptolemy (Plut. Dem. 18; c.f. Diod. Sic. 20.53.1-4); Attalus after his success against Antiochus and the Galatians (Poly. 18.41), to name a few.133 Since this aura of success was directly tied to the kings, the link was maintained because an unsuccessful king could quickly become an object of contempt, and therefore vulnerable (Austin 1986: 458-9).134 It was also important to the soldiers that they profited from their Hellenistic monarch’s

132 The king’s ability to gain ‘spear-won territory’ could often be considered their strongest right to rule: for example, according to Polybius (11.34.15-6) this was the method by which Antiochus III became considered worthy of his throne; Theocritus (Id. 17.90-4, 98-103) expresses a similar ideology concerning Ptolemy II Philadelphus. For further discussion of this, see: Barner (1889), 16-7; Born (1934), 22-3; Goodenough (1928), 66, 70; Schubart (1937), 5; Walbank (1984), 66, 82-3. See also Cairns (1989), 19-20, for further bibliography.
133 Bradley (1989), 117, noted that the acclamation of Eunus was typically Hellenistic; see also Vogt (1965), 29-30.
134 This ideology is most famously presented in the Suda lexicon, which outlined the basis of monarchical power as an ability to command an army, and to handle affairs sensibly (s.v. Βασιλεία (2)): Βασιλεία. Οὔτε φόρος οὔτε τό δίκαιον ἀποδοθεῖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς βασιλείας, ἀλλὰ τοῖς δυναμένοις ἐγείρθη στρατευτέου καὶ χειρίζοντα πράγματα νοοῦντος· οἶ δὲ Φιλίππος καὶ οἱ διάδοχοι Αλεξάνδρου. Τόν γὰρ υἱόν κατὰ φύσιν οἰδέν ὠφελήσει ἡ συσχέτωσιν διὰ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀδυναμίαν, τὸν δὲ μηδὲν προσήκοντας βασιλέως γενέσθαι σχεδὸν ἀπάντως τῆς οἰκουμένης. Basileia. Neither birth nor lawful claim yield kingship to men, but to those who are able to command an army and to handle affairs sensibly: just as it was for Philip and the Successors of Alexander. For kinship through birth did not help his son because of his poverty of spirit, while those by no means related to him became kings of almost the whole inhabited world.
success: without that, they could be quick to turn on their king, as was the case with Demetrius (Plut. *Demetr.* 42.1-6; 44.8; see also Bosworth 2002: 258). Indeed, failure as a military leader was enough to castigate a king as unmanly and feminine. The account of King Prusias preserved in Polybius gives a clear example of this form of denigration (32.15.9):

| ἀνδρὸς μὲν γάρ (ἔργον) οὐδὲν ἐπιτελεσάμενος κατὰ τὰς πρὸς βολὰς, ἄγεννός δὲ καὶ γυναικοθῆμως χειρίσας καὶ τὰ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ τὰ πρὸς ἄνθρωποις μετήγαγε τὸ στράτευμα πρὸς Ἑλαίαν |

After doing nothing worthy of a man in his attacks on the town, but behaving in a cowardly and womanish manner both to the gods and men, he marched his army back to Elaia.

The military sphere was a distinctly masculine one in antiquity (Beston 2000: 316-7), thus a complete failure in the military sphere was connected to effeminate tendencies (Poly. 28.21.3). As a corollary to this idea was the wider idea that leaders ought to focus on matters of administration and the military at the expense of all other considerations. Several anecdotes from the ancient world preserve this idea: for example, Polybius recorded that Philopoemen censured the Achaean *strategoi* for their concern over their retinues and dress, claiming that they would be better to focus on their arms and armour (11.8-9).\(^{135}\) He noted, moreover, that Philopoemen’s admonishment and example was so firm that all the *strategoi* followed his advice immediately and even went out of their way to correct others who had not heard Philopoemen’s advice. Plutarch commented that Pyrrhus, in a similar vein, focussed so much on the art of generalship that, when asked at a drinking-party his opinion on the relative merits of two flute players, he responded by stating that Polyperchon was a good general: Plutarch commented that this implied that Pyrrhus meant that a king ought to care only about these matters (*Pyrr.* 8.3). In his letter to Philocrates, Aristeas stated that a king ought to focus only on forethought and care for his subjects (245), and spend time studying the records of his kingdom to ensure good rule (283).\(^{136}\) Diodorus’ account of Viriathus also reflects these concerns, especially in Viriathus’ disdain for the wedding gifts offered him, and his preference for self-sufficiency, open-country, and the eminence won through *ἀνδρεία*, ‘bravery’ (33.7.1-4).

---

\(^{135}\) Champion (2004), 150, commented that this was typical of the characterisation of Philopoemen in Polybius, in which he ‘exhibited self-restraint in his private life and dress and self control in money matters’.

\(^{136}\) For a discussion of this text see Murray (1967), and for these passages see especially 357. See also Cairns (1989), 15 and 20.
Diodorus’ use of the phrase ἀνδρεία τε καὶ στρατηγία as a ‘catch-all’ definition of a good leader is in accord with the described Hellenistic attitudes about kingship: for Diodorus the best leaders were brave in battle and had a knowledge of strategy. It hardly needs to be added that a brave leader was not effeminate or luxurious.

We should now return to Eunus, the ‘slave’ king. I noted above that Diodorus’ choice of vocabulary when describing Eunus’ acclamation – which followed a very minor success – suggested that he was setting Eunus up in opposition to ‘good’ leaders. The outline of Hellenistic literature on kingship has clarified this contrast: Diodorus clearly describes Eunus’ acclamation as taking place for the wrong reasons, and implies that Eunus was the inverse of what a Hellenistic king should be.137 We should now pursue this recognition through the rest of Diodorus’ narrative, after a final comment. In terms of the narrative, and especially in terms of Eunus’ own career, his acclamation was the apex of everything that had gone before. During Diodorus’ introduction of his character, we learn that Eunus predicted his own rise to kingship (34/5.2.7-9; although not, as will become clear, through true prophetic ability), and Diodorus, by describing Eunus’ crowning achievement as he does, directly downplays Eunus’ success: the description of Eunus’ acclamation was composed intentionally with the literary objective of characterising Eunus negatively.138 Furthermore, Diodorus achieved this denigration through appeal to Hellenistic ideals of kingship, and so connected Eunus to a wider contemporary ideology, with all the salient links involved in this. In spite of the very real success of the leader of the Sicilian forces in the Sicilian Insurrection for a number of years (as discussed in the previous chapter on King Antiochus), Diodorus continues to under-cut actions of the character he calls Eunus throughout his narrative, thereby negating his success, and turning any Hellenistic reader against him. It is to these various negations of Eunus’ achievements we now turn, in order to assess by what literary means they were achieved, as well as to explore Diodorus’ intentions.

137 For Dumont (1987), 207, Eunus was ‘la parodie d’un vrai roi’.
138 This description of Eunus’ acclamation as king has not been commented on in the past: Green (1961), 14, does not discuss how Diodorus describes Eunus’ acclamation, nor does Goldsberry (1973), 243; Vogt (1965), 29-30, discusses the institutions built up around Eunus after his election, but not why he was chosen, beyond Eunus’ name. The following do not mention the reasons for Eunus’ election: Manganaro (1967; 1980; 1982; 1983; 1990a; 1990b); Forte (1972), 100-1; Bradley (1989), 58-9, 116-20; Callahan and Horsley (1998), 146. Wirth (2004), 284, and (2006), 125-6, does not go beyond a straight interpretation of Diodorus’ text; Kunz (2006), 336, ignores the negatives in Eunus’ acclamation; finally Urbainczyk (2008a), 55-6, does at least acknowledge Diodorus’ attack on Eunus’ credentials, but fails to follow up on the terms in which the attack was mounted.
II. An Ignoble End

From his apex, we turn first to Eunus’ downfall. The narrative of it is compressed – 34/5.2.20-3; the climax of the war, and the subsequent capture and death of Eunus, is preserved only in Photius – but it is clear that Eunus’ demise came at the very end of the revolt, and completed Diodorus’ narrative of the war. After the town of Enna was retaken by the Romans, Diodorus gives the following account (34/5.2.22-3):

> ὦ δὲ Εὖνος ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς σωματοφύλακας ὑπάλληλοις ἐκείνοις ἐπεφυγεν ἀνάνδρος εἰς τινάς παρακρήμνους τόπους. ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μέν σὺν αὐτῷ ἄρισκτον τὸ περὶ αὐτῶς δεινῶν ἐπιστάμενοι, ἡδὴ γὰρ καὶ ὁ στρατηγὸς Ῥουπίλιος ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἠλαυνεν. ἀλλήλους τοῖς ἐξίσους ἐφθαζον ἀπαγχοῦσιν. ὦ δὲ τερατικὰς Εὖνος καὶ βασιλεῖς καταρφυγὸν διὰ δειλίαν ἐν τισι κοιλᾶν ἐξελκότηθη ἁμα τετάρτῳν, μαγείρῳ καὶ ἀρτοποιῷ καὶ τοῦ τριβόντος αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ λουτρῷ και τετάρτῳ τοῦ παρὰ τοὺς πότους εἰσώθος ψυχεωσεν αὐτὸν. καὶ παραδοθεὶς εἰς φυλακὰν καὶ τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ διαλυθέντος εἰς φθειρὸν πλήθος οἰκεῖος τῆς περὶ αὐτὸν ραδίουργίας κατέστρεψε τὸν βιόν ἐν τῇ Μοργαντίνῃ.

Eunus, taking up a bodyguard of a thousand men, fled in an unmanly fashion to certain precipitous regions. But those with him, knowing that the danger around them was inescapable, for already the general Rupilius was hastening towards them, took the initiative by beheading one another with swords: however Eunus, the wonder-worker and king, having through cowardice fled for refuge in certain caves, was dragged out together with four men, a cook, a baker, the man who massaged him in the bath and a fourth, who had been accustomed, throughout the drinking bouts, to beguiling him. Transmitted to prison, and after his flesh had dissolved into a mass of lice, he ended his life in a way worthy of his knavery, in Morgantina.

There are several aspects of this passage that warrant attention for present purposes.

II.i. Cowardice

Diodorus describes Eunus’ flight as ἀνάνδρος, ‘in an unmanly fashion’, and relates that he fled to the caves διὰ δειλίαν, ‘through cowardice’. This is in keeping with the way Diodorus portrays Eunus’ acclamation as king. Unlike in his acclamation, in which he was contrasted implicitly with ‘good’ leaders for his potential lack of bravery and generalship, Eunus’ behaviour is explicitly contrasted with that of his followers. Therefore, while he fled through cowardice, they bravely took their own lives. This is a damning indictment on Eunus: not only did he take the coward’s way, but his men refused to fight for him. Their actions

---

139 Noted by Urbainczyk (2008a), 55, with no further comment. Oddly, Wirth (2004), 282-3, and (2006), 126-7, consistently argued for a positive interpretation of Eunus’ demise, arguing that Eunus was spared (2006), 127, ‘ein grausamer Tod’, and furthermore (2004), 283, that his death by psoriasis could be seen as a form of martyrdom. This is entirely at odds with how Diodorus himself views Eunus’ end, and in this case we must privilege the ancient context of the comments over any modern reinterpretation of psoriasis or a cowardly end (for ancient uses of psoriasis, or similar diseases in the accounts of ancient figures’ deaths, see below).
mirror those of other soldiers of Hellenistic monarchs, who abandoned their leader because of flaws in their leader’s character: faced with a choice of dying fighting for their king and death by their own hands, they chose the latter.

The portrayal of a leader as a coward was exploited for propagandistic purposes by other ancient authors as well. Plutarch (Aem. 19.3-10) contrasted the two differing accounts of King Perseus’ withdrawal from the battle of Pydna, one from Polybius (29.18) and the other from Posidonius: the former argued that Perseus withdrew through cowardice at the start of the battle, while the latter argued that it was through injury late in the battle. Both Chaniotis (2005: 219-20) and Walbank (1979: 390) thought that Polybius described this episode as he did to strengthen his pro-Roman bias. For present purposes it is notable that Polybius’ version used cowardice as a method of denigrating Perseus.

Furthermore, for a king the manner of death was significant. Diodorus characterises Eunus’ death as οἰκείως τῆς περὶ αὐτὸν ῥᾳδιουργίας, ‘worthy of his knavery’.140 He died, it has been argued, from scabies,141 and the manner of his death is an interesting feature of this passage. Urbainczyk (2008a: 55 no. 20) noted that Antiochus IV Epiphanes was described as dying in a similar fashion according to 2 Maccabees 9:5, 8-10, albeit infested with worms. In the narrative Antiochus IV is a monstrous enemy of the Jews, and his death is described as a divine punishment. Similarly, Plutarch (Sul. 36) linked Sulla’s death from a disease like that of Eunus to his excessive lifestyle after he retired from public life; also Pheretime in Herodotus (4.205), who is described as dying from a festering body as divine punishment for her way of life. Finally, Herod Antipater is described as dying having been eaten up by worms (Acts 12.23). This particular form of decay, either by lice or by worms, was attributed to people who were the object of hostile narrative treatment.

II.i. The Companions

There is more to Eunus’ negative characterisation in this passage than just cowardice: Eunus’ companions on his capture also deserve attention. We learn that he had only four attendants left when he was dragged out of his cave: a cook (μαγείρος); a baker (ἄρτοποιός); a masseuse

140 Not the death at the head of any army, as was preferable for a Hellenistic monarch: see e.g. Poly. 18.41; Chaniotis (2005), 60-1; Landucci Gattinoni (1990). Dumont (1987), 206, described Eunus’ death as ‘la mort ignominieuse’.
141 Keaveney and Madden (1982), 94.
(τριβον); and a drinking party entertainer. Eunus was thus depicted as a degenerate monarch (Grünewald 2004: 61), and therefore is contrasted directly with his former guards: no military figure was left with him, only creators of luxury. In other words, these four companions serve to intensify the accusations of Eunus’ cowardice in his flight with further suggestions of excessive luxury in his lifestyle.\(^{142}\) Again, this contrasts with the prevalent model in Greek thought that a ‘good’ leader refused luxuries and excesses, as I demonstrated above. Indeed, some Hellenistic authors singled out leisure and the dining companions of a king as an important subject.\(^{143}\) Moreover, Xenophon noted in his *Oeconomikos* that it was necessary to exercise control over yourself before you can rule others (12.9-14).\(^{144}\) The focus on luxury in the roles of the attendants is also reminiscent of Theopompus of Chios’ criticisms of Philip’s court, which he accused of engaging in excessive drinking and extravagance (Athen. 166f-167c and 260d-261a; see also Flower 1994: 104-11). The focus on luxury in his demise is clearly designed to complement Eunus’ characterisation as a cowardly and unworthy Hellenistic king. Moreover, as we shall see in what follows, the language of the passage concerning the fourth attendant, the entertainer, is related directly to the introduction of Eunus himself in the narrative in a manner that suggests that the construction of the narrative of Eunus’ death was serving a very specific purpose in the overall story of the revolt.

**II.iii. From Beguiler to Beguiled**

The fourth attendant is described as (34/5.2.22) τετάρτου τοῦ παρὰ τούς πότους εἰωθότος ψυχαγωγεῖν αὐτόν, ‘a fourth, who had been accustomed, throughout the drinking bouts, to beguiling (Eunus)’. The verb used, ψυχαγωγέω, meaning ‘to beguile’ in this context, echoes Eunus’ introduction into the narrative. In this introduction Diodorus gave a lengthy aside on Eunus’ history prior to his involvement in the rebellion. The passage contains more important facets of his character which further demonstrate his unsuitability for kingship, but we will focus on another aspect of it, in which Diodorus describes Eunus’ relationship with his master (34/5.2.7-8):

\(^{142}\) Bradley (1989), 117, suggests that the hostility of the narrative towards the slaves at this point hides a typical institution of Hellenistic monarchs, the *philoi*, and that the four attendants were perhaps re-labelled by Diodorus to denigrate them, following typical ‘Greek contempt’ for *philoi* (quotation from Bradley (1989), 117; see also Herman (1980-1), 117-24.

\(^{143}\) See, e.g., Aristea’s advice that a king ought to attend only restrained theatrical shows (ad Phil. 284), and receive only learned men in his symposia (ad Phil. 286). For modern discussions of this subject see Goodenough (1928), 69-70, 87-9 and 95; Schubart (1937), 6; Murray (1967), 356; Cairns (1989), 19-20.

\(^{144}\) For similar comments see also: Xen. *Mem.* 1.5.1-5; Pl. *Grg.* 527D; Isoc. *To Nicocles* 29 and *Nicocles* 39
The outline of the passage is clear. Eunus’ master, Antigenes, was rather taken with his slave’s outspoken claims, and made him into a dinner entertainer; he was so successful that he was able to extract extra food from his master’s guests.145 However, the verb describing Antigenes’ relationship to Eunus (ψυχαγωγός) is used in exactly the same way as in the previous passage: Antigenes was beguiled by Eunus.146 Interestingly, this verb is the same as that used by Polybius in his discussion of ‘tragic historians’ at 2.56.10 to describe the aim of the ‘tragic historian’.147 Diodorus used the verb ψυχαγωγέω, along with the noun ψυχαγωγία in a variety of ways. The basic use of the words as ‘to please’ and ‘pleasure’ in a neutral sense are found seven times (1.91.7; 2.8.7, 10.5, 53.6; 3.50.1; 4.4.3; 16.52.4) and are typically placed in the ‘mythological’ sections of his work. The negative use of the verb to mean ‘to beguile’ or ‘to seduce’ is found six times (1.76.2; 20.77.2; 26.17.1; 30.6.1; 31.14.1; 32.9b.1; this list is not inclusive of the two uses described in the main text concerning Eunus) and is generally used of leaders or peoples that are negatively described in the narrative: e.g. the

145 Eunus’ unusual relationship with his master, in regard to his position as an entertainer and acquisition of additional food, is regularly commented on, although the language used, discussed below, has not been: see Green (1961), 11-2; Vogt (1965), 25-6; Dumont (1987), 224; Bradley (1989), 114; Urbainczyk (2008a), 55.

146 The verb ψυχαγωγέω is used by Diodorus in the context of dinner parties three times in his history. Two occasions involve Eunus, and the final occasion involves the Icthyophagi (3.17.1) whom Diodorus describes as ψυχαγωγοῦντες ‘entertaining’ one another. In this context the verb is clearly being used neutrally, whereas I would argue that this is not the case with Eunus. Therefore, the use of this verb depends upon the context of the passage in which it is used.

147 The bibliography on ‘tragic historians’ is too great to give here, as is the debate concerning how best to understand ‘tragic history’, but for a seminal work on the origins of ‘tragic history’ see Walbank (1960). Also see Zeger (1959); Meister (1975), 109-11; Sacks (1977), 144-6; Seibert (1983), 15-7; Richter (1987), 38-41; Marasco (1988), 48-67; Rebenich (1997), 267-9; and Marincola (2010), 445-60.
Campanians are described as ψυχαγωγο/μενοι, ‘deluding themselves’, about their relationship with Hannibal, and therefore they sided with him against Rome (see 26.17.1). The relationship between the passage describing Eunus’ beguilement of his master and his own death is clear, and suggests an effort at ring composition in the construction of Eunus’ character. For example, Eunus’ beguilement of his own master took place in the context of dinner parties, while his servant (34/5.2.22) παρά τούς πότους ειοθότος ψυχαγωγεῖν αὐτόν, ‘had been accustomed, throughout the drinking bouts, to beguiling (Eunus)’ (my emphasis). While the context is not identical, the implication of luxury is there in both passages, and the link must be intentional. The inference from this internal allusion is that Diodorus links Eunus to his own master and creates a circle in Eunus’ personal narrative: he has gone from the beguiler of a foolish master to the beguiled himself (and by logical association, foolish as well). It also suggests that Diodorus’ intention was to portray Eunus, in spite of his status as the leader of a revolt against the actions and mistreatments of harsh masters, as no better than the same men he had risen up against: in a sense, Eunus became his master, who, we must not forget, Eunus had put to death during the uprising (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.15). Owing to the state of Diodorus’ narrative we can only hint at the full inter-relationship between Eunus and Antigenes, but I suggest that this allusion demonstrates the effort to create a convincing literary account of Eunus’ character, which, through certain careful applications of vocabulary, had a clear purpose in mind: to turn the reader against him, but also to create a circular narrative that is clearly a piece of literary stylisation (as opposed to one of historical reality).

We have seen that the character of Eunus in the narrative of Diodorus, specifically relating to his role as king, is made up of cowardice, military inexperience and luxurious

---

148 Twice the verb is used in its original meaning, or in a neutral sense (4.7.4 – Melpomenē ‘charmed the souls of her listeners’; 4.25.4 – Orpheus ‘entranced’ Persephone). On three occasions the use of the verb and noun exactly mirrors the usage of Polybius in his attack on Phylarchus (Poly. 2.56.3-13): on these occasions Diodorus described either why he had included material in his history (32.12.1: Diodorus explains that he includes stories about shifts of sex οὖ ψυχαγωγίας ἄλλη ὀφελείας…τῶν ἀναγωγευκότων ‘not for the entertainment but the improvement…of our readers’) or used the noun to criticise other authors for using invention of fact for the ψυχαγωγίας ‘pleasure’ of their readers, a technique he claimed he would not follow (1.69.7: 3.11.1). The context determined the intended meaning. See also Meijering (1987), 5-12, for a discussion of the changing meaning of ψυχαγωγία in Greek literature.

149 A slave? The matter is not specified by Diodorus but it is interesting to note that Eunus was still served by his compatriots.

150 This reference to πότου ‘drinking bouts’ also echoes the criticisms of Philip voiced by Theopompos regarding his habit of engaging in drinking bouts (Athen. 10.435b-c), which was a sign of his intemperance, and an aspect of his inability to carefully manage his kingdom’s finances: see also Flower, (1994), 104-8.
tendencies, described in terms that were consistent with Diodorus’ own conception of (bad) Hellenistic leadership as well as wider ideas about Hellenistic kingship. Furthermore we have seen that Diodorus made explicit links between Eunus and his master Antigones, creating a comparison between the two and thus completing Eunus’ character arc that ended with his own assumption of the role that his master had filled in the narrative. It is also important to note that this portrayal of Eunus – in spite of the fragmentary and compressed nature of the source that does not give the full picture of his development – is consistent throughout his rise to power and his subsequent demise. There is only one other aspect directly related to Eunus’ character to consider, and that is Diodorus’ insistent references to wonder-working when introducing Eunus, and, subsequently, on his rise to kingship.

III. Τερατεία and τερατευόμενος

As already seen, Diodorus’ introduction of Eunus includes a lengthy aside on his actions prior to the start of the revolt. This episode, of which I have already discussed the second half, contains an important aspect of Diodorus’ representation of Eunus: his pretensions to wonder-working. Before relating Eunus’ relationship with his master, Diodorus relates the following (34/5.2.5-8):

There was a certain household slave of Antigones of Enna, a Syrian from Apamea, a magician and wonder-worker in manner. This man claimed by divine commands to foretell the future through dreams and because of his talent in this direction he fooled many. Progressing from there, he did not simply prophesy from dreams, but even while awake he pretended to see gods and to hear from them.
the future. Of the many stories that he invented, some, by chance, turned out to be true, and since those that did not come to pass were questioned by no-one, while those that did happen were acclaimed, the reputation of this man grew. Finally, through some contrivance, in the midst of some frenzy, he produced fire and flames from his mouth, and thus foretold the future. For he would place into a nut, or something such as this, that was pierced on both sides, fire and fuel to maintain it: then placing it in his mouth and blowing kindled either sparks or flame. Before the revolt this man used to say that the Syrian goddess showed herself to him saying that he would be King: and he kept repeating this not only to others, but also to his own master. When the matter became something of a joke, Antigenes, beguiled by his knowledge of wonders, would bring Eunus into his banquets (for this was the wonder-worker’s name) and continually ask about his kingdom and how he would treat each of those present: and since he explained everything without hesitation, explaining how moderately he would treat the masters, and in general talked in a colourful manner about wonders, laughter erupted among the guests, and some of them, lifting remarkable portions from the table gave them to him as gifts, saying as they did so that whenever he became King he should remember the favour.

There is a definite consistency in how Eunus is described. In the first line Eunus is described as a μάγος καὶ τερατουργός, 'magician and wonder-worker'. However, Diodorus does not allow Eunus’ status as a μάγος καὶ τερατουργός to appear legitimate. Immediately afterwards, Diodorus clarifies the situation: Eunus προσέποιησε…προλέξεων τὰ μέλλοντα, ‘claimed…to foretell the future’;152 but there is no real prophecy taking place. We soon learn that Eunus went on to pretend (ὑποκρίνετο)153 that he saw gods. The language chosen here is specific. In spite of his claims to the contrary, Eunus’ actions are always described strictly in terms of creative impulse, not divine inspiration.154 However, these claims, despite their fraudulent nature (as highlighted by Diodorus), gained Eunus considerable fame. This led to his position as entertainer at his master’s dinner parties (34/5.2.8) and, ultimately, to his election as king. When Eunus was elected king, Diodorus remarked that it was principally because of his wonder-working (τερατεία), a point to which I will return. Throughout the passage quoted above (34/5.2.5-8), Diodorus consistently uses words based on this concept of ‘wonders’ (τερατα: for example see 34/5.2.5 for τερατουργός; or 34/5.2.8 for τερατεία and τερατόσωμαι). In keeping with Diodorus’ description of Eunus’ character in other respects, the description of Eunus’ reputation as a wonder-worker remains uniform. However, it is important to enquire if, as with his portrayal of Eunus as possessing neither ἄνδρεια nor

151 It is possible that the details regarding Eunus’ relationship with Atargatis reflect a form of perverted hero tradition, such as those attributed to Scipio Africanus and others. In this case, Diodorus’ narrative leaves little room for doubting the falsity of this tradition: on this type of tradition see Walbank (1967), 54-69.
152 See Chapter V for a discussion of the verbal links to the description of Athenion here (Diod. Sic. 36.5.3).
153 The choice of ὑποκρίνετο to describe Eunus’ actions is important. The verb’s strong connections to acting on stage and exaggeration stress that Eunus’ pretence was intentional, further damning his duplicity.
154 The sole Latin text to record anything significant about Eunus repeats this tradition concerning him. Florus (2.7.4) describes him as a ‘(s)yrus quidam nomine Eunus – magnitudo cladium facit, ut meminerimus – fanatico furore simulato, dum Syriae deae comas iactat…’, ‘certain Syrian named Eunus - the seriousness of our defeats causes his name to be remembered - counterfeiting an inspired frenzy and waving his dishevelled hair in honour of the Syrian goddess…’ As with Diodorus, Florus is explicit that Eunus’ frenzy is counterfeited.
στρατηγία, Diodorus is again linking his portrayal of Eunus to general stereotypes, and if this portrayal has an even deeper pejorative sense than that suggested by its surface appearance.

Ill.i. The Connotations of τερατεία and τερατευόμενος

The negative connotations of the words τερατεία and τερατευόμενος can be found earlier than Diodorus in Polybius and his descriptions of other authors’ techniques.155 The word is consistently used to describe a style of history that focussed more on sensationalism than historical ‘fact’: at 2.56.10 Polybius describes how ‘tragic’ historians like Phylarchus would describe their history τερατευόμενον, ‘sensationally’; at 2.58.12, once again attacking Phylarchus, Polybius states that Phylarchus included excessive detail and invented outrages that took place at the sack of Mantinea purely for the sake of τερατείας, ‘sensationalism’; finally, at 7.7.1, Polybius asserts that other historians (not named), when describing the fall of Hieronymus of Syracuse, introduced πολλὴν...τερατείαν, ‘much sensationalism’. In Polybius, in the historiographical context, τερατεία and τερατευόμενος were both linked to ψεύδος, ‘falsehood’ in history (e.g. 2.58.12),156 and, as I argued above, Diodorus makes it quite clear that Eunus’ τερατεία were false; although he does not use the word ψεύδος he does seem to be working from the same concept of τερατεία as does Polybius.157 Returning to Diodorus’ Bibliotheca in general, in two places (3.36.2; 6.1.3) he uses the adjective τερατώδης, ‘monstrous’, to describe stories told about gods that he felt were invented; indeed in the latter case he states explicitly that the writers of myth πεπλεκασαν, ‘invented’, the monstrous tales. He also used the verb τερατολογέω, ‘to tell of marvels’, twice (1.63.8; 4.53.7) to criticise first

155 The Suda lexicon provides two separate explanations of τερατεία and τερατευόμενος, two words (noun and verb) used to describe Eunus and his actions (Suda s.v. Τερατευόμενος and Τερατεία): 
Τερατευόμενος. ψευδόμενος, και μηδὲν ἀληθῆς μηδὲν ψεύτης λέγων. τερατευόμενοι καὶ κομπάζοντες, ὡς εἰς πολλὰ εἶπ χρήσιμος ἢ τοῦ τόπου κατάληψις. ‘Terateuomenos – one who deceives, and speaks nothing true or sound. Wonder workers bragging that not giving the point can be useful in all things.’
Τερατεία. ψευδολογία. παραδοξολογία. τοὺς ὑπὸ τοῦ τερατευόμενον καὶ γοητόν παρὰ ἴσον ὀπιούχον καὶ δαιμόνων ἀποπομπῆς. ‘Terateia – a falsehood, a tale of wonder. [Used] by wonder workers and sorcerers for spells and averting ghosts.’

The texts of these entries are quite difficult to understand, as they are very compressed. However, it should immediately be apparent that the understanding of both terms given in the Suda contains negative connotations: specifically the underlying assumption is one of deception and trickery, and legitimacy is not accorded to the one so labelled. These connotations tally well with the impression given in Diodorus of an implicit distrust in the kind of ‘wonder working’ engaged in by Eunus. For example, it is notable that in the case of τερατεία the idea of falsehoods is also linked to sorcerers (γοητεῖς), and in the narrative of Diodorus Eunus is linked to another related descriptive term in his introduction: magician (μάγος).

156 Mohm (1977), 108-16, argued that τάρατα are without value because they contained falsehood.
157 For a discussion of the meaning of τερατεία in Polybius in relation to sensationalism and critique of other historians, see Marincola (2001), 135, and (2010), 453-4. Regarding Polybius’ critique of other historians, see also Walbank (1972), 34-40; Rebenich (1997), 265-6, 281 and 285.
the Egyptians for creating sensational tales of the pyramids, and in the latter passage the tales told by the poets about Herakles, which he felt were inaccurate. Nonetheless, these are the only surviving passages of Diodorus’ *Bibliotheke* to use the vocabulary in this manner.\(^{158}\) I do not want to speculate on the origin of the terminology used to describe Eunus in this passage – and in any case the answer may well be unattainable; but it is enough to note that Polybius, just like the *Suda*,\(^ {159}\) provides a persuasive framework for the proposed interpretation of Diodorus: Eunus’ description is linked to a mode of behaviour stereotyped as deceptive and false. At this point it is worthwhile investigating Greek ideas of ‘magic’ and ‘magic-workers’ to see how the connotations inherent in these concepts inform our interpretation of Eunus’ character.

---

\(^{158}\) Vocabulary linked to τέρατα features sporadically throughout the *Bibliotheke*. The noun τέρατα appears 5 times (2.29.3; 4.6.5; 4.77.4; 32.12.1; 32.12.3) and consistently refers to either portents or monsters of some kind. Τερατός, ‘prodigious’ or ‘monstrous’, appears one further time (4.47.3) to describe a monstrous tale, but with no clear pejorative meaning. The adverbial form is used once (1.26.6), and the noun τερατεύμα walks out with the narrative of Eunus, only two more times (4.51.3; 4.56.1), although in the latter case it does appear to be being used in a manner similar to Polybius’ criticisms of Phylarchus.\(^ {159}\) See note 155 above.

\(^{160}\) The term μάγος originally meant a Median priest (Nock (1972), 309), but during the archaic period it came to mean a fraudulent magician; Nock (1972), 323-4; Gordon (1999), 99, 104; Dickie (2001), 14-5; Janowitz (2001), 9. According to the *Suda* s.v. Γοητευμάτως, a γόης designated a magician who summoned up corpses. Modern scholars trace the term γόης to one who used lamentations in summoning the dead: see Johnston (1999), 103. Chantraine (1968), s.v. goao defines γόης by their use of cries and incantations; see also Dickie (2001), 14. Φαρμακεύς is related to the use of drugs or poisons, although quickly lost this association; Dickie (2001), 14.

\(^{161}\) See Nock (1972), 323-4, and Dickie (2001), 13-6. In the case of Eunus, the focus in the modern literature has, without exception, been on his status as a μάγος in order to understand how Diodorus was characterising him, with no attention given to the other vocabulary highlighted here: see Toynbee (1965), 405; Finley (1968), 140; Vogt (1965), 40-3; Yavetz (1988), 8; Bradley (1989), 55-7, 113-4; Callahan and Horsley (1998), 147; Shaw (2001), 12; Wirth (2004), 282, and (2006), 126; Urbainczyk (2008a), 52. Kunz (2006), 338-41, argued that Diodorus (whom she refers to as Posidonius) denounced only the magic and prophetic powers of Eunus, but not his choice of religious calling. All these authors take great pains to demonstrate the validity of Diodorus’ characterisation, without identifying if Diodorus was connecting his description to already existing stereotypes.
be based on falsehoods, carried certain expectations of trickery. Furthermore, in the Roman mind, foreign peoples and their religions were often associated with witchcraft, and different regions held different expectations of their specific craft. Holy men and ‘magicians’ from the east of the Mediterranean were typically understood, in both the Greek and the Roman worlds, to be skilled in prophecy, provided their prophetic abilities were not used to enhance their own authority: in this case they were considered lowly magicians (Dickie 2001: 112). Furthermore, the Romans believed, at least in the first century B.C., that the religious observances of the μάγοι in Persia were suspect (Graf 1996: 37-8; Catull. 90); in Roman literature there were also clear distinctions between Roman ‘state’ religious practices, which were acceptable, and magical rites of a foreign and dangerous nature (Dench 1995: 167). In Greek and Roman literate society of the mid-first century B.C. there was a clear opinion that the dubious magical practices of other religions and those of ‘magicians’ were aiming to alter the course of nature and were implicitly wrong (Dickie 2001: 137-41). This led to the use of the terms μάγος and γόης for stigmatising ‘socially deviant, and therefore undesirable, views and behaviour’ (Flintermann 1995: 67). However, in spite of clear prejudices against these magical practitioners, some were very successful: for example, Simon Magus from the Acts of Peter, or Alexander the False Prophet from Lucian’s Alexander. When looked at from this perspective, even Jesus could be considered to have been one of the most successful charlatan magicians. However, my main point is not that these men could be successful, but that the purpose of the terminology used to describe them was consistently negative.

---

162 Dickie (2001), 75-6, noted that Herodotus called the Neuroi γόητες for their claims to change into wolves, because he thought their claims to be false, and not because he believed they did magic.

163 The Marsi were characterised as having the ability to charm snakes in various literary sources from as early as the second century B.C. through to the first century A.D.; see Dench (1995), 159-66. These powers were also associated with certain parts of North Africa; see Gibson (2006), 221.

164 I do not think it is surprising that the word chosen for Eunus was μάγος given his supposed origins from Syria; see Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.5.

165 This is not to deny that Roman religion was in regular interaction with ‘foreign’ cults or practices, many of which became incorporated into Roman religious practice: see e.g. North (1976), 8-11; Beard (1985); North (2000), 54-7. Roman religion was not, of course, completely open, and in many respects after the third century B.C. became much more closed to outside influences (North (1976), 8), and in cases could be vehemently opposed to certain cultic practices, most notably the Bacchanalia and the Chaldaeans in 139 B.C. (Val. Max. 1.3.2) and others: see Gallini (1970); North (1979), 85-9; Pailler (1988); North (1992), 181; North (2000), 63-8.

166 In Mk. 3.22, Lk. 11.15-20, and Mt. 10.24-5, 12.27-8, the scribes and Pharisees called Jesus a magician, who cast out demons in the name of Beelzebul. Smith (1978), 32 and 174, notes that this demon is (32) ‘unmistakably Palestinian’. Moreover, Jesus was called (Jn. 8.48) a Samaritan, a connection to Simon Magus, the Samaritan magician. Justin Dial. 69.7, 108.2, preserves evidence of Jewish claims that Jesus was a magician (69.7: μάγος) and Origen C. Cels. 1.68, notes that Jesus was compared to a γόης. For a discussion of the varied views of Jesus in the ancient world see Smith (1977).
Furthermore, the centrality of this ‘wonder-working’ to Eunus’ character returns, as we have seen, in his election to kingship: the apex of his success. After commenting on the qualities for which Eunus was not elected, ἄνδρεια τε καὶ στρατηγία, Diodorus informs us of the reasons for his election (34/5.2.14): διὰ δὲ μόνην τερατείαν καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀποστάσεως ἀρξαί ‘but only because of his knowledge of wonders and his setting of the revolt in motion’. We can now understand Diodorus’ tone in this exclamation, given his clear prejudices against the use of τερατεία. For example, it is hardly positive that the slaves were duped by Eunus, and his charlatan ability could not be considered flattering, if we keep in mind the negative view driving the use of these terms. It is therefore apparent that this characteristic of Eunus infects his crowning achievement, further undermining his success, on top of the fact that Diodorus considered Eunus a coward and an inept leader. But, there is still an additional element of Diodorus’ scorn for Eunus at his crowning moment that we have not yet examined.

IV. τὸ τῆς ἀποστάσεως ἀρξαί

We have seen above that Diodorus gave yet another reason for Eunus’ election (34/5.2.14): τὸ τῆς ἀποστάσεως ἀρξαί, ‘his setting of the revolt in motion’. In order to understand the event to which Diodorus refers, we have to turn to two separate, parallel passages from earlier in the narrative. After describing the treatment of Damophilus’ slaves, Diodorus relates that they went to Eunus in order to ascertain if they had the approval of the gods for their rebellion (34/5.2.10 and 34/5.2.24b):

εἴς δὲν ἀποθηριωθέντες οἱ προπηλακιζόμενοι συνέθεντο πρὸς ἄλληλους ὑπὲρ ἀποστάσεως καὶ φόνου τῶν κυρίων. καὶ πρὸς τὸν Εὔνουν ἐλθόντες ἤρωτον εἰ συγχωρεῖται παρὰ τῶν θεῶν αὐτοῖς τὸ βεβουλευμένον. οὐ δὲ μετα τερατείας, ὡς εἰόθενε, συνθέμενος ὡς συγχωροῦσα, παραχρήμα πείθει ἐξέσται τῆς ἐγχειρήσεως.

In consequence of this, those treated with contempt, who had been made savage by the treatment, came to a mutual agreement to revolt and to murder their masters. They went to Eunus, who was spending time not far away, and they asked if their decision was approved by the gods. He used his usual wonder-working to confirm that the gods did favour them, and persuaded them to embark on their undertaking forthwith.

Ότι συνετίθεντο πρὸς ἄλληλους οἱ δοῦλοι περὶ ἀποστάσεως καὶ φόνου τῶν κυρίων. παρελθόντες δὲ πρὸς τὸν Εὔνουν οὐκ ἀποθεῖ οὐδὲ διατρίβοι τῇ διατρίβῃ τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ βεβουλευμένον. οὐ δὲ τερατευομένος μετ’ ἐνθυσιασμῷ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἠκούσας διεσάφησεν ὅτι διδάσκαν αὐτοῖς ἡ Γαῖα ἀπόστασιν. εἶχαν μηδέποτε ἐντυπωσάμεν τῇ εὐρυπάνσει παραχρήμα μὲν ἐγχειρήσεως ταῖς ἐπιταξίαις· υπὸ γὰρ τῆς πεπρομένης αὐτοῖς κεκυρώθησαν πατρίδα τῆς Ἐννας, οὐσαν ἀκρότολον ὅλης τῆς νῆσου.

The slaves agreed with one another about revolt and the murder of their masters. They came to Eunus, who was spending time not far away, and they asked if their decision was approved by the gods. He
began working wonders in a frenzy, and when he heard why they had come he made clear that the gods
gave them permission to revolt, so long as they did not delay but immediately undertook their
enterprise: for it was fated that Enna, the citadel of the whole island, was fixed as their homeland.

First, we should note that Diodorus is consistent in the language he is using to describe the
actions of Eunus, once again using language based on τέρατα and its derivations. The two
passages are similar, although the first passage, from Photius, is simpler and less detailed
than the second, Constantinian, excerpt. For example, in the Photian version, the slaves ask
Eunus for advice, and immediately on working his wonders (μετά τερατεύοντος) Eunus is
presented as assenting: he acts without knowing what the slaves’ resolve was. In the
Constantinian excerpt, there is a delay in the assent: Eunus, who still began working wonders
(ὅ δὲ τερατεύομενος), waited until περὶ τίνος ἠκούσα ἀκούσας, ‘he heard why they had
come’, to tell them that they had permission. The slaves only asked initially if their decision
was approved (εἰ συγκροτεῖται παρὰ τὸν θεῶν αὐτοῖς τὸ βεβουλευμένον), and it appears from
the narrative that Eunus delayed his prophecy in order to hear the full details.¹⁶⁷ Eunus,
furthermore, does not provide a true prophecy, for Diodorus has already made it clear by this
stage that Eunus was a charlatan: he was not divinely inspired, and so preferred, as this
passage implies, to know as much as possible before ‘divining’. We should also consider how
the characterisation of Eunus discussed above affects our reading of this passage.

Throughout the narrative, Eunus is described in very different terms from those of the
rebels whom he then led. Concerning the slaves, we should note first how Diodorus describes
their treatment: their lack of food and clothing, and their alienation from their masters. This is
consistent throughout the general descriptions of slave mistreatment in the narrative, as well
as the specific case of the slave owner Damophilus, whose actions caused the initial outbreak
of war. For example, we learn from Diodorus the following (34/5.2.2 and 26):

βαρέος δ’ αὐτοῖς κατά τε τὰς ὑπηρεσίας ἐχρόντο, καὶ ἐπιμελείας παντελῶς ὀλίγης ἡξίουν,
ὅσα τε ἐντρέφεσθαι καὶ ὥσα ἐνδύσεσθαι. ἐξ’ ὅν οἱ πλείους ἀπὸ ληστείας τὸ ζήν ἐπορίζοντο,
καὶ μεστὰ φόνων ἦν ἀπαντα, καθάπερ στρατευμάτων διεσπαρμένων τῶν ληστῶν.

¹⁶⁷ Only Green (1961), 12, and Urbainczyk (2008a), 55, note this distinction. For Green it is evidence of
differing biases in the narrative of Diodorus, one pro-Roman, and the other not (he does not make clear what
bias the latter tradition held): I think it is more accurate to consider the difference in details to be caused by the
distinct compositional styles of the two excerpters (Photius tends to compress his account, whereas the
Constantinian excerpts are often verbatim), and not two differing accounts contained in the same text of
Diodorus. Urbainczyk, on the other hand, notes that there is varying treatment of Eunus across the two different
excerpts, but pursues the point no further.
They abused them (the slaves) with a heavy hand in their service, and altogether thought them worthy of the minimum of care: as far as concerned food and clothing. The majority of them provided themselves with a livelihood through banditry, and everywhere was full of bloodshed, since the bandits were scattered like armies of soldiers.

διὰ γὰρ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς εὐπορίας τῶν τὴν κρατίστην νήσον ἐκκαρπουμένων ἄπαντες σχέδον οἱ τοῖς πλούσιοι προκεκοφτεῖς ἐξήλωσαν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἔμφυτον, εἰ δὲ ὑπερηφανὶαν καὶ ὑβρίν. ἐξ ὁν ἄπαντον αὐξανοµένην ἐπὶ ισης τῆς τε κατὰ τῶν οἰκετῶν κακουχίας καὶ τῆς κατὰ τῶν δεσποτῶν ἄλλοτριότητος, ἐρρέγη ποτὲ σὺν καρδίᾳ τὸ μέσος. ἐξ οὗ χορίς παραγγέλματος πολλαὶ μυρίας συνέδραµοι οἰκετῶν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν δεσποτῶν ἀπώλειαν.

For because of the excessive wealth of those enjoying the fruits of the most excellent island, nearly all of those who had become wealthy strove after first luxury, then arrogance and insolence. Because of this, and since the mistreatment of the slaves and their estrangement from their masters increased equally, there was, when opportune, a general outburst of hatred. From this, without formal command, tens of thousands of slaves joined forces for the destruction of their masters.

When describing Damophilus’ treatment of slaves, Diodorus specifically notes his lack of provisioning for his herdsmen (34/5.2.36) and his poor relationship toward slaves in supplication (34/5.2.38). When compared with Eunus, the contrast is apparent. A lack of provision, even if it had occurred in Eunus’ case (and for this we have no evidence), was offset by Eunus’ close access to his master at dinner parties with the added bonus that (34/5.2.8) τινες αὑτῶν ἀπὸ τῆς τράπεζῆς ἀξιολογοῦσις μερίδας αἴροντες ἔδωροῦντο, ‘some of (the dinner guests), lifting substantial portions from the table gave them to him as gifts’. Furthermore, Eunus’ position as the dinner entertainer gave him a close, and to judge by the narrative in Diodorus, good-natured relationship with his master; it is clear from these aspects of the narrative that he was a favoured slave. Up to the moment when the estranged and mistreated slaves came to Eunus, his lifestyle had been completely separate from theirs, as he had not experienced nor shared in their collective plight. This might suggest that his subsequent leadership of the revolt was vitiated in the mind of an ancient reader: Eunus was actually benefiting from his position as a slave and his opportunistic pretence of prophecy. This suggests in turn that his leadership of the revolt was a mark of further opportunism on his part: it was not based on a shared experience of bad treatment, creating a separation between Eunus and his subjects in the mind of the reader.

By singling out Eunus in this way, Diodorus set up the platform for his subsequent negative portrayal of Eunus, the cowardly king. As is clear now, Diodorus was not crediting

168 This understanding of Diodorus does not accord with that generally put forward by scholars on the subject. Typically the relationship is viewed as one of Antigenes and his dinner guests patronising Eunus (see Green (1961), 12; Urbainczyk (2008a), 55), or a dangerous mocking of a ‘holy idiot’ (see Vogt (1965), 25-6), or just exploitation of Eunus’ reputation by Antigenes (Bradley (1989), 114).
Eunus with any positive characteristics. The connotations inherent in the language, shown above, and the clear indications given by Diodorus that Eunus was not actually a divinely inspired seer serve to denigrate his character in preparation for his subsequent important role. Indeed, the strength of this characterisation led one scholar – interested in magic and magicians, not slavery – to comment that the ‘…account we have of Eunus’ career will be in some measure an imaginative recreation…based on patterns of behaviour with which [the author] was familiar’. This view of Diodorus’ text is unusual in that it allows for a certain level of creativity on the part of the author, creativity which we have seen in Diodorus’ choices of language when describing Eunus. And this description left little doubt about the author’s opinion of the man.

The depiction of Eunus in Diodorus is unremittingly hostile. At no point in the narrative is Eunus praised unless the praise is tempered with a corresponding caveat or explanatory denigration of either him or his followers. The associations crafted throughout Diodorus’ narrative with Hellenistic kingship and wonder-working are consistent from Eunus’ introduction to his pathetic death in a Morgantina jail. It is striking that the strongest scorn was reserved for the most significant moment of Eunus’ career, his acclamation to kingship. At this moment Diodorus tied together all the threads of abuse employed throughout the narrative against Eunus, negating the importance of Eunus’ achievements and destroying any credibility that Eunus, once king, sought to achieve. Furthermore, his depiction in Diodorus is composed to create certain literary effects. The symbolic connection between Eunus and his master, Antigenes, indicates that, because of literary finesse that had Eunus assume the place of his own degenerate master by the end of his life, we cannot trust the impression given by the text for historical purposes. Awash with stereotypes and literary plays, Eunus’ character is a caricature designed to turn the reader against him. This suggestion can be further analysed by considering how Diodorus contrasted Eunus with his στρατηγὸς, Kleon.

V. A Military Man

As I argued above, one of Eunus’ defining negative features at the moment of his election to kingship was his lack of ἀνδρεία τε καὶ στρατηγία. The character of Kleon, and to a certain
extent that of his brother Komanus, contrasts with this facet of Eunus’ character. There is considerably less evidence for Kleon compared with Eunus, but the evidence that there is suggests that his character, like Eunus’, was generally portrayed negatively, and with a definite literary purpose. Unlike Eunus, Kleon has only two defining moments in Diodorus’ narrative, and although he is mentioned in other authors he does not feature prominently. Kleon’s introduction into the narrative comes after the description of the initial uprising in two parallel passages in Photius and the Constantinian excerpts (34/5.2.17; 34/5.2.43):

During this time Kleon, a certain Cilician, began a revolt of other slaves: and although all were buoyed up by hope that the seditious factions would wage war against one another, and that the rebels themselves, by destroying themselves utterly, would release Sicily from discord, unexpectedly they came to terms with one another, Kleon having been subordinated to the mere command of Eunus, and discharging the service of a general such as indeed for a king, having his own band of five thousand soldiers. It was nearly thirty days after the revolt.

There was another revolt of runaways and a band worthy of mention. For a certain Kleon, a Cilician from a region about the Taurus, who was accustomed from childhood to a life of banditry and in Sicily became a herder of horses, constantly waylaid people and committed murders of every kind. When he learned of the progress of Eunus, and the successes of the runaways with him, he became a rebel and persuading some of the slaves nearby to share in folly with him he overran the city of Acragas and all the surrounding countryside.

It is clear from the two passages that Photius is compressing the original Diodorus quite heavily, but compared with the Constantinian excerpts he features a narrative that constitutes a longer chronological period in the work: his extract continues to include the subordination of Kleon to Eunus and the size of his army. From Valerius Maximus we gain the only mention of Kleon in Latin. In a short passage about the death of Kleon’s brother, Komanus, Valerius records the following (9.12.Ext. 1):

_Sunt et externae mortes dignae adnotatu. Qualis in primis Comae, quem ferunt maximi latronum ducis Cleonis fratrem fuisse._
There are external deaths too worth noting, such as that of Coma [Komanus in Diodorus], who is said to have been brother to Cleon, the great leader of brigands.

Description’s of Kleon’s character use two main operative terms: *latro*\textsuperscript{170} and *ληστής*\textsuperscript{171}. Both of these translate the same from Latin and Greek respectively, both meaning ‘bandit’ or ‘robber’.\textsuperscript{172} For the remainder of this section I will use the term *latro* to account for both terms. It is with this term that we should begin to analyse the depiction of Kleon, for it is the central concept of his character as it is described by Diodorus and Valerius Maximus.

\textit{V.i. Bandits in the Ancient World}

In the ancient world, as Shaw has shown (1984: 9; see also Grünewald 2004: 18-25), banditry was considered endemic. Indeed, the terms *latro* and *ληστής* both carry with them a commonly understood knowledge that they spoke of someone engaged in violent robbery; the terms were predicated on the concept of the ‘ubiquity of banditry’.\textsuperscript{173} However, the terms are more complicated than just that. Legally the term *latro* meant, of course, a robber,\textsuperscript{174} but it was also used to cover someone who fought against the Roman state by unconventional means, meaning that they could not be termed *hostes* and were instead termed *latrones* or *praedones*.\textsuperscript{175} Beyond the legal definition in the Roman world the terms had strong literary connotations. Often an ancient author writing about a conflict in which he had particular disdain about one party would use terms such as *latrocinium* and *ληστήρια*, ‘banditry’, at the author’s discretion in order to slander the disdain ed party: e.g. the war with Viriathus (App. *Hisp.* 71.301; 73.310); the fight against Tacfarinas (Tac. *Ann.* 2.52; 3.20, 32, 73; 4.23-6; Aur. *Vinct. Caes.* 2.3); the constant wars and battles in Judaea from 64 B.C. to the Jewish War.\textsuperscript{176} Furthermore these terms could be used to describe a great range of individual people whom an author particularly disliked, and in fact this became something of a political topos.\textsuperscript{177}

170 In this case used to describe the men that Kleon led: ‘maximi latronum ducis’, (a great leader of brigands).
171 In the case of the passage above, it is a variant in the adjectival form: συνήθης ὣν ἐκ παιδῶν τῷ λήστρικῷ βίῳ ‘who was accustomed from childhood to a life of banditry’.
172 However, it should be noted that the terms *latro* and *ληστής* have a far greater variety and complexity of meaning than the English translations ‘robber’ or ‘bandit’.
174 The specific requirement to classify as a *latro* was the resort to violence (Call. *Dig.* 48.19.28.10), although another aspect of a *latro* was the gathering of a band (*factio*) around them (Marc. *Dig.* 48.19.11.2); see also Grünewald (2004), 15.
176 Josephus consistently uses the term *ληστήρια* to refer to the rebel groups of Jews. See Rhoads (1976), 159-62, and Rajak (1983), 84-5, 123, 132, 161.
Cicero branded his political opponents such as L. Sergius Catilina and M. Antonius *latrones* (Cic. *Cat.* 1.9.23; 1.10.27; 1.13.31, 33; *Phil.* 3.29.11); leaders of guerrilla movements against Roman authority such as Viriatus or Bulla Felix were also described this way (Livy *Per.* 52; Flor. 1.33.15; Dio Cass. 76.10). In each example the actual events taking place could hardly be realistically termed *ληστήρια* or *latrocinium*, ‘*banditry*’, and yet, nonetheless, the ancient writers used these terms as derogatory expressions to slander their enemies.

It should now be clear that, in using the terms *latro* and *ληστής* to describe Kleon, the ancient authors were linking him to an established system of abuse that an ancient reader of their works would have understood. Furthermore, the actual narrative itself leaves no doubt concerning the character of Kleon. While the terms *latro* and *ληστής* had a legal definition that specifically stressed the use of violence, Diodorus relates that Kleon (34/5.2.43) οὐ διέλευεν ὁδοιπόρον καὶ παντοδαποῦς φόνους ἐπιτελόμενος, ‘*constantly waylaid people and committed murders of every kind*’. It is also clear from the description of Kleon’s actions once in Sicily that he was not forced into his brutal behaviour, rather he was συνήθης ὁν ἑκ παῖδων, ‘*accustomed from childhood*’, to this type of behaviour. Another aspect of his background further intensifies this fact: he is a Cilician. In the second century B.C., Cilicia was an area that had become rife with piracy (Rostovtzeff 1941: 783-5). Because of this, an association built up in the Roman and Greek minds that connected Cilicians with brigands on principle: De Souza (1999: 97) has shown that Strabo (14.3.2), Appian (*Mith.* 92), Dio (36.20-3), and Plutarch (*Vit. Pomp.* 24) presented a picture of Cilicians and Pamphylians as ‘*dyed-in-the-wool pirates*’. From Diodorus we can see this particular prejudice: Kleon, a Cilician, was a brigand from childhood.

**V.ii. A Natural Savage**

---

178 This list is by no means exhaustive: Cicero refers to Antony himself as a *latro* 25 times (*Phil.* 2.5.6, 5.9, 6.2, 9.10, 62.14; 3.29.11; 4.5.13, 15.3, 15.8; 5.23.6, 30.6; 6.12.10; 11.36.9, 12.12.15, 17.2, 20.4, 27.18; 13.10.5, 16.5, 19.2, 21.2; 14.8.2, 10.4, 27.15, 31.9), his band of followers as *latronēs* 11 times (*Phil.* 2.87.6; 4.9.9; 5.6.10, 18.9; 6.3.14, 4.12; 8.9.2; 11.14.10; 12.15.7, 13.26.21; 14.21.3), and his associates and followers as *latronēs* 5 times (*Phil.* 11.4.10, 7.5, 10.0, 32.5; 13.26.21). Cicero even compares Antony with Spartacus; see Cic. *Phil.* 4.15.3 and 13.22.16.

179 We should also note that, in terms of Hellenistic ideologies regarding kingship, an insatiable desire for warring was not a positive characteristic. Following Murray’s (1965) reconstruction of Philodemus, Philodemus argued that (Col. IX 14-6) ‘(t)he good ruler must therefore be warlike, but not a lover of war or of battle’. Aristeas likewise argues that military exploits for their own sake are a negative characteristic of leaders (*ad Phil.* 223); see Schubart (1973), 5, and Murray (1967), 354-5.

180 The association was long lasting, even into the Byzantine period when the area also produced the finest soldiers of the Byzantine army. See Ormerod (1924), 192, and De Souza (1999), 97.
Above we saw that Diodorus carefully segregated Eunus from his followers in terms of the treatment received by him from his master. We can see this particular pattern emerging again with Kleon. As I have shown, Kleon was not forced into brigandage, but having been accustomed to it from childhood then engaged in extremely violent brigandage once in Sicily. If we compare this background with that of the men he eventually led into battle then we find a significant contrast. In terms of choice, Diodorus is clear that the slaves were forced into their acts of brigandage (34/5.2.2, 27-8):

They employed the young men as herdsmen, while they employed the others in such ways as need arose for each. They abused them with a heavy hand in their service, and altogether thought them worthy of the minimum of care as far as concerned food and clothing. The majority of them provided themselves with a livelihood through banditry, and everywhere was full of bloodshed, since the bandits were scattered like armies of soldiers.

The Italians who had acquired many slaves allowed their herdsmen such a self-indulgent life-style that they did not provide them food, but permitted them to plunder. Since power such as this had been given to men who, because of their physical strength were able to accomplish everything they chose, and because of their licence and leisure had the opportunity, and because of their lack of food were compelled to undertake perilous tasks, it came about that there was a swift increase in lawlessness.

This decision to turn to brigandage stands in contrast to Kleon who chose, once in Sicily, to continue his actions with unremitting violence. In another passage Diodorus clarifies that the slaves were not violent through nature but because of how they had been treated in Sicily (34/5.2.40):

Despite the rebellious slaves had become savage against the whole household of their masters and turned to implacable violence and revenge, they showed a little that it was not because of the natural
savagery, but because of the arrogance that had earlier been shown to them that they were raging, having turned to the punishment of those who had been first in wrong doing.

Even among slaves, nature is self-taught with regard to just restitution of both gratitude and vengeance.

By describing Kleon as accustomed to violence throughout his life rather than through circumstances, he is further separated from his subsequent followers. The final facet of this characterisation lies in the origin of Kleon’s decision to go to war. He was, at this stage, already a brigand, and his decision to revolt was predicated not on the fact that he was forced into brigandage, but merely because Eunus had been successful (34/5.2.43):

ος πυθόμενος τὴν κατὰ τὸν Εὔνουν προκοπῆν καὶ τὰς τῶν μετ’ αὐτοῦ δραπετῶν εὐμερίας ἀποστάτης ἐγένετο…

When he learned of the progress of Eunus, and the successes of the runaways with him, he became a rebel…

Much like Eunus, who is presented as having joined the rebellion in what could be interpreted as an act of opportunism, Kleon also opportunistically seizes the moment. In spite of these negative pronouncements about the character of Kleon, it is undeniable that he was quite successful at first: the rebels captured at the very least (in the narrative of ancient authors) Enna, Morgantina, Tauromenium, Agrigentum and Catana (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.20-2, 43; Strabo 6.2.6; Oros. 5.9.5) and won a number of battles against Roman commanders (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.18-20; Flor. 2.7.7-8). Diodorus’ record of this success does not outweigh the extensively negative account Kleon receives elsewhere by the narrative. It was not impossible in ancient histories for a character to be a successful general and a terrible person simultaneously: L. Sergius Catilina and Q. Servilius Caepio were both severely censured for the manner in which they gained their wealth or victories. Even Alexander the Great, in spite of his reputation as a great general, did not escape criticism from ancient authors: for example, in the description of the revolt at Opis recorded in Arrian, Alexander was reprimanded by the author for his quick-temper and gradual acceptance of eastern flattery (7.8). Furthermore, it could be argued that the success attributed to Kleon, which had to be acknowledged given the length of the war and the broad area that was controlled by the rebel

---

181 Despite his character being represented as ‘…malo pravoque’ (evil and depraved), and as a person that ‘…bella intestina, caedes, rapinae, discordia civilis grata fuere…’ (revelled in civil wars, murders, pillage, and political dissension) (Sall. Cat. 5.1-2) he is later credited with considerable skills as a general (Sall. Cat. 59: 60.4-5) and bravery in death (Sall. Cat. 60.7).

182 He was heavily criticised for the murder of Viriatus. See Val. Max. 9.6.4; App. Hisp. 69.295-300.
forces, was undercut by the way in which the overall narrative of the war was presented in the ancient sources.

**V.iii. Death and Redemption**

As we have seen, Kleon’s character is presented as that of a bloodthirsty bandit. However, in one context he is described positively, as is his brother Komanus, and that is on the occasion of his death. For Kleon, the passage is preserved by Photius in a very compressed form, but clearly shows a brave ending to his life (34/5.2.21):

\[
καὶ Κλέωνα τὸν στρατηγὸν ἐξελθόντα τῆς πόλεως καὶ ἱρωικὸς ἀγωνισάμενον μετ’ ὀλίγων ὑπὸ τῶν τραυμάτων δείξας νεκρὸν…
\]

After the general Kleon had come out of the city, and had exerted himself heroically with a few men, Rupilius displayed him dead from his wounds…

There are some features here to come back to, but for the moment it is necessary to note the adverb ἱρωικὸς, ‘heroically’ used to describe Kleon’s struggle. For Komanus our evidence comes from Valerius Maximus, recording his capture and death before the Roman commander P. Rupilius (noted in Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.20). In this passage, from a series ‘de mortibus non vulgaribus’ ‘of deaths out of the ordinary’, Komanus, called Coma by Valerius Maximus, is praised for his willingness to part with his life through his own actions, rather than holding out through torture in order not to give away details of the rebels’ efforts (Val. Max. 9.12.ext. 1). The regard that these two rebel leaders gained for their actions is marked, but we must be careful to consider them in their context. In the narrative the deaths of the two brothers come immediately before the cowardly and unmanly flight of Eunus discussed above. These heroic deaths – Kleon died while fighting μετ’ ὀλίγων, ‘with a few men’, further augmenting his heroism – served to contrast with the failure of Eunus to end his life well: the narrative implies that even Kleon and his brother, brigands of the worst kind and thoroughly deplorable men, could die in a brave and worthy manner. By this narrative flourish, Diodorus adds yet another layer to the character assassination of Eunus, and so while their

---

184 My thanks go to John Marincola for suggesting this interpretation.
brave deaths do not make up for their otherwise bad lives, Kleon and Komanus regain some recognition from Diodorus.\textsuperscript{185}

This acknowledgment of bravery in death completed the negative portrayals of these characters, but did not make amends for their actions. For Kleon, and to a lesser extent his brother Komanus, reference to preconceptions about behaviour and character linked to geographical locations (Cilicia) or political invective based on concepts of banditry (\textit{latro}; ληστής) created about him a natural blood-lust at odds with his compatriot slaves. Furthermore his only redeeming feature, his brave death, was part of a narrative structure designed to emphasise the lack of bravery in Eunus’ own death. Kleon’s character complements that of Eunus. The latter, a coward without military experience is assisted by his στρατηγός, a bloodthirsty bandit. Together, they represent poor choices for leadership, and in both cases their characters and descriptions are linked to literary stereotypes by Diodorus and other ancient authors. It is clear that with Kleon, as with Eunus, Diodorus used a vocabulary resonant with Hellenistic ideology. In the following section I will suggest that by understanding the purpose of this vocabulary in the context of rhetorical argumentation, either consciously or unconsciously used by the author, we can begin to understand why Diodorus wrote as he did about the rebel leaders, and what this should suggest to us about the place of his narrative in a historical reconstruction of the events of the Sicilian Insurrection.

\textit{VI. Rhetoric and History}

In this section, I will pursue a new reading of some important passages analysed above. This new analysis will give strict attention to how the conclusions reached above concerning the resonance of ideology invoked in Diodorus’ language can help us to understand the

\textsuperscript{185} It is possible that the deaths of Kleon and Komanus also served to augment the glory of the victorious Roman generals. In each ancient description of the war the narrative progresses in a similar fashion: a succession of incompetent generals conceded defeats to the rebels, until a worthy commander was appointed, at which point the war instantly changed in character. For example, Florus describes four previous commanders who had failed against the rebels only for Perperna to turn everything around during his command (2.7.7-9); Valerius Maximus confusingly credits both L. Calpurnius Piso (4.3.10) and P. Rupilius (6.9.8) with ending the war; Diodorus makes clear that P. Rupilius cleared Sicily of the war and the whole island of bandits very quickly afterwards (34/5.2.20-3). The descriptions of the deaths of Kleon and Komanus, always given in relation to one of the men credited with ending the war, perhaps served the purpose of extolling the virtues of the victorious general: these heroic deaths, like a captive general displayed in a triumph, augmented the individual general’s brilliance; see Flower (2004), 339-40, and Beard (2007), 12-3, 120-2, on triumphs. Ancient authors also noted the role of the displayed captives in glorifying the victorious general; see for example App. \textit{Milh.} 116-7, Plut. \textit{Vit. Pomp.} 45.4, and Dio Cass. 36.19 for reference to Pompey’s triumphs.
relationship between Diodorus and his ancient (and perhaps also modern) readers. In particular, the texts will be reconsidered from a rhetorical and narratological viewpoint in order to fashion a new understanding of what Diodorus was trying to achieve with his descriptions of Eunus and Kleon. The principle tools in this analysis will be the rhetorical theory of ‘identification’ between rhetorician and audience and the narratological concept of a covert omniscient narrator. This will enable us to see how Diodorus manipulated his readers into agreeing with (or for the modern reader, more likely disagreeing with) his depiction of Eunus, regardless of the historical truth or untruth of his analysis. This, in turn, will also show that the statements and values represented by Diodorus’ depictions of Eunus and Kleon reflect more on the values that he held than on any that Eunus and Kleon themselves may have held.

VI.i. Diodorus and his reader

The previous five sections of this chapter offered no answer to why Diodorus sought to use language that was resonant with Hellenistic ideologies beyond denigration of those described. I will now suggest that we can understand the choices of vocabulary and ideology if we consider the narrative as a piece of rhetorical persuasion, in which the reader was intended to accept the descriptions given, and draw the correct conclusions from them. To demonstrate this, we should look again at two examples from Diodorus’ narrative for which it seems more likely that he wrote inventively, rather than from a position of knowledge: Eunus’ acclamation and the rebels’ approach to Eunus before the attack on Enna.

186 Following the definition of Diodorus’ reader I gave at no. 127.
187 Aristotle considered this concept in his Rhetorica (3.14.7-8) when he discussed the ways in which an ancient orator would strive, by appealing to respectability, to bring the audience on to their side: see also the discussion in Burke (1950), 55-6, which, although old, is nonetheless a most lucid analysis of ‘identification’ as a rhetorical technique. The ancient methodology of appealing to respectability, or any other trait thought acceptable to the audience (see also Cic. De or. 2.178; 182; 3.211-2) is also reflected, as early as Booth (1961), 119-47, in his discussion of the role of shared beliefs and interests between the author and the audience in literature in general.
188 I disagree with Quintillian (Inst. 10.1.31) that history is ‘…quodammodo carmen solutum, et scribitur ad narrandum non ad probandum’ ‘a kind of prose poem, while it is written for the purpose of narrative, not of proof’, and consequently think that history has a purpose beyond the mere recording of events for posterity or the glorification of the reader: in this position, although not in my opposition to Quintillian, I follow Barthes (1966), 79, in regarding historiographical texts as a form of narrative, and therefore that they can be analysed through narratological considerations. For views contrary to Barthes see Genette (1991), 65-93, and Cohn (1999), 109-31. See also the discussion in de Jong (2004), 8-9, of the place of historiographical texts in field of narratology of ancient literature.
189 Finley (1985), 13-4, reminded us of the important consideration that ‘… there can be no doubt that on the innumerable occasions Thucydides reported as a simple matter of fact that a political figure, a military commander, even a group of people adopted a particular course of action as the consequence of a particular
The passage on Eunus’ acclamation is particularly relevant to the new manner of investigation proposed above. As Diodorus tells us (34/5.2.14)

ἔκαθην ἀφελέται βασιλεύς ὁ Ἑυνοῦς οὔτε δι’ ἀνδρείαν οὔτε διὰ στρατηγίαν, διὰ δὲ μόνῃ τερατείᾳ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀποστάσεως ἀρξαί, ἀμα δὲ καὶ τῆς προσηγορίας οἰονεί τινα καλὸν οἰωνὸν ἐχούσης πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὑποτατομένων εὐνοίαν.

(then, Eunus was chosen king, and not because of his courage, nor his generalship, but only because of his knowledge of wonders and his setting of the revolt in motion, but also at the same time because his name seemed to hold some favourable omen in respect to the goodwill of his subjects.

Diodorus acts, at this point, as a covert external narrator. That is to say that he does not overtly intrude into the narrative, nor was he taking an active part in the events described. He does not openly give his opinion of what is going on, and instead uses an implicit focalisation to put the thoughts into the heads of the rebels, all in his role as omniscient narrator. The absence of any words indicating uncertainty or postulation on his part, however, should not confuse or obscure what the narrator is doing: despite his covert presence and apparent reticence to intrude, Diodorus is here diving beneath the surface of his narrative to provide information that it is highly unlikely he had and a judgement on that information. Unless the acclamation was most irregular it is improbable that the rebels chose to acclaim Eunus for the reasons given. We must remember the context: Eunus had just won a significant military victory, secured the first stronghold of the rebellion, and to this point shown himself, to the rebels, to be nothing but a good leader with a certain élan for military timing, all features that fit with a Hellenistic ideology of kingship and acclamation. These are far better, and far more Hellenistic reasons to acclaim Eunus. What we are being told by Diodorus is, at this point, in contradiction of what we have been shown of Eunus. It would seem that in a direct challenge of the events being narrated Diodorus chose to engage with his audience using language that reflected a strong strand of Hellenistic ideology about kingship, and also related to Diodorus’ own internal values of kingship, albeit in a negative sense.
(ἀνδρεία; στρατηγία). In keeping with Aristotle’s pronouncement (Rh. 3.14.7-8) that a speaker causes an audience to like a figure through carefully chosen agreeable traits, Diodorus caused his readers to side against Eunus by telling his audience that Eunus was the opposite of what the narrative showed that he was.

At this stage in the narrative, moreover, Eunus has not yet been ‘shown’ to be a coward,193 we only have Diodorus’ word for it. In order for this pronouncement to be agreeable to his audience, Diodorus had to link his depiction to the beliefs and attitudes with which his readers would identify. This desire for the narrative to be agreeable, or ‘identifiable’, in turn led to language which, as we have seen, connected to Hellenistic ideals about kingship and stereotypes of religious behaviour. While we have no proof of Eunus’ unsuitability, Diodorus’ version is a plausible depiction, and intentionally so. It says more about his and his expected audience’s views on the critical faculties of the rebels for selecting the leader they did, and the merits of that leader than it does about the rebels themselves. Furthermore, Diodorus’ use of the expression ἀνδρεία τε καὶ στρατηγία, seen already in his Bibliotheca so often, sets up an anticipation in the audience of what is to follow: the moment Eunus is described as elected οὔτε δι’ ἀνδρίαν, ‘not because of his courage’, the audience, by this point familiar with Diodorus’ narrative style, can already predict the completion of the phrase (οὔτε διὰ στρατηγίαν, ‘nor his generalship’). As Burke put it (1959: 58): ‘...you will find yourself swinging along with the succession of antitheses.’ The predictable flow of Diodorus’ prose is itself a rhetorical device.

Nor are these rhetorical and narratological considerations found only in the passage above. When the rebels approached Eunus to gain approval for their plans, Diodorus provides a narrative of events (34/5.2.24b; see also 34/5.2.10):

193 Even later in the narrative, while Eunus is in some respects ‘shown’ to be a coward, his actions in fleeing to a cave are judged by the narrator for his reader, leaving, as I have argued above, no room for interpretation (see Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.22).
The slaves agreed with one another about revolt and the murder of their masters. They came to Eunus, who was spending time not far away, and they asked if their decision was approved by the gods. He began working wonders in a frenzy, and when he heard why they had come he made clear that the gods gave them permission to revolt, so long as they did not delay but immediately undertook their enterprise: for it was fated that Enna, the citadel of the whole island, was fixed as their homeland. Since they had heard these words and believed that the divine power was assisting them in their plan, they were so disposed in their minds for revolt that they made no delay in what they had decided. Immediately, therefore, they set free those who had been bound and of the others they collected those that lived nearby, and assembled about four hundred in a certain area near Enna. After making a covenant among one another and taking oaths of trust by night over sacrifices, they armed themselves as opportunity allowed at that time: all of them took up the strongest weapon of all, a desire for the destruction of their arrogant masters: and Eunus was their leader.

Several aspects of this narrative would suggest the action of an involved, but covert omniscient narrator. First, there are two instances of focalisation, in which we see the narrative through the eyes of the participants. We gain an insight into the minds of the rebels on hearing Eunus’ proclamation about their plans, and learn that τοιοτων λόγων ἀκούσαντες καὶ διαλαβόντες ὅτι τὸ δαιμόνιον σωτοῖς συνεπιλαμβάνεται τῆς προαιρέσεως, ‘(s)ince they had heard these words and believed that the divine power was assisting them in their plan, they were so disposed in their minds for revolt that they made no delay in what they had decided’. This is a clear literary device, but not something that the narrator could have been party to. The same is the case with the later example of how the rebels arm themselves: πάντες δὲ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ὀπλῶν τὸν θυμὸν ἀνελάμβανον κατὰ τῆς ἀπολείας τῶν ὑπερηφάνων κυρίων, ‘all of them took up the strongest weapon of all, a desire for the destruction of their arrogant masters’. In this case, again, Diodorus is providing a stylistic and rhetorical flourish with information that he would not have known, but plausibly suggested, through careful focalisation. Prior to this the reader has learnt of Eunus’ charlatanism, but the naïve acceptance of his word by the rebels is all the more telling. This also suggests that Eunus’ delaying of his prophecy was a deliberate narrative ploy, as proposed earlier, because it implies a more cynical manipulation of the gullible rebels. Furthermore, this description of Eunus’ actions, carefully tied into the language of

194 I would add that in this case also the narrator told his reader what to think of Eunus’ wonder-working, and did not demonstrate the falsity of the wonder-working. See Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.5-9.
τερατεία,\textsuperscript{195} was designed to create an identification in the reader with the negative connotations this term held, not only in general but also specifically in the narrative itself.\textsuperscript{196} If we accept that major elements of this passage are fabrications, then we can see that the reader is being prepared by the author to judge the rebels and their leader negatively once again.

These two passages reflect a greater problem in Diodorus’ narrative. Critical aspects of Eunus’ character belong, at important moments in his characterisation, to the ideology Diodorus attempted to share with his audience,\textsuperscript{197} and to his own authorial artifice. In sum, the description of Eunus given by Diodorus reflects his judgement of Eunus and his efforts to make this portrayal resonate with his audience: what is most difficult is that these aspects were often placed into the narrative through focalisation. It is hard to say whether any of the behaviour ascribed to Eunus throughout the rest of the narrative is actually based on an accurate portrayal or Diodorus’ attempts to create a convincing, negative depiction that persuaded his audience to side against the rebel movement. It is also difficult to assess if Diodorus was appealing to opinion or truth in his depiction,\textsuperscript{198} although we can be certain that in specific passages his depiction was completely dependent on his ideas being shaped to appeal to his audience.\textsuperscript{199} We cannot tell, at this stage, if the continuation of these themes into the rest of the narrative reflects their truth, or their effective use as a rhetorical tool. While the narrative was doubtless based on some ‘hard-core’ of historical data, it would appear that

\textsuperscript{195} Eunus: τερατευόμενος ‘started working wonders’ (34/5.2.24b); see also 34/5.2.10: ὁ δὲ μετὰ τερατείας, ὡς εἰσδοθε… ‘He used his usual wonder-working’.

\textsuperscript{196} We saw earlier that Diodorus made it clear in his introduction of Eunus that his prophetic abilities were not genuine: see 34/5.2.5-7.

\textsuperscript{197} Even if the ideas present in Diodorus’ narrative came from Posidonius it still remains that the language is Diodoran in many places and that he chose to keep these ideas in his narrative; this then reflects Diodorus’ own identification with the narrative of Posidonius. This suggests that the ideas expressed had resonated in the ancient world for at least fifty years prior to Diodorus’ own composition.

\textsuperscript{198} For Burke (1959), 54-5, either course could work, however a more palatable untruth is more effective than an unpalatable truth: in a sense this line can be seen in Aristotle (\textit{Rh}. 1.9.30-1) when he proclaimed that it is easy to praise Athenians in Athens, and Scythian virtues amongst Scythians, the point being that a virtue palatable to the audience will always be received better than one unpalatable. In this case we should ask, what is the more palatable to Diodorus’ aristocratic reader: a concerted effort from a united front to redefine the boundaries of Hellenistic Sicily, or a failed slave rebellion led by an incompetent and cowardly charlatan?

\textsuperscript{199} We would do well here to remember the words of Aristotle (\textit{Rh}. 2.19.16-25) that, rhetorically, if something seems likely to have happened, but did not, and something else seems less likely, yet happened, the audience will believe the former over the latter. In our case, Diodorus told his reader early in Eunus’ description that he was a coward: it follows that if Eunus then fled, it would more likely have been through cowardice in the readers’ mind because of Diodorus’ work regardless of the actual reason.
Diodorus is engaged in the rhetorical and stylistic embellishment of his text that Woodman (1988: 70-116) has described as typical of ancient historical narratives.200

VI.ii. Coinage, Rhetoric and Diodorus

The proposed conclusion drives at another problem: how do we reconcile the hostile rhetoric of Diodorus’ narrative with the conclusions reached in the previous chapter? I argued there that the coinage of King Antiochus represented an appeal to the free people of Sicily, and as such suggested an altogether different view of the Sicilian Insurrection. Bearing in mind all that has been said about the undercurrents of intentions in language, we should look again at the language of imagery on King Antiochus’ coinage, for imagery is a language as much as the written word, and speaks with its own network of meanings and subtexts.201

If, as I have argued, the work of Diodorus appealed to and engaged with a collection of Hellenistic ideas concerning kingship and magic, then it follows that the coinage, through its own vocabulary of images connected to and appealed to an ideology as well. This ideology, I argued in the last chapter, was the history and culture of Sicily, which suggested in turn that the insurgents in the war were more diverse than suggested in the literary sources. If we consider the ideology of the coinage to have been expressed by an author, King Antiochus (or at least his administration), then the intended audience who may have shared the ideology would have been the people of eastern Sicily. Leaving aside, for the moment, the question of the success of the coinage’s appeal, this allows us to delve deeper into the perceptions of the conflict in the contemporary debate, at least from one angle. The efforts, only represented to us now through the coinage, showed that regardless of the origins of the conflict, King Antiochus’ side identified with the free of Sicily: we can see that, consciously or subconsciously, they viewed the conflict as one involving the free of Sicily against Rome. This was demonstrated by understanding the careful connections the imagery of King Antiochus’ coinage made to Sicilian history and culture through uses of types that had strong historical meanings in the Sicilian context. However, we also saw in the previous chapter that this appeal was not based on a generic appeal to Sicilians, but carefully chosen images that appealed to (or identified with) specific groups of Sicilians from specific areas in much the

200 Woodman (1988), 70-116, argued that Cicero had no problem with embellishing historical data with rhetorical, yet likely, narratio, which did not have to be accurate, provided it was rhetorically persuasive.

201 See Toynbee (1956) and Hölscher (2004).
same way that the characterisation of Eunus in Diodorus appealed to certain aspects of Hellenistic ideology.

Diodorus’ negation of King Antiochus’ legacy through the creation of the figure of Eunus can also be understood in the ancient context. The deliberate castigation of failed monarchs was typical of ancient historiography. King Eumenes III,\(^{202}\) who claimed to be the son of Attalus of Pergamum and led a rebellion against Roman interests in Asia Minor, was called Aristonicus\(^{203}\) in the sources who claimed he was not the rightful heir, even though other sources suggest that he may have had a claim;\(^{204}\) King Philip VI, who claimed to be the son of King Perseus of Macedonia and tried to retake his supposedly legitimate kingdom, is called Andriscus in the hostile ancient tradition.\(^{205}\) It is important that on the two occasions in the text of Diodorus that we discover knowledge of Eunus’ title as monarch, King Antiochus, once in Photius, once in the Constantinian excerpts, this knowledge does not appear to come from Diodorus’ own text, but from the excerptors.\(^{206}\) Therefore, it was known in the ancient world that Eunus, at least once king, was actually called King Antiochus, but no surviving literary source from that period or after uses that title in their text. I would argue that this suppression is intentional and is part of the hostile narrative against the kingdom of King Antiochus, represented in this chapter through the character-assassination of his literary proxy: Eunus.

**Conclusion**

The creation of Eunus as a literary proxy for King Antiochus raises many questions about the veracity of the other information contained in Diodorus’ narrative, as noted above. The text of Diodorus is deliberately rhetorical in its description of Eunus and Kleon. For Eunus, connections to Diodorus’ internalised ideas of ideal kingship (ἀνδρεία; στρατηγία) or external Hellenistic stereotypes of religious behaviour (τερατεία; τερατευόμενος; μάγος) served to brand him incapable of leadership, and therefore turned the ancient reader against him. For

\(^{202}\) This title is confirmed from cistophoric tetradracmas bearing the title *Basileōs Eumenous*, which would fit into no other system of dating unless Aristonicus was Eumenes III; see Habicht (2006), 233; Robinson (1954), 1-8.

\(^{203}\) Just. *Epit.* 36.4.5-12, 37.1.1-3; Strabo 13.4.2, 14.1.38; Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.26, 34/5.3; Livy, *Per.* 59; Oros. 5.10.1-5; Eutr. 4.8.21-9, 4.9.1-23; Vel. Pat. 2.4.1; Plut. *Vit.* Flam. 21.6; Flor. 1.35.1-7.

\(^{204}\) Plut. *Mor.* 184b; Sall. *Hist.* 4.69.8-9.

\(^{205}\) Poly. 36.10; Diod. Sic. 31.40a, 32.15; Zonar. 9.28; Liv. *Per.* 48-50.

\(^{206}\) See Appendix 7: King Antiochus’ Title in Diodorus.
Kleon, references to preconceptions about behaviour and character linked to geographical locations (Cilicia) or hostile rhetoric based on concepts of banditry (latro; ληπτής) created about him a natural cruelty at odds with his compatriot slaves. Furthermore his only redeeming feature, his brave death, was part of a narrative structure designed to contrast the bravery of a ληπτής-turned-στρατηγός with the cowardly death of Eunus, further condemning Eunus through this contrast. The ideologies and beliefs used to construct these identities for Eunus and Kleon served to create a convincing rhetorical identification between Diodorus and his audience, with the aim of turning the ancient reader against the leadership of the Sicilian Insurrection. Moreover, Diodorus presented these ideologies and beliefs through narratological techniques that served to hide their origin: by focalising these ideas through the eyes of the rebels involved in the conflict, Diodorus distanced his narration from the claims it made. We cannot, therefore, trust that Diodorus’ text gives a clear and uncomplicated description of the events of the Sicilian Insurrection.

Even so, we do not have to lose all of Diodorus’ narrative, since it must have been based on some ‘hard core’ of historical data, but it is necessary to acknowledge the rhetorical embellishments outlined in this chapter for what they are: the narrator’s adornments for a narrative he was creating. Nor should we accept, tout court, the ideology expressed by King Antiochus’ coinage: not all in Sicily were against Roman rule, and not all would have risen freely to join his cause. It is imperative, then, for us to combine the two forms of evidence, and see how best we can construct our own narrative of the conflict from the rest of Diodorus’ narrative; and while we do this, we must be sure to carefully understand and integrate the two competing stories about the Sicilian Insurrection we have seen so far.

Woodman (1988), 88-94, described as the ‘hard core’ those details of history that are ‘singular factual statements about the past’, such as the fact that a battle took place, or a consul triumphed; this terminology he took from McCullagh (1984), 26, who described the ‘hard core’ of historical data to be statements such as ‘the battle of Waterloo was fought on Sunday, 18 June 1815’.
III. Understanding An Anachronism in Diodorus’ Narrative 1: The Anachronism

We have seen in the previous chapter that both the narrative presented in Diodorus and its narrator are consistently actively involved in deciding how the information contained in the narrative is presented to their audience. The focus of that chapter was the depiction of Eunus and Kleon. In what follows, I will extend the understanding of Diodorus’ text as actively being shaped towards a purpose, i.e. as a working historical text, to the rest of the narrative. The analysis will concentrate on the moment in Diodorus’ text when we can most clearly see the efforts of the author to artificially bind the narrative structure of the text together for didactic purposes. This was achieved through an explanation of how the Sicilian Insurrection came to pass that is anachronistic. In the first part of this chapter, however, I will concentrate only on exposing clearly the anachronism in question, and fully explaining the historical problems it causes with the text as it stands.

I. The Text of the Anachronism

Diodorus’ narrative of the Insurrection’s course opens with an explanatory prelude for the conflict, detailing the development of Sicily in the preceding years. This prelude describes a rise of banditry among the herdsmen of Sicily which Diodorus connected to their mistreatment at the hands of their masters (34/5.2.1-2 and 25-30). The failure of the governors of Sicily to react to the development then rounds off the prelude (34/5.2.3 and 31), at which point our anachronism appears. Diodorus explains that the governors failed to act because of constraints placed on them by the extortion courts in Rome. Both the Photian

---

208 A version of Chapters III.1 and III.2 has been accepted for publication by Histos.
209 The prelude is given by both Photius (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.1-3) and the Constantinian excerpts (34/5.2.25-31) with some degree of overlap, although the Constantinian excerpts are far more detailed.
epitome and the Constantinian excerpts give this passage, in a very similar manner (34/5.2.3 and 34/5.2.31 respectively):

The historical inaccuracy here is quite clear. The epitome and the Constantinian excerpts give this passage, in a very similar manner (34/5.2.3 and 34/5.2.31 respectively):

The governors tried to repress them, but did not dare to punish them because of the power and influence of the men who were the masters of the bandits, so they were forced to disregard the plundering of the province: for since most of the owners were Roman knights, and were judges for charges against governors from provinces, they caused fear in the governors.

The governors tried to repress the madness of the slaves, but did not dare to punish them, and because of the power and strength of the masters they were forced to disregard the plundering of the province. For since most of the owners were recognised Roman knights, and were judges for charges against governors from provinces, they caused fear in the governors.

The first court to be permanently established for trying cases of extortion was established in 149 B.C., which is before the time of the Sicilian Insurrection, but this court was not composed in the manner in which Diodorus describes in his narrative. Rather than having a jury composed of equites, the proceedings took place in front of a board of senators, after an appeal had been made to a praetor, believed to be the praetor peregrinus. Diodorus could not have been referring to this court, and so we must look to the later history of the extortion courts. The next major change to the system of extortion courts that we know of took place at the earliest in 123 or 122 B.C. The lex Acilia set up a court in which the provincials themselves could bring extortion cases against governors, either with or without a Roman patronus. The case was then brought before a jury of fifty men chosen by a complex system of selection and rejection from a standing panel selected each year by the praetor of

---

210 We should note that the passage from the Constantinian excerpts is slightly different, including the additional information that these equites were also ἐντελεῖς, ‘recognised’: they were not only equites, but notable ones.

211 Jones (1972), 48-9; Stockton (1979), 139; Mitchell (1986), 1; Lintott (1992), 14-6; Lintott (1993), 99-100.

212 I agree with the arguments put forward by Lintott (1992), 166-9 and Crawford (1996), 49-50, that the tabula Bembina lex repetundarum records the lex of a colleague of C. Gracchus, rather than a later lex by C. Servilius Glaucia in 104 or 101 B.C. For this reason the following discussion is based on the reconstruction of the lex Acilia from the tabula Bembina.
four hundred and fifty men.\textsuperscript{213} The selection of this jury is the most interesting and pertinent part of the \textit{lex Acilia} and relates directly to the account of Diodorus.

The text of the \textit{lex Acilia} stipulates very stringent limitations on the composition of the jury. The selected individuals had to be between thirty and sixty years old, could not be or have been major or minor magistrates, and could not be senators or the fathers, sons or brothers of senators.\textsuperscript{214} The text of the \textit{lex Acilia} does not, however, preserve any positive qualifications. The account of Appian about the reform of the extortion courts states that C. Gracchus gave control of these courts to the \textit{equites} (\textit{B Civ.} 1.22). A passage from Pliny the Elder, however, suggests that the people to whom the courts were given were merely a group of people who came to be known as the \textit{equites}, but were first known as \textit{iudices} (\textit{HN} 33.34). Jones (1972: 86-90) argued that this indicates that the positive qualification defined in the law was one of census qualification, that is of owning 400,000 sesterces, which is the census qualification required to be part of the eighteen voting centuries that were given the public horse. In time, this body became thought of as part of the \textit{equites}, and was certainly thought of as such by the late Republic.\textsuperscript{215} Herein there may lie an additional anachronism: not only were the extortion courts changed in the manner described by Diodorus at the earliest in 123 or 122 B.C., and therefore a full ten years after the end of the Sicilian Insurrection, but it was also the creation of this new court that led to the formation of the greater body known as the \textit{equites} that Diodorus sees as so important to his narrative.

\textbf{Conclusion}

I am by no means the first to note this mistake in Diodorus, nor is the anachronism difficult to explain in terms of the basic details. However, a thorough understanding of how the text is mistaken at this point is vitally important for understanding how the whole prelude to the Insurrection is constructed by Diodorus, and how it seeks to link, artificially, two historical events that were in fact unconnected. In the following section of this chapter, I will show that the anachronism is in fact both the lever with which we can prise apart the logical

\textsuperscript{213} \textit{Lex repetundarum} 6-8,12-5 (\textit{RS}, Crawford). See Jones (1972), 49-50; Stockton (1979), 141; Mitchell (1986), 2; Lintott (1992), 20-2; Lintott (1993), 101-2; Crawford (1996), 97.

\textsuperscript{214} \textit{Lex repetundarum} 12-8 (\textit{RS}, Crawford). See Jones (1972), 49; Stockton (1979), 142; Mitchell (1986), 2; Lintott (1992), 21; Lintott (1993), 101-2; Crawford (1996), 98-100.

\textsuperscript{215} Badian (1972), 82-4.
construction of the narrative and the tool with which we can begin to understand the purpose of various narrative elements in Diodorus’ account of the Sicilian Insurrection.
III. Understanding An Anachronism in Diodorus’ Narrative 2: The Narrative Function

‘Further, attempts at repression on the part of Roman governors were of no avail: pressure exercised on them by wealthy slaveowners preempted their efforts, and their owners simply connived at and encouraged the illegalities of their pastores because they themselves benefited from them.’ Bradley (1989), 54.

Introduction

In the previous section of this chapter, I described and explained an anachronistic feature of Diodorus’ Sicilian Insurrection narrative. In what follows I will show why understanding this anachronism is so important for correctly interpreting the narrative in which it was placed. Typically the issue highlighted in the previous section of this chapter is dismissed as Diodorus (or Posidonius) mistaking generic aristocratic pressure on the praetores for the very real threat of legal retribution that made sense in his own time: essentially, it is argued, the text is fundamentally correct, as only the finer details are mistaken, which are easily accounted for. In what follows, I will demonstrate that this approach, in which the anachronism is excused with a probable historical gloss, represents a gross misunderstanding of what the anachronism represents in the Diodoran narrative, and how we can use it to further our analysis of Diodorus.

We should start from the following proposition: the anachronism is proof of active, covert and unsuccessful authorial intervention. From this perspective, it is less important to suggest explanations for how the information in the narrative is partially correct. Moreover, with this understood, we are able to investigate, much more clearly, the narrative function of the anachronism, and the relationship of the narrator to the causal logic underlying the narrative. With this proposition in mind, we should now turn to the description of the events

216 Frank (1935), 62; Green (1961), 13-4; Vogt (1965), 25-6; Forte (1972), 98-9; Verbrugghe (1972), 544-5; Goldsberry (1973), 242; Dumont (1987), 214-5; Bradley (1989), 54; Matsubara (1998), 166-72; Sacks (1990), 146-50; Shaw (2001), 13; Urbainczyk (2008a), 11. Finley (1968), 139-44 makes no mention of the anachronism in his discussion of the war. Verbrugghe (1975), 197-204, explains this anachronism as an example of Posidonius composing his history through the use of a narrative template, which, when projected backwards in history, became anachronistic. Manganaro (1980), 438, sees this as an example of ’l’ostilità [di Posidonio] verso la classe equestre romana’; see also Manganaro (1967), 211, for an earlier version of this argument. Farrington (1936), 21-2, misses the anachronism completely, and takes Diodorus’ explanation at its word.
that this anachronism was attempting to explain to explore the potential for a new explanation of them.

I. Background and Prelude

First, let us turn to the function of the anachronism in the narrative: it serves as a means of connecting together two different parts of the narrative. While it comes at the end of an extended introduction to the condition of Sicily prior to the Insurrection, and effectively concludes that introduction, it also provides the step that then links this description to the following narrative. As an introduction and background to the more detailed account of the Sicilian Insurrection Diodorus describes the development of banditry on the island in the preceding years, presenting this development as the aitia of the conflict.217 Both Photius and the Constantinian excerpts contain versions of this narrative; however, as is so often the case, the version from the Constantinian excerpts is the more detailed. Following Diodorus’ narrative I will split my analysis into two sections: the first will discuss actions of the landowners in Sicily (the cause), and the second will consider the results of these actions (the effect).

Diodorus describes the actions of the landowners as follows (34/5.2.1-2, 27):

έπι πολὺ τοῖς βίοις ἀναδραμόντες καὶ μεγάλους περιποιησάμενοι πλούτους συνηγόραζον οἰκετῶν πλήθος, οίς ἐκ τῶν σωματοτορφείων ἀγεληθῶν ἀπαρχεῖσιν εὐθὺς χαρακτῆρας ἐπέβαλον καὶ στημάς τοῖς σώμασιν. ἔχροντο δὲ αὐτῶν τοῖς μὲν νέοις νομεῖσα, τοῖς δ’ ἄλλοις ὡς πὴ ἐκάστοτε ἡ χρεία ἐπέβαλλε. βαρέως δ’ αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὰ υπὲρείς ἄρχοντο, καὶ ἐπιμελείας παντελῶς ἀλήγης ἥξιον, θανὰ τε καὶ ἐντρέφεσθαι καὶ θανὰ ἐνδύσασθαι.

Since they had become more prosperous in their daily lives and acquired great wealth they were buying up a large number of slaves, onto whose bodies, as they were led away from the slave merchant like cattle, they were inflicting brands and marks. They employed the young men as herdsmen, while they employed the others in such ways as need arose for each. They abused them with a heavy hand in their service, and altogether thought them worthy of the minimum of care as far as concerned food and clothing.

217 This vocabulary is present in the Photian version just before the beginning of the introductory narrative (34/5.2.1): ὁ δουλικὸς αὐτοῖς ἐπανέστη πόλαμος ἐξ αἰτίας ταυτάς, ‘the slave war rose up against them for the following reasons’. This Polybian vocabulary is also reflected in a later section of Diodorus’ narrative in which the story of Damophilus is described as being (34/5.2.9) ἀρχὴ δὲ τῆς ἀλῆς ἀποστάσεως, ‘the start of the whole revolt’. This is very similar to Polybius’ theory of causation outlined in Book 3.6-7 of his History, in which he differentiates between the αἰτία, ἀρχή, and the προφήτας of wars: that is, following Walbank (1972), 158, the matters contributing to the decision to go to war, the first acts of the war, and the pretext under which war was declared respectively.
In a similar fashion, the large landowners were buying whole slave markets to work their land to bind some with fetters, and to exhaust others with weight of work, and they marked all with arrogant brands. In consequence, so large a multitude of slaves flooded all Sicily, that those who heard the extravagant numbers did not believe them. For those of the Sicilian Greeks who had acquired much wealth were contending hotly with the Greeks of Italy in arrogance, greed and wickedness. The Italians who had acquired many slaves allowed their herdsmen such a self-indulgent life-style that they did not provide them food, but permitted them to plunder.

In essence the content of the Photian passage agrees with the Constantinian excerpt, though it provides less detail and as we will see, it misses subtle nuances in the terminology. We can see that both narratives provide the same description of the landowners’ actions: they mistreat their slaves and do not provide adequate support to their herdsmen. Both also differentiate between the general bad treatment, and the specific treatment given to the herdsmen. Here though, the nuances of the terminology are lost by Photius, and are preserved only by the Constantinian excerpt. In the first line of the Photian version, there is no subject specified, but from the context of the Photian epitome it would appear to be the Sicilians. The lines immediately preceding read (34/.5.2.1): Ὅτι ἐπὶ ἐξήκοντα ἔτει τῶν Σικελιών ἐν πάσιν, δ οὐκ ἔτοι τοιαύτης τιαυτός τοιαύτης. ‘After the destruction of Carthage, when things had been flowing smoothly for the Sicilians in every respect for sixty years, the slave war rose up against them for the following reason.’ Were we to have only Photius it would appear that the mistreatment being described was the sole responsibility of the Sicilians; but the Constantinian excerpt shows this not to be the case: it appears that the ‘Ἰταλικοὶ Ἰταλικοὶ’ were in competition with the ‘Σικελιώται’ with regard to their slaves, whereas the ‘Ἰταλικοὶ Ἰταλικοὶ’ were specifically those who allowed the herdsmen to get out of hand. Sacks (1990: 144-51) concluded that this narrative actually comprised two separate narratives, with one blaming the Greeks of Sicily and Magna Graecia which came from Posidonius, and another blaming Italians and Romans that came from Diodorus, or some

218 The manuscript is defective here.
other Sicilian source.\textsuperscript{219} I do not think we need to be this complex, at least to understand the purpose of this narrative in the context of the Sicilian Insurrection. For example, in a passage that most likely introduced the whole narrative, Diodorus more generally states that the mistreatment of slaves was a general malaise among the slave-owners on the island (34/5.2.26):

διὰ γὰρ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς εὐπορίας τῶν τὴν κρατίστην νῆσον ἐκκαρπομένων ἔπαντες σχέδον οἱ τοῖς πλούτοις προκεκοφότες ἔξηλωσαν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον τρυφήν, ἐθ´ ὑπερηφανίαν καὶ ὑβριν. ἦς ἄν ἀπάντων αὐξανομένης ἐπ´ ἴσης τῆς τε κατὰ τῶν οἰκετῶν κακουχίας καὶ τῆς κατὰ τῶν δεσποτῶν ἀλλοτριότητος, ἐρράγη ποτὲ σύν καὶ ρ ὑπὸ τὸ μίσος.

For because of the excessive wealth of those enjoying the fruits of the most excellent island, nearly all of those who had become wealthy strove after first luxury, then arrogance and insolence. Because of this, and since the mistreatment of the slaves and their estrangement from their masters increased equally, there was, when opportune, a general outburst of hatred.

It is not especially problematic that specific actions were attributed to the Italians regarding their herdsmen, which led to the herdsmen’s reaction. Furthermore, that Photius appears to miss this is not critical. He has compressed this part of the narrative so heavily that he provides no subject for his verbs, as we have seen. So perhaps the text need not be so difficult to interpret: the narrative is at least clear that the Sicilians, apparently competing with the Italian Greeks, were mistreating their slaves. This does not create undue problems with the introduction of the Italians who then figure so prominently in the overture to the war, especially since the narrator earlier confirms that mistreatment of slaves was a universal cause of revolt: essentially the aitia for the war. We do not need two different sources of information to understand why everyone was complicit in the treatment, or that some engaged in mistreatment in one form, some in another: in the narrative it works. We should now turn to the effect of their actions.

\textbf{II. Herdsmen and Praetors}

Once again in parallel passages, the results of the Italians’ – and to a lesser extent the Sicilians’ – mistreatment are narrated by Diodorus, leading to the introduction of the law-

\textsuperscript{219} Verbrugghe (1972), 544-5, seems to consider the law-court anachronism, and the resulting confusion about who was to blame, was due to cross-contamination from the narrative of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War.
courts anachronism. The Constantinian excerpt appears to record the details very closely (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.28-30): 220

Since power such as this had been given to men who, because of their physical strength were able to accomplish everything they chose, and because of their licence and leisure had the opportunity, and because of their lack of food were compelled to undertake perilous tasks, it came about that there was a swift increase in lawlessness. For first they murdered those who travelled singly or in pairs in the night the farm houses of the weak, and were destroying them by force and were plundering the possessions and were killing those who resisted. Since their courage kept growing ever greater, by night Sicily was not passable to travellers, and for those accustomed to living in the countryside it was not safe to spend time there. Everywhere was filled with violence, banditry and killings of all kinds. Since the herdsmen were experienced in the countryside and equipped like soldiers, they all were, with good reason, full of arrogance and boldness: for since they were carrying clubs, spears and remarkable shepherd’s crooks, and covered their bodies with the hides of wolves or wild boars, they had a striking appearance and one that was not far from warlike. A pack of fierce dogs following each man, and a plentiful supply of milk and meat being available made their bodies and minds wild. Therefore the whole countryside was full as though of scattered armies, as if the boldness of the slaves had been armed by the guardianship of the masters.

The text is then concluded by ‘our’ anachronism: ‘The governors tried to repress the madness of the slaves, but did not dare to punish them, and because of the power and strength of the masters they were forced to disregard the plundering of the province. For since most of the landowners were recognised Roman knights, and were judges for charges against governors from provinces, they caused fear in the governors.’ It is an impressively circumstantial descent into lawlessness. The anachronistic reference to praetors unable to act because of

---

220 There is a parallel passage in the Photian version, but it is so compressed it does not appear to be of any use as a comparative example (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.2): ἦν δὲ οἱ πληθὺς ὑπὸ λῃστέως τὸ ξίνον ἐπιρρήσαν, καὶ μετὰ φόνων ἦν ἀπάντη, καθάπερ στρατευμάτων διωσάμενοι τῶν ληστῶν. ‘The majority of them provided themselves with a livelihood through banditry, and everywhere was full of bloodshed, since the bandits were scattered like armies of soldiers.’

221 Critical notes suggest an ἄνω to start the word, therefore ‘inconspicuous’. Perhaps, although the narrative is not inexplicable without this.
legal repercussions serves to amplify the magnitude of the problem: not only was there banditry, but no-one could stop it because the authorities at the time had their hands tied. This description has been used to reconstruct the development of slavery in Sicily in this period, including the causal link between mass-mistreatment of slaves and revolt; but we know, because the passage concerning the law-courts is anachronistic, that it must be understood as direct authorial intervention. The anachronism’s purpose is clear: the amplification of the problem that the herdsmen of Sicily were causing creates an apocalyptic setting for the events to come. Bearing this proposition in mind the question that remains is this: why did the narrator need to intervene? The answer, I would suggest, is that this served to integrate the completely unrelated of the Insurrection into the larger picture of provincial mismanagement formed by the αἰτία.

III. ἡ ἀρχή τῆς ἀπόστασεως

Diodorus noted that, despite his own description of the rise of banditry, the true start of the war was the depredations Damophilus visited on his slaves (34/5.2.9). He then proceeded to introduce the character and to describe his actions with regard to his slaves. The salient

---

222 For a detailed discussion of these issues see: Farrington (1936), 21; Green (1961), 10; Vogt (1965), 24-7; Manganaro (1967), 211-2; Finley (1968), 137-9; Verbrugghe (1972), 540-58; Manganaro (1980), 437; Sacks (1990), 147-9; Dumont (1987), 213-5, 246-7; Bradley (1989), 47-55; Shaw (2000), 11-2; Urbainczyk (2008a), 11-2, 41-2. Strabo (6.2.6) records a very similar account of why the revolt happened, with a focus on herdsmen. The passage appears to be grounded in the same logic as that of Diodorus, and is perhaps from the same source. For a discussion of the Polla Stone, often connected to the events of Sicily in this period, see Appendix 8: The Polla Stone.

223 The line which links the rest of the narrative to Damophilus is preserved only in Photius, but in what follows the Constantinian excerpts on Damophilus will be used, as they preserve much greater detail of Diodorus’ account: the Constantinian excerpts record the story of Damophilus in 34/5.2.34-6, 38, 37+24b, roughly two full pages of the Loeb edition, while the Photian version (34/5.2.10) is barely a third of a Loeb page by comparison. A fragment of Posidonius, preserved in Athenaeus, also blamed Damophilus for the rise of the revolt (12.59.21-9 = F59 Kidd): Ποσειδωνίων δ’ ἐν τῇ ὀργῇ τῶν Ἰστοριῶν περὶ Δαμοφίλου λέγων τοῦ Σικελίωτος, δι’ ὁν ὁ δούλικος ἐκτιθήθη πόλεμος, ὅτε τρωφής ἦν οἰκείως, γράφει καὶ τάτα τρωφής οὖν δοῦλος ἦν καὶ κακουργός, διὰ μὲν τῆς χόρας τετρακόλως ἀπίστως περιαγόμενος καὶ ἔπους καὶ θεράποντας ἁράως καὶ παραδομὴν ἀνέγερεν κολάκων τε καὶ παιδῶν στρατιωτικῶν. ὅστοιον δὲ πανοικίᾳ ἐφοβηθέντος κατέστρεψε τὸν βίον ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκετῶν παραβρισθεῖς, ‘Posidonius, in the eighth book of his Histories, says about Damophilus of Sicily, because of whom the slave war was set in motion, that he was addicted to luxury, and he writes this: “He was therefore a slave of luxury and wickedness, leading round the countryside with him four-wheeled wagons, horses, beautiful attendants, an ill-bred following of flatterers and even of boys dressed as soldiers. But later he, with his whole household, wantonly ended his life after having been grievously insulted by his slaves’; for a discussion of this passage as evidence of Diodorus’ use of Posidonius and the interactions between the two texts, see Appendix 6: Merely a Slavish Copyist? See Mileta (1998), 142-3, for an argument that the very minor differences between the texts of Photius and the Constantinian excerpts reflect differing interpretations of Diodorus’ text, drawn from two different aims in their respective texts: this could well reflect the minor differences, but Mileta’s argument that this makes the two passages incompatible is not tenable.
passages – for the overall description of Damophilus is quite long – are as follows (34/5.2.34-6):

There was a certain Damophilus, whose family came from Enna, an exceedingly wealthy man, and of arrogant character, who, since he cultivated a vast circuit of land, and had acquired large herds of cattle, not only emulated the luxury of the Italians in Sicily, but even their great numbers of slaves and their inhumanity and arrogance towards them...For his ill-bred and uneducated nature, having gained possession of unaccountable power and an excessive fortune, first produced satiety, then wantonness, and finally ruin for himself and great misfortunes for his country. For, buying great numbers of slaves in the market, he used to treat them outrageously, branding marks on the bodies of those who had been born free in their own countries, but who had experienced the fate of slavery through capture in war. Some of them he fettered in chains and threw into worker’s barracks, while others he assigned as herdsmen, and provided neither appropriate clothing nor food.

The links to the prelude provided by Diodorus are clear. Initially Damophilus is introduced as emulating the luxury, slaves and attitudes τῶν κατὰ Σικελίαν Ἰταλικῶν, ‘of the Italians in Sicily’. Furthermore, by the end of the passage we are informed that Damophilus is exactly copying with his own herdsmen the treatment given to the herdsmen in the prelude: οὔτ’ ἐσθήτας οὔτε τροφὰς ἐχορήγη τὰς ἀρμοτούσας, ‘(he) provided neither appropriate clothing nor food’. Thus far there do not appear to be any problems: these two aspects clearly link Damophilus to Diodorus’ prelude, and would appear to account for its importance in the narrative. Yet, this story makes sense as a self-contained tale without any need for the background of general disorder in Sicily, or even Italians influencing Damophilus’ behaviour, as becomes clear when we consider the actions that actually caused Damophilus’ slaves to revolt.

Diodorus indicates in another place what truly drove Damophilus’ slaves to revolt, and it is not connected to his treatment of herdsmen. In several associated passages from the Constantinian excerpts Damophilus’ actions, as well as those of his wife, are recorded toward domestic slaves (34/5.2.38, 37 and 24b):
Here we see the actual cause of the revolt. In an important disconnection with the prelude caused an actual outbreak of revolt was directed, violently, at domestic slaves. Given by Diodorus that focussed so intensely on the herdsmen and Italians, the treatment that explicit that it was consequently, following the hyperbole, worse than those of the Italians. It was his own from the Italians, that behaviour from the Italians, are described as being worse than those of the Persians and slaves believed punishments from [their masters]

Because of his wilfulness and cruelty of character, there was not a day when the same Damophilus was cruelly. Because of the outrages and punishments from both of them, the slaves became brutal towards their masters, and believing that nothing worse than the present evils could come to them ...

The slaves agreed with one another about revolt and the murder of their masters.

Here we see the actual cause of the revolt. In an important disconnection with the prelude given by Diodorus that focussed so intensely on the herdsmen and Italians, the treatment that caused an actual outbreak of revolt was directed, violently, at domestic slaves. The text is explicit that it was διὰ τὴν εξ ἀμφοτέρων ὁβριν καὶ τιμωρίαν, `because of the outrages and punishments from [their masters]’, that the slaves chose to revolt, and specifically because the slaves believed μηδὲν ἔτι χείρον τῶν παρόντων αὐτοῖς κακῶν ἀπαντήσεται, `that nothing worse than the present evils could come to them’. A more stark contrast from the herdsmen is difficult to imagine, who were described as living in (34/5.2.27) συνήθειαν ῥαδιουργίας, `a self-indulgent life-style’, and (34/5.2.29) ἀπαντεῖς…φρονήματος καὶ θράσους, `full of arrogance and boldness’. Damophilus’ excesses, attributed to his having learnt them from the Italians of Sicily, are described as being worse than those of the Persians and consequently, following the hyperbole, worse than those of the Italians. It was his own ἀνάγκης γὰρ καὶ ἀπαίδευτος τρόπος, `ill-bred and uneducated nature’, not his learnt behaviour from the Italians, that τὸ μὲν πρῶτον κόρον ἐγέννησεν, εἶδ’ ὁβριν, τὸ δὲ

224 More accurately recorded as Megallis in the Photian version: see Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.10, 14.
225 The narrative picks up again immediately with no change in subject in 34/5.2.24b.
226 This disconnection has been noted by Matsubara (1998) 166-7.
telēuτα/uni1FD6όν τε αὐτῷ καὶ συμφοράς μεγάλας τῇ πατρίδι, ‘first produced satiety, then wantonness, and finally ruin for himself and great misfortunes for his country’ (all the above from 34/5.2.35). In fact, the critical aspects of Damophilus’ character and actions are all understandable without the prelude of Diodorus. When viewed in this light, the connection to herdsmen and Italians, which we have seen was engineered through the use of an anachronism, becomes yet more removed from the true causation of the Insurrection: it becomes a rhetorical connective gloss for the character of Damophilus, and nothing more. It appears that we have two separate narrative items: the α/uni1F30τ/uni1F77α that ends our anachronism, and the ρχ/uni1F74 that details Damophilus.

Conclusion

If we accept the above conclusion, there remains a final question: why was the artifice necessary? The answer lies in the bigger idea that the narrative was aiming to discuss. It is implied in a Constantinian excerpt that the whole narrative was used as a microcosmic example of the larger problem of how to organise civil society and avoid strife (34/5.2.33):

Not only in the exercise of political power should prominent men behave moderately to those who are humble, but also in their private lives, if they are wise, they should attend gently to their slaves. For just as arrogance and a heavy hand in cities produces civil conflicts among the free citizens, so in private homes it produces slave plots against their masters, and terrible revolts in common against cities. The more the powers that be might be changed into savagery and lawlessness, so much more are the characters of those subject to that power made savage to the point of despair: for all who chance has made humble willingly yield to those in power for virtue and good repute, but when deprived of good treatment become an enemy of those who savagely lord it over him.

This excerpt comes immediately before the account of Damophilus, which would suggest that his story was, moreover, one designed to demonstrate the moralistic lesson outlined in this passage (see also Sacks 1990: 144-5). However, this passage’s relevance extends further. The anachronism, by amplifying the problem of the herdsmen through implications of administrative corruption, also fits the purpose outlined in the passage above, making the
whole narrative about a subject greater than the limited scope of a ‘slave war’. It would appear that the author of this narrative had a problem with how to present the events in question: unsure of why Sicily suddenly exploded into revolt in a wider sense, the author plausibly suggested an aitia grounded in tales of administrative mismanagement. The narrative demonstrates the benefits of healthy political practice through the example of an island that fell into a slave war through upper-class arrogance and greed. This aitia, moreover, then draws the ἀρχὴ involving Damophilus into the bigger debate: Italian greed and vice seeps beyond administrative misconduct and corrupts the practices of the Sicilians themselves, causing, indirectly, the ἀρχὴ of the revolt. Once this is made clear, the narratorial edifice falls apart: historically the explanation does not work. If we consider that even the introduction of Eunus into the narrative is tied to the anachronistic aitia, it is clear that we require a new context in which to interpret the remaining evidence. In the following section I will discuss how we can understand the narrative’s details once we discard the context provided in the narrative.

Verbrugghe (1975), 197-204, building on the work of Strasburger (1965), 43, argued this tale of administrative mismanagement was a narrative template that ‘Posidonius’ used to understand a conflict about which he only knew (Verbrugghe (1975), 192) ‘episodic adventure stories’. Verbrugghe (1975), 198-201, argued that this template was based jointly on what he called the latifundia of Italy in the 70s B.C. and the rise of piracy in the first century B.C. While this may well be the origin of the overall frame developed, this thesis is overly reliant on two hypotheses: first, that the source underlying Diodorus’ account is uncomplicatedly Posidonius; second, that the general details of the narrative of the Sicilian Insurrection appear to be disconnected from each other because they actually were disconnected details. On the first point, see Appendix 6: Merely a Slavish Copyist?; on the second point, it should be noted that with an account as fragmentary as that of the Sicilian Insurrection, it is impossible to tell, for the most part, if the disconnection of narrative details was the case in the original narrative, or merely the result of the process of epitomisation and excerption. The only point of clear disconnection in the narrative is between the aitia and the ἀρχὴ of the conflict, as outlined above.

In the Photian epitome, as we will see, the anachronism is immediately followed by a general summation of the condition of the slaves in Sicily, and then a long introduction of Eunus (34/5.2.4-11). The Constantinian excerpts do not provide the long introduction of Eunus given in the Photian version (34/5.2.5-9), but jump almost directly to Damophilus, who would appear to be somewhat later in the narrative.
III. Understanding An Anachronism in Diodorus’ Narrative 3: Eunus and the Sicilian Insurrection

Introduction

We have seen in the previous two sections of this chapter that Diodorus’ prelude to the narrative of the Sicilian Insurrection was connected to the main part of the narrative by means of an anachronistic αἰτία in which praetorian inaction was explained through Romano-Italian intervention. Furthermore, without this connection there is no explicit narratological link between the rise of banditry in Sicily concluded by the anachronism and the ἀρχή of the Sicilian Insurrection. The aim of this section will be to analyse the remaining narrative of Diodorus based on the new understanding of the narratological separation that exists within his account, and to suggest a new context in which to place the passages under consideration.

I will argue that events central to the account of the Sicilian Insurrection can only be superficially linked to the prelude provided for the conflict. First, the account of Eunus, which is so central to the majority of the events of the war, and which provides the framework to connect all the events, will be shown to be completely explicable outwith the specific context provided by Diodorus. Indeed for Eunus, as for Damophilus in the previous section, it will be demonstrated that the material that connected him to the prelude in the narrative was merely a rhetorical connective gloss that should not affect our interpretation of Eunus’ purpose in the narrative. With these conclusions, it will then be necessary to consider – if the context provided in Diodorus is incorrect – what alternate context we can find. The new understanding of Eunus’ story gained in Chapter II means that we cannot use the narrative of Eunus to construct an accurate context for Diodorus’ narrative, and so we must turn to the context drawn out in Chapter I from the coinage of King Antiochus to create a more accurate analysis of Diodorus’ narrative within Sicilian history. Finally, it will be concluded that to label a conflict a ‘slave war’ which so clearly includes a wider range of
participants than merely slaves is a gross over-simplification that we must avoid, even if the ancient literary sources (as many modern authorities) were apt to use the term themselves.

I. A Return to Eunus

As I noted in the conclusion to the previous section of this chapter, one of the functions of the anachronism was to provide a method for introducing Eunus into the narrative. From this point on, with the notable exception of the section about Damophilus, the whole narrative revolves around the figure of Eunus discussed in Chapter II. In the Photian epitome of Diodorus, after Eunus is introduced at 34/5.2.5, he features in every section of the narrative apart from 34/5.2.19-20. He is the active agent at each critical juncture throughout, with the exception of 34/5.2.18 when Photius refers to the rebels as a whole in battle. It is also notable that Eunus is the very last rebel captured, and with his capture the narrative is wrapped up quite perfunctorily. In the Constantinian excerpts Eunus first appears at 34/5.2.24b when Damophilus’ slaves approach him. From here he does not feature as prominently as in the Photian epitome, but this could be because the Constantinian excerpts have a large number of moralising passages in them (34/5.2.33; 39; 40; 47). Otherwise, in the passages detailing actions taken by the rebels, Eunus appears as the active agent in five out of six passages. How Diodorus introduces Eunus into the narrative is therefore important to understanding how he sought to integrate Eunus into the prelude provided. The specific question I want to address here is this: how does Eunus relate to the disconnected prelude given by Diodorus?

I.i. Eunus’ Entry

Immediately after rounding off his prelude with the law-courts anachronism, Diodorus provides a brief recapitulation of slave conditions before introducing Eunus. The passage is quite short, although it is unclear if this is because Photius compressed the passage (34/5.2.4):

Πιεζόμενοι δὲ οἱ δοῦλοι ταῖς ταλαπωρίαις καὶ πληγαῖς τὰ πολλὰ παραλόγως ἵβριζόμενοι, οὐχ ὑπέμενον, συνιόντες οὖν ἄλληλοις κατὰ τὰς εὐκαιρίας συνελάλουν περὶ ἀποστάσεως, ἐως εἰς ἔργον τὴν βουλὴν ἔγαγον.

Eunus appears actively in Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.24b, 41, 42, 43, and 46. The only other passage is Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.40.
The slaves, oppressed by their hardships, and frequently ill-treated with blows beyond reason, could not endure. Therefore, meeting with each other as opportunity allowed, they talked together about revolt, until they put their plan into action.

Following on from this is the long introduction of Eunus discussed in Chapter II (34/5.2.5-9) in which Eunus’ position as a domestic slave of Antigenes is established, as is his claim to be a wonder-worker (τερατευόμενος). The juxtaposition of these two passages would seem to make a clear suggestion: while the slaves were oppressed and chose to revolt, Eunus was a central part of the plan that they decided to put into action. The connection between the prelude and Eunus has been made; but as we have seen in the previous section, we need to question whether these connections between important events and the prelude are authorial artifice rather than a true reflection of historical causality. To answer this question, we have to again find the actual moment in the narrative at which Eunus enters as an active participant and how this is presented as fitting into the narrative.

In fact Eunus’ first active participation in the revolt, as opposed to his early interactions with his master and his master’s friends at dinner parties described in Diodorus’ introduction of Eunus (34/5.2.5-9), comes just after Damophilus had sparked the revolt as discussed in the previous section. I have already explored the passage in Chapter II when analysing the rhetorical and narratological strategies employed in the text to slander the character of Eunus, but here I would like to consider the passage in a narrative setting (34/5.2.37+24b):

καὶ διὰ τὴν ἔξ ἁμορτέρων ὑβριν καὶ τιμωρίαν ἀπεθηριώθησαν οἱ δούλοι πρὸς τοὺς κυρίους, καὶ διαλαβόντες μηδὲν ἐτί χείρον τῶν παρόντων αὐτοῖς κακῶν ἀπαντήσεσθαι...

Ὅτι συνετίθεντο πρὸς ἄλληλοις οἱ δούλοι περὶ ἀποστάσεως καὶ φόνου τῶν κυρίων. παρελθόντες δὲ πρὸς τὸν Εὔνουν οὐκ ἀποθεῖσθαν διατρίβοντα ἥρωτον εἰ συγχωρεῖται παρὰ τῶν θεῶν αὐτοῖς τὸ βεβουλευμένον. ὃ δὲ τερατευόμενος μετ’ ἐνθουσισμῷ καὶ περὶ τίνων ἠκουσὶ ἀκούσας διασάρθησαν ὅτι διδόσαν αὐτοῖς οἱ θεοὶ τὴν ἀπόστασιν, ἕως μηδεμίαν ὑπερβολὴν ποιηταθείν ταῦτα παραρθήσει μὲν ἐχειρήσομεν ταῖς ἑπιβολαῖς ὑπὸ γὰρ τῆς πεπρομένης αὐτοῖς κεκυρώσθατα πατρίδα την Ἐνυν. οὕτων ἀκρόπολιν ὅλης τῆς νήσου. τοιοῦτον λόγον ἀκούσαντες καὶ διαλαβόντες ὅτι τὸ δαιμόνιον αὐτοῖς συνεπιλαμβάνεται τῆς προαιρέσεως, οὕτως παρέστησαν ταῖς ψυχαῖς πρὸς τὴν ἀπόστασιν ὡστε μηδεμίαν ἀναβολὴν τῶν δεδομένων ποιηθῆναι...καὶ τούτων ἄφηγετο Εὔνους.

Because of the outrages and punishments from both of them, the slaves became brutal towards their masters, and believing that nothing worse than the present evils could come to them...

---

230 A similar passage is preserved in the Photian epitome, but it is heavily compressed by comparison; see Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.10-1.
The slaves agreed with one another about revolt and the murder of their masters. They came to Eunus, who was spending time not far away, and they asked if their decision was approved by the gods. He began working wonders in a frenzy, and when he heard why they had come he made clear that the gods gave them permission to revolt, so long as they did not delay but immediately undertook their enterprise: for it was fated that Enna, the citadel of the whole island, was fixed as their homeland. Since they had heard these words and believed that the divine power was assisting them in their plan, they were so disposed in their minds for revolt that they made no delay in what they had decided…and Eunus was their leader.

The narrative here clearly assumes a prior knowledge of who Eunus was and how we are meant to react to his wonder-working, information provided earlier in the narrative by his introduction (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.5-9). We saw above that the rise of the Insurrection among Damophilus’ slaves had no clear link to the prelude provided by Diodorus, indeed any link suggested in the text was merely a rhetorical connective gloss because the connection related so superficially to what was actually important in the story of Damophilus. Likewise, it is only at this point in the account that Eunus becomes integrated firmly into the events: his earlier introduction, despite its connection to the prelude, was there merely to provide the essentials of Eunus' character once he became important. However, the mere fact that the connection had been made before in Eunus’ introduction would mean that an unaware reader would proceed with reading the passage above without divesting it of the context implied through both the introduction of Eunus and the story of Damophilus: the Italians and the banditry would lurk at the back of their minds, as indeed they have for modern readers. Understood correctly, there is no need for a link to Diodorus’ prelude: the presence of Eunus makes sense in the context of a small scale rising of slaves driven to despair by their individual master. The passage describes at best an episodic moment, an exemplum of how not to treat slaves for otherwise they will rise in outright revolt, and into this exemplum is drawn a larger-than-life character of a cowardly slave wonder-worker. A massive rise in banditry, the complicity of the Italians and Romans in the inaction of praetores, even the widespread inhumane treatment of slaves described in Sicily is unnecessary in order to understand this passage. It is now clear that even the subtle strands linking Eunus to the

---

231 This also confirms that the layout of the narrative given in Photius is accurate: it is very difficult to forge an understanding of how the narrative was structured from the Constantinian excerpts alone.

232 Farrington (1936), 21-2; Green (1961), 10; Vogt (1965), 24-7; Manganaro (1967), 211-2; Finley (1968), 137-9; Verbrugge (1972), 540-58; Goldsberry (1973), 241-2; Manganaro (1980), 437; Dumont (1987), 233-9; Bradley (1989), 47-55; Sacks (1990), 147-9; Shaw (2000), 11-2; Urbainczyk (2008a), 11-2, 41-2.

233 In this interpretation I go against nearly every modern scholar to have written on the subject, in which the inhumanity toward slaves generally, the complicity of Italians and Romans in the inaction of praetores (however this is realised) and the rise in banditry is typically foregrounded as the only explicable context for these events. See Farrington (1936), 20-3; Green (1961), 10; Vogt (1965), 25-7; Manganaro (1967), 211-3; Finley (1968), 138-40; Forte (1972), 98-9; Goldsberry (1973), 241-3; Manganaro (1980), 436-8; Dumont
that the text gave for the whole revolt, understood as authorial artifice because of the clear anachronism present in the connection, can now be left aside for what they are: tenuous, unnecessary and unhistorical.

II. A New Context

Understanding fully the purpose of the anachronism in the narrative presents an additional problem. If we cannot rely on the background context provided by Diodorus, we are left with the character of Eunus to bind together the disparate strands of the narrative, and give it shape. We have seen, however, that Eunus’ character in the narrative was not constructed along lines of strict historiographical ‘truth’, but had many layers of rhetorical meaning put into it. With every event in the narrative tied to his character and influenced by his presence, and his description so tied into rhetorical and narratological ends, we must be extremely careful when using Eunus’ story to reconstruct events; but without the structural context provided by Eunus’ story the events described in Diodorus become disconnected, and mean very little.

All that remains is a notice that in Sicily, in 136 B.C., a conflict arose. This conflict took several years to be fully resolved, and only through the intervention of the highest level of Roman magistrates. At this point, the island was undergoing considerable internal turmoil, with the free poor of Sicily engaging in opportunistic looting (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.48). There is, nonetheless, another context in which to reconstruct the Sicilian Insurrection, one already shown in Chapter I, and reiterated in Chapter II. There I argued that another form of evidence, the coinage from the kingdom of King Antiochus, can best be understood as part of a Sicilian insurrection against the Roman dominance of the island, and the situation that Rome had created there. Not only was the coinage of King Antiochus most explicable in the context of an eastern Sicilian Hellenistic kingdom, but furthermore the island of Sicily was, in the period, a vibrant Hellenistic culture with strong civic identities throughout the island. With a declining interior, notably former Sicilian centres like Enna and Morgantina, and a burgeoning coast, represented by towns such as Catana, Syracuse and Messana, Sicily was an island divided in its fortunes, but King Antiochus’ kingdom, the same as that of Eunus,

(1987), 228-9, 241-8; Bradley (1989), 47-55; Sacks (1990), 144-9; Matsubara (1998); 157; Shaw (2000), 11-2; Urbainczyk (2008a), 11-3.

234 Cic. Verr. 2.4.112; Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.20-3; Flor. 2.7.7-8; Liv. Per. 56, 58-9; Oros. 5.9.4-8; Val. Max. 2.7.3, 9; 4.3.10; 6.9.8; 9.12.1.
represented the last efforts of the people of inland Sicily to redefine their futures. The disorder of the free poor I have argued reflected the divides present among the Sicilians. These divides were linked to Rome’s economic exploitation of the island, and the collusion in that exploitation by some among the ruling classes of Sicily. In short, the one detail that we know for certain about the conflict was that it was much more complex than simply what the label of a ‘slave rebellion’ implies.

**Conclusion**

So where do the slaves come from, if the narrative is incorrect? From where do the ancient authors drag out the spectre of a slave uprising with which to tar the actions of a significant portion of the free people of Sicily? I think we would do best to refrain from such absolute questions: perhaps the slaves were always there, fighting in the war, but only in the write-up did they become the most important aspect of the war. It is also highly probable that there was indeed servile unrest: I would argue that one reason that King Antiochus was so closely linked with a ‘slave rebellion’ was because he, like so many in the ancient world, freed slaves, or welcomed runaways from his enemies, in order to fight in his army. We can detect subtle hints of this in a passage of Diodorus preserved in the Constantinian excerpts. In a short, unconnected passage recounting the details of a siege, the rebels taunt in turn the Roman soldiers and the Sicilian inhabitants of the city they are besieging. The passage runs as follows (34/5.2.46):

```
Τον ο Εύνους ἐκτὸς βέλους ἐπιστῆσα τὴν δόναμιν ἐβλασφήμει τοῦς Ῥωμαίους, ἀποφαίωμενος ὅσι έαυτούς ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνος εἷς δραπέτας τῶν κινδύνων, μίμοις δὲ ἐξ ἀποστάσεως τοῖς ἐνδόν ἐπεδέκυντο, δὴ ὅν οἱ δοῦλοι τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων κυρίων ἀποστάσεις εξεθάτριζον, ὄνειδιζόντες σὺτῶν τὴν ὑπερηφανίαν καὶ τὴν ὑπερβολήν τῆς εἰς τὸν ὀλέθρον προσαγούσης ὃμερος.
```

Eunus, having stationed his force beyond the range of the missiles, taunted the Romans, declaring that it was not his men, but they who were running away from danger. He displayed mimes from the revolt

235 Slaves were regularly freed in order to fight in ancient conflicts. See Appendix 9: Slaves in Ancient Warfare for examples of the practice.
236 There are a number of slingshots attributed to the Sicilian Insurrection; see Manganaro (2000) for the details. These appear to give the individual communities and sub-divisions in which Sicilian citizens were serving. However, interpretations that place these slingshots in the context of forces fighting for Rome assume, a priori, that this is the only capacity under which Sicilian citizens would fight: for this interpretation see Shaw (2000), 105-6, 128-9, and Prag (2007a), 98-9. Bearing in mind the conclusions of this chapter, and the two preceding, it is equally plausible that these forces fought for King Antiochus.
237 The siege of which city is unspecified; at the very least it is not that of Enna, as chronologically and narratologically that would not work, but it is perhaps that of Morgantina, the town recovered by L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi in 133 B.C.; see Brennan (1993), 184, for the chronology.
for those within the city, through which the slaves made a public show of the revolts from their individual masters, casting in their teeth the arrogance and excessive violence that had led to their ruin.

The taunting of the Romans is completely explicable in any warfare context involving Rome, but perhaps the taunting of those within the city also took place, in which runaway slaves from the city in Antiochus’ army taunted the owners in the city they were later hoping to kill after a successful siege. This interpretation of why slaves feature so prominently in the ancient sources would also explain how stories about slave-owners like Damophilus rose out of the war (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.10, 34-8): we can reinterpret this story as one in which a brutal slave-owner was murdered by his slaves, who then fled to King Antiochus and joined his cause. There is no inherent problem in having slaves involved in the conflict; indeed I think it perfectly sensible for King Antiochus to have actively encouraged slaves to join him. During the American War of Independence the British colonial army actively encouraged the slaves in the colonies to abandon their masters with the promise of freedom if the slaves fought in the British army. The hope was that in this way the undermanned armies of the British colonial forces might be bolstered, and that the rebelling plantation owners would have to deal with a spread of servile insurrections throughout the colonies. It seems reasonable to suggest, fully aware of the different historical contexts, a similar strategy for King Antiochus.

However, to label a movement so clearly steeped in Sicilian culture and history, a movement so clearly designed to appeal to the free people of Sicily, and one that succeeded in this effort, in short, to label a movement such as this as a ‘slave rebellion’ merely because slaves were involved is ironically to deny the voices of the people of Sicily their own legitimacy: the failure of scholarship in the past has been to focus so narrowly on giving the voice back to the slaves that they have denied it to the free people of Sicily. We would never label the Second Punic War a ‘slave war’ merely because Rome freed slaves in order to form legions when under extreme duress. The ancient sources were not so scientific in their use of the label. In Diodorus alone there are several examples of this confusion. When providing a proem to the Sicilian Insurrection, Diodorus noted that (34/5.2.26)

238 See Schama (2006), 17-8, 59-70, and 84-5, for details and bibliography.
239 Liv. 22.57 records that the Romans enlisted eight thousand slaves, freeing them on the understanding that they had to fight in the war. To this point could be added any of the wars mentioned in Appendix 9: Slaves in Ancient Warfare. This does not preclude our unscientific use of the label about conflicts that the ancients saw first as slave revolts: see Appendix 10: The Definition of a Slave Revolt.
(a) similar thing happened in Asia during the same period, when Aristonicus laid claim to a kingdom that did not belong to him, and the slaves, because of mistreatment by their masters, shared in this man’s folly and encompassed many cities in great misfortunes.

Similarly, Diodorus considered the uprising lead by T. Vettius (36.2.6 and 2a) to be part of a trio of slave uprisings, despite the fact that all of the impetus in the event arose from a free man trying to escape debt. In both cases Diodorus saw an event involving slaves and considered it to be in the bracket of a ‘slave rebellion’ despite its more complex nature. These conflicts had little to do with slavery in their core issues and yet were often slandered with the label; however, we need not be so imprecise ourselves. The Insurrection discussed here was a major threat not only to Rome’s control over Sicily in general terms, but also to their first and most famous effort at provincial control. For this effort to fail so spectacularly would not be an option: how much more palatable was a slave rebellion that the ancient sources agreed was not only outwith the normal nature of slaves (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.13, 26, 33, 37, 40), but also by inference easily avoidable in future, than admitting that Sicily, the oldest of Rome’s overseas provinces, was deeply unhappy with Roman rule, and capable of fighting to change it? When viewed in this light, it is little wonder that Eunus was so carefully attacked throughout the narrative: by downplaying his abilities, Diodorus also directly reduced the appearance of threat from the conflict to the Roman status quo. Whoever the final author was of the text we call Diodorus’ (see Appendix 6: King Antiochus’ title in Diodorus for Posidonius’ pro-Roman bias and Sacks 1990: 122 no. 22; 151-3), and however exactly over the years in which this text was created the sources were employed, I wonder whether Diodorus, Posidonius, or whoever else, may not have regarded the reconstruction of events given in the first three chapters of this thesis to be substantially closer to the historical truth than the Diodoran account that has haunted the imagination of both historians of ancient Sicily and Rome, and scholars of Roman slavery alike for centuries now.

240 King Eumenes III (Aristonicus): Just. Epit. 36.4.5-12, 37.1.1-3; Strabo 13.4.2, 14.1.38; Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.26, 34/5.3; Sall. Hist. 4.69.8-9; Cic. Phil. 11.8.18; Laelius, De Amicitia 11.37; Livy, Per. 59; Oros. 5.10.1-5; Eutr. 4.8.21-9, 4.9.1-23; Val. Max. 3.2.12; Vel. Pat. 2.4.1; Plut. Vit. Flam. 21.6; Flor. 1.35.1-7. Sextus Pompeius: Res Gestae 27.3.

241 In any case, we must be careful when using the terms ‘slave revolt’, ‘slave war’, ‘slave rebellion’, ‘sklavenaufstände’ or ‘guerre servili’ to be completely upfront about what we actually mean: see Appendix 10: The Definition of a Slave Revolt for a discussion of the imprecise use of these terms, and for an effort at a new definition.

242 In the following chapters I discuss Cicero’s representation of Sicily as a peaceful and loyal province of Rome, and this description’s relationship to reality.
IV. Antiquus socius fidelissimus 1: Athenion, Verres and Cicero

Itaque in Sicilia non Athenionem, qui nullum oppidum cepit, sed Timarchidem fugitivum omnibus oppidis per triennium scitote regnasse

‘You will easily see, therefore, that, for three years, not Athenion, who captured no town, but Timarchides was king of the runaways over all towns in Sicily.’ Cic. Verr. 2.2.136.

Introduction

The three previous chapters have demonstrated that the event typically known as the First Sicilian Slave War can be better understood as a Sicilian Insurrection based in the east of the island, and aimed against the Roman domination of the island. Leaving aside for the moment the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War, which will be discussed in later chapters, the only other time that Sicily featured in the literary record of the Roman Republic occurred during the repentundae case against C. Verres. Cicero’s prosecution speech against Verres was a wide-ranging attack on Verres’ actions as governor in a variety of fields. Out of necessity, therefore, Cicero drew on the history of Sicily including the two Sicilian ‘Slave Wars’ throughout the Verrine Orations. This chapter aims to assess how Cicero’s engagement in his Verrine Orations with these two events can be utilised for our understanding of what he called the ‘Slave Wars’, and furthermore to assess if his rhetoric about Sicily can be deconstructed in order to gauge the island’s reputation as a source of allies among the Romans of the first century B.C. This understanding, in turn, will demonstrate that Cicero differed in his engagement with the two ‘Slave Wars’, and that this difference can only be explained by their very different nature. As a result, Cicero’s ‘use’ of the ‘Slave Wars’ allows us to separate their natures, too.

I. Cicero and the ‘Slave Wars’

We will start our investigation of Cicero’s role in understanding the two Sicilian ‘Slave Wars’ by assessing how he used these events in his Verrine Orations. On the few occasions when Cicero actually evokes the memory of the two ‘Slave Wars’, he does so in a manner that suggests a complex interaction of events, the mention alone of which seems to have
caused him some discomfort.\textsuperscript{243} We will also see that Cicero’s engagement with the Sicilian Insurrection differs markedly from that with the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War. I will concentrate first on Cicero’s straightforward statements regarding the history of the ‘Slave Wars’ before moving on to his more veiled references.

\textit{i.i. Athenion as a Comparative}

Cicero’s most important and direct tactic when using the ‘Slave Wars’ in his \textit{Verrine Orations} manifested itself in explicit comparatives within his invective against Verres and his accomplices. As his method of comparison varied, each case must be dealt with individually. The simplest comparison Cicero used compared the actions of Verres, Timarchides or Apronius unambiguously to the leaders’ of the ‘slave revolts’; or perhaps, I should say, to Athenion, since in the entirety of the \textit{Verrine Orations} no other ‘slave’ leader is mentioned.\textsuperscript{244} Despite being the only ‘slave’ leader exploited in the \textit{Verrine Orations}, Athenion is still used sparingly by Cicero: he is brought up only three times throughout the orations (2.2.136; 2.3.66; 2.3.125). Each comparison will be introduced in turn and briefly considered, thus yielding wider conclusions from the work as a whole. I will discuss the comparison between Athenion and both Apronius and Verres first, for this comparison is the least problematic.

The first mention of Apronius in the speech is a lengthy character sketch, which ostensibly was meant to turn the audience against him. In this sketch (2.3.23) we learn that Apronius was the equal of Verres in his ‘mores improbos impurosque’ ‘foul and wicked character’, as well as that he was ‘gurges vitiorum turpitudinumque omnium’ ‘an abyss of all vices and abominations’. When Cicero finally draws on the comparison between Athenion and Apronius, it is to demonstrate the outright excesses of Apronius, a man whom the audience has already been informed was an ‘inhumanus…barbarus’ ‘savage barbarian’. He then brings Verres into the comparison as the man in charge of the province as a whole (2.3.65-6):

\begin{quote}
\textit{Tantum apud te quaestus Aproni, tantum eius sermo inquinatissimus et blanditiae flagitiosae valuerunt ut numquam animum tuum cura tuarum fortunarum cogitatioque tangeret?}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{243} Even including very oblique references, Cicero refers to the two ‘Slave Wars’ only nine times: the Sicilian Insurrection four times (2.2.32; 2.2.125; 2.4.108; 2.4.112); the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War four times (2.2.136; 2.3.66; 2.5.2-3; 2.5.7-8); and both together once (2.3.125).

\textsuperscript{244} The significance of the absence of the name of any other ‘slave’ leader will be discussed further in what follows.
Cernitis, iudices, quod et quantum incendium decumanorum impetu non solum per agros sed etiam per reliquias fortunas aratorum, neque solum per bona sed etiam per iura libertatis et civitatis isto praetore pervaserit...Quid est hoc? populi Romani imperium, praetoriae leges, iudicia in socios fidelis, provincia suburbana? Nonne omnia potius eius modi sunt quae, si Athenio rex fugitivorum vicisset, in Sicilia non fecisset? Non, inquam, iudices, esset ullam partem istius nequitiae fugitivorum insolentia consecuta.

Did Apronius’ profit, his filthy conversation and his disgraceful flatteries have such power over you [Verres] that consideration and care for your fortunes never took hold of your mind? You perceive, judges, how a conflagration of collectors, like an attack, swept through, not only the fields, but even the remaining property of the farmers; nor only through their wealth, but even through their rights of freedom and citizenship, when this man was praetor...What is this? Is this the command of the Roman people? Are these the laws of a praetor? Are these the trials for your trusted allies? Wouldn’t everything be better in Sicily, if Athenion the king of the runaways had won, for he would not have done these things in this manner? I say, judges, that with their insolence, the runaways would not copy any part of this man’s vileness.

Ignoring the hyperbole engaged in here by Cicero, the comparison is unmistakable: the actions of Apronius, and by association the complicity of Verres in those actions, was, to Cicero, a greater threat to Sicily than even the victory of Athenion in the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War could have been. Given the widespread nature of Apronius’ actions in this comparison, ranging over the whole island, Cicero has clearly chosen the comparison of Athenion in order to play on the island-wide danger that Apronius posed. In context, Cicero has just finished at this stage relating Apronius’ crimes in extorting grain, money and property from wealthy landowners, and in a later speech Cicero admits that the richest men stood to lose most to a slave revolt (2.5.20), causing his comparison to be all the more striking: losing property to Apronius and Verres was worse than any other disaster that could have otherwise befallen them. Cicero also used the figure of Athenion for another comparison with a despoiler of the richest landowners’ property, Timarchides, this time through judicial extortion.

This comparison is more problematic than the last, for Cicero’s choice of Athenion is not necessarily the best. Athenion is incorporated at the end of a passage, which relates the character of Timarchides, a thoroughly despicable individual (2.2.134-6). Among his many vices – including a penchant for thievery and a licentious ability to corrupt women – Cicero noted his (135) ‘ars et malitia miranda’ ‘amazing skill and malice’. Finally concluding the attack on Timarchides, Cicero noted that (2.2.136)

(i)taque in Sicilia non Athenionem, qui nullum oppidum cepit, sed Timarchidem fugitivum omnibus oppidis per triennium scitote regnasse; in Timarchidi potestate sociorum populi
Romani antiquissimorum atque amicissimorum liberos, matres familias, bona fortunasque omnis fuisse.

(you will easily see, therefore, that for three years, not Athenion who captured no town, but Timarchides was king of the runaways over all the towns in Sicily; that all the children, wives, households, goods and money of the oldest and closest allies of the Roman people were in the power of Timarchides.

The point of the comparison is quite clear: Timarchides’ dominion over Sicily was so destructive, and so abusive that it must have appeared, Cicero suggests, that Athenion was in control of all Sicily. It would seem to be a perfectly rational link to make, except for Cicero’s own admission: Athenion ‘nullum oppidum cepit’ ‘captured no town’. A more vivid comparison would have been between Timarchides, the man who ostensibly controlled all the towns of Sicily for three years, and King Antiochus (or Eunus), the man who, by capturing several towns in Sicily for several years, came much closer to matching, and perhaps even surpassing the achievements of Timarchides than Athenion ever managed. That this comparison was not used is significant, as we shall see in Cicero’s final mention of Athenion.

In the course of the third oration of the second Actio, Cicero drew on a letter of the new governor of Sicily, L. Marcellus, which had been written to the senate.\(^{245}\) In the letter Marcellus outlined all his actions in Sicily, which ensured that the remaining farmers returned to their land and began working again. Cicero seized this opportunity to point out the contrast between the results of Verres and APRonius’ actions and the aftermath of the three great disasters that had previously befallen Sicily one hundred and fifty years ago (2.3.125):

Cum bellis Carthaginiensibus Sicilia vexata est, et post nostra patrumque memoria cum bis in ea provincia magnae fugitivorum copiae versatae sunt, tamen aratorum interitio facta nulla est. Tum sementi prohibita aut messe amissa fructus annuus interibat; tamen incolumis numerus manebat dominorum atque aratorum; tum qui M. Laevin aut P. Rupilio aut M’. Aquilio praetores in eam provinciam successerant aratores reliquos non colligebant. Tantone plus Verres cum APRonio provinciae Siciliae calamitatis importavit quam aut Hasdrubal cum Poenorum exercitu, aut Athenio cum fugitivorum maximis copiis, ut temporibus illis, simul atque hostis superatus esset, ager araretur omnis neque aratori praetor per litteras supplicaret neque eum praesens oraret ut quam plurimum sereret; nunc autem ne post abitum quidem huius importunissimae pestis quisquam reperiretur qui sua voluntate araret, pauci essent reliqui qui L. Metelli auctoritate in agros atque ad suum larem familiarem redirent?

When Sicily was plagued by the Carthaginian war, and after, in our memories and those of our fathers, great numbers of runaways moved around the province, nevertheless there was no ruin of farmers. Then a year’s fruits were lost by a prevented sowing or a missed harvest; nevertheless the number of

\(^{245}\) It is unimportant here that it is likely that Cicero carefully misrepresented the letter of L. Marcellus to be more damning than it was for Verres, since the issue here is the rhetoric deployed, not the technical meaning of Marcellus’ letter: for a discussion of the letter’s potential ‘real’ meaning see Frazel (2009), 202-7.
households and farms remained intact; then the praetors who were succeeding M. Laevinus, or P. Rupilius, or M’. Aquilius did not draw together the surviving farmers. Did Verres, with Apronius, bring to the province of Sicily so many more injuries than Hasdrubal with his Carthaginian army, or Athenion with his enormous forces of runaways, so that, while in those times, as soon as the enemy was overcome, land was tilled everywhere, and the praetor neither implored the farmer through letters nor entreated him in person to sow as much as possible; yet now, not even after the departure of this dangerous pest was anyone found who tilled on his own accord, and there were few survivors who came back, by the authority of L. Metellus, to the fields and to their hearths and homes?

The contrast drawn here is quite striking, especially as Cicero narrates it. Verres’ predations caused more harm than rampaging fugitives or a Carthaginian army, but it is not this element that should pique interest here. Cicero is careful to mention each of the Roman governors who concluded every episode in Sicily, but only explicitly names Hasdrubal and Athenion among the enemy generals who ravaged the island. The Sicilian Insurrection is referred to only implicitly by the naming of P. Rupilius as the Roman governor who ended the war. Much like the passage discussed above (2.2.136), Cicero appears to be avoiding any explicit mention of the Sicilian Insurrection when he delves into the history of Sicily. In this he differs from his treatment of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War: Athenion is openly mentioned by name, and used as an example of the worst fate a province can suffer, with the exception of Verres himself.246 What is perhaps most striking is that even when Cicero cannot avoid mentioning the Sicilian Insurrection, he is very careful in his use of the event, as the following discussion demonstrates.

I.ii. The Sicilian Insurrection in Cicero

Cicero’s discretion regarding the Sicilian Insurrection is best illustrated in his passage concerning the town of Enna, along with the story of Verres’ attempts to steal the sacred statuary of the town in the fourth oration of the second Actio (2.4.106-15).247 In this passage

246 Cicero’s invective against Verres develops throughout the Orationes. What follows is only a brief sketch, but annotates the relevant developments. In the early speeches Verres is called a madman (1.15), accused of engaging in orgies and drunkenness (2.1.32-3); and even, in one passage, called licentious, lazy, cowardly, rude and feminine (2.2.192). However, by the end of the Orationes he is at first compared to the ‘slaves’ at Enna (2.4.112); then progressively, throughout the fifth speech of the second Actio, called a king (2.5.27); a catamite (2.5.33-4); a pirate (2.5.54); a woman (2.5.81); a wild beast (2.5.109); until finally he is compared to Charybdis and Scylla, and called a second Cyclops (2.5.146). For Verres’ underlings, comparison with Athenion and an exclamation that they were worse than Athenion was a typical method of concluding an invective on their characters: see 2.2.136 for Timarchides; and 2.3.66 for Apronius. Apronius is inveighed against with the harshest censure among the lieutenants, at one point even being described as worse than Verres (2.3.23), but also called a semi-slave (2.3.134) and a pirate (2.5.70). Frazel (2009), 125-86, argued that the entire fifth speech of the second Actio aimed to portray Verres as a tyrant.

247 In spite of the fact that the second Actio was never delivered, it is still nonetheless important for study. While Cicero, in publishing this speech after having already driven Verres from Rome with the first Actio, avoided having to present all his evidence completely accurately, he nevertheless had to publish a text displaying his
Cicero had no choice other than to make a reference to the town’s history during the Sicilian Insurrection, but the way in which he engages with this history is cautious at best. He openly mentions the town’s supposed capture by the ‘slaves’ of the Sicilian Insurrection only once, after narrating the whole episode in which Verres’ men stole some statuary from the shrine to Demeter (2.4.112):

\[
\text{Henna tu simulacrum Ceres iti tollere audiebas, Henna tu de manu Ceres victoriam eripere et deam deae deträhere conatus es? quorum nihil violare, nihil attingere ausi sunt in quibus erant omnia quae sceleri propriora sunt quam religiones. Tenuerunt enim P. Popilio P. Rupilio consulis illum locum servi, fugitivi, barbari, hostes; sed neque tam servi illi dominorum quam tu libidinium, neque tam fugitivi illi ab dominis quam tu ab iure et ab legibus, neque tam barbari lingua et natione illi quam tu natura et moribus, neque tam illi hostes hominibus quam tu dis immortalibus. Quae deprecatio est igitur ei reliqua qui indignitate servos, temeritate fugitivos, scelere barbaros, crudelitate hostes vicerit?}
\]

It was from Enna that you [Verres] dared to remove the image of Ceres, from Enna that you attempted to snatch a victory from her hand, and to withdraw one goddess from another? Of these things they dared to violate and touch nothing, those in whom there was everything closer to wickedness than piety. Indeed, in the consulship of P. Popilius and P. Rupilius, this place was held by slaves, runaways, barbarians, enemies; but they were less slaves of their masters than you of your desires, less runaways from their masters than you from justice and laws, less barbarians in speech and nation than you in nature and customs, less enemies of man than you of the immortal gods. What plea, therefore, is left to him who overcomes a slave in unworthiness, a runaway in foolhardiness, a barbarian in wickedness and an enemy in cruelty?

Cicero is clear about his subject’s statuses, and it is also obvious that he uses the positions of all four reprobates to paint as cruel and degenerate a picture as possible of Verres by comparison. However, despite the glaring opportunity to incorporate a(ny) leader from the Sicilian Insurrection to make a direct comparison to Verres as an individual, leaders whom we have elsewhere seen effectively and comprehensively inveighed against in other historical sources, Cicero fails to embrace this opportunity.\textsuperscript{248} If we consider that, with the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War, Cicero always referred to Athenion, either directly by name or by inference,\textsuperscript{249} the avoidance of King Antiochus/Eunus or Kleon is doubly unusual. Where Cicero could have made a very persuasive comparison between a leader of degenerate, savage runaways who nonetheless held them back from sacrilegious plunder, and Verres’ own orders to plunder at will, he checks himself and presents a clumsier comparison. In other

\textsuperscript{248} Frazel (2009), 85-6, despite noting the intention of this passage to set up a comparison between Verres and the actions of the ‘slaves’, did not note the missed opportunity.

\textsuperscript{249} At 2.5.3 Athenion is the unnamed enemy general killed by Manius Aquilius in single combat.
instances of similar contrast elsewhere in the *Verrine Orations*, Cicero typically makes the distinction more directly: individual to individual.\(^{250}\)

This apparent difficulty in fully exploiting the potential comparison offered by the Sicilian Insurrection is also evident earlier in the passage on Enna. In his prologue to Verres’ attempts to raid the sanctuary at Enna, Cicero presents an example of the outstanding antiquity and reputation of the sanctuary, even in the minds of the Romans (2.4.108):

\[\text{Itaque apud patres nostros atroci ac difficili rei publicae tempore, cum Tiberio Graccho occiso magnorum periculorum metus ex ostentis portenderetur, P. Mucio L. Calpurnio consulibus aditum est ad libros Sibyllinos; ex quibus inventum est Cererem antiquissimam placari oportere. Tum ex amplissimo collegio decemviralii sacerdotes populi Romani, cum esset in urbe nostra Ceres pulcherrimum et magnificentissimum templum, tamen usque Hennum profecti sunt. Tanta enim erat auctoritas et vetustas illius religionis ut, cum illuc trent, non ad aedem Cereris sed ad ipsam Cererem proficisci videretur.}\]

In this way, in the time of our fathers, a dreadful and dark state, when Tiberius Gracchus had been killed, a fear of great dangers was indicated by the prodigies. In the consulship of P. Mucius and L. Calpurnius the Sibylline books were consulted; from them it was discovered that it was necessary to placate most ancient Ceres. Then priests of Rome, from the renowned college of Decemvirs, although there was in our city a most beautiful and magnificent temple of Ceres, nevertheless travelled all the way to Enna. So ancient and mighty was that cult that, since they went there, it seemed they travelled not to her dwelling, but to Ceres herself.

The date for this episode is 133 B.C. Regardless of the actual or purported reason for this embassy to the shrine of Demeter,\(^{251}\) it nonetheless remains that at this time the town of Enna, although not the sanctuary to Demeter,\(^{252}\) was in the hands of the rebels of the men behind the Sicilian Insurrection. Yet, Cicero fails to mention this detail. This would not be noteworthy if there were no rhetorical gain to made by the mention, but in this case, as in the examples discussed previously, the benefit of including this fact is evident: Cicero could have noted

\(^{250}\) Seager (2007), 39, noted two other instances of this type, in which Verres is differentiated unfavourably from Mithridates (*Verr*. 2.2.51-2) and Massinissa (*Verr*. 2.4.103-4), at the same time as commenting on the passage in question above; he did not, however, remark on the absence of such a direct, individual contrast/comparison where it was possible for the episode at Enna. The other important parallel drawn with a single figure is of course the continual dichotomy drawn by Cicero between M. Claudius Marcellus and Verres, discussed in the following section of this chapter.

\(^{251}\) Bradley (1989), 62 no. 28, did not think, following Verbrugghe (1974), 55, that the delegation had anything to do with the Sicilian Insurrection, and considered Cicero’s explanation to be accurate. White (1964), 278, however, argued that the embassy was also inspired by a desire to expiate the goddess because of the Sicilian Insurrection (for this see also Manganaro (1967), 216). Vogt (1965), 40, also argued that the embassy had a link to the Sicilian Insurrection.

\(^{252}\) If we accept the argument of Brennan (1993), 168-73, that M. Perperna won his *ovatio* for regaining control of the sanctuary of Demeter atop the plateau of Enna, and that the war was subsequently concluded by P. Rupilius when he captured the town of Enna itself, then the sanctuary would have been free of rebels in time for the delegation of priests sent by the Romans.
that despite there being a temple of Ceres in Rome which was not under threat from hostile rebels, the priests still travelled to Sicily, such was the sanctuary’s reputation.

**Conclusion**

What are we to glean from Cicero’s reticence? We cannot claim that Cicero does not exploit the two ‘Slave Wars’ for rhetorical effect, even if his use of them differs distinctly. For the moment, the following conclusion remains: when searching for a suitably wicked comparison for Verres, or his lieutenants, Cicero on occasion openly utilises Athenion as a comparative, although never Salvius/Tryphon, the other leader in that conflict. However, when forced by the necessity of subject matter to engage with the Sicilian Insurrection, Cicero carefully avoided any mention of the conflict’s leaders, even where there might have been a positive gain in rhetorical effect. The conclusion reached here can only be furthered when placed into the context of Cicero’s exploitation of history, which will be discussed in the next section of this chapter.
IV. Antiquus socius fidelissimus 2: Sicily in the Verrine Orations

‘...but oratorical texts do not present a direct and straightforward representation of the world; they are products of a highly sophisticated technical system, central to which is the need to subordinate facts to the argument which the speaker is propounding.’ Steel (2001), 12.

Introduction

In the previous section of this chapter I demonstrated that Cicero’s engagement with the ‘Slave Wars’ differed markedly between the two events. The answer to why this is the case lies, I suggest, in how Cicero typically employed history throughout his Verrine Orations above and beyond the ‘Slave Wars’, in passages more generally concerning Sicily as a provincia and socius of Rome. The aim here, therefore, will be to construct a context in which to understand the conclusion outlined above: Cicero’s use of history throughout the Verrine Orations. In two of his speeches in favour of provincial governors, both delivered after the Verrine Orations, Cicero drew on Roman stereotypes of provincial peoples in order to discredit their evidence: in the pro M. Fonteio Cicero drew on Roman prejudices against the Gauls on grounds of their duplicity, while in the pro Flacco he impugned the Greeks of Asia for their base morals. Cicero’s ready use of clichéd conventions about provincials, and his apparent success in defending a likely guilty man with the strength of these ideas,\(^\text{253}\) implies that he would have expected a similar defence to have been employed by Hortensius for the benefit of Verres.

I. The Verrine Orations and History

Since it is clear throughout the Verrine Orations that Cicero wanted to neutralise the defence’s argument, the purpose here will not be to demonstrate Cicero’s deflection of that defence, but to analyse how his treatment of various Sicilian towns interacts with their histories relative to Rome. While other towns will be mentioned where appropriate, the focus

\(^\text{253}\) Throughout the pro Flacco Cicero avoided answering the specific accusations levelled at his client, but instead defended Flaccus as a saviour of the state (1-5; 94-106) and impugned the credibility of the witnesses (66); see also Classen (1982); Classen (1985), 180-217; Vasaly (1993), 198-9, 203; Steel (2001), 53.
will be on the use of Syracuse in Cicero’s oration. Cicero’s rhetorical manipulation of this town is indicative of his willingness to engage with, twist and exploit history to suit his purposes and to avoid potentially embarrassing admissions of past hostility between Rome and certain Sicilian towns. Before commencing with the discussion of Cicero’s exploitation of Syracuse, however, it will be of some interest to discuss Cicero’s presentation of the Sicilian people.

I.i. Sicily and the Sicilians

In the second speech of the second Actio, Cicero finally engages with Verres’ crimes in Sicily. Having spent the first speech of the second Actio detailing Verres’ career until his time in Sicily, Cicero opens the second speech with a passionate endorsement of Sicily, its people, and why they deserved the favour of the court. He starts the defence with comments on Sicily itself, noting the island’s unique place among Rome’s imperial acquisitions (2.2.2)

...plurimis iustissimisque de causis, primum quod omnium nationum exterarum princeps Sicilia se ad amicitiam fidemque populi Romani adplicavit. Prima omnium, id quod ornamentum imperi est, provincia est appellata...sola fuit ea fide benivolentiaque erga populum Romanum ut civitates eius insulae, quae semel in amicitiam nostram venissent, numquam postea deficerent, pleraeque autem et maxime inlustres in amicitia perpetuo manerent.

254 Steel (2004) has demonstrated that Cicero was willing in the Verrine Orations to report selectively, or at worst misleadingly, in order to turn an anecdote against Verres. She argued that the episode Cicero narrated of the death of a Roman lictor in Lampsacus (Verr. 2.1.63-7) was carefully constructed to make it appear as though Verres was more at fault than he actually was, and that Cicero was attempting to cover for the far greater problem of the structural tendencies of Roman provincial administration to exploit the provincials. The following discussion owes much to Steel’s conviction in demonstrating the exploitation of history by Cicero.

255 The problem of defining a supposed ‘national’ identity, such as ‘Punic’ or ‘Sicilian’, has been explored in two studies by Prag (2006a; 2009b). In the former, Prag concluded that the term ‘Punic’ was a purely literary construct that was defined by outside forces, that is hostile Greek and Roman literary traditions, and was not representative of the heterogeneous group involved, of whom he said that (2006), 30, ‘…we do not know how far they thought of themselves as in any way unified.’ Furthermore, he argued that ‘…Punic identity, as it is presented in the Republican period, cannot be understood to inform us about anything other than Roman attitudes and self-definition.’ In the second work, Prag (2009b), 87-8 and 90-1, argued that the self-definition of a person as Sicilian, and the acceptance of a unified and homogeneous identity that was held alongside that of a polis identity across Sicily, was one of the features that enabled Sicily to unify itself against outside aggressors, and also contributed to Rome’s own adoption of Sicilian imagery such as the triskeles on their coinage pertaining to Sicily. Regardless of whether it was correct to talk of a ‘Sicilian’ identity in the time of Cicero, nonetheless it is important to understand the manner in which Cicero depicted the Sicilians, regardless of the historicity of the account, but in relation to his rhetoric.

256 This endorsement could be seen, rhetorically, as a digression from the narratio of the speech, which demonstrates the suitability of the location for what Cicero was about to describe, a suitability in this case for the sympathy of the Roman audience; for this rhetorical concept in Cicero’s own work see Inv. rhet. 1.29, but also Quint. Inst. 4.3.12 and Woodman (1988), 58.
...for many just reasons, first that of all foreign nations Sicily first devoted itself to the loyalty and friendship of the Roman people. The first of all, this that is the jewel of our empire, to be called province; it was alone in its loyalty and goodwill towards the Roman people so that the states of this island, which once had obtained our friendship, hereafter never abandoned us, and moreover the majority, and the most illustrious, remained perpetually our friends.

The exhortation to the jurors in the trial is aimed very carefully by Cicero to drive home Sicily’s unique nature. He singles out the island for its ‘fide benivolentiaque’ ‘loyalty and goodwill’, among all other nations, as well as its exceptional antiquity in devoting itself to Rome’s ‘amicitiam fidemque’ ‘loyalty and friendship’.

With this one passage Cicero sets the tone for the majority of his future laus of the Sicilian people and Sicilian towns. In particular, Cicero regularly throughout the Verrine Orations draws on the importance of Sicily’s ‘fides’ ‘loyalty’ to Rome: the term is used thirty-two times in total with reference to Sicily, its towns or their citizens and only once in the negative about Syracuse. This fides is combined, on eight occasions, by a reference to the age of Sicily’s loyalty, presented in a variety of forms but typically specified with the adjective ‘antiquus’ ‘ancient’. This initial portrayal of Sicily, which has laid the groundwork for most of Cicero’s subsequent sponsorship, is then expanded upon by his description of the Sicilian populace.

Having set the tone for his impassioned support of Sicily, Cicero moves, after some brief comments on Sicily’s place as an important military asset and an island of economic opportunity for Roman entrepreneurs (2.2.3–7), to detailing the character of the Sicilian people (2.2.7):

---

257 Frazel (2009), 188-9, noted that this initial description of Sicily is uniquely ‘Roman’, inasmuch as Sicily is described as worthy of the jury’s sympathy specifically in terms of its status as a Roman province.

258 Either in the noun form fides or the adjectival form fidelis. The term fides is important in Ciceronian oratory concerning the status of various foreign peoples. In both the pro Fonteio and the pro Scauro Cicero attacks the lack of fides among the Gauls and Sardinians as a reason to doubt their testimony; see Vasaly (1993), 195-7. For fides in respect to international relationships see Badian (1958), and for definitions of fides regarding trust especially see: Fraenkel (1916), 187-99; Heinze (1929), 140-66; Latte (1960), 237 and 273; Earl (1967), 33.

259 For Sicily in general eighteen times: 1.1.13; 2.2.2 (twice); 2.2.6; 2.2.14; 2.3.12; 2.3.24; 2.3.64; 2.3.66; 2.3.127; 2.3.211; 2.3.228; 2.5.83; 2.5.115; 2.5.127 (twice); 2.5.137; 2.5.157. The other fourteen are each for different cities of Sicily: Thermae: 2.2.90; Halaesa: 2.2.122 and 2.3.170; Centuripae: 2.2.163 (twice); Agyrium: 2.3.67 and 2.3.74; Tyndaris: 2.4.84 and 2.5.124; Assorus: 2.4.96; Syracuse: 2.4.122 and 2.5.84 (although in the latter case it is given in the negative ‘non fidelissimis’); Segesta and Centuripae: 2.5.84; Segesta: 2.5.125.

260 The antiquity is implied at 2.2.2 by Sicily’s position as the first of Rome’s foreign allies. The adjective antiquus is used four times about Sicily generally (2.2.14; 2.3.64; 2.3.228; 2.5.115) and once about the town of Halaesa (2.2.122). Thermae’s ‘amicitia fideque’, ‘friendship and loyalty’, is considered to have existed ‘semper’ ‘always’ at 2.2.90. Finally, Cicero asks at 2.5.83 if, with no Roman citizen to command the fleets of Sicily, ‘quid civitates quae in amicitia fideque populi Romani perpetuo manserant?’ ‘what about the communities who had remained constantly in the loyalty and friendship of the Roman people?’.

261 Frazel (2009). 188-9, well noted that Cicero’s stress was often on Sicily’s profitability for Romans and the Roman state.
Now in truth the virtue of these men, judges, is their endurance and frugality, so close is it to our custom of old, not to that which now seems to have come to prevail; they are nothing like other Greeks, neither slothful nor excessive, on the contrary they are hard working in both private and public affairs, very frugal and diligent.

Here Cicero is clearly aiming at an assimilation of Sicilians to Romans. Roman virtues function as the cornerstone of the description thus supporting two of his rhetorical aims: the first is to admonish the Romans around him for their failure to live up to their own heritage when even Sicilians are capable of doing so; the second is to compel the jurors to view the case as a whole as one in which the Sicilians are, in essence, part of the Roman state. The second part of the passage serves to neutralize the counter-argument that we might expect Cicero’s opposition to have made, which may have emphasised typical Greek stereotypes for the Roman jurors: Cicero deftly disarms this line of attack and sets a default declaration of Sicilian virtue upon which the rest of his speeches will be based. This is a clever technique considering this virtue has yet to be proven concretely. Finally, he delivers the encomium’s conclusion with the following proclamation of Sicilian loyalty to Rome (2.2.8):

Magistratum autem nostrorum iniurias ita multorum tulerunt ut numquam ante hoc tempus ad aram legum praesidiumque vestrum publico consilio confugerint...Sic a maioribus suis acceperant, tanta populi Romani in Siculos esse beneficia ut etiam iniurias nostrorum hominum perferendas putarent.

The injustices of our many magistrates, nevertheless, they have borne so that never before this time have they, by public consent, taken refuge in the sanctuary of the law and your assistance...So they accept by tradition, as much as the people of Rome are a benefit in Sicily, so likewise they account the injuries caused by us must be borne.

This passage is followed by an exclamation that Sicily was only driven to legal recourse due to Verres’ inconceivable excess, which transcended that of any previous governor (2.2.9). For Cicero, Sicily was the oldest and most loyal province of Rome, a faithful ally despite Rome’s

---

262 This recalls Aristotle’s (Rh. 1.9.30-1) proclamation that it is easy to praise Athenians in Athens, and Scythian virtues amongst Scythians: here Cicero praises the Sicilians in distinctly Roman terms, and so creates the identification between not only the jurors and his argument, but also the jurors and the people of Sicily themselves.

263 Vasaly (1993), 212-3, noted that Cicero anticipated ‘the thrust of the defense’s attack’ and therefore ‘turned it back against his opponents’.

264 Nonetheless, there is evidence in the Verrine Orations that Cicero was well aware that the jurors had no pity for the Sicilians: at 2.3.58-60 Cicero laments Verres’ treatment of the Sicilians, and yet turns to his mistreatment of Romans to draw out the full indignation of his listener.
mistreatment, and essentially populated by Roman equals. Cicero constructs his image of Sicily throughout the *Verrine Orations* on this foundation. His repeated use of *fides* when describing Sicilian towns and his stress on the hardy character of Sicilian people reinforce his portrayal for the jurors until almost the very end of the orations. How Cicero’s portrayal of Sicily relates to reality is a more challenging matter to assess. In the next section, I will analyse Cicero’s interactions with Syracuse, and how they are indicative of his difficulties in the *Verrine Orations*.

**II. Marcellus, Verres and Syracuse**

In keeping with the general attitude developed toward Sicily in the *Verrine Orations*, Cicero attempted to cultivate a positive image of Syracuse for his jurors, principally in order to ensure the censure of Verres’ actions against the city. As a point of interest specific to Syracuse, Cicero contrasted Verres’ plundering during peace with the (supposed) prudence of M. Claudius Marcellus on the capture of Syracuse during the Second Punic War. The difficulty with Cicero’s treatment of Syracuse is twofold: the first issue involves his use of the actions of M. Claudius Marcellus as exempla; the second concerns Syracuse’s history with Rome, although it is worth noting that Cicero barely mentions Syracuse’s history without reference to Marcellus. On both counts Cicero’s version of events can be compared unfavourably with accounts from other authors, and this will allow us to understand better Cicero’s own relationship with ‘history’ in the *Verrine Orations*. I wish, first, to study his engagement with the memory of Marcellus.

**II.i. Marcellus and Verres**

Syracuse first appears, beyond three brief asides in the first speech of the second *Actio* (2.1.14; 2.1.55; 2.1.113), early in the second speech of the second *Actio*, and is mentioned in...

---

265 Vasaly (1993), 119, noted, when discussing Cicero’s use of Republican exempla, the following: ‘(u)sing the image – but surely not the reality – of past heroes of the Republic as exempla, Cicero points to the supposed religious scrupulosity of a Mummius, the restraint, generosity and *humanitas* of a Marcellus, and the generosity of a Scipio Aemilianus as a justification for Roman rule.’ It is with the opening of this statement, the assertion of unreality in Cicero’s exploitation of Republican exempla, that the following discussion proceeds. On Ciceronian use of exemplars see van der Blom (2010), and on their potential for manipulation see 107-17. Finley (1968), 122, is rather disparaging of Cicero’s choice of comparison, commenting that Marcellus was ‘widely condemned by earlier writers and characterized by Appian, a late but by no means stupid historian, as a man “nobody would trust except under oath”, whom even the Roman Senate had agreed to withdraw from Sicily because he was intolerable to the Sicilians.’; see App. *Sic*. 1.3 for this piece of information.
the context of its capture by Marcellus. At this stage Cicero is still constructing his general image of Sicily, and so the purpose of the reference to Syracuse is to demonstrate the respect that Sicily commanded even from conquering Romans (2.2.4):

*Urbem pulcherrimam Syracusas, quae cum manu munitissima esset tum loci natura terra ac mari clauderetur cum vi consilioque cepisset, non solum incolumem passus est esse, sed ita reliquit ornatum ut esset idem monumentum victoriae, mansuetudinis, continentiae, cum homines viderent et quid expugnasset et quibus pepercisset et quae reliquisset. Tantum ille honorem habendum Siciliae putavit ut ne hostium qui dem urbem ex sociorum insula tollendam arbitratetur.*

The most beautiful city of Syracuse, which was, with most strong walls, enclosed by the nature of its location by land and sea from attack, when [Marcellus] by force and stratagem captured it, he not only suffered it to be uninjured, but left it so adorned that it was a monument alike to his victory, his clemency and his temperance, since men saw what he had taken, those whom he had spared, and what he had left. So much honour did he think Sicily must have that he believed not even the city of our enemies must be removed from the island of our allies.

The subsequent mentions of Marcellus’ attitude towards Syracuse further the impression of his respect for the city given in this passage, although in the second speech the town is mentioned only once more to record Marcellus’ largesse to Syracuse in not disbanding their senate (2.2.50).266 Here, then, we have the initial establishment of what becomes, in the fourth speech of the second Actio, an important contrast for Cicero to exploit. It is not until the fourth speech that this groundwork is built upon, for Syracuse is mentioned only briefly in passing as the backdrop of legal events in the third speech concerning the charges of grain extortion against Verres.

In the fourth oration of the second Actio, having detailed Verres’ thefts throughout Sicily, Cicero returns to Syracuse; and the city, along with Marcellus’ relationship to it, essentially dominates the speech from this point onwards. To start, Cicero appeals to the common knowledge about the capture of Syracuse by Marcellus (2.4.115):267

*Nemo fere vestrum est quin quem ad modum captae sint a M. Marcello Syracusae saepe audierit, non numquam etiam in annalibus legerit. Conferte hanc pacem cum illo bello, huius praetoris adventum cum illius imperatoris Victoria, huius cohortem impuram cum illius*
exercitu invicto, huius libidines cum illius continentia: ab illo qui cepit conditas, ab hoc qui constitutas accepit captas dicetis Syracusas.

There are almost none among you who has not often heard, and also read in the annals, the manner of Syracuse’s capture by M. Marcellus. Compare this peace with that war, the arrival of this praetor with the victory of that imperator, this man’s vile retinue with that man’s unconquered army, this man’s inordinate desire with that man’s temperance: and you will say that Syracuse was founded by the man who captured it, and captured by the man who received it already settled.

Cicero continues this hyperbolic account of Marcellus’ capture of Syracuse in the next section of the speech, and continues the comparison with Verres that was implicit in the above passage (2.4.116): the marketplace was spared bloodshed under Marcellus, but ran with blood under Verres; the harbour, closed off even to the fleets of Rome in the Punic Wars, was open to pirates under Verres; when they captured the city, Marcellus’ army showed ‘restraint’ in not raping both single free-born women and married women, while Verres freely did as he pleased with anyone. This passage operates on an inversion of roles between Verres and Marcellus, and, as we will see, relies on the listener agreeing with Cicero’s version of Marcellus’ capture of Syracuse. For the moment, it is critical to note the inversion at work.

After briefly describing the city for the benefit of the jury (2.4.117-9) Cicero maintains his praise for Marcellus, in direct contrast to Verres, by again commenting on Marcellus’ self-control when seizing the city. This extended passage ends with an explicit command from Cicero to compare the two men (2.4.120-1):

Nunc ad Marcellum revertar…Qui cum tam praeclaram urbem vi copiisque cepisset, non putavit ad laudem populi Romani hoc pertinere, hanc pulchritudinem, ex qua praevertim periculi nihil ostenderetur, delere et exstinguere. Itaque aedificiis omnibus, publicis privatis, sacris profanes, sic pepercit quasi ad ea defendenda cum exercitu, non oppugnanda venisset. In ornatu urbis habuit victoriae rationem, habuit humanitatis; victoriae putabat esse multa Romam deportare quae ornamento urbi esse possent, humanitatis non plane exspoliare urbem, praevertim quam conservare voluisset. In hac partitione ornatus non plus Victoria Marcelli populo Romano appetivit quam humanitas Syracusanis reservavit…Conferte Verrem…ut pacem cum bello, leges cum vi, forum et iuris dictionem cum ferro et armis, adventum et comitatum cum exercitu et Victoria conferatis.

Now I will return to Marcellus…When he captured so famous a city by force and his army, he did not think it suitable to the Roman people’s glory to destroy and extinguish this beauty, particularly since it exhibited no danger. Therefore he spared the buildings, public and private, sacred and secular, as if he had come to its defence with his army, not to attack. In regard to the adornment of the city he kept his consideration of victory, and his humanity; in victory he thought to take many objects which could adorn the city, by his humanity he thought not to wholly plunder the city, which he had principally wished to conserve. In this distribution the victory of Marcellus seized no more adornments for the people of Rome than his humanity preserved for Syracuse…Compare Verres…you compare peace with
war, law with force, the oratory of the forum and courts with swords and arms, the coming [of the praetor] and his retinue with the army and victory [of Marcellus].

This passage, which once again inverts the expected roles of Verres and Marcellus, is one of the last few that directly involves the latter. Cicero rounds off his exploitation of Marcellus’ memory with a final exclamation that under Verres the Syracusans mourned the loss of more gods than they lost men through the victory of Marcellus (2.4.131).²⁶⁸ Taken together, these passages form a powerful rhetorical feature of Cicero’s invective, and the juxtaposition of the *exemplum* of Marcellus with Verres skilfully draws the audience into agreement with a condemnation of Verres’ predations in Syracuse. Yet the question remains: does Cicero’s version of Marcellus’ actions accord with that presented in other sources?

This question raises problems regarding the historical accuracy of Cicero’s account. Marcellus is presented by Cicero as a man shaped by his moderation and care regarding both Syracusan property and the people themselves: this is perhaps best symbolised by Cicero’s admittedly hyperbolic assertion that Syracuse mourned the loss of more gods under Verres than men under Marcellus. In spite of Marcellus’ reputation throughout antiquity – exemplified in many ways by Cicero’s account of his actions – of benevolence to Syracuse,²⁶⁹ Livy’s account demonstrates the difficulty of this view on several counts. First, Marcellus only instructed his men to spare the lives of free people (specifically commented on by Cicero at *Verr*. 2.4.116) in the *initial* phase of sacking the city (25.25.7-9). On the eventual capture of Achradina, Marcellus handed over that section of the city to his troops to plunder (25.31.8-9), resulting in ‘multa irae, multa avaritiae foeda exempla’ ‘many infamous examples of anger and greed’. In a later passage Livy records a Sicilian embassy that complained of Marcellus’ treatment, accusing him of slaughtering the people of Syracuse.

²⁶⁸ Cic. *Verr*. 2.4.131: ‘Ut saepius ad Marcellum revertar, iudices, sic habetote, plures esse a Syracusanis istius adventu deos quam Victoria Marcelli homines desideratos.’ ‘If I may again return to Marcellus, judges, you will know that more gods were lost by the Syracusans through visits of [Verres] than men through the victory of Marcellus’. We might note that Marcellus’ reputation, discussed below, of having looted an unprecedented number of statues from Syracuse most likely prevented Cicero’s turning to that direct comparison of Verres’ actions in stealing statues with Marcellus’ ‘restraint’.

²⁶⁹ Plutarch (*Vit. Marc.* 19-20) records an image of Marcellus as a moderate conqueror whose personal anguish at the destruction of the city demonstrated his temperament: Plutarch therefore notes Marcellus’ initial – and as can be seen from Livy’s account noted below, it was only initial – instructions not to kill free people in Syracuse, and also his beneficence to the people of Engyium in sparing their lives when entreated by a Romanophile leading citizen, Nicias, who was himself to be spared. There is a feature of import in the latter anecdote: Marcellus had, in the first instance, decided to enslave the entire town, and it was only the supplication of Nicias on the town’s behalf that stayed his hand. It follows that if *Nicias* had not been struck by a moment of conscience, then Marcellus would have proceeded with the mass enslavement. The same conception of the *exemplum* of Marcellus is found in Silius Italicus (14.665-78), Valerius Maximus (5.1.4), and Florus (1.22.33-4), all authors later than Cicero.
Furthermore, his reputation for restraint in regard to the wealth of Syracuse, a factor that Cicero took great pains to stress when comparing the two men, is even less accurate upon scrutiny of other historical records.

Given the fragmentary nature of Polybius’ account of the capture of Syracuse, we must again rely on Livy for the most part, although the remarks of Plutarch will also be of use. As we saw above, if we believe Cicero, Marcellus left Syracuse adorned following his victory (Verr. 2.2.4). Additionally, in this context, Cicero’s engagement with history is selective at best, and when deconstructed carefully, intentionally misleading. We should first consider the enduring reputation of Marcellus as the man who introduced Rome to the wonders of Greek art: Plutarch (Vit. Marc. 21.5) records an anecdote in which Marcellus boasts of teaching the ignorant Romans to admire the arts and works of Greece. 

Earlier in his narrative, Plutarch records that Marcellus’ men had plundered as much wealth from Syracuse as was later taken from Carthage, since the whole city had been despoiled (19.3).

But it is Livy who lays out the sack of Syracuse most clearly. In the first instance, as noted above, Livy disclosed Marcellus’ orders to spare the free born when initially sacking the city (25.25.7); however, despite the lack of bloodshed the actual plundering of the city on this occasion was complete (25.25.9): ‘…rapinis nullus ante modus fuit quam omnia diuturna felicitate cumulata bona egesserunt’ ‘to plundering there was no restriction until [Marcellus’ soldiers] had carried off all the goods accumulated by a long-lasting prosperity’.

In the final sack of Achradina the plunder was on a greater scale still, leading Livy to remark the following (25.31.11):

_Hoc maxime modo Syracusae captae; in quibus praedae tantum fuit, quantum vix capta Carthagine tum fuisset, cum qua viribus aequis certabatur._

Syracuse was captured on the whole in this manner, in which there was booty in such quantity as there would scarcely have been if Carthage, with which the conflict was evenly matched, had then been captured.

270 Furthermore, Livy (34.4.4) records a speech of Cato the Elder against the repeal of the lex Oppia in which he traced the Roman love of luxuries to the spoils of Syracuse plundered by Marcellus.

271 λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἔλαττονα τούτον ὢδ τὸν ἱστερόν ἀπὸ Καρχηδόνος διαφορικτάντα πλούτου γενέσθαι καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν οὕ τετα πόλιν χρόνον ἔλαττον ἐκ προσόποις ἐβρέσαντο διαρρήσαι, πλὴν τὸν βασιλείαν χρημάτων τοῦτα δὲ ἐς τὸ δημόσιον ἔκρηβε. ‘For it is said that no less wealth was carried away from Syracuse now than at a later time from Carthage; for not long afterwards the rest of the city was betrayed and taken and subjected to pillage, excepting the royal treasure; this was converted into the public treasury.’
There was in fact a long-standing tradition of Marcellus’ reputation for adorning Rome in a manner hitherto unheard of. This tradition included Cicero himself, who commented on the fact that Marcellus adorned Rome, not his house (Verr. 2.4.121), but also Polybius, who censured the Romans for taking the riches of Syracuse back to Rome (9.10). These accounts, including those of Livy and Plutarch noted above, very urgently suggest that the sack of Syracuse was, in material terms, unprecedented, and in many respects quite brutal. Perhaps most incriminating of all, following Marcellus’ drawing of the consular lot for Sicily in 210 B.C., the delegation of Sicilians present in Rome assiduously petitioned for his removal from the provincia (Liv. 26.29.1-10). This same delegation later accused Marcellus of sacking the city so thoroughly that, aside from their city walls, empty homes and despoiled sanctuaries, the people of Syracuse had absolutely nothing (26.30.9-10). Livy, or perhaps the delegation, is naturally embracing the technique of exaggeration, but it is untenable to suggest that Cicero’s account of a Syracuse humbly deprived of some of its riches by Marcellus for Rome’s gain (Verr. 2.4.121) is comparable with antiquity’s general consensus that his exemplary sack of Syracuse was by any standards thorough, and to an extent unrivalled at that time. Cicero’s use of Marcellus’ exemplum is to underscore his invective against Verres whom he depicts as worse than the conqueror of the city, and this enables him to accentuate the inversion of a Syracuse more devastated in peace than at its lowest moment: in this schema historical accuracy was a secondary concern.

II.ii. Syracuse Revisited

Cicero’s constant praise of Marcellus and his attitude towards Syracuse could only succeed, however, if Cicero’s jurors sympathised with the city: had the defence actually presented a case in the second Actio it is probable that they would have engaged in drawing sympathy

---

272 In de re Publica (1.21), Cicero states that Marcellus only took one item into his house, a bronze globe designed by Archimedes out of a large haul from the city. Frazel (2009), 82, argues that this line of argument, that Marcellus adorned Rome and not his house, was Cicero’s rhetorical method of excusing Marcellus’ looting.

273 When reporting Marcellus’ ovation, Livy (26.21.7-8) noted the quantity of plunder on display, especially the statuary of Syracuse. Marcellus’ actions in Sicily otherwise, or at least those employed by his subordinates and then approved by him, were typically brutal in most cases. See, for example, the brutal sack of Leontini (Liv. 24.4-7, 29-32; Poly. 7.2-8) and the pre-emptive massacre at Enna, which resulted in a widespread uprising of Sicilian towns (Liv. 24-37-9). The sack of Leontini was allegedly also used by the Sicilian envoys attacking the conduct of Marcellus as an excuse for Syracuse’s betrayal of Roman interest (Liv. 26.30.5).

274 Appian (Sic. 1.3) records the mass distrust of Marcellus in Sicily during his campaign there.

275 Livy records (27.16.6-8) that the sack of Tarentum, which was thorough according to Livy, was notable because Fabius showed greater magnanimity than Marcellus in refraining from taking statuary from Tarentum.

276 We may do well to note Cicero’s statement in the fifth oration of the second Actio (2.5.127), in which he admits, albeit obtusely, that Rome had, through warfare, plundered the wealth of Athens, Pergamum, Cyzicus, Miletus, Chios, Samos, all Asia and Achaea, all Greece and all Sicily.
away from the Sicilians, much as Cicero did later in the pro Flacco and the pro M. Fonteio. Cicero had the greatest difficulty in evoking sympathy from his listeners towards Syracuse, because his objectives were conflicting: in the fourth speech the city had to be portrayed as a loyal friend, treated well even in defeat, in order that Verres’ depredations might provoke the desired opprobrium in the jurors. In the fifth speech Cicero, when expounding on Verres’ critical failures as a military leader, had to confess to Syracuse’s chequered history in relation to Rome. This tension will again demonstrate how Cicero’s manipulation of historical ‘facts’ and exempla served a rhetorical purpose in his oration, and that ‘history’ functioned as a malleable construct in the Verrine Orations as a whole.

As we saw above, Syracuse is initially introduced into the orations in the context of Marcellus’ ‘sparing’ of the city (2.2.4). In this first instance, Syracuse is described as ‘urbs pulcherrima’ ‘the most beautiful city’, despite Cicero’s admission that it was also ‘hostium…urbem’ ‘the city of our enemies’. When Syracuse is next commented on by Cicero, he immediately stresses the city’s wealth and beauty (2.4.115). In an extended description of the city (2.4.117-9), Cicero relates that Syracuse lives up to its reputation as the most beautiful of all Greek cities, and goes into great detail about its beauty and strength. The purpose of the description is clear; in what follows, Cicero recounts the plundering of Verres (2.4.122-33), and this is far more vivid as he had already created an image of Syracuse to be despoiled in his listeners’ minds. Immediately at the start of the description outlining Verres’ offenses, Cicero delivers his final encomium to Syracuse. As he describes paintings of Agathocles, which Marcellus had left in a temple untouched (2.4.122), Cicero explains that they had been changed into ‘…sacra religiosaque…’ ‘…sacred and holy things…’, transformed ‘…propter diuturnam pacem fidelitatemque populi Syracusani…’ ‘…because of the long peace and loyalty of the Syracusan people…’ The inclusion of fidelitas in this description draws Syracuse into the general praise of Sicily and Sicilian towns given by Cicero throughout the Verrine Orations (see note 259 above). Here we can see Cicero presenting a very clear picture of Syracuse as a beautiful and loyal city, deliberately so that the following narrative of Verres has a more graphic context in which to condemn him. Problems arise once we turn to Cicero’s fifth speech in the second Actio.
The fifth speech of the second Actio serves several functions, one of which aims to destroy Verres’ reputation as a military leader of importance.\textsuperscript{277} Among the strategies employed by Cicero to achieve this aim is an attack on Verres’ handling of the fleet in Sicily, especially regarding his actions allowing a group of pirates to rout his fleet and sail into the harbour of Syracuse. One important aspect of this debacle was Verres’ decision to appoint a Syracusan, Cleomenes, to command the fleet (2.5.82). Despite this being in itself an unusual act, and Cicero essentially calls the selection illegal (2.5.83), he focussed on one aspect in particular: that Verres chose a Syracusan to command the fleet. It would seem, despite Cicero’s assertions of Syracusan loyalty (2.4.122), that this was not something Rome could rely on. He begins by rhetorically questioning Verres as to whether there were other commanders he could have appointed. He first suggests the junior officers on the island, then Roman citizens and finally puts forward (2.5.83) ‘…civitates quae in amicitia fideque populi Romani perpetuo manserant’ ‘…communities who had remained constantly in the loyalty and friendship of the Roman people’. He places Segesta and Centuripae in this category due to their fides and blood ties to Rome.\textsuperscript{278}

Following these rhetorical suggestions, Cicero compares Verres’ choice of a Syracusan by stressing Syracuse’s history of antagonism with Rome. He notes (2.5.84):

\begin{quote}
Si harum istarum civitatum militibus, navibus, nauarchis Syracusanus Cleomenes iussus est imperare, non omnis honos ab isto dignitatis aequitatis officiique sublatus est? Ecquod in Sicilia bellum gessimus, quin Centurpinis sociis, Syracusanis hostibus uteremur? Atque haec ego ad memoriam vetustatis, non ad contumeliam civitatis referri volo.
\end{quote}

If Cleomenes of Syracuse was ordered [by Verres] to command the soldiers, ships and captains of these same communities [who had remained loyal], was not every consideration of merit, equity and obligation cast down by this man? Is there anyone against whom we fought in Sicily without having Centuripe as an ally and Syracuse as an enemy? And also, I intend, by these things, to refer to old memories, not the abuse of a city.

\textsuperscript{277} Frazil (2009), 126-30, argues that we must take the likely defence of Verres seriously: that he was a good commander. The fifth speech of the second Actio deals with a great range of attacks on Verres. It starts with a reference to a defence Cicero expected from Verres that he was a good general (2.5.1-4) and from there proceeds to detail Verres’ actions in putting down ‘slave revolts’ in Sicily until 2.5.25. From 2.5.26 to 2.5.37 Cicero described Verres’ typical habits throughout the year of government, in contrast to that expected of a governor. He then briefly (2.5.38-41) detailed Verres’ failure to deal with a situation in Tempsa, which then led to a long narrative (2.5.42-138) which included all of Verres’ extortions and mismanagements relating to naval matters in the province, incorporating the narration of the execution of some Roman citizens. With the conclusion of this passage Cicero had finished with the people of Sicily, and from 2.5.139 until the end (2.5.189) proceeded to conclude the entire of the Orations with matters pertaining to Roman citizens directly.

\textsuperscript{278} Segesta, according to Cicero, drew a common heritage with Rome from Aeneas (2.4.72), and had supported Rome throughout their wars with Carthage (2.5.125); Centuripae is noted as having been such a loyal ally of Rome that it was a by-word for devoted allies (2.2.163-4).
As much as Cicero tries to diminish the implications of this statement by referring to it as old memories, he nonetheless is acutely aware that his line of argument undermines the image he had constructed of Syracuse as a mistakenly undervalued town that ought to be pitied. For while he dismisses the history as outdated, it follows that he selected this method of prosecution as he expected this appeal to the history of Syracuse to assist in condemning Verres.\textsuperscript{279} Cicero then develops the argument in the lines immediately following those above (2.5.84):

\begin{quote}
\textit{Itaque ille vir clarissimus summusque imperator, M. Marcellus...habitare in ea parte urbis quae in Insula est Syracusanum neminem voluit; Hodie, inquam, Syracusanum in ea parte habitare non licet; est enim locus quem vel pauci possent defendere. Committere igitur eum non fidelissimis hominibus noluit...}
\end{quote}

Therefore this most famous and great man, M. Marcellus...did not allow any of the Syracusans to live in that part of city which is on the Island; today, I say, it is not permitted for any Syracusan to live in that part; it is, indeed, a place which even a few men can defend. Therefore Marcellus was not willing to trust it to men who were not the most trustworthy...

In this construction, Syracuse becomes the only town, in the entirety of the \textit{Verrine Orations}, to be described in terms of negative \textit{fides}. Such is their failure in this regard, a portion of their city was barred to them, and Cicero reveals the full import of this detail (2.5.85):

\begin{quote}
\textit{Vide quid intersit inter tuam libidinem maiorumque auctoritatem, inter amorem furorremque tuum et illorum consilium atque prudentiam. Illi adatum litoris Syracusanis ademerunt, tu imperium maritimum concessisti; illi habitare in eo loco Syracusanum, qua naves accedere possent, noluerunt, tu classi et navibus Syracusanum praeesse voluisti; quibus illi urbis suae partem ademerunt, iis tu nostri imperii partem dedisti, et quorum sociorum opera Syracusani nobis dicto audientes sunt, eos Syracusano dicto audientes esse iussisti.}
\end{quote}

Observe the contrast, Verres, between your wantonness and your ancestors’ judgement, between your raging passion and their resolution and prudence. They deprived the Syracusans of the sanctuary of the shore, you yielded them the command of the sea; they did not allow the Syracusans to live in the place where the ships were able to land, you wished them to command the fleet and the ships; to those they deprived of part of their city, you gave a part of our power, and you ordered those allies, because of whose help the Syracusans are obedient to our order, to be obedient to the Syracusans.

We can see, in full now, the problem that Cicero faced with Syracuse. Rhetorically this passage works very well, as the opportunity to contrast Verres’ actions with every Roman governor or magistrate in Sicily after and including Marcellus is a powerful rejoinder to any claim of martial prowess on Verres’ part. For this argument to work, however, Cicero must have counted on an undercurrent of antipathy toward Syracuse, even in the 70s B.C.

\textsuperscript{279} Frazel (2009), 152-3, noted that this attack on Syracuse as forever Rome’s enemy in wars in Sicily is, at best, an exaggeration.
Otherwise his casual dismissal of ‘facts’ as old memories would also weaken his argument. The placement of this episode in the fifth and last oration was vitally important: as it comes after any passage attempting to evoke sympathy for Syracuse, its deliberate reference to antipathy between Rome and Syracuse does not undercut any argument to come.

What should be very clear now is that Cicero’s use of historical ‘fact’ concerning Syracuse was malleable enough that it could suit one or other of two purposes: denigration or adulation of the town. In a manner similar to his manipulation of Marcellus’ exemplum, Cicero used Syracuse’s history and reputation for whatever purpose was required in order to win the case. It is this conclusion about the purpose of history in the context of juridical oratory that we must bear in mind when assessing Cicero’s use of historical exempla or comparisons elsewhere. Before returning to the Sicilian Insurrection and the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War, some final remarks will be made regarding Sicily generally in Cicero’s writing.

**III. A Return to Sicily and the ‘Slave Wars’**

Powell (2009: 18) argued that when an ideal is expressed we, as historians, ought to investigate the underlying fear that the ideal counsels against. In Cicero’s manipulation of the memories of Syracuse and Marcellus we saw that his pronouncements respectively on their loyalty and mercy principally served to draw attention away from their alternative reputations as either a staunch enemy or violent despoiler. Few cities or individuals in the *Verrine Orations* receive the attention that Syracuse and Marcellus garnered. Therefore, in what follows, I shall judge Cicero’s collective depiction of Sicily, noting especially those towns that diverge from the typical description given of a Sicilian town. The purpose here will be to assess if Cicero’s depiction of other Sicilian towns coincides with reality, or if there is evidence that he utilises rhetorical strategies to convince his listeners.

**III.i. Sicily – A Patient Province?**

We saw earlier that Cicero describes Sicily, along with many of the towns in Sicily, as firm allies of Rome. This emphasis on *fides* is coupled, as we saw, with a stress on the hardness of the Sicilians (2.2.7). Throughout the *Verrine Orations* several different towns are praised
for these features, building up a firm impression of Sicily as an island of worthy allies. Cicero also stresses Sicily’s patience enduring exploitation, which appears to illuminate an unspoken fear that the jurors may have felt concerning Sicily. The following example taken from a direct address to Verres (2.3.96) demonstrates the typical form this expression might take:

*Spoliasti Siculos; solent enim muti esse in iniuriis suis.*

You have despoiled the Sicilians: indeed they are accustomed to being silent about their injuries.

I noted a similar sentiment when Cicero first detailed his view of the Sicilian people, in which he stated that they bore acts of oppression patiently (2.2.8). As a corollary to this, Cicero notes that the people of Sicily actively benefited from peace and Roman rule, although the context of this assertion is important: he is considering the likelihood of the war we often call the Spartacus War spreading to Sicily. Cicero affirms that even during the Social War no troubles affected Sicily (2.5.8):

*Ergo his institutis provinciae iam tum, cum bello sociorum tota Italia arderet, homo non acerrimus nec fortissimus, C. Norbanus, in summo otio fuit: perfacile enim sese Sicilia iam tuebatur, ut ne quod ex ipsa bellum posset existere. Etenim cum nihil tam coniunctum sit quam negotiatores nostri cum Siculis usu, re, ratione, concordia, et cum ipsi Siculi res suas ita constitutas habeant ut iis pacem expediat esse, imperium autem populi Romani sic diligant ut id imminui aut commutari minime velint, cumque haec a servorum bello pericula et praetorum institutis et dominorum disciplina pro visa sint, nullum est malum domesticum quod ex ipsa provincia nasci possit.*

Because of these regulations for the province, even during the time when all Italy was blazing with the Social War, that not very active nor powerful man, C. Norbanus, was in the greatest peace; so easily, in fact, Sicily now upholds itself, from whatever conflict is able to spring forth internally. Indeed, since there is nothing so joined as our business men with the Sicilians by familiarity, commercial matters and harmony, and since these same Sicilians have a situation so settled that peace is expedient, while they esteem the power of the Roman people so much that they hardly wish it to be lessened or changed at all, and since they are provided for against the dangers of a slave war by the regulations of the praetors and the strictness of the slaves’ individual masters, there is no internal calamity that is able to arise from the province itself.

Leaving aside for the moment the regulations referred to in the first line, the main concern here is clear. If we judge this passage by what it argues against, then it is conceivable that a

280 See note 258 for a list of the uses of *fides* or *fidelis* when describing Sicilian towns. Other virtues noted are: prosperous and efficient farmers (Agyrium: 2.3.67); reputable and prosperous (Herbita: 2.3.75); honest and industrious (Tissa: 2.3.86); fine, hard-working farmers (Agrigentum: 2.3.103); strenuous and hard-working (Entella: 2.3.103); friendly and prosperous (Catana: 2.3.103); mindful of obligations, abundant (Halaesa: 2.3.170); friends and allies (Segesta: 2.4.72); numerous and stout-hearted (Agrigentum: 2.4.93); stout and trustworthy people (Assorus: 2.3.96).

281 The unspoken fear being of an *impatience* with exploitation.
strong line of argument existed in favour of Verres’ suggestion that he prevented Sicily, with its troubled history, from again collapsing into a similar state. We should also note Cicero’s efforts in making this passage convincing: he cannot merely say that Sicily has no wish for an end to Roman rule, but instead needs to give a variety of reasons for Sicily’s strength of constancy.

The regulations mentioned are also noteworthy, because they reveal an unusual piece of Ciceronian logic in his depiction of Sicily as an island free from internal problems. In the course of criticising Verres’ claim that he prevented the problems in Italy in the 70s B.C. from spreading into Sicily, Cicero asserts that since Sicily had problems in the past with revolting slaves, there was no reason for this issue to arise again, as (2.5.7)\textsuperscript{282}

\textit{posteaquam illinc M’. Aquilius decessit, omnium instituta atque edicta praetorum fuerunt eius modi ut ne quis cum telo servus esset.}

(e)ver since M’. Aquilius left [Sicily], all regulations and edicts of the praetors were framed so as to permit no slave to carry arms.

He then relates a story about L. Domitius, who, as governor, put to death a slave who admitted to hunting a boar with a spear. The purpose of the story was to demonstrate that governors endeavoured to be seen as strictly adhering to the policy, even if its execution was unduly harsh. This is immediately followed by the passage discussed above (2.5.8). What is unusual is that Cicero appears to be suggesting that the regulations about slave armament prevented something similar to the Social War from taking place in Sicily: ‘Ergo his institutis provinciae…’ ‘\textit{Because of these regulations for the province…}’ Regardless of how logical this assessment is, it does at least demonstrate one point: Sicily had become a province secure from internal outbreaks (of any kind) in the Roman mind only after the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War. We can go further. I have argued (see Appendix 9: Slaves in Ancient Warfare) that the arming of slaves to fight in wars was a typical aspect of ancient warfare. The regulation mentioned by Cicero thereby also prevents the arming of slaves by their masters, and therefore can also be seen as a preventative of this typical ancient occurrence. This also means that Cicero viewed, by the logical connection shown above, that the practice of arming slaves was also part of the problem of the Social War. Prior to this, from Cicero’s

\textsuperscript{282}Manganaro (1980), 441, considered the law to be aimed at distinguishing trustworthy slaves; Bradley (1989), 48, 130, notes the law, but only comments on how it displays Roman legal coercion to prevent slave unrest; Vogt (1965), Manganaro (1967), Rubinsohn (1982), Canfora (1985), and Urbainczyk (2008a) do not mention this passage of Cicero.
evidence, we can assume the Romans felt that Sicily had to fear internal outbreaks of not only slaves, but also those who campaigned for either the weakening or transformation of the Roman government and sought to arm their slaves to further this objective. Finally, this regulation prevented anyone in Sicily from arming any slave, and apparently prevented any further internal problems in Sicily. This is strongly suggestive that the presence of armed slaves in Sicily in the periods prior to this regulation cannot be taken to indicate a priori that these slaves had armed themselves and rebelled without the backing of the free or indeed the actions of the free: the Roman regulations after two major conflicts in Sicily involving armed slaves suggest that they saw a link between this practice and social upheaval, and sought to prevent it. There is a tension between this brief allusion to Sicily’s troubled past (as recently as thirty years prior to Verres), and Cicero’s constant assertions that Sicily was generally antiquus socius fidelissimus. That Cicero almost avoided demonstrating this tension in his speeches is a testimony to the skill of his oratory; that he had to deal with this anxiety about Sicily is testimony to the complexity of the island’s relationship with Rome.

III.ii. Cicero and the ‘Slave Wars’

We have now seen how Cicero alters his implementation of history and historical exempla concerning Sicily depending upon the rhetorical requirements. When dealing with the general subject matter of Syracuse, Marcellus and the people of Sicily, Cicero delicately balanced his oratory between acknowledging certain opinions which he believed would harmonise with those of his listeners, and asserting his own assessment of Sicily’s unique and important role in the Roman ‘empire’. In this negotiation between Cicero and the jurors, history played a subordinate role, utilised when necessary, but ignored or circumnavigated when deleterious.

283 Not all Sicilian cities were treated to the strident praise that stressed their fides. Perhaps most strikingly Enna, throughout Cicero’s long description and narrative of Verres’ plundering of the shrine of Demeter (2.4.106-13), is never referred to in the terms typical of Cicero’s account of Sicily: the people of the town are never described as fidelis, nor is the town itself a socius. Instead, Cicero had to resort to a somewhat hackneyed exclamation that the people of Enna could be considered (2.4.111) ‘not…citizens of a city, but all of them…priests, all of them…the servants and ministers of Ceres…’. Moreover Cicero, apparently aware of the town’s history regarding Rome and especially Rome’s previous misjudgement of the religious importance of Enna to Sicily, urges the jurors not to sneer at the Sicilian regard for the cult of Demeter at Enna. As I noted in Chapter I, under Marcellus the Romans sought to prevent Enna from rebelling by pre-emptively massacring the populace (Liv. 24.37-9). This action caused widespread revolt across Sicily because, as Livy tells us, the Sicilians felt that the town of Enna was sacred to Demeter and this act was therefore sacrilegious (24.39). Frazel (2009), 217-9, also noted that this past history between Marcellus and Enna was problematic for Cicero’s argument, and suggested that Cicero’s method of avoiding this problem was to stress Enna’s sanctity.
to the rhetoric being employed. Bearing these conclusions in mind, how does this affect our reading of Cicero’s engagement with the Sicilian ‘slave wars’?

If we accept the argument put forward in the first three chapters of this thesis concerning the Sicilian Insurrection, namely that it was an Insurrection that drew on the support of and represented the people of eastern Sicily against Rome, then this has important conclusions for how we view Cicero’s evidence. His view of Sicily, which has been outlined above, is quite clear. He conceived of the island as a *socius fidelissimus*, which had, since the time of Marcellus’ capture of Syracuse, been a loyal ally and provider for Rome. Furthermore, with the conclusion of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War, new legislation provided for the island not only ended the threat of internal outbreaks that had plagued the island with the ‘slave wars’, but also ensured the island’s solidarity throughout the Social War. The arrival of Verres as governor, therefore, resulted in the worst depredations that the island had ever faced: worse than the Greek tyrants; the wars with Carthage; the island’s subjugation by Rome; or even the two ‘slave wars’. In this *schema* there is no place for an event like the Sicilian Insurrection, especially given Cicero’s insistence that Sicily was capable of overlooking almost any Roman exploitation or excess without complaint. This could hardly be argued if King Antiochus’ kingdom was indeed a reflection of Sicilian discontent with Roman dominance, and for this reason Cicero had to be mute on the matter, or present it in a way suited to his larger argument.

**Conclusion**

We can now provide a tentative answer to the question left unanswered in the previous section of this chapter: why did Cicero handle references to the Sicilian Insurrection so cautiously, when the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War was presented more directly? King Antiochus represented too problematic a figure to blend into the imagined picture of Sicily’s history. Instead Cicero focussed on the slaves involved in the conflict, in much the same manner that Diodorus foregrounded the slaves in his account. In a sense Cicero’s representation of the Sicilian Insurrection was accurate, as it is impossible to deny the presence of slaves in the army of King Antiochus. When viewed with that in mind, the island seemingly was held by slaves. Had Cicero engaged more directly with the history of the Sicilian Insurrection, as I have argued he had the potential to do, then while the individual rhetorical passages might have been more persuasive, his overall thesis regarding Sicily’s
history would have suffered, along with the hyperbolic vitriol directed towards Verres. Moreover the Sicilian Insurrection was an older *exemplum* to draw on, and one better suited to exploring ideas surrounding Hellenistic kingship, as we have seen in Chapter II. The sympathy for the Sicilians would have been more difficult to maintain had the reality been described, and indeed this is true of Enna’s history generally (see note 283 above). Athenion, it would seem, was a more palatable, more recent and less complex *exemplum* to draw on: in essence, he was more rhetorically suitable. We now, therefore, have several different questions, although no less important: why was Cicero, by contrast, so freely able to draw on Athenion as a comparison with Verres and his lieutenants? What does this say about the difference between Athenion and the other, unmentioned leader of the later conflict, Salvius/Tryphon? Furthermore, does this exploitation of Athenion reflect the dissimilarities, social, historical or otherwise, between the Sicilian Insurrection and the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War? The answers to these questions lie beyond Cicero, and in the study of Diodorus’ account of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War, to which we now turn.
V. Divination, Astrology and Discord
The Characters of Salvius and Athenion

τότε δὴ καὶ εἰς ἐκκλησίαν συνελθόντες καὶ βουλῆς προτεθείσης πρῶτον
μὲν εὐλαντὸ βασιλέα τὸν ὄνομαζομένον Σάλβιον, δοκοῦντα τῆς ἱεροσκοπίας
ἐμπειρὸν εἶναι καὶ ταῖς γυναικείαις θέαις αὐλομανοῦντα.

'At that time, then, they gathered in an assembly and when the proposal was put before them they
first chose as king one named Salvius, who was reputed to be practised in divination and a
flute player in mystic orgies for women.' Diod. Sic. 36.4.4.

Introduction

We saw in the previous chapters that throughout his Verrine Orations Cicero engaged quite
differently with aspects of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War, than he did when he was
forced into discussing similar elements of the Sicilian Insurrection. The answer to why this is
the case lies beyond Cicero, and in a comparison of the two events in question. They are, in
both modern and ancient accounts, typically considered together, and at first glance this is
explicable. For the ancients, concerned in historiographical works primarily with events of
military and political significance, Sicily only ever became part of their narratives when
significant events of these kinds took place there; and those occasions were only rare: the
Sicilian Insurrection; the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War; the pacification of the Marians
by Gn. Pompey Magnus; the governorship of Verres; and the resistance of the island against
C. Octavian under S. Pompeius. Of these events, only the two ‘slave wars’ involved active
military forces that were not dependent on Rome in some form. In this way, they are unique
in Sicilian history after the Second Punic War.

The ancient authors certainly connected in their works the two ‘slave revolts’, and
dealt with them as mutually relevant episodes; but is the narratological link necessarily borne
out by the events themselves?284 Modern scholarship has followed the approach of linking the
two episodes, albeit for quite different reasons. Whilst Appian saw two wars taking place in
the same geographical location and Florus saw the maintenance of a vendetta amongst

284 See, for example, Appian (Hisp. 99) and Athenaeus (6.104), as well as the linking of both conflicts in Florus’
work (2.7).
Sicilian slaves across two generations (2.7.10), we link them through the topic of slavery; in particular through the fact that in forty years two seemingly unique ‘slave revolts’ ripped through Sicily, revolts that were unheralded and without sequel. Yet we have seen that the evidence from the *Verrine Orations* sounds a note of caution in regard to this ‘obvious’ link: it is possible that social or historical differences of some kind stood between the two conflicts, forcing a different approach to each on Cicero. We cannot immediately assess the presence of these differences without first considering whether Diodorus’ narrative of the second conflict can be understood without complications. For the Sicilian Insurrection, the depiction of the leaders in Diodorus has been shown to have a strong rhetorical framework that sought to define a context for the reader in which to interpret all of the actions of Eunus. This meant that we could not simply use the evidence of Diodorus to reconstruct the character of the insurgency. A similar analysis will be engaged in here for the lead characters of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War.

The depiction of the two leaders in the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War has typically been accepted without question by modern accounts: Salvius/Tryphon is uncomplicatedly seen as a religious leader, while Athenion has been regarded as a brave leader whose exploitation of his perceived prophetic abilities demonstrated his leadership qualities. These straightforward readings of Diodorus’ text must be examined more carefully in light of the discussion in Chapter II. Unfortunately, and in contrast with the Sicilian Insurrection, there is no independent body of evidence for the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War against which to compare Diodorus’ account. The forces of Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion never minted coinage, and the sum of the evidence to come directly from the rebels is the few slingshots discussed in Appendix 11: Athenion’s Slingshots. In the absence of comparable data, a different comparison will be made: we will investigate whether the same ideas and narrative techniques that we saw were typical of Diodorus’ depiction of Eunus and Kleon are also employed in describing Salvius/Tryphon

---

285 Green (1961), 10; Toynbee (1965), 316; Vogt (1965), 20; Dumont (1987), 197, 291-2; Bradley (1989), xi; Callahan and Horsley (1998), 143 and 145; Shaw (2001), 1-2; Martínez-Lacy (2007), 35; Urbainczyk (2008a), 102-3; Strauss (2009), 180; Strauss (2010), 185, 189. The revolt of Spartacus in Italy can also be seen as part of this period, extending it to seventy years.


288 Or at least, if they did, it has not survived.
and Athenion. If this is the case, we can postulate that the same interpretative problems exist for the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War as for the Sicilian Insurrection. This, in turn, will allow us to analyse the social movements behind the former event with a clearer idea of the methodological problems involved. Before either analysis, however, a brief chronology of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War will provide a context for the following discussion. In this I will follow the sources closely, and no attempt will be made at any significant interpretation of their accounts.289

I. A Brief Chronology

The so-called Second Sicilian Slave War started in the vicinity of the town of Heraclea Minoa, with the murder by a group of slaves of a certain P. Clonius, their owner (36.4.1-2). This murder closely followed a failed outbreak near Halicyae which had been put down by the governor, P. Licinius Nerva (36.3.4-6). The revolt near Heraclea rapidly grew following the governor’s initial failure to destroy it with a garrison drawn from Enna (36.4.2-3), and so the rebels elected Salvius, later to be called Tryphon, to become their leader. He, in turn, marched his forces on the city of Morgantina – why he marched on this city is unclear from the narrative. In the process of the siege, which was unsuccessful, Salvius/Tryphon and his men defeated a force of ten thousand Sicilians and Italian Greeks led by Nerva (36.4.5-8). Meanwhile a second revolt started near Segesta and Lilybaeum, led from the start by Athenion. These rebels briefly besieged Lilybaeum, and following a failure there withdrew (36.5). By this time, Salvius/Tryphon’s forces had broken off the siege at Morgantina, and following a sacrifice of a toga at the shrine of the Palici, proceeded to seize Triocala in the west of the island in order to build a palace there (36.7). At this point, Salvius/Tryphon summoned Athenion and the two groups united. In response Rome assigned L. Licinius Lucullus to the command against them, and he attacked the rebels in open battle with sixteen thousand troops, winning comfortably, although he then failed to follow up his victory (36.8). In a desire to discredit his successor and prevent prosecution for his actions, Lucullus burned his camp and disbanded his army; this then caused the next praetor, C. Servilius, to achieve nothing of note in his praetorship, during which time the rebels gained the ascendancy (36.9). Finally, M’. Aquilius was assigned as consul to the command, and in a single engagement

289 For the full text and translation of Diodorus’ account of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War see Appendix 12: Text and Translation of Diodorus’ Account of the Sicilian Stasis.
290 For a discussion of Diodorus’ introduction to the war, including his argument for why it took place, see Chapter VI.
crushed the rebels and killed Athenion, who was by this time king (36.10). Subsequently, Aquilius cleared the province of pockets of resistance and celebrated an ovation on his return to Rome.  

II. Entrances

As we saw in Chapter II, Eunus’ character was carefully introduced into his narrative with an opening that defined the reception of his character for the rest of the narrative. Moreover, we saw that these facets of Eunus were not all demonstrated to us through his actions, but also through the covert intrusions of the narrator. In this way, the entire story of Eunus in Diodorus was coloured from the initial phrases of his entrance, and since his character subsequently dominated the narrative of the Sicilian Insurrection, the colourings applied in the first lines of his character served to alter the reading of the entire Insurrection. This centripetal force exerted by Eunus was also present in the only other ancient account to give a narrative of the events beyond a brief summary or anecdote: Florus. While it could be attributed to the manner of Diodorus’ preservation and Florus’ own adaptation of Livy, in the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War the leaders, Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion, do not dominate the narrative in nearly the same manner. For Salvius/Tryphon in particular, his demise during the narrative naturally lessens his impact; nonetheless the ways they are introduced into the narrative contain the seeds of their characterisations and the start of a better understanding of their roles in Diodorus.

II.i. Salvius/Tryphon

We first hear of Salvius/Tryphon at the start of the last uprising in the sequence that opens Diodorus’ narrative of the conflict. Unlike in the Sicilian Insurrection, it is only after the initial successful engagements that the rebels select their leader (36.4.4):

καὶ πολλῶν καθ’ ἡμέραν ἀφισταμένων σύντομον καὶ παράδοξον ἐλάμβανον αὐξησιν, ὡς ἐν ὀλίγας ἡμέραις πλείους γενέσθαι τῶν ἐξαισισθίων. τότε δὴ καὶ εἰς ἐκκλησίαν συνελθόντες καὶ βουλής προτεθεὶς πρὸ τοῦ πάντων ἑλαντο βασιλέα τῶν ὅνομαξόμενον Σάλουιον, δοκοῦντα τῆς ἱεροσκοπίας ἐμπιστού εἶναι καὶ ταῖς γυναικείαις θέαις αὐλομανοῦντα. οὕτως βασιλεύσας τάς μὲν πόλεις ἀργὰς αἰτίας καὶ τρυφῆς νομίζων ἐξέκλινεν, εἰς τρία δὲ μερίσσας τοὺς

291 Ath. 5.213b; Cic. De or. 2.195. For a discussion of the awarding of honours for both conflicts, see Appendix 13: Honours for Victory?.
292 Unusually, Salvius/Tryphon appears in no other narrative of the war, for Florus only ever mentions Athenion.
Several days many revolted, they built up their force quickly and contrary to expectations, so that in a few days they were more than six thousand. At that time, then, they gathered in an assembly and when the proposal was put before them they first chose as king one named Salvius, who was reputed to be practised in divination and a flute player in mystic orgies for women. He, on becoming king, avoided cities, considering them to be the cause of idleness and luxury, but divided the rebels into three parts and established equal commanders for the parts, and he ordered them to pillage the countryside and to meet in full at one place and time.

There is one important link between this characterisation of Salvius/Tryphon and the earlier (narratological) characterisation of Eunus: they both contain an element of the feminine. For Eunus it was directly applied by describing him as lacking in ἀνδρεία, ‘bravery’ (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.14), behaving ἄνάνδρως, ‘in an unmanly fashion’, and fleeing διὰ δείλαν, ‘through cowardice’ (34/5.2.22). For Salvius/Tryphon, the slur is rather more subtle. He was known for only two reasons: first, his skills in ἐροσκοπία, ‘divination’; second, his role as τὰς γυναικείας θέας αὐλομανοῦντα, ‘a flute player in mystic orgies for women’. Indeed, we are only ever told these two details of Salvius/Tryphon, never shown them. Furthermore for the rest of the narrative both these suggestions lie dormant, but the implications of the latter remain important: by having access to an expressly female religious rite, Salvius/Tryphon’s own masculinity would be questioned, and, as we saw in Chapter II, Hellenistic kingship and warfare was a masculine sphere in which failure was linked to feminine tendencies (see Beston 2000: 316-7 and Poly. 28.21.3). Yet, there remain some differences between this account, and that of Eunus’ acclamation. In this passage, the narrator does not give any opinion as to why Salvius/Tryphon was chosen. It is implied that it was because of his reputation in divination, but not stated explicitly. There is a further difference: unlike both Athenion and Eunus, Salvius/Tryphon is never shown in the narrative to demonstrate his

---

293 This religious element, especially the divination, is typically noted, but not discussed by modern studies; see Toynbee (1965), 407; Vogt (1965), 33; Goldsberry (1973), 256; Manganaro (1980), 440; Bradley (1989), 74, 114; Callahan and Horsley (1998), 147; Wirth (2004), 283-4; Urbainczyk (2008a), 54. Dumont (1987), 264, followed by Strauss (2010), 194, argued that this passage demonstrates the importance of the cult of Dionysus to the rebellion. There is little reason to assume that his flute-playing singled out Salvius/Tryphon as a slave, domestic or rural: Bradley (1989), 74, argued for a domestic identification from this evidence. Salvius/Tryphon’s nationality is not specified, though Finley (1968), 144, suggested that he could have been Italian, and perhaps even not a slave.

294 The aulos was, during the fifth century and into the fourth century B.C., disliked among some Greek authors for weakening the control of the physique: see Wilson (1999), 65; Theophr. Fr. 92W; Paus. 9.12.5-6; Arist. Pol. ch. 26; Dio. Chrys. Or. 78 (2.281 Dind.). Moreover, the role of aulos players in the symposium often overlapped with their ‘sexual use-value’, in Wilson’s words (1999), 84-5. Aristotle (Pol. 1342a20) also considered it unmanly to perform music except when drunk or for fun. Finally, in Aristophanes’ Nicophron (17), the verb προσαύλειν is used in a punning phrase describing the act of fellatio (see also Henderson (1975), 184-5). While the context outlined here is not necessarily directly relevant to Salvius, it is important to note the literary context in which the aulos was considered. Furthermore, the placing of Salvius’ use of the aulos into a principally female space could potentially activate these latent meanings behind the expression.
skills, nor use them to his or the rebels’ advantage. While these elements of Salvius/Tryphon are not immediately developed, they are, nonetheless, the only two elements to his character in his initial introduction: what remains to be seen is how this introduction underpins his character throughout the rest of the narrative.

II.ii. The Battle of Morgantina

Despite Salvius/Tryphon’s introduction as a subtly effeminate leader, he in fact had a major success against a force commanded by Rome. Yet, his success is not uncomplicated, even if it does draw some grudging praise in the narrative. In the course of his siege at Morgantina, Salvius/Tryphon’s forces were attacked by the praetor, P. Licinius Nerva, but through a combination of cowardice among Nerva’s men and Salvius/Tryphon’s cunning, the rebels seized the day (Diod. Sic. 36.4.6-8):

The governor, in order to come to aid the city, made a night march, having with him about ten thousand soldiers from Sicily and the Italian Greeks; he discovered that the rebels were engaged in the siege and attacked their encampment, and finding that there were few guards, and many captive women and other forms of booty, he took the encampment easily. He sacked this, and went on to Morgantina. The rebels all of a sudden counter-attacked, and since they had a commanding position above, and attacked forcibly, they immediately were in the ascendancy: the forces of the governor were turned to flight. When the king of the rebels made a proclamation to kill none of those who threw down their arms, the majority fled dropping their weapons. Having outwitted the enemy in this fashion, Salvius both regained the camp and, having obtained a famous victory, got possession of many weapons. Not more than six hundred Italian Greeks and Sicilians died in the battle because of the humanity of the proclamation, but about four thousand were taken.

Urbainczyk (2008a: 45) described this as ‘a very favourable account of the behaviour of the slaves’; however, it is not favourable in all respects.295 The offer to spare the soldiers if they

---

295 Finley (1968), 144-5, commented that Salvius/Tryphon ‘had more military skill than any other slave commander in either revolt’, although from what evidence is unclear. It is certainly the case that he could be
dropped their weapons came after they had fled, and while it was certainly shrewd, and elicited praise for its φιλανθρωπία, ‘humanity’, it did not win the battle by itself. The principal cause of the defeat, in the text, was the higher ground that the rebels held and the Roman army’s cowardice. Moreover, Salvius/Tryphon had in the early stages of the battle lost his camp, and the impression given from the narrative is that P. Licinius Nerva made the mistake of attacking a larger force holding a raised position. Even so, despite downplaying Salvius/Tryphon’s success through its attribution to the cowardice of Nerva’s force, the narrative still records a significant victory for Salvius/Tryphon, even if he could not follow it up with the capture of Morgantina. Before exploring this dichotomy between a military success and Salvius/Tryphon’s effeminacy, we have to deal with the second leader, Athenion, whose narrative quickly becomes intertwined with that of Salvius/Tryphon.

II.iii. Athenion

Athenion’s rise in the narrative, unlike Salvius/Tryphon’s, is both more detailed and active. At the point of his introduction, we are given the following characterisation (36.5.1):

Περὶ δὲ τὴν Αἰγεσταίων καὶ Λιλυβαίων χώραν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν πλησιοχώρων, ἐνόσει πρὸς ἀπόστασιν τὰ πλήθη τῶν οἰκετῶν, γίνεται δὲ τοῖς ἀρχηγοῖς Αθηνίων ὄνομα, ἀνὴρ ἄνδρεια διαφέρων, Κήλει τὸ γένος, οὗτος οἰκονόμος ὄν διοικήσῃ ἀδελφῶν μεγαλοπλούτων, καὶ τῆς ἀστρομαντικῆς πολλὴν ἔχων ἐμπειρίαν, ἔπεισε τὸν στρατηγὸν ἀφόρος τοῦτον τῶν οἰκετῶν πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς υἱὸ ἐκείνου τεταγμένους περὶ διακοσίους ὄντας, ἔπειτα τοὺς γειτνιῶντας, ὡστε ἐν πέντε ἡμέραις συναρχῆναι πλείον τοῖς χίλιοις.

In the territory of Segesta and Lilybaeum, and yet others adjacent, the multitude of slaves were sick for revolt. The chief of these was one named Athenion, a man excelling in courage, a Cilician by birth. He was the steward of two exceedingly wealthy brothers, and having great experience of astrology, he first persuaded those of the slaves formed up under him, about two hundred, then those in the vicinity, so that in five days more than a thousand had been brought together.

In this first instance we have a remarkable characteristic attributed immediately to Athenion, for he is described as ἄνδρεια διαφέρων, ‘excelling in courage’. In his case it also appears that his skill in astrology was directly relevant to his subsequent leadership, indeed the text is adamant that this was the principal cause of his ability to persuade his fellow slaves to revolt. Furthermore, Athenion is depicted as centrally active in beginning his revolt, rather than becoming leader on its initial success: in this respect Athenion is much more like Eunus and demonstrated from what we are shown in the narrative to have been a reasonable commander, but at no point in the narrative are we ever told he was. Noted by Finley (1968), 145. Bradley (1989), 75, appears to imply that Salvius/Tryphon’s proclamation was the ‘master stroke’ that pulled off the victory.
Kleon. We should also note, at this stage, that the portrayal is not openly hostile: unlike Kleon, who was not only Cilician but also a bandit, rendering the connection between the two evident, Athenion has no such stigma so explicitly stated for his Cilician origins.  

Yet this positive portrayal does not remain for long. Immediately after his initial recruitment of followers he proclaimed a divine right to the island, and proceeded to besiege Lilybaeum, told as follows (36.5.3-4):

There is an immediate verbal similarity here with the description of Eunus. Diodorus recorded about Eunus that (34/5.2.5) οὕτος προσεποιεῖτο θεοῦ ἐπιτάγμασι καθ᾽ ὑπὸν προφέρειν τὰ μέλλοντα, ‘(t)his man claimed by divine commands to foretell the future through dreams and because of his talent in this direction he fooled many.’ While the specifics differ, nonetheless, like Eunus, Athenion προσεποιεῖτο, ‘pretended’, that the gods foretold to him through the stars places him firmly in this category of astrologers, whereas Eunus did so only through dreams and because of his talent in this direction he fooled many.

There is an immediate verbal similarity here with the description of Eunus. Diodorus recorded about Eunus that (34/5.2.5) οὕτος προσεποιεῖτο θεοῦ ἐπιτάγμασι καθ᾽ ὑπὸν προφέρειν τὰ μέλλοντα, ‘(t)his man claimed by divine commands to foretell the future through dreams and because of his talent in this direction he fooled many.’ While the specifics differ, nonetheless, like Eunus, Athenion προσεποιεῖτο, ‘pretended’, that the gods foretold to him. Astrologers were not uniformly accepted, and in 139 B.C. had been expelled from the city of Rome by the praetor Cn. Cornelius Hispalus for spreading false interpretations of the stars (Val. Max. 1.3.3).  

297 Although, undoubtedly, the negative associations of being Cilician were still important: for these see De Souza (1999), 97; Strabo 14.3.2; Appian Mith. 92; Dio 36.20-3; and Plutarch Vit. Pomp. 24.  

298 See also Cramer (1954), 58-60, 234-5, for a discussion of astrology in the period of the mid-Republic, and measures taken against astrologers.
and therefore draws in the relevant associations.\textsuperscript{299} This clear narratorial intervention, by commentating on the veracity of Athenion’s abilities, compels us to question the episode that follows.\textsuperscript{300} Athenion’s retreat from Lilybaeum, leading him to abandon his efforts at organising the west of the island,\textsuperscript{301} was a major tactical failure, especially considering the casualties that his forces received when attacked while on the march. Yet owing to Athenion’s prior prediction, this retreat became a major success for his leadership. Much as for Eunus, whose abilities at wonder-working secured his position at the head of the Sicilian Insurrection and who by verbal similarities is evoked in this passage, Athenion’s success is undeniable, but this does not mean that this reflects well on his followers; indeed, I would argue the opposite. There is, then, a similar style of characterisation here in relation to Eunus, much as we saw above with Salvius/Tryphon, but just as with Salvius/Tryphon, it is not as heavily pressed as it was for Eunus. Furthermore, beyond this brief mention, we hear no more of Athenion’s astrology.\textsuperscript{302}

\textbf{III. The Soldier and the King}

At this stage in their narratives, both Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion are being introduced by the same basic matrix of ideas as Eunus and Kleon. The parameters of these character traits are not identical; yet, implications of effeminacy, charlatan wonder-working and authorial interventions have all resurfaced in these passages. Moreover, the same narrative gaps exist between what the narrator sought for us to know and what he had shown us. We have not explored all the aspects of the characterisation of the two leaders, for their roles continued

\textsuperscript{299} Both Cato (\textit{De Agricultura} 5.4) and Columella (\textit{Res Rusticae} 1.8.6) recommended that either the \textit{vilicus} of a farm should not consult astrologers and fortune-tellers, or that these people should not be allowed onto the farm in the first instance.

\textsuperscript{300} Vogt (1965), 33-4, gives a very positive portrayal of Athenion as a brave leader; see also Manganaro (1967), 221, for Athenion’s bravery. Urbainczyk (2008a), 57, does not note the movement away from the very beginning of Athenion’s description, concluding that ‘here we have a positive portrayal of a rebel leader’; likewise Callahan and Horsley (1998), 147; Bradley (1989), 114, is right that we should not necessarily regard Athenion as a charlatan, but his argument misses a vital point: we are never \textit{shown} that Athenion was a charlatan, we are \textit{told}. Therefore, before we simply dismiss this as a negative source tradition, we need to consider why the narrator thought to tell us that Athenion was engaging in false prophecy.

\textsuperscript{301} Diodorus reports that Athenion did not accept all the runaway slaves into his army, but made some remain working the land in order to furnish his army with supplies (36.5.2). This is typically taken as demonstrating Athenion’s care in maintaining rebellion: see Toynbee (1965), 329; Vogt (1965), 34-5; Bradley (1989), 76-7; Wirth (2004), 284; Urbainczyk (2008a), 57. Bradley (1989), 110, stressed, moreover, that this reflected ‘a rational, even sensible and enlightened, character in the slaves’ actions’. Yet, by withdrawing from the area after his failure at Lilybaeum, and moving east to Trioca, Athenion effectively abandoned this strategy: his subsequent actions betray his lack of foresight in this regard.

\textsuperscript{302} In Florus, this aspect of Athenion’s character is not recorded at all (2.7.9-12), nor is there any indication of this aspect in any of the mentions of Athenion in Cicero’s \textit{Verrine Orations}. 


through the rest of the narrative, and we still need to see if, like Eunus, the early foundations laid for their characters then affect the reading of their subsequent narrative.

**III.i. First Encounters**

The first time we see the two characters interacting in the narrative, the initial characterisations immediately assume a unique importance. Once Salvius/Tryphon had decided to set his base at Triocala, he then summoned Athenion to join him (Diod. Sic. 36.7.1-2). It is at some point after their unification that we are given an indication of differences at play between the two men (36.7.2):

διανοούμενος δὲ τὰ Τριώκαλα καταλαβέσθαι καὶ κατασκευᾶσαι βασίλεια πέμπει καὶ πρὸς Ἀθηνίωνα, μεταπεμψεόμενος αὐτῶν ὡς στρατηγὸν βασιλεὺς. πάντες μὲν οὖν ὑπελάμβανον τὸν Ἀθηνίωνα τὸν πρωτεύον ἀντιποίησθεν, καὶ διὰ τὴν στάσιν τῶν ἀποστατῶν ῥόδιος καταλυθήσεσθαι τὸν πόλεμον· ἢ δὲ τούχη καθάπερ ἐπίτηδες αὐξώσα τὰς τῶν δραπετῶν δυνάμεις ὁμονοῦσα τοὺς τούτων ἡγεμόνας ἐποίησεν. ἦκε μὲν γὰρ συντόμως μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως ἐπὶ τὰ Τριώκαλα ὁ Τρύifton, ἦκε δὲ καὶ Ἀθηνίων ἐπὶ τριχλίων, ὑπακοῶν ὡς στρατηγὸς βασιλεῖ τῷ Τρύifton, τὴν ἄλλην αὐτοῦ δύναμιν κατατρέχειν τὴν χώραν καὶ ἀνασεῖειν πρὸς ὑπόστασιν τοῖς οἰκέταις ἀπεσταλκός, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ὑπονοῆσας ὁ Τρύifton τὸν Ἀθηνίωνα ἐπιθήσεσθαι ἐν καιρῷ παρέδωκεν εἰς φυλακήν.

Intending to seize Triocala and build a palace, [Tryphon] sent to Athenion as king to a general. Therefore everyone expected that Athenion would lay claim to the first place, and that because of the sedition among the slaves the war would collapse easily: but fortune, as if on purpose to increase the power of the runaways, made their leaders to be of one mind. For Tryphon came directly to Triocala with his army, and likewise Athenion came with three thousand, complying as a general to King Tryphon, having sent the rest of his army to overrun the country, and to stir up the slaves for revolt. After this Tryphon, suspecting that Athenion would attack given the opportunity, threw him in jail.

From the passage above it is altogether unclear exactly why Salvius/Tryphon suspected Athenion. In any case, the Athenion’s imprisonment did not last, and he was released within the year to give counsel before the battle of Scirthea. By this point, Salvius/Tryphon had won an engagement with the Roman forces under P. Licinius Nerva at Morgantina, a victory that owed as much to Salvius/Tryphon’s cunning as to the cowardice of Nerva’s men (Diod. Sic. 36.4.6-8), as we have seen. This presents an interesting situation in the narrative: Athenion, who we have been told was ἄνδρεία διαφέρον, ‘excelling in courage’, has not been shown to be a good leader: the retreat from Lilybaeum had been a tactical disaster. By contrast, Salvius/Tryphon, implicitly called effeminate by the covert narrator through his

---

303 Toynbee (1965), 329, and Finley (1968), 145, completely ignore the details of the problem despite mentioning the imprisonment. Bradley (1989), 80, implies that the friction between the two leaders may have been caused by a difference in opinion over strategy.
status as τας γυναικειας θεας αυλαμανοντα, ‘a flute player in mystic orgies for women’, actually had a major success against a force commanded by Rome.

In short, there is a tension between what the narrator has told us, and what he has been able to show us. If we only follow what we have been told, then there is an uncomfortable inversion at play: the brave general is subordinate to the effeminate yet cunning king, much as in the Sicilian Insurrection. While this does not accord with what we have been shown in the narrative, there is an implicit expectation that it was unexpected for Athenion, the superior man in how he was described, to subordinate himself willingly to Salvius/Tryphon. Moreover, it suggests that the narrator, regardless of the details he was able to demonstrate openly, aimed for a negative characterisation of Salvius/Tryphon. At this stage in the narrative the tension is problematic. Yet, in the following narrative of the battle of Scirthaea the latent characters ascribed to the two men once again break through the surface, and finally solidify the two roles credited to Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion.

III.ii. The Battle of Scirthaea

Following Salvius/Tryphon’s erection of the palace, walls and agora at Triocala (36.7.3-4), Rome sent out the propraetor L. Licinius Lucullus to oppose the rebels (36.8.1). In what appears to be a reaction to this development, Salvius/Tryphon then released Athenion, and was beginning to plan for the campaign. At this stage, the freshly released Athenion convinced Salvius/Tryphon that an open battle was a better plan than withstanding a siege (for Salvius/Tryphon’s initial desire, see 36.8.2), and so the two forces engaged at Scirthaea (Diod. Sic. 36.8.3-4):

τὸ μὲν οὖν πρὸτον ἐγίνοντο συνεχεὶς ἀκροβολισμοὶ· ἐτὰ παραταξαμένων ἐκατέρων καὶ τῆς μάχης ὁδὸς κάκεισε ῥεπούσης καὶ πολλῶν ἐκατέρωθεν πιπότων, ὁ μὲν Ἀθηνίων ἔχων συναγωνιζομένων διακοσίων ἐπιτεῖς, ἐπικρατόν πάντα τὸν περὶ αὐτὸν τόπον νεκρῶν ἐπιλήφθη, τροχείς δὲ ἐμφότερα τὰ γόνατα καὶ τρίτην λαβὼν ἄχρηστος ἐγένετο πρὸς τὴν μάχην· εξ οὖ οἱ δραπέται ταῖς ψυχαῖς παισόντες πρὸς φυγήν ἐπράπτησαν. ὁ δὲ Ἀθηνίων ὡς νεκρὸς ὤν ἐλαθε, καὶ προσποιηθεὶς τετελευτηκέναι τῆς νυκτὸς ἐπιλαβούσης διεσώθη, ἐπεκράτησαν δὲ λαμπρὸς οἱ Ρωμαῖοι, φυγόντων καὶ τῶν μετὰ Τρόφαμος καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ πολλῶν κατὰ τὴν φυγὴν κοπέντων τέλος οὐκ ἔλαττους τῶν δίσμυρων ἀνηρέθησαν.

First there was constant skirmishing. Next, after the two armies had drawn up opposite each other, the battle swung this way and that, with many dead on both sides. Athenion, who had a force of two hundred cavalry fighting with him, was victorious and filled the area around him with corpses. He was, however, wounded in both knees, and taking a third injury was useless to the battle: because of this the runaways, losing spirit, were turned to flight. Athenion escaped detection as being a corpse, and by
pretending to be dead came through safely in the night. The Romans won a magnificent victory, since those with Tryphon, and Tryphon himself, fled; many were cut down in flight, and not less than twenty thousand died.

Here we see, in a direct and open comparison, the two originally defined characters of the two men presenting a striking contrast. Athenion, who was introduced as renowned for his bravery, was a success in the battle, only withdrawing once wounded three times, and with him the rebel cause is apparently lost. Salvius/Tryphon, by contrast, who was inculpated in being part of feminine orgiastic rituals, himself fled from the battle. Regardless of whether we believe this analysis of the battle (and it is, at best, impressionistic), it reinforces their characters further, and draws a parallel with the narrative of the Sicilian Insurrection, in which the brave Kleon balanced the cowardly Eunus, eventually dying in battle, while Eunus fled and was captured. The tension created in the gap between what we have been shown and what we have been told is here released, as both men revert to character.

Furthermore, this event is the crux of the whole relationship between the two men. Shortly after, Salvius/Tryphon dies (36.9.1). It is from the battle of Scirthaea onwards that the initial leadership of the rebels is shown to have been poorly chosen: it is only whilst Athenion holds the field at Scirthaea that the rebels prevail, and, on his assumption of command, they overran large portions of the island (36.9; it was most likely, in this period, that they made an attempt on Messana: see Dio 27.93.4 and the Chapter VII). Moreover, Athenion’s death, in sole combat against the heroic consul M’. Aquilius, is at least implicitly brave (Diod. Sic. 36.10.1): the killing of Athenion defines Aquilius’ glory more finely than ending the war, and was the achievement that later enabled his acquittal on charges of extortion (Cic. Flac. 39.98; De or. 2.195; Verr. 2.5.3). Aquilius’ glory in turn defines Athenion’s character. Finally, the narrative sets up Salvius/Tryphon as a poor choice of leader. This impression, there from the beginning, served to mitigate any successes he had, most notably outside the walls of Morgantina, when he defeated the Roman praetor P. Licinius Nerva. It is notable that in the authors that record the narrative of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War after Diodorus, none mention Salvius/Tryphon; we have already seen this for Cicero. Why this was the case cannot be answered here, but I would suggest, as will be argued in the Chapter VII, that it was because Salvius/Tryphon, like King Antiochus before him, was a more difficult enemy to stomach than Athenion.

Vogt (1965), 49, noted that Athenion’s brave death would have helped future generations tolerate him as a champion of the two insurrections in Sicily.
Conclusion

Diodorus’ narrative preserves no other details about either man. Neither man warranted a grand entrance, and it is this that should suggest that their characters were not well fleshed out: in the Sicilian Insurrection it is the introduction of both Eunus and Kleon that provided the firm platform for their later, continued denigration. In contrast, Salvius/Tryphon enters with a single line of introduction, and Athenion with a somewhat longer introduction that still lacks in the colour and depth of the attack on Eunus. However, the ideas employed to disparage both Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion are similar to those used for Eunus and Kleon, even if neither man in the latter event warranted the vicious attack on their deaths that Eunus received in Diodorus. The narrative itself, and the covert narrator, deal with the two leaders of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War in much the same manner that they dealt with Eunus and Kleon: a matrix of assumptions was created for both Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion, which then dictated the reader’s reaction to their later actions. For Salvius/Tryphon especially, there is never any explicit proof given of his skills at divination, nor is his implied effeminacy ever confirmed. His retreat from Scirthaea acquired the connotations with cowardice from the earlier statement of his effeminacy. In short, the same narratorial problems are present for the narrative of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War as for the narrative of the Sicilian Insurrection. While we cannot compare the evidence of Diodorus against meaningful evidence from either Salvius/Tryphon or Athenion, it is important to note, as we pursue an understanding of the social movements behind the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War that for this conflict also we cannot take the details given by Diodorus at face-value. It is time to work out, as far as this is possible, what we can say about this war.
VI. Nicomedes, P. Licinius Nerva and Sicily: The Origin(s) of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War?

"Εκείθεν ἐν πολλοῖς τόποις τῆς τῶν οίκετῶν τόλμης ἐκδήλου γινομένης.

'From then on the boldness of the slaves was made plain in many places.' Diod. Sic. 36.3.4.

Introduction

When analysing the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War, scholars have faced a peculiar problem. Unlike the Sicilian Insurrection, which had in Diodorus’ narrative a clearly defined point of origin among the slaves of Damophilus, the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War does not have such an origin. No single anecdote is presented as the key to the start of the war, and the backdrops provided in Diodorus’ narrative of servile unrest in Italy and administrative incompetence in Sicily are only loosely linked to the first stirrings of disorder. Hence, each modern author identifies a different moment from Diodorus’ long preamble to the revolt as indicative of the event. By way of example, Bradley (1989: 66-7) opens his account of the episode with the revolt of Varius in west Sicily, while Urbainczyk (2008a: 16-7) starts with the three revolts that Diodorus described as taking place in Italy before the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War. In these two approaches we find the crux of the problem: out of all the episodes that Diodorus uses to introduce his main narrative, it is unclear which are the ones stressed by Diodorus as the salient episodes and which are merely included because of their chronological coincidence. The aim of this chapter is to address this problem, and to determine whether Diodorus’ account provides nonetheless a structure that aids a clear understanding of the cause(s) of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War, or if we must look beyond the reasons given in Diodorus’ text in our own investigation independent from Diodorus.

I. The (Many) Beginning(s) of the War

As we saw with the Sicilian Insurrection, Diodorus’ account of why an event took place or even the order and connection of events leading to an episode are not to be taken entirely at
face value. In the following, I will show that a thorough analysis of the account of how the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War arose will also demonstrate that the account preserved by Diodorus, and to a lesser extent Dio, do not provide a useful context for understanding the events of the conflict. Diodorus’ account of the inception of the war divides into three parts: first, a description of three ‘slave revolts’ in Italy in the years preceding, including the T. Vettius episode discussed in Appendix 10; second, an explanatory passage that documents the indecision of the praetor in Sicily over whether to follow a senatorial decree to free allies enslaved in the provinces which concluded with a group of slaves withdrawing to the shrine of the Palici and discussing revolt; finally, the start of the war in two slave revolts in the west of the island. 305 Owing to Diodorus’ own disconnection of the events in Italy preceding the start of the revolt in Sicily, and because I have discussed the most important episode in Appendix 10, I will not engage in a discussion of the three ‘slave revolts’ in Italy here: it is enough to note that they were most likely recorded by Diodorus only because of their chronological coincidence with the larger revolt in Sicily at this time. 306

\[l.i. \ Η \ όρχή\]

We start, then, with what Diodorus (36.2.6) describes as Η όρχή, ‘the beginning’, of the larger revolt in Sicily: the problems with allies being enslaved in the Roman provinces. 307 For this narrative we have two parallel accounts, one in Diodorus (36.3.1-3) and one in Cassius Dio (27.93.1-3), but for the moment I wish to concentrate on Diodorus’ account in order to focus on how he conceives the rise of the revolt, before then contrasting his conception with that of Dio. Diodorus presents the origin of the revolt as part of the wider Roman problems of the period, resting essentially in a requirement for manpower to fight the Cimbri. In response to this requirement Marius sent to Nicomedes, king of Bithynia, and requested assistance:

305 Although it will be shown that there is not necessarily a link between the uprising of Varius and that of the slaves of P. Clonius that seem to jointly represent the start of the revolt.

306 Diodorus (36.2.6) concludes about the three ‘slave revolts’ in Italy as follows: καὶ ταῦτα μὲν πρὸ τῆς κατὰ Σικελίαν, ὀσκαρ προοιμαζόμενα ταὐτῆς μεγίστης ἀποστάσεως. ‘these events took place before the great revolt in Sicily, as if making a prelude for it’. It is clear that he does not see a direct connection between these events and the eventual revolt in Sicily, but recorded them according to their apparent role as a prelude, and their chronological coincidence. It has been suggested that T. Vettius’ uprising most likely reflected a perceived weakness in Roman control of Italy in this period, rather than any real madness on his part; see Vogt (1965), 27-8, Rubinson (1971), 447, and Chapter VII.

307 It is noteworthy in itself that Diodorus considers the problems with the allies enslaved in provinces to be the όρχή of the larger rebellion, rather than the αἰτία. This represents an important break from the manner in which the Sicilian Insurrection was narrated by Diodorus, in which he distinguished between the όρχή and the αἰτία of the conflict. In a sense Diodorus does not give an αἰτία for the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War, and this could reflect a weaker conception of why it came about, or simply the conflation of the both όρχή and αἰτία in the problems with allies.
Diodorus then records that (36.3.1) ὁ δὲ ἀπόκρισιν ἔδωκε τοὺς πλείους τῶν Βιθυνῶν ὑπὸ τῶν δημοσιωνὸν διαρραγέντας δουλεύειν ἐν ταῖς ἐπαρχίαις, ‘(Nicomedes) responded that the majority of the Bithynians had been seized by the tax farmers to be slaves in the provinces.’ The senatorial response to this was, as Rubino (1971: 445) put it, ‘[to play] injured innocence…to the hilt’: they declared all allies enslaved in provinces to be freed, but went no further (Diod. Sic. 36.3.2); indeed within the year Bithynian soldiers are recorded fighting as allies for Rome (Diod. Sic. 36.5.4, 8.1) and had also been fighting in Paphlagonia the year before the request was sent (Just. Epit. 37.4.3), which implies that the senate’s gesture was successful.308

The narrative at this point finally comes to Sicily, the only province mentioned by Diodorus in response to the senate’s decree. The actions of the governor of the province are noted as follows (36.3.2-4):

οἱ δ’ ἐν ἢξιόμασι συνδραμόντες παρεκάλον τὸν στρατηγὸν ἀποστῆναι ταύτης τῆς ἐπιβολῆς. οἱ δ’ εἶπε χρήσις πειθεῖς εἶπε χάριν δουλεύσας τῆς μὲν τὸν κριτηρίον τούτων σπουδῆς ἀπόστημαι, καὶ τοὺς προσόντας ἐπὶ τῷ παρεκάλον τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐπικαλέσθητοι εἰς τοὺς ἱδίους κυρίους προσέπτωσεν ἐπαναστρέφειν. οἱ δὲ δοῦλοι συστραφέντες καὶ τῶν Συρακουσῶν ἀπαλλαγέντες καὶ καταφθαρέντες εἰς τὸ τῶν Παλικῶν τέμνους διελέλοντο πρὸς ἄλλης ὑπὲρ ἀποστάσεως. ἔκηθεν ἐν πολλοίς τόποις τῆς τῶν οἰκετῶν τόλμης ἔκδηλον γινομένης

...Licinius Nerva, who was governor in Sicily at that time, and following the decree, set free many of the slaves, setting up a court, so that in a few days more than eight hundred obtained their freedom. And all those in slavery on the island were buoyed up at the thought of freedom.

The authorities assembled, and exhorted the governor to desist from this enterprise. He, either because he was bribed, or slavishly to honour them, gave up interest in these courts, and when men approached to win freedom, he rebuked them and ordered them to return each to his own master. The slaves, collecting together, departed from Syracuse and took refuge in the shrine to the Palici, and discussed with one another about revolt. From then on the boldness of the slaves was made plain in many places.

308 Rubino (1982), 444-7, has discussed the relative chronology of the embassy to Nicomedes and the political backdrop against which Nicomedes’ response to Rome ought to be viewed. He argued that in light of the general state of chaos across the Roman empire, and the apparently dire straits in which the city found itself, allied kings, among others, were more willing to negotiate boundaries of power with Rome, and therefore were more willing to lie to Rome for their own benefit. We need not be detained here in considering if indeed large scale enslavement of Bithynians had taken place, as the purpose is to assess how Diodorus constructed his narrative as a series of causal links. Toynbee (1965), 328, likewise doubts the story, although does not go so far as to dismiss it completely.
Immediately after this passage Diodorus proceeds to describe the initial outbreaks of servile violence, but they are strictly in the west of the island near Halicyae and Heraclea (36.3.4-6 and 4.1-3 respectively). Through this passage of narrative Diodorus linked the matters concerning allied citizens enslaved in Roman provinces and the problems this caused for the governor of Sicily, with the first of this new wave of ‘slave revolts’ in Sicily, a link largely accepted in modern scholarship.  

Perhaps, however, we ought not to accept this link in Diodorus so readily. Diodorus records that the disappointed slaves τὸν Συρακουσίων ἀπαλλαγέντες καὶ καταφυγόντες εἰς τὸ τῶν Παλικῶν τέμενος διελάλουν πρὸς ἄλληλους ὑπὲρ ἀποστάσεως, ‘departed from Syracuse and took refuge in the shrine to the Palici, and discussed with one another about revolt.’ I have argued in Chapter II that Diodorus, in the account of the Sicilian Insurrection, at times acted as a covert external narrator, and here again we have evidence of this activity. It is not as obvious here as it was in the Sicilian Insurrection, but with additional context it becomes clear. The slaves fled to the shrine of the Palici. This shrine, as Diodorus records, had several functions (11.89): people swore oaths at the shrine on pain of being struck blind for lying; this extended the use of the shrine so that legal claims could be disputed there; finally it was viewed as a place of sanctuary for slaves. This final use is, clearly, the most pertinent here. According to Diodorus, slaves who had abusive masters could seek sanctuary in the shrine, and their masters could only remove them after having sworn to conditions of humane treatment: Diodorus adds that history records no case of this pledge ever being violated. In this context the refuge taken by the slaves is more explicable as a typical, or at least an understandable recourse that is absolutely within the bounds of Sicilian culture in this period. Whereas later in the revolt Salvius appears to be using the shrine for explicitly political purposes (see Diod. Sic. 36.7.1 and Chapter VII), the slaves in the passage under discussion are better understood as striving to voice their concerns through acceptable and well tested means: our only reason to view their actions as a precursor, and indeed initial cause of the later revolts is that Diodorus, as a covert narrator, tells us this was the purpose of the retreat.

---

309 This connection was accepted by Toynbee (1965), 328; Vogt (1965), 27; Manganaro (1967), 219; Goldsberry (1973), 255; Manganaro (1980), 440; Dumont (1987), 229-31, 250; Bradley (1989), 67-8; Matsubara (1998), 174-5; Urbainczyk (2008a), 19; Strauss (2010), 192. Rubinsohn (1982), 441-2, did not think that there was a link because of the geographical differences.  
310 Bradley’s contention (1989), 72, that ‘for slaves who simply refused to obey their masters and...withdrew to the shrine of the Palici for asylum, there was little other alternative for survival than banditry’ is, in the context of Diodorus’ passage, untenable: Diodorus is describing actions of slaves that perfectly fit an attempt to
I.ii. Dio and Diodorus

At this point we should return to the passage of Dio that I left aside before. As the only other source that records the basis of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War, Dio is an important source to compare against Diodorus’ account. Dio’s account runs as follows (27.93.1-3):

Publius Licinius Nerva, who was governor in the island, on learning that the slaves were not justly treated in some manner, or because he sought a pretext for profit (for he was not incorruptible), sent round a message that all who had some complaint against their masters should come to him, so that he might help them. Therefore, of these many banded together and some said that they were being wronged, while others brought charges against their masters, thinking that they had seized an opportunity to accomplish everything they wished against them without bloodshed: the freemen, after conspiring together, set themselves against the slaves and surrendered nothing. Therefore Licinius, seized with fear of a conflict\(^{311}\) between the two sides, and lest some great suffering be caused by those worsted, admitted none of the slaves, but sent them away, so that they would suffer no harm, or at least be unable to agitate as they would be scattered. They, since they feared their masters, as they had dared to accuse them to begin with, gathered and by common consent turned to robbery.

There are a great many agreements between the two versions. For example, it is clear that the tradition definitely recorded pressure from the slaveowners of the island on Licinius Nerva, and that he bowed to their pressure. However, other details differ. Rubinsohn (1982: 443 no. 26) argued that Dio and Diodorus had a common source, with Dio offering a ‘parallel narrative’, but also that Dio ‘obviously did not know of the senatorial decree’. However, the expression ὅτι οὐκ ἐν ὀική τινὰ περὶ τοὺς δοῦλους γέγονεν, ‘that the slaves were not justly treated in some manner’, could be a reference to the senatorial decree, and thus the matter is not so

---

311 In the Loeb edition σύστασις was translated as ‘the united front’, and indeed this translation is the more typical for the noun. However, in the context this translation makes little sense, and I think that a better case can be made to translate the noun as ‘conflict’, a less common meaning of the noun, since the previous line had emphasised the conflicted nature of the island at this point.
simple. The evidence of the two passages, however, would not appear to support the conclusion about a common source without concessions to each author’s intervention. There is, for example, a difference between how the governor was persuaded to start the hearings, and also about the purpose of the hearings. In Diodorus the hearings clearly arise from a senatorial decree concerning free allies enslaved in Roman provinces and therefore the hearings aim to free those involved; in Dio the governor starts the hearings either out of concern for slave treatment, which may have been caused by the senatorial decree, or his own greed, and their purpose, it appears from the passage above, was to allow slaves to air their grievances against their masters. Furthermore, the outcomes of the events described by both authors are different. In Diodorus we finally hear of the greed of the governor, but as a reason that he stopped the hearings, at which point the slaves withdrew to the shrine of the Palici; in Dio the governor chooses, between the slaves and the owners, to anger the slaves over their owners to avoid trouble and so the slaves decide to turn to robbery. On this reading, if the two passages do share a source, one or both of Diodorus and Dio reworked the episode for a new purpose, for these differences are not minor, but demonstrate distinct objectives in each author.

If we consider, for example, what we can tell of the passage’s purpose in Dio, then we begin to see the problem of working out what actually happened in Sicily in this period. First, the introductory sentence, ὁ Πούπλιος Λικίνιος Νέρους στρατηγὸς ἔν τῇ νήσῳ, ‘Publius Licinius Nerva, who was governor in the island’, indicates that this passage belonged to a longer narrative: it does not appear to be an unwarranted suggestion that this passage was also part of an explanatory introduction to a longer narrative occurring during the period of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War. If this is the case then Dio’s explanation of the cause of the problems is different from Diodorus’. For Diodorus the problems arise from a single decision to revolt taken at the shrine of the Palici (36.3.3). In Dio, on the other hand, it appears to be founded on the decision of the slaves to turn to banditry more generally, which could suggest that he viewed the whole conflict as stemming from a rise in banditry in Sicily, not unlike the explanation given in Diodorus for the Sicilian Insurrection. This might help to explain the alteration of the whole passage, if we accept that it had the same source as Diodorus. For Dio the passage reflects what happens when a governor sets out, for reasons of personal profit, to interfere with relations between slaves and masters: had he not been

---

312 The failure to give the name of the island indicates that the text preceding this excerpt included the fact that the passage refers to Sicily.
involved, it follows that the slaves would not have had their hopes raised and then dashed, and therefore would not have turned to banditry. Freedom for slaves is never an issue in Dio’s version, and the whole episode rests distinctly on the correct handling of slave complaints. Either the removal of the senate’s decree, or its downplaying through the governor’s personal greed, simplifies the picture and allows for more direct apportionment of the blame: in the Diodoran version, while the governor is censured for his willingness to back out of the hearings for the sake of the owners, nonetheless the senatorial decree was the only cause of the initial decision to start the hearings. We are left with a significant problem: regardless of whether the senate did or did not issue the decree, it is clear that different authors could use the episode to construct alternative reasons that implied that the governor was essentially responsible for the troubles surrounding the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War. In many ways, then, regardless of how either text explains the cause in detail, there is little point in retaining the link in our reconstruction of how the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War arose. For Diodorus, as we saw above, there is little reason beyond the narrator’s opinion to see a connection, and for Dio the link extends only as far as seeing a rise in banditry lead to a rise of larger struggles, a distinctly generic explanation.

I.iii. The Revolts of Varius and Salvius

The general link outlined above between the problem of enslaved allies and the outbreak of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War, suggested by Diodorus’ covert intrusion as narrator, is then strengthened by the narrator for the two following revolts – that under Varius, and the second that started with the killing of P. Clonius – by the connective gloss that follows (36.3.4): ἐκείθεν ἐν πολλοῖς τόποις τῆς τῶν οἰκετῶν τόλμης ἐκδήλου γινοµένης, ‘(f)rom then on the boldness of the slaves was made plain in many places’. For the Sicilian Insurrection, Diodorus engaged in a considerable degree of authorial intervention in order to connect the prelude of the narrative to the main part of the narrative. As will be clear in the following

313 In many ways it is clear that Dio provides a less complete view of the situation in Sicily than Diodorus: in Diodorus the slaves withdraw to the shrine of the Palici when disappointed, which is, in the context of Sicily, a more explicable move than a direct withdrawal to banditry described in Dio; in addition to this, Dio is ignorant of, or chooses to ignore the wider context in which these events then fit.

314 Both Dio and Diodorus’ narratives are in essence discourses on good and bad government. While this is not relevant to the thesis presented here, it is important that the rest of Diodorus’ narrative of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War is primarily interested in the actions, good or bad, of the succession of Roman generals (36.4.6-8, 8-10), and their effect on the island. There are significant aspects of these narratives that remain to be studied in this regard, especially in light of Rome’s seeming interest in the realities of good and bad government in the late second century B.C.: for this see Hassell, Crawford and Reynolds (1974), 213-9.

315 What Rubinson (1982), 443 no. 26, called Dio ‘resort[ing] to commonplaces’.
narrative, it is unclear if this was the case for the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War. Following the line above, Diodorus describes the revolt of a man named Varius (36.3.4-5):

The first to lay claim to freedom were thirty slaves of two exceedingly wealthy brothers in the region of Halicyae: a man named Varius led them. First, they cut the throats of their masters as they slept, then, going to the neighbouring farmsteads they summoned the slaves to freedom: in the same night more than one hundred and twenty assembled. Seizing a place that was naturally strong, they strengthened it more, having received eighty other armed slaves. The governor of the province, Licinius Nerva, had attacked them swiftly and besieged them, but his exertions were to no avail.

This revolt was eventually suppressed through the betrayal of the rebels by a turn-coat bandit (Diod. Sic. 36.3.5-6 and Chapter VII). If Diodorus’ narrative preserved any clear indications of why the governor’s actions at Syracuse matter to this revolt, then these more elaborate comments have been lost, most likely through Photius’ summarising. As it stands, there is little reason within the narrative to connect this event to the withdrawal to the Shrine of the Palici. From the narrative we might expect there to be a number of allies enslaved in that area, but this is not indicated. In the absence of any demonstrated link between this episode and the broader background described in Diodorus, it might be best to place this revolt among those others reported for Italy around the same time principally because they happened in a chronological timeframe that matches that of the larger revolt. Otherwise, we might just as well assume that the Italian revolts, too, were part of a larger movement. If we exclude this option, as I do, we must accept that we have no grounds on which to connect the two events reported for Sicily either.

This conclusion leaves us with the remaining revolt to consider: the revolt of Salvius that led in turn to the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War. Diodorus records the start of the revolt as follows (36.4.1-2):

Τὸν δὲ στρατιωτὸν πρὸς τὰ οἰκεῖα ἦθη ἀπολυθέντων, ἦκὼν τινες ἀπαγγέλλοντες ὅτι Πόπλιον Κλόνων, γεγομένων ἐπειδή Ῥωμαίων, ἐπαναστάτην ὡς δοῦλοι κυτέσσαντες ἐγόρηκαντα ἄντες, καὶ ὁ μὲν στρατηγὸς ἐτέρων βουλὰς παρακρούσει, ἦθη καὶ τῶν πλείστων στρατιωτῶν ἀπολελυμένων, καυρόν παρεῖχε διὰ τῆς ἀναβολῆς τοῖς ἀποστάταις βέλτιον αὐτοῦ ἄσφαλισθαι. προῆγε δὲ μετὰ τῶν ἐνόντων στρατιωτῶν, καὶ διαβᾶς τὸν
After the soldiers had been disbanded to their usual homes, some reports came that eighty slaves had risen up and murdered Publius Clonius, who had been made a Roman knight, and that a great number were gathering. The governor, led astray by the advice of others, as well as because the majority of his soldiers had been disbanded, at the critical time handed the rebels an opportunity, during the delay, to secure themselves. He advanced with the soldiers available, and crossing the river Alba passed by the rebels who were residing on the mountain called Kaprianus, and arrived at the city Heraclea. At all events, making known that the governor was a coward as a result of his not attacking them, they stirred up many of the slaves. Many flocked together and were prepared in a strong fashion for battle, within the first seven days more than eight hundred had been armed, immediately afterwards there were not less than two thousand.

Here we encounter a similar problem to the revolt of Varius above: the narrative again fails to provide a reason to link this episode to any other, and does not even note a causal link between this instance of servile unrest and that of Varius just before. In short, from what we have of Diodorus’ narrative, the only reason given, explicitly or through the narrative, for why these two revolts are connected to the wider problems of Sicily was the line that literally relates the prelude to these sections (36.3.4): ἐκείθεν ἐν πολλοῖς τόποις τής τῶν οἰκετῶν τόλμης ἐκδήλωσε γνωμένης, ‘(f)rom then on the boldness of the slaves was made plain in many places’. Even allowing for the explanation given by Dio for the larger revolt, these episodes do not appear to be rising from banditry, but are rather flash-points of servile unrest, not unlike those recorded for Italy by Diodorus in his proem to the whole narrative: they are the kinds of sporadic, small scale up-risings of slaves seemingly characteristic of slavery in the American South, such as the Stono Slave Rebellion, Nat Turner’s slave rebellion, and the New York Slave Revolt of 1792.316 Thus, we rely utterly on the opinion of the narrator that his link is correct, for there is no reason beyond his statement to connect the two instances of servile discontent to an episode that, to all intents and purposes, was widely defused through slave action.

Conclusion

316 The Stono Slave Rebellion (September, 1739) included more than 60 slaves; Nat Turner’s slave rebellion (August, 1831) featured more than 70 slaves; the New York Slave Revolt (April, 1712) numbered 23 slaves. Each of the revolts lasted for barely a week at most. For further information regarding these revolts see: Aptheker (1966) and (1993); Genovese (1980); Hoffer (2010).
In his account of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War, Diodorus is not engaging in a complex explanation for what happened, but he is giving his reader an impression of connectivity in Sicily that is only loosely if at all backed up by his narratorial comments. Once we strip off this authorial connection then we cannot build a persuasive context for the rise of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War from Diodorus’ narrative alone. While Sicily, on the evidence of Diodorus, was an island facing civic problems from as early as 106 B.C., the narrative does not convincingly connect the difficulties faced by the governor, Licinius Nerva, over the presence of unlawfully enslaved allies with the uprisings in the west of the island. We cannot, from this conclusion, comment for the moment on what was the ‘true cause’ of the events in Sicily during this period, but we can at least conclude that Diodorus’ conception of events cannot provide a useful guide in this respect. In the absence of an explicitly relevant context in Diodorus, we will assess, in the following chapter, alternative contexts in which to interpret the evidence of Diodorus’ narrative.

317 The actions of C. Titinius Gadaeus are recorded by Diodorus as having taken place for two years prior to his involvement in the revolt of Varius (36.3.5).
VII. A Society in Stasis
Sicily at the End of the Second Century B.C.

Introduction

The previous chapter demonstrated that Diodorus’ narrative for the rise of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War cannot provide us with a useful context in which to investigate the events. In this chapter I will suggest an alternative context for understanding the events that took place in Sicily between 106 and 93 B.C.: the wider context of Sicily in the late second century B.C. The aim here will be to analyse the evidence for the condition of Sicily at the end of the second century B.C., and to demonstrate that the island was suffering problems of internal order from as early at least as 106 B.C., and very likely before this as well. The breakdown of order will be shown to have been exacerbated, but not caused by, the uncontrolled uprisings in the west of the island in 104 B.C. led by Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion, and the governor’s inability to control these.

The analysis will be in two parts. In the first, focus will be given to a period of social disorder following the victory of Salvius/Tryphon at Morgantina (Diod. Sic. 36.6 and 11). This section of Diodorus’ text has been underappreciated in the past despite what it tells us about Sicily in this period. It will be argued that the outbreak of anarchy following the retreat of the Roman governor from Sicily is indicative of wider internal problems in the society of Sicily that existed before the rise of Salvius/Tryphon in 104 B.C. In the second part, Salvius/Tryphon’s and Athenions’ actions will be assessed as far as is possible from

318 The story of the death of a man from Morgantina, named Gorgus, at the hands of a band of bandits following the Sicilian Insurrection demonstrates the continuing problems Sicily had with banditry even following Rupilius’ victory over King Antiochus’ army: see Diod. Sic. 34/5.11.
Diodorus’ evidence in order to consider their intentions for the nascent rebellion. It will be shown that these two leaders differed in their approaches to running the revolt: while Athenion embraced the opportunity to wreak widespread but insignificant destruction, Salvius/Tryphon sought to forge a new state amidst the disorder of Sicily. Moreover, the accoutrements adopted by Salvius/Tryphon upon his acclamation to kingship were reminiscent more of holders of Roman *imperium*: this, it will be argued, is indicative of the disconnection that his movement had from the Hellenistic Greek world.

**I. The Decay of Social Order**

Diodorus’ narrative for the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War is for the most part highly compressed, largely thanks to its preservation being almost entirely in Photius’ epitome. Therefore, while we are given a detailed description of the events of 104 B.C., the years 103 and 102 B.C. are glossed over only summarily in a single brief section of the narrative (Diod. Sic. 36.9). Photius’ efforts at compression included a tightly worded précis of a collapse of order in the cities of Sicily in 104 B.C. A longer version of this passage comes from a rare Constantinian excerpt (Diod. Sic. 36.11). These passages, despite their brevity, preserve the best evidence we have for the problems facing Sicily at the end of the second century B.C., and as such demand considerable attention. Most importantly, they provide a valuable context for understanding the efforts of Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion at forming their insurgent government. But before dealing with the large-scale outbreak of disorder, it is necessary to review the problems that Sicily had been experiencing before the revolt of Salvius/Tryphon in 104 B.C.

**I.i. …To Catch a Thief**

The earliest indication we find of the problems in Sicily in 104 B.C. is with the first revolt on the island under Varius, which preceded Salvius/Tryphon’s revolt. The particulars of this event have been discussed elsewhere (see Chapter VI) with the exception of one detail that is of relevance to the current problem. After his initial failure to destroy the rebels in their stronghold, the praetor on the island sought other methods of dealing with the situation (Diod. Sic. 36.3.5-6):
When [Publius Licinius Nerva] saw that the citadel was impregnable to force, he looked to betrayal, and persuading Gaius Titinius, called by the surname Gadaeus, with a promise of immunity, involved him as a servant of the enterprise. This man had been condemned to death two years before, but having escaped the punishment had killed many of the free people of the island through banditry, while attacking no slaves. He, taking with him sufficient trusted slaves, approached the rebels’ citadel, as if going to take part in the war against the Romans: both favourably and kindly received he was even chosen as general because of his bravery, and then he betrayed the citadel.

We learn here that in order to defeat the rebels, Nerva enlisted the help of a certain Gaius Titinius Gadaeus. This man, as the passage makes clear, was a notorious criminal who had been operating on the island for at least two years, and had met with no little success. At first sight it appears that the governor has found a creative and effective solution to what was a minor problem on the island, and indeed this interpretation is accurate; yet it misses certain important elements. We should note, first, that Gadaeus’ actions are described as killing free people κατὰ ληστείαν, ‘through banditry’: the same nexus of implications that was drawn for Kleon is again present here. However, there is a marked difference between the banditry of Gadaeus and that of Kleon on several counts. Gadaeus’ actions appear to have some kind of social character to them, especially with his insistence on sparing slaves and killing only free people.

This is not the only important point here, however. The praetor’s action in recruiting a man from outside the normal bounds of society has a great many parallels in the ancient

---

319 Gadaeus has not been considered much in the past. Most recently Urbainczyk (2008a), 20, gives no name for him and only briefly notes his participation in the uprising; Bradley (1989), 67, likewise gives only a brief consideration of Gadaeus’ role, noting that the slaves were duped by him; likewise Dumont (1987), 233, and Manganaro (1980), 440. Many do not discuss Gadaeus at all: Toynbee (1965); Vogt (1965); Finley (1968); Goldsberry (1973); Perkins (2007); Strauss (2010).

320 If he was sentenced to death two years prior to this event in 104 B.C. then it follows that he must have been doing something to be sentenced to death before that; he was, therefore, active since at least 106 B.C. Modern estimates of the lifespan of a person once they had turned bandit are between two and six years: see Hobsbawm (1959), 19.

321 Although perhaps we should note that, given his eventual role in the downfall of the rebel enclave in the passage above, this reticence to harm slaves did not last long once Gadaeus was offered immunity for his crimes: he was clearly no ‘social bandit’ in the ‘noble robber’ mould (Hobsbawm (2000), 47-8), fighting against corrupt governors and despoiling the rich to help the poor; for the phenomenon of ‘social banditry’ see Hobsbawm (1972) and (2000), as well as criticism from Blok (1972) and Shaw (1984). Dumont (1987), 258, entertained the thesis that Gadaeus’ efforts to spare slaves included sparing the poor as well.
world. There were several occasions when a man formerly considered a ‘bandit’\textsuperscript{322} was officially recognised by a legitimate authority, or given de-facto control of the area in which they had operated. By way of example, Herod, at some point during his rule in the late first century B.C., granted the Babylonian Jew called Zamaris control of the borders of Trachonites in order to prevent banditry there. He did this despite Zamaris himself essentially being a bandit (see Joseph. \textit{AJ} 17.23-31; see also Neusner 1984: 43).\textsuperscript{323} Similarly, in Roman Anatolia the authorities negotiated with the Isaurian bandits in 368 A.D. and even concluded a treaty with them (Amm. Marc. 27.9.7; see also Hopwood 1999a: 177-8, 188-9). What these events often have in common is an acknowledgement from the technically superior (and legitimate) forces that they cannot defeat the ‘bandits’, and so they treat with them: in the case of Roman Anatolia in 368 A.D., Hopwood (1999a: 178-9, 194-5) has argued that Rome’s willingness to communicate was partially down to a series of defeats that they had suffered in other theatres prior to the problems with the bandits. He stressed that, moreover, it was in times of considerable transformation of political factors in a variety of senses that ‘bandits’ could become symbols of that transformation (1999a: 194-5). It is tempting to suggest a similar situation here with Nerva and Gadæus: an acknowledgement of Nerva’s own inability to cope with the situation.\textsuperscript{324} In any case, in Gadæus we have evidence of a man driven to banditry for some reason, but also capable of taking advantage of the situation on the island to survive for years, escape authority even once caught, and finally extort a deal from the praetor of the island. He does not, \textit{per se}, indicate either way a state of order or disorder on the island in this period, and so we must look to other parts of Diodorus’ narrative to investigate this.

\textit{\textit{l.ii. Violence and Disorder in Sicily}}

Our best insight into the disorder on the island comes with the defeat of P. Licinius Nerva in 104 B.C. outside Morgantina. His efforts to relieve the siege of the city had ended with his forces utterly routed by Salvius/Tryphon’s army, even if the city itself maintained its own

\textsuperscript{322} As discussed in Chapter II, the terminology would usually be either \textit{latro} or \textit{ληστής}.

\textsuperscript{323} In Josephus (\textit{AJ} 18.310-70), again, we hear the story of the Jewish bandit brothers Anilaeus and Asinaeus in the 20s and 30s A.D. who were recognised by the Parthian king Artabanus as having control over a certain region of his kingdom that they had terrorised, despite it belonging to one of his satraps; for a discussion of this story see Fowler (2007), 147-62.

\textsuperscript{324} Bradley (1989), 71, argued, furthermore, that Gadæus represented a continuation of the lawlessness in the island that had been there since the end of the Sicilian Insurrection. In this, Bradley considered also the story of the man named Gorgus of Morgantina, who, most likely in 131 B.C., was caught outside the city by a band of fugitive slaves, and was killed when attempting to flee back to the city.
resistance to the besieging forces and remained untaken (Diod. Sic. 36.4.6-8). With this defeat the narrative quickly switches to outlining Athenion’s rise in the far west of the island (36.5) and then to an interlude, preserved both in Photius’ epitome and one of only two Constantinian fragments for the entire conflict, that detailed the great rise in disorder on the island. Given the location of this interlude between the rise of Athenion and the unification of the two rebel forces at Triocala, it would appear to take place in 104 B.C., after the defeat of Licinius Nerva at Morgantina (Diod. Sic. 36.6 and 11):

Ruin and an Iliad of troubles held all Sicily. For not only the slaves, but even the impoverished free performed all kinds of robbery and lawlessness, and those that happened to be about, both slaves and free, so that no one might report their madness, they murdered ruthlessly. Therefore all those in the cities supposed that what was within the city walls was scarcely their own, but that what was without fortune, not only outrageously lost their abundance because of the runaways, but were even forced to held first place in their cities in both reputation and wealth now, because of their unexpected change of men, having unaccountable licence, were causing misfortunes far and wide; therefore all regions were madness and lawlessness. Since no Roman magistrate administered justice there was anarchy, and all extraordinary ventures undertaken in Sicily, and by many.

Not only did the multitude of slaves who had rushed to revolt ravage, but even those of the free who had no possessions on the land turned to robbery and lawlessness. For those without property, because of poverty and lawlessness alike, were pouring out en masse into the countryside and were driving away the herds of cattle, plundering the crops that had been stored in the farms, and freely murdered those who happened to be about, both free and slave, so that no one might bring tidings of their madness and lawlessness. Since no Roman magistrate administered justice there was anarchy, and all men, having unaccountable licence, were causing misfortunes far and wide; therefore all regions were full of violent robbery that exerted authority over the property of the wealthy. Those who before had held first place in their cities in both reputation and wealth now, because of their unexpected change of fortune, not only outrageously lost their abundance because of the runaways, but were even forced to
be steadfast in the face of violent threats from the free. Therefore, they all considered what was within the gates to be scarcely theirs, and that outside the walls to belong to others and to be slaves of the force of lawlessness. In a word there was disorder in the cities and confounding of justice under the law. For the rebels, being masters of the open country, made the countryside inaccessible, since they bore their masters a grudge, and were not getting a fill of their unlooked for success: the slaves within the walls, being sick in their minds, and buoyed up for revolt, began to cause great fear in their masters.

The passages, while similar, reveal some notable differences. The Photian version ignores almost entirely an explanation for the events described, reducing it to a simple fact of widespread lawlessness taking place. By contrast, the Constantinian excerpt, which also more precisely defines those involved, gives a reasonably nuanced explanation of why there had been a descent into disorder: first, the landless were compelled διὰ τὴν ἀπορίαν ἁμα καὶ παρανομίαν, ‘because of poverty and lawlessness alike’; and second, order deteriorated everywhere ἀναρχίας δ’ οὔσης διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν Ἄρχην δικαιοδοτεῖ, ‘since no Roman magistrate administered justice, there was anarchy’. Furthermore, when describing the problems within the cities, as opposed to the disorder in the countryside, the two accounts differ again. Photius gives an unduly simplistic impression of those in the city losing their possessions to those in the country, whereas the Constantinian excerpt defines the conflict in the cities as one between (36.11.2) οἱ δὲ πρότερον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν πρωτεύοντες ταῖς τε δόξαις καὶ τοῖς πλούτοις, ‘those who before had held first place in their cities in both reputation and wealth’, and οἱ ἐλευθέροι, ‘the free’, inside the city. Judging by the contrast set up in the passage, these ‘free’ people would, most likely, have been the poor within the city, or at the very least, not amongst the ruling aristocracies of the cities.

The passages also give an indication of the political dimensions inherent in the disorder. It is true that the actions of those in the countryside – butchering both slaves and

---

325 The Photian version records that (36.6) οὐ...οἱ δοῦλοι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων οἱ ἀποροι, ‘not only the slaves, but even the impoverished free’, were involved in the disorder. From the Constantinian excerpt we learn that (36.11.1) οὐ μόνον τὸ ἀλήθες τῶν οἰκετῶν τὸ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόστασιν ὁρμημένον κατέτρεχεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων οἱ ταῖς ἐπὶ χώρας κτήσεις σὸν ἐροτεντες ἐτρέρασαν πρὸς ἀρπαγήν καὶ παρανομίαν, ‘not only did the multitude of slaves who had rushed to revolt ravage, but even those of the free who had no possessions on the land turned to robbery and lawlessness’. The latter version is much more detailed, and more precisely identifies those among the free who were involved in the disorder.

326 These differences, and in particular the greater precision of the Constantinian excerpt concerning those involved in the disorder, would seem to suggest that here, also, the Constantinian excerpt is the more faithful representation of the Diodoran original, a view supported by Rubinsohn (1982), 449-50.

327 Toynbee (1965), 330, commented that ‘the free urban proletariat behaved even worse than they had behaved in the First (War)’; likewise Goldsberry (1973), 259, and Strauss (2010), 198. Manganaro (1980), 441, noted only that the participation of the impoverished free prolonged the conflict. Dumont (1987), 249, mentions the passages, but only as part of a discussion of why the slaves were agitating against their masters. Bradley (1989), 78, describes Diodorus’ account here as ‘highly rhetorical’, and thereby did not discuss the importance of this
free who witnessed their looting – do not necessarily speak of an ideological basis for their ravaging, as argued by Rubinsohn (1982: 449-50). Yet he stated further (449-51) that these conflicts were part of a general breakdown of social order on the island. This breakdown reflected the weakening state of the Roman order in the Mediterranean at the time, and could have led the poor people in the cities to push for greater political equality, as they were in Rome as well. Moreover, he argued (446-7) that at the end of the second century B.C. the pax Romana would have appeared, to many, to have been crumbling. There is, indeed, reason to believe that this was the case: the actions of successive Roman generals in the campaign against Jugurtha in 111 and 110 B.C. had led to the creation of a special court to try them for their acceptance of bribes to shorten the war, and even commanders such as Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus and C. Marius took four years to complete the war; in 106 B.C. a legate in the war against the Tigurini was exiled when accused of maiestas for surrendering hostages and baggage to the enemy; L. Cassius Longinus had proposed in 104 B.C. laws to reduce the power of the nobility; perhaps most importantly, the Roman losses in Gaul were significant and only reversed in 102 B.C. and onwards, at least two years into the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War; because of this, Italy itself lived in fear of the Gauls (Sall. Iug. 114); finally in Italy itself, in 104 B.C., a supposedly madman named T. Vettius had purchased, armed and freed his slaves in order to deal with his creditors (Diod. Sic. 36.2.1-2a.1). Order was restored in the last event only through a praetor equipping an army, and violently crushing the insurrection. In the period preceding 104 B.C., then, the Roman control over the Mediterranean may well have seemed to have been weakening. The conclusion that

indication of the widespread disorder in Sicily at this time. Many did not discuss these passages at all: see Vogt (1965); Finley (1968); Perkins (2007); Urbainczyk (2008a).

328 L. Calpurnius Bestia in 111 B.C. was bribed by Jugurtha into giving the king an easy surrender, and then abandoned the province to hold elections in Rome: Sall. Iug. 27-9, 32.2, 85.16; Liv. Per. 64; Plut. Vit. Mar. 9.3; Flor. 1.36.7; Eutr. 4.26.1; Oros. 5.15.4. Sp. Postumius Albinus in 110 B.C. was outmanoeuvred by Jugurtha in Numidia, and when he returned to hold elections in Rome his army was defeated under the command of his brother, A. Postumius Albinus. This subsequently destroyed his influence in Rome: Sall. Iug. 35-43; Liv. Per. 64; Flor. 1.36.9; Eutr. 4.26.3; Oros. 5.15.6; Cic. Brut. 128.

329 Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus was appointed consul in 109 B.C. in order to fight Jugurtha, and was subsequently appointed proconsul for 108 and 107 B.C., in which year C. Marius replaced him after having been appointed consul. Marius was himself appointed proconsul in 105 B.C., meaning that even after commanders had been appointed who were more or less incorruptible, it still took five years to finish the war: Sall. Iug. 43-92; Diod. Sic. 34/5.38; Liv. Per. 65; Strabo 17.3.12; Vell. Pat. 2.11.2; Val. Max. 2.7.2. 9.1.5; Frontin. Str. 1.8.8, 2.3.1, 4.1.2, 4.1.7; Plut. Vit. Mar. 7-10; Flor. 1.36.11-4; Dio Cass. 26.89, 98.1; Eutr. 4.27.1-3; Veg. Mil. 3.10; Oros. 5.15.7-8.

330 C. Polilius Laenas, legate in 107 B.C. under the consul L. Cassius Longinus – see Auct. ad Her. 1.25, 4.34; Cic. Balb. 11.28; Leg. 3.56; Inv. rhet. 2.72-3; Caes. B Gall. 1.14.7; Oros. 5.15.24.

331 Longinus proposed a law to expel from the senate any man who had been deprived of their imperium by the people (Asc. 78 C). This law was then used to expel Q. Servilius Caepio in 104 B.C. – see Cic. De or. 2.124, 197-200; Brut. 135; Tusc. 5.14; Balb. 28; Liv. Epit. 67.

332 The losses given for the battle at Arausio range from 80,000 soldiers and 40,000 camp followers (Liv. Per. 67; Oros. 5.16.3), to as few as 60,000 (Diod. Sic. 36.1).
the urban poor of Sicily were agitating for greater political representation may be going too far. But, even if it accords well with the general political situation in Rome in that period, we would do well to consider further the importance of this breakdown of order. We should do so not least for what it tells us about Sicilian society at the end of the second century B.C. in the wider context of the Mediterranean.

I.iii. Violence and Disorder in Rome

The various upheavals that gripped Rome throughout the first and second centuries B.C. are instructive as a comparison. Nippel (1995: 75-84) noted that in the Roman Republic the major breakdowns of order were typically caused by extreme political circumstances, but also by the collapse of traditional methods of control and order. The outbreaks of severe senatorial violence against the Gracchi and Saturninus in the second century B.C. were all indicative of the feeling that the political order as a whole was threatened (57). Nonetheless, this extreme response relied on the senate being able to call on the support of a substantial number of the citizenry, and therefore it was only when the situation was perceived as an emergency that these actions could be taken. It is also important that, for Ti. Gracchus, his followers still held such respect for their senatorial attackers that they shrank from fighting back (App. B Civ. 1.16.69), whereas increasingly with C. Gracchus and L. Saturninus the respect for the authority of the senate was undermined in the lead up to the fatal interactions (Nippel 1995: 58-60), a situation that was to get worse in the later Republic.

In the later conflicts of the Republic during the mid-first century B.C., Nippel (78) argued that the urban masses could no longer be kept in check by traditional means because they ‘no longer showed the deference to their social superiors which had once (as in 133 B.C.) restrained them from actual confrontation’; the urban masses’ lack of deference is best exemplified in their attacks on the interrex of 52 B.C., Lepidus, in the aftermath of Clodius’ murder by Milo (Cic. Mil. 13; Ascon. 33, 36, 43C; Schol. Bob. 116 Stangl), and their subsequent burning of the Senate House. This in turn meant that the (78) ‘fundamental principles of the Republican constitution’ had to be abandoned at times, and soldiers brought in to the city to maintain order. Clodius’ actions before his death are also most illuminating for the Sicilian context. He drew on rituals of popular justice against both Cicero and Pompeius Magnus, in which he organised mock verses to be sung about Pompeius insinuating his homosexual inclination (Cic. Q Fr. 2.3.2; Plut. Pomp. 48.7), as well as night
time processions against Cicero (Cic. Dom. 14; Att. 4.1.6). In this way, Clodius took advantage of a form of popular justice typified by charivaris – also known as ‘rough music’ (Nippel 1995: 39-46) – which has been shown throughout history to express social and political protest. While we naturally have far greater information for the political climate of Rome throughout the later Republic, the context that can be constructed from this information for the much less defined situation in Sicily is of vital importance for understanding the few pieces of information that we do have for the island.

We should note, first, the general similarities to the situation during Rome’s troubles and those described in Sicily in the passages above. The situation described inside the towns of Sicily bears remarkable resemblances to the unrest in Rome in the late Republic. Diodorus remarks (36.11.2) that those who had once held the highest positions were forced to endure violent threats from the free people inside the city: we presume these people, by the implicit comparison presented in Diodorus’ narrative, were poor, or at least politically less important than those they agitated against. Here we might find evidence of popular justice similar to that practiced by Clodius in the 50s B.C., as demonstrated above. This lack of traditional respect was compounded by the prevailing anarchy of the island. Yet this anarchy is specifically attributed to one cause, namely that it existed (36.11.2) διὰ τὸ μηδεὶς Ῥωμαῖκὴν ἄρχην δικαιοδοτεῖ, ‘since no Roman magistrate administered justice’. We see here a comparable situation to that in Rome, albeit caused through a different set of circumstances. The breakdown of traditional order amongst the urban masses was aggravated by an absence of authority, an absence caused by the victories of Salvius/Tryphon in the field against Licinius Nerva. Here we see, then, the circumstances described by Nippel for the failure of traditional methods of control.

Moreover, this breakdown of order happened despite the strong Hellenistic gymnastic and civic culture that has been noted for the first and second centuries B.C. on the island, perhaps indicating a reliance on Roman authority to maintain the status quo of the island’s ruling classes. At the same time, the countryside had become unsafe, not only with the forces of Salvius/Tryphon, but also with the landless free, who were taking the opportunity to

---

333 Prag (2007b), 257-62, argued that Hellenistic Sicily had an active civic culture, and maintained a gymnastic culture, one encouraged by Rome, in order to ensure manpower. Finley (1968), 126, stressed that Rome sought to maintain friendly oligarchies in Sicily, rather than radical democracies; see also Rizzo (1980); Prag (2003); Pittia (2005); and Campagna (2006), 21, 32-4. We know from the Verrine Orations that some Sicilian towns were run by aristocratic senates organised with the help of Rome: Agrigentum in 197 B.C. (Cic. Verr. 2.2.123); Halaesa in 95 B.C (Cic. Verr. 2.2.122).
engage in wanton plunder. These events are not unconnected, and it appears that Sicily, in the late second century B.C., was riven with political problems, much like Rome in 103 and 100 B.C. with the machinations of Saturninus: the poor and disenfranchised were only waiting for a suitable failure of traditional political controls in order to voice their dissent. What the sources cannot tell us, but is most likely to have been the case, is that this discontent was there for a time before the outburst in 104 B.C., and that these lapses of order, both within and without the cities, were symptomatic of a wider problem. It certainly appears that the problems in the countryside were not alleviated quickly, since Cicero noted in De lege Agraria (2.83) that in 101 B.C. M’. Aquilius had to lend grain to the towns of Sicily. In any case, the evidence discussed here is strongly indicative of considerable internal problems in Sicily in this period, beyond and separate from those represented by the insurrections of Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion. In what follows, then, I will investigate the social elements represented in Salvius/Tryphon’s and Athenion’s movements.

II. The Sicilian Stasis

Sicily in 104 B.C. faced a multitude of problems. As we saw above, in the absence of a praetor to maintain order the cities had collapsed into internecine struggles, while the countryside, no longer policed adequately owing to the escalating warfare that gripped the island, had descended into anarchy. Not least among the problems facing the beleaguered cities of Sicily was the force led by Salvius/Tryphon that had defeated and driven from the island the praetor, P. Licinius Nerva. The rise of this army had precipitated the following collapse of order; yet these events, in the sources at least, were not directly connected. It remains to investigate what social elements comprised Salvius/Tryphon’s forces and what this means for our interpretation of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War. While for King Antiochus we could reconstruct the make-up of his kingdom from ‘internal’ evidence, for the movements of Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion we have to rely on the literary accounts, albeit in this case from a much fuller account than that preserved for King Antiochus’ insurrection.

II.i. Salvius/Tryphon: a Hellenistic consul?

Despite having already been chosen as king at the start of the rebellion (Diod. Sic. 36.4.4), we hear of the accoutrements that Salvius/Tryphon employed to embellish his authority only after he had set up his royal palace at Triocala. At this point we get a glimpse into the image
of power that was being affected, and this is not as simple a picture as we might expect, given Salvius/Tryphon had been acclaimed βασιλεύς (Diod. Sic. 36.7.4):

Ionic
έξελέξατο δὲ καὶ τὰν φρονήσει διαφερόντων ἄνδρων τοῖς ἰκανοῖς, οὕς ἀποδείξας συμβούλους ἐχρήσε τε συνεδρίας αὐτοῖς τῆβεννάν τε περισσόφρονον περιβάλλεται καὶ πλατύσμιον ἐδώ χτόνια κατὰ τοῖς χρηματισμοῖς, καὶ ῥαβδούχους εἶχε μετὰ πελέκευν τοῖς προηγουμένοις, καὶ τάλλα πάντα δόσα ποιοῦσι τε καὶ ἐπικοσμοῦσι βασιλεύειν ἐπετήθενε.

He (Salvius) chose sufficient men who excelled in prudence, and appointing them as counsellors he used them as his councillors. He wore a purple bordered toga and a broad bordered chiton when in session, and had lictors bearing axes precede him; and in all other things he made it his business to both prepare and adorn himself as much as a king.

The first line appears to reflect a perfectly acceptable Hellenistic institution, that of the φίλοι of the king, or at least an equivalent for the situation. Moreover, the final line would appear to confirm the general indication of the typical Hellenistic institution of kingship, with the phrase τάλλα πάντα implying all the other aspects of monarchical regalia: we might assume a diadem, for example, had we no other information. Yet, the information between complicates matters. The symbols of office assumed, both the τῆβεννάν τε περισσόφρονον, ‘purple bordered toga’, and the ῥαβδούχους…μετὰ πελέκευν, ‘lictors bearing axes’, are emblematic of the office of the consul in Rome, or at least a praetor. Moreover, the συμβούλους referred to in the first line could well be taken as an imitation of a Roman magistrate’s consilium. The last line of the passage above is in fact verbally very similar to Photius’ gloss for King Antiochus following his acclamation, in which Photius recorded that he (34/5.2.16) πάντα τὰ ἄλλα τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν βασιλικὸς διακοσμήσας ‘arrayed his surroundings in a kingly manner’.

We should note, for example, the repetition of the phrase πάντα τὰ ἄλλα, and the very similar verbs used in each sentence: διακοσμέω for Antiochus and ἐπικοσμέω for Salvius/Tryphon. The line given above concerning Antiochus was part of a passage that was heavily compressed (see Appendix 7: King Antiochus’ Title in Diodorus). Given the verbal similarity between this line and the one about Salvius/Tryphon, it would seem reasonable to suggest that both represent a form of Photian shorthand for a variety of details concerning the initial phases in the establishment of their authority by these rulers.

So Vogt (1965), 35; Bradley (1989), 117.

The love-sick T. Vettius also assumed, under the title of King, the regalia of Roman offices, wearing a purple bordered toga and being preceded by lictors, yet he added to his regalia a diadem, which is not here mentioned for Salvius/Tryphon; see Diod. Sic. 36.2.4. The similarity of the description of Salvius/Tryphon’s regalia with that of a Roman magistrate has been noted before: see Toynbee (1965), 329; Vogt (1965), 35; Manganaro (1967), 220; Finley (1968), 145; Goldsberry (1973), 257; Manganaro (1980), 441; Dumont (1987), 268; Bradley (1989), 123; Wirth (2004), 284; Wirth (2006), 127; Perkins (2007), 48; Urbanczyk (2008a), 58 no. 38.

This line is part of a statement in which we are also informed that Antiochus had adopted a diadem (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.16).
In his choices of regalia Salvius/Tryphon is quite unlike all the other leaders involved in the Sicilian Insurrection and the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War.\footnote{Contra Bradley (1989), 116-7, 123; Callahan and Horsley (1998), 146-7; Perkins (2007), 48; Urbainczyk (2008a), 60. Wirth (2004), 284, argued that Salvius/Tryphon’s actions were an active and deliberate departure from the actions of King Antiochus.} While there are verbal similarities in Diodorus’ descriptions of both King Antiochus and Salvius/Tryphon for at least some parts, the remainder of the description is quite different. Antiochus adopted a Hellenistic diadem against Salvius/Tryphon’s purple bordered toga and lictors; Florus’ account (2.7.6) of King Antiochus agrees with that of Diodorus, describing him as ‘regisque…decoratus insignibus’, ‘adorning himself…with the insignia of royalty’. We saw in Chapter I that King Antiochus, from the internal evidence of his kingdom, presented himself as a Sicilian Hellenistic monarch, who was part of, and in touch with the culture of Sicily. In this respect there is no confusion about the type of authority he represented even in the hostile literary tradition about his role as king. The polemical attacks on his character preserved in Diodorus and Florus are presented in terms explicable to a Hellenistic audience, familiar with the ideas and concerns of which Hellenistic kingship was a part. Salvius/Tryphon’s general and later successor is, likewise, described in different terms from his predecessor. We are informed by Diodorus (36.5.2) that Athenion, on his rise to kingship διάδηµα περιθέµενος, ‘put on a diadem’, but we hear also from Florus that he was (2.7.10) ‘ipse veste purpurea argenteoque baculo et regium in morem fronte redimita…’, ‘himself arrayed with a purple robe and a silver sceptre, and crowned in the manner of a king…’ Our only sources for Athenion are literary,\footnote{Beyond a small collection of slingshots bearing his name, for which see Appendix 12: Athenion’s Slingshots.} but they present a clear picture of a Hellenistic monarchy, albeit one acclaimed with no victory, and quickly followed by a reverse at Lilybaeum (Diod. Sic. 36.5.2-4). Nowhere are we given any hint of a complicated inter-mingling of Hellenistic and Roman insignia in Athenion’s choices, even if we are given, at best, caricatures of a slave-bandit leader in all our sources regarding Athenion. What are we to make of this difference between Salvius/Tryphon and both Athenion and Antiochus?

\textit{Il.ii. T. Vettius}
At this stage, it will be useful to consider another anomalous figure of the ancient accounts in the period, a certain T. Vettius. In 104 B.C., this man hatched a plot to escape his creditors, allegedly spurred on by his excessive love for a slave girl he had bought without the means to pay for her. The plot involved, among other things, arming four hundred of his own slaves and proclaiming himself king, while also taking on various insignia of magisterial significance (36.2.4):

εἴτε ἀνάλαβὼν διάδημα καὶ περιβόλαιον πορφυρόν καὶ ῥαβδώχας καὶ τὰ ἄλλα σύσσημα τῆς ἄρχης, καὶ βασιλέα ἕαυτὸν συνεργών τὸν δούλον ἀναδείξες, τοὺς μὲν ἀπαιτοῦντας τὴν τιμὴν τῆς κόρης ῥαβδίσας ἐπελέκισεν

Then, after taking up a diadem, purple cloak, lictors and the other regalia of power, and having, with the slaves cooperation, proclaimed himself king, he flogged and beheaded those who demanded payment for the girl.

As is clear, Vettius assumed one clear aspect of Roman magisterial symbolism with his use of lictors. Yet, like Antiochus and Athenion, he also wore a diadem and a purple cloak, appearing therefore to have created a blend of both Roman and Greek attributes of power. Moreover, it is stressed that he proclaimed himself king. We would appear to have a precursor of Salvius/Tryphon’s combination, but because of the Roman context of this episode we must be careful of certain details.

In particular, any accusation that a Roman aimed at kingship must be treated with due caution: this slur was common throughout the Republic, and was often cast at those who sought to pursue radical social or personal agendas. According to Diodorus, Scipio Nasica openly boasted that his slaying of Ti. Gracchus had prevented the latter from achieving a tyranny (34/5.33.6-7); more appositely, Plutarch (vit. Ti. Gracch. 19.2-3) records that a signal from Ti. Gracchus was mistaken for his requesting a crown, a mistake that precipitated the mass of senators to attack and kill both him and his supports. Regardless of the veracity of this tale, it is clear that the accusation of Ti. Gracchus seeking kingship had been made by his opponents, not least in the story that he was slain near the statues of the kings of Rome (App. B. Civ. 1.2.16). This same accusation was made of C. Gracchus in 121 B.C. and L. Saturninus in 100 B.C. (vit. C. Gracch. 14.3 and Flor. 2.5.3 respectively). What is more, the

---

339 The T. Vettius episode is discussed in greater detail, and more generally, in Appendix 10: The Definition of a Slave Revolt. The episode is only preserved in Diodorus, at 36.2 and 2a.

340 It is typically assumed that this statement about Vettius is an uncomplicated fact: see Toynbee (1965), 327-8; Vogt (1965), 35; Dumont (1987), 226, 256; Bradley (1989), 72, 123; Yarrow (2006), 222-3;
senate sought, following the deaths of C. Gracchus and Saturninus, to enact lasting sanctions against their memories. These included the prohibition to mourn either man (for C. Gracchus see Plut. C. Gracch. 17.5; for Saturninus see Cic. Rab. Post. 24-5; Val. Max. 8.1 damn. 2, 3) and the destruction of their houses (Val. Max. 6.3.1c; Cic. Dom. 102). The form of sanctions followed the precedents set in the cases of the three men who had allegedly aimed at kingship in Rome in the early Republic: Sp. Cassius; Sp. Maelius; and M. Manlius Capitolinus. In the late Republic this same idea was used by Cicero to defend the actions of Milo after his killing of Clodius (Cic. Mil. 72, 80, 83). The accusation was also thrown at Cicero in the aftermath of the Catilinarian conspiracy (Cic. Sest. 109); indeed, the destruction of Cicero’s house following his voluntary exile in 58 B.C. (Cic. Dom. 100; App. B Civ. 2.3.15; Dio Cass. 38.17.6) further invoked the punishments meted out to those accused of tyranny, even if Cicero argued later that the destruction of his house could not be compared in that way (Dom. 100-3). It is highly unlikely that any of these figures actually aimed at kingship: yet, were we to have only a hostile source, this impression would remain.

With this in mind, we would do well to question the assumption that Vettius proclaimed himself king. In the narrative of the episode he is described at one point as (Diod. Sic. 36.2a.1) τὸ δὲ ἔρωτι δούλεων, ‘being a slave to passion’. Indeed, the passage presaging Vettius’ final decision to kill his creditors characterises the whole enterprise as a ἀνέλπιστον ἐπιβουλήν, ‘hopeless plot’, one that was παραλογωτάτη, ‘beyond all reason’. Moreover, it was a plot arrived at through διαλογισμοῖς παιδαρίδες καὶ πολλῆς ἀφροσύνης μεστοῖς, ‘childish and utterly foolish considerations’. Whatever the original source for this episode, it is portrayed as a series of actions by a man completely devoid of sanity, driven by an excess of lust to extreme measures. As Urbainczyk (2008a: 17-8) noted, this detail is important for the narrative, since it explains to the ‘right’ thinking Romans how one of their own took up with slaves. Moreover, it fits perfectly into the Roman discourse outlined above that this man would aim for kingship, since his actions were otherwise un-Roman. Yet, moving away from the value judgements preserved by the sources concerning his sanity, with his choice of lictors to represent his authority, Vettius is not invoking kingship – and indeed

---

341 The destruction of these three men’s houses was recorded in antiquarian tradition: see Varro, Ling. 5.157; Cic. Dom. 101; Val. Max. 6.3.1b; Liv. 6.20.13. Regarding the three early Republican ‘kings’ generally, see Salerno (1990).

342 The very fact that Cicero had to stress that interpretation strongly implies that others had already made the connection.

343 If we consider the episode’s location near Capua (Diod. Sic. 36.2.5), it is likely to be Roman or Italian in its origin.
only the diadem speaks of kingship otherwise – and he could just as easily have proclaimed himself consul or dictator. It is, of course, entirely possible that Vettius did proclaim himself king with the aid of his slaves, but we must be wary of accepting at face value any derogatory remark of this nature: especially in the context of Rome, any declaration of a man’s intent to become king must arouse suspicion. Certainly his other choices of insignia speak more of a Roman consul, a form of majestic power display with which Vettius must have been very familiar.

This might be the answer to why Salvius/Tryphon’s choices of accoutrements were so different from those of the other leaders in Sicily in the second century. King Antiochus, from the evidence considered in Chapter I, clearly advertised himself as a Hellenistic monarch, and presented himself as such to the people of eastern Sicily; in this respect, he firmly understood the Hellenistic world that he was appealing to, and as such presents, even in the hostile literary narratives, an uncomplicated picture of kingship. Likewise Athenion, who we know was (Diod. Sic. 36.5.1) Κηλιάτος γένος, ‘a Cilician by birth’, presented himself simply as a monarch, and his own background in Cilicia could well have given him a familiarity with the institution. For Salvius/Tryphon, as we noted in Chapter V, there is no information regarding his past. If this was the case then the only figures of authority that Salvius/Tryphon would have been familiar with were the succession of praetorian Roman governors, each with a consilium, purple bordered toga and an entourage of lictors. It is only natural that he would model himself on the Roman governors, but this also indicates that Salvius/Tryphon was not the usual,  

344 Vogt (1965), 35, thought of both Salvius/Tryphon and Vettius as anticipating Caesar’s dictatorship with their combination of both monarchical and Roman symbols; Urbainczyk (2008a), 60, argued that the leaders appropriated symbols of power with which they were familiar from their own background, and therefore all took items of regalia that were linked to Greek monarchy. Despite this, she does not think that Salvius/Tryphon’s choice of Roman accoutrements were part of his background, but rather a statement of his acquisition of Roman authority.

345 Although his name prior to taking a regal title, Salvius, could indicate an Italian origin: postulated by Finley (1968), 144, and Dumont (1987), 227, not least in Dumont’s case because of Salvius/Tryphon’s ‘goût pour les insignes du pouvoir romain’. Manganaro (1967), 220, noted the dichotomy between Salvius/Tryphon’s two names, arguing that the former is Roman and the latter Hellenistic.

346 His choice of regal name, Tryphon, if it is indeed confirmed by the slingshots attested by Manganaro (2000), 130 figs 34a-b, is unusual. Unless we posit an origin from somewhere within the Seleucid kingdom, and an unusual interest in the dynastic problems of the kingdom in the 140s and 130s B.C., then it appears to be inexplicable; for Diodotus Tryphon’s reign in Syria see Strabo 4.5.2. Finley (1968), 145, commented on Salvius/Tryphon’s choice of a Greek name; similarly Goldsberry (1973), 257. Bradley (1989), 77, took it to be an action designed to ‘strengthen his authority of his supporters’. Urbainczyk (2008a), 58, suggested that Tryphon was actually Salvius’ name. Most assume it to be an attempt to invoke an eastern form of kingship: Toynbee (1965), 329; Vogt (1965), 34; Dumont (1987), 226; Callahan and Horsley (1998), 146-7; Yarrow (2006), 223; Perkins (2007), 48; Strauss (2010), 194.
Hellenistic figure that we have seen in the Sicilian Insurrection, or indeed in the figure of Athenion who later fought in the rebellion. It is thus clear that the first leader of the insurrection at the end of second century B.C. considered the most intelligible source of authoritative insignia to adopt to be those of the Roman governors of Sicily.

**II.iii. Insurgent Organisation**

In order to understand the movement itself we must assess what evidence there is for the organisation that the rebels formed during the course of their insurrection. We saw in Chapter V, Salvius/Tryphon’s rise to kingship, and how the description of this event coloured his later conduct in the revolt. Quite unlike Eunus in the Sicilian Insurrection, about whom we hear very little regarding his initial organisation of his kingdom once acclaimed king, we are relatively well informed about Salvius/Tryphon’s organisation of his forces. Aside from his initial choice as leader, the first indication of the insurrection’s nature follows Salvius/Tryphon’s victory at Morgantina. There, after the victory over the Roman forces under the praetor Publius Licinius Nerva, but notably failing to take the city itself, he retired to the shrine of the Palici, and proceeded to sacrifice in celebration of his victory and proclaim himself king (Diod. Sic. 36.7.1):

After the siege of Morgantina, Salvius, having overrun the country as far as the plain of Leontini, gathered his whole army, chosen men of not less than thirty thousand, and having sacrificed to the Palici heroes, dedicated a purple bordered robe to them in thanksgiving for victory. He also proclaimed himself king and was addressed by the rebels as Tryphon.

Here we have an example of the Hellenistic practice of acclamation or proclamation of kingship following a military success, and there is nothing particularly extraordinary about this, notwithstanding Salvius/Tryphon’s odd choice of accoutrements discussed above. The dedication at the shrine of the Palici is, on the other hand, significant. King Antiochus, as we saw, advertised a very strong connection to the cults of eastern Sicily, and with the shrine of the Palici to be found in the fertile lands around Leontini, Salvius/Tryphon could appear to be doing the same. Yet his subsequent move west, where he remained for the rest of his involvement in the conflict, undercuts any suggestion, as was argued for Antiochus, that
Salvius/Tryphon aimed to found his insurgency on support from the east of the island. The choice of dedication, a purple bordered toga, is easily reconcilable with the forces defeated: those under a Roman praetor. However, unless we wish to connect Salvius/Tryphon to Ducetius, and see him as a Sikel leader, we need to look to the shrine’s other important aspect for the meaning of Salvius/Tryphon’ actions: its relationship with the underrepresented on the island. By sacrificing the toga at a shrine so closely connected to Sicily, Salvius/Tryphon made a symbolic gesture that stressed his links to the unsupported of Sicily. In addition, the shrine’s function as an outlet of servile dissatisfaction, briefly mentioned in Chapter V, allowed Salvius/Tryphon to achieve a dual-purpose with his sacrifice. At this shrine a slave could abandon their abusive master and take refuge, and could only be taken back on the condition of a change in treatment from their master (Diod. Sic. 11.89). It is perhaps with this dual nature of the shrine that we can find the meaning behind Salvius/Tryphon’s actions: a form of solidarity with those underrepresented members of Sicilian society as well as the servile members of his insurgency.

If we follow the logic presented above, then Salvius/Tryphon appears to have engaged in the typical ancient practice of appealing to slaves and underrepresented free in times of war. Yet, his actions at the shrine suggest that he was interested in demonstrating solidarity with these groups that went beyond routine military requirements. It is arguable that his appeal to the impoverished free was unsuccessful in many respects since these groups were, for the most part, taking to widespread looting and disorder, as we saw above (Diod. Sic. 36.6 and 11). Their actions do not, however, entirely preclude their taking up with Salvius/Tryphon’s forces. It is true that we should not talk of Salvius/Tryphon as siding with the slaves of Sicily, since in many respects his actions were typical of any ancient military

347 Perhaps the specificity of the robe (µ/uni1F77αν) implies that this was a robe captured from the praetor himself?
348 It has been argued that the shrine preserved a priesthood that served an (Maniscalco and McConnell (2003), 176) ‘active social agenda rooted in a sense of indigenous identity which championed those who opposed control from the outside’. In this respect, the shrine maintained a similar importance with regard to the protection of slaves from their masters, and so formed a type of social release in the island for those underrepresented. Wirth (2004), 284, rather saw the actions at the shrine as a form of intensification of the religious element of the conflict, while Perkins (2007), 48, noted the conflation of the cult’s duel native and slave aspects in this revolt.
349 This shrine was discussed in Chapter VI, 166.
350 After he had defeated L. Licinius Nerva, Salvius/Tryphon appealed to the slaves of Morgantina and offered them freedom (Diod. Sic. 36.4.8). It is likely that he hoped that the city would fall through treachery, but in the event the slaves in the city chose to accept their masters’ offer of freedom, and repulsed the besieging forces. Later, the Roman governor rescinded the offer, and in fact caused the desertion of slaves that Salvius/Tryphon had failed to achieve. Dumont (1987), 250 no. 483, argued that the praetor’s later order was an embarrassment for him; Bradley (1989), 75, argued that this represented a lack of solidarity among the slaves of Sicily in this period; Urbainczyk (2008a), 45, noted that the slaves in the city were mistaken to accept their masters’ offer.
force when pressed for men (see Appendix 9: Slaves in Ancient Warfare). However, it is nonetheless the case that his actions betray an unusual effort to engage with the slaves and poor of Sicily on an ideological and symbolic level, quite unlike those of Athenion. We saw, in Chapter V, that Athenion and Salvius/Tryphon differed in their opinions on how to combat the Roman forces in the lead up to the battle at Scirthaea, with Athenion’s plan of fighting in open battle preferred. This divergence is also present beyond the strategic level, and especially in the manner in which the two men organised the insurgency whilst in charge.

II.iv. Settlement and Movement

The main difference between the two leaders is one of their general aims within the conflict. Notwithstanding the fragmentary nature of our evidence, and the absence of any mention of Salvius/Tryphon outwith the narrative presented in Diodorus, the two leaders appear to have adopted quite different overall approaches. We will start by considering Salvius/Tryphon. There appears to be an intimation of considerations beyond mere survival in the initial phases of his rule, when we hear in Diodorus that he ordered his men to avoid cities as sources of (Diod. Sic. 36.4.4) ἀργίας...καὶ τρωφῆς, ‘idleness and luxury’; however, it is unclear how the source knows this to have been Salvius/Tryphon’s opinion: care ought to be taken in accepting this as indicative of his true strategy, especially since his first combative move was to attack Morgantina, and then to found a central stronghold for the rebellion at Triocala. The latter event gives a better indication of the type of movement he sought to create (Diod. Sic. 36.7.2-3):

tὸ δὲ φρούριον ὑγρότατον ὄν κατασκεύασε πολυτελέσι κατασκευαίς καὶ ἐπὶ μάλλον ὑγρόρου. Τριόκαλα δὲ αὐτὸ φασιν ὄνομάσθαι διὰ τὸ τρία καλὰ ἔχειν, πρῶτον μὲν ναματαιον ὑδάτων πλῆθος διαφόρων τῇ γλυκύτητι, δευτερον παρακειμένην χώραν ἀμπελόφυτών τε καὶ ἐλαιώφυτων καὶ γεωργεῖσθαι δυναμένην δαυμαστῶς, τρίτον ὑπερβάλλουσαν ὑγρότητα, ὡς ἢν ὦσις μεγάλης πέτρας ἀναλώτον ἢν καὶ περιβόλῳ πόλεως σταδίων ὀκτὼ προσπερβάλλον καὶ ταφρέσσαις βαθεία ἀργίας βασιλείας ἐχήρτω, πάση ἀφθονία τὸν κατὰ τὸν βίον ἀπάντων επικλημένην. κατασκεύασε δὲ καὶ βασιλικὴν οἰκίαν καὶ ἀγοράν δυναμένην δέξασθαι πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων.

The citadel, which was very secure, he equipped with costly constructions and secured it more. It is said that this place is named Triocala because it has three fine features: first, many flowing springs remarkable for their sweetness; second, the country around is planted with both vines and olive trees.

351 Bradley (1989), 80, also noted that Athenion’s general strategy of widespread raiding was at odds with the more sedentary nature of Salvius/Tryphon’s leadership.

352 It is possible that this reference to idleness and luxury was something of a topos among ancient authors regarding town slaves. Certainly Columella (Rust. 1.8.1-2) thought that lazy and idle slaves were to be found in the cities, and counsels against appointing them as vilici.
and is wonderfully amenable to cultivation; third, surpassing strength, as it is a large and impregnable rock ridge. Tryphon surrounded the city with a wall of eight stades and a deep moat, and used it as his royal residence, filling it with every abundance required for living. He built a royal residence and an agora able to hold many people.

This passage is followed immediately by the passage discussed above that described Salvius/Tryphon’s accoutrements once king. In total the passage gives a reasonably full description of the state that was created by the insurgency, and in this respect it appears to be much like any other Hellenistic state. In particular, the agora was an important civic feature for any Greek city. Moreover, the choice of location, one that could be easily defended, but also had good access to easily cultivated land, is typical of many Greek cities. What is most important about this passage is that it provides evidence of a clear desire among the rebels under Salvius/Tryphon to achieve more than just material gain from looting (or even their freedom, for those who had been slaves), and it traces the outline of a society in its infancy. The passage following the one above notes that Salvius/Tryphon wore his purple bordered toga (Diod. Sic. 36.7.4) κατὰ τοὺς χρηµατισµοὺς, ‘when in session’, again suggesting an effort at active political life, especially once we include his chosen councillors. While this particular state did not survive (much like the kingdom of King Antiochus in the 130s B.C.), it nonetheless points up the possibility of one being founded on Sicily independently of the Roman authorities, even as late as 104 B.C. This is a vitally important point to remember when we recall that the island was in a state of almost total anarchy both in the countryside and within the cities: in this sea of chaos, the most organised state, free from the dependence on Rome that had crippled the other cities of Sicily in its absence, was that led by Salvius/Tryphon and populated by large numbers of people previously subjected to slavery in Sicily.

If we compare this strong evidence of organisation to the manner in which Athenion led the rebels, both in his initial leadership and following the death of Salvius/Tryphon in 102 B.C., we will see that at no point did Athenion demonstrate the same kind of social planning or forethought. In the first instance, we have already seen that Athenion attacked Lilybaeum, and in the process of his retreat from the city, had to abandon his efforts to exploit agriculturally the area between Lilybaeum and Segesta (Diod. Sic. 36.5). His subsequent career gives no more indication of a careful plan. For example, his strong desire to oppose the forces of L. Licinius Lucullus in 103 B.C. in the field, rather than to withstand a siege was

---

misplaced. This battle, which went badly for the insurgents, was followed by a successful effort at repelling Lucullus’ forces at Triocala, even accounting for the lost forces at Scirthaea (Diod. Sic. 36.8.5).

Yet, it is only once Athenion took sole command of the revolt in 102 B.C. following the death of Salvius/Tryphon that we get a proper indication of his aims for the forces. In Diodorus we hear relatively little about this phase of the war, with only a brief passage outlining Athenion’s actions once in command (36.9.1):

Γάιος δὲ Σερούλιος καταπεμβήσας στρατηγός διάδοχος Λουκούλλου οὗτός τι ἀξίων μνήμης ἐπρέξε· διὸ καὶ όμοιος Λουκούλλῳ ὀστερὸν φυγῆ κατεδιάκασθη, τελευτήσαντος δὲ Τρύφωνος, διάδοχος τῆς ἀρχῆς οὗ Ἀθηνίων καθίσταται, καὶ τούτῳ μὲν πόλεις ἐπολεύρκει, τούτῳ δὲ πᾶσαν τὴν χώραν ἀδεως κατέτρεχε καὶ πολλῶν ἐκφύγεισε, τοῖς Σερούλιοις μηδὲν ἀντιπράττοντος.

Gaius Servilius, sent out as governor to succeed Lucullus, accomplished nothing worthy of note: therefore, like Lucullus, he was later condemned to exile. After Tryphon died, Athenion was appointed his successor in office; he besieged cities and overran the whole country with impunity, and seized many places, while Servilius never acted against him.

This narrative does not tell us a great deal. While the passage seems to imply that Athenion had some successes in taking parts of Sicily, we know from Cicero that he did not succeed in any of his attempts when besieging cities (Verr. 2.3.136), so we must not imagine Athenion’s control over Sicily being complete. Moreover, Lucullus’ attempts to sabotage the command of Servilius by disbanding his own army and breaking up his camp (Diod. Sic. 36.9.2), meant that Athenion, in 102 B.C. at least, had carte blanche across Sicily to effect any strategy he wished.

A better indication of the type of strategy he then adopted is preserved in a fragment of Cassius Dio (27.93.4):

354 Despite Athenion’s failure to capture any cities, we need not dismiss this passage of Diodorus (which is Photian in origin and clearly heavily epitomised) as merely hyperbole, pace Bradley (1989), 79. The attack on Messana, in fact, perfectly accords with the general statement here: Athenion besieged a city, having overrun the country from the west to the north east of the island, but also seized the location of Makella.
The Messenians, who had expected to suffer no danger, had brought all of their most valuable and prized possessions to that place for safety. When he learned of this, Athenion, the very Cilician who was leader of the bandits and held a strong force, set upon the Messenians when they were celebrating some public festival in the suburbs. He killed many of them as they scattered and almost seized the mastery of the city. After fortifying a certain spot, the Makella, with a wall, he violently ravaged the country.

The passage describes a reasonably successful attack on Messana by Athenion, one which provided him with a base to ravage the country around the city; the narrative does not, however, indicate if Athenion succeeded in his principal objective, namely seizing the possessions of the Messenians. We must be careful, though, not to mistake a single successful attack with the greater strategy, and it is in the broader scheme of the conflict that this event tells us the most. While Salvius/Tryphon had the command of the insurgency, effort was made to secure a base of operations that was defensible, and nonetheless in an area that was well supplied: both the assault on Morgantina and the construction of a royal city at Triocala, replete with all the requisite structures of a Hellenistic city, accord with this. Slingshots bearing Athenion’s name have also been found near Leontini, which testifies to the presence of forces commanded by him operating in that area. This most likely took place in 102 B.C. once he had assumed sole control of the insurgency.

The passage above outlines an example of a quite different strategy being employed by Athenion. It would seem reasonable to suggest that the event described in the passage also belongs to 102 B.C., especially if the slingshots are indicative of military action by Athenion’s forces en route to Messana. If this is the case, Athenion abandoned, with a sizeable force under his direct command, the palace at Triocala and the efforts of the rebels in the west of the island, and marched the length of the island, merely to seize the possessions of the Messenians. The site could be argued to have been strategic, but with the majority of the rebels’ efforts expended for the previous two years in the west, and a semi-permanent seat of power established, the attempted seizure of Messana does not speak of a tightly focused effort to control Sicily. Indeed, the wide ranging raids conducted by Athenion are more redolent of the breakdown of social order on the island that was outlined earlier in the chapter.356 While Salvius/Tryphon sought to forge a community from the rebels and create an

355 See Appendix 11: Athenion’s Slingshots.
356 Interestingly, the passage refers to Athenion’s force as ληστῶν, ‘bandits’, perhaps implying that Dio also saw Athenion and his men as part of the larger problem of the general breakdown of order in Sicily at this time: as we saw in Chapter VI, Dio described the slaves turning to banditry in reaction to the praetor’s injustices at the beginning of the conflict (27.93.3). Without more of Dio’s narrative, however, it is impossible to tell if this was intentional, or merely a method of varying the vocabulary when referring to Athenion’s men.
island of order amidst the anarchy of late second century B.C. Sicily, Athenion is best viewed as a symptom of the overall situation in Sicily. The greater significance given to Athenion in the historiographical sources – indeed, Salvius/Tryphon is not mentioned in any literary source other than Diodorus – is merely the result of his unique position in two respects: he entered into a vacuum of military power that enabled his ravaging to take place across a wide area, with little or no resistance; but, most importantly, he was killed in single combat by the Roman consul, M’. Aquilius, who finally ended the disorder (Diod. Sic. 36.10.1).

It is here, in the difference between the two approaches of Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion to leading the insurgency that we find the answer to the former’s disproportionately small presence in the historiographical record. At the end of Chapter V it was noted that Athenion’s death in single combat was one reason that he could be tolerated as a champion of the insurrection, but, perhaps, the reason is more complex still. For Athenion is an uncomplicated enemy; his war was fought in the field, and principally involved unsuccessful sieges and failed set-piece battles. He had no agenda beyond personal gain, or at least if he had an agenda beyond this, it is not recoverable from the sources as they remain and it made no appreciable impact on his actions while leader. Salvius/Tryphon, on the other hand, is a rather more intricate phenomenon. His actions in the battle at Morgantina, in routing the praetor’s army, as well as his choice of stronghold, both speak of a man with a considerable intellect. The sacrifice at the shrine of Palici and the structures set up in his capital demonstrated not only his clear understanding of the nature of the conflict he fought, but also an effort to define his followers by more than their individual desires for freedom, better social standing or whatever had driven them to their actions. On an island that lacked, in the period, social cohesion, it must have been deeply uncomfortable that those who were most underrepresented were able to form a state.

This is not to argue that Salvius/Tryphon’s movement was of a similar kind to King Antiochus’ in the 130s B.C.: while the former did indeed create a state in opposition to Rome, unlike the latter’s it did not precipitate the problems in Sicily, but grew from them. Through his choice of magisterial regalia that owed so much to Roman norms, Salvius/Tryphon demonstrated the ideological and cultural disconnection from the Hellenistic

---

357 This event afforded Aquilius no small amount of political capital on his return to Rome: see Appendix 13: Honours for Victory.
358 In this, I disagree with Bradley’s assertion (1998), 82, that the insurgency sought no goal beyond survival.
culture of Sicily and the wider Greek Mediterranean that his movement suffered from. Where King Antiochus managed to unite a sizeable portion of Sicily in a combined endeavour under a truly Hellenistic ruler, Salvius/Tryphon was the leader of a section of an island already in turmoil, a turmoil caused by problems that went far beyond what his actions represented.

**Conclusion**

Sicily at the end of the second century B.C. was an island beset by a variety of problems; the insurrections of Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion were only one part of a complex series of events. That this is the case is evident especially in the fact that M'. Aquilius did not, in the end, settle the military problems in Sicily for another year after his victory over Athenion. Prorogued as proconsul in 100 B.C., he spent the year hunting down the splintered remains of Athenion’s forces, and no doubt lending his aid to the beleaguered rich in the cities of Sicily. The final one thousand survivors of those who had followed Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion, as Diodorus narrates, killed themselves rather than be condemned to the beasts (Diod. Sic. 36.10.2-3). That it took Aquilius over a year to deal with the military troubles in Sicily is testimony to the problems that Sicily had faced, and it would not be surprising if many of the pockets of resistance that were wiped out were in fact composed of those landless free men who had taken advantage of the lack of authority in 104-102 B.C. Whatever measures he took to secure the island again in purely military terms were evidently successful: during the Social War, the island remained peaceful (Cic. Verr. 2.5.8), and it was well treated by Pompey when he was sent there to deal with the remaining Marians, with some exceptions, such as Messana (App. B Civ. 1.95.440; Plut. Vit. Pomp. 10.1-2 and 6-7; Mor. 203 C).

Yet, the island had not been recovered fully through this military intervention. In social terms, juridically and economically, there was a lasting impact from the troubles of 104-100 B.C., and these were not addressed by M’. Aquilius. In fact, in the aftermath of

---

359 In Chapter IV we saw that Aquilius’ ruling that slaves could not carry arms (Cic. Verr. 2.5.7) does not necessarily imply that only slaves were to blame for the problems in Sicily in this period.

360 Brennan (2000), 481, argued that Cicero ‘strongly’ implied that there was a danger of a ‘slave uprising’ in Sicily during the Social War. Yet, we must wonder why there would have been a danger during the Social War from the slaves of Sicily, rather than the cities? There is little reason, beyond a generic distrust of any assertion that Cicero made in the *Verrine Orations*, to believe that he was hinting at or implying that Sicily almost had great problems with slaves during the Social War. Indeed we might note that to imply this was detrimental to his argument that Verres had over-emphasised the threat from a servile insurrection on the island.

361 This conclusion is not incompatible with the view of the Roman intervention expressed on the *denarius* of 71 B.C. on which the moneyer, a member of the Aquilii, boasts of M’. Aquilius’ role in aiding Sicily (Figure 28).
his consulship on the island, Aquilius was tried for mismanagement (Cic. *Flac.* 98; *De or.* 2.195; *Verr.* 2.5.3; he was acquitted), implying at some level at least that he exploited the province, despite (or because of) its weakened state. It is only with a later governor, L. Sempronius Asellio, that we hear finally of the recovery of the island from its destitution, this most likely in 93 B.C. (Diod. Sic. 37.8; see Brennan 2000: 480 and 747 no. 263 for the date). Diodorus stresses that Asellio reformed the administration of justice on the island, and this might hint at the unresolved problems that had caused the internal problems in the cities of Sicily in 104 B.C., problems that had also affected the island in the 130s B.C. From 106 to 93 B.C. the island had faced a unique complex of difficulties, and the insurrection led by Salvius/Tryphon was just one aspect of the whole. Indeed, regardless of the status of the participants in Salvius/Tryphon’s revolt – and we commit a gross over-simplification if we assume them all to be slaves – it remains that Sicily encountered, for over ten years, severe problems, and was often left, as in 104 B.C., in a state of chaos. We cannot then call this episode a ‘slave war’ without confirming the typical ancient bias towards recording military events; and we cannot call it a ‘Second Sicilian Insurrection’, for the events outlined here and in the previous two chapters are not of the same kind as those associated with King Antiochus. If we consider the problems as a whole, a better label suggests itself. For nearly fifteen years Sicily was torn by banditry, insurrection, political impotence from the ruling class, and either exploitation or failure from its Roman governors. The impoverished openly looted what they wanted; slaves seized their freedom, and took part in a short-lived effort to found a new state amidst the disorder. The Greeks had a term for this: στασις. The island which had in part risen up against Rome in the Sicilian Insurrection was, only thirty years later, experiencing sustained problems that were both home-made and Roman-made: the Sicilian Stasis.

From the Roman perspective, the result of Aquilius’ actions represented an improvement over the disorder of the preceding years, although it is clear from the fact that Aquilius was tried for corruption after his time as governor that his actions were not universally popular in Sicily (Cic. *Flac.* 98; *De or.* 2.195; *Verr.* 2.5.3).
Conclusion:
Renegotiating Sicilian History

‘The two great slave wars of the later second century B.C. and Cicero's devastating critique of Caius Verres' governorship in 73-71 B.C. encourage a negative assessment of the island under Roman rule.’ Prag (2007a), 69.

From the arguments put forward in this thesis it should by now be clear that I view the two conflicts that took place in Sicily in the second century B.C. as manifestations of the island’s strong Hellenistic culture, and as part of its negotiation with its imperial master, Rome. Both the Sicilian Insurrection and the Sicilian Stasis are telling examples of the fragility of the relationship between the Sicilians and Rome. For both conflicts it has been shown that a fresh analysis of all the relevant evidence in its most immediate context demonstrates that far from being events that inform us only about the state of slavery on the island in the second century B.C. the two conflicts also provide compelling evidence for the strength of the Hellenistic culture in Sicily, and how this culture could, in times of duress, manifest itself. At this point it may be useful to reconsider where we have come from to reach to this conclusion, and to reflect on what the conclusions put forward in this thesis mean for further study of Hellenistic Sicily and Hellenistic slavery.

Both the ancient literary sources and the majority of the modern accounts consider both the Sicilian Insurrection and the Sicilian Stasis to have been primarily concerned with slavery. In truth, the ancient accounts are unambiguous concerning this, and therefore place great stress on the status of those involved as ‘slaves’. The events were then employed to demonstrate aspects of other subjects: as part of a commentary on the correct moral administration of an empire (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.1-3, 27-33; 36.2-4; Dio.27.93.1-3); as part of the degeneration of a Republic into autocracy (Flor. 2.7); as a source for the great and (in)glorious deeds of Romans and foreigners (Val. Max. 2.7.3, 2.7.9, 4.3.10, 6.9.8, 9.12.1); as a suitably wicked and apposite comparison for a provincial governor (Cic. Verr. 2.2.136; 2.3.65-6, 125; 2.4.112); or as an example of the results of moral failure (Oros. 5.9). Modern accounts, eschewing the strong vein of moralising in the ancient sources, have sought to understand the events in the context of ancient slavery, and as such have taken the ancient evidence and justified the ambiguities and textual problems with historical contexts that made
sense of them. The events have been variously interpreted as Syrian nationalistic uprisings caused by the mass-importation of Syrian slaves into Sicily (Vogt 1965: 40-3), as instances of maroonage and flight taken to extremes (Bradley 1989: xiv-xv; Bradley 2011b: 365), as the most prominent examples of the continual efforts by the slaves of the ancient world to revolt (Urbainczyk 2008a: 29-50), or just as examples of the lengths to which slaves would go in the ancient world when pushed to their limits (Westermann 1945 and 1955; Green 1961; Dumont 1987; Sacks 1990; Shaw 2000). Overwhelmingly the events have been accepted in their essential details as given by the ancient accounts (principally Diodorus Siculus and Florus), and analyses have concentrated not on challenging the inconsistencies of the ancient accounts, but on explaining them (away).

Even those who stressed the non-servile element of the revolt reported in the ancient sources (Verbrugghe 1972; 1974), or those who emphasised the Sicilian context of the events and their meaning to the Sicilians themselves (Manganaro 1967; 1980; 1982; 1983; 1990a; 1990b; 2000), have either been too abrupt in their dismissal of the ancient evidence (see Verbrugghe 1972; 1974), or have not provided any answers as to what, if the events in question were not slave revolts, actually took place (see: Verbrugghe 1972; 1974; and Manganaro 1982; 1983; 1990a; 1990b). With the important exception of Manganaro’s various articles on the subject, Rubinson’s (1982) careful work on the Sicilian Stasis, and some brief considerations in Verbrugghe’s 1972 article, the Sicilian context for both events has been ignored. Even Manganaro and Rubinson’s contributions have not questioned what it meant for a developing Roman province to be struck by provincial revolts or civic disorder so quickly in so short a space in time. In this thesis I have demonstrated that it is only by approaching the revolts from the point of view of their Sicilian context that we can begin to understand not only the inconsistencies of the ancient evidence, but also begin to answer why the province erupted in the manner that it did on two separate occasions in the space of thirty-five years.

Yet, these conclusions also have important implications for the study of Sicily itself. If members of the province were, as I have argued, so deeply unhappy with Roman exploitation that they attempted to throw off the Roman governance, this should force us to reconsider the place of Sicily among the ‘possessions’ of the Roman empire: we have to question the assumption that Sicily and the Sicilians considered Rome’s taxation of the
province to be reasonable; and we must ask if we can consider the island as a unified entity and perhaps ask more directly who benefited from the Roman order on the island, and at whose cost? Moreover, the conclusions reached regarding the Sicilian Stasis ask uncomfortable questions about the broader narrative of Sicily as an island of strong civic Hellenistic culture throughout the second and first centuries B.C.: how could such a strong civic culture collapse so completely merely because Roman governance was weakened; how did Sicily in general recover from a period of apparent anarchy, in which the strongest driving force of civic culture was a breakaway state of runaway slaves and dispossessed free people; and, moreover, how does this background affect our reading of the later literary evidence regarding Sicily during Verres’ governorships? It is certainly the case that we can no longer study any aspect of Sicily in the first and second centuries B.C. without taking proper account of the evidence for the Sicilian Insurrection and the Sicilian Stasis, since both events, while perhaps not attested well archaeologically, were clearly important to the island politically, militarily and structurally. A specific example will illuminate the problem.

In a recent article, Prag (2007a) has highlighted the nature of Rome’s military involvement with Sicily after 211 B.C. He has shown that the island was most likely policed by Sicilian soldiers, led by Sicilian officers (82-7). In this reconstruction he stressed the difficulty of assessing the evidence for Roman involvement on the island from literary sources, noting especially the patchy account in Livy and the difficulty of gleaning clear information regarding the Roman forces during the Sicilian Insurrection and Sicilian Stasis (76-8). Yet, despite concluding that (99) ‘...the evidence is growing ever stronger for the vitality of Republican Sicily’, Prag nonetheless considered the Sicilian Insurrection and Sicilian Stasis to be evidence for a (69) ‘...negative assessment of the island under Roman rule’. His engagement with both conflicts is limited, but a more thorough consideration of the events shows that, at least in the case of Sicilian Insurrection, they can be evidence for the strength of Sicilian Hellenistic culture, and perhaps even the gymnastic culture that interested Prag.

---

362 See, for example, Serrati’s (2000b: 123-4) comment that ‘Sicily was so productive that a second tithe was often requisitioned by the Roman government to feed its legions’. See also Carcopino (1914), 1-44; Rickman (1980), 37; and Bell (2007a), 199-200.

There is an additional irony in the study of Sicily under the Roman Republic that does not fully accommodate the study of the Sicilian Insurrection and Stasis. As I noted in Chapter I.2, there has been an increasing awareness of the strong civic culture of Sicily that was maintained throughout the Hellenistic period. This culture is linked, at times, to the powerful economy of Sicily, with Wilson (2000: 144-5) noting that ‘…local elites, even after paying off their tithe to Rome, still had money to spare to invest in new construction’. 364 Evidence of this civic culture, and the Hellenistic constructions that went with it, is found in a wide variety of Sicilian sites, with Wilson (140-50) alone noting Soluntum, Ietas, Segesta, Tyndaris and Halaesa. The presence of civic buildings such as bouleuteria, stoai and theatres, as well as honorifics, formal agorai and building inscriptions have been interpreted as indicators of Sicilian culture. 365 The gymnastic culture outlined by Prag (2007a) is, moreover, another example of the ties between the attested civic culture and the vibrancy of some local elites. Prag (2007a: 92) argued that ‘those who regularly trained in the gymnasion may have constituted the core, or in some cases an elite element of a city’s fighting force…this gymnasion-based elite provided the leaders for these city-based elements [of Sicily’s military].’ Sicilian autonomy has also been found in the rise of localised numismatic output during the second century B.C. (Crawford 1985: 115; Frey-Kupper 2006: 27-56). This has all been attested as evidence of Sicily’s strong Hellenistic culture and in particular its political culture.

Yet, despite all this evidence on the ground for a strong, independent civic culture, it is nonetheless the case that several Sicilian towns, when needing help to define their ruling elite, turned to Rome for help. 366 I argued in Chapter VII that the collapse of order at the end of the second century B.C. during the Sicilian Stasis was partly caused by the excessive reliance among the Sicilian elite on Roman authority to support their rule, and there is an important corollary to this observation. The types of buildings and epigraphies described as evidence for Sicily’s culture illuminate only one aspect of Sicily: the ruling aristocracies. I noted before that this economic and civic culture was not universal, and I even tied this discrepancy to the decision of some cities to revolt against the Roman order under the guidance of King Antiochus. Moreover, the people of Sicily described by Diodorus as taking

364 See also Campagna (2006), 15-34, and Bell (2007b), 118.
366 Agrigentum in 197 B.C. turned to Rome: see Cic. Verr. 2.2.123. Halaesa in 95 B.C did the same: see Cic. Verr. 2.2.122.
part in the insurgency under King Antiochus or venting their frustrations during the Sicilian Stasis – the poor free and slaves of Sicily – are precisely those who would not have left any evidence of their culture in the form of honorifics, building inscriptions and statues. Neither political leaders (not being aristocratic), nor members of the gymnasium of Sicily owing to their status (Prag 2007a: 92), these people are those who are not understood through the focus on the vibrant Hellenistic political culture of Sicily that relied on Roman sanction to operate; but they can be studied, albeit with difficulty, through analysis of the few times in Sicilian history that they made themselves unavoidable. These people demonstrated, during the Sicilian Insurrection and the Sicilian Stasis, that they were not thriving under Roman administration and taxation, and that some in Sicily wanted to renegotiate terms, even with those Sicilians who ostensibly ran affairs on the island.

Nor does the evidence for Sicily’s Hellenistic culture illuminate all of the aristocratic society. In Chapter I.1 it was noted that King Antiochus’ coinage reflected a strong understanding and interest in the history and society of Sicily; in particular, the coinage connected to the tradition of political unification that existed before Roman domination, and was utilised to unite eastern Sicily against Rome. This familiarity with the history of Sicily, and the ideological implications of certain images, argues very persuasively for an element of King Antiochus’ movement that was in the position to maintain these cultural memories and appreciate their history: this is likely to have included members of the aristocracy in Sicily. These same aristocrats are unlikely to have survived (either literally, or as aristocrats) after King Antiochus’ defeat, and therefore a part of Sicily’s Hellenistic civilisation ended with them: the part that resisted, rather than colluded with, Roman governors. The Sicilian Insurrection, therefore, is evidence for a form of negotiation with Rome that is not preserved in the material record that is the focus of the current scholarship on Republican Sicily; moreover, this was a form of negotiation that succeeded, at least in part, in extracting compromises from Rome. This was demonstrated in Chapter I.2 through the reforms instigated by Rupilius on concluding the war (Cic. Verr. 2.2.32). Without this analysis we do not discover this vital form of interaction between Rome and some Sicilian communities, and we stress too much the ability and willingness of Sicilians to work with Rome. Furthermore, by failing to emphasise this evidence, the nuances in aristocratic reactions to Rome are lost in

This interpretation is at odds with Wilson (2000), 144-5, who argued that (144) ‘Roman rule brought prosperity to the Sicilians as well as benefits to Rome’, and Serrati (2000a), 112, who stated that ‘Sicilian grain played a tremendous logistical role in the Roman conquests of the second century, and Sicily enjoyed a period of peace and prosperity.’
the material evidence for continuity; and it is the very fact that King Antiochus’ forces lost that ensures that Sicily left no material evidence for the continuity of resistance to Roman rule.

In a different manner, the Sicilian Stasis preserves similarly problematic evidence for Sicily’s development as a province. Contrary to the Sicilian Insurrection, there is no evidence of aristocratic support for Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion’s revolt, nor for aristocratic support of the widespread disorder in the province. It is quite the opposite: the Sicilian Stasis is compelling evidence for aristocratic solidarity with Rome, since they relied on Rome to restore order to the island. The evidence from this later conflict strongly suggests that Sicily was far from a settled province with firm civic identities, but that in many cities there had been a complete collapse of social order, represented most clearly in the disrespect and open violence shown to those who had once been well regarded in their cities (Diod. Sic. 36.6 and 11). The evidence in the narrative also demonstrates that some of the problems that caused the Sicilian Insurrection had not been adequately alleviated by Rupilius’ actions, and that Rome had to take considerable remedial action to stabilise the island between 106 and 93 B.C.\footnote{The governor of c. 93 B.C., L. Sempronius Asellio, is credited with restoring the island’s fortunes: Diod. Sic. 37.8.} The poor and landless on the island were deeply unhappy with the conditions there and this was repeatedly demonstrated during the second century B.C., much as similar problems were demonstrated in Rome and Italy before and after the Social War. In addition, the unease among the landless and poor that became clear during the Sicilian Insurrection and Sicilian Stasis is only evident when approached through evidence for these two conflicts. Without thus engaging with the ancient accounts discussed here, scholars concerned with Sicily as a province have missed a whole level of interactions between Roman and Sicily, and have not noted the considerable problems that Sicily faced from the 130s to the 90s B.C.

That this has not been noted in the works on the development of Sicily as a province is precisely because the Sicilian Insurrection and Sicilian Stasis have been relegated to the domain of ‘slavery studies’. This relegation has resulted in a skewed analysis of the two events which has focused too much on explicating the slave context of Diodorus’ narrative, and which has not attempted to understand how the two conflicts relate to Sicily as a province. In particular, the comparative lack of attention given to those passages of Diodorus that stress the involvement of the free poor and landless, and the reluctance to approach
Diodorus’ narrative as a piece of literature, means that problems with both the nature and content of the text have been ignored and the involvement of the free poor of Sicily reduced to footnotes. Moreover, it is only by studying the two conflicts in the context of the developing Sicilian province that we can understand correctly the place of slavery in Hellenistic Sicily, and the reactions of those in servitude to their condition. By over-emphasising the negative assessments given in the ancient literary sources regarding those involved in the conflict (see Chapters II and V), and attempting to reinterpret those negatives in a positive light, scholarship has only reaffirmed the bias of the ancient literature in favour of these events as simply ‘slave revolts’. Worst of all, by stressing the servile aspect of the events, previous studies have denied the essential detail of cooperation between slave and free that is evident in the Sicilian Insurrection and the Sicilian Stasis, essentially creating a falsely sharp contrast between the worlds of the slaves and the free. Through studying the events in their most immediate context – Hellenistic Sicilian culture, society and history – we can begin to understand the relevance of the material to constructing our narratives of ancient Sicily, and the place of the island in the developing empire of Rome.

These narratives must be more nuanced than simply describing the events in question in terms of slavery, and more complex than analysing Sicily’s engagement with Rome solely through its efforts to work with Rome. There has to be a new appreciation for the intricate web of views in Sicily concerning the relationship between slave and free, as well as between province and imperial centre. Most importantly, a new narrative of Sicily in the second century B.C. should be written. Throughout the century Sicily was an island engulfed in flames. Citizens and slaves rose up in anger, together and separately, and armies met their ends on the plains of eastern and western Sicily. Frustration at political incompetence, economic exploitation or juridical corruption drove portions of Sicily into revolt, from the aristocrats to the poorest farmers and slaves. On several occasions Roman control of the province was broken, and the island descended into disorder, or attempted to create its own order outwith the remit of Rome. Roman order was only restored on each occasion through hard fighting and political concessions. In the two hundred years after involvement in Sicily became a sine qua non for Rome, the negotiation with the inhabitants of the island was

---

369 See Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.48 for the Sicilian Insurrection and my discussion in Chapter I.2 no. 122, and Diod. Sic. 36.3.5-6, 36.6 and 11 for the Sicilian Stasis, and my discussion in Chapter VII.

370 Powell (2002), 103-33, argued that during the wars between Sextus Pompeius, Octavian and M. Antonius, Sicily was ‘an island amid the flames’ of the war that raged throughout the Mediterranean, and a refuge for the proscribed of Antonius and Octavian.
consistent and heated. If Sicily profited from Roman involvement, as Cicero claimed (Verr. 2.2.8), then it was only because the Sicilians had made the situation profitable through dissent, resistance, and in cases open insurgency against Rome. Although sporadic and fragmentary, the one fact that is clear from the literary, archaeological, and numismatic record regarding the Sicilians’ relationship with Rome from the third to the first centuries B.C. is that it was decidedly complex and definitely fragile. And in this, it may have been typical, for all we know, of Rome’s ‘relationships’ with its other ‘possessions’ – outside of and within Italy.
Refiguring the Sicilian Slave Wars: from Servile Unrest to Civic Disquiet and Social Disorder: Volume Two

Peter Morton

PhD in Classics
The University of Edinburgh
2012
Appendix 1: The ΦΙΛΙΠΗΙΟΝ Gold Coinage

GOLD COIN 1 (Campana, Enna 15)

Obv: Male head, right, diademed with long hair.
Rev: Nike standing right, right hand holding a crown (not visible); ΦΙΛΙΠΗΙΟΝ curved across the bottom.

GOLD COIN 2 (Campana, Enna 16)

Obv: Male head, right, diademed with long hair.
Rev: Seated soldier left on pile of armour (?), left hand holds a spear, the right hand a club (?); ΦΙΛΙΠΠΟΣ upwards at left.

These two coins have been published by Manganaro (1990a and 1990b), Berk and Bendall (1994) and Lorber (1994), and are listed in the catalogue of Campana (1997: 158) as coins 15 and 16 from Enna. They are both made from gold, and appear to be, individually, the only specimens recorded with these types. The obverse is similar on both coins. I have been unable to view either coin in person, due to their location in a private collection, but according to Manganaro (1990b: 181) Coin 1 was found in the
area around Morgantina, although he does not say how he knows this.\textsuperscript{371} The coins are regarded by Manganaro (1990a: 418-9) as being issued by King Antiochus because Coin 2 shares, with the bronze issues firmly attributed to King Antiochus, the lunate sigma in its lettering. The unusual legends, which should cause concern, are suggested to have been chosen to confirm to the owner of the coin that it possessed the same weight as the famous staters of Philip II of Macedon (Manganaro 1990b: 183; Berk and Bendall 1994: 7-8),\textsuperscript{372} and Berk and Bendall (1994: 8) suggested furthermore that the coins were designed by King Antiochus for use in overseas trade. Finally Lorber (1994: 3) has suggested that the two coins reference, through their imagery, Antiochus III as a liberator of Greece, and the ‘liberation’ of Greece by Flamininus.

I have excluded these two coins from the main body of my analysis for several reasons. Most importantly, the attribution of the two coins to King Antiochus is problematic. There are three reasons given for this attribution. First, that the coins were found near Morgantina; second, that they share the lunate sigma with the bronze issues of King Antiochus; and third that they ‘must’ have been the coinage used by King Antiochus to fund his war. The first point may be discounted quite easily. Only one coin is claimed to have been found near Morgantina, and that is Coin 1, with the legend reading \textit{ΦΙΛΙΠΗΙΟΝ} (Manganaro 1990b: 181). The lunate sigma, however, is \textit{not} present on this coin, and it is too great a leap of faith to believe that because the other coin \textit{has} the lunate sigma, and looks on the obverse like the former coin, the two coins are related, and that they were both found in Sicily. If there is no reason to link Coin 1 to King Antiochus, and the find site of Coin 2 is unknown, then we cannot link Coin 2 to Antiochus either. Furthermore, they are not stylistically similar to the bronze coins of King Antiochus, and do not share any types with them either, \textit{pace} Lorber (1994: 2-3). Manganaro (1990a: 419) offered the final link between King Antiochus and these coins. Having argued that in

\textsuperscript{371} Berk and Bendall (1994), 8, claim that both coins were found near Morgantina, but state no evidence for the claim. Considering that the content of the article by Berk and Bendall is mostly a repetition of articles by Green (1961) and Manganaro (1982: 1983; 1990), it is possible that they considered the find site of Coin 2 to be near Morgantina because of its stylistic similarity to Coin 1, in spite of the fact that Manganaro (1990), 181, is not discussing Coin 2 in his article.

\textsuperscript{372} Suggested by Manganaro (1990), 183 for Coin 1, and extended by Berk and Bendall (1994), 8 for Coin 2.
order for King Antiochus to have carried on a war against Rome he must have had large quantities of money, Manganaro concluded that (419)

(p)er fare fronte alle esigenze della guerra, Antioco avrà potuto ricorrere ad una emissione di oro, la quale allora non poteva essere che del tipo del philipeion come quello rinvenuto a Morgantina.

This is not a strong enough argument to link the gold issues to King Antiochus: there is no chronological, stylistic or epigraphic reason to connect them to him.\textsuperscript{373}

Furthermore, Manganaro was quite aware of this problem, noting that (419)

tuttavia non può non meravigliare la rinunzia, nella leggenda, al nome personale e al titolo regale.

Considering that the use of his title is the one consistent feature of King Antiochus’ bronze coinage, it is therefore very difficult to argue the case for their attribution to him, and it seems better to err on the side of caution and exclude them from the overall debate.

In addition, the legends are unusual. ΦΙΛΙΠΠΟΣ is uncomplicatedly nominative. While the nominative could be used on coins, it was normally used when expressing an ethnic identity for the authority of the coin, and even this was rare.\textsuperscript{374} It is has been suggested that King Antiochus may have used the legend in order to facilitate external trade,\textsuperscript{375} but this seems unlikely. The legend ΦΙΛΙΠΠΙΟΝ is rather odd, too. The most plausible explanation is that ΦΙΛΙΠΠΙΟΝ is a nominative adjective with νομισμα understood, in order to indicate that the coin is of Philip. This is more likely than it being a reference to the Philipeion, a temple set up in Olympia by Philip II of Macedon.\textsuperscript{376} In any case, the fact that the legends are different on the two coins throws doubt on the suggestion that both were designed to achieve the same purpose and that they can be safely linked.\textsuperscript{377}

\textsuperscript{373} So Sánchez León (2004), 225.
\textsuperscript{374} Kraay (1976b), 6.
\textsuperscript{375} Berk and Bendall (1994), 8; a claim made on the strength of Manganaro’s suggestion for Coin 1 (1990), 183.
\textsuperscript{376} Nicolaou (1976), 651.
\textsuperscript{377} Andrew Burnett suggested in conversation, July 2008, that the coins were most likely fake.
Appendix 2: Sicilian Coinage c. 210 B.C. to the First Century B.C.

| Year (B.C.) | 120 | 119 | 118 | 117 | 116 | 115 | 114 | 113 | 112 | 111 | 110 | 109 | 108 | 107 | 106 | 105 | 104 | 103 | 102 | 101 | 100 | 99 | Total |
|-------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| 120 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 119 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 118 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 117 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 116 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 115 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 114 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 113 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 112 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 111 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 110 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 109 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 108 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 107 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 106 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 105 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 104 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 103 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 102 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 101 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 99 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coin Hoards from Morgantina</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Inesilicus</th>
<th>Helograms</th>
<th>M. H. C.</th>
<th>M. H. C.</th>
<th>M. H. C.</th>
<th>M. H. C.</th>
<th>M. H. C.</th>
<th>M. H. C.</th>
<th>M. H. C.</th>
<th>M. H. C.</th>
<th>M. H. C.</th>
<th>M. H. C.</th>
<th>M. H. C.</th>
<th>M. H. C.</th>
<th>M. H. C.</th>
<th>M. H. C.</th>
<th>M. H. C.</th>
<th>M. H. C.</th>
<th>M. H. C.</th>
<th>M. H. C.</th>
<th>M. H. C.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3: Sicilian Coinage 250 B.C. to c. 210 B.C.  
The Importance of Syracusan Coinage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hoard</th>
<th>Total Coins</th>
<th>Syracuse Coins</th>
<th>Unused Hoards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2215</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2217</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2218</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2219</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2220</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2221</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2223</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2224</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2225</td>
<td>1242</td>
<td>1242</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2226</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2227</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2228</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2229</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2230</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2231</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2232</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2233</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2234</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2235</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2236</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2237</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2238</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2239</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2240</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2241</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2242</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>256</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2243</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2245</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2246</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2247</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>7909</strong></td>
<td><strong>4790</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% Syracuse 60.56%
### Appendix 4: Sicilian Coinage in the Fourth Century B.C.
#### Corinthian Coinage and Pegasi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hoard</th>
<th>Total Coins</th>
<th>Corinthian Coins/Pegasi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2144</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2146</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2147</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2148</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2149</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2150</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2151</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2152</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2153</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2154</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2155</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2156</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2157</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2158</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2159</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2161</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2162</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2163</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2164</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2165</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2166</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2167</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2172</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2173</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2174</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2175</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2176</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2179</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2180</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2181</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCH 2182</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| IGCH 2183 | 89 | 79  |
| IGCH 2184 | 500| 450 |
| IGCH 2185 | 357| 250 |
| IGCH 2187 | 169| 136 |
| IGCH 2188 | 243| 243 |
| IGCH 2189 | 23 | 23  |
| 23 (CH 5) | 27 | 27  |
| 42 (CH 7) | 6  | 6   |
| 56 (CH 7) | 30 | 26  |
| 57 (CH 7) | 80 | 75  |
| 58 (CH 7) | 52 | 0   |
| 59 (CH 7) | 281| 0   |
| **Total** | 5196| 3825 |

% of Pegasi: 73.61%

**Unused Hoards**

| IGCH 2145 |
| IGCH 2160 |
| IGCH 2168 |
| IGCH 2169 |
| IGCH 2170 |
| IGCH 2171 |
| IGCH 2177 |
| IGCH 2178 |
| IGCH 2186 |
| 28 (CH 5) |
| 21 (CH 6) |
| 296 (CH 8) |
Appendix 5: Text and Translation of Diodorus’ Account of the Sicilian Insurrection

I. The Photian Version: Greek Text

(34/5.2.1) Ὅτι μετὰ τὴν Καρχηδονίαν κατάλυσιν ἐπὶ ἔξήκοντα ἔτεσι τῶν Σικελῶν εὐροοῦντων ἐν πᾶσιν, ὁ δουλικὸς αὐτοῖς ἐπανέστη πόλεμος ἕξ αἰτίας τοιαύτης.

ἐπὶ πολὺ τοῖς βίοις ἀναδραμόντες καὶ μεγάλους περιποιησάμενοι πλοῦτος συνηγόραζον οἰκετῶν πλῆθος, ὡς ἐκ τῶν σωματοπροειῶν ἄγελθον ἀπαγχόησιν εὐθὺς χαρακτῆρας ἐπέβαλλον καὶ στιγμὰς τοῖς σώμασιν. (34/35.2.2) ἔχροντο δὲ αὐτῶν τοῖς μὲν νέοις νομεύσα, τοῖς δ’ ἄλλοις ὡς πὴ ἐκάστοι ἡ χρεία ἐπέβαλλε. βαρέως δ’ αὐτοὺς κατὰ τὰς ὑπηρεσίας ἔχροντο, καὶ ἐπιμελείας παντελῶς ὀλίγης ἥξιον, ὡς τὰ ἐντρέψεθαν καὶ δεῖ ἐνδούσασθαι. εἷς ὃν οἱ πλείους ἀπὸ ληστείας τὸ ζῆν ἐπορίζοντο, καὶ μεστὰ φόνων ἦν ἀπαντα, καθάπερ στρατευμάτων διεσπαρμένου τῶν ληστῶν. (34/35.2.3) οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ κολύειν μὲν ἐπεχείρουν, κολάζειν δὲ οὐ τολμῶντες διὰ τὴν ἴσχυν καὶ τὸ βάρος τῶν κυρίων, οἱ ἐδέσποζον τῶν ληστῶν, ἠναγκάζοντο περιοράν ληστευομένην τὴν ἐπαρχίαν οἱ πλεῖστοι γὰρ τῶν κητόρων ἠπειξὶς δόντες τὸν Ρωμαίον, καὶ κριταὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπαρχιῶν κατηγορουμένοις στρατηγοῖς γινόμενοι, φοβεροι τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ὑπῆρχον.

(34/35.2.4) Πιεζόμενοι δὲ οἱ δουλοὶ ταῖς ταλαιπωρίαις καὶ πληγαῖς τὰ πολλὰ παραλόγως ύβριζόμενοι, οὐς ὑπέμενον. συνιόντες οὐν ἄλληλοις κατὰ τὰς εὐκαιρίας συνελάλουν περὶ ἀποστάσεως, ἐως εἰς ἔργον τὴν βουλὴν ἤγαγον. (34/35.2.5) ἦν δὲ τις οἰκέτης Αντιγένους Ἐνναίου. Σύρος τὸ γένος ἐκ τῆς Απαμείας, ἄνθροπος μάγος καὶ τερατουργός τῶν τρόπων. οὕτως προσεποιεῖτο θεῶν ἐπιτάγμασι καθ’ ὧν προλέγειν τὰ μέλλοντα, καὶ πολλοὺς διὰ τὴν εἰς τούτο τὸ μέρος εὐφυίαν ἐξηπάτητα. ἐντεύθεν προῖον οὐ μόνον ἐξ ὑπνοῖν ἐμαντεύσετο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐγρηγορότως θεοὺς

όραν ὑπεκρίνετο καὶ εξ αὐτῶν ἀκούειν τὰ μέλλοντα. (34/35.2.6) πολλῶν δ᾽ ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ σχεδιαζομένων ἀπὸ τῆς ἕνα πρὸς ἀληθεῖαν ἐξέβαινε· καὶ τῶν μὲν μὴ γνομένων ὑπ᾽ οὖδὲν ἑλεγχομένων, τῶν δὲ συντελούμενῶν ἐπισημασίας τυχανόντων, προκοπὴν ἐλάμβανεν ἢ περὶ αὐτὸν δόξα. τελευταῖον διὰ τινος μηχανῆς πῦρ μετὰ τινος ἐνθουσιασμοῦ καὶ φλόγα διὰ τοῦ στόματος ἤρει, καὶ οὕτω τὰ μέλλοντα ἀπεφοίβαζεν. (34/35.2.7) εἰς γὰρ κάρυν ἢ τι τοιοῦτο τετρημένον εἰς ἐκατέρου μέρους ἐνετίθει πῦρ καὶ τὴν συνέχειν αὐτὸ δυναμεῖν ὕλην· εἶτα ἐντιθέεις τῷ στόματι καὶ προσπνέον ποτὲ μὲν σπανήρας, ποτὲ δὲ φλόγα ἐξέκασεν. οὕτως πρὸ τῆς ἀποστάσεως ἔλεγε τὴν Συρίαν θεὸν ἐπιφαινομένην αὐτῷ λέγειν ὅτι βασιλεύει· καὶ τοῦτο οὐ πρὸς ἄλλους μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν κύριον αὐτοῦ διετέλει λέγον. (34/35.2.8) εἰς γὰρ λέγον τρεπομένου τοῦ πράγματος, ὁ μὲν Ἀντιγένης ψυχαγωγοῦμενος ἐπὶ τῇ τερατείᾳ παρῆγε τὸν Ἐβύνου εἰς τὰ σύνδειπνα τοῦτο γὰρ ὄνομα τῷ τερατί καὶ διηρητά περὶ τῆς βασιλείας καὶ πῶς ἐκάστῳ χρήσεται τῶν παρόντων τοῦ δὲ ἀτρέπτως πάντα διηγομένου, καὶ ὁς μετρίως χρῆσται τοῖς κυρίοις, καὶ τὸ σύνολον ποικίλους τερατευμένον, γέλοιες ἐγίνοντο τοῖς παρακεκλημένοις, καὶ τινὲς αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τῆς τραπέζης ἀξιολόγους μερίδας αἴροντες ἐδωροῦντο, ἐπιλέγοντες ὅπως, ὅταν γένηται βασιλεὺς, τῆς χάριτος μημονεύοι. (34/5.2.9) οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἡ τερατεία προῆλθεν εἰς ἀληθῶς ἀποτέλεσμα βασιλείας, καὶ τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν τοῖς παρὰ τὰ δεῖπνα δεξιωσμένοις ἐν γέλωσι ὁ χορις σπουδῆς ἔποιησατο τῆς χάριτος.

Ἀρχὴ δὲ τῆς ὅλης ἀποστάσεως ἐγένετο τοιαύτη. (34/35.2.10) Δαμόφιλδος τις ἦν Ἐνναίος, τὴν δ᾽ οὐσίαν μεγαλοπλουτοῦ, ὑπερήφανος δὲ τὸν τρόπον. οὕτως κακῶς εἰς ὑπερβολὴν ἐκέχρητο τοῖς δουλῶσι, καὶ ἡ γυνὴ δὴ Μεγαλλίς ἀντεφιλονείκει τάνδρι πρὸς τὴν τιμωρίαν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀπανθρωπίαν τὴν περὶ τοὺς δουλοὺς. εἰ δὲν ἀποθηρωθέντες οἱ προπηλακίζομενοι συνέθεντο πρὸς ἄλληλους ὑπὲρ ἀποστάσεως καὶ φόνον τῶν κυρίων. καὶ πρὸς τὸν Ἐβύνου ἔλθοντες ἤρωτον εἰ συγχωρεῖει παρὰ τῶν θεῶν αὐτοῖς τὸ βεβουλευμένον, Ῥ δὲ μετὰ τερατείας, ὥς εἰσόθιε, συνθέμενος ὅτι συγχωροῦσι, παραρχήμα πειθεῖ ἔχεσθαι τῆς ἐγχειρήσεως. (34/35.2.11) εὔθως οὖν τετρακοσίους τῶν ὁμοδουλῶν συνήθροισαν, καὶ ὡς ὁ καιρὸς ἐδίδου καθοπλισθέντες εἰς τὴν Ἐνναν τὴν πόλιν εἰσπίπτουσιν, ἀφηγουμένου αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ πυρὸς τὰς φλόγας τερατευμομένων τούτως τοῦ Ἐβύνου. ταῖς δ᾽ οἰκίαις ἐπεισελθόντες
πλείστον φόνον εἰργάζοντο, μηδὲ αὐτὸν τὸν ὑπομαζόν φειδόμενοι. (34/35.2.12) ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν τῆς θηλῆς ἀποσπῶντες προσπίσασον τῇ γῇ· εἰς δὲ τὰς γυναίκας οὐδ᾿ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, καὶ ταῦτα βλεπόντων τὸν ἀνδρὸν, ὁσα εὐνοῦρίζει τε καὶ ἐνήσελγαίνον, πολλοῦ αὐτοῦς πλῆθους τὸν ἁπὸ τῆς πόλεως δοῦλων προστεθέντος, οἱ καὶ κατὰ τὸν κυρίων πρὸτερον τὰ ἐσχάτα ἐνδεικνύμενοι οὕτω πρὸς τὸν τῶν ἄλλων φόνον ἔτρεποντο. (34/35.2.13) οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἐνύνου πυθόμενοι τὸν Δαμοφίλον ὅτι κατὰ τὸν πλησίον τῆς πόλεως περίκηπον διατίρβει μετὰ τῆς γυναίκος, ἐξικνοῦν διὰ τινὸν ἐξ αὐτῶν σταλέντων αὐτὸν τε καὶ τὴν γυναίκα δεδεμένους ἐξαγγωνίσαντες, πολλὰς κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ὄβρεις ὑποσχόντας. μόνης δὲ τῆς θυγατρὸς αὐτοῦν οἱ δοῦλοι ὁφθησαν εἰς πάντα τοῖς φιλίᾳ διὰ τὸ φιλάνθρωπον αὐτῆς ἥθος καὶ περί τοὺς δοῦλους συμπαθῆς καὶ βοηθητικὸν κατὰ δύναμιν. εἰς ὧν ἐδείκνυτο τὸν δοῦλον οὐχὶ ὀμότης εἶναι φύσεως τὰ γινόμενα εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους, ἀλλὰ τὸν προφητημένον εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀδικημάτων ἀνταπόδοσις. (34/35.2.14) τὸν δὲ Δαμοφίλον καὶ τὴν Μεγαλλίδα εἰς τὴν πόλιν οἱ ἀπεσταλμένοι ἐκλύσαντες, ὅσπερ ἐρήμεν, εἰς τὸ θέατρον εἰσῆγαγον, συνεληλυθότος ἐνταῦθα τοῦ πλῆθους τῶν ἁποστατῶν. καὶ τοῦ Δαμοφίλου τεχνάσασθαί τι πρὸς τὴν σωτηρίαν ἐγχειρήσαντος καὶ πολλοῦς τοῦ πλῆθους τοῖς λόγοις ἐπαγομένου. Ἐρμείας καὶ Ζεῦς πικρῶς πρὸς αὐτὸν διακείμενοι πλάνον τε ἀπεκάλουν, καὶ οὐκ ἀναμείναντες τὴν ἀκριβὴ τοῦ δήμου κρίσιν ὁ μὲν διὰ τῶν πλευρῶν τὸ ἔξορος ὀθεῖ, ὁ δὲ πελέκει τὸν τράχηλον ἐκοψεν.

ἐκεῖθεν αἵρεται βασιλέως ὁ Ἐνύνου οὔτε δι᾿ ἀνδρείαν οὔτε διὰ στρατηγίαν, διὰ δὲ μόνην τερατεύαν καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀποστάσεως ἄρξαι, ἀμα δὲ καὶ τῆς προσηγορίας οἰονεί τινα καλὸν οἰονὸν ἔχουσῆς πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὑποταττομένων εὔνοιαν. (34/35.2.15) Τῶν ἄλων δὲ τοῖς ἀποστάταις καταστάς κύριος καὶ συναγαγὼν ἐκκλησίαν ἀνείλε μὲν τοὺς ἐξωγηρμένους τῶν Ἑναίων, ὅσοις οὐκ ἦν ἡ τέχνη ὁπλα ἐργάζεσθαι, ἐκεῖνους δὲ δεδεμένους τοὺς ἔργους ὑπέβαλλεν. ἔδωκε δὲ καὶ ταῖς θεραπαίναις τὴν Μεγαλλίδα χρήσασθαι ώς ἄν βουλίντοι· καὶ αὕται κατεκρίμησαν αἰκισάμεναι, καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ τοὺς ἰδίους ἀνείλε κυρίους Αντιγένη καὶ Πόθωνα. (34/35.2.16) περιθέμενος δὲ διάδημα καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλλα τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν βασιλικὸς διακοσμήσας τὴν τε συμβιοῦσαν αὐτὸς, Σύραν καὶ συμπολίτες οὐδὲν βασιλίσαν ἀποδείξας συνεδροὺς τοὺς συνέστε δοκοῦντας διαφέρειν ποιησάμενος, ὅν ἦν Ἀχιώς καὶ τοῦνομα καὶ τὸ γένος, ἄνηρ καὶ βουλὴ καὶ χειρὶ διαφέρων, καὶ ἐν τρισίν
ήμέραις πλείους τῶν ἑξακισχυλίων τῶν δυνατῶν καθοπλίσας τρόπον καὶ ἔτερους συνεπαγόμενος ἄξινας καὶ πελέκεις χρωμένους ἢ σφενδόνας ἢ ὥρεπάνους ἢ ξύλους πεπυρακτωμένους ἢ καὶ μαγείρων ὀβελοίς, ἐπήει πάσαιν λεβλατῶν τὴν χώραν, καὶ πλήθος ἅπερον οἰκεῖον προσαλμμάνων ἐθάρρησε καὶ στρατηγοῖς Ῥωμαιῶν πολεμήσαι, καὶ συμπλακεῖς τῷ πλῆθει πολλάκις ἐκράτησεν, ἔχον ἕδη στρατώτας ὑπὲρ τοὺς μυρίους.

(34/35.2.17) Ἕν τούτῳ δὲ Κλέων τις Κύλις ἄλλων δούλων ἀποστάσεως ἦρξε. καὶ πάντων ταῖς ἐλπίσει μετεωρισθέντων ὡς ἀντιπολεμήσας τὰ στασιάσαντα πρὸς ἄλληλους καὶ αὐτοῖς ἑαυτοῖς οἱ ἀποστάται διαφθείροντες ἐλευθερώσουσι τὴν Σικελίαν τῆς στάσεως, παρὰ δόξαν ἄλληλοις συνεβησαν, τοῦ Κλέωνος ὑποταγέντος ψυλὸ τοῦ Εὐνοῦ προστάγματι καὶ τὴν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ὅα δὴ βασιλεὶ χρείαν ἀποσπληροῦντος, ἔχοντος οἰκείον πλήθος στρατιωτῶν πεντακισχυλίων· ἠμέραι δ’ ἐγγὺς ἦσαν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀποστάσεως τριάκοντα.

(34/35.2.18) Καὶ μετὰ βραχὺ ἐκ Ρώμης ἦκοντι στρατηγῷ Λευκίῳ Ὑψαῖῳ, ἔχοντι στρατιώτας ἐκ Σικελίας ὑκταισχυλίους, εἰς πόλεμον καταστάντες οἱ ἀποστάται ἐνίκησαν, πλήθος ὄντες δισμύριοι. μετ’ οὐ πολὺ δὲ ἄθροίζεται τὸ σύστημα αὐτῶν εἰς μυριάδας ἐκκοσι, καὶ πολλοῖς τοῖς πρὸς Ῥωμαιῶς πολέμους ἐνευδοκιμησάντες ἦλαττον αὐτοὶ ἔπταιον. (34/35.2.19) οὐ διαβοηθέντος κατὰ τε Ῥώμην δούλων ἀπόστασις ἔκατον πεντήκοντα συνομοσάντων ἀνήπτετο, καὶ κατὰ τὴν Ἀττικὴν ὑπὲρ χιλίων, ἐν τε Δήλῳ καὶ κατ’ ἄλλους πολλοὺς τόπους· οὐς τάχει τε τῆς βοηθείας καὶ τῇ σφοδρᾷ κολάσει τῆς τιμωρίας οἱ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν ἐπιμεληταὶ τῶν κοινῶν θάττον ἠφάνισαν, σωφρονίσαντες καὶ τὸ ἄλλο ὄσον ἦν ἐπὶ ἀποστάσεις μετέφερον. (34/35.2.20) κατὰ δὲ Σικελίαν ἤξετο τὸ κακὸν, καὶ πόλεις ἠλίσκοντο αὐτανδροὶ καὶ πολλὰ στρατόπεδα ὑπὸ τῶν ἀποστάτων κατεκόπησαν, ὡς Ῥουπίλιος ὁ Ῥωμαῖον στρατηγὸς τὸ Ταυρομένιον ἀνεσώσατο Ῥωμαιίος, καρτερὰς μὲν αὐτὸ πολιορκήσας καὶ εἰς ἄφατον ἀνάγκην καὶ λιμῶν τοὺς ἀποστάτας συγκλείσας, ὡστε ἀρξαμένους ἑκ παιδὸν βορᾶς καὶ διελθόντας διὰ γυναικῶν μηδὲ τῆς αὐτῶν ἄλληλοφιγίας μηδ’ ὄλως φείσασθαι ὅτε καὶ Κομανὸν τὸν ἄδελφον Κλέωνος φέουντα ἐκ τῆς πολιορκομένης πόλεως εἶλε. (34/35.2.21) καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον Σαρατίωνος Σύρου τὴν ἄκραν προδόντος, συμπάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ὀρατετῶν ὁ
II. The Photian Version: Translation

(34/5.2.1) After the destruction of Carthage, when things had been flowing smoothly for the Sicilians in every respect for sixty years, the slave war rose up against them for the following reason.

Since they had become more prosperous in their daily lives and acquired great wealth they were buying up a large number of (household) slaves, onto whose bodies, as they were led away from the slave merchant like cattle, they were inflicting brands and marks. (34/5.2.2) They employed the young men as herdsmen, while they employed the others in such ways as need arose for each. They abused
them with a heavy hand in their service, and altogether thought them worthy of the minimum of care as far as concerned food and clothing. The majority of them provided themselves with a livelihood through banditry, and everywhere was full of bloodshed, since the bandits were scattered like armies of soldiers. (34/5.2.3) The governors tried to repress them, but did not dare to punish them because of the power and influence of the men who were the masters of the bandits, so they were forced to disregard the plundering of the province: for since most of the owners were Roman knights (equites), and were judges for charges against governors from provinces, they caused fear in the governors.

(34/5.2.4) The slaves, oppressed by their hardships, and frequently ill-treated with blows beyond reason, could not endure. Therefore, meeting with each other as opportunity allowed, they talked together about revolt, until they put their plan into action. (34/5.2.5) There was a certain household slave of Antigenes of Enna, a Syrian from Apamea, a magician and wonder-worker in manner. This man claimed by divine commands to foretell the future through dreams and because of his talent in this direction he fooled many. Progressing from there, he did not simply prophesy from dreams, but even while awake he pretended to see gods and to hear from them the future. (34/5.2.6) Of the many stories that he invented, some, by chance, turned out to be true, and since those that did not come to pass were questioned by no-one, while those that did happen were acclaimed, the reputation of this man grew. Finally, through some contrivance, in the midst of some frenzy, he produced fire and flames from his mouth, and thus foretold the future. (34/5.2.7) For he would place into a nut, or something such as this, that was pierced on both sides, fire and fuel to maintain it: then placing it in his mouth and blowing kindled either sparks or flame. Before the revolt this man used to say that the Syrian goddess showed herself to him saying that he would be King: and he kept repeating this not only to others, but also to his own master. (34/5.2.8) When the matter became something of a joke, Antigenes, beguiled by his knowledge of wonders, would bring Eunus (for this was the wonder-worker’s name) into his banquets and continually ask about his kingdom and how he would treat each of those present: and since he explained everything without hesitation, explaining how moderately he would treat the masters, and in general talked in a
colourful manner about wonders, laughter erupted among the guests, and some of
them, lifting substantial portions from the table gave them to him as gifts, saying as
they did so that whenever he became King he should remember the favour. (34/5.2.9)
But the fact is that his wonder-working did result in the true creation of his kingdom,
and he made the repayment of the favour to those who had pledged it in jest at the
banquets not without seriousness.

The start of the whole revolt took place as follows. (34/5.2.10) There was a
certain Damophilus of Enna, an exceedingly wealthy man, and of arrogant character.
This man had mistreated his slaves to excess, and his wife Megallis competed with
her husband in the punishment and in her overall inhuman treatment of the slaves. In
consequence of this, those treated with contempt, who had been made savage by the
treatment, came to a mutual agreement to revolt and to murder their masters. They
went to Eunus and asked if their plans found favour with the gods. He used his usual
wonder-working to confirm that the gods did favour them, and persuaded them to
embark on their undertaking forthwith. (34/5.2.11) Immediately, therefore, they
gathered together 400 fellow slaves, and having armed themselves as opportunity
offered, they attacked the city of Enna, with Eunus leading them, working wonders
of flames of fire for them. When they entered the houses they wrought carnage, not
even sparing suckling babies, (34/5.2.12) but tearing them from the breast dashed
them on the ground: while in regard to the women it is not even possible to say (and
their husbands were actually looking on) what insults and outrages they perpetrated
on them. A great multitude of slaves from the city had joined them, who, first
exhibiting the worst (outrages) against their masters thus turned themselves to the
slaughter of others. (34/5.2.13) Those around Eunus, learning that Damophilus was
wasting time with his wife in his garden near the city, dispatched some of them (to
them) and dragged both the man and his wife from that place with their hands bound
behind their backs, enduring many outrages along the road. For the daughter alone
were the slaves seen to be considerate in all respects on account of her benevolent
nature, both her sympathy to the slaves and readiness to help as far as she could. As
a result of this it was demonstrated that the things perpetrated on others were not
from the natural savagery of slaves, but were retribution for past wrongs to them.
The men who had been dispatched dragged Damophilus and Megallis into the city, as we were saying, and led them into the theatre, where the multitude of rebels had assembled. But when Damophilus attempted to contrive something to save himself, and was bringing many of the multitude to his side with his words, Hermeias and Zeuxis, bitterly disposed towards him, stigmatized him as deceiving and did not wait for the formal judgement of the assembly, but one thrust a sword through his side, the other cut his neck with an axe.

Then, Eunus was chosen king, and not because of his courage, nor his generalship, but only because of his knowledge of wonders and his setting of the revolt in motion, but also at the same time because his name seemed to hold some favourable omen with regard to the goodwill of his subjects. (34/5.2.15) When he was appointed as master for everything by the insurgents and he had summoned together an assembly, he killed the captives from Enna, all those who were not skilled in working arms, while those who were he bound and put to work. He gave Megallis to the/her handmaids to deal with however they wished: and after torturing her they threw her down a precipice. He himself killed his own masters Antigenes and Pytho. (34/5.2.16) After putting on a diadem and arraying his surroundings in a kingly manner, and having proclaimed his wife, who was Syrian and from the same city, Queen, he appointed a council of men who seemed to excel in intelligence, among whom was Achaeus, Achaeus (both in name and birth) a man who excelled in both planning and deeds. In three days he had armed more than six thousand as well as he could, and others he had drawn to himself furnished with hatchets and axes or slings or scythes or fire hardened stakes or even kitchen spits. He swept over the whole country plundering, and since he was enrolling countless multitudes of household-slaves, he even ventured to do battle with Roman generals, and having become engaged in close fighting, he prevailed many times with his multitudes, having by this time more than ten thousand soldiers.

(34/5.2.17) During this time Kleon, a certain Cilician, began a revolt of other slaves: and although all were buoyed up by hope that the seditious factions would wage war against one another, and that the rebels themselves, by destroying
themselves utterly, would release Sicily from discord, unexpectedly they came to terms with one another, Kleon having been subordinated to the mere command of Eunus, and discharging the service of a general such as indeed for a king, having his own band of five thousand soldiers. It was nearly thirty days after the revolt.

(34/5.2.18) After a short time, the rebels engaged in warfare with a general arrived from Rome, Lucius Hypsaeus, who had eight thousand Sicilian soldiers, and were victorious, being 20,000 strong. In a short while their number had reached 200,000, and in many battles against the Romans they gained glory and only infrequently came off worse. (34/5.2.19) Because word of this was spread abroad, in Rome a revolt was gained 150 slave adherents who swore together, and in Athens more than a thousand, and in Delos and in many other places: by swift assistance and violent retribution the military commanders in each of these places quickly obliterated these rebellions, and chastened others, as many as were buoyed up for rebellion. (34/5.2.20) In Sicily the trouble was increasing, and cities were being captured together with their men, and many armies were cut to pieces by the rebels, until Rupilius, the Roman general, recovered Tauromenium for the Romans, after a severe siege and enclosing the rebels in unutterable duress and hunger, so that beginning with the flesh of the children and progressing through the women, they did not altogether abstain from eating the flesh of each other: at the time when also he captured Komanus, the brother of Kleon, as he fled out of the besieged city. (34/5.2.21) Finally, after Sarapion of Syria betrayed the citadel, the general became master of all of the runaways in the city, whom, having tortured, he threw down a precipice. From there he came to Enna which he besieged in a similar way, enclosing into extreme duress the hopes of the rebels. After the general Kleon had come out of the city, and had exerted himself heroically with a few men, Rupilius displayed him dead from his wounds, and he captured this city too by betrayal, since it was not easy to capture by force, because of its strong position.

(34/5.2.22) Eunus, taking up a bodyguard of a thousand men, fled in an unmanly fashion to certain precipitous regions. But those with him, knowing that the danger around them was inescapable, for already the general Rupilius was hastening
towards them, took the initiative by beheading one another with swords: however Eunus, the wonder-worker and king, having through cowardice fled for refuge in certain caves, was dragged out together with four men, a cook, a baker, the man who massaged him in the bath and a fourth, who had been accustomed, throughout the drinking bouts, to beguiling him. (34/5.2.23) Transmitted to prison, and after his flesh had dissolved into a mass of lice, he ended his life in a way worthy of his knavery, in Morgantina. Thereupon Rupilius, covering over the whole of Sicily together with a few picked men, faster than anyone expected, freed Sicily from all the bands of robbers.

(34/5.2.24) Eunus, the king of the rebels, named himself Antiochus, and the multitude of rebels Syrians.

III. The Constantinian Excerpts: Greek Text

(34/35.2.25) Ὅτι οὕδεποτε στάσις ἔγενετο τηλικαύτη δούλων ἡλίκη συνέστη ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ. δὲ ἤν πολλαὶ μὲν πόλεις δειναῖς περιέπεσον συμφοραῖς, ἀναρίθμητοι δὲ ἄνδρες καὶ γυναῖκες μετὰ τέκνων ἐπειράθησαν τῶν μεγίστων ἀτυχημάτων, πάσα δὲ ἢ νήσους ἐκινδύνευσεν πεσεῖν εἰς ἐξουσίαν δραπετῶν, ὄρον τῆς ἐξουσίας τιθεμένων τὴν τὸν ἐλευθέρων ὑπερβολὴν τῶν ἀκληρημάτων. καὶ ταῦτα ἀπήντησε τοῖς μὲν πολλοῖς ἀνελπίστως καὶ παραδόξως, τοῖς δὲ πραγματικῶς ἔκαστα δυναμένους κρίνειν οὐκ ἄλογος ἐδοξεῖ συμβαίνειν. (34/35.2.26) διὰ γὰρ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς εὐπορίας τῶν τὴν κρατήστην νήσον ἐκκαρποφόρους ἀπαίτες σχεδὸν οἱ τοῖς πλοῦτοις προκεκοφότες ἐξήλωσαν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον τρυφήν, εἰδὼς ὑπερηφανίαν καὶ ὑβρίν. ἐξ ὧν ἀπάντων ἀυξανομένης ἐπὶ ἵσης τῆς τε κατὰ τῶν οἰκετῶν κακουχίας καὶ τῆς κατὰ τῶν δεσποτῶν ἄλλοτροπίτητος, ἔρραγε ποτὲ σὺν καιρῷ τὸ μῖσος. ἐξ οὐ χωρίς παραγγέλματος πολλαὶ μυρίades συνέδραμον οἰκετῶν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν δεσποτῶν ἀπώλειαν. τὸ παραπλῆσιον δὲ γέγονε κατὰ τὴν ἁσίαν κατὰ τοὺς αὐτωδίκαις καιρούς. Αριστονίκου μὲν ἀντιποιησαμένου τῆς μὴ προσηκούσης βασιλείας, τῶν δὲ δούλων διὰ τὰς ἐκ τῶν δεσποτῶν κακουχίας συναποιησαμένουν ἐκεῖνο καὶ μεγάλως ἀτυχήμασι πολλὰς πόλεις περιβαλόντων.
(34/35.2.27) Ὅτι παραπλησίως καὶ πρὸς τὰς γεωργίας ἐκαστὸς τῶν πολλῶν χώραν κεκτημένον ὤλα σωματοτροφεία συνηγόραζον... τοὺς μὲν πέδαις δεσμεύειν, τοὺς δὲ ταῖς βαρύτητι τῶν ἔργων καταπονεῖν, πάντας δὲ τοῖς ὑπερηφάνοις χαρακτῆρις κατεστιζοῦν. διό διὸ τοσοῦτο τῶν οἰκετῶν ἐπέκλυσε πλῆθος ἅπασαν Σικελίαν, ὡστε τοὺς ἀκούοντας τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μὴ πιστεύειν, καὶ γὰρ τῶν Σικελιστῶν οἱ πολλοὶς πλοῦτοςς κεκτημένοι διημιλλότων πρὸς τὰς τῶν Ἰταλιστῶν ὑπερηφανίας τε καὶ πλεονεξίας καὶ κακουργίας. εἰς τοιαῦτην γὰρ συνήθειαν ῥαδιουργίας τοὺς νομεῖς ἤγαγον οἱ πολλοὶς ὁικέταις κεκτημένοι τῶν Ἰταλικῶν ὡστε τροφὰς μὲν ἡ παρέχειν, ἐπιτρέπειν δὲ ληστεύειν. (34/35.2.28) τοιαύτης δοθείσης ἔξουσίας ἀνθρώπως διὰ μὲν τὴν ἑσύχαν τῶν σωμάτων δυναμένως πάντα τὸ κρυθὲν ἐπιτελεῖν, διὰ δὲ τὴν ἀνέσιν καὶ σχολὴν εὐκαίρον, διὰ δὲ τὴν τῆς τροφῆς ἐνδεικνύον ἀναγκαζομένους ταῖς παραβόλοις ἐγχειρεῖν πράξεσιν, συνεβάλα ταχὺ τὴν παρανομίαν αὐξηθῆναι. τὸ γὰρ πρῶτον ἐν τοῖς ἐπιφανεστάτοις τόποις τοὺς καθ’ ἕνα καὶ δύο τὰς ὀδοιπορίας ποιομένους ἐφονέμον· εἶτα ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν ἀνθενεστέρων ἐπαύλεις νυκτὸς ἀθροίσει νυκτέρινας ἐξήρουν· βίᾳ ταῦτας καὶ τὰς κτήσεις διηρπάξαν καὶ τοὺς ἀνθισταμένους ἀνήρουν. (34/35.2.29) ἵνα δὲ μᾶλλον τῆς τόλμης προβαινοῦσης, οὐτε τοῖς ὀδοιπόροις νυκτὸς ή Σικελία βάσιμος ἢ οὔτε τοῖς ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας ζῆν εἰσθάνον ἀσφαλῆς ἐπὶ ταῦτας ἢ διατριβή, πάντα δὲ βίας καὶ ληστείας καὶ παντοδαπὸν φόνον ἢν μεστα. τοῖς δὲ νομεῖσιν ἀγραυλίας γεγενημένης καὶ σκευῆς στρατιωτικῆς, εὐλόγως ἀπαντεῖς ἐνεπιμπλήντῳ φρονήματος καὶ θράσους· περιφέροντες γὰρ ὀρᾶτα καὶ λόγχας καὶ καλαύροσας ἀξιολόγους καὶ δέρματα λόκων ή σώγρων ἐσκεπασμένοι τὰ σώματα καταπληκτικὴν εἰχὸν τὴν πρόσωπον καὶ πολεμικῶν ἔργων οὐ πόρρῳ κεκμένην. (34/35.2.30) κινοῦν τε ἄλκίμων ἄθροισμα συνεπόμενον ἐκάστῳ καὶ τροφῆς καὶ γάλακτος καὶ κρεῶν παρακειμένων πλῆθος ἐξηγηρίου τὰς τε ψυχὰς καὶ τὰ σώματα. ἤν οὖν πάσα χώρα μεστὴ καθάπερ στρατευμάτων διεσπαρμένον, ὡς ἂν ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν δεσποτῶν ἐπιτροπῆς τοῦ θράσους τῶν δούλων καθωπλισμένου. (34/35.2.31) οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ καλάς εἰς μὲν ἐπέχειρουν τὴν ἀπόνουσαν τῶν οἰκετῶν, καλάς δὲ οἱ τολμῶντες διὰ τὴν ἑσύχαν καὶ τὸ βάρος τῶν κυρίων ἢναγκάζοντο περιορῶν τὴν ἐπαρχίαν ληστευμένην. οἱ πλείστησι ήγάρ τῶν κτητόρων ἑπείς ὄντες ἐντελεῖς τῶν Ῥωμαίων, καὶ κριταὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπαρχῶν κατηγορομένους στρατηγοὺς γινομένους, φοβοροὶ ταῖς ἄρχαις ὑπήρ χον.
(34/35.2.32) Ὅτι οἱ περὶ τὰς γεωργίας ἀσχολοῦμενοι τῶν Ἰταλικῶν παμπληθεῖς οἰκέταις οὐνόμενοι καὶ πάν τας χαράττοντες τοῖς στίγμασι τροφάς μὲν οὐκ ικανὰς παρεῖχοντο, τῇ δὲ βαρύτητι τῶν ἔργων κατέξαινον ... τὴν παρ᾿ αὐτῶν ταλαιπωρίαν. (Const. Exc. 2(1), pp. 302-303.)

(34/35.2.33) Ὅτι οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς δυναστείας τοὺς ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ὄντας ἐπισκόπος χρῆ προσφέρεσθαι τοῖς ταπεινοτέροις, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ἰδιωτικοὺς βίους πράξας προσενεκτέον τοῖς οἰκέταις τοὺς εὗ φρονοῦντας. ἢ γὰρ ὑπερηφανία καὶ βαρύτης ἐν μὲν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀπεργάζεται στάσεις ἐμφυλίους τῶν ἐλευθέρων, ἐν δὲ τοῖς κατὰ μέρος τῶν ἰδιωτῶν οἴκοις δούλων ἐπιβουλὰς τοῖς δεσπόταις καὶ ἀπὸ στάσεις φοβηράς κοινῆς τάς πόλεις κατασκευάζει. ὅσον δ᾿ ἂν τῇ ἐξουσίᾳ εἰς ὀμότητα καὶ παρὰ νομίαν ἐκτρέπηται, τοσοῦτοι μᾶλλον καὶ τὰ τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων ἥθη πρὸς ἀπόνοιαν ἀποσήφυται: πᾶς γὰρ ὁ τῇ τύχῃ ταπεινὸς τοῦ μὲν καλὸν καὶ τῆς δόξης ἐκουσίως ἐκχωρεῖ τοῖς ὑπερέχουσι, τῆς δὲ καθηκονίας φιλανθρωπίας στερισκόμενος πολέμιος γίνεται τῶν ἀνημέρως δεσποζόντων. (Const. Exc. 4, pp. 383-384)

(34/35.2.34) Ὅτι Δαμὼφιλὸς τις ἦν τὸ γένος Ἑνναῖος, τὴν οὐσίαν μεγαλόπλουτος, τὸν τρόπον ὑπερήφανος, δὲ πολλὴν χώρας περίοδον γεωργῶν, παμπληθεῖς δὲ βοσκημάτων ἀγέλας κεκτημένος οὐ μόνον τὴν τρυφήν τῶν κατὰ Σικελίαν Ἰταλικῶν ἐξήλωσεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ κατὰ τοὺς οἰκέτας πλήθος καὶ τὴν εἰς τούτους ἀπανθρωπίαν καὶ βαρύτητα. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῆς χώρας ἱπποὺς τε πολυτελεῖς καὶ τετρακόκλους ἀπήνας μετ᾿ οἰκεῖον στρατιωτικῶν περίγειτο· πρὸς δὲ τούτους εὐπρεπὸν παῖδον πλήθος, ἔτι δὲ κολάκων ἀνάγογον παραδομήν ἔχειν ἐφιλοτιμεῖτο. (34/35.2.35) κατὰ δὲ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὰς ἑπαύλεις ἀγρομαμάτων ἐκθέσεις τορευτῶν καὶ στραμάτων θαλαττῶν πολυτελείας ἐκπονούμενος παρετίθεσα τραπέζας ὑπερηφάνους καὶ βασιλικὰς ταῖς δασυλίαις, ὑπεραίρων τὴν Περσικὴν τρυφὴν ταῖς δαπάναις καὶ πολυτελείας· ὑπερέβαλε δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ὑπερηφανίαν. ἀνάγογος γὰρ καὶ ἀπαίδευτος τρόπος ἐξουσίας ἀνυπευθύνου καὶ τύχης μεγαλοπλούτου κυριεύσας τὸ μὲν πρότον κόρων ἐγέννησεν, εἶτε ὃ ὑβρὶν, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον ὀλεθρόν τε αὐτῷ καὶ συμφοράς μεγάλας τῇ πατρίδι. (34/35.2.36) ἀγοράζον γὰρ οἰκεῖον πλήθος ὑβρὶ στικῶς αὐτοῖς προσεφέρετο, στίγματι σιδήρου χαράττων τὰ σόματα τῶν ἐλευθέρων.
μὲν ἐν ταῖς πατρίσι γεγενημένοιν, αἰχμαλωσίας δὲ καὶ δουλὶ κῆς τύχης πεπειραμένον. καὶ τούτων τοὺς μὲν πέ διας δεσμεύων εἰς τὰς συνεργασίας ἐνέβαλλε, τοὺς δὲ νομεῖς ἀποδεικνύον οὗτ’ ἐσθήτας οὕτε τροφᾶς ἔχορηγε τὰς ἀρμοτούσας. (Const. Exc. 2(1), p. 304.)

(34/35.2.38) Ὅτι Δαμόφιλος ὁ Ἐνναῖος ποτὲ προσελθόντων αὐτῷ τινον οἰκετῶν γυμνῶν καὶ διαλεγομένων ὑπὲρ ἐσθήτος οὐκ ἦν σχετικὸν τὴν ἐντευξίν, ἀλλ’ εἰπών· Ἐγὼ γὰρ; οἱ δὲ τῆς χώρας ὀδοποροῦντες γυμνοὶ βα δίζουσί, καὶ οὐχ ἐτοίμην παρέχονται τὴν χορηγίαν τοῖς χρείαιν ἔχουσιν ἰμαίν’; ἐπέταξε προσδῆσα τοῖς κίσι καὶ πληγὰς ἐμφορίσας ἐξαπέστειλεν ὑπερηφάνως. (Const. Exc. 4, p. 384.)

(34/35.2.37) Ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς Δαμόφιλος διὰ τὴν αὐθάδειαν καὶ τὴν ὁμοτητα τῶν τρόπων οὐκ ἦν ἡμέρα καθ’ οὐκ ἤδειξε τινας τῶν οἰκετῶν ἐπ’ αἰτίαις οὐ δικαίας. οὐχ ἦτον δὲ οὐ γινὴ τοῦτον Μετάλλης χαίρουσα ταῖς ὑπερηφάνους τιμωρίας ὁμός προσεφέρετο ταῖς θεραπαινίσαι καὶ τῶν οἰκετῶν τοῖς ὑποπεσοῦσιν. καὶ διὰ τὴν εἰκοστὴν δήμοι καὶ τιμωρίαν ἀπεθηριώθησαν οἱ δούλοι πρὸς τοὺς κυρίους, καὶ διαλαβόντες μηδὲν ἔτι χείρον τῶν παρόντων αὐτοῖς κακῶν ἀπαντήσεσθαι. ... (Const. Exc. 2(1), p. 304.)

(34/35.2.24b) Ὅτι συνετίθεντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἱ δοῦλοι περὶ ἀποστάσεως καὶ φόνου τῶν κυρίων. παρελθόντες δὲ πρὸς τὸν Εὐνου εἶπον οὐκ ἠπόδειξαν διατρίβοντα ἡρώτων εἰ συγκεράτει παρὰ τῶν θεῶν αὐτοῖς τὸ βεβουλευμένων. ὁ δὲ τερατευόμενος μετ’ ἐνθουσιασμοῦ καὶ περὶ τίνων ἢκουσι ἄκουσας διεσφάρησαν ὅτι διδάσκαν αὐτοῖς οἱ θεοί τὴν ἀπόδειξαν, ἐὰν μηδεμίαν ἕπερβολον ποιησάμενοι παραχήμα μὲν ἐγχειρήσασι ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς· ὑπὸ γὰρ τῇς πεπρομενῆς αὐτοῖς κεκυρώθαι πατρίδα τὴν Ἐνναν, οὗσαν ἀκρόπολιν ὅλης τῆς νῆσου. τοιοῦτων λόγων ἄκουσαντες καὶ διαλαβόντες ὅτι τὸ δαμόνιον αὐτοὺς συνεπαλαμβάνει τῆς προαιρέσεως, οὕτως παρέστησαν ταῖς ψυχαῖς πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ὅστε μηδεμίαν ἀναβολήν τῶν δεδογμένων ποιεῖσθαι. εὐθὺς οὖν τοὺς μὲν δεδεμένους ἔλεγον, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων τοὺς πλησίον διατρίβοντας συλλαβόμενοι περὶ τετρακοσίους συνήφοροιν ἐπὶ τίνος ἀγροῦ πλησίον ὄντος τῆς Ἐννης. συνθέμενοι δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ πίστεις ἐπὶ σφαγῶν ἐνόρκους νυκτὸς ποιησάμενοι καθωσπίσθησαν, ὅς ποτ’ οὖν ἡ καιρὸς
συνεχώρει πάντες δὲ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ὄπλων τὸν θυμὸν ἀνελάμβανον κατὰ τῆς ἀπωλείας τῶν ύπερηψάνων κυρίων· καὶ τούτων ἄφηγείτο Εὐνοῦς. καὶ παρακαλοῦντες ἀλλήλους περὶ μέσας νόκτας εἰσέπεσον εἰς τὴν πόλιν καὶ πολλοὺς ἀνήρουν. (Const. Exc. 3, pp. 206-207.)

(34/35.2.39) Ὅτι κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν ἦν τοῦ Δαμοφίλου θυγάτηρ, παρθένος μὲν τὴν ἥλικίαν, ἀπλότητι δὲ τρόπων καὶ φιλανθρωπία διαφέρουσα. αὕτη τοὺς μαστιξομένους ὑπὸ τῶν γονέων αὐτοὺς φιλοτίμως εἰόθηε παρηγορεῖσθαι, καὶ τοῖς δεδεμένοις τῶν οἰκετῶν ἑπαρκοῦσα διὰ τὴν ἐπείκειαν θαυμαστῶς ὑπὸ πάντων ἠγαπᾶτο. καὶ τὸτε οὖν τῆς προγεγενμένης χάριτος ξενολογησάσης αὐτή τὸν παρὰ τῶν εὐ πεπονθότων ἔλεον, οὐ μόνον οὐδεὶς ἐπόλιμης μεθ’ ὑβρεὸς ἐπιβαλεῖν τῇ κόρῃ τὰς χεῖρας, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἄθικτον πάσης ὑβρεὼς τὴν ἄκμην αὐτῆς ἐτήρησαν. προχειρισάμενοι δὲ εἰς αὐτῶν τοὺς εὐθέτους, ὥν ἐκτενέστατος ἦν Ἐρμείας, ἀπῆγαγον εἰς Κατάνην πρὸς τινας οἰκείους. ( Const. Exc. 2(1), p. 305. )

(34/35.2.40) Ὅτι ἀπηγηρωμένων τῶν ἀποστατῶν δούλων πρὸς ὅλην τὴν οἰκίαν τῶν δεσπότων καὶ τρεπομένων πρὸς ἀπαραίτητον ὑβριν καὶ τιμωρίαν, ὑπέφαινον ὡς οὐ δι’ ἀμοιβὴ πρὸς, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς προγεγενμένας εἰς αὐτοὺς ὑπερηφανίας ἐλύττουν πρὸς τὴν τῶν προαδικησάντων κόλασιν τραπέντες.

Ὅτι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς οἰκέταις αὐτοδιδάκτος ἐστιν ἡ φύσις εἰς δικαίαν ἀπόδοσιν χάριτος τε καὶ τιμωρίας. (Const. Exc. 4, p. 384.)

(34/35.2.41) Ὅτι ο Ἐυνοῦς μετὰ ἀναγορευθηκε τα βασιλεύς πάντας ἀνελων· ἐκκλήσας μόνως ἄρχηκ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν χρόνος κατὰ τάς τοῦ κυρίου συμπεριφοράς ἐν τοῖς συνδείτινοι ἀποδεδεγμένοις αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ τε μαντικῇ καὶ κατά τάς ἐκ τῆς τραπέζης δόσεις φιλανθρώπως· ἀμείωται τὴν τε τῆς τύχης περιπέτειαν καὶ τὸ τὴν κατὰ τῶν εὐτελεστῶν εὑρεγεισιν ἀμειφθῆναι σὺν καρφῷ τηλικαύτῃ χάριτι. (Const. Exc. 2(1), p. 305.)

(34/35.2.42) Ὅτι Αχαίας ὁ τοῦ βασιλέως Αντιόχου σύμβουλος τοῖς πραττομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν δραπετῶν οὐκ εὐαρεστοῦμενος ἐπετίμω τοῖς τολμωμένοις
(34/35.2.43) Ότι καὶ ἄλλη τις ἐγένετο ἀπόστασις δραπετῶν καὶ σύστημα ἂξιόλογον. Κλέων γὰρ τις Κύλις ἐκ τῶν περί τὸν Ταῦρον τόπων, συνήθης ὅσον ἐκ παίδων τῷ λῃστρικῷ βίῳ καὶ κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν νομέως γεγονός ἀποφορβίων, οὐ διέλυσεν ὀδοιποδῶν καὶ παντοδαποῦς φόνους ἐπιτελοῦμενος. ὡς πυθόμενος τὴν κατὰ τὸν Εὔνους προκοπῆν καὶ τὰς τῶν μετ´ αὐτῶν δραπετῶν εὐθυμείας ἀποστάτης ἐγένετο, καὶ τινας τὸν πλησίον οἰκετῶν πείσας συναπονήσασθαι κατέτρεξε τὴν πόλιν τῶν Ἀκραγαντίνων καὶ τὴν πλησιόχωρον πᾶσαν. (Const. Exc. 2(1), p. 305.)

(34/35.2.44) Ότι ἡ κατεπείγουσα χρεία καὶ σπάνις ἡνάγακαζε πάντα δοκιμάζειν τοὺς ἀποστάτας δούλους, οὐ διδοῦσα τὴν τῶν κρειττόνων ἐκλογήν.

(34/35.2.45) Ότι ὑπῆρχεν οὐ διοσθήμας δεόμενον τὸ συλλογίσασθαι τῆς πόλεως τὸ εὐάλωτον. φανερὸν γὰρ ἢν καὶ τοῖς εὐθεστάτοις ὅτι τῶν τειχῶν διὰ τὴν πολυχρόνιν εἰρήνην κατερρυθμήσων καὶ πολλῶν εἰς αὐτῆς στρατιωτῶν ἀπολωλότων, ἔσται τῆς πόλεως εὐκατόρθωτος ἡ πολιορκία.

(34/35.2.46) Ότι ὁ Εὔνους ἑκτὸς βέλους ἐπιστήσας τὴν χάον μὲν ἐβλασφήμει τοὺς Ὑπαιτοὺς, ἀποφαινόμενος σὺχ ἑαυτοὺς ἀλλʼ ἐκείνους εἶναι δραπέτας τῶν κινδύνων. μίμους δὲ εἰς ἀποστάσεως τοῖς ἔνδον ἐπεδείκνυτο, διʼ ὅτι οἱ δούλω καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἱδίων κυριῶν ἀποστασίας ἐξεθεάτριξον, ὀνειδίζοντες αὐτῶν τὴν ὑπερηφανίαν καὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς εἰς τὸν ὀλέθρον προαγούσης ὑβρεως.

(34/35.2.47) Ότι τὰ ἐξήλλαγμένα δυστυχήματα, εἰ καὶ τινὲς πεπεισμένοι τυγχάνουσι μηδένοι τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιστροφήν ποιεῖσθαι τὸ θεῖον, ἀλλʼ οὐν γε σύμφορον ἔστι τῷ κοινῷ βίῳ τὴν ἐκ θεῶν δεισιδαιμονίαν ἐντετηκέναι ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν ψυχαῖς. ὁλίγοι γὰρ οἱ διʼ ἄρετὴν ἱδίαι δικαιοπραγοῦντες, τὸ δὲ πολὺ φύλον τῶν ἀνθρώπων νομικαὶς κολάσει ταῖς ἐκ θεοῦ τιμωρίας ἀπέχεται τῶν κακουργημάτων.
(34/35.2.48) Ὄτι πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων κακῶν ἐπισυμβάντων τοῖς Σικελίωταις, τούτοις ἀπασίν ὁ δημοτικὸς ὄχλος οὐχ οἴον συνεπασχεν, ἀλλὰ τούναντιν ἐπέχαρε προσεπιθοθοῦν ἄνισον τύχης καὶ ἀνωμάλου ζωῆς. ὅ γάρ φθόνος ἐκ τῆς προγεγενημένης λύπης μετέβαλεν εἰς χαράν, ὡρῶν τὸ λαμπρὸν τῆς τύχης μεταπηπτωκὸς εἰς τὸ πρότερον ὑπ’ αὐτῆς ὑπερορώμενον σχῆμα, καὶ τὸ πάντων δεινότατον, οἱ μὲν ἀποστάται προνοηθέντες ἐμφρόνως περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος οὔτε τὰς ἑπαύλειας ἑνεπύριζον οὔτε τὰς ἐν αὐταῖς κτήσεις καὶ καρπῶν ἀποθέσεις ἔλυμαινον, τῶν τε πρὸς τὴν γεωργίαν ὀρμηκτῶν ἀπείχοντο, οἱ δὲ δημοτικοὶ διὰ τὸν φθόνον ἐπὶ τῇ προφάσει τῶν δραπετῶν ἐξιόντες ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν οὐ μόνον τὰς κτήσεις διήρπαζον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἑπαύλειας ἑνεπύριζον. (Const. Exc. 4, pp. 384-385.)

**IV. The Constantinian Excerpts: Translation**

(34/5.2.25) There was never a discord of slaves so great as that which erupted in Sicily, through which many cities encountered terrible circumstances, countless men and women, along with their children, experienced the greatest misfortunes, and all the island ran the risk of falling into the power of the fugitives, who measured the extent of their power by the excess of misfortunes of the free. These things happened unexpectedly and contrary to expectations to most people, but to those who could judge each matter realistically, they did not seem to happen unaccountably.

(34/5.2.26) For because of the excessive wealth of those enjoying the fruits of the most excellent island, nearly all of those who had become wealthy strove after first luxury, then arrogance and insolence. Because of this, and since the mistreatment of the slaves and their estrangement from their masters increased equally, there was, when opportune, a general outburst of hatred. From this, without formal command, tens of thousands of slaves joined forces for the destruction of their masters. A similar thing happened in Asia during the same period, when Aristonicus laid claim to a kingdom that did not belong to him, and the slaves, because of mistreatment by their masters, shared in this man’s folly and encompassed many cities in great misfortunes.
(34/5.2.27) In a similar fashion, the large landowners were buying whole slave markets to work their land ... to bind some with fetters, and to exhaust others with weight of work, and they marked all with arrogant brands. In consequence, so large a multitude of (household) slaves flooded all Sicily, that those who heard the extravagant numbers did not believe them. For those of the Sicilian Greeks who had acquired much wealth were contending hotly with the Greeks of Italy in arrogance, greed and wickedness. The Italians who had acquired many slaves allowed their herdsmen such a self-indulgent life-style that they did not provide them food, but permitted them to plunder. (34/5.2.28) Since power such as this had been given to men who, because of their physical strength were able to accomplish everything they chose, and because of their licence and leisure had the opportunity, and because of their lack of food were compelled to undertake perilous tasks, it came about that there was a swift increase in lawlessness. For first they murdered those who travelled singly or in pairs in conspicuous places: then, coming together in bands, they attacked in the night the farm houses of the weak, and were destroying them by force and were plundering the possessions and were killing those who resisted. (34/5.2.29) Since their courage kept growing ever greater, by night Sicily was not passable to travellers, and for those accustomed to living in the countryside it was not safe to spend time there. Everywhere was filled with violence, banditry and killings of all kinds. Since the herdsmen were experienced in the countryside and equipped like soldiers, they all were, with good reason, full of arrogance and boldness: for since they were carrying clubs, spears and remarkable shepherd’s crooks, and covered their bodies with the hides of wolves or wild boars, they had a striking appearance and one that was not far from warlike. A pack of fierce dogs following each man, and a plentiful supply of milk and meat being available made their bodies and minds wild. Therefore the whole countryside was full as though of scattered armies, as if the boldness of the slaves had been armed by the decision/guardianship of the masters. (34/5.2.31) The governors tried to repress the madness of the slaves, but did not dare to punish them, and because of the power and strength of the masters they were forced to disregard the plundering of the province. For since most of the owners were recognised Roman knights (equites), and were judges for charges against governors from provinces, they caused fear in the governors.
(34/5.2.32) The Italians who were engaged in farming purchased vast numbers of (household) slaves, branded them all with marks, and did not provide sufficient food, but wasted them away with the burdens of work ... distress from them.

(34/5.2.33) Not only in the exercise of political power should prominent men behave moderately to those who are humble, but also in their private lives, if they are wise, they should attend gently to their slaves. For just as arrogance and a heavy hand in cities produces civil conflicts among the free citizens, so in private homes it produces slave plots against their masters, and terrible revolts in common against cities. The more the powers that be might be changed into savagery and lawlessness, so much more are the characters of those subject to that power made savage to the point of despair: for all who chance has made humble willingly yield to those in power for virtue and good repute, but when deprived of good treatment become an enemy of those who savagely lord it over him.

(34/5.2.34) There was a certain Damophilus, whose family came from Enna, an exceedingly wealthy man, and of arrogant character, who, since he cultivated a vast circuit of land, and had acquired large herds of cattle, not only emulated the luxury of the Italians in Sicily, but even their great numbers of slaves and their inhumanity and arrogance towards them. For he always had with him in the countryside four-wheeled wagons and lavish horses with a retinue of armed slaves: in addition to these he prided himself on having many handsome slave boys and an ill-bred following of flatterers. (34/5.2.35) In the city and in his country houses he worked hard to produce extravagant exhibitions of silver plate worked in relief and coverings dyed with purple and served sumptuous and royal dinners in abundance; he exceeded Persian luxury in expense and extravagance: he surpassed them even in arrogance. For his ill-bred and uneducated nature, having gained possession of unaccountable power and an excessive fortune, first produced satiety, then wantonness, and finally ruin for himself and great misfortunes for his country. (34/5.2.36) For, buying great numbers of slaves in the market, he used to treat them
outrageously, branding marks on the bodies of those who had been born free in their own countries, but who had experienced the fate of slavery through capture in war. Some of them he fettered in chains and threw into worker’s barracks, while others he assigned as herdsmen, and provided neither appropriate clothing nor food.

(34/5.2.38) Damophilus of Enna, when some naked slaves approached him and talked with him about clothing, he could not endure the conversation, but said, “What? Do those who walk through the country go naked, and do they not offer a ready supply for those who need clothes?” He ordered them bound to pillars and beaten, and dismissed them arrogantly.

(34/5.2.37) Because of his wilfulness and cruelty of character, there was not a day when the same Damophilus was not mistreating some of his slaves without just cause. The wife of this man, Metallis, who delighted no less in arrogant punishments, treated her maidservants, and the other slaves who fell in her way, cruelly. Because of the outrages and punishments from both of them, the slaves became brutal towards their masters, and believing that nothing worse than the present evils could come to them ...

(34/5.2.24b) The slaves agreed with one another about revolt and the murder of their masters. They came to Eunus, who was spending time not far away, and they asked if their decision was approved by the gods. He began working wonders in a frenzy, and when he heard why they had come he made clear that the gods gave them permission to revolt, so long as they did not delay but immediately undertook their enterprise: for it was fated that Enna, the citadel of the whole island, was fixed as their homeland. Since they had heard these words and believed that the divine power was assisting them in their plan, they were so disposed in their minds for revolt that they made no delay in what they had decided. Immediately, therefore, they set free those who had been bound and of the others they collected those that lived nearby, and assembled about four hundred in a certain area near Enna. After making a covenant among one another and taking oaths of trust by night over sacrifices, they armed themselves as opportunity allowed at that time: all of them took up the
strongest weapon of all, a desire for the destruction of their arrogant masters: and Eunus was their leader. While encouraging one another they burst into the city about midnight and were killing many.

(34/5.2.39) In Sicily there was a daughter of Damophilus, not yet married, but outstanding for her simple character and humanity. She had always been accustomed to generously soothe those flogged by her parents, and since she assisted those slaves who had been bound she was wondrously regarded with affection for her fairness by all. Therefore, since her previous kindness raised at this time a contribution of pity for her from those whom she had treated well, not only did no-one dare to lay violent hands her, but all maintained her flower untouched from all outrage. Selecting from them suitable persons, of whom Hermeias was most warmly attached to her, they led her to Catana to some relatives.

(34/5.2.40) Although the rebellious slaves had become savage against the whole household of their masters and turned to implacable violence and revenge, they showed a little that it was not because of the natural savagery, but because of the arrogance that had earlier been shown to them that they were raging, having turned to the punishment of those who had been first in wrong doing.

Even among slaves, nature is self-taught with regard to just restitution of both gratitude and vengeance.

(34/5.2.41) Eunus, after being proclaimed king, killed all of them, and dismissed only those who, in times past, in accordance with the indulgences of his master, had received him into their banquets and in both his prophecy and in their gifts from their table treated him kindly: here was an amazing thing, both a sudden change in fortune, and a good deed concerning a paltry thing taken in exchange for so great a favour, at a critical time.

(34/5.2.42) Achaeus, the counsellor of King Antiochus, not being well pleased with the accomplishments of the runaways both censured them for the things
undertaken by them, and very boldly proclaimed that they would meet with speedy retribution. Eunus was so far from putting him to death for his outspokenness that he not only presented him with the house of his masters, but even made him a counsellor.

(34/5.2.43) There was another revolt of runaways and a band worthy of mention. For a certain Kleon, a Cilician from a region about the Taurus, who was accustomed from childhood to a life of banditry and in Sicily became a herder of horses, constantly waylaid people and committed murders of every kind. When he learned of the progress of Eunus, and the successes of the runaways with him, he became a rebel and persuading some of the (household) slaves nearby to share in folly with him he overran the city of Acragas and all the surrounding countryside.

(34/5.2.44) Their pressing need and poverty compelled the rebel slaves to approve as fit everyone, and did not give them the choice of those better suited.

(34/5.2.45) The fact was that it needed no omens to realise that the city was easy to capture. For it was obvious even to the simple minded that since the walls had fallen into ruins because of the long standing peace, and many of her soldiers had been killed, the siege of the city would be easily effected.

(34/5.2.46) Eunus, having stationed his force beyond the range of the missiles, taunted the Romans, declaring that it was not his men, but they who were running away from danger. He displayed mimes from the revolt for those within the city, through which the slaves made a public show of the revolts from their individual masters, casting in their teeth the arrogance and excessive violence that had led to their ruin.

(34/5.2.47) As for extraordinary ill-fortune, even if there happen to be some who are persuaded that the divine has nothing to do with such retribution, yet surely it is expedient for the common life that fear of the gods is dissolved into the minds of the many. For there are few who act honestly because of their own goodness, but
most people are kept from doing wrong by legal punishments and retribution from the divine.

(34/5.2.48) When many great evils fell upon the Sicilians, the popular mob was not only unsympathetic to all these, but on the contrary rejoiced, since they begrudged their unequal fate and irregular way of life. For envy turned quickly from a prior pain into joy, when the mob saw that the glorious fate had changed into a form formerly overlooked by them. Most terrible of all, the rebels, exercising rational forethought concerning the future, neither set fire to farm houses nor damaged the stock in them and the harvest lying in store, and held off from those who had turned to farming. The populace, however, because of their envy, and behind the pretext of the runaways, went out into the countryside and not only plundered the estates, but even set fire to the farm houses.
Appendix 6: Merely a Slavish Copyist?
Diodorus and the Problem of His Sources for the Sicilian Insurrection

‘...it requires too great an act of faith to believe that the excerpts [of Diodorus] now extant preserve evidence of literary ingenuity...’ Bradley (1989), 136.

The sentiment expressed by Bradley in the above quotation is all too indicative of the general regard in which Diodorus’ worth as a historian is held. In a recent commentary on Books 11-12 of Diodorus, Green (2006: 1) commented that the one fact that ‘... virtually all classicists think they know about [Diodorus is] that he is a mere slavish copyist only as good as his source’. His comments were made at the start of an argument set to rehabilitate Diodorus. In doing so, Green responded to Stylianou (1998), whose work rose from the tradition of Volquardsen (1868) that viewed Diodorus as a ‘historical compiler of low stature’ (Stylianou 1998: 139). Diodorus’ history, therefore, was seen as a work that was composed through (137) ‘incompetence, lack of care, and ignorance’, with (15) ‘empty and inept rhetoric and...poverty of vocabulary’.379 Green is not alone in attempting to rehabilitate Diodorus (among other ‘secondary’ historians) as a writer and historical source, although with few exceptions most attempts do not extend into the problematic and fragmentary later books, in which the Slave War narratives are preserved.380 Perhaps the most nuanced approach taken to date has been that of Hau in her studies of the interactions between Diodorus and his sources with particular reference to a specific passage of Book 32 (2006) and the representation of changeability of fortune and moralising in relation to his sources (2009). She concluded that Diodorus was capable of adapting what he found to suit his own purposes, and composing material himself in his proems.

379 Stylianou (1998) is not alone in his views: see also, e.g., Soltau (1889), 368; Schwartz (1903), col. 663; Schäfer (1930), 350-1, (quoting a letter from Willamowitz); Nock (1959), 5; Hornblower (1981), 28. This list is not exhaustive.
380 Sacks (1982); Rubincam (1998a); Rubincam (1998b); Bosworth (2003); Green (2006); Sulimani (2008). The exceptions to this list are Sacks (1990); Sacks (1994); Matsubara (1998).
In spite of this recent renaissance of scholarship prepared to explore afresh Diodorus’ worth as both a source of information and a creative historian, scholarship on the Sicilian Insurrection has continued to focus on the lost text of Posidonius as the principal, indeed in some cases only source for Diodorus’ narrative. By so doing, it has effectively denied Diodorus the kind of creative abilities in his treatment of this episode which are now conceded him for his treatment of other historical happenings. In contrast, I will argue that in the only section of the Sicilian Insurrection narrative for which we have a comparable potential source, comparison can demonstrate that Diodorus could engage creatively and significantly with the historical tradition. My aim in doing this will not be to argue what source Diodorus may have been using, either Posidonius or otherwise, or to argue that he was composing history entirely of his own accord. Rather, I will argue against the notion that we can conclusively settle on understanding Posidonius’ compositional methodology as the best or only way of understanding the Diodoran text. My reason for challenging this assumption is that the over-zealous attribution of the narrative as entirely or even mostly Posidonian in structure and purpose lends itself, in most cases, to an opinion that the essential details of the narrative itself need not be questioned. This, in turn, leads to the conclusion that the challenges the text poses for the modern historian lie in the first instance in understanding how the various pieces fit together chronologically, or in what historical context they should fit.

381 The most extreme view is that held by Bradley (1989), 133-6, in which he states that Posidonius was the source for Diodorus, and that ‘if [Diodorus] followed his usual methodological procedures when using [Posidonius], [Diodorus’] account of the slave wars could be assumed to be reasonably accurate, reliable, and comprehensive.’ In a more recent account, Urbainczyk (2008a), 82-3, with due reference to the work of Sacks (1990), acknowledged that while the principal source was most likely Posidonius, elements of the narrative may well have been Diodoran in origin. The other source is usually ascribed to sections of the narrative that contain historical mistakes and anachronisms: e.g. see Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.3, 31. The following all believe Posidonius to be the principal, if not necessarily the sole, source: Forrest and Stinton (1962), 88; Vogt (1965), 21; Verbrugghe (1974), 48; Sacks (1990), 142-54; Shaw (2001), 27; Ambaglio (2008), 27, 68; Bradley (2011a), 247.

382 Forrest and Stinton (1962), 88, in response to Green (1961) who had not mentioned Posidonius in his paper but had considered Caecilius Rufus as a source, postulated Posidonius as the source for Diodorus, following Rathke (1904), who argued for a Posidonian origin on grounds of the ‘sympathetic’ account of Diodorus, although they also suggest L. Calpurnius Piso’s annalistic history as another source, providing no evidence for the statement. Both Vogt (1965), 21, and Verbrugghe (1974, 48; 1975, 189-191) agree that Posidonius had to be the sole source. Bradley (1989), 134-6, took great comfort in the fact that Diodorus used Posidonius as a source. A more nuanced approach was taken by Sacks (1990), 142-54, Matsubara (1998), 144-7, and Urbainczyk (2008a), 82-6, regarding different elements of the narrative to be from Posidonius and Diodorus’ other source (unspecified normally, although postulated by Sacks (1990), 149-51 to be local sources in Sicily), but
occasions where, on the other hand, the details of the narrative are challenged, the supposition used to challenge them is either that the questionable aspects are Diodoran intrusions, implying the need for an unfavourable opinion of Diodorus’ compositional method,\(^\text{383}\) or that the narrative is based on incorrect assumptions from Posidonius about Sicilian history, made in order to fill gaps in his knowledge, which, in turn, denies any creative influence outside of Posidonius.\(^\text{384}\) In contrast, the following investigation will demonstrate that Diodorus’ engagement with the historical tradition could alter the narrative in ways profound enough to significantly change its focus not only in sections that were historically erroneous, but also in matters of rhetorical stress. It will be shown that Diodorus’ engagement with his material could be complex enough that without the original text for comparison it is impossible to extract the source from the text: once this is understood, it will be clear that trying to understand the surviving narrative through a (postulated) Diodoran source is flawed, and that the only way forward is to address the text in its own right.

\textit{I. Posidonius’ Damophilus}

I shall expand my argument basing myself on the example of the Damophilus episode. The text below, a fragment of Posidonius quoted by Athenaeus, is the only piece of evidence that can be used to link Posidonius to the specific account of the Sicilian Insurrection in Diodorus.\(^\text{385}\) The passage describes, in similar terms to those of Diodorus, one event of the war, and reads as follows (12.59.21-9 = F59 Kidd):

\begin{quote}
Ποσειδώνιος δ’ ἐν τῇ ὠγδόῳ τῶν Ἑστορίων περὶ Δαμοφιλίου λέγων τοῦ Σικελιώτου, δὲ ὁ δουλικὸς ἐκινήθη πόλεμος, ὁτί τριφής ἦν οἰκέως, γράφει καὶ ταῦτα: τριφής οὐν δουλός ἦν καὶ κακουργίας, διά μὲν τῆς χώρας τετρακόλους ἀπήνασε περιαγόμενος καὶ ὕπτως καὶ θεράποντας ὑμάντως καὶ παραδρομὴν ἀνάγαγον κολάκων τε καὶ παιδῶν στρατιωτικῶν. ὥστε τοι ἐπιον τινεῖ ψυφρίστως κατεστρεψε τὸν βίον ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκετῶν περιμβρισθείς.
\end{quote}

universally agreeing that the historical mistakes must come from Diodorus’ other sources, not Posidonius.

\(^{383}\) Sacks (1990), 147-51; Matsubara (1998), 170-3.
\(^{384}\) Verbrugghe (1972), 535-59; Verbrugghe (1975), 194-200.
\(^{385}\) Jacoby (1927) took far greater liberties with the text of Diodorus as accurately reflecting Posidonius, and the work of Kidd and Edelstein (1972) corrected this imbalance with a due degree of caution. Most importantly for the Sicilian Insurrection, F108 in Jacoby, which contained the majority of the slave narrative in Diodorus, was not accepted in Kidd and Edelstein, leaving only F59 Kidd as a link between Diodorus and Posidonius for the Sicilian Insurrection.
Posidonius, in the eighth book of his *Histories*, says about Damophilus of Sicily, because of whom the slave war was set in motion, that he was addicted to luxury, and he writes this: "He was therefore a slave of luxury and wickedness, leading round the countryside with him four-wheeled wagons, horses, beautiful attendants, an ill-bred following of flatterers and even of boys dressed as soldiers. But later he, with his whole household, wantonly ended his life after having been grievously insulted by his slaves.

This is comparable to a passage of Diodorus about Damophilus preserved in the Constantinian excerpts, except that the passage in Diodorus belongs to a longer piece of text (34/5.2.34-8). The text of Diodorus, where comparable, reads thus (34/5.2.34):

ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῆς χώρας ἦποις τε πολυτελεῖς καὶ τετρακύκλους ἀτῆνας μετ᾽ οἴκετον στρατιωτικῶν περιήγησα πρὸς δὲ τούτοις εὐπρεπῶν παιδῶν πλήθος, ἐπὶ δὲ κολάκων ἀνάγοιον παραδρομῆν ἔχειν ἐφυλοτιμέον.

For he always had with him in the countryside four-wheeled wagons and lavish horses with a retinue of armed slaves: in addition to these he was eager to have many handsome slave boys and an ill-bred following of flatterers.

These two passages have been relatively understudied in the past. For example, Malitz (1983), in a major monograph on Posidonius that reserved a whole section of the fourth chapter to *Sklaven und Piraten*, and that gave the text of the Athenaeus in full (150), summarily concluded from the existence of the Athenaeus only (37) ‘daß sich Diodor eng an den Wortlaut der Historien [des Poseidonios] gehalten hat’. A similar conclusion was reached by Theiler (1982), who stated ‘daß der erste sizilische Sklavenkrieg (135-132) von Diodor aus Poseidonios genommen ist.’ Perhaps so, but even a subtle change of wording could alter the drive and intention of a text, or cause problems for our interpretation of the text, including the one under discussion here, as we shall see in due course. The line advocated by Malitz was previously taken by Momigliano (1975: 33-4) who viewed the Posidonian fragment as a reason ‘to feel no qualms in taking Diodorus as a faithful epitomizer of what must have been a compact and careful section of Posidonius on the slave war in Sicily.’ Laffranque in 1964 also connected the two passages (119 n.43; 147-8) but did not draw any further conclusions. For Brunt (1980: 486) the two passages served as proof of Diodorus’ use of Posidonius, but despite citing the connection in a paragraph aiming to show that we cannot always be certain that fragments of historians from the ancient world necessarily represented their work, he did not take
the opportunity to test this hypothesis with an analysis of the passages in question here. Sacks (1990: 144-5) took a more nuanced approach, arguing that this fragment demonstrated that Diodorus followed Posidonius in attributing the start of the revolt to Damophilus, but made no effort to demonstrate the variance between the two texts. Certain differences between the two passages were noted by Urbainczyk (2008a: 85-6), but she did not pursue them beyond the observation that ‘the [Posidonian] extract is briefer than the account found in the epitome of Diodorus, which is unexpected if the latter took it from the former and elaborated on it.’ Finally, Ambaglio (2008: 27), in his only comment on the above passage of Posidonius, stated that ‘(l)a convergenza a proposito di un motivo molto particolare, il lusso del padrone Damofilo, rivela tra i due autori un accordo senza ombre…’; he had earlier on the page noted that Posidonius had been recognised as Diodorus’ source for books 33-37 ‘pur se mancano elementi inoppugnabili di prova’. Garnsey (1997: 163-5) did note that there are important aspects of Posidonius’ passage missing from the corresponding Diodorus, and stated that (163) ‘one fragment apart, it is something of an act of faith to claim that any particular passage [of Diodorus] is wholly or substantially Posidonian.’ In sum, with the exception of Garnsey, all the authors allow their interpretation to rest on the assumption that we can say something of the interrelationship between Diodorus and Posidonius; yet, no other author has attempted to compare the texts directly and in detail.\(^\text{386}\) So doing, however, will demonstrate that the evidence offered here cannot allow a firmer view of the interrelationship between Diodorus and Posidonius for the narrative of the Sicilian Insurrection. So let us start from the beginning.

We should first note the similarities. In places the vocabulary is strikingly similar: for example, both use the phrase τετρακύκλους ἀπήνας, and παραδρομὴν ἀνάγωγον κολάκων, albeit with a different word order. Verbally there are similarities, as both passages use the verb περιάγωμαι or περιάγω in some form. In addition, in spite of the differing vocabulary used to describe them, θεράποντας ὀραίος in Posidonius and εὐπρεπῶν παίδων in Diodorus mean very similar things: both seem to refer to an entourage of handsome male followers. Furthermore both

\(^{386}\) Both Reinhardt (1926) and Schmidt (1980) ignore the passage completely.
passages are giving essentially the same description of Damophilus’ activities in Sicily. In this respect it seems likely that at the very least Posidonius and Diodorus shared a source, or perhaps that Diodorus used Posidonius for this section: this has been noted before. However, there are certain features that speak against putting too much emphasis on understanding Posidonius’ historical methods as the only way in which we can further our analysis of Diodorus’ later books, including his narrative on the so-called Slave War. These features, I argue, suggest that Diodorus had a creative input into this passage in some important ways.

First, the opening and closing lines of the Posidonian passage have no direct parallel in Diodorus. In particular the rhetorical sentiment that Damophilus τρυφής οὖν δούλος ἦν καὶ κακοψυχίας, ‘was therefore a slave of luxury and wickedness’ is completely unparalleled, unlike the statement about his death, which is mirrored, in a sense, by the overall narrative of Diodorus that gives a much lengthier description of Damophilus’ capture and demise among the slaves. This narrative is

388 Urbainczyk (2008a), 85-6, viewed this line as one of the reasons to believe that the passage is genuinely Posidonian, however Garnsey (1997), 164, noted that this line was missing from Diodorus. In this he reflected (1997), 165, that Diodorus’ narrative did not retain any aspects of Stoicism that one might have expected if it was merely a copy of Posidonius, but did contain humanitarian sentiments. Malitz (1983), 140 n.40, noted, on the other hand, that this kind of expression features twice elsewhere in Diodorus, once about Tiberius Gracchus (34/5.6.1 – προστάτην δὲ ἄρχοντα τὸν μήτηρα μήτη φόβου δοῦλον) and a second time about Titus Vettius (36.2a – τῷ ἔρποι δουλείαις) but not in the context of the Sicilian Insurrection. If these two expressions came from Posidonius, as Malitz believes, then it is even more significant that this expression is avoided by Diodorus when describing Damophilus, as he clearly was not averse to the description in other places.

389 Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.13-4: οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Εὐνοῦν ποθοῦσιν τὸν Δαμόφιλον ὅτι κατὰ τὸν πλησίον τῆς πόλεως περίκτησαν διατρήσαντες μετὰ τῆς γυναικὸς, ἕλθον ἐκεῖθεν διὰ τοῦτοις σταλέσαντοι αὐτὸν τε καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα διέδεμαν ἐξηγούντος, πολλὰς κατὰ τὴν ὅθον ὧδες ὑποσχόντας, μόνης δὲ τῆς θυγατρὸς αὐτῶν οἱ δούλουις ὄψθησαν εἰς πάντα φαινόμενοι διά τὸ φυλάνθρωπον αὐτῆς ἠθος καὶ περὶ τοῖς δούλους συμπαθῆς καὶ βοηθητικοὺς κατὰ δύναμιν. εἰ δὲν ἐδοκίμασεν τὸν δοῦλον σοφὸ γούματι εἶναι φύσεως τὰ γνώμην εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους, ἀλλὰ τὸν προδημηγμένον εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀδικημάτων ἀντιπάλοδος, τὸν δὲ Δαμόφιλον καὶ τὴν Μεγαλιλίδα εἰς τὴν πόλιν οἱ ἀπεσταλμένοι ἐλκύσαντες, ἔστωσεν ἔρημον, εἰς τὸ θέατρον ἐσήμαγον, συνελημφόθος ἐνταθύθη τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἄποστατῶν. καὶ τοῦ Δαμόφιλοι τεχνάσασθαι τι πρὸς τὴν συστητὴν ἐγχειρήσαντος καὶ πολλοῖς τοῦ πλῆθους τοὺς λόγους ἐπαγγελμένου. Ἐρεμείς καὶ Ζεῦς πικρὸς πρὸς αὐτοὺς διακείμενοι πλάνον τε ἀπεκάλουν, καὶ οὐκ ἀναμείναντες τὴν ἀκριβῆ τοῦ ὄντος κρίσιν ὁ μὲν διὰ τὸν πλευρόν τὸ ἔριος οἴδηξ, ὁ δὲ πελέκει τὸν τρόχηλον ἔκσοψεν. ‘Those around Eunus, learning that Damophilus was wasting time with his wife in his garden near the city, dispatched some of them (to them) and dragged both the man and his wife from that place with their hands bound behind their backs, enduring many outrages along the road. For the daughter alone were the slaves seen to be considerate in all respects on account of her
preserved only by the Photian account of the war, and so could, potentially, have also been considerably longer than it now appears, if Photius had compressed the original, although it is unclear if this was the case; this is notwithstanding the possibility that Photius could have altered the structure and in places wording of the text. This passage is not paralleled in what we have of Posidonius.

Second, the two passages differ in other small ways. There are very minor alterations: in the Posidonian passage the section describing Damophilus’ entourage round Sicily is a subordinate clause controlled by a participle of περιάγομαί, which governs all the accusatives in the sentence; moreover the journey of Damophilus through the countryside is described with the preposition διά. In Diodorus, half of the segment is controlled by an indicative middle of the verb περιάγω, in which the journey through the country is described with ἐπὶ rather than διά. The other half of the extract, including the κολάκων ἀνάγωγον παραδρομήν from the Posidonian passage, is controlled by a new indicative verb φιλοτιµάμαί, and so represents a more significant change in the structure from Posidonius and, it must be noted, a change in the characterisation of Damophilus:390 his striving for handsome slave boys and ill-bred flatterers.391 These alterations, however, are generally very slight, but focus ought to be given to this additional facet of Damophilus, because it affects how we read the subsequent narrative about Damophilus, and that understanding gives greater weight to this alteration.

---

390 The verb φιλοτιµάμαι is not in and of itself pejorative in Diodorus. Typically it means ‘to make a special effort for’ or ‘to put one’s effort in something’ (e.g. 1.63.1; 2.25.8; 3.18.4; 36.3; 15.44.2). However, context is of vital importance. In the context above, it is things for which Damophilus strove that provides the negative context, and by this stroke the verb has a sense of the pejorative to it.

391 There are also some minor changes to the vocabulary, including the change of θεράπωνας φραίον in Posidonius to εὐπρεπὸν παιδίον in Diodorus, which also include the addition of an adjective to describe the horses: πολυτελής.
II. The Structure of Damophilus’ Death

As we saw above, Posidonius’ passage ends with a very brief notice of Damophilus’ death. The Diodoran passage, on the other hand, continues with a series of extra details about Damophilus that further our understanding of his character. Having learnt that he was eager for his followers and handsome slaves, we are informed of another series of character vices that he held, far beyond the portrait in Posidonius (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.35):

κατὰ δὲ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὰς ἑπαύλεις ἀργυρωμάτων ἐκθέσεις τορευτῶν καὶ στρωμάτων κοινητῶν πολυτελείας ἐκπούσων παρεσώκετο πραπέξας ὑπερηφάνους καὶ βασιλικὰς ταῖς ὑψωτίκαις ὑπαρχόν τὴν Περσικὴν τροφὴν ταῖς δαπάναις καὶ πολυτελείας ὑπερβάλε ὃς καὶ κατὰ τὴν ὑπερφανίαν. ἀνάγεον γὰρ καὶ ἐπαιδευτὸς τρόπος ἐξουσίας ἀναπαυθόνου καὶ τύχης μεγαλοπλοῦτου κυριεύσας τὸ μὲν πρῶτον κῶρον ἐγέννησεν, ἐκὸ ὑβρίν, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον ὀλιβρόν τε αὐτό καὶ συμφορὰς μεγάλας τῇ πατρίδι.

In the city and in his country houses he worked hard to produce extravagant exhibitions of silver plate worked in relief and coverings dyed with purple and served sumptuous and royal dinners in abundance; he exceeded Persian luxury in expense and extravagance: he surpassed them even in arrogance. For his ill-bred and uneducated nature, having gained possession of unaccountable power and an excessive fortune, first produced satiety, then wantonness, and finally ruin for himself and great misfortunes for his country.

He is, in addition to being eager for handsome slave boys and ill-bred flatterers, also extravagant, arrogant, ill-bred, uneducated and wanton. Comparisons are added between him and the Persians, with his role as the superlative over even them. When finally this hyperbolic passage ends, it does indeed end with a foreshadowing of his demise, but with no mention of his family, only his country. The exemplum if it shared a common historical source with Posidonius, has been adapted, with a simple addition of a new verb, to be part of a wider invective against the character of Damophilus that connects him with a greater range of vices and failures, and the wider point of Diodorus’ narrative. On this evidence, if Diodorus was using Posidonius here for the extended passage, he was adapting what he found there at least to some extent, either adding significant context to the character of Damophilus and fleshing his character out to a greater degree or reworking the structure of Posidonius’ presentation. We can now see that the difference in the length of the two passages noted by Urbainczyk (2008a: 85-6) is of fundamental importance: we can no longer accept, as Momigliano had, that Diodorus is a ‘faithful epitomizer’, as it is
clear that he was able (and willing) to alter his text to suit his own purposes, if indeed his source was Posidonius. In other words, it does not follow that because he utilised the vocabulary he may have found in Posidonius – Malitz’ contention (1983: 37) that he stuck to the ‘Wortlaut der Historien [des Posidonios]’ – he necessarily had to hold to the essential meaning of what was said. Moreover, the passage of Diodorus is set into a narrative that gives great detail about the character and actions of Damophilus. As we will see below, it is unlikely that the Posidonian passage given here was presented in the same context as that of the Diodoran passage: wherever this information in Diodorus is coming from it is not from a logical extension of the structure of Posidonius that we have.

When introducing the passage of Posidonius, Athenaeus does not provide much, if any context for it.\textsuperscript{392} It is given in a list of examples of excessive luxury, and gives no indication of why Posidonius mentioned the episode, or in what context he did so. He does provide the information that it is about Damophilus (12.59.22-3), δι´ ὁ δουλικός ἐκκινήθη πόλεμος, ‘because of whom the slave war was set in motion’, but it is unclear if this comes from Posidonius, or Athenaeus’ own memory. Presumably there was some context for the remark in Posidonius, but this provides no guarantees. There is a reasonable likelihood for this passage to have been a part of a preface in Posidonius to a narrative of the so-called First Sicilian Slave War,\textsuperscript{393} but even if this is the case, some important, indeed crucial points remain. It is uncertain how long the passage was before Athenaeus’ excerpt, but the structure within the passage is built on a μέν...δέ clause. For Posidonius, the μέν clause includes the entire description of Damophilus’ entourage, which is then contrasted in the δέ clause with his, and his family’s demise at the hands of their slaves for their actions: the link between the two is implied by the clause. Interestingly, Diodorus’ passage is not built on a μέν...δέ clause. In Diodorus, the μέν is followed by a succession of δέ

\textsuperscript{392} Pelling (2000), 186-8, commented that Athenaeus’ methodology when quoting authors in his work was not necessarily concerned with accuracy, but chiefly with achieving a variety of aims within the text. To this end, Pelling, 189, argued that Athenaeus would happily alter the wording slightly of texts in order to play upon his speakers’ own faulty memories, or to test his readers, and that therefore we cannot assume that Athenaeus was a (187) ‘plodding transcriber’. For the purposes here, this means that we cannot be absolutely certain that Athenaeus is representing the words of Posidonius faithfully, but unfortunately without the original text of Posidonius (which of course I argue Diodorus cannot be taken to represent) we cannot ascertain the accuracy of Athenaeus’ use of Posidonius.

\textsuperscript{393} My thanks to John Marincola for pointing this possibility out to me.
clauses, that each demonstrates different features of Damophilus’ character with reference to an earlier statement that concerned his imitation of the Italians in Sicily (34/5.2.34). Therefore, Diodorus’ version notes, through the structure adopted, that Damophilus had an entourage while he travelled about Sicily, he was eager to have handsome slave boys and ill-bred flatterers for followers, and that his efforts toward luxury meant that he surpassed the Persians themselves in arrogance. This difference in structure is important. The Posidonius passage is a self-contained exemplum about Damophilus, detailing briefly his lifestyle and personal vices, and linking them directly with his demise: it perhaps prefaced a longer narrative. For Diodorus, on the other hand, it is merely a stylised method of developing Damophilus’ character toward becoming the paradigm of bad slave treatment it fulfils in the narrative. Regardless of the function of the passage in Posidonius, however, it remains that if Diodorus did take the passage from Posidonius he has, at the very least, slightly redrafted it, altered its structure, and placed it into the middle of his narrative. And even if Posidonius also placed the passage into the middle of his narrative, Diodorus has nonetheless altered its purpose: the internal structure of the passage serves now to develop important facets of Damophilus’ failings, and, in turn, the immediate reference to his death is removed. I suggest from the comparison of the two passages that even if Posidonius was a major source for the rest of Diodorus’ narrative of the Sicilian Insurrection, we can have no guarantees that Diodorus did not adapt what he found to suit his own rhetorical purpose throughout his narrative. Nor could we distinguish between any postulated Diodoran and Posidonian emphasis in the text where we have only Diodorus’ text surviving, as changes to emphasis can noticeably alter the drive of a passage, such as the one above, in which it is possible that Diodorus has indeed preserved most of the vocabulary of his potential source. Finally, we cannot rely on Diodorus preserving the overall structure of any potential author on which he was basing his narrative: although we cannot define for certain

394 I personally see little reason to doubt this, but as this longer narrative does not exist it is not useful to speculate on its nature.
395 Chaplin (2000), 71-2, noted that exempla were rhetorical devices in a narrative, and therefore were malleable, dependent upon the purpose they served in the narrative. In this context, we can see that Diodorus was utilising this malleability of exempla in order to fit a new purpose: indeed this suggests even more so that we cannot assume that Diodorus, if he used Posidonius for this passage, represents Posidonius faithfully if his use of Posidonius was subject to alteration to suit a new purpose.
how Posidonius was utilising the Damophilus *exemplum*, it does not appear to be integrated into the centre of a narrative as Diodorus has done.

**III. Conclusion**

To sum up. I think that we ought to adopt a more subtle approach to Diodorus’ working method. For while it is likely, although by no means certain, that Diodorus used Posidonius for his description of at least some of the vices of Damophilus, this does not preclude his use of other sources.\(^{396}\) Can we rule that Diodorus’ own revision of his sources did not inevitably alter them in fundamental ways in any case? Bosworth (2003: 194) argued that secondary historians did not invent facts themselves to embellish their works, but provided the interpretation and framework in which the details they pulled from their sources were interpreted in order to create a new picture. He writes (2003: 194): ‘(s)election was part of the creative process. When faced with a multiplicity of sources, a historian would opt for the treatment most conducive to exemplary moralizing, and the same episode could be shaped to convey very different messages.’ We cannot be sure of the ultimate source or sources for Diodorus’ factual information regarding the Sicilian Insurrection, even if Posidonius was perhaps one of them; and we cannot be certain of where one source stops and another starts in the narrative, including where Diodorus himself started and stopped altering. In the case of the Damophilus episode, the differences evident in the narrative threads of the two surviving texts – i.e. in Posidonius and in Diodorus – show a distinct difference in historical use: where we do not have the two texts to compare, we cannot be certain of the extent of this interplay. And this plays both ways: we also cannot be certain of where the shaping and structure of the narrative reflects Diodorus’ vision, and where it is merely taken from his source. Therefore the most fruitful way ahead is not to focus above all else on Diodorus’ source for the information concerning the different events for which he provides the only surviving text, but to try to understand how the text as we have it displays the information and what kind of stories it tells.

\(^{396}\) Several sources have been postulated, including local Sicilian sources, Caecilius Rufus and the annals of L. Calpurnius Piso. See also no. 382 above.
Appendix 7: King Antiochus' Title in Diodorus

Ὅτι ὁ τῶν ἀποστατῶν βασιλεὼς Εὐνοὺς ἔαντον μὲν Ἀντίοχον, Σύρους δὲ τῶν ἀποστατῶν τὸ πλῆθος ἐπωνύμασεν. (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.24)

Eunus, the king of the rebels, named himself Antiochus, and the multitude of rebels Syrians.

Ὁ Ἀχαίος ὁ τοῦ βασιλέως Ἀντίοχου σύμβουλος τοῖς πραττομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν δραπετῶν οὐκ εὐφρεστούμενος ἐπετίμη τε τοῖς τολμομένοις ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν καὶ μᾶλλα θρασσοῦς προήλεγεν ὅτι συντόμως τεῦξονται τιμωρίας. ὡς ὁ Ἐὐνοὺς παρρησιαζόμενον τοσοῦτον ἀπέσχη τῷ θανάτῳ περιβαλέν ὡστε οὐ μόνον ἐδοκήσατο τὴν τῶν δεσποτῶν οἰκίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ σύμβουλον ἐποιήσατο. (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.42)

Achaeus, the counsellor of King Antiochus, not being well pleased with the accomplishments of the runaways both censured them for the things undertaken by them, and very boldly proclaimed that they would meet with speedy retribution. Eunus was so far from putting him to death for his outspokenness that he not only presented him with the house of his masters, but even made him a counsellor.

Introduction

Eunus’ title once king, Antiochus, is mentioned only twice in the literary source tradition, and both times in Diodorus: the epitome of Photius and the excerpts of Constantine Porphyrogenitus both mention the title once respectively, but it is unlikely that these mentions are from a verbatim transmission of Diodorus. Acknowledging this peculiarity in the communication of Diodorus’ text does, however, cause problems for the attribution of the coinage of King Antiochus to Eunus and the Sicilian Insurrection, if the only connections in the literary tradition come in the Byzantine period. For this reason, a careful analysis of the two passages is important in order to assess if this problem is insurmountable or not.

I. The Passages

I.i. The First Passage

At the end of his preservation of Diodorus’ 34th book, Photius adds a single line to conclude the whole episode: he adds that Eunus ἔαντον μὲν Ἀντίοχον, Σύρους δὲ τῶν ἀποστατῶν τὸ πλῆθος ἐπωνύμασεν, ‘named himself Antiochus, and the multitude
of rebels Syrians' \footnote{The reference to the naming of the other slaves as Syrians has been dealt with elsewhere: see Chapter I.1, no. 73.} In the run of the narrative this line is unconnected to anything that had come before, and indeed comes after Eunus himself had died. The placement of the line, its disconnection from the rest of the narrative, and the presence of ὄτι to introduce the line would seem to suggest that this is a gloss added by Photius in order to provide additional information that he thought would be helpful for the preceding narrative. This hypothesis may be corroborated by the fact that this use of ὄτι was only the second time that Photius used the introductory expression in his whole retention of Diodorus’ narrative. For the moment I do not want to comment on whether this information came from outside of Diodorus or not, but I think it is clear that Photius was not copying directly from the run of Diodorus’ narrative.

\textit{l.ii. The Second Passage}

The second passage is rather clearer than the first. In a brief passage, mirrored in a very short notice in the Photian version (34/5.2.16), the Constantinian excerpt records the unexpected raising of a man named Achaeus to the rank of counsellor after he criticised the rebels for their excesses. The oddity lies in the fact, noted by Walton (1967: 87) in the Loeb edition, that the excerptor records Achaeus’ position as ὁ τοῦ βασιλέως Ἀντιόχου σύμβουλος, ‘the counsellor of King Antiochus’ at the start of the narrative passage in which he gains the title. It would seem clear that, as the whole purpose of the passage relies on the fact that Achaeus’ fate is unexpected, this inclusion of his future title at the start of the passage is an addition by the excerptor. What is unusual is that he uses the title of King Antiochus when referring to Achaeus at this point, when the passage itself refers to King Antiochus as Eunus. It would appear on first sight that both references to King Antiochus belong to the work of the excerptors, and do not belong to Diodorus’ text. But there are other issues to be considered.

\textit{II. King Antiochus’ Title}
First, these two additions suggest that in the Byzantine period there was an accepted version in which Eunus took the title of King Antiochus on becoming king. The source of this information, however, is not clear. No other source for the conflict records his name as anything other than Eunus. This alone is not evidence enough to link King Antiochus with Eunus. We must look again at the coinage to assess their provenance. For this assessment, owing to the fact that the coinage of King Antiochus is almost entirely held in private collections in Sicily (either the collection of Cammarata or Bruno; see Manganaro 2000: Plates 85-8), I am reliant in some cases on the opinions of Manganaro and Robinson for the likely provenance.

Robinson noted as early as 1920 (175) that the coin held in the British Museum (Figure KA4a), which was once attributed by Professor Percy Gardner to the uncertain section of the Syrian series in the British Museum, and was acquired in 1868 along with one hundred and eighty other Sicilian coins, was most likely Sicilian for reasons of ‘…style…the epigraphy with its round sigma, and the fabric, which lacks the characteristic bevelled edge of Syria’. He furthered this suggestion by noting that as the coin was bought in a collection that was entirely from Lipari or Sicily, it was ‘…humanly speaking, certain that this coin also was found in the Western Mediterranean’. His views were built upon by Manganaro (1982: 237), who argued that the coin (Figure KA2f) ‘…non può essere identificato con alcuno degli omonimi dinasti di Siria, la monetazione bronzea dei quali si rivela diversa per merallo, tecnica, tipologia e soprattutto per i caratteri epigrafici della leggenda, ignorando l’uso delle lettere lunate.’ The majority of the coins are held in the collection of Cammarata (Figures KA2a-g; KA3a; KA4c), which Manganaro claimed was formed and composed from (239) ‘l’area locale’, and the two from the collection of Bruno (Figures KA2h-i), put together by Bruno’s uncle, are part of a collection that Manganaro described (1990a: 418) as ‘…una vecchia collezione formata dallo zio Restivo Navarra a Enna’. We might reasonably claim that the majority of the coinage of King Antiochus (fourteen out of fifteen specimens: 93.33%) was found in Sicily: while few of these provenances are firmly

---

398 The remaining example of the coin type here given as Figure KA4 which I have not discussed yet, KA4b, is in the collection of the Museum of Syracuse, and came, according to De Agostino (1939), 85, ‘dalle Collezione del farmacista Vetri di Enna’.
accountable, the overwhelming trend is toward a Sicilian find spot for nearly all the examples.

To these logistical considerations we must add the conclusions drawn in Chapter I about the significance of the imagery of the coinage. There I argued that the imagery connected strongly to a cultural and historical context of eastern Sicily, and was most explicable in that context. Robinson (1920: 175) saw that the imagery of the coin here given as Figure KA4a was ‘essentially Sicilian in character’, and that its types were ‘most uncommon in the Seleucid series’. With due deliberation given to their most likely find sites (and we ought to note that at least three of the specimens were found in and around Enna itself: Figures KA2h-i and KA4b), and their strongly focussed imagery, it would certainly seem very likely that the authority under which the various coins were produced, a King Antiochus, was based in Sicily. Furthermore, Bussi (1998: 24-5) noted that this coinage of King Antiochus was produced on the same weight system as that used across the island in the second century B.C., which was matched to that of Rome. This, I suggest, shows that the coinage was not only likely to have originated in Sicily, but also dated after or during the influx of Roman coinage into Sicily; this, as I have shown in Chapter I, took place in the second century B.C.

III. Coins and Texts

We are left, then, with the following position: in Sicily, after the Roman reorganisation of the island subsequent to the siege of Syracuse, a man called King Antiochus produced a bronze coinage that was stylistically and ideologically tied to eastern Sicily. The mere presence of a Hellenistic monarch in Sicily in this period would force us to question his relationship with Rome, considering the typical fate of Hellenistic monarchs who attempted to set up kingdoms in areas reorganised by Rome.\footnote{The most pertinent example here would be Andriscus’ short-lived kingship in Macedonia; see Poly. 36.10; Diod. Sic. 31.40a, 32.15; Zonar. 9.28; Liv. Per. 48-50.} With full acknowledgement of the potential circularity of the argument, the only man in ancient Sicilian history who we know became king, and yet of whose
title as king we are not aware, is Eunus.\footnote{400} it follows that if we were to connect King Antiochus with anyone in Sicily at this time, it would have to be Eunus.\footnote{401} The issue of why the title King Antiochus does not appear in the literary sources, while still an important question, is not, I think, one we can conclusively answer.

The answer could well rest, for example, on issues of the biases of either Diodorus or Posidonius: Sacks (1990: 151-3) argued for a strong bias in favour of Rome in Posidonius, which could then explain why the title of a man who represented a movement against Rome was repressed. Taken further, this could also explain, if Posidonius was Livy’s source for the Sicilian Insurrection, why the title is not present in Livy, or his derivatives. It is equally possible that Diodorus did in fact mention the title, but in a passage that has now either been compressed, or ignored by the excerptors. For example Photius provides us with the following passage, which could have been compressed to miss out the detail of a regal title at any point in the passage (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.16):

\begin{quote}
περιθέμενος δὲ διάδημα καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλλα τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν βασιλικῶς διακοσμήσας τὸν τὲ συμβιώσαν αὐτῷ, Σώραν καὶ συμπολίτιν υόσαν, βασίλεσαν ἀποδείξας συνέδρους τὲ τοὺς συνέσθε δοκοῦντας διαφέρειν ποιησάμενος, ὃν ἦν Ἀχαῖος καὶ τοῦνόμα καὶ τὸ γένος, ἀνήρ καὶ βουλὴ καὶ χειρὶ διαφέρουν
\end{quote}

After putting on a diadem and arraying his surroundings in a kingly manner, and having proclaimed his wife, who was Syrian and from the same city, Queen, he appointed a council of men who seemed to excel in intelligence, among whom was Achaeus, Achaeus (both in name and birth) a man who excelled in both planning and deeds.

In any case, as I have stated already, it would seem, from the inclusion of the title by the Byzantine excerptors that in that period there was a version in which Eunus took the title King Antiochus on assuming the kingship. There is also considerable evidence to place King Antiochus in Sicily during the second century B.C. owing to his coinage, and if we accept this then we are left with few episodes of Sicilian history to which we can attach him. The only event that was both chronologically

\footnote{400} If we accept the arguments above that the use of the title King Antiochus come from the excerptors, and not Diodorus.
\footnote{401} Regardless of whether this connection is still valid, it would remain nonetheless the case that in Sicily, during the second century B.C., a Greek king arose, and appeared to be making an effort to unite the people of Sicily under his cause.
and geographically similar to the apparent area of King Antiochus’ influence was the Sicilian Insurrection, which centred on Enna under the command of Eunus.
Appendix 8: The Elogium of Polla

...I built the road from Rhegium to Capua and on that road I put all the bridges, milestones, and signposts. From here it is 51 miles to Nuceria, 84 to Capua, 74 to Muranum, 123 to Cosentia, 180 to Valentia, 231 to the statue at the Straits, and 237 to Rhegium; total from Capua to Rhegium 321 miles. I also as praetor in Sicily hunted down and returned 917 runaway slaves to their Italici owners. Further, I was the first one to make shepherds withdraw from public land in favour of ploughmen. I built the forum and public buildings here.402

The elogium from Polla in Vallo di Diano in Lucania has been known since the fifteenth century, and is currently part of a monument on the road to Polla, from which it derives its name (Carlsen 2010: 304). The text records the actions of a man, presumably consul when erecting the inscription – although the line recording this, and his name, is lost. He constructed a road from Capua to Rhegium, captured and returned 917 runaway slaves to their Italici owners, effected some form of land reform, and finally built a forum and other public buildings on the site where the inscription was originally erected.

Owing to the missing first line, it is entirely unclear who was responsible for this monument. Briefly, the two favoured candidates are P. Popillius Laenas (cos.

402 CIL X 6950 = ILS 23 = ILLRP 454. The translation is taken from Carlsen (2010), 304.
132 B.C.) and T. Annius Rufus (cos. 128 B.C.), although Ap. Claudius Pulcher (cos. 143 B.C.) has also been suggested in the past. Brennan (2000: 153) has noted that it is likely that if the identification with T. Annius Rufus is correct, then he would have been praetor in Sicily in 131 B.C., since it is unlikely that he would have neglected to mention his achievements in fighting in that conflict had he actually done so. Moreover, this would make T. Annius Rufus the annual successor of P. Rupilius. T. Annius Rufus could then have been pro. pr. in 130 and perhaps also 129 B.C. while he carried out the road construction noted in the elogium. If on the other hand the author of the inscription is Ap. Claudius Pulcher, then the runaway slaves and their Italici owners are not relevant to the Sicilian Insurrection. However, if the author was P. Popillius Laenas, or more likely T. Annius Rufus, then we need to address what effect this evidence has on the argument put forward in Chapter I regarding the Sicilian Insurrection.

The inscription has been adduced as evidence against the argument that the Sicilian Insurrection has more to do with Sicilian revolt than slavery. In the CAH^2 IX, Lintott argued that (27)

\[\ldots\text{we have the unimpeachable evidence of a contemporary inscription, in which the magistrate operating in Italy and Sicily at the end of the first revolt claims to have rounded up and returned to their masters 917 runaway slaves of Italian owners. The success of the slaves in Sicily would have been a magnet for those working with herds or on the land in south Italy.}\]

---

For an overview of the various identifications see Brennan (2000), 152-3. Mommsen (CIL V 935) argued for P. Popillius Laenas, and placed him as praetor in Sicily in 135 B.C. and was followed in this, initially, by Broughton (MRR I), 489. However, later Broughton (MRR III), 169, corrected himself and favoured the identification with T. Annius Rufus. This was first argued by Wiseman (1987), 99-125, from a milestone found at Vibo Valentia inscribed with ‘T. Annius T.f. pr.’ (ILLRP 454a). This led Wiseman (1987), 123-5, to argue that Annius helped to pacify Sicily after the end of Sicilian Insurrection and then, Wiseman argued, as part of his Sicilian provincia, built the road in southern Italy and rounded up the runaway slaves.

Verbrugghe (1973), followed by Gordon (1983), 88. Verbrugghe’s argument hinged on the Sicilian Insurrection starting as early as 138 B.C. – which is not correct – and that it was highly unlikely, in his opinion, that runaway slaves captured during or just after the revolt would have escaped crucifixion (32): ‘(i)t is very difficult to believe that they did not participate in the rebellion if they were captured in 131. And if they did participate, they surely then would have been crucified.’ This is not a very persuasive analysis, even if the events in question had been, uncomplicatedly, a slave revolt.
A similar judgement can be found in Brennan’s otherwise excellent analysis of the *elogium*. He argued that it was logical for the Sicilian praetor’s *provincia* to extend into southern Italy, since (2000: 152)

Lucania and Bruttium...served as a likely place of refuge for the rebel slaves, once defeated. This is where the praetor T. Annius must have rounded up most of his nine-hundred-odd fugitives – and there their owners, the “Italici,” lived.

However, there is no reason to think, *a priori*, that the presence of slaves turns any event into a slave revolt (see Appendix 9: Slaves in Ancient Warfare). Moreover, whilst some of those defeated in the Sicilian Insurrection may have fled across to Italy, it is equally likely that these 917 runaways had, rather than taken part in the Insurrection, merely taken the opportunity it presented to escape their servitude in the disorder. It is not, on this interpretation, that important who the *Italici* actually were, either Italians resident in Sicily, or Italians resident in Italy: refuge in flight was not uncommon in times of uncertainty and war, and we assume too much if we argue that these 917 runaways *must* have been part of the Sicilian Insurrection. We could therefore take the *elogium* cautiously as evidence that, regardless of the precise date, mid second century B.C., Sicily faced enough troubles and strife for slaves to abscond themselves from their masters (which, for all we know, may have been a typical feature of slavery in Roman times). Moreover, the *elogium* is evidence for the pressing need of a road through Lucania and Bruttium which would improve communications with Sicily and aid – incidentally as it were – in the suppression of the troubles that enabled slaves to abscond in such numbers.

---

405 Wiseman (1987), 124, first suggested this interpretation of the *elogium*. 
Appendix 9: Slaves in Ancient Warfare

Introduction

The practice of freeing slaves to fight during times of war had a long history in the ancient world, and indeed extended into the modern world (see, for example, the papers collected in Brown and Morgan 2006). The purpose of this appendix is to illustrate this practice. I have divided the lists below, somewhat artificially, into examples for this practice from the Greek and Roman worlds. These lists are by no means exhaustive, but provide a good survey of some of the more important examples. It is clear from the examples listed below that the freeing of slaves to fight in ancient conflicts was a regular occurrence, and that the presence of slaves and ex-slaves fighting in a conflict on either side does not constitute evidence for the identification of a war or rebellion as a ‘slave war’ or ‘slave rebellion’.

I. The Greek World

The earliest examples come from the Persian Wars: at the battle of Marathon, Pausanias records the grave of the slaves who fought for the Athenians (1.32.5); at Thermopylae, helots fought alongside the Spartans in the battle (Herod. 8.25.2) as well as at Plataea (Herod. 9.10.1, 28.2, 29.1); Hunt (1998: 40) has argued that slaves must have rowed in the fleets at the battle of Salamis as certain references in the ancient texts refer to crews on the ships being only partly free, and moving into the Peloponnesian War there is evidence from Thucydides that slaves were regularly used in non-Athenian navies (Thuc. 1.55.1; 2.103.1; 8.15.2, 84.2). Staying with the Peloponnesian War: Brasidas fought alongside 700 Helots (Thuc. 4.80.5, 78.1); elsewhere Thucydides records 2000 helots serving in the Spartan army (4.80.3); at the siege of Syracuse a relief force was sent under Gylippus that also included 600 Helots (Thuc. 7.19.3, 58.3); finally, Athens is well recorded as freeing slaves in order to man its fleet before the battle of Aegospotami (Xen. Hell. 1.6.24; Ar. Ran. 693-4 with schol. 694; IG i³ 1032). In other conflicts there are further examples of the practice of freeing slaves to fight: Dionysius I manned 60 ships with freed slaves.
(Diod. Sic. 14.58.1); in 305/4 the Rhodians bought and freed slaves to fight during a siege (Diod. Sic. 20.84.3); the Achaeans also freed 12,000 slaves in order to resist Rome (Poly. 38.15.3; Paus. 7.15.7).

II. The Roman World

In the Roman world there are a large number of examples from the late republican period: Catiline was accused of inciting slaves to join him during his uprising (Cic. Cat. 42.1-2; 46.3); Caesar accused Pompey of using slave herdsmen as cavalry during the civil war (Caes. B Civ. 1.24). Moving beyond mere accusations of inciting slaves: the Pompeian leaders in the civil war drafted slaves into the new legions raised in 47 B.C. (App. B Afr. 19.3, 20.4, 35.4 and 6, 36.1, 88.1); Cn. Pompeius also formed a legion from natives and slaves while in Spain (App. B Hisp. 7.4, 35.4); Cicero claimed that Anthony drew soldiers from the ergastula after Mutina (Fam. 11.10.3); Sex. Pompeius and Octavian freed slaves to fight for them or to man their fleets (Sex. Pompeius’ fleets: App. B Civ. 5.131; Dio 48.19.4; 49.12.4; Oros. 6.18; RG 25.1; Sex. Pompeius’ legions: App. B Civ. 4.85; Vel. Pat. 2.73; Dio 49.12.4; Augustus’ fleets: Dio 48.49.1; Suet. DA 16.1.). In earlier history C. Graccus and F. Flaccus tried to free slaves to defend themselves against the senate in Rome (App. B Civ. 1.26) and after the battle of Cannae the Romans formed two legions from slaves who had just been manumitted (Liv. 22.57). Towards the end of the Social War, Q. Pompaedius Silo freed and armed 20,000 slaves for infantry, and 1000 for cavalry (Diod. Sic. 37.2.9). According to Florus (2.9.11), Marius freed and armed slaves and convicts on returning to Italy in 87 B.C. In the imperial period we have one reference in Tacitus to Otho having freed gladiators to fight for him (Hist. 2.11). This passage is particularly interesting because Tacitus also recorded that this was a means resorted to by even strict generals in civil war, indicating that it was a typical practice otherwise.
Appendix 10: The Definition of a Slave War

Introduction

What is a ‘slave war’? Among the modern works on ancient slavery, and especially among those that discuss ‘slave wars’ exclusively, this question has been answered often, but always without any conscious acknowledgement of the question. The answer to the question, in each modern work, lies in the choices made by the author of what material to include and what interpretive framework to choose in which to analyse the material. The purpose here will be to reassess what answers have been given to the question, and in turn to examine the suppositions and assumptions that underlie these answers. This study will be limited to two select ancient case studies (the war against Aristonicus in Asia Minor and the uprising of T. Vettius near Capua in the late second century B.C.) which have been included in two influential works as ‘slave wars’: that of Urbainczyk (2008a) on ‘slave wars’ specifically, and that of Vogt (1965), in his study of structure of ‘slave wars’. Although different from one another in approach, these studies have been chosen because they are characteristic of the modern take to the study of ancient slave revolts.

I. ‘Slave Wars’

I.i. The Ancients’ View

As I noted in Chapter III.3, ancient authors were not altogether scientific when describing the underlying causes of conflicts or events. In particular, their definition

---

406 Throughout this appendix the term ‘slave war’ will be used as synonymous of ‘slave rebellion’ and ‘slave revolt’ (‘Sklavenaufstände’ and ‘guerre servili’ in German and Italian respectively), as these terms are used essentially interchangeably in modern scholarship.

407 Other authors have mentioned one or either of the conflicts, but to avoid excessive length the survey here will focus on only these two authors. The others include: Pareti (1927), 65; Rubinsohn (1982), 446-7; Vavrinek (1975), 109-29; Manganaro (1980), 440; Bradley (1989), 72-3, 78, 123; Hermann-Otto (2009), 129; Strauss (2010), 192. The notable exception to the general reticence to discuss what might be defined as a ‘slave war’ is Rubinsohn’s discussion, (1982), 443 n. 28. There he engaged with the definition, suggesting that the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War ought not be termed a ‘slave revolt’ because ‘the movements are not purely servile in origin or in objectives pursued.’ He noted that this definition did not necessitate a denial that the ‘majority of the participants were slaves de iure’, and in this respect he demonstrated, in a sense, his own definition of a ‘slave war’: a movement that is purely servile in origin and perhaps also objectives pursued, and one largely made up of servile participants.
of what constituted a ‘slave war’ could be decidedly imprecise, encompassing events that had causes and roots that went far beyond, or in some cases had nothing to do with, slavery as an issue. The first example I want to discuss, the conflict with Aristonicus in general was regarded in ancient literary accounts as a dynastic war, and not as a ‘slave war’. Nonetheless, not only has the conflict with Aristonicus been discussed by Urbainczyk (2008a; 2008b) and Hermann-Otto (2009) among ‘slave wars’, but the ancient sources for the war were also included in Yavetz’s 1988 source-book for ancient ‘slave wars’. This then begs the question: if the ancient sources are generally clear that Aristonicus’ war with Rome was not about slavery, why has it become part of the modern discourse on the subject? The answer lies with two passages from two ancient authors: Diodorus Siculus and Strabo. Together the two authors focus in different ways on the slave element of Aristonicus’ support, and this in turn has led to a confusion of their importance in the modern literature. For example, Diodorus, in his introduction to the Sicilian Insurrection, made a connection between the two events (34/5.2.26):

τὸ παραπλήσιον δὲ γέγονε καὶ κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν κατὰ τοὺς αὐτούς καρυούς, Ἀριστονίκου μὲν ἀντιποιησαμένου τῆς μὴ προσηκοῦσης βασιλείας, τὸν δὲ δούλων διὰ τὰς ἐκ τῶν δεσποτῶν κακοκυρίας συναποιησαμένων ἐκείνῳ καὶ μεγάλοις ἀντυχήμασι πολλὰς πόλεις περιβαλόντων.

A similar thing [to the Sicilian Insurrection] happened in Asia during the same period, when Aristonicus laid claim to a kingdom that did not belong to him, and the slaves, because of mistreatment by their masters, shared in this man’s folly and encompassed many cities in great misfortunes.

Strabo also stressed a servile element in Aristonicus’ followers, albeit in a rather different fashion. He related the actions of Aristonicus as seemingly drawing in disenchanted free followers and slaves with promises of freedom for the slaves and something (that is not specified) for the free (14.1.38):

Μετὰ δὲ Σμύρναν αἰ Λεδκαι πολίχνιν, δ ἀπέστη σεν Αριστόνικος μετὰ τὴν Αττιάλου τοῦ ψυχομήτορος τελευτῆτι, δοκῶν τοῦ γένους εἶναι τοῦ τῶν βασιλέων καὶ

408 All the following authors present the conflict as just a war: Just. Epit. 36.4.5-12, 37.1.1-3; Sall. His. 4.69.8-9; Cic. Phil. 11.8.18; Lælius, De Amicitia 11.37; Livy, Per. 59; Oros. 5.10.1-5; Eutr. 4.8.21-9, 4.9.1-23; Val. Max. 3.2.12; Vel. Pat. 2.4.1; Plut. Vit. Flam. 21.6; Flor. 1.35.1-7. This body of evidence led Kim (1988), 163, to conclude that ‘Aristonicus’ dynastic claim was the most fundamental element throughout his movement.’
After Smyrna one comes to Leucae, a small town, which after the death of Attalus Philometor was caused to revolt by Aristonicus, who was reputed to belong to the royal family and intended to usurp the kingdom. Now he was banished from Smyrna, after being defeated in a naval battle near the Cymaean territory by the Ephesians, but he went up into the interior and quickly assembled a large number of resourceless people, and also of slaves, invited with a promise of freedom, whom he called Heliopolitae. Now he first fell upon Thyateira unexpectedly, and then got possession of Apollonis, and then set his efforts against the interior and quickly assembled a large number of resourceless people, and also of slaves, and sees a relationship between the two events he is discussing. In fact, it is clear from all the evidence that Aristonicus’ turning to the slaves for supporters was out of desperation, and even in Diodorus there is no indication, pace Urbainczyk (2008a: 16), that the slaves involved had already revolted before joining Aristonicus: taking into account the evidence of Strabo above it would seem more sensible to err on the side of caution in this respect, and leave the
active role to Aristonicus in recruiting the slaves. In short, if we are prepared to look beyond the presence of slaves and the spectre of a ‘slave war’, the passages in question make at least as much, if not more sense. So much for Aristonicus: the vast majority of our ancient sources view his uprising as a dynastic dispute, but as we will see below, this has not prevented modern scholarship from focussing on the two passages that actually stress the servile elements under Aristonicus.

The second example, that of T. Vettius’ uprising, is at first glance less complex in how it is presented by the only source to record it, Diodorus Siculus: he appears to present it uncomplicatedly as a ‘slave war’. This has led to the event’s smooth absorption into the chronicle of ancient ‘slave wars’ in the modern accounts. On closer inspection, however, it seems that we cannot be so certain of this supposition. The event is one of the few that is recorded by both Photius and in the Constantinian excerpts throughout the narrative of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War (36.2 and 2a). It is necessary to look at several aspects individually to unpack fully how Diodorus is presenting the conflict, starting with how it is introduced (36.2.1-2 and 2a.1):

Πρὸ δὲ τῆς κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν τῶν δούλων ἐπαναστάσεως ἐγένοντο κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν πλείος ἀποστάσεις ὀλιγοχρόνιοι καὶ μικραὶ, καθάπερ τοῦ δαίμονος προσημαίνοντο τὸ μέγεθος τῆς ἐσομένης κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν ἐπαναστάσεως, πρῶτες μὲν ἡ περὶ Νουκερίαν, τριάκοντα οἰκετῶν συνεμοσίαν ποιημένοι καὶ ταχὺ κολασθέντων, δευτέρα ἡ περὶ τῆν Καποῦν, διακοσίων οἰκετῶν ἐπαναστάντων καὶ ταχυ καταλυθέντων.

τρίτη δὲ παράδοξος γέγονε τις ἦν Τίτος Μενούίτιος, ἵππεως μὲν ὶῬωμαίων, μεγαλοπλοῦτον δὲ πατρὸς παῖς, οὗτος ἤρασθη θεραπανίδος ἄλλοτριας κάλλει διαφερούσης.

Before the uprising of slaves in Sicily there occurred in Italy several short lived and minor revolts, as if the divine were announcing the magnitude of the coming uprising in Sicily. The first was in Nuceria, where thirty slaves formed a conspiracy and were quickly punished, the second was in Capua, where two hundred slaves rose up and were quickly put down.

409 It is perfectly possible that, as Diodorus suggest (34/5.2.26), the slaves were being abused by their masters and therefore were eager to join Aristonicus, but it does not follow from the passage that they had already chosen to revolt separately.
The third one was contrary to all expectations. There was a man Titus Minucius, a Roman knight, the son of an exceedingly wealthy father. He conceived a passion for a beautiful slave girl owned by another.

'Ὅτι πολλαὶ ἐπαναστάσεις ἐγένοντο οἰκετῶν· πρώτη μὲν ἢ περὶ τὴν Νουκιαρίαν, τριήμερον οἰκετῶν συννομίσαν ποιησμένων καὶ ταχὺ κολασθέντων, δεύτερα δὲ ἢ περὶ τὴν Καπηλήν, διακοσίων οἰκετῶν ἐπαναστάντων καὶ ταχὺ κολασθέντων'

τρίτη δὲ ἀπόστασις ἐγένετο παράδοξος καὶ πολὺ τὰς εἰθισμένας διαλύττονσα. ἂν γὰρ τις Τίτος μὲν οὐετίος, ἰππεῖς δὲ Ῥομαιῶν, ὃς ἔχειν πατέρα μεγαλύπλοιτον καὶ νέος δὲν παντελῶς ἐἰς ἐπιθυμίαν ἤλθεν ἀλλοτρίας θεραπανίδος κάλλει διαφεροῦσης.

There were many uprisings of slaves: the first was in Nuceria, where thirty slaves formed a conspiracy and were quickly punished, the second was in Capua, where two hundred slaves rose up and were quickly punished.

The third revolt was contrary to all expectations and very different from the normal. For there was a certain Titus Vettius, a Roman knight, who had an exceedingly wealthy father, and being a very young man he had a desire for a very beautiful slave girl owned by another.

Now, with the exception at the start of the Constantinian excerpt, discussed in note 412, which would imply that these conflicts were clearly regarded as slave revolts, Diodorus is merely including these three ἀποστάσεις, ‘revolts’, as a prelude or divine pronouncement of the coming Sicilian revolt, not as independent examples of ‘slave wars’. It is undeniable that the first two revolts are to do with issues of slavery, but for the third, as we will see, this is not so clear. The narrative of the third revolt continues as follows (36.2.2-6).


411 Every other reference in the Photius and the Constantinian excerpts is to Titus Vettius, or Oὐετίος, so somewhere there is a textual error, probably in this passage.

412 This much shorter introductory sentence, which is reflected in the Photian version with a much longer lead up to the list of revolts, would appear to indicate the work of the excerptor giving at least some context to the following text. The difficulty is with the inclusion of οἰκετῆς in the opening, which is not mirrored in the Photian version. It would appear from the Photian version that Diodorus himself did not call these events ‘slave revolts’ directly, but implied as such from his narrative: this is not the case with the Constantinian excerpt above which leaves no room for interpretation of the matter.

413 There is a parallel version for the first section in the Constantinian excerpts (36.2a.1), but as it only adds circumstantial detail, and does not record the whole event, I will be using the Photian version for the following discussion, and will draw on the Constantinian excerpt only when it would illustrate a salient point. I have also slightly abridged the narrative in order to cut out unnecessary details, and to focus on the important features of the narrative for the purpose here.
The drive for the revolt throughout the narrative is the passion and madness of T. Vettius. Where slavery comes into the story it is either as the cause of his madness – and indeed in the Constantinian excerpt (36.2a.1), seen in a metaphorical sense
Iii. The Modern View

As I outlined above, this overview will be limited to two modern accounts. For both, I wish to demonstrate the ways in which they discuss the two ancient episodes, to show that it is their focus, and not the evidence of the ancient sources, that forces the stress onto the servile element in the events. Furthermore, this analysis will demonstrate that neither author is clear on what they conceive of as a ‘slave war’, and so incorporate events that ought to fall outwith the remit of their discussion.

Vogt (1965: 20) opened his discussion Zur Struktur der antiken Sklavenkriege with a comment on the unusual fact that all ‘die großen Sklavenaufstände’ in the ancient world happened between 140 and 70 B.C. He followed this statement with a list of the ‘Sklavenaufstände’ that he had in mind: ‘der erste sizilische Aufstand (136/5-132), die Erhebung des Aristonikos in Asien (133-129), der zweite sizilische Aufstand (104-100), der Krieg des Spartakus (73-71).’ As he then proceeded to discuss the different structures of the ‘slave revolts’ he had chosen, Vogt devoted considerable space to Aristonicus (31-3, 43-5, 48). What is

414 Urbainczyk (2008a), 17, describes Diodorus’ account as ‘…a rather unconvincing tale of a love-sick individual…’
unusual in his treatment of Aristonicus is that he did not appear to consider it important for slaves to have had an active role in the conflict in order for it to be considered a ‘slave war’, going so far as to say that (33)

(f)ür uns bleiben die aufständischen Sklaven Asiens stumme Werkzeuge eines Prätendenten...

It might seem surprising, then, that he included Aristonicus at all in a list of ‘slave wars’. But throughout his description of Aristonicus’ uprising, Vogt focused on either Aristonicus’ integration of disparate groups (including slaves; 31-3) or the potential social organisation of his new state (43-5): the latter debate based on the sole reference to the Heliopolitae of Aristonicus in Strabo (14.1.38), who attaches no importance to the term. It seems to be enough that slaves were involved in an event that appeared to speak of social change, because Vogt is clear that the event was, in essence, a dynastic problem that led to a revolutionary instance driven by Aristonicus (31): ‘…von Anfang an also (war) das revolutionäre Geschehen planvoll bestimmt.’

Vogt’s attitude towards the T. Vettius episode is somewhat clearer. While describing the ‘slave revolts’ preceding the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War, Vogt included, without comment, the T. Vettius episode among the (27) ‘Verschwörungen der Unfreien’. Later he noted Lucullus’ success in using treachery to defeat Vettius as an example of slave conspiracies being crushed through betrayal (49). At no point did he consider how the implications of Vettius’ leadership may have affected how we view this event, nor did he stop to question if the motives of the uprising factor into the equation: was slavery at its core, or, as the ancient sources seem to suggest, did it concern a lapse of sanity in one man who then took advantage of those around him to seize power? Without answering these questions Vogt leaves it unclear as to what he considered to be a ‘slave war’: was it merely the involvement of slaves?

Urbainczyk (2008a) discussed Aristonicus in detail in her monograph, Slave Revolts in Antiquity. She stated, for example, that in the accounts of Aristonicus (14) ‘…we are told that the slaves had the support of the free people…’ and furthermore
that (15) ‘Aristonicus...took advantage of an uprising of the slaves and formed an army to resist the Romans.’ Such a sequence of events, however, does not occur in the ancient sources; nor is there any explicit mention of ‘an uprising of the slaves.’ Urbainczyk has derived this reading from a passage of Diodorus (34/5.2.26), as seen above. She interpreted the line τόν δὲ δούλων διά τάς ἐκ τῶν δεσποτῶν κακουχίας συναπονοησαμένων ἐκείνῳ, ‘the slaves, because of mistreatment by their masters, shared in this man’s folly’, as indicating (Urbainczyk 2008: 16) ‘...that the slaves had already rebelled and that these rebels joined forces with Aristonicus.’ She went on to say that the manner in which Diodorus sets out events suggested ‘...not that Aristonicus recruited the slaves because he promised them freedom, but rather they had been badly treated and so joined the revolt.’ Urbainczyk seems to be prioritising her interpretation of Diodorus over Strabo’s evidence in order to infer a ‘slave war’ in the beginning of the conflict. Whilst this could be used as evidence that the conflict reflected more than just a dynastic problem, she also construed that (14) ‘...slaves had the support of free people’. However, the two texts of Diodorus and Strabo are not mutually exclusive in their explanations, and it is entirely possible that the slaves joined willingly because they were poorly treated and offered freedom. Whether or not a ‘slave war’ already took place remains uncertain according to Diodorus. Urbainczyk later commented that (88) ‘[Diodorus] adds that the same thing [as the Sicilian Insurrection] happened in Asia when Aristonicus claimed the kingship’ (my emphasis). However, Diodorus uses the expression (34/5.2.26) τὸ παραπλήσιον δὲ γέγονε, ‘a similar thing happened’, to describe the events in Asia. The specific word παραπλήσιον implies that the two events were not entirely identical; they were comparable but not one and the same.415

Urbainczyk’s view on the purpose behind freeing slaves also remains to be considered. She followed a question posed by Vavrinek (1975: 115):

Was [Aristonicus] a revolutionary leader who, conscious of his purpose, placed himself in command of the revolting slaves, or was the freeing of the slaves merely

---

415 In another article (2008b, 97) Urbainczyk translates τὸ παραπλήσιον δὲ γέγονε as ‘(a)lmost the identical thing’, which would imply that there was little different between the two events: this is not clear from Diodorus’ text, nor does he imply this.
a tactical device which he was forced to employ because he lacked other means of achieving his aims?

Urbainczyk (2008a: 63) concluded that the second option was more probable, but added that we must stress the likely reasons of the slaves for fighting, namely that they wanted to achieve freedom and would have done so by any means possible. However, the freeing of slaves, at times, was a necessary tactic and common practice in the ancient world (see Appendix 9): through his actions Aristonicus becomes no more of a slave leader than Octavian or Sextus Pompeius in the civil wars. It seems as though Urbainczyk’s discussion of Aristonicus’ uprising to some extent overemphasises the servile nature of the event beyond the capacity of the ancient evidence. Her approach to the T. Vettius episode highlights this aspect as well.

Given the problems I have foregrounded with interpreting the T. Vettius episode as a ‘slave war’, Urbainczyk’s (2008a) interpretation remains contentious. Despite acknowledging the role of T. Vettius, she nonetheless describes the event as

…the seeds of yet another uprising of slaves, whatever the motives of the leader. The point is that whatever the intentions of Vettius Minutius, arming so many slaves had consequences far beyond one Roman noble either losing his sense from desire, or trying to escape his debts. One might imagine that such a story developed in order for the Romans to understand for themselves why one of their own took up with slaves.

She also included this episode in a list of ‘slave wars’ that had ended through treachery (17 n. 36), and in this followed Vogt. Her explanation, however, deserves closer attention: the mere act of arming slaves does not necessarily imply a unification of forces. Moreover, the ancient evidence attests to the use of slaves in warfare for a variety of reasons. If, as Urbainczyk urges above, we look beyond the motives concerned in arming slaves and concentrate solely on the act when

416 Elsewhere (2008b, 97-8), Urbainczyk argued that we cannot rule out the development of a desire to abolish slavery in Aristonicus’ fight, in spite the lack of evidence in our ancient sources regarding this wish, stating that ‘(q)uite apart from the consideration that the personal wishes of leaders may not have much influence on the historical course of events, there is also the possibility that ideas evolve over time with changing circumstances.’ Nonetheless, without any evidence to suggest the rise of this idea in Aristonicus’ forces, it seems prudent not to impose the concept from a purely modern perspective.
determining the importance of these events, then we must consider those freeing the slaves as joining them, which creates more problems. Following this rationale, the Second Punic War, the Peloponnesian War and even the civil wars of the Late Roman Republic can be rendered as ‘slave wars’. The extant evidence for the T. Vettius episode does not allow for an interpretation in which he becomes a partisan of rebellious slaves, and it seems problematic to include the event in a list of ‘slave wars’ merely because Diodorus considered it one (Urbainczyk 2008a: 14 n. 23). Never having explicitly defined the term, Urbainczyk seemed to regard any conflict involving slaves collectively as a ‘slave war’. The intentions of those who armed the slaves remain unexplored and her proclivity to emphasize her interpretation of a ‘slave war’ results in a debatable reading of ancient evidence. In order to fully understand the events of Aristonicus and T. Vettius, and determine which incidents correctly fall in a similar category, a more concrete definition of this term is necessary.

In sum, despite never being explicit about her definition of a ‘slave war’, Urbainczyk seemed to regard any conflict involving slaves as a ‘slave war’, whatever the intentions of those arming the slaves. Her focus on ‘slave wars’ led to interpretations of the ancient evidence that can not be supported from the evidence. This, however, is precisely the problem: without a clear definition, we are left questioning the inclusion of certain events incorporated in her study, especially those involving Aristonicus and T. Vettius.

**Conclusion: A New Definition?**

By now it should have become clear that I do not regard the uprising of Aristonicus and the T. Vettius episode as ‘slave wars’. For each there are stronger grounds for viewing the involvement of the slaves to have been purely at the behest of free people, with the slaves benefiting *only* if their free benefactor also succeeded. Furthermore, I have argued elsewhere in this thesis that the Sicilian Insurrection should *also* not be considered a ‘slave war’ for a variety of reasons, despite the strong literary evidence for servile involvement. For each of the conflicts discussed
here, their inclusion among discussion of ‘slave wars’ came from a willingness to foreground wherever possible the inclusion of slaves in the combatants, to the detriment of any other participants. This approach must not be taken, and more care must be given to analysing the purpose of each conflict. If we consider, for example, Aristonicus, then we can see that the slaves’ opportunity to join the revolt was predicated on Aristonicus’ offer to do so: we assume too much if we think that they would have revolted in any case had he not offered.\footnote{The same applies for the T. Vettius episode: without the actions of T. Vettius it is conceivable that his slaves may have revolted, but in the case of his endeavour, their complicity was utterly reliant on his actions. We ought to note that Diodorus does not suggest that all the slaves offered their freedom to fight for Vettius accepted: at 36.2.4 Diodorus notes that Vettius gave arms to those who joined him, but killed those who resisted.} In the Sicilian Insurrection, we have seen that the coinage of King Antiochus was appealing very specifically to the Sicilians of eastern Sicily: even allowing for the presence of slaves in the army of King Antiochus, and I see little reason to doubt their inclusion, it is clear that the Insurrection aimed to rely upon the support of the free, and the legitimacy that would follow from that support. In any case, it is clear that the use of slaves in times of warfare was common in the ancient world (see Appendix 9: Slaves in Ancient Warfare). The aim here is not to provide an all-encompassing definition which will filter out alleged ‘slave wars’ from true slave revolts, but to show that an unwillingness to be open about how or why we discuss these events leads to an over-reliance on the often unreliable views of the ancient authors and the uncritical inclusion of certain events that can in no way be called ‘slave wars’. As a corollary to this, the explanation of these events as ‘slave wars’ leads, in turn, to incorrect contextual evidence being drawn in to the discussion, which, then, in a circular argument, supports their inclusion as ‘slave wars’. A more open analysis of these events will avoid these pitfalls, and allow us a clearer understanding of not only slavery in the ancient world, but also of wider social issues and forms of protest.
Appendix 11: Athenion’s Slingshots

There is a small pool of epigraphic evidence with which we can supplement the narrative of Diodorus for the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War: slingshots. A small number of slingshots bearing Athenion’s name have been found in Sicily (IG 14.2407a-d). Of these, two have no find spots recorded (c and d) and so need not detain us. The other two are recorded as being found near Leontini (b) and in the area of Panormus (a). Their find spots would appear to indicate, then, actions by men under the command of Athenion in the plains of Leontini and at Panormus. Both require some additional attention to assess their significance.

The find spot near Leontini would not appear, on first glance, to be problematic, since the rebels spent a considerable amount of time in the area, and ended up at the shrine of the Palici. Yet, in the chronology of the war in Diodorus, these actions all took place before the joining of the forces under Athenion and Salvius. The slingshot would then appear to give evidence that after the withdrawal by the rebels to Triocala and the subsequent battle at Scirthaea (Diod. Sic. 36.7-8), forces under Athenion fought in the area around Leontini. This action would be best placed in the praetorship of Servilius, when Diodorus recorded that Servilius’ inaction allowed Athenion to plunder freely across the island (36.9.2). The second slingshot, possibly discovered in the area of Panormus, is more difficult to assess. Chronologically it could have been fired at any point, since Athenion was operating at Lilybaeum prior to the move to Triocala, and could have ventured north, following the road round the coast, and then down from Panormus to Triocala by the road between Agrigentum and Panormus. This is, perhaps, a better solution than placing

---

418 Manganaro (1982), 241, and (2000), 131-2, has published a number of other slingshots which seem to relate to Salvius. If we accept his reconstruction of two slingshots in particular (2000), 130 figs 34a-b, which do not appear in IG, then there would also seem to be slingshots bearing Salvius’ royal name, Tryphon, found near the suggested site of Triocala (modern Caltabellotta). Sadly, these slingshots tell us nothing more about the war, merely bearing the inscription ΝΙΚΑ/ΤΡΥΦΩΝΟ/ΝΟC. Furthermore, in IG XIV there are a total of 26 entries recording slingshot finds in Sicily, and these have been variously attributed to the forces either for or against the insurgency based upon their choices of deities or specification of which city and unit thereof the slinger came from (Manganaro 1982: 243; 2000: 130-3; Bradley 1989: 75 no. 14, 80 no. 22; Shaw 2000: 128-9). Without better archaeological contexts, however, we cannot state their date or target. Until this evidence is brought to light, we must restrict ourselves to using only the slingshots that explicitly state their commander.
the fighting at Panormus in the period after Scirthaea if we consider the following. We know from Dio (27.93.4) that Athenion attacked Messana, and this attack ought to be placed after the battle of Scinthaea, unless we want to allow for Athenion moving across the entire island, from Lilybaeum to Messana, before being recalled to Triocala by Salvius. This could then give us an itinerary for Athenion’s movements into the east after Scinthaea, as we have evidence that he fought in the plains of Leontini; I would suggest that this took place on his march to Messana. This demonstrates a rough area for the operations of Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion. In sum, then, Athenion and Salvius were active in an area spreading from Lilybaeum, up to Panormus and across to Messana, and also in an area stretching from north of Heraclea across to Morgantina and Leontini.
Appendix 12: Text and Translation of Diodorus’ Account of the Sicilian Stasis

I. Photian Version and Constantinian Exerpts: Greek Text

(36.1.1) Ὄστι ὑπὸ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους ἐν Ῥώμῃ, καθ’ ὡς Μάριος μὲν τοὺς κατὰ Λιβύην βασιλεῖς Βόκχον καὶ Ἰουγοῦρθαν κατεπολέμησε μεγάλη παρατάξει, καὶ πολλὰς μὲν τῶν Λιβύων μυριάδας ἀνέίλεν, ὡστερὸν δὲ αὐτῶν Ἰουγοῦρθαν συλληφθέντα ὑπὸ Βόκχου, ὡστε τυχεῖν συγγνώμης παρὰ Ρωμαίον ὑπὲρ ᾧ αὐτοῖς κατέστη πρὸς πόλεμον, λαβόν ἐκεῖθεν αἰχμάλωτον εἶχε, μεγίστοις δὲ πταίσμασι τοῖς κατὰ Γαλατίαν τῶν Κίμβρων πολεμοῦντας Ρωμαίοι περιπέπεσον ἡθῶμουν, κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους ἦκὼν τίνες ἀπὸ Σικελίας ἀπόστασιν ἀγγέλλοντος οἰκετῶν εἰς πολλὰς ἀριθμούμενον μυριάδας. οὗ προσαγγελθέντος, ἐν πολλῇ περιστάσει τὸ Ρωμαῖκόν ἦπαν συνεχόμενον διετέλει, ὡς ἄν στρατιωτῶν ἐπιλέκτων σχεδὸν ἐξακισμυρίων ἐν τῷ πρὸς Κίμβρους κατὰ Γαλατίαν πολέμῳ διοικοῦσον, καὶ ἄπόρων ὄντον εἰς ἀποστολὴν στρατιωτῶν λογάδων.

(36.2.1) Πρὸ δὲ τῆς κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν τῶν δούλων ἐπαναστάσεως ἑγένετο κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν πλείους ἀποστάσεις ὁλιγοχρόνοι καὶ μικρά, καθάπερ τοῦ δαμονίου προσημαίνοντος τὸ μέγεθος τῆς ἐσομένης κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν ἐπαναστάσεως, πρώτῃ μὲν ἡ περὶ Νουκείαν, τριάκοντα οἰκετῶν συνωμοσίαν ποιησάμενον καὶ ταχύ κολασθέντων, δευτέρα ἡ περὶ τὴν Κατούν, διακοσίων οἰκετῶν ἐπαναστάτων καὶ ταχύ καταλυθέντων.

(36.2.2) τρίτη δὲ παράδοξος γέγονε τες. ἦν Τίτος Μενουίτιος, ἵππεως μὲν Ρωμαίων, μεγαλοπλούτου δὲ πατρὸς παῖς. οὗτος ἡράσθηθεν θεραπαινίδος ἄλλοτες κάλλει διαφερούσης, συμπλακεῖς δ’ αὐτῇ καὶ εἰς ἔρωτα παράδοξον αὐτῆς ἐμπεσὼν ἐξηγόρασεν αὐτὴν, οὗτο τοῦ τε μανιώδους ἔρωτος βιαζομένου καὶ τοῦ κυρίου τῆς κόρης τὴν πράσινα μόλις κατανεύσαντος, ταλάντων Ἀττικῶν ἐπτά, καὶ χρόνον ὄρισεν καθ’ ἄν ἀποτίσει τὸ χρέος: ἐπιστευέτο δὲ διὰ τὴν πατρίδαν περιουσίαν. ἐνστάντος δὲ τοῦ ὁρισθέντος, καὶ μὴ ἔχον ἀποδοῦναι, πάλιν ἠτάξε τριάκοντα ἕμερον προθεσμίαν.

(36.2.3) ώς δε καὶ ταύτης ἐπιστάσθη οἱ μὲν ἀπήτουν, ὁ δὲ οὐδὲν πλέον εἶχεν ἀνόειν, ὁ δ’ ἔριξ ἦκμαξεν, ἐπεχείρησε πράξει παραλογωτάτη, ἐπιβουλεύει μὲν γὰρ τοὺς ἀπαιτοῦντας, ἐκατό δὲ μοναρχικὴν ἐξουσίαν περιέθηκε. συναγοράσας γὰρ πεντακοσίας πανοπλίας καὶ χρόνον τῆς τιμῆς συντάξας, καὶ πιστευθεὶς, λάθρα πρὸς ἀγρὸν τινα παρακομίσας τοὺς ἰδίους ἀνέσεισε πρὸς ἀπόστασιν οἰκέτας, τετρακοσίους ὄντας. (36.2.4) εἶτα ἀναλαβὼν διάδομα καὶ περιβόλαιον πορφυρὸν καὶ βαβδοχοῦς καὶ τὰ ἄλλα σύσσημα τῆς ἄρχης, καὶ βασιλέα ἑαυτὸν συνεργία τῶν δοῦλων ἀναδείξας, τοὺς μὲν ἀπαιτοῦντας τὴν τιμῆν τῆς κόρης βαβδίσας ἐπελέκισεν, ἐξοπλίσας δὲ τοὺς οἰκέτας ἐπήμε τὰς σύνεγγυς ἐπαύλεις, καὶ τοὺς μὲν προθύμους συναφισταμένους καθόπλεξε, τοὺς δ’ ἀντιπράττοντας ἀνήρει. ταχῷ δὲ συναγαγὼν στρατιώτας πλείους τῶν ἐπτακοσίων καὶ τούτους εἰς ἐκατονταρχίας καταλέξας, ἐνεβάλετο χάρακα καὶ τοὺς ἀφισταμένους ὑπεδέχετο. 

(36.2.5) τῆς δ’ ἀποστάσεως εἰς Ρώμην ἀπαγγελθείσης, ἢ σύγκλητος ἐμφρόνως περὶ αὐτῆς ἐβουλεύσατο καὶ κατώρθωσε. τὸν γὰρ κατὰ πόλιν στρατιγὸν ἀπέδοιξεν ἐνα πρὸς τὴν τῶν δραπετῶν σύλληψιν. Λεύκιον Λούκουλλον. οὕτος δὲ αὐθημερὸν ἐκ τῆς Ρώμης ἐπιλέξας στρατιώτας ἐξακοσίους, εἰς τὴν Ἐκτύν ἕλθε συναθροίσας πεζοὺς μὲν τετρακύκλιοις, ἐπιμεῖς δὲ τετρακοσίους. (36.2.6) ο ὁ Οὐσττιος τὴν ὀρμήν τοῦ Λούκουλλον πυθόμενος κατελάβετο λόφον καρτερὸν, ἔχον τοὺς πάντας πλέον τῶν τρεισίλιον καὶ πεντακοσίων, καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον συμβολής γενομένης ἐπελεύκησαν οἱ δραπέται ἐκ τῶν ἐπιδεξίων μαχόμενον· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὸν μὲν στρατηγὸν τοῦ ΟὐσττιοΥ Ἀπολλώνιον διαφθείρας ὁ Λούκουλλος καὶ τῇ δημοσίᾳ πίστει τὴν ἄφεσιν τῆς τιμωρίας βεβαιώσας, ἐπεισεν αὐτὸν προδότην γενέσθαι τῶν συναστατῶν. διὸ καὶ τούτῳ συνεργοῦντος τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις καὶ τὰς χείρας προσφέροντος τῷ Οὐσττιῷ, φοβηθεῖς τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἀλὼσεως τιμωρίαν ἑαυτὸν ἀπέσφαξεν, αὐτικὰ συναπολολότων καὶ τῶν τῆς ἀποστάσεως κεκοινονικότων πλήν τοῦ προδότου Ἀπολλώνιον. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν πρὸ τῆς κατὰ Σικελίαν, ὡσπερ προοιμαζόμενα ταῦτη, μεγίστης ἀποστάσεως· ήτος ἄρχην ἐλαβε τοιαύτην. (Photius, Bibl. pp. 386-387 B.)

(36.2a.1) Ὅστι πολλαὶ ἐπαναστάσεις ἐγένοντο οἰκέτων· πρῶτη μὲν ἡ περὶ τὴν Νουκερίαν, τριάκοντα οἰκέτων συνομοσίαν ποιησαμένων καὶ ταχὺ κολασθέντων, δευτέρα δὲ ἡ περὶ τὴν Κατυήν, διακοσίων οἰκέτων ἐπαναστάταντος καὶ ταχὺ κολασθέντων·
τρίτη δὲ ἀπόστασις ἔγένετο παράδοξος καὶ πολὺ τὰς εἰθισμένας
dιαλλάττουσα. ἦν γὰρ τὸς Τίτος μὲν Οὐέττιος, ἵππες δὲ Ῥομαῖον, δὲ ἔχων πατέρα
μεγαλόπλουτον καὶ νέος ὅν παντελῶς εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν ἦλθεν ἀλλοτρίας θεραπανίδος
κάλλει διαφεροῦσις. ἐπιπλακείς δὲ αὐτῇ καὶ συμβιώσας ἰκανόν τινα χρόνον εἰς
ἐρωτα παράδοξον ἐνέπεσε καὶ διάθεσιν μανία παρεμφερῆ. διὰ γὰρ τὴν φυλοστοργίαν
ἐπιβαλόμενος ἐξαγοράσας τὴν παιδίσκην τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἔσχε τὸν δεσπότην αὐτῆς
ἀντιπράττοντα, μετά δὲ ταῦτα τὸ μεγέθει τῆς τιμῆς προτρεψάμενος ἑξηγόρασεν
αὐτὴν ταλάντων Ἀττικῶν ἑπτά, καὶ τὴν ἀπόδοσιν τῆς τιμῆς εἰς τακτὸν χρόνον
συνέθετο. πιστευθεὶς δὲ τοῦ χρήματος διὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς εὐπορίαν ἀπήγαγε τὴν
θεραπανίδα, καὶ καταδίκας εἰς τὸν τοῦτον ἄγρον ἐξεπλήρωσεν τὴν ἰδίαν
ἐπιθυμίαν. ὡς δὲ ὁ συγκείμενος τοῦ χρέους χρόνος διήλθην, ἦκον οἱ πεμφθέντες εἰς
τὴν ἀπαίτησιν. ὁ δὲ εἰς τὴν τριακοστὴν ἡμέραν ἀναβαλόμενος τὴν ἀπόλυσιν, καὶ τὸ
μὲν χρῆμα οὐ δυνάμενος πορίσαι, τὸ δὲ ἐρωτὶ δουλεύων, ἐπεχείρησε πράξει
παραλογιστή. διὰ γὰρ τὸν πάθους τὴν ὑπερβολὴν καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἀναβολῆς
ἔπακολον θοῦσαν αἰσχύνην ἐξετράπη πρὸς διαλογισμοὺς παιδαρίωδεις καὶ πολλῆς
ἀφροσύνης μεστοὺς. πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν γὰρ λαμβάνων τὸν ἐσόμενον τῆς ἐρωμένης
διαχωρισμὸν τοὺς μὲν ἀπαιτοῦσθι τὴν τιμὴν ἀνέλπιστον ἐπιβουλὴν συνεστήσατο. ... (Const. Exc. 3, p. 208.)

(36.3.1) Κατὰ τὴν ἐπὶ τοὺς Κίμβρους τοῦ Μαρίου στρατείαν ἔδωκεν ἡ
σύγκλητος ἐξουσία τῷ Μαρίῳ ἐκ τῶν πέραν θαλάττης ἔθνων μεταπέμπεταν
συμμαχια. οὐ μὲν οὖν Μάριος ἐξέπεμψε πρὸς Νικομήδην τὸν τῆς Ἱπποδρόμου Βασιλέα
περὶ βοηθείας· ὁ δὲ ἀπόκρισιν ἔδωκε τοὺς πλείους τῶν Βιθυνίας ἡπτὼν ὑπὸ τῶν
δημοσιονῶν διαραγάγειτας δουλεύετον ἐν ταῖς ἐπαρχίαις. (36.3.2) τῆς δὲ συγκλήτου
ψηφισματικῆς ὅπως μηδεῖς σύμμαχος ἐλευθέρους ἐν ἐπαρχία δουλεύοντος καὶ τῆς τοῦτον
ἐλευθερώσεως οἱ στρατηγοὶ πρόνοια ποιοῦνται, τότε κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν ἄν
στρατηγὸς Λικίνιος Νέρος ἀκολούθως τῷ δόγματι συνχωνὶ τῶν δουλῶν
ἡλευθέρωσε, κρίσεις προθείς, ὡς ἐν ολίγαις ἡμέραις πλείους τῶν ὀκτακοσίων τυχεῖν
tῆς ἐλευθερίας. καὶ ἦσαν πάντες οἱ κατὰ τὴν νήσου δουλεύοντες μετέωροι πρὸς τὴν
ἐλευθερίαν.

(36.3.3) οἱ δὲ ἐν ἄξιόμασι συνδραμόντες παρεκάλουν τῶν στρατηγῶν
ἀποστήμεναι ταύτης τῆς ἐπιβολῆς. ὁ δὲ εἶτε χρῆμα πισθεὶς εἶτε χάριτι δουλεύσας τῆς
μὲν τῶν κριτηρίων τούτων σπουδῆς ἀπέστη, καὶ τοὺς προσώποντας ἐπὶ τῷ τυχεῖν τῆς
ἐλευθερίας ἐπιπλήττων εἰς τοὺς ἱδίους κυρίους προσέτατεν ἐπαναστρέψειν. οἱ δὲ δοῦλοι συστραφέντες καὶ τῶν Συρακουσῶν ἀπαλλαγέντες καὶ καταφυγόντες εἰς τὸ τόν Παλικόν τέμνον ψυχῇν ἀνέπεσεν εἰς τὸν Ἀλκυονίων χόραν ἀδέλφον δυνῆν μεγαλοπλούτων οἰκεῖα τριάκοντα, ἃν ἢγείτο Ὀάριος ὅνομα· οἱ πρῶτον μὲν νυκτὸς κοιμομένους τοὺς ἱδίους δεσπότας ἀπέσφαξαν, εἶτα ἐπὶ τὰς γειτνίσκους ἐπούλεις παρελθόντες παρεκάλουν ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν τοὺς δούλους· καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ νυκτὶ συνέδραμον πλείστοι τῶν ἐκατόν εἴκοσι. (36.3.5) καὶ καταλαβόμενοι χορίον φύσει ὠχυρόν, τοῦτο μᾶλλον ἐποχύρωσαν, προσδεξάμενοι καὶ ἐτέρους δούλους ὁπλισμένους ὁδοιπόροντα. ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς τῆς ἐπαρχίας Λυκίνιος Νέρους κατά τάχος αὐτοῖς ἐπελθὼς καὶ πολιορκῶν ἀπακτόν ἔσχε τὴν σπουδήν, ἐπεὶ δὲ βία ἀνάλωτον τὸ φρούριον ἐώρα ἐπὶ τὴν προδοσίαν ὅρα, καὶ σωτηρίας ὑποσχέσεις Γάιον Τιτίνιον ἐπικαλούμενον Γαδαίον ἀντιπεῖσας (ἣν δ᾿ ὦτος πρὸ δυεῖν ἐτῶν καταδικασθεῖς μὲν θανάτῳ, τὴν τιμωρίαν δὲ ἐκφυγόν καὶ πολλούς τῶν ταῖς τὴν χώραν ἐλευθέρων κατὰ ληστείαν ἀναρρόν, οὔδένα δὲ τῶν οἰκετῶν παραλυπόν) ἐχέν ὑπηρέτην τοῦ σκοποῦ. (36.3.6) οὗτος ἔχον αὐτῷ πιστῶς οἰκεῖας ἰκανοὺς πρόσεις τῷ φρούριῳ τῶν ἀποστατῶν, ὡς δὴ συμμεθέξειν τοῦ κατὰ Ῥωμαίων πολέμου· εὐμενίδος δὲ καὶ φιλοφρῶνος προσδεχθεῖς ἡρέθη διὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ στρατηγίας, καὶ προδώσατε τὸ φρούριον. τόν δ᾿ ἀποστατὸν οἱ μὲν μαχόμενοι κατεκόπησαν, οἱ δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀλώσεως δεδιότες τιμωρίαν ἐσωτερικώς κατεκρήμνισαν. ἢ μὲν οὖν πρῶτη τῶν ὅραπετῶν στάσις κατελύθη τὸν εἰρήμενον τρόπον.

(36.4.1) Τὸν δὲ στρατιωτῶν πρὸς τὰ οἰκεία ἡθη ἀπολυθέντων, ἦκὼν τινες ἀπαγγέλλοντες ὅτι Πόπλιον Κλόνιον, γενόμενον ἰππέα Ῥωμαίον, ἐπαναστάντες οἱ δοῦλοι κατέσφαξαν ὁδοιπόρον δυνῆ, καὶ ὅτι πλῆθος ἀγείρουσι. καὶ ὁ μὲν στρατηγὸς ἐτέρον βουλαῖς παρακρουσθεῖς, ἡθη καὶ τῶν πλείστων στρατιωτῶν ἀπολευμένων, καιρὸν παρείχε διὰ τῆς ἀναβολῆς τοῖς ἀποστάταις βέλτιον αὐτοῦ ἀσφαλίσασθαι. (36.4.2) προῆγε δὲ μετὰ τῶν ἐνόντων στρατιωτῶν, καὶ διαβὰς τὸν Ἀλβαν ποταμόν παρῆλθε τοὺς ἀποστάτας διατρίβοντας ἐν ὅρει καλομέγδρον Κατριανὸ, καὶ κατηγήθησαν εἰς πόλιν Ἡράκλειαν ἐκ γούν τοῦ μὴ προσβαλεῖν αὐτοῖς τὸν στρατηγὸν ἀτολμίαν αὐτοῦ διαφημίσαντες συχνὸς ἀνέσειον τῶν ὀικετῶν. καὶ πολλῶν συρρέοντων καὶ τῶν δυνατῶν τρόπον εἰς μάχην παρασκευαζόμενον, ἐν ἐπτα
κατάστρατηγος ἡμέρας καθωπλίσθησαν πλείους τῶν ὀκτακοσίων. ἐφεξής δὲ ἐγένοντο τῶν διασχίζων ὡς ἐλάττων.

(36.4.3) πυθόμενος δ’ ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ τὴν αὔξησιν αὐτῶν ὁ στρατηγὸς ἡγεμόνα προεχερίσατο Μάρκον Τιτίνον, δούς αὐτῷ στρατιώτας τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Ἐννης φρουροῦς ἐξακοσίους. οὕτος δὲ μάχη προσβαλὼν τοὺς ἀποστάτας, ἔπει καὶ τῷ πλῆθει καὶ ταῖς δυσχωρίας ἐπελεονέκτουν ἐκείνοι, ἐτράπη σὺν τοῖς περὶ αὐτῶν, πολλῶν μὲν ἀναφεδέντων, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ρυγάντων τὰ ὅπλα καὶ φυγὴ μόλις διασωθέντων. καὶ οἱ ἀποστάται ὅπλων τε εὐπορήσαντες τοσοῦτον ἄθρον καὶ νίκης ἰρρασύτερον εἶχοντο τῶν ἔργων, καὶ πάντες τῶν δούλων ἐμετεωρίζοντο πρὸς ἀπόστασιν. (36.4.4) καὶ πολλῶν καθ’ ἡμέραν ἀναφεδένους σύντομον καὶ παράδοξον ἐλάμβανον αὔξησιν, ὡς ἐν ὀλίγας ἡμέραις πλείους γενέσθαι τῶν ἐξακοσίων. τότε δὴ καὶ εἰς ἐκκλησίαν συνελθόντες καὶ βουλής προτεθείσης πρῶτον μὲν ἐλατντο βασιλέα τὸν ὠνομαζόμενον Σάλουιον, δοκοῦντα τῆς ἱεροσκοπίας ἔμπειρον εἶναι καὶ ταῖς γυναικείαις θέαις αὐλομανοῦντα. οὕτως βασιλεύσας τὰς μὲν πόλεις ἀργίας αἰτίας καὶ τρυφῆς νομίζεισε ἐξεκλίνειν, εἰς τρία δὲ μερίσας τοὺς ἀποστάτας καὶ ίσους ἠγεμόνας ἐγκαταστήσας ταῖς μερίσι προσέταξεν ἐπιέαν τὴν χώραν καὶ πρὸς ἕνα τόπον καὶ καίρφν ἀπαντάς ἀπαντάν. (36.4.5) διὸ πολλῶν ἐκ τῆς ἐπελασίας ἄλλων τε ζώων καὶ ἐπιὼν εὐπορήσαντες ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ κατεσκευάσθησαν ἐπίφεις μὲν πλείους τῶν διασχίζων, πεζοῖ δὲ οὐκ ἐλάττους τῶν δισμυρίων, ἡδὴ καὶ γυμνασίας πολεμικαῖς ἐνδιαπέρησαντες. προσπεσόντες οὖν ἄφινα πόλει χρυῆ Μοργαντίνη προσβολὰς ἐνεργεῖς καὶ συνεχεῖς ἐποιουντο.

(36.4.6) ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς ὡς βοηθήσως τῇ πόλει ἐπελθὼν, νυκτοπορία χρησάμενος, ἔχων μεθ’ ἑαυτοῦ Ἰταλίωτας ταὶ καὶ ἐκ Σικελίας σχεδὸν στρατιώτας μυρίους, κατέλαβε τοὺς ἀποστάτας ἀσχολουμένους περὶ τὴν πολιορκίαν, καὶ ἐπιθέμενος αὐτῶν τῇ παρεμβολῇ καὶ εὐρῶν ὀλίγους μὲν τοὺς φυλάττοντας, πλῆθος δὲ γυναικῶν αἰχμαλώτων καὶ λείας ἄλλης παντοδαποῦς, ῥαδίως ἐξέβλε τὴν στρατοπεδείαν. καὶ ταύτην μὲν δήρησεν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν Μοργαντίνην ἤγεν. (36.4.7) οἱ δ’ ἀποστάται ἐξαίρεσις ἀντεπιθέμενοι, καὶ ὑπερδέξονι τὴν στάσιν ἔχοντες βιαίως τε ἐπιρράξαντες εὑρῶς ἐπὶ προτερήματος ἤσαν ὁ δὲ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ἐτράπησαν πρὸς φυγῆν. τοῦ δὲ βασιλέως τῶν ἀποστατῶν κήρυγμα ποιησαμένου μηδένα κτείνειν τῶν τὰ ὅπλα ῥυπτοῦντον, οἱ πλεῖστοι ῥυπτοῦντες ἔφευγον. καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ καταστρατηγήσας τοὺς πολεμίους ὁ Σάλουιος τῇ τε παρεμβολῇ ἀνεκτήσατο καὶ
περιβόητον νίκην ἀπενεγκάμενος πολλῶν ὀπλῶν ἐκμείνεσεν. (36.4.8) ἀπέθανον δὲ ἐν τῇ μάχῃ τῶν Ἰταλωτῶν τε καὶ Σικελίων οὐ πλείους ἐξακοσίων διὰ τὴν τοῦ κηρύγματος φιλανθρωπίαν, ἐάλωσαν δὲ περὶ τετρακισχιλίους. ὁ δὲ Σάλωνος, πολλῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ κατορθώματος συνρρέωντο, διπλασίας τὴν ἰδίαν δύναμιν ἐκράτει τῶν ὑπαύθρων, καὶ πολιορκεῖν πάλιν ἐπεξείρει τὴν Μοργαντίναν, κηρύγματι δοὺς τοῖς ἐν αὐτῇ δούλοις τὴν ἐλευθερίαν. τῶν δὲ κυρίων ἀντιπροτεινόντων αὐτοῖς ταῦτην, εἰ σφίσι συναγωνίσαντο, εἶλοντο μάλλον τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν κυρίων, καὶ προθύμως ἀγονισάμενοι ἀπετρίψαντο τὴν πολιορκίαν. ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἀνατέρψα ταὐτομολήσα τοὺς πλείστους παρεσκεύασε τοῖς ἀποστάταις.

(36.5.1) Περὶ δὲ τῆς Ἀιγεσταίων καὶ Λιλυβαίτων χῶρων, ὥσι τε τῶν ἄλλων τῶν πλησιοχώρων, ἐνόσει πρὸς ἀπόστασιν τὰ πλήθη τῶν οἰκετῶν. γίνεται δὲ τούτων ἀρχηγὸς Αθηνίων ὅνομα, ἀνὴρ ἀνδρείας διαφέρων, Κύλης τὸ γένος, οὗτος ὁ ὁικονόμος ὃν δυοῦν ἀδελφῶν μεγαλοπλουτῶν, καὶ τῆς ἀστρομαντικῆς πολλῆν ἔχουν ἐμπειρίαν, ἔπεισε τῶν οἰκετῶν πρὸ τῶν μὲν τοὺς ὑφ᾽ ἕαυτου τεταγμένους περὶ διακοσίους ὄντας, ἔπειτα τοὺς γειτνιόντας, ὡστε ἐν πέντε ἡμέραις συναχθήναι πλείους τῶν χιλίων. (36.5.2) ὑπὸ δὲ τούτων αἱρεθῆς βασιλεὺς καὶ διάδημα περιθέμενος ἔναντι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπαύνῃ ἀποστάταις τὴν διάθεσιν ἐποιεῖτο. οὐ γὰρ προσεδέχετο πάντας τοὺς ἀρισταμένους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀρίστους ποιούμενος στρατιώτας τοὺς ἄλλους ἤναγκαζε μένοντας ἐπὶ τῶν προγεγενημένων ἐργασίῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς ἰδίας ἐκαστον ὁικονομίας καὶ τάξεως, ἐξ ὧν καὶ τροφῆς ἀφθόνους τῶν στρατιώτων ἐχορηγεῖτο. (36.5.3) προσεποιεῖτο δὲ τοὺς θεοὺς αὐτῷ διὰ τῶν ἀστρῶν προσημαίνειν ὡς ἐσοῦτ τῆς Σικελίας συμπάσης βασιλεύς: διὸ δεῖν αὐτῆς τε τῆς χώρας καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ ζώνων τε καὶ καρπῶν ὡς ἰδίων φειδεσθαί. τέλος ἀθροίσας ὑπὲρ τοὺς μυρίους ἑτόλιμης πόλιν ἄπορθητον τὸ Λιλύβαιον πολιορκεῖν. μηδὲν δὲ ἀνύσω μετανιστάτο αὐτῆς, εἰτῶν αὐτῷ τοὺς θεοὺς τοῦτο ἐπιτάτευεν ἐπιμένοντας γάρ ἄν τῇ πολιορκίᾳ δυστυχήματος πειραθῆναι. (36.5.4) παρασκευαζομένου δὲ αὐτοῦ τῆς ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀναχώρησιν, κατέπλευσαν τίνες ἐν ταῖς ναοίς κομίζοντες ἐπιλέκτος Μαυρουσίως, οὐ ἐπὶ βοήθειαν ἤσαν ἀπεσταλμένοι τοῖς Λιλυβαίταις, ἔχοντες ἤγουμενὸν δὲ ὀνομαζέτοι Γόμον. οὕτος σὺν τοῖς ἰμαῖνοντα καὶ ἀνελπιστοὺς ἐπιθέμενος τοὺς περὶ Αθηνίων ὀδουποροῦντας, πολλῶς καταβαλόντες, οὐκ ὀλίγοισ δὲ
(36.6.1) Εἴξε δὲ τὴν Σικελίαν πᾶσαν σύγχυσις καὶ κακῶν θλιᾶς, οὐ γὰρ οἱ
dοῦλοι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐλευθερῶν οἱ ἄποροι πᾶσαν ἀρπαγήν καὶ παρανομίαν
ἐργαζόμενοι, καὶ τοὺς περιτυγχάνοντας δοῦλους τε καὶ ἐλευθέρους, ὅπως ημὲνες
ἀπαγγέλλοι τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦς ἀπόνοιαν, ἐφόνευον ἀναιδῶς, διό καὶ πάντες οἱ κατὰ τὰς
πόλεις ὑπελάμβαναν τὰ μὲν ἐντὸς τειχῶν μόλις εἶναι ἱδία, τὰ δ᾽ ἐκτὸς ἀλλότρια καὶ
dοῦλα τῆς παρανόμου χειροκρατίας, καὶ ἄλλα δὲ πολλὰ πολλοῖς ἄτοπα κατὰ τὴν
Σικελίαν ἐτολμάτω. (Photius, Bibl. pp. 387-389.)

(36.11.1) Ὅτι οὐ μόνον τὸ πλῆθος τῶν οἰκετῶν τὸ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόστασιν
ἀρμιμένον κατέτρεχεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐλευθερῶν οἱ τὰς ἐπὶ χώρας κτήσεις οὐκ
ἐχοντες ἐτρέποντο πρὸς ἀρπαγήν καὶ παρανομίαν. οἱ γὰρ ἐλλιπεῖς ταῖς οὐσίαις διὰ
τὴν ἀπορίαν ἁμα καὶ παρανομίαν ἐξέχωντο κατὰ συστροφὰς ἐπί τὴν χώραν καὶ τὰς
μὲν ἁγέλας τῶν θρεμμάτων ἁπίλαινουν, τοὺς δὲ ἐν τοῖς σταθμοῖς τεθησιωρισμένους
καρποῦς διήρπαζον, καὶ τοὺς περιτυγχάνοντας ἄνεδην ἐλευθέρους τε καὶ δοῦλους
ἐφόνευον, ὅπως ημὲνες ἀπαγγείλῃ τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦς ἀπόνοιαν τε καὶ παρανομίαν.
(36.11.2) ἀναρχίας δ᾽ ὀυσίς διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν Ῥωμαϊκὴν ἀρχὴν δικαιοδοτεῖν, πάντες
ἀνυπεύθυνον ἐξουσίαν ἔχοντες πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας συμφορὰς ἀπειργάζοντο· διὸ καὶ
πᾶς τόπος ἔγεμνον ἀρπαγῆς βιαίοι ταῖς τῶν εὐπόρων οὐσίαις ἐνεξουσιαζοῦσι. οἱ δὲ
πρότερον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν πρωτεύοντες ταῖς τε δόξαις καὶ τοῖς πλοῦτοις τότε διὰ τὴν
ἀνέλπιστον τῆς τύχης μεταβολὴν οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ τῶν δραπετῶν ὑβριστικῶς
ἀπέβαλλον τὰς εὐπορίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐπηρεαζόμενοι καρτερεῖν
ὁναγκάζοντο. (36.11.3) διὸ καὶ πάντες ὑπελάμβαναν τὰ μὲν ἐντὸς τῶν πυλῶν μόγις
ὑπάρχειν ἱδία, τὰ δὲ ἐκτὸς τῶν τειχῶν ἀλλότρια καὶ δοῦλα τῆς παρανόμου
χειροκρατίας εἶναι. καθόλου δ᾽ ἤν κατὰ πόλεις φυρμός καὶ σύγχυσις τῶν κατὰ
νόμους δικαίων. οἱ γὰρ ἀποστάται τῶν ὑπαίθρων κρατοῦντες ἀνεπίβατον ἑποιούντο
τὴν χώραν, μνησικακουσίς τοῖς δεσπόταις, οὐκ ἐμπιπλάμενοι δὲ τῶν ἀνελπίστων
ἐντυπημάτων· οἱ δὲ ἐντὸς τῶν τειχῶν δοῦλοι νοσοῦντες ταῖς ψυχαῖς καὶ
μετεωρίζομενοι πρὸς ἀπόστασιν φοβερότατοι τοῖς κυρίοις ὑπῆρχον. (Const. Exc.
221.Y, p. 314.)

(36.7.1) Ὅ δὲ τὴν Μοργαντίνην πολιορκήσας Σάλουιος, ἐπιδραμὼν τὴν
χώραν μέχρι τοῦ Λεοντίνου πεδίου, ἤθροισεν αὐτὸν τὸ σύμπαν στράτευμα,
ἐπιλέκτους ἄνδρας οὐκ ἐλάττους τῶν τρισμυρίων, καὶ θύσις τοὺς Παλικοῖς ἦρωσε τούτοις μὲν ἀνέθηκε μίαν τῶν ἄλωργοιν περιπορφύρων στολὴν χαριστήρια τῆς νίκης, αὐτὸς δὲ ἀναγορεύσας ἐαυτὸν βασιλέα Τρόφων μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀποστάτων προσηγορεύετο. (36.7.2) διανοούμενος δὲ τὰ Τριόκαλα καταλαβέσθαι καὶ κατασκεύασαι βασιλεία πέμπει καὶ πρὸς Αθηνίωνα, μεταπεμπόμενος αὐτὸν ὡς στρατηγὸν βασιλεὺς. πάντες μὲν οὖν ὑπελάμβανον τὸν Αθηνίωνα τὸν πρωτεῖον ἀντιποιύσθησαι, καὶ διὰ τὴν στάσιν τῶν ἀποστάτων ῥαξίως καταλυθήσεθαι τὸν πόλεμον· ἢ δὲ τύχη καθάπερ ἐπίτηδες αὐξοῦσα τὰς τῶν ὑπατικῶν δυνάμεις ὁμονοῦσαι τοὺς τούτον ἡγεμόνας ἐποίησεν. ἦκε μὲν γὰρ συντόμως μετά τῆς δυνάμεως ἐπὶ τὰ Τριόκαλα ὁ Τρόφων, ἢκε δὲ καὶ Αθηνίων μετά τρισχείων, ὑπακούοις ὡς στρατηγὸς βασιλεὶ τῷ Τρόφωνι, τὴν ἄλλην αὐτοῦ δύναμιν κατατρέχειν τὴν χώραν καὶ ἀνασείει πρὸς ἀπόστασιν τοὺς οἰκέτας ἀπεστάλκως, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ὑπονοῆσας ὁ Τρόφων τὸν Αθηνίωνα ἐπιθύμησθαι ἐν καρδὶ παρέδωκεν εἰς φυλακὴν. τὸ δὲ φροῦριον ὑψηλότατον δὲ κατεσκεύαζε πολυτελέσι κατασκεύας καὶ ἐπὶ μᾶλλον ὑψέρω. (36.7.3) Τριόκαλα δὲ αὐτὸ φασὶν ὄνομασθαι διὰ τὸ τρία καλὰ ἔχειν, πρῶτον μὲν ναματαίων ὕδατον πλῆθος διαφόρον τῇ γλυκότητι, δεύτερον παρακειμένην χώραν ἀμπελόφυτον τε καὶ ἐλαιώφυτον καὶ γεωργεῖσθαι δυναμένην θαυμαστὸς, τρίτον ὑπερβάλλουσαν ὑψηλότητα, ὡς ἄν οὕσης μεγάλης πέτρας ἀναλῶτον· ἢ καὶ περίβολο πόλεως σταδίων ὡκτὼ προσπερεβιάλων καὶ ταφρεύσας βαθείᾳ τάφρῳ βασιλείους ἐχρῆτο, πάσῃ ἀφθονίᾳ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον ἀπάντου πεπληρωμένην. κατεσκεύασε δὲ καὶ βασιλικὴν οἰκίαν καὶ ἄγοραν δυναμένην δέξασθαι πλῆθος ἄνθρωπων. (36.7.4) ἐξελέξατο δὲ καὶ τὸν φρονῆσι διαφερόντων ἄνδρον τοὺς ικανοὺς, οὓς ἀποδείξας συμβούλους ἐχρῆτο συνέδρους αὐτοῖς· τῆβενὰν τε περιπόρφυρον περιβάλλετο καὶ πλατύσημον ἐδώ χιτῶνα κατὰ τοὺς χρηματισμοὺς, καὶ ῥαβδόςχος εἶχε μετὰ πελέκεων τοὺς προηγομένους, καὶ τάλλα πάντα ὡς πουιοῦσι τε καὶ ἐπικοσμοῦσι βασιλείαν ἐπέτηδεσεν.

(36.8.1) Προσχειρίζεται δὲ κατὰ τῶν ἀποστάτων ἢ σύγκλητος τῶν Ῥωμαίων Λεύκων Λικίνων Λοῦκουλλον, ἔχοντα στρατιῶτας μυρίους μὲν καὶ τετρακισχιλίους Ῥωμαίους καὶ Ἰταλοὺς. Βιθυνοὺς δὲ καὶ Θεταλοὺς καὶ Ακαρνάνας ὀκτακοσίους, ἐκ δὲ τῆς Λευκανίας ἐξακοσίους, ὧν ἤγειτο Κλέπτιος, ἀνὴρ στρατηγικὸς καὶ ἐπὶ ἄνδρειαν περιβόητος, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἔτερους ἐξακοσίους, ὡς γενέσθαι σύμπαντας ἐπτακισχιλίους καὶ μυρίους, οὓς ἔχον κατέλαβε τὴν Σικελίαν. (36.8.2) ὁ δὲ Τρόφων
ἀπολύσας Αθηνίων τῆς αἰτίας ἐβούλευτο περὶ τοῦ πρὸς Ῥωμαίων πολέμου. καὶ
tῷ μὲν ἤρεσκεν ἐν τοῖς Τριοκάλοις ἀγονίζεσθαι, Αθηνίων δὲ συνεβούλευε μὴ
συγκλείειν ἐαυτοὺς εἰς πολυρκίαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ὑπαίθρῳ διαγονίζεσθαι. κρατησάσας δὲ
tαύτης τῆς βουλῆς κατεστρατοπέδευσαν πλησίον Σκιρθαίας, ὄντες οὐκ ἐλάττως τὸν
tετρακισμυρίων ἀπείχε δ᾽ αὐτῶν ἡ Ῥωμαίων παρεμβολή στάδια δουκαίδεκα.
(36.8.3) τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἐγένοντο συνεχεῖς ἀκροβολισμοῖ· εἶτα παραταξαμένον
ἐκατέρωθεν παττῶν, ὁ μὲν Αθηνίων ἔχον συναγωνιζομένους διακοσίους ἱππεῖς, ἐπικρατῶν πάντα τὸν
περὶ αὐτῶν τόπον νεκρὸν ἐπλήρωσε, τρωθεὶς δ᾽ εἰς ἀμφότερα τὰ γόνατα καὶ τρίτην
λαβὼν ἄχριστος ἐγένετο πρὸς τήν μάχην εξ οὐ διὰ δραπέται ταῖς ψυχαῖς πεσόντες
πρὸς φυγὴν ἐτράπησαν. (36.8.4) οὐ δὲ Αθηνίων ὡς νεκρὸν ἦν ἔλαθε, καὶ
προσποιηθεῖς τετελευτηκέναι τῆς νυκτὸς ἐπιλαμβούσες διεσάθη, ἐπεκράτησαν δὲ
λαμπρῶς οἱ Ῥωμαιοί, φυγὸντο καὶ τῶν μετὰ Τρύφωνος καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκεῖνου· καὶ
πολλῶν κατὰ τὴν φυγὴν κοπέντων τέλος οὐκ ἐλάττους τῶν δισμυρίων ἀνηρέθησαν.
οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ, τῆς νυκτὸς συνεργούσας, διέφυγον εἰς τὰ Ἴρικαλα· καίτοι ράδιον ἦν
ἐπιδιώξαντι τῷ στρατηγῷ καὶ τούτους ἄνελειν. (36.8.5) ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον δ᾽ ἐτεταπείνωτο τὸ οἰκετικὸν ὡστε καὶ ἐβούλευσαντο ἐπὶ τοὺς κυρίους ἐπαναδραμεῖν
καὶ σφᾶς αὐτοῖς ἐγχειρίσαν πλὴν ἐπεκράτησαν ἡ γνώμη τῶν μέχρι τελευτῆς
ὑποθεμένων ἀγονίσασθαι καὶ μῆ τοὺς ἐξήροις ἐαυτοὺς καταπροδόνται. μετὰ δ᾽
ἐνάτην ἠμέραν ὁ στρατηγὸς ἢ ἡ πολυρκίσεις τὰ Ἴρικαλα. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄναρφον, τὰ
dὲ ἀναρούμενος, ἔλαττον ἔχον ἀπηλλάγη, καὶ οἱ ἀποστάται αὐθες ἐφρονηματίζοντο.
ἡνε ἐπὶ τῶν δεόντων ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐτε διὰ ρᾳστών ἐτε διὰ δωροδοκίαν οὐδὲν·
ἂν οὐ καὶ δίκην ὅστερον κριθεὶς Ῥωμαίως ἔδωκε.
(36.9.1) Γάιος δὲ Σερουίλος κατασκεφῆς στρατηγὸς διάδοχος Λουκούλλου
οὐδ᾽ αὐτὸς τι ἄξιον μηνής ἐπραξέ· διὸ καὶ ὁμοίως Λουκούλλως ὅστερον φυγῇ
katekeikáseth. telenetisantos de Trúfwnos, diádóchoς tής ἄρχης ο Αθηνίων καθίσταται, καὶ τούτῳ μὲν πόλεις ἐπολύρκεις, τούτῳ δὲ πάσην τὴν χώραν ἄδεως
κατέτρεχε καὶ πολλῶν ἐκωρίευε. τοῦ Σερουίλου μηδὲν ἀντιπράττοντος. (Photius,
Bibl. pp. 389-390.)
(36.9.2) Ὅστις Λουκούλλος ὁ στρατηγὸς πυθόμενος διαβεβηκέναι τὸν πορθμὸν
Σερουίλου Γάιον στρατηγὸν ἐπὶ τὴν διαδοχήν τοῦ πολέμου, τοὺς τε στρατιώτας
ἀπέλυσε καὶ τοὺς χάρακας καὶ τὰς κατασκευὰς ἐνέπρησε, βουλόμενος τὸν
diadephýmevou tìn ἀρχὴν μηδεμίαν ἔχειν ἀξιόλογον ἀφορμὴν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον. βλασφημούμενος γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ δοκεῖν τὸν πόλεμον αὐξεῖν ὑπελάμβανε τῇ τοῦτον ταπεινόσει καὶ ἀδοξίᾳ καὶ τὴν ἐαυτοῦ κατηγορίαν καταλύειν. (Const. Exc. 4, pp. 392-393.)

(36.10.1) Τοῦ δ’ ἐνυασίου χρόνου διελθόντος ὑπατος ἐν Ῥώμη Γάιος Μάριος ἤρθη τὸ πέμπτον καὶ Γάιος Ακύλλιος· ὅν ὁ Ακύλλιος στρατηγὸς κατὰ τὸν ἄποστατὸν στάλεις διὰ τῆς ἄνδρείας ἐπιφανεῖ μάχη τούς ἄποστάτας ἐνίκησε. καὶ πρὸς αὕτων δὲ τὸν βασιλέα τῶν ἄποστατῶν Αθηνίων συμβαλόν ἑγόνα συνεστήσατο, καὶ τούτον μὲν ἀνείλεν, αὐτὸς δ’ εἰς τὴν κεφαλὴν τροθεῖς ἐθεραπεύθη, καὶ στρατεύει ἐπὶ τοὺς ὑπολειπομένους τῶν ἄποστατῶν, ὅντας μυρίους. οὐχ ὑπομεινάντον δὲ τὴν ἔφοδον, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὰ ὁχυρώματα καταφυγόντων, ὅμως Ακύλλιος οὐκ ἐνεδίδου πάντα πρῶτον ἐως αὐτοὺς ἐκπολιορκήσας ἐχειρώσατο. (36.10.2) ἐπὶ δ’ ὑπολειπομένων χιλίων καὶ στρατηγὸν ἐχόντων τὸν Σάτυρον, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἔπεβαλε διὰ τῶν ὀπλῶν αὐτοὺς χειρώσαθαι, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διαπρεσβευόντων καὶ παραδόντων ἐαυτοῖς τῆς μὲν παραυτίκα τιμωρίας ἀπέλυσεν, ἀπαγαγὼν δὲ εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην θηριομάχας αὐτοὺς ἐποίησε. (36.10.3) τοὺς δὲ φασὶ τινὲς ἐπιφανεστάτην ποιήσασθαι τοῦ βίου καταστροφῆν’ τῆς μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὰ θηρία μάχης ἀποστήναι, ἀλλὰ δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν δημοσίων βωμῶν κατασφάξαι, καὶ τὸν τελευταίον αὐτὸν τὸν Σάτυρον ἀνελόντα τούτον δὴ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν αὐτοχειρία ἤρωικός καταστρέψαι. ὁ μὲν οὖν κατὰ Σικελίαν τῶν οἰκετῶν πόλεμος, διαμείνας ἐτή σχεδὸν ποὺ τέταρτα, τραγικὴν ἔσχε τὴν καταστροφὴν. (Photius, Bibl. p. 390.)

**II. Photian Version and Constantinian Excerpts: Translation**

(36.1.1) In Rome, about the same time that Marius defeated the Libyan kings Bocchus and Jugurtha in a great battle, and killed many tens of thousands of Libyans, and later Bocchus seized Jugurtha, and so he won pardon from the Romans for having gone to war with them, Marius took Jugurtha from that place and kept him captive, furthermore when the Romans, having encountered great misfortunes in Gaul during the Cimbric wars, were disheartened, at the same time some men came from Sicily bringing news of a revolt of slaves numbering into the tens of thousands. On this news, the whole Roman state fell into a great crisis, since nearly sixty
thousand chosen soldiers had died in the war against the Cimbri in Gaul, and there was a shortage of troops to send out.

(36.2.1) Before the uprising of slaves in Sicily there occurred in Italy several short lived and minor revolts, as if the divine were announcing the magnitude of the coming uprising in Sicily. The first was in Nuceria, where thirty slaves formed a conspiracy and were quickly punished, the second was in Capua, where two hundred slaves rose up and were quickly put down.

(36.2.2) The third one was contrary to all expectations. There was a man Titus Minucius, a Roman knight, the son of an exceedingly wealthy father. He conceived a passion for a beautiful slave girl owned by another. After he had lain with her and fallen in love contrary to all expectation he bought her and having been so overpowered by a mad passion, the master of the girl only just consented to the sale, for seven Attic talents, he fixed a time for the repayment of the debt: he was given credit because of his father’s wealth. The fixed time arrived, and he did not have the means to pay, so he once more agreed to pay in thirty days. (36.2.3) When this day arrived and the creditors demanded repayment, he did not have enough to pay, his passion was at its height, and he attempted an undertaking beyond all reason. For he contrived against his creditors, and conferred monarchical power on himself. For having bought five hundred suits of armour and arranged a time of payment, and was trusted, he secretly conveyed them to a certain field and stirred up his own slaves to revolt, four hundred in number. (36.2.4) Then, after taking up a diadem, purple cloak, lictors and the other regalia of power, and having, with the slaves cooperation, proclaimed himself king, he flogged and beheaded those who demanded payment for the girl. Arming his slaves, he marched on nearby farms and armed those willing to join the rebellion, but killed those opposed. Soon, after he brought together more than seven hundred soldiers and organised them into centuries, he set to work upon a palisade and welcomed any rebels.

---

420 Every other reference in the Photius and the Constantinian excerpts is to Titus Vettius, or Οὐσιος, so it is likely that there is a textual error here.
(36.2.5) When the rebellion was reported in Rome, the senate sensibly took council about it and set things straight. For of the generals in the city they appointed one to apprehend the runaways, Lucius Lucullus. He, the same day, selected six hundred soldiers from Rome, and arrived at Capua having assembled four thousand infantry and four hundred cavalry. (36.2.6) When Vettius learned of Lucullus’ attack, he seized a strong hill, having more than three thousand five hundred in all. At the start of the battle the runaways had the advantage since they fought from higher ground: but after this Lucullus, by bribing Apollonius the general of Vettius and confirming in the name of the state his immunity from punishment, persuaded him to turn traitor against his fellow-rebels. Therefore, since he was cooperating with the Romans, and turned his forces on Vettius, who, afraid of the punishments from capture, cut his own throat, in a moment the other rebels were destroyed together, except for the traitor Apollonius. These events took place before the great revolt in Sicily, as if making a prelude for it: this began as follows. (Photius, Bibl. Pp. 386-7 B.)

(36.2a.1) There were many uprisings of slaves: the first was in Nuceria, where thirty slaves formed a conspiracy and were quickly punished, the second was in Capua, where two hundred slaves rose up and were quickly punished.

The third revolt was contrary to all expectations and very different from the normal. For there was a certain Titus Vettius, a Roman knight, who had an exceedingly wealthy father, and being a very young man he had a desire for a very beautiful slave girl owned by another. Having slept with her, and lived with her for a sufficient time he fell in passion contrary to all expectations and into a state near to madness. Wishing, because of his affection, to take possession of the girl, he at first faced the opposition of her master, but after this, having persuaded by the magnitude of the price, he bought her for seven Attic talents, and fixed the payment of the price at a stated time. Having gained credit for the sum because of his father’s wealth he carried the girl off, and going down to one of his father’s farms fulfilled his private desire. When the time agreed on for the debt arrived, those sent to retrieve the debt arrived. He put off the settlement for thirty days, and not being able to provide the
money, but being a slave to passion, he attempted an undertaking beyond all reason. For because of the excess of his condition and the shame resulting from his deferred payment he turned to childish and utterly foolish considerations. For facing an immediate separation from his love he contrived a hopeless plot against those demanding payment…\footnote{The text stops here, and the \textit{μὲν} just before suggests a continuation of the sentence which is not preserved.} (Const. Exc. 3, p. 208.)

(36.3.1) During Marius’ campaign against the Cimbri the senate granted Marius permission to summon allies from the nations across the sea. Therefore, Marius dispatched a message to Nicomedes, king of Bithynia, about aid: he responded that the majority of the Bithynians had been seized by the tax farmers to be slaves in the provinces. (36.3.2) Then the senate decreed that no free ally should be a slave in a province and that the governors should make provision for their freedom, and Licinius Nerva, who was governor in Sicily at that time, and following the decree, set free many of the slaves, setting up a court, so that in a few days more than eight hundred obtained their freedom. And all those in slavery on the island were buoyed up at the thought of freedom.

(36.3.3) The authorities assembled, and exhorted the governor to desist from this enterprise. He, either because he was bribed, or slavishly to honour them, gave up interest in these courts, and when men approached to win freedom, he rebuked them and ordered them to return each to his own master. The slaves, collecting together, departed from Syracuse and took refuge in the shrine to the Palici, and discussed with one another about revolt. (36.3.4) From then on the boldness of the slaves was made plain in many places. The first to lay claim to freedom were thirty slaves of two exceedingly wealthy brothers in the region of Halicyae: a man named Varius led them. First, they cut the throats of their masters as they slept, then, going to the neighbouring farmsteads they summoned the slaves to freedom: in the same night more than one hundred and twenty assembled. (36.3.5) Seizing a place that was naturally strong, they strengthened it more, having received eighty other armed slaves. The governor of the province, Licinius Nerva, had attacked them swiftly and
besieged them, but his exertions were to no avail. When he saw that the citadel was impregnable to force, he looked to betrayal, and persuading Gaius Titinius, called by the surname Gadaeus, with a promise of immunity, involved him as a servant of the enterprise. This man had been condemned to death two years before, but having escaped the punishment had killed many of the free people of the island through banditry, while attacking no slaves. (36.3.6) He, taking with him sufficient trusted slaves, approached the rebels’ citadel, as if going to take part in the war against the Romans: both favourably and kindly received he was even chosen as general because of his bravery, and then he betrayed the citadel. Of the rebels, some were cut down while fighting, while others, fearing the punishments upon capture, threw themselves off the precipice. The first sedition of the runaways was put down in the manner described.

(36.4.1) After the soldiers had been disbanded to their usual homes, some reports came that eighty slaves had risen up and murdered Publius Clonius, who had been made a Roman knight, and that a great number were gathering. The governor, led astray by the advice of others, as well as because the majority of his soldiers had been disbanded, at the critical time handed the rebels an opportunity, during the delay, to secure themselves. (36.4.2) He advanced with the soldiers available, and crossing the river Alba passed by the rebels who were residing on the mountain called Kaprianus, and arrived at the city Heraclea. At all events, making known that the governor was a coward as a result of his not attacking them, they stirred up many of the slaves. Many flocked together and were prepared in a strong fashion for battle, within the first seven days more than eight hundred had been armed, immediately afterwards there were not less than two thousand.

(36.4.3) When the governor learnt in Heraclea of their growth he appointed Marius Titinius as commander, giving him six hundred soldiers from the Enna garrison. Titinius carried out an attack on the rebels, but since they had the advantage in greater numbers and rough terrain, he and those around him were routed, many having been killed, while the remainder threw down their weapons and with difficulty saved themselves through flight. The rebels, having procured both so many
weapons all at once and a victory, grew in boldness from their deeds, and all of the
slaves were buoyed up for rebellion. (36.4.4) Since every day many revolted, they
built up their force quickly and contrary to expectations, so that in a few days they
were more than six thousand. At that time, then, they gathered in an assembly and
when the proposal was put before them they first chose as king one named Salvius,
who was reputed to be practised in divination and a flute player in mystic orgies for
women. He, on becoming king, avoided cities, considering them to be the cause of
idleness and luxury, but divided the rebels into three parts and established equal
commanders for the parts, and he ordered them to pillage the countryside and to meet
in full at one place and time. (36.4.5) Therefore, since they had plenty of horses and
other animals because of their raids, in a little time they were equipped with more
than two thousand cavalry and not less than twenty thousand infantry, and indeed
were eminent in military exercises. Therefore, falling suddenly on the strong city of
Morgantina, they made continuous and active assaults.

(36.4.6) The governor, in order to come to aid the city, made a night march,
having with him about ten thousand soldiers from Sicily and the Italian Greeks; he
discovered that the rebels were engaged in the siege and attacked their encampment,
and finding that there were few guards, and many captive women and other forms of
booty, he took the encampment easily. He sacked this, and went on to Morgantina.
(36.4.7) The rebels all of a sudden counter-attacked, and since they had a
commanding position above, and attacked forcibly, they immediately were in the
ascendancy: the forces of the governor were turned to flight. When the king of the
rebels made a proclamation to kill none of those who threw down their arms, the
majority fled dropping their weapons. Having outwitted the enemy in this fashion,
Salvius both regained the camp and, having obtained a famous victory, got
possession of many weapons. (36.4.8) Not more than six hundred Italian Greeks and
Sicilians died in the battle because of the humanity of the proclamation, but about
four thousand were taken. Salvius, since many joined him because of his success,
doubled his forces and was master of the countryside, and again endeavoured to
besiege Morgantina, and was offering, by proclamation, freedom to the slaves in the
city. Their masters offered this to them in turn, if they would join in the struggle with
them, and the slaves chose rather the offer from their masters, and fighting with 
enthusiasm resisted the siege. After this the governor, by nullifying their freedom, 
caused the majority to desert to the rebels.

(36.5.1) In the territory of Segesta and Lilybaeum, and yet others adjacent, 
the multitude of slaves were sick for revolt. The chief of these was one named 
Athenion, a man excelling in courage, a Cilician by birth. He was the steward of two 
exceedingly wealthy brothers, and having great experience of astrology, he first 
persuaded those of the slaves formed up under him, about two hundred, then those in 
the vicinity, so that in five days more than a thousand had been brought together. 
(36.5.2) When he had been chosen king by these men and had put on a diadem, he 
adopted the opposite disposition to all the other rebels. For he did not accept all who 
revolted, but making soldiers of the best he compelled the others to remain at their 
previous work, and each to engage in their own domestic affairs and post; therefore 
he was able to furnish plentiful provisions for his soldiers. (36.5.3) He pretended that 
the gods foretold to him through the stars that he would be king of all Sicily; 
therefore there was a need to spare the land itself, the animals on it and the crops as 
his own. Finally, having gathered more than ten thousand, he undertook to besiege 
the city of Lilybaeum, which had never been captured. After accomplishing nothing 
he removed himself from it, saying that the gods ordered this: for were they to 
continue the siege they would experience misfortune. (36.5.4) While he was 
preparing to retreat from the city, some ships put in carrying Mauretanian auxiliaries, 
who had been sent to help Lilybaeum, having as leader one called Gomon. He, with 
his men, unexpectedly attacked those walking with Athenion in the night, killing 
many, wounding not a few, and returned to the city. As a result, the rebels wondered 
at the prediction from the stars.

(36.6.1) Ruin and an Iliad of troubles held all Sicily. For not only the slaves, 
but even the impoverished free performed all kinds of robbery and lawlessness, and 
those that happened to be about, both slaves and free, so that no one might report 
their madness, they murdered ruthlessly. Therefore all those in the cities supposed 
that what was within the city walls was scarcely their own, but that what was without
belonged to others and were slaves of the force of lawlessness. And many besides were the extraordinary ventures undertaken in Sicily, and by many. (Photius, Bibl. Pp. 387-9.)

(36.11.1) Not only did the multitude of slaves who had rushed to revolt ravage, but even those of the free who had no possessions on the land turned to robbery and lawlessness. For those without property, because of poverty and lawlessness alike, were pouring out en masse into the countryside and were driving away the herds of cattle, plundering the crops that had been stored in the farms, and freely murdered those who happened to be about, both free and slave, so that no one might bring tidings of their madness and lawlessness. (36.11.2) Since no Roman magistrate administered justice there was anarchy, and all men, having unaccountable licence, were causing misfortunes far and wide; therefore all regions were full of violent robbery that exerted authority over the property of the wealthy. Those who before had held first place in their cities in both reputation and wealth now, because of their unexpected change of fortune, not only outrageously lost their abundance because of the runaways, but were even forced to be steadfast in the face of violent threats from the free. (36.11.3) Therefore, they all considered what was within the gates to be scarcely theirs, and that outside the walls to belong to others and to be slaves of the force of lawlessness. In a word there was disorder in the cities and confounding of justice under the law. For the rebels, being masters of the open country, made the countryside inaccessible, since they bore their masters a grudge, and were not getting a fill of their unlooked for success: the slaves within the walls, being sick in their minds, and buoyed up for revolt, began to cause great fear in their masters. (Const. Exc. 2, p. 314.)

(36.7.1) After the siege of Morgantina, Salvius, having overrun the country as far as the plain of Leontini, gathered his whole army, chosen men of not less than thirty thousand, and having sacrificed to the Palici heroes, dedicated a purple bordered robe to them in thanksgiving for victory. He also proclaimed himself king and was addressed by the rebels as Tryphon. (36.7.2) Intending to seize Triocala and build a palace, he sent to Athenion as king to a general. Therefore everyone expected
that Athenion would lay claim to the first place, and that because of the sedition among the slaves the war would collapse easily: but fortune, as if on purpose to increase the power of the runaways, made their leaders to be of one mind. For Tryphon came directly to Triocala with his army, and likewise Athenion came with three thousand, complying as a general to King Tryphon, having sent the rest of his army to overrun the country, and to stir up the slaves for revolt. After this Tryphon, suspecting that Athenion would attack given the opportunity, threw him in jail. The citadel, which was very secure, he equipped with costly constructions and secured it more. (36.7.3) It is said that this place is named Triocala because it has three fine features: first, many flowing springs remarkable for their sweetness; second, the country around is planted with both vines and olive trees and is wonderfully amenable to cultivation; third, surpassing strength, as it is a large and impregnable rock ridge. Tryphon surrounded the city with a wall of eight stades and a deep moat, and used it as his royal residence, filling it with every abundance required for living. He built a royal residence and an agora able to hold many people. (36.7.4) He chose sufficient men who excelled in prudence, and appointing them as counsellors he used them as his councillors. He wore a purple bordered toga and a broad bordered chiton when in session, and had lictors bearing axes precede him; and in all other things he made it his business to both prepare and adorn himself as much as a king.

(36.8.1) The senate of Rome appointed Lucius Licinius Lucullus against the rebels, with an army of fourteen thousand Romans and Italians, eight hundred Bithynians, Thessalians and Acarnanians, six hundred Lucanians, commanded by Cleptius, a man versed in generalship and famous for bravery, and a further six hundred in addition, for a total of seventeen thousand, with these he seized Sicily. (36.8.2) Tryphon, having absolved Athenion of guilt, was taking counsel about the war against Rome. His choice was to fight at Triocala, but Athenion advised that they should not shut themselves into a siege, but ought to fight in the open. This plan prevailed, and they encamped near Scirthea, no fewer than forty thousand strong: the Roman camp was twelve stades from them. (36.8.3) First there was constant skirmishing. Next, after the two armies had drawn up opposite each other, the battle

---

422 The text is wrong here, as the total is only sixteen thousand.
swung this way and that, with many dead on both sides. Athenion, who had a force of two hundred cavalry fighting with him, was victorious and filled the area around him with corpses. He was, however, wounded in both knees, and taking a third injury was useless to the battle: because of this the runaways, losing spirit, were turned to flight. (36.8.4) Athenion escaped detection as being a corpse, and by pretending to be dead came through safely in the night. The Romans won a magnificent victory, since those with Tryphon, and Tryphon himself, fled; many were cut down in flight, and not less than twenty thousand died. The remainder, under the cover of night, escaped into Triocala: though it was easy to kill them too if the governor had pursued them. (36.8.5) The slaves had come to such a low point that they even considered returning to their masters and placing themselves in their hands: however the judgement prevailed of those arguing to fight till death prevailed, and not to utterly betray themselves to the hated enemy. After nine days the governor arrived to besiege Triocala. After inflicting some casualties, but also suffering some, he departed the worse off, and the rebels were back to being presumptuous. The governor accomplished nothing of what needed doing, either because of indolence or because of taking bribes: because of this he was later tried and punished by the Romans and brought to justice.

(36.9.1) Gaius Servilius, sent out as governor to succeed Lucullus, accomplished nothing worthy of note: therefore, like Lucullus, he was later condemned to exile. After Tryphon died, Athenion was appointed his successor in office; he besieged cities and overran the whole country with impunity, and seized many places, while Servilius never acted against him. (Photius, Bibl. pp. 389-90.)

(36.9.2) When the governor, Lucullus, learned that Gaius Servilius, the governor to succeed him for the war, had crossed the straits, he both disbanded his soldiers and set fire to his camp and its fittings, since he did not want his successor to the command to have any important resources for the war. For since he was being slandered for his seeming to expand the war, he supposed that by humiliation and contempt of this man he would dispel the charges against himself. (Const. Exc. 4, pp. 392-3.)
(36.10.1) When the year had finished, Gaius Marius was elected consul for the fifth time with Gaius Aquilius: of them, Aquilius was sent as general against the rebels and by his own bravery he defeated the rebels in a famous battle. Confronting Athenion, the actual king of the rebels, he exhibited a brave struggle, and killed him, although he, having been wounded in the head, was treated. He advanced with the army against the remaining rebels, which were ten thousand in number. When they did not await his advance, but fled for refuge into their strongholds, nevertheless Aquilius did not fail in attempting everything until by forcing them to capitulate he subdued them. (36.10.2) Yet a thousand remained, with Satyrus as their leader. Aquilius at first attempted to subdue them through arms, but later, after they had exchanged envoys and handed themselves over, he released them from immediate punishments, and bringing them back to Rome he made them those who fight beasts. (36.10.3) Some say that they made a most magnificent end of their lives: for they avoided battle with the beasts, and slaughtered one another at the public altars, Satyrus himself killing the last man. This man then, after the rest, died heroically by his own hand. Therefore the slave war in Sicily, that persisted for about four years, had an end that befitted a tragedy. (Photius, Bibl. p. 390.)

423 Diodorus is wrong here, it was Manius Aquilius.
Appendix 13: Honours for Victory?

It has become a commonplace to assert, following Aulus Gellius (5.6.21-3) and Pliny (N.H. 15.125), that one reason for denying a general a triumph was that his opponents were slaves. The evidence typically adduced for this includes the ovations of Crassus over Spartacus, Perperna for his victory at Enna over the armies of Eunus during the Sicilian Insurrection, and Aquilius for his over Athenion during the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War. This has led one scholar to remark that (Marshall 1972: 671) ‘(i)n view of the attitude towards a victory over slaves, it was a considerable mark of distinction that Crassus was allowed a celebration at all’ for his victory over Spartacus.\textsuperscript{424} The implication is that the conflicts just briefly mentioned were not regarded as significant (enough) by the Romans to earn the successful generals esteemed honours for victory. Yet, a brief overview of the honours actually awarded, as well as their relative merit, may throw some doubt on the notion that the Romans allocated a lesser status to the conflicts in question.

To start with, it is not clear in all of the ancient texts that the awards of ovations were because of a pre-existing rule (\textit{pace} Gellius and Pliny),\textsuperscript{425} and a brief reassessment of the evidence will demonstrate that matters are not so simple. In the cases of both Perperna and Crassus there are explicit statements that the choice of asking for an ovation was made by the generals themselves. For Perperna we have only the testimony of Florus, who gives a rather problematic account of the whole Sicilian Insurrection: he records it as finished by Perperna, when in fact Rupilius had to complete the war in the year after Perperna was praetor on the island (as a subordinate to Calpurnius Piso who was consul that year in Sicily). Florus records the following (2.7.8):

\begin{quote}
Shaw (2001), 13, argued that ‘(r)epressing rebellious slaves was beneath the dignity of [praetors and consuls,] and the legionary soldiers they commanded’, and characterised this type of engagement as a ‘sordid task’; Strauss (2010: 196), asserted that there was ‘little glory in suppressing a slave rebellion.’
\end{quote}
\textsuperscript{425} Beard (2007), 187-218, has recently reminded us that the ‘rules’ often discussed for the assignation of triumphs (for example that requiring five thousand enemies killed; see Val. Max. 2.8) were not hard and fast, but that in fact the process of celebrating or not celebrating a triumph was one of negotiation with both the senate and the people of Rome, and that it could require one of either’s permission, although even generals that had been denied the right by both groups could still triumph.
...fuitque de servis ovatione contentus, ne dignitatem triumphi servili inscriptione violaret.

[Perperna] was content with an ovation for his victory over the slaves, so that he might not violate the dignity of a triumph with a servile title.

Brennan (1993: 168-73) has persuasively argued that Perperna’s ovation was awarded for clearing the hill-top of Enna of the forces of King Antiochus, allowing a delegation of priests to access the sanctuary located there. Bearing this in mind, it would be unusual for Perperna to request a triumph: regardless of the status of those defeated, it would be odd for a praetor operating in subordination to a consul, a praetor who neither finished the war, nor brought his army home, nor even broke the back of the enemy’s resistance, to request the highest honour from the senate. It is therefore understandable that he chose discretion.

We then have the case of Crassus. Plutarch records that Crassus did not even attempt to ask for a triumph, and in fact that it was ignoble for him to celebrate even the ovation. However, Pliny claims that Crassus used his influence to secure, nonetheless, a laurel wreath rather than a myrtle one for his ovation, which could be considered a form of honour for a triumph (N.H. 15.125; discussed in Beard 2007: 265). There is, therefore, a slight complication. Plutarch notes (Vit. Crass. 11.8):

Κράσσως δὲ τὸν μὲν μέγαν θρίαμβον οὐδ’ αὐτὸς αἰτεῖν ἐπεχείρησεν, ἔδοκε δὲ καὶ τὸν πεζὸν, δοῦν δὲ καλούμενον, ἀγεννητὸς καὶ παρ’ ἄξιον ἐπὶ δουλικῷ πολέμῳ θριαμβεύειν.

…but Crassus did not attempt to demand the major triumph, and it was considered sordid and unworthy of him that he triumphed on foot, called an ovation, for a servile war.

It is stressed in both the accounts of Appian (B. Civ. 1.120) and Plutarch (Comp. Crass. et Nic. 3.2) that Crassus was eager to secure the glory of the conflict for himself, and so there was clearly an understanding that a conflict of this nature could bring glory, and that therefore individuals sought it. In the case of Crassus, he also sought to augment this glory yet further by combining (on certain interpretations) the aspects of both the triumph and the ovation. We might also note that Plutarch uses the same verb, θριαμβεύω, to describe the action of marching in ovation, revealing
the potential ambiguity of the term θρίαµβος without clarification. Moreover, the Greek text of Plutarch implies only that the ovation was a poorer honour; it is still clear that Crassus was being bestowed with glory (the verb used to describe his action is θριαµβεύω) regardless of the type of procession.

For both of the generals just discussed, we have evidence that they sought, by choice, not a triumph but an ovation. The case of Aquilius is not so clear. His honours are recorded in two places: Athenaeus and Cicero’s de Oratore. Athenaeus (5.213b) records, based on Posidonius, that on his return to Athens, the tyrant Athenion informed the crowd that Mithridates, among other things, had captured M’. Aquilius, ὁ τὸν ἀπὸ Σικελίας καταγαγὼν θρίαµβον, ‘who celebrated a triumph after his Sicilian campaign’. The ambiguity of what honour was bestowed is clarified by Cicero (De or. 2.195), who depicted M. Antonius remembering Aquilius ‘ovantem in Capitolinum ascendisse’ ‘mounting in an ovation to the Capitol’. There is no doubt, then, that Aquilius won an ovation for the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War.

Nonetheless, there remains an additional oddity. Manius Aquilius was also known for having slain Athenion in single combat during the final main battle of the campaign in Sicily (Diod. Sic. 36.10.1). However the details of the spolia opima are reconstructed from the ancient sources, it is clear that Aquilius fulfilled all the ‘criteria’ for claiming this honour: he was a general under his own auspices; he defeated the identified enemy leader in sole combat; and he did so during a pitched battle. It is possible that this tradition had been forgotten in Aquilius’ time, since the last known example before him was Marcellus in 222 B.C. (see MRR I 232-3; Plut. Vit. Marc. 7-8; Liv. Per. 20; Verg. Aen. 6.855-9); it is also possible, but highly unlikely, that he requested the honour and it was never granted, or perhaps even that he never asked for it. It is still the case that Aquilius was famous enough for his exploits to be acquitted of charges of extortion during his time as governor of Sicily in 98 B.C. This was largely because (Cic. Flac. 98) ‘cum fugitivis fortiter bellum

426 See Festus 202.14 and Liv. 4.20.3-11 for two ancient opinions on the matter; for modern reconstructions see: Dessau (1906); Picard (1957), 131-3; Syme (1959); Rüpke (1990), 217-23; Rich (1999); Flower (2000); Sailor (2006).
427 Perhaps Athenion’s status as a slave could have been problematic in this regard, but the fame garnered for this achievement could be seen as evidence that this was not such a problem.
gesserat’, ‘he had waged war with the runaways valiantly’, and he had sustained bodily injuries in the process (De or. 2.195), most specifically from the enemy leader himself (Verr. 2.5.3). There is a strong likelihood that Aquilius was guilty, and in this would be in keeping with a line of governors in Sicily down to c. 93 B.C., when a certain L. Sempronius Asellio allegedly won renown for his recovery of the island from devastation through his careful administration after finding the island destitute (Diod. Sic. 37.8; for the date see Brennan (2000) 480 and 747 n.263). Regardless of whether he won the award, therefore, Aquilius won notable, and functional honours for his actions in the conflict that were not at all affected by the status of the conflict he fought in.

Thus, in every one of three conflicts, the victorious general won honours from the senate, winning an ovation. If, on the basis of this, we consider Publius Rupilius, it seems likely that he did not go empty handed either. To be sure, there is no record of any honours awarded him in the sources; and the fasti triumphales are not extant for the period of his consulship. It follows that whatever can be said of him can only be conjecture; but, in addition to the general ‘success rate’ here discussed, it is important to note that the Sicilian Insurrection had already seen one ovation awarded to a subordinate commander, indicating first the potential for award from the conflict, but also the honour attached to the fight. It seems therefore reasonable to suggest that Rupilius may have asked for a triumph, but that he possibly received an ovation.

To sum up. If we take into account all the honours won by generals fighting in conflicts typically regarded as slave revolts in the Republic, it would appear that the status of the engagements was not one for which no glory could be won. Indeed, we might better note that in none of these wars was a general not awarded an honour; one might say that these conflicts almost guaranteed honours for the Roman general

---

428 Indeed Cicero actually admits as much in the pro Flacco (98).
429 Marshall (1972), 672, argued that Rupilius won an ovation, while Bradley (1989), 68-9, considered it possible that he won a triumph for his victory. Valerius Maximus credits both L. Calpurnius Piso (4.3.10) and P. Rupilius (6.9.8) with ending the war; we know that M. Perperna was awarded an ovatio, possibly during the year of Piso’s consulship and it is possible that Valerius Maximus’ confusion was caused by the fact that an ovation for the conflict was awarded during Piso’s consulship.
on success, or, perhaps rather more accurately, that they were like any other conflict in this sense. If we consider, also, that the decision to ask for an ovation was often ascribed to the generals themselves, it seems rather more likely that the ‘rules’ governing the attribution of honours mentioned in Gellius (5.6.21-3) and Pliny (N.H. 15.125) were later inventions designed to explain why certain conflicts were awarded ‘only’ an ovation. The decision resting with the generals would also seem to contradict the interpretation that the awarding of an ovation was a method of (Beard 2007: 291) ‘rewarding those who had defeated enemies of lower status, namely slaves’. In their own day, successful generals were proud to be seen celebrating successes in the conflicts they fought; the three incidents here discussed show, therefore, that these conflicts were not conceptually downgraded by the Romans who fought in them, at least not when it came to obtaining honours for victory. Perhaps there are other elements of these conflicts which currently suffer from the belittling label of ‘servility’ that may regard closer scrutiny.
Figures

Figure KA1: King Antiochus on obverse with winged thunderbolt on reverse. Source: Manganaro (1990a) Plate 85 Fig. 5. (Collection Cammarata).

Figure KA2a: King Antiochus on obverse with quiver on reverse. Source: Manganaro (1990a), Plate 87 Fig. 1 (Collection Cammarata).

KA2b: King Antiochus on obverse with quiver on reverse. Source: Manganaro (1990a), Plate 87 Fig. 2 (Collection Cammarata).

KA2c: King Antiochus on obverse with quiver on reverse. Source: Manganaro (1990a), Plate 87 Fig. 3 (Collection Cammarata).

KA2d: King Antiochus on obverse with quiver on reverse. Source: Manganaro (1990a), Plate 87 Fig. 5 (Collection Cammarata).

KA2e: King Antiochus on obverse with quiver on reverse. Source: Manganaro (1990a), Plate 87 Fig. 4 (Collection Cammarata).

KA2f: King Antiochus on obverse with quiver on reverse. Source: Manganaro (1990a), Plate 87 Fig. 6 (Collection Cammarata).
KA2g: King Antiochus on obverse with quiver on reverse. Source: Manganaro (1990a), Plate 87 Fig. 7 (Collection Cammarata).

KA2h: King Antiochus on obverse with quiver on reverse. Source: Manganaro (1990a), Plate 88 Fig. 1 (Collection Bruno).

KA2i: King Antiochus on obverse with quiver on reverse. Source: Manganaro (1990a), Plate 87 Fig. 2 (Collection Bruno).

KA3a: Athena on obverse with club on reverse. Source: Manganaro (1990a), Plate 88 Fig. 3 (Collection Cammarata).

KA3b: Athena on obverse with club on reverse. Source: Manganaro (1990a), Plate 88 Fig. 4 (Collection Vagliasindi).

KA4a: Demeter on obverse with ear of corn on reverse. Source: Manganaro (1990a), Plate 86 Fig. 3 (British Museum).

KA4b: Demeter on obverse with ear of corn on reverse. Source: Manganaro (1990a), Plate 86 Fig. 4 (Syrcause, Archaeological Museum).
Figure KA4c: Demeter on obverse with ear of corn on reverse. Source: Manganaro (1990a), Plate 86 Fig. 5 (Collection Cammarata)

Figure 1: Coin of Centuripe, c. 241-150 B.C.; Zeus on obverse with winged thunderbolt on reverse. Source: SNG ANS 3, Plate 37 no. 1307; Calciati III, 169-72, nos. 3-4, SNG Morcom 572-4.

Figure 2: Coin of Syracuse, c. 230-216 B.C.; Gelon on obverse with winged thunderbolt on reverse. Source: SNG ANS 5, Plate 29 nos. 898-902.

Figure 3: Coin of Syracuse, 215-214 B.C.; Hieronymus on obverse with winged thunderbolt on reverse. Source: SNG ANS 5, Plate 33 nos. 1024-39.

Figure 4: Coin of Demetrius I Soter, c. 162-50 B.C.; Demetrius on obverse with quiver on reverse. Source: Manganaro (1990a), Plate 88 Figs 5-6.

Figure 5: Coin of Halaesa, after 241 B.C.; Artemis on obverse with quiver on reverse. Source: SNG ANS 3, Plate 34 no. 1191.

Figure 6: Coin of Tauromenium, after 300 B.C.; Apollo laureate on obverse with tripod on reverse. Source: SNG ANS 5, Plate 35 nos. 1114-23.
Figure 7: Coin of Centuripe, after 241 B.C.; Apollo on obverse with lyre on reverse. Source: SNG ANS 3, Plate 38 nos. 1316-9.

Figure 8: Coin of Syracuse, after 212 B.C.; Artemis on obverse with Apollo standing on reverse. Source: SNG ANS 5, Plate 34 nos. 1104-6.

Figure 9: Coin of Morgantina, c. 150-50 B.C.; Artemis on obverse with Nike standing on reverse. Source: SNG ANS 4, Plate 17 nos. 481-2.

Figure 10: Coin of Agyrium, c. 345-300 B.C.; helmeted head on obverse with club on reverse. Source: SNG ANS 5, Plate 41 no. 1304.

Figure 11: Coin of Aluntium, c. 212-150 B.C.; Herakles on obverse with club and quiver on reverse. Source: SNG ANS 3, Plate 34 no. 1193.

Figure 12: Coin of Caleacte, c. 241-150 B.C.; Herakles on obverse with club on reverse. Source: SNG Cop. 157; Calciati I, 130, no. 5.

Figure 13: Coin of Centuripe, c. 212-150 B.C.; Herakles on obverse with club on reverse. Source: Calciati III, 177, no. 9.

Figure 14: Coin of Cephaloedium, c. 241-210 B.C.; Herakles on obverse with club on reverse. Source: Calciati I, 373-4, no. 10.
Figure 15: Coin of Menaenum, after 210 B.C.; Herakles on obverse with club on reverse. Source: *SNG ANS* 4, Plate 10 nos. 288-9.

Figure 16: Coin of Centuripe, c. 212-150 B.C.; Demeter on obverse with plough on reverse. Source: *SNG Morcom* 569-71; Calciati III, 175-6, nos. 7-8.

Figure 17: Coin of Hybla Magna, after 210 B.C.; Artemis on obverse with Demeter holding corn on reverse.
Source: Calciati III, 43, no. 2.

Figure 18: Coin of Leontini, after 210 B.C.; Demeter on obverse with bushel of corn on reverse. Source: Calciati III, 81, no. 9.

Figure 19: Coin of Syracuse, c. 247-16 B.C.; Poseidon on obverse with trident on reverse. Source: *SNG ANS* 5, Plate 31 nos. 964-1015.

Figure 20: Coin of Syracuse, c. 247-16 B.C.; Hieron II on obverse with horseman on reverse. Source: *SNG ANS* 5, Plate 29-31 nos. 923-63.

Figure 21: Coin of Syracuse 317-289 B.C.; Arethusa on obverse with biga on reverse. Source: Kraay (1976a), Plate 48 no. 134.

Figure 22: Coin of Syracuse, c. 247-16 B.C.; Kore on obverse with biga on reverse. Source: *SNG ANS* 5, Plate 27 nos. 862-67.
Figure 23: Coin of Catana, 3rd-2nd century B.C.; Apollo on obverse with Isis on reverse. Source: SNG ANS 3, Plate 36 nos. 1278-84.

Figure 24: Coin of Mamertines, 3rd-2nd century B.C.; Zeus on obverse with advancing warrior on reverse. Source: SNG ANS 4, Plate 16 nos. 440-51.

Figure 25: Coin of Mamertine, 3rd-2nd century B.C.; Apollo on obverse with standing Nike on reverse. Source: SNG ANS 4, Plate 16 nos. 453-8.

Figure 26: Coin of Mamertines, 3rd-2nd century B.C.; Ares on obverse with horseman on reverse. Source: SNG ANS 4, Plate 15 nos. 423-30.

Figure 27: Roman as, 169-58 B.C.; Janus laureate on obverse with prow on reverse. Source: RRC 195/1.

Figure 28: Roman denarius, 71/70 B.C.; bust of virtus on obverse, with Roman soldier raising Sicilia from ground on reverse. Source: RRC 401/1.
Bibliography


Barner, G. (1889), Comparantur inter se Graeci de regentium hominum virtutibus auctores, Diss. Marburg.


Berger, S. (1992), Revolution and Society in Greek Sicily and Southern Italy, Stuttgart.


Bormann, E. (1901), *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* XI, Berlin.


Carcopino, J. (1914), La loi de Hiéron et les Romains, Paris.


Ciaceri, E. (1911), *Culti e miti nella storia della antica Sicilia*, Catania.


Forte, B. (1972), Rome and the Romans as the Greeks saw them, Rome.


Jones, A.H.M. (1940), The Greek City from Alexander to Justinian, Oxford.


Kraay, C.M. (1976a), Greek Coins, New York.


Meijering, R. (1987), Literary and Rhetorical Theories in Greek Scholia, Groningen.


Mohm, S. (1977), Untersuchungen zu den historiographischen Anschauungen des Polybios, Diss. Saarbrücken.


Pareti, L. (1952), Storia di Roma e del mondo romano, Turin.


Reinhardt, K. (1926), Kosmos und Sympathie, München.


Richardson, J.S. (2008), The Language of Empire, Cambridge.


Roth, U. (2008), ‘Cicero, a legal dispute, and a «terminus ante quem» for the large-scale exploitation of female slaves in Roman Italy’, *Index* 36: 575-83.


Stahl, H.-P. (2003), Thucydides: Man’s Place in History, Swansea.


