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LEGITIMATION BY MULTIMODAL MEANS:

A THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL ENQUIRY WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO AMERICAN POLITICAL SPOT ADVERTISEMENTS

Rowan R. Mackay

PhD

The University of Edinburgh
2013
SIGNED DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis has been composed by me and that the work is my own. This work has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.

Signed:

Date:
ABSTRACT

What is ‘legitimacy’? Is legitimation possible through non-linguistic modes? These are the key theoretical questions with which this study is concerned. It explores them in conjunction with an analysis of American political spot advertisements. These ads are situated at the nexus between legitimation and multimodality, and their relevance to contemporary politics on the world stage is reflected in the immense financial and skilled resources which have been — and continue to be — devoted to them.

A historical perspective into legitimation, multimodality and the attendant concepts of rationality and irrationality is given, followed by a discussion challenging the assumed rational role accorded to language. So challenged, the discussion moves to looking at the pairing of multimodality and politics; first from a historical viewpoint, and then from a more contemporary one. The role of myth, in the form of the American Dream, is investigated, leading to discussion of political appropriation, branding, tangibility, affordances and the (im)possibility of restricting interpretation. Spot ads are analysed with a specific focus: first on modal salience, and secondly on how the semiotic richness of the concept of nature is exploited for purposes of legitimation.
KING LEAR

Speak.

CORDELIA

Nothing, my lord.

KING LEAR

Nothing!

CORDELIA

Nothing.

KING LEAR

Nothing will come of nothing: speak again.

CORDELIA

Unhappy that I am, I cannot heave My heart into my mouth: I love your majesty

According to my bond; nor more nor less.
Largo.

espressico

sempre medio tenuto

cresc.

dimin.

stretto

cresc.

dimin.

Cresc.
Dedicated to

my supervisor, John E. Joseph

and

my parents, Anna and Ray Mackay
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

More people than I can possibly mention have contributed to this thesis through support and inspiration – I can only hope I have succeeded in showing my appreciation directly.

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I undertook this PhD with two young children. This was a recipe for guilt: time spent working was not time spent with my girls, and vice versa. Thanks to Joanna, however, my children were enrolled in the Cowgate Under Fives Centre. This nursery helped care for my children, educate my children, play with my children, and bring up my children in such a wonderful way that much of my guilt was assuaged. In particular I would like to offer my heartfelt appreciation to Lynn, Lian, Cheryl and Teresa. No parent could hope for more.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

What is ‘legitimacy’? Is legitimation possible through non-linguistic modes? These are the key theoretical questions with which this study is concerned. It will explore them in conjunction with an analysis of American political spot advertisements\(^1\). The analysis is positioned within the field of social semiotics, making use as well of tools and insights from adjoining areas of enquiry. These ads are situated at the nexus between legitimation and multimodality, and their relevance to contemporary politics on the world stage is reflected in the immense financial and skilled resources which have been — and continue to be — devoted to them.

In the literature review, I draw together ideas disparate in both discipline and time, in order to present the backdrop to my study. I also attempt to reveal the interplay and tension between legitimation and multimodality already inherent in the literature. Starting with Aristotle, and a brief discussion of how he envisaged a rhetoric firmly placed in multimodality, where, from a skilled orator, the metaphor selected was paired with a particular cadence for specific (and legitimating) effect.

Bourdieu’s elucidation of symbolic power introduces the role of embodiment in legitimation, which extends, of course, to language as it is manifested by each individual, and impersonally, by each powerful (or powerless) body. Latour’s challenge to the assumptions underlying culture (especially that of the West), and the (expedient and self-legitimating) fallacies found therein is partially supported by, and partially exposes as complicit, the discipline of anthropology which is shown to have

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\(^1\) I use ‘advertisement’, ‘ad’, and ‘spot ad’ interchangeably for reader variation.
been at the forefront of an emerging interest in multimodality. Joseph discusses the political nature of language and emphasises that it is therefore dependent on — and open to — interpretation, not as an exception, but as an undeniable and integral feature. This brings me on to a discussion of the hopes and fears attendant on the notion of controlling language and its subsequent interpretation. For this I focus on Orwell and Chomsky.

In the last part of the overview, I discuss Critical Discourse Analysis (or, as van Dijk has recast it, Critical Discourse Studies — or CDS). I summarise the (political) motivation behind its development and also discuss its reception, and in particular, its critical reception by those who view it as irredeemably biased. I focus on the work of van Dijk, and his pairing of theory and application. His work on legitimation and ideology underpins this thesis. Yet his emphasis has been on written and spoken institutional language, and I go on to briefly summarise the strain of multimodality as it grew alongside CDS, before concentrating in a great deal more depth on particular works by Kress and van Leeuwen.

I focus in detail on particular papers which have influenced this study: the selection of which has been bound by space, rather than relevance. Several other papers and books written by Kress and van Leeuwen are relevant to this study, and throughout the thesis, I attempt to bring in many of them. However, I had to select the ones I felt were both the most salient, and the most influential to my own work: both as background literature, and as modelling similar methodology to that which I myself adopt. In the last paper I review, ‘Legitimation in discourse and communication’ (2007a), van Leeuwen identifies four main types of legitimation:
authorisation, moral evaluation, rationalisation, and mythopoesis. One can see the relevance of this typology of legitimation throughout my analysis.

In Chapter Three, I outline my theoretical framework, explaining the different layers which compose it and why I blend theoretical approaches within it.

In Chapter Four, I outline my methodology, highlighting the importance of CDS. My thematic selection is explained, as is the selection of ads I have made. For both these selection processes, I emphasise that the potential coverage of my subject being so large, the selection I make is absolutely inexhaustive. The subject is rich and there is much more that could be done.

In Chapter Five, I look, historically, at the relationship between legitimation and rationality — and the consequent dichotomous pairing, illegitimacy and irrationality. I concentrate on the layers of meaning which have built up and make these concepts complex, fraught and extremely political. The role of science, Romanticism, Modernism, mythology, and technology are, by turn, discussed in some detail, while I continually attempt to draw together the influence each has upon the other, and the resultant resonances which carry forward. The socially constructed nature of legitimation is highlighted, and the political implications of this lead to my introducing to the discussion the role of religion, gender, the medical profession, and colonialism.

I use Chapter Six as a bridging chapter between theory and application and this is paralleled by the form it takes. In it there is a discussion of legitimation by multimodal means, the light synaesthesia sheds on it, and the complicated legacy of the Dada and Surrealist movements. Although the intention of these movements was
undoubtedly political, the next artist I discuss was so to a different degree. Eisenstein’s film making, his attempt to inculcate the global audience with the ideological correctness of the (Leninist) Socialist vision was intensely theorised and, crucially, when applied, not in the least reliant on spoken or written language. The last part of this chapter takes this concept (of altered modal hierarchy) into the present and, through the analysis of some spot ads from the 2008 presidential campaign in the U.S., attempts to demonstrate the political motivation which can lie behind such a deployment of modes. Within this discussion I also consider genre, and the effect that technological advances (namely the internet and its viral quality) have had on the distribution and temporal characteristics of ads.

Van Leeuwen identified mythopoesis as one of four categories of legitimation. With this in mind, I dedicate Chapter Seven to a discussion of the American Dream: I introduce its mythical status, and the narrative qualities which this encompasses. Looking at its evolving history, I suggest that the process whereby the American Dream becomes identified, not only with concepts (such as freedom and opportunity for all), but increasingly with material things (cars, houses, etc.) is problematic if it is to remain a positive myth in American life. I see this commercial and political appropriation as limiting the uptake of the American Dream. After discussing the complexity of tangibility vis-à-vis the myth, problematising the view that every instance of its reification in a thing is problematic, I look in depth at one manifestation of the Dream, and look at the political implications that this has. Into this discussion I bring Silverstein’s notion of ‘political message’ (Silverstein, 2011), Tilley’s ‘palimpsests’ (Tilley, 2006), and Bell’s notion of ‘mythscapes’ (Bell, 2003).
Despite arguing that the appropriation and branding I discuss reduces the affordances of the American Dream — which proves detrimental when desired by the individual to help shape, create and inspire them — I end this chapter by discussing Joseph’s opinion that the attempt to control interpretation of any semiotic text (this in the broadest way possible) is a forlorn one (Joseph, 2010c). Bringing this into a multimodal context, I talk about the relevance of Barthes’ question: ‘Mad or Tame?’ (in reference to photography), and DeNora’s proposition that instead of analysing music in linguistic terms, it makes more sense to analyse language in musical terms, thus bringing interpretation centre stage.

In Chapter Eight, I explore the role of the concept of nature in the legitimating strategies of a selection of spot ads. The different and competing meanings of nature are brought to the fore and their use within these multimodal texts is analysed in terms of how they are deployed and why. I bring into the discussion Bourdieu’s notion of habitus and his placement of ‘practical belief’ as residing in the body rather than being ‘a state of mind’. The connection between the ‘numb imperatives’ (a phrase of Proust’s he employs) and (human) nature is problematic, as I point out. Persuasion in advertising relies upon a haziness between fact and fiction and a lack of strict examination into the effect produced by this haze. ‘Nature’, a rich conceptual resource exploited greatly in advertising, offers many contradictory meanings. I focus on the status of children; nature as metaphor, and the increasing role of nature as synonymous with environment.
I end Chapter Eight in an analysis of two ads in which I operationalise my theoretical framework and then provide a typology of political spot ads’ multimodality as emerges from the analyses.

My analysis of the spot ads repeatedly highlights the fact that these are multimodal texts which need to be analysed just as much in terms of what the text (spoken and written on screen) offers the visual film and its musical score, as in terms of what the visual and the musical elements offer the linguistic ones. The notions of modal salience and modal hierarchy, as well as the functioning of each modal constituent, are investigated with the awareness that the strength and legitimating power of a multimodal text lies not only in the sum of its constituent parts, but in the relation between those parts.

In my conclusion I reflect back upon my study, discuss what I see as its original contribution to knowledge, and finally explain how I see it fitting into the development of a critical pedagogy.
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

In that the subject of legitimation is an overarching one, and multimodality attends not only to all communicative modes, but also to the interplay between them, an exhaustive literature review is impossible. Therefore, I have elected to give a brief overview of where I see my work situated and the pre-existing connections between the many disciplines which have influenced this study. Out of this broad overview, I select works which have been especially relevant for this study, focussing particularly on Van Leeuwen’s work, which I consider the closest to — and the most influential upon — my own.

At the heart of this thesis lies my desire to investigate legitimation, and particularly, its multimodal possibilities. Legitimation, therefore, is the principal field of investigation, with multimodality delimiting my exploration. My path to this topic is reflected in the weight I have given to the previous treatments of legitimation. However, the cursory nature of my coverage of some of the discipline-specific investigations of legitimation does not mean that I consider them of negligible importance, but rather reflects the breadth of the subject and my need for some degree of focus — as well as the practical considerations of a word-count.

A further constraint has been the material I have selected to analyse: spot ads from the U.S. This has allowed for a productive interaction between theory and application: a dialectical relationship which holds to the spirit of much work done
under the rubric of Critical Discourse Studies (CDS). For, in this thesis, I aim not to foreclose interpretations, but to critique and explore them, before offering my own syntheses.

Legitimation is not only an overarching topic with which many disciplines are concerned, but also a practice which all disciplines partake of. Political science, political philosophy, rhetoric, and the law are traditional areas in which grappling with questions of legitimacy seems a necessary part of their theoretical canons, and meta-discussion of legitimation gives legitimation in some instances. In other disciplines, or sub-disciplines, although legitimation is present, the theory behind it is treated as unproblematic, and discussed in terms of its role in the object of study. We can see this to some extent in linguistics, where, for example, scholars within Propaganda Studies, or Critical Discourse Studies, see the concept of legitimation as absolutely central to their projects, yet the question of what it actually is and how it functions is taken, to a large extent, as a given.

Focussing on multimodality and the place of legitimation within it, we come upon the interplay between the non-linguistic modes and rhetoric. The core question is: what, rhetorically, can be achieved through non-linguistic modes? Of course, this is no trivial concern, for what can be claimed as relevant to an area of study increases its remit and gives it greater influence as a discipline, increasing its legitimacy in a greater participatory sphere. If art and music, for example, are relegated to pure aesthetics, their influence and impact will be lower than if it is accepted that they possess rhetorical power — that they can legitimate. In the disciplines of semiotics, art history, musicology, film studies, and the philosophy of art, these questions are
highly relevant. Multimodality as a specific concern concentrates upon the interaction between modes and what is uniquely offered when modes are combined.

Finally, it is vital to look beyond the theorising or academic application of legitimation, to learn from practical activities which have legitimating as their primary concern. Observing how political aides and campaign managers proceed in the day-to-day, and how successful advertising campaigns are constructed, gives at least as much insight as does academic theorising. In political science and marketing departments, collaboration (or at least communication) between practitioners and academics often proves fruitful (as can be seen in the work of Scott, and Diamond and Bates). Yet, generally speaking, practitioners rely on untheorised, or informally theorised, intuition-based principles. The advertising executives or campaign managers willing and able to explain their craft in published work are thin on the ground.

Implicit in the above are four loose groupings:

1. The disciplines and practitioners that theorise about legitimation;
2. Those that use the concept of legitimation, although not heavily theorising it themselves;
3. Those involved in the process of legitimating and which legitimate their own positions by describing the way in which their modes are rhetorical;
4. Those either directly involved with legitimating a ‘product’, or at least concerned with the applied side of legitimation.

Layered on top of these four are groupings which cross disciplinary borders. These can be particular theorists whose ideas are taken up across academic fields, or
they can be particular theories or approaches which, again, have been taken as relevant across the board. For example, Marxist theory, and especially the work of Adorno, spans political science, musicology, linguistics, philosophy, aesthetics, and more. Similarly with the work of Bourdieu. Finally, woven through this complex arrangement are strains of meaning contained in the word ‘legitimation’ — e.g. discourses of nature and legality — which prove resonant throughout the literature.

The overview which follows is intended as a mapping of the interconnections between the subjects, the disciplines, and the recurring ideas which are contained in the subsequent chapters. The path I have cut out begins by looking at some of the implications arising from Aristotle’s *On Rhetoric* — pointing out their fundamental relevance not only for legitimation, but also for multimodality. After highlighting the importance of discourse in Aristotle, I discuss the importance of Bourdieu’s work both in terms of legitimation through symbolic power, and through his theory of embodiment, which leads conclusively to a legitimation achieved in an inherently multimodal form, and I discuss how this notion of embodiment dovetails with anthropology. I attempt to indicate not only the importance of anthropology in the development of multimodality, but also how a problematised view of anthropology sheds light upon the assumptions underlying a specifically ‘Western’ conception of legitimation, especially in its relation to rationality. In noting the politically expedient dichotomies and fallacies which have been evidenced through anthropology, particularly in Latour’s work, I suggest that such a recognition forces a reassessment

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2 I use the term ‘Western’ with and without scare quotes, but attempt to problematise the term’s easy uptake. The difficulty (nay, impossibility) of selecting an appropriate term which does not have unhelpful connotations is acknowledged.
of language, and, in particular, how the emotions are inextricably bound up in language (much to the dismay of some). The role of the emotions in language is taken up by Joseph who, viewing language as political through-and-through, identifies the significance this has for questions of identity. And identity is a core aspect of the how, why, and who of legitimation. Furthermore, if by ‘language’ we mean all semiotic modes of communicating, this further implies the existence of legitimation by multimodal means. In concentrating in turns on multimodality, legitimation, and language, and the inroads and entailments each makes upon the others, I hope to demonstrate why they can and ought to be studied together.

I then move onto a discussion of Orwell and Chomsky and the significance of their respective positions upon the study of legitimation, especially as it pertains to linguistics and political advertising. This forms the backdrop to an overview of Critical Discourse Studies, in particular the work of van Dijk, and the developments into multimodality and the social semiotics of van Leeuwen, whose work takes up the second half of this chapter.

2.2 Overview

2.2.1. Aristotle

Aristotle’s *On Rhetoric* unites the theoretical dimension and the practical dimension of legitimation, and is generally held as being the first work to do so (see Kennedy's Introduction to Aristotle, 2007). He is also credited with being

[T]he first person to give serious consideration to drawing a map of learning and to defining the relationship between the various disciplines of the arts and
In other words, Aristotle was the first theorist of multi-disciplinarity. He recognised too that the divisions between disciplines and modes are sites of ongoing negotiation and legitimation (see Ch. 4 on legitimation for a further discussion of this). The remit — the legitimate area for a discipline to be involved with — reflects the very argument that the early Greeks themselves had concerning persuasion. Joseph summarises:

Still, with democracy came a sea change. The power to persuade became ultimate power, and instruction in the art of persuasion was not long in being put on offer. The first teachers of the subject were given the name Sophists (roughly, wise guys) by their enemies, those who thought that persuasion should come purely from stating the truth, and not from any ‘art’, the purpose of which could only be to persuade others of what is not the case. The best remembered of their enemies is Socrates — himself a teacher, but of dialectic, a form of enquiry aimed at reaching the truth rather than persuading. In modern terms, Socrates was training philosophers and theologians, while the Sophists were preparing lawyers, advertising and PR types, spin doctors and politicians. (Joseph, 2006, p. 110)

This also helps explain the animosity still existing between, on the one hand, those disciplines which continue to hold to these distinctions; and on the other hand, between the theorising disciplines and the practitioners — a degree of disdain accorded to those who get their metaphorical hands dirty.

Aristotle’s motive for analysing rhetoric was ostensibly to equip his students to know their enemy:

Further, one should be able to argue persuasively on either side of a question, just as in the use of syllogisms, not that we may actually do both (for one should not persuade what is debased) but in order that it may not escape our notice what the real state of the case is and that we ourselves may be able to refute if another person uses speech unjustly. (Aristotle, 2007, p. 35)
Aristotle’s canny position, the ‘cleverness of this rhetorical self-defense argument’, as Joseph notes, ‘borders on the Sophistic’ (Joseph, 2006, p. 111). Furthermore, Aristotle’s engagement with — and ‘backing’ for — using ‘as our modes of persuasion and argument, notions possessed by everybody’, appeals to the multimodal manifestation of feelings, ‘pain and pleasure, and above all, happiness, the chief end of all human actions’ (*ibid*.). Joseph wryly notes that Aristotle ‘would not necessarily have disapproved of those television advertisements that are all about establishing a mood — the sort where you don’t even know what product is being advertised until its name appears at the end […]’ (*ibid*.). So, in Aristotle’s work, we can already see legitimation discourse — both concerning and affecting legitimacy.

In summary, then, Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* is fundamental to a study of legitimation by multimodal means first, because it was the first work to discuss the connection between disciplines, the modes they employed, and legitimation. Secondly, he studied the art of persuasion whilst maintaining the moral distinction between those who would employ it and those who would seek to understand it in order to counter it.

2.2.2. Bourdieu

The power of discourse in brokering legitimation is again taken up, this time through a more linguistic and sociological angle, by Bourdieu, another person whose work and ideas have been influential across disciplinary boundaries. I have discussed particular points raised by Bourdieu in different sections, but here it is helpful to look
at his description of symbolic power — the expression and elaboration of which is central to his work — and the role of language within it.

None the less, in a state of the field in which power is visible everywhere, while in previous ages people refused to recognize it even where it was staring them in the face, it is perhaps useful to remember that, without turning power into a ‘circle whose centre is everywhere and nowhere’, which could be to dissolve it in yet another way, we have to be able to discover it in places where it is least visible, where it is most completely misrecognized — and thus, in fact, recognized. For symbolic power is that invisible power which can be exercised only with the complicity of those who do not want to know that they are subject to it or even that they themselves exercise it. (Bourdieu, 1991, pp. 163-164)

Crucially, for my discussion, Bourdieu sees the body, as well as language, as a site within which symbolic power struggles are played out. This paves the way for the argument that legitimation can be performed not only by employing the body to assist in or be part of legitimation by multimodal means, but also through *embodiment*, in which the body is a primary site of legitimation. It is a multimodal site, due to the body’s inherent capacity for multimodal expression, but neither reliant on nor subordinate to anything outwith the body. Although it is not traditionally viewed as such, I would say that embodiment is, itself, a mode. Assuming multimodality, Bourdieu makes a tripartite division of ‘symbolic instruments’ into

- “Symbolic systems” (art, religion, language) as structuring structures’;
- “Symbolic systems” as structured structures’ — which includes ‘means of communication [mode] (language or culture vs. discourse or behaviour; and,
- ‘Symbolic productions as instruments of domination’.

Concerning the physical dimension of such power play, ‘cultural capital’ (as Bourdieu terms it) is carried, encoded, in many forms, one of which is in the body:
Most of the properties of cultural capital can be deduced from the fact that, in its fundamental state, it is linked to the body and presupposes embodiment. The accumulation of cultural capital in the embodied state, i.e., in the form of what is called culture, cultivation, Bildung, presupposes a process of embodiment, incorporation, which, insofar as it implies a labor of inculcation and assimilation, costs time, time which must be invested personally by the investor. (Bourdieu, 2010, p. 313)

In *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (1977), through an ethnographic account of Kabylia (N. Algeria) and the Kabyle people, Bourdieu explicates the link between embodiment and symbolic power using the concept of ‘doxa’ (and the weaker form of orthodoxy, implying, as it does, heterodoxy). Bourdieu writes that ‘[b]odily hexis is political mythology realised, em-bodied, turned into a permanent disposition, a durable manner of standing, speaking, and thereby of feeling and thinking’ (p.94). Social order is thus internalised, naturalised, there appearing to be no disjunction between what is ‘natural’ and what is socially demanded. This state is called ‘doxa’ and while it obtains, even those (relatively) disadvantaged in the society recognise the legitimacy of the social order and their place within it. Furthermore, because of this appearing to be ‘natural’, and its concordance with commonsense, What is essential goes without saying because it comes without saying: the tradition is silent, not least about itself as a tradition. (1977, p. 167)

*Doxa* is a state of social unanimity (ibid.), which is only challenged by the emergence of a ‘field of opinion’ (ibid.).

In this section, I have highlighted the importance of Bourdieu’s notion of ‘symbolic power’, arguing that in his conception of it the idea of ‘embodiment’ implies that legitimation necessarily involves the body. This being the case, the mode in which symbolic power is invested is clearly not merely the linguistic mode.
Furthermore, I note the importance of ‘doxa’ as the politically-imbued ‘commonsense’ view from which the powerful in society have their hold on power and their legitimacy appear as ‘natural’.

2.2.3. *Embodiment*

Bourdieu’s arguments concerning the physicality of ‘practical sense’ — a prerequisite for symbolic power — are discussed further in sec 7.2.4, but from his tripartite division, we can also see that ‘symbolic systems’ of ‘art, religion and language’ are not on an equal footing as regards their status and appropriateness as dominating structuring systems. Art has been seriously demoted; religion is considered suspect in the wake of Enlightenment scientific rationality; and language is what we are left with, given that ‘pure’ scientists have not yet found a way round it — not for wont of trying to eviscerate language of all bar its rational, mechanistic parts. But if embodiment is literal, then the body as a site of symbolic struggle becomes crucial. The adornment of the body through fashion is an extension to such embodiment: see, for example, van Leeuwen’s 2011 discussion of the social semiotics of the colour black of the ‘little black dress’ and the austere black Puritan garb, and Petten (2009) on ‘the intertwined processes of legitimation, identification and professionalization’ involved in ‘body modification’ (tattoos, piercings, cosmetic surgery and the like — probably, though not necessarily the result of more conscious decision making). Furthermore, the politics of deportment, poise, gesture and presence may not be well theorised, but that does not prevent their being taught, and not just in the distant world of Jane Austen, but on the curricula of ‘finishing’ or
‘charm’ schools for young women of circumstance still today. Yet in the predominant mind/body dualism (see Ch. 5) the body has been subordinated, and the potential for a legitimating art expressed through the body (dance, wordless singing, performance art) has been reduced.

I am not asserting that performances using, expressing, or employing the body are no longer in a position to legitimate or, in a wide sense, to be rhetorical. I am simply highlighting their lack of status and, indeed, legitimacy in being considered modes and art forms which can be used toward such ends. Throughout my discussion I shall try to point out why a reassessment needs to be made, based on evidence that counters the rhetorical inefficacy of these non-linguistic modes, I shall warn of the dangers arising from a failure to recognise the rhetorical and legitimating power of these modes.

No discussion of power and the body can legitimately ignore Foucault. I regret that length constraints limit me to a rather indirect engagement with his influential ideas. Much of the work cited here has been shaped by Foucault; even those that predate him have been reappraised in the light of his radical reconceptions. Similarly, my discussion of ideas about art and the sublime do not engage directly with Lyotard or Deleuze. The latter, especially, has been taken up by many of those studying multimodality from a philosophical or linguistic perspective (see, for example, work by Iedema and Lemke).

In this section I elaborate upon the importance of embodiment in relation to studying legitimation in multimodal texts. I introduce the significance of the mind/body dualism (to be looked at in more detail later) not only with regards to
legitimation and embodiment, but with regards to legitimation and the disciplines that deal with the body and embodiment.

2.2.4. Anthropology and Latour

The growing field of multimodality has benefited greatly from insights gained in anthropology. Howes describes the basis of this relationship:

Anthropologists are, I think, privileged when it comes to studying multimodality because of their work conditions. As they typically come from Western, urban backgrounds, they cannot help but have their senses awakened by the new sounds, smells and savours of the non-Western societies in which they usually undertake their fieldwork. (Sociologists, customarily working within the more familiar sensory landscape of their own society, do not undergo a similar jolting of their senses.) (Howes, 2009, p. 230)

Here, Howes concentrates on the sensual element, but anthropology, as Latour points out, is both a product and producer of the Western (as he puts it) dualistic fallacy separating nature and society, body and mind.

The goal of anthropology is not to scandalize twice over, or to provoke incomprehension twice in a row: the first time by exporting the Internal Great Divide and imposing dualism on cultures that reject it; the second time by cancelling the External Great Divide and imposing monism on a culture, our own — that rejects it absolutely. Symmetrical anthropology must realize that the two Great Divides do not describe reality — our own as well as that of others — but define the particular way Westerners had of establishing their relations with others as long as they felt modern. ‘We’, however, do not distinguish between Nature and Society more than ‘They’ make them overlap. (Latour, 1993, p. 103)

Anthropology in this sense can be used to expose the groundlessness of the legitimacy gained by the West in simultaneously creating a differentiation between Modern and Pre-modern, and layering onto that several hierarchised dichotomies (see Ch.4). Howes, after mapping out anthropological trends in relation to multimodality,
summarises what needed to be done after the ‘textual turn’ of the 1970s created an impediment to the development of a ‘multimodal sensory anthropology’:

For anthropologists to come to their senses, therefore, three things were required. First, that the study of the role of the senses across cultures be disassociated from traditional hierarchies which linked the so-called lower senses to supposedly lower races. Second, that the central role of the senses as mediators and shapers of social knowledge and values be recognized. Third, that sensory practices and values be situated within a society’s particular “sensory model” or way of understanding the world through the senses (instead of being filtered through “the model of the text” and other such categories of the Western imagination, such as “music”, or “the visual arts” or “cuisine”).) (Howes, 2009, p. 231)

This, together with Latour’s argument, is actually quite drastic: it legitimates multimodality for itself, but in so doing also de-legitimates the Western hierarchy which has enabled centuries of rationalisation for treating many non-Westerners atrociously (see further Sec. 5.2 where Latour’s symmetrical anthropology is used).

If this meta-anthropology (the anthropology of anthropology) has helped dismantle such politically expedient fallacies, then it has also led to a re-analysis of the place of the emotions within legitimate communication (and the question of such legitimacy — say of hysteria or hatred — is also up for debate). It is as if the pendulum has begun to swing back from the dichotomised state. As other modes are admitted, the question of the emotions inextricably linked to them must also be discussed. And, for that matter, the mode we have been relying on to protect us from such emotions — language, preferably typed and read silently so as to obscure all signs of handwritten or spoken emotion — is seen as being a little less reliable than we thought. Or at least the scientists thought — the politicians were under no such illusions.
Here I argue that Latour is significant for this study in pointing out the fallacies which form and perpetuate the base of many of the values we accord legitimacy. Through his symmetrical anthropologie (anthropologie symétrique) he has demonstrated the political and skewed nature of ‘our’ anthropology, challenging, in its turn, our view of ourselves as Modern and rational, and the ‘Premoderns’ as backward and irrational. The results of having the anthropologist’s eye turned inwards, at our own society, has profound implications for our assumptions of what is and is not, can and cannot, be legitimate.

2.2.5. Joseph

Joseph has tackled these issues from various angles. In Language and Politics (2006), he expounds upon Aristotle’s idea that ‘language might be political in its very essence’ (p. 10). And, as he slyly illustrates, disagreement (and therefore emotion) is part of the equation:

All animals are political, but some are more political than others, and one in particular is the most political of all, the reason being language. So wrote the Philosopher some 2,350 years ago, and who today would disagree? Any number of people might, actually. And necessarily so, if Aristotle’s claim is right, because disagreement is the necessary condition of politics. Man is first of all the animal who disagrees, and then the animal who tries to get his own way. Disagreement is as natural to human beings as speaking is. (pp. 1-2)

Disagreement about what constitutes a national language, ‘proper’ language, powerful language, the acceptable use of language. This latter is taken up again in a paper in which Joseph first recalls the Twelve Tables of Roman Law (from the mid-fifth century B.C.) in which the legal classification of different manifestations of
language meant that spoken slander was a lesser offence than that which was put to music for the following reason:

The song, Latin *carmen*… was different in kind from ordinary talking — not just a genre, but another sphere of verbal activity altogether, in which language fulfilled its original, divine function of embodying the power and knowledge that links men to the gods. […] In the sphere of *carmen*, what one says is not opinion; every word is effectively sworn to. By virtue of being in Latin rather than vulgar speech, and in set poetic metre, and especially if set to the music that vibrates with the Pythagorean harmony of the spheres, the song bears the seal of divinity. No one is authorised to reject what it claims, even if their reason tells them they should. (Joseph, 2010b, p. 65)

Divinity trumps rationality, and singing and poetry, being linked to the divine, lay beyond what it was legitimate for people to reason about. The revered status of language put to music was not, however, in opposition to language so much as an understanding that as ‘*carmen*’ language was invested with more divinity. As Joseph points out in another paper, language itself, until relatively recently,

was not about the “trivial” matter of how ordinary people get across their desires and opinions to one another. It was instead about knowledge — something divine that is transmitted into the minds of human beings, with varying degrees of understanding when it comes to those aspects of knowledge with which we are not innately endowed, but must learn from others. The desire for a *true* understanding links up with the search for an authoritative way of determining right and wrong interpretation of texts. (Joseph, 2010c, p. 104)

So, while a putative division has now been set between language and the other modes (i.e. music and metre as we have seen), the beguiling potential in language to undermine the rational is never far from the surface. Joseph continues:

It is a hangover of this heritage that, still today, linguistics so fears having language destabilised by individual interpretation that it goes to extraordinary lengths to exclude or mechanise interpretation […] *ibid.*
Individual interpretation is feared (the result of a ‘primordial hermeneiaphobia’), as is the possibility of subsequent irrational action based upon such interpretation — especially when this unites many individuals:

There is in all this [concern over incitement to hatred] a deep fear of the irrational — never of one’s own potential for irrational behaviour, but that of the masses. Every time we see a film of Hitler in full bluster, stirring up hatred of Jews among an audience of otherwise civilised, rational middle-class Germans, we remember what language is capable of in the mouth of an orator who can control every cadence, every tone, making it into *carmen*, an incantation to summon up the darkness that lies within every soul. (Joseph, 2010b, p. 72)

As a running theme, Joseph presses home the point that language both reflects and goes into forming who we are — in the eyes of ourselves, and in the eyes of others. Being inextricably bound up with identity, language mirrors the impossibility of disentangling the emotional and the rational; indeed, it begs the question of there being two such dichotomised classes to disentangle. Questions of identity, be they concerning national, ethnic, religious (see Joseph, 2004b), class, gender, or sexual identity, are often:

vexed questions, and we cannot make progress in sorting them out until we have a richer understanding of language and identity, which means working through the massive accumulation of assumptions about how language is tied to what we feel — senses, affections, passions — and therefore to who we are. (Joseph, 2004a, p. 92)

If we extend this concern over ‘language’ to cover ‘all semiotic modes’, the expanse before us is more panoramic: not simpler, but fuller and richer.

In this section I look at three aspects of language as it relates to legitimation discussed by Joseph. The first is the fundamental point of the political nature of all language; the second is the effect of language on its audience and how, in ages
passed, the legal status of verse and singing was different – in terms of ‘truth’ value, and in terms of penalty for the ‘perpetrator’. The third point is the link between this last, and the discussion of incitement. He cautions against a refusal to engage with the ‘vexed questions’ which involve language and its relation to how we feel, perceive, act, and interpret.

2.2.6. Multimodality and legitimation

There is still, perhaps, the inclination to see non-linguistic modes as removed from legitimation and politics — especially in any narrow sense of ‘politics’. I have introduced Bourdieu’s idea that embodiment is inseparable from the functioning of symbolic power — struggles for which extend from the child’s struggle with a parent, all the way to struggles at the head of the body politic. But colours? Sounds? Smells? Textures? Tastes? How can they be political? How can they legitimate?

Two examples will suffice here, as this matter is discussed below with reference to Eisenstein’s cinematography, Adorno’s musicology, Kandinsky’s art, and the social semiotic work of van Leeuwen. Textures first: in Edinburgh’s New Town, a part of a partially realised planned city extension built in neo-classical and Georgian styles from the mid-Eighteenth to the mid-Nineteenth centuries, there are Georgian townhouses. These form part of the ambitious master-plan, through which, ‘it can be argued that Edinburgh negotiated for itself an identity and a role that drew on Roman imperial ideas and allowed the city to walk a line between improvement and civilisation, on the one hand, and Anglicization and conquest, on the other’ (Lowrey, 2001, p. 149). Many of the townhouses are four stories high, with a
basement below. The façade of each storey reflects the power of those living behind the walls. The basement, where the kitchen was located and the lower tier of servants lived and worked, is faced with rough-hewn stone, which gets increasingly smoother the further up the building you go, with the top floors frequently finished off with some classically inspired stone-masonry. Under the plain slated roof are, again, quarters for the upstairs servants. Architecture has legitimated the powerful through such semiotic resources as size, texture, colour, proportion, material and siting since ancient times.

The second example comes from Howes’ discussion of taste in his chapter on anthropology and multimodality, which quotes from Farquhar’s book *Appetites* (2002):

> In China, where food is medicine, specific combinations of flavours do have power in themselves. The taste is not incidental, not just a side-effect. What seems ephemeral [sic] is actually essential. Grasping this point proved vital to Farquhar’s subsequent analysis of the experiential dimensions of Chinese medicine:
> This experiential side to Chinese medicine encourages a personal micropolitics, as patients [in collaboration with their physicians] seek to govern themselves and their immediate environment using techniques that fuse thinking and feeling, forming habits that make sense to their own senses. (Howes, 2009, p. 233, citing Farquhar, 2002, p. 66)

In the West, science, and the so-called ‘legitimate’ language of discourse, have been divorced from ‘techniques that fuse thinking and feeling’, especially if those techniques might then lead to *empowerment* through a self-interpretation of sensual experience — recalling Joseph’s hermeneiaphobia.
Here, I have attempted to demonstrate through two examples how modes other than those of written or spoken language are (and have been through history) used for the purposes of legitimation.

2.2.7 Orwell and Chomsky

The third meaning defined under ‘propaganda’ in the *Oxford English Dictionary* is:

The systematic dissemination of information, esp. in a biased or misleading way, in order to promote a political cause or point of view. Also: information disseminated in this way; the means or media by which such ideas are disseminated.

The fear of uncontrolled interpretation has a strange relationship with the fear of uncontrolled production (‘uncontrolled’ taken in both senses as being neither overseen by a morally acceptable authority, nor of being carefully thought through), a relationship in which both Orwell and Chomsky, in different ways, have become embroiled. After viewing propaganda in action, Orwell wrote:

Many political words are similarly abused. The word Fascism has now no meaning except in so far as it signifies ‘something not desirable’. The words democracy, socialism, freedom, patriotic, realistic, justice, have each of them several different meanings which cannot be reconciled with one another. […] Words of this kind are often used in a consciously dishonest way. That is, the person who uses them has his own private definition, but always allows his hearer to think he means something quite different. (Orwell, 2010 [1945])
The comparison with Chomsky is often made, and, indeed, Chomsky draws upon his Orwellian lineage.³ In reply to a question quoting Orwell’s view that political speech and writing is the ‘defense of the indefensible’, Chomsky replies:

Yes, he [Orwell] gave interesting examples which are now classic, like the term “pacification” in Vietnam. If you look at what the pacification programs were, they were literally programs of mass murder to try to suppress and destroy a resisting civilization population. […] Orwell had pointed out early examples of this kind of usage. A standard example is “defense”. In the United States up until 1947 we used to have something called the “War Department”. Since 1947 we haven’t had a War Department; we’ve had a “Defense Department”. Anyone who had his head screwed on realized in 1947 that we were not going to be involved in defense any more, we were only going to be involved in war, and that’s why the War Department has to be renamed the Defense Department — because “defense” means “aggression”. (Chomsky, 1988, p. 663)

Their concerns are similar: disinformation for the purpose of the pursuance or maintenance of power (does Chomsky believe that disinformation for the purposes of challenging such a maintenance of power is acceptable on the grounds of it being a means to a moral end?). Yet, this recalls the argument between Socrates and the Sophists: does rhetoric serve truth or falsehood? When does the careful (de)selection of information used to persuade, say, a populace, fall under the charge of ‘misleading parliament’ or holding it in contempt? The more recent term ‘spin’ inhabits this fuzzy area, where advertising is no less at home. What is pertinent, in terms of legitimation by multimodal means, is the power of juxtaposition and propositional coercion across modes. We shall repeatedly see in the political ads the following setup: the promoted candidate will have his policies discussed to the backdrop of positive visuals, and

³ Although respecting much of Chomsky’s work in terms of its political commitment, I should make clear that I am approaching him critically, both with regards to his notion of manufacture of consent and the legacy of his linguistic philosophy.
upbeat music. The opposition candidate will be presented, in mention, image, or implication, in front of something negative (dark, ominous lighting, dystopian social images), with dissonant music. Claims of misleading are far more likely to be upheld in the spoken or written modes than any such allegation in music or image (see Sec. 2.3.1, and Hogben, 2009).

The juxtaposition of abstract terms is something which, again, has exercised both Orwell and Chomsky (see further Sec. 7.4.1). Here is another extract from an interview with Chomsky:

Q: Could you address the notion that words, language, have inherent power, concepts convey meaning beyond their words? What is happening mechanically when certain phrases are used, such as “the free world” or “strategic interests” or “national interests”?

Chomsky: […] I think it’s almost obvious to the point of banality. Terms like “the free world” and “the national interest” and so on are mere terms of propaganda. One shouldn’t take them seriously for a moment. They are designed, often very consciously, in order to try to block thought and understanding. […] Part of the reason [for the introduction of those terms] was to insinuate somehow that the systems of control and domination and aggression to which those with power were committed here were in fact a kind of freedom. That’s just vulgar propaganda exercises. (Chomsky, 1988, p. 616)

Propaganda was deemed, in the aftermath of the First World War, to be too dangerous to ignore. Ogden and Richards (The Meaning of Meaning, [1923]) conceived of a system, Basic English, which would simplify — and concretise — English, so as to avoid the abstractions which were seen to have been wielded for harm. Joseph, Love and Taylor (2001) summarise Ogden’s view:

[T]he First World War was itself the result of the misuse of complex abstract words such as democracy and freedom for purposes of propaganda, and any hope of future world peace depended upon the ability of thinking people to control the meanings of such words so that they could not be abused. […] Ogden believed that paring down the language to 850 words, a large portion
of them referring to concrete substances, would make it virtually impossible to use language in such a way as to deceive people for propagandistic purposes. (2001, p. 36)

Although initially attracted to the project, Orwell was to have a complete reversal of opinion. Where, before, he had entertained the possibility that the efficacy of propaganda would be diminished by diminishing the range of the English language, he came to believe, fervently, that such a reduction in language could not only work to aid the propagandists, but would also handicap attempts to counter it. In the dystopian *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, he parodies Basic English through ‘Newspeak’. The character of Syme, a colleague of the hero Winston, working at the ‘Ministry of Truth’ (which is, of course, working to perpetuate and publish lies) explains:

> Don’t you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the range of thought? In the end we shall make thoughtcrime literally impossible, because there will be no words to express it. Every concept that can ever be needed will be expressed by exactly one word, with its meaning rigidly defined and all its subsidiary meanings rubbed out and forgotten [...] The whole climate of thought will be different. In fact there will be no thought, as we understand it now. (Orwell, 1958, pp. 44-45)

Chomsky, however, believed Orwell’s vision lacking. He writes of Orwell:

> I also think he missed the main techniques of thought control and indoctrination in the democracies. For example, in England and the United States we do not use for control the devices he described, crude vicious use of highly visible power. That’s not the way thought control works here. It works by much more subtle and much more effective devices, the kinds we’ve been talking about. Orwell completely missed this. He didn’t understand anything about it. So I think that Nineteen Eighty-Four is very much overrated. (Chomsky, 1988, p. 630)

I do not entirely agree with this judgement for, as Syme later points out, in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*:

> Even now, of course, there’s no reason or excuse for committing thoughtcrime. It’s merely a question of self-discipline, reality-control. But in
the end there won’t be any need even for that. The Revolution will be complete when the language is perfect. (Orwell, 1958, p. 45)

The draconian actions in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* are interim measures put in place until the linguistic and imaginative limits of the definitive Newspeak (with the continued use of ‘memory holes’) render any less subtle operations unnecessary. In fact, Chomsky and Herman’s notion of the ‘manufacture of consent’ is more along the way to the ‘definitive’ Newspeak, than is the ‘interim’ Newspeak of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. In a state which successfully manufactures consent, imaginable frames of reference are restricted:

One of the ways you control what people think is by creating a debate so it looks like there’s a debate going on, but making sure that that debate stays within very narrow margins, namely you have to make sure that both sides in the debate accept certain assumptions, and those assumptions turn out to be the propaganda system. As long as everyone accepts the propaganda system, then you can have a debate. (Chomsky, 1988, p. 672)

Barsamian, Chomsky’s frequent interviewer, asks the following question:

Who engineers this, who pulls this off, who are the mandarins, perhaps as in Gramsci’s term the “experts in legitimation”? Who are these people? (Barsamian interviewing Chomsky, 1988, p. 674)

Underlying this question is the anticipation of the attack levelled against Chomsky: proposing that there is a coordinated and concerted ‘manufacture of consent’ implies a conspiracy in which an (evil) elite pull the strings of a duped populace (with only a few enlightened observers such as Chomsky himself, trying to inform the masses). As Joseph puts it, this is ‘pure propaganda anxiety redux’ (Joseph, 2006, p. 126). Chomsky’s answer to the question discriminates between those with real power, and those in the service of those with real power (reminiscent, again, of the Party make-up in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*). He says:
The experts in legitimation, the ones who labor to make what people in power do legitimate, are mainly the privileged educated elites. The journalists, the academics, the teachers, the public relations specialists, this whole category of people have a kind of an institutional task, and that is to create the system of beliefs which will ensure the effective engineering of consent […] In the media it’s still more obvious. The media, after all, are corporations, major corporations. Some of the major corporations in the country. The people who own and manage them belong to the same narrow elite of owners and managers who control the private economy and who control the state, so it’s a very narrow nexus of corporate media and state managers and owners. They share the same perceptions, the same understanding, and so on. (Chomsky, 1988, pp. 674-675)

This last, the mention of shared perceptions and understandings, is not incompatible with Bourdieu’s symbolic power and notion of doxa. The difference lies, I think, with intention. There is no reason to assume that those with the most power — the power elite — are all part of an elite quasi-Masonic lodge with the motto ‘We shall: for power and money’. The ‘membership’ of which Bourdieu speaks suffices to explain why — and how — the elite perpetuate their position. It also helps explain how less powerful groups can remain so, without their being in some way less analytical than their elite counterparts. Joseph sums up the danger of Chomsky’s view:

The idea of ‘manufacturing consent’ is the outcome of the loss of faith in the human will, in favour of a belief that a small oligarchy is exercising its will over the masses, who are like automata under the oligarchy’s control. […] But the oligarchical position that underlies the modern Chomskyan anxiety poses huge problems. On one level, it is a form of middle-class loathing of the great unwashed. No one ever expresses anxiety that they themselves are having their minds controlled from without. Their awareness of the ‘manufacture of consent’ apparently immunises them from its effects. But they are certain that the vast majority of human beings are not so enlightened, and are therefore the pawns of the oligarchy. (Joseph, 2006, p. 126)

This indictment can be somewhat tempered however, by the presence, in both Orwell and Chomsky’s conceptions, of a working class (the ‘proles’ in Nineteen Eighty-
Four), who are left, although powerless with regards to the machinations of the State, to express scepticism. Chomsky writes:

Propaganda very often works better for the educated than it does for the uneducated. This is true on many issues. There are a lot of reasons for this, one being that the educated receive more of the propaganda because they read more. Another thing is that they are the agents of propaganda. After all, their job is commissars, they’re supposed to be the agents of the propaganda system so they believe it. It’s very hard to say something unless you believe it. Other reasons are that by and large they are just part of the privileged elite so they share their interests and perceptions, whereas the population is more marginalized. It by and large doesn’t participate in the democratic system, which is an elite game overwhelmingly, and people learn from their own lives to be sceptical, and in fact most of them are. There’s a lot of scepticism [sic.] and dissent and so on. (Chomsky, 1988, p. 674)

The ‘manufacture of consent’ for Chomsky, is what the elite must do if it cannot rule primarily by force: ‘It therefore has to control what you think’ (Chomsky, 1988, p. 672) in order to create and maintain legitimacy. Chomsky’s tireless attempts to expose the corruption, hypocrisy, terrorism and greed which he sees at the very heart of the power elite in the U.S. have made him the hero of tens of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, the world over, but he has had another charge levelled against him which, in some senses, is more serious when attending to the multimodal part of a study on legitimation by multimodal means.

It is not necessary to discuss the intricacies of Chomsky’s generativist linguistics to assess the balance (or rather imbalance) between its treatment of the ideal speaker-hearer, producing sentences with infinite creativity and identifying correct or ‘deviant’ ones, and automatically interpreting the correct ones without error. This implies that interpretation is not only normative, but is also a passive activity for the most part — unless ‘deviance’ is flagged up, and an ‘interpretation’
needs to be ‘imposed’ — whereas speaking is active and infinitely creative. Joseph sees (ironic) coherence in Chomsky’s positions:

Chomsky’s decree that the great fact which linguistics must take as its point of departure is the infinite linguistic creativity of every speaker received wide attention for the political message it seemed to convey about the possibility, indeed the necessity of human freedom. Yet this was always a false impression, since the ‘creativity’ Chomsky proclaimed was limited to linguistic production, and was banned from the much more important matter of what production meant, since semantics for Chomsky cannot be a matter of interpretation. That is precisely the model on which propaganda anxiety depends: the ordinary person processes whatever they are told automatically, without critical interpretation. (Joseph, 2006, p. 126)

So, with his Politics hat on, Chomsky bemoans the ‘manufacture of consent’ by the powerful elite, and (with what can be viewed as intellectual condescension), attempts to enlighten the duped masses. With his Linguistics hat on, he himself ‘manufactured consent among a critical mass of linguists’ (Joseph, 2010a, p. 16), attempting to delimit the interpretation of his theory which itself denies the existence of creative interpretation. Chomsky, however, has had a long career and perhaps the best note to end on would be one of his own statements, made in response to a question about his extreme popularity as a public speaker. He says:

As you know from having heard me speak, I’m not a particularly charismatic speaker, and if I had the capacity to do so I wouldn’t use it. I’m really not interested in persuading people, I don’t want to and I try to make this point obvious. What I’d like to do is help people persuade themselves. I tell them what I think, and obviously I hope they’ll persuade themselves that that’s true, but I’d rather have them persuade themselves of what they think is true. (Chomsky, 1988, p. 774)

I daresay, then, he would be satisfied enough with these other interpretations.

In this section I have looked at the positions of Orwell and Chomsky, and similarities and differences between them. Starting with Orwell’s insights into
propaganda, I move onto discuss (political) Chomsky’s notion of the ‘manufacture of consent’. I discuss the problems inherent in this concept, notably the idea that in order for it to function, one must believe in a duped populace, a conscious and evil elite, and a small group of enlightened thinkers who have ‘seen through’ the constructions of the powerful. However, I do not wish to reject all of Chomsky’s arguments as he makes extremely important points with regards to the centralised control of the media, the power of vested interests, and the importance of the ‘framing’ of issues for those (institutions) with most power. Finally in this section, I look at Chomsky’s attempts to control and frame (in the very way he criticises others doing while embodying his political persona) the role of the listener/reader in their role as interpreters. While being heralded for putting forward the idea of the speaker as infinitely creative, he forces upon the receiver a passive role in which they must enact normative interpretation (anything other, not being ‘creative’, but ‘deviant’).

2.2.8 Critical Discourse Analysis ~ Critical Discourse Studies

Chilton, in a paper appropriately from 1984, draws together several of the elements discussed above with regards to Orwell, Chomsky, and the deep and enduring influence they have on the field of linguistics. He writes:

In Orwell the Utopian ideal of a unified, factual language has become dystopian. This clearly depends on the assumption that theories of language and certain language practices express ethical and political values. This position would be incompatible with most modern views about what constitutes linguistic science, since such views usually would disclaim any logical connection between linguistic theory and the holding of political beliefs. (Chilton, 1984, p. 130)
The inconsistency between a view of linguistics as a ‘biological’ discipline, as Chomsky would have it, and one which admits the Orwellian perspective that language is inherently political, and thus open to interpretation, has inspired the rise of Critical Discourse Studies, of which Chilton is a founder, along with Kress, Fairclough, van Dijk, and Wodak. Of course, Orwell was not the first to claim that language was inherently political: we have seen that this has been disputed at least since Aristotle (see 2.2.2). In the twentieth century, Bakhtin (Holquist, 1981) and his circle (Brandist, Shepherd, & Tihanov, 2004), Voloshinov (Voloshinov, 2010a, 2010b) and Medvedev (Medvedev & Medvedeva, 2004) in particular, propounded a view of language (as an exemplar of the sign) in which its dialogic (and embodied) nature was inescapable and of its very essence. Monologism was rejected but not at the expense of ‘the concept of a unified truth’ (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 81), which could be imagined as being the result of a plurality of consciousnesses. In fact, Bakhtin rejects outright a monologic interpretation:

> Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction. (ibid, p. 110)

Dialogism in this view is synonymous with what it means to live:

> To live means to participate in dialogue: to ask questions, to heed, to respond, to agree, and so forth. In this dialogue a person participates wholly and throughout his whole life: with his eyes, lips, hands, soul, spirit, with his whole body and deeds. (ibid. p. 293)

An implication of this (living) dialogism was heteroglossia: a multiplicity of voices. Applied initially in literary criticism, the political ramifications were, however, always present (the ideological function of the literature in full view). Yet, it was
perhaps with Voloshinov that the ideological character of language was most focussed upon. The ‘ubiquity’ of the word, rather than its ‘sign purity’ (Voloshinov, 2010a) was what was important:

The word is implicated in literally each and every act or contact between people – in collaboration on the job, in ideological exchanges, in the chance contacts of ordinary life, in political relationships, and so on. Countless ideological threads running through all areas of social intercourse register effect in the word. (ibid.)

What was under the lens of these philosophers was the sign. Thus, language fits in as one system of semiotic production among many. Yet, the ‘word is the ideological phenomenon par excellence’ (Voloshinov, 2010b) being as it is ‘wholly absorbed in its function’ (ibid.). The influence of these Russian thinkers upon the development of critical approaches in many disciplines (not only in linguistics) continues to be large.

Van Dijk offers his definition of Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) as a:

[S]cholarly movement specifically interested in theory formation and critical analysis of the discursive reproduction of power abuse and social inequality […] (van Dijk, 2008, p. 1)

Within the ‘concept of power’, legitimacy is pivotal, yet, as van Dijk subsequently points out, these are not ‘unproblematic notion[s]’ (ibid.). In fact, he goes to the very heart of what has appeared to be the most problematic feature of CDS (erstwhile CDA — it is in this 2008 book that van Dijk proposes the change). He states that it is not power in general that CDS is concerned with but specifically with ‘abuse of power […] on forms of domination that result in social inequality and injustice’ (ibid., p.3). The ‘problem’ lies in the relativity of such normative concepts. He writes:

Such a normative notion (abuse is bad) requires analysis on terms of other normative notions and criteria of the social sciences, such as legitimacy, which in turn presuppose an applied ethics and moral philosophy. (ibid.)
These early proponents of CDS, rejecting the hitherto apolitical stance taken, not only wanted to be explicit about their own political positions and intentions, but to challenge the view that there was, in actual fact, an ‘apolitical’ stance. Fairclough states at the start of his *Language and Power*,

> The scientific investigation of social matters is perfectly compatible with committed and ‘opinionated’ investigators (there are no others!), and being committed does not excuse you from arguing rationally or producing evidence for your statements. (Fairclough, 1989 p. 5)

Now, it happens that this first generation of critical discourse analysts are all politically placed left-of-centre. This shared political stance, leading to an unacceptable bias in some people’s view, is explained by van Dijk when he reflects on the implications of explicitly taking a ‘critical’ stance:

> Whereas much ‘neutral’ social research may well have an implicit social, political or ideological position […] scholars in CDS recognize and reflect about their own research commitments and position in society. (van Dijk, 2008, p. 7)

Van Dijk has consistently defended the possibility of being both a politically committed and scientifically rigorous scholar. He reflects, after many years, on this constant need to defend his position against attacks such as that made by Widdowson, who writes:

> Fairclough […] in common with his critical colleagues, sets out to expose how language is exploited in the covert insinuation of ideological influence. But they do this by the careful selection and partial interpretation of whatever linguistic features suit their own ideological position and disregarding the rest. (Quoted in Davies, 2007, p. 142; Widdowson, 1998, p. 146)

In reflection, van Dijk discusses aspects of the debate which questions the scientificness of ‘socio-politically committed scholarly research’ (van Dijk, 2008, p. 7) , noting that accusations of bias are ‘routine occurrences’ (*ibid.*) — and themselves worthy of
critical analysis due to the fallacy of neutrality which they purport to be guided by. He stresses, however, the need to take the criticism seriously, and writes that a committed perspective such as his does not ‘imply less rigorous research’ (*ibid.*). Indeed, he sees it as quite the reverse, with CDS scholars more acutely aware of the potential impact of discourse, and the consequent need to provide thorough, well thought through, and methodologically impeccable research programmes.

If CDS is viewed as necessarily bound up with a particular political position, I can see that the possibility of its becoming a normative practice is increased (we only need to look at the scientific dogma of ‘neutrality’ to see that this is indeed a risk). However, the framework of CDS is not essentially, but only contingently, bound up with any particular school of thought, or on any particular side of any political fence. It is, to use a computing metaphor, open-source. Even if it has been developed by those with (neo)Marxist leanings, such a viewpoint is not integral to its makeup or use. If, for example, a beleaguered religious group were to be studied for the ‘domination’ which scholars, positioning themselves on the right-of-centre, saw being perpetuated by an atheist mainstream, a critical discourse analysis would be enlightening. Similarly, if a scholar from within a white minority group in an Asian or African country were to present an analysis of institutional discourse, in which they argued that their group was a ‘dominated’ one, lacking in a fair share of resources and symbolic capital, then a critical discourse analysis would be of compelling interest — not least for how it would attempt to counter van Dijk’s charge that such discourse constitutes ‘reversal’: ‘the strongest form of denial [of racism]’ (*ibid.*, p.128).
There is also a gap in theoretical coverage and analytical focus caused by CDS being conceived of as a ‘social movement’ (*ibid.*, p.8). If it limits its concerns to the dominated as opposed to the dominating, it cannot easily take account issues of non-human (or not directly human) concern such as, for example, the position and power of climate-change sceptics. We can anthropomorphise the Earth as the dominated (see Sec. 4.2.5), or we can look at human groups that suffer as a result of climate change policies, yet these options are problematic either in approach or in coverage. Yet it remains the case that the rhetorical practice that climate-change sceptics engage in is a mirror image of that undertaken in CDS. For example, the Republican think-tank ‘Project for the New American Century’, led by Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz, is extremely apt at something very much akin to critical discourse analysis. They have effectively analysed Democrat and liberal discourse, locating the sources of its power and identifying the ideological functions within it, and used this information to build a counter argument — and even a counter discourse of their own. In a quote, attributed to Karl Rove, we can see that the creation of just such a discourse, or of an Orwellian ‘reality’, is underway. He was speaking to a *New York Times* columnist:

The aide [Rove] said that guys like me [the columnist] were ‘in what we called the reality-based community’, which he defined as people ‘who believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality’. I nodded and murmured something about enlightenment principles and empiricism. He cut me off. ‘That’s not the way the world really works anymore,’ he continued. ‘We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality — judiciously, as you will — we’ll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that’s how things will sort out. We’re history’s actors… and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do’. (Salmon, 2008)
Linguists such as van Dijk are needed to keep up the judicious studying of discourse and methods of *legitimation*. There may be those within the (neo)Marxist CDA school who would feel that my application of ‘their’ framework is unacceptable and too apolitical — not to mention too much removed from its original (neo-Marxist) context. I would answer that this ‘free-ing’ of CDA serves to strengthen it, increase its relevance, and, crucially, defend it from the criticism that it is inherently biased.

The arguments surrounding the ‘free-ing’ of CDA have recently been made from another angle: that of its cultural bias. Zhang, Chilton, He & Jing (2011) investigate the translation of ‘critique’, ‘critical’ and their cognates into Chinese; and the reciprocal translation of the Chinese words used in similar circumstances into English. By doing so they expose certain cultural associations, shaped by – and through – historical events, which are brought to bear on contemporary usage. This is not simply at the etymological level from which strains of meaning shape the use and comprehension of the word, but implicates the evolution and political deployment of ‘critique’ in a culture’s history. Thus, as the paper outlines, in the western tradition, ‘critique’ is seen emerging mainly from a philosophical standpoint (with Kant, Marx and Habermas plotted along the line), whereas, in the Chinese tradition there is more emphasis upon a critique of *self* paired with a heightened notion of public duty (developing in Confucian philosophy), which can be made institutionally political by turning such ‘self-critique’ into public performance – a type of political confession, for which the consequences could be fatal (a practice employed in the Maoist period). The paper, however, stresses that two different traditions need not imply that critique (as it is understood in CDA) is a western export – and an imperialist one at that,
damaging an indigenous tradition of critique (Shi-Xu, 2009). Instead, they suggest that there are more common features than may first be supposed, and that a sensitivity to similarities and differences will allow for their two final questions ‘Is criticism a universal practice? Can it be transferred across cultures’ to be answered in the affirmative.

The focus upon culture has been taken up again in a paper by Gavriely-Nuri (2012) who, in a sense, advocates solving the ‘problem’ addressed in the paper by Zhang et al, by creating a particular sub-set of CDA, namely CCDA (cultural approach to discourse analysis). Aligning itself to the discourse historical approach, Gavriely-Nuri proposes using the metaphor of ‘culture as database’ in this culturally orientated CDA approach ‘which aims at exposing the various ways in which cultural codes are embedded in discourse, and contribute to the reproduction of abuses of power’ (ibid). The simultaneous expansion and particularising of CDA is another method by which it can be ‘freed’.

A third recent contribution worth mentioning in this discussion of the ‘freeing of CDA’ is Chilton’s recent (2011) paper entitled ‘Still something missing in CDA’. That ‘something’ is an exploration and explication of ‘the underlying moral values of the critical stance in CDA’. According to Chilton, this is now required ‘in view of the global context in which CDA operates’. Chilton highlights the problematic question of ‘universalism’ when it comes to a value-based analysis, noting that this requires the explicit acknowledgement of cultural norms and values. This call for (even) greater transparency is a response to the fact that ‘CDA has been constituted of scholars who have shared a common core of ethical and political assumptions’ (2011, p. 775). I
would add that this has also been a matter of nomenclature: those following the same methods of critique and analysis but not sharing the same bedrock values are said to be doing something other than CDA.

In this section I have given a summarised history of the development of CDA – or, as van Dijk has renamed it, CDS. Showing Orwell, Bakhtin and Voloshinov as inspiration for – and precursors of – the critical movement, I see the view as coming out of a reaction to the view of linguistics as ‘biological’ and something done by neutral scientists. CDA challenged the very possibility of this neutral position and, while having a fair share of critics (mostly attacking what was seen as its Marxist bias), has gone on to become a very important multidisciplinary approach. I summarise the most significant attacks made against CDS and demonstrate how the ‘freeing’ of it from its particular political position would allow it – in theory – to be taken up by those on the other side of the political spectrum. I end by pointing out that although this ‘freeing’ may seem to be a distasteful (or worse, disloyal) use of their politically motivated creation, it allows CDS to maintain its own legitimacy while undertaking the important work of challenging the legitimacy of others.

2.2.9 Van Dijk

As one of the founders of Critical Discourse Studies, van Dijk has spent more time than many others in the field — or as he would have it, ‘scholarly movement’ (van Dijk, 2008, p. 1) — situating it theoretically, questioning and honing the analytical methods it can call upon, and discussing its reach, purpose and limits. From early on, van Dijk has embraced multi- and inter-disciplinarity which becomes
relevant to my study in its admission (at least in theory) of expansion into other modes, and further disciplines. He notes that ‘interdisciplinary endeavors often bring most interesting forms of theoretical renewal’ and anticipates this increasing as the study of discourse becomes ‘one, complex scholarly enterprise’ (van Dijk, 1997b, pp. 27-28). While applying his theoretical insights primarily to racism and (manipulative) parliamentary discourse, van Dijk has focussed closely on ideology (1998a), discourse (1997a; 1997b), and the intersections of discourse and context (2009a), discourse and society (2009b), discourse and power (2008), discourse and manipulation (2006a), and politics, ideology and discourse (2006b). He does this through his characteristic triangulation of discourse, cognition and society. Rejecting the ‘general tendency in critical research […] to directly link society — and especially power and domination — with discourse, social practices or other phenomenon we study’ (van Dijk, 2008, p. 16), van Dijk consistently engages with aspects of social cognition. He writes that in his framework:

such a direct link does not exist: there is no direct influence of social structure on text or talk. […] Personal and social cognition always mediates between society or social situations and discourse. Hence, in CDS we need to study social problems in terms of the discourse-cognition-society triangle. (ibid.)

By way of cognition, van Dijk can be situated somewhere between Chomsky (and his ‘manufacture of consent’), and Bourdieu (and his ‘symbolic power’). The question of agency and interpretation are core concerns here. In this elaboration of his position we can hear echoes of Habermas, Gramsci, Orwell, Chomsky and Bourdieu:

I essentially define social power in terms of control, that is, of control of one group over other groups and their members. […] Control does not only apply to discourse as social practice, but also to the minds of those who are being
controlled, that is, their knowledge, opinions, attitudes, ideologies as well as other personal or social representations. (ibid., p.9)

Van Dijk later mitigates the seeming absoluteness of this ‘mind control’ by saying that in general it is indirect,

an intended but only possible or probable consequence of discourse. Those who control discourse may indirectly control the minds of people. And since people’s actions are controlled by their minds (knowledge, attitudes, ideologies, norms, values), mind control also means indirect action control. (ibid.)

He goes on to suggest the possibility that the ‘illusion of freedom’ may very well be the best way to create the ‘ideological hegemony’ which benefits the dominant groups in society, some of which are the very companies — media and technology — ‘that produce such an illusion’ (ibid., p. 12). For any study of political advertising, such questions of ‘mind control’ and ideological hegemony are crucial.

The relation between Bourdieu’s concept of doxa (see 2.2.3), van Dijk’s position on ‘mind control’ and Chomsky’s notion of hegemonic control is relevant here. The doxa is only challenged when ‘political and economic crises’, or “cultural contact” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 168) brings about a reassessment, ‘brings the undiscussed into discussion, the unformulated into formulation’ (ibid.). Controlling (or attempting to control) the frame within which any debate takes place is central to Chomsky’s propaganda model, and in van Dijk’s theory, the intentionality of this control need not be (but may be) so direct. In Bourdieu, although it is not the frame of the debate which is contested, the doxa is a close counterpart. He writes:

The dominated classes have an interest in pushing back the limits of doxa and exposing the arbitrariness of the taken for granted; the dominant classes have an interest in defending the integrity of doxa or, short of this, of establishing in its place the necessarily imperfect substitute, orthodoxy. (ibid. p. 169)
Thus, in a sense, the *doxa* is a denial of any frames of debate; it is the insistence upon an arbitrariness, and a naturalness, which here implies the same thing.

Of even more precise relevance to my own study is van Dijk’s work on legitimation (e.g. van Dijk, 1998b, 2006a) and here it is worth repeating his basic point (which, rather surprisingly, seems to be more or less assumed in other CDS studies) concerning the normativity implied by his work:

If we want to analyse and criticize domination, and if domination is defined as illegitimate, we need to be very explicit about the norms, criteria or standards of legitimacy. Crucially, then, the question is: who defines what is legitimate in the first place? […] As is the case for all our norms, values and knowledge, the standards of legitimacy are relative and change historically and vary cross-culturally — even when we claim each time that they are ‘universal’. (2008, p. 19)

This problematising of the very concept of legitimation, identifying the relativity implicit in it as both its strength and weakness, is a central theme running through this thesis.

The internalised form of legitimation, in the form of mental models, beliefs and attitudes, neurologically coded, lies beyond the bounds of this thesis. It is, in principle, not incompatible with my focus on multimodality. Van Dijk repeatedly includes multimodality within the scope of CDS. At the very beginning of his 2008 book he asks the question:

how do a specific intonation, a pronoun, a headline, a topic, a lexical item, a metaphor, a colour or camera angle, among a host of other semiotic properties of discourse, relate to something as abstract and general as power relations in society? (2008, p. 1)
This openness to semiotic variety, and willingness to include it in his more general theorising, has meant his work offers a clear path from text based analysis to the social semiotics of van Leeuwen.

In this section I have summarised van Dijk’s contribution to and development of CDS. I have focussed particularly on his presentation of it as a ‘scholarly movement’, rather than as a methodology. This position lends more weight to the concentration he puts on its interdisciplinary nature and applicability. I also look into the connection between van Dijk’s notion of ‘mind control’ and the previously surveyed notions of Bourdieu’s ‘doxa’, and Chomsky’s ‘manufacture of consent’, placing van Dijk somewhere between the two with his cognitively mediated ‘mind control’. Finally, I identify van Dijk’s work on legitimation as particularly pertinent to this study, and his identification of the normative aspect of the values underlying legitimation as crucial.

2.2.10 Multimodality

While talking about ‘power and access’, van Dijk points out the irony that a methodological problem facing CDS is the ‘serious limitations of access’ (ibid., p.13). We can, he notes, analyse news, textbooks, and parliamentary speeches, ‘but [we] seldom have access to the kind of discursive interaction at the top’, for example, cabinet meetings, editorial discussions, or boardroom planning. ‘The general rule’, he writes, ‘is that the higher up and the more influential the discourses, the less they are public and the less they are accessible for critical scrutiny — sometimes so by law.’ (ibid.). A year after van Dijk’s book was published, Wodak, a co-founder of Critical
Discourse Analysis, published a book entitled *The Discourse of Politics in Action: Politics as Usual* (2009). A part of the impetus of the book reads straight from Habermas: despite increased information about politics, an apparent disenchantment points to a ‘democratic deficit’. The book is in part an ethnographic study of exactly the types of situated discourse contexts van Dijk bemoans a lack of critical access to. Following a day in the life of an MEP (there is a chapter of that name), we find out about the significance of long corridors (mundanities which we are shown really do shape ‘professional habitus’), time constraints, on-the-move briefing, and much more description which allows us a look in to a specific ‘community of practice’. This is an important contribution to the understanding of multimodality, as well as of discourse-in-practice.

Wodak’s own strain of CDA, the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA), is an important and complimentary addition to the CDA espoused by Fairclough, Chilton and others, and my theoretical framework uses it. However, like van Dijk’s work, Wodak’s own work is generally concerned with written and spoken texts, so I do not refer to it directly. I do, however, in applying the discourse-historical approach, attempt to take a deep historical perspective in order to shed light on the present, and I do so from a critical perspective.

Many other studies ranging between CDS and multimodality have been instructive (Fairclough, Chilton, Iedema, Scollon, Chouliaraki, Lemke, Jaworski, Jewitt and Kress), but I wish to single out just one other. The work of Machin (with Jaworski, 2006; with Hansen, 2008), and in particular his 2004 paper, ‘Building the world’s visual language: the increasing global importance of image banks in
corporate media’ has helped me understand the prevalence of certain images in the (new) media, the shift in how — and with what aim — visuals are classified and selected. Because the meta-data organisation of millions of images shapes how the resource of image banks is used, the underlying, organising ideology is powerful. The shift from the specific boy, office, city to the generic and conceptual echoes what van Leeuwen (2010) says about ‘writing’ from the Middle Ages to the present, taking into account the influence of religion and technology.

In this short section I briefly discuss the crossover between CDA and multimodality, mentioning a few important works and scholars in the area.

2.2.11 Cap and Johnstone & Eisenhart

Cap (2010) develops his ‘tripartite proximisation strategy’ STA model of ‘legitimisation’ (space – time – axiology) which focuses upon the relative positions between speaker (or writer), hearer (or reader), and any others indirectly summoned in the discourse. Following on from Chilton’s (2004) work on the importance within legitimating language of deixis, Cap uses the example of official U.S. government language after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 to show how the Bush administration used language to ‘dislodge and blur the old reality and build one anew’ (Cap, 2010, p. ix). Creating feelings of proximity and distance (in time or space) between the hearer/reader (at the deictic centre) and any others (friends and foes) has the simultaneous effect of inducing feelings of comfort or fear, safety or danger. This manipulation of the effects achieved by expressions of proximity and distance can also be undertaken multimodally. What the term ‘near-at-hand’ might signal to an
audience, can be achieved by an acoustic distance/volume play-off (e.g. a whisper which seems loud to the audience or the sound of a voice receding into the distance), subject framing (e.g. is the subject shown in close-up, at a distance, approaching or retreating?), frame speed (e.g. is the frame changing accelerated?), etc., etc. Of course the affordances of each mode and modal combination (the institutional language of Cap’s study being an example) are largely conventionalised, but always within a context, and never universal or unchanging. In Eisenhart and Johnstone’s (2008) edited collection, there is a section of papers on ‘Style and legitimation’. The four papers all focus on micro level features of discourse and demonstrate how ‘small grammatical and rhetorical choices contribute to the political activity of legitimation’ (ibid., p. 14). The importance of creating cohesion and continuity within a legitimating text is highlighted, as is the status of style and genre in legitimating strategies. All four papers stress the importance of context (situational and temporal) in the development and success of legitimation techniques.

In this section I discuss two of the works specifically on legitimation which I came upon while in the writing-up process of this thesis. I briefly review these two contributions to the area of legitimation, mentioning the connection between Cap’s work on proximisation and Chilton’s important work on deixis. In Eisenhart and Johnstone’s edited volume, I single out the four papers which look at both micro level features, and the importance of context.

2.3 Van Leeuwen (with Jewitt and Kress)

2.3.1 Ten Reasons Why Linguists Should Pay Attention to Visual Communication
The exploration of semiotic resources across modes requires researchers to be fashionably multi-disciplinary. To have expertise covering different modes of expression, and to be good at conveying such knowledge to a lay audience is the distinctive (and enviable) mark of the ‘Renaissance Man’. It is an irony perhaps, that in our age of specialisation, multimodal discourse analysis (and social semiotics) requires a broader discipline base — necessitating either collaboration, heavy reliance on other experts, or an all-round ability. One such polymath is the linguist, musician, erstwhile film producer, polyglot, and semiotician Theo van Leeuwen. In ‘Ten Reasons Why Linguists Should Pay Attention to Visual Communication’ (2004), van Leeuwen highlights the gap into which my own study fits. He says:

Visual communication is particularly important for critical discourse analysis (CDA). Nowhere near enough attention has been paid to it in CDA, with most critical discourse analysts analyzing transcripts of only the words of political speeches, or newspaper articles taken out of their visual context. (van Leeuwen, 2004, p. 15)

Using the example of racist discourse, van Leeuwen quotes Anthony Trollope’s account of the West Indies in 1858:

The Negro is idle, unambitious as to worldly position, sensual and content with little. He lies under the mango-tree and eats the luscious fruit in the sun. He lies on the grass surrounded by oranges, bananas and pine-apples. (ibid.)

As van Leeuwen points out, this text and others like it, are now ‘completely unacceptable’. Citing Nederveen Pieterse’s book White on Black, he goes on to say that Pieterse shows that ‘such racist views were also expressed visually and continue to be expressed to this day’ (ibid.). An easy way to see if this was still the case, ten years on, was a search on Getty images for ‘West Indian man’. This is the tenth image:
Figure 1: Getty image search for 'West Indian man' (10th result)
For ‘Jamaican man’ this stereotypical image comes up third:

![Image of a man in a hammock]

**Figure 2: Getty image search for ‘Jamaican man’ (3rd result)**

Van Leeuwen concludes that:

Racist imagery has in fact a much more tenacious life than racist language, maybe because the idea is still widespread that the meaning of images is more subjective than the meaning of words, more “in the eye of the beholder,” and maybe also because so many of these images are found in entertainment-orientated texts which often escape critical scrutiny, including critical scrutiny by discourse analysts, but may in fact be much more important carriers of political and ideological meanings in contemporary society than parliamentary speeches, newspaper editorials, and BBC radio interviews. *(ibid.)*

This is the most concise expression I have come across of one of the problems I am attempting to address, and van Leeuwen’s work is a pivotal juncture between CDA and my own work. Of course, the subjectivity marked by “in the eye of the beholder”
poses a challenge. Interestingly, out of curiosity, after finding the two images above, I searched for ‘English man’ (the ‘Scottish man’ search was generally, unsurprisingly, tartan-clad), and the first image was this:

![Image of a man lying on the grass with a briefcase nearby]

**Figure 3: Getty image search for ‘English man’ (1st result)**

What does this do to van Leeuwen’s argument? Does this mean that the above images, moved into this wider context, change from being racist to being neutral; or are they *all* racist, with the image of the English man supporting a different, but equally racist, stereotype such as ‘English men are unmotivated workers, slacking at every opportunity, and failing to fully embrace the corporate spirit through their poor
attendance and hypochondriac tendency”? Perhaps, on the other hand, these images are not racist at all, but sexist: ‘all men are lazy’. The context in which we find the images, whether they are in a travel brochure, a Bloomberg in-house publication, or a feminist magazine such as *Spare Rib* or *Bitch*, changes our interpretation of what their ideological intention might be.

The question of whether knowing ideological intention is necessary to judge the effect — and occasionally the offense — is an important and difficult one, and importantly for this discussion, one which is relevant not only for visual material but also in written, spoken, and even physical modes. Take the hypothetical situation in which a white doctor kills an old black lady by administering an overdose. She admits to killing on compassionate grounds. The state, however, finds that she has had a string of unsuccessful relationships with black men thwarted in her view through domineering mothers-in-laws and queries whether this was not a racially motivated crime. The successful presentation of one of these two conflicting summaries, ‘female caring professional’, and ‘white vengeful female’ is going to impact upon the sentence passed by judge and jury even though the effect of these two scenarios remain the same.

Now for a hypothetical verbal exchange, imagine a group of inner-city London youths all mucking around in a park (oh yes, with hoods up). Out of the dozen, one is white. As they get rowdier, a young black woman, irritated with their noise, shouts, “Shut up, will you?!”. The effect being to bring the most boisterous youth over close to her and start commenting on her loud mouth, her short skirt etc. In response, one of his friends shouts “Hey, nigga, let her go man”. The woman, far
more upset by the use of the ‘n-word’ than with the jostling commentary, takes the matter to the police. She is certain that it was the white boy who spoke, but his friends say it wasn’t. Does it matter? Could a friendly epithet be taken out of the context of the user’s intention and the intended receiver’s understanding by the woman’s higher status complaint? Wikipedia says the following:

Some African-Americans express considerable offense when referred to as a nigga by Caucasian people, but not if they are called the same by other African-Americans, or by some other minority, as a term of endearment. In this case, the term may be seen either as a symbol of brotherhood, similar to the usage of the words dude and bro, and its use outside a defined social group an unwelcome cultural appropriation. Critics have derided this as a double standard.

The importance of context in analysing images is easily illustrated: take a photograph of a young girl in a bath, the image sitting on a computer hard drive. If it is the mother’s hard drive no questions will likely be asked. If it is on the hard drive of a previously convicted paedophile, it may immediately be classed as ‘evidence’. The spectrum of unlikely-to-likely ‘suspects’, of course, has its own ideological overtones. What all these examples show is that the problem of subjectivity is not limited to image, and thus the argument held up stating the impossibility of the careful ideological analysis of visual texts is invalid. “In the eye of the beholder”, maybe, but in what circumstances is it beheld, from whom, by whom?
The treatment of this ‘problem’ of subjectivity can be teased out by looking at the treatment of it in law. If we turn to look at the development of ‘hate speech’ in law, and the possibility, in some countries to seek legal redress in criminal and civil
law for this; the increasing attention paid to verbal bullying in institutional settings; and the inclusion within the framework of domestic abuse not only for ‘verbal abuse’, but also for ‘emotional abuse’ (see the equivalence drawn between physical and verbal abuse in the public awareness poster)\(^4\), we can see that there has been — and continues to be — a continuum of socio-legal wrangling over the subjective interpretations of language (and in these cases, where the ‘harm principle’ trumps the right to freedom of speech). We see, for example, institutional attempts to mitigate against the damage caused in the (very political) arena of the school playground have meant that children are less likely than they were in earlier generations to be told that:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Sticks and stones} \\
\text{May break my bones} \\
\text{But words will never hurt me.}
\end{align*}
\]

and would be more likely to receive a flyer home from school:

\[
\text{Sticks and stones} \\
\text{May break my bones} \\
\text{But words will never hurt me.}
\]

\(^4\) It is instructive to imagine the written alternative to this poster: ‘VERBAL ABUSE IS JUST LIKE/ AS BAD AS/ AS POWERFUL AS/ AS HURTFUL AS PHYSICAL ABUSE’. Not quite so visceral and not nearly as subtle or concise. In fact, at the bottom of these ads, produced by Saatchi & Saatchi, Singapore as part of a Public Awareness campaign, was the following, in tiny typeface: ‘VERBAL ABUSE CAN BE JUST AS HORRIFIC. BUT YOU DON’T HAVE TO SUFFER IN SILENCE, CALL THE AWARE HELPLINE FOR ADVICE AND SUPPORT, MONDAY TO FRIDAY FROM 3PM TO 9.30PM ON 1800 774 5935’ Clearly the visual and the written text do different things — each employing their communicative strengths.
In the rhyme, the ‘hurt’ caused by taunts (another version ends ‘But names will never hurt me’) is held as being of a lesser order than the physical hurt possible. This rhyme reflects a time when policing the playground involved breaking up fights, whilst warning against being a ‘tell-tale’ or ‘clype’, thus reinforcing the distinction between physical and linguistic. Furthermore, the rhyme can be seen as a warning that physical retribution for verbal taunts will not be considered appropriate or commensurate. Times have changed indeed and children are told ‘to tell a grown-up’ if someone does or says something ‘not nice’ to them, relieving the need for such a
chant. The mediation of the school into the children’s non-taught hours is high. The resultant loss in time given over to learn coping strategies has been increasingly replaced by a more centralised, top-down insistence upon individual responsibility as a ‘citizen’. So the children are asked to reflect upon the impact of their own (linguistic) actions on others, changing the standpoint from that of receiver to producer.

I have gone into this detail in order to foreground the evolution of thinking into the status of subjectivity as it is applied to the physical, the linguistic, and the visual. Two important points arise from this:

i) The subjectivity inherent in words does not mean that their impact is less than with physical actions (which, themselves, are not so clearly objective).

ii) Subjectivity is a barrier to neither scrutiny nor legal implications.

2.3.2 Introduction to Visual Analysis

Van Leeuwen, together with Carey Jewitt, edited the *Handbook of Visual Analysis*, a book they wanted above all to […] be a useful resource for researchers investigating the visual representation of significant social issues, and which provided exemplification of a range of methods and perspectives of visual analysis […] (van Leeuwen & Jewitt, 2001, p. 1)

The list of different types of visual analysis — or rather different approaches which can be used to do visual analysis — is instructive in itself for demonstrating the inclusive nature of this young discipline: content analysis, visual anthropology,
cultural studies, semiotics and iconography, psychoanalytical image analysis, social semiotics, conversation analysis, ethnomethodology, and film and television analysis. In their introduction, they summarise the key benefits and limitations of the above approaches while repeatedly stressing the benefits of applying a combination of methods. They then offer a concise summary of the perennial issue faced by visual analysts — that of ‘the image as record or construct’ (ibid., p.4). Visual analysts, answering different questions and looking at different types of material, are positioned in various (and sometimes multiple) places along a continuum which has, at one end, the image seen as a record, and at the other, the image seen as construct. The former, such as a passport photo, are

[I]mages [...] produced to serve as records of reality, as documentary evidence of the people, places, things, actions and events they depict. Their analysis is a matter of extracting just that kind of information from them. (ibid.)

Figure 6: Michaelangelo’s The Downfall of Adam and Eve and their Expulsion from the Garden of Eden
Art historians too, they point out, sometimes look to their objects of study for factual information, while also gleaning what they can of the symbolic meaning of the images. So while these lie near one end, at the other, as with Michelangelo’s allegorical *The Downfall of Adam and Eve and their Expulsion from the Garden of Eden* (Fig. 6),

[I]mages are analysed, not as evidence of the who, where and what of reality, but as evidence of how their maker or makers have (re-) constructed reality, as evidence of bias, ideologically coloured interpretation, and so on. (*ibid.*, p.5)

The importance of this continuum will be seen, in the analysis of political advertisements, to be great. With advertisements (as with the cologne ad pictured, Fig. 7), viewers are required to straddle (as art historians sometimes do) these two conceptions, finding the ‘facts’ in the ads, while, *at some level* appreciating
symbolic value and the non-factual elements conveyed. The problem flagged up by ‘at some level’, indicating a partial consciousness of the viewer, is discussed by van Leeuwen in his own chapter within the *Handbook of Visual Analysis*, and will be discussed below. Prior to that, he and Jewitt make some generalised comments from an editorial standpoint. These are important but also problematic. They say:

The issue of ‘record’ versus ‘construct’ exists because many images have an element of both and so require a mode of analysis which is sensitive to both. *(ibid.)*

This implies that *some* images do not have an ‘element of both’, but I cannot think of any image which is, or even theoretically could be, only ‘record’ — perceiving involves construction. Similarly, it is difficult to imagine an image which is only ‘construct’ (perhaps some abstract art is close to this, but we still ‘record’, name and canonise such works). At the end of their introduction, they also throw into the mix, very briefly, other considerations of which analysts ought to be aware: the detailing of units of analysis; whether one or many images are to be analysed (and the implications these decisions have upon the depth of analysis possible), and the degree with which analysts engage with textual, contextual, and re-contextualised information available with the image. Again, they take an open editorial stance which accommodates the multiplicity of approaches taken in their collection:

> There are good arguments for analysing images in relative independence of their context (for re-contextualising them, in other words), and for analysing them together with the physical context and or *[sic]* social interaction in which they are embedded. *(ibid., p.7)*

### 2.3.3 Semiotics and Iconography

*Semiotics*
In his contribution to this collection, van Leeuwen discusses two approaches to visual analysis: Barthesian visual semiotics and iconography. By placing these in parallel, van Leeuwen sets up a comparison which proves to be very fruitful. The overlap between the two approaches stems from their both asking:

the same two fundamental questions: the question of representation (what do images represent and how?) and the question of the ‘hidden meanings’ of images (what ideas and values do the people, places and things represented in images stand for?). (van Leeuwen, 2001, p. 92)

The main difference lies in the attention paid to the context in which the image is situated (both in its original inception, and in its re-contextualisation). Barthesian visual semiotics isolates the image itself from the cultural context in which it is located — treating the cultural meanings as unproblematically known by those ‘at all acculturated to contemporary popular culture’ (p.92). Iconography, on the other hand, takes the context of an image’s production and reception into account, using all available material to gain insight into the piece. This apparently clear-cut difference between the two approaches is somewhat muddied later and this muddying allows more credit be given (where it is due) to the contextual considerations which are part of Barthes’ theory. Van Leeuwen begins by looking at the ‘key idea’ of the layers of meaning (p. 96) within Barthesian visual semiotics, and more specifically at the two main layers of denotation (which van Leeuwen states is ‘a relatively unproblematic issue’ for Barthes) and connotation, which is ‘the layer of broader concepts, ideas and values which the represented people, places and things ‘stand for’, ‘are signs of’” (ibid.). In denotation, the content of the image is analogical to reality (Barthes, 1977, p. 18), and is more to do with recognising what and who is depicted than
comprehending or deciphering any symbolic, metaphoric, or cultural meanings to be found therein. Barthes is quoted here describing the denotative layer of a particular advertisement for pasta. He writes:

> We need to know what a tomato, a string-bag, a packet of pasta are, but this is a matter of almost anthropological knowledge. This message corresponds, as it were, to the letter of the image, and we can all agree to call it the literal image, as opposed to the symbolic message. *(ibid., p.36)*

Here, anticipating problems with our ability to ‘all agree’ (I suspect), van Leeuwen suggests that ‘it may be desirable to introduce a little more context than Barthes did’ *(van Leeuwen, 2001, p. 95)*, at least to the extent that allows us to ‘set a plausible level of generality for the reading’, so that, for example, the tomato can be recognised as a generic tomato, and not as a Sicilian versus a Tuscan tomato (leading to a different denotation of tomato supremacy). This seems to be a necessary addition which may allow more viewers to come up with the same ‘literal image’. Interestingly, the power of the ‘ beholder’, discussed above, emerges here when van Leeuwen asks:

> Is denotation entirely up to the beholder? Not necessarily. This too depends on the context. There are contexts (for example, certain forms of modern art) where a multiplicity of readings is allowed or even encouraged. But there are other contexts where the producers of the text have an interest in trying to get a particular message across to a particular audience, and in such cases there will be signs to point us towards the preferred level of generality. *(p.95)*

In response to this, van Leeuwen augments Barthes’ notion of denotation with four ‘pointers’ which he believes could ‘help overcome some of the problems involved’ *(p.96)*. These are:
i. **Categorization**: the level to which ‘typification […]’ through the use of visual stereotypes, which may be cultural attributes […] or physiognomic attributes’ is employed at the cost of individual features.

ii. **Groups vs. individuals**: a similar tactic in which the individual characteristics are subsumed within a group identity ‘especially if similarity is enhanced by similar poses or synchronised action’. This is highly relevant to political advertising in which the crowd shot must succeed at generalising on one level (e.g. they all support the Republicans), while differentiating onto another group, rather than an individual, level (e.g. look at the gender/ race/ age mix in the crowd).

iii. **Distancing**: this is the effect by which showing people at a distance ‘can also decrease their individuality and make them more into types, because from a distance we will be less able to discern their individual features’. Again, the recognised silhouette is an interesting complication here. Obama’s outline, de-featured and thus de-contextualised — yet well recognised — becomes ‘iconic’ (Mitchell, 2009).

iv. **Surrounding text**: clearly, captions can indicate at what level of generality we are encouraged to view the image, but of course, this is not a direct relation, as van Leeuwen says, ‘pictures and words may also contradict each other in this respect. The picture of a named individual may illustrate a generalising text, for example. British documentaries made in the 1930s often showed highly generic shots of
workers while a voice-over commentary would somewhat patronizingly call them by their first names’. Politically, we can see a clear line all the way from Stakhanov to the various Joe Bloggs and John Does — individuals selected to embody generalised features (are these people always/ necessarily working class men, ‘innocent’ children or domestically contained, ‘hockey-mom’ women?).

Machin’s research on image banks (Machin, 2004), referenced in Sec. 2.2.11, is highly relevant here for a contemporary view on the increasing use of generic images.

The Barthesian concept of connotation seems to sit less problematically with van Leeuwen’s own social semiotics, indeed, the influence is clear. Connotative meanings, or ‘myths’ as they are conceived of in Barthes’ 1957 book *Mythologies* (2000) are:

> [F]irst of all very broad and diffuse concepts which condense everything associated with the represented people, places or things into a single entity [...] Secondly, they are ideological meanings, serving to legitimate the status quo and the interests of those whose power is invested in it. (van Leeuwen, 2001, p. 97)

Clearly, this is central to a discussion of legitimation by multimodal means, particularly since this study deals with political advertising — pre-staging the most important negotiation of the status quo in which the lowly electorate get to participate in a modern (that is a neo-liberal Western) democracy. Legitimation is dealt with by van Leeuwen in an article discussed below, but it must also be stated that more generally, in his body of work, his political and pedagogical commitment to help equip us to better engage in critical social practice is fundamental, indeed, I believe
that his work consistently places the social at the very centre of his academic and theoretical considerations. In his most recent book, *The Language of Colour: an Introduction* (2011), he explains the demands made upon social semiotics to explain colour. It is necessary, he writes, for social semiotics to take full account of the context in which colour is found. This requires knowledge of the colour ‘codes’ which are attached to certain domains (visual genres and registers), as well as necessitating a nuanced awareness of the cultural values and meanings of colour as they are at present and as they have developed through time. Barthes was especially concerned with photography and its apparent ability to ‘naturalise’ meanings. This could be seen to date him, for although there is still a residual trust in the photograph as a portrayer of the ‘truth’, the ubiquity of image-editing software such as Photoshop, for personal and professional use, is well known. Airbrushing is the norm, whereas previously, relatively clumsy efforts to doctor images were covert and denied: e.g. Stalin’s removal of Trotsky from the State photographic archives in two oft-quoted examples of doctoring, one of which involved Trotsky and Kamenev being removed from near Lenin’s side as he gave a famous speech, in Sverdlov Square, Moscow on 5th May, 1920; and another removing Trotsky from Lenin’s side in a picture taken on 7th November, 1919, during second anniversary celebrations of the October Revolution ('Censorship of images in the Soviet Union', Wikipedia). However, the genre in which the image is to be found very much effects the expectations of its ‘truthfulness’ — or what is rather confusingly also called degree of modality (e.g. by Kress and van Leeuwen, 1996). In September 2010, the BBC covered the story of the Egyptian state-run newspaper doctoring a photograph taken
during official talks at the White House. The photo, went the article, was changed ‘to suggest President Hosni Mubarak was leading the Middle East peace talks’. The images in question:

Figure 8: Mubarak shown as ‘leading’ the Middle East peace talks

Figure 9: The original photo showing Obama as the ‘leader’
The BBC article goes on to quote ‘the opposition 6 April Youth Movement’ of accusing the newspaper of being ‘unprofessional’ for publishing the doctored image without mentioning the alteration. ‘this is what the corrupt regime’s media has been reduced to,’ it said in a statement on its website, adding that the paper had ‘crossed the line from being balanced and honest’ (BBC, 2010, 15/09). So, despite the ubiquity of photo manipulation, there is still an enduring rubric insisting upon ‘the truth’ in regards to ‘official’ photography. However, van Leeuwen points out a further ‘naturalising’ element which still holds firm:

[Photographs] can be thought of as just ‘finding’ these meanings on the street, as it were, rather than ‘constructing’ them. And they can also be thought of as not quite ‘spelling out’ their message, not saying it ‘in so many words, so that the message can be construed as ‘read into it’ by the viewer, rather than as communicated by a powerful social institution. (van Leeuwen, 2001, p. 97).

This goes back to the discussion on subjectivity, and the political expediency which such a belief enables. Note the linguistic metaphors — ‘spelling out’, ‘in so many words’, and ‘read into it’ — which we still employ to express a clarity of understanding; I dare say it is no accident that van Leeuwen foregrounds these through his own scare quotes. Barthes himself, singling out *poses* and *objects* as particular carriers of connotation, talks of an unwritten ‘dictionary’ of poses and the existence of an unwritten but ‘veritable lexicon’ which van Leeuwen says Goffman (1979) ‘comes close to realising’ in the domain of gendered poses.

Van Leeuwen then introduces the features of Barthes’ connotation which allow for a deeper contextual reading than his theory first seems to allow. Although the lexicon is made up of single instantiations of connotative meaning, they can also be read in a ‘discursive reading of object-signs’ (1977, cited in van Leeuwen) which
means that ‘the signifier of connotation is no longer to be found at the level of any one of the fragments of the sequence but at that… of the concatenation’ (ibid.). So connotations themselves can be connected to form a richer and more complex layer of connotative meaning (not so distinct from an appreciation of a wider cultural context).

Lastly, van Leeuwen brings up Barthes’ ‘photogenia’:

Connotation can also come about through the style of artwork or the techniques of photography, such as ‘framing, distance, lighting, focus, speed’ (1977:44). (van Leeuwen, 2001, p. 98)

This inclusion moderates van Leeuwen’s early statement that Barthesian semiotics does ‘not have very much to say about visual ‘syntax’’ (p.92), but this slight crossover into the social semiotic work pioneered by Kress and van Leeuwen (Kress & van Leeuwen, 1996; van Leeuwen, 2005a) helps explain why van Leeuwen feels that his approach to social semiotics is well complemented by this work by Barthes.

**Iconography**

Van Leeuwen then moves onto a discussion about iconography⁵ and its pertinence in analysing contemporary visual images. To demonstrate this, he uses a study by Nederveen Pieterse (*White on Black, 1992*), a quote from which was cited earlier in this section. Pieterse’s book was conceived of in reaction to an exhibition of visual materials, collected by Rufus Collins, an Afro-American theatre director who had been greatly taken aback by the ‘continued existence of demeaning caricatures of

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black people which in the USA would have been proscribed long ago’ (van Leeuwen, 2001, p. 102). I would like to introduce two images which are not only relevant to this study, but also chimes in with Pieterse’s work. This will, I hope, demonstrate the applicability of iconographical analysis not only to contemporary studies of visual representation (van Leeuwen succeeds fully in doing this), but also to specifically political multimodal texts.

Figure 10: Painting the White House black
Iconography works with three layers of meaning: representational meaning, iconographical symbolism, and iconological symbolism. Representational meaning is roughly equivalent to Barthes’ ‘denotation’. It is what is represented, based on our experience of materials. Thus we can see an image depicting a man painting a big white building with cylindrical columns, windows, surrounding shrubs, a triangular pediment topped by a flag pole, etc. Iconographical symbolism approximates the Barthesian ‘object signs’ discussed above; that is, in it motifs are connected and combinations of motifs are recognised. So we see the Lincoln Memorial symbolising freedom and democracy. And we see the statue of Lincoln giving a fist bump (of celebration/ recognition/ brotherhood?) to (at the time) President Elect Obama.
Iconological symbolism is equivalent to ideological meaning, a level of analysis which takes into account broader and underlying significance of which the artist may be both unaware and opposed to (if made aware).

If we go back to representational meaning, the least ideological level, which does, however, take into account the production conventions of (for example) perceiving three dimensional objects in two dimensions, two points are immediately problematic here: first, the conventions of perspective are culturally bound and not in the least ‘natural’ or untouched by ideological concerns. Secondly, the initial identification of ‘what is represented on the basis of our practical experience, taking into account the stylistic conventions’ (ibid., p.100) is, itself, ideological. Van Leeuwen states that the ‘key idea’ is to see these two as separate: one as the recognition, and the other as the understanding of further and conventional associated meanings. But in what non-ideological language are we to make this identification? A young child might say ‘a man is painting a house’. But I would not say that — or rather, it would certainly not be my first description and it would take me an extra effort to reach this (naïve/ straight-forward/ non-ideological?) point. Even in my attempt to describe the White House I would note the pediment and colonnade. To describe the man I would say he is of ‘normal’ proportions, is wearing a suit and — what? — ‘his pigmentation is of a darker hue than that of the building’? This seems ridiculous, but then what neutral terms to describe the building’s Classical style, or Obama’s apparent ethnic identity, ought I to use? Regardless of these problems, an important point about this analytical level of representational meaning (however ideal such an endeavour may be) is that it can protect symbolic features from being lost to
obscurity. Van Leeuwen writes that in analysing contemporary images the identification of representational meaning:

may seem an unnecessary complication, but in studying art works from the past it is not: faces may no longer be recognised, objects, gestures and activities may have become obsolete and establishing which of the people, places and things in a picture are iconographically significant (or, rather, were at the time of its production) may require quite a bit of research. (ibid.)

The research which informs this representational layer can be of the following order:

i) the title of the piece is considered;

ii) any information we get from our personal experience which informs us is relevant;

iii) visual intertextuality may help to identify recurring ‘types’ and also individuals;

iv) background research similarly;

v) information gleaned on the basis of verbal description or physiognomic stereotyping is useful.

Iconographical symbolism recognises symbolic conventions. Thus, Panofsky (1970, p. 55) notes that at this level, a male figure with a knife represents St Bartholomew. These ‘generally accepted’ (van Leeuwen, 2001, p. 101) conventional meanings can be abstract or figurative symbols (e.g. the Christian cross, or a lion as Christ), and can be identified by noting the visual pointers (e.g. all eyes looking up towards the lion) and again, by taking into account contextual information. Art history abounds with such motifs, many of which have fallen out of common knowledge: we are indebted to the field for retaining and rediscovering knowledge of a symbolic history which still informs us. Moreover, van Leeuwen points out that ‘[t]he conventions of the past
are more easily recognized as conventions than those of the present’ (*ibid.*) and this only increases the importance of the historicity of iconography. This level of iconographical symbolism is complicated — and made more interesting — by the distinction made between ‘open symbolism’ and ‘disguised symbolism’. An open symbol is one in which there is no ‘natural’ explanation for its presence. Thus a cross suspended in the sky is of this type. However, an apple in a fruit bowl could be just that, or it could represent ‘original sin’ (*ibid.*, p.109). This disguise means that:

symbolism can be more easily denied. Deciding which motif should be interpreted symbolically becomes more problematic and contestable […] (*ibid.*)

Van Leeuwen also suggests that there is a possibility of disguise being subconscious (or unconscious), as when contemporary artists draw on ‘unconscious inspiration rather than on consciously known symbolic traditions’ (*ibid.*). This brings us back to questioning the importance or primacy of the artist’s intention, as compared to the beholder’s interpretation. I also wonder where Billig’s symbols of banal nationalism fall, being as they are *naturalised*. The pediment of the White House, for instance, may hardly be recognised as having any significance but such an architectural symbol is steeped in ideology. Is this, therefore, a symbol ‘intended to be understood only by a restricted audience of cognoscenti’? (Van Leeuwen, 2001, p. 108). I think not, but the knowledge of the viewers or art historians (perhaps they are automatically cognoscenti?) is more problematical than is noted here. For example, if we recognise the Lincoln Memorial, but know nothing of Lincoln and his political legacy, are we in the same position to *appreciate* the symbolic affordances which the cartoon contains?
The connotations are clear here. An ‘informed’ reading is likely to be given more weight than a more ‘common-sense’ one.

Iconological symbolism as equivalent to ideological meaning is, according to Panofsky:

apprehended by ascertaining those underlying principles which reveal the basic attitude of a nation, a period, a class, a religious or philosophical persuasion. (Panofsky, 1970, p. 55)

If we apply this to the cartoon above, we can see that on an iconographical level, the White House and the U.S. flag are connecting motifs which symbolise ‘democracy’, ‘power’, ‘freedom’, ‘neo-imperialism’, ‘evil empire’ and many other things depending on who is interpreting. There is no discussion here about conflicting symbolic claims but as we shall see with the political ads, and as we can see here with these political cartoons, laying claim to such symbols and retaining hold of them is central to legitimation. With hindsight, the sites of these symbolic battles align with the level of iconological symbolism. Will we find, for example, that one battleground concerns the assimilation of African American values into what has been (and still is) a largely white preserve? Will the fist-bump between Obama and Lincoln be later seen to be part of a wider discussion about the changing demographics of the U.S. and the cultural significance of this? The iconographer will have to use not only their highly cultured literary knowledge but also what Panofsky describes as:

a mental faculty comparable to that of the diagnostician — a faculty which I cannot describe better than by the rather discredited term “synthetic intuition”, and which may be better developed in a talented layman than in an erudite scholar. ⁶ (Panofsky, 1970, p. 64)

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⁶ There is intuition sneaking in again, but Panofsky immediately goes on to say: “However, the more subjective and irrational this source of interpretation (for every intuitive approach will be conditioned
Van Leeuwen makes three more general points regarding iconography’s more distinctive features. First, in contrast to Barthesian semiotics, the image is not expected to stand on its own: any accompanying text is central, and any contextual information gleaned is considered valuable. Again, this raises the question of the art historian’s own cultural bias and the possibility of comprehending the ‘original’ symbolism. Van Leeuwen points out that:

> With respect to art works of the past it is not possible to appeal to a shared knowledge of what ‘object-signs’ stand for (Barthes’ ‘accepted inducers of ideas’), and so iconography also uses intertextual comparison and documentary research to support its interpretations. (2001, p. 101)

Passing over the rather problematic notion of ‘shared knowledge’\(^7\), the complication of re-presenting a symbolic understanding from a previous era to a contemporary audience is clear. This brings us to van Leeuwen’s second point: that art history is criticised for privileging the ‘original’ meaning of art works, but Panofsky notes that the ‘patina of age’ ‘is an important part of their contemporary meaning, even though this was obviously not intended by the artists’. Art interpretation thus informs our present day understanding of the symbols around us and this relationship is dialectical: our readings are shaped by, and themselves shape, our ideological and

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\(^7\) Van Dijk defines knowledge as ‘justified belief shared by the members of an (epistemic) community’ (van Dijk, 2011), but acknowledges that such knowledge is shared through mutual reconstruction of ‘at least more or less what we had in mind’ (ibid., p.589). The ‘more or less’ signals van Dijk’s awareness that the sharing of knowledge (achieved through the constant recreation and interpretation of ‘mental models’) is an ideal, although pragmatically essential for our daily communication. ‘Shared’ knowledge is built upon the iceberg of context (a metaphor he uses) and, due to the internal quality of mental models, relies upon many presuppositions, inferences and assumed ‘common-ground’; ‘inferences that may be misguided, so that errors may ensue’ (ibid., p. 590).
cultural position. This leads to critical readings which, as Pieterse’s study demonstrates, can take a useful role in the contexts of social movements such as that of anti-racism. Furthermore — and this is the third point — within this context, iconography can ‘bring to light the origins of certain conventions and undo the ideologically convenient effects of what Bourdieu has called ‘genesis amnesia’’ (ibid., p.102). Pieterse traces back the development of the iconic ‘golliwog’; perhaps in time, the political cartoon showing the Obama and Lincoln fist bump will be used to trace the gesture back to its African-American roots. Or perhaps, with a completely different focus, the cartoon will be seen as a moment where the old Republican Party values paralleled those of Obama’s Democrats. But that will depend upon how history plays out, the Zeitgeist of the time and the ideology — and intuitive capability — of the iconographer.

2.3.4 Sound and Vision

There is an inherent tension in writing in an academic register, in an academic journal, about multimodality. The necessary reduction (and for the most part acknowledged impossibility) of translating multimodally realised effect into words is an irony of the discipline itself — at least as it exists in the present logocentric academic environment. Van Leeuwen’s ‘Sound and Vision’ (2007b) appeared in the journal Visual Communication (of which he is also a founder and editor), a journal the remit of which is to provide ‘an international forum for the growing body of work in numerous interrelated disciplines’ with the visual as the crux, and particular
attention paid to (among other things) ‘the role of the visual in relation to language, music, sound and action’. Leeuwen gives the following abstract for this article:

Experimenting with page layout as a discursive mode, this visual essay offers a brief history of the idea of immersion. It then pays particular attention to the role of sound in immersive experience.

This is a significant paper for two reasons: first it is a fine distillation of a historical introduction to immersive experience. Secondly, it brings into focus several issues which run through the academic study of multimodality and is, in itself, a grappling with these very issues. A perfect illustration of the tension which runs through the piece (creatively as well as problematically) is provided by the printed out version of the article:
Figure 12: Expected cover-page format

This is the expected — and provided — format of a scholarly journal article cover-page. The typography is ‘standard’ and probably in keeping with the institution’s typographic specifications: a certain font, of a particular size, a centralised layout, etc. (see van Leeuwen, 2005b). Moreover, the information given is also pre-specified in terms of type and order. The purposes of keeping within, and thereby legitimising and maintaining these conventional norms are not controversial; indeed, they are so naturalised as to hardly be worth mentioning. A regularity offers ease of
comprehension; meeting typographical expectations helps the reader focus upon content not form. An acceptance of the demands made by the institutional nature (with the status and consequent power entailed) provides benefits for the author, the institutions involved, and the more abstract notion of a locus of canonical learning. The next page reveals van Leeuwen’s ‘personalised’ title page:

![Figure 13: Van Leeuwen’s personalised title page](image)
Here we can see the tension between conformity to tradition on the one hand, and unique expression made through bespoke design, on the other. It is worth noting that it is because of the norm in existence that such a title page can flaunt convention to good effect. The presence and knowledge of such norms underwrites the semiotic currency and affordances of deviation.

2.3.5 Reading Images: The Grammar of Visual Design

In *Reading Images: The Grammar of Visual Design* (1996), Kress and van Leeuwen distinguish between their own and previous visual grammars thus:

But where the study of visual ‘lexis’ has emphasized ‘denotative’, ‘connotative’, ‘symbolic’ meanings, the study of visual ‘grammar’ has not paid much attention to this, at least not in explicit or systematic ways […] We intend to provide inventories of the major compositional structures which have become established as conventions in the course of the history of visual semiotics, and to analyse how they are used to produce meaning by contemporary image-makers. (*ibid.*, p.1)

Kress and van Leeuwen see this project as serving a pedagogical and a critical purpose. Of course, the former, for example, ‘as input into the design of curricula for ‘arts literacy’ and ‘media literacy’’ (*ibid.*, p.13), is a long term investment into the latter. Repeatedly, Kress and van Leeuwen talk of their book being a tool. In it they offer a systematic analysis based upon Hallidayan metafunctions, the ideational, the interpersonal, and the textual. So the book is structured to move from discussing ‘patterns of representation’ to ‘patterns of interaction’ and then onto how these
patterns ‘cohere’ into a text. I find these categories less helpful for comprehending structure and purpose than van Dijk’s suggested extended list (2009a):

— ideational

— interpersonal

— textual

— cultural functions (definition of cultural identity and reproduction)

— social/societal functions (e.g., for group identity, institutional activity, dominance)

— evaluative or normative functions (e.g., for the reproduction of norms and values)

— ideological functions (e.g., for the enactment of group interests, etc.)

— emotional functions (for the enactment or expressions of emotions)

— intrapersonal functions (establishment and maintenance of self-identity, etc.)

— poetic/artistic functions are also suggested

The clarity of ideas and the open-mindedness of the authors does not make such an application difficult, although I am sure there is another argument to be had as to whether it is necessary. This book, and another by van Leeuwen, *Introducing Social Semiotics* (2005a), develops the field, clarifies many of the ideas, concepts, aims and methodological considerations which inform my own work, but it is to van

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8 For a critique of Systemic Functional Linguistics see van Dijk (2009a: Ch.2).
Leeuwen’s 2007 article, ‘Legitimation in discourse and communication’, that I shall turn.

2.3.6 Legitimation in discourse and communication

Van Leeuwen states that he aims to ‘set out a framework for analysing the way discourses construct legitimation for social practices in public communication as well as in everyday interaction’ (van Leeuwen, 2007a, p. 92). He identifies four main categories of legitimation:

1) Authorization: in general, this is defined as ‘legitimation by reference to the authority of tradition, custom and law, and of persons in whom institutional authority of some kind is vested’ (ibid., p.97). This category is further broken down into three subcategories (Custom, Authority, and Commendation), which then each divide into two, resulting in the following diagram:
The two categories, ‘Authority’ and ‘Commendation’ can be taken together. They include the legitimation which comes from individuals’ roles in various socio-institutional hierarchical contexts. The teacher over the pupil, the parent over the child, the doctor over the patient, the film-star over the wannabe, the specialized department over the layman, the rule of law over general activity. Note that this authority can rest with a person or/and with an organisation. Van Leeuwen makes the point that ‘there is increasing slippage between the rule of law and the rule of conformity’ (ibid.).

2) Moral evaluation: Just as with ‘authority legitimation’, in the legitimating category of ‘moral evaluation’ there is a point at which (further) justification is not given. General words such as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are used without offering any further explanation of the grounds upon which they are being applied, while more heavily moralistic words (van Leeuwen quotes the
example ‘axis of evil’) are also employed and ‘linked to specific discourses of moral value’. However, similarly, these discourses are ‘not made explicit and debateable’ and therefore remain implicit, or ‘only hinted at, by means of adjectives such as ‘healthy’, ‘normal’, ‘useful’ and so on’ (ibid.). This is often expedient, avoiding as it does a real discussion of the complex and culturally-bound bases of any moral judgements. Van Leeuwen writes that these ‘adjectives are then the tip of a submerged iceberg of moral values. They trigger a moral concept, but are detached from the system of interpretation from which they derive, at least on a conscious level’ (ibid.). Thus, as van Leeuwen points out, only a historically and culturally focussed researcher can hope to uncover the underlying norms, values and judgements which form the basis of such rationalizations. He makes the further point that, following on from Leech (1966), many adjectives are both ‘designative’ and ‘evaluative’. ‘Natural’, ‘green’ and ‘golden’, for example, simultaneously describe and legitimate. Two more subcategories of moral evaluation are presented. By way of ‘abstraction’, legitimacy can be accorded to the discourse by removing the detail from it, and using an abstraction to tie it to a moral stance. He offers the example of a text which legitimises schooling by saying not that ‘the child goes to school for the first time’, but that ‘the child takes up independence’ (van Leeuwen, 2007a, p. 99). Independence has acquired a ‘commonsense’ positive value and so needs no further analysis. Finally, he introduces the important category of ‘analogy’, noting that it may be explicit (e.g. ‘doing this for me is like saving a life’) or implicit (e.g. Ivan Illich’s delegitimizing use of
militaristic and prison-based metaphors to refer to what children are subjected to at school).

3. Rationalization: Van Leeuwen makes the point that although in ‘contemporary discourse, moralization and rationalization keep each other at arm’s length […] morality remains oblique and submerged, even though no rationalization can function as legitimation without it’ (ibid., p.100). He distinguishes between two main types of rationalization: ‘instrumental rationality legitimates practices by reference to their goals, uses and effects. Theoretical rationality legitimates practices by reference to a natural order of things’ (ibid., p.101). The natural order may be either a scientific or a religious framework of ‘truth’. Van Leeuwen’s acknowledgment of the crossover between his different categories makes it easier to grasp the insights offered through such an arrangement. For example, with regard to rationalization and practices, he comments:

Like legitimations, purposes are constructed in discourse in order to explain why social practices exist, and why they take the forms they do. […] The question is, are all purposes also legitimations? I believe not. In order to serve as legitimations, purpose constructions must contain an element of moralization, in the sense in which I have described it in the previous section. Only this can turn purposes and purposiveness into what Habermas (1976: 22) has called a ‘strategic-utilitarian morality’ (ibid., p.101).

With further subcategories, the focus is moved to the place of agency in the discourse — and it is noted that, in general, the more powerful the actors, the more active is their role. Children (the texts van Leeuwen uses for purposes of illustration are all taken from the pedagogically orientated (de)legitimating
discourse of starting school) can be seen as passive actors in a process, whereas teachers can be seen to be choosing to act within a process. Van Leeuwen employs Barthes’ concept of ‘nuclei’ within a process — ‘real hinge-points of the narrative’ (Barthes, 1977, p. 90) — to highlight the differences between purposes: does the legitimatory value rest in the means or the ends? For example, is the value in forming a queue to go into school framed more in terms of the eventual outcome of orderliness, or in the learning to form a queue? (My own sense is that present-day pedagogical trends lean towards the latter: the learning through action, participation and process will be more legitimating than the static outcomes of the end product).

4. Mythopoesis: The importance of storytelling and narrative in legitimation reveals a complexity belied by the often simple forms such stories take. As with fairy tales, studied with a view to their underlying meaning for, and function within, disparate cultures and societies, with the broader category of mythopoesis, van Leeuwen teases apart the synthesis of purpose, motivation, aim, and legitimation within the narrative form. He distinguishes between the moral tale and the cautionary tale on the one hand, and single determination and overdetermination on the other. The moral tale is the telling of a story with a positive moral message applicable to the situation of the audience. It presents something to emulate, unlike the cautionary tale, which is the story of what will happen if deviant behaviour is engaged in. ‘Single determination’
and ‘overdetermination’ refer to whether the application of the moral tale is relevant for a one-off situation, or whether it is applicable across domains.

And what of the implications multimodality brings to such a framework and, in particular, the relationship between legitimation and context? The discussion of context brings in an analysis by Kress (1985) in which, looking at a political speech at an anti-nuclear rally, ‘he shows that a single text can invoke many different, sometimes even contradictory, discourses’ (van Leeuwen, 2007a, p. 108). Kress suggests that this leads to a crisis, not so much in legitimation, as in motivation:

[T]he discursive differences are not resolved. Consequently the text is unlikely to provide that definitional impulse which would act to give unity to the diverse groups which had assembled that day to hear this speech. (Kress, 1985, p. 17)

Van Leeuwen addresses this somewhat bleak outlook by pointing out that despite such an unresolved melange of moral discourses (embodying the aspects of legitimation he has discussed thus far), the people at the rally ‘were united in doing what they were actually doing. They all participated in the same practice — attending the rally, and demonstrating against nuclear arms’ (van Leeuwen, 2007a, p. 110). However, he is not confident in this being the sign of a brave new world of fluid participatory politics and he ends by asking the following:

Does this provide a starting point for a new, common morality centred on actions rather than beliefs? Or does it signal a devaluation of beliefs, turning ideas, moral or otherwise, into products on the supermarket shelf, essentially identical, but differently branded so as to allow consumers to express their lifestyle identities and marketers to sell their products as widely as possible? (van Leeuwen, 2007a, p. 110)

These are amongst the key questions underlying my own study, and in my theoretical framework (presented in the next chapter) I attempt to provide a systematic way of
addressing them. Then, in the Conclusion, I shall revisit them in the light of the texts I have analysed.

2.3.7 Summary

In Section 2.3 I have surveyed works authored and co-authored by van Leeuwen which are most pertinent to this study. I underline the following points he makes: one, that CDA has (at the time of his writing, 2004) too long ignored, or treated as secondary and peripheral, visual communication. I follow through his argument on racist imagery and – in bringing it to the present – highlight the fact that context is of vital importance when analysing a text, and that for visual communication, the subjectivity marked by ‘in the eye of the beholder’ poses a challenge; not a challenge, however, unique to any visual modality. I further develop this argument by pointing out the legal status of verbal and physical abuse, and how verbal abuse negotiates, legally, the same ground of subjectivity/objectivity often only accorded to the non-linguistic modes.

I then summarised his own contribution to a book he edited with Carey, *Handbook of Visual Analysis* (2001). In his chapter, he gives an overview of the disciplines and methodological approaches most common in semiotics and iconography. Within this paper he discusses the import of the differences between the two approaches and the main significance, as he sees it, of these differences. He mentions the often overlooked value of iconological study in preserving and recovering meaning easily lost to us through time, and he introduces Barthes’ work – which I engage with briefly – and the few problems he finds therein (which I agree
are problems). His development of the Barthesian approach is the one I take forward. After look at his interesting paper, ‘Sound and Vision’ (2007b), in which he challenges, to a degree, the qualification for legitimacy of an ‘academic paper’, I mention the seminal work he co-authored with Kress, *Reading Images: The Grammar of Visual Design* (1996), although I argue that van Dijk’s critique of the limitations of the Hallidayan functions underpinning the book stands and that van Dijk’s extended list is more useful.

Finally, I summarise in greater detail the most important paper for this thesis, van Leeuwen’s ‘Legitimation in discourse and communication’. I outline his proposed framework in some detail as in the following chapter it is used within my theoretical framework.
CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce a framework for analysing legitimation by multimodal means which, it is hoped, may be used by others and applied to their own choice of texts. The framework, explicated in detail within this thesis, shall be introduced here and applied in Chapter Eight.

The theoretical framework used for the data analysis in this thesis uses the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) pioneered under Wodak (see Sections 2.2.8, 2.2.10) with features of the social semiotic approach exemplified in work by Kress and van Leeuwen (see Section 2.3), together with the two frameworks of legitimation proposed by van Leeuwen and van Dijk.

This theoretical splicing is intended to fill an analytical gap identified by van Leeuwen in the (2007a) paper outlined in the previous chapter. Before introducing my original framework in Section 3.4, I shall first describe the gap, then explain why the DHA needs to be used together with van Dijk’s more pragmatic framework, and why, due to the multimodality of the texts to be analysed, both need to be grounded in a social semiotics.

3.2 Analytical gap

Van Leeuwen identifies one type of legitimation as ‘moral evaluation’ but highlights the fact that terms of moral evaluation (e.g. clean, healthy, natural, etc.) sit on the ‘tip of a submerged iceberg of moral values’ (2007a, p. 97). They tap into
moral concepts but do not engage with the ‘system of interpretation from which they derive’ (ibid.). The concepts which underwrite our moral evaluation remain below the surface. Yet, as we have seen from van Dijk (see 2.2.8), the normativity such evaluations entail is far from unproblematic and needs to be recognised in all its complexity. Van Leeuwen, however, in this paper, sets such considerations aside. In fact he makes the following statement:

it is not possible to find an explicit, linguistically motivated method for identifying moral evaluations of this kind.[...] The usefulness of linguistic discourse analysis stops at this point. Historical discourse research has to take over. (2007a, p. 98)

Such historical discourse, he writes, as he undertook to study, together with Wodak (1999), by employing a ‘Discourse-historical analysis’. In my opinion the line being drawn between linguistic- and historical- discourse analysis is an odd one and is not, in fact, one which holds. As an identification of focus, however, it is clear and it explains why van Leeuwen does not attempt to incorporate a deeper analysis of legitimation by moral authority into his paper while being sure to flag up the importance of what he leaves undone.

However this gap in coverage not only pertains to one of his categories, but has implications for all four. Figure 15 below shows a simplified schema of his framework for legitimation. If we accept his view (as I do) that moral evaluations signal, index, or draw upon a deeper store of moral values constantly being constructed, maintained and negotiated, then we are left to question which of his four types of legitimation do not, at base, rely upon this moral core. Legitimation by
authority, rationalization and mythopoesis as well as that explicitly moral legitimation all rely, I would argue, on a deeper store of moral values.

As I discuss further in Chapter Five, authority on occasion becomes divorced from moral values – and then there is a legitimation crisis. Authority without a moral basis is either despotic (and reliant on violence or the threat of it), or is the reified result of a previous situation, now due for renewal (re-election, reinstatement, reavowal, etc.). This latter situation in which there is a total divorce between authority and moral values only seems possible if there has been a dramatic, perhaps revolutionary change causing the previously legitimate authority to entirely lose its claim to legitimacy. Legitimation by rationalization (see Section 4.2) is also built upon a foundation of moral values. When legitimation by rationalization becomes separated from moral values, the worst abuses can seem rationally sound. Finally, mythopoesis: narrative as a resource for legitimation is not put forward by van Leeuwen as a legitimating function on its own. Rather, it carries the force of one or many of the other legitimating rationales with it.

It is this gap – the lack of a deeper consideration of how moral values are created and reproduced, of what is seen as commonsense and what is considered ‘natural’ – that I hope to start filling in this thesis.
Figure 15: Simplified schema of van Leeuwen's types of legitimation (2007a)
3.3 Blending theoretical approaches

Returning for a moment to van Leeuwen’s identification of the DHA as a method by which it is possible to investigate the basis and make-up of our moral evaluations, he adds that only ‘the social and cultural historian can explain the moral status of these expressions by tracing them back to the moral discourses that underlie them, and by undoing the ‘genesis amnesia’ (Bourdieu) that allows us to treat such moral evaluations as commonsense values’ (2007a, p.98). The DHA allows for explanation of the moral status but it does not help identify the pragmatic features utilised by creators of texts, or looked for in a critical discourse analysis of a text. Van Dijk offers a list of (de)legitimation strategies applicable to written and spoken texts.

**Van Dijk: (de)legitimation strategies (2006a)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>▶ Overall interaction strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ Positive self-presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Negative other-presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▶ Macro speech act implying Our ‘good’ acts and Their ‘bad’ acts, e.g. accusation, defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▶ Semantic macrostructures: topic selection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ (De-)emphasize negative/positive topics about Us/Them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▶ Local speech acts implementing and sustaining the global ones, e.g. statements that prove accusations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▶ Local meanings Our/Their positive/negative actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Give many/few details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Be general/specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Be vague/precise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Be explicit/implicit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| ▶ Lexicon: Select positive words for Us, negative words for Them |
| ▶ Local syntax |
| ▪ Active vs passive sentences, nominalizations: (de)emphasize Our/Their positive/negative agency, responsibility |
| ▶ Rhetorical figures |
| ▪ Hyperboles vs euphemisms for positive/negative meanings |
| ▪ Metonymies and metaphors emphasizing Our/Their positive/negative properties |
| ▶ Expressions: sounds and visuals |
| ▪ Emphasize (loud, etc.; large, bold, etc.) positive/negative meanings |
| ▪ Order (first, last; top, bottom, etc.) positive/negative meanings |
If, by ‘speech’ we extend van Dijk’s original meaning and understand it to mean ‘semiotic production’, the strategies he proposes are quite easily transposable to multimodal texts. I will take each in turn to illustrate this translate/transpose-ability:

1. *Overall interaction strategies*: clearly this is not specific to any particular mode or modes. Positivity and negativity can be expressed by colour, music, film, text, speech, sound, etc. Although contextually and culturally specific – and even then continually changing (Wang, 2013) – the ability to express positive and negative (and various nuances of these) is an affordance of all the modes engaged in the ads. For my purposes I shall simplify this label to ‘General strategy’.

2. *Macro speech act*: most ads are either classified as positive or negative. However, there are several frames for a negative message e.g. an accusation, a narrative causing fear, a mockery, etc. Similarly, there are several ways in which a positive ad can be framed e.g. a positive bio, an empathetic human interest, an endorsement, etc. I shall adopt van Dijk’s label ‘Macro speech act’.

3. *Semantic macrostructures: topic selection*: this is applicable directly onto the multimodal texts of the ads although it is possible that simultaneous with the main topic selection there are undercurrents which speak of other topics. One could imagine that in an ad whose main topic was the support needed for the farming community, there might be an undercurrent carried by the same or
another mode, which raised the topic of the maintenance of church and family values. Although the presence of multiple modes might emphasise this function of multiple topic selection, in many single modes topics other than the main one can be suggested, implicated, or directly mentioned. I shall simplify this label to ‘**Topic selection**’.

4. **Local speech acts implementing and sustaining the global ones**: As van Dijk says, a macro speech act such as an accusation can be supported by local speech acts such as statements in support of the accusation. This is true for multimodal texts also but for my purposes, I would like to change the focus away from speech acts onto internal measures taken in any mode which supports the coherence of the text and its macro speech act. Therefore, e.g. an ad which is an accusation may be supported by an ominous or dissonant soundtrack, harsh colours, a bold camera style (e.g. no slow panning, but an insistent central framing with rapid frame changes). I shall call this strategy ‘**Supporting internal coherence**’.

5. **Local meanings Our/Their positive/negative actions & Lexicon**: These two strategies I shall take together. The tactic of emphasising the negative actions of one’s opponent(s), and de-emphasising our own negative actions and, conversely, de-emphasising our opponent’s positive actions and highlighting our own is fundamental to legitimation. When we look at multimodal texts we need to be aware that the lexicon denoting actors can be pre-defined (e.g. the colour of a political party, or ‘nation’, the designated symbol or mascot, the selected soundtrack to a specific actor’s campaign) or contextually defined.
Furthermore, it is possible to be vague linguistically (e.g. not naming one’s opponent), while making it perfectly clear (perhaps through other modes, e.g. visuals) who or what is the intended target. I shall call this important and broad strategy ‘**Semiotic lexicon**’.

6. **Local syntax**: Van Dijk mentions the power of various linguistic constructions which (de)emphasize agency. The translation of these features into other modes reveals a complex and rich repository of resources, many of which are discussed in Kress and van Leeuwen’s (1996) *The Grammar of Visual Design*. For example, as an equivalent to the passive voice, in film, the agent of the action can be hidden, and only the resulting action displayed. Similarly, if, in an ad, there is talk of environmental pollution, there can be the use of generic factory chimneys (not the responsibility of one named company, or in one particular town, or under the aegis of any particular political body); or there can simply be images of the pollution – rather than the polluters. This is especially important when the issue is the pollution caused by the public – those being asked to vote do not want to be cast into a bad moral light (see Section 7.2.3). Due to the multimodal requirements and capabilities of this type of strategy, I shall expand this to a wider label of ‘**Foregrounding/backgrounding**’.

7. **Rhetorical figures**: Rhetorical devices, such as visual metaphor and musical hyperbole have long been used and recognised (Blair, 1996; Forceville, 2009; Forceville & Urios-Aparisi, 2009; B. Scott, 2004; L. M. Scott, 1990; L. M. Scott & Batra, 2003). However, as linguistic concepts have grounded social
semiotics to a large degree, the ‘discovery’ of this multimodal rhetoric has appeared as new (musicologists and those in history of art and film studies have a different disciplinary perspective). I shall adopt van Dijk’s label ‘Rhetorical figures’.

8. **Expressions, sounds and visuals**: This category is an accommodation of what is, in my own framework, central. It is my aim that the effects of non-linguistic modes are not seen as additions or appendages, but, rather, as integral.

Having described the changes I shall make to van Dijk’s framework in order to incorporate some of his points into my own framework, I would like to add two strategies requiring more salience in a framework tailored for multimodal texts.

9. **Deixis**: The use of deictic expressions to create temporal and spatial proximity and distance has been highlighted by many in CDA (see particularly Chilton 2003, 2004) as being a very effective method by which to orient an audience and give them (coerce them) to take a perspective which is beneficial to one’s own rhetorical intentions. The transposition of this strategy into visual and auditory modes – and the power of the strategy thus transposed – means, I believe, that it ought to be a category unto itself.

10. **Emotional manipulation**: The word ‘manipulation’ is clearly a subjective term yet appropriate here as what I mean to highlight in this category is the use made of emotive triggers. National anthems, certain chord changes, landscape shots, human interest ‘tear-jerkers’, ‘heart-warmers’; visuals, narratives,
symbols or sounds which instil fear in us – these are all part of the larger strategy for (de)legitimation.

I have thus identified and outlined nine strategies which can be seen as forming a pragmatic level within a larger theory of analysing legitimation in multimodal texts. These levels are:

1. General strategy
2. Macro speech act
3. Topic selection
4. Supporting internal coherence
5. Semiotic lexicon
6. Foregrounding/backgrounding
7. Rhetorical figures
8. Deixis
9. Emotional manipulation

I will now outline my own skeleton framework.

3.4 Theoretical framework

There are six layers to the framework which are arranged, top to bottom, in an order which reflects a move from application to theory, from the practical and pragmatic to the explanatory and underlying. These layers are:

1. Multimodal resources
2. Pragma-strategic level
3. Justificatory schema (van Leeuwen, 2007a)

4. Legitimation as a process

5. Legitimation as a quality

6. Discourse-historical moral evaluation

Each level can function on its own to tell us something about the legitimation involved; about another facet of legitimation. Taken together, we are given a way of looking at legitimation from multiple angles, giving a greater depth and complexity to our understanding of it. I shall explain the four layers I have yet to discuss (the ‘Pragma-strategic level’, and van Leeuwen’s ‘Justificatory schema’ are discussed above), and then in Section 8.6, I shall operationalise the framework in my analysis of two of the ads.
Figure 16: Framework for legitimation by multimodal means
3.4.1 Multimodal resources

In the level I have called ‘Multimodal resources’ the following questions are prompted regarding the text to be analysed:

- Which **modes** are used and what **affordances** do they have?

- What **contextual demands** are involved in reducing the potential affordances? (This could reflect the technological limits, legal stipulations of what must or must not be included, financial constraints on production costs, etc.)

- What is the **cultural context** and what does it mean for the selection and realisation of the potential affordances? There is no simple answer to this question but the consideration of what cultural expectations are brought to bear on the creation and reception of a text is essential. (In Section 7.4 I discuss the interplay between constraints and affordances) For example, in considering the ads, we must be aware of the political context, the history of the spot ad, the public’s expectations of political advertising, and the public’s expectations of any particular campaign, set in its time and space.

- Is there any evidence of **modal hierarchy** – if so, in terms of information conveyance, emotional effect, or some more general ‘impact’? For example, an ad which gives a great deal of information with a spoken voice-over together with startling images may be seen to have two modal hierarchies and an overall one which may judge the visuals to have more impact than the voice-over. (See further Section 6.2)
• What are the **temporal features** of the text? This not only concerns duration, but also potential ‘shelf-life’, year/era of production, and the (often complicated) role of time within the text (e.g. references, evocations, projections, implications). Such a profile of time within a text helps our understanding of how time is involved with (de)legitimation. (For an even more detailed picture, this profile can be viewed in parallel with an analysis of the deixis – as suggested in the Pragma-strategic level)

3.4.2 Legitimation as a Process

This level looks at what definition of ‘legitimate’ pertains in the text – and to what extent (if at all) it is challenged. Markers of such challenge could be whether or not assumptions are questioned, conventions challenged or flouted, explicit rejections made of precedent forms or institutions. In Section 5.2 I discuss this in more detail but briefly, at the soft end of the spectrum, the meaning of legitimacy is accepted and there is an attempt (through the text) to present something (or oneself) as legitimate on the pre-existing understanding of what that means. At the deep end of the spectrum, there is a rejection of the (present) meaning of ‘legitimate’ and a demand for some degree of redefinition which would, through its changes, include what is being presented as legitimate.

3.4.3 Legitimation as a Quality

This level looks at the tension which inevitably arises through the passing of time once an institution/person/thing is granted/assumes the status of being
legitimate. The reification of legitimacy produces the paradoxical situation in which the so-called legitimate body alters in its qualities thereby no longer being legitimate, or, alternatively, the legitimate body remains the same but the definition of what is legitimate changes. The inertia of institutions and the time delay between the events which grant legitimacy (such as elections) and the altering of the qualities of those institutions, or of society’s definition of legitimacy leads to the Habermasian situation of a constant gap existing between the concept of legitimacy and any particular material holder of it (Habermas, 1976, 1991, 1993). Clearly, the political advertising of a challenger will attempt to exploit this gap, and the advertising of an incumbent, deny it. This level is discussed in more detail in Section 5.2.

3.4.4 Discourse-historical moral evaluation

As discussed in Section 3.2, van Leeuwen identified the need for a deeper analysis in order to understand the basis of the moral values which underpin legitimation. He identified the possible role of Discourse historical analysis in this. This level, therefore, is one in which the assumptions made in the text about what is morally good are explored and the basis for these assumptions explicated. What is taken as a base assumption is often what is viewed (or rather not viewed but taken) as natural. What is ‘natural’ is usually taken as equivalent to ‘good’. Similarly, what is seen as ‘rational’ and what is ‘commonsense’ are also (usually) taken as ‘good’. There are, of course, contradictions inherent in such classifications and I explore these in a great deal of detail. This level – that which I have labelled that of ‘Discourse-historical moral evaluation’ – taps into a vast resource from which we
take things in order to legitimate our very process of legitimation. Without making the attempt that this level entails, our understanding of legitimation will always be left wanting. For example, in the ads (as discussed in Chapter Eight) children often feature. It is assumed that children are good and that is because they are ‘innocent’ and ‘natural’. A discourse-historical investigation would undertake to understand first why children are assumed to be ‘good’, and secondly, why ‘innocent’ and ‘natural’ are equated to ‘good’. It would also investigate the instances where this view is challenged by facts-on-the-ground, and in what way such a challenge is negotiated and resolved.

3.5 Summary

In this Chapter I have articulated my theoretical framework by means of systematic description of the levels of theoretical analysis I propose, and a schematic diagram illustrating the framework. I start by introducing the gap identified by van Leeuwen in his own schema of legitimation – that of a deeper historical analysis of the foundation of the moral values which inform the four legitimation types he proposes. I then go on to demonstrate how van Dijk’s pragmatic legitimation strategies can be altered, adapted and supplemented to create a layer of analysis I have called the ‘Pragma-strategic level’. Following on from this I explain the further four levels (while pointing to further discussion where appropriate), ‘Multimodal resources’, ‘Legitimation as a Process’, ‘Legitimation as a Quality’, and the level of ‘Discourse-historical moral evaluation’.

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CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

In this investigatory work, exploring the meaning of legitimation generally as well as in its specifically multimodal realisations, the methodology used has been textual analysis, from a historical and critical perspective. The advertisements have been analysed from the point of view of Critical Discourse Studies (CDS). According to van Dijk, this is not a methodology, but a mindset and political commitment. However, the limitations on authorial intent apply here as well, and however van Dijk may have imagined the programme, CDS has, like the original Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of which it is an offshoot, become well established as an analytical framework or method applicable to institutional spoken and written texts. At the same time, work in CDS has found very little, if any, application to multimodal discourses. This thesis, then, can be best described as falling within the ‘scholarly movement’ of CDS (see further Sec. 2.2.9), and as using — while also helping to constitute — a methodology that may most accurately be termed Critical Multimodal Discourse Analysis.

4.2 Literature Review as/on Legitimation

Legitimation is both a large topic, and a ubiquitous activity: the selection of literature I make is both a review of selected works, and an act of self-legitimation. As detailed in the previous chapter, my selection has been driven by the twin forces of containment and discipline orientation. Legitimation being too large a field to survey properly in a work of this size, I have further delimited my selection by only discussing that work which touches upon, or illuminates in some
way, the pairing of legitimation and multimodality. Furthermore, this thesis has been undertaken from the discipline base of linguistics, and it reflects this. An equivalent study of legitimation from a legal or political angle would similarly reflect its disciplinary influence, and although there would most certainly be a degree of crossover, the studies would be different from my own. Similarly, there is a whole marketing discipline which, in another thesis focussing more exactly on what it means to advertise, one would need to engage with far more than I have. The literature on advertising I have referred to directly (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1997; L. M. Scott, 1994; L. M. Scott & Batra, 2003; Wattenberg & Brians, 1999) has tended to address the multimodal nature of advertising but I have also been helped by Cook’s The Discourse of Advertising (1992).

4.3 Thematic selection

Certain themes have emerged from the literature review as central and problematic to a study on legitimation. I dedicate chapters four and five to a discussion of these themes and the implications that arise from them. These chapters lay the groundwork for the subsequent chapters, which deal with the fundamental relationship between legitimation and rationality. The tension between legitimation and rationality makes such a discussion essential — all the more so when it is shown that the status of modalities and their (culturally defined) hierarchy are themselves embroiled in questions of rationality. For example, we shall see that different modes are accorded different degrees of legitimation based on their perceived rational basis. In this first theoretical chapter, therefore, I take a historical, critical perspective on the evolution of such ideas, highlighting the ideological underpinnings of positions and changes.
The selection of the other key themes — the American Dream and Nature — has been the result of a more dialectical/dialogical process. I surveyed the literature and watched the ads: certain themes were prevalent and seemed to run through the spot-ad genre to such an extent that I came to view them as leitmotifs. This brought me back to the literature in an attempt to explain the reason for their being refrains. Close textual analysis can help to identify preoccupations. This can, of course, be done quantitatively, by counting the number of tokens of, say, a particular lexical item. Yet, this is problematic when attempting a nuanced, culturally and historically sensitive analysis. The American Dream, for example, can be indexed by far more than the words the ‘American Dream’, especially when the material being analysed is of such a rich multimodal character.

An added complexity is how multimodal texts ought to be interpreted. What can index the American Dream visually, musically, through the movement of dance, or the sense of smell? The national anthem could certainly be said to represent a version of the American Dream, yet, as discussed by DeNora (see Sec. 7.5), context can introduce layers of irony, and invert the conventional understanding. A degree of cultural literacy is required to interpret any signifying text, and the more complex the text, the more literate the interpreter needs to be.

There is also the need to be aware of the demands which the analysis of historical material puts upon the analyst. To avoid anachronism requires both a sensitivity to the evolution of signs, and an attempt to temper one’s present understanding with the cultural context in which the texts to be analysed were created. An example concerning the ads is furnished by the technological limits
on what was possible in any given year, in terms of colour representation, or animation techniques.

Finally, the ads available are an incredibly rich resource and I do not attempt an exhaustive survey of the themes which arise. As the ads span over fifty years, the issues of gender, ethnicity, family values, the international standing of the U.S. (to name but a few), are huge topics in themselves deserving of analysis in a larger study.

4.4 Key notions and terms

There are several notions with which this thesis is concerned and in this section I shall give my working definitions of them.

- **Mode**: I shall use Kress’s definition of mode which is: ‘*Mode* is a socially shaped and culturally given semiotic resource for making meaning. *Image, writing, layout, music, gesture, speech, moving image, soundtrack and 3D objects* are examples of modes used in representation and communication’ (Kress, 2010, p. 79). Following from van Leeuwen (2011), I include colour as a mode. I would also like to offer another definition of mode by Kress which does not contradict anything in the first one, but puts a certain focus upon ‘mode’ which I think important, namely, the way the term attempts to move away from an all-inclusive use of ‘language’. The definition is: ‘a term that allows us to get away from using ‘language’ for everything’ (Kress & Hendriksen, 2012).

- **Multimodality**: I shall use van Leeuwen’s definition of multimodality which is: ‘The combination of different semiotic modes – for example,
language and music – in a communicative artefact or event’ (van Leeuwen, 2005a, p. 281).

- **Text**: I shall adapt Cook’s definition of text to: ‘Text is used to mean semiotic [replacing ‘linguistic’] forms, temporarily and artificially separated from context for the purposes of analysis’ (Cook, 1992, p. 4). I also use the term ‘text’ to refer to the written form.

- **Discourse**: I shall use van Leeuwen’s definition of discourse which is: ‘Discourses are resources for representation, knowledges about some aspect of reality which can be drawn upon when that aspect of reality has to be represented. There may be several discourses about a given aspect of reality, making sense of it in different ways, including and excluding different things, and serving different interests. Any given discourse may be realized by different genres and different combinations of semiotic resources’ (ibid., p. 275).

- **Narrative**: I shall use Trask’s definition of narrative which is: ‘A text which tells a story […] In addition to familiar kinds of written narratives, such as history books and novels, there are oral narratives […]’ (Trask, 1999, p. 197). I would, however, point out that ‘a text which tells a story’ can be reframed as ‘a story told through a text’. It is both of these aspects of ‘narrative’ which I employ.

- **Myth**: I shall use Chandler’s definition of myth which is: ‘Myths can be seen as extended metaphors. They express and serve to organize shared ways of conceptualizing something within a culture […] Their function is to naturalize the cultural - in other words, to make dominant cultural and
historical values, attitudes and beliefs seem entirely 'natural', 'normal', self-evident, timeless, obvious 'common-sense' - and thus objective and 'true' reflections of 'the way things are.' (Chandler, 1994). I would highlight the fact that myth, then, is public and culturally realised (and this in contrast to ‘dream’).

- **Dream**: Dream is a term used in this thesis with reference to myth. I shall use Joseph Campbell’s definition of dream which is: ‘A dream is a personal experience of that deep, dark ground that is the support of our conscious lives, and a myth is the society’s dream. The myth is the public dream and the dream is the private myth […] On some levels a private dream runs into truly mythic themes and can’t be interpreted except by an analogy with a myth’ (Campbell & Moyers, 1991, pp. 48-49).

### 4.5 Analytical framework

The analytical framework I use is the operationalisable part of the theoretical framework which is the subject of Chapter Three. In brief, I break down the analysis of the investigation of legitimation in multimodal texts into six levels. The first looks at the multimodal text and establishes which modes are being employed, the affordances used, the contextual demands put upon the text, the cultural context in which we find the text, the modal hierarchy evident in the text, and the temporal features of the text. The second level (adapted from van Dijk’s framework) which I term the ‘pragma-strategic level’ looks at various features focussing particularly on the pragmatic creation of legitimation in texts, and particularly on methods of positive self- and negative –other presentation. The
The third level is the justificatory schema proposed by van Leeuwen (2007a). The fourth level looks at legitimation as a process and in what way the multimodal text challenges the very meaning of legitimate. The fourth level looks at legitimation as an ascribed (or claimed) quality and explores the implications which the reification of the quality of legitimacy in a person, institution, or thing has on what is understood as ‘legitimate’. The final level suggests a discourse-historical moral evaluation into the underlying values assumed in the text.

4.6 Selection of ads

The corpus of ads from which I make my selection is freely available on the internet. Two sites in particular offer fairly comprehensive collections of the ads used in the U.S. Presidential elections. These are the Museum of the Moving Image’s ‘The Living Room Candidate’ archiving ‘Presidential Campaign Advertisements 1952-2008’, <http://www.livingroomcandidate.org>. The second site starts with the Presidential election of 2000, but has more advertisements which aired in the elections since then. The site is Stanford University’s Political Communication Lab (PCL), <http://pcl.stanford.edu>. The importance of this site is that it includes far more single-issue, independent, and internet-only ads, giving a deeper insight into the particular issues relevant in a certain year. Furthermore, with the exponential use of the internet in campaigning, the importance of unofficial web-only advertisements has hugely increased. How the new media have changed political advertising will be discussed in Section 6.2.3.

A further advantage of using material freely available to the (global internet-enabled) public is that the ethical and copyright considerations which
need to be taken into account are massively reduced. None of the issues which
need to be addressed when dealing with raw data are relevant here.

Before selecting the ads, I spent a period of time watching all the ads I
could of a certain election, trying to get, first of all, an overview of what issues
were salient in any particular campaign. I also looked for unexpected or notable
features, which seemed to be innovative or in some way challenging to norms
specific to this genre which were emerging, and to more general norms which I
believe pertain to all advertising. I identified archetypical ads, and then tried to
contrast these with ones which fell outwith the norm. As posited by van Dijk (and
outlined in the literature review), one basic twin-method employed in legitimation
is positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation. This is a fundamental
advertising requirement which, through practice, forms a norm. Yet in order to
recognise this, the analyst (and the watching public) must understand the political
lay of the land, at least at a basic level.

4.7 Objectivity and political commitment

Van Dijk has insisted that practitioners of CDS are politically committed,
and many commentators (notably Widdowson) have criticised CDA for following
a narrow political agenda that, in the critics’ view, determines in advance what
their analysis will claim to discover. This is seen by them as an inherent
methodological weakness. This judgement fails however to appreciate three
things: one, there is no ‘neutral’ stance; two, there are no ‘neutral’ analysts, and
three, the fact that these two statements are true does not mean that what analysts
have to say is worthless or suspect. Certainly, there is a line to be drawn between propaganda and analysis, but it does not bisect the sub-field of CDS.

My political commitment manifests itself in this study through my determination to explore and bring attention to the role of the non-linguistic modes in legitimation in general, and political legitimation as enacted through the spot-ads in particular. I have watched the ads more with an eye to dissection than to their party political allegiances. Themes arose across the political landscape — they formed the field of battle — although for the most part it was possible to anticipate the positions adopted with regard to those themes. The ads were selected not in order to illustrate how the Democrats or the Republicans design their ads. Rather, I chose those which, subjected to analysis, most clearly demonstrate the importance and functioning of multimodality and legitimation by multimodal means.

4.8 Limitations

The most serious limitation to this study is, paradoxically, its scope. Multimodal analysis, multiplies the aspects and combinations of aspects to be considered in any text. Every avenue taken in every chapter of this thesis opens out to a new vista of questions. Beguiling as each vista has been, I have not been able to investigate any of them fully, for the reasons of space and time. Furthermore, many questions concerning specific modes — music, dance, painting, film-making, etc. — warrant the application of expertise I do not possess. This is a limitation, however, with a silver lining: collaboration under such conditions is often fruitful, exciting, and ground-breaking.
These limits on my exploration have an inverse dimension. In order to be as wide-ranging as I have been, I have had to forego a degree of depth which would strengthen the foundations of both the theory and the analysis. I have tried to counter this by approaching certain theoretical dimensions and certain ads in far greater detail than is generally given.

For example, I have elected to focus on one manifestation of the American Dream, and do it justice, rather than try and cover all manifestations in little detail. Similarly, when looking at the role of nature in legitimation (Chapter Eight), I have not been exhaustive in my selection of categories which could fall under this label — but, instead, have attempted to give a nuanced analysis of the categories I have selected. This dual-scale approach has, I hope, given the thesis the rigour which a more evenly generalised approach could not have achieved.
CHAPTER FIVE: LEGITIMATION

5.1 Introduction

In this section I look at legitimation and its close corollary, rationality. In so doing, I hope to tease apart, by following both theoretical and historical strands of thought, what is so often seen as a natural partnership. The purpose of this is twofold: clearly in a discussion of legitimation by multimodal means, the key terms need to be, if not simply defined, then elaborated upon; furthermore, the present status of different modes are, themselves, bound up in such considerations. Even a cursory tracing of the historical development of legitimation shows that its relationship with rationality and irrationality has been neither static nor simple. It is with this that I begin. I then turn my investigation around to look at the relationship between legitimation and irrationality. This throws into relief the ideological underpinnings of the very concepts of legitimation and rationality which are being used uncritically to classify, dismiss and uphold further judgements. Dualisms feature heavily in the discussion, yet, with these too, I attempt to problematise their easy uptake.

5.2. Rationality

We immediately encounter a problem, as Raymond Williams (1983) points out in his exposition of what he deems a keyword:

The group of words which are derived from and include rational and reason is extremely complex. We have only to think of the contemporary distance between reasonableness and rationalization. The social and intellectual history involved in the development of these words is immense. (ibid., p.252)
As he shows, *reason, reasonable* and *rational*, although sharing a derivation, have diverged from their shared meaning somewhat. He notes that ‘from its earliest uses in C13’, ‘reason’ had two kinds of meaning: one specific (e.g. ‘a reason’), and one general, ‘a (usually specifically human) faculty of connected thought and understanding’. Already Williams has entered political territory, for in the thirteenth century, was reason really considered a *human* faculty? He brings up early politically charged connotations himself when he says:

> There have been times when *Reason*, often in this use capitalized, has been sharply distinguished from the giving of any specific reason or reasons. The two most notable instances are the lC16 and C17 theological use of *Reason*, often emphasized as *Right Reason*, against new kinds of *reasoning* and *rationality*, and the lC18 and eC19 Idealist use of *Reason* as the transcendent power of grasping first principles, as distinct from the processes of empirical [...] verification or *rational* calculation. *(ibid., p.253)*

Other than begging the question of whether theologians identified Wrong Reason, this politicised notion of reason prefigures many of the points which will come up in the later discussions about rationality, irrationality and legitimation. Here we see different schools of thought vying for primacy of meaning; an ideological battle which will make legitimation a permanent battle-ground. One transposition especially has obfuscated the ideological motivations shaping rationality: on the one hand it is used to differentiate between mentally evolved animals (I do not say humans because other higher primates, at least, are believed by some to reason) and the rest of the animal kingdom; and on the other hand, it is allied to particular schools of thought. The first fundamental, *natural*, meaning carries over (and legitimates) the others, while the other meanings cast complicated shadows over the first. Williams writes that:
Given this complexity, it is not surprising that in the most bitter disputes most parties have claimed to have *reason* on their side... *Reason* in the most general sense, as a human faculty, has always been there but has been so variously applied, over a range from *reason* understood as ‘informed by grace’ as opposed to mere ‘carnal reason’, to *reason* understood as a set of universal principles as distinguished from *reason* as the faculty of connected and demonstrated argument, that it is, obviously, a word that cannot be taken far on its own. (*ibid.*)

Unfortunately, not only is it a word that is left to go a very long way on its own, but it is seen as a trusty chaperone for many other words and concepts — ‘legitimation’ being one of them, and ‘language’ another.

‘Reason’, with all its historical and ideological baggage, has shaped the political development of ‘rational’. In tracing the history of this word Williams finds early on a *preponderance* for the meaning of ‘natural’ to be set in opposition to religious belief (he quotes, ‘a mere Rationalist... an Atheist’ from 1670). From the emerging dualism of ‘rational’ ~ ‘religious’, we soon get another: ‘rational’ as opposed to ‘emotional’. This opposition to the emotional settles in as the main basis for understanding the rational, although an undercurrent remains in the negative connotations of ‘rationalization’ as ‘finding a false or covering *reason*.’

This leads Williams to conclude:

Where this leaves *reasoning* and *rationality* has not been clear. *Rationalization* can be distinguished as false reasoning, but *irrational* is still avoided... Moreover, though more comfortable words are usually found, the associated conviction is usually that human beings are ‘at root’ or ‘fundamentally’ *irrational*; the *rational* is then mere reason-making and reason-finding, of a secondary kind. (*ibid.*, p.255)

This final statement chimes with the fear lying behind Baconian rationality, discussed below. The impact of the long-standing domination of this manifestation of Enlightenment rationality has been - and remains - great, although, as I try to demonstrate, the ground is constantly shifting. I have had to
ride roughshod over the intricacies and nuances of many of the theoretical discussions about rationality: my focus here is not rationality per se, but rather the way it has become unquestioningly, ‘naturally’, a good thing. This is the same process whereby dominant legitimated paradigms arise, and here I draw a parallel between the development of rationality and the development of ‘language sciences’.

Taking Kress’s definition of ‘mode’ as ‘a term that allows us to get away from using ‘language’ for everything’ (Kress & Hendriksen, 2012), the status of different communicative modes has altered in conjunction with the evolution of the meaning of rationality, with the standard written form dominant. The parallel to be drawn is that, as with the development of a ‘normal’ understanding of rationality, the development of standard forms of language has similarly relied on the following legitimating tactics: a de-historicisation, a turn to the ‘objective’ and scientific, a naturalising of the ideological features allowing for the standard form’s own hegemonic position, and a corresponding attempt to claim universality. In fact, the two ‘results’, standard rationality and standard languages, are intertwined: the language informs, validates and shapes the very rationality which it will later call as an independent witness on behalf of its own claim to rational status. Perhaps what we can identify as the legitimation of a certain type of mode and a certain type of language (and a corresponding de-legitimation of the rest) are not two processes, but one: a filtration whereby modes are separated out — the ‘rational’ ones moving on to the next level in the process, whereupon another, finer sieve further ‘cleanses’ the language of anything non-standard.
Clearly, the filters are ideologically constructed, and the final product ‘pure’ only in the sense of how reflective it is of those ideologies.

The myth of purity, is, of course, an attractive one, especially when compared to the messiness of the ideological historical wrangling of meaning. However, as Joseph cautions, it is the illusion of purity, not the messiness of reality, that needs to be avoided:

Thus, to suggest that significant misreadings have shaped the history of linguistics, and that these misreadings may have ideological motivation, is in no way to argue about the field’s scientifceness… ideology in one form or another is omnipresent in linguistics as in most other types of thought. The crucial distinction to be drawn is between linguists who acknowledge their ideological stances and those who do not. Just as the failure to recognize misreading produces the illusion of successful communication, the failure to acknowledge ideology creates the illusion of an objective, ‘pure’ sphere of enquiry. In both cases it is neither ideology, nor misreading, but illusion that compromises the integrity of the science, and that it is healthy to dispel. (Joseph, 1990, p. 52)

Regarding rationality, MacIntyre finds similar de-historicisation and warns of the resultant ‘unintelligibility’:

The history of philosophy as a form of rational enquiry is in such cultural and social orders embedded in the larger history of culture and society and will be, if too much detached from that history, in certain respects distorted or even unintelligible. (MacIntyre, 1991, pp. 150-151)

Similarly interested in preserving the ‘integrity of the science’, MacIntyre argues that varying conceptions of rationality should not be divorced from the contexts in which they emerged, and that no way of conducting rational enquiry from a standpoint independent of the particularities of any tradition has been discovered and that there is good reason to believe that there is no such way; that the problems of understanding and representing faithfully the concepts and beliefs of some tradition alien to one’s own tradition confront difficulties which can in certain contingent circumstances be overcome; that rival traditions have rival conceptions of rationality and of progress in understanding, but that this does not entail relativism or perspectivism. (ibid., p.152)
It is ironic that the conscious retreat from considerations of historical, political and (therefore) ideological influences upon language and notions of rationality has meant that linguists arrive in the paradoxical position described by Crowley:

> History, though markedly acknowledged as central, ‘since languages are always changing’, has to be forcibly excluded, ‘ignored’, in order that the mathematical precision required of a science be gained. To engage in this process of deliberate blindness, however, is to admit that the allegedly all-encompassing scientific study of language is based upon a myth: ‘the notion of a linguistic state can only be an approximation. In static linguistics, as in most sciences, no demonstration is possible without a conventional simplification of the data’. (Crowley, 1990, p. 32)

And rational philosophers must give their definition of rationality yet end it thus:

> Rationality is interpreted here, broadly, as the discipline of subjecting one’s choices — of actions as well as objectives, values and priorities — to reasoned scrutiny. Rather than defining rationality in terms of some formulaic conditions… rationality is seen here in much more general terms as the need to subject one’s choices to the demands of reason…. Reason need not be second-guessed out in defining rationality. (italics added, Sen, 2002, p. 5)

These decisions to de-historicise, naturalise and present as objective science have had academic implications, relegating those not so ‘hard’ disciplines to the disparaged ‘soft’ sciences, deemed not so ‘rational’, and therefore not so valuable, trustworthy, or important:

> What is more, in a period when linguistics was assuming a quasi-mathematical nature, no one found a convincing way to quantify the constituent elements of culture. While sociolinguistics rose to a prominent position precisely by committing itself to a statistical foundation, the cultural aspects of language — for better or for worse — refused to be reduced to formulae. At a cursory glance, culture-based studies appeared to lack what have emerged as the hallmarks of scholarly validity in our time. (Joseph, 1987, p. viii)

Moreover, if the ‘exclusion of value judgements is part of the definition of ‘scientific’’ (ibid., p.18), the cost to the ‘integrity’, not only of each academic
discipline, but to the professed ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’ ethics of each field, is compromised:

The constant flux of history is relegated in favour of static systems whose alteration alone can allow history to appear as momentarily important. Yet such a discursive hierarchy can only be bought at the price of deliberate exclusion and its recognition, which slips out here, displaces the straight face of scientificity with the jovial mask of mythology. (Crowley, 1990, p. 33)

In my discussion of mythology at the end of this section, I suggest that the Modernists used it as a lens, neither positive nor negative of its own accord. However, the Enlightenment myth of Rationality is seen as divisive, and has been damaging because it has not recognised its own ideological construction (Latour, 1993). James L. Marsh questions the legacy of such rationality:

Is modern, western rationality essentially opposed to the other, inevitably dominating her, excluding her, reducing her to sameness? (Marsh, 1998, p. 171)

In inverting the discussion to focus on irrationality and legitimation, I hope to further de-naturalise the automatic assumptions attached to ‘rationality’; here we have a recognition, by Marsh, of feminist critiques, and further on, he spells out quite clearly the not-so-academic result of a ‘natural’ and ‘universal’ rationality:

A second implication is that abuses of rationality do occur: illegitimate reduction to sameness, assimilation, domination, exploitation. But we can only criticize those from the perspective of a more comprehensive, deeper kind of rationality. (ibid., p.182)

Yet these serious errors of judgement should not lead to the even more foolish act of dismissing rationality out of hand. Marsh (and many others besides) have looked for a way to rehabilitate it:

Reason in general and modernist rationality in particular is being most rational when it is most fully open to its other, least rational when it is most closed… Rather more fruitful and plausible would seem to be a dialectical “yes” and “no” to modernity and its pathologies of domination,
in which less adequate forms of rationality are evaluated and criticized by
more adequate and non-dominating forms. (ibid., p.183)

Williams ends his entry on Rationality with the following:

To be reasonable or rational is to have certain assumptions of purpose,
system or method which are then so deeply held that for others to
challenge them is not only unreasonable but irrational (and probably a
rationalization of some quite other emotion or motive). It would help,
against such confusion, if we could with any confidence call in reason, but
we have seen how shifting that is. Reasoning, however, may still hold.
(Williams, 1983, pp. 255-256)

Through the rest of this section I shall use reasoning in Williams’ cultural and
societal, IC20 sense.

5.2.1 Rationality and Legitimation

Legitimation does not simplify this messy picture, but by bringing it into
the scene we can progress to a deeper discussion of what its partnership with
rationality implies. Again, I ride roughshod over millennia of philosophical
developments, but my focus is more on the relationship of rationality to
legitimation than on rationality per se.

Legitimation, under the rubric of rationality, divides into two — non-
legitimate Legitimacy, and legitimate Legitimacy. Non- legitimate Legitimation
occurs through the ossification, the reification, of the concept of legitimacy with a
concrete (although by no means universally recognised) instance of this. For
example, although post-colonial governments were seen as being legitimate at the
time of their coming to power, non-legitimate Legitimacy claims that because
they are the government, they are legitimate. Legitimacy is thus reified into
institutions which claim legitimacy by the dint of their being the institution they
are, not by dint of that institution demonstrating its legitimate qualities.
This non-legitimate Legitimation is bolstered by the institution’s hold on other manifestations of power — physical and symbolic resources; as well as by the hesitation engendered by the fact that there is an acceptance (other than with anarchists) that legitimation will, indeed, sit in an institutional setting such as the one in question. This hesitation is compounded by the difficulty in trying to identify what in the institution is non-legitimate because of the abuse of the system (such as corruption), and what is non-legitimate because of the form the institution itself has. (The division between these two is not at all clear — for example, will an example of police abuse based on racism be held as an abuse by individuals of the system or a symptom of what is inherently wrong with the system?)

Non-legitimate Legitimation leads to dictatorships which (pro)claim that what is writ is true because it originates from them, the sayers and definers of truth (e.g. Orwell’s Big Brother). On a lesser level, the argument from authority (especially institutional authority) can be an example of this. The Law/Government/Church/Monarch/Parent/Teacher can be claimed to be legitimate because of their position without any further recourse to why their position entitles them to make such demands (and claim such legitimacy).

Legitimate Legitimation breaks down along the lines of whether legitimation can be objectively grounded, or whether, following Weber, it is present where it is believed to be present. According to Beetham, this distinction has also traditionally followed discipline lines, where Weber has led the social scientists; and political philosophers ‘will probably start with Thomas Hobbes, if not earlier, and proceed through the great tradition which includes Locke,
Rousseau, Hegel and others’ (Beetham, 1991, p. 8). Weber’s position, according to Beetham, is that:

For a social scientist to say that a given power relation is legitimate[…] is not to make a moral judgement about it in the manner of the philosopher; it is rather to make a report (which may be empirically true or false) about other people’s beliefs. Power is legitimate where those involved in it believe it to be so; legitimacy derives from people’s belief in legitimacy. (ibid.)

This relativist view is dialectically realised. Negotiation of what is meant by (and ought to be accorded the status of) ‘legitimate’ involves all the participants involved in the power relationship. Schaar is quoted in Beetham giving the following (critical) summary of this state of affairs:

The new definitions, all dissolve legitimacy into belief or opinion. If a people holds the belief that existing institutions are “appropriate” or “morally proper”, then those institutions are legitimate. That’s all there is to it. (ibid., p.9)

The ‘manufacture of consent’ fits into this model. By first defining and naturalising (through other institutions interested in maintaining the power status quo, such as the media, the education system, and the armed forces) the parameters of what is under consideration, and then laying claim to legitimacy in this limited remit, those with limited (access to) knowledge understand (agree with, and perpetuate) the conception of legitimacy offered to them. Beetham notes the applicability of the Weberian perspective to the contemporary setting:

Such an explanation appears particularly plausible in an age of propaganda and public relations, when the public sphere is dominated by an emphasis on presentation over reality. If people believe in the legitimacy of power, is this not because the powerful have been successful in the public relations campaign, because they have managed to convince people that they are legitimate, because their ‘legitimations’ have been accepted? Is the question of their legitimacy not therefore in the hands of the powerful themselves? (ibid.)
If legitimacy is not to be understood in this way it must be understood in moral terms:

For the moral and political philosopher, power is legitimate where the rules governing it are justifiable according to rationally defensible normative principles. And as with any moral principles, these embody a universalising claim; it is not the principles that happen to pertain in a given society that are sufficient, but those that any rational person, upon considered and unbiased reflection, would have to agree to. (Beetham, 1991, p. 5)

Constitutions are built upon such principles — as are their Amendments. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights ends its Preamble with the following statement:

Now, Therefore THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction. (UN General Assembly, 1948)

However, there has not yet been produced a Universal Declaration which has been taken up universally, either due to religious reasons or for reasons of ‘practicability’.

Clearly these two conceptions of legitimacy inform one another. However universal, any normative principle must refer back to interpreters, even idealised ones (and it would be a disservice to the philosophical tradition mentioned to imagine that real people with real emotions were not considered in the formation of its philosophical theories). In the other direction, people’s beliefs (that something is legitimate) are formed (at least to some extent) through persuasion,

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9 For further discussion on the universal foundation of human rights and the viability of housing this within law, see Mooney, (2012).
and such persuasion uses anything persuasive — including the philosophical arguments themselves (for their informative value and their kudos).

Rationality has been taken as equivalent to, and equalling, legitimation. The Enlightenment succeeded in diminishing superstition by altering the grounds upon which (a legitimate) judgement should be based. An empirical approach was developed which saw as primary our powers of reason and observation. Scientific logic, based on an application of our rational abilities became, and has more or less remained, the legitimate modus operandi. So much so that an application of rationality stands as proxy for legitimation. Rationality bypassing legitimation in this way can lead to some uncomfortable conclusions. Swift’s A Modest Proposal (1729) is a supreme satire of such reasoning, in which, through faultless ‘computation’, with the statistics in order (‘I have reckoned upon a medium, that a child just born will weigh 12 pounds, and in a solar year, if tolerably nursed, encreaseth to 28 pounds’), he makes his proposal: ‘I have been assured by a very knowing American of my acquaintance in London, that a young healthy child well nursed, is, at a year old, a most delicious nourishing and wholesome food, whether stewed, roasted, baked, or boiled; and I make no doubt that it will equally serve in a fricasie, or a ragoust.’ Swift’s criticism of the application of economic logic to the plight of the Irish is heightened by its ironic temperance: ‘After all, I am not so violently bent upon my own opinion, as to reject any offer, proposed by wise men, which shall be found equally innocent, cheap, easy, and effectual.’ Swift’s use of irony as a weapon resulted from his frustration (hinted at through his narrator) of ‘having been wearied out for many years with offering vain, idle, visionary thoughts, and at length utterly despairing of success’. Satire countering
a misguided application of rationality-as-legitimacy (which was resulting in starvation, infanticide, squalor, and misery) is, however, not commensurate with the sinister and terrifying consequences of the ‘solution’ resulting from a planned application of ‘dispassionate’, ‘scientific’, rationality upon a human population, taken to a ‘logical’ conclusion.

5.2.2 Dichotomies and Dualisms

Dichotomies are easy classifying and labelling tools: but they fail at nuance. In the table below I list some of the dichotomies and dualisms which have both come out of — and have helped create and perpetuate — the status of the rational vs. the irrational. In my earlier discussion of Latour’s work I mentioned his insistence upon the need for a symmetrical anthropology (which would recognise that the ‘Moderns’’ dualistic conception – fallacy – does ‘not describe reality’ [Latour 1993, p. 103], our own reality or that of the ‘Premoderns’). This table is, in Latourian spirit, aimed at focussing attention at both the strength and tenacity, and the contradictory nature of the dualisms which uphold, underpin, yet constantly undermine the legitimacy of the rational.

In the left hand double column I list dichotomies used to legitimate the rational – and de-legitimate the irrational; in the right hand column I list dichotomies which, conversely, are used to legitimate the irrational – and de-legitimate the rational (see further Section 5.2.5).

There are four things to notice: first, the dichotomy often stands unchanged in both rows. In these cases, the legitimacy of (and positive connotation attached to) the two qualities/characteristics is disputed: e.g. is being
'rational' a legitimating or de-legitimating characteristic? (This was discussed at some length above).

Secondly, the situation can be the exact reverse of this when there is a struggle over (symbolic) possession of the positive term — and a denial of the negative one (which is thus attached to the opposing camp): e.g. ‘legitimate’ itself is one of these labels — both the Rational and the Irrational camps would lay a claim to it and tar the other with ‘illegitimate’ (I put these terms in brackets).

Thirdly, it will be seen that a slight change of focus, a careful (de)selection of the terms used makes all the difference: e.g. to legitimate the rational one could use the dichotomy ‘hysterical/controlled’, whereas, with only a slight (but crucial) shift, one could use the dichotomy ‘spontaneous/stilted’ to legitimate the irrational. The choice of a single (opprobrious or complimentary) word used to name a particular facet of a far more complex characteristic can be selected to (simplistically and often disingenuously) ‘stand for’ the whole concept: e.g. ‘hysterical’ as representing the salient quality of the irrational.

Lastly, at the bottom of the table, I have tentatively placed both modes and disciplines. This is an exploratory move, and I do it to illustrate both the connotations which attend such classification, and the flux and nuance such classification hides.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legitimating the Rational</th>
<th>Legitimating the Irrational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irrational</td>
<td>Rational</td>
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<tr>
<td>Illegitimate</td>
<td>(Legitimate)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subjective</td>
<td>Objective</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emotional</td>
<td>Rational</td>
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<td>Natural</td>
<td>Sophisticated</td>
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<tr>
<td>Body</td>
<td>Mind</td>
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<tr>
<td>Illogical</td>
<td>Logical</td>
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<td>Hot</td>
<td>Cold</td>
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<td>Base</td>
<td>Noble</td>
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<td>Intuitive</td>
<td>Evidence-based</td>
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<td>Feeling</td>
<td>Thinking</td>
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<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
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<tr>
<td>Impulsive</td>
<td>Considered</td>
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<td>Hysterical</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
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<td>Childlike</td>
<td>Cultured</td>
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<td>Superstititious</td>
<td>Rational</td>
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<td>Involved</td>
<td>Removed</td>
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<td>Messy</td>
<td>Neat</td>
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<tr>
<td>Simple</td>
<td>Complex</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>Concrete</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Disputed) placement of modes and disciplines</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Music</td>
<td>Music</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Painting</td>
<td>Painting</td>
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<tr>
<td>Storytelling</td>
<td>(Oratory)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Written language</td>
<td>Scientific diagram</td>
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<tr>
<td>Photography</td>
<td>Drama/literature</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oral testimony</td>
<td>Dance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medicine/therapy</td>
<td>Medicine/therapy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Disputed) placement of modes and disciplines

Figure 17: Dichotomies & dualism
5.2.3 Irrationality

The importance of the legitimacy of the ‘irrational’ as it concerns multimodality can be illustrated by playing mix and match with the following compositional elements (and here I choose an example relevant to political advertising):

a) A film of a little girl in a dress running through a field of bluebells.

b) A film of a little boy in salwar kameez running through the desert.

c) Soundtrack: Elgar’s Nimrod

(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sUgoBb8m1eE)

d) Soundtrack: Muezzin call to prayer

(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EAvlimEYEpQ)

One day I may imagine a cross-cultural Romeo and Juliet; another day, a story of growing up in a culture different to that of one’s parents. Other people would have their own interpretations. However, it is hard to imagine a day when I would not feel compelled to come up with some linking narrative; compelled, that is, to make juxtapositions into more than non-sequiturs (see further sec 5.2.3 on Eisenstein’s montage theory) and to ‘fill in the gaps’. So if there is a narrative here (even one we construct), what does it entail? What holds value? What is the interplay between the visual and the musical? Perhaps the music receives a visual accompaniment, or possibly the film gains a soundtrack; either way, each narrative element inserted in order to make sense of the stream reflects and embodies the values and judgements of those putting them in. If we are forced to make two narratives (‘a’/‘b’ + ‘c’/‘d’) do the connotations held by ‘childhood’ and ‘nature’ show internal division? What happens if we swap the children’s
genders, or for that matter any of the signifying features (dress, ethnicity, landscape)? What happens if the films are in black and white, sepia, or colour? What if the last frame cuts to this:

![Image 1](image1.jpg)

or this:

![Image 2](image2.jpg)
In order to ‘make sense’ of the sequences, we are forced to create or dredge up associations which need not be put into words. In fact, as I shall argue later, it is important for achieving the desired effect that words are bypassed. In multimodal texts, implications, associations and rippling significances interact and are forced to cohere, at least for the duration of play, into a meaningful unit. The importance of the values and characteristics which we attach to each element informs the legitimacy we will accord the text. In this section I will, first, discuss the irrational vis-à-vis legitimation, and attempt to elucidate a spectrum of discussion which I find helpful. Leading on from this, I will give a brief overview of the philosophical developments which accompany legitimation and the interplay of modes and movements within them. Finally, I discuss the fluidity of legitimacy as applied to various modes.
5.2.4 Irrationality and Legitimation

There is a great field of science which is as yet quite closed to us. I refer to the science which proceeds in terms of life and is established on data of living experience and of sure intuition. Call it subjective science if you like. Our objective science of modern knowledge [...] is a science of the dead world. (Lawrence, 2008, p. 8)

This quote from D. H. Lawrence exhibits many of the tensions and frustrations which exist in the attempt to legitimate the irrational. Rationality is paired with science, yet this ‘mechanistic’ approach is seen as dualistic rather than holistic, reducing and delimiting the ‘whole scope of human possibility’. Lawrence calls for a ‘subjective science’ rather than the presently legitimated ‘objective’ one, yet he is still talking in terms of science and thus reasserting — re-legitimating — the status it has. We get intimations of the dualisms (as presented by Lawrence who stands firmly in the irrational camp): ‘authentic’ as opposed to ‘superficial’, ‘vital’ as opposed to ‘dead’, and ‘complex’ as opposed to ‘reductive’. How then, is one to legitimate the irrational? And why, and for whom might it be desirable to do so? The irony of employing the genre of the essay, a rational form, to legitimate the irrational is not lost upon Lawrence.

5.2.5 Legitimating the Irrational

Before discussing the methods by which the irrational can be legitimated, it may be prudent to point out that two terms — ‘irrational’ and ‘non-rational’ — are useful in conceiving of differences within the agglomeration piled outside Rationality’s door. One would imagine that the irrational stands in decided opposition to rationality whereas the non-rational is that which stands outside
such a sphere (de Sousa discusses a third label, the ‘arational’, as not being ‘amenable to rational evaluation’ (Sousa, 1987, p. 5). A normative element also comes in here and the legitimation of the non-/irrational reflects two positions: the first being to say “yes, this is irrational and there is nothing wrong with that” and the second to say “this is not irrational but outside the realm of reason — not commensurate with such considerations”. Insofar as rationality, by definition, involves the application of reasoning, that which is seen to bypass it, to involve something other than the application of reason, can be seen as non-rational (this stands in contrast to an irrationality judged on the same terms as rationality and found lacking or opposing).

It is possible to conceptualise a spectrum of legitimation, as there is for ecology (Conley, 1997; Dryzek & Schlosberg, 1998; Pierce & VanDeVeer, 1995; Shrader-Frechette, 2003), which at the one end is ‘soft’ and at the other ‘deep’ (the mixed metaphors perhaps allowing both ends non-derogatory names, for who would prefer to be shallow rather than deep? And hard has resonances of intractability). For soft legitimation, like soft ecology, change is attempted without challenging the fundamental framework. Arguments can be made to reclassify something hitherto demoted to ‘irrational’ into the ‘rational’, using the mainstream definitions. An example of this might be the desire of mothers to be with their newborns. Previously, this was interpreted as merely an emotional (and thus irrational) reaction, but an increased understanding of obstetrics has led to the now widely-held belief that many medical advantages are gained through the gratification of this (now legitimate and rational) desire.
Still soft, but less so, would be an argument which attempted to slightly shift the meaning of what it is to be ‘rational’. This would not challenge the main assumptions underlying the pairing of rationality and legitimacy, but suggests a rethink of some border, a recalibration of priorities. Carrying on in a medical vein, this might be exemplified by the slow acceptance into the mainstream of ‘alternative therapies’, whether based on ‘new-age’ practices or ancient non-Western traditions. Their slow, and by no means comprehensive, ‘habilitation’ extends the meaning, expands the boundaries, of rationality.

When the framework itself is challenged, when the importance, supremacy, or relevance of Rationality is questioned, its status (and by extension all it stands for) is under threat. The softer version of this would be that which does not question the definition or importance of rationality — indeed may even, as in the quote from Lawrence, reaffirm it — but questions whether it is sufficient. If its capability is not commensurate with the demands of human experience, then the irrational ‘Other’ that is required to meet those demands needs must be legitimate. If religiosity is a human requirement, more fundamental yet transcendent to rationality, as Gandhi argues, the legitimacy of this transcendent-to-rational sphere should be presumed. The politics of legitimation, always present, comes to the fore here, due, in part, to the historical context in which Gandhi spoke.

A criticism of what is held by the mainstream to be legitimate is not simply a matter of terminology: a culture, a history, a belief in the past, and an investment in the future, are all being forcefully re-evaluated. Furthermore, of course, the practical implications for the success of an attempt such as Gandhi’s to
shift what is under the aegis of legitimacy are profound and resonant. His critique of rationality centres on accusations of ideological imperialism in both geographical and conceptual terms; thus he says, ‘we resist the tyranny and domination of the modernity idols [sic] of science, rationalism and objectivity’ (Pandey, 2007). Gandhi is not, however, suggesting a wholesale rejection of rationality, and he himself was vocal in pointing out the irrationality of the caste system and the numerous self-defeating superstitious beliefs he saw peasants suffer under. He says,

> Rationalism is a hideous monster when it claims for itself omnipotence. Attribution of omnipotence to reason is as bad a piece of idolatry as is worship of stock and stone believing it to be God. I plead not for the suppression of reason, but [an appreciation of its inherent limits]. (Gandhi, 1972, p. 275)

At heart, Gandhi reclaims the possibility of truth (which is generally considered legitimate) being centred not in what rationality and science ‘discover’ it to be, but in a far more fluid and varied human environment, one which does not expel rationality but insists on its mingling with religion, love, trust and forgiveness. Already we can see various strands intertwining — that of post-colonialist criticism, a critique of rationalism in what it has become (recalling Swift), and an assertion that great swathes of humanity and human experience seem to have been disregarded in the name of Progress.

Deep legitimation would, in contrast to the above, be that which rejects entirely the foundations upon which the mainstream stands. For our example this would be a repudiation of rationality as legitimate. This is going one step further than saying that rationality is not sufficient, to saying that it is invalid, illegitimate. The irony being that in order to challenge what is considered
legitimate *legitimately*, some degree of common language must be employed. Nandy talking from a post-colonialist standpoint about the essays in a volume he edited, makes this point:

That the authors often support their insights with examples drawn from the western world through a mode of discourse comprehensible primarily to the moderns should not mislead us. What Chinua Achebe says in another context can also, with a slight alteration, be said about these studies: Let no one be taken in by the fact that we deal with western issues in a western language; we want to do unheard-of things with them. (Nandy, 1990, p. 22)

Perpetrating ‘unheard-of-things’ is still, however, an engagement of sorts. Viewed from the deep end of the legitimation spectrum, what is considered legitimate in the mainstream, the modes employed and the genres used, would be of no interest, no value whatsoever. An *absolute* rejection would only see itself as legitimate if it were to apply its own self-legitimated form. In a final twist though, there seems to be something of the *populist* in legitimacy, and that which a minority calls legitimate, unless endowed with power from some domain, remains on the fringes.

As we have seen, the ‘female’ and its associated qualities have generally been denigrated. This, understandably, has led to feminist critique, taking forms that have varied right across this spectrum of legitimation as I have laid it out. The legitimation of the feminine cannot be viewed as a slow yet inevitable pendulum swing over time. There have, across cultures and ages, been times when female wisdom was considered legitimate. However, within academic discourse, we do seem still to be experiencing the first unidirectional increase in the legitimacy of the female (in terms of participation and outlook). Of course the tension arising from the use of written academic discourse to dislodge Enlightenment certainties
is always present. Mary Wollstonecraft demonstrates a soft approach to legitimation, in that she does not challenge the legitimacy of a pre-defined rationality, but rather argues that its own precepts are not being applied. Her manifold arguments are couched in concerns which make them, *rationally* and practically, difficult to deny. And such was her aim. She links rationality to true Christian virtue:

> I love man as my fellow; but his sceptre real or usurped, extends not to me, unless the reason of an individual demands my homage; and even then the submission is to reason, and not to man. In fact, the conduct of an accountable being must be regulated by the operations of its own reason; or on what foundation rests the throne of God? (Wollstonecraft, 1792)

This is a challenge to (rational) men to alter the female ‘curriculum’, rather than a call for women to make these changes themselves (Wollstonecraft ‘acknowledges’ that because of the state of affairs, uneducated women would make a hash of it). Furthermore, not wanting to halt the march of Progress, she declares that ‘Till women are more rationally educated, the progress in human virtue and improvement in knowledge must receive continual checks’ (*ibid.*). As noted, this was not a challenge to the terms of judgement, but a demand to be included within the auspices of rationality as it stood. Yet this acceptance of the terms was to change: the legitimacy of rationality as presented by the patriarchal West was — and remains — under attack. A common focus of historical attack has been the formation of the Royal Society, intended to ‘raise a masculine philosophy… whereby the Mind of Man may be ennobled with the knowledge of solid Truths’ (Henry Oldenberg, Secretary of the Royal Society, 1664). Keller describes the project thus:

> Science has been produced by a particular sub-set of the human race, that is, almost entirely by white, middle class males. For the founding fathers
of modern science, the reliance on the language of gender was explicit; they sought a philosophy that deserved to be called ‘masculine’ that could be distinguished from its ineffective predecessors by its ‘virile’ powers, its capacity to bind Nature to man's service and make her his slave. (Keller, 1982)

Vandana Shiva, a nuclear physicist by training, an Indian woman, and a feminist, encapsulates and connects feminist and post-colonial concerns, when she says:

In Bacon’s experimental method, which was central to this masculine project, there was a dichotomising between male and female, mind and matter, objective and subjective, rational and emotional, and a conjunction of masculine and scientific dominating over nature, women and the non-west. His was not a ‘neutral’, ‘objective’, ‘scientific’ method — it was a masculine mode of aggression against nature and domination over women… Both nature and inquiry appear conceptualized in ways modelled on rape and torture -- on man’s most violent and misogynous relationships with women -- and this modelling is advanced as a reason to value science. (Shiva, 1988, pp. 15-16)

In her essay, ‘The Cartesian Masculinzation of Thought’ (Bordo, 1987), after her historical critique, in which she also homes in on a Baconian misogynistic ‘Flight from the Feminine’, Bordo makes the interesting point that our age has parallels with the Renaissance ‘in the cultural reawakening to the multiplicity of possible human perspectives, and to the role of culture in shaping those perspectives’ (*ibid.*, p.115). I would add that, then as now, we see an explosion in the modalities used to portray these perspectives. And this multimodal smorgasbord fattens the represented modes’ influence, power, and thus dialectical roles within the culture — simultaneously offering reflection, commentary, and transformation. Yet Bordo pinpoints a crucial difference:

But in our era, the reawakening has occurred in the context of a recognition not merely of the undiscovered “other”, but of the *suppressed* other. Women, people of colour, and various ethnic and national groups have forced the culture into a critical re-examination not only of diversity (as occurred for Renaissance culture), but of the forces that mask diversity. That which appears as “dominant,” by virtue of that very fact, comes to be suspect: It has a secret story to tell, in the alternative perspectives to which
it has denied legitimacy, and in the historical and political circumstances of its own dominance. (*ibid.*, p.115)

Rationality and legitimation have long exercised philosophers. On the whole, the two are positively linked. However, where this has not been the case, where philosophers have argued to reject or at least problematise the connection, we get an insight into the shifting grounds of what is defined as ‘rational’ and what is defined as ‘legitimate’, in terms both of ways of thinking and of the modes used to express these thoughts. Jean-Jacques Rousseau is absolutely critical in this regard. Not only did he question the belief and faith his contemporaries placed in their emerging Enlightenment vision of scientific and rational Progress, but he envisioned an alternative which was and remains deeply influential. He upheld many of the dualisms listed, but argued, against the tide, that the irrational part was of better character and truer. For him, authenticity, naturalness, honesty, and innocence were being turned into a superficial, false, compromised artifice. In ‘Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts’ he writes:

> The mind has its needs, as does the body. The needs of the latter are the foundations of society; the needs of the former made it pleasant. While the government and the laws see to the safety and well-being of assembled men, the sciences, letters and the arts, less despotic and perhaps more powerful, spread garlands of flowers over the iron chains with which they are burdened, stifle in them the sense of that original liberty for which they seem to have been born, make them love their slavery, and turn them into what is called civilised peoples. (Rousseau, 2012, p. 6)

Rousseau is not advocating a return to barbarism; he says that ‘it is a grand and beautiful sight to see man emerge somehow from nothing by his own efforts…’. But the fact that he has been taken as desiring a return to a Golden Age pre-Enlightenment, a pastoral idyll that existed mainly in the imagination, has meant that for many others fighting to reclaim a legitimate status for the non-/irrational,
he is something of a double edged sword, since legitimacy cannot ultimately depend on myth. Furthermore, it is important to note that, in this romanticisation, although there is certainly not, in Bordo’s words, ‘A Flight from the Feminine’, there is instead a deep appreciation of women in their rightful place — the irrational and womanly sphere. Hence the forcible feminist attacks on Rousseau.

Despite these criticisms, the influence of Rousseau pervades contemporary culture, and advertising in particular. Above I mentioned Bacon’s ‘antagonistic’ vision of Nature, but this is not, in general, how Nature is viewed and represented today. In order to take stock of general representations and accepted interpretations — and here I am specifically looking for the clichéd and common — Getty Images is a rich resource. Getty Images is a stock photo agency particularly catering for business customers, with an archive of over 80 million still images and illustrations and more than 50,000 hours of stock film footage. Its market focus is upon three main groups: creative professionals (advertising and graphic design), the media (print and online publishing), and corporate (in-house design, marketing and communication departments). Type in ‘nature’ and hundreds of thousands of images are retrieved, and classified into ‘concepts’ for the user’s convenience. These concepts are listed in order, highest to lowest, of the number of images accorded to each. So, with ‘nature’, the five largest concept groups are:

1. Tranquil Scene (41,440)
2. Growth (25,212)
3. Freshness (16,870)
4. Idyllic (15,109)
5. Fragility (13,679)

Rousseau’s pleasant, fecund, nurturing Nature’s dominance is tempered only by a relatively new conception of nature as fragile. What we do not see is Nature as malevolent. This is not to say that the image bank does not work with the concepts of ‘nature as dangerous’ or ‘nature as powerful’, but these concepts are not amongst the most common. Furthermore, although we shall see the political use of ‘nature as predatory’ in the symbolic use of wolves and bears, this contested ground seems to be being won by those who either hold to Rousseau’s vision or adopt a more scientific view of ‘nature as amoral’ (or arational). Also noteworthy in terms of Rousseau’s influence is the heavy metaphoric use of ‘childhood’ to signify innocence. Again, it ought to be pointed out that this romanticised notion plants childhood firmly in the irrational, whilst extolling the legitimacy of this. Indeed, Rousseau calls childhood ‘the sleep of reason’. Going again to Getty Images, the top five concepts filed under ‘childhood’ are:

1. Childhood (268,307)
2. Togetherness (79,174)
3. Happiness (71,062)
4. Fun (58,107)
5. Innocence (53,136)

This, again, shows the attraction the romantic vision holds. Although, in contemporary culture, there is serious discussion of how best to constructively conceive of childhood in a less idealised way, the fall-back position, and one beloved of advertisers and politicians, is a sentimentalised one with Rousseauian undertones.
Of course, Rousseau is not the only figure in Western philosophy questioning the absolute supremacy of Enlightenment Rationality. The place of the passions and the senses within philosophy has always been under debate, and whilst there is no space for a full discussion here, Rousseau is one of many who have persisted in challenging or delimiting Cartesian dualism, rationality, irrationality and their legitimization or lack thereof. David Hume, a contemporary of Rousseau, says in *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739) that ‘Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them’. Hume’s insistence on the primacy of the passions somewhat moderates the overarching critique of the gentlemen scientists made up till now. Subsequently, another relevant contribution to this debate was made by Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche explored the status of truth so essential to scientific rationalism, and disturbed the relationship of scientific language to the literary language that was generally taken to be its opposite:

> What then is truth? A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding. (Nietzsche, 2000, p. 56)

Nietzsche was an important link between the movements of Romanticism and Modernism, both crucial to an understanding of the legitimization by multimodal means of today. ‘There are ages’, he wrote, ‘in which the rational man and the intuitive man stand side by side, the one in fear of intuition, the other with scorn for abstraction. The latter is just as irrational as the former is inartistic’ (*ibid.*, p.60). Cynically, I think it may be the case that in our age, with specific reference to political advertising, the rational man (as politician) and the intuitive man (as
(advertising executive) stand side by side, both relying on their audience’s intuition on the one hand, and their scorn for abstraction on the other. The ‘irrational’ sphere is under-theorized and, as such, things achieved there are less monitored, analysed, and scrutinised. I shall be asking whether there is, therefore, a case for saying that this dualism, as it applies to modes and holds legitimacy, is politically expedient.

5.2.6 Rationality and Legitimation in Romanticism

As part of what has retrospectively been called the Counter-Enlightenment, Romanticism emerged, less of a challenge than as an alternative to Rationality. Its ‘sensibility’ emerged across disciplines, including philosophy and science, but with regard to modes, its influence as an artistic movement is the most significant. As Russell makes clear, there was, prior to Rousseau, already an undercurrent in which people greatly admired what they called sensibilité, which means a proneness to emotion, and more particularly to the emotion of sympathy. To be thoroughly satisfactory, the emotion must be direct and violent and quite uninformed by thought. (Russell, 1972, p. 675)

Although this ‘sensibility’ was, taken as a conceit, almost instantly derided — especially by feminists such as Wollstonecraft who saw it as self-indulgent infantilising — its emphasis on unmoderated, hence ‘authentic’ subjective experience resonates today. The importance of empathy for and sympathy with others, although clearly not original with Romanticism, has nevertheless become one of its features. Stripped, perhaps, of its rhapsodic and melancholic fancy, the Romantic vision is to be seen in what is now positively termed ‘holistic’, ‘forward-thinking’, and — ironically — ‘enlightened’ thinking.
Medicine, a discipline which has been at the forefront of scientific rationalism is a case in point. Medical practitioners are now ‘enlightened’ if they look to the whole patient — not only their body’s functioning. In a letter from the 2nd January 1833, Coleridge made a much quoted observation which I cite here in the context of an article in the first volume of *The Lancet* called ‘The Psychological Character of the Physician’, an article which embodies many of the tensions discussed:

[R]emember the observation of Coleridge that “In the treatment of nervous cases, he is the best physician who is the most ingenious inspirer of hope.” How often has a disease which has baffled the skill of the scientific, practical man, vanished before the spell of a village witch. A patient inflicted with a malady which refused to yield to the demands of legitimate medicine, surrendered himself into the hands of a notorious quack. (Winslow, 1852)

Oliver Sacks, a neurologist working and writing today, says,

[T]he physician must confront, must have a feeling for, the total being of his patients — not merely as an ethical, Hippocratic necessity, but because, otherwise, he may find himself unable to treat them. (1990)

He continues,

I had… a sense of complete psychophysical transparency or continuity, of the physical and the mental dissolving into each other — never a sense of two elements or realms. “Awakening,” it became clear, was not just a matter of a chemical, but of everything that constituted, in moral and human experience, “a life”. (*ibid.*)

It seems that the Romantic — or at least select features from it — has been adopted into the medical science mainstream. Clearly this brings with it a reassessment of what is legitimate — both in terms of medical complaints, and in terms of their treatments. Neurology, as described by Sacks, is, for example, making ‘strange phenomena — previously called “hysterical”’ more ‘intelligible’*(Note to Editors, Sacks, 1990). ‘Hysteria’ was a ‘catch-all junk
diagnosis’ limited (almost entirely) to women and residing very much in the realm of the irrational. ‘Cures’ on offer were ‘bed rest, bland food, seclusion, refraining from mentally taxing tasks (for example, reading), […] sensory deprivation […] and ‘pelvic massage’’ (Wikipedia). The fact that this diagnosis has all but disappeared\(^{10}\) leads to the conclusion that, in fact, this is an example of soft legitimation whereby what was hitherto irrational hysteria is now placed comfortably within the rational, legitimate, and explicable-by-other-means. With ‘hysteria’, the irrational became legitimate by moving to the rational, but Sacks looks toward a legitimate synthesis between the rational and irrational when he writes:

> Art and play, and drama and rite, had a therapeutic power as strong as L-DOPA, as strong as any drug; but, it was clear, these worked in a different way. They worked, one felt, to evoke a self, and not in some partial and mechanical way. (1990)

With this, the rational becomes legitimate by moving to the irrational. This, I think, the Romantics would approve of. Coleridge:

> Now Art, used collectively for painting, sculpture, architecture and music, is the mediatress between, and reconciler of, nature and man. It is, therefore, the power of humanizing nature, of infusing the thoughts and passions of man into everything which is the object of his contemplation. (Shedd, Coleridge, & Coleridge, 1858, p. 828)

The Modernists too would approve of this legitimation of the irrational through typically non-rational ‘artistic’ modes, although the extent to which individuals could be reconciled to themselves — never mind to any external force such as nature — becomes a preoccupation.

\(^{10}\) Although the feminist literary critic Elaine Showalter in her book, Hystories: Hysterical Epidemics and Modern Media (1997), has courted controversy by maintaining that dissociative identity disorder (formerly called multiple personality disorder), Gulf War syndrome and chronic fatigue syndrome are modern manifestations of hysteria.
5.2.7 Rationality and Legitimation in Modernism

‘It is the mission of the twentieth century,’ wrote Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘to elucidate the irrational’ (Ch. 8, Braun, 1974). Does elucidation equal legitimation? In looking at how various modes legitimate, it is going to be important to answer this question. Elucidation clearly equals recognition, but does recognition necessarily equal legitimation? I would say that to some degree the answer has to be yes. Recognition leads to categorization, selection, and canonisation; Modernism has certainly a great deal to show us in this regard.

Habermas, ambivalent towards many aspects of the Modernist agenda says this:

Let me start a different analysis by recalling an idea from Max Weber. He characterized cultural modernity as the separation of the substantive reason expressed in religion and metaphysics into three autonomous spheres. They are: science, morality and art. These came to be differentiated because the unified world-views of religion and metaphysics fell apart. Since the eighteenth century, the problems inherited from these older world-views could be arranged so as to fall under specific aspects of validity: truth, normative rightness, authenticity and beauty. They could be handled as questions of knowledge, or of justice and morality, or of taste. Scientific discourse, theories of morality, jurisprudence, and the production and criticism of art could in turn be institutionalized. (Habermas, 1993)

This fragmentation of unified world views cast attention back onto and into the individual. Morally, ethically, and artistically, this would lead to angst and introspection explored through divergent channels. Kierkegaard’s instruction resonates with the later development of existentialism, but also holds fast to the importance of authenticity-of-self:

[T]he thing is to find a truth which is true for me, to find the idea for which I can live and die. (Kierkegaard, 2003, p. 44)

This authenticity, rather secure and resplendent in Romanticism, will be undermined through Freud’s psychoanalysis, the Modernist writers’ ‘stream of
consciousness’, Dadaism, Cubism, and Surrealism. One refrain playing through Modernism is the power of myth and the eternal relevance of mythology. Another is the view to the future, to technological ‘advancement’ and the hopes and fears it engendered. This Janus-faced identity is bound up with a search for legitimacy and again, a reassessment of what can be legitimate. Skipping ahead for an instant, in multimodal political legitimation, we will repeatedly see myth and technology, tradition and progress, in fluid interaction with each other: sometimes in harmony and sometimes antithesis.

5.2.8 Mythology and Legitimation

The mythical played a large part in the creation myths of new European states. To the extent that the existence of a common language was taken to mean a common identity, myths, retrospectively written in the ‘shared’ language, historicizing the birth and shared traditions of the Nation was crucial for legitimation purposes. Furthermore, the political narratives of Communism and Fascism both relied heavily on a mythologising and romanticising of a past.

This re-engagement with myth was not just used politically, but spanned the arts and the creation of the new disciplines of psychotherapy and anthropology. What features made mythology such fertile ground? Within mythology the irrational side of the human psyche was recognised, explored and legitimated, at least to a degree. Myths also seemed to offer a process by which the non-legitimate irrational could be cathartically expurged: Mann’s homosexuality (‘what am I suffering from? From sexuality’ he wrote in a letter to Otto Grautoff in 1896 (Lawson, 2005, p. 34)), and according to Freud, women’s
aberrant sexuality. Moreover, mythology was invoked in attempts to give voice to existential angst, a loss of trust in Rationality and Progress, and incomprehension due to the experience of war. It is important to see mythology as a lens through which the irrational can be explored, rather than as a pair of rose-tinted spectacles legitimating all the irrationality gazed upon. Frye writes:

> It is clear that all verbal structures with meaning are verbal imitations of that elusive psychological and physiological process known as thought, a process stumbling through emotional entanglements, sudden irrational convictions, involuntary gleams of insight, rationalized prejudices, and blocks of panic and inertia, finally to reach a completely incommunicable intuition. (Frye, 1957, p. 83)

We can see myth as a vehicle for legitimation on two levels: first as a venerable and recognisable frame within which observations about human existence can be arranged, composed, and displayed, in order to make sense of a world now devoid of ‘unifying world views’. Secondly, as an interpretative gauze through which the irrational and unconscious could be analysed, made manifest, decrypted and doctored. Looking first to myth as a legitimate frame, in *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche writes:

> And now the myth-less man remains eternally hungering among all the bygones, and digs and grubs for roots, though he has to dig for them even among the remotest antiquities. The stupendous historical exigency of the unsatisfied modern culture, the gathering around one of countless other cultures, the consuming desire for knowledge — what does all this point to, if not to the loss of myth, the loss of the mythical home, the mythical source? (Nietzsche, 1923, p. 175)

So the loss of the old myth and its narrative frame, primarily due to the ‘death of God’, forces a casting about, geographically and temporally,

> For through an awareness of myth we can perhaps recapture the spirit of the now forgotten rites which lent passion and purpose to the most ordinary experiences of our forbearers. An understanding of myth has come to be a central concern of a large body of twentieth century thought. (Block, 1952)
In this adoption of mythological narratives (and not the beliefs that engendered them), we also have a recognition and embodiment of the power of language. Wittgenstein writes (with reference to Frazer): ‘An entire mythology is stored within our language’ (Wittgenstein, Klagge, & Nordmann, 1993, p. 133).

The links between language, myth and legitimation are many, and interwoven. Writing about myth and anthropology, mid-century, Block brings in Renan (who was involved in the politically legitimating use of myth vis-à-vis nation building mentioned above):

For my part, I find Renan’s notion of philology as “la science des produits de l’esprit humain” particularly applicable to present-day critical trends. Renan conceived of philology as the vast synthesizing discipline, to embrace not only history, poetry, and philosophy, but also primitive mythology, ancient cults, comparative religion, and the ways in which all these subjects constitute part of the heritage of mankind. (Block, 1952)

This view of philology as synthesising, as it being the discipline-nexus towards which disparate formulations gravitated, is certainly true with regards to myth although the contiguity between the two suggests this is a symbiotic rather than dependant relationship. By this I mean that myth and its narrative frame are pulled into, but also reside in and define, philology. Frazer, and The Golden Bough in particular, is seen as crucial in raising the profile of myth. Simultaneously giving voice to the aforementioned existential angst and offering myth as a new lens through which to see and comprehend the world, Frazer incorporated Christian stories into his analyses — at once causing great outrage, but also allowing for a rehabilitation of sorts. Again, looking ahead, the tensions between, on the one hand, Obama being represented as ‘hero’ in the American story, and on the other, being seen as presenting himself as overly Messianic (rather than simply
generically heroic) will be played out between the Democrats and Republicans in their (de)legitimation strategies.

Turning to the second way in which myth legitimates, namely, as an interpretative gauze, we can look again at T.S. Eliot’s remarks. Eliot says of Joyce’s *Ulysses*:

In using the myth, in manipulating a continuous parallel between contemporaneity and antiquity, Mr. Joyce is pursuing a method which others must pursue after him. They will not be imitators, any more than the scientist who uses the discoveries of an Einstein in pursuing his own, independent, further investigations. It is simply a way of controlling, of ordering, of giving a shape and a significance to the immense panorama of futility and anarchy which is contemporary history. (Eliot, 1923, quoted in Block, 1952)

Indeed, Block talks of the ‘modern mythomania’ (Block, 1952), not in a dismissive way, but in relation to the importance and centrality of myth. In literature, many including Eliot, Joyce, Lawrence, Graves and Mann employ it centrally in their work, and where myth is not referred to directly, Freud’s psychoanalysis — itself indebted to mythology — strongly influenced the ‘stream-of-consciousness’ writers. Furthermore, in a wider sense, the values surrounding myths re-emerge in much Modernist work. The dangerous power of music, for example, is a trope revisited again and again. Woolf writes: ‘If we try to analyse our sensations we shall find that we are worked upon as if by music — the senses are stirred rather than the brain’ (Woolf, 1986). And this concern is not a purely literary one; it is played out throughout the history of the relationship between music and politics (to be discussed in more detail later).

But one can see its place within the societal, as well as the mythological Greco-Roman context, in Joseph’s previously mentioned (Sec. 2.2.6) discussion of the implications of a decree within the Twelve Tables of Roman Law which
made it a capital offense ‘if anyone sings or composes a song that might cause infamy and shame to another’. He contrasts the Roman law with one from Britain (or, as it concerns the Statute of ‘Westminster the First’, from 1275, Joseph avoids the anachronism by writing of ‘these islands’) in which the common law tradition of freedom of speech is constrained by an order against ‘false News or Tales, whereby Discord, or Occasion of Discord or Slander may grow’. However, as Joseph writes,

between these laws lies a great divide. On one side lies a world in which language is magical in its essence. On the other it is treated as something rational, the very stuff of reason, rather than, as in the ancient text, something that exists prior to reason and retains the power to overcome it. The Roman law says nothing about whether the content of the song is true or false. […] Yet a Roman of this time could say what he wanted about another, as long as it was ordinary speech, not verse, not language in the fullest sense. This is where the magic enters. (Joseph, 2010d, pp. 65-66)

Music, then, was considered inherently powerful, and has remained so. In much literature of the Modernist period, it is presented as working in concert with other catalysts of ‘irrational’ behaviour through the personification of Bacchus (e.g. in Mann, Nietzsche and Joyce) in which musical power combined with wine and dance to free people from their convention-bound lives (Bacchus was also ‘the Liberator’, Eleutherios). This awareness of possible subversion and proximity to chaos is neatly transposable (not accidentally) onto psychoanalysis.

If philology was seen as synthesising, psychoanalysis was seen as all-pervasive. Thomas Mann, in *Freud and the Future*, is very concerned with myth11:

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11 In fact, in the speech, given in celebration of Freud’s eightieth birthday in 1936, Mann says: ‘While I was speaking to you I found myself wondering whether I might not have led you into error about the true content of my talk and whether, considering everything I say, especially towards the end, it might not have been better to entitle it *Freud and Myth.*’ (Mann, 1959)
I realized this connection only at a time when his [Freud’s] achievement was no longer thought of as merely a therapeutic method, whether recognised or disputed; when it had long since outgrown his purely medical implications and become a world movement which penetrated into every field of science and every domain of the intellect: literature, the history of art, religion and prehistory; mythology, folklore, pedagogy, and what not. (Mann, 1959)

Freud, himself influenced by Frazer, used myth as a vocabulary to explain the unconscious. He carried the analogy further than similitude, recognising the anthropological universals of myth mentioned previously, and ‘identifying’ certain myths as being manifestations of a repressed human psyche. Famously, he recognised the Oedipal complex, as well as other psychological situations, conflicts, and diseases named after Electra, Eros, and Narcissus. Freud’s influence remains huge, his legacy somewhat mixed, and his reception heated. Many feminists (including de Beauvoir and Irigaray) have called the whole theory a phallocentric ‘pseudoscience’, yet other feminists have tried to reconcile and incorporate many of its features into their own work (e.g. Kristeva and Juliet Mitchell). From another angle, Wittgenstein wrote that ‘Freud […] has not given an explanation of the ancient myth. What he has done is to propound a new myth’ (Barrett, 1966).

Yet, the whole theory has not been, and cannot be, debunked. In fact, Wittgenstein’s comment has proven incisive: Freudian theory has gained mythological status. The levels at which psychoanalysis legitimates range from the soft to the deep (using the spectrum described earlier), in that, again, we see the previously irrational medicalised and brought into the legitimate, scientific arena. Yet, it would be grossly inaccurate to see this as a one-way legitimation. With psychoanalysis as the vehicle, the irrational, seen through a legitimate
mythological membrane, made an irreversible break through to become a legitimate way of analysing the world. Mann is optimistic and effusive about the long-standing effects of psychoanalysis:

This physicianly psychologist will, I make no doubt at all, be honoured as the path-finder towards a humanism of the future, which we dimly divine and which will have experienced much that the earlier humanism knew not of. It will be a humanism standing in a different relation to the powers of the lower world, the unconscious, the id: a relation bolder, freer, blither, productive of a riper art than any possible in our neurotic, fear-ridden, hate-ridden world… Call this, if you choose, a poet’s utopia; but the thought is after all not unthinkable that the resolution of our great fear and our great hate… may one day be due to the healing effect of this very science. (Mann, 1959)

In retrospect, Mann was overly optimistic: psychoanalysis has not proven to be the panacea he dreamt it might be. Our society is not without neuroses, nor free of hate or fear. Nonetheless, the investigation into the non-rational within the human, the subconscious if you will, has, itself, become a legitimate frame. One could certainly argue that the mental landscape we inhabit stands in a bolder, more open, and more productive relation to the rational world, thanks, in part, to Freud.

5.2.9 Technology and Legitimation

The machinery of Society, profoundly out of gear, oscillates between an amelioration, of historical importance, and a catastrophe. It is a question of building which is at the root of the social unrest of to-day: architecture or revolution.
Le Corbusier, Towards a New Architecture (Cahoone, 1996)

Le Corbusier is often presented as representative of the other face of Modernism: that which looked forward rather than back, to the new rather than the old, to Progress rather than Tradition; that which embraced new technology and saw in it cures for society’s ills. His 1925 plan for Paris proposed to knock
down the entire Marais district and replace it with rows of identical towers set between freeways, a technological urban ‘solution’ to the fragmentation discussed in the previous section. The legitimacy of the mass-produced was explored further through Duchamp’s ‘readymades’, and the rapid new developments in science and automation seemed to promise an improvement in quality of life for the masses. Yet it is imperative to avoid the ease of sticking to, of securing, the dichotomous belief that those Modernists interested in myth were only backward looking while those Modernists interested in looking for a technological solution saw no value in the past.

Myth was a re-discovery, strikingly new in application. Ezra Pound’s motto “Make it New!” was of crucial importance in shaping the Modernist poets, including D.H. Lawrence and T.S. Eliot, who, as we have seen, were also immersed in myth. Le Corbusier, himself, was very much in favour of the application of classical proportions, as detailed in Rowe’s essay, *The Mathematics of the Ideal Villa*, which ‘traces parallel proportional systems in the work of Palladio and Le Corbusier’ (Ostwald, 2000).

Unravelling this Modernist paradox is crucial for a discussion about legitimation and modes and I think the key is to separate the evaluations concerning the newness of method of expression from the newness of what is being promoted and expressed. Looked at in this way, Modernism uses both old and new forms to express old and new ideas: the combinations are original. One example should make this clear: in 1913, Diaghilev’s Ballets Russes premiered Stravinsky’s *The Rite of Spring*, in Paris. With classically trained ballet dancers performing Nijinsky’s unconventional choreography, taking on a theme involving
myth and paganism, using Roerich’s set design and Stravinsky’s revolutionary score played by a traditional orchestra, a riot broke out in the theatre, the police were called in, and the enduring fame of the occasion was secured. The disjunction between the legitimate (classical structure in ballet, music and painting) and the radical (non-demure dancing, dissonant music, unconventional scoring and set design) was what generated the power (Butler, 2004; Garafola, 2009). There are many more examples (discussed with specific reference to mode later) in which the flaunting of combinations upset and destabilised expectations. We shall see in the advertisements that this disjunction can throw assumptions into relief, but also that such a disjunction can be avoided through careful construction.

5.3 Summary

In this chapter I have examined the historical links between, and various evolving meanings of, legitimation, rationality and irrationality. To explore the layers of meanings, built up over time and imbued with strains of complex and sometimes contradictory meaning, I have attempted to tease apart the various discourses which come together so densely when we talk of ‘legitimation’. Two concepts, ‘rationality’ and ‘nature’ are salient, as are the many dichotomies which form a web of values and encompass the histories of many disciplines’ thinking on the subject of legitimation. After looking at rationality and its close pairing with legitimacy, I look, by turns, at the role of science, Romanticism, Modernism, mythology, and technology in the changing meaning of legitimation. In each subsection I attempt to reflect the historical traces which go on to influence the future
meaning. I also attempt to highlight the role of religion, gender, and colonialism in changing the meaning of legitimation and, by so doing, emphasise the political and social nature and importance of the concepts of legitimation, rationality, irrationality, and nature.
CHAPTER SIX: MULTIMODAL PROPOSITIONAL COERCION

6.1 Doing politics multimodally

6.1.1 The Transferability of the Arts

Studies in synaesthesia and cognition both tell us that there is significant crossover in what perceiving different modes of art makes our brain do. This is a fascinating, huge topic quite outwith the scope of this study. Here, I want to challenge the view that music and visuals are, by their nature, only able to support the written word through pathos when it comes to multimodal texts. This simplistic view fails to appreciate the inextricability of one mode from another when it comes to analysing effect — indeed, the impossibility of even having a mono-modal medium (Mitchell, 2005).

The relationship between modes, the interplay, is obviously not something which can be studied if the effect of each mode is looked at separately. It is an irony of academic writing — especially about another mode — that there is a necessary reductionism and transmutation. Kandinsky (writing in 1911) notes the irreducibility of colour — and by extension other modes — into words:

It is clear that all I have said of these simple colours is very provisional and general, and so also are those feelings (joy, grief, etc.) which have been quoted as parallels of the colours. For these feelings are only the material expressions of the soul. Shades of colour, like those of sound, are of a much finer texture and awake in the soul emotions too fine to be expressed in words. Certainly each tone will find some probable expression in words, but it will always be incomplete, and that part which the word fails to express will not be unimportant but rather the very kernel of its existence. For this reason words are, and will always remain, only hints, mere suggestions of colours. (p. 47, Kandinsky, 1977)
In multimodal analysis, therefore, we should fall neither into the category of thinking all modes can achieve the same thing — each has unique affordances (Gibson, 1979); nor of thinking that each mode is an island unto itself and we are wasting our time looking for parallels and shared qualities. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts is a good maxim here. Kandinsky elaborates this position:

In this impossibility of expressing colour in words with the consequent need for some other mode of expression lies the opportunity of the art of the future. In this art among innumerable rich and varied combinations there is one which is founded on firm fact, and that is as follows. The actual expression of colour can be achieved simultaneously by several forms of art, each art playing its separate part, and producing a whole which exceeds in richness and force any expression attainable by one art alone. The immense possibilities of depth and strength to be gained by combination or by discord between the various arts can be easily realized. (p. 47, Kandinsky, 1977)

In the previous section I have attempted to challenge the assumption that language — written and spoken language — is composed of those qualities (and only those qualities) which entitle it to be understood as the vehicle for legitimation and rationality. In problematising the simplistic dichotomies which we have seen attend upon legitimacy — and in particular its relationship with language — I hope to have prepared the ground for a more nuanced understanding of legitimation vis-à-vis the non-linguistic modes.

6.1.2 Dada and Surrealism: Their Politics and Paradoxical Legacy

Dada and Surrealism were born out of the horrors of war, and the passion of the Russian Revolution. Dada participants ‘sought to overturn bourgeois notions’, counterposing ‘their love of paradox and effrontery to the insanities of a world-gone-mad’ (Introduction, Hopkins, 2004), whereas the Surrealists, ‘committed to the view that human nature is fundamentally irrational’ (ibid.), set
about exploring that hidden, subconscious landscape. Both these movements were
dedicatedly left-wing, involving themselves not only with challenging the
aesthetic values of their day (especially the distinction between high and low art),
but also in being politically outspoken. Their legacy has been — and remains —
immense, although somewhat paradoxical. Indeed, it is fair to say that to
understand advertising today, that is, to understand the public legitimation by
multimodal means attempted for the furtherance of specific aims (whether that be
for political power, or capital gain), some knowledge of these two movements is

Both their methods and their preoccupations can be seen as a blueprint for
present-day advertising: a brief exploration into how this deeply ironic state of
affairs came to pass offers an instructive illustration of the interplay between
politics and art (here taken in the widest possible cultural sense, encompassing all
modes) and a case in point of legitimation by multimodal means being the site of
a symbolic power struggle.

That the Dada and the Surrealist movements were ‘profoundly inimical to
capitalist values’ (Hopkins, 2004, p. 96) is demonstrated by a look at the one-off
issue of Jedermann sein eigner Fussball (‘Everyman his own football’), from 15th
Feb, 1919, produced by ‘the fervently Communist Heartfield-Herzfelde-Grosz
faction of Berlin Dada’ (ibid., p. 54). This Dada publication was complex in
design and ambiguous in message. Its self-reflexivity, and multi-layered
referencing to recent political events and political actors was achieved not only
through a complicated design (incorporating photo-montage, typography and
text), but also through the event of its production. Hopkins summarises: ‘All in
all, then, the design both plays with mass advertising and criticizes its role in manufacturing political consent’ (ibid., pp. 55-56). This parodying — making it ‘difficult as a spectator to separate the (anti-)art on display from the polemical barrage’ — paired with the emphasis on ‘shock’ and juxtaposition, was the signature of Dada, initially so successful due to a working awareness of the techniques employed by those to whom they were opposed. This was a strength, particularly, of the Russian contingent, who were acutely aware of the power of image and slogan. Their output:

[Re]vealed the Berlin Dadaists’ awareness of the increasing power of advertising in daily life. Rather than stand aloof from the processes of the commercial world, they hijacked its strategies to disseminate their message. (ibid., p. 35)

Yet the tables have turned, with many present day artists heavily reliant ‘on the achievements of Dadaists and Surrealists’, yet ‘prod[ding] at a Surrealism gone flabby through its assimilation into the market place’ (ibid., p. 150). What Dada hijacked and made its own has been (re?)assimilated, or, as Hopkins writes, ‘hijacked by the market system to cater to the ‘pseudosatisfactions’ of capitalist consumerism’ (ibid., p. 96). By the 1960’s ‘smart advertisers realised its disruptive codes were ideal for cheeky posters, […] rediscovered the platitudes of surrealism and called them revolution’ (Sutherland, 2001).

The Dada and Surrealist movements fell victim to their own success: their ‘populist currency has all but obliterated its underlying value’ (Hopkins, 2004, p. 150), and subversion for left-wing political ends, has (overwhelmingly) become subversion-lite: a means to corporate profit and political packaging, or, as Sutherland laconically labels it: Surrealism - ‘a sexy dodo’ (Sutherland, 2001). Sex continues to sell, juxtaposition continues to be arresting, and shocks continue
to rouse: advertising, however, needs to appeal — and in this crucial aspect, Dada and Surrealism retain an independence — answerable as they are to no one — which advertising cannot have (thus, the need to serve Surrealism-lite).

Or perhaps it can, if well managed. Especially in political advertising, negativity works very well. A negative campaign ad can show shocking things as long as the features which are unappealing are attributed by the viewers to the target of the ad, and not at the producers. This is not so dissimilar from the Dadaists and Surrealists who, as discussed, were self-publicists par excellence. A much cited example of advertising employing many of the tactics of these two movements is the work by photographer Oliviero Toscani, most famous for his controversial campaigns for the Benetton company. These flaunted (and continue to flaunt) advertising convention by portraying ‘unappealing’ images such as an AIDS activist on his death-bed, (unsexy) body organs, and an unwashed, newborn baby. The appeal of the ads lies in the artistic composition of the photography, and in the starkness, the shockingness, of the image. This is compounded by the juxtaposition of advertising and the ‘real-world’ politics into which it appears to be encroaching.

We have seen the success of the multimodal output of the Dadaists and the Surrealists, their signature use of various features, namely juxtaposition, shock, self-publicity, and an emphasis on ‘the image’. We have then seen their ‘assimilation into capitalism’ to such a degree that Hopkins suggests that Surrealism, in its popular forms, ‘can [now] be understood as constituting the ideology it professed to oppose, caught in a distorting mirror’ (Hopkins, 2004, p.
What is in play here is not only the see-saw of these forms’ legitimacy, but also a vying for the legitimacy to *use* them. Virilio writes:

> It also involves the sudden *lack of distinction between genres*, with the visual arts, the architecture of installations, the staging of exhibitions in museums, but also theatre, opera and the art of choreography, all the art forms and their specific morphology, abandoning themselves to this rhythmology in which provocation and intimidation sell so amazingly well that Anglo-Saxon advertising people have created the term SHOCK-VERTISING in reference to the commercial necessity of shocking to attract attention. (Virilio, 2011, p. 235)

This is not a development of which he approves, calling it the ‘last form of anti-cultural incivility’ (*ibid.*). The melange of genres, modes and communicative motivations, impoverished and impoverishing, due to what he presents as a sort of cultural ADHD (Attention-Deficit-Hyperactivity-Disorder), explains, in his view, ‘the catastrophic substitution of the event for cultural action and its perennity, promoting instead the shock of images to the detriment of the weight of forms and words’ (*ibid.*, p. 237).

Virilio’s bleak assessment is a common one: the immediacy of much multimodal advertising (political spots as much as any), catering to the (derogatorily termed) sound-bite generation, loses in import where it gains in impact. Moreover, the possibility of critical commentary is seen as lessened due to the omnivorous capacity of the market to appropriate from culture — in just the manner it can be seen to have done for the Dada and Surrealist movements.

**6.1.3 The Russian avant-garde, Eisenstein and Soviet cinema**

The Russian avant-garde and later the Frankfurt School of theorists contributed to a body of work which theorised the role of art within politics. The politics they were concerned with differed, though both had Marxist roots. The
two groups consecutively spanned the Russian Revolution, Stalinism, Fascism and, towards the end, McCarthyism in the U.S. Adorno, in his *Philosophy of Modern Music*, writes:

The analogy which has been noted repeatedly between the transition from Debussy to Stravinsky in music, and the development from Impressionistic painting to Cubism, demonstrates more than a vague common denominator of cultural history, according to which music limped along behind literature and painting at the customary distance. (p.191, Adorno)

For the Russian avant-garde, the political upheaval and revolutionary declarations gave rise to newly invigorated aesthetic production and theorising. This evolved and mutated, under Stalinism, into several strands of Soviet Art, notably Socialist realism: some artists being sent to the Gulags, and some being heralded as heroes of the Nation. Nevertheless, in this early period, we see an attempt to forge culture specifically for the Proletariat.

In cinema, Eisenstein’s theory of montage countered the situation as it stood\(^\text{12}\) prior to his intervention, in which, as described by the critic Shklovsky, ‘film music is of the same significance as music in a restaurant’ (Egorova, 1997, p. 4). In 1917, the first trade union of cinema operators and pianists was organized in Moscow. Egorova summarises the state of affairs:

There was nothing paradoxical in this uniting of people so different by profession. On the contrary, it was consistent with the real state of affair [sic], since neither the cinema operator nor the musician took part directly in the work of the film team, being mere ‘mediators’ between the picture and the audience, and providing the technical and, partially, the aesthetic conditions for watching. Thus, the picture recorded on the screen had no analogous musical accompaniment recorded: it was each time re-created anew and thus there existed a great number of contradictory variants in the individual musicians’ improvisations. (Egorova, 1997, p. 4)

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\(^{12}\) This was not unique to Russia, but a universal for all silent films. Eisenstein’s response to this universal situation is what is of interest here.
This is interpreted as something bad, being as it was, inconsistent. However, it focuses upon the power of the musical score and, brought forward almost a century, would be a fascinating experiment on music and cognition — that of the musicians themselves and that of their audience. However, in Bolshevik Russia, the solution was found:

There seemed to be only one way to free silent film music from its dependence on the will or whim of these pianists: it was necessary that, besides the film director, the script writer, the camera-man and the actors, there should be a composer who, instead of selecting musical fragments to illustrate one or another sequence, should compose music intended only for one particular picture. *(ibid.)*

In ‘The Montage of Attractions’, Eisenstein presents a version of his montage theory, which he was to hone and alter (sometimes at the behest of the Communist Party) throughout his career. Himself a film director, Eisenstein was very much focussed on how he could legitimate an ideological position through the medium of film. For him, cinema had ‘the task of irrevocably inculcating communist ideology into the millions’:

An attraction… is any aggressive moment in theatre, i.e. any element of it that subjects the audience to emotional or psychological influence, verified by experience and mathematically calculated to produce specific emotional shocks in the spectator in their proper order within the whole. These shocks provide the only opportunity of perceiving the ideological aspect of what is being shown, the final ideological conclusion. *(p.30, Eisenstein, 1923)*

These attractions are by no means held in a supporting role, but are absolutely primary:

More often than not, given our scriptwriters’ utterly feeble approach to the construction of a script, this task falls entirely to the director. The transposition of the theme into a chain of attractions with a previously determined end effect is the definition we have given of a director’s work. The presence or absence of a written script is by no means all that important. *(ibid., p. 41)*
Here we have a director turning the usual primacy of language to achieve ideological aims on its head. Not only this but, as Taylor points out, for Eisenstein, the presence of a script needs to be justified and could only be so if ‘it performed a useful function in furthering the effectiveness of the film, in facilitating the communication of its ideological purpose’. But this separation between language and image was not desirable to Eisenstein, regardless of whether image was held subordinate to the script or not: ‘Only intellectual cinema will be able to put an end to the conflict between the “language of logic” and the “language of images”’ (Eisenstein, from Taylor, 1988, p. 158).

Sound, for Eisenstein, ‘is a double-edged invention’ (Eisenstein, Pudovkin, & Alexandrov, 1928, p. 80), with tremendous potential to improve or damage the art of film. He foresees that the ‘talking pictures’ will attempt to create ‘a certain “illusion” of people talking, objects making a noise, etc.’, which is seen as harmless exploration at first. But then

the danger comes with the second period, accompanied by the loss of innocence and purity of the initial concept of cinema’s new textural possibilities which can only intensify its unimaginative use […] Sound used in this way will destroy the culture of montage, because every mere addition of sound to montage fragments increases their inertia as such and their independent significance; this is undoubtedly detrimental to montage which operates above all not with fragments but through the juxtaposition of fragments. (ibid., p. 81)

In retrospect, his fears were well-founded, but the development of film has afforded more than he anticipated. We certainly expect naturalistic sounds on our films; indeed, with anything else, a film risks the kiss-of-death label ‘arty’. Then again, films which are extremely naturalistic (in sound, lighting and colour), such
as those made in response to the Dogma Manifesto\textsuperscript{13} are also labelled ‘arty’, and subsequently marketed as such, with all the financial and viewing implications that has. Nonetheless, despite his misgivings, Eisenstein embraced sound:

Sound, treated as a new element of montage (as an independent variable combined with the visual image), cannot fail to provide new and enormously powerful means of expressing and resolving the most complex problems, which have been depressing us with their insurmountability using the imperfect methods of a cinema operating only in visual images… The contrapuntal method of structuring a sound film not only does not weaken the international nature of cinema but gives to its meaning unparalleled strength and cultural heights. (Eisenstein et al., 1928, p. 81)

Eisenstein’s opinion of the use of colour seems to have altered from his early theorising on ‘the insignificance of colour and stereoscopic cinema in comparison with the great significance of sound’ (1928), to his later stance: ‘there is no difference at all between working with colour and music’ (1947). He extrapolates:

Once you have understood how you should treat the musical resolution, you have laid the groundwork for handling colour too. Because music in sound film begins at the point where the usual pairing of sound and image gives way to an arbitrary unity of sound and depiction; that is, when actual synchronisation ceases to exist. (ibid.)

Eisenstein’s belief in the power of film seems absolute, and in retrospect, more than a little misplaced. His enthusiasm and belief, if not naïve —

Whereas the conventional film directs and develops the emotions, here we have a hint of the possibility of likewise developing and directing the entire thought process.

— seem to verge on overreaching vision:

Intellectual cinema will be the cinema that resolves the conflicting combination of physiological overtones and intellectual overtones, creating an unheard-of form of cinema which inculcates the Revolution

\textsuperscript{13} Dogme 95 was a filmmaking movement launched in 1995 by the Danish directors Lars von Trier and Thomas Vinterberg, who forged political and aesthetic links to Eisenstein (Trier & Vinterberg, 2005, p. 87).
into the general history of culture, creating a synthesis of science, art and militant class consciousness. (Eisenstein, 1929)

This, however, did not happen. The transformative power of Soviet film did not turn us all — or even the Soviets— into the classless, creative, communist society which was the ideal. The argument — made through montage — was not persuasive enough. This, however, does not diminish the point that the argument was forcefully made; none of the reams written, nor the moving oratories in favour of an ideal communist state worked either. The ambitious project embarked on by Eisenstein, evolving, but always unequivocally ideologically motivated, failed.

Juxtaposition takes two known elements and makes anew. The echoes of Pound’s phrase, ‘Make it New!’ here are noticeable. Symbolism, Imagism, Dada, Surrealism, and, across the political gulf, Eisenstein and his theorising, were all intent and passionate about the forging of a new (and a new way) of understanding the world. If we bring this back to present-day advertising, we can detect the influence these movements appear to have had. Running counter to this, however, is the fact that mainstream American politics is not – Republican or Democrat – revolutionary, subversive, or parodying. There is a desire for newness but only within the tight economy of conservatism.

Juxtaposition, therefore, is used for (what Eisenstein would surely consider) superficial purposes: to juxtapose elements for effect, yet remain within the confines of the political arena. The juxtaposed elements are looking to shock just a little (rather, perhaps, to titillate) for the sake of creating a formulaic mental and physical response. By juxtaposing clichéd elements, this effect can be achieved. A tame, reliable, safe juxtaposition, justifying Virilio’s attack.
6.1.4 Adorno

Adorno and Eisler, about two decades later, as émigrés to the U.S. during the Second World War, co-authored *Composing for the Films*, in which they opine that ‘Thus far, Sergei Eisenstein has been the only important cinema director to enter into aesthetic discussions’ (p.65, 1994). Eisler, a talented young composer and musician, was far more sympathetic to Eisenstein’s aesthetic and ideological position than Adorno was. Himself a communist sympathiser and activist, Eisler’s project was, like Eisenstein’s, ‘primarily a political one: to give concrete musical expression to the Marxist vision of society and the aspirations of the working class’. A pivotal figure in Adorno and Eisler’s troubled relationship was the composer Schönberg. All three of these figures took issue with Hollywood, their shared attitude summed up by a mutual acquaintance, Bertolt Brecht, when he described it as the ‘centre of the international narcotics trade’, by which of course he meant the cinema.

Adorno is concerned here with addressing the deadening effect of mass culture, and the need for both artistic commentary and authenticity. This turns out to be well nigh impossible, with Stravinsky (‘How treacherous that Stravinsky’ *ibid.*, p. 203) something of a musical Judas, beguiling us with myth, custom, and several other self-conscious applications of various forms including ‘universal necrophilia’ and ‘rhythmic tricks’. One of his trenchant conclusions was that

Those who long for the administration of society through direct domination by force continually acclaim the traditional values which they wish to preserve from ruin. From this point, in like manner, objectivistic music appears as the force of preservation, proclaiming its own recovery… It recoins in counterfeit the destructive law of society itself — of absolute power, that is — as the constructive law of authenticity. The farewell trick of Stravinsky — who otherwise, in an elegant gesture,
renounced everything astonishing — is the enthroning of the self-forgotten negative as the self-conscious positive. (Adorno, 1973, p. 205)

Adorno’s discussion circles around how music can and should reflect the alienation of mass culture without being self-conscious: ‘Modern music sees absolute oblivion as its goal. It is the surviving message of despair from the shipwrecked’ (ibid., p. 133). An illumination of the ‘meaningless world’ is the aim of modern music, and what it ‘sacrifices itself to’. This amounts, Adorno is aware, to the unrewarding ‘consequences of the new idiom which rewards with gross failure on the market the most sincere effort of artistic conscience’ (ibid., p. 6).

This negative outlook, as reflected in Adorno’s whole body of work, did much to shape subsequent theorists such as Baudrillard, Lyotard, Jencks\(^{14}\), and Jameson, as well as the bridging Habermas. The pressure of authenticity leads to ironic comment on how this is (im)possible. This ironic, self-referential turn has, ironically, worked its way into mainstream political advertising.

6.1.5 Summary

In this section I have looked at the possibility of doing politics by multimodal means and have taken a historical look at four different theorists or groups of theorists who have engaged with this issue. The first is Kandinsky who (with his synaesthetic sensibilities) not only asserted that communication through the musical and visual modes was possible, but that in certain areas of experience, they were far subtler and capable of much more nuanced expression.

I summarised the political intentions at origin, the evolution, and immense impact of Dada and Surrealism. I emphasised their paradoxical legacy and

\(^{14}\) Charles Jencks is an American architectural theorist who has written extensively on Modernism and Postmodernism from an architectural standpoint.
suggested that the view that they had been co-opted by the mainstream, whose techniques they themselves had co-opted in order to forge their critique, was largely true.

I then changed focus to look at the Russian avant-garde and, especially, Eisenstein. By outlining his explicitly ideological intentions vis-à-vis his art, I hope to have demonstrated that legitimation by multimodal means with language not necessarily in the communication at all was not only theorised by Eisenstein, but attempted. As part of this discussion I foregrounded the importance of technology and the varying status of those technologies (and those who worked with them).

Finally, I looked at the legacy of Adorno with regards to the legitimacy – or otherwise – of mass cultural products. I used the example of Adorno’s position on music (‘absolute music’) to highlight the problems he had in applying his theory, which sought authenticity and honest (negative) commentary. I ended by noting that the failure of Adorno’s application had led to ironic commentary on the possibility of authenticity, and had, in this sense had greatly influenced the postmodernists and much advertising arising from those emerging out of the postmodernist tradition.
6.2 Inverted modal salience and music

6.2.1 Introduction

In this section I look at legitimation in multimodal texts. By analysing a small selection of ads used in the 2008 presidential campaign, I show how the legitimating features they contain, although recognisable from more traditional studies, have been strikingly and successfully adapted to a new context. Furthermore, I suggest that this reworking marks a shift in the hierarchy of legitimating tools: a shift away from the unquestioned primacy of text and talk. Obama’s campaign and subsequent election have led to a renewed interest in oratory and rhetoric, classical tools which are concerned with legitimation. The election of a President compared to Cicero (Higgins, 2008), a ‘man of ideas’, a lawyer, an ‘intellectual heavyweight’, shows that oratorical and rhetorical qualities are still highly valued for someone holding the office of President — but have tended to overshadow other notable features of the Obama campaign.

The campaign was revolutionary in the way it used the internet: not only to raise money, but also by exploiting its viral quality. Social networking and video-sharing sites were utilised, multimodal messages were freed into cyberspace and left to do their work, and other multimodal texts were picked up from cyberspace and redeployed in more formal settings. The official advertisements aired on television were only one part of the advertising offensive: other ads were released as ‘web-only’, and of course there were the more traditional billboards, bumper stickers, T-shirts etc. It is worth remembering that multimodality itself is not new, but the ways of realising multimodality are changing in line with the
affordances of the new technology. It is in this socio-political-technological context that this section is situated.

6.2.2 Legitimation by the multimodal affordances of a speech

Legitimacy draws on contextual knowledge, as well as being achievable in the moment. Barack Obama’s concession speech in New Hampshire was made during the primaries, while he was competing with Hilary Clinton, John Edwards and Bill Richardson for the Democratic nomination. This formal position — as a contender in a formal and heavily institutionalised competition — is already a legitimating one. It is understood that Obama is there after going through due process and succeeding where others have failed. It is also contextually understood that he has respectable financial backing, both in terms of amounts and in terms of sources. A plethora of other background details are almost certainly known and add to the consideration of legitimacy before the New Hampshire speech is even begun. These legitimating features are absolutely crucial yet are so taken as a given that it is easy to dismiss them. Legitimacy is accrued by Obama being:

- A U.S. citizen
- College-educated
- A man
- Able-bodied
- A lawyer
- Married with kids
- Straight
- Healthy
- Clever

Hopefully this is not a non-controversial list. Yes, of course some people would attach more legitimacy to Obama if he was gay, or female, or anything but a lawyer. But the fact remains that Obama does not appear on that stage as an unknown quantity, and the context we perceive him in is highly relevant to our consideration of his legitimacy.

Van Dijk has recently proposed a detailed ‘framework for a theoretical concept of “context” that can be used in theories of language, discourse, cognition, interaction, society, politics and culture’ (Teun A. van Dijk, 2009a, p.15). The theory espoused in this two-book monograph emphasizes that the relation between society and discourse is indirect, and mediated by the socially based but subjective definitions of the communicative situation as they are construed and dynamically updated by the participants. (Teun A. van Dijk, 2009b, p.vii).

Contextual knowledge relevant to Obama’s speech will vary from person to person, and the evaluation of such knowledge will inform each individual’s judgement as to the legitimacy of Obama’s position. Normative pressures created and applied socially lead to a consensus in many areas. It is a truth almost universally acknowledged that elected leaders ought to be adults (pace generations of teenagers). This is at the uncontroversial end of a huge spectrum. There is no comparable consensus that the leader of a multiracial nation ought to belong to a particular race, but the fact that Obama is black certainly lends him a degree of legitimacy with some — and none with others (Sinclair-Chapman &
Price, 2008). And it is this play upon the elements which differentiate him from his competitors, and sell him to (enough of) the American public that matters most here.

It is important to note that the dialectical nature of context not only means that we shape our contexts and that they shape us, but that we can project contradictory notions. Thus, I may believe that class ought not to signify legitimacy, since I believe in meritocracy rather than aristocracy. This would imply that class indicators were of no interest to me when judging the legitimacy of someone’s position. However, if I were to judge two candidates, one of whom spoke RP and one of whom spoke Manc (an English regional dialect), I may decide that the RP candidate sounded more politically experienced and accord them more legitimacy, but this may simply be because I am used to the politically experienced having an RP accent. Clearly this is an area with inexhaustible permutations: the point is that, as individuals, we do not make simple binary judgements.

Working out what is relevant, what is concerned with legitimation, in the context of Obama’s speech is incredibly difficult. The fact that he is from Chicago legitimates him in the eyes of those who feel that belonging to a certain place means something: unique features of that city giving him by environmental osmosis certain qualities of the city which they hold dear. Van Dijk wryly notes the need to ‘define (delimit) the notion of “context”, lest the theory becomes a Theory of Everything’ (Teun A. van Dijk, 2009b, p.3). That being said, as analysts we have to be aware that the dog Obama chooses, the look in his eye, or even something so undefined as the ‘I just really [don’t] like him’ gut response,
remain factors at which we can only guess — together with Obama’s image consultants and advertising teams paid to pick up on such elusive appeal. Van Dijk moves away from this conundrum by saying that in his understanding of context, it is the discursively relevant — as opposed to simply the socially relevant — which is important.\(^\text{15}\) I shall take van Dijk’s definition as my own working definition: ‘context is what is defined to be relevant to the social situation by the participants themselves’ (*ibid.*, p. 5).

This ad was originally a viral music video, released on February 2, 2008 by musician will.i.am, member of a popular and influential hip-hop band. The lyrics are almost entirely taken from Obama’s New Hampshire Concession speech, apart from the Hebrew, Spanish and Sign Language translations of the slogan ‘Yes We Can’, and the addition of ‘I want change’. The order of the text is slightly different, and some repetitions not in the original speech have been added. These very minor changes mean that throughout the ad we hear and see Obama’s speech as it was given and broadcast on the U.S. national and international news.

The video is in stark black and white, the frame division varies from none to a triptych, with the placement of Obama giving his speech varying within that. The guest appearances are all young American celebrities of varied race, cultural heritage, and gender, ranging from musicians to actresses; basketball players to models, singing the words of the speech, chanting “Yes We Can”, or playing

\(^{15}\) Interestingly, it is here, at this early point in his Introduction, that van Dijk indicates that semiotic studies may have a different take on what is relevant: “That is, usually our clothes are seldom *discursively* relevant, although they may often be *socially* relevant, for instance in order to ‘flag’ aspects of our current social identity (‘doing feminine’), or to adapt (as does our discourse) to formal vs. informal social events. Politicians are very conscious about their ‘image’ and no doubt their clothes (ties etc.) are consciously selected and adapted to the occasion in which the politicians are going to speak. This also suggests that besides discourse there are other (semiotic) aspects of interaction and communication that may have their own contextual constraints. These, however, shall not be the main focus in this book” (T.A. van Dijk, 2009, p. 4).
instruments. The use of text in the video is limited: four phrases appear in different parts of the frame in temporal keeping with the call-and-response style of the song. These phrases are: ‘YES WE CAN’, ‘CHANGE’, ‘HOPE’, and ‘VOTE’. The last of these is the only use of colour in the video and ends the video — ‘HOPE’ in black changes letter by letter to ‘VOTE’ in red.

The cornerstone of this ad is Obama’s speech, as it is seen and heard, not as it is written. Oratory, in this televisual age, is clearly multimodal: we listen and watch. Obama’s speeches have been analysed a great deal in terms of their rhetorical power, and his skill as an orator is much discussed. I must limit my discussion of these two subjects in order to give myself space to discuss the multimodality of the ad. It is important, however, to summarise where the power lies in the speech given and I do that below. However, this ad is not simultaneous with the speech. The speech’s context has changed in a retrospective fashion. What is important about this speech has altered, and keeps altering depending on when it is viewed. One of the qualities of the viral video is that re-interpretation, re-contextualisation continues upon viewing which is unprogrammed but openly available. This video was released just before super Tuesday, a day when many primaries occur and therefore, crucial to the nomination. Fast forward to Obama’s nomination though and the video becomes an ad for the presidency, rather than for the primary. Fast forward to today and the video, again, is thrown into a different light.

Keeping in mind that such re-contextualising occurs, for an ad to be both viral and effective over time (at least until the election is over) the legitimating features need to withstand the changes that will occur in the remaining timescale.
For example, if the ad had mentioned the need to vote in the primaries, its use in the subsequent presidential election would be limited. Similarly, Obama’s speech, looked at retrospectively, stands as a powerful speech advocating voting for Obama, rather than a poignant concessionary speech, linked solely to a defeat in the primaries. In the speech, and ad, we get the following uses of tense:

We know the battle ahead will be long. But always remember that, no matter what obstacles stand in our way, nothing can stand in the way of the power of millions of voices calling for change. We have been told we cannot do this by a chorus of cynics. And they will only grow louder and more dissonant…
there is something happening in America… Yes, we can…
And, together, we will begin the next great chapter in the American story, with three words that will ring from coast to coast, from sea to shining sea: Yes, we can.

This unspecific futurity is linked with a very conscious reflection on the history of America leading up to this point. The notion of history in the making, with the momentum and forward-looking impression that this calls up, is a significant theme of the speech. Obama placed himself very consciously within the narrative of the Civil Rights Movement — and also painted himself as the result of the patchwork history, and unfettered potential (to be realised once again through him) of the United States. The legitimation which comes from tradition, and from the ‘rightness’ of conforming to that tradition (thus also showing a high regard for it) is two-fold. First, it is a powerful source of ideological legitimation, and social legitimacy (society in general being receptive to the more conservative following of past tradition). Secondly, as noted at the beginning, legitimacy can be performative, and in following tradition and the rules set down, legitimation is bestowed upon Obama.
It is worth looking at this in more detail as regards the multimodality of the ad. Obama gains legitimacy through placing himself not only within the tradition of America politically, but also more personally. Politically he aligns himself with Martin Luther King, who, although not named, is heavily alluded to: “a king who took us to the mountaintop and pointed the way to the Promised Land”. This is a clear signal to the civil rights movement, and although at no time in the speech does he discuss his own race, the fact that he is the first African American to run for president makes his place as heir to King’s ‘kingdom’ visually more legitimate than that of any of the other presidential hopefuls. The soundtrack here is one mixing hip hop and black gospel call-and-response: this is not a white soundtrack. Of course, one could argue that there is no such thing as a black or white soundtrack, but I think this would be missing the point. This music situates and legitimates Obama as King’s heir apparent and also as something new in politics: a change! For when have we seen a presidential candidate congruent with black youth culture? We will see later on in this section how Obama uses the age of a genre of music to his advantage — and to McCain’s disadvantage.

The video emphasizes several of the themes within his speech which are themselves legitimating. Obama’s rhetoric and oratory have been much discussed and this speech is a good example of why. The formal rhetorical devices used are multiple (and these are just a few):

- Molossus (three stressed syllables: ‘Yes we can’)
- Triad (threesomes: repetition of ‘we are’)

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16 Is it echoes of anti-miscegenation sentiment which leads Obama to be called — and call himself - black, or is it a consequence of the not-so-distant ‘blood fraction statutes’ or the ‘one drop rule’?
• Syntheton (balanced doubles: ‘the hopes of the little girl who goes to the crumbling school in Dillon are the same as the dreams of the boy who learns on the streets of L.A)

• Anaphora (repetition of words at the beginning: ‘We’)

• Epistrophe (repetition of words at the end: ‘Yes, we can. Yes we can. Yes we can.’)

• Alliteration (words starting with similar sounds: ‘documents that declared the destiny’)

• Assonance and consonance (words with similar vowel/consonant sounds: ‘whispered by slaves and abolitionists as they blazed a trail towards freedom (through the darkest of nights’)

• Imagery (emotive images for the audience: ‘sung by immigrants as they struck out from distant shores and pioneers who pushed westward against an unforgiving wilderness’)

These are often emphasised by Obama’s delivery, reminiscent of gospel sermons. Graham says:

To hear Obama speak is to be vividly reminded of the language and cadences of the African-American pulpit, transposed into public oratory. (Graham, 2009, p. 156)

The cadences are highlighted and emboldened by the singing of the soundtrack. The sung harmony brings out the musicality of the Obama speech. These are stylistic points but also become part of the legitimation strategy. On several levels, Obama needs us to read between the lines, or rather ‘do the math’: he talks about civil rights and Martin Luther King and we are expected to put him into that narrative (Frank, 2009). To some extent, the success of such legitimation comes
from it not being explicit but from our putting him in the frame. Similarly, Obama does not discuss his own religious beliefs but in his speech, he becomes the implied (yet not ambiguous) vehicle of deliverance. The ad highlights the religious style of his speech and places him as the pastor — his ‘we’, therefore becomes one of a religious and visionary leader and his congregation. Of course, if this was made explicit, Obama would be attacked for arrogance (even more than he already was being). This religious tone legitimates his position not only with the black Christian community, but also, in the U.S., with the Christian community at large.

The catchphrase ‘Yes we can’, driven home repeatedly has a history itself. It is a slogan of the organised labour movement in the United States stemming from “Sí, se puede” (Spanish for “yes, it can be done”), the motto of the United Farm Workers who, in 1972, brought it to widespread attention by the fasting of César Estrada Chávez. For the large Latino minority in the States, Obama’s use of this national hero’s catchphrase will legitimate his position, as well as associating Obama with the values of change by peaceful means (which Chávez and King both espoused). Appealing to the racial minorities in the States is extremely important for any Presidential campaign, and in this ad, the multiracial presence of young and attractive people, singing Obama’s words and chanting ‘we want change’, is an appeal to the masses.

Framing is also very important in this ad: not only do we have rapidly shifting frames, but we have a constant play upon the triptych structure. The stylistic features of the speech which have to do with timing are highlighted once again, not this time by the harmony of the singers, but by the rhythm of the
changing frames. Kress and van Leeuwen (1996) say this about framing and its role in composition:

> In temporally integrated texts framing is, again, affected by rhythm. From time to time the ongoing equal-timed cycles of rhythm are momentarily interrupted by a pause, a *rallentando*, a change of gait, and these junctures mark off distinct units, disconnect stretches of speech or music or movement from each other to a greater or lesser degree. (*ibid.*, p. 214)

The frames themselves are variations upon the triptych. This compositional tool is not only aesthetic — it also contains information which we need in order to decode the message, that is, it deals in social semiotics. The triptych is a frame divided into three (normally equal) parts, either vertically or horizontally. Thus, in this ad it is so:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Given</th>
<th>Mediator</th>
<th>New</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

*Figure 18: Horizontal triptych (Kress & van Leeuwen, 1996, p. 211)*

That is, the left hand side of the frame tells us what is already known, the right hand side of the frame is the new information, and the middle frame is the method by which we get from the given to the new. There is also the vertical triptych structure of Ideal at the top, Mediated in the middle, and Real at the bottom. In terms of political advertising, clearly, there are two projected scenarios: one, the advertised wins and the ideal becomes the new; two, the advertised opponent does not win and the new dystopia begins. This also explains, visually, why an incumbent has to struggle to break away from the present ‘real’, to promise a new,
enhanced, ideal. A concrete example of this is the way in which the Obama campaign ‘threatened’ that a vote for McCain was ‘more of the same’.

As applied to this ad, the message seems to be less clear-cut. The frames play with thirds, sometimes being divided with two-thirds on the left and a third on the right, sometimes being in even thirds, sometimes being one-third on the left and two-thirds on the right, and sometimes being a full frame.

\[\text{Figure 19: Obama within the triptych}\]

Obama is pictured in all these positions, as are the others in the ad. This signals equality and continuation: that everyone is in all these positions and Obama, particularly, fills all three. How should we interpret this? I think this is a reinforcement of Obama as preacher and the responders as his congregation: going together as equals, yet led by Obama. There are some crucial instances in
which the traditional formulation applies — and that is with the reference to Martin Luther King in which the screen is, for the first time made whole;

Figure 20: Frame made whole upon reference to ‘the king’

With the text, ‘YES WE CAN’ varies its position, ‘CHANGE’ is on the right and ‘HOPE’ are in the centre, until the last frame in which the letters ‘O’ and ‘E’ from ‘HOPE’ is carried through to become ‘VOTE’ in red (which is the only use of colour in the video). I would suggest this interpretation: ability (existing now as real and given — thus empowering) symbolised by ‘Yes we can’, mediated by hope, will lead to the new and ideal of ‘Change’, if hope can extend into the action of voting. Interestingly, it is also in this very last frame that the borders between the middle and the right become crossable which again reinforces the possibility that with hope as mediator, the ideal can be realised.
6.2.3 Legitimation through genres

The existence of the red and the blue states in the U.S., the fact that certain demographics indicate a certain voting behaviour means that Presidential campaigns work within their budget to convert those swing voters, or lightly allied voters, and also work to ‘bring out the vote’. It is the expressed aim of most politicians that they would like to see more voting turnout, regardless of whether that favours them. However, a Democratic campaign will not spend money in bringing out Republican voters, and vice versa. Indeed, there is fear of lethargy among the converted, and the likelihood that a candidate is getting through to the more politically inactive influences the pollsters. There are also demographic
tendencies influencing who is likely to care enough about any election to actually get to a ballot box and vote. Furthermore, in the States, every state except North Dakota requires that citizens who wish to vote be registered. Some states allow citizens to register to vote on the same day of the election, but others do not.

Political commentary leading up to an election habitually uses these generalised (but nonetheless useful) demographic tendencies, together with the notion of generational cohorts. For example, Jon Bruner wrote in a *Forbes* blog called ‘Trailwatch’:

Successive generations are more liberal in their views toward minorities, Hansen said, and baby boomers, who are substantially more liberal on race than their parents, have reached the age bracket of maximum voter participation, making their attitudes particularly influential at the polls… The generational effects continue into the cohort that has just reached voting age. Obama is particularly popular with college students, whose support may obviate one of the Clinton campaign’s biggest knocks against him: that Obama can’t connect with white, blue-collar voters. (Bruner, 2008)

He goes on to say that if we pair these relevant demographics with the idea that ‘Americans have generally become more liberal on race regardless of generation’ (because of increased exposure to African-Americans in prestigious positions), we get the following result:

Americans are more willing than ever to vote for a black presidential candidate. A 1958 Gallup poll found that just over 40% of Americans would be willing to vote for a qualified black presidential candidate. That percentage broke the 70% mark in the late 1960s; today, about 95% of Americans tell pollsters that they would vote for a qualified black presidential candidate. (*ibid.*)

What is interesting here is the matrix of group belonging it concocts. In the ‘Comments’ section of the blog, there is this comment:

And there is another demographic — it comprises all those ‘immigrants’ (oh yes, legal, of course) who came here over the last 20-40 years. Many of us are baby boomers, doubling the effect described above. We are
definitely considering someone with more diversity, and if Obama doesn’t embody diversity of almost all kinds, I don’t know who does.

The analysis of demographic tendencies is important to this study in that the same demographics influencing voting behaviour of a particular group often overlaps with the preferred musical and visual genres of that group. Matching demographic makeup with the genre chosen to communicate is extremely important.

This ad, ‘Don’t Vote Alone’ was released as a web video on the 30th October, 2008 — that is, five days before election day, and the second last ad released by the Obama team. It contains a small amount of text, is 40 seconds long, has no narrator, and is an animation with a soundtrack. The same soundtrack was used in another web-only ad released five days earlier and is similar enough in style to be seen as a follow-up, although both ads can stand alone. A simplified, description of the ad would be:


Simultaneously, the music starts — it is heavy on bass, electronic/house music with a simple electronic melody.

2. The frame now overlaps and then fades into another frame with a tennis net and some ground drawn as if by hand. A racket hits the ball from our (near) side of the court to the other side. The camera pans around to the head of a female, again drawn sketchily, mouth downturned unhappily.

3. The frame changes again and we see the same girl sitting on a seesaw by herself looking dejected.

The picture pans out to her in the play park
Text: HOW ABOUT SEESAW? — appears similarly.

4. The one cloud in the sky moves above the girl and she is seen shaking her hand with nobody

Text: NICE TO MEET YOU — the text is not typed out this time.

The music here gains another strain in a higher register, accompanying the melody.

5. Then she is pictured holding an end of a tin-can phone to her ear.

Text: HELLO?

The picture pans out to show the other end of the ‘phone’ hanging down over a branch.

Text: SOME THINGS ARE FUNNER WITH SOMEONE ELSE

6. The cloud which has been moving through the sky (viewer left to right) morphs in the next frame into a box labelled: VOTE HERE on one face of the cube, and POLLING LOCATION on another (under which is a drawn in door). To the right of this box is the text BRING.

7. The box then starts to fade out, lines turning from black to red, and faint red and yellow beams emanating from the box (in a way viewers will associate with the iconic ‘Hope’ image of the Obama campaign) rotate clockwise. At the same time, the text is increased word by word in time with the rhythm to: BRING A FRIEND TO VOTE.

8. As soon as this text is completed, it moves closer into the foreground, increases in size, and below this message is the text: TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 4th, 2008, and then immediately after that in red the words VOTE FOR and ‘written’ along the bottom of the date, the word
CHANGE appears, also in red. When these text features have arrived, the rest of a web address appears making the red text read: www.VOTEFORCHANGE.COM. The faint rotating beams continue and the words VOTE FOR are underlined, as if by hand, in red.

9. Centralised at the bottom the ‘Hope’ image (or logo)\textsuperscript{17} appears and the music simplifies.

This ad uses animation, music and language simultaneously, to identify with, and persuade, its target audience. The brevity of the ad — the complete text of which follows — contrasts starkly with the previous one:

TENNIS ANYONE?  
HOW ABOUT SEESAW?  
NICE TO MEET YOU  
HELLO?  
SOME THINGS ARE FUNNER WITH SOMEONE ELSE  
VOTE HERE / POLLING LOCATION  
BRING A FRIEND TO VOTE  
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 4TH, 2008  
www.VOTEFORCHANGE.COM

The power of the ad does not lie in any rhetorical flourish, indeed its apparent simplicity in terms of typeface, uppercase lettering and vocabulary is clear.

\textsuperscript{17} A full analysis of the logos used by the Obama campaign is outwith the scope of this study. There is however much discussion about their importance, significance, success, and rapid proliferation (see, for example, Smith, 2009).
But something more complex is going on: informal and youth-orientated slang phrasing e.g. ‘SOME THINGS ARE FUNNER’, changes the register in which the ad is placed from simple to more self-consciously casual. The relationship between the portrayed character and the intended audience is interesting. To vote in the U.S. you need to be eighteen or above. In the ad, the figure looks very much like a young girl: she is in the play park, trying to play two-person games on her own.
The gender seems clear and with the ponytail attached to a stick figure betraying no curves, the figure does not seem to be nearing voting age. Why this discrepancy? If we follow through the logic of the ad, the character would go with a friend from tennis, to the play park, to the poling station, her day just getting funner and funner. Yet not many kids would actually find voting fun and they are not permitted to vote anyway. Why is the youth so youthful? The style of the drawing and writing is also childish: does this signal naivety, simple hope? And what is the relationship of young voters, eligible to vote for the first time perhaps, to this stick girl? Do they relate to her youth? Perhaps the stereotypical teenager would not have the right semiotic associations. The child must have afforded something which another figure could not. Furthermore, the discrepancy between the age of the character and any intended audience (of voting age) allows for the phrase, ‘some things are funner with someone else’ to be recontextualised into an older, yet still youthful space. The fun of the play park could easily be replaced by the fun of sex.
This ad does not come with an ‘intended audience certificate’ so its identification is debatable. Moreover, a viral ad may have several different demographic groups making up a more complicated intended audience which we have to differentiate among. This was a web-only ad, which already delimits its primary viewers. Only those who watch videos on the web will be exposed to this ad initially. I would suggest that this is the part of the intended audience to which the ad appeals. The genre of music, graphic design and animation should, therefore, also appeal to these people, as should the message, put succinctly on The Living Room Candidate website:

This Web video/animation urges supporters to turn voting into a social activity and bring friends along. (VoteForChange.com, 2008)

Note that even though the text of the ad does not specify until the end who it would like to follow this advice (the web address specified at the end, <www.voteforchange.com>, is identified with the Obama team enough to make it tantamount to an endorsement) it does not come across as a cross-party call to the ballot box.

Figure 24: 'Bring a friend to vote' (for Obama)
The political identification is realised multimodally. We can see the demographic reflected through some of the comments made by viewers on YouTube about the video:

• Already voted - alone - absentee. It was fun. But it could've been funner.

• already voted with my 5 friends it was fun, obama 08!

• this video is really good its not just telling u to vote its telling u to vote with a friend and for obama! GO OBAMA!!!!!!!

• I brought a friend. And yes, it was more fun.

• it was funner for me lol

• Like this ad, it is positive, short, sweet and simple. I refuse to live in fear

• Thank you so much for all this fun, positive, creative work.

• my mom is 50 and has NEVER voted. ever. i printed out a slip had her sign it she mailed it and she received her first voter card last weekend. she was so proud. i then sat and watched these videos with her and then she was excited. then i took her to vote. the first time in many elections that she is able to say she felt motivated enough to go vote. im so proud of her.

• Funner is a word. It's just not often used. Cute ad, vote Obama!

• Some things are "funner" ?? And these are the people who want to run our educational system ??
which if obama is elected, he will bring an extreme leftist view, such as making funner, aint and tubular a word, where as mccain will keep english the way way it was when he was a kid, like thee and ye

This is clearly a multimodally realised demographic, successfully attracted by and responding to the ad.

This brings us onto a counterpart of intended audience — namely, that part of the audience which is likely to feel isolated in some way by the message being put across. Web-based ads released virally quickly make it onto the television news, newspaper websites and further afield through news agencies. This second round of viewers is also part of the intended audience. If the language in this ad jars for a certain demographic, or the playfully sexual overtones are disapproved of, it is possible that the ad succeeds on two fronts: the core intended audience feels like the ‘in’ group, cutting-edge, liberal and enthused; while those actively put off by the ad may be demotivated, their apathy increasing as they feel ‘out of touch’ with the world the ad represents. The former group are those likely to vote Democrat, and the latter group are those likely to vote Republican. Obviously this could be a dangerous game since the right type of negative feeling needs to be created. A stirring of righteous anger may motivate voters to actively go out and vote against the values represented in the ad. This tendency to vote as much
against something as for something was evident in this election. McCain was tarred by the similarities between himself and Bush. A vote against McCain was seen by many as a vote away from what Bush represented. Even McCain presented himself as a ‘maverick’, not a natural heir to Bush. But the positivity of this ad, and its apparent lack of political allegiance are both factors which have been acknowledged as less likely to galvanise voters to vote against it — although the effect of negative and positive advertising is not agreed upon (Heldman, 2009; Iyengar & McGrady, 2006; Jamieson, 1984; McClurg, 2009; Wattenberg & Brians, 1999).

6.2.4 Legitimation and semiotic simultaneity

Much of the post-ad analysis and dissection aired on television and radio and published on websites and in newspapers concerns the question of negativity. There is much academic discussion about whether negative advertising works (on the whole stemming from Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1997) but it is certainly the case that media accusations of negative campaigning are frequent and campaign teams seem to feel obliged to defend themselves against such a judgement. The multimodal components of an ad can be used to carefully balance the negative and positive impressions and messages it gives viewers. Both humour and music can counteract an ad with a predominantly negative message (see Bush’s 2004 ‘Windsurfing’ ad criticising Kerry). Similarly, a visually positive ad can be accompanied by harsh commentary (see Johnson’s 1964 ‘Ice Cream’ ad attacking Goldwater’s nuclear policy). The juxtaposition between the different modes and tones are used for legitimation and delegitimation, attack and self-defense. Many
stock clichés can be employed regardless of the subtlety of production. Children, happy music, the U.S. flag, bright, saturated colour, and beautiful scenery are all rough and ready positivity signs. Ominous music, black and white colour, stormy skies, and war are all negativity signs.

The background to this ad is clearly the financial crash, but it also requires the cultural knowledge of a specific song, ‘Wonderful World’ by Sam Cooke. The referencing of popular culture has to be carefully done: judgements of taste, inaccurate assumptions of knowledge, or any sense of cultural inappropriacy is a minefield of (sometimes) slightly trivial, but nonetheless, politically lethal gaffes (recall Howard Dean’s “Yee Haw!” exclamation in the 2004 primaries).

Instead of taking a paragraph to describe this ad, I want to emphasise the simultaneity of the modes by using these three columns: this still conflates and reduces (for example the spoken endorsement is put in the same column as the sung lyrics and the music), but it goes some way to illustrating the many tiers which are interrelated and inter-signifying.
Spot ad: ‘Don’t know much’

VOICE
I’m Barack Obama and I approve this message.
I’m not up on the economy,
Don’t know much about industry,
Really can’t explain the price of gas,
Or what has happened to the middle class,
But I know that one and one is two,
And if I could be just like you,
What a wonderful world this would be.
“Do we really want four more years of the same old tune?”

TEXT
BarackObama.com
“Economics is not something I’ve understood as well as I should” – John McCain
December 2007

IMAGE WITH TEXT
(On signs)
ADVANCE REALTY
598-212
FORECLOSURE

Voted with Bush 90% of the time.

Approved by Barack Obama. Paid for by Obama for America.

This ad emphasises the importance of semiotic simultaneity — by which I mean that the practice of legitimation is realised in different modes simultaneously.

A stylistic analysis of the words — written, spoken, and sung — would need to be brought together with a visual and musical analysis. Again, it is useful to look at this ad in the light of the grid adapted from Kress and van Leeuwen.
To reiterate, very simply, on the left hand side of the screen is what is given — what we already know. On the right is what is new. This ad uses this semiotic language in complex ways.

For example, the ad starts with Obama on the right and when it changes, McCain is situated on the left - this is basic projection: Obama as future, McCain as past. Moreover, note the colour and saturation choices of the two different faces: Obama is in the sunlight (outdoors, with the red, white, and blue of the flag blurred in the background?) which, although strong, shows Obama to his advantage, with his facial definition highlighted, and his colour healthy. Contrasting with this is McCain, pictured with darkness around him, his thinning white hair reflecting bright artificial light. A light which also manages, literally, to highlight the folds of skin around his neck. Although not a bad picture of McCain (that would be an overly heavy-handed comparison) it does rather emphasise the age (and implied health) difference between the two.

It is clear that Bush and McCain are interchangeable in terms of position — and the dividing line (present-given / future-new) is compromised by their
bodily contact. This is exactly the message the Obama team tried repeatedly, throughout the campaign, to get across. Furthermore, when pictured together, Bush appears dominant physically — taller, bigger, younger. This physical representation easily slips into a wider, metaphorical comparison, of say policy and influence, not to mention that the reiterated ‘chumminess’ of McCain towards Bush, out of context as it is here, seems obsequious. The importance of presenting physical stature in political advertising is great, although remains implicit. Camera angle, lighting, posture and relative height are all employed to manipulate our impression of a candidate’s stature. The importance of stature, I suggest, comes from this metaphorical importance attached to it. The age-old belief that there is a connection between the body, mind and morals of individuals has gone through many stages but has never quite disappeared.\textsuperscript{18} The fact that stature is sometimes taken as analogous to moral state, social status, physical virility and mental agility is used by advertisers — including political ones.

\textsuperscript{18} Disraeli writes: ‘Plutarch, in his essays, has a familiar illustration, which he borrows from some philosopher more ancient than himself: “Should the Body sue the Mind before a court of judicature for damages, it would be found that the Mind would prove to have been a ruinous tenant to its landlord.”’ (D’Israeli, 1791-1823)
A part of negative campaigning is concerned with scaremongering — or warning, the authoring camp may say. In this ad we see the McCain quote about economics (“Economics is not something I’ve understood as well as I should”) in the ‘new’, right hand side position, and the Foreclosure sign in the ‘given’, left hand side position. By this simple placement McCain’s claim to be economically competent is de-legitimated and, simultaneously, placed into the projected future. Furthermore, by initially inserting a dividing white line between right and left in these first frames concerning McCain, there is a sense of duality: an old McCain/Bush’s present escalating fuel costs/ middle-class foreclosures in the present, and McCain’s implied economic incompetence in the future. This strong linear divide is broken by the close physical proximity and body contact between Bush and McCain (interchangeably placed) in the next three frames, hammering home the “more of the same” message.
The defining feature of this ad — that which makes it work — is the use of the old (1960) song ‘Wonderful World’. This cultural appropriation of a ‘golden oldie’ allows for the allusions made about McCain’s age and his similarity and closeness to Bush to be made explicit through the use of irony and humour.

In the ad, the lyrics of this song have been changed but it is highly unlikely that the original lyrics are not known, thus making the change itself foregrounded.
The original lyrics are placed beside those of the ad:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The original lyrics</th>
<th>The ad lyrics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don't know much about geography</td>
<td>I’m not up on the economy,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know much trigonometry</td>
<td>Don’t know much about industry,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know much about algebra</td>
<td>Really can’t explain the price of gas,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know what a slide rule is for</td>
<td>Or what has happened to the middle class,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>But I do know that one and one is two</td>
<td>But I know that one and one is two,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And if this one could be with you</td>
<td>And if I could be just like you,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What a wonderful world this would be</td>
<td>What a wonderful world this would be.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This satirising is only effective because of the assumed knowledge of the original. Insofar as it assumes some knowledge and rewards comparison, it legitimates the Obama camp for cleverness, and also flatters the viewer for recognizing the satire. Clearly, the song’s narrator’s intellectual weakness is directed at McCain — with the quote about economics emphasising this (viewers will probably also know and anticipate the next line of the song “now I don't claim to be an ‘A’ student”), but the values attached to the song more generally are ambiguously attached to both camps. It is a much loved song; the Obama team is using it. But also, it is old — just like McCain. This attempt to split the legitimating function indicates the richness of this as semiotic currency.
6.2.5 Summary

The three sections in this section focus on the unique characteristics of the multimodal text and how these can be used to legitimate. The ability to re-contextualise a speech is the first example, and I point out how the visual and auditory elements foreground certain features (of an already strong and symbolically rich text) to legitimate Obama. I then use a very different ad to show that the written — or spoken — text is not a necessary base to which multimodal adornment is added. Furthermore, I point out that the careful selection and use of genres can single out demographic groups which can then be appealed to or repelled. The ad I analyse aims to appeal to one group while, at the same time, demotivate a politically opposed demographic. This ability to do several different things simultaneously is the focus of the last section. In this I emphasise the importance and efficiency of semiotic simultaneity — that is the inextricably entwined semiotic layers which work together, and at the same time, to achieve different things. I think it is important to note that the sum of the parts does not equal the whole here: the interaction between the different modes affords more than the different modes could, taken separately.
CHAPTER SEVEN: BEWARE OF DREAMS COME TRUE — VALUING THE INTANGIBLE

7.1 Introduction

One has only to look at the multiplicity of adages, sage maxims and commonplace sayings concerned with dreams to realise the fundamental importance they hold in human society. Must we follow our dreams, or hold on to them? Should we guard our dreams from those who might rob us of them (or from our own careless loss), or can our dreams never be taken away from us? We have sleeping dreams and waking dreams, both seen as manifestations of something essential to us. We also have public dreams, private dreams, and shared dreams that fall in-between the two, and which are often pivotal in helping to determine the evolution of our relationships. In fact, dreams, enigmatic as they and their meanings have proven to be, seem to be essential to our identity formation — and maintenance. This enigmatic nature, the intangibility of dreams, is precisely what allows them to have such affordances in terms of their interpreted significance and meanings. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the implications this feature of intangibility has on the American Dream specifically, and to other culturally held dreams more generally.

7.1.1 Situating the Dream

Joseph Campbell has said that ‘The myth is the public dream and the dream is the private myth’ (Campbell & Moyers, 1991, p. 48). Clearly, there is a typological difference between those dreams with which psychoanalysis is concerned and the American Dream which, by its very nature, has a public, shared element: which is,
in fact, public before it is private. I say, it has a shared element (rather than saying it is shared entirely) because what can be invested in, understood by, and gained from such a public resource, can be incredibly private and personal. Clearly then, we must understand the American Dream in its multiple capacities (inexhaustively listed) as: a (multi)national myth, a common dream, a national wish-list of consumerist items, a normative delimiter, a utopian vision, a container into which personal hopes and aspirations can be placed, a place of negotiated, contested and reflected social and political values, a place represented not only through linguistic description but through music, architecture, landscape and visuals.

Popularised by Adams in 1931, the term ‘The American Dream’, as we have seen, denotes a vast array of meanings and from each of these ripples numerous and overlapping connotations. Adams’ influential description contains within it many of the strains (in many senses of the word) which, together, make the notion so rich:

But there has been also the American dream, that dream of a land in which life should be better and richer and fuller for every man, with opportunity for each according to ability or achievement. It is a difficult dream for the European upper classes to interpret adequately, and too many of us ourselves have grown weary and mistrustful of it. It is not a dream of motor cars and high wages merely, but a dream of social order in which each man and each woman shall be able to attain to the fullest stature of which they are innately capable, and be recognized by others for what they are, regardless of the fortuitous circumstances of birth or position. (Adams, 1933, p. 415)

From this snippet it is possible to see the strain of consumerist materiality intertwined with notions of intangible, value-laden, potentialities; motor cars alongside (utopian?) dreams of a perfect ‘social order’.

To look first at the entity which is the American Dream, Tilley’s introduction to ‘Identity, Place, Landscape and Heritage’ (Tilley, 2006) and Bell’s
notion of ‘mythscape’ are useful looked at in tandem. Tilley’s broad discussion of landscapes — partially defined as ‘structures of feeling’ (*ibid.*, p. 7) — put together with notions of identity, materiality, embodiment, memory and myth help to frame the complexity of the American Dream. He writes:

> Collective identities are always bound up with notions of collective traditions and shared material forms. (*ibid.*, p. 12)

Here, then, we already have a defense of the materiality of the American Dream — although not of its commodification or political appropriation. For Tilley, ‘things in culture’ are required for the (necessary) move from the intangibility of dreams to the intangibility of individual identities:

> Material forms may act as key metaphors of embodied identities, tools with which to think through and create connections around which people actively create identities. Artefacts permit people to know who they are by virtue of the fact that they assume specific forms or images in the minds of the viewer in a manner not possible to convey in words. (*ibid.*, p. 23, my italics)

This brings into the foreground a tension between different understandings of ‘(in) tangible’. Is the intangible defined by being that which is unarticulated, unarticulatable, immaterial, abstract or impalpable? What is the place of specificity in the intangible? Tilley here seems to suggest that the translation from tangible ‘thing’ to ‘the minds of the viewer’ results in something ‘specific’, yet something, the process of whose becoming is ‘not possible to convey in words’.

Bell, similarly exercised by how identity is formed in relation to ‘things’, introduces myth as the narrative form in which such translation and interpretation can take place. Arguing against a conflation of memory with myth, Bell discusses the agency involved in memory and notes that in the conflation (which he sees as a common misunderstanding) non-animate objects (e.g. landscapes) are seen as
possessing memory, and people are represented as holding memories which they simply cannot have gained first-hand (Bell does not address second-hand memories nor the various physiological conditions, described so well by Oliver Sacks, in which an individual’s body seems to have memories no longer easily accessed by the mind19).

These conflated examples of this type of ‘remembering’ belong, Bell claims, to myth rather than to memory. It is in mythologizing that non-animate objects become invested with meaning — a meaning neither static nor stable, but continually contested. Furthermore, Bell argues that the temporal possibilities of myth are far greater than those of memory, allowing for an engagement with the past, present and future simultaneously (whereas, clearly, in his ‘more limited and cogent’ conception of memory this is not possible). He therefore introduces the ‘mythscape’ as:

[The temporally and spatially extended discursive realm wherein the struggle for control of people’s memories and the formation of nationalist myths is debated, contested and subverted incessantly. The mythscape is the page upon which the multiple and often conflicting nationalist narratives are (re)written; it is the perpetually mutating repository for the representation of the past for the purposes of the present. (Bell, 2003, p. 63)

The metaphorical use of the book/manuscript from which the mythscape is a ‘page’ indicates strongly the narrative dimension of Bell’s concept. However, the story is not found on the page passively present: Bell emphasises the agency

19 See particularly his description of phantom limb syndrome (Sacks, 1985) and also Musicophilia in which Sacks poignantly describes the effect of music therapy on patients with advanced dementia: “Shakespeare’s Jaques, in As You Like It, considering the seven ages of man, sees the final one as “sans everything.” Yet though one may be profoundly reduced and impaired, one is never sans everything, never a tabula rasa. Someone with Alzheimer’s may undergo a regression to a “second childhood,” but aspects of one’s character, of personality and personhood, of self, survive — along with certain, almost indestructible forms of memory — even in advanced dementia. […] But music therapy with such patients is possible because musical perception, musical sensibility, musical emotion, and musical memory can survive long after other forms of memory have disappeared.” (Sacks, 2008, pp. 372-373)
involved in the creating and editing of the narrative - Tilley uses the poetic metaphor of ‘palimpsests of past and present’ (Tilley, 2006, p. 7). It is an agency which can be personal and political (simultaneously). I argue that the appropriation of the narrative of the American Dream by political (in the narrow sense of the word) actors inhibits its uptake by individuals.

Splicing an idea developed by van Leeuwen (van Leeuwen, 2009b) in his discussion of the mixture of affordances and constraints offered by Playmobil (a brand of children’s toy), with his idea of ‘semiotic regimes’ (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 133), I suggest that political ‘branding’ forces upon the myth a stricter template with reduced options, further limiting the affordances offered by the American Dream. Yet, in counterbalance to this, rejecting the idea that a final definition can actually be imposed upon the myth (regardless of the partial and temporary success of certain attempts) I employ DeNora’s insight into the interpretation of musical meaning, supporting her conclusion that:

[I]t is not only music which is characterized by the “problem” of a lack of double articulation (i.e. no one-to-one correspondence of form and function). The same is true for utterances, objects and acts whenever they are perceived as being invested with aesthetic, ideological or ethical connotations, and this has serious implications for the way in which culture is conceived. (DeNora, 1986, pp. 92-93)

Following on from this is the idea, articulated by Joseph, that the attempt to define and thereby delimit meaning e.g. through ‘grammar, logic and rhetoric — the trivium of medieval education — plus poetics, law and theology’ (Joseph, 2010c, p. 95) and, I would add, branding, is ‘forlorn, or utopian’ (ibid., p. 95), a symptom of a ‘primordial hermeneiaphobia’ in which we fear ‘having language destabilised by individual interpretation’ (ibid., p. 104). However, if, as Joseph suggests, Chairman Mao is the ‘patron saint of hermeneiaphobia’ (with, one might surmise,
Chomsky approaching beatification), then the venerable Bourdieu seems to be the poster-boy for hermeneiaphiles. His exposition on the role of linguistic exchanges in the negotiation of symbolic power brings together this individual insistence (in fact, compulsion) upon meaning making with that of institutionalisation:

In this and other cases, moving from the implicit to the explicit, from one’s subjective impression to objective expression, to public manifestation in the form of a discourse or public act, constitutes in itself an act of institution and thereby represents a form of officialization and legitimation […](Bourdieu, 1991, p. 173)

And thus we come back around to the creation of a narrative and the mythologizing that entails, and, through legitimizing attempts, the embodiment of the American Dream in things (whether by the process of officialisation, or by a commodification and branding) which by definition makes tangible, material, and strives to fix what has hitherto been fluid and intangible.

7.2 The American Dream

Figure 28: 'Closing a Summer Cottage, Quogue, New York', a 1957 Norman Rockwell Art-directed Colorama
7.2.1 The Concept

The American Dream, as a concept, is quite unusual. There is not, as far as I am aware, a ‘Scottish Dream’, a ‘German Dream’, or a ‘French Dream’. In fact, those labels have connotations which are politically dubious and would, for any degree of successful uptake, have to be euphemised rather heavily. But the United States is an immigrant nation, and this, as Adams perceives it, is an important distinction so far as national dreaming goes. But then, we would expect to have a similarly developed Australian Dream, or an Israeli Dream. And, again, in any sense that these do exist (or have existed) they are dogged with controversy. Actually, what we find is that the American Dream has become a conceptual export: as the English language has expanded into world Englishes, a (disputed) global lingua franca, the American Dream no longer belongs inside the United States alone, but can be found with regional features across the globe (although as cultural imperialism goes, successfully exporting a national dream to which to aspire is quite astounding). This is not to say that the much maligned cultural imperialism of the U.S. has been responsible, wholesale (or perhaps even for the most part) for this coming to be. America as the ‘land of opportunity’ has been (and remains so for many) such a potent symbol worldwide that the uptake across cultures was desired and often bolstered by hazy tales of American Dreams being realised.

In the introduction to this chapter was listed some of the most prevalent frames for understanding the American Dream (as a (multi)national myth, a common dream, a national wish-list, a normative delimiter, a utopian vision, a
container for aspirations, a place represented multimodally of negotiated, contested and reflected social and political values). First off, I think Anderson’s imagined community is helpful as a backdrop:

The idea of a sociological organism moving calendrically through homogenous, empty time is a precise analogue of the idea of the nation, which also is conceived as a solid community moving steadily down (or up) history. An American will never meet, or even know the names of more than a handful of his 240,000,000-odd fellow Americans. He has no idea of what they are up to at any one time. But he has complete confidence in their steady, anonymous, simultaneous activity. (Anderson, 2006, p. 26)

The American Dream must, therefore, compose a coherent narrative which masks — but allows for — multiple subjectivities.

7.2.2 Narratives ~ Myths

Viewing the American Dream as a composite of narratives does not limit further classification — such as the American Dream being, equally, a composite of myths. Fisher, arguing for the narrative paradigm, notes that it is, in fact, a ‘metaparadigm’ (Fisher, 1985), which therefore:

[D]oes not deny the utility of drawing distinctions regarding macroforms of discourse — myths, metaphors, arguments, and so on. It insists, though, that any instance of discourse is always more than the individuated forms that may compose it. (ibid., p. 347)

Thus, it is helpful to view the American Dream also in terms of it being a myth, and as Rowland and Jones suggest, a particular type of myth:

The dominant social narrative often labelled the “American Dream” has been treated by a number of rhetorical critics and other political

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20 Agnew and Sharp bring together Tilley’s notion of landscape with Anderson’s ‘imagined communities’: “Spatial orientations are of particular importance to understanding America, whether this is with respect to foreign policy or to national identity. It could be argued that a geographical imagination is central to all national political cultures […] However, if all nations are imagined communities, then America is the imagined community par excellence.” (Agnew & Sharp, 2002, p. 82)
commentators as a myth. While we agree that the American Dream has been among the most powerful secular myths in this country for well over a century, we think that the functioning of the narrative is best illuminated by treating it as a particular sub-form of myth: political romance. (Rowland & Jones, 2007, p. 428)

They choose this sub-type because, as they put it, political romance holds its hero not as ‘superior in kind’ to other men, but rather, ‘superior in degree’ (ibid., p. 429). Therefore, every man can be hero of his own narrative in his own dream. Yet the tension this creates between dreamworld and reality is one played out in Arthur Miller’s *Death of a Salesman*.

This play is a crucial (and devastating) commentary on the American Dream. In it every man is represented by Willy Loman, an unsuccessful travelling salesman consumed by the materialism of the American Dream at the cost of the truly valuable humanity at the centre of every man’s life. The American Dream, Miller believes, is guilty for the corruption of American society. Charley, Willy’s only friend, and a wiser man than he, says:

Nobody dast blame this man. Willy was a salesman. He’s a man way out there in the blue, riding on a smile and a shoeshine. A salesman is got to dream, boy. It comes with the territory. (Requiem, Miller, 2010, p. 120)

Yet it is the contents of the Dream, those internalised uncritically by Willy and thrust upon his sons, which are ‘All, all, wrong’, in fact, the Dream is summed up as ‘phony’ and dangerous (although such a revelation never comes for Willy, who commits suicide in order to leave his family death-insurance money).
7.2.3 Freedom, Want, and Wealth

We can see Miller’s opinion echoed in various ways. In an essay following the American Dream and its moral and material realisations from Adams’ day to 2009, Kamp sees a shift from a wartime Rockwell inspired ‘freedom from want’, completely different, he stresses, from ‘freedom to want’. In fact it was ‘a world away from the idea that the patriotic thing to do in tough times is go shopping’ (Kamp, 2009, p. 8) through the Levittown 50s in which:
Buttressed by postwar optimism and prosperity, the American Dream was undergoing another calibration. Now it really did translate into specific goals rather than Adams’s more broadly defined aspirations. Home ownership was the fundamental goal, but, depending on who was doing the dreaming, the package might also include car ownership, television ownership (which multiplied from 6 million to 60 million sets in the U.S. between 1950 and 1960), and the intent to send one’s kids to college. (*ibid.*, p. 10)

Of course, the explosion in television ownership also increased exponentially the public exposure to the model families seen on soaps (modelling the achievement of the American Dream) and, when advertising began in earnest, to the pairing of the myth with any brands packaged well enough to make such a pairing credible.

Kamp highlights the introduction of the credit card alongside the changing moral standing of credit in general. Through the 1970s, however, as he enumerates, the uptake of long-term credit was still modest, and despite appearances, this trend continued through the 80s. But, he writes:

[I]t was in the 80s that the American Dream began to take on hyperbolic connotations, to be conflated with extreme success: wealth, basically. […] “Who says you can’t have it all?” went the jingle in a ubiquitous beer commercial from the era, which only got more alarming as it went on to ask, “Who says you can’t have the world without losing your soul?” (*ibid.*, p. 12)

Kamp describes this development in the 80s as the ‘recalibration [which] saw the American Dream get decoupled from any concept of the common good’ (*ibid.*, p. 13). Wealth, or at least the outward signs of wealth — a simulacrum of it, then leads to gaudy architectural façades, and garish interiors.
This inflation (coupled with its economic counterpart) contributed, in Kamp’s view, to the situation in which:

The American Dream was almost by definition unattainable, a moving target that eluded people’s grasp; nothing was ever enough. It compelled Americans to set unmeetable goals for themselves and then consider themselves failures when these goals, inevitably, went unmet. (*ibid.*, p. 15)

Of course, such consumerism and particularly its tie to the American Dream, did not go uncriticised — in political, artistic and popular fields.

Many were critical of Reagan and noted the irony of his Hollywood connection in upholding the veneer. Molly Haskell, a feminist film critic, spelled this out when she said, ‘The propaganda arm of the American Dream machine — Hollywood’. And humorist George Carlin quipped, ‘they call it the 'American Dream' because you have to be asleep to believe it’. Kamp himself, talking of the American Dream and its connection with various frontiers (the Wild West or the

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21 More recently, there has been scrutiny paid to Hollywood’s connection to the Pentagon and its apparent willingness to be ‘on message’ at the price of having access to great war-film props (think *Top Gun*).
Moon) makes the dry suggestion that ‘perhaps debt was the new frontier’ (*ibid.*, p. 13).

![Figure 31: ‘Checking out of the American Dream’](image)

However, as Fisher makes clear,

> In dichotomizing the American Dream into materialistic and moralistic myths, there is danger that one may assume that there is virtue in one and only vice in the other. But this is an inaccurate view. (Fisher, 1973, p. 163)

It would be disingenuous to attempt to remove from the American Dream all that was ‘tainted’ by materialism and consumerism. Fisher again (writing just after the re-election of Nixon in 1972):

> If one conceives of the American Dream as a monistic myth, it will seem odd to suggest that both Mr. Nixon and Mr. McGovern epitomize that dream. Actually, the American Dream is two dreams, or, more accurately, it is two myths, myths that we all share in some degree or other and which, when taken together, characterize America as a culture. (*ibid.*, p. 160)

Thus we see the need and demand for a pendulum swing back to an American Dream more recognisable as the one Adams envisages (or is it post-rationalisation, the silver lining of the cloud of economic depression?).
Obama, once President, talked of the American Dream being ‘in reverse’. One can assume that this was describing the economic crash and sub-prime housing market rather than the voicing of a pessimistic opinion about the worsening morals of the American public. He also said in his infomercial (before being elected):

“Everybody here has got a story. Somewhere, you’ve got parents who said ‘you know what, maybe I won’t go to college, but I know if I work hard, my child will go to college.’ Everybody here has got a story of somebody who came from another country. They said ‘maybe my grandchild or my great grandchild, they’ll have opportunity, they’ll have freedom.’ Everybody here has got a story about a grandparent or a great-grandparent who worked in a coal mine, who worked in a tough factory, maybe got injured somewhere, but they said ‘you know what, I may not have a home, but if I work hard enough, someday my child, my grandchild they’ll have a home they can call their own.’ That’s the story of America.” (Obama, 2007)

Yet he would also say, in more elevated tones (in the same infomercial):

It is that fundamental belief — I am my brother’s keeper, I am my sister’s keeper — that makes this country work. […] (ibid.)

And here we come to the moralistic myth Fisher feels is wound together with the materialistic one. He puts it thus:
Where the materialistic myth involves a concept of freedom that emphasizes the freedom *to do* as one pleases, the moralistic myth tends toward the idea of freedom *to be* as one conceives himself. (Fisher, 1973, p. 162)

Yet, astutely, he identifies the guilt inherent in the uptake of the moralistic myth and the guilt engendered by the recognition of someone else’s uptake of such a myth:

Put another way: in order to be moved by moralistic appeals, one must condemn himself in some way or other […] There is a tendency to derogate advocates of moralistic causes and campaigns. They are accused of taking a “holier than thou” attitude […] (ibid.)

Two points arise from Fisher’s understanding of the tangled myths of the American Dream: one, that ‘doing’ is more aligned to materialism and things (which can be bought), and ‘being’ is more concerned with values and morals (which are intangible). Two, that there is a normative element to the moralistic myth: it attaches values to the American Dream (think of “I have a dream that one day…”). And what are those values, specifically? It is not easy, not even possible, to give a definite answer here. The best one can do is to quote the Declaration of Independence and leave extrapolation open:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.

So what Fisher offers us is a way of conceiving of the American Dream in terms of two intertwined myths which, when taken together provide the material for a coherent narrative. He ends his paper on a cautionary note:

America needs heroes and rituals, presidents and elections, to signify her whole meaning — moralistic and materialistic; she requires symbols that her citizens can identify with and can gain sanction from for what they are as individuals and what they represent as a nation. The American experiment goes on but we may very well lament the disenchantment. (Fisher, 1973, p. 167)
7.2.4 Summary

In this section I have looked at the morphing of the American Dream myth - used to legitimate on many levels, over many years – from something concerned more with morals to something focussed on consumption. I use Fisher’s conception of the American Dream as being an intertwining of two myths – the moral one and the materialistic one. This, I suggest, plays out in the spot ads we will see further on in the analysis.

7.3 Myths, Materiality, Appropriation and Branding

Figure 33: Branding and appropriation of a symbol - John Stetson, John Wayne, Reagan-as-actor, Reagan-as-President, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama

7.3.1 Landscapes and Authenticity

The idea of the American Dream is intangible — ideas are. But in order for it to be public, it must be expressed through something — words, symbols, sounds, sensations, most often a combination of these. Tilley focuses a great deal
on place and landscape; landscape being a place invested with meaning (whereas a place, arguably, has no inherent meaning). He also focuses on identity formation in relation to memory — including memory of place (he talks of ‘ontological moorings’). As mentioned already, the American Dream is associated with frontiers. Specific frontiers have become prominent but the more figurative frontier is also fundamental: the material one often stands metaphorically for the figurative one. Yet, take the two frontiers already mentioned — the Wild West and the Moon — I think it would be safe to say that nobody reading this will have experienced these frontiers first hand. So, not only are these mythologized places out of our temporal or geographic reach, but they go through numerous re-interpretations. Therefore, although Tilley says this:

Ideas and feelings about identity are located in the specificities of places and landscapes in what they actually look like or perhaps more typically how they ought to appear […] and how they feel, in the fullness and emotional richness of the synaesthetic relations of these places with our bodies which encounter them. (Tilley, 2006, p. 14)

He also says of ‘traditions’ (including those relating to place) that ‘notions of degrees of authenticity or inauthenticity remain entirely inappropriate to evaluate them’ (ibid., p. 12). Tilley seems to be at odds with himself here: on the one hand the sensory, sensual experience of actual place seems to be vital, yet, on the other, the authenticity of these places is a lesser concern (note the priority given to the subjective interpretation ‘more specifically how they ought to appear’).

How, then, are we to understand our romanticised notions of place as most often authentically experienced in the cinema? What sort of synaesthetic associations do we actually have with these frontiers if not the smell of popcorn, the movie soundtrack mingled with coughs and whispers, the darkened theatre in
which the proximity of strangers contrasts with the characters on-screen? (Or, perhaps more common nowadays, the sitting-room sofa and the ambivalent attempt at escapism from ‘the comfort of our own home’?) These two real frontiers of the American Dream are experienced only as second hand translations, always mythologised, often pastiched to kitsch. I would take issue, therefore, with Tilley’s apparent relegation of authenticity to the somewhat negligible and suggest, instead, that authenticity is frequently held up against accusations of being ‘phony’: the struggle to define ‘authentic’ becomes a very important, and bitterly contested one.

Tilley does talk of the problems of a certain romanticisation:

A symbolic return to the past often acts as a retreat from the uncertainties of the present. The crucial point is that place as a stable, relatively closed or bounded, and secure resource for forging social identity has become more and more problematic in the flux of spatial flows that ‘open out’ places to the world. (ibid., p. 14)

The agency involved in the creation of landscape and place is, for Tilley, absolutely central for our understanding of how it comes to play a part, not only in our personal identity creation, but in political identities. Thus:

What kinds of landscape and place we produce, and want, are inextricably bound up with the politics of identity, for ideas about both relate to whom we want to live with and whom we want to exclude, who belongs and who does not, to issues of class, ethnicity, gender and sexuality. (ibid., p. 15)

And this is precisely why the Wild West, together with the Stetson-wearing hero, is extremely problematic when it comes to a multicultural — not to mention multi-gendered — American Dream.\(^\text{22}\)

\(^{22}\) Ang Lee’s film *Brokeback Mountain* (2005) has, at least, given a mainstream outing to the gay cowboy.
7.3.2 John Wayne and the Wild West Frontier

We all know (from childhood) the role of the indigenous Native American and the Mexican in cowboy films. Way out West things just ain’t that complicated. As John Wayne, in various incarnations as white frontier hero would have us know,

“I know those law books mean a lot to you, but not out here. Out here a man settles his own problems.” — Tom, in The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance (Ray, 1985, p. 217)

“Out here, due process is a bullet.” — Ethan, in The Searchers (Roberts & Olson, 1997, p. 558)

Out of character, the man John Wayne said:

I don’t feel we did wrong in taking this great country away from them. There were great numbers of people who needed new land, and the Indians were selfishly trying to keep it for themselves. (Golson, 1981, p. 269)

It might seem like the political comments of a mere actor are out of place, but first, an actor by the name of Ronald Reagan made it to the White House (his acting-out the hero was — together with his political talents — endorsement enough for him to get ‘all the way to the top’, and he continued to use his acting experience to great effect) and, secondly, John Wayne’s iconic status is such that he has come to symbolise, and is seen (by some) as embodying, many of the values associated with this frontier version of the American Dream. The role of the iconic in our times is immense, but here I just focus briefly on why Wayne is significant in understanding the frontier version of the American Dream and how this impacts upon its political appropriation.

Wayne’s iconic status is hardly under dispute. Here are a few short introductions:
Why was Wayne the Number One Movie Star, even as late as 1995? He embodies the American myth [...] One becomes American by going out. We are a people of departures, not arrival. To reach one place is simply to catch sight of a new Beyond. Our basic myth is that of the frontier. Our hero is the frontiersman. To become urban is to break the spirit of man. Freedom is out on the plains, under the endless sky. A pent-in American ceases to be American [...] The “young American” Emerson imagined out on the horizon had the easy gait and long stride of John Wayne. (Wills, 1997, pp. 302-303)

He epitomized rugged masculinity, and has become an enduring American icon. He is famous for his distinctive voice, walk and physical presence. He was also known for his conservative political views and his support in the 1950s for anti-communist positions. (NationMaster-Encyclopedia)

There are, of course, many actors who are typecast, and many actors who seek to preserve their ‘brand’ (and their commercial sponsorships) by acting in their daily lives in a way not incongruent with their public image. Wayne was no different in this reinvention:

[C]onstructing a screen persona and a private personality that reinforced one another in a continual, symbiotic dance. In the process he became a permanent fixture of American popular culture, an icon. During much of the twentieth century, for millions of Americans, watching a John Wayne movie was like peering, over and over again, into a great cultural mirror [...] (Roberts & Olson, 1997, p. 647)

However, Wayne’s influence has been deeper than most: ‘he became a magnet that drew the cultural ideals and popular attitudes of the nation into an agreeable figurehead’ (Davis, 2001, pp. 280-281). From a chapter entitled ‘Reactionary Patriarch’, Davis writes not only about Wayne’s ability to engender feelings of personal empathy, but also his political influence:

Wayne had become the unofficial spokesman for provincial America, giving sanction to traditional attitudes in a time of raging conflict. (ibid., pp. 280-281)

An iconic image need not accurately reflect the complexities of the character on which that icon is based. The myth which supports the icon ‘hides nothing and
flaunts nothing: it distorts; myth is neither a lie nor a confession: it is an inflexion.’ (Barthes, 2000, p. 129). And simplicity is an important part of this inflexion according to Barthes:

In passing from history to nature, myth acts economically: it abolishes the complexity of human acts, it gives them the simplicity of essences, it does away with all dialectics, with any going back beyond what is immediately visible, it organizes a world which is without contradictions because it is without depth, a world wide open and wallowing in the evident, it establishes a blissful clarity: things appear to mean something by themselves. (ibid., p. 143)

There are many accounts of Vietnam veterans citing Wayne as being representative of the America for which they thought they were fighting, not all of whom were celebrating the ‘simplicity’ of that easy connection upon return\(^{23}\).

Davis quotes screenwriter, Roy Huggins, as saying:

> “People actually thought of Wayne as a great hero […] And, of course, John Wayne was just an actor. He was never in any armed service, never saw a war, never even saw a gun fired that actually had lead in it. To me that is an incredible comment on American society. It says something about the confusion in the American people between reality and myth.”

(Davis, 2001, p. 8)

Yet that confusion, that uncritical embracing of the myth, has implications. For what Wayne-the-icon symbolises is a mixture of what he, his characters, and the pre-existing myth of the frontier hero bring together. And that relationship is not one way: Wayne influences the meaning of the frontier hero. His social conservatism is well documented:

Duke came forward as a vehement foe of gun control [...] He disdained hippies, long hair on men, and left-wing writers and eggheads who questioned the conservative principles on which the United States had

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\(^{23}\) In *Born on the Fourth of July*, Kovick, does not mince his words: “Gone. And it is gone for America. I have given it for democracy […] It is gone and numb, lost somewhere out there by the river where the artillery is screaming in. Oh God oh God I want it back! […] Yes, I gave my dead dick for John Wayne.” (2003, p. 80)
taken root. “The disorders in the schools are caused by immature professors who have encouraged activists…” (ibid., p. 280)

Of course, the argument can be made that he was ‘of his time’, and that would certainly be true. But, as Barthes points out, in myth ‘history evaporates’ (Barthes, 2000, p. 151) and all is pressed to present concerns. This provides ground for the frontier hero being conservative, and, in rejecting multiculturalism (while begetting the results of a multicultural pairing!), an accusation of ‘backwardness’ may be raised. Compounding this reputation, Wayne is also quoted as saying:

“I believe in white supremacy” said Wayne, “until the Blacks are educated to the point of responsibility. I don’t believe in giving authority and positions of leadership and judgement to irresponsible people… I’ve directed two pictures and I have given Blacks their proper positions. I had a Black slave in The Alamo and I had the correct number of Blacks in The Green Berets. But I don’t go so far as hunting for positions for them. I think the Hollywood Studios are carrying their tokenism too far.” (Johnson, 1971)

Again, it is important to remember that what I am discussing here is the influence of an icon upon the perception of the American Dream myth, and specifically the frontier incarnation of that myth. John Wayne’s political views have been simplified to fit into his iconic status, and these simplified (and simplistic) political views have leached into what he is taken to represent and is allied to. Public figures can officially endorse ideas and other public figures; alternatively, public figures and movements can appropriate (or at least attempt to appropriate) the values associated with certain myths. This is why John Wayne’s iconic importance within the frontier-hero myth is relevant and troubling.

7.3.3 Political Appropriation

The American Dream, therefore, has a problematic tie to place, and not only place but the connotations which are deeply associated with that place.
Which political allegiance does such a frontier vision fit best? The Republicans, without question. In *Mythologies*, addressing what he sees as the political inclination of myth, Barthes writes:

Statistically, myth is on the right. There, it is essential; well-fed, sleek, expansive, garrulous, it invents itself ceaselessly. It takes hold of everything, all aspects of the law, of morality, of aesthetics, of diplomacy, of household equipment, of Literature, of entertainment. […] The oppressed makes the world, he has only an active, transitive (political) language; the oppressor conserves it, his language is plenary, intransitive, gestural, theatrical: it is Myth. The language of the former aims at transforming, of the latter at eternalizing. (Barthes, 2000, p. 149)

Although this politically over-charged statement drops nuance for impact, it helps explain why there has been a great deal of discussion as to the methods leading to Obama’s success at the ballot box and his deployment of the rhetoric and narrative of the American Dream. There are, in theory, different strategies he could adopt. He could reject as Republican, backward and conservative, those features of the narrative which tie it to the values associated with his opponents. Or he could attempt to reclaim those features, and reframe them in his own narrative. In practice, he did a bit of both, but notably, he concentrated on the latter strategy. Here, from his 2004 Democratic National Convention Keynote speech:

The pundits, the pundits like to slice-and-dice our country […] Red States for Republicans, Blue States for Democrats […] We coach Little League in the Blue States and yes, we’ve got some gay friends in the Red States. There are patriots who opposed the war in Iraq and there are patriots who supported the war in Iraq. We are one people, all of us pledging allegiance to the stars and stripes, all of us defending the United States of America. (Obama, 2004)

Not only did Obama attempt to muddy the divided ideological waters, but he has, since, gone out of his way to place himself in the places and roles (real and metaphorical) normally only available within the Republican narrative (e.g.
stressing his maternal Kansas connection and his donning of the Stetson). Tilley writes,

> Identities must of necessity be improvised and changing, rather than fixed and rule-bound, intimately related to experience and context. They are both in the mind and of the world, embodied and objectified through action and material practice. (Tilley, 2006, p. 17)

And of the interplay of such identity formation with the negotiation of power he writes:

> Relatively powerless actors in one group may attempt to adopt symbols of the powerful in another. [...] Identity in such circumstances may be regarded as a scarce resource requiring careful cultivation and manipulation of material symbols to maintain it. (ibid., p. 15)

7.3.4 Political Message and Emblems of Identity

Taking up this idea of place, identity, political appropriation and narrative, Silverstein, in a discussion of political ‘message’ within Obama’s campaign, says:

> For an electoral candidate these particular semiotic flotsam, the design elements of “message,” become what we term *emblems of identity* that can be deployed to remind the folks of who — that is, of course, sociologically speaking, what — the political figure is. What are his or her defining dimensionalities? (Silverstein, 2011, p. 3)

‘Semiotic flotsam’ is a rather nice image and useful, as long as it is remembered that flotsam is contained upon a particular sea (although floating — the sea — the wider context acts as a boundary) and that it comes to be after being jettisoned from a particular ship (each sign has a history which shapes its subsequent reception). Silverstein goes on:

> Such emblems position people, allowing a public to identify them in a structural space of relative possible social identities, like protagonists and villains in the emplotments of most of the narratives to which we are otherwise exposed (soap opera of grotesques, we might term it). Such a contrast space provides relative places for them to stand in our — the electorate’s — imaginations, defined thus publicly as personalities by
processes they either have controlled or their opponents have managed to (a figuration of winning and losing, note). *(ibid.)*

In an astonishingly blunt way, this ‘message’ of Obama’s (having received a severe buffeting in the currents of White House reality) has recently had something of what Silverstein terms a ‘semiotic self-redemption’ *(ibid.)*. Jones writes:

With one cool shot, the US president brought down both Osama bin Laden and Republican claims to the mantle of western hero. (Jones, 2011)

He then goes on to draw out the significance of Obama’s president-as-gunslingin’-good-guy role. He notes that after Reagan and George W. Bush both adopted, to varying degrees of success, the western hero persona (and symbolic props), the ‘heritage of the mythic west’ remained firmly in Republican control.

As he sees it, however, this has been overturned by Obama:

This is why cool-talking, straight-shooting President Barack Obama has just changed history. He has overturned more than three decades in which the Democrats looked through the lens of the western like wimps from back east, and Republicans posed as tough sheriffs. Now there is a new sheriff in town […] *(ibid.)*

And, supporting both Silverstein’s view of the ‘message’ as being of primary importance, and Fisher’s application of the narrative paradigm, Jones ends his piece by saying:

It may seem trite to reduce it all to a western. But in the political imagination, where elections are won and lost, this is a game-changer. […] The myth of superior Republican patriotism is headed for Boot Hill — and Destry Rides Again. *(ibid.)*

This political appropriation and subsequent struggle over claims to be fiduciaries (and thus executors) of the American Dream myth marries institutionality and mythologizing. The first is addressed by Bourdieu, the second by Bell.
7.3.5 Institution of Identity

Bourdieu makes the point that an identity, by the dint of being named as such is both a right and an imposition:

The institution of an identity, which can be a title of nobility or a stigma (‘you’re nothing but a …’), is the imposition of a name, i.e. of a social essence. To institute, to assign an essence, a competence, is to impose a right to be that is an obligation of being so (or to be so). It is to signify to someone what he is and how he should conduct himself as a consequence. (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 120)

Therefore, to enter into the discourse about the American Dream (i.e. to use/engage with/define oneself to some degree by the pre-existing myth which exists of the American Dream) and, like those actors and politicians above, to publically assume the mantle of living in, living up to, aspiring towards its attainment (or privately casting oneself as the hero?), is to appropriate the values, affordances and limitations which it entails. Entering into a public dream, employing such a myth, involves recognising its boundaries, and, moreover, it may demand something itself. Yeats used as an epigraph, ‘In dreams begins responsibility’, and perhaps political actors and commercial interests could be held accountable here for their (ab)use of the American Dream myth. Furthermore, it could be suggested that only a dream free of political appropriation and branding (a reification of sorts), could inspire responsibility in individuals taking up the dream.

Perhaps, however, conceiving of the American Dream myth as something which deserves (which can deserve) is an unhelpful personification. Bourdieu’s point holds, however, that an identity is an institutionalisation of sorts and with such an institutionalisation comes external and political demands, requirements, and deserts. He elaborates:
In this and other cases, moving from the implicit to the explicit, from one’s subjective impression to objective expression, to public manifestation in the form of a discourse or public act, constitutes in itself an act of *institution* and thereby represents a form of officialization and legitimation […] (ibid., p. 173)

These paired dualities, implicit and explicit, subjective impression and objective expression, are connected to the tangibility, the articulation, the determinacy of an identity.

The ambiguities resonant in these terms make distinction difficult. For example, if I am arguing that leaving dreams as intangible affords them greater (and more positive) use than if they are hijacked (I note the derogatory metaphor) by political and commercial players, what definition of tangible am I using and what relation does such intangibility have to subjectivity or objectivity? The *Oxford English Dictionary* has four main meanings for ‘tangible’ as an adjective, and one for it as a noun:

**A. adj.**
1. a. Capable of being touched; affecting the sense of touch; touchable.
   b. Hence, Material, externally real, objective.
2. That may be discerned or discriminated by the sense of touch; as a tangible property or form.
3. *fig.* That can be laid hold of or grasped by the mind, or dealt with as a fact; that can be realized or shown to have substance; palpable.
4. Capable of being touched or affected emotionally.

**B. n.**
A thing that may be touched; something material or objective. Also *fig.*

There is clear overlap here between tangible and objective, and tangible and material. However, the figurative uses and the definition (4.) concerned with emotional affect, remove the certainty and simplicity afforded by the first two definitions (and ‘real’ and ‘objective’ are not *that* certain or simple themselves when it comes down to it).
If we foreground three defining features of the American Dream: it is public, it is a myth, and it is a dream; its being ‘dealt with as a fact’ is clearly impossible. Furthermore, if it does possess dream-like qualities (and what are these exactly if not undefined, insubstantial, unreal or unobjective?) then in one way it will be absolutely graspable ‘by the mind’ (dreams which seem unreal at the time of dreaming are unusual), and it may feel palpable, but, in another way, it will resist definition and remain very (and necessarily) immaterial.

Bourdieu employs the trinity of ‘credit, credence and fides’ (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 192) in connection with political capital and the constitutive features of symbolic power which highlights the giving-over of power, the divestment of it from some people to other ‘powerful’ people and ‘significant’ things. He writes:

Political capital is a form of symbolic capital, credit founded on credence or belief and recognition or, more precisely, on the innumerable operations of credit by which agents confer on a person (or on an object) the very powers that they recognise in him (or it). This is the ambiguity of the fides, analysed by Benveniste: an objective power which can be objectified in things (and in particular in everything that constitutes the symbolic nature of power — thrones, sceptres and crowns), it is the product of subjective acts of recognition and, in so far as it is credit and credibility, exists only in and through representation, in and through trust, belief and obedience. (ibid., p. 192)

And here, again, Joseph Campbell’s statement that ‘myths are public dreams, dreams are private myths’ brings into focus the strange topography of the American Dream.

7.3.6 Topography of myth

This topography, the topography of myth, is a subject upon which Barthes ponders in his book Mythologies. He writes:
Thus every myth can have its history and its geography; each is in fact the sign of the other: a myth ripens because it spreads. I have not been able to carry out any real study of the social geography of myths. But it is perfectly possible to draw what linguists would call the isoglosses of a myth, the lines which limit the social region where it is spoken. As this region is shifting, it would be better to speak of the waves of implantation of the myth. (Barthes, 2000, pp. 149-150)

This quote is interesting on multiple levels: first, in the clear parallels drawn between myth and nationalism. Secondly, in Barthes’ attempts to portray myth, on the one hand as an organic, alive being which ‘ripens’ and ‘spreads’; and on the other, as something to which the application of some systematic scientific study (‘real study’) is not only possible, but could produce a very tangible isogloss of myth (although he immediately moves from envisaging ‘lines’ which ‘limit’ to ‘waves’ which ‘implant’). The notion that myths can be likened to linguistic features in the sense that they travel and gain a geographical coverage (and I suppose these days this would also pertain for cyberspace) is an appealing one. It may help to explain a certain expansion and contraction in the popularity of myths (and particular versions of particular myths, if we are looking at the American Dream). It also has the advantage of explaining how a myth could be inflected with local features, as we can see by local — and other national — variations of the American Dream. The American Dream of a Californian as compared to a New Englander, when taken down to the details, is bound to differ. The difference, however, is not only going to be merely the result of a geographic distance, but of a myriad of reflected aspirational (and therein cultural) differences which will surely inform the material and the moral features of each individual creation. The American Dream as an international phenomenon may be seen as even further removed from its original location, and seen more as a byword of a
Westernised aspirational model (see Sec. 6.4 on templates). Realising one’s ‘manifold destiny’ hardly seems to be an edict which could count as cultural imperialism so it is what travels alongside this which is seen to qualify.

However, Barthes’ conception of myth as likened to language does run the risk of being reductive (or rather, its necessary reductiveness runs the risk of being a barrier to a deeper understanding of myth’s multi-layered nature). Bell writes:

[A] mythscape can be conceived of as the discursive realm, constituted by and through temporal and spatial dimensions, in which the myths of the nation are forged, transmitted, reconstructed and negotiated constantly. (2003, p. 78)

Bell’s point being that as an organising, analytical tool and framework, ‘memory’ — collective and individual — does not suffice. He rather scathingly writes:

‘Memory’, it appears, has today assumed the role of a meta-theoretical trope and also, perhaps, a sentimental yearning; as the idea of an Archimedean Truth has slowly and painfully withered under the assault of various anti-foundational epistemologies, memory seems to have claimed Truth’s valorized position as a site of authenticity, as a point of anchorage — albeit an unsteady one — in a turbulent world stripped of much of its previous meaning. In memory we trust. (Bell, 2003, p. 65)

This touches upon several of the points raised thus far: the notion of a ‘meta’ trope recalls Fisher’s commitment to the narrative (meta)paradigm; the demand for something to protect truth and authenticity, as well as provide a ‘point of anchorage’, recalls the strength, use and appropriation of the American Dream myth; the reiteration of the need for a ‘site’ echoes Tilley’s discussion of the importance of place and the role of the material and tangible in that; and finally, Bell highlights the yearning for stability in the face of the world’s turbulence which myth, dreams, memory, narrative, place, institutionalisation, and objectification make manifest. Bell’s critique of ‘the mnemonic turn’ (ibid., p. 78) is based on what he presents as the danger of a conflation:
It is argued, moreover, that the careless employment of the term ‘memory’ results not only in conceptual confusion, but serves also to obscure an important political phenomenon, whereby ‘organic’ forms of collective remembrance can actually run against the grain of the dominant narrative (or ‘governing mythology’) of the nation, the alleged repository of national collective ‘memory’. (*ibid.*, p. 66)

The relevance of such a dominant narrative to the American Dream myth is clear, particularly when the party political dimension comes in, but also more generally as a restricting frame both foisted upon, and adopted by, disparate people. Bell asks difficult and pertinent questions which throw light upon the manifold complexities of the American Dream:

> And in what way does a national identity maintain temporal continuity, exerting its fierce gravitational pull from generation to generation? (*ibid.* p. 67)

> [W]hat are the key discursive elements that help to bind together the idea of a collective national identity? How is history, indeed time, represented? (*ibid.*, p. 69)

> [H]ow do we ‘cultivate’ and moreover ‘acquire’ memories? […] And how can institutions, practices, buildings or statues remember?24 (*ibid.*, p. 71)

The reason I think Bell’s formulation of a mythscape is so useful when looking at the American Dream rests upon the way such a concept encapsulates the intangibility and dehistoricity of myth, while bringing into the foreground (through the use of the suffix ‘-scape’) both an objectifying and a subjectivity: that is, an interplay of interpretation and translation. Bell notes myth’s ability to hide complexity and contradiction:

> Myth serves to flatten the complexity, the nuance, the performative contradictions of human history; it presents instead a simplistic and often uni-vocal story. (*ibid.*, p. 75)

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24 Clearly, the Statue of Liberty (Evertz, 1995), and the Mount Rushmore carvings (Joseph, 1987, p. 176) are invested with mythical significance, but it is also worth noting that the sensitivity of Ground Zero, the inextricability (at least at the present time) of the N.Y.C. Firefighters, points to an even odder (yet much repeated) sense that a void itself, a gap, a lack, can, in some sense, remember.
But this ‘uni-vocal’ story, although politically expedient, can be (and is) challenged by what Bell calls ‘subaltern myths’. Applying this to the American Dream, we can see how it may be envisaged as *ripening* (in Barthes’ terms), as *palimpsestic* (in Tilley’s), and as *controlled through narrative* (in Fisher’s). Bell writes:

> We can view the nationalist governing mythology in a similar way, as the attempt to impose a definite meaning on the past, on the nation and its history. However, as with ideologies this attempt will invariably fail, there will always be dissent and the story will never be accepted consistently and universally. […] The governing myth thus coexists with and is constantly contested by subaltern myths, which are capable of generating their own traditions and stories, stories as likely to be concerned with past oppression and suffering at the hands of the dominant groups as by tales of national glory. (*ibid.*, p. 74)

In this section I have looked only at one dominant strand of the American Dream myth. There are others, equally, if not more, dominant. The imposition of these meanings, the vying for symbolic power, and the fear of allowing interpretation is looked at in the next section.

### 7.3.7 Summary

In this section I focus more closely on one manifestation of the American Dream myth and discuss its significance for present day politics – both in terms of being employed by politicians, and in terms of being an important interpretative frame within the arsenal of frames the American public has recourse to. I discuss the way in which the frontier version of the American Dream shapes – and is shaped by – landscape and lifestyle, having what Tilley terms ‘ontological moorings’, yet being most authentically experienced in the cinema (with the implications about authenticity that this has). What these complex realisations
imply is that legitimation through myth (van Leeuwen’s ‘mythopoesis’) can be extremely multifaceted and multilayered.

I move on to discuss the political appropriation of this particular myth and use Silverstein’s discussion of ‘political message’ to theorise this. Cataloguing the struggle over ‘possesion’ of this frontier version of the American Dream myth between the Republicans and Democrats, I employ Silverstein’s concept of ‘emblems of identity’ to show how this power play can also be understood in terms of Bourdieu’s ‘symbolic power’. Finally, I return to Barthes and attempt to understand a little deeper what this use of myth offers. In doing so, I bring in Bell’s notion of ‘mythscapes’, expressing as it does, the idea of a multimodal landscape, together with the foregrounding of myth over memory.

7.4 Affordances, constraints and templates

7.4.1 Social semiotics and the American Dream

Van Leeuwen and Kress have both written a great deal about multimodality and the need, as they see it, for a development in multimodal and semiotic literacy. They have written (in co-authored and individual works) about this need from a pedagogical perspective (analysing textbooks and the ideological implications of the multimodal approaches adopted therein). Here, however, I concentrate on just two of van Leeuwen’s papers which seem to me to do two things: throw light upon our understanding of the American Dream; and also show the wider — and contemporary — relevance of the social semiotic approach. In
doing so I also refer to Kress’s book, *Multimodality: A social semiotic approach to contemporary communication* (2010). The need for inserting an overtly ‘social’ perspective into semiotics in general is explained thus:

> Semiotics traditionally spoke of rules and codes, and in doing so it did perhaps not pay sufficient attention to the way in which these rules and codes came about, and the ways in which they are maintained. Social semiotics, on the other hand, seeks to re-sociologise concepts such as ‘rule’ and ‘code’, to put *agency* back in them, and to study the regulation of semiotic practices as a process rather than a structure. (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 133)

The American Dream, as a myth and as a container for aspirations (thus able to accommodate multiple dreams) is, as I have argued, both public and private. The public myth (or as Fisher argues *myths*) is expressed variously and simultaneously in different ways. It ensues that its many incarnations are most certainly multimodally realised. As Tilley has shown, landscape alone (and this is only one locale for the semiotic investment of the American Dream) is an interpretative cocktail of (for instance) colour, form, texture, as well as a memory or future anticipation of these. Suffice to say that a complex myth is multi-layered, multi-faceted, and realised through multimodal means. The question of agency in regards to the American Dream has proven to be equally complex. Its evolution as a myth, with the layers of historical interpretation this not only assumes (as a myth immemorial — or at least as old as the America to which the dream belongs), but also as have been evidenced in a more self-conscious fashion (e.g. as we have seen by Kamp), also necessitates multiple agency. The political appropriation and commercial use of the American Dream as both a site of legitimacy and a site ripe for branding adds further to the agents involved in its re-

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25 Kress too puts social semiotics together with agency when he writes, ‘Multimodal social-semiotic theory deals with *meaning* and *meaning-making*; with *sign-making* and *signs*. ‘Making’ implies a ‘maker’; hence *agency* is central.’ (Kress, 2010, p. 107)
creation and perpetuation. Add to this the personal manifestations, uses and shaping of the American Dream, what becomes an ever more pertinent question is: why it is not, and how it resists becoming, a semiotic free-for-all? The answer to this lies, I believe, in the interplay between the affordances and restraints each agent applies to their own version of the Dream; the ‘semiotic regimes’ (2008, p. 132) governing each interpretation (both as it is produced and as it is received); and the interpretative inertia caused by the weight of the previous (historical and cultural) interpretations.

7.4.2 Writing: the new, the old, and the problem of transposition

The multimodality outlined in van Leeuwen’s paper ‘New forms of writing, new visual competencies’ differs, he says, to that of old writing in which the distinction between writing and image ‘seemed so clear cut and obvious’ (2008, p. 132). In these old formulations,

Speech, writing, music, image were conceived of as independent and self-contained semiotic modes that could function either independently or in combination [...] Each mode was able to communicate on its own, and in the culturally ‘highest’ forms that was exactly what was attempted: the densely printed pages of the novel; the wordless pictures on the wall of the gallery; the visually minimal performance mode of classical music. (ibid.)

Although I think this rather simplifies the ‘high’ forms of the past (insofar as it not only sweeps the multimodal contextuality of the mono-mode artworks out of sight but also ignores the all-important gilt framing of the wordless pictures, the performance space of the classical music, and the cover design and paper quality of the novel), the point about the contemporary text being a lot more multimodal is an important one. Moreover, van Leeuwen links this together with a broader turn towards interdisciplinarity. Using the example of colour, he writes:
But the semiotic forms foregrounded by the new writing differ from this. Colour cannot stand on its own. It always has to be the colour of something […] But, as already mentioned, colour can make a semiotic contribution in many different contexts, in pictures, graphics, typography, fashion, product design, exhibition design, architecture, gardening, food, and more. In other words, colour is the semiotic resource for a time in which ‘team work’ and ‘interdisciplinarity’ are fundamental values. It has to work with other semiotic modes. It cannot do the whole job on its own. It needs others. (ibid.)

Van Leeuwen is focussing, in this piece, on ‘new forms of writing’. There is a slight irony here, one which Kress also, in his writing on multimodality, exhibits — indeed, perhaps it comes with the territory of ‘writing’ about multimodality in a (modally unadventurous) academic context. The irony is located in the tension between building on, and building anew, theories to accommodate the unique features of multimodal study. Kress writes:

Necessarily, the linguistic approach has nothing to say about other modes in making meaning […] In some sense both linguistics and pragmatics recognize the presence of other modes — in terms such as ‘extra-linguistic’, ‘para-linguistic’, ‘non-verbal’ or in different kinds of acknowledgement to features of ‘context’. That, however, is a recognition of the phenomenon in the same moment as its instant dismissal; a backhanded theoretical compliment: I notice you and you’re not significant enough for me to bother.’ (Kress, 2010, pp. 58-59)

The use — the re-deployment — of linguistic theories (both van Leeuwen and Kress are self-professed Hallidayans), as well as the deeply entrenched and entirely incorporated use of the metaphors of writing, language, reading, and speaking, seems to exacerbate the attempt to break free of a ‘linguistics’ supra-layer. Kress notes the need not to attempt to solve ‘new environments and new problems […] by patching together elements of diverse theories made to solve
other problems.’ This would, he concludes (referring to Kuhn) ‘produce a social, epistemological and ideological hotchpotch.’ *(ibid., p. 106)*

The American Dream is not a ‘new form of writing’ but in its multimodality it certainly seems to be better likened to the ‘new’ than to the ‘old’. In the American Dream also, each mode cannot function alone: semiotic contributions are in a self-supporting matrix. Van Leeuwen points back to an insight he made with Kress — that semiotic resources (again, they use the example of colour) are most usefully viewed as:

> [B]undles of features with metaphoric or connotative potential [...] Each of these features has a connotative and/or metaphoric meaning potential that can be exploited to express identity in specific contexts. For example, in contexts boasting centuries-old traditions, a regal dark red has connotations of royalty, heraldry and so on. Colour saturation can provide an example of the metaphor potential of colour. Lack of saturation, ‘paleness’, is both literally and metaphorically, a lack of *strength*, of *boldness*. In context this can then become ‘soft’ and ‘tender’ — or ‘pale’ and ‘bloodless’, as the case may be. *(2008, pp. 132-133)*

Again, these ‘bundles’ help account for the richness and affordances of semiotic resources (in fact ‘Multimodal Social Semiotics’ is basically a vast theory of how things mean)*27* but fail to explain how semiotic limitation functions (and affordance leads to meaninglessness if unrestrained).

### 7.4.3 Writing individual agency into the sign

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*26* A further discussion of Kress’s position vis-à-vis agency and Saussure’s conception of the sign can be found in McDonald (2012).

In order to explain this, Kress brings in Saussure’s notion of ‘arbitrariness’ and discusses the convention which binds signification, as well as the agency and power implied in such a position. He writes:

In Saussure’s sign, *signifier* and *signified* are linked in a relation which is *arbitrary* and bound by *convention*. Both *arbitrariness* and *convention* point to social power, though in distinctly different ways: *arbitrariness* as an indication of a social power which is sufficiently strong to tie any form to any meaning; and *convention* — the effect of *social power over time* — as a social force which acts to keep signs *stable*, a stabilizing force for the community which subscribes to it. In this account, the actions of individuals cannot change signs or the relation of the sign to the system of signs. (Kress, 2010, p. 63)

In relating this to the American Dream and specifically to how the meaning of it is constrained, one point is salient: if convention, as a ‘social force’ comes to bear ‘for the community which subscribes to it’, this also has implications for the membership requirements of that community. The very act of subscription is at one and the same time an imposition and a right (recalling Bourdieu: ‘To institute, to assign an essence, a competence, is to impose a right to be that is an obligation of being so (or to be so).’ (1991, p. 120)). Therefore, to ‘sign-up’ to the American Dream you must belong to the community that subscribes to it; and to belong to the community, you must ‘sign-up’ to the American Dream.

Kress argues that Saussure (as a product of his age), failed to recognise individual agency and motivation in sign-making. He continues:

The notion of *arbitrariness* goes directly against the notion of the sign-maker’s *interest* in the making of signs and meaning. (*ibid.*, p. 64)

Both Saussure’s notions of ‘arbitrariness’ and ‘motivation’, are, according to Kress indexical of social principles (and thereby antithetical to individual agency?). Both are concerned with convention: ‘arbitrariness’ with the social
convention that controls definition; and ‘motivation’ with the social convention (in fact, the same one?) that enforces an interpretation of causality based upon what is explicable from social meanings. So, while power is recognised at a social level, the role of the individual in that formation is denied. If this were the case there could be no translation of the ‘sign-maker’s interest’ to the sign. Meaning would necessarily stagnate (in fact how could it initially be made?). Yet this it does not do: innovation and creativity, subversion and manipulation, evolution and appropriation, historicising and mythologising are all processes involved in the development of signs and meaning and all, necessarily, originate from individuals. Kress writes:

These objects [his examples being banal, material objects such as salt and pepper shakers] show that signifiers and signs carry, in their make-up, the traces of long histories of practices. The meanings of these practices are present in the signifiers as a potential for meaning and are carried ‘forward’ in constantly transformed fashion into new signs, remade in the light of the resources that (re)-makers of the signs bring with them. In signs, sign-makers mediate their own social history, their present social position, their sense of their social environment in the process of communication; and this becomes tangible in the reshaping of the cultural resources used in representation and communication. The makers of signs ‘stamp’ present social conditions into the signs they make and make these signs into the bearers of social histories. (Kress, 2010, p. 82)

So, in the interplay between the social power to inhibit ‘open’ reading at one level, with the power of the individual to modify, ‘stamp’, subvert, and innovate at another, the affordances and restraints are mediated.

7.4.4 Semiotic regimes

Van Leeuwen discusses five kinds of ‘semiotic regime’, ‘that can regulate the production and interpretation or use of semiotic artefacts’ (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 133), these being: codification, tradition, the rule of the expert, best
practice or role model, and the rule of technology (ibid.). Remembering that his context and aim is different from my own, his being to look at new forms of writing, and my own being to look at the American Dream and its (in)tangibility, we can still extrapolate and find the utility in doing so (indeed, as multi- and inter-disciplinary academics, both van Leeuwen and Kress’s work has been taken up across disciplines — and even outside of academia and education). That being said, it is important not to force a piece that does not fit:

Given the distinct affordances of different modes they can be used to do specific semiotic work. The uses of mode constantly reshape its affordances along the lines of the social requirements of those who make meanings; that ensures that mode is constantly changed in the direction of social practices and requirements. Modal change tracks social change. [...] The potentials inherent in materiality are never fully used to become affordances of a mode in a particular culture (Kress, 2010, p. 82)

Keeping in mind that potential affordances are never fully exploitable, two of the five categories of ‘semiotic regimes’ are less useful. ‘Codification’ is ‘regulation by means of codes — more or less explicit and mandatory rules and prescriptions’ (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 133). Clearly, this would not apply to the American Dream myth. To the extent in which it deals in codes, these are convention and tradition bound, as well as having a moral dimension. Codification is arguably, therefore, the result of a reification of these equally normative, but ‘unwritten’ codes. This returns us to questions of the American Dream being tangible. If the compositional or entry requirements for the American Dream are codified (by whom? Politicians? Advertising executives? Social commentators?) then the flexibility and wide applicability it affords will be instantly and immensely reduced. Kress points out the differential in power between formal codification
and unwritten normative processes (e.g. ‘tradition’ and ‘best practice or role model’ discussed below) when he writes:

The crucial point is the unnoticed, near invisible social and ideological effects of the signs of the everyday, the signs of ordinary life, of the unremarkable and banal, in which discourse and genre and with them ideology are potently at work — nearly invisibly — as or more effective than in heightened, clearly visible and therefore resistible instances. (Kress, 2010, p. 69)

Note the ‘resistible’: the American Dream in its multi-temporally-spatially-facetted mythical form(s), and its elusive (but very present) normativity, has clearly appeared irresistible (and that in terms of desirability and volition).

Another ‘semiotic regime’ which does not clearly apply when trying to understand how the meaning of the American Dream is restrained, is ‘the rule of the expert’. This ‘regime’ ‘regulates semiotic practices through the authority of expert advice’ (2008, p. 134). This is a more subtle form of control than that of codification and although the American Dream does not have ‘experts’ qualified (as, for example, doctors on medical issues), often such deeply culturally embedded myths do indeed attract unofficial ‘experts’, be they cultural commentators, popular historians, academics, or writers (on occasion, artists more generally). Van Leeuwen says of its inexplicit nature:

In areas where a certain degree of individuality and choice, or of spontaneity and creativity, should be seen to be maintained, expert advice will generally be preferred over the enforcement of rules — or enforcement may be disguised as expert advice and rules will be called ‘guidelines’ or ‘best practice models’. (ibid.)

Therefore, we can imagine a situation in which Obama, Chomsky, Oprah, or Gore Vidal, all of whom could claim to be (or more likely be assignated as) ‘experts’ on the American Dream, made pronouncements about what is and is not part of (or acceptable within) the American Dream. But this shares ground with another
‘semiotic regime’, that of ‘best practice or role model’ about which van Leeuwen says ‘[t]he semiotic regime of role modelling is today perhaps even more important than expertise’ (2008, p. 134). And the political and commercial appropriation of the American Dream for political gain or financial profit fits very well into this category of restraint. Kamp emphasised the importance of soap-operas with their model families, and, by extension (in the commercial breaks) of those companies keen to sell their products by trying to make a credible (enough) link between their product and the irresistible characteristics of the American Dream (especially in terms of its material, consumerist capacity). The rather insidious nature of this method of restraint, of semiotic regime, is noted by van Leeuwen:

Today’s entertainment and lifestyle media constantly expose us to a wide range of such role models, glamourously presented to enhance their appeal. Although there is no enforcement here, the ‘regime of the role model’ is no less successful than codification in achieving conformity and homogeneity of practice. Who needs rules and enforcement when the same can be achieved by offering choice? As Adorno and Horkheimer said (1997), ‘something is provided for all, so that none may escape’. (ibid.)

A further layer to this, decried by many liberal commentators, is that the role models themselves, especially those appealing to ‘the youth’, are ‘victims’ of such role-model brainwashing (in the sense of having their real identity stripped — rather than, say, their bank balance).

The ‘semiotic regime’ of ‘tradition’ is clearly relevant to the mythical status of the American Dream. Van Leeuwen writes,

Tradition is regulation by means of unwritten rules that are passed on between generations and justified as having existed for as long as memory stretches back — though often that turns out not to be the case when such claims are actually investigated. (ibid.)
This restraint through tradition is a characteristic of myth — and, by extension, applies to the myths of nation states, national languages, and national dreams. Tilley (2006), Bell (2003), Anderson (2006), Hobsbawm and Ranger (1992) and Joseph (2004b) have all looked at various aspects of this. Van Leeuwen writes:

Linguistics enshrined tradition as the force regulating language, professing to only record what tradition spontaneously produced, just when linguistics in fact began to play an increasingly important role in regulating language use, mediated by academies and through education systems. (2008, p. 134)

This will come up again in Joseph’s discussion of ‘inventive’ linguistics and interpretation — or rather the fear of interpretation (Joseph, 2010c), discussed below (Sec 6.5). Where the focus of van Leeuwen’s paper — new forms of writing — leads him to the conclusion that ‘tradition is on the way out’, this most certainly does not hold with the semiosis of the American Dream. However, perhaps there is less of a divide than at first appears. Van Leeuwen continues:

[S]emiotic regimes which are in fact strongly regulated are disguised as tradition, so as to surreptitiously annex tradition’s aura of having spontaneously emerged from ‘the people’ or ‘the speakers of the language’. Bourdieu (1977) has described the difference between tradition and codification as that between the objectivating ‘outsider’ knowledge of science and the pragmatic and usually tacit ‘insider’ knowledge of practice. (2008, p. 134)

The dichotomy drawn between ‘objectivating’ and ‘tacit’ shares qualities with that between ‘material’ and ‘intangible’. The point of similarity being that ‘tacit’ and ‘intangible’ affords more for not being (publically?) articulated — or, for that matter, publically interpreted.

The fifth ‘semiotic regime’ is that of technology. As van Leeuwen says, ‘[t]he rule of technology, finally, asserts itself through the artificial intelligence built into semiotic technologies’ (ibid.). Although, clearly, in his discussion this is
more salient (he discusses here and has since elaborated upon the choices offered — and not offered — by PowerPoint), it seems equally clear that any communication involves technology of sorts. And if these do not all have the capacity for artificial intelligence (developing an up-to-date notion of the American Dream through neighbourly talk over white picket fences cannot really be said to use an A.I. containing semiotic technology!), they do all have unique features offering up certain possibilities of certain types of semiosis. Furthermore, in the present day, when so much of our information comes to us by way of sophisticated technologies, those ‘simpler’ technologies and means of communication themselves are cast into a new light (be that ‘authentic’, ‘kitsch’, ‘old-fashioned’, ‘classy’, ‘backward’ or ‘retro’). What becomes the norm in a culture\(^{28}\) (mobile, multimodal, internet-enabled, hyperlink-mediated, etc.) alters the way previous norms, previously banal and unremarked-upon semiotic modes, are interpreted. The film reels representing the American Dream on the ‘silver screen’ in the 1950s, for example, may be the same material entities, but they are no longer the same cultural artefacts — Tilley’s palimpsests prevail.

The end of van Leeuwen’s paper, “New forms of writing”, dovetails into what is, for my purposes here, the important points made in his paper “The world according to Playmobil”. He ends the former by suggesting that ‘Students of visual communication should also study the role of normative discourses and of norm-enforcing semiotic technologies in this process’ (2008, p. 135). What is important for Kress as well as for van Leeuwen is that literacy should be developed — and taught where possible. This multimodal literacy has,\(^{28}\)

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\(^{28}\) The cultural differential in available technologies has huge political ramifications. For discussion of these from a human rights perspective see Hammelink (1994).
unsurprisingly, to have a critical aspect (and this in the probing and reflective, rather than the negative sense). There is a great deal of technological know-how (and this is certainly not something an older generation needs to pass on to the younger), but the need to analyse and critique the impact technology is having upon our communication — for good and bad — is important, *pressing* perhaps.

Van Leeuwen concludes thus:

> Notwithstanding the achievements of the new semiotic technologies, we should guard against the all-too-easy affirmations of boundless choice and endless creative opportunity which now characterise a certain discourse about new technology, not by being equally affirmative about the opposite, but by actually investigating just how homogenous or varied semiotic practices are in different contexts, and by looking at the way normative discourses translate into competencies that inform how people get by in the new world of multimodal communication. *(ibid.)*

I want to draw the parallel between the limitations intimated at here, and the limitations put upon the American Dream.

Up to this point I have argued that in several ways the intangible nature of the American Dream (such that it is considering its public conception) enables it to be of more use, indeed, allows it greater affordances, than when it is appropriated politically and commercially. Van Leeuwen discusses the effect, not only of technological templates (e.g. PowerPoint’s colour, layout, effect options etc.) but also, more generally, of how ‘semiotic systems are always a mixture of affordance and constraint’ (2009b, p. 299) and that each mixture represents (and aims to reproduce) an ideological position. So, comparing two types of children’s toy — Lego (well known building blocks of colourful plastic which ‘fit’ together in many ways, albeit with an unavoidable right-angle, linear, and therefore
masculine(?) bias\textsuperscript{29} and Playmobil (plastic figurines, mainly but not exclusively human, with variously moving parts, fitting particular accessories, within a family or professional grouping) — van Leeuwen comes to the conclusion that Playmobil ‘is shown to be stronger on constraints than affordances’, and, crucially, that as ‘a global brand and genre, the figures of Playmobil have the potential to influence nascent perceptions of the way that social actors operate’ \textit{(ibid.)}. Translating that to the American Dream, I think we can safely say that any public portrayal (through films, politics, or advertising) produces, reflects and perpetuates restraints in the semiotic possibilities offered by the myth. Whether one particular portrayal (say, the cowboy Frontier hero version) is more restrictive than another (say, the immigrant rags to riches version), or simply differently restrictive is open to debate. What interests me here is the method by which semiotic choice is inhibited (if not made impossible). Van Leeuwen notes early on in his paper that,

\begin{quote}
As they [preschool-age children] are playing, they will gradually learn what can and cannot easily be done and ‘said’ with Playmobil, of the way it bends itself easily to some meanings and resists others, of the difference between what you want to say and what Playmobil (or the adults that may regulate its use) want you to say. \textit{(ibid., p. 301)}
\end{quote}

There are two salient points here: first, that the normative pressures do not lead to anything absolute — it is a matter of resistance and ease; secondly, that the children do not get to ‘create’ their own Playmobil characters. Again, relating this back to the American Dream, if the more salient mythical narratives become appropriated (politically or commercially), their features, in being ‘set’ and reified, projected as static, come less to resemble a dream, and more a template.

\textsuperscript{29} Lego has been moving towards a more semiotically restraining production, very much in line with Playmobil, in which role models and their accessories (e.g. specific characters from Harry Potter or Transformers) are less generic, and therefore less interchangeable, and therefore affording less ‘open’ or ‘unintended’ options.
By which I mean that the re-iteration by ‘relevant’ and ‘powerful’ political players of certain (necessarily ideologically imbued) manifestitations and materialisations of the American Dream, come to inhibit other narratives forming, in just the same way that Playmobil ‘resists’ some meanings. This being the case, it is important to note the features which become, to most intents and purposes, the options from which to choose. I stress ‘most’ because of course, it is possible to swim against the tide and subvert and distort (Ang Lee’s Brokeback Mountain is a case in point). To that extent the metaphorical template is weaker than the technological template in that, as far as I am aware, it is not possible to distort or pervert template options on, say, PowerPoint (although I suppose computer programmers could subvert in this way if they so desired).

A further insight is offered by van Leeuwen’s discussion on Playmobil and that involves what is, and is not, on offer in ready-made form. He notes that:

[m]ost dolls are also nameless generic characters, standard types, identifiable only in terms of their function or class, designed to represent categories such as ‘baby’, ‘black’, ‘fireman’, etc., as in the case of Playmobil. (ibid., p. 303)

So far, so harmless. However, the fact that generic classifications necessarily employ stereotypes, means that these need to be analysed carefully. And in this analysis, van Leeuwen reveals that Preschool Playmobil (there are different sets for different ages and ‘competencies’) reaffirms negative, conservative, racist and sexist stereotypes. There are equally depressing points made regarding the presentation of ‘class’ (helmet and uniform or overalls), ‘mobility and professional activities’ (‘[m]obility is therefore signified as exclusively male, with the exception of the female horse rider’), ‘old age’ (signified by grey hair and
brown and grey clothes), and ‘family’ (nuclear). In a different vein, but equally worrying, is the fact that:

There are, in Preschool Playmobil, no characters drawn from fiction, no anthropomorphic animals or aliens, and the cars and houses are resolutely contemporary, without any fantasy, anachronistic or futuristic features. Playmobil for older children, however, does have fantasy characters […] It is as if a solid foundation of close-to-home reality must be laid before the world of pirates, fairytale princesses, wizards, witches, and Wild West characters can be entered. Yet the everyday world of Preschool Playmobil is conceptual. It does not realistically reproduce what is out there in the world […] (ibid., pp. 308-309)

The role of the imagination is vital, not only in childhood, but throughout life. For it to be inhibited by the (lack of) possibilities encouraged (note, again, these are not forbidden — unless through social taboos); for it to be inhibited by the foregrounding of certain options and the opprobrium placed on others (or simply the denial of others existing), leads to socialisation, yes, but also to an impoverishment of what is, in fact, imagined. What I am arguing is that intangibility guards against such impoverishment.

7.4.5 Summary

In this section I attempt to answer the question which, through the previous discussions about the affordances of the American Dream, has become pertinent: why is the American Dream not, and how does it resist becoming, a semiotic free-for-all? To answer this I return to some social semiotic theory. I discuss the fundamental belief taken in the discipline that signs are always motivated (and, in Kress’s view, not arbitrary). This leads to the belief that there is some social pressure put upon meaning making (through all modes) which van Leeuwen discusses in two papers concerning templates and affordances.
In one, he introduces the idea of ‘semiotic regimes’ through which production and interpretation of all texts are regulated and controlled. He discusses ‘codification’, ‘tradition’, ‘the rule of the expert’, ‘best practice or role model’, and the ‘rule of technology’. The similarity between these terms and those in his framework of legitimation is not accidental: it is through (de)legitimation that the semiotic sign and its meaning remain connected, yet able to change over time.

In the second paper, van Leeuwen uses a discussion of the ‘accepted’ and actual affordances of two types of children’s toy to show the importance of the interplay between affordances and restraints and the vital role of normative and socially (which includes in this instance pedagogically) applied pressure to maintain the status-quo of meaning. These two papers help to explain the role of legitimation in the political field of controlling meaning – and how a balance is always stuck between restraints and affordances.

7.5 Irrepressible, Irascible, Indefatigable Interpretation

7.5.1 Interpretation: ‘Mad or Tame’

Barthes, at the end of his last book, *Camera Lucida*, plots two trajectories for Photography:

Mad or tame?
[...] Such are the two ways of the Photograph. The choice is mine: to subject its spectacle to the civilised code of perfect illusions, or to confront in it the wakening of intractable reality. (Barthes, 1984, p. 119)
Reaffirming his agency in interpretation, Barthes looks clearly (lucidly!) upon the state of photography and its possible futures, views the political and emotional implications of the choices he perceives, and ends the book. It is to be understood that he will choose the way of madness, as he puts it, but he ends without pressing upon the reader (his interpreter) his own personal choice. We can make our own — now in light of his book. Placing his ability — his right (and duty?) — to come to his own interpretation at the very crux of his argument is vital: he does not do so blithely. Yes, of course, his interpretation is all he can give, yet he also seems very concerned with the limiting effect of socialisation. He writes:

Society is concerned to tame the Photograph, to temper the madness which keeps threatening to explode in the face of whoever looks at it. To do this, it possesses two means. The first consists of making Photography into an art, for no art is mad.[…] The other means of taming the Photograph is to generalize, to gregarize, banalize it until it is no longer confronted by an image in relation to which it can mark itself, assert its special character, its scandal, its madness. (ibid., pp. 117-118)

‘Taming’, ‘tempering’, ‘generalizing’, ‘gregarizing’, banalizing’: all these terms chime with the reasons for — and methods of — the impoverishment of the imagination discussed above. Barthes seems to me to be expressing concern over the result of the restraints placed upon the interpretation of photography. Yet — and this is equally obvious and crucial — interpretation cannot be stopped. As Joseph writes:

Of course, the hope of controlling interpretation is forlorn, or utopian, which is the same thing. (Joseph, 2010c, p. 95)

So, why do we worry? Why not leave any megalomaniacal fantasies of interpretation-control alone to wither and die? Because, in the attempt to do the impossible, damage is done. Restraint and affordance need to be kept in balance.
What I have argued above is that the restraining template, the branding, the appropriation, the materialisation, the reification of particular American Dream narratives reduces the richness of the myth. The myth is not open-ended, but, if fettered, its affordances are reduced. This reduction is not always the primary motive (making money through selling a branded item may be the end in sight), but it often is, and, even when it is not, it is a means to an end and has the same result. How better to sell a house than to tap into the notion that it is proper, right, desirable, admirable, what one dreams of, to live in a house like this?

Socialisation through the creation of conservative template-like options, or role-models is ideologically motivated.

Inhibiting (ideologically undesirable) choices being made is what successful socialisation and ideological rhetoric are all about. And those undesirable choices are made when the ‘incorrect’ interpretation of material is arrived at. Van Leeuwen brings this up in reference to a boy who played with Playmobil in a way it was not designed/intended for (of course, this begs the question, by whom? The toys manufacturer? Creator? Are the design decisions conscious or are they motivated themselves by an unconscious acceptance of a hegemonically shaped reality?):

But this was something you cannot ‘say’ in the language of Playmobil, an ‘ungrammatical’ statement. (2009b, p. 314)

This linguistic parallel is telling. In a paper entitled ‘Hermeneiaphobia: Why an “Inventive” Linguistics Must First Embrace Interpretation’, Joseph writes:

In a historical perspective, “inventive linguistics” is an oxymoron. Invention is about creating something new. But the traditions from which modern linguistics descend have in common that they were initially about accounting for, not how new utterances are generated, but how texts are to be rightly interpreted. “Rightly” means excluding, shutting down any new
or inventive interpretations. These must have abounded for such powerful institutions to be put in place to control them. [...] They are the manifestation of a felt need for authority to limit the freedom of hearers and readers to invent meanings for texts. (2010c, p. 95)

The political need for impeding interpretation brings us directly back to Bourdieu’s symbolic power. To even get close to delimiting the ‘valid’ interpretation of a text — or, in this case the myth of the American Dream — is as close to hegemonic perfection as a political player can dream of being^30. So, in order to resist such shackling, where can we look to for help? From a linguistics angle, it may seem wise to challenge the assumptions that lie behind the labels ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ as applied to interpretations. Yet, as Joseph points out, linguistics, even when apparently cut free from such ideologically motivated institutions as previously mentioned (grammar, logic, rhetoric, etc.), suffers from what he has termed ‘hermeneiaphobia’: a fear of interpretation. He catalogues the manifestation of this from Saussure through Bloomfield to Chomsky and then to the rebellion (linguistically speaking) of a ‘minority within linguistics, indeed quite a small (though proud) minority.’ Aside from whom, ‘translation theory is the one area interested in interpretation as a creative or inventive activity’ (ibid., p. 99.). Why would this be? Kress has one answer:

The former certainties about language had acted as a barrier to posing a raft of questions, such as ‘What other means for making meaning are there?’ and ‘What are they like; what can they be used for, what can they do?’ Turned around, that certainty could have led to unsettling questions:

^30 Although this does bring to mind the final aim of Newspeak, in Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four*: By 2050—earlier, probably—all real knowledge of Oldspeak will have disappeared. The whole literature of the past will have been destroyed. Chaucer, Shakespeare, Milton, Byron—they’ll exist only in Newspeak versions, not merely changed into something different, but actually contradictory of what they used to be. Even the literature of the Party will change. Even the slogans will change. How could you have a slogan like “freedom is slavery” when the concept of freedom has been abolished? The whole climate of thought will be different. In fact there will be no thought, as we understand it now. Orthodoxy means not thinking—not needing to think. Orthodoxy is unconsciousness. (Orwell, 1958, p. 45)
‘What, actually, is *language* like? ‘[…] ‘Language’, which had been seen as a full means of expression; as the foundation of rationality; sufficient for all that could be spoken and written, thought, felt and dreamt (Eco 1979), is now seen as a partial means of doing these. (Kress, 2010, p. 84)

Certain linguistic groups (and, indeed, Joseph notes, ‘Even literary scholars, who by and large are more open to the “inventive” aspects of language, count more than a few hermeneuaphobes within their ranks’ (2010c, p. 100)) have felt threatened by the *implications* which embracing ‘inventive linguistics’ has. It involves an explosion in ‘acceptable’, and ‘acceptable’ is considered ‘valid’, ‘legitimate’, a worthwhile subject for study by all the disciplines that feel interpretation involves them. That may force linguists to choose: ‘Mad or tame?’

Away from what is an eddy of sorts within the discipline of linguistics, cross-disciplinary study continues to benefit from the insights linguistics can give. Kress and van Leeuwen (and others) fruitfully apply linguistic theories to the emerging discipline of multimodality. Moreover, repeatedly, across disciplines, *language* is a springboard, a ‘way in’, and, as noted, a potent metaphor, for further study. This chapter has focussed on the ‘language’ of the American Dream, multimodal in character, mythical in form, and narrative in structure. Language provides us with the means to discuss interpretation, and due to this, at least academically, we are bound to it.

But, as we can see, the American Dream is multimodal. As interpreters of it, we need to analyse all the modal layers (which themselves all refer back to previous semiotic layers and in doing so absorb resonances) but it is already clear that some modes ‘give up’ their meanings more readily than others. Not that meanings are resident somewhere, waiting for the taking, or the discovery, but
rather that the structure or form of some modes (spoken and written language primarily) enables easier discussion.

This ease also translates into an ease of appropriation and manipulation. Some modes resist easily articulated, shared, interpretation. In June, 2011, U.S. Republican hopeful Michele Bachmann launched her campaign for nomination. As she walked onstage at a rally, her soundtrack was Tom Petty’s song, ‘American Girl’. What associations did she — or her team of advisors — want to conjure up by playing that song? And why? To answer that you would have to find out about the ‘mood’ of the melody, the lyrics, and the place the song holds in American culture. Or, perhaps not: Reagan used Bruce Springsteen’s ‘Born in the U.S.A.’ in spite of the anti-Vietnam War, anti-what-Reagan-stood-for lyrics. And it worked — the Reagan team’s interpretation overrode (for the most part, or for the greatest number, or for long enough) Springsteen’s own interpretation31. However, this Republican candidate was not so lucky: Petty’s management team ‘immediately sent the Bachmann campaign a cease and desist letter’ (Michaels, 2011). I want to end this chapter by discussing, in the light of Joseph’s ‘hermeneiaphobia’ and Kress’s suggestion that language itself needs to be re-analysed in terms of its affordances and restraints, DeNora’s discussion about how

31 Springsteen says of his own song: "Born in the U.S.A. is about a working-class man [in the midst of a] spiritual crisis, in which man is left lost...It's like he has nothing left to tie him into society anymore. He's isolated from the government. Isolated from his family...to the point where nothing makes sense". Reagan’s own take: "America's future rests in a thousand dreams inside your hearts; it rests in the message of hope in songs so many young Americans admire: New Jersey's own Bruce Springsteen. And helping you make those dreams come true is what this job of mine is all about."

And the columnist, George Will, who brought it to Reagan’s attention wrote, after attending a gig: "I have not got a clue about Springsteen’s politics, if any, but flags get waved at his concerts while he sings songs about hard times. He is no whiner, and the recitation of closed factories and other problems always seems punctuated by a grand, cheerful affirmation: 'Born in the U.S.A.!'” (Wikipedia, 2012b)
music means, and how seeing the question from a fresh angle poses challenging questions about language and interpretation.

7.5.2 Musical interpretation and language

DeNora identifies the problem as she sees it: there is a ‘pervasive idea’ that music is ‘capable of symbolizing emotions, images or ideas’. However, ‘equally pervasive’ in the (social) scientific disciplines is the belief that despite much study and a recent renewed focus upon the subject, the solutions to this conundrum have not been forthcoming and:

There is, in other words, a tension between the apparent validity (at the level of listening) and the apparent invalidity (at the level of empirical analysis) of music’s symbolic capacity. (DeNora, 1986, p. 84)

DeNora breaks down the ways in which this paradox has hitherto (and unsuccessfully) been dealt with by referring to (but in this dense article not actually defining — which proves unhelpful) two broad approaches: the formalist and the expressionist. The ‘expressionist approach’ is an umbrella term for three ‘problematic’, ‘not always mutually exclusive’, and ‘not, in every case, self proclaimed’ (ibid., p. 85) approaches: the semiotic, the hermeneutic, and the phenomenological. (And, as DeNora notes, these themselves split down lines of influence). So, apologetically, DeNora groups these all together and summarises the aim of these expressionist theorists as being to:

[E]stablish the “objective” nature of musical meaning […] they look for reliable connotations, by which it seems fair to say they mean isomorphic links between musical symbols and extra-musical referents, notations and connotations. (ibid.)
To clarify what exactly this could mean, she suggests that both the expressionist and the formalist approaches (the latter of which remains to be identified through inference and deduction) can be plotted along two axes:

[F]irst, the way in which the symbolic unit is defined (whether it is a note of the scale, an interval, a phrase, the entire piece) and second, that unit’s degree of specificity (whether it refers to a particular object, image or idea — such as the “cuckoo” in Beethoven’s Pastoral symphony — or […] — for example, the more general sense of “the countryside” […]). (1986, p. 86)

This is clearly relevant for music which attends or is, of itself, interpreted/presented as expressing/representing the American Dream. Copland’s compositions, for example, described in the introduction of his Wikipedia page as:

The open, slowly changing harmonies of many of his works are archetypical of what many people consider to be the sound of American music, evoking the vast American landscape and pioneer spirit.

(Wikipedia, 2012a)

And who would disagree? The problem is that some people would (interpretation is in force), and many people would not (consensus is also in force). DeNora quotes Cooke (a representative of the expressionist approach) while he grapples with the ability of music to ‘convey’. Yet, he insists that what we feel is conveyed is the ‘subjective experience’ of composers. The authorial/composorial interpretation is, for him, the ‘right’ one, and the one which, given enough time, effort and insight, will be accessible. He set out to compose a ‘musical dictionary’ in which, for example, a minor second expresses ‘spiritless anguish’, a major second ‘pleasurable longing’ etc. He is quoted by DeNora (in a perfect illustration of the ‘forlornness’ of controlling interpretation mentioned by Joseph):

I am only too well aware that by using the simple everyday words for human emotion to make my classification of the terms of human language, I have only scratched the surface of a problem of well-nigh infinite depth. […] A psychologist of deep insight and great understanding will be called
for; perhaps psychology will have to link hands again with philosophy and metaphysics before the language of music yields up its innermost secrets.[…] (Cooke, 1962)

This ‘yielding-up’ is what it seems to most people that written and spoken language does so well, yet, as made manifest everyday, everywhere, this simply is not the case. DeNora summarises many other positions on these two axes. There are those theorists (notably Ferguson) who believe in a theory of meaning by contiguity. That is, that music directly communicates emotion; it functions without the necessity of a recourse to language. DeNora notes that this theory:

[R]ekindles the Mendelssohnian argument that music is actually more expressive than words precisely because it is able to offer sonic parallels of types of unmediated experience (for example, music does not signify the feeling of sudden-ness, quiet, confusion, etc., by telling the listener about an instance of any of these feelings; rather it recreates the feeling through the medium of sound). Tones, Fergusson suggests, are “a truer profundity than is possible with the machinery of nouns and verbs”. (DeNora, 1986, p. 86)

This insistence that certain modes are more apt to achieve certain affective responses informs the modus operandi of advertising but so does the fact that certain modes bypass verbal articulation. What is not said cannot easily be countered. On the one hand this means that, for example, a ‘patriotic’ soundtrack cannot easily be criticised for being so. On the other hand, having the audacity to rely on one’s own interpretation and (hope to) use a piece of music to ‘patriotic’ effect, runs its own risks of counter-interpretation (and this too, without the vocabulary of argument available to spoken language).

However, DeNora introduces one more ‘expressionist’ position: Harris and Sandresky also subscribe to a theory of meaning based on contiguity, but in their case, the correspondence between musical tone and meaning is not a priori, but one established on a cultural level. That is to say, that the meaning of a
particular tone is not a universal one, but culturally bound. However, their argument is only one step removed from that of the ‘purer’ expressionists, in that they

[S]eem to have made a progressive move away from the implicitly psychological thrust of Cooke and Ferguson only to re-establish a priori meaning by relocating it at the level of culture or, in other words, by relocating the objectivity of musical reference in the cultural mediation of the tone itself […] (ibid.)

To demonstrate their culturally sensitive expressionism, they are quoted as saying:

The exuberance of our national anthem, The Star Spangled Banner, gives form to one aspect of patriotic feeling; the quieter radiance of America, another. When sung with conviction, who among us can resist a feeling of pride and community? (Harris & Sandresky, 1985, p. 296)

Although I think DeNora is correct in her conclusion that this shifts the ‘problem’ rather than solving it, it is interesting to view Harris and Sandresky’s position in the light of Bourdieu’s habitus, described here by Thompson in his ‘Editor’s Introduction’ to Bourdieu’s Language and Symbolic Power:

The habitus is a set of dispositions which incline agents to act and react in certain ways. The dispositions generate practices, perceptions and attitudes which are ‘regular’ without being consciously coordinated or governed by any ‘rule’. The dispositions which constitute the habitus are inculcated, structured, durable, generative and transposable […] (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 12)

Harris and Sandresky’s question: ‘who among us can resist a feeling of pride and community?’ in relation to listening to a national anthem, implies (as they intend) a fixity of meaning. Yet that fixity of meaning, as DeNora goes on to discuss, is to be located on a spectrum of openness: a spectrum which is controlled not through meanings being more-or-less resident in a text, artefact, landscape, or tune (as the expressionists and formalists would have it), but in the flexibility of interpretation permitted (ultimately) by the interpreter themselves. Bourdieu’s habitus helps to
explain how we, as interpreters, delimit our own interpretational boundaries. Many people are inculcated from childhood with a potent mix which means (*de facto*) that their levels of ‘resistance’ are severely reduced (not, however, impossible in theory). DeNora takes up this line of questioning herself and discusses *The Star Spangled Banner* in relation to these issues — and she also brings into the mix the importance of audience expectation, previous experience, and the semiotic associations (Tilley’s palimpsests) already in place. She first questions the likelihood that *The Star Spangled Banner* will always, and in everyone, ‘connote a “feeling of pride and community.”’. She asks us to imagine the Jimi Hendrix version of this anthem and asks: ‘would any version of the *Star Spangled Banner* evoke or connote national pride and community spirit among all, or even most, Jimi Hendrix devotees?’ Unless, she says, the answer to this is ‘an unequivocal “yes”, she concludes that we must ‘reconsider the fruitfulness’ of the attempt to ‘enunciate lexicons (whether universally valid or culturally circumscribed) of extra-musical meaning as *in the music itself*’ (DeNora, 1986, p. 87). This does not, however, do away with all meaning constraints (and therefore all meaning). Instead, the explanation of any shared meaning must be looked for somewhere else.

The expressionists thus dismissed, DeNora deals with the formalist argument (in less detail as far as one can make out given the lack of any person or example being explicitly labelled ‘formalist’). This position, aligned to a Saussurean notion of signification, contends that, unlike language, music is a system of signifiers without signifieds, lacking ‘double articulation'. This means that the meaning music has comes from the relations between these signifiers.
Tunstall is quoted as saying that music’s ‘elements are not signs, but the relations between them are coherent and meaningful’ (Tunstall, 1979). This, however, leaves no way in to describe or explain ‘music’s semantic content’ (1986, p. 87). Not stymied by this apparent flaw in the approach, this apparent weakness is viewed defiantly (by adherents of ‘syntactical structuralism’) as a strength. This approach is traced back to Hanslick and his book *The Beautiful in Music* (1885) which DeNora says is notable due to Hanslick’s appreciation of this ‘paradoxical aspect of musical meaning’ (DeNora, 1986, p. 87).

Hanslick argued that language was a means of expressing, whereas music was in a far more direct sense expression itself — not, therefore a means to an end, but the end in itself. Objecting to the linguistic analogy,

[H]e thought it philistine to attempt to pin music to an interpretation since it ultimately destroyed the musical beauty which was not so much a product of intrinsically meaningful symbols mechanically strung together but due to the fact that music was a kind of polymorphous, sonorous logic in a pre- or unconscious, tactile sense [...] (ibid.)

What these two approaches share is a belief that meaning is invested by the composer into music. The means by which this investment is realised differs, but, our job, as listeners, is to read or feel the meaning ‘correctly’, as was intended by the composer. The role of the performer is called into question here: what could different interpretations offer the listener? Simply better or worse reflections of a composer’s intention? Moreover, there is the question of technical reproduction of noise: any piano — as opposed to harpsichord — recital of Vivaldi, for instance, would surely be ‘incorrect’. If interpretation is being treated as an unfortunate stage in-between composition and listener comprehension, then any notion of value being placed on creative re-interpretation does not seem to make sense
(and, indeed, the question of ‘reading off’ the [originally penned?] score a composer’s intention opens up a Pandora’s box of interpretation and intentionality). This, of course, is analogous to the discussion above concerning written and spoken language and DeNora raises a similar point to Kress’s as to what the consequences these conclusions have for the study of language. She sums up by pointing out that it is not just music which suffers from ‘the “problem” of a lack of double articulation’, but that, in fact,

The same is true for utterances, objects and acts whenever they are perceived as being invested with aesthetic, ideological or ethical connotations [...] (ibid., pp. 92-93)

And she, too, looks to Bourdieu’s symbolic power for the best explanation seeing in it the pivotal role of culture as a site of struggle over definitions, and the salience of meanings being a constant site of (symbolic) power struggle.

7.5.3 Summary

In this section I start with a presentation of Barthes’ question asked of the future of photography: ‘Mad or Tame?’ to move into a discussion of the role of interpretation. Showing an appreciation for Barthes’ willingness to leave the question open for his readers to answer, I bring in Joseph’s identification of a fear (at least within the discipline of linguistics, but applicable more generally) of interpretation – a fear he terms ‘hermeneiaphobia’. Legitimation rests on the ability to assume a particular interpretation of one’s actions. To control interpretation itself makes legitimation all the easier. However, as Joseph points out the hope of controlling interpretation is a forlorn one, so what, I ask, is the problem? I suggest that in the process of trying but failing to control
interpretation, damage can be done – to the resources people have to create their own life-templates, such as the American Dream.

I end this section by concentrating on the implications these social semiotic insights about the political nature of meaning, and the existence of ‘hermeneiaphobia’ have on the analysis of music. Using DeNora’s discussion as a base, I summarise a few theoretical positions related to how music means, and outline her fundamental challenge to the assumed hierarchy of modes in which language is at the top and music is somewhere below it. She posits that the criticisms made of music’s ‘inability’ to mean anything specific can be cast – as Kress casts them – back onto language. The crucial and political role of the interpreter in both cases is made clear.
CHAPTER EIGHT: NATURALLY

8.1 Introduction

In this chapter I aim to show how the concept of ‘Nature’ is an important part of the legitimation strategy employed within spot-ads. As has already been seen, however, there are competing discourses at work in which ‘nature’ plays central and opposing roles. The Rational both embraces and rejects various aspects of what is ‘natural’: the ‘natural sciences’ are foundational but ‘human nature’ is suspect and discredited. Rousseau’s repudiation of such hard scientific rationality in favour of a romanticised (and not by dint of this, emancipatory) ‘natural order’, champions a certain conception of Nature which has proved extremely enduring. Rousseau’s vision has in some senses been a precursor to the post-colonial and feminist rejections of the scientific, rational orthodoxy, but it has proved as much a hindrance as a help: being criticised for being simplistic, conservative, paternalistic, and racist in turn. The noble savage, the earthy woman, and the innocent child are pastoral ideals, yet the idealism of the Golden Age in which Nature (personified as female) was in balance — in which ‘Nature maintained or redressed this balance by revolutions, while men maintained or re-established it through their inconstancy’ (Rousseau & Herder, 1966, p. 42) — clearly takes no account of history (preferring instead a fabricated, Romantic past), a history in which during the Middle Ages, nature was a force — partially moral, partially religious, partially pagan — within the superstitious framework of a scientifically ignorant society.

From this, perhaps, we still retain the multitude of nature metaphors which, although flying in the face of scientific knowledge, seem to express a
deeply-felt concern with the power of Nature and our relationship with, and place within, it. These metaphors are deeply ingrained in our language and are embedded in the advertising discourse. We can particularly see the use of the metaphor: ‘Nature as threat’, whether that be through a combination of its power and unpredictability (e.g. a stormy sea), or through the use of particularly evocative tokens (e.g. wolves as predatory killers). This rich metaphorical discourse is partly contiguous with the newer environmental discourse in which Nature is fragile and needs protected, or, in a less personified manner, is a resource which needs managed wisely. Through these various conceptions of Nature, man’s place within it oscillates between being removed from Nature to being part of it: Nature and human-nature sometimes allied against Rational man, but sometimes seen as divorced (for good or ill), marking man’s separation from Nature. This is further complicated by the continued removal of children into a class of their own a propos their relationship with Nature, and the perpetuated view of females as in some way closer to, more in touch with, more part of Nature themselves (and less rational as a result).

8.2 Persuasion, naturalisation, and Bourdieu

8.2.1 Persuasion in advertising

Advertising works on several levels at the same time. It necessarily has a factual element which links a product or a brand with the advertisement. Where this fails and it is remains unknown what is being advertised, the ad has failed. Yet, there has been an increasing move away from directness: the links made are often lateral or intertextual and we have to be (and are rewarded with comprehension for being) ‘clever enough’ to ‘get it’. This is the sign of a very confident brand (Silk Cut cigarette ads in the U.K. were a case in point, reduced as they were to no mention of smoking and no naming of their brand — just a certain...
Furthermore, it often attempts to communicate some details about the product being promoted: it selects certain features to push into the foreground and thereby (either actively or by default) de-emphasises, does not engage with, or positively re-frames other features. The rhetorical manoeuvres of what van Dijk calls ‘positive Self-presentation’ (and, in the case of political advertising, ‘negative Other presentation’) have evolved with language, with the need to persuade. That is to say, although mass production, broadcasting capabilities, social structure, and the (neo) liberal, free-market economy have all contributed to the development of a massive advertising industry, the sophistry involved is part of an august tradition, and the impulse behind advertising immemorial, natural even.

Advertising also works on an emotional level by attempting to make the audience feel a certain way which, either directly or indirectly, will make the promoted product (more) desirable. Again, Aristotle’s On Rhetoric reminds us that such appeals are not new. This emotional appeal, pathos, is seen, paradoxically, as both inferior to (and separable from) the appeal to reason (logos), and also as more dangerous (superior in effect), bypassing our rationality to something more visceral and fundamental. Dualistic assumptions are at play here — body/mind, emotional/rational etc. — with their attendant moral qualifications — ‘body is dangerous’, ‘rational is superior’, ‘emotions are untrustworthy’, ‘emotions are natural’, etc. These dualisms (which are not hard and fast, and can be contradictory) are discussed in Sec. 4.2.2, in relation to legitimation. Advertisers must tread a fine line (a line policed by advertising regulators) between what and how they claim. The line between fact and fiction,
truth and impressionistic projection into the golden future, is not at all clear: and this lack of clarity is expedient.

8.2.2 The expedience of uncertainty

This expedience can only be usefully channelled if the reason for it existing — the hazy line between fact and fiction — remains unstudied. That is to say, if every claim being made by an ad — explicitly through text and voiceover and implicitly through visuals, music, intertextual referencing, textual connotation and the combination of all these elements — is rationally and systematically broken down (to the extent that this is actually possible) to its constituent parts, valid claims, assumptions, fictional projections etc., then the power of the ad will be lost. Although one ought to be cautious when applying theories of art and aesthetics directly onto advertising, there is certainly an art to advertising. In examining the expedience and characteristics of the ‘hazy line’, Heinrich Wölfflin’s remark (written in 1921, and focussing on architecture) reminds us of the inherent absurdity of imagining reduction to be desirable (or, indeed, possible):

If it were possible to express in words the deepest content or idea of a work of art, art itself would be superfluous, and all buildings, statues and paintings could have remained unbuilt, unfashioned and unpainted. (Forty, 2000, p. 21)

The notion that one could reduce an ad down to its constituent parts through an application of rigorous and rational argumentation is untenable from the artistic angle and from the angle of functionality. The ‘power’ of an ad must remain in its irreducibility. Forty continues:
Like the feeling of emptiness experienced by the anthropologist who travels to a primitive people in a remote region only to discover that the strangeness he hopes to study is lost as soon as he learns what it consists of, Wölfflin’s remark was a warning against trying to explain the very thing criticism aims to expose. The extraordinary degree of hostility shown by artists and architects towards language can perhaps be understood as one response to this conundrum. (ibid., p. 22)

Wölfflin and Forty concentrate on the aesthetic response, but, in discussing advertising, the expedience of the ‘haziness’ is important to remember. Even if it were possible to reduce all modes down to a rational written text, this would not be desirable in advertising although this time, I believe, the ‘extraordinary degree of hostility’ would be due to the effect that a rigorous critique would have upon the financial profits of the advertising agencies, rather than from some aesthetic righteous indignation.

A very simple example can demonstrate the importance of the unreduced and (to some extent) unexamined. In many of the spot ads, as we shall see, we find the clichéd collocation of the following: children, innocence, Nature, good, pure, vulnerable. We understand what is meant, and, for the duration of the ad at least, we go along with the massive assumptions and simplifications underlying the grouping. This is the coercive power inherent in our need to make sense of the message being communicated to us — the coercive power immanent in our compulsion to understand. Yet many collocations do indeed seem natural in the sense of being unquestionably correct (the coverage of such a consensus is individually, culturally and thus politically bound). Moreover, if an ad can leave open a space within its signification into which individuals can insert what they want to believe they see (cf. the discussion in Ch. 6 of the American Dream as a template within whose borders there is space for individual aspirational input),
then it will be successful for we are most unlikely to be suspicious or cynical of our own input. I want to draw together three things:

(i) The concept of Nature (and ‘natural’) as used by a selection of spot-ads;
(ii) The emotional appeals made by exploiting the ambiguity in the concept ‘Nature’, and,
(iii) The insight given by Bourdieu in his description of ‘practical belief’ (the performative part of our *habitus*) being ‘not a ‘state of mind’, still less a kind of arbitrary adherence to a set of instituted dogmas and doctrines (‘beliefs’), but rather a state of the body’ (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 68).

8.2.3 ‘Daisy’, 1964: emotional advertising

To illustrate the validity and usefulness of splicing these three strands we can see how they come together in the infamous 1964 ‘Peace Little Girl’ (or ‘Daisy’ spot). This is widely considered to be one of — if not the — most important political spot ad. From ‘The Living Room Candidate’ website it is introduced thus:

The most famous of all campaign commercials, known as the “Daisy Girl” ad, ran only once as a paid advertisement, during an NBC broadcast of Monday Night at the Movies on September 7, 1964. Without any explanatory words, the ad uses a simple and powerful cinematic device, juxtaposing a scene of a little girl happily picking petals off of a flower (actually a black-eyed Susan), and an ominous countdown to a nuclear explosion. (http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1964)
Johnson, running on the Democratic ticket, ‘had the power of incumbency, and a unity achieved following the assassination of the youthful, attractive Kennedy, plus the issues of prosperity and peace (although 16,000 U.S. advisers had taken the first few steps into the Big Muddy of Vietnam)’ (Diamond & Bates, 1984, p. 121). The campaign strategy, outlined by Diamond and Bates, was to criticise Goldwater (the Republican nominee) early-on so that he was on the defensive and then ‘switch to more positive advertising, praising Johnson’s program’ (ibid. p. 127). They go on to say, however, that: ‘Positive ads were ultimately done — though they were few and generally, forgettable. 1964 was the year of Daisy’ (ibid.). There has been a great deal of analysis done on this one specific spot and, for that reason, I shall be cursory about its details here\textsuperscript{33}, and select only the elements of it which will inform further discussion.

What is taken for granted in the ad and in much subsequent analysis of it, are the clichéd and assumed qualities of childhood which inform the most basic assumption of the ad — that we equate childhood with innocence and that this is fundamentally valuable and worth preserving and protecting from the machinations of the adult world. What is discussed by commentators and theorists — what, perhaps, seemed noteworthy as opposed to absolutely obvious — is the focus of the ad upon creating an emotional response. It might, nowadays, seem so blatantly clear that this is what advertising attempts to do, that it is odd to imagine a time when the idea of using the audience’s emotional response was new and exciting. The cutting-edge advertising company involved in producing the ‘Daisy’ spot was called DDB. Co-founder Bernbach,

\textsuperscript{33} A very informative website documents the spot’s production, the creative team behind it, the lead up to its airing, and the reactions it provoked: http://www.conelrad.com/daisy/video.php
who sympathized with the public's distaste for the “hard sell,” shunned marketing research and embraced *instinct*. “Artistry, by and large, is having *deep insights into human nature* and then expressing it in a very, very fresh way — an original way,” he was quoted by the New York Times in 1982. One of the ways he fostered this approach at DDB was to break with the traditional agency organizational model and institute what was dubbed a “horizontal hierarchy.” “In most agencies the copywriter and the art director never worked together,” explained Myers for CONELRAD. “The copywriter would not work with the art director. At DDB, that was different. DDB innovated the partnership.” Bernbach also insulated his “Creative Teams” from the outside pressures of sales demands, freeing them to focus on their more purely *inspirational* tasks.

Two salient features emerge here: the importance of the non-rational — whether that be ‘instinct’, ‘human nature’ or ‘inspiration’; and the importance of creative cooperation across disciplines. DDB’s willingness to give equal status to all within the creative team resulted in the hiring of a soundman, Schwartz, who had made a name for himself through the combination of his two specialities: first, working with children and recording their sounds at play, and secondly, developing the theory of an emotional advertising:

Schwarz was developing his ideas of broadcasting as a medium of feelings, ideas later published in his two books, *The Responsive Chord* (1973) and *Media: The Second God* (1981). Advertising has power, Schwartz concluded, when people feel that the ad “is putting them in touch with reality,” when they feel the ad “strikes a responsive chord with the reality the listener or viewer experienced.” (*ibid.*, p. 119)

This ‘experienced’ reality clearly has a subjective quality, yet this is not to suggest that the beliefs which uphold such subjectivity are superficial: indeed, the opposite is true: our own ‘reality’ is probably the most fundamental and complex structure we maintain. We invest *ourselves* in it.

Diamond and Bates offer an anecdote given to them in conversation with Goldwater’s campaign aide, F. Clifton White, in which White recounted attempting to counter fears when ‘very intelligent people would say to me: “We
just cannot use atomic weapons’” by telling them verbatim what Goldwater had said (that small tactical weapons could be used in Vietnam, but not big — read nuclear — ones). Yet, White continued, ‘But all the time I’m going through this explanation, the person is standing there, nodding his head, and saying, “Yeah, but we can’t drop the bomb, Clif.” It was so totally emotional…’ (ibid., pp. 132-133). Emotions, for White, trumped or overruled rationality and, in doing so, made factual information (the ‘objective truth’) irrelevant. Diamond and Bates note that:

Schwartz values White’s assessment because it matches so closely his own ideas about inner feelings in advertising messages. As he observes in The Responsive Chord, “the best political commercials are similar to Rorschach patterns. They do not tell the viewer anything. They surface his feelings and provide a context for him to express those feelings.” (ibid., p. 133)

This unusual conversion of ‘surface’ to a transitive verb chimes very closely with Bourdieu’s notion of habitus. Both Bourdieu and Schwartz believe there to be an underlying strata of beliefs which ‘surface’ in reaction and response to present events. These beliefs, although necessarily ideological, exist, for the most part, ‘below the radar’. And it is in that way that they are held as commonsensical, natural, and unnecessary to question.

8.2.4 Bourdieu’s habitus and the creation of ‘numb imperatives’

In ‘Belief and the body’ Bourdieu writes:

Practical belief is not a ‘state of mind’, still less a kind of arbitrary adherence to a set of instituted dogmas and doctrines (‘beliefs’), but rather a state of the body. Doxa is the relationship of immediate adherence that is established in practice between a habitus and the field to which it is attuned, the pre-verbal taking-for-granted of the world that flows from practical sense. (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 68)
According to Bourdieu, one’s habitus is formed starting in childhood, indeed, at a pre-verbal time. Beliefs are inculcated not only into our heads, but also our young bodies:

Enacted belief, instilled by the childhood learning that treats the body as a living memory pad, an automaton that ‘leads the mind unconsciously along with it’, and as a repository for the most precious values, is the form par excellence of the ‘blind or symbolic thought’… and which is the product of quasi-bodily dispositions, operational schemes, analogous to the rhythm of a line of verse whose words have been forgotten… Adapting a phrase of Proust’s, one might say that arms and legs are full of numb imperatives. (ibid., pp. 68-69)

This concept of an early-created habitus does not place limits upon adult agency, but means that certain choices will be difficult, if they go against the grain of embodied inclinations and tastes. One cannot enter this magic circle by an instantaneous decision of the will, but only by birth or by a slow process of co-option and initiation which is equivalent to a second birth. (ibid., p. 68)

This is the case because ‘practical faith is the condition of entry’, tested to ensure that ‘undisputed, pre-reflexive, naïve, native compliance with the fundamental presuppositions of the field which is the very definition of doxa’ obtains. As soon as one cares to study one’s own habitus, one is put into a position similar to those of the anthropologists he describes, ‘who want to believe with the beliefs of others grasp neither the objective truth nor the subjective experience of belief’ (ibid.).

So, if one’s own habitus becomes reflexive, rather than pre-reflexive; if the ‘blindness’ is less than complete; the imperatives felt, but no longer ‘numbly’, then do we not join the anthropologists?

All the attempts by anthropologists to bewitch themselves with the witchcraft or mythologies of others have no other interest, however generous they may sometimes be, than that they realize, in their voluntarism, all the antinomes of the decision to believe, which make arbitrary faith a continuous creation of bad faith. (ibid., p. 68)
We ‘cannot enter this magic circle by an instantaneous decision of the will’, nor, it is clear, can we make a clean break from it. Yet, the analogy Bourdieu uses of ‘membership’ (in or out) makes it difficult to imagine how, once the magic spell is broken, one could say anything if not in ‘bad faith’. How can the qualities of a habitus be truly understood if one has to be blind to be ‘in’ and by definition cannot understand, or be ‘in’, if one is not blind? Moreover, does enculturation necessarily blind us to (make us forget?) our own earlier recognition of the arbitrariness of the habitus we are mimetically entering? Of this process of acquisition, Bourdieu writes:

[T]he process of acquisition — a practical mimesis (or mimeticism) which implies an overall relation of identification and has nothing in common with an imitation that would presuppose a conscious effort to reproduce a gesture, an utterance or an object explicitly constituted as a model — and the process of reproduction — a practical reactivation which is opposed to both memory and knowledge — tend to take place below the level of consciousness, expression and the reflexive distance which these presuppose. (ibid., p. 73)

This lack of ‘reflexive distance’ accords with the notion of a ‘gut feeling’ — itself a bodily term presupposing ‘practical belief’ — a feeling which is generally considered (again, paradoxically) to be more truthful, more fundamental, more trustworthy. What Bourdieu refutes is the deep-seated implication that what is pre-reflexive, body-based, intuition-based, is pre-political, avoiding the ideological ‘tarring’ which comes with language and rationality. The fact that this mirrors the status of children is no coincidence.

Despite my reservations as to the appropriateness of the metaphor of ‘membership’ in describing the belonging we have and lose of different habitus as

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34 We teach our children to ‘trust their intuition’: “If your gut feeling is bad, if alarm bells start ringing, if it just doesn’t feel right, don’t do it” we say. With one hand we press upon them the need to reason things out, and with the other we counter (perhaps undermine) such rational action by saying “when it comes down to it, trust your instincts”.

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we move through life, I fully agree with Bourdieu’s conception of habitus, and the numb imperatives which make them such very strong parts of us.

8.2.5 Naturalised beliefs in advertising

Advertising relies heavily on the assumptions created when some beliefs are naturalised and seen as bodied (when actually they are embodied). But, in terms of the production of advertisements, again, this brings up the strange dichotomy between the ‘true believers’ and the anthropologists: how are advertisers to truly understand the emotional appeals they must make if they are not, themselves, on the one hand, believers themselves (and therefore not able to see the make up of the habitus they inhabit), or, on the other hand, like the anthropologists (except perhaps with a more mercenary aspect), not truly able to understand the habitus of the people they are attempting to appeal to. In the case of the ‘Daisy’ spot, however, this was not an issue:

By April, DDB co-founder William Bernbach had selected 40 copywriters, art directors, television production people and support staff to form a dedicated team to work exclusively on the Johnson campaign. A prerequisite for the prestigious assignment was for the recruits to be Democrats. "Oh, yea, everyone was a true believer. Yea, it was like a crusade," confirmed Sid Myers, the Art Director for the Daisy Spot, in an interview with CONELRAD. In a June Newsweek story, Bernbach refused to divulge the advertising strategy of the campaign. He did allow with a laugh: "I think we have a great product, though. In fact I’d say it's the easiest account we ever got." (Conelrad, 1999-2007)

What does this imply? That faith, a true belief in the product one is packaging for sale, makes the packaging better and the task easier. Proselytists are more
effective than mercenaries in that they carry with them — the implication is — something which cannot be bought or contracted: the *mark* of the initiated\textsuperscript{35}.

\subsection*{8.2.6 Unmodern resonances}

It is deeply ironic that underlying all these points is something which recalls the pre-Modern. The ‘magic circle’ summons up enchantment and superstition; membership which demands total fidelity, with a careful and obscured initiation process, recollects the Knights Templar. The body being the site of our fundamental beliefs about the world brings to mind Hippocratic humours. There is a notion that we live in a time in which modern rationality and science are viewed by some as a thin veneer. Sometimes it is cast as an artificial one which obscures truth:

\begin{quote}
If you wanted to come up with a bumper sticker that defined the Republican Party’s platform it would be this: “Repeal the 20th century. Vote GOP.” […] But they have set their sights on an even bolder course […] It’s not just the 20th century they have targeted for repeal; it’s the 18th and 19th too. The 18th century was defined, in many ways, by the Enlightenment, a philosophical movement based on the idea that reason, rational discourse and the advancement of knowledge, were the critical pillars of modern life. […] But more than 200 years later, those basic tenets — the very notion that facts and evidence matter — are being rejected, wholesale, by the 21st-century Republican Party. […] Republicans have become proudly and unquestionably anti-science. […] they believe, as a matter of principle, that scientific evidence is no evidence at all. (Heuvel, 2011)
\end{quote}

At other times it is presented as a positive but fragile framework which is struggling to contend with the world as we find it:

\begin{quote}
By seeking to reorient man’s exploitation of man toward an exploitation of nature by man, capitalism magnified both beyond measure. […] After seeing the best intentions [the end of exploitation of man by man, and
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{35} It would, however, be naïve to imagine that global advertising agencies, say Saatchi & Saatchi, only took on ‘accounts’ they ideologically believed in. To bypass this need for belief in the product, there is a culture of developing, instead, corporate loyalty and belief.
nature by man] go doubly awry, we moderns from the Western world seem to have lost some of our self-confidence. […] this doubt about the well-foundedness of the best of intentions pushes some of us to become reactionaries, in one of two ways. We must no longer try to put an end to man’s domination by man, some say; we must no longer try to dominate nature, say others. Let us be resolutely antimodern, they all say. (Latour, 1993, pp. 8-9)

This tension plays out in the multifarious meanings foisted upon ‘Nature’.

8.3 Children in/as Nature

8.3.1 Children and Politicians

It is no surprise, nor any new insight, that children are used by politicians as part of their Public Relations campaign. Looking at the U.S., Boller has traced this back, anecdotally, to President Jackson (in office, 1829-1837):

When Andrew Jackson was visiting one town, according to a campaign tale, a proud mother handed a dirty-faced baby up for him to hold. “Here is a beautiful specimen of young American childhood,” said Jackson obligingly. “Note the brightness of that eye, the great strength of those limbs, and the sweetness of those lips.” Then he handed the baby to his friend John Eaton. “Kiss him, Eaton,” he cried, and walked away. (Boller, 1984)

Similarly, the reason behind such behaviour is widely known and is summed up in the media year-in-year-out. Here, from 2011:

Then there is the creepy propaganda dimension. What politician is thinking: Can I be photographed holding your baby so that I can co-opt its aura of innocence? It would be very helpful in my bid to persuade irrational voters that I am trustworthy, likable and empathetic. (Friedersdorf, 2011)

The rationale is clear but the basis for the rationale is far more complex than it appears.

8.3.2 Children and Innocence
To pick our way through the assumptions underlying such a very basic, indeed clichéd, political strategy, let me start with the broad but rather uncontested claim that ‘childhood equates to innocence, and innocence is our natural state’. Straight away there is the religious strain: innocence, the Garden of Eden, and the Fall of Man. This religious connotation gives ‘children’ a double layer — that of the young humans who (ideally) have not been corrupted by ‘the ways of the world’, and that of the more metaphoric mankind who are all ‘God’s children’. In the ‘Daisy’ spot, the voiceover after the countdown is:

JOHNSON (voice-over): These are the stakes: To make a world in which all of God's children can live, or to go into the darkness. We must either love each other, or we must die.\textsuperscript{36}

MALE NARRATOR: Vote for President Johnson on November 3rd. The stakes are too high for you to stay home.

These are assumptions, of which ‘the process of reproduction — a practical reactivation which is opposed to both memory and knowledge — tend to take place below the level of consciousness, expression and the reflexive distance which these presuppose’ (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 73). And overlying this meaning, or perhaps conflated with it is the Rousseauian notion of the primordial pastoral idyll in which not only children, but mankind could live unfettered, uncompromised, by the hypocrisy and artificiality of society. In Discourse on the Sciences and Arts, Rousseau writes:

Before art had fashioned our manners and taught our passions to speak an affected language, our mores were rustic but natural, and, differences in

\textsuperscript{36} The CONELRAD website follows the textual influences of this last line thus: The more poetic words conveying the choice between "God's children" fading into the "dark" or loving one's fellow man that precede the hard sell "vote tag" are paraphrased from W.H. Auden's famous poem "September 1, 1939" (specifically, "We must love one another or die," which is changed slightly as spoken by Johnson). Auden's line is itself informed by scripture: "He that loveth not his brother abideth in death" (First Epistle to John 3:14). The authorship of this particular speech is likely Bill Moyers [….] Moyers, it must be pointed out, was (and perhaps still is) an ordained Baptist minister. (Conelrad, 1999-2007)
behaviour heralded, at first glance, differences of character. (Cahoone, 1996, p. 33)

This view, shared (in political terms at least) by Lord Shaftesbury, Addison and Pope, of

> [t]he modern sense of ‘natural’ as a virtue, as what is free and unaffected, was unknown before the beginning of the eighteenth century. The development of this meaning in the hands of British philosophers took place specifically as a reaction to what was perceived as the denial of the ‘natural’ right of liberty, freedom of speech and so on by despotic regimes of Europe, particularly that of Louis XIV, and only too clearly manifested in their approach towards garden design. (Forty, 2000, p. 227)

This political overtone persists and adds complexity to all the other conceptions of nature. However, for Rousseau, children are born — and initially exist — in this natural state (and for Rousseau this equated with authenticity and moral purity) prior to their being affected. In Emile, Rousseau writes:

> Although modesty is natural to man, it is not natural to children. Modesty only begins with the knowledge of evil... Blushes are the sign of guilt; true innocence is ashamed of nothing. (Rousseau, 2007, p. 191)

So spontaneity and a lack of self-consciousness are marks of childhood (and, as Rousseau would see it, positive on those grounds). If we look back to the ‘Daisy’ spot, we can see how the girl’s mixed-up counting and rapt concentration upon the flower help to form this impression. However, we can see from the production analysis that there were many, many ‘takes’ made of the petal-picking frame. There is no definite conclusion as to whether the (confused) counting was scripted (although the consensus seems to be that it was not), but certainly, the girl was instructed to repeat the action, the loud counting, and the looking upwards many times: she was being made to seem spontaneous.

8.3.2 ‘Icecream’: protecting childhood
From this view, in which children are our connection to a pure and innocent nature, it is easy to see why the subsequent portrayal of childhood would be as something valuable, fragile, and worthy of protection. In another Johnson ad (from the same campaign, using the same advertising agency, DDB), we can see this use of the notion of childhood. In the ad ‘Icecream’, what we see is a young girl eating her icecream cone with unadulterated enjoyment; what we hear in a gentle, clear, teacherly, woman’s voice is this:

Do you know what people used to do? They used to explode atomic bombs in the air. Now children should have lots of vitamin A and calcium, but they shouldn't have any strontium 90 or caesium 137. These things come from atomic bombs, and they are radioactive. They can make you die. Do you know what people finally did? They got together and signed a nuclear test ban treaty. And then the radioactive poison started to go away. But now there's a man who wants to be president of the United States, and he doesn't like this treaty. He fought against it. He even voted against it. He wants to go on testing more bombs. His name is Barry Goldwater, and if he is elected they might start testing all over again.

This ad was attacked at the time by Senator Thruston B. Morton, speaking in Washington on September 16th (quoted in the Chicago Tribune), who:

challenged President Johnson today to end the “despicable, distasteful acts of cowardice” […] “What will we see next?” demanded Morton. “Herr Goebbels in his heyday could not compete with such gruesome, panic-inspiring falsehoods calculated to instil fear into our citizenry…”

Yet this counterattack recalls Goldwater’s campaign aide, F. Clifton White’s recollection of the emotionality of the Johnson campaign. Although there is an attempt here to brand the opposition with ‘cowardice’ — itself a very emotionally and morally charged label — the power of the threat to childhood trumps. In ‘Icecream’ we can see a contrast drawn between ‘people’ and ‘children’: the latter being the passive victims of ‘these things’ that people make (atomic bombs). ‘The people’ who used to explode bombs change and become
'the people’ who signed a nuclear test ban; the plural form in ‘the people’ is contrasted to the singular of ‘a man who wants to be the president’. The victimhood of children is therefore finally connected to that single person. Another contrast drawn implicitly is the pedagogical frame of the narrative ‘Now children should have lots of vitamin A and calcium’, and the political narrative being described. This further highlights the moral ‘lesson’ being given by the narrator (against Goldwater). The children in these two ads, the little girls (female and young being easily construed twice-over ‘natural’, ‘passive’, and ‘victim’), although both unaware of the politics involved, nonetheless, are shown as alarmed by the end of the ads. They are both shown, in their last frame of being seen, as looking up with trepidation to the top-right of the screen. This frame position holding, as Kress and van Leeuwen have gone to great lengths to explain, the place of ‘future’ and ‘ideal’. In both ads, the children look to the future (their future) and see, where there should be something positive, something (being presented as) terrifying.

8.3.3 ‘Dangerous World’, ‘Changing World’ and ‘Ashley’s Story’: childhood threatened

In this section I examine three more ads — this time from the two campaigns of George W. Bush. In the first two (‘Dangerous World’, 2000; ‘Changing World’, 2004) we are given the narration over films whose central character is a child. In both, the ‘state of the world’ is summed up at the start in dramatic (critics would say scare-mongering) terms:

‘Dangerous World’: ‘Today we live in a world of terror, madmen and missiles’.
‘Changing World’: ‘The world is changing. Sometimes in ways that astound. And others that terrify.’

In both, the composition of the frames is such that the diminutive nature of the child is contrasted with big events outwith their sphere of experience — in the complex arena of world politics. In the first, a girl is seen wandering around what appears to be a deserted airbase, past military wire fences, down metal airplane stairs, around an air-traffic cone (innocently ‘righting’ something that has gone awry). The second (a composite Computer Generated Image [CGI] production rather reminiscent of the Spielberg film *A.I.*) has a young boy standing in an open doorway with a teddy bear hung loosely by his side as images of the ‘changing’ world play out in the space ahead of him. In both, we are shown undefined, unlocated images of modern warfare: missiles, guns, tanks and explosions. In both, these sections are monotoned: in the first to a cold blue, and in the second to a dusty (desert?) reddish-brown.

These early sections form dissonant bridges through their visuals, the accompanying narratives, and the soundtracks (in the first there is the use of an ominous snare drum noise, and in the second a ‘ride into battle’ military drumbeat). We move from (metaphorically *over*) these problematic bridges towards the proposed solutions. Namely, the solutions which will keep these two representative children, these *wards* of the State, safe and unsullied by war and all the other machinations of the political and adult world. However, saying this, in ‘Changing World’ we may be presented with the ‘terrifying’ alternative: during the warfare frames, it looks as though there may be children throwing rocks at the tanks, and, if we put this together with the Arabic graffiti on the walls within the warzone, the Middle East certainly, and Palestine and the West Bank specifically,
come to mind. And here is one of those occasions where the intentional vagueness allows for a message to be interpreted (by me, at least) without the risk of the Bush campaign spelling it out: the Other, this ad seems to me to be saying, the terrifying and threatening other, these volatile Arabs (associated as they are with Muslim fundamentalists), do not protect their children as we do. They allow their children to be radicalised and scarred through their involvement in war. Childhood is not inviolable for them. These children throw stones at tanks rather than stand in their pyjamas with their teddy bears.

The solutions proposed in the two ads are not the same, but neither are they mutually exclusive. In ‘Dangerous World’, the solution ‘because a dangerous world still requires a sharpened sword’, (metaphorically enacted by the girl’s running her fingers along the fence to the sound of a metallic ring), is to, in Bush’s words:

rebuild our military. I will move quickly to defend our country and allies against blackmail... by building missile defense systems.
As President, I will have a foreign policy with a touch of iron, driven by American interests and American values.

Again, this is represented through the girl’s actions: her righting of the fallen-down cone, and her moving so quickly that she seems to instantly evaporate. The ‘American interests’, being necessarily more self-interested are not envisaged, apart from where they dovetail with American values. Symbolized here by the protection of childhood, the protection of these values is represented in a clichéd manner with the girl running to, looking up to, smiling at, and taking the hand of, a male protector symbolized by an Air Force uniform-clad arm (of high-rank judging by the yellow stripes and insignia). This generic military protector is

37 However, the boy’s posture changes in the course of the ad from that of a vulnerable child to one with a little more confidence.
shown (to the extent that he is shown) framed to the right (the frame position of
the future) within a clear, bright, blue sky, wispy with clouds. That is, within
Nature at its best, portending Good, symbolising Good, representing and framing
Good. Furthermore, as the camera pans upwards from the girl joining hands, to
the uniformed figure, to the sky, the text on the screen (in a font itself infused with
— and emanating — light within the bright blue sky) declares ‘George W. Bush:
a fresh start’.

In ‘Changing World’, the solution is more concentrated on these values.
Here is the transcript of the whole ad, given to show the use of multimodal
reiteration:

MALE NARRATOR: The world is changing. Sometimes in ways that
astound. And others that terrify. We depend more than ever on our values -
family, faith, the freedom we celebrate. In today's changing world the
answers aren't easy.
[TEXT: a VISION for the future]
MALE NARRATOR: We need a sense of purpose, a vision for the future,
the conviction to do what's right.
[TEXT: CONVICTION to do what's right]
BUSH: I'm George W. Bush and I approve this message. Together, we're
moving America forward.
[TEXT: PRESIDENT BUSH: Moving America Forward]

The reiteration, clear in relation to the narration and the text on screen, is more
complicated and far more interesting when it comes to the visuals and the
soundtrack. The process by which a certain string of images is chosen (selected
from all that is available) to go alongside these words is very complex. For
example, are the visuals to illustrate, complement, reiterate, challenge (unlikely
here), or add depth to, the words? Having decided this, how does one represent
(in the way that has been chosen) ‘Moving America Forward’. We get a child on a
bike, but not just any child, any bike, and any neighbourhood. We have a white
girl in pink, with a clean-cut father (one supposes), pushing her on a girly bike in what appears to be a leafy suburban street. In just a second or two, we are given a great deal more material from which to extrapolate (rightly or wrongly — again, they aren’t making any clear statements here, and thus, cannot easily be held to account) more information regarding the vision and values the Republicans would like to be associated with (and, of course, with a view to the target audience of the spot ad). The visuals to go with ‘our values - family, faith, the freedom we celebrate’ are stereotypical not only in the selection of what is presented, but also in the method in which it is presented. The glowing (Kodachrome-type, almost hyper-real) colours are set within frames of soft-focus, sunny days, an unbounded green field of grass, exuberant school children, happy faces (of which included, on the right side of the frame, relaxing on the side of a relatively modest wooden house, are George W. and Laura Bush), and very many examples of shafts, rays, beams, and sources of light. The ‘vision for America’ is clearly enlightening; the ‘conviction to do what’s right’ heralded by a descant horn and carried by a man — the incumbent President, bedecked with warmly glowing CGI stars and stripes — who is ‘moving America forward’. The easily interpreted metaphoric power of ‘light’ according positivity, moral rectitude — extending both to the values, and to the possession of faith — and goodness, is put to use here (see Sec. 7.4.2).

So the innocence of childhood, viewed as something natural rather than as a construct (and nature itself viewed as inherently positive), is worth protecting, and each presidential campaign claims their man (so it has been up to now) as the best protector. Casting a man of presidential age into such a role also allows the role of ‘father figure’ (although on several counts this is extendable to a more
paternalistic, grandfatherly role\textsuperscript{38}) to be exploited. Just as the construction of childhood as natural and positive has been naturalised (and in Bourdieu’s sense, acquired through ‘practical mimesis’ on a bodily, as well as a mental level), the construction of ‘fatherhood’ as one in which it is (only) ‘natural’ to feel impelled/compelled (it is exactly this distinction which is greatly problematised by Bourdieu’s notion of doxa) to ‘protect’ and ‘provide for’ one’s children. Clearly, on a metaphorical level, the President’s ‘children’ could be understood to be \textit{all} American children (and in a more paternalistic way, all Americans, although I suspect this understanding has lost ground).

In the next ad, \textit{‘Ashley’s Story’}, from the 2004 election campaign, we can see Bush cast as protector, again over a female child, but this time there is an added dimension of the child being at the cusp of womanhood. This added dimension, when layered onto that of ‘father figure’, invites not only protection of childhood innocence, but also of the protection of the journey through childhood, and the protection of a specifically \textit{female} innocence: the stereotypical ‘fatherly’ protection of the daughter’s ‘innocence’ (and therein ‘worth’). Innocence in terms of knowledge and experience is wrapped up with traditionalist notions, including religious ones, with all their moral overtones.

In this ad Ashley, the girl, or rather the ‘young woman’, has been forced to confront what is, in this dichotomised view, the adult world, through the loss of her mother in the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre. This is stated by Ashley’s father more emotively: ‘My wife Wendy was murdered by terrorists’.

\textsuperscript{38} The adoption of these respective roles by Obama and McCain — playing on the differential in their ages — and the values which attach to each, is instructive not only for understanding the affordances of each role, but also for understanding the status of different stages of manhood in culture.
Ashley has been taken from childhood by the ‘terrorists’. Her tender age (and this description comes to mind partially due to the portrayal of Ashley in the garden swing, reading what appears to be a Romantic Classic) has caused this traumatic event to have a particular impact as described by the male narrator in soft tones over a sad, simple, sentimental piano soundtrack:

The Faulkner’s daughter Ashley closed up emotionally.

The soundtrack now changing with the introduction of a major key, the start of musical resolution mirroring the arrival of Bush to our screen, and, as the narrator tells us, to Lebanon, Ohio, where Ashley went to see him, ‘as she had with her mother four years before’ (flagging up continuity of leadership, the status of the incumbent candidate, and a certain continuity for Ashley, bridging this traumatic event).

We then get three testimonials (accompanied throughout by the continuation of the sentimental (though now slightly more upbeat piano music) about the President and how his actions reflect his humanity. The interaction with the President is described by the mother-figure (a family friend accompanying Ashley to the Presidential visit) as a turning point for Ashley who had previously ‘closed up emotionally’:

Our president took Ashley in his arms and just embraced her. And it was at that moment that we saw Ashley’s eyes fill up with tears. Ashley’s ‘natural response’ is released — her healing, it is implied, begun. The father-figure role cast for Bush (quite paternalistic here due partially to the presence of Ashley’s actual father) is set alongside his official role:

He’s the most powerful man in the world and all he wants to do is make sure I’m safe, that I’m okay.
The President’s ‘humanity’ is shown to come out not as one calculating the value of a photo shoot (recall President Jackson’s “Kiss him, Eaton”), but as a protector’s ‘numb imperative’. The picture being presented is that Bush acted spontaneously and not in a calculated fashion. (Note that this employs the Rousseauian dichotomy of nature vs. artifice). The implication is that it is natural that a man of such integrity would act in this way. In Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts, Rousseau writes:

How sweet it would be to live among us, if outer appearances were always the likeness of the heart’s dispositions, if decency were virtue, if our maxims served as our rules, if true philosophy were inseparable from the title of philosopher! (Cahoone, 1996, p. 33)

Ashley’s father’s analysis of the event being the most interesting:

What I saw was what I want to see in the heart and in the soul of the man who sits in the highest elected office in our country. Bush’s actions towards Ashley are ‘read’ as illuminating ‘heart’ and ‘soul’; his ‘true nature’ revealed.

8.3.4 Deciphering the body

The idea that one can ‘read off’ from the body, and draw deep meaning from small performed actions is an old one: it seems clear that the interpretation of such things is not only something we all do, but something which we are compelled to do (it comes naturally to us). Joseph writes of the mammalian capacity for ‘semiotic receptivity’.

which is simply a way of saying that animals not only respond directly to things in their environment, as plants do, but “read” things in their environment, and respond to their interpretation. What is universal is the ability to interpret, to “read” features of the world of our sensory

39 From the O.E.D., two of the old examples of ‘decipher’ are given as:
   a1649  W. Drummond Wks. (1711) 143  Crosses serve for many Uses, and more than Magistracies decipher the Man.
   1793  T. Holcroft tr. J. C. Lavater Ess. Physiogn. xxxviii. 197  Each man has his favorite gesture which might decypher his whole character.
experience as signs of something not immediately available to our senses. (Joseph, 2010c, p. 96)

Despite this trait we all share, at least two further points must be made: first, the fact that we do interpret from all sources available to us does not mean that we (always) have good grounds for doing so, or that misinterpretation does not occur even when we may have good grounds for attempting such an interpretation. Secondly, there is always a danger that, as Ashley’s father could (ironically) be taken as pointing out, ‘What I saw was what I want to see…’. Taking the latter point first, it is obvious that the interplay between the signs to be interpreted and the interpreter necessarily means that the interpreter’s ideology, habitus, biases, background, indeed the whole makeup of their self-identity, is involved with the interpretation they will make. Schwarz, the soundman for the ‘Daisy’ ad, is quoted as saying:

“Goldwater could have diffused Daisy by saying, ‘I think that the danger of total nuclear war should be the theme of the campaign this year, and I’d like to pay half of the cost of running this commercial.’ If he had, the commercial would not have been perceived as being against him. He would have changed the feelings and assumptions stored within us. Instead it was like the woman who goes to the psychiatrist and is shown a Rorschach pattern and says, ‘Doctor, I didn’t come here to be shown dirty pictures!’ The Daisy commercial evoked Mr. Goldwater’s pro-bomb statements. They were the dirty pictures in the public’s mind.” (Diamond & Bates, 1984, pp. 146-147)

On what grounds do we feel qualified to make a judgement about what an action or inaction means? Bourdieu’s analysis reflects the complexity, and the contradictions which arise from an attempt to answer this question. On the one hand Bourdieu explains, through his examination of ‘bodily hexis’, why we have good grounds for making judgements:

Practical sense, social necessity turned into nature, converted into motor schemes and body automatisms, is what causes practices, in and through
what makes them obscure to the eyes of the producers, to be sensible, that is, informed by a common sense. [...] One could endlessly enumerate the values given body, made body, by the hidden persuasion of an implicit pedagogy which can instil a whole cosmology, through injunctions as insignificant as ‘sit up straight’ or ‘don’t hold your knife in your left hand’, and inscribe the most fundamental principles of the arbitrary content of a culture in seemingly innocuous details of bearing or physical and verbal manners [...] (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 69)

On the other hand, not only does he highlight the very political nature of these ‘numb imperatives’, but he also flags up the fallacy of reading a part as signifying or accurately representing the whole:

The logic of scheme transfer which makes each technique of the body a kind of pars totalis, predisposed to function in accordance with the fallacy of pars pro toto, and hence to recall the whole system to which it belongs, gives a general scope to the apparently most circumscribed and circumstantial [sic] observances. (ibid.)

In a response to the recent acquittal (3rd October, 2011) of the young woman, Amanda Knox, tried for murder by the Italian police, Leslie writes:

Professional interrogators remain stubbornly convinced of their ability to tell if a person is being truthful simply by observing them. The lawyer and fraud expert Robert Hunter has termed this misapprehension “the demeanour assumption” [...] We all have an inherent bias towards assuming that we can discern a person’s inner mental state simply by observing them [...] we possess an endless capacity to speculate on a person’s character, thoughts, and motivations based on the slender evidence of a facial expression. The eyes, it is said, are windows to the soul. They are not. They are organs for converting light into electromagnetic impulses. What does it stem from, this over-confidence in facile intuitions about what other people are thinking? (Leslie, 2011, p. 41)

Leslie offers his own answers to this question, but here it is enough to point out the problems inherent in attempting to apply rational, scientific thinking (note Leslie’s recourse to anatomical ‘hard science’) to our compulsive trait to ‘read into’ and ‘read off’ our environment and our fellow-humans.

8.3.5 Child as savage
Rousseau’s pastoral idyll is not one in which people are born a better breed, but one in which:

At base, human nature was no better, but men found their safety in the ease with which they saw through each other, and that advantage, which we no longer value, spared them many vices. (Cahoone, 1996, p. 33)

Rousseau is inaccurately thought of as using the term ‘the noble savage’, but it does fit his soft primitivist philosophy and, taken together with his notion of childhood as ‘the sleep of reason’, one can see how savagery, childhood, and nobility may conjoin rather than contradict. However, what if that veneer of civilisation, the very fact that ‘[o]ne no longer dares to seem what one really is’ (ibid.) is actually civilisation’s saving grace? What if children are natural in the Darwinian sense — closer to the amoral, ‘natural world’ — more like ‘savages’? This was a view much courted by anthropologists — often in outrageously racist terms — in which the European Male was at the highest stage of evolution and the ‘savage’ and the ‘child’ were at the bottom (although Kidd noted that the Kafir child ‘savages’ were behind their European counterparts in intellectual and moral development!). As discussed by Montgomery, Charles Staniland Wake, in his Evolution of Morality (1878), came up with a model in which there were five stages of moral development shared by children and ‘savages’: ‘the selfish, the wilful, the emotional, the empirical, and the rational’ (Montgomery, 2009, p. 19).

However, in opposition to the notion of childhood being a golden age of innocence which civilisation corrupts, here is a crucial passage from William Golding’s Lord of the Flies:

“The rules!” shouted Ralph, “you're breaking the rules!”
“Who cares?”
Ralph summoned his wits.
“Because the rules are the only thing we've got!”
But Jack was shouting against him.
“Bollocks to the rules! We're strong — we hunt! If there's a beast, we'll hunt it down! We'll close in and beat and beat and beat — !” (Ch.5, Golding, 1954)

It would do Rousseau a disservice to entirely equate his position (acknowledging, as he does, human nature remaining constant) with the idealised notion of children’s natures presented in the ads and naturalised, to a great extent, by us, the audience. Golding’s novel, however, does run wholly counter and remains important for having done so; but its exploration is one removed, literally, from the normality we inhabit as the children in the novel are on a desert island.

Panofsky summarises these two positions thus:

There had been, from the beginning of classical speculation, two contrasting opinions about the natural state of man, each of them, of course, a ‘Gegen-Konstruktion’ to the conditions under which it was formed. One view, termed ‘soft’ primitivism in an illuminating book by Lovejoy and Boas, conceives of primitive life as a golden age of plenty, innocence and happiness — in other words, as civilised life purged of its vices. The other, ‘hard’ form of primitivism conceives of primitive life as an almost subhuman existence full of hardships and devoid of all comforts — in other words, as civilised life stripped of its virtues. (Panofsky, 1970, p. 342)

Closer to home, in the world of today, where all children are not English public school boys, Blake Morrison, in the fallout from the Bulger case has written a great deal about our society’s view of children and nature. He asks:

Are we still caught in the same bind, unable to escape the old dualistic stereotypes: little angels versus little devils; our children (essentially good and well brought-up) versus other people’s children (out of control, fecklessly parented and wicked); golden-haired innocents (James Bulger, Madeleine McCann) versus monsters of motiveless malignity; kids with Lego versus kids with knives? (Morrison, 2009)

Clearly no presidential candidate is going to want to go against the convention of holding childhood up as metaphorical shorthand for what is good in society, what

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40 James Bulger was a two-year-old boy who was abducted, tortured and murdered by two ten-year-olds in 1993.
is good in humans, and what is bright about the future: to do so would be political
suicide. However, in the next two ads, the complications which arise from ‘real’
children who do not fit the mould are considered.

8.3.6 ‘Poverty’, ‘The Threat’: childhood changed

In both ads, ‘The Threat’, and ‘Poverty’, society (especially that part of it
for which the political opposition can be held responsible) has warped or
corrupted the positive potential of childhood. In both, the ostensible political
messages have darker undertones relating to what is ‘natural’: nature/nurture,
civilised/barbaric dichotomies being applied to the questions of what is/ought to
be ‘natural’ for civil(ised) society, and where childhood sits within that.

‘Poverty’ is another spot ad for Johnson’s successful presidential
campaign of 1964, of which ‘Daisy’ and ‘Icecream’ were part. In it, the scourge
of society is poverty but it is the effect this has on children which is the focal
point (visually speaking entirely, and through the narrative, partially). The
accompanying narration:

Poverty is not a trait of character. It is created anew in each generation but
not by heredity: by circumstances. Today, millions of American families
are caught in circumstances beyond their control. Their children will be
compelled to live lives of poverty unless the cycle is broken. President
Johnson’s war on poverty has this one goal: to provide everyone a chance
to grow and make his own way, a chance at education, a chance at
training, a chance at a fruitful life. For the first time in the history of
America this can be done. Vote for President Johnson on November 3rd.
The stakes are too high for you to stay home. (my italics)

This narrative responds to an anticipated, or previous, counter-argument. One
identified by Ehrenreich:

While ideas about gender and even race have moved, however haltingly,
in the direction of greater tolerance and inclusivity, ideas about class
remain mired in prejudice and mythology. Enlightened people who might flinch at a racial slur have no trouble listing the character defects of an ill-defined ‘underclass,’ defects which routinely include ignorance, promiscuity, and sloth. (Ehrenreich, 1989, p. 7)

Ehrenreich’s comment, however, comes twenty-five years after the spot ad aired: ideas about gender and race were lagging a quarter of a century behind the ‘halting’ move towards ‘greater tolerance and inclusivity’ she identifies. The ad, therefore can be seen as rebutting the following statements:

- Poverty is a trait of character.
- It is hereditary.
- An individual can escape it if they put adequate effort in to do so.

It can also be seen as implying through the use of its deep Southern blues soundtrack (what could be called roots blues), a connection between poverty and race. This pairing, of course, being neither original, nor, when looked at in parallel with the socio-economic status of black Americans up until 1964, groundless. Indeed, Johnson’s platform was one from which he promised continuity: to ensure that the assassinated JFK’s ‘ideas and ideals’ were ‘translated into effective action’. In his State of the Union address, this link was made explicitly, as he ‘cautions and reminds’ his audience that for the privileges of equal rights enshrined in law to be exercised, one must have the opportunity (among other things) to escape the ‘clutches of poverty’.

The backdrop to the ad, then, is an ugly one — that of racial and economic discrimination bolstered by the arguments that it is natural for ‘these people’ to be in poverty because of flaws in their nature. The rhetorical attack upon these arguments often focuses upon children and whether, following Locke’s tabula
rasa, they are born with innate differentiating qualities, or not\textsuperscript{41}. This argument is the basis for the nature/nurture debate on which the rhetorical power of this ad rests. By showing a series of stark pictures of children — all in the ‘clutches’ of poverty, yet all, as yet, able-bodied and full of potential, the insistent changing frames represent not only the cyclical nature of poverty which is being discussed, but also the compulsion, the built-in inertia of the status-quo. The musical progression and repetition reiterates this.

The ad only shows children, and concentrates upon showing their eyes: again, relying on the underlying assumption that a cast of eye displays a cast of character. What underlies this ad is that the challenge (distrustful appeal?) seen in many of the children’s eyes (and the last child is the only one who is hiding his eyes, while in a pose of abject misery) will become something worse: something threatening, desperate, and de-forming. Although the narrator mentions American ‘families’, the fact is that there are no adults (or even youth) presented. This suggests that they would be considered too compromised and also that it would be tougher to make the argument that adults are, without challenging their autonomy, still ‘caught in circumstances beyond their control’. This reaffirms the dichotomous relationship drawn between children and adults. Complementing this division is the contrasting language between what the responsible adults will do — wage ‘war on poverty’ — and what the children shall be enabled to do: ‘grow’, and have a chance ‘at a fruitful life’. The metaphoric use of the ‘child as fecund growing plant’ reiterates the assumption of children as part of/closer to nature.

\textsuperscript{41}William Golding’s view was more of a Kantian one, with children identified as non-rational. Golding also seemed to believe in inherent evil. The recognition of the ‘darkness of man’s heart’ is in the devastating last line of \textit{Lord of the Flies}. 
In ‘The Threat’, part of Dole’s 1996 Republican ad campaign, we are invited to take a view of history in which a contrast is drawn between the past as confronted thirty years before and seen through a 1964 spot ad (in fact, the iconic ‘Daisy’), and the present as being confronted by Dole. Such intertextuality does occasionally seem to be one of the implicit intents of an ad, but explicit parallels or contrasts are not usually made. Stylistically, then, this ad is interesting. Moreover, it is unusual for dealing with the transitional stage between childhood and adulthood. This stage of human development is known for its ‘difficulty’, and is not usually thought of as being extremely photogenic. However, it is the result of the dichotomy discussed above, between childhood and adulthood, that makes the inclusion of this ‘stage’ particularly difficult. Dichotomies do not have transitions, they do not blend into each other. A consequence of drawing a binary opposition between children and adults is that youth, or teenage-hood, tends to be ignored. There are exceptions to this: Ashley was a ‘young woman’. Yet, her passivity and her romanticised innocence (recall the placidity in the garden swing) removed her from what is ‘troubling’ about representing teens.

The argument in ‘The Threat’ is that there is a new external danger to kids which is not being sufficiently tackled by the incumbent Clinton. This new danger, however, interferes with children’s real natures changing them into something threatening to themselves and to society at large: note that it is ‘America’, not the American teens which ‘deserve better’. The narration, spoken in a calm female voice, is as follows:

Thirty years ago, the biggest threat to her was nuclear war. Today the threat is drugs. Teenage drug use has doubled in the last four years. What’s been done? Clinton cut the Office of National Drug Control Policy by 83 percent. And his own Surgeon General even considered legalizing drugs.
Bill Clinton said he'd lead the war on drugs and change America. All he did was change his mind. America deserves better.

The ‘Daisy’ spot features a little girl threatened by the external, global threat of nuclear war. The reflection of a detonation in her pupil is a metaphor for her exposure (and for nuclear weapons, as highlighted in ‘Icecream’, exposure to something ‘invisible’ and malignant is an issue) to the political world — a world she, in her innocent, natural state, should be protected from (thus, ‘vote Johnson’). This is contrasted with the image of young men (most only partially visible, fractured, incomplete, furtive even, filmed in black and white) portrayed through their bodies and not through their eyes until the last scene in which a young teen, whose back is initially turned to us, whips around in a startled and defensive manner (akin to a threatened animal) and looks directly at us with his sickly pallor and darkened eyes, crack-pipe in hand. The implication is clear: drugs inveigle the youths to embrace their bodily demands, lowering or deforming (and here, the body as mirror to the moral quality is strong) their true natures to their base natures. The soundtrack is dark and ominous, with dissonant strings being built up to include (there is meant to be a ‘war on drugs’) a few military-battle cymbal and snare drum beats, culminating in a sudden chord struck (upon the youth turning to face us). This particular chord especially and the soundtrack of ominous threat more generally is very reminiscent of the one used in the ‘Wolves’ spot (see Sec. 7.4.3), in which the wolf is a metaphoric symbol of the evil Other threatening America.

A comparison between this ad and another in the same presidential campaign — but this time for the Clinton (Democrat) team — is interesting. In ‘First Time’, children try smoking for the first time. Yet in this one the children
are not demonised, but rather portrayed purely as victims of the failure of leadership, initiative, and (perhaps) intelligence of those such as Dole, the Republican candidate. Note the unsophisticated use of ‘Dole says’ as contrasting with the smooth and measured tones of the female narrator:

FEMALE NARRATOR: These children are trying smoking for the first time. One will die from the habit. President Clinton says, “Stop ads that teach our children to smoke.” But Bob Dole opposes an FDA limit on tobacco ads that appeal to children.
FEMALE NARRATOR: Says cigarettes aren't necessarily addictive.
FEMALE NARRATOR: “Some say milk is bad for kids, too” Dole says.

And again, the lack of colour accompanying the portrayal of Dole, and the bright clear saturated colours accompanying Clinton (framed as he is, upon his podium — literally and metaphorically — against a clear blue sky) employs the metaphoric value of colour and saturation as positive and pure, and black and white and bleached as negative and compromised.

8.4 Metaphorical Nature

8.4.1 ‘Victory’

Lakoff and Johnson begin their seminal work, *Metaphors we Live By*, with the following paragraph:

Metaphor is for most people a device of the poetic imagination and the rhetorical flourish — a matter of extraordinary rather than ordinary language. Moreover, metaphor is typically viewed as characteristic of language alone, a matter of words rather than thought or action. For this reason, most people think they can get along perfectly well without metaphor. We have found, on the contrary, that metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature. (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, p. 3)

Examples of nature-based metaphors include:

- Wolves as dangerous, predatory, pack-based, evil Other.
- Good weather as moral Goodness.
- Stormy weather as political instability.
- Starry night sky as Heaven.
- Nature’s forces as unpredictable political forces.
- Morning as Hope.
- Countryside as moral Goodness.
- Children as Hope/ Optimism/ Innocence.
- Light as Goodness / Dark as Evil.
- Saturated colour as Goodness / unsaturated, monotoned, B&W, as Bad.

These are all, arguably, clichéd, hackneyed, and well worn. That perhaps adds to their power. To exemplify some of these points, I have selected an ad from George W. Bush’s 2004 campaign in which he was the incumbent and the attacks of 9/11 formed much of the significant context in the public mind. This ad, entitled ‘Victory’, is relatively simple: it is thirty seconds long, starts with the obligatory ‘Stand by your ad’ disclaimer, has a short narrative, and a few bits of on-screen text:

BUSH: I’m George W. Bush and I approve this message.
FEMALE NARRATOR: In 1972, there were 40 democracies in the world.
[TEXT: 40 democracies]
FEMALE NARRATOR: Today, 120.
[TEXT: 120 democracies]
FEMALE NARRATOR: Freedom is spreading throughout the world like a sunrise. And this Olympics, there will be two more free nations.

42 ‘The ”Stand By Your Ad” provision (SBYA) of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA, also known as ”McCain-Feingold”), enacted in 2002, that requires candidates in the United States for federal political office, as well as interest groups and political parties supporting or opposing a candidate, to include in political advertisements on television and radio ”a statement by the candidate that identifies the candidate and states that the candidate has approved the communication.”’ (Wikipedia)
FEMALE NARRATOR: And two fewer terrorist regimes.
With strength, resolve and courage, democracy will triumph over terror.
And, hope will defeat hatred.

However, it is the combination of image, soundtrack, narration and text, heavily
imbued with metaphor, which makes it effective. The following figure sets side by
side many of the frames of the ad with the accompanying text, both spoken and
on-screen. The direction of the ad in terms of the coordination of these different
elements is crucial to its rhetorical impact, and thus to legitimation (and this
analysis does not transcribe the music but soundtrack is another layer which I
shall discuss — and its coordination with the rest is equally important43).

43 It is for good reason that the state of affairs as regards metaphor analysis is as Forceville
summarises it: ‘While the linguistic mode, in its written and spoken varieties, has received ample
attention, and the visual mode is also now theorized more broadly, non-verbal sound and music as
Musical metaphor is extremely difficult to grapple to academic argument.
BUSH: I'm George W. Bush and I approve this message.

FEMALE NARRATOR: In 1972, there were 40 democracies in the world.

FEMALE NARRATOR: Today, 120.

FEMALE NARRATOR:

Freedom

is

spreading throughout

the

world

like

a

sunrise.

And this Olympics, there
will be two more free nations.

[TEXT: Afghanistan: Iraq]

FEMALE NARRATOR:
And two fewer terrorist regimes.

With strength, resolve and courage, democracy

[TEXT: Approved by President Bush and paid for by Bush-Cheney 04, Inc.]

will triumph

over

terror.

And,

hope will defeat hatred.

[TEXT: President Bush. Moving America Forward]
Looking at the nature based metaphors, one is initially struck by the use of the metaphor ‘Light is Goodness’ (or is it ‘Goodness is Light’?) and more specifically, daylight, possibly even sunlight (in other ads there is a specific contrast made metaphorically with natural light as good, and unnatural light as bad). Following Lakoff and Johnson’s view of metaphor being conceptual rather than solely linguistic (or literary), we can see here that the metaphor is immediately presented as a cross-modal or multimodal one (see Forceville & Urios-Aparisi, 2009). That is, from the very first shot of George and Laura Bush outside, lit by sunlight, there is the deployment of the metaphor for which the ‘light’ is portrayed by the visuals only (with the one explicit mention to ‘sunrise’ an exception — and note the natural, inevitable and upward progression already entailed in choosing ‘sunrise’), and the ‘Good’ is conveyed by the text alone, or by both the visuals and the text. This metaphor draws an equivalence between an abstract natural phenomenon (light), and an abstract positive (often moral) quality (goodness). At this point, something rather strange can be noted: the source and the target domain are interchangeable. In a simple metaphor such as ‘Richard is a Lion’, as derisively used as an example by Black, we find out about the target domain (Richard — or Man) by applying our understanding of lions (the source domain). The one, lions, illuminates the other, Richard (or, by extension, Man). There is a small feedback in which we reappraise our understanding of lions, but this is certainly secondary. In this ad, however, we are to understand both the following as true:

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44 This ‘somewhat unfortunate example… which modern writers have discussed with boring insistence’ apparently riles him enough to cause him to ask, in a footnote, ‘Can we imagine anybody saying this nowadays and seriously meaning anything? I find it hard to do so.’ (Black, 1954-1955, p. 281).
(Natural) light as Goodness

and

Goodness as (Natural) light

Now, as Black wryly writes “‘Light’ must be supposed to have a symbolic sense, and certainly to mean far more than it would in the context of a text-book on optics” (Black, 1954-1955, p. 275). How then can we understand this deceptively simple metaphorical arrangement? Light is from Nature, and Nature is Good. Therefore, light, by extension, is also Good. But from a theological standpoint — and this is a particularly important standpoint to consider when looking at a Republican candidate’s promotional material — Goodness (or God as the ultimate Good) is Light. (This metaphorical reflection actually goes full circle and even now, with Nature no longer tethered to God, the rationale for Nature being considered Good is very much tied to this religious connotation):
‘Goodness’ is, indeed, abstract, the various concrete embodiments projected by the ad are all-important. We get, in the order in which they come:

- President George W. Bush is Good
- Democracy is Good
- The Olympic Games are Good
- Freedom is Good
- Hope is Good
- Moving forward is Good

We can — in fact we must — extrapolate further from these manifestations of the ‘Light is Goodness’ metaphor in order to understand the political claim being made — and the legitimating qualities the ad possesses; but, as Black points out, these ‘subordinate metaphors’ are ‘usually intended to be
taken less “emphatically”, i.e., with less stress upon their implications’ (Black, 1954-1955, p. 290). Expedience, again, could be a reason for this: ‘Light is Goodness’ is vague to the extent, in this political context, of being a platitude. A palatable, pleasing, platitude may function in the same way as one of Orwell’s tired metaphors: to successfully evoke a weak, positive, banal feeling, and thereby reduce the focus paid to the rather more thought-provoking ‘secondary’ claims. In this ad, for instance, we must make the assumption that ‘democracies’ are equal to Democracy. This may seem tautological until we look at all the different political systems which call themselves, or are called by others, democracies (and who is the definer and arbiter of that label?). Then we must make a similar connection between the Olympic Games and these democracies. This claim (which equates, on unspecified grounds, the Olympic Games and Democracy) is actually a non-sequitur: there were far more than forty participating countries in the 1972 Munich Olympics and if that was the number of democracies, then Democracy was very much in the minority.

The claim ‘Freedom is Good’ is less controversial in its widest sense. Who would disagree? Yet, freedom for whom, and to do what? Freedom in this ad is represented by a young, white, healthy-looking, female swimmer competing against other young, white, healthy-looking female athletes. Using such women (I use the plural because the ad splices different swimmers into the ‘lead’ and apparent victor role) as a token to signify freedom, itself, sits on a great many assumptions. ‘Freedom’ may designate an almost universally positive value — in fact, a natural right (this is reminiscent of Rousseau’s view that we are born free and increasingly shackled thereon in to society’s corrupting conventions). Article
1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights begins: ‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’, but as this lofty notion descends to various concrete manifestations, culturally specific understandings are needed to make sense of it. Applied freedom is a lot more problematical. To interpret this ad in an American context, we can first see it in the similarly lofty light of *The Declaration of Independence*:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.

In the American context, ‘men’ becomes the ungendered ‘people’ and ‘Liberty’ has a particular cast to it, sandwiched, as it is, within the triumvirate between ‘Life’ and ‘the Pursuit of Happiness’. The ‘right’ to pursue happiness entails the freedom to do so and, as Roosevelt’s *Four Freedoms* speech expounds (Roosevelt, 1941), this includes the right to be in a position to do so (a right to a way of life which allows for health of body and mind included in this).

The health of the swimmers is conveyed through the hue of their sunlit skin: their exposed, young, female skin. Two points are worth making here: first, this representation of what ‘healthy’ looks like is both cultural- and era- specific (see e.g. Vannini & McCright, 2004). The pairing of ‘natural’ and ‘healthy’ is a relatively recent phenomenon, come about, as it has, since the days of ‘leisure’ in the sun, rather than ‘peasantry’ in the fields; secondly, images of young, slim, tanned women in skimpy garb have a particular - and controversial — place amongst the more obviously universal tokens of personal freedoms. The use of this particular token in the context of Bush’s ‘freeing’ of two predominantly Muslim nations has to be significant. The participation of females representing
Muslim nations at the Olympic Games is a political one and is representative of a fault line between different cultural conceptions of freedom. This ad is disingenuous in that it implies that the two ‘free nations’ will be in a position to and will desire to embrace the Western conception of ‘freedom’ as propounded through the images of the ad. That, to be precise, Iraq and Afghanistan will now enter their young female athletes into the swimming competition, gratefully emulating their ‘liberators’. Presenting the possibility to the target audience of this ad that the two ‘free nations’ may embrace, freely, democratically, strictly Muslim political leadership (incorporating Sharia law, which, for Muslims, is God’s law and thus, natural and Good) does not fit the frame. This is not even to mention the possibility that the ‘freedom’ being declared is somewhat more abstract than concrete! These cultural caveats are somewhat tempered — or rather, problematised — by the actions and demands of dissident and vociferous feminists from many strict Muslim countries. A recent example being the publishing of a full-frontal nude picture by a well known and controversial Egyptian blogger, Aliaa Magda Elmahdy:
Accompanying the image (of which the above is a popular adaptation), is her own rationale for her controversial posting:

Put on trial the artists’ models who posed nude for art schools until the early 70s, hide the art books and destroy the nude statues of antiquity, then undress and stand before a mirror and burn your bodies that you despise to forever rid yourselves of your sexual hangups before you direct your humiliation and chauvinism and dare to try to deny me my freedom of expression. (Elmahdy, 2011)

The relationship between nature, nudity and freedom is not ideologically free, nor, it is clear from the fallout of this picture being published, is the place of such nudity in ‘Arab Spring’ Egypt: conservatives are unsurprisingly incensed, but many liberals have also distanced themselves:

Women rights activist Nehad Abou el-Qomsan said conservatives “keep adding layers to cover up the women and deny their existence.”
But, she said, what Elmahdy did “is also rejected because posing nude is a form of body abuse.” (Michael, 2011)

The Right to Freedom, philosophically, is weighed against the harm principle.
This parallel drawn between freedom and harm is implied (simplistically) in the ad with the drawing of the following explicit and implicit parallels, and linked collocations (further implications of which are below in brackets):

- free nations ~ terrorist regimes
- (America) & Olympic Nations ~ Iraq and Afghanistan
- (Us) ~ (Them)
- democracy ~ terror
- strength, resolve & courage ~ (weakness, indecision & cowardliness)
- hope ~ hatred
- light ~ (dark)
- (Good) ~ (Evil)
- (natural) ~ (unnatural)

The implicit nature of the parallels is a rhetorical technique which is, superficially, wholly ‘positive advertising’, but allows for criticism of the Other. Positive things can be said within a framework which leads the audience to fill in the gaps — and those gaps highlight negative qualities of the adversary (or political opponent) without besmirching the producers with the ‘negative campaigning’ label. The dichotomies above illustrate the legitimating potential of implied collocations. The extent to which drawing such contrasts is in fact rhetorically coercive will depend on whether one supports the view that propositional coercion can be achieved through visual means (see Sec. 7.4.3 below), whether, indeed, there is
such a thing as a visual argument (Blair, 1996). Suffice to say at this point that this rhetorical device, although used universally, was seen as being a particular favourite of George W. Bush’s.45

As a final comment on the use of the ‘Light as Goodness’ metaphor, I would like to briefly describe its use in another ad, this time from the McCain campaign in 2008. Called ‘The One’, the ad was purportedly intended as a humorous parody of Obama’s high rhetoric, and aura of celebrity. It also taps into the messianic role which had been adopted by — or foisted upon (depending on interpretation) — Obama. However, there was much talk in the American media about whether Obama was actually being portrayed as the Antichrist. This sounds extremely far-fetched, and perhaps the media was spinning out a popular story (Eilperin, 2008; Phillips, 2008; Sullivan, 2008; Waldman, 2008). Nonetheless, the justification for this conspiratorial interpretation of the ad is extremely interesting. Recall, first, that this is an ad made by the Republican McCain campaign — not a Republican-sympathetic pressure group, or a conservative single-issue group. Waldman, Editor-in-Chief of BeliefNet quotes an interesting memo from the ‘Eleison Group’ (‘a Democratic campaign consultant operation’) concerning the ad:

The McCain campaign has responded to initial criticisms about their “THE ONE” ad by saying it was meant merely as a joke poking fun at Obama’s strong support and Messiah-like imagery. But […]It was a professionally and carefully produced ad that had a much more sinister subtext that millions of Americans will pick up on. The makers of the ad chose all of

45 Indeed, used to the extent that moral philosopher Peter Singer wrote The President of Good and Evil (Singer, 2004), reviewed by Altman who, in the light of this discussion about ‘nature’, makes an interesting point: ‘In taking Bush’s rhetoric seriously, Singer reminds us that politicians act out of conviction as much as out of expediency, persuading themselves that what is convenient is also moral. In this they are no different to the rest of us, and one might ask how fair is it to demand consistency. All of us, in our everyday lives, live with contradictions and hypocrisy, and indeed social life would be almost impossible without some degree of inconsistency.’ (Altman, 2004)
Obama’s quotes very carefully and the ad is rife with image after image
equating Senator Obama to the anti-Christ [...] It is an attempt to subtly and
perhaps even subconsciously play on some of the deepest fears of millions
of evangelical Americans [...] Our goal with this memo is to expose the
McCain campaign’s lies they disseminate in darkness with the light of
public scrutiny and the scriptural facts they quietly distort and use to
mislead. (Waldman, 2008)

Their memo proceeds to draw out many of the ad’s multimodal features and
discuss them in the light of scripture and the hugely popular Left Behind series
(dealing with Christian dispensationalist End Times and which the authors suggest
is being paralleled throughout the ad). In their interpretation, the ad draws on fear
that the anti-Christ could work to evil ends, undetected.

8.4.2 Metaphor and Multimodality

There is a certain irony that part of the persuasive power of metaphors is
their ability to summon up images, sensations and sounds which enrich the words
on the page, or in the orator’s speech, yet their role in visual and auditory
communication has been sidelined, if not denied outright. This is even apparent in
Lakoff and Johnson’s reversion to language and, although they note that language
is ‘one way’ to investigate the ‘lines’ we think and act along, and ‘an important
source’ of evidence concerning our conceptual system (clearly implying the
existence of others), these others are not discussed. Scott has attacked this
language bias:

Pictures pun, photographs fantasize, illustrations illuminate. In rich colors
and textures, a panoply of visual messages entice, exhort, and explain.
The literature on advertising images fails to encompass the rhetorical
richness so characteristic of this form. Whether drawing from scientific or
interpretative paradigms, scholarship has tended to treat advertising
visuals in a manner inconsistent with their observable traits or their
historic tradition. Instead, consumer research reflects a bias in Western
thinking about pictures that is thousands of years old: the assumption that
pictures reflect objects in the real world. From the vantage of this ethnocentric stance, the frankly rhetorical nature of advertising imagery is either purposively overlooked or criticized as a distortion of reality. (L. M. Scott, 1994, p. 252)

With carefully chosen examples, Scott supports her claim that a visual rhetoric is, in fact, extremely pervasive, and that research into it is needed. The traditional approach critiqued, she suggests a move to something ‘radically different’:

This new approach to visuals, therefore, would recast pictures as information in symbolic form — as messages that must be processed cognitively by means of complex combinations of learned pictorial schemata and that do not necessarily bear an analogy to nature. (ibid., p. 253)

In this section, I wish to discuss what happens when visual metaphors about nature conflict — when the rhetorical messages being offered are, at some level, mutually incompatible. To demonstrate this situation I will use four ads: two employ the general metaphor ‘nature as threat/danger’ (using predators as specific carriers of the threat); and the other two employ the general metaphor ‘nature as fragile entity/endangered thing’ (also using predators to identify what is under threat).

The order of metaphor between the two differs: with the first two (‘Bear’ from Reagan’s 1984 campaign, and ‘Wolves’ from Bush’s 2004 campaign) the animals are metaphors for external, political actors (the U.S.S.R. as a bear, foreign terrorists as a wolf pack); in the second two, the animals stand for a unified, threatened, and almost anthropomorphised or pantheistic environment. Bourdieu’s aforementioned ‘logic of scheme transfer’ is relevant again here, although this time it is not the body standing for manifestations of symbolic power, but an endangered predator — its rarity, beauty and naturalness — synecdochically representing (external) Nature. The function being ‘a kind of pars totalis,
predisposed to function in accordance with the fallacy of *pars pro toto*, and hence to recall the whole system to which it belongs’ (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 69).

‘Bear’

If we look to the first ad, ‘Bear’, from Reagan’s 1984 (re)election campaign, we can see the use of multimodal propositional coercion. By which I mean that although through the primary linguistic mode in the ad (talk-over, not on-screen text), we seem to be presented with the following argument: there is a bear in the woods; which may, or may not, be threatening. This being the case, would it not be wise to weigh the risks and thus be prepared? Through the parallel modes of music and visuals, we are not given the same argument. We are, instead, shown that there *is* definitely a bear, and that (by dint of being a large, wild, predatory and territorial mammal) it *is* dangerous. Moreover, the ominous soundtrack (a heavy heartbeat, accompanied, latterly, by slowly swelling minor key strings) supports the idea of the bear being *imminently* dangerous, rather than harmless. Thus, despite gaining legitimacy through ‘fairness’, the ad also attempts to legitimate Reagan’s being ‘Prepared for Peace’. The transcript is:

MALE NARRATOR: There is a bear in the woods. For some people, the bear is easy to see. Others don't see it at all. Some people say the bear is tame. Others say it's vicious and dangerous. Since no one can really be sure who's right, isn't it smart to be as strong as the bear? If there is a bear? [TEXT: President Reagan. Prepared for Peace]

There is another interesting argumentation move made: there is a conflation invited by the textual parallel ‘some people’. In the first phrase ‘some people’ are factually correct: they see the bear which is in the woods. In the second phrase ‘some people’ are (visually and musically shown to be) wrong: the bear is not
tame. This rhetorical strategy keeps the audience off-balance, and this, in turn, compliments the unsureness being relied upon to promote Reagan’s policy.

The metaphorical symbolism of the bear is discussed in a paragraph about the ad on ‘The Living Room Candidate’ website:

The familiar, soothing, and avuncular voice narrating this classic ad belongs to advertising executive Hal Riney, who created this spot, and most of the optimistic “Morning in America” ads for Ronald Reagan’s re-election campaign. Using symbolism, the ad features a large grizzly bear lumbering through the woods. […] While no mention is made of the Cold War, it becomes clear at the end of the ad that the bear represents the Soviet Union and the lone hunter represents the United States. With a soft, reassuring voice, the ad evokes fear of our enemies and makes a commonsense appeal for peace through strength. (2012)

Here, nature, in the form of the bear, is (potentially) threatening and dangerous. The qualities ascribed to the Soviet Union, where they differ from those ascribed to the U.S., are bulk and brute strength. The hunter, however, is human (with the advantage in reasoning that gives over being a brute), lithe, in touch with nature (although not quite a part of it), armed (but only ‘fairly’ so), and courageous. Interestingly, the above analysis of the ad goes on to say that:

When the ad was tested for focus groups, many viewers were unsure about what the bear represented, thinking that it had something to do with the environment or gun control. Yet with its simple, ominous imagery, and suspenseful music combined with the subtle sound of a heartbeat, this is one of the most memorable of all campaign ads.

This comment rather challenges the importance of ‘issue’ as opposed to ‘message’ (as discussed by Silverstein, 2011), highlighting as it does the importance of Reagan’s message/brand, over the specifics of policy. Furthermore, the ad is ‘memorable’ not because of its revolutionary, or artfully worded claims, but because of its multimodal impact.

‘Wolves’
In Bush’s 2004 ad, ‘Wolves’, the predatory animal works in packs — this pack metaphorically representing, one guesses (it is not specifically stated), a terrorist cell ‘waiting to do America harm’. The context here, one must remember, is the first presidential election post 9/11. The use of wolves as metaphor carriers is probably at least as old as the identification of ‘metaphor’ as a rhetorical device.

Max Black uses wolves as an example in his paper, ‘Metaphor’. He writes:

What is needed is not so much that the reader shall know the standard dictionary meaning of “wolf” — or be able to use that word in literal senses — as that he shall know what I will call the system of associated commonplace. […] From the expert’s standpoint, the system of commonplaces may include half-truths or downright mistakes (as when a whale is classified as a fish); but the important thing for the metaphor’s effectiveness is not that the commonplaces shall be true, but that they should be readily and freely evoked. (Black, 1954-1955, p. 287)

This implies that there can be (at least) two types of wolf — the first being the actual animal as we experience it in nature (or in the captivity of a zoo), and the second being the metaphorical sort. Wolves are in fairy tales, foundation-myths, fables, religious texts, and in the mythology of many, many countries (mostly standing for negative qualities, but sometimes for very positive ones). Black elaborates upon the elements necessary in ‘the idea of a wolf’, for ‘wolf’ to function as a metaphor.

The idea of a wolf is part of a system of ideas, not sharply delineated, and yet sufficiently definite to admit of detailed enumeration. […] A suitable hearer will be led by the wolf-system of implications to construct a corresponding system of implications about the principal subject. […] Any human traits that can without undue strain be talked about in “wolf-language” will be rendered prominent, and any that cannot will be pushed into the background. The wolf-metaphor suppresses some details, emphasises others — in short, organizes our view of man. (ibid., p. 288)

Therefore, in the ad, we are called upon to use our cultural and contextual knowledge. As Black says,
Nor must we neglect the shifts in attitude that regularly result from the use of metaphorical language. A wolf is (conventionally) a hateful and alarming object; so, to call a man a wolf is to imply that he too is hateful and alarming (and thus to support and reinforce dislogistic attitudes). *(ibid., p. 289)*

Crucially, however, no men—or group of men—are actually called wolves. The actual target domain is left (barely) implicit. Furthermore, the metaphorical power of the ad is deeper than that held by the wolf metaphor.

In stylistics and in much (critical) textual analysis, there is a method by which different layers of meaning are approached separately. The approach whereby elements are identified and studied as belonging somewhere along a micro to macro spectrum is particularly advantageous when looking at very dense texts where, if such a division is not made, much is likely to be missed. And, so long as these levels (which are arbitrarily delineated) are reintegrated, the insights gained warrant the compartmentalising. Each ad I am studying is a complex mix of sound and vision—with all the political and symbolic connotations which enter into the comprehension and production of any cultural artefact. Each ad contains enough material to warrant a great deal more exploration than any I offer, but to elaborate upon the multimodal power of ‘Wolves’, and simultaneously to demonstrate (although not exhaustively by any means), a more micro analysis, I now turn to look at three aspects of layout as identified by Kress and van Leeuwen *(Kress & van Leeuwen, 1996)*: information value, salience, and framing. Apart from in the last shot when they come from the mid-distance towards the audience, the wolves are always captured, fleetingly, from right to left, unknown to known, new to given. In this instance, the right edge of the frame is where danger comes from. The new is threatening and at close range. Five out of the six
times wolves are shown, they are in the foreground for a fleeting instant (under a second and on two occasions almost imperceptible). They move quickly, although, as the soundtrack emphasises, quietly: stealthily. We can also see a repeated movement from light to darkness, up to down, left to right with the panning camera motion. Can we interpret this as Ideal and Real? Metaphorically, yes. Light is knowledge and power, darkness is ignorance and weakness. Therefore we can see:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Light is knowledge</th>
<th>Right is new</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>power</td>
<td>other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strength</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[good]</td>
<td>powerful?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ideal?</td>
<td>threatening?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Left is given</th>
<th>Darkness is ignorance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>us</td>
<td>weakness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>known</td>
<td>danger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>comfortable</td>
<td>[bad/evil]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-threatening</td>
<td>Real?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 37: Metaphorical matrix**

Moving on to salience, there are thirteen shots in this twenty-seven second spot. I would suggest that they can be usefully divided into three types: ones taken from far outside the forest; those taken from next to the forest; and those taken from within the forest. The first shot is an aerial view looking down onto a large, uninhabited, misty forest. The sunlight shines onto the tops of the trees — the interior of the forest is invisible to us. The second shot is that of a highly illuminated part of a tree, taking up the left side of the frame, yet out of focus. The
background is the line of trees which mark the start of the mature forest — the trunks of these trees are more in focus, but are in relative darkness. We are then shifted to a shot from within the forest looking up, through the dark, high trees, at the sunlight coming down through the canopy. This is a rather over-exposed shot, the trees are in partial silhouette. The frame then darkens as the camera pans downwards. Before it gets to eye-level, we are given a short shot of a wolf entering bottom right, moving to the left, and filling two-thirds of the screen with a close, yet out of focus, hairy body for a brief instant.

The sunlight in all these shots is extremely important. It only illuminates a few things on the forest floor, yet it is very bright. The movement of the wolves is also salient, yet they are in the semi-darkness. There is much play-off here between light and dark, focus and blur, movement and stillness. We are encouraged by the soundtrack to feel the tension of looking yet not being able to focus, just seeing, catching movement in the darkness. It is a nervous camera motion, held at eye-level. We get one glimpse of a wolf’s muzzle, illuminated by the sun, at close range, with the wolf’s right eye — in focus - looking directly at us. This is less of an appeal than a challenge. It is certainly a threat. If we pair this with the final — and by far the longest shot (7 sec.) — we can see that this threat is not that of an individual wild animal protecting its environment, but a reiteration of a constant threat of an organised and opportunistic group (hiding out in the wilderness… with no mercy…waiting for a show of weakness before coming out of the darkness and attacking…The metaphorical currency here is astonishing).
The last shot is taken in the open, at the border of the forest. The wolves, for the first time seen together and still, are lounging in the mid-distance, looking straight at us. The voice over for this shot is: ‘And weakness attracts those who are waiting…[*] to do America harm.’. At [*] the wolves all jump up and lope in our general direction. Their sudden movement is salient and this is emphasised once again by the soundtrack. Because we have been led to see them as threatening, we continue to do so now, despite the fact that given another soundtrack and a different voice-over, this spot could easily be part of an atmospheric nature documentary showing the habitat of wolves; we never actually see any aggressive or threatening behaviour by them.

It is a little difficult to analyse the framing within a short film without going into film and television analysis. The frame, according to Iedema, is the lowest level of analysis; ‘what the analyst takes to be the salient aspect of a shot’ (Iedema, 2001). Of course these frames will be carefully composed and thus contain their own meaningful frames. In ‘Wolves’, the vertical tree trunks are used to disrupt the ease of an open frame. This explains the visual unease of the forest interior shots relative to the open aspects of the distant or border forest shots. While the camera is constantly moving, the main horizontal framing is that of the wolves’ backs — thus we are aware of the most fleeting image of a wolf. There is also interesting use made of focus and light in this spot. There is no comfortable, in focus focal point, but rather a smattering of illuminated undergrowth, shafts of sunlight and the occasional blurred wolf body. The bordering forest shots are therefore a relief. In these we are given a longer depth of field, an open frame and calmer camera action. The integrated text which is
placed centre-left on the frame is salient in bold, white type. It reiterates what the voice-over has already said: making it a substantiated claim in a more formal and less atmospheric fashion. Another clear use of framing is in the last shot whereupon the frame is divided clearly into two distinct parts. The smaller segregated area is absolutely impermeable — very much like a government health warning on tobacco advertising. This is an attempt to divide the portrayal from the necessary facts. This announcement of who financed the spot and its approval by the President is, I believe, so standard as to be overlooked by most audiences. It is regulation to display such information and, as such, visually and practically routine.

‘Polar Bears’ and ‘Wolves (II)’

In an ironic twist of fate, man’s predators — those animals which have acquired the symbolism of danger, evil, stealth and strength — are now endangered due to their treatment at the hands of man (their status as ‘trophies’ arising out of the very qualities which have shaped their metaphorical resonance) and their habitat. In these two ads from the 2008 election, the ‘Defenders of Wildlife Action Group’ (a single-issue advocacy group) enlist not the mythological meanings these animals have, but rather the symbolism arising from their being an endangered (and native) species. Cast as innocent victims of Palin’s ‘brutal’ and ‘barbaric’ ‘savagery’, the metaphoric tables are turned and it is Palin, rather than the predator, who is seen as representing the worst in nature.
This is supported by an exceptionally unflattering picture of Palin (Fig. 37) in which she appears bloodless, recalling the Galenic diagnosis of humours and the blood-letting remedy.

Compounding this image is the effect of the red stain on screen: ambition wins over nature. In ‘Polar Bears’, left of screen, beside a similar picture to the one above (identified beneath as ‘Sarah Palin’), we get the following text:

‘Protecting polar bears gets in way of drilling for oil, says governor’ — The Times 5/23/08

The ‘exploitation’ of Nature’s resources in terms of drilling for oil carries over into a more general de-legitimating ‘exploitation’ (and even leads to a slight variation on the Obama team refrain of ‘we can’t afford four more years of the same’ by asking in a calm, soothing, female voice-over, and on-screen: ‘Do we really want another Vice President with these values?’). This slide (arguably
elision) from one meaning to another is a prominent feature of metaphor. Black writes:

This might be met by denying that all changes of meaning in the “associated commonplaces” must be counted as metaphorical shifts. Many of them are best described as extensions of meaning, because they do not involve apprehended connexions between two systems of concepts. [...] Secondly, I would not deny that a metaphor may involve a number of subordinate metaphors among its implications. But these subordinate metaphors are, I think, usually intended to be taken less “emphatically”, i.e., with less stress upon their implications. (Black, 1954-1955, pp. 289-290)

The ‘associated commonplaces’ which pertain to nature, then, have been subject to an ideological battle. One which fits very well into Bourdieu’s notion of the struggle for ‘symbolic power’. Is Nature to be, primarily, the source of metaphors which tell us about ourselves, or is it to be taken as an anthropomorphised entity that needs our protection? In the battle, the associated commonplaces are also altered: the Baconian control of nature can be viewed as scientific (and preserving), or masculine exploitation. The dichotomous relationship of male and female as regards nature is undermined here: either not all females are natural, or there is no natural affinity between Nature and the female. And yet, one step further, we can see that the assumption of women being naturally nurturing (nature often set against nurture) is also challenged.

8.5 Nature as Environment

Van Leeuwen states, slightly provocatively, that:

The poet and scholar Petrarch was the first European to climb a mountain for no other reason than to enjoy the view, in 1336. (van Leeuwen, 2009a)

We are so accustomed to the idea of Nature, conceived of as a coherent whole, and often — at least metaphorically — given a degree of sentience (Nature on her
knees; avenging Nature; accommodating Nature; long-suffering Nature), that the fact that ‘Nature’ is a construct is easily forgotten. Van Leeuwen goes on to write:

In the Renaissance, Europeans sought to break out of their immediate local environment, to move away from inward-looking reflection and mediation on religious matters. They cast their eyes on the far distance, seeking to explore the world, and their position in it. […] In the Romantic era, nature is no longer a rationally ordered universe, but an ancient, awe-inspiring, and sometimes frightening ‘other’ which can bring people face to face with their deeper selves. Rousseau and Goethe walked in nature, seeking to come to themselves, but also experiencing wild mood fluctuations, exhilaration as well as depression. (ibid.)

In his paper, van Leeuwen discusses landscape and perspective in both painting and music. By showing the evolution of the idea of nature and man’s place within it, it is clear that the battle (discussed in the previous section) between different metaphorical meanings and their symbolic purchase is bound up with religious and cultural positions. In the first ad I analyse here, there is an ambiguous use of symbolism and we can see this ad as sitting somewhat on the fence between these two sections. In the other ads, we can see an environmental focus. Although the environment has become a much more prominent political issue in the last few decades, it is not completely new and I briefly discuss an ad from Stevenson’s 1956 campaign in which nature is conceived of as a precious ‘resource’. The other ads selected focus on the cleanliness of the environment and its fragility.

8.5.1 ‘Orbiting’

In this ad from Mondale’s 1984 campaign, we get a mix of the religious and the scientific. The ad starts with the iconic picture of the Earth from space — the sphere of blue, white, and brown, surrounded by black. This image is often used to signify the insignificance of mankind. Yet it is also used to signify both
our uniqueness, and humans’ part in the Earth’s ecosystem. It is, primarily, a testament to science but this ad remains ambivalent about scientific advances in so far as they enable human incursions into ‘the heavens’. The transcript of the ad is:

It's from up here that President Reagan, if re-elected, is determined to orbit killer weapons. He'll spend a trillion dollars. The Russians will have to match us, and the arms race will rage out of control. Layer on layer--orbiting, aiming, waiting. Walter Mondale will draw the line at the heavens. No weapons in space, from either side. On November 6, draw that line with him.

In the ad, with the ominous and sinister soundtrack, the agency behind the ‘orbiting, aiming, waiting’ ‘killer weapons’ is ambiguous: Reagan puts them up there but once ‘out of control’, his agency disappears and is replaced by these layer upon layer of weapons apparently continuing to act of their own accord like some alien force. The figurative ‘drawing of a line’ is shown on screen, thereby looking more like a planetary shield (against those weapons?):

Figure 39: Orbiting: a line drawn
Of course, the common name of the space missile project was well known: ‘Star Wars’ — and this only increases the recognition of the ‘line as shield’, although I suspect the name has too much of a positive connotation (connected to the films of the same name) to be mentioned here (especially as the films were seen as representing the Cold War, with the U.S., naturally, as Good).

Van Leeuwen describes what he sees as a developing sense of nature from that first terrifying walk up a mountain to the Dutch Masters’ mastering of a perspective in which:

> On the one hand these paintings speak of the smallness of the human element in a vast world, under a vast sky. But vastness is no longer unsettling and anxiety-provoking. Human culture and nature have come together in a divine order that can be understood rationally, calculated, and trusted. (van Leeuwen, 2009a)

It is this order which Mondale is recalling and saying he will preserve. Below the line there is vastness and humanity, but the space above the line is the preserve of the divine, and should be maintained as such. By using the word ‘heavens’, a religious sensitivity is introduced: the idea that man is ‘playing God’ by such incursions into space. The soundtrack supports this claim being, although not quite unmeasured, certainly more suspenseful than rhythmical, recalling far more the ‘inhospitable, menacing’ ‘Twentieth century landscapes’ (both visual and musical), than the ‘landscapes of Vivaldi, Handel and Haydn’. Van Leeuwen again:

> Human action is by nature rhythmical and so an accompaniment in measured time can be said to relate to action — to represent it as well as to facilitate it, for instance in dance, or in ‘work songs’. Unmeasured time then contrasts to this by being ‘not human’, which, depending on the context, can signify ‘nature’, ‘outer space’, the ‘divine’, or anything else that can be constructed as ‘not human’. (ibid.)
In ‘Orbiting’, outer space and the divine are signified not only as not being human, but as it not being ethical/moral for them to be touched by (in the universal scale of things) childish (although dangerous) human conflict.

8.5.2 ‘National Parks’

On the 18th August, 1956, at a speech at the National Democratic Convention, Stevenson famously stated that:

The idea that you can merchandise candidates for high office like breakfast cereal — that you can gather votes like box tops — is, I think, the ultimate indignity to the democratic process.

This ad very much reflects this conviction: there is no music and the setting for his speech is staid. The visuals are stills, with very little noticeable attempt to manipulate emotion (apart from that which comes from the plain sight of landscape). That is the way Stevenson would have it: more Platonic that Sophist. His speech, which provides almost the full voiceover for the ad is not, however, without rhetorical flourish:

I'm Adlai Stevenson. Does anyone mind if I say something good about a Republican? Theodore Roosevelt was the first great champion of the development and the preservation of our natural resources: our rivers, our forests, our great national parks. Today, the Republican administration of Eisenhower and Nixon is undermining that policy. Look at Dixon-Yeats: Senate Republicans voted 96 per-cent to undermine TVA in favor of private power interests. Only a fighting Democratic opposition prevented the Republicans from giving away our raising lands, our national forests to private interests. Every time we give away natural resources, America is poorer. You--who own them--are poorer too. (my italics)

The self-legitimating tactic of being ‘above’ an automatic criticism of one’s opponents is, here, paired with a rhetorical question to which the listener’s answer (for the sake of their own self-legitimacy) must answer in the negative: ‘No, of course, I don’t mind — ’. Thereby the listener grants themselves — and
Stevenson — with legitimacy. In so doing, they form an alliance, an alliance which is reiteratated by the repetition of ‘our’. This, in turn, is used to contrast to the other which, is, by turns, the ‘private interests’, and the present Republicans, namely the Dixon — Yeats partnership on the 1956 election Republican ticket.

In so far as the preservation of ‘natural resources’ is the subject matter, the argument given for why this is important is rather vague: ‘Every time we give away natural resources, America is poorer. You — who own them — are poorer too’. The meaning of poverty itself is open here: if Stevenson is talking about monetarily valuable resources, then he would be promoting state-owned companies doing the exploitation he accuses the Republicans of selling off to private interests. However, the pictures of beautiful landscapes belie this interpretation. The poverty is one unconnected to monetary value: it is, instead, the loss of other benefits — a different type of ‘wealth’ — that enigmatic and intrinsic value of non-urbanised, un-peopled, nature. Stevenson is recalling the perceived importance of nature to man. As van Leeuwen writes:

Whether in the work of painters or composers, landscapes not only depict, they also have something to say about the relation between humans and the world in which they live. (van Leeuwen, 2009a)

However, in 1956, the fragility or endangerment of nature is not an issue — we are simply frittering away something valuable. Stevenson, in a radio address, earlier, in 1952, is quoted as saying:

Nature is indifferent to the survival of the human species, including Americans.

8.5.3 ‘Harbor’ and ‘Bay’
In these two ads from the 1988 election in which Bush was running as the Republican, and Dukakis as the Democrat candidate, the ‘environment’ seems a superficial front for — ironically — some political mud-slinging. Both are negative ads — Bush’s one, ‘Harbor’, entirely so. In both, the ‘environmental’ focus is upon the cleanliness — or otherwise — of bays. There is no discussion about the impact of the dirtiness **apart from** the financial implications; concerning these, the parties divide along stereotypical party lines (although note Dukakis’s attempt to trump such accusations of policy partisanship with ‘The nonpartisan League of Conservation Voters has endorsed Mike Dukakis.’). Therefore, in the Bush ad, the emphasis is on the cost of the clean-up to the tax payer due to Dukakis’s ‘lack of action’. It highlights not the environmental cost (by way of endangered wildlife, bio-diversity, or even sustainable livelihoods dependant on the harbour being clean), but the fact that Dukakis has been (according to them) both negligent in his representative duties and improvident in making and acting upon his priorities. The fundamental rhetorical aim of the ad is not, however, to highlight the plight of the environment, but to project and expand a negative portrayal of Dukakis into the future. At the last moment, the ad turns metaphorical:

And Michael Dukakis promises to do for America what he's done for Massachusetts.

The complicated connections between cleanliness, nature, human machinations and morality are all at play here: the dead fish in the harbour of secondary importance.

The Living Room Candidate website gives the following brief description of the Bush/Dukakis campaign:
The Bush campaign used brutal television advertising to portray Dukakis as an ineffective liberal who would gut the country’s defense system and let convicted murderers out of prison. Hoping voters would dismiss the attacks as unfair, Dukakis refused to counterattack until late in the campaign. By then it was too late. (The_Living_Room_Candidate, 2012)

In ‘Bay’ we can see Dukakis on the back foot, making a parry against the effective attack made in ‘Harbor’. Again, the rationale behind the drive for environmental ‘cleanliness’ is missing; again, the environment is a foil for an attack on policy and performance. The fiscal concern is refocused upon Bush’s support for ‘slashing’, ‘cutting’, ‘vetoing’, ‘opposing’ funds which would have gone towards a ‘clean up’. The absolute assumption here is that it is bad morally, politically and financially to ‘slash’ clean water. But, we are informed, such measures reflect ‘The Truth’, which belies ‘Bush’s False Advertising’. There is a parallel drawn here between Bush’s environmental record, and his integrity. The attack is not only upon Bush’s adopted policies, but his hypocrisy: Bush is not, metaphorically speaking, ‘clean water’.

8.5.4 ‘Matters’

This thirty second ad begins with a couple of second’s film of a gently flowing river, in which some leaves are floating with the current, and the sky – displaying a palette of sunrise/sunset colours – is reflected in the water. Our perspective is as if hovering over the river, a few feet up. This vantage point, being neither boat-bound nor bridge-bound, seems to encourage a disembodiment. This is further encouraged by the ethereal, new-age soundtrack (music with birdsong and sounds of water flowing initially intermingled) which plays for the duration of the ad. After the river scene, we have the set for the rest of the ad – a
brightly lit study in which Gore’s very smartly besuited head and shoulders are centrally framed and in focus (the camera pans around the room while keeping him in this central position). He makes the following speech:

[TEXT: Al Gore]

GORE: In this election, the environment itself is on the ballot. And there's a big difference between us. I'll never put polluters in charge of our environmental laws. I've worked for twenty-four years to protect our air and water and to hold polluters accountable. And I believe that if we act now we can reverse the tide of global warming. I hear some people say, you know, this election doesn't really matter. It does matter. Our air and water are at stake, and I need your help to protect them.

[TEXT: Al Gore for President]
(The_Living_Room_Candidate, 2013)

Al Gore, Vice President to the incumbent Clinton, was serious about the environment: whether that was wholly appreciated at the time of his vice-presidency, or during his presidential campaign, I am not sure. It has certainly been acknowledged since — and with such an acknowledgement, it is impossible to view his past in quite the same light. As an aside, it is interesting to note the constant reassessment forced upon my own analysis — especially with regards to the very recent past or contemporary political players, but also with regards to how ones assessment of the past political landscape is altered by that of the present. Gore looks quite radically left-of-centre from my vantage point today.

In ‘Matters’, Gore attempts to combine many pragmatic levels: first, the ad is a vehicle for him to present himself as having political gravitas. His possession of this is little in doubt due to his being the Vice President, but as well as reinforcing this feature of his positive self-presentation, it is used to draw a contrast between himself and his challenger, George W. Bush (and so, is also, by implication, negative other-presentation). Secondly, it aims to be generally
positive. This is an issue in every election when (as evidenced above) candidates are required to attempt to ‘balance’ positive and negative advertising in ways which still enable them to be ruthless competitors. Such an impression of general positivity also provides space for more negative messages to be couched within.

Thirdly, the ad aims to highlight the environment as an issue the handling of which has long-term implications — as opposed to it being a faddish or politically expedient issue\textsuperscript{46}. Fourthly, and connected to this, there is an attempt to impress upon the viewer the urgency and depth of the problem. In doing so, Gore is presented as calm, visionary and concerned whereas the Republicans (unnamed — but this is implicit in the form of a presidential race) are in league with ‘polluters’ (note that this not only challenges their policies, but also challenges their political integrity). There is also the use of the stereotypically emotive term ‘reverse the tide’ which could arguably be seen as fear-mongering (climate-sceptics would certainly claim this), but when it comes to ‘global warming’ perhaps ‘reversing the tide’ has a slightly less abstracted meaning. Finally, there is an attempt to arouse a pride of place (and where that dovetails with a sense of national identity — the repeated deictic use of ‘our’ and ‘your’ could be seen as appealing to this — all the better), but this ‘place’ is a generic, pretty and calm one. This summons up the corporate images of nature now used as a matter of course to signify green credentials (or at least a simulacrum of them). Hansen and Machin have analysed the way the environment is featured in the media, with

\textsuperscript{46} The full name of Al Gore’s most famous book is ‘An Inconvenient Truth: The Planetary Emergency of Global Warming and What We Can Do About It’, published in 2006. In it he says: ‘Although it is true that politics at times must play a crucial role in solving this problem, this is the kind of challenge that ought to completely transcend partisanship so whether you are a Democrat or a Republican, whether you voted for me or not, I very much hope that you will sense that my goal is to share with you both my passion for the Earth and my deep sense of concern for its fate’ (Introduction, Gore, 2006).
particular attention paid to the use of images from the Getty Images (cf. Machin, 2004) which they point out are, on the whole, generic and positive:

The more uses these images have the more revenue they are likely to generate. Therefore Getty promote image [sic] that are multipurpose and generic that no longer capture specific, unrepeateable moments. This is a photography which denotes general classes or types of people, places and things rather than specific people, places and things. […] This decontextualisation allows photographs to […] acquire a ‘conceptual’ feel. Where settings are shown, they are often out of focus and tend to appear over-exposed suffusing them with a feeling of brightness and airiness. Clearly, the world of the image bank is the bright and happy world of ‘positive thinking’ favoured by contemporary corporate ideology. (Hansen & Machin, 2008, pp. 784-785)

It is ironic that Al Gore — the most committed environmentalist presidential candidate since Theodore Roosevelt — produced an ad the appearance and soundtrack of which fits perfectly into the corporate green(wash?) mould. Hansen and Machin’s description of the ideal depiction of nature for such images could be a description of the nature shown in the ad:

Exteriors also tend to be generic. They are generic idyllic countryside scenes, not rugged or dangerous, but peaceful and depicted much as in a romantic painting (Macnaghten and Urry, 1998). These are not environments with which we interact but ones at which we look. […] In the exteriors there is much emphasis on water which is used to index relaxation, tranquillity, health and being carefree. We get a sense here of the way corporate visual language incorporates ‘new age’ ideas. Connotations of serenity, escape and freedom bring a sense of ‘philosophy’ or even morality into the corporate world of branding and consumerism. (ibid., pp. 785,790)

That Gore’s ads failed is evident from the fact that he was not elected. Why did they fail? We know that election campaigns are never aimed exclusively towards voters, as endorsements and financial backing are also needed. Is it possible that, in attempting to bring the corporations on-side, and to reassure the centrist majority that Gore was not an environmental extremist planning to do away with huge swathes of industry, that this ad catered to corporate advertising tastes? If so,
the genericity was overplayed. The sentimentality is overdone: the soundtrack is almost a caricature of itself, with synthesiser and strings playing a new-agey easy-listening melody, well matching the mawkish ‘nature’ scene. The balance between feel-good and hard-hitting is misjudged. In attempting to achieve legitimation on so many layers of signification and pragmatic action, this ad is — ironically — watered down, and, I would argue, less persuasive than if it had been more focussed.

8.6 Theoretical framework applied

In this section I shall operationalise my theoretical framework through an analysis of two ads looked at in earlier parts of the thesis. I aim to demonstrate how the framework may be applied, and how it allows us to look in detail at the function of different modes within a legitimating multimodal text, and at the multifaceted and multilayered legitimation made possible through the presence of multiple modes.

In that both my multimodal texts are political spot ads from the U.S., there is necessarily some duplication in the points to be made. However, the theoretical framework is designed to have wider application than only political spot-ads and therefore contains questions of genre and context which would not be necessary in a framework designed to look only at political multimodal ads from the U.S.

8.6.1 ‘The Threat’, Dole, 1996

In order to best demonstrate the systematicity of my framework, I shall go through each layer point by point, remembering that not all points will be salient in, or
relevant to, all texts. In such cases, I shall explain why I think this is the case, and then move on to the following point.

**Multimodal Resources**

- **Modes & Affordances:** In this ad there is the use of film, a composite mode which in this instance includes the use of black and white colour, visuals, a soundtrack, a voice-over narration, and (as part of the visual mode) on-screen text. Clearly, these modes do not offer the affordances offered by modes which can appeal directly to our touch or smell (although such appeals can be indirectly achieved through the text as, for example, the smell of the smoke from the crack-pipe is here, or the feeling of the insertion of the hypodermic needle). No mode has more legitimacy than another per se, but the (de)selection of a particular mode or combination of modes will have implications as to how the text is received. For example, if a text using one particular mode was known to be very cheap to produce, this would have to be taken into consideration by the producers with regards to whether they thought the audience would find the choice of what they knew to be a cheap production less legitimating than a highly expensive one.

- **Contextual demands:** there are technological limits to the definition of film possible to be viewed but in this instance, in 1996, the entire public would be likely to have (access to) a television capable of showing the film produced. (This has altered a little now with certain televisions and audio systems offering 3D, high definition, surround sound, etc.) There are
almost always financial constraints but unless we gained access to insider knowledge of someone privy to the financial constraints placed upon Dole’s advertising campaign, we have no grounds on which to make a detailed judgement. What we can say is that all presidential candidates for the two main parties in the U.S. have immense advertising budgets. In this ad, for example, even if it were (still) cheaper to produce a black and white film in 1996, I think we can be quite confident that the decision to make this ad in black and white was not down to financial considerations. There are, as has been mentioned, legal stipulations put upon ads in which there is a requirement to claim responsibility for the ad. This was not legally enacted until 2002 (‘Stand By Your Ad provision’, Wikipedia), so the authorship details on screen in the ad are voluntary (although, perhaps, ‘encouraged’). The interplay between contextual demands and legitimation can be as simple as meeting the letter of the law (legitimate as a quality), or demonstrating credibility by being ‘up to date’ (and thereby legitimate) in terms of technological advancement.

- **Cultural context**: in order to fill in the details of cultural context one has to decide what level of detail is required. First of all this involves the analyst (me in this case) accommodating within the analysis the gap between their own knowledge and the knowledge of their assumed reader. In this case, it might be appropriate to note that Dole’s adversary, the incumbent Clinton, had already had a very successful term in office, which made Dole’s job difficult. As this particular ad makes clear, there is a cultural knowledge assumed which, through time, readers (of a critique
such as this) or audiences (of the ad as a historical document) could not keep being assumed. There is the awareness of the ‘Daisy’ ad, the Cold War, the ‘War on Drugs’, as well as a much deeper and massive shared cultural knowledge of government agencies, the status of newspapers vis-à-vis ‘accurate’ information, legitimacy, statistics as a science, even the comprehension of the various contrasts drawn in the ad (‘healthy sport’ vs. ‘unhealthy drugs’, simple countryside vs. messy urban landscape). As should immediately be clear, the cultural context begs questions concerning value which are the subject of the layer (in this framework) of ‘Discourse-historical moral evaluation’.

- **Modal hierarchy**: I think it may be a good idea with this ad to start with the most obvious stylistic decision which is to present the ad in black and white. This would, as already discussed, have to be divorced from the notion that the lack of full colour was a financial move, or one enforced by technology. Once removed from any delegitimising implication that a lack of money or technology was the reason for the decision, the selection of black and white is very prominent stylistically. To purposefully deselect the mode of colour which affords so much, highlights the purpose behind the use of black and white (the details of which fall to the analysis of the ‘pragma-strategic level’). I think that this stylistic move makes the visual mode most prominent. Having said this, it is important to note that there is no definitive modal hierarchy: in the same way that people learn in different ways – some people are tactile learners, some people learn best through verbal repetition (thus through auditory modes), and some people
through visual modes – the decision as to what mode has most impact is not one which can ultimately be measured. However, salience – in this case through the visual film – is one way to attempt to sort between the modes. In this ad the spoken text (given on p. 324) is not hard-hitting. The impact gained through it comes more from the cadence and tone (the delivery) of the female narrator than through the actual words spoken. If we now look at the soundtrack (as separate from the voice-over, which is, of course, an artificial distinction as we experience the text), it is clearly dissonant and supports the ‘harsh’ black and white images of urban teen drug use. Because of its repetitive characteristic, I would suggest that although essential to create the scare-mongering mood, it is more easily viewed as supportive of the visuals than vice versa. The attempt to work out a modal hierarchy – if one is indeed thought to exist – helps the analyst pinpoint impact but comes up against the multimodal quality in which (in this ad for example) the soundtrack and the visuals are clearly mutually impacting.

• Temporal features: Spot ads are ‘traditionally’ thirty seconds long and this one conforms to this expectation. As previously mentioned, the ad ran as part of Dole’s 1996 campaign. It is a spot made specifically for this presidential campaign and appears to be one which ran nationally (rather than targeting any specific states). It would be interesting to see at what stage in Dole’s campaign this ad ran – and for how long. This would give us more of an idea as to what exactly was being countered, and how successful at delegitimating the Clinton administration the ad was deemed
to be at the time. The most interesting temporal feature of this ad is its explicit referencing to the ‘Daisy’ ad (the deictic characteristic of which shall be discussed within the ‘pragma-strategic level’). This puts ‘The Threat’ in a temporal relationship with an iconic ad (legitimating through association) while also bringing into the background the continuity of the presence of danger and war (while engaging in self-legitimation by referencing in a positive way an ad by someone – Johnson – from the other side of the political fence).

Pragma-strategic level

- **General strategy**: this is an attack ad, focussed on delegitimating the incumbent Clinton. The only positive undercurrent is that with the aim to draw a legitimating parallel between the successful ‘Daisy’ ad and this one (as discussed above). The black and white film, the soundtrack, the voice-over, and the text onscreen all contribute and support a negative message.

- **Macro speech act**: this is an accusation mixed with a more generalised message instilling fear.

- **Topic selection**: the main topic selected here is the War on Drugs and, more specifically, the need for it and Clinton’s failure to (move towards) winning it. Underlying this topic is the evolving but ever-present danger to children (in the U.S.). Additionally, however, *unlike* with the ‘pure’ and ‘innocent’ girl in the ‘Daisy’ ad, there is the simmering danger of drug-altered children-turned-youth to ‘America’
suggested in ‘The Threat’. This double-edged danger (to children and from children) pivots upon the status and agency of teenagers (see Section 8.3.6).

- **Supporting internal coherence:** clearly the visuals depicting drug use in a non-complimentary, non-recreational way, with the black and white film (hard-hitting, realistic, urban, etc.) and the close focus upon drug paraphernalia is supported by the voice-over and the soundtrack. We could say that there is emotional and informational coherence. The mood of the ad is reiterated in all the ways previously mentioned but there is also rhetorical coherence in terms of ‘support’ for the argument being put forward that drug abuse is a worsening problem. The newspaper headlines support this claim in two ways: first, it presents ‘external proof’ in a mode which we generally see as having a strong relationship to veracity; and secondly, it employs statistics – a ‘science’ dedicated to ‘facts’ and produced by (‘neutral’) ‘scientists’.

These statistics showing the percentage of increased use of different types of (illegal) drugs is immediately paralleled by the voice-over which contrasts the rise in use with the cuts made by Clinton. It is worth noting that the internal coherence between the filmed dealing and use of drugs, and the unresolved and dissonant chords, begs questions of the apparent ‘grammar’ that such a pairing taps into. To investigate why such a pairing ‘makes sense’ and seems coherent (there is nothing inherently coherent in this connection) we need to
move into the analytical territory covered by the ‘discourse-historical moral evaluation’.

- **Semiotic lexicon**: There are none of the standard symbols used here to represent either the U.S. (as a nation), or the political party of the candidate (in this case Republican). The reason for this, I would suggest, is that this is an entirely negative ad – it exhibits none of the changes which would accompany a presentation of what America would look like under Dole. In negative ads it is often at this juncture – after the negative presentation of the opponent, and at the point in which the ‘right’ alternative is given, that we are shown symbols of hope (from the perspective of the presenting candidate). The symbols used in this ad are those discussed previously in the thesis – the use of children and nature to represent innocence.

- **Foregrounding/backgrounding**: There is a very interesting framing of agency in this ad. The taking and dealing of drugs is both close-up, and anonymous (until the last frame in which we are confronted with the youth who is both victim and threat). This lack of agency paired with proximity of the action stands metaphorically for the status of the illegal drug world in general – undercover, hidden, yet ever-present and (from Dole’s perspective) criminal and threatening. The lack of agency also metaphorically represents the effect of drugs on addicts which the ad seeks to highlight: a dehumanising, a losing of oneself to bodily addiction (thus the people involved are faceless but bodied).
• **Rhetorical figures**: Although this is an attack ad, there is no visual representation of what Clinton’s administration has actually done wrong: the representation given is a generalised one of the effect of inaction. We *hear* he has made cuts (in money or jobs, it is not clear), but this statement is ‘trumped’ by a different kind of act – the one of Clinton having ‘his own Surgeon General’ *even consider* ‘legalizing drugs’. Here we have an example of propositional coercion: there is a drug problem (evidenced) and America needs changed (so that there is no drug problem); there is a War on Drugs which Bill Clinton ‘said he'd lead’. The fact that he had an advisor wanting to legalize drugs is presented as evidence that Clinton has ‘change[d] his mind’, and that he is no longer going to lead the War on Drugs. The possibility that legalizing drugs could be (in the professional opinion of the Surgeon General) the best way to lead the War on Drugs, is not given a space for consideration. Already mentioned is the metaphorical power of many of the elements present in the ad: countryside, young child, urban landscape, teenager, drugs. The clear metaphorical use of black and white – which presents issues as ‘black and white’ is one which I believe would be considered too simplistic if presented as such in the written text, but taps into a ‘commonsense’ belief that some things are clearer when bleached of their complexity (in this case symbolised by colour tone).

• **Deixis**: there are two noteworthy uses of deixis in this ad. The first is the time-frame given by the referencing of the ‘*Daisy*’ ad (*Thirty
years ago…Now…’). Putting the audience so explicitly into the recent history of the U.S. forces the comparison being made between then and now. There is even, in the tone of the narrator’s voice, the implication that the threat faced then was not as big as the threat now (‘Thirty years ago, the biggest threat to her was nuclear war. Today the threat is drugs’). Regardless of this being the case (and the tone of voice is nuanced enough to not make this certain), there is a definite equivalence drawn – and such an equivalence, with the history of the Cold War so foregrounded, makes the claim about the threat of drugs a grave one indeed. The second use of deixis is the visual one introduced above: the proximity to the viewer of the anonymous drug dealer/takers. The use of a very narrow depth of field heightens the effect. This is particularly the case in the second to last frame where there is a shift of focus from the basketball game being played in the background, to the crackpipe being smoked in the foreground. The soundtrack adds to the general effect by being a relatively quiet noise at loud volume (the chords on the strings seeming close due to their volume, rather than loud due to their volume over distance). The narrator’s voice too is quite loud though not projected.

- **Emotional manipulation**: The scare-mongering (or justified instilling of fear – depending on one’s own perspective) is an example of emotional manipulation. The visuals and the soundtrack do most of the work (in fact the rational statistics and calm narrator’s voice are set against this emotional effect – perhaps precisely to be able to deny
emotional manipulation). The tension created by the repeated chords on the strings paired with the film of drug use (an uncomfortable, near-taboo subject for ‘family viewing’) culminates in the confrontation of the teenager to us, the viewers, in the final frame. This is emphasised by a sudden, lower and then sustained bass note entering the soundtrack.

Justificatory Schema

Van Leeuwen’s (2007a) schema can be used to provide an extensive analysis of the legitimation of a text, particularly the manner in which a justification for the holding of legitimacy is given. Here I shall make a few important points in summary.

- **Authority:** this de-legitimating text uses Clinton’s misuse of his authority (as president) to challenge his legitimacy. Moreover, by challenging the judgment of Clinton’s Surgeon General, the ad de-legitimates Clinton on the grounds of his judgement of others.

- **Moral:** This is a heavily moralistic text which takes many things for granted: that society has a duty of care to children especially, that children are vulnerable, that illegal drugs are bad for teenagers and for society, and that the War on Drugs is the right way forward (and this on the understanding that such a war does not require considering legalization). In the ad, a lack of upholding all these values not only signals a lack of legitimacy as president, but signals a lack of qualification to be re-elected president.
- **Rationalization**: There is no argument made – as could potentially be made – that drugs cost too much to the federal state, or keep too many people out of work. Rationalization in this sense is not present. However, there is an implication that it is not only America’s children that suffer, but America in general (‘America deserves better’). Alongside the presentation of criminality, there is the possibility that the expense (in all senses) of crime, the penal system, and crime prevention in general is signalled. This would be easier to judge if we knew, for example, that the penal system had been a hot topic in this campaign.

- **Mythopoesis**: In a sense the narrative quality of this ad is incomplete: ‘Once upon a time a president was derelict in his duty to those under his care, the war was being lost –’. To be continued in one of two ways: Clinton continues to fail, or Dole saves the day. This implication is only possible because we, as the audience, know the context in which the ‘story’ is being told: that of a presidential campaign ad.

**Legitimation as a Process**

This ad does not challenge the status-quo. In fact, in its response to Clinton’s Surgeon General, it presents as a de-legitimating feature what it sees as a challenge to the status-quo (a possible legalisation of drugs). This is no surprise as both of the main parties in the U.S. stand on central ground where the biggest challenge to the definition of legitimacy is made by the rare ‘soft liberal’
tendencies of the Democrats, and the more hawkish tendencies of U.S. foreign policy.

**Legitimation as a Quality**

This ad attempts to de-legitimate Clinton based on his record in office. Seen as a test of his ability to be president, the ad finds Clinton left wanting. There is no challenge to his *being* the President, but in the upcoming election where he is running for office again, Dole’s ad attempts to show him as not possessing the requisite moral vision to be re-elected. Clearly, in a presidential election, the institution of the President (and very probably the wider political system) is unlikely to be challenged. Where the legitimacy of the president *is* challenged in a fundamental way is when the calculation of who the winner is, based on the counting of votes, cannot be agreed upon. Such a challenge took place in the 1994 presidential election between Al Gore and George W. Bush, where Bush received the minority of the popular vote but, because of the system of vote-counting in Florida, he was elected president. On a lower level, in every election, there are official complaints made regarding the polling, the registering, and the counting of votes (this is not a solely U.S. phenomenon).

**Discourse-historical moral evaluation**

If we take the primary subject matter – drugs – we can see that there is an assumed moral status with regards to them. First of all we are made to assume that what is meant by ‘drugs’ in the ad are those illegally classes substances which have various effects upon users. This is not an ad against alcohol or tobacco,
although it is an ad against cannabis, cocaine and LSD (and, we can assume, heroin, speed, and any derivatives). One hundred years ago cocaine and cannabis were prescribed drugs – given as medicine by doctors to cure ailments. LSD and speed also have chequered histories with regards to their legal, moral and medicinal status. A discourse-historical moral evaluation would look into the evolution of opinion (both public and expert) regarding drugs which in turn would help explain why this ad uses Clinton’s record (as the ad presents it) on drugs to de-legitimate him, but also why Clinton was able to have a Surgeon General who ‘even’ suggested legalization.

I have already discussed at some length the complex and contradictory moral values placed upon ‘children’ and ‘nature’ which are both relevant to the analysis of this ad. Other assumptions made could investigate why a female voice such as the narrator possesses holds the associations it does (calm, caring, rational, sensible, mature, maternal, teacherly?) and what each of these associations give the voice-over in terms of value. There is no end of depth into which such an analysis could go: why are ‘maternal’ or ‘calm’ viewed as positive, etc.? The decision as to how far an analyst should follow the trace of value in a quality or object (or some more complex composite situation) will depend on where the focus of the study lies. In this thesis I have wanted to challenge the assumptions built into the very meaning of legitimacy and have therefore followed this path quite far. Another analyst would want to take for granted themselves much of what was taken for granted in the analysed text. By using this framework it is at least possible to discuss which facet – which layer – of legitimation is being focussed upon.
Multimodal resources

- **Modes & Affordances**: As with ‘The Threat’, this ad uses film, a composite mode which in this instance includes the use of colour, oratory (rather than voice-over narration), text on-screen, music, and moving images. The affordances offered by these modes are employed to a fairly normal level (unlike in the previous analysis when the affordance for colour was not taken up). Certain affordances offered by modes are mutually exclusive so, for example, in this ad there is a choice taken to move smoothly from one frame into another – one image fades as another is gradually superimposed. It is not possible to employ this affordance offered by the moving picture at the same time as employing the affordance which allows frames to be changed with a sharp cut between the two. This is obvious, of course, but it is worth pointing out to highlight the fact that not all affordances offered by modes can be simultaneously employed (although even in a short ad a whole range of affordances may be engaged). The most notable use of the affordances offered by a mode in this ad is that of the use of colour. In the first scene, an idyllic countryside scene, the colours seem hyper-real. It is possible that the filmmaker has caught a moment in which this is ‘natural’, but this is neither here nor there with regards to how the audience may view it (although how they judge it may be affected – would knowing it was doctored alter the legitimating potential of the ad? And what if the film was taken with a
special filter thereby altering the colours but not through post-editing?). The hyper-real colours make the scene reminiscent of an impressionistic painting (such as a riverside scene by Monet). Here then the affordance of colour to imply mood and to reference other texts or a genre of texts is employed. Later, the use of a quality and colour of light is used (what exactly ‘light’ is if not the mode of which colour is an aspect is an interesting question). Gore’s face is lit from the side by a warm (reddish) ‘natural’ light connoting a great wealth of other qualities (e.g. healthy, natural, good, honest, positive, etc.).

- **Contextual demands**: The contextual demands upon this ad are the same as those upon ‘The Threat’.

- **Cultural context**: The wider cultural context for this ad is similar to that of the one from Dole’s campaign but there are some significant differences. This campaign ran four years later, after Clinton’s second term in office (meaning he could not run again). Gore, the Vice President during Clinton’s presidency now ran for president himself. Neither the incumbent nor a fresh face, Gore could play on his high status and proven ability in the second highest political office in the land, but he could also be tarred by the same brush as Clinton (and his last term in office was overshadowed by the Lewinsky sex scandal and subsequent impeachment). Bush entered on a conservative Republican ticket, running on the slogan ‘A Fresh Start’ although, with his father’s presidency having ended only eight years previous, he was not really an unknown quantity (and reassuring or terrifying on that count). The other bit of cultural
context required is that increasingly (and particularly since the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992) the state of the environment was a concern thought worthy of being included in a presidential campaign. Gore, a known environmentalist, was, perhaps, a little ahead of his time in thinking that the public would care quite as much as he encouraged them to do (‘Our air and water are at stake, and I need your help to protect them’). The environmental rhetoric was also by this time being taken on board by corporations who either felt compelled to be – or look like they were being – environmentally responsible. The images which supported their long environmental policy documents were often reminiscent of the one seen in this ad and, as such, this corporate PR might have been as likely to come to mind as a painting by Monet.

- **Modal hierarchy**: Gore was criticised for ‘the stiffness of his image’ (The_Living_Room_Candidate, 2013), and the positive ads were seen as a move to counter this. However, in this ad, I would argue that Gore’s message is most prominent. However, is it a pity (for him) that it has to be delivered – as opposed to silently read by the audience or reported by someone else) for his oratorical power leaves a great deal to be desired in terms of its emotionality and conveyance of passion. Failing in rousing oratory, the mood of the ad is carried by the soundtrack and the visuals. The soundtrack is a calm, ‘new-agey’, rather anodyne accompaniment (with the early addition of trickling music noises to accompany the shots of the river landscape), and the visuals are similarly calm, with the river and a slow panning camera shot showing Gore in a gently (and, as
discussed, warmly) lit study-type room. In this ad, the *multimodality* does not, in my view, successfully counter the fact that at heart this is a decently written short message-statement by Gore, badly delivered.

- **Temporal features**: The ad is from 2000 (with hindsight, notably just pre-9/11), and runs for the common thirty seconds. It references Gore’s twenty-four years in public office as well as referencing the ‘tide of global warming’ which is actually as much a reference to time as it is to rising sea levels – tides being events or processes in which time and sea level interact. The deictic nature of this referencing will be discussed in the ‘pragma-strategic level’ discussed below.

**Pragma-strategic level**

- **General strategy**: This is a positive ad for the most part, aimed at legitimating Gore. There is a negative but implicit attack on Bush in the statement ‘I'll never put polluters in charge of our environmental laws’. If this is not a straw-man argument, then the implication is that Gore would never do such a corrupt and irresponsible thing but that others (read *Bush*) would do so. There is also a degree of negativity in the subject matter being one in which the environment is in danger and valuable resources not only ‘at stake’, but that a reversal (not only a halting) needs to occur to put things right.

- **Macro speech act**: This is an invitation paired with a promise: help (vote for) Gore and he promises to protect the valuable natural resources.
• **Topic selection**: The main topic here is Gore’s strong record on and commitment to the environment. Other aspects of the environment are drawn out: its aesthetic and moral quality, its vulnerability, and its precarious state of being almost irreversibly damaged. These other aspects of the main topic are all made to appeal to different hopes, fears, sensibilities and judgments of the audience, but finally result in the audience choosing to vote for Gore.

• **Supporting internal coherence**: There is strong supporting internal coherence in this ad with the light and colours seen in the first nature shot repeated in the long, slow, panning frame of Gore. This slow movement also emulates (metaphorically) the atmosphere created (or presented as existing) in the idyllic scene. (We are not supposed to imagine the amoral, harsh, violent side of nature as we survey the river, trees, and sunlight.) The soundtrack too provides coherence between all the elements in the text, maintaining the ‘lightness’ despite the occasionally negative import of Gore’s message.

• **Semiotic lexicon**: There are two good (and stereotypical) examples from the visual mode. First, the set in which Gore speaks his message is composed of elements designed to signify to us various positive characteristics. The room itself seems to be a comfortable type of study – not too messy, nor too neat; not too grand, but clearly not a hovel. Gore is placed in an atmosphere which makes him respectable but approachable. The books on the bookshelves are not aligned so neatly as to seem like set pieces – they look read and thus we are to imagine that Gore has read
them, that he’s a reader, and learned and knowledgeable on that account. Furthermore, the nicely framed picture on the wall, which appears towards the end of the ad is reminiscent, in its colours, of the riverside scene at the start of the ad. This coherence reconfirms the bond which Gore is informing us he has: he has internalised the best of a calm nature by respecting its beauty, protecting its qualities of cleanliness and purity, and embodying its calmness. Secondly, there is a very common use of colours to show allegiance to the Nation (through the concerted use of the colours of the flag). Gore’s white shirt and red tie is met with the blue line under the on-screen text ‘Al Gore’ (and above the text ‘for President’). This hue of blue is duplicated by the blue in the framed picture (bringing us back around to the matching blue in the image of the American idyll). In my description of the soundtrack, the semiotic work done by it is already made clear. In fact in most description of music the semiotic work done by it is reflected. Thus, in this ad, the music is ‘calm’ and ‘new-agey’: there is nothing about the music (the notes, the instrumentation, etc.) inherently so but we often use the values accorded to the music to describe it aesthetically to others.

• **Foregrounding/backgrounding:** Pollution is a tricky subject politically, especially when it is discussed on the planetary scale of ‘global warming’, as opposed to the bad effect of a few greedy corporations (and even here, with financial backers often tied to industry, political players must take care). The public do not wish to be told that they are polluters (even though the fact of the matter is that most of them are – the U.S. as a huge
industrialised nation is one of the most culpable). In this ad Gore points out the fact that the water and air is being polluted, that is needs protection. He makes a clear rhetorical move away from blaming the public by actually blaming two groups – the polluters (nameless) and, most gravely, the politicians who put such polluters ‘in charge of our environmental laws’. The buck stops at the politicians – but not at him, he has been ‘working for twenty-four years to protect our air and water and to hold polluters accountable’. In this way, agency, although not identified, is narrowed down to include (the predecessors of) those he is competing against.

- **Rhetorical figures**: The use of visual and musical metaphor has been mentioned. Here there is a connection made between: a physical lack of chemicals we have chosen to call ‘pollutants’, running water in a river, cleanliness, purity, and rectitude. Note that we often choose to soak ourselves in water into which we add ‘bad’ chemicals and when we come out, we think of ourselves as clean and not polluted. Conversely, ‘clean’ rivers may not have the chemicals we dispose of after cleaning ourselves in them, but many of us would think we were dirty were we to fall in. Thus the ease with which we make these metaphorical moves relies on something other than our empirical experience. This is straying into the territory of discourse-historical moral evaluation but I want to make the point that the complexity of the metaphors employed in this ad is belied by the ease with which we process them in a ‘commonsensical’ way.
• **Deixis:** Three points can be made here – each concerning a different mode. The first point to make is that when the ad starts, the musical soundtrack is embellished by the sound of trickling water. The trickling water – despite being trickling – is relatively loud for the audience. This brings us figuratively into close proximity with the source of the noise, a closer proximity, indeed, than is suggested by our viewing position of the countryside scene. This allows us to be situated in two places at once – one from which to see the beauty, wholeness and lack of human habitation of the nature being/need of protection – and the other from which we feel included within the scene and the tranquillity it seems to offer. The second point to make is that although the camera pans round slowly while Gore talks, Gore is always addressing us, the audience, directly. This puts us into an intimate situation with him, adding to the impression of his genuineness (and attempting to counter his image as a rather wooden character). The third point concerns the details of his short speech. The first use of a pronoun is ‘us’, meaning Gore and Bush (but Bush remains unnamed). Then we get the hanging ‘I’ll never put polluters…’ which begs the question of comparison, for which we have already been given (indirectly) our subject: Bush. Then, after some uses of ‘I’, there is a ‘we’. However, in *this* case, the ‘we’ is either Gore and everyone else or, more likely, it is Gore and us, his addressees (and excluding the ‘supporter-of-polluters’, Bush). Finally, Gore reiterates this bond between him and us (the audience), by naming a commonality – ‘Our air and water’ – and then appealing to us (‘I need your help to protect them’). A request for help to
do something worthy against the forces of bad is a very good legitimating strategy, countering the danger I have discussed of the public feeling guilty about being called out on their polluting habits.

- **Emotional manipulation:** There is a clear attempt to make us take a romantic view of nature and to accept the metaphorical mileage our romantic view takes us. The lack of science is notable in an ad concerning global warming. The music is sentimentalised and saccharine sweet: clearly meant to maintain the pleasantness of the ad while not rocking any boats or turning-off any listeners.

**Justificatory Schema**

- **Authority:** The ad is, on the surface of it, surprising in this aspect. There is no direct attempt to legitimate using authority – that of authority through custom and tradition, by position, or by commendation. This ad works on the belief that Gore will have authority because he is the Vice President (and now also the Democratic presidential candidate); he has an implicit commendation from the President (who has just run his maximum term in office) in that he was chosen to be his running partner; and he has authority through custom because it is customary that a Vice President of two terms will be accorded a large degree of authority. Therefore, Gore is legitimated in a double sense: by demonstrating that he is able to assume that he has authority, and not feeling it necessary to ‘prove’ it.

- **Moral:** I have discussed some of the moral elements already. To add to the points already made, it is worthwhile pointing out the moral status of years
of work. Although Gore does not mention ‘public service’, it is clear that twenty-four years working as a polluter would not be quite as legitimating, even though it may involve the same ‘amount’ of work.

- **Rationalization:** This ad does not use rationalization as a means for legitimation. It is, of course, possible to argue that as *resources*, water and air need to be kept clean. But this does not fit with the romantic view of nature being presented, or the benevolent-protector image Gore is presenting. There is mention made to accountability, which is often taken as a type of rationalisation, but here this is not obviously the case (although by using the word ‘accountability’, Gore does tap into that strain of thought).

- **Mythopoesis:** This is, as with the last ad, an unfinished story. This one is classic: ‘there is a beautiful, unspoilt place we call home; some bad, greedy people damage it; we must unite and protect it against the enemy. If we do, we will be able to return to our idyll’. It is perhaps because of the need in this narrative of a ‘baddy’, but a failure to directly name one for the audience, that ultimately signals this ad as a failure.

**Legitimation as a Process**

Again, being the political ad of a candidate for a mainstream political party, this text does not challenge the fundamental process of which the ad is a part (this is not an impossibility: the Liberal Democrats in the U.K. included in their manifesto significant changes they said they would make to the electoral system were they to be elected). It would be particularly unlikely in an ad from Gore’s
campaign as he is presenting himself (accurately) as playing an important part in the political structure as it stands. De-legitimating the process of which he is and has been a part would be likely to backfire as it would at the same time undermine the very points on which he is able to legitimate himself and de-legitimate his opponent, George W. Bush.

**Legitimation as a Quality**

Considering Gore’s role as a Vice President attempting to become President, it is possible that he would distance himself somewhat from the president he has been working under (Clinton in this case), and especially any legal or moral misdemeanours that the president may have been found guilty of. However, this ad does not deal with these issues (and, in fact, the Bush campaign did not exploit Gore’s connection to Clinton in this regard as much as it might have) and there is no mention of any legitimate body having become illegitimate over time. There is mention made of an illegitimate practice – putting ‘polluters in charge of our environmental laws’ – but this is not presented as something which was legitimate and no longer is, rather something which is (unalteringly) illegitimate.

**Discourse-historical Moral Evaluation**

Rousseau’s great influence upon our moral evaluation is discussed in Section 5.2.5: this ad, with its uninhabited countryside idyllic scene, taps into Rousseauian notions of nature and the attendant values of cleanliness, simplicity, moral goodness, and purity. Contrasting with this is the ‘corruption’ heavily implied by the action of ‘put[ting] polluters in charge of our environmental laws’. There is
also in evidence in the ad a shift in the status of nature: no longer a reliable 
universal force but something which (re-presented as ‘the environment’) needs to 
be protected – a role that Gore says he has been striving to succeed in for twenty-
four years. This shift has implications for the very way we view a scene such as 
the riverside one given at the beginning of the ad: the same scene viewed by an 
audience, say, a hundred years ago, might see Gore’s self-stated role as 
environmental protector as superfluous or deluded, rather than as legitimate and 
politically relevant. The parallel in mood drawn between the calm scene and 
Gore’s calm demeanour only works if the qualities and associated moral values of 
the outer countryside scene are taken as a given; only then can Gore be seen to 
‘possess’ some of the moral qualities of the environment he is in, caring of, and in 
care of.

8.7 Typology

Below is a typology, presented in tabulated form, of political spot ads’ 
multimodality as has emerged from the analytical chapters. In it I have included 
each ad analysed, chronologically organised from earliest to most recent (1956-
‘colour’, ‘black and white’, ‘voice-over’, ‘oratory’, ‘soundtrack’, and ‘text on-
screen’. ‘Oratory’ is a category aimed at capturing speech made which is not the 
narrator’s. To the right of five of these columns are columns labelled ‘Em’, which 
stands for ‘embedded’. The ads make use of the ability to embed a mode inside 
another mode. For example, a still image in black and white of a candidate’s face 
may be embedded within a colour film; or a newspaper article may be presented
as a readable prop inside the film of an ad. The inclusion in the typology of the
possibility of embedding helps to reflect the complexity of the multimodality in
evidence in the spot-ads.

There are a few abbreviations used:

- Em: embedded
- sep: sepia (a variation on black and white)
- s: as part of the ‘Stand by your Ad’ provision in which candidates assume
  responsibility for the ad.

Figure 40: Typology of spot ads' multimodality
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of spot</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Moving image</th>
<th>Em</th>
<th>Still image</th>
<th>Em</th>
<th>Colour</th>
<th>B&amp;W</th>
<th>Em</th>
<th>Voice-over</th>
<th>Oratory</th>
<th>Em</th>
<th>Soundtrack</th>
<th>Text onscreen</th>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>National Parks</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daisy</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<td>Icecream</td>
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<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>Poverty</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<td>✓</td>
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<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<td>✓</td>
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<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<td>✓</td>
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<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>Wolves (II)</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know Much</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>✓</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>Don’t Vote Alone</td>
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<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yes We Can</td>
<td>2008</td>
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<td>x</td>
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</table>
CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION

9.1 Introduction

Some studies are undertaken to look for answers to specific questions, which, it is hoped, a methodical, focussed, and insightful application of theory to data will bring to light. This study was not undertaken for such a reason. It resulted from a compulsion to investigate what appeared to be either holes or discrepancies in what I had come across thus far. That is, this study was undertaken very much due to a feeling of discontent: I had not formulated specific questions I wanted answered. The exact cause of my discontent was unknown to me, although I could articulate the misgivings I had in the theory which lay before me. Coming from a literary background via a politically motivated immersion in Critical Discourse Analysis, my focus was upon legitimation. What made something (il)legitimate? What assumptions lay behind such judgements — are they ideological or methodological? Was the study of legitimacy necessarily confined to the institutional language most often studied? Indeed, was it even confined to language? This has remained my focus. However, layered upon this was a feeling that, as admirable and vital as I recognised the various studies undertaken by critical discourse analysts to be, something large was missing. My study, therefore, has been more exploratory than resolving: it has been a quest for a missing part, which is one of the many ways to achieve a new contribution to knowledge.

My instinct was to start by looking beyond the traditional confines of language. In this, I was following in the steps of many others: for decades the
notion that the pictures accompanying the text, the voice that spoke the words, mattered, had been gaining attention. Sometimes the images belied the words, sometimes the voice was so strong it did not seem to matter what was said. These observations had a venerable heritage in the Ancient Greek philosophers, even if the arts they concerned were oft considered, by Aristotle at least, ‘vulgar’: ‘An Art concerned with [the delivery of oratory] has not yet been composed […] and delivery seems a vulgar matter when rightly understood’ (Aristotle, 2007, p. 195).

And yet, still, simply transposing linguistic methods of analysis onto other modes seemed in some way wrong: on what grounds did it seem necessary only to apply linguistic approaches to other modes? Why this bias? Why this modal hierarchy?

This question of linguistic bias has proven to be crucial in understanding legitimation and the ideological basis behind its different incarnations. The social semiotic work of van Leeuwen, greatly influential upon my own thinking, has encouraged my a-disciplinary inclinations. Van Dijk’s definition of critical discourse analysis too, has been inspiring:

Critical discourse studies is not a method or a theory. It is a movement of critical scholars. It’s like a movement of people who are politically and socially engaged in the work they do. And it uses any kind of method or theory that you can find in discourse analysis, in linguistics, in the social sciences, in psychology, and so on. It depends on the aims of the research. (van Dijk, 2008)

I count myself within this movement of critical scholars, and yet, in pressing against linguistic boundaries, I have found myself firmly within the field of multimodality; in fact, I would term myself a multimodalist. Such a positioning exponentially increases the semiotic resources and productions under investigation, for not only does the linguistic mode become one among many, but
the interactions between the many are also necessary subjects of study. The serious implications of such a stance have become increasingly apparent.

First, by attempting to negotiate such a huge canvas, specialism, by needs, must be taken on second-hand — or not at all. The cost-benefit analysis of this is yet to be seen. Everyone can try their hand at putting things together: the internet is testimony to such democratisation of analysis. Of course, there are worries that misinformation multiplies without precedent, and that there is not enough information control, assessing and perhaps legislating to an ‘acceptable’ standard (yet, we can take heart in the similarities this holds with Orwell’s Oldspeak speaking proles in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*).

Secondly, there is the potential for levelling the modal hierarchy which sits as a basic assumption, not only in linguistic departments, but more generally in both academia, and in wider societal considerations of legitimacy. Pulling language off its pedestal does not necessarily deny its privileged position in certain spheres, or in certain circumstances. Yet, by placing it on an even playing field (or at least *attempting to*), and requiring its superiority (where it may possess it) to be argued for, gives it meritocratic rather than aristocratic legitimacy: *legitimate* legitimacy.

Thirdly, in the process of arguing for why the other modes deserve consideration, it has become apparent that rather than language being one-step removed, and residing on a higher plain from the other ‘emotional’ modes, language sits in the body of the kirk, with equally emotive potential: pulpit eloquence unites Architecture’s soaring ribbed vaults, with the strains of the pipe organ and the scent of incense. The attempt to deny the emotionality of language
to bleach it of emotional resonance — is the result of the twin desires to control its meaning, and to purge it of its irrationality. If language could be (revealed as being) mechanised, formulised and made uniformly universal, then, by applying rational thinking (through the verifiable application of legitimate, scientific, methodology), a predictable and rational interpretation would be reached. And if one can predict, then one can control. These pairings of rationality and language on the one hand, and irrationality and emotions on the other, runs deep and long. The Enlightenment’s panacea of rational science seemed to hold the promise of curing the world of superstition and the terrible consequences it had had. However, other, less laudable dichotomies were embraced under the rubric and legitimate status of Rationality.

Yet, it could not continue thus: women, Nature, the body, children, the foreign Other, the ill, and the passionate, could not remain (as) repressed. Freud’s medicalising of the unconscious seems a double-edged sword in this regard — admitting the importance of the irrational, yet looking to frame it within the context of scientific problems and medical syndromes. Many permutations of what had to happen, did happen. The ‘legitimacy’ of Science as the ultimate in rationality was shaken to its core by its sickening abetting of the Final Solution through racist Social Darwinism. The post-colonial and female reactions to being thus branded undermined both the notion of rationality and of legitimation, and with it, the most sanitised version of scientific language which had been used to package and present this ideology. With the fallacious assumptions exposed, a reassessment could be made. What did rationality now stand for and ought it still be the bed-mate of legitimacy? Was rationality to be expanded to admit what had
hitherto been viewed as irrational so as to accord it legitimacy, or was the gold standard of legitimacy to be completely decoupled from rationality so as to be able to assign legitimacy to the irrational?

A crisis in confidence was announced: Habermas’ *Legitimation Crisis*, and Adorno and Horkheimer’s *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, both Marxist in outlook, questioned the direction of Western society, as well as reappraising its history in light of its present state. Adorno, particularly, with his musical, literary, and artistic interests manifest, can be seen as a modern figure linking both multimodality and legitimation. Not so much, perhaps, in contributing to a reappraisal of the irrational, but certainly in placing on similar (if not equal) footing, different artistic modes. He also theorised as to how Art could regain legitimacy (and from his Marxist standpoint, this was necessarily political). However, it was the much maligned postmodernists who really challenged the status-quo concerning mode and legitimacy: their pastiche (seeming to many to be apolitical47) of previous forms was both a challenge and a send up. As with the Modernists before them, the canonisation and veneration of particular styles was seen as stultifying:

The only escape from rule-governed art is to suppress from consciousness the canons behind one’s creativity — hardly a comforting liberation. And it’s practically impossible to remain ignorant of these, at least of antecedent ones, in an age of constant communication and theorising. […] To conclude this survey of Postmodern Classicism we might summarise a few of the more outstanding canons that lie behind the new art and architecture. […] Rules, however, do not necessarily a masterpiece make, and tend to generate new sets of dead-ends, imbalances and urban problems. Hence the ambivalence of our age to orthodoxy and the

47 Achille Bonito Oliva writes: ‘The failure of political discourse and ideological dogma has caused the superstition of art as a progressive attitude to be overcome. Artists have realized that the principles of progressivist thought can be reduced, in the final analysis, to an internal progression or evolution of language along the lines of escape which parallel the utopian escape from ideology.’ (Oliva, 1993, p. 258)
romantic impulse to challenge all canons of art and architecture while, at
the same time, retaining them as a necessary precondition for creation:
simultaneously promoting rules and breaking them. (Jencks, 1993)

The (now so-called) legitimacy of High Culture was challenged and a celebration
of omnivorous mongrelisation came about. Architects built duck sheds, authors
wrote books with multiple endings, musicians composed works of complete
silence. In celebrating Low Culture (perhaps not for its own sake, so much as to
be contrary: postmodernists are not renown for their regard of the masses), a
certain democratisation occurred. This, coupled with the challenge to the assumed
legitimacy of Rationality and the mode of language as its logical mode of
transmission, meant that multimodal considerations and reappraisals seemed
logical.

9.2 Original contribution to knowledge

A study conjoining legitimation and multimodality, for the purposes of
further understanding legitimation by multimodal means is not one I am aware has
been previously undertaken. The value of such a study can be seen as shared out
between the two individual areas — legitimation and multimodality — and as
contributing to the smaller but important area of legitimation by multimodal
means, in which the two more theorised concepts come together and interact. This
is the theoretical contribution I shall outline below. This study in particular has
been focussed on American political spot advertisements. There is a great deal of
scholarship focussed upon advertising, and a fair proportion of this deals with
political advertising. Therefore my own contribution is, again, one of focus: by
concentrating on how the ads legitimate by employing their multimodal
affordances, I offer what I hope to be useful insight into their makeup and functioning (detailed below).

In this thesis I have taken a two-pronged approach to looking at multimodality: on the one hand I have highlighted its importance with regards to legitimation, by showing, for example, how modes can support or undermine the purported (main) message; or by demonstrating how multimodal metaphor can ‘say’ what would be judged socially unacceptable if said in spoken or written language. On the other hand I have attempted to hold language up to a fresh analysis in light of the questions raised by investigating legitimation by multimodal means. This has challenged the role of language as the rational mode (and thereby shaken its assumed modal primacy). By exposing the irrational in language, I hope to have added to the discussion about the status of various modes, including that of written and spoken language. And, although not an original contribution to knowledge, in advocating this position of more modal equality, and in illustrating the complexity and prevalence of legitimation by multimodal means, I hope to have, in a very small way, increased the disciplinary legitimacy of multimodality itself.

As regards contributing to the body of work on legitimation, I feel it necessary to restate the qualification that legitimation being such an immense ‘topic’ (if one can call it that), my grasp on its scholarly treatment is limited to the reach I have been able to make outward from Linguistics, over the last five years or so. That being said, I do feel confident in saying that this thesis builds on previous work done on legitimation from my own (or a contiguous) field of study.
This study has brought to the fore the political nature of legitimation and, with reference to Bourdieu, highlights the importance of ‘embodiment’. I have made the tentative suggestion (it warrants more focused attention) that embodiment could perhaps be usefully treated as a mode unto itself (with its own affordances — although whether agency is a necessary feature of affordance would also have to be considered).

I have attempted to offer two distinct ways of conceiving of legitimation: the first concerning legitimation as a quality which something/somebody is said to possess; and the second concerning legitimation as a process (although this quality/process distinction is not nearly as clear as the dichotomy sounds). With the first I have differentiated between illegitimate Legitimation and legitimate Legitimation (cf. Sec. 5.2.1). The first arises when there is a reification of the quality with a specific entity. Therefore, the Ruler is deemed legitimate because of being the Ruler. This is illegitimate Legitimacy because it makes — and requires — no recourse to the more fundamental reasons of why it lays claim to the label ‘legitimate’ (recall Edmund’s rejection of being branded ‘illegitimate’ through ‘plague of custom’). Legitimate Legitimation is that which is claimed on the basis that it satisfies the (cultural and societal) stipulations for laying claim to the label ‘legitimate’.

Secondly, I have found it useful to conceive of the process of legitimation as if on a spectrum analogous to that used in ecology — ranging from soft to deep. This spectrum reflects the underlying challenge being made in the classification to the status-quo, the received understanding, the consensus of the age. I tried to emphasise, however, that this should not be seen as a rewording of
‘weak’ to ‘strong’, as my example of Mary Wollstonecraft’s legitimising rhetoric of women’s right to education hopefully demonstrated. Although she was not challenging the basic framework of legitimation (what it meant, and with what requisite qualities it should be conferred), she was advocating for women’s inclusion in the opportunities to be thus judged. On the other end of the spectrum, a group that rejected outright the basis for what their society classed as legitimate, and drew up their own code (not necessarily explicitly) for what was and was not legitimate would be engaging in deep legitimation.

As well as offering these two distinct ways of conceiving of legitimation, I have constructed a theoretical framework, presented in Chapter Three, which, it is hoped, can be taken away and used on any multimodal text in order to investigate how the text legitimates.

In Chapter Seven, with reference to one incarnation of the American Dream, I pulled together the legitimation strategy of mythopoesis identified by van Leeuwen (van Leeuwen, 2007a), his work on templates and semiotic regimes, with a discussion of where tangibility sits in this discussion. Clearly, legitimation is conceptual and as such not to be ‘found’ in the world. However, in its conferral, it can be applied to other concepts, or to ‘things in the world’ (or to a combination of these) and I discussed some of the implications these permutations have — particularly in regards to inhibiting or enhancing affordances. I ended this section by casting back upon language what the maddening (Barthes, 1984) fact of interpretation throws up: that containment of meaning is futile (Joseph, 2010c).

The theoretical contributions noted above have evolved in tandem with the investigation into — and analysis of — the ads. This thesis is neither theory, not
data driven: I have attempted to let insights from each feed into the development and direction taken. In Chapter Six, I turned to look at the importance of modal salience and modal hierarchy. I offered the following new insights: the legitimating features of a relatively stable genre — the political speech — can be altered by its adoption into a multimodal context. In the case of Obama’s speech, the legitimating qualities discerned in the rhetoric are emphasised and enhanced by other modal layers. The prowess of Obama’s rhetorical delivery is foregrounded by musical rhythm and frame changes. Supplementing this are additional legitimating layers: the visuals put Obama into a new context, at the same time as reflecting the original one. That is, while still shown in the highly legitimating role as a masterly public speaker, Obama is placed into the legitimating context of belonging to (or at least not being at odds or dissonant with) a ‘representative’ multicultural grouping of beautiful, young and gifted people who are, through their participation, endorsing him.

The power of genre to legitimate was taken up again in the analysis of the ad ‘Don’t Vote Alone’. In this, I argued, the established modal hierarchy for legitimation purposes is inverted. Words are not primary: the pairing of contemporary youth music (albeit of a rather generic sort) with a cutting edge visual style aimed, it appears, at a very specific demographic, have the main legitimating force. Such genre selection (and by definition de-selection) affords, it appears, quite a nuanced message to be crafted. On the one hand, obviously, the specified genres attract a certain demographic: this legitimates Obama by association. It is of no consequence if, in actual fact, he is au fait with the genres used — Silverstein’s political message and emblems of identity are what matters
(Silverstein, 2011). Furthermore, these genres, while they attract a certain demographic, are almost certainly off-putting to others. I addressed the question: can this be so carefully honed that the ‘correct’ (Democrat-voting) demographic is encouraged to vote, whilst (at least sections of) the Republican-voting demographic is disencouraged to vote at all? I believe that this (somewhat cynically propounded) possibility is worthy of further investigation. There is always fear voiced of the possibility and unbridled potential of subliminal advertising. While not subliminal, the possibility that genre could be used as a banal (Billig, 1995) tool for affecting political disengagement was, to me, striking.

In my analysis of Obama’s ‘Don’t Know Much’ ad, I suggested that there is a careful balancing act taking place in which the associations deriving from the intertextually referenced song ‘Wonderful World’, are split: the legitimating ones being claimed by Obama; the delegitimating ones being conferred onto McCain. Again, the complexity of such a machination surprised me.

In Chapter Seven, my analysis brought together facets of the American Dream myth which underlie the legitimation of many of the ads, yet seem to remain implicit. My discussion of the importance of the materiality of myth, as well as its character of being realised through multimodal means is given more depth by my analysis of one specific manifestation of this myth: the frontier version. On this I offered an original analytical perspective incorporating van Leeuwen’s insights into templates and semiotic regimes, with a discussion of Kress’s reassertion of agency into the (social semiotic) sign.

In Chapter Eight I analysed ads which exploit the semiotic richness of the concept of nature. Having previously highlighted the enduring influence of the
Rousseauian view, I concentrated upon the role of children in these ads. Particularly revelatory to me was the far more ambivalent role (or complete absence) of teenagers. This seemed to be best explained by their age being a halfway house: in terms of agency, socialisation, innocence, and both physical and mental maturity.

After looking into the role of childhood (as an aspect of nature) in the ads, I turned to look at the metaphorical role nature has. The tension between a clichéd metaphor and a fresh (or as the Dadaists would desire it, ‘shocking’) juxtaposition remains grounds of negotiation. The legitimating role of the known and expected exists alongside the legitimation derived from a metaphor whose force lies in its unexpected aptness. Furthermore, the contested ground of the very meaning of nature revealed itself as being a site, too, of political struggle. Wolves as metaphor were pitted against wolves as a real and endangered part of nature. I found this set of advertisements particularly rich — not only with this specific play-off, but also in the way that the definition of nature is an ongoing political battle-ground seen also to interact with influential representations of nature found in other fields, namely business publications (Hansen & Machin, 2008). The ironic legitimating failure of the Gore ad was sobering, reaffirming as it does the importance of ‘political message’ over political qualifications or integrity. Sobering, but not surprising. I end Chapter Eight by providing a typology of political spot ads’ multimodality as emerged from the analyses.

9.4 Towards a critical pedagogy
A PhD by its nature is an insular product, its requirement to contain an original contribution to knowledge not coupled with any demands upon the dissemination of that original contribution, although the buzzwords (taken up by many of the large academic funding bodies) of ‘impact’, ‘knowledge transfer’ and ‘collaborative learning’ point in this direction. I see my own contribution to knowledge as fitting in to the discussions of literacy and critical thinking, as relevant today as they were in Aristotle’s day. I quoted, in the literature review, from *On Rhetoric*, and I repeat that quote here:

One should be able to argue persuasively on either side of a question, […] not that we may actually do both (for one should not persuade what is debased) but in order that it may not escape our notice what the real state of the case is and that we ourselves may be able to refute if another person uses speech unjustly. (Aristotle, 2007, p. 35)

To be thus equipped will stand any student, any person, in good stead. This ability to ‘argue persuasively’; to be able to recognise and use the rhetorical tools of the argumentative trade (building the ‘knowledge workers’ of the future), is what is identified in the twenty-first century pedagogical framework, the *Curriculum for Excellence*, as critical literacy:

In particular, the experiences and outcomes address the important skills of critical literacy. Children and young people not only need to be able to read for information: they also need to be able to work out what trust they should place on the information and to identify when and how people are aiming to persuade or influence them. (*Skills for Learning, Skills for Life and Skills for Work*, The Scottish Government, 2009)

In *Multimodality* (2010), Kress, acknowledging that everyone’s ‘take’ on the world ‘has consequences’ (Kress, 2010, p. 96) addresses the purpose of research:

Research needs specific data to answer the research questions posed. So maybe the first step is to ask: in what domain am I operating? Is it that of politics, of public information and awareness-raising? Am I attempting to produce usable accounts of complex phenomena by means of academic research? (ibid.)
His own answer reflects his critical pedagogical outlook — he is ‘developing precise tools for understanding the interrelation of resources of representation and forms of knowledge’ — but he chooses not to call the achievement of such understanding ‘literacy’. For him, that term is too bound up with one form of transcription, naming ‘just one of many such cultural technologies of transcription’ (ibid.). He prefers to (as he sees it) widen the remit to talk of such ‘technologies of transcription’, and he highlights the consequent need to find ‘apt names and terms for them’ (ibid.).

I would rather expand the term ‘literacy’ to encompass more than it traditionally does, that is, more than the ability to read and write language. We already talk of ‘emotional literacy’, and, in fact, the extended meaning of ‘literacy’ is commonplace: it not only implies an ability to ‘read’ and ‘write’, but is expanded to include the ability to ‘interpret’, ‘translate’ and ‘produce’ in a certain designated field of cultural activity. However, Kress’s resistance to such an extended meaning does point to several problematic aspects of the term ‘literacy’.

Waller, in focussing on the differences between music and language literacy points out that ‘literacy’ is frequently applied to the passive ability to read — and not to the active ability to write. He gives examples from colonial days in which the ability to write was not taught until much later in a student’s life — disempowering many people who could not continue their schooling to reach that point (a disproportionate number of whom were girls, thus exacerbating and perpetuating the literacy — and power — divide). He concludes:

Perhaps, second only to denying all access to literacy, the most flagrantly undemocratic practice a literate culture or subculture can have is that of
allowing full literacy (both reading and writing) only to an elite, while permitting others only to read. (Waller, 2010, p. 39)

Education ‘as the exercise of domination’ (Freire, 1972, p. 52) is discussed by Freire, who, advocating the ‘liberation’ of education (as part of a wider revolutionary ending of oppression), emphasises the need to move away from the passive ‘banking education’, in which ‘the students are the depositories and the teacher is the depositor’ (Freire, 1972, p. 45) and encourages the development of ‘critical consciousness’ in which active, participatory teaching/learning (this dichotomy is necessarily challenged) creates citizens who are ‘transformers’ of their own world.

Kress (Kress, 2012) addresses the nuances which the practical application of such a pedagogical vision contains: it is not a choice of either the old traditional syllabus of learning how to read, write and comprehend a traditional text (with ‘correct’ spelling, grammar and punctuation in place), or the embracing of ‘new forms’. Rather, it is necessary to appreciate — and teach — the multiple layers in their semiotic contexts, with their affordances and limitations discussed. This, again, is something with which the Curriculum for Excellence engages. As part of the ‘literacy framework’ in which ‘listening and talking’, ‘reading’ and ‘writing’ remain basic categories, there are further latticed categories including ‘enjoyment and choice’, ‘tools’, ‘finding and using information’, ‘understanding, analysing and evaluating’ and ‘creating texts’. The question ‘What is meant by texts?’ is directly addressed, and the answer given very much coincides with Kress’s advocation of the need to recognise and move beyond the traditional textual/modal hierarchy. It is given thus:
It follows that the definition of 'texts' also needs to be broad and future proof. Therefore, within Curriculum for Excellence: “... a text is the medium through which ideas, experiences, opinions and information can be communicated.”

Reading and responding to literature and other texts play a central role in the development of learners’ knowledge and understanding. Texts not only include those presented in traditional written or print form, but also orally, electronically or on film. Texts can be in continuous form, including traditional formal prose, or non-continuous, for example charts and graphs. The literacy framework reflects the increased use of multimodal texts, digital communication, social networking and the other forms of electronic communication encountered by children and young people in their daily lives. It recognises that the skills which children and young people need to learn to read these texts differ from the skills they need for reading continuous prose. (Skills for Learning, Skills for Life and Skills for Work, The Scottish Government, 2009)

The practicalities, bound up as they are with access to technological resources (and the financial implications such access brings with it) is a crucial point at which theory and practice — political intention and political action (or putting money where the mouth is) — national curriculum and classroom practice, is challenged. This is not addressed in this thesis, but in order to have an ‘impact’, dissemination of information and ideas needs to be matched with policy makers and enactors.

It is, I hope, clear — after this thesis — that this reassessment (as manifest in the Curriculum for Excellence) of what a text is, and what ‘literate’ means is, in itself, an immense act of legitimation. I have attempted to provide a critical analysis of legitimation by multimodal means for, as Freire writes, ‘[c]ritical reflection is also action’ (Freire, 1972, p. 99).
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