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The Ideas of a Precursor,

'Abd al-Rahmān al-Kawākibi (1849-1902),

In Relation to the Trend of Muslim-Arab Political Thought.

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Arts of the University of Edinburgh for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

October 1953.

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Note on Transliteration

The transliteration is quite obvious; all that needs to be added is that حن has been rendered by 'q', and ط by 'z'.

In the transliteration of proper names, the same principle has been followed, except when some names are European in origin in which case the European equivalent has been given; example: Nicola Ziyada for نقول زيادة. When the authors have written only in a Western language, their own spelling of their names has been retained, as Negib Azoury for نجيب عازوري. Where it has been thought necessary, cross-references have been given in the list of sources.
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Chapter I

Life of ʿAbd al-Rahmān b. ʿAbd al-Kawākibi

The first difficulty which confronts the student of the ideas of ʿAbd al-Rahmān al-Kawākibi is the absence of a full biography of the man; al-Kawākibi did not have his Boswell, nor would his personality have attached a faithful and admiring disciple as Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍa. He is nevertheless a well thought of figure, and he appears in the standard literary and biographical dictionaries. It is to be noticed however that all the biographical notes which refer to him have one and the same source: the two official documents which Rashīd Riḍa, editor of al-Manār printed in his obituary notice about al-Kawākibi.1 These documents and the life of al-Kawākibi given in al-Manār were used by all subsequent writers and editors of biographical compilations.

Muḥammad Rāghib al-Tabbākh publishes the notice of al-Manār in full, correcting only a few dates, and adding a photographic portrait of al-Kawākibi, together with the verses of Ḥāfiẓ ʿIbrāhīm inscribed on his tomb and the funeral oration composed by Muḥammad Ṣādiq al-Rāfīʿī.2 Yusuf ʿIlyān Sarkīs, on the other hand, does not copy Rashīd Riḍa verbatim, but draws on al-Tabbākh in his own much shorter note. He

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also mentions a biographical note published in the fourth edition of al-Kawākibi's book *Umm al-Qura* which, however, does not seem to add anything to the above sources, otherwise Sarkīs would have given new information. C. Brockelmann, the most solid European authority, gives what looks like a direct translation of Sarkīs' summary. Ahmad Amīn, in an essay on al-Kawākibi, also incorporates the above information. Ph. de Tarrazi, in his large book on the Arabic press, also relies on the source for his short note on the life of al-Kawākibi. G. Antonius is probably the only writer who adds to the bare and dry facts to be culled from these writers; he paints a colourful picture of the man's personality and of his saintly habits, and describes the court he used to hold in the *Splendid Bar Café* in Cairo which he frequented. Of the other more recent contributions, two are to be cited: an essay by Sāmi al-Kayyālī from Aleppo who appears to know the Kawākibi family, including Dr. As'ad al-Kawākibi, the son of 'Abd al-Raḥmān, and an unsigned essay on the fiftieth anniversary of al-Kawākibi's death, in the popular magazine *al-Fuṣūl* of Cairo, which seems to be mainly based on the

Both these articles bring in some new material which will be discussed where relevant.

If the life of al-Кawākibi, as available in the above mentioned sources, seems ordinary and unpromising to the student of modern Arabic thought, the number of references to him give quite another idea of the importance of the man and more than make up for the indifferent impressions carried from reading his short biography. References to him abound. They can be roughly grouped as follows:

The imaginary meeting that al-Кawākibi describes in his book *Umm al-Qura* has often been spoken of as though it had actually taken place in Mecca in 1898. Rev. S.M. Zwemer, a missionary for many years in the Middle East, for instance, mentions it to draw a moral. The moral is that thinking Muslims, as can be judged from the discussion in Mecca, are becoming slowly conscious of the decay of Islam and convinced that Islam lacks inward vitality. This belief that the meeting had actually taken place was not quickly discarded; Carra de Vaux, writing in 1926, is under the same impression. But the latter does not mention his source, and it is not possible to tell whence the confusion could have arisen, especially as all the Arabic sources are clear about the

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imaginary nature of the account. To mention these misappre-
hensions - and there are other and later instances - is not
to attempt to discredit their authors. It is to stress the
wonder and the excitement which the book created when it
first appeared, and the kind of conclusion which was drawn
from its analysis, as well as to indicate the place which it
immediately occupied in people's minds. The mode of presen-
tation of the book was no doubt so convincing that the unwary
readers and those who knew of it by hearsay, took it to be a
rendering of fact. And because the belief is so widespread,
it is necessary to make it clear from the start that such
references are mistaken.¹

The next group of references to al-Kawākibi, is made by
men with a cause to argue out, and it seems that al-Kawākibi
is the best authority to adduce in support of their doctrine.
Antonius, for instance, stresses al-Kawākibi's point of view
on the caliphate, his advocacy of an Arab caliphate and his
"differentiation between an Arab movement and the general
pan-Islamic movement". Antonius whose main concern is
with the Fertile Crescent, or, more precisely, Palestine,
Syria and Lebanon, finds in al-Kawākibi a more important
personality than Muhammad ʿAbdu or Jamāl al-Dīn - both men
of greater influence than him - to illustrate the growth
and maturity of Arab nationalism. K.T. Khairellah, who de-
scribes the activities of the secret societies of the Arab

¹. See also, R.M.M., XLIV-XLV, 1921, p. 308, n.1, where
the same mistake attributed to Nallino is corrected.
provinces of the Ottoman Empire brings him in to show how much his ideas and his programme influenced later revolutionary societies. "Al-Kaouakebi," writes Khairallah, "réalisa la création d'un comité secret, dont il avait esquisssé le dessin dans Om-al-Cora et l'on peut dire que cette association fut l'Alma Parens de toutes celles qui se sont constituées pour servir la cause Arabe." To Khairallah, al-Kawākibi is an important precursor of Arab nationalism, because of his desire for the separation of powers. These writers - although their facts are sometimes wrong - are correct in attributing importance to al-Kawākibi, and in pointing out the aspect of his thought which they most approved of. But none of them is concerned to bring out the contradictions in his thought and the different sources from which he drew. To give an indication of the extent of these, the last group of references make the best introduction. These references are found in the works of the European scholars concerned, not so much with the religious or political consequences of al-Kawākibi's fictitious meeting, but with the trend of ideas in general in Arabic, and al-Kawākibi's place in it. H. Laoust, for example, sees al-Kawākibi's importance as a supporter of the Salafiyya movement. H.A.R. Gibb finds in him a pioneer for a change in the nature of the caliphate. J. Lecerf says

that his book Ṭabāʾ al-istibdād is a curious development of the themes of Montesquieu.1 These quotations do not claim to be exhaustive, but have been given to show the lack of a complete study of al-Kawākibi, and to hint that such a study cannot be devoid of interest or variety. It will be the purpose of this thesis to bring out the variety, diversity and contradiction in his thought, to try and explain why and how they occurred, and to find out how much of his thought was original and how much derivative.

It would seem then, from the two documents2 mentioned above, given in the autobiographical notice by Rashid Riḍa, that al-Kawākibi was born in Aleppo in 1265/1849, of a noble family who trace their origin to the Safawids of Ardabil, and who had been settled in Aleppo and Constantinople for four centuries.3 ‘Abd al-Rahmān, the son of Aḥmad al-Kawākibi, once professor at the Umayyad Mosque of Damascus, lost his mother at an early age, and was brought up by an aunt of his, a lady of Antioch who, according to Rashid Riḍa, was of a type rare among her Eastern sisters: she was intelligent, shrewd and of good breeding, and she brought

1. J. Lecerf, "Le Mouvement Philosopique Contemporain", in Mélanges de l'Institut Francais de Damas, Beirut, 1929, p. 68.

2. These two documents are: an official document certified by the governor of Aleppo, the Mushīr ʿUthmān Nūri Pasha, and another official document of a later date, certified by Rā'īf Pasha, also wali of Aleppo.

up her nephew ably and well. He received his early education in al-Madrasa al-Kawākibiyya which had been founded in Aleppo by his ancestors, and where his father taught for a time. Besides this schooling, he had private tuition in Persian and Turkish, and acquired some knowledge of mathematics and the natural sciences through his reading and private study. How much 'Abd al-Rahmān is a self-taught man will come out clearly in the following chapters. Rashīd Riḍa says that al-Kawākibi's knowledge of law and jurisprudence was so good that it won him a government appointment on the examining body for law candidates. Moreover, Rashīd Riḍa affirms, there was no subject on which al-Kawākibi could not converse intelligently and sensibly.

The character of al-Kawākibi is praised by all the writers. His honesty, discretion, sincerity, generosity, and his love of the poor, it is affirmed, won him the title of Abu al-du'āfāʾ (Father of the Weak). Rashīd Riḍa describes how he held his own private court in a building between his house and the Government House which he called al-Markaz (The Office), and to which people went for arbitration, rather than to the Government courts. This social position does undoubtedly

1. Al-Manār, V, p. 239 or al-Tabbākh, VII, p. 510.
2. There is not much information about this college. When al-Ghazzi was writing neither classes nor prayers were being held there. See Kāmil b. Husain al-Ghazzi, Nahr al-dhāheb fi tārīkh Ḥalab, vol. II, Aleppo, 1342/1923-4, pp. 45-6. In the same volume, p. 85, al-Ghazzi mentions the Kawākibi family among the notable families of Aleppo. Ahmad Amīn, p. 250, confirms the supposition that the Azhari tradition was followed in their college in Aleppo.
3. Antonius, p. 96; Al-Manār, V, p. 239 or al-Tabbākh VII, p. 510.
point to the fairmindedness of al-Kawākibi and to his sense of justice, qualities on which all those who mention him, especially Antonius, insist. If he was as reserved as Antonius indicates, then his reserve did not prevent him from leading an active and varied public life. He had a share in a cigarette factory; he did some town planning when he was the Head of the Municipality, a post that is said to have cost him a large part of his fortune because of the enmity of the Wali towards him; and what is more relevant to the present study - he edited the official paper of Aleppo, *Furat*, both in its Arabic and Turkish sections, 1292-1297/1875-1880. In 1293/1876, he brought out the first private paper to be issued in Aleppo, *al-Shahbā',* an Arabic weekly. After a little while, it was suspended by order of the Wali

2. For history of *Furat*, see *al-Ghazzi*, III, p. 393; *al-Ghazzi* became its editor in 1300/1882-83 for some twenty years. The Paper appeared from 1284/1867-68 to 1334/1915-16, i.e. 2,420 numbers altogether. It was the first paper to appear in Aleppo. It appeared weekly in Turkish and Arabic except for nos. 50-101 which had Armenian as well. A supplement was sometimes issued under the title 'Alāwat Furāt or Ghādir Furāt. In 1334/1915-16, the year of the general mobilisation, the paper was discontinued and was later replaced by the paper *Halab* which was issued in Arabic only.
I have seen at the Public Record Office cuttings of this paper sent in consular dispatches to Constantinople; they contained only the news of the day, and are of no importance to the student of ideas.
of Aleppo, Kāmil Pasha.¹ A second paper, al-I'tidāl had the same fate. Al-Tabbākh says that in this paper, al-Kawākibi exceeded the limits of fairmindedness in his attack on the government.² Al-Kawākibi's freedom of speech and his unconcealed patriotism earned him the suspicion and the hatred of the Turkish officials. In the end, he had to leave Syria for Egypt. There is a certain vagueness and uncertainty about the reasons for this move. It is not clear whether he went there out of choice, or whether he was actually forced

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¹ See al-Manār V, p. 238, or al-Tabbākh, VII, p. 508, and al-Ghazzi, III, p. 404. Al-Tabbākh, VII, p. 523, questions the date given by Rashīd Rida and gives it as 1295/1878, while al-Ghazzi gives it as 1294/1877. Probably al-Tabbākh's date is the correct one since he derives it from a number of the paper which he had seen and which bore the date 29 Jamādi al-Awwal 1295/ May 31, 1878. Tarrazi, II, pp. 200-1, gives the date as May 10, 1877. The paper belonged to Hāshim al-ʿAṭṭār known also as al-Kharraṣ. It was edited by al-Kawākibi with the help of a group of literary men in Aleppo. Tarrazi mentions a reference to al-Shahba' in al-I'tidāl, al-Kawākibi's other paper which appeared on July 25, 1879. The reference is to the effect that al-I'tidāl will pursue the same policy as its predecessor.

² Al-Tabbākh, VII, p. 523; al-Ghazzi, III, p. 406, gives here the same date as al-Tabbākh who had seen a copy of the paper, Shaʿbān 5, 1296/ July 5, 1879. He says it had both Arabic and Turkish and was owned by the same al-Kharrāṣ; the editors were al-Kawākibi and Ṣāʿīd Bey b. Ali Pasha Sharīf. Sarkīs, and consequently Brockelmann, do not mention this paper; nor does Antónius. Tarrazi, II, pp. 202-3 prints the leading article of the first number in which the policy of the paper is set out: "Al-I'tidāl is really al-Shahba' in all its aspects. It has taken it upon itself to carry out all the functions of private newspapers. It will make public all benevolent actions, and likewise every evil deed committed by functionaries; it will expound the needs of the country in order to guide the efforts of those who hold power; and it will publish everything tending to polish character and to increase knowledge, whether on political or scientific subjects...."
to flee. The best account of this migration, so far, is given by al-Ghazzi, a close friend of al-Kawākibi, "A day before he left," al-Ghazzi writes, "he came to visit me in my house to bid me farewell. He told me that he had decided to go to Istanbul on the morrow, to have himself transferred from Rāshiya. I was already acquainted with his book Umm al-Qura, and I felt that he was resolved to publish it. It therefore occurred to me that he would change his route and go to Egypt to have it printed and published, because it was impossible for him to publish it anywhere else. So I warned him and said: 'Be careful and do not go to Egypt; for once you have entered that country, it will not be possible for you to return to your birthplace. You will be immediately labelled as a Young Turk, for you are already well-known for your criticism of the present conditions and your strong opposition to them.' He answered: 'I only decided to go to Istanbul for the reason I mentioned.' In this way, he kept secret the reason of his journey even from his dearest friend. He bade me farewell and left, and I prayed God the Most High to keep him and favour him with good luck and success. He thus left Aleppo at the beginning of 1316/1898 •••"2

1. Sarkis, loc cit.; Antonius, p. 95. Brockelmann writes that al-Kawākibi could evade imprisonment only by fleeing but that his fortune was confiscated. As none of the writers before Brockelmann give this reason for al-Kawākibi's move, Brockelmann may have translated in too precise a way the vague and ambiguous statement of Sarkis: fa ta'ammadat al-hukūma habasahu thumma jarradūhu min amlākihi fa ghadara al-wātan wa jā'a Migr.

2. Quoted by al-Kayyālī, loc. cit., p. 442.
quite clear that whatever the immediate reason of al-Kawākibi's journey to Egypt, it was a form of exile. In Egypt, he planned a tour of the various Muslim countries: he went along the Red Sea coast to the Sudan and Zanzibar, penetrated into the Arabian Peninsula and reached as far as Karachi. He then planned another journey into the heart of Arabia, but his sudden death in 1320/1902 prevented the realisation of this dream. 1 Wherever he went, he met the princes and the Shaikhs and studied the military, literary, agricultural and all other aspects of the countries and tribes he came across. 2 Concerning the reason for this tour, the writer in al-Fusūl has a story to tell. It seems that al-Kawākibi went so far and wide in order to accomplish a mission. The Khedive 'Abbas Hilmi was interested in all Arab affairs, and especially in the caliphate which he wanted to assume. According to this

1. There were rumours that al-Kawākibi was poisoned and that Abu al-Huda al-Sayyādi was responsible for this act. Abu al-Huda was 'Abd al-Hamīd's astrologer. Some Arabic writers have given him a reputation of a spy and a poisoner; see, Rashīd Riḍa, Tārīkh al-ustādīh al-imām, vol.I, Cairo 1931, p. 91; al-Kayyālī, loc. cit., p. 447; al-Fusūl, August 1952, p. 39. As 'Abd al-Laṭīf Ḥamza puts it, almost all Arabic writers who went to Istanbul came up against this gentleman (iṣṭadamu bihē) and suffered his intrigues, which were as effective as the witchcraft he practised. Even his power over 'Abd al-Ḥamīd had, it seems, a mysterious and inexplicable origin. See 'Abd al-Laṭīf Ḥamza, Adab al-maṣāla al-sabāḥiyaya fi Misr, 1950, vol.II, p.28, vol. III, pp. 128-6, 137-140 & 149, vol.IV, pp. 121-2. Abu al-Huda al-Sayyādi was an Aleppine, b.1849, d. 1909; see Qustākī al-Ḥumṣī, Udabā' Ḥalab dhu'ul-athar fi'l-qarn al-tāsi' ashar, Aleppo, 1925, vol.II, p. 105.

writer then, al-Kawākibi was employed by the Khedive at a salary of fifty guineas a month to win for him the suffrage of the shākhs of 'Adan and the Nine Protectorates for the caliphate. ¹

There are different versions of al-Kawākibi's quarrel with the Wali or Walis of Aleppo. From one source, it appears that the clash arose over the question of the Régie des tabacs. Al-Kawākibi had been appointed director and inspector in its administration for a period of three years, but he came into conflict with 'Ārif Bey, the then Wali of Aleppo, and he resigned his post before his term ended. ² His struggle with 'Ārif Bey did not rest there. He made someone write to Istanbul to complain of the evil deeds of the Wali, ...  

¹ Al-Fuṣūl, August, 1952, p. 39. See also the interesting observation of Marmaduke Pickthall: "In the years 1894-6, I was in Syria," he wrote in 1914, "living native", as the English call it. I can remember hearing Muslim Arabs talking more than once of what would happen on the downfall of the Turks. They looked to Egypt, remembering the conquests of Mehemet Ali, and the gospel of an Arab Empire under the Lord of Egypt which Ibrahim Pasha preached in Palestine and Syria. That gospel, I gathered was still being preached in secret by missionaries from Egypt.... I gathered then and subsequently that the Sherif of Mecca was to be the spiritual head of the reconstituted realm of El Islam, the Khedive of Egypt the temporal head...." "The Arab Question", in The New Age, November 5, 1914, p. 9. It is to be noted also that al-Kawākibi contributed to al-Mulayyad owned by 'Ali Yusuf, the Khedive's man. See below pp.21-2. Al-Kawākibi did know 'Abbās Hilmi; see Rashid Rida, Tarikh... I, p.1059.  
² Al-Manār, V, p. 267 or al-Tabbākh, VII, p. 513.
enumerating them in detail. The latter came to hear of this step, and plotted against al-Kawākibi in order to have him imprisoned and to seize all his papers. He forged a document which he attributed to al-Kawākibi, which he called "Plan for Handing over the Wilaya of Ḥalab to a Foreign Power". He consequently asked to have him tried.\(^1\) The penalty for this crime was death by hanging, but, owing to a legal error in the trial, the judgment was not immediately executed. Al-Kawākibi was quite aware of the shortcomings of the trial, and he wrote to Istanbul to complain of the unjust treatment meted out to him, and to object to the bias against him. He also asked to be tried in another wilaya, which was granted. He was therefore tried in Beirut and acquitted. Al-Kawākibi, however, did not let the matter rest there, but followed it up till the Wali was recalled from Aleppo. He insisted on giving this news himself to the Wali, and he forced him, in the end, to leave his family behind, and to depart in a most hurried and undignified fashion. Not even this, it seems, would satisfy al-Kawākibi who followed Ārif Bey to Istanbul to bring him to justice, but al-Kawākibi had hardly reached the place when Ārif Bey died of vexation (!).\(^2\) This is only one instance of his struggle against the Wali, but, it is repeatedly asserted,

\(^1\) Sāmi al-Kayyāli tells how the incident of the Italian Consule being hit by a stone gave Ārif Bey the opportunity to incriminate al-Kawākibi in a fabricated plot implicating an Armenian revolutionary gang; see Sāmi al-Kayyāli, loc. cit., pp. 440-442; also al-Fuṣūl, August 1952, pp. 35-6.

\(^2\) Al-Manār, V, p. 278, or al-Tabbākh, VII, pp. 515-516.
he was continuously against injustice and his fearlessness lost him a large part of his fortune, and earned him the enmity of more than one person. Rashīd Riḍa sees in the quarrel between him and Muḥammad Abu al-Huda, the Naqib of Aleppo, the traces of al-Kawākibi's upbringing, of his gentleness and modesty, prudence and integrity, courage and pride. These qualities showed themselves in his attitude to Abu al-Huda: al-Kawākibi always remembered the man's qualities and would not let his anger blind his fairness. Al-Kawākibi refused to recognise the nobility of Abu al-Huda's origin or to admit him as the lawful Naqib of Aleppo because this function belonged to the Kawākibis by right; this was the beginning of the quarrel between the two men, and of Abu al-Huda's enmity.1 Al-Kawākibi, it is also affirmed, had definite views about bribery, and this lost him thousands of pounds and, in the end, his post, and always earned him the hatred of the venal. Witness the time when, as Head of the Municipality, he was offered forty thousand piastres which he declined to take for himself, but accepted as a contribution to the Municipality funds. When the Wali heard of this, he wanted a share of the money, which he refused to give. He was therefore dismissed from his post.2 Rashīd Riḍa insists all the time on the qualities and good manners shown by al-Kawākibi in his encounters with his antagonists. The thread of these transactions is however very entangled

1. Al-Manār, V, p. 239, or al-Tabbākh, VII, p. 511.
and it is doubtful whether it would ever be disentangled. But, it would seem, the faults were not all on one side, that the quarrels were devoid of any political significance, and did not pass the bounds of the private and the personal. But, in any case, this is not relevant to the present thesis. The main purpose of this thesis is to trace the intellectual currents of the period, and will not deal with the political events unless they are of fundamental relevance to the general study. Al-Kawākibi's thought will hold a central place in this study - his political role seems to have had no effect on the general run of events, and his importance is not that of a political figure, but of a thinker who worked out a system taken up later by many writers.

As has been mentioned above, al-Kawākibi had the upbringing of a pious Muslim; he supplemented the traditional subjects by reading mathematics and other sciences; he never acquired, however, a knowledge of a European language, although other Muslims of his generation, especially in Egypt, did have such a knowledge. It is therefore all the more curious to see how many European traces appear in his writings. Even his

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1. Muhammad Ḥabdu, for instance, taught himself French because he found it indispensable to know a European language, as the interests of the Muslims had become so entwined with the interests of a Europe, that someone who did not have a knowledge of their language could neither profit from their good points nor fight their evil side; such a knowledge, Muhammad Ḥabdu found therefore necessary for anyone who wanted to serve his people. See Rashīd Riḍa, Tārīkh..., I, pp. 104-5, quoted also by 'Uthmān Amin, Muhammad Ḥabdu Cairo, 1944, p. 109. Jalāl al-Dīn had also learnt French, Rashīd Riḍa, ibid, I, p. 42.
contemporaries noticed this. Rashīd Riḍa had to deny the
imputation that al-Kawākibi copied an Italian writer - Vittorio
Alfieri, according to Āḥmad Amīn.\(^1\) Others describe him as
a disciple of Montesquieu. No one has explained so far how
he came to these sources without knowledge of a European
language. The answer seems to be then that he only came to
know of them through his reading in Arabic, Turkish and
Persian, the only languages which he knew.\(^2\) This immediately
raises the question of what books were translated into these
languages in his time or before, or if not translated, in what
form, probably garbled and unrecognisable, they were presented
to the reading public. A word about al-Kawākibi's circle of
friends would not be out of place here. He belonged to the
circle of Jamāl al-Dīn and Muḥammad ʿAbdu; this is the

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1. Al-Manār, V, p. 279 or al-Tabbākh, VII, p. 517. Rashīd
Riḍa denies that Tabāṭīʿ al-istibdād was copied from the
writings of an Italian philosopher, for is there no
difference, asks Rashīd Riḍa, between repeating parrot-
like and reading with great understanding and adopting
some views which apply in one's own case and society?
Moreover, repeats Rashīd Riḍa, al-Kawākibi did not know
Italian; al-Manār, V, p. 240 or al-Tabbākh, VII, p. 511;
Rashīd Riḍa also wonders how much greater al-Kawākibi's
Philosophy would have been if he had had a proper
training such as given in a European university.
Āḥmad Amīn, p. 254, says that al-Kawākibi took over many
of Vittorio Alfieri's sayings, but he adapted them to
his own time and environment. Āḥmad Amīn is at a loss
to indicate how al-Kawākibi could have heard of Alfieri.
Sāmi al-Kayyālī, loc.cit., p. 446, or al-Fugūl, August
1952, p. 37, list Rousseau, Ḫidżāt Pāsha and Mazzini,
as the writers to whom the composition of Tabāṭīʿ was
attributed when it first appeared.

2. Rashīd Riḍa affirms that al-Kawākibi's knowledge of
psychology, ethics, politics, sociology and philosophy,
came through his reading Turkish and Arabic publications
and newspapers.
prevalent impression; he is however nowhere mentioned as a special friend of theirs. But his upbringing, his social station and his circumstances make it very probable that he was in relation with them. Muhammad 'Abdu was an exile from 1883 to 1892; he spent the better part of that period in Syria, lectured for three years in al-Madrasa al-Sultaniyya in Beirut to crowded audiences of Muslims and others. Even if al-Kawakibi had not been present at any of these meetings, he must have heard of them, of the fame of the great man, and of the questions and discussions raised round him; and he most probably read what Muhammad 'Abdu published in the Syrian papers. To my knowledge, there is no record of an actual meeting between al-Kawakibi and Muhammad 'Abdu in Syria, so that, either they did not meet, or the meeting was not thought deserving of record. The fame of Muhammad 'Abdu in Syria can be gathered from this recollection by Shakib Arslan: "From a very early age," he wrote, "I used to read the newspapers. When the 'Arabi Revolt broke out in Egypt in 1882, I was twelve years of age, and I used to follow its events in detail; I burned with anger at the bombardment of Alexandria by the English, their occupation of the city, and their advance into the hinterland of Egypt; and I was fearful of the consequences of their stay there. When the Revolt was

2. These articles are reproduced in...
over, the trial of those involved in it began. I read in a report of the trial the text of an oath which was attributed to Muḥammad ʿAbdu. That was the first time I heard his name. The style I thought elevated and unlike what I had been used to; I could not then appreciate all the qualities of a good style, but I could by instinct distinguish between an elevated style and a debased one; the text of this oath impressed me very much, and I came to the conclusion that its author, Muḥammad ʿAbdu, could not be like the reformers we knew. In 1883, the supporters of ʿArabi were exiled from Egypt. Muḥammad ʿAbdu was one of those who came to Beirut. ... I was then a student at Madrasat al-Hikma. At the beginning of 1885, I read in the periodical al-'atabīb, news of the publication of a paper in Paris called al-ʿUrwa al-Wuthqa,1 edited by Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and Muḥammad ʿAbdu. We conceived a great desire to make the acquaintance of al-Afghānī, of whom I had already heard, and of his disciple and companion Shaikh Muḥammad ʿAbdu.2 To these details indicating the probability of a meeting between al-Kawākibi and Muḥammad ʿAbdu, it must be added that during al-Kawākibi's stay in Egypt, Muḥammad ʿAbdu was the Mufti of Egypt, an office he held from 1899 till his death in 1905.3

Although it is very difficult to decide from the available material whether the two thinkers actually met, it is possible

2. Rashīd Rīdī, Tārīkh..., I, pp. 399-400.
to describe the intellectual atmosphere in Egypt while al-Kawākibi lived there. Egypt was then the centre of the whole Arab Middle East; it received Syrian emigres, whether as refugees from Ottoman rule, or as seekers of the wide opportunities created by British rule; they came in great numbers, and Egypt offered them a field where their literary abilities could be used to the best advantage and where they contributed greatly to the revival of Arabic and to its transformation into a modern language. The ‘Arabi Revolt had been put down, and the discussion on the merits of the British occupation waxed hot and furious. Newspapers multiplied and there was continual ammunition for the war of the pens and the battle of the books. The discussions were not confined to one class of society; the upper class met in the fashionable salon which were, it seems, numerous;¹ but the man in the street also had his share in the controversy; he was reached by those anxious to persuade him of their views in a manner not very different from that adopted by Ḥasan al-Banna in our own day²; Jamāl al-Dīn and ʿAbdullāh al-Nadīm are well-known practitioners in this art, and there were, undoubtedly many others, less well-known.³ In these conditions it is obvious that the written and the printed source will not disclose all the picture. Friendships, connections, relationships, must have been made and consolidated, and they were probably too commonplace and too much taken for granted to have been worthy of

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¹ ʿAbd al-Latīf Ḥamza, I, pp. 27-8.
² Ḥasan al-Banna, Mudhakkarāt, n.d. (Beirut 1948?)
³ ʿAbd al-Latīf Ḥamza, I, pp. 31-2.
record. ‘Abd al-Laţīf Ḥamza’s book, Adab al-maṣāla al-sahafiyya fi Miṣr, although it deals mainly with the development of journalistic style in Arabic, is a good guide for the study of Egypt in that period, bringing out as it does in a methodical manner, the intellectual turmoil, and giving a fair idea of the number and variety of subjects to which writers gave their attention. Other books dealing with translations into Arabic, with the Arabic press, with the nature of the periodicals and the learned journals of the period, have also contributed to our knowledge.¹ The autobiographies of writers such as Ṭhāb Ḥusain, Salāma Mūsā and ʿAḥmad ʿAmmīn show clearly how widely and quickly, if sometimes superficially, ideas travelled.

¹. Of the various books in this field, the following may be added to the general working bibliography used in this thesis:

A direct indication of al-Kawakibi's familiarity with the opinions of Muḥammad ʿAbdu is provided by his description of Muḥammad ʿAbdu as the greatest thinker of Egypt and his estimate of him as more learned than Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī.⁴ In any case, al-Kawakibi's friendship with Rashīd Riḍa appears to be firmly established. It was through Rashīd Riḍa that he was introduced to Shaikh ʿAli Yūsuf in whose newspaper al-Muʿāyyad al-Kawakibi's book, Ṭabāʾ al-istibdād wa maṣāriʿ al-istiʿbād first appeared in 1900 in the form of anonymous articles.² Rashīd Riḍa himself published Umm al-Qura in al-Manār in the same form.³ A contemporary of al-Kawakibi has left a description of his circle, and of al-Kawakibi's impact on his fellow intellectuals. "The late al-Kawakibi," wrote Ibrāhīm Salīm al-Najjār, "contacted Shaikh ʿAli Yūsuf, owner of al-Muʿāyyad, through Rashīd Riḍa, owner of al-Manār. The bonds of friendship and affection were established

2. Al-Fusūl, August 1952, p. 36. ʿAli Yūsuf (1863-1913), editor of al-Muʿāyyad. This was one of the first successful political dailies in Egypt; it first appeared on December 1, 1889 to provide a platform against the pro-British paper al-Muqattam. It remained to the end a faithful supporter of the Khedive, and sided with him against Muṣṭafā Kāmil's party, when the Khedive and Muṣṭafā Kāmil fell out after 1904. See Sarkīs, p. 1371, and ʿAbd al-Leṭīf Hamza, vol. IV which is devoted entirely to ʿAli Yūsuf.
3. Al-Manār, V (1320/ April 1902-February 1903), pp. 26-32, 55-71, 105-110, 141-146, 182-190, 223-228, 264-268, 304-308, 344-9, 361-5, 501-5, 668-678, 703-710, 771-8, 825-833, 859-864, 899-910; and vol. XV (1330/October 1912), p. 792 for the information that Umm al-Qura was banned in the Ottoman Empire.
between them. We used to meet every day in a circle which included al-Kawākibi, al-Sayyid Rashīd Riḍa, Rafīq al-Azm, Kurd 'Ali and myself.... One day al-Mu'ayyad brought out a curious work; it was unusual both in subject and style - not even al-Mugātṭam or the other papers which were then famous for their independent views published anything of the kind. It drew the attention of writers, and it puzzled the public. The call to freedom assumed a serious tone and everybody enquired about the author of this admirable production in al-Mu'ayyad, which followed the example of the independent papers in spite of its close connection with the Khedive 'Abbās II, and with Constantinople. ... To start with the work was attributed to Muḥammad 'Abdu, although relations between him and the owner of al-Mu'ayyad were cool, ... and although the shaikh Muḥammad 'Abdu ... was not even slightly connected with the Khedive. A few days after the publication of this work in al-Mu'ayyad, it was discovered that al-Kawākibi was the author; this immediately placed him in the forefront of the thinkers of the day and its men of letters; he was ranked as high as shaikh Muḥammad 'Abdu, his importance was appreciated and his talent praised.¹ The book was as favourably received in the Ottoman Empire - it must have had, of course, an illegal circulation since it would have been banned by the authorities as Umm al-Qura was.² Even now it holds its place

among the best known books in Arabic.¹

A third book by al-Kawākibi, Ṣabā‘īf Quraish, and descriptions of his journey are also mentioned as having been written. They were all however lost together with al-Kawākibi’s private papers after his death in 1902. Sāmi al-Kayyāli mentions that Dr. As‘ad al-Kawākibi intends to bring out a book containing the unpublished additions to Ṣabā‘ī al-istibdād made by his father and still in his possession.²

A number of questions arise out of this exposition of the life and background of al-Kawākibi, and a few lines of investigation present themselves. It is necessary to examine, in the first place, through what possible channels al-Kawākibi’s ideas, which are mainly derivative, came to him. In the second place, it will be useful to study al-Kawākibi’s place in the intellectual life of the Arabic renaissance; he was not, it is true, an original thinker or a great reformer, but he was a representative of his age and generation; this constitutes his value for us. In the third place, it would be necessary to investigate how many of his ideas have survived and how they were developed by the following generations. The period in which al-Kawākibi lived and wrote seems to be the turning-point between the old Muslim orthodoxy and the new secular nationalism. It will be the purpose of this study to enquire how the transition was made.

Chapter II
The Study of Tyranny

I.

A photograph of al-Kawâkibi is reproduced on the cover of a number of al-Fuqâl in which an article is devoted to him.¹ He is in beduin dress, complete with 'âba, 'aqâl, kaffiyeh and dagger, but, significantly enough, he carries an umbrella, an item hardly in keeping with desert finery. The picture is symbolic of the miscellaneous elements which went to make up the personality of this well-meaning but self-taught man, and of his published works. Al-Kawâkibi, ignorant of any European language, unable to read Rousseau, Fourier or Hegel in the original, shows unmistakable signs of having been greatly influenced by the European writers and political thinkers of the XVIIIth and XIXth century. It may look difficult at the outset, to explain through what possible channels the few and well-defined ideas he copied could have come to him, especially as no translation of the works from which he borrows so literally and faithfully, exists either in Turkish or in Arabic. But it has to be remembered that the channels through which European ideas were coming to the Arab East were numerous and varied. There was the profusion of translations, commissioned and otherwise, the increasing number of periodicals which attempted to cover every field of life

¹. See chapter I, pp. 2-3.
and learning: the publication of *al-Jamī‘a*, *al-Muqtaṭaf*, *al-Mashriq*, \(^1\) was in full swing when *al-Kawākibi* brought out his books; there were also great numbers of students travelling in Europe and coming back to Egypt to impart the knowledge they had acquired. It is not difficult therefore to imagine the atmosphere of excitement at this recent and sudden revelation of new perspectives in life and learning. The discussion must have ranged widely, albeit not very deeply. The cafés, always a very important element in the life of Mediterranean countries, must have been, at this period, of political unrest and upheaval in Egypt, after the failure of ‘Arābi and before the appearance on the scene of Muṣṭafa Kāmil, full of the talk of Egyptian intellectuals, Syrian emigrés and exiles, of Francophils and Turcophobes, Panislamists and regional nationalists. The Splendid Bar, overlooking the Azbakiyya Gardens in Cairo, which according to Antonius, *al-Kawākibi* used to frequent, \(^2\) seems to have been the meeting place of the Syrian emigrés to Egypt. \(^3\) Of those who frequented it, Rashīd Riḍā, \(^4\) Shibli Shumāyyīl, \(^5\) Rafīq and Haqq al-‘Azm, \(^6\) Muhīb al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb, \(^7\) are probably the most worthy of

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2. See above, p.2.
4. On Rashīd Riḍā, see below, Chapter IV.
notice. All of them were thinkers and writers. In such an atmosphere, any man with literary pretensions would not remain unaware of the ideas of the day, whether Eastern or European, nor could he guard himself against influences which must have poured on him from every direction. It is of course very difficult to pick out every sentence of his and to say what exact source it comes from. One has to rely as much on chance as on research to discover from which source an isolated sentence, metaphor or saying comes. The difficulty is diminished when al-Kawākibi incorporates bodily a whole theory into his books. When such an instance occurs, and when it is ascertained that he could not have derived his information of the European source from a published translation, then it is safe to conclude that there were other channels besides published material through which European ideas also infiltrated. The following instance is particularly striking.

"Half of the human race, which numbers about 1500 million people," says K in Tabāi', "is a burden on the other half. The majority of this burdensome half is made of the women of the towns. Women are that species whose role in nature has been acknowledged as the preserver of the race, and one male is enough to fecundate a thousand of them. The remaining males are driven to dangers and perils or are to undergo a fate similar to that of the male bee. It is on this basis that women have divided up with the men the tasks of life in an unequal manner, and have accaparated the authority for making a general law to the effect that, as they are weak, only
light and easy tasks would be in their province. They have made their sex preciously sought after by a show of chastity. They have also made courage and adventurousness a bad characteristic in themselves and praiseworthy in men. And they gave licence to their kind to insult and not to be insulted, to oppress, or to expect succour should they be oppressed. They bring up their sons and daughters on this principle. That is why some moralists have called them the harmful half. Some of them have even said that the harm of women increases with urbanisation and civilisation in a geometrical proportion. The beduin woman robs man of half of his work; the country woman robs him of two thirds, and the townswoman of five-sixths, the daughter of the capital in an even higher proportion.¹ The last part of this sweeping view of the uselessness of women is a translation of the views put forward by Charles Fourier in the nineteenth century.² Among the three classes of domestic parasites, Fourier includes three quarters of the women in the cities, and a half of the women in the country. The degree of parasytism of woman in al-Kawākibi's work is altered to suit, no doubt, Eastern conditions where nomadism obtains. The half and two thirds are retained as basic proportions starting from the lowest level of society, namely the beduin, and a new proportion, five-sixth, is introduced for the city woman. Besides women, some

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1. T, pp. 70-1.
men also have an unfair share of the spoils of the earth. "Moreover," says al-Kawākibi, "men too have divided up hardships in an unjust manner. Men of government and of religion, and their dependents, whose number does not exceed 1% of the human race, enjoy half or more of what labour makes, and spend all in self-enjoyment and extravagance. An example of this is the way they decorate the streets with millions of lamps for the benefit of their own passage there, once in a while, and they do not think of the millions of poor living in darkness in their own homes." "Next to these," he goes on to say, "come the makers of precious goods and specialised craftsmen, the greedy and monopolistic merchants, and their like. They too are also about 1%, but each one of them lives on what tens or even hundreds and thousands of workers and peasants live. This unequal division between the offspring of Adam and Eve is the result of political tyranny."¹ This passage also echoes Fourier somewhat. Fourier considered half the manufacturers and nine tenths of the merchants useless.

The chance discovery of such textual fidelity to an author, generally unknown in al-Kawākibi's time and environment, must lead to the conclusion that he could easily have borrowed from other writers, also not much known, as much or even more extensively. This too can be shown. To realise the extent to which he did borrow from European ideas, it is best to examine in detail the theories he propounds. For that purpose, a summary, first of his book ʿabāt al-istibdād..., then of Umm al-Qura, will have to be given.

¹. T., 71-2.
The foreword to Ṭaba‘ī says that the book, which is dedicated to Arab Youth (al-nāshi‘a al-‘arabiyya), consists of articles published in newspapers, together with some additions. The theories advanced, it says, are partly what al-Kawākibi had thought out for himself and partly what he imbibed from others. He denies that he is attacking a specific tyrant or a particular tyranny, but claims that he is drawing attention to the origin of the disease of the East. According to him, the people brought the disease on themselves and are responsible for the condition in which they are now; neither circumstance nor the actions of others can in any way be blamed. ¹

The exposition of al-Kawākibi's ideas in this book present one disadvantage. The author deals with a number of separate topics only loosely connected by the fact that they all are different manifestations of tyranny. The summary has to be disconnected and static, if one is to avoid the risk of imposing a system which is absent from the book. It would probably be best to start by giving al-Kawākibi's description of the Just State (al-hukūma al-‘adila).

Al-Kawākibi begins by enumerating the following ideal conditions which a few governments attained in the past and in the present, among which the second Roman Republic, and the period of the First Four Caliphs in Islam. In these just states, the individual is secure in his life, person, possessions and property, in his physical and mental enjoyments; assured of his personal, intellectual and religious freedoms,

as though he were alone in the world with no one to stand in his way; assured of his power to do what is beneficial to his umma (nation); confident in the uprightness of the judiciary; confident that he will have the honour – as is prescribed by the law – to come to the defence of the nation by shedding his blood. All these freedoms are secured for the individual in civilised nations by his government which watches over him, and supplies all his needs. In a state where these conditions are fulfilled, the individual lives in the world the life promised to him in paradise by religion, as though he were eternal in his nation (qaum), and Fatherland (watan). A family or a tribe might reach such a degree of progress that the person will consider himself a real member of a body. The living body among civilised peoples is the sum of the nation (majmu' al-umma), and the division into families and persons is the same as the division of a town into houses and the houses into apartments. Free man is a complete master of himself and is completely owned by his nation (qaum). When the constitution of a state reaches this degree of progress that every individual is ready to sacrifice his life and his possessions to his nation (umma), then will the nation be able to dispense with his life and possessions.\(^1\) These desirable conditions can, of course, not be attained if the government is tyrannical. Politics is defined as "the wise administration of public affairs (al-shu'ūn al-mushtarakā)." It therefore follows that

\(^1\) T., pp. 151-6. For the translation of the terms umma, qaum, watan, see discussion below, chapter V.
the prime study of politics concerns tyranny, i.e. "the wilful and arbitrary conduct of public affairs" without fear of retribution or punishment.¹

Al-Kawākibi will therefore study the causes, the generation and the progress of tyranny, the habits of tyrants, and the influence of tyranny on those subject to it. Having diagnosed the evil, he will then devise a method for curing it and for ensuring a healthier state of affairs.² A government may become tyrannical if it is not bound by any revealed law or tradition or the will of the people (irādat al-umma) - and this is the case of absolute governments; or else, it might be governed by some of the above, but might have enough power to abrogate the binding laws and to act as it wishes - and this is the case of those governments which call themselves limited. A government, whatever its type - whether a democracy or a monarchy, limited or absolute - can only be excluded from the class of the "tyrannical" when it is under meticulous supervision and uncompromising control. Every government, no matter how just, becomes immediately tyrannical when the nation is not vigilant.³

Al-Kawākibi then studies tyranny in its relation to religion, science, honour, wealth, morals, education and progress.

Tyranny and science (‘ilm) are contradictory and exclusive opposites. The tyrant makes it his policy to keep the people ignorant, because, once they are enlightened, they will

1. T., pp. 7 & 11.
2. T., p. 8.
realise that "freedom is better than life", and will understand the true significance of such a tenet as "There is no God but God", on which Islam and all other religions are based. They will understand that it means that no one beside God deserves obedience or respect; once the subjects of the tyrants will understand this, they will act accordingly, and will no longer be subservient to him. The tyrant fears science in itself and in its results. He fears science in itself, because it has greater power and authority than anything else, and the tyrant must be afraid of all who have more knowledge than himself. But generally, the tyrant does not fear all the sciences, but only those which broaden the minds and teach man what he is and what his rights are, whether he is oppressed, and how to demand and to keep his rights; such are, for instance, pure and mental philosophy, the study of the rights of nations, politics, history and rhetoric. But he does not fear the theological sciences because he believes that they do not lift the veil of ignorance but are only a pastime for those who are enthusiastic for science. Should anyone shine in these subjects and gain fame among the people (al-‘awām), the tyrant will use every possibility to win them over to his side. It is clear then that there is a constant battle between tyranny and science, a battle where both sides aim at drawing the mass of the people to their cause, because, if these are ignorant, they are afraid, and if they are afraid, they give in; contrariwise, once they have learnt, they will speak, and once they have spoken, they will act. The masses are then the food on which the tyrant lives; they are his
livelihodd and his power. But the fear of the tyrant lest his subjects should avenge themselves is undoubtedly greater than their fear of his might. His fear results from knowledge and theirs from ignorance. He fears just retribution and death, and they only their helplessness and the loss of a few mouthfuls of food and a motherland which they will quickly learn to replace. The more the tyrant is tyrannical, the greater indeed is his fear of his subjects and of his court.\(^1\) The power of the tyrant rests not only on the ignorant mass of the people but also on the support of those who seek false honours (al-mutamajjidūn). These are deceived into thinking themselves independent while they are really used by the tyrant in the same way as he uses the religious dignitaries to further his own ends. He may either divide them among themselves, or flatter them, or set the people against them so that he may always be stronger than them.\(^2\) Wealth also plays its role in a tyrannical government. On the one hand, it is possible under such a government to accumulate wealth by all manner of illegitimate and criminal methods, on the other, the wealthy in such a state become in practice the pillars on which the tyrant builds his strength, although in their heart, they hate and fear him.\(^3\)

This is how al-Kawakibi deals with tyranny and with the elements on which it draws for its strength, authority and power. But tyranny has also an effect - obviously a nefarious one - on morals, education and progress.

1. T., pp. 37-44.
3. T., pp. 68-86.
Will power is that which divides the animal from the plant. It is the law according to which people organise their behaviour. It is so important that, if worship of other than God were permissible, the wise would have worshipped it. The prisoner of tyranny has no will power and is thus devoid of the characteristics not only of man but of beasts, because he acts not according to his own will, but by the order of another. His life has neither plan nor organisation. His circumstances dictate his character: he is brave and generous when rich, but mean and cowardly when poor. His life will be anarchic, governed neither by reason nor principle. The least harm that tyranny will foster in the character of people, is to make the best of them hypocritical, professing virtue and religion without truth, the villains among them, safe from criticism or exposure because most of their actions will remain hidden and because people will be afraid to expose them. In this way tyrannical rule corrupts every class of society or individual. Not only does it corrupt morals, but it is also at the basis of religious indifference which is often said to be the reason for the ills of the East.\(^1\) In the same way, al-Kawākibi says, a just government would legislate for the benefit of the people, and would see that everything necessary for their well-being - from midwives to elementary schools - are all made available.\(^2\) Tyranny creates a state of constant fear in which all the classes of society, including the tyrant himself, are plunged.\(^3\)

\(^1\) T., pp. 93-102.
\(^2\) T., pp. 113-114.
\(^3\) T., p. 125.
II.

The summary of Ṭabāʾī gives a passing remark of Aḥmad Amīn about the origin of the book a central importance. As has been seen, ¹ Aḥmad Amīn has indicated that al-Kawākibi might be indebted to the Italian author, Vittorio Alfieri, for many of his ideas. But Aḥmad Amīn gives no idea of the extent of al-Kawākibi's debt to Alfieri. It is very extensive. Big parts of Ṭabāʾī are a faithful reproduction of a small book by Alfieri, Della Tirannide, first published in Italy in 1800. ² A comparison of the table of contents of both books make the similarity apparent. The titles of Alfieri's chapters are as follows:

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1. See chapter I, p. 16.
2. Vittorio Alfieri (1749-1803), a northern Italian nobleman, dramatist, traveller and pamphleteer. Studied Voltaire, Rousseau and especially Montesquieu with whom he shared his great admiration for English political institutions. His book, Della Tirannide, was written in 1777, printed in 1789, but not published before 1800. It was first translated into French (by Merget?) in 1802, and then by J. A. F. Allix in 1831. The first translation was reprinted in 1865 and 1867. All references in this thesis will be from the French text of 1802. For further details on Alfieri, see article in Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th ed., and G. Megaro, Vittorio Alfieri: Forerunner of Italian Nationalism, New York, 1930.
Book One

To Freedom.

Chapter I
What is a tyrant?
II
What is tyranny?
III
Of Fear.
IV
Of Cowardice.
V
Of Ambition.
VI
Of the Prime Minister.
VII
Of the Army.
VIII
Of Religion.
IX
Comparison of ancient and modern tyrannies.
X
Of False Honour.
XI
Of the Aristocracy.
XII
Comparison of Asiatic and European tyrannies.
XIII
Of Luxury.
XIV
Of the Wife and the children under a tyranny.
XV
Of self-love in a tyranny.
XVI
If the tyrant can be loved and by whom?
XVII
If the tyrant can love his subjects and how?
XVIII
Comparison of small tyrannical governments to large ones.

Book Two

Chapter I
Introduction to Book II.
II
Of the manner in which it is possible to vegetate under a tyranny.
III
How it is possible to live under a tyranny.
IV
How to die under a tyranny.
V
To what extent tyranny is to be supported.
VI
Whether the nation which does not feel tyranny deserves it or not.
VII
How to supersede tyranny.
VIII
By what government it is best to replace tyranny.
In the titles are as follows; all the topics discussed by Alfieri are underlined:

**Foreword:** Reason for composition of the book, Dedication to Youth.

**Introduction:** The study of politics, Reasons for writing about tyranny, Methods and results of the students of tyranny.

**What is tyranny:** Definition, Types of tyrannical governments, Nature of governments, Description of the tyrant.

**Tyranny and Religion:** Religious tyranny, Political tyranny, Confusion of Creator with tyrant in the mind, Use made of religion by tyrants, Use of religion against tyrant, Shirk and the unity of the Godhead (tawhid), Muslim politics, How tyranny has taken hold of the Muslims, Innovations and their effects on religions, Tyranny and the Qur'an.

**Tyranny and Science:** Tyranny the enemy of science, The tyrant fears the men of science, The tyrant and the masses, The tyrant and his fear, The unity of the Godhead and the tyrants.

**Tyranny and honour:** The natural inclination to honour, Types of honour, Who are the honourable, Honour and false honour contrasted, Characteristics of those who seek false honour, The tyrant and his enemies, The nobles and tyranny, The tyrant and his supporters, The tyrant's ministers and his subordinates.

**Tyranny and wealth:** Man's aggression towards his kind, The domination of women over men, The domination of the strong over the weak, What is wealth, Nature of the accumulation of wealth, Socialism at the origin of Christianity and Islam, The protection of the land from its sons, The harm of excessive riches, Usury and its prohibition, The accumulation of wealth and its reasons, Characteristics of the wealthy.

**Tyranny and morals:** Effects of tyranny over inclinations, The cowardice of the slaves, Effect of tyranny over the minds and the truths, Tyranny has no good results, Tyranny and the forbidding of evil, Freedom of criticism in Islam, Tyranny and its effects, Lack of confidence in oneself and in others, The malady of the East, Ways of guidance, Difference between the Orientals and the Westerners, Religious reform.

**Tyranny and education:** The instincts of man, Effects of tyranny on education, Education in the well-ordered government, Education in the tyrannical government, The life of the free, of the slaves, Distractions and dissipations, Slaves and education, Pressure on the slave, The life of the slave.
Tyranny and progress: The law of progress and decadence, Types of progress, Effects of tyranny on decadence, Freeing the mind from pressure, (Addresses) Constructive criticism, Description of vileness, Advice to the Muslims, the Arabs, the East, the West, to the Youth, Description of apathy, The happiness of advanced nations, Progress of man's faculties, The highest degree of progress.

The way out: Types of government, Questions of political life, Which nations deserve freedom, How to combat tyranny, What to replace it with, How is a just government to be set up.

Al-Kawâkibi, as appears from the above, follows Alfieri's scheme faithfully and even copies the constructions of his sentences. There is however at times a little confusion, perhaps when al-Kawâkibi does not grasp the exact meaning of a certain passage. Alfieri is very clear about the separation of the legislative from the executive power: "Similarly," he writes, "one must call tyranny the government in which he whose function it is to pass laws, can himself have them executed; one must call attention here to the fact that the laws, that is the solemn pact, equal for all, must only be the product of the will of the majority received by those elected legally by the people." "The government is then tyrannical," he goes on to say, "not only when he who executes the laws makes them or when he who makes them executes them, but there is perfect tyranny in all governments where he whose function it is to execute the laws never has to account for their execution to whoever has passed them." 1 Al-Kawâkibi, ending his very similar passage on the types of the tyrannical governments, varies it thus:  

"They [tyrannical governments]," he writes, "also include the constitutional government in which the legislative power is separated from the executive power, because that does not lift tyranny, nor does it make it lighter, unless those who execute the laws are responsible to those who legislate, and these, in turn, responsible to the nation which knows how to supervise."¹ There also are a few more variations, especially when al-Kawākibi writes about Islam. This is understandable. Alfieri shared with his generation a poor opinion of the East and a contempt for Islam; he was convinced of the superiority of Europe in all branches of the arts and learning over all the other continents. Al-Kawākibi could, naturally, not follow Alfieri all the way in his condemnation of Islam. He is therefore subject to certain indecisions and contradictions: he tries for instance, to apply Alfieri's analysis of Western religious organisation to Islam. Alfieri, in Della Tirannide, is anti-clerical. The Roman Catholic Church for him is a principle of evil. It fosters and supports tyranny. The clergy are corrupt and rapacious. They constitute a large class of vain, idle, ignorant persons, flourishing on the sale of indulgences. It is necessary for them to ally themselves to tyrannies either because they are perverse, or because they have to preserve the fortunes they have accumulated in an illegitimate manner.² What is worse, the highest ecclesiastical honours and dignities become hereditary to the aristocracy; what could have

¹ T., p. 12.
² Alfieri, p. 83.
been elective and comparatively less harmful, becomes heredity and twice as harmful. It is obvious that this analysis, whatever its merits, can make sense only when applied to Roman Catholic conditions. Al-Kawākibi therefore has to shift his ground somewhat when he tries to apply Alfieri's dogma to Islam. In Umm al-Qura he writes about the Ottoman government corrupting religion and creating a hereditary class of 'ulamā' from the ignorant sons of certain dignitaries. These "so-called" 'ulamā' are, says al-Kawākibi, responsible, among other things, for encouraging the rulers to be absolute, and to refuse to consult their subjects, although this is against the Sunna. But al-Kawākibi does not fail to distinguish between the real 'ulamā' whose growing poverty has left them too helpless to have much influence or an impulse to study, and the official and ignorant ones. Alfieri does not make such a distinction. Al-Kawākibi moreover departs completely from the line taken by Alfieri who considered that all monotheistic religions, especially Islam, are systems synonymous with tyranny. Because religion is more important to Asiatics, writes Alfieri thinking all the time of Islam, and their God is an all-powerful God, their tyrant becomes in their eyes a "real article of faith" and the tyranny of Islam is even worse than that of Christianity. A Muslim will of course disagree with such an interpretation of Islam, and so does al-Kawākibi. In his chapter

1. T., p. 106.
2. Q. (Umm al-Qura), p. 42.
4. Alfieri, p. 120.
"Tyranny and Religion" he argues against this view. Western political thinkers, he says, agree that political tyranny is the result of religious tyranny, or, at least, if it is not the result, the two tyrannies go hand in hand and lend support to each other. These views are correct, according to him, only when they refer to the myths of the Ancient, the historical part of the Bible and the Epistles of the New Testament, but not when they refer to the ethical sections of these scriptures, or to the Qur'an. "These writers," he goes on to say, "maintain that religious teaching and the Divine Books make people fear an all-powerful force which cannot be understood by human reason and which threaten man with every misfortune in life and long or eternal torture after death.... And then these teachings open avenues of liberation from these fears, but these avenues are guarded by human beings such as the clergy, the priests or the shaikhs. The fee for entry into these avenues is... a tax of veneration paid with humiliation, or a price of absolution, some of these guardians detain even souls from meeting their Creator until they receive the toll which enables these souls to pass to the tomb."¹ These writers, al-Kawākibi goes on to say, conclude that tyranny and religion go hand in hand.² This description of tyranny and religion is inspired by Alfieri's passage on the nature of the monotheistic religions. This is the result, al-Kawākibi objects, not of monotheism, but of the shirk which contaminated Judaism

1. T., pp. 18-9.
2. T., p. 22.
and Christianity. Islam brought finally the principles of political freedom which are intermediary between Democracy and Aristocracy, and put the unity of the Godhead (tawḥīd) on a secure foundation. It brought to the world the rule of the first four Caliphs, the like of whom has never been seen before or since in the world. These caliphs understood the meaning of the Qur'an which is full of teachings against tyranny, and in support of justice and equality. Here follows a section with al-Kawākibi's views about Consultation (shūra) in Islam, Socialism (al-ishtirakiyya)¹, and about the verses of the Qur'an which have foreseen modern scientific discoveries, all of which are - of course - from a source other than Alfieri, and will be dealt with later. Al-Kawākibi however is not always sure that apathy in Islam is not explicable partly, if not wholly, by the support to the rulers given by the 'ulamā'. He may, of course, have derived this view from other Muslim writers who decried the influence of Sufism and of the 'ulamā' over the people; and these latter may have themselves drawn on Western ideas. In the case of al-Kawākibi, it seems that he took up these innovations not from a desire to imitate the Europeans, but because he was not aware that he was preaching something incompatible with the Sunna. And some of Alfieri's doctrine were identical with orthodox Muslim teachings. For instance, Alfieri, discussing how to fight tyranny, states that prudence - to be distinguished from cowardice - is the first requisite for

¹. The translation of this term will be discussed below, chapter III.
action. An action, the outcome of which is not very sure, might do more harm than good because it might unnecessarily upset the peace, and might confirm the tyrant in his oppression. Patience however has its limits: confiscation of wealth can be suffered in silence but not the killing of a near and dear relative. In the latter case however a man must act alone to avenge the private offence. If he does feel strong enough to lead a conspiracy against the tyrant, he must not do so before the tyrant has repeatedly offended in a public, not a private manner. Conspiracies are in most cases, even when successful, designed only to remove the tyrant not the tyranny; harm results as the avenging of a private offence will create more miserable people. This theory of prudence in political action is part of the theory of obedience in Sunni Islam, and it is also substantially the conclusion which al-Kawākibi takes up, point by point:

"1. The nation," he writes, "all the members or the majority of which do not feel the pains of tyranny does not deserve to be free.

"2. Tyranny is not to be fought with violence, but slowly and with gentleness.

"3. Before one begins to fight tyranny, one must know what is to replace it.

"These are the principles which must serve as guides in getting rid of tyranny; they are principles which do not make the

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2. The theory of obedience in Islam will be discussed in chapter V.
slaves of tyranny too hopeful, and which please the tyrants because they seem to keep them secure in their oppression. That is why I shall remind them of how the famous Alfieri warned them saying, Let not the tyrant be happy in his great power and great precautions; many are the stubborn and the powerful who have been vanquished by a humble one, suffering oppression." "The principle," al-Kawākibi continues, "that the nation (umma) the majority of whose members do not feel the pains of tyranny does not deserve freedom: the nation which has been struck with vileness and poverty to the extent that its members have become like animals or worse, does not ask for freedom. It might avenge itself on the tyrant but for the sake of taking revenge on his person, not to get rid of tyranny. This will not benefit such a nation at all but will replace one disease for another like exchanging constipation for a headache. Or it might fight the tyrant by following another; should it succeed, the new leader will wash his hands only in the water of tyranny, and it will not benefit anyone, but will exchange a chronic disease for an acute one. Such a nation might perhaps attain freedom by chance, but it will again not benefit from it, and this freedom will soon turn into an unsettled form of tyranny which is worse still, in the same way as when a convalescent has a setback."

Alfieri makes one distinction in this respect which al-Kawākibi overlooks. He distinguishes between those who are too ignorant to realise that they have civil rights; they are to be

1. T., pp. 171-3.
pitioned; and those who know quite well the abjection they live in, but still go on being servile; it is only these who do not deserve freedom.\(^1\) The rest of al-Kawākibi's passage reproduces Alfieri.\(^2\) He, like the Italian author, thinks that the only way to uproot tyranny is by educating the people, which is a slow process.\(^3\) Alfieri devotes a small chapter to the question of what to replace tyranny with, and says that to answer this question properly, he would need to write another book on The Republic, a question on which Machiavelli has written best.\(^4\) Alfieri is not dogmatic about the form of government to be set up because not all types of government suit all types of people. He meant by republic, it seems, any type of government, whether a republic proper, or a monarchy, where popular sovereignty exists.\(^5\) Al-Kawākibi too leaves the matter vague. Both writers agree however that the first step towards uprooting tyranny is to feel it.\(^6\) Both elaborate this theory of knowledge in the same way. Ignorance is the source of all evil, and knowledge, the foundation of the just state.\(^7\) "The people," writes al-Kawākibi, "kill themselves with their own hands because they are afraid. Their

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2. Alfieri, 175.
3. T., pp. 173-9; Alfieri, p. 179.
5. See G. Megaro, Vittorio Alfieri: Forerunner of Italian Nationalism, New York, 1930, pp. 51-4, where he mentions Alfieri's use of the phrase 'English republic' to denote the government of England in his day.
7. The criterion that knowledge is a mark of an advanced nation, deserving to rule itself, has always been one of the principal arguments used by nationalists when they demand political independence for their countries. See, for instance, the speeches of Muṣṭafā Kāmil in his Egyptiens et Anglais, Paris, 1906.
fear is the result of ignorance. Once ignorance is cured, fear will disappear, and the situation will change. The tyrant, in spite of his nature, will change into an honest agent... a just ruler... and a thoughtful father... "

Al-Kawākibi repeats all of Alfieri's analysis of tyranny and the way in which it thrives, how it is supported by the clergy, the nobility, the wealthy classes and the military - especially if recruited abroad - and the ignorant masses. In order to show how closely he copies Alfieri, all that would be necessary is to set side by side al-Kawākibi's text and Alfieri's. The similarity is literal and exact. The discussion of fear, both of the oppressor and the oppressed, false honour, wealth and poverty, and in general the picture he draws of ravenous wolves devouring each other, is taken wholly out of Alfieri. One salient point which Alfieri no doubt borrowed from Rousseau, is that there can never be a good tyrant since tyranny must necessarily involve corruption. In a tyranny, the goodness of the good man is transmuted into evil by reason of the maleficent environment. This doctrine rules out the possibility of a good tyrant, a possibility which Muslims in al-Kawākibi's time were very ready to envisage. 2

1. T., p. 40.
2. "Is there not in the whole East," asks Muhammad 'Abduh, for instance, "a tyrant from among his people, just in ruling them, able to do, by justice, in fifteen years what reason alone cannot do in fifteen centuries?" "Innama yanhad bi'l-shara mustabid 'ādil", in Rashīd Riḍā, Tārīkh..., II, pp. 390-1. See also "al-Umma wa sūliyat al-bākhim al-mustabid", in al-'Uṣūwa al-wuthqā, which first appeared in 1884, Beirut 1933, pp. 213-215, where the progress or decadence of the umma seem to be the result of one man's actions.
does not therefore take up more than vaguely this idea of Alfieri's. Tyranny indeed corrupts everything, but at the same time he regrets the absence of a benevolent ruler who might force the people into the right conduct.\(^1\) This is not necessarily because he did not fully understand the implications of Alfieri's theory of linking popular sovereignty to freedom and of proving by logic the impossibility of a benevolent tyrant. It must be remembered that Alfieri himself, in his medley of libertarian opinions drawn from Rousseau, Condorcet, Voltaire and especially Montesquieu, was not free from contradictions and inconsistencies. Although he recognised the force of public opinion in supporting or rejecting tyranny, he did not rule out violent action of one man or a group of men against the tyrant.

There are a few points which al-Kawākibi deals with in Tabāī\(^2\) which he could not have taken from Alfieri's book: The cyclical nature of history,\(^2\) the remarks on socialism (al-ḥayāt al-ishtirākīyya)\(^3\), the educative function of government. It is not possible to trace directly the source from which al-Kawākibi borrowed these points. He was, as has appeared, familiar with certain of Fourier's ideas, and it may be that he was interested in socialism and communism through his knowledge of this author as well as through the numerous articles in the Arabic press of the period dealing with European ideas.\(^4\)

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1. Q., p. 51.
2. T., p. 131.
3. This question will be dealt fully in chapter III.
4. The perusal of the nineteenth century Arabic periodicals shows what a variety of topics were covered. New discoveries, new theories, new ideas, and new superstitions, all found room in these publications. For instance, choosing at random, from al-Muqtatār of 1898-1900, the topics covered are as follows: Japan and the reasons/ cont.
This analysis leaves no doubt about the source from which al-Kawākibi drew the ideas he presented in Tabā'i'. How could he have come to know of Alfieri, and of another Western work standing in relation to Umm al-Qura as Della Tirannide stands to Tabā'i', if he really could not read any European language, and if these books had not been translated into a language he could read? All his biographers are unanimous in affirming that he had neither French nor English nor any other Western language. One can of course suppose that he did know a European language but kept the fact hidden. This, although possible, is very unlikely; at a time when European learning was held in such high esteem, to broadcast one's mastery of French or English could bring nothing but rewards. It is difficult to believe that, even if al-Kawākibi persisted in hiding his knowledge of a European language, the fact would not have become known. The only plausible explanation is that he had these books read out and explained to him, taking down the main points and remembering the construction and method of analysis. In Arabic, this is a legitimate mode of composition, to which the name of plagiarism does not apply.

On this assumption, another point remains to be made: if al-Kawākibi had had any book read to him in Cairo, the reader would have most probably mentioned it, and the matter would have become known in al-Kawākibi's small circle. Therefore, one may perhaps conclude, the book was read to him when he

4. (cont. from p. 47.) for her progress, various aspects of Herbert Spencer's teachings, the Social Democrats, Competition and cooperation, the behaviour of children, etc......
was still in Aleppo. This would account for the complete silence as regards the way in which it came to him, because in the Ottoman Empire, it would have been dangerous for anyone to avow acquaintance with such a book as Della Tirannide. In spite of the rigid censorship, a copy of the book could have easily been introduced by an employee of a foreign consulate, who could have also easily acted as al-Kawkibi's interpreter. Al-Ghazzi wrote that al-Kawkibi had written Umm al-Qura while he was still in Aleppo, and there is no reason to suppose that he had not also thought, planned or written part of Tabā'i while he was still there. After all, Tabā'i appeared two years before Umm al-Qura. But all these are speculations. To say that Tabā'i was inspired to this very great extent from a European writer is not to try and diminish its value and importance in Arabic. What is important is not whether al-Kawkibi copied from Fourier or Alfieri, but that what he copied was read in Arabic as having a special reference to his time and place. This was indeed the case. The book published under the pseudonym, al-Raḥḥala K, was immediately understood to refer to the Ottomans and to contain attacks on 'Abd al-Ḥamīd.1 It may well be true that al-Kawkibi did not, as he says in the preface, mean any special tyrant or particular tyranny, but it also remains to ask why he was so impressed with this study of tyranny, in itself neither very inspiring nor greatly perspicacious; no doubt because he mentally applied Alfieri's discussion to his time

and place. Islam was decaying, and the reason must be the tyranny of the government. 'Abd al-Ḥamīd would immediately occur to the mind. This is also why the book was so naturally taken to refer to the government of 'Abd al-Ḥamīd. Liberal European ideas were already being preached, and French eighteenth century ideas were quite current. Egypt was under the British occupation, and one revolt had already failed. National political parties were being formed. Tabā'i, written in a clear, rousing and compelling style, found therefore a welcome reception. Such an outspoken attack on obvious evils aroused admiration. It came at a moment when it could lend support to the ideologues and the enthusiasts of nationalism. Many of its ideas and cryptic remarks were later to be taken up and more fully developed. Al-Kawākibi himself seems to have considered it an important contribution to the study of politics, which he says was, unfortunately, not often taken up by the Arabs. This study, he holds, is especially necessary now because it explains the malady of the East, and devises a cure for it. The idea that political conditions could be described in terms of disease and health was prevalent among Arabic writers of his day. He took up this

1. See, among others, Adīb Iṣḥāq, Al-Durar, which is a selection from his works collected and edited by his brother, 'Auni Iṣḥāq, Beirut, 1909, where the theory of natural law is developed.
2. T., pp. 6-7.
3. In al-'Urwa al-wuthqa, which appeared in 1884, the authors also speak in terms of malady and cure; see for instance al-'Urwa al-wuthqa, pp. 54 ff. The cure propounded there is, of course, not exactly the same as al-Kawākibi's, and is drawn from other sources.
idea and gave it a new sharpness. If tyranny was a disease, then it was possible not only to find a cure, but to go on experimenting until the best cure for the disease could be found. Government, on this view, is not the exercise of power in accordance with traditional prescription, but an arrangement subject to the reason of men and their will, an arrangement, moreover, designed to bring concrete benefits to the citizens, and liable to be upset if it does not answer expectations. Such a view contradicted, of course, the traditional Muslim doctrine. It is a purely secular view justifying dissent and revolution, and its introduction into Muslim lands could not fail to have far-reaching consequences.

1. T., pp. 8, 162 ff., 178.
Chapter III

The Apathy of Islam: Causes and Remedies

In Umm al-Qura, al-Kawākibi devoted two meetings of his society to a discussion of the reasons leading to the decline of Muslim society and to the apathy which reigns over the world of Islam. Later in the book, he distinguishes three main types of causes for this apathy, religious, political, and moral, which he subdivides into primary and secondary.¹

The author considers that the Muslims no longer possess the strength and the renown they had in the earlier periods of Islam. They are now a dead people (umma mayyite)², detached from public affairs, unaware of the existence of rights and duties. Every Muslim is now as though he were independent in himself (ka' annahu khuliga umma wāhid): he leads a day to day existence, and is interested only in his own petty affairs. Not even the approach of death can teach him that he has rights and duties within the Islamic society, and indeed within the whole of human society (al-jāmi‘a al-islamiyya wa‘l-jāmi‘a al-bashariyya), that he is political by nature (madani al-tab‘), and can only live by cooperation (al-ishtirak). This state of affairs has arisen because the Muslim has now come to forget the teachings of the Qur'an and the Sunna on cooperation.³ But the situation is not

¹. Q., pp. 19-65 and 137-150.
³. Q., p. 54.
entirely hopeless. Al-Kawakibi takes the example of the Rumanians, the Greeks, the Americans, the Italians, the Japanese, to prove that other nations have risen again from the depths of apathy and decadence, and to point to the possibility of such a rebirth in Islam.¹

One of the most important reasons for the apathy of Islam is the one which he makes al-Maula al-Rumî bring forward: to wit, the loss of political freedom by the Muslims through the tyrannical measures imposed upon them by Hamidian despotism, measures such as the blind and ignorant censorship of the written and the spoken word.² But this, for al-Kawakibi, is not the principal reason. It lies rather in the decline of Islamic culture, and in the absence of racial and linguistic bonds between the various Muslim peoples: "The Muslims outside the Peninsula," he says, "are a congeries of mixed races, foreign converts and remains of various peoples, united by no bond but that of the Ka'ba (lafîf akhlâq dukhala' wa baqâya aqwâm shatta)."³ These people can of course never constitute a united and strong public opinion (ra'i'am). The traditional meetings and councils of Islam, such as the pilgrimage and the khutba have fallen into decay, and the preachers and the imâms are unwilling to give guidance in public affairs. The public good is thus languishing, and the social organisations which the Qur'ân has set up in order to secure this good and which may be found in all thriving foreign nations, no longer perform their functions.⁴ The polity of Islam,

² Q., pp. 28-30.
³ Q., p. 34.
⁴ Q., pp. 52-4.
al-Kawākibi laments, has now changed; it was representative and socialist, that is democratic in the real sense; now it is an absolute monarchy. Such a transformation can be traced to the fact that the laws of the Shari'ā could not be set down while the Companions were on their expeditions of conquest. When the empire grew, the argument between the 'ulama' waxed strong, and the foreign converts (al-dukhalā') introduced into Islam their idolatrous tendencies. The political leaders, especially those in the distant provinces, found their advantage in these dissensions and utilised them to separate themselves from the Muslim state. These sectarian and political divisions within the Muslim umma made it an easy prey to civil wars and to foreign invasions. Al-Kawākibi raises here the question of the attitude of the rulers and the 'ulama'. He regrets that the Muslims have no leader like Bismarck and Garibaldi to unite them and make them see reason, by force if need be. The present rulers in Islam are blamed for ignorance and mismanagement; they are said to need the advice of a loyal and upright philosopher to direct them and their peoples into the right path. Al-Kawākibi however does not

1. Q., p. 25.
2. "Muslim historians," writes Tritton, "attribute these heresies, as they call them to foreign influence; the process is only a repetition of the past for the Jew perished when the children of foreign concubines multiplied among them and introduced speculation. Heresies and errors were due solely to the children of captives. Others ascribed them to Persian influence. . . .
"There was a tendency to ascribe everything to foreign influence. Some ascetics cavilled at the recitation of poetry and this was said to be foreign asceticism." A. S. Tritton, Muslim Theology, London, 1947, pp. 18 & 19.
4. Q., p. 34.
5. Q., pp. 15 and 51.
discuss whether a Bismarck or a Garibaldi needs philosophical advice; but the trend of his argument is that they do not.

He is very critical of the 'ulama': they give currency to theories such as al-Jabariyya which preach asceticism and discourage initiative and enterprise, teaching the Muslim to live like a dead man even before he dies. The would-be theologians and the Sufi extremists have also sinned: they have borrowed from the Talmud, the Papacy and other foreign religions, elements which they have falsely attributed to Islam. They have thus hindered the proper understanding of Islam, in the same way as the Jews, relying on the Talmud, have neglected the Torah.

The hold of these Sufis on Islam is shown by the practice of magic, witchcraft and saint worship and by the size of their establishments in all the great cities from Constantinople to Baghdad and Tlemcen. They have deviated in religion, but they try to pass themselves off as real 'ulama', and adopt all the

1. Q., pp. 23-4.
2. Al-Kawākibi in his disapproval of those whom he calls Sufi extremists, and in his denunciations of their practices and beliefs, is following the usual line taken by the reformers and the modern Muslim thinkers. See A.J. Arberry, Sufism, London, 1950, p. 122. Taufiq al-Tawfi in his book, al-Taßawwuf fi Migr ibbān al-Asr al-'uthmāni, Alexandria, 1945?, reaches the same conclusions as al-Kawākibi. His point is that, although intellectual paralysis had already caught Islam as early as 1200 A.D., the Sufis exploited the apathy of the umma and strengthened this apathy by their degenerate teachings; he therefore holds them responsible for much of the decay of Egyptian thought during the Ottoman period; pp. 200-288, and especially p. 210.
3. For the influence of Ahl al-‘urūq, their relation to the rulers, their power over the people, see al-Tawfi, pp.124-140. In pp. 138-140, the Shaikhs of the Tarīqa are said to constitute the link between the oppressed people and their tyrannical rulers. These Shaikhs, to impress the rulers with their position and with the hold they had over the people, went, according to al-Tawfi, to extraordinary lengths.
latters’ external practices. They have thus corrupted Islam and made of the zakāt their livelihood, and of the proceeds of the Awqaf, gifts for their followers. The real ‘ulamā‘ lost their livelihood and the reverence due to them. These ‘ulamā‘ have in any case not kept up with the advance of knowledge. They have concentrated on the study of theology, rhetoric, jurisprudence and some branches of mathematics, completely neglecting the new natural sciences. Europe has on the contrary made so much progress in these fields, that the Muslims find themselves dependent on the Europeans both for the requirements of their daily life, and for the clarification of many obscure points in the Qur’ān. This is the manner in which the ‘ulamā‘ have let the people down. Their influence on the rulers is no better. These turbaned and ignorant pretenders to knowledge have encouraged the rulers in their evil courses. These rulers

1. Q., pp. 35-40. On the wealth of Ahl al-Turuq, see al-Tawīl, 118-120, 133-140 and 154. According to this account, they received gifts and allowances from the governors, the princes and the kings. This income however is said to have been spent in great measure on the welfare of the poor. On the poverty of the ‘ulamā‘, see E.W. Lane: "... if he a shaikh who had studied in the Azhar went to a butcher, to procure some meat (for he found it best to do so, and not to send another), the butcher refused to make any charge; but kissed his hand, and received as an honour and a blessing whatever he chose to give. - The condition of a man of this profession is now so fallen, that it is with difficulty he can obtain a scanty subsistence, unless possessed of extraordinary talent." Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians, Everyman Edition, pp. 218-219. Al-Kawākibi mentions nothing of all this.

2. Q., pp. 47-50. In T., pp. 33-6, al-Kāwākibi gives a list of Qur’ānic verses which used to be obscure because they prophesied new discoveries. Al-Kawākibi is not the only one to take up this attitude; see al-Tawīl, p. 219 for references to the views of Fārid Wajdi and Muṣṭafā al-Ghaṭalayīnī. Compare also with Muḥammad ‘Abdu’s similar views, see C. C. Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt, London, 1933, pp. 137-143; and with Rashīd Riḍa’s, ibid., p. 241.
are ignorant and vain. They talk as though they meant to start political reforms, when, in fact, they have no such intention. These rulers, especially the foreign among them, follow Islam because it suits them; they are, in reality, idolatrous; although they may not be aware of it, this is so, as their beliefs show. It is only lip-service that they pay to the Qur'ān, and they do this only to strengthen their hold on the simple people. If it had not been for two verses in the Qur'ān, namely - "Obey God, obey the Messenger and those of you who hold power", and "Strive in the cause of God", they would have neglected religion altogether. But these rulers do not heed the meaning of these verses and the conditions implied in them; all their interest lies in taxation and conscription. Their neglect of religion is abetted by the 'ulamā' who are rewarded for their help. For two centuries now the grade of ḥālim in the Ottoman Empire could be, and has been conferred, upon the ignorant, the illiterate and even children. Promotion comes not with learning but with seniority. Thus, some who are still infants get their appointment as 'ulamā' and their title grows with them. The greatest evil wrought by these turbaned men is the encouragement of absolutism, and the discouragement - against the teachings of the Sunna - of Consultation (shūra). They supply the ruler with arguments

1. Q., p. 27.
2. Q., p. 33.
3. Q., pp. 42-3. On the 'ulamā' in general, see Earl of Cromer, Modern Egypt, vol. II, London 1908, pp. 173-186. Cromer holds that the 'ulamā' have often been a check on the actions of the ruler.
to maintain his absolutism and to refute foreign criticism. Progress and Consultation, the ruler pretends, are not consonant with Islam, and public opinion is against improvements.¹

Al-Kawākibi's conclusion is that the fundamental cause of the present situation of Islam is internal: the fault lies in the Muslims themselves; they no longer act according to the injunctions of the Qur'ān and their religion is not the real Islam.² It is not clear however whether he thinks that tyranny has corrupted religion, or whether the decay of Islam has enabled the tyrant to consolidate his rule. It seems to be a continuous process: tyranny debasing religion, and debased religion breeding tyranny. In Ṭabāt he says that it is not enough to attribute the malady of the East to religious indifference, because religious indifference itself is the result of tyranny.³

The social system enjoined by the Qur'ān and built up by the first four caliphs has still, compared with the present conditions obtaining under tyranny, another virtue. That social system, according to al-Kawākibi, was al-wa'isha al-ishtirākiyya, the socialist life. In such a life there would be no excessive wealth, because excessive wealth corrupts character. Moderate wealth would, however, be permitted on three conditions: it must be legitimately earned, it must not be an obstacle to the satisfaction of the needs of other men, and it must not exceed what is necessary for the satisfaction

¹. Q., pp. 45-6.
². Q., Q., pp. 31-2 and 60.
³. T., p. 102.
of personal needs. Land tenure would be devised in such a
manner as to protect the peasant. Interest would be forbidden,
because it tends to increase disparity of wealth. 1 These
principles of socialist life are present in the Qur'ān and
the Muslim Canon Law; for instance, Islam was the first to
invent the "principles of the budget" on which all private and
public finance is based; it also enjoins the giving of zakāt
and other taxes to provide for the welfare of the poor, and
these taxes, if levied properly would result in an organised
life of universal socialism (al-ishtirāk al-‘umūmi) for which
so many nations in Europe are now striving. 2 Islam is a demo-
cratic religion; it grounds political freedom on firm bases,
and the government enjoined by it must treat rich and poor
alike. But, in Tabā‘, while also stating that such is the
nature of Islam, al-Kawākibi says that Islamic government
requires aristocratic consultation or consultation of the
notables (al-shūra al-aristuqrāṭiyya al shūrat al-ashrār). 3
This seems to echo Alfieri. As Megaro explains, Alfieri was
far from being a democrat and did not envisage popular sover-
eignty in its full meaning. The masses he held in utter con-
tempt. What he meant by the people is made clear in a footnote
in Della Tirannide: "By people," translates Megaro, "I mean
nothing but that mass of citizens of farmers more or less well-
to-do who have their own property or trade and who have wives,
children and relatives, and not that more numerous perhaps, but

1. T., pp. 76-79.
2. Q., p. 53.
3. T., p. 27.
so much less estimable class of *nulla tenenti* of the lowest plebeians. To these people, accustomed to living from day to day, and indifferent to any type of government, because they have nothing to lose, and being extremely corrupt and boorish especially in the cities, any government, even a pure Democracy, cannot and should not accord any other indulgence than that of never letting them lack bread, justice or fear. For any time that one of these three things is wanting to them, every good society can in an instant be overthrown by them and even be completely destroyed."  

Al-Kawakibi, taking over these views of Alfieri, makes his "People" into "Muslims: Ahl al-ḥal wa'l-faqd. At the same time, he makes the Qur'an originate socialism (Ishtirākīyya), but says that the political freedom of Islam is intermediate between democracy and aristocracy. What he meant then by *ishtirākīyya* is not quite clear, and is, in any case not what is meant by the work nowadays. In 1877, the word *ishtirākī* was used, in a translation of a book by Guizot, to mean social. The word however does not appear in the dictionaries as early as that. J. Catafago and Ellious Bocthor do not give the words *ishtirākī* or 'socialist' at all. Belot translates, in 1890, 'socialism' as madhhab alladhīn amrūhum wa alwālūhum fawda bainahum, that is 'anarchy'. S. Spiro does not list the word *ishtirākī* in his *Arabic-English Vocabulary*.

2. T., p. 25.
which appeared in 1895, but he does translate 'socialist' by ishtirāski in his English-Arabic Vocabulary of Modern Colloquial Arabic of Egypt, which appeared in 1897. It is clear that at the time of al-Kawākibi the use of the word in the latter sense was common. Although he himself did not use the word in the sense attached to it now, he nevertheless did attribute to it an economic connotation. He seems to have understood by it a vague form of primitive communism, and equality of right. Other writers have also argued that democracy or socialism - as the case may be - are the ideals preached by Islam. But in all cases what they seem to have done was to take a vague general term and to fill it with connotations derived from modern political thought. Muhammad 'Abdu, for instance, equates public opinion with shūra. He uses shūra and ra'ī 'ām interchangeably. Rashīd Riḍa uses the term shūra to mean parliamentary government. So it is with ishtirākiyya and Islam.


3. H. Laoust, Le Califat dans la Doctrine de Raṣīd Riḍā, Beirut, 1938, n. 13, pp. 249-250. On shūra in Islam, see H. R. Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam, Chicago, 1947, p. 10. "That the ordinary business of secular government," writes Gibb, "is to be controlled by the general body of believers is an idea which was, indeed formulated in the first century of Islam, but only to be decisively rejected as heretical, because of the excesses of its supporters." See also H. Laoust, Essai sur les Doctrines Sociales et Politiques de Taḥṣīl al-ʿUqlā bi al-Tāhirīh, Cairo, 1939, pp. 254-5, where he explains who Ḥāf al-Ḥāl wal-ʿaqd are, and how some writers have tried to interpret their function as an expression of national sovereignty.
"Quite early," writes H. Laoust, "Muslim modernism thought it could find in the tradition and the revived fiqh the makings of an economic ideology. But as in all other subjects, modernism was content to draw only the general outlines of this ideology. As Rashid Ri'ad puts it, modernism intended to hold a middle position between liberal capitalism and communism or socialism. It is thus in favour of private property, but considers the right to hold property limited by its social function.\(^1\)

A more recent writer, Abd al-Ḥamid Jūda al-Saḥḥār, has defined socialism as the economic theory enjoined by Islam. He knows that there are different kinds of socialism - democratic socialism, national socialism or nazism, Soviet communism - but Islam combines freedom and economic justice. It is a socialism which neither allows the rich to devour the poor nor the ignorant to claim equality with the learned, nor the idle with the hard-working. The socialism of Islam does not abolish property; it does not make the people work for the government for a fixed wage. But its operation decreases inequalities between different individuals. The socialism of Islam is also a spiritual socialism (ishtirākīyya maṣnawiyya) consisting of the practices of fasting and pilgrimage which tend to abolish social differences among Muslims.\(^2\) It is thus clear that al-Kawākibi and those who followed in his tradition did not contribute very much to the introduction of modern

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1. Laoust, Califat..., n.41, p. 266.
Western political thought on socialism and democracy to Arabic writing. They used terms such as *shūra* and *ishtirākiyya* for purposes of apologetics. What they really said was that Western ideas and sciences, which they thought worthy of approval, were of the essence of Islam, and owed their origin to it. But there has not been a real attempt in Arabic to explain the theory of socialism in Muslim terms or to reconcile its assumptions with those of Islam. This is unlike what has happened to other European ideas, also taken up and preached by al-Kawākibi.

Al-Kawākibi is not the only one to ascribe decay of Islam to the causes which have been enumerated. Other writers before and after him have speculated on the subject. The most interesting analysis is that given by Shakīb Arslān, some thirty years after *Umm al-Qura*, in his book *limādha Taʾakkhare al-muslimūn wa limādha taqaddama ghairuhum*.1 Shakīb Arslān's criterion for decay is the subjection of Muslim countries to European powers. The causes of this subjection are, according to him, lack of self-confidence, fatalism and despair, ignorance or inadequate knowledge, cowardice, avarice, corruption.

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1. For a sympathetic study of the personality, activities and works of Shakīb Arslān, see A. Lévi-Provençal, "L'Emir Shakib Arslan", in *Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain*, IX-X, 1947, pp. 5-19. See also Ru完整的引语
of morals, and the attitude prevalent among the rulers of assuming that their subjects were created for their benefit; the encouragement by the 'ulamā' of this attitude and their refusal to come to terms with modern knowledge, the prevalence of either of two evil trends: petrifaction (jumūd) or blasphemy (juḥūd). Shalāb Arslān denies that there is anything in the essence of Islam or the Qur'ān to lead to such a condition; Islam indeed is a religion which copes both with the temporal and the eternal. He makes one important point: there is no discrepancy, according to him, between a national revival and a religious one; a religious revival implies a national one and vice versa. In Europe or Japan a national revival would not have been possible without the help of religion.

Ja'māl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and Muḥammad ʿAbdu had already preached a return to the original sources of religion to cure the ills of Islamic society. With the passage of the years and with the extension of the Islamic community, Islam became mixed with foreign elements and lost its original strength and purity. Only the first two centuries of Islam are held to be the real Islam. It thus appears that al-Kawākibi's diagnosis shows no great originality. But the cure prescribed is not the same in all cases. Al-Kawākibi preaches an Arabian caliphate to restore the spiritual forces of Islam. This was the most radical solution, and the others were content with less drastic measures. ¹

¹. See further, chapter IV below.
Al-Kawākibi's contribution then is not of great importance in itself. Its importance lies rather in the fact that it shows the thought of an intelligent Muslim Arab trying to come to terms with bewildering conditions. He was, it has been sufficiently shown, very much influenced by Western thought. The idea of apathy as something undesirable is a reaction to the spectacle of Western bustle and activity. The introduction of the masses as a possible factor in politics is an echo of the industrial revolution in Europe. The Western ideas, however, suffer, in al-Kawākibi's mind, a curious change, and emerge slightly different from what they were originally; he has put them into an Islamic mould, and in this disguise they proceeded to take their place among the political ideas which move the modern Arab East.

It may be profitable therefore to examine what are the assumptions which, as a result of his labours, became acclimatised in the East. The foremost among them is the necessity for a strong leader to unite the people. In his elucidation of this necessity, al-Kawākibi does not draw on the early history of the Arabs or of Islam, but on modern European history, particularly on that of Germany, Italy and the Balkans. Japan, exemplary among all Eastern nations, also retains his attention. He may have found it necessary to draw his examples from contemporary non-Muslim history in order to show that a renaissance was possible even now. But his preference is perhaps more significant. On the one hand, it points clearly to the authority with which the
Western example was quoted in his day. On the other hand, it prefigures one persistent pattern of thought in later Arabic political writers: the example of Japan, Germany and Italy went on gaining more and more ground in political discussions in the modern Middle East. Some two years after al-Kawākibī's death, Muṣṭafā Kāmil brought out his study of Japan, holding it up as a model to the Egyptians, that they may learn and do likewise. In Ṣāḥib Arslān's booklet, Japan plays the same role, and references to Japan in the literature are too numerous to collect and set down. As the years went on Germany and Italy became the more authoritative examples. Arabic writers have often seen a similarity between Germany and Italy in the nineteenth century and the Arab world today. Germany, as Sāṭiʿ al-Ḥusri remarks, was then, in spite of great cultural achievements, divided up into small independent states. The task before German nationalism was to unify these states in the face of the selfishness of the kings and princes clinging to their privileges. Italian nationalism too faced the same problem with the added one of the foreign occupation of parts of the national territory.

2. Muṣṭafā Kāmil, al-Shams al-muhīra, Cairo, 1904, pp. 3-7
3._limāḥa taʾakkhaḥara..., pp. 168 ff.
The temptation to apply the lessons of the German and Italian examples to Arab conditions is obvious. 'Abd al-Rahmān Azzām expresses perfectly the preoccupation of Arab nationalists with Germany and Italy. In an article published in a newspaper, al-'Arab, in 1932, entitled "The Arabs, People of the Future", he sums up the hopes of the Arab nationalists and the historical analogies which fed these hopes.¹ "Les hommes politiques occidentaux et les faux politiques d'Orient," began Azzām, "accueillent la propagande en faveur de l'unité arabe avec plus ou moins de mépris ou de dérision, dans la mesure où ils ignorent la vérité et où ils se laissent tromper par les apparences. Ainsi se moquait-on, au siècle dernier, de l'unité italienne et de l'unité allemande." After recalling the divisions of Germany and Italy at the beginning of the nineteenth century and the seeming hopelessness then of the dream of unity, he went on to describe how unity nonetheless was established: "Et, depuis cette époque, les plus grandes forces du monde n'ont pu réduire l'Allemagne à la division, à partir du moment où elle a goûté l'union, le

¹ Al-'Arab was published in Palestine and was the organ of Hizb al-Istiqāl al-'Arabi which aimed at the unification of the Arab countries. It published articles by 'Abd al-Rahmān Azzām and Shakīb Arslān among others. See L. Jovelet (R. Montagne?), "L'Evolution sociale et politique des 'Pays Arabes'", in R. E. I., 1933, p. 476. See also R. Montagne, "L'Union Arabe", in Politique Étrangère, 1946, p. 186, where the author states that the periodical was subsidised by King Faiṣal I. Montagne cites in p. 189-192, the text of Azzām's article above mentioned. Quotations will be from his French translation as the Arabic original is not available.
prestige, la richesse de la paix. Le monde s'est réuni contre elle dans la guerre générale, et vingt-huit États alliés n'ont pu ressusciter ce qu'elle avait fait disparaître: les rancunes régionales et les préjugés des clans."

'Azzām proceeded to point the moral: "Voici deux exemples tirés de l'Histoire contemporaine. Que les Arabes les tiennent en considération. Que ceux qui s'occupent de la propagande en faveur de l'unité arabe en fassent l'objet constant de leur attention, car, en fait d'importance, les Arabes ne le cèdent pas aux Germains, ni bien entendu aux Italiens, tant par le nombre que par les autres qualités."

And he concludes by affirming: "Le besoin des Arabes de réaliser l'unité ne fait donc pas de doute, pas plus que ne fait de doute le besoin qu'a l'univers des Arabes. Quand la nécessité se présente, choisissez ce qui convient manifestement. Portez donc votre regard sur la nation de l'avenir, la nation arabe!..."

Al-Kawākibi's strong leader has an ambiguous nature. In ʿUmm al-Qura, he says that the need is not only for such a leader to appear but for a wise man to lead the people in the right direction.¹ In Ṭabāʾihowever he speaks as though the wise man and the strong leader were one person, attending at the same time to the political renaissance of the umma and to the purification of religion.² Faithful to Alfieri, Al-Kawākibi tries also to make the nation not

¹. Q., pp. 51-2.
². T., p. 106.
only responsible for the misdeeds of its ruler but, able by its collective action, to secure its own liberty. This is of course vague and confused but not necessarily contradictory. The general will in Alfieri's scheme can lead to the rule of a strong leader and in al-Kawākibi's, the strong leader can have a religious function. This is possible because al-Kawākibi interprets Alfieri with the help of his Muslim traditions. In Islam religious and political leadership have been combined, or if not combined, then the ideal state has been held to be that in which they are combined. Al-Kawākibi's interpretation of Alfieri is therefore natural: he was not concerned with the decay of Islam as a spiritual force merely - a meaningless conception in orthodox Muslim terms - but, above all, as a political system. Given al-Kawākibi's tradition, it can be said that he was not preaching a modern totalitarian form of government, but only a mild democratic rule based on "liberal" nationalism, a combination which can lead in the circumstances of Islam, much further than he himself could have anticipated.
Al-Kawākibi's analysis of the apathy of Islam culminates in his discussion of the caliphate. The revival of the caliphate will be the means for the regeneration of Islam. In Umm al-Qura the discussion is concluded by some remarks attributed to the Indian Prince to whom the minutes of the meetings were supposedly shown.

The problem of Islam is to be solved by an Arab caliph from Quraish installed at Mecca, whose political authority will extend over the Hijaz only and will be exercised with the concurrence of a special Council of Consultation (shūra). The caliph cannot interfere in any of the political or administrative affairs of the other Muslim emirates or sultanates, but is only to give his approval to the appointment of sultans and emirs. He is to have no army. His name will be mentioned before that of the sultans in the khutbah, but it may not figure on coins. A force of two to three thousand soldiers drawn from all the emirates and sultanates will be entrusted
with the protection of the Hijaz. The commander of this army will be drawn from one of the small emirates and will receive his orders from the general Council during its term of office. Besides the Hijazi Council there will be a general Islamic Council, the head of which acts for the caliph. This general Council will be composed of about one hundred members nominated by all the Muslim sultanates and emirates. Its functions are restricted to matters of general religious policy, and governed by a special law adopted after approval by the constituent sultanates and emirates. The caliph proclaims the rulings of this body and is responsible for their execution. The Council elects the caliph; the election must conform to special conditions which do not conflict with the Shari'a. Should the caliph trespass any of these conditions, his election becomes invalid. As a general rule, the caliph is re-elected every three years. The general Council meets every year for two months, either in Mecca or in Ṭā'īf, just before the season of the Pilgrimage. The vice-President is chosen by ballot at the outset of every session; and the caliph appoints him on the recommendation of the Council. The functions of the general Council do not extend beyond the consideration of essential religious problems important to the political life of the umma, and of those which might have a profound influence over its character and activity. It might, for instance, consider problems such as the opening of "gates of ijtihād", i.e. the independent exercise of judgment; the encouragement of obedience to just governments even if they happen to be
non-Muslim, and the discouragement of blind obedience even to someone as just as 'Umar b. al-Khattab; problems arising from the adoption of useful arts and sciences, even should they come from the fire-worshippers, and the putting a stop to time wasting futilities. In this way the problem of the caliphate is solved and an Islamic Union, the members of which cooperate with and guarantee the safety of each other (tagāmuni taʿāwuni), becomes possible. The arrangement according to which this Union is set up derive from the principle of the German and American Unions, suitably modified of course.

The choice of the caliph from Quraish is not haphazard but is based, al-Kawākibi claims, on a deep study of the situation of the Muslim peoples. These are his reasons. In the conduct of the religious policy of the Muslims, a special place is to be assigned to the Arabian Peninsula, owing to its peculiar features. It should be a matter of policy to distribute the functions of the Muslim Union to the people best suited to carry them out. Diplomacy must be entrusted to the Ottomans, administration to the Egyptians, the organisation of military forces to the Afghans and their neighbours in the East, and to the Moors in the West; Persia, Central Asia and India should take care of culture and economics. Since the Jamʿiyyat Umm al-Qura strives mainly for the revival of Islam, it lays all its hopes in this respect on the Peninsula and its people. The geographical position of the Peninsula, half way between the Far East and North Africa, the treasures which it contains - the Kaʿba and the Prophet's Mosque - indicate it as
a centre for the elaboration of religious policy in Islam. It has also the additional safeguard of poverty and remoteness to protect it from the ambitions of competitive neighbours, and from the intermixture of races, religions and sects; this intermixture, it is to be observed, is practically absent in Arabia. The inhabitants of the Peninsula have many qualities to recommend them. As a free people, they constitute, together with the related tribes of Mesopotamia and North Africa, the core of a Muslim Union. Islam originated among them, and religious belief, which accords with their social customs better than with those of other peoples, is deeply rooted among them. As they are the oldest practitioners of Islam, so they have the greatest knowledge of its laws, as many hadithes testify. They are the pillars of religion, and zeal for the Prophet's cause (al-asabiyya al-nabawiyya) still lives among them. Their Islam is still pure, flexible and free from confusion. The beduin characteristics of pride and esprit de corps still survive among them, and their princes have noble forbears. Finally, to judge by the riches of their language and literature, the Peninsula Arabs are the most ancient of civilised peoples. These Arabs are, of all Muslims, the best able to bear hardships in order to attain their aim and the most adaptable to changing conditions, since they have not succumbed to the debasing habits of luxury. They are the purest in race for they do not mix with other peoples. They are the most jealous for their independence and freedom as may be seen from the fact that the Yamanites have resisted Ottoman
domination for so long. Their language is richer than that of any other Muslim people; it is the common religious language of all the Muslims, that is of about three hundred million people. It is also the spoken language of a hundred million Arabs, Muslim and non-Muslim. Arab society is one of the oldest in the world to follow principles of equality and to eschew wide disparities of status. They are the most ancient people to practise consultation (shūra) between governor and governed, and the most gifted in fulfilling the requirements of communal life. They are the most conscientious of nations in the respect they accord to treaties and to the sworn word; they are generous towards neighbours, and philanthropic in their sentiment. In short, they are the most fit to be an authority in religion, they are a model for all Muslims, all the other nations have hearkened to their message at the beginning, and cannot now refuse to follow their lead.

These are the reasons why Jam'iyyat al-Qura considers the Arabs the only possible instrument to effect Muslim Union, and, not only Muslims, but indeed Eastern Union. Therefore, although the Jam'īyya considers that the other Muslim peoples have their own contribution to make, and has accordingly assigned to each the function best suited to it, it deems it futile to expect that any other people will, in matters of religion, achieve what it is in the power of the Arabs to achieve. The Arabs, weak and poor as they are, inexperienced in military and political affairs, are the most fit to inaugurate that religious renaissance which must precede the achievement of
political stability. They are more suited to this role than
the Ottoman Sultan, in spite of all the power that he wields,
because "religion is one thing, and sovereignty another, and
the Sultan is not the whole of the state." The Ottoman Sultans
have often paid merely a superficial respect to the rites of
religion. They will not put the interests of Islam before those
of the state. This is the meaning of the assertion "Religion
is one thing and sovereignty another." They have often only
supported Islam for the sake of power, and it is impossible
for them to prefer Islam to power because of the situation of
their empire. Their kingdom is made up of different countries,
professing different religions, divided into numerous sects,
and their ministers are drawn from these different nationalities.
The most that can be expected of the Ottomans then is that they
should support the movement of Islamic Union; more than that,
they are not fit to do.

This is not said in a spirit of prejudice against the
Ottomans, or in partiality for the Arabs. The Ottomans them­
selves would look at things in the same manner if they only
took heed. This programme for the caliphate is actually the
only possible means to renovate their own political life. They
undoubtedly have qualities of gentleness and toleration of
religious beliefs, but they failed the state by the annihila­
tion of the Abbasid caliphate, and by the ruin and the loss
which they have brought over the Muslim lands which the Arabs
had conquered and preserved. It is therefore time for the
Ottomans to repair what they have done in past centuries and
to give up the caliphate to those who are fit for it, and the care of religion to those who can protect it. They can keep the rest of their power and remain satisfied with the honour of serving the two Harams. It is obvious to whoever views the matter carefully, that the beduin Arabs are destined by Divine Will to restore the glory of Islam; has not Islam kept them free from the incurable moral diseases that have afflicted others?

As for the Christian states, especially England, Russia and France, who have Muslim subjects, they know from experience that Muslims can never be converted to Christianity - certainly not in an age when the Christians themselves are forsaking their own religion. They also know that the generality of enlightened Muslims are free from intrigues, and they know also that the Arabs among the Muslims are the most trustworthy and the most sociable. If the European statesmen will consider these facts and will also consider what duties the Jihad makes incumbent on the Muslims, drawing their knowledge from translations of the Qur'an, and not from the fanatical teachings of antagonists, they will find that the two relevant verses which concern the Jihad, i.e. 'Obey what you are commanded' (fasda bima tu'mar), and 'Fight for the sake of the Lord' (wa jahidu fi sabil Allah), refer to idolaters and to the People of the Book dwelling among the Arabs. There is nothing in the Qur'an to make these two commands apply universally. And if these Europeans would look into the matter more deeply, they would find that the 'Ulama' do not restrict the Jihad to fighting the
non-Muslims; every difficult act which benefits religion and
the world, even the earning of one's living and the ability
to maintain one's family, is also called 

Jihād. They will
also learn that the restriction of the word Jihād, to mean
Jihād in war, came about through the desire for conquest and
through the necessity of encouraging martial instincts when
the opportunity for conquest presented itself. This restriction
also came about on the occasion of the Crusades which the
Christians initiated. If the Europeans will examine the facts
of history, they will find that for seven centuries the Arabs
made no war in the name of Jihād; the attacks of the North
African navies on Christian vessels were the work of pirates
who are to be found everywhere. The Tartar raids and the
Turkish raids on Europe were not religious wars, since these
groups attacked Muslim countries as well. In fact, when
the Tartars became Muslims, their manners softened. As for
the Turks, who claim the authority of religion, they are only
moved by political ambitions, and try to make people submit to
their rule and to frighten Europe by invoking the caliphate
and Muslim public opinion. The best proof that Islam is not
intolerant, and that the Arabs understand the meaning of the
Qur'ān and submit to its religious commands, is the fact that
they have taken no part in the Armenian massacres. The
Europeans may be surprised to learn that up to now Turkish
policy has not found it expedient to allow the translation of
the Qur'ān into Turkish.¹ The statesmen may ponder another

¹. This assertion is not based on fact. The translation of
the Qur'ān has always been vehemently opposed by the
Muslims doctors. In 1914, Rashīd Riḍa condemned the
translation of the Qur'ān into Turkish on the grounds /cont.
proof that the principles of Islam do not mean unfriendliness between Muslims and non-Muslims, but, on the contrary, imply fraternity. The Arabs, wherever they dwelt, have attracted by their good example the natives of the land to their own language and religion. The Arabs have not remained aloof from the nations who have conquered their countries; they have not emigrated from Aden and Egypt, because they consider that their subjection to another people is an act of God. The statesmen, considering all these truths, will surely not be suspicious of an Arab caliphate but will realise that it is in their own interest, in the interest of Christianity and of humanity to support the creation of an Arab caliphate, with limited powers and subject to a Council.

(1. cont. from p. 77)

that this was a sign of racial fanaticism encouraged by the Young Turks, al-Menār, XVII (1332/ January 1914), p. 160. Marmaduke Pickthall has recorded the story of his English translation of the Qur'an in 1930, and the anger such a translation aroused both in al-Azhar and in the Egyptian press, see M. Pickthall, "Arabs and non-Arabs and the Question of translating the Qur'an", in Islamic Culture, vol. V, 1931, pp. 422-433; see also A. Fremantle, Loyal Enemy, London, 1938, pp. 408-420, where the article is reproduced by Pickthall's biographer. See Gibb, Modern Trends, pp. 3-4, on orthodox opposition to the translation of the Qur'an even into other Islamic languages. Interlinear translations had however often accompanied the Arabic text; ibid, p. 131, n.1, for the discussions on whether the translation of the Qur'an for non-liturgical purposes by non-Arab Muslims is permissible. Rashīd Riḍa was in strong opposition to the Azhar 'Ulamā' who allowed such translations.
This summary has made it clear what an innovation al-Kawakibi's ideas represent. A pious Muslim as he no doubt was, he unconsciously adopted all the Western fallacies about the temporal and spiritual powers of the caliph, and carried the distinction so far that he justified through it the setting up of an Arabian caliphate. 1 These ideas made him a pioneer in the philosophy of Panarabism in Arabic, and the debt to him has been amply acknowledged. 2 It is not amiss to ask here whether his originality is real - as has been maintained - or whether his thought was new only in Arabic. It would seem that these ideas are not of his own invention, but are a foreign importation. It is startling to discover that the ideas he propounds are a duplicate of those which Wilfred Scawen Blunt put forward in his book, The Future of Islam published in 1882. This book was not translated into Arabic. This but serves to increase the wonder at the closeness of the ideas of the two men. It can only be concluded that, as in the case of Della Tirannide, al-Kawakibi, in spite of his ignorance of English, knew Blunt's book very well, perhaps through having it read to him. Where and by whom is again a matter for speculation.

1. The author of Foreign Office Handbook no. 57, Mohammedan History, London, 1920, mentions (p. 44) a movement started C. 1870 in Bukhara by Khudayar Khan who desired a Muslim federation with the Sharif of Mecca as caliph. But his reasons were very different from al-Kawakibi's; unlike him, he found his reasons in the humiliating conditions imposed on Turkey by the Treaty of Berlin.

2. See chapter I, pp. 4-5 above.
It seems that Umm al-Qura was written before al-Kawākibi left Aleppo.\(^1\) This would give some probability to my supposition that he had had Deila Tirannide and The Future of Islam read to him while he was still in Syria.\(^2\) Whether or not the published text of Tabānī and of Umm al-Qura is the same as in the manuscripts as they were in Syria, is not certain. Al-Kawākibi could have made some minor additions, not essential to his main argument, as a result of what he picked up in Egypt. Enough has already been said about the channels through which ideas were being imbibed in Arabic. It remains to explain who W. S. Blunt was, and what al-Kawākibi took from him.

Wilfred Scawen Blunt (1840-1922), poet, politician and man of letters, travelled extensively in the Levant, in Arabia and in India, all through the 1870s. In 1881, he bought an estate on the outskirts of Cairo where he built himself a house in which he used to spend part of the year. A well-known personality in Egypt, he counted among his friends many important Egyptians: 'Arābī, Muḥammad ʿAbdu, the Khedive ʿAbbās ʿHilmi.\(^3\) Al-Kawākibi too may well have known him. No book of his, especially on such an important subject as the future of Islam could have passed unnoticed.

Al-Kawākibi is very emphatic in his preference for Arabia as the seat for a religious revival. The reason is that he

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1. See chapter I, p. 10, above.
2. See chapter II above, pp. 48-49.
sees qualities, such as purity of race and of religious practice, in the Peninsula Arabs and in the tribes related to them, not common among other Muslims. Islam remains pure among them because their land is its birthplace, and because this land, owing to its geographical position, leaves them immune from alien influences and infiltrations. The Peninsula Arabs possess also the beduin characteristics of pride, independence and esprit de corps. These views are extremely new among Muslim writers. Before al-Kawākibi, beduins, instead of being idealised, were looked upon by Muslims as wild, pagan, faithless destroyers of God-fearing men. 1 Blunt’s belief in the beduins as regenerators of Islam and upholders of morality and religion, as exemplars of the good life, is expressed in this way: "We have seen that Abd el Hamid dreams of Damascus or Baghdad. But others dream of Cairo as the new seat of the

1. This view of the beduins has always been predominant in Islam. See for instance Laoust, Essai sur... ibn Taimiya, p. 44; Ibn Taimiyya’s reaction against beduin paganism and his view of the Ḥāliliyya of the tribes are at the basis of his book Al-ʿAqidā al-Tadmuriyya and of his various references to the beduin practice of revenge and brigandage. More recently Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā has expressed a similar view of the superficial Islamisation of the beduins. He remarks that, at the time of Muḥammad, it was forbidden to the Faithful to become nomadic because the tough life of the desert could only make the unbelievers even more heretical than their counterpart in the settled areas; see al-Manār XVI, 1331/ November 1913, p. 900. Even such a sympathetic observer of the beduins as Aref el-Aref, Bedouin Love, Life and Legend, Jerusalem 1944, pp. 35-6, can only say of the beduins and of their religion that they are "illiterate and do not often read the Koran, but know by heart the passages essential to the spiritual comfort. Their devotion amounts to acceptance of a simple faith, and the proph­ecies of Mohammad."; more details of their religious practices are given ibid., pp. 40-44. This is far from the lofty view that al-Kawākibi held of beduin religion.
Caliphate; and to the majority of the far-sighted Mussulmans it is rapidly becoming apparent that the retreat, once begun, must be conducted further still, and that the only true resting-place for theocracy is in Arabia, its birth-place and the fountain head of its inspiration. Here, alone in the world, all the conditions for the exercise of religious sovereignty are to be found. In Arabia there are neither Christians nor Jews nor infidels of any sort for Islam to count with, nor is it so rich a possession that it should excite the cupidity of the Western ambassadors in virtue of any capitulations; he would be free to act as the Successor of the Apostle should, and would breathe the pure air of an unadulterated Islam. A return therefore, to Medina or Mecca is the probable future of the Caliphate.\textsuperscript{1} Blunt expresses in this passage al-Awākibī's hope of twenty years later that the caliphate should return to Arabia. It also seems that Blunt spoke to Muḥammad ʿAbdu of organising a movement to help the Arabs to have a state of their own in Najd, and that Muḥammad ʿAbdu did not find such a scheme advisable.\textsuperscript{2} The Arabia that Blunt has in mind is not that of the townsmen, "a multitude of mixed origin, descended from such pilgrims as from every quarter of the globe have visited the Holy Places, and have remained to marry and die in them", but of the nomads, "a pure race of a peculiarly noble type, and unchanged in any essential

\textsuperscript{1} W. S. Blunt, \textit{The Future of Islam}, London, 1882, p. 100.
\textsuperscript{2} Rashīd Riḍa, \textit{Ṭārīkh...}, I, p. 914.
feature of their life from what they were in the days of
Mohammed. They are warlike, unquiet, Bedouins, camel-riders
(for they have no horses), and armed with matchlocks; and they
are proud of their independence and tenacious of their rights."1
Al-Kawākibi echoes this eloquence in his own sentence, "Arabu
al-jazīra aqwa al-muslimīn ʿaṣabiyya wa ashadduhum anfa lima
fīhim min khaṣā'is al-badawīyya."2

Of the geographical position of the Hijaz, Blunt wrote
further, "Hijaz for all military purposes is inaccessible by
land to Europeans; and Mecca, were it necessary at any time to
give the Caliph a garrison of Mussulman troops, is within a
night's march of the coast. In Arabia no Christian rights
need vindication, nor could any European power put in a claim
of interference. ... and other parts of the Arabian shore might
be declared the natural apanage of the Caliphate, the Stati
Pontificali of the supreme head of the Mussulman religion."3
This argument too is substantially reproduced in al-Kawākibi.

The revolutionary change in the nature of the caliphate
from being a power, both temporal and spiritual, to being a
kind of Papacy, as laid down by al-Kawākibi, was already being
fully defended by Blunt: "One great result the fall of Con­
stantinople certainly will have, which I believe will be a
beneficial one. It will give to Mohammedanism a more distinct­
ly religious character than it has for many years possessed,
and by forcing believers to depend upon spiritual instead of

2. Umm al-Qura, p. 194.
temporal arms will restore to them, more than any political victories would do, their lost moral life. Even independently of considerations of race as between Turk and Arab, I believe that the fall of the Mussulman Empire, as a great temporal dominion, would relieve Islam of a burden of sovereignty which she is no longer able in the face of the modern world to support. She would escape the stigma of political depravity now clinging to her, and her aims would be simplified and intensified. I have already stated my opinion that it is to Arabia that Mussulmans must in the future look for a centre of their religious system, and a return of their Caliphate to Mecca will signify more than a mere political change. It is obvious that empire will be here impossible in the sense given to it at Constantinople, and that the display of armies and the mundane glory of vast palaces and crowds of slaves will be altogether out of place. "The Caliph of the future, in whatever city he may fix his abode, will be chiefly a spiritual and not a temporal king, and will be limited in the exercise of his authority by few conditions of the existing material kind. He will be spared the burden of despotic government, the odium of tax-gathering and conscription over unwilling populations, the constant struggle to maintain his authority in arms, and the as constant intrigue against rival Mohammedan princes. It is probable that all these would readily acknowledge the nominal sovereignty of a Caliph who could not pretend to coerce them physically, and that the spiritual allegiance of orthodox believers everywhere would accrue to him as other
Mohammedan sovereignty relaxed its hold. Thus the dream of what is called Pan-Islamism may yet be fulfilled, though in another form from that in which it is now presented to the faithful by Abd el Hamid and the Ulema of Constantinople."¹ Blunt perceives many consequences to follow from this change in the nature and the seat of the caliphate. The spiritual life of Islam will be renewed, and all the Muslims will be united, all the sects, including the Shi'as and the Wahhābis will be reconciled, and lastly "the Caliphate would in Arabia be freed from the incubus of Turkish scholasticism and the stigma of Turkish immorality, and would have freer scope for what Islam most of all requires, a moral reformation."² All these desirable results are claimed by al-Kawākibi to follow from the programme of the Committee of Umm al-Qura. The mode of election of this spiritual caliph is the same in both writers, "It is naturally not beyond the flight of sane imagination to purpose," says Blunt, "in the last overwhelming catastrophe of Constantinople, a council of Ulema assembling at Mecca, and according to the legal precedent of ancient days electing a Caliph."³ And "Since we are imagining things," Blunt goes on to say, "we may imagine this one too, - that our Caliph of the Koreysh, chosen by the faithful and installed at Mecca, should invite the Ulema of every land to a council at the time of the pilgrimage, and there, appointing a new Mujtahed, should propound to them certain modifications of the

2. Ibid., pp. 128-131
3. Ibid., p. 131.
Sheriat, as things necessary to the welfare of Islam, and deducible from tradition. No point of doctrine need in any way be touched, only the law. The Fakh el din would need hardly a modification. The Fakh ed Sheriat would, in certain chapters, have to be rewritten.¹

Blunt had a prejudice against anything Turkish and Ottoman. According to him, all the misfortunes of Islam came from that race and family. "The Turkish Ulema," he wrote, "ever since their first appearance in the Arabian schools in the eleventh century, finding themselves at a disadvantage through their ignorance of the sacred language, and being constitutionally adverse to intellectual effort, had maintained the position that mental repose was the true feature of orthodoxy, and in their fetwas had consistently relied on authority and rejected original argument. They therefore readily seconded the Sultan in his views. Argument on first principles was formally forbidden in the schools. ... This closing of doctrinal enquiry by the Ottoman Sultans, and the removal of the seat of the supreme spiritual government from the Arabian atmosphere of Cairo to the Tartar atmosphere of the Bosphorus, was the direct and immediate cause of the religious stagnation which Islam suffered from so conspicuously in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries."² Blunt represents the views of Muslim divines - Shāfiʿites, of whom, for some reason, he seems to approve - about the caliphate in this manner: "They know," he

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2. Ibid., pp. 72-3.
says, that as long as there is an Ottoman Caliph, whether his name be Abd el Aziz or Abd el Hamid, moral progress is impossible, that the ijtahad cannot be reopened, and that no such reformation of doctrine and practice can be attempted as would enable their faith to cope with modern infidelity. They see moreover that, notwithstanding his affected legality, Abd el-Hamid's rule is neither juster nor more in accordance with the Mussulman law than that of his predecessors... The same vices of administration are found in it, and the same recklessness of his Mussulman subjects' welfare. Of all the lands of Islam his own are probably those where Abd el Hamid has now the most scanty following.\(^1\) Finally: Blunt's conclusion on the relation between Ottoman rule and the interest of Islam is worthy of mention: "The House of Othman, as such," he states, "represents nothing sacred to Mussulmans, and the Turkish race is very far from being respected in Islam. The present Caliphal house is unconnected in blood with the traditional line of 'successors' and even with the Turks themselves inspires little reverence."\(^2\) Now, al-Kawākibi too is no lover of the Ottomans, and the indictment that he draws up of Ottoman rule is a development of Blunt's attack. The Ottomans have corrupted Islam, the caliphate and the teaching of the Qur'ān. If they uphold religion, it is only out of self-interest and expediency. If their interest should dictate otherwise, they

\(^1\) Blunt, pp. 88-9.
\(^2\) Ibid., p. 92.
will even persecute religion and wage war on Muslims. Muḥammad the Conqueror, was the best of the Ottomans but even he put the state before religion and made a secret treaty with Ferdinand of Aragon the Spaniard, and with his wife Isabella, to support them in their struggle against Bani al-ʿĀmmar, the last Arab House in Spain, thus abandoning five million Muslims to death or apostasy. Sultan Salīm was no better; he dealt treacherously with the ʿAbbāsid House, and while he was killing Arabs in the East, he allowed the Spaniards to kill them in the West. Sultan Sulaimān pressed the Persians so hard that they could not but remain obstinately schismatic. The Ottomans brought about the decay of fifteen Muslim states and governments. They set the Russians upon the Muslim Tartars and the Dutch upon the Muslims of Java. Again and again they have attacked Yaman and have respected neither religion nor humanity nor brotherhood in their designs; their villainy went so far that the Ottoman soldiers surprised the Muslims in Ṣan`a while they were praying in the mosque and killed them off. Sultan Maḥmūd introduced Frankish innovations in the dress of the army and the court. These innovations he adopted in their totality and would not even modify them when they conflicted with religious duties; in this way he insisted on retaining the cuffs of European dresses which interfere with ritual ablutions. Sultan ʿAbd al-Ḥajīd, finding usury and drunkenness profitable, allowed them in his dominions. He even abolished the power of the nīqābāt to spite the nobles and humiliate the sayyids.¹ The Ottoman Turks are moreover,

¹ Umm al-Qura, pp. 203-4.
so says al-Kawākibi, the only people who have maintained proudly the difference between themselves and their subjects. They did not attempt to Turkify them nor did they themselves become Arabised. On the other hand they were willing to imitate the French and the Germans, so that their exclusiveness has no reason save their hatred of the Arabs. The many pejorative expressions they use about the Arabs witness to this; and the Arabs themselves have returned the dislike, as appears from their calling the Turks Ṭūm, indicating thereby their doubts about the sincerity of the Turks' Islam. They also say about the Turks that they, together with lice and locusts, have been created to oppress and destroy. To Islam, the Turks have contributed nothing but a few mosques which they had only built to have their names of their sultans proclaimed from their pulpits. On the other hand, they introduced into Islam blind obedience and respect for superstition. Al-Kawākibi insists that the Ottoman sultans have nothing to do with Islam, that their authority is not in any way religious. The state, he says, is one thing, and religion another. Here again he faithfully reproduces Blunt's thought. "In India," writes Blunt, "the house of Othman was still known as Padishah or Sultan er Roum, the Roman Emperor, the most powerful of Mussulman princes, but not in any special manner the head of their religion, certainly not their sovereign. ... The Sultans themselves were doubtless to blame for this, seeing that the spiritual functions of their new office were left almost entirely unperformed. For it cannot be too strongly insisted on that the assumption of the Caliphate was to the
house of Othman only a means to an end, viz. the consolidation of its worldly power upon a recognised basis, and that, once that end obtained, the temporal dignity of Sultan was all that they really considered. Thus they never sought to exercise the right appertaining to the Caliphal Office of appointing Naibs, or Deputy Imams, in the lands outside their dominions, or to interfere with doctrinal matters at home, except when such might prejudice the interests of their rule. With regard to these, the theologians of Constantinople, having satisfactorily settled the Caliphal dispute, and pronounced the house of Othman for ever theirs to the dignity they had assumed, were recommended by the head of the state to busy themselves no further with doctrinal matters, and to consider the ijtahad, or development of new dogma, altogether closed for the future in their schools. Soliman the Magnificent, Selim's heir, especially insisted upon this. He had already promulgated a series of decrees affecting the civil administration of his empire, which he had declared to be immutable; and an immutability, too, in dogma he thought would still further secure the peace and stability of his rule. Nor did he meet with aught but approval here from Hanefite divines.¹

¹ Blunt, pp. 71-2.
II.

It seems most likely then that al-Kawakibi received the inspiration for his suggestion of an Arab caliphate from a European and non-Muslim source, and it is also significant that his programme was first taken up not by a Muslim but by a Christian Syrian, Negib Azoury, author of *Le Réveil de la Nation Arabe*, and director of *L'Indépendance Arabe*, published in Paris.\(^1\) A graduate of the Ecole des Hautes Études of Paris and afterwards a functionary of the Ottoman Government in Jerusalem, he was condemned to death in 1904 "for having left his job without permission and gone to Paris where he committed actions prejudicial to the existence of the state."

His extradition from Egypt where he took refuge and died in 1916, was refused. He collaborated with Eugène Jung in his political and literary activities, and, thanks to the help of a few friends, many French papers, such as *La Revue des Revues*,

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1. Altogether eighteen numbers of this monthly review appeared between April 1907 and September 1908. Eugène Jung was editor and other collaborators included René Pinon, Ludovic de Contenson, E. Fazy. The review was anti-Ottoman and pro-European; it attacked Muṣṭafa Kāmil and claimed the existence of a very important party in Egypt, the Liberal Egyptian Party, founded by Muḥammad Wahid Bey, an Egyptian landowner. The programme of this supposed party of enlightened and patriotic men is given in nos. VII-VIII of the review (October-November 1907), p. 122. The motto of the men who made up this party is given as: The safety of Egypt through an understanding with the occupying Power. When the Young Turk seized power in Turkey, Azoury declared his support for the new régime, nos. XVI-XVIII (July-August-September 1908), p. 257, and went to Syria to become a candidate for Parliament, *ibid.*, p. 1; See also E. Jung, *La Révolte Arabe* (1906-1924), vol. I, Paris 1924, p. 23, where the author quotes from *L'Indépendance Arabe* on the occasion of the Young Turk Revolution, and on Azoury's acceptance of the terms of their reform. This book is a necessary companion for the appreciation of Azoury.
L'Echo de Paris, La Patrie, were open to him to make his case heard. He founded in 1905 in Paris a Parti National Arabe de la Turquie which spoke in the name of the Ligue de la Patrie Arabe. It brought out a manifesto which may have been drawn up on that of al-Kawākibi - whom Azoury mentions with approval as another Arab martyr poisoned by the Sultan for it reproduces some points of his programme. Azoury comments on this manifesto in his book, and explains its "liberal spirit and the peaceful nature of the change it represents." The civil and the religious powers are to be separated in the interest of both Islam and the Arab "nation". The throne then of the proposed Arab empire - the natural frontiers of which extend from the valley of the Tigris and the Euphrates to the Suez Canal in the West, and the Mediterranean in the north, to the Indian Ocean in the south (it does not include Egypt because it is geographically separated from Arabia and because the Egyptians do not belong to the Arab race) - will go to the prince of the Khedivial family who will openly proclaim himself sympathetic to it. The form of government of this Arab Patrie will be a constitutional sultanate granting freedom to all the sects and religions, and equality to all the citizens. There

3. E. Rossi, Documenti sull'origine e gli sviluppi della questione araba (1875-1944), Rome, 1944, p. XIII.
will then have to be "a universal religious caliph" to rule over all the Muslims. This caliph will be the Sharīf, descendant of the Prophet, who will support religion sincerely. He will rule over the whole of the Hijaz wilaya, together with the town and territory of Medina as far as 'Aqaba. For the rest, he will have the honours due to a sovereign, and will possess a "real moral" authority over the Muslims of the whole world. This, because the caliph of Islam must be either the sovereign of all the Muslims of the world, united in one state - a thing which has never been possible, not even under the first caliphs - or he must be the ruler of a wholly Muslim state, and no such state is more suitable than the Hijaz. This separation of powers is essential because the failure of the Arab Empire and the decadence of the caliphate in Ottoman times is mainly due to the centralisation of civil and religious authority. Moreover, the successor of the Prophet of Allah must be independent and must enjoy uncontested moral prestige; his life must be irreproachably honourable, his authority unimpeachable. His power will then be universal; and he will, from his seat, rule morally over all the Muslims of the world who will flock in pilgrimage to the sanctuary of Muḥammad.¹

Some of the points made in this programme have, as it has been seen, already appeared in ʿUmm al-Qura. Azoury does not acknowledge a debt to al-Kawākibi, but even if he did not copy

¹. Azoury, especially pp. I-III of preface, and 245-8. Rossi pp. 2-6, gives, in Documents 2 & 3, the text of the manifesto and a translation of the proclamation sent to Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia.
hima textually the similarity between the programmes is too obvious to allow one to imagine that Azoury thought it all out on his own. Azoury's programme is definitely designed to appeal to a Muslim public, hence - one supposes - all the details about the "real" moral power that the caliph will wield over all the Muslims. It is also part of a policy to win European favour, hence - no doubt - the assurance that all the privileges and rights accorded to Europe by Turkey will be respected. This at least is the difference between him and al-Kawākibi. The latter did not work for or woo a European Power, but wrote to the best of his knowledge. It is difficult to believe however that the former had no profitable connexion with France.\(^1\) The extent of Azoury's importance can be gauged by the fact that the preface to his book and the manifesto of his league are quoted, often in full, by all subsequent writers dealing with the Arabs and the Arab Revolt. K. T. Khairallah, for instance, who considers al-Kawākibi's scheme for a committee in Mecca as the original begetter of all later political parties, also quotes Azoury's programme, and gives

\(^1\) See for instance E. Jung, I, p. 47, where the author prints a letter from Azoury of November 1912 sent to him to transmit to the French Prime Minister. In this letter, Azoury insists about his loyalty to France and asks for 600,000 francs to win over the enemies of France in Egypt and to organise action in her favour. On p. 18 of the same volume Jung speaks of a commercial mission which he and Azoury wanted to start in 1906 to make contacts with the Arab chiefs. A part of the profits of this mission was to serve some political ends which would have been very profitable to France. What Azoury's exact connexion with France was, and what France thought of his activities, cannot, of course, be fully established without the use of archives which are still closed.
it an important place as a starting point for later political programmes and parties of decentralisation. The points made previously by al-Kawākibi are: the separation of the religious from the civil power, and the plan for an Arabian caliphate with its seat in the Hijaz. But al-Kawākibi's programme has an essentially Muslim colouring, hence the role that he assigns to the other Muslim peoples in his plan for the caliphate. Azoury, on the other hand, has no compunction about ignoring the non-Arab Muslims. He improved on al-Kawākibi's programme by insisting on the separation of the Arab Fatherland from the Turks, and on the political arrangements which he suggests to this end, and by his definition of this Arab Fatherland in terms of an Arab "race" only, both of which are steps much easier to make by a Christian, who would not have the Muslim's attachment to a religion which ignores differences of race. But it is wrong to conclude that al-Kawākibi was conscious of starting a Panarab movement which is not in strict accordance with Islam. It may be true that he found his inspiration in a European theory, but the important thing is that, in his presentation of this theory, he relates it to Islam and not, as Azoury and later Arab nationalists, both Muslim and Christian, to a secular philosophy of nationality. That is why the roots of a Panarab theory in his writings are inextricable from his general desire for a Muslim union; it is in keeping that he also toys with the idea that this is the only possible way to an Eastern union. But his programme

for the caliphate is nonetheless unorthodox in its plan for the separation of powers. To realise how unorthodox such a scheme was one has to remember that this idea was not distinctly taken up by a Muslim in Arabic before 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq caused an uproar with his so-called blasphemous and heretical book on sovereignty in Islam, in which he tried to distinguish between the political and the religious side of the nature of Muhammad's mission. ¹ The definition of the Arab Fatherland as set by Azoury remained the only accepted one during the Arab Revolt and all through the First World War, well after Iraq attained its independence, and until the Panarab movement grew in scope and importance in the thirties. Both the needs of this movement and the ambition of the Egyptian monarch about the caliphate ², helped to enlarge the definition, and to make the Arab world extend as far as the Atlantic to cover all the Arabic speaking peoples. The formation of the Arab League with a representative from Egypt, has, for some time now, made Egypt also a part of this world. ³

1. 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq, Al-Islām wa ʿuṣūl al-Ḥukm; bayth fiʿl-khilāfa wa ʿuṣūl al-Ḥukm fiʿl-Islām, Cairo, 1925; on the whole affair, see O.M., V. 9, pp. 492-6 & 12, pp. 680-1; and Adams, pp. 259-268.

2. Symptomatic of the trend in Egypt after Fāruq's accession to the throne is the special number of al-Hilāl, Al-ʿArab waʿl-Islām fiʿl-ʿagr al-badīth, Cairo, 1939, which is an example of the attempt at closer relations between Egyptian, official and semi-official, opinion and Arab nationalism. Among the articles, all of which seem to extol Egypt's role in the Arab and the Muslim world, is one by Makram 'Abīd, a Copt, al-Mīrīyyūn ʿArab, in which he attempts to prove scientifically that the Egyptians are Arabs in race, culture and history.

Other people also thought on lines similar to al-Kawākibī's. He was not fortunate enough to see his plan materialise into an actual meeting in Mecca, and he had to content himself with an imaginary rendering of the proceedings of such a meeting. Ismā'il Gasprinsky, after him, was more fortunate, and succeeded in propagating the idea of a Universal Muslim Congress. He even published a periodical in Arabic, al-Nahḍa, in which the programme of the Congress appeared from the start. The aims of this Congress as expressed in the programme published in January 1907 are substantially the same as al-Kawākibī's and of the reformist group in general. The Congress was to examine the reasons which had led to the social decay of Islam, and the heresies which had infiltrated into it. It was to attempt to do away with these by discovering the means of a renaissance. Any proposed reforms could be accepted only if based on the Qur'ān, the Sunna, the Ijma' and the Qiyās. Political questions were not to be touched on in these discussions. 1 This and all further Muslim congresses, of 1926

1. See RMM, February 1908, pp. 399-40, where the programme is translated from al-Muṣayyad, of January 23, 1907, by C. Desormeaux; extracts from al-Nahḍa are given also in RMM, May 1908, pp. 173-176; Ismā'il Gasprinsky approves the wish of al-Muqattam that the Congress should be Oriental rather than just Muslim, and says that this might happen in the future.

As al-Nahḍa was to appeal to all Muslims, it was to be a nomadic paper, moving after two months from Cairo to other Muslim towns. The Congress would meet in Cairo and not Constantinople for the following reasons: a- most of those who would attend it, from all the Muslim lands, would know Arabic; b- Cairo was to be preferred to the other Arab towns because of its geographical and cultural position; c- by choosing Cairo, the Congress, which was concerned only with social problems, would avoid suspicions and imputations about its true nature.

Desormeaux also translates the manifesto issued by Salīm al-Bushri, ex-rector of al-Azhar and president of the Congress, inviting Muslims to join the Congress which /cont. over
in Cairo or of Jerusalem 1931, for instance, are in the tradition of al-Kawākibi.

It is clear from all these examples that al-Kawākibi's influence, although not very direct, is nonetheless important: his ideas have proved pervasive, and he is the principal link between the nationalists and the religious groups. The desire of Gasprinsky to translate the notion of ʿijmāʿ into an institution was of the same kind as the prior suggestion for a regular meeting of the Council of Consultation. 2

The views of al-Kawākibi on the caliphate are important, not so much because they are original, but because they illustrate a trend of ideas in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the trend which found its origin in European ideas, and which has now found its culmination in the literature of

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1. H. A. R. Gibb, at least, sees in the 1931 meeting an indication that the sects, including the Shiʿas, are drawing together, "The Islamic Congress at Jerusalem in December 1931", in Survey of International Affairs, 1934, pp. 99-110. For Congress of Cairo 1926, see A. J. Toynbee, Survey ..., 1925, part I, pp. 81-91; and Achille Sékaly. Les Deux Congrès Généraux de 1926: Le Congrès du Khalifat (Le Caire, 13-19 mai, 1926) et le Congrès du Monde Musulman (la Mekke, 7 juin - 5 juillet, 1926, RMM, LXIV, 1926, 2e trimestre, gives the procès-verbaux of these congresses.

2. Laoust, Califat..., p. 267, n. 46.
the Arab nationalists. The apparent contradiction which exists between Islam and nationalism is being slowly argued away, and Islam is being brought into line with the theory of Panarabism, a political movement which aims at the unification of all the Arab countries under one authority. Muḥammad ʿAbdu, as Laoust so rightly points out, incorporated Egyptian nationalism in his conception of Islam and his universal ideal of Muslim solidarity. Being primarily a social reformer, his thought is not to be judged without reference to the historical background of the period, or without being linked to the problems of the day.\(^1\) Al-Afghānī as well, agitator that he was, based his political activities on his Muslim ideal of a universal caliphate. Nationalisms in his system were useful and welcome because, whether they were Egyptian or Persian, they were designed to rid these countries of the foreigner ruling over them, and the independence of these Muslim countries from foreign rule was, in his opinion, the first step towards their unification. According to Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, Jamāl al-Ḍān, in preaching Panislamism, did not aim at unifying the Muslims under one head— which he thought rather difficult— but desired rather that all the Muslims should be ruled by the law of the Qur'ān.\(^2\) Muḥammad ʿAbdu and al-Afghānī

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1. See Laoust, Essai sur... ibn Taimiya, pp. 551-2.
2. See what Rashīd Riḍā has to say about this aspect of the thought of the two men, Tārīkh..., I, pp. 306-330, esp. pp. 306-7 & 321-2. According to Rashīd Riḍā, al-Afghānī would have been satisfied to see a religious union, civil and military reforms in every Muslim state, present and future, and an alliance between these states recognising the strongest among them as the leader and the Muslim caliph, on the analogy of Prussia in the German Union. Rashīd Riḍā distinguishes between al-jāmiʿa al-
had no animus against the Caliph and consequently against the non-Arab Muslims as al-Kawâkibi had. The first was concerned only with Egyptian nationalism, which, being anti-British, was friendly to the Ottoman caliphate the support of which it sought to enlist; and the latter was himself a non-Arab, and could hardly be expected to set up a hierarchy of the Muslim peoples with the Arabs at the top. But the factors which have gone to make up al-Kawâkibi’s outlook were different. Being a Syrian, his animus was against the Ottoman ruler, and the nationalism which he would have to work into his ideal of universal Islam would be an anti-Ottoman nationalism. This is why his position might seem more contradictory than Muhammad ‘Abdu’s or al-Afghâni’s as his inflammatory style would

\[1\] islâmîyya, translated above Panislamism, and al-wu’ûda al-islâmîyya or al-dîniyya, translated religious union. I am aware that Panislamism in ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd’s time was a name for a political movement attributed to him by the West and exploited by him. Western Orientalists have made many efforts to define the meaning of the word and the scope of the movement. Mention may be made of C. S. Hurgronje, Les Confréries Religieuses: la Mecque et le Panislamisme, Paris, 1901; D. S. Margoliouth, "Pan-Islamism", in Proceedings of the Central Asian Society, 1912; C. A. Nallino, Notes on the Nature of the "Caliphate" in general and on the alleged "Ottoman Caliphate", Rome, 1919; T. W. Arnold, The Caliphate, London, 1925; see F. O. Handbook, no 57, p. 44, for the first use of the term in a Western source. A good account of the early growth of the idea of Panislamism and the role of Jamâl al-Dîn in it, is given by X (Taghi Zade, according to A.-M. Goichon in Réfutation des Matérialistes, Paris, 1942); "Le Panislamisme et le Panturquisme", in RHM, XXII, March, 1913, esp. pp. 180-190. It is a movement initiated by Jamâl al-Dîn to provide a solution for both the internal and the external problems of Islam at a time when the awareness of the Muslims of their weak position vis-à-vis the West was acute. In this thesis, the term is used in the sense of a movement of brotherhood and fraternity of the Muslims based on a re-statement of the principles of Islam in response to the challenge of the West which has increasingly impinged on the Muslim lands. When reference to ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd’s policy is intended, the phrase ‘political Panislamism’ will be used.
encourage a revolutionary attitude against the acknowledged caliph of the Muslims. Consequently the Turks would have to be considered insincere Muslims and their caliph a usurper. Al-Kawākibi does not hesitate to ascribe the decay of Islam to the influence of the non-Arab Muslims. Such an interpretation of Muslim history, seen in the light of the recent development in the theory of Arab nationalism, appears as an important stage in the development of that idea. The man, however, who has systematically helped to spread among religious circles the awareness of the great contribution that the Arabs have made to Islam, is the prolific writer, Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍa, editor of al-Manār.² Like al-Kawākibi, he was a Syrian émigré to Egypt. Like him, he did not have to work Egyptian nationalism into his general thought, and he saw in it signs of local chaivinism and irreligiousness. But, even

1. For the study of Rashīd Riḍa, the debt to the monumental works of Henri Laoust cannot be sufficiently acknowledged; where reference is not given to his works, use of them has nonetheless been made. Of special relevance are his: Le Califat dans la Doctrine de Rashīd Riḍa, Beirut, 1938; Essai sur les Doctrines Sociales et Politiques de Ṭakī al-Dīn Ahmad b. Ṭalā'ī, Cairo, 1939, and "Le Réformisme ortho­doxe des 'Salāfīya' et les Caractères Généraux de son Orientation Actuelle", in REI, 1932, pp. 175-224. H. A. R. Gibb's Modern Trends in Islam, Chicago, 1947, and C. C. Adams' Islam and Modernism in Egypt, London, 1933, must also be kept in mind. For obituary notice, see Muḥammad Bahjat al-Baḥṭārī, in Majallat al-Majma' al-'ilmī al-ʿArabī, Damascus XV, 1937, pp. 355-75. I regret to say that I have not been able to see a copy of Shakīb Arslān's biography of Rashīd Riḍa, Akhā'arbaʿīn sansa.
he, in spite of his being a loyal subject of the caliph, both in word and deed, came, from the beginning into conflict with the Porte and his Review was banned from all Ottoman territory. He took up from the start the defence of the Arabs, and always compared them and their contribution to Islam to the Turks, to the lesser glory of the latter. Like al-Kawākibi, he did not hesitate to ascribe to the non-Arabs the reasons for the decay of Islam, but, unlike him, he did not preach an Arab caliphate. Extreme and revolutionary measures do not seem to have appealed to him; this may be a sign of his moderation and of his orthodoxy. His views on the caliphate underwent, no doubt, various changes during the forty years of his editorship, but his loyalty to the Ottoman caliph persisted until the policy of the Young Turks made it absurd, and he had to look somewhere else for a suitable candidate. He was deterred, in the end, from his support of Ḥusayn, and became sympathetic to the cause of the Imam Yaḥya of the Yemen and to the Wahhābi movement.¹ The starting point of Rashīd Riḍa's thought is not the nationalist one; he comes to all his conclusions from Islamic premises. Rashīd Riḍa, whose sympathies for the Arab cause and whose constant defence of it can hardly be glossed over, never really grappled with the question of how to reconcile this cause with his supra-national view of Islam. His attitude to Arabism was never clearly defined. He consistently denounced regional nationalism and racial fanaticism in

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¹ Laoust, Califat..., pp. 5-6, for Rashīd Riḍa's practical difficulties in choosing a suitable caliph.
Islam, on the grounds that the umma is defined only in terms of religion. In the first number of al-Manār, writing of the aims of his Review, he says that it is "Ottoman in its leaning, and speaks with a Hamidian accent, defends the just cause of the Sublime Porte, and serves our master the Sultan sincerely."¹ This definition of the nature of the Review did not prevent the Ottoman authorities from banning it from their territory as soon as it appeared.² His essays took up from the beginning the defence of the Arabs against Turkish misconceptions and their rehabilitation by describing the glorious role they played in Islam and in world civilisation. His titles are often indication enough of his approach and of the content of his essays. He published a series of articles in volume III, on The Civilisation of the Arabs, and on The Turks and The Arabs, the reading of which makes one wonder if he does not overstep the limits he had set himself. "The Turks are a warlike nation," he wrote in May 1900, "but they are not of greater moment than the Arabs; how can their conquests be compared to those of the Arabs, although their state lasted longer than all the states of the Arabs together? It is in the countries which were conquered by the Arabs that Islam spread, became firmly established and prospered. Most of the lands which the Turks conquered were a burden on Islam and on the Muslims, and are still a warning of clear catastrophe. I am not saying that those conquests are things for which the Turks must be blamed or criticised, but I want to say that the greatest

glory in the Muslim conquests goes to the Arabs, and that religion grew and became great through them. Their foundation is the strongest, their light is the brightest, and they are indeed the best umma brought forth to the world. I do not deny that the Turks have virtue, intelligence and nobility, and I do not like to continue the comparison of the conquests of the Arabs and of the Turks, and the greater importance to Islam of the Arab contribution. A little knowledge of past and present history shows that most of the countries where Islam was established were conquered by the Arabs who were the active agents of the propagation of Islam.¹ Such a polemical passage avoids the spirit of shu'ubiyya only by a hairbreadth, and does so only because of Rashid Rida's constant moderation on questions of race or nationality. His continual denunciations of racial prejudice touched both Turks and Arabs, and his position always entailed an unmistakable universalism drawing on the orthodoxy of Islam. In this respect he is more traditional than al-Kawakibi with whom he disagrees on the question of the separation of religious from political power in Islam.² His interest in Arab history and culture is for the sake of Islam. "To care for the history of the Arabs and to strive to revive their glory," he explains in the same year, "is the same as to work for the Muslim union which only obtained in past centuries thanks to the Arabs, and will not return in this century except through them, united and agreed with all the other races (ajnás).

The basis of this union is Islam itself, and Islam is none other than the book of God Almighty and the Sunna of His Prophet - prayer and peace be on Him. Both are in Arabic. No one can understand Islam who does not understand them correctly, and no one can understand them properly unless he understands their noble language; and whoever understands them in this sense is, according to our usage, an Arab. For we do not mean by the Arabs only those who have a kinship relationship with an Arab tribe, because we do not want to be fanatics for race; on the contrary, we deplore such an attitude and attack all its exponents. Not all the men of the Arab civilisation in which we pride were pure Arabs with a clear lineage; but the foreigner among them did not have his knowledge in his foreign language, for the impetus to acquire this knowledge came to him from the Arab lands and the religion which he learnt in the Arabic language. Ibn Khaldūn was right when he said that people such as al-Zamakhshari and ʿAbd al-Qādir, the knights of the language and the keepers of the treasury of Arabic, were foreigners only in their ancestry. Ibn Khaldūn was right when he said that people such as al-Zamakhshari and ʿAbd al-Qādir, the knights of the language and the keepers of the treasury of Arabic, were foreigners only in their ancestry. Ibn Khaldūn was right when he said that people such as al-Zamakhshari and ʿAbd al-Qādir, the knights of the language and the keepers of the treasury of Arabic, were foreigners only in their ancestry. 1

But Rashīd Riḍa never really grapples with the relation of Panarabism as a political movement to which his thought would invariably lead him, to his conception of the community of all the Muslims which is his ideal picture of the purpose and meaning of Islam. It is only during the War that he begins to be more and more inclined to commit himself with regard to the

political stand of the Arabs vis-à-vis the Ottomans, and becomes definitely anti-Turk: "I have said," he wrote in 1917, "that I am an Arab Muslim. I am, in religion, the brother of thousands of thousands of Muslims both Arab and non-Arab, and the brother, in race, to thousands of Arabs both Muslim and otherwise. ...

"I thank God ... that he made the political interest of the Arabs in our time coincide with the political interest of the Muslims. If these interests had conflicted, I would have given primacy to what my religion requires over the interests of the sons of my race (jins), because through my religion I strive after the happiness of the world and of the after-life — and I am sure of this — but, in serving my race along, I strive after the world only, and I am not even sure that I shall attain worldly happiness — I am, indeed, satisfied with the portion of it that God has given me. But since the two interests coincide, then to save my race is to save my religion; this will be useful for me in the after-life if not in this world. I believe in this, although it may not be so obvious to many of my brother Muslims."¹

The principal impression that one gathers from reading Rashid Riqa on the question of the caliphate is that he was a man of piety whose main wish was to see the regeneration of Islam which, torn between the external factors tending to disrupt it and the internal elements working towards its decay,

¹. Al-Hasan, "Al-mas'ala al-‘arabiyya", XX, 1335/ July 1918 p. 34.
needed the guidance of a caliph. But Rashīd Riḍa never lost sight of the realities of the moment, and that is why, as has been seen above, he was never very dogmatic about the nomination of a caliph, but greatly favoured a kind of institute for the study of Muslim theology and Canon Law, to prepare men for the principal religious functions of Islam. He had to modify his doctrine of the caliphate to suit prevalent conditions, and, in practice, the function of his caliph became religious and juridical only.¹ The duties of the caliph as expounded by Rashīd Riḍa do not seem to be very different from those assigned to him by al-Kawākibi. The caliph is to revive the culture of Islam, that is to encourage the study of the Arabic language and literature, and to help to arabise the school curricula. Rashīd Riḍa, Salafi that he is, is greatly concerned, like al-Kawākibi, to purify Islam from popular superstitions and innovations, from the cult of the saints, and to revive the Sunna by returning to the origin of Islam to develop thereby the sense of solidarity and fraternity of the Muslims.² This is illustrated by his eloquent exposition of the purpose of the Manār which appeared in its first number: "The first purpose [of our Review] is to press for the education of boys and girls, not to incite against princes and sultans; it is to induce [the Muslims] to study the sciences and the arts, not to oppose the judges and the law. It is to reform the textbooks and the methods of teaching, to

¹ Laoust, Califat..., pp. 5-7, and Essai sur... ibn Taimiya, pp. 572-575.
² Laoust, Califat..., pp. 6-7.
encourage the Muslims to compete in useful works with the
civilised nations, and to practice the arts of livelihood and
economy. It is to explain the innovations which have become
mixed with the beliefs of the umma and the bad habits which
have viciated many of its traditions; the deceitful teachings
which have confused sense with nonsense; the false interpre-
tations which have mixed truth with falsehood, until the jabr
has become the unity of the godhead; the denial of causation,
faith; the abandonment of useful works, trust in God; the know-
ledge of truth, blasphemy and atheism; the harming of those
who belong to another sect (madhhab), religion; the practice
of witchcraft and the belief in superstitions, righteousness;
madness and idiocy, a goodly rule; humiliation and self-abasement,
true humility; resignation to oppression and support of tyranny,
the acknowledged and accepted thing; and blind imitation of all
precedents, knowledge and certainty.¹ In fact, then, Rashid
Rida, in spite of his disagreement with al-Kawakibi about the
separation of powers, is forced by circumstances to relinquish
a great part of his utopic programme for the caliphate. He
would probably have been prepared to consider the candidate
who would be strong enough to impose himself as caliph and to
symbolise the unity of Islam.

Thanks then to the thought and the work of Rashid Rida,
Muslim religious opinion is brought nearer to the growing
tendency of nationalism. This did not however prevent religious

¹. Al-Manar, I, 1316/1897, pp. 11-12; repeated again in II,
1317/July 1899, pp. 253-4.
leaders from continuing to denounce nationalism as Rashid Riqa had so often done before. The often quoted condemnations of nationalism by Shaikh Mustafa al-Maraghi and other Azharites\(^1\), have for too long now held the field as the authoritative expression of Muslim theology on this question. The impression given in some Western books on Islam, is that the division between the pious Muslim and the Arab nationalist is clear cut, and that nationalism, being an importation from the West, is in complete opposition to Islam, because the materialist nature of nationalism must always make it alien to the universal nature of Islam. This belief is deceptive. It must already be apparent from the summaries of al-Kawakibi’s argument given above and from the short study of Rashid Riqa, that the Muslim Reformers were themselves not very clear about the existence of an opposition between the two; and indeed they often saw, as in the passage from Rashid Riqa, a community of interests existing between the two movements. As H. A. R. Gibb so well puts it, "Arab Nationalism is based on a community of sentiment. The general content of that sentiment ...: pride in the historic mission of Islam, in the achievement of the Arab Empire, and in the cultural tradition enshrined in Arabic literature, together with envy of the material supremacy of the West and resentment at its assumption of moral superiority."\(^2\) "And Islam," Gibb goes on to say, "is so much a part of that past that the Arab ideal can never be fully dissociated from it."


\(^3\) Ibid., p. 30.
It is seen therefore that the Arab nationalists who start not from a religious standpoint as the Reformists do, but from a secular theory of the nation and the state, come more and more to emphasize the Muslim heritage. Sāti' al-Ḥusrī, for instance, objects to Shaikh Muṣṭafa al-Ḥarāghī who said: "I have no opinion about the Arab union ... I do not occupy myself with it ... I am neither for it nor against it", because Islam does not call for racial fanaticism and does not distinguish between the Arab and the non-Arab, but considers all the Muslims a unity. Al-Ḥusrī answers: "If religion does not call for racial exclusiveness, does it then call for regional exclusiveness?"

"And if religion does not distinguish between the Arab and the non-Arab, must it then distinguish between the Egyptian, the Damascene and the Iraqi?"

"And if religion made the Muslim community (umma) a unity without any distinction between the races (ajnās) who compose it, has it not then also made the Arab nation (umma) a unity without any distinction between its peoples (shu'ub)?"

"I can understand that Shaikh al-Ḥarāghī is of those who are not satisfied with having an Arab union only, but aims at a bigger and more comprehensive one, and works for a general Muslim union. But I cannot understand how he makes use of this tendency to condemn Arab union and attack it.

"I do not wish to argue with Shaikh al-Ḥarāghī about the possibility or impossibility of achieving a Muslim union, just as I see no need to enter into a discussion about the question of race (jinsiyya) in Islam, or to contradict his saying: The direction of thought to the union prescribed in the Qur'ān is obligatory on the 'ulama' of Islam. In spite of
all this, I see no logical connexion between 'the call of the Muslim 'ulamā' to work for an Islamic union' and their call 'not to work for an Arab union'.

"How is it possible for anyone to say, it is the duty of the Muslim 'ulamā' to work towards the realisation of a union between the Arab, Persian, Indian and Turk, but that they may not strive to realise the union between the Damascene, the Egyptian and the Hijazi?

"How can any one hope to form a union of the Islamic countries who speak different tongues, without forming a union of the countries who speak the same language, and that, the language of the Qur'ān?

"I believe that those who direct their thought to the union desired by the Qur'ān - according to the expression of His Eminence Shaikh al-Maraṣī - cannot neglect Arab union without contradicting themselves. They must occupy themselves with Arab union for the sake of Islam, if not for the sake of national pride." ¹

Not only does al-Ḥuṣrī affirm the above, but he also affirms its corollary: "Whoever opposes Arab union would also have opposed Islamic union. And if he opposes Arab union in the name of this Islamic union or presumably because of it, then he would have gone against the most elementary rational and logical premises."² He moreover sees that whoever is in

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2. Ibid., p. 91.
such contradiction to logic must be deceived, and this kind of
deception is encouraged by some *shu'ūbis* who do not want to
see a revival of the Arab nation (*umma*).¹

A much fuller and more complete synthesis between Arab
nationalism and Islam is given by 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Bazzāz.
His argument is based not only on the practical role of Arab
nationalism in relation to Islam, as al-Ḥuṣrī's is, but deals
also with the special Arab nature of Islam, and reinterprets
Islam in terms of Arab nationality. He argues that Islam,
unlike Christianity which was imported into Europe, is primarily
an Arab contribution. It indeed expressed best the "national"
spirit of the Arabs and their desire for unification and growth.
Al-Bazzāz says that he does not deny that Islam became a uni-
versal religion, but the point which he wants to stress is
that Arab nationalism, unlike Turkish nationalism for instance,
is not contradictory with Islam because Islam is the expression
of Arabism.² It is clear that the argument used by al-Bazzāz
was being prepared by the kind of literary output which has
been described above. The attempt to reconcile Islam and Arab
nationalism goes back to al-Kawkābī.

H. A. R. Gibb is quite right when he says Islam is an
essential part of the ideal of Arab nationalism. Another

1. Ibid., essay "Bain al-wuḥdā al-islāmiyya wa'l-wuḥdā al-
    *qarabiyya*, pp. 88-98. Notice how al-Ḥuṣrī, at the same
time as he appeals to the idea of the Muslim union,
argues, in the same essay, that this union is not possible
in the political sense and that it never existed.

2. The full text of the essay of al-Bazzāz, *Al-islām wa'l-
    gaumiyya al-qarabiyya*, Baghdad, 1952, is given in the
    appendix.
indication of the tendency of Arab nationalism to adapt itself to Islam and to come nearer to those Panarabs who started from a Panislamic ideal, is that of the Eastern Christians who were always at the forefront of the nationalist movement. Their place within this presumably secular movement with an Islamic past and a unity based on religion, is rather ambiguous. Their position, previously, as a minority bound by the clear cut rule of Islam — that security is accorded them on condition they accept their inferior status, becomes now uncertain in a so-called "national" movement which, although it claims it has no religious distinctions, is also based on the religious system which has assigned to them an inferior position within the state. Their own effort at defining their stand has often led them to forestall the Muslims to the nationalist theory. It was the Syrian Christians who were the first promoters of a "national" conception of a political movement, and now that this "national" movement shows unmistakable signs of drawing on a specifically Muslim past, it is still the Christians themselves who are the first to proclaim the importance of this Muslim heritage for the Arab movement. The instances of Christians making public proclamations to this effect do not only belong to this decade. During or soon after the First World War, a Syrian Christian, owner of al-Hamra' newspaper in Brazil, was captured by the Arab movement that he changed his name from Ilyās abu Ta'ma to Abu'l-Faqīl al-Walīd 'Abdullāh Ta'ma, and thus addressed his readers on the occasion: "Let everyone of us say I am an Arab and none is more Arab than me; and if being an Arab is only possible through being a Muslim,
then let him say I am an Arab and a Muslim, I testify there is no God but God and Muḥammad is the Prophet of God.¹ The proclamations of Salāma Mūsa and Makram ‘Abīd, both Copts, in Egypt, are too well-known to require quoting again.² But the most complete "metaphysical" exposition for the basis of such proclamations is that given by Qustantīn Zurāiq and quoted with approval by ‘Abd al- Raḥmān al-Bazzāz: "True nationalism can on no account contradict true religion, because it is in essence no other than a spiritual movement which aims to resurrect the internal forces of the nation and to realise its spiritual and psychological abilities in order that the nation may do its share in the progress of the world and its civilisation.... It is therefore the duty of every Arab, whatever his sect or his community, to interest himself in his past culture and in his present renaissance. This interest is the first duty enjoined on him by his nationality. He must come forward to study Islam and understand its true nature, and sanctify the memory of the great Prophet to whom Islam was revealed...."³ Nicola Ziyāda, a Palestinian Christian, writes to the same effect.⁴

It is obvious then that where al-Kawākibi wavered, later writers were firm and dogmatic; what he hinted at, they

² See P. Rondot, "Destin des Chrétiens d'Orient", in Politique Étrangère, February 1946, esp. p. 51.
³ Quoted from ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Bazzāz.
⁴ See his book al-ʿUrūba fi mīzān al-qaʿumiyya, Beirut, 1950, especially the last chapters.
explained and emphasized. What he suggested they took up as a creed. His place in Arab thought is important although his output is small and not very original. He must be considered in any attempt to date the origin of certain ideas, and to indicate the various trends of thought of the period preceding him. He follows up the Muslim tradition, that of al-Afghāni and Muhammad 'Abdu, and is like Rashīd Riḍa, primarily a Muslim who has become keenly aware of the decadence of Islam and whose main concern is to reverse this process. But his originality and his importance lie not in his awareness of the weakness of Islam, which was not uncommon in his day, but in the process of regeneration which he proposed. Much earlier than Rashīd Riḍa, he proposed a break with the Ottoman caliphate and assigned to the Arabs the role of regenerating Islam. He is the first writer in Arabic to forecast such a daring scheme as an elective Arabian caliphate with its permanent seat at Mecca. It has been seen how this plan for the caliphate was first taken up by Azoury, a Syrian Christian; the rest of the Muslims were much slower in taking it up. Al-Kawākibi has often been proclaimed the father of Panarabism, and the attribute is just. His programme for uniting the Arabs has remained the most important feature of the programmes of all the subsequent Arab nationalists, not to say their only one. Although, as has been seen above, it is most likely that al-Kawākibi took this idea of the Arabian caliphate from a European source, it does not detract from the value of his contribution and from the importance of his position in Arabic thought. The important thing is that he worked it so easily into Arabic, in his
book which set out to analyse the symptoms of the illness of Islam and to provide a cure for the disease. And his importance lies exactly in this: that he worked Western notions in Arabic and placed them into an Islamic context. He successfully used, for instance, the idea of a critical attitude to the government and the ruler, even if these are as just as 'Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb - a principle surely of non-Muslim origin - and the Salafi principle of reopening the gates of ijtihād and encouraging the exercise of independent judgment. To encourage the exercise of independent judgment, usually referring to matters of religion, becomes the same as a critical attitude to obedience (which leads, according to al-Kawākibi, to obedience to the just, even non-Muslim ruler) - a theory without precedent in Islam. Given then al-Kawākibi's historical position, he found many Western ideas reasonable, not because he had rejected Islam; on the contrary, just because he was a convinced Muslim dissatisfied with the position of Islam and looking for a solution to make it once again, if not superior to Europe, at least its equal and its match. It is in al-Kawākibi then that the trends of orthodoxy, especially as reiterated by the Reformist school, and the beginnings of the nationalist theory meet and intermingle.
Chapter V

The Development of Arab Nationalism and its Relation to Islam

I.

The sympathetic attitude of the Muslim world towards Germany and the Axis in the years between the wars has already been mentioned. 1 But a distinction must be made between opportune alliances of the moment 2 and general tendencies which flow from the implications of modern Muslim thought on such questions as nation, society, statehood and sovereignty. It may appear at first sight that the popularity in the Arab countries of paramilitary youth movements, that the introduction by governments of official versions of history in the schools they controlled, and discrimination against religious and ethnic minorities, 3 that the emphasis on the

1. See above, Chapter III.
2. On the relations between Nazi Germany and the Middle East, see the following:
J. C. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, New York, 1950
index under Mufti, Germany and Italy.
Majid Khadduri; Independent Iraq, London 1951, chapters VIII and IX. This book, though it mentions the attractions of totalitarian ideologies, ignores too many facts about the understanding between Rashid 'Ali and the Mufti on the one hand, and the German and Italian Governments on the other; C. Mackenzie Eastern Epic, vol. I, London 1951, gives details not mentioned by M. Khadduri; see index under Rashid Ali and in particular, p. 93. See also C. L. Sulzberger, "German Preparations in the Middle East" in Foreign Affairs, New York, 1942, pp. 663-678; The Arab War Effort published by the American Christian Palestine Committee, New York 1947(?)
sacredness of the national being, may be attributed solely to the example given by the Fascist Governments of Europe to the native rulers, who were themselves inimical to the so-called Imperialist countries of the West which the Axis claimed to fight. But potent as the example was, it was not the efficient cause of the evolution of these Middle Eastern nationalisms. Their manifestations derive, to a great extent, from the very sources of Muslim-Arab nationalist doctrine.

To give a cursory idea of these manifestations, it is necessary that a few points should be examined. The first of these is the role of such organisations as al-Futuwwa and al-Kashshafa in the Arab Middle East. The material on these organisations is, unfortunately, very scattered and incomplete. The best sources are to be found in Oriente Moderno and in the writings of a few French observers who have interested themselves in the subject.¹ O'Zoux shows clearly the influence

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¹ On youth movements in the Arab countries, see: Ettore Rossi, "L'Instituzione Scolastica Militare 'al-futuwwah' nell' Iraq", in Oriente Moderno, XX, 1940, pp. 297-302. The author gives the programme of the movement according to al-Dalil al-'Iraqi of 1936, and shows how, with a name borrowed from the Muslim-Arab tradition, the movement has copied the Italian example and has tried to be an auxiliary to the Police and the armed services of the state. See also. O'Zoux, "Les Insignes et Saluts de la Jeunesse en Syrie et au Liban" in Entretiens sur l'Evolution des Pays de Civilisation Arabe, II, Paris, 1938, pp. 98-104; Grandjouan, "Le Scoutisme chez les Musulmans", Ibid, I, Paris, 1937, pp. 100-113. See also pp. 96-9, Ibid, I, discussion on Dubois-Richard's paper, "L'Etat d'Esprit des Etudiants Egyptiens et leur rôle dans la Vie Politique". On the place of al-Futuwwa in Medieval Islam, see G. Salinger, "FUTUWA: An Oriental Form of Chivalry?" in Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 1950, Vol. 94, no. 5, pp. 481-493; and article Futuwwa in EI. On the political tendencies of al-Futuwwa in Iraq, see M. Ahadduri op. cit., pp. 159, 161 and 185.
of the youth movements of Italy and Germany after 1918 on the dress and the salutes prescribed in the similar movements in Syria and Lebanon. Grandjouan describes how a peaceful and disciplined organisation for school children has become in the East a xenophobic and aggressive movement not confined to schoolchildren, and has tried to extend military training to civilian adults. But the locus classicus where all these tendencies find a clear and blunt expression is Dr. Sāmi Shawkat's Ḥādhiḥi Aḥdāfuna.¹

The main difference between the Futuwwa and the Kashshafa on the one hand, and their Western model, the Scouts, on the other, is that while the latter are supra-national, the former start with a pronounced nationalism. Their ideal is to arouse national consciousness in the growing generation. This they propose to achieve by the teaching of patriotic songs, the inculcation of toughness, by parades and all manner of paramilitary demonstrations, that serve to impress the populace and to inspire the youths themselves with self-satisfaction and a vainglorious sense of importance. The Scouts, inter-denominational and unsectarian in principle, become, in the guise of the Futuwwa and the Kashshafa, like some other

¹. Sāmi Shawkat, Ḥādhiḥi Aḥdāfuna, Man ǧama biha fa ḫuwa minne, Baghdad, 1939; (referred to, from now on, as Shawkat). The book, a collection of addresses, was distributed by Majallat al-muʿallim al-jadīd, published in the Ministry of Education of Iraq, to its subscribers. Sāmi Shawkat was Director General of Education and Protector of al-Futuwwa. For details of his career, see M. Khadduri, op. cit., pp. 160-161.
institutions introduced from Europe into the East, agents for strengthening religious and national differences. Having also become official organisations, they constitute an important instrument in the hands of the party in power. The Futuwwa and the Kashshāfa therefore, do not differ significantly from such organisations with political aims, as political parties and politico-religious associations. They all

1. This, for instance, is an extract from a letter written by Ralph Borg to Cromer in 1893: "A spirit of intolerance has lately shown itself even in a Masonic Lodge where a native Brother, not of the ordinary rank, in a speech that touched lightly upon the peculiar condition of Egypt dwelt upon the necessity of excluding non-Muslim Brethren from Lodges frequented by Moslems. I may here remark that such intolerant sentiments have never been expressed in Masonic Lodges, not even during the Arabi rebellion!"; F.O. 141. 297. Dispatch no 31.

2. During the Rashid Ali revolt of 1941, the whole of Baghdad was in the hands of the Futuwwa, who were meant to act as an urban security force but were only, in fact, the agents of petty persecution.

have a common ideal: a selfless dedication to purity, chastity, to the revival of religion and traditional culture, and to the glorification of the homeland. This last point, especially, meets with favour in official eyes. The teaching in the schools emphasises it, and history books are written for this special purpose. The schoolboy is taught that the glory of the nation must be his first overriding concern, that the shedding of his own blood and that of others in its cause is the supreme virtue, that discipline and obedience must be the keynote of his life. "Independence is not given but taken", "Thrones are built on skulls", such are the themes, first taken up in the Arab Revolt, which set the tone of the school curricula. ¹ Sāmi Shawkat when Director General of Education speaks thus to the teachers of private and foreign schools in Baghdad in 1939: "No other history is to be taught in an attractive and sympathetic manner except the history of the Arab nation (al-umma al-‘arabiyya), and when I say the Arab nation, I mean the history of all the Semitic waves."² And to the teachers of history he says:

"You see how history is made up according to the needs of the moment; this is formative history. History for history's sake, on the other hand, has no place in our present society; it is a matter for the specialists and for those who

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¹. "Independence is not given but taken", "Thrones are built on skulls", were inscribed on the flag presented by al-Nādi al-‘Arabi to Faisal on his becoming king in Syria in 1920. A picture of this flag is found in Sāṭī al-Ḥuṣri, Yaum Maisalūn, 2nd. ed., Beirut, 1948, picture 22.
devote themselves to learning alone. The histories which are written with this aim in view are buried and nobody reads them. I believe that the Arab masses which are instinct with deep national feeling and with sentiments of pride and glory, must defile the tomb of Ibn Khaldūn just for his saying 'The Arabs are a people who cannot unite, and a people without political capacity', and just for his blaspheming in such a manner.

"Science is called science because emotion plays no part in it; but emotion has a share in the arts such as poetry, painting, music and acting, and he who has no strong emotions cannot sense the meaning of pictures or of acting. I believe that the teacher of history, if he has no feeling of love for his nation and of adoration for its great men, will not be able to teach history. In this respect therefore, history is in the category of the arts." \(^1\) Sātī al-Ḥuṣrī supplies the rational basis for this attitude. In his essay "A' al-‘ilm li'l-‘ilm, am al-‘ilm li'l-wa‘ān? he distinguishes between al-‘ilm and al-ta‘līm, learning and teaching. He argues that even if we say that knowledge is for the sake of knowledge, it does not follow that teaching is for the sake of teaching. On the contrary, instruction is not an end in itself, but, especially in its primary and secondary stages, is a means towards an end, and the end is education. As it is impossible to teach everything about a subject, instruction is always a matter of selecting what to teach and what to leave out. Sātī al-Ḥuṣrī

\(^1\) Ibid., pp. 43-4. The expression used about Ibn Khaldūn is yanbush qabr, no equivalent of which in English can give the full idea of the primitive violence of the action as expressed in Arabic.
draws, from these premises, his conclusion about the teaching of history; among all nations, he says, history is designed to cultivate the spirit of patriotism and nationalism.¹

The point must be stressed that these phenomena which flourished in the thirties in the shade of the German example, were present, before then, in a less obvious, but no less unmistakable, form. "Soon after the kingdom of Iraq got its full independence from the Mandatory in the early thirties, its officials in the Ministry of Education devised a curriculum in modern history for the use of primary and secondary schools. The perspective given by this curriculum was somewhat peculiar, for it consisted in large part of the story of the attainment of national unity and independence by Germany, Italy and Japan in the nineteenth century."² ‘Ajjān al-Hadīd, discussing the Monroe Report, agrees with its criticism of the official indoctrination in the Government schools in Baghdad and adds: "On voit se développer en même temps, une idéologie historique qui cherche dans les exemples de la domination arabe des premiers siècles dans le Proche Orient ses inspirations journalières".³ The same has been said of Egypt where the history school teachers were reminded by the official instructions to explain to their students that although Egypt

¹. Sāṭīr al-Ḥusri, A ṣ ⛭wa ahādīth fi'l-wataniyya wa'l-qaumiyya, Cairo, 1944, pp. 135-144. On Sāṭīr al-Ḥusri, see belo., p. 133.
³. ‘Ajjān al-Hadīd, "Le Développement de l'Éducation Nationale en Iraq" in REI, 1932, pp. 231-268; the above quotation is from p. 234. The author, who seems to have the interests of French cultural influence at heart, is rather bitter about the Monroe Report, i.e. the Report of the Educational Enquiry Commission, Government Press, Baghdad, 1932. The commission was American.
has since ancient times been subject to foreign dynasties, it has always been an independent state under the Tulunids, the Ikhshídids, the Fatimids, the Ayyubids and the Mamluks, just as it has always enjoyed a large degree of autonomy under the Byzantines, the Caliphate or the Ottomans. Such sentiments as xenophobia, pride in race and language, ideologies that seek inspiration in the Arab and pre-Islamic past, could not have, suddenly and without previous cultivation, appeared and made such a potent appeal. And these sentiments are continually met with from then onwards, in all countries of the Middle East. This is not a mere accident. It is rather the expression of a deep-seated and aggressive attitude towards the world in which men in power found themselves. Whence this attitude, and why it was inevitable and irresistible will be considered later. It would not be amiss, however, to quote once again from the Director General of Education of Iraq to make it clear what kind of mentality and attitude is to be examined:

"We have up to now neglected a very vital aspect of our glorious history," says Sámi Shawkat, "we have made it start at the prophetic message, and this is a period of less than fourteen centuries. In reality however the history of our illustrious Arab nation extends over thousands of years and goes back to the time when the peoples of Europe lived in

forests and over marshes, in caves and in the interstices of the rock, but when our own ancestors used to set up banks, sculpt statues, and lay down canons and codes of law, when they invented the first principles of medicine, geometry, astronomy, the alphabet and the numerals. On the stele of Hammurabi in the Louvre, we find inscribed the basic law given by one of our ancestors, Hammurabi; one of its clauses concerns the legal punishment of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth; this was laid down before the Torah, the Gospels or the Qur'ān. In the same way, we find that everything makes us lift high our heads when we consider the histories of the Semitic empires which were formed in the Fertile Crescent – the Chaldean, the Assyrian, the African, the Pharaonic or the Carthaginian –; all these things must persuade us that the civilisation of the world at present is erected on foundations laid down by our ancestors. These empires and their dependencies are all our property; they are of us and for us; we have the right to glory in them and to honour their exploits, just as we have the right to cherish and exalt the glories of Nebuchadnezzar, Hammurabi, Sargon, Ramses, Tutenkhamen, in the same way that we glory and pride in ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Dākhil, ‘Abd al-Malik b. Marwān, Hārūn al-Rashīd and al-Ma'mūn.1

This tendency to make the Arabs the ancestors of all known civilisations in the Middle East is not confined to Sāmi Shawkat. ‘Ali Nasīr al-Dīn, a Syrian ideologue of Arab

1. Shawkat, p. 11. See also Muhammad Jamīl Baihat, "Al-'Arab qabl al-Islām wa ba‘dahu fi Filistīn", in Al-'Ir ūf, Sidon, 1952, pp. 440-1. The author there maintains that the Arab nationality (aqūmiyya) and language precede Islam in Syria.
nationalism, does the same and affirms even that what are commonly called peoples (šu’ūb), such as the Assyrians or Chaldeans, are in fact tribes and no more. The Chaldeans, Amorites, Canaanites, Assyrians, Aramaeans, Phoenicians, and perhaps the Pharaohs — "if Makram Abid is to be believed" — and others, are without exception Arab tribes and not nations or peoples.¹ The same point of view was worked out some years earlier, in French, by Edmond Rabbath, a Christian, at one time deputy in the Syrian Parliament, with much greater precision and a show of scientific method.² Such doctrines are no doubt inspired to some extent by European example — notably Italy's and Germany's — but it is perhaps more interesting to ask how much these tendencies are a natural growth of the local Muslim-Arab tradition, or if they are not perhaps so natural, then how fertile was the ground for their reception. It is important to investigate whether the ideas of Muslim leaders of thought made it in any way possible for such doctrines to flourish ultimately. One or two considerations on the nature of Muslim history may perhaps help in directing inquiry to the right place. The beduin ideal of strength and heroism which still survives, even if only in a debased form, among the people of the Crescent, would tend to make men

¹ 'Ali Naṣir al-Dīn, Qadiyyat al-'arb, Beirut, 1946, pp. 30 n.1, 55 n.2, 57, n.104 ff. The author considers that Islam, although important as an event because of the expansion it made possible, is but an accident in the larger and older being of Arabism.

² Edmond Rabbath, Unité Syrienne et Devenir Arabé, Paris, 1937; there is no indication however that the French book had had any influence on moulding the thought of 'Ali Naṣir al-Dīn.
admire military prowess. Islam too has helped to develop the idea of the leader. It is to be remarked here that practically the only political philosophy in Islam is a discussion of the Imamate, because of its attitude to the ruler and of the counsels of obedience to authority in which it is lavish, does not generally equip its people to question forms of government, even when they happen to do violence to Muslim orthodoxy itself. Obedience to the ruler has exercised the minds of the Muslim doctors all through the ages. Al-Ghazâli has a classical essay on the religious duty of obedience to the ruler. "The first point," he writes, "is the explanation of the obligation to set up an imâm. It must not be thought that the obligation to do this is derived from reason, for, as we have shown, it is derived from revelation. What is obligatory, however, is interpreted, as the action which is beneficial and whose omission is harmful in this world; and on this interpretation, it is not denied that the setting up of the imâm is obligatory because of the benefits in it and because it avoids what is harmful in this world (and this is in accordance with the demands of reason). Yet we base on revelation the decisive proof of the obligation. What consensus there is in the umma on this point is not sufficient for our purpose; rather we call attention to the basis of this

consensus. We maintain that the right ordering of religion was certainly the purpose of the agent of revelation. This is an absolute premise on which there can be no disagreement. We will add to it another premise, to the effect that the right ordering of religion can only obtain where there is an imām to whom obedience is given. It follows from these two premises, that the contention that an imām must be set up is correct, "If it be said however that the second premise is not granted, to wit, that the right ordering of religion can only obtain through an imām to whom obedience is given, therefore prove it, then we will say: The proof is that the right ordering of religion can only obtain where there is right ordering of the world, and the right ordering of the world can only be obtained through an imām to whom obedience is given. Here are two premises. Where does the disagreement lie? And if it be asked: Why do you say that the right ordering of religion can only result from the right ordering of the world, when, in fact, it can only result from the ruin of the world, for are not the spiritual and the temporal opposites, and does not the prosperity of the one entail the ruin of the other? Our answer is: This is the speech of him who does not understand what we mean by the 'world' in this context. It is an ambiguous word which may, on the one hand, refer to excessive self-enjoyment and pleasure beyond need and necessity, and, on the other, it may refer to all the necessities in the life before death. In one sense it is indeed against religion, but in the other, it is the very condition of religion. Mistakes are thus made when one does not distinguish the meanings of ambiguous terms. We say therefore that the right ordering of religion
comes through knowledge and worship, and these can only be attained with a healthy body, with the preservation of life and the necessary requirements which answer to the exigencies of cold, hunger, exposure and insecurity, the ultimate evil. On my life, for him who is secure in his freedom, healthy in body, able to obtain his daily bread, it is as if the world has been fulfilled in all its aspects. Man cannot be secure in his life, body, possessions, dwelling and food, under all conditions but only under some. Religion cannot be rightly ordered except through the fulfilment of these essential needs; otherwise how can a man who spends all his time defending himself against the swords of the oppressors and seeking his food in the face of those who overreach him, how can such a man find time to devote himself to learning and endeavour, for these are his means to a blessed after-life? Therefore, the right ordering of the world, that is according to its necessity, is a condition for the right ordering of religion.

"As for the second premise," al-Ghazālī goes on to say, "i.e. that the world and the security of life and possessions cannot be organised except by having a ruler to whom obedience is given, is confirmed when we observe the civil wars which break out at the death of the rulers and the imāms, especially when there is a lapse of time before another ruler has been nominated. Disorder, violence and scarcity rule, cattle perish and manufactures die out. Might seizes what it can; no one devotes himself to worship or to learning, even if he remains alive, while the majority perish by the sword. That is why religion and rule have been called twins. It is said
that religion is a foundation and rule a guardian; what has no foundation is destroyed, and what has no guardian is lost. On the whole, no sensible man will doubt that human beings, with all their classes and variety of desires and opinions, if they were left to their condition, and if there had been no one opinion to command obedience and to unify them, would have perished altogether. This is a disease which has only one cure: a strong ruler to command obedience and unify the diversity of opinions. It is clear that power is necessary for the right ordering of the world, and the right ordering of the world is necessary for the right ordering of religion, and the right ordering of religion is necessary to win eternal happiness; this is indeed the aim of all the prophets. The obligation to set up an imām is therefore enjoined in the Share which it is out of question to abandon."

Al-Ghazālī grounds the necessity to obey on the necessity of maintaining social order in the interest of religion. Obedience becomes a religious duty. He goes on to deal with the question of a suitable candidate for the imamate, and then discusses the question of whether obedience is due to the imām who has the qualifications of leadership both in matters of opinion and of war, but lacks those of legislation, yet refers to the 'ulamā' in such matters. About such an imām, he writes: "He may be deposed on condition that he is replaced by another who has all the qualifications, and on condition this deposition does not arouse any dissension or violent commotion. If this is impossible, then obedience is due to him, and his imamate must be accepted. ... For if we cause a revolt to break out, the consequences of which we do not know, this may
lead to the loss of life and possessions."

Such is al-Ghazālī's view of the exercise of power among the Faithful. It is the traditional Sunni view. It is extremely reluctant to counsel opposition to government however tyrannical the government may be. In practice, orthodoxy had always to accommodate itself to political tyranny. "... The traditional compromise of orthodoxy with political tyranny," as M. Halpern puts it, "which Islam justified on the grounds that it would preserve religion, has produced habits of acquiescence among parts of the population which may continue to persist even after the earlier motivation has disappeared." The accusation that al-Kawakibi and other Muslim Modernists make against the Sufis, that the Sufi orders had encouraged passive obedience among the masses, one-sided as it is, is an indication of the state of affairs. The discussion went on

3. This has been noticed by many writers on Islam. But the relevance of this attitude to modern politics and international relations has not been widely dealt with. In his article, "Conquering Faiths", in The Hibbert Journal, January 1952, pp. 113-123, E. Marmorstein studies the similarities between communism and Islam, but his study deals mainly with the outward similarities of both, and is mainly a comparison of the reasons for the quick success of both faiths and their rapid growth into vast empires. M. Halpern, on the other hand, tries to give in his article in The Muslim World, see n.2 above, a philosophical and systematic interpretation of the nature of Islam as a religion and a system of government, and how this does not make it an outright enemy of communism, in spite of the obvious disparity between the two beliefs. His masterly treatment of the subject takes into account the way Islam has had to deal with contemporary problems, and how it has always prepared the field for radical alternatives.
long after al-Ghazālī. Sunni opinion agrees with Ibn Taimiya, that obedience is due even to the unjust and ignorant ruler so long as his orders do not constitute a breach of an injunction laid down by God or by Muhammad. Disobedience, in such a case, is only allowed when the orders of the imām are manifestly in contradiction to a prescription which is based on a precise text of the Qur'ān or the Sunna and agreed upon by the Ijma' of the Salaf.1 More recently the Salafi Shaikh Muhammad Rashīd Riḍa answered the same question in the light of modern problems. Rashīd Riḍa prefers Ahl al-ḥal wa'l-qadd over the imām, and says that if the former agree about something different from what the sultan has ordered, then the sultan must execute what they have agreed upon instead of what he prescribed because they are the representative of the umma, and it is their prerogative to elect the imām. There can be no imām over the Muslims except through their nomination; so that if he contradicts them, the umma must obey them and not him. In spite of this effort to interpret the power of the ruler in terms of national sovereignty, and in spite of the very categorical condemnation of blind obedience which Rashīd Riḍa makes on the grounds of the Sunna, his views do not, in practice, differ from what has been quoted above; he ends his analysis on the theme that "the resistance of the umma against the tyrannical rulers must be carried on with wisdom, foresight and care not to cause civil strife, and with the principle

1. H. Laoust, Essai sur ... ibn Taimiya, pp. 313-4. Laoust mentions the different theological position taken by the Shi'ites and some other sects. My study is however concerned with the orthodox developments only.
of following the course of the lesser evil." All forms of government, then, as they are more or less powerful, can be made more or less acceptable.

II.

The trends then which are to be found now in the Arab East indicate that, in some fashion, an irreligious and totalitarian view of government has superseded, and perhaps grown out of the traditional theocratic view which has obtained in Islam for a thousand years and more. The nature of the change in Muslim political theory may be grasped through a consideration of the gradual and successive attempts to invest with meaning and content the conception of a secular Arab nation. And it is perhaps worth while to start with the case of a person like Sātī‘ al-Ḥusri. Sātī‘ al-Ḥusri, a native of Aleppo and an official of the Ottoman Government, became a follower of Faisal and an ardent Arab nationalist. Faisal made him responsible for education in the short-lived Arab Government of Damascus of 1919 and 1920, and took him to his exile when the French put an end to the régime. Sātī‘ al-Ḥusri eventually accompanied Faisal to Iraq and was given prominent posts in the educational administration of the country. He at one time held the post of Director General of Education. He left Iraq after the failure of the Rashīd‘Allī Revolt, having been deprived of

Iraqi nationality. 1 When the Syrian state was established in 1943, he was here too entrusted with the general direction of Education. The Arab League, formed in 1945, gave him further scope and he now is one of its advisers on Educational affairs. In his book, Safahat min al-madi al-qarib, he defines in orthodox Hegelian terms the concept of freedom, of order and of the state; this definition he claims to be that which the West universally understands. He recalls a scene from a play he had seen in Paris and in which the European officer says to his mistress, the Moroccan dancer, who tried to turn him away from his military duties by appealing to his sense of freedom:

"Liberty for us Westerners is not as you Easterners understand and desire it. You understand by freedom that a person should put on his burnous, mount his horse and ride straight into the desert wherever he may wish to go... As for us, we do not demand this kind of freedom; every one of us carries round his neck ties and chains... ties and chains made of spiritual gold... of the gold of tradition, of history and of duty... We love those chains with all our hearts, and we carry them with great joy... We venerate those ties and chains and we indeed hold them sacred." And the author comments: "The generation which spoke in those terms carried France to glory and to victory, but the generation which forsook the sanctity

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1. A bill has been introduced in the Iraqi Parliament to restore Iraqi nationality to him in view of "his long services in Iraq in the fields of education". See al-Zaman, Baghdad, March 21, 1953. A full report of the debate in the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies on the restoration of Iraqi nationality to Sati' al-Husri and Darwish al-Midjadi who were deprived of it, following Rashid 'Ali's movement in 1941, is given in al-Sha'b, Baghdad, April 17, 1953.
of the social ties, and adopted the notion of absolute freedom... the generation which set aside social solidarity and sanctified individualism... this generation... has carried France to these calamities... of 1940, the fall of France to the Germans.

"I believe that this outcome must be a precious lesson to all Arab youth...

"I wish it realised that freedom is not an end in itself but a means towards the higher life... The national interests which may sometimes require a man to sacrifice his life, must perforce entail in some cases the sacrifice of his freedom...

"He who does not sacrifice his personal freedom for the sake of his nation's freedom (hurriyat ummatih) - when the necessity requires - might lose his own freedom along with the freedom of his people (qaum) and of his country (watan) ...

"And he who refuses to lose himself in the nation to which he belongs, might - in some cases - find himself lost in the end within an alien nation which might one day conquer his fatherland.

"That is why I say continuously and without hesitation:

"Patriotism (wataniyya) and nationalism (gaumiyya) before and above all... even above and before freedom..."²

The originality of these ideas in Arabic merits a detailed exposition. According to Sāṭī al-Ḥuṣrī then, the individual is not a solitary human being, but part of a society, and

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2. Sāṭī al-Ḥuṣrī, Saffat min al-mādī al-garīb, Beirut, 1948 pp. 57-8; from the address "Kaul inhiyar France" given to Nādī al-Buthanna in Baghdad in 1941. The author uses "yurni" nafṣahu for what is rendered here 'loses himself'; the inverted commas necessary because the expression is new?
therefore must not give in to every whim and desire that
seizes him. This is not freedom but anarchy. Real freedom
consists in losing oneself in one's own nation or society, in
fulfilling the dictates of the traditions laid down by one's
ancestors. Such is real freedom. But, in any case, this free-
dom is not an end in itself; the true end is the attainment of
a higher mode of being. The individual who is not a solitary
person cannot attain it by himself but must reach it in company
with his society or nation.

To appreciate how new is such a departure in Arabic thought,
this definition can be compared with an exposition of the
meaning of happiness which Muhammad ʿAbdu attributes to Jamāl
by nature, desires happiness and tries to avoid, as much as he
can, unhappiness; all his actions are designed towards this aim.
But the happiness of man is in the happiness of his community
(milla) and of his countrymen (ahāli watanihi). He is one of
the members of his community, and there can be no doubt that
the member grieves when the other members grieve and is hurt
with what pains them, unless he is paralysed and devoid of
feeling. The greatest happiness to be desired is surely the
happiness of the umma and of the milla within which the person
has grown. But the paths leading to this desired happiness
are rough and the seeker might lose his way and find himself
away from his goal, far from what he sought, and might succumb
to misery. The duty therefore of every man is to prepare
himself, to look into all the possible ways and to take the
best of them to lead him to this lofty aim."

It may look at first sight that this passage is directly inspired from European sources. Does it not maintain, like the European organic theories of the state, that man is not alone, that his interests are not to be understood apart from the interests of the other members of his community, and would it not be legitimate to conclude from this passage that the interests of the individual are the same as the interests of the community? Muhammad 'Abdu explains this identity of interests by comparing the social unit to a body the many different organs of which perform their functions in such a way as to benefit all of them.2 If these extracts are examined in the light of some Hadīths on the body politic of Islam, it would perhaps appear that they derive from a purely Islamic tradition. The comparison of the Muslims to one body is not a new one. The Hadīths dealing with the body politic have been assembled by Ibn Taimiyya to illustrate his definition of Muslim solidarity. "Dans le Sahīh," translated H. Laoust, "on rapporte que le Prophète a dit: "Les croyants, par l'affection qu'ils se portent mutuellement, par leur pitié réciproque, par leur sympathie commune, ressemblent à un seul corps; lorsqu'un membre se plaint, les autres membres compatissent à sa peine par la fièvre et l'insomnie." Un croyant de même est, pour un autre croyant, comme une construction dont tous les éléments se renforcent les uns les autres. - Et le Prophète

2. Ibid., vol. II, p. 112; from Muhammad 'Abdu's essay, "Rājat al-insān īla al-zawāj".
entremêla ses doigts (taṣbīk). Dans le Sahīh, le Prophète dit encore: "Par celui qui a mon âme entre ses mains, nul parmi vous ne saurait être croyant tant qu'il ne souhaite pas pour son frère ce qu'il souhaite pour lui-même."¹

Comparing the temper of Jamāl al-Dīn and Muḥammad ʿAbdu's thought to that shown in these Ḥadīths one finds a great similarity between them. They lack the metaphysics necessary to the thought of Sāṭī al-Ḥusaynī. Jamāl al-Dīn and Muḥammad ʿAbdu base themselves on the Qur'ān and the Ḥadīth to stress the solidarity of the Muslim community, a solidarity which is one of the recognised duties incumbent on the Faithful. Consequently, in the Ḥadīth and the teachings of the Muslim Ulama', even the Reformist among them, such as Muḥammad ʿAbdu, the theories about al-ummah al-islāmiyya, although they appear to be similar to Western organic theories of government, in fact, insist on the benefits which the individual reaps in such a solidarity community, and on the material services rendered by one individual to another; they do not deal with a collective being higher than the individuals who make up that society, and they do not so much stress the fact that there are duties to perform as well as benefits to reap. Al-Fārābī had previously used the comparison of the human society to the human body, but he made a clear and fundamental distinction between the two: "Cependant les organes du corps sont naturels et leurs dispositions sont des puissances naturelles. Tandis que les parties de la cité bien que naturelles, leurs

dispositions et habitus par lesquels elles agissent pour la cité ne le sont point; ils sont (au contraire) volontaires. Toutefois, les parties de la cité sont douées de nature hiérarchisées qui font qu'un homme est utile à un homme en une chose à l'exclusion d'une autre. Mais elles ne sont point partie de la cité par leurs aptitudes naturelles uniquement, mais aussi par leurs habitus volontaires acquis, tels que les arts et les (activités) similaires. Aux puissances formant les organes naturels du corps correspondent dans les parties de la cité des habitus et des dispositions volontaires. ¹

This is not to deny the presence of specific prescribed duties without which no order can be preserved, but to insist that there could have been no reference to abstract duties, i.e. duties of self-abnegation and self-sacrifice for the greater good not of the individuals in society, but of the society as a whole superior to the sum of its components.

A certain ambiguity about the correct translation of some of the terms is however not altogether lacking. ²Abdu's sentence, quoted above, yaṣūmu kull ʿaḍu minhu bi maṣlahat al-kull, translated as 'every organ will function in such a way as to benefit all of them', can be interpreted—depending on the attitude of the reader—as benefitting all the other members separately, or benefiting them as a whole. And indeed Jamāl al-Dīn had already introduced in the passage quoted

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¹ Al-Fārābī, Idées des Habitants de la Cité Vertueuse, translated by R. P. Jaussen, Yousef Karam and J. Chlala, Cairo 1949; for Arabic text, see Friedrich Dieterici, Alfarabi's Abhandlung der Musterstaat, Leiden, 1895, p. 55.
above the idea of the greatest happiness and that man's happiness is in the happiness of his umma or milla. The ambiguity then in the language of Muhammad Abdu and in the following passage from al-ʻUrwa al-wuthqa, lends itself to legitimate developments in opposite directions: the one in the direction of liberal individualism, the other in that of totalitarian chauvinism. One difference however between Jamal al-Dīn's talk about the greatest happiness, and the organic theory of Sāti al-Ḥusri, is that the former makes everything emanate from God! In the opinion of the writers of al-ʻUrwa al-wuthqa, to perform one's task in life, just as an organ performs the function for which it is meant in the human body helps to ensure the survival of the social unit to which one belongs, as well as to ensure for oneself a share of the general benefit; existence-in-society (kaun al-ijtimā‘) is the gift of God to man - it makes him superior to the rest of the animal species with whom he shares the faculty of self-preservation. It seems then that to help to preserve the social unit to which one belongs has a higher purpose than the mere preservation of the species; it is obedience to God who willed the superiority of man over the animals by making him live a life of existence-in-society. "Every individual," write the authors of al-ʻUrwa al-wuthqa, "has his own particular existence. Divine Providence has endowed him with the faculty of protecting his own existence and of preserving the species by reproduction. Man is like the rest of the animals in this respect. But the Divine Wisdom decided to make man superior to the rest of the animal species by giving
him another attribute and a higher kind of existence. This attribute is, existence-in-society (kaun al-ijtimā'). All the individuals in society make up one structure, subsumed under one name; they are, in that structure, like different organs performing different functions, just as God has entrusted different functions to the organs of the body. Each performs his function to preserve the enveloping structure (al-bunya al-jāmi'a), to strengthen it and to increase its chance of existence. ... Each member is able to perform his function but cannot do more, just as the hand can fight and seize, but does not see, ... but they are all alive with one life. ... "Fortunate is the umma ... every member of which works for the good of everybody (al-kull), aiming at nothing which contradicts their aim, neglecting nothing which pertains to the umma. Then they will all be like a firm structure, shaken neither by tempests nor earthquakes. It is from the strength of everyone that the umma gathers its strength (wa bi quwwat kull min umma yajtami' li'l-umma quwwa). ... This is the umma in which virtues have prevailed...."¹

The hadiths cited by ibn Taimiyya refer to the attitude, compassionate and helpful, of the members of the group towards the individual. The corresponding obligation of the individual towards the group is not stressed. The one position can, of course, be logically argued from the other, but the question to ask is, Why has this not been done earlier than the XIXth century; is it that Western influence

¹. Al-'urwa al-wuthqa, pp. 132-134.
was essential before this step could be made? In order to
decide on this question, the stages through which the reaction
to Western thought had to pass, must be reviewed, to appreciate
the importance of the terminology used, such as ِwatān, ِumma,
and to study the process of change they had gone through and
how they have come to mean what they mean now. In the passage
from ِSāḥiḥ al-Ḥuṣrī, I have translated ِumma by 'nation' without
any hesitation or qualification, while I have retained the
words ِmillā and ِumma in the passage of al-Afghānī. This is
because the views of al-Ḥuṣrī are only to be understood in the
light of romantic Western thought which culminated in Europe
in the growth of totalitarian doctrines and forms of govern­
ment; but the Islamic tradition apparent in the extracts from
Jamāl al-Dīn and ِMuḥammad ِAbdu, is still too strong to allow
one to give ready made European equivalents to the Arabic
expressions which confront the reader. When the translation
of European works and modes of thought became necessary for
the intellectual life of the Middle East, the Arabic equiva­
lents of the terms 'nation', 'people', 'patrie', were of course
taken from the current Arabic vocabulary, and the words ِwatān,
ِ qaum, ِmillā, ِumma, were used to denote those European notions.
But just as the European counterparts of these terms were them­
selves adaptations from past philosophical and juridical sys­
tems, these terms themselves, in Arabic, were by no means
devoid of various connotations peculiar to Islam. ِUmma, a
term used more than once in the Qur’ān, was generally under­
stood to refer to 'ethnic, linguistic or religious bodies of
people who were the object of the divine plan of salvation.'

1. R. Paret, article ِUMMA, in ِEI.
The same with the word *milla*, which, up to the end of the Ottoman rule and in some cases even later, meant a religious community. B. Lewis however, drawing perhaps on his knowledge of Turkish as well as of Arabic, has found it necessary to translate it both as a 'creed, or religious community', and as 'nation'.¹ The attempt to present the secular doctrines of Europe in Arabic was therefore bound to result in confusion so long as these specifically Islamic terms were used indiscriminately. Jamal al-Dīn who is by no means free from foreign influences, makes no special reference in the quotation to *al-umma al-islāmiyya*, but speaks in general of the *umma* and the *milla* in which one has grown. In this approach we may detect an attempt at a generalisation about the place of the individual not only in the *umma*, which is the Muslim *umma*, but in all the *ummahs*, whether religious groupings or national ones in the European sense; it may well be that the distinction was not present in the mind of Jamal al-Dīn. There is nothing in this passage which an orthodox Muslim, whose mind is still untainted with Western ideas, would reject as new, unorthodox or unacceptable. Even if al-Afghānī himself was aware of such a distinction and wanted to introduce new notions, it will remain true to say that the average Muslim reader would understand the traditional words al-Afghānī used, in terms of the allusions they would conjure up for him; and he would still not take the words *umma* and *milla* to mean anything else but

al-ummah, al-islāmiyya and millat Muḥammad. The mental interpretation of purely Western theories into Islamic concepts is therefore possible and easy; no tour de force is required, when one is ignorant of the linguistic and doctrinal difficulties involved. The point may be further illustrated by examining how the sense of the word watan shifted slowly from being "the place where one is born or resides" to that of 'patrie' with all the contemporary political connotations of loyalty and duty attached to it. Even as late as the Reformists, the word watan had definite limitations which could be completely understood, and neither signified nor in any way implied a mystic "genetic-cultural" boundary, as for instance, Charles Malik, as will be seen, would like to give it today.

This is how Muḥammad ʿAbdu defined the concept of watan: "Linguistically, watan means, without exception, the place where the person lives; it is synonymous with the word sakan: to say istaʿtana al-qaum hādhīhi al-ard wa ṣawattaṭanūna is the same as saying 'they have made it their abode'. The word as used by those whose study is politics (ahl al-siyāsa) means the place after which you are called, where your right is safeguarded, and the claim of which on you is known, where you are secure in yourself, your kin and your possessions. It has been said: There is no watan without freedom. Le Bruyère, the French philosopher, said: There is no watan properly speaking compatible with tyranny, but only private interests, personal
glorification and exalted places. 1 Watān was defined by the Ancient Romans as the place where a person has rights and political duties.

"This latter Roman definition does not contradict the saying that there is no Watān without freedom. They are indeed identical. Freedom is the right to fulfil the known duty, and if it does not exist there can be no Watān, since there are no rights. When political duties exist, then they imply the existence of both right and duty, which are the motto of all the Watāns to which lives and possessions are sacrificed, and which are put before kin and friends; in generous souls, the love of Watān reaches the height of adoration and of passion.

"But the abode where the dweller has no rights, and where he is secure neither in his life nor in his possessions, is, in short, the resort of the powerless, and the abode of him who can find no way to another; if it grows bigger, there is no ease, and if smaller then life in it cannot become worse. La Bruyère, mentioned above, said: What is it to me that my Watān be large and great, if I am sad and lowly in it, living in humility and misery, a prisoner and afraid. 2 But to belong

1. "Il n'y a point de patrie dans le despotisme; d'autre choses y suppléent: l'intérêt, la gloire, le service du prince." Jean de la Bruyère, Caractères, Editions Nelson, Paris, 1945, p. 315; "Du Souverain ou de la République."
2. "... Que me servirait, en un mot, comme à tout le peuple, que le prince fût heureux et comblé de gloire par lui-même et par les siens, que ma patrie fut puissante et formidable si, triste et inquiet, j'y vivais dans l'oppression ou dans l'indigence; si, à couvert des courses de l'ennemi, je me trouvais exposé dans les places ou dans les rues d'une ville au fer d'un assassin, et que je craignisse moins, dans l'honueur de la nuit, d'être pillé ou massacré dans d'épaisses forêts que dans ses carrefours...." Ibid p. 331, "Du Souverain ou de la République".
to a certain watan means that a connexion links the watan to
the person who dwells in it, a connexion based on personal
honour; so that he will be jealous for it and will defend it
as he defends his father after whom he is called, even if he
is a bad-tempered and strict father. This is why it has been
said that the relational ending 'i' in Migri, Inglizi, Fransawi
is of a kind which inspires regard and jealousy in the heart
of the Egyptian for Egypt, of the French for France, and of the
Englishman for England. This has been denied by some people,
but this was no doubt due either to misunderstanding or to
unclear exposition.

"The conclusion of the matter is that there are three
things in a watan which compel love, solicitude and vigilance
for it. They are as follows: First, watan is the abode where
there is food, protection, kin and children; Second, it is
the place of rights and duties, which are the focal points of
political life and the importance of which is obvious; Third,
it is the place with which one is associated and through which
man is exalted and honoured, or cast down and humbled; and
this is purely spiritual."¹

In Muhammad 'Abdu's doctrine then, a man's watan is the
place where he feels his security preserved and to which

¹ "Al-hayāt al-siyāysiyya", in Rashīd Riḍa, Tarikh..., vol.II, pp. 194-5. This definition was given previously by Adib Ishāq (1856-1895) in his essay al-Hayāt al-siyāysiyya
in al-Durar, pp. 453-4. This does not detract from the
value of the above argument; the fact that Muhammad 'Abdu
gave Adib Ishāq's definition verbatim goes to show how
much he was impressed with it. On Adib Ishāq, see
Tārāzī, vol. II, pp. 105-9, and Ḥābd al-Laṭīf Ḥamza,
vol. I.
therefore, he owes certain duties. The criterion is thus clear, and in the discretion of the individual to apply. The following passages from Sami Shawkat are equally clear in their diametrical opposition: "The foreigner according to the definition of the Futuwwa of Iraq," he writes, "is not he who does not possess an Iraqi nationality card; but the foreigner is, in our creed, he who does not feel as we do and does not hold sacred the dignity of Iraqi unity even though he possessed ninety such cards and even though our cemeteries be filled with the bones of his ancestors for thousands of years. The foreigner for us is he who intrigues against Arabunity; and he is not only a foreigner to us in the creed, belief and spirit, but is our sworn enemy."¹ "We have, like all other nations," he goes on to say, "enemies; the enemy of the nation (umma), like the enemy of the family is of two types: the internal and the external. Usually the internal enemy is more harmful and destructive than the external one. No nation can have a real renaissance unless she first of all defeats this internal enemy, uproots him completely from the bedrock of her foundations. This internal foe is formed from those persons or groups who, both at school and at home, come to feel like strangers in the midst of the being of the state, and feel that the majesty and loftiness of the state are harmful to their interests and diminish their power and position, and are humiliating to themselves. As the strength of such persons or groups is not sufficient to make them stand up against their state and declare

¹. Shawkat, pp. 5-6.
their enmity openly towards it, they strive in secret, stretching their hands, under cover of the dark, to the external enemy, shaking hands with him and conspiring to become his agent, their heart full of envy, anger and vengeance. The pact between the external enemy and the internal one is thus made.¹

Great indeed is the gulf between the ruthlessness of these passages and the liberal benevolence of Muhammad 'Abdu's attempt at a definition. The last two passages assume many things: they assume the existence of a nation in the full sense of the word, they assume the oneness of the nation with the state, and that the nation is superior to the individual. The final conclusion is that all criticism, whether voiced or otherwise — and Sāmi Shawkat seems to have in mind certain quite unvocal minorities² — is disloyalty, and such disloyalty deserves the most systematic and scientific method of elimination. Muhammad 'Abdu, on the other hand, is, in fact, justifying the lack of a feeling of loyalty for one's wāṭan from the moment that wāṭan ceases to safeguard certain minimum rights. Thus the wāṭan, from being the place where one feels most secure, becomes an omnipotent force which must crush you if it suspects that you do not fully abandon yourself to it.

The dictionaries will shed further light on the evolution of the meaning of the word wāṭan. In Buṭrus al-Bustānī's Ḥujūṭ

¹. Ibid., p. 36.
². See in particular ibid., p. 37, where the author praises Hitler and Mussolini for making it a first condition of their "renaissance" the annihilation of these internal enemies; and p. 63, where he mentions specifically one of the groups who betrayed their Semitic race and are therefore internal enemies, namely the Jews.
al-muhīṭ, wātān is defined as the place where a person dwells, irrespective of whether he was born in it or not. Al-Bustāni enumerates: al-wātān al-āṣli which is, according to the Law, the birthplace of a man, the place where he grew and the town where he dwells, which is also called wātān al-fīṭrā wa l-gaḍr or al-shli; wātān al-icāma or al-wātān al-mustaʿfār or al-badīth or wātān al-safar is the place where one decides to stay for fifteen days or more, without taking it as a permanent habitation.1 Dozy, who reviewed all available material, does not list the word wātāniyya although wātāni does appear as 'provincial'.2 Ellious Bocthor in his French-Arabic dictionary, on the other hand, has recourse to a paraphrase to express what now would be unhesitatingly termed wātāniyya. He gives:

"Patrice: pays, Etat ou l'on est né, wātān, arḍ mīlād, bīlād, maulid; L'amour de sa patrie: ḥub, muʿizzat al-wātān.
Patriote: qui aime sa patrie par-dessus tout, kāthir al-
muʿizzat li wātānihi.
Patriotisme: caractère du patriote, muʿizzat al-wātān.
Nation, he defines as habitants d'un même pays, Taifa, milla.
National: yakhusṣu al-ṭaifa; and Garde Nationale requires a
circumlocution, ghefar ahl al-bīlād libīlādīhim."3

Al-Bustāni mentioned the Ḥadīth Hubb al-wātān min al-Imān, but
Bocthor wavers between muʿizzat and ḥubb al-wātān when he had

1. Buṭrus al-Bustāni, mūḥīṭ al-mūḥīṭ au ẓāmīs muṭawwal al-
2. Dozy, vol. II, p. 820; see the preface on material that was used.
3. Ellious Bocthor, Dictionnaire français-arabe, revu et
augmenté par A. Gaussin de Perceval, Paris, 4th edition,
1869, pp. 581 and 527.
to translate the European notion of patriotism; and the difficulty of translating it was a real one. The relation between a person and his **watan** was not always clear-cut in Arabic, and the notion of having duties towards it was a late accretion.

Richr Farès has a useful note on the question: "Le hima se distingue du **watan**; celui-ci, à notre sens, désigne la patrie du point de vue sentimental, celui-là du point de vue guerrier."¹ The word **watan** is used in an unpoltical sense in this passage of Rashīd Riḍā's: "I have two **watain** in this world: the **watan** of origin and upbringing which is Syria. I was born in al-Calāmūn near Tripoli in Syria on the Kūra coast in Lebanon, and studied in Tripoli; and the **watan** of work, which is Egypt, where I have lived for eleven years..."² And here is another use of the word **watan** in the sense of local or native:

"... that the merchants send every year wool worth millions of pounds to London or to Marseilles, and after this wool is woven there, it is sent back and these merchants sell it at very high prices to the local people (**al-wataniyyin**)"³

The synthesis between Islam and Western political thought is possible without immediately upsetting the balance of the Muslim tradition. The foreign character of many political theories is immediately lost through the use of purely Islamic

¹ Richr Farès, op. cit., p. 96, n.4.
² al-Manār, XI (1326/ Jan.1909), p. 904. For Rashīd Riḍā there is no problem because Egypt and Syria are Muslim territory.
words with definite and much discussed connotations. One transition at least is thus smoothly made. The necessity for understanding the success of Europe in which the Muslim thinkers found themselves, was a real one; they were greatly concerned with the reason of their own decline, and of the obvious superiority and prosperity of Europe. To fathom the reasons for the success of Europe, European works had to be read and translated. They would be pored over and digested in the hope that, may be, they would be efficient in rousing the apathetic Muslims. Of course, these works had to be translated, whether mentally or actually, into the existing language, Arabic, as it had been developed during the many centuries of theological and philosophical studies. This was done without difficulty because the translators were not themselves always aware of the difference in the traditions that had gone to form the learning which they admired and attempted to transmit to their fellow Easterners. They tried to prove that what they admired in the West did not contradict the tenets of Islam, but was a mere extension and development of notions already known among them. It becomes, especially after a process of translations as will be seen below, not too difficult to superimpose on the concept of the umma in Islam an alien conception of nationhood, since the conception of the umma, as one body different from and superior to every other form of society, already existed in Islam. Such a procedure would not cause a revolution in the thought of the Muslim intellectuals. Al-Kawākibi plays his part here to illustrate more clearly the transition and the confusion. In the nineteenth century the nature of the umma
was very much discussed especially because the Muslims were aware of their weakness and wished to study the causes of that weakness in order to revive the umma in all its strength, glory and cohesion, and make it such as it has always been ideally conceived in Islam. The kind of Europe that the East came into contact with was influenced both by utilitarianism and by the new Idealistic Liberalism spreading from Germany, which was little by little superseding utilitarianism, and which inclined to a romantic belief in self-determination. It may be asked whether, given the time and conditions under which the Arabic revival was taking place, it could have been different from what it was? The West was there and account had to be taken of it. It could evoke admiration or hostility, but not the superior indifference which was customary in Islam till then. Jamāl al-Dīn is a prominent instance of the preoccupation of the most confirmed anti-European with European ideas. The same applies to Ḥasan al-Banna who taught complete isolation from the West and used its techniques in his political action.¹

The key notion in al-Ḥuṣri's definition of freedom is that of 'society': the individual is not a solitary human being, he is part of a society, a nation. This conception of man as a person unable to exist by himself as a solitary being is not new in Islam. Al-Fārābī and Ibn Khaldūn had already developed the Greek idea that man is a "political" animal. Al-Fārābī,

¹ See J. Heyworth-Dunne, Religious and Political Trends in Modern Egypt, especially p. 62.
in *al-Madīna al-fādila*, discusses the organisation of the perfect city as first pictured by Plato; Ibn Khaldūn's axiom *al-insān madani bil-ta'ṣī* is at the basis of his doctrine of social cooperation necessitated by man's need for living in a society.\(^1\) This condition of man had become the accepted and obvious assumption for all discussion on the nature of government in Islam. Al-Kawākibi also, in the Muslim tradition, argues that man is political by nature, and must consequently cooperate with his fellow men. Such a starting-point makes possible the acceptance of Sāḥiḥ al-Ḥusārī's premise that a man is aware of his place in his society or nation through his feeling of solidarity and identification with his society and his past. And indeed Al-Kawākibi makes this statement as well: "Free man is a complete master of himself and completely owned by his qaum".\(^2\) There is a slight but significant difference between the traditional account of the relation of man to his society and that of al-Ḥusārī. Traditionally a Muslim has to be solidary with the *ummā* because the Qur'ān dictates it, and Islam expects it. But Sāḥiḥ al-Ḥusārī bases his system on individual feelings. It is the individual who feels the call of tradition, it is he who feels that he must answer it, it is he who does not feel fulfilment and total realisation if he does not lose himself in his nation. Hegel and not the Qur'ān inspires Sāḥiḥ al-Ḥusārī. Once you have established that man must live in a society, it is only one step from the enu-

\(^{1}\) T., p. 156.

meration of the benefits he reaps to the description of the duties he has to perform. Muḥammad ʿAbdu takes this step: rights and duties become the same in his definition of the term waṭan given above. Waṭan, the place where one feels most secure, is also the place where one has the right to perform one's duty towards it. Muḥammad ʿAbdu, who was also striving in his gentle and moderate way to assemble together a workable theory of the state, borrows from the same sources which al-Ḥuṣri was later exclusively to draw up on for his intellectual make-up.

Another concept which would make the definition of Sātī ṣuluṣ al-Ḥuṣri acceptable to the average Muslim, is that of umma in Islam, as a compact body of all the Muslims one of whose primary duties is the Holy War. The conception of the umma in modern Arabic has become almost inseparable from the notion of nationalism, a secular movement imported from the West. But just as the passages in the Qurʾān where the word occurs are so varied that it is difficult to define its meaning more rigidly than R. Paret has done, so are the uses of the word at the turn of the century. Even a man like Rashīd Riḍa who spent forty years relentlessly preaching the unity of the Muslim umma - in his periodical al-Manār - uses the word in the sense of 'nation' or 'people', a sense devoid of all religious content: "The Turks are a warrior nation (umma ḫarbiyya), but they were not more valorous than the Arabs, ..."¹ And indeed the word

¹ "Al-Turk wa'l-ʿArab" in al-Manār, III, 1318H/ May 1900, p. 172.
was used in the same sense even in the classical period of Arabic.¹ When European books were read and translated for the first time into Arabic, it would have been very difficult to render, without being pedantic, the secular concept of nationhood by any words other than milla or umma. Milla, although it did lend itself to some form of secular interpretation, must have still been too much connected in people's minds with the idea of a religious community within the much larger and more powerful umma, especially as long as the official adoption of the term by the Ottoman Government in 1839 to denote the Jewish and Christian communities of the Empire, remained in force till 1908.² These communities did of course have some features of nationhood for they had their own autonomy inside the Muslim community. The word umma, however, denoted a much larger entity than the word milla. Its meaning fluctuated in the early period of Islam until the Muslim conquests gave it an immutable significance. Muḥammad first regarded the people of Mecca as a closed umma, and when he emigrated to Medina, he considered the people of Medina — including the Jews — to form one umma; but as time went on, the umma came to consist more and more of the believers. When he finally broke with the People of the Book, he resumed his original idea of an umma embracing the community of the Arabs, but of the Arabs who were Muslim. With the conquests after his death


the *umma* came to include all the Muslims, whether Arab or not.¹

Al-Kawkābī clarifies a little the meaning of *umma*: "An *umma* is the sum of individuals with a common ancestry or *wātān*, language or religion, just as a building is a collection of stones. When one member of the *umma* progresses or degenerates, the totality of that *umma* will be affected, just as a flea, standing on the side of a great ship, will weigh it down and make it lean sideways, although the movement cannot be felt by the senses."² The author of this definition has made more than one step to meeting Western secularism, and it has been seen how al-Kawkābī worked out an almost racial theory of nationality, while remaining an orthodox Muslim; the result was Panarabism. Racialism is not wholly absent from the history of Islam - the *Shu'ubiyya* movement is proof enough.³ The definition of *umma* given by al-Kawkābī, therefore, permits a purely secular definition to replace the traditional one; and such a secular definition is now taken for granted by many writers: "After all, what is this *umma*?" asks Nicola Ziyāda, "And what is *qaumiyya*? *Qaumiyya*, in essence and origin is a feeling, and the *umma* is the result of this feeling. It is the result of the feeling of the individuals and their belief that the *umma* exists. But such a feeling cannot be, except when the common characteristics obtain, those characteristics that enable the members to realise that they are different from others. These

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2. T., p. 129.
common characteristics obtain when people live in one spot of the earth, and enjoy the goods of this spot in an organised community. This goes together with a general philosophy of life, based on history, custom, experience, thought, language and literature, distilled from the heart of their past and present life, outlining for them their future aims and indicating the plan of their lives."¹

It may be remarked here that the word generally used now to denote nationalism is qaumiyat. Sāmi Shawkat had already adopted this word in the early 1930s. "We have to be firm in our belief," he says, "that our age is the age of nationalities (al-qaumiyat) not the age of religions."² He again says: "We hold sacred all the divinely inspired religions; this is our motto; we shall not allow any one to lay sacrilegious hands on them. But of the worldly creeds, we will only adopt the national creed (al-mabda' al-qaumi), without which neither can nations be formed, nor the foundations of states laid."³ The distinction quoted above that Bishr Fārē's makes between hīma and wātan may give the clue to the preference shown for the word qaumiyat over the word wātaniyya. Wātaniyya, by derivation, attaches a person to his dwelling-place, an attachment

² Shawkat, p. 69.
³ Ibid., p. 13; quoted from an address given by him to teachers of private and foreign schools in Baghdad on March 31, 1939.
which, as proved by Bichr Fares, was sentimental rather than implying duties of war and defence. *Qaumiyya* on the other hand, is derived from the word *qaum*, the unit - in Beduin usage - to which one belongs, and to which allegiance is owed, especially in time of war; the *qaum* usually comprised only the male members of the group. A man attached to a *qaum* owed them assistance when they were engaged on a razzia or in defending themselves. ¹ *Qaumiyya*, therefore, is a word which defines the position of a man in relation to the other members of his group, rather than in relation to his place of birth or of residence. "The belief of the members of one tribe (*qabil*)," writes Nicola Ziyāda, "in one common origin or ancestor tied them to each other, and they felt that they were all one *qaum* affected equally by prosperity or misery. Therefore, when a member meets with calamity or misfortune, he goes to his *qaum* asking for their help, and crying out to them. And if the member of a tribe (*qabil*) is hurt, he can expect every individual to ward off evil from him, and to stand against whoever means him ill...

"This feeling which we notice in the relationship between the members among themselves on the one hand, and between the individual and his *qaum* on the other, is what may be called *qaumiyya*. It is therefore clear that the idea of *qaumiyya* is as old as human society; that this form of relationship used

to be called 'aṣabiyya does not diminish from its value.\(^1\) From Nicola Ziyāda's analysis, it must appear that qaumiyya is, on the whole, a more emphatic term than waṭaniyya. The contributors to the periodical, Al-ʿAbbāth, published in the American University of Beirut, use both terms equally frequently but, it seems, with a vague difference in emphasis. For instance in the article entitled "Taʾrīb al-ʿArab" \(\) The Arabisation of the Arabs \(\), where the author argued that the arabisation of the Arabs is far from complete, he puts forward a plan which would result in "an intellectual and spiritual waṭaniyya different from this dry waṭaniyya, taking roots in us. We are waṭaniyyun geographically not intellectually, and great is the distance between the two kinds of waṭaniyya."\(^2\) But in an article of a general nature on national education, which assumes the full existence of a nation (umma), the title is "Al-tarbiya al-qaumiyya".\(^3\) Are we to infer then that qaumiyya is a more complete and exacting form of nationalism than waṭaniyya? The contributors to Al-ʿAbbāth have not, so far, given their reasons for using one word rather than the other; and it has to be guessed from a general knowledge of the subject whether the words are being used interchangeably in a particular context, or whether the author attaches a specific

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1. Nicola Ziyāda, op. cit., pp. 9-10. 'Aṣabiyya, usually translated esprit de corps, or tribal loyalty, but here it has strong sense of chauvinism.
meaning to each of them. Sāṭī' al-Ḥusri gives his reasons for using the word qaumiyya:

"One of our Egyptian brothers ...," he writes, "considered the question from a purely legal and canonical standpoint, and his concern was therefore only with the state (al-daula) and not with the nation (umma).

"He spoke about the nationality (jinsiyya) and mentioned the French word Nationalité saying: There is an Egyptian nationalité (jinsiyya) and there is an Iraqi nationalité ... but there is no Arab nationalité ....

"I wish to draw attention to one important truth in this connection: the word nationalité in French has two different meanings: the legal which denotes that a person belongs to a certain state, and the social which denotes that a person belongs to a certain nation (umma) even though this nation does not form a state.

"I call to witness the dictionary of philosophical terms published by the French Philosophical Society. Look up the word nationalité in this dictionary. You will find that Professor Leland distinguished clearly between the two meanings. He mentioned the first meaning under the heading (A) and quoted many examples of that use, and he mentioned the second one under the letter (B) and again quoted other examples of its use in this latter sense.

"Thus we have before us a word which means two different things, but the French found no objection to expressing these two meanings by one word.

"As for the Germans, they were in this question deeper in
thought and truer in expression than the French; they express each of these meanings by a special word, absolutely different from the other. They express the legal meaning that I have mentioned above by a word similar to the French word, Nationalité but they express the second meaning - the social one I have mentioned - by quite a different word, Wolkstum \[sic\].

"The difference between the French and the German appellations is not strange: the French belonged to one national state for many centuries. That is why we find that every member of the French nation (umma) can be described by the French Nationalité in both the senses we have mentioned above. The lack of a distinction in talking cannot them harm the Frenchman in a practical manner. That is why the French saw no objection in expressing these two senses by one word, in spite of the fact that their philosophers and thinkers distinguish clearly between the two meanings.

"As for the Germans, they were up to a comparatively recent time, divided into many states; it was therefore necessary for them to distinguish between the two meanings, i.e. the legal and the social one, not only from the theoretical point of view, but from the practical one as well. That is why they have fixed for each meaning a word special to it. And they were undoubtedly more precise in this matter and more attentive to the requirements of philosophical and social analysis, and to the demands of correct scientific expression.

"Since the legal sense is fixed by the existing laws by the word jinsiyya in Egypt, and the words tabi‘iyya or ra‘awiyya in the other Arab countries ... we have to agree to use another
word to express the social meaning of the word *nationalité*.

"I have been in the habit - and so have many of the Arab writers and thinkers - to using the word *qaumiyya* to indicate this latter sense."¹

The word *qaumiyya* therefore denotes the nationhood of a nation whether or not it has achieved its unity and independence. All the writers so far mentioned - Sāmī Shawkat, Nicola Ziyāda, Sāṭī al-Ḥuṣri, the contributors of al-Abbāth - are indefatigable exponents of the idea of Arab nationalism or the Panarab movement. This passage is a good illustration: "It would follow," objects 'Ali Nāṣir al-Dīn, "that ... the Syrians, being Syrian, in relation to the land, would not be Arabs!"

"This is a scientific, historical and social mistake, and there would not be today one nation on the face of the earth which could be correctly called a nation. Then every one of the Arab countries (*kull qutr min al-aqtar al-‘arabiyya*) would be a nation independent by itself, with a geographical 'territorial' nationality particular to itself. But it would be a counterfeit nation. And there would not remain in the world an Arab nation (*umma*) nor an Arab nationality (*qaumiyya*) ... because there is no land called *‘Arab*, so that we may be able to say *‘Arabi* in relation to this land."² A curious and premonitory instance about the use of the word *qaum* is recorded

by Rashīd Riḍa. Some time before the Great War, the editor of a Beirut newspaper, al-Mufrīd, was prosecuted by the Ottoman authorities because the expression Ya Qaum appeared in a poem published by that paper. The editor protested that this was merely a rhetorical expression of no political significance, and that the word in Arabic meant a group of people. But the tribunal contended "that the word qaum meant the Arab race (‘unsūr al-’arb), and its mention promotes disunion among the Ottoman races (al-’anāṣir al-’uṭmānīyya), and that, because the Turks use the word qaum in the sense of jins or, as some people would say, ‘unsūr."¹ The word waṭaniyya, used by the pioneers of Egyptian nationalism,² would not be equally suitable to use, as it might imply a regional nationalism, Egyptian or Iraqi for instance. The distinction is made clear by Jalāl al-Urfali who speaks about al-waṭaniyya al-‘irāqiyya and al-qaumiyya al-’arbīyya as complementary forces to achieve what he calls "the national aims" (al-ghayat al-qaumiyya) which are common to all the Arab countries, namely the realisation of the desired Arab unity.³

2. See Muḥammad Atiyya al-Ibrāshi, Abīl al-sharg, Cairo, 1947 where the author gives extracts from the speeches of Muḥammad Farīd and Sa‘īd Zaghlul, and where the word waṭaniyya is the only current one; especially pp. 70-1, 75, 78, 107, 152ff.; for the speeches of Muṣṭafā Kāmil, see Abī al-Ra’yān al-Rāfi‘ī, Muṣṭafā Kāmil, Bā’ith al-ḥaraka al-waṭaniyya, Cairo, 1939.
Egypt does not seem absolutely won over to the Arab League or to the Arab movement, and has often stressed its Pharaonic heritage. \(^1\) \(\text{Wataniyya, in the usage of the Panarabs, would probably be reserved either to sentimental attachment to one's homeland - much in the old sense of } \text{hubb al-waṭan min al-Imān} \(^3\) - or to regional nationalism, \(^4\) and very often only as an adjective as in mashrūb waṭani or aqmishā waṭaniyya.\) The conception

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1. Proof, this book by al-Ḥuṣrī, Ārā' wa aḥḍāth fi'l-qaumīyya al-ṣarābiyya, the main purpose of which is to argue that Egyptians are Arab. Besides the address on al-qaumīyya al-ṣarābiyya given in Cairo, the book contains refutations of some Egyptian writers who argued against Egypt taking part in an Arab movement.


3. Rifaʿa Rāfīʿ al-Taḥṭāwī defines the notion of hubb al-waṭan as follows: "Hubb al-waṭan min al-Imān. It is the nature of the freeborn to yearn to their waṭāns (birthplace); the birthplace of a man is always loved, his place of origin is familiar and desirable; that, where you live, claims the respect due to a birthplace just as your mother may claim her due for having sustained you. ... Even though Cairo has bestowed her benefits on me and raised me above my peers in knowledge ... and I cherish it greatly, having received its benefits and lived forty years in it, I still yearn for my particular waṭan, am always on the look-out for its happy news, and will not hold anything equal to Taḥṭa ..." Quoted by Ābd al-Laṭṭif Ḥamza, op. cit. vol. I, pp. 140-1. This is the traditional approach in Arabic literature as may be seen from an extract from al-Jāḥid's Asas al-balāgha, given in al-Manār, XVII (1333/April 1915) pp. 230-6. Al-Taḥṭāwī uses some of al-Jāḥid's expressions.

4. It is in this sense that Sāṭīf al-Ḥuṣrī uses it, Ārā' wa aḥḍāth fi'l-qaumīyya al-ṣarābiyya, pp. 65-66; see also Heyworth-Dunne, Religious and Political Trends in Modern Egypt, pp. 64-5, where he mentions a similar distinction that Ḥasan al-Banna makes between waṭaniyya and qaumīyya and lists the different kinds of waṭaniyya and qaumīyya that al-Banna defines.
of qaumiyya, therefore, starts from the assumption that there exists a nation (umma). As the writers who use the term are mainly exponents of the Panarab movement, then their main assumption is that there is an Arab Nation. The efforts to prove the existence of such a nation and to define the term Arab and Nation are so profuse in present Arabic publications, that it is difficult to decide what passages to choose for the sake of illustration and which to leave out. It would perhaps be least confusing to choose further illustrations from the books dealt with so far.

Qaumiyya implies a predetermined scheme of things and requires conformity. It is not within the choice of a person to be Arab in the "social" sense that Sāṭī al-Ḥuṣrī gives to the word. "Some people asked me," he writes, "you say that every person who belongs to one of these peoples of the qādār is an Arab, but suppose he does not wish to be an Arab? suppose he does not acknowledge himself as an Arab? that

1. But the sophisticated Charles Malik sees a problem: "The word 'Arab'," he writes, "denote neither a race nor a religion. For the most part its connotation today is 'Arabic-speaking'. The overwhelming majority of the Arabic-speaking peoples (or Arabs) are Moslem, just as the overwhelming majority of Moslems are non-Arab; so that the two terms do not coincide. Although there are vast diversities of culture among them, the Arabs have certain general traits in common. They also have common aspirations. Whether all Arabic-speaking peoples constitute a single nation depends first on the meaning of the term 'constitute' and second on the 'Arab' adaptation of the European concept of 'nation'. All this of course is independent of the question whether they should constitute a nation." "The Near East: the Search for Truth", in Foreign Affairs, January 1952, p. 232.

2. Nicola Ziyāda, "Recent Arabic Literature on Arabism", in Middle East Journal, Autumn 1952, pp. 468-473, gives some idea of the amount of literature which is being brought out on this subject.
he does not care for Arabism (‘urūba), but despises it? How can we consider him an Arab in such a case? Is it not better to say: The Arab is he who desires to be an Arab? or at least should we not make this desire one of the conditions of being an Arab?

"As for myself, before I answer these questions, I want to change the discussion from the question of Arab nationhood (qaumiyya) generally, to that of Egyptian nationality (jinsiyya) in particular. And I ask myself: Do we when we attempt, for instance, to define this Egyptian nationality demand those conditions and ask those questions?

"And does it occur to any of us to say: A person is not considered an Egyptian unless he himself wants to be Egyptian, unless he acknowledges that he is such, and is attached to his Egyptian nationality?

"You all know that the son of the Egyptian is considered Egyptian whether he likes it or not, whether he cherishes his Egyptian nationality or not. He is an Egyptian by custom and law. But if he does not know or does not acknowledge it, that may be because he is ignorant and needs instruction; because he is unaware and needs to be wakened up, or because he is a traitor and deserves to be punished.

"It is the same with Arab nationhood (qaumiyya). Every Arabic-speaking people is an Arab people, and every one who belongs to one of the Arab peoples is an Arab... But should he not know that himself... or should be not cherish Arabism (al-‘urūba)... then we must find out the reasons that make him adopt such a stand."
"It may be due to ignorance, in which case it is our duty to teach him the truth . . . or it may be due to unawareness or credulity, and we must awaken him and direct him to the right path. And if it is due to excessive selfishness, then we must try to put a stop to his selfishness. But in any case, whatever the reason, we may not say: "He is not an Arab, since he does not want to be an Arab, or because he is ashamed of Arabism."

... He is an Arab whether he desires it or not, whether he recognises the fact in the present or not ... he is an Arab ... ignorant or unaware ... ungrateful or treacherous. But he is in any case an Arab: an Arab who has lost his consciousness and his feelings, and probably has at the same time lost his conscience."

This is a view directly opposed to that expressed by Muhammad `Abdu. A man's real feeling towards his nation does not depend on the manner in which his rights are safeguarded and his security protected within the nation; this feeling is decreed, predetermined and inevitable. Al-Husri introduced the idea of treason in its widest implications. Not to feel that one belongs to the "Arab nation" is a treason, and should be treated

1. Sāti' al-Ḥusri, Ārā' wa ẓādīth fi'l-qaumiyya al-ārabiyya, pp. 44-5. Note how al-Ḥusri uses here the "legal" argument which he rejected above, to prove his point. The founder of Nādi al-ittibād al-ārabi, Club of Arab Unity, in Baghdad, comments on a præviso in the statute of the Club, founded in 1943, pledging the Club to oppose iqlimiyya, as follows: "As Iraq is made up of many minorities, and as some of these minorities are not inclined to join the Arab Union which Iraq, both government and people, desire, it is our duty to combat this trend which is contrary to the general principles of Arabism," Jalāl al-Urfali, op. cit., vol. I, p. 316, n. I.
as such. Sāmi Shawkat indicated how to deal with such traitors by complete and systematic liquidation.

Another step in the transition can be understood by examining the definition that Ahmad Luṭfi al-Sayyid, a liberal nationalist, gives of the word Egyptian. His definition differs from Muhammad 'Abdu's general tone by being secular but it is still not as organic as al-Ḥuṣri's theory and does not prohibit dissent in the same way as al-Ḥuṣri's does; it is much more in agreement with the legal criterion of nationality. "One of our great thinkers was asked..."; Luṭfi al-Sayyid writes, "What is an Egyptian? He answered: The Egyptian is he who knows no other wātan besides Egypt. But he who has two wātans, who lives in Egypt and takes for himself another wātan for safety's sake, he is far from being an Egyptian in the full sense of the word.

"The Salaf [Great Ancestors] used to say that the land of Islam is the wātan of all the Muslims. This is an imperialism rule the application of which serves every nation which intends to enlarge its possessions and to increase its influence every day over its neighbouring countries. It is a rule which fits easily with the designs of the strong element which conquers a country in the name of religion, and which wants to endow all the members of its empire in the conquered lands, with all the national rights, so that the different races in the many conquered countries are united and do not forsake their allegiance, and become discontented with the higher authority, and look forward to the enjoyment of independence and self-government. But now that the Eastern countries have become the target of Western imperialism, and their own
imperialist ambitions have been arrested, they are on the defensive rather than the offensive, and they only seek to preserve their identity and the existence of their national being. Independence becomes therefore the ambition of every Eastern nation.

"So that now, conditions being what they are, this rule cannot exist because it is not compatible with the actual conditions of the Muslim nations and their ambitions. There is no other alternative but that it should be replaced by the one faith which agrees with the ambition of every Eastern nation that has a defined waṭan. And that faith is the faith of nationalism (waṭaniyya).

"We must therefore decide that the Egyptians are the original people of this Egyptian land in addition to every Ottoman who has lived in Egypt as a resident, and who has adopted it as his waṭan exclusive of other Ottoman watans. This faith is not new, but has been the doctrine of Egyptian law for a long time."¹

It may be that the word for nationalism has become qaumiyya rather than waṭaniyya because of the change in influence which has come over the Middle East. The Egyptian nationalists who were, at the turn of the century, the most active intellectually, had all come under French influence, and under the spell of the French Revolution; they had mostly received their education in France or England, under the liberal and positivist

¹. Ahmad Luṭfi al-Sayyid, Ta’ammulat, pp. 68-69; from the article "Al-Miṣriyya", which first appeared in al-Jarida of January 16, 1913.
influence of the sociologists; such were Tāḥa Ḥusayn, Mānṣūr
Fahmi, Sālāma Mūsā, Saʿd Zāghlūl and even Muṣṭafā Kamīl himself.
But the intellectual influences to which the Middle East was
being subjected gradually changed as the nineteenth century was
changing into the twentieth. The older liberalism, based on
utilitarian and positivist philosophy, which one generation of
thinkers had imbibed from Europe came gradually to be replaced
by a subjective and romantic creed the chief feature of which
was: a belief in the sacredness of the national personality
and in the necessity for its self-realisation. It is this last
variety of Western philosophy that is still exercising its
sway over the intellectual leaders of the Arab world today.
There are perhaps one or two reasons why this change in attitude
did not first manifest itself in Egypt but in the countries that
used to form Turkey in Asia. There is no national problem in
Egypt, for it is a reasonably homogeneous country. The case
is otherwise with the Fertile Crescent; and the very hetero-
genosity of the area may explain the extremes to which nationa-
list doctrines have run there; professions of exasperated
nationalism wax most furious in mixed and border regions.
Another reason may perhaps lie in the disturbed political con-
ditions of the Ottoman Empire towards the end of ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd's
reign and afterwards, when the Young Turks acquired power.
Clandestine associations, plots, assassinations, none of these
things lead to moderation in political thinking.\footnote{Qaumiyā}

\footnote{It may be that the extravagances of Balkan, and especially
of Macedonian and Armenian nationalisms infected the Young
Turks with their spirit, and that the influence passed from them to the Arabs.}
makes a deeper impression. It implies that qaum is bigger, better and holier than the sum of its components. It has therefore a "mystical" hold over the individual. The individual loses himself mystically in the qaum, as in the passage of al-Huṣri where he gives a definition of liberty, or in the following passage from Charles Malik: "Those things dominate the Arab mind in general: independence and unity. There is a deep-seated mystical element in both of these feelings. The only analogous situation I can think of is the radical sense of unity and independence which determined the history of German peoples in recent decades. Independence springs from the Arab sense that has been sharpened in recent centuries by the relative isolation of the Arabs from the rest of the world. Unity takes on many modalities: from the mild form of general community and consultation enshrined in the Arab League to the extreme form of complete political unification desired by certain nationalist movements, partly in Iraq and Syria. But regardless of its modality every Arab feels an immediate mystical unity with every other Arab. The elaboration of the ultimate causes and the real structure, limitation and promise of these two creative Arab persuasions is one of the most fascinating philosophical-cultural tasks to be undertaken by the loving and understanding mind."¹

¹. Charles Malik, loc. cit., p. 240.
Such is the character of the most powerful trend of modern Muslim-Arab political thought. Its derivation from both local and European antecedents has been explored. The gropings of al-Kawākibi can now be appreciated, and his place as a pioneer of Arab nationalism can be clearly seen. His work constitutes a direct and important link between Western doctrines, Islam and Arab nationalism. His reactions and interpretations are representative of his age, and his borrowings show that the modern doctrine of Arab nationalism is not incompatible with Muslim-Arab political thought and experience.

Ahmed Sakka, in his useful thesis, *De la Souveraineté dans le Droit Public Musulman Sunnite*¹, argues cogently that the rights of the individual are supreme in the Sunna. The power of the caliph is, in principle, not absolute, since absolute power belongs only to God. All temporal power on the other hand, restricts the liberty and independence of the individual, attributes bestowed on him by God. In consequence the power of the ruler, which restricts individual freedom, must itself be restricted to the aims of tutelage and protection only. Moderation, kindness, temperateness are incumbent on the ruler. He must be just and must follow strictly the prescriptions laid down in the Qur'ān. Only thus does his power remain valid, and his edict command obedience. The ruler of the Faithful who follows the dictates of the Sunna is entitled to the obedience of the Faithful. The subjects obey because it is in their own interest to do so and because God ordains that they should, since the commands of the ruler are merely executive

prescriptions based on the divine Law. It is thus that obedience is grounded and justified in the Sunna. This justification of government may develop in two opposite directions. On the one hand, the doctrine of obedience to the just ruler may lead to a system of checks and balances designed to test the rectitude of the ruler and to correct him when he errs. It may, on the other hand, lead to an attitude of completely passive obedience. This is what had happened in Islam. Passive obedience is in turn justified on two grounds. The criterion by which a ruler is held to rule justly or not is that of the Canon Law which only the 'Ulama can authoritatively interpret and apply. In the second place, even if the 'Ulama decide that a ruler is unjust, it is not open to the Faithful to rebel. Rebellion may lead to anarchy and anarchy is worse than tyranny, for it might disrupt the unity of Islam. In practice then, all reaction against government has been most of the time discouraged in Islam, and established order or the exercise of effective power has always elicited the loyalty of Muslim religious leaders. Passive obedience became the rule in both ecclesiastical and popular attitudes. When the impact of the West was felt, an effort had to be made to come to terms with Western modes of thought. As a result Sāti Al-Ḥuṣri and his successors have made Hegel and his system natural denizens in Arab-Muslim thought. Sāti Al-Ḥuṣri requires the individual to lose himself within his own community. This requirement is

new in Islam, but it has one thing at least in common with the orthodox Muslim approach, and that is the demand for unlimited, implicit obedience. Whatever the reason given to justify it, whether to attain a higher mode of being, or to maintain the unity of the Faithful, the difference in practice is nil. Another feature of the modern doctrine which fits in with the Muslim past is the emphasis which both of them lay on communal solidarity, discipline and cooperation. The umma in Islam is a solidary entity, and its foremost duty is to answer the call of the Jihād. Although Sakka does not touch on this feature of Islam, it is nonetheless a well-known one. And it brings us to the third feature which both modern and ancient systems have in common, to wit, the glorification of one's own group. The traditional attitude of the Muslims to the outside world is one of superiority, and the distinction between Dār al-Ḥarb, Dār al-İslām and the intermediate one of Dār al-Ṣuḥāb, is an ever present one in the mind of the Muslim jurists. It may therefore be said of this modern doctrine of extreme nationalism that although it introduces features which may not accord with the strict orthodoxy, it is the least incompatible perhaps of European doctrines with the political thought and political experience of Sunni Islam.
Appendix

A Note on Islam and Nationalism. 1

The often quoted condemnations of nationalism by Shaikh Muṣṭafa al-Marāghi and other Azharites, have, for too long now, held the field as the authoritative expression of Muslim theology on this question. The impression given in some Western books on Islam, is that the division between the pious Muslims and the Arab or other nationalists is clear-cut, and that nationalism, being an importation from the West, is in complete opposition to Islam, because the materialist nature of nationalism must always make it alien to the universal spirit of Islam. This belief is deceptive. It cannot, of course, be denied that nationalism in the Middle East developed in the nineteenth century, directly following Western example. One must however enquire how far these imported views can be and are actually reconciled with the past history and experience of Islam. And, in fact, the argument which justifies such a belief — namely, that nationalism is material, but Islam is spiritual, therefore Islam and nationalism are contradictory — is not as decisive at it might seem at first sight. For arguments, also derived from the nature of Islam, have been adduced to justify diametrically opposite conclusions. W. Cantwell Smith, in a stimulating essay on Turkey, points out that modern Turkey

2. See notably, M. Colombe, L'évolution de l'Egypt, 1924-
is not a-religious as is commonly believed, but that it is staunchly Muslim. Turkish Islam, Turks hold, is different from traditional Islam in the same way as Anglicanism is different from Roman Catholicism. The Turks maintain that this is none-theless Islam, freed from the deadhand of ignorant and medieval Ulema.

The Turkish argument is based mainly on a reinterpretation of the history of Islam and the Arabs. The interpretation which is now favoured both by Arab and by many Western writers, is that Islam was at its golden period at the time of the Prophet and the early Caliphs, and that, declining ever since, it reached its nadir of corruption and decadence under Ottoman rule. As Cantwell Smith points out, the Turks question this interpretation vehemently, and regard themselves rather as the saviours of religion and the true keepers of Islam. They saved Islam from the Arabs who could not preserve it, and managed to maintain its unity for some centuries. The break-up of the empire, so they argue, was speeded up by the rôle that the Arabs played in the First World War. It is on this interpretation that the Turks base their contention to be still loyal to Islam, and to have preserved its heritage.

An argument on similar lines is advanced by the Arab nationalists. It is similar to the Turkish argument because it also builds its claims on a particular interpretation of history. The Arab nationalists deny the allegation that Arab nationalism is an un-Islamic movement just as the Turks deny that their national movement has no place for Islam. The best expression so far of the Arab nationalist's view of his position towards Islam is that of 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Bazzāz who concludes
that "Arab nationalism which is devoid of the spirit of Islam is like a body without a soul". The little pamphlet, *al-Islām wa'l-qaumiyya al-‘arabiyya*, Baghdad, 1952, from the preface of which this quotation is taken, contains the text of an address given in January 1952 to Nādi al-Ba‘th al-‘arabi of Baghdad. The author studied in London and taught at a college in Baghdad. While in London, he was active both in a students' society, *al-jam‘iyya al-‘arabiyya*, which he helped to organise, and in *al-jam‘iyya al-islāmiyya* which consisted mainly of Indian Muslims. In Baghdad in 1939, he was a member of *Jam‘iyat al-jawwāl al-‘arabi*, which was banned in 1941 together with Nādi al-Muthanna.¹

The author was then interned and was in three different camps during the War years. These details the author himself gives in the short preface to explain his personal reasons for choosing such a topic for his address. Active both in Panarab and in Muslim organisations, he was often criticised for his illogical behaviour, people always telling him that these two activities could not be compatible with one another. His argument is not altogether new, and the question has been touched on previously by personalities such as ‘Abd al-Rahmān ‘Azzām and Sāti‘ al-Ḥuṣari. R. Montagne translates an article of ‘Abd al-Rahmān ‘Azzām published in 1932², which may be compared to this address. But the importance of this pamphlet lies in its approach to the subject, self-assured and free from all apologetics. The argument had not before been presented so clearly, so logically and so completely. It also shows the essential features of the movement: pride in the Arab past, pre-Islamic as

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¹ On Nādi al-Muthanna, see Oriente Moderno, 1936-1941, index Circolo.
well as Islamic, and an assertion of the indivisibility of Islam and Arabism. The translation follows.

**Islam and Arab Nationalism**

**Introductory**

Before I begin, I had better explain the significance of the title of this talk and limit its scope somewhat, because the title's unqualified generality might give the impression that I wish to examine thoroughly and in detail the "principles of Islam" and the "National Idea". This, however important, cannot be treated in one lecture, but deserves rather a special study. All I aim at this evening is to define the relation of Arab nationalism in so far as it is a "belief and a movement" to the Islamic Sharī'a in so far as it is "a religion, a civilisation and a philosophy of life"; in other words, my talk will try to elucidate the answer to an important question, which, I suspect, has often occurred to Arab intellectuals, and which has often confused them. The question is: Is it possible for one of us to be a loyal nationalist and a sincere Muslim, at one and the same time? Is there a fundamental contradiction between Arab nationalism in its precise scientific sense, and true Muslim feeling? And does the acceptance of the one entail the rejection of the other? ... Allow me to simplify the question a little and to say: Does a contradiction and opposition lie in our saying 'This man is a nationalist Muslim' or 'This man is a Muslim nationalist', as when we say 'This man is an atheist believer' or 'He is a religious atheist', or
when we join opposites as 'This man is a communist fascist' or 'He is a democratic dictator'? Or, if we wanted, to use the terms of the Ancients, is there in our saying 'This is a nationalist Muslim' an incompatibility such as exists in saying 'This is a Jabari Qadari', or 'He is a Shi‘ite Kharijite'?

**The reasons of the contradiction**

I think that the apparent contradiction between Islam and Arab nationalism which is still present in the minds of many people is, in the first place, due to misunderstanding, misrepresentation and misinterpretation, involving both Islam and Arab nationalism.

**The misunderstanding**

The misunderstanding of Islam is due to the wrong significance attributed to the word 'religion'. We are influenced here - as a result of the intellectual imperialism under which a group of us still labour - by the Western concepts which restrict religion within narrow limits which do not extend beyond worship, ritual and the spiritual beliefs, which govern a man in his behaviour and in relation to his God, and to his brother man, in his capacity of an individual independent of society. Islam does not admit this narrow view of religion, and opposes it and the purpose it serves, to the utmost. Many people still believe that Islam is similar to Christianity or Buddhism, and consists in devotional beliefs and exercises, ethical rules and no more. But, in fact, Islam, in its precise sense, is a social order, a philosophy of life, a system of economic principles, a rule of government, in addition to its
being a religious creed in the narrow Western sense. Some of
the Western thinkers have come to realise the wide difference
between the comprehensive nature of Islam, and the limited
nature of Christianity; Christianity pays more attention to
the individual as such, and to his spiritual purity, than to
the individual as part of a whole and to his relation to this
whole. This was inevitable because of the difference in the
nature of the two religions, their circumstances, and the
periods in which they were revealed. Christ was a member of the
Israelite society which, under the authority of the Roman state,
was devoid of any active share in the existing political organi-
sation. But the Prophet - Peace be on Him - was a leader and
a statesman, as much as he was a social reformer and a religious
teacher. Bertrand Russell, the contemporary philosopher, is
one of those Western thinkers who have realised the difference
between the two religions. He referred to it in his book
Education and the Social Order. He considers Islam a political
religion or socially directed religion, which pervades the life
of the individual and the society completely, and he considers,
on the other hand, Christianity and Buddhism the religions of
"individuals" or non-political religions. Those who still
consider Islam and understand it in a restricted sense, and
derive its significance from that of Christianity, make a
glaring mistake in the appreciation of its nature. Since Islam
is a political religion as Russell says, it does not therefore
necessarily contradict Arab nationalism, unless their political
aims differ, but this is unthinkable as we shall see later.

Just as Islam has been misunderstood, so has Arab nationalism.
The reason for this may be that some think that nationalism can
only be built upon racial appeal or racial chauvinism, and would therefore be contrary to the universal nature of Islam. The exaggeration of some nationalists has undoubtedly been one of the important reasons for this misunderstanding; and no doubt what some Umayyād governors, princes and wālis have done in their enthusiastic tribal chauvinism and their racial propaganda, was contrary to the nature of Islam. But the Arab nationalism in which we believe, and for which we call, is based, as our national pact stipulates, not on racial appeal but on linguistic, historical, cultural and spiritual ties and fundamental vital interests. In this respect too, there is no contradiction between Arab nationalism and Islam. Many young people have greatly misunderstood Arab nationalism. They know something of the history of the West, of its national revivals, and have found there obvious signs of contradiction between Christianity and these national movements; this is of course natural in Western societies. The Church which used to claim great spiritual power over all the Christians, looked askance on all political movements which aimed at shaking off ecclesiastical authority. In other words, European society gave allegiance to two fundamental authorities, the spiritual authority of the Pope and the temporal authority of the Emperor. This dualism - although it has come to us in some stages of our slow social evolution - is not known in true Islam where it is not admitted. On the contrary, the unity of creed has led to the unity of life, and the unity of life has made the caliph of the Muslims, the leader in prayer, the leader of the army, and the political head at the same time. The opposition of German or Italian
nationalism to Christianity, for instance, does not therefore necessarily mean that Arab nationalism should be opposed to Islam. It befits us to remember here the great difference between the relation of Christianity to the West, and the relation of Islam to the Arabs. Christianity is a religion introduced to the West. It arose out of the spirituality of the East, and is in complete opposition to the nature of the Teutonic tribes in Germany and the Celtic in France; that is why the German or the French nationalist finds great difficulty in reconciling it with the elements of the nationality which he cherishes, and realises that Christianity has not found it possible to penetrate to the roots of Germanic and Celtic life. The opposite is the case with Islam and its influence over Arab society and the Arab nation, as we shall explain in some measure.

The misrepresentation

By misrepresentation I mean that surprising and imaginary picture by which many thinkers and writers, both Muslim and others, have represented Islam, in the past and in the present. They made Islam lose its content, and its vitality which pervades every aspect of life, and they have gradually transformed it into abstract general principles and ideals, having but the faintest relation to actual life. Some writers have also made an effort to break the tie between Islam and Arab life which allowed Islam its first and most generous scope. This misrepresentation increased when some historians and men of letters intentionally presented the history of the Arab nation in a misleading way; and, for a variety of reasons - with which this lecture cannot deal - the non-Arab Muslims, many of whom
were shuʿubis who envied the Arabs their honourable achievement in the cause of Islam, strove to present the history of the Arab nation in a false light. A number of Arab historians, such as Ibn Khaldūn, have themselves slipped; he called the Arabs by many an iniquitous name, and has committed injustice against them in many of his conclusions, and in many cases he only meant the Beḍuins, not the settled Arabs as Sāṭiʿ al-Ḥuşrī has pointed out in his valuable study of the Prolegomena of Ibn Khaldūn. It is natural that political events should have played their part in the elaboration of this mistaken view; when the political power of the Arabs waned, and the non-Arabs penetrated into the administration and the government, they inclined to belittle the rôle of the Arabs, and to give the picture of Islam a cosmopolitan character, and to suppress its connexion with the Arabs as much as possible. Many of the Ḥabbūsid princes and ministers of the period exaggerated in this respect just as some of the Umayyād rulers had exaggerated in the opposite direction. I do not want to review here the history of the Ḥabbūsid state to show the influence of the foreigners and of the clients from the time when propaganda for it started, until it appeared as a power on the stage of life, and to the time when it perished. And I do not want to talk long about the petty Dynasties, most of whom were non-Arab, and their influence on the spirit of Shuʿubiyya. Moreover the fact that most of the Arabs remained under the Ottoman government for many centuries has helped very much to spread the mistaken view that Arab nationalism and Islam are in contradiction, because the awakening of any national feeling
would expose the Ottoman caliphate to danger in its very foundations. That is also why the only Arab country which did not obey completely the rule of the Ottomans, and was always the scene of revolts which inflicted serious losses on the Turks was the Yaman, the bulk of whose people were Zaidis who believe that the caliphate belongs to Quraish, and in Quraish to the Hashemite house and within that house to the descendants of Zaid ibn ‘Ali, and that the Ottoman caliphate was illegal, as it contradicted the absolute principles of Islam itself.

The misinterpretation.

By misinterpretation, I mean, in the first place, the misinterpretation of some Qur’anic verses relating to the preaching of Islam. Although Islam is a universal religion suitable for all peoples, and has, in fact, been disseminated among many nations and races, it also is undoubtedly, a religion revealed first to the Arabs themselves; in this sense, it is their own special religion. The Prophet is from them, the Qur’ān is in their language; Islam retained many of their previous customs, adopting and polishing the best of them. In expressing this opinion, we are not speaking out of an uncontrollable national feeling, nor from emotion, nor do we speak heedlessly, but we base ourselves on the wisdom of the Qur’ān itself, on the true Laws of the Prophet, and on the actions of the early caliphs of Islam who represent it best. It is these which represent true Islam, not the false and obscure concepts which have become gradually common in the Islamic world, and which the Muslims have followed as the power of the foreigners grew and they became the leaders in both the political and
the intellectual sphere. The Qur'ānic verses which support this view are many, but I select the following from them: In sūrat Ibrāhīm verse 4, it says "We have never sent a messenger save with the language of his people"; The Arab messenger then has been sent to his people in their own Arabic tongue; sūrat al-Zakhraţ verse 24, "It is indeed a reminder for you and for your people and you shall be questioned", only means that the Qur'ān is a reminder for the Prophet and for his people, the Arabs, who will be responsible if they transgress it. In sūrat al-Baqara verse 143, "We have thus made you a middle nation that you may witness against mankind and that the Prophet may witness against you"; there is no doubt that it is the Prophet's people who are being addressed; verse 2 of sūrat Yūsuf is in the same sense, "We have revealed it an Arabic Qur'ān that you may be wise". Those who are to understand are none other than those who know the sense of the Qur'ān and understand it, and naturally they are the Arabs. Verse 58 of sūrat al-Dukhkhān is also to the same effect: "We have made it easy in thy language only that they be warned"; and verse 2 of sūrat al-Jum'a, "He it is who sent to the unlettered a Messenger from among themselves to recite to them the Scriptures and Wisdom ..."; also verse 128 of sūrat al-Tauba, "There has come to you a Messenger, one of yourselves, to whom all that you have suffered is important"; and verse 66 of sūrat al-Anfām "Your people have denied it, but it is the truth". These gracious verses and many others, both Meccan and Medinese,

1. Verse 44 is meant.
confirm that Islam is the religion of the Arabs before it is a universal religion. This does not contradict other verses, such as verse 107 of surat al-Anbiya', "We have sent thee only in mercy for mankind", because it is proved historically that the sending of the Prophet to the Arabs, revived the Arab nation in its entirety and resurrected it. This resurrection was, at the time, beneficial to all the inhabited universe. The Arabs were the propagators of Islam and the saviours of the world, from the reigning oppression, and from the absolute ignorance which was then supreme, and they were, as Gustave Le Bon said, the most merciful conquerors that the world has known.

There is more to support this view in the Tradition. Al-Bukhārī and Muslim report Ibn 'Umar quoting from the Prophet as saying: "Power will remain in Quraish so long as two of them still exist". There is also the Tradition "The imāms are from Quraish", and the Tradition attributed to Salmān al-Fārisi; he said: "The Prophet said to me: 'O Salmān, do not hate me and part with your religion', I said: 'O Prophet of God, how can I hate you seeing that it is through you that God directed us?' He said: 'If you hate the Arabs, you hate me.'" The actions of the Muslims of the early period confirm indeed the Arab nature of Islam. The caliph 'Umar hesitated greatly before conquering the parts outside the Arabian Peninsula and the Fertile Crescent; he agreed to accept a double amount of the zakāt from the famous Arab Christian tribe when they refused to pay the Jizya which they considered a sign of humiliation, and many of the Christian tribes took part and helped in the conquests. Moreover the Muslims accepted the Jizya from the
followers of other religions among other races outside the Arab Peninsula, but, in the Peninsula itself, they gave them the choice between Islam or evacuation. It appears from all this that the Arabs and their country have a special place in Islam. An indication of the favoured position given to the Arabs in Islam and Islamic jurisprudence may be gathered from the fact that some jurists have gone so far as to discuss whether, other things being equal, a foreigner was good enough to take an Arab woman in marriage. I can state that many principles which have become part of Islam are ancient Arab customs which Islam polished, and to which it gave a new stamp. The respect paid to the Ka'ba and the pilgrimage thereto are old Arab customs; such is the case also with many of the devotional practices and rules of the pilgrimage. Another proof of the Arab character of Islam lies in the veneration for Friday, which the Arabs used to call "The Day of Arabism", and, as the Tradition mentions, in setting it aside as a day of festivity and rejoicing. Many Arab concepts survive in the laws of inheritance and obligation, especially in the provisions giving the kin-group a claim on the inheritance and in the attention given to the claims of kinship.

We may also include under the heading misinterpretation that unjust description of the condition of the Arabs at the time of the Prophet's birth and of his message. The biographers and their followers are, to a great extent, responsible for this. They thought that the more they dwelt on the bad conditions of the Arabs before Islam, the more they would exalt the greatness of the Prophet - Peace be on Him. What is why they left
no iniquity, or licence, disorder, tyranny or cruelty, but they imputed it to the Arabs. And the worst of all this was that they imagined the condition of all the Arabs, at all times, to have been the same as their condition at the time of the Prophet's Message - Peace be on Him - and as though the Arabs did not previously have states and civilisations, as though they did not have a language or a poetry or a literature or concepts of life. I cannot in this lecture answer all the allegations which contradict the Qur'an itself, but I refer all those who are interested in this question to the valuable book of Muhammad Izzat Darwaza, The Times of the Prophet and his Environment before the Message. Basing himself on the Qur'an, he gives a true description of that age; he attacks the Shu'ubiyya and the Orientalists who have followed its tradition, and he puts the matter straight again. The correct scientific explanation of the emergence of the Arabs in the first period of Islam is that it was one of the waves out of the Arabian Peninsula, although it was the most venerable of these waves and the most illustrious in the history of the Arabs themselves and in the history of the whole of mankind. There is no contradiction at all between our sincere Muslim feeling and our holding precious the ancient Arab civilisation of the Yemen such as the civilisation of the Ma'inites, the Himyarites, and the Sabaeans, or the civilisation of the Amalekites and of the Nabataeans, and the Arab civilisations which preceded these, the civilisations of the Assyrians and of the Babylonians. Islam abandoned only what was bad in our customs and what was false in our laws and tradition. Islam
holds - as the noble Ḥadīth has it - that men are metals like gold and silver, those among them who were the best in the Jahiliyya remain the best in Islam. It would not have been possible for the Arabs to achieve such a revival and accomplish such tremendous actions, in war, politics, legislation, literature, art, sociology and the other aspects of life, in such a short time, if their metal had not been pure, and their abilities latent in them from long ago, their nature creative and their spirit strong and true. It is not easy that there should shine in such a nation, in one or two generations, men like Abu Bakr, ʿUmar, ʿAli, ʿAbd ʿAbbās, Saʿd, Khālid, ʿAbd ʿAbbās, Abu Durr, and ʿAbd ʿUd, or women like Khādīja, Fāṭima, ʿĀʾisha, Asmaʾ, al-Khansāʾ, and many other men and women of genius of that age, if the Arabs had not inherited an ancient and continuous civilisation, and if they had not been prepared by their instinct to create and build and renovate. The fact that the Prophet Muḥammad was Arab was not a matter of chance; a genius, he belonged to a nation of great abilities and qualities. But the ancient shuʿūbis — as ʿAbd al-Latīf Shararāt said in his book The Spirit of Arabism — have solved this problem by depriving the Arabs of all quality and by refusing to recognise any beneficient action of them in the affairs of humanity; they confined their interest, their consideration and their appreciation to the Prophet in a forced manner and separated him from others before him, and from his contemporaries and his compatriots, and converted him into a universal being, abstracted from his land and climate, freed from his history and people, and pictured him as a prosperous plant
growing in an empty desert, no one having helped him, and himself not indebted to anyone's help. Consequently, they pretend that there is no sense in talking of Muhammad as an Arab or a foreigner.

If we leave history aside and if we examine the language and the literature, we find that the Arabic Language had reached, before Islam, a degree of progress, and literature, a degree of maturity impossible to find in a primitive and artless community... The Orientalist Noeldeke says: "We may be surprised by the richness of the ancient Arabic vocabulary when we remember how simple was the business of Arab life", and he goes on to say: "Arabic is not only rich in its vocabulary, but also in its grammar and conjugations." A language is the mirror of the intellectual life of a people, and the measure of the progress of a society. It is a sign of the advance of Arab society that Arabic had attained this degree of comprehensiveness and of complexity; and indeed the Qur'an witnesses to the greatness of the Arabs in the arts of speech and in their appreciation of fluency and eloquence. This only obtains in a society which is intellectually advanced; that is why nomadism which was prevalent among the Arabs was not a sign of primitiveness, as nomadism would be in other nations. The Arab, even the beduin, is the resultant of old civilisations; the roughness and the discomfort of his external life has been imposed on him by nature. His mentality, qualities and literature reveal great social progress.
The position of the Arabs in Islam.

It is clear from all this that the Arabs are the backbone of Islam. They were the first to be addressed in the verses of Revelation; they were the Muhajirun and the Ansar; their swords conquered countries and lands, and on the whole, they are as ‘Umar has described them in a saying of his: "Do not attack the Arabs and humiliate them for they are the essence of Islam."

If we may take an instance from contemporary history, we can say that the position of the Arabs in Islam is like that of the Russians in the communist order, with the obvious difference between the spiritual appeal of Islam and the material principles of communism. Moreover, you have to remember that the Prophet of Islam was an Arab of the most respected Arab tribe, and that the constitution of Islam was revealed in a pure Arabic language, but that the preacher of communism was a German Jew, and the scriptures of communism Capital appeared in German. I cannot understand how the preachers of cosmopolitanism in this country can hold sacred the Russian homeland, and be proud of the ancestors of the Russians to whom they are not related, objecting all the time to the Muslim Arabs glorifying their own ancestors and exalting their own heroes.

After this clear exposition of the intellectual problems and the factors that contribute to the mistaken belief in a contradiction between Islam and Arab nationalism, it befits us to define the meaning of nationalism, and more particularly of Arab nationalism and of its assumptions, to look into these assumptions in order to see which are accepted by Islam and which, if any, are rejected.
Nationalism is a political and social idea which aims in
the first place, to unify each group of mankind, and to make it
obey one political order. The factors and assumptions of
nationalism are varied, and we do not intend to analyse them
in this lecture. But we can assert that modern nationalism is
based on language, history, literature, customs and qualities.
On the whole the ties which bind individuals together and make
them into a nation are both intellectual and material ties. If
we examine these assumptions carefully, and enquire into the
position of Islam towards each of them, we find a great simi­
liarity and sometimes a complete agreement between what Arab
nationalism teaches and what is affirmed by Islam. Language
then is the primary tenet of our national creed; it is the soul
of our Arab nation and the primary aspect of its life. The
nation which loses its language is destined to disappear and
perish. It is the good fortune of the Arabs that their lan­
guage is the language of Islam, and that the care for this
language is the language of Islam, and that the care for this
language is not only a national duty but also a religious one,
and the influence of Islam on its propagation and preservation
is very great. The German Orientalist Johann Rück says in his
book, Arabiya: Untersuchungen zur Arabischun sprach­und Stil­
geschichte: "No event in the history of the Arabs was as
important for their future destiny as the rise of Islam. In
that age, more than thirteen hundred years ago, when Muḥammad
recited the Qur'ān to his compatriots in a pure Arab tongue,
a strong connection was established between his language and
the new religion, and it boded great results for the future of
this language". Moreover, as we have explained above, the
Arabs had a glorious history before Islam, and their history is even more glorious and of greater moment after Islam; the Muslim Arab when he exalts his heroes partakes of two emotions, that of pious Muslim and that of proud nationalist. In fact, the most glorious pages of Muslim history are the pages of Arab Muslim history, as the Western historians themselves admit.

Lothrop Stoddard, author of The New World of Islam, has spoken to this effect, and Gustave Le Bon, author of The Civilisation of the Arabs, has made it explicit. Le Bon says: "One difference is apparent to us between the nations which were of great intelligence like the Arabs, and the degenerate nations like the Barbarians of the Middle Ages who destroyed the Roman state, and the ancestors of the Turks and Mongols whose flood engulfed the state of Muḥammad. The Arabs have created, from the beginning, after using the civilisations of the Greeks, the Romans and the Persians, a new civilisation superior to the civilisations which came before it. The brains of the barbarians were unable to understand the meaning of the civilisation which they conquered and they were merely imitative at the beginning. They did not develop it until their minds became polished and they came, long after, to understand its significance." This independent French thinker regretted that the Arabs had not conquered Europe and said: "If Muḥsa b. Nuṣair had been able to conquer Europe, he would have made it Muslim, and would have saved it from the darkness of the Middle Ages which, thanks to the Arabs, Spain did not know."

I wonder therefore if there is any contradiction with the Muslim creed in exalting this history or even pre-Islamic
history. There is nothing to prevent the sincere Muslim and loyal Arab from holding precious the brilliant pages of the history of the Arabs. Did not the Prophet - Peace be on Him - remember the Fudūl pact in which all the clans of Quraysh took part in pre-Islamic time in order to succour the oppressed and obtain his rights for him; he said: "How much it would please me to have taken an active part in a confederation I witnessed in the house of Ibn Judān. If I had been invited to it in Islam, I would have accepted."

As for Arabic literature which is the result of Arab feeling and emotion all through the ages, its greatest and most venerable parts came from Islam, and indeed the Qur'an itself, in addition to its being a book of direction, is the most awesome example of the elevated prose which the Arab, irrespective of his religion, exalts. How I wish the youth, especially, to read a small original book, Descriptive Technique in the Qur'an, by Sayyid Quṭb, to see the artistic beauty of the style of the Qur'an. Who can belittle the influence of the Qur'an in Arabic literature? As for pre-Islamic poetry, and especially descriptive and wisdom verse, there is, in most of it, nothing which contradicts the spirit of Islam. The fourth element in Arab nationalism consists of "the good Arab customs and qualities". Here, undoubtedly, there is similarity, not to say complete identity, between the ethical ideal of Arab nationalism and that prescribed by Islam. Let us take a verse from the noble Qur'an which defines righteousness - the most honoured of Muslim qualities - and let us see how much Arab nationalism admits it. "It is not righteousness that
you turn your faces to the East or to the West; he is righteous who believes in God and in the Last Day, in the Angels and in the Book and the Prophets, and spends for love of Him, on his kin, on the orphans, the poor and the wayfarers, on those who beg and for ransoming the captives, he who prays and pays the zakåt, keeps his word when he has given it; Those who are patient in misery and in afflictions, at the time of stress, these are the truthful and the Godfearing." Is there not in this noble verse a clear call for abnegation and sacrifice for the sake of others, who may be poor or enslaved and in need of help to regain their freedom. This verse also exhorts men to keep promises, to be patient in difficulties and calamities. And is chivalry, the sum of all Arab virtues, not the same as this? We do not pretend to say that all the pre-Islamic customs of the Arabs were good, but we maintain that Islam has confirmed all that was best in Arab character. In our national call for exalting the Arab character, we mean those polished virtues which elevate man and make of him a being worthy of the description "polite".

The characteristics of the national movement and the attitude of Islam towards it

Let us leave the Arab factors aside and examine nationalism as a political movement working to unite the Arabs, and to give them self-government. The national movement is "democratic", "socialist", "popular" and "cooperative". Islam although it did not lay down in detail the organisation of government, requires consultation, and does, without any doubt, accept completely the democratic organisation. Its
financial legislation and juristic principles, are, in essence, socialist. Sayyid Qutb has succeeded in explaining this in his book *Social Justice in Islam*. It is enough to remember something of the life of the Prophet and of the Caliphs, to realise the extent of the cooperative and the popular spirit of Islam. The position being such, the national government for which we call does not, in any way, contradict Islam.

**Arab nationalism and Panislamism**

But to say this is not to imply a call for Panislamism. To say that Islam does not contradict the Arab national spirit is one thing, and to make propaganda for Panislamism is another. Panislamism in its precise and true meaning aims at forming a comprehensive political organisation which all the Muslims must obey. This organisation, although it may be desired by all the pious Muslims, is not possible in practice, the reasons being many - geographical, political, social - or, at least, it is not possible under present conditions, even if we agreed to limit this union to the parts of the Muslim homeland which are contiguous. And even if we assumed that these parts could be united, then the unification of the parts which speak the same language, inherit the same literature and the same history, is more urgently needed, and more worthy of consideration; it is not natural to expect the union of Iraq with Iran, or Afghanistan for instance before Syria and Jordan are united. A view contrary to this is nonsense and deserves no answer. It follows therefore that the call to unite the Arabs - and this is the clearest and most important objective of Arab nationalism -
is the practical step which must precede the call for Panislam­
ism. It is strange however to find that some of those who call
themselves supporters of Panislamism in the Arab countries
are the most violent opponents of Panarabism. If they would
understand things as they are, and would appreciate matters
properly, if they did not follow mere emotion, they would admit
that their call is misplaced, until the first aim of the Arab
nationalists is fulfilled, namely the erection of a collective
organisation for the Arabs in Asia and Africa.

Summary

The conclusion is that no fundamental contradiction or
clear opposition exists between Arab nationalism and Islam.
The nearest analogy for the relation between them is that of
the general to the particular. If we wanted to represent that
relationship geometrically, we can imagine Islam and Arabism
as two circles, overlapping in the greater part of their sur-
face, and what remains outside the area common to the two
circles, is not in fundamental opposition to each other. This
is a truth which we must realise, and it befits the Arabs to
rejoice in this great good fortune, that their nationalism
does not contradict their religion; the Muslim Turk, for
instance, who wants to glory in his nationalism, finds an
insoluble difficulty in reconciling this sentiment with his
sincere religious feeling. His national feeling requires him
to be proud of his language and to purify it from other foreign
languages; this may drive him to belittle Arabic, which is the
flowing source from which Turkish language and literature
drew from the earliest days. And if he wants to exalt the
glorious actions and the heroes of the past, this will drive him in most cases to feel that the Muslim Arabs were strangers to him and that they were, in spite of external appearances, his real colonisers, mentally, spiritually and culturally; the nationalist Muslim Arab will not often encounter this kind of difficulty.

**Arab nationalism and the other Muslim peoples.**

I do not know whether it is necessary for me to say that our call for Arab nationalism and for a comprehensive Arab being, does not, under any circumstance, make us antagonistic to the non-Arab Muslims; for - as our national pact defines it - we consider the group of the Islamic peoples the nearest of all other groups to us; we see in this group a great force which we cherish, and we work to strengthen the ties with it and to cooperate with it. Our relation to the non-Arab Muslims who inhabit the Arab homeland is a brotherly one for they are the brothers of the Arabs; they have all the rights and all the duties of the Arabs. There is not in our nationalism a call to persecute any of the human races; there is no empty national arrogance nor blind racial chauvinism in it. When we take pride in our great actions and cherish our nationality, we want to inspire our nation to reach the place which it deserves among the peoples and the nations of the earth. This is a natural right, accepted by all religions, and recognised by the principles of justice. There is in it no feeling of superiority over others or a desire to oppress other races.
Arab nationalism and the non-Muslim Arabs

It also befits us to make it clear that there is nothing in this national call of ours which need exercise the non-Muslim among the Arabs, or diminish their rights as good compatriots. Chauvinism, in all its aspects and forms, is incompatible with the nature of the Arabs; the non-Muslim Arabs used to enjoy all their rights under the shadow of the Arab state from the earliest times, and the scope open to them was wide. The loyal nationalists among the Arab Christians realise this, and know that Islam and the civilisation which accompanied it are an indivisible part of our national heritage, and they must, as nationalists, cherish it as their brother Muslims cherish it.

Allow me, ladies and gentlemen, to conclude this lecture of mine by reading to you these selected passages, the meaning of which I hope you will consider seriously:

"True nationalism can, on no account, contradict true religion, because it is in essence no other than a spiritual movement whose aim is to resurrect the internal forces of the nation and to realise its spiritual and psychological abilities in order that the nation may do its share in the progress of the world and its civilisation.... It is therefore the duty of every Arab, whatever his sect or his community, to interest himself in his past culture and his new renaissance. This interest is the first duty enjoined on him by his nationality. He must come forward to study Islam and understand its true nature, and sanctify the memory of the great Prophet to whom Islam was revealed...."

Do you know from whom this quotation is taken? From an
Arab, a Christian, a cultured man; for these reasons his words constitute an authority for the nationalists, the Christians and the educated. These are the words of Quṣṭānīn Zuraq, the Dean of the Syrian University and one of the leaders of modern Arab nationalism.

I realise indeed that this talk of mine and tens of other better ones on this subject, will not be enough to dispel all the common myths and mistakes about the meaning of Arab nationalism and Islam, and will not succeed in removing all the illusions which assume the existence of contradictions between the two. What those harmful pictures and wrong explanations, what past centuries have left, cannot be erased nor effaced if we do not realise the three following matters;

First:— We must free ourselves from the intellectual power of the West, its important concepts, and we must think independently and with originality about our problems, affairs and history. We must abandon false standards in intellectual and social matters, because the difference of the borrowed concepts and the variation in the factors and conditions, will lead us to mistaken results and false judgments. We must become intellectually independent and consider things objectively; we must not borrow from the West, or when we do, we must borrow and reject after a careful examination and a full and complete comparison.

Second:— We must work earnestly and sincerely to present anew our nation's past, and to write our history in a correct scientific manner, to eradicate these distorted pictures and to put a stop to these iniquitous judgments, to tear those
black pages which the pens of prejudiced intriguers have drawn. We must, in other words, clear our history from the false accusations of the šu'ubiyas, and from the stupidities of the ignorant - I shall not call them historians -, and present our history as the living nations present theirs, and confirm the civilised values and the beneficent contributions in knowledge, art, literature, jurisprudence and in the other aspects of intellectual life, which we have given to mankind through the ages. Then will these distorted pictures and black phantoms which have clung to their minds, concerning their nation's history, be erased from the imagination of many of the young men and women of this generation. They will come to see how that history is as strong as strength can be, as clear as clarity itself, alive and full of rousing scenes, eternal heroisms, and full of general good.

Third:— Last but not least, we must look at Islam which we cherish so much and which we believe to be the reflection of the Arab soul and its spiritual source which does not exhaust itself, we must look at it as a whole, devoid of its communal and sectarian character, the Book of God and his Sunna flowing out of its clear and original sources, as our ancient ancestors used to understand it before some backward Muslims burdened it with what there remained in their subconscious of the influence of Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, of the Israelite traditions, of Roman and Greek sophistry. We must receive it straight from its clear Arab environment, not mixed in an imaginary international environment, and not weighed down by the chains of symbolic sufism or burdened by the deadhand of a petrified clergy.
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