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Prosopographical Approaches to the *Nasab* Tradition: a Study of Marriage and Concubinage in the Tribe of Muḥammad, 500-750 CE

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Abstract

This thesis will demonstrate how prosopographical methods can be used to provide a narrative of social change for the Quraysh tribe of Late Antiquity. By applying these methods to records of their marriage behaviour, it will be shown that the pre-Islamic Quraysh led a far more marginal existence than is widely thought, and that in the post-Islamic period they were surprisingly flexible with regard to their marriage practices and ideas on group membership.

The first three chapters focus on historiography and methodology. Chapter One introduces the methodological preliminaries that lie at the heart of this research; these concern the nature of the data, the manner in which it is extracted and the way it will be structured within databases. Issues regarding the quality and reliability of the marital records as preserved in the *nasab* (tr: genealogical) literary tradition are also discussed in this section. Chapter Two provides a historiography of the *nasab* tradition, paying particular attention to the nature of its emergence and the possible effects of social and cultural contexts on the quality of the marriage data. This provides the groundwork for Chapter Three which focuses more narrowly on the work from which most of our data are extracted – the *Nasab Quraysh* of al-Zubayrī (d. 851).

The remaining five chapters outline how the data within the *nasab* tradition can be analysed and incorporated into existing secondary scholarship. Chapters Four and Five establish that the data show a rapid rise in concubinage at the same time as the Arab military conquests of the seventh century. This has implications for our current consensus on the nature of marriage and identity in the seventh and eighth centuries. Chapters Six to Eight investigate the marriages made by the Quraysh to Arab women in the sixth to eighth centuries, and will show how practice adapted to context.

To conclude, it will be argued that this investigation not only establishes the high quality of the marriage data as preserved in the *nasab* tradition, but also the enormous potential of prosopographical methods when applied to the study of early Islamic history.
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Beyond the confines of the academy, numerous family members have provided much needed backing. To my parents Maryam and Tony I owe my love of intellectual inquiry and language skills; to my in-laws David and Valerie I give thanks for their unceasing generosity and kindness. To Steph I give thanks for your no-nonsense feedback and enthusiasm for all things religious studies; to Dariush cheers for developing the software that will one day hopefully make this database management a lot easier.

Finally, my most heartfelt thanks go to Kirstie. This is not only for your love and support over so many years, but also for agreeing to marry a man who spends far too much time in the company of concubines.

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1 For those without time to read this thesis in its entirety, the answer is “increasingly.”
Notes on Citations and Transliterations

The Arabic transliteration in this thesis follows a modified version of the system advocated by the *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. Arabic nouns commonly found in the English language are not transliterated; e.g. caliph, harem, Mecca, Medina etc. Transliterated Arabic book titles have the first letter of the first word capitalised only unless this word is *kitāb* in which case it is the following word with the only capitalised initial letter.

The nature of the research means that there is a great deal of reliance placed on computer software, most of which has not been designed to handle Arabic grammatical conventions. This has led to a minor modification to standard transliteration, namely the ‘al-’ prefix in initial will in general be avoided. This is in order to make it easier for computer programs to quickly sort names into an alphabetical list. Occasionally this leads to minor inconsistencies when dealing with familiar characters; so Ibn al-Zubayr (the commonly used version of his name) is the son of Zubayr b. ‘Awwām. Additionally, most authors’ and caliphs’ names that begin with ‘al-’ will remain in this format as they are not being entered into the database (e.g. al-Ṭabarī, al-Balādhurī); again, this is because they are more familiar in this configuration and they are normally not subjected to database analysis.

Numbers from one to ten will be written out; numbers above this will be provided in numerical form. Exceptions to this are numbers as they appear in lists, and also when used to refer to generations; this is to account for the negative numbers that occasionally appear. Decimals will be given to two places. All dates are Common Era unless otherwise stated though ‘CE’ will be written after dates in instances where clarity is needed (for instance in a paragraph with a lot of other numbers).
References will be provided in full form in a footnote in the first instance, and afterwards consist of author surname followed by an abridged title and page reference. Encyclopaedia articles will take the form Name [or abridged name] of Encyclopaedia, s.v. ‘Title of Article’ (Name of Author); e.g. EQ, s.v. ‘Tribes and Clans’ (Ella LandauTasseron).

Best efforts have been made to render this work accessible to the non-Arabic reader. To this end, references to translations have been provided where available and plural forms of Arabic words are avoided where practicable.
Introduction

This thesis will demonstrate how prosopographical approaches can be used to turn the Arab genealogical literary tradition (Ar: *nasab*) into a social history of Muḥammad’s tribe for the period 500-750 CE. These approaches will primarily involve tracking the origins and statuses of the mothers of Qurashī tribespeople over time. Through this our study will confirm some elements of the existing historical narrative for the period while contesting others. The investigation will also tell us a great deal about the historiography of the *nasab* tradition in general, and the *Nasab Quraysh* of al-Zubayrī in particular.

In terms of concurrence, statistical analyses of our database will show that the first Muslims married fewer Qurashī women than the non-Muslims of their fathers’ generation, and instead turned to brides taken from a much wider geographical range. This correlates with elements of the traditional narrative such as the ostracisation of the early Muslims, their anti-tribal ideology and their conquest of the Arabian Peninsula. In the Umayyad era we see a further correlation between the results of our analysis and the traditional narratives; this is in the form of an increase in the numbers of children born to foreign slave women. The timing of this change matches exactly the period of the military conquests which brought with them an influx of captive women.

These concurrences are welcome because they tend to support the conclusion (arrived at separately, on the basis of internal evidence and anthropological parallels) that our methodology is a sound means of extracting, structuring and interpreting the data. This means that where we find divergences between the prosopography and the traditional narratives we must explain them convincingly.

One of the most significant of these divergences concerns the pre-Islamic Quraysh, whose marriage behaviour as revealed by quantitative analysis does not correlate with that of the Quraysh as they exist in many of our most familiar primary and secondary sources. It will
be shown that the marriages made by the Quraysh in this period are not characteristic of a tribe at the heart of a far-flung trading empire, or even that of a tribe that enjoyed eminence in the Ḥijāz; in fact, our analysis highlights the parochiality of the Quraysh as they existed before and during Muḥammad’s lifetime.

Additionally, the data also reveal that concubinage was enthusiastically taken up by all sections of the Quraysh as soon as slave women became available; this was not a gradual change in behaviour that only became prevalent in the ʿAbbāsid era (as argued in the primary sources and secondary literature). The data also go some way in showing that there is little evidence that the children of concubine unions were treated as being of lower status than their full-born siblings. Furthermore, it will be demonstrated that the Umayyad caliphs exhibited remarkable dynamism and creativity when it came to changing their marriage practices. Overall, it will repeatedly be shown that the prosopographical approach has the capacity to suggest a number of new avenues of inquiry unavailable to us had we relied solely on more traditional methodologies.

The structure of this research is shaped entirely by the nature of the sources. The Quraysh of the sixth to mid-eighth centuries have been chosen because the genealogical data available on this cohort in this time period enjoy a unique amount of detail – indeed, it will be argued that in terms of volume and nature these data are without comparison in all pre-modern human historiography. The Arabic historical sources record the names of approximately 3,000 Qurashīs of this period for whom we know the names of their fathers and at least the status of their mothers; no other society known to this researcher preserved this level of genealogical information in anything like the same fashion.

The choice of marriages – specifically child-bearing marriages – as our principal data category is also closely related to the nature of the sources. Genealogical memory can be very accurate and consistent in some respects, but it can also be highly divergent and contradictory in others. By drawing on anthropological studies of tribally organised societies we will show that there are good grounds for believing that the child-bearing
marriage data for this period fall into the accurate and consistent category of genealogical memory. This will be further supported by a study on the internal and external consistency of the *nasab* data itself.

Finally, the nature of the data has led us to use prosopography as the primary methodological school of approaches. While the genealogical marriage data are extensive and arguably very accurate in general terms, it does not mean that we can be sure that any individual record is true. The quantitative approaches familiar to prosopographers can overcome this problem as they mitigate the effects of small numbers of erroneous accounts. Prosopography is also useful because it can turn genealogy into a collection of individual choices (the decision to have children with a concubine rather than a wife, for example) which can then be studied in terms of different sub-groups and how these choices change over time. Through this we can understand how Qurashīs modified their marriage behaviour in response to the events of a particularly dramatic two and a half centuries of their history.

**Prosopography and early Islamic history**

Prosopography is taken here to mean the collective study of a group of historical actors. The methodological approaches of most concern in this thesis are those that employ quantitative analysis to uncover changes in the social structure of a status group.

The idea that these sorts of prosopographical techniques could be useful to historians of pre-modern Islam has over four decades of heritage. An early pioneer whose work led to

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3 There is another type of prosopography that uses statistics to a far lesser extent as it is interested in smaller groups of people for whom it goes into a much greater degree of detail. For discussion see Stone, “Prosopography.”
published output was Richard Bulliet who published “A Quantitative Approach to Medieval Muslim Biographical Dictionaries” in 1970; he followed this with the 1972 work *The Patricians of Nishapur* and then *Conversion to Islam in the Medieval Period*, published in 1979. In all cases he applied quantitative techniques to biographical dictionaries of medieval Islamic ʿulamā. Some of the conclusions he drew based on this data analysis were bold – perhaps too bold – but the influence of the works is undeniable.

The timing of the publication of these studies was in part related to the emergence of computers as research tools, but Bulliet’s work was also part of a wider debate on how Islamic historical sources can be used in reconstructing Islamic social history. His starting point was that, although the content of the biographies of the Muslim scholarly class was not particularly good evidence for contemporary social practice in itself, the entries did contain small amounts of stable information such as marriage behaviour and genealogy. By mining this information, the resulting database could then be used to construct a social history of medieval Islamic societies. Like the work in this thesis, his research approach was shaped by the sources.

The methodologies used by Bulliet were not only of interest to social historians of the medieval era; those with interests in earlier times could also see the appeal of the quantitative approach. In 1980, Patricia Crone published her own prosopography of

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7 As can be seen in recent works looking in more detail at conversion in the Balkans (Evgeni Radashev, “The Spread of Islam in the Ottoman Balkans: Revisiting Bulliet’s Method on Religious Conversion,” *Archiv Orientalni* 78, no. 4 (2010): 368-384) and Spain (Alwyn Harrison, “Behind the Curve: Bulliet and Conversion to Islam in al-Andalus Revisited,” *Al-Masaq: Islam & the Medieval Mediterranean* 24, no. 1 (2012): 35-51). The appeal of computing as a means of handling the vast amounts of data preserved in the Islamic sources is a recurring one; for instance Lecker’s comments on how “Prosopographies and other computerized tools will reduce the time consumed by the arduous task of unearthing the relevant source material; all this could lead to a comeback of the primary sources.” (Michael Lecker, *People, Tribes and Society in Arabia Around the Time of Muhammad*, ed. Michael Lecker (Aldershot: Ashgate, s005), vii).
Umayyad and ʿAbbāsid governors in *Slaves on Horses*, declaring in the opening pages that “early Islamic history has to be almost *exclusively* prosopographical” (emphasis hers).\(^8\) Again, this declaration and the prosopographical study were shaped by the sources; in this case the governor lists which were extensive and (according to Crone) accurate, but limited in terms of what each individual piece of information could tell the historian. Crone’s use of prosopography was designed to turn this ‘shallow’ data into something more useable by giving it breadth.

In the background loomed larger but less successful projects. The 1960s saw the birth of the computerised (using punch cards) *Onomasticon Arabicum* which was based on the vast collection of biographical data that had been collected by Giuseppe Gabrieli and Leone Caetani in the first 14 years of the twentieth century. This project gathered pace in the 1970s, but constant changes to computing technologies (from the punch cards, to magnetic tapes, to Microsoft Access and to the website that exists today) along with the difficulties of getting early computer programmes to handle Arabic script has meant that the project has been perpetually beset by problems.\(^9\) We should also mention Charles Pellat’s “Peut-on connaître le taux de natalité au temps du Prophète? A la recherche d'une méthode” (published 1971) which was an ambitious but unconvincing attempt to calculate Prophetic-era birth rates using the *Nasab Quraysh* of al-Zubayrī.\(^10\)

But neither Bulliet’s work nor Crone’s *Slaves on Horses*, or even the *Onomasticon Arabicum* led to a glut of prosopographical works concerned with Late Antique\(^11\) or Early Medieval Islam. The *Onomasticon* ultimately yielded very little in terms of published

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\(^11\) For the purposes of this thesis the end point of Late Antiquity is taken to be 750 CE following Peter Brown, *The World of Late Antiquity, AD 150-750* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1971).
output; it serves as a cautionary tale for the prospective prosopographer when one considers the enormous amount of effort that it has consumed. At the same time, Crone’s own prosopographical work did not extend far beyond *Slaves on Horses*, and very few scholars have followed Bulliet’s lead and taken a long-term commitment to prosopographical or statistical methods for this historical period (in this category we can only really point to Michael Lecker). As for the successful use of these methodologies when occasionally deployed by established academics there are few other than Harald Motzki’s “The Role of non-Arab Converts in the Development of Early Islamic Law” and Fred Donner’s “Tribal Settlement in Basra During the First Century A.H.”

As for less well-known scholars, the only substantive works devoted to the prosopography of the Late Antique era have been published relatively recently; Fu’ad Jabali’s *The Companions of the Prophet: A Study of Geographical Distribution and Political Alignments* (from 2003) and Asad Ahmed’s *The Religious Elite of the Early Islamic Hijāz* (from 2011). Both are problematic in that they do not address the problems with the source material adequately and as a result arrive at conclusions unsupported by the evidence (this will be discussed in greater detail below); besides this, Ahmed’s work is not concerned with statistics. More convincing academic studies for the Late Antique period include Salih Said Agha’s *Revolution Which Toppled the Umayyads* (from 2003) and Michael Ebstein’s “Shurṭa Chiefs in Baṣra in the Umayyad Period: A Prosopographical Study” (from 2010). This latter paper drew on data gathered and structured by the Jerusalem Prosopography Project run by Michael Lecker, but sadly is

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12 Carl Petry and John Nawas have also done statistical work for pre-modern Islamic history but this is largely for the later Medieval period for which we have much better resources (particularly for Egypt). Indicative works of all these scholars are listed in the bibliography.
one of very few published works to have used this resource as a means for quantitative study.

The aspiring prosopographer therefore faces two problems. The first is that many scholars of pre-modern Islamic history are unfamiliar with quantitative or prosopographical approaches. This means that explanations and justifications cannot consist solely of references to other works and a brief synopsis in an introduction; they have to be handled in a detailed way throughout the investigation. The second problem is that there are very few established methodologies to build on. While the works of Bulliet et al. mentioned in the section above are undoubtedly prosopographical studies of pre-modern Islam, there is little of their methodology that can be directly borrowed and applied to other sources describing different categories of people. For similar reasons, prosopographical studies of non-Islamic cultures are also of limited use. The tools of this trade have to be fashioned en route; again, this requires careful explanation and justification at every stage.

In order for readers to be able to critically engage with the conclusions drawn from any novel research methods, the workings of these methods must first be shown and its tools fully understood. It is for these reasons that methodology and related issues account for almost half the word count of this thesis. While the conclusions drawn from this research on the subjects of marriage and identity are substantive, the methodology is at least as important; without detailing its underpinnings we are denying scholars the ability to easily replicate this research in the future.

**The sources of early Islamic history**

A convincing prosopographical methodology rests on the appropriateness of its source material and, as anyone with a degree of familiarity with the historiography of early Islamic history will know, this source material is very complicated. These issues have been discussed extensively in the secondary literature, but in essence the debate centres on what can be considered as primary evidence. Much of our extant historiographical data
are presented in a primary, or even a documentary fashion (e.g. eyewitness statements, participant accounts, letters and contracts) but not only was the bulk of this information preserved centuries after the events described, they also bear the marks of repeated retellings and reformulations.  

The scholarly responses to this are typically schematised as falling into two broad categories. On the one side, some historians of the early Islamic period have seen enough of the contradictions and anachronisms of the traditional historical narrative to convince themselves that none of the information contained within it can begin to be considered akin to a primary source. As a result, they have turned to non-narrative historical sources (principally archaeology, architecture, numismatics and papyrology) or narrative sources from outside the Islamic tradition for answers. Against this group are those who believe that the criticisms of the source material are over-stated; with experience and careful analysis, a scholar can discern the fabricated account from the one with a more solid historical basis.

This is of course a gross over-simplification as most credible work on Islamic history cannot be said to fall decisively in either one camp or the other. This thesis is a case in point. The author’s choice of a non-standard methodology is a result of his conviction that the source materials are deeply problematic and cannot be read in a straightforward fashion; at the same time, the data that form the prosopography is preserved in this very same source material. And while part of the argument for the high quality of this particular type of genealogical data is found in evidence from outside the traditional historical narratives (principally anthropological observation), another set of arguments comes from

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within (namely the high degree of internal correlation between the genealogies and the clear links between the trend analysis and the main events of the historical narrative).

Nonetheless, the scholarly caricatures remain useful because they provide a framework for inquiry, and as long as a scholar aims to please both camps then he or she does not have to worry whereabouts on the spectrum his or her research fits. In terms of this thesis, it is hoped that those who think criticism of the historical sources is over-stated will welcome it as a means of incorporating the under-studied and challenging genre of Arab genealogical literature into wider scholarship. On the other side, scholars of the sceptical persuasion will hopefully consider this work as an academic approach to early Islamic history that fully takes into account their concerns, and is analogous to the more familiar uses of non-narrative sources such as archaeology or numismatics.

Marriage and concubinage

The prosopographical methodologies and the genealogical data have been directed towards uncovering changing patterns of marriage amongst the Quraysh. This is thanks to the genealogies’ recording of maternal data which can then be turned into a study of marriage decisions.

The simplicity of the intent belies the difficulty in carrying out the investigation. The marriages of the Quraysh are scattered across dozens of works written in a variety of contexts and exhibiting varying degrees of consistency. As a result, this research has primarily used one source for data extraction – the *Nasab Quraysh* (tr: *Genealogy of the Quraysh*) of al-Zubayrī. By comparing it to some rival historical and genealogical works it will be shown that the *Nasab Quraysh* is the best possible candidate for this sort of data extraction; it is consistent, comprehensive and conveniently structured.

The next problem is one of dating. None of the historical works pay any particular attention to the dates of marriages, or the dates of the births of children (which could otherwise be used to indicate when a marriage was contracted). Other contextual data (such as death dates and battle participation) are of lower quality than genealogical data, and can only provide broad indications of when a person (or his parents) may have married. Because of this, marriages will instead be categorised according to the number of generations separating the husband from Quṣayy b. Kilāb – the person whom tradition reports as having instigated the unification of the Quraysh and their subsequent settlement at Mecca. Constructing a genealogical framework along these lines is made possible because all the Quraysh were (by definition) connected to him.

Using this generational organisation system, it will be shown that the origins of Qurashī wives change dramatically over the 250 years in question. In the generation prior to the revelation of Islam, the Quraysh predominantly took wives from other Quraysh; where they did not, the women came almost entirely from the tribes of the central Ḥijāz. But Muḥammad and his close companions behave very differently. The number of wives of Qurashī origin for this group is significantly lower and their place is taken by non-Qurashī Arab women from all over the Arabian Peninsula. Ultimately though, this did not become an established pattern of behaviour for all Muslims. Following Muḥammad’s death, the nature of Qurashī marriage changed once more – the Quraysh began eschewing Arab women in favour of foreign slave women. But at the same time as they were making more and more of these highly exogamous unions with slave women, at least one branch of the Quraysh (the Umayyad caliphs and their sons) were becoming increasingly endogamous by marrying their cousins with greater frequency.

These findings confirm some elements of the traditional narrative yet refute others. The rise in concubinage coincides with the conquests, which would have given the Quraysh access to large numbers of slave women. Here the prosopography and the traditional narrative concur. But where they diverge is in the timing of this change in marriage behaviour and also in the treatment of the slave women and their children by the Arab
elites. The traditional sources have so far been interpreted as saying the concubine was a widespread phenomenon of the ʿAbbāsid era and not the Umayyad; they also claim that Umayyad society treated the concubine and her child relatively poorly. Neither argument can be sustained in the light of our prosopographical analysis.

Similar divergence can be found in the pre-conquest marriage behaviour. The high degree of exogamy exhibited by the early Muslims relative to the non-Muslims of their fathers’ generation concurs with a number of elements of the traditional narrative such as the estrangement of the early Muslims from the rest of the Quraysh, the anti-tribal ideology of the *umma* and the conquest of the Arabian Peninsula. But the traditional historical narrative is not as good at explaining the marriage behaviour of the pre-Islamic Quraysh - most of these marriages took place with tribes situated within 200 miles of Mecca. The parochiality of the *jāhiliyya* Quraysh jars with the historical sources that say they enjoyed a pre-eminence recognised by all Arabs.

Data collection and analysis is a time-consuming business, meaning that there is a cost in terms of how long it is feasible to spend applying the findings to the narrative sources in a comprehensive fashion. This is felt particularly acutely in the time-frame of a PhD, especially since the early stages of data extraction consist of numerous false starts. Because of this, attempts at explaining the data trends and the conflicts with the narrative sources will be drawn predominantly from secondary studies as well as the most familiar traditional narrative sources. While a full-scale literature review based on these tentative conclusions is clearly desirable, this will have to be carried out in a future study. At this stage, it is hoped that enough argumentation has been provided to at least indicate future research directions.
Structure of the thesis

The eight chapters of this thesis have been grouped into two parts. The first part – consisting of Chapters One, Two and Three – is concerned with the methodology and the historiography of the source material. The framework for this has been built up largely *ex nihilo*; neither the source material nor the methodology have attracted a great deal of attention in modern scholarship so we must first patiently make the case that these are suitable bases for an academic study of this sort. The second part of the thesis – Chapters Four to Eight – makes use of the methodology to carry out investigations into the changing nature of Qurashī marriage as the tribe responded to the arrival of Islam and the upheavals of the conquest period. In these chapters, the data will be used as a springboard for a wider discussion of the impact these findings may have on existing scholarship.

Chapter One on methodology will begin by considering the claims for and against the accuracy of the *nasab* tradition with reference to anthropological studies and psychological research into the nature of memory. This is then followed by an explanation of the way in which the investigation will be carried out. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to the issue of comprehensiveness; the database at the heart of this research relies largely on the work of one author – the *Nasab Quraysh* of al-Zubayrī – and as such a case must be made that the conclusions drawn from the data analysis will not be overturned simply by including more sources.

While the chapter on methodology will establish that human societies can accurately remember their genealogies and that the *Nasab Quraysh* is our most comprehensive source for the period in question, the following two chapters will consider the degree to which al-Zubayrī’s work was shaped by the author’s context. A number of approaches will be taken. In Chapter Two, the *nasab* genre will be considered as a whole and particular attention will be paid to the different sub-genres of *nasab*. This will lead to some suggested reasons as to why the Arabs created this unique body of work where other tribal peoples did not. It will also consider the effects of politics and social circumstances
in shaping these works. Following this, Chapter Three will analyse the life and work of al-Zubayrī himself. Using our database and comparisons with other works it will be shown that the author’s context did indeed influence the contents and structure of the Nasab Quraysh, but that the alterations he makes are predictable and small-scale. The existence of these alterations should not therefore undermine our overall approach.

The fourth and fifth chapters will look at the rise in numbers of Qurashī children born to concubines. Chapter Four is centred on a number of analyses drawn from our database which are illustrated in both tabular and graphical form. It will be shown that there are almost no children born to concubines before the Islamic conquests but after this point they become increasingly common and by the middle of the Umayyad period they account for a third of all births. This finding has implications for prior narratives of the emergence of concubine-born children; it can no longer be assumed that they arrived gradually and were heavily discriminated against until the ʿAbbāsid caliphate had securely established itself. In Chapter Five we go further and consider what implications the rapid adoption of concubinage has for our understanding of the emergence of this practice in its normative Islamic form. It will be argued that the Islamic concubine and her child were quite unlike their pre-Islamic precursors and as such represent a unique cultural development.

The treatment of concubines in these chapters allows us to consider the marriages between Qurashī men and Arab women in terms of exogamy and endogamy. From the outset it will be apparent that these relationships are more complex than those between Arabs and slaves; defining a particular tribal relationship as ‘exogamous’ is deceptively challenging as people belong to various overlapping groups which change over time. In order to mitigate any confusion that may arise we will proceed at this stage by carefully laying out our databases for reader scrutiny. To this end, Chapter Six consists of three databases of marriage behaviour, each belonging to a single cohort: first the generation that came directly before the early Muslims; then the early Muslims; then the Umayyad caliphs and their sons. These tables will provide details on the multiple tribal affiliations of the non-
Qurashī wives in order to allow the reader to check the methodology and reformulate the data for their own uses if they so desire.

Chapter Seven will compare the marriages of the pre-Islamic cohort with that of the first Muslims. It will be shown that there are clear contrasts between the rates of endogamy and exogamy, and by analysing this from a geographic perspective we get a unique insight into the horizons of the world as they existed for the Quraysh in Late Antiquity. The first half of this chapter will aim to stay as close to the data as possible; the second section will be more discursive in that we add a layer of secondary sources to the genealogical data in order to suggest an alternative narrative of Islamic origins.

In Chapter Eight we will look at the changing nature of marriage in the post-conquest milieu. It will be shown that the Umayyad caliphs and their sons rapidly changed their marriage behaviour in line with the evolving nature of the Arab polity of the first century of Islam. Like the chapter that came before it, this chapter will also feature a more discursive second section where it will be suggested that some of the questions raised in Chapters Four and Five on concubinage can be resolved through a discussion of the evolution of the caliphal state’s structures as seen in terms of marriage.

The application of prosopographical approaches to early Islamic history can sometimes seem demanding. The sub-discipline of prosopography does not have established methodologies and even once these are developed the subsequent data gathering is timeconsuming. Despite this, it is hoped that the reader will conclude that the potential of prosopography – when carefully applied – far outweighs these costs. It is also hoped that this appeal should be universal. For the positivist historian there is the potential to analyse social change in a very obscure historical period; as for those more inclined to treat nasab as historiography, the quantitative approach can provide them with a means to manage the vast amount of information contained within these works. Ultimately, the aim of this thesis is to establish that just by counting certain words in certain books, we can read old sources in new and stimulating ways.
Part One - Data, methods and historiography

Chapter One: Methodology

Introduction

The methodology in this thesis is premised on the claim that the maternal and paternal genealogies of the Quraysh in the period 500-750 CE as recorded in the *nasab* tradition are largely accurate. Two elements of this can be queried. First, from a historical point of view, the problematic nature of our sources means that we cannot accept that any information category as dispersed and diverse as parental information should be considered as authentic without considerable argumentation in its favour. Second, from a prosopographical perspective, we would want to know what is meant by ‘largely accurate.’ In other words, can the data do what we are asking of them? Answering this question is the subject of this chapter and the two that follow.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first will lay out the current arguments for and against the accuracy of the Arab genealogical records. It will be shown that the current arguments for genealogical accuracy are not supported by a great deal of convincing evidence, and they certainly have not decisively rebutted those who argue that genealogy is not very different to myth-making. This is particularly problematic when we see that the genealogists themselves admit to lying.

But not all genealogical data are equal. While there is certainly a lot of scope for creativity in genealogical memory, at the same time there are certain rules that genealogists do not appear to break. It will be shown through reference to anthropological observations of genealogically-organised societies that memory of the more recent generations of ancestors is often accurate and stable; reasons for this will be found in studies of legal
psychology and scientific studies of memory. This will establish that we have a good basis for believing that the Arabs were capable of recording much of their genealogical history in a comprehensive and accurate fashion and that there are sufficient grounds for believing that maternal data recorded in the period 500-750 CE may be a usable dataset.

The second section of this chapter will demonstrate the process of extraction. This will include a translation of a typical passage of the *Nasab Quraysh* followed by a datasheet which will show how the information has been reformulated. The generational dating scheme will also be explained in greater detail.

The final section of the chapter will address the concern that the *Nasab Quraysh* is too narrow a source for us to claim it is representative of the Quraysh as they exist in all historiography. We will address this by taking a sample of the data from the *Nasab Quraysh* and comparing it to equivalent samples taken from outside historical and genealogical works. This will conclusively show that there is no better source for creating a database of Quraysh marriage than al-Zubayrî’s work.

**Section One: Accuracy of the kinship reports**

There are two types of data we are primarily concerned with in this thesis – paternal lineage and maternal origin. The former is important as it can be used to create cohorts – the descendants of a certain founder-figure for instance, or a particular generation of Qurashīs. This is especially useful for the many individuals for whom we have no other contextual data (e.g. offices held or geographical origins). The second type of data (the status or tribal affiliation of the mother) is important for the reasons outlined in the introduction, namely that by analysing them we can confirm or refute the hypothesis that the marriage behaviour as recorded in Arab historical literature can be used to elucidate socio-political changes amongst the Qurashī elites in Late Antiquity.
The main repository of this type of data is found within the *nasab* tradition. As the name implies, works in this tradition are ones that owe their internal structure to the genealogical links between their historical subjects. This provides us with the paternal lineage network data we require. In addition to this, many genealogists were interested in the marital connections between their subjects; this provides us with the marriage records.

Our first task is to establish a degree of confidence in the accuracy of these two types of data. This in itself is a challenge; arguments in favour of the accuracy of the *nasab* tradition are not particularly strong while the counter-arguments in both the primary and secondary sources are vigorous and in many cases compelling.

**The accuracy of *nasab* data: causes for concern**

Arguments in favour of the general accuracy of the genealogical tradition are limited both in terms of sophistication and number. One argument is given by Hoyland, where the corroboration of a 360 CE South Arabian king’s name preserved in epigraphic form with a name in the late eighth/early ninth century *nasab* work of Ibn al-Kalbī constitutes a “stunning” extent of recollection.\(^{20}\) But the problem here is that one link – or even a few links – between Ibn al-Kalbī and the epigraphy cannot be used as a sound argument that all the records of Ibn al-Kalbī are remotely representative of Arabian genealogy. After all, although Ibn al-Kalbī’s book on the religions of pre-Islamic Arabia (the *Kitāb al-Aṣnām*) does find some corroboration in the epigraphy and archaeology of the period it purports to describe, it fails to mention the most significant deities of the jāhiliyya. As Robin puts it, “[Ibn al-Kalbī] is more concerned with providing details of the idols mentioned in the Qurʾān or tradition rather than researching first-hand information.”\(^{21}\)


\(^{21}\) *EQ*, s.v. “South Arabia, Religions in Pre-Islamic” (Christian Robin); Gerald Hawting, *The Idea of Idolatry and the Emergence of Islam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 111-139.
Similarly, Ibn al-Kalbī’s king lists of Aksum have little correlation with what is known from the epigraphic sources. The same could easily be true of his genealogical work; pace Hoyland, a single piece of epigraphic evidence is not enough to conclude otherwise.

Even Asad Ahmed – who in his Religious Elite uses the nasab sources to a greater extent than almost any other modern scholar – has worryingly little to say about the accuracy of the genealogical data with the issue of forgery is limited to just two pages in the introduction. Even here, one of the arguments is not as secure as Ahmed thinks it is.

Matters are not much improved when we consider prosopographical approaches more widely; for instance the basis of Crone’s argument for the accuracy of governor lists in Slaves on Horses is also surprisingly weak given their centrality to this work. In this instance, her case rests on the observation that two obscure government figures and a general appear in both Muslim and non-Muslim sources. Based on this, she argues that the governor lists enjoy “unshakeable, surprising and impressive agreement” in the nontraditional historical sources.

If prosopography based on data extracted from the nasab tradition wants to be taken as the basis for a serious academic study, we first need to provide better evidence for trusting

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22 Retsö, Arabs in Antiquity: Their History From the Assyrians to the Umayyads (London; New York: Roudledge, 2003), 121.
24 Ahmed posits that the existence of names of individuals of whom we are specifically told produced no descendants and for whom there are no further records (called NFRs in genealogical literature) indicates that the records are accurate. This is because he can think of no reason for the invention of this information, hence “such records should probably be taken at face value” (The Religious Elite, 11, note 30). There is however a good reason why these records exist – they are evidence that the Quraysh were defending themselves against ‘false’ membership of their tribe. These NFRs are ‘prunings’ of the family tree, and it is impossible for anyone to say whether or not the stumps left behind are the results of a tradition preventing false claimants from grafting themselves onto the tree, or the result of genealogists removing those who actually had legitimate claims. While this thesis argues that Ahmed is in fact right, the lack of discussion of the sources in his work is a concern.
25 Crone, Slaves on Horses, 17. Even in this limited range of examples there is room for dispute; the identification of ’Amru b. Sa’d (as he appears in the 12th C Chronicle of Michael the Syrian) with ’Umayr b. Sa’d al-Anṣārī (who appears in al-Ṭabarī) needs more backing than the amount provided in Hagarism before we can agree with the authors that “there is little doubt” in the connection. Patricia Crone and Michael Cook, Hagarism: the Making of the Islamic World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 162, note 11.
the prosopographical data than has hitherto been provided. Most importantly, we need to address the widespread and long-standing concerns regarding the capacity for genealogists to fabricate lineages. Amidst an abundance of examples, we will refer here to the example of Alex Haley’s 1976 bestseller *Roots* on his genealogy as a descendant of North American plantation slaves.26

In *Roots*, Haley claimed that he had made contact with a West-African *griot* (a type of genealogist) who recalled the name of Haley’s ancestor who had been exported as a slave to the Americas in the eighteenth century. Later researchers established that Haley’s contact was not a *griot* at all, and even if he had been there is no evidence that *griots* retain any historically usable genealogy from before the nineteenth century.27 Haley was revealed to have prompted the local informant with the name of the ancestor, who in response incorporated the person into the genealogy. The importance of this story is not so much that Haley’s evident need to find an origin story got the better of his judgement, but the fact that he knowingly wrote *Roots* for a literate, investigative culture where there was a serious chance he would get caught and be publicly discredited.

Given this, it is unsurprising that anthropologists have repeatedly observed similar creative tendencies in the genealogists of non-literate tribally organised societies. Although genealogy is presented by these societies as the explanation for current inter- and intra-tribal relationships, it is often the other way round – when the nature of the relationships between competing groups changes, the genealogy changes accordingly. For instance, the creation myth of the Gonja kingdom of Northern Ghana in the early twentieth century involved a founder and his seven sons – the sons corresponding to the seven tribal divisions of the Gonja of the time. By 1960 however, two of the tribes had disappeared, and the creation myth accordingly mentioned only five sons.28

In addition to this, the names of ancestors can be used not just to explain tribal dynamics, but also to settle legal matters and to prevent conflicts escalating. An example of this latter case was observed amongst the Tiv people of Northern Nigeria where the elders of the village prevented their excitable young men from getting involved in a border dispute by saying “We will not fight the Uge nor will they come to fight us, for we are both sons of Ikor.” This calmed the younger men down, but upon later probing by the anthropologist it became clear that these men had no idea who Ikor was. Rather than ask the elders, they worked it out for themselves; Ikor must have been the father of Tiv and Uge, the two founder-figures of the respective peoples. Genealogy here is used as a third party agent, and instead of the elders telling their sons what to do (which could possibly have raised intergenerational conflict within the tribe) their commands are expressed in terms of ‘immutable’ genealogical networks. As a result, Tiv gained a brother and a father.

It is no surprise therefore to find that tribally organised Arabian societies subjected to anthropological investigation exhibit exactly the same characteristics when it comes to genealogical manipulation. Emrys Peters investigated the question of genealogy and tribal dynamics in great detail amongst the Bedouin of Cyrenaica and demonstrated that their genealogy was similarly flexible. This flexibility was necessary because of the tribes’ relationship with the environment; the land could only support a limited number of inhabitants, so if a tribe got too large it would have to break apart. Conversely, when there was a downward pressure on population growth (normally in the form of disease), one tribe tended to be affected disproportionately harder than its neighbours (this was due to the large geographical distances between the groups which checked the spread of infections). In these circumstances, the survivors of a depleted group would join another tribe, and their genealogy would be grafted accordingly. The tribes retained a surprising capacity to absorb new members (in one case an Italian man) who would begin by living in the same encampment, then be married into the tribe and eventually become fully integrated into the genealogy. The only barrier to joining a tribe seemed to be the capacity...

of the environment to support them; should the pressure on resources become too great the newest recruits would be the first to be jettisoned.\textsuperscript{30} The genealogies therefore had to be highly mutable in order to accommodate these changes.

The fact that the genealogists in the early Islamic period are frequently characterised as being dishonest is a good indication that they were operating in much the same manner as the genealogists observed by twentieth century anthropologists. Ibn al-Kalbī himself admits to lying in genealogical matters and the pressures that led him to do so,\textsuperscript{31} while his father claimed to have had a dream where the Prophet Muḥammad said he would go to hell if he kept on compiling genealogies he did not really know.\textsuperscript{32}

In the secondary scholarship, the critique of the reliability of the \textit{nasab} tradition has been led by Zoltan Szombathy who has argued that the genealogical tradition and the historical tradition are indistinguishable – both are examples of an “easily conceivable and flexible discourse adaptable to meet a multitude of social needs that arise in various groups.”\textsuperscript{33} The evidence he provides for this position is overwhelming, and – when combined with the anthropological findings above – we can say that the criticisms of genealogy as being a useable historical source cross temporal, geographic and societal boundaries.

\textsuperscript{31} From the \textit{Kitāb al-Aghānī}: “And Ibn al-Kalbī said: “The first lie I told in genealogy was this: Khālid b. Ṭabd Allāh asked me about his grandmother, Umm Kurayz. She was a slave woman (\textit{baghī}) of the Banū Asad who they called Zaynab. I told him she was Zaynab bt. ʿArʿara b. Jadhīma b. Naṣr b. Quʿayn. He was pleased with this and gave me gifts”” (al-Īṣbahānī, \textit{Kitāb al-Aghānī} (Cairo: Būlāq, 1867), 19:58). Goldziher translates \textit{baghī} as “ordinary prostitute,” which is indeed an alternative meaning of the word, but Ibn al-Kalbī’s fabrication of a lineage implies that the problem here was her deracination, not her vocation (\textit{Muslim Studies}, trans. C.R. Barber and S.M. Stern (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1966), 1:188).
\textsuperscript{32} Meir Kister and M. Plessner, “Notes on Casket’s Ġamharat An-\textit{nasab},” \textit{Oriens} 25/26 (1976), 53, referring to the manuscript \textit{Taʾbīr al-ru ḵa} of Ibn Qutayba (d. 889)
The accuracy of the *nasab* data: reasons to be optimistic

The idea that genealogists are generally dishonest is a widely held one (nowhere more so than in tribal societies themselves) but this idea has subtleties. If genealogy was constantly reformulated on the whim of whatever genealogist was tasked with recording it, the network of relationships it purported to describe would be completely meaningless. Genealogy is certainly a game, but the game has rules.  

The most significant of these rules is the point at which genealogical manipulation can take place; it is very rare to find manipulation taking place at the level of parents for example. In the case of the early Muslims there is Qurʾanic acknowledgement of fosterage (which is a way of changing one’s parents), which Muslims later argued meant it had been forbidden at an early stage. This passage is supported by a hadīth which states “whoever knowingly claims descent from some other than his father is an infidel.” The question of fosterage in early Islam is a complicated one, but we can at least say that the Muslims and non-Muslims of the period recognised that the issue of changing one’s parents was a serious matter.

As for generations beyond one’s parents, the anthropological evidence indicates that genealogies delivered by different informants drawn from tribally organised societies deliver consistent lineages going back three to five generations from the oldest generation of informants. Peters found this amongst the Bedouin of Cyrenaica; he recorded the genealogies of four tribes in extensive detail, and in each case it was at the fifth ascending  

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34 As Lecker puts it: “Genealogies are not correct or incorrect; genealogical claims reflect the situation at a certain point in time, or attempts to transform it.” Michael Lecker, “Tribes in pre- and early Islamic Arabia,” in People, Tribes and Society in Arabia Around the Time of Muhammad, ed. Michael Lecker (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), chapter 11, page 2.  
35 Q 33:4-5; though there are complications as to how this and the hadīth should be interpreted. See David Powers, *Muhammad is not the Father of Any of Your Men* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009) and discussion in Chapter Five below.  
generation that “arguments would flare up” between informants as to who should or should not be included. 38 His discovery was pre-empted by that of Musil’s anthropological work with the Rwāla Bedouins from the first part of the twentieth century, who at that time could comfortably recount the connections of their tribal group – this group constituting the descendants of a common great-grandfather. Beyond this third generation however matters become vague and debatable. 39 This “area of ambiguity” (as Peters termed it) was critically necessary for the survival of genealogy as an ideology of organization as it was here that tribal segments would manipulate the past in order to explain the present. Beyond this area of ambiguity, the genealogy would re-stabilise into a mutually agreed lineage going back to the founder figures that linked all the tribes. 40

The explanation for this contrast between contentious and non-contentious genealogies lies in the way the genealogies are learnt. Below a certain level of ancestry, the genealogical memory of a group consists of people whom the genealogist has actually met and in some cases lived alongside for extensive periods of time. In terms of the extent of this memory amongst the living it probably extends to the limits of the local tribal grouping, which varies in number but is normally between 100 and 150 names. 41 The limits of genealogical memory are therefore the limits of direct personal contact and

40 This is also discussed in William Lancaster, Rwala Bedouin Today, 24–22.
41 In a paper on Arabic genealogy, Kennedy argues for the upper limit for name memorisation amongst Arabs to be 110 names based on Von Oppenheim’s Die Beduinen, Leipzig, 1939, 1:154 (Kennedy, “From Oral Tradition to Written Record in Arabic Genealogy,” 541) while Peters observed that small residential groups of Bedouin numbered between 150 and 200 individuals (Peters, “Bedouins of Cyrenaica,” 32). The size of these groups may be biologically determined: Robin Dunbar has suggested that the optimum size for a human group is 147.8 members, a figure he generated by establishing a ratio of neocortex size to group size amongst primates (Robin Dunbar, “Co-evolution of Neocortex Size, Group Size and Language in Humans,” Behavioural and Brain Sciences 16, no.4 (1993): 681-735). He goes on to argue that human groups of around 150 members appear repeatedly in anthropological and historical studies of human societies.
knowledge of connections that go beyond groups of this size requires memory of ancestors in a distant past to which the living have no direct experience; this part of the genealogical memory is more malleable and is where the disputes happen.

The connection between genealogical memory and the way this memory is acquired reflects an important distinction between the ultimate sources of Arab genealogical literature and the rest of the Islamic historical corpus. In psychological terms, knowledge of relatives you have frequently met (i.e. your genealogical knowledge) falls into the category of ‘semantic memory’ which are memories not tied to a specific context; these include the name of a neighbouring tribe for instance, or the name of your grandfather.\textsuperscript{42} This sort of memory is highly stable and explains why anthropologists have observed so much agreement between their tribal informants as long as the subjects are asked about people they have been in contact with, rather than those they have only heard of.

The anecdotal historical literature\textsuperscript{43} on the other hand relies on ‘episodic memory’ – events and speeches remembered by contemporary informants and passed on to others. Experiments in the field of legal psychology have repeatedly shown the inability of humans to consistently recall events they have observed in controlled conditions, and humans have no capacity at all for remembering speech word-for-word following a single hearing.\textsuperscript{44} From the moment an event or speech has concluded, memory of it has the

\textsuperscript{42} See \textit{MIT Encyclopaedia of the Cognitivie Sciences}, s.v. “Episodic vs. Semantic Memory” (Endel Tulving).

\textsuperscript{43} This is often referred to as the \textit{akhbār} (from the plural of \textit{khabar}, meaning ‘report’ or ‘anecdote’) corpus and is distinct from the \textit{nasab} literature. The differences are discussed in greater detail below.

\textsuperscript{44} An insightful investigation of this is Ulric Neisser “John Dean’s Memory: a Case Study,” in \textit{Memory Observed: Remembering in Natural Contexts}, ed. Ulric Neisser (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1982), 102-115. This focuses on the testimony of John Dean, a counsel to President Richard Nixon and a prosecution witness in the Watergate trial. Dean began his testimony with the production of a 245 page statement describing dozens of meetings and reports of the conversations – all produced from memory. When challenged as to how he could perform these feats, he claimed that he had a good memory; he immersed himself in the press reporting of the events; and he also emphasised that meeting the President in the Oval Office was an uncommon and momentous occasion – one a staff-member would recall. He did not realise that some of these conversations were recorded however, and in the two instances when they could be compared there was almost no correlation between what he reported people as saying and the transcripts of the tapes. His descriptions of meetings read more like the descriptions of scenes in films, and almost none of the things he described the President as saying were actually said by
capacity to be bitterly contested and constantly reformulated (this has also been studied in controlled conditions)\textsuperscript{45} – which is exactly what we find in the traditional historical sources.

The comparison between memory types does not automatically mean that the \textit{nasab} literature is true just because it can be preserved as semantic memory; the \textit{nasab} works extend far further than five generations into the past and the authors must have relied on chains of informants rather than personal memories. But the point here is that humans can remember extended genealogical relationships, which means they can potentially preserve these for later generations by writing them down. Humans are therefore biologically capable of creating the \textit{nasab} tradition. This is in sharp contrast to the speeches and events that constitute the traditional historical narrative of early Islam, the preservation of which would require capacities for memorisation and observation that have never been performed by any non-savant individual. It is therefore biologically impossible for the vast majority of \textit{ḥadīth}s and \textit{khabar}s to be considered accurate reflections of past events in anything but the broadest of terms.\textsuperscript{46}

Despite his intense scepticism towards the \textit{nasab} tradition, Szombathy accepts this. He admits that genealogical knowledge up to 100 years before the time of Muḥammad is more reliable than the older material and that the closer relations of the Prophet are less “rudimentary, confused and fragmentary” in nature. His doubts with regard to the veracity of the \textit{nasab} tradition are directed at the ancient ancestral connections that purported to him. What is problematic is that despite this, in general thematic terms, everything he said was true – and Nixon was of course found guilty.

\textsuperscript{45} For an overview with case studies see Elizabeth Loftus, \textit{Eyewitness Testimony} (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996) particularly pages 3, 5-6, 59 and 63.

\textsuperscript{46} This, incidentally, is good evidence for the argument that the Qurʾān was preserved orally in its extant wording (though not structure) during the lifetime of Muḥammad. The fact that there are not a large number of divergent Qurʾāns today is an occurrence that could have only have resulted from it being preserved by people who went to great lengths to memorise what was revealed as it was revealed and periodically checked these memorised passages amongst each other and Muḥammad himself. Had they not done this, it is unlikely that the actions of the early caliphs could have prevented the Qurʾān turning into something that looked a lot more like the \textit{ḥadīth} corpus. That the Muslims of Muḥammad’s time went to these lengths also indicates that they appreciated that these words were not the same as their Prophet’s quotidian announcements but had a far greater significance.
bind together the Arab tribes, not the more recent generations or the close relations of Muḥammad.47

From oral to written: the preservation of the genealogy of the Quraysh

It is with a degree of confidence that we can say that Arabian tribes of the seventh century Ḥijāz recalled their near-term genealogy (i.e. going back three to five generations) with a similar degree of consistency as has been observed in tribally organised societies in the twentieth century. The question remains as to whether it is this knowledge that is recorded in the nasab works of the late eighth and early ninth centuries and not the products of the imagination of later genealogists.

At this point however we enter our own area of ambiguity. The reason for confidence in the accuracy of near-term genealogy as remembered by tribal societies is the consistency observed by anthropologists amongst multiple independent informants; this can only be the case if the genealogies were based on kinships that actually existed. Although we can demonstrate a degree of consistency amongst the different sources that constitute the nasab tradition, this certainty is not at the same level as that shown by the anthropologists. Many (if not most) of the personages featured in al-Zubayrī’s Nasab Quraysh or Ibn al-Kalbī’s Jamharat al-nasab do not appear in any other works, and in these instances we have no means of checking for consistency. In addition to this, where there is consistency we cannot always be sure that we are looking at independent informants because the sources of information frequently go uncredited; hence one work may be derived from the other, or both works could be derived from a common third source.

47 Zoltan Szombathy, The Roots of Arabic Genealogy: a Study in Historical Anthropology (Piliscsaba: The Avicenna Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, 2003), 42, 96. This is presumably why the works of neither al-Zubayrī nor Zubayr b. Bakkār (who both focus on the Quraysh tribe) appear in the bibliography of this book.
Other obvious means of corroborating the genealogical data are closed off to us. Al-Zubayrī provides us with almost no chains of transmission for the genealogical material in his work, and while Ibn al-Kalbī occasionally provides references to the use of tribal informants and archaeology to support his research, these references are unverifiable and are possibly a literary trope. Both men fall well outside the three to five generation span of genealogical memory for many of their subjects and - unlike the genealogists who appear in the anthropological literature - could not have met the vast majority of people they write about.

The nature of the link between the oral genealogical culture and the written nasab literature is therefore of critical importance, and we will return to this subject in the next chapter on historiography. Our primary concerns in this chapter are on methodology and specifically centre on the accuracy and usability of the Nasab Quraysh as a data source. It is to these themes that we now turn.

Section Two: Data extraction and database creation

Data extraction

The above has outlined that our current state of research is in a stalemate; there are good arguments to show that tribal peoples can preserve accurate genealogies, but also equally good arguments that show that those tasked with recording it often lie.

One way of resolving this impasse is by going deeper into the records and creating a database comprised of genealogical information whose accuracy is then tested against outside sources. This cross-checking is a theme that runs throughout the entire thesis; in this chapter these tests include checks on the consistency and comprehensiveness of the nasab literature while in later chapters it is the correlation between the trend analysis and

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the non-genealogical historical sources. But before this can begin, we must first introduce our principal source and the ways in which we intend to extract its data.

The database at the heart of this thesis consists of every reference to a child-bearing union carried out by a Qurashī man recorded in the *Nasab Quraysh*. The vast majority of these unions appear in passages like the following, which details the descendants of a distant relative of the Zubayrids. The translation is literal in order to give a flavour of the passage, words in parentheses are supplementary notes (when not italicised) or transliterations of the Arabic (when italicised). Punctuation and paragraph divisions are mine or derived from the critical edition:

And of the children of Zamʿa b. al-Aswad: ‘Abd Allāh al-Akbar (the older) b. Wahb b. Zamʿa, he was killed at the battle of Camel or the battle of Dār, and his mother (was): Bint Shayba b. Rabīʿa b. ‘Abd Shams.

And the descendants (*walad*) of ‘Abd Allāh al-Akbar b. Wahb b. Zamʿa died without issue (*inqaraḍa*), apart from girls; and his son Yazīd b. ‘Abd Allāh al-Akbar, he was killed in Africa, and his mother (was): Bint al-Ḥārith b. ‘Āmir b. Rabīʿa, of the Banu Firās.

And ‘Abd Allāh al-Aṣghar (the younger) b. Wahb b. Zamʿa, he was born to a concubine (*umm walad*), and there are many descendants of his. And his wife: Karīma bt. al-Miqdād b. ‘Amr al-Bahrānī, and her mother: Ḍubāʿa bt. Zubayr b. ‘Abd al-Muṭṭalib. She (Karīma) gave birth to al-Miqdād b. ‘Abd Allāh, he had no descendants, he was killed at the battle of Ḥīra, and Wahb b. ‘Abd Allāh, he had no descendants, he was killed at the battle of Ḥīra; and Yaʿqūb, and Abū al-Ḥārith, and Yazīd, and Zubayr, sons of ‘Abd Allāh al-Aṣghar b. Wahb.”

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49 Al-Zubayrī, *Nasab Quraysh*, 228.
The preliminary observation to be made here is the sheer quantity of information in such a small amount of space. There are references to battles, there is an NFR (a person with no further records), a concubine, a maternal lineage, naming patterns and the myriad of connections between the families of wives and husbands. To record every piece of this information over the 400-plus pages of the edited version of the book would represent an enormous undertaking; the limitation of the investigation to marriage data is hence a necessity.

Our first task in creating the database is therefore to record all the marriages that took place and provide a reference as to where these marriages are recorded. Concubines and wives are recorded separately as we have reasons to believe that these change by cohort and time period. The result looks like the following:

Table 1.1: First-stage data extraction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Wahb b. Zam‘a</th>
<th>‘Abd Allāh al-Akbar</th>
<th>‘Abd Allāh al-Asghar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of wives</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of concubines</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page reference</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This works well in this instance, but we have a potential problem. Although it is clear that there was one child-bearing union with one concubine in the example above, we frequently find in other entries that a list of children is given and their mothers are referred to simply as ‘concubines’ with no indication of the number of women that this could represent. We resolve this in two ways. First, whenever the plural of ‘concubine’ appears, it will be marked in its own column and this is taken to indicate ‘two concubines’ when we compile the data later on. ‘Two’ is the minimum number of women the term could refer to (we cannot be sure that the Arabic dual form is being consistently applied) as opposed to the maximum, which would be to say that there were as many concubine
women as there were children. This is important from a statistical perspective; as we are later going to try to prove the existence of an increasing number of concubines over time, it is best practice to take the option that is least likely to flatter our results.

The second way of resolving the issue is to record the number of children by each type of union. This has the added benefit of producing data that is focused on relationships that produced children, meaning we do not have to concern ourselves with marriages that were brief or those of men who were reported to have had large numbers of concubines but only produced children from a fraction of them. It is also the case that marriages that produce children are more likely to be accurately remembered (for the reasons discussed above) than unions that remain childless. Additionally, the gender of the children has been recorded as it requires little extra work in the inputting stage and may yield interesting results later on.

Expanding the table to take in these concerns results in the following:

Table 1.2: Advanced data extraction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Wahb b. Zam’a</th>
<th>ʿAbd Allāh al-Akbar</th>
<th>ʿAbd Allāh al-Asghar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of wives</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of sons born to free wives</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of daughters born to free wives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of concubines (singular)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of concubines (plural)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of sons born to concubines</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of daughters born to concubines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page ref.</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Generational structuring

There is one further task and that is to locate the men temporally. There are almost no dates at all in the *Nasab Quraysh* for either births or deaths, nor can this information be recovered from outside sources in the vast majority of cases. To resolve this issue we have taken the somewhat novel approach of organising individuals generationally.⁵⁰

All individuals for whom we have lineages will be assigned a number indicating the number of generations that separate them from the generation of Quṣayy (who is Generation 0). Muḥammad, for example, is Generation 5 (five generations after Quṣayy) while the putative founder of the Quraysh, Fihr b. Mālik, is Generation -6 (six generations before Quṣayy). The advantage of having a Generation 0 is that we can easily calculate genealogical separation by subtracting the earlier generation from the later; Muḥammad therefore comes eleven generations after Fihr.⁵¹ Of course, any generation could have been selected as our ‘zero’ generation, but Quṣayy is both widely known and convenient.⁵²

This generational structuring works surprisingly well in terms of consistency as the following example illustrates. The brothers Saʿd and Usāma, sons of ʿAbd Allāh b. Qays, were both killed at the battle of al-Ḥarra in 683.⁵³ These men were very distant and

---

⁵⁰ Somewhat similar generational approaches have been used by Caskel to structure his family tree diagrams (Werner Caskel, *Ǧamharat An-nasab: Das Genealogische Werk Des Hišam Ibn Muḥammad alKalbī* (Leiden: Brill, 1966)) and to a lesser extent by Bernheimer in her prosopography of the ʿAlid family (Teresa Bernheimer, “Genealogy, Marriage and the Drawing of Boundaries,” in *Sayyids and Sharifs in Muslim Societies: The Living Links to the Prophet*, ed. Kazuo Morimoto (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 75-91).

⁵¹ Generations are given as numbers rather than written out to make negative generations appear more clearly.

⁵² Muḥammad may seem a logical centre point for the genealogical ordering, but this would result in us having to refer to negative generations relatively frequently. This is an issue because it reduces clarity in instances when we are frequently referring to Generation -1 alongside Generation 1 (Muḥammad’s uncles alongside his daughters, for instance); the minus sign could be missed or confused with a hyphen.

⁵³ Al-Zubayrī, *Nasab Quraysh*, 436.
obscure\textsuperscript{54} relations of the main protagonists of the battle, Yazīd I and ʿAbd Allāh b. Zubayr, connected through Luʾayy b. Ghālib b. Fihr, of the fourth generation before Quṣayy. Despite this huge generational gap with their common ancestor, the brothers died as members of Generation 8 while Yazīd I and Ibn Zubayr were members of generations 7 and 6 respectively. This is a completely credible spread of generations to be involved in a single battle (the two men killed are not reported to have had children in the Nasab Quraysh so were presumably young), and it is another testament to the remarkable resilience of the genealogical tradition in that it could connect the four men to an ancestor living over 300 years before them\textsuperscript{55} with a consistent number of generational links. This is all the more surprising when we note that the ‘telescoping’ of genealogies (whereby they are shortened as members are forgotten) is a common feature of lineages as observed by anthropologists.\textsuperscript{56}

Another example demonstrating the working of the generational system uses Muḥammad and his Companions. The following table shows a selection of well-known early Muslims, the generation they appear in and the number of generations that separate them from their common ancestor with Muḥammad:

\begin{table}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{54} This means they do not appear in the index of the translation of al-Ṭabarī’s Taʾrīkh or the Jerusalem Prosopography Project database (accessed August 26, 2013, \url{http://micro5.mssc.huji.ac.il:81/JPP/v3/regTou.jsp}).

\textsuperscript{55} 30 years to a generation has been adopted as a rule of thumb in this thesis; this is based on a comprehensive recent study of how long a male generation lasts in a society living in largely pre-modern conditions (Shuichi Matsumura and Peter Forster, “Generation Time and Effective Population Size in Polar Eskimos,” \textit{Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences} 275, no. 1642 (2008): 1501–1508). Other scholars have taken different numbers of years for generational length; Ahmed uses 20 years which he takes from the entry for Ṭ-B-Q in Lane (\textit{The Religious Elite}, page 8, note18), and Bulliet uses 34 years which is the average number of years between a son’s death and that of his father in his database of Nishapurī scholars (\textit{Conversion to Islam}, 21). Interestingly, when Ibn Khaldūn was investigating the veracity of genealogical claims, he said that a credible number of generational links in a lineage was three per century which falls between the Matsumura and Forster estimate and that of Bulliet (Ibn Khaldūn, \textit{Mugaddima}, (Cairo: Dār Nahḍat, 1980), 2:547-548).

Table 1.3: Comparison of degrees of separation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>Degree of separation</th>
<th>Estimated years separation from common ancestor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ṭalḥa b. ʿUbayd Allāh</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zubayr b. ʿAwwām</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again, even though the common ancestor is in some cases many generations beyond the extent of genealogical memory as observed by anthropologists, there are no wild anomalies with regard to the generation the men appear in.

Using generations as our primary dating system in an investigation of social change in early Islam is unusual (though used in a broad sense in Bulliet’s *Conversion to Islam*) and as such may ultimately be found wanting as the research progresses. But at the present level of study it does not yet seem to have any serious shortcomings, and as the subject of this research is an investigation into social trends over the *longue durée*, the lack of dates may be a benefit as it forces us to think in a mindset less focused on a year-by-year chronology and more on generational changes.\(^{57}\)

Beyond this, it should also be noted that there is a degree of judgement required in inputting the data. Not all sections of the *Nasab Quraysh* are as straightforward as the one

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\(^{57}\) It also means we have to think in terms of groups rather than individuals, which should be welcomed as it is closer to the way the early Muslims understood themselves. This is evident in the language of the Constitution of Medina, as pointed out by Šaïd Arjomand in “The Constitution of Medina: A Sociolegal Interpretation of Muhammad’s Acts of Foundation of the “Umma”,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 41, no. 4 (2009): 566. Here it is clear that (with the exception of Muḥammad) the relevant legal entity is not the individual but the tribe.
given above; it is sometimes difficult to establish the gender of a child, or what the status of their mother was. In these cases a note has been made and the information excluded from the record. There are no absolutes in this sort of database creation, and another researcher asking the same questions will undoubtedly disagree with some of the decisions that have been made here. The database is in a sense an ‘edition’ of a work – one that is not absolute in its rightness or wrongness, but an interpretation that must be reworked and adapted as circumstances change.

Section Three: How representative is the Nasab Quraysh of the marriage relations of the Quraysh as recorded in the wider literature?

It is clear just from just a cursory reading of the Nasab Quraysh that it contains far more marriage information than other genealogical works but given how crucially important the issue of representativeness is we must give this issue more thought. If it turns out that we get different results when our methodology is applied to other sources of marriage information then the research here is not a true prosopography but instead a statistically-minded insight into historiography. This section will establish that there are no grounds for concern in this regard; it will also incorporate a cautionary tale for prosopographers who go too far, too fast.

The issue of representativeness will be addressed in two ways. The first is to establish how far al-Zubayrī’s genealogical interest ranged when compared to other historians; in other words, which named individuals can be found in the Nasab Quraysh that do not appear in other works and vice-versa. The second is to investigate more narrowly the marriages as recorded in other sources. In both cases (names and marriages) it will be shown that the Nasab Quraysh is the work best suited for our investigation, and that future research drawing data from other sources will most likely complement and support our conclusions rather than undermine them.
In terms of the first question, a sample of the Nasab Quraysh will be compared to outside sources in order to establish how representative it is of the historical corpus as a whole. The section selected will be that detailing the descendants Khalaf b. Wahb b. Khudhāfa of the Jumāḥ subdivision of the Quraysh. This descent group has been selected because the family is mostly uncontroversial; it did not become a significant religious or political scion in later eras (as with the ʿAlids or Umayyads) and, although they allied with some tribes against others in the course of their history, this is no different to any other family. There is no reason therefore to think that the biases of any of the authors selected for comparison would have a significant impact on how the genealogy appears in the sources.

The genealogical works selected for comparison will be the relevant sections of Ibn al-Kalbi’s Jamharat al-nasab and al-Balādhurī’s Ansāb al-ashrāf (the authors died in 819/21 and 892 respectively). These two works have been selected because they are from a relatively early era and it is easy to extract descent group data from them due to their genealogical structuring. There are of course many other works that could have been selected for comparison, but the list of potential candidates is extensive and all we are trying to establish here are some grounds for confidence in the approach. The results will be presented in the form of a table which will clearly illustrate the respective interests of each work in terms of which individuals appear as actors (i.e. not names that appear only as links in patrilines) within them.


59 Other works considered and rejected were Ibn Ḥazm’s Jamharat ansāb al-ʿArab (Abū Muḥammad ʿAlī Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat ansāb al-ʿArab, ed. E. Levi-Provencal (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif bi Miṣr, 1948)) and alSamʿānī’s Kitāb al-Ansāb (ʿAbd al-Karīm b. Ṭabīʿī al-Bakhtārī, ed. D.S. Margoliouth (Ledien; London: Brill, 1912)) as both are late works; Zubayr b. Bakkār’s Nasab Quraysh wa akhbārihā (Zubayr b. Bakkār, Nasab Quraysh wa akhbārihā, ed. Maḥmūd Muḥammad Shākir (Cairo: Maktabat Dār al-ʿUrubā, 1962)) as it is incomplete and derived from al-Zubayrī’s work; Ibn Saʿd’s al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubra (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1985) and al-Balādhurī’s Ansāb al-ashrāf as both are awkwardly structured and very long. Even a cursory look at these works will reveal the same point as made here – that the Nasab Quraysh is by far the most useable source of Qurashī marriage and genealogical data available to us. An extensive list of other genealogical works (again, mostly derivative or from later periods) is provided in Lecker, “Tribes in Pre- and Early Islamic Arabia,” 48, note 37, and also in the bibliography of this thesis.
The second investigation will be into marriage behaviour as recorded in the nongenealogical historical works. This would be an enormous undertaking as it requires us to create similar databases from all Arab historiography, so a short-cut will be proposed. This short-cut cross-checks the *Nasab Quraysh*’s marriage data with the marriage information as recorded in Asad Ahmed’s recently published *The Religious Elite*, a prosopographical work which draws from a wide range of historical sources (including the *Nasab Quraysh* and other genealogies) in order to detail the marriage behaviour of five prominent Qurashi families. This comparison will reveal a high degree of correlation between the *Nasab Quraysh* and the marriages recorded in this comprehensive modern source. All of this will establish that we have good grounds for believing that the marriage data in the *Nasab Quraysh* is representative of the data within Islamic historiographical tradition as a whole.

**Comparison of named individuals with the other Arabic sources**

The simpler part of this investigation is finding which names appear in the *Nasab Quraysh* that do not appear in the other sources. The base cohort for comparison is the group comprised of all named descendants of Khalaf b. Wahb in the relevant section of the *Nasab Quraysh* (pages 387-393 in the edited version). These appear in the first column of the table below. References to these names are then sought in the corresponding sections of the *Jamharat al-nasab* (pages 95-97) and the *Ansāb al-ashrāf* (volume 9, pages 6-15). The names are organised according to where they appear in the *Nasab Quraysh* and page numbers are provided referring to significant appearances. If there is no reference the space is left blank:

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60 These do not include names that appear solely as links in the patrilineal section of name.
Table 1.4: Appearances of Khalaf b. Wahb’s descendants in historical literature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>NQ</th>
<th>JN</th>
<th>AA (vol.9)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khalaf b. Wahb</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Amr b. Khalaf b. Wahab</td>
<td>387</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Āmir b. Khalaf b. Wahb</td>
<td>387</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harím b. Khalaf b. Wahb</td>
<td>387</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umayya b. Khalaf b. Wahb</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ubayy b. Khalaf b. Wahb</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wahb b. Khalaf b. Wahb</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalada b. Khalaf b. Wahb</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma’bad b. Khalaf b. Wahb</td>
<td>387</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabī’a b. Umayya b. Khalaf b. Wahb</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Şafwān b. Umayya b. Khalaf b. Wahb</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Şafwān b. Şafwān b. Umayya b. Khalaf b. Wahb</td>
<td>390</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khālid b. Şafwān b. Umayya b. Khalaf b. Wahb</td>
<td>390</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ḥakīm b. Şafwān b. Umayya b. Khalaf b. Wahb</td>
<td>390</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yahyā b. Ḥakīm b. Şafwān b. Umayya b. Khalaf b. Wahb</td>
<td>390</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Page No.</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ṣafwān b. Ṣafwān b. Ṣafwān b. Ṣafwān b. Umayya b. Khalaf b. Wahb</td>
<td>390</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mas'ūd b. Umayya b. Khalaf b. Wahb</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Āmir b. Mas'ūd b. Umayya b. Khalaf b. Wahb</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wahb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Umayr b. Wahb b. Khalaf b. Wahb</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>7, 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wahb b. 'Umayr b. Wahb b. Khalaf b. Wahb</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asīd b. Khalaf b. Wahb</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wahb b. Asīd b. Khalaf b. Wahb</td>
<td>392</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalada b. Asīd b. Khalaf b. Wahb</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taw'ama bt. Ubayy b. Khalaf b. Wahb</td>
<td>392</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Āmir b. Ubayy b. Khalaf b. Wahb</td>
<td>392</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wahb b. Ubayy b. Khalaf b. Wahb</td>
<td>392</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hind bt. Ubayy b. Khalaf b. Wahb</td>
<td>392</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ubayy b. Ubayy b. Khalaf b. Wahb</td>
<td>392</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalaf b. Ubayy b. Khalaf b. Wahb</td>
<td>392</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Ubayy b. Khalaf b. Wahb</td>
<td>392</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umayya b. Ubayy b. Khalaf b. Wahb</td>
<td>392</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Layth b. Ubayy b. Khalaf b. Wahb</td>
<td>392</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wahba bt. Ubayy b. Khalaf b. Wahb</td>
<td>392</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These data are then enumerated, and expressed in terms of numbers of appearances. This is detailed in the following table:

**Table 1.5: Where Khalaf b. Wahb’s descendants appear in select historical sources**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of work</th>
<th>NQ</th>
<th>JN</th>
<th>AA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of named individuals</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The *Nasab Quraysh* contains over twice as many individuals as the other works; it is clearly far more comprehensive in this regard.

**Names in outside works not in the *Nasab Quraysh***

Moving on to the second part of this first investigation we perform the reverse procedure - finding members of the descent group that appear in the *Jamharat al-nasab* and the *Ansāb al-ashrāf* that do not appear in the *Nasab Quraysh*. These are the following, along with their page references:

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61 The *Jamharat al-nasab* and *Ansāb al-ashrāf* entries for this individual have an extra link in the patrilines.
Table 1.6: Appearances of Khalaf b. Wahb’s descendants outside the *Nasab Quraysh*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th><em>JN</em></th>
<th><em>AA</em> (vol.9)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Juʿayd b. Umayya b. Khalaf b. Wahb</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>6, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Attāb b. Asīd</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muḥammad b. Ṣafwān b. 'Ubayd Allāh b. 'Abd Allāh b. Ubayy b. Khalaf b. Wahb</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By adding together the names found in all the sources, we find that the three works name 54 members of this descent group. We can then express the degree to which each work represents the total number of names from all three sources in the form of a percentage:

Table 1.7: Proportions of Khalaf b. Wahb’s descendants in select works

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of work</th>
<th>Number of individuals</th>
<th>Percentage of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>NQ</em></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>92.59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>JN</em></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>40.74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>AA</em></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>37.04%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although this sample is not large it confirms what is obvious to anyone who reads the *Nasab Quraysh* and compares it to that preserved in other works: there is a strong likelihood that it contains far more onomastic information on the Quraysh than any other single source, and quite possibly more information than all the other sources combined.
Comparison of marriage data with outside sources

The *Nasab Quraysh* is even more outstanding a source when we consider only the marriage data. The *Jamhat al-nasab* provides no marriage information at all for this descent group in the section analysed and the *Ansāb al-ashrāf* is little better; it provides information on mothers only on three occasions. The *Nasab Quraysh* far outstrips them in this regard and names 22 mothers for this group.

This does not necessarily mean that the *Nasab Quraysh* is a representative source of marriage behaviour; it could simply be that the *Ansāb al-ashrāf* and the *Jamhat al-nasab* are uniquely poor. Fortunately, we are able to make a case for the representativeness of the *Nasab Quraysh* thanks to the publication of a recent work that looks in detail at the marriage patterns of five Qurashī families. This book – *The Religious Elite of the Early Islamic Hijāz* by Asad Ahmed – is drawn from a wide range of Arabic historical literature (including *nasab* works) and is primarily interested in the issue of marriage. This offers us another means to evaluate the comprehensiveness of the *Nasab Quraysh* in terms of marriage data when compared to the historical tradition as a whole.

The comparison here will be of the marriages of the five founder figures around whom Ahmed structures his work; Saʿd b. Abī Waqqāṣ, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAwf, Ṭalḥa b. ʿUbayd Allāh, ʿUthmān b. Ṭālib and ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib. All are prominent figures in early Islamic history, and the marriage behaviour of all of them features in the *Nasab Quraysh*.

In the following we analyse the numbers of named women that each man is purported to have married, and the number of children of each gender he is supposed to have had by each of these named women.62 This is slightly problematic as Ahmed’s work is not statistical and the data has to be compiled by the reader; additionally where Ahmed does

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62 Concubine women and the children born to them are not included as Ahmed does not systematically list these. The category of ‘named women’ here includes those for whom at least tribal affiliation is known, though in a few cases not necessarily their first name.
provide figures these are sometimes wrong. While some of these have been detected, there may be others that could marginally influence the results of this investigation.

The results are laid out in the table below:

Table 1.8: Comparison of wives and children for an early Islamic cohort as recorded in the *Nasab Quraysh* and Asad Ahmed’s *The Religious Elite*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of husband</th>
<th>Number of named wives in <em>The Religious Elite</em></th>
<th>Number of named wives in <em>NQ</em></th>
<th>Number of children from named wives in <em>The Religious Elite</em> (sons only)</th>
<th>Number of children from named wives in <em>NQ</em> (sons only)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saʿd b. Abī Waqqāṣ</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>34 (17)</td>
<td>4 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAwf</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27 (20)</td>
<td>16 (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ṭalḥa b. ʿUbayd Allāh</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12 (10)</td>
<td>11 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21 (10)</td>
<td>17 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19⁶⁴ (13)</td>
<td>15 (10)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For most of these results there is a high degree of correlation between the figures as drawn from multiple sources (Ahmed’s work) and those from the single work (the *Nasab Quraysh*). Where there are differences, this is in a number of cases where Ahmed has uncovered obscure and questionable (by his admission) marriages/maternal links in

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⁶³ Fāṭima bt. Muḥammad is described as having three sons and possibly a fourth by ʿAlī (*The Religious Elite*, 139) which is probably a typo; it should of course be two sons and possibly a third (the sources are divided on Muḥassin). He also claims that ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān had children through eight named women (page 133), but only seven of the eight wives he lists produced children (Umm Kulthūm bt. Muḥammad al-Nabī did not, as he states on page 110). There is potentially an eighth child-bearing woman named in the chapter, Fākhīta bt. Ghazwān (page 110, note 56), but she is not listed amongst the other women and Ahmed indicates that he believes her record to be the result of confusion in the sources. She does however appear as a mother in the *Nasab Quraysh*.

⁶⁴ Twenty children of ʿAlī by named women are mentioned *The Religious Elite*, but for one of these neither gender nor name is provided (p. 195).
isolated references. \(^{65}\) Other instances where there are conflicts are (for our purposes) related to minor issues such as the child in question being female, or dying young without issue.

There are two areas where the data do not match quite as well. Some of the figures for ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. ‘Awf seem a little skewed; the *Nasab Quraysh* fails to record one marriage and the seven children it produced, although descendants of these children return several generations later. This may be a lacunae of the *Nasab Quraysh*, but we cannot exclude the possibility of genealogical forgery; while the children of this union largely disappear from the historical record, their later descendants reappear in the early ’Abbāsid era, which is not a characteristic of many other families (this is also noted by Ahmed). \(^{66}\)

Either way, the quantitative approach used in this thesis ensures that occasional conflicts like this one will not make a substantive difference.

The case of Saʿd b. Abī Waqqās is much more serious; there are a full seven wives missing from the relevant section in al-Zubayrī’s work and an astonishing 30 missing children. This potentially has serious implications for the research in this paper as it diminishes the confidence we have in the *Nasab Quraysh* as being a work representative of the genealogical information preserved in Arabic historical literature as a whole.

Fortunately, when we look more closely at the marriages of Saʿd as preserved in the historical literature, we find that a reliance on just the *Nasab Quraysh* actually improves the quality of information gathered. Saʿd’s appearances in the outside literature can quickly be shown to be confused, contradictory and unreliable.

Ahmed himself raises a number of reasons that ought to make us consider that even Saʿd’s own near-term genealogy is suspect, especially with regard to the existence and naming of his father. In one particularly intriguing incident, we have a *ḥadīth* were Saʿd

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\(^{65}\) Ahmed, *The Religious Elite*, 47.

approaches Muḥammad and asks him “Who am I?” to which the Prophet answers “You are Sa’d b. Mālik b. Uhayb...May the curse of God be upon anyone who says otherwise.” Ahmed dates this ḥadīth to the second half of the second Islamic century (his arguments for this are not provided), and argues that either this relates to some confusion over Sa’d’s father’s name, or that Sa’d was not a Qurashī at all and his inclusion in Qurashī genealogy dates to some point between the second half of the first and first half of the second century (again, an explanation for this dating is not provided). Ahmed also points out that that Sa’d made only one Qurashī marriage (which is not recorded in the list of wives in the Nasab Quraysh), indicating that the other members of the tribe possibly did not regard him as one of their own.

There are additional reasons to believe that Sa’d’s genealogy should be treated with caution. The Nasab Quraysh follows quite a strict structure in terms of how generations are introduced; maternal information is normally provided for everyone until the generation of Muḥammad’s grandchildren (Generation 7), after which many lines become patrilines only. Sa’d’s entry is unusual in that the matriline stops two generations before him (meaning we are not told who his mother is, or the name of the mother of his father) but we are then told who the mothers of Sa’d’s children and grandchildren are. This is unusual; also unusual is the fact that his father’s name does not appear in the section detailing the grandfather’s wives and children.

The problems continue. According to Ahmed’s reckoning, Sa’d fathered 35 children. This is certainly a large number of offspring – though not in itself implausible. The problem is that it means that a man who seems to have faced challenges on the marriage market produced more children (including children born through concubines) than

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68 Ahmed also notes that suspicions that Sa’d was of actually of South Arabian heritage are recorded in Ḥassān b. Thābit’s Dīwān (Ahmed, *The Religious Elite*, 29).
69 This is one more than the figure provided in the table above, as previously we were only interested in marriages to named women or concubines in order to check correlation; the additional child was born to an unnamed woman so only appears here.
anyone else recorded in the *Nasab Quraysh* – more than any caliph, Companion or close relative of Muḥammad. Indeed, the second highest number of children is the 33 of ʿAlī b. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbbās, whose own appearances in the historical records may have been manipulated as a by-product of the ʿAbbāsid daʿwa and later myth-making. On top of this, Ahmed has omitted one of Saʿd’s marriages and the resulting child which is found in the *Nasab Quraysh* (this is presumably a mistake as all other recorded wives are included in the chapter), meaning that Saʿd should have had 36 children by 12 wives. The 12 wives of Saʿd mean he (along with ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAwf) had more childbearing named women than any other Qurashī man.

These problems are compounded when we look at the details of these marriages as recorded by Ahmed. The primary sources are a confusing mess, and this is made worse by Ahmed’s insistence on taking this information at face value. So we find for instance that one marriage to an unnamed woman listed by Ahmed is generated from a record of an Andalusian man who claimed he was a seventh generation descendant of Saʿd, and who was born in 352 AH (963–4 CE). By Ahmed’s own generational distancing of 20 years, a seventh generation descendant should have been born 140 years after Saʿd’s own birth (probably at 600 CE) – which would place it at some point in the second half of the eighth century. Even applying the more generous 30 year gap used in this thesis brings us only to the beginning of the ninth century, still 150 years too early. In another instance Ahmed tells us that Saʿd’s son Iṣḥāq was his eldest child, where a few pages earlier it is ʿĀʾisha. Other times the confusion in the marriage data is noted, but these poorly attested marriages are used alongside those for whom we have far more consistent reports. These factors taken together indicate that much of the information we have for Saʿd b.

71 *EI*, s.v. “Saʿd b. Abī Waḳḳāṣ” (Gerald Hawting).
Abī Waqqāṣ’s marriages as recorded in *The Religious Elite* (and by extension, the outside sources it uses) is deeply problematic.⁷⁵

All this shows that the *Nasab Quraysh* is by far the best source of information for Qurashī marriage data for the period 500-750 CE. It does not record every marriage, but it does contain more Qurashī marriage data than any other single source and, as the case of Sa‘d b. Abī Waqqāṣ has shown above, it is better to engage with one source in a critical manner than to uncritically incorporate many. It will also be shown throughout this thesis that, where the *Nasab Quraysh* contains data that cannot be verified in other sources, these data are internally consistent and credible when analysed in terms of wider trends. Additionally, while there are certainly erroneous records in the *Nasab Quraysh*, the quantitative approach means that their influence is minimised. In short, we are justified in believing that the conclusions drawn from a statistical analysis of this work are unlikely to be overturned simply by applying the same analysis to another source or collection of sources.

**Excursus: critiquing prosopography**

There is a wider point to be made here about how prosopographies and statistical studies should be read. By their nature, studies like Ahmed’s contain large quantities of decontextualised information drawn from multiple sources, and the capacity for mistakes to creep in is much greater than a study that uses more familiar comparative literary approaches that pay a lot of attention to context. This is not necessarily a problem; given that the nature of the work is a quantitative approach, the presence of a few records that a later investigator might find questionable will not necessarily undermine the overall conclusions.

A good critique therefore focuses only on the mistakes that make a material impact on the conclusions drawn from the data. This is certainly the case with Ahmed as his overall argument is to demonstrate that Sa’d’s marriage behaviour betrays his political manoeuvrings; by casting doubt on so many of the marriages, and highlighting the lax way in which the data have been managed, this argument is fatally undermined. This does not invalidate the whole work though; the chapters detailing other Qurashis appear to be built on firmer foundations. It seems that Ahmed would have been better off omitting Sa’d altogether.

The mistakes made by Ahmed also highlight the strengths of the methodological approach taken in this paper. Quantitative analysis means that the remarkable number of children Sa’d produced is shown up for being the oddity it is; because Ahmed’s study did not enumerate the children and wives and compare them to other figures of the period he missed an important sign that there may be issues with the veracity of this family’s genealogical records. Using a single source also means that we are able to develop a far better understanding of its structures and styles which helps us identify suspicious information; something that is far harder when using the vast array of sources that inform Ahmed’s work.

Conclusion

At the end of this chapter it is clear that Hoyland was right – the nasab tradition is indeed evidence of a stunning degree of historical memory and that it can be shown to extend back over three centuries. While we will not go as far as Crone and say the study of early Islamic history must as a result be exclusively prosopographical, we have many grounds for thinking that it is an approach that can provide compelling additions to the existing historical narrative.

But if the argumentation for this has been successful it is only because we have narrowed our interests to specific types of genealogical memory and have considered which
prosopographical approaches are the most appropriate for the nature of the data. Genealogy is almost synonymous with forgery in a wide range of historical and anthropological contexts, and in light of this we had to explain how we can expect to use it to create a positivist historical narrative. The explanation above has referred largely to the anthropological observation that humans are capable of accurately remembering genealogical connections going back three to five generations from the eldest members of the tribe. How precisely the Arabs came to record this genealogy will be the subject of the following chapter on historiography; here it will be sufficient to say that it is possible that the Arabs recorded their genealogy accurately, as distinct from the material that went into the hadīth and khabar corpuses which would have required miraculous degrees of information recall in order to be anything more than broadly similar to the events they purport to record.

Having argued this case we moved on to our research approach. Prosopographical methods can only be as good as the data that inform them, and it was in light of this that we chose to focus on marriage behaviour. By converting maternal information into marriage data we create a database that is expansive enough to reduce the impact of suspect records but specific enough to say something interesting about social trends and politics in the two centuries surrounding the revelation of Islam. The biggest challenge to this approach is the extensive amount of time it takes to accurately gather data. For this reason, the source of the data has been limited to one work, the Nasab Quraysh, which contains large amounts of marriage information presented in a very straightforward format.

There are dangers in using only one source, not least of which is the risk of it not being representative of the tradition as a whole. By sampling the Nasab Quraysh and checking this against the information recorded in other works it was shown that al-Zubayrī’s genealogical book is easily the most comprehensive in terms of recording marriage data. While it certainly does not contain every Qurashī marriage for which there is a record, it contains a sufficient quantity at a high enough degree of accuracy for the current study.
The dangers of not narrowly defining what is reliable data and being vague about methodology were amply demonstrated in the critique of Ahmed’s research on Sa‘d b. Abī Waqqāṣ. In this case, using multiple sources made his argumentation weaker rather than stronger because he did not apply any means of discriminating between the types of data he was extracting. This resulted in consistently attested data being given equal value to information that was contradictory and in some cases obviously forged.

Of course, we can never hope for the arrival of a simple rubric that can be applied to all sources in order to allow us to partition the ‘good’ data from the ‘bad’; the sources are far too divergent to ever allow this. Instead, our approach should be to methodically increase our understanding of each source and each category of data before analysing them in a way that allows us to easily distinguish between the root works should we need to. Simply compiling enormous amounts of decontextualised data for its own sake is never going to produce compelling results.

The scope for conflict and confusion in this field is considerable, and while we are still at these preliminary stages a study that looks predominantly at marriage data as recorded in one source should not be judged as limited – it is simply the most logical way to proceed based on our current understanding of the sources. As the critique of Ahmed has shown, if we go too far too fast we can very easily find ourselves coming unstuck. The Nasab Quraysh has been shown to be the best source of data for marital information on account of it being conveniently structured, relatively short, credible and more comprehensive than other works. With this in mind, we are in a position to provide a historiographical analysis structured around the context of the work and its author.
Chapter Two: Historiography of the *nasab* tradition

Introduction

By this point it should be clear how central al-Zubayrī’s *Nasab Quraysh* is to the formulation of the database that constitutes the heart of this thesis. It is necessary therefore to understand where this work fits in within its genre: the *nasab* literary tradition.

In its broadest sense, the historiography of the *nasab* tradition is genealogy as written by Arabian and Islamicate peoples. This is a problematic starting point for a number of reasons. First, the Arabian concept of ‘*nasab*’ is not directly translatable as ‘genealogical literature’ because the ideologies connected to kinship permeated pre- and early Islamic Arabia to a much greater extent than other societies, especially those with long-standing literary traditions. The result is that if we approach the historiography of *nasab* in the same way as we would approach the historiography of any other genre (or the same genre in a non-Arabian context), we quickly run into non-trivial issues. Something as simple as writing down a name is arguably an instance of *nasab* writing thanks to the North Arabian convention of listing a person’s ancestors along with their given first name(s); as such it may appear that genealogical literature technically extends to the first epigraphic instance of an Arabian name appearing in this format. But there is clearly a difference between the person who carved a name into a desert rock (who was following a common convention) and the degree of agency al-Zubayrī exhibited when he wrote the *Nasab Quraysh*.*

A second issue is that the already complex subject of *nasab* literature is poorly treated by modern academic studies that do not incorporate the complexities of the genre into their

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76 Having said this, when found in groups these inscriptions can be used by archaeologists to postulate surprisingly detailed genealogical connections – see Zeidoun al-Muheisen and Ahmad Ajlouni “A Nabataean Inscription From Northern Jordan Survey (Umm al-Jimāl area),” *Syria* 82 (2005): 167-171.
historiographical analysis. Works commonly ascribed to the *nasab* genre (this generally includes any work with the word *nasab* and its variants in the title) actually fall into several distinct sub-categories. Each sub-category has its own historiographic narrative, but this part of the story is only cursorily treated – despite the fact that the subcategories have been recognised by both contemporaries of the genealogists and by most modern scholars. Discussion of the *Nasab Quraysh* and its author cannot begin until we have first carried out this delineation.

The first part of this chapter will therefore be an extended discussion of the literary category of *nasab*. We will begin by looking briefly at the different sub-categories of *nasab* literature before identifying the characteristics of the one to which the *Nasab Quraysh* belongs. The sub-category we are most interested in here is the ‘genealogically structured history’ which is characterised by its radiating family tree structure, extensive scope in terms of numbers of individuals and its role as a literary work rather than a ledger maintained by a caste. Following this, we will look at the timing of the genre’s emergence and decline and which cultural and political forces may have been responsible for this historiographical trajectory.

This groundwork will prepare us for the following chapter where we will consider the life and work of al-Zubayrī in more detail. It will be shown that the author of the *Nasab Quraysh* was in many ways exactly the sort of proto-Sunni, anti-shuʿūbī, pro-ʿAbbāsid historian we would expect to find behind a loyalist genealogical work of the Quraysh written in the first half of the ninth century. Throughout this it will be shown that although authorial bias is detectable in the *Nasab Quraysh*, it is both minor and easily detectable.

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77 In the case of Chase Robinson’s *Islamic Historiography* genealogy is not treated at all (page 56); Szombathy is not interested in Qurashī genealogy (as discussed above) and Khalidi’s treatment of al-Zubayrī ignores some important references in the historical sources (see note 161 below).
Defining *nasab* and the genealogically-structured history

The idea that *nasab* can refer to more than one type of literary work is not a new one. When Zubayr b. Bakkār completed his *Jamharat nasab Quraysh wa akhbārihā*, a friend teased him saying that the work was not a *nasab* at all, but a collection of *khabar*. Many modern scholars have also noted the existence of more than one type of work within the *nasab* genre. These include Khalidi, Duri, Rosenthal and Leder, all of whom have contrasted the styles of the *nasab* works of al-Balādhurī and Zubayr b. Bakkār with those of the earlier Ibn al-Kalbī and al-Zubayrī.

These sub-genres do not have subtitles or even consistent definitions. Most modern scholars follow the lead of Zubayr b. Bakkār’s friend and describe works like that of al-Balādhurī as genealogically-structured *khabar* works. Becker and Rosenthal go slightly further and describe al-Balādhurī’s *Ansāb al-ahsrāf* as a “ṭabaqāt in the style of Ibn Sa’d, arranged genealogically.” In almost all cases, it is Ibn al-Kalbī’s *Jamharat al-nasab* that is held as being the true and original genealogical literary work from which the alternative forms are derived.

In addition to these genres, Islamicate society produced other works described as *nasabs* that were of a very different nature to those described above. One popular form was the...

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81 *EI*², s.v. “Nasab” (Franz Rosenthal).
82 *EI*², s.v. “al-Zubayr b. Bakkār” (S. Leder).
83 The chronology here is not strict; Ibn Ḥazm’s (d. 1064) *Jamharat ansāb al-ʿArab* is an interesting example of a genealogy written in the sparser Ibn al-Kalbī style yet coming from a much later period.
85 E.g. Kazuo Morimoto “It is generally accepted that the science of Arab genealogies achieved its peak with Ibn al-Kalbī (d. 819 or 821) whose *Ǧamhara fi ansāb al-ʿArab*...embodies the attainments of the science of Arab genealogies.” From “The Formation and Development of the Science of Talibid Genealogies in the 10th and 11th Century Middle East.” *Oriente Moderno* 2 (1999): 543.
elite genealogy which focused narrowly on dynasties of political and religious families. Extended relations were not of interest, and chronology was prioritised over genealogical connections.\(^{86}\) Another common genre was the one comprising the genealogical registers of the *sayyids* and *sharīfs*; descendants of Muḥammad who lived as a distinct caste in many parts of the Muslim world. These registers were kept in order to verify those who claimed membership of this group in order to access its benefits.\(^{87}\)

As the field develops, it is possible that these sub-divisions within the field of *nasab* will themselves be sub-divided further, but at this stage the schema outlined above will suffice. Our primary concern is with the first two types of genealogical writing: those that are organised according to a strict genealogical framework. These are our ‘genealogically-structured histories’ and, though the differences between the two subgenres of ‘true’ *nasabs* (e.g. Ibn al-Kalbī’s *Jamharat al-nasab*) and genealogically structured *khabar* works (e.g. al-Balādhurī’s *Ansāb al-ashrāf*) are real enough, in this discussion it is the similarities that are of the greatest interest.

As the name implies, structure is the most important distinguishing element of this subgenre. The paradigmatic form\(^{88}\) is thus; the works first link Muḥammad to Ismāʿīl (son of Abraham) through a patriline, and this is followed by details (or sometimes just names) of the Prophet’s wives, sons and daughters. Had Muḥammad had any siblings, these would have been addressed in the section immediately following. As he does not, the genealogy moves up one generation to that of his uncles. One uncle is selected, and the details of his descendants are listed. Once these are addressed, another uncle is selected. After the uncles are exhausted, attention turns to Muḥammad’s grand-uncles, then great-grand uncles and so on until the founder figure of the descent group is reached (in the *Nasab Quraysh* this is Fihr). The genealogical books focusing on the Quraysh stop here;

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\(^{86}\) There are many examples of these, but one relevant to the time period and available in translation is Salamah ibn Muslim ʻAwtabī’s *An Early Islamic Family from Oman: al-ʻAwtabī’s Account of the Muhallabids*, trans. Martin Hinds (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1991).

\(^{87}\) For a scholarly account of this process in action see Morimoto’s “Formation and Development,” 552 ff.

\(^{88}\) I.e. that followed by most extant genealogies.
the others carry on to incorporate all the other Arab tribal groups within their scholarly remit.

It is worth remarking that historiographies of this type are literary experiments that few other genealogically-minded cultures developed or emulated and that this was recognised by Muslims of later periods. When we combine this novel structure with the overwhelming quantity of detail in some of these works (Ibn al-Kalbī’s *Jamharat al-nasab* names 35,000 individuals) we are left with an achievement that has no parallel in pre-modern history. It is therefore somewhat surprising to see how rarely this uniqueness is noted in the secondary literature.

With this in mind we will consider the various forces that led to the preservation of genealogical knowledge in the form of the genealogically-structured history. Although this has been addressed to some extent in the secondary literature, these discussions have treated *nasab* as secondary to historiography in general. In the following section we will consider political and religious contexts of the time period in which the *nasab* genre emerged and will then assess the relative effects of these factors on the genre.

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90 Kennedy, “From Oral Tradition to Written Record,” 531.

91 There are exceptions: Kennedy describes the genealogies recorded in the *Jamharat al-nasab* as being “in a class of their own” (“From Oral Tradition to Written Record,” 531) while Morimoto says “the science of genealogies has been regarded as one which originated from among the Arabs” (“The Formation and Development,” 542). But most scholars treat the emergence of the *nasab* as a stepping stone to the more popular genres of *ṭabaqāt* and *khabar* narratives – for instance Rosenthal says genealogy “prepared the Arab mind for world histories” (A History of Muslim Historiography, 20).
The genealogists: temporal location

Our first task is to locate the genealogists in time. Table 2.1 below is formulated from information taken from the section of Ibn al-Nadīm’s *al-Fihrist* that details historians and genealogists. Individuals he reports as writing a work with *nasab* (and its variants) in the title are extracted along with death dates, page references and some notes on their backgrounds. References are provided for the Dodge translation of the work (though this resource should be used with caution as the translation is frequently wayward). The six extant works are in bold.

There is admittedly an assumption here that all these works are genealogically-structured histories, but this is a fair one given that all the works to have survived from this period that have variations of the word ‘*nasab*’ in the title are indeed structured in this fashion. Excluded from the selection are authors who wrote genealogies of smaller families as we have reason to believe that these do not necessarily share all the characteristics of the genealogically-structured history. Added to the list are al-Sadūsī and Abū ʿUbayd alQāsim b. Sallām whose works survive and were written in the relevant era, but are not recorded by Ibn al-Nadīm.

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94 For instance, see al-ʿAwtabī’s *nasab* of the Muhallabid family which is organised genealogically but includes only the most prominent of the Muhallabids (ʿAwtabi, *An Early Islamic Family from Oman*).
### Table 2.1: Authors of genealogical works as recorded in the *Fihrist*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Book titles</th>
<th>Death date</th>
<th>Page in <em>al-Fihrist</em> (Dodge translation)</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abū Yaqẓān Suḥaym b. Ḥafṣ</td>
<td><em>Kitāb al-Nasab al-kabīr</em> (tr: <em>The Great Book of Genealogy</em>)</td>
<td>786/7</td>
<td>138 (203-204)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibn Abī Maryam</td>
<td><em>Al-Kitāb al-Nasab</em> (tr: <em>The Book of Genealogy</em>)</td>
<td>838/9</td>
<td>139 (205)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibn al-Kalbī</td>
<td><em>Jamharat al-nasab</em> (tr: <em>Collection of Genealogy</em>)</td>
<td>819/22</td>
<td>140-143 (205206)</td>
<td>Important source was his father who died 763/4, who in turn was taught by al-Shaybānī al-ʿIjlī (p. 139 in <em>al-Fihrist</em>; p. 239 in Dodge)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Madāʾinī</td>
<td><em>Nasab Quraysh wa akhbārīhā</em> (tr: <em>Genealogy of the Quraysh and Their History</em>)</td>
<td>830/1 (Dodge also has 846)</td>
<td>147-152 (220221)</td>
<td>Also wrote a number of books on women and marriage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibn ʿAbda</td>
<td><em>Kitāb al-Nasab al-kabīr</em> (tr: <em>The Great Book of Genealogy</em>)</td>
<td>Probably mid 9th C</td>
<td>153 (229)</td>
<td>Work was based on Ibn al-Kalbī’s according to Ibn al-Nadīm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muḥammad b. Ḥabīb</td>
<td><em>Kitāb al-Nasab</em> (tr: <em>Book of Genealogy</em>)</td>
<td>859/60</td>
<td>155-6 (234)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibn Ghanām(^{95}) al-Kilābī</td>
<td><em>Kitāb al-Nasab</em> (tr: <em>Book of Genealogy</em>)</td>
<td>First part of 9th century</td>
<td>158 (240)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{95}\) Dodge’s manuscript has this name as “ʿAsḥām.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghanūya al-Sadūsī</td>
<td>Kitāb al-Māthir wa al-ansāb fī al-ayām (tr: Glorious Deeds and Genealogies During the Conquests)</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>159 (240)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Zubayrī</td>
<td>Nasab Quraysh (tr: Genealogy of the Quraysh), Kitāb al-Nasab al-kabīr (tr: The Great Book of Genealogy)</td>
<td>851^97</td>
<td>160 (242)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zubayr b. Bakkār</td>
<td>Jamharat nasab Quraysh wa akhbārihā (tr: Collected Genealogy of the Quraysh and Their History)</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>160-162 (244)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Jahmī</td>
<td>Nasab Quraysh wa akhbārihā (tr: Genealogy of the Quraysh and Their History)</td>
<td>Contemporary of the caliph Mutawakkil (r. 847-61)</td>
<td>162 (244-245)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ʿUmar b. Shābba</td>
<td>Kitāb al-Nasab (tr: Book of Genealogy)</td>
<td>876 in Samarrā</td>
<td>163-4 (246-248)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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^96 Dodge has this name as “Ghuyūbah.”

^97 The *Fihrīst* has 848; as will be discussed later, 851 is the date preferred by modern scholars.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Page Range</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Balādhurī</td>
<td><em>Kitāb al-Akhbār wa al-ansāb</em> (tr: <em>Book of Historical Traditions and Genealogies</em>)</td>
<td>892</td>
<td>164 (247-248)</td>
<td>As Dodge notes this is probably the extant work <em>Ansāb al-ashrāf</em> (tr: <em>Genealogies of the Notables</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Makāwali⁹⁸</td>
<td><em>Kitāb al-Akhbār wa al-ansāb wa al-sīr</em> (tr: <em>Historical Traditions, Genealogies and Military Expeditions</em>)</td>
<td>Mid 9th C</td>
<td>165 (249-250)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abū al-Hassan al-Nassāba</td>
<td><em>Kitāb al-Ansāb wa al-akhbār</em> (tr: <em>Genealogies and Historical Traditions</em>)</td>
<td>Contemporary of Ibn al-Nadīm and was alive at time the Fihrist was written (988)</td>
<td>166 (251)</td>
<td>Also wrote book on Persian genealogies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mu’arrij b. ‘Amr alSadūsī</td>
<td><em>Kitāb Ḥadhf min nasab Quraysh</em> (tr: <em>Concise Genealogy of the Quraysh</em>)</td>
<td>810/11</td>
<td>Not in al-Fihrist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abū ‘Ubayd al-Qāsim b. Sallām</td>
<td><em>Kitāb al-Nasab</em> (tr: <em>Book of Genealogy</em>)</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>Not in al-Fihrist</td>
<td>Work is an abridgement of Ibn al-Kalbī’s <em>Jamharat al-nasab</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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⁹⁸ Dodge’s manuscript has this as “Makārī.”
What we are now interested in is when these individuals were active; we will do this by tracking the death dates over time. Using this information, the following table expresses the number of authors who died in a particular quarter century:

Table 2.2: Number of genealogist deaths per quarter century from *al-Fihrist* and extant works

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Era</th>
<th>Number of deaths</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>775-799</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>800-824</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Includes Ibn ṬAskām al-Kilābī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>825-849</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Includes al-Makāwalī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>850-874</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Includes al-Jahmī, Ibn ṬAbda and al-Zubayrī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>875-899</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Later eras</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Abū al-Ḥassan al-Nassāba, alive at time the <em>Fihrist</em> was written (988)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This can also be expressed in the form of a graph:

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99 The two authors for whom ‘mid-ninth century’ is the best guess at death date have been evenly split between the 825-849 and 850-874 categories.
Graph 2.1: Number of author deaths per quarter century from *al-Fihrist* and extant works

![Graph showing number of author deaths per quarter century from *al-Fihrist* and extant works.]

Looked at in this way, the seeds of the genre must have been sown in the early ʿAbbāsid era when antiquarians like Ibn al-Kalbī endeavoured to turn the genealogical knowledge of their father’s generation into compendia of *nasabs*. These would have looked more like books than the notes used to support the oral performance of genealogy that the Arabs had previously relied on for the preservation of genealogical memory.\(^{100}\) It was following Ibn al-Kalbī’s death in 811 that the genre really flourished though; over the course of the next fifty years it is likely that at least ten different scholars wrote at least one book on genealogy that was notable enough to be mentioned by a Baghdad book-seller a hundred years later. But in the second half of the ninth century the genre seems to have declined in significance with many genealogists dying without being replaced by a younger generation. This is roughly contemporaneous with the crisis of the Samarran caliphate

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\(^{100}\) This is somewhat speculative as writing and the oral transmission of genealogy are not specifically linked, but transmission in this form would be in line with Schoeler’s argumentation in *Genesis of Literature* which establishes that this is the case for other types of history writing.
which began in 861 with the assassination of al-Mutawakkil. In 892 the caliphate moved back to Baghdad; in the same year al-Balādhurī died and with his passing ended the golden age of a unique experiment in history writing.\textsuperscript{101}

\textbf{Underlying reasons for the emergence of nasab literature 1: Tribalism}

Using Ibn al-Nadîm’s \textit{al-Fihrist} as a tracker for popularity is not an exact science – the high point of \textit{nasab} writing coincides with a golden age for a lot of other types of writing too.\textsuperscript{102} But while scientific works, religious texts and non-genealogical historical works continued to be produced,\textsuperscript{103} the genealogically-structured history would largely disappear from the repertoire of Muslim scholars. Additionally, no new genealogies structured along the lines of these works were ever made again for the families of any of the non-Arab tribal peoples that established themselves within the Islamic world. There is clearly something particular about the experience of Arab peoples as they moved from non-literate to literacy that resulted in them creating the genealogically-structured history.

That the pre-Islamic Arabs were genealogically-minded there can be no doubt; the poetry, the epigraphy, the Qur’ān and the consistency of the historical records referring to the \textit{jāhiliyya} all indicate that the peninsular Arabians believed genealogy explained their internal political relationships as well as their identity (with an important exception being the southern Arabians). Disagreements and alliances were understood along tribal lines, while ancestry was the battle ground where poets fought in the language of shame and

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{101} Borru\ also uses the year 892 as a cut-off point in his periodisation of Arab historiography (Antoine Borru, \textit{Entre mémoire et pouvoir: l’espace syrien sous les derniers Omeyyades et les premiers Abbassides} (Leiden: Brill, 2011)).
\item \textsuperscript{102} See Fred Donner’s \textit{Narratives of Islamic Origins} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 280. It also coincides with the introduction of paper to the Muslim world.
\item \textsuperscript{103} See for example the large number of contemporary authors of poetry Ibn al-Nadîm can name (339 ff. in \textit{al-Fihrist} (371 ff. in Dodge translation)) compared to the one contemporary genealogist he mentions earlier. Again, it is emphasised that this is not a comprehensive analysis of Ibn al-Nadîm’s interests; the point here is that the references to the poets of his era means he was not averse to the idea of including contemporaries in his work. The decline in number of genealogists is therefore significant.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
pride (Rosenthal notes that the lack of a cognate for the *n-s-b* root in other Semitic languages is an indicator of its extreme age). If we take the historical records at face value, this *ʿaṣabiyya*, or tribal solidarity, was too strong even for Muḥammad to overcome; his attempt to create an *umma* was only briefly successful in cutting across tribal loyalties in the latter part of his career and it did not survive him.

It seems natural therefore that the Arab historians of the second century of Islam should structure their histories on similar lines. The centrality of Muḥammad to these genealogically-structured histories (he is always the starting point) is itself relic of the *jāhiliyya* in that it is similar to the way the tribal Arabs today reportedly see themselves as surrounded by layers of increasingly distant loyalties to relatives – as the Bedouin saying has it “Me against my brother; me and my brother against my cousin; me, my brother and my cousin against the world” (Hoyland analogises this world-view as being akin to a Russian doll). But by making Muḥammad the centre of this model rather than themselves, the genealogists were making a powerful statement about his centrality to their worldview.

The connection between Late Antique Arabian culture and the pervasiveness of this genealogical mindset can be seen in the way that later non-tribal Muslim genealogists

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104 *EI*, s.v. “Nasab” (Franz Rosenthal). Margoliouth uses the same observation to argue that the term must have originated in Arabia (al-Samʿānī, *Kitāb al-Ansāb*, 1 (Introduction)). Joy McCorriston has argued that the emergence of tribal identities is linked to the adoption of the pastoral lifestyle; given that this is dependant on the domestication of animals, the archaeological evidence indicates that *nasab* as an organisational principle in Arabia can be dated to 6,000 BC (Joy McCorriston, *Pilgrimage and Household in the Ancient Near East* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 91–2. These tribal bonds appear to have undergone a significant evolution in the Late Antique period; research by Hoyland has shown that from the third century CE the epigraphic record starts to show tribal groupings that would have been familiar to the early Muslims (“Arab kings, Arab tribes, Arabic texts and the beginnings of Arab historical memory in late Roman epigraphy,” in *From Hellenism to Islam: Cultural and Linguistic Change in the Roman Near East*, eds. Hannah Cotton et al., 374-401 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)).


were unable to replicate its structure. One example is the case of Fakhr-i Mudabbir’s genealogical work. This 13 year project, which resulted in a book called the *Shajara-yi ansāb* (tr: *Tree of Genealogies*), was written in Persian during the early 13th century in the territory of the Delhi Sultanate. Fakhr-i Mudabbir’s starting point was the reconstruction of his own genealogy (which had been lost), and this was of some value - he reckoned himself to be a descendant on his father’s side of Abū Bakr, and on his mother’s side to the Ghaznavid dynasty. But once he worked this out he then became interested in the Prophet’s Companions, the *anṣār*, the *muhājirūn*, and a number of later Islamic dynasties – all of which he also wanted to incorporate into his genealogy. As a result of this, although gathering the information took time, it was its organisation that presented a far greater challenge. As he puts it:

> When all [information] was known and collected, a year, day and night had to be passed in reflection, and engineering-like effort had to be exerted in deciding how the relationships would occur in the composition of this book; because connecting father to father (*pidar bā pidar*), and branch to branch (*shākh dar shākh*) is very difficult. Establishing these affiliations is a thousand times more laborious than extracting and bringing [them] together. How can one connect these relationships branch by branch to Adam in an orderly and uninterrupted fashion? This difficult system of writing (*kitābat*) should be executed in such a manner that it should come downward from the top, or it should move up from the bottom to the top.  

If Fakhr-i Muddabbir had read the *nasab* literature of the Arab tradition there is little evidence he borrowed their structure for his work. He instead approaches it from an

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independent angle. The results are remarkable – although he starts with Muḥammad in his genealogy, he quickly departs from the Russian doll structure. The following is the order in which the cohorts appear in his book:

- The Prophet and the ten companions (*dah yār* – most, but not all, Quraysh)
- *Muhājirūn* (those who emigrated from Mecca with Muḥammad to Medina – most but not all, Quraysh)
- *Anṣār* (Medinans who supported the early Muslim community – none were Quraysh)
- Prophets mentioned in the Qur’ān
- Ghassāniyān and Ḥimyariyān (Arabian tribal states of the sixth century – non-Quraysh)
- Poets who were Companions (*ṣaḥāba*) of the Prophet
- Poets of the pre-Islamic period and those who lived both before and during the time of the Prophet (*muḥadramūn*) and Muslim and convert poets
- Pīshdādiyān, Kiyāniyān, Sāsāniyān, Ashghāniyān (*mulūk-i tavāʾif*, or pre-Islamic Iranian dynasties)
- Progeny of Adam
- Umayyads, ‘Abbāsids, Imām Abū Ḥanīfa, Imām Shāfiʿī
- Arab tribes and companions that were separated from their tribes and cities
- Alexander the Great and Luqmān Ḥakīm and Balaʿam Baʿūr and other children of Mālik Duʿar
- *Amīrs* of the Umayyad and ‘Abbāsid periods
- Ṭāhirids, Ṣaffārids and Sāmānids
- Ghaznavids (*āl-i Sebuktīgin*)
- Ghūrids (descendants of Ḍaḥḥāk)
- *Sharīfs* (descendants of the Prophet)
- ‘Alaviyān (descendants of ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib)
This is completely different from the Arab *nasab* works discussed above. Particularly striking is the late appearance of the ‘Alids who are normally the first or second family to appear after that of the Prophet. The *Shajara-yi ansāb* is not a genealogically organised work in the sense discussed above; it is more a prosopography where people are organised in terms of their membership of various descent groups, and as such it has more in common with *ṭabaqāt* works or compendia of miscellanea – works which Fakhr-i Mudabbir would no doubt have been familiar with and seem to have had a greater impact on him.

Fakhr-i Mudabbir’s work is interesting because it looks exactly the way we would expect it to from an author who considered himself a genealogist but was the product of a non-tribal environment. Though the personal ancestry he chooses to highlight was Turkish and Arab, his means of structuring the information betrays a cultural background where genealogy was not a primary principle of social organisation. The fact that he found the structuring of the work “a thousand times” harder than the actual gathering of the information is a sure sign of the difficulties created through his cosmopolitan interest in creating a more-or-less universal genealogy of Islam. The result is a work of genealogy that would have been acceptable to the settled literati of most cultures but would have seemed bizarre to a tribal Arabian.

The case of Fakhr-i Mudabbir illustrates that it takes more than a scholar with a general interest in genealogy to create a work structured like the *Jamharat al-nasab*; he has to be part of a culture whose tribal thinking is so entrenched that it retains its power to create a literary genre after a century or more of gradual de-tribalisation. Had Ibn al-Kalbī not been part of this culture, we would expect his work to have looked a lot like the *Shajara-yi ansāb*. The lingering legacy of pre-Islamic tribalism was hence an important factor in the creation of the genealogically-structured history.  

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109 Szombathy discusses this from the opposite angle in *The Roots of Arabic Genealogy*. His argument in this monograph is that the way in which Ibn al-Kalbī (among others) connected various tribes to distant ancestors is a product of a literary age, and was nothing like the tribal networks as understood by the pre-Islamic Arabs. He criticises the secondary scholarship for being too credulous and for falsely
Underlying reasons for the emergence of *nasab* literature 2: The *shuʿūbiyya*

Important as tribalism no doubt was, other motivations for the creation of the genealogically-structured history can be discerned from the texts. A serious deficiency with the *nasab* format is the fact that it excludes anyone who does not fall within the work’s genealogical remit; in the case of the *Nasab Quraysh* non-Qurashīs can only appear incidentally. Attempts to include a wider scope of history (as we saw with the *Shajara-yi ansāb* above) result in works that look nothing like the genealogies we are interested in here.

But perhaps exclusion was the point. The high point of Arab genealogical historiography coincided with a number of emerging social contexts in which some felt that it was increasingly necessary to argue that the ‘Arab’ was superior to the ‘non-Arab’. These contexts included the reaction of the old elite to the marginalisation of the Arab heartlands (where many of the families detailed in the genealogical works resided), the increased veneration of the family of the Prophet (and by extension the rest of the Quraysh) and the emergence of the Islamic caste system (which would later be realised in the form of the *sayyids* and *sharifs*).

All these factors were interwoven with more general tensions between Arab and non-Arab Muslims as the former were declining in relevance while the latter were in the

presenting genealogists of this type as simply preserving knowledge rather than creating it. This does not conflict with the point made here though; Szombathy is saying that the work of Ibn al-Kalbī is less tribal than some scholars think, whereas it is argued here that the cultural context of this era is demonstrably more tribal than that of later periods.

It has been convincingly argued that this tension expressed itself in literary terms, not only in what is referred to as the *shuʿubiyya* and counter-*shuʿubiyya* writings, but also in the form of genealogy, which as noted above was becoming increasingly popular in the first century of ʿAbbāsid rule. Genealogical knowledge was valuable on both sides; for the anti-*shuʿubi* party the mass of noble names they could muster was proof of Arabian greatness, while pro-*shuʿubi* genealogists could respond by casting doubt on the genealogical claims of the Arabs or by mocking their ancestors.

This connection can be extended further. As mentioned above, the genealogies under consideration excluded non-Arabs and this may be a sign of the anti-*shuʿubi* leanings of their authors. The *Fiḥrist* notes that in addition to writing *Nasab Quraysh wa akhbārihā*, al-Jahmī also wrote *al-Intiṣār fī al-radd ʿalā al-shuʿubiyya* (tr: *The Defence of the Refutation of the Shuʿubiyya*). In addition to two genres follow a similar trajectory of popularity. The first genealogical writers emerged in the first decades after ʿAbbāsid Revolution, a period when tensions between the non-Arab secretarial classes and the Arabs were at their height. A century later, while small-scale genealogical writing in general remained popular (typically in the form of an elite family history), the authors of the universal genealogically-structured history faded away along with the decline in enthusiasm for the *shuʿubiyya*.

There is a further coincidence of timing when we consider a later period of Islamic history. In eleventh century al-Andalus there was a small revival of the *shuʿubiyya* that survives in the form of Ibn Garcia’s epistle and the responses to it. The period of this dispute coincides with the life of pro-Umayyad and pro-Arab Ibn Ḥazm who wrote a

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genealogy of his own. Genealogically organised in the traditional way and excluding non-
Arabs, his Jamharat ansāb al-ʿArab is possibly the last fine example of the
genealogically-organised history book.  

On this point we should exercise caution. Authorial motivation is rarely clear in the works of this period, and even if we had more information to hand the situation is so complex that we can never hope to definitively say if a work is motivated more by an anti-šuʿūbī stance than a pro-ʿAlid one (for example) – people then, as now, had overlapping interests and loyalties. For example, the Yemeni tribes of the Umayyad period were not above spreading šuʿūbī sentiment amongst the Copts of Fustāṭ in order to drive a wedge between the populace and the non-Yemeni Arabians who ruled them. We can also note that one of the most famous early Umayyad genealogists, Daghfal b. Ḥanẓala (active during Muʿāwiyah’s caliphate and died in 685), was according to some sources associated with Khārijite figures, Khārijism being in some ways the original expression of the šuʿūbiyya. The flourishing of genealogy in eleventh century al-Andalus may also have been due to other factors.

With these caveats however, the link between the genealogically-structured history and the šuʿūbiyya is very clear; it goes well beyond the general interest human societies have in genealogy and the specific interests of all Muslim societies in their religious heritage. The nasab genre could only have emerged in the ʿAbbāsid period where a large and closely related elite was losing its claims to religious and political authority to groups who could not be incorporated into their genealogical schema. In writing a genealogy

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119 Gibb, “Social Significance of the Shuubiya,” 66-7; Donner, Narratives of Islamic Origins, 110; Goldziher, Muslim Studies, 1:130 ff.

120 Rosenthal points to the “provincial” character of Umayyad Spain in addition to the aforementioned racial tensions (A History of Muslim Historiography (Leiden: Brill, 1952), 85).
consisting only of Arabs and structured in a way that was integral to their tribal worldview, the genealogists were providing a bold (yet ultimately fruitless) attempt to fight back against those who believed Islamic society should be more cosmopolitan and less in thrall to its Arab constituencies. These circumstances did not exist for later tribal invaders; as these groups became de-tribalised there were not enough stakeholders in their (real or imagined) pre-conquest polity to establish a literary tradition with its own Ibn al-Kalbī or al-Zubayrī. Hence the Turks and Mongols failed to produce a Nasab Seljuk or a Nasab Chingiz.

**Underlying reasons for the emergence of nasab literature 3: Shīʿism**

Far more challenging an undertaking is understanding where Shīʿism fits in with the creation and dissemination of the genealogically-structured historiography. The *shuʿūbiyya* – while certainly not without its complexities – is historiographically approachable because it was in many ways a literary movement. The place of Shīʿism in early Islamic society on the other hand goes far beyond our written sources.

Shīʿī thought is naturally interested in genealogy because of its ideological concerns; divine authority was frequently understood to be transmitted through the descendants of Muḥammad’s family and the means of this transmission was normally genealogical. It may be that the genealogically-structured history was an attempt to counter claims of Hāshimite exceptionalism; al-Zubayrī’s *Nasab Quraysh* can be seen to answer Shīʿī claims of ʿAlid prominence by subsuming the family amongst all the other Qurashī tribes, most notably the families of the first three caliphs (al-Zubayrī was himself a student of Mālik b. Anas and hence ideologically a proto-Sunni). This is arguably a statement in favour of the Four Rightly Guided caliphs model, which was emerging as a proto-Sunni doctrine in this period. But beyond this we find difficulties in pinning down al-

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Zubayrī’s ideological leanings; as Pellat has demonstrated we can see in al-Zubayrī’s family evidence of both support and hostility towards prominent Shīʿīs. Sectarian divisions were blurred in this period (which is unsurprising as the sects were still evolving) and we can only tentatively suggest direct connections between a person’s religious convictions and their authorial interests. Ibn al-Kalbī after all was the son of a very prominent Shīʿī scholar, but produced a work that was far more comprehensive than the Nasab Quraysh. In this case his antiquarianism overrode any concerns he may have had over diluting the doctrine of ʿAlid exceptionalism.

Shīʿism is not conveniently packaged in the manner of the literary shuʿūbiyya and it is hence impossible to track the relative popularity of genealogically-structured histories alongside this element of the authors’ social/religious context. There is more to be said about the effect of Shīʿism on the Nasab Quraysh as a book, but this cannot be generalised across the genre and is better reserved to the discussion of al-Zubayrī as an individual author.

**Underlying reasons for the emergence of nasab literature 4: statesponsored genealogical writing**

Some scholars link the emergence of nasab literature to a register of tribal names maintained by the caliphs known as the dīwān; they argue that the genealogists either borrowed from it directly, or were inspired to compose their own works because of its existence. But these links are poorly attested in the sources themselves and it is argued

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123 *EI* 2, s.v. “Muṣʿab” (Charles Pellat).
124 Mottahedeh argues that “The shuʿūbiyyah was primarily a literary controversy, and if it was used on rare occasions by political movements with a noticeable “ethnic” (or regional) character like the Ṣaffārīds, most shuʿūbīs were not political and were, as often as not, faithful servants of the caliphate.” From “The Shuʿūbiyah Controversy,” 162.
125 “In the first period of Islam knowledge of nasab was made necessary by the administrative needs of the dīwān” - Kister and Plessner, “Notes on Caskel’s Ḥamḥarat An-nasab,” 50; Retsō also claims the basis for Ibn al-Kalbī’s Ḥamḥarat al-nasab was ʿUmar I’s dīwān (Arabs in Antiquity, 29, referencing Rüdiger Puin’s 1970 dissertation Der Dīwān von ʿUmar). For Morimoto, the dīwān is as important as the shuʿūbiyya in understanding why the nasab genre emerged (“Formation and development,” 543).
here that newfound literacy within a tribal milieu was a more important factor in the emergence of the *nasab* tradition than the *dīwān*.

The *dīwān* itself refers to some form of register of Arab tribes that was created (supposedly by `Umar I) for the purpose of managing payments to veterans and soldiers of the early Islamic conquests. A fragment of the *dīwān* survives: dated to 685 and written in Greek, it comprises a list of Arab names that have been crossed off alongside corresponding amounts of food and money.\(^{126}\) The central register was reportedly subject to repeated revision throughout the Umayyad period; the Umayyad caliph Wafid II commissioned a genealogical work of the Arab tribes as late as 744.\(^{127}\) In terms of organisation, the central *dīwān* was probably structured genealogically, even though the payments themselves were calculated according to *sābiqa*.\(^{128}\)

As for the *dīwān*’s relationship to historiography, it is possible to connect individual historians to the register; a student of the *muḥaddith* Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhrī (who himself worked as an Umayyad tax collector and began his scholarly career by collecting his own clan’s genealogy) was said to have written works that resembled the *dīwān*.\(^{129}\) Szombathy has also collected references in historical works where genealogists are reported to have used the *dīwān* as a resource.\(^{130}\)

But we should exercise caution in making the connection between *nasab* literature and the *dīwān* too uncritically. The *dīwān* itself (whatever form it took) survives only in scant fragments and the genealogists themselves rarely refer to it as a source in their own works.


\(^{127}\) "The *dīwān*, the poems, the histories, the genealogies and the dialects of the Arabs were gathered by Al-Walīd b. Yazīd b.ʿAbd al-Malik and this collection (*dīwān*) was handed over to [the historians] Ḥammād and Jannād.” From Ibn al-Nadīm, *al-Fihrist*, p. 95 (Dodge translation pp.197-198).


\(^{129}\) *EF*, s.v. “al-Zuhrī” (Michael Lecker).

\(^{130}\) Szombathy, *The Roots of Arabic Genealogy*, 117 and 127-128.
Indeed, even where there are references, we should be cautious of written evidence for the commitment of historians of this period to the use of primary sources. As Szombathy argues with regards to Ibn al-Kalbī, claims of carrying out primary research (in this case archaeology and study of epigraphy) may be a trope.¹³¹

At the same time, it is indisputable that nasab works like those written by al-Zubayrī and Ibn al-Kalbī were based on an earlier generation of written sources - otherwise they would not have been able to exhibit the internal and external consistency demonstrated in the previous chapter.¹³² A society’s genealogical memory simply could not incorporate so many names over such a long period of time and in such a consistent fashion without recourse to writing. The question is: what form did these earlier writings take if not that of a state-sponsored register?

One possibility is that the nasab works drew on registers maintained and drawn up not by the state but by castes. Al-Zubayrī’s book in particular provides some evidence for this in the form of the large number of people for whom no further record is provided (abbreviated as NFRs). People of this type do not appear in living genealogical traditions as they get forgotten; it is unlikely therefore that al-Zubayrī was drawing solely from non-literate tribal sources. Furthermore, for many of these NFRs the Nasab Quraysh often explicitly states that a person had no descendants (inqaraḍa) which is an important expression when used in the ledgers of those who police caste systems as it cuts off people who claim descent from them. Additionally, these NFRs have been observed in the

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¹³² This is not to say that written genealogical sources in living societies are immune to abuse. See the Bāroṭs of Gujarat, genealogists for their caste who apply a pragmatic approach to who is or is not included. See A.M. Shah and R.G. Shroff, “The Vahīvancā Bāroṭs of Gujarat: A Case of Genealogists and Mythographers,” The Journal of American Folklore 71 (1958): 50. Similar pragmatism is also found within the Muslim caste of sharīfs, as demonstrated by Morimoto (“Formation and Development,” 566-568).
genealogical ledgers of the sayyids and sharīfs of the Muslim world.\textsuperscript{133} It should also be noted that the emergence of the naqīb (which denotes the office responsible for maintaining the caste’s register in any particular locality) is dated to the late ninth century - the period when the genealogically-structured history was in decline.\textsuperscript{134}

Another possibility is that the tribes of the period were writing down their genealogies not because they were trying to police a caste, but because they believed this heritage was important and in danger of being lost. This is an impulse that has been noted by anthropologists studying other newly literate tribal cultures. In one example, Bohannon observed a non-literate Tiv chieftain commission a written genealogy to aid his literate but politically inastute son; the purpose of this was to give the son authority to adjudicate in tribal disputes.\textsuperscript{135} Elsewhere in Africa, while carrying out his anthropological survey of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica, Emrys-Peters noted that whenever he approached a new group the first thing he was asked to do was to write down their genealogies.\textsuperscript{136} It should also be noted that in writing down their genealogies the postconquest Arabs had some local precedent; al-Ṭabarī refers to Ibn al-Kalbī consulting the written records of the monasteries surrounding al-Ḥira whose monks preserved the genealogies of the Banū Lakhm (an Arabian tribe who had controlled the area before the arrival of Islam).\textsuperscript{137}

It is highly likely therefore that the Arab tribes who converted to Islam and conquered the Near East used their new-found access to literacy to record their genealogies. Some of these writings would have been lost or forgotten, but others would have been reformulated and passed on; a few may have formed the basis of the caste ledgers that eventually

\textsuperscript{133} Morimoto, “Formation and Development,” 563.
\textsuperscript{136} Peters, “Proliferation of Segments,” 40–41.
\textsuperscript{137} Abū Ja’far Muhammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh rusul wa-al-mulūk, ed. M.J. de Goeje (Leiden: Brill, 1879-1901), 1:770 (all future references to the Leiden edition will be by series and not volume). Translations of passages are from The History of al-Ṭabarī, ed. Ihsan Abbas (Albany: SUNY Press, 19892007) unless otherwise stated (in this case they are from volume 4, page 150).
emerged amongst the sayyids and sharīfs in the late-ninth century. The result would have been a large number of written sources held by non-caliphal tribespeople and scholars which were eventually transmitted to compilers of genealogy such as Ibn al-Kalbī. This scenario would explain both the consistency of the extant nasab works as well as the absence of references to the use of the Umayyad dīwān as a source.

In summary, connecting the dīwān of the early Islamic period to the extant genealogical works written in the ʿAbbāsid era is certainly a tempting idea, but with our sources as they currently exist it is ultimately unprovable, and actually quite unnecessary. Tribes do not need to rely on centralised efforts to preserve their genealogy; they just need access to writing. Not only this, the accuracy of the genealogical data is better established through other means such as correlation with the historical narrative and internal consistency. Establishing both these points is a recurrent theme in this thesis.

**Concluding remarks on the social context of the nasab**

Rosenthal was wrong when he argued: “Genealogical literature starts when genealogical lines become dubious and it is felt that a literary fixation would help to clear up doubts to forestall frauds.” The study of the anthropology and the history of genealogical knowledge above shows that there is a perpetual element of dubiousness with regard to lineage – it is in fact an important feature of genealogical organisation itself as it provides it with the flexibility required to survive. The act of writing down these lineages is not the result of a literate tribe reaching breaking-point with regards to false claimants, but the consequence of a non-literate tribe gaining access to literacy before losing its tribal dynamic.

The strength of the tribal ties meant genealogies were able to survive in the collective memory of the umma long enough to be recorded; not only this, the tribal method of

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organising individuals in terms of relationships radiating outward from a central figure gave the *nasab* literature a distinctive structural form that is absent from its later imitations. Equally important were the specific tensions between those at the court who argued for and against Arab social primacy. Those who supported it could see the value of a work whose very structure specifically excluded their opponents.

The effects of Shīʿism will be discussed in the next chapter in relation to the specific interests of al-Zubayrī as this is the only way in which the subject can be adequately addressed. The Shīʿī/Sunni divide was far too ill-defined at this stage for us to be able to definitively say that a sectarian stance was more or less likely to encourage an interest in genealogy. Also discussed above was the possible role of the *dīwān* in the formation of the genealogically-structured history; we concluded that, with the evidence as it currently stands, no direct connection could be made.

We turn now from the general field of genealogically-structured histories to the work that is of central importance to this thesis; the *Nasab Quraysh*. While keeping in mind the dominant cultural factors at work in its creation, we will look at the life of al-Zubayrī and consider the contents of his one surviving book.
Chapter Three: The *Nasab Quraysh* in Context

Introduction

We have very little historiographical information on the life of al-Zubayrī. His most extensive appearances are in Ibn al-Nadīm’s *al-Fihrist* and al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī’s *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*,¹³⁹ and these sources cannot even agree on his death date or age at death; the former has him die as a 96 year old in 233 AH, while according to the latter he passes away in 236 AH at the age of 80.¹⁴⁰ The *Taʾrīkh Baghdād* provides information on people from whom he transmitted (notably Mālik b. Anas) and to whom he passed on his knowledge (which include Ibn Abī Khaythama and his nephew Zubayr b. Bakkār). Little biographical detail is provided in the *Nasab Quraysh* itself; unlike Ibn Ḥazm’s comparable work¹⁴¹ he provides no introductory remarks where he explicitly speaks of any motivations or justifications for its composition. Other sources contain even less information.¹⁴²

A different approach is therefore needed. The investigation that comprises this chapter is based on the premise that genealogical works are characterised by two rules; that the author would ordinarily include every person known to him within the remit of his work, and that he would structure it so that the most important personages are treated before the

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¹⁴⁰ Both Levi-Provencal (*Nasab Quraysh*, 14, note 3) and Pellat (*EF*, s.v. “Muṣʿab”) prefer the second estimate, meaning al-Zubayrī was probably born in 773 and died in 851.

¹⁴¹ The *Jamharat ansāb al-ʿArab* of Ibn Hazm begins with a quotation from the Qurʾān 49:13 (“We ... made you into races and tribes”) and a number of related *hadīths*. This provides explicit Prophetic justification for his endeavour which is implicitly aimed at the *shuʿābīs*.

less important. It will be shown that al-Zubayrī normally follows these rules and where he occasionally violates them, he does so in a manner concomitant with his background and social context.

The investigation will conclude that the characteristics of al-Zubayrī as indicated in his meagre historiographical presence are just as proto-Sunni, anti-shuʿūbī, and proʿAbbāsid as the characteristics of the book he wrote. But all is not quite as it seems; despite the correlation, it will also be shown that the quantitative analysis awkwardly suggests a number of reasons as to why we should think that al-Zubayrī did not actually write much of the *Nasab Quraysh* at all.

The result of our data analysis is a detailed picture of the *Nasab Quraysh* that has eluded those who have only read the book in the standard cover-to-cover fashion. It will also show that the biases of the author (whoever he was) are small-scale and normally detectable, which means that the *nasab* data is still a suitable subject of prosopographical investigation. Additionally, by applying the methodologies discussed above, we further demonstrate that the *nasab* tradition is particularly well-suited to statistical analysis.

**Absences: Who is not in the *Nasab Quraysh***?

One of the most important editorial decisions when composing a genealogically-structured history is whom to include. Normally, the genealogist does not record every name he knows about but chooses the most noble and notorious. Ibn Ḥazm and Ibn al-Kalbī follow this format quite rigidly – there are rarely instances where they include a name without a reason for its inclusion (normally they are accompanied by an anecdote or at least a job title). Al-Zubayrī is an exception though. We have already seen that he includes far more maternal information than the other two authors of similar works and this is not because the mothers in question are of any great significance; normally they are not. Not only this, al-Zubayrī also includes a lot of names with no additional information whatsoever – again, there are very few of these in other *nasab* works. This makes it all the more
significant when al-Zubayrī chooses to omit names that are found in other historical sources. Uncovering all of these missing names is beyond the remit of this thesis; instead we will target our analysis at the section we would expect al-Zubayrī to know best – that of his own family.

Our first task is to make a list of all the descendants of Zubayr b. ʿAwwām that al-Zubayrī names in the Banū Asad section of the Nasab Quraysh. The result is a list of 77 names (including the founder) and the results are presented in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of work</th>
<th>NQ</th>
<th>JN</th>
<th>AA</th>
<th>Taʾrīkh of al-Ṭabarī</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Zubayrids</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite the comprehensiveness, al-Zubayrī still misses out some of his relatives. The number of names that appear in outside works that do not appear in the Nasab Quraysh is seen in this table:

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143 Zubayrids do appear outside this section, but given their infrequency and the time it would take to collect them this investigation has been limited to a more achievable scan of the book.

144 These works were analysed in the same way as the descendants of Khalaf b. Wahb investigation in the previous chapter. A section of each book was selected for analysis; in the Jamharat al-nasab this was pages 69-75 and in the Ansāb al-ashrāf it was volume 8, pages 41-78. As before, excluded from this are names that appear only as links in patrilines. Al-Ṭabarī’s Taʾrīkh presented a particular challenge as it is not organised genealogically, making the extraction of names impossible without reading the entire work. This problem was overcome by searching for the word “Zubayr” in the Google Books scan of the Index volume of the English translation. As the name is not widely found in non-Zubayrid families, this search produced a list of page references which were then cross-checked to see if they do indeed refer to descendants of Zubayr b. ʿAwwām.
Table 3.2: Number of appearances of Zubayrids in outside works that do not appear in the *Nasab Quraysh*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of work</th>
<th>JN</th>
<th>AA</th>
<th><em>Taʾrīkh</em> of al-Ṭabarī</th>
<th>Total individuals missed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Zubayrids not named in <em>NQ</em></td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For some of these names we have no idea why al-Zubayrī omitted them. For example al-Balādhurī tells us that one of al-Zubayrī’s uncles was a *faqīh* and died in Medina at the age of 72;\(^{145}\) this is hardly ignominious yet in the *Nasab Quraysh* this person does not get a mention. Most of the others however fall into three categories, each of which tells us something about al-Zubayrī’s interests and biases. These categories are the embarrassments, the *rāwīs* and the women. These will be treated in order below.

**Absences 1: The embarrassments**

Some of the relatives al-Zubayrī chose to ‘forget’ in his genealogy were guilty of relatively minor misdemeanours. One example of this is Ḥamza b. Jaʿfar b. Zubayr, who we learn from al-Balādhurī was punished for drinking.\(^{146}\) Others however were party to much more serious offences.

We see this when we consider the only Zubayrid named in Ibn al-Kalbī’s *Jamharat al-nasab* who does not appear in the *Nasab Quraysh* - Ibn Khudayr, also known as Ibrahīm b. Muṣʿab b. Muṣʿab b. Zubayr. Al-Zubayrī does tell us a bit about Ibn Khudayr’s father, and makes sure the son is completely erased from the record by specifically saying that

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\(^{145}\) Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, 8:76.  
\(^{146}\) Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, 8:73.
Muṣʿab b. Muṣʿab (also known as Khuḍayr) produced no children except women. Ibn al-Kalbī’s entry for him gives the reason why this individual might have been excluded from the Zubayrid’s work; he was a member of the shurṭa of Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh al-Nafs al-Zakiyya.

The Nafs al-Zakiyya uprising of 762-3 is well-known as a Shīʿī attempt to overthrow the newly installed ʿAbbāsid caliphate. It was quickly crushed by the caliph al-Manṣūr but not before a number of Medinan families had joined the Shīʿī cause. Quite a few Zubayrids joined the rebellion; in addition to Ibn Khuḍayr, al-Ṭabarī and al-Balādhurī tell us of five others who also supported the uprising in various capacities. These absentees are as follows:

1) Ibn Khuḍayr, Ibrāhīm b. Muṣʿab b. Muṣʿab b. Zubayr: Ibn Khuḍayr was an active supporter of Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh from the outset and joined his shurṭa. He was eventually killed alongside his leader.

2) ‘Uthmān b. Muḥammad b. Khālid b. Zubayr: ‘Uthmān was a supporter of the rebellion, and appointed governor of Medina by Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh. He was later executed by the caliph al-Manṣūr after the uprising was put down.

3) Muḥammad b. ‘Uthmān b. Muḥammad b. Khālid b. Zubayr: As a youth, Muḥammad carried Muḥammad Nafs al-Zakiyya’s banner on behalf of his father (number 2, above). Al-Manṣūr wanted him executed following the suppression of the revolt, but he was judged a minor and flogged instead.

4) ‘Abd al-Wahhāb b. Yaḥyā b. ‘Abbād b. ‘Abd Allāh b. Zubayr: This individual was reported to have joined the revolt in an unknown capacity.


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147 Al-Zubayrī, Nasab Quraysh, 50.
148 The following details are taken from al-Ṭabarī’s version of events which can be found on pages 3:189-266 of the Leiden edition, and pages 142-231 of volume 28 in the translation.
6) **Khālid b. ʿUthmān b. Khālid b. Zubayr** (from al-Balādhurī only):\(^{149}\) Khālid joined the rebellion in an unspecified capacity and was subsequently crucified by al-Manṣūr.

None of these men appear in the *Nasab Quraysh*. Not all the Zubayrids were unanimous in their support for the uprising however; al-Ṭabarī tells us of two Zubayrids who were against Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh. They are the following:

1) **Khubayb b. Thābit b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Zubayr**: Khubayb was one of the four ‘leading citizens’ to stay away from Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh at the outset of the rebellion.

2) **Nāfīʿ b. Thābit b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Zubayr**: Nāfīʿ refused to meet Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh at the outset of the uprising and when eventually brought forth he tells the rebel “I simply have no sympathy for what you intend to do.”

Unsurprisingly, both men are spared excision by al-Zubayrī; he is clearly cleaning up his family’s past in this section by editing out family members who supported the Nafs al-Zakiyya uprising while including those who were known to have opposed it. There are a couple of caveats; the men who voiced their opposition to the uprising are the author’s uncles (which may explain their presence) and if al-Zubayrī was proud of their refusal to join the uprising we would have thought he would mention these incidents (which he does not). There is also evidence of some squeamishness in general with regard to the uprising; ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Muṭṭalib b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Makhzūmī for instance is named in al-Ṭabarī as a supporter of Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh and that he even worked as a judge under him.\(^{150}\) But although he gains an extensive entry in al-Zubayrī’s work with a couple of stories, no mention is made of his appointment under the pretender’s brief rule; we are told that he only operated as a judge for the ʿAbbāsid caliphs al-Manṣūr and al-Mahdī.\(^{151}\)

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\(^{149}\) Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, 8:64.


\(^{151}\) *Nasab Quraysh*, 341-342.
Despite these qualifications, the involvement of the Zubayrid family in the uprising (which happened only a decade before al-Zubayrī himself was born) must have been a lingering source of embarrassment to members of the clan. Not only were they connected to a failed rebellion but al-Zubayrī’s father and brother both had successful political careers under the ‘Abbāsid; his father was a companion to three caliphs and was awarded governorships of Yamāma, Medina and Yemen. His son, Bakkār (al-Zubayrī’s brother) also served as Hārūn’s governor of Medina, a post he held for 13 years (though according to al-Balādhurī he was not popular with the local population). Bakkār’s son Zubayr (author of the *Jamharat nasab Quraysh wa akhbārihā*) would be appointed a tutor to the son of Mutawakkil and was also assigned by this caliph to be the *qāḍī* of Mecca around 855 CE.

These close ties to the ‘Abbāsid dynasty may also explain why later historians were keen to preserve the misdemeanours of al-Zubayrī’s relations; the court environment is not always a friendly one, and a person could gain an advantage by recalling the details of a rival’s embarrassing relatives. These memories ultimately outlived al-Zubayrī. Writing in the late ninth/early tenth century, al-Ṭabarī reports that when al-Manṣūr was told that the two families most involved in the Nafs al-Zakiyya uprising were the descendants of ‘Umar b. Khaṭṭāb and Zubayr b. ‘Awwām, his response is: “Were I to find a thousand from al-Zubayr’s family, all of them good except for one evildoer, I would kill the whole lot. But if I were to find a thousand of ‘Umar’s family, all of them evil except for one good man, I would forgive the whole lot.”

Further evidence that the Zubayrids had political enemies is seen in two rather peculiar incidences involving the deaths of al-Zubayrī’s father and brother as recorded in al-

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Ṭabarī. In the first, 'Abd Allāh b. Muṣʿab accuses the imprisoned Yaḥyā b. 'Abd Allāh (brother of the rebel Muḥammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyyah) of fomenting a plot against the caliph Hārūn, which the 'Alid denies. Yaḥyā and 'Abd Allāh both swear oaths that should they be lying about this, God should strike them down. 'Abd Allāh dies shortly after swearing the oath.

In the second incident, something remarkably similar happens to his son Bakkār. Once again, the trigger is a spat between the Zubayrid and the imprisoned Yaḥyā b. 'Abd Allāh. Bakkār accuses Yaḥyā of introducing evil into Medina; the 'Alid retorts by saying that after his brother’s uprising was crushed, he was approached by Bakkār who cursed the one who had killed Muḥammad and then recited a 20 verse elegy for the dead pretender. Bakkār then promised his allegiance to Yaḥyā. In response to hearing this the caliph forces both men to swear an oath to the truth: again the Zubayrid dies shortly afterwards. However, al-Ṭabarī also gives us a Zubayrid version of events where Bakkār is killed by his wife out of jealousy for acquiring a concubine.

Neither event appears in the Nasab Quraysh and the second account is even more problematic when we try to calculate Bakkār’s age at the alleged swearing of allegiance to Yaḥyā. But the point here is not to decide whether or not these things actually happened; instead we should note the incredibly long period of time damage to a family’s reputation could last (al-Ṭabarī was writing around a century after these events). Al-Zubayrī was of a generation that understood the power of historical writing to preserve

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155 An element of this incident also appears in Abū al-Faraj al-Iṣbahānī, Maqāṭil al-Tālibiyīn (Tehran: Muasasah-i Matbuati-i Ismailiyan, 1970), 285, though this only tells us that 'Abd Allāh and his father Muṣ ab both revolted with Muḥammad Nafs al-Zakiyya.


159 If Bakkār’s brother Muṣ'ab was born in 773 (as discussed above), and if we guess the minimum age Bakkār must have been to make a meaningful oath was 15 years old, then there must have been a gap of around 25 years between the two brothers’ ages. This is by no means impossible, but casts further doubt on an already unlikely story.
this genealogical baggage; hence the trimming of his family tree of its more embarrassing branches.\textsuperscript{160} It may even explain why he chose to write the work in the first place.\textsuperscript{161}

**Absences 2: Rāwīs and recent generations**

The second significant group of absentees are the Zubayrids who appear only as rāwīs in al-Ṭabarī’s *Taʾrīkh*. They are the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Appearance in al-Ṭabarī</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Going by the number of generations that connected them, the men in question would have been contemporaries or near contemporaries of al-Zubayrī, meaning that he must have known them. It is possible that he did not include them because they were unremarkable in every respect except ḥadīth transmission, but the *Nasab Quraysh* contains a lot of people who do not seem to have achieved anything of note.

\textsuperscript{160} Genealogists were not the only ones to reveal their colours through omission; Rosenthal argues that historians of other genres can be guilty of the same thing (*A History of Muslim Historiography*, 57).

\textsuperscript{161} Despite all these courtly shenanigans, Tarif Khalidi claims that “Unlike the Alids, who were often to rise in rebellion against both Umayyads and Abbassids, the Zubayrid clan was quietist, channelling its talents into religious scholarship and literature” (*Arabic Historical Thought in the Classical Period* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 52). Neither the involvement of the Zubayrids in the Nafs al-Zakiyya revolt nor the gubernatorial careers of al-Zubayrī’s brother and father receive mentions. In the absence of any other explanation, this treatment is typical of the short shrift genealogists in general and al-Zubayrī in particular receive in the secondary scholarship.

\textsuperscript{162} Al-Samʿānī’s *al-Ansāb* records two other Zubayrid contemporaries of al-Zubayrī who are similarly absent from the *Nasab Quraysh*; they too are rāwīs (al-Samʿānī, *Kitāb al-Ansāb*, 6:266).
Another possible explanation is that the very fact that they were contemporaries excluded them from the *Nasab Quraysh*. The book as a whole seems largely indifferent to the more recent generations, and we can see this when we track the data over time. The following graph shows how the frequency of fathers and children as they appear in the *Nasab Quraysh* changes by generation.\(^{163}\)

**Graph 3.1: Number of fathers and children in the *Nasab Quraysh* over time**

The graph indicates a distinct bulge in the data. The number of entries increases rapidly three generations before Muḥammad (who was of the fifth generation), and declines rapidly three generations after it (this coincides with the generation that saw the fall of the Umayyads during their adulthood). The first observation is that this is clearly not the product of a non-literate tribal informant of the sort familiar to anthropologists. There is far too much data for a start; where a non-literate genealogist of a living tribal culture might be expected to accurately remember around 150 names, the *Nasab Quraysh* can

\(^{163}\) ‘Fathers’ here refer to men for whom we know at least the maternal status of their children; ‘children’ are people for whom at least maternal status is known. Generation 0 is that of Quṣayy for reasons explained in the previous chapter. Generations prior to Generation -6 are ignored as these generations contain only one entry in the ‘father’ category.
produce a database naming 2,938 people.\textsuperscript{164} Furthermore, the data do not have the distribution we would expect them to have if they were from a non-literate tribal environment. Rather than the greatest number of records clustering around the generation of the informant (Generation 10 in al-Zubayrī’s case), the peak of the distribution here is around Muḥammad’s generation.

This is to be expected; al-Zubayrī was indeed the product of a highly literate culture and it is unsurprising that the \textit{Nasab Quraysh} should reflect this. The generations around Muḥammad’s also produce the greatest number of significant early Muslim figures, in particular the Companions and their wives. But even so, al-Zubayrī seems remarkably uninterested in the generations surrounding his own; the tenth to thirteenth generations (i.e. his contemporaries at time of writing) contain records only 20 men who had childbearing marriages out of a total of 813 men of this type in the whole book. This ambivalence over things contemporary extends to his own family; we know nothing of his mother or grandmother, and he does not include himself. Even the ‘Abbāsid caliphs are treated only cursorily; only the first two gain proper genealogical entries (and here only as children, not as fathers); the others only appear as incidental characters in non-‘Abbāsid entries. This means eight ‘Abbāsid caliphs who reigned during al-Zubayrī’s lifetime do not appear as full entries. All-in-all, al-Zubayrī seems remarkably reticent about mentioning anyone who might have actually read his book or heard it being performed.

The theory suggested here is that the \textit{Nasab Quraysh} is only part of a more complete work; the missing part being the oral supplement to the written text. Al-Zubayrī did not record the generations closest to him in writing because he knew these very well, and his audience would probably have known them too. The generations most liable to be forgotten (or disputed) would be those further in the past. The decline in data also follows closely the three generational limit of genealogical memory observed by anthropologists;

\textsuperscript{164} These are people for whom we know the name of the father and the status of the father; the actual number of people named is higher.
as a member of Generation 10, his personal genealogical memory would have extended to Generation 7, which is where this decline starts. The caliphs and contemporaries of al-Zubayrī would not be offended at their exclusion from the written portion of the work because they were not meant to see the physical copy; the Nasab Qurasyh was essentially a notebook.\textsuperscript{165}

Extending this theory we can argue that had literary and social fashions not changed then the Nasab Quraysh would have been added to as each generation and tribe would ‘adopt’ it as al-Zubayrī had done. They would have supplemented the work with the entries that their audience were forgetting, take out the ones that had ceased to be relevant (or were embarrassing), and use the resulting work as a support to their oral performances of genealogy. But as shown in the previous chapter, the great era of genealogical writing of this style was coming to an end, and al-Zubayrī’s notebook became frozen in time.\textsuperscript{166} The rāwīs present in al-Ṭabarī’s records but absent in the Nasab Quraysh are not the victims of their clansman’s purge – they are guilty of nothing except being alive at the time the book was written.

**Absences 3: Women**

The embarrassments and recent rāwīs account for nine of the 23 absent records. This leaves one last major group of absentees – eight women. These are all daughters of Zubayr b. ‘Awwām, and they are named in al-Balādhurī alongside their brothers, but in the Nasab Quraysh they are reduced to the word ‘niswatan’ (tr: women).\textsuperscript{167}

\textsuperscript{165} Again, this confirms Schoeler’s theories on the nature of the preservation and performance of historical memory in the first two centuries of Islam (\textit{Genesis of Literature}).

\textsuperscript{166} This is particularly interesting because the final link in the chain of transmission recorded in the extent version is a seventh generation descendant of the Umayyad caliph Hishām b. ‘Abd al-Malik; despite this he does not seem to have used his position as a transmitter to fill in the details of his more recent family ancestry so does not go beyond Hishām’s grandchildren (i.e. five generations before his own). Although it is has been shown that al-Zubayrī has less interest in his contemporaries than those of earlier generations, he still retains some interest in them (he includes his brother and father after all). His attitude to genealogical writing is hence very different to that of the Umayyad transmitter living a century and a half later.

\textsuperscript{167} Al-Balādhurī, \textit{Ansāb al-ashrāf}, 8:58; al-Zubayrī, \textit{Nasab Quraysh}, 236.
The *Nasab Quraysh* is in general biased against recording daughters as opposed to sons; the database has 2328 sons to 610 daughters, which is roughly four times as many. But the proportions become even more skewed when we look at the section concerning the Banū Asad, of which the Zubayrids were a constituent part.

Beginning with Asad’s father (Generation 1) as our starting point, there are 162 children named in this section. 14 of these are girls, 8.64% of the total. This is far below the Qurashī average as recorded in the *Nasab Quraysh*; in the book as a whole 20.76% of the children with identified parents are female. For some reason the Zubayrid section – the section we would expect the author to known best – has significantly less information on women than the others.

This cohort also has slightly fewer children per father than the Qurashī average; 3.31 per man as opposed to 3.62. If we multiplied the number of recorded fathers for whom we have named children in the section (49) by the Qurashī average of 3.62, we would expect to find 177 children – 15 more than the actual amount recorded. If we assume that these forgotten children are all female, we would get a total of 29 girls in a cohort of 177 children, which gives us a proportion of 16.35% - a significant improvement on our earlier figure. It is clear that in this section there are people missing, and it is likely that these people are women.

This absence is most striking amongst the descendants of Zubayr b. ʿAwwām himself. Not a single one of the 49 named children for whom maternal status is known is female despite this section including some very significant figures, such the caliph ʿAbd Allāh b. Zubayr and the traditionist ʿUrwa b. Zubayr. In their place, we are told that a number of men had daughters (*niswatan*), but these women remain unnamed.

Yet the names of these daughters were not only known to al-Balādhurī and al-Ṭabarī (who were writing several decades after al-Zubayrī died) but also to al-Zubayrī himself – five Zubayrid daughters appear in the Banū Asad section of the *Nasab Quraysh* as wives, and
at least one more appears outwith this section. As they are left out of their fathers’ sub-sections, we do not know the names or statuses of their mothers, hence their absence from the database.

These women were not excluded for being of recent generations like the rāwīs – the daughters were of early generations and born to important figures. There is (with the one exception of the Zubayrid woman who had a child by Muḥammad Nafs al-Zakiyya) also no evidence that they were excluded for being embarrassments like the male supporters of the 'Alid rebellion mentioned above.

In the absence of any other explanations, it is most likely that al-Zubayrī omitted his female relatives simply because he did not think them important enough to be named in the context of a father’s children. If this is the case, then it raises a further question – if he did not think the Zubayrid women were important enough for inclusion in the Nasab Quraysh, why did he not omit the daughters of the non-Zubayrid families? The proportion of women in the Banū Asad section would not be so far below average if the editorial policy had been universally applied. And why is Fākhita bt. Fulaykh b. Muḥammad b. Mundhir b. Zubayr excluded from the Zubayrid section of the Nasab Quraysh but mentioned in the entry for Muḥammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya where we are told she bore him a son?168

This leads us to suggest that there is more than one editorial policy evident in the Nasab Quraysh and – as will be shown through further evidence below - this is probably because the work had multiple authors. Al-Zubayrī’s policy was to include women only when they produced children and even here only in their husbands’ entries; they would not be listed alongside their brothers in their fathers’ entries. From this, it appears that al-Zubayrī did not write much of the Nasab Quraysh; he acquired the bulk of it off someone else and then revised his own family’s section before passing it on to his students.

168 Al-Zubayrī, Nasab Quraysh, 54 (for Muḥammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya’s wives); 244 (for Mundhir b. Zubayr’s wives).
Nor is this the only instance where we find evidence of multiple editorial strategies. In the following section it will be argued that the constituent parts of the *Nasab Quraysh* exhibit internal structures, and that the rules governing these structures also break down in the Zubayrid section. We will begin by explaining these structures as they exist in the non-Zubayrid sections. This will not only lay the groundwork for understanding al-Zubayrī’s authorship, but will also add to our argument that the *Nasab Quraysh* should be seen as a pro-ʿAbbāsid, proto-Sunni and somewhat anti-Shīʿī work.

**The arrangement of the *Nasab Quraysh***

The purpose of this chapter is to gain a better understanding of the *Nasab Quraysh* by comparing it to other related works. So far this has been done by comparing its genealogical remit to that of other *nasab* works; where we find omissions, we have suggested reasons for this, and these reasons are often found in the social context of the author. The following section aims to continue this by comparing not the content of the *Nasab Quraysh* but its structure. It will again be shown that where a genealogist has editorial freedom, he often uses this to display his ideological background.

The ‘classical’ structure of a genealogy is the following. If the remit of a genealogist includes Muḥammad he is put at the beginning of the work and everyone else radiates away from him. After dealing with Muḥammad, his wives and his children, the genealogist has to move to the next closest link – the generation of his father. In Muḥammad’s case, the father did not produce any children other than the Prophet which means that the genealogist can then move to the marriages and progeny of one of Muḥammad’s many uncles.

At this point the genealogist has options in terms of ordering. This is important because there is evidence in wider Islamic literature that the ordering of lists of individuals reflects the affiliations of the person doing the ordering. This has been noted by Muḥammad
Zaman, whose translation provides the following passage from Sunnī legal scholar Yaḥyā b. Maʾīn’s Taʾrīkh:

[Abū’l Faḍl al-ʿAbbās b. Muḥammad b. Hātim b. al-Dūrī, the transmitter of Yaḥyā b. Maʾīn’s Taʾrīkh, said:] I said to Yaḥyā: What about one who says: Abū Bakr and ʿUmar and ʿUthmān [were legitimate caliphs]? [Yaḥyā] said: He is correct [muṣīb]; and one who says Abū Bakr and ʿUmar and ʿUthmān and ʿAlī is [also] correct. He who says Abū Bakr and ʿUmar and ʿAlī and ʿUthmān is a Shīʿī, but one who says Abū Bakr and ʿUmar and ʿUthmān, and stops at that, is correct. Yaḥyā said: I say. Abū Bakr and ʿUmar and ʿUthmān and ʿAlī. This is our doctrine (madhhab) and our position (qawlunā).169

Yaḥyā b. Maʾīn was a contemporary of al-Zubayrī (they died within a year of each other) and was also connected to the ʿAbbāsid court; he was even summoned along with Ibn Sāʿd as part of al-Maʾmūn’s miḥna.170 The passage above shows that for some people in al-Zubayrī’s milieu, the ordering of names (and not just inclusion) was an important marker of doctrinal allegiance.

Similarly, the Nasab Quraysh appears to prioritise certain lines over others. For instance, when it comes to Muḥammad’s uncles the work first goes to ʿAbbās (founder-figure of the ʿAbbāsid dynasty) before Abū Ṭālib (father of ʿAlī) despite the fact that ʿAbbās was by far the younger man and was not a figure of any great repute. This decision with ordering therefore fits the pro-ʿAbbāsid, proto-Sunni image we are developing of the author. The Shīʿī Ibn al-Kalbī on the other hand swaps the order around in his Jamharat al-nasab.171

170 EI², s.v. “Yaḥyā b. Maʾīn” (F. Leemhuis); al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, Leiden edition 3:1116; (translation 32:204).
This practice of placing the more important names as early as possible in the genealogical schema is exhibited in the other sections of the *Nasab Quraysh*. Looking at the Taym b. Murra section, we see that the first genealogical line is the one that includes Abū Bakr. It appears like this:


Identifying Abū Bakr as the locus of this line is not clear-cut; it could be that it is one of his descendants whom the genealogist really thinks is the most important, and Abū Bakr is simply a link in the chain that leads to the more relevant figure. But although this may be the case in instances such as the Zubayrids and ‘Alids (families that have a lot of famous names spanning generations), in general it is quite clear whom the genealogist is prioritising.

Additional proof that Abū Bakr is the locus can be found when we can look at the number ‘splits’ in his ancestry that the genealogist could have taken that would not have led directly to the caliph. So in the example above, the genealogist could have followed the lines of ‘Uthmān b. ‘Amr, Jud‘ān b. Ka‘b, ‘Abd Manāf b. Ka‘b and ‘Āmir b. Ka‘b in order to relegate Abū Bakr. Instead, these lines are pursued only after Abū Bakr and his descendants have been addressed. This is evidence of the genealogist making a decision regarding the way in which he is intending to structure his data.

This decision making can also be seen in a number of other families:

'Abd al-Dār b. Quṣayy – this section selects the lineage of the companion and early convert Ṭalḥa over three other lineages that would have excluded him (other lineages split at Shurāqḥ b. ‘Uthmān (p.253), ‘Abd Manāf b. ‘Abd al-Dār (p.254), Sabbix b. ‘Abd al-Dār (p.256)).

Zuhra b. Kilāb – this section goes directly to a female – Muḥammad’s mother, Āmina bt. Wahb (p. 261).172 This is selected over two other lineages (other lineages split at Uhayb b. ‘Abd Manāf (p.263), Ḥārith b. Zuhra (p.265)).

Makhzūm – this very large section also goes first to a female, Ḥantama bt. Hāshim, who was the mother of the caliph ‘Umar. Her line is selected over her ten uncles and numerous great-uncles (p. 301).

If this is accurate, then the placing of Abū Ṭalib after ‘Abbās is a sign of a pro’Abbāsid/anti-Shī‘ī slant to the Nasab Quraysh. We may also see similar forces at work in the later nasab work of the Ḥanbali jurist Ibn Qudāma al-Maqdisi (d. 1223), the Tabyīn fī ansāb al-Qurashiyyīn.173 After dealing with Muḥammad’s family, the book names the people who wrote for Muḥammad (this includes some non-Qurashiš). Only then are the uncles’ families addressed, beginning with Ḥārith b. ‘Abd al-Muṭṭalib. Particular attention is devoted to Ḥārith’s son Nawfal, who was the progenitor of a long line of historians.174 Abū Sufyān b. Abī Ṭālib is then addressed, and only then does Abū Ṭalib appear – even here, his most famous son ‘Alī is the last to appear amongst his brothers. Then the other uncles appear, and finally ‘Abbās. ‘Abbās and Abū Ṭalib are also relegated towards the end in the nasab of Ibn Ḥazm (a pro-Umayyad Sunni of eleventh century Spain), though are not quite the last of ‘Abd al-Muṭṭalib’s sons to appear (this distinction goes to Ḥārith then Abū Lahab).

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172 Strangely, Wahb does not get his own entry which would include his wife and their connection to a daughter. Āmina’s mother is hence only mentioned in Muḥammad’s entry as part of a matriline (al-Zubayrī, Nasab Quraysh, 20-21).


174 EI2, s.v. “al-Nawfalī” (Charles Pellat).
In the examples above there appears to be some correlation between the interests of the author and the genealogical ordering, though in some cases we struggle to find an explanation. In Ibn Qudāma’s case, we can see evidence of his love of scholarship and being somewhat anti-Shi‘i in his nasab work, though it is harder to explain the relegation of the `Abbāsids.\footnote{Ibn Qudāma came from a family of prominent Hanbalite scholars. He lived in Damascus, though also spent several years in Baghdad where the `Abbāsid caliphs were still ruling. He also took part in Saladin’s conquest of Jerusalem (\textit{EF}, s.v. “Ibn Ḳudāma al-Maḳdīsī” (G. Makdisi)).} In Ibn Ḥazm’s case, the relegation of the `Abbāsids and `Alids to the end with the hated Abū Lahab is perhaps understandable given the author’s pro-Umayyad political views,\footnote{\textit{EF}, s.v. “Ibn Ḥazm” (R. Arnaldez).} but the appearance of Ḥārith and his children in the same place is harder to explain given the family’s connections to historians and early converts.

If the placing of important figures at the beginnings of genealogies tells us something about the biases of the author, it correlates with what we know about al-Zubayrī from his biographies; the structure of the \textit{Nasab Quraysh} in this regard is proto-Sunni, pro-`Abbāsid and to some extent anti-Shi‘i. We should also note in this context the treatment of `Alī’s mother. While Muḥammad and `Umar’s mothers are placed at the front of their respective genealogies,\footnote{While `Uthmān and Abū Bakr’s mothers do not appear first in their genealogies it should be noted that they belong to the same tribal grouping as their sons; they are hence out-ranked.} `Alī’s mother Fāṭima bt. Asad b. Hāshim appears only after every other descent line of Hāshim has been dealt with. This means she is outranked by the largely unremarkable lineages of her paternal uncles Abū Ṣayfī and Naḍla. When she does appear, the \textit{Nasab Quraysh} does not name `Alī as her son - it is simply stated that Fāṭima gave birth to all of Abū Tālib’s children.\footnote{Al-Zubayrī, \textit{Nasab Quraysh}, 91.} This is significant because when the mothers of all the other caliphs appear in their family sections, their famous progeny are named alongside them.\footnote{Page 294 of al-Zubayrī’s \textit{Nasab Quraysh} for Abū Bakr’s mother; page 301 for `Umar’s mother; page 147 for `Uthmān’s mother.}

But the fore-fronting of important personages in the \textit{Nasab Quraysh} does not occur in one important instance – the section on the Zubayrids. We would expect that the line of
Zubayr b. 'Awwām and his son 'Abd Allāh to appear first amongst the descendants of Asad (no-one else in the family could rival these two men for importance in the history of early Islam) but instead the organisation of the section takes the slowest possible route to get to Zubayr and his descendants.

Moreover, this is not the only way in which the expected structuring breaks down in the Zubayrid section. In the rest of the *Nasab Quraysh*, the information is transmitted in a very strict form; a person is introduced along with all their children and the women they had them by. Only then do we move on to details of the children’s children. The Zubayrid section does not rigidly adhere to this. When discussing 'Abd Allāh b. Zubayr’s children the *Nasab Quraysh* first lists those born to his wife Tumādir; it then provides further details on the marriages and descendants of these children before moving on to the children of the next of Ibn al-Zubayr’s wives with their descent details, and so on. This unusual format happens again with Muṣʿab b. Zubayr’s children some pages later.

This again shows that there is evidence for multiple editorial politices at work in the *Nasab Quraysh*. Al-Zubayrī does not flatter his family as we would expect him to based on the the preferential ordering given to other prominent Muslims in the work; perhaps he was either unaware of the potency of ordering names, or simply did not find it particularly compelling as an insult or compliment. The organisational structure also breaks down in this section with the descendants of children being nestled within the entries for their fathers; this does not a feature anywhere else in the *Nasab Quraysh*.

**Who wrote the *Nasab Quraysh***?

The Zubayrid section stands out for a number of reasons: its absence of daughters; the way it places its most significant actors towards the end; and the way internal organisation differs from that used in other families. The best explanation for this is that al-Zubayrī

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was far more involved in the transmission of this section than he was for the others. Our analysis of this is by no means complete; there are very probably other parts of the *Nasab Quraysh* on which al-Zubayrī left his fingerprints (most likely in the more recent generations) that remain undiscovered. But even with our preliminary findings we are in a position to outline a theory of where the *Nasab Quraysh* came from and what al-Zubayrī’s connection to it really was.

It is suggested here that the *Nasab Quraysh* as it exists today is only the written part of a more complete performance that included oral delivery. The written component was for the most part not original research by al-Zubayrī; the contrasting editorial standards employed in the non-Zubayrid sections (i.e. the structuring and the inclusion of women) are evidence that another scholar – one who evidently shared al-Zubayrī’s proto-Sunni, pro-‘Abbāsid, somewhat anti-Shī‘ī views – did the bulk of this work. At some point al-Zubayrī acquired this work (either in written form or as an oral performance) from the unknown genealogist. The historiography that formed the written element of this performance included a section on the Zubayrids that al-Zubayrī did not find flattering so when he came to pass an authorised copy of this work onto his student Ibn Abī Khaythama he revised this part while leaving much of the rest intact.

This transmission could not have been entirely oral otherwise al-Zubayrī would have had the opportunity to drop the awkward marriage of his Zubayrid relative from Muḥammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya’s section and remove the female names in the rest of the book as he read it out. It may have been that he asked the student to copy the work in its entirety apart from the Zubayrid section; al-Zubayrī would then be able to deliver the ‘correct’ version of this genealogy in oral form for Ibn Abī Khaythama to write down. Alternatively, the revised version was inserted into the manuscript prior to transmission and the student simply copied the whole work.

There is evidence for this sort of non-oral transmission in the period. Mālik b. Anas – a teacher of al-Zubayrī – is specifically named as someone who handed out official versions
of his Kitāb al-Muwaṭṭa without a corresponding oral performance.\textsuperscript{182} Also of interest is the fact that although al-Zubayrī’s book as it survives today was passed through a further three links, these links have not smoothed out the jarring differences between editorial systems. Al-Zubayrī’s reformulation appears to be the final one, which correlates well with Chase Robinson’s observation that redactions in other historical genres were also stabilising in this era.\textsuperscript{183}

In terms of who was responsible for writing the original Nasab Quraysh, al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī tells us that al-Zubayrī gained his knowledge of nasab from al-Wāqidī.\textsuperscript{184} This would seem to fit; al-Wāqidī was a contemporary, and although Ibn al-Nadīm suggests he had Shīʿī leanings, Leder does not find that this is particularly evident from his actual writing.\textsuperscript{185} But while al-Wāqidī is precisely the sort of proto-Sunni, pro-ʿAbbāsid historian we could imagine being behind a work like the Nasab Quraysh, these characteristics were common to a lot of scholars of the period. Nor does Ibn al-Nadīm provide us with a record of al-Wāqidī having written a genealogy of the Quraysh.\textsuperscript{186} We should not forget that al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī was writing a long time after the supposed transmission took place and while there is so much more work we can do with the actual text we should not spend too long speculating on the veracity of these meagre biographical notes.

**Conclusion**

The purpose of this chapter was not to provide a ‘life and times’ of al-Zubayrī as this is not possible with the available source material. Instead the aim was to establish the


\textsuperscript{183} C. Robinson, Islamic Historiography, 34-38.

\textsuperscript{184} Al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Taʾrīkh Baghdad, 13:114.

\textsuperscript{185} EI\textsuperscript{2}, s.v. “al-Wāqidī” (S. Leder).

\textsuperscript{186} Ibn al-Nadīm’s al-Fihrist does however mention that al-Wāqidī wrote a book on ʿUmar I’s organization of the dīwān along genealogical lines (page 144 in the Arabic edition).
grounds upon which we can claim that the *Nasab Quraysh* is a suitable source for generating a prosopographical database. By using traditional historiographical approaches we have been able to place the work in the social context of the maturing ʿAbbāsid caliphate, and by supplementing this with quantitative methods we have for the first time been able to identify anomalies within the *Nasab Quraysh*. Our best explanation for these anomalies is that rather than being an active collector, compiler and editor of a genealogy, al-Zubayrī instead inherited a largely complete version of the genealogy of the Quraysh which he adapted with regard to his own family (and possibly contemporaries), but otherwise left untouched.

This is a significant discovery for a number of reasons, not least because it gives us such a clear insight into medieval Islamic notions of authorship and the nature of literary transmission. But it is also a problematic discovery because by shining a light on al-Zubayrī’s limited contribution the bulk of the work becomes authorless. There is no indication as to where al-Zubayrī got the work in the first place and although this is not surprising given the time period it was produced, it is somewhat frustrating.

Nonetheless, as far as the current investigation is concerned the most important finding is that the historiographical analysis above has not provided us with any compelling reason as to why we should not trust the marriage data as recorded in the *Nasab Quraysh*. So far, where the biases of the author(s) have been found in the text, these can be characterised as being limited. The high degree of correlation between the *Nasab Quraysh* and other sources, the nature of the memory that preserved it and the anthropological arguments in favour of its accuracy all come together and give us grounds for justifying the investigations into the data that constitute the remainder of this thesis.
Part Two - Data analysis and application

Introduction to Part Two

Part One of this thesis focused on the nature of the marital records in the *Nasab Quraysh* and outlined the ways in which we intend to extract this data. Part Two moves onto the analysis itself, and demonstrates how quantitative methodologies can be used to provide a narrative of social change amongst the Quraysh in the period 500-750 CE. We are particularly interested in patterns of exogamy and endogamy, and how these were affected by the arrival of Islam.

Two recurring themes of Part Two should be highlighted at this stage. The first is the ongoing question of reliability. The prosopographical analysis we are undertaking only works if we believe the marriage records of the *nasab* tradition to be broadly accurate. While this issue was discussed at some length in Part One, the investigations below will provide a crucial additional component to the argument for the veracity of the data; this is the connection between historical trends when statistically measured and historical events as recorded in the non-genealogical sources. Because the trends revealed by the quantitative analysis could not have been apparent to the authors, in the absence of a historiographical explanation for their existence, we can conclude that the data are a generally accurate record of child-bearing unions as they actually occurred.

The second issue is the nature of endogamy and exogamy itself. This seemingly simple concept (the degree to which the members of a group marry each other rather than outsiders) actually belies a huge amount of complexity. People are never members of a single group throughout their lives; instead, they have multiple identities which change over time. Because of this, a seemingly unremarkable ‘inside’ marriage in one generation can become strikingly ‘outside’ in the next. Fortunately, a lot of the groundwork in handling this problematic issue has already been carried out by sociologists studying
people living in much more recent eras. Before we move onto the analysis of Quraysh marriage patterns, we will briefly explore the problems surrounding exogamy/endogamy in general and propose a framework for inquiry borrowed from the discipline of sociology.

**Exogamy and Endogamy**

The study of the degree of relatedness between marriage partners has a long history in Western academia. The terms exogamy and endogamy were first coined by the anthropologist John McLennan in his *Primitive Marriage* published in 1865, and this was symptomatic of a wider fascination with genetics and degrees of relation in the Victorian era. Charles Darwin himself was particularly concerned with this subject as his research had given him an insight into the health risks caused by inbreeding, which was of relevance to him as he had married his cousin.

The issue of the degrees of relatedness in terms of child-bearing partnership is as much an obsession today as it was in the Victorian era, though this is now largely driven by a perceived need to measure the integration of religious, ethnic and immigrant minorities. As a result, the issue of exogamy and endogamy is served by a wealth of information and approaches that have accumulated over the course of 150 years of academic and non-academic study. These approaches are now a lot more sophisticated than they were in McLennan’s day and not only in terms of the theory that underpins them; sociologists today have enormous amounts of data available to them and increasingly sophisticated tools for their analysis.

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189 A recent paper drawing on a number of different studies and introducing some of the advanced analytical tools readily available to sociologists today is Matthijs Kalmijm and Frank van Tubergen’s “A Comparative Perspective on Intermarriage: Explaining Differences Among National-Origin Groups in the United States,” *Demography* 47, no. 2 (2010): 459–479.
The majority of these tools and approaches are not relevant to us in our present study. While the 3,000 people in our database may represent a remarkable feat of pre-modern genealogical preservation, compared to modern resources (namely censuses and surveys), the *Nasab Quraysh* is extremely thin on detail. While this is frustrating in one respect, it also means that the data can be studied with the general audience in mind - no sophisticated mathematical knowledge will be required for anything that follows.

The modern studies provide us with two very useful ideas. The first is the universal agreement that linking trends in marriage to wider social and historical changes is an intellectually fruitful endeavour; the only disagreements are over how this connection can best be explained. The second is that sociologists can provide us with a basic framework of inquiry for marriage behaviour that we can borrow from.

The framework that will be used in this thesis is based on the following model, as described by Kalmijn:

Marriage patterns arise from the interplay between three social forces: the preferences of individuals for certain characteristics in a spouse, the influence of the social group of which they are members, and the constraints of the marriage market in which they are searching for a spouse.190

In terms of the first, Kalmijn explains that the preference of the individual effectively relates to whether or not they share norms and values. This is of limited relevance when applied to our study; the Quraysh can be assumed to have a high degree of cultural homogeneity during their pre-conquest history as they all lived in the same geographic area. Though cultural differences may have emerged in later times (such as between the

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Damascene Umayyads and the Zubayrīds who remained in the Hijāz), we have no way of recovering the possible effects of these changes from our sources.

The other two factors are far more relevant. The influence of the social group relates to the ability and desire of a cohort to police the marriage market, normally through preventing certain marriages. In our case this would have included restrictions on which non-Qurashī Qurashī women could marry, and after the conquest it would prevent Muslim women from marrying non-Muslim men.

The third factor – the structural element – is also of great interest, as the Qurashīs could only marry people with whom they came into contact. Our analysis will show that in the pre-Islamic period Qurashī marriages were restricted to the central Hijāz in the region surrounding their hometown of Mecca. This contrasts with the marriages of the early Muslims who married women from a much wider array of backgrounds thanks to their ostracisation from the Quraysh and their later conquest of the Arabian Peninsula. Following the conquests of North Africa, the Near East and Iran we see a further change; anonymous foreign slave women begin producing increasing numbers of children. Additionally, the fact that we can connect statistical trends to historical events proves that the genealogical data should be considered as reliable primary evidence when studied prosopographically.

Part Two of this thesis is not structured chronologically but in terms of the relative complexity of the prosopography. We will begin by analysing the most easily detectable exogamous marriages – those made to concubines – by tracking the increasing number of concubines bearing Qurashī children. The results of this and its analysis constitute Chapters Four and Five.

Chapter Six consists of tables detailing the marriages of three cohorts of Quraysh men spanning the period 500-750. The purpose of these tables is to illustrate the extra levels of complexity added when we decide to consider women with known tribal affiliations.
In Chapter Seven we use these tables to analyse the earlier two cohorts (that of Muḥammad’s generation and that of his fathers’ generation) in order to demonstrate how the geographic origins of brides changed as a result of the revelation of Islam. Finally, in Chapter Eight, we will analyse the marriages of a third cohort – the Umayyad caliphs and their sons. This will show that despite theoretically having access to any woman they wanted within the Islamic world the Umayyad caliphs and their sons were surprisingly limited in terms of their marriage choices. This behaviour will be explained in terms of the context in which they were living and also in terms of the concubinage data discussed in Chapters Four and Five; in so doing it ties together the prosopographical strands that run throughout this thesis.
Chapter Four: Statistical analysis of concubinage

Introduction

The first subject of our quantitative analysis is concubinage as recorded in the *Nasab Quraysh*. This is for a number of reasons. As with many other practices rooted in the first Islamic century, attempts to explain the origins of concubinage are poorly served by primary sources, and if quantitative approaches can help illuminate the subject of slave marriage then they are serving a useful purpose. Our analysis will show that this is indeed the case; prosopography allows us to obtain a surprisingly detailed narrative of the emergence and evolution of concubinage in this period.

The study of concubinage is also important for methodological reasons. Without accounting for marriages between Qurashī men and foreign slave women (who represent the most exogamous marriages possible) we cannot adequately discuss exogamy or endogamy between Qurashī men and named Arab women. Additionally, the investigation is useful as it allows us to trial some of our methodological tools on a relatively simple type of relationship before moving on to more complicated types of marriage.

After a discussion on terminology and some minor methodological issues, this chapter will show that the quantitative analysis of the *Nasab Quraysh* provides us with a narrative of the evolution concubinage superior to those narratives derived solely from the traditional historical sources. It will be shown that as far as the Quraysh are concerned, concubinage as a practice was enthusiastically adopted as soon as foreign slave women became available, and it will also be suggested that there are few grounds for believing that the children of concubines were widely discriminated against. This goes against the findings of a number of other scholars who have relied solely on the anecdotal traditions.
Definitions

The suitability of the word ‘concubine’ in discussing these slave mothers is questionable; the word is derived from the Roman institution of *concubinatus* which they understood as being “a long-lasting, monogamous union, an alternative to marriage employed by those for whom legitimate marriage was legally impossible or socially unacceptable.” In the Roman world, a union of this type would typically involve young men who intended to make a better marriage in the future, or older widowers who did not want to complicate inheritance (concubines in the Roman world did not normally produce children). These women were frequently freeborn, though of a lower social status than the husband. In Evans-Grubbs’s analysis, concubinage was “an alternative, not a supplement, to legal marriage” and Roman men did not have both wives and concubines at the same time (though she suspects that in the eastern part of the empire this may not have been the case). Equally importantly, the children of these unions were not assumed to be legitimate.

This institution is clearly very different from the comparable one as understood by Muslims. First, as translated into English, the term ‘concubine’ covers (at least) two words in Arabic denoting distinct statuses; the *surriyya* (derived from the root *s-*-*r-* denoting pleasure) was a slave woman in a sexual relationship with her master but had not produced any children while the *umm walad* (tr: mother of a child) was a slave woman

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192 This last point is not as surprising as it sounds; a recent study found that the failure rates of withdrawal as a contraceptive method (which was perhaps the most common form of pre-modern contraception) are almost exactly the same as failure rates for male condom use as a contraceptive method in real-world conditions. See Rachel Jones *et al.*, “Better Than Nothing or Savvy Risk-reduction Practice? The Importance of Withdrawal,” *Contraception* 79, no. 6 (2009): 407–410.
194 Another term for a female slave is *jāriya*; according to Lane this is connected to the Arabic root *j-*-*r-* denoting activity. There was not necessarily a sexual element to this term though; it is used as the counterpart to the male *ghulām*. Similarly, the Qurʾānic terms for female slaves (*ama* and *fataya*) should not be assumed to be synonymous with ‘concubinage’ either (for discussion see *EQ*, s.v. “Concubines” (Jonathan Brockopp)).
who had produced a child by her master.\textsuperscript{195} Second, the institution of concubinage was not necessarily an alternative to marriage (as in the Roman case) – quite often it was a supplement. Social and legal practice allowed the Muslim man to own a limitless number of concubines in addition to his quota of four wives.

Further complications arise when we try to establish a fixed definition of the status of the concubines and their children in Islamic society. Looking at this from a strictly legal perspective (i.e. what our legal texts explicitly state), we see that the positions of both mother and child in the Islamic household were as precarious as it had been in the Roman system in that many of their rights were dependent on the recognition of full legitimacy by the father. In some Islamic legal traditions, the master has the option of declaring whether or not the children through a surriyya are his; if not, then the children cannot become full heirs and the mother does not gain the legal benefits available from becoming an \textit{umm walad} (namely emancipation on the death of the master plus prevention from sale beforehand).\textsuperscript{196}

But there is an important distinction to be made here between legal arguments and actual social practice; Brockopp uses the status of the \textit{umm walad} as presented in Mālikī law to illustrate precisely this point. By analysing the \textit{Muqtaṣar al-kabīr fī l-fiqh} of Mālikī jurist Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam (d. 829), Brockopp argues that although the options of recognition or denial of paternity existed in the law codes, the fact that the ramifications of selecting the latter are not discussed is an indication that the the child was in practise automatically

\textsuperscript{195} This is a simplification of a complex legal debate; Schacht draws from the \textit{ḥadīth} and legal literatures to suggest an evolution of the status of concubinage in \textit{EP}, s.v. “Umm al-walad” (J. Schacht). See also Khalil ‘Athamina, “How Did Islam Contribute to Change the Legal Status of Women: The Case of the Jawārī or the Female Slaves,” \textit{Al-Qantara} 28, no. 2 (2007): 383–408. In some interpretations, pregnancy was enough to change a surriyya’s status to that of \textit{umm walad}.

\textsuperscript{196} The most detailed treatment of this subject has been by Jonathon Brockopp (\textit{Early Mālikī Law: Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam and His Major Compendium of Jurisprudence} (Boston: Brill, 2000), 162-205) where he discusses the \textit{umm walad} as she appears in \textit{al-Muqtaṣar al-kabīr fī l-fiqh} of Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam (d. 829). See also Joseph Schacht, \textit{The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence} (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950), 264-266 (the latter also notes that in Shīʿī law the \textit{umm walad} was only emancipated if she was still in her master’s possession at time of his death); \textit{EP}, s.v. “Umm al-walad” (Joseph Schacht); and \textit{EQ}, s.v. “Concubine” (Jonathan Brockopp).
recognised as legitimate. Brockopp also points to the fact that there is no discussion of royal succession with regard to the ’Abbāsid caliphs, and that the umm walad gains very little attention in any legal works prior to the Muṣtaṣar (indeed, this work may be the first text to ever give the umm walad her own chapter). His conclusion is that, although this legal work technically allows a man to deny paternity of his child, this is only because Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam’s primary aim was to provide an account of Mālikī law that was internally consistent – he was not interested in creating something that might be usefully applied to Islamic society in general.\footnote{Brockopp, \textit{Early Mālikī Law}, 205. Brockopp’s analysis is a development of Schacht’s \textit{EF} entry “Umm al-walad”, which also contains useful further references.}

Although we are still waiting for more early-period legal works to be given the same scholarly attention as carried out by Brockopp, it is unlikely that the conclusions he draws will be significantly undermined. The written output of medieval Islamic legal scholarship is better understood as being the product of a desire to satisfy its own internal consistency\footnote{This is the conclusion of Brockopp (\textit{Early Mālikī Law}, 205). For a more detailed study see Calder’s \textit{Studies in Early Muslim Jurisprudence} (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), especially chapter eight.} and hence should not be considered a barometer of social change (we are reminded of the risks of conflating Islamic history with “ulamology”).\footnote{This term is ascribed to Mottahedeh’s 1975 review of Bulliet’s \textit{Patricians of Nishapur} by R. Stephen Humphreys (\textit{Islamic History: a Framework for Inquiry} (London: Tauris, 1991), 187), but Cornell believes it has older precedence. See Vincent J. Cornell, \textit{Realm of the Saint: Power and Authority in Moroccan Sufism} (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998), 295, note 4.}

Our definition of ‘concubinage’ will therefore have to rely on our understanding of the institution as broadly practiced by Muslims; an understanding that is no different from the scholarly consensus (at least as far as the post-ʿAbbāsid elites were concerned). To summarise this consensus we will highlight three relevant characteristics. First, concubinage is a type of marriage\footnote{Defining ‘marriage’ is a highly complex issue and this is because the question of legitimacy is not fixed but (as Bell puts it) “a strategic variable in the control of dominants within a social system” (Duran Bell, “Defining Marriage and Legitimacy,” \textit{Current Anthropology} 38, no. 2 (1997): 237). In this thesis we will handle this issue by considering all child-bearing unions to be marriages; this is as far as we need to go for the purposes of our data gathering and analysis.} conducted between a Muslim man and a woman born outside the Muslim world who has been reduced to slavery. Second, it was very common...
in the Islamic world: between the ʿAbbāsid period and the twentieth century, this type of marriage was familiar to most Muslim elites. Finally, while the Muslims recognised a parallel institution of full-marriage which gave a different set of rights to the wife, the products of unions of this type were not treated any differently to their concubine-born siblings.

The growth of concubinage: data and graphical illustrations

The database of concubine marriages can quickly provide us with visualisations of data that illustrate the growth in concubinage from the time of Muḥammad. This will be shown in two ways. The first is to look at the unions themselves and track the number of child-bearing unions of Qurashī men with freewomen over time and compare it to the number of unions with concubines conducted over time. The problem here is that the way the concubine data have been collated means that there is a bias towards undercounting; when the plural form of *umm walad* appears it is recorded as meaning two women when it could in fact mean many more. But since we are trying to establish a rapid increase in the number of concubines, having a bias towards under-representation represents best practice as it is more likely to undermine our theory.

In addition to this, we will mitigate the consequences of undercounting by also taking into consideration the absolute number of children produced from each type of union.

(Further note on terminology for the following datasets: as a genealogical work, the *Nasab Quraysh* has little interest in the *surriya*, so for our purposes here the term ‘concubine’ will refer to the ‘*umm walad*’. The term ‘freewoman’ will be used to refer to any named woman. There are occasions when this does not work; sometimes, as with Māriya the Copt, we have a named woman who was a concubine and later freed. But as instances like this are rare it will not adversely affect conclusions drawn from a dataset consisting of hundreds of entries.)
The raw collated data appear in the following table:

**Table 4.1: Maternal status of children by generation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>Free children</th>
<th>Conc. children</th>
<th>Free women</th>
<th>Conc. women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 and 2</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 to 13</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The fifth generation is that of Muḥammad. The table has collapsed the earlier generations into a single category as there are no records of any concubine unions before the third generation. The final generations have also been collapsed; as discussed in the earlier chapter al-Zubayrī does not seem particularly interested in the marriage behaviour of these later generations so they account for very few records).

The columns of greatest interest here are the ones labelled ‘Conc. children’ and ‘Conc. women’ both of which show a rapid rise in concubinage. These can be visualised graphically. The graph below tracks the number of concubine unions against unions with freewomen:
This graph performs the same function but for numbers of children born to the respective categories of women:
Another way of representing the data is through the proportion of total unions that are with concubines, and proportions of children produced through these unions against the total number of children produced. This can be expressed in the form of a table:

**Table 4.2: Proportion of concubines and children of concubines by generation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>Proportion children of concubines</th>
<th>Proportion concubines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 and 2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.21%</td>
<td>1.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.88%</td>
<td>3.23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>12.10%</td>
<td>11.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>26.88%</td>
<td>29.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>35.56%</td>
<td>34.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>42.12%</td>
<td>37.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>38.12%</td>
<td>36.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 to 13</td>
<td>25.71%</td>
<td>28.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It can also be presented graphically:

**Graph 4.3: Proportion of concubines and children by generation**
The proportion of unions of each type can also be compared graphically:

**Graph 4.4: Proportion of concubine unions against unions with free women**

Preliminary Analysis

The analysis of the data clearly shows that concubinage is closely linked to the arrival of Islam. Before the generation of Muḥammad’s grandfather, there are no Quraysh born to foreign slave women. The first instances of concubinage appear in Generations 3 and 4, but are still very uncommon. In Generation 5 however – the generation of Muḥammad – the picture changes completely with a six-fold increase in the number of children born to concubines. The proportion of children born to slave mothers then increases rapidly throughout the generations of the Umayyad period, before settling somewhat in the generations living closer to the period of the Nasab Quraysh’s authorship.

It may be objected that these trends are actually caused by historiography. It could be that the Qurashīs took large numbers of slave women before Muḥammad’s generation, but did not consider the children produced through these unions to be Qurashīs. They therefore
had some sort of second-class status and because of this did not form a part of genealogical memory. The rise of Islam did not increase the numbers of slave women producing children; it simply meant that the children who were being produced were now recognised as being full members of the tribe.

This is an unlikely explanation. Principally, there is no evidence for large numbers of slave women and children owned by Qurashī men for the pre-Islamic period (Brockopp finds only two references of pre-Islamic concubinage in North Arabia – ‘Antara and ‘Ammā b. Yasīr), while ‘Athamina’s list of Meccan tribal aristocrats who were born to Greeks and Abyssinian slave women in the pre-Islamic period is on closer inspection a far more contestable reference than he allows for.\textsuperscript{201} It is also unlikely that the Quraysh could have owned large numbers of slave women given the marginality of their existence (which will be discussed in Chapter Seven).

It is more likely therefore that the increasing numbers of concubines producing Qurashī children is linked to the economic power of the Quraysh tribe as a whole. In the early stages, their involvement in the conquests would have brought in slave women directly (as war booty) or provided them with the wealth required to purchase slave women at market.\textsuperscript{202} This would have continued in the Umayyad era thanks to the continued dīwān

\textsuperscript{201} Brockopp, Early Mālikī Law, 195, note 151. ‘Athamina’s list (alluded to on page 385 of “How did Islam contribute”) is found in the Muḥabbar of Ibn Ḥabīb which lists sons born to nisrāniyyāt and habashiyāt (pages 304-309). ‘Athamina makes four errors. First, there is no mention of the Greek women (rūmiyyāt) he claims can be found here – instead with have nisrāniyyāt who are Christians, and who may be (and sometimes demonstrably are) Arabs. Secondly, despite the name, habashiyāt does not necessarily mean that the women are from Abyssinia; variations on the root h-b-sh sometimes refer to Arab tribes (EI\textsuperscript{2} – Glossary and Indes of Terms, s.v. “Aḥābish” (unknown)), and given that some of the men listed in this section of the Muḥabbar have Arab mothers in the Nasab Quraysh (e.g. Umayma bt. Wudd of the Quḍāʿa, mother of the first three men listed in this part of the Muḥabbar) which may have confused Ibn Ḥabīb. Thirdly, not all the men in this list are from the jāhiliyya (e.g. ʿAbd Allāh b. Qays b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Zubayr). Finally, there is no indication in the Muḥabbar that these women are slaves.

\textsuperscript{202} Jairus Banaji dates the emergence of a wealthy Quraysh elite to ʿUthmān’s caliphate in “Late Antique Legacies and Muslim Economic Expansion,” in Money, Power and Politics in Early Islamic Syria, ed. John Haldon (Farnham; Burlington: Ashgate, 2010): 181-200. As for the number of slaves that the Muslims acquired, the conquest narratives are replete with numbers of slaves acquired, the names of those who acquired them and the locations from where they were taken, but the overriding conclusion is that none of this information is to be trusted. For a largely uncritical summary of these ‘facts’ and figures,
payments and the close connections of the Quraysh to caliphal elites. More tentatively we can suggest a change following the ʿAbbāsid Revolution; the tenth to thirteenth generations (the era of al-Zubayrī) show a marked drop in the number of children born to concubines. The ʿAbbāsid era saw the end of the dīwān payments to the families of the early conquerors, the end of Qurashī involvement in new conquests, the marginalisation of the Ḥijāz (where many of the families featured in the Nasab Quraysh resided) and the increasing irrelevance of the wider Quraysh at the ʿAbbāsid court. All this would have conspired to restrict their access to and ability to acquire slave-women, though caution is required on account of the small sample sizes.

There are two points to be made here. The first is that this is an argument for the soundness of the methodology. The timing of the rise in concubine mothers comes exactly at the point where we would expect it to; namely the conquests that followed the revelation of Islam. While this point may seem obvious, we must remember that it is built on two contentions that are not obvious, namely the idea that the Nasab Quraysh contains large quantities of accurate data and that organising this data generationally is a viable means of structuring it. The second point is more elaborate, and concerns the degree to which the data confirms or contradicts the current scholarly consensus on the emergence of concubines in Islamic society. This is discussed below.

The rise of the concubine – earlier studies

Attempts to explain the emergence of Islamic concubinage have to date been limited. While Schacht’s EI² entry on “Umm al-walad” remains one of the most thorough analyses of Muslim concubinage as it exists in the written sources, it barely touches on the subject of its origins. Instead, Schacht simply notes that the “old pre-Islamic point of view” (which was prejudiced against the concubine and her progeny) was eroded to the point in the second half of the ninth century where “the absolute equality of the children born from

a marriage with a free-woman and in concubinage has now been long completely established.” Evidence for this is based on the emergence of legal texts that seem to improve the condition of the concubine, but underlying reasons for this change are not given.203

Schacht’s shortcoming in this regard is completely understandable; the problematic nature of the sources for the first century of Islam means that there is little scope for uncovering social history using conventional methodologies. But unlike Schacht, other scholars have not let the paucity of source material withhold them from making some very bold claims which betray their own biases and prejudices. So with Nabia Abbott we find that the concubine was an “evil social consequence” which ultimately pitted the “free Arab woman of noble race and lineage, haughty but generally virtuous” against “the foreign slave woman, singer or concubine, with pride of beauty and talent but easygoing and of comparatively loose morals.”204 The concubine is hence symptomatic of a broader moral decline which is linked in a vague sense to the decline of the Islamic empire.205

On the same subject, Bernard Lewis is more sophisticated, if no less flawed. The aim of his Race and Slavery in the Middle East is to puncture what he sees as a Western constructed myth of “Islamic racial innocence,”206 and part of his argument rests on the discriminatory treatment by “true Arabs” of their “half-Arab” (his terminology) counterparts. These half-Arabs were “half-privileged” and he presents the ’Abbāsid revolution as being in no small part due to the fact that the children of these mixed unions

203 The subject is also treated in his Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, 264–266, but in less detail.
205 Remarkably, this does indeed appear to be the judgment of Abbott herself rather than the sources. But this attitude towards concubinage was not limited to Western scholars of the period; a tafsīr of the Qurʾān produced by the Aḥmadiyya community in the 1940s tells us that “The Muslim Empire of Baghdad fell to pieces because the Khalīfas took to contracting conjugal relations with bondwomen. The incompetent princes born of them ruined the State. In most cases marital relations with bondwomen are calculated to have a demoralizing effect on both husbands and children.” I. Alhaj, Mirza Bashir-ud-Din, Mahmud Ahmad, The Holy Quran with English Translation and Commentary, (Tilford: Islam International Publications Ltd., 1988), 515.
were “ever less willing to accept the disabilities and humiliations imposed upon them by their full-blooded half brothers.” Evidence for this is slight; he refers to the concubine-born Maslama b. ʿAbd al-Malik who was an able commander yet never became caliph.207 This is enough to unequivocally state that “Umayyad princes who were the sons of non-Arab slave women were not for one moment considered as possible candidates for the succession”,208 this is in contrast to the more liberal ʿAbbāsid era where almost all caliphs have concubines for mothers. These observations are bolstered with a collection of disparaging statements regarding the hajīn – the Arabic term for the products of these mixed unions – which Lewis notes should be likened to the words “mongrel” and “half-breed” as used in English.

Parallel to Lewis and Abbott runs more sober scholarship. One of the first substantive analyses of the social forces that dictated the nature of Islamic concubinage was carried out by Goldziher in his Muslim Studies.209 Goldziher’s approach is to subsume analysis of the concubine and her progeny into a wider discussion on the Arab treatment of the mawālīs, and in so doing makes the narrative of the two institutions indistinguishable.210 The emergence of the hajīn211 caliph is therefore linked to the successful efforts of the ʿajam (non-Arab Muslims in this context) in breaking down Arab chauvinism. The position is supported through multiple references to negative attitudes shown towards female slave ancestry from the poetry of the jāhiliyya and the criticism against men who married their concubines as preserved in anecdotes from the Umayyad era. According to Goldziher, it was only in the middle of the ʿAbbāsid period that maternal status was considered irrelevant; evidence for this is in the status of the caliph’s mothers, the

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207 This ‘fact’ appears repeatedly in the secondary sources, despite the fact that there are other reasons why Maslama never became caliph such as his lack of opportunity (he died towards the end of the long reign of his brother Hisham) and his responsibility for the failed siege of Constantinople.
209 Goldziher, Muslim Studies, 1:118.
211 Goldziher does not use this term and it may be anachronistic for much of the period 500-750 CE. I have chosen to employ it freely in this thesis however as it does not have the negative connotations that the terms ‘half-breed’ or ‘half-Arab’ have for the native English speaker. Incidentally, the term hajīn is used in the title of the Arabic translation of the popular children’s book Harry Potter and the Half-blood Prince.
elevation of the ‘ajam to positions where they outranked Arabs, and the appearance of reports remarking on the qualities of concubines and their children.

Like Schacht, Goldziher is quite vague in terms of why he thinks the child of the concubine should have been accepted as equal in the mid-‘Abbāsid period. There is a reference to a story telling of the respect Zayn al-‘Abidīn (the son of Ḥusayn b. ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib by a concubine) enjoyed amongst his contemporary Medinans. This led the Medinans to have children by concubine women, but the whole story is judged by Goldziher to have been produced by religious scholars in a much later period. According to Goldziher, the hajīn seems to have earned acceptance only because of the success of the ‘ajam in general breaking into the upper echelons of power, and the eventual recognition by Arab Muslims that ‘true’ Islam does not discriminate between believers.\textsuperscript{212}

Goldziher’s arguments are closely followed in Bashear’s 1998 monograph \textit{Arabs and Others in Early Islam} and again in ‘Athamina’s 2007 article “How did Islam Contribute to Change the Legal Status of Women.”\textsuperscript{213} Bashear points out that even the sons of Umayyad caliphs who had concubines for mothers were discriminated against; he refers to the ‘Iqd al-farīd of Ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi (d. 940) which tells us that ‘Abd al-Malik’s hajīn son had difficulties in finding a wife,\textsuperscript{214} while a reference to Ibn ‘Asākir (d. 1175) shows how the issue of a mother’s slave origins arose in the struggle between Yazīd III and Walīd II.\textsuperscript{215} ‘Athamina expands the number of sources used by the earlier scholars but still supports the same proposition - that the child of the concubine was the “target of contempt and derision” (‘Athamina is quoting Goldziher here). So we hear that the caliph Ma’mūn was mocked for the slave-status of his mother in a poem that appears in the

\textsuperscript{212} Goldziher, \textit{Muslim Studies}, 1:116 (“The old Arabs remained quite untouched by the consequences of Muhammed’s and Islam’s teaching of equality in regard to this question [of Arab men being allowed to marry non-Arab slaves]); 1:117 (“It cannot be denied, and this has been repeatedly stressed in descriptions of Islam, that the Islamic spirit helped make good treatment of slaves a duty and inner duty and to encourage an attitude that had its roots in the oldest documents of Islam”).


\textsuperscript{214} Bashear, \textit{Arabs and Others in Early Islam}, 39.

\textsuperscript{215} Bashear, \textit{Arabs and Others in Early Islam}, 39–40.
Maʿārif of Ibn Qutayba (d. 889). Ibn Qutayba also provides the information that the Arab nobles were “appalled” at the idea of their daughters marrying the sons of concubines (this in his ʿUyūn al-akhbār). ‘Athamina returns to Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih’s al-ʿIqd for the notion that the Umayyads forbade the sons of concubines from assuming the caliphate because they were not considered members of Arab society.216 ‘Athamina even goes so far as to suggest that the Umayyads believed in a Prophetic ḥadīth that the accession of a concubine-born son would lead to the end of their dynasty (this ḥadīth appears in a variety of sources including the Ansāb al-ashrāf of al-Balādhurī (d. 892); the Taʾrīkh of al-Ṭabarī (d. 923) and the Rabīʿ al-abrār of al-Zamakhsharī (d. 1144)).217

Like Goldziher, ‘Athamina also judges these attitudes to have dissipated in the ʿAbbāsid era, and his evidence for this again includes the statuses of the caliphal mothers; he points to the fact that only three of the 38 ʿAbbāsid caliphs were born to Arab women is “clear evidence” that the “obstinate, conservative” attitude of the Arabs was in decline.218 ‘Athamina goes on to extend his study of maternal origins by including references to the marriage preferences of Shīʿī religious leaders; the sixth imām (by the Twelver reckoning) Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq and the seventh imām Qāẓim all had multiple children through slave women.219

Further evidence for the change in attitudes comes from the positive comments on the hajīn. Like Goldziher, ‘Athamina also refers to the use of hajīn religious scholars as a means of habilitating the children of concubines. Specifically, he refers to the same tradition mentioned by Goldziher saying that the people of Medina only married the

217 ‘Athamina, “How Did Islam Contribute,” 395. This prophecy appears in a conversation between Hishām b. ʿAbd al-Malik and the ʿAlid rebel Zayd b. ʿAlī. The caliph also asks: “How could you claim the position of caliph despite the fact that you are the son of a jāriya?” (this version is from al-Balādhurī). Lewis also implies that this prophecy can be dated to the Umayyad era (Race and Slavery, 105). Given that neither Lewis nor ‘Athamina provide any evidence dating this prophecy to the Umayyad period, and given the fact that unlike most prophecies it accurately predicts an event, we must assume that this report first appeared in the ʿAbbāsid era.
jawārī (another term for slave women) and had sons by them after Zayn b. 'Ābidīn, Qāsim b. Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr al-Ṣadīq and Sālim b. 'Abbās b. ʿUmar b. Khaṭṭāb established themselves as leading members of the Muslim community. In addition to this, the taking of concubines is presented as a deliberate policy to “improve the stock” of their descendants (referring back to Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih’s al-ʿIqd), while the virtues of foreign mothers were praised in other sources (such as Ibn Qutayba ʿUyūn al-akhbār and al-Zamakhsharī Rabīʿ al-abrār). ‘Athamina goes on to say that the acceptance of the concubine and her children was a result of a “more understanding attitude presented by Islam toward the institution of slavery, the decline in the basic concepts of the jāhilī heritage in favour of the basic values of Islam, and the increasing numbers of jawārī which resulted in an ever-increasing number of births to non-Arab mothers among the Arab aristocracy.”

Putting Abbott and Lewis to one side to focus on the more mainstream strand of academic discourse, we see that Goldziher, Bashear and ‘Athamina agree on a number of fundamentals (in this paper this will be referred to as the ‘Goldziher argument’). Up to the time of Muḥammad, there were few children born of Arabs and foreign slave women. Following the conquests the picture changes; large numbers of these women arrive in the Islamic world and an unknown number of Arab men had children with them. Not all men took concubines; the majority seem to have been highly critical of the practice. The children of these unions were subsequently discriminated against as a result of the chauvinistic beliefs of the Arab majority; evidence for this is in the derogatory reports that can be dated to the time, as well as the lack of hajīn caliphs and the poor performance of hajīns in the marriage market. But over time these attitudes softened and with the arrival of the ʿAbbāsids came greater tolerance. In this later period we see hajīn caliphs become the norm and reports referring to the qualities of concubines and mixed-race children correspondingly proliferate.

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220 He refers to Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih’s al-ʿIqd, al-Zamakhsharī’s Rabīʿ al-abrār and al-Ibshīhī’s al-Mustaṭraf.
222 ‘Athamina (“How Did Islam Contribute”) appears to hold a number of positions on when the concubine emerged as a significant source of Muslim children; at one point he says the Islamic conquests...
Critiquing the Goldziher argument

There are some obvious problems with the Goldziher argument. To begin with, it is worryingly similar to what ‘Abbāsid-era scholars would want us to believe; that the ‘true’ Islam of Muḥammad was hijacked and subverted by the conservative Umayyads, and only with the arrival of the ‘Abbāsid dynasty could the legitimate faith be restored (this trope has been described in some detail by Crone).\(^\text{223}\) Secondly, the derogatory antihajīn remarks collected by the proponents of the Goldziher argument are used without considering that they may be later fabrications or indicative only of a minority opinion. None of these remarks are from sources contemporary to the Umayyad or early ‘Abbāsid eras (most are from the mid-ninth century or even later) and there is no way of knowing which ones were genuinely handed down through isnāds and which were backdated in order to add authenticity.\(^\text{224}\) The result is that the Goldziher argument is forced into the circular reasoning of saying that if a report demonstrates intolerance then it must be early, but if it is enlightened then it must be late. It is suggested here that all the reports should be considered as undatable component parts of a wider discourse akin to the literary banter of the shuʿūbiyya, and cannot be used as evidence of a deep social cleft between Arabs and hajīns in the first century of Islam.

But the Goldziher argument does have one piece of incontrovertible evidence – the change in status of the mothers of the caliphs from freeborn to slave. This is essentially a simple prosopographical observation; in the cohort of all caliphs, a single data category (maternal


\(^\text{224}\) It also ignores the evidence for the existence of an anti-concubine prejudice in later centuries; e.g. al-Ghazālī’s (d. 1111) judgement that marrying a concubine was “evil” but better than fornication or masturbation. Al-Ghazzālī and Madelain Farah, *Marriage and Sexuality in Islam: a Translation of Al-Ghazālī’s Book on the Etiquette of Marriage from the Iḥyāʾ* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah, 1984), 64. Even later than this, we find Ibn Khaldūn (d.1382) blaming marriages to foreign women for causing Arabs to forget their genealogies (Walī al-Dīn ʾAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-ʿIbar wa-diwān* (Cairo: Būlāq, 1867), 6:3. Musil also reports that the Rwala Bedouin punished any man who married a slave with death (*Manner and Customs*, 137).
status) is selected and the results are tracked over time. So between 632 and 744 there were no caliphs with concubines for mothers; between 744 and 785 two thirds of them were *hajīns* (Yazīd III, Ibrāhīm, Marwān II, al-Manṣūr); and after 785 they were almost all born of concubine women. This would appear to indicate that there was a seachange in social attitudes that the Umayyads could not keep up with, a change which ultimately opened the door to the less chauvinistic Islam of the 'Abbāsids. The Goldziher argument then appends the anecdotal traditions that concur with this point upon the foundation stone of the caliphal mothers and incorporates the entire argument into a narrative of the wider social changes that 'Abbāsid-era Islam engendered (particularly more inclusive attitudes towards the *mawlās*).

Our findings on the emergence of concubinage offer a different narrative. The graphs and tables above show that the Quraysh as a whole took up concubinage as soon as they were able to; there is no evidence of widespread reticence towards the practice here. As for the caliphal Umayyads, they were in fact more likely to have children by concubines than the Quraysh in general – hardly the conservative laggards implied by the Goldziher argument.

It would appear from this that there was never any great problem with having children by concubines. As for discrimination against the children of these unions, the quantitative approach also provides no good evidence that this was widespread; in fact, it often points in the opposite direction and indicates that the *hajīn* was considered an equal to his (and possibly her) full-Arab sibling.

Evidence for the absence of discrimination comes from two secondary prosopographical studies, one on the marriages that the *hajīns* made and the other on the wider changes in marriage behaviour that were happening in this period. The former is discussed in Appendix 1 which also provides a list of *hajīns* who made marriages to Qurashī women.

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225 This refers to the marriages of the Umayyad caliphs and their sons which are discussed in greater detail in Chapter Eight.
The fact that marriages between hajīns and Qurashī women appears to be quite common not only refutes a postulation of the Goldziher argument that this was a rare occurrence but it strongly implies that the sons of concubines were not considered second-class Qurashīs.

As for the wider social changes it will be argued that the late emergence of the hajīn caliph was the result of structural changes caused by the Islamic polity’s adoption of increasingly imperial trappings. In the earlier tribal period, men with only one set of familial relations (i.e. the hajīn) were at a disadvantage when compared to those with two sets (i.e. their full-Arab siblings) because they lacked the connections needed to thrive in this informal environment. As these tribal connections diminished in importance over the course of the Umayyad period, the barriers to the caliphate were lowered, allowing hajīns like Marwān II to take control of the caliphate. All this is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Eight.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has provided the first outlines of what prosopographical approaches can tell us about the history of early Islam. Most strikingly we have been able to elucidate elements of social change in this period, which is not something we thought possible given previous assumptions about the quality of the sources. We have also learned that the acceptance of concubinage amongst Islamic elites was not a gradual process that had its roots in the mid-eighth century. The trends illustrated appear to be consistent with a narrative of the elites taking concubines as soon as they became available and - for the most part - treating the offspring of these unions no differently to their full Arab siblings from birth.

This is in contrast to our prior understanding of the emergence of concubinage, referred to here as the Goldziher argument. It was shown that the evidence upon which this argument rests was not particularly secure and relied on the contention that the change in the statuses of caliphal mothers at the time of the ‘Abbāsid Revolution was a strong
indicator of wider social trends. The prosopographical investigation undermined this point by showing that if we consider the mothers of all recorded Quraysh (as opposed to just the caliphs) we find that the *hājīns* arrived a long time before the fall of the Umayyads. The prosopographical approach will also be used later to show that the late emergence of the *hājīn* caliph was more likely the result of structural change rather than discrimination.

In addition to these historical findings, important lessons have been learnt about our methodology. The most significant is that a result of our quantitative analysis finds a parallel in the historical sources; in the case above, it is the rapid increase in the number of *hājīns* which happens at the same time as the Islamic military conquests. This vindicates our methodological contentions that the *Nasab Quraysh* is a repository of high-quality data and that generational structuring is a valid means of organising the undated marriages.

Another lesson has been the importance of keeping prosopographical study simple. The tables and graphs above are nothing more complicated than counting the appearances of certain words in one book, yet we have still been able to generate substantive findings that will be difficult to refute. The contrast here is with Ahmed’s *Religious Elite* - especially in the case of Sa’d b. Abī Waqqās as discussed in Chapter One - where too many questionable sources are compiled into one narrative without adequate assessment. A similarly problematic prosopography can be found in Jabali’s *Companions of the Prophet*,226 a study that aims to make a connection between the geographic origins of Muhammad’s companions with their stance at the Battle of Ṣiffīn. The issue with this work (as pointed out by Zaman), is not that it draws on too many sources, but that it assumes that the terminology of affiliation did not change in meaning over the 600 years between the events he refers to and the time when the last of his sources was written.227

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Without the necessary groundwork of establishing what the various authors and their sources mean when they use these terms, we are left only with a collection of anecdotes masquerading as a database.

Given the complexity of the source material, the sheer volume of data available and the fact that we are still in the process of developing our tools, it is important to restrain ourselves from adding too many layers of information without adequate thought or checks. By keeping matters simpler we can avoid serious pitfalls yet still make a meaningful contribution to the study of early Islamic history. The concubine/Arab status of a person’s mother is binary and in the vast majority of cases quite straightforward which simplifies data gathering.

The success of the quantitative analysis of the rise of the concubine provides us with proof that the methodological programme outlined in Part One of this thesis is workable. It also allows us to move to the more complicated subject of marriages between Quraysh men and Arab women as we not only understand exogamy/endogamy better, but have faith in our methodological tools and source material.

Before we do this however, we will continue our discussion of the concubine. The prosopographical study above has indicated that there was a massive increase in the number of children born to foreign slave women that coincided with the arrival of Islam. This may appear to require no further comment; the arrival of Islam led to the Arab conquests which gave the Quraysh access to large numbers of slave women. This translated into the practice of concubinage which would go on to become a common form of marriage for Muslim elites throughout the world until relatively recently.

But we are lacking an explanation for this change in behaviour and the long-term survival of the practice; concubinage is not a significant component of the Qurʾān or the Prophetical hadīth literature and was not a widespread pre-Islamic practice in the Ḥijāz or anywhere else conquered by the Arabs. Major ruptures in social practice – especially
in areas as sensitive as marriage and legitimacy – do not happen without some sort of impetus. Unless we are prepared to believe that Arabs or Muslims are particularly libidinous (which, needless to say, takes us down some very dark Orientalist corridors) we must suggest a reason behind this transition – this is the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter Five: Origins of Islamic concubinage

Introduction

The quantitative analysis of the marriage data preserved in the *Nasab Quraysh* as detailed in the previous chapter has allowed us to be more specific about the rate at which concubinage spread amongst the Muslim elites. The study showed that large numbers of men were taking concubines from the early Umayyad period onwards, and this change in marriage practice may even have begun during the time of the Rashīdūn caliphs. The study also suggested that there is little evidence that the majority of Muslims in the Umayyad era treated concubines and their progeny any differently to Muslims of later eras.

But there is a problem with this alternative narrative because it does not explain why the Arab conquerors changed their marriage practices so quickly and in such a widespread fashion. Ruptures in social practice – especially in matters as sensitive as marriage and legitimacy – do not happen in a vacuum. There must have been some outside impetus and in this chapter we will suggest what forms this impetus could and could not have taken.

We will begin by considering the obvious sources of changes in marriage behaviour, namely precedent. We have already shown in our graphs and tables above that concubinage was not widely practiced amongst the pre-Islamic Quraysh; here it will be shown that concubinage of the normative Islamic type was not a practice known to other peoples of the Late Antique Near East either. Having exhausted the possibility that the behaviour was borrowed we will turn to another seemingly obvious source of change in

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228 While it is true that this research currently can only tell us about one tribe, it would be surprising if similar results were not found amongst other tribal groups; the Quraysh were numerous, diverse and influential so while it is possible to consider them some sort of outlying vanguard that the rest of the Muslim community belatedly emulated, this position lacks evidence.
marriage behaviour – the Qur’ān and Prophetic practice. Here too we will find no obvious parallels between revelation and normative Islamic concubinage.

In the final part of the chapter, it will be suggested that the emergence of Islamic concubinage was a result of the unique set of circumstances faced by the Muslims of the Umayyad era. Chief amongst these was that the tribal environment creates an enormous amount of pressure to create sons; not only could concubines satisfy this need, they could do it without the problems of split-loyalties and expense associated with Arab wives.229 Elements of the tribal dynamic survived to the very end of the Umayyad era, and because of this concubinage survived the first military conquests and remained a relatively common form of elite Islamic marriage practice right into the twentieth century.

**Concubinage in law and practice**

In the ‘Definitions’ section of Chapter Four, we highlighted a number of key elements of Islamic concubinage, the most important of these being: Muslims allowed unrestricted concubinage; that children of these unions were considered full members of their tribes and societies; and that this type of union was very common amongst elites. It is the emergence of these three attributes that concerns us here.

Concubinage of this form was not an extension of Ḥijāzī practice. Part of this has been established above with the quantitative analysis of the *Nasab Quraysh* showing that no Qurashī before the generation of Muḥammad’s grandfather (i.e. the generations born before the sixth century) is recorded as having had a concubine for a mother. Additionally only two *hajīns* are found in literature referring to pre-Islamic North Arabian literature.230

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229 Jack Goody, *The Oriental, the Ancient and the Primitive: Systems of Marriage and the Family in the Pre-industrial Societies of Eurasia*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 362-363, on cousin marriage being cheaper, and page 364 on the links between a married woman and her father's family that continue after marriage. For a collection of reports concerning caliphal wives who may not have had their husbands’ best interests at heart see Abbott, “Women and the State in Early Islam,” 353-354.

Nor does the term *umm walad* appear in the Qurʾān or in the ḥadīths. According to Brockopp’s survey a woman with some comparable legal characteristics makes a first appearance in an anecdote dated to ʿUmar I’s reign, but even here the term ‘*umm walad*’ is not used.231

Where textual evidence does exist, the indications are that the *hajīn* of pre-Islamic Arabia were automatically considered as slaves at birth and they would remain in this state unless the father chose to recognise them as full heirs. This was the case with the sixth century poet and hero ʿAntara, who was raised as a slave (following his mother’s status) before his father rewarded him with recognition as a full son following a demonstration of valour in battle.232

Pre-Islamic Arabian practice in this regard has parallels with elements of the ancient law code of Hammurabi and reported Achaemenid customs, but it is harder to establish what non-Arabian norms concerning concubinage were extant the period immediately prior to the Islamic conquests.233 The Jewish position on the subject is particularly difficult to ascertain; although concubinage appears in Biblical texts, it seems to have fallen out of favour a long time before the birth of Muḥammad and is rarely mentioned.234 We can only say that in later periods Jewish legal authorities under Islamic rule prohibited Jews from sexual intercourse with their slave women on pain of death. It was also forbidden for a Jewish man to even live under the same roof as a slave girl if he did not also cohabit with a close female relative.235

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233 For the law code of Hammurabi, see stipulations 170-171 (Martha Roth, *Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995), 113-114). In the Achaemenid period, the children of concubines had a second-class status, and they were termed by the Greeks as ‘*nothus*’, meaning illegitimate. *Elr*, s.v. “Harem: In Ancient Iran” (A. Shapur Shahbazi).
235 S. D. Goitein, “Slaves and Slavegirls in the Cairo Geniza Records,” *Arabica* 9, no. 1 (1962), 6. These practices could of course have been a product of the Jewish community wishing to differentiate itself from the Muslim majority.
With regards to Christian communities, not only was their understanding of concubinage completely different to the normative Islamic version (as discussed in Chapter Four), but they had banned this more limited practice a long time before the conquests. The first instance of this prohibition is dated to Constantine I (r. 306-337), though laws regarding the inheritance rights of children did later appear in the Near Eastern provinces (these children got some rights rather than none).\(^\text{236}\) Despite this small caveat, there is still no way we can equate derivations of the Roman practice of *concubinatus* as it existed in the seventh century Christian Near East with concubinage as practiced by Muslims – and it is safe to say that the Christians utterly condemned Islamic behaviour in this regard. We can see this in the purported letter of Leo III to ʿUmar II:

> And what shall I say of the execrable debauchery which you commit with your concubines? For you are prodigal with them of all your fortune, and then, when you are tired of them you sell them like dumb cattle.\(^\text{237}\)

As for Christians living in the Sasanian Empire, the evidence is sparse. Brockopp refers to the Syriac law text of the Church of the East which says in the case of a non-legal marriage with a slave woman resulting in children, the slave woman is freed on the master’s death but the children “have no right to be seen as heirs or [legitimate] children of the deceased.” While there are parallels between this practice and that of Islamic concubinage, we have a problem (noted by Brockopp) in the late date of its composition; it was probably written in the early "Abbāsid era.\(^\text{238}\)


\(^{237}\) Arthur Jeffrey, “Ghevond’s Text of the Correspondence Between ‘Umar II and Leo III,” *Harvard Theological Review* 37, no.4 (1944), 325-326. Further evidence of negative attitudes towards Muslim marriage practices can also be found in these pages, especially note 83. The shame of being descended from a concubine was so great according to Sozomenus, writing in the 440s, that the name ‘Saracen’ itself was an attempt to forge a genealogical link to Abraham’s wife, Sarah (Fergus Millar, “Hagar, Ishmael, Josephus and the Origins of Islam,” *Journal of Jewish Studies* no. 1 (1993): 42. For a Christian rejection of polygamy see John Meyendorff, “Byzantine Views of Islam,” *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 18 (1964):120121.

\(^{238}\) Brockopp, *Early Mālikī Law*, 194. Translation Brockopp’s from Sachau’s *Syrische Rechtsbücher*. 
Amongst the Sasanian elites and the Mazdaeans the situation is slightly different in that intercourse with slave women was permitted. But the second part of the Islamic practice – that the children were automatically legitimate – was explicitly not a feature of the institution. The Shāh himself would choose a chief wife who would be the only woman through which legitimate heirs could be produced. As for the non-elites, a Mazdaean law book dating from just before the Islamic conquests says that “up to the reign of Wahrām” (420-439 CE according to Macuch) the status of children followed that of the father. The law book explains this early custom by referring back to a third century jurist who stated that “the child belongs to the father.” But after this point the law code explicitly states that the child follows the mother’s status; this too is divergent from Islamic practice.

So with the taking of concubines, and the full acceptance of their offspring, the Muslims did something that contrasted with the prevailing norms of every major Near-Eastern religious practice of the conquest era – including that of the pre-Islamic Ḥijāz. By allowing unlimited concubinage they were overturning the Roman understanding of it being a monogamous institution, and by allowing it at all they were in conflict with Jewish and Christian law. Even in the only religious system that did allow concubinage in something approaching the Islamic sense – the Mazdaean – there were important discrepancies. The Muslims did not continue the concept of a chief wife who produced heirs for the king, and their practice was also in conflict with the Mazdaean law declaring that children of a free man and slave woman carried the woman’s status.

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239 E. Ir., s.v. “Harem: In Ancient Iran” (A. Shapur Shahbazi).
240 There were more than one Wahrām’s; Macuch has selected the most recent. See E. Ir., s.v. “Barda and Barda-Dārī: in the Sasanian Period” (Maria Macuch)
241 E. Ir., s.v. “Barda and Barda-Dārī: in the Sasanian Period” (Maria Macuch).
Understanding the emergence and survival of concubinage

It is logical at this point to turn to the Qurʾān and Muḥammad’s example on the basis that such an unprecedented sea-change in seventh century Arab social behaviour must be related to the revelation of Islam. But neither in the Prophet’s practice nor in the Qurʾān do we find the normative framework for the umm walad and hajīn.

In terms of the Qurʾān, the exegetes have explained that it permits a Muslim man to take as many concubines as he wants; this goes back to a number of references in the Qurʾān where the curious expression mā malakat aymānakum (‘that which your right hands possess’) is used in the context of a list of those with whom intercourse is permitted. The exegetes explain that this term should be understood in Arabic as meaning ‘umm walad’ with little further discussion.242

But this is the limit of what the Qurʾān can tell us with regard to the institution of concubinage. Mā malakat aymānakum as a reference to a woman with whom a man has right of sexual access is clear, and elsewhere in the Qurʾān she is linked with winnings from successful battles.243 But this does not mean she is a slave, and a free Arab woman taken in battle from a local tribe is a very different category of person to the deracinated concubine.244 There is also no mention made of the status of her children meaning that the Muslims could have discriminated against the progeny if they so wished (the fact a person is a Muslim is not necessarily a guarantee of equality in law – as we see with Muslim women and Muslim slaves in general). As Brockopp notes, mā malakat

243 Q 33:50 – “Prophet, we have made lawful for you the wives (azwājaka) whose bride gift you have paid, and those whom your hands possess given to you by God as the spoils of war (wa mā malakat yaminuka mimmā afā' a Allāh 'alayku).”
244 The difficulty in making any sort of generalised remarks about marriage through capture are elucidated by R. H. Barnes in “Marriage by Capture,” The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 5, no. 1 (1999). Here it is shown that ‘capture’ not only involves varying degrees of willingness on the part of the captive, but false accusations of using capture as a source of spouses were useful as polemic against neighbouring tribes.
aymānakum could refer to a lesser type of marriage; indeed it does bring to mind the Roman institution of the in manus marriage, which was a lower class of marriage in comparison to the full variety.

The hadīth corpus is not a great deal more helpful; as discussed above in relation to Brockopp’s work (where the term umm walad could not be found in the sources concerned with Muḥammad’s time) concubinage was not a common occurrence in the Prophetic era. The result is that a small number of tales appear repeatedly in the discussion of the legal implications of concubinage, one of which involves the (by now familiar) figure of Sa’d b. Abī Waqqās. In this story, Sa’d b. Abī Waqqās claims that a certain boy is a relative of his through his brother and a slave girl. Muḥammad’s brother-in-law (through his wife Sawda bt. Zam’a) counters this, saying that the boy was actually born to the slave girl on the bed (firāsh) of his father. In response, Muḥammad rules against Sa’d with the maxim (mathal) “al-walad li-l-firāsh wa-li-l-ʿāhir al-ḥajar” – which is normally interpreted as “the child belongs to the bed, and the fornicator gets nothing” (ḥajar is less commonly, though more literally translated as ‘the stone’).

Earlier Western scholars were very doubtful of the Prophetic provenance of this mathal, with Schacht going so far as to say it is “incompatible with the Koran.” But further work by Motzki and Rubin has established that not only are there supporting reports of Muḥammad acting in accordance with the maxim, at one stage it may even have been part of the Qurʾān that did not make it into the ‘Uthmānic codex.

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245 *EI*, s.v. “Concubines” (Jonathon Brockopp).
246 For further discussion on in manus marriage see Archie Bush and Joseph McHugh, “Patterns of Roman Marriage,” *Ethnology* 14, no. 1 (1975): 27.
Although this anecdote may refer to an actual event, and the maxim uttered by Muḥammad may also have been an accurate reflection of what he said, neither it nor the Qurʾānic references help us a great deal with the origins of the distinctive characteristics of the Muslim concubine. First of all, we have the established problem of the example of Muḥammad and the stipulations of the Qurʾān not being the pre-eminent sources of law for early Muslims. In addition to this, there is a lot the Qurʾān and hadīths do not tell us (such as the change to the slave girl’s status upon pregnancy or the status of the child), so we are again left wondering how it was that the Muslim polity quickly adopted and maintained a practice that had no heritage in its own pre-Islamic context or the pre-Islamic context of the Near East.

The evolution of sexual ethics

Given all this, the expected narrative might have been that concubines were taken in the first flush of military success and then abandoned when the conquerors were faced with the condemnation of the subject populations and the lack of Prophetic justification for the practice. After all, this is what we see happening to other closely related matters of sexual ethics and paternity which seem to be veering to the norms of the written non-Islamic law codes of the Near East in exactly the same period. This is despite the fact that in some instances this accommodation takes place even when it directly contradicts explicit Qurʾānic edicts. Consider the following examples:

1) Rajm (stoning to death): This is the punishment for adultery in Islamic law, which is at complete variance to the non-capital punishment of flogging stipulated in the Qurʾān. In some traditions this discrepancy led to the story of forgotten sūras which should have abrogated the parts of the Qurʾān that

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251 EI², s.v. “Zinā or Zīnā” (R. Peters); John Burton, The Collection of the Qur’an (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 72-82, 89-94.
limit the punishment to flogging; this is just one of a number of creative measures employed by later jurists to overrule the verse.  

2) *Mutʿa*: This term refers to temporary marriage, which is mentioned in the Qurʾān, and according to some reports was both practiced and sanctioned by Muḥammad. Ultimately it was prohibited in Sunni Islam (normally through reference to a ḥadīth of ʿUmar where he bans it).  

3) *Istilḥāq*: This refers to a number of different ways in which paternal genealogical relationships can be modified; here it will be translated as ‘adoption’. Powers has argued that the Qurʾān does not prohibit adoption, and the fact that normative Islam would later take such a hard line against this practice is a result of the doctrinal implications of the existence of Muḥammad’s own adopted son.  

In all these cases we have examples where the Qurʾānic stipulations been overridden by later jurists. In cases 2) and 3) above, ambiguity in the Qurʾān led to a number of intensely argued legal debates that ultimately resulted in a banning of the practice in most cases. In case 1) however, the Qurʾānic injunction is at complete variance with the opinions of the later jurists, resulting in an extended legal discourse on the matter and in some cases the generation of a story of a ‘forgotten’ sūra. 

Quite why the Muslim jurists went in this direction is beyond the realms of scholarly knowledge; the juristic material as it survives today is the end product of around two centuries of oral debate to which we have no access. We also have no idea the extent to which these juristic norms affected actual social behaviour, or vice-versa. But the direction of travel appears to be towards the norms of the written laws of the existing

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253 *EI*, s.v. “Mutʿa” (W. Heffening).
254 This is a necessary over-simplification; for the full range of meanings *istiḥlāq* can take see Landau Tasseron, “Adoption, Acknowledgement of Paternity,” 180 ff.
settled populations of the Near East; this is particularly true of stoning adulterers (a Biblical punishment) and the ban on temporary marriage. Relaxed attitudes towards sexual ethics on the other hand can be found in non-settled societies (the Bedouin observed by Musil had a surprisingly permissive attitude towards extra-marital sex). The Qurʾān, in the instances where it is concerned with law, appears to follow the more pragmatic approach of these groups than the restrictive written law of the cities.

We cannot go so far as to suggest a direct link between the written law of the conquered populations and the conclusions of the jurists. As Burton notes with regard to the “striking coincidence” that the Islamic penalty for adultery – along with its justification – mirrors that in Karāite Judaism, current scholarship is such that we are in no position to do any more than draw attention to the fact. We simply do not know – and may never know – enough about the nature of the contacts of the Muslims with their non-Muslim subjects over the course of the first two Islamic centuries to be able to make assertions about the origins of these social norms.

The usefulness of these three cases however is that they throw the institution of concubinage into sharp relief. The Muslim jurists of the first centuries of Islam could have done to the practice of concubinage what they did to adultery penalties, temporary marriage and adoption by making them less permissible. We should also not be fooled into thinking that the existence of the expression mā malakat aymānakum and the firāsh maxim were enough to offer any clues that normative concubinage would emerge and survive; Qurʾānic support was no guarantee of survival. There was clearly something about concubinage that ensured it emerged and lasted.

256 Musil reports that pregnancy before marriage was common amongst the girls of the Rwala Bedouin, and this was normally dealt with by their families through abortion (Manner and Customs, 240).
257 Despite being ostensibly strict about such matters, comparable tolerance of extra-marital sex is found in a number of other tribal cultures. For contemporary example in a polygamous societies see Yasuko Hayase and Kao-Lee Liaw, “Factors on Polygamy in Sub-Saharan Africa: Findings Based on the Demographic and Health Surveys,” Developing Economies 35, no. 3 (1997): 297.
258 Burton, Collection of the Qurʾān, 71.
Before we move to our explanation for this difference we will provide a quick summary of the above. The pre-Islamic Arabians of the Ḥijāz probably owned slave women and had intercourse with them, though there is little evidence that this was particularly widespread. The few offspring of these unions were presumed slaves unless the father chose to change their status (e.g. ‘Antara). Concubines were still uncommon amongst Muslims of the Prophetic era; this is supported by the near-complete absence of unambiguous references to the institution in the Qurʾān and recorded Prophetic practice. Despite this, according to the narrative suggested by the trends in the *nasab* data, the Arabs took concubines in large numbers as soon as the conquests began.

When the inevitable children of these unions arrived, there is no conclusive evidence that they were treated as anything less than equals from birth. The result is a widespread practice that can be considered a novelty in terms of both the practitioners’ pre-Islamic behaviour and that of the peoples they conquered. Additionally, the institution flourished in the context of a majority non-Muslim post-conquest world that condemned this form of marriage. That the Arabs might be influenced by pre-Islamic Near Eastern norms can possibly be seen in the way Muslim attitudes on other matters of sexual ethics evolved in the period - even where these had better pre-Islamic, Qurʾānic and Prophetic support.

**Emergence of concubinage: a hypothesis**

For an explanation of the origins of concubinage we have taken two standard routes followed by both modern scholarship and the Islamic tradition. The first has been to locate it in pre-Islamic practice (both Arabian and Near Eastern) but here we found no direct parallels. The second approach (the one more familiar to traditional Islamic scholarship) aimed to locate the practice in the Qurʾān and the example of the Prophet. As before, we did not find any unequivocal connection between what the sources tell us and later practice.
The failure of both these approaches in explaining the origins of concubinage forces us to consider the complexities social change for the period in question. In his work *Studies in Early Muslim Jurisprudence*, Calder found himself at a similar juncture with regard to the origins of Islamic law codes. The traditional scholarship strove to place the origins of Islamic law in a single time and place (seventh century Arabia), but this was an unsatisfactory explanation for the modern scholar because it could not be reconciled with how these codes evolved and what was actually in the works themselves. Calder found modern scholarship similarly wanting as it sought to ascribe the origins of Islamic law to the non-Islamic law codes of the Near-East. The problems here were that the modern scholars had not taken enough consideration of the differences between the different legal systems, or the ease of parallel evolution or (most importantly) the complete lack of interest the legal works seem to show in either other faiths or realworld situations.\(^{259}\)

Calder’s conclusion was that neither of these approaches can generate compelling results; as he put it “The origins of Muslim culture lie in the experience of the Muslim communities of the Middle East and in the uncountable systematic responses to that experience.” His response was to root the origins of Islamic law in the cities and time periods in which it actually emerged (e.g. early medieval Baghdad and Qayrawān); not the cities and time periods that its texts refer to (Prophetic and conquest era Baṣra, Kūfa and Medina).\(^{260}\)

The riddle of what the law might have been in the pre-classical period is not one Calder attempts to answer in his work; he makes the point that law in the earlier period was oral and informal which lends itself very poorly to literary study. But our interest here is not law, it is concubinage, about which we now seem to know a lot in this very period of

\(^{259}\) The whole book is dedicated to establishing this; the most useful synopsis can be found in Chapter Eight.

Islamic history thanks to our quantitative analysis of the *Nasab Quraysh*. This means we are well-placed to reconsider its origins.

**Ethics and elites**

If neither pre-existing practice nor revelation were the origins of concubinage, we will propose a third factor – the evolving needs of the elite Muslims in the social context of the Rashīdūn and Umayyad eras. ‘Elite’ here does not just comprise the caliphs and their families; it means the thousands of members (male and female) of the leading Arab families of the early conquerors and converts, the most important single constituency of which would have been the Quraysh. By understanding the needs of this group, we can perhaps suggest more satisfactory explanations for the evolution of Islamic sexual ethics.

The hypothesis here is that attitudes towards adultery, fosterage and temporary marriage became increasingly hardened following the death of Muḥammad because they were precisely the sexual ethics that concerned the elites the least. Harsher punishments for adultery are of less concern to men who usually had access to limitless women and whose wealth was able to maintain a physical segregation between the genders that had been impossible in the pre-Islamic era. Because of this they would not have reason to resist their legal scholars who modified *jāhilī* and Prophetic-era permissiveness and over the course of generations introduce opinions more akin to the official practices of the non-Ḥijāzī urban populations they mingled amongst.

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261 In fact, Calder suggests caliphal and gubernatorial practices may have been the starting point for law and that this represents a potentially fruitful avenue for future study (he lists “fiscal law, law of war, and penal law” as possible areas of interest with the caveat that this “is no more than a first thought on this matter and is probably subject both to expansion and to qualification” (Calder, *Early Muslim Jurisprudence*, 221)). As concubinage is very much a caliphal practice our investigation into its origins may represent just such an expansion.

262 The word ‘usually’ is included here as even the most powerful men sometimes had a check on their ability to acquire women. For instance, al-Ṭabarī tells us that al-Manṣūr’s wife made him sign a declaration that he will take no more wives or concubines while he is married to her. He responds by repeatedly asking lawyers for ways to get out of this clause, and in one case the wife bribes the caliph’s faqīh in order for the judgement to go in her favour rather than her husband’s. When the wife died he took a hundred virgin concubines (*Taʾrīkh*, 3:423 (translation 29:127-128)).
With the abrogation of temporary marriage the scholars were also successful in bringing what was probably an early Islamic practice into line with what the conquered populations considered more normal, although it survived in Twelver Shi’ism (not Zaydi) rather than suffer from totally eradication. Following the reasoning above, the reason for this was that the elites had little use for *mutʿa*; it - like adultery - was of little use to men who had access to many women. As it was divergent from the marriage practices of most of the subject populations, without any constituency of support it too could vanish from what was considered normative Islamic behaviour by the ‘ulamā without upsetting their political superiors.

The stickiest of the three altered practices was adoption because the ability to manipulate paternity still appealed to elites as a means of rewarding or ensuring loyalty. There are numerous examples of Muslims attempting to incorporate others into their lineages; the most famous one being that of Muʿāwiya’s attempt to claim that he and Ziyād b. Abīhi shared a father (not adoption per se, but still an attempt to join another individual into a descent line through a freshly created genealogical claim). Ultimately though, this did nothing to change the long-term trajectory of social opinion; adoption would later be completely outlawed in normative Islam.

This demise was partly due to theological concerns (as argued by Powers), but a more significant problem is that it was not universally beneficial to the elite constituency. An individual unilaterally adding people to his family was likely to provoke objections from the family’s existing members – especially when there was the prospect of significant

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264 Temporary marriage has some Mazdaean precedent – Young notes that temporary marriage (though specifically ten years long) appears three times in the *Mādigān ī hazār dādistān* (Walter Young, *Stoning and Hand Amputation: the pre-Islamic Origins of the Ḥadd Penalties for Zināa and Sariqa* (unpublished dissertation: 2005), 225)
266 Adoption was also negatively viewed in Sasanian and Roman law (Powers, *Muhammad is not the Father*, 61).
267 Powers, *Muhammad is Not the Father*. His theory is that because Muhammad adopted a son, and this son had children who outlived Muhammad, there was potentially a line of Prophets that could make a claim on the leadership of the *umma*. 

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inheritance. This can be compounded with insensitive language; in Mu‘awiya’s case, the caliph managed to offend the prospective adoptee’s family with his suggestion that his brotherhood with Ziyād originated in his father’s congress with a prostitute.268

Adoption could only have survived if it provided mutual benefit for the parties concerned without any negative consequences for their wider social and familial connections. Muhammad’s adoption of Zayd was initially a perfect instance of how this should work as it connected a man removed from his people with an orphaned and otherwise sonless man who had no siblings.269 Even here, the adoption eventually did turn out to have negative consequences for others (later Muslims as argued by Powers), and this may have been a factor in its ban in normative Islam.

The survival of adoption was ultimately imperilled by the increasing bureaucratisation of the Muslim polity. In the early decades, the more informal, tribal structures of the empire meant adoption would have been a logical way of incorporating talented outsiders into a ruling family. But in later periods, outsiders would have been more interested in acquiring lucrative posts and regional governorships than nominal inclusion in a lineage (we return to this theme in Chapter Eight). While adoption almost certainly continued amongst many lower-ranking Muslims – even perhaps amongst the Quraysh270 – it was not enough to secure the preservation of the practise in normative Islam.

269 Cf. Ella Landau-Tasseron, “Adoption, Acknowledgement of Paternity,” 169–192. Her assertion that adoption was infrequent in the pre-conquest era (page 171) because it has little textual support is unconvincing; a successful adoption means the new person is seamlessly grafted into an existing genealogy (she does concede this to a degree on page 172).
270 The database also suggests the ‘Abbāsids in the era of the *daʿwa* may have been using adoption to connect the leadership with its followers. This comes from the odd finding that the man recorded as having had more sons than any other in the *Nasab Quraysh* is the otherwise obscure ‘Ali b. ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Abbās – the father of Muhammad who was instrumental in organizing the movement during its underground phase. Most of these 22 sons do not reappear in the *Nasab Quraysh* or in other sources. Was Muhammad recruiting agents to his project by rewarding them with fictive genealogies? We should recall that the word used to describe the ‘Abbāsid project during the pre-revolutionary era was *daʿwa* which etymologically closely linked to the word for claiming false paternity (*diʿwa*).
Appeal of concubinage

Concubinage did not suffer the same fate as the three practices mentioned above because it benefited large numbers of men at an acceptable cost to wider society – indeed it may be that the widespread use of concubinage hastened the demise of the three changes in sexual ethics mentioned above. The most important facets of concubinage were its ability to provide many sons without the problems related to money (no dowries were required) and the potentially destabilising effect marriage a marriage to an elite woman could have on the balance of power between the various tribal groupings. This was no different to any other court culture, but the Islamic case is different because the social networks of the elite were tribal at the time of the conquests, and this dynamic took a very long time to disappear. In the diffuse, power-sharing environment of a tribal political culture, both the pressure to produce sons and the negative impact of in-laws were more acutely felt than in royal courts that owed less of their structure to tribal relationships.

As we learnt in the previous chapter, a concubine mother may have been a barrier to political success on account of her deracination, but a concubine wife was a different matter entirely. Having the capacity to reproduce using concubines meant that Arab elites could generate large numbers of their most important social relationships; namely father-son, brother-brother and cousin-uncle. The more of these connections a man enjoyed the more likely he would be to have a successful career. Unlike the situation in a non-tribal society, one son was not enough to serve as an heir; the heir needed brothers, and the heir’s sons would need uncles in order to prevail.

The necessity of sons and brothers as a component of political success in a tribal society is difficult to quantify, but we should note that a number of high-profile early Muslims lacked these connections and it may have been that their religious bonds were a convenient supplement. Muhammad’s situation is a case in point; from an early age he had no father-son relationships of any sort (until the adoption of Zayd), and he never had any brothers. In terms of a lack of brothers he was not alone – the Nasab Quraysh tells us
that none of the first three caliphs had a full-brother (Abū Bakr and ʿUthmān had no paternal brothers; ʿUmar had a paternal half brother). As such, all these men were in a genealogically precarious position.

Hence it may be that the Islamic message was tailored to appeal to men in a similar situation. Establishing this is not easy; although the Qurʾān is full of references to brotherhood it is difficult to differentiate between the moments where it is using a standard monotheist metaphor and where it is speaking of something more literal. More securely, we can point to the use of brotherhood in the historical events of Muhammad’s life; for instance, the arrival of the Muslims in Medina after the Hijra was followed by a brothering event between the Muhājirūn and the Anṣār (there may have been other brotherings prior to this in Mecca involving Muḥammad himself). We should also note that in the Medinan case these brotherings were explicitly instituted in order to solve potential problems of inheritance claims from family members who had refused to convert; they are not purely metaphorical. While more research is needed on this, brotherhood for early Muslims seems to have been something more than a Late Antique scriptural trope.

Ultimately Islam was unable to replace the old tribal loyalties with its more egalitarian vision of an umma. Once most Ḥijāzī tribes had converted, a Muslim brother was no longer remarkable and the old rules still applied; biological brothers were the ones that

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271 For Abū Bakr see page 275, for ʿUthmān see pages 101-104, for ʿUmar see page 347.
272 EQ, s.v. “Brothers and brotherhood” (Roy Mottahedeh).
273 These were occasions were two men would become brothers for the purpose of inheritance. EF, s.v. “Muʿākḥāt” (W. Montgomery Watt).
274 Although the connection between political success and the number of sons has not had a great deal of anthropological attention, mention should be made of Beverly Mack’s observation that “I have lived long enough in the Kano harem to know that it is all about sons, sons, sons, not sex, sex, sex. One needs a big offspring pool from which the kingmakers choose if the kingship is to be kept in the family.” From Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, “Women, Marriage, and Slavery in Sub-Saharan Africa in the Nineteenth Century,” in Women and Slavery: Africa, the Indian Ocean World, and the Medieval North Atlantic, eds. Gwyn Campbell, Suzanne Myers and Joseph Miller (Athens (Ohio): Ohio University Press, 2007), 70. The quote is from personal correspondence with Coquery-Vidrovitch; for Mack’s related academic work see “Royal Wives in Kano,” in Haussa Women in the Twentieth Century, eds. Catherine Coles and Beverley Mack (Madison (Wisconsin): University of Wisconsin Press, 1991), 109–129
counted and by producing a large number of sons you were giving your lineage the best chance of survival. The need to produce sons was partly satisfied through polygamy, but marriage was costly and could be problematic given the split loyalties of the wives. By allowing sexual intercourse with the newly-acquired foreign slave women, and stipulating that the children of these unions were fully legitimate from birth, Islamic society offered an attractive supplement to standard marriage.

For the highest echelons of the elite (notably the caliphs and their most serious opponents) the need to create large numbers of sons diminished as the empire matured. This was because new ways to secure a loyal following were emerging, such as the distribution of resources through appointments or largesse. The influence of money and the dispersion of families across the empire ultimately reduced the loyalty of brothers; a high profile example of this being ʿAbd Allāh b. Zubayr whose brother ʿUrwa allied himself to the Umayyad cause shortly after the Zubayrid caliph’s downfall in 692.

By the time the legal schools were establishing themselves in the ʿAbbāsid period the concubine was an established element of the Islamic court. The lawyers were unlikely to develop or maintain a legal position of prohibition as it would have been very unpopular, and so concubinage became an unremarkable part of normative Islam. Eventually the practice acquired pseudo-historical support through the tales of high profile hajīn religious scholars (such as Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn) who won over the once-chauvinistic Muslims.

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275 Interestingly, we are told that Muʿāwiya (whom we saw above attempting to adopt a brother) was rendered infertile by a botched Khārijite assassination attempt around the time he assumed the caliphate (al-Ṭabarî, Taʾrîkh, 1:3464-3465 (translation 17:223)). While the exact details of this story may not all be accurate, it is interesting that the infertility of the caliph concurs with the fact that our statistical analysis reveals him to have produced a remarkably small number of children for such a powerful and long-lived man. This lack of depth with regards to progeny may have been a contributing factor towards the later usurpation of the Sufyānid dynasty, and it may also provide an explanation as to why he was so keen to incorporate Ziyād into his family.

276 *EI* 2, s.v. “ʿUrwa b. al-Zubayr” (G. Schoeler).

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Another reason that the concubine continued to survive as a feature of the Islamic court was the fact that the tribal-to-imperial trajectory was followed by a number of other notable non-Arab elites in later centuries. For example, the Ottoman sultans were born of freewomen until they established themselves at Constantinople in 1453, after which point they were produced by concubines. Other converts to Islam, from West Africa to Mongolia, could see the benefits offered by concubinage and repeatedly adopted the practice; we can only presume that this was due to political expediency. In terms of the longevity of its appeal, we should note that the Kano harem still had concubines in the 1990s.277

So, unlike some other aspects of sexual ethics practiced by the first Muslims, concubinage did not veer towards the norms of the first societies conquered by Arabs because it was too useful to too many elites over too long a period of time. By the time legal opinions on the matter were beginning to crystallise,278 the concubine and the hajīn were unremarkable parts of both Islamic history and the wealthier urban Muslim family.

As for the reports decrying the incorporation of hajīns and concubines into Muslim society these are more likely to be vestigial remains of conservative attitudes. These would have most likely have been held by members of the conquered societies; not only non-Muslims but also converts. Equally likely is the existence of a minority of Arab chauvinists who had converted to Islam but retained older social norms. Given the viciousness of the invective directed against the hajīns and concubines we cannot deny

278 That there are no surviving legal works from before 150 A.H. is an indicator of the period when the crystallisation on this matter must have taken hold (date from Brockopp, Early Mālikī Law, 147). Brockopp also argues that the lack of interest in the origins of the umm walad and the mukātab in Ibn ʿAbd al-Hakam’s work (despite the fact that neither term is found in the Qurʾān or ḥadīth) as being “an attempt to present both of these slaves as long-accepted institutions in Islamic law” (page 204). This indicates that the concubine was well established in terms of her presence in Muslim society and it was only the legal scholars who had to catch up by reconciling their conflicting arguments on the matter.
the existence of some deep-seated hostility towards these groups; we simply question the Goldziher argument’s contention that these beliefs were at all widely-held.

**The origins of Islamic law**

This alternative narrative for the rise of Islamic concubinage means we can reappraise other narratives of the emergence of Islamic law, particularly narratives that root this law in pre-existing practices. A typical approach is that of Crone in *Roman, Provincial and Islamic Law* where she argues that Islamic civilization borrowed heavily from Greek and Persian provincial practice. Her aim in this is to counter the existing notion that “Sundry elements apart, one is assured, Islamic civilization is simply Ḥijāzī culture writ large”, a view that “rests on nothing but a documentary sleight of hand.”

The rise of concubinage brings the premise of this argument into question. In the first instance, we have already shown that concubinage was not a common practice of the conquered societies, and where it did it appear it was phrased in terms of condemnation – the Muslims could not therefore have borrowed it. But nor can concubinage be seen as an example of “Ḥijāzī culture writ large”; even to the limited extent that it was practiced by the Arabs prior to the conquests, it existed in a very different form - one that ascribed markedly fewer rights to both mother and child.

The normalisation of concubinage cannot therefore be characterised as an Islamisation of Ḥijāzī or Near Eastern cultural/legal practices. It is instead the result of human innovation. The early Islamic elites had a need (producing sons), and they satisfied this need through pragmatism (buying concubines). Eventually, legal cover was provided for this by a creative interpretation of the ḥadīth and Qur’ān (predominantly the use of the firāsh maxim and the Qur’ānic expression *mā malakat aymānakum*).

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Conclusion

The potential of prosopographical approaches when applied to the study of early Islamic history is evinced in the way that even at this most basic level of quantitative analysis we can spark a scholarly inquiry that draws in social, legal, political and historical material. The fact that we can do this for the first century of Islam makes it even more significant.

The data show that concubinage was adopted by large numbers of Qurashī men of the fifth and sixth generations; in other words, contemporaries of Muḥammad. This must have happened as soon as concubines became available to them, and was not the result of a small number of hajīn children proving their worthiness in the manner of ʿAntara in pre-Islamic poetry. While there is certainly evidence of discriminatory attitudes towards the hajīn, these are not reflections of the sorts of social divisions we see between the Arabs and the mawlās; evidence for social parity can be seen in their marriage behaviour and alternative explanations for the late emergence of the hajīn caliph.

Concubinage as it existed in the first decades of Islam was therefore likely to have been broadly the same in social terms as it was in the ʿAbbāsid period, and as it remained in later Islamic courts. Men were not condemned for entering into sexual relationships with slave women and the children of these unions were considered full heirs. But upon accepting this we are then forced to consider where the Arabs got the concept from; it had no precedence in either the pre-Islamic Ḥijāz or the conquered territories. The solution offered here is one of Muslim innovation; the early elites solved a problem (winning the fecundity arms race) in a novel way using the tools to hand (concubinage, which they made licit through interpreting ambiguous phrases in the Qurʾān).

The investigation has also highlighted the fact that previous narratives of the emergence of the concubine at the Islamic court have been skewed by poor prosopography as well as their over-reliance on problematic sources. After all, the proponents of the Goldziher
argument noted above are not known for their overly-credulous attitude to the traditional Islamic historical tradition - indeed, it is to their credit that they used the prosopography of caliphal mothers as a supplement to their literary research in the first place. But by assuming that the caliphs were a bellwether for wider social trends, scholars have erroneously placed the appearance of the concubine and the recognition of the equality of her children towards the end of the Umayyad era. Looking at a wider pool of Muslims – all Quraysh as recorded by al-Zubayrī – we see that the hajīns first appear in significant numbers as the children and grandchildren of the first generation of Muslims and that there is no unequivocal evidence from their marriage behaviour to indicate that they were ever considered as second class Arabs or Muslims.

Finally, this new interpretation of the origins of concubinage can be used to highlight the shortcomings of a tendency within the study of early Islamic history for what Biblical scholars call “Parallelomania.” This term, as defined 50 years ago by Samuel Sandmel, is “that extravagance among scholars which first overdoes the supposed similarity in passages and then proceeds to describe source and derivation as if implying literary connection flowing in an inevitable or predetermined direction.” We see this predisposition in the work of many Islamicists; Crone, Schacht, Goldziher and the editors of many popular encyclopaedias frequently resort to explaining Islamic behaviour in terms of parallels with non-Islamic cultures. The overall effect is too frequently redolent of that which irked Sandmel. Returning to his paper he states:

> While I hold that Mark was a source utilized by both Matthew and Luke, I am not prepared to believe that the writers of Christian literature only copied sources and never did anything original and creative.  

The quantitative analysis above suggests the following reformulation: while we hold that pre-Islamic behaviours were sources for later Islamic practice, we are not prepared to

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believe that Muslims only copied pre-Islamic practices and never did anything original and creative. Islam was certainly creative enough with regard to other elements of preexisting law when it came to slavery; as Irene Schneider notes, Muslims prohibited debt bondage and the enslavement of family members, as well as introducing the default position of freedom for foundlings.\footnote{Irene Schneider, “Freedom and slavery in early Islamic time (1\textsuperscript{st}/7\textsuperscript{th} and 2\textsuperscript{nd}/8\textsuperscript{th} centuries),” \textit{Al-Qanṭara} 28 (2007): 361-376.} It is hoped that our non-literary approach to the mothers of the Quraysh means we can add concubinage to this list and thereby show the societal originality and creativity of the early Muslims in action.
Chapter Six: Marriage datasets

Introduction

The previous two chapters showed how Qurashī marriage behaviour can be extracted from the *Nasab Quraysh* and then organised to show correlations with historical events. In doing this we established the efficacy of our methodology; namely that temporal organisation by generation is a sound means of diachronically studying marriage patterns, and that the marriage behaviour preserved in the *Nasab Quraysh* is remarkably consistent with events as recorded in other sources.

Having established this and accounted for the concubine marriages, we are now in a position to analyse patterns of marriage between Qurashī men and Arab women. Three cohorts of men have been chosen for this: the fourth generation descendants of Quṣayy; Muḥammad and eight of his Companions; and the Umayyad caliphs and their sons. Through the analysis of the marriages of these three groups we will further our understanding of how Qurashī marriage behaviour changed during the period 500-750 CE. The framework of inquiry remains that of Kalmijn noted above; marriage patterns will be explained in terms of social pressure (namely Qurashī opinion on the permissibility of intermarriage between groups) and opportunity (the ability of two partners to meet).

Arab wives are a great deal more complicated than concubines and this is reflected in the structure of the remaining parts of this thesis. This chapter will provide the datasets as a reference tool, along with notes on how the data was gathered. Chapter Seven will show

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283 The selection of these cohorts is based on a number of factors, namely that they are of similar size in terms of numbers of marriages and their ability to represent a before-during-after illustration of the effect Islam and the conquests had on their social behaviour. This will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapters.
how we can use this data by extracting information relevant to the pre-Islamic Quraysh and the first Muslims; Chapter Eight will focus on the caliphal Umayyads.

**Methodology**

Other than the addition of the wives’ names and tribal affiliation our methodology is much the same as that used in the previous chapter; the generational system is still employed and the object of our attention remains child-bearing marriages as preserved in the *Nasab Quraysh*.

The first cohort investigated will be that of the fourth generation male descendants of Quṣayy which includes Muḥammad’s father and uncles. This cohort is realised in the form of a database comprising 53 marriages, in 52 of which the tribal affiliation of the wife can be ascertained. There is no implication here that these husbands formed a single recognisable tribal sub-grouping within the Quraysh whilst they were alive, but as they contained in their number the parents of many early Muslims their marriages will provide us with a snapshot of how the Quraysh married before the arrival of Islam.

The marriage behaviour of this cohort will be compared to a second group consisting of the men at the heart of the Islamic project in its formative years; Muḥammad, the first four caliphs, and the Companions Ṭalḥa, Zubayr, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. ‘Awf and Sa’d b. Abī Waqqās (according to the traditional historical sources these latter four were potential caliphs thanks to their appointment to ’Umar’s *shūra*). This group provides us with a sample size of 54 marriages, 52 of which were to women of known tribal groupings. This sample is intended to give us a picture of marriage behaviour during Muḥammad’s life and the period of the Rashīdūn caliphs.

Our third cohort consists of the marriages of the Umayyad caliphs and their sons. The number of marriages carried out by this group is similar to those of the other two cohorts (56) but extends over a far longer period in time (four generations). The purpose of
creating this cohort is to show us how marriage practices inherited from a tribal society were adapted to suit an increasingly imperial environment. Analysis of this group will also allow us to re-introduce our concubine data; these data are not relevant for the earlier cohorts as concubinage was so rare.

Complications

It should be noted that the nature of exogamy and endogamy is not always as straightforward as it was in the previous chapter. While the distinction between Arab and non-Arab was for the purposes of that investigation more-or-less absolute, when it comes to tribal assignations matters are complicated by the fact that the Arabs had multiple and changing loyalties. Reducing this complexity to a single name assignation implies an unwarranted sense of confidence, yet to abandon any attempt to address the issue of the existence of tribes is, as Conrad puts it, “excessive.”

As a result, the editorial decision-making process that has led to the assignation of tribal loyalty has been made as open as possible. For each entry multiple levels of tribal affiliation are provided in the tables below allowing the reader to perform their own analyses if they disagree with the tribal affiliations used here.

Cohort One – the pre-Islamic Quraysh

This cohort includes all the fourth generation descendants of Quṣayy who are recorded in the Nasab Quraysh as having had children with named women. Only one individual had children with concubines – this is ‘Abbās b. ‘Abd al-Muṭṭalib (Muḥammad’s uncle and ancestor of the ’Abbāsid dynasty). Assuming the historical record is correct in this regard,

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his status as an outlier is in keeping with his being a young member of his generation; he
outlived his nephew Muḥammad by over 20 years. As such he would have been alive at
the time a large influx of slave women came into elite Arab hands as a result of the
conquests.

These marriages are recorded in Table 6.1 below. Preceding this are some useful terms
and explanations.

**Terminology**

**Reference**: number code for identifying individual marriages.

**Husband name**: Familiar characters are named to the level of their father’s generation;
less familiar ones are given longer lineages.

**Wife name**: This is provided in the form of first name plus father’s name if the individual
is non-Qurashī; a longer lineage is given to show familial connection if the person is
Qurashī.

**Wife tribal affiliation**: Non-Qurashī women are given tribal affiliations at multiple levels
where available with the predominant affiliation first (e.g. ‘Quraysh; Hāshim’). Decisions
on what constitutes a tribal division are only suggestions and are largely based on the
relevant entries in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Watt’s table on page 7 of *Muhammad at
Mecca*, and Caskel’s tribal schema which appears on pages 85-86 of his Ġamharat An-
nasab.

**Degree of separation**: “Non-Quraysh” consists of all Arabs not descended from Fihr
(normaly regarded as the man from whom all Quraysh are descended). “Non-lineal
Quraysh” equates to Quraysh who are not descended from Quṣayy. “Lineal Quraysh”
includes all descendants of Quṣayy and is accompanied by a number in parentheses
indicating the generational degree of separation between the husband and the nearest
common ancestor he shares with his spouse (first cousins would be (2), for instance).

**Ordering**: As appears in the *Nasab Quraysh*. Page references are for the relevant
appearance of the husband’s entry.
Other notes:

Only one man had children with concubines; 'Abbās b. 'Abd al-Muṭṭalib. These relationships are not included in the table below.

There is one woman of unknown tribal affiliation (entry A11); the Nasab Quraysh only provides her first name and she has not been recovered in other sources.

Table 6.1: Marriages of the fourth generation descendants of Quṣayy b. Kilāb
(Cohort One)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ref</th>
<th>Husband name</th>
<th>Wife name</th>
<th>Wife tribal affiliation</th>
<th>Degree of separation</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A2</td>
<td>‘Abbās b. ‘Abd al-Muṭṭalib</td>
<td>Umm al-Faḍl bt. Ḥārith</td>
<td>‘Āmir b. Ṣa'ṣa'a; Hilāl</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A3</td>
<td>‘Abbās b. ‘Abd al-Muṭṭalib</td>
<td>A woman of Hudhayl</td>
<td>Khindif; Hudhayl (closely related to Kināna).</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A4</td>
<td>Abū Ṭālib b. ‘Abd al-Muṭṭalib</td>
<td>Fāṭima bt. Asad b. Hāshim</td>
<td>Quraysh; Hāshim</td>
<td>Lineal Quraysh; connected through Hāshim (2)</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A6</td>
<td>Abū Lahab b. ‘Abd al-Muṭṭalib</td>
<td>Umm Jamīl bt. Harb b. Umayya</td>
<td>Quraysh; Umayya</td>
<td>Lineal Quraysh; connected through ‘Abd Manāf (3)</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A7</td>
<td>Arqam b. Naṣla b. Hāshim</td>
<td>Khalda b. Asad b. Hāshim</td>
<td>Quraysh; Hāshim Lineal Quraysh; connected through Hāshim (2)</td>
<td>91</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>A8</td>
<td>Ḥunayn b. Asad b. Hāshim</td>
<td>Woman of Zuhra</td>
<td>Quraysh; Zuhra Non-lineal Quraysh</td>
<td>91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A9</td>
<td>Qays b. Makhrama b. Muṭṭalib</td>
<td>Durra b. 'Uqba b. Rabī‘a</td>
<td>Aws; Nabīt; 'Abd Ashhal Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A10</td>
<td>Ṣalt b. Makhrama b. Muṭṭalib</td>
<td>Fāṭima b. 'Abd Qays</td>
<td>Quraysh; Banū 'Abd al-Dār Lineal Quraysh; connected through Quṣayy (4)</td>
<td>93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A11</td>
<td>Ṣalt b. Makhrama b. Muṭṭalib</td>
<td>Rumayma</td>
<td>Unknown Unknown</td>
<td>93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A12</td>
<td>'Uthātha b. 'Abbād b. Muṭṭalib</td>
<td>Umm Misṭaḥ bt. Abī Rahm b. 'Abd al-Muṭṭalib</td>
<td>Quraysh; Muṭṭalib Lineal Quraysh; connected through Muṭṭalib (2)</td>
<td>95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A13</td>
<td>'Abd Yazīd b. Hāshim b. Muṭṭalib</td>
<td>'Ajla b. 'Ajlān b. Tabā‘ (Biya‘ in JN)</td>
<td>Kināna; Layth. Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A14</td>
<td>Abū al-'Āṣ b. Umayya</td>
<td>Āmina b. 'Abd al-'Uzza</td>
<td>Quraysh; 'Adī b. Ka‘b Non-lineal Quraysh</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A15</td>
<td>Abū al-'Āṣ b. Umayya</td>
<td>Ruqayya b. Ḥārith</td>
<td>Quraysh; Makhzūm Non-lineal Quraysh</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A16</td>
<td>Abū al-'Āṣ b. Umayya</td>
<td>Şafiyya b. Rabī‘a b. 'Abd Shams</td>
<td>Quraysh; 'Abd Shams Lineal Quraysh; connected through 'Abd Shams (2)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A17</td>
<td>Abū al-'Āṣ b. Umayya</td>
<td>Arwā bt. Asīd b. 'Alāj b. Abī Salama</td>
<td>Thaqīf Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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285 The wife’s genealogy in the edited edition of the *Nasab Quraysh* is erroneous; it should read “Muṭṭalib” rather than “Abd Muṭṭalib”. See Ibn al-Kalbi, *Jamharat al-nasab*, 60.


287 Tribal attribution not provided in *Nasab Quraysh*, but father’s genealogy can be found on pp. 388-389 in Ibn al-Kalbi’s *Jamharat al-nasab*. 
<p>| | | | | | | |</p>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A18</td>
<td>Ḥarb b. Umayya</td>
<td>Şafiyya bt. Ḥazn</td>
<td>‘Āmir b. ḳaṣa’a; Hilāl</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>121</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A19</td>
<td>Ḥarb b. Umayya</td>
<td>Woman of Banū Tamīm</td>
<td>Tamīm</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>121</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A20</td>
<td>Ḥarb b. Umayya</td>
<td>Fākhita bt. ‘Āmir b. Muʿattab</td>
<td>Thaqīf</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>121</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A21</td>
<td>Ḥarb b. Umayya</td>
<td>Umm Qattāl bt. ‘Abd al-Ḥārith b. Zuhra</td>
<td>Quraysh; Zuhra</td>
<td>Non-lineal Quraysh</td>
<td>121</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A22</td>
<td>‘Amr b. Umayya</td>
<td>Umm Qattāl bt. ‘Abd al-Ḥārith b. Zuhra</td>
<td>Quraysh; Zuhra</td>
<td>Non-lineal Quraysh</td>
<td>135</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A23</td>
<td>Abū ‘Amr b. Umayya</td>
<td>Āmina bt. Abān</td>
<td>‘Āmir b. ḳaṣa’a</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>135</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A24</td>
<td>Abū ‘Amr b. Umayya</td>
<td>Raḥta bt. Ḥuwayrith</td>
<td>Thaqīf; Jusham</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>135</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A25</td>
<td>Rabī’a b. Ḥabīb b. ‘Abd Shams</td>
<td>Umm Sakn bt. Zālim b. Munqidh</td>
<td>Khuzā’</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>147</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A26</td>
<td>Samra b. Ḥabīb b. ‘Abd Shams</td>
<td>Raḥta bt. ‘Uthmān</td>
<td>Quraysh; Taym b. Murra</td>
<td>Non-lineal Quraysh</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A27</td>
<td>Samra b. Ḥabīb b. ‘Abd Shams</td>
<td>Bint Ḥāritha b. Qays</td>
<td>Kināna; Ghanam b. Malik</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh;</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A28</td>
<td>Ḥārith b. Umayya</td>
<td>Zaynab bt. Nawfal b. ‘Abd Shams</td>
<td>Quraysh; ‘Abd Shams</td>
<td>Lineal Quraysh; connected through ‘Abd Shams (2)</td>
<td>151</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A29</td>
<td>Ḥārith b. Umayya</td>
<td>A woman of Thaqīf</td>
<td>Thaqīf</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>151</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A30</td>
<td>Abū al-ʿĀṣ b. Nawfal b. ‘Abd Shams</td>
<td>Fāṭima bt. Abī Wahb</td>
<td>Makhzūm</td>
<td>Non-lineal Quraysh</td>
<td>152</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A31</td>
<td>'Utba b. Rabī‘a b. 'Abd Shams</td>
<td>Śafiyya bt. Umayya</td>
<td>Sulaym&lt;sup&gt;288&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>153</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A32</td>
<td>'Utba b. Rabī‘a b. 'Abd Shams</td>
<td>Khanās bt. Mālik b. Muḍarrib</td>
<td>Quraysh; ‘Āmir b. Lu‘ayy; Mu‘ays&lt;sup&gt;289&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Non-lineal Quraysh</td>
<td>153</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A33</td>
<td>'Utba b. Rabī‘a b. 'Abd Shams</td>
<td>Umm Ṣafwān bt. Ṣafwān b. Umayya</td>
<td>Kināna</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>153</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A34</td>
<td>'Utba b. Rabī‘a b. 'Abd Shams</td>
<td>Bint Zuhayr al-Dawsī</td>
<td>Azd; Daws</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>153</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A35</td>
<td>Shayba b. Rabī‘a b. 'Abd Shams</td>
<td>Fārī‘a bt. Ḥarb b. Umayya</td>
<td>Quraysh; ‘Abd Shams; Umayya</td>
<td>Lineal Quraysh; connected through ‘Abd Shams (2)</td>
<td>155</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A36</td>
<td>Shayba b. Rabī‘a b. 'Abd Shams</td>
<td>Umm Shārik bt. Waqdān</td>
<td>Quraysh; ‘Āmir b. Lu‘ayy; Ḥisl</td>
<td>Non-lineal Quraysh</td>
<td>155</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A37</td>
<td>Rabī‘ b. 'Abd al-‘Uzza b. 'Abd Shams</td>
<td>Hāla bt. Khuwaylid b. Asad b. ‘Abd al‘Uzza</td>
<td>Quraysh; Asad</td>
<td>Lineal Quraysh; connected through Quşayy (4)</td>
<td>157</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A38</td>
<td>'Āṣ b. Umayya b. 'Abd Shams</td>
<td>Ra‘īta bt. Biyā‘</td>
<td>Kināna; Layth&lt;sup&gt;290&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>173</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A40</td>
<td>Muṭ‘im b. ‘Adī b. Nawfal b. ‘Abd Manāf</td>
<td>Umm Jamīl bt. Sha’ba</td>
<td>Quraysh; Mālik; Ḥisl; ‘Āmir&lt;sup&gt;291&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Non-lineal Quraysh</td>
<td>201</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>288</sup> Not stated in the *Nasab Quraysh*, but the genealogy is the same as that of Hāshim’s mother (see Varisco, “Metaphors and sacred history,” 146).

<sup>289</sup> Muḍarrib’s genealogy does not appear in the *Nasab Quraysh*, but can be found on page 400 of the *Muḥabbar*. His grandfather ‘Amr b. Ḥujayr appears on *Nasab Quraysh*, 434.

<sup>290</sup> Affiliation not stated in the *Nasab Quraysh*, but see Ibn al-Kalbī’s *Jamharat al-nasab*, 129, where the same genealogy appears on line 6.

<sup>291</sup> Sha’ba appears on the *Nasab Quraysh*, 422-423.
| A41 | Khiyār b. `Adī b. Nawfal b. `Abd Manāf | Umm Anās bt. Umayya (or `Abd Umayya) b. `Abd Shams | Quraysh; `Abd Shams; Umayya | Lineal Quraysh; connected through `Abd Manāf (3) | 201 |
| A44 | Qaraẓa b. `Abd `Amr b. Nawfal b. `Abd Manāf | Fāṭima bt. Utba b. Rabī’a b. `Abd Shams | Quraysh; `Abd Shams | Lineal Quraysh; connected through `Abd Manāf (3) | 204 |
| A45 | Ḥārith b. `Āmir b. Nawfal b. `Abd Manāf | Bint `Iyāḍ b. Rāfi’ | Khuzā’a | | 204 |
| A46 | Ḥārith b. `Āmir b. Nawfal b. `Abd Manāf | Durra bt. Abū Lahab b. `Abd al-Muṭṭalib | Quraysh; Hāshim | Lineal Quraysh; connected through `Abd Manāf (3) | 204 |
| A48 | Umayya b. Ḥārith b. Asad b. `Abd al’Uzzā | Zaynab bt. Khālid | Quraysh; Taym b. Murra | Non-lineal Quraysh | 212 |
| A49 | Hāshim b. Ḥārith b. Asad b. `Abd al-‘Uzzā | Arwā bt. Ḥārith b. `Abd al-‘Uzzā | Quraysh; `Abd al-Dār | Lineal Quraysh; connected through Quṣayy (4) | 213 |
The spousal choices by tribal affiliation break down as follows:

Table 6.2: Breakdown of marriages by major groupings for pre-Islamic cohort

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wife’s tribal affiliation</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Proportion of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All wives of known tribal affiliation</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>43.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-lineal Quraysh</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lineal Quraysh (other descendants of Quṣayy)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>30.19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cohort Two: prominent early Muslims

This table incorporates the childbearing marriages of Muḥammad, the first four caliphs plus four men who were reputedly appointed to the shūra established by the caliph ʿUmar to select his successor from amongst their number. These latter eight men were all early converts from the Meccan period, and were either caliphs or could potentially have been caliphs.

Terminology

As Table 6.1 above, with the following changes:

Degree of separation: Intra-Quraysh marriages in this table will be described as “Lineal” or “Non-lineal”. For the descendants of Quṣayy any marriage with another descendant of Quṣayy will be considered lineal; all others are non-lineal. For the individuals not descended from Quṣayy, a non-lineal marriage is one that crosses their established Qurashī clans; for Abū Bakr and Ṭalha this is outside Taym b. Murra, for ʿUmar it is outside ʿAdī b. Kaʿb, and for Saʿd b. Abī Waqqās and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān it is outside Zuhra.

Other notes:

Concubinage is more common for this group, though still a relatively minor practice; only ʿAlī and ʿUmar are listed as having had children through anonymous umm walad. These relationships are not included in the table. There are additionally two instances of men having children with named women of slave origin who are not referred to as being umm walad in the Nasab Quraysh; these are Muḥammad with Māriya, and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAwf with Ghazāl bt. Kisrā. These are included below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ref</th>
<th>Husband name</th>
<th>Wife name</th>
<th>Wife tribal affiliation</th>
<th>Degree of separation</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B1</td>
<td>Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh</td>
<td>Māriya al-Qibtiyya</td>
<td>Egyptian slave</td>
<td>Non-Arab</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B2</td>
<td>Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh</td>
<td>Khadija bt. Khuwaylid b. Asad</td>
<td>Quraysh; Asad</td>
<td>Lineal Quraysh; connected through Qusayy (5)</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B3</td>
<td>‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib</td>
<td>Fāṭima bt. Muḥammad</td>
<td>Quraysh; Hāshim</td>
<td>Lineal Quraysh; connected through ‘Abd al-Muṭṭalib (2)</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B4</td>
<td>‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib</td>
<td>Khawla bt. Ja’far</td>
<td>Bakr b. Wā’il; Hanīfa</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B5</td>
<td>‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib</td>
<td>Umm Ḥabīb bt. Rabī’a</td>
<td>Taghlib b. Wā’il,</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B6</td>
<td>‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib</td>
<td>Umm al-Banīn bt. Ḥizām b. Khālid</td>
<td>‘Āmir b. Ṣa’ṣa’a; Kilāb b. Rabī’a</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B7</td>
<td>‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib</td>
<td>Layla bt. Masʿūd</td>
<td>Tamīm; Nahshal b. Dārim</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B8</td>
<td>‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib</td>
<td>Asmāʾ bt. ‘Umays</td>
<td>Qaḥṭān; Khath’am b. Anmār</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B9</td>
<td>‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib</td>
<td>Umm Saʿīd bt. Urwa</td>
<td>Thaqīf</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B10</td>
<td>‘Uthmān b. ʿAffān</td>
<td>Ruqayya bt. Muḥammad</td>
<td>Quraysh; Hāshim</td>
<td>Lineal Quraysh; connected through ‘Abd Manāf (5)</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
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<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B11</td>
<td>‘Uthmān b. ’Affān</td>
<td>Fākhita bt. Ghazwān</td>
<td>Qays ‘Aylān; Māzin&lt;sup&gt;292&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B12</td>
<td>‘Uthmān b. ’Affān</td>
<td>Umm ‘Amr bt. Jundab</td>
<td>Azd; Daws</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B13</td>
<td>‘Uthmān b. ’Affān</td>
<td>Fāṭima bt. Walīd</td>
<td>Quraysh; Makhzūm</td>
<td>Non-lineal Quraysh</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B14</td>
<td>‘Uthmān b. ’Affān</td>
<td>Umm al-Bānīn bt. ‘Uyayna</td>
<td>Ghatafān; Dhubyān; Fazāra</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B15</td>
<td>‘Uthmān b. ’Affān</td>
<td>Ramla bt. Shayba b. Rabī‘a b. ‘Abd Shams</td>
<td>Quraysh; ‘Abd Shams</td>
<td>Lineal Quraysh; connected through ‘Abd Shams (4)</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B16</td>
<td>‘Uthmān b. ’Affān</td>
<td>Nā‘īla bt. Farāfīṣa</td>
<td>Kalb</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B17</td>
<td>Zubayr b. ’Awwām</td>
<td>Asmā bt. Abī Bakr</td>
<td>Quraysh; Taym b. Murra</td>
<td>Non-lineal Quraysh</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B18</td>
<td>Zubayr b. ’Awwām</td>
<td>Rabāb bt. Unayf</td>
<td>Kalb</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B19</td>
<td>Zubayr b. ’Awwām</td>
<td>Umm Khālid bt. Khālid b. Sa‘īd b. ʿĀṣ b. Umayya</td>
<td>Quraysh; Umayya</td>
<td>Lineal Quraysh; connected through Qusayy (5)</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B21</td>
<td>Zubayr b. ’Awwām</td>
<td>Umm Kulthūm bt. ʿUqba b. Abī Mu‘āyt b. Abī ’Amr b. Umayya b. ‘Abd Shams (NQ 138 for complete genealogy)</td>
<td>Quraysh; Umayya</td>
<td>Lineal Quraysh; connected through Qusayy (5)</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>292</sup> *EP*, s.v. “‘Utba b. Ghazwān” (C.E. Bosworth).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ref</th>
<th>First</th>
<th>Second</th>
<th>Third</th>
<th>Fourth</th>
<th>Fifth</th>
<th>Lineage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B23</td>
<td>Sa’d b. Abī Waqqās</td>
<td>Māriya bt. Qays b. Ma’dī Karib</td>
<td>Kinda</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>264</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B24</td>
<td>Sa’d b. Abī Waqqās</td>
<td>Woman of Bahrāʾ</td>
<td>Qūḍā’a; Bahrāʾ</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>264</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B25</td>
<td>Sa’d b. Abī Waqqās</td>
<td>Umm Hakīm bt. Qārṭ b. Khālid</td>
<td>Kināna; Ḥārith b. ‘Abd Manāt</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>264</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B26</td>
<td>'Abd al-Rahmān b. 'Awf</td>
<td>Umm Kulthūm bt. 'Utba b. Rabī‘a b. 'Abd Shams</td>
<td>Quraysh; 'Abd Shams</td>
<td>Non-lineal Quraysh</td>
<td>266</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B27</td>
<td>'Abd al-Rahmān b. 'Awf</td>
<td>Bint Shayba b. Rabī‘a b. 'Abd Shams</td>
<td>Quraysh; ‘Abd Shams</td>
<td>Non-lineal Quraysh</td>
<td>266</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B28</td>
<td>'Abd al-Rahmān b. 'Awf</td>
<td>Umm Kulthūm bt. 'Uqba</td>
<td>Quraysh; Umayya b. 'Abd Shams</td>
<td>Non-lineal Quraysh</td>
<td>266</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B29</td>
<td>'Abd al-Rahmān b. 'Awf</td>
<td>Bahriyya bt. Ḥāni‘</td>
<td>Bakr b. Wā‘il; Shaybān</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>266</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B30</td>
<td>'Abd al-Rahmān b. 'Awf</td>
<td>Sahla bt. Suhayl b. 'Amr b. 'Abd Shams</td>
<td>Quraysh; 'Abd Shams</td>
<td>Non-lineal Quraysh</td>
<td>266</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B31</td>
<td>'Abd al-Rahmān b. 'Awf</td>
<td>Umm Hakīm b. Qārṭ</td>
<td>Kināna; Ḥārith b. 'Abd Manāt</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>266</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B32</td>
<td>'Abd al-Rahmān b. 'Awf</td>
<td>Woman of 'Abd al-Ashhal</td>
<td>Aws; Nabīt; 'Abd Ashhal</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>266</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B33</td>
<td>'Abd al-Rahmān b. 'Awf</td>
<td>Tumāḏir bt. Aṣbagh</td>
<td>Kalb</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>266</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

293 Her full genealogy is given in the *Nasab Quraysh*, 267.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B34</th>
<th>'Abd al-Raḥmān b. 'Awf</th>
<th>Asmā’ bt. Salāma</th>
<th>Tamīm&lt;sup&gt;294&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Non-Quraysh</th>
<th>266</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B35</td>
<td>'Abd al-Raḥmān b. 'Awf</td>
<td>Majd bt. Zayd</td>
<td>Himyār; Yaḥṣub b. Mālik&lt;sup&gt;295&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B36</td>
<td>'Abd al-Raḥmān b. 'Awf</td>
<td>Ghazāl bt. Kisrā</td>
<td>Persian</td>
<td>Non-Arab</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B37</td>
<td>'Abd al-Raḥmān b. 'Awf</td>
<td>Bādiyya bbt. Ghaylān</td>
<td>Thaqīf</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B38</td>
<td>Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq</td>
<td>Qutayla bt. [‘Abd] al-’Uzza b. Abd As’ad b. Naṣr b. Mālik b. Ḥisl b. Ḥāmir b. Lu’ayy</td>
<td>Quraysh; Ḥāmir; Ḥisl; Mālik</td>
<td>Non-lineal Quraysh</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B39</td>
<td>Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq</td>
<td>Umm Rūmān bt. Ḥāmir</td>
<td>Kināna; Mālik</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B40</td>
<td>Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq</td>
<td>Asmā’ bt. ‘Umays</td>
<td>Anmār of Qaḥṭān; Khath’am&lt;sup&gt;296&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B41</td>
<td>Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq</td>
<td>Ḥabība bt. Khārija</td>
<td>Khazraj; Ḥārith</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B42</td>
<td>Ṭalḥa b. ‘Ubayd Allāh</td>
<td>Hamna bt. Jaḥsh b. Ri’āb</td>
<td>Asad b. Khuzayma&lt;sup&gt;297&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B43</td>
<td>Ṭalḥa b. ‘Ubayd Allāh</td>
<td>Khawla bt. Qa’qā’ b. Zurāra</td>
<td>Tamīm</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B44</td>
<td>Ṭalḥa b. ‘Ubayd Allāh</td>
<td>Umm Abān bt. ‘Utba b. Rabī‘a b. ‘Abd Shams</td>
<td>Quraysh; ‘Abd Shams</td>
<td>Non-lineal Quraysh</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>294</sup> Her tribal affiliation is not given in the Nasab Quraysh but can be found in Ahmed’s Religious Elite, 76.
<sup>295</sup> Subdivision provided in Ahmed’s Religious Elite, 61.
<sup>296</sup> See <i>JE</i>, s.v. “Asmā’” (Charles Pellat).
<sup>297</sup> Sister of Muhammad (and Zayd’s) wife Zaynab. See <i>EQ</i>, s.v. “Wives of the Prophet” (Barbara Stowasser) and Ibn al-Kalbī, <i>Jamharat al-nasab</i>, 186.
<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B45</td>
<td>Ṭalḥa b. ʿUbayd Allāh</td>
<td>Umm Ḥārith bt. Qusāma b. Ḥanẓala</td>
<td>Ṭayy; Mālik b. Judʿān</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B46</td>
<td>Ṭalḥa b. ʿUbayd Allāh</td>
<td>Umm Kūltūm bt. Abī Bakr al-Ṣiddīq</td>
<td>Quraysh; Taym b. Murra</td>
<td>Lineal Quraysh ʿAmr b. Kaʿb (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B47</td>
<td>Ṭalḥa b. ʿUbayd Allāh</td>
<td>Suʿdā bt. ʿAwf</td>
<td>Ghatafān; Dhubyān; Murra298</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B48</td>
<td>ʿUmar b. Khaṭṭāb</td>
<td>Zaynab bt. Maẓʿūn</td>
<td>Quraysh; Jumāḥ</td>
<td>Non-lineal Quraysh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B49</td>
<td>ʿUmar b. Khaṭṭāb</td>
<td>Umm Kūltūm bt. ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib</td>
<td>Quraysh; Hāšim</td>
<td>Non-lineal Quraysh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B50</td>
<td>ʿUmar b. Khaṭṭāb</td>
<td>Umm Kūltūm bt. Jarwal</td>
<td>Khuzāʿa</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B51</td>
<td>ʿUmar b. Khaṭṭāb</td>
<td>Jamīlā bt. Thābit</td>
<td>Aws; ʿAmr b. ʿAwf</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B52</td>
<td>ʿUmar b. Khaṭṭāb</td>
<td>ʿĀṭika bt. Zayd b. ʿAmr b. Nufayl</td>
<td>Quraysh; ʿAdī b. Kaʿb</td>
<td>Lineal Quraysh; connected through Nufayl (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B53</td>
<td>ʿUmar b. Khaṭṭāb</td>
<td>Umm Ḥakīm bt. Ḥārith b. Hishām b. Mughīra</td>
<td>Quraysh; Makhzūm</td>
<td>Non-lineal Quraysh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B54</td>
<td>ʿUmar b. Khaṭṭāb</td>
<td>Suʿayda bt. Rāfīʿ</td>
<td>Aws; ʿAmr b. ʿAwf</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This data can be summarised as follows:

---

Table 6.4: Breakdown of marriages by major groupings for early Islamic cohort

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wife’s tribal affiliation</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Proportion of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Arab wives of known tribal affiliation</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>63.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-lineal Quraysh</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lineal Quraysh</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15.39%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Cohort Three: The Umayyad caliphs and their sons**

This final cohort consists of the child-bearing marriages of those men that made it to the political summit of Islamic society during the Umayyad period. The inclusion of the sons of caliphs as well as the caliphs themselves is in part an attempt to equalise the size of this cohort with the other two, but equally importantly it reflects the fact that relatives would have had a great deal of power over the marriage choices of their children.299

This cohort presents two primary complications. First, it spans four generations rather than one, so each marriage will have to be identified accordingly. The second complication is that of concubinage. Children produced by concubines rarely appeared in the previous two cohorts, but in this group over 40% of the recorded children are produced by slave women. This requires a more detailed discussion that will appear in Chapter Eight.

299 There are numerous examples in anthropological and sociological research, but for the context of this period see Kecia Ali, *Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam* (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 2010), 32.
Terminology

This table utilises the terminology and format of those above with the following minor changes:

1) Tribal affiliation of the wife is given in a slightly different format in order to reflect the alignments of the conquest and post-conquest era milieus. Where a marriage is exogamous, the wider tribal loyalties of the wife’s clan are provided (e.g. northern, Kalb etc.). Where marriages are endogamous, greater detail is provided for the families of the Quraysh into which they married.

2) The generation of the husband has been included. This will allow us to analyse changes in marriage behaviour by generation.

3) If the father is a caliph, this is mentioned in parentheses following his name.

4) Entries are ordered by generation and then alphabetically by name of husband in order to aid data retrieval.

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300 The most significant of these was the emergence of ‘northern’ and ‘southern’ affiliations. See Patricia Crone, “Were the Qays and Yemen of the Umayyad period political parties?” Der Islam 71 (1994): 1-57; Gerald Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam 2nd edition (London: Routledge, 2000), 36 ff.; and the links made by Bashear between the messianic connotations of the term yamāniyya, the battle of Marj Rāhiṭ and the tribal conflicts of the Umayyad era (Suliman Bashear, “Yemen in Early Islam an Examination of NonTribal Traditions,” Arabica 36, no. 3 (1989): 361).
Table 6.5: Marriages of Umayyad caliphs and their sons (Cohort Three)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ref</th>
<th>Husband name</th>
<th>Gen. of husband</th>
<th>Wife name</th>
<th>Wife tribal affiliation</th>
<th>Degree of separation</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C1</td>
<td>Marwān b. Ḫakam (caliph)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>’Ā’isha bt. Mu‘āwiya b. al-Mughīra b. Abī al-ʿĀṣ</td>
<td>Quraysh; Umayyad</td>
<td>Lineal Quraysh; link to Abū al-ʿĀṣ (2)</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Marwān b. Ḫakam (caliph)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Laylā bt. Zabbān</td>
<td>Southern; Kalb</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3</td>
<td>Marwān b. Ḫakam (caliph)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Qutayya bt. Bishr</td>
<td>Northern; Qays; Kilāb b. Rabīʿa</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4</td>
<td>Marwān b. Ḫakam (caliph)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Umm Abān bt. ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān</td>
<td>Quraysh; Umayyad</td>
<td>Lineal Quraysh; link to Abū al-ʿĀṣ (2)</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C5</td>
<td>Marwān b. Ḫakam (caliph)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Zaynab bt. ʿAmr b. Abī Salama</td>
<td>Quraysh; Makhzūm</td>
<td>Non-lineal Quraysh</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C6</td>
<td>Muʿāwiya b. Abī Sufyān (caliph)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Maysūn bt. Bahdal</td>
<td>Southern; Kalb</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C7</td>
<td>Muʿāwiya b. Abī Sufyān (caliph)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Fākhita bt. Qaraḍa</td>
<td>Quraysh</td>
<td>Lineal Quraysh; link to ʿAbd Manāf b. Quṣayy (5)</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C8</td>
<td>Muʿāwiya b. Abī Sufyān (caliph)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Kanūd bt. Qaraḍa</td>
<td>Quraysh</td>
<td>Lineal Quraysh; link to ʿAbd Manāf b. Quṣayy (5)</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

301 For the tribal affiliation see EI², s.v. “Bishr b. Marwān” (L. Veccia Vagler).
<p>| | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C9</td>
<td>Abān b. Marwān b. Ḥakam</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Zaynab bt. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. Ḥārith</td>
<td>Quraysh; Makhzūm (gave birth, but no children named)</td>
<td>Non-lineal Quraysh</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C10</td>
<td>‘Abd al-‘Azīz b. Marwān</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Umm ‘Abd Allāh bt. ‘Abd Allāh</td>
<td>Quraysh; Sahm</td>
<td>Non-lineal Quraysh</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C11</td>
<td>‘Abd al-‘Azīz b. Marwān</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Laylā bt. Suhayl</td>
<td>Northern; Qays; Kilāb b. Rabī‘a</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C12</td>
<td>‘Abd al-‘Azīz b. Marwān</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>‘Ā’isha bt. ‘Abd Allāh b. Mu‘āwiyyah</td>
<td>Quraysh; Umayyad</td>
<td>Lineal Quraysh; link to Umayya (4)</td>
<td>168-169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C15</td>
<td>‘Abd al-Malik b. Marwān (caliph)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Umm Walīd bt. ‘Abbās</td>
<td>Northern; Ghaṭafān; Fazāra</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C16</td>
<td>‘Abd al-Malik b. Marwān (caliph)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>‘Ātika bt. Yazīd b. Mu‘āwiya</td>
<td>Quraysh; Umayyad</td>
<td>Lineal Quraysh; link to Umayya (4)</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C17</td>
<td>‘Abd al-Malik b. Marwān (caliph)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Umm Hishām bt. Hisham</td>
<td>Quraysh; Makhzūm</td>
<td>Non-lineal Quraysh</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C18</td>
<td>‘Abd al-Malik b. Marwān (caliph)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>‘Ā’isha bt. Mūsā b. Ṭalḥa</td>
<td>Quraysh; Taym b. Murra</td>
<td>Non-lineal Quraysh</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C19</td>
<td>‘Abd al-Malik b. Marwān (caliph)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Umm Ayyūb bt. ‘Amr b. ‘Uthmān b. ‘Affān</td>
<td>Quraysh; Umayyad</td>
<td>Lineal Quraysh; link to Abū al-‘Āṣ (3)</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C20</td>
<td>‘Abd al-Malik b. Marwān (caliph)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Umm Mughīra bt. Mughīra</td>
<td>Quraysh; Makhzūm</td>
<td>Non-lineal Quraysh</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C21</td>
<td>Bishr b. Marwān b. Ḥakam</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Hind bt. Asmā’</td>
<td>Northern; Ghatafān; Fazāra(^{302})</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C22</td>
<td>Bishr b. Marwān b. Ḥakam</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Umm Ḥakīm bt. Muḥammad b. ‘Umāra b. ‘Uqba b. Abī Mu‘ayṭ b. Abī ‘Amr b. Umayya</td>
<td>Quraysh; Umayyad</td>
<td>Lineal Quraysh; link to Umayya (4)</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C23</td>
<td>Bishr b. Marwān b. Ḥakam</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Umm Kulthūm bt. Abī Salama b. ‘Abd alRaḥmān b. ‘Awf</td>
<td>Quraysh; Zuhra</td>
<td>Non-lineal Quraysh</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{302}\) This affiliation is not explicitly stated by al-Zubayrī but is based on her ancestor’s name “Ḥiṣn b. Ḥudayfa”, which is the same as that given for ʿUyayna b. Ḥiṣn b. Ḥudhayfa (see *EI*, s.v. “ʿUyayna b. Ḥiṣn” (Michael Lecker)).
<p>| C25 | Muḥammad b. Marwān b. Ḥakam | 7 | Bint Yazīd b. Ṭḥ萱 Allāh b. Shayba b. Rabī‘ā b. Ṭḥ萱 Allāh | Quraysh; Ṭḥ萱 Allāh lineal Quraysh; link to Ṭḥ萱 Allāh Shams | 169 |
| C26 | Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya (caliph) | 7 | Umm Hāshim b. Abī Hāshim | Quraysh; Ṭḥ萱 Allāh Shams | Lineal Quraysh; link to Ṭḥ萱 Allāh Shams | 128 |
| C27 | Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya (caliph) | 7 | Umm Kulthūm bt. Ṭḥ萱 Allāh b. Ṭḥ萱 Allāh b. Kurayz | Quraysh; Ṭḥ萱 Allāh Shams | Lineal Quraysh; link to Ṭḥ萱 Allāh Shams | 129 |
| C28 | Ṭḥ萱 Allāh b. Ṭḥ萱 al-Malik b. Marwān | 8 | Ruqayyā bt. Ṭḥ萱 Allāh b. Muʿāwiya | Quraysh; Umayyad | Lineal Quraysh; link to Ṭḥ萱 Allāh Shams | 132 |
| C29 | Ṭḥ萱 Allāh b. Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya | 8 | ‘Ā’isha bt. Zabbān | Southern; Kalb | Non-Quraysh | 131 |
| C30 | Ṭḥ萱 Allāh b. Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya | 8 | Umm ‘Uthmān bt. Saīd | Quraysh; Umayyad | Lineal Quraysh; link to Umayya | 131 |
| C31 | Ṭḥ萱 Allāh b. Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya | 8 | ‘Āṭīka bt. Ṭḥ萱 Allāh b. Muʿāwiya | Quraysh; Umayyad | Lineal Quraysh; link to Muʿāwiya | 131-132 |
| C32 | Ṭḥ萱 Allāh b. Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya | 8 | Umm Kulthūm bt. Anbasa b. Abī Sufyān | Quraysh; Umayyad | Lineal Quraysh; link to Abū Sufyān | 132 |
| C33 | Ṭḥ萱 Allāh b. Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya | 8 | Umm Mūsā b. ‘Amr b. Saʿīd b. Ṭḥ萱 | Quraysh; Umayyad | Lineal Quraysh; link to Umayya | 132 |
| C34 | ‘Abd al-Rahmān b. Yazīd b. Mu‘āwiya | 8 | Maryam bt. Sa‘īd b. ‘Āṣ  | Quraysh; Umayyad  | Lineal Quraysh; link to Umayya (5) | 181 |
| C35 | Bakkār b. ‘Abd al-Malik | 8 | Azza bt. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz b. ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Amr b. ‘Uthmān | Quraysh; Umayyad | Lineal Quraysh; link to Abū al-‘Āṣ (4) | 116 |
| C36 | Hishām b. ‘Abd al-Malik b. Marwān (caliph) | 8 | Ruqayya bt. ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Amr b. ‘Uthmān | Quraysh; Umayyad | Lineal Quraysh; link to Abū al-‘Āṣ (4) | 115 |
| C37 | Hishām b. ‘Abd al-Malik b. Marwān (caliph) | 8 | Umm Ḥakīm bt. Yaḥyā b. Ḥakam b. Abī al-‘Āṣ | Quraysh; Umayyad | Lineal Quraysh; link to Ḥakam (3) | 167 |
| C38 | Hishām b. ‘Abd al-Malik b. Marwān (caliph) | 8 | ‘Abda bt. Aswār (ʿAbd Allāh) b. Yazīd b. Mu‘āwiya | Quraysh; Umayyad | Lineal Quraysh; link to Umayya (5) | 167 |
| C39 | Hishām b. ‘Abd al-Malik b. Marwān (caliph) | 8 | Umm ‘Uthmān bt. Sa‘īd b. Khālid b. ‘Amr b. ‘Uthmān | Quraysh; Umayyad | Lineal Quraysh; link to Abū al-‘Āṣ (4) | 167-168 |
| C40 | Khālid b. Yazīd b. Mu‘āwiya | 8 | Āmina bt. Sa‘īd | Quraysh; Umayyad | Lineal Quraysh; link to Umayya (5) | 130 |
| C41 | Sulaymān b. ‘Abd al-Malik (caliph) | 8 | Umm Abān bt. Abān b. Ḥakam b. Abī al-‘Āṣ | Quraysh; Umayyad | Lineal Quraysh; link to Ḥakam (3) | 165 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Lineage Details</th>
<th>Tribal Affiliation</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C42</td>
<td>Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Malik (caliph)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Umm Yazīd bt. ʿAbd Allāh b. Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya</td>
<td>Quraysh; Umayyad; link to Umayya (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C43</td>
<td>Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Malik (caliph)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>ʿĀʾisha bt. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAmr b. ʿUthmān</td>
<td>Quraysh; Umayyad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C44</td>
<td>Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Malik (caliph)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Umm ʿAmr bt. ʿAbd Allāh</td>
<td>Quraysh; Umayyad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C45</td>
<td>ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Marwān (caliph)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Fāṭima bt. ʿAbd al-Malik</td>
<td>Quraysh; Umayyad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C46</td>
<td>ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Marwān (caliph)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>ʿĀʾisha bt. Mūsā b. Ṭalha b. ʿUbayd Allāh</td>
<td>Quraysh; Taym b. Murra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C47</td>
<td>Walīd b. ʿAbd al-Malik (caliph)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Umm al-Bānīn bt. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Marwān</td>
<td>Quraysh; Umayyad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C48</td>
<td>Walīd b. ʿAbd al-Malik (caliph)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Umm ʿAbd Allāh bt. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAmr b. ʿUthmān</td>
<td>Quraysh; Umayyad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C49</td>
<td>Yazīd b. ʿAbd al-Malik (caliph)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Umm al-Ḥajjāj bt. Muḥammad</td>
<td>Northern; Qays; Thaqīf</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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303 This tribal affiliation is not explicitly stated by al-Zubayrī, but it is based on the correlation between her genealogy and that of Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf (her uncle).
| C50 | Yazīd b. ʿAbd al-Malik (caliph) | 8 | Saʿda[^304] bt. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAmr b. ʿUthmān | Quraysh; Umayyad | Lineal Quraysh; link to Abū al-Āṣ (4) | 167 |
| C51 | ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Walīd b. ʿAbd al-Malik | 9 | Maymūna bt. ʿAbd al-Rahmān | Quraysh; Taym b. Murra | Non-lineal Quraysh | 165 |
| C52 | Bishr b. Walīd b. ʿAbd al-Malik | 9 | Umm ʿAbd Allāh bt. Ḥābīb b. Ḥakam b. Abu al-Āṣ | Quraysh; Umayyad | Lineal Quraysh; link to Ḥakam (4) | 172 |
| C53 | Muʿāwiya b. Hishām b. ʿAbd al-Malik | 9 | Umm ʿAbd Allāh bt. ʿAbd Allāh | Quraysh; Umayyad | Lineal Quraysh; link to Ḥakam (4) | 168 |
| C54 | ʿUmar b. Walīd b. ʿAbd al-Malik | 9 | Umm ʿAbd Allāh bt. Ḥābīb b. Ḥakam b. Abu al-Āṣ | Quraysh; Umayyad | Lineal Quraysh; link to Ḥakam (4) | 172 |
| C55 | Walīd b. Yazīd b. ʿAbd al-Malik (caliph) | 9 | ʿĀṭika bt. ʿUthmān | Quraysh; Umayyad | Lineal Quraysh; link to Umayya (6) | 167 |
| C56 | Walīd b. Yazīd b. ʿAbd al-Malik (caliph) | 9 | Umm ʿAbd al-Malik bt. Saʿīd b. Khālid b. ʿAmr b. ʿUthmān | Quraysh; Umayyad | Lineal Quraysh; link to Abū al-Āṣ (5) | 167 |

[^304]: On page 115 of the *Nasab Quraysh* (in ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAmr’s section) ‘Saʿda’ appears as ‘Umm Saʿīda’ – the fact that they refer to the same person is apparent from their identical genealogies and names of their children.
Table 6.6: Breakdown of marriages by major groupings for Umayyad caliphs and their sons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wife’s tribal affiliation</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Proportion of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All wives of known tribal affiliation</td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-lineal Quraysh (non-Umayyad descendants of Quṣayy)</td>
<td>11 (17)</td>
<td>19.64% (30.36%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lineal Quraysh (only Umayyads)</td>
<td>37 (31)</td>
<td>66.07% (55.36%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The additional figures in parentheses provided here are to indicate marriages to other descendants of Umayya as opposed to descendants of Quṣayy.

Concluding remarks

The primary purpose of this chapter was to show the workings of the methodology in order for other scholars to check the conclusions drawn from the analysis of these datasets. This is in contrast to certain other prosopographical studies where a great deal of underlying information is hidden behind a handful of headline figures and graphs. Also, by providing the datasets in the format above, it means they can also be exploited by other scholars who wish to carry out their own research using related approaches.

Finally, this chapter has forced us to think about non-trivial issues like tribal identity and group affiliation in new ways. There is no room here for an open-ended discussion of where ‘tribe’ ends and ‘race’ begins (for example), and though this is certainly an interesting subject it does not help us a great deal here. In the tables above we have instead been forced to think about identity far more narrowly; we need a definitive answer on a woman’s tribal affiliation or else she cannot be included in the database. This is often challenging and will provoke some debate. Nonetheless, the ensuing chapters will show...
that with a little thought and ingenuity we can apply overcome these difficulties and show how this data can be used in the study of early Islamic history.
Chapter Seven: Marriage in the late jāhiliyya and early Islam

Introduction

In this chapter it will be shown that the marriage behaviour of early, prominent Muslims contrasted starkly with the marriage behaviour of their fathers; they married into the Quraysh far less frequently and drew wives from a far greater geographic region. As with our study of concubinage, these findings concur with some elements of the traditional historical narrative, yet cannot be reconciled with others.

In terms of concurrence the decrease in numbers of marriages to Qurashī women is a sign of the ostracisation of the first Muslims by their fellow tribespeople. Likewise, the increased geographic dispersal of the tribal origins of the spouses is most likely a result of the conquest of the Arabian Peninsula. But this latter point forces us to reconsider the marriage behaviour of the Quraysh in the pre-Islamic era; the geographic range of these marriages is so limited that we have to radically reassess our sources and secondary studies when they describe the status of the tribe as they were for much of Muḥammad’s lifetime.

This chapter consists of two principal parts. After a brief discussion of exogamy/endogamy, in Section One of this chapter we will aim to present the data as plainly as possible with little in the way of adding secondary sources or speculative approaches. Section Two of the chapter will be more discursive, and will suggest some of the more radical ways in which the trends found within the marriage data can be interpreted. Through all this we will gain a better understanding of social change in Late Antique Arabia and a more nuanced understanding of what exogamy/endogamy can mean in this context.
Exogamy and endogamy within the Arabian tribes

Before we focus on the first two cohorts we will compare all three in order to gain a preliminary understanding of the longer-term trends related to exogamy/endogamy. A side-by-side comparison of the three groups is provided in the table below:

Table 7.1: Comparison of (non-concubine) marriage patterns of the three cohorts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wife’s tribal affiliation</th>
<th>Proportion of Cohort One marriages (preIslamic era)</th>
<th>Proportion of Cohort Two marriages (first Muslims)</th>
<th>Proportion of Cohort Three marriages (Umayyads)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>43.40%</td>
<td>63.46%</td>
<td>14.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-lineal Quraysh</td>
<td>26.42%</td>
<td>21.15%</td>
<td>19.64% (30.36%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(nonUmayyad descendants of Quraysh)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lineal Quraysh (Umayyads)</td>
<td>30.19%</td>
<td>15.39%</td>
<td>66.07% (55.36%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The marriage type that fluctuates the least between the cohorts is the category of unions made with the non-lineal Quraysh. The proportions of marriages of this type do not vary drastically between the different groups; the difference between Cohorts One, Two and Three is a difference of just three marriages, or five if we consider the Umayyads as constituting their own lineage (this is the figure in parentheses).

Far more changeable are the other two categories. This indicates a two-way link; when a male member of a cohort marries a woman from within his lineage this is at the expense of a marriage to a non-Quraysh woman (and vice-versa). Hence the Umayyads were

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305 As discussed in the previous chapter, these are marriages outside the relevant Qurashī sub-group (e.g. the marriage of a Makhzūmī to an ʿAlid).
taking other Umayyads for brides not at the expense of Qurashī clans like Makhzūm and Sahm but at the expense of the non-Qurashī Kalb and Thaqīf.

Looking at Cohorts One and Two we see that the first Muslims married very differently to their fathers; their marriages to Qurashī women of their own lineage group collapsed to half the previous amount with the slack taken up by marriages to non-Qurashī women (the number of marriages of this type increases by almost 50%). Also interesting is the fact that there were only four child-bearing marriages to daughters of other members of the cohort. This is clearly a group that liked to marry out.

The Umayyads of the third cohort swing the opposite way. The number of marriages to non-Qurashī women falls dramatically; the eight marriages they make to outside Arab tribes are far fewer than we would expect to find based on the marriage behaviour of their relatives living in the early- and pre-Islamic periods. But we should not be too quick to label this group as highly endogamous – recall that this same group was taking foreign women of slave origin (i.e. making the most exogamous marriages possible) in far greater numbers than the other cohorts.

The next stage is to formulate arguments as to why these cohorts differ in the way they marry. In this chapter (which will compare the pre-Islamic cohort with the Prophetic) we will show that explanations for some of these differences can be found within the traditional historical sources. What we learn from this will be developed in the next chapter where we consider the marriages of the Umayyad caliphs and their sons.

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306 This is not an effect of incorporating groups who are not descended from Quṣayy; looking at only Muḥammad, ʿAlī, ʿUthmān and Zubayr we still find that the majority of marriages are to non-Qurashīs.
307 This latter observation is clearly something that requires further investigation; until now studies on marriage have tended to emphasise the large number of marriage connections between the early Muslims – perhaps we should consider the possibility that they made surprisingly few such marriages.
308 This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Eight.
Section One: Statistical analysis of the marriages of Cohorts One and Two

Our starting point is the following table, which illustrates the differences between the marriages of the two groups:

**Table 7.2: Comparison of marriage patterns between pre-Islamic and early Islamic cohorts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wife’s tribal affiliation</th>
<th>Pre-Islamic marriages</th>
<th>Early Muslim marriages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>43.40%</td>
<td>63.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-lineal Quraysh</td>
<td>26.42%</td>
<td>21.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lineal Quraysh</td>
<td>30.19%</td>
<td>15.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total marriages</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As noted above, the main difference between the two groups is that the early Muslims married outside the Quraysh far more frequently than the men of the pre-Islamic society they were born into, and that these exogamous unions came at the expense of marriages that previously occurred between them and women of their respective lineages.

There is also evidence that conversion changed the nature of endogamous marriage. We can see this when we compare the degree of separation between the husband and his wife, expressed as a figure indicating the number of generations between him and his common paternal ancestor with his wife (so ʿAlī’s marriage to Fāṭima is listed as a “2” because ʿAlī is two generations away from ʿAbd Muṭṭalib, who is his nearest common link with his wife in the male line). This is shown in the table below:
Table 7.3: Degree of separation between marriage partners measured over time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of separation (in generations)</th>
<th>Number of occurrences in pre-Islamic cohort</th>
<th>Number of occurrences in early Islamic cohort</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>(3)(^{309})</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>16 (19)</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.88 (3.21)</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.88</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Caution should be applied to any conclusions drawn from this; we are dealing with very small groups of people here. Nonetheless, it is clear that the trend towards exogamy seen in the wider marriage behaviour is replicated within the lineal marriages. The preIslamic cohort made seven marriages to women with whom they were connected through a paternal grandfather; these would be to first cousins or the daughters of first cousins. The number of marriages of this type is drastically reduced in the Islamic era. Another indicator of this change is the figure in the bottom row of the table which gives the average generational distance between a husband and his common ancestor with his wife. Even when including the Banū Zuhra (see note 309) we see that there is a significant difference between the average distance in the Islamic and pre-Islamic era.\(^{310}\)

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\(^{309}\) This is the figure for the number of marriages between this cohort and the Banū Zuhra, who were descended from Quṣayy’s only child-producing brother. The reason for this inclusion is that the cohort of early Muslims came a generation later than the earlier cohort, and therefore had an extra generation’s worth of marriage partners. By including the Banū Zuhra we can equalise our analysis when considering endogamy/exogamy by generational distancing.

\(^{310}\) The significance can be seen if we note that in order for the two figures to be reconciled, the pre-Islamic Quraysh would have to reduce their marriages to first cousins by four and increase their marriages to Zuhra by the same amount in order to match the exogamy of the early Muslims. Alternatively, the Muslims could reduce their marriages to women separated by four and five generations to zero and increase the marriages to women separated by two and three generations by the corresponding amount in order to approach the endogamy rate of their fathers’ generation.
The trend towards exogamy can also be found when we look closer at the origins of the non-Qurashī women the two groups of men married. This table details the number of marriages the pre-Islamic cohort made to various Arab tribes alongside the number of marriages made by the Prophetic-era cohort into the same tribes:

Table 7.4: Number of exogamous marriages of pre-Islamic and early Islamic cohorts by tribe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Pre-Islamic cohort</th>
<th>Early Islamic cohort</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kināna</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thaqif</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Āmir b. Ṣa’ṣa’a</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khuzā’a</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulaym</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aws</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daws</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hudhayl</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakr b. Wā’il</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamīm</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>23</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clear from this that there is a dramatic change in marriage patterns between the two cohorts. The pre-Islamic group make 18 of their 23 non-Quraysh marriages into just five tribes yet these same five tribes account for only seven of the Prophetic cohort’s 33 exogamous marriages. The later cohort also married into groups that the Quraysh of their fathers’ generation had been less keen on. In the table above we see that the group married into Bakr b. Wā’il, Aws and Tamīm three times each; in the early generations these tribes accounted for only one marriage each.
Another indicator of change is the number of marriages to new tribes made by the generation of the Prophet; absent from the table above are the 16 marriages made to tribes that the earlier cohort had never married into (marked in the ‘Other’ row). The most frequently married of these new tribes include Kalb (three marriages), Qaḥtān, Ghatafān and Asad b. Khuzayma (two marriages each). For all the problems with assigning tribal affiliation at this level, it is clear that the Quraysh of Muḥammad’s time were spreading their marriages out to a far greater extent than their fathers.

We get strikingly similar results when we approach the issue of exogamy/endogamy geographically rather than genealogically. The image below is a map of the distribution of the Arab tribes during the seventh century taken from Margoliouth’s *Mohammed and the Rise of Islam*:311

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In terms of the accuracy of the map, it is true that the information on the geographic locations of the tribes is drawn from the traditional historical narratives. But, as with genealogy, we have grounds for believing that geographical locations of tribes are less susceptible to manipulation than anecdotes and hadīths. As Donner has suggested, the geography of the ‘battle days’ could be a useful resource for historians because even if the battle itself is non-historical, the location would have to be a plausible one and relate to the location where the descendants of the tribes resided at the time of telling. In addition to this, the veracity of the geography is also boosted by the corroboration of

contemporary epigraphy which alludes to at least one of the main tribes that the Quraysh are recorded as having married into – and possibly up to three.\footnote{The tribe in question is the ʿĀmir b. Ṣaʿṣaʿa who are mentioned in the Murayghān inscription of 552 AD. The events the inscription describes took place in the middle of the sixth century and the inscription locates them in the Hijāz (Meir Kister, “The Campaign of Huluban: A New Light on the Expedition of Abraha,” \textit{Le Museon} 78 (1965): 425-436); the fourth generation descendants of Quṣayy produced children with four women from this tribe. The other possible reference to a local tribe is more complex; this is the appearance in Greek sources of the “Kinaidokolpites” who have been linked to both Kināna and Kalb b. Rabīʿa b. ʿĀmir b. Ṣaʿṣaʿa (along with other theories). For an extensive recent discussion of the complexities of this latter term see M.D. Bukharin, “Towards the Earliest History of Kinda,” \textit{Arabian Archaeology and Epigraphy} 20, no.1 (2009): 64-80.}

Our next map shows how the origins of the marriage partners Quraysh of the preProphetic era were distributed graphically. The tribe names have been removed (for clarity) and every time a tribe has contributed a bride to the Quraysh, this has been marked with a star placed on the location Margoliouth put the tribe name.

\textbf{Map Two: Geographic distribution of tribal origins of non-Qurashī women marrying into pre-Islamic cohort}

\hspace{1cm}

\[300\text{miles/500km}\]
Almost all the marriages they carried out were with tribes living within 200 miles of Mecca. Only two marriages involved tribes placed far outside this range; one to a woman of Bakr b. Wā’il and another to a woman of Tamīm (A19 and A47), both from tribes living on the western shore of the Persian Gulf. This gives us a good measure of the geographical horizons of the Qurashīs on the eve of Islam.

When we repeat this process for the early Islamic marriages we see a marked difference:

**Map Three: Geographic distribution of tribal origins of non-Qurashī women marrying into early Islamic cohort**
The geographical spread of marriages for Cohort Two is enormous, representing almost all inhabited regions of the Arabian Peninsula\textsuperscript{314} and extending into Iraq and the Syrian Desert. Once again, we see that the underlying characteristic of this generation\textsuperscript{315} is its exogamy. This generation not only married outside the Quraysh significantly more often than the pre-Islamic cohort, but when it did so it was to women from a far greater geographical range.

**Explanations – marriages of the early Muslims**

These findings indicate that the early Muslims were more likely to marry exogamously than members of the non-Muslim society they grew up in. This tendency towards exogamy is not only evident in absolute terms of whether their wives were Quraysh or non-Quraysh, it is also evident within these categories. When the early Muslims married lineal Qurashī women they did so with women to whom they were more distantly related; when they married non-Qurashī women they did so with women from a greater geographical range.

In terms of the marriage patterns of the early Muslims in general, and their exogamy in particular, this fits with what we know from the outside sources. First, it appears to be a result of the ostracisation of the early Muslims from the wider Quraysh; this reduced their chances of finding marriage partners from within this group meaning that they had to look further afield. According to the Kalmijn framework of inquiry this is an example of a change in marriage behaviour affected by social forces. Similarly, the ideology of Islam meant they were less beholden to existing tribal divisions and may have been more open to unions considered unthinkable before their conversion. Finally, many of these men lived after the conquest of Arabia; as such, they were able to marry outside the confines

\textsuperscript{314} Except Oman – this will be addressed below.

\textsuperscript{315} For reference, the older members of this generation were born around 570 and the last of them died in the 660s.
of the Ḥijāz. This latter reason is structural – the conquests brought the men into contact with a wider group of women and this facilitated their marriages to the outside groups.

The only major area of the peninsula that the Prophetic cohort did not marry into is Oman, and Crone notes that this is the only region whose markets the pre-Islamic Quraysh did not visit.316 There is also evidence of a cultural and material divide between the eastern third of the peninsula and the remainder in pre-Islamic times.317 This indicates two things: first, the success of the Islamic project meant an intensification of existing relationships rather than a complete break with the past for the first Muslims; second that the methodology is sound - the absence of Omani markets in the traditional narratives of the history of the Quraysh concurs with the results of our prosopographical analysis.

**Polygamy**

Qurashī marriage behaviour as recorded in the *Nasab Qurasyh* may also confirm another theory relating to marriage changes caused by the arrival of Islam. Stern has argued that Islam introduced polygamy into what was previously a largely monogamous society and the data appear to agree with this;318 the 54 child-bearing marriages of Cohort One were conducted by 34 men while the 54 marriages and unions of Cohort Two were conducted by just nine men. While this is a dramatic increase in the number of marriages per man, we should be aware of a possible historiographical reason for this; the older generation may have been producing children from similarly large numbers of women, but later genealogists did not feel that these children were worth recording in the same detail as those of Cohort Two.

Since the publication of Stern’s book there has been a significant amount of sociological 
research on the reasons why some societies are polygamous and why others are 
monogamous.\textsuperscript{319} It becomes quickly apparent from reading this literature however that 
the more data a researcher has on a society’s economic, social, political and 
environmental structures, the more reasons can be suggested for explaining its monogamy 
or polygamy. It has been observed that monogamous societies are less common than 
polygamous ones (about 15\% of the total number of historically recorded societies) and 
these monogamous societies are found in both the most marginal conditions (where the 
smallest distinctions in status and wealth between men are exhibited) and also in the 
largest and most successful of ancient civilizations (which exhibited the largest 
distinctions in status).\textsuperscript{320} In the Islamic case, the Arabs seem to have gone from being a 
marginal society to the masters of an empire and somehow acquired polygamy on the way.

**Conclusions to numerical/geographical analysis of Cohorts One and Two**

Stern aside, the marriage patterns of the early Muslims confirm many elements of the 
traditional historical narrative. The arrival of Islam coincides with a dramatic alteration 
in the patterns of marriages for those who converted to the new faith early and would go 
on to lead the community after the death of Muḥammad. Not only this, the nature of the 
change is in line with what we would expect from the traditional historical sources. In 
terms of social change, the ostracisation of the early Muslim community combined with 
their pan-tribal ideology would have led to the greater levels of exogamy we see in the 
tables above. In terms of structural change, the conquest of the Arabian Peninsula and the

\textsuperscript{319} For overviews see Douglas R. White and Michael L. Burton, “Causes of Polygyny: Ecology, 
Sanderson, “Explaining Monogamy and Polygyny in Human Societies: Comment on Kanazawa and 

\textsuperscript{320} Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, and Peter J Richerson, “The Puzzle of Monogamous Marriage,” 
*Philosophical Transactions of The Royal Society Of London. Series B, Biological Sciences* 367, no. 1589 
Near East would have brought them into contact with a far greater range of tribes than their forefathers who dominated only Mecca and possibly its hinterland.

By locating the marriages geographically we can also effectively counter some of the more extreme revisionist theories on Islamic origins. In her *Meccan Trade*, Crone’s scepticism of the narrative of Islamic origins leads her to suggest that the pre-Islamic Quraysh were not based at Mecca at all but located much farther north, or that the tribe was split between one group at Mecca and the other at the northern base, or that the tribe was dispersed all over the peninsula. The marriage distribution as indicated on the maps challenges all three theories; the marriages of the pre-Islamic Quraysh are concentrated in the region of Mecca and the high degree of endogamy within the tribe precludes the notion that they were geographically split in two camps. And, although the first Muslims certainly married women from all over the peninsula, we should not forget that over a third of their marriages were with other Qurashīs; when it comes to marriage, the only centre of gravity in both cohorts is a location in the central Ḥijāz. It should also be recalled that this counter-argument to Crone’s theories is built on the relatively solid (by the standards of early Islamic history) foundations of geography and genealogy using a prosopographical approach advocated by Crone herself.

Finally, the comparison shows once again that our data and methodology are on a sound footing. Within the traditional narrative sources, there is an identified bias towards tribes that had settled around the main urban centres that supported intellectual circles, such as Baṣra and Kūfa. The tribes identified in table 5.4 above are not these tribes; they are tribes local to Mecca who in many cases did not play a significant role in the conquests

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321 Crone, *Meccan Trade*, 162–165. Crone is not the only one to promote the theory of a non-Meccan Islamic origin story, but unlike Gerald Hawting (in *The Idea of Idolatry*) and John Wansbrough (*The Sectarian Milieu* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978) Crone is to be preferred because she actually provides some concrete suggestions on where Islam might have emerged if not Mecca.

or the post-conquest milieu. The genealogical literature seems to have resisted the distortions of later historians – at least with regard to maternal data.

Hopefully by now scholars of the sceptical persuasion can see that the child-bearing data preserved in the Nasab Quraysh (and most likely early nasab works in general) should be treated more like primary evidence. It bears more similarities in this regard with the Qurʾān and the Constitution of Medina than it does with the bulk of ḥadīth and sīra material. In other words these are complicated sources, but uniquely useful for the work of positivist historians.

Section Two: Discursive approaches to the analysis of Cohorts One and Two

In the second section of Chapter Seven we will reassess relevant elements of the secondary literature along with a number of the more familiar historical sources such as al-Ṭabarī’s Taʾrīkh. The purpose of this is to show that the findings of Section One of this chapter can help us decide between narratives that currently have equal weight. While the result can only be described as being a sketch of a full literature review it will nonetheless show how prosopography is capable of provoking new discussions and suggesting new avenues of inquiry.

Our remarks will primarily concern the status of the pre-Islamic Quraysh on which there are broadly speaking two narratives. On the one side we have a narrative that tends to emphasise two features of the pre-Islamic Quraysh; that they were the pre-eminent tribe of Arabia (and recognised as such) and that they had a far-flung trading empire that extended to Byzantium, Iran, Yemen and Abyssinia. This is the image provided by the majority of the traditional narrative sources and it is supported to a lesser or greater degree by a large number of modern scholars.\(^{323}\) On the other side there is a counternarrative that

\(^{323}\) Henri Lammens La Mecque à la veille de l’hégire (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1924); W.
regards the reported importance of the Quraysh in the pre-Islamic era as being grossly overestimated in the majority of the traditional sources, and in reality the Quraysh were far more parochial an entity than these sources lead us to believe. This is the opinion of a smaller number of modern scholars, who can be typically characterised as being revisionists.324

In the following section it will be argued that by taking all the elements of our prosopographical findings together we end up with an argument that overwhelmingly supports the revisionist position. The grounds for this will be laid out below by looking at three inter-related themes where the parochiality of the Quraysh is evident. The first theme is that of their political horizons; it is argued that the limited geographic distribution of the marriages is a good indicator that their political purview did not extend more than a week’s travel in any direction from Mecca. The second theme concerns their relationships with the surrounding tribes. Here it is shown that the role of the Quraysh as custodians of a shrine indicates that they were superior to the geographically dispersed tribes that encircled them. But this was a relationship of mutual dependency; the Quraysh still needed these tribes in order to survive. Not only this, they were also inferior in status to the tribes who controlled nearby towns. The final theme is that of the economy of Mecca. In this latter discussion, it will be shown that the Quraysh tribe’s very survival at the settlement depended on a fine balance of power mediated through trade and religion.

The discussion will conclude with an alternative narrative for the rise of Islam that combines these themes. This new narrative is one that emphasises the precarious nature of Qurashī existence before and during the lifetime of the Prophet. Unlike the masters of

an international trading empire as some scholars would have us believe, the Quraysh that emerge from this analysis constituted a tribe that struggled to raise itself above the status of the surrounding peoples of the central Ḥijāz, who were custodians of a minor shrine, and were ultimately extremely vulnerable to any group who could upset the balance of regional power in its favour.

**Marriage and status in pre-Islamic Mecca**

Turning first to the supposed international connections of the pre-Islamic Quraysh, we see that the geographic distribution illustrated in Map Two indicates that in marriage terms the geographic horizons of the tribe did not even extend to the northern and southern limits of the Ḥijāz. If the marriage behaviour of a particular group is a reflection of its relationship with outsiders – and all through this thesis the indicators say that this is the case – then from the map we can only conclude that the most important relationships of the Quraysh in this period were with the tribes in their immediate surroundings. Based on the geographic data alone we cannot conclude that the Quraysh enjoyed relationships of any similar intensity with the peoples outside Arabia, or even with the Arab tribes that abutted these peoples. It is only with the early Islamic period that we see a marriage distribution pattern that matches the status of a widely recognised tribe of trans-peninsular importance.

In terms of the pre-Islamic Quraysh being recognised as an elite amongst the Arab tribes, the marriage behaviour is also unsupportive. This can be seen in the geographic distribution; the only tribes willing to hand over daughters to Qurashī men are those living near Mecca – it follows therefore that it was only the tribes near Mecca that saw any value in developing closer relations with the Quraysh. But it is more apparent in the relative levels of exogamy and endogamy. Returning to the caliphal Umayyad marriage behaviour in Table 7.1, we see that their status as an elite meant that they shunned connections with Arabs they considered ‘outsiders’ (only eight of 56 marriages were to non-Qurashī women); it also meant fewer marriages to non-Umayyad Qurashīs. In their place came
non-Arab women (the concubines) and paternal cousins. Their pre-Islamic forbears could not do this, so although the sources often insinuate that the pre-Islamic Quraysh enjoyed an Umayyad-like pre-eminence over the Arab tribes of the peninsula in the jāhilī era, this was clearly not the case.

Furthermore, the degree of endogamy exhibited by the pre-Islamic Quraysh correlates remarkably well with some more recent studies on Arab marriage patterns. In the 1960s, Richard Randolph and Allan Coult used the novel means of a computer to analyse the marriages of a Hawaashleh Bedouin subgroup; these had been recorded by Randolph in the Israeli part of the Negev desert earlier in the decade.325 This group of around 350 individuals recalled 150 marriages. For our purposes, we are only interested in the marriages made by the men of this sub-group, of which there are 119. Of these marriages, 61 were carried out with other members of the subgroup. This subgroup is defined as those people descended from a founder figure who came between four and eight generations prior to the generation of the living. This is equivalent to the combined lineal and non-lineal Quraysh when looking at the marriages of our pre-Islamic cohort.

Based on these figures, we find that the level of endogamy (marriages amongst the subgroup as a proportion of total marriages) amongst the Hawaashleh Bedouin of the mid-twentieth century was 51.26%. The equivalent level of Quraysh endogamy for the pre-Islamic cohort of the sixth century was 56.61%. For the first Muslims it dropped to 36.44%, but for the Umayyads it shot up to 85.71% (and this is not taking into account the large numbers of concubines of the Umayyads, something the Hawaashleh did not have access to). Hence the pre-Islamic Meccans were exhibiting a level of endogamy comparable to the marginalised Bedouin living a few hundred miles north of them 1,400 years later.

In addition to this the Quraysh did something in this period that they tried to avoid in later times, which was to marry their own daughters off to non-Qurashī tribes. Ibn Iṣḥāq informs us that one of the leaders of Thaqīf who turned down Muḥammad’s message in the pre-Hijra period was married to a Qurashī woman of Jumaḥ.326 Later on, when the Thaqafī town of Ṭāʾif was besieged, Abu Sufyān b. Ḥarb and Mughīra b. Shu’ba went in to appeal to the Qurashī wives of Thaqīf to leave – they are named as Āmina bt. Abī Sufyān and Firāsiya bt. Suwayd b. ‘Amr b. Tha’ laba (both women produced sons by their non-Qurashī husbands).327 The Nasab Quraysh records other tribes with whom the Quraysh married their women in the pre-Islamic period; Kurayz b. Rabī’a b. Ḥabīb married his daughter to a Ḥadramī, and his grand-daughter (Kayissa bt. Ḥārith b. Kurayz) married Musaylima al-Kadhāb of the Banū Ḥanīfa.328 Two daughters of Abū alʿĀṣ b. Umayya are also recorded as having made child-bearing marriages into Thaqīf.329 Even the Banū Hāshim provided daughters to other tribes; ‘Abd al-Muṭṭalib’s daughter (Muḥammad’s aunt) married Jaḥsh b. Riʿāb of Asad b. Khuzayma in a union which produced a number of children, including a daughter who married Muḥammad’s onetime adopted son Zayd and later the Prophet himself.330

In later generations, exogamous marriages of Qurashī women appear to have been drastically curtailed. The Nasab Quraysh does not record a single exogamous marriage for any daughter of an Umayyad caliph, and there is evidence that the Umayyads went so far as to prevent marriages from other Qurashī clans to outsiders. The Umayyads reproached ‘Abd Allāh b. Jaʿfar b. Abī Ṭālib for marrying one of his daughters to al-Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf – despite the fact that this man was an invaluable governor and of the very same Thaqīf tribe the Umayyads had given daughters to a couple of generations

328 Al-Zubayri, Nasab Quraysh, 18-20.
329 Al-Zubayri, Nasab Quraysh, 101.
330 Al-Zubayri, Nasab Quraysh, 19.
The avoidance of marriages of this type seems to have even permeated the Nasab Quraysh itself. An illustration of this is the fact that three identifiable Qurashi women who made exogamous marriages as recorded in a section of Ibn Ḥabīb’s al-Munammaq do not appear at all in al-Zubayrī’s work. This may be because as a work of genealogy it is not interested in familial lines that leave the Quraysh, but we should note that the daughters in question are not even mentioned alongside their brothers.

The issue of daughter marriage is not one that can be addressed in a truly prosopographical fashion at this stage; the current database consists only of childbearing marriages of Qurashi men, not women. A comprehensive database of all personages recorded in the Nasab Quraysh is hence a desideratum, though given the indications that the work is being coy about female Qurashi exogamy it will have to be supplemented with data from other sources.

As a preliminary to this, we can make use of a table that appears in the appendix of an unpublished PhD thesis by Rasheed Hosein. This table draws on multiple historical sources and records over a hundred unions between Qurashi and Thaqafi tribes that took place between 530 and 750 CE. As this is unpublished research it is unfair to be critical of Rasheed’s table, or to place too much reliance on it, but nonetheless it provides us with some useful early indicators. The table shows that of the 25 childbearing unions where a Qurashi woman married a Thaqafi man, only two occurred after the sixth generation.

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332 In that their fathers can be identified.
333 Muhammad Ibn Ḥabīb, *al-Munammaq fī akhbār Quraysh* (Hyderabad: Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif al-ʿUthmāniyya, 1964), 301-324. The women are Ṣafiyya bt. Abī Ṭalḥa of ʿAbd al-Dār b. Quṣayy who married Ḥajjāj b. Alāt of Bahz of Banū Sulaym b. Manṣūr producing a son called Maʿraḍ (*al-Munammaq*, 306; father appears in the Nasab Quraysh, 251, but she does not appear amongst his children); a daughter of Aswad b. Awf of Zuhrā who married ʿAbd Allāh b. Yazīd of Azd - a tribe with whom it is stated there was no alliance (*al-Munammaq*, 307; father appears in the Nasab Quraysh, 273, but the daughter is not listed amongst his children); and a daughter of ʿUbayd Allāh b. ʿUthmān (sister of Ṭalḥa) who married ʿAlqama b. Waqqāṣ of Layth (*al-Munammaq*, 310; father and sons appear in the Nasab Quraysh, 280, she does not). This last marriage took place in the Islamic era.
(using the generational system employed in this thesis). The Generation 6 exogamous daughter marriages would have been organised by the men of the fifth generation; in other words the early Muslim men who we know married exogamously themselves. This type of marriage is not found amongst the marriage records of the daughters of the Umayyad caliphs in the *Nasab Quraysh*.

These exogamous daughter marriages of the Quraysh have attracted a degree of scholarly interest. Landau-Tasseron has argued that exogamous marriages of Qurashī daughters were only ever conducted with tribes with whom the Quraysh were in a formal alliance, and this was due to the “special status of this tribe at that time.”

The problem is that some sources explicitly state that the tribe receiving a Qurashī daughter was not an ally. In response to this, she points out that these claims of non-alliance are contradicted in other sources. Her explanation for the discrepancies is that those who denied the allegiances were attempting to Islamise the *jāhili* history of Muḥammad’s clan. In this case, by reducing the number of allies of the Quraysh, historians hoped to make it appear as though the pre-Islamic tribe pre-empted the *ḥadīth* declaring that “there should be no alliance in Islam.” But this cuts both ways; it could be that the alliances themselves are the fabrication of some later historians in order to explain why the Quraysh frequently gave away their daughters to non-Qurashī tribes – a most uncommon act at the time these histories were being written down. By making these tribes allies the exogamous marriages become endogamous. This is a better explanation for the resulting confusion in the sources with regard to who was and who was not an ally (a confusion also noted by Kister) than Landau-Tasseron’s, where she blames a lack of data.

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337 Kister lists ten variations on which tribes constituted the Ḥums alliance provided by nine different authors (in one case the author gives two variation). Meir Kister, “Mecca and Tamīm (Aspects of Their Relations),” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 8, no. 2 (1965): 132.
Returning to the issue of marriage and the status of the pre-Islamic Quraysh, the situation can be summarised thusly. The genealogical tradition tells us that Qurashī men of the immediate pre-Islamic era normally married Qurashī women; when they did not, they took wives from the region surrounding Mecca. They also gave their daughters in marriage to some of these tribes – in particular Thaqīf, though we cannot preclude marriages made to other tribes who were not as successful in preserving their genealogical traditions. Both these marriage practices were abandoned by the Umayyad caliphs, and quite probably by the rest of the Quraysh too. Short of a simpler explanation, exogamy was something forced upon the pre-Islamic Quraysh by the circumstances of their relatively low status during the late jāhiliyya, and as soon as they could give up the practice, they did so. This forces us into a reappraisal of the political milieu of the Quraysh immediately before and shortly after the arrival of Islam, with particular attention being paid to the tribes that the Quraysh married into with the greatest frequency.

**Meccan inter-tribal relations**

The data imply that there were two types of inter-tribal relationship enjoyed by the Quraysh; one where they were equal or possibly subservient, and another type where they were dominant though possibly equal.\(^{338}\) The marriages where they were equal or subservient were those made to the Thaqīf as they also provided this tribe with their own women. The tribes which they probably dominated include ‘Āmir b. Ṣa’ṣa’ and Kināna from whom they accepted women but rarely offered their own in return. Understanding these two types of relationship forms the crux of what follows.

\(^{338}\) A similar dynamic has also been observed by Teresa Bernheimer with regard to the marriages of the ’Alids. In this case, the ’Alids are shown to take brides from the Makhzūm branch of the Quraysh but not give any in return; this implies a position of relative ’Alid strength. The opposite is the case with regard to the marriages carried out between the ’Alids and the ’Abbāsids, thus indicating a position of relative ’Alid weakness (“Genealogy, Marriage and the Drawing of Boundaries,” 81-87). There are additional caveats with our prosopography of the pre-Islamic period however; as the non-Qurashī groups did not preserve their genealogies there is still a possibility that they were taking Qurashī brides but these are not recorded.
The Thaqīf stand out amongst local tribes because – like the Quraysh - they were largely concentrated in a single town, in their case Ṭāʾif. Ṭāʾif and Mecca were comparable in that they both operated as centres of gravity for the surrounding villages and transhumant tribes, and both cities were associated with trade and both had cultic centres important to the surrounding tribes. A passage in the Qurʾān also suggests that residents of these towns seem to have considered themselves to be more favoured in God’s eyes than the more geographically dispersed tribes that surrounded them; hence in Q 43.31 where the unbelievers pose the question: “Why was this Qurʾān not sent down to a distinguished man, from either of the two cities?” (the exegetes explain the two cities as being Mecca and Ṭāʾif).

But there was one major difference between the two towns. Ṭāʾif was a walled agricultural settlement, which not only meant it could supply home-grown goods for the surrounding tribes (it still supplies fruit to Mecca) but also meant it could withstand a siege. Mecca had neither agriculture nor a wall; its indefensibility is highlighted by the fact that it surrendered to Muḥammad without a fight and that the Muslim leadership did not remain there after the victory. Ṭāʾif on the other hand held out for some time against the same man and army before surrendering on generous terms. We should recall that before the Hijra it was to Ṭāʾif that Muḥammad first went to proselytise when remaining in Mecca was no longer possible. Only after his failure in this nearby city did he go to Yathrib – another large, defensible, agricultural settlement in the Ḥijāz.

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339 The marriage of the Qurashī woman to Musaylima mentioned above also fits this mould; the Banū Ḥanīfa were concentrated in the town of Hajr.
340 According to Ibn Iṣḥāq, Muḥammad only broke the siege of Ṭāʾif by wooing the surrounding tribes (2:492); his success in this strategy is cited as the reason for their surrender (2:537-538). From Ibn Hishām, *al-Sīra al-nabawīyya* (translated in Ibn Iṣḥāq, *The Life of Muḥammad*, 594 and 614).
The lack of agriculture at Mecca meant that its survival depended on other sources – most probably religion and trade. In terms of the former, the shrine of the Kaʿba and the nearby pilgrimage destinations were exploited in the form of the local religion of the Ḥums, observers of which included the Quraysh and – according to most sources – ʿĀmir b. Ṣaʿaʿa, Kināna, Thaqīf and Khuzāʿa. Correspondingly, the bulk of the exogamous marriages made by the Quraysh were with members of these tribes (see Table 7.4 above). The relationship between the Quraysh and three of these tribes (the exception being Thaqīf) was one of superiority; this is seen in the absence of Qurashī female exogamy and the fact that they were in charge of the cultic centre to which these tribes made pilgrimage. The cult they administered had much in common with other forms of religious observance that existed in the Arabian peninsula (and much in common with Islam); prohibitions on certain food stuffs, marriage taboos, observance of sacred months and pilgrimage. One narrative explains that the taboos themselves had been established by the Quraysh around the time of the birth of Muḥammad.

This is interesting because newly created taboos are a means of affirming bonds; by agreeing to change old taboos or accept new ones, groups and individuals make a highly visible gesture indicating their commitment to the authority who instituted the rule change. Similarly, breaking a newly instituted taboo is a way of indicating a refusal to acknowledge that authority. The battle over who gets the authority to decide on taboos forms some of the backdrop to the formulation of the Qurʾān; verses such as Q 2:189 (“It

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344 Kister, “Mecca and Tamīm,” 132 ff. The inclusion of Thaqīf is questionable based on the indications of their parity or superiority in relations with the Meccans and the fact that they administered their own shrine-based cult; their presence in some of the lists of the Ḥums may indicate an attempt by later authors to explain the evidence of the imbalance in power as preserved in other sources (especially in relation to marriage).

345 See Munt, Sacred History, 150, and discussion on harams below.

346 Crone, Meccan Trade, 190, note 104.


348 For examples from anthropological observation see Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966). As she puts it in her introduction: “...rituals of purity and impurity create unity in experience. So far from being aberrations from the central project of religion, they are positive contributions to atonement. By their means, symbolic patterns are worked out and publicly displayed. Within these patterns disparate elements are related and disparate experience is given meaning” (pp. 2-3).
is not piety to enter houses from their rear”) should be seen in political terms as much as religious ones.

In terms of the link between economy and religion, it is difficult to say how much money the Quraysh made from their religious activities. The shrines of southern Arabia do seem to have been associated with profits, and some of the taboo rituals would have had the effect of generating money from pilgrims (such as a ban on bringing in food stuffs and forcing some of the pilgrims to circumambulate the Ka’ba in specially purchased garments). But it is not inconceivable that these profit-seeking activities were part of a later trope that emphasised the money-obsessed practices of the preIslamic Quraysh. It is also possible that the devotional functions of the shrine at Mecca were run at a loss which was justified in terms of the value earned through prestige and authority (the Hajj to Mecca today costs the Saudi Arabian government more than it earns from the pilgrims).

**Meccan trade**

There is far less ambiguity surrounding the other major activity of the Quraysh – their role as traders. The form and nature of this trade has been hotly contested over recent decades, but the sources are unanimous in saying their primary export commodity was leather. In terms of imports, these are most likely to have been basic luxuries that could not otherwise be obtained locally. As for the extent of the trade network, the marriage data support Crone’s contention that “Meccan trade was thus a trade generated by Arab needs, not by the commercial appetites of the surrounding empires, and it is as traders operating in Arabia rather than beyond its borders that the Meccans should be seen”; in

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349 *EQ*, s.v. “South Arabia, Religions in Pre-Islamic” (Christian Robin).
the same work she goes on to say that Meccan trade should be seen solely as a West Arabian phenomenon.\textsuperscript{353} All this concurs with the marriage data above.

Crone has revised her opinion somewhat in a more recent paper where she recognises that the demand of the Roman army for leather means that Arabian trade may have been far more lucrative than she first thought.\textsuperscript{354} But despite this, there is nothing in the sources to suggest that this turned the Quraysh into a uniquely powerful tribe – though they traded in leather they did not have a monopoly on it and instead acted as middlemen. Additionally, the Quraysh had a choke point, which was the vulnerability of their caravans.

It was this vulnerability that directly led to them losing control of Mecca to the Muslims based in Medina. Crone is right to find it inexplicable that the masters of a supposed “Meccan Commonwealth” should surrender to Muḥammad’s blockade (conducted by what she crudely terms “a nest of robbers”); the Muslims stopped only three caravans in five or six years according to Ibn Iṣḥāq.\textsuperscript{355} This is indeed a paradox if we follow the traditional characterization of Meccan trade. But if the Quraysh led a marginal existence, then the loss of these three caravans would have been a catastrophe. Not only would they have lost status amongst the surrounding tribes (especially if payment for the goods was only made at the conclusion of a successful trade mission),\textsuperscript{356} their loss of profits would have meant they could not buy the food produced by the villages of these same tribes. The result is confirmation of Donner’s observation that while in the traditional sources the blockaded Quraysh “are generally represented as being worried about their profits and their prestige,” there is a body of material within the sources (and possibly also within the Qurʾān) that the blockade caused real suffering and starvation.\textsuperscript{357}

\textsuperscript{353} Crone, \textit{Meccan Trade}, 151-153.
\textsuperscript{354} Crone, “Quraysh and the Roman army.”
\textsuperscript{355} Crone, \textit{Meccan Trade}, 165.
\textsuperscript{356} This is the arrangement suggested by Crone, \textit{Meccan Trade}, 205 ff.
\textsuperscript{357} Fred Donner, “Mecca’s Food Supplies,” 249-266.
This latter point indicates that Mecca could not survive as a cultic centre alone. According to a report from Ibn al-Kalbī, in an earlier period of famine the Quraysh responded to the food shortage by buying grain from Jurash and Tabāla in the south;\textsuperscript{358} the fact that they could not repeat this trick as a response to Muḥammad’s disruption of the northern caravan route is evidence that they were short of cash. Trade was hence a necessity for the Quraysh - Mecca could not survive as a standalone cultic centre in the pre-Islamic period for any great length of time without the support of the surrounding non-Qurashī tribes.

This ‘parochial Quraysh’ argument also helps resolve the issue of the target audience of the Qurʾān. In another paper, Crone has highlighted the numerous passages in the Qurʾān that refer to agriculture and fishing which far outnumber the references to trade.\textsuperscript{359} This is indeed peculiar if the target audience of Muḥammad’s message were the Quraysh of Mecca, who were traders and not farmers, and did not live near the sea. But perhaps the Quraysh were not the only intended audience of Muḥammad’s message. It is just as likely that Muḥammad proselytised to the peoples upon whom the Quraysh were dependant; the surrounding villagers and fishermen who provisioned a town that could not produce its own food.

The story of the Quraysh in Late Antiquity is therefore the story of how a small group of people navigated a complicated set of relationships between towns, villages and nomads. As town-dwellers, the Quraysh presumably did not see the tribes that inhabited the hinterland as their equals, but at the same time they understood that their survival in Mecca depended on good relations with them. The Quraysh maintained their preeminence amongst these tribes by providing them with the goods and spiritual services they could not provide for themselves. This interdependency was compounded by the lack of

\textsuperscript{358} Ibn Ḥabīb, \textit{al-Munammag}, 262.
\textsuperscript{359} Patricia Crone, “How Did the Quranic Pagans Make a living?” \textit{Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies} 68, no. 3 (2005): 387-399.
agriculture in Mecca which meant that the town’s custodians relied on religion and trade to a far greater extent than other major settlements of the Ḫijāz such as Ṭāʾif and Yathrib.

Reframing the narrative of early Islamic origins

Seen in this light, we must prefer a narrative that highlights the marginality of Quraysh existence rather than one that emphasises its peninsular pre-eminence. Creating such a narrative is long overdue, but to do such a thing even using a small range of sources is far beyond the constraints of this thesis. Instead, the following will provide a sketch of the rise of Islam that will combine the marriage data with the elements of the Qurʾān and the less disputed elements of the historiographical tradition that emphasise the parochiality of Muḥammad’s life. It in no way aims to be a comprehensive explanation behind every Qurʾānic sūra or historical paradox; the purpose here is to see the ways in which the marriage data and the parochial narrative might contribute to future research.

At the geographic centre of the Quraysh’s world was the Kaʿba. The Kaʿba was a physically unremarkable shrine for much of Muḥammad’s life (if not all of it); both alAzraqī (d. 834) and Ibn Iṣḥāq describe it as being an enclosure of unmortared stones with no roof. In Ibn Iṣḥāq’s description this construction was slightly higher than a man’s height, and according to al-Azraqī the covering was draped over only one side. When thinking of the Kaʿba at this time we should therefore picture sites like the sanctuary of Jabal al-Lawdh (as Robin does) rather than the more magnificent structure that stands there today.

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362 *EQ*, s.v. “South Arabia, Religions in Pre-Islamic” (Christian Robin).
This shrine in turn was surrounded by a small settlement of mud houses (Muʿāwiya was supposedly the first person to build using bricks),\textsuperscript{364} forming a town unrecorded in any pre-Islamic source. The settlement was not particularly old; discarding al-Ṭabarī’s chronology, if Quṣayy established it five generations before Muḥammad’s conquest then the earliest houses were built in the 480s - less than a century before many of the first Muslims were born. It was also prone to periodic damage from the floods that swept through every few years.\textsuperscript{365} The settlement was ill-equipped to withstand a siege\textsuperscript{366} and the Quraysh could only maintain their suzerainty over it by having good relations with the villagers and nomads of the tribes that surrounded them; they especially needed good

\textsuperscript{364} Peters, \textit{Mecca}, 23, 32.
\textsuperscript{366} We note that in Ibn Iṣḥāq’s account of the Abyssinian attack on the town, ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib’s response to the invading army is to take the Quraysh into the surrounding mountains and entrust its defence to God (Ibn Hishām, \textit{al-Sīra al-nabawīyya}, 1:50 ff. (translated in Ibn Iṣḥāq, \textit{The Life of Muḥammad}, 25 ff.)).
relations with the wealthier town of Ṭāʾif. They did this through administering a local religious cult of the Ḥums, through marriage and through trade; in terms of the latter most probably exporting leather produced by the non-Qurashī tribes and importing “necessities and petty luxuries” from the peripheries of the Ḥijāz. In none of these cases did they have anything like a monopoly; the surrounding tribes could satisfy both their material and religious needs using non-Meccan alternatives.

The formal mechanism by which this relationship was managed was through the politico-religious institution of the Ḥums. The tribes of the Ḥums would demonstrate their allegiance to the Quraysh by undertaking pilgrimages to the shrine of the Kaʿba and also by observing their unique taboos. But there was no non-divine third party stopping these surrounding tribes from switching their loyalties to other shrines and middlemen and thereby returning the Quraysh to the dispersed lower-class existence of the pre-Quṣayy era (which is what reportedly happened to the Baghīd of Ghatafān when they tried to establish their own haram without the necessary support of the surrounding tribes).

Muḥammad’s message was initially driven by a concern that his people would soon lose the divine favour that he believed underpinned the survival of the Quraysh at Mecca. The polytheism of his tribe was angering a jealous god whose worshippers had in recent centuries become majorities in Syria, Egypt, Abyssinia and (to a lesser extent) Yemen – four of the five principal population centres that surrounded the Ḥijāz. Politically too this God seemed to be in the ascendant; Muḥammad’s birth coincided with an army of Abyssinian monotheists taking a military excursion in the Ḥijāz in response to pagan insolence, and the first of Muḥammad’s revelations coincided with the battle of Dhū Qār where the Christian tribe of Bakr b. Wāʾil (a tribe who also counted the bishop of Najrān

367 This is Crone’s reference to the type of goods brought in by traders of the region in the colonial period. Crone, Meccan Trade, 150. These may have included grain and flour (“Quraysh and the Roman Army,” 64); Peters (Mecca, 33) suggests textiles and oil.

in Yemen as one of their own)\textsuperscript{369} defeated the Sasanians - the only regional power that did not worship this god.

While Muhammad’s mission was at first a personal one, it soon became his duty to warn all the Quraysh of the consequences of not worshipping this God alone. But the message was not well-received. The leading families of the Quraysh could not accept the message because in doing so they would have to accept authority from a man who came from an insignificant branch of their family, a man whom the genealogical literature tells us had no brothers, no biological sons, no living parents and whose line was soon to die out. Nor could they let him continue delivering his message like some local eccentric; by insulting the gods of the tribes who supported the Quraysh he risked upsetting the delicate balance of power that allowed them to remain at Mecca.

These tensions must have been exacerbated when Muḥammad took the message to the tribes who surrounded Mecca. These were most likely the tribes the Quraysh are recorded as having married into and inhabited the region highlighted in Map Two above.\textsuperscript{370} Given that the Quraysh needed to eat but could not provide food themselves, these tribes must have counted amongst their number significant numbers of farmers.\textsuperscript{371} When addressing these settled tribesmen, the familiar message of divine anger remained, but added to it were references to the non-Meccan world they inhabited, a world of seafaring and farming. If the primary objects of his missionary activity were the main tribes that provisioned Mecca, they were probably only a few days travel away; this is based on a reference in Ibn al-Kalbī where a drought (\textit{jahd}) meant they had to import grain from


\textsuperscript{370} Ibn Iṣḥāq lists Kinda, Banū ’Abd Allāh of Kalb, Banū Ḥanīfa, ’Āmir b. Ṣaʿa’a and Banū ’Abd al-Ashhal as the tribes proselytised to (Ibn Hishām, al-	extit{Sīra al-nabawiyya}, 1:423-427 (translated in Ibn Iṣḥāq, \textit{The Life of Muhammad}, 194–197)). With the exception of ’Amir b. Šaʿa’a, this list does not tally very closely to the marriage or geographic data indicating that it is somewhat polemical. See also Crone, \textit{Meccan Trade}, 175.

\textsuperscript{371} R. B. Serjeant, “Meccan Trade and the Rise of Islam: Misconceptions and Flawed Polemics,” \textit{Journal of the American Oriental Society} 110, no. 3 (1990): 474. Refs to Ibn al-Kalbī speaking of Tabāla and Bishā provisioning Mecca with grain (both located in northern `Asīr, eight days travel from Mecca). Additionally, the disparaging remarks about the \textit{aʿrāb} in the Qurʾān indicate that it was the settled villagers who provisioned the Quraysh who were of primary interest rather than the nomads.
Jurash and Tabālah. As the latter is estimated by Serjeant to by eight days travel from Mecca, the farms that ordinarily supplied the Quraysh would most likely have been closer to Mecca than this. But here too Muḥammad was unsuccessful in breaking the Meccan stranglehold on their spiritual lives.

Eventually remaining at Mecca became untenable for the Prophet and his followers. He tried delivering his message to the nearby town of Ṭāʾif, which had its own shrine that attracted pilgrims from the surrounding tribes, but with no greater luck. Things changed however when he moved to another settlement of the Ḥijāz – Yathrib. The contemporary political situation in this town is difficult to discern from the sources, but religiously we have less of a problem – there are no records of the town having a sacred space such as a haram or a himā before the arrival of Muḥammad, yet one is mentioned in the Constitution of Medina. One theory is that Muḥammad was responsible for establishing this haram (not Abraham as stated in most Islamic sources), and in doing this he was replicating a model familiar to Buss and Mecca; a central shrine from which radiated a web of influence reaching into the surrounding tribes.

In addition to this some elements of the cult of Ḥums were retained, such as forbidden degrees of marriage and taboo food stuffs. Just as effective were demands to abandon other taboos – by doing this the tribes made a powerful statement of their loyalty to the new regime. In terms of the reception of the message, the absence of a previous haram and the lack of unity in Yathrib in comparison to Mecca and Ṭāʾif (the settlement was

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372 Ibn Ḥabīb, Kitāb al-Munammaq, 262.
374 Crone, Meccan Trade, 217–218.
376 For a survey of how this network may work based on twentieth century observation, see R.B. Serjeant, “Haram and Hawtah: The Sacred Enclave in Arabia,” in Mélanges Taha Husain (Cairo: Dar al-Maʾārif, 1962): 47-52. Munt (Sacred History, 178) agrees with Serjeant to a point, also noting that these powerful outside tribes are not mentioned in the Constitution of Medina. The inclusion of minor settled tribes in this document (also mentioned by Munt) indicates that the relationships outlined within it are not the sum total of all the relationships established by Muḥammad during the Medinan period, but should be seen as a snapshot of the state of his relationships at the time the agreement was made.
377 E.g. the Medinan sūra Q 2:189 “It is not piety to enter houses from their rear.”
spread over 25 square miles and divided into tribal cantonments) meant that the Muslims could gradually win over a critical mass of the population. It should also be noted that the most significant group of Medinans who could not accept the message of Muḥammad were the Jewish tribes who exhibited the most Ḥums-like characteristics in terms of their group solidarity through taboo observation. Those that did not convert were eventually expelled or killed.

Muḥammad had been thus far unsuccessful in undermining the religious pillar of Mecca’s existence, but once established in Yathrib he had an opportunity to destabilise its second pillar – trade. It is unclear as to whether or not Muḥammad intended to do this the moment he set out from Mecca; Chabbi notes that “interest in Mecca...seemed to have diminished during the first part of the exile of Muḥammad to Medina.” As for the change in qibla direction to make it face Mecca, while elements of the story are debated, most agree that this took place some time after the emigration. This too would indicate that Mecca was not of primary concern to the Emigrants in the early days of their Medinan residence.

But regardless of whether or not they emigrated with the intention to recapture Mecca, the Emigrants must have been aware of the value and vulnerability of the Meccan caravans. With no loyalties to their old tribe and a young, recently uprooted community to provide for, attacks were inevitable. After seven attempts and 18 months they successfully captured a caravan at Nakhla which led to an escalation of confrontation between the Meccans and the Muslims.

An important component of this conflict was the series attempts by both sides aimed at undermining the opposition’s support base. The Meccans were alleged to have made secret deals with the tribes of Yathrib in order to upset the balance of power enshrined in the Constitution of Medina; in particular they courted the Jews who - partly for theological reasons - had become increasingly alienated from the Muslim project in the

378 *EQ*, s.v. “Mecca” (J. Chabbi).
379 *EQ*, s.v. “Qibla” (Richard Kimber).
years since Muḥammad’s arrival. Muḥammad responded by expelling the tribes of Medina whom he could not trust while simultaneously disrupting the balance of power in the Meccan littoral through his trade strangulation strategy.

Muḥammad prevailed because he could play the divide-and-conquer game better than his opponents. This was partly due to factors of unquantifiable value such as his coherent religious message and personal skills as a political strategist. But it was also due to the precariousness of Meccan existence relative to that of the neighbouring towns. Unable to guarantee the safety of the goods entrusted to them for sale in foreign markets, the Quraysh at Mecca suddenly found that both pillars of their existence in their inhospitable valley had been removed; tribes were unwilling to trade with such unreliable couriers or pay homage to a shrine whose custodians clearly enjoyed little divine favour. But unlike Muḥammad in Medina, or the Thaqīf at Ṭāʾīf, the Quraysh could not survive by falling back on agriculture while waiting for the storm to pass. After defeat at the Battle of the Ditch in 627 the Qurashīs of Mecca soon starved and then capitulated. The momentum from this victory was carried by the Muslims to the rest of the Ḥijāz and following Muḥammad’s death to the rest of the peninsula and beyond.

**Conclusion**

The marriage data we have for the pre-Islamic Quraysh has provided us with a starting point for a long overdue reformulation of Muḥammad’s world. The parochiality of their marriage distribution in both genealogical and geographic terms has led us to question three elements of their pre-Islamic status that appear to lesser or greater extents in both the traditional narratives and much modern scholarship; these are the political horizons of the Quraysh, their status amongst the Arabs and the status of Mecca.

In terms of the first, it is clear from multiple sources that that any political influence enjoyed by the Quraysh extended only to the central parts of the Ḥijāz. This fact has been clouded by popular stories found in the traditional narrative, for example; Muḥammad’s
great-grandfather Hāshim getting a right of free travel from the Byzantine emperor himself; the international routes Hāshim’s brothers traded along; the warm reception by the Christian Negus of Abyssinia of the emigrant Muslims; the gift of the slave girls given to Muḥammad by the Christian Muqawqis of Alexandria; and the letters of invitation Muḥammad sent to the rulers of the surrounding empires. But in reality, neither the sīra of Muḥammad nor the Qurʾān demonstrate any real concern for international politics. The Qurʾān names only one group of non-Arabian contemporaries (Rūm); as for the sīra material, aside from the questionable examples given above, the only major events of Muḥammad’s life with a non-peninsular connection concern Abyssinia. Where they speak of politics, the bulk of the sīra and Qurʾānic material relate to tribes of the central Ḥijāz.

Revising the conventional model in favour of something more parochial is not to say that the Quraysh were ignorant of trends in the outside world; the strict monotheism that sprang up and established itself in the Ḥijāz is evidence enough of that. Instead it is a call to be more nuanced about the ways the tribe looked outwards. Their primary concerns would have been their relationships with the surrounding tribes upon whom they depended to maintain their settled existence around the otherwise inhospitable shrine of the Kaʿba. Their secondary concerns were their relationships with other nearby towns – particularly Ṭāʾif. Any concerns with the non-Ḥijāzī world would have been tertiary at best.

The second trope - that the pre-Islamic Quraysh were superior to the surrounding tribes - appears repeatedly in the sources, and in Ibn Iṣḥāq’s version of events originated with the miraculous defence of Mecca from attackers thus establishing the group as a chosen people. But this is not supported by the marriage behaviour or indeed elements of the sīra material; the Meccan Quraysh were after all overthrown by a relatively small-scale

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380 Admittedly, the only Ḥijāzī tribe mentioned are the Quraysh, but nonetheless the world of the Qurʾān is very clearly a Ḥijāzī tribal one, not an international imperial one.

uprising based in a town over 200 miles away. The ‘ennoblement’ of the Quraysh in many of the extant reports is clearly a by-product of the historiographical context of the narrative traditions. This serves a rhetorical purpose; by making the Quraysh look powerful it makes Muḥammad’s achievements look all the greater. The exaggeration may also have been an attempt to appeal to the audience; we should not forget that the historians operated in a political environment that was entirely dominated by descendants of Quraysh. These descendants insisted on their suzerainty over the non-Quraysh tribes who made up their armies in the Umayyad era, and this may have been reason enough for historians to emphasise the continuity of this arrangement by claiming it existed in the jāhiliyya.

The final element of discord in the accounts is the role of Mecca. The assumed regional dominance of this town has already been recognised by Crone as being incongruous with much that is in the sources; it was not a significant market town or a major site of pilgrimage. But there is no reason to go as far as she does and question its very existence. The parochial Quraysh model would say that Mecca was of some regional relevance and supported some of the spiritual needs of some of the local tribes. The fact that it lacked a significant market was unimportant as there were others in the region which the Meccans could easily get to (which were probably the mawāsim we are told Muḥammad preached at).

The discrepancies in the historical sources regarding Mecca are best understood by appreciating the changes the town underwent in the first decades of Islam. After the Muslim conquest, the Kaʿba was rebuilt and enlarged, houses were made of brick and stone, irrigation was constructed, defences were erected and the pilgrimage became an enormous state affair. Even though the pre-Islamic image of Mecca as being a collection of mud-brick houses surrounding a low, unmortared, roofless enclosure is one preserved

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382 Ibn Hishām, al-Ṣīrat al-nabawiyya, 1:45 (translated in Ibn Isḥāq, The Life of Muhammad, 23). In this report, all Arabs assume that the target of Abraha's invasion was the Kaʿba, and they were all anxious over its fate.
in some of the sources, the implications of this – that neither Mecca nor the Quraysh were of any great prior significance – are not followed through in the most commonly told narratives of Islamic origins.

When retelling this story, the Muslim historians urbanised Muḥammad, ennobled the Quraysh and internationalised Mecca. In other words, they did exactly what we would expect them to, which is place the rise of Islam in their own context. An alternative story of Muḥammad as a member of an unremarkable tribe and a resident of a minor shrine preaching primarily to farmers may not have been unthinkable to historians in later centuries but it was probably unprofitable, and when compared to the competing preIslamic narratives of the peoples they conquered possibly a little embarrassing. Luckily for us, this reshaping of history did not extend to the marriage behaviour preserved in the nasab tradition; it is here that we see the Quraysh as they were at the time of Muḥammad.
Chapter Eight: Caliphal Umayyad marriages

Introduction

The arrival of Islam changed the nature of Qurashī marriage for good. This was not due to any particular religious tenets (apart from polygamy, perhaps) but a result first of the ostracisation of the early Muslims from the Quraysh and also the conquests.

In this chapter we will see how Qurashī marriage behaviour changed again – this time due to the effects of imperial power on the Umayyad caliphs and their sons (Cohort Three). As with the previous cohorts, the changes here are also due to the twin factors of social pressure and structural opportunity. In terms of social pressure, the Umayyad caliphs found themselves increasingly ostracised from the rest of the Quraysh thanks to the inevitable alienation of illustrious lineages who challenged their authority (principally the Zubayrids and ‘Alids). They also may have been reticent about marrying into less belligerent noble groups for fear of bolstering the latter’s political strength at their expense, in addition to concerns over the split loyalties of the wives. As for structural change, the increasing number of children born to concubines was a result of the conquests of the period which brought non-Arab slave women right into the heart of the Qurashī family.

This chapter will begin by accounting for the children of this cohort that were born to concubines. It will be shown that the wider Qurashī trend of increasing numbers of hajīns is mirrored amongst the caliphal Umayyads but in a more exaggerated fashion; the first generation was less likely to have concubine children than average, the later generations more likely. With these exogamous unions accounted for, we then move to the unions between the cohort and Arab women. This will reveal a trend of everincreasing endogamy. The final part of chapter will explain this simultaneous increase in both

endogamy and exogamy as being a symptom of other changes; namely the transition of the Muslim polity as one structured along tribal lines to one that enjoyed far more imperial trappings.

**Concubines**

Concubinage was not a major factor in the discussion of the two earlier cohorts as concubines produced very few of their children, but here they must be treated as a preliminary prior to any wider discussion on exogamy and endogamy.

The *Nasab Quraysh* contains the parental information on 23 Umayyad caliphs and their sons who are listed as having produced 181 children, 76 of whom were born of concubines. There is no sense in comparing this figure to the overall Qurashī average; as demonstrated in Chapter Four we know that the rate of concubinage changes over time. In order to account for this moving average we will weight each generation in terms of the concubine children we would expect to see produced based on the Qurashī average, and compare this to the number of children the cohort actually produced through slave women. This is demonstrated in the following tables:

**Table 8.1: Changing maternal statuses of the children of Umayyad caliphs and sons compared to Qurashī generational average**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>Total Umayyad children as recorded in the <em>Nasab Quraysh</em></th>
<th>Qurashī average for children born to concubines by generation</th>
<th>Predicted number of concubine children based on Qurashī average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26.88%</td>
<td>5.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>35.56%</td>
<td>19.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>42.12%</td>
<td>33.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>38.12%</td>
<td>10.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>181</td>
<td></td>
<td>68.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8.2: Comparison of maternal statuses of the children of Umayyad caliphs and sons compared to Qurashī generationally weighted average

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Expected figures based on Qurashī average</th>
<th>Actual figures as recorded in the <em>Nasab Quraysh</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total concubine children</td>
<td>68.41</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion concubine children</td>
<td>37.80%</td>
<td>41.99%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Umayyad caliphs and their sons therefore produced a higher than average number of children through concubines, though not dramatically so.

We can drill further into this data by looking at it generationally, as demonstrated in the following table. For reference, Muʿāwiya and Marwān I are of the sixth generation, ʿAbd al-Malik is of the seventh and the dynasty ends with Marwān II who is of the eighth generation.

Table 8.3: Maternal status of children of Umayyad caliphs and sons by generation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generation of father</th>
<th>Total children</th>
<th>Total concubine children</th>
<th>Proportion concubine children</th>
<th>Qurashī average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.52%</td>
<td>29.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>40.74%</td>
<td>34.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>45.57%</td>
<td>37.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>59.26%</td>
<td>36.70%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By doing this we can reveal that the numbers of Umayyads born to concubines is depressed by the records of the sixth generation; had these two men not been included then 46.25% of the cohort children would have been produced through concubines against a weighted Qurashī average of 39.23%. This generation is odd also because it consists of
only two fathers; Muʿāwiya and Marwān I, and as such the small sample size may be affecting our results. Despite this caveat, the overall trend of the data is in keeping with the values revealed in the earlier chapters on concubinage; numbers of children born to concubines start low and increase over the course of the first Islamic century.

**Exogamy and endogamy of the caliphal Umayyads**

With concubinage accounted for, we can now move to the marriages made by the caliphs to Arab women. Unlike the other two cohorts, the caliphal Umayyad cohort lends itself well to diachronic study as it spans a century. The following table breaks the data down across the four generations that comprise the cohort:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>Non-Quraysh wives</th>
<th>Non-Umayyad Quraysh wives</th>
<th>Umayyad wives</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The database of 56 marriages indicates that there is a significant move towards endogamous unions over the course of the first Islamic century. Generation 6 – which comprises the marriages of the caliphs Muʿāwiya (r. 661-680) and Marwān I (r. 684-685) – is marked by the widest spread of marriages. Their eight marriages are balanced between three different groups in roughly equal proportions, though it should be noted that two of the non-Umayyad Quraysh marriages were to female descendants of ʿAbd Shams (Umayya’s father). As we have seen, these two caliphs were not keen on
concubines either; children born by them through concubines account for only two of their 21 offspring.\textsuperscript{384}

In Generation 7 – this is the generation of Yazīd I (r. 680-683) and ʿAbd al-Malik (r. 685-705) – there is a shift in behaviour. Although there are far more marriages in this generation, there is no increase at all in the number of marriages to women from outside the Quraysh. The men of this generation are instead turning to women within the Quraysh, in particular the non-Umayyad clans. Again, many of these non-Umayyad Qurashī marriages are to descendants of ʿAbd Shams, but we also see a number made to families linked with earlier caliphs such as ʿAdī b. Kaʿb (for ʿUmar) and Taym b. Murra (for Abū Bakr). Somewhat unsurprisingly there are no child-bearing marriages at all between these men and the descendants of ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib – although the Nasab Quraysh does record a number of Umayyad marriages with this family that did not produce children.\textsuperscript{385}

The eighth and ninth generations (who account for the caliphs reigning between the years 705 and 750) see the most dramatic change in marriage behaviour. Of the 29 marriages in this period, only two are to women outside the Quraysh, and a further two to non-Umayyad Qurashī women. The predominant form of Umayyad marriage in this period is to other descendants of Umayya. Recalling our investigation earlier in the chapter, we note that these two generations are also remarkable in terms of the large numbers of children they are producing through concubines culminating in nearly 60\% of Generation 9’s children being produced by concubines.

\textsuperscript{384} This is admittedly a small sample, but when we also incorporate the 11 marriages made by the brothers of these two men we come to the same conclusion (the data for this are provided in Appendix Two).
\textsuperscript{385} I have found three marriages of this type (Umayyad man, ‘Alid woman) in the Nasab Quraysh. See Al-Walīd b. ʿAbd al-Malik to Nafīsa bt. Zayd b. Ḥasan b. ʿAlī (page 32); Muʿāwiya b. Marwān b. al-Ḥakam to Ramla bt. ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (page 45); and Abū Bakr b. ʿAbd al-Malik b. Marwān to Fāṭima bt. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan b. al-Ḥasan b. ʿAlī (page 53).
Analysis

The data reveal two trends; increasing concubinage at the expense of marriage, and increasing endogamy. In terms of the first trend, concubinage was peripheral though existent in the generation of Muʿāwiya and Marwān I (where they produced only two of 20 children), and exploded in popularity in the following generation with over 40% of children being born to slave women (figures from Table 8.3 above). This is the generation of ʿAbd al-Malik and Yazīd I whose reigns began in the 680s. This confirms the conclusions drawn from Chapters Four and Five which argued that the evidence for the popularity of concubines as partners – and possibly the acceptability of their children as full members of the Quraysh – was not a practice that emerged at a late stage in the Umayyad period but established itself early on.

It is harder to tell whether or not the caliphs were marrying fewer free women over the course of the Umayyad period. The data ostensibly indicate that this was the case; the caliphs of Generations Six and Seven had an average of four wives each; the next generation had just under three wives each while the ninth generation produced only one caliph who had more than one wife. Using the whole cohort we find the proportion of wives to husbands goes down from 4.00, to 2.71, to 2.3 to 1.2. We can also note that not long after the ʿAbbāsid takeover of the caliphate marriages to free women became a rarity. But small sample sizes and historiographical concerns mean that we cannot be as sure of this as some of our other findings.

Despite this, our main point stands; the later Umayyads were less likely to make dynastic marriages than the founding Umayyads. Instead of marrying tribal princesses and women from non-Umayyad Qurashi scions, the leading Umayyads turned to their cousins and concubines. Something fundamental was clearly happening to Muslim society that was allowed its elite family to shut itself off in this manner.
From tribes to empire

The first Umayyads married more like the pre-Islamic Quraysh of Cohort One than the early Muslims of Cohort Two; they split the number of wives between non-Quraysh, non-lineal Quraysh and lineal Quraysh roughly evenly, and they are not particularly fond of concubines. It is suggested here that this is a reflection of a relatively egalitarian polity that would have been familiar to their pre-Islamic Ḥijāzī forbears. Marriage in this environment was an important component of affirming and creating bonds between groups who co-operated through mutual agreement.

Muʿāwiya, for instance, had no army which owed him primary loyalty and as a result of this Humphreys argues he was forced to develop personal ties with the tribes of Syria.386 This was not ideal as these tribesmen still maintained existing loyalties to their clans which clashed with their loyalties to the caliph; as Landau-Tasseron concisely puts it, this left them with “considerations other than doing their jobs properly.”387 The next generation of caliphs and their governors had less tolerance for this. As argued by ‘Athamina, ‘Abd al-Malik’s generals recruited non-Arab militias and explicitly justified this policy in terms of them being a counterweight to the tribal armies that the state had relied on in the past.388 This relationship is distinctly non-tribal; the militias would not have understood their ties to each other and to their paymasters in terms of biology but in terms of personal loyalty based on effective leadership and regular payment.

This transition from tribal organization to empire was epitomised by Marwān II, the last Umayyad caliph. Marwān II was himself the son of a slave woman, and learned his gubernatorial skills on the Caucasian frontier. Rather than rely on tribal armies and an

extended web of family connections he recruited non-tribal forces from the Islamic frontiers; these included the Ṣaqāliba (freed Slavic slaves) and the Qīqāniyya (from Sind). As long as he could pay and manage them on the battlefield he could ensure their loyalty; he did not have to marry them just to prevent them from revolting. In his background, his army and also his attempt to move the capital eastward we see many of the precursors to the ‘Abbāsid court, and had it not been for the revolution brewing in Iran, he may have established the Umayyad dynasty on a much firmer footing.

**Conclusion**

The findings of this chapter tie together all the various strands of this thesis. The fact that the trends in the data once again correlate with historical events as recorded in the traditional narrative vindicates the contention that the marriage data preserved in the *Nasab Quraysh* represent an accurate reflection of Late Antique relationships; it also shows that these data can be organized generationally. The connection between marriage behavior and social change suggested in the second part of the thesis has also been upheld; whether it is through their status or tribal affiliation, the mothers of the Quraysh consistently provide compelling indications of wider structural and ideological changes.

Looking more closely at the Umayyad marriages we showed that the rising numbers of concubine children along with the increase in cousin marriage and the emergence of the hajīn caliph are all inter-related symptoms of one cause - the transition the Islamic polity was undergoing in this period. The first Muslim conquerors brought with them an organisational system that was an expansion their existing tribal practice in that it was largely egalitarian, based on fair distribution of income and held together by a complex network of personal ties which included marriage. In this environment, the better connected a person was, the more likely he would be to succeed.

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389 'Athamina, “Non-Arab Regiments,” 373.
Pace Goldziher et al., this is what held the *hajīn* back during much of the Umayyad period and not discrimination; his lack of maternal relatives handicapped his chances in an environment where familial connections were the currency of political success. Fortunately for him, as the links between the caliphs and their agents of coercion changed from ones reliant on familial solidarity to ones linked to sinecures and wealth, the canny *hajīn* who aspired to the caliphate found himself increasingly favourably placed when challenging a well-connected but incompetent incumbent. Marwān II did not appear as the first effective *hajīn* caliph thanks to the efforts of those who were restoring ‘true Islam’ (as alleged by Goldziher), but because a newly non-tribal political environment valued organisational nous over family connections.\(^{390}\)

This theory appeals because it ties together far more evidential strands than the prior explanations. There is no need for circular reasoning to justify the use of the highly questionable anecdotal traditions or to make the assumption that the *hajīns* are broadly similar to the *mawlās*. Instead we rely on the far clearer evidence for the changing nature of the Arab armies; the increase in popularity of concubinage; and the increase in numbers of cousins being married. Ultimately we should prefer an explanation for the rise of the concubine that rests on the structural changes for which we have proof rather than purported attitudinal changes about which we can only speculate.

\(^{390}\) This also correlates well with the structural changes detailed in Crone’s *Slaves on Horses* which uses prosopographical methods but applies them to other data categories (Crone, *Slaves on Horses*, 42-57).
Conclusion

This thesis has developed an array of prosopographical tools that have expanded our historiographical and historical knowledge of early Islam. In terms of the former, the collation and analysis of large amounts of data have told us that the *Nasab Quraysh* is an outstanding work of genealogical memory and is part of a literary tradition unique to the Arabs. The statistical approach has also been able to suggest ways in which al-Zubayri’s work was transmitted and the extent to which its putative author was actually responsible for its contents.

In terms of historical study, quantitative approaches have delivered some equally substantive findings. The history of the pre-Islamic Ḥijāz is often considered to be beyond the scope of credible historical scholarship due to the complete lack of primary sources. The analysis above has shown that this is not true; although recorded centuries after the relationships they describe, the marriage data preserved in the genealogical literature are accurate enough to enable us to suggest a historical narrative for this very period. The result of this has been to show the Quraysh to be far more minor a tribe than often suggested and far more concerned with the politics of the central Ḥijāz than the wider Near East.

Prosopography has also proven useful when applied to the Umayyad period. Here too we did not expect to be able to recover a social history of the Muslims as they adapted to the demands of imperial government and the emergence of what would become the normative elements of their faith. But in the graphs and tables above we have seen for the first time the rate at which concubinage was adopted; we have also been able to suggest what the attitudes of the Quraysh to the products of these unions may have been. It was argued that the emergence of concubinage as a form of marriage was evidence of both the ingenuity of the Arab conquerors in their formulation of normative Islam and evidence for the
gradual erosion of the social bonds that had existed between the tribes of the pre-conquest era.

The simplicity of this summary betrays the complexity of interwoven methodologies that have been detailed above. For this reason, before we move to our concluding remarks on the challenges presented by prosopographical approaches, we will explore in a little more detail the five most important discoveries of this thesis.

1. The *nasab* tradition contains extractable primary information

The *nasab* tradition is not like the traditional narrative sources of Islamic historiography. With the latter sources, while most scholars will agree that there is some useable information within them, there is no straightforward means of extracting it. The veracity of each individual *khabar* must be argued comprehensively and even here there is no guarantee that a consensus will emerge that this argumentation is convincing.

With the *nasab* literature we do not have this problem; for certain categories of information the data are consistent and accurate. Establishing this began with a hunch predicated on the observations of anthropologists who reported a lack of disputes found between tribal informants in certain fields of genealogical memory. This was further supported by evidence from the field of legal psychology that indicated the quality of a person’s memory is directly linked to the type of experience that the person is being asked to recall.

The hypothesis that the *nasab* literature may be relatively consistent received further support when we cross-checked the information preserved in a number of *nasab* works and historiographies. The results also showed that the differences between the works were ones of scale rather than detail; they did not repeatedly contradict each other in the manner of the narrative sources.
Most important however has been the correlation between our quantitative findings and the traditional historical narratives; we have seen this in the graphs illustrating the rising numbers of concubine mothers and the changing geographical distribution of marriages in the first half of the seventh century. This latter point is particularly pertinent because the marginality of the Quraysh was played down by many historians and the fact that the marriage data appear to contradict the more popular reports in this regard is evidence that nasabs passed through two centuries of historical revision in better condition than the traditional narrative sources. This is a good indication that the nasab data are an accurate reflection of relationships as they actually occurred.

The nasab tradition – at least as far as mothers are concerned – should therefore take its place alongside the Qur’ān and the Constitution of Medina as our only primary sources for the time of Muhammad. These are certainly complicated sources, and certainly not free of some distortion, but they are of a completely different character to the ostensibly eye-witness accounts that populate the hadīth and khabar corpuses.

At the same time, it must be emphasised that we cannot say that the nasab literature as a whole should be considered akin to a primary source; it is only when we apply the specific methodologies outlined above that we can make this claim. So although we can now be quite confident of the accuracy of the maternal data in the nasab tradition, this is not proof that any other data category within the tradition is accurate. Additionally, we cannot say that any individual marriage can be considered accurate; these marriages are only usable sources for historical research when studied en masse – that is to say, when studied prosopographically.

2. Exogamy and endogamy are measurable

This thesis is the first large-scale attempt to treat early Islamic endogamy and exogamy in a statistically meaningful way. Its conclusions have given us three important contributions. First, we can now discuss exogamy and endogamy in a far more nuanced
fashion as we have a better understanding of where a particular marriage fits in with wider patterns of marriage behaviour. This is preferable to earlier appearances of exogamy/endogamy in the secondary literature were it is reduced to being a discursive starting point. Second, it has given us some base lines for comparison; we can do more than just observe that a family made mostly endogamous marriages (for example), but we can say whether this represents a relatively large number of marriages, or a small number, or whether this figure changed over time. Finally, it has shown that there is a fast-moving interplay between exogamy and social change. Numbers of concubines rise, the geographic origins of wives change, and cousins become more or less popular as marriage partners.

To take one application of this approach, we can turn to Bernheimer’s paper on the marriages of the ʿAlid family. This is an excellent prosopography, but it becomes problematic when she wishes to discuss whether the ʿAlids married out or not. She argues that the ʿAlids married “to a large extent endogamously” (page 81), but also notes that there is no way of knowing whether or not they did this to a greater or lesser extent than other leading Muslim families because this has not been investigated (note 30). By careful argumentation, she does not allow this to affect her overall conclusion, but the lacuna is obvious. Thanks to this thesis, the gap has been filled; scholars like Bernheimer are now not only permitted confidence in the marital records and the tools required to extract these data, but are also provided with statistics from some other cohorts to provide meaningful comparisons.

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391 A lot of secondary literature on marriage behaviour is guilty of this; a typical example is Meir Kister’s “On the Wife of the Goldsmith from Fadak and Her Progeny: a Study in Jāhilī Genealogical Traditions,” *Le Muséon* 92 (1979): 321-330, where a single marriage between a Kalbī tribesman and a Jewish slave woman is taken as evidence for the declining power of Jewish agricultural settlements. 392 Bernheimer, “Genealogy, marriage.”
3. The Quraysh were a minor Arabian tribe before the arrival of Islam

The geographic dispersal of Qurashī marriages in the pre-Islamic period reinforces something that a number of scholars have long suspected; the importance of the Quraysh in the jāhiliyya was grossly inflated by later historians. This tribe were not widely respected as the masters of peninsular or even Ḥijāzī trade; they were middlemen dependant on their ability to navigate the highly fickle and fluid networks of tribal relations that existed in the immediate vicinity of Mecca.

Mecca was not a particularly important shrine or town; it was probably not even a particularly old shrine or town. The Kaʿba itself was a roofless enclosure of no great height, constructed of unmortared rocks which housed still more rocks that were worshipped. The Quraysh had not been in charge of this shrine for very long before the birth of Muḥammad, and given the ecology of the location they faced constant threats of eviction. Only through close and happy relations with the surrounding tribes of herdsmen and farmers could they hope to survive at Mecca; without the support of these people they would have had no means of making money and using it to provision themselves.

This image of pre-Islamic Mecca is not one reliant on the nasab data or prosopographical approaches; many scholars have pointed out that the reports used to construct this narrative of the parochial Quraysh are preserved in the same traditional sources used by those who have argued for the eminence of the tribe in the pre-Islamic era. The contribution of this thesis is instead to resolve a stalemate. Previously we were faced by two sets of contradictory reports; one set which could be used to emphasise Qurashī dominance, and another that emphasised its parochiality. In the absence of any outside sources there was no real way to decide between the two. But if the nasab data are indeed primary evidence of social relationships, then they decisively come down on the side of the parochial narrative.
4. The adoption of concubinage was early, rapid and widespread

The prosopographical approach to maternal data has allowed us to say something new about concubinage. Previous studies of the phenomenon in the Islamic context have been stymied by the fact that they could not look beyond the anecdotal traditions. The result is the Goldziher argument described above. Because it uses predominantly anecdotal sources, and because these anecdotal sources are so scant, it is forced to combine the study of the hajīn with the study of other Muslim outsiders who enjoyed a more extensive historiographical presence (typically the mawlās). This is justified by saying that the anecdotal traditions along with the prosopography of caliphal mothers indicate that the mawlās and the hajīns had a lot in common before the ‘Abbāsid Revolution.

The problem with this approach was the circularity of the argument used to date the traditions; anti-hajīn anecdotes were placed in the first century of Islam because they reflected the feelings of the majority of Muslims in that period, while pro-hajīn traditions were dated to the ‘Abbāsid period as this was an era of more enlightened attitudes. This meant that the Goldziher argument was forced to rely solely on the one piece of uncontroversial evidence to the hand; the late emergence of the hajīn caliph.

But by looking at the changing nature of marriages conducted by Umayyad caliphs and their sons we saw that there were structural reasons as to why the hajīn could not become caliph - principally his lack of tribal links through a mother. Once these structural elements were removed (through a decreasing prevalence of tribal structures at the heart of the Islamic state), the ruler with a slave mother became a familiar feature of Islamic courts. Additionally, we saw that Qurashi hajīns were very common in the early Umayyad period; this is not good evidence for a widely held taboo against procreation with slave women as argued by Goldziher et al. There was also little evidence that the hajīns were barred from marrying Quraysh women because of their status. None of these points could have been made had we simply applied familiar analytical approaches to the traditional historical sources.
5. The methodologies have a wide range of future applications

The focus of this investigation was the *nasab* tradition, but the methodologies used here can be profitably applied to many other sources. Before this research, taking all the marriage data out of Ibn Saʿd’s *al-Ṭabaqāt* (for instance) would have represented an immense undertaking; it would also have been an extremely risky one seeing as there are no guarantees that it could produce useable results. But now that we have an established methodology and some findings for a relatively large sample of early Muslims, we not only know that it is specifically the maternal information in the *Ṭabaqāt* that is potentially of interest, we also have a relatively large sample from our existing study to which we can compare any subsequent findings.

Another potential extension is to the other categories of non-anecdotal data in the historical traditions such as administrative and religious posts. This is a very different type of information to maternal relationships, so our initial approach would have to be much the same as it has been for this project; i.e. beginning with a wide-ranging taxonomic strategy at the start before honing in on promising types of information within individual sources. Once this is done we would be in a position to incorporate the findings of this present study as it represents the only significant piece of research concerned with social change in Late Antique Arabia that is not based on the anecdotal traditions. The generational dating system may be particularly useful in studies of this sort.

**Final remarks**

We finish on a note of caution – prosopography is not easy. The methodological approaches used above were not logical and obvious at the outset of this project, but are actually the result of an enormous amount of trial and error. From the very beginning, this research project has had to simultaneously address three problematic issues regarding the data: which data categories to select; should this extracted data be considered accurate; and can this data generate compelling results. Because of the nature of these demands, it
was impossible to satisfy one without addressing the others; the result was a circular process of improvement by increment. This dynamic is worth explaining.

We began with the first of these difficulties which was establishing which data category within the *nasab* tradition (and in which source) was most likely to generate compelling results. As the translated passage in the first chapter showed, there is an enormous amount of information within these *nasab* works, and any other category of data (appointments, geographic origins, battle participation etc.) could equally have been the focus of an extended investigation. A number of false starts and a great deal of taxonomic stamp-collecting had to happen before we could begin to consider maternal origin as a field likely to yield results.

Once some preliminary databases had been created (these were based on the Makhzûm and Zubayrid sub-groups), there was little sense in expanding the database without first being able to argue that the data were accurate reflections of historical accounts rather than historiography only. This comprises the second set of challenges; addressing the concerns of the source-critical modern scholars. This was initially done through a survey of the anthropological literature concerning the nature of genealogical memory. This survey gave us some grounds for believing that genealogical memory could indeed be preserved accurately. But before we could expand this survey in the manner shown in Chapters One, Two and Three we had be confident in the capacity of the database to provide results that would be of interest to historians of early Islam.

This formed the third level of problems - could the data be used to resolve questions regarding the traditional narratives of Islamic origins? There would be no sense in compiling large datasets and investing research time in establishing their veracity if it could not be shown how they aided the study of Islamic history. Fortunately, the preliminary databases hinted that with concubinage there was evidence of an evolving dynamic that aligned with some parts of the secondary literature but contradicted others. Based on these early indications, we were in a position to return to the previous two issues
– collecting the data and establishing its veracity. The most time-consuming element of this involved the expansion of the database to cover all the maternal relationships listed in the *Nasab Quraysh*. We then moved on to the second difficulty, which meant a further development of our justifications for believing the maternal data to be accurate, as well as arguing a case for its representativeness of the *nasab* tradition as a whole. Only at this stage could we return to the third area and begin to further develop arguments of what this data could potentially tell us. It became clear at this point that the issue of concubinage could not be divorced from marriage in general. This meant that the database had to be expanded to include the tribal origins of the Arab wives; this was done for the three cohorts featured in Chapter Six. All of this taken together meant we were able to correlate our findings with the traditional narrative sources. This fed back into the first two issues as it justified our belief in the accuracy of the *nasab* data and the efficacy of our methodology.

In order to navigate all this, the methodology was deliberately kept simple and applied to a carefully selected group of sources. The result was a gradualist, catholic approach; the tools and our understanding of the sources were developed and introduced by stages and in parallel. The result was a staggering array of suggested research directions and counter-narratives that would have been completely hidden to us had we continued to read the traditional sources in traditional ways.

It is this ability of prosopography to suggest new narratives that makes it so appealing. Despite the debt owed in this work to revisionist historians it must be said that they often make themselves vulnerable to the accusation that they exert more effort in questioning previous narratives rather than constructing new ones.\(^{393}\) This thesis has aimed to redress the imbalance; although we have repeatedly cast aspersions on many long-standing elements of the traditional narrative of Islamic origins, at the same time we have repeatedly suggested new narratives and new avenues of enquiry. It is this positive quality

\(^{393}\) For example, Patricia Crone begins the conclusion to *Meccan Trade* with the words: “This is a book in which little has been learnt and much unlearnt.” Crone, *Meccan Trade*, 203.
of the prosopographical approach that is perhaps its most attractive feature and as scholars delve deeper into the *nasab* tradition and incorporate more sources of data they will continue to add to the sum total of what can be known of early Islamic history.
Appendix One - *Hajīn* marriage

The research in this thesis has established that concubinage was a marriage practice adopted early in the Umayyad period. It could still be the case however that the acceptance of the product of these unions by the wider Muslim community was a feature of the late Umayyad/early ʿAbbāsid eras (as per the Goldziher argument). We can cast doubt on this too through an investigation of the marriage patterns of the *hajīns*.

In terms of marriage behaviour, it must first be noted that the Quraysh were very strict when it came to female exogamy.\(^{394}\) As we have seen with Saʿd b. Abī Waqqās, even people who were reputedly integrated into the tribe by Muḥammad himself could find themselves ostracised in the marriage market. The chapters above have shown that the degree to which they practised this strictness varied by tribe and over time (the Umayyad princesses never married outside the Umayyad family while other Qurashī factions were less strict), but it appears to have been universally agreed that an Arab woman could only marry a non-Arab man in exceptional circumstances.\(^{395}\) As such, we would expect the *hajīns* to struggle when marrying Arab women from elite families if they were indeed seen as belonging to a lower caste. But the *Nasab Quraysh* tells us that they often married a lot better than Saʿd ever did.

The table below consists of all the Generation 7 *hajīn* fathers for whom the *Nasab Quraysh* provides marriage records. The seventh generation has been selected as it is our first large sample, and the marriages probably took place during the first century of Islam. Names and suggested tribal affiliations are provided; where a wife was non-Qurashī this is also stated:

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\(^{394}\) As outlined in Goldziher, *Muslim Studies*, 1:124, where he refers to the story ʿAbd Allah b. Jaʿfar being reproached by the Umayyad princes for allowing the marriage of his daughter to the non-Qurashī (though still elite) Hajjāj b. Yūṣuf. They were later forced to divorce. Ella Landau-Tasseron (“The Status of Allies,” 9) makes the same point, though she adds that there were some incidences when daughters were given to allies. \(^{395}\) Goldziher, *Muslim Studies*, 1:121.
Table 10.1: Marriages to Arab women by the Generation 7 sons of concubines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Spouse name</th>
<th>Spouse tribe</th>
<th>Page ref (NQ)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abū Ḥāshim b. Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (Alid)</td>
<td>Khalda bt. ʿAlqama b. Ḥuwayrith</td>
<td>Banū Ghifār (non-Quraysh)</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abū Ḥāshim b. Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (Alid)</td>
<td>Umm ʿUthmān bt. Abī Judayr</td>
<td>Bāliyy of Quḍāʾa, non-Quraysh of the Anṣār and a hilf of the Qurashī ʿAmr b. ʿAwf</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abū Ḥāshim b. Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (Alid)</td>
<td>Umm Ḥārith bt. Ḥārith b. Nawfal b. Ḥārith b. ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib</td>
<td>Banū Ḥāshim</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muḥammad b. Marwān b. Ḥakam (Umayyad)</td>
<td>Bint Yazīd b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Shayba b. Rabīʿa b. ʿAbd Shams</td>
<td>Quraysh</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ʿAbd Allāh al-ʿAṣghar b. Wahb b. Zamʿa (Banū Asad)</td>
<td>Karīma bt. Miqdād b. ʿAmr al-Buḥrānī</td>
<td>Buḥrānī (non-Quraysh)</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This cohort conducted 15 marriages, only three of which were with non-Qurashī women. There is a certain degree of endogamy in these marriages (they tend to be between members of the same tribal sub-section), but we should remind ourselves that Saʿd b. Abī Waqqās struggled to find a Qurashī wife even within his own supposed tribal subsection. If the children of Qurashī fathers and concubine mothers did not count as full Qurashīs, we would expect them to be treated as unsuitable matches for all Qurashī women (including members of their own sub-section) – the table above shows that this is clearly not the case.

Having said this, there is evidence that the hajīns did not marry as well as their full-Arab brothers. The following tables illustrate that the Generation 7 sons of concubines were more likely to produce their own children through concubines, and took far fewer Arab wives. The raw data is as follows:

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396 It is clearly a desideratum to be able to find out whether the hajīn were more or less likely to marry close relatives than full-Arabs or not. This would require an expansion of the database.
397 The one marriage he did manage to a woman of this cohort does not appear in the Nasab Quraysh and moreover the outside source where she does appear fails to name her (Ahmed, The Religious Elite, 46-47).
Table 10.2: Marriages of Generation 7 men by maternal status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total men</th>
<th>No. of concubines</th>
<th>No. of wives</th>
<th>Children through concubines</th>
<th>Children through freewomen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men of Arab mothers</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men of concubine mothers</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This can be simplified as follows:

Table 10.3: Marriage patterns of Generation 7 men by maternal status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Arab wives per husband</th>
<th>Proportion of children born to concubines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men of Arab mothers</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>34.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men of concubine mothers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41.46%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should also be noted that the *hajīns* who appear as children in the sixth generation are less likely to appear as fathers in the seventh; only 14.14% of the 99 of the *hajīns* who appear as children in the sixth generation return as fathers in the seventh, compared to 27.53% of the their full-Arab brothers. Disappearance from the genealogical record is a sure sign that they were struggling to match the influence of fellow Qurashīs who had an Arab mother.

But this is all a long way from saying that the *hajīns* were systematically discriminated against. As was discussed in Chapter Eight on the subject of Umayyad marriage, the lack of an Arab mother may not have carried any significant social stigma, but it would have
deprived the men of tribal connections that they would have gained through their maternal relations. This would have reduced their chances of gaining wealth or power, and hence reduced the chances of them making good marriages and being preserved in the genealogical record.

We can also consider the fate of the female *hajīns*. Ideally, we would analyse their marriage behaviour in the same way as with their brothers above, but our database currently lacks the necessary information. Instead, we can compare the gender division of *hajīn* children to the gender division of full Arab children. As women only rarely appear as historical actors in the *Nasab Quraysh*, their inclusion is most likely an indication that they married well and/or gave birth to prominent figures. If *hajīn* girls were less likely to marry or produce lineages, there should accordingly be less of them. The results are presented in the table below:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of full Arab children</strong></td>
<td>2396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of full Arab daughters</strong></td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of children born of concubines</strong></td>
<td>542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of daughters born of concubines</strong></td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proportion of full Arab children that were female</strong></td>
<td>19.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proportion of concubine children that were female</strong></td>
<td>25.83%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures show that children born of concubines recorded in our database are more likely to be female than children born of Arab women. As the genealogical interest in women is most likely to be related to their marriage behaviour, we can hypothesise that these *hajīn* girls did not struggle on the marriage market. Quite what this means for their status is disputable. On the one hand, if the Qurashī *hajīn* girl was of lower status than
her full-blooded sister, she may have found it easier to get married as there was a larger pool of potential marriage partners (because she would be of lower status to more men). But this is as far as we can go without understanding more about the types of men they were marrying; whether or not they were cousins for instance, or how powerful they were. At this stage all we can say is that there is no conclusive evidence on the relative attractiveness of the hajin women when compared with their full-Arab sisters, and that further prosopographical investigation is needed.398

398 This avenue of inquiry may prove useful to us in future investigations where we are concerned with the network of marriage partners. If it can be shown that the hajin girl was relatively successful on the marriage market it means that when a man was choosing a wife it was specifically her paternal relatives whose favour he was interested in cultivating; her maternal relatives were irrelevant. This means we can limit the scope of the connections we are interested in when considering the reasoning behind marriage decisions.
Appendix Two – Marriages of the brothers of Muʿāwiya and Marwān I

The marriages of Muʿāwiya and Marwān I are important because they appear to have more in common with the marriages of the earlier generations of Quraysh than they do with the later Umayyads; they take very few concubines and seem to marry quite exogamously. But the small size of the sample is clearly problematic – these two men could be outliers and not representative of wider trends.

To address this concern this appendix will collate the marriage data for the brothers of the two men. The table below provides a summary of this information as recorded in the *Nasab Quraysh*:

**Table 11.1: Marriages of the brothers of Muʿāwiya and Marwān I**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ref</th>
<th>Husband name</th>
<th>Gen. of husband</th>
<th>Wife name</th>
<th>Wife tribal affiliation</th>
<th>Degree of separation</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D1</td>
<td>ʿAnbasa b. Abī Sufyān</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Zaynab bt. Zubayr</td>
<td>Quraysh; Zubayrid</td>
<td>Lineal Quraysh; link to Quṣayy</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2</td>
<td>Muḥammad b. Abī Sufyān</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Umm ʿUthmān bt. Usayd b. Akhnas b. Sharīq</td>
<td>Northern; Thaqīf</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D3</td>
<td>Ḥārith b. Ḥakam</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mufāḍdāt bt. Zabirqān</td>
<td>Northern; Tamīm; Zayd Manāt; ʿAwf b. Kaʿb</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D4</td>
<td>Ḥārith b. Ḥakam</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Bint Dhuʿayb b. Ḥalḥala</td>
<td>Khuzāʿa</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D5</td>
<td>Hārith b. Ḥakam</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>‘Ā’isha bt. ‘Uthmān b. ‘Affān</td>
<td>Quraysh; Umayyad</td>
<td>Lineal Quraysh; link to Abū al-‘Āṣ b. Umayya (2)</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D6</td>
<td>‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. Ḥakam</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Umm Qāsim bt. ‘Abd Allāh</td>
<td>Quraysh; Umayyad</td>
<td>Lineal Quraysh; link to Abū al-‘Āṣ b. Umayya (2)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D7</td>
<td>Abān b. Ḥakam</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Umm ‘Uthmān bt. Khālid</td>
<td>Quraysh; Umayyad</td>
<td>Lineal Quraysh; link to Umayya (3)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D8</td>
<td>Yaḥyā b. Ḥakam</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Umm Kulfūm bt. Muḥammad b. Rabī’a b. Ḥārith b. ‘Abd al-Muṭṭalib</td>
<td>Quraysh; Hāshim</td>
<td>Lineal Quraysh; link to ‘Abd Manāf (5)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9</td>
<td>Yaḥyā b. Ḥakam</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Umm Sulaymān bt. ‘Āmir</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D10</td>
<td>Yaḥyā b. Ḥakam</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Zaynab bt. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. Ḥārith b. Hishām</td>
<td>Quraysh; Hāshim</td>
<td>Lineal Quraysh; link to ‘Abd Manāf (5)</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D11</td>
<td>Ḥabīb b. Ḥakam</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Maryam bt. ‘Abd Allāh</td>
<td>Anṣār; Aws; Hāritha</td>
<td>Non-Quraysh</td>
<td>172-3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This shows that the 11 marriages of these seven men are not dissimilar from the marriages made by their brothers who became caliphs. Of the marriages to women with known tribal affiliations, four of them are to non-Qurashī women, three are to non-Umayyad Quraysh and three to other Umayyads, which reflects a similar distribution to what we saw above with Muʿāwiya and Marwān I.
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Arabic sources


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