SCOTLAND AND CATALONIA: THE PATH TO HOME RULE

Luis Moreno

Introduction

Scotland and Catalonia share a somewhat similar configuration as sub-state peripheral nations with analogous perceptions, interpretations and aspirations for home rule within their respective British and Spanish frameworks. Nevertheless, Scotland and Catalonia have not followed parallel processes over the last decades, as far as the achievement of institutional forms of self-government is concerned.

The nationality of Catalonia at present enjoys a great degree of political autonomy within the quasi-federal Spanish Estado de las Autonomias. On the contrary, and although in Scotland there is a wide constellation of political and social forces favouring Scottish home rule, the task of translating this common concern into action has proved in the last years to be extraordinarily difficult.

It will be contended later on in this article than an inter-party political convention is the desirable option for the achievement of self-government in Scotland, although a change in the traditional political pattern of self-interest and party competition characteristic of British politics is required to achieve such a goal.

It must be emphasized, however, that not only is it an absolute requirement that the Scots have a vision of self-government but that this vision must also be brought into the realm of the possible/probable through social mobilisation.

Very similar to the approach of a majority of Catalans to the so-called "national question", non-secessionist self-government in Scotland bases its argument mainly on the following:

1. Scottish cultural, economic and political differences with the rest of Britain, marked by an increased centre-periphery dichotomy in Britain.

2. Scottish dual nationality: one being the result of a reinforcement of the pre-Union identity, and the other being the product of the national integration brought about by British state-building after 1707.

Scottish and Catalan Affinities and Differences

In order to set out subsequent sections, it is first of all necessary to focus on the main historical, political, socio-cultural and economic affinities and differences between Scotland and Catalonia. They can be outlined as follows:

(A) Historical

Affinities. In pre-capitalist Europe, Scotland and Catalonia exercised significant political independence as ethnically structured territories. This continued until their personal dynastic unions with England and Castile, respectively (ie. James VI & I in 1603 and the Catholic Kings in 1469). Nevertheless, both nations continued to preserve institutional forms of self-government until the coercive imposition of political standardization which occurred in the aftermath of a military defeat (ie. the failure of the Jacobites to reinstate the Stuarts in 1745 and the Catalans' setback in their support for Archduke Charles in the Spanish War of Succession in 1714). These events formed the basis of the origins of the processes of national integration and state-building which occurred in the United Kingdom and Spain during the 18th and 19th centuries.

In Scotland and Catalonia, during the second half of the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries, there was a progressive reassertion of nationalist values with unfulfilled economic and social expectations, caused by the decline of the British Empire and the inability of the Spanish bourgeoisie to achieve its revolution nationwide. These political movements eventually forced concessions from the centre which, in order to accommodate them, granted a degree of administrative devolution, eg. the Secretaryship for Scotland in 1885 and the Mancomunitat de Catalunya in 1914. The creation of the Scottish Office in Edinburgh in 1939, and the achievement of the 1932 Catalan Statute of Autonomy, although different in political and institutional content, can be seen as outcomes of a similar political struggle for the gain of larger degrees of home rule.

In the 1960s and 1970s, with the progressive obsolescence of the centralist state apparatus in liberal Britain and despotic Spain, the peripheral nationalism of Scotland and Catalonia challenged the political legitimation of the corporatist forms of uniformity imposed on them from the centre of their respective polities. With the 1979 Referenda in Scotland and Catalonia, the desire for self-government of a majority of Scots and Catalans was expressed (51.6% cent in Scotland and 88.1% in Catalonia in the turn-out).
Differences. While throughout the Middle Ages the Catalan-Aragonese Confederation was one of the leading Mediterranean powers, Scotland continually struggled to overcome the "natural" expansionist interests of England in the Wars of Independence. Both the out-looking Catalan and defensive Scottish psycho-social attitudes have somehow moulded the ancestral national character of the Catalans and Scots. More important, however, is the fact that when the nationalist movements emerged defiantly in the 1960s and 1970s, the ancestral detachment of their respective compound identities – i.e. Scottish and Catalan, but at the same time British and Spanish too – reflected the assertive and reactive nature of their similar political aspirations for self-government.

The main historical dissimilarity between both political processes in Scotland and Catalonia in contemporary times is that, during the Second Spanish Republic, the Catalans achieved democratic institutions of self-government although the Statute of Autonomy and the Generalitat were later abolished by Franco in 1939 at the end of the Civil War. The Scots have not had any analogous experience.

These divergent realities undoubtedly conditioned not only social mobilisation in Scotland and Catalonia prior to the 1979 Referenda but, more importantly, the form and content of the political response from the centre of both centralist states.

It is, however, important to note that if the "memory" of the Republican Catalan Government and Parliament has counted as an extraordinary asset in the centre-periphery negotiation in the transitional period after the demise of Franco's dictatorship, the mere existence of an administrative Scottish Office since World War Two, in combination with the civil institutions preserved by the 1707 Treaty of Union, has also enhanced the subsequent salience of the Scottish dimension in British politics.

(B) Political

Affinities. Scotland and Catalonia have, in recent times, seen the rise of strong nationalist parties – the Scottish National Party and the coalition Convergencia i Unió – which have brought not only an element of heterogeneity to the British and Spanish electoral scenarios but have also tested the adaptability of both liberal and post-despotic state apparatuses to profound institutional changes (see electoral results in Scotland and Catalonia in Tables 1 and 2).

The lack of major political violence in these two nationalities is, moreover, highly significant. It indicates the absence both of strong intra-communal social cleavages, as is the case in Northern Ireland, and of a considerable section of the population ready to support the fight for self-determination, by whatever means possible, as in the Basque Country. In any case, both forms of political nationalism share the perception that political violence would undoubtedly jeopardise social mobilisation and popular support for the cause of self-government. Moreover, the reformist character of such nationalisms is antagonistic to radical change. Neither have the policies of repression by their centralist states or the internal social climate reached the level of suffocating oppression or civil war as happened in the Basques Country and Northern Ireland in the 1960s and 1970s.

Differences. Setting aside electoral and institutional traditions, the stark difference between the Scottish and Catalan processes for gaining home rule rests upon their antithetical strategic approaches. The Scottish political class has tended to defend, in an inert manner, a political territorial pattern, a situation which did not exist in post-Franco Catalonia and which has also been greatly influenced by the dialectics of partisan competition and self-interest characteristics of British politics.

TABLES 1: Percentages of popular votes in General Elections in Scotland since the Second World War.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>LABOUR</th>
<th>CONSERVATIVE</th>
<th>LIBERAL (*)</th>
<th>SNP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974(Feb)</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974(Oct)</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) The 1983 and 1987 results correspond to the SDP/Liberal Alliance.
TABLE 2: Percentages of popular votes in General and Catalan elections since 1977.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>PSC-PSOE</th>
<th>CiU</th>
<th>PSUC</th>
<th>ERC</th>
<th>AP</th>
<th>UCD/CDS</th>
<th>OTHERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977 (General)</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979 (General)</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 (Catalan)</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982 (General)</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>2.0/2.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984 (Catalan)</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986 (General)</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PSC-PSOE: Catalan Socialist party federated to the Spanish PSOE
CiU: Centre-right Catalan nationalist coalition
PSUC: Catalan communists
ERC: Centre-left Catalan nationalist party
AP: Spanish conservative party
UCD: Centrist coalition which disappeared after the 1982 General Election
CDS: Centrist party created in 1982

Thus, the achievement of home rule, which has been the concern of a majority of Scots, has always been subordinated to the priorities of each party. The Catalan forces, on the contrary, not having to break a territorial pattern of institutional power in post-Franco Catalonia, have sought and negotiated the articulation of a common strategy to make the re-establishment of institutions of self-government after the demise of Francoist dictatorship possible. This pattern has followed the traditional inclination of the Catalan seny ("common sense") for negotiation and compromise, or pactisme.

(C) Social and Cultural

Affinities. The concept of dual nationality, or compound nationality, is a common element of identification for a majority of Scots and Catalans (see results of survey polls on national identification by Scots and Catalans in Tables 3 and 4). Both peripheral nations have preserved a national identity, or quasi-nationhood, from pre-Union times and have also assimilated a post-Union identity, a product of the process of malintegration in the British and Spanish state-building.

A consequence of such pre-Union collective consciousness is the employment of both Scottish mythology and the Catalan language as the main socio-cultural instruments in the forging of ethnical cohesiveness.

Differences. The diverse nature of socio-cultural instruments has reinforced the assertive and reactive character of Scottish and Catalan nationalism. Not surprisingly, many of the Scottish myths for popular consumption deal with heroes like William Wallace or Robert the Bruce, or events like the battle of Bannockburn, rather than the egalitarian values developed in Scottish civil society since the union with England. The former emphasises Scotland’s successful defence against the external English adversary, and contributes to feed, in turn, a certain sense of defensive “hopelessness” in national Scottish values vis-à-vis the “powerfulness” of the English ones.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question:</th>
<th>We are interested to know how people living in Scotland see themselves in terms of their nationality. Which of the statements on this card best describes how you regard yourself?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Scottish, not British</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) More Scottish than British</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Equally Scottish and British</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) More British than Scottish</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) British, not Scottish</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Don’t Know)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Those expressing a degree of dual nationality 54
(*) Those expressing exclusive single nationality 46

(*) Percentages have been rounded. “Don’t Knows” have been ignored.


**Question:** “In which of these five categories do you include yourself?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I consider myself only Catalan</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I consider myself more Catalan than Spanish</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I consider myself as much Spanish as Catalan</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I consider myself more Spanish than Catalan</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I consider myself only Spanish</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Don’t Know)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Those expressing a degree of dual nationality 79

(*) Those expressing exclusive single nationality 21

Percentages have been rounded. “Don’t Knows” have been ignored.

**Source:** ECO poll published in Cambio 16, no. 698. See Appendix 2, Luis Moreno (1986), *ibid*, p.442.

The Catalan language, on the other hand, provides the means for a permanent re-assertion of Catalan ethno-cultural distinctiveness. The external adversary theory has also played, and continues to play, an important role in the articulation of political mobilisation in Catalonia. However, the emergence in the last decades of new outward-looking cultural forms, not exclusively tied to the pre-Union signs of identity, has brought about an active socio-cultural Catalan role in concurrence with other Spanish values.

(D) Economic

**Affinities.** The regional economies of Scotland and Catalonia have similar economic indicators as regards population (5.15 and 5.96 million, respectively), location (peripheral regions) and production (EEC GDP: 1.5% and 1.4%). They have traditionally perceived themselves as discriminated by the core areas and political elites of their respective unitary states, i.e. the Scottish perception of relative deprivation and the Catalan sense of comparative grievance. In other words, while a large sector of Scottish society is of the opinion that the English – especially those living in the South – are economically better off than the Scots, the Catalans’ comparative grievance is based upon a feeling of being treated unfavourably by the centre, or receiving less than they have given. These two popular perceptions have greatly fuelled the rise of modern nationalism in both peripheral nations.

**Differences.** In relative terms, and taking into account both the British and the Spanish contexts, Scotland can be seen to be poorer and Catalonia richer. Growth of population, one simple indicator of the well-being of a country, illustrates this point. Whereas in 1931 the population of Scotland accounted for 12.1% of the UK total figures, in 1971 the percentage fell to 10.7%. Catalonia’s population, by contrast, climbed from 11.2% of the Spanish total in 1940 to 15.6% in 1974.

However, as far as natural resources are concerned, the contrast is spectacular. North Sea oil, for example, provided £16bn of the gross revenue of the UK Treasury in 1982, while the very few natural resources in Catalonia amount to no more than some salt and lignite mines and a very small oil extraction off the coast of Tarragona.

Although both countries have shared the recent experience of the increased penetration of multinational companies, their regional economies show dissimilarities with respect to their economic structures: specialised, in the case of Scotland, with large “uncompetitive” heavy industries which are in the gradual process of closure; and diversified, in the case of Catalonia, with production based on small firms and businesses. Paradoxically, the financial sector based in Edinburgh is very strong in comparison with the feebleness of Catalan local finances.

In general terms, the “productive” sector of the Scottish regional economy relies upon the implementation of policies from above, basically through the provision of jobs and the creation of economic activities via British public expenditure. On the other hand, an entrepreneurial vocation developed by a petite bourgeoisie mentality makes the Catalan industrialists more likely to develop initiatives from below. These are on a small scale and are very adaptable to changing economic scenarios.

Catalan experiences, future variables and the quest for Scottish Home Rule.

The task of putting forward a systematic pattern of predictions is factually inaccessible rather than methodologically problematical. In this section we will seek to induce a political situation through which self-government in Scotland can be achieved and exercised in the foreseeable future and which has proved to be effective in the light of the Catalan experience. In any case, a climate of political consensus is the sine-qua-non requirement prior to any further development.

It needs to be said, however, that the prospect of political agreement between the different representative political parties operating in Scotland...
is rather unfamiliar in the competitive complexion of the British political system. Perhaps the whole idea of a political convention is regarded as strange in Britain because of the preoccupation with parliamentary sovereignty — itself evidence of the archaic nature of the British state — and the failure to develop a doctrine of popular sovereignty.

However, some variables are considered to be highly important in any future development concerned with Scottish self-government:

(1) SNP electoral revival. This is a "compelling" variable which could provoke an expedient response by the British parties to the rapid setting up of a Scottish Assembly or Parliament. This new hypothetical electoral upsurge of the SNP in a medium-term future would need the concurrence of two other main sub-variables:

(1.a) An increase in both the economic decline of Britain and in the sense of relative deprivation felt in Scotland.

In general, the trend of relative economic decline in Britain has been steady since the end of World War Two. This decline has taken place amidst a rapid increase in the economic expansion of other industrial countries. In 1955, for instance, the United Kingdom was fifth in the world league of income per head. In 1981 the UK GNP per capita was $9,000, 26th in the world behind countries like the Federal Republic of Germany ($13,450 and 9th), France ($12,190 and 16th) or Japan ($10,080 and 25th).

Some authors predict that if present trends continue, Britain will be overtaken by countries like Spain in the mid-term future and that the British economy will not reach the present level of the national income in the Federal Republic of Germany until 2051(10).

The classical free-liberal market and supply-side monetarist policies developed by the Thatcher Governments have severely damaged the traditional "lameduck" heavy industries located in Scotland, but have served very appropriately the ethnocentric interest of British capital based in the City. This financial industry has simply disregarded investments in the North of Britain and has concentrated mainly on speculative operations overseas — namely, US financial markets or in investment ventures in the South East of England.

This sense of relative deprivation could certainly be channelled in electoral terms through an instrumentalist vote for the SNP, together with a wide support for Labour which, as the 1987 General Election has proved, also receives in Scotland a large proportion of the so-called "protest vote" articulated against the English Tory policies which are aimed at favouring the Conservative strongholds in the South of England.

(1.b) An SNP effective strategy and charismatic leadership. The lack of charismatic leadership has been a feature universal to all the parties operating in Scotland at least in the last twenty years — with the quasi-paradox of the cases of John Mackintosh, Jim Sillars and Winnie Ewing. This lack of leadership is an element which highly conditions the nature of social mobilisation for self-government in Scotland.

In this respect the "Billy Wolfe affair" can be cited as a very illustrative one. The fact that the chairman of the SNP was "able" to alienate, with his comments in 1982, the important Catholic minority in a country where religious bigotry still exists in some areas causes more than perplexity. The view that a democratic and participatory structure, combined with the strong commitment of the SNP membership, does very little to compensate for the absence of charismatic leadership and the tactics-strategies confusion over Party goals has to be stressed.

Indeed, the passive political attitude of the Scots might be galvanised by the presence of a charismatic political leadership like that of Jordi Pujol in Catalonia. This factor is essential for the breaking of the ingrained attitude of political defeatism and institutional solidarity so characteristic of some Scottish political culture.

(2) The "conversion" of Scottish Labour to self-government. Labour has traditionally failed to assimilate the fact that political decentralisation mounts per se a democratic challenge to the structure of a capitalist state which, in the case of Britain, uses the practices of economic corporatism and political centralisation to maintain its supremacy. Labour, on the other hand, should no longer hold the populist view of attacking the self-interest of Welsh and Scottish nationalisms while, at the same time, deploying the same kind of English-British nationalist self-interest in attacking the EEC in the European Parliament.

The alleged defensive mood of Scottish politics finds in the case of Labour the compliance of a political leadership most unwilling to use political mobilisation to pursue the democratic principle of self-government.

In any possible future, however, the political fortunes of Scottish home rule would very much depend on the attitude of the Labour membership in Scotland and, as a result of this, on the willingness of Scottish Labour leaders to operate also in the Scottish dimension of British politics, rather
than exclusively aiming their territorial interests at gaining institutional power in London.

In Catalonia, the label “national” or “nationalist” cannot be claimed solely by the parties which explicitly define themselves as such. Both socialist PSC and communist PSUC are not only Catalan national organisations but were also main catalysts and protagonists in the process of political negotiation aimed at the re-establishment of home rule in Catalonia.

In contrast with some of their European counterparts, notably the British Labour Party, the Spanish socialist PSOE has traditionally had a strong anti-centralist tradition and federalist vocation.

(3) The transformation of the British state. The issue of Scottish self-government is very closely related to the content and form of any future social transformation in the British state. The trend of political backwardness in Britain, which has encompassed the loss of the Empire and progressive economic decline, has seen an increased paternalist centralisation in the last decades since World War Two. This situation has been described as follows:

“We live in an archaic political society...The British state is to be defined as an ancien régime closer in the spirit to the monarchy overturned in 1789 than to the republican constitutions which followed in France and elsewhere in Europe... The reason that the British economy does not work is that British institutions are in terminal decay.”

The failure of the democratic parliamentarian system in the industrial state has been caused, amongst other factors, by its problems to function spatially in large communities (ie. nation-state).

The fate of any social transformation within the British state is closely related to the creation of geographical, political and cultural communities through which civil society can determine the mechanisms of participation. This opposition to centralist corporatism, a feature common to other Western European states, cannot simply rely on the appearance of spontaneous “unhistorical” upsurges of social mobilisation (eg. May 68), but must rely on the developments of self-governed activities which reject the technocratic solutions and the tutelar role of the “paternalist” industrial state.

(4) A political convention for Scottish Home Rule. The means by which an institutionalised form of self-government can be achieved in Scotland from the point of view of its “desirability” takes into account two crucial premises:

(a) The product of broadly agreed proposals of home rule will inevitably respond to a broad desire for self-government expressed by the Scots.

(b) The social mobilisation which would follow the political agreement by the political parties in Scotland on the form and content of the home rule proposals would confer a character of irreversibility to the whole political process.

The most desirable and workable form of self-government in Scotland is provided by the process of negotiation and agreement among those parties representing the broad majority of the Scottish electorate. A political convention, encouraged by a cross-party organisation like the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly, or another of similar characteristics, would provide the means for discussion and agreement on the kind of assembly/parliament to which the Scots aspire.

In Catalonia, the Assemblea de Catalunya, set up in 1971, genuinely reflected the struggles against both dictatorship and centralist rule. Its activities followed a simple four-point programme which included the recovery of Catalan Home Rule. This Assembly of Catalonia gathered together Liberals, Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, Socialists, Communists, trade unionists, urban community associations, university groups, intellectuals and ordinary people in a clandestine and highly representative movement of opposition to Franco’s regime in Catalonia. More importantly, it started the practice of inter-party discussion and negotiation which subsequently proved to be essential in the task of wording the Autonomy Statute for Catalonia.

In Scotland, some Scots still believe that devolution has something to do with the total secession of Scotland from the rest of Britain. So, the constitutional convention would have the goal, among others, of publicly debating the differing views of the various parties on the home rule issue. Were the SNP to put forward the claim “independence-nothing-less” in the negotiations of the political convention, the Scottish population at large would be able to distinguish more clearly between the arrangements for home rule and those for complete secession.

Once the content and form of the proposals had been broadly discussed and agreed to in the Scottish convention, the legislative procedure should start in Westminster. At this point the biggest question would be raised: Would MPs at Westminster, with their “own” territorial constituencies, allow the Scots whatever they wanted?...

In such a situation, the role of the Scottish Labour MPs would be crucial. As was said before, any form of home-rule to be achieved in Scotland very much depends on the “Scottishness” of the Labour MPs
elected in Scottish constituencies.

Proceeding to a Scottish Convention

The best-positioned body to call on for political negotiations over the setting up of both a Scottish Assembly and an Executive would be a cross-party organisation. Once a cross-party organisation like the CSA was accepted as convener body by the representative parties, the next step would be a constituent meeting with the political representatives of their respective parties. This aspect is not merely formal: in order to avoid pre-judgements about the way the Convention should operate, the constituent parties would be the ones who decided upon the working methodology to be adopted. The role of the convener would subsequently be that of taking charge of the provision of the material elements needed for the proceedings of the Convention. The convener would, consequently, become the instrumental body which would put into practice the decisions taken by the Scottish Convention.

To say that the political parties should be the constituent parts of the Convention is not to deny their own prerogative to consider the inclusion or not in the Convention of other representative Scottish “voices” (eg. Local Authorities, STUC, Chambers of Commerce and Industry and/or representatives of the major religious organisations). The parties, by the very expression of their political will, would accept the “operational” legitimacy of the Convention and so, the result of the negotiations would be one of a tacit consensus assumed by the parties involved.

The goal of a Scottish Convention can only be realised by the prior assumption made by the political parties that an institutional form of self-government for Scotland can be achieved by consent and, in so doing, reflecting the electoral preferences of the Scots for those parties advocating home rule for Scotland. If we take into account the 1987 General Election results we should stress the fact that 85% of all MPs elected in Scotland are members of political parties advocating some form of Scottish self-government (ie. Labour, Alliance and SNP).

In the eventuality of political agreement being reached, and being widely embraced by the parties involved in the Convention, the next step would be constituted by the formal acceptance of the constitutional proposals by the Scottish Grand Committee.

Finally, and in order to make the whole process workable, the political agreement reached within the Scottish Convention would accomplish one priority goal:

- The constituent parties would agree not only on the content and form of the proposals, but would explicitly pursue social mobilisation in order to implement them. That is, a new popular referendum on the text containing the proposals agreed in the Scottish convention would be held before the implementation of such legislative provisions.

Catalonia, a referential example and a precedent.

The afore-mentioned proposals are not original per se. This is to say, they have already been attempted successfully in Catalonia, a country with a context similar to that of Scotland. Indeed, the process in Spain of decentralisation and regional autonomy in which nationalities and regions participated in the framing of their own statutes offers a remarkable example.

In Spain, after the 1977 Spanish General Election, 80% of the Catalan elected candidates to the Congreso de los Diputados (Lower House of the Spanish Parliament), and all but one of the elected candidates to the Senado (Upper House) were committed to Catalan Home-Rule.

Most certainly in post-Franco Catalonia the achievement of home rule was a political priority for all major political parties, regardless of other ideological cleavages. A few days after the 1977 General Election, the Assemblea dels Parlamentaris (Assembly of Parliamentarians) first met in Barcelona to start on the wording of the Statute of Autonomy. On 29th December 1978, during the final vote on the draft of the Statute Bill finalised in the town of Sau (Girona), there were no votes against the drafted text in the Assemblea dels Parlamentaris and only one abstention.

Very significantly, the drafted Catalan Autonomy Statute involved the active presence of the Conservative MP, Laureano López Rodó, a prominent minister in Franco’s government during the 1960s.

The Bill of the Autonomy Statute for Catalonia was debated in the Spanish Joint Parliamentary Committee which was composed of the members of the Constitutional Committee of the Congreso de los Diputados (34 votes in favour, 1 against and 1 abstention) and the Catalan Assembly of Parliamentarians (21 affirmative and 1 abstention). On October 25, 1979, 88.1% of the Catalan vote (52.6% of the registered electorate) voted affirmatively for the implementation of the Autonomy Statute. The turnout was 59.7% of which 7.7% were “No” votes, 3.5% Blank votes and 0.5% spoiled votes. On 30th November and 12th December, respectively the Spanish Congreso de los Diputados (317 MPs in favour, 1 against and 13 abstentions) and the Senado (168 MPs in favour, 1 against and 3 abstentions) ratified the provisions of the Catalan Autonomy Statute. The Royal Assent was given on December 18, 1979. On 17th January 1980, the provisions of the Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia were fully put into effect, after their publication in the Spanish Official Gazette BOE on December 22, 1979.
Conclusion

It is simplistic to believe that historical events and processes can operate in the same way and with the same results in different countries but, having said that, Scotland and Catalonia have so many features in common that it would also be unrealistic to deny beforehand a similar result in their respective paths to home rule.

There are global trends to decentralisation in the Western world. In fact, the centralisation/decentralisation debate has usually remained isolated on the political fringe of the discussion of the efficiency versus inefficiency of state institutions in the provision of public goods. Such marginal treatment minimises the comprehensive study of the formation (state building and national integration) of the modern states, the intergovernmental relations within its boundaries, the crisis in the legitimacy of its political institutions (e.g. Parliament and representative democracy) and the impact of the internationalisation of capital in the "post-industrial" state.

Power has an inherent territorial dimension: it cannot be abstracted from its geographical component. The development of industrial society inevitably involved a reallocation of the spatial division of power. Since the Industrial Revolution, and due mainly to a marked increase in the volume and scope of government activity, power has been progressively allocated according to meaningful geographical criteria. As a consequence, the issues "dispersion-concentration", "central-local relations" and "state homogenization-regional diversity" have become crucial for both the configuration of the state institutions and the social transformations which can take place within the state.

Diverse economic, cultural and political factors are leading to the recognition of pluralist centres of decision-making. In this respect, Scotland and Catalonia may represent the future of decentralised political structures. In other words, decentralisation needs to provide a deepening of democracy by means of a more effective access by civil society to political decision-making, something which in the case of minority nations like Scotland and Catalonia overlaps with their ethnic/cultural/economic dimension.

References

1. This article is a revised version of different sections of the Ph.D. thesis written by the author under the title, Decentralisation in Britain and Spain: The cases of Scotland and Catalonia (1986, University of Edinburgh).

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2. For a chronological account of both Scottish and Catalan contemporary processes of home rule see Appendix 3, ibid, pp. 443-453.

3. The Catalans also fought Castilian/Spanish assimilation in revolts and wars of independence from 1640 to 1714: ie. "War of Reapers" 1640-1652 with the result of Catalonia's loss of Roselló and Cerdanya to France in 1659 (Peace of the Pyrenees) and War of Succession which ended with the surrender of the Catalans after the forces of Philip V entered Barcelona on September 11, 1714.

4. seny is a word which implies common sense, prudence and wisdom rather than intelligence. Pactisme establishes "that rules are made by parties entering into contracts of their own accord, and also that social life is the result of bargaining among people, and not unilateral violence or imposition" (Giner, S, 1980, The social structure of Catalonia, Sheffield University, pp.5-6).

