The Origins of the Peripheral Estates

Glasgow's peripheral estates have achieved fame in Scotland and beyond for their deep-rooted social and economic problems. Yet, unlike many urban crisis points elsewhere in Britain and abroad, they are not a relic of the industrial revolution or the unplanned development of the nineteenth century, but modern housing estates conceived and developed precisely as part of the answer to urban decay and dereliction in central Glasgow. Their origins lie in the housing crisis of post-war Glasgow and the battles fought at that time between the advocates of new towns, dispersal and overspill and those forces within the old Corporation who insisted that Glasgow could solve its housing problems within its own boundaries. The outcome was a compromise. By the early 1950s, the Corporation had conceded the case for overspill and was actively assisting in the decanting of population and industry from the city; but rising pressure for housing and the slow pace of planned overspill kept up the pressure. As a result, large parts of the discredited 1946 Bruce Plan were in fact implemented, with building at the periphery and at ever higher densities to the early 1970s. The periphery, as a result, developed further and faster than had ever been planned, encroaching into the green belt. Easterhouse grew as a single-tenure, one-class estate. Some 95% of the housing was corporation-owned, predominantly in three and four storey tenements and from the start there was a substantial proportion of large families. Such was the urgency to build houses that shopping and community facilities were, in the early years, seriously neglected.

Lack of school building combined with teacher shortages to curtail education provision with children in part-time schooling until the 1970s. In 1963, proposals were first mooted for a Township Centre, combining shopping and social facilities but concern about viability and costs held it up for a decade. By 1966 agreement had been reached with a private developer for a project of 95 shops, 5 supermarkets, a cafeteria, a restaurant, a car...
showroom, a service station, a post office, library, city factor's office, police station, bowling alley, community hall and dance hall. A year later, the developers cut down the proposals, postponing the ballroom, cinema and restaurant until there was evidence of their commercial viability and halving the number of shops. It was not until 1969 that contracts were placed and in 1972 the first shops in the Township Centre were finally opened. By this time, rising unemployment and continuing low incomes indicated that further development would not be a commercial proposition and the second phase of the centre remains unbuilt. Suggestions that commercial entertainment facilities would have to be subsidised by the council had met a cool response in 1969 when a joint Scottish Office-Corporation report had pinpointed this as a key deficiency of the area. Publicly-owned recreational facilities were developed, with a community centre and a swimming pool in 1971, but these remain limited. It was not until 1983 that a health centre was established and in the same month, the Rotherfield child care clinic was closed. Drumchapel's history was similar. This was envisaged in 1952 as a 'town inside the city', with its own town centre, shops, churches, schools, baths and libraries. It was not until 1968 that the swimming pool was opened, with construction of the shopping centre starting at the same time. Employment opportunities within the areas were also limited. An industrial estate was established at Queenslie but of the 10,000 jobs there less than a third went to Easterhouse residents. Long distances, poor services and high fares on public transport were obstacles to seeking employment further afield in a community in which, by 1981, only some 15% of households were car owners. Drumchapel was better situated in relation to the city centre and the river but the estate itself remained without an economic base, a dormitory area rather than a 'town within the city'.

Almost from their beginnings, Easterhouse and Drumchapel were regarded as 'problem' areas. In the early days, attention was focussed on juvenile delinquency, with gang fights in Easterhouse and vandalism in Drumchapel receiving heavy press coverage. Complaints about the lack of social and shopping facilities were rife and it was widely suggested that the areas had failed to develop any community spirit. The lack of 'community feeling' is an amorphous idea but it was frequently suggested that the social cohesion which had characterised the old inner-city tenement areas had been broken up in the move to the periphery. As the inner-city areas themselves had often been developed extremely rapidly in the nineteenth century, often to accommodate Irish and Highland incomers, it might have seemed reasonable to expect community identification to develop over time and this has been a consistent goal of policy. While there has been some success here, however, the relatively high turnover of houses and the out-migration of the more active and mobile members of the population militated against this from the early days. It has also been increasingly recognised that the tenure pattern in the estates, with nothing but low-cost municipal housing is an obstacle to the development of a balanced community and militates against attempts to attract and maintain even the modestly upwardly mobile.

The impact of the recession in the 1980s has exacerbated the problems of Easterhouse and Drumchapel, as the analysis of the 1981 census for the Easterhouse and Drumchapel APTs shows. In Easterhouse, as befits a postwar development, practically all houses have the basic amenities, but no less than 29.5% are classed as overcrowded, against a Glasgow average of 15.9%. There are 6.4% of households with four or more children against 2.2% for the city as a whole and 15.9% of households contain single-parent families (against 7.0% for the city). Only 1.7% of heads of households are in professional or managerial occupations, compared with 11.0% for Glasgow and 16.2% for the region as a whole; by contrast 39.7% are in low-paid occupations (25.6% for the whole city). Male unemployment is 40.3% overall and 47.8% among the 20-24 age group (19.2% and 24.0% for the whole city). The extent of low incomes can be judged from the fact that some two thirds of households are on housing benefit. 85.1% of households are without a car (70.6% for the city and 54.6% for the region). The population of Easterhouse has been declining along with that of the city.

Taking the Greater Easterhouse area as a whole, the population declined from 56,483 in 1971 to 45,708 in 1981 but, because of diminishing opportunities elsewhere, this was not as great as had been anticipated in the late 1970s, when it was hoped that population movement could, if not solve the problems of the peripheral estates, at least make them more manageable. The age structure of the population, reflecting that of the scheme, showed an increase in the 17-24 age group and only a small drop in the 12-16, indicating that unemployment is likely to increase. Overall, Easterhouse retains a younger population than that of the city as a whole and, with low levels of educational achievement, limited prospects of moving into employment outwith the area. Health statistics reinforce the image of deprivation. The perinatal death rate is 23.5% against 18.4% for Glasgow and the infant death rate 22.0%, against 16.3%. Health problems are related to and exacerbated by housing conditions. For Drumchapel, overcrowding stands at 22.9%, with 15.1% of households containing single-parent families. 35.8% of heads of households are in low-paid occupations and 81.5% of households lack a car. The closure of the Goodyear tyre factory in 1979 removed the major industrial employer in the area, further exacerbating Drumchapel's problems.
Overall, then, Easterhouse and Drumchapel exhibit the classic symptoms of multiple deprivation, a finding confirmed by the CES report, which noted that Easterhouse contained 10 of the worst 30 enumeration districts in the city (7 of the others were in the other peripheral estates). Glasgow, in turn, was one of the worst-off cities in Britain in terms of deprivation.

The Impact of Public Policy

By the late 1960s, it was already widely accepted that the policy of building at high density on the periphery had been mistaken, however understandable in the circumstances of the time. The 1971 census showed a slump in the city's population from 1,065,017 to 898,848, less a result of planned overspill than from spontaneous movement, but indicating that an end to the crude housing shortage was in sight. The second review of the Development in 1972 called for an end to overspill and the application of resources to combating urban decay. This was in tune with the changing national policy agenda, where the "rediscovery of poverty" had focussed attention on the problems of urban deprivation. National policies in both Scotland and England began to shift from a concern with overspill and physical renewal to an emphasis on the social and economic problems of the inner cities. In England, this was marked by the Inner Area Studies, the 1977 White Paper on the cities and the 1978 Inner Urban Areas Act with its Partnership and Programme schemes. In Glasgow, the shift in emphasis had been heralded with the West Central Scotland Urban Areas Act with its Partnership and Programme schemes. In Glasgow, the shift in emphasis had been heralded with the West Central Scotland Urban Areas Act with its Partnership and Programme schemes. In this context, the establishment of a development agency for the West of Scotland. In 1975 the Scottish Development Agency was set up with both economic and urban renewal responsibilities and, following a further recommendation in the Regional Report of the new Strathclyde Regional Council, Stonehouse was abandoned and its team and resources transferred to the inner-city Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal (GEAR) project. Strathclyde's Structure Plan placed the same emphasis on renewing the older industrial areas and tackling urban deprivation. In the Glasgow conurbation, however, urban decay manifested itself in two types of location. In the older urban and industrial areas, there was the problem of the decline of traditional industries and the flight of the younger and more enterprising sections of the population, often accompanied by poor housing conditions and other symptoms of multiple deprivation. In the peripheral schemes, similar social and environmental problems could be seen but linked here not to the decline of an economic base but to the failure to develop one in the first place.
outweighed their potential for local job creation.

The divergence of the social and economic aspects of urban renewal policy increased after the experience of GEAR. The SDA had been pushed into this rather reluctantly by the Scottish Office (which saw the project as a coordinated attack on all aspects of urban decline), but came increasingly to see the social policy role as a diversion from its main task of economic and industrial renewal. Subsequently, the Agency's area projects focussed more narrowly on the latter, increasingly seeking locations offering the best return on investment rather than those with the most severe social problems (Keating and Boyle, 1986).

We have indicated that, by the mid-1970s, Easterhouse and Drumchapel were recognised as a priority area by local and central government, eligible for additional resources through the Urban Programme and from local authority mainstream capital and revenue budgets. Data on the geographical distribution of expenditure is notoriously difficult to assemble but the District Council has undertaken a series of exercises to assess the impact of capital investment by public and private agencies on the priority areas, GEAR, the Maryhill Corridor and the peripheral estates. The figures for capital spending from 1979-80 to 1983-4 indicate a bias against the estates, with investment per head by all agencies amounting to £586 in Easterhouse and £317 in Drumchapel against £2,415 in GEAR and £1,776 in the Maryhill corridor. For District Council spending alone, the figures are £219 per head in Easterhouse, £271 in Drumchapel, £604 per head in GEAR and £684 in the Maryhill corridor – though these figures exclude the District's non-HRA capital programme which provides grants for private house improvement. Given the lack of private housing in Easterhouse and Drumchapel, inclusion of this would produce a further bias against the schemes. What also emerged was the crucial dependence of the peripheral estates on council spending. While the District Council was responsible for nearly 40% of all investment over the period, in the peripheral estates it is the dominant investor. In Drumchapel, for example, 85% of all investment was undertaken by the District. In Easterhouse, this figure was just 37.5% but this was due to the fortuitous circumstance of the Monkland Motorway passing through the area, increasing sharply the contribution of Strathclyde Region during the road’s construction. There is no private investment recorded and only a token amount by the SDA, a finding confirmed by the SDA’s own figures, which show Provan and Garscadden as amongst the three parliamentary constituencies with the least amount of SDA current investment as at November 1984. More detailed figures which have been produced by the District Council for selected years up to 1984-5 confirm the picture.

What emerges, then, is that Easterhouse and Drumchapel are critically dependent on public expenditure and, given their preponderance of public sector housing, vulnerable to policies such as prevailed in the early 1980s, when central government sharply diverted housing capital expenditure from the public to the private sector. For the city as a whole, the centrally-permitted expenditure on council house investment (the HRA account) fell from £62.6m in 1979/80 to £51.0m in 1984/5 while that for private sector grants and loans (the non-HRA account) increased from £13.3m to £84.5m. The balance has since been reversed with the heavy cuts in the non-HRA programme, though in real terms council housing investment remains well below the levels of 1979.

Figures on revenue spending are even more elusive. Under Strathclyde Region's anti-deprivation policy launched when the council was set up and refined as the Social Strategy for the Eighties the areas are eligible for preferential treatment in the allocation of resources. In education, falling school rolls and the elimination of the teacher shortage has meant that staffing levels could be established on a proper basis and then extra staff under the Scottish Office Circular 991 scheme allowing 390 additional teachers in Strathclyde's areas of need. In Social Work, too, extra staff have been provided since reorganisation and Welfare Rights workers have been deployed to try and ensure that people get the state benefits to which they are entitled. The fact remains, however, that many revenue services are demand-led so that those areas with more children staying on at school will tend to get more education expenditure and make more demands on the library service.

A major aim of the Strategy has been to ensure not simply that resources were available but that the various service delivery agencies cooperated in a joint appreciation of the problems facing them and in coordinated strategies for tackling them. At the same time, the need for community cooperation has been stressed. This stems from a concern that local government professionals tend to see problems in compartmentalised terms and draw a line around their sphere of competence, resisting intrusion by other professionals. The 1972 report by the old Glasgow Corporation had foreseen a problem of coordination when the two-tier local government system came into being, at a time when joint approaches were most needed; but there is also a problem about liaison within authorities, of bringing, for example, teachers, social workers and policemen to share a common appreciation of their problems. Strathclyde's original joint initiatives in seven of the APTs focussed on this problem, with a limited degree of success.
These, then, were the dimensions of the Easterhouse and Drumchapel problem. Over recent years, several initiatives have emerged in the areas of community development, housing, education and social work. The rest of this article is concerned with the latest, the Drumchapel and Greater Easterhouse Initiatives.

The Origins of the Initiative

We have argued that, since the early 1980s, there has been a progressive disaggregation of the physical, social and economic elements of urban policy. At the same time, the main thrust of physical and economic development policy has largely passed the periphery by, leaving estates like Easterhouse and Drumchapel dependent on local social policy initiatives and the limited moneys which can be obtained through urban aid. Concern about them had been building up for some time, however, stimulated by the Social Strategy for the Eighties, Glasgow District’s area management and decentralisation structures and the work of the Region’s Glasgow Divisional Deprivation Group. There was general agreement that ‘something should be done’ about the peripheral schemes and that an attack should be made simultaneously on the social and economic problems. Just what should be done and how the resources could be found was not so obvious.

In October 1983, proposals were put forward by the Chief Executive’s Department of the region identifying the problems, outlining the broad objectives of Joint Economic and Social Initiatives for Easterhouse and Drumchapel and discussing the strategy and programmes. It was stressed that the gestation period for the Initiatives should not be as long as that which preceded GEAR. A steering committee was to be established consisting of elected and senior officers of the two authorities as well as other agencies, the Scottish Development Agency, Greater Glasgow Health Board, and possibly the Scottish Office and Manpower Services Commission. In the event the part played by the central agencies was negligible or, in the case of the Scottish Office, non-existent. Each agency and each department was asked to prepare briefs and various ideas were to be considered in the lead up to the formal establishment of the Initiatives. Community involvement was regarded, at least on paper, as an essential component in the Initiatives not only to lend credibility to the ideas but also to foster community spirit in the areas.

The following year and half or so, to the Summer of 1985, saw very slow progress towards the establishment of the Initiative. Partly because some of the most senior members of both authorities were involved, who were obviously pressed for time, and partly because of the need to seek advice, views and ideas from a range of departments and officials, it took more time in arriving at the point when a formal agreement could be reached. Training seminars were run, consideration of the administrative structure and constitution of the Initiatives and the nature of community involvement were discussed. Until this stage there had been almost no communication with the local communities. However, it is always difficult determining how to involve a community and necessarily, in the case of an initiative from a governmental agency, there will be the appearance of presenting a fait accompli to the local community. During the Summer of 1985, community conferences were held in each of the areas. In Drumchapel a single conference was held at which six residents were elected to form the Drumchapel Residents’ Forum. In Easterhouse, a much larger area, community conferences were held in the constituent neighbourhoods and fifteen residents were elected at these who formed the Easterhouse Residents’ Forum. Perhaps inevitably, there were not particularly large turnouts at the community conferences and those who became involved as members of the Residents’ Forum were almost all “community activists”. This at least ensured that the members of the community who became involved had some experience of committee structures and the workings of the Councils, though obviously the “representativeness” of the individuals might be questioned.

Organisation and Constitution

Interim Planning Groups (IPG) consisting of elected members and officials from the two authorities, other representatives from bodies such as the SDA and GGHB, and some of the members from the Residents’ Forum met regularly from Summer 1985, acting as the institutional lead-in to the formal establishment of the Initiatives. The executives of the two Initiatives was further considered and the advertisement for the post of Initiative Director was advertised. This was one of the most contentious matters which developed. The SDA, in one of their very rare examples of involvement in the areas and with the Joint Initiatives particularly, funded a consultant to draw up an advertisement for the post. The result was an advert which was seen by many local people as insulting because of the implication that what Easterhouse and Drumchapel required was a missionary or “superman”. The expenditure of the “prime-pumping” budget for the Initiatives was discussed at these meetings.

The formal, legal establishment of the Area Management Groups (AMG) for each of Greater Easterhouse and Drumchapel, replacing the
IPGs, only occurred in April 1986. The AMGs were set up under the provisions of the Local Government (Scotland) Act, 1973 as a Joint Committee of the two authorities. In both cases, equal numbers of Regional Councillors, District Councillors, and Community representatives make up the AMGs. In Drumchapel three members from each of the components make up the AMG of nine members, while in Easterhouse there is a total of fifteen members constituted from five members of each of the components. The chairman and vice-chairman (convener and vice-convener as Drumchapel has chosen to designate these positions) of the AMG cannot come from the same component part of the Group, so for example the convener of Drumchapel AMG is a District Councillor and the Vice-Convener is a resident. Notably, Drumchapel's constitution allows for substitute members to attend meetings of the AMG in the absence of a member with the powers of the absent member, though this is not part of Easterhouse's constitution. In the case of Easterhouse, there would appear to be the need for an amendment given that at the AMG's second meeting, and first to discuss substantive issues, the absence of a number of councillors made the meeting inquorate. The AMGs are to appoint the Initiative Director, a Clerk, a Treasurer and other staff as they may decide, though because the AMGs exist only as Joint Committees of the two authorities and have otherwise no statutorily recognised existence, these officials will officially be employed by the local authorities. Clearly, the relationship between the AMG and its staff will be ambiguous, at least in terms of its legal position though this is unlikely to be of consequence in practice.

The aims of the Easterhouse and Drumchapel Initiatives as set out in 1983 when the idea was first being posited were:

1. to generate the facilities and community organisation of the areas, which in the case of Easterhouse especially, was recognised to be comparable to a medium sized town.
2. to meet the aspirations of the population both in the short term and also into the 1990s and beyond.
3. to create jobs and (re)generate the local economy.
4. to involve the local community.
5. to develop the communities of Easterhouse and Drumchapel and their respective individual component communities.
6. to make use of all possible sources of funding, encourage flexibility and innovation.

In effect, the aims come under two broad headings of social and economic development. Under the former, the fostering of a community spirit and participation in their communities is hoped for as well as improved and better coordinated service provision. Under the latter heading of economic regeneration, the most obvious element is the reduction of unemployment.

Each of the areas has particular needs and potentials in respect to these aims. Drumchapel, for example has the best repairs service in the city of Glasgow for its stock of council housing while there would appear to be much more room for improvement on this front in Easterhouse. The Kingsridge/Cleddans scheme in Drumchapel is an example of an innovative approach to housing in one of the most disadvantaged areas where Difficult-To-Let houses were concentrated. There tenant participation has included involvement in a local lettings policy initiative. In Easterhouse, the clearance of the Pendeen Crescent/Sandaig Road area of South Barlanark and the SDA's interest there offers opportunities which the Easterhouse Initiative will no doubt be taking an interest in. The former Goodyear site in Drumchapel has been considered as a potential site for economic development, as has the Queenslie Industrial Estate in Easterhouse.

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Aims and Objectives

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However, while the Initiative has been described as a Social and Economic Initiative and the local authorities recognise the clear links between the two aspects, the evidence suggests that what is being purposed is, in fact, little more than a social initiative which will also act as a pressure group for greater financial investment in the areas. The employment strategies of the Initiative for each area would appear to envisage the maximum use being made of the various existing funds. The Manpower Service Agency's various "placebo" policies are to be made use of. Training and education are seen as important and this is seen as an area in which the Initiatives could press for support. One important area recognised by the local authorities in which the social and economic aspects of the projects most clearly overlap is that of the encouragement of a local recruitment policy. Not only is there much scope for increasing employment in order to meet the demands caused by the sparsity of services provided, but there would be the encouragement of the employment of those living in the areas by the local authorities. While community businesses can generate employment, the scale of unemployment will require far more ambitious projects and there seems little likelihood that these will come the way of the Easterhouse and Drumchapel Initiatives without the major funding which can probably only be supplied by central government, who have to date shown little interest in, and even less of active part in the establishment of the Initiatives.

Though the SDA has an interest in the South Barlanark development, most likely because it is under pressure from the Treasury and in need of expanding its interests, its interest in Easterhouse and Drumchapel has been negligible. The Glasgow Parliamentary constituencies in which Easterhouse and Drumchapel exist – Provan and Garscadden respectively – are amongst the three constituencies which received the least amount of SDA current investments as at November 1984. 109 Glasgow Central was by far the most fortunate Scottish constituency in terms of investment according to the same answer to the Parliamentary Question. The SDA sponsored Glasgow Action is a further example of the preference which that body has for investing in the city centre. The SDA report The Potential of Glasgow City Centre may well propose to "put the heart back into Glasgow" but the Agency offers little for the peripheral estates where unemployment is concentrated at its highest levels.

The lack of interest shown by the Scottish Office, especially compared with the activities of the Department of the Environment in many of the inner city developments south of the border, the "placebo" policies of the Manpower Services Commission and the SDA's emphasis on the city centre do not augur well for the prospect of the economic element in the Initiative being successful.

Finances

The finances of the Initiatives will inevitably determine their powers, the extent of their independence and, ultimately, their success. A specific pump-priming budget for 1985/86 was established which offered £50,000 to each of the areas. In subsequent years "Area Budgets" jointly funded by the participating authorities will be devolved to the AMGs. Additionally, it is envisaged that greater priority for capital and revenue mainstream resources will feed into the areas as Easterhouse and Drumchapel AMGs articulate their proposals to the local authorities. One of the general principles guiding the local authorities is that there should be no need to declare a large arbitrary sum of money immediately and that the provision of resources should grow in response to the identification of need, specific proposals and activities by and in the community.

A specific block allocation of Urban Aid to Drumchapel and Easterhouse for the financial year 1986/87 was proposed in the report submitted to the Policy and Resources Committees of the Region and District in August 1985. The AMGs would act as the initial approving agency for these sums of over £200,000 for Drumchapel and almost £400,000 for Greater Easterhouse. This effectively means that applications for Urban aid will have a further hurdle to mount though at least there will be a set allocation for the areas. Existing recipients of Urban Aid might well fear this arrangement though this would appear to be the case only if the AMGs, which after all are expected to be closer to the communities than the local authorities, become aware of failings in the existing recipients.

Much talk has been heard of the need for outside financial support. The Greater Glasgow Health Board, the SDA, the MSC, the European Community and the private sector will all, it is hoped, contribute. However, there would appear to be the likelihood of private sector investment only if the private sector see it as in its interests. This may follow from the activities of the public sector funders, notably in providing infrastructure, premises and help with investment finance. It may also, if the Region is serious about bringing in private capital, require some reappraisal of the Structure Plan.

Powers and Responsibilities

Deliberately, the powers and responsibilities of the Initiative are not clearly set out. As a long-term project it is expected that powers and
responsibilities will be gained over time. This "rolling devolution" may well involve the need for legislative amendments to Acts of Parliament according to some of those behind the idea. The statutory responsibility of the Region for major areas of education and social work and the District for areas in housing provision mean that these responsibilities will remain under the authority of the local authority. In some respects then, the Initiative will be able to function only at the margins and act more as a pressure group than an administering or governing body. Obviously, the finances available to the Initiative will determine how independent it can be.

The Region and District will have the ultimate power of withdrawing support for the Initiatives and require only to give three months notice in order to do so. Otherwise, the local authorities will maintain a watching brief over the Initiative and there is the intention to devise some method of assessing and monitoring the work of the Initiatives. This could not be by the number of jobs provided or any such criteria which would be affected by variables external to the Initiative's capabilities and measuring such nebulous notions as "community spirit" would, of course cause difficulties. In all likelihood, the Initiative will not be expected to produce any tangible or obvious successes in its first few years of existence. The support in the local communities will act as a measure of success, though not measurable, and also lend credibility and legitimacy to the Initiative's position vis-a-vis the local authorities. In that respect, the success of the Initiative may well have a catalytic effect.

One of the most important functions which the Initiatives will be expected to perform will be that of ensuring that their areas are not forgotten. Though the assertion that the Initiatives will be allowed to determine policy has been made, it must be recognised that this will only be permitted within the outlines of the policies of both local authorities. The power of virement within the local service block allocations will be fairly limited because the statutory demands made on the local authorities. This particular power will increase only as the financial resources allocated to the Initiatives over and above the basic levels required to meet statutory requirements increases. It is therefore clear that the Initiatives' role as pressure group on behalf of the communities of Easterhouse and Drumchapel will be crucial.

Conclusion

Much of the rhetoric surrounding the establishment of the Greater Easterhouse and Drumchapel Joint Social and Economic Initiatives suggested that there was going to be a major shift in resources to these peripheral estates ("£ Millions In Action - Boost for city schemes", *Evening Times* headline, 30 August, 1985). In reality, though less of an appealing headline, it would have been correct to state that the Initiative has a long-term potential of gaining increased resources from various agencies but does have the more immediate prospect of improving and coordinating service provision. It has become a cliché that urban economic and social problems are not solved by 'throwing money at them'. If this were all that there is to be said, it would be a comforting thought; but solutions to urban decline do not come free. Large amounts of money need if not to be 'thrown at', then applied to the problem, particularly in areas like Easterhouse and Drumchapel which have been so starved of investment in the past. Providing the resources requires commitment not simply from local government but, critically, from central government which has effectively taken control of local finance. It is worth remembering that both peripheral estates owed their origins to the urban decay and overcrowding of Glasgow city centre which also gave rise to the emergence of the New Towns which were given considerable financial support from the Treasury. Given the lack of support for Easterhouse and Drumchapel over the years since they were conceived, it would seem only just and fair were central government to give their backing to these communities in order that they would be able to develop and prosper to the extent that the city centre is currently receiving the support of central government and the private sector.

Connected with the issue of finance is that of power. The ability of the Initiatives to lever resources out of mainstream budgets will depend on their political 'clout'. Certainly, they have received support from the highest levels in the participating authorities, but the quality of the management structure and the arrangements for local participation will be critical in ensuring that they retain their place in the order of priorities.

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