THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF MODERN SCOTLAND*

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Although the phenomenon is more pronounced to those of us who live in Scotland, it is apparent to any British sociologist that sociological statements about and empirical materials illustrating the 'British social structure' are firmly grounded on studies of England. There are no texts which provide the basic picture of the Scottish social structure on which a good analysis can be based. Sometimes absence is accounted for by the assumption that the British social structure is homogeneous, or by an admission that 'Scotland is different', but pleading ignorance of the form and dimensions of its social structure.

Over the last few years, assumptions about the social, economic and political homogeneity of British society have begun to be questioned. Regional disparities have not disappeared in the post-war period and have shown up in prolonged recession since the mid 1960s, the problems of declining industries, and attempts by the State at industrial and physical regeneration have reinforced this breakdown while political differences have become more marked.

The old assumption was built partly on the view that the British state and British society were neatly related, that because Britain was governed by a unified and centralised system of government, the social structure would reflect this homogeneity. Only now are sociologists beginning to be interested in 'regional' variations. These variations are, of course, geographical, but they are more than that. Space

* I am grateful to my colleagues, Frank Bechhofer and Steve Kendrick, with whom I have discussed many of the ideas in this paper. Together we have begun to gather sociographic material on Scotland in a study financed by the Social Science Research Council (HR 6948/1).
comes both to pattern and to reflect important differences in economic and social development within Britain. In this respect, Scotland provides a strategically interesting case study, for its economic structure is overlaid by important political and cultural levels - part of a 'civil society' which has managed to survive more than 200 years of political union with different legal and cultural institutions. One of the most obvious manifestations is the resurgence of nationalism - political and cultural - in the past fifteen years.

The argument about the 'distinctiveness' of Scotland can become a sterile one, subservient to the political requirements of nationalists and unionists alike. Nevertheless, processes of economic, social, and political change have had a particular impact on Scotland.

(a) Economic Change

While the Act of Union can be seen as some kind of recognition of a close relation between the Scottish economy and that of Britain as a whole, the relationship has been particularly close for the last 150 years or so. At the turn of the century, the Scottish economy was a highly developed but also highly specialised part of the British one, dependent on heavy industry and coarse textiles, and since then has become still more integrated into the British economy. However, the problem of industrial regeneration has faced successive governments since the 1950s, and they have been forced to intervene earlier and to a much greater extent than south of the border. This revolution in Scotland's economy has had fundamental effects. The industrial elite who depended for their social and political as well as economic power on the success of their 'junior partner' role in Victorian imperial development, found their power and influence drastically reduced. Second, the State direction of industry has advanced, and the power of entrepreneurs has diminished. Third, there has been a consequent change in the location of ownership and control of the industrial base. The Scottish economy has become a 'branch' or a 'satellite' economy.

(b) Political and Social Change

Partly because of the stage at which Scotland, and Britain generally, developed, economic development was not accompanied by national mobilisation;[3] nationalism was not harnessed in the course of economic development in Scotland, and the political aspirations of the Scottish industrial bourgeoisie did not take the form of nationalist demands. It is only in recent years that a degree of 'politicisation' of civil society has occurred, partly reflected in the upsurge of nationalism. The relationship between the Scottish state and 'Scottish society' has become more problematic as the state has been involved more and more with the problems of the Scottish economy, coinciding with the hopes and aspirations boosted by North Sea Oil. The rapid rise of the Nationalist party in the political stakes should not be allowed to mask the growing divergence of political behaviour between Scotland and England since the 1950s.

These important differences in social, economic, and political development in Scotland are clearly going to be reflected in the social structure, but as yet we have little by way of good sociological analysis of Scotland. It is impossible to cover all aspects of the social structure in one short essay. The focus will be on those elements which determine the shape of distribution of social and economic power in society - the industrial and occupational structure, and patterns of social inequality. These aspects of the social structure form the web of social constraint which are imposed within the society itself, and which, although people directly experience, they are often only dimly aware of.

Industrial and Occupational Change in Scotland

For too long, we have covered our ignorance about social change in Scotland with easy assumptions, for example, that changes in Scotland's industrial base have led to Scotland becoming 'de-skilled' or 'proletarianised'.[4] The reality is more prosaic. The most up to date information available shows that the 'service' sector is by far the major industrial category in terms of employment, and that it is the only sector to have increased in size over the past ten years (by 167,000 jobs).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>1969</th>
<th>1979</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I Agriculture, forestry, fishing</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Mining and quarrying</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III-XIX Manufacturing</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>X XI</td>
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<td>-------</td>
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<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>Gas, electricity, water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,076,000</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


These data refer to both men and women in the labour market, and reflect the growing importance of women in employment. Women now account for some 40% of the labour force, and, taking the rough with the smooth, some 37% of the unemployed in Scotland. However, the labour market for women is significantly different from that of men; using 1976 data, we find that 37% of men were employed in manufacturing, compared with 22% of women. Women are more likely to be found in professional and scientific services (28%; 9% of men) and in distribution (17%; 7% of men).

From the above table, it is clear that manufacturing industry, as in the rest of Britain, represents a declining proportion of the labour force. Although Scotland shares this trend with the rest of Britain, there are some important differences in its industrial and occupational structures. Analysing data for male workers only, it is clear that, using S.I.C. Industrial Orders as before, certain sectors of Scottish industry are more important employers than south of the border. Deriving an index figure of 100 if the same proportion of workers in Scotland as in England and Wales are employed in the sector, it becomes clear that Scotland still (in 1971) has a disproportionate number employed in shipbuilding and engineering (298), agriculture, forestry and fishing (174), food, drink and tobacco (154), textiles (122) and construction (120). Similarly, certain sectors employ far less workers in Scotland than in England and Wales; coal and petroleum products (47), clothing and footwear (42), vehicles (52), metal goods (52), electrical engineering (62), insurance, banking, finance and business services (72) and chemicals (75).

Examination of the occupational structure (for male workers only) begins to reveal the outlines of Scotland's social structure.
of England and Wales. In order to answer that question, Jones\(^8\) has used shift-share analysis to apportion the extent of variation in the socio-economic structure to the industrial structure or the occupational structure. Using this technique he is able to conclude:

"For men, at least, it appears that Scotland's relative excess of 'undesirable' jobs has been, in the recent past, due as much to the internal structure of her industries as to the industrial distribution of the labour force." (P.405)

However, the problems of inferring further from this data are considerable. We cannot simply assume that the S.E.G. figures produced by the registrar-general are indicators of registrar-general's categories contain sub-groups from different social classes, making the construction of 'social class' very difficult.

In all parts of Britain, the trends towards non-manual occupations and away from manual ones is in evidence, although Scotland starts with a larger manual category. Nowhere is there much evidence of a divergence occurring between the industrial and occupational structures of the two parts of Britain.

Manufacturing Industry

In recent years, commentators have been pointing to the shrinkage of Britain's manufacturing sector and its declining profitability.\(^9\) In this respect, Scotland's manufacturing industry fits this unenviable pattern. Although the U.K. and Scotland appear to be doing no worse than other countries in terms of percentage employed in manufacture, the trend since 1963 shows that only in the U.K. and the Netherlands has there been an absolute loss of manufacturing jobs.\(^10\) In Scotland, the heavy erosion of jobs in manufacturing has been moving at around 5,800 annually between 1963 and 1974. The loss of jobs in Scotland has been large in agriculture as Firn shows, as well as in metal manufacture and textiles.

This decline in manufacturing industry in Scotland would probably have been much worse but for the growing importance of non-Scottish owned industry coming into Britain since 1945. The loss of indigenous manufacturing industry in Scotland has been partially compensated for by the advent of non-local firms, most significantly, North American.\(^11\)

According to John Firn, in 1973, 59% of employment in manufacturing industry in Scotland was controlled 'externally' (including English control). Firn's work\(^12\) using the 1973 data-base on manufacturing industry in Scotland constructed by the Scottish Council (Development and Industry), provided the first systematic and reliable profile of the changes taking place in Scottish manufacturing industry. Whereas nearly 72% of plants were 'Scottish', compared with 21% of English and 5% North American, the Scottish firms employed only 41% of employees in manufacturing, compared with 40% by English, and 15% by North American concerns. The larger the enterprise, the more likely it is to be externally owned, for whereas 86% of plants employing 50 people or less are Scottish, only 25% of those employing more than 1,000 are Scottish-owned. Of the top 110 plants, providing nearly half of manufacturing employment in Scotland, only one-quarter are Scottish owned.

Firn concluded:

"The faster the growth of the sector, the higher the proportion of that sector's employment in Scotland that is externally-controlled. The level of Scottish control in the five fastest-growing sectors is only some 13.5% of total employment in these sectors in Scotland." (P.161)

Recent updating by Campbell\(^13\) using 1977 data revealed a further intensification of external control in manufacturing industry.

More recent work by the Scottish Economic Planning Department\(^14\) using 1979 data shows that 275 overseas units, European and American, provide some 100,000 jobs in Scottish manufacturing industry, 16% of
employment in this sector. Of course, Scotland is by no means the only part of Britain dependent on foreign investment; in 1975, 13% of U.K. manufacturing employment was provided by overseas firms. What is significant about foreign investment in Scotland is that it is disproportionately from the United States, whose corporations provide some 72,000 of the 100,000 jobs in manufacturing. More recently, there has been a trend towards European investment in Scotland.

Certainly since Firn carried out his analysis in 1973, the investment by foreign companies has continued, although there has been a slackening off in U.S. involvement. However, in recent years, employment growth has ceased and there has occurred a net loss of around 8,000 jobs, especially in mechanical engineering. Since 1975, there has been a 4% drop in total employment in Scottish manufacturing, but over the same period, a fall of 7% in employment in overseas owned plants.

A recent report by Hood and Young for the Scottish Office (15) into U.S. owned manufacturing companies in Scotland was more sanguine about their influence. They pointed out that there was no performance imbalance between the American Scottish affiliates and the U.S. parent company, and that a number of the smaller corporations in Scotland had done better than some of the major U.S. corporations at home. Nevertheless, such a financial performance does not necessarily contradict the fact that in 1979, a significant number of ‘branch’ plants belonging to U.S. corporations have either closed or shed labour, the most notable being Singer (3,000 jobs), but also Goodyear, Hoover, Monsanto, and Timex. In all, some 28,000 jobs were lost in Scotland in 1979.

The work done by Firn and others into foreign investment in Scottish manufacturing industry is not only of economic but also of social significance. We need to know more about the effects on the socio-economic structure of Scotland of these phenomena. We have not yet been able, for example, to link industrial employment with changes in the occupational structure, work which can only be done when the 1981 census data becomes available. The effects of overseas investment and of the impact of the oil industry will only be in evidence when we are able to compare 1971 and 1981 data on the occupational structure.

At present we can only surmise that external control has had some impact on the employment structure of Scotland, but we cannot know whether it serves to increase the levels of skill in Scotland by providing employment opportunities for skilled labour, or whether such employment merely provides for ‘screwdriver’ or assembly jobs requiring lower levels of skill.

Some important sociological issues also present themselves for resolution. To what extent does dependence on foreign capital remove political as well as economic decision-making from within Scotland? Even although the level of political decision-making occurring within Scotland is minimal already, what is the effect on governmental and political structures of such dependence? At present, we have little inkling as to what this dependence means for Scotland. However, recent research on the impact of the North Sea Oil industry on North East Scotland, (16) and particularly on Aberdeen, suggests that the intrusion of non-local enterprises into what has been traditionally a self-contained economy has had dramatic consequences for the distribution of social and political power. The shift in the level of control on the economic base, together with greater central state involvement in the national interest has removed the social and economic hegemony of local capital, and redefined the power game in the North East.

The value of Firn’s work cannot be denied for he had done much of the valuable spade-work for the student of socio-economic change in Scotland. However, he admits that defining the location of ultimate control in geographical terms is but the first step in the analysis of ownership and control. Similarly, it would be inappropriate to construct such an analysis simply on the basis of manufacturing industry, a declining employer of labour in Scotland.

John Scott and Michael Hughes (17) have set out to provide for a more sociological analysis of economic power in Scotland, rather than a ‘geography’ of ultimate ownership. Confining their analysis to the 96 companies who own the 114 largest plants in Scotland, they discovered that 26 of them are ‘Scottish’ in Firn’s terms, 48 are ‘English’ and 21 ‘North American’. Of the 'Scottish' companies, 17 are public companies, such as DCL, Aberdeen Construction, Carron,
Coats Paton, United Biscuits and Weir. In no case is there evidence of 'managerial' control of the company, though minority shareholder control is the norm. Further work on the interests of the directors (156 in all) of these 17 companies reveals that in most cases (72%), their primary interests are in Scotland; only 24% of these directors have business interests outwith Scotland.

It is clear in their earlier work that Scott and Hughes are not happy with a crude 'interest-counting' by way of assessing influence in the major companies of Scotland. In subsequent analysis, they employ the analysis of Maurice Zeitlin(18) to argue that while there may be a separation of the managerial function from ownership, there is not necessarily a separation of control from such ownership. A particularly important role is played by banks and investment trusts in controlling the network of Scottish companies:

"The top Scottish companies appear to form a highly integrated network of financial companies with a number of tentacles reaching out into industry. The Scottish-registered sector of the economy is a proprietary controlled system of highly integrated financial and industrial interests."(19)

Given the controlling interests of English banks in the major Scottish ones, (20) Scottish industry is more integrated into the British economic and financial structure than ever before.

However, although Scottish capital is predominantly owned by English interests, the network of interlocking directorships shows the relative autonomy of Scottish business within the British economy. (21)

"The Scottish network is a relatively autonomous sub-system of an over-arching British system. English interests in Scottish companies are mediated through a distinct Scottish directorate." (P.42)

Scottish companies, Scott and Hughes conclude, are directed by "a corps of Scotsmen".

What, then, are we to conclude about changes in Scotland's industrial and occupational structures? The major feature of such change over the last fifty years or so has been the opening up of the Scottish economy to non-Scottish influences. The loss of power by an indigenous capitalist class with the decline of traditional manufacturing industry has opened up opportunities for the State to play a more important role in economic decision making and new forms of capital to penetrate the economy and socio-economic structure. The importance of foreign capital, North American and European, shows little signs of abating and has become an integral part of the economy. The shift of control within Britain has resulted from amalgamations and takeovers of key Scottish firms (e.g. House of Fraser), and from the centralisation of nationalised industry in steel and in shipbuilding. Increasingly, financial and commercial capital has taken a controlling interest in that part of manufacturing industry which remains indigenous and in profitable new outlets such as the oil industry. Nevertheless, the top Scottish companies remain in the managerial hands of the 'corps of Scotsmen', who are able to apply their knowledge of local political, social and economic structures. In the management and control of its economy, Scotland no longer provides its own entrepreneurs, but contributes a 'managerial class' well versed in local conditions.

Social Inequality

An understanding of the social structure requires that we examine the distribution of social and economic benefits, for this will reflect the configurations of power in Scotland. Sorting out reality from myth is particularly important because of the accretions of conventional wisdom which have gathered around the topic of social inequality.

The statement that Scotland is a 'more equal' society has often been asserted, but rarely tested. It is true that there appear to be some a priori reasons for arguing this. First, the relative importance of the State in determining rewards and life chances in Scotland might be expected to have diminished the extent of social inequality. Second, shared aspects of social and cultural status, such as accent and lifestyle, rather than economic class might create such an impression. Third, there persists what Alan McLaren(22) has called 'the democratic myth' - that Scotland offers greater equality of social opportunity for self advancement - generated by democratic Presbyterianism with its emphasis on education.

However, in attributing to Scotland and its Kirk a commitment to
democracy and equality of opportunity, it is important to bear in mind that its notion of 'equality' was a narrow one, as McLaren has pointed out:

"... the belief in a specific Scottish egalitarianism never implied that Scotland was in any sense a classless society. It held that the social gap between classes was never important, and through societal encouragement and institutional means the 'lad o' pairts' with ability and resolution could easily effect a crossing."

What was on offer was equality of opportunity, not equality of achievement.

(b) Equality and Educational Opportunity

Research at the Centre for Educational Sociology at the University of Edinburgh has shed light on the workings of the Scottish education system, particularly on the cozy assumptions which Scots have been apt to wrap themselves in on the matter of educational opportunity. By taking the entrants of Scottish universities at two time-points 1962 and 1972, Hutchison and McPherson have been able to compare the entrance rates by sex and social class for these two years. Their data shows unequivocally that the proportion of students from manual backgrounds actually fell from 35.4% in 1962 to 29.4% in 1972. Such findings that working class children do not go to university are not found in much research in England and Wales; most recently, Halsey and his colleagues, looking at the social composition of all students, not only first year entrants, put the proportion of students from manual backgrounds at 19.7%.

By and large, the expansion of universities in the mid 1960s benefited middle class women to the detriment of working class men, with working class women holding their own as a proportion of entrants:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1962</th>
<th>1972</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-manual Men</td>
<td>41.5%</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Men</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-manual Women</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Women</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0 (N=2097)</td>
<td>100.0 (N=6033)</td>
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</table>

There is no doubting that equality of educational opportunity, particularly as it relates to social class, has not been achieved. To understand the mechanisms of inequality would require a more extensive examination of primary and secondary education as well as the role of fee-paying schools, particularly in Edinburgh and Glasgow, which operate to cream off a significant number of middle class children, and thus serve to perpetuate educational and social divisions.

(b) Equality and Social Opportunity

Until recently, our knowledge about social mobility in Scotland belonged to realms of surmise, assertion and conjecture for there was no data available to show us how much (or how little) mobility was taking place across the occupational structure. The recent mobility studies - in Scotland at the University of Aberdeen, and in England and Wales at Nuffield College, Oxford - have given us the means to make a more reasoned and grounded assessment as to the 'openness' of our occupational structure.

Perhaps the most striking finding of both studies is the high degree of self-recruitment into manual occupations across the generations. Nearly three quarters of manual workers, skilled as well as unskilled, had fathers who were also manual workers. A high degree of self-recruitment is also in evidence among 'small proprietors' - a category including shop-keepers, small farmers and those who own small businesses. 32% of small proprietors had fathers in the same occupation; and 47.5% of fathers who were small proprietors had sons in the same category, a figure higher even than for manual workers.

It comes as little surprise to discover high self-recruitment of the top group - major employers, professionals and managers. 42% of fathers in group I have sons in the same group, and a further 22% end up in the lower professional, managerial and employer category (group II). Only 11% end up as manual workers. Certainly there is a degree of openness at the top, a levelling of the elite, but the phenomenon should be interpreted with care. First, it is obvious that over the generation in question, the number of jobs in group I has increased dramatically, with the expansion in professionals and administrative jobs in particular. Consequently, there is room enough at the top to accommodate both the sons of the older elite, and to provide opportuni-
ties for the upwardly mobile, especially through the education system. So there is little evidence of downward mobility among the sons of 'professionals'; most stay at the top of the tree. Upward social mobility over the last thirty years has resulted from an expanding labour market for non-manual workers and from the demand for professionals and administrators in a bureaucratised society.

(c) Equality and The Distribution of Economic and Social Benefits

Scotland has always been a relatively poor country. On most economic indicators - personal disposable income, consumers' expenditure - its population has lagged behind that of England. Nevertheless, one of the startling features of relative economic performance has been the declining differential in earnings between Scottish and English workers.

Average weekly earnings of adult male manual employees: Scotland as a per cent of GB/UK

Scottish Economic Bulletin 20, Spring 1980, p.28

A recent study by the Scottish Economic Planning Department (28) into these trends argued that while Scots work more overtime (thereby inflating 'earnings'), there had been major growths in labour productivity in Scotland compared with the U.K.

Alongside these shifts in income have gone a narrowing of other economic and social differentials. Whereas in the mid 1960s, the Scottish rate of unemployment was over 150% of the U.K. rate, by the mid 1970s and later it had fallen to under 120% (29). That barometer of social and economic malaise, the migration rate, had fallen from 43,000 in 1965 to 14,500 in 1979. (30)

Although we have data on Scotland/Great Britain earnings comparison, we can say nothing about the distribution of income within Scotland. The Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth has not provided intra-U.K. comparisons in the way it has done so for the distribution of personal wealth. (31) These data were collected for 1973 and up-dated for 1975, and they show that wealth is more unequally distributed in Scotland compared with England and Wales:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>England and Wales</th>
<th>Scotland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top 1%</td>
<td>27.6% 22.9%</td>
<td>32.2% 27.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top 5%</td>
<td>50.4% 45.8%</td>
<td>62.8% 52.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top 10%</td>
<td>66.1% 61.6%</td>
<td>79.3% 68.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top 20%</td>
<td>85.4% 81.1%</td>
<td>94.4% 85.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further research has also been carried out by Alan Harrison (32) for the Fraser of Allander Institute for the period between 1938 and 1969, and both sets of data seem to indicate a more unequal distribution regarding the ownership of wealth, but we have to be careful in our interpretation of these data for there are methodological pitfalls. (33)

To a large extent however, these data are a reflection of the ownership of certain kinds of assets. John McEwen (34) has shown that the ownership of landed estates has changed little since the 1874 census of land. Another factor leading to inequality of wealth is the extent of public sector housing in Scotland. Housing is not only an important feature in this respect, it also plays a central role in the processes generating poverty and deprivation.

In 1975, the Department of the Environment produced a report (35) studying the concentration of deprivation. By ranking the 'worst' census enumeration districts (E.D.s) in Great Britain on one or more indicators (thus giving a measure of 'multiple' deprivation), the researchers concluded:

"Clydeside consistently has a very much more than proportionate share of the worst 5% of E.D.s on nearly all kinds of deprivation, and so to a lesser extent does the rest of 'urban' Scotland," (36)

So, Scotland contained as much as 72% of the worst 5% E.D.s in Britain when overcrowding and male unemployment were used together as a measure of deprivation. Proportionately, it should have had only 11%. Major concentrations of deprivation were to be found not only in
Glasgow, but in Edinburgh, Dundee, Aberdeen, Clydebank, Paisley and Rutherglen. We cannot say from these data how many of the households in these E.D.s which have high levels of deprivation are themselves deprived. We require rather different forms of research on multiple deprivation focusing on people rather than places before we can answer this question. However, some research has begun to be done, and Geoff Norris's pamphlet for the Child Poverty Action Group provides a useful review using more conventional measures of poverty. (37)

A more detailed reading of the Department of Environment report reveals that urban poverty is changing its locale. Whereas once the 'traditional' areas of poverty were inner city slum areas containing very amenity deficient housing, to a great extent urban deprivation has become the property of council-built urban ghettoes on the fringes of our towns and cities.

Why should this be so? Why, after two generations of council housing, should the promise of a fairer and better life have been betrayed? As yet, the social and political mechanisms of such concentration of deprivation are poorly understood, but there seems little doubt that they derive from the development and practice of public housing policies in Scotland. Sean Damer (38) has shown how local authorities have created social divisions within council housing by building different housing for different groups of people, high amenity housing for 'general purposes' and low amenity housing for 'slum clearance'. The consequences of fifty years of such policies are quite visible - in the 'Wine Alleys', the Ferguslie Parks, the Bowhouses, Piltons and Finnys of Scottish towns and cities.

Further, the peculiarities of the land tenure system together with the constellations of land and property interests which had so much to do with the making of Scottish cities seem to have produced a pattern of stark social segregation. (39) In contemporary terms, for example, Edinburgh (40) is the most socially segregated city, more divided than British or American cities yet studied. The argument must be that in order to understand urban deprivation, we must understand processes of social segregation. We cannot comprehend the concentration of the poor without accounting for the segregation of the rich, each is the outcome of political and economic policies at the local and the national level. Despite the salience of housing as the political issue, (41) it seems that State intervention has simply provided a new and more efficient form of social regulation. There is little evidence that greater State involvement has been significantly redistributive. By drawing upon what Geoffrey Best (42) has called 'civil authoritarianism' in Scottish cities, the State has taken on the role of moral regulator and social policeman. The worst forms of poverty and social inequality may have been reduced, but there is little sign of their eradication from the Scottish social structure.

Conclusion: Power and Authority in Scotland

Perhaps more than most other parts of Britain, Scotland has undergone a shift from a self-regulating and self-legitimating 'economic' system to a more consciously regulated 'political' one. The problem of industrial decline in Scotland in the last fifty years has forced the State to play a more active role in seeking economic solutions, thereby, becoming more embroiled in the social fabric. In many ways, the 'corporate society' is alive and well in Scotland, and has been since Tom Johnston added to Scottish Office powers with Churchill's connivance. (43) It is, though, a peculiar corporate society, for the politicians play an odd role. The absence of devolved democratic power means that only a few government ministers play a significant role in its exercise, given the dislocation between electoral strength and political authority.

The power of bureaucratic authority in Scotland is very significant, and yet our understanding of it is poor. The existence of a 'non-democratic elite', to use John P. Mackintosh's term, has spawned a myriad of so-called quangos and semi-public authorities, and an analysis is needed of the recruitment patterns and network of influence in these bodies. Given the scale of Scottish society, perhaps social and personal connections are more significant, and networks of influence might be traced across different aspects of Scottish life - politics, business, the universities, the church and the professions. (44)

The social structure of Scotland is undergoing fundamental change. The extension of the activities of the State, significant shifts in the ownership and control of Scotland's economic assets, and the rise of
new social and political movements all present an intellectual challenge to the student of Scottish society. It is about time we took our task seriously.

Endnote:

It can be argued, of course, that 'Scotland' as a unit of analysis is somewhat problematic, as there are significant regional variations within it (as in Britain). However, insofar as 'Scotland' has a political-administrative as well as socio-cultural meaning, there is justification for using it.

REFERENCES

1. For texts on the basic British picture see:
5. G. Payne 'Occupational Transition in Advanced Industrial Societies', Sociological Review 25, 1977. "Clearly, Scotland has become more working class and its population is now less skilled, vis a vis England, than at any time since the First World War." P.33
6. There were 965,000 women in employment in Scotland in 1978, 40% of the labour force, roughly comparable to the proportion in the U.K.: see Regional Statistics 1980 8.1, p.102.
7. This does not mean that female employment is insignificant, merely that patterns of employment for women require separate analysis if a meaningless aggregate for the two patterns of employment is to be avoided.

8. I am grateful to Trevor Jones, Dept. of Sociology, Edinburgh University, for permission to use the data which follows.
15. C. Campbell, 'More Scots industry under outside control', The Scotsman, 14 April 1977.
23. Scott and Hughes 'Capital and Communication in Scottish Business' in Sociology 14, 1 1980
Their most recent work (The Anatomy of Scottish Capital, London, Croom Helm, 1980) provides an analysis of major companies since 1904.


The data discussed in this paper are taken from Goldthorpe's book, pages 44-5 and 289-290, because there are differences in the occupational classifications used in the two studies, and using Goldthorpe's allows a direct comparison to be made between Scotland, and England and Wales.


32. A. Harrison 'The Distribution of Personal Wealth in Scotland' research monograph No. 1, Fraser of Allander Institute, Glasgow, 1975.

We are concerned here strictly speaking with the distribution of wealth owned by Scots, not the distribution of wealth physically situated in Scotland", Harrison op. cit., p.10.


35. Holtermann op. cit., p.37.