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THE MATERIALS IN THE WORKS OF AL-FARABI
AND IBN-SINA ON WHICH THE METAPHYSICAL
SECTION OF AL-GHAZALI'S MAQASID IS BASED.

by

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M. M. R.
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TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
Afnan = Afnan, S.M. - Avicenna His Life and Works.
Arberry = Arberry, A.J. - Avicenna on Theology.
Far., Dā'awi = Al-Farābī, - Ad - Dā'awi al-Qalbiyya.
Far., Siyāsa = Al-Farābī, - Al-Farābī's the Political Regime. (Al-Siyāsa al-Madaniyya: also known as the Treatise on the Principles of Beings.)
Far., Tal. = Al-Fārābī, - At - Taʻlīqāt.

Far., Zīnūn = Al-Fārābī, - Sharḥ Risālat Zīnūn al - Kabīr Yūnānī.

Also known as Muqaddamāt Tathafūt al-Falāsifa. Edited by Dr. Sulaymān Dunyā.


IS., Ilah. (I) = Ibn-Sīnā, - Al - Illāhiyyāt. (I)
From ash - Shīfā'.
Text established and edited by G.C. Anawati and Saʿīd Zayed.

IS., Ilah. (2) = Ibn-Sīnā, - Al - Illāhiyyāt. (2)
From ash - Shīfā'.
Text established and edited by Muḥammad Yūsuf Moussa, Solaymān Dunyā and Saʿīd Zayed.

Al - Illāhiyyāt - Ishāra.

Al - Illāhiyyāt - Tanbīh.

Al - Illāhiyyāt - Tadhniḥ.

Al - Maṭīq - Ishāra.


IS., Shifa' = Ibn-Sīnā, Shifa'. Arabic Manuscript.


Quadri, Philosophie = Quadri, G., La Philosophie Arabe dans l'Europe Médiévale des Origines à Averroès.


Watt, Philosophy = Watt, W. Montgomery, Islamic Philosophy and Theology.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Islamic Philosophy seems essentially to be a response to the challenge that reached the Muslim world from Greek thought. Various conflicts arose in early Islam from time to time with respect to certain principles in different sects and everyone adapted whatever new form seemed to be conducive to his thought. The conflict between the Mu'tazilite tradition influenced by rationalism and Ash'arite tradition dominated by 'faith' was virtually set at naught by the chief of the Ash'arites, Abū-Ḥamīd Muḥammad al-Ghazālī (1058-1111 A.D.), who found the culmination of tradition in mystical awareness. From the time of al-Ash'arī down to that of al-Ghazālī the Arabs assimilated the fundamentals of Hellenism, and Greek culture caused a vigorous philosophical renaissance represented by Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (died A.D. 950) and Abū-'Alī al-Husayn ibn-'Abd-Allāh ibn-Sīnā (A.D. 980-1037). Under the influence of their philosophical thought theology was shaken once more when confronted by the ideas of the Mu'tazila. Facts and phenomena had no ultimate significance beyond what they presented in experience. Men who were concerned with the refinements of philosophical speculations and the intricacies of metaphysical abstractions were greatly needed to work to the support of the dogmas of Islam and to nullify the conclusions of a philosophy inconsistent with it.
When this colossal task appeared to be imperative, the Muslim world found their leader in al-Ghazālī who was capable of withstanding Hellenism and attacking its representatives. In addition to his being a philosopher who wished to counteract the unorthodox tendencies of his hellenising predecessors, al-Ghazālī was an eminent mystic, sufi and original thinker. In the Muslim world he was the great bridge between traditionalism and mysticism, activism and intuitionism. From the days of his youth he possessed an intense thirst for knowledge which persuaded him to study every form of philosophy and religion and to question all whom he met with regard to the nature and significance of their belief. He discussed problems of understanding, value of knowledge, learning, instruction, efficiency and duty. The ruthless iconoclasm practised by al-Ghazālī in destroying the revered images of Greek Philosophy which then held sway over the mind of many Muslims and his efforts to bring about a reconciliation between mysticism and orthodoxy crowned him with the title of Ḥujjat al-Islam.

As for the problem of the origin of the world both al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā had maintained the Aristotelian position that the world was eternal. They conceived of matter as existing
though continually taking different forms. According to them God was the eternal creator, and He produced matter with forms. Similarly, time proceeded from Him. Their chief arguments were incorporated in al-Ghazālī's Maqāṣid in which he took much care first to understand their position and to represent them in a plausible manner.

The present work is a study of materials collected from the writings of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā with which the metaphysical section of al-Ghazālī's Maqāṣid may be compared. Maqāṣid al-Falāṣīfa or Muqaddamat Tahāfut al-Falāṣīfa as it is called, is a work in which al-Ghazālī briefly noted the principal views of the "philosophers" by whom he presumably means al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā. In this connection Professor W. Montgomery Watt states that "he first wrote an exposition of their philosophy without any criticism, Maqāṣid al-Falāṣīfa, which was much appreciated in Spain and the rest of Europe in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries".

(1) Prior to providing a refutation of the philosophers by making explicit the inconsistency and ambiguity of their doctrines al-Ghazālī deemed it necessary to present their system of ideas and beliefs, so that, these might be adequately known by other theologians. Thus he noted their essential views in Maqāṣid without distinguishing between what was right and wrong in them.
On the contrary he aimed at making the essentials of their philosophy understood without introducing what seemed irrelevant to this purpose.

Therefore, the main objective of his writing this book was to expound the primary views of al-Farābī and Ibn-Sīnā in a clear and concise way. Doctrines and principles of philosophy propounded by al-Farābī were not found at all well-arranged with definite itemization under proper headings. For this reason it is very difficult to derive comprehensive understanding of a particular subject from varied and uncertain source materials. Ibn-Sīnā, however, made an attempt to arrange his views methodically under a definite title, though indeed, more specific itemization was necessary. At times Ibn-Sīnā based his argument upon what al-Farābī had previously propounded. At other times he set out the latter's views in greater detail, and sometimes he argued with a new object in view. Al-Ghazālī, therefore, stated in this book their views by compressing their lengthy discussion without making any comment whatsoever. The chief merits of this in my opinion may be described in the following ways:

1. The Mağāsid incorporates certain hellenistic ideas that had been previously noticed in the philosophy of al-Farābī and Ibn-Sīnā.

2. It gives a clear and concise exposition by representing their views under adequate headings.
3. It helps to achieve maximum benefit from minimum labour through the reduction of time and difficulties in the apprehension of their elementary principles.

4. It serves as an introduction to the methodology such that we may discern how al-Ghazālī brought together the essentials of their philosophy from various writings without distorting their significance.

5. It assists in overcoming the difficulties of learning the trend of thought in early Eastern Philosophy and in determining the position of its masters not only in their period but also in the subsequent period of history.

I believe that the aim of the Maqāṣid is not only to interest scholars or an élite, but apparently also a wider circle of readers, and al-Ghazālī writes in such a way that the views should be perfectly intelligible to the general public. However, before we can accept this suggested view it is essential to venture upon a comprehensive study to discover how far this Maqāṣid is to be regarded as an abridged account of the views pertaining to al-Farābī and Ibn-Sīnā or whether it is something more. This investigation is particularly important because in many cases it is found that new things may come out of so-called pre-established dogmas and that
this "new knowledge" fits appropriately in the new setting. With this object in view I have endeavoured to discover in general terms the way in which al-Ghazālī's aims are worked out in his Maqāsid.

Of the three sections, Logic, Metaphysics and Physics, Metaphysics is vitally important, since certain aspects of Logic and Physics are treated by al-Ghazālī in this part. My investigation concentrates on the important parts of this metaphysical section. Thus what I have taken for investigation out of its five chapters are chapters I (four doctrines), II, III and V; and each of them is discussed in a separate chapter. This arrangement has been clearly indicated in the table of contents at the beginning of this work.

Similarly, intreating the contents of each chapter, I have concentrated on the main points in each. Furthermore, I have ignored his introductions to chapters (where applicable), his theological parts and epilogues.

Maqāsid al-Falāsifa edited by Dr. Sulaymān Dunyā, Cairo 1961 has been taken as a basis for my research. In different places in each chapter and section various captions frequently preceded by 'wa fī nuskha "..." ' have been noted.
When quoting al-Ghazālī's passages in this work these are found to be unnecessary and are not inserted.

As regards the collection of materials in the works of al-Fārubī and Ibn-Sīnā I am dependent upon the materials available to me at the moment. Arabic passages from them which after careful study have been found to correspond either directly or indirectly to al-Ghazālī's accounts are regarded as main sources. It would be extremely difficult to claim an exhaustive investigation into all relevant materials owing to the complexities inherent in the development of Islamic Philosophy over centuries and, consequently, the multifarious factors necessarily involved in research into sources. In reference to the problem of the general background of Islamic Philosophy Dr. R. Walzer has remarked: "Too many facts are still unknown, too many works have been neglected for centuries and remained unread and are only gradually being rediscovered in Eastern and Western libraries and edited and studied." (2)

There is still a possibility of new works of the Muslim philosophers being available from this or that source.

2. Walzer, Greek into Arabic ... 1
Their manuscripts are in such disorder that nobody can be sure of having a proper text unless he can spend much time in going through them very carefully for proper identification. In this connection Professor W. Montgomery Watt has rightly remarked:

"The consequence of these features of the material is that anyone who writes about Islamic philosophy and philosophers in a general way is taking a large risk. All kinds of things may happen which make his wider statements false. The text of a crucial passage may be proved to be erroneous; a new work by the author in question may be discovered; or a work supposed to be his may be shown to be by someone else. Thus most of the general statements about Islamic philosophy made at the present time must be regarded as in part provisional. The scholar, then, who would write about Islamic philosophy is in a dilemma. If he is very careful, he will hesitate to say anything at all. If he is concerned to try to meet the world's desire to know a little about Islamic philosophy, he will give some account, while knowing that what he says is based on inferior editions and does not refer to all the relevant passages." (3)

3. Watt, Philosophy ... xi
Keeping all these difficulties in mind I have made a serious attempt to engage in an intensive and extensive search for the component materials from the works of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā and to compare them with al-Ghazālī's accounts. Later on I have ventured upon an impartial judgement about the correspondence of al-Ghazālī's accounts with those of his two predecessors.

Strenuous efforts have been made to ensure that all the works by al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā, which are readily available for research, have been studied and quoted where necessary. Materials other than Arabic and Persian are noted in connection with the discussion.

After writing this Maqāṣid al-Ghazālī wrote *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa* where he selected twenty problems for investigation and exposed contradictions in varied philosophical theories. In this way he notices that there is not any purely intellectual basis for life. We have been driven back to the realm of faith and revelation, and all of our rational knowledge may accordingly be derived from these sources. He has smitten the philosophers hip and thigh, he
has turned as previously al-Ashʿarī did, their weapon against themselves and has pointed out that, with the premises which they postulated and the methods they adapted, no certain knowledge could ever be attained. His philosophic aim is to prove the insufficiency of reason as the real guide to truth. With this chief object in view he made an effort to achieve an universal criterion by invalidating the so-called conclusions of reason in the prevalent philosophical works. Most scholars agree that al-Ghazālī's Tahāfut al-Falāsifa rendered a death-blow to philosophy in the Muslim world.
CHAPTER ONE

METHODS AND TECHNIQUES.
Before I proceed to investigate the metaphysical section of al-Ghazālī's Ṭadāsī, I deem it necessary to describe the methods and techniques adapted throughout this research. It has seemed appropriate to devise a method involving four elements in order to assess findings and to arrive at definite characterization. This method consists in an initial indication of the precise limits of the subject-matter under consideration, the setting out in full of relevant primary sources, a comparative study of these sources, and, finally an assessment of the results obtained.

The application of these elements is uniformly maintained in all chapters. This uniformity of assessment throughout the research is regarded as a fundamental criterion. The ways in which it is effectively carried out are shown by grouping these elements under the following headings:-

1. Brief introduction
2. Analogous Views
3. Comparative study
4. Result
Each of these headings must now be discussed for purposes of clarification. In each discussion I shall be concerned with the implications of each element in relation to the investigation.

1. BRIEF INTRODUCTION.

Prior to taking up a particular chapter, the nature and disposition of the subject under consideration are stated. This statement deals with the topic merely in an elementary way.

An attempt is made to present the topic being discussed in the simplest possible manner and thereby prepare for the more detailed discussion that follows. This attempt is of necessity theoretical throughout. It implies a recourse to experience gained through observation and an endeavour to discover thereby the meaning and significance of the subject in hand.

This introduction is stated in close conformity with the text and dispenses with needless details. Considerable stress is laid upon important aspects of the discussion and care is taken to be as concise as possible when one is concerned with the divergent factors in each section.
With regard to the similar arguments which reappear frequently in the subsequent sections of the same chapter it is sufficient to indicate them only initially.

Areas of investigation concerning the collection of materials for al-Ghazālī's each chapter have been briefly indicated.

2. ANALOGOUS VIEWS.

Major themes in the metaphysical section of al-Ghazālī's Maqāṣid are stated in this work point by point and headed by a particular title under his name. Every context in which each theme is treated in Arabic is noted exhaustively here.

The works of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā have been carefully studied for metaphysical elements which may have provided the materials for al-Ghazālī's Metaphysical section. Whenever any part of their work has been found to be similar, much attention has been given to the selection of these portions which exhibit conformity
between the views of al-Ghazālī and those of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā. Subsequently, those Arabic or Persian passages (as the occasion arises) have been taken out and noted under the names of their authors.

The views of al-Fārābī are listed first and those of Ibn-Sīnā are listed next under each theme of Maqāsid. Where relevant views are not available either in the works of al-Fārābī or of Ibn-Sīnā with respect to a particular theme in Maqāsid, no material can be listed.

In certain cases themes in Maqāsid are found to be out of correspondence with the metaphysical views propounded by al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā. In these cases a vigorous search has been made beyond their metaphysical findings into their fields of Logic, Physics and Mathematics. Whenever any part of them appears to form a background for al-Ghazālī's collection of materials, it has been listed accordingly.

In addition to the Arabic and Persian materials
in the works of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā, references are also available in other languages, such as, French, German, English etc. These are considered as secondary sources and later on included in the comparative study. Furthermore, these passages have been quoted with double inverted commas ("...") in the original form.

At the conclusion of each theme a number is placed within brackets and is used for the identification of the relative sources. Then at the bottom of the page the names of texts and articles have been listed in abbreviated form together with the page numbers. Details of these abbreviations have been mentioned at the beginning of this work in the 'Table of Abbreviations'. But it may be noted that only the works which are frequently used and quoted have been included in this table. However, prior to the study of the texts indicated in this manner, care and precision have been given to a survey of numerous texts, and also articles in various journals dealing with the subjects in question, and these have been listed in the bibliography.
according to the alphabetical order.

In some of the sections the views of al-Farābī and Ibn-Sīnā are found to be more numerous. Under such circumstances, these are noted in numerical order.

Although themes in Maqāsid are stated in different ways, in certain cases it is observed that they appear to originate from a common source. When this is the case, references are quoted on the first occasion and then referred to in those that follow by the words: "compare the context of ... on the point no. ...".

At times dots (e.g. ...) are placed at the beginning or in the middle or at the conclusion of different quotations. When used either at the beginning or at the conclusion, they indicate that some other aspects of the quotation included may be considered as the occasion arises. However, the dots
used in the body of a passage indicate that certain aspects considered to be of minor importance are omitted.

3. COMPARATIVE STUDY.

Each of the titles of al-Ghazālī's accounts in the ANALOGOUS VIEWS is firstly stated with its accompanying number. Before the process of comparison accounts of al-Fārābī, Ibn-Sīnā and al-Ghazālī are discussed in sequence and their chief objects in view are clearly indicated. Whenever English materials are available as translations of the passages of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā, these have been noted with single inverted commas (e.g. ' ... ') and their sources have been indicated in abbreviated form at the bottom of the page as I have shown in the study of the ANALOGOUS VIEWS. Moreover, these are stated along with discussion. Whenever more than one account is available from either al-Fārābī or Ibn-Sīnā, the entire subject in question has been considered at some length but in a concise manner.
References from sources other than Arabic and Persian have been quoted at the end of the discussion of its author and put in the similar way of usual discussion but within double inverted commas (e.g. "...") and with a little space at the left side.

In this study while discussing each point I have maintained uniform forms of expression throughout. Thus I have generally begun with "Al-Fārābī propounds ...", "Ibn-Sīnā asserts ...", and "Al-Ghazālī states ...". This uniformity of expression though of minor importance, avoids confusion at the beginning of each point. Similarly, when more than one reference is available from al-Fārābī or Ibn-Sīnā, I have uniformly stated as: "such and such references are quoted from so and so". At the end of discussing each point I have shown in the same way: "Al-Ghazālī's accounts corresponds closely to ..." in the case of his direct agreement at some length with a philosopher; and "his account corresponds to
or is closer to " in the case of his partial or indirect agreement with a particular philosopher.

At the conclusion of the discussion the views which seem to correspond to those of al-Ghazālī have been clearly pointed out in a concise manner and the extent of correspondence has been indicated. Moreover, the areas in which direct and indirect correspondence are observed have also been shown. This process clearly establishes the criteria which al-Ghazālī is believed to follow.

During the course of discussion of these views, comments have also been made about the harmony or discord between the opinions of al-Farābī and Ibn-Sīnā with respect to a particular theme of al-Ghazālī.

Cases of repetition of views which have been initially noted and subsequently referred to are considered necessary to make the comparison as complete as possible. Although al-Ghazālī appears to summarise
certain views of al-Farābī and Ibn-Sīnā in his Maqāsid, some of his assertions are made repeatedly by him and their material is later found to have originated from the same source.

In the course of comparison, when disagreement between al-Farābī and Ibn-Sīnā has been observed, this has been assessed on the basis of the particular view held by al-Ghazālī.

Furthermore, certain minor, accessory themes have also been discovered in addition to the major themes in Maqāsid. However, considerable research has failed to locate their component sources. Those are primarily auxiliary aspects used in association with his important views and illustrated by concrete instances. The possibility that they may have originated from al-Ghazālī himself remains, although it may be still possible that they are derived from either al-Farābī or Ibn-Sīnā. While referring to these auxiliary views or instances, they are termed "additions" and thus presented in the transliterated form. Important Arabic technical
terms are shown in transliteration and noted with English equivalents. For this transliteration the table of the Muir Institute, University of Edinburgh, has been followed.

Throughout this study care has been taken to select passages from al-Farābī and Ibn-Sīnā from fields which appear to be analogous to those of al-Ghazālī.

While evaluating the standard of resemblances, both intrinsic and extrinsic, implications of views have been brought into consideration. Moreover, a constant uniformity is maintained throughout this process of comparison.

4. RESULT.

Al-Ghazālī's agreement with a particular philosopher has been clearly identified by means of numerals. In how many points his accounts appear to
correspond to or be closer to those of a particular philosopher have been indicated. Sometimes remarks have also been made about the form of his agreement with the views maintained by al-Farābī or Ibn-Sīnā.

Whenever al-Ghazālī's findings extend beyond metaphysical aspects, their references have been accordingly shown. Similarly, the "additions" which are marked out in the comparative study have been exhibited with their relative points.
CHAPTER TWO

PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE.
1. **BRIEF INTRODUCTION.**

This chapter deals with the problem of existence as taken from the first chapter of the Metaphysical section in Al-Ghazālī's *Maqāsid.*

He divides existence into substance and accident, and states that this division is based on the fact that man can realize the existence of a thing by means of his intelligence alone without requiring any definition or description.

He lists existences of things under two categories, one of which depends upon a place for its subsistence, and the other is not so dependent. Moreover, he divides the first category into two groups. The first occurs in a place which subsists in itself. The second occurs in a place in such a way that the essence of the place is constituted by it and that essence is subject to change owing to this occurrence.

He illustrates the concepts of definition, description, eternity, creation, accident, subject, matter and form. Moreover, he describes how form is treated as substance and substance is divided into four groups.
Lastly, he mentions by way of elaboration the controversy of theological sects and shows how opinion differs from one group of thinkers to that of another.

My investigation in this chapter is concerned with (a) the division of existence, (b) the significance of those concepts, (c) form as substance, and (d) classification of substances.
2. ANALOGOUS VIEWS.

AL - GHAZĀLĪ

I. DIVISION OF EXISTENCE.

الوجود ينقسم إلى
الجوهر والعرض - (1)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

ما لا يمكن أن لا يوجد هو
في جوهرة وطبيعته كذلك، وما يمكن
أن يوجد وأن لا يوجد هو أيضا في جوهرة
وطبيعته كذلك، فإن أنه لا يمكن أن يكون
ما لا يمكن أن لا يوجد صادرا وانما مازار
كذلك لا يجلي أن جوهرة وطبيعته غير
ذلك وعرض له أن صار كذلك، وكذلك
ما يمكن أن يوجد وأن لا يوجد - وابنات

I. Ghaz., Mag. ... I40
الوجودات ثلاثة: البريق من المادة والجسم السماوي والجسم الروحانية - (3)

**Ibn - Sīnā**

قد نقول ان الوجود لا يمكن
ان يشرح بغير الاسم لأنه مبدأ أول لكل
شرح فلا شرح له بل صورته تقوم في
نفس بلا توسط شكي وهو ينقسم نحواء
من القسمة الى جوهر وعرض - (3)

**Al - Ghazālī**

2. **DEFINITION.**

اما الحد فلذاته عبارة عن
الجمع بين الجنس و الفصل - (6)

2. Dunlop, *Fusūl* ... 147
3. IS., *Naj.* ... 200
4. Ghaz., *Mag.* ... 141
الحد كلي مركب يؤلف من جنس وفصل، كقولنا في الإنسان إنه حيوان ناطق - وإذا اتفقت في حدنا أن يكون فيه جنس وفصل أكثر من واحد كما في حد الحيوان إنه جسم متنفذ حساس، ينبغي أن تحلل أن الفصل المقوم لذلك النوع هو الفصل الأخير، وما قبل ذلك من الفصول المقرونة بالجنس حد لجنس ذلك النوع أحد حدود مكان اسمه - و ذلك الجنس، أما إن لا يكون له اسم تكون حد ذلك يجعل أيضا مكان اسمه، أو يكون له اسم فاخذ حدوده وترك اسمه - (5)

إبن طنح

الآخر قول دال على ماهية الشيء، ولا شك نفي أنه يكون مستندا على مقوماته اجتمعا، و يكون لا معالجة مركب من

5. Dunlop, "Eisagoge" ... 126
3. DESCRIPTION.

وأما الرسم، فهو عبارة عن تعريف السفيف بالواضح، ولا شيء أوضح من الوجود، وأعرف به الشيء، حتى بعرف الوجود به - (7)

AL - FARABI.

والرسم يؤلف من جنس و خاصة كقولنا في الإنسان إنه حيوان ضعاك، ومن الجنس وعرف أو أعراض كقولنا إنه حيوان كأنه وحيوان يبيع ويشترى - (8)

6. IS., Ish (0.M-I ) ... 56.
7. Ghaz., Mag. ... 141
8. Dunlop, "Eisagoge" ... 127
واما اذا عرف الشئ بقول
مؤلف من اعماجه وخواصه التي تخصه
جعلها بالاجتماع، فقد عرف ذلك الشئ
برسمه -
و اجود الرسم ما يوضح فيه
الجنس اولاً ليفيد ذات الشئ - مثاله ما
يقال للإنسان: أنه حيوان مشاه عين
قدميه، عريض الأذفار، ضحائك بالطبع - و
يقال للمثلث: إنه الشكل الذي له ثلاث
زوايا -
و يجيب ان يكون الرسم
بخاصيات و اعراض بينة للشيء، فان من عرف
المثلث بأنه الشكل الذي زواياه مثل
قائمتين لم يكن رسمه الا للمهندسين -

9. Is., Ish (0.M-I) ... 58
4. ETERNITY AND CREATION.

فان الحادث : عبارة عن موجود بعد عدم - والقديم : عبارة عن موجود غير مسبوق بعدم - (6).

IbN - SINA.

(1) يقال قديم للشيء اما بحسب الذات واما بحسب الزمان فالقديم بحسب الذات هو الذي ليس لذاته مبدأه هي به موجودة : والقديم بحسب الزمان هو الذي لا أول لزمانه - والمعدت ايا ما على وجهين - احدهما هو الذي لذاته مبدأه هي به موجودة - والاخر هو الذي لزمانه ابتداء وقد كان وقت لم يكن وكانت قبلية هو فيها معدوم وقد بطلت تلك القبلية - ومني ذلك كله أنه يوجد زمان هو فيه معدوم و ذلك لدن

Io. Ghaz., Nalq. ... I4I
كل ما لزمان وجوده بداية زمنية دون البداية الإبداعية فقد سبقه زمن وسبقته مادة قبل وجوده لأنه قد كان لدمالة معدوما. فاما ان يكون عدمه قبل وجوده او مع وجوده، والقسم الثاني مقال فبقى ان يكون معدوما قبل وجوده فلا يغلو اما ان يكون لوجوده قبل او لا يكون. فان لم يكن لوجوده قبل فلا يكن معدوما قبل وجوده وان كان لوجوده قبل فاما ان يكون ذلك القبل شيئًا معدوما او شيئًا موجودا فان كان شيئًا معدوما قلب يكين له قبل موجود كان فيه معدوما وايضا فان القبل المعدوم موجود مع وجوده فبقى ان القبل الذي كان له شيئ موجود وذلك الشئ الموجود ليس الان موجودا فهو شيئ قد مضى وكان موجودا - وانذاك إذا ماهية لذائه وهو الزمان واما ماهية لغيره وهو زمانه كتبته الزمان على كل حال ـ (41)}
الحادث بعد ما لم يكن له قبل لم يكن فيه: ليس كقبلية الواحد التي هي على الاثنين، التي قد يكون بها ما هو قبل وما هو بعد، معانى حصول الوجود. بل قبلية قبل لا تثبت مع البعد - مثل هذا ففيه أيضا تجدد بعدية بعد قبلية باطلة ؛ وليس تلك القبلية في نفس العدو، فقد يكون العدو بعد ولا ذات الفاعل، فقد يكون قبلا ومع، وبعد شيء آخر لا يزال فيه تجدد وتصرم على الانصال - (12).

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

5. ACCIDENT.

فمحتى (العربي) على هذا الاصطلاح، هو الذي يُطلق عليه (موضوع) - (13).

I2. IS., Ish (N.I-Th) ... 499
I3. Ghaz., Ḥag. ... I42
الكلييات ضرّان، ضرب يعرف من موضوعاتها كلها ذواتها، ولا يعرف من موضوع اصلا شيئًا خارجا عن ذاته، وهو كلي الجوهر، وضرب يعرف من موضوعاته له ذواتها ومن موضوعات أخرى شيئًا خارجة عن ذواتها، وهو كلي العرفان... و العرض بالجملة هو الذي يعرف من موضوع ما شيئًا خارجا عن ذاته - (14)

Ibn - Sīnā.

(14) و كل ذات قوامها في موضوع نهج عرض - (15)

(16) إن العرض هو الموجود في الموضوع فيكون الموضوع مقدما عليه و لا يمكن وجوده دون الموضوع - (16)

I4. Dunlop, "Categories" ... 169
I5. IS., Naj. ... 200
I6. IS., Arsh. ... 4
6. **SUBJECT.**

ومعنى (الموضوع) هو الذي يتقوم بنفسه، دون المعنى اكالله فيه. (17)

**AL - FĀRĀBĪ.**

و واستوطنيس بسمي المكمل الكلي الذي يعرف ذاخت الموضوع المقول على موضوعه، و الذي يعرف من موضوع شيئاً خارجاً عن ذاته المقول في موضوع. فتكون الأشياء منها ما هو على موضوع لا شيء موضوع اصلأ، وهو كلي الوجوه، ومنها ما هو على موضوع وهو في موضوع ما، وهو كلي العرض، ومنها ما هو في موضوع لا على موضوع اصلأ، وهو شخص العرض، و

I7. Ghaz., Mag. ... I42
منها ما ليس هو في موضوع ولا على موضوع
بأصل، وهو شخص الجوهر - (16) 

IBN - SĪNĀ.

(زا) و الموضوع بالحقيقة ...
قائم بنفسه - ...
و اى الموضوع يعني بما
صار بنفسه و نوعيته قائمًا، ثم صار سببا
لا يقوم به شيئ فيه ليس كجزء منه ...
وكان الموضوع ما يكون فيه انشئ، و ليس
كجزء منه - (16)

(زى) ثم إذا كان المخل مستغنبا
في قوامه عن الحال فيه فانما نسميه
 موضوعا له - (18)

18. Dunlop, "Categories" ... I69
19. IS., Shīfāʾ ... I89
20. IS., Naj. ... 200
MATTER AND FORM.

...
في السربر وهو تربيعة أو تدويرها أو غير ذلك - فالمادة هي بالقوة سربر و بالصورتة تصير سربرا بالفعل - (22)

(21)

وكل واحد من هذه قوامه

من تشغيله اجدهما منزلته منزلته خشب السربر والاخر منزلته منزلته خلقية السربر

ثما منزلته الخشب هو المادة والهيولي وما منزلته خلقته هو الصورة والهييئة و

ما جانس هذين من اللاشيئ - (23)

(22)

والصوررة هي تي الجسر الجوهر

لاجسياني مثل شكل السربر في السربر و

المادة مثل خشب السربر - فالصوررة هي التي

بها يصير الجوهر المنتجسي جوهرا بالفعل و

المادة هي التي بها يكون جوهرا بالقوة - فإن

السربر هو سربر بالقوة من جهة ما هو خشب

و يشير سربرا بالفعل مني حصل شكله في

الخشب - (24)

22. Dunlop, Fuṣūl ... 105
23. Diet., Must. (Text) ... 20
24. Far., Siyasa ... 36
Ibn - Sīnā.

Then if a thing is the medium, it cannot
be proper to anything unless its proper
be proper to something else. And this is
the case with the body. For if the body
is proper to a soul, then the soul is
proper to the body. And this is in
contradiction with what we have seen.
(25)

Al - Ghazālī.

3. **Form is Substance.**

What is the substance is the form.
And what is the form is the substance.
Thus the form of the body is not
present in the body, and the body is
not present in the form.
(26)

25. IS., Naj. ... 200
26. Ghaz., Nag. ... I43
Ibn-Sīnā.

فتبين أن بعض ما في المدخل ليس في موضوع - واما ائتباث هذا الشيء الذي في محل دون موضوع - فذلك علينا إلى قريب -
و اذا ائتباثا - نهو الشيء الذي يخصه في مثل هذا الموضوع بسما الصورة -
وان كما قد نقول لغيره ايضادصورة باشتراك
الاسم - و اذا كان الموجود لا في موضوع هو
المسمى جوهراء، فالصورته ايباض الجوهر - (27)

Al-Ghazālī.

9. CLASSIFICATION OF SUBSTANCES.

فانقسام الجوهر إلى أربعة
أنواع: الهيولوجي، الصورى، والاجسمي، والعقل
المفارق - وهو القائم بنفسه -

27. Is., Shifa’ ... I89
وكل جسِّمٍ جَواهر الثلاثة
الأولِ، موجودة فيه، فالجُواهر مُضلاً جسمًا
مركب من صورة المائعة، ومَن الهيولي
الحاملة للأمور: (12)

Ibn - Sīnā.

فأولى الأشياء بالوجود هي
الجَواهر ثم الاعراض و الجَواهر التي ليست
بإجسامةً أولى الجَواهر بالوجود الآخر الهيولي لأن
هذه الجَواهر الثلاثة - هيولي وصورة ومفارقة
لا جسَم ولا جزء جسِّم ولا بد من وجوده لأن
الجسَم واجزاءه معلولة وابنته إلى جُوهر هو
عملة غير مقارنة بل مقارنة البينة - فأول الموجودات
في استحثاث الوجود الجَواهر المفارقة الغير
المجسم في الصورة في الجَوهر في الهيولي - وهي
و إن كانت سبباً للجُوهر فإنها ليست بسبب يعطي
الوجود بل هي معل لنبيل الوجود - (29)

28. Ghaz., Nag. ... 143
29. IS., Naj. ... 208
3. COMPARATIVE STUDY.

1. DIVISION OF EXISTENCE.

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that 'What cannot not exist is so in its essence and nature, and what can exist and not exist is also so in its essence and nature. For it is impossible that what cannot not exist should come into existence and only becomes so because its essence and nature are otherwise and it is an accident that it becomes so, and similarly what can exist and not exist. The kinds of existents are three: (a) the creation from matter; (b) the heavenly bodies; (c) the spiritual bodies.' (1)

Ibn-Sīnā asserts that existence cannot be explained without a name; because it is a fundamental principle (mabda') for every explanation. Thus it has no explanation, rather its form (ṣūra) subsists in mind without the mediation of anything else. And 'All existing beings can be seen 'in a manner of division into substance and accident'.' (2)

1. Dunlop, Fugül ... 58
2. Afnan ... 109
In this connection Dr. D. Saliba says:

"D'aucuns ont dit que la réalité de l'être et son fondement, c'est d'être agent ou agi, et ils ont cru par là donner une définition de l'être. Mais nous savons que l'idée d'être est antérieure à celles d'agent ou d'agi qui ne peuvent être acquises que par la déduction. Donc la représentation de l'être est première.

L'être se subdivise en substance et en accidents." (3)

Al-Ghazālī states that existence may be divided into substance (jawhar) and accident (farad).

In this respect al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of Ibn-Sīnā. The views of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā in relation to the account of al-Ghazālī have been found to be on dissimilar lines; because al-Fārābī deals with the problem of existence and asserts that whatever exists or does not exist is so because of its essence and nature; whereas Ibn-Sīnā discusses the criterion of existence and its division into substance and accident. Al-Ghazālī's account corresponds fully with this.

3. Saliba, Êtude ... 65
2. DEFINITION.

Al-Farābī propounds the view that 'The definition is a compound universal made up of genus and differentia as when we say of man that he is a rational animal. When it happens in a particular definition that there are in it a genus and more than one differentiae, as in the definition of animal as 'a body taking nourishment, sentient', you must know that the differentia which constitutes that species is the last, and the preceding differentiae joined to the genus are a definition of the genus of that species, whose definition was taken in place of its name. That genus either has not a name, and its definition also is put in place of its name, or it has a name, and its definition is taken and its name left'. (4)

Ibn-Sīnā does not fundamentally differ from al-Farābī. He asserts that definition (hadd) is an [explicit] statement which indicates the connotation of a thing. Indeed, it includes all essential qualities of the thing and is composed of genus (jins) and differentia (faṣl); for its common qualities by which it is constituted are its genus, while the particular

4. Dunlop, "Eisagoge" ... 136
quality is its differentia.

Al-Ghazālī states that definition consists in the comprosome of genus and differentia.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that definition is composed of genus and differentia. Moreover Ibn-Sīnā clarifies the nature of definition and relation of genus and differentia to it. Al-Ghazālī's account appears to be closer to this.

3. DESCRIPTION.

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that 'The description is made up of genus and property, as when we say that man is a laughing animal, and of genus and accident, or accidents, as when we say that he is an animal which writes and an animal which buys and sells.' (5)

5. Dunlop, "Eisagoge" ... 137
Ibn-Sīnā does not fundamentally differ from al-Fārābī. He asserts that whenever a thing is characterized by a statement consisting of genus, property (khāṣṣa) and accident the totality of which ascertains the reality of a thing, it is known as description (rasm). The best description is the one in which genus is placed at the beginning to indicate the essence of a thing. For example, a man may be described as an animal that walks on two feet and has broad fingernails and a laughing nature; and a triangle may be described as a figure which has three angles. Ibn-Sīnā further adds that the description should be characterized by properties and accidents distinct from the thing. In this respect whoever characterizes a triangle as a figure whose three angles are equal to two right angles, cannot describe it to anyone except a geometrician.

Al-Ghazālī states that description consists in characterizing the latent qualities in terms of what is evident. Nothing can be more evident, comprehensible and manifest for its proper characterization than the existence of a thing, so that, its existence characterizes it. Here he apparently uses
"... taʿrif al-khaṭṭī bi l-wadhiḥ ..." in place of genus, property and accident which have previously been used by both al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that description consists in characterizing a thing by genus, differentia and accident. Moreover, Ibn-Sīnā illustrates the nature and functions of these terms with examples. Al-Ghazālī's account appears to correspond indirectly to this. On the other hand, his use of "... taʿrif al-khaṭṭī bi l-wadhiḥ ..." seems to be an "addition".

4. ETERNITY AND CREATION.

Two references are quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. He asserts that 'A thing may be eternal according to essence, or it may be eternal with respect to time. According to the former it is 'that whose essence has no origin from which it exists'; and with respect to the latter 'it is that for whose age there was no beginning'. And the word 'created' also has two distinct
meanings that should not be **confounded**. In one sense 'it is that for whose essence there was an origin by which it exists'; and in the other 'it is that for the age of which there was a beginning, and there was a time when it did not exist. A prior-period (qabliyya) during which it was non-existent, and that prior period was terminated'. Hence there is a notion of time involved in the whole matter. Let us follow this argument. Everything that had for its existence a temporal beginning aside from a creative beginning, must have been preceded by time and matter; and previous to that was altogether non-existent. Its non-existence could not have been together with its existence. It must have been earlier, **which means that there was a period prior to its existence which has expired and is no more. And what constitutes that period is 'either a quiddity to itself' which in this case is time, 'or a quiddity to something other than itself, which is its time'. In both cases it is a proof of the existence of time'.

(5)

Creation after no previous existence is not analogous to

5. Af'nan ... 127
the priority of a thing where two meanings are involved, one concerning what is prior and the other what is posterior. For a thing which is prior cannot be established with what is posterior. "To be created everything must needs have been a possible being in itself; and it has been stated that the possibility of being is the potentiality of being. It does not depend on the ability or inability of the agent to create. The two things are entirely distinct, and the agent cannot create unless the thing is in itself possible. Now the notion of the possibility of being can exist only in relation to what is possible to it. It is not a substance in itself, it is a notion present in a subject and an accident to it.

... 'Creation means nothing except existence after non-existence'. The non-existence of the thing is not a condition, it is just an attribute and an accident. And after coming into existence, it becomes either a necessary or a not-necessary being. So a thing in so far as its existence is said to have been from non-existence, need not have a cause in itself". (6)

6. Afnan ... 127
Al-Ghazālī states that the created (ḥādith) thing consists of existence after non-existence and the eternal (qadīm) thing consists of existence not preceded by non-existence.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā asserts that 'creation means nothing except existence after non-existence', and eternity consists of 'that whose essence has no origin from which it exists' and 'it is that for whose age there was no beginning'. He illustrates this view in greater detail with examples. Al-Ghazālī's short account corresponds fully with this.

5. ACCIDENT.

Al-Farābī propounds the view that 'The universals are of two kinds. One kind affords knowledge of the essences of all its subjects, and affords no knowledge outside its essence of any subject. It is the universal of the substance. The other kind affords knowledge of the essences of some of its subjects and of other subjects things outside their essences. It is the universal of the accident.'
The accident in general is that which affords knowledge of something outside the essence of a particular subject'. (7)

Two references are quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. He asserts that every essence whose subsistence is in a subject (mawdūʿ) is called accident. 'An accident is a being in a locus. The locus is precedent to it and its being is not possible without the locus'. (8) In the connection Dr. S. Saliba says:

"L'accident est, au contraire, ce qui est dans un sujet". (9)

Al-Ghazālī states that accident is that which occurs in a subject. It is incapable of subsisting in itself and as such it depends upon a subject for its subsistence.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of Ibn-Sīnā. The views of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā seem

7. Dunlop, "Categories"...183
8. Arberry ... 28
9. Saliba, Étude ... 65
to have concerned two different approaches. For al-Fārābī divides universals into (a) that which affords knowledge of the essences of all its subjects, and (b) that which affords knowledge of the essences of some of its subjects and of other subjects outside their essences. In respect of this second kind al-Fārābī brings in that the accident affords knowledge of something outside the essence of a subject. On the other hand, Ibn-Sīnā asserts that accident consists of every essence whose subsistence lies in a subject, that is to say, the subject precedes it. Al-Ghazālī's short account corresponds fully with this.

6. **SUBJECT**

Al-Fārābī refers to the view that 'Aristotle calls the universal predicate which affords knowledge of the essence of the subject what is said of its subject, and that which affords knowledge of anything outside the essence of a subject what is said to be in a subject. Some things are of a subject, not in any subject, viz. the universal of the substance. Some are both of and in a subject, viz. the
universal of the accident. Others are in a subject, not of any subject, viz. the individual of the accident. Others again are neither in nor of any subject, viz. the individual of the substance'. (10)

Two references are quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. He asserts that subject in reality subsists by itself. It may refer to a place which is independent of its subsistence. Furthermore, it may be a cause by which something in it which is not a part of it becomes subsistent with it. Therefore, subject is what contains the thing and not as a part of it. It has an independent subsistence of its own on the one hand and by its species on the other.

Al-Ghazālī states that subject subsists by itself apart from the abstract form inhering in it.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of Ibn-Sīnā. The views of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā appear to be based upon dissimilar stand-points; because

10. Dunlop, "Categories" .. 184
al-Fārābī uses the term 'subject' in connection with predicate which is mostly concerned with relational proposition, where subject loses its independent being apart from the predicate, for the total relation requires both these concepts. On the other hand, Ibn-Sīnā's subject manifests itself without any support whatsoever. It is concerned with a position which is capable of independently subsisting on the one hand and of becoming a cause for something else on the other. Al-Ghazālī's short account appears to correspond fully with this.

7. **MATTER AND FORM**

Three references are quoted from al-Fārābī. He propounds the view that 'Physical objects are either artificial or natural. Examples of the artificial are a couch, a sword, glass and the like. Examples of the natural are man and the other animals. Each is made up of two things, matter and form. The matter is, for example, the wood of a chair, and the form is, for example, the shape of the chair, i.e. its squareness, roundness, etc. The matter is
potentially a chair, and by the form it becomes a chair actually'. (11) Al-Farābī further asserts that the subsistence of each of them requires two things: one is the position corresponding to the wood in the chair; and the other is the position corresponding to that of the making of the chair. Here the position of the wood is the matter (maddā), and the position of the making is the form.

Ibn-Sīnā does not basically differ from al-Farābī. He asserts that whenever a place cannot be independent of subsistence, we do not call it a subject, rather we term it 'matter (hayūla)' instead. On the other hand, a thing may exist in a place and be a substance along with it: if the proximate place where it exists becomes subsistent with the substance, it does not subsist with its essence; thereupon it has a subsistence which we call form. In this connection S. H. Nasr says:

"Form according to Ibn-Sīnā, is "the quality or quiddity (mahīyah) by which a body (jism) is what

11. Dunlop, Fugul ... 28
it is," whereas matter "is that which supports (hamil) the quality or form". Matter can only exist by the form imparted to it by the Intellect; without form it would be pure receptivity deprived of being. That is why prime matter cannot be found by itself. Moreover, "matter is [created] for form and its purpose is to have form imposed upon it, but form is not [created] for matter". (12)

Al-Ghazālī states as regards man that what pursues the course of humanity is called form and its place is termed matter. Wood, for example, is a subject for the form of chair and matter for the form of ashes. For it remains as wood when it assumes the form of chair, but loses its being with the form of ashes.

Here al-Ghazālī's account involves two aspects, one dealing with the nature of form and matter, and the other comprising examples. Now with respect to the first aspect al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā, and with respect to his second aspect, his account corresponds closely to that of al-Fārābī. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī

12. Nasr, Cosmological Doctrines .... 218
in that a thing manifests itself in a place and with a form. Moreover, Ibn-Sīnā asserts that if a place is not independent of its subsistence, we sometimes call it matter; and form is a quality by which a body is what it is. If the place subsists with the reality of a thing, it manifests itself through form. The first aspect of al-Ghazālī's account appears to be closer to this. In this respect Ibn-Sīnā's use of maball may be compared to al-Fārābī's mansila. On the other hand, al-Fārābī uses the examples of khashab and sarīr in order to demonstrate his views on matter and form. The second aspect of al-Ghazālī's account corresponds fully with these.

8. **FORM IS SUBSTANCE.**

Ibn-Sīnā asserts that something can exist in a place apart from its being in a subject. He describes it as form and demonstrates it to be substance as well. For an existent which is not in a subject is called substance. Here his argument is based on giving prominence to form. "Yet in the scale of existence form is superior to matter. It is more
real. Bodily matter cannot divest itself of material form and so remain separate. Its very existence is that of one disposed to receive, just as that of an accident is an existence disposed to be received. Form is what gives unity to a portion of matter, and form is dependent upon disposition. Under Platonic rather than Aristotelian influence Avicenna may be thought to give to form a superior reality which is somewhat degraded when united with matter. Thus in his view intelligible reality is superior to sensible reality." (13)

Al-Ghazālī states that form is called substance, because substance consists of every existent which is not in a subject, while form is not in a subject.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā asserts that there is something which exists in a place without being in a subject, and he calls it form and considers it to be substance; for an existent which is not in a subject is termed substance. Al-Ghazālī's account corresponds fully with this. Moreover,
he arranges Ibn-Sīnā's view in the order of syllogism; and we may demonstrate its various forms in the following ways in order to test the validity of the reasoning:—

1. All substance is that which consists of every existent not in a subject.

   All form is that which consists of every existent not in a subject.

   ∴ All form is substance.

2. All substance consisting of every existent is not in a subject.

   All form is substance.

   ∴ All form is not in a subject.

3. All substance consisting of every existent is not in a subject.

   All form is not in a subject.

   ∴ [No conclusion].

4. All existent which is not in a subject is substance.

   All form is the existent which is not in a subject.

   ∴ All form is substance.
In the first form of syllogism 'which consists of every existent not in a subject' is the Middle term; and as predicate in both the premises it remains undistributed. Hence the conclusion involves a fallacy which is technically known as the Fallacy of Undistributed Middle.

On the other hand, if 'that which consists of every existent' is omitted from the Minor premise, then it would be a negative proposition. Consequently, the conclusion would be negative and therewith negate the affirmative conclusion. Thus this method also is defective.

In the second form the syllogism appears to be valid in the form of 'CELARENT'. But the main fallacy lies with the transfer of the given conclusion to the Minor premise, since 'All form is substance' is al-Ghazālī's conclusion. However, it has been taken here in the Minor premise for which it is basically wrong.

In the third form both the Major and Minor premises are in negative forms. Thus according to the syllogistic rules no conclusion can be inferred from two negative premises. Therefore, the affirmative conclusion
'All form is substance' cannot be proved.

In the fourth form the Middle term 'existent which is not in a subject' in both of the premises suffers from ambiguity and involves the Fallacy of Ambiguous Middle.

It follows, therefore, that all these forms of syllogistic reasoning lack material validity. However, al-Ghazālī simply states Ibn-Sīnā's view in a methodical way without pointing out any inconsistency whatsoever.

9. **CLASSIFICATION OF SUBSTANCES.**

Ibn-Sīnā asserts that the primary things in existence are substances. The next grade of being is concerned with accidental things. The substances which do not have bodies in existence, pertain to the primary substances with the exception of the grade of matter. These substances are of three kinds, viz. matter, form and separate substance which is neither a body nor a part of it. For body and its parts are caused, and ultimately imply
substance which is cause. Thus he arranges the order of existents in the following way:

1. Separate incorporeal substance
2. Form
3. Body
4. Matter

Although they may be a cause of body, they are incapable of providing the existence of things; rather each of them is a place for the attainment of existence. In this connection Dr. D. Saliba says:

"La première substance qui ait droit à l'existence, c'est la substance séparée; la seconde, c'est la forme; la troisième, c'est le corps; et enfin, la quatrième, c'est la matière. Il est vrai que le corps est composé de matière et de forme qui sont ses causes; or, comme la cause est antérieure à l'effet, la matière qui est une cause par rapport au corps doit précéder en quelque sorte le corps. Mais on peut répondre à ceci que la matière n'est pas la cause de l'existence du corps."
Non seulement la matière n'est pas cause de l'existence et à ce titre est dénuée de tout effet actuel, mais son rôle est réduit à celui d'un simple réceptacle. La matière n'est pas la cause de l'existence du corps, elle est simplement le lieu qui reçoit l'existence. La preuve en est, qu'elle n'existe que par la forme qui compose avec elle l'individualité du corps. La matière est donc quelque chose d'inférieur en degré, dans l'échelle ontologique, non pas seulement à la forme, mais au composé de matière et de forme; à savoir, le corps." (14)

Furthermore, in connection with the order of substances S.H. Nasr remarks:

"The separate substances themselves form the first class in the list of beings which "have a right to exist," that is, which possess a rank in the hierarchy of Being. The order of this scale may be given as follows:

1. Separate substances
2. Form
3. Body

14. Saliba, *Ètude* ... 68
As the separate substances, or angels, stand highest in this scale, matter stands lowest in the hierarchy and possesses an inferior degree of reality with respect to form, contrary to the view of Aristotle." (15)

Al-Ghazālī divides the substance into four groups, viz. matter, form, body and separate intelligence. Each body consists of the first three of the above substances. Water, he states, is a body composed of the form of a liquid thing, and matter is a support of it.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā classifies substances into four kinds and al-Ghazālī's account of division corresponds fully with this. But it has been observed that al-Ghazālī changes Ibn-Sīnā's order of substances and places matter first, form second, body third and separate intelligence fourth. Moreover, he gives the definite name of 'separate intelligence' to that which Ibn-Sīnā called 'separate incorporeal substance (al- jawhar al-mufāraq al- ghayr al-mujassam)'. This Ibn-Sīnā defined as a separate substance which is neither a body nor a part of it, and to this

15. Nasr, Cosmological Doctrines ... 200
indefinite character al-Ghazālī clearly ascribes a definite name. Furthermore, al-Ghazālī introduces the example of water in connection with this classification of substances and describes it as a kind of body. Thus his instance of "Fa l- mā', mathalan, jism murakkab min: sūrat al-mā'iya, wa min al-hayūlā al-hamila li s-sūra" appears to be an "addition".

4. RESULT.

Al-Ghazālī's accounts correspond to those of Ibn-Sīnā in all points considered in this chapter. But with respect to examples his account corresponds to that of al-Fārābī in point no.7.

In addition to his materials available in Metaphysics, al-Ghazālī depends upon both of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā in their Logic in points 2 and 3. Moreover, some "additions" have been observed in points 3 and 9.
CHAPTER THREE

DOCTRINE OF THE REALITY OF BODY.
1. **BRIEF INTRODUCTION.**

In this chapter al-Ghazālī deals with the doctrine of the reality of body, and ascertains its nature by geometrical methods. Body, he states, is substance in respect to which three dimensions can be postulated to have intersected at right angles, and more than three cannot be so ascribed.

He discusses the nature and prerequisite of right angles and their relation to acute and obtuse angles.

He demonstrates the absurdity of defining body as a long, wide and deep thing for the reason that a thing may be characterized as a body not because of its length, width and depth; but it would be so described in respect of the content indicated by these three-fold dimensions.

He illustrates how dimensions can simply be regarded as transitory phenomena, whereas the corporeal form remains unalterable. In this connection he shows that dimensions
existing in the body are accidental phenomena which may, of course, be necessary and inseparable.

Therefore, the primary essential of body is corporeal form, and it may accept a postulate of dimensions which is not the actual existence of them, but concerns the dimensions which are actually present as accident.

My investigation is concerned with the collection of materials relevant to al-Ghazālī's four fundamental points in this chapter; namely, (a) body has three dimensions, (b) nature of angles, (c) nature of body and (d) corporeal form is the essential of body.
2. ANALOGOUS VIEWS.

AL-GHAZALI.

I. BODY HAS THREE DIMENSIONS.

فجسُجُ رُكَّبَ جَوهرٍ يُمْكِن
أن يُفْرَضُ فِيهِ ثَلَاثَةٌ امتدادات متقاطعة
على زوايا قائمة...

ول لا يوجد شيء ينقسم من
ثلاث جهات الا الجسم، فكل ما يمكن أن
يفرض بالرغم فيه ثلاث امتدادات
متقاطعة، على زوايا قائمة، فهو الجسم.

و إنها خصصنا الزوايا
بالقائمة؛ لأن ذلك ان
لم يشترط كل جسم يُمْكِن
ان يُفْرَضُ فيه امتدادات
كثيراً متقاطعةً، لا على
زوايا قائمة مثل هذا.
فاذًا فرضت النوايا قائمة،
لم تزدهر الثلاثة: وهو الطول،
والعرض، والعمق - (1)

AL-FARABI.

... إننا لا نعرف حقيقة
الجوهر بل إننا نعرف شيئًا له هذه
الخاصة وهو إنه الموجود لا نفي
موضوع وهذا ليس حقيقته، و لا
نعرف حقيقة الجسم بل نعرف
شيئًا له هذه الخواص وهي الطول
و العرض والعمق - (2)
 입

8.  (

ز) إن الجسيم هو الوجه الذي
يمكنك أن تفرض فيه بعداً كيف شئت ابتداءً
فيكون ذلك المبتداً هو الطول، ثم يمكنك
ان تفرض أيضاً بعداً آخر مقاطعاً لدلك البعد
على قواطع. فتكون ذلك الاعد الثاني هو
العرض، ويمكنك ان تفرض فيه بعداً ثالثاً
مقاطعاً لهذين البددين على قواطع ثلثين
الثالثة على وضع واحد، ولا يمكنك ان
تفرض بعداً عمودياً بهذه الصفة غير هذه
الثالثة - (3)

(2) إنما هو جسم لذانه بحسب
يجب أن يفرض فيه ابتدال ثلثين كل واحد
منها تأثير على الآخر ولا يمكن أن تكون فرق
ثلثين فلذي يفرض أو لا هو الطول والقائمة
على لما الحرض والقائمة عليهما في الحد
المتشارك هو العميق وليس بيمن غيره - (4)

3. 'Ilah (1) ... 63
4. IS., Naj. ... 201
2. **NATURE OF ANGLES.**

الزاوية القائمة هي التي
تُحصل بقيام خط منتصب على وسط آخر بحيث
لا يميل إلى أحد الجانبين،
و بحيث تتساوي الزاويتان
الحاصلتان من الجانبين؟
فماذا نستولي عليها?
كل واحدة قائمة، مثل
هذا.

فاذًا ميل به إلى جانب اليمين
مثلًا مثل هذا.
صارت الزاوية من
الجانب الذي اليمين
الميل اضيق من مقابلتها، تسمى راحة) و تسمى
الواحدة المقابلة (منفرجة) - (5).

5. Ghaz., Nag. ... 145
(زا) و إذا قام خط على خط نصير الزاويتين اللتين عن جانبيه متساويتين فالقائم عمود على الآخر وزاوية كل واحدة منهما قائمة، والمنفرجة زاويتهما أعظم من القائمة، والحايدة أصغر من القائمة. (6)

(زا) والزاوية القائمة هي التي تحدث من تقاطع بعد قائم على بعد ليس ميله إلى أحد الاجهتين أكثر من ميله إلى الآخر. فهذا معنى كون الجسم ذا اقتار ثلاثية. (7)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

3. NATURE OF BODY.

وقد تبلي طي الحد الجسمى، الله

6. IS, Shīrāzī, ... I
7. IS, Naj. ... 98
الطويل، العريض، العميق. وهذا فيه نوع
الساهل، فإن الجسم ليس جسمًا باعتبار ما فيه
من الطول والعرض والعمق، بالفعل، بل
باعتبار قبوله للطول والعرض والعمق، وم
الإبعاد الثلاثة. بدليل أنك لو أخذت شمعة
مشكلتها بطول شبر، وعرض اصبعين، وسمك
إصبغ واحد، فهي جسم، لا لب فيه من الطول
والعرض، إذ لو جعلته مستديرة أو على شكل
آخر، زال ذلك الامتداد المعين، وذلك
الطول المعين، وحدث امتداداً أخرى
بدلاً عنهما، فالصور الجسمية لم تتبدل
أصلاً.

فاذن المقدادير الموجودة في
الجسم، إعرابًا خارجًا عن ذات الجسمية، و
قد تكون لأزمة لا تفارق، كشكل السماء،
و لكن العرض قد يكون للأزمة، وكذا العرض,
كالسود للحبش - (8).

8. Ghaz., Mag. ... I45
فهكذا يجبر أن يعرف الجسم،
وهو أنه الجوهير الذي كذا صورته، و هو بها هوما هو، لم سائر الأبعاد المفروضة فيه بين نهاياته و نهاياته أيضا واشكاله و اوضاعه. إصور ليست مفروسة له، بل هي تابعة لجوهرة - و ربما لزم بعض الأجسام شئ منها أو كلها، و ربما لم يلزم بعض الأجسام شئ منها أو بعضها -

و لوانك اخذت شمعة
菲尔قها بشكل افترض لها المفعول بالفعل بين تلك النهايات محدودة مقدرة محدودة، ثم
AL-GHAZÂLÎ.

4. **CORPOREAL FORM IS THE ESSENTIAL OF BODY.**

كاذن الذاتى للجسم الذي هو الصورة الجسمية، كونه بحيث يقبل

9. **IS, Ilah (I)** ... 63
10. **IS, Ñaj.** ... 202
شرط الامتدادات، لا يوجد الامتدادات بالفعل، بل المقدار الحاصل بالفعل عرض، ولذلك يجوز أن يقبل جسم واحد مقدارا أكبر وامفر، فيكمبر مرة ويصغر أخرى من غير زيادة من خارج 36 بل في نفسه، من حيث ان المقدار عرض فيه - وليس بحفر المقدار منعين له لذانه ويدل على كون المقدار غير حقيقة الجسم إن الأجسام متساوية في الصورة الجسمية لا يتصور بينها فرق، وهي مختلفة في المقدادر لا مكالمة - (1ا)

AL- FĀRĀBĪ.

وقال: الصورة الجسمية و هو بعد المقوم للجسم الطبيعي ليس قوامه بالمحسوسات فتكون محسوسة بل هي مبدأ المحسوسات فهي عارضة للموجود بما هو موجود وكل ما يكون داخلنا نعلوم كثيرة

II. Ghaz., Mag. ... I46
كالوحدة والكثرة وغيرهما فإنهم يدخلان في الطبيعيات والتعليميات وغيرهما - (1)

ِIِبِنِ سِنَامَ.

فلاجسمية بالحقيقة صورة

الاتصال القابل لما قلناه من فرض الأبعاد الثلاثة -

وهذا المعنى غير المقدار وغير الجسمية

التعليمية - فان هذا الجسم من حيث له

هذه الصورة لا يخفف جسما أخرى بأنه أكبر أو

أصغر، ولا يناسبه بأنه مساو أو معدود به

وعاد له أو مشترك أو مبادئ، وإنما ذلك له

من حيث هو مقدر ومن حيث جزء منه

يعده - وهذا الاعتبار له غير اعتبار الجسمية

التي ذكرناها - ...

أصورة الجسمية من حيث

هي صورة الجسمية محتفظة إلى مادة، ولأن

طبيعة الأصورة الجسمية في نفسها من حيث هي

12. Far., Tal. ... 25
صورة جسمية لا تختلف - فإنها طبيعة واحدة
بسيطة - ليس يجوز أن تتكون فصول تدخل
عليها بما هي جسمية - فإن دخالتها فصول تكون
أموراً تضاف إليها من خارج - وتكون أيضاً إحدى
الصور المقارنة للمادة - ولا يكون حكمها معها
حكم الفصول الحقيقية - ...

و أما صورة الجسمية من حيث
هي جسمية فهي طبيعة واحدة بسيطة محصلة
للاختلاف فيها - ولا تختلف مجرد صورة
جسمية لمجرد صورة جسمية بفصل داخل في
الجسمية - وما يلحقها انتهاك يلحقها على انها
شي خارج من طبيعتها - (13)

(13) - وأما الصورة الجسمية فلا ننها
إما أن تكون نفس الاتصال و تكون طبيعة بيلزها
الاتصال حتى لا يوجد هي إلا الاتصال لزمن لها.
فإن كانت نفس الاتصال فقد يكون الجسم متصلاً
13. IS., Ilah (I) ... 64
لا ينفصل فيكون هناك للمحالة شيء هو بالقوة كلاهما خلّيس ذات الاتصال بما هو اتصال قابل للانفصال لان قابل الاتصال لا ينفصل عند الاتصال والاتصال يعد عند الانفصال فاذا شيء غير الاتصال هو قابل للانفصال وهو بعضه قابل الاتصال فليس الاتصال هو بالقوة قابل للانفصال - ولا أيضاً طبيعة بلزمها الاتصال لذا منها - خواص ان همها جوهرها غير الصورة الجسمية وهو الذي يعرض له الاتصال والاتصال معه هو مقارن للصورة الجسمية وهو الذي يقبل الاتصال بصورة الجسمية فيصير جسم واحد بما يقوم به بلزمهما من الاتصال الجسماني - (14)
Al-Farabi begins by referring to the opinion that we cannot have any knowledge of the reality of a thing except through properties, accessories and accidents. In this connection he mentions as an example that we do not know the reality of substance. On the contrary, we are only capable of knowing a thing through its property (khassa) which does not exist independently in a substratum, that is to say, it is not its reality. Accordingly, we do not know the reality of body, but we simply know a thing which has the properties of length, width and depth. In this connection Dr. Muhsin Mahdi says:

"Then, after that, he proceeded to inquire into them. He found that each of the things he called substance extends in all directions, having length, width and depth. He called them, insofar as they are endowed with the property of extending in all the directions, at times bodies and at times bodily substances. Hence natural beings become bodies
and attributes, and bodily substances (or substances that admit of assuming a bodily form) and attributes in them". (1)

Two references are quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. He asserts that body (jism) is substance in respect to which three dimensions (abād) can be postulated in such a way that each of them is perpendicular (qā'im) on the other; but more than three cannot be ascertained in this manner. In this respect Ibn-Sīnā demonstrates that the first dimension may be postulated in any way one likes and be described as length. Then the second dimension can intersect the initial dimension at right angles and is called width. Lastly, the third dimension can intersect both of the above dimensions at right angles and is termed depth. "A body is supposed to have three dimensions and no more. It is first supposed to have length, and if so then breadth, and if so then depth". (2)

Al-Ghazālī states that body is substance in respect to which three dimensions (imtidadāt) can be postulated intersecting at right angles (zawāya qa'ima). Al-Ghazālī further adds that body is the only thing which can be divided from three directions. On the other hand a right angle is

1. Mahdi, Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle ... 98.
2. Afnan ... 110.
specified for the reason that if any condition is not imposed, then in each body manifold dimensions can be postulated which do not intersect at right angles. But whenever right angles are postulated, they do not exceed three dimensions: length, width and depth.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of Ibn-Sīnā. The views of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā are not of very similar nature. According to al-Fārābī we are incapable of knowing the reality of body, rather instead of it we can simply know its properties. Moreover, "each of the things he called substance extends in all directions, having length, width and depth ...". On the other hand, Ibn-Sīnā asserts that body is substance where three dimensions can intersect at right angles. Furthermore, any number exceeding three cannot be capable of doing so. Al-Ghazālī's account fully corresponds with this. But it has been observed that al-Ghazālī uses َِّمَتِيدادَت in place of Ibn-Sīnā's َِّمَسَد; both terms, however, have been translated in this investigation by "dimensions". 
2. **NATURE OF ANGLES.**

Two references are quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. He asserts that whenever one line stands [perpendicularly] upon another, it produces two equal angles on its sides. Then the perpendicular is vertical upon the other, and each of the two angles is a right angle. Ibn-Sīnā describes the nature of the obtuse (munfarija) and acute (badda) angles in this connection; and states that the obtuse angle is greater than the right angle, whereas the acute angle is smaller than it. Furthermore, he asserts that the right angle is produced by drawing a perpendicular upon a dimension, so that it does not incline to either of the two directions. This is the meaning of body's being endowed with three dimensions.

Al-Ghazālī states that a right angle is that which is produced by drawing a straight line as perpendicular in the middle of another in such a way that it does not incline to anyone of the two sides, so that, two angles thus produced on both sides are equal. Whenever the line is made to incline to the right-side, then the angle of the side to which the inclination is, becomes narrower than its opposite and is called acute; whereas the opposite wider angle is termed obtuse.
Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā illustrates that right angle can be produced by erecting a perpendicular on a dimension in such a manner that two equal angles are produced. But whenever the line inclines to one side, two unequal angles are produced, one being greater than the right angle and the other being smaller than it. Al-Ghazālī's account fully corresponds with this.

3. NATURE OF BODY.

Two references are quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. He asserts the view that body is long, wide and deep. It is divisible in all dimensions. But Ibn-Sīnā clarifies that by this division it is not meant that body is actually divided "exhaustively", rather this division may simply be postulated.

Thus it is necessary to perceive a body by the fact that it is a substance that has a form which subsists with it. Then all postulated dimensions within its extremities, forms and positions can simply be things which are not its constituents, rather they are only subordinate to its substance. At times some or all of them may attach to some of the bodies, whereas at
other times nothing or any of them may attach to some of the bodies.

In order to explain this assertion Ibn-Sīnā introduces the example of wax and argues that if you take a piece of wax and mould it into a shape, dimensions would actually be postulated for them. You may in fact give certain definite and calculated dimensions within certain limits. On the other hand, if you change that form, no dimension would actually be characterized in that particular limit and measure. Rather new dimensions would arise which are distinct from the others. These dimensions belong to the category of quantity.

With reference to the dimension Ibn-Sīnā further asserts that at times it may so happen that in some of the bodies these new dimensions appear to be as necessary and inseparable as the adherence of their forms. On the other hand the form is subsidiary; as such the adherence of form does not indicate that it is included in the definition of its corporeality. Same is the case with these particular dimensions.

Al-Ghazālī begins with the statement that body is long, wide and deep, but shows that this definition appears to be
inaccurate; because body is not a body on account of what it
contains actually by way of length, width and depth but on
account of its capacity for the acceptance of length, width and
depth. The three dimensions can be demonstrated by the fact
that if you take a piece of wax and form it into the length of
the span of the hand, the breadth of the two fingers and thickness
of one finger, then it is a body not because of what it contains
in length and width, since if you make it round or another form,
that definite dimension and length cease to exist and two other
dimensions are produced instead of them and the corporeal form
(as-sūra al-jismiyya) is not changed at all.

Therefore, the dimensions existing in the body are
accident outside the essence of corporeality. They may be
necessary and inseparable (like the form of the sky) but some-
thing which is accidental may be necessary, as may be the
accident (like the blackness of the Abyssinian).

Here al-Ghazālī’s account corresponds closely to that
of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā asserts that body is long, wide and deep.
All postulated dimensions, forms and positions are not constituent parts of it, rather they are subordinate to its reality. He introduces the example of wax and explains how changes occur in bodies under the varied conditions of them. Al-Ghazālī's account fully corresponds with this. Furthermore, he notes that the definition of body as being long, wide and deep is inaccurate; and this may be treated as an "addition".

4. CORPOREAL FORM IS THE ESSENTIAL OF BODY.

Al-Fārābī refers to the opinion that while the corporeal form is the dimension which gives subsistence to the natural body, its subsistence cannot be perceptible through the senses. It may be perceptible, [or] be a principle of the things perceptible through the senses. But it is accidental to the existent in that it exists and [it is accidental] to all that is included in numerous aspects of knowledge; such as, unity, multiplicity and the like. Moreover, these are included in Natural Sciences, Theoretical Sciences and the like.

Two references are quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. According to him, corporeal reality is a form of continuity (ittiṣāl) which is capable of accepting a postulate of three dimensions, which we have mentioned above. This means neither the measure nor the
corporeal quantity; for this body, in as much as it has form, does not differ from another body in that it is greater or smaller, and it does not correspond to a thing in that it is similar or calculable or equivalent or associated or dissimilar. On the other hand, it has these properties on account of its quantity and on account of an aspect which defines it. Thus the aspect of body is distinct from that of its corporeality.

On the other hand, corporeal form, in as much as it is corporeal, requires matter for its manifestation. The nature of corporeal form is such that it does not differ in itself, for it consists of one simple nature; as such it cannot make specific differences. Because if any difference enters into the reality of corporeal form, it involves things which are added from outside, while one of the forms would be connected with matter. That is why its aspect cannot exist with that of the reality of the difference.

Ibn-Sīnā further asserts that corporeal form may either be continuity itself or a nature necessitating continuity, so that,
the corporeal form cannot exist without the continuity which is requisite to it. In this respect if it is the continuity itself, the body may be continuous and then discontinuous; in such a case there must be something which has the potentiality for both cases. Ibn-Sīnā further argues that the essence of continuity, because of its being continuous, does not accept discontinuity (infisāl); for that which accepts continuity does not cease to exist at the time of discontinuity, whereas continuity would cease to exist at the time of discontinuity. Therefore, there is something other than continuity which accepts discontinuity, and moreover, this very thing accepts continuity also. So continuity is not capable of accepting discontinuity, nor is it a nature necessitating continuity because of its essence.

It is evident, therefore, that there is a reality other than the corporeal form which accepts both continuity and discontinuity while it is joined to the corporeal form. This is the thing which accepts unison with the corporeal form, thus becoming a single body because of bodily continuity which constitutes it or adheres to it.
Al-Ghazālī concludes this chapter by stating that the essential of body is corporeal form, and it has ability to accept a postulate of dimensions not as an actual existence of them but as an accident actually present. For this reason one body can accept greater and smaller measurement, so that, it increases at one time and decreases at another time without any addition from outside, since measurement here is an accident. Furthermore, some of the measurements are not specified for the essence of body, while existence of the measurement is distinct from the reality of body. However, all bodies are equal with respect to corporeal form and no differences between them can be imagined. They are only different in respect of measurement.

Here al-Ghazālī’s account corresponds to the views of Ibn-Sīnā. The approach of Ibn-Sīnā appears to be dissimilar to that of al-Fārābī. According to al-Fārābī, the corporeal form while concerning dimension which gives subsistence to the natural body cannot be perceptible through the senses. It is accidental to a thing and to all that is included in numerous sciences. But Ibn-Sīnā makes his assertion in a different way. Corporeal reality according to him, is a form of continuity which is capable of accepting the postulate of the aforesaid three dimensions. Body,
in as much as it has form, does not differ from another of its kind in that it is greater and smaller in extent. On the other hand, the nature of corporeal form consists in one simple continuity for which it does not differ in itself. He further adds that corporeal form is either continuity itself or a nature which the continuity follows. If it concerns the very continuity, the body maybe continuous and discontinuous, and if it is so, there must be something capable of potentiality for both cases. Thus there is a reality other than the corporeal form which accepts continuity and discontinuity, and establishes a unison with the corporeal form. Al-Ghazali's account appears to be closer to the detailed views of Ibn-Sīnā. It may further be said that Al-Ghazali has clearly systematized materials derived from varied presentations of Ibn-Sīnā's views.
4. RESULT.

Al-Ghazālī's accounts correspond to those of Ibn-Sīnā in all points. In addition to his agreement with Ibn-Sīnā's metaphysical works Al-Ghazālī's accounts correspond to his Physics and Mathematics in point 2.

Furthermore, a certain "addition" has been observed in point 3.
CHAPTER FOUR

DOCTRINE OF THE INSEPARABLE
RELATION BETWEEN MATTER
AND FORM.
1. BRIEF INTRODUCTION.

In this chapter al-Ghazālī states the doctrine of the inseparable relation between matter and form. He begins by describing their invariable relation and then gives two proofs for this relation.

In his first proof al-Ghazālī clearly points out that if matter exists without form, then one of two things must be true: either it would be perceptibly indicated by hand, or it would not be so perceptible. In the former case, it involves two aspects resulting in division of the thing which in fact manifests itself through corporeal form. In the latter, it implies an absurd statement, since form must settle somewhere for its manifestation.

In his second proof al-Ghazālī shows that if matter is postulated to be free from form, it would be either divisible or not divisible. Then he demonstrates that in either of the cases matter cannot be isolated from form.

While indicating this inseparable relation
al-Ghazālī refers to various opinions and uses them to substantiate the body of his proofs.

The present investigation is concerned with the collection of materials from this chapter relating to (a) the inseparable relation between matter and form, (b) and (c) the two proofs and, (d) the conclusion of this relation.
2. ANALOGOUS VIEWS.

AL - GHANZALI.

I. INSEPARABLE RELATION BETWEEN MATTER AND FORM.

الحيولي ليس لها وجود بالفعل بنفسها. دون الصورة، البينة، بل يكون ابذا وجودها مع الصورة - وكذلك الصورة لا تقوم بنفسها دون الحيولي - (1)

AL- FARABI.

والصورة قوامها بالمادة، والمادة موضوعة لعمل الصور - فان الصور ليس لها قوام بذواتها وهي متاحة الى ان تكون موجودة في موضوع، وموضوعها المادة - والمادة انما وجودها لا جل الصور - (2)

I. Ghaz., Mag. ... 158
2. Far., Siyasa ... 36
Ibn - Sīnā.

فقد صحت إن المادة
الجسدانية إنها تقوم بالفعل عند وجود
الصورة، وإضافان الصورة المادة
ليست توجد مفارقة للمادة - (3)

Al - Ghazālī.

2. FIRST PROOF: MATTER IS NOT DEVOID OF FORM.

والدليل: على أن الصورة (ه)
لا توجد خالية عن الصورة إمران:

الأول: إنه لو وجدت لكان
لا يخلو - إما أن تكون مشارا إليها وإلى
جهته بالبه اشارة حسية - أو لم تكن -

فإن كانت مشارا إليها فلها
اذن جهتان - فما يأتي منها جهة بلقي منه غير الذوي

(a) Read ...

3. IS., Ilah. (I) ... 80
يُلقي ما يأتيه من الجهة الأخرى، فتكون منقسمة. فتكون فيه صورة الجسمية إذا لا معنى للصورة الجسمية وحقيقةها، لا قبول القسمة، وإن لم تكن مشارا إليها:

فهو باطل من حيث أنه إذا حلت بها الصورة، فإنها لا تكون في كل مكان. أو لا تكون في مكان أصلا. أو تكون في مكان دون مكان.

والاقسام الثلاثة باطلة:
فالنفي إلى البحا باطل، أما بطلان كونها في كل مكان، أو لا في مكان ؛ فظاهر، و أما بطلان اختصاصها بمكان دون مكان، فمن حيث أن الصورة الجسمية، من حيث انها جسمية، لا تستند إلى مكان معين، بل نسائر الاماكن بالنسبة إليها واحدة، فتكون الاختصاص بامر زائد على الجسمية - (6)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ

بالمادة موضوعة ليكون بها توأم الصورة والصورة لا يمكن أن يكون لها قوام

4. Ghaz., Mag. ... 158
و وجدت بغير المادة فالمادة وجودها لأسجل الصورة ولم تكن صورة ما موجودة ما كانت المادة والصورة وجودها لا لوجود بها المادة بل ليحصل الجوهير المنتجسي جوهرًا بالفعل فان كل نوع انما يحصل موجودًا بالفعل وبكل وجودية اذا حصلت صورته وما دامت مادته موجودة دون صورته نانه انها هو ذلك النوع بالقوة - (١)

IBN - SINNA

(١) ننقول إن تلك المادة أيضاً لا يجوز أن تفارق الصورة الجسمية وتقوم موجودة بالفعل لأنها إن فارقت الصورة الجسمية فلا يخلو إما أن يكون لها وضع وحيز في الوجود الذي لها حينذاك أو لا يكون نان كان لها وضع وحيز وكان يمكن أن تنقسم ففي لمقالة ذات مقدار وقد فرضت لا مقدار لها هذا خلاف وان لم يكن ان تنقسم و لها وضع فهي لمقالة نقطة و يمكن ان ينتهي إليها خط ولا يمكن ان

5. Diet., Must. (text) ... 21
تكون منفردة الذات منحازة لذن خط. إذاً انتهى إليه لذاها بنقطة أخرى غيرها ثم انلاقهام خط آخر لذاها بنقطة أخرى غيرها. (6)

(6) فإذا الصورة الجسمية بما هي الصورة الجسمية لا تختلف فلا يجوز أن يكون بعضها دائماً في المادة وبعضها غير قائمة فيها فانه من المكانان ان تكون طبيعة لا اختلاف فيها من جهة ما هي تلك الطبيعة ويعزى لها اختلاف في نفس وجودها لأن كونها ذلك الواحد متفرق وابضاً فان وجودها ذلك الواحد لا يخلو إلا ان يكون دائماً في مادة او غير قائمة في مادة او بعضها دائماً فيها وبعضه غير قائمة ومكان ان يكون بعضه دائماً فيها وبعضه ليس لأن الاعتبار انا نتناول ذلك الموجود من حيث هو واحد غير مختلف تقليد او يكون ذلك الواحد إذا كان غير قائمة فيها او كله قائمة فيها وتمكن ليس كله غير قائمة فيها تقليد ان يكون كله قائماً فيها. (7)

6. IS. Naj. ... 203
7. Ibid ... 203
الدليل الثاني: أن الهيكل اذًا
فرضت مجردة عن الصورة، فلا تخلو:
إما إن تنقص، أو لا تنقص، فإن
كانت تنقص فاذن فيها الصورة الجسمية، فإن
كانت لا تنقص فلا تخلو:
إما أن تكون نبوئاً عن قبر.
القسمة، طبعاً لها ذاتياً، أو عارضاً غريباً بالنفيه، فان كان ذاتياً استحال أن تقبل
الانقسام، كما يستحيل أن ينقلب العرض
جسمًا والعقل جسماً.
وإن كان ذلك عارضاً غريباً فيها فاذن فيها الصورة، وليس خالية عن الصورة، و
لكن تلك الصورة مضادة للصورة الجسمية. (8)
8. Ghaz., Mag. ... I60.
AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

و قال: قالوا أن الهيولى من حيث هي هيولى شئ ومن حيث هي مستعدة شئ فالاستعداده ذ صورتها - وليس كذلك فإن الاستعداد هو نفس الهيولى وهذا التحديد وهو اندهام مستعر لأكثرها - (9)

IBN - ʿĪSĀ.

٢٤١ هذا الحامل إنما لى الوضع من قبل اقتران الصورة الجسمية به و لو كان له ني ده ذاته وضع:

و هو منقسم؟ كان في حد ذاته ذا حجم او غير منقسم؟ كان في حد نفسه مقطع منتهى إشارة: نقطة  ان لم ينقسم البناء او خطأ او سطحا  ان انقسام في غير جهة الإشارة - (10)

9. Far., Tal. ... 8.
10. IS. Ish(0, T-Th) ... 52.
(2) وكيف تكون ذات لا جزء لها بالقوة ولا بالفعل تقبل الكم وتسمى فضني ان المادة لا تبقى مفارقة بين ووجودها وجود قابل لا غير كما ان وجود الارض وجود مقبول لا غير و ايضا انا لا تخذه ما ان يكون وجودها وجود قابل فتكون دائما قابلا للشيء و ما ان يكون لها وجود خاص متنقم ثم تقبل فتكون موجودة الاخاذ المتقدم غير ذات كي وقد قامت غير ذات كي يكون المقدار الجسدي عرض لها وصير ذاتها بحيث لها بالقوة اجزاء و قد تقومت جوهرا في نفسها غير ذي جزء باعتبار نفسها البنت لعدمها الاستعداد في حد نفسها فتكون ما هو متنقم بانه لا جزء له يعرض له ان يبطل عنه ما ينتمى به بالفعل لورود عارض عليه فتكون حينئذ للمادة منفردة صورة غير عارضة بها تكون واحدة بالقوة والفعل و صورة اخرى عارضة بها تكون غير واحدة بالفعل فيكون بين الامرين شيء مشترك هو قابل لللازمين خي شأنه ان يصير مرة ليس في قوته ان ينقسم
4. CONCLUSION OF THE INSEPARABLE RELATION BETWEEN MATTER AND FORM.

 فلا انة الهيوليه لا توجد دون الصورة، و إن الصورة الجسمية و الهيوليه أيضاً لا يوجدان دون أن ينطاف الحما الفصل المنتهي نوع ذلك الجسم، لأن كل جسم إذا خلت وطبعه طلب موضع يستقر فيه، ولا فيه تلك تكونه جسماً قبل الزائد.

 وكل جسم فإما أن يكون:
 سريع الانفصال أو عسرة أو ممتنة - وكل ذلك ليس بمحمي الجسمية، بل لزائد عليه - فاذن لا بد من الزائد أيضا، حتى يتم الوجود (2).

II. IS., Naj. ... 204
I2. Ghaz., Mag. ... I61
فأحد من هذا: أن الهيوي لا
تتجبر عن الصورة الجسمية. (3)

ولا الهيوي قد لا تخلو أيضا
عن هور أخرى - وكيف!! ولا بد من أن يكون:
إما مع صورة توجب قبول الانفکاك والانشام
والشك، بسهولة - أو بعض. أو مع صورة
توجب امتناع قبول تلك. (4)

وإذا فكان كل جسم يختص للد
ملاحظة بعين من الاختباس و ليس له الجري الخايمي
بوا هو جسم، إلا أنه كل جسم كذلك، فهو
اذن لا ملاحظة مختص به بصورة ما في ذاته، و
هذا بين فانه إما أن يكون غير قابل للتشكيلة و
والتحقيلات فيكون بصورة ما صار كذلك لأنه

13. IS., Ish (0, T-Tb) ... 59
14. IS., Ish (0, T-Th) ... 60
بما هو جسم قابل له، فإنها ان تكون قابلا لها بسهولة أو بعضك وكيف ما كان، ف neger على واحد الصور المذكورة في الطبيعيات - فاذن المادة الجسمية لا توجد مفارقة للصورة.

فالمادة اذن انها تتقوم بالفعل بالصورة، فاذن المادة اذا جردت في التوهم، فقد فعل بها ما لا يثبت معه في الوجود. (15)
3. COMPARATIVE STUDY.

1. INSEPARABLE RELATION BETWEEN MATTER AND FORM.

Al-Farabī propounds the view that subsistence of form is with matter and matter is a substratum for the support of forms. But forms have no subsistence by themselves, rather for their existence, they require to be in a substratum, while their substratum is matter. That is why, existence of matter is for the sake of forms. In this connection Dr. F. Dieterici says:

"Der Stoff ist die letzte und geringste aller Wesenheiten. Hätte derselbe nicht die Annahmefähigkeit zur Form, so hätte derselbe keine actuelle Existenz. Er war also potentiell nichtseidend. Dann aber nahm der Stoff die Form an und wurde Substanz, diese nahm dann Hitze, Kälte, Trockniss und Feuchtigkeit an, und ward zu Elementen. Dann erzeugten sich aus diesen letzteren die verschiedenen Producte und Zusammensetzungen." (1)

1. Diet. Abh. (Text) ... 162
Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī and asserts that corporeal matter (al-madda al-jusmaniyya) actually subsists with the existence of form. On the other hand, material form (as-sūra al-maddiyya) cannot be separate from matter. Thus Dr. D. Saliba remarks:

"La matière n'existe que par la forme, elle ne peut pas en être séparée ni exister en même temps en soi et en acte, car c'est la forme qui actualise la matière." (2)

Al-Ghazālī states that matter has actually no existence apart from form, rather its existence is always with form. Similarly, form cannot subsist by itself without matter.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of al-Fārābī. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that the relation between form and matter is inseparable and one cannot exist without the other. Al-Fārābī further asserts that form can only subsist with matter, and this

2. Saliba, Œtude ... 68
matter, on the other hand, may be called a substratum for the support of form. Al-Ghazālī's account appears to be closer to this.

2. **FIRST PROOF : MATTER IS NOT DEVOID OF FORM.**

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that matter is a substratum for the subsistence of form; and form, on the other hand, cannot in fact subsist or exist without matter. Because, existence of matter manifests itself through form; that is to say, unless form is existent, matter cannot exist. Al-Fārābī further asserts that the existence of form is not for the purpose of producing matter, but for the sake of actually deriving corporeal reality. Thus each kind can be actually existent and perfect if its form is attained. Furthermore, matter cannot continue to be apart from form.

Two references are quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. He does not fundamentally differ from al-Fārābī. According to him, matter can not be separate from corporeal form, nor can it
actually subsist alone. If it is separate from corporeal form, then one of two things may be true. Either it has a position (wāqf) and place (hayyiz) for its existence, or it has neither of these. If it has a position and place and can be divided, then it undoubtedly involves a quantity, while to postulate that it has no quantity is self-contradictory. If it is not divided and has a position, then it is a point (nuqtā) to which a line may be drawn. It cannot be an isolated essence, because when a line is drawn to it, it meets another point besides it. Then if it meets another line it meets another point besides it.

Ibn-Sīnā further asserts that corporeal form does not differ in itself. Thus it cannot be held that some of it should subsist in matter and some of it should not. For it cannot have such a nature in which there is no difference and at the same time a difference should appear in its very existence. Since its existence is one, there are three possibilities: (a) it subsists in matter, or (b) it does not subsist so, or (c) some of it subsists in it and some of it does not. But it is inconceivable that some of it should subsist in it and some of it should not. Because
existence in so far as it is. one cannot be different in itself. Therefore, there are only two possibilities: either one is wholly not subsistent, or wholly subsistent in it. Since the whole of it is not not-subsistent there, it follows that the whole of it subsists there.

Al-Ghazālī lists two ways of proof for the inseparable relation between form and matter. If matter exists without form, there are two possibilities: either matter and its direction would be perceptibly indicated by hand, or it would not be so. If it were indicated perceptibly, it would have two directions. What meets from one direction is different from another. As a result it would be subject to division; and thus it would involve corporeal form, while the possession of corporeal form and its reality simply point out admissibility of division.

On the other hand, if matter is not capable of being indicated, that also involves an absurdity. For whenever matter occurs in a form, it may be in every place, or it may not be anywhere at all or it may be in one place and not in another. Strictly speaking, each of the three
divisions becomes invalid and what is attributed to them is untenable. It is self-evident that we may not validly speak of its being in every place or in no place; but as for the invalidity of speaking of its being specifically in one place and not in another, the corporeal form, in so far as it is corporeal, does not require any definite place; rather all places in this respect are one. Hence specification to one place is made by something which is additional to corporeality.

Here al-Ghazālī's account indirectly corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that matter cannot manifest itself without form. Moreover, Ibn-Sīnā asserts that if matter is separate from corporeal form, then it would have a position and place or it would have nothing of this kind. In either of the cases matter can only be conceivable in and through form. Furthermore, Ibn-Sīnā points out how matter is inseparably connected with form at the time of division and otherwise. He also demonstrates how corporeal form cannot differ in itself. However, it appears that al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā in an indirect way. Moreover, his
account is seen to be a systematic rearrangement.

3. SECOND PROOF.

Al-Fārābī refers to a view concerning matter and form. According to this view, matter in itself is one thing and in so far as it is prepared, it is another thing. Preparation [appears in] its form. But it is not in fact like this; for preparation is [involved in] matter.

Two references are quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. According to him, matter can be viewed in terms of position which is connected with corporeal form. If it had position in its essence, it would either be divisible in which case it would have a body; or it would not be divisible, and as such it would be a point or a line or a surface.

Ibn-Sīnā further explains how an essence that has no part either potentially or actually can accept quantity and becomes equal to it by making it manifest that matter does not exist as a separate entity. But on the other hand, the existence of matter is only receptive and nothing else, just
as, the existence of accident is received and nothing else. Furthermore, it can only be that its existence is either receptive, thus making it always receptive of a thing, or else it has a special subsistent existence - then it receives, thus becoming, by virtue of its special subsistence existent with no quantity, while it subsisted as having no quantity. Thus corporeal measure (miqdar) becomes an accident to it in such a way that it has potentially several parts. It subsists as a reality in itself which has no parts in view of its lack of extension in itself. Thus it comes about that what has subsisted as having no part is subjected to the accident of that which nullifies the quality by which it actually subsists due to the occurrence of an accident in it. Accordingly, matter by itself has a form which is not accidental to it, but which is one potentially and actually; and it has another form which is accidental to it and which is not actually one. Thus between the two things arises common thing which is receptive to both, and is capable of becoming, at one time incapable of dividing and at another capable of dividing, meaning the near power which has no mediator.
Al-Ghazālī states that whenever matter is postulated to be free from form, it would be either divisible or not divisible. If it is divisible, it must have corporeal form. If it is not divisible, one of two things may be the case: either its opposition to accepting division implies a nature essential to it, or it is accidental, external and inconsistent with it. If it is essential, it would be impossible for the accident and intelligence to become a body. If the opposition to division is accidental and external, it must have a form and can never be devoid of it. But that form appears to be contrary to corporeal form.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā. The views of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā are on dissimilar lines. Al-Fārābī makes the distinction that matter in itself is different from that of its prepared state; whereas Ibn-Sīnā asserts that matter is inseparably connected with corporeal form. It has position and place, and as such it implies quantity and division. Moreover, he
argues that existence of matter is always receptive and is connected with corporeal reality. Matter manifests itself through form which is not accidental to it. Al-Ghazālī's account indirectly corresponds to this, and it appears to me that he systematizes the views without distorting the basic concept put forward by Ibn-Sīnā.

4. **CONCLUSION ON THE INSEPARABLE RELATION BETWEEN MATTER AND FORM.**

Three references are quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. According to him, matter can not be without form. It would either be with a form which involves acceptance of separation, association and formation, easily or with difficulty; or it would be with a form which makes it impossible to accept them.

In concluding the subject of the inseparable relation between matter and form Ibn-Sīnā asserts that
each body must have a specific place, but it does not have a place which is specially applicable to it on account of its being a body, otherwise each body would be like this one. It must therefore be specific to it because of some form in its essence. However, a body is either not receptive of formations and particularization in which case it becomes so on account of its association with a form, because as a body it is receptive of form; or it is receptive of form whether easily or with difficulty. Whatever the case maybe it must be in one of these forms.

Therefore, corporeal reality cannot be separate from form, that is to say, matter actually subsists with form.

Al-Ghazālī concludes this chapter by stating that matter cannot be found without form. On the otherhand, corporeal form and matter cannot exist unless a complete differentia is attributed to them for a particular kind of that body. For everybody if left to its nature, seeks for
a place to settle there. It involves that, not because of its being a body, but because of something further to this.

Each body is capable of being disjoined, which may be easy or difficult or impossible. Each of them is not with pure corporeality, but it is on account of something additional to it. So the additional thing which is indispensable also completes the existence.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā asserts that matter cannot be isolated from corporeal form. Along with form it necessitates the acceptance of association and dissociation either easily or with difficulty. Furthermore, he advocates that a body must have a specific place for its manifestation and must receive form easily or with difficulty. Al-Ghazālī's account indirectly corresponds to this. Moreover, his account appears to be a systematic arrangement of the detailed views advocated by Ibn-Sīnā.
4. **RESULT.**

Al-Ghazālī's accounts correspond to those of Ibn-Sīnā in points 2, 3 and 4; and his account corresponds to that of al-Fārābī in point 1.

Al-Ghazālī's accounts correspond to Ibn-Sīnā's Physics in points 3(i) and 4(i) & (ii).

It has been observed that al-Ghazālī's accounts indirectly correspond to all points in those of Ibn-Sīnā.
CHAPTER FIVE

DOCTRINE OF ACCIDENTS.
1. **BRIEF INTRODUCTION:**

In this chapter al-Ghazālī gives an account of the doctrine of accidents, and starts at the very outset by dividing accidents into two groups, one requiring nothing external in its essence, and the other requiring it.

The first group includes both quality and quantity. The former neither needs anything external for the manifestation of its essence nor can it be divided; while the latter implies mensuration in determining the reality of a thing. The second group which involves the necessity of something outside the essence of a thing for the completion of its nature consists of seven categories, viz. relation, place, time, position, possession, action and passion.

Each of these categories necessarily involves an external thing in view of its finding expression there; as such apart from this prerequisite it can never manifest itself nor can it be identified.
Al-Ghazālī briefly states the nature of both groups of accidents and methodically discusses their roles with examples without going into much detail.

My investigation chiefly concerns the collection of materials in respect to (a) al-Ghazālī's first group, viz. quality and quantity, and (b) his second group, viz. the seven categories, as taken from his account in Magāsid.
2. **ANALOGOUS VIEWS.**

**AL - GHAZALI.**

I. **QUANTITY.**

أما الكمية: فهي العرض الذي يلحق الأجوهر بسبب التقدير والزيادة ونقصان المساواة مثل: الطول، العرض، وعمق، الزمان - (1)

**AL - FARABI.**

والكم هو كل شيء يمكن أن يقدر جميعه بجزء منه، مثل العدد ونسبة البسيط والمصمم، ومثل الزمان ومثل الانقطاع والاقطاب، فإذا ان أخذ أي عدد اتفق وجود له جزء يقدر أو ما هو مساوٍ لجزء منه، مثل الخمسمة، فان الواحد

I. Ghaz., Mag. ... I63
يقدرون خمس مرات، ومثل العشرة، خان الاثنين يقدرون خمس مرات - (2)

IBN – SINA.

ومنها (الكم) وهو السعي الذي يقبل لذاته المساواة والامساواة والتجزئ - (3)

AL - GHAZALY.

2. QUALITY.

الكيبية، وهي التي لا يتجزئ تصورها إلى الالتفات الى امر خارج، ولا يقع بسببها قسمة للجوانب،

ومثالها من المعوسات، المذكارات بالحس: كالألوان والطعوم,

2. Dunlop, "Categories" ... I71
3. IS., Naj. ... ... 80
و الروايات والخشونة والملاسة، واللبن، والصلاة والطروبة واليبسية والكرارة والبرودة.

ومن غير المحسوسات: ما هو استعداد لكمال، أو نقيضه، كمرة الممارسة، والممكحية، والضعف، والهربية، ومنها ما هو كمال، كالعلم، والعقل (4).

AL - FĀRAĪB.

الكيفية هي بالجملة البدعات التي بها يقال في الأشخاص كيف هي؛ وهي التي بها يجاب في المسألة عن شخص شخص كيف هو - وواستخط في رسمها قولنا في الأشخاص ليفرق بينها وبين الفصول، فالفصل كفيفات ابضا ما كانت هيئات بها يقال في الأنواع كيف هي ...
والتي يقال بقوة طبيعية ولا
قوة طبيعية فإن انواعها متضاربة، بدخل أحد
الصدام منهما فيما يقال بقوة و الآخر فيما يقال
بلا قوة. و ذلك مثل الصلابة واللين، فإن
الصلاة تحت القوة الطبيعية، واللين تحت
ما هو لقوة طبيعية. فما يقال بقوة طبيعية
هو الاستعدادات الطبيعية التي بها تفعل
الاجسام بسهولة و تنفع بعسر، وما يقال بلاف
قوة طبيعية هو الاستعدادات الطبيعية التي
بها تفعل الاجسام بعيسر و تنفع بسهولة، و
ذلك مثل الشدة و الضعف، فإن السدة استعداد
طبيعي لأن يفعل بسهولة و ينفع بعيسر، و
الضعف استعداد طبيعي لأن يفعل بعيسر و
ينفع بسهولة....

والكيفية الانفعالية ضرورة
ضرب في الجسم، وهو المحسوسات، مثل
الللوان و الطعم و الرؤى و بالمعلوم مات
كالحرارة و البرودة، و ضرب في النفس.
و هو عوارض النفس الطبيعية، مثل الغضب والرحمة والحنين وأشباه ذلك - (5).

Ibn - Sīnā.

(وأما الكيف) فهو كل هيئة
قارة في جسم لا يوجب اعتبار وجودها فيه نسبته للجسم إلى خارج ولا نسبة واقعة في اجزاءه ولا لحفلته اعتبار يكون به ذا جزء مثل البياض والشوارد وهو ما ان يكون مختصبا بالكم من جهة ما هو كرتيریع بالسطح و الاستقامة بالخط والفردية بالعدد. وإما ان لا يكون مختصب به غير المختص به اما ان يكون مختصبا ينفع عنه الحواس و يوجد انفعالاته الممتدات فالواصخ منه مثل صفرة الذهب وحالة الخجل تعني كيمياء انفعاليات وسريع الزوال منه وإن كان كيفة بالحقيقة فلا يسمى كيمياء بل انفعالات لسرعة استبدالها مثل حمرة الخجل وصفرة

5. Dunlop, "Categories" ...I76
الوجيز - ومنها ما لا تكون محسوسة - و هذا 
إما أن يكون استعدادات انا تتصور في النفس 
بالقياس الى كمالات فان كان استعدادا 
المقاومة و اباع للانفعال سمي قوة طبيعية 
كالمصحاحية و الصلابة و ان كان استعدادا 
سرعة الاعانان بالانفعال سمي لا قوة 
طبيعية مثل المرضية واللين - و إذا ان 
بكون في انفسها كمالات لا يتصور انها استعدادات 
لكمالات أخرى و يكون مع ذلك غير محسوسة 
بدائها فما كان منها ثابت سمي صلة مثل العلم 
والصحة و ما كان سريع الزوال سمي حالا مثل 
غضب الحليم و هرس المصحح - (6) 

AL - GHAZALI.

3. RELATION.

فَأَمَّا الْإِضَافَةُ فَهِيَ حَالَةُ
للَّجُوْهِرِ تَعْرِضُ بِبَسْبُع كُرْنٍ غَيْرِهِ فِي ضَفَابَتهُ،

6. IS., Naï. ... 81
كالابوة، والبنوة، والاخرة، والصلاقة، والمجاعة، والموازاة، وكونه على اليمين، والشمال. إذ الابوة ليست لاب، الا مصيح وجد الابن في مقابلته، (7).

AL- FARABI.

والاطاقة هي نسبة بين شيئين، بها بعينها يقال كل واحد منهما بالقياس الى الآخر، وهذه النسبة تتخذ للدول منهما. يقال بها بالقياس الى الثاني، وتأخذ بعينها للثاني، يقال بها بالقياس الى الأول. والشياطين اللذان يقال كل واحد منهما بالقياس الى الآخر لاجل هذه النسبة، وهما الموضوعان لها، يسميان المضافين والمضافين. ويستعمل عند قياس كل واحد منهما الى الآخر احد حروف النسب، مثل من و الى و مع و ما اشبهها، و ينبغي ان يكون لكل واحد منهما اسم بدل عليه، من جهة ما هو مضاف الى قريبه بنوع ما من انواع الاطاقة، (7) Ghaz., Naq. ... 164.
مثل الأب والابن، فإن بينهما نسبة واحدة

يقال بها كل واحد منهم بالقياس إلى الآخر، فإن
الأب ابن الأب والابن ابن الأب - وتلك النسبة
بعينها إذا اخذت صفة لأحدهما سميت
أبوة، وإذا اخذت صفة للآخر سميت ب koşة،
و اسم أحدهما من حيث يوصف بها ابن، واسم
الآخر من حيث يوصف بها بعينها ابن، وهما
اسبان متبادلان، وكذلك الجبر والموالي - (ع)

IBN - SINA.

ومن المقولة العشر (الإفانة).
و هو المعنى الذي وجوده بالقياس إلى شيء آخر
و ليس له وجود غيره مثل الباوة بالقياس إلى
البنوة، إلا كالأب فإن له وجود يخصه كالإنسانية - (ع)

8. Dunlop, "Categories " ... 179
9. IS., Naj. ... ... 80
AL - GHAZALI.

4. PLACE.

وأما الابن: فهو كون الشيء في المكان مثل كونه فوقه، ونحته (6).

AL - FARABI.

وابن هو نسبته الجسم إلى مكانه، وليست هو بالمكان ولا تركيب الجسم ومكانه، وبالجملة هو الشيء الذي سبيله.

إن يجاب على السؤال عن الشيء ابن هو كقولنا في البيت، فإن الابن ليس هو البيت، لكن ما يفهم من قولنا في البيت، فإن حرف في دال على النسبة إلى البيت. وكل جسم طبيعي فله نوع من أنواع الأبناء، من ذلك الإنسان، ثم يأتي أنواع الحيوان وانواع النبات، وحياجارة، ثم آخر العالم...

IO. Ghaz.; Nag. ... I64
وماهو اين بإضافة فهو فوق  
وثبت واعلى واسفل ويمين ويسرة و  
قدام وخلف وحول ووسط فيما بين وما  
يلي وعند ومع واعلى وما اشبه ذلك، الا  
انه ليس للجسم اين مضاعف او يكون له  
اين بذاته - (الاين)

**IBN - SĪNĀ.**

**وصى جملة العشرة (الاين)**  
وهو كون الاجوزر الفي مكانه الذي يكون فيه  
ككون زيد في السوق - (12)

**AL - GHĀZĀLĪ.**

5. **TIME.**

وأمامتي: فهو كون الشيء في

II. Dunlop, "Categories" ... 22
I2. IS., Naj. ... ... 81
الزمان ككونه في الأنس و عام او ل و اليوم - (3) 

AL- FARABI 

و متي هو نسبة الشيء الي الزمان المحدود الذي يساو و موجودة وجودة و تنطبق نهايته على نهاية وجودة، اوزمان محدود يكون هذا جزءا منه - وليس معني متي هو الزمان ولا شيء مركب من جوهر وزمان، على ما ظنه قوم. ...

و الزمان المحدود هو الذي قد يحسب بعدة من الآن، إما في الماضي وإما في المستقبل، و ذلك إما بأسر له مشهور يعدل عليه من الآن في الماضي و المستقبل، اما في الماضي فكمونا امس و اول من امس و عاما اول، و اول من عام اول و من سنة ومن سنين، و اما في 13. Ghaz., Eqa. ... 164
المستقبل فكقولنا غدا أو بعد غد والعام المقبل وال سنة وال سنة و المئة و أربعة مئة في معلوم بعد من الآن كقولنا على عهد هرقل الملك، أو نزمان الحرب الطليانية - (ع) 

*Ibn - Sina.*

(وفاوني) وهو كون الجوهـر
في زمنه الذي يكون فيه مثل كون هذا الأمر
امس - (53)

*Al - GhaZali.*

6. POSITION.

واما الوضع: فهو نسبة
ابراجة الجسم بعضها الي بعض ككونه جالسا،
ومضطحبها، وقائمها 12 باختلاف وضع الساقين

14. Dunlop, "Categories" ... 21
15. IS., Naj. ... ... 81
من الفخذين يختلف القيام والقفود - (۱۴)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

و والوضع هو ان تكون اجزاء
الجسم المحدودة محاذية لجزء محدودة
من المكان الذي هو فيه او منطبة عليها,
و ذلك يوجد لكل جسم للن كل جسم فله
ابن على وضعما, و ذلك مثل ما للإنسان، فإن
له انواعا كثيرة من الوضع، كالقيام و الفقود
والانتعاب والاضطجاع. والانتكاء والانبطاح
والاستلقاء، فإن اجزاءه المحدودة مثل
الرأس والظهر والكتفين وسائر اجزائه
يكون كل واحد منها في كل واحد من هذه
الأوضاع محاذية لجزء من المكان الذي فيه
و منطبة عليه، فإذا تغير وضعه تصير تلك
الأجزاء بعبارة محاذية لجزء آخر من
أجزاء المكان - (۱۷)

I6. Ghaz., Nag. ... ۱۶۴
I7. Dunlop, "Categories"... ۲۳
Ibn - Sīnā.

(٨) إن يكون لاجزاء بعضها إلى بعض نسبة في الأنهار والموازاة بالقياس إلى الجهاد. واجزاء المكان ان كان في مكان مثل القيام والقعود وهو في المعنيين غير الوضع المذكور في باب الكم - (٨).

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

7. POSSESSION.

وأما الجدة: وتسمى (الملك) أيضا فهو كون الشيء بحيث يحيط به ما ينتقل بانتقاله، كونه منطلسا، ومنتمهما ومتقمحا، ومنتعل، وكون الفرس ملجمًا ومسجأ - (٩).

I8. IS., Naj. ... 81
I9. Ghaz., Mag. ... I64
و هو نسبة الجسم إلى الجسم المنطبق عليه أو على جزء منه، إذا كان المنطبق ينتقل بانتقال المحاط به، مثل اللبس والانفعال والتسلسل. فإن اللبس يدخل على نسبة الجسم إلى جسم آخر منطبق على سطحة، إذا كان المحيط ينتقل بانتقال المحاط به، و الانفعال أيضا يدخل على شبيه هذا المعنى، غير أنه في جزء من الجسم، وكذلك التسلسل. (20)

IBN - SINA.

(20) رم الملك) و ليست احساسه
و يشبه أن يكون كون الأجوه في جوهر
اخر يشمله و ينتقل بانتقاله مثل اللبس
والتسلسل. (21)

20. Dunlop, "Categories" ... 24
21. IS., Nai. ... ... 82
- I41 -

AL - GHAZĂLI.

8. ACTION.

وأما ان يفعل فهو كون الشيء فاعلا في حال كونه مؤثرا في الغير بالفعل، ككون النار محرقة، في وقت حصول الاحتراق بالفعل، وكونها ممسحة - (22)

AL - FĂRÂBÎ.

وأما ان يفعل فهو ان ينتقل الفاعل باتصال على النسب التي له الى اجزاها ما يحدث في الشيء الذي ينفعل حينما ينفعل. فان الفاعل هو الذي عنه ينفتض في الجسم الذي ينفعل شيء بشيء وجزء. جزء على اتصال من الأمر الذي اليه يصير المنفعل - فالفاعل نسبته الى كل جزء حادث غير نسبته الى الجزء الآخر. إذ كان فاعلا لكل واحد من تلك الأجزاء، فالفاعل ينتقل.

22. Ghaz., Mag. ... I65
على نسبته إلى جزء جزء مما يحدث في المنقول قليلًا قليلًا على مثال مسلك الجسم الذي ينتقل على جزء جزء مما يحدث فيه.
مثال ذلك أن المنشن في حين ما يتسخن المنشن، له نسبة إلى جزء جزء من الحرارة التي تحدث فيما يتسخن، فكما أن المنشن ينتقل من جزء من الحرارة إلى جزء آخر على اتصال، كذلك المنشن ينتقل من نسبة إلى الجزء الأول من الحرارة إلى نسبة إلى الجزء الثاني، فهو ينتقل بين نسبة إلى نسبة على اتصال، فله إلى جزء الحرارة مع انقطاع سلوك المنشن على إجزء الحرارة - (23).

IBN - SINA.

زو الفعل) وهو نسبة الجوهر التي أمر موجود عنده غير قار الذات.

23. Dunlop, "Categories " ... 25
9. **PASSION.**

وأما الانفعال: فما يقابله،
وهو استمرار نأثر الشيء بغيره، كتسخين الماء، وتريره، وتسووه وتببله، و
النسخ غير السخونة، والتسوود غير
السود; فإن السخونة والسود من
الكيفية التي لا تحتاج في نصورها الى
الاختلاف الى الغير -

وإذاما لغنى بالانفعالات: التأثر
والتغير والانتقال من حال الى حال، حيث
تتراجد السخونة، او تنتقص -

24. **IS., Nai.** ... 82
كان كان مستنفر كنان منكعغ
بالسخونة، ولم يكن منفعلًا - (25)

AL-FARABI

وكان منفعل هو مصير الجوهر
من شئ إلى شئ وتغيير من أسر إلى أسر، وما
دام سالكا فيما بين الألربين على اتصال يقال
فيه أنه منفعل - و قد يكون ذلك من كيفية
الكيفية، مثل مصير الجسم من السواد إلى
البيض، وهو النبيض، ومصيره من البرودة
الحرارة، وهو الساخن، فإن جنس ما
ينفعل، ففي خسره منه ما كان فيه أو لا قليلًا
فليلا أو شيءًا شيئًا على اتصال، حتى يأتي
ينقطع سلوكه فيقف، فهو في كل وقت
حين ما ينفعل على جزء مما يحدث فيه
غير محصل، و على جزء مما يحدث عنه
غير محصل، فإن الذي ينطفخ نفوذه عند
سلاكه إلى الحرارة يحدث فيه أولاً فاولاً

25. Ghaz., Kāg. ... I65
على اتصال جزء جزء من اجزاء الاحرارة وبحصر
عنه جزء جزء من اجزاء البرودة ؛ الا انه لم
كن أن يحصل لما دام لم ينفع اى جزء حدث فيه من
الاحرارة ؛ ولا كى مقدار ما حدث منها فيه ؛ و
لا اى جزء بطل من البرودة ولا كى مقداره
فانه كلما اردت به ان تجد جزء قد حدث
فيه من الاحرارة او تجد جزء قد بطل في
البرودة او مقدارامها ؛ تجد كى كى يزال عن
ذوى الجزء وعن ذلك المقدار ، الى ان
ينتهى الى اخر ما عليه تلك فيقف - فحينئذ
يمكن ان تجد اى جزء حدث وكم مقدار
ما حصل فيه - (26)

26. Dunlop, "Categories " ... 24

27. IS., ناى. ... ... 82
3. COMPARATIVE STUDY.

1. QUANTITY. (KAMMIYYA).

Al-Farabī propounds the view that 'Quantity is everything of which the totality can be measured by a part of it, e.g. a number, a line, a surface, a solid, and time, and expressions and utterances. For if any number whatever be taken, it possesses a part which may be measured or the equivalent of a part, e.g. five, for they measure one five times, and ten, for they measure two five times.' (1)

Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Farabī and asserts that quantity is something which in its essence is capable of accepting equality, inequality and division.

Al-Ghazālī states that quantity is an accident which attaches to substance in respect to measurement (increase, decrease and equality, such as, length, width, depth and time).

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā.

1. Dunlop, "Categories" ... 186
Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that quantity refers to certain measurement of things, and then he systematically arranges al-Fārābī's account by clearly pointing out that quantity indicates a certain amount of a thing in order to determine it. Al-Ghazālī's account appears to be closer to this.

2. QUALITY. (KAYFIYYA).

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that 'Quality is in general the forms by which it is said of the individuals how they are. These are used in answer to the question concerning each separate individual, How is it? In describing them our saying 'of the individuals' is a necessary condition to distinguish between them and the differentiae, for the differentiae are also qualities, since they are forms by which it is said how the species are.

... As for (the qualities) which denote natural power and the absence of natural power, their species are mutually opposing, one kind entering into what denotes power, and the other into what denotes the absence of power, e.g. hardness and softness, for hardness comes under natural power, and softness under its absence.
What denotes natural power are the natural dispositions by which bodies act with ease and are acted upon with difficulty, and what denotes absence of power are the natural dispositions by which bodies act with difficulty and are acted upon with ease, e.g. strength and weakness, for strength is a natural disposition to act with ease and be acted upon with difficulty, and weakness is a natural disposition to act with difficulty and be acted upon with ease.

\[\ldots\]

The passive quality is of two kinds, one in the body, viz. the sense-perceptions, like colours, tastes, scents, and sensations of touch, like heat and cold, and another kind in the soul, viz. the passions or affections of the natural soul, such as anger, pity, fear and the like.\[1\] (2)

Ibn-Sīnā does not fundamentally differ from al-Fārābī. According to him, quality indicates every fixed form in a body, the mere existence of which does not necessitate any relationship of the body to the outside nor any actual relationship within its parts nor does its totality have an aspect by which it should consist of parts, such as whiteness and blackness.

2. Dunlop, "Categories" ... 190
It is either specific to the quantity in respect of its being a measurable thing like squareness of the surface, straightness of the line and oddness in number; or it is not specific to it in which case it would either be perceptible in such a manner that the senses are affected by it and mixtures are created as its effects. So the thing which is firmly established (such as yellowness of gold and sweetness of honey), is called a responsive quality, but that which quickly passes away even if it is really a quality, is not called a quality, rather it is called a response because of the quickness of the change (like the redness of blushing and yellowness of fear).

Or it is such that one of them is not perceptible. This would either consist of capacities which can however be imagined in mind with reference to entelechies. If it is a capacity for withstanding and resistance to response, it is called a natural power (as are the cases of healthiness and hardness.). If it is a capacity for quick surrender and for response, it is not called a natural power (as are sickliness and softness). Or these could be entelechies in themselves, that is, they cannot be imagined as the capacities for other entelechies,
and despite that they are not perceptible in themselves by the senses. Now out of them whatever is established is called a [stable] disposition (such as knowledge and sound health); and whatever quickly passes away is called a [variable] state, (such as, the anger of a forbearing person and sickness of a healthy individual).

Al-Ghazālī states that quality is that which does not require "turning to an external thing". Moreover, nothing can be brought under division because of it. His examples, from things perceptible through the senses, are colours, tastes, odours, roughness, smoothness, softness, hardness, moisture, dryness, heat and cold.

And the things which are not perceptible through the senses are those which have a propensity for entelechy or its contrary (like the power of wrestling and sound health, and weakness and sickliness).

It is from these that is derived entelechy, such as knowledge and intelligence.
Here al-Ghazālī's account appears to correspond to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā's account is seen to be a rearrangement of al-Fārābī's detailed views and as such is in basic agreement with al-Fārābī. However, al-Ghazālī's account appears indirectly to correspond to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Moreover, he divides the course of his discussion in two ways, one dealing with examples from things perceptible through the senses, and the other with things not perceptible through the senses. This methodical division of examples has no clear relationship to Ibn-Sīnā here, and as such, it would appear to be an "addition".

3. RELATION. (IDĀFA).

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that 'Relation is a connexion between two things by which in itself each of them is spoken of with reference to the other. This connexion is taken for the first of them and is spoken of with reference to the other. The same connexion is taken for the second, and is spoken of with reference to the first. The two things, each of which is spoken of with reference to the other on account of this connexion, they being its subjects, are named relatives and correlatives, and there is employed in referring each one of them to the other one
of the particles of connexion, such as min 'from', ilā 'to', ma'a 'with', and the like. Each one of the two must have a name which indicates it qua related to its counterpart by one of the kinds of Relation, e.g. father and son, for there is between them a single connexion, by which each is spoken of with reference to the other, for the father is the father of the son, and the son is the son of the father. The identical connexion when taken as a description of one is called paternity, and when taken as a description of the other is called sonship. The name of one of them as described by it is father, and the name of the other as described by the same thing is son. They are opposite terms, and similarly servant and master.' (3)

Ibn-Sīnā basically agrees with al-Fārābī, and asserts that relation is one of the ten categories; and its existence arises in the comparison of one thing with another. Apart from this it cannot have any existence at all; just as fatherhood with reference to sonhood is not like the father. For the father has an existence which specifies him in the capacity of human being.

3. Dunlop, "Categories" ... 193.
Al-Ghazālī states that relation is a mode of substance which happens accidentally because of other elements being in its counterpart, (as in the cases of fatherhood, sonship, brotherhood, friendship, "neighbourship", parallelism and being on right and left). Because fatherhood cannot be attributed to a father until there is a son corresponding to him.

Here al-Ghazālī's account appears to correspond closely to that of Ibn-Sīna. Ibn-Sīna agrees with al-Fārābī on the one hand and summarises his detailed views on the other; and with this al-Ghazālī's account fully corresponds.

4. PLACE. (AYN).

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that 'Where? [Place] is the relation of the body to its place, but it is not place, nor the combination of body and place. In general, it is the thing which is such that it answers the question concerning where the thing is, as when we say 'In the house', for the Where? is not the house but what is understood from our saying 'In the house', the particle fī [= 'in'] pointing to the relation to the house.
Every natural body possesses one of the species of Where?, for instance, mankind, then the remaining species of animal, the species of plants and stones, then the rest of the world. ... and Where? relatively is 'above', 'below', 'higher', 'lower', 'right', 'left', 'infront', 'behind', 'round', 'in the middle', 'between', 'near', 'at', 'with', 'upon', and the like, except that a body does not have a relative Where? unless it has Where? essentially.' (4)

Ibn-Sīnā does not fundamentally differ from al-Fārābī. He asserts that place is the existence of substance in a particular place where it manifests itself, (such as, Zaid is in the market).

Al-Ghazālī states that place is an existence of something in a particular place as is the case of its being above and below.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā. The views of Ibn-Sīnā appear to be a summary of al-Fārābī's detailed account. So al-Ghazālī's brief account is found to be closer to that of Ibn-Sīnā. On the other hand, his example of

4. Dunlop, "Categories" ... 38.
'above and below' is in direct agreement with that of al-Farābī.

5. **TIME. (MATĀ)**

Al-Farābī propounds the view that 'When? [Time] is the relation of the thing to the definite time whose existence synchronizes with its existence and whose two limits coincide with the two limits of its existence, or a definite time of which this is a part. The meaning of When? is not time as such nor anything composed of substance and time, as some think. In ordinary use this expression is employed to ask concerning the definite time of a thing. The logicians make it a name pointing to a thing, such that it is used in answer to the question concerning when the thing was or will be. The definite time is that which is defined according to its remoteness from now, either in the past or in the future, and that either by its having a well-known name pointing to it in relation to now in the past and future, in the past as when we say 'yesterday', 'the day before yesterday', 'last year', 'the year before last', 'a year ago', 'two years ago', and in the future as when we say 'to-morrow' or 'the day after to-morrow', 'next-year', 'till this day year', 'till this day two years', or something occurring in it, the distance of which from now is known, as when we say 'in the time of King Heraclius' or
or 'during such and such a war'.

Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī and asserts that time implies an occurrence of something at the particular time in which it is, (as is the occurrence of this thing yesterday).

Al-Ghazālī states that time is the occurrence of something at a particular time (as is the case of its occurring yesterday, last year, and to-day).

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā's account appears to be a summary of al-Fārābī's views, and as such al-Ghazālī's account corresponds fully to this brief statement. On the other hand, his examples of last year and to-day are in direct agreement with those of al-Fārābī.

6. **POSITION. (WAD)**

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that 'Position is that the definite parts of the body match definite parts of the place in which it is or coincide with them. That applies to everybody,

5. Dunlop, "Categories" ... 37.
because everybody possesses a Where? according to a certain position. [Take,] for example, the case of man. He has many kinds of Position, such as standing, sitting, rising up, lying on his side, leaning back, lying prone and supine. His definite parts, such as his head, back, shoulders, &c. are each of them in each of these positions matching a part of the place in which he is or coincident with it, and when his position alters, those same parts come to match other parts of the place.' (6)

Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī and asserts that position implies the existence of a body in such a way that any relationship of its parts with each other is concerned with inclination and parallelism in comparison with the dimension and parts of any place whatever, (such as, standing and sitting).

Al-Ghazālī states that position indicates a relationship of the parts of a body with each other (like its being in the state of sitting, lying, and standing; for with a difference of with regard to two (lower) differs from that of position of two thighs &. legs the state of standing &. sitting.)

6. Dunlop, "Categories" ... 39.
Here al-Ghazali's account corresponds closely to that of Ibn-Sina. Ibn-Sina's account appears to be a summary of al-Farabi's views, and with this al-Ghazali's account corresponds fully. But his examples are found to be in direct agreement with those of al-Farabi.

7. POSSESSION. (Milk).

Al-Farabi propounds the view that 'State is the relation of a body to the body which coincides with it or with part of it, when that which coincides is transferred by the transference of that which is included by it, e.g. being clothed, wearing sandals and being armed, for being clothed points to the relation of the body to another body which coincides with its surface, when that which includes is transferred by the transference of that which is included by it. Wearing sandals also points to a similar meaning, except that it applies to a part of the body, and similarly being armed.' (7)

Ibn-Sina agrees with al-Farabi and asserts that possession (or property) implies the existence of one substance which includes another and moves with its transfer, (such as clothing and armament).

7. Dunlop, "Categories" ... 40.
Al-Ghazālī states that possession implies the existence of something in such a way that it is surrounded by what moves in its transfer, (as are the cases of being turbanned, clothed with a shirt, furnished with shoes, bridled and saddled).

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that possession implies the existence of one reality including another and coinciding with it. Moreover, it moves with its transference. Ibn-Sīnā systematically arranges al-Fārābī's views in his brief statement. Al-Ghazālī's account appears to be closer to this. On the other hand, his examples of 'Ka-Kawni-hi mutatallisen, wa mutacamman, wa mutaqammisan, wa mutanacilan, wa kawn al-faras muljaman wa musrajan' appear to be "additions".

8. **ACTION.** (FL).

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that 'Action is that the agent should be transferred continually over the relations which it has with the parts of what is coming into existence in the thing which is acted upon, when it is acted upon. For the agent is that from which came into existence one after another continually, in the body which is acted upon, the several parts
of that towards which tends what is acted upon. Thus the relation of the agent to every part coming into existence is different from its relation to the other part, since it is agent for every one of those parts, and the agent is transferred over its relation to the several parts of what is coming into existence in what is transferred, gradually, like the course of the body which is acted upon over the several parts of what is coming into existence in it. For example, that which warms, during the time when it warms that which is being warmed, has a relation to the several parts of the heat which is coming into existence in what is being warmed, and just as that which is being warmed is transferred continually from one part of the heat to another, so that which warms is transferred from its relation to the first part of the heat to its relation to the second part. It is thus transferred from relation to relation continually, [and] sometimes the cessation of its course over the relations which it has with the parts of the heat coincides with the cessation of the course of what is being warmed over the parts of the heat.' (8)

Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī and asserts that action is the relation of substance to a thing existent out of it whose essence is not permanent, rather it is continually renewed and interrupted, (e.g. heating and cooling).

8. Dunlop, "Categories" ... 42.
Al-Ghazālī states that action implies the existence of something as active while its existence actually affects other things, (e.g. occurrence of fire in the state of burning at the time of getting combustion and being heated).

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of al-Fārābī. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that action indicates the relationship of something with that which is acted upon. Al-Fārābī further asserts that action implies that the active element is continually transferred in the relationship, for things come into existence one after another through the active element and its relationship to every part coming into existence is different. Hence, al-Ghazālī's account appears to be closer to this.

9. **PASSION. (INFIQAL).**

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that 'Passion is the transition of the substance from one thing to another and its change from something to something else. What continues to move between the two things without interruption is said to be in this Category. [The movement] is sometimes from quality to quality, as the transition of the body from blackness to whiteness, i.e. the
whitening process, and its passage from cold to heat, i.e. the warming process, which is a kind of Passion. There is lost from it gradually or piecemeal without interruption what was in it at first, till its movement ceases and it stops. All the time when it is acted upon, it is made up of indeterminate parts of what is coming into existence in it and what is being lost from it. For in the movement towards heat of something being warmed there come into existence in it imperceptibly without interruption successive parts of heat, and there are lost from it successive parts of cold, but it is not possible to determine, as long as the process is not complete, what part of heat has come into existence in it nor what amount of it, nor what part of cold has been lost nor what amount. For whenever you wish to define a part of heat which has come into existence in it or to define a part of cold which has been lost or an amount of it, you find that it has passed from that part and from that amount, till it reaches the last stage and stops. Then it is impossible to define what part has come into existence, and what is the amount of what has accrued in it.' (9)

Ibn-Sīnah agrees with al-Fārābī and asserts that passion is the relation of a substance to an inherent disposition of this quality, (e.g. being interrupted and becoming hot).

9. Dunlop, "Categories" ... 40.
Al-Ghazālī states that passion is opposite to action. It represents continuity in being affected by something other than itself, (e.g. the water’s becoming cold, or black, white - becoming heat and black is not blackness, for heat and blackness are qualities which do not require "turning to other things").

However, passion implies sensivity, change, transformation from one state to another where heat increases and decreases. If it continues, it becomes qualitative with the heat, and it can no longer be affected.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of al-Fārābī. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that passion is the relation of a substance to a disposition for being affected. Moreover, al-Fārābī asserts that "What continues to move between two things without interruption is said to be in this Category. [The movement] is sometimes from quality to quality, as the transition of the body from blackness to whiteness, i.e. the whitening process, and its passage from cold to heat i.e. the warming process which is a kind of passion ..." Al-Ghazālī's account appears to be closer to this.
4. RESULT.

Al-Ghazalī's accounts correspond to those of al-Fārūbī in points 8 and 9, and to those of Ibn-Sīnā in points 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. Moreover, his examples are found to be in direct agreement with al-Fārūbī in points 4, 5, and 6.

On the other hand, certain "additions" have been observed in al-Ghazalī's points 2 and 7.
CHAPTER SIX

GOD.
1. **BRIEF INTRODUCTION.**

In this chapter al-Ghazālī discusses the problem of God. He begins this discussion by dividing existence into two kinds. One is what is dependent upon another thing for its existence. The other is what is not so dependent; rather it forms an absolute which requires nothing for the completion of its nature and is necessary by its essence alone. The latter kind belongs to the Essence of God whose nature is analyzed and described by the following twelve characteristics:

(i) God cannot be an accident, for the accident is dependent upon body on the one hand and is contingent on the other.

(ii) He cannot be a body, for the body is quantitatively divisible into parts, and is composed of matter and form.

(iii) He is not like any form of a particular thing connected with matter. Similarly, He is not like matter which is the place of form.
(iv) His Being is not other than His quiddity, and His identity and quiddity form a unity.

(v) He is not dependent upon another thing in the same manner as that thing is dependent upon Him; that is, the existence of each of them being the cause of the other.

(vi) He is not related to any other thing as that other is related to Him by way of reciprocity.

(vii) There cannot be two things each of which is equally necessary and independent by itself without any dependence on the other.

(viii) There is no attribute which can augment His Essence.

(ix) His nature is unchangeable, for any change consists in the coming-into-being of a new quality.

(x) Nothing can proceed unmediated from Him
except one thing, and multiplicity results successively.

(xi) As He is not called an accident, He is not called a substance either even though He subsists with Himself apart from any place.

(xii) All that is other than He emanates from Him in proper succession. He is only one and He is not more than one, for whatever can be enumerated is simply contingent.

All contingent beings require causes which necessarily ascend to Him who is the single and pure Being. He is the source of existence for all things and His Being is the most perfect one. His relation to the world is similar to that of the sun which shines upon all bodies and spreads its beams over them out of its essence and not from anyother thing.

My investigation in this chapter is concerned with the materials of the above twelve points.
2. ANALOGOUS VIEWS.

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

I. GOD IS NOT AN ACCIDENT.

الأول: إنه لا يكون عرضاً;
لأنه يتعلق بالجسم، ويلزم عدمه بعدم
الجسم، ونحن عبرنا بواجب الوجود عما لا
علاقته له مع غيره البينه.
فالعرض ممكن، وكل ممكن
موجود بغيره - و ذلك الغير علته، فيكون
معلولاً، لامحالته. - (أ)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

و كذلك عظمته وجلاله و
مجده وان العظمة و الجلاله و الماجد في الشهاب

I. Ghaz., Mag. ... 210
انما يكون بحسب كماله اما في جوهره واما في عرض من خواصه و اكثرا يقال ذلك فينا انما هو كمال ما لنا في عرض من اعراضنا مثل البسار والعلم وفي شيء من اعراض البدن و الاول لما كان كمالا بابنا لكل كمال كانت عظمته وجلاله ومجدنا بابنا لكل ذي عظمة ومجد وكانت عظمته ومجدنا الخيات فيما له من جوهره لا في شيء اخر خارج عن جوهره وذاته و يكون ذا عظمة في ذاته او ذا مجد في ذاته اجله غيره او لم بجله عظمة غيره او لم بعظمه مجد غيره ام لم بمجده و الجمال و الهاجه والزينة في كل موجود هو ان يوجد وجودة الأفضل و يحمل له كماله الاخير و اذ كان الأول وجودة افضل الموجود فجماله ثابت لجمال كل ذي الجمال و كذلك زينته و بهاوته. (2)

IBN - SINĀ.

(ن) أعلمنا الموجود اما ان يكون

2. Diet., Must. (Text) ... I3
له سبب في وجوده أو لا سبب له فان كان
له سبب فهو الممكن سواء كان قبل الوجود
اذا فرضنا في الذهن أو في حالة الوجود لان
ما يمكن وجوده فدخلته في الوجود للازل
الله امكان الوجود وان لم يكن له سبب في
وجوده بوجه من الوجود فهو واجب الوجود
فذا لتفخفت هذه القاعدة فالدليل على ان
في الوجود موجود الا السبب له في وجوهه ما
اقوله 
فهذا الوجود اما ممكن الوجود
أو واجب الوجود فان كان واجب الوجود فقد
ثبت ما طلبنا وان كان ممكن الوجود فممكن
الوجود لا يدخل في الوجود الا بسبب يرجع
وجوده على عدمه فان كان سبب امضا ممكن
الوجود فهذا تتخلل الممكنات ببعضها بعض
فلا يكون موجود البتة لان هذا الوجود الذي
فرضناه لا يدخل في الوجود مالس يسبقه
وجود مالا يتناهي وهو مجال فذا الممكنات
تنتهي بواجب الوجود - (7)
(iii) و بيان أنه ليس بعرض أن

العرض هو الموجود في الموضوع فيكون الموضوع مقدما عليه ولا يمكن وجوده دون الموضوع و قد ذكرنا أن واجب الوجود لا سبب
له في وجوده - (4)

ل(iii) و بيان أنه لا يجوز أن يكون

واجب الوجود من وجه ممكن الوجود من وجه
انه من الوجه الذي هو ممكن الوجود يكون
متعلق الوجود بالغير و يكون له سبب ومن
الوجه الذي هو واجب الوجود يكون مقطع
العلاقة فيكون الوجود له و لا يكون له و
هذا مثال - (5)

4. IS., Arsh. ... 4

5. Ibid ... 5
2. **He is not a body.**

الثاني: أنه لا يكون جسماً من وجوهين.

developers من كل جسم منقسم بالكمية إلى أجزاء فتكون الجملة منفصلة بالاجزاء، فلو قدر عدم الأجزاء، لزم عدمه، كالانسان الذي يلزم عدمه، بتقدير عدم أجزاءه.

و قد ذكرنا ان كل جملة نهي معلقة بالجزأء؟ فلهذا لا يجوز ان يكون واجب الوجود مركبا من أجزاء.

فانه إذا فقيل لنا: لم كان الحبر موجوداً؟ قلنا: لأنه كان الماء والخفض والزاج، والاجتماع، فحصل من المجموع الحبر. فهذة الأجزاء علامة الجملة، وهكذا اجزاء كل مركب علامة للمركب.
والآخر: إن الجسم قد ثبت
أنه مركب من الصورة والهيولي، فلقد عدم
الهيولي انعدام الجسم، فلو عدم عدم الصورة
انعدام -
و نحن على جواب الوجود
وعنا بحاجة الوجود ما لم يلزم عدمه بعدم
غير ذاته - واما يلزم عده، اذا قدر عدم
ذاته فقط - (6)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

(زا) ولا الأهمية له مثل الجسم اذ
قالت أنه موجود فاكه الموجود شيء وحد الجسم
شيء، سوى أنه واجب الوجود و هذا وجوده - (7)

(زب) ولا يجوز أن يكون جسيما و
سطعا وخطا ونقطة أن الجسم مركب من المادة
وصورة فالمادة و الصورة علتان للجسم، قيام

6. Ghaz., Kāf. ... 210
7. Diet., Abh. (Text) ... 57
السطوح والخطوط والنقطة بالجسم وفواض الجسم بالمقارنة والصورة وكل ذلك ينافي وجود الوجود بذاته فهو واحد من جميع الموجودات وقد عقل ذاته بل عقل ذاته هو بذاته لا شيء آخر.

سوي ذاته يكون ذلك الشيء سببًا في تعقل ذاته بل عقل ذاته بذاته وكان من حيث اند عقل عاقلًا ومن حيث انة معقول ذاته معقولًا ومن حيث انة عقل ذاته بذاته لا شيء آخر خارج وصبيان عقلًا (8).

(8) أو إنه واحد بمعنى إنه غير منقسم انقسام العظام وسائر الكمياد تيلزم أن يكون للكمية لها وان يكون لائيان له ولا منته وانه ليس بجسم وأنه واحد بمعنى أن وجوده الذي هو في ذاته وجود ليس هو غير وجوده الذي به ينصح عن الموجودات الآخر وانه لا يضر له وإن أنه خير ما خض بهذه الثلاثة فيه بمعنى واحد (9).

8. Far.; زینوّ ... 5
9. Far.; دا ای ... 3
قد صع لنا فيما تقدمنا من القول ان الواجب الموجود بدانته واحد، وإن ليس بجسيم ولا نبي جسيم ولا منقسم بوجه من الوجه، فاذن الموجودات كلها وجودها عنه، ولا يجوز أن يكون له مبدأ بوجه من الوجود ولا سبب لدلاً عن؟ ولا الذي فيه أو به يكون، ولا الذي له، حتى يكون للأجل شيء - (10)

و نقول أيضاً أن الواجب الموجود لا يجوز أن يكون لذاته مباديء تجتمع فيقوم منها واجب الوجود لا أجزاء الكمية ولا إجزاء الأحدث والقول سواء كانت كهيئة المادة والصوره أو كانت على وجه آخر، لأن تكون أجزاء القول الشارح لمعنى اسمه فيدله كل واحد منها على شيء هو غير الوجود غير الآخر بذلك - و بذلك لأن كل ما هذا صفتاه فذات كل جزء منه ليس هو ذات الآخر ولا ذات المجتمع فما أن يصح لكل واحد.

IO. Is., Ilah(2)... 402
من جزئيه مثللا وجود منفرد لكنه لا يصبح للمجتمع وجود دونها فلا يكون المجتمع واجب الوجود أو يصبح ذلك لبعضها ولكن لا يصبح للمجتمع وجود دونه فما لا يصبح له من المجتمع والاجزاء الأخرى وجود منفرد فليس واجب الوجود و ليس لكي يكون واجب الوجود إلا الذي يصبح له وان كان لا يصبح للكل الاجزاء ومعرفة الجملة في الوجود ولا للجملة معرفة الاجزاء وتعلق وجود كل بالآخر وليس واحدا قدم بان ذات فليس شيء منها يواجب الوجود (فقد اوضحت
هذا على ان الاجزاء بالذات اقدم من الكل) فتكون العلة الموجبة للوجود توجب أو لا الاجزاء ثم الكل ولا يكون شيء منها واجب الوجود و ليس يمكننا ان نقول ان الكل اقدم بالذات من الاجزاء فهو إذا كان أخر وما معنا كيف كان فليس بواجب الوجود -

فقد اتضح من هذا أن واجب الوجود ليس بجسم ولا المادة جسم ولا صورة جسم ونسبة معرفة بصورة معرفة إلا
صورة معقولة في مادة معقولة ولا له فسامة
لا في الكبد ولا في المباري ولا في اللثولا فهو
واحد من هذه الأجهزة الثلاثة - (1a)

(111) واما برهان اده لا علة له
صورية ان العلة الصرورية الجسمية اما تكون
و تتحقق عدا كاست له مادة فتكون للمادة
شركة في وجود الصورة كما ان للصورة حظا في
تقوم للمادة في الوجود و بالفعل فيكون
معلولا و يظهر من انتفاء هذه العلة عليه
انتفاء جميع العوارض الجسمانية من الزمان
و المكان و الجهة و الانتصاص بمكان و على
الجملة فكل ما يجوز على الأجسام يستعمل
عليه...

واما برهان اده لا علة له غائبة
و كما لان العلة الغائبة ما يكون لاجل شيء
و الحقيقة أول لا يكون لاجل شيء بل كل شيء لاجل
كامل ذاته وتابع لوجوده و مستفاد من وجوده
ثم العلة الغائبة وان كانت لان وجود متأخرة

II. IS., Naj. ... 227
3. HE IS NOT LIKE FORM AND MATTER.

الثالث: ان واجب الموجود لا يكون مثل الصورة ؛ لأنها منحلة بالهيرولي:

I2. IS., Arsh. ... 6
I3. Ibid ... 15
ولا يكون أيضا مثل الهيالى، التي هي محل الصورة، التي لا توجد الأمعى؛ لأن الهيالى توجد بالفعل مع الصورة، ويلزم من عدم الصورة، عدم الهيالى خلها تتعلق بالغير. (14)

AL - FARĀBĪ.

ولأنه ليس بمادة ولا مادة، بل يوجد من الوجه خانة بحسبه عقل بالفعل.
لأن المائع للصورة من أن تكون عقلاً؛ لأن تعقل بالفعل هو المادة التي فيها يوجد الشيء ثمتي كان الشيء في وجوده غير محتمل إلى مادة كان ذلك الشيء بحسبه عقلاً بالفعل، ونل ذلك حال الأول فهو إذن عقل بالفعل وهو أيضا معقول بحسبه. (15)

I4. Ghaz., Mag. ... 2II
I5. Diet., Must. (Text) 9
ران:) فانه ليس بمادة ولا القوامه في مادة ولا موضع اصلا بل يوجد خلوص من كل مادة ومن كل موضع ولا ايضا لضرورة لأن الصورة لا يمكن ان تكون الا من مادة وللكلانة صورة لكان ذاتية مؤتلفة من مادة وصورة و لا كان كذلك لكان قوامه بجزئيه الذتين منهما انتفه ولكان لوجوده سبب فان كل واحد من اجزائه سبب لوجود جملته وقد وضعنا انه سبب اول ولا ايضا لوجوده غرض وغاية حتى يكون انما وجوده ليثبت تلك الغاية و ذلك الغرض ولا لكان يكون ذلك سببا ما لوجوده فلا يكون سببا اولا ولا ايضا استفاد وجوده من شيء اخر اقعد منه وهو من ان يكون استفاد ذلك مما هو دونه ابعد ـ (16)

Ibn - Sinā.

ان واجب الوجود واحد

I6. Diet., Must.(Text) ... 5
بالعدد، و بان ان ما سواه اذا اعتبار ذاته كان ممكنة في وجودة، فكان محلولا، و لاح انه ينبغي في المخلوطة لامكانية البه، فاذن كل شيء الا الواحد الذي هو ذاته واحد، والوجود الذي هولداه موجود؟ فهو مستنفيز الوحيد عن غيره، و هو ايس به، و ليس في ذاته؟ و هذا يعني كون الشيء مبدعا ايا نائل الموجود عن غيره؟ و له عدم يستحقوه في ذاته مطلق، ليس انما يستحقوه عدم بصورة دون مادته، او بمادته دون صورته، بل بكليته، بكليته اذا لم تقترن بإيجاب الموجود له؟ و احتمسه انه منقطع عنه وجب عدمه بكليته، فذان ايجاده عن الموجود له بكليته، فليس جزء منه يسبق وجودة بالقياس الى هذا المعنى للحاده و لاصورته، انا كان ذا مادهة و صورة — (7)

(ii) Compare the last paragraph of Ibn-Sīna's point no. 2(ii) in page 176.

17. IS., Ilah. (2) ... 342
4. HIS BEING IS QUIDDITY.

الرابع: هو أنه لا يكون وجود غير ماهيته، بل ينبغي أن تنحدر ابنته وماهيته، إذ قد سبق أن الانية غير الماهية، وأن الوجود الذي هو الانية عبارة عن عارق للماهية.

و ان كل عارق لمسلم، لأنه لو كان موجوداً بذاته، لما كان عارضاً لغيره. و اذما كان عارضاً لغيره، فلله تعالى بغيره؟ إذ لا يكون الامعه.

وعلة الوجود لا تخلو:

إما أن تكون هي الماهية. او غيرها، فان كاشت غيرها، فيكون الوجود عارضاً مطلولاً، ولا يكون واجب الوجود.

و باطل ان تكون الماهية، بنفسها.
سبيلاً لوجود نفسها؛ لأن الحدم لا يكون
سبيلاً للوجود - والماهية - لوجود له قبل هذا
الوجود، كيف تكون سبيلاً له؟

و لو كان لها وجود قبل هذا
الوجود، لكانت مستغنенная عن وجود ثان - ثم
كان هذا السؤال لازماً في ذلك الوجود، فانه
عرض فيها - فمن اين عرض له، ولزم؟

فثبت ان واجب الوجود أنيته،
ماهته، و كان وجب الوجود له، كالماهية
لغيره. - (8)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

(9) هو الموجود الأول وان الواجب
الوجود به ذاته حتى فرض غير موجود لزم منه
المحال وانه هو السبب الأول لوجود سائر

I8. Ghaz., Mag. ... 2II
الوجودات فيكون وجودة أقدم الوجود و
الله بريء من جميع اتخاذ النقض فيكون
وجوده اكمل وانه لا علة له فاعلية و
لا غاية ولا صورية ولا مادية وان
وجوده ليس لاحقا لماهية غير الوجود
وانه لماهية له غير انه واجب الوجود
و هي ابتها - (19)

(11) فوجودة افضل الوجود و
اقدم الوجود ولا يمكن ان يكون وجود
افضل ولا اقدم من وجودة وهو من
فضيلة الوجود في اعلى انكائه ومن كمال
الوجود في ارفع المراتب ولذلك لا يمكن
ان يشبه وجودة وجودة عدد
إصله - (20)

(iii) فان الأول منفرد وجودة
لا يشاركه شيء انراصلا موجود ني نوع
19. Par., Daawi ... 3
20. Diet., Must.(Text) ... 5
وجودة فهو اذن واحد وهو مع ذلك منفرد أيضاً برتبتة وحدة فهو أيضاً واحد من هذة الوجهة - (2)

IBN - SĪNA.

بيان الله لا تكون ماهيته غير ابنيته بل ينحد وجودة في حقيته انه اذا لم يكن وجودة نفس حقيقته فيكون وجودة (1) نفس حقيقته وكل عارفي فمحلول لكل محلول محتاج الى السبب فهذا السبب اما ان يكون دارجاً على ماهيته او يكون هو ماهيته فان كان دارجاً فلا يكون واجب الوجود ولا يكون منزها عن المثولة الفاعلة وإن كان السبب

(1) كذا ولله خيكون وجودة غير نفس الله - 21. Diet., Must. (Text) ... 8
He is not (causally) related to anything as that thing is (causally) related to him.

5.

AL - GHAZÁLÍ.

22. IS. Arsh. ... 4
الخامس: إنه لا يتعلق
بغير على وجه يتعلق ذلك الغير به على
معنى كون كل واحد منهما علة الآخر، فان
هذا إلى غير واجب الوجود محال وهو أن
يكون: (رب) علة (ز) و (ز) علة (رب)
لذان (رب) من حيث أنه علة
فهو تقبل (ز) و (ز) من حيث أنه علة.
فهو تقبل (رب) من حيث قبله.
فيكون قبل ما هو قبله، وهو محال. و يكون كل واحد منهما تقبل
صاحب، من حيث أنه علة. و بعدة من
حيث أنه محال. و ذلك ظاهر
البطلان. (23)

23. Ghaz., Kagh. ... 212
الواجب الوجود من فور
غير موجود لزم منه محال ولا علة لوجوده
ولا يجوز كون ووجوده كبيره وهو السبب
الأول لوجود الاستنباء ـ (23)

(ان كان) كل شيء في عالم
الكون وفساد مما لا يمكن مكان خليل الكون
ممكن الوجود إذ لو كان ممنوع الوجود لما
وجد ولو كان واجب الوجود لكان ليزل و
لا يوجد موجودا وممكن الوجود يحتاج في
الوجود الى علة تتخرجه من العدم الوجود فكل
مانه وجود لاعن ذا هنه فهو ممكن الوجود و
كل ممكن الوجود موجودة عن غيره وذلك
الغير ان كان ممكن الوجود فالكلام فيه
كل الكلام فيما نتكلم فيه فلا بد وان يكون

24. Diet., Abh. (Text) ... 57
وجود ما هو ممكن الوجود يستند إلى الواجب الوجود بذاته ولا يجوز أن يكون الشيء علة نفسها لأن العلة تتقدم على المعلول بالذات وذللك إذا أذنا (ر) علة (ب) فاننا تعني بذلك: ان وجود (ب) من وجود (ا) بالفعل وقضية هذا تقتضى أن يكون وجود العلة متقدما على المعلول ولا يكون للشيء وجودان. احدهما متقدم وعلاقة والآخر متاخر ومعلول حتى يكون الشيء علة نفسها.

(و بهذا) الطريق يعلم انه لا يجوز أن تكون ماهية الشيء بسبب لوجود العارض للماهية لأن وجود العلة هو سبب في وجود المعلول وليس للماهية وجودان احدهما مفيد و الآخر مستفيد ولا يجوز أن يكون شيئان كل واحد منها علة للآخر مثل (ا) و (ب) فيكون (ا) علة لوجود (ب) و (ب) علة لوجود (ا) فان وجوعد (ب) إذا كان من (ا) وجب ان يكون وجود (ا) متقدما على وجوعد (ب) فلا.
لا يكون معلوماً وذلك يقتضى أن يكون (را) من حيث هو علة (رب) متقدماً ذي وجودة على رب و من حيث هو معلوم (رب) متأخر في وجوده عن وجود (رب) فتكون نفي اعتبار واحد موجوداً معدوماً و يكون (رب) علة نفسه لان علة العلمة علة فيما كان (رب) علة (را) و يكون (را) علة (رب) كان (رب) علة نفسه و يؤدئ ذلك الي إن وجودة متقدم على وجوده و ذلك باطل - (25)

Ibn - Sīnā.

(را) و الشيء الواحد لا يكون متقدماً و متأخر بالنسبة الى وجودة و أيضاً لو فرضنا عدم ذلك الاخر فهل هذا يكون واجب الوجود ام لا كان كان واجب الوجود فلا تعقل له بالاخر و ان لم يكن واجب الوجود فهو ممكن الوجود فينتائج الى

25. Far., Zīnūn ... 3
غير واجب الوجود فاذذا واجب الوجود واحد
غير مستفيد الوجود من واجب فاعل واجب الوجود من كل الوجود وخبره مستفيد الوجود من الآخر. (26)

فنقول: ان الواجب الوجود بذاته لا علة له، وان الممكن الوجود بذاته له علة، وان الواجب الوجود بذاته واجب الوجود من جميع جهاته، وان الواجب الوجود لا يمكن ان يكون موجودا مكافئا لوجود آخر فسيكون كل واحد منهما مساويا للآخر في وجب الوجود وينتقلان - وان الواجب الوجود لا يجوز ان يجمع ووجوده عن كثره البينة - وان الواجب الوجود لا يجوز ان تكون الحقيقه التي له مستنكرا فيها بوجه من الوجود، حتى يلزم من تصحيحنا ذلك ان يكون واجب الوجود غير مضاف، ولا مستغير، ولا مستكثر، ولا مشترك في وجدان الذي يخصه -

26. IS., Arsh. ... 5
اما ان الواجب الوجود لا علة
له، فظاهر - والله ان كان الواجب الوجود علة في
وجودته، كان وجوده بها - وكل ما يوجد بانيه.
فاذًا اعتبر بذاته دون غيره لم يجعل له وجود،
وكلما اذى اعتبر بذلكه دون غيره، ولم
 يجعل له يوجد، فليس الواجب الوجود بذاته.
فبين انه ان كان الواجب الوجود بذاته علة لم
يكن الواجب الوجود لعالة له - فقد ظهر ان
الواجب الوجود لعالة له - وظاهر من ذلك
انه لا يجوز ان يكون شيء الواجب الوجود بذاته،
و الواجب الوجود بغيره; لانه ان كان يجعل
وجوده بغيره، فلا يجوز ان يوجد دون غيره.
وكلما لا يجوز ان يوجد دون غيره،
فيستحب وجوده وأجدها بذاته - و لا يوجب
بذاته لحصل - و لا تأثير لأيجبب الغير في
وجودة الذي يؤثر غيره في وجودة فلا يكون
واجبا وجوده في ذاته. (27)

27. IS., Ilah. (I) ... 37
HE IS NOT RELATED TO ANOTHER THING AS THAT OTHER IS RELATED TO HIM BY WAY OF RECIPROCITY.

السادس: هو انه لا يتعلق بغيره، على وجه يتعلق ذلك الغير به، لا بمعنى العلاقة، ولكن على سبيل التضافة، كما بين الأخوين؟ لنقول: ان لم يلزم عدمه عدم ذلك الغير، فلا علاقة له مع ذلك الغير.

و نحن نجوز ان يكون لغير
واجب الوجود علاقة بواجب الوجود؟ كان
المعلوم يتعلق بالعلاقة، والعلاقة لا تتعلق
بالمعلوم.

وا ان كان يلزم عدمه بعدم
ذلك الغير، فهو ممكن لا واجب؟ فان كل ما
 يتعلق بغيره فهو ممكن؟ لا انه لله يخليّه:

اما ان يكفي في وجوده
ذلك الغير، فيكون ذلك الغير وحده علته
و هو معلوله -
و أما أن يحتاج مع ذلك
الغير إلى شيء آخر، فيكون هو معلول الجمع.
و كل ذلك يناقض وجوب الوجود - (28)

AL - FĀRĀḤI.

(أ) (و ليس) كذلك حال المتضايقيين فان لهما ثالثا اواقع علاقة التفاويع
بينهما ولا يجوز ان تكون علل ممكنة لا
نهاية لها لان لكل واحدة منها خاصية
الوسط فتكون معلولة باعتبار و علة باعتبار
و كل ما يكون له خاصية الوسط فله بالضرورة
طرى و الطرى نهاية فيكون استناد الممكنات
إلى وجود واجب الوجود بريغا عن العلل
المادية و الصورية و الغائية و الفاعلية - (29)

28. Ghaz., Mag. ... 212
29. Far., Zīnūn ... 4.
(30) ويلزم أن يكون وجوهه أول وجوه وان ينزل عن جميع انحاء النقص فوجودة اذن تام ويلزم أن يكون وجودة التم الوجوه ومنفها عن الخلل مثل المادة والفرصة والفعل والغابه (30)

TBN-SINA.

(30) ولا يجوز ان يكون شيء واحد واجب الوجود بذاته وبغيره معاً فإنه ان رفع غيره او لم يفعل وجودة لم يكمل اما ان يبقى وجب وجوهه على حاله فلا يكون وجوهه بغيره و اما ان لا يبقى وجب وجودة فلا يكون وجب وجوهه بغيره. و اما ان لا يبقى وجب وجودة فذاته فإنه ممكن الوجود بذاته لدن ما هو واجب الوجود بغيره وجودة ووجودة تابع لنسبة ماؤها واضافة وأسس و الاضافة اعتبارهما غير اعتبار نفس ذات

30. Diet., Abh. (Text) ... 57
الشيء الذي لها نسبة و اضافة: في وجب
الوجود ما ينقرر باعتبار هذه النسبة
على أن الزوايا لا يمكن إما أن يكون
مقتضياً نوجب الوجود أو مقتضياً للسكان
الوجود أو مقتضياً للمنشأة الوجود ولا يجوز
ان يكون مقتضياً للمنشأة الوجود ثالث كل ما
امتنع وجوده بدأته لم يوجد ولا بعضه 6
و لا ان يكون موجوداً معًا وإما ان لا يكون
موجوداً معًا فان لم يكن موجوداً معًا غير
المتناهي في زمن واحد و لكن واحد قبل الآخر
أو الآخر. لنؤخر الكلام في هذا الآية هما ان
بكون موجوداً مقتضياً لوجب الوجود فلقد قلنا
ان ما وجب وجوده بدأته استنجل وجب و
وجودة بعضه فبقي ان يكون باعتبار ذاته ممكن

لاَّ أَعْلَمُ أَنَّمَا بَيْنَ الْمَلَّاَبِينَ جَنَّاتٌ
كَذَا لَكَ لَنَّهُ حَسُّوُّ الْمُنْتَكِبِ النَّجْمَيْنَ
بضعة بعض عملي -
الوجود وباعتبار إيقاع النسبة إلى ذلك الخير واجب الوجود وباعتبار قطع النسبة التي إلى ذلك الخير ممنعت الوجود وذاته بذاته بلا شرط ممكنة الوجود - (31)

(ii) Compare the context of Ibn - Sīnā on point no. I(iii) in page 172.

(iii) و برهان أنه لا علقة له ماديه وقابلية إن العلقة القابلة هي العلقة لحصول المكان المقبول له ايا هو المستحيل لقبول الوجود أو كمال وجود فواجع الوجود كمال بالفعل المحض لا يشوبه نقص وكل كمال له ومنه ومسوبه بدأته وكل نقص و لو بالمحاز من غير عنه - (32)

31. IS., Naj. ... 225
32. IS., Arsh. ... 5
(iv) Compare the context of Ibn Sīnā on point no. 5(ii) in page 192.

... ثم يعرض شيء آخر وهو،
انه إذا كان مكان وجود ذلك هو علة إيجاب وجود هذا، لم يتعلق وجود هذا بوجب ين، بل
بإمكانه. فوجب أن يجوز وجودة مع عدمة و
قد فرضها متناقضين، هذا خلف، فاذن ليس
يمكن أن يكون متناقض الوجود، في الحال ما،
لا يتعلقان بعلة خارجة، بل يجب أن يكون
احدهما هو الأول بإذانات، أو يكون هنالك
سبب خارج آخر بوجبهما جميعا بإجاب
العلاقة التي بينهما، أو بوجب العلاقة
بإجابهما - أو المضانى ليس احدهما واجباً
بالآخر، بل مع الآخر، ووجب لهما الحالة
التي جمعتهما، أو ايضاً المادتان أو الموضوعان
وا الموضوعان بهما، أو ليس يكفي وجود
المادتين أو الموضوعين لهما وحدهما، بل
وجود ثلاث بجمع بينهما - و ذلك لأنه لا يخلو إما ان يكون موجود واحده من الآخرين وحققاً هو ان يكون مع الآخر، فوجودة بذاته يكون غير واجب، فيصير ممكناً فيصير معلولاً، و يكون كما ظننا ليس علته مكافئة في الوجود، ختنكون اذن علته امرًاءً اخرً فلا يكون هو و الاخر علة للعلاقة التي بينهما فإن ذلك الآخر - واما ان لا يكون، فتكون المعيبة طارئةً على وجودة الخائن لاحقةً له - و ايضاً فإن الوجود الذي يخصه لا يكون عن مكافته من حيث هو مكافيه ؛ بل عن علة متقدمه ان كان معلولاً تجيئىً اما ان يكون وجودة ذلك عن صاحبه، للإضافة كيفاً، بل من حيث وجود صاحبه الذي يخصه، فلا يكونان متكافئين، بل علة ومعلولاً و يكون صاحبه ايضاً علة للعلاقة الوعيقة بينهما كالسابق والابن - واما ان يكونان متكافئين من جملة ما يكون الآخر ليس اذه با علة للآخر، و تكون العلاقة للأزمة
HE HAS NO PARTNER.

السابع: هو انه لا يجوز ان يكون شريك، كل واحد منهما واجب الوجود، حتى يكون للواجب ند و يكون كل واحد مستقل بنفسه لا يتعلق بالآخر، لانه لا يفعل:

33. IS., Ilah (I) ... 41
اما ان يتشابها من كل وجه او بختيلها.

فان تتشابها من كل وجه، بطل المعدود، ولم تحقل الاثنينية كما ذكرنا من است كما ساودين في مكان واحد، في حالة واحدة، ببيان ان الكلي لا يصير حاصلا الا بفصل، او عارض بختيلها لدماكالة.

و ان كانا مختلفين بفصل او عارض فهم مكاحل أيضا، اذ قد سبق ان الفصل والعارض لمدخل لهما في حقية ذات الكلي، وان لمدخل للانسانية في كون الحيوانية حيوانية.

واما يدخل في كونها موجوداً، وذين فيما يكون الوجود عارضاً على الاهبة، وخيرها، فاما ما انبته ومهيته واحدة و الفصل لم يكن داخلا في ماهيته ولم يكن
داخلنا نرى أن تكون دون الفصل واجب
الوجود، فيكون الفصل و العارض لخواً.
وان كان لا يكون واجب
الوجود دون ذلك الفصل، فقد صار الفصل
داخلنا دقيقة المعنى؛ يعني معنى ووجود
الوجود.
و في سبق ان ذلك معانٍ،
وانه انما يدخل في وجود الماهية والحقيقة،
اذًا كانت الماهية غير الموجود - (34)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

و هو مباينة بجوهره لكل ما
سواه ولا يمكن أن يكون الوجود الذي له
شيء آخر سواه لذن كل ما وجودة هذا الوجود
لا يمكن أن يكون بينه وبين شيء اخر له
 ايضا هذا الوجود مباينة اصل و لا تغير

34. Ghaz., Man. ... 213
إذاً فلا يكون اثنان بل يكون هناك ذات واحدة
نقط الانتهاء إن كانت بينهما مباينة كان الذي
نبينا به غير الذي اشترك فيه فيكون الشيء
الذي بائن بمثل واحد منهما الآخر جزءًا مما
به توام وجودهما أو الذي اشترك فيه هو الجزء
الآخر فيكون كل واحد منهما منقسمًا بالقول و
يكون كل واحد من جزئيهما سببًا ل侔ائه ذاته فلا
يكون أولًا بل يكون هناك موجود آخر اختدم
منه هو سبب لوجوده وذلك محال -
و ان كان ذلك الآخر هو الذي
فيه ما بائن به هذا ولم يكن في هذا شيء ببابين
به ذلك إلا بعد الشيء الذي به بائن ذلك
لزمن يكون الشيء الذي به بائن ذلك الآخر
هذا هو الموجود الذي يخص ذلك ووجود هذا
مشترك لهما فان ذاك ذلك الآخر موجود مركب
من شيئين من شيء يخصه ومن شيئ يشارك
به هذا فليس اذن وجود ذاك هو وجود
هذا بل ذات هذا بسيط غير منقسم وذات
ذلك منقسي فلذلك اذن جزءان بهما تواضع
فهموجده اذن سيء وجوده اذن دون وجود
هذا و انقى منه فليس هر اذن من الوجود
في الرباع الدولية - (35)

IBN - SINA.

(أ) ولا يجوز ان يكون اثنان
يجبت منهما واجب وجود واحد ولا ان يكون
في واجب الوجود كثرت بوجه من الوجود ولا
يجوز ان يكون شبيكان اثنان ليس هذا ذلك
ولا ذلك هذا وكل واحد منهما واجب الوجود
بذاك له وبالآخر فقد بان ان واجب الوجود بدأته
لا يكون واجب الوجود بغبرج ولا يجوز ان يكون
كل واحد منهما واجب الوجود بالاخر حتى يكون
(أ) واجب الوجود ربح لا بدانته زرب(واجب
الوجود ربة) لا بدانته وجمالهما واجب وجود
واعد و ذلك لان اعتبارهما ذاتين غير

35. Diet. Must. (Text) ... 6
اعتبارهما متضابطين، ولكل واحد منها وجود
وجود لا بد أن فنكن واحد منها ممكن الوجود
بذاته ونكن ممكن الوجود بذاته علة في
وجوده اقدم منه لنكن كل علة أقدم في وجود
الذات من المخلوق، فإن لم يكن في الزمان
فلكن واحد منها في الذات شيء آخر يقوم
بد أقدم من ذات الله وليست ذات ادحها
أقدم من ذات الآخر على ما وصفنا للنها اذًا
على كارجة عنهما أقدم منها خليان اذًا
وجود ووجود كل واحد منها مستفاداً من
الآخر بل من العلة الخارجية التي وقعت
العلاقة بينهما، وإيضاً فإن ما يجب بغيره
فوجوده بالذات متأخر عن وجود ذلك الغير
و متوقف عليه، ثم من المستحيل أن
تتوقف ذات بم توجد على ذات توجد
بها فإنهما متوقفان في الوجود على وجود نفسها و
بالمجمله ناذر إكان ذلك الغير يجب به كان
هذا اقدم مما هو اقدم منه ومتوقف على
ما هو متوقف عليه فوجودهما مثال. (36)

36. IS., Naj. ... 227
(ii) علم ان واجب الوجود تعالى
لديجوز ان يكون انثيًا بووجه من الوجود و
برهانه ان يحكمبقًا واجب الوجود الآخر فلا بد
ان يتميز احدهما عن الآخر حتى يقال هذا او
ذاك اما ان يكون بذاقي او عرضي فان كان
التمييز بينهما بعرضي فهذا العرضي لا يخلو اما
ان يكون في كل واحد منهما او في احدهما فان
كان في كل واحد منهما عرضي يتميز به عن
الآخر فكل واحد منهما متعلق للنوع الذي
يخلق الشيء بعد تحقيق ذاته وان كان العرضي
في كل ما يلزم الوجود و يكون في احدهما
 دون الآخر فيكون الذي لد عرضي له واجب
ال الموجود والآخر لا يكون واجب الوجود و ان
كان التمييز بينهما بذاقي فان ذاتي ما يتقوم
بته انحدار وان كان لكل واحد منها ذاتي غير
للفلاش تيزي به عنه فتكون كل واحد منها
مركبًا والمركب متعلق فلا يكون كل واحد
منهما واجب الوجود و ان كان هذا الذي
للاحدهما والآخر واحد من كل وجه لا تزكي
فيه بوجه من الوجود خالذي ليس له ذا تي
8. **No quality can augment His Essence.**

النَّفَاسِ: أنه لن يجوز أن يكون
لحقة زائدة على الذات، لأن الذات كان ينقوم
وجوده بذلك الحالة حتى يبطل وجوده
بقدر عدومها، فقد تعلق بها، وصار مركباً
من أجزاء لا تتزعم ذاته إلا بمجموعها.

وكل مركب من الشيء محلول

كما سابق -

37. *Iṣ., Arsh.* ... 3
و إن كان لا يلزم عدمه سين
تقدير عدم تلك الصفة في عرضية فيه،
كالعلل في الإنسان مثلا، و ذلك مكال، لأن
كل عرضي فجعلوه كما سبق negatively
و علتت؟ إن كانت ذات
واجب الوجود، كان الذات فاعلا و فاعلا - و
كان كونه فاعلا، غير كونه فاعلا - لن يقبل
نام حين يفعل و يفعل لأن، حين يفعل -
فتكون فيه كثرة بوجه ما -

و قد بينا ان الكلفة في
ذات واجب الوجود مكال، لأنه يوجب
تعليل الجملة بالاتحاد -

فهو واحد من كل وجه - (214)

38. Chaz., Kar. ... 214
في هذا هو ازلي دائم الوجود
بجوهره وذاته من غير أن يكون به حاجة
إِن انا ازليا الي شيء آخر يمد بقائه
بل هو بجوهره كأن تي بقائه ودوام وجوده
و لا يمكن أن يكون وجود اصلا مثل وجوده
و لا اضاب مثل مربه ووجود وجود يمكن
إِن يكون له او ينفر عليه وهو الموجود
الذي لا يمكن ان يكون له سبب به او عنه
او له كان وجوده ـ (39)

و اذا ظهر انه لا علة له
قابلة فلن يكون له شئ بالقوة ولن تكون له صفة
منتظرة بل كماله حاصل بالفعل ولا تكون له
علة ماديه وقويتها بالفعل لفظ مشترك اي
كل كمال يكون لغير معدوم ومنتظر وهو

39. Dict., Must. (Text) ... 5
له موجود حاضر فذاته الكاملة المتقدمة على جميع الاعتبارات واحدة، وبهذا يظهر أن صفاته لا تكون زائدة على ذاته لأنها لذاتها زائدة على ذاته لكون الصفات بالنسبة إلى الذات بالقوة وكون الذات سبب تلك الصفات فان تلك الصفات تكون متقدمة عليها فتكون من وجه فاعلة ومن وجه قابلة وكونها فاعلة خبر جهة كونها قابلة فتكون فيها جهة من جهةان وهذا مطرد في كل شيء فان الجسيم إذا كان متتحركاً فكون التحريك من وجه و التحريك من وجه آخر.

فإن قيل ان صفته ليست زائدة على الذات بل هي داخلة في تكوين الذات، والذات لا يتصور وجودها دون تلك الصفات فتكون الذات مركبة فتنكسر.

الوحدة - (40)
9. HIS NATURE IS UNCHANGEABLE.

التاسع: أن واجب الوجود

يستهيل أن يتغيّر، لان التغيير عبارة

عن حدوث صفة فيه لن تكن -

وكل حداثة فيفتقر إلى

سبب - ويستحيل أن يكون غيره، كما

سبق، وأن يكون ذاته؛ لان كل صفة تلزم

من الذات، تكون مع الذات، لا تتأخر عنه.

وقد ذكرنا أن الفاعل لا يكون قابلاً، فلا

يفعل شيئاً في ذاته البنعة - (4).

AL - Fârâbî.

و يلزم من هذا ان لا يمكن ان

لا يكون ولد حاجة به الى شيء يمد بقائه ولا

41. Ghaz., Nâq. ... 215
يتغير من حال إلى حال وهو واحد بمعنى ان الكثيافة التي له ليست نشئة عبره - (22)

\[ \text{IBN - S\text{\'}N\text{\'A}.} \]

وينظير أيضاً نفي الخلق

القابلة انه يستنكر عليه التغير لأن التغير معناه زوال صفة وثورات أخرى فيكون فيه بالقوة زوال وثبات وهذا مجال نتبين منه انه لا يضد له كمالا ندله لان الضررين مما اذان منتحاتثنان على محل واحد بينهما غاية الخلقى وهو تعالى عني الغير قابل للأعراض عفلا عن الاضداد واعادة الغير عبر عبارات من المنازع

في الملك فتبين أيضاً انه لا يضد له وتبين انه يستنكر عليه الحدود لانه لما تثبت وجودا وجوده استنكر عندمك لان كل ما يكون بالقوة لا يكون بالفعل فيكون فيه جميلان و كلما يكون قابلا لشيء فذا حصل القبول لا

42. Diet., Abh. (Text) ... 57.
IO. NOTHING CAN PROCEED FROM HIM EXCEPT ONE THING.

العشر:  ان واجب الوجود لا يصدر منه إلا شيء واحد، بغير واسطة، و
أيما يصدر عنه شيء كثيرة، على ترتيب،
وبواسطه وذلك لأنه ثبت أنه واحد لا
كثره فيه بوجه؟ اذ الكثرة:

اما ان تكون بكثرة اجزاء
بستقل احدها كثيرة الجسم المؤلف - او
بكثره المعنى بان يقسم الشيء الى امرتين لا
بستقل احدهما دون الآخر كالصوره و

43.IS., Arsh. ... 6
الله يولي - أو كالوجود والماهية - و قد نفينا
كل ذلك عنه فلا يبقى إلا الواحد من كل
وجه - والواحد لا يصدر منه إلا واحد -

و اننا خالف فكل الواحد :

اما باختلاف المصدر - أو باختلاف اللة - و
بسبب زائد على ذات الفاعل الواحد - (45)

AL - FARABI.

الموجود الأول هو السبب
الأول لوجود سائر الموجودات كلها وهو
برئ من جميع انعدام النقطة وكل ما سواه
ليس بخليط من إن يكون فيه شيء من انعدام
النقطة اما واحد واما أكثر من واحد أو
الاول فهو خلو من انعدامها كلها - (45)

44. Ghaz., Mag. ... 216
45. Diet., Mst. (Text) 5
Ibn Sīnā

فواجِب الوجود واحد لا ينشارك في زبنته شيء. فلذ شيء سواه واجب الوجود. وأذ لا شيء سواه واجب الوجود، فهو مبدأ ووجب الوجود لكل شيء ويجبره ايجاباً أولياً أو بواسطة، وإذا كان كل شيء غيره موجودة منه وجودة فهو أول و لا نعني بالدولي معنى يضاف إليه ووجب وجوده حتى يشكو به ووجب وجوده، بل نعني به اعتبار اضافته إلى غيره.

و نقول أيضاً: أن واجب الوجود يجب أن يكون ذاتاً واحدة، و الاخليك كثرة و يكون كل واحد منها واجب الوجود، فلا يعول أما أن يكون كل واحد منها في المعني الذي هو حقيقي، لا يختلف الآخر البينة أو يخالفه - فإن كان لا يخالف الآخر في المعني الذي لذا أنه بالذات، ويخالفه بأنه ليس

46. IS., Ilah. (2) ... 343
لا، وهذا خلاف للاعتقاد، فإنه يخالف في غير المعنى، وذلك لأن المعنى الذي هو غير المعنى، وقد ثاره شيء، به صار هذا أو غير هذا، أو قارن نفسه نفسه اشد، هذا أو غير هذا، ولم يقارن هذا المقارن في الآخر، بل ما به صار ذلك ذلك، أو نفس أن ذلك ذلك، وهذا تخصص ما قارن ذلك المعنى، و بينهما به تبادلة.

فاذن كل واحد منهما يباين الآخر به، وليس يخالف في نفس المعنى، يخالف في غير المعنى - (47).

(47) فنحن إذا قلنا هذا الفعل صادر عنه بسبب و السبب منه أيضا فلا نقص في فاعليته بل الكل صادر منه و به و الية فاذنا الموجودات صدرت عنه على ترتيب معلوم و وسائط لا يجوز ان يتقدم 47. IS., Ilah. (I) ... 43
II. HE IS NOT A SUBSTANCE.

ما هو متاخر ولا يتأخر ما هو منتقدم وهو المقدم والمؤخر معا - (48)

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

48. IS., Arsh. ... I5
في الحال حاصل في الوجود، ام لا يكون:
جملة من الجواهر.

فاذن الجوهر يطلق على
حقيقة وصمة، إذا عرض لها الوجود، عرض
لا في موضوع، فبكون عبارة، كما تكون صمة،
غير الهوية.
فما صمة، وكأنه واحد.
لا يسمى جوهرًا بهذا الاصطلاح، الا ان يخترع
مختصر اصطلاحاً، فيثبت عبارة، عن وجود
لد ملك له فلا تمنع اذ ذاك من إطلاقه
عليه - (98).

AL - P/armi.

لا) و أيضاً فإنها غير منقسمة بالقول
إلى اشياء بها تجوهر و ذلك لأنه لا يمكن
ان يكون الكلام الذي بشرح معناه بدل على
جزء من اجزائه أو على جزءه يتجوهر بما

49. Ghaz., Mag. ... 216
(ii) Compare the context of al-Farābī on point no. 3(i) in page 180.

IBN-SĪNĀ.

(لا) فنقول برهانه أنه لاعلة له ذاعليّة وهو ظاهر لأنه لواكان له سبب في الوجود نكن هذا جازننا وذاك واجب الوجود و اذا كنت النها للعلة له ذاعليّة فبذلك الاعتبار لا تكون ماهيئة غير التي في غير وجودة ولا يكون جوهرا ولا عرضا ولا يجوز أن يكون أثنا كل واحد منها مستنفيد الوجود من الآخر ولا يجوز أن يكون واجب الوجود من وجه وممكن الوجود من وجه آخر (۵)

(لا) و الفائل أن يقول: انكم في تحاشيكم ان تطلقوا على الأول اسم الجوهر فلستم تتحاشون ان تطلقوا عليه معناه و
ذنًك لأنَّه موجود لَنْ يَن تُوضَع، وَهذَا المَعنى هو الجُوهر الذِّي جُنُسُمُوعُ لهَ - خَنْقُولٌ لَِّبَسَ هذَا مَعنى الجُوهر الذِّي جَنِسُه، بَلْ مَعنى ذلِكَ الْجُنُس الْيَنْتَقِمِيَّةِ المِنْتَقِرَةَ الذِّي وُجُدَّة. لَيْسَ بِمَوْضُوعٍ كَجَسَرٍ أَو نَفْسٍ، وَالدِّلِيلِ عَلَى اَنَّهَ اَلذِي لَمْ يَعِن بِالجُوهر هذَا لَمْ يِكن جَنِسًا الْبِنَّةَ.

هُوَ اَلْمَدْلُولُ عَلَى بِلَفْظِ المَوْضُوعِ لَيْسَ يَقْتَنُي جَنْسِيَّتهُ، وَالسَّلِبُ الذِّي يَلْحَقُ بِهِ لَيْسَ يَزِيدُهُ عَلَى الْوَجْدِ الْاَطْسَابِيَّةِ مِبْانِيَةً، وَهذَا المَعنى لَيْسَ فِي اَثْبَاتِ شَيْءٍ مَكْحُولٍ بعَدَ الْوَجْدِ، وَلَهُ مَعنى لَِّبَسْ، بَلْ دُوَّرَتْ بِالْنَتْسِبَةِ فَقْطًا، فَالَّذِي لَنْ يَمْكُرَ مَوْضُوعُ الْأَطْسَابِ الْمَعْنَى الْأَتْبَاتِيَّ الَّذِي يِجْزِيَهُ اَنْ يَكُن لَهَذَا مَا، هُوَ الْمَوْضُوعُ، وَبَعَدَهُ شَيْءٌ سَلِيبٍ. وَضَتَّ خَارِجَ عَنْ الْهُوَيَةِ الَّتِي تَكُن لِلَّذِيَ صَيْحَاءً، فَهذَا المَعْنَى اَنْ اَخْذَ عَلَى هذَا الْوَجِّ لَمْ يِكن جَنِساً، . .

وَقَدْ عَلِمْتُ بِالْمَنْطَقَ الْأَيْضَا، اَنَا اَذَى فَلَنَا: كَلٌّ "١٠٠" مِنْهَا١ عَنْيَنَا كَلّ شَيْءٍ مَوْضُوعٍ
بأنه "ا" و لوكانت له حقيقة غير الألفية،
فقولنا في حد الوجه: أنه الموجود لا في موضوع، معناه أنه الشيء الذي يقال عليه موجود لا في موضوع محمول عليه، ولله نفسه ماهية
مثل الإنسان والحجر، والشجر، فهكذا.
بمجرد ان يتصور الوجه حتى يكون جنساً
و الدليل على أن بين الأمنيين فنناً و ان
الجنس احدهما دون الآخر، انك تقول
لشخص انسان ما محجوز الموجود: انه لا
محالة هو ما وجرده ان لا يكون في موضوع،
وب لاتقول: انه للمحالة موجود الذن لا في
موضوع، وكانا قد بالنها في تعريف هذا حيث
تكلمنا في المنطق - (52)

52. IS., Ḥak. (2) ... 348
I2. EVERY THING EMANATES FROM HIM IN SUCCESSION.

الثنائي عشر: ان كل ما سوى
واجب الوجود ينتمي ان يكون صادراً عن
واجب الوجود على الترتيب، و ان يكون
وجود كل ما سواء منه.

برهانه: انه اذا بان ان
واجب الوجود لا يكون الا واحداً، فما عداه
لا يكون واجباً، سيكون ممكنأ، فينبغى الى
واجب الوجود . (53)

AL - FĀRĀDI.

لا يوجد كثيرة وهي مع
كثرتها خفيفة، وجودة جوهرية في منه

53. Ghaz., Mag. ... 219
كل وجود [كيف كان ذلك الوجود] كان كاملاً
او ناقصاً و جوهره ايضاً جوهر إذا فاست منه
الموجودات كلها بترتيب مترتب بها حصل
عند كل موجود فسماه الذي له من الوجود
وسرتبته منه - (45) (29)

(29) فمنقول ان الموجودات على
ضريبين احدهما اذ اعتبر ذانه ليجب وجودة
و يسمى ممكن الوجود و الثاني اذ اعتبار ذانه
وجب وجودة و يسمى واجب الوجود و ان كان
ممكن الوجود اذ فرضناه غير موجود ليلزم
منه مثال على بوجودة من علة و اذا وجب
صار واجب الوجود بغيره فيلزم من هذا انه
كان وما لي بزل ممكن الوجود بذلك واجب
الوجود بغيره وهذا الامكان اما ان يكون
شيئاً فيما لم يزل و اما ان يكون في وئمت
دون وقت، و الاشياء الممكنة لا يجوز ان
تبردتأ نهائية في كونها علة ومعلوماً و لا يجوز

54. Diet., Must. Text) ... I7
كونها على سبيل الدور بله لا بد من انتقاءها إلى شيء، واجب هو الموجود الأول - (55)

55. Diet., Abh. (Text) ... 57
(iii) Compare the context of Ibn-Sīna on point no. 10(iii) in page 217.

56. IS., Ilah. (1) ... 47  
57. IS., Ilah. (2) ... 403  
58. IS., Arsh. ... 13
Al-Fārābī attributes greatness, exaltedness and magnificence to God and states how His qualities are different from those of finite things. The perfection of a thing in those qualities lies either in its essence or in one of its accidents. Most of the qualities ascribed to us are due only to some form of perfection in one of our accidents; such as, gentleness, knowledge or accidental qualities of body. But the perfection of God is apparently distinct from that of other things in the world. Similarly, His greatness, exaltedness and magnificence are different from things having those qualities. On the contrary, these noble qualities of God are derived from His Essence alone and not from any other thing outside His Essence. It does not matter at all whether anybody glorifies His Being with those attributes. But He possesses them in His Being. Thus in His nature nothing is 'awaited'. On the other hand, beauty, splendour and adornment in every other being are the best qualities which are derived from His Being. Since His existence is the best of all, His beauty, splendour and
adornment also transcend all qualities of the finite things in the world.

Thus God's providence is exercised over all existents, and perfection can be attributed to Him eminently, namely, whatever positive being it expresses belongs to Him as its cause. Thus Dr. T. J. De Boer says:-

"The first Existence, one alone, and of a verity real, we call God; and since in him all things are one, without even difference in kind, no definition of his Being can be supplied. Yet man bestows upon him the noblest names, expressive of all that is most honoured and esteemed in life, because in the mystic impulse thereto, words lose their usual significance, transcending all discrepancy. Some names refer to his essential nature, others to his relation to the world, without prejudicing, however, the unity of his essence; but they are all to be understood metaphorically, and we can interpret them only according to feeble analogy. Of God, as the most perfect Being, we ought properly to have also the
most complete idea." (1)

Here the position of al-Fārābī is mystic. With him as with all mystics, contemplation dominates action. He prefers to study the relation between God and the World, and endeavours to arrive at the knowledge of one Being. His philosophic system is a form of spiritualism and his method deduction. But with regard to mysticism some distinction has been observed between the works of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā. In this connection B. Carra De Vaux remarks:—

"I have pointed to a difference between Fārābī and Avicenna as regards the position of Mysticism; in Avicenna mysticism appears only at the end of the system to crown his work, as it were; it is quite distinct from the other parts of it and Avicenna treats mysticism — and very artistically — as a chapter in philosophy which he would study in an objective fashion. On the contrary in Fārābī mysticism penetrates

1. Boer, Hist. ... 114
everything; the terms of Ṣūfīsm are scattered throughout his works and one clearly feels that with him mysticism is not a theory but rather a subjective state. This point of view further contributes to make his system somewhat obscure.

It has been said that Avicenna is clearer, better arranged and more methodical than Farābī; Muslim Scholasticism has clearly a more finished form in Avicenna." (2)

Three references have been quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. He asserts that 'Whatever has being must either have a reason for its being, or have no reason for it. If it has a reason, then it is contingent, equally before it comes into being (if we make this mental hypothesis) and when it is in the state of being - for in the case of a thing whose being is contingent the mere fact of its entering upon being does not remove

2. EI. ¹ ... Art. "Al-Farābī".
from it the contingent nature of its being. If on the other hand it has no reason for its being in anyway whatsoever, then it is necessary in its being. This rule having been confirmed, I shall now proceed to prove that there is in being a being which has no reason for its being.

Such a being is either contingent or necessary. If it is necessary, then the point we sought to prove is established. If on the other hand it is contingent, that which is contingent cannot enter upon being except for some reason which sways the scales in favour of its being and against its not-being. If the reason is also contingent, there is then a chain of contingents linked one to the other, and there is no being at all; for this being which is the subject of our hypothesis cannot enter into being so long as it is not preceded by an infinite succession of beings, which is absurd. Therefore contingent beings end in a Necessary Being.' (5)

Having thus established that all categories of
contingent beings end in Necessary Being or God, Ibn-Sīnā aims at ascertaining His nature, and asserts that 'He is not an accident: An accident is a being in a locus. The locus is precedent to it, and its being is not possible without the locus. But we have stated that a being which is necessary has no reason for its being.' (4)

Then Ibn-Sīnā wants to prove that the nature of God cannot be confounded with that of the contingent being. Thus according to him, 'Proof that He cannot be a Necessary Being in one respect and contingent being in another respect: Such a being, inasmuch as it is a contingent being, would be connected in being with something else, and so it has a reason; but in as much as it is a necessary being, it would have no connexions with anything else. In that case it would both have being and not have being; and that is absurd'. (5)

Al-Ghazālī states that God cannot be an

4. Arberry ... 28
5. Ibid ... 28
accident, and he advances two reasons for this argument. Firstly, an accident is dependent upon a body, and its non-existence invariably follows from the non-existence of a body. Secondly, an accident is a contingent thing. Since every contingent thing is capable of being existent through another thing which may be its cause, it would be caused. Both of these lines of thought are sound. That is why God cannot be an accident, for His is the necessary existence which has no connection with anything else. His demonstration of absurdity also can be tested by the syllogism in the following ways:

1. All accident is that which has connection with a body.

   God is not that which has connection with a body.

   \[ \therefore \text{God is not accident.} \]

2. All contingent thing is that which is existent through another thing.

   God is not that which is existent through another thing.

   \[ \therefore \text{God is not a contingent thing.} \]
The conclusion of each of the syllogisms is valid in the form of 'CAMESTRES'. His absurdity, therefore, is proved by the way of thought and practice.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to the views of Ibn-Sīnā. The views of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā appear to be on dissimilar lines. For al-Fārābī attributes certain noblest qualities to God and asserts that these qualities transcend the finite beings possessing them. In this connection he brings in the term 'accident' and illustrates it as one of our qualities. Ibn-Sīnā, on the other hand, categorically asserts that God cannot be an accident which can only manifest itself in a subject and thus it becomes a contingent being. Moreover, he divides being into two kinds, one being necessary and the other being contingent. Thus according to him, God is Necessary Being which has no connection with anything else. So He cannot be an accident which is connected in being with something else. Al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to the detailed view of Ibn-Sīnā.
Moreover, al-Ghazālī's account appears to be a systematic arrangement, where the contexts of jism, and ġarad as mumkin seem to be "additions".

2. **HE IS NOT A BODY.**

Three references from Al-Fārābī and four from Ibn-Sīnā have been quoted. God, according to Al-Fārābī, is pure Being whose Essence does not manifest itself in a body, surface, line and mathematical point. For body is composed of matter and form which, on the other hand, may be stated to be its causes. Moreover, subsistence of the surface, line and mathematical point is with body, and that of body is with matter and form. All of these corporeal adjuncts are opposed to the Essence of God. For He is one in all respects. This means that His Being concerns His Essence alone apart from other existents, and His reality is not quantitatively divisible. Therefore, quantity, space and time cannot be ascribed to Him. Furthermore, He comprehends His existence, and this apprehension is possible by His Essence only and not from any other thing. From this simplicity of His existence and
incorporeality of His Essence are derived.

This indicates that the concept of His existence coincides with that of unity, truth and goodness. Thus the nature of God is made an absolute criterion in comparison with the differences and diversities, plurality and individuality with which our universe teems. So De Boer says:-

"If we now take a general survey of Farabi's system, it exhibits itself as a fairly consistent Spiritualism, or, to be more precise, - Intellectualism. The Corporeal, - that which appeals to the Senses, - as it originates in the imagination of the Spirit, might be designated "a confused presentation". The only true existence is Spirit, although it assumes various degrees. God alone is entirely unmixed and pure Spirit, while those Spirits, which eternally proceed from him, already have in them the element of plurality. The number of primary Spirits has been determined by the Ptolemaic cosmology, and corresponds to the celestial hierarchy."
The farther anyone of them is removed from the first, so such the less part has it in the Being of the pure Spirit. From the last World-Spirit Man receives his essential nature, that is - Reason. There is no gap in all the system; the Universe is a beautiful and well-ordered whole. The Evil and the Bad are the necessary consequence of finiteness in individual things; but the Good which characterizes the Universe is set thereby in bolder relief." (6)

Ibn-Sīnā does not fundamentally differ from al-Fārābī. He asserts that God is simple and pure Being. There is no principle for His subsistence apart from His Essence. Neither has He quantitative parts in His Essence nor is He dependent upon form and matter, because they depend upon the essence of other things. He is one, and He is neither with a body, nor in a body, nor divisible in any respect. Rather existence of all things emanates from Him. There is no cause and nothing else in His Essence

6. Boer, Hist. ... 124
except His will for a thing. ' ... He has no formal cause: A formal, corporeal cause only exists and is confirmed when a thing is possessed of matter: the matter has a share in the being of the form, in the same way that the form has a part in the disposition of the matter in being in actuality; such a thing is therefore caused. It is further evident as a result of denying this cause to Him, that He is also to be denied all corporeal attributes, such as time, space, direction, and being in one place to the exclusion of all other; in short, whatever is possible in relation to corporeal things is impossible in relation to Him.

Proof that He has no final cause: The final cause is that on account of which a thing has being; and the First Truth has not being for the sake of anything, rather does everything exist on account of the perfection of His Essence, being consequent to His Being and derived from His Being. Moreover, the final cause, even if it be posterior in respect of being to all other causes, yet it is mentally prior to them all. It is the final cause which
makes the active cause become a cause in actuality, that is to say in respect of its being a final cause.' (7)

On the contrary, God is Necessary Being. He contemplates His Essence as well as the order pervading all things. Consequently, the order of existents emanates from Him. 'It follows necessarily that the first thing to emanate from God was not a body; for every body is compounded of matter and form, and these require either two causes, or a single cause with two aspects; this being so, it is impossible that these two should have emanated from God, it having been established that there is no compounding in God whatsoever. Since the first thing to emanate from God was not a body, it follows that it was an abstract substance, namely the First Intelligence.' (8)

Thus God is pure Being. He never depends upon any corporeal reality. Rather He is above all determinate

7. Arberry ... 31
8. Ibid ... 36
qualifications. In this connection Dr. D. Saliba says:

"... Et ensuite, de ce que Dieu est pur de toute puissance et de toute matière, il suit qu'il est absolument simple.

L'être nécessaire est simple, parce que son essence ne peut pas avoir des principes réunis par les quels il subsiste. En effet, l'essence d'une partie n'est ni l'essence de l'autre partie, ni l'essence du tout qui est le composé des parties; mais chaque partie par essence est antérieure au tout. Et comme les parties sont inséparables du tout et que le tout est inséparable des parties, leur existence dépend de leur réunion. La cause de l'existence doit donc nécessiter l'existence des parties avant celle du tout, qui serait pour ainsi dire causé par ses parties. D'où il suit qu'aucun être composé ne peut être nécessaire par lui-même.

Il s'ensuit immédiatement que l'être nécessaire n'est pas un corps; car le corps est, par définition,
divisible en parties. Or, nous venons de voir que l'être nécessaire ne peut pas être composé; car, s'il l'était, il cesserait d'être nécessaire par lui-même. Il suit également de là que l'être nécessaire n'est ni matière de corps, ni forme corporelle, ni matière intelligible d'une forme intelligible, ni forme intelligible d'une matière intelligible." (9)

Furthermore, Ibn-Sīnā explains that God is the First Being, and He has no relation with material adjunctions. "God, he says, 'is not a body, nor the matter of a body, nor the form of one; nor an intelligible matter for an intelligible form, nor an intelligible form in an intelligible matter. He is not divisible, neither in quantity, nor in principle, nor in definition, he is One'. Hence as a transcendental being God is, in accordance with the tenets of his Faith, strictly one. He

9. Saliba, Étude ... 114
is complete in himself, and no state in him is to be 'awaited'. He is a Necessary Being in essence as well as in all other respects. He could not be a necessary being in one sense and possible being in another. He could not be both at the same time, because that would involve contradiction. And if he is necessary in everyway, and everything that is possible has already become necessary in him, there remains nothing incomplete or lacking in him to be awaited - neither will, nor nature, nor knowledge, nor any of his attributes. Furthermore, he who is a necessary being in his essence, is pure Good and pure Perfection. The Good is what every being keenly desires in order to perfect its existence; it is a condition of perfection, and evil does not exist in essence. 'Existence is a goodness, and the perfection of existence is the goodness of existence'. Thus a being that does not suffer any evil in the form of the absence of a substance, or of any undesirable state of it, is pure Good. This could not apply to what is in essence a possible being. Good in the sense of useful and profitable is only with the object of attaining perfection in things. God as a source
of help becomes a source of Good and free of all defect or evil." (10)

It follows, therefore, that Ibn-Sīnā merely depends on pure reason. Thus Dr. J. L. Teicher says:

"The type of knowledge ascribed by Avicenna to God, although super human, is in fact, rationalistic, and it coincides exactly with the description of a hypothetical super human intelligence which scientists like Huxley, Laplace, and others have offered, and which Bergson justly rejects as being rationalistic. It is a symptom of the confusion in philosophical thought at the present day that certain philosophical schools still apply to God the term "intuitive knowledge" in the Avicennian - Thomistic sense without troubling to reply to Bergson's criticism of it". (11)

Al-Ghazālī lists two reasons why God cannot be a body. Firstly, every body is quantitatively divisible into

10. Afnan ... 169
11. Wickens, Avicenna ... 41
parts and their totality is dependent upon parts. Then non-existence of that totality invariably follows from the non-existence of those parts. For example, a human being may be taken as a sum-total of all his organs; in that his non-existence is determined by the non-existence of them. Furthermore, every totality is caused by different parts. Since God is pure Being, His Essence cannot be constituted by parts.

Secondly, body is composed of matter and form; and non-existence of anyone of them eventually causes the non-existence of the body. On the other hand, the existence of God is with His Essence alone. Thus His non-existence, if one could imagine that, would follow from the non-existence of His Essence only. Al-Ghazālī's argument here is like Bosanquet's implication of proposition by "This and Nothing". For Bosanquet says:–

"There is a given complex as starting-point, whether fact or supposition makes no difference. Construed along with the ordered whole of our
experience, it affirms a certain result, and this result, its implication, you must admit as its implication, so long as you affirm the ordered whole to be real. You cannot escape from the implication as such by pointing out that you do not affirm as a fact the complex which is your starting-point. On the contrary, you may decide to deny it as a fact just because its implication is inevitable. If the joint system has been rightly read, which we must assume, you could only annul the implication by ceasing to affirm the system of reality within which you are judging it to hold. If you have judged the relation rightly, you would in the end, in attempting to annul your judgment, have to deny the Law of Contradiction. That is to say, an implication rightly judged is guaranteed by the whole system of reality. If you deny it, you leave nothing standing." (12)

Al-Ghazālī states that the existence of God

12. B. Bosanquet, - Implication and Linear Inference ... 10
wholly concurs with His Essence. This is most adequately expressed by the word 'implication'; that is, within a given nature, a system of terms and relations, so far it possesses the unity of a true universal, the presence or absence of certain terms in certain moditions enables us to be sure that certain other terms in certain determinate forms will be present or absent.

Here al-Ghazālī's account has got two aspects. Now with respect to his first aspect his account corresponds to the views of Ibn-Sīnā, whereas with respect to his second aspect his account corresponds to the views of al-Farābī. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Farābī in that God is One. He is neither with a body nor is divisible in any respect. In addition to their basic agreement, it has been observed that in the philosophy of each of them a particular aspect has been emphasized. Ibn-Sīnā asserts that God is neither with a body nor in a body. Moreover, the first thing to emanate from Him is not a body, rather it is known as abstract intelligence. Then Ibn-Sīnā shows that body is quantitatively divisible into parts for which
it cannot be ascribed to the nature of God. Al-Ghazālī's first aspect appears to be closer to this. On the other hand, al-Fārābī asserts that body cannot be ascribed to the nature of God, for body is composed of matter and form; and as such it negates the necessary character which has no connection with anything else. Al-Ghazālī's second aspect appears to be closer to this. Furthermore, his "Fa-`innahu idhā qīla lanā : līmāqāna al-ḥibr mawjūdan? ... fa-hādhihi al-ajzā' illat al-jumla, wa hākadhā ajzā' kull murakkab illat li l-murakkab." appears to be an 'addition'.

3. HE IS NOT LIKE FORM AND MATTER.

Two references from Al-Fārābī and two from Ibn-Sīnā are noted. According to Al-Fārābī God can not be with matter nor can His subsistence be in matter nor can He be in a substratum. On the contrary, the Essence of God is intelligence as opposed to form and matter. For whenever a thing does not require matter in respect to its
existence it is called intelligence with respect to its essence. So He is intelligence and intelligible by His Essence. Furthermore, His Being is free from matter, form and substratum. Form cannot exist without matter. On the other hand, if He has any form, His Essence would be composed of matter and form. Then if there are two principles in His Being, He concedes a cause in Him, for each of them becomes a cause for the existence of totality. He is the First Cause. No aim and standard are needed for the completion of His Being. There can neither be the first cause for His Being, nor can His Being be derived from another thing which is prior to Him. In this connection Dr. R. Walzer says:

"The world was ruled by the First Being, the First Cause, which was eternal and perfect, without matter and without form, the absolute One without any other specification or qualification. This had been, in all essentials, the upshot of Al-Kindi's metaphysics as well. Centuries of unquestioned
philosophical tradition had given to a highly controversial and hypothetical postulate like this the appearance of self-evidence, and it had been eagerly accepted by Christian theologians and, to a large extent, by their Muslim counterpart, the Mu'tazila. Al-Farabi's philosophy is connected with the last Alexandrian philosophers, whose thought shows a growth in the influence of Aristotle; hence to the definition of the Godhead as one indivisible substance he adds, probably like his Christian Greek predecessors, that God is thought, thinking and object of thought in one, nous, noōn, noumenon, ᵃᵃˡˡᵃᵃˡˡᵃᵃˡˡᵃᵃˡˡᵃᵃˡˡ,aqīl maʾqūl." (13)

God, therefore, does not require matter for the support of His Being. Thus B. Carra De Vaux adds:

"The matter which is in question here is the substratum of the world which contains its possibility. The world is produced by coming from

13. Walzer, Greek into Arabic ... 20
this matter, not created directly from nothing. The celestial spheres, animated by their respective soul, are put into motion by the prime mover; the latter is not God himself but rather the primary intelligence which emanates from him." (14)

Ibn-Sīnā does not fundamentally differ from al-Fārābī. He asserts that God is one in number. Whatever is other than He is contingent and caused. Everything except God who is one in His Essence and except the existent which derives its existence from its own essence, derives its existence from something else. This means that the existence of a thing implies a creation through which it acquires its being from another thing. Non-existence can be ascribed to its essence, but it applies to the whole of matter and form, and not to form alone without matter. Therefore, its creation comprises both form and matter. Furthermore, "God, he says, 'is not

14. Fl. ¹ ... Art. "Al-Fārābī"
a body, nor the matter of a body, nor form of one; nor
an intelligible matter for an intelligible form, nor an
intelligible form in an intelligible matter. He is not
divisible, neither in quantity, nor in principle, nor in
definition, he is one."

Matter, according to Ibn-Sīnā, is possible
being; and creation consists in granting actual
existence to this possible being. However, in the nature
of God being and existence are one. Of course, in all
that is not the nature of God, existence is called by
Ibn-Sīnā an attribute of being. On the other hand,
matter is pure passivity and it appears to be the subject
upon which celestial influences act. In this connection
S. H. Nasr states:

"In his doctrine of matter Ibn-Sīnā implicitly
assumes the "original matter" of Ikhwān al-Ṣafā
without, however, mentioning it. He considers the
hylē as the subject of corporeality and that to
which corporeal form (ṣūrah jismīyah) is added to make a general body ... " (15)

Al-Ghazālī states that God is not like form and matter, because form is dependent upon matter and its non-existence invariably follows from the non-existence of matter. Similarly, matter is a place of form and it cannot manifest itself except through form. For matter actually exists with form and ceases to be owing to the non-existence of form.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to the views of al-Fārābī. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that God is not matter and form. But al-Fārābī's views appear to be developed. For he teaches that God is not matter nor can this subsistence be in matter, nor can He be in a substratum. Furthermore, the relation between form and matter is inseparable: thus if He had any form, His Essence would be composed of matter and

15. Nasr, Cosmological Doctrines... 220
form; and this is inconceivable. Al-Ghazālī's account appears to be closer to this.

4. **His being is quiddity.**

Three references have been quoted from al-Fārābī. He propounds the view that God is the First Being. He is single, and no other thing can ever be His partner. His Being is the most excellent and perfect of all categories of beings. His existence cannot be postulated to be non-existent. For He is the First Cause of all existents. Furthermore, His is the best and prior existence, and no other thing can ever be prior and better than He on the scale of existence. Consequently, His existence and Essence can never be conceived non-existent, as non-existence involves imperfection. On the contrary, He is free from all types of imperfection. That is why, no efficient, formal, material and final causes are needed for His Being. Moreover, His existence does not follow a quiddity which is other than the existence. And He has no quiddity other than that He is Necessary Being, and this is His
On the other hand, His identity, quiddity and necessary existence, broadly speaking, manifest His Essence. This implication within such an order not merely establishes a connection of the terms having a relative necessity, but over and above it confirms their existence and establishes their true character. Observation establishes their bare existence as something, but apart from insight into the order it gives us no support that we are apprehending the constituent members as they really are. The proposition 'God's essence is His existence' identifies the predicate with the subject. Our common convictions are inferences from implications within a system. They are inferences from a character which we presume in some groups of terms and relations presented to our constructive apprehension.

However, according to Al-Farābī "... existence is a grammatical or logical relation, but not a category
of actuality which makes any assertion about things. The existence of a thing is nothing but the thing itself." (16)

Ibn-Sīnā does not differ in principle from Al-Fārābī and he asserts that His quiddity, identity and Necessary Being are one. '... His Quiddity is not other than His Identity, but rather that His Being is unified in His Reality: If His Being were not the same as His Reality, then His Being would be other than His Reality. Every accident is caused, and everything caused requires a reason. Now this reason is either external to His Quiddity, or is itself His Quiddity: if it is external, then He is not a necessary being, and is not exempt from an active cause; while if the reason is itself the Quiddity, then the reason must necessarily be itself a complete being in order that the being of another may result from it. Quiddity before being has no being; and if it had being before this, it would not require a second being. The question therefore returns to the problem of

16. Boer, Hist. ... 113
being. If the Being of the Quiddity is accidental, whence did this Being supervene and adhere? It is therefore established that the Identity of the Necessary Being is His Quiddity and that He has no active cause; the necessary nature of His Being is like the quiddity of all other things. From this it is evident that the Necessary Being does not resemble any other thing in any respect whatsoever; for with all other things their being is other than their quiddity'. (17)

On the other hand, everything which has a quiddity is postulated to be existent in its essence and imagined in the mind by having its part present with it. If it has a reality other than the fact that it exists in one or other of these two forms, and that is not constituted by it, existence would then be a concept which would be added to its reality as a concomitant or otherwise. However, according to Ibn-Sīnā Being in itself is the cause of all particular existents. He is above

17. Arberry ... 27
all distinctions and polarization and yet the cause of the multiplicity, casting its light upon the different quiddities of all things.

"Thus Avicenna's comprehension of essence does not differ much from that of Aristotle as found in Book Z of the metaphysica. What was necessary and important for his chief argument was to stress its distinction from the notion of existence. Modern philosophers may think that the idea of essence is 'purely linguistic', and that 'a word may have an essence, but a thing cannot', yet at that early stage the conception was real and helpful. ... 'All true being is true according to its essential reality. And it is agreed that He is One and cannot be pointed out. How then could what through Him attains all the truth of its existence'..." (18)

On the other hand, existence derives its principle from Being and His Essence is the same as His existence. Thus S. H. Nasr says:-

18. Afnan ... 119
"There are two major distinctions which underlie the philosophy of Ibn Sīnā, one an ontological distinction between quiddity, or essence (mahīyāh), and existence (wujūd), and the other the tripartite division between the Necessary (wajib), possible (mumkin) and impossible (mamtani') being. Only in the Necessary Being (wajib al-wujūd), or God, are essence and existence inseparably united, while for all other beings unity and existence are only accidents added to their essence or quiddity. The Necessary Being whose essence and existence are one is pure Truth as It is pure Goodness; It is the source and origin of all existence." (19)

Necessary Being is an unbending unity which involves no multiplicity in its essence. A thing may be caused in relation to its quiddity and reality, or it may be caused in its existence. Thus Dr. Kenelm Foster, O.P. says:-

"I have said that existence, for Avicenna, is

19. Nasr, Cosmological Doctrines ... 198
something that happens to, or is added to, essence.
It follows that, if essences do exist, they must
derive existence from outside themselves, and
ultimately from some First Being who is not
strictly an "essence" at all, but pure existence ...
God is utterly one both as undivided in Himself
and as unique. A stress on the Divine unity was
accepted as characteristically Avicennian: "the
first being cannot be other than a unity ... and
this is Avicenna's position". Now this stress
seems to have found an eager and somewhat unguarded
welcome, in the last decades of the 12th century,
with certain inheritors of the strong tradition,
more or less neoplatonist, which derived from
Boethius, had been fed by Denys and Scotus Erigena
and developed by the great 12th century School of
Chartres. This "tradition De Unitate", as it has
been called, laid a particular stress on form as
the principle of intelligibility and unity in
being; and saw this formal principle of oneness
and stability as realized perfectly in God and
participated, variously, by creatures; each
creature deriving from God and returning to God according to the measure of its unity, stability and intelligence. It is a very intellectual view of the world, but also mystical and religious." (20)

Al-Ghazālī states that the existence of God is not different from His quiddity. Generally, the concept of identity is distinct from that of quiddity and its existence is accidental to quiddity. But while considering the Essence of God, both identity and quiddity form the unity of His Being.

Every accidental thing is caused. For if it were existent by its essence, it would not be accidental to something else. Wherever it is accidental to something else, it is dependent upon it, since it cannot be except along with it. The cause of its existence must be one of the following two things. Either it is the quiddity or something else. But if it is something else, the existence would then be accidental and caused.

20. Wickens, *Avicenna* ... 113
On the other hand, quiddity by itself is incapable of becoming a cause for its existence, because non-existence cannot be the cause for existence, and quiddity has no existence prior to this existence. How would it be a cause? If it had an existence before this existence, it would be independent of the second existence. But then the same series of questions would follow, i.e. whether this existence is accidental or not.

However His quiddity and identity form the unity of His Being which does not resemble anything else. For whatever can be enumerated, is simply a contingent thing which derives its being from Necessary Being.

Al-Ghazâlî discusses the role of the finite and determinate qualities and points out that these ideas can be true, in that they have a reference beyond mental experience. But they point to a system organised by other finite qualities in
interrelation with them. Al-Ghazālī calls them contingent factors whose existences can simply be derived from God.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that His Essence and existence cannot be non-existent; and His identity, quiddity and necessary existence manifest His Essence. Moreover Ibn-Sīnā adds from his own. He describes how His quiddity is not different from His identity and His Being is unified in His reality. Furthermore, he illustrates the nature of accident as contingent factor. Al-Ghazālī's account appears to correspond closely with this detailed view.

5. HE IS NOT (CAUSALLY) RELATED TO ANYTHING AS THAT THING IS (CAUSALLY) RELATED TO HIM.

Two references from Al-Fārābī and two from Ibn-Sīnā are noted. Al-Fārābī asserts that the Necessary Being cannot be supposed to be non-existent.
There is no cause for His Being. Moreover, His Being cannot be with anything else. He is the First Cause of all things.

Everything in the world is contingent. It requires another thing for its existence and that thing, on the other hand, is in need of something else for its coming into being. The process of one contingent thing's coming into being pursues an upward trend till it reaches Necessary Being. Thus the thing, according to al-Farābī, cannot be a cause for itself. Similarly, its quiddity is incapable of being a cause of its existence. Furthermore, one quiddity cannot have two existences, one deriving something and the other having something derived. On this basis there cannot be two things, each of them being the cause of the other. For example, A is the cause of B, and B is the cause of A. If the existence of B is derived from A, then the existence of A is necessarily prior to the existence of B. So B is not an effect. On the otherhand, A in view of its being a cause of B, comes before the existence of B and in view of its being effect of B, it follows from
the existence of B. Thus in one respect, it is existent and in another it is non-existent. Consequently, B becomes a cause of itself. For a cause of a cause appears to be a cause. In this connection, if B is the cause of A, and A is the cause of B, in reality B is its own cause. This is inconceivable.

Ibn-Sīnā does not differ from Al-Fārābī in principle. God, according to him, is necessary existence and there is no cause for Him, nor can His existence correspond to another existence where each of them is equal to the other. Furthermore, no partnership, multiplicity, change or becoming can be ascribed to Him.

Ibn-Sīnā demonstrates that God has no cause. For if there is a cause for His Being, He would exist by means of that cause, and would not be necessary by His Essence. That is why the Necessary Being has no cause.

God is Necessary Being and He does not depend upon anything else for His existence, '... one and the
samething cannot be both precedent and subsequent in relation to its being. Moreover, if we assume for the sake of argument that the other is non-existent: would the first then be a necessary being, or not? If it were a necessary being, it would have no connexion with the other: if it were not a necessary being, it would be a contingent being and would require another necessary being. Since the Necessary Being is One, and does not derive its being from any one, it follows that He is a Necessary Being in every respect; while anything else derives its being from another.' (21)

Al-Ghazālī states that God is not related to anything as that thing is related to Him in such a way that each of them is the cause of the other. For instance, B is the cause of C and C is the cause of B. Here B in view of its being a cause is prior to C; and C in view of its being a cause, on the other hand, is prior to B. Thus one is prior to the other which

21. Arberry  ...  28
precedes it and this is an absurd statement. For in respect of its being a cause each of them occurs before its associate and in respect of its being effect it follows the other. Consequently, each of the phenomena appears to be a cause of the other and this is absurd.

Thus his views consist of two aspects. One deals with the principle that God is not (causally) related to anything else as that thing is (causally) related to Him. The other is concerned with a concrete example. However, in respect to his first aspect al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to the views of Ibn-Sīnā. On the other hand, in his second aspect his concrete example is found in agreement with that of al-Fārābī. Thus his 'Annahu lā yuta'allaq bi-ghayrihi c al-lā wajh yuta'allaq dhālika al-ghayr bihi' appears to be closer to Ibn-Sīnā's 'Fa-in kāna wājib al-wujūd, fa lā ta'alluq lahu bi l-ākhar'. On the other hand, al-Ghazālī's statement with the examples of 'B is the cause C and C is the cause of B' corresponds closely to al-Fārābī's instance of 'A is the cause of B and B
is the cause of A.'

6. **HE IS NOT RELATED TO ANOTHER THING AS THAT OTHER IS RELATED TO HIM BY WAY OF RECIPROCITY.**

Two references from al-Fārābī and five from Ibn-Sīnā have been quoted. Al-Fārābī propounds the view that as in the cases of two phenomena each of them cannot be equally a cause of the other, so a reciprocal relation between two phenomena cannot be ascertained. On the contrary, a third relation between them is established, but there cannot be infinite and contingent causes for them. For each of them has a peculiar medium which becomes an effect in one respect and a cause in another. Furthermore, whatever has a peculiar medium, has a finite extremity. Consequently, on contingent things the existence of Necessary Being is free from material, formal, efficient and final (gha'īya) causes. Therefore His Being is most perfect and exalted; and moreover, He is free from all inadequacies and determination.

Ibn-Sīnā does not fundamentally differ from
al-Fārābī. He asserts that nothing can be necessary by means of its essence and at the same time of something else. For if the other thing is excluded or its existence is not taken into consideration, then one of two things must be true. First of all, if its necessary existence remains in one condition, it cannot be necessary by means of other things. Secondly, if its necessary existence is not so, then its existence cannot be necessary by its essence. All that is necessary in association with other things, can simply be a contingent thing by its essence. For whatever is considered to be necessary to other things, its necessary existence is subordinate to a relation and addition. Later on, necessary existence is confirmed by this relation. Moreover, the essence of a thing determines necessary or possible or impossible existences. But it is to be noted that this is not required for the impossible existence. For all that opposes its existence by its essence, can neither exist by its essence nor by something else. That is why whatever becomes necessary by its essence, cannot simultaneously be necessary by other things.
In this connection Ibn-Sīnā emphatically remarks that Necessary Being cannot be compared to contingent being which is connected with something else. 'Demonstration that He has no material and receptive cause: The receptive cause is the cause for the provision of the place in which a thing is received; that is to say, the place prepared for the reception of being, or the perfection of being. Now the Necessary Being is a perfection in pure actuality, and is not impaired by any deficiency; every perfection belongs to Him, derives from Him, and is preceded by His Essence, while every deficiency, even if it be metaphorical, is negated to Him.' (22)

Thus His Being can be related to no other thing except His Essence. Things are contingent and caused. That is why they cannot be equated with the universal nature of Necessary Being. For example, between two phenomena if one is the cause of the other, it can be related to the other only by possibility and not by necessity. They can in no way be equal nor can they be connected with any external cause. Rather one of them should be taken as first by dint

22. Arberry ... 29
of its existence. Then the reciprocal relation of one of them cannot be necessitated by the other, rather it may be so regarded in company with the other and a cause is required for putting them together. They consist of two distinct matters or subjects or descriptions, and the existence of a third thing unites them together. This, on the other hand, consists of two factors. One of them implies any one of the two things and its reality is compresent with the other. Thus its existence cannot be necessary; it is merely contingent and caused. Similarly, its cause cannot be equal in existence. Hence its cause turns out to be another thing; as such it and the other thing cannot be a cause of the relation between them, rather it becomes that other thing. The other does not have the same implication. For the concomitance becomes accidental to its particular existence. Furthermore, the existence which specifies it cannot be equal in respect of that to which it corresponds, but is derived from a precedent cause if it is an effect. Thus it has two possibilities. Firstly, the existence is derived from its associate not in the way it corresponds, but in the manner
the existence of its associate specifies it. So they cannot be equal; yet they can be understood as cause and effect. In this connection one of their associates appears to be a cause for the imaginative relation between them as are the cases of father and son. Secondly, they can not be equal in respect of two things where each of them cannot be cause of the other, but the relation is necessary for the existence of both of them. Thus the first cause for the relation is an external thing which produces the essence of both of them. All relations are accidental and they can not be equal unless they accidentally happen to be so.

Ibn-Sīnā is concerned to demonstrate that the reality of God is isolated from the objective world. His reality refers to an ideal content beyond the objective reference. It is recognized as such. It is not an empirical fact but an adjective. Thus in the act of our assertion we may simply transfer this adjective to and unite it with a real substantive. We comprehend at the same time that the relation thus set up is neither
constituted by the act, nor merely holds within it, but is real, both independent of and beyond the objective world.

Al-Ghazālī states that God cannot be related to any other thing as that other is related to Him; [this] not [only] in respect of causality but [also] in respect of reciprocity such as is between two brothers. For, if the non-existence of one does not follow from that of the other, no relation can be established.

On the other hand, existence which is different from necessary existence can have a relation with Necessary Being. But it is to be noted that this form of relation is similar to that of the effect to its cause, where effect is related to cause, but cause may not be so related. In other words, if non-existence of one follows from the non-existence of the other, it can simply be contingent and not necessary. Moreover, whatever depends upon another thing, can be merely contingent. For there are two alternatives: either that other (thing) would be sufficient in its existence, or that would require
another thing. However, either of these cases would be contrary to the nature of Necessary Being.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to the views of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that as between two phenomena each of them can not be equally a cause of the other, so a reciprocal relation cannot be ascertained. On the other hand, Necessary Being is most perfect, and is above all contrary and all determinate qualities. In addition to this, Ibn-Sīnā asserts that God is Necessary Being and He does not depend upon any contingent being, because the latter is caused and is incapable of having any necessary existence. Moreover, His Essence does not have necessary existence and contingent being together. The reciprocal relation between two things can simply be regarded as a possibility, and as such it cannot be necessitated by each of them, while a cause is required for putting them together. Moreover, Ibn-Sīnā asserts that Necessary Being is not impaired by any deficiency; every perfection belongs to Him, derives from Him and is preceded by His Essence. He has no cause for His
own and no relation can ever be ascribed to Him. Al-Ghazālī's account seems to be closer to Ibn-Sīnā's detailed view and appears to be a systematic arrangement.

As for the difference between points 5 and 6, it may be manifestly shown that the former deals with causality, while the latter is concerned with reciprocity. But in both points al-Ghazālī states that neither can anything ever be causally related to God, nor can any reciprocal relation be attributed to Him, indicating thereby that all finite categories fall far short of actual characterization of the nature of God.

7. HE HAS NO PARTNER.

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that God has no associate. He is different by His Essence from all that is other than He. Nothing else can have the existence which is His. For everything whose existence is this existence cannot differ from another thing which
has that existence also. So there cannot be two things, rather there should be one essence only. Because if one thing differs from the other, that in which they share will be other than that in which it differs. Consequently, each of them is divisible and each of those parts becomes a cause for the subsistence of its essence. But it cannot be the first, rather another existent comes before it which is the cause of its existence. This is inconceivable.

If the other were different from this and is not in this thing, then it follows that the thing which is different from that other concerns this existence specifying that, while existence of this is common to both of them. As a result existence of that other is composed of two things, one specifying it and the other associated with this. Therefore existence of that cannot be the existence of this. For the essence of this is simple and indivisible and on the other hand, the essence of that is divisible. Because of this, the subsistence of essence is divided into two parts.
It follows, therefore, that two things cannot be ascribed to His Essence. He is one in every respect. If there were two things, they would have to be partly alike and partly different, in which case the simplicity of each of them would be destroyed. In otherwords, if He had a partner, there would necessarily have to be some difference and some identity between them. Thus the differential and common element would constitute the essence of each of them, and these parts, in turn, would appear to be the cause of all things. If this is true not God but His parts would be the first being. This argument also is misleading. Thus it is manifest that God should be one to the supreme degree.

Two references have been quoted from the works of Ibn-Sīnā. He agrees with the views propounded by Al-Fārābī. God, according to Ibn-Sīnā, is a single Being. As Necessary Being He is pure truth, since the reality of every thing is the particularity of its existence, and there can be nothing more true than He. Similarly, in His
Essence no duality nor plurality of things can be ascribed. Moreover, there cannot be two things which are identical, while each of them is necessary by its essence and by something else. One the contrary, neither of them can be a cause of the other nor can the existence of one be derived from the other.

Thus it follows that 'It is not possible in anyway that the Necessary Being should be two. Demonstration: Let us suppose that there is another necessary being: one must be distinguishable from the other, so that the terms "this" and "that" may be used with reference to them. This distinction must be either essential or accidental. If the distinction between them is accidental, this accidental element cannot but be present in each of them, or in one and not the other. If each of them has an accidental element by which it is distinguished from the other, both of them must be caused; for an accident is what is adjoined to a thing after its essence is realized. If the accidental element is regarded as adhering to its being, and is present in
one of the two and not in the other, then the one
which has no accidental element is a necessary being
and the other is not a necessary being. If, however,
the distinction is essential, the element of essentiality
is that whereby the essence as such subsists; and if
this element of essentiality is different in each and
the two are distinguishable by virtue of it, then
each of the two must be a compound; and compounds are
caused; so that neither of them will be a necessary
being. If the element of essentiality belongs to one
only, and the other is one in every respect and there
is no compounding of any kind in it, then the one which
has no element of essentiality is a necessary being,
and the other is not a necessary being. Since it is
thus established that the Necessary Being cannot be two
but is All-Truth, then by virtue of His Essential
Reality, in respect of which He is a Truth, He is United
and One, and no other shares with Him in that Unity:
however the All-Truth attains existence, it is through
Himself.' (23)

23. Arberry ... 25
Al-Ghazālī states that in the Essence of God there cannot be two things, each of which is necessary and independent. For this would consist of two possibilities, one of resemblance in all respects and the other of difference. If they appear to resemble in all respects, then plurality is nullified and dualism cannot be realized, just as the cases of two black colours having been in one place with one condition are impossible.

If they were to differ in respect to differentia or accident, an impossibility would again arise; because neither differentia nor accident can actually enter upon the reality of the universal nature. However, they may indeed exist in their being, but their existence would in fact be accidental. On the other hand, as His identity and quiddity are one, neither differentia is included in His quiddity nor can it come into His identity. That is why differentia and accident cannot be ascribed to the nature of God. They are simply ineffectual. In other words, if the nature of God is not complete without
differentia, then the differentia is included in His reality; but it loses its ground owing to the fact that the differentia enters into the existence of quiddity and reality where the quiddity is actually not existence. So this argument is fallacious.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to the views of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that God is one, and there cannot be two things in His Essence. Ibn-Sīnā further shows that God does not have two things in His Essence, each of which is necessary by His Essence. He clearly demonstrates how there should not be two things equally necessary. To these detailed views al-Ghazālī's account appears to be closer.

On the other hand, it has been observed that his uses of fasāl, māhiyya and anniyya seem to be "additions".

8. **NO QUALITY CAN AUGMENT HIS ESSENCE.**

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that God is the eternal and everlasting Being with His Essence,
and His Essence does not require any other thing which can extend His permanence. Rather He is sufficient in His permanence and perpetual existence by virtue of His Essence. No existence can be like His Essence, nor can any being be equated with the grade of His Being. Moreover, there is no cause for His existence.

Ibn-Sīnā does not fundamentally differ from al-Fārābī. He asserts that 'Since it is thus established that He has no receptive cause, it follows that He does not possess anything potentially, and that He has no attribute yet to be awaited; on the contrary, His Perfection has been realized in actuality; and He has no material cause. We say "realized in actuality", using this as a common term of expression, meaning that every perfection belonging to any other is non-existent and yet to be awaited, whereas all perfection belonging to Him has being and is present. His Perfect Essence, preceding all relations, is One. From this it is manifest that His Attributes are not an augmentation of His Essence; for if they were an augmentation of His
Essence, the Attributes would be potential with reference to the Essence and the Essence would be the reason for the Attributes. In that case the Attributes would be subsequent to a precedent, so that they would be in one respect active and in another receptive; their being active would be other than the aspect of their being receptive; and in consequence they would possess two mutually exclusive aspects. Now this is impossible in the case of anything whatsoever; when a body is in motion, the motivation is from one quarter and the movement from another.

If it were to be stated that His Attributes are not an augmentation of His Essence, but they entered into the constitution of the Essence, and that the Essence cannot be conceived of as existing without these Attributes, then the Essence would be compound, and the Oneness would be destroyed.' (24)

It follows that there could not be any quality which may be an addition to His Essence. So

24. Arberry ... 29
De Boer says:–

"This first One is the God of Ibn Sīnā, of whom many attributes may of course be predicated, such as thought &c., but only in the sense of negation or relation, and in such a way that they do not affect the Unity of his essence." (25)

Al-Ghazālī states that there can not be any attribute which can augment His Essence. Because if He subsists with that attribute, He is connected with it and is composed of different parts. But it may be noted that all that is composed of things is caused. If its non-existence does not follow from the implication of the non-existence of that attribute, it may be treated as an accidental phenomenon, (as is the case of knowledge in man). However, this is inconceivable, since every accidental phenomenon is caused. But if its cause is the Essence of God, then the Essence would imply two aspects, one being active and the other being

25. Boer, Hist. ... 136
receptive; but His being active is different from His being receptive. As a result multiplicity would occur in the Essence of God; which is absolutely inconceivable because He is one in every respect.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to the of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that the Essence of God does not require anyother thing and there is no cause for His Being. Ibn-Sīnā further asserts that there cannot be any attribute which augments His Essence. For if there is an augmentation of His Essence, then the attributes would be subsequent to a precedent. Thus they would be active in one respect and receptive in another. Consequently, His Essence would be compound on the one hand and would thereby imply a multiplicity in His Essence on the other. This is absurd. Al-Ghazālī's account corresponds fully with this.

9. HIS NATURE IS UNCHANGEABLE.

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that God is the self-sufficient Being. Nothing is needed for the
completion of His nature, nor can He require anything else for the extension of His permanence. Furthermore, His nature is not changed from one state to another. He is one in the sense that the reality of His Being can not be derived from anything other than His own.

Ibn-Sīnā does not disagree with the basic idea of Al-Fārābī. But he adds more from his own standpoint. According to him, the nature of God is unchangeable. 'It is also evident, as a result of denying the existence of a receptive cause, that it is impossible for Him to change; for the meaning of change is the passing away of one attribute and the establishment of another; and if He were susceptible to change, He would possess potentially an element of passing-away and an element of establishment; and that is absurd. It is clear from this that He has no opposite and no contrary; for opposites are essences which succeed each other in the occupation of a single locus, there being between them the extreme of contrariety. But He is not receptive to accidents, much less to opposites. And
if the term "opposite" is used to denote one who disputes with Him in His Rulership, it is clear too on this count that He has no opposite. It is further clear that it is impossible for Him not to be; for since it is established that His Being is necessary, it follows that it is impossible for Him not to be; because everything which exists potentially cannot exist actually, otherwise it would have two aspects. Anything which is receptive to a thing does not cease to be receptive when reception has actually taken place; if this were not so, it would result in the removal of both being and not-being, and that is untenable.' (25(a))

From this it is evident that the idea is generally associated with transcendental being divested of all concrete contents and beyond all categorical determinations. Such transcendental being is abstract, universal, unchanging, not an object of thought or discursive reason, but one of unique experience. It is

25(a). Arberry ... 30
either an indeterminate unity which discourages all plurality and differentiation or harbours, we know not why, contents within itself not as they empirically are but only as transformed and transmuted in the whole.

Al-Ghazālī states that the nature of God cannot be subject to change. All categories of change consist of the creation of a quality which did not exist before. It becomes a new reference. However, everything which is created necessarily requires a cause and in no way can it be possible without it and be its essence. In other words, every quality follows from the essence and exists with it, but it never comes after it. This leads us to believe that the Essence of God is the absolute criterion of truth which is unconditional, invariable and eternal principle transcending all finite relations and references. Moreover, as we have already discovered that agent is not receptive, nothing can be added to His Essence; for the act of doing and that of receiving imply two distinct phenomena; as such it causes a duality in His Essence which is impossible.
Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that the nature of God cannot be changed. But Ibn-Sīnā teaches that change is the passing away of one quality and the establishment of another. Consequently, it gives rise to being and not-being. That is why the nature of God is unchangeable. Al-Ghazālī's account corresponds fully with this detailed view.

10. **NOTHING CAN PROCEED FROM HIM EXCEPT ONE THING.**

Al-Fārābī teaches that as the First Being God is the First Cause of all existents. He is isolated from all kinds of imperfection. All that is other than He cannot be free from a certain amount of imperfection of one kind or more than one. But God is free from all determinate relations. In this connection De Boer says:-

"We are able to see God better in the regular gradation of Beings which proceeds from him than in himself. From him, the One alone, comes the All,
for his knowledge is the highest power: In his
cognizance of himself the world comes into
being:” (26)

Three references have been quoted from Ibn-
Sīnā. He does not differ from Al-Fārābī in principle.
According to him, God is one and nothing can be associated
with His grade. Similarly, anything which is other than
He cannot be considered as a necessary existence. Since
nothing other than He can be necessary, He becomes a
principle of the necessary existence of all things and
causes them to be necessary either from the beginning or
through a mediator. In other words, Necessary Being should
have one essence only, otherwise a multiplicity would result.
Thus it involves two possibilities. One is that each
essence has a meaning of its reality which does not differ
from another. The other possibility is that it would
differ. Now if it does not differ in one respect and differs
in another, then the argument would involve a contradiction.
However, each of the things is clearly distinct from the

26. Boer, Hist. ... 115
other. It differs not only in the very meaning of the thing, but also in other respects besides its meaning.

It, therefore, follows that the nature of God is unique and all other things emanate from Him in succession. 'So when we say that this Act emanated from Him through a reason, and that that reason was of Him also, this implies no imperfection in His Activity; on the contrary, totality emanated from Him, through Him and unto Him. Therefore all things having being emanated from Him according to a known order and known media: that which came later cannot be earlier, and that which came earlier cannot be later, for it is He Who causes things to be earlier and later.' (27)

Al-Ghazālī states that nothing can emanate unmediated from God except one thing. Then various things come out of it mediately and successively. Thus

27. Arberry ... 36
He is one without any multiplicity whatsoever. According to al-Ghazālī, multiplicity of things may be of two kinds. Either it consists of different parts of things of which each of their units is independent, as is the multiplicity of a composite body; or it consists of the multiplicity of a concept where the thing is divided into two groups, one of which can not be independent without the other; such as, form and matter or being and quiddity. Al-Ghazālī clearly excludes all types of the above multiplicity and rejects them as a constituent part of His Essence. For God is one, and nothing can proceed from Him except one. Then he discusses that the act of the one may be different in three ways owing to the difference of the place, or that of the appliance, or that of a cause augmenting the essence of one agent.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to the views of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that God is the First Cause of all existents. He is one and is free from imperfection. Ibn-Sīnā further
asserts that God is the principle of things and things proceed from Him in proper succession. As He is Necessary Being He causes the things to be necessary either through beginning or through a mediator. His Being should always have one essence, otherwise multiplicity would result. Al-Ghazālī's account seems to be closer to this detailed view. Moreover, it has been observed that al-Ghazālī states the implication of Kathra in detail and this context appears to be an "addition".

11. HE IS NOT A SUBSTANCE.

Two references from Al-Fārābī and two from Ibn-Sīnā are noted. Al-Fārābī propounds the view that we are incapable of defining the nature of God. His nature cannot be divided into different things by which He becomes substance. For it can not be demonstrated by one of those parts. If this is the case, the parts with which He becomes substance are
likely to be the causes for His existence. But this is inconceivable, because God is the First Being, and there is no cause for His existence. Thus the nature of God cannot be divisible either qualitatively or quantitatively. He is immaterial Being and His Essence is nothing but abstract intelligence which does not require any matter.

Ibn-Sīnā asserts that 'He has no active cause:
This is self-evident: for if He had any reason for being, this would be adventitious and that would be a necessary being. Since it is established that He has no active cause, it follows on this line of reasoning that His Quiddity is not other than His Identity, that is to say, other than His Being; neither will He be a subsistence or an accident. There cannot be two, each of which derives its being from the other, nor can He be a necessary being in one respect, and a contingent being in another respect.' (28)

28. Arberry ... 27
Ibn-Sīnā quotes a reference to a passage about substance which deals with the question whether or not it can be applied to the nature of God. Generally speaking, a substance is primarily concerned with space. But according to the reference of Ibn-Sīnā, it implies an abstract thing which is not existent in any substratum. It has a permanent quiddity apart from being existent in a particular place as are the cases of body or soul. For example, if we refer to every phenomenon as A, we mean that every thing is described by the term A, even though it has reality without identity. Thus in the definition of substance, it must be held that it is not existent in any particular place. It has a quiddity in itself like man, stone, and tree. In this connection 'man' indicates an unknown individual whose being can not subsist in a place.

This may refer to the Platonic doctrine about the distinction between the world of Ideas and that of sense or reality. While referring to a man we generally
mean a particular man who exists in the world of realities, but this is a particular manifestation of 'man-ness' out of the world of Ideas. In this connection W. T. Stace remarks:

"We have seen that the Ideas are absolute Being, and that things of sense are half real and half unreal. They are partly real because they participate in Being. They are partly unreal because they participate in not-being. There must be, therefore, a principle of absolute not-being. This, in Plato's opinion, is matter. Things of sense are copies of the Ideas fashioned out of, or stamped upon, matter. But Plato does not understand by matter what we, in modern times, understand by it. Matter, in our sense, is always some particular kind of matter. It is brass, or wood, or iron, or stone. It is matter which has determinate character and quality. But the possession of specific character means that it is
matter with the copy of Ideas already stamped upon it. Since iron exists in great quantities in the world, and there is a common element in all the various pieces of iron, by virtue of which all are classed together, there must be a concept of iron. There is, therefore, an Idea of iron in the world of Ideas." (29)

However, Ibn-Sīnā's reference appears to be concerned with the world of Ideas, where a thing exists in abstract form; and as such it does not require any substratum for its subsistence.

Al-Ghazālī states that God is not a substance even though He subsists with Himself without being in a place just as [an ordinary] substance. According to this technical term, substance consists of reality as well as quiddity whose existence is not in a substratum. In this respect substance applies to reality and quiddity alone.

29. Stace, - A Critical History of Greek Philosophy ... 208
Whenever their existence is taken into consideration, it may be conceivable apart from any substratum. Since His quiddity and identity are stated to be one, He is not called a substance.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to the views of Ibn-Sīnā. The views of al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā appear to be on dissimilar lines. For al-Fārābī asserts that the nature of God cannot be divided into different parts by which He becomes substance. If one supposes that, then the parts with which He becomes substance are likely to be the causes of His existence. But this is a sheer absurdity, for God is the First Being, and there is no cause for His existence. On the other hand, Ibn-Sīnā's views consists of two aspects. Firstly, he categorically asserts that substance or accident cannot be ascribed to the nature of God. According to the general view, substance occupies a space, and has extension and solidity. In this respect Ibn-Sīnā denies the possibility of God's being identified with substance. Secondly, he refers to a traditional opinion, and states...
that God’s substance (if one supposes so) indicates an abstract reality which does not subsist in a particular substratum for its manifestation. Its nature is full of quiddity and we know not what it is. Al-Ghazālī’s account corresponds fully with these detailed views. Furthermore, it has been observed that Ibn-Sīnā took 'man, stone and tree' as examples for his demonstration of the view, whereas al-Ghazālī brings in the example of 'crocodile' whose context is very brief; as such it requires clarification.

12. EVERYTHING EMANATES FROM HIM IN SUCCESSION.

Two references from Al-Fārābī and four from Ibn-Sīnā have been quoted. Al-Fārābī propounds the view that there are various kinds of existents. The nature of some of them may be complete or incomplete in comparison with that of the other. However, all of them emanate from the Essence of God in succession. Furthermore, an existent may be of two kinds, necessary
and contingent. The contingent thing cannot be independent of a cause for its being nor can it continue ad infinitum in its being cause and effect. On the contrary, at the end it requires a necessary thing which is the First Existent.

Al-Fārābī, therefore, asserts that all categories of existents successively emanate from the First Existent or God. In this connection Professor W. Montgomery Watt says:—

"In the centre of his metaphysics is the First Being or absolute One, which was understood to be identical with God as proclaimed in Islamic doctrine. From him emanated all other existent things in hierarchical order." (30)

Ibn-Sīnā does not basically differ from al-Fārābī. He asserts that God is one in number.

30. Watt, Philosophy  ...  55
He is pure Being which is different from contingent being. For the latter requires necessarily another thing for its coming into being. Moreover, contingent being may be existent with respect to its essence, but its being may be necessary in association with other things.

God is the agent of all things in the sense that He is the existent from which every distinct existent emanates. But it is to be noted that there is no compound element in His Essence, and He is free from all sorts of causes. With regard to His relation with other existents, it is shown that all of them emanate from Him according to known order and media. There is no imperfection in His acts. Rather the totality emanates from Him, through Him, and unto Him; that is to say, He causes things to be earlier and later.

Al-Ghazālī states that all that is other than Necessary Being emanates from Him in successive order. In other words, the existence of all other things is
derived from Him. In order to demonstrate this view al-Ghazālī states that Necessary Being is one in number. What is subject to enumeration cannot be necessary; rather it must simply be a contingent thing which requires Necessary Being for its coming into existence.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to the views of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that there are various kinds of existents which successively emanate from God. An existent may be necessary and contingent, while the latter requires Necessary Being for coming into being. Moreover, Ibn-Sīnā asserts that God is one and pure Being; as such there is no compound element in His Essence and He is free from causes and imperfection. Things other than He derive their being from Him in proper succession. In respect to this detailed account of Ibn-Sīnā's views al-Ghazālī is in more substantial agreement.
4. RESULT

Al-Ghazālī's accounts correspond to those of al-Fārābī in points 2 (partial), 3 and 5 (partial) and of Ibn-Sīnā in points 1, 2 (partial), 4, 5 (partial), 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12.

On the other hand, some 'additions' have been observed in al-Ghazālī's points 1, 2, 7 and 10.
CHAPTER SEVEN

ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.
1. **Brief Introduction:**

This chapter is largely about the attributes of God. Al-Ghazālī begins with an introduction and briefly states that multiplicity cannot be ascribed to the Essence of God. A great deal of difference lies between two types of qualities: one leads towards multiplicity in essence and the other does not. He lists five distinct qualities and clearly points out which of them, strictly speaking, could be conceivable for attribution to God.

Al-Ghazālī chiefly deals with the attributes of God, and discusses them in eleven sections with analysis and examples. He vividly describes how God is living, knowing and happy Being; and He has will, providence and omnipotence. Moreover, His Knowledge of particulars can never be realized in the realm of temporal phenomena. On the other hand, His knowledge of all categories of beings does not augment His Essence, and nothing can remain far from His knowledge.

In the last part he turns his attention to certain
theological issues and ignores strictly metaphysical problems.

At the end of this chapter al-Ghazālī states certain views in question and answer form; the fundamental problems these raise, have already been considered in the discussion of the nature of attributes.

Only the sources involved in the main eleven sections concerning attributes have been the subject-matter of this investigation.
2. ANALOGOUS VIEWS.

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

I. GOD IS LIVING.

فَأَوْلَاهُ: اِنَّ المِبْدَأَ الْأَوْلِيَّةُ حَيٍّ،
فَإِذْنَ هوُ عَالِمُ حَيٍّ،
وَ بِرَهْنِ كُونِهُ عَالِمًا بَدَايَةً:
أَنْ تَعْرِفْ مَعْنَى قُولُناً: اِنَّ الشَّيْءَ عَالِمًا ماَ هُوَ؟
وَ اِنْ مَعْنَى قُولُناً: اِنَّهُ عَلِمٌ وَ مَعْلُومٌ ماَ هُوَ؟
وَ مَعْنَى كُونُهُ عَالِمًا اِنَّهُ مَوْجُودٌ
بَرِٰءٰ عَنِ الْمَادَةٍ وَ مَعْنَى كُونِ الشَّيْءِ مَعْقَوَلٌ وَ
مَعْلُومَا; اِنَّهُ مَجْرَدٌ عَنِ الْمَادَةٍ. فَمَهَما فَضَلَّ
خَلَوَ مَجْرَدًّا فِي بَرِٰءٰ، كَانَ اَلْتَحَال عَلِمَاً وَ كَانَ
الْمَحْلَ عَالِمًا; اَذْ لَا مَعْنَى لِلْعَلَمِ الاَنْتَبِاعُ صَوْرةٌ
سَيَرْدَةٌ مِنَ الْمَوَادَةٍ فِي ذَٰلِكَ هِيْ بَرِٰيَةٌ عَنِ الْمَوَادَ
فِي كُونِ المَنْطَقَ عَلَمًا وَ المَنْطَقُ فِيْهِ عَالِمًا,
والمعنى للعلم الا هذا - خمسموا وجد هذا صدق
اسم العلم و العالم، ومهما انتهى لصدق - و
المراد بالبريء، والمجرد واحد، ولكن خصصنا;
المجرد بالمعلوم و البريء بالعالم حتى لا
بلتبس في ترديد الكلام - (2)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.
بكون حيا لانه يعقل من جهة ما هو عقل، ولا
عقله وانه عقل وانه عاقل وانه عقل هو نفسه معنى
واحد وكذلك الله حي وانه حيوة معنى واحد، و
االذان اسم الخي تد يستعار لغير ما هو حيوان
فيقال على كل موجود كأن على كماله الاخير وعلى
كل ما بلغ من الوجود و الكمال الى حيث يصدر
عنقه ما من شانه ان يكون منه كما من شانه
ان يكون منه نفسى هذا الوجه اذ كان الدور
وجوده اكمل وجود كأن حق باسم الخي من
الذي يقال على الي انشا في استعارة وكلما كان
وجودة اثني ذائه اذا علم وعقل كان ما يعقل
عنقه ويعقل منه اما اذا كان المعقول منه في
نفسنا مطابقا لما هو موجود منه نعى حسب
وجودة الخارج عن نفسنا يكون معقوله في
نفسنا مطابقا لوجوده وان كان ناصح الوجود
كان معقوله في نفسنا معقولًا انقص (ر).
كونه حيا قد نبتد أنه واحد
وأنه لا يتجز من ذاته إذا عرفت أن جي وزت لا
ليست صفعة عارضة ذاته بل معنى الذكي هو
العالم بنفسه على ما هو عليه وإذا ذكرنا
إنه واحد لا تعزب ذاته عن ذاته فإنه هو
إلى ذاته العالم بذاته لم يكن كل ما سواءً و
إن كان عالمًا به علمه به بواسطة علمه تعالى
بذاته تقدس وأيضاً الذكي يعبر عنه المدرك
والفاعل فعن له علم واعتراف وفعّل فهو حي
ومن يكون له جميع المعلومات وجميع
المدركات وجميع الافعال فهو أولى فإن يكون
حياً (١)

أَعْلَى عَالِمٍ عِلْمُهُ بِذَاتِهَ وَأَنْ عَلَمَهُ
ومعلوميته وعالميته شيء واحد وأنه عالم
بغيره وبجميع المعلومات وانه يعلم الجميع
بعله واحد وأنه يعلمه على وجه لا ينغير
علمه لوجود المعلوم وعجمه...

٣. IS., Arsh. ... و
2. HIS KNOWLEDGE IS NOT ADDITIONAL TO HIS ESSENCE.

الدعاوي الثانية: ان علماً
بذاذا له هوا ازكدا على ذاته، حتى يوجب فيه
كثره، بل هو ذاته ـ

4. IS., Arsh. ... 8
وبيانه: "بان نقدم عليه مقدمة، وهي أن كل ما يعرفه الإنسان إلا أن يكون معلومًا بمشاهدته في نفسه، بحسن ظاهر أو بحسن باطن - وإما أن لا يكون معلومًا، ولا سبيل إلى إعلامه إلا بالمقارنة التي شيعت مما ثبت في مشاهدته في نفسه، فإن لم يشاهد من نفسه له نظرة، بوجه ما، لم يمكن تعرفه.

فاذًا ثبت هذا فنصول: لا يعرف الإنسان هذا في حق الإله إلا بمقبضة إلى نفسه - فانه يعلم نفسه، فمعلومه غيره؟ أو هو إعينه؟

كان كأن غيره، فهو الآن لا يعلم نفسه، بل على غيره - وإن كان معلومه هو عينه، فالعالم هو نفسه، والمعلوم هو نفسه - فقد انجد العالم والمعلوم.

فنقيل الدليل على أن العلم هو المعلوم أيضًا، حتى إذا جعلنا المعلوم أصلا، وبينا أن العلم هو عين المعلوم، فإن العالم أيضًا..."
هو عين المعلوم كنما سابق لزم منه بالضرورة أن لكل مبدأ واحداً لذا كثرته فيه - (5)

AL - FARĀBĪ.

و كذلك الحال في أنه عالم فانه ليس يحتاج في أن يعلم إلى ذات أخرى يستفسر بعلمها الفضيلة خارجة عن ذاته ولا في أن يكون معلوماً إلا ذات أخرى تعلمه بل هو مكتمف بجوهره في أن يعلم ويعلم و ليس علمه بهذا شبيه سوى جوهره فانه يعلم وانه معلوم وانه علمه فهو ذات واحدة وجوهر واحد - (6)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

(7) وبيان ابنه يعلم الاشياء بعلم واحد وانه يعلمه على الوجه الذي لا

5. Ghaz., Nāg. ... 226
6. Diet., Must. (Text) IO
ينتخب بعض المعلومات أنه قد ثبت أن علمه لا يكون زائدًا على ذاته وهو يعلم ذاته وهو مبدأ لجميع الموجودات وهو منزوع عن العرض والتخبرات فإذا علم الأشياء على الوجه الذي لا ينتخبان المعلومات تباع لعلمه لا علمه تباع للمعلومات حتى ينتخب بعضها لأن علمه الأشياء سبب لوجودها - (7)

و بياناً: عالم و علم و معلوم إن العلم عبارة عن الحقيقة المجردة فإذا كانت هذه الحقيقة مجردة فهو علم وإذا كانت هذه الحقيقة المجردة له وحاسرة لديه وغير مستورة عنه فهو عالم وإذا كانت هذه الحقيقة المجردة لا تحصل إلا أنه فهو معلوم بعبارات مختلفة والدال على العالم والمعلوم بالنسبة إلى ذاته واحد.

و نفسك قابل فانك اذًا علمت نفسك لمعلومات غيرك أو كنت

7. IS., Arsh. ... 9
3. **HE KNOWS ALL TYPES OF EXISTENTS, AND NOTHING IS FAR FROM HIS KNOWLEDGE.**

"الدعوی الثالثة: ان الأول"
عالم بسائر انواع الموجودات و اجزائها، فلا
يعرف عن علمه شيء.
وهذا الآن أدق وأعمد
من الأول.
وبيانه: أنه ثبت أند يعلم
ذاته، تنبيني أن علمه على ما هو عليه، لأن
ذاته مجردة لذاته. مكشوفة له على ما هو عليه بきっかけه.
وحقيقة أنه وجود محسن.
هو ينبوع وجود الجواهر والأعراف، والمكابس
كلها، على ترتيبها، فإن علم نفسه مبدأ لها، فقد
انطوى العلم بها في علمه ذاتها وإن لم يعلم
نفسه مبدأً، يعلم نفسه على ما هو عليه.
وهو مفعول؟ لأنه 만ما علم ذاته، فإن ذاته
ليس غائبًا عن ذاته، وهم مجردة، اعني ذاته بالاعتبارين، وهو كما هو عليه مكشوف
لذا نه (6)

9. Ghaz., Mag. ... 227
فإن العالم لا يتغير علمه لانه
 يجعل الابداع بالأسباب العقلية والترتيب
 الوجودي لا بالحواس والعلم العقلي لا يتغير و
 المستفاد من الحسن يتغير. (10)
على الوجه الذي هو عليه وهو أنه مبدع لجميع الحقيقيات والموجودات فإنه لا يعترف على علمه شيء في الأرض ولا في السماء بل جميع ما يحصل في الوجود أما يحصل بسببه وهوسبب الأسباب نجعل ما هو سبب و موجودة و مبدعه

(زا) واجب الوجود Enuma يعقل كل شيء على نحو كل شيء ومع ذلك فلا يعترف عليه شيء شخصي ولا يعترف عنه منفصل ذرة في السقوط ولا في الأرض، وهذا من العجائب التي يحويه تصورها لطف قرينة

(زا) كلانه إذا عقل ذائد وعقل أنه مبدأ كل موجود، عمل أوائل الموجودات عنه وما يتولد عنها، ولا شيء من الأشياء يوجد إلا وقد مارست جهة ما واجب بسببه، وتجميع هذا، فتكون هذه

II IS., Arsh. ... 8
4. **THERE IS NO MULTIPLICITY IN HIS ESSENCE AND KNOWLEDGE.**

الدعاوى الرابعة: إن هذا أيضًا لا يؤدي إلى كثرة في علمه، وفي ذاته - وهذا افتعض من الأول؟ كان المعلومات على كثرةها تستدعي علما كثيرة، فعلما واحد بمعلومات مفصلة، مسائل وجوده، إذ يعني الواحد أنه ليس فيه شيء غير شيء، وأنه لم يقدر عدم بعضه، لزم عمه؟؛ إذ لا بعض له - والعلم، إذا ذُقي بالجواهر والأخلاق.

وإذا، فلن قدروا زوال تعلقه بالأعرق، بقي شيء غير ما قدروا زواله، وهو تعلقه بالجواهر. وكذا

12. IS., *Ilah.* (2) ... 359
كل معلومين -
و هذا ينافض معنى الوحدة،
ولكن بيانه بالمقاييسة بمشاهدته النفس؟
فإن النفس نسخة مختصرة من كل العالم،
يوجد لكل شيء فيها نظير - وبها يتمكن من
معرفة الكل - (3).

AL - FARĀḤĪ.

... وليس يحقق أكثر من
ذاته لتعقله للكل والكثرة وإنها علة لوجود
الكل على معنى أنه بعضي الكل وجوداً دائماً و
يمنع العدم مطلقًا لا على أن بعضي الكل
وجوداً بحيثا بعد تسلط العدم عليه (ه) إلا
العدم الذي يسقته الكل بذاته - (4).

(ب) Read... عليه...

I3. Ghaz. Maq... 228
I4. Far., Da'awi... 4
(ز) إعلاننا إذا، قلنا بل ينها أن واجب الوقوع لا ينكر بوجه من الوجه، وأن داشه وحداني صرف محض حق فلا نعني بذلك أنه أيضا لا يسلب عنه وجود ذات، ولا تقع له إضافة إلى وجود ذات، فإن هذا لا يمكنا - وذلك لنكن كل موجود فليس بله انحياز من الوجود مختلفة كبيرة، وكل موجود إلى الموجودات نوع من الإضافة أو النسبة، وخصوصا الذي يفيض عنه كل وجود.
لكننا نعني بقولنا أنه وحداني الذات لا ينكر أنه كذلك حتى إذا ثني ان تبعته إضافات إيجابية وسلبية كثيرة، كذلك لوازم الذات مخلوطة للأذات توجد بعد وجود الذات، وليس مقومة للأذات ولا اجزاء لها - إياكم.
(ز) وأيضا هذه تمام الوجود لان نوعه لم نعتقد في شيء آخر، خارج

15. IS. Ilah. (2) ... 343
5. HE IS AWARE OF CONTINGENT BEINGS.

الدعاية الخامسة: هو أن
الله تعالى كما يعلم الأجناس والأنواع، يعلو
الممكنات المحادثة، وإن كنا لا نعلمهها; لأن

I6. IS., Naj. ... 230
الممكن ما دام يعرف ممكنًا، بستكميل أن يعلم وقوعه أو لا وقوعه؟ لأنه اما يعلم منه وصف البساط، ومعناه انه يمكن ان يكون، ويمكن ان لا يكون - (17)

AL - FARĀBĪ.

و لكل موجود من وجوده قسم ومرتبة مفردة ووجود الأشياء عند الله عن جهة تصدمنه ويشبه قصورنا ولا يكون له تصد الأشياء ولا مصدر الأشياء عنه على سبيل الطبيع من دون أن يكون له معرفة ورضاء بصدورها وحصولها، وانما ظهر الأشياء عنه لكونه عالماً بذاته - (18)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

و في هما ظهر ان العلم نفسه

I7. Ghaz., Maq. ... 232
I8. Diet., Abh. (Text) 58
لقدرأى وهو يعلم الممكنات كما يعلم الموجودات
وإن كان نحن لانعلمها لأن الممكن بالنسبة
البنا يجوز وجودة ويجب عدمة وبانسبة
الله يكون أحد الطرفين معلوما له فعلمده
بالاجناس والأنواع والموجودات والممكنات
والجلي والخفي واحدا (62).

AL - GHAZALI.

6. HIS KNOWLEDGE OF PARTICULARS IS NOT SUBJECT
TO TEMPORAL DISTINCTIONS.

الدعاوي السادسة: هو أن
الأول سبحانه وتعالى، لا يجوز ان يعلو
الجزئيات العلما يدخل تحت الماضي والمستقبل
والآن،
حتى يعلو أن الشمس لم
تنكسف اليوم، وإنها ستتكسب غدا.

19. IS., Arsh. ... 9
لذا إذا جاء العدد، ينبغي انها
الآن مكسوفة، وإذا جاء بعد غد فجعلها
كانتアルバム، مكسوفة -
فان هذا يجب تغيير في ذاته;
للاختلاف هذه العلوم عليه، وقد سبق ان
التغير محال عليه -
و وجه لزوم التغير، ان المعلوم
يتبعد العلم، فمهما تغير المعلوم تغير العلم، و
مهما تغير العلم تغير العلم، اذ العلم ليس من
الصفات التي اذ اختلفت لايتغير العلم،
كونه بمبدأ وشمالا، بل العلم صفة للذات
يوجب اختلافه اختلاف الذات، وليست نسبة
المعلوم إلى المعلوم ابهما نسبة لا يوجب اختلاف
المعلوم، اختلافا فيه حتى يغري علم
واحد - (20)

IBN - SĪNĀ.

فان الواجب الإجبار يجب ان لا

20. Ghaz., Mag. .... 233
يكون علمه بالجزئيات علما زمنيا، حتى يدخل نبئه: 
الآن.
والماضي.
والمستقبل.

في حسر لصفة ذاته ان
تتغير، بل يجب أن يكون علمه بالجزئيات
على الوجه المقدس العالي في الزمان والدهر.
و يجب أن يكون عالما بكل
شيء؟ لأن كل شيء لازم له، بوسط، أو بغير
وسط، باتخاذ اليا بعينه قدرة الذي هو
تفاصيل تفاصيله الأول، تأديها واجب؟ اذا كان ما لا
يجب لا يكون كم علمت - (12)
7. HE HAS WILL AND PROVIDENCE.

الدعوي السابعة: ان الأول مريد للارادة، وعناية، وان ذلك ليستبد على ذاته...

وبيانه: ان الأول فاعل؟ فانه ظاهر.

ان كل الاشیاء حاضرة منه، فهي فعله.

والفاعل اما ان يكون فاعلا بالطبع المحتفظ، أو بالارادة، والطبع المحتفظ هو الفعل المنفرد عن الجمع، بالمعطى، وبالفعل، و كل فعل لا يخلو عن العلم، فلا يخلو عن الارادة، و كل فاعل من ذات الله تعالى مع علمه به فائق منه، وقبضانه منه غير مناف لذاته، حتى يكون كارضاً، فلا كرامة فيه له، فهو إذن رافق بقبضانه.

و هذه الحالة يجوز ان يعبر عنها بالارادة، وصداً قبضان الكل منه، علمه بوجه النظام في الكل، فيكون علمه سبب وجود
المعلوم - خاذن إرادته علمه - 328

و تكون معنى عنايته بالخلق،
انه على مثلان الإنسان يفتقر إلى الله باطشة,
لو لم يكن له نكاح ناقصة، ولكن سرنا حقه.
وإن الأمة الباطشة ينبغي أن تكون مثل اليد
و الكيف. 328
فتمت العبادة بتمام الخير، و
تم الخير بالهداية بعد الخلق. (22)

**AL - FĂRĂBI.**

(22) وهو مثير لدنا ليس فيه
ضدية للأشياء - (23)

(23) وانه ليس في ذاته ما يضاف
صرور الكل عنه فهو بهذا المعنى مثير لوجود
الكل في انه لا يجوز ان يتجدد له ارادة لى

22. Ghaz., Mag. ... 235
23. Far., Zīnūn ... 6
(2) ... فإذا قال له: مريد، لا يعني الد
كون واجب الوجود مع عقليته - أي سلب
المادة عنه - مبدأ لنظام الخير كله وهو يعقل
ذلك، فيكون هذا مؤلفاً من إضافة وسلب - (25).
(25) ... فيجب أن يعلم أن العناية هي
كون الأول عالمه لذاته بما عليه الوجود في نظام الخير،
وعلة لذاته للخير والكمال بحسب الإمكان، و
راضياً به على النحو المذكور، يعقل نظام الخير
على الوجه الأول، بلغ في الإمكان، نبغي عليه ما
يعقله نظاماً وخيراً على الوجه الأول، بلغ الذي يعقله
فيضاً على أن تأديبة إلى النظام، بحسب الإمكان،
فهذا هو معنى العناية - (26).

24. Far., Daawi ... 4
25. IS., Ilah. (2) ... 368
26. Ibid ... 415
كونه مريرا فقد ظهر انه
واجب الوجود و انه واحد و ان اليه تنتهي
الموجودات في سلسلتها الترقيه والتنزل فمهما
وجود الكل و اليه رجوع الكل و به تواب الكل
نذاكر ما سواء فهو فعله وهو فعله و موجوده
ب الفاعل ل يخلو اما ان يكون له الفعل الصادر
منه شعور او لم يكن نان لم يكن له شعور فلا
يخلو اما ان يكون فعله مختلفا او مختلفا فان
كان فعله مختلفا فذلك المبتدء و السبب هو
الطبع و ان كان فعله مختلفا لذلك المبتدء و
السبب هو النفس النباتي...

فاذآ عرفت هذا تعرف ان
فعل الله تعالى صادر عن العلم الذي لا يشوبه جهل
و لا يغبر وكل فعل صادر عن العلم بنظام الاشباه
و كمالاتها على احسن ما يكون فذلك يكون
براعدة فاذآ هو من ذاته عالم بوجود الاشياء
المادية عنه على احسن النظام والكمال وذلك
الاختلاف الذي فيها لازم لذو أن لها اذ لو فارق
و الطبع طبعه لم يكن ذلك طبعا وهو له ذاتي - ... فإذا أوائل الأشياء فارق الأشياء يعلمه الذي هو سبيل لوجود جملة نامة كاملة علي احسن النظام من احكام وانخان ودوام و استمرار وهو المسمى بالدراية لان صدور هذه الافعال من اثار كمال وجودة فيلزم ان يكون مرجعا لها -

ومن هنا يعلم معنى الغاية من انها لا تحتاج الى سبيل و.TXT من م tính واحد من الاتجات دخور قررنا انها منجز من العلة الغائبية فادا العناية تصور نظام العناية الكل فيدخل في الوجود على حسب ما علم فذلك الخصائص المتعالية من التغيير هو العناية والسكون الكمالات من اثار عنائي والارادات - (27)

27. IS., Arsh. ... IO
8. **HE IS OMNIPOTENT.**

الدعوى الثامنة: كونه قادرًا -
و برحمتة: أن الفادر عبارة عن فعل ان شاء، و لا يفعل ان شاء - وهو بهجة الصفة; فإمآ قد بينا أن متبجيته علماء،
و ان ما علم ان الخير فيه فقد كان وما علم
ان الأولي به ان لا يكون له يكن - (24)

**AL - FĀRĀBĪ.**

(24) وهو حكيم، و حي راكن
و قادر و سديد و له غاية الجمال، و الكمال، و البهاء،
و له أعظم السرور، بدأته وهو العاشق الأول،
و العشوق الأول، و يوجد جميع الأشياء منه
على الوجه الذي يمكن أن وجدوه إلى الأشياء —

28. Ghaz., *Iṣāq* ... 239
فتصير موجودة وموجودات كلها على الترتيب حصل من الله ووجوده - (62)
(ال) ولها حكيم وبعث وقادر وانه على غاية الكمال والبهاء وانه اجل مبتهم
بذا انه وانه الباشق الأول والمعشوق الأول
وانه عنه توجد سائر الموجودات على جهة نبض وجودة بوجودها وعلى انين وجودها
فائق عن وجوده وانه يترتب عنه الموجودات
الفائضة عنه سرائها - (63)

*IBN - SINÁ.*

كونه قادرنا انا بيناه عالم
وان الفعل الصادر عنه على وفق العلم فيه و
ان العلم بنظام الخير على وجه يعلم انه من
اثار كمال وجودة هو الازادة -

فاة عرفت ذلك فتعلى ان

29.Diet., Abh. (Text) ... 58
30. Far., Da'awî ... 3
ال قادر هو الذي يصدر منه الفعل على وفق
انـدراـدة وهو الذي ان شاء فعل وان لـريفـاه لـي
يفعل ولا بـلـزم من هذا انـه لا البـد ان تكون
مـشيـقتـه وارادـته مـخـلـفة حتى بـشاـء تارـة
و لا بـشاـء اـخرى لـان اختلاف الـدارات
لـاختلاف الـعـراـقي وـقـد ذكرنا انـه لا غرـي لـه
في فـعله فـاذـا مـشيـقتـه وارادـته مـتـحـدة و
لـان هـذه القـضـيـة شرطـيـة ولا بـلـزم من قولـنا
ان شاء فعل وان لـريفـاه لـي يـفعل انـه لا
بد (لا) وان بـشاـء وان يـقـعل وان لا بـشاـء
و ان لا يـفعل لنـه يـفيـل لـكن نـظام الـخـير على الوجه
الابـلغ الاـكـمل فلا تـتعـيـف ارادـته ومشيـقتـه - (13)

(13) ن صـف لا بـد وـن لـد بـشـاء
و ان لا يـفعل كـما بـلـزم من قولـنا ان شاء فـعل
انـه لا البـد وان بـشاـء وان يـفعل -

31. IS., Arsh. ... II
9. **He is wise.**

الدعاوى التاسعة: إن الأول
حكيم? لأن الحكمة تطلق على شيئين:

أحدهما: العلم، وهو تصور
الأشياء بما حققها الماهية والحدود، والتصديق
فيها بالبقين المكتم المحقق.

والثاني: الفعل بأن يكون
مرتبة محكما جامعا، لكل ما يحتاج إليه من
كمال وزينة.

والأول عالم بالأشياء على ما
هي عليه علما هو الشرف أنواع العلم.

فإن علمنا ينقسم: إلى ما لا
يحصل به وجود المعلوم، كعلمنا بصورة
السماء والكواكب، والكائنات والنبات - و
اً إلى ما يحصل به وجود المعلوم، كعلمي النقاش.
بصري النقلش، التي يرتكعها من ألقاء نفسه،
من غير مثل سابق يحتذيه - فيوجد النقلش
فهذا فيكون عليه سبب وجود المعلوم.

وإذا نظر إليه غيره وعرفه،
كان المعلوم في حقه سبب وجود العلم، و
العلم الذي يفيد الوجود الشرف من العلم
المستفاد من الوجود (32).

وكل ذلك في أنه حكيم:

الحكمه هو أن يجعل الفضل الأشياء بفضل
علم، و بعقول من ذاته و يعلمها، يعلم الفضل
الأشياء بافضل علم، و العلم الأفضل
على العلم النام الذي لا يزول لما هو دائم و لابيرول.
فهذا هو حكيم لا بحكمة استفادها بعلم
شيء آخر خارج عن ذاته، بل في ذاته كفاية.

32. Ghaz., Kanz. ... 240
تعلم كيف وعلمي الغيب، وتعلم من هناك إن الذئب من ذاته كيف يعلُّم كل شيء، وإن ذلك لأنه مبدأ كل شيء، وعلم اللاشياء من هنا، إذ هو مبدأ شيء أو شيئان، حالها وحركاتها كذا، وما ينتج عنها كذا.

إلى التفصيل بعدد، ثم على الترتيب الذي بلزم ذلك التفصيل لزوم التحديد والتأدية، فتكون هذه اللاشياء مفاتيح الغيب التي لا
يعلمها أحد الا لأهو، فانه اعلم بالغيب وهو
عالي الغيب والشهادة وهو العزيز
الحكيم.- (و)}

(21) فالواجب الوجود له الجمال و
البهاء المحض؟ وهو مبدأ جمال كل شيء وبهاء
كل شيء. وبهاءه هو ان يكون على ما يحب له
فكيف جمال ما يكون على ما يحب في الوجود
الواجب؟ وكل جمال وثلاسمة وخبر مدركات
فهو محورParams م عشوق، ومبدأ ذلك كله
إدراكه. . .

فالواجب الوجود الذي هو في
غاية الجمال والجمال والبهاء الذي يعقل
ذاته بذلك الغاية والبهاء والجمال، وبتمام
العقل و بتعقل العنايت والفعقول على انها
واحد بالحقيقة، تكون ذاته لجاهه اعظم

34. Is., Ilah.(2) ... 362
الدعوى العاشرة: إنه جواد!
لأن إفادة الخير والإنعام به ينقسم إلى ما يكسب لفائدة وغرض، يرجع إلى المفيد - و
أن ما ليس كذلك -
و الفائدة تنقسم إلى ما هو
مثل المبذول، كمحابيلة المال بالمال - و إلى
ما ليس مثله، كمن يبدل المال رجاء الثواب
أو المحمداء، أو اكتساب صفة الفضيلة و
طلب الكمال به -
و هذا أيضاً معاوضة و معاملة،
و ليس بجود، كما أن الأول معاملة، و أن
كان العوام يسمون هذا جواداً - بل الجود

35. IS., Ìlah(2) ... 368
هو افادة ما ينبغي من غير عوض ؛ فإن واهب السبي ممن لا يحتاج إليه ليس بمنحيٍ (63)

AL- FĀRĀBĪ.

و الاسماء التي تدل على الكمال والفصلة في الأشياء التي ندينها منها ما يدل على ما هو للشيء في ذاته لا من حسب هو مضاد إلى شيء آخر خارج عنه مثل الموجود والواحد والأشياء ومنها ما يدل على ما هو للشيء بالإضافة إلى شيء آخر خارج عنه مثل الحدود والحدود... وامثال هذه الاسماء من نفقت وسعت بها الأول في شيء من الموجود فينغي إن لا يجعل الإضافة جزءًا في كماله ولا أيضًا يجعل ذلك الكمال المخلول عليه بذلك الاسم قوامه بذلك الإضافة بل ينبغي أن ندل به على جوهر وكمال ينبعه

36. Ghaz., Maj. ... 241
ضرورة تلك الإضافة وعلى أن قرائ تلك الإضافة
بذلك، الأجوهر وعلى أن تلك الإضافة تابعة
نما جوهر ذلك الأجوهر الذي دل عليه بذلك
الأسئلة (37).

إبن - سينا.

(38)
و شأنه أنه جواهر محاك.
وكمال حق - (38)

(39)
و إذا قال له: جواهر، عنده من
حيث هذه الإضافة مع السلب، بزيادة سلب
أخير وهو أنه لا ينكر غرمًا لذاته - (39)

(40)
و إذا قيل أنه جواهر فمعناه
أنه يفيض الوجود من غير عوض ولا غرض من
المدح والسخرين من الذم ولا يقصد به نفع
الخير - (40)

37. Diet., Must. (Text) ... 18
38. IS., Arsh. ... 7
39. IS., Ilah. (2) ... 368
40. IS., Arsh. ... 13
(٤٠)  آنعني ما الجواب؟
الجواب هو إبادة ما ينبغي لا لوحظ - فهل من يهب السكين لمن لا ينبغي له ليب بجواب -
و لعل من يهب ليستعيض معامل و ليس بجواب - و ليس العرض كله عينًا بل وغيره;
حتى الشناء والصيح والخصى من المذمة - و التوصل إلى ان يكون على الأحسن - او على ما
ينبغي -
فمن جاد ليشرف او ليحمد او ليحسن به ما يفعل فهو مستعيض غير جواب -
فالجواب الحقي هو الذي تقيض
منه الفواطد لا لشروق منه و طلب قضية
لشيء يعود اليه -
واعلم أن الذي يفعل شيئاً
لو لم يفعله قبّع به او ليبسن منه فهو
بما يُفيده من فعله متعلق - (٤١)

41. IS., Ish., (N.I-Th) ... 555
II. HE DELIGHTS IN HIS ESSENCE.

الدورة العادية عشرة: ان
الأول مبتهم بذاته؟ و ان عنده من المعنى
الذي يعبر عن نظيرة نحن هنا باللذة والخرب
والفرح والسرور بجمال ذاته وكماله ما لا
يدخل تحت وصف واضح - (42)

AL - FĂRĂBÎ.

و [اذ اكانت] اللذة والخرب
والسرور والخبطة انها تتبع وتحصل أكثر
بأن يدرك الاجمل بالادراك الأتقن واذ ا
كان هو الاجمل على الإطلال و الابيي و الارب و
اذ ادرك لذا هذ الإدراك الأتقن والعلم الأفضل،
فاللذة التي يلتذ بها الأول لذة لا نفهم نحن
كناها ولا ندري مقدار عظيمها الا بالقياس و

42. Ghaz., Mag. ... 242
لا الإضافة التي يسير من نهجنا نحن من اللدئة
عندما نظن أنما أدركنا ما هو عندنا أجمل و
أبهى إدراكاً أتلقى إنا باحساس او تخييل او
باحله عقلناً... من
فاته بين ان الأول يخشى
ذاته ضريرة ويبعثها ويعجب بها عشقنا و
إعجاباً ونسبيته الى عشقنا لما تلتقي به من
فضيلة ذواتنا كنسبة فضيلته هو كمال
ذاته الى فضيلتنا نحن وكمالنا الذي تُعْيَب
به من أنفسنا - والمحب من هو الحبوب
بعينة والمعاكب منه هو المعاكم بعينه
فهو الحبوب الأول والمعشوق
الأول - (43)

Ibn - Simā.

اصل مبتهاج بشيء، هو
الأول، بدأته، لأنه انشد الأشياء إدراكاً

43. Far., Siyāsa ... 46
ائيْن الأَشْيَاء كَماَلَاً، الَّذِي هُوَ بَرِيءٌ عَن
طَبيِّعَةِ الإِسْكَانِ وَالْحُرُمٍ -
و هُما منبِعاً الشَّشَ-
و لا شَاعِلَ لَهُ عِنْدَهُ -
و العَشْقُ الحَقِيقِيُّ هُوَ الْإِبْتِناجٌ
بَتْصُورَ حُضَرَةٍ ذَاتِهِ مَا -
و الشَّوْقُ هُوَ الحَكْرَةُ الْيَلِدَةُ
تَنْمِيَّ، هَذَا الْإِبْتِناجُ، اٌذَا كَانَتْ الصُّوْرَةُ
مَتَمَثَّلَةً مِنَ الْقَدْحِ، كَمَا تَتَمَثَّلُ في الْخَيْيَانِ -
غير مَتَمَثَّلَةً مِنَ الْقَدْحِ، كَمَا يَتَفَقُّ انْ لا
تَكُونَ مَتَمَثَّلَةً في الْعَجْسِ، حَتَّى يَكُون
نَهَامُ التَّمَثِيلِ الْعَجْسِيُّ لِلَّامَرِ
الْعَجْسِيُّ - (٤٤)

44. IS., Ish. (N.I-I) ... 782
3. COMPARATIVE STUDY.

1. GOD IS LIVING:

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that God is living and He is life. By these two qualities al-Fārābī asserts that His Being should not be denoted with two distinct essences, rather He remains with one essence. The meaning of living (hayy) is that He comprehends the best intelligible things with His best intelligence. In other words, He is aware of the known with His best knowledge. In this respect since He comprehends all things with His supreme knowledge, it is proper to realize that He is living. Al-Fārābī, however, tries to justify that this apprehension of things is communicable through His intelligence and asserts that God is intelligent and intelligence, knowing and knowledge. But al-Fārābī takes them to be of one meaning. Similarly, His being living and [His being] life appear to have one significance.

On the other hand, the hayy is a metaphorical term for that which is other than hayawan. For this is applicable
to every existent of extreme perfection and to what attains a high degree of existence. Furthermore, it implies that the perfection of a thing brings out another thing of its nature. Since the existence of the first is the most perfect, it is more appropriate to ascribe living to it. Because when one knows and comprehends a thing, it corresponds to actual existence which is external to our mind.

Two references are quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. He agrees with al-Fārābī and adds that God is one; and there is no cause for His Essence. His life is not a quality which is accidental to His Essence; rather the meaning of ḥāyya is that He is knowing by His Essence. Since He is one, His Essence is not separate from Himself. 'God has Knowledge of His Essence: His Knowledge, His Being Known and His Knowing are one and the same thing.' He knows other than Himself, and all objects of Knowledge. He knows all things by virtue of one knowledge and in a single manner. His Knowledge does not change according to whether the thing known has being or not-being.

Proof that God has knowledge of His Essence: We have
stated that God is One, and that He is exalted above all causes. The meaning of knowledge is the supervention of an idea divested of all corporeal coverings. Since it is established that He is One, and that He is divested of body, and His Attributes also; and as this idea as just described supervenes upon Him; and since whoever has an abstract idea supervening upon him is possessed of knowledge, and it is immaterial whether it is his essence or other than himself; and as further His Essence is not absent from Himself; it follows from all this that He knows Himself.' (1)

Al-Ghazālī states that God is living. For whosoever knows his essence is living. Since God knows His Essence, He is knowing and living. Al-Ghazālī demonstrates how He is knowing by His Essence. The meaning of His being knowing is that He is an existent which is free from matter; that is to say, the meaning of the thing intelligible and known lies in its being free from matter. Whenever an occurrence of the object of knowledge in knower is postulated, then the

1. Arberry ... 33.
occurrence is knowledge and the repository is knower. Because there cannot be any knowledge except impressing a form abstracted from matter. So the thing which is impressed is knowledge and that which is impressed into becomes knower.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā does not differ in principle from Al-Fārābī, rather he agrees with that God is living, and by His Knowledge He comprehends all things. But he adds that God is knowing by His Essence. All things other than He are known by means of His knowledge. His knowledge is divested of all corporeal coverings. Al-Ghazālī's account fully corresponds to this. Thus his first assertion corresponds to Ibn-Sīnā's context under point (i) and his demonstration corresponds to Ibn-Sīnā's point (ii). But it is to be noted that in his demonstration al-Ghazālī emphatically states that the meaning of His being knowing lies in His being free from matter, whereas Ibn-Sīnā asserts that "The meaning of knowledge is the supervision of an idea divested of all corporeal coverings." Furthermore, Al-Ghazālī states that when the object of knowledge in the knower is taken into consideration,
then the occurrence becomes knowledge and the repository
turns to be knower. So his 'Fa-mahmā furida ḥulūl ... bi-
l-Cālim' appears to be an "addition."

2. HIS KNOWLEDGE IS NOT ADDITIONAL TO HIS ESSENCE.

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that God is knowing. He does not require any essence which is external to His Essence in order to know a thing. Rather He is complete with His Essence in the respect that He knows and is known. In other words, His knowledge itself cannot be a thing other than His Essence. For He knows, He is known and He is knowledge - all signify one essence and one reality.

Two references have been quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. He agrees with the views of al-Fārābī, and wants to prove them from his own standpoint. So according to him, 'He knows all things by virtue of one knowledge, in a manner which changes not according to the change in the thing known: It has been established that His Knowledge does not augment His Essence,
and that He is the Origin of all things that have being, while being exalted above accident and changes; it therefore follows that He knows things in a manner unchanging. The objects of knowledge are a consequence of His Knowledge; His Knowledge is not a consequence of the things known, that it should change as they change; for His Knowledge of things is the reason for their having being.' (2) Ibn-Sīnā further adds, 'He is Knowledge, Knowing and Known: Knowledge is another term for an abstract idea. Since this idea is abstract, it follows that He is Knowledge; since this abstract idea belongs to Him, is present with Him, and is not veiled from Him, it follows that He is Knowing; and since this abstract idea does not supervene save through Him, it follows that He is Known. The terms employed in each case are different; otherwise it might be said that Knowledge, Knowing and Known are, in relation to His Essence, one. Take your own experience as a parallel. If you know yourself, the object of your knowledge is either yourself or something else; if the object of your knowledge is something other than yourself, then you do not know yourself. But if the object of your knowledge is yourself, then both the

2. Arberry ... 35.
one knowing and the things known are yourself. If the image of your self is impressed upon yourself, then it is your self which is the knowledge. Now if you look back upon yourself reflectively, you will not find any impression of the idea and quiddity of your self in yourself a second time, so as to give rise within you to a sense that your self is more than one. Therefore since it is established that He has intelligence of His Essence, and since His Intelligence is His Essence, and does not augment His Essence, it follows that He is Knowing, Knowledge and Known without any multiplicity attaching to Him through these Attributes; and there is no difference between "one who has knowledge" and "one who has intelligence", since both are terms for describing the negation of matter absolutely.' (3)

Al-Ghazālī states that God's knowledge does not augment His Essence. For such augmentation would bring plurality into His Essence, which is inconceivable. Al-Ghazālī introduces the example of man in order to prove his assertion. Thus according to him the process of man's

3. Arberry ... 33.
knowing has two aspects. Firstly, he knows by intuition i.e. by internal and external perception. Secondly, he does not know a thing except by comparing it to a thing he perceives in himself. If there is no correspondence with such a thing, no acquaintance is possible.

Al-Ghazālī further states that with respect to God man cannot perceive anything except by comparison to his own state. For he has a clear knowledge of his self. If he knows something other than himself, he knows that and not his own self. On the otherhand, if the object of knowledge is his self, then both knowing and 'known' become one; that is to say, knowing and known form a unity. Consequently, it follows that knowledge is identical to the thing known; and similarly, knowing is also identical to the thing known. Hence there is necessarily one principle for all of them and multiplicity does not arise.

In this respect Al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with Al-Fārābī in that

\* That is, the knowing one or knower.
God is knowledge, knowing and known. Moreover, he gives the meaning of each term. The knowledge of God, according to Ibn-Sīnā, does not augment His Essence. He is the principle of all things, and He knows things in an unchanging manner. To cite an example, he takes your experience as a parallel, and shows that knowing yourself involves two possibilities: either it concerns yourself or something other than your own. If it is other than your own, you do not know yourself. If it is in respect to yourself, both the knowing and the known concern yourself. Al-Ghazālī's account fully corresponds to this. But it is to be noticed that in place of Ibn-Sīnā's demonstration with nafsuka al-Ghazālī brings in the reference of insan, and shows two ways of his knowing. Therefore this reference appears to be an "addition."

3. **HE KNOWS ALL TYPES OF EXISTENTS, AND NOTHING IS FAR FROM HIS KNOWLEDGE.**

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that God is knowing, and His knowledge is unchangeable. For He is aware of things by means of the intelligible causes and existential order,
and not by senses. He distinguishes intelligible knowledge from perceptive knowledge by the fact that the former is unalterable, whereas the latter is derived from perception; as such it is subject to change.

Two references have been quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. He does not basically differ from al-Fārābī. But his account appears to imply numerous facts and instances. However, according to Ibn-Sīnā, 'He has knowledge of other than Himself: Whoever knows himself, if thereafter he does not know other than himself this is due to some impediment. If the impediment is essential, this implies necessarily that he does not know himself either; while if the impediment is of an external nature, that which is external can be removed. Therefore it is possible — nay, necessary — that He should have knowledge of other than Himself, ...

Proof that He has knowledge of all objects of knowledge: Since it is established that He is a Necessary Being, that He is One, and that the universe is brought into being from Him and has resulted out of His Being; since it is
established further that He has knowledge of His Own Essence, His knowledge of His Essence, being what it is, namely that He is the Origin of all realities, and of all things that have being; it follows that nothing in heaven or earth is remote from His Knowledge - on the contrary, all that comes into being does so by reason of Him: He is the causer of all reasons and He knows that of which He is the Reason, the Giver of being and the Originator." (4)

Moreover, He comprehends everything; as such not even the smallest particle can remain far from His knowledge. He is the principle of all existents, and the knowledge of the existents is derived from Him. Nothing can be produced except it becomes necessary through Him. Consequently, He is aware of all causes and their correspondence with things.

Al-Ghazālī states that God has knowledge of all existents pertaining to both genus and species. As a result nothing remains far from His knowledge. Then al-Ghazālī proves his assertion in the following way:-

4. Arberry ... 34.
God has knowledge of His Essence and His Essence is an abstract thing. He is pure Being, and He causes the existence of all substances, accidents and quiddities in successive order. Thus if He knows Himself as a principle of them, then His knowledge would be implied in His knowledge by His Essence. On the other hand, if He does not know Himself as a principle, He has no knowledge in respect of what He is. This argument is misleading, because His Essence cannot be absent from Himself.

Here al-Ghazālī's account appears to correspond to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in the sense that God has knowledge of all things. But he adds more materials of his own. Thus according to him God comprehends everything in the world, and even the smallest particle cannot remain far from His knowledge. 'Whoever knows himself if thereafter he does not know other than himself this is due to some impediment. If the impediment is essential, this implies necessarily that he does not know himself either.' Moreover, He is the prime cause of all causes and origin of
all realities. Al-Ghazālī's account corresponds with this. Furthermore, it has been observed that al-Ghazālī's "Fa-lā yaʿzib ʿan ilmi-hi shay" is a direct use from the account of Ibn-Sīnā.

4. THERE IS NO MULTIPLICITY IN HIS ESSENCE AND KNOWLEDGE.

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that multiplicity cannot be ascribed to the Essence of God. He is the cause for the existence of all things. This means that He provides continuously existence for all of them and hinders total non-existence but not in the sense that He gives them renewed existence after non-existence prevails over them.

Two references have been quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. He does not fundamentally differ from al-Fārābī, rather he adds more things of his own. Thus according to him, no multiplicity can be ascribed to the nature of God. On the other hand, His Essence is unique, absolute and pure truth. Since He is the most perfect Being, He is single; because cases of
multiple and additional things cannot be single. So He is single with respect to His perfect nature, unique definition, indivisible character and grade of Being. In reference to this Ibn-Sīnā brings the categories of existents and asserts that they are not deprived of His Being; because all of them emanate from Him in successive order.

Ibn-Sīnā further asserts that each of the existents may have some form of relation with Necessary Being. In other words, everything proceeds from Him in proper order. He has only one essence, and multiplicity can never be added to it. If any affirmative or negative relation is ascribed to His Essence, then that would be accessory only and not a constituent part of it.

Al-Ghazālī states that multiplicity can neither be ascribed to His Essence nor to His knowledge. For the object of knowledge in their multiplicity require many 'knowledges'. One knowledge for distinct objects of knowledge cannot possibly exist, for the meaning of one is that there are not in it distinct things. If one supposes the non-existence
of part of a thing, then the non-existence of the whole of it would necessarily follow, since it has no part. If the knowledge of substances and accidents is supposed to be one and if the connection (of the knowledge) with accident is postulated to cease there must remain something other than what is postulated to have ceased, and this is the connection (of knowledge) with substances. Similarly with each pair of objects of knowledge. This contradicts the meaning of singularity. But it is explained by comparison with intuition (or observation) of the soul. For the soul is an abridged copy of the world, in which there is something corresponding to each item in (the world). In this way knowledge of everything is possible.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in the sense that multiplicity cannot be ascribed to the nature of God. Then he states that His Essence is the unique principle, absolute and pure truth. Nothing can augment His Essence. All affirmative and negative relations are simply finite phenomena which can never be referred to His Essence as a constituent
part of it. However, al-Ghazālī agrees with Ibn-Sīnā in principle. But his account in fact appears to be a re-organized characterization, and more particularly, his contexts of maʿlūmayn and nafs are "additions".

5. **HE IS AWARE OF CONTINGENT BEINGS.**

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that all kinds of existents have their being from God. Each of them belongs to a particular group and simple order. But in reference to the derivation of being from God it should not be held that He has any intention which might resemble our intentions. Thus God has no prior "intention of things". Furthermore, the origin of things cannot be possible by way of nature apart from His knowledge and approval. Here al-Fārābī refers to the problem of beings which are subordinate to the will of God. Thus the origin of things and their achievement can only happen whenever He wishes. Thus things come about from Him because He knows His Essence.

Generally speaking, Ibn-Sīnā does not differ from
al-Fārābī. But his account here appears to be concerned with the specific itemization of things. God has supreme knowledge over all things in this world. 'Hence it is manifest that Knowledge is itself Omnipotence. He knows all contingent things, even as He knows all things that have being, even though we know them not; for the contingent, in relation to us, is a thing whose being is possible and whose not-being is also possible; but in relation to Him one of the two alternatives is actually known. Therefore, His Knowledge of genera, species, things with being, contingent things, manifest and secret things - this Knowledge is a single knowledge.' (5)

Al-Ghazālī states that as God has knowledge of all genera and species, so He is fully aware of all contingent beings of which we have no knowledge at all. Al-Ghazālī defines the scope of contingent thing and shows that a contingent thing, as long as it is known to be contingent, is incapable of being known to occur or not to occur.

5. Arberry ... 35.
It is simply known to have the quality of possibility; that it is possible for it to be or not to be.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that God has knowledge of all things. But he makes a specific statement rather than a general one as al-Fārābī does, that God has clear knowledge of all contingent beings, even as He is aware of all categories of beings. On the other hand, "the contingent, in relation to us, is a thing whose being is possible and whose not-being is also possible." Al-Ghazālī's account corresponds fully with this. Moreover, it has been observed that al-Ghazālī states the role of the contingent thing explicitly in greater detail.

6. HIS KNOWLEDGE OF PARTICULARS IS NOT SUBJECT TO TEMPORAL DISTINCTIONS.

Ibn-Sīnā asserts that God's knowledge of particulars (juz'iyyāt) is not subject to temporal distinctions, such that it includes any reference to past, present and future; because if it included references to various times the
quality of His Essence would vary. But Ibn-Sīnā does not allow any change in the nature of God. Rather His knowledge of particulars necessarily pertains to His holiness which is above Time and Era; that is to say, it must not be compared to a specified characterization of finite phenomena. On the other hand, God is fully aware of everything. For everything follows from Him either mediately or without any mediation. As a result, nothing can manifestly exist without having its being in some form from Him. That is why, all that exists derives its necessity or otherwise from His omnipotence.

Al-Ghazālī states that God does not know particulars which are subject to temporal distinctions, such as, past, present and future. Because this would necessarily involve variations which cannot be referred to His Essence. Al-Ghazālī takes the particular example of an eclipse of the sun and states that if the sun is not eclipsed to-day, it would be to-morrow. Then it takes place to-morrow. Thus when the day after to-morrow comes, it would be that the eclipse took place yesterday. This necessarily implies a variation
in its essence owing to those diversities of knowledge. In reference to change al-Ghazālī further states that the object of knowledge follows knowledge and varies with the variation of the latter. Moreover, as knowledge varies, knowing is subject to variation. On the other hand, the relationship of knowledge with the known is not a relationship which necessitates a difference in the known unless one item of knowledge is postulated.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā categorically asserts that God's knowledge of particulars is not conceivable in terms of temporal phenomena; because if it manifests itself through a definite time, it would be subject to variation in another aspect, that is to say, the quality of the Essence would necessarily change. Al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely with this. Moreover, it has been observed that al-Ghazālī introduces the example of an eclipse and then shows a concomitant variation between knowledge and the known. The context of these instances appears to be "additions".
7. HE HAS WILL AND PROVIDENCE.

Two references have been quoted from al-Fārābī. He propounds the view that God wills. There is nothing in His Essence which is contrary to the origin of all things. On the other hand, things have their being through Him. In this respect He is said to will them.

Three references have been quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. He deals with the role of will (irāda) and providence (żināya) in respect to God. According to him, God has will. The concept of His willing implies that He is Necessary Being with purely intellectual nature isolated from matter. His is the single Being from which all existents are derived and to which all of them return, that is, they are subsistent with Him alone. Whatever is other than He is His act, and He is its Agent (fa'īl). The state of being fa'īl involves one of two aspects: either he has knowledge of the origin of things proceeding out of him, or he has no knowledge of this kind. On the other hand, the state of his being devoid of any knowledge consists of two possibilities: either his
act would be similar, or it would be dissimilar. If his act is of similar form, that principle pertains to nature. But if his act is of dissimilar type, then that principle belongs to vegetable soul (an-nafs an-nabatā). The act of God originates from His knowledge which is entirely uncorrupted by ignorance and variation. Ibn-Sīnā further asserts that God is the principle of the best order (aḥsan an-nīzām) of things: as such every act comes out of His knowledge in compresence with the best order that ever could be. This comprises His will. His Essence is capable of knowing the existence of things proceeding from Him successively through the best order and perfect condition. In the process of this emanation certain differences creep into one category of existent from that of another; and this is vitally essential. However, with regard to creation in the world and to primary things being inseparable from His knowledge (which is the cause of the total existence in the best form), the entire process implies His will.

On the other hand, providence lies in the state of His knowing things in the best form. He comprehends the
best order of things in respect of what can possibly come into being. Thus providence primarily deals with the best order in all, and consists in an exalted and unabated perspective apart from variation. Therefore, traces of this perfection may apparently be postulated to be the product of His will and providence.

Al-Ghazālī states that God has will and providence; but they do not augment His Essence. He proves this assertion by the fact that God is Agent, and all that proceeds from Him is His act. The agent would either be active by dint of pure nature or by will. The act which issues from pure nature is an act not associated with knowledge. So every act which is not destitute of knowledge cannot be devoid of will. All things emanate from the Essence of God with His knowledge, and this flux is not incompatible with His Essence; rather this state may express His will. He is the principle of overflow, and His knowledge sets an order in all things. Therefore, His knowledge is virtually the cause of existence of the thing known, that is to say, His will is His knowledge.
The providence of God is also knowledge. It is fundamentally concerned with the best order in things. Moreover, providence indicates the accomplishment of a thing by dint of complete goodness. It may also express the accomplishment of goodness with guidance after creation.

Al-Ghazālī introduces the example of man and states that a man is in need of forceful organs, as are the hand and palm. If he does not have them, he would be defective and imperfect in that respect.

Al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that God has will, and he adds more materials of his own. According to Ibn-Sīnā, God is Necessary Being and He is the fundamental cause of the origin of all things. What is other than He is taken to be His act. As every act is performed through His knowledge it implies His will. Furthermore, God is the principle of Supreme Order in the world, and His Essence is knowing the existence of things proceeding from Him. On the other hand, the providence of God comprises the state of
His being cognizant of the thing in the best order by virtue of His Essence. Al-Ghazālī's account fully corresponds with this. Moreover, his account appears to be a simple abridgement of Ibn-Sīnā's diversity of views. But it is to be noted that his instance of man appears to be an "addition" to clarify the thought.

8. **HE IS OMNIPOTENT.**

Two references have been quoted from al-Fārābī. Both of them appear to be of similar nature. Al-Fārābī propounds the view that God is wise, living, omnipotent and willing. He has supreme beauty, perfection and magnificence on the one hand, and the greatest happiness and joy in His Essence on the other. He is endowed with the qualities of being lover and beloved. As for the creation of all categories of existents al-Fārābī further asserts that they emanate from His Being in successive order.

Ibn-Sīnā agrees with the basic principle of al-Fārābī. According to him, God is omnipotent. Ibn-Sīnā repeats his assertion that God is All-Knowing and acts come from Him in pursuance of His cognizance. Moreover, His knowledge of the best order of things is concerned with the
traces of perfection mentioned above. Ibn-Sīnā asserts all of these traces to be of His will.

Then he explains that the omnipotent being is he from whom the act proceeds in accordance with his will; that is to say, if he wishes he does, and if he does not wish he does not do. It does not necessarily follow from this that his volition (mashī'a) and will should be different in such a way that at one time he wishes and another time he does not. Because difference of volitions is due to the difference of purposes. But in the act of God there is no purpose. Therefore, his volition and will appear to be one thing. On the other hand, Ibn-Sīnā points out that this proposition is an hypothetical one. Now it does not follow that he must wish or that he must do; and that he must not wish or that he must not do. For he knows the best order of things, in the most perfect way. Therefore, his will and volition remain unalterable.

Al-Ghazālī states that God is omnipotent. Then he demonstrates this assertion by the fact that the omnipotent being is one who does what he wishes, and refuses to do that
which he does not wish. Al-Ghazālī further adds that God has this quality and His volition is His knowledge. Moreover, whatever He knows to be good, becomes so, and whatever He prefers should not exist, can never come into being.

Here al-Ghazālī’s account corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that God is omnipotent. But he expounds this view in greater detail. The implication of omnipotence is shown by him in the following way:

Whatever He wishes He does and if He does not wish, He does not do. This implies that God has supreme power to do each and everything according to His will. Al-Ghazālī’s account appears to correspond fully with this. But it should be noted that he uses ‘fa’ala in sha’a wa lam yaf’al in sha’a in place of Ibn-Sīnā’s in sha’a fa’ala wa in lam yasha’ lam yaf’al.’ This implies an emphasis on 'doing' which probably should be seen as corresponding to Ibn-Sīnā’s use of "omnipotence".
9. **HE IS WISE.**

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that God is wise. This wisdom, according to him, implies that God comprehends the best things by His best knowledge. Such apprehension is possible by His Essence alone. Al-Fārābī analyses the content of God's knowledge and asserts that His knowledge is the most perfect form of knowledge and is everlasting and unending. God is wise not because of the wisdom which is derived from the knowledge of another thing external to His Essence, but because of the fact that He is sufficient in His Essence to become wise in respect of what He knows.

On the other hand, beauty, magnificence and embellishment in every existent are the qualities by which its existence is made best of its kind and is capable of reaching ultimate perfection. However, since the existence of God is the most perfect of all, His beauty, magnificence and embellishment transcend the existent possessing those qualities. Moreover, His Reality and Essence are full of beauty which He comprehends out of His Essence.
Two references are quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. He does not fundamentally differ from al-Fārābī. Here he firstly deals with the problem of God's knowledge about things and their movements in the world. Secondly, he speaks of certain noblest qualities of God and their relation to the finite qualities of similar kind. In the former he asserts that God is the principle of all things. He is fully aware of them, their occurrences and movements. There are a great deal of diversities and accomplishment of things in the world, the mystery of which no body knows except God. Keeping this view in mind Ibn-Sīnā emphatically remarks that God is conscious of the hidden thing and cognizant of the visible and invisible, since He is omnipotent and wise.

In the latter, he asserts that God has pure beauty and magnificence and He is the principle of those qualities. Ibn-Sīnā considers the possibility of how beauty would be requisite in Necessary Being, and then asserts that God is the most perfect, beautiful and magnificent Being; and His Essence comprehends them with the fullest understanding and thought. He is for Himself the greatest lover and beloved, and enjoyer and enjoyed.
Al-Ghazālī states that God is wise. Wisdom, on the other hand, comprises two different aspects. One of them is the knowledge which conceives imagining things by ascertaining the quiddities, definition and believing them with indubitable pure certitude. The other is the act of all that needed perfection and embellishment.

God knows things by the best form of knowledge. In this connection al-Ghazālī brings up the problem of human knowledge and divides it into the following two groups:

One of them is that existence of the object of knowledge cannot be attained, as is our knowledge of the form of the sky, stars, animals and plants.

The other is that existence of the object of knowledge can be attained, as is the case of a painter's knowledge of the form of painting that he invents by himself without any previous example which he imitates. For the painting is done by him. As a result his knowledge
becomes a cause for the existence of the object of knowledge. But if somebody looks at it and perceives it, then the object of knowledge with respect to it becomes a cause of the existence of knowledge. Thus the knowledge which bestows existence is better than the knowledge acquired from existence.

Here al-Ghazâlî's account corresponds closely to that of al-Fârâbî. Ibn-Sînâ agrees with al-Fârâbî in that God is wise. He is aware of things by virtue of His best form of knowledge, and He has beauty, perfection and magnificence for all things. But al-Fârâbî's account consists of two vital aspects. God's wisdom implies apprehension of things by His best knowledge. His knowledge is most perfect and everlasting. Furthermore, His wisdom includes some form of act. Every existent derives from Him certain beauty, magnificence and embellishment in order to attain some form of perfection. God has these qualities in His Essence which transcend the finite things possessing them. God has full acquaintance with all states of existents. In this sense some form of act is implied. Al-Ghazâlî's account
corresponds with this. His categorical assertion of two-fold aspects in wisdom is a clear itemization from al-Fārābī's indeterminate account. Moreover, he explains both of those aspects of knowledge and act; and lastly divides our knowledge into two groups. These two sorts of division appear to be "additions".

10. **HE IS BENEVOLENT.**

Al-Fārābī speaks of certain names which may be attributed to God. Two kinds of names are cited by him, one of which indicating perfection and excellent quality in things is primarily concerned with the essence of them. They should not be in anyway related to external things, as are the cases of existent, the one and the living. The other kind of names has some form of relationship with external things, such as, justice and benevolence.

However, al-Fārābī is more concerned about the names which can be ascribed to God. Whenever these names pertain to Him, we should not consider that relation as a
part of His perfection, rather we may infer a relation from His reality only.

Four references are quoted from Ibn-Sīnā. According to him, God has pure benevolence (jud) and true perfection. His benevolence implies that He renders benefit to being without any compensation whatsoever. In other words, God never does anything to others with the intention of being praised and distinguished or of escaping blame. This kind of benevolence involves negating any purpose for doing good and includes the content of doing for the sake of doing only.

Ibn-Sīnā introduces certain concrete examples in order to illustrate his assertions. Thus a man cannot be benevolent by giving his knife to someone who should not have it. Similarly, benevolence cannot be ascribed to a man who receives some kind of compensation for entering into a mutual relationship. However, the idea of benevolence should not be generalised on the basis of doing 'like for like'. Thus the true benevolent is he from whom benefits proceed without any intention of getting anything in return.
Al-Ghazālī states that God is benevolent. He divides the giving of good and benefaction into two groups. One of them pertains to benefit and objective (gharad); and the other involves nothing of this kind. Again al-Ghazālī divides benefit into two ways. Firstly, it is like an exchange of wealth for wealth, secondly, it is not this sort of exchange. In this connection al-Ghazālī points out that whoever sacrifices wealth in the hope of reward or praise or acquisition of a moral quality and claims perfection thereby, should not be called benevolent (even though the common people claim so). Thus al-Ghazālī states that benevolence is exemplified in the giving of a thing to someone without any hope of getting a benefit out of it. In reference to this he mentions that the donor of a sword, when he does not require it, should not be called a benefactor.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of Ibn-Sīnā. The account of Ibn-Sīnā, on the other hand, appears to be different from that of al-Fārābī. For al-Fārābī uses the term 'benevolence' in connection with an example which is not of much importance. However, Ibn-Sīnā
specifically asserts that God is benevolent. This quality implies doing something to somebody without any compensation. If a man renders any benefit to someone in the hope of getting anything in return, he should not be called benevolent. Al-Ghazālī's account fully corresponds with this. Moreover it is observed that he shows two divisions in his account, one dividing ifāda al-khayr wa l-in'am into two groups, and the other dividing fa'idā into two ways. He has to do this in order to make his statement quite explicit. On the other hand, he demonstrates the example with sayf where Ibn-Sīnā used the context of sikkīn.

11. **HE DELIGHTS IN HIS ESSENCE.**

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that the noble qualities of God transcend the similar qualities which are possessed by us. More particularly, whenever pleasure, joy, delight and happiness are taken into consideration, they arise in that God apprehends them. In this connection when qualities are attributed to Him, we cannot understand anything about them except by comparing them with our own by means of feeling, imagination or intellectual knowledge.

Al-Fārābī further asserts that God loves His Essence
and likes it most. Furthermore, He is highly pleased with His Essence. In this respect a comparison may be made with our love for our essence. Similarly, we may have some form of comparison for the perfection of His Essence with our excellent qualities. For example, we are pleased with our perfection. In this connection al-Fārābī draws an analogy with the fact that a lover appears to be beloved exactly in the same way and similarly a pleaser is pleased. Thus God is the First Lover and Beloved.

Ibn-Sīnā basically agrees with al-Fārābī. According to him, the highest "being with" a thing is God alone "with" His Essence. He is the strongest of all in His perception of the most perfect things isolated from the nature of possibility and non-being. On the other hand, both possibility and non-being are the sources of evil or imperfection. Ibn-Sīnā further asserts that real love is happiness in the imagining of the presence of a certain essence, whereas desire is a motion for the accomplishment of this happiness. In other words, since the form is
imagined in one way - just as it takes shape in imagination - it arises in perception in order that the completion of perceptive imagination may give effect to the thing perceived.

Al-Ghazālī states that God delights in His Essence. He has the noblest qualities which no describer can describe; but they have some form of correspondence with our own. Thus pleasure, joy, merriment, and delight may subsist in relation with His beauty and perfection.

Here al-Ghazālī's account consists of two aspects. Firstly, he states that God delights in His Essence. Secondly, he discusses how God has the noblest qualities which have in some form certain correspondence with our own. Now with respect to the first aspect his account fully corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā, whereas with respect to the second aspect his account corresponds to that of al-Fārābī.

Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that God is pleased with His Essence. Thus his 'ajall mubtahij bi-shay' huwa al-awwal bi-dhāti-hi,' is a developed idea in place of al-Fārābī's ' ... yanjab biha'. However, al-Ghazālī's first aspect is found to be in direct agreement with
that of Ibn-Sīnā. On the other hand, al-Fārābī propounds the view that God has excellent qualities in His Essence and they transcend the similar qualities possessed by us. Thus joy, pleasure, and delight may exist in relation with those of the transcendental qualities of God. Al-Ghazālī's second aspect of his account corresponds with this.

But it is observed that al-Ghazālī's account is very brief and the second aspect of his account appears to be a tacit derivation from al-Fārābī.
4: RESULT.

Al-Ghazālī's accounts appear to be closer to those of al-Farābī in points 9 and 11 (partial), and to those of Ibn-Sīnā in points 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 11 (partial). Moreover, certain "additions" have been observed in points 1, 2, 4, 6, 7 and 9.
CHAPTER EIGHT

THEORY OF EMANATION.
In this chapter al-Ghazālī discusses the nature and role of various existents in this world, and states how they proceed from God in proper succession. First of all one thing comes from Him which is abstract intelligence and which is the matrix of all multiplicities in the world. Then the gradual process of creation continues till ten intelligences and nine celestial spheres follow one after another.

After the completion of those intelligences and spheres, existence of the lower beings begins firstly with four primary elements whose natures are different from each other. Later on, other bodies are created by mixtures of those elements; but this process of creation, on the other hand, starts from the lowest grade of being and passes through the upward grades of vapours, mineral, plant, animal and man respectively. Each of these grades of being results from certain degrees of mixture of the primary elements. The forms proceed from the giver of the form and
arise out of the preparation of things.

The heavenly bodies remain in one condition and all things in the world ascend at the end to the motion of the heaven.

Lastly, al-Ghazālī deals with certain theological aspects and states how the theory of emanation is treated to be applicable to them.

My investigation into materials concerns only the fundamental points of al-Ghazālī's metaphysical part; such as (i) one thing emanates from God, (ii) abstract intelligence emanated from God has two aspects, (iii) emanation of ten intelligences and nine celestial spheres, (iv) creation of lower beings, (v) creation of other bodies by the mixture of primary elements, and (vi) ways of upward trend in creation.
2. ANALOGOUS VIEWS.

AL - GHAZĀLI.

I. ONE THING EXISTES FROM GOD.

الأول مصدر منه شئ واحد -
بنظر ذلك الواحد، لا من جهة الأول حكماً آخر،
فيحصل بسبب نية كثرة، و يكون ذلك
مبدأ لتحقيق كثرة - (ر).

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

واول المباعات منه شئ واحد بالعدد وهو العقل الأول و يحصل في
المباع الأول الكثرة بالعرض - (2).

IBN - SĪNĀ.

I. Ghaz., Kā. ... 288
2. Diet. Abh. (Text) 58
2. **ABSTRACT INTELLIGENCE EMANATED FROM GOD**

   **HAS TWO ASPECTS.**

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3. **IS., Ilah.** (2) ... 406

4. **Ghaz., Nag.** ... 290
5. Far., Daawi... 4
6. Far., Zinn...

(6) هو شطر

(7) هو شطر

(8) هو شطر

(9) هو شطر

(10) هو شطر

(11) هو شطر

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(50) هو شطر
إن يكون عن المبادئ الأول بسبيبة
اثنينيته يجب أن يكون فيها ضرورة أو
كثرة كيف كانت، ولديكم في العقول
المفترضة شيء من الكثرية إلا على ما أقول:
ان المخلول بذاته ممكن الوجود، وبالإول
واجب الوجود، ووجوده، فإنه عقل.
وهو يعقل ذاته، ويعقل الأول ضرورة، فيجب
ان يكون فيه من الكثرية مبني عقله لذاته
ممكنة الوجود في حيزها، وعقله ووجوده
وجوده من الأول المعقول بذاته، وعقله
للول، وليس الكثرية له عن الأول، فإن
امكان وجوده أمر له بدائته لا بسبب الأول،
بل له من الأول ووجب وجوده. (7)

و هذا هو الذي نسميه
العقل المجرب؟ ونجعل صدور ما بعده عنه؟ و
لكن هذا غير المنفعل عن الجسم و غير
المشارك ابنا، والصائر صورة خاصة به، والكائن
عن الجهة التي حدثنا عنها حين أثبتنا هذه النفس. (8)

7. Is., Ilah. (2) ... 405
8. Ibid ... 408
في بين ان أول الهيوجادات عن

العة الأولى وادى بالعدد وذاته وماهينته
موجودة لا في مادة فليس شيء من الأجسام و
لا في الصور التي هي كملاك الأجسام معلوم لا
قربا له بل المعلول الأول عقل محك لا إنه
صورة لا مادة وهو أول العقول المفارة
التي عددها ويشبه ان يكون هو المبدأ
المحرك للجرم الاقصى على سبيل التشريفي - (5)

لا يوجد إذا ابتدأ من عند

الدول حتى ينزل كل دال منه أدون مرتبة في الدول
ولا ينزل بناحية درجات; فأول ذلك درجة
الملاك الروحانية المجردة التي تسمى
عقولا، ثم مراتب الملاك الروحانية التي
تسمى نفوسا، وهي الملاككة العاملة، ثم
مراتب الاجرام السياوية، وبعضا اشرف من
بعض الى أن يبلغ اخرها - (6)

9. IS., Naj. ... 275
10. IS., Ilah. (2) 435
3. EXAMINATION OF TEN INTELLIGENCES AND NINE
CELESTIAL SPHERES.

فيحصل منه عقل ثاني باعتبار
كونه واجبا - و الفلك الأقصى باعتبار الامكان
الذي له كالمادة -

وبنزم من العقل الثاني العقل
الثالث، و ذلك البروج - ومن العقل الثالث رابع،
و فلك نجل - ومن الرابع خامس، و ذلك المشترى -
و من الخامس سادس و ذلك المربخ - و من
السادس سابع - و ذلك الشمس - و من السابع
ثاني - و ذلك الزهرة - ومن الثامن ناسع - و
ذلك عطارد - ومن التاسع عاشر - و ذلك
القمر - (زا)

II. Ghaz., Mag. ... 290
و يحصل من العقل الأول بانه واجب الوجود وعلى الاعلى عقل آخر ولا يكون فيه كثرة الابالوجه الذي ذكرناه ويدل على ذلك العقل الأول الثاني بأنه ممكن الوجود و بأنه يكون ذاته الفلك الاعلى بمادته وصورته التي هي النفس والمراد بهذا ان هذين الشيئين يشيران سبب شئين اعنى الفلك بالنفس و بانه يحصل من العقل الثاني عقل اخر و ذلك اخر تحت الفلك الاعلى و انما يحصل منه ذلك لان الكثرة حاصلة فيه بالعرض كما ذكرناا ابن ملا عقل الأول وعلى هذا يحصل عقل و فلك من عقل و نحن لا نعلم كمية هذه العقول والانفلاك الاعلى طريق الجملة الى ان تنتهي العقول الفعالة الى عقل فعال مجرد من المادة و هناك يتم عدد الانفلاك و$
abla$ (ii) وبعدين من الاعلى وجود الثاني.

I2. Diet., Abh. (Text) ... 59
فهذا الثاني هو أيضا جوهر غير متكسو اصلة ولا هو في مادة فهو يعقل ذاته و يعقل الأول و ليس ما يعقل من ذاته هو شيء غير ذاته فيما يعقل من الأول يلزم عنه وجود ثلاث و بما هو متجوز بذاته التي تخصه يلزم عنه وجود السماء الدول والثالث أيضا وجوده لا في مادة وهو يتجوز عقل وهو يعقل ذاته و يعقل الأول فيما يتجوزه بين ذاته التي تخصه يلزم عنه وجود كرات الكواكب الثابتة و بما يعقله من الأول يلزم عنه وجود رابع و هذا ايضا لا في مادة فهو يعقل ذاته و يعقل الأول فيما يتجوزه من ذاته التي تخصه يلزم عنه وجود كر زحل و بما يعقله من الدول يلزم عنه وجود خامس وهذا الخامس أيضا وجوده لا في مادة فهو يعقل ذاته و يعقل الدول فيما يتجوزه بين ذاته يلزم عنه وجود كرات المشترى و بما يعقله من الدول يلزم عنه وجود سادس و هذا ايضا وجوده لا في مادة وهو يعقل ذاته و يعقل الدول بما يتجوزه من ذاته يلزم عنه وجود كرات مربع و بما يعقله من الأول.
بلزم عليه وجود سابق وهذا أيضا وجوده لا في مادة وهو يعقل ذاته أو يعقل الأول فيما يتوجهر به من ذاته بلزم عليه وجود كرزة الشمس و بما يعقل من الأول بلزم عليه وجود ذاته و يعقل الأول فيما يتوجهر به من ذاته انتخابه بلزم عليه وجود كرزة الزهرة و بما يعقل من الأول بلزم عليه وجود تاسع وهذا أيضا وجوده لا في مادة فهو يعقل ذاته أو يعقل الأول فيما يتوجهر به من ذاته بلزم عليه وجود كرزة عطارد و بما يعقل من الأول بلزم عليه وجود عاشور وهذا أيضا وجوده لا في مادة وهو يعقل ذاته و يعقل الأول فيما يتوجهر به من ذاته بلزم عليه وجود كرزة القمر (3)

Ibn - Sīnā.

ف يكون عدد العقول المقارنة بعد المبدأ الأول عدد الحركات فكان اقلاع

Ib. Diet., Must. (Text) ... I9
المناخيَرة إنما المبدأ في حركة كرات كل كوكب
منها قوة تخفيف من الكوكب لم يعد ان تكون
السماوات بعدد الكواكب لها لا بعدد الكبات
وكان عددًا عشرة بعد الدول اولها العقل
المتحرك الذي لا يتحرك وحركة كرة الجرم
القضية التي الحد هو منزلة لحماية التوابع
الذي هو مثلاً لحركة زحل، وكذل علية ينتهي
أي العقل الغائض على نفسه وهو عقل العالم
الأرضي: ونسمي هناك الفعل (ثا)

(ثا)
وهذا بعد استناد وجود
السماوات كلها خيلزم دائمًا عقل بعد عقل حتى
تتكون كرية القمر. ... فقد بان واتضح أن
كل عقل هو أعلى في المرتبة ذاته لمعنًئ فيه وهو
انه بما يعقل الأول يجب عنه وجود عقل آخر
دونه و بما يعقل ذا نفسه يجب عنه ذلك بنفسه
وجمه و جرم الفلك كان عنه ومستندي بتوسط
نفس الفلكية فإن كل مصورة في علة لأن تكون
مادتها بالفعل لأن المادة بنفسها لا قوام لها. (ثا)

14. IS., Naj. ... 273
15. Ibid ... 280
(... بين طبيعت بتدبير نفس
برحكم تسير، هم إينان معين بود بتحريك
بسبب أن ارنا بكم خويش ساندر كمال ان 
شكلاً كوني برد كوه او ادوم الاتصال است 
نادر ديمومة نوعى علاقات كرهه باشد عالم 
نفس راعي شكل كرين بسبط جملة شكلها است
و أول اشكال شكل كريست كه در نهايت وجه
است و بين مستزيه انا مقصور خواند و بين 
مثلت و بين مربع و هميين متكرر ميشود
بين اصفرو إنسي بروم فلكل أعلى حاجل شد 
روى بحسب صفائه وى [و] برجم عقلي و نفسي بوي 
بيوس يست و دييغراى اصفو كد روجرم فلكل أعلى 
"نلكي" دييغرا حامل شد و[و] بحسب صفائه وى 
(برجم) عقلي و نفسي بوي فيروس و هميين 
تاباخ فلك قمر، جمله نه فلك بساناكه بصيد ر 
معلوم كرده امتد - نكسست بلك ناسح كه فلك 
الخلاكمست و دييغرا نلك فنان كه فلك البروجست 
و دييغرا نلك سابع كه نلك زحل است و [دييغرا] 
فلكل سادس [كوه] فلك مشترى است
4. CREATION OF LOWER BEINGS.

Then, if he went to the upper worlds, he would see, in the four elements, the same shapes and forms that are present in the material world. For, as long as there is a distinction between the elements, there will always be a distinction in the world of matter. Thus, the elements are not visible in the world of the heavens, as they are in the world of the material. Therefore, what is seen in the world of the material is not seen in the world of the heavens. And this is how the elements are created.
الإجسام السماوية وحدها، ولأجل أن مادة
الترابعة مشتركة، لا بجوز أن يكون علة
وجود مادتها كثيرة.

ولأجل أن صورها مختلفة، لا
يجوز أن تكون علة صورها الأكشرة مختلفة،
محصورة في أربعة أشياء أو في أربعة أنواع;
لأنها أربع صور - (17).

ال -فارابي.

(1) والصور المتعلقة إلى المادة
هي على مراتب؛ فسادناها مرتبة هي صور الأسطح
الترابعة وهي أربع في أربع موارد - (1).

(1) وانتشار الجرام السماوية
في معنى واحد وهو الحركة الدورية الصادرة
عنها يصير سبب اشتراك المواد الأربع في

17. Chat., Hac. ... 291
18. Far., Siyasa ... 38
مادة واحدة واختلاف حركاتها يصير سبب
اختلاف الصور الاربع وتغيرها من حال إلى حال
يصير سبب تغير المواد الاربع - ...

و الحركات السماوية وضعية
دورية والحركات الكائنة الفاسدة حركات
مكانية وحركة الكمية والكيفية والحركات
المستوية اللازمة للبساطة وهي على ضربين
اخطهما من الوسط والاخر إلى الوسط - و
حركة الاشياء المركبة بحسب غلبة
البساطة من المواد الاربع عليها - (9)

Ibn - Sīnā.

فأذا استوت الكرات
السماوية عددًا، لزم بحدها وجود اسقاطات؛
وذلك لدن الأجسام الاسطفاسية كائنة فاسدة،
فليجب أن تكون مبادئها القريبة اشياء تقبل
نوعا من التغيير والحركة - ...

19. Diet., Abh.(Text) ... 60
Creation of other bodies by the mixture of the primary elements.

AL-GHAZALI.

5. CREATION OF OTHER BODIES BY THE MIXTURE OF THE PRIMARY ELEMENTS.

Nothing beats this:

العناصر أجسام أخرى:

20. IS., Ilah. (2) ... 410
الأولى: حوادث الاجو من البخار،
والدخان، والشهب وغيرها -

وثانية: المعادن -
وثانية: النباث -
ورابعها: الحيوان -
واخر رتبتها الانسان -

وكل هذا يعمل بأمتزاج العناصر. فمن امتزاج صورة المائية، والهوائية، يبحث البخار. ومن امتزاج النارية والترابية، يبحث الدخان. يحصل بالاختلاط الأول حوادث الاجو -
و يكون سبب اختلاطها
حركات تحصل فيها من الحرارة والبرودة الصادرة من الأجسام السماوية. فستيقف الاستعداد منها - (12)

21. Ghaz., Mag. ... 294
لذا يجد اولا الأساطقسات
ثم ما جانسها و قارنها من الأجسام مثل البخارات و اصنافها مثل الغيوم والرياح و سائر ما يجدث في الجو و أيضا مجانساتها حول الأرض و تحتها و فى الماء و النار و يجدث في الأساطقسات و تقع كل واحد من سائر تلك توسيع تتحرك بها من تلقاء انفسها الى الأشياء والانهما إن توجد لها او بها بغير محرك من خارج و تقوى يفعل بعضها في بعض و تقوى يقبل بها بعضها فعل بعض ثم يفعل فيها الأجسام السماوية و يفعل بعضها في بعض
فيجد تلك من اجتماع الافعال من هذه الجهات اصناف من الاختلافات و الامتيازات كثيرة و المقدار كثيرا مختلفة بغیر تضاف و مختلفا بالتضاف فيلزم عنها وجود سائر الأجسام - (22)

و ترتيب هذه الموجودات

22. Diet., Must.(Text) ... 28
هو ان تقدم اولا اخسها ثم الافضل فالمثل اثناء ينتهى الى افضلها الذي لا افضل منه فاكثرها المادة الاولى المشتركة و الافضل منها الاستفسارات في المعدنية في الدهن يتم على الحيوان غير الناطق في الحيوان الناطق و ليس بعد الحيوان الناطق افضل منه - (23)

ILN - SINA

(3) هذه مخلوق منها ما مخلقن، بالمجازة تقع فيها، على نسب مختلفة، معينة نحو جملة مختلفة، بحسب المعدنيات و النبات والحيوان، انناسها وانواعها - وكلا واحد من هذه صورة مقومة، منها تسبعت كيبيته المحصلسة و ربما نبتت الكيفية، و انخفضت الصورة:

مثل ما يعرض للناء ان يسكن، او ان يختلف عليه الجمود و

23. Diet., Must. (Text) ... 22
الميعان؟ وصائبه محفوظة - (24)

(25) ... ثم من بعدها يبتدئ

وغير المادة القابلة للصور الكائنة الفاسدة
فلتقبس أول شيء صورة العناصر - ثم تتدرج
بسيرًا يسيرًا فيكون أول الموجود فيها أحسن
وأرجل مرتبة من الذي يتلوه فيكون أحسن
ما فيه المادة ثم العناصر ثم المركبات الجمادية
ثم الثامنات و بعدها الحيوانات و أفضلها
الإنسان و أفضل الناس من استكملت نفسه
عقلاً بالفعل و محتلاً للاخلاق التي تكون
خضائل عملية و أفضل هؤلاء هو المستعد
لمرتبة النبوة - (25)
6. WAYS OF UPWARD TREND IN CREATION.

AL - GHAZĀLĪ.

... تَفْيِيضُ الصُّورَ مِنْ وَاهبِهِ
الصور - فَإِذا حَصَلَ امِتْزاجُ الأَقْوَى مِنْ ذلِكَ، وَأَنْتِ
وَانْضَافُ الْيَهِ شَرْوَتٌ حُصُلَ اسْتَيْعَادٌ لِسَبْدِ
الجُواهر المِهِدْنَةِ، تَفْيِيضُ تلكِ الصُورَ أَيْضاً
مِنْ وَاهبِهِا -
فَأَنَّ كَانَ الامِتْزاجُ آتِيَ مِن
ذلِكَ، حُصَلَ النَّبَاتُ، فَأَنَّ آتِيَ حُصُلَ العَبْوَانِ
وَآتِي الامِتْزاجُ آتِيَ مِنْ نُفْضِ اللهِ الْإِنسانِ، الذِّي
لَهُ اسْتَيْعَادٌ لِفْؤِدِ صُورَةِ الْإِنسانِ - (26)

AL - FĀRĀBĪ.

(رِ) فَبَعْضُ الأَجْسَامِ يَتَحَدِّثُ عَن
الخَلَائِلِ الدُّوْلَةِ وَبَعْضُها عَنْ الْأَثْنَئِيَّةِ وَبَعْضُها
عَنْ الْثَّالِثِ وَبَعْضُها عَنْ الاختُلاطِ الْأَخْرِ - و
صور ... (a) Read ...

26. Ghaz., Mag. ... 294
المعدنات تحدث باختلاط اقرب الى الاسطح، واتكل تركيباً ويتكون بعدها في الاسطح سراتب اقل، ويحدث النبات باختلاط أكثر منها تركيباً، وبعد عن السطح سراتب اقل، كثر الحيوان غير الناطق يحدث باختلاط أكثر تركيباً من النبات، والانسان وحده من الذي يحدث عن الاختلاط الاحيائي. (27)

(27) و باتي الصور هي صور الأجسام الحارة عن اختلاط الاسطح، و اشترابها، وبعضها أرفع من بعض، فإن صور الأجسام المعدنية أرفع مرتبة من صور الاسطح، وصور النبات على تفاضلها أرفع مرتبة من صور الأجسام المعدنية، وصور انواع الحيوان غير الناطق على تفاضلها أرفع من صور النبات، ثم صور الحيوان الناطق، وهي الهيبات بلحية النيه بها هو ناطق، ارفع من صور الحيوان غير الناطق. (28)

27. *Diet.*, *Must.* (Text) ... 29
28. *Far.*, *Siyasa* ... 38
فيفينب أن تكون هيئلى
العالم العنصري للزمتة عن الحقل الآخر...

وأما الصوامع فتفيض أيضا من
ذلك الحقل، لكن تختلف في هيولاها,
بحسب ما يختلف من استحقاقها لها,
بحسب استعداداتها المختلفة.

و لا بد للختلافاتها الا
الإجواح السماوية بتفضيل ما يلي جهة المركز
صلى جهةً المحيط، وبأحوال تدق عن إدراك
الأوهام تفاصيلها، وإن فطنت لعملتها - وهن
هناك يوجد صور العناصر -

و يجب فيها: بحسب
نسبتها السماوية - ومن امور صبحنة من
السماوية - امتراجات مختلفة الإعدادات
لقوى تعدهها - وهناك تفريض: النغوس
النباتية - والحيوانية والناطقة من الجوهر
العقل الذي يلي هذا العالم - (29)

(ان) الفعل النفساني في الجسماني

فكتار القوى النفسانية في العناصر الأربعة
من امتصاز بعضها ببعض تحدث في المركبات
المعدنية والنباتية والحيوانية ثم تأثيراتها
في تلك المركبات من نغذية وتنميتها و
تربيتها واتمامها إلى غير ذلك - (30)

(ان) وقد يتكون من هذه العناصر
أكوان أيضاً بسبب القوى الفلكلية إذا
امتصاز العناصر امتزاجاً أكثر اعتدالاً أى اقرب
إلى الاعتدال من هذه المذكورة واولها النبات.
فمنه ما يكون مجزراً يفرز جسياً حاملاً للقوة
المولدة ومنه كائن من تلقاها نفسه من
غير بذر - (31)

29. IS., Ish.(N.I-I)... 66I
30. IS., Al-Fi'1 wa l-Infal ... 2
31. IS., Naj. ... ... I57
3. COMPARATIVE STUDY.

1. ONE THING EMANATES FROM GOD.

Al-Fārābī propounds the view that the first creation from God is one thing in number. He calls it first intelligence and teaches that multiplicity can accidentally result from the first creation. In this connection De Boer says:

"We are able to see God better in the regular gradation of Beings which proceed from him than in himself. From him, the One alone, comes the All, for his knowledge is the highest power: In his cognizance of himself the world comes into being:" (1)

Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī and expounds his view in the following way: one thing comes from God. That one thing, on the other hand, will necessarily have a different aspect or state or effect or quality which will

1. Boer, Hist. ... 115
also be one. Later on, multiplicity of things follows in association with that necessary thing and the totality of them follows from His Essence. In this connection Dr. D. Saliba says:-

"Un premier principe admis par Avicenne est que: de l'un ne peut sortir que l'un.

Nous savons que l'être nécessaire est absolument un, parce qu'il n'a rien de commun avec ce qui est en dehors de son essence. Or, de ce que l'un ne peut produire que l'un, il suit que l'être nécessaire qui est absolument un, ne peut produire qu'un seul et même être également simple." (2)

Al-Ghazālī states that one thing emanates from God. That one thing necessarily has a different aspect, and consequently multiplicity results and that becomes a principle for derivation of all kinds of multiplicity in the world.

2. Saliba, Étude ... 128
Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that one thing emanates from God and multiplicity results from that thing. Moreover, he asserts that the one thing which comes from God involves different aspects, and as such multiplicity of things arises in compresence with that necessary thing. Al-Ghazālī's account corresponds fully with this.

2. ABSTRACT INTELLIGENCE EMANATED FROM GOD HAS TWO ASPECTS.

Two references from al-Fārābī and four from Ibn-Sīnā have been quoted. Al-Fārābī propounds the view that the first of the creations is one abstract intelligence (aql mujarrad). It involves two aspects; one having the knowledge of its essence and the other comprehending the First. Then multiplicity accidentally happens there in the respect that, on the one hand, it is contingent being in consideration of its essence and, on the other hand, necessary being with respect to its derivation from God.
Ibn-Sīnā does not fundamentally differ from al-Fārābī. He asserts that one thing emanates from God which is purely abstract intelligence, and the essence and quiddity of which do not exist in matter. It is one of the separate intelligences in the world, and it causes movement of the farthest (agā) body. Moreover, in reference to creation Ibn-Sīnā describes the first grade which is chiefly concerned with the intelligences as being abstract spiritual angels. Then the grade of spiritual souls follows on and this pertains to world-soul. Then follows the grade of heavenly bodies of which some are quite excellent in comparison with others.

Ibn-Sīnā further asserts that the first intelligence implies two distinct aspects. It has knowledge of its own essence on the one hand and that of God on the other. Furthermore, it is a contingent being by its essence and a necessary being in respect of its derivation from God. Thus multiplicity arises from the first intelligence itself and not from God.
Thus G. Quadri says:—

"L'intelligence est ainsi la première émanation, le premier causé. Elle est pure, c'est-à-dire forme n'existant absolument pas dans la nature. Et avec cela Avicenne obéit au principe néoplatonicien: de l'un ne procède que l'un. Elle est née des réflexions de l'être nécessaire sur soi-même. Possible en soi, elle est nécessaire par rapport à l'être nécessaire dont elle procède nécessairement." (3)

Al-Ghazālī states that abstract intelligence emanates from God. It has two aspects. Firstly, it has knowledge of the First and, secondly, it has knowledge of its essence. However, out of it angel and celestial sphere result, while angel is abstract intelligence. Al-Ghazālī further states in a syllogistic way that excellent things are produced from excellent quality. Intelligence is the most excellent of all things, since the quality which it has had from God is necessarily excellent.

3. Quadri, Philosophie ... 98
Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of Ibn-Sīnā. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that abstract intelligence emanates from God, and multiplicity arises from this intelligence. Furthermore, it has knowledge of its own essence on the one hand and that of God on the other. In reference to this it may be noted that De Boer's remark about the difference between al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā deserves serious consideration.

Here B. Carra De Vaux remarks:

"T. J. de Boer has also pointed out as a difference between Fārābī and the other philosophers of his school that Avicenna does not, like him, derive matter from God. According to this writer, Fārābī conceived matter as having emanated from God by passing through several spiritual intermediaries. I do not think that this statement is quite correct. It is in the treatise on "the principles of beings" of which we possess a Hebrew translation by Moses ibn Tibbon ... that Fārābī gives the chain of principles in a way which makes
it resemble an emanation: the primary intelligence or first cause comes from God; from it come in their order the intelligence of the spheres; the last is the active intelligence; above it are placed the universal soul, then form and lastly matter. Avicenna's metaphysics are really quite comparable to this system." (4)

However, in addition to the above agreement Ibn-Sīnā asserts that the grade of abstract intelligence pertains to angels. Then the grades of souls and celestial spheres follow. Al-Ghazālī's account appears to be closer to that of Ibn-Sīnā.

3. **EMANATION OF TEN INTELLIGENCES AND NINE CELESTIAL SPHERES.**

Two references from al-Fārābī and three from Ibn-Sīnā have been quoted. Al-Fārābī propounds the
view that the first intelligence is necessary being and it has knowledge of God. From the first, second intelligence emanates which is incorporeal reality having the capacity of knowing its essence and the first. Moreover, it does not exist in matter. It is a contingent being which is aware of the higher sphere by its matter and form that is soul. Third intelligence emanates from the second and the celestial sphere of the fixed stars follows with the above aspects. The process of creation continues in a similar way, and the existences of Saturn (zuhal), Jupiter (mushtari), Mars (mirrikh), the Sun, Venus (zuhara), Mercury (Cutārid) and the Moon follow from the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth intelligences. Dr. S.M. Afnan states this view in the following way:

"From the first being there emanate successively ten different intellects or intelligences; and from each of these when 'substantially constituted in its proper essence', there results a sphere. The intelligences are absolutely incorporeal substances
and in no way reside in matter. And the spheres that come into being from them are: the first sphere, the sphere of the fixed stars, the sphere of Saturn, the sphere of Jupiter, the sphere of Mars, the sphere of the Sun, the sphere of Venus, the sphere of Mercury, and the sphere of the Moon. This comprises all the beings that in order to exist in this fashion have no need whatever of matter in which to reside. They are separate beings, intelligences and intelligibles in their substance. And the sphere of the Moon is the last of those in which heavenly bodies move by nature in a circle. From the Moon there proceeds a pure intelligence called 'the active intelligence' which bridges the gap between heaven and earth. We thus have God as the First Being, a species by himself, governed by the principle of complete unity. From him emanate the ten intelligences with their nine spheres as a second species of being which represent plurality. Then comes the active intelligence as a third, and none of these species are corporeal themselves. Finally, in the last
Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī and asserts that separate intelligences are ten in number. Every intelligence is a higher grade of being and it comprehends the first and necessitates the existence of another intelligence. When it comprehends its essence, it necessitates a sphere. However, first intelligence is the mover being itself unmoved, and it causes movement to the farthest body. This process continues in succession and with each intelligence a bodily sphere follows. Thus the spheres of the Zodiac, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the Sun, Venus, Mercury and Moon follow respectively from the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth intelligences. This process of creation ends in the intelligence of the terrestrial world which we call active intelligence (al-cāqīl al-fāṣal). In this connection S.H. Nasr says:-

"The First Intellect (al-cāqīl al-awwal) is possible in essence and necessary by virtue of the

5. Afnan ... 31
"Cause of Causes", (قيلات القيلات) or the Necessary Being itself. But because the First Intellect is possible, it generates multiplicity within itself. By intellection of the Divine Essence, it gives rise to the Second Intellect, and by intellection of its own essence to two beings which are the Soul of the first heaven and its body. One may say that the First Intellect has three forms of knowledge:

(1) Knowledge of the Essence of the Necessary Being.

(2) Knowledge of its own essence as a being necessary by virtue of another being (واجب بِلَـِغَرِيۡر). 

(3) Knowledge of its own essence as a possible being.

It is these three forms of knowledge which give rise respectively to the Second Intellect, the Soul of the first heaven, and its body. The Second Intellect through intellection generates in a similar manner the
Third Intellect, the Soul of the second heaven and its body. This process continues until the ninth heaven and the Tenth Intellect, which governs the sublunary region, are generated. This scheme corresponds to the planetary spheres in the following manner:

**TABLE VII. THE HEAVENS AND THEIR GENERATING INTELLECTS ACCORDING TO IBN SĪNĀ.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Heavens</th>
<th>Name of Heaven</th>
<th>No. of Generating Intellect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>&quot;Heaven of heavens&quot; (falak al-aflāk)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Heaven of signs of Zodiac (falak al-burūj)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Saturn</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Jupiter</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mars</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Sun</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Venus</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mercury</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Moon</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The heavens, therefore, are generated by a series of intellections, each Intellect actually giving being to
Al-Ghazālī states that, with respect to its being necessary, a second intelligence emanates from the possibility which is, as it were, its matter, first, and a distant sphere follows. Thus the spheres of the Zodiac, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the Sun, Venus, Mercury and the Moon follow respectively from the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth intelligences.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds closely to that of al-Fāraḥī. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fāraḥī in that nine spheres follow from ten intelligences. But it is to be noticed that about his reference from Risālah dar ḥaqīqat wa kaifiyyat ... S.H. Nasr remarks:

"The authenticity of the Risālah dar ḥaqīqat wa kaifiyyat ... has been doubted by some authorities, but there is no question that it summarizes Ibn Sīnā's

6. Nasr, Cosmological Doctrines ... 203
views on the chain of Being found with greater elaboration in the Shīfā' and other works." (7)

However, al-Fārābī gives a systematic account of the theory of emanation for nine celestial spheres and ten intelligences; and with this al-Ghazālī's account appears to correspond closely.

4. CREATION OF LOWER BEINGS.

Two references are quoted from al-Fārābī. He propounds the view that forms require matter which may be of different grades. [Firstly], a grade consisting of the forms of four elements, and these elements are [primarily] four in different kinds of matter. On the other hand, the partnership of the heavenly bodies remains in one condition, that is, it has circular motion which becomes a cause of the partnership of four elements of matter into one, and then the difference of their motion becomes a cause of the differentiation of four forms.

7. Nasr, *Cosmological Doctrines* ... 203
Their change, on the other hand, causes a change in the four elements.

Al-Fārābī further asserts that the motions of the heavenly bodies are circular and those of "corrupt" beings pertain to a place. Thus motion of quality and quantity, and regular motion are necessary for simple elements. But they are of two different kinds, one moving from the centre and the other moving towards the centre. Moreover, motion of compound things is derived from the matter of four elements.

Ibn-Sīnā does not fundamentally differ from al-Fārābī. He asserts that whenever the number of the heavenly bodies is [made] complete, the existence of the [primary] elements necessarily follows, but the elementary bodies are, properly speaking, corrupt (fāsida) beings. That is why their proximate origin implies change and motion.

On the other hand, there is a common matter for these elements. But their forms may be of different
kinds. Furthermore, the diversities of their forms specify those of spheres; and similarly, the concurrence of their matter specifies that of the spheric conditions.

Ibn-Sīnā further asserts that matter which is derived from heavenly bodies pertains to one of two sources: either they emanate from four bodies or from a number confined to four totalities where each is prepared for a form of simple body.

Al-Ghazālī states that [after the completion of the celestial spheres] the existence of lower beings begins, and these beings are firstly concerned with four primary elements (canāṣir). They are different in nature with respect to their places, and as such some of them move to the centre and others move from the centre. Al-Ghazālī further states that a body cannot be derived from another body, nor can it be caused by the heavenly bodies alone. In this respect, matter of the four common elements cannot be cause for the existence of manifold
matter. Their forms are different and thus are incapable of being cause of their forms except in respect to diverse multiplicity confined to four things or kinds. For they are four in number.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of al-Fārābī. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that primary elements are four in number and they are by nature different with respect to their places. All of them are derived from the heavenly bodies. Al-Fārābī further asserts that the heavenly bodies which remain in one condition consist in circular motion which in fact causes association and dissociation of the four elements. Moreover, the elements are of two types, one moving towards the centre and the other moving from the centre. Al-Ghazālī's account seems to be closer to this.

5. CREATION OF OTHER BODIES BY THE MIXTURE OF PRIMARY ELEMENTS:

Two references from al-Fārābī and two from Ibn-Sīnā have been quoted. Al-Fārābī propounds the view that
first of all, [primary] elements are created. Then the things which resemble them and are associated with them proceed. In this connection al-Farabi asserts that there are vapours, their species like clouds, rain and all that is created in the air. Moreover, the things which concern diversities on earth, in water and fire are also produced. In reference to the process of creation al-Farabi teaches that there is a power in each of the elements which evokes things. The power of some of them influences other, whereas some of them receive the act of others. Moreover, the heavenly bodies influence some of them and through [them] the others. Consequently, things with varied natures, as well as other bodies, follow.

As regards the order of existents al-Farabi asserts that the lowest of them comes first and the better thing follows. Then the better thing continues with an upward trend till it attains the best, which has no higher degree. So primary common matter is the lowest of all, and then the better elements, then the minerals, then the plants, then the speechless animal, and
then the animal with the faculty of speech, i.e. man, follow.

Ibn-Sīnā does not fundamentally differ from al-Fārābī. He asserts that after the grade of heavenly bodies, the existence of matter which receives the forms of the corrupt beings begins with the creation of the primary elements. By their mixture various creations are prepared, such as, minerals, plants and animals - their genera and species. Perceptive qualities arise out of each of these subsistent forms. At times qualities change, while forms remain, (such as, what happens to water when heated or when it varies in respect to solidity and fluidity, while the watery substance continues). Ibn-Sīnā, moreover, deals with the gradation of beings. The process of creation, according to him, undertakes a gradual upward trend. The first existent is the lowest and the most inferior grade of being, and then compounds of inanimate being, the lower levels of plant life, animals and man respectively follow, while man is the best of them. Then the best kind of man by acquiring excellent qualities and perfection attains the grade of prophethood. In this connection S. H. Nasr says:
"Moreover, all beings in the world of generation and corruption are made from the four elements (قانسیر), fire, air, water and earth, each of which possesses a pair of the fundamental natural qualities. Fire is warm and dry, air, warm and moist, water, cold and moist, and earth, cold and dry. Other properties of objects derive from the four basic qualities, for example, softness from moisture and hardness from dryness.

The four elements out of which all sublunar beings are composed consist basically of the same matter which on different occasions accepts different forms. They are therefore transformed into each other continuously. This transformation is accomplished by the rejection of one form and the acceptance of a new one." (8)

Al-Ghazālī states that other bodies are created

8. Nasr, Cosmological Doctrines ... 240
by mixture of the primary elements. First of these are the creation of air out of vapour, smoke, flame and the like. Secondly minerals, thirdly plants, fourthly animals and then the grade of man follow. All of them are created by mixture of the primary elements. Moreover, by the mixture of the form of water and air vapour is created, and by that of fire and clay smoke is created.

Here al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of al-Fārābī. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that from the mixture of primary elements various things are created and the process of creation continues with an upward trend; and accordingly, plants, animals and man respectively follow. But al-Fārābī further shows how air and the vapours, their species like cloud, rain and all else that is subsequently created follow. Furthermore, he speaks of the diversities on the earth, in the water and fire, and teaches that there is a power in each of those elements which is capable of evoking things. Al-Ghazālī's account appears to be closer to this detailed view of al-Fārābī.
6. WAYS OF UPWARD TREND IN CREATION.

Two references from al-Farābī and three from Ibn-Sīnā have been quoted. Al-Farābī propounds the view that the nature of bodies differs with respect to the mixture of elements. Some of them are created by the first mixture, some by the second or the third or some other mixture. In this connection al-Farābī asserts that the minerals are created by a mixture which is the nearest to the elements and simplest in composition. Their distance from the elements is in smaller degree. The plants are created by a mixture which is greater than these in composition and farther from the elements. Then speechless animals are created by a mixture which is greater in composition than the plants, and then man alone is created from the best mixture.

On the other hand, forms of the bodies are created from the mixture of the primary elements. Some of them are higher in grade than the others. Thus forms of the mineral bodies are higher in grade than those of
elements. Similarly, the grade of form continues with an upward trend, and passes through the grades of plants, speechless animals and animals with the faculty of speech. Thus according to al-Farābī, the form of man is higher in grade than that of animals.

Ibn-Sīnā does not fundamentally differ from al-Farābī. He asserts that matter of the elemental world necessarily follows from the ultimate intelligence. Similarly, forms emanate from that intelligence, but they differ in respect of their matter in such a way that they vary in merit and preparation. There is no principle for such difference except in respect to the heavenly bodies in the distinction which they show between what is near the central region and what is near the peripheral region. Thus the details of dispositions are too subtle to be perceived. Here the forms of the primary elements are produced; and their relations to the heavenly bodies and the things sent forth from them necessarily consist in the mixture of different
preparations produced by such powers as dispose them. Thus the souls of plants, animals and man emanate from the intellectual reality which rules this world.

Furthermore, Ibn-Sīnā illustrates that mental act with respect to corporeal thing is like the influence of psychical powers in the four primary elements. Some of their mixtures are used with others for the creation of mineral, vegetable, and animal compounds. Their influences in those compounds follow from nutrition, growth, development and completion. In reference to this Ibn-Sīnā further adds that 'When the elements are mixed together in a more harmonious way, i.e. in a more balanced proportion than in the cases previously mentioned, other beings also come into existence out of them due to the powers of the heavenly bodies. The first of these are plants. Now some plants are grown from seed and set aside a part of the body bearing the reproductive faculty, while others grow from
spontaneous generation without seeds.' (9) In this respect Dr. A. M. Goichon remarks:

"Voici le dernier échelon de la création: une matière, où se retrouvent quatre éléments, sur laquelle agissent les influences célestes, pour la préparer et lui donner déjà une certaine diversité. Cette préparation obtient, pour ainsi dire, à la matière la forme qui lui convient, car lorsque la préparation de la matière est achevée "déborde de l'intelligence séparée une forme particulière, propre, et elle s'imprime dans cette matière". Comme l'intelligible est donné du dehors à l'esprit humain, ainsi la forme est donnée du dehors à l'être composé de matière et de forme. L'un et l'autre viennent du Dator formarum, ce Donateur des formes n'étant autre que l'Intellect actif.

Les formes ainsi données sont reçues, telle dans une matière, telle dans une autre. Si les

9. Rahman, Avicenna's Psychology ... 24
préparations subies par ces matières, ou plus exactement ces parties de la matière, sont très diverses, les formes seront d'espèces différentes. Si les préparations, sans être absolument semblables, sont voisines, les formes seront de même espèce ici, l'être est composé; il n'est pas fait uniquement de la forme ou quiddité; c'est pourquoi il peut y avoir plusieurs individus, distingués par leur matière et par ce qu'elle impose à la forme." (10)

Al-Ghazālī states that forms emanate from the giver of the forms. Whenever a mixture becomes stronger and more complete under certain conditions, mineral substances result and those forms come from the giver of them. Then if the mixture becomes more complete than that, plants result. Similarly, if it is still more complete, animal results, and yet more complete mixtures consist in the sperm of the human being which involves preparation for accepting the form of man.

10. Goichon, La Philosophie d'Avicenne ... 46
Here al-Ghazālī's account consists of two aspects, one of which indicates how forms emanate from the donor of them, and the other shows how different mixtures produce various grades of being beginning from the lowest grade to that of the highest. Now in reference to his first aspect al-Ghazālī's account corresponds to that of Ibn-Sīnā; whereas in respect to his second aspect, his account corresponds to that of al-Fārābī. Ibn-Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī in that by the mixture of different elements various grades of beings along with respective forms are produced. This process of creation undertakes an upward trend of development beginning with the lowest being and continuing till the highest of its grade. In this respect al-Fārābī clearly shows how minerals, plants, animals and man are created with their forms from different degrees of mixtures. Al-Ghazālī's second aspect of the account appears to be closer to this. On the other hand, Ibn-Sīnā asserts that forms emanate from the ultimate intelligence and they differ in respect of the preparation of matter. Ibn-Sīnā further shows how
forms of the various grades of beings consist of the mixture of different preparation of things. The first aspect of al-Ghazālī's account appears to be closer to this.

4. RESULT

Al-Ghazālī's accounts correspond to those of al-Fārābī in points 3, 4, 5 and 6 (partial), and to those of Ibn-Sīnā in points 1, 2, and 6 (partial).

In addition to his references available from Ibn-Sīnā's metaphysics al-Ghazālī's accounts corresponds to Ibn-Sīnā's Physics in points 5(i) and 6(iii).
CHAPTER NINE.

CONCLUSION.
At the end of careful investigation the result obtained prompts us to believe that the Metaphysical section of al-Ghazālī’s Maqāsid is indeed a short account of the essential views of al-Farābī and Ibn-Sīna; but, because of other factors which have crept into this work and been discerned in the course of this research, it cannot simply be identified as a mere summary. Furthermore, it indicates that al-Ghazālī was in more substantial agreement with the writings of Ibn-Sīna than those of al-Farābī.

The metaphysical section comprises some of the views held by them. Others of their views al-Ghazālī did not attend to for the reason that when collecting materials from their writings for the preparation of his accounts his attention to different aspects was determined by his own principles of selection. But there is no denying that the aspects which he has noted in the body of this section, are in fact the fundamentals of their philosophy.

In order to develop fully the section he made use
of their works in Logic and Natural Sciences in addition to what might be described as chiefly metaphysical writings; thus some of his accounts correspond with such sources. He had to incorporate these contents out of their varied fields with a view to rendering the accounts as comprehensive as possible. Furthermore, in order to keep a constant uniformity of thought and homogeneity of expression he frequently used their technical terms and conceptual phrases where appropriate, thereby making some of his accounts correspond with their views to a considerable degree. On the other hand, where only indirect agreement is concerned, his accounts are observed to correspond with them in principle only, since his main object appears to have been to characterize uncertain and ambiguous ideas with determinate description. At times he seems to have laid stress on rearranging their views in a balanced way and took a great deal of care and accuracy of thought in systematizing their varied ideas into a harmonious form without distorting their actual significance.

He brought in various opinions and instances to substantiate exhaustively the representation of their views.
For this purpose he had to go through all sorts of works available under their names to make his work more comprehensive. In other words, both intensive and extensive search made his system in practice simpler and more illuminating. His approach to each of the problems appears to be methodical, well-organized and concise; and at certain places he presents his conclusion of a theme in what seems to be syllogistic form.

No criticisms or comments whatsoever have anywhere been clearly identified. But it should be noted that his treatment of a particular theme may be so brief as obviously to require elaboration for the reader to grasp it fully without ambiguity.

With reference to his assimilation of their synthetic judgements, his rearrangement of their materials where necessary his methodical setting out and logical conclusion, it appears that al-Ghazālī's was the first attempt to show them a priori possible. He presumably deemed it necessary to impart a priori character to certain of their views, with analysis and examples,
in such a way that the entire system thus moulded appears to be consistent and significant. Considering the heterogeneous elements necessarily involved in his accounts to produce clear understanding of the intricate metaphysical problems, this work, even taking Maqāsid as a whole, may be regarded as equally important with other comprehensive works of that time. Moreover, the work conveys a uniformity by penetrating through a diversity of uniformities. Thus one may describe it as holding an independent position.

It is important to notice that the Eastern Philosophers, particularly in the mediaeval period, hardly distinguished Philosophy from Religion, and as such they thought theology as a component of metaphysical studies. But perhaps al-Ghazālī was the first to initiate by this work a kind of bifurcation of theological aspects from metaphysical principles proper.

Anyone who is curious to learn about Arabic metaphysical philosophy will find this work of great value for acquiring knowledge of its basic ideas and ideals.
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