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THE BRITISH ANNEXATION OF NORTHERN ZAMBEZIA (1884 - 1924) - ANATOMY OF A CONQUEST -

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Vol. I.
The history of the Northern Rhodesia Protectorate, as Zambia was known before 1964, has been depicted as a relatively benevolent process. The region 'had been subjugated', says Mulford, 'not by war but by treaties concluded between white men and the Territory's unsophisticated chiefs'. The struggle of 'Christianity, commerce and civilization versus the slave trade' had, according to A.J. Hanna, distinguished the earlier years. In Gann's view, the establishment of administration, undertaken by 'government officials', coming 'in the missionary's footsteps' promoted the 'birth of a new economy'.

Such accounts have implied that the 'protection' of 'northern Zambezia' compared favourably with the situation south of the river, where military subjugation followed the Ndebele and Shona 'risings', and was indeed qualitatively different. Moreover, this view could draw support from the statements of some Zambian nationalists. As late as 1959, Kenneth Kaunda, while under political restriction, described the Protectorate as based on 'treaties freely entered into' between local rulers and Queen Victoria's 'representatives'.

This thesis is concerned to modify this assessment radically in the light of extensive research into British South Africa Company records, Colonial Office correspondence, the private papers of some B.S.A.C. agents, the letters and diaries of missionaries and others, coupled with extensive tape-recording of the testimonies of senior Zambians.

After outlining the theme of the research (Chapter I), this 'anatomy' of the B.S.A. Company's 'conquest' proceeds to review the relation of 'the rules of the great game of scramble' to Rhodes's action in Central Africa (Chapter II), and to examine 'treaty-making' in 'northern Zambezia' in detail (Chapter III).

Chapter IV is devoted to the B.S.A. Company's strategy of military conquest, with special reference to the defeat of the stronger kingdoms.

The main body of the thesis (Chapter V) is concerned with what are seen as the major instruments by which the conquered territory was controlled and exploited. This includes an examination of the revenue, drawn from 'hut tax' in relation to the Company's real objectives.

In the final chapter (VI) brief surveys are provided of three major consequences of this conquest: the degradation of traditional rulers; the fostering of a comprehensive 'colour bar'; and the awakening of African nationalism.

It is submitted that the swift and relatively early triumph of Zambian nationalism cannot be accurately understood without the fuller 'anatomy' of the British 'conquest' which this thesis offers.
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CHAPTER I

Anatomy of a Conquest

(a) The need to reappraise familiar terms

Words like 'occupation', 'acquisition' or 'annexation' have loose enough meanings in colloquial usage. For the purposes of this essay, the word 'annexation' has, however, been deliberately included in the title because of the very specific use of it that appears to have been made during the deliberations of the Berlin West Africa Conference of 1884-85. Germany, whose meteoric rise to a dominant role in European international relations in the latter decades of the nineteenth century had so much to do with the 'cold war' situation that led to the calling of the Conference, was insisting on the principle of 'effective occupation', by 'the Powers', of coveted tracts of Africa. Britain, on the other hand, wanted a loose term which would enable her, as the recognised leader in the field of colonial expansion, to 'keep others out' of the territories to which she laid claim without imposing awkward obligations upon herself. In this Britain was to triumph, as the resolutions of the Berlin Conference show. She was then free to carry out policies of relatively gradual annexation without having to be able to prove that she exercised 'strong and effective control'. She would declare herself responsible, in her various African 'spheres of influence', for the general 'protection' of her subjects.
who lived and did their business there. The words 'protection' and 'protectorate' thus slipped in, consciously ill-defined, to the parlance of the dynamic imperialism of the last quarter of the century, with Britain 'avoiding any definition of the obligations of protectorates'. Indeed in the words of Sir Edward Malet, her chief negotiator at the Conference, "No attempt was made...to interfere with existing maxims of international law. Dangerous definitions had been avoided"; and Britain was effectively left with no commitments to 'protect' African chiefs and peoples but with a free hand to require such rulers and nations, faced with the reality of her military prowess, to undertake not to agree to the entry of representatives of other European powers into their territories.

In making this distinction between 'annexation' and 'protectorates', Britain maintained that the latter provided 'a perfectly legitimate but much less complete form of government, exempt from any of the obligations imposed by the Conference-occupying powers'. Thus Lord Selborne carried the day not only against Bismarck's strong opposition but also in the face of sharp criticism within the British Cabinet. At the last, Bismarck, who liked to disclaim any interest in colonies, 'finally yielded, his concession marking a signal triumph for the principles of vague and loose definitions for which Great Britain stood, since it clearly provided her with the means of evading all the
obligations of the third basis (i.e. "effective control") should she wish to do so'. ¹

This original hazy connotation of 'protection' and its relation to actual annexation were, as we shall see, to have profound consequences upon British-African relations in what, in the usage of the early colonial period, we are calling 'Northern Zambezia'. For here is a field of study in which the difference between the realities of imperialist action and later, superficial but well-established assumptions about the meaning of 'protection' and 'protectorate' has been found to be a factor of special significance in the era of African 'nationalism'.

A cursory glance at recorded Central African history over the last century might lead to the conclusion that here was the story of a civilised European power replacing uncivilised African powers and thus preparing the way for 'indigenous' governments to design nation states in keeping with the patterns of modern European civilisation and geared to integrate rapidly into the current international, economic and technological situation. Such a judgment would then pronounce the European mastery of Central Africa, associated with the dynamic leadership of Cecil Rhodes,

as 'a good thing' - to use the uncomplicated language of '1066 and All That'. This, in turn, may lead us to recall Sellar's and Yeatman's summary statement that 'the Roman Conquest (of Britain) was a Good Thing, since the Britons were only natives at that time', with its profound insight into that particular cast of mind\(^2\), which is the springboard of 'herrenvolkism'.

The findings of a closer study contradict this impression and are less exhilarating. Because for most of the period of British Control of the region now called Zambia, the words 'protection' and 'protectorate' figured in official papers, there appeared to arise a belief that the relations between Britain and this region were shaped and directed by the principles of tutelage and nurture. Though the term 'protectorate' had been applied also to territory acquired by Britain south of the Zambezi, the great 'rebellions' of the Ndebele and Shona in 1896-7 clearly demonstrated that British authority over that part of Central Africa was effected by military conquest. 'Northern Zambezia' did not record 'wars' on such a scale and so the idea grew that there was a qualitative difference in the way in which the British acquisition north of the river was accomplished.

\(^2\) See Sellars and Yeatman '1066 and All That' (Methuen, 1933?).
David Mulford, for instance, having stated that 'in the early days of white settlement in Central Africa the Zambezi River had marked the beginning of black Africa', remarks, in the first chapter of his excellent book: 'Zambia: the Politics of Independence', that 'in the beginning Northern Rhodesia had been subjugated not by war but by treaties concluded between white men and the Territory's unsophisticated chiefs'. This implies that what made the establishment of white rule possible was in fact the signing of 'treaties' and that the 'treaties' were therefore of major importance to the British agents in their relations with the African peoples over whom their suzerainty was thus legally established by bilateral contracts. Treaty-making implies moreover negotiation rather than the duress of superior force.

Mulford's statement suggests further that the British advance north of the Zambezi - in contrast to what had happened south of the river - was motivated by a conscious desire, or at least intention, to 'protect' the native peoples from various oppressive forces and that (as comes out notably in the writings of Michael Gelfand4) the use of force was therefore to be understood as a last resort in situations where certain

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4. See e.g. Gelfand, M., 'Northern Rhodesia in the Days of the Charter' (Oxford 1961) p. 87.
belligerent African Kings were ill-treating their neighbours and proving 'recalcitrant'.

It is true that recent historical studies of the region have revealed a definite change of emphasis. The British incursion into 'Northern Zambezia' has been described by writers like Rotberg as 'conquest' and there has appeared an explicit recognition of the need to see Zambian history through the eyes of her indigenous people. Yet the position still is that the greater weight of historical writing is on the side of a relatively benevolent view of the British acquisition of 'Northern Zambezia' and one can already detect some disquiet about the aims and scope of the more recent approach as its investigations expose more vividly the motives and manners of 'colonialism'; a sense of distress lest such exposures increase bitterness on racial lines and do injustice to the 'civilising mission' of Europe in Africa. One can detect a cautionary voice saying 'Enough said. Don't throw out the baby with the bath-water. Let's go on to more creative research now. Let's try to know more about such fascinating subjects as pre-colonial trade, movements of population, etc., etc.'

The argument of this present enquiry is that enough has not yet been ascertained or chronicled about the 'colonial period' to ensure a sound understanding of why the situation developed as it did in Central Africa. For the student of history cannot decline to examine what the shovels of research dig up. Of course, he must not write history in order to increase bitterness any more than to generate euphoria. His task is always to try to understand the processes of human action, inter-action and reaction by which things come to be as they are at any given moment of time.

It has therefore to be remembered that when Africans began to find their 'voice' in Central Africa, what they said was at once denounced by the 'authorities' as the reckless outbursts of a tiny minority of self-seeking and power-hungry people, totally unrepresentative of the 'average native'. This was a strong element in the official propaganda of the period of Roy Welensky's ascendancy. In the words of one Governor in 1956, 'unsophisticated' Africans were being 'duped by rogues, crooks and self-seekers'. Events quickly gave the lie to this 'official' assessment and the mid-sixties saw the swift accomplishment of constitutional changes which in turn opened the way to

economic, political and social 'revolution'. Yet the conflict still goes on elsewhere in Africa and the old assumptions of colonial apologists and chroniclers of 'white civilisation' are far from dead.

The history of the region now called Zambia has been relatively well served in recent years by writers with the ability to make their researches readable. Richard Hall's 'Zambia' is much more than a work of journalism. Rotberg's 'Rise of Nationalism', despite the limitations of so wide a canvas, gives a picture of conquest and the reaction to it very different from, for instance, Lewis Gann's 'Birth of a Plural Society' and his 'History of Northern Rhodesia'; and the concise relevant section of his 'Political History of Tropical Africa' strengthens Rotberg's general thesis. The same quality of sympathy with the African side of the encounter characterises Mulford's 'Zambia: the Politics of Independence'; while no study of the area and period can overlook H.A.C. Cairns' analysis of 'British reactions to Central African Society, 1840-1890' which he entitles 'Prelude to Imperialism'.

It is, however, the work of a Zambian historian, Henry Meebelo in his 'Reaction to Colonialism', which, in its study of the country's Northern Province, takes this new approach furthest, and most clearly reconstructs the picture of local reaction to foreign conquest without being either emotionally anti-British or, on the other hand, inhibited by assumptions of colonial benevolence. Meebelo thus demonstrates how the people of the province in question at no time forgot 'that they were a colonial people - a people relegated to the status of second-class citizens in their own country by an alien and white elite whose policies were as detestable and burdensome as the old traditional rule was brutal'. But though he makes numerous passing references to other parts of the country, Meebelo is concerned with one province of Zambia, the impact of foreign intrusion on it and its peoples' increasingly articulate and coordinated reaction which contributed so significantly to the country-wide movement towards national sovereignty.

The intention of the present study is to extend the enquiry in breadth and depth to other parts of Zambia

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10. Ibid., p. 91. Underlining is mine.
while reducing the period under investigation to the four crucial decades from the Berlin Conference of 1884 to the transfer of authority in 1924 from the British South Africa Company to the Colonial Office in London. Extensive use has therefore been made of oral evidence recorded in Zambia, alongside a wide range of written documents, in an attempt to reconstruct important aspects of the conquerors' actions and to make it easier to understand why 'the African recovery' so rapidly united previously disparate societies, in rural no less than in urban areas, in an explicit and irresistible surge, in face of strong and determined white opposition, to create one nation coterminous with the area of British conquest.

Historical scholarship about Zambia divides itself, as we have noted, into (a) traditional apologia for the European 'civilising mission' whose champions write of the whole region of Central Africa; (b) the radical critique which Meebelo, for instance, applies to a limited part of the region — a critique with which Rotberg, Hall, Mulford and Patrick Keatley are in fundamental sympathy; and (c) the dispassionate umpire role of writers like A.J. Wills, which is demonstrated in his article on Central Africa in 'Africa in the 19th

and 20th Centuries'.

It is hoped to show here that the motives and manners of the agents of the B.S.A. Company in our region were essentially and consistently those of conquerors and that the consequences of their intrusion upon the subsequent political, social and economic condition of the region have to be seen as the consequences of a determined, coordinated, swift, effective and comprehensive subjugation. If this view is correct, then there needs to be a major reappraisal of the real significance of such terms as 'protection', 'treaty', etc. and of the legacy of traumatic dislocation which can then be seen as a major factor contributing to the herculean task in, for instance, the field of rural reconstruction with which modern Zambia is faced.

(b) The notion of 'Protection' in the mid-twentieth century.

Though, as we have stated, this enquiry is limiting itself to the forty years prior to 1924, it is important to note at the outset the considerable stress laid by the first spokesmen of Zambian 'nationalism' on the idea of 'protection'. Indeed it is possible to explain Mulford's mistaken assumption about the local significance of 'treaties of protection'.

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by reference to what various African political leaders said as they began to formulate their reasons for rejecting either the 'amalgamation' or, later, the 'federation' of the three territories of Central Africa. For example, in their major 25-page memorandum on 'Federation in Central Africa', Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda of Nyasaland and Mr Harry Nkumbula of Northern Rhodesia, declared, in May 1949, that federation 'would mean discontinuation of the policy of deliberate tutelage for Africans now pursued by the Government of the United Kingdom' in the two northern territories. Moreover 'it would extend to Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia the policy of segregation and discrimination under which our fellow Africans in Southern Rhodesia now legally suffer social indignities and civil and political disabilities'.

The reader of this memorandum who did not have first-hand knowledge of 'Northern Zambezia' would have assumed that there was little or no 'colour bar' there and that Africans were free to play their part in the political and economic life of the territory. This impression would have been reinforced for him by the subsequent statement that 'in Nyasaland and Northern

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Rhodesia the declared policy is to prepare Africans for self-government'. This situation Banda and Nkumbula contrasted with the inhuman attitudes of Southern Rhodesian white settlers who 'have never forgotten that they conquered the Africans of the colony by force of arms'. In view of the realities of Northern Rhodesia's all-pervasive racial discrimination, this mild statement must have derived in the main from the views of Dr Banda, long since self-exiled from Nyasaland and obviously not aware of the Northern Rhodesian situation.

Yet there was further frequent reiteration of the theme of protection, tutelage and the leading of African people towards self-government, by the early nationalists. In 1951, Harry Nkumbula declared that there was 'a cold war between the British Government and the indigenous peoples...Britain is suffering from moral defeat', he said 'because she has broken her promise'.¹⁴ A few months later, when some leading chiefs accompanied Nkumbula to a meeting with the Africa Bureau in London, the Bemba paramount Chitimukulu referred to David Livingstone's having prepared the way for British rule and said that 'the African people...welcomed him and the assurances from the British Government which followed the treaties he made with them. They accepted the protection of the British Government

¹⁴. ANC: Address delivered by the Gen. President, Xmas Day, 1951. Underlining is mine.
and believed they would enjoy continuous freedom and there would never be interference with their protectorate'. Chief Musokotwane agreed that 'Livingstone suggested the protection of our country by the British Government...We have known the British people to be people of their word', he concluded, 'and we hope they will keep to that'.

Such statements, made when there was no encouragement by the territorial governments for the expression of African opinion, all appeared to assume that it was the fact of 'protection' that made Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland different from the Crown Colony across the Zambezi. Orton Chirwa of the Nyasaland African Congress, expressed this idea thus: 'I want to start from the fact that we want to remain under the Colonial Office. Some people think we are fools, but I do feel that the British Empire and the British Government should be proud of their Colonial Office, but no one has really commended us for saying so...As it was at home, under the Colonial Office, we should very soon, I don't know in how long, but very soon, follow the road that India has followed'.

15. ANC: Record of Public Meeting held by the Africa Bureau in Church House, 9th May, 1952, pp. 1-2. Underlining is mine.

16. Ibid., p. 5.
What Africans in Northern Rhodesia seemed to want was the continuing authority of Britain to safeguard them from domination by the policies of men like Godfrey Huggins, the Southern Rhodesian politician whose name, along with that of Roy Welensky in Northern Rhodesia, was increasingly associated with the demand for the closer association of the three territories. Congress leaders noted however that there was already a serious erosion of 'protection' of Africans especially in respect of 'land rights' and that it was evident that 'the Protectorate Government has relinquished its power and authority and its goodwill towards Africans because of the increasing political importance and participation of European elected members in the Government'. The same Congress memorandum noted that Africans were denied the franchise on the grounds that they must first surrender their status as 'British Protected Persons' and incur the expense of applying for naturalisation as British subjects.17

The idea of 'protection' subsumed the reality of 'treaties' and 'treaty obligations', and so it is important to note references by African leaders to such contractual relations. A confidential statement by Congress in 1948, signed by Robinson Nabulyato, recorded that in response to the suggestion of Sir

Stewart Gore-Browne, the specially nominated Member of Legislative Council for African Interests, that Africans should seek a 'treaty' from Britain as a safeguard against European domination, Congress was 'not prepared to do so...as most Treaties have proved to be "mere scraps of paper"'. Nonetheless, the Congress declared that 'Northern Rhodesia...is ruled on the basis of trusteeship, i.e....until the wards of Trusteeship are matured to be able to rule themselves'.

Earlier in the same year, the Federation of Northern Rhodesia African Societies had suggested that 'the misleading name' Northern Rhodesia Protectorate should be changed to 'Queen Victoria Protectorate'.

Immediately after the Federation of African Societies had constituted itself the Northern Rhodesia African Congress, the Secretary, in a letter written to the Secretary for Native Affairs, made this significant statement: 'As the policy of the Colonial Office Rule is to educate and civilize Africans and then let them rule themselves, it is earnestly hoped that this sacred promise will be fulfilled...As no English blood was shed by Africans when the English first entered in Northern Rhodesia, it is hoped that the Colonial Office will, as before, protect the interests of Northern Rhodesian Africans from the oppression of European

settlers', since 'African chiefs asked for and were graciously granted British Protection by Her Most Gracious Majesty the late Queen Victoria'.

In September, 1951, as the threat of an imposed Federation was increasing rapidly, Harry Nkumbula, soon after his election as President of the Congress, signed a memorandum for presentation to the Colonial Secretary which repeated the view that there had been treaties which 'were made in the clearest understanding that the relations between the British Government and the (indigenous) Africans is one of a proctor (sic) and protected. The Africans sought British Protection at the time when various European powers scrambled (sic) for Africa for economic and political reasons. The African chiefs could have sought protection from the Portuguese or the Germans or the Belgians but because they had a certain amount of trust and confidence in the British Government, they decided on British Protection. This trust and confidence of the Africans in the British Government have remained unshaken until the intentions of the officials who produced the Closer Association Report were made known'.

Here was a rosy memory of five decades of benevolent tutelage.

20. Ibid: Congress memorandum to SNA, 15/7/48, signed by George Kaluwa. Second underlinings are mine.

Seven years later, when Nkumbula was addressing the All Africa Peoples' Conference in Accra, he spoke of 'treaties' which had 'merely stated that H.M.G. had an obligation to train and prepare Africans of the Protectorate for self-government and independence'.

This statement seemed to contradict the claim made in 1955 in A.N.C.'s Official Gazette that no chiefs, other than Lewanika of the Lozi, 'signed any treaties of protection'.

The birth of ZANC - the Zambia African National Congress - in October 1958 was regarded by the territorial Government as a dangerous threat to peace by a group of radical extremists who had been chafing under Nkumbula's leadership. In less than five months ZANC was banned and its leaders restricted to remote corners of the land. It is thus interesting to note the reiteration by its leader, Kenneth Kaunda, of the idea of benevolent protection as the basis of British rule from the outset. In a memorandum drafted for, but not submitted to, 'the Commission of Inquiry into the Circumstances which gave rise to the making of the Safeguard of Elections and Public Safety Regulations, 1959', Kaunda included these words: 'Northern Rhodesia is a Protectorate whose status was reached through treaties freely entered into between our forebears and representatives of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain'. Such treaties, he added, 'could not rightly

22. ANC: Nkumbula's speech at the All Africa Peoples' Conference, 8/12/58.
be broken by either side with impunity'. Thus the notion of a contractual relationship and of 'protection' to which Mulford, as we saw above, referred, died hard.

One more example of this appeal by Africans to early treaty relationships was the 'written evidence' submitted to the Monckton Commission in 1960 by the Chishinga Native Authority in the Kawambwa District. They cited treaties 'made between Chiefs and Her Majesty Queen Victoria, long since 1890, namely that they were to stay under Her Protection during which period the British Government would educate them in every walk of life until they were capable to manage their own affairs'. They had 'since lived under the pledges of these treaties', they said.

There again there was the assumption that the whole pattern of British relations with the territory had been shaped by binding treaty obligations, now under threat from 'white supremacists' from south of the great river. And this was reiterated in many statements, from which we have cited but a few, despite the expressed suspicion that the treaties were of dubious intent, to say the least, as was revealed in the report

24. RH:103/2: Undated 'Sworn Memorandum by K.D. Kaunda prepared for submission to the 'Ridley Commission', established to inquire into the situation that had led to the banning of ZANC. Underlining is mine.

of the meeting in London in January 1953 between Chief Mpezeni III of Ngoni, Harry Nkumbula and a lawyer called Bryden. It remains a mystery why, only three months after that London meeting, Nkumbula was one of the five signatories of a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations which said, inter alia, 'We declare that our lands and people were entrusted by agreement with our forebears to the Protection of Her Majesty's Government. Among the signatories included in the attached copy of a petition to Her Majesty...are direct descendants and...legal successors of these chiefs who were the original signatories of these treaties whereby our territories were entrusted to Her Majesty's Government...(Copies of some of these treaties are attached hereto).'

An interesting and important study requires to be undertaken to show why and how this assumption of real 'protection' developed, since African contestants in the verbal battles that were to culminate in the granting of independence to Zambia in 1964, made such repeated references to 'protection' as the distinguishing factor in the Northern Rhodesian situation.


'Protection', 'tutelage', 'trusteeship' and the like were major coins in the currency of the African people in their struggle to break away from the Central African Federation and chart their own destiny. The story of that struggle with its dangerous clashes between 'white supremacy', 'paramountcy of native interests', 'partnership', etc., has been told elsewhere. Obviously significant changes had been wrought upon the situation by the aftermaths of the two great European wars, more especially the second (1939-45), and by the increasing influence of liberal and humanitarian forces in Britain and elsewhere. Moreover in the relations of British colonial officers to subject African peoples, there was a marked amelioration in the nineteen-forties.

Our concern here, however, is to re-examine in some detail the motives of the first colonial agents as revealed by their actions and their statements, along with the reactions of the African people to them. Then, noting the shortness of the space of years between the B.S.A. Company's acquisition of the region and Zambia's attainment of independence, we should ask how the processes of radical reversal were influenced by what was still fresh in the memories of men. 'Why', asked a woman missionary in the early nineteen-fifties, with genuine distress, 'do they not respect our flag?' The answer, it is suggested here, lay in the peoples' clear memory of how European rule began and was extended,
and in their great and well-nigh unanimous desire to be free of it.

Because 'protection' has, as we have noted, been a primary premiss of historical writing as well as of mid-century political campaigning, it is considered right to attempt to 'set the record straight' in the interests of greater accuracy and understanding. On the one hand, for instance, the 'Guide to the Public Archives of Zambia' claims that the history of 'the early development of the territory bears out the fact that "most of the region, unlike other parts of Africa, has never been a conquered country"'.28 Meebelo, on the other hand, places a very different emphasis. 'The tidal wave of belligerent nationalism in post-war Northern Rhodesia was the estuary of an ever-flowing river of African political thinking and activity which came running down the years, having as its source the inception of colonial rule'. The evidence we are now offering leads us to support this view and to go on to interpret the motives and methods of that intrusive regime as meriting the definitive description of it as 'conquest' rather than as 'colonialism'.29


(c) Contemporary Comments at the end of our Period.

In our attempt to reassess how the situation really developed after the first B.S.A. Company incursions into the region, we now take our retrospections a quarter of a century back from the time we have just glanced at above, to the years after the end of the First World war, when B.S.A. rule was formally replaced by direct rule from London. From one point of view, Gann's picture of the Company's efforts, during the brief post-war boom, to accelerate white immigration, merits note. The setting aside of about 2,500,000 acres of land for settlement by ex-service-men, free to eligible candidates, even though it partly failed, must be seen, however, from the standpoint of the indigenous communities as well. Similarly, while agreeing that the Chartered Government had perhaps 'proved a flop' in its commercial undertakings and that there were reasons why the B.S.A.C. was ready to cede its administrative authority over the territory, it is most important to note, on the other hand, how the African people were faring in the post-war years. Moreover, as Gann points out, the settlement finally accepted by the Company and the Imperial Government, though bitterly resented by some of the Company's representatives, was in fact 'a brilliant bargain' as far as the Directors were concerned. The B.S.A.

Company was about to begin to reap the fruits of its spurious claims to 'mineral rights' in the area of the Lamba people where the Northern Rhodesian Copper Belt was suddenly to appear. 31

We shall look later at the record of rural dislocation and depopulation in the decades of B.S.A. rule. Now, however, the comments of various missionary bodies in 1922 offer a picture of the post-war situation. In a letter to the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, for example, the London Office of the Universities' Mission to Central Africa stated that it could not but 'regard the position of the natives and the attitude of the Directors of the British South Africa Company with grave anxiety'. It then quoted the comment of the Anglican bishop in the territory, Alston May, that "the enormous powers that the B.S.A. have exercised are in the case of this country based upon the flimsiest foundation...I have always understood that they simply marched through the land and announced that they had taken it over". The Bishop had then added that he was "not saying that this may not have been the right thing to do with a view to driving the slave-traders, and keeping the Germans, out". 32

Though, two years earlier, the Colonial Office had told the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society in London that it had 'always considered that the interests of the natives were never in doubt one way or another', the Northern Rhodesian General Missionary Conference was taking an increasingly serious view of the social, moral and economic consequences of three decades of white rule. This concern found its chief spokesmen in Bishop May and Rev. John Fell of the Methodist Mission, whose statements were 'heartily endorsed' by the Conference. With this support, May called on the Administrator, for instance, to ensure 'fair and adequate representation of native interests at the Privy Council enquiry' which was expected to follow the publication of Lord Buxton's Report on land rights in the territory. The ignoring of 'native interests' was emphasised at the Conference by Frank Melland, himself a Native Commissioner of the B.S.A. Company, when he said: 'In all the East Central African protectorates...I do not know of any law promulgated by us for the natives. All our laws here, for example, are either for the whites, for the relations between white and black, or for the government and

taxation of the black: not one for the blacks themselves'.

The Conference was perturbed by the injustices that had been perpetrated in the apportionment of land. In Fell's words, it had created a situation whereby 'the average white holding will be 4,250 acres each' while 'the unalienated land is 175,840,000 acres which gives about 176 acres per native...The time to safeguard the Native', said Fell, 'is now. Many have been bought off their old lands. Those still living in their old haunts may at any time be dispossessed through alienation'. He then cited Lord Buxton's view based on what was, as we can now know, the untenable notion that 'in Northern Rhodesia there was no conquest', for Buxton had observed that 'a claim might be put forward that the unalienated lands...belong...to neither of them (i.e. the Crown or the Company) but to the natives'. Yet, in North-eastern Rhodesia already, through alienation, '6,495,000 acres or nearly a tenth of the whole were in the hands of 400 whites', namely, the North Charterlands Concession and other alienated settlements. The Conference noted further that 'much

34. Conf.Br.Miss.Socys.1211, papers of 1922 G.M. Conference at Kafue. See also Melland F.H., 'In Witch-bound Africa' (Cass 1923) pp. 106 ff.; and esp. p. 307 for his speech to the G.M. Conference, 1922. Melland was widely regarded as an exceptionally liberal and humanitarian administrator and was co-author, with Rev. T. Cullen Young of the Livingstonia Mission, of 'African Dilemma' (Lutterworth, 1937). The Administrator at that time was Sir Drummond Chaplin.
of the unalienated land is unsuitable for cultivation, other areas are in the tsetse fly belt, and, judging from the history of similar peoples, the population is likely to double itself in the next 25 years'. Moreover, 'we know of no case where a native has purchased land and been granted full title to it in his own right'. Fell concluded that 'a deliberate attempt is being made to impoverish the natives, to make the conditions of their life unbearable and to make even life itself for both man and beast precarious'. The Conference therefore affirmed that the white rulers 'must not make the aborigines into landless serfs. If we can secure to the native...his right to land ownership we shall probably save him from real disaster. If we fail... we betray our trust to the African people who are under our protection'.

The above quotations confirm that, as early as 1922, the assumption of 'protection' as the role of a foreign authority established without conquest, was clearly in the minds of the assembled missionaries not less than of Lord Buxton. Yet it was not only in the specific matter of land apportionment that the Conference gave expression to both a strange contradiction of the

35. Ibid: and note Lord Buxton's 'Second Report of the Committee appointed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to consider certain questions relating to Rhodesia (Cmd.1471: 1921).
principle of tutelage and a disturbing similarity to the pattern of government in Southern Rhodesia. The refusal to allow any effective 'rights' of land ownership to the indigenous peoples was paralleled by, and inextricably related to, the policy and methods of 'native taxation'. This was the subject of a special study by Bishop May, whose protests had been prompted by the Administration's decision in 1919, whereby the tax was doubled 'to be precise, for the 5/- tax was substituted a 10/- poll tax levied on all adult males and on every wife except one of polygamists'. May apparently carried out extensive enquiries and received reports from numerous missionaries before making his speech to the Conference.

The Bishop began with two concessionary comments:
'(a) the hardship of the high tax is felt less in some districts, e.g. those bordering on the Belgian Congo, than in others; (b) the Government must have money to administer the country'. But, he asserted, the sharp increase in taxation 'seriously aggravated a very bad situation'. For, he declared, 'communications received from a number of Missions in North-eastern Rhodesia showed that at any given time a very high percentage of the able-bodied male population (from 50% to 75%) is absent from the villages to work outside the Territory or far away from their homes, in some instances hardly one able-bodied man remaining'. The doubled
tax, which was criticised not only by missionaries but by 'all the District Officials responsible for the collection of the tax, one of whom resigned his position rather than collect it', was bound to accelerate this depopulation. The Conference took note of the grave consequences of this process upon 'the normal life' of the villages, of increased 'immorality' among girls, 'very many separations and divorces' and 'an increased rate of mortality'. Furthermore, 'the old men, women and children can hardly do more than raise enough food for bare existence' and 'any improvements in methods of cultivation is out of the question'. Meanwhile those patently baleful effects of 'the injustice and oppression' of taxing people 'to force them to work... for the commercial benefit of the white man', were accompanied by 'the high cost of calico and other "kaffir truck" at the stores'. As the birthrate fell and family ties were loosened and the care of children devolved 'upon the lone mother or grandmother', 'ces exodes amendent la misère dans le pays', as one French missionary wrote.\(^{36}\)

Individual missionaries can also be quoted as concerned critics of the situation. Referring to a

proposal for a 'mid-Africa Conference', one London Missionary Society agent wrote that 'of all the countries to be invited...we...especially in the North-east are the worst governed and the most poverty stricken...Let us reflect upon the tens of thousands of pounds taken from our local natives in taxation with no adequate return beyond keeping the peace...There is little hope of the B.S.A. Co. doing anything for native education in these parts that they are not compelled or shamed into doing'. This was a comment sadly in line with an entry in the diary of the French White Fathers Mission in the north made over twenty years before, that 'the first objective of the colonisers is to fill their own pockets - as for improving the lot of the indigenes that is the business of poor missionary folk who do not know the value of gold'. In 1922, Bishop Guilleme of the White Fathers commented as follows on the situation of the Ngoni in the Eastern Province: 'The Chief Mpeseni has for his people a so small reserve that obliged to cultivate, since so many years the same land, the soil is so exhausted that the natives are in the impossibility to get sufficient foodstuffs for their actual needs. The natives of the Vulwe valley

37. CCWM: Central African Letters, Box 20, letter of James Ross, Kambole, 16/12/22.
who have been and who will be removed from their land have to go to a hilly and poor country where it will be for them to get sufficient food for the present and impossible in a few years. The consequences of so drastic measure if it were not stop will be in my opinion:

(1) to make the native malcontent.
(2) the natives will be obliged to occupy places full of tsetse fly where cattle cannot live. The result will be that the only wealth of the Ngoni will be lost.
(3) the country will become poor even for the settlers who require labour and produce from the natives'.

The personal observations of an individual administrator reinforce this view with an interesting comparison of missionaries and government agents. 'Mission and Boma', Theodore Williams wrote in 1919, 'get very different aspects of their one and the same raw material', meaning the African population, 'quite apart from the difference of our policies. Theirs is to give and teach; ours is to take and to compel. For there is no denying that in exacting 10/- from every able-bodied man we take more from the country than we put into it. Still the native does not distinguish consciously between our policies yet - all

38. W.F.: Nyasa, 1895-1906 (Diaries), entry for, apparently, 1899; and PRO: CO 417/691, Guilleme to May, 19/1/22.
he knows is that we are all white men, and one lot
seems to be here for no conceivable reason...and the
other lot is here to enjoy the delights of tyranny'.
Williams was saying here what had been asserted in a
letter to the 'Livingstone Mail' a few months previously,
namely that the Chartered Company's 'sole aim is to
exploit the natives and to enlarge the pockets of their
shareholders'.

Meanwhile, the rule of 'the White Bwana' con-
tinued to be exercised by drastic methods. One vet-
erinary officer who sojourned briefly in the territory
in the last years of B.S.A.C. rule, told, for instance,
how as a matter of course, he worked his will upon a
village headman in the Chilanga district. When asked
why he did not obey the officer's orders, the headman
had replied that "They were no good". 'So I showed
him with a sjambok they were really excellent and he
finally agreed with me. From that time, my path was
strewn with roses'. At the same period, an official
reply of the Colonial Office to a question in the House
of Commons on Northern Rhodesia stated that 'native

39. RH:Mss.Afr.s.781: letter of Theordore Williams,
Solwezi, to mother, 16/10/19.
40. 'Livingstone Mail' 11/4/19, letter by 'Freedom
Hoper'.
41. RH:Mss.Afr.s.350 - 'Impressions and Experiences
of Northern Rhodesia', Arthur Wakefield, 4/4/24,
p. 25.
Tax' was expected to yield £90,000 in 1923 but that 'no direct expenditure is incurred by the British South Africa Company upon native education'.

CHAPTER II

THE BERLIN CONFERENCE AND RHODES'S DREAM

(a) Africa in late nineteenth century European politics

'Cold war' is a relatively recent name for an ancient international phenomenon, that state of affairs when nations are in grave tension with one another and manoeuvring, under threat of 'hot war', in the hope of averting open conflict without surrendering their aspirations. The turgid second half of the nineteenth century witnessed a sharpening of the rivalries of certain European nations and, as we can see so clearly in retrospect, adumbrated the devastating conflagrations of the present century. How the European 'cold war' of the latter nineteenth century related to Central Africa has been told by numerous historians. ¹ What concerns us here is to recall why European politicians and their imperial agents behaved as they did in Africa, and how their behaviour impinged upon the 'native peoples' of the territories which they coveted in the region which we are studying.

'My map of Africa lies in Europe', said Count Otto van Bismarck in 1884. 'Here lies Russia, here lies France, and we are in the middle; that is my map of Africa'. For him, what made Africa important was its

role as an arena for the mounting industrial and political rivalries of Europe. The potential riches of the various tracts of the vast central region of the African continent were vital pawns on the tense chessboard of European politics. The century that had begun with the rise and fall of Napoleon Bonaparte and which had brought to birth in its middle decades a jig-saw pattern of new sovereign states, witnessed in its last quarter the dynamic ascendancy of Germany under 'the Iron Chancellor' and the consequent escalation of 'big power' politics closely related to the urgent quest for new sources of raw materials and new markets for the sophisticated wares of the major industrialised nations. Contemporary commentators rightly spoke of 'the scramble' for Africa.

In the mid-twentieth century the birth of new independent nations in Africa was to highlight the complex historical relation between colonial power and missionary enterprise and so bring a sharp critique to bear upon missionary motives. Only sixty years earlier, however, historical understanding of the motives and methods of European 'imperialism' in Africa had been confounded by the synchronisation of the various thrusts into the heart of Africa that is sometimes called 'the scramble' with the impressive series of missionary

incursions that followed the death of David Livingstone. The missionary-explorer's vision of Christianity and 'legitimate commerce' combining to effect a civilising mission in Africa had, as has been widely recognised, the effect of leading many humanitarian people in Britain and other parts of Europe, as well as a number of pioneer missionaries in the region of modern Zambia, to believe that the objective of Cecil Rhodes, on the one hand, and Livingstone's successors on the other, were in harmony.

Contemporary judgment, at the start of our period, was also profoundly affected by the prevalent belief that 'imperialism' was synonymous with the spread of 'civilisation', which in turn could be understood as almost another name for 'Christianity'; the word 'Christendom' signifying, as it were, a secular realisation of the Gospel in the social, economic and political structures of Europe. As Cairns says, 'The unwillingness to attempt a divorce between Christianity and the nineteenth century west partially reflected a belief in the social benefits of Christianity and the thesis that the rewards of prosperity and power flowed from fidelity to the Christian religion...The neat fit between Christianity and the progressive west, in conjunction with the absence of secular progress in non-western countries,...gave the missionary tangible proof of...the social value of Christianity, and made it
difficult and almost contradictory for him to isolate his message from his culture.\textsuperscript{3}

This was the notion that has survived, however distorted, in the repeated claims of the Rhodesian 'rebel leader', Ian Smith, in the period from 1965, to be the champion of Christian civilisation in Africa. His 'unilateral declaration of independence' in November 1965 was, Smith asserted, 'a refusal by Rhodesians to sell their birthright' and a blow struck 'for the preservation of justice, civilisation and Christianity'.\textsuperscript{4}

This merger, in the minds of many, of Christian missions and the expansionist programme of Rhodes's Company which flowered in the doctrine and practice of 'white supremacy', was further epitomised in the title 'Rhodes-Livingstone Institute' for the major social and anthropological research bureau in Central Africa. It is not possible to review the history of Central Africa without taking note of the idea that 'colonialism' was a consequence of missionary enterprise.

The mainspring of the thrust in central Africa, however, was the European 'cold war' situation that was dangerously intensified in consequence of Bismarck's unification of Germany and his resounding defeat of France in 1870. In the years that followed, the major

\textsuperscript{3} Cairns, op.cit., p. 200.

\textsuperscript{4} Extract from broadcast by Ian Smith, Rhodesian 'rebel' Prime Minister, November 11th 1965; and see 'Africa Digest' Vol. XIII, no. 3, p. 51.
European powers were engaged on the greatly increased production of armaments and ships; the Suez Canal, opened in 1869, was giving much easier access to the Indian Ocean and the east coast of Africa; Britain established her first naval base in the eastern Mediterranean on the island of Cyprus; and in 1876 the Belgian King, Leopold II, called an international conference at Brussels to legitimise the birth of the 'International African Association' which in turn enabled him to turn his attention vigorously towards the Congo. By 1885 he was recognised as sovereign of 'l'État Indépendant du Congo' and lost no time in turning it into his 'domaine privé'. A year earlier, Germany had annexed a large tract of south-west Africa and acquired suzerainty over territory in both East and West Africa.

A contemporary chronicler of the 'Partition of Africa' has summarised what happened at this period thus: 'Following the example of Germany, the other great powers of Europe made a rush upon Africa. Inextricable difficulties were sure to arise unless some rules were laid down on which the great game of scramble was to be conducted...curiously enough, the proposal for an International Conference to consider the whole question of the Congo came from Portugal herself. France endorsed the proposal which was cordially taken up by Bismarck...This was in June 1884 and a month later Lord Granville gave in his adhesion on behalf of Great Britain'. This led to the calling of the Berlin West
Africa Conference with the primary purpose of finding a modus vivendi for the relations of the European powers in the exploitation of the Congo Basin. 'It was also agreed to make some arrangements with reference to the Niger, and to fix the conditions under which new annexations would be recognised as valid by other powers'. The participants in the Conference were the governments of Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Britain, Italy, Holland, Persia, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, Norway, Turkey, along with the Presidents of France and the United States and, interestingly enough, the Sultan of Zanzibar.

The title 'West African Conference' reminds us that the original focus, on Portuguese initiative, was on the Congo region stretching eastwards from the Atlantic Ocean and the region north and north-west of it. But the scope of the agreements reached went far further, for 'the General Act of the Conference enacted freedom of trade to all nations within the region watered by the Congo and its affluents, including the coast of the Atlantic from 2°30′N. latitude to 8°S. latitude. The Free Trade Zone was further prolonged on the north to the East Coast at 5°N. latitude and down the coast to the mouth of the Zambezi; up the Zambezi to five miles above the mouth of the Shire and onwards along the water-parting between the Zambezi and the Congo'. Though the Conference provided that 'this eastern extension...was only to be effective if agreed to by the
sovereign states (i.e. European nations) having jurisdiction in the regions included therein', the way was clearly open for thrusts of 'the scramble' to be made throughout a virtually unlimited area of middle Africa. Moreover, as Rotberg says, the Conference, for trading purposes, specifically 'included in the "conventional basin" of the Congo lands lying as far from the mouth of the Congo as southern Somalia and northern Mozambique', thus confirming the vast ambitions and self-confidence of the 'scramblers'.

In reality, this agreement of the nations participating in the Berlin Conference, could not but lead to an acceleration of 'the scramble'. From the European standpoint this formula 'facilitated the peaceful settlement of the subsequent territorial controversies', as claimed by the Cambridge Modern History. For Africa, it meant a new era of powerful exploiting, and the coming of 'the brigands' as Basil Davidson has called the agents of the great Powers, determined to outwit and outpace one another. There was little love lost between them. What they had done was to recognise that the 'rush upon Africa' was of interest to them all and so they had devised, as a means of checking one another's claims, 'the important rule which was to guide

5. Keltie J., 'The Partition of Africa' (Stanford, 1895), pp. 207, 209. Keltie was the Assistant Secretary of the Royal Geographical Society; and Rotberg 'Political History', op.cit., p. 245.
...the great game...Occupation of the Coast of Africa, in order to be valid, must be effective'. Immediately this 'rule' was extended to cover the whole region for which the 'scramblers' were competing. Their occupation and annexation could, however, only be shown to be 'effective' by some documentary 'proof' which rivals should recognise as 'valid'.

Over seventy years later the discovery of a reliable record of how such validity was established so shocked African nationalist leaders in Angola that they told neighbouring nationalist movements of it as proof of how their rights had been denied. According to an English Baptist missionary in Angola, 'The following is the true history of how one treaty was made with a native King. In 1884 a copy of "Le Mouvement Geographique" fell into my hands and in it was a letter that was said to have been sent by Dom Pedro V, King of Congo, to the King of Portugal. In it the former acknowledged the latter as his liege lord and used every expression of fealty, loyalty and submission. I remember that the letter was, at the time, put forward as a proof of the righteousness of the Portuguese claim to the Congo; and it certainly helped them in gaining a part of what is now called Portuguese Congo. Having occasion to

speak with the King about that time, I asked him if he had written the said letter and I gave him a translation of it. The old man was sitting in a high back, embossed, leather chair, and rising from it he said "My brother, the King of Portugal, sent me this chair and I sent a letter thanking him for this gift, and that is the only letter I ever signed my mark to or ordered to be sent". He had signed away his country in saying thank you for a chair. Attached to the letter were the names of the head Portuguese Roman Catholic priest, a Portuguese trader and a French trader as witnesses to the King's mark. Shortly after reading this letter, I met Mr Dumas and told him that I had just seen the said letter. I reminded him of its date and asked, "Why was not I requested to sign this letter, for all the other white men in Sao Salvador signed it, and I was here on that date? Am I not a white man?" Mr Dumas answered, "We did not ask you to witness the King's mark because we felt sure you would not do it until the King thoroughly understood the real purport of the letter". I thanked Mr Dumas for his estimate of my character and gave him my view of the manner in which they had deceived and defrauded the King. The King thought he was saying: Thank you for a few presents sent him by a brother sovereign; but he was signing away his territory to another power...They have every reason to hate white men for robbing them of their country and reducing them to slavery'. The letter, according to Holden Roberto,
leader of the Angola People's Liberation Front, was shown by Portugal to the Berlin Conference in 1885. The contemporary comment of Henry Morton Stanley was that the 'scramble for Africa' reminded him of how his 'black followers used to rush with gleaming knives for slaughtered game'.

We shall be examining later on the matter of 'treaties' of the B.S.A. Company and others in respect of various kingdoms of 'northern Zambezia'. Our concern now is to emphasise that validating documents in support of claims to vast tracts of Africa were of real significance to the 'scrambling' powers in respect of international relations in Europe and that there alone is where their value must be placed. For the African peoples their significance could not be more than that of 'honour among thieves'. Nor can such 'treaties' be regarded as in any way restraining ambitions or humanising the process of annexation. Rather, as we shall see, the collection of such documents was, at least as far as British agents were concerned, prosecuted with unseemly haste and with a specific objective. In the words of Joseph Thomson to a friend, in 1889: 'I'm off to the Zambesi to do for that region what I

accomplished on the Niger - that is, secure it from other people'.

At this point it is desirable to note something of the antecedents of the major protagonists in the British drive north of the Zambezi, remembering that the demarcation of what were to be the separate 'protectorates' of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia does not justify us in ignoring the eastern region in our study. For Sir Henry Hamilton Johnston, appointed Her Majesty's Consul for Mozambique in 1888 and three years later 'Commissioner and Consul-General to the Territories under British influence to the north of the Zambesi'. was concerned with much more than the area of modern Malawi. The handful of determined men who made the annexation of 'northern Zambezia' a reality, despite their personal disputes, shared attitudes which merit our notice before we begin to look at the operation of their plan in detail and from the point of view of their victims.

Cecil John Rhodes must head this list of protagonists. His life and work have been extensively described by a number of biographers and historians, and it is not our task here to review the many facets of his dynamic character. Perhaps, however, Terence Ranger's summary of him is most worthy of quotation:

9. FO 84/2113: FO to Johnston, 14/2/1891.
'Rhodes was above all a great gambler - the sending of the ill-prepared and ill-led Pioneer Column (north from Kimberley) in 1890 was a gamble; the concentration on the push to the sea despite the threat of Ndebele action in the rear was a gamble; so supremely was the Jameson Raid of 1895. And so was Rhodes's failure to build up a Native Department to control and conciliate the African peoples of Rhodesia...an unsuccessful gamble for which the price was paid in 1896', in the great revolts of the Ndebele and Shona. 10

Ranger's allusions are, as we see, to the situation south of the Zambezi, in which, as the British High Commissioner at the Cape, Lord Milner, said: 'The blacks have been scandalously used'. 11 What is significant for us is that 'northern Zambezia' was, at that same time, falling under the power of the same men, fired by the inspiration of Rhodes, a man of fabulous wealth and limitless ambition; that Zambian history at the end of the nineteenth century cannot be understood without taking into account the history of Rhodesia south of the river; and that indeed we misread Zambian history if, as Wills and Gann do, we see the B.S.A. 10

10. Ranger T.O. 'Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 1896-7' (Heinemann, 1967), p. 53; and note important biographies of Rhodes, Williams B., 'Cecil Rhodes' (Constable 1921, revised 1958); Gross F., 'Rhodes of Africa' (Cassell, 1956); Millin S.G., 'Rhodes' (Chatto and Windus, 1952); Michell I. 'Life and Times of Cecil John Rhodes' (Arnold, 1910); etc., etc.

Company's northward thrust as following 'in the missionary's footsteps'. Of course, the missionaries played a part, consciously or unconsciously, in the impact of Europe on Africa. But whether or not they had arrived on the scene, the 'cold war' urges of the 'scramble' and the whetted appetites of Rhodes and his band of bold adventurers would as certainly have thrust across the Zambezi as they were determined to subjugate the lands of the Shona and the Ndebele. Indeed as Keatley says, though with particular reference to the 1890 Pioneers, the whole drive into central Africa began not primarily as 'a venture of Britain as an imperial power but essentially as a private venture undertaken through South African initiative', with Rhodes as 'the instigator and the man who paid the bills'. And here the personal comment of one of his associates, three years before Rhodes's death, adumbrates the unfolding saga of immaturity and impulsiveness that brought so much of Africa under the control of men who were far more gamblers than statesmen. At dinner with Rhodes, Leander Starr Jameson and Willoughby, that friend was 'more struck than ever by their undeviating schoolboyishness, Rhodes...as much as the rest of them, though of course

12. Gann, 'Birth', op.cit., p. 44, and see his Chap. II and III and Wills, op.cit., Chaps IV, V, VI.
13. Keatley, op.cit., p. 27.
he is a schoolboy of genius...they want somebody to... see that they do not get into mischief'.

David Livingstone's travels and his recording of sundry scientific data certainly proved informative to the 'colonisers' but the evidence all points to the conclusion that with or without missionaries on the scene, Rhodes's men would have come to conquer. Moreover the behaviour of Livingstone and indeed of many of his followers was very different from that of Rhodes's agents. He was 'Chilele-pa-Maba', he who would sleep in the marshes, a man who 'learned to forget colour' and to whom 'our race' meant the human race. His bearing among Africans had none of the arrogance and harshness of the tax collectors and labour recruiters who worked the will of the British South Africa Company upon northern Zambezia.

Cecil Rhodes's last speech to shareholders of the Chartered Company, in 1899, contained remarks which, when considered with reference to the bloodshed of the Ndebele and Shona 'rebellions', reveal that he remained an 'adventurer' to the end. In an attack on the 'Little England' policy which he associated with the name of John Morley, a leading English Liberal, he declared

15. 'Chilele-pa-Maba', nickname given to Livingstone in the Luunda language of Zambia's Luapula Province, from testimony of Aaron Mwenya and William Kawandami to Machperson, May 1973; and see Keatley, op. cit., pp. 121 ff.
that Britain 'whatever party may be in power, will insist on the support of Imperial expansion'. The motive of exploitation for profit demanded this, for 'I have said in simple language that the duty of our people is to occupy and administer new territories and to work up their wealth - to work up the raw products by manufacturing them, and then distribute them throughout the world'. And this, to his mind, was essentially the role of Britain. 'I went to Egypt', he said, 'and saw there eight millions of people governed by one man, Lord Cromer. Be it civil administration, be it defence, be it irrigation, be it justice, he has to attend to all and...with all is equally competent. You read your histories of your Ramases, of your Memnon and many others, but forget that there is a simple Englishman there greater than them all'. Moreover, Rhodes saw extra-territorial expansion by Britain as an essential safeguard against internal revolution. 'To save the 40 million inhabitants of the United Kingdom from a bloody civil war, we colonial statesmen must acquire new lands to settle surplus population, to provide new markets...The Empire...is a bread and butter game'.

The resolutions of the Berlin Conference inevitably applied a straightjacket to the ambitions of men like Rhodes. The record of his life reveals his impatience with the British Government's insistence on the niceties of international relations and its consequent persistent dampening of imperialist ardour, which can be traced directly to the concordat at Berlin. When the conquest of Central Africa was already well advanced, the chagrin of Rhodes's successors was typified by the words of Lewis Michell: 'National gratitude to a Chartered Company that does empire work is not only non-existent but, in lieu of it, there seems to exist bitter hostility'.

It would be more accurate, however, to endorse the assessment by Crowe of the significance of the Conference as having been exaggerated; 'for when the regulations are studied it can be seen that they all failed...Free trade was to be established...Actually highly monopolistic systems of trade were set up...The centre of Africa was to be internationalised. It became Belgian. Lofty ideals and philanthropic intentions were loudly enunciated...Only the vaguest resolutions were passed concerning the internal slave trade...; whilst the basin of the Congo...became, as everyone

17. PLG-BSA 3/171, L. Michell to P.L. Gell ref. the BSAC's 'concessions' from Lewanika, 16/8/07.
knows, the scene of some of the worst brutalities of colonial history'. Moreover, there was a stipulation 'that the Conventional Basin of the Congo, a huge area which, besides the Congo Free State, comprised parts of French Equatorial Africa, of German Cameroons, of Portuguese Angola, of the future British colony of Rhodesia, of Italian Somaliland and of territories of the Sultan of Zanzibar...should be neutralised in time of war', but this was completely forgotten when the great conflagration of 1914 began.

Among the ostensibly humanitarian provisions of the Conference was Article 6 of the General Act which bound all signatories 'to watch over the preservation of the native tribes and to care for the improvement of their moral and material well-being, and to help in suppressing slavery and especially the Slave Trade'. In addition, after pledging to 'protect and favour all religions without distinction of creed or nation', the Powers undertook the positive promotion of the work of all agencies 'which aim at instructing the natives and bringing home to them the blessings of civilisation'. Therefore 'missionaries, scientists and explorers, with their followers, property and collections, shall likewise be the objects of especial protection'.

Yet even the leader of the British team at the Conference gave expression right away to his awareness that the Powers were likely to be blamed: 'Whilst the interests of commerce have been carefully studied, those of the natives have not received sufficient consideration, and...the welfare of the blacks may have been subordinated to the commercial wants of the Whites'. Malet was therefore at pains to stress that a great boon would be conferred upon the continent's indigenous peoples in so far as 'the slave-gang is doomed'.

The real significance of the Conference for our study seems then to lie in two main consequences; firstly, the virtual carte-blanc...
mutual recognition of a 'right' to 'protect' expansionist interests may indeed be seen as offering the primary meaning of the word 'protection', as well as setting the stage for a round of tense rivalries over regions coveted by more than one Power.

The second consequence of the Conference upon imperialist action north of the Zambezi, as elsewhere, was to make it necessary for the men in the field to provide their headquarters, as a matter of urgency, with documents for transmission to the British Government to legitimise their claims in the eyes of the rival Powers. It is most important to realise that this was why 'treaties' were made and that there is every reason to believe that, without the 'cold war' in Europe and the stipulations of the Berlin Conference, no 'treaties' would have been either sought or cited.

Moreover, it seems reasonable to believe that the vagueness of phraseology, for which Britain in particular had striven at the Conference, was reflected in the case of this particular matter of documentation. The Act itself could scarcely have been less demanding, as is shown in its Article 34, to wit: that 'any Power which henceforth takes possession of a tract of land on the coasts of the African continent outside of its present possessions, or which, being hitherto without such possessions, shall acquire them, as well as the Power which assumes a protectorate there, shall accompany
the respective act with a notification thereof, addressed to the other Signatory Powers...to enable them, if need be, to make good any claims of their own'.

Notification, however, in practice required some supporting documentation. It could not be enough to say simply: 'We have taken control of territory X'. The urgency of staking rival claims, which may have developed faster even than the various signatories anticipated, meant that some form of documentary attestation of such claims had to be devised. The anxiety of the Powers in this respect is illustrated by Lord Salisbury's assertion, a few months before the 'treaty-making' expeditions of Harry Johnston, Joseph Thomson and Alfred Sharpe, that German aspirations for territory 'between Lat. 1°S. and 11°S.' must be resisted on the ground that 'the country was already occupied by Englishmen'. For, said Salisbury, 'there were English Missions and stations of the African Lakes Company upon Lake Nyassa and Lake Tanganyika and along the Stevenson Road...and the rights acquired by these settlements could not be justly set aside by a far vaguer claim'. Indeed Alfred Sharpe proclaimed a British Protectorate over Northern Zambezia in May 1890 before most of the treaties had been concluded. Paper treaties were therefore

22. Ibid: Article 34. The underlinings are mine.
23. BM-SP: 1890, LI, C.6043, June 1890.
a device to avoid open confrontation between the verbal
claims of rival Powers.

As we shall see, Sir Harry Johnston stated that, in scrutinising 'treaties' and 'concessions' submitted by British agents in northern Zambezia, his endorsement was given on condition that 'the said claims' would conform with the provisions of the General Act of the Berlin Conference in respect of 'the conventional free trade area' in which the territories concerned lay and of the import and manufacture of arms and ammunition. But such 'limitations', as Johnston called them, were to mean little in a situation distinguished by aggressive monopolistic enterprise and by the repeated use of military methods of establishing control. Indeed Johnston, in referring explicitly to 'these exclusive claims acquired by the British South Africa Company in Central Africa', expressed the view that the Berlin regulations regarding free trade would not apply 'since none of the independent African chiefs who have bestowed these special privileges on the B.S.A.C. in return for considerable payments were signatories of the General Act of the Berlin Conference, so they can be held in no way bound by it'.

25. MSA: Report to NR Governor, July 1932 by Mr Justice Maugham (Colonial No. 73) of North Charterland Concession Inquiry, Appendix, Item 10, despatch by Sir H.H. Johnston on B.S.A. Co. claims (undated but around 1891). Underlinings are mine.
In this and other ways, as we shall see, the verbiage of the Berlin Conference was set at naught as the rush upon Africa accelerated. But since it was for their mutual satisfaction that the Powers devised the formula of 'treaties' and 'concessions' we ought now to examine the documents whereby Johnston and the B.S.A. Company claimed to have secured their suzerainty.

(b) The British South Africa Company takes the field

Like Harry Johnston, Frederick Lugard was one of Britain's most widely travelled agents of imperial expansion in Africa. In his long life, he was closely associated with military action on the continent over a period of thirty years and saw service in East, West and Central Africa. In 1893, at the age of thirty-five, he addressed the Royal Geographical Society in London on 'Treaty-making in Africa'. The validation of 'treaties' in respect of Central Africa was still fresh in the minds of those concerned, and indeed the Geographical Society had recently learned from Joseph Thomson himself of his journey to Lake Bangweolo and the Unexplored Region of British Central Africa'. Lugard's remarks thus merit extensive quotation, especially in view of what we shall be reviewing of the methods of annexation adopted in Northern Zambezia.

After making reference to the African formula of 'blood-brotherhood' as 'the most solemn and binding of contracts', he made this statement: 'Since there are different methods of treaty-making - I have known a valuable possession purchased by the present of an old pair of boots - I am anxious to explain to geographers the proper procedure followed by responsible and duly-accredited diplomats in that Continent'. He then set out the steps that should be followed, and the reasons for them. 'To a savage, the most precious things in this world or the next are his spear and his arms of war: more precious than his own skin...His oath is sworn on these, the gods of his existence. I fancy the inference is that if he turns traitor his own arms shall turn against him. Then my pet rifle is held aloft over my head' - a significant symbol when we recall David Livingstone's comment about the terror caused by guns in Africa - 'and my interpreter stands forward and repeats my pledge. That I will be a friend to these people; that my men shall not molest them; that if crops are stolen or wrong done I will make good; that if enemies attack him near my camp I will help him; that he shall look on the British Company as "his big brother" whom he has to obey but who have not come to eat up his land or oust him from his place...Then he produces his primest sheep or goat or ox...Then I put down on paper what was the pith of the contract between us: that is a treaty as I consider it...The treaties
thus made by the representative of a company acting under Royal Charter are submitted at once for approval to Her Majesty's Government through the Foreign Office. It is obvious that it is only by an abuse of language that such action can be described as filibustering. 27

Thus was the British public told of the methods of imperialism in Africa. It is therefore no less important for us to note what was being done in Southern Rhodesia at the time of the northern thrusts. In 1888, just after the Colonial Office had affirmed its rejection of 'the proposal to take a Chief living north of the Zambesi under protection...for obvious reasons', 28 the 'Cape Times' made a notable comment on the 'concession' acquired by Charles Rudd on behalf of Cecil Rhodes from King Lobengula of the Ndebele.

'Mr Rudd and his friends do not desire to hurry the pace. A rush of mines would simply alarm a chief who has too reasonable cause for suspecting the white man and fearing him even when he brings gifts...Colonisation by freebooting is what the natives dread. Nor would the dread be lessened were they only aware of the persistency with which that sort of colonisation is advocated in the chief city of South Africa and in a quarter where the influence is acknowledged of the controller of the Colonial Government'. 29 We have here,

27. Ibid: Vol. I no. 1, Lugard, pp. 53-54.
29. 'Cape Times', 24/11/88. Underlinings are mine.
along with a tentative humanitarian hope, the twin facts of the tremendous urge to surge forward for the exploitation of Africa's wealth and the benevolent support for it of the Imperial Government; factors which were to shape events in the subsequent decades as the surge went north across the Zambezi.

The 'Cape Argus', recognising that Rhodes's Concession was 'an event in South African history the full magnitude of which it is difficult to realise at first hearing', hoped that the B.S.A. Company's approach to the exploitation of 'mining resources developed by the peaceable process of electing a white committee rather than by measures of rapine and musket', - as for instance in Swaziland - would mean respect for Lobengula's authority 'so as not to lead to the demoralisation of the native races'. The 'Argus' dreamed of 'mining development in Matabeleland' as being 'as it were, the King's own business'.

Only four months later, the missionary who had acted as interpreter at the signing of the Rudd Concession, was reporting a bitter reaction among the Ndebele against what they had discovered to be the real provisions of the Concession, during which he was given his 'full share of abuse for hiding, so it was said, from

30. 'Cape Argus', 24/11/88. Underlinings are mine.
the Chief the meaning of the agreement'. The Company had offered £100 per month, a thousand Martini rifles and a hundred thousand rounds of ammunition in return for 'the complete and exclusive charge over the metals and minerals situated and contained' in his kingdom 'with full power to do all things they may deem necessary to win and procure the same and to hold, collect and enjoy the profits and revenues, if any, derivable from the said metals and minerals'. But Lobengula was deeply offended and protested, in a letter to Queen Victoria, that when he had 'demanded a copy of the document', he discovered that he 'had signed away the mineral rights of my whole Kingdom to Rudd'. He and his indunas therefore repudiated the Concession in its entirety. Cecil Rhodes at once defended the integrity of his agents, Rudd and Maquire, and, a month later, the Colonial Office told the B.S.A. Company that the Queen would soon be asked to grant the Royal Charter which Rhodes urgently wanted. The British Government, though it knew that Lobengula was charging Rhodes's men with perfidy, virtually ignored the King's protest choosing instead to move quickly to bring the B.S.A. Company to birth.

32. Ibid: no. 358, text of Rudd Concession, 1888. Underlining is mine.
34. Ibid: Rhodes to CO 21/6/89.
35. Ibid: CO to 'Exploring Company' (Later B.S.A.C.), 10/7/89.
Within a few months, as Robinson, Gallagher and Denny have said, the Foreign Secretary 'was doing all he could by diplomacy to satisfy Rhodes's insistent claims in northern Zambezia'. For 'his wealth, his charter, his premiership (of the Cape) enabled Rhodes to exhort, cajole and brow-beat Salisbury'. The protagonists of expansion and conquest were delighted. Harry Johnston, who was not disposed to like Rhodes, recalled in a personal letter to him three years later, how Rhodes's wealth had tipped the scales of history in British Central Africa. 'When the Government, though wishing to save this country from the Portuguese, yet had not a penny to spend on it, you stepped forward and said, "Make the extension of British supremacy and I will find the money"; and within a week...new instructions were drawn up for me at the Foreign Office'.

Five years had now passed since the international Conference at Berlin. The progress of imperialist development in Central Africa was accelerating; and Rhodes's plans for crossing the Zambezi were shaping simultaneously with the tightening of his hold to the south of the river. The thorny issues of defining boundaries between the territories acquired by the contending Powers had still to be faced but those five years had further enhanced the prestige and 'legitimacy' of British colonial expansion. It was therefore significant that the Africa Order in Council of 1889 should

37. PRO-FO 2/55, Johnston to Rhodes, 8/10/93.
have enunciated both the scope of British designs in Africa and the policy whereby 'British subjects' were to be treated differently from 'natives' and 'foreigners' in the territories under British 'jurisdiction'. 'The limits of this Order shall be the continent of Africa', the preamble to the Order-in-Council declared. But while the word 'native' was to connote 'a native or subject of any country within the limits of this Order, not being a British subject nor the subject of any non-African power', the status of 'British subject' was extended to persons 'enjoying Her Majesty's protection and includes, by virtue of 39 and 40 Victoria, c 46, subjects of the several Princes and States in India in alliance with Her Majesty, residing and being in the parts of Africa mentioned in this Order'.

As the Central African situation unfolded, these formulae were to be of grave import in the matter of, for instance, the granting of franchise and of the authenticity of reputedly contractual relations between the Crown and various African states as, specifically, in the dealings of the B.S.A. Company with the Lozi Kingdom of Lewanika and with the kings from whom 'concessions' were allegedly acquired in the north-eastern districts of Zambia. For, as we shall see, the word 'alliance' was to be used on various occasions in reference to such 'treaties and 'concessions'.

38. BM-SP: 32/3, extract from 'London Gazette', 22/10/89, 'Africa Order in Council'. Underlining is mine.
The most striking feature of this Order-in-Council is that, on a strictly unilateral basis, it proclaimed the 'legality' of British jurisdiction, 'in so far as by treaty, grant, usage, sufferance or other lawful means, Her Majesty has power or authority in relation to such persons and matters, that is to say,

1. British subjects as herein defined;
2. The property and personal proprietary rights and obligations of British subjects within the local jurisdiction;
3. Foreigners as herein defined who submit themselves to a Court in accordance with the provisions of this Order;
4. Foreigners, as herein defined, with respect to whom any State, King, Chief or Government, whose subjects, or under whose protection, they are, has by any treaty as herein defined, or otherwise, agreed with Her Majesty for, or consented to, the exercise of power or authority by Her Majesty'.

The flexibility of interpretation allowed under such a clause is further illustrated by the definition of a 'foreigner' as 'a person, whether a native or subject of Africa or not, who is not a British subject as herein defined', while 'treaty' was understood to 'include any convention, agreement or arrangement made by or on behalf of Her Majesty with any State, or
Government, King, Chief, people or tribe, and any regulation applied thereto.\textsuperscript{39}

When, over sixty years later, the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress made an attempt to obtain legal clarification of the 'treaties' and 'concessions' which were cited as the bases of the B.S.A. Company's right to rule and to own the country's mineral resources, it was advised that, under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1894, the jurisdiction of the British Government was final whether established 'by treaty, capitulation, grant, usage, sufferance or any other lawful means' and that therefore: 'It matters not how the acquisition has been brought about. It may be by conquest, it may be by concession following a treaty... In all cases the result is the same', namely that, as regards any native inhabitant of such territories,'Such rights as he had under the rule of predecessors avail him nothing', and 'even if in a Treaty of Cession it is stipulated that certain inhabitants should enjoy certain rights, that does not give a title to these inhabitants to enforce these stipulations'. The A.N.C.'s legal adviser feared therefore that no case could be made for the exclusion of Northern Rhodesia

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid: p. 3, para. 10, and p.2 (definitions). Underlining is mine.
from the provisions of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act. In this way the carte-blanche given by the Berlin Conference had been appropriated by Britain and extended ad lib.

The nations that 'scrambled' for Africa thus safeguarded themselves - for Britain was not acting less morally than her rivals - from any 'legal' responsibility to allow their interests at any time to be subordinated to those of the indigenous peoples concerned. The Zulu rising of 1888 and the subsequent banishment of Dinizulu to imprisonment on St. Helena had followed 'the alienation from Zululand in 1886 of nearly half the country...forcibly effected by Sir Arthur Havelock'. In the strength of such 'legal' powers as she was appropriating to herself, Britain refused to allow an inquiry into the causes of the rising. But it was still necessary to gather in as fast as possible documentary evidence to support British claims upon Central Africa against the ambitions of her European rivals.

40. ANC: Notes of Conference with Paramount Chief Mpezeni III of Ngoni on behalf of the NR African Congress on Tuesday, 13th January, 1953 (with Mr A.L. Bryden of Messrs. A.L. Bryden and Williams, Solicitors, 53 Victoria Street, LONDON, S.W.1). The lawyer cited inter alia the case of Chief Sekgoma of the Bechuanaland Protectorate in 1910 and of Sobhuzu II of Swaziland, 1926.

On 29th October 1889 the Great Seal of the United Kingdom was affixed to the Charter of the British South Africa Company and the deed hailed in London as 'an outward and visible sign of the colonizing genius of the Anglo-Saxon race'. At the same time, the role of missionaries, and especially of the Scottish missionaries in the Shire Highlands, was seen as auguring happy cooperation in the two-pronged advance of 'civilisation' and Christianity into middle Africa. 'The missionaries...are politically powerful because they have behind them the whole religious world besides the nearly unbroken Scotch vote', said the 'Economist'. 'They ask for protection for themselves and their dependents...the missionaries approve, for the modern companies, unlike the old ones, make friends with the teachers of religion; the merchants are delighted..., and the adventurers precipitate themselves upon the new lands with an avidity of which the world sees daily evidence in the proceedings of the Stock Exchange'.

The 'Spectator', however, sought to temper the euphoria with realism. 'The fairest portions' of the territory that the B.S.A. Company was acquiring were 'possessed by a powerful and warlike tribe...whose fighting force is well organised on the Zulu model and

42. 'Pall Mall Gazette', 1/11/89.
43. 'Economist', 26/10/89.
consists of 15,000 soldiers'. However careful and kind the Company's agents might be, 'that cannot prevent the struggle which must always take place before a fighting race is finally compelled to adapt itself to the benevolent despotism of the white man...The Company will win in the end', but this might well involve assistance from London or the Cape and could lead 'the taxpayer' to abandon the Company system of increasing the Empire. What would follow would be, however, not a change of heart but the quest for 'some equally thin disguise for rapidly and lightheartedly annexing the unappropriated portions of the globe'.

Count Otto van Bismarck might like to declare himself a "no colonies" man. But, said the 'Liverpool Courier', 'Whether this be a genuine feeling or a little pleasant pretence...British ministers have no option but to assist in facilitating, protecting and directing the enterprises of the Queen's subjects in foreign parts'. The subsequent decades were to unfold a strange tale of ambivalence and vacillation on the part of the Foreign and Colonial Secretaries. But the men who moved, armed, into northern Zambezia had reason for confidence that Her Majesty's Government was fundamentally behind them.

44. 'Spectator', 10/10/89, comment entitled 'British Zambesiland'. Underlinings are mine.
45. 'Liverpool Courier', 16/10/89. Underlining is mine.
Yet there had been no lack of adverse comment when the Charter was debated in the House of Commons. 'Are we to believe', asked one M.P., 'that...it is in the power of the Crown as a matter of personal prerogative to give away great continents?' The clause stipulating that the Charter was to be recognised 'by the Government and by all British naval and military officers and Consuls' meant that, with 'control, only stopping short of actual sovereignty, over a territory now declared partly under British protection and partly under British influence...(and) a monopoly of all the minerals', the new Company would have authority 'to declare war on native tribes and to call in to their aid any of Her Majesty's forces...The Charter is to be most favourably construed to the best advantage...not of the native tribes but of the Company...Why did they (H.M.G.) want to grant this Charter at a time when nobody is in London and when Parliament is not sitting? ...This is one of the grossest jokes that ever came before the House'.

(a) Treaty-making starts with 'Mandala' and Johnston

The Royal Charter granted to Rhodes and his 'Exploring Company' was of mutual benefit to grantor and grantee. A major thrust in Central Africa was going to be undertaken, in actuality on behalf of the British Government, to forestall Portuguese, German and Belgian colonial aspirations, and the British tax-payer was not to bear the cost of it. The Company, on its part, was given a free hand to operate a virtually monopolistic commercial programme and to ensure that the territories to be exploited were brought effectively under its own direct control.

But the 'Company system' entailed the quest for shareholders and the need to give them a rosy vision of compounding dividends. The goodwill of major bodies of public opinion was highly desirable, and this is well-illustrated by the statement to its shareholders made by the Company in its first report, for the years 1889-1892. 'At the time the founders of the British South Africa Company had under their consideration the steps to be taken for obtaining the Royal Charter', said the Directors, 'the country north of the Zambesi and the work of civilisation which was being carried on there by the Scotch missions and the African Lakes
Company were brought to their notice, with a view to seeing what steps could be taken to prevent this important "Key of Africa" from falling into the hands of a foreign power'. The shareholders then learned of the exploits of Captain Maguire against the slave-traders and of the 'treaty-making' journeys of Joseph Thomson and Alfred Sharpe.\(^1\) Clearly the acquisition of the territories north of the Zambezi was far from being an afterthought or a reluctant addendum to the operations to the south. The area of modern Zambia was rather seen as a key to the expansion and consolidation of British power, an area in which the strategy of swift advance, the out-witting of rivals and the effective 'policing' of captured kingdoms would operate as in the land of the Ndebele and the Shona. The architect of the whole unitary plan dreamed of linking the Cape not just to Leopold's Congo but to Cairo and the Mediterranean, and indeed it is worth remarking that the development of the northward thrust might have been even more determined if Cecil Rhodes had not died prematurely in 1902.

At the time of the first exercise in 'treaty-making' the disposition of states in northern Zambezia

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1. BSAC Report, 1889-92, p. 32; and note RH:MSS.Afr. s.74, BSA Misc. Papers, Cawston to Rhodes, 6/2/90: 'It is essential for us to be active in all matters relating to the slavery, drink and arms questions. There is a large section of the public at home who look at these matters'.

was roughly thus: in the south-west the Lozi Kingdom, reorganised and extended after the rout, by Lozi leaders and their allies, of their Kololo conquerors in 1864; with, north of that Kingdom, the Luvale, Lunda and Kaonde states, and in the west central region the Ila or Shukulumbwe chiefdoms. The Zambezi valley eastwards from Livingstone and the Plateau above it were the lands of the Tonga, Toka, Leya and related loosely organised groups. The Lenje occupied the region around modern Lusaka and Kabwe while the land of the Lamba was where the Copperbelt was to appear in the 1920s. The largest state in the Luapula area was the Luunda Kingdom of Kazembe, with smaller states and chiefdoms such as the Aushi, Unga and others to the south and east of it; while the Tabwa, Lungu and Mambwe fringed the southern reaches of Lake Tanganyika. The extensive Bemba Kingdom occupied the largest part of what is Zambia's northern province, flanked to the north-east and south-east by Mwanga, Iwa, Senga, Bisa and numerous small groupings who inhabited the region between Isoka and the Ngonde and Tumbuka kingdoms of modern Malawi. In the east of the territory, around the lower escarpment area of the Luangwa river, the Ngoni kingdom of Mpezeni was outstandingly the most powerful and was surrounded by such peoples as the southern Tumbuka, the Chewa, Ambo, Kunda, Nsenga, Lala and Soli, with the warrior Chikunda people occupying
the banks of the Zambezi between Tongaland and the confluence of the Zambezi and the Luangwa rivers.  

Early in 1890 Rhodes and his Board were urging that 'Consul Johnston's concessions should be included in the British sphere of influence' along with the Lozi Kingdom of Lewanika so that 'continuous connections to Nyassa and Tanganyika be secured'. The Colonial Office endorsed this plea on the ground that Portugal might well press her claim to the territory 'between the Lower Zambesi and Lake Nyassa'; while the High Commissioner in Cape Town, Sir Henry Loch, stressed the need to maintain a line of communication with the East Africa Company.  

Meanwhile, to give reality to his plans, Rhodes acquired, by deed of cession dated 23rd December 1889, but without the knowledge or approval of King Lewanika, the whole of what was called the 'Ware Concession', from Harry Ware, an experienced explorer and prospector. As in the case of Lobengula, the B.S.A. Company had to overcome rivals in order to secure this gain. Moreover the move into 'Barotseland', like the incursions into the Kingdoms of Lobengula and Mpezeni, involved buying 'concessions' from previous claimants which in themselves were suspect. The French missionary at Lewanika's court, Francois Coillard,  

2. See Map, Appendix A.  
always ready to think the best of white men in Africa, admitted that the Lozi had 'feared a trap' when Harry Ware came to buy the 'right' to dig for gold, though they were 'fascinated by the considerable presents of Martini-Henry rifles, of ammunition, blankets and garments' which Ware had brought.4

This acquisition of the Ware Concession constituted the B.S.A. Company's first actual holding of 'title' north of the Zambezi. Ware claimed to have won from Lewanika in June, 1889, 'the sole and absolute right to dig, mine and quarry for precious stones, gold, silver and all other minerals and metals whatever', plus rights to wood, water, building land, grazing areas, railways and free access throughout Lozi territory, for a period of twenty years. The purchase by Rhodes was very expensive but, as he told the Duke of Abercorn, a director of his Company, 'as the Concession gave the whole of the minerals of the Kingdom, I did not consider it excessive' as 'it would have interfered with the sphere and scope of our Charter'. The purchase also 'broke the Portuguese plan of extending from East to West Coast. If you will look at the map', Rhodes added, 'you will see that Barutse (sic) extends as far

5. MSA: Report Vol. II, Text of Ware Concession, 27/6/89, pp. 3-4; and Rhodes to Abercorn, 31/3/90, p. 7.

6. See Oliver R., 'Sir Harry Johnston and the Scramble for Africa' (Chatto and Windus, 1957); Hanna, op.cit.; and relevant sections of Rotberg's 'Political History of Tropical Africa' op.cit.; also Sir H.H. Johnston's own 'British Central Africa', (Methuen, 1898).

7. Oliver, op.cit., p. 118, quoting Salisbury on Johnston's despatch re deportation of Ja Ja to West Indies.


as the Congo State'.

While Rhodes was establishing his foothold north of the river, a swift journey towards the Nyasa-Tanganyika plateau region was being made by Harry Johnston who had assumed his post as Her Majesty's Consul for Mozambique in November 1888. The African exploits of Johnston have received scholarly attention elsewhere. Here it is enough to remember that, in his previous assignment in the Niger delta, he had received a ruling from the Foreign Office that 'when a merchant differs from a native chief as to their respective rights, the native chief is to be deported'. He thus came to Central Africa already instructed in the means whereby 'protection' was to be guaranteed to British activities in Africa by adequate measures to effect the conquest and coercion of her princes and peoples. However 'tired' Rhodes might feel 'of this mapping out of Africa at Berlin', neither he nor Johnston could have had any doubts of Lord Salisbury's sympathy with the view expressed by Rhodes: 'Private enterprise has given us India. Why should it not give us South and Central Africa?'
1889 was a year of feverish activity on the part of the agents of the rival imperialist Powers. Henry Morton Stanley, for instance, met a number of chiefs and rulers as he moved eastwards after the 'relief' of Emin Pasha, and thereafter 'unashamedly inflated these visits into treaty-making ceremonies writing down his version of what had been agreed' so that Britain used them in negotiations with Germany about the final carving up of East Africa. What was now happening in northern Zambezia must be understood in this context. As he moved into northern Zambezia as successor to the exhausted Consul O'Neill, Johnston saw his terms of reference in retrospect, thus: 'that in those districts admittedly beyond Portuguese jurisdiction I should take measures to secure the country from abrupt seizure by other European powers by concluding treaties of friendship with the native chiefs in which they bound themselves not to transfer their governing rights to any European Power without the consent of Her Majesty's Government'. His fortuitous meeting with Rhodes earlier in the year and the transmission to London of the news of Rhodes's offer to underwrite the development of administration in the area by a grant of £10,000 per year, led the British Government to assent readily to an attempt to secure for her 'a reasonable amount of political influence over those countries of Central Africa not claimed by Germany, Portugal or the Congo Free State'. The overt pressure of Rhodes to forestall
Portuguese, German or Belgian incursions into northern Zambezia was thus rendered, in Johnston's mild language, as a plan to undertake the filling-in of blank spaces on the map! Moreover, 'The form of Treaty...was not altered, as it was not intended to proclaim any Protectorate if more indirect means of political supremacy could be attained'.

The presence of already well-established white missionary settlements in the area of modern Malawi affected both Johnston's mode of operation in the beginning and the development of his administration in the territory. We shall see further on how he and his officers were to encounter sharp missionary criticism. At the outset, however, he was certainly regarded as an instrument in the surgical healing of Africa's 'open sore', as David Livingstone had called the slave trade. Details were now being constantly supplied by missionaries of the horrors and sufferings of slavery. For instance, the head of the Scots Blantyre Mission wrote that 'The Arab slave trade is making frightful progress. Caravans of Arabs are pouring in for trade? No! Hardly a bale of cloth goes up country from the east coast; it is guns and powder...It is simply

9. See Hall R., 'Stanley', op.cit., p. 328; Johnston, op.cit., p. 81; and note, for important studies of the Northern Rhodesia 'treaties'and 'concessions' (a) Baxter 'Concessions', op.cit.; and (b) Krishnamurthy B., 'The Thomson Treaties and Johnston's Certificate of Claim', article in African Social Research, No. 8, Dec. 1969, University of Zambia.
slaughter, and slaughter of thousands, and the desolation of the fairest lands...where the natives were at peace, where industry and thrift and happiness ruled. Where, to go through one village you might start in the early morning and not pass out of it till the sun was half-way down, journeying straight on; and these are now desolate...it is ruthless massacre of the most barbarous type'. This report had found support in the despatches to the Foreign Office of Consul O'Neill who, in 1887, had recorded 'the remarkable growth of Arab power during the past three years...and...the bloodshed and ruin and desolation that has been the direct result of that growth'; the movement of caravans, which had formerly been mainly towards the Congo Free State, now 'threatening to devastate the well-populated districts round the North end of Lake Nyassa'. The fact of Portuguese connivance with and frequent participation in this trade and the belief that Johnston was the spearhead of a British act of liberation won for his enterprises the initial wholehearted support of missionaries who hailed him as protector of their settlements and promoter of their programmes of expanding evangelistic and educational work.

The missionaries in the Shire Highlands were obviously looking for a mode of rule different from the

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Portuguese. For them, 'the principle of Portuguese annexation' was that 'a native chief for certain immediate advantages, such as cloth or goods or upon certain representations not recorded, hands over the sovereignty of his land to a European power and that European power uses such treaties against others who may desire to enter the land'.

Having received details of a treaty-signing ceremony at Mudi between the Acting Consul, Buchanan, and the chiefs of Sochi and Ndirande, they declared happily that 'now the country is British - Magololo' (sic Makololo). Johnston followed this by securing 'Mponda's signature, Jumbe's and all the important signatures along the Lake' and planting 'stations along the Lake and the Tanganyika Road - the latter being strategical points of "occupation" as against German advance'.

Johnston came thus among the missionaries as the representative of "a meteor flag which for a thousand years had braved the battle and the breeze" associated with trained soldiers, mighty war vessels and the roar of guns' and foreshadowing doom to the dealers in slaves.

Johnston's personal account goes on to tell how he moved swiftly to the north end of the Lake where

11. 'Life and Work((Blantyre), December 1888 - (periodical publication of Blantyre Mission) - by courtesy of Professor George Shepperson, Edinburgh.


'only one week was occupied at Karonga in making peace with the Arabs, securing North Nyassa by treaty, choosing this harbour for the African Lakes Corporation and arranging my caravan for Tanganyika'. His haste, with £2,000 received personally from Rhodes to defray expenses, was clearly due to his desire to get as fast as possible up the east shore of Lake Tanganyika. However he was prevented by ill-health but Alfred J. Swann of the London Missionary Society came to his relief. 'Mr Swann's expedition', Johnston recalled, 'was entirely successful'. Treaties were made and the British flag was planted at the extreme north end of Lake Tanganyika, however, copies of those treaties arrived in London too late to be taken into consideration at the signing of the Anglo-German Convention of July, 1890, the conclusion of which had been accelerated by the accession of the new German Chancellor, von Caprivi, who favoured better relations with Britain.

Swann's account of this cooperation with Johnston, catches the whimsical glamour of the high noon of imperialism. 'Johnston', he recalled, 'was scrupulously attired and at home on a donkey. I felt that this calm and polite servant of the Crown would have annexed half a continent to the Empire before luncheon, making the owners feel they ought to reward him handsomely for the trouble of signing his name to the transfer'. But, apart from noting that they 'decided it was best for treaties to be made directly with the Crown',
Swann offered no clue as to the provisions of such 'treaties'. When Swann remarked that Johnston had 'left flags and treaties' but nothing by which to protect the people in case of attack, the Consul replied, "Yes, that is true; you will probably be appealed to and it will be annoying because you cannot defend them". Johnston was aware of the magnitude of what was being imposed upon these lands yet apparently unconcerned with regard to the ability to fulfil the promises allegedly made on behalf of the Crown. Nor was there any hint that such treaties 'made directly with the Crown' would offer the peoples of the Kingdoms involved the status of 'British Subject', as was granted to the citizens of the Indian states that entered into treaty relationships with Britain.

Moreover the men who went on the 'treaty-making' expeditions tended to present a picture of their activities for 'home consumption' that was both romantic and inconsequential, as though they were dealing with beings of another type than their own. Johnston's brother, in his biography of the Queen's Commissioner, told how, as Sharpe moved through northern Zambezia, 'Nearly all the chiefs were ready to "take hold of the White Queen's leg" as they termed their acceptance of a Protectorate but they regarded the act
of signing a treaty with a cross as dangerous "medicine". 14

The African Lakes Company may be said to have been the first 'treaty-making' body in what was soon to be called North-eastern Rhodesia and indeed in northern Zambezia. In a book recounting his exploits on behalf of the A.L.C., one of its founders, Fred Moir, made a brief mention, without dates, of 'a number of chiefs' having 'signed formal treaties with the Company, asking to be taken under British protection'. One of our oldest informants, Nansala Manyeta of Chief Mailo's area in Serenji district, recounted vividly a visit by Moir (presumably Fred but possibly his brother John) to Nansala's village. The headman went into hiding but Moir insisted on seeing him, assured him that he came in peace and gave him a flag 'the first to be brought here by a white man'. As Joseph Thomson called the little lake Lushibashi by Moir's name, it seems likely that Moir made that visit not later than mid-1890. There are however still extant various texts of what are obviously more than mere 'concessions' of

14. Johnston, op.cit., pp. 94 and 95; note that Johnston erroneously mentioned the African Lakes trading agency as a 'Corporation', while in fact it was the African Lakes Company until its liquidation in 1893 and the creation in its place of the African Lakes Corporation; and see Maxwell Stamp Association Report, Vol. I p. 6 (footnote 124 below) for reference to Rhodes's grant of £2,000 to Johnston; and Swann's account in his 'Fighting the Slave-Hunters in Central Africa' (Cass 1910 and 1969) pp. 191-2. Also Johnston A. 'Life and Letters of Sir Harry Johnston' (Jonathan Cape, 1929) p. 134.
mineral or other such 'rights' in Central Africa. The missionaries in the Shire Highlands were shocked by what the A.L.C. was doing in this respect. 'The question is not yet settled', they protested, 'whether a native chief from whom land has been bought is able to hand over the sovereignty of that purchased land along with his own'. 15

The most amazing of those 'claims' is probably the 'treaty' between the Lakes Company, represented by John Nicoll, and 'Mwinimambwe, ruling Chief of the District or County of Mambwe' which was allegedly 'signed' on 26th August 1885 at Chirundamusi. This was the ruler who had received James Stewart of the Livingstone Mission in 1879 and responded to Stewart's suggestion of his allowing 'the English to settle in his country' by saying that 'he would welcome them and that they and he would have the country between them'. Nicoll's document stated briefly that the Chief 'in recognition of the benefits conferred...by the African Lakes Company Limited and the British Missionaries...and in consideration of the payment made to me this day in goods and merchandise' made the following contract: 'I for myself my heirs and successors whomsoever do hereby in the presence of my people cede transfer assign

and make over absolutely and for all time coming...all my sovereign rights and right of jurisdiction over my people and country' to the African Lakes Company. Mwinimambwe then bound himself and his successors 'for all time coming not to enter into any treaties or negotiations at variance with the spirit of this deed without the consent in writing of the African Lakes Company Limited'.

This document bore the form of 'unconditional surrender', suggesting that it was either extracted from Mwinimambwe at the point of a gun or indeed not extracted at all but produced by the A.L.C. in support of its plan to capture the well-worn trade route of the Tanganyika Plateau for its own wares from Britain. But it was placed in the Consul's office alongside Nicoll's 'Deed of Sale' of 16th August 1890 whereby he purchased from 'Mangwe Kafola, Paramount Chief of the Mambwe Country all and whole' an area bounded 'on the north by a line running east and west at 8°15' East Longitude; on the south a line running East and West at 9°30' South Latitude; and on the west a range of the Losongo Mountains or Eastern Limits of the Country of Ulungu'; to wit, the whole of the same Mambwe kingdom. Then, on 18th September 1893, Johnston duly sanctioned both

16. NLS 7904 Folio 48: Free Church of Scotland - 'Report of Journey of Exploration, September to December 1879' from J. Stewart to the Church's Foreign Secretary; NAZ-BS-1/103; and note that 'Mwinimambwe' meant simply 'owner or chief of Mambwe country'. Underlining is mine.
these 'treaties' by the issue of a Certificate of Claim, in which however he made no mention of a 'treaty' with 'Nangwe, Mwinyi Mambwe' which, as we shall see, he claimed to have concluded personally eight months previously. Ten days later the area thus acquired was transferred to the B.S.A. Company and registered in Blantyre. The present Senior Chief Nsokolo states however that there is no record at his court of any such 'treaties' or 'concessions'; that Mandala (the African Lakes Company) did not establish a station in his kingdom; and that had any such surrender been sought and understood it would have been rejected. Moreover, the memory of the event would certainly have been retained by Nsokolo's councillors and subjects.\(^{17}\)

In the same year as Nicholl's 'treaty' with Mwinimambwe - the year of the Berlin Conference - the African Lakes Company's director, John Moir, had told the Acting Consul that he had persuaded many chiefs in the region of Malawi to request a British Protectorate, failing which they would seek the protection of his Company. Documents to support this action were sent

\(^{17}\) Ibid: and RI/Senior Chief Nsokolo and others, 21/8/75; and note that Nsokolo has been the royal title of Mambwe chiefs for generations and no trace can be found of the name Mangwe Kafola in the royal line; and see Willis R.G. 'The Fipa and Related Peoples of South-West Tanzania and North East Zambia', Ethnographic Survey of Africa, East Central Africa, Part XV (International African Institute 1966), pp. 47-48.
to London and Moir claimed to have another thirty-three such petitions for submission to the Foreign Secretary. But, as in the case of Lobengula and the Rudd Concession and, as we will see, in cases of 'treaties' in the area of Zambia, the Kololo chiefs concerned complained that they had not been told what they were required to sign. Those Kololo were survivors of Livingstone's 'Makololo' who had settled in the region and apparently established authority over the local people.\footnote{PRO-FO 84/1702, despatches to Foreign Office, No. 8 Africa, 9/8/85 and No. 1 Africa 17/9/85; and see Hanna op.cit., pp. 82-87.} At this time, Johnston's dislike and contempt for the A.L.C. was growing rather than diminishing and in the year in which he sanctioned its Mambwe claim, he described it as managed by 'the riff-raff of Glasgow' who 'devote the whole of their talents to the cheating of all men, white, black and yellow'.\footnote{Ibid: FO 2/54, Johnston to Percy Anderson, FO, 21/1/93.}

The A.L.C. managed to secure the signature of a Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Westminster, Alfred Sharpe, to their engagement with one 'Ngorwi Kito' near Mbala at the south end of Lake Tanganyika, their base of operations. Ngorwi Kito was alleged to have authority to cede to them 'the whole territory', its minerals and mining rights, game preserves, taxes, tolls, duties \textit{and privileges of whatever sort and kind} in Urungu (sic), the country of the Lungu people. The
relevant document was dated 30th December 1890, John Nicholl acting again for the Company. 20

Very soon afterwards, in January 1891, the A.L.C., once more through Nicholl, procured a 'deed of sale' from the paramount chief of the Mwanga whose capital was in what was to be the southernmost tract of modern Tanzania. The king, Chikanamulilo, was stated to have ceded, as in the case of Ngorwi Kito, and in return for £50 worth of trade goods, 'all mineral mining rights, game preserves taxes tolls and duties and privileges of whatever sort and kind' pertaining to 'a strip of land ten miles in width and about fifty-five miles in length following the course of the Stevenson Road and having five miles of its width on either side of the said road'. The Stevenson Road was the highway which it was planned to construct between the north end of Lake Nyasa and the south end of Lake Tanganyika with capital provided by James Stevenson, a Glasgow merchant, who was Convener of a Sub-Committee of the Free Church of Scotland's Foreign Mission Committee, the body charged with oversight of the work of the Livingstonia Mission in the Lake Nyasa region. Work on the road had been started in 1880 though by 1895 Johnston spoke of it as having 'very little existence except on paper'. 21

20. MSA: File 24. Underlining is mine.
The Chikamanulilo 'deed of sale' transferred the land to the Company 'absolutely and for all time coming'. The deed was executed at Mkoma, the traditional capital of the Mwanga King. It was witnessed by two strangers to the area, 'Matope (Native of Bandawe)' on the shore of Lake Malawi, and Alfred Sharpe. When Johnston sanctioned these claims, he declared that he did so on behalf of the British Government by the authority vested in him to 'grant to all claimants whose titles shall be proved to be true and just a Certificate to that effect' which would be then 'a voucher for the legality of the Claim'. The only significant condition attached to the claims was that villages were not to be 'disturbed or removed' without his written consent and that the proprietor, being the A.L.C., could legally forbid the making of new villages or plantations on his 'estate'. Johnston apparently accepted without question the declaration on the Chikamanalira (sic) Deed of Sale, signed by Sharpe, again in his capacity as 'Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Westminster', that he (Sharpe) had 'truly and honestly translated the terms of this transfer to the said Chikamanalira in the

22. NAZ-BS-1/103, 'Deed of Sale', Mkoma, 15/1/91; and note that the Mwanga people have generally and in my view erroneously been referred to, in English, as 'Namwanga' or 'Inamwanga'. The original community of this Kingdom was believed to have lived near the 'holy' lake called Mwanga and so been known as 'Awina-Mwanga', people of Mwanga.

23. Ibid: underlining is mine.
Kiswahili language and that he has signed the said transfer in the full understanding of its purpose'.

The Mangwe Kafola (Mambwe) Deed had borne a similar attestation signed by Stewart Burton and Adam McCulloch, presumably A.L.C. employees. Nor was Johnston concerned to establish whether Mwinimambwe (owner of Mambwe-land) or Mangwe Kafola, 'Paramount Chief of the Mambwe Country' was, as he stated in the Certificate of Claim 'the sole and rightful owner of the land'. Instead, he confused the issue by speaking of 'the two ruling chiefs of the two sections of the Mambwe people'.

The next batch of 'treaties' in chronological order was the collection made by Johnston himself, and mentioned above, on his dash across the Nyasa-Tanganyika plateau. Though, according to Baxter, there were copies of twenty-four such 'treaties' sent by him to the Foreign Office in February 1890, Johnston made the briefest general reference to them, which we quoted above, in his monumental 'British Central Africa'.

To that we can add his summary statement to the Foreign Office that he had 'now secured by treaty all country from South end of Tanganyika to River Ruo on Shire and West

24. Ibid.
25. Ibid: e.g. 'Certificate of Claim on the Mangwe Kafola 'Deed', 18/9/93, and cf. MSA, copy of this 'Certificate of Claim'.
to River Longwa (sic Luangwa)...I made treaties along the South end of the Lake (Tanganyika) to the south west to the north of Cameron Bay...I then penetrated inland westward to within a short distance of Lake Moero (sic) and also southward to near the Kazembe's Kingdom'. This journey of Johnston's was mentioned in letters of L.M.S. missionaries at the south end of the Lake to whom Johnston's objective clearly was 'to fore-stall any delegates from other European governments... thus paving the way for the Chartered Company that is being formed'.

The texts of those treaties do not appear to be extant, but the list of chiefs which Baxter has reproduced has some interesting inclusions. There is, for instance, Mkoma who presumably was the Chikanamulilo of Nicholl's 'Deed of Sale' of 15th January 1891. However, the Deed made no reference to the Treaty which the Commissioner himself had claimed to procure fourteen months earlier, on 18th November 1889, nor did Johnston refer to his own 'treaty' when certifying the A.L.C. claim on Mwanga territory. There is also reference to Undi from whom the Consul obtained a 'treaty' on 22nd September 1889, chronologically the second in his list and presumably executed as he moved north through Chewa country in the hinterland of Lake

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Malawi. The same chief, Paramount of the Chewa, was included in region 4(a) of the map of Johnston's Certificate of Claim, against the date 15th April, 1891.

Thirdly, the Baxter list includes a treaty between Johnston and the correctly-titled ruler of the Lungu, Tafuna, dated 29th November, 1889. By geographical location as well as by title, this Tafuna must have been the Lungu King, with his capital of Isoko a few miles from Mbala (Abercorn). Yet the A.L.C. submitted, and had approved by Johnston, a deed dated thirteen months later which did not cite the Johnston 'treaty'. If Ngorwi Kito had authority over 'the whole territory' of the Lungu, he must have been no other than Tafuna. 30

This catalogue of contradictions then reveals the Johnston 'treaty' of 15th December 1889, noted above, with one called 'Nangwe, Mwinyi Mambwe', procured as the Consul was moving eastwards again towards the 'mixed tribes' of the northward reaches of the Isoka district. 'Mwinyi Mambwe' cannot have been other than the 'Mwini-mambwe' whose absolute surrender of all sovereign rights to the African Lakes Company Johnston was to endorse four years later in the issue of a Certificate of Claim, without reference to his own 'treaty' with the Mambwe;

30. Ibid: and MSA File 24, which includes a copy of the map of 15/4/91. See Appendix A., and note that, on Johnston's map, nos. 1,2,3, were used for areas later marked K.E.F; no. 4 for B; no.4(a) for L; no. 5 for A.
and 'Nangwe' suggests a typical mishearing of the name 'Mangwe' as in the 'Mangwe Kafola' Deed of August, 1890. Kera, with whom he claimed to have contracted on the previous day, was also a Mambwe chief but inferior to the 'Mwinimambwe' and therefore highly unlikely to have been either willing or permitted to make a 'treaty' with a foreign power.

Moreover, four of the twenty-four Johnston 'treaties' bear the names of rulers in the region of modern Tanzania, namely 'Mwinyi Tshinga' (4th November); Mkoma of the Mwanga who was presumably Chikanamulilo from whom the A.L.C. were to claim the 'concession' of January 1891 (18th November); 'Chiefs of Ukukwe' (19th November); and 'Chief Wakinga' (16th December). Similarly Zowa and Msangawari (10th and 16th November) were presumably rulers near Lake Malawi. A further query arises in respect of the 'Watambo-Nuwandia'. If Johnston's 'treaty' was made with the Tambo and the Wandia on one and the same day, it must refer to the Tambo and Wandia groups near Chitipa (Fort Hill) about fifty miles ESE of Mwenzo and forty miles from the other Tambo area near Isoka. However, in the Tambo country near Isoka, the area of Chief Katyetye, there is a memory of a 'Muzungu' or white man coming to break the Bemba-Arab alliance and end their wars, though no record has been heard of any treaty-making.
Finally the last but one treaty in the Johnston list was made with 'Kazembe' on 4th January 1890, two weeks after he claimed to have procured some such arrangement with the 'Chiefs of Watambo-Nuwandia'. Though his despatch to the Foreign Office, quoted above, mentioned that his journeying had taken him 'southward to near the Kazembe's Kingdom', there can be no reason to assume that the 'Kazembe' with whom his treaty was reputedly made was the famous Luunda King on the Luapula. Even at his relatively fast pace of travel, Johnston on a donkey, but with walking carriers, could scarcely have turned back from Tambo-Wandia country so swiftly to the Luapula; nor would he have been able to snatch a 'treaty' quickly from one of the strongest kings of the whole region of northern Zambezia. Indeed he did not claim to have been more than 'near the Kazembe's kingdom;' moreover, he attributed a 'treaty' with Kazembe of the Luunda to Sharpe in his omnibus Certificate of Claim of 25th September 1893.\(^\text{31}\) Since 'Kazembe' is a name used very widely in the area of Zambia, this man Johnston claimed to have engaged by 'treaty' must have been some other personage. There is no 'paramount' of that name in the north-eastern regions of the territory.

\(^{31}\) Baxter, op.cit., pp. 26 and 28-33; and RID/Richard Mtambo, Court President, Mwenwisi, Isoka, 19/7/75.
Johnston's volumes on 'British Central Africa' suggest to the reader a meticulous care for detail. The above survey of the first rounds of his work of procuring and also of cataloguing 'treaties' indicates, on the contrary, an astonishing casualness which may well have to be explained by the fact that the 'treaty-making' business had no real significance for the local princes and peoples. They were being brought into subjugation anyway. What mattered was, as we noted earlier, to provide Her Majesty's Government with enough paper on the 'treaties' to enable her to assert her claims against the rivalry of Germany, Portugal and the Congo Free State. Indeed, six months after the date of the last of these Johnston treaties, London was able to use them to block German penetration south of the interlacustrine belt when a boundary was fixed as part of the portmanteau Anglo-German agreement of 1st July 1890.

(b) Joseph Thomson and Alfred Sharpe as collectors of treaties.

The review of the 'treaties' of Joseph Thomson and Alfred Sharpe to which we now turn offers further proof of casual inaccuracy. Robert Rotberg has provided us with a major study of Joseph Thomson's African
exploits, showing him to have been an impetuous and immature person. A member of the Royal Geographical Society described him to George Cawston, a B.S.A. Company Director, as 'quick-blooded, generous, good-natured and frank to a fault', and Thomson's writings strengthen this view. He had a profound devotion to the memory of David Livingstone and in 1893 proposed that the large tract north of the Zambezi which he had traversed three years earlier should be called 'Livingstonia'. For him, Central Africa held 'the sacred spot where Livingstone closed his great career, leaving his heart in the land where all his thoughts and aspirations were centred'. Moreover he expressed great admiration for the Scots missionaries in the Shire Highlands who, he said, 'unaided by Maxim guns or government support and armed only with moral weapons... wielded a powerful influence which embraced a hundred chiefs and extended all over Nyasaland as far as the distant shores of Tanganyika'.

Thomson's first journey in the area of Africa which concerns us here was made in 1879-80. It took him via Mwanga and Mambwe country to the southern end

33. Thomson J., article in Geographical Journal Vol. I 1893, pp. 97-121; 'To Lake Bangweolo and the Unexplored Region of British Central Africa'. 
of Lake Tanganyika where he wrongly assumed that Tafuna was the name of a raider of the 'Mazitu' (Ngoni) or 'Watuta' and not the chief of the raided Lungu. He does not appear to have been concerned with 'treaties' on this earlier journey. However, during his service with the National African Company (later called the Royal Niger Company) in the mid-eighties, Thomson obtained signatures of local princes to treaties which, Rotberg says, 'gave Britain reasonably good paper rights to a large portion of what became Northern Nigeria'.

It was to his Nigerian exploits that he referred, as we saw earlier, when he accepted the invitation to go on his second mid-African pilgrimage in the employment of the B.S.A. Company.

According to the biography of him by his brother, Thomson was enlisted by Rhodes 'for his past achievements as an explorer, and the notable success of his humane methods in dealing with savage races'. Indeed in his own chronicle, Thomson reiterated his conviction that, in his brother's words, 'the courage of patience smoothed the way even where the situation bristled with provocation to bloodshed'.

34. Thomson J., 'To the Central African Lakes and Back' (Sampson Low, Marston, 1881), Vol. I, p. 317; and note that 'Mazitu' and 'Watuta' were local names for the Ngoni. See also Barnes (f/note 57 below) p. 9.
of the Luangwa valley between the kingdoms of Mpezeni and Mwase, included this vivid passage: 'With startling suddenness the hitherto silent wilderness quivers over many a near and distant mile with the warning cry which calls the men to arms and sends the women and children to the woods for shelter...An accidental shot, an arrow slipped from the drawn bow, and nothing can stop bloodshed. On the other hand, a little coolness, a little confident patience, a little more time for the effervescence of the mad passion aroused, and peace ensues with equal certainty'.

Thomson's record of his explorations in northern Zambezia in 1890 makes no mention of treaty-making. The only reference to the relation of Rhodes's Company to his journey appears in these words: 'In the beginning of 1890, the British South Africa Company, in pursuance of the splendid enterprise which has marked its short but brilliant history, offered me an opportunity of visiting Lake Bangweolo and the neighbouring regions'. Thereafter the article is a description of places and peoples as he moved through 'Wa-Nyasa' to 'Kiwende', the country of a Bisa chief called 'Kabwire', thence to Katara's area, 'Kwakatara', at the foot of the Muchinga mountains, and on, by the foothills of the

'Lokinga Range' and the 'Vimbe Hills' to 'Lusiwazi', which he called 'Moir's Lake', in honour of the founder of the African Lakes Company. Then, on 21st September, 1890, the party reached 'Nansara, a female Biza Chief', at whose village small-pox attacked them. After hunting for Chitambo's village where Livingstone was reputed to have died and which, Thomson claimed, was not in 'Ilala', as generally believed, but in 'Kalinde', the party moved by the 'River Moengashe' to 'Kalonga, the village of the principal chief of Iramba', then, in the direction of the Kafue River, to 'Kwa-Kavoii', by 'Pa-Mkwemba' to the 'Kalera Hills' with the 'Irumi Hills' to the south. On 4th November, they reached 'the village of the important Iramba (sic Lamba) chief, Mshiri', hoping to move on to 'Mashukulumbe (sic, the Ila area), by way of Manica'. Thomson was by then, however, very ill, and so the party began the return journey via 'Urenje' and over the 'Lunsefwa' (sic) river, and through Mpezeni's kingdom to Kasungu where they arrived at the very end of the year.  

Despite the hazards of his travels, however, Thomson, like Johnston, moved across northern Zambezia with unceremonious haste. Johnston had recorded

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38. Ibid.; and see p. 80 above. 'Manica' probably was a mishearing of the local words for 'plains' and not as Hall suggests (p. 84) a confusion with 'Manicaland'.
procuring 'treaties' at one stage at the rate of one per day and once, on 4th November 1889, two in one day. Thomson moved no more slowly, claiming to have covered over a dozen kingdoms and chiefdoms in a little over two months. His list, however, is full of mistaken names and names of persons whose identity cannot be established, and, as Hall says, 'the concessions obtained by Thomson were a ludicrous confusion...In return for trade goods, men who could neither read nor write and whose very existence in most cases seems quite forgotten, handed over most extensive rights'. Hall cites Professor Doke's statement to the effect that the visit of Thomson, Grant and Wilson is clearly remembered by Lamba people, especially because the smallpox, which had struck Thomson's caravan, continued to plague the area for some time afterwards.

In his study of the Thomson Treaties, Krishna-murthy cites verbatim evidence collected from a nephew of the Lamba chief, Mushili, who is number ten in the Thomson list. The evidence was as follows:-

'...These white men came with their book and they asked Mushili to put his thumb print in the presence of the following...Musopelo, Kanamina and Mukwemba and myself, Mwebela, and told the chief to look after that book very carefully. They used black stuff.

39. Hall, op.cit., p. 84.
That black stuff was on something so that thumb print was put against that one and then on the paper. I do not remember them making any cross on the paper.

'There was not a meeting of all the people of the village. They said, "As all the chiefs have run away from us, and you are the only one we have found who has not run away from us, so we want you to accept us by putting this mark on the book, and we recognise you as the only chief here..."

'The mpundus, they were interpreting. They did not talk about land. They did not talk about iyela (metals). I know what was talked about and this, I am definite, was not talked about. If they did talk about it I should have known'. Interviews conducted more recently both with holders of chieftainships named, however inaccurately, in the Thomson list and with people well versed in local history give reason for some suspicion that the original list may, in part at least, have been made simply as a result of questioning some ruler or other persons, somewhere in 'northern Zambezia', as to which chiefs ruled where. The inaccuracies that characterise Thomson's list may indicate that the questioning of informants, who had not full knowledge of more distant kingdoms and rulers, and the rough jotting down of names, were not subjected to confirmation by actual or properly conducted meetings.
with the persons listed. For example, 'Tshitambo' or Chitambo (no. 5) was not a 'paramount chief'. And, while the 'official' list puts the date of the Chitambo 'treaty' as 4th October 1890, Thomson's brother states categorically that the caravan, with a great sense of relief, reached Chitambo on 29th November soon after the outbreak of smallpox which, he says, struck them at Nansara. Again, there is notable inconsistency in the use of titles. No explanation is offered for calling Kalonga (no. 7) and Simesi (no. 8) 'sultans' while other rulers are called 'chiefs'. Nor does Thomson indicate why Katara (no. 3) and Nansara (no. 4) are described as 'independent' chiefs.

Thomson must have been especially confused about chieftaincy among the Lamba. While, as we have seen, his article in the Geographical Journal called Kalonga 'the principal chief of Iramba', the list, quoted by Baxter, gives 'Kalenga', 'Simesi' and 'Mkwemba' as chiefs of eastern, western and central 'Iramba' respectively, while 'Mshiri' is called 'paramount chief' of southern Iramba. Meanwhile, another 'Mshiri' appears as number 6 in the list with the impossible title of 'paramount chief of the B-a-usi (sic) country Llala (sic) E. of the Luapula and of Kawende on the west side of the Luapula', i.e. in Leopold's Congo. In the same way, the description of Nansara as 'chieftainess of the Lobisa country of Mbalala' reveals a serious error in
identity, since 'Lobisa' obviously means 'the country of the Bisa' while 'Mbalala' means 'the Lala people'. The Bisa and the Lala were not at any time under one ruler. Moreover, according to Hall 'Nansara' was 'merely a village headwoman...pushed forward by the people because they did not want to disclose the real chief'.

Two other mysterious items in the Thomson list merit note. Firstly, he claimed to have made treaties with 'Tshavira (Shaibila) of South-Eastern Ilala and 'Tshavira, Chief of Western Senga' on one and the same day, 25th November, 1890 (nos. 13 and 14). The present Shaibila, however, asserts (a) that the Senga of Mboroma were formerly tributary to his forebears and (b) that Mkwemba (Thomson's no. 9) was in fact another name for Shaibila. But he declares emphatically that there was no such visit to his court by Thomson and that, if the chief of that period, only 84 years ago, had in fact made a 'treaty' and granted 'Concessions' 'in the presence of the headmen and people', to a white man, leading a large caravan, this would certainly have been remembered. Joseph Thomson himself said his caravan consisted of '55 Makua and 98 Atonga' along with Wilson and Grant. Shaibila's people did not consider they had been fraudulently denied the sums of money promised in the Thomson document simply because they did not know of the existence of such a
'treaty'. Again, his last 'treaty' was allegedly made with 'Chevia and Miembe, Chiefs of Senga' who were to be paid 'jointly...goods to the value of £25'. No explanation is offered of the phenomenon of co-chieftainship. Like all Thomson's documents, this one stated that the deal was made in the presence of headmen and people.

Finally, though Thomson described each 'treaty' as 'a treaty or alliance made between the said chief and people and the Government of Her Britannic Majesty Queen Victoria', on only two cases did he make an explicit commitment to 'protection'. 'Kambwiri, Paramount Chief of Kiwende' was assured that the Company undertook 'to protect the said King and people from all outside interference or attacks' and held its servants 'responsible for any ill-treatment of the King's native subjects' - a formula similar to that found in Sharpe's 'treaties' with Kazembe and Nsama. More specifically, Thomson allegedly promised Chipepo of the Lenje (no. 11) relief 'from the tyranny of the Portuguese Half-caste ivory and slave hunters who keep them in constant fear of lives and property'. This 'treaty', dated after the caravan was stricken by smallpox and Thomson himself was seriously ill, gave no indication how such 'protection' would be afforded to the Lenje; in contrast to Sharpe's promise to provide Kazembe and Nsama with 'a Resident' and 'an escort of British Police'. The memory of senior men in Chipepo's area is, however, very different.
The first man who visited them, they say, asked to see the chief, Mwashi by name. The chief and his council feared the approach of an armed stranger with about 100 armed porters, and so they agreed that the chief must hide. The white man was displeased and so, at last, Muchinga, the chief's son, went out to meet him. The stranger said he had brought a gift, which was a bundle of cloth. The chief, however, did not wish to receive it. The stranger and his party then left, and some years passed before another white man came and planted a flag on the large ant-hill outside the royal enclosure. There was, the witnesses declare, no mention whatsoever of any agreement or 'treaty' nor was there any money or its equivalent in trade goods offered by the white man. Moreover, at that time, Chipepo's people did not regard the Portuguese-Mbunda traders as enemies, as all their dealings were conducted respectfully with the chief who sold them ivory and slaves. Those slaves were convicts and prisoners taken in local border fighting with neighbours. There was no desire to abandon the ivory trade in favour of some relationship with the new white travellers who were beginning to appear in the land.  

40. MSA Report Vol. II, pp. 132-145; Krishnamurthy op.cit., pp. 588-601 and esp, p. 593; Thomson J., article, op.cit.; Hall, op.cit., p. 84; RI/Chief Shaibila of the Lala, 24/7/75; MSA Vol II pp. 151 ff., FO to CO, 23/7/94; and RI/Chief Chipepo and Councillors, 14/10/75.
We should nevertheless look further at the texts of some of Thomson's fourteen documents, which were all, along with one of Sharpe's, accorded the approval of Johnston as Her Majesty's Commissioner and Consul-General on 25th September, 1893. In this Certificate of Claim, Johnston summarised the 'rights and privileges' obtained for the British South Africa Company thus:

'1. The sole right "to search, prospect, exploit, dig for and keep all minerals and metals";
2. The sole right "to construct, improve, equip, manage and control all kinds of public utility";
3. The "absolute and exclusive possession of all commercial privileges of whatsoever kind";
4. The right "to do all such things as are incidental or conducive to the exercise, attainment and protection of all or any rights, powers and concessions granted".41

Though the Certificate of Claim included quotation marks as shown here, the texts of the various 'treaties' in fact varied. Moreover, though Johnston's wording implied that he was endorsing 'claims' to various lands and properties 'conceded by local rulers,' all that the Thomson documents included, as their first clause, was the ruler's commitment 'to accept the British flag and to place himself irrevocably under the Protectorate of

Great Britain’. Similarly all the agreements contained a pledge on the ruler's part 'not to enter into any treaty or alliance with any other person Company or state'.

The payment which Thomson claimed to have offered these rulers was variable, the largest amount being £60 worth of trade goods with a promise of £50 per annum when the commercial properties began to yield profit to the Company. The lowest amount was £10 worth of trade goods for 'the Independent Female Chief Nansara' who was alleged to be 'content to leave the question of future compensation in the hands of the Company'. To only four rulers was £50 worth of goods or more offered while six were to receive £20 worth and two £10. If in fact these amounts were handed over, the total bill for the 'treaties' was £415 furnished in the form of 'trade goods' of whose value Thomson and his partners, James Grant and Charles Wilson, were the sole assessors.

Two other notable features of Thomson's 'treaties' are the inclusion of longitudinal and latitudinal positions of the kingdoms and chiefdoms concerned; and the names of interpreters. To have accurately measured the bounds of each area, Thomson would have required time, which his recorded schedule clearly

did not allow. To read them off an inevitably inaccurate map of what he called 'unexplored regions' would be proof of an amazing casualness in relation to lands which the Company hoped to exploit. Yet, according to Rotberg, he did not even carry a sextant on his travels. Meanwhile in dealing with rulers whose names he obviously misheard and some of whose names are untraceable, he used the services of a foreign interpreter, Jumah Abubakr, whose competence in the variety of languages involved must be open to doubt. As has been indicated by the scholars who have examined those documents, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that no demand was laid upon Thomson to do his work accurately and to ensure that authentic contracts had been fully understood before acceptance; that indeed the whole operation was spurious in execution as in concept. Yet H.M. Commissioner prepared the Certificate of Claim in duly legalistic language after having 'inquired' into the claims concerned. This included, as Roland Oliver has pointed out, 'one document purporting to convey 140,000 acres for a consideration of £2.13.0., distributed among four persons who were not in any sense the chiefs of the district'. Johnston however certified that he had 'ascertained...that the granters of the said rights and privileges were the sole and only rightful owners of the land'. He wrote elsewhere, however, that 'the tenure

of the land was in reality tribal (and) ... theoretically the chief has no right to alienate the land'. 44

There are two other sets of documents relating to the region once called North-Eastern Rhodesia which remain to be noted: the 'treaties' of Alfred Sharpe and the so-called Wiese Concessions in the areas of the Ngoni and their neighbours in the large region around the confluence of the Zambezi and Luangwa Rivers. Sharpe, like Thomson, had some years of experience in Central Africa before he began to busy himself with 'treaty-making', and had fought at Karonga in Northern Malawi in 1887 against the 'Arab' Mlozi and his allies. Johnston had recently appointed Sharpe as his vice-consul and it was with this title that he began his journey westwards. In Johnston's view, Sharpe emphatically deserved 'the main credit of having secured all this portion of our new dependency to the British Flag'. Indeed he described Thomson's documents as 'absurdly worded' and regarded his efforts as having merely 'supplemented' Sharpe's work. With a small force, 'scarcely exceeding fifteen or twenty men and by weight of his personal influence alone' Sharpe had 'secured' those territories 'to British interests'. 45


45. Johnston op.cit., p. 90; Hall, op.cit., p. 84; and Baxter, op.cit., pp. 28-33.
In point of time Thomson and Sharpe virtually continued the Commissioner's own operations, as Johnston's twenty-fourth 'treaty' was dated 7th January 1890, and Thomson's first 'treaty' was dated 15th September 1890, two weeks before the first in Sharpe's list. The six Sharpe documents cited in Johnston's Certificate of Claim of 25th September 1893 cover the period 30th September 1890 to 17th July 1891. To these we have to add his 'treaty' with 'Mwapi, Chief of the Lukusasi country', dated 12th May 1890, which Johnston grouped with Thomson's fourteen documents; and a later 'treaty' with Mkula in the Lake Mweru area in November 1892.46

Sharpe's attitude to the 'treaties' made in 1890-91 was revealed by the fact that, in May 1890, before any except the Johnston 'treaties' had been secured, he declared a British Protectorate over the area west of the Luangwa which the Foreign Office apparently did not disallow. His first 'treaty' made no reference to the 'protection' of Mwapi and his people, though it was obtained in the same month.47 The 'treaty' with 'the Council of Kazembe branch of the Lunda people', dated 30th September 1890, did however declare that 'this covenant shall be treated in the light of a treaty of alliance between the said nation and the

46. For Sharpe's 'treaties' see MSA Report, op.cit., Vol. II p. 131 (Mwapi), and Baxter, op.cit., p. 29.
47. Ibid.
Government of Her Britannic Majesty'. It further pledged that the British South Africa Company would be held responsible 'for any ill-treatment or interference with any other of the King's native subjects'; and that a Resident would be appointed at the royal capital. This official would 'protect the King and nation from attack' and 'under the King's supervision and authority, aid and assist in the establishment and propagation of the Christian religion, and the education and civilisation of the native subjects of the King by the establishment maintenance and endowment of such churches, schools and trading stations as may be from time to time mutually agreed upon by the King and the Resident'. The reference to Christianity was an interesting inclusion since missionary work did not begin near to Kazembe for another decade. 48

Sharpe's 'treaty' with Nsama of the Tabwa, made two and a half months later, committed the Crown and the B.S.A. Company in almost identical terms to those of the Kazembe document. It made the serious error, however, of calling Nsama 'Paramount Chief or King of the Awemba (Babemba) people', a strange blunder.

48. MSA files: texts of Sharpe's 'treaty' with Kazembe; and note that the London Missionary Society opened a station at Mbeembi, not far from the royal capital in 1900. Underlining is mine.
in view of the widespread and dread reputation of Chitimukulu, the Bemba King, well-known as an ally of the Arab slave-masters with whom Sharpe had fought three years earlier. In his account of the Nyasa-Tanganyika Expedition of 1889-90, Harry Johnston explained that only lack of time prevented him from visiting 'Ketimkuru (sic) the Wa-Wemba King'. But, he said 'I had reason to believe, from a message transmitted to me from him, through an Ulungu chief to the South of Tanganyika, that I should have been well received and...found it not very difficult to enter into a pact with him to cease raiding the native tribes under our protection'. Meanwhile, Sharpe promised to pay both these princes '£25 per annum in perpetuity', in cash or trading goods. 49

The other four agreements in this group were reputedly concluded between 17th and 24th July 1891 and like the brief document concerning Mwapi, were all concerned with 'exclusive mining rights'. They included the right to keep all minerals extracted, and 'absolutely and exclusively all timber wood and water rights (except what are required for native purposes)' as well as 'all commercial and manufacturing privileges and all agricultural rights'; the only caveat being that 'it must be clearly understood by the Company that

49. Ibid: text of Nsama treaty, 15/12/90; and RH: MSS.Afr.s.84 Johnston's Report on the Nyasa-Tanganyika Expedition 1889-90, p. 27.
ample land must be reserved for native villages and gardens'. It is probably the case that the 'agreements' with Muliro of Sengaland, Chuzumba, Paramount Chief of Tembo, and Endole of Sangawo, were in fact African Lakes acquisitions, merely witnessed in some cases by Sharpe. The situation is however confused by obvious inaccuracies in the list mentioned by Johnston to the Foreign Office in October 1893 thus: 15 by Thomson and Grant, 3 by Sharpe and 2 by Stevenson of the African Lakes Company. The name of one James Meldrum appears on the Muliro Document as well; and Chuzumba, Koza and Endole were all promised 5% of all minerals and metals extracted, though the Company expressed a preference for 'a yearly sum of £30 in lieu'. Those chiefdoms were all in the Luangwa Valley region. There is also mention of a treaty with Undi of the Chewa, which we noted above, and 'Likangui', both in April 1891, presumably secured by Sharpe. 50

The record of correspondence between London and Central Africa over the validity of the 'treaties' and 'concessions' that were required by both the Foreign

50. Ibid: texts of agreements with Endole, 17/7/91, Koza, 20/7/91, and Chuzumba (or Tshuzumbo) 21/7/91 and Muliro 24/7/91; and note Johnston's lengthy statement (MSA Report Vol. II pp. 153-178) of 14/10/93 listing the treaties, inaccurately. The dates of the Undi and Likangui documents were 15@4/91 and 22/4/91, respectively.
Office and Rhodes's Company is a long and complicated one, which has been usefully collated in the second volume of the 'History of the Mineral Rights of Northern Rhodesia' prepared for the Government of Zambia by Maxwell Stamp Associates of London. What is crucial for our enquiry is the means by which highly suspect 'agreements' were given legitimacy by Johnston in his capacity as Her Majesty's Commissioner. His Certificate of Claim, noted above, and his lengthy despatch of October 1893 give the most explicit expression to this validation, applying conditions whose subsequent history we shall review later, which were to have no meaning for the African peoples concerned except in so far as they underlined the monopolistic power of the British South Africa Company. Moreover, Johnston's report to the Foreign Office of his rejection of certain African Lakes Company claims in the West Nyasa region, because the chiefs concerned 'were not aware at the time what they were granting', makes his action in validating the A.L.C., Thomson and Sharpe documents in north-eastern Zambia all the more reprehensible. 51

A year earlier Johnston had assured the Liberal Foreign Secretary, Lord Rosebery, 'that the chiefs with whom Treaties were made by Messrs Thomson and Grant

were quite aware of what they were giving to the Company, and on one occasion, at any rate, a subsequent prospec­tor was refused any right to mine by the native Chief, on the plea that he had already sold that right to "Shati's people" (Mr Sharpe's "people")! In addi­tion, 'I have seen most of the Treaties...and in all that I have seen a fair sum - in some cases, a very large sum - has been paid down for the granting of the Con­cession and an annual payment secured to the Chief (when the Concession shall be put in force) which might be regarded as a percentage on the value of the minerals worked'. A number of the Treaties had been sent to him 'by the Manager of the Lakes Company in whose hands they had been left by Mr Sharpe, Mr Thomson and Mr Wilson. Some of these are concluded in the name of the British South Africa Company, others in the joint names of the British South Africa Company and the African Lakes Company'.

From our review so far it will be clear that Johnston's assurances were significantly at variance with the texts of the 'treaties'. His statement about payments was a case in point since, excluding any pay­ments made by himself for his original twenty-four contracts, what Thomson, Sharpe and the Lakes Company put down cannot have exceeded seven or eight hundred pounds. Johnston's reckoning of between £6,000 and £7,000 spent by the B.S.A. Company, by 1891, in securing
the greater of the claims detailed, must have included those payments to princes and chiefs along with the cost of porters and the salaries of the 'treaty'-makers, but he did record the amounts reputedly disbursed to chiefs. It is worth noting that fifty-nine years later, the Attorney-General told the Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council, in reply to the question of an African member, that those treaties 'were freely negotiated and there can be no doubt at all that both parties knew precisely what they were doing'.

The correspondence further reveals some concern in the London office of the B.S.A. Company about delay in the depositing of the 'treaties' with the Foreign Office. A reply to Cawston, the Company's most active director in London, confirmed that there had been a search for relevant documents in the Foreign Office and that they had not been seen by the senior staff there until March 1893. 'It was Johnston's opinion', the Foreign Office told Cawston, 'that the only conflicting claims were those of Wiese...If you are able to clear them out of the way, you will apparently have a clear field. There are three sets of Treaties', the letter went on, 'those of Thomson, Wilson

and Sharpe. The latter confer some powers of interference in administration...Thomson's and Wilson's Treaties give no power of government or administration and the Barotse Treaties, which form a fourth group, distinctly preclude their exercise. Those of Thomson and Wilson accept the British Protectorate which is not at present offered' - despite Sharpe's proclamation of May 1890. 'All the Treaties use the Queen's name without authorisation'. Over a year later, however, the Foreign Office was still seeking guidance from the Colonial Office as to how the documents should be interpreted and their various ambiguities resolved.53

Despite the protracted debate on the legality of what had been done in northern Zambezia, Johnston's authority and freedom of action were not in any significant way circumscribed, and his argumentation, however devious, carried the day. This is well illustrated by his statement that 'Chief Nkula (sic), the recognised ruler of Itawa and Uwemba (Lobemba) countries, and the successor of Nsama over a portion of his territories, recently ceded the whole of his countries to the Queen in order to check the aggression of the Arabs. Nkula's predecessor Nsama (a chief first made known to us by the writings of Livingstone and who was visited

53. MSA Report Vol. II, pp. 150-152, FO to Cawston, 28/3/93 and FO to CO, 23/7/94. Presumably 'treaties' attributed to Wilson were included by Johnston in the Thomson list.
by Mr Sharpe in 1890) had, however, previously sold to the B.S.A. Company the exclusive right to mine, etc. over the whole of his territories. Nkula's cession to Her Majesty therefore', Johnston went on, 'should be limited by this previous and perfectly valid concession to the B.S.A. Company'. Johnston well knew that neither Nsama nor Mkula was ruler of the Bemba. Therefore this statement of his strengthens the impression that neither Rhodes's men nor he were concerned to safeguard their actions against serious scrutiny from London because they had reason to be sure that no such scrutiny would be applied. Instead, the confidential correspondence of the Colonial Office contains a strange communication from the Foreign Office in 1894 which picked out the Nsama 'treaty' for special mention and formally accorded it the status of 'a Treaty of Alliance with Her Majesty's Government'.

The crucial issue for us is to examine the extent to which 'treaties', 'concessions', 'mineral rights', etc. had significance for the local rulers and peoples and effectively shaped their relations with the 'protectors'. We have seen that, not only Her Majesty's Commissioner but the Foreign Office also, knew that such 'absurdly worded' documents as those associated with Joseph Thomson went extravagantly ultra vires in claiming to be 'treaties of alliance'. Yet there is no record,

54. Maugham Report, Appendix Item 10, Johnston's Report on BSAC Claims (undated; and MSA: FO (Percy Anderson) to CO, 23/7/94. Underlining is mine.
written or oral, of any action by Johnston or anyone else to visit the rulers concerned and correct the grave abuses thus committed.

(c) **Wiese, Mpezeni and the B.S.A.C.**

We now come to the large and well-populated region now forming the bulk of Zambia's eastern province and lying north of the boundary with Mozambique, west of the Malawi border beyond Lilongwe and Mchinji and enclosing the confluence of the Luangwa River with the Zambezi. The Ngoni kingdom of Mpezeni lay in this region and it is noteworthy that in 1897 Johnston, on the eve of the war with Mpezeni, described that kingdom to the Foreign Office as 'healthy and auriferous'.

The history of the B.S.A. Company's 'rights' over this region was thoroughly reviewed by Mr Justice Maugham in a special Report to the Northern Rhodesian Government, dated July 1932, and Maxwell Stamp Associates drew heavily on Maugham's material in preparing their Report on the basis of which the Government of Zambia rejected the mineral rights of the B.S.A. Company in October 1964. A brief scholarly account of this phase in Ngoni history has been provided by Barnes in his 'Politics in a Changing Society'.

55. PRO-FO, 2/127, Johnston to FO, 6/2/97.
56. Report of an Inquiry into the North Charterland Concession (Mr Justice Maugham) July 1932 (Colonial No. 73); MSA Report Vols. I and II, relevant sections; and 'Africa Digest' Vol XII, no. 3, December 1964, p. 73.
The Anglo-Portuguese boundary in the lower Zambezi region was not defined until June 1891, after over fifteen years of bad relations during which the local peoples fell prey to the intrusions of a number of determined adventurers, and Portuguese encouragement of the traffic in slaves further aggravated their plight. Maugham's inquiry was primarily concerned with a dispute over the claim of the North Charterland Company for compensation in respect of land set aside for Native Reserves, and not with the justice of the B.S.A. Company's acquisition of 'the tract' and their lease of it to the N.C.C. But his researches revealed that the first 'concessions' there were those claimed by a German prospector called Carl Wiese who had apparently established a relationship with King Mpezeni in or before 1885, in the interests of his associates in Mozambique. British anger was aroused because Mpezeni refused to make any agreement with Sharpe in 1891 or to allow the British flag on his soil. Moreover, Joseph Thomson had passed through the Ngoni Kingdom on his return to Lake Malawi in early 1891 and his biographer described Mpezeni as 'an arbitrary and blood-thirsty savage' adding that 'his attitude to the British visitors was not ameliorated by the fact that he had at his ear, as adviser, a man in the pay of the Portuguese'.

At the outset, therefore, Johnston was anxious to warn the Foreign Office against Wiese, especially since the prospector seemed ready to trade his loyalty among the rival European Powers. In a despatch, dated 31st March 1892, Johnston said that 'Mr Sharpe's journey brought to him many proofs that Wiese was little else than a slave trader. His bands of armed Zambesi natives raided the country right and left and the people thus captured were made to work on Wiese's plantations... This much I have learned from native sources, that Mr Wiese on several occasions ordered native Chiefs under his control to make their mark at the foot of certain documents and that he never explained what these documents meant, and that he never gave any presents in return for the Concessions granted'. The Commissioner then went on to ask for 'a legal opinion from the Foreign Office as to whether I am compelled - anywhere in British Central Africa - to recognise or allow claims to monopolise in trade or "exploitation". Can Mr Wiese, for instance be allowed to maintain his sole right to trade in india-rubber along the banks of the River Loangwa?' Since, a year and a half later, Johnston was to attest the legality of the Thomson, Sharpe and A.L.C. documents which we have reviewed, with their claims upon 'exclusive mining' and other comprehensive 'rights', we either have to conclude that he was concealing from London the real significance of his
colleagues' exploitative appropriations or that, in the interim, he received Foreign Office sanction, officially or otherwise, for his action on behalf of the A.L.C. and above all of Rhodes's Company. 59

That, however, was not all that Johnston had to tell the Foreign Secretary. No Wiese documents had been shown to him and 'no dates are given. Consequently', he wrote, 'I cannot decide whether they are prior or subsequent to Treaties concluded...by the same Chiefs or by those Chiefs' overlords with the British Government (through Mr Sharpe who made two journeys through Wiese's country) or with the British South Africa Company represented by Messrs Thomson and Grant who traversed ground, claimed by Wiese, in 1890 and concluded many agreements'. 60 It is noteworthy, however, that Thomson's list does not include any names which seem likely to have associations with the region east of the Luangwa and in the vicinity of Mpezeni's Kingdom.

Johnston did not name Mpezeni at this point, yet it was clear to Maugham that 'Mpeseni', the Angoni Chief was 'de facto paramount in the tract' and that he had 'refused to entertain the suggestion of a treaty'.

59. Ibid: Appendix Item 7, Johnston to Salisbury, 31/3/92. Underlinings are mine.
60. Ibid.
Maugham did not therefore doubt that Johnston and the Foreign Office rightly rejected Wiese's claim to 'the tract', as it was called, and that Johnston's attitude was reinforced by the texts of Wiese's spurious concessions which he transmitted to London. However, as a new way of acquiring 'the tract' began to develop in the thinking of the B.S.A. Company, it became necessary to imply that Mpezeni was no more than an invading brigand and that therefore 'treaties' with chiefs who had been ousted by him or were his neighbours could give legitimacy to Rhodes's claim to the whole region.

Wiese's 'concession' from Mpezeni was dated 14th April 1891. Six years later, Johnston was insisting that when the Anglo-Portuguese Convention of June 1891 placed Mpezeni's kingdom within the British sphere and Portugal withdrew her Resident and her flag, 'Wiese quarrelled with Mpezeni and left to try and bounce the British Government into a recognition of his wholly-unfounded claims. The Foreign Office did not recognise them but', said Johnston, 'advised the B.S.A. to come to terms with Wiese'. Yet in 1894, when urging London to ignore the claims of Wiese and the so-called 'Oceana Company', the Commissioner described it as 'simply a collection of stockjobbers and speculators'. Thomson's treaties, though 'most absurdly worded', were incorporated, Johnston stated, in a settlement based on 'the

protection of native rights, protection of government rights and prevention of monopolies... We must,' he asserted, 'think of the rights of the natives in tropical Africa where they will always form the bulk of the population'.

The plot now thickened fast, according to Johnston's own account. 'A group of capitalists bought up Wiese's supposititious claims and received from the B.S.A. Company a concession of mining and other rights north of the Zambezi which included Mpezeni's country in its scope. The B.S.A. Company would base its right to grant this concession on its recognised Treaties with Undi, Mwase Kazungu and - (I forget the names) the indigenous and partially dispossessed Chiefs of Mpezeni's country'. What then took place was summarised by Maugham in this important passage of his Report: 'The Mozambique Gold, Land and Concessions Company Ltd. was incorporated on the 18th February 1893 by the London Firm of Messrs. Bewick and Moreing for the purpose of acquiring from Mr Wiese for the consideration of £1,500 and certain shares the whole of the Wiese Concessions. The Mozambique Company duly acquired the concessions... Mr Moreing... called at the Foreign Office and there had an interview with the then Permanent Secretary and

63. Ibid: and MSA, Johnston's Memorandum (to FO), 17/10/94. Underlining is mine.
64. Maugham Report, Appendix Item 35, Johnston's memo on 'the Mpeseni Question', 6/2/79. Underlinings are mine.
showed him the concessions. It was observed that they were not registered with the Commissioner of Nyasaland. Mr Moreing accordingly sent Colonel Warton promptly to Nyasaland and had the concessions registered with (but not ratified by) the Commissioner. Mr Moreing returned to the Foreign Office with the concessions as registered in April or May 1894...according to his recollection no question was raised at that time in any way as to the validity of the concessions...Negotiations were then opened on behalf of the Mozambique Company with the British South Africa Company. On the 8th May, 1895, the British South Africa Company wrote a letter...recording the agreement which had been reached...that the basis of the transaction was the surrender to the British South Africa Company of all Wiese's right, title and interest within the British sphere. For this consideration, the British South Africa Company purported to grant to the Mozambique Company the right to locate a block of land not exceeding 10,000 square miles having the boundaries of the tract as previously set out...
There were certain conditions and the rights of the natives were to be respected...This letter...is alleged to be the root of the title of the North Charterland Company...The letter imposed upon the Mozambique Company an obligation to form a new company, the North Charterland Exploration Company Ltd., with a capital of £1,000,000 in £1 shares, of which 300,000 fully paid
shares were to be provided for the British South Africa Company'.

In this way, the rejected Wiese claims became the basis of a vast appropriation of territory; a virtually dummy company in London was used to cloud the area, as it were, between the spurious concessions themselves and the monopolistic action of Rhodes's Company; a new company, subordinate to the B.S.A.C., was brought to birth to do the pioneering in the field; and Mpezeni and his neighbours, totally excluded from those negotiations and operations, were in a short space of time to feel the impact of military subjugation and dispossession. Moreover Her Majesty's Government were clearly party to all this and Johnston did not have to fear their displeasure, should the details of collusion and perfidy reach the Foreign Secretary's desk.

Our last concern at the moment with the documentary aspect of the annexation of 'the tract' should be to consider what in fact was the substance of Wiese's claims. Johnston, as we saw above, sent a summary of those twelve acquisitions to London at the time when it seemed to serve his purpose to use them as evidence against, and not in favour of, the validity of Wiese's undertakings, and when, incidentally, he specifically described the British agreement with Undi of September 1889 as a 'treaty with Her Majesty'. In his lengthy

65. Maugham Report, p. 6, paras 17, 18 and 19. Underlinings are mine.
report on the 'settlement of land claims in British Central Africa', of October 1893, he spoke vaguely of 'a variety of treaties concluded on behalf of the African Lakes Company with Undi and other Chiefs of Maravi', but gave no dates. 66

The 'concessions' listed by Johnston as comprising Wiese's claims can be summarised as ceding to Carl Wiese, as an individual prospector, a 99-year tenure of 'rights' to exploit minerals, timber and rubber in a dozen kingdoms or chiefdoms; promising in return the payment of royalties at 1% to the rulers concerned. Wiese apparently made no offer to extend 'protection' to them. The list of names submitted by Johnston reveals however that, though the names of some of the rulers are obscure, the area covered by their territories was a large one. The details were as follows:

1. 'M'Pesene Jery (sic)' dated 14th April 1891;
2. 'Chigaga Pire, Chief of Maravia' - undated;
3. 'Unde, Chief of the Northern Maravi Nation', signed by Unde and 18 others - undated;
4. 'Nyangifanhu Wula, Chieftainess of the Senga', signed by her and 5 Headmen - undated;
5. 'Satcherima Miti, Independent Chief of Senga', signed by him and 4 Headmen - undated;
6. 'Lundo Nyango, Paramount Chief of the Senga', signed by him, 10 'relations' and 13 Headmen - undated;

(7) 'Said Nyendwa, Paramount Chief of Wambo-N'gomia, signed by him, 5 'relations' and 10 Headmen - undated;
(8) 'Chipore, known also as Ngonna, Sovereign of Wiza', with 37 signatures - undated;
(9) 'Sandue, Paramount Chief of Kunda tribe', signed by him and 6 others - undated;
(10) 'Marama, Paramount Chief of the Kunda Nation', signed by him and 10 others - undated;
(11) 'Jumba, Paramount Chief of MUIZA tribe', signed by him, 10 Headmen and 4 others - undated;
(12) 'Sopa Muandza', signed by him and 5 others - undated. 67

Here again, the casualness and confusion of recording names of princes and kingdoms suggests that Wiese, like Thomson and his colleagues, did not have reason to be concerned to be accurate because the reaction of the African rulers was irrelevant to what he was doing. Moreover, no one in Lisbon or London was likely to want to verify who in fact, between numbers 2 and 3, ruled over 'Maravi' or 'Maravia'; whether 'Senga' was one or three as suggested by numbers 4, 5 and 6 in the list; who really ruled the Kunda people, 'Sandue' or 'Marama'; or how Wiese distinguished 'Wiza' (number 8) from 'Muiza' (number 11), though in fact

67. Ibid.
'Muiza' simply means a member of the Wiza, Biza or Bisa nation.

Our review has now reached the year 1891. Cecil Rhodes had then held the premiership of the Cape for a year. In February, the Foreign Office had formally announced the extension of the operations of the B.S.A. Company under the Charter to 'the territory under British influence north of the Zambezi and south of the territories of the Congo Free State and the German sphere' but not including Nyasaland. This Memorandum had promised the sanctioning of the 'treaties made on behalf of the Company' as long as 'no provisions in them will be confirmed which may conflict with the prohibition against monopolies contained in the Charter'; and the Foreign Office undertook also to examine further the titles to claims originally secured by the Lakes Company and by Wiese. But, as we saw earlier, Johnston made the explicit assertion that the 'exclusive claims' of Rhodes's Company were exempt from the ruling of the Berlin Conference's General Act against monopolies, since 'none of the independent African chiefs concerned were signatories of the General Act...so they can be held in no way bound by it'; and the Foreign Secretary did not demur at this cynical misreading of the unequal situation whereby those rulers

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68. BM-SP Command Paper C.7637, p. 3. Underlining is mine.
had been involved, whether really or fictitiously, in the 'treaty-making' exercise.\textsuperscript{69}

This complex exercise in documentary validation which we have been studying gave, at this time, an adumbration of what would be a crucial issue, fifteen years later, namely, the legality in African customary law of a ruler's title to land 'ownership'. Maugham remarked that, in addition to the fact that 'Mpeseni did not understand many of the words' in Wiese's 'concession', 'he had no right on behalf of his tribe to grant the rights alleged to be disposed of'.\textsuperscript{70} As we shall note later, the B.S.A. Company used this argument about corporate tenure in 1906, as a reason for invalidating the payment of a % of mineral royalties to local rulers.\textsuperscript{71} This was with reference to Johnston's inclusion, in his Certificate of Claim, of a commitment to such payments.\textsuperscript{72}

Once again it is obvious that the case that was being argued was not concerned with 'protecting' the interests of the weaker parties to the 'treaties' and 'concessions' but with the consolidation of the 'legality' of imperial action in the eyes of the British public and in the context of international European politics.

\textsuperscript{69} See p. 54 above. Underlining is mine.
\textsuperscript{70} Maugham Report, p. 5, para 15.
\textsuperscript{71} PRO-CO 879/91 no. 802 - p. 103, BSA to CO, 18/5/06.
\textsuperscript{72} Baxter, op.cit., p. 30.
The victory of the Liberals in 1892, after over five years of Tory rule in Britain, was bound to increase the moral scrutiny of colonial policies. But for a long time to come, the final verdict would favour the white invaders, as is underlined in the citation by Maugham's Report of 1932 of the judgment of Lord Haldane in the famous Swaziland case of 1926.

Haldane's pronouncement was as follows: "Land belongs to the community and not to the individual. The title of the native community generally takes the form of a usufructuary right, a mere qualification of a burden on the radical or final title of whoever is sovereign. Obviously such a usufructuary right, however difficult to get rid of by ordinary methods of conveyancing, may be extinguished by the action of a paramount power which assumes possession or entire control of the land". With this premiss, Maugham's own observation on the realities of the colonial period in northern Zambezia gains in significance: 'The development of the system was gradual but before long the Protectorate began to be administered in a way differing little from that which would be adopted in the case of a complete sovereignty'. In the eyes of 'the indigenous peoples' this could not mean other than that from

73. Maugham Report, p. 4, para 9. Underlining is mine.
74. Ibid: p. 8, para 22. Underlining is mine.
a position of marked material superiority, the conquerors were consolidating their brigandage; and their chagrin could not but be aggravated by the fact that, under the Africa Order-in-Council, the rulers and peoples who were, when it was so desired, declared to be related to the British Crown by 'treaty' and 'alliance', were treated as vanquished and voiceless.

Meanwhile, back in England, the semblance of legality was insistently laid over the operations of Rhodes's men. In answer to the query of a concerned enquirer, George Cawston, as the Company's most active Director in London, explained that 'the principle which has guided the British Government has always been that the land belongs to the native Chief...All our rights to land and minerals have always been obtained from the native chiefs and these grants or concessions have been approved by Her Majesty's Government'. The facts of history are, nevertheless, that the whole business of mustering documents in support of effective occupation required great haste as much on the part of the British Government as of the 'treaty-makers' in the field. For, as Baxter reminds us, as early as February 1891, the Foreign Office memorandum, which formally extended the sphere of 'British influence' north of the Zambezi, stated that 'the Treaties made on behalf of the Company in the Chartered Territory will be sanctioned on the condition that no provisions in
them will be confirmed which may conflict with the 
prohibition against monopolies contained in the Charter, 
and with the stipulations of the Act of Berlin'.
Clearly it was the sanction and not the caveat that 
counted, as the B.S.A. Company moved in to carry out 
the untrammelled exercise of 'exclusive rights' over 
its vast new domain. 75

It fell to Sir Harry Johnston to give legiti-
macy to the northern Zambezian 'treaties' at a time when 
London had its definite reservations about the motives 
and practices of Cecil Rhodes. It is fitting there-
fore to conclude this section by quoting Johnston on 
one of his own treaty-making expeditions and on how he 
presented 'treaty-making' to his British readers.
Describing an encounter with 'Ededama' near the Cross 
River in eastern Nigeria, he wrote: 'I said I had come 
on a mission of friendliness from a great white Queen 
(and) ... I should like to "make a book with them"; I 
added, to take home to the Woman Chief ... I extracted a 
Treaty form from my despatch case and three or four 
persons of preeminence (or so it seemed) crowded into 
the canoe to make crossings on it with my ink ... After 
crosses had been splodged on the treaty form and I had 
made my present of cloth and beads, my crew was ... ready 
to resume paddling'. The operation had, according to

75. RH-MSS.Afr.s.76-BSA Miscell. 1891-94, G. Cawston 
to E. Davis, 28/1/93; and Baxter, op.cit., p. 28, 
citing Command Paper C.7637 p. 3 of February 1891.
his record, taken a short time. A man not knowing the local language or having time to study the local political system had left a few gifts and gone. Yet Johnston had this to say on 'treaty-making' in Central Africa:— 'One feels... that to readers of a new generation this treaty-making must seem a farce... In Central and West Africa, though the natives might not be able to read or write, they had a very clear idea what resulted from making a treaty. They memorized the terms though they could not read. If one proceeded to interfere in the conditions of a tribe without the treaty right to do so, there was sure to be a fight...I am sure we were right... to consult with the native tribes and rulers as to whether they wished us to preside over their affairs in Northern Zambezia and Nyasaland.' A much later apologist for the 'treaty-making' exercise has implied that the 'treaties' were endangered, not by any failure on the part of Her Majesty's representatives but by cultural differences and the conscious dishonesty of the African rulers concerned. 'Since', says Hanna, 'the tidy European concept of sovereignty has no counterpart in tribal customary law, it is probable that no amount of interpreting could have made the chiefs, with their profoundly different cultural background and mode of thought, appreciate the precise significance of what they were doing, nevertheless it is hard to believe that they completely failed to realise that the general
effect of their action was to bind them to submit to the Queen's authority... But the sanctity of treaties was no part of their creed and it is unlikely that they ever intended to be a hair's breadth more submissive than necessity or at least prudence might require'. The material before us, however, rejects the whole basis of such a judgment and must place upon the men who claimed to represent Queen Victoria the guilt of having abused the concept of 'treaties' and their 'sanctity' with cynical and deliberate perfidy in order to prepare the way for their military subjugation of the territories concerned. 76

(d) 'A Bag of Gold with a Small Hole'

Before concluding our review of the paper documentation mustered to attest the B.S.A. Company's annexations, we should look briefly again at the Lozi Kingdom of Lewanika and its neighbours to the south, the east and the north. It may be because there was no armed clash with the Lozi that Rotberg describes the conquest north of the Zambezi as 'diplomatic' as well as 'military'. As we have seen, London was anxious that Rhodes should move circumspectly in his thrust into Lewanika's area. There are thus special features of the British action in the western region of Zambia which distinguish it from what happened elsewhere, and

continued to influence developments in 'Barotseland' right up to the coming of Zambian Independence. The danger of using the word 'diplomatic' is that it may give the impression that the two negotiating parties were equally able to shape the future. The facts of thirty-four years of B.S.A.C.-Lozi relations suggest instead that what took place there was conquest by stealth, in contrast to the overt military subjugation of other areas; that it was largely because of the attitude of the British Government that the Company's rule was imposed on the Lozi less roughly and with more concessionary features than elsewhere. As the major research undertaken by Maxwell Stamp Associates confirmed, the issue of the relationship of the Lozi state to Rhodes's Company and to the British Government continued unresolved well beyond the upper limit of our period of study.

The original 'Concession' had been obtained in June 1890. But twenty years later, on one of the many occasions when the Lozi king protested against the machinations of the Company, a man called Mwanza, listed as an 'interpreter' at a meeting between the King's Council and the Resident Commissioner from Salisbury, expressed grave doubts about the meaning of Clause 42 of the draft Order in respect of the amalgamation of North-western and North-eastern Rhodesia, the section dealing with the right to sell land. 'It is like a bag of gold which has a small hole', said Mwanza.
'First a few grains are lost and then eventually all is lost...if portions of our country are sold, it will soon all be gone'.

Despite Lord Haldane's judgment, cited above, with its implication that land tenure in Africa was so vague as to be valueless, it is suggested that the importance of land to the whole story of the African renaissance of the latter twentieth century cannot be exaggerated. What makes the relationship between the B.S.A. Company and the Lozi so significant is that 'Barotseland' was the threshold to the coveted wealth of the north.

As we noted earlier, the Rudd Concession from the Ndebele king, Lobengula, had immediately brought charges of dishonest dealing upon the B.S.A. Company. Indeed, in 1892, large-scale military movements by Lobengula beyond the Shangani River had been interpreted by Rhodes's advisers 'as a sort of demonstration against any further encroachment westwards by the Europeans'. The study of Rhodesian history, even from official sources, shows that the years that followed the Rudd Concession were increasingly troublous until desperate war and brutal defeat in 1896 and 1897 set

77. PRO-CO 879/64 no. 948, p. 150 ff., RC to HC 5/12/10, encl. record of meeting at "Livingstone with Lozi king Lewanika and Council.

78. PRO-CO 879/36 no 426, p. 68, F.W. Colenbrander to B.S.A., 30/3/92.
set the stage for the smouldering racial antipathies that are coming to a head in the 1970's. The names of Mtassa, Ng'omo, Mpondera and many others recall the first surges of African resistance. 79

Without drawing upon the evidence of African witnesses, it has been demonstrated that the conquest of the Ndebele and Shona was effected by deceit no less than by the gun. At the time when the B.S.A. Company was purchasing the Lippert Concession - for £30,000 and a large number of shares - it was known to men like the ex-missionary turned administrator, J.S. Moffat, that Lippert had won the Concession from Lobengula by protesting his personal enmity to Rhodes, while it had already been agreed between him and Rhodes that he would promptly sell out to him. Whereas the Rudd Concession was limited to mineral rights, Lippert claimed to have secured permission to sell land to white settlers. 'Matabili' Thompson was also worried by this barely disguised perfidy. 'I discussed it with Rhodes', he recorded later, 'and he said to me, "Why raise the question of the validity of Lippert's thing? The Government have accepted it as bona fide. Why do you want to say anything about it, raising unnecessary bother?"' To the Company, said Thompson, 'nine-tenths is possession. I on that point have much to say, i.e.

79. See PRO-CO 879, relevant folios; and especially Ranger, op.cit.
the actual cause that brought about war (in 1896) and I have no axe to grind'. The B.S.A. Company exploited their purchase of the Lippert Concession fully in the following decades. Yet in 1918 the Privy Council's Judicial Committee pronounced it as valueless as a title deed to land which the Company had claimed as 'one of the mainstays' of its land rights south of the Zambezi. 80

King Khama of the Tswana had no less reason for bitterness over his dealings with concession-hunters. 'It is the old story', wrote J.S. Moffat in 1887, 'on the one side it is stated that (Frank) Johnston claims the sole right to prospect in Khama's country; on the other side, it would appear that Khama is quite unaware of having conceded such powers...The person who acted as Johnson's interpreter is a young man of no character and almost entirely uneducated'. Missionaries were working in Botswana and some had the confidence of the King and so Moffat was annoyed that 'persons who come seeking concessions should so systematically avoid the missionaries', as Johnson's agent had done; for missionaries, though not hostile to 'such opening up of the country...object to any device the result of which would be to alienate the land, and they have reason to suspect...that gold mining is a mere blind and that the

80. PRO-CO 417, 557, letter of 'Matabili' Thompson, 14/3/14, The Lippert Concession of 1891 was acquired by Rhodes in 1892. The brackets are mine. Also Gann 'History of Southern Rhodesia' (Chatto and Windus, 1965), pp. 105-6, and footnote 1 on p. 106.
ultimate object is to get hold of the land'. This was strengthened by the fact that in mid-1892 Rhodes was at loggerheads with the Bechuanaland Exploring Company over the issue of the frontier between the kingdoms of Lobengula and Khama, and was asserting that "the territory situated between that latitude (22°S) and the Zambesi will be found to be under Lo Bengula" - a case of commercial rivals using their potential African enemies in support of their own plans of expansion. For in a year:81 time the first Ndebele war would break out against the rule of Rhodes's Company.81

The role of missionaries in the political turmoils of the decades of imperial advance has not yet been adequately chronicled so as to provide a documented reconstruction of their various activities over Southern and Central Africa. But all that we are reviewing here indicates that some of them were convinced that the formulae of acquisition that Rhodes and Johnson used were dishonest. Frederick Arnot of the Plymouth Brethren spent a few years in the early eighties in Lozi country. He was aware of Lobengula's efforts, by way of 'presents of shields and spears and by inviting Liwanika (sic) to become his "blood-brother"' to persuade the Lozi to join the Ndebele 'in resisting the invading white man'. He tried to urge Lewanika rather

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to ally himself with Khama; but he became deeply perturbed by what Rhodes's men were doing. 82

When, therefore, Arnot moved north in 1886 to the region called Katanga, he made it his business to urge King Msidi of Bunkeya never to sign any 'pieces of paper which', as Gann says, 'would assuredly rob him of his country'. 83 But it was well-known to the 'scramblers' that Msidi's kingdom of Yeke or Nyamwezi and a large region round it was rich in ore, and David Livingstone's journals, for example, contained many references to the copper trade as he traversed the country around the Luapula and Lake Mweru. 'Livingstone said the copper mines there were the richest in the world', George Cawston told Rhodes, 'and I believe there is also gold'. It is therefore not surprising that the region should have witnessed one of the more dangerous examples of 'Big Power' competition. Early in 1890 the B.S.A.C. Directors toyed with the idea of offering to buy 'Garenganse', as they called Katanga, from the Belgian king, believing that, since it was 'costing him £80,000 per annum', he might be willing to sell. Alternatively they might rent it from him; either arrangement enabling them to push a railway from

the Zambezi to Ujiji. This was urgent, in George Cawston's view, 'since Germany's only object in wanting to carry their line across Nyasaland to the Congo is to be able to acquire Katanga'.

The situation however developed otherwise. The Anglo-German agreement of July 1890, with its emphases on mutual accommodation involving Heligoland, Zanzibar, the Caprivi Zipfel or 'strip' and notional navigation on the Zambezi, established a general frontier along the Nyasa-Tanganyika plateau and terminated the threat of a German thrust to Katanga. But at the same time it became clear that Leopold II, far from wanting to shed the burden of Katanga, was anxious 'to extend his boundaries to the south' and wanted a 5-mile belt from Lake Bangweolo to Lake Nyasa. The tension was then heightened by the B.S.A.C. men's awareness that, in terms of the agreements reached at Berlin in 1885, France had a 'right of preemption on the Congo' and could enter the race for the valuable Bangweulu-Nyasa tract. Moreover, someone had circulated one of Harry Johnston's maps on which Msidi's kingdom was marked as British, which embarrassed the Foreign Office.


Johnston had said of this map that it included 'a little piece of territory which in some maps is given to the king of the Belgians...the country of Katanga. It is really rightly ours, by treaty with the native ruler and by the work of the missionaries and traders. No Belgian ever has set foot there, so it is monstrous for Leopold the Wily to lay claim to it and so eat into the head of our new province...you must not let him overreach us without protest'.

The 'scramblers' were thus finding their hands seriously tied by the delays due to manoeuvres between European capitals and moreover a senior Foreign Office official had declared that their Charter did not give the B.S.A. Company 'any power over the Zambezi'. But in May 1891 Joseph Thomson received a cable from Rhodes which demanded immediate action: 'You seem to have had the plagues of Egypt', Rhodes said, in reference to the smallpox that had attacked Thomson's caravan in the Serenje district. 'I want you to get Msiri's (sic). I mean Katanga. The king of the Belgians has already floated a company for it, presumably because he does not possess it. Next time you arrive there no doubt Arnot will be there so matters will be all right' - presumably based on Thomson's reputation for cordial relations with

missionaries. 'You must go and get Katanga. If you are too seedy, send Sharpe with Grant'.

Here was the voice of the man who 'called the tune' because he 'paid the piper, the man who controlled a gold and diamond empire worth more than £20,000,000 by the time he was 37 in 1890. Thus, though Sharpe was responsible to Johnston, Rhodes demanded his services too if Thomson's health did not improve. Sharpe had in fact already visited Msidi at least once, but had been firmly rebuffed by the King, though Gouldsbury and Sheane stated that 'a few days after Sharpe left, Msiri (sic) signed the treaties and sent them after him but they never arrived at their destination', because 'Capt. Stairs intercepted the letter and kept it'. Thomson therefore set off for Bunkeya but his health broke again. What followed must be understood in terms of its impact upon the African rulers and peoples over a very wide region of Central Africa. The events at Msidi's palace were recounted by the Irish doctor who accompanied the Canadian soldier Captain William Stairs, now in mercenary service with King Leopold, in the final confrontation with the Nyamwezi king. It is also right to record Frederick Arnot's observation that 'The amount of quietness and peace that reigns' in Msidi's country, 'is remarkable...(Msidi) is sharp and severe in his

87. Ibid: Cawston to Rhodes, 29/10/90, quoting Sir Robert Herbert, FO; and Thomson J.B., op.cit. p. 269.
government, though I see or hear nothing in the way of torture or cruelty inflicted by his orders... He received me very warmly and, seeing that I was very tired, sent one of his wives to cook a dish of rice and honey for me... I have no suspicion of his friendship'.

Dr Moloney recorded that the action led by Stairs was a further attempt to validate the Belgian king's 'paper-ownership' of Katanga. 'We proposed to secure the country', he said, 'either with or without Msiri's leave... for other eyes... had turned towards this desirable and derelict territory, those namely of Mr Cecil Rhodes'. Thus the 'race for Bunkeia' began.

Quoting the stipulation of the Berlin Conference that European nations annexing parts of Africa must 'possess the outward signs of treaties, the national flag, and a sufficient police', Moloney then recounted a 'long palaver', on 17th December 1891, between Stairs and the King in which 'Msiri was given plainly to understand that his monstrous cruelties could no longer be tolerated... that the missionaries must not be molested... and that anyone who tried to detain them would be shot without ceremony'. Under such threats, Msiri, having first said that he would accept only 'the Engreza (English) flag', now 'professed his readiness' to allow

the Belgian colours to be raised on his territory. On the next day 'Capt. Bodson drew up his little band in line' after 'leaving the Marquis (de Beauchamps) with instructions to attack directly the signal was given... two shots from his revolver'. In the brief clash that followed both Msiri and Bodson were killed. "Doctor", Bodson whispered to Moloney, "I don't mind dying now that I have killed Msiri". Thereafter, according to the missionary, Dan Crawford, 'The severed head of Msidi was publicly paraded to show his people who were their masters now'. Harry Johnston's view, however, was that Msidi had been 'a persistent slave trader...hated by the people over whom he ruled (who) rallied to the Belgian authorities after his death. 89

The brief period of the swift thrusts of the European 'scramblers' into tracts of central Africa unappropriated by their rivals was now over. The various arbitrarily bounded territories were defended in the political manoeuvrings of the Powers by fences strung with 'treaty' papers. Around the area of modern Zambia the ring was all but complete by the end of 1891. The weakest links in the chain of the fence were those dividing what is now Zambia's north-western province

89. Moloney J.A., 'With Captain Stairs to Katanga' (Sampson Low, Marston, 1893), pp. 6 ff., 179,183 ff., 192; Crawford D., 'Thinking Black' (Morgan and Scott), pp. 300 ff.; Johnston H.H., op.cit., p. 89. Underlining and words in brackets are mine.
from Angola and, to a lesser extent, from the Congo Free State. Tensions were to develop in that section as Portugal, recovering from the debility in which Livingstone had found her outposts, as a result of the thrusts of her European rivals, began to prod sporadically beyond the eastern limits of Angola. However, Cecil Rhodes had said, as we saw earlier, that the Barotse state extended as far as Leopold's Congo. 90 Colonial Office correspondence reveals that the British Government vacillated for years over the depth and breadth of control by British agents over the Lozi 'empire' which it was politic to countenance. 91 But London was ready to endorse the frontiers which the Company wished to claim on the western reaches of the 'sphere of influence'. It was therefore on this basis that the modus vivendi agreement was made with Portugal in June 1893, which stated that both nations repudiated 'any rights of whatever nature which the subjects of the one may claim to have acquired in such territories, subsequently to 11th June 1891, either by means of Treaties with the natives or any other title'. 92 Apart

90. See p. 72
91. See PRO:CO 879 series of files for our period.
92. BM/SP CIX, 1893-94, (C.7032) - 'Agreement between Great Britain and Portugal relative to spheres of influence north of the Zambesi', June 1893.
from minor adjustments consequent upon the final delineation of boundaries, the map of modern Zambia was thus outlined by her subjugators.

Three aspects of the process of international legitimisation of Britain's acquisition of northern Zambezia remain which require a brief comment before we proceed to examine the arrival of 'Chartered's' agents in the territory. The first of these is the matter of the cost of the annexation to Rhodes's Company; the second, the reaction of H.M.G. to the work of the 'treaty-makers'; and thirdly, the mood of Rhodes and his men around 1891-92.

It is extremely difficult to assess in firm figures the amount of money spent by 1895 as capital outlay in securing the B.S.A. Company's documents of acquisition and the related 'concessions' which it was effectively to control. No single tabulation of such amounts appears to have been set down during the decades of correspondence involving the Commissioner, the Company and the British Government. The figures that appeared in print seem to have been as follows: Purchase of Ware Concession (Lozi) £9,000; Rhodes's grant to Johnston, 1889, £2,000; payment to Thomson, including extras, approximately £3,100; purchase of Thomson, Sharpe and A.L.C. 'concessions' from chiefs, £800;

93. Rotberg 'Joseph Thomson', op.cit., p. 280, gives the cost to the B.S.A.C. of Thomson's journey as £3,094.2.2d.
purchase, per Mozambique Gold, Land and Concessions Co., of Wiese's 'concessions', £1,500; purchase by B.S.A. Co of A.L.C. concessions, £15,000, which makes a total of £31,400. Johnston told the Foreign Office in 1893 that he reckoned that the B.S.A.C. had spent 'a sum of between 6,000l and 7,000l...in securing the greater part of the claims...and...not far off 15,000 in obtaining the cession of similar claims on the part of the African Lakes Company'; that is to say, about £22,000 excluding the transactions with the Lozi. If this figure for the purchase of the A.L.C. Concessions is correct, the Lakes Company must have made an extravagant profit out of 'rights' won so cheaply and held for so short a time.

But, in his 1897 memorandum 'on the Mpezeni question', Johnston had this to say: 'I hear the B.S.A. Company received 75,000l. in cash and a number of shares in the North Charterland Company then constituted (i.e. in 1895). Well, from 1889 onwards, whenever Mr Rhodes spent a penny on British Central Africa, Makanjira Fund and everything else, he carefully booked it to the B.S.A. Company, not to his private purse. According to their own accounts, the B.S.A. Company spent thus, from first to last, 85,000 l. on the British Central Africa Protectorate. They were repaid subsequently 100,000 l. by the Imperial Government for what they had spent on the British Central
Africa Protectorate' - namely, Rhodes's grant towards police and administrative costs - 'and from this North Charterland Company they regain 75,000 l., therefore Mr Rhodes has lost nothing and the B.S.A. Company very little so far on the North Zambezian enterprises'.

That memorandum of Johnston's was very outspoken, as shown by his later statement that 'Mpezeni has ceded nothing to anybody, but even setting him aside as a robber without rights, the real Chiefs of the country have not ceded to the British South Africa Company their governing rights'.

Johnston's animosity to Rhodes was reciprocal and of long standing and may have added point to his remarks. Yet he had stated clearly a few years earlier, as we have noted, in defence of the 'concessions' and 'treaties' that the B.S.A. Company had procured them 'in exchange for considerable payments'. In another confidential despatch also mentioned above, he had affirmed that in obtaining the 'treaties', 'a fair sum - in some cases a very large sum - has been paid down... and an annual payment secured

94. MSA Report Vol. II, p. 175, end of Chap. 3 of Johnston's 'Report on Settlement of Land Claims' (pp. 153-178) 14/10/93; Maugham Report, Appendix Item 35; Johnston's Memo, on 'the Mpezeni question', 6/2/97. Brackets and underlining are mine. The Makanjira Fund was a special fund, to which Rhodes contributed, to meet the cost of Johnston's war with Makanjira and other Yao chiefs who organised an attack on Fort Maquire in Malawi in 1894. See Johnston, op.cit., p. 121.


96. See, e.g. Hanna op.cit., pp. 249-64 on Johnston's relations with Rhodes; MSA Report Vol. II, pp. 82-95; and Johnston A., op.cit., pp. 142-6 giving an account of Johnston's quarrel with Rhodes in which Johnston 'refused to be made a catspaw' and Rhodes retorted, "I will smash you, Johnston, for this".
to the Chief (when the Concession shall be put into force) which might' - by some strange logic - 'be regarded as a percentage on the value of minerals worked ...(which) varies from £1,000 to £10 according to the extent of the country and its probable value from a mineralogical point of view'. Johnston's statement must arouse doubts about his honesty, for in a footnote he said that Lewanika had been promised £2,000 a year, thereby seemingly excluding him from the list of annual payments ranging from £1,000 to £10. Moreover, his statement, by speaking of very large sums involved implied that a number of payments were in the upper area of this wide range. Yet, as we have seen, no 'treaty' in north-eastern Rhodesia gave a figure higher than £50 p.a. 97

The British Government appears to have been unconcerned to obtain a certified total of expenditure with details to indicate how much in fact was paid to the various African rulers concerned; and so, by their leave, 290,000 square miles came under 'Company rule'. The reaction of Her Majesty's Government to the whole undertaking in Central Africa was, as we have gathered, fundamentally favourable, and this applies equally to its attitude to events south of the Zambezi as north

97. Maugham Report: Appendix Item 10, Johnston's Report on B.S.A. Claims, (undated, around late 1891); and see p.512 above; also MSA Report Vol. II p. 147, Johnston to Rosebery, 18/10/92 and see p. 54 above.
of it. The news that Rhodes's forces had 'utterly defeated' the Ndebele in the end of 1893 led the High Commissioner in the Cape to state that 'the great success of the Company' had 'modified' his views; and to propose that 'Mashonaland and Matabeleland should be treated... as one country under the Administration of the Company'.

This evoked a sympathetic response in London despite a missionary's protest against 'the indiscriminate killing of unnumbered Ndebele, including wounded, by British agents' and his forlorn hope that 'the British public will know how to deal with cruelty and treachery of white men as well as with the same qualities in black'. The Ndebele situation, Willoughby wrote, was full of people 'for ever thirsting to be at the throats of the "niggers"'.

But the High Commissioner was quick to assure the Colonial Secretary that the seizing of about 230,000 head of cattle by the Company - over five-sixths of the total owned by the Ndebele - was appropriate since the cattle were Lobengula's personal property, and he merited 'punishment'; and it was at a banquet in Cape Town to celebrate the smashing of the Ndebele that Dr Jameson announced the Directors' enthusiastic decision to call the territory 'Rhodesia'.

98. PRO:879/39 no. 454: BSAC to CO, 2/11/93; HC to CO, 11/12/93.
100. Keatley, op.cit., p. 159.
It was then also, however, that African anger and hatred were becoming articulate against 'the blood-stained white men who had slain scores of thousands of Zulus and their Matabele relations'. The scale of those unequal conflicts between the latest of European artillery and the inferior weapons of African armies has in recent years won the attention of scholars. For us, it is obviously very important to recall what was happening to the south when the push northwards was beginning and to realise that the seizure of the Ndebele and Shona countries was bringing in its train a wave of violence and hatred. Her Majesty's Government, despite murmurs of disquiet about the extremism of B.S.A.C. conduct, was smiling upon the northward push, strengthened by the opinion of the Law Officers to the Foreign Office. By that formal opinion, approval was urged to Rhodes's plan on the grounds that 'the first section of the Charter ran as follows: "The principal field of the operations of the British South Africa Company shall be the region of South Africa lying immediately to the north of British Bechuanaland, and to the north and west of the South African Republic, and to the west of the Portuguese dominions"; that the

word "immediately" did not occur in the Petition; that it might therefore be presumed that it was inserted with a definite object; that section 3 on the same page authorised the Company..."to acquire by any concession, etc."..."all or any rights" etc...."in Africa"; that the words "in Africa" were underlined as being important in that consideration of the case'.

That verbal web appears to have been meant to say that the Company should be encouraged to go ahead. It is true that, three years later, the Foreign Office was still showing reluctance to give final approval to the Sharpe and Thomson 'treaties'. But the Colonial Office was answering the complaint of the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society against the B.S.A. Company's 'fraudulent procurement' of the Lochner Concession from Lewanika in 1890, by referring the matter to the Foreign Office, while, on the other hand it was arguing that the Concession had not in fact granted Her Majesty's protection to Lewanika but had merely been dealing with the relationship of the Lozi kingdom to Rhodes's Company. This was in contradiction to the Colonial Secretary's statement to the Foreign Office in 1891 that 'Lewanika should be assured that he is under

102. PRO:879/35 no. 414 - Law Officers to FO, 25/3/91; and see RH:MSS.Afr.s.71 for BSA Charter of Incorporation.

the protection of Her Majesty'. The Foreign Office then actually drafted a reply, which the Colonial Office however disapproved, to the effect that no agreement with Lewanika had been submitted by the Company to the Foreign Secretary.

While this prevarication and procrastination went on, the Lozi had reason to reckon with the significance of B.S.A.C. action south of the Zambezi. Because of their long-standing hostility towards the Ndebele, news of the breaking of Lobengula's military prowess must have brought a measure of relief. In 1893, the High Commissioner in Cape Town had reported the first defeat of the Ndebele to Coillard as good news for the surrounding countries and their prospects of 'peace and prosperity'. But it would be simplistic to assume that the Lozi were elated by these defeats. While Portuguese action against 'rebels' in Angola was increasing in ferocity, Lewanika's nation had reason to dread the advance of white military power north of the Zambezi as betokening the grave curtailment of their sovereignty.

105. Ibid: FO draft letter and CO to FO, 9/7/94.
106. PRO:CO 879/40 no. 461, HC to Coillard, 7/12/93; and 879/47 no. 517, p. 560 re Portuguese W. Africa situation and concern over Portuguese military incursions into Lozi kingdom, Feb.-April, 1897.
A few months later, while Rhodes had made it clear that he would delay sending his promised representative to Lewanika until it was decided whether Barotseland should be ruled from Zomba or from Bulawayo, the Foreign Office announced that the Company could now undertake 'the direct administration of the portion of the British sphere north of the Zambesi'. An Order in Council entitled 'Northern Zambezia' was then drafted for the Foreign Office with the objective 'simply to add the northern territory to the southern, so that the northern will be under the general government of the Administrator and judicially under the jurisdiction of the High Court of Matabeleland'. For a few years, therefore, Dr Leander Starr Jameson, Administrator in Matabeleland - so recently blamed by the 'Standard and Diggers' News' of Johannesburg for 'his rash and criminal attack' on the Ndebele - held sway as far as the frontier with Portuguese West Africa, the Congo Free State, German East Africa along the Nyasa-Tanganyika plateau and down the western boundary of the Nyasaland Protectorate, as proclaimed in May 1891. The pace was now set and so it is not surprising to note that, under

107. Ibid: FO to CO, 2/7/94 and 21/2/95.
the terms of the North-western Rhodesia Order in Council, less than a decade later, the Colonial Secretary could 'include within the limits of the Order any parts of Africa north of the Zambesi'.

The mid-nineties were indeed a time of turmoil and terror. 'The Angel of Death', wrote one 'Onlooker', 'hovers over Mashonaland...pointing the finger of scorn at the arch-plotters of the tragedy and all their agents and abettors from London to Cape Town and...to Mashonaland'. To Rhodes's men, however, a dream was being fulfilled that, as the Duke of Fife said, 'thousands of our countrymen who are too crowded here' - in Britain - 'will take advantage of the enormous space, the healthful climate and the immense resources which this territory offers to those who will go in and possess the land'.

This enthusiasm had been engendered in Britain by prophecies, such as that of the London 'Times' in 1889, that all would go well in northern Zambezia under 'a powerful corporation, well-supplied with capital, well-sustained by enterprise and determination, and not unmindful of the duties which English philanthropy owes


110. 'Standard and Diggers' News', op.cit., 26/8/93, letter by 'Onlooker'.

111. RH:MSS.Afr.s.72 BSA Reports to Shareholders - Duke of Fife's speech, to Third Annual Meeting, 19/12/93. Underlining is mine.
to the natives of Central Africa'.\textsuperscript{112} Jameson, reporting to the shareholders in January 1895, told them that the Ndebele were now 'thankful the past regime is over and thoroughly grateful for the protection of the civilized government' of the Company; and that, 'as Mr Rhodes told you, our revenue is now practically balancing our expenditure'.\textsuperscript{113}

The emphasis of the B.S.A. Company's propaganda was insistently upon the benefits of its 'civilising mission'. As Cawston expounded it to 'The Imperial Institute', there had first been four hundred years of the Portuguese presence in Africa, fierce resistance to it and its latter period of 'ruin and decay'; then four hundred months between Livingstone's first journey to the Zambezi and the Berlin Conference; four hundred significant weeks following the discovery of diamonds and gold in South Africa; and now four hundred glorious days of B.S.A.C. enterprise, from 28th October 1889 to 3rd December 1890 with '400 miles of road cut, 400 miles of telegraph laid and 126 miles of railway commenced, completed and opened for traffic'.\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{112} London 'Times' 29/5/89.
\textsuperscript{113} RH:MSS.Afr.s.72 - Fourth Ordinary General Meeting, 18/1/95 - speech by Dr Jameson, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid: s.76 - Lecture by G. Cawston, BSA Director, 30/11/93.
But Cecil Rhodes, himself, with the bluntness of a man made confident by the power of his purse, talked more with the voice of a military commander than of a public relations officer. To him the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, which was watching affairs in 'Rhodesia' with increasing concern, was 'the Aborigines' Destruction Society'. In the same way, he reacted angrily to the Rev. John Mackenzie's criticism of the Company's conduct and to his assertion 'that this is not a white man's country but a black man's country'. On 'native affairs', Rhodes was described by one of his chroniclers as steering 'a middle course between the extremes', namely 'the Dutch view that excludes natives from the Lord's Supper' and the extreme English view that would give Africans 'electoral privileges for which they are quite unprepared'. Rhodes defined his policy thus: 'Either you have to receive them on an equal footing as citizens or you have to call them a subject race. Well, I have made up my mind that there must be class legislation, that there must be Pass Laws and Peace Preservation Acts, and that we have got to treat natives when they are in a state of barbarism, in a different way from ourselves'.

Cecil Rhodes made enemies, and incurred the displeasure of the British Government on various occasions,

most notably in the infamous 'Jameson Raid' of 1896. But his colleagues and agents held him as a hero and saw his greatness in his monarchical conquest of Central Africa and ownership of its soil. Thus when he died, 'The Rhodesia Review' sought to immortalise him in verse:

'It is his will that he look forth
Across the lands he won -
The granite of the ancient north,
Great spaces washed with sun.
There shall he, patient, make his seat
And there awaits a people's feet
In the paths that he prepared.
There, till the vision he foresaw
Splendid and whole arise
And unimagined empires draw
To council neath his skies,
The immense and brooding spirit still
Shall quicken and control
Living, he was the land, and dead 116
His soul shall be her soul'.

116. 'Rhodesian Review' (ed. P. Lindley, 30 Fleet St., London) August 1905, p. 3. Rhodes was buried on the Matopo Hills where he had met Ndebele leaders towards the end of the second Ndebele war, in August 1896 - Ranger, op.cit., pp. 243 ff.
CHAPTER IV

THE REALITIES OF CONQUEST

(a) A further note on fundamental misconceptions

Two non-sequiturs have significantly affected the recording of Zambian history. The first is, as we saw at the outset, that, since in point of time a number of Christian mission stations appeared north of the Zambezi before colonial administrative posts were established, the entry of the agents of Rhodes and of Johnston was a logical development of missionary enterprise and in spiritual affinity with it. We have tried to show from documented sources that Rhodes and his partners had another purpose and another impetus to which they would certainly have responded even if Livingstone and his successors had never appeared on the scene.

The second non-sequitur is that, because Johnston and Rhodes worked so vigorously and swiftly to produce a bundle of 'treaties' purporting to cover the whole of northern Zambezia and because the word 'protectorate' was early prominent in the parlance of their business, the work of treaty-making would be followed by a programme of 'protection'. But we have seen what the major original connotation of 'protection' and 'protectorate' was, and so we now have to review, not a process of philanthropic action, but the conquest and
systematic subjugation of the kingdoms and peoples of the territory. The 'treaty-making' journeys were vital in so far as they armed Her Majesty's Government with the means of asserting her claim to northern Zambezia and so allowed Rhodes's Company to develop its strategy of occupation with minimal risk of conflict on African soil with agents of other Powers. Moreover, whereas Thomson described his 1890 expedition as a venture into an 'unexplored region', the strategy that followed was facilitated by a better knowledge of the terrain and its inhabitants, gained by the men who had moved through it, greeting some of the chiefs and presenting them with blankets and other small gifts.

The historical reconstruction of the period thus helps us to grasp the significance of the words of a contemporary chronicler: 'Mr Rhodes, with Dr Jame-son, visited England in the end of 1894 and succeeded in securing still further concessions confirming the supremacy of himself and the Company. Among other things, he decided to take over the direct administration of the Company's extensive territories north of the Zambesi. The Company is thus unfettered in its enterprise'.

1. Keltie J.S., op.cit., p. 437. This statement was published in 1895. Underlinings are mine.
It would be worthwhile to seek historical parallels for the Zambian situation during the decades of B.S.A.C. rule in various examples of conquest at different moments of history and in different parts of the world. Should this be done, it would be seen that most conquerors are ready, and indeed anxious, to subjugate without bloodshed where subjugation can be effectively attained that way; but that the distinguishing feature of foreign conquest is to be found in the determination to exploit the human and natural resources of the subjugated region for the greatest benefit of the foreign masters. Therefore, as was suggested at the start of this review, we have before us now historical data which make it easier to understand both the determination with which 'white supremacists' struggled to hold Zambia as a profitable sector of a great dominion, and, no less, that counter-determination which finally proved the stronger whereby indigenous 'nationalists' won their independence and proclaimed their sovereignty.

It would, however, be a grave contradiction of the facts of history even to imply that before the colonial conquerors came, 'everything in the garden was lovely'. History is not a series of clean breaks and fresh starts but rather the unending entail of sowing and harvesting, of action and reaction. It is therefore right to look at least briefly at certain aspects
of the situation in northern Zambezia at the moment of the coming of the conquerors from Europe. Cairns, in his 'Prelude to Imperialism', has given us an invaluable and comprehensive study of 'British reactions to Central African Society' covering the fifty years preceding the granting of a Royal Charter to the British South Africa Company. What we now have to do here is to reconstruct a picture of how conditions were north of the Zambezi when Rhodes's thrust began to gain momentum.

In our preliminary review of the processes of 'legitimisation' of British action in Central Africa, consequent upon mounting international tension in Europe, the 'scramble for Africa' and the Berlin Conference, we have had to use written documentary sources deriving from either London or the centres of British enterprise in central and southern Africa. But our major concern here is with the peoples upon whom the impact of annexation fell and so we have now to turn increasingly to Zambian sources. In doing so, we have to reckon with the influence of the bias found in the bulk of European documents, whereby it is hard for the student of the situation to see it other than through European eyes, be they the eyes of colonial agents, missionaries, anthropologists, hunters or sight-seers. We also have to be aware of the bias that readily affects the testimony of people who have been the victims of pressures of superior material power and who have, in
consequence, underlined in their memories, not only the harshness of the rule imposed upon them, but also the rosier aspects of their own situation before that coercive rule began. Nonetheless, it is suggested that Central Africa has been much more seriously affected by the former than by the latter bias. 'Pride of race', wrote the Principal of the Barotse National School, 'makes the Britisher socially blind...I have listened to a Director of Native Education trying to impress a native chief with the announcement that the Governor of the territory had been educated at Eton and he himself at Winchester.'

In seeking to focus the Zambian situation at the turn of the century, as it were from the other side, there is another important point to note, namely, the difference between 'pacification' and peace. While the latter condition should be understood as almost a synonym for prosperity, or at least for well-being, 'pacification', in the history of empires down the ages, has meant the subduing of one group by another and the maintaining of subjugation by superior force adequate to overcome 'rebellion'. Again, peace connotes a situation in which the people participate in the processes of development willingly: whereas under 'pacification' there are generally few, if any, channels for the self-expression of the group that has been brought into


submission. In conditions of genuine peace, people are ready to respect each other's rights and liberties. But 'pacification' usually imposes a diminution of rights if not a denial of them, and a significant curtailment of liberty. These observations are pertinent to our study of B.S.A.C. rule in northern Zambezia.

There are still in Zambia a number of persons, and, indeed, groups of people, who can either recall from their own experiences memories of life at the end of the nineteenth century or record faithfully the reminiscences and comments of their forbears about pre-colonial days. Often such persons will be unable to specify the months and years when recalling events and encounters; but they have kept their memories fresh through, and perhaps in part at least on account of, the multitudinous upheavals of this century. The testimony of such persons varies, of course, from community to community and from district to district. But it is important to set their local records of the conditions of life, as they knew or heard of them, alongside the statements of foreigners. For the moment, while we must be conversant with the statements, for instance, of Francois Coillard and his colleagues about the Lozi, the missionaries of the London Missionary Society in the southern region of Lake Tanganyika, the White Fathers in the northern province, and a host of other Christian agents as well as hunters, traders and Company officials, it is vital to take into account
the testimonies of Zambians about conditions of peace or conflict, poverty or prosperity, industry and trade in as many parts of the country as possible.

The general picture of conditions in the immediately pre-colonial period is one of widespread local conflicts interrupting the life of close-knit societies. In consequence there appeared the regular phenomenon of people grouping together when raiding bands from elsewhere came to seize food, animals and sometimes people, and then separating into family settlements when the external trouble passed. There had thus developed a situation whereby people's interest and conversation dwelt to a great extent upon the doings of their neighbours while they were quick to use any chance to live less close to them. With relatively ample land for the size of the population, in most parts of Zambia, there was little occasion for litigation over land rights and usage. The word 'usufructuary', as we saw above, was used significantly in Lord Haldane's opinion on the Swaziland case of 1926. In its correct connotation it can rightly be used to describe the general pattern of communal economy in pre-colonial Zambia, whereby people shared the 'right to use and profits of

4. E.g. the Mambwe-Ngoni clashes, 1890; the Mwanga-Bemba battle in 1877; Ovumbundu raiding around the Kafue, 1878; Bemga-Ngoni war of 1887; the Ila-Lozi wars of 1870 and 1888; Lovale-Lozi war, 1892; the wide-ranging raiding of the Chikunda along the middle region of the Zambezi, etc., etc.
of property belonging to another without damage to it or waste. To deduce, from such an economic system, that land did not matter much to the people would be manifestly wrong when considering the life of agrarian societies anywhere in the world.

The widespread pattern of what European commentators have generally called 'tribal war' has to be understood in terms of the rivalries of the stronger nations of the region and the consequences, upon smaller nations and groups, of their struggle for hegemony. In such situations, guns and gunpowder were sought wherever they might be found. Thus, from around a hundred interviews with groups and individuals throughout Zambia with whom pre-colonial conditions were discussed, it is clear that 'there was not real peace in the land'. This is the response of a large number of representatives of smaller groups or nations, whereas within a larger state it was apparently easier for peace to prevail. However, from all parts of the country the picture appears of communities closely-knit in respect of, for instance, tributary relations to kings and chiefs, marriage and birth customs, and the detection and punishment of crime. Moreover, the great body of 'lore' associated with the training of the young confirms the picture of structured societies; and pre-colonial

5. See p. 128 above; and H.C. Wyld's 'Universal Dictionary of the English language' for definition of 'usufructuary'. 
societies had a clear sense of what made life fruitful and pleasant. "A good village" said an old man of the Tumbuka people, "is where the headman and the elders are respected by all; and where they too have consideration for all, even the children. It is only a good village where the young respect their parents and where no one tries to harm another. If there is even one person who belittles others or works harm, then the village is spoiled". Perhaps even more significant is the testimony, drawn from many parts of the country that 'in the old days marriage was sound and lasting...because before the couple married they had to receive instruction...from those who...had experience in married life'. This type of evidence confirms the picture of community life maintaining, despite external stresses and internal strains, a fundamental order and cohesion. It is far from that notion of the chaos of savagery in Africa that was purveyed, for a variety of motives, to the British public at the turn of the century. 6

It thus seems sound to assume that, at the time of the European intrusion, Zambian societies were

6. Young T.C., 'Notes on the Customs and Folk-lore of the Tumbuka-Kamanga Peoples!' (Livingstonia 1931), p. 9; and for other early sympathetic studies of African life and social philosophy, see Smith E.W., 'The Secret of the African' (S.C.M. Press, 1929); Young T.C., 'African Ways and Wisdom (U.S.C.L. 1937); and also P. Tempels 'Bantu Philosophy', (Presence Africaine 1952); Mbiti J.S. 'African Religion and Philosophy' (Heinemann 1969); and RI/Yaphet Mugara, 22/12/66 and many others.
not decimated by the conflicts which persistently interrupted the rhythm of life. Obviously the degree of centralisation of authority varied greatly, as is shown vividly by contrasting, for example, the Lozi government under King Lewanika with the Tonga groups of the Gwembe valley; the militarised regime of the Ngoni with their weaker neighbours; the Bemba of Chitimukulu with the Mwanga, Mambwe and Lungu among whom heads of families played such important roles; the kingdom of Kazembe with the little chiefdoms in the area between his Luunda state and the Zaire Pedicle; and the kingdoms of the Luvale and southern Lunda with the Ila-Kaonde groups. But nonetheless the picture is of a number of states of different degrees of strength and internal authority; and this is borne out by the fact that, despite the casualness and confusion of the data of the 'treatymakers', the African Lakes Company, Sir Harry Johnston, Joseph Thomson, Alfred Sharpe and indeed Carl Wiese, all attempted to authenticate their transactions by citing the names of 'kings', 'paramount chiefs' and 'chiefs'.

Pre-colonial African trade is now receiving the attention of scholars and it is becoming clear that, at least along certain important routes, there was a movement of various types of merchandise, some of which involved the region of Zambia in trade with the sea-boards of east and west Africa. In this trans-continental traffic, certain regions of modern Zambia appear
to have played significant roles, such as 'Urenje' north of the middle reaches of the Zambezi; and there were Yao and Bisa caravans, carrying copper and ivory, linking Kazembe's kingdom to the Indian Ocean, well into the second half of last century. 7

The 'trade' of the region which, however, especially attracted the attention of explorers, missionaries and others and which appeared in official statements from the proceedings of the Berlin Conference to the despatches and memoranda of B.S.A.C. agents in northern Zambezia, was 'the slave trade'. David Livingstone regarded it as 'the open sore of Africa' and four months before his death he recorded his prayer for its abolition. 'If the Good Lord above...permits me to put a stop to the enormous evils of this inland Slave Trade, I shall bless His name with all my heart'. 8

Horror at the slave-trade, renounced a few decades earlier by Britain and other European countries, increased greatly in response to Livingstone's call for

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7. See Gray R. and Birmingham D. (eds.) 'Pre-Colonial African Trade - Essays on Trade in Central and Eastern Africa before 1900' (Oxford 1970), and esp. Chaps. 10, pp. 202-230 and 11 pp. 231-242; and Renault F. 'Lavigerie, l'esclavage Africaine et l'Europe' (De Boccard, Paris 1971), Rome I, p. 11. Note that 'Urenje' which may have been the country of the Lenje, had diminished in importance considerably by the end of the century.

8. Macnair J.I. 'Livingstone the Liberator' (Collins 1940), p. 352 quoting a letter of Livingstone to his brother; and see, e.g., his description of a slave caravan in Tabwa country as he moved WSW to Lake Mweru in 1867, 'Last Journals', ed. H. Waller (Murray 1874), Vol I, pp. 239-40.
international action to end the traffic in human beings. Early missionaries and agents of imperial expansion north of the Zambezi added their own accounts to what Livingstone had said about the ravages of slavery and so it quickly began to be regarded in Europe as the distinguishing feature of 'savagery' in Africa. 9

Sir Harry Johnston, however, was less convinced, and his utterances did not always support his official despatches on the subject. In 1894 he reported that while 'the great Makua race which occupies the bulk of the country between Nyasaland and the east coast does not go in, to any great extent, for slavery...the worst sinners are the Awemba, the Angoni, the Yaos and the Black Portuguese. The Arabs and the Wanyamwezi do a great deal of harm in the north and it may certainly be said...that the Arabs are the backbone of the Slave Trade. If the Arabs were entirely expelled from Central Africa, the Wanyamwezi and other native races would soon be reduced to a condition of law and order'. He went on significantly: 'The Arab represents in their eyes a kind of rival civilisation to that of the white man...which is of a much easier nature for the native mind to accept and assimilate'. Johnston kept the Foreign Office informed of his operations against

9. See, e.g. pp. 75-76 above.
slave-traders and Salisbury responded by conveying the Queen's congratulations. 10

In his earlier report of the Nyasa-Tanganyika Expedition of 1889-90, he had compared the Ngoni to the East African Masai as 'devastators' and declared that 'the utmost misdeeds of the Arabs have not occasioned one-hundredth part of the misery and bloodshed and desolation' wrought by them. Yet the assessment of the Ngoni given in a major study of the 'mfecane' (the time of conflict and dispersion in the Zulu empire in the 1820's) and its consequences, describes the Ngoni intrusions north of the Zambezi as 'a terrible disaster for the peoples of East-Central Africa...(which) combined with the effects of the expanding Arab Slave Trade to bring a long era of peaceful existence to a violent end. Almost every people in the whole vast area between Lake Bangweulu and the Indian Ocean was affected'. 'The Arabs', Johnston said, 'have had little wars in Konde' - northern Malawi - 'where they tried to conquer the land and failed and were not in so doing wickeder than we have been in many of our acquirements of territory. They have squabbled and fought and become friends again with the Alungu. We have to remember', Johnston urged, 'that the Arabs are in Central

10. BM-SP, 1894, LVII (C.7504) Report by Commissioner Johnston on First three years of British Central Africa, 31/3/94, p. 773; and 1896, LVIII (C.7925) Johnston's despatch on 'operations against slave traders' 13/11/95; with Foreign Secretary's message of congratulation, 14/2/96.
Africa both as wandering merchants and as settlers, rulers and colonists and we have got to deal with them as they are... The real way to combat the Slave Trade... is not to quarrel with the Arabs... but to get the Arabs to join you... in subduing and taming irrational and blood-thirsty wild beasts... like the Angoni, Zulus, the Wa-Wemba (sic)... and all the hundred and one races of negro robbers'. The Ngoni, however, Johnston said, 'dis­courage the Slave Trade and are not very partial to the Swahili traders', which, as we saw above, was contra­dicted by what he was to report in 1894 and 1897. The B.S.A. Company, in its report to shareholders, quoted Thomson's description of the Ngoni as "most industrious... willing to turn their hand to anything" and that he knew of "no other place in Africa so thoroughly well supplied with eager, industrious men as yet unspoiled by gin and a too-paternal government". 11

Johnston's view, expressed in 1894,, that 'the presence of Arabs is incompatible with the intro­duction of European civilisation and, sooner or later, the Arabs must go from Central Africa...(because) they are adventurers of the worst type', suggests that

imperial strategy, rather than a discovery of the evil of Arab behaviour, was guiding his thinking. For now, he claimed, 'the salvation of Central Africa will be found in the introduction of the Indian trader and agriculturist...so that he may fill up the gap between the two extremes', namely, the white master and the African labourer. 12

Johnston's initial sympathy with the colonising and commercial motives of the Arabs was supported by Alfred Swann, the L.M.S. missionary pioneer who joined the B.S.A.P. Administration in 1894. Though the title of Swann's book, 'Fighting the Slave Hunters in Central Africa', suggests that the author was a convinced crusader, his correspondence with mission headquarters reveals a far from hostile attitude to Arabs and their presence in Central Africa. Indeed, in his book, having declared that he held 'no brief either for Congo State officials or Arabs', he described 'the wealthy Arabs' as 'courteous, sensible adventurers, so far as the common rules of life are concerned, ever ready to assist white men'. 13 His missionary colleagues were generally anti-Arab and saw them as ruthless exploiters; 14

14. E.g. CCWM, CéAfrican Letters, Box 7, Dr Tomory 30/5/87; D.P. Jones, 26/2/88; Box 8, R.S.Wright, 4/3/90; A. Carson (Secy.) 9/12/92, blaming Swann's 'policy of trying to keep in with the Arabs'.

but Swann reported with sympathy what Tip-pi-Tip (sic) asked him personally: "How did you get India? Was it not by force?...What would you say if Arabs went and denied your rights? Things you continually do are an abomination to us". In his anger against Henry M. Stanley's 'gross' aims and 'detestable' actions Swann made himself an unofficial peace-maker with the infuriated Arabs. While enjoying 'the promised protection of my friend Mohamed bin Khaffan', Swann was angered by news of British praise for Stanley and his contract with Hamed bin Muhamed (alias Tippo Tib); for such a deal could not 'erase the track of blood made by white men' or 'open hearts to listen to the white man's story of Jesus who loves Peace and Goodwill'.

A considerable number of Zambian sources present a view of the Arabs which portrays them first and foremost as traders. Inasmuch as it was their custom to call first at the court of the king or chief, who was of course the keeper of all ivory belonging to his state, the Arab traders are specifically regarded as 'not coming with war'. Over large tracts of the country and at many periods of time, it seems that they conducted their dealings with local rulers formally and with a recognition of reciprocity. Having come with merchandise of various kinds, they exchanged their goods for ivory and the local rulers then supplied them with

15. Ibid: Box, 8, A. Swann, 20/6/90, 31/8/91 and Jan. 1892.
174.

press-ganged porters to carry the ivory away.

The brutality and agony of the experiences of those enslaved carriers seems to have made relatively little mark on the local communities or by way of bereaving families in the villages because, from the testimony of numerous Zambian informants, the rulers generally provided as porters persons who were either prisoners-of-war or convicts, people who were already virtual slaves in the status of outlaws and likely to be forgotten quickly. Informants acknowledged the cruelty of slave-porterage but did not regard the Arabs as having generally 'made war' upon local communities. While Arab traders were known over wide tracts of the north and east of the territory as Balungwana, in the central and southern regions the name Banasala is still most often used. Among the African groups who took an active part in rounding up slaves in the Luangwa-Zambezi confluence area, local testimony speaks of the Achawa (Yao) and the Baluya. In the western and northwestern regions of modern Zambia Mambari, as either partners or employees of the Portuguese, were the main slave agents, while west of Zumbo the Chikunda appear to have developed slave-raiding under the leadership of Afro-Portuguese living on the southern banks of the
Zambezi. 16 Joseph Thomson's comment on the extent and conduct of the slave-trade merits quotation here: 'In the interior', he said, 'slavery goes on unchecked... Yet, through the wide area of country I traversed (in 1890), I saw hardly any signs of its existence and of its atrocities witnessed practically none'. On the major routes of the traffic, he added, 'the main object is to get at a very cheap rate, carriers for ivory who will practically entail no expense for feeding and clothing...The traffic in slaves alone would never repay the traders, the main value...simply being that they act as unpaid carriers'. 17

Of course, there was obviously not one pattern of conduct on the part of the Arab traders and their agents. There must have been numerous instances when, in Johnston's phraseology, they 'squabbled' with local rulers and communities and much worse; when their agents, perhaps in order to bring to the required number gangs of slaves depleted by hunger, disease or death,

16. RI with e.g. Soli Chief Shikabeta of Rufunsa and others, 2-5/9/74; Zebron Sambwa, Serenje, 16/10/73; Yakobe Lusuma, Serenje 16/10/73; Nansala Manyeta, Mailo, Serenje, 15/10/73; Simon Ngulube, Mbuluma, 4/9/74; Albino Ngulube, and others, Zarupango, Kabandwe, 4/9/74; Dixon Kabunda, Kamushimi Mponda, Daniel Mwape, Mayengo and the Chief at Mukupa Katandula, 24-27/11/74; Verishoni Tembo's group, Chipata, 4/3/75; Sam Banda, Chadiza, 8/3/75; Kuyenda Phiri, Katete, 12/3/75; Senior Chief Nya­mphande, Petauke, 15/3/75; Nyathande Chirwa, Petauke, 17/3/75; People of Sitambuli, Petauke, 19/3/75; etc., etc.

raided villages and left scenes of havoc and mourning behind. Moreover, there are records extant of armed encounters between Arabs and local rulers such as the situation which Livingstone found in Tabwa country in August, 1867, when the Arab Hamees seriously clashed with Nsama. And missionaries' reports from the Luangwa and Shire regions give a horrific picture of what happened when local rulers participated actively in rounding up men, women and children as slaves and selling them into the slave-masters' yokes. Along the borders of Angola and Mozambique, Portuguese agents were also heavily committed to the traffic in human beings, despite the ending of official Portuguese trading in slaves in 1878. It is clear, therefore, that the stability and prosperity of many of the states of northern Zambezia was being gravely damaged by this traffic at the time of the implementation of Rhodes's northward thrust; and there must have been not a few inhabitants of the region of modern Zambia who were transported to Brazil and to Persia, never to return. Moreover, the recorded prices paid for slaves in Malawi in the 1880s indicate a very low regard for human life, on the part of the traders: 'a strong young man was valued at 40 yards of calico', 'a young unmarried school girl' at 56 yards; 'a young mother', at 36 plus 4 yards.

for her child; 'an elderly man or woman' at 4 and 'a toothless old man' at only 2 yards. 19

On the general question of the degree of tranquility or disturbance in the various parts of northern Zambezia around 1890 local testimony and, for example, missionary reports do not seem to be significantly at variance. Around Niamkolo on Lake Tanganyika, the country of the Lungu was described by an L.M.S. mission doctor as 'lovely' with 'beautiful water, plenty food, cattle in abundance, milk both goats' and cows' ad nauseam and charming scenery'. 20 But a few years earlier, Alexander Carson of the same mission had passed through the Nyasa-Tanganyika plateau on his way from Quelimane to Niamkolo, and had described villages as 'filthy' with gardens of 'cassava, beans and tobacco' close to the village stockades. The situation was aggravated by the intermittent and stealthy attacks of Bemba raiders in league with the forces of 'the Arab Mlozi' who was based at Karonga at the north end of Lake Malawi. 21

19. See Gray and Birmingham, op.cit., p. 177; and NLS 7905 Folios 3-9, 'The Livingstonia Mission', by J.C. White, Mission Committee Convener, Glasgow, 18/1/86; and missionary reports, such as 'Twenty Years' Review of the Livingstonia Mission' 1895 (NLS, 7905 Folio 85); correspondence of the L.M.S. missionaries (CCWM, C.Afr. letters and reports for period); diaries of Arthur Baldwin, 1890 ff. (MMS); Coillard F., op.cit., relevant references; etc., etc.

20. CCWM, C.Afr. letters, 1878-89, Dr Tomory, Niamkolo 30/5/87 (Box 7).

As the writings of Alfred Swann show, missionaries in the north were very concerned about the possibility of a large-scale conflict, 'a second Soudan War', being provoked by the activities of 'the Anglo-Belgian Anti-Slavery party' and Cardinal Lavigerie of the White Fathers Mission. 'Some madmen seem to be pressing into Africa', wrote Dr Mather from Niamkolo at the end of 1892, 'with an absurd idea that the slave-trade is to be stopped by force'.

The southern end of Lake Tanganyika and the north end of Lake Malawi, linked by the consequently disturbed corridor, thus presented a situation very similar to that of the region of central Malawi where major clashes between Yao and other agents of the 'Arabs' and the armed forces of 'anti-slavery' were increasing in frequency and ferocity at the same period.

Yet other contemporary records speak of rural prosperity. The German Moravians who began work in 1890 in the Ngonde kingdom and the Nyakyusa country north-west of it, in the hilly region at the northern end of Lake Malawi, described villages as making 'a pleasant impression. If culture be defined as the conquest of nature and its subjugation to the service of

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22. Ibid: 1890-92, Box 8, A.J. Swann, Jan. 1892; and Dr Mather, 2/11/92.

man, these tribes have attained a considerable degree of civilisation... Often the villages are open and one may walk through banana plantations beside the houses for half an hour or more... Special attention is paid to the sheds for the cattle... (which) are well smoked out to rid them of mosquitoes and other insect pests'. The "sultans" of the region generally were, the Moravians reported, 'respectable, peace-loving men possessed of good sense in matters pertaining to their rule'.

Similarly, Joseph Thomson's biography gives his impression of Mpezeni's country as 'interesting in the extreme... in its charmingly picturesque variety... a teeming population, and the appearance on every hand of vast flocks and herds'.

Thomson himself also described villages of the northern country above Lake Malawi as clean and well-swept, 'their domestic utensils, pots, etc. were kept scrupulously washed and free of dirt', the houses 'worked prettily with rounded bricks and daubed symmetrically with spots, the tout ensemble... worthy of a place in any nobleman's garden'. Further westwards in Mambwe country, 'Huts were being rethatched and repaired and a general air of industry pervaded and the natives could hardly spare sufficient time to come and

24. Hamilton J.T., 'Twenty Years of Pioneer Missions in Nyasaland - a History of Moravian Missions in German East Africa' (S.P.G. 1912), pp. 31-33.
and stare at us. The people of Mambwe', Thomson noted, 'employed a wonderful variety of materials for the purposes of clothing'. This he contrasted sharply with the condition of the Nyika people not far away whose 'huddled' houses, with cattle 'brought within the stockade' and with the 'filth...never removed', because of 'the almost constant state of warfare'. Johnston's report of his 1889-90 expedition corroborates this picture when he described how he 'hurried on' to the south end of Lake Tanganyika by way of 'the pleasant lands of Wunyamwanga (sic) and Mambwe'.

In summary, it is clear that where war swept across the country, life in villages was poor and unstable. The north-western regions, where the Lunda, Ndembu, Luvale and other related peoples lived, appear to have presented such an aspect. But, whether stability belonged to a strong kingdom that did not fear attack or to small family clusters whose home-lands lay beyond the routes of raiding armies, when people were able to live without fear of war, life prospered. Indeed, this is an axiom of human life anywhere in the world. In northern Zambia, therefore, as the forces of British imperial expansion moved in, they encountered varying patterns of peace and of conflict in the

vast tract they had wrested from the equally covetous appetites of Germany, Portugal and the Belgian king.

(b) The first Missionaries - Successors of David Livingstone

The annals of Christian missionary enterprise north of the Zambezi are fairly voluminous, and it is not our concern here to recount the story of the planting of mission stations, the beginning of village schools and of medical work, nor to trace the development of missions through the earlier period of 'spheres of influence' into the years that witnessed both rivalries and movements towards cooperation through such bodies as the General Missionary Conference. 29 We shall have occasion later to note the reactions of some individual missionaries and of some missionary bodies to the B.S.A. Company's rule. But, for the moment, we have to try to assess, in a summary way, the first impact of such agencies and their early relations with local communities, and to note their chronological relation to the establishment of what B.S.A.C. men often called 'civilised government'.

The appearance of missionaries north of the Zambezi can be said to have been a direct continuation of Livingstone's endeavours. The Universities' Mission to Central Africa, born from his address to the University of Cambridge in 1857, sent its first missionaries to the Shire Highlands in 1861. Fourteen years later and two years after his death, the Free Church of Scotland founded the Livingstonia Mission at Cape Maclear on Lake Malawi in 1875, and a year later the Blantyre mission field of the Established Church of Scotland was opened in the Shire Highlands. Then in 1878 Francois Coillard, of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society of various Reformed Churches of Europe, made a brief visit to the Zambezi from Lesotho. Another three years later, agents of Livingstone's own organisation, the London Missionary Society, came down Lake Tanganyika to the estuary of the River Lofu where they established a foothold in 1883. Frederick Arnot, a Plymouth Brother, having settled at Lewanika's capital at Lealui in 1882, started a small school for children of the Lozi court in 1883. Meanwhile, Jesuit missionaries visited Lewanika briefly in 1881 and 1883, a year before Coillard came to open his first station at Sisheke on the Zambezi.

In the year of the Berlin Conference, the L.M.S. moved to Niamkolo on Lake Tanganyika and the next decade saw the expansion of their work, parallel to the P.E.M.S. expansion in the south. Meanwhile, the
Primitive Methodists appeared in Lozi territory, seeking Lewanika's permission to settle in Ila country. The Roman Catholic White Fathers of the Algerian mission of Cardinal Lavigerie founded Mambwe Mission on the Nyasa-Tanganyika plateau in 1891, followed by Kayambi in 1895 and Chilubula and Chilonga in 1899. At last in 1893, the Primitive Methodists began to live among the Ila, while the Scots Free Church missionaries moved up the Nyasa-Tanganyika plateau in late 1894, from the ill-fated site at Chirenje in Ibanda, to open Mwenzo Mission among the Mwanga, where the African Lakes Company already had a post. Then, as more stations were sited by the missions already established, South African agents of the Dutch Reformed Church of the Orange Free State opened a station at Magwero in Mpezeni's country in the last year of the century.

In January of the year of his death, Livingstone had the experience of finding a local ruler and his people near Lake Bangweulu barring themselves into their stockade at his approach. In his diary he jotted these words: 'The terror guns have inspired is extreme'.

As the trade in ivory and slaves increased across northern Zambezia, the flow of guns and gunpowder also increased and indeed Gann, referring to events in Katanga in 1891, says that when 'the old condottiere', Msidi,

'was killed in a scuffle...his gunpowder kingdom quickly disintegrated'. But the appearance of the most modern firearms in the possession of almost all the white men who arrived in the region should not be overlooked in any attempt to assess how black-white relations developed in the years of 'the scramble'. It was a fact that a notable number of missionaries wanted to see British rule imposed to enable their work to develop under its protection and that some of them were ready to support the 'pacification' of areas of turbulence to this end. It was also a fact that many, if not most of them, carried guns. One such, in the Luapula district, was known as 'Chengamasase' because he seemed to have an endless supply of bullets. It is therefore understandable that, in a number of cases, 'People did not view the European missionary as being different from the Boma administrator. They thought they were the same and had the same aims of ruling the country'.

Missionaries, working under pressure to erect buildings in which to live and from which to start their evangelism, often had little time for the painstaking work of learning local modes of thought and speech.

All the early missionary chronicles tell of the severe

31. Gann, op.cit., p. 64.
32. RI/William Kawandami and Aaron Mwenya, Mbereshi, 9/5/73, including reference to the nickname of Adam Purvis, pioneer L.M.S. missionary at Mbereshi.
incidence of malaria and other diseases and of a high death-rate. In situations in which they were received constantly with suspicion by people who were therefore loth to respond to calls for labour, many of them became angry quickly and mutual confidence and respect were hard to cultivate. It may have been the case that most of them, when they arrived in the country, had little or no idea of the long history of brutality that had characterised the activities of white men in Africa. Nor perhaps would they expect the people among whom they sought to settle - people who seemed materially so deficient and so different from themselves in the outward expressions of social morality - to be aware of the unsavoury reputation of white men in distant parts of the continent. In consequence, the early annals of numerous missions make sad reading in terms of human relations, the local people and the foreign agents of the churches being equally tempted to make generalised judgments upon each other on racial grounds.

Francois Coillard's massive book about his experiences and labours in the Lozi kingdom reveals a consistently low view of local life and behaviour. Chroniclers of the Paris Mission have recorded that Coillard described Sisheke, where his colleague Jean-mairet founded a station in 1885, as 'le bourbier du désespoir' the slough of despond. And Coillard told a meeting in Exeter Hall in 1898 that there was 'a mal-ediction upon the land of Africa', expanding his idea
thus: 'They themselves when they speak of their own joy, say that their hearts are white, but when they speak of their sorrow, they say that their hearts are black. Yes! Black like their skins and thus they carry with them the symbol of sorrow from the cradle even unto the grave'.

This note of revulsion is even more dominant in the diaries of Arthur Baldwin of the Primitive Methodists, who found himself quarrelling with people who, for example, could not understand why he refused to buy food from them 'on the Lord's Day'. One entry, in 1891, reads thus: 'Had a long chat with Mr Goy... when he was telling me about the great immorality of the people'. Coillard told him, Baldwin recorded, that 'people here don't marry, the men take women and cast them off at will - the whole country is a cesspool of immorality'. In the dreary months of waiting for Lewanika's permission to enter the country of the Shukulumbwe or Ila, Baldwin's daily experiences continued to be bitter. 'I have never met with lying so flagrant', he wrote, 'so odious and so hideous as here...You can catch a boy red-handed in a deed and he will...avow with oaths that he wasn't doing it...I many times think they will need to be ruled with a rod of

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Iron before a change is effected'. A few months before leaving Lozi territory to open a station near the Kafue, he made this jotting: 'I have heard Mr Coillard say he has never preached a single sermon on "Love" since coming into the country, for this side of the people's nature is so dead that an appeal to it at present would be useless'.

In the north, where Commissioner Johnston in 1892 gave permission to the Lakes Company to sell guns and ammunition to the White Fathers in view of Bemba raiding, the Bemba chief Mwamba reported that the Arabs were warning his people against the sorcery of the Europeans. The general atmosphere of suspicion was worsened by missionary antipathies, which died hard. As late as 1923, a Native Commissioner in the Chilanga area blamed the Roman Catholic Jesuits, Wesleyan Methodists, Seventh Day Adventist and Dutch Reformed missionaries for opening village schools 'in rivalry with one another and hawking the word of God in competition' to such an extent that 'this method of proselytising has to stop or schools will be closed'.

In 1892 the White Fathers, shocked at seeing an English missionary passing with 'une tente speciale' under which 'il abrite son serail de negresses' were angered by the Englishman's question as to 'combien nous avons de femmes'. The early antipathy between Protestant and Roman Catholic missionaries appears constantly.

34. MMS: Baldwin Diaries, 22/2/91, 1/4/91, 8/3/92, 18/5/92, 5/3/93.
in their letters and reports. Swann of the L.M.S. believed that Cardinal Lavigerie's crusade against the slave trade was an 'idiotic plan' designed to hoodwink Protestants 'by posing as the champion of anti-slavery, all the while obtaining means and an army of practical, zealous, cunning Jesuits whom he has insinuated into every open channel thro' this continent...to tear up every Protestant mooring'. On their part, the White Fathers claimed that Johnston's administration found the Scots missionaries 'bien encombrants', called the Mwenzo missionaries 'nos voisins et adversaires', and were to urge later that 'les ministres de l'erreur...les protestants' should not be allowed into Bemba country.

The White Fathers had earlier recorded, with disapproval the passage of a great British caravan, with five or six white men and many armed soldiers who were accompanied by some Protestant missionaries going towards Lake Mweru. But in common with other missionaries they were given to generalised judgments on traits of cruelty in local character, while their houses, in which all manner of white men were received as guests, were closed to all forms of social intercourse with local people, as was indeed the case with most missionary dwellings. 35

This fact of history has to be noted in order to reconstruct situations in which the development of reciprocal relations of friendship and trust was severely hampered. The subsequent history of missionary activity presents a varied pattern of success and failure. Undoubtedly, however, this factor of reciprocal aversion made it difficult for missionaries, despite the demands of the 'ministry of reconciliation' upon them, to be interpreters, let alone spokesmen, of African unhappiness and resentment in race of the oppressive rule of Rhodes's Company.

Alexander Carson of the L.M.S. formed the opinion in 1886 that white men were welcome on the Nyasa-Tanganyika plateau for 'Happily as yet the white man is associated with justice and mercy'; and he hoped that 'distant may be the time when one shall degrade his reputation...before these children of nature'. But after a German had been murdered 'by Penza's people' in 1889, the missionaries at Fwambo found 'a large number of Penza men' very suspicious lest they had 'sent for "war from Tanganyika and Nyasa"'; namely, soldiers and guns to avenge the death. 'When we assured them that we had done nothing of the kind, they left...dancing and shouting vigorously, 'Tuli ana ya Muzungu - We are children of the white man''. The L.M.S. situation was meanwhile complicated by the persistent ill-feeling between some of the staff of British origin and the
Jamaicans, Mr and Mrs Hemans, who had been sent to the Tanganyika field with the idea that people of African stock might significantly promote the growth of the mission. The Hemanses, however, believed that they were treated unfairly: they had been accommodated on board the 'Oriental', which took the missionary party to Zanzibar, in 'the 2nd class compartment...not better than a pigs' sty' while their white colleagues travelled first-class. In their work in the field they were conscious of jealousy directed against them because the Lungu people 'know we are of their race...say we are relatives...and their hearts tell them to come to us in preference'. Two years later, Hemans reported that the Bemba chief Ponde had invited him to work among his people but added: "I do not want to see the white man...I want the one of my own colour...he will be my friend". About the same time, an English missionary remarked that 'the people are delighted at our settling among them. They think white men, however situated, must be a protection to them. Besides they see in our advent the prospect of calico and beads. As to the message we bear, one nowhere meets with natives who are anxious to hear it'.

36. CCWM: C.Afr. letters, Box 3, 1880-86, A. Carson's Report, 4/7/86; Box 7, 1878-89, Jones, Fwambo, 18/11/89, and Hemans, 1/12/88; Box 8, 1890-92, Hemans, Niamkolo, 6/1/92; Hemans, 8/10/94 and Jones, Fwambo, 25/10/94.
During this period, as we noted, Scots missionaries were now established in Malawi and moving westwards into Zambia. The Livingstonia Mission leader, Dr Robert Laws, met Rhodes at the Cape in 1894 and thereafter arrangements were made for 'grants' of land to the mission, in view of '20 years' service and an expenditure of £90,000...for the advancement of the country and especially of its native inhabitants'.

Nine years earlier, however, there had been clashes between some of the staff, notably Dr William Elmslie, and agents of the A.L.C. Elmslie was angered by the rudeness of Stevenson and Stuart to the Ngoni 'Prime Minister and his councillors' and their crude attempts to secure 'treaties' thereby. By 1895, Alexander Dewar, the founder of Mwenzo Mission, was complaining that 'the Administration not only does nothing for us but weakened our influence and lowered the prestige of the Government'. However Laws, in expressing reluctance to move into Chitimukulu's country in view of the power and number of the Bemba remarked that he 'should not be at all surprised though the Maxim guns of the B.S.A.C. yet put an end to their barbarous misrule'.

Initially, as we noted with reference to other districts, Dewar

37. NLS: 7876, Laws to Major Forbes, 24/8/95; Elmslie to Smith, Foreign Mission Secretary, Edinburgh, 20/8/85; 7878, Folio 30, Dewar to Smith, 12/1/95; Folio 281, Laws to Smith, 4/10/95.
found the Mwanga people 'uncooperative and needing constant supervision' as he attempted to establish himself at Mwenzo. 38

'When the missionaries came, they were kind... very good people. Whenever they met Africans, they welcomed them and lived together peacefully... and the people demanded that they should learn the local languages... And when you entered the stores of Mandala - the African Lakes Company - 'even there you were well received'. This was the memory of men in Isoka district who were young at that time. It was 'when other companies began to arrive that things turned very bad'. 39

Their account of the beginnings of Mwenzo Mission is reinforced by the statement of a man who accompanied Dewar to Scotland in the first years of this century, Benjamin Kanyungulu Sikombe. 'It was like this', he recalled in 1954. 'Before Europeans came... there existed soothsayers who used to foretell that there would arrive in the country certain people from the north. They appealed to the people to welcome these strangers... One day a certain European arrived at Mwenzo... Rev. Alexander Dewar... After he had rested for some days, the villagers started constructing a pole and dagga shelter for him near the village... Every evening, when

38. Livingstonia Papers (by courtesy of Professor Shepperson, Edinburgh) - Dewar, Mwenzo, 17/9/94.
people had returned from their fields, he visited the village to chat with the people and introduce the word of God to them. In turn, the villagers told him of their traditional beliefs and customs. Sikombe's long statement included the memory of how 'if there was a funeral in the village, Dewar would be present himself mourning with the people'.

From the outset, of course, missionaries knew that they were going to be involved in dangerous and delicate situations. The 'Instructions to Lake Nyassa Mission Party', issued in 1875 by the Free Church of Scotland make this very clear, and were fairly comprehensive. For instance, wages for native porters and labourers were to 'be fixed at first at the very lowest amount for which porterage can be obtained' because it would be 'simply impossible to develope (sic) an industrial settlement with high rates for passing into and out of the country'. Therefore 'about sixpence a-day ought to be amply sufficient'. The missionaries were urged 'to gain the confidence of the natives by letting it be widely known what your real objects are...the grand leading object of your Mission, which is the enlightenment of their minds, the salvation of their souls and...the elevation of their character and the improvement of their general condition, individual and social'. But they were expressly warned, in reference to dealings

40. B.K. Sikombe, written statement given to me, 18/10/54. Sikombe would be aged about 30 when Dewar arrived.
with the slave trade of a rule which was 'absolute and to be scrupulously observed...that active interference by force initiated on you side is in no case...to be resorted to...the only case in which fire-arms can be justifiably used will be in self defence or in case of actual attack...but under all circumstances...it will be better to try the effect of conciliation, forbearance and patient endurance to the uttermost...Livingstone's journals will be found to supply some excellent examples of what is here indicated...remember that simple acts of kindness and courtesy are never thrown away, even on a savage people'.

Very soon after establishing their first stations, however, missionaries found themselves involved in matters which were referred to as 'civil jurisdiction'. Allegations of brutality, involving execution by firing squad - which led reputedly to a declaration of war against the Mission by a chief related to the victim - house burning and flogging, brought the Blantyre Mission under serious censure in 1880. The L.M.S. Mission at the south end of Lake Tanganyika also suffered from charges of flogging, with one missionary sometimes blaming another, which undoubtedly generated suspicion.

41. NLS, 7904, Folios 1-2.
in the minds of the local communities. Baldwin's diaries from the Lozi and Ila areas meanwhile tell of numerous occasions on which blows were exchanged with 'insolent' people who had been recruited as labourers; of news, in 1891, that 'Setunda with his troops was starting out again for Sesheke...with the intention of murdering the missionaries, carrying off their wives and all their goods'; of the thrashing of himself and another white man for having entered the courtyard of the Lozi Queen unbidden, 'intending to become masters of the country'; and of an order from Lewanika to his headman 'to stop all the boys from working for the Missionaries'. It was in that time of troubles that Baldwin, by way of diversion, 'had a long read at General Booth's "Darkest England"'.

Baldwin's senior companion, Henry Buckenham, had a fight one day in 1893 with a dagga-smoker and 'taught the urchin a lesson'. But, said Baldwin, 'There is no justice in this country and an appeal to Lewanika would avail us nothing...This country is a British Protectorate but we might as well be living on the moon for all the protection we have...The King's

43. CCWM: C.Afr. letters 1890-92, Box 8, Hemans, 6/1/92; 1903-04, Box 12, Ernest Clark, Feb. 1904, against Hemans in long-protracted case; and Secretary, Kambole, 7/12/29 ref. charges of flogging during building of stone church at Niamkolo.

Likhombura (sic)... - his household - are bitter against us and are constantly urging him to allow them to pounce on us... They hate us and the gospel... They want traders and mechanics, not missionaries'. The tense situation in which the Methodist agents were trying to establish themselves was aggravated by the problem of language. As Buckenham and Baldwin at last moved into Ila country, Baldwin recounted a bitter clash with labourers who showed 'insolence' by eating outside his door. But, he wrote, 'I could not understand their Seshukulumbwe'. Yet in a typical crisis, he gave 'liberty to our boys' to beat a suspected thief with a sjambok and administered a number of such thrashings himself. 45 What concerns us here is not to attempt to adjudge whether justice lay on the side of the missionaries or the people who clashed with them. What matters is that, when the B.S.A.C. came in to seize control of the territory, white-black relations already existing were far from happy and cooperative. 46

In retrospect the attitudes of missionaries to the intrusion of European 'power', no less than to

45. Ibid: 28/2/93, 3/3/93, 8/2/94, 9/2/94, 6/5/95, 28/5/95; and note the Lozi name for the Ila, Mashukulumbwe (language Sishukulumbwe), in reference to their habit of wearing their hair bound in a long conical shape and held by clay.

the problems of their own relation to the indigenous political and social systems of the region, may seem ambivalent. Undoubtedly, however, the behaviour of most missionaries was influenced by their belief that, as agents of the Christian Gospel, they should not engage in 'political' activity. Coillard was described by Edwin Smith of the Primitive Methodists as 'a man who dreaded interfering with political matters'. And, in the L.M.S. field in 1890 there was heated controversy over Alfred Swann's involvement in Johnston's 'treaty-making' endeavours; Carson the Secretary asserting that 'during the existence of our Missions in Central Africa, the Arabs, European travellers and the natives have been persistently told that we have no connection with politics...it is largely due to this that we are being tolerated by the Arabs'.

There is available a large amount of comment concerning the missionary pioneers. Here it must suffice to note that it proved very difficult for reciprocal relations to be established between foreign church agents and their African 'parishioners', and that while suspicion and apprehension still existed on both sides, the irruption of the forces of imperialist annexation took place. So we conclude this sketchy comment with

47. MMS: Papers of Rev. Edwin Smith, Box 4; Notes by Smith on 'Barotse Country'; and CCWM, C.Afr. letters, Box 8, Carson to Wardlaw Thomson, London 2/8/90.
words from the Blantyre Mission which recalled Livingstone's observation about the 'terror' of guns. A letter in the mission news-sheet, 'Life and Work', in late 1893, describing the battle between Johnston's troops and the people of Chief Mkanda over their resistance to tax collection, spoke of a 'scene of horrible grandeur...Natives rushing from their burning houses, the wail of distressed and flying women, the flames of burning huts shooting into the sky with clouds of smoke and crack of rifle'. Missionaries throughout northern Zambezia were to be witnesses of the strategy of 'effective occupation'.

(c) 'Champagne Bottles'- The Day of the Maxim Gun and Martini Rifle.

As is the case with many types of human endeavour, the enterprise of the imperialists developed its own cryptic slang. Thus in the early personal correspondence of B.S.A.C. men, the guns which they were importing into Central Africa were referred to as 'champagne bottles'. Here was a commercial company not simply advising its agents each to carry a gun for self-defence and hunting. Instead it was equipping itself with the latest types of powerful war weapons in readiness for an expected and seemingly planned round of

48. 'Life and Work', op.cit., November, 1893, letter by 'Pro Bono Publico'.
49. PLG: BSA 3/43, sundry references.
military encounters necessary to guarantee unhampered control by the Company of a huge part of the great continent. It seems right to assume, moreover, that Rhodes must have been aware that his grand design might entail clashes, not only with African rulers, but with soldiers of other European nations.

The dream of a vast British African domain stretching from the Cape of Good Hope to Cairo was not Cecil Rhodes's original idea. Harry Johnston may have been the first to use the phrase 'Cape to Cairo' in 1888, but there is reason to believe that Dr Jose Lacerda had predicted, in 1796, that Britain's future aim would be to establish one huge empire from Egypt to the Cape. Indeed Lacerda's famous journey across what are now the Northern and Luapula provinces of Zambia may be understood as an attempt to forestall that British plan. Subsequent decades had witnessed the degeneration of Portuguese power but the idea of claiming the whole region from Loanda on the Angolan coast to Beira in Mozambique died hard in Portuguese imperial circles. Thus as late as 1890, Lisbon applied to the Pope 'for (confidential) Spiritual Jurisdiction across the Continent north of the Zambezi from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean'. But, George Cawston of the B.S.A.C. told the Foreign Office, 'I am happy to say

that I think I have been the means of blocking this'. 51

The events and actions we have reviewed so far all demonstrate a determined plan of subjugations effected not haphazardly but strategically. Rhodes may have been 'a gambler' in the ways in which he tackled given crises. But the grand imperial design of which he was the protagonist was clearly based upon a simple yet thorough strategy which, it would appear, was modified latterly by the successes or failures of its first phases, but nonetheless retained its primary and consistent purpose. And perhaps that purpose could be defined thus: simultaneously to consolidate the southern conquests and bring northern Zambezia under Company control, in order to enable the swiftest possible exploitation of its mineral and other resources without the interference of other European nations.

Certainly after the furore caused by the 'Jameson Raid' and in the course of an exchange of bitter telegrams between himself and the B.S.A.C.'s London office, Rhodes declared that, in view of the crisis and Britain's apparent fear of angering Paul Kruger and the Transvaal Republic, despite the 'extremely strong' support

52. See pp. 60 ff. above.
of Rhodesia's white population for Jameson, he now intended to devote his energies 'to the development of the north'. Thus 'Johnston's immediate strategy was to create what he called a "protective line of treaties" around the perimeter...to secure the whole area against incursions and counter-claims by any foreign power'.

Now the huge region of northern Zambezia had to be filled in with effective centres of power without which its human and mineral resources could not be brought into the service of the Company, whose territory had been increased by 1½ million acres when the African Lakes Company was liquidated in August 1893 and all its 'estates' taken over by Rhodes's Company.

In his two major books on Northern Rhodesia, Gann's description of the occupation of both North-Western and North-Eastern Rhodesia suggests a gentle process, and though he contrasts the 'police' element in the North-West, as an extension of the system to the south of the Zambezi, with the less 'civil' regime in the North-East, he concludes that 'the Company's rule was...profoundly unmilitary in character'. The siting of 'camps', 'posts' or 'forts' and the dates of their establishment suggest, however, that they had the dual purpose of placing a British military preserve

53. RH:MSS.Afr.s.81: Extracts from BSAC Board Meetings - Cable from Rhodes, Cape Town, to Board, 9/1/96; MSA: File no. 35, undated and unsigned memorandum on 'NR Treaties, excluding Lewanika Concession'.

near to the as yet ill-defined borders with the territories annexed by King Leopold and by Germany, as well as those held by Portugal, and of signifying military readiness to 'tame' the local populations.

Dr Moloney's account of the clash between Captain Stairs and King Msidi in Katanga, noted above, made it plain that the area around Lake Mweru and the Luapula was crucial to Anglo-Belgian competition for the rich copper deposits of that region, however partially they were then known. Thus, when Alfred Sharpe had recovered strength after his fruitless attempts to obtain a 'treaty' from Msidi, he returned in 1890 to Chiengi at the north-east corner of Lake Mweru and planted the Union Jack there, leaving Captain Crawshay to establish what was called Fort Rhodesia. This was before the murder of Msidi. Crawshay was, Johnston reported, 'to protect the Company's interests' and he was clearly trusted by the Commissioner. In the area he was nicknamed Kamukwamba, because he was associated with 2-yard lengths of calico which served as currency when British agents wanted to purchase food, etc.\(^{55}\)

Sharpe's 'treaty' with Nsama must have been obtained at the time when he put the flag at the court of Chief Puta with whom, however, he recorded no 'treaty'.

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local memory of Sharpe's visit to the Tabwa kingdom is that the white men 'first reported to the Chief and presented him with white beads. They gave these as gifts and wrote down the Chief's name'. That was all. 'What followed after this was to snatch the country from the chiefs'.

Two years later, and after the Belgian seizure of Katanga had been recognised by Britain, Sharpe moved Fort Rhodesia to the Kalungwishi River, some forty miles south of Chiengi and five from the Lake, while placing another post fairly close to the border with the Congo Free State above Mweru wa Ntipa, the great marsh to the east of the Lake. These two posts enabled armed British agents to keep watch over both the capital of King Kazembe and the Congo border, at a point not far from where the German, Belgian and British 'spheres of influence' met. Choma, the post above the marsh, was also on the trade route from the Tanganyika plateau to Mweru and Katanga. Moreover now that King Leopold had annexed Katanga, it was important to Sharpe that the powerful King Kazembe should be kept under discreet surveillance, since the earlier peaceful trading relations of the Luunda with the Yeke or Nyamwezi of Msidi had recently changed to enmity. From the outset of

56. RI/Mukupa Katandula, 27/11/74.
British 'administration' Kazembe had given refuge to 'immigrants fleeing from the British in the north'. In a situation in which money and men were not yet adequate to enforce British authority, bluff, aided by a show of modern weapons, had to be used. The first two officials at Kalungwishi died and were buried there; and, said 'Chiana' Harrington, 'Rumour had it they had been poisoned by the natives'.

At the same time, one of the B.S.A.C. directors, the Duke of Abercorn, was honoured by the establishment of Fort Abercorn in Tafuna's kingdom of Lungu on the high land above the southern end of Lake Tanganyika, near to the L.M.S. mission station at Kawimbe, now three years old, and close to the frontier fixed in 1890 between German Tanganyika and the British sphere. The man who opened the Fort was Hugh Marshall. In that same year the B.S.A. Company had purchased £20,000 of shares in the Lakes Company and Sharpe had proclaimed a British Protectorate over northern Zambezia. 'Treaties' therefore mattered even less than before but the B.S.A. Company's stake in the A.L.C. trade route along

57. NRJ No. VI, Vol. III, op.cit., p. 69; Cunnison I. 'The Luapula Peoples of Northern Rhodesia ' (Manchester 1959) pp. 42-43; and NRJ No. III Vol II 1954, H.T. Harrington 'The Taming of North-Eastern Rhodesia', p. 9. Note: Choma station was manned initially by Cecil Worringham, nicknamed Chapalapata. The men who opened Kalungwishi were Kidd (Kalindo, the little rat trap) and Bainbridge (Pemberani, meaning 'wait').

the so-called Stevenson Road now needed to be safeguarded. The liquidation of the Lakes Company in August 1893 made it essential to have arms and ammunition concentrated on that crucial border, especially since Swann's dealings with the Arabs were not prospering and, as Carson wrote from the L.M.S. station at Fwambo, there were ominous signs of 'a decreasing respect for the interests of the white men on the part of the Awemba...largely due to their imperfect knowledge of us and probably to the prejudice created in their ignorant minds by crafty Arabs'. Before their military operations against the Bemba began, the B.S.A. Company had a close cluster of forts in the Tanganyika plateau region as follows: Chiengi (1890), Kalungwishi (1892), Abercorn and Choma (1893), Fife and Kaputa (1894), Katwe and Sumbu (1895), Mirongo (1896), and Milima and Nyala (1898). The proximity to one another of those posts, especially around the south end of Lake Tanganyika, must be seen as of primarily military importance at a time of extended lines of communications and a minimal supply of personnel. In the eyes of the local people, the establishment of such forts was certainly proof of an intention to conquer. 59

The situation around Niamkolo on the lake shore and the Lungu capital at Isoko, near Mbala, was

further complicated by Alfred Swann's claim, which he eventually put in writing in 1904, that, while he was 'the principal agent' of the L.M.S. in the area, 'the principal Alungu chiefs', in gratitude 'for 10 years protection from the raids of the Awemba and support during repeated famines,...spontaneously offered me the whole of their country...from Kituta to the Lovu river, embracing the whole of the south coast of the Lake'. Moreover 'the Committee allowed me to accept it on behalf of the Society, and at that time there was no sign of the British Government or the B.S.A. Co extending their sphere of influence so far north'. The chiefs, he argued, had full right to make over the land and the Society, which had spent around £15,000 on its work in the region 'had a perfect right to accept'. Though generally loyal to Johnston, his new master, Swann was very angry at the action of the Commissioner and Sharpe in cutting their estate to a small fraction of the original 'grant'. Swann's reference to the 'protection' given by the L.M.S. to the Lungu recalls his early description of them in 1893 as hemmed in and harried by both Bemba and Arab raiders, when 'the one swooped down from the hills like fish-eagles, as the Walungu termed it; and the other rushed along both sides of the river completing the work of ruin'.

Ibid: Swann to L.M.S., London (from Kota Kota), 1/8/04; and Swann, op.cit., p. 89.
It was, however, the coming clash between the Europeans at the north end of Lake Malawi and the 'Arab' Mlozi and his Bemba allies that was to dominate the situation along the whole length of the Plateau. The Lakes Company's post at Ikawa had been fortified as a 'boma' in 1894 and called after another B.S.A. Co. director, the Duke of Fife. The official in charge was John Bell. Alexander Dewar of the Livingstonia Mission established his station at Mwenzo, a few miles west of Ikawa and his journey to this site of the burial grove of the Mwanga hero-chief, Musyani, was made the occasion of a display along the road of the skulls of victims of the Bemba. When the actual 'war' with Mlozi took place in November 1895, there were fortified posts at Fife, Abercorn, Choma and, not far from it, Kaputa. In the next three years, small posts were erected at Sumbu on Lake Tanganyika in 1895; at Chinunda NNW of the modern Chipata sited so that the Company could watch the hunters in 'the tract'; in the Mkushi district at Fort Elwes, which was probably built in anticipation of war with the Ngoni; and at Mirongo in the Isoka district in 1897 to control the turbulent situation following the defeat of Mlozi. It was also in 1897 that the long-awaited Resident took up his post near the court of Lewanika, in fulfilment of the promise of the Lochner

Concession seven years earlier. 62

The 'Mlozi war' has been described in detail elsewhere, but we should note that Johnston, in his memoirs of Central Africa, added that the final conflict was provoked by Mlozi's flogging of a missionary called Stevens and his breach of the 1891 treaty. What is significant here is that the overall strategy of Rhodes and Johnston - despite the deep animosity between them - demanded action by a very small force equipped, however, with vastly superior weapons, at a time when the southern Africa scene was one of general and worsening conflict. Not only was Mozambique in turmoil with rumours of the killing of 'all Portuguese inhabitants at Zumbo', as reported by Johnston. But the Tswana, Ngwaketse, Khatla and Kwena peoples were all protesting against B.S.A.C. misrule. 63 Moreover, only two years had passed since the crushing of the violent Ndebele uprising of 1893; and after the alleged death of Lobengula a deliberate land scramble took place in which the Ndebele were ousted from all the good land which, according to promise, had been forfeited to every white man


63. Hanna, op.cit., pp. 221-2 and Johnston H.H. op.cit., p. 135; PRO: 879/40, no. 484, Johnston to FO re Zumbo, 22/4/95; 879/44 no. 498, Khama to HC, 9/7/95; Bakwena Chief to CO, 17/9/95; Bangwaketse to HMG, 31/7/95; Bakhatla to HMG, 27/7/95.
who would take up arms against them; while in southern Malawi Johnston's forces were engaged in a series of wars against Yao and other chiefs. Anglo-Boer relations were meanwhile ultimately embittered by the 'Jameson Raid' of December 1895, and, in his determination to push a railway line through to the Indian Ocean coast of Mozambique, Rhodes was reported to be arming the workers on the railway and 'contemplating a coup de main' against the Portuguese. 64

As the military plans of the Company unfolded, ill-feeling arose between its officials and various missionaries. Dewar of Mwenzo told the Edinburgh secretary of his Mission that 'things are conducted wretchedly which of course is not to be wondered at when we consider the men who make up the Administration'. It 'more properly might be called Maladministration'. Sharpe, for his part, was furious at the reported attempt of Govan Robertson of the L.M.S. to release slaves and warned him thus: 'If I hear of you or your people mixing yourselves up again with these slavery questions, I shall consider it my duty to cause your removal from the District'. 'Almost every war we have had', he had written earlier, had been caused by the releasing of slaves. Yet Johnston was describing his round of

64. RH:MSS.Brit.Emp.s.22(G159) (undated) letter of J.H. Harris to the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society; and PRO 879/47, no. 517, CO to BSA warning against Rhodes's possible coup de main, 7/3/96.
violent clashes in central Malawi as 'operations against slave-traders', and sent London a specimen certificate of manumission. The scale of the war is well illustrated by Major Edwards's account of the destruction of Makanjira's town, which was in fact a group of large villages in a valley twelve miles long, which contained 'about 8,000 huts' and 'probably much more' than 25,000 people. 'The 17th and 18th November were employed', he wrote, 'in destroying all the huts'. In face of such enormous conflagrations, the shock felt by the missionaries concerned was roused in the main by the way in which the British forces scored their victories. Here again it must be sadly realised that the technique of provocation to battle, followed by overwhelming victory by force of vastly superior arms, followed in turn by the wholesale burning of houses, grain-stores and fields was the pattern of imperialist action over vast tracts of Africa as the 'scramble' took effect. 65

It may be true that 'Johnston faced "an initial weakness in military and financial power which made it necessary to destroy rather than to preserve"', and that therefore "The ultimate reckoning had to be accomplished by force against an indigenous structure too weakened

65. NLS, 7878, Folio 30, Dewar to Smith, 12/1/95; Folio 134, Sharpe to Govan Robertson, 18/3/95 and 12/1/95; BM/Parl. Papers 1896 LVIII (C.7925) Johnston to FO, 13/11/95 and p. 399, certificate of manumission in respect of a woman called Kavitendo, dated 26/10/89; and (C.8013), Major Edwards's report, 27/12/95.
or too dangerous to survive the shock of conquest".\textsuperscript{66}
To the more observant missionaries, Johnston and Rhodes and their coadjutors were revealing what Elmslie of the Livingstonia Mission called their 'intention to make a cause for war'. Indeed Johnston had deliberately sent the cattle and other spoil, seized after Mlozi's defeat, through Ngoni country 'in order to provoke them to steal and so provide a cause for war'.\textsuperscript{67} And in such battles as they provoked, the Europeans used the latest weapons at their disposal, with the result that village after village went up in flames. Thus 'Life and Work' commented: 'When one sees native bullets - bits of slag and filed iron or ironstone - and compares them with our modern lead bullets or compares the flintlock and rapid precise firing of civilized troops, one feels how very righteous must be the punishment...before we take such weapons into our hands to war with heathen bowstrings and unavailing luck. Honour and glory are misplaced terms altogether in such a connection'.\textsuperscript{68}

The dual role of Cecil Rhodes, assumed as we have seen with the full sanction of Her Majesty's Government, was further aggravating the situation. Fear was


\textsuperscript{67} NLS, 7879, Folio 76, Elmslie to Mission Secretary, 9/11/96; 'with ref. to Johnston's clash with the Central Ngoni.

\textsuperscript{68} 'Life and Work, January 1894. Underlining is mine.
growing, as the Blantyre missionaries said, about that 'Napoleon of South Africa', for 'It is very difficult to separate between loyalty to a real government and false subservience to a private interest when both are represented by the same individual'. Four years earlier, in the year when the Charter came into operation, the same Mission warned that 'a Chartered Company in the capacity of ruler is an old spectre rehabited. The same spectre in India plundered the Nabob's treasures, this same lean spectre here must fill the pockets of its shareholders with money from the African...a Chartered Company is not a government and never can be'. Then, with startling frankness, 'Life and Work' had made the prophecy that 'the horrors that loom in the near future of prison, flogging, deportation and taxation, the horrors of irresponsible oppression of chiefs and people, are the advent of a new slavery'. What Captain Stairs had accomplished for King Leopold in Katanga simply endorsed those baleful realities. 'Here is an expedition which was sent out by a commercial company to secure rights in a country in which not a single member of the Company had ever set foot or possessed any claims whatsoever. The chief of the country is murdered...and his kingdom is now held by an armed force in the name of the gold company...And the expedition will be described as "successful"'.

69. Ibid: March 1894, October 1890, June 1892.
Nothing, however, was happening to cause a revision of the Company's strategy. The situation south of the Zambezi was rapidly worsening and the tragic story of the Ndebele and Shona 'rebellions' of 1896-97 once again demonstrated an utterly unequal confrontation followed by harsh humiliations. There was meanwhile increasing evidence of 'forced labour', as shown in the report of Sir Richard Martin, Deputy Commissioner in Salisbury. 70 In addition, the Company was forcibly disarming the people of Chief Chiquaqua who had said that the Shona would surrender weapons if the Government would call in weapons in the possession of white men. To ensure Chiquaqua's submission, Martin reported that 'Lord Grey is anxious that they should be harrassed and their crops destroyed'. If the Shona resisted then, said Martin 'I intend to place a gun in the fort and try the effect of shelling his kraal at night'. 71

(d) The Downfall of the Greater Kings

Rhodes's annual grant of £9,000 to £10,000 towards the 'policing' of the British Central Africa Protectorate - abruptly terminated by him in pique in September 1893 - had undoubtedly enabled the increasing

70. PRO 879/47 no. 517, Martin's Report on Matabeleland Cattle Regulations; BM/Parl. Papers, 1897, LXII, (C.8547) Report on 'Native Administration' of the BSAC, July 1897; and BSA to CO, 24/3/97 rejecting 'forced labour' allegations.

71. PRO: 879/47 no. 517, Martin to CO, 6/2/97. Underlining is mine.
number of small 'bomas' or 'forts' to be well-stocked with modern weapons. Inevitably, too, the word passed swiftly that the white man's methods of war which had crushed the Zulus and now smashed the Ndebele and the Shona — and for which East and West Africa also offered parallels — were likely to be applied again if resistance was offered to his mastery of the kingdoms of northern Zambezia. It is significant also that the official report on the Ndebele war of 1896 drew the conclusion that 'the primary...cause...was the fact that the Nation as a whole had never been thoroughly subdued' and that 'in the general excitement caused by the rush for gold...the Native question was belittled'. The conclusion was, it seems, that the Company must strike hard and decisively in order to guarantee that scale of 'pacification' necessary for the swift implementation of its programme of commercial mining and exploitation. The potential riches of the soil of Africa were not in doubt.

For northern Zambezia this meant that 'recalcitrant' rulers must be swiftly subjugated, and the defeat of Mpezeni's Ngoni, the Bemba chiefs and Kazembe of the Luunda in February 1898, March and April 1899 and October 1899 respectively was to create a situation in which the submission of the lesser kings and chiefs

72. BM/Parl. Papers 1897, LXII, op. cit., Martin's Report, folio 571. Underlining is mine.
would be assured. There had, of course, been the expected preliminary flurry of apprehension in London over the 'development' of the northern territories. The Foreign Secretary did not wish to prevent such expansion as long as 'it can be done with reasonable prospect of avoiding such collisions with the Chiefs as are likely to bring about another war with the Natives which it is of paramount importance to avoid or, at all events, to defer in the present state of affairs in Africa generally'. But Mpezeni had been in consultation with the northern Ngoni of Mwambera and this could be interpreted as 'subversive'.

Johnston's brother and biographer sought to give glamour to his exploits, telling for instance how Alfred Swann recalled his first meeting with the Commissioner 'riding on a donkey with a sailor's straw hat on his head' and how even in battle he carried 'his beloved white umbrella' since he feared sunstroke more than enemy bullets. The romantic record went on to tell how 'the ever-victorious little army of the Protectorate usually fell upon each enemy separately with Napoleonic strategy', for 'my brother's method was to get in the first blow, never to await a declared enemy. And he forced each chief to declare his disposition unequivocally. He would send him a bullet and some salt,

73. PRO 879/52, FO to CO, 10/11/97.
that was all...If the bullet came back, it brought the defiant message, "Bring me your war". And the sender of it got what he asked for sooner and harder than he had ever expected'. The Mlozi war, under Johnston's brother's pen, was given its own colourful presentation. When it was all over, 'his brother came to Harry...and thanked him for giving Mlozi "such a beautiful hanging", for, so it was said, 'Harry, between announcing the sentence and carrying it out, entertained Mlozi to a banquet with champagne'.

The realities of the war against Mpezeni's Ngoni were far from romantic, as Barnes's important and scholarly account shows. The missionaries in nearby Malawi were speaking in 1896 of Mpezeni as 'the bogie man of the Protectorate'. By the beginning of 1898 they were speaking of the conflict as 'the most serious war that has yet been undertaken' but they were far from clear about what had caused it. There was 'a sad tale...about a white man, a representative of the Chartered Company, having assaulted the old King and having, in spite of the King's efforts on his behalf, been killed by the enraged warriors'. By April, they declared the general feeling 'that the cause of the war was altogether an unjustifiable one'.

76. 'Life and Work', August 1896; January and April 1898.
Harding of the Barotseland Native Police, writing many years later, said that 'a highly strung official mistaking an ordinary native dance for an act of hostility towards the Administration' had led to the despatch of a company of B.C.A. rifles 'to quell this rebellion'. Though the request for troops was cancelled by 'the hectic official', he was ignored, 'a pitched battle ensued' and, though the Europeans suffered no casualties, many Ngoni were killed. Harding then asked whimsically why 'the first thing we do after subduing a native enemy is to deprive him of his means of living and his country of its most valuable product'.

The Maugham Report of 1932, to which we have referred above, gives another version, to the effect that the trouble started with the pioneer party of the North Charterland Exploration Company, led by Colonel Warton and accompanied by Carl Wiese, entering the country armed but initially well-received by the King. Not long afterwards, however, 'by some misunderstanding of his position, Col. Warton endeavoured to impose a hut tax and to exercise administrative powers'. Mpezeni resented this interference in the life and government of his country and so, said Maugham, 'the trouble came to a head in December 1897 when the Angoni rose in rebellion'. His account goes on, in the language of Sir Henry Newbolt's poetic romances of imperialism, to

77. Harding c., 'Far Bugles', (Simpkin Marshall, 1933), p. 82.
tell how Colonel Manning, Acting Commissioner in Nyasaland, believed it urgent to relieve 'the beleaguered white men'. Mpezeni's son, Nsingu, was then promptly charged before a summary court martial with 'raiding in British territory' and shot. 78

This was not, however, defensive military action by the British. Warton had written over a year earlier to Major Forbes that 'the absolute consensus of opinion, including that of Carl Wiese, de Sulla Panchecho, the Fathers of the Jesuit Mission and...everyone capable of forming a sound opinion...is that safety (for the N.C.E.C.) depends upon his (Mpezeni's) being convinced that there is sufficient force available, if necessary, to compel him to submit'. Three months later, Johnston had written to the Foreign Office that he had 'no objection to the B.S.A. Co. sending two Maxims and a sufficient number of rifles...for eventual use against Mpeseni'. The leader of the Dutch Reformed Mission, Andrew Murray, was advised by Rhodes not to start work among the Ngoni in view of the likelihood of war. When the conflict came, Johnston wanted to be sure that either Major Forbes or Major Edwards would be in command and that the B.S.A. Company would pay all expenses. 79


79. Ibid: Appendix Item 28, Warton to Forbes, 2/4/96, and Item 31, Hohnston to FO, 14/7/96; and Gann 'History, op. cit., p. 112. Phrases in brackets are mine. The Maxim Automatic gun was invented by Sir Hiram Maxim (1840-1916).
It had been, said Maugham, 'a remarkably well-managed little war' prosecuted with 'courage and decision' on the part of the vastly outnumbered white soldiers and their army of about seven hundred troops, including Sikhs and Africans, very well equipped with Martini rifles and with seven Maxim guns. There was no chivalry, however, but rather a high degree of punitive excess. 'By the 6th February, the Angoni were broken up into small bodies of fugitives. A number of their cattle were seized and many of their kraals destroyed'. Official records indicated that, as had happened at the end of the Ndebele rising five years earlier, a very large number of the cattle of the Ngoni was 'captured'. The N.C.E.C.'s chairman, Frederick Young, condemned the 'harsh treatment of the natives and excesses in the looting of cattle which apparently was acquired and disposed of in the personal interests of the British Central Administration officers engaged in this mission'. This commandeering of large numbers of cattle very adversely affected local agriculture, Young said. According to Hall, this 'loot' of cattle enabled the B.S.A.C. to 'derive a considerable profit from the "rebellion" after covering all expenses'.

After a period of recrimination, in which organs of public opinion in Britain were involved, it appears that a number of the captured cattle was returned to

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80. Ibid: para 21; N.C.E.C. Chairman to FO, 4/8/99; and Hall op.cit., p. 90. Underlinings are mine.
the Ngoni. But where there had been around 20,000 head of cattle, the official figure for the end of March 1900 was 1,224. Rhodes's personal correspondence includes the following statements: 'We have at Mpeseni's 16,000 head of cattle' and 'I have agreed to bring down 1,000, redistribute 5,000 among the natives and make arrangements for herding the balance'. The Ndebele war, less than two years previously, had enabled the Company to appropriate thousands of cattle 'by right of conquest'; one witness stating that 'conquest, according to all native customs, gave the right to capture all the cattle of chiefs and people together'. Barnes does not exaggerate when he sums up the violent confrontation by saying that 'thus ended the Ngoni war and with it the Ngoni state'. Meanwhile, Scottish missionaries were further shocked by the report of a N.C.E.C. agent that 'one of the stipulations of the peace was that Mpezeni's men were to carry the loads of that company for a year... a state of matters too perilously near a form of slavery or serfdom to be accepted without protest'.

Ngoni testimony confirms a corporate memory of first perfidy and then destruction. 'Why did Nsingu dislike the white men?' 'He did not want them to

81. RH.MSS.Afr.s.228 Index to Rhodes's Letters, extracts from letters of 17/3/98 and 16/6/98; BM/Parl.Papers, 1897, LXII, folio 615, testimony of J.M. Orpen, May 1897; Barnes, op.cit., pp. 93-96; and C.of S. Overseas Council, Inventory 13, 'Aurora', 1/6/98.
occupy the land...When they first approached his father they came in peace...they never sought any treaties...in any case, our chiefs did not know how to write...For example, when Wiese first arrived he had to approach the chief and make friendship...They exchanged gifts, Mpezeni gave Wiese some magic charms and Wiese gave him some yards of calico. This is what Nsingu didn't want'.

The arrival of 'traders' who demanded the carriage of heavy goods, paying 'nothing but salt and white calico', sharply worsened the situation. 'These were the very men who declared war on Mpezeni and defeated him near the hills of Lwangeni...until Nsingu was forced to flee...pursued by Indian soldiers, Sikhs...until they apprehended him in the Nsatwe hills. From there he was taken and murdered'.

Local testimony further claimed that Wiese had an associate, whom the people called 'Chapalapata' and who was regarded as closely involved in the plan to conquer the Ngoni. 'Chapalapata' was the nickname of a B.S.A.C. collector, F.C. Worringham, who had opened the fort at Choma, near the Mweru wa Ntipa marsh, in 1893 and the Chinunda Boma in the eastern province in 1896. Chinunda was about 25 miles NNW of the modern Chipata (Fort Jameson). 'Worthingham was charged with keeping an eye on the...concession companies', according to Brelsford, and had 'Trooper Middleton

82. RI/Chief Mpezeni and Nduna Nikazio Jere, 5/3/75.
83. RI/Headman Kuyenda Phiri, 12/3/75.
and thirty Askari plus three Maxim guns' with him. 84

The name 'Chapalapata' probably meant 'the scraper' or 'the one who grazes the skin'. When the Europeans began shooting, a man called Kaposile was killed at once. Thus, though Mpezeni himself was afraid of war, 'the elders of the village advised Nsingu to fight', especially since the first attack took the royal village by surprise. When Nsingu was killed, some witnesses maintain his body was not seen and 'no one has ever seen his grave'. Then the seizure of cattle began. 'This was the end of freedom...the beginning of perpetual slavery'. 85

The importance to us of missionary criticism of the imperialist incursion is perhaps chiefly that the serious strictures of white men who were basically in favour of the establishment of British rule reveals their awareness of the adverse impact of British action on local societies and on local feelings. The Blantyre periodical had commented on the earlier defeat of the Ngoni chief, Chikusi, in the end of 1896, that 'it is a great deal for us to say that we think it justified. Still, to have six feet of noble savage somehow tried by


85. RI/Verishoni Tembo, Nikazio Tembo, Chitamukutwa Soko, Wilson Mhlanga, 4/3/75. Note: 'Chapalapata' could also mean: one who shudders in anger, as if in rigor mortis; and see footnote 57 above.
Court Martial and shot brings sad reflection in upon our soul. Could that noble savage not have been laid hold of by the influence of a superior civilisation with faith in its commission to rule the world?' The missionaries had welcomed Rhodes's resignation from the Board of the B.S.A. Company after the scandal of the Jameson Raid. They had seen it significantly as 'bad for the Company but good for the peace of Africa' for 'Rhôdes had been the incarnation of what a large constituency felt but could not express, a Pharoahism, a Napoleonite, and that spirit is only exorcised, having rent poor Africa sore'.

In January 1897, 'Life and Work' clutched at the hope that the administration would be 'strong enough NOT TO BREAK UP STRONG NATIVE POWERS'; though an earlier report that the beating of drums in villages, an immemorial part of African life, was forbidden suggested rather a determination to make 'white rule' felt by everybody. Hopefully, the missionaries looked forward 'soon to be listening to sweet music in Central Africa - not the harsh grating of the Maxim gun, not the crackle of burning huts, not the groan of dying men, all hideous noises to our ears, but the gold waltz and the rubber gavotte and the ivory fugure'. David Livingstone's

86. 'Life and Work', op. cit., November, September and December, 1896.
dream of the combined advance of commerce and Christian civilisation was still fresh in their minds, and they saw the Trans-Continental Telegraph project - 'long nervestrings communicating with finger-tips on the African keyboard' - as a glorious idea which 'no one but Mr Rhodes...would have set...afoot'.

Johnston's correspondence with the Foreign Office revealed a less romantic and more cynical view of the situation in the region of the Ngoni kingdom. Mpezeni had, in 1889, agreed to Wiese's plan for a Portuguese Resident to live at his court and fly the Portuguese flag over the Residency. The King had, however, 'absolutely refused to make any treaty'. What brought his kingdom under British rule was the Anglo-Portuguese Convention, whereupon the Foreign Office, while refusing to recognise Wiese's 'treaties', 'advised the B.S.A. to come to terms with Wiese'. Warton's quarrel with Mpezeni had arisen because the N.C.E.C. agent had ordered the King to stop slave-raiding and 'that his people must pay a hut tax to the whites...As to slave-raiding, Col. Warton was right, but as to the imposition of a hut tax he was absolutely wrong...Now,' Johnston added, 'Mpezeni has ceded nothing to anybody, but, even setting him aside as a robber without rights, the real chiefs of the country have not

87. Ibid: January 1897.
ceded to the B.S.A. Company their governing rights'.

What decided the issue seems to have been, in Johnston's words, that 'his country is exceptionally healthy...and is very auriferous (and) it lies on the direct route overland from British South Africa to Tanganyika'. Therefore if he blocked the N.C.E.C. plan to conquer him,'After the defeat and dispersal of Mpezeni's forces, the indigenous chiefs...will be restored'.

There had been a characteristic flutter of concern thereafter at the Foreign Office. 'H.M.G. are most anxious to avoid another native war', the Foreign Office told the B.S.A. Company and were disturbed to learn that the N.C.E.C. had 'maintained friendly relations with him (Mpezeni) by withholding from his knowledge their connection with the B.S.A. Company and their British nationality, as it is said that he would be opposed to anything British'. To strengthen the deception, 'the representative of the North Charterland Company has passed himself off to Mpezeni as brother of the German, Wiese'. Though London repudiated in advance any responsibility for the consequences of precipitate action by N.C.E.C. agents, the Foreign Office had known for some time, by Johnston's despatch of July 1896, noted above, that the Commissioner was far from opposed to military action. For, said Johnston, 'Mpeseni

89. Ibid: Item 36, FO to BSAC, 7/4/97.
is such a scourge to the indigenous populations of the Company's sphere that he must one day be dealt with'. But if supported by other Ngoni chiefs, Mpezeni might muster 'at least 50,000 warriors' to pit against British forces. Moreover he was 'intimately allied with the Matabele'. What the B.S.A. Company told its shareholders in 1898 was that 'the deprivations of the Angoni ... have for some years caused considerable trouble both in the Company's territories and in the British Central Africa Protectorate. In December last a rising of this tribe took place and representatives of the Company were for some weeks in serious danger'. However, 'latest reports...state that the Angoni have been completely routed, that Mpeseni has surrendered himself and that all danger is at an end'.

The kingdom of the Bemba in the north was obviously another hindrance to the B.S.A. Company's strategy and here again, as confirmed by the diaries of the White Fathers, plans for subduing the Bemba were made well in advance of the actual confrontations. In December 1896, just a year after the execution of Mlozi at Karonga, the Fathers at Kayambi recorded their amazement at the visit of a British agent to Mwalule, the burial place of the Bemba kings, in the company of an Arab, Mohammed. This man, who had been so recently

90. Ibid: Item 31, Johnston to FO, 14/7/96.
'ennemi battu, ruiné et blessé' of the British now appeared as their confidant. A few months previously Jock Law of the B.S.A. Company had stated that 'Britain could not make war this year'. The White Fathers recorded their concern over developments in view of their own good relations with the senior Bemba chief, Mwamba, and believed that B.S.A.C. men were collaborating closely with the Scots mission at Mwenzo, 'nos voisins et adversaires'. 92

A detailed account of the British subjugation of the Bemba has been provided by Dr Andrew Roberts in his scholarly 'History of the Bemba', which he has strengthened by the use of a considerable amount of Zambian oral testimony. Meebelo's study of the Northern Province from 1893 to 1939, which we noted earlier, is likewise of great value to our knowledge of the European conquest. 93 What the White Fathers' diaries notably add to the record is their concern that the behaviour of certain white men could make Africans believe that all Europeans were alike. The talkative Spencer from Ikawa (whom they called Pincer) visited the area with an African concubine, a freed slave from Bisa country. 'Ces extravagances et l'inconduite d'un

92. WF: Kayambi Diary, 17/12/96; Mambwe Diary, 6/7/96, 3/7/96; Kayambi, 13/2/97. Jock Law, Assistant at Ikawa, was brother of Andrew Law, the Collector at Abercorn.

trop grand nombre d'Anglais ne font que mieux ressortir la différence qui existe entre nous et eux', the Fathers complained. Though they gave the local information demanded by Hugh Marshall and Lawrence Wallace, they noted sadly that, since the B.S.A.C. men were determined to secure the submission of Mwamba, war was imminent and that 'this war will probably be an exhausting affair as far as we are concerned'. The earlier comment of a L.M.S. missionary at Fwambo on the situation on the frontier of the Bemba kingdom is worth adding here: 'There has always been, among European residents in the Tanganyika Districts a somewhat exaggerated idea of the dangerous qualities of the Awemba...so far as any attack on Europeans is concerned...During the ten or twelve years we have been in contact with the Awemba, they have never yet made any attempt to injure us or our interests. On one occasion only has a load of European goods been stolen from a Mambwe man carrying it and on that occasion, a tusk of ivory was immediately sent by the Awemba chiefs - unsolicited - as compensation. In fact their motto may be said to be: "We don't want to trouble you; we don't want you to trouble us; but leave us alone in our country and don't interfere in the little differences we have with our coloured (sic) neighbours".'

94. WF: Kayambi, 2/4/97, 16/6/97; and NLS 7906, Folio 150, 'The British Central Africa Gazette, 12/10/94, extract from article of Rev. Mr Thomas on 'The Awemba Country'.
Harry Johnston had told the Liberal Foreign Secretary in 1893 that "subjugation" is an ugly word to use in connection with British enterprise in Central Africa. We do not come here necessarily to subjugate: we come to protect and instruct. African rulers and states were left to their own devices, he said as long as they did not attack British posts or 'natives under our immediate administration'. But that was written to a Liberal politician and at a time when Johnston and his collaborators were not ready to carry out their strategy of subjugation.

The change of pace in British action can be traced directly to the appointment of Major Patrick Forbes as the B.S.A.C.'s Deputy Administrator for northern Zambezia in June 1895 and his extensive tour of the Nyasa-Tanganyika region a few months later. Though temporarily resident at Zomba, Forbes was responsible, not to Johnston but to Leander Starr Jameson who was Administrator in chief of all the Company's Central African annexations, and whose activities in those closing years of the century were earning him increasing notoriety.

Thus the testimony of the White Fathers' diaries is endorsed by British agents in the field, namely that, even before the defeat of Mlozi, B.S.A.C. plans were in hand for a military confrontation with

95. PRO: FO/55-No.56C.A., Johnston to Rosebery, 17/10/93.
the Bemba. This is evidenced by a letter to Johnston from the explorer, Poulett Weatherley, in October, 1895, who spoke of 'rumours of war, tackling the Awemba, etc.' and considered that 'if fighting is regarded as a necessity, a lesson and a severe one might be struck at the root of all Awemba troubles, i.e. Kitiamkulu (sic)' 96. The situation in the Bemba kingdom was complicated, however, by the activities of a White Father, Joseph Dupont, who had taken over the leadership of his mission in mid-1895. 97. In the rough parlance of 'Chirupula' Stephenson, this helped to precipitate a sharp encounter between the White Fathers and the Company in which 'the Man-of-God's politics were upset by the Man-of-War Major Forbes'. Stephenson wrote this as part of a memorial leaflet which he issued at the time of the death of the B.S.A. pioneer, Hector Croad, in 1949. What happened at Mwamba's capital in November 1898, according to Stephenson, was that the 'capture' of Dupont by Charles McKinnon, the B.S.A. Collector from Ikawa, was significant as a check to French colonial ambitions, of which the Fathers were unofficial agents. As the Fashoda crisis had arisen at the same time, Franco-British relations were tense and European 'cold war' politics

thus continued to impinge on Central Africa. 98

It is also clear that dissensions within the Bemba kingdom offered the British a chance to strike swiftly and decisively. There would certainly, it seems, have been a battle in Mwamba's domain if the presence of Dupont at the capital had not allowed McKinnon and his combined force from Ikawa and Mirongo to effect 'pacification'. But the news of the defeat of Mwamba's rival, Ponde, by the British in March 1899 and the destruction, by a force led by Andrew Law of Abercorn and 'Chiana' Harrington from Kalungwishi, of the capital of Chief Mumpolokoso immediately afterwards, signalled the fragmentation of African resistance in the north. Moreover, the military programme had involved also the first round of the battle with King Kazembe of the Luunda and was completed when a second assault was made upon his capital before which Kazembe himself fled across the Luapula in October 1899.

Like Mpezeni and indeed like Mlozi, the northern rulers indicated, at various times before the final clashes, that they wished to live at peace with the

98. RH:MSS.Afr.s.833(4), papers of G. Hughes Chamberlain, including J.E. Stephenson's 'The Chirupula Gazette No. 26, 6/4/49', with a memorial article on Hector Croad, '1865 or 1869-1949'. Note: Croad's nickname was Chenda-na-nseko, lit. he who walks with laughter, but which, I was told, meant the reverse in fact; RI/Benjamin Mpande, Kalwa, Serenje, 19/10/73.
white invaders. The war initiative was, however, taken in each case by the Company's men, who seemed, as we shall see on various occasions further on, to be united in the conviction that severe 'chastisement' was required to prove their hegemony. Robert 'Bobo' Young summed this up when he declared: 'Our punishments err on the soft side and the natives do not fear them'. Moreover, since the Company's Directors were clearly anxious to get hold of as much of northern Zambezia as possible at the minimum cost, the chance of meeting the expenses of these 'little scraps', as Young called them, from the ivory captured, added impetus to the military campaign. In view of the note of frankness in what he recorded of the battles which we have noted above, Young's account merits some quotation here; revealing as it does the zest of the B.S.A. Company men for opportunities to display the great superiority of their weapons.

Mwamba, for instance, had been brought to his knees by reports of how Young and 'the army of Mirongo', the Boma at which he lived, had defeated the Senga Arabs in an encounter in which 'the general in command got shot through both thighs and died on his way back'. Young's 'ever victorious' army with its Nordenfeldt had also chased Mwamba's son westwards across the River Chambeshi, the Company having taken sides in a succession

dispute over one of the lesser Bemba chieftainships. Thereafter Chief Ponde who 'seemed to be looking for trouble', was shown the power of the Nordenfeldt 'at practice on some grain-stores'. Charles McKinnon of Ikawa forbade Ponde to enter Mwamba's country after Mwamba's death. When Ponde rejected this order, he was ambushed and the B.S.A.C. troops, having looted his village, put the houses to fire until 'Ponde's village was reduced to ashes'. 100

'Bobo' Young also recounted the clash with King Kazembe, a chronicle that supplemented the written memories of 'Chiana' Harrington, Collector at Kalungwishi, entitled 'The Taming of North-eastern Rhodesia'. In that encounter, the Company was vigorously supported by Alfred Sharpe from Nyasaland 'with a company of Sikhs and a company of Nyasaland armed forces'; a further indication of a concerted strategy of conquest. The plan was accelerated when Harrington heard from Nasoro bin Suliman, an Arab leader captured by him, that 'those Arabs, dissatisfied with the rule of the Sultan of Zanzibar, had decided to form a Mohammedan Kingdom' in the Luapula and Katanga region. 101

While there is no doubt about the burning of the 'towns' of Ponde and Mumpolokoso by the British, it is less clear what happened when Kazembe's large musumba

100. Ibid: 66-70.
was eventually overrun. Alfred Sharpe's report to the Foreign Office did not mention the burning of the town, but Robert Codrington's report to the Chief Secretary in Salisbury stated that when the force of 13 Sikhs, 60 askari, Lieut, Barclay and 'one seven-pounder' gun, commanded by Captain Margesson, reached Kazembe's, it was 'only to find that he had set fire to his town and fled with his people across the Luapula...The stockade which was found...to be 1877 yards in circumference and contained 1709 huts or a population of not less than 5,000 people was entirely deserted'. Sharpe, however, gave the population of the town as about 20,000. Codrington who succeeded Forbes as Deputy Administrator in May 1898 after serving under Johnston, had decided that it was 'advisable to make a display of a well-organised and equipped force which has never before been seen in this part of Africa and to strike if necessary a decisive blow'. He considered that the Administration had treated Kazembe with forbearance with the result that 'he considered himself to be formidable'. He therefore made what he regarded as 'perfectly reasonable' demands upon Kazembe, that he should 'demolish his stockade...come in person to see me at

102. PLG: BSA 8/22, Sharpe's despatch to FO, 19/12/99.
103. Ibid: 8/13, Codrington to CS, Salisbury, 29/10/99; and 8/22, Sharpe to FO, 29/12/99.
Kalungwishi and...make compensation for the seven men recently killed by his orders'. When the King refused, the troops moved in. In 1902, however, when Sharpe was now High Commissioner, he sent to the Foreign Office an account of the clash with Kazembe in which he said that Codrington's demand for troops was based on his belief that 'unless Kazembe was dealt with at once, the prestige of the Chartered Company...would be practically ruined'. But said Sharpe, 'I was inclined to think...that the dangers...had been somewhat exaggerated'.

One important African account of the Kazembe 'war' is that found in the Luunda traditional history as recorded in Vol. II of the Central Bantu Historical Texts. 'The Europeans came with troops and powerful guns', they stated, 'and Mwata Kazembe ran off to Kabimbi across the Luapula...At this time the Europeans burnt the capital and many people died in it'. Zambian oral testimony links the defeat of Kazembe in 1899 with his earlier effective rebuff of Company force, some years earlier. The nickname of one of the men associated with offensive action against both Mumpolokoso and Kazembe, who presumably was Dr Blair Watson of Kalungwishi, was Cipanta-Malinga, the one who kicks down

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105. Ibid: 8/13 as footnote 291; and NAZ: BS1/16-18, Sharpe to FO, 18/9/02.
107. Roberts, op.cit., p. 281 gives the year of Kazembe's rebuff of the BSAC as 1895; while Cunnison I., op.cit., p. 155 gives 1897.
the stockades, signifying that he dealt crushing blows and scored quick victories. Watson appears to have been known also, and more frequently, as Kaulang'ombe, because of his bovine and angry manner. 'He used to kill people' is one firm memory of him. Local testimonies confirm Watson's association with both actions against Kazembe. The first attack was repulsed before the Company men had reached the musumba. On the second occasion, word reached the King that a heavily armed force was approaching and so 'immediately the news was heard, people fled', Kazembe and his entourage wading into the Luapula river as no boats were available, but being met by canoes from the other side.

As we shall be noting from various districts of northern Zambezia, the local people used nicknames for almost all Europeans in the 'pioneer' period of the B.S.A. Company. Some District Notebooks, like that of Kawambwa, give a list of such nicknames. Indeed missionaries and leading Arab traders appear also to have been given nicknames. Because of the memory of these nicknames and also because of the difficulty

108. RI/Simon Kawesha, interviewed by his son, Joseph, a senior undergraduate of the University of Zambia, 12/5/73; and Mwanawata Chibwe, 21/5/73.

109. RI/PHL/17, David Ntondo Walima, Mwansabombwe, 12/9/73, and PHL/26, Jim Chilima and Kataka Chebo, Lukwesa, 15/10/73 (by permission of Peter Lary).

110. NAZ: KSG 3/1.
found in pronouncing the real names of white agents, it is sometimes difficult to ascertain to whom a particular nickname referred. Blair Watson, who committed suicide in 1904 as a result of his addiction to morphine drugs, was one of those remembered for his cruelty. The consequences of the deep antagonism between him and Poulett Weatherley, must have been harsh upon the communities among whom these men made their camps. Weatherley seems to have been, at some time at least, in the partial employ of the Company. A bitter quarrel between him and Watson involved charges by him that Watson was 'raising the natives of a district against a white man'; while Watson accused him of having 'even gone so far as to fire on Kasembwe's people'. Watson reacted by arresting some of Weatherley's carriers, but Weatherley claimed that his men had been driven to extravagant behaviour 'by the attempt to starve them', and accused Watson of flogging his carriers. He believed that Watson was jealous of his influence with the local people; and Roberts confirms that at that time, the end of 1896, Mumpolokoso wanted Weatherley to mediate in his conflict with Watson and 'Chiana' Harrington at Kalungwishi.

An article by Weatherley in the Geographical Journal, dated 1898, describes his visit to the islands of Lake Bangweulu and suggests an attitude other than that of a man imposing his will on the people by superior force. 'The more I saw of the natives of Kirui (sic, Chilubi Island) the more I liked them', he wrote. 'They were quiet, hospitable, exceedingly friendly and most inoffensive. The island is low, beautifully wooded, well-peopled and cultivated'. Of Chishi Island he said: 'Happy little island and happy islanders!...May it be centuries before civilization, with its innumerable attendant evils, finds out and robs little Kisi (sic) of the peace and contentment it now enjoys'.

Zambian accounts of the defeat of Kazembe include a memory of the King being warned by 'friendly white men' of the impending attack, and suggest that Weatherley may have been regarded as a friend, as there is reason to believe that he was in the Lake Mweru region shortly before the final clash.

This review of the military operations in the Nyasa-Tanganyika region reveals no reference, on the part of those who carried them out, to 'treaty' obligations towards local rulers and peoples. Instead the evidence points to (a) an initial disposition of goodwill on the part of African rulers towards the white

114. RH/PHL/26 op.cit., and NRJ Vol.IV, No. 6, op.cit., p. 553.
men who are remembered as those who came after Livingstone, the 'Ngereza' or 'Englishman'; (b) no significant requests for 'protection' or the implementation of what the 'treaties' claimed to have promised; and (c) the determined subduing of the region by British military action as part of the unified strategy of the B.S.A. Company. The initial friendly disposition is evidenced in testimonies from, for instance, Serenje district and the islands of Lake Bangweulu.¹¹⁵

In the confused situation created by the increasing appearance of armed white men, however, and the awareness of local rulers however varying and however indefinite, of the playing out of European 'big power' rivalries on African soil, various chiefs and kings sought the favours of the invaders and some certainly tried to use such favours against their own enemies. A member of an expedition in the Luangwa area reported how, in 1896, he came to the country of a chief called 'Chitala' (whom Joseph Thomson had called Katra), west of the river, and was shown by him a letter, dated June 1894, in the hand of one, E.J. Glave, of the 'Century Magazine', which read thus: 'He is the most hospitable and friendly chief I have met in this part of the world. He is, as far as I can learn, loyal

¹¹⁵ E.g. RI/Nansala Manyeta, Chief Mailo, Serenje, 15/10/73, Kapumfi, Chilubi Island, Bangweulu, 10/11/74.
to the British...and most anxious that the British build
a fort...to protect his neighbouring villages against
the Angoni of Mpeseni and Mombera. With a little assist-
ance from the whites such men as Katara (sic) can hold
their own against their enemies'. Again, it is notable
that Glave made no mention of the 'treaty' which Thom-
son claimed to have signed with Katara or Chitala in
September 1890. 116

Northern Zambezia was characterised at this
period, as we have seen, by a pattern of conflict be-
tween local states, exacerbated by Arab maraudings, a
confusion now further confounded by the various wide-
spread British thrusts. Their primary object was, of
course, to secure the Nyasa-Tanganyika region and to
stop the major Portuguese threat from Mozambique. But
along the western reaches also the turn of the century
witnessed the movement of British armed bands; while
a wide belt of land, in the vicinity of what later
became the agreed boundary between Angola and North-
western Rhodesia, was the scene of Portuguese military
movements, the subjugation of local rulers and the
establishment of a line of forts, between 1895 and 1897.
One of these was at the Capital of Chief Kakengi of the
Luvale, another at Mosiko where the Portuguese killed

116. Geographical Journal Vol. 11 - 1898 No. 6, p. 617
ff., Cyril Hoste of the expedition assumed leader-
ship on the death of Dr J.A. Moloney, former
companion of Capt. Stairs. Underlining is mine.
the chief in battle, Mosiko was south of the Luena river; Kakengi at the junction of the Luena and the Zambezi, while two other forts, Kalunga-Kameya and Nyakatoro were at the Luena-Lumeji confluence and at Nana Kandundu, north of Kakengi, respectively. 117

(e) 'The White Men came with war'

In the central region of the Zambezi the tremors of the carnage of the Ndebele and Shona wars were further heightened by relatively isolated incursions. One such was the appearance in the Zumbo-Feira district in 1899 of John Harrison-Clark whose 'pioneer work' was to be acknowledged by Codrington in 1902. 118 Early in 1899, Lawley, who was then the Administrator, had complained of constant reports of 'illegalities committed by white men...Even if taken red-handed', he said, 'the criminals cannot be brought to justice owing to our officials having no jurisdiction to deal with offenders.' There was a real danger that Barotseland would become for such 'unscrupulous white men' a 'Filibusters' Alsatia', and what happened in Stellaland might well be repeated north of the Zambezi. 119

118. PLG-BSA 8/66, R.C. Codrington to Harrison-Clark, 11/8/02.
A few weeks later, Lawley reported that Harrison-Clark was 'creating trouble in the Loangwa country...collecting hut tax...and representing that he was sent by the Chief Native Commissioner, Salisbury, to obtain native labour...directly infringing the rights of the British South Africa Company as defined by agreements with Her Majesty's Government...The peaceful relations between whites and natives in the Mashukulumbwe and Longwa (sic) districts were in jeopardy'.

In support of his complaint, Lawley forwarded an affidavit obtained from Chief Chintanda (sic. Chitanda), stating that Clark had produced a letter from Salisbury. 'I signed as such', the chief stated, 'knowing that my territories were under British influence'. In addition to collecting hut tax, 'he took by force one of my wives...When Clark sees a girl he fancies, he takes her as his mistress for a few days and when tired of her sends her home'. Therefore 'I resolved to go straight to Mzwiti (H.M. Taberer, Chief Native Commissioner) who was in Salisbury'.

Presumably it was Taberer who obtained the affidavit. The chief's quandary must have been grim. Just over a year earlier the Ngoni kingdom had been

120. Ibid: Lawley to HC, 4/7/99. Underlining is mine.

crushed by British arms in a conflict one of whose causes was believed to be an altercation between Mpezeni and invading white men. To have resisted the brutalities of Clark might have brought like 'punishment' upon Chitanda, whose southern borders looked across to the lands of the vanquished Shona and Ndebele and to the seat of the conquerors' power. It was not easy to distinguish white men from one another and thus all seemed bent on seizing power. Hence Chitanda's humble report to Taberer, from whom 'Changa Changa' Clark claimed his authority.

The area was not only dangerously close to the scene of the savage wars to the south of the Zambezi. It had previously experienced the intrusions of armed white men. Around 1855 an Italian called Simeons had come to the court of Chief Mbuluma of the Feira district with gifts and then proceeded to kidnap children and demand ivory as ransom. Simeons was eventually killed by the joint action of Mbuluma and neighbouring chiefs. When David Livingstone arrived in the area in 1856, the people assumed he was also an enemy. The memory of that time of conflict and of the depredations of a brigand called Mphuka, the half-caste son of a Portuguese adventurer, is still alive in the area around Feira. The collusion of Portuguese marauders, their half-caste offspring and Chikunda raiders made the Luangwa-Zambezi confluence area very sensitive to the
presence of white men with guns. Testimony from Chief Mailo's area in Serenje district indicates that Carl Wiese roamed over a large area west as well as east of the Luangwa and that he 'brought war'. Portuguese involvement in slave-buying on the lower as well as the upper reaches of the Zambezi was undoubtedly the cause of widespread and lasting confusion and led to deep racial bitterness. The thirty years before the coming of Rhodes's men were marked by almost continuous warfare along the Zambezi between Portuguese forces and the Praazzo settlers. 122

Before the coming of Harrison-Clark, there was apparently another white man, nicknamed 'Kapanga'. With his base at Nyalukanza village very near to Mbuluma's court, Kapanga demanded 'tax' from the people in the form of maize. 'Kapanga' was well-armed and very free with the sjambok. What prevented Mbuluma from attacking him was, it is said, a warning 'by his spirit', that if he took action, he could expect 'more of his men from where he came. They will invade your country', he was warned, 'like a swarm of locusts'. For the people along this stretch of the Zambezi, the south was where white men were doing brutal things and African kingdoms were being shattered. When he first entered

the country, Harrison-Clark seems to have comported himself in such a way that he was spoken of as having been relatively 'kind' and 'good'. This may be what made it possible for him to claim that, far from offering gifts in return for the 'concession' granted to him, he was promised by Chintanda that, should the chief need help against his enemies, Clark would 'receive £12 a month when on service with him'. Clark communicated this to the B.S.A. Administrator in August 1897 along with his offer to raise 7,000 labourers for work in the south.123

'Changa Changa' also enclosed copies of a 'concession' dated 21st August 1896, from 'Caetano Anselmo Sant Anna Chapugira' who, he claimed, ruled an area bounded on the south by the Zambesi, on the north by the Resemfa (sic Lunsemfwa), eastwards by the Luangwa and westwards by 'the River Choiar (sic)'. Chapugira, he said, had allowed him to raise tax in the form of corn 'for his own consumption' and 'to do as he thinks fit with Arab caravans coming...with ivory from somewhere near the Congo River'; 'to collect a royalty on all ivory' passing through the Chief's domain and to obtain up to 500 'boys' at any time for white enterprise in the south. Clark told the Administrator, however, that he would do nothing about 'the slave

123. RI/Tiki Mazyambe, 4/9/74; Alberto Chisengelelo and others, Ching'ombe Mission, 13/8/74; Simon Ngulube, Mbuluma, Feira, 4/9/74; Albino Ngulube and others, Zarupango village, Mbuluma, 4/9/74.
trade, since the terrible things that happened in Mashonaland prove that slavery is best for the blacks'.

The B.S.A. Company thus knew of Clark's activities two years before Lawley brought his complaints against him, and then only when his presence seemed to be working against the Company's interests. In 1899, however, his 'illegalities' were exposed much as was done in the case of Wiese.

'Changa Changa' was obviously a vigorous personality, though some Zambian witnesses say that his nickname derived from the fact that he was carried everywhere in a machila. In April 1899, he reported his visitation of 'over 80 chiefs'. 'I am taking boys from all parts of the country', he said, 'as I wish the news to spread... With judicious handling the much-talked of labour question will be a thing of the past, at least as regards Rhodesia'. Once again, he submitted copies of 'concessions', this time from 'Chetentaunga or Chekokla', obtained on 25th May 1898 at 'Cheknombi (sic Ching'ombe); from 'Luvimbie or Sinkaronar' on 12th June 1898, at 'Mount Cauda'; from 'Sinkermeronga or Maundundua, 18th May 1898, at 'Chenonga'; and from 'Longo or Marlonguarlau', 5th June.


125. RI/Albert Chisengelelo, op.cit.
1898, at 'Manestear, Queen's Kraal', whereby he claimed mineral rights 'in my country of Batwa and Mashukulumbwe'.

It was presumably on account of this last 'claim' that Clark offended the Company. He was now threatening to encroach upon what they insisted was part of the 'empire' of the Lozi king, Lewanika. From the point of view of the local rulers and peoples, however, Clark's presence in a large region north-west of the Zambezi-Luangwa confluence had created a stir that is still widely remembered. He had quarreled with 'the Zulu people' (presumably some Ndebele south of the Zambezi) and fled after they killed his wife, probably during the first Ndebele war. For a while he had stayed with the Chikunga - Portuguese half-caste, Mphuka, on the south bank of the Zambezi, and married one of his daughters. At one time Mphuka had raided in the area of the Nsenga of Mbuluma. Clark had been briefly imprisoned in Mozambique. On arrival north of the Zambezi in 1895, he began to sink a small mining shaft near Chakwenga. 'He was not a harsh man ...he used to assist people in many ways...he had many wives'. However, 'in order to force people to


127. RI/Albino Ngulube, op.cit.

128. RI/Tiki Mazyambe, op.cit.
accept his authority, he started to apply the sjambok'. People feared the magical power of European's white skin and 'eyes like owls' and so did not resist when flogged in public. Moreover 'Changa Changa', like all the white men, always carried a gun. In the Soli chiefdom of Shikabeta, the following description of Clark's arrival was given by a senior associate of the chief: 'When the Europeans first came here, they came by sea. The first to arrive was Changa Changa. He first settled near Feira where he was imprisoned by the Portuguese because they didn't like his presence there. After he was released from his cell at Villa prison, he escaped and travelled up the river until he came to settle near the lands between Lukasashi and Lunsefwa, this was around 1900. After settling there, he was surrounded by the local inhabitants who were suspicious about this strange white creature who looked like a kind of fish from the river! Then he realised that he was in danger of being killed, so he pulled out his big gun and fired a shot in a bit "munyonja" tree. The bullet left a large hole in the tree trunk. When the people who stood nearby observed this, they realised this strange white creature was very dangerous and if we dare cause any trouble with him, he will completely wipe us out!' 129

The threatened clash between the B.S.A. Company and Harrison-Clark did not, in fact, come to a head, and three years later, the Administrator's Secretary at Fort Jameson described him as 'fully recognised as a native chief', yet exercising 'the influence of a white man', thus creating a situation whereby 'when steps were taken in 1900 to establish the Administration's direct control...practically no difficulty was experienced in the vicinity of Mr Harrison Clark's location'. His claim to chiefly authority was, Clark himself maintained, based on the fact that he had 'expelled Chimtanda a Portuguese half-caste from the Resunfa (sic Lunsemfwa) river...for murder and trading in guns and powder'. This, however is stoutly denied by senior members of the court of Chief Shikabeta of the Soli in Rufunsa district nor do they include Chitanda in their list of chiefs who were ruling in the region west of the Luangwa at that time. As Clark claimed that 'Chimtanda' was a half-caste of Portuguese connection, it may be that, if and when they clashed, Clark simply began to wield authority - as armed white men were doing elsewhere - and receive obedience.

130. NAZ - BS 1/52-55, Folio 31, Secretary, F. Jameson 15/8/02.
132. RI/Chaponda Khondowe and Luchele Ng'umbo at the Soli Chief Shikabeta's village, 2/9/74.
The twisting course of the River Kafue became a natural temporary limit to the BSAC movement into the region of King Lewanika's domain and the areas inhabited by what were allegedly tributary peoples, like the Tonga, Toka, Leya and Ila. As agents of the Administrator at Chipata (Fort Jameson) pushed westwards, they moved towards the other bank of the Kafue. The recognition by the Foreign Office in 1895 of the B.S.A.C.'s 'direct administration' of the region north of the Victoria Falls had pushed back Sir Harry Johnston's field of responsibility to an undefined line east and north-east of the B.S.A.C.'s area of authority. The demarcation of the Nyasaland Protectorate in 1891 and the consequent extension of B.S.A.C. control over the vast area from the Zambezi to the line of the Anglo-German frontier between Lakes Tanganyika and Nyasa, led, as we have noted, to the appointment of an Administrator, responsible to Dr Jameson, for what was soon to be called North-eastern Rhodesia. In 1900, the Administrator in Chipata sent an agent, Val Gielgud, to reconnoitre the area around the Hook of the Kafue. Gielgud's despatches provide further evidence of a policy of determined subjugation.

133. PRO: CO 879/40, African South no. 484, FO to CO, 21/2/95; and see Hertslet E., 'The Map of Africa by Treaty' (HMSO 1909), p. 286.

134. MAZ: BS 1/93, many references.
There were persistent movements of Mambari slave caravans in Ila country when Gielgud established his camp on the Mwenga, a tributary of the Kafue. He at once became involved in fighting with those Mambari but was, he said, welcomed by the people of Siasonkomona. As he moved eastwards, however, in the direction of the court of the Lenje chief, Chipepo, he found growing hostility. Chipepo's name had appeared in Joseph Thomson's list of 'treaties' made in 1890. The people 'absolutely denied the presence of a Collector at Chipepo' and 'at Mona's kraal on the Tshibila River the natives made hostile demonstrations, some 200 turning out armed with bows and guns to oppose my march...In nearly every case the indunas hid themselves...There is no doubt in my mind', Gielgud added, 'that the people inhabiting the country between Chipepo's and Myyanga's are extremely distrustful of the white man and are alarmed at the presence of white men accompanied by armed natives'.

There were visits from time to time to the Ila country near the Kafue by Lozi indunas seeking tribute in the form of skins, but the people appeared to live in a loosely knit society, concerned mainly with cattle-herding and small-scale cultivation. Gielgud wanted 'a strong patrol' to be sent to the Hook as soon as possible to prove to the people that 'the white officials stationed in their midst are...representatives of a powerful government'.

135. Ibid: Gielgud to Asst. Collector, Chipepo, 2/9/00, and to Administrator NER, 25/9/00.
Very soon, however, Gielgud was facing problems other than those caused by 'Mambundu or Mambari' slave raids. As Codrington reported from Chipata, to the B.S.A.C.'s Secretary, traders were now entering many parts of North-Eastern Rhodesia and 'rapidly denuding it of cattle, rubber and ivory'. There was a real danger, he believed, that 'every European travelling and trading in the country will maintain, as is customary in other parts of Central Africa,...a following of askari or armed natives who, either on their own account or with the concurrence of their employer, raid and intimidate the native population'. In the clashes that followed, the traders, being better armed than the local people, would set fire to whole villages and leave a trail of desolation and hatred. 136 Despite what Johnston had said about respect for African communities and their way of life, Gielgud urged that the Ila must be made to grasp the idea that 'the occupation of the country by the white man' must 'affect them in their tribal life and customs'. Though he had been given no authority to 'administer' the area, Gielgud was obviously constantly on the move and making his presence felt, as when he thrashed a runaway labourer - 'not assuming the right to do so as a Government official but simply...as a white man who had to establish

136. PLG: BSA 8/20, Codrington to Secretary, 4/4/00, and his report of outrage against Kasangu village by Dahna Smith, 21/4/00.
and sustain the prestige of the white race'. He had been taken to task for this action by Major Colin Harding, Acting Administrator of North-western Rhodesia who had visited the area. Harding's visit apparently annoyed Gielgud as 'the natives (had) already tendered their submission' to him. The local people were undoubtedly aware of the fact that Gielgud frequently used the Primitive Methodists' station, Nkala, as his base of operations. 137

Telling the people that they were under British 'protection', was, Gielgud said, 'like assuring the fishes in a fresh water pond, into which one has thrown a pinch of salt, that they were in the sea'. But his primary concern was to demonstrate 'the immense superiority and power of the white race'. 138 He was increasingly anxious therefore for 'military police' and 'a show of force' rather than 'logical argument or assurance'. He confessed that, on hearing of a quarrel between two villages, what made him hold his hand was 'that it would be impossible to utilise and demonstrate the tremendous superiority of breechloader fire in a country covered with grass about seven feet high'. But everywhere he went, he was telling the people that they were now under the NER Administration 'whom they

137. NAZ: BS 1/93, Gielgud to Admin., NER, 21/11/00.
138. Ibid: Gielgud to Admin., 14/10/00.
must support and that in return the White Government would support them...where they found themselves brought into collision with...their people, when carrying out the...commands of the Administration'. The tone of his despatches suggest that his activities had the active support of Codrington. Meanwhile various proclamations to the people announced the coming of 'hut tax'.

When, however, a clash took place between the people and white traders, he was ready to dismiss the trader's action in burning houses as 'a most trifling affair'. A strange ambivalence emerges from Gielgud's despatches on such matters. While anxious to distinguish the Government official, in the local community's eyes, from 'the trader and his pilfering servants', he excused 'the savage reprisals on the part of the white man' on the ground that 'the traders have to suffer much extortion and bad treatment' at the hands of villagers. He was convinced that though traders carried out their business 'at their own risk...the political effect of the murder of white men...would assuredly entail much loss of prestige'. Gielgud's passionately racist assumptions were apparently endorsed by Codrington.

139. Ibid: Gielgud to Admin., 26/1/01 and 23/2/01.
140. Ibid: Gielgud to Admin., 18/5/01, reporting conflict involving a trader called Fairbank.
Gielgud was asked by Harding for assistance in an expedition he was undertaking against some 'Batshukulumbwi (sic) Chiefs' with '70 of his own police plus 23 armed Matabele of my escort, one Maxim gun and some 600 "friendlies"'. Mgalo was routed and an attack on Minenga was then undertaken. 'The effect of this patrol', said Gielgud, 'will greatly increase the prestige of the white Government'. Refugees from the conquered area fled to Siankwema's area and Gielgud anticipated an attack on his camp. He therefore requested more military support 'to force their submission'. He was, he reiterated, constantly impressing upon the people 'the supremacy of the white man...and...that the cause of one white man was the cause of all, provided it was a just one'.

By dismissing the local people as 'savages', agents like Gielgud apparently felt no obligation to understand their grievances in the face of brutal intrusions by white men. This had been well illustrated, early in 1901, when Harding reported the complaint of 'chiefs Simbola, Kasongomona, Kiaba Moasi and Simarumba' against 'a white man whose name they did not know but known as Mr Luizi' for taking away all their cattle. The Acting Administrator, C.P. Chesnaye, told Lewanika that, since the matter had not been reported through the Lozi court and as there was 'some doubt whether

141. Gielgud to Admin., 5/7/01. Ibid.
they form part of the Barotse empire', he did not feel justified to take action in the matter. But Lewis was the name of a manager of the Silver King Mine which had recently been opened up in the district. The Mine had been the scene of desertion by African workers en masse when Lewis and his partner Baragwanath left for Bulawayo. Once again Gielgud called for active measures to 'pacify' the district and establish 'the supremacy of the white man once and for all'. Though the white miners were supplied with armed guards for their protection, it was Gielgud's view that 'the native is beginning to find the white man with his numerous wants, labour, canoes, to buy cattle and be crossed over rivers, etc. a nuisance, as he is always extremely persistent, and, not having been impressed with the power of the white race, the native is disposed to resent his presence'. He then reported news of the murder of the trader, Fairbank, and the flight before pursuing Ila men of a prospector called Boijier. This growing hostility to white men must be smashed by 'the sharpest lesson.' A force of 100 men would be adequate to preclude the chance of effective resistance. 'Small... patrols in new countries', he concluded 'only irritate and increase the hostility of the natives'. It did not seem to concern him that his own deputy, A.C. Anderson, had found that the trouble at the Silver King Mine

142. Ibid: 4\7\4/01.
of the Northern Copper Company had been caused by 'the conduct of the white miners...and the desertion to be the result of ill-treatment'.

Prospectors of the Northern Copper Company were confident that they would unearth major ore deposits in the area of the Hook of the Kafue. Already, by the end of 1901, Lewis was employing 1,000 labourers at Silver King and using another 700 men as porters. Gielgud's visit to the mine in January 1901 was preceded by his military action against the people of a chief called Bulibuli who had allegedly committed murder. The use of corporate 'punishment' was already apparently sanctioned for, having forced the surrender of Bulibuli and his people, Gielgud 'fined him 20 guns and detained him and his headmen until they were paid'. Immediately after visiting the Mine, Gielgud and Anderson ordered a man called Kapandula to come and 'tender his submission to the white man'. Kapandula did not respond and so 'on the third day we marched into his kraal in two parties. We found the people had fled and removed all their belongings'. Then, claiming that 'this was not fright', Gielgud 'burned some of the principal huts in the village and some grain to punish them for their hostility'.

143. Ibid: 2/11/01 and 21/2/02.
144. Ibid: 4/1/02.
Thereafter the party moved to Sankomola's village where the headman reported the theft of his cattle by 'a white man accompanied by "police"...I discovered the white man to have been Ziehl and the "police" his armed natives'. Ziehl had fallen foul of the B.S.A. Company by establishing his own despotism, after the manner of Harrison Clark, and claiming the authority of the Company. He and a man called Bolle had set up a Boma near Chief Chiwala's court (in the neighbourhood of modern Ndola) and had raided for ivory over a wide area, as far as Serenje to the east and towards the Luapula River in the north. The B.S.A.C.'s Secretary for North-eastern Rhodesia spoke of that great region as 'the scene of his many outrages'. But Ziehl had already been 'punished by the white Government', and so, Gielgud told Sonkomola, it was not now possible 'to open up the matter as regards the restitution of cattle'. On his own showing, Gielgud's role cannot have appeared to the local people as that of 'protector'. He was serving the interests of white traders and prospectors, swift to turn his guns upon the local communities, indiscriminate in his 'punishments', arrogantly assertive of the right of 'the white man' to rule and so concerned not with 'argument and assurances' but with the decisive demonstration of Company's fire-power.  

145. Ibid: and PLG: BSA 8/25, C.P. Chesnaye, Secretary, NER, to Administrator, on the arrest of Ziehl and Bolle, 20/6/00; and see NRJ Vol. III, No. 2, 1956, description by Gielgud of his war with Mgalo in 1901, pp. 148-151.
In view of Gielgud's repeated references to the hostility of the local people and the need to enforce their subjugation, his comments on the Hook of the Kafue in a letter to the Company's London Office are surprising: 'In nearly every case a savage race is inclined to accept the rule of the white man as a relief from the despotism of their own rulers or the oppression of superior or more warlike tribes...Men such as Monze looked upon the white Government as a protection against white traders, others again as a protection against the Barotsi or the slave-raiding Bakunde (sic Kaonde).'

He went on to speak of the 'peaceful' occupation of the country but foresaw growing hostility and the need for 'a sufficiently armed force...to tangibly demonstrate the futility of armed resistance'.

The Lamba country in which Ziehl was eventually run to earth by Chesnaye had within it, near the side of the modern city of Ndola, the domain of Chiwala, a Swahili ruler who had established himself there at the heyday of Swahili intrusions from Zanzibar. He had moved into the area of the Copperbelt, Chesnaye reported, from the Congo Free State where 'depredations committed by officials...on his people and property' had forced his flight. His subjects were 'Swahili, ordinary natives and cross-breeds...well-fed and prosperous'. When Chesnaye, the Secretary of the N.E.R.

146. PLG/BSA 8/60, Gielgud to London Secretary, BSAC, 23/8/02.
Administration, went there in pursuit of Ziehl and Bolle, he warned Chiwala of severe measures if he did not help the Company men to arrest the two white men. Chesnaye's party was well armed and Chiwala expressed willingness to have a British flag, 'a request acceded to'. But, once again, there was no report of any reference to the visit there ten years earlier by Joseph Thomson as emissary of the Chartered Company. Chesnaye did however, refer to 'the irresponsible behaviour of white traders generally throughout that portion of the country'. The most emphatic claim to have brought the copper-rich land of the Lamba under B.S.A.C. control was that of J.E. Stephenson who in his autobiography wrote as follows: 'We made no treaty, we referred to no treaty, we complied with no treaty. We walked in and,' after announcing the defeat of the Ngoni not so far to the east, 'we forthwith began to "administer" the country'. Stephenson wrote that he was 'prepared to swear that in the instructions issued (in 1900)... no mention of any such treaty was made; curious, if we were being sent to occupy a country so recently occupied by treaty-rights. Further', he said, 'I can swear that neither that, nor any other treaty, was observed by me during the first five years of occupation of the Copperbelt, though in the course of his journeyings Thompson (sic) made many treaties with petty chiefs. They were the loosest kind of agreements, not worth the paper they were written on - if indeed they were written -
and the B.S.A. Company no doubt realised this'.

'Chirupula' Stephenson has been the subject of glamorous biographer as well as autobiography. The biographer presents a picture of, for instance, the Lala people as gazing in wonder on Stephenson and his companion, Jones, as reincarnations of heroes of local mythology, Kashindika, Shingo and Luchele. The Lala chief, Shaibila, to whom reference has been made above, is likewise described as 'no petty chief' but 'most exalted of Central African rulers, the chief of all chiefs, the communer with the gods, a mighty priest-king'. Jones was alleged to have told Shaibila's people that now, because of the defeat of 'their old enemy the Angoni', by the white men, there would be 'no more war - no more witchcraft - no more slavery'. But Stephenson's biographer also notes that his nickname 'Chirupula' meant 'the flogger'. It is for this that he is still vividly remembered over a wide area of central Zambia.

The testimony of senior men at the court of Shaibila tells how, when Stephenson arrived 'the reigning chief was Lwashi'. The name by which Stephenson is remembered there, as elsewhere, is 'Selesele', meaning 'the rough despiser' or 'humiliator'.


148. Rukavina K., 'Jungle Pathfinder' (Hutchinson, 1951), esp. p. 78; and see p. 100 above, ref. Shaibila.
Selesele came into the village of Shaibila, he planted the flag and went back to Fort Jameson... for two years... He came back a second time and settled in the village of Shaibila (and) told the people that he knew it was the "Mapunde" who had brought war'. The Lala called the Ngoni 'Mapunde'. 'Stephenson said there would be no more wars... and there was great jubilation... The second thing he said was that there would be no more keeping of slaves by chiefs... This did not please the chief... Who will cultivate the fields for us?... He further ordered that no one should abuse his fellow man'. But Stephenson then ordered the payment of tax, burned the houses of those who did not pay and used the sjambok freely. 'He was a very cruel man... He got the name "Chirupula" because of beating people'. 149 Near Ching'ombe Mission of the Jesuit Fathers, NNW of the confluence of the Lukasashi and Lunsemfwa rivers, Stephenson and his companions are remembered as 'very harsh people (who) treated people like slaves... But some people said he was good... even though he was cruel, he had saved us from the Ngoni'. At the Soli chief Shikabeta's court, near Rufunsa, the testimony is that 'the first European to arrive was Chirupula Selesele (who) beat people and used to swear at them. Some people even lost their lives because of beating. One of the victims was Chief Mbosha who was murdered... Chirupula

149. RI/ at Shaibila's court, Mkushi, 18/8/74; and Leo Chikambalala and others, Old Mkushi, 12/8/74.
was a lion, a real beast'. In Mboroma's chiefdom between the Lukasashi river and old Mkushi, this comment was made recently on the people's first contact with white men. 'When they heard that the Ngoni had been defeated, the people rejoiced. There were not going to be any more wars... But the white men made us once more look like slaves, forcing us to carry their loads on our heads, as far as Kabwe. They brought great suffering upon the people'.

The B.S.A.C. thrust into what is now called the North-western Province, the area of the Luvale, Lunda and Kaonde peoples, came a little later, probably because of the unsettled frontier between B.S.A.C. territory, Portuguese Angola and the Congo Free State. We shall look at that area of Zambia later. Our survey so far has included references to most parts of modern Zambia, especially east of the Kafue River, and has been concerned with the years of military occupation. It remains now, within this survey, to mention incidents which illustrate further the relations of the armed incursors to the local peoples. One such illustration comes from the Mwanga area around the Boma at Ikawa (Fife). The 'collector' was a man named J.M. Bell, who, like Gielgud in the Hook of the Kafue, called

150. RI/John Mwelwa, Ching'ombe, 13/8/74; Chaponda Khondowe, Lucheleng'umbo and the Chief at Shikabeta, 2/9/74; and Kaimfa, near Ching'ombe 13/8/74.
persistently for more effective fire-power to establish white authority, and who was involved in numerous attacks on Arab and Bemba caravans. Like Gielgud, too, he was very concerned by the quantity of guns and powder in African hands in the area. In one clash with a caravan which included 'one white Arab', Bell captured 1500 lbs. of ivory and set 57 slaves free. 151

Bell's despatches include a report of people being 'beaten, blackmailed or threatened' by 'police' in the employ of the B.C.A.P. agent at Fort Hill, a man called Best. He also reported an incident which brought him into conflict with Rev. Alexander Dewar at Mwenzo Mission. His version was that the people of Ilendela village ignored his demand for labour, and that when he and Spencer went there, they found that the people had withdrawn into their stockade. He asked Spencer to fire his gun into the air 'to scare off any people that may be lurking about'. Supported by his Makua messengers, Bell entered the stockade, at which someone fired from under cover. A messenger then fired and one man of the village was killed. 'As the people had given evidence of insubordination, I set the village on fire'. Soon afterwards, Dewar wrote to Bell that the people were angered by his action, and by the seizure of goats by the police. Bell then rebuked the owner of the goats for having gone to Dewar and not to himself.

151. NAZ: BS1/1, Bell to Forbes, 16/1/96, 24/4/96, 25/6/96.
'Dewar', he told Forbes, 'is exactly the type of missionary who pokes his nose into matters outside his province'. Bell then said that 'the Wa-Nyamwanga (sic) have refused absolutely to obey me in any way and all along', and affirmed his policy of destroying the villages of such 'insubordinate' people.\footnote{152}{Ibid: 11/9/96.}

Dewar's first letter spoke of the incident as 'one of the most heartrending and pitiful...a case of pillage, incendiaryism and a poor man being shot down like a dog...If such as has just happened at Ilendera (sic) is allowed to go on', he added, 'the lives of the Europeans will be endangered'.\footnote{153}{Ibid: 11/9/96, encl. Dewar's letter of 9/9/96.}

The last five years of the century, in the northern reaches of the territory were a time of war, sometimes smouldering, sometimes erupting, with the Chartered Company's forces constituting a new factor in the situation of protracted turbulence, adding in their own more deadly 'nkondo' (war) by the use of the latest weapons from Britain's armoury and swiftly gaining the upper hand over a huge stretch of territory. Violence stalked in the land, as when 'Bobo' Young reported, in late 1897, to Charles McKinnon, his superior, that 'Worringham has been and smashed up Chiquwanda (sic) and burnt 4 villages and made Chiquwanda prisoner'.\footnote{154}{NAZ: BS1/2 Young to McKinnon, Sept, 1897.}
In local eyes, the white men appeared as quick to resort to violence, turning their fury on whole districts without discrimination. When the London Secretary of the Chartered Company asked information from Codrington in 1899 about 'the treatment of natives', what came to light were the personal animosities existing between B.S.A.C. officials and employees of the African Lakes Company. The impact of the ill-treatment upon its victims was not a point at issue in the correspondence. Yet the charges of the A.L.C. included a statement that 'Chiefs and headmen have been put in chains at Ikawa until their people turned up to carry loads for the B.S.A. Company'. The B.S.A.C. was operating 'a regular "cordon" of officials stationed round the best labour districts who are compelling the natives to go to Karonga to carry loads for the B.S.A. Company only - refusing to allow them to work for the Corporation (A.L.C.) as they have been in the habit of doing. B.S.A. Company Askari, stationed in the villages, have been stated to have actually threatened to shoot if the natives refuse to work for the B.S.A. Company'.

Whatever may have been the rights and wrongs of the B.S.A.C. - A.L.C. rivalry, local memory appears

to corroborate the substance of 'Mandala's' charges against Rhodes's men. Simon Singoyi of Isoka, along with other senior men who recalled the time in question, have testified that the first white men to settle in Mwanga country were 'Mandala called Tom' and then the missionaries at Mwenzo (1894). 'The first Europeans arrived in this country peacefully, first it was Mandala and then the Missionaries...Things began to change completely when other Companies began to arrive. These people began to force us to carry their katundu (loads) from Karonga. Taking these things to Mbala, to Nachitipa or Mwenzo or Kasama - big boxes called vingongongo - steel trunks. If you failed to carry this heavy steel trunk, then the alternative was sjambok...There was no road covering the distance between Karonga, through Ikawa to Kasama. And how much money did one expect as payment for the trip between Karonga to Nachitipa? People used to be given a few yards of material - about ten feet. The boxes they carried contained beads, big beads. When you put this box over your head, it felt extremely heavy. These type of beads were called intundulu. When they arrived, Askaris would announce to the villagers ? 'Isei kuno, iseni kuno, come here, come here. Then they would place the big steel trunk of beads in front of their white boss and he would dip his hands into the trunk, scoop some beads and throw them into the air, and to his amusement, the people, Africans,
would rush each on to snatch his share. As the Africans fought each other for their share the European would burst into laughter. We began to wonder whether we had really been freed from our fetters! It did not take long before we experienced the introduction of the yoke. They introduced long chains which they used to chain people's necks - and they would chain several people together - in a line. Sometimes when they set off they could get ropes for tying people round their necks, and they would then force people to run about in the bush, tied together, and in a line. People began to refuse to carry *katundu* and escaped into the bush, and it was terrible to sleep in the bush infested by marauding lions. When they discovered that you have dropped the heavy steel trunk, then you have to carry this on your head right through up to Mwenzo. When one could no longer stand this, you just find a tree in the bush and just dump the thing there and flee into the bush and they begin to hunt for you. This turned into a kind of war.  

In the British Central Africa Protectorate, the Blantyre Mission had commented a few years earlier on 'Mr H.H. Johnston' in Africa 'and how the Commissioner had reacted when Chief Mitochi had refused to pay gun taxes and send his people to hoe the road to Zomba.

156. RI/Simon Singoyi, Philemon Silwimba and others, Chiwanda, Isoka, 26/4/71; and see p.192 footnote 39.
'People fled to the hills on the rumour of "war" and... the expedition proceeded to loot and burn several houses in it. Four tusks of ivory, several kegs of powder and a variety of miscellaneous articles were borne off'.

Similar treatment was given to the people of Chipalasa. 'A native chief said to us the other day, "You English have come and you have seized our country. Well, we give it to you, only we wish to live at peace with you. If you burn our houses, we will build again; if you seize our property, we will work and get more. But if you destroy our food, we must die. Why do you treat us in this way? You will only drive us away from the European altogether"'.

The situation in what is now Zambia was not developing differently from Johnston's 'protectorate'. Thus today in many parts of the country, people recall how when the B.S.A. Company began its 'effective occupation', 'the white men came with war'.

157. NLS: 7906, Folio 219, 'Life and Work in British Central Africa', June 1890(?).

158. Sundry RI - e.g. Zebron Sambwa, Serenje, and Yakobe Lusuma, Muchinka, 16/10/73; Simon Singoyi, see footnote 156 above; Tiki Mazyambe, Mbuluma, 4/9/74; Sam Banda, Chadiza, 8/3/75; William Kawandami, Mbereshi, 9/5/73; Noah Kapika, Lushi­wash, 17/10/73; Kapumfi, Chilubi Island, 20/11/74; Nansala Manyeta, Mailo, 15/10/73; and many others.
CHAPTER V

MAJOR INSTRUMENTS OF SUBJUGATION

(a) 'Musonko' - Universal Taxation by Sjambok, Firebrand and Yoke.

It is now necessary to consider the significance of the imposition of 'hut tax', the coercive recruitment of labour, and the methods employed in general by B.S.A.C. agents in northern Zambezia from 1900 onwards. Though our review starts with the 'hut tax', musonko, it is clear that the need for cheap labour for European enterprises south of the Zambezi cannot be separated from the imposition of Taxation. Moreover, the taxing of African populations by the colonial 'administrations' set up by European nations was already being widely enforced. Indeed, we can assume that when musonko was eventually imposed in the area of Zambia, Africans were aware of what had happened elsewhere in consequence of such taxation. It is therefore also vital to note, in the case of territories annexed by Britain, that though taxation became at once a cause of anger and often of physical resistance, the conquerors were everywhere determined to enforce it.

In praise of the Royal Charter granted to the B.S.A. Company in 1889, it had been said that 'a large and valuable territory will be opened to British commerce and enterprise without any burdens being
placed on the shoulders of the tax-payer'.¹ Even at that time, however, it was officially recognised that in pursuance of the terms of the Charter, the Company would have authority 'to make laws and ordinances and to impose and levy taxes'.² The Parliament that eventually approved the Charter was, however, persuaded by the claim of the Colonial Under-Secretary that Britain could now hope to 'spread the influence of civilisation to the barbarous districts of Africa without assuming the grave responsibilities which attack to an extension of Protectorate'. Moreover 'the native chiefs will no longer be exposed to the...bad bargains which they have made at different periods. The country will be opened up and control will remain just as before'.³ So persuaded, the House was not likely to anticipate what would actually happen in a situation in which land, labour and taxation would be together exploited in the Company's drive for quick returns from its new annexation.

Within a very short space of time, the Company was literally battling for supremacy in Central Africa. South of the Zambezi, the 'insurrection' of African

1. RH:MSS.AFR.70, cutting from 'St. James Gazette', 27/8/89.
rulers, like Ng'omo and Umtassa in Rhodesia, had been answered by drastic acts of communal 'punishment'; and though the High Commissioner in Cape Town might express disquiet over 'such a lamentable loss of life', the argument of Dr Jameson that the peoples concerned were guilty of 'armed resistance to the law' apparently carried the day. The 'law' was now virtually a synonym for the decisions of the directors of the Chartered Company, the significance of which becomes clear when we note that, at the time of the first Ndebele War, the High Commissioner assured the Company that he had 'no desire to oppose the imposition of hut-tax in Mashonaland'. Indeed, as we noted earlier, he was soon to inform the Colonial Office that the defeat of the Ndebele should be a signal for the recognition of the Company's fitness to administer the Ndebele and Shona regions 'as one country'.

The supremacy of the Company in the fiscal field included the prohibition of any direct levies by local rulers upon the commercial or other operations of white men. This was made explicit in a despatch of the High Commissioner to the Colonial Office at the end of 1893. But the next two years saw increasing

4. PRO:CO 879/36, African South no. 426, CO to BSA, 31/5/92; Jameson's comment, 1/6/92; HC to Jameson, 4/7/92; letter of Umtassa ref. R.W. Benningfield ('Dindwan') 30/6/92; HC to CO, 6/7/92, and 2/9/92, et.al, with ref. to Ng'omo and Umtassa.


evidence of African resistance to the imposition of hut tax. Soon after the decision, taken ostensibly in view of a quarrel between King Khama and his brother Raditladi, to split the Tswana kingdom into three – placing the third part under the direct control of the B.S.A. C. – the Kwena chiefs of the Molepolole area told the Colonial Secretary that they did 'not wish to be protected simply from those who would make war' upon them but 'from those who would divide up our country into allotments... If the Queen will hear us... we will render our thanks by paying such a tribute as will make manifest our gratitude. We are not at present prepared to pay a hut tax'. Indeed, so many such petitions were presented that the High Commissioner felt that the B.S.A. Company should be told 'that the policy of Her Majesty's Government must necessarily be to a great extent influenced by the views of the Chiefs'.

Instead, however, the Company's policy was to lead to the major uprisings of both the Ndebele and the Shona peoples. Indeed, the exaction of tax, which had begun in 1894-95, was extended and the Company's cause now received the support of leaders of both the Roman Catholic and Wesleyan Methodist missions in Rhodesia. To them, tax and labour were bound together. 'This... is the kind of forced labour required', said

7. Ibid: 879/44 African South no 498, petition to Colonial Secretary, Chamberlain, 17/9/95; and HC to CO, 9/8/95.
the head of the Jesuit Mission, while the Methodist Superintendent believed that, since there were 'thousands of savages living in sloth...the discipline of work for a few months in the year would be of the highest moral benefit'.

The financial yield of the first year of the hut tax had clearly benefited the Company's exchequer, a total amount of £4,323, raised between April and August 1895, being over £4,000 more than the yield of the same period in 1894. The overall position of B.S.A.C. finances for the period, the Directors told their shareholders, gave 'confidence in the future'; revenue, including £203,905 from the sale of stands, being £322,788 against expenses of administration, 'direct and indirect', of £142,423. The rate of tax per 'hut' was 10/-, the equivalent of a 200-lb bag of grain or a yearling heifer.

In 1899, the Company's Administrative Secretary declared that 'the people must do work on the country until they have repaid the expenses actually incurred by the Administration on their behalf'. Presumably this would include the cost of the military operations by which the 'pacification' of the Ndebele and Shona had been effected.


urging a four-fold increase in taxation to £2 per 'hut', the Administration argued that this was 'absolutely necessary in the interests of the natives themselves' and spoke of plans to apply 'the whole or part of the proceeds...of the tax to objects calculated to improve the condition of the natives'. As the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society increasingly criticised the Company's administration, the Resident Commissioner in Bulawayo took grave exception to the Society's claim that the duty to pay tax must be dependent upon recognition of the African's 'rights of citizenship'. 'The natives of Southern Rhodesia', he said, 'are quite unfit for such a responsibility'. The picture of African inferiority and docility was further supported by the Chief Native Commissioner's report on the methods of tax collecting now in use. 'It would be impossible for the Native Commissioners to go to every kraal...nor do the natives expect their Chief (for they look upon their Native Commissioner in the light of a great chief) to go to them for tax; this would be contrary to native custom'. Therefore people were ordered 'to appear at certain central points in the district' to pay their taxes in person. This report came in response to a

query from the High Commissioner about death caused by the guns of a 'native patrol' of tax hunters in the Mazoe district. 12

In fact the Mazoe district had been the scene of action by a far from docile African leader and his disciplined followers. Mapondera, a Rozwi chief, had left his homeland in 1894 because of the severe impositions of B.S.A.C. rule. After joining forces with Makombe in Mozambique in 1896-97, he came back, only to find that his herds had been confiscated. In late 1900, Commandant Flint of the B.S.A. Police ordered a patrol to hunt Mapondera and prove their success by bringing back his head. The High Commissioner regarded such means of identification as regrettable, but a head had been duly brought to Flint. Soon afterwards, the Resident Commissioner reported an attack on the administrative post at Lomagundi by Mapondera's men. 'Mapondera is still a fugitive', he said. The question of whose head had been brought in to Flint was not raised in official correspondence. Mapondera was eventually seized and died in prison. In such situations, tax patrols, such as the Mazoe one, were, in the eyes of the local communities, not less than war. Rhodes's comment on Mapondera's 'insurrection' was that he did not 'deem it of much importance. They are the usual

12. Ibid: 879/76 AfricanSouth no. 694, Res.Comm. to HC, 9/7/01; and 879/68, no. 656, CNC Taberer to HC, 15/1/00.
The imposition of hut tax in Johnston's domain beyond the Zambezi came about somewhat differently. There, Johnston was to speak of 'tax treaties' and to present the Foreign Office with an account of free negotiations on the subject. 'The principle we go on in taxing the natives', he wrote in 1897, 'is this: "Will you, Chief So-and-So, surrender to us by a Treaty and for a quid pro quo your sovereign rights, including the right to tax your people? No? Very well then, govern your people properly; do not raid for slaves or provoke civil war; afford reasonable protection for Europeans. We will then establish no officials...and shall not require to tax you".'

Three years earlier, he had stated his opinion that it was 'only reasonable that the sacrifice should not be all on one side - that the natives whom we are defending against the Slave Trade should...contribute...towards this expenditure...At the commencement, therefore, of my Administration, I began to treat with the chiefs in the more settled districts on this subject. In fact the question of


taxation was first introduced by the natives themselves in that Lower Shire district which we took over from the Portuguese in...1891. The natives were accustomed to pay taxes to the Portuguese and...asked us to assess the tax which they were to pay'. Tax 'treaties' were then signed, he said, throughout most of the Shire region, whereby the chiefs bound their people to a tax of six shillings per year, either as poll tax or as hut tax. 15

In 1891, however, the Scottish missionaries had recorded their distress at news of a 12/- tax 'on all male householders' in the Ruo district. This would mean that 'a man would have to work for four and a half months every year...We regret exceedingly that a policy of native taxation - gun tax, poll tax, licence taxes, etc. - should inaugurate a British Administration in Central Africa. It is decidedly un-English - runs counter to all the past in our Central African history...To commence the development of the resources of the country by imposing taxes seems a strange reversal of the ordinary course of economic science...it was not for this that the battle of the last two years was fought'. A month later, the missionary newssheet was expressing fear 'that the collection of the tax will be accomplished

only by the use of force'. By mid-1892, however, the tax was 'being imposed on all over 14, school children included! Zanzibari police were telling people: "If you don't bring in your taxes at once, we'll come and burn your houses"; and this tax compared adversely with the 10 shillings hut tax in Cape Colony, the Mozambique tax which was equivalent to six shillings and eightpence, and that in force in Burma, 'a country conquered by British arms and one of the richest and most fertile in the world', where tax was not more than 2½% of a man's income. Furthermore, said the missionary commentator, 'in 1889 when these treaties were being signed as a foil against the Portuguese, there was much talk on the part of the English Residents...comparing that country (Portugal) with the English who did not impose taxes. The natives...accuse us of a breach of faith'. The newsheet cited positive assurances of no taxation in such 'treaties' as that made with Malemya near Zomba. As the months went by, however, Johnston's agents pressed on with the collection of taxes, whereby, said the missionaries, people were 'scared by the sudden presence of soldiers in the village and perhaps too by the smoke of burning huts, as if they were bees to be despoiled of their honey in the old barbarous method of smoke and dismay'. In the end of 1893, Captain Edwards and his force of Sikhs made a frontal attack on Mkanda's village in the Mulanje district to punish tax
defaulters, burning the village to the ground as people fled in terror. 16

The first collection of tax was at the rate of six shillings a year but, under the pressure of traders, planters and missionaries, Johnston reduced it in 1893 to three shillings. Initially it was planned that chiefs should act as collectors and receive 10% of the tax revenue in return; but in reality, it was white officials who carried out the collections and there is no evidence of any payment of commission to chiefs. 17 Johnston had ruled that the 'hut' of a tax-defaulter must be 'forfeit' to the Administration, and he wanted this to be operative on the day after the tax was due. The Foreign Office modified this by recommending two months' grace. But there was only one way in which a house could be effectively 'forfeit' and that was by burning. As the Commissioner's wars with Kawinga and Zarafi were followed by exploits further north against the Ngoni, people were 'in alarm because Chikuse raids them for paying taxes and (they) are afraid that their hut will be burned if they do not'. 18 Thus began

16. LW October, November, 1891, August 1892, November 1893; and see p.198 above.


years of vigorous 'punishment' of tax defaulters in Nyasaland. As late as 1928 the Nyasaland Government was to give formal approval to the arrest of relatives of defaulters as hostages until the cash was forthcoming and to the demolition of the houses of male defaulters and "of women whose husbands are in Southern Rhodesia and who have not paid the hut tax". Yet as early as 1892, the 'Glasgow Herald' had voiced public concern at the fact that there could be no respect among Africans 'for British justice, if we allow the same man to impose taxes and decide appeals against them'. Indeed, at a time when Rhodes's tax programme had not yet drawn public attention, the Edinburgh 'Scotsman' urged that 'Mr Rhodes, as well as Lord Salisbury, should keep an eye on Mr Johnston'.

In German Tanganyika, taxation was being enforced by 1899 and 1900, meeting with sporadic resistance in various districts including those closest to Nyasaland and North-Eastern Rhodesia. There also it was missionaries who drew attention to the excesses of 'hut-burning, snatching of women, removal of cattle and political disregard for local leaders'. In the Maji-Maji 'rebellion' of 1905, which was suppressed ferociously, the anger of the people was turned in particular


20. 'Glasgow Herald', 10/8/92 and 'Scotsman' 18/12/91.
upon askari who patrolled the countryside for tax.\textsuperscript{21}

Meanwhile the notorious situation of exploitation in Leopold's Congo had also been aggravated by tax impositions which, as a critic wrote in 1910, involved all adults, both men and women, in the payment of 19 francs 'expressed in produce of an indefinitely greater intrinsic value and requiring for its collection an amount of time and labour to which the stated figure bears no relation'.\textsuperscript{22} In South Africa, to which in so many respects the two Rhodesias appeared to look for a model in matters of 'administration', there was a constant murmur of African resentment against taxation, as expressed at an \textit{indaba} in Pretoria in 1906. 'Taxes are high and oppress us...You say you have good laws. It is your laws that are killing us. The Boers did not tax dogs ...You increase our taxes...you deprive natives of work by means of the Chinese. Where is the money to come from to pay all these taxes?...Who represents us in Parliament?'\textsuperscript{23}

As we now begin to review the operation of the 'hut tax' in northern Zambezia, we should note that, in North-western Rhodesia where the Colonial Office

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{21} Wright M., 'German Missions in Tanganyika 1891-1941' (Oxford 1971), pp. 64, 75-77.
\item \textsuperscript{22} PRO:CO 417/494, Letter to 'Times' by E.D. Morel, 31/1/10, in answering a glowing picture of the Congo in letter of a missionary, Dugald Campbell, 18/1/10.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Ibid: 450, Report from papers of a Mr Grant of \textit{indaba} with Sir Godfrey Lugden, 1/3/06.
\end{itemize}
continued to urge restraint in the Chartered Company's dealings with Lewanika, the imposition of tax was delayed; whereas in North-eastern Rhodesia, tax exactions began not long after the various military subjugations which we examined above. Indeed Codrington followed, as quickly as was possible, the model offered by Johnston, with whom he had worked, but there was no recorded attempt to relate the introduction of hut-tax to any 'treaty' negotiations. In 1898, Lawley had commended to Rhodes a comprehensive plan for labour recruitment for the south, submitted by an agent called Smitherman. To make it effective, Lawley urged the Company 'to institute a heavy tax as soon as possible'. In 1899, Codrington reported that about 87,000 adults lived in the districts of the Tanganyika Plateau. 'The universal opinion...including the missionaries, traders and officials, is that some form of taxation should be introduced in order to compel the natives to work for at least a few weeks every year. In no place in British Central Africa can a native earn money so readily as on the Nyasa-Tanganyika transport route'.

By 1901, 'hut tax' was being thoroughly exacted in the district around Ikawa and indeed Dr Chisholm of Mwenzo Mission hoped that the Company would

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24. RH:MSS.Afr.s.228, Lawley to BSAC, enclosing Smitherman's report, 7/12/98; and NAZ: BS 1/43-44, Folio 250, memo of Codrington, 19/9/99. Underlining is mine.
make the people live in bigger villages, which would aid not only tax collection but the establishment of mission schools. A census of villages around the L.M.S. field south of Lake Tanganyika was followed by the first tax collection later in 1901. 'Chiana' Harrington recorded the first collection in Mansa (Fort Rosebery) District in 1901, and how the people were put to work on the road to Sokontwi, because 'at that time there was no work for them to earn money'. He also recalled that the 'definition of Hut Tax' listed 'the usual occupants of a taxable hut as the owner, wife and a child. The usual occupants of an untaxable hut is (sic) an old couple with a young nephew or niece or an old woman and her daughter who is often the wife of a man in the village, or 3 or 4 young boys, or a couple of old women with a niece of nephew. The young men scheme to put their second wife with these so as not to have two huts'. Harrington added that 'whole villages decamped to the Belgian Congo to avoid payment...Chief Chisunka evacuated with all his people'. Musonko thus brought serious consequences of both over-crowding and depopulation from the start. 25

25. NLS: 7883, Folio 44, Chisholm to Secretary, Edinburgh, 3/4/01; and CCWM, C. Africa Reports, Box 1, W.G. Robertson, Kawimbe, 21/1/02; RH:MSS.Afr.s. 1355, extracts from Nhelenge (sic Nchelenge) District Notebook, 1899-1922 (by J. Fowlie) pp. 2-5, notes by Hubert T. Harrington.
The first mention of hut tax in the White Fathers' diaries spoke of 'benevolence' on the part of collectors in the ingathering of tax, as evidenced by 'Tambalika' Marshall's encouragement of men to take back polygamous wives whom they had sent away for fear of having to pay tax for each such wife. However, the picture around their Chilubula Mission was different. In December, 1902, Cookson and Jones of the B.S.A.C. announced that every house must display a tax receipt or be demolished. The traditional custom of living in temporary grass shelters (mitanda) close to fields, to protect crops from animals, was declared illegal, as was the movement of villages without 'official' permission. Any walled house erected in a mitanda cluster would be burned and its owner arrested. Moreover, all adults were ordered to go to the Boma to pay tax, which often involved long journeys.26

In the 'tract', as the North Charterland's field of enterprise was called, an attempt to impose hut tax had been made by Colonel Warton, as we saw above, in 1898. After the military subjugation of the Ngoni, the tax was effectively imposed by 1901. Zambian testimony in the Eastern Province tells of people

26, WF: Kayambi, 28/11/02; Chilubula, 6-8/12/02, 24-25/5/03 and August 1903. Note: H.C. Marshall's nickname, 'Tambalika' or 'Mutambalika' may (as suggested by NRJ Vol.II, no. V, 1955) have referred to his hunting prowess, though in the Bemba language it would also suggest a peaceful disposition.
being taxed as soon as hair appeared under their armpits, youths being lined up and subjected to inspection. The money value of the tax went, the people were told 'to the Queen under whose protection the country fell'. Many times, whole villages were deserted, their inhabitants living for some weeks in the forest, feeding on wild honey. When men escaped alone, messengers would seize their wives whom they 'forced to commit adultery'. This forced the men to come out of hiding. Defaulters were imprisoned for up to 'six months in jail plus the sjambok'. Though B.S.A.C. men sometimes suggested that musonko was merely an extension of the traditional offering of tribute to chiefs, this was stoutly denied by local testimony, in 'the tract' as elsewhere. The use of the chain-gang as punishment for tax default was seen rather as a continuation of the practices of slavery.  

The year 1901 can be regarded as the beginning of musonko throughout North-eastern Rhodesia, though there was apparently some delay in the as yet undefined border districts between North-western and North-eastern Rhodesia. Early documents referred to 'tax-labour' to express the mode and purpose of the exactions, but the

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Foreign Office in London queried this. There was a danger of charges of 'forced labour' and so the Company was reminded that the N.E. Rhodesia Hut Tax Regulations made 'no provision for the acceptance of labour in lieu of taxes'. The B.S.A.C. Secretary replied that 'taxation will be in kind or cash for the future'. Previously the exaction of labour in lieu of tax had been practised 'owing to the very limited amounts of cash which were then in circulation'. But the Administration in the field continued to mention 'tax-labour' and so the Company's London office reminded Codrington that 'natives should be encouraged to pay the tax themselves'. The Foreign Office continued to be fearful lest 'an arrangement under which natives are compelled to labour...to discharge their hut tax...may become indistinguishable from mere traffic in forced labour'. But there were reassuring reports in their hands of the whole country being now 'under control' with 'peace and good order' prevailing and 'no longer any danger of a war with the natives'.

In 1899, the B.S.A.C.'s Accountant ordered, for speedy delivery, 'twelve gang chains with four collars on each chain', and there is reason to believe that such items were regularly requested from London.

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28. NAZ: BS 1/16-19, FO to BSAC, 31/5/02; BSAC reply, 5/7/02; BSAC, London, to Administrator, 9/5/03; FO to BSAC, 16/3/03; and BSAC to FO, 21/1/02.

29. Ibid: BS 1/43-44, letter CT 9/99 of Secretary-Accountant.
Zambian testimonies recorded over very large parts of the country corroborate the fact that, when musonko was first imposed upon societies which did not practise a cash economy, there were constant demonstrations of the determination of 'collectors' to exact the tax at all costs. After a cursory census of houses had been made - sometimes, as in the Namwala district, by adding the total of sticks of thatching grass plucked from each house in a village - the collector and his armed askari would swoop on the village. These askari appear to have been recruited in general from distant and already subjugated areas. Malawi Tonga askari were employed in the Mwanga, Mambwe, Bemba, Lungu and other areas. Ndebele askari accompanied Gielgud, Anderson and other B.S.A.C. agents in the Kafue region. Bemba men were used as messengers in the Luangwa region, and after the defeat of Mpezeni, some collectors used Ngoni men for this work. The appearance of armed foreign Africans in a village naturally heightened the atmosphere of 'war' as tax was being exacted. Indeed 'the white man's appearance in a village...was regarded as a declaration of war. War drums were sounded with that tone that makes a Mwila (member of Ila community) develop a fighting spirit'. Defaulters caught by these

askari were bound together in a chain-gang and driven off to the nearest Boma. People in the Lenje chiefdom of Chipepo vividly recall the departure of chained men, marching to the crack of whips, to the Boma at Mwomboshi which was built by 'Sheketani' (Shekleton) and 'Chirupula' Stephenson in 1902. 31

The practice of burning 'huts' of tax defaulters was not known in the area where 'Changa-changa' Harrison had settled before the establishment of B.S.A.C. rule. Similar testimony has been received from informants in the area of Chief Mbuluma of the Nsenga, at the court of Chief Shikabeta of the Soli, and from Headman Sumbi near Kayambi in the Northern Province. In these areas however, witnesses have all confirmed that there was much public flogging. At Old Mkushi, people remember how when an official was encamped near a village, anyone who coughed near his camp was liable to be seized, thrown on the ground and thrashed with a sjambok. Salt was sometimes then rubbed into the skin where it was broken by the flogging. The same evidence was given at Nanzhila in the Namwala district, just south of the Kafue. 32

31. Ibid: and RI/Chief Chipepo and Councillors, 14/10/75. The Boma at Kapopo (Chipepo) had been established in early 1900 by Francis Jones but Mwomboshi was the main B.S.A.C. centre in the area after 1902. Phrase in brackets is mine.

32. RI/Kaimfa, Ching'ombe, 23/8/74; Simon Ngulube and others, Mbuluma, 4/9/74; Albino Ngulube and others, Zarapango, Mbuluma, 4/9/74; Chaponda Khondowe and Lucheleng'umbo, Shikabeta, 2/9/74; Headman Sumbi, Kayambi, 31/5/72; Old Mkushi, 12/8/74; and Benjamin Shankwaya, Chose Ngana, Shadreck Samalomo, Nanzhila; 19/4/73.
On the islands in Lake Bangweulu, and around the Lake, people remember the destruction of both houses and grain-stores by fire. This was also the testimony of people at Mukupa Katandula on Mweru wa Ntipa (Mweru Marsh) in the Northern Province; in the area of Kabwe, and in Serenje district, and in the Lala chiefdom of Shaibila. But it was not only by fire and by whip that the collection of tax became an occasion of terror in villages. There were night raids, accompanied by floggings, as in Namwala district. In consequence, people began to plan a variety of subterfuges to evade payment. In some areas, swift runners would move from village to village by night to hand on to others, not yet visited by the 'collector' or his askari, a supply of tax receipts collected among themselves. Meanwhile, askari, acting for their masters, were free to demand tax in excess of what was stipulated and also to harrass women. The testimony of a headman in the Chipata district seems to sum up the impact of taxation on the various communities of northern Zambezia, in the Chewa language, thus: **Inali nkhortdo, nkhondo yoopsveratu** - it was war, most terrifying war.\(^{33}\)

The accounts of their own activities in respect of tax collection by some B.S.A.C. officials provide confirmation for the testimonies of Zambian people throughout the country. 'Chirupula' Stephenson himself recounted one tax collecting incident thus: 'I remember at Mukonchi's village, one of the princesses proved obdurate. She said she saw no reason on earth why she should give me money; and I said I would burn her house down if she didn't. We were both obstinate: and so the firebrand was laid to the thatch and...the hut went up in flames'. In retrospect, however, Stephenson wrote thus about tax: 'I ask you, my philosopher, what would you do had the Germans, having won the war, started in to administer England and to compel you to pay them an enormous tax in marks and pfennigs, obtainable only in Germany - a tax which would involve you labouring solidly for at least a month in every year at work so foreign to you that you were forced to break up your homelife of ease...and become a veritable slave? Would you set out to get these pfennigs and heave them disdainfully at the foreigner's head - the Protector of the Poor, the Viceroy of God, the Tax-Collector Omnipotent - and be gaoled for your pains? Or would you look out for a nice soft billet under the foreigner?...Would you throw your weight about a bit?...Would you rather enjoy ordering the mighty-who-are-fallen to eat humble pie - even foreign humble pie? And then, wouldn't you sometimes
"revert" - in favour of your own flesh and blood?" 34

Francis, a 'collector' in the Lake Bangweulu region, told the White Fathers on Chilubi Island that he had been given authority to burn all defaulters' houses, as the Unga people were refusing en masse to pay musonko. On his return from a tour of the island, he reported to the Fathers that he had 'found one village hidden in the lake and blown it up'. Headman Matipa said then that the Unga would now declare war on the Company, but the subsequent visitations of West-Sheane, a man of notorious severity, and Goodall from Luwingu with 'la chaine', eventually quenched the smouldering fires of Unga resistance. 35

One of the notable agents of the B.S.A. Company, who had worked in Rhodesia before coming to 'Barotseland', was Colin Harding. His reminiscences appeared in book form in 1933, entitled 'Far Bugles', and they present him as a man who took part in numerous armed encounters with African rulers and peoples with that degree of relish which appears in many of Rhodes's agents. In 1906, however, his service with the Barotse Native Police was terminated, officially because of the necessity to apply 'drastic economy' to the Company's

34. Stephenson, op.cit., pp. 227-8 and p. 87. Rukavina suggests that Stephenson's resignation from the BSAC may have been due, to some extent, to the severity of the Tax Regulations.

35. WF: Chilubi, 12/2/05, 16/3/05, 17/5/05, 22/6/06, 9/5/11.
operations. The real reason was a clash with the Administration in North-western Rhodesia over the methods in use for forcing people to pay tax.\textsuperscript{36} The disagreement reached a climax over a patrol to Kaunga, which was the subject of a despatch from the Assistant District Commissioner, Batoka. That despatch claimed that, while destroying the houses of defaulters, the patrols were under orders to preserve those of people who had paid their tax. But, said MacGregor, 'I regret to find that, upon the approach of the patrol, men, women and children, with all stock flee to the hills and will not come down to be spoken to. This attitude leaves no alternative course open and defaulters' huts are destroyed...In one case natives gathered on a hill and shouted out insulting terms to our party as it passed'.\textsuperscript{37}

Among Colonial Office documents on North-western Rhodesia, there are papers relating to Harding's resignation, which include a printed pamphlet. As an appendix to this pamphlet is a 'list of huts burnt' during the Kahunga (sic) patrol between March and May 1905, the total of which is 970. This could be taken to represent action which rendered not less than 4,500 people homeless. In addition, 64 cattle were confiscated by the patrol. Harding's pamphlet also gave, as an appendix, this despatch from Captain Hodson of the

\textsuperscript{36} Harding C., op.cit., pp. 140-143.
\textsuperscript{37} PRO: CO 879/86 African South 763, ADC, Batoka, to DC, 9/4/05.
Bartoseland Native Police to his Commandant: 'April 5th (1905) - Went to Nkrummai's Kraal 12 miles easterly direction generally Mwanakanego District; found the people had cleared and taken all their cattle with them. Burnt the kraals and did a little damage to the crops and collected food for the party.

'Siamatuli's people (a kraal about 1½ miles further on) came in to the A.D.C. bringing presents, so as there are v. few defaulterers at this kraal I decided to proceed to it, but warned them about the tax having to be paid.

'April 6th - went on about 10 miles to Kasengo's Kraal, Momba District. Found here that people had cleared, in two of the huts there were receipts, so left them standing, burning the remainder. Another of his headmen's kraals, a mile away was also burnt, and some of the lands destroyed. Could hear the people in the hills but the showed no signs of coming in.

'April 7th - Went on to Chumaika's Kraal, about seven miles east, one of Kasenga's headmen, en route burnt two small kraals, the people having cleared. Burnt all the huts in Chumaika's kraal except his own, as on the roof of his hut found Hut Tax receipt; did slight damage to his lands. Trekked on again 4½ miles in a south-easterly direction and came to Chibambi's kraal where the people had only just cleared, burnt all the huts and did slight damage to the crops and collected food for the party.
'April 8th - Went on in a more southerly direction 7½ miles and reached Siamkamoni's kraal. He, together with a few old men and women came down to meet us, and was most civil. But, when asked about the Hut Tax, immediately said they had no money; then when told that the cattle would be bought, replied that they had gone to the Kafue. He was then told that all huts which had not been paid for would be burnt next day if the money were not forthcoming, and again Mr McGregor and myself went to his kraal later in the day and... his reply was again, What can I do?...This, we considered nonsense as, of course, hearing of our approach, he had sent off his cattle. He sent down food for the police that night, all of which was well paid for by myself in limbo.

'April 9th - Went off with the A.D.C. Party and all the police except a small guard...in an easterly direction to visit some of Siamkamoni's headmen. Came to several kraals from which the people had only just cleared. Burnt all kraals (except those on which receipts were found) and did a little damage to the lands, but nothing to what should have been done, time not allowing for this; also this involves a lot of work. Returned to camp after sunset; on our way home the people who had evidently fled to the hills shouted insulting remarks to the police. This I took as quite natural after burning their huts and attach no importance to the matter.
'April 10th - Went off again in an easterly direction but further into the hills...leaving Corpl. Pilkington...to look after the camp...Visited four kraals, burnt all the huts time only allowing of very little damage to the lands. Food was collected. Tomorrow...we shall, after destroying the huts that have not been paid for in Siamukamoni's kraal, proceed in a westerly direction...Cannot see what other action can be taken where the people will not meet us'.

We shall have occasion to look at Zambia's North-western Province when we are reviewing the history of labour recruitment. A Unique collection, in Rhodes House, Oxford, of the personal diaries and letters of Theodore Williams, sheds light on tax collection and related 'administrative' actions during the twelve years, from 1812, when Williams was serving as a B.S.A.C. Native Commissioner. He wrote to his parents weekly throughout most of his twelve years with the Company. Williams worked in the Solwezi, Mwinilunga and Kasempa districts, and took part in the hostilities around Mbala during the 1914-18 war. Perhaps because his home was in Jamaica, Williams talked of 'niggers' and his regular use of the word 'savages' certainly indicates that he shared the rough racial insensitivity which characterised the whole B.S.A.C. operation in Central Africa. When people fell on the ground before

38. PRO: Co 147/480: Harding Papers, including pamphlet, esp. Appendix XIV and XIII. Underlinings are mine.
him in Sakupa's village near Kansanshi early in 1913 and women ululated in his honour he was 'flattered'. He was distressed when the 'savages take to the woods when a peaceful traveller comes their way'. Soon, however, he was commenting on the fact that 'every nigger has a gun - they get them from those stinking Belgians and Portuguese across the border'. But he was now aware of the deep distrust and fear inspired in the local community by the Company's presence, and especially by his superior officer, Pound, who seemed to the people to be 'the man who put them in prison for hitherto unknown offences and who threatens them with prison if they will not work and earn their tax...the man with whose advent...the announcement of tax was first heard'.

Williams recorded an exodus to Angola and the Congo from 'the entire district'. 'We hear from messengers...that not a village has stayed in the northern part of the district - they have all fled in the night. There is no doubt that it is the 10/- tax that they revolt from...10/- seems the deuce of a tax to put on men who don't normally own more than a pot and a spear and a yard or two of calico...Sonka is the word meaning tax, a N.E.R. word, whence spread taxation. The Wandembo connect this - and therefore abhor it - with a word of theirs, sonkola - a verb meaning "to be impaled". And rumours of this...will spread against
any efforts at negation'. The massive exodus of people from a great area around the Boma badly affected Pound, 'putting him off his grub and sleep and spoiling his nerves. He was quite apt to jump for his rifle if anything cropped up suddenly'. Pound was 'tyrannical' and the effects of the taxation policy were devastating, even after an amiable visit from Frank Melland. Moreover, in the neighbouring district of Kasempa, the Commissioner was famous for his 'floggings'. So, when Williams went on tour around Kaumba and Nyakanshaya (sic), he found '2 old men and 2 old women, the remnants of those who have run away 2 months ago - all 4 will be dead in a year, of starvation. The blessings of tax are manifold', he said...'It raises my gorge to think of attempting to tax these savages - even the young ones. But then, when the rub comes, sacrificing every single item of improving administration and sticking to the dirty tax'. In an earlier letter Williams had exclaimed: 'If only this infernal tax had never been talked of for 20 years! What a happier place this would have been!'

It worried Williams that, whereas in Northeastern Rhodesia tax was 3/- but the official monthly wage was 4/-, in his district the tax and the monthly wage had both been started at 10/-. This meant that the Company had to pay a higher wage and consequently 'a higher price for food of all sorts - but we don't get the tax!' 'All that the tax has done', he wrote,
'is simply to frighten the people of us, making it harder to get them to work for us (for they will work for the Portuguese and other traders, etc. in moderation and a good many make their money out of expeditions for rubber to the Congo - which they sell to the Portuguese) and depopulate the district. The D.C. published it as his object partly...to drive out the worthless who would not earn their tax, from the country. In either case, if getting the people to stay to work, the tax was a failure. If driving the people was the object, then the tax was barbaric - cruel morally and materially a damned foolish thing, for now we have no villages about to bring us food'. When Hazel!, the new District Commissioner at Kasempa, visited his Boma, Williams commented thus: 'There is a great deal of powerfulness, if very little of principle, in his creed, which is - first, have obedience - and the payment of tax is an outward expression of obedience and subjugation'.

As late as mid-1914, Williams was still struggling with the problems of depopulation consequent upon continuing tax raids. Of the people of Kabasa, he wrote that they were 'a stiff-necked lot...they will have to have their houses burnt before they see that I mean business'. Yet four years later, he made a

39. RH:MSS.Afr.s.776-81 Diaries of Theodore Williams, 10/1/13. 25/1/13; MSS.Afr.s.779, Williams' letters, folio 89; folio 156, 8/5/13; folio 158; folio 186, 27/7/13; folio 172, 16/6/13; folio 201, 23/9/13; folio 213, 7/10/13. Underlining is mine.
significant comment on the relationship of tax revenue to the welfare of the people. 'I can't tell you', he wrote to his mother, 'how great the deficit is even now in running the country; but you can't imagine a country run much more cheaply. We make the chiefs and headmen do most of the management...(But) no schools, no doctor and, for example, the Solwezi Division of about six-thousand square miles and with a population of about 10,000 natives, in charge of your first-born and Griffiths at £375 and £280 per annum respectively. Local revenue is about £1,300 (of which tax is about £1,150) and local expenditure about £1,200'. Meanwhile. Boma messengers were still engaged in 'catch as catch can' on their tax raids and Williams himself told his mother how he had 'thrashed' his head messenger 'roundly' for becoming drunk in the company of some village headmen. His local nickname, Mutelanjambi, connoted his habit of looking sideways like a shy girl; and indeed a reading of his voluminous letters to his parents gives the impression of a naturally shy man, not at ease in rough company. Pound's nickname Kusaloka refers to the fury of boiling water.40

40. Ibid: folio 365, 27/6/14; and MSS.Afr.s.780, Williams's correspondence continued, folio 323, 5/8/18; and 781, ditto, folio 26, 7/6/19; and see NAZ: KSE 4/1, Mwinilunga District Notebook, for list of nicknames of BSAC officials between 1907 and 1919.
Williams's full, personal account was written week by week without any fear that a senior official might see what he was recording. It testifies to the fact that the coercive exaction of tax, involving the use of sjamboks and burning not only of houses but of grain stores, continued for many years after the first invasion of northern Zambezia by the B.S.A. Company's forces. The White fathers also recorded how, in 1913, they saw '20 prisoners, chained by the neck, being taken to Changala to build houses for Europeans from Fort Hill'. Despite the brutality of penalties which they had seen imposed by the Company men for the best part of two decades, they were loth to protest however. They had, for example, recorded how, in 1905, a cowherd who stole about £3 from one of the Fathers was sentenced to a year's hard labour in the chain gang. As late as 1917, they noted that Company agents were still burning all mitanda despite the fact that these grass 'tents' were essential during the periods when crops required to be guarded against monkeys and other animals; the reason for forbidding mitanda being that the collectors found difficulty in gathering people for tax payment. 41

In 1908, Robert Wright a L.M.S. missionary at Niamkolo told the Society's London secretary that people were finding great difficulty in paying tax. 'To obtain

41. WF: Kayambi, 20/3/13; Chilubula, 6/1/05; Kayambi, 24/1/17.
money for taxes and force the young men south to work, the Administrator told the people at a public indaba at which I was present that in future non-tax-payers would be put for three months on the chain. But that if the young men cared, they could go south, get work and pay their taxes as well as those of their relatives'. As late as 1911, Chesnaye, now Magistrate at Mbala, was insisting that 'a youth over 14 whose physique and intelligence would qualify him to earn 12/- a month, should be held liable to tax whether married or not'. Moreover, 'a boy of the above description who systematically inhabits the veranda of some relative's hut should be treated as an evader'. Hut burning was still to be practised. Wright had meanwhile expressed pleasure at a change in the behaviour of the local 'collector'. 'Instead of coming as he did last year extorting taxes from old and starving people, he came remitting taxes and giving food to the old sick and infirm...Last year the people lived for four months on roots and any rubbish they could get to sustain life. When in such a condition they were compelled to give taxes...This year there has been no starvation...My protests to the Administrator have borne fruit'.

In 1915, Dr Wareham voiced his distress that the tax was to be further increased and 'that men should be compelled to go and find work hundreds of miles from home in order to pay that tax'. When the increase was
applied, the missionaries feared that many of their teachers - who were less poor than the average villager - would be jailed for tax default as 'it is hard for them to find the money'. Tax-raiding, however, continued all over northern Zambezia, and so two other missionary comments on conditions in the latter years of our period merit attention. Rev. J. Bouchet of the Paris Mission at Sefula protested in 1919 that 'to put into prison with chain and all a man who has not paid tax is not fair'; while G.R. Suckling of the Christian Mission in Many Lands at Kabompo, claimed that 'such arrest is effected without white supervision and involves being tied with cord or chains...and marched through the villages sometimes for several days'.

Beyond our period, officials were still well aware of the hardships caused by musonko. In 1933, the Provincial Commissioner in the Northern Province 'issued a ukase that Africans were not to be treated lightly because they did not pay their tax, in spite of the fact that there was no work from which they could earn money...As a result, most of the gaols in N.R. were overflowing. I had 100 quite frequently', said

42. CCWM, C.Africa, Box 14, Wright, Naimkolo, 8/12/08; W.G. Robertson, Kawimbe, 28/11/11; Wright, 12/2/10; Box 17, Wareham, Kyengwa, 13/10/15; Box 19, Robertson, 3/2/21; and NAZ: KDE 2/39/3, letters to Res. Magistrate, Mongu, from Bouchet, 24/1/19 and Suckling 16/11/18.
one District Officer, 'in the Isoka prison which had been designed to hold twenty'. In 1937, after thirteen years of government under the direct control of the Colonial Office, the Acting Governor, in a lengthy minute on 'Native Taxation', censured 'the imposition of penalties and measures of compulsion such as offend against our sense of justice'. He had been 'astonished to see prisons in such an unproductive region as Barotse-land filled with tax defaulters'. There were 7,109 persons committed to prison in that year (1934) for tax default. As the B.S.A. Company prepared to hand over Northern Rhodesia to the Colonial Office in 1923, criminal conviction in the Livingstone sub-district amounted to 2,416, of which 1,640 were for tax default. As the B.S.A. Company prepared to hand over Northern Rhodesia to the Colonial Office in 1923, criminal conviction in the Livingstone sub-district amounted to 2,416, of which 1,640 were for tax default.

In the Chipata district, in 1917, 5,204 out of a total of 5,416 convictions had been passed upon tax defaulters. The Commissioner for the Mweru-Luapula Province reported 5,406 tax convictions in 1921-2 and 8,768 in 1922-3.

Indeed, imprisonment with hard labour had been urged as a severer penalty than 'forfeiture' by fire, as early as 1905, as people were able to replace a burned house quite speedily.

43. RH.MSS.Afr.r.113 - 'Notes on Northern Rhodesia' by S.R. Denny, pp. 20 ff. Isoka 1933-4. Underlining is mine.


45. Ibid: Livingstone District Note-book KSC 4/1, pp. 334 and 404; KSJ 4/1, Annual Report, Fort Jameson Sub-District to 31/3/17; and KDF 6/1/6 Mweru-Luapula Reports.

46. PRO: CO 879/86 African South no. 763, Coryndon to HC, 30/5/05.
Our survey of 'hut-tax' in northern Zambezia has so far made little mention of the Lozi kingdom. The reason for this may be supported by Lord Hailey's observation that 'the policy of the Chartered Company, save in respect of the treaty state of Barotseland, was one of direct rule'. 47 We have been concerned to record so far how such 'direct rule', supported by drastic punitive measures, enforced 'hut-tax' upon the conquered peoples of the territory. The position of the Lozi was different because, as we noted above, the British Government had exercised distinct restraint upon the Company as it moved into Lewanika's domain. Moreover, the Company was anxious to be free to carry out maximal exploitation of the territory's mineral wealth and so was willing to move more circumspectly in its dealings with Lewanika in an attempt to exaggerate the extent of his 'empire' and, by corollary, its own field of mineral operations. This special treatment of the Lozi is illustrated by such facts as these: (a) whereas other chiefs were reluctantly and belatedly given very small 'subsidies', Lewanika was in receipt of an annual subvention, as stipulated by the Concession of 1900, of £850; 48 (b) sundry communications from


48. For text of 'Lewanika Concession' 17/10/1900, see Gann L.H., op.cit., 215-220 Appendix II. Note that the sum originally promised by Lochner in 1890, under pressure from Coillard of the PMS was £2,000 p.a.
London urging that the Company comply with the spirit of 'protection' as originally promised;\(^49\) (c) the Company's attempt to operate a system of 'indirect rule' over peoples neighbouring the Lozi by the use of indunas appointed by Lewanika;\(^50\) (d) the Company's agreement, however reluctant, to allow a % of the tax revenue in his 'empire' to be paid to Lewanika; and (e) the protracted conflict between the Company and the Lozi royal house about minerals in the area originally reserved from prospecting.\(^51\)

What happened in respect of taxation in the Lozi 'empire' appears to have been like this, namely that the initial purchase by Rhodes of the Ware Concession, noted above, and the signing soon after of the Lochner Concession were not followed up quickly by decisive annexation of the Lozi kingdom to the Company. Lewanika's swift reaction against what he regarded as perfidy on Lochner's part was never effectively appeased, despite fluctuations in the mood of the king and of his court in the following years. Though

\(^49\) E.g. MSA: CO to FO. 3/5/90; FO to Coryndon, 8/4/97, etc.

\(^50\) Ibid: e.g. Codrington to BSAC, London, 28/8/07; Text of Agreement between Lewanika and BSAC, 11/8/09; and note also Magistrate, Mumbwa to SNA opposing Lozi authority over Ila, 7/11/18 and SNA's reply, 21/11/18.

\(^51\) Ibid: e.g. Provincial Commissioner, Mungu, to Chief Secretary, 21/3/32, reported how he had threatened to withdraw financial assistance to King Yeta if the Lozi rejected the BSA Company's plan to establish 'Minerals Separation Ltd.' in the reserved area - eight years after the transfer of Northern Rhodesia to Colonial Office rule.
Coillard of the Paris Missionary Society could be held to have 'sold the pass' to Rhodes's agents, it can also be argued that his often fearful but not the less insistent pleading of Lewanika's cause increased the British Government's misgivings over the whole affair. Like no other northern Zambezian ruler, Lewanika was able to correspond with the High Commissioner in Cape Town and, in 1902, to visit Britain in person. Though Lewanika's throne was often far from secure, he was undoubtedly strengthened by the fact of his relations with both the B.S.A. Company and the direct representatives of the Crown in southern Africa. The rumour of a rising against Lewanika obliged the Company to handle him with care, as the rebels of his court were certainly not in a mood to entertain further encroachments on their state. Lewanika was essential to the Company just as, at times, it appeared as though he needed the Company to bolster his power. The Colonial Office, nervous about the risk of 'serious native disturbances', was meanwhile urging the High Commissioner to put a firm rein upon the Company's desire to start taxing Lewanika's 'empire' at a higher rate than in Southern Rhodesia. The increasing scrutiny of Central African affairs by the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection
Society was further embarrassing London. The whole story of B.S.A.C.–Lozi relations is distinguished by constant reference to contractual obligations and indeed this may help to explain how the idea grew, albeit wrongly, that British action in northern Zambezia was based on treaties.

The matter of taxation, therefore, was delayed while a *modus operandi* was sought. In mid-1902 the Company said that it was willing to agree that 'at the outset' the tax should 'be collected by Lewanika on behalf of the Administration, to whom he will hand it over'. But this would only operate 'in those districts in which his authority is sufficient to ensure the *peaceable* payment of the tax'. On the one hand it would suit the Company to have the unpleasant business of visiting the villages to exact the tax done on their behalf by the King's *indunas*; but, on the other hand, Lewanika was sufficiently unpopular for such action by his agents to provoke open hostility. Moreover, he was not likely to be content with such a menial role in the extraction of taxes which he must then 'hand over' to the Company, even though he replied at first,

52. See pp. 71 above; Stokes E. and Brown R. 'The Zambesian Past' (Manchester, 1966) pp. 261-301, article by Stokes, 'Barotseland: the Survival of an African State'; PRO: CO 879/68 African South no. 656 - Milner, HC to Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary, agreeing to oppose N.W. Rhodesia tax, 14/5/00; RCS: Mss 52, Coillard Papers, Folio II, Coillard to HC, 30/5/91; 'Bulawayo Chronicle' on rumoured Lozi rising, 6/2/01.
'There is no reason why I should not try as I used to get tribute from them'. The Colonial Office however was now alarmed at the Company's apparent determination to fix the North-western Rhodesia tax at £1, or twice the Southern Rhodesian rate. At the same time, Coryndon, the Administrator, was not persuaded that collection of taxes by indunas sent by Lewanika 'would show the people that he is still their King'. Rather, he feared that 'all loyal natives will strongly object...This refusal will mean continual fighting; and in the probable case of serious resistance...or the murder of native collectors, I shall be bound in principle to support the recognised authority'.

South of the Zambezi there was pressure from the Secretary for Native Affairs for approval of an increase of 'hut tax' to £2 despite the fact that Company agents still considered themselves obliged, as for instance in the case of the Mtoko district, to burn both houses and crops of 'defaulters', and, in Milner's phrase, to construe non-payment of taxes as 'an act of rebellion'. The reason offered by the Company in approving the increase in principle was that it would 'bring our natives in line on taxation with those of

53. PRO: CO 879/78 African South no. 702, BSAC, London, to Col. Harding, Ag. Administrator, NWR, 8/8/02; Lewanika to BSA 10/7/02; CO to BSAC, 17/12/02, Coryndon to BSAC, 9/1/03.
the Transvaal'. Coryndon, meanwhile, told Lewanika that, when the Company had collected tax money, 'I will send it to you at Lealui so that you shall see it and... send it back to me intact'. Lewanika's visit to England had further delayed action on taxes and increased the Company's hesitance in forcing the pace. Coryndon therefore began to press for authority to start taxing weaker tribes like the Toka who were nominally tributary to the Lozi, as there would be 'no chance of organised opposition' from such 'timid' people. The Colonial Office was further confused by the danger of a confrontation with Portugal over Lewanika's claims to a considerably larger 'empire' that he had claimed in 1891. Lewanika's response was that the frontier with Angola should be fixed before any taxation was imposed. He wanted, as the District Commissioner reported, the railway line to reach Livingstone first, so that 'the boys would be able to earn money and so pay the hut-tax'. Though cattle were plentiful in the Barotse Valley, they were mainly Lewanika's personal property, and so the average Lozi was in fact poorer than it might appear.

54. Ibid: SNA to BSAC, telegram in ref. to Bloemfontein Conference on Rhodesian matters, 24/2/03; and BSAC's reply, 27/2/03; Res.Comm to HC re Mtoko district, 22/7/02; Milner, HC's reply, 26/9/02; Coryndon to BSAC on Toka taxation, 3/3/03; Chamberlain to Milner, 3/6/03; Lewanika to DC, Lealui, 15/8/03 and DC to Secretary, Kalomo, 21/8/03.
While the Company was facing constant unrest south of the Zambezi over taxation, negotiations dragged on in the north, further complicated by Lewanika's demand - which he had reluctantly reduced from 50% to 20% - for a share of tax revenue for his own use. Marshall Hole replied, as Acting Administrator, that the hut tax was 'the contribution made by your people in return for the benefits of British protection' and that the King's 'commission' was 'in lieu of the tribute you formerly collected and...have agreed to abandon'. Hole was also not ready to consider more than 5% as 'commission'. The Company told the Colonial Office that Lewanika was 'not capable of handling more'. However, with this issue still unresolved, the Secretary of Native Affairs, Frank Worthington - known to the Lozi as Nq'ake, the Tortoise - reported that the first collection of tax in N.W. Rhodesia had recorded 8,300 payments with only 5 defaulters. The Colonial Office now wanted 10% to go to the King, part of which would be applied 'to works of public utility for the benefits of the natives'. But the High Commissioner wanted Lewanika's share to be fixed at a maximum of £1,200 p.a.

A marked increase in unrest in both Angola and German South-west Africa and the continuing evidences of resistance to taxation in Southern Rhodesia undoubtedly influenced the British Government's thinking; the
situation being aggravated by a report of Ila resistance to the hut tax serious enough to warrant the swift despatch of '40 police and one Maxim gun' against Siankamolo's village. 'The lesson will be of the greatest value', wrote the Barotse Native Police Commandant who intended 'to inflict some punishment for the refusal to pay in the first place'. The fundamental sympathy between the British Government and the Company was further confirmed at this time by a Colonial Office communication giving approval to the fining of defaulters as 'forfeiture' by fire did not seem to be regarded by the people as a severe enough penalty. But London was not sure whether proof of the Kafue area's ability to pay tax had yet been established and wanted the rate to be held at 10/- for the time being. Tax must be exacted from all adults, the term 'wife' being interpreted as 'any wife of native custom or concubine'. This rigorous approach was further illustrated by Coryndon's report, in 1907, of fines for default amounting to £5 or three months imprisonment with hard labour.  

55. Ibid: Minute by Hole, 28/3/04; Hole to Lewanika, 9/4/04; PLG: BSA 9/108, BSAC Secy. to CO 5/12/04; PRO: CO 879/78 African South no 702; SNA's report of first NWR collection, 17/11/04; Lyttelton, CO to HC, 18/2/05; HC to CO, 3/7/05; British Ambassador Lisbon, to FO, 16/2/05; despatch of BNP Commandant on Ila unrest, 23/3/05; Lyttelton to HC, 15/7/05; and 879/95 African South no. 872, Coryndon to HC, 15/3/07. See also NAZ-BS 2/96, 'Native Unrest in the Kafue Area', sundry memoranda.
Communal punishment was the rule in the Company's dealings with local people, and no concern was expressed by the Colonial Office at the report of Sir Arthur Lawley, the High Commissioner, that, after the Kaunga patrol which led to Harding's quarrel with the Company, a fine of 100 bags of grain was to be imposed on the villages concerned 'as punishment of the refusal to pay in the first instance', in addition to the demolition of houses. Harding's view, noted above, that many of the people did not have 'the means to pay', and that the patrols had great difficulty in distinguishing 'with accuracy the defaulters from the non-defaulters', had no recorded effect on the Company's practice of concluding whole communities together for punishment. As such punishment fell on villages on the fringes of Lewanika's kingdom, the might of the Company was further underlined. The 'collector' at Batoka reported whole communities in flight before tax patrols. 'I regret', he told his immediate superior, 'having to take the active part forced on me but have no alternative if I am to prevent the idea becoming rooted in the native mind that exemption from punishment and hut tax is to be achieved by all able-bodied men absenting themselves, merely deputing to a few women and children to present ...a small quantity of meal or grain or a fowl in lieu'. Coryndon therefore wanted the rigours of gaol to replace the burning of houses. 56

56. Ibid: HC to CO, 8/5/05, Harding to HC, 14/4/05 and see p. 292ff, above; ADC Batoka, to DC, 9/4/05, 15/4/05, 24/5/05; Coryndon to HC, 30/5/05.
The Colonial Office continued to be worried lest the districts which the Company was so eager to tax at once might genuinely fail to yield what was demanded. But the High Commissioner was now championing the Company's cause, repeating Coryndon's statement that the people had had ample warning since 1902 and no excuse for evasion in view of the 'exceptional opportunities of earning money owing to the labour requirements of the Northern Copper Company and the Rhodesia Copper Company since 1901'. By mid-1905, Coryndon was recording pleasure at the High Commissioner's approval of his plan to raise tax in the Sisheke, Mankoya and Kafue districts and throughout Ila country. This approval was given without the prior assent of the Colonial Office and in spite of Lyttelton's relatively strong criticism of the burning of crops as 'not only illegal but barbarous'.57 Initially the Charter had given the Company the power to levy taxes and so the last word was with the B.S.A.C. men rather than with the Colonial Office - a fact of great significance in considering subsequent political history on both sides of the Zambesi.

Hut Tax was thoroughly in force by 1906, not only over the whole of North-Eastern, but also over a large part of North-western Rhodesia. It is therefore interesting to note what Selborne, the High Commissioner,

57. Ibid: CO to HC, 6/7/05; HC to CO, 22/7/05; Coryndon to HC, 5/6/05.
wrote to the Earl of Elgin at the Colonial Office in the middle of 1907. Referring to the Lewanika Con­cession of 1900, he stated that it had given the Company 'mineral and trading and railway construction rights, etc., judicial rights regarding Europeans, and the right (subject to the protection of native interests) to make grants of land for farming purposes in the Batoka and Mashukulumbwe countries, but no right was given to tax the natives'. By 1906 it was thus estab­lished that, wherever the B.S.A. Company claimed the right to rule, local communities must respond by paying tax or suffer the summary penalties imposed by Company officials. In the Lozi kingdom Lewanika was now com­plaining that traders were refusing to pay cash for the cattle they bought and insisting on exchanging trade goods instead. Apart from the fact that the trader could claim the sole right to assess the value of such goods, the Lozi were finding great difficulty in procuring cash for their hut taxes. Lewanika was now also feeling the effects of 'white administration...the suppression of domestic slavery, the imposition of hut tax, the prevention of the promiscuous raiding and plundering by which the Barotse obtained and held their supremacy, and so on·, as Coryndon reported. Lozi suspicions of the Company's perfidious tactics were not lessening. It was at this time that Coryndon was battling for the recognition of the Company's land rights in the Lozi kingdom and suggested confidentially to the
Resident at Lealui that, as a last resort, he might offer Lewanika, as a quid pro quo, 10% of the tax revenue from the 'territory lately acquired from North-eastern Rhodesia'. However since 'Lewanika has no shadow of a claim to this new country...you should use your best endeavours to obtain his signature without reference to it'.

'To the tax itself', writes A.J. Wills, 'the reaction appeared...to be nowhere unfavourable'. This statement cannot stand, however, in the light of the detailed correspondence of the Colonial Office with reference to the B.S.A. Company's rule to the north any more than to the south of the Zambezi. As we have seen, there was widespread resistance to the Company's rule, intensified by the added rigours of 'hut-tax' exactions both north and south. Despite Harding's report in 1901 that all but one of the Ila chiefs had 'made their submission', the general turbulence of Central Africa was certainly not diminishing in the first decade of the century. There was open rebellion against the Portuguese in the Angolan districts of 'Bihe, Balundu, Chebokwe, Liombe and Luchaze'—sparked by the brutalities of traders but blamed on missionaries by the Portuguese authorities; and from the British Central Africa Protectorate, Sharpe reported to the

58. NAZ: BS 2/277, HC to Elgin, 17/6/07; and PRO: CO 879/91, African South no. 802, Coryndon to HC on uneasy situation in Lozi kingdom, 19/12/05; NAZ: BS 2/196, Coryndon to Aitkens, 1/1/06. Underlining is mine.

59. Wills, op.cit., p. 226.
Foreign Office that the people 'almost invariably state that they have no means of paying a tax'. in consequence of which rough labour recruitment led to 'serious riots'.

In a personal tribute to Codrington's regime in northeastern Rhodesia, Leicester Beaufort, Judge to the High Court at Fort Jameson, wrote that 'one cannot help comparing this place with B.C.A. That place is chaos. The native administration (under Sharpe) is a disgrace to the century; burning of huts, immense journeys of natives taken to work for hut tax, journeys not paid for; justice a derision'.

The state of smouldering resistance in northwestern Rhodesia, in response to both taxation and labour recruiting, reached a climax in 1906 and 1907 when, through the insistence of a white farmer, the brutalities of the Native Commissioner in the Gwembe district came to the attention of the higher authorities.

Indeed it is hard to understand how Beaufort compared the situation westwards from the Luangwa basin so favourably with Nyasaland. Harding had reported in 1900 that, through the depredations of unauthorised labour agents, men were 'being driven like sheep...improperly fed - some die en route...a far greater number

60. PRO: CO 879/76 African South no. 694, Harding's despatch after Mashukulumbwe patrol, 22/8/01; Admin to HC encl. a report on Angolan fighting 'N. and N.W. of Lealui', 26/12/02; Sharpe to FO, 12/3/03; and PLG: BSA 8/84, Beaufort to Gell, 20/2/03. Phrase in brackets is mine.

61. 'The MacNamara Case' as revealed by C.B. Venables, farmer on the Kafue confluence - for sundry references, see below.
migrate south of the Zambezi than is generally imagined'. Perhaps a clue to B.S.A.C. thinking about northern Zambezia in the first years of the century, can be found in their view that, while there seemed to be 'not the slightest doubt that our Administration in Southern Rhodesia will not last very long (and that was Mr Rhodes's conviction) it may be an open question...whether the Company will be left in possession north of the Zambezi'. For, so the thinking went, 'North-eastern and North-western Rhodesia...will never be a white man's country'. 'The Home Government' were anxious for the Company to retain control in the north 'which gives the Government a convenient scapegoat if anything goes wrong'. Yet the Company's agents acted as though they had a free hand. 62

Before reviewing the case of C.J. McNamara in the Gwembe, we therefore note Lewanika's protest to the High Commissioner, in 1907 against (a) the forcible removal and burning of villages, e.g. Moka and Sekute; (b) the sale of Moso-Koloane's burying-place to a Dutchman, and the cutting down of the sacred trees there; (c) the compelling of all the people 'to salute even the wives of officials'; and (d) the arbitrary fixing of the King's tax 'commission' at £1,200. 'We sometimes are caused to feel as if we were a conquered nation, while we have made an agreement which was said

62. PLG: BSA 9/6, NWR Report by Harding, 5/3/00; 9/34, Gell to Duke of Abercorn, 12/7/02.
to be just like an alliance between our nation and the Imperial Government. When we say so, those of the B.S.A. Company ask, "Do you want to be conquered?". The King also complained that, without his consent and therefore in breach of the Concession, Boer and other settlers had occupied land on the Machili River; that game were being slaughtered indiscriminately; and that Coryndon had personally beaten one of his sons, while other white officials had beaten sons of various Lozi chiefs. Lewanika was further embittered by 'the expulsion' by B.S.A.C. officials of his representatives in the Ila and Toka areas. 'Does the Company intend to take the districts out of my power? Oh! that we were granted to pass directly under the Government of King Edward!' Lewanika traced this action by the Company's men to the fact that one of his indunas, Motumosoana, was alleged to have told some Ila people that the hut tax was different from the tribute formerly offered to Lewanika. "We the ma-Rotse (sic)...did not force you to pay any money; if anybody had got a tiger's (sic) or a wild-cat's skin, a calabash of honey or a hoe, he would give it and we were satisfied. Now it is hard for you to get money which is not a native product. Where can you get that money from? Perhaps there will be a war this year". The news that there was widespread unrest was confirmed to Lewanika's envoys by three B.S.A.C. men: Anderson, the District Commissioner, Kafue; Hinds, known as Selimatanga, the aloof
one; and Nicholls, whom the Ila called Kalapukila, the one who strikes out violently. During the disturbance, a missionary, William Chapman of the Primitive Methodists, who fled from his station at Nambala after a building had been burned, was accused of 'cowardly and foolish conduct' by the local Collector and refused any compensation. 63

In 1903, Philip Gell, a Director of the B.S.A. Company from 1899 to 1925, had expressed the view that Codrington's rule in North-eastern Rhodesia compared favourably with the situation in North-western Rhodesia where the influence of Southern Rhodesia brought 'the rigid, official temper' which Gell attributed to 'the large Cape Colony element'. Codrington was in charge of a huge region in which the greater kings, as we saw above, had been subjugated by war. It was therefore not surprising, perhaps, that, as the N.E. Rhodesia Administrator reported in 1902, 'the stronger tribes paid (tax) readily...having recognised the inevitability of their being called upon, sooner or later, to pay tribute to the dominant race'. It was 'the weaker tribes' that offered 'passive resistance' to tax collection. The Company's military prowess can also

63. PRO: CO 879/95 African South no. 872, report by Selborne, HC, on NWR tour, 11/11/07, enclosing Lewanika's letter of 1/10/07, and letter from Adolphe Jalla of the Paris Missionary Society, undated, citing Lewanika's proposal that the Lealui and Sisheke districts should be placed directly under the Imperial Government; Kewanika to HC on reported Ila unrest, 11/12/07. Also NAZ: BS 2/96, report of Collector, Mumbwa, 3/7/07.
explain the apparent acquiescence of the conquered peoples in the system, described by Codrington, whereby, though 'theoretically the native who engages himself for work...is paid 3/- which he immediately hands over to the Boma...in practice his employer pays the taxes of a large number of men by cheque, the actual cash does not therefore pass through the hands of the native'. The relative success of Codrington's fiscal system led Gell to foresee that N.E. Rhodesia would 'become self-supporting at far less outlay than elsewhere'. In such a situation of 'pacification' it is noteworthy that Codrington took disciplinary action against an official found guilty of persistent assaults and floggings and of causing death. Among the assaults which he committed, Harger had struck ShiMwalule, the high priest of the burial grove of the Bemba kings. Known as 'Bwana Kasehmbe', the tsetse fly, Harger clashed with other officials including 'Bobo' Young. After the enquiry, noted above, into A.L.C. allegations of B.S.A.C. brutality, Codrington appears to have maintained some measure of control. 64

64. PLG: BSA 8/90, Gell to Codrington, 7/4/03; 8/64, NER Report, 31/3/02; PROF CO 879/79 African South no. 717, Admin., NER to BSAC, 6/12/03; PLG: BSA 8/105, Gell to Grey, 26/1/04; NAZ: BS 1/66, folios 82-114 on Hager's case, including written accusations by Hugh Marshall, Magistrate, 7/11/04. Underlinings are mine. See p266 above.
In the western reaches of Codrington's domain, however, around the Hook of the Kafue and in North-western Rhodesia, such acts of violence, though noted, did not receive effective censure. The greater flow of traders, prospectors and labour 'touts' in Coryndon's sphere must have aggravated inter-racial relations, and this can be seen, not only in Lewanika's complaints, but in numerous reports which came to the attention of both the High Commissioner and the Colonial Office through official channels. There was a man called Malevaris, for instance, who flogged an Ila man who visited him 'without trousers', an action which provoked an attack on his camp. The intervention of Chief Mueswa retrieved the situation. Mueswa then 'paid 3 cows as a fine and returned most of the goods taken' when the camp was plundered. There was danger of a 'battle' at Shaloba against an unpopular trader. The correspondence of Anderson, the Native Commissioner, Kafue, from 1904 to 1907 contains a number of references to cases of assault by white men, in the employ of the local Copper Mines and elsewhere, and of the fierce reaction of local communities against them.66

65. PLG: BSA 8/70, report by Gielgud, 10/9/02.
66. See NAZ: KDC 1/1/1, 1/1/2, and 1/1/3, Letter Books A, B and D. from 1/1/04 to 25/2/07.
As mentioned earlier, 'the McNamara Case', as the 'Livingstone Mail' called it, was brought to the attention of the higher authorities by Charles Venables, who had a farm at the confluence of the Kafue and Museya rivers near Chirundu. At Kanchindu in the Gwembe valley the arrival of B.S.A.C. agents is vividly remembered. 'Sibwembwe' Williamson, a quiet man who moved about with neither gun nor whip, is remembered as the first. 'Chikoma' Miller, the shifty one, followed almost immediately. Haphazard swoops on villages by messengers who beat people are associated with F.W. Mosely, 'the weak walker, Mutetemasolo' who joined Miller in 1903. The first registration took place in 1904 under Maurice 'Jarira' Cox, the man who stopped people roughly in their tracks. Then came Caldwell, whose name 'Siadunka' commemorated his habit of prodding people with a stick. 67

Though 'the McNamara Case' did not become the subject of an official enquiry till 1909, his arrival at Sijoba Boma, in 1906 was marked by a report in the 'Livingstone Mail', which its proprietor and editor, Leopold Moore, had been publishing since the beginning of the year. McNamara had brought in £1,560 in taxes, £50 in excess of the estimated tax revenue. The 'Mail' then described the type of 'general muster' that accompanied a Native Commissioner's visit to any given area. 'In

67. RI/Yohane Shamayiwa and others, Kanchindu, Gwembe, 6/8/74 and 7/9/74.
every kraal there are many boys who have returned from work on the mines, there is any amount of native labour available in this District...The country is very thickly populated, is well-watered, and at nearly every kraal large flocks of sheep and goats...the country is becoming prosperous and the natives very willingly pay their taxes'.

This statement can find parallels in the reports of, for example, Harry Johnston or Robert Codrington or indeed the Chief Native Commissioner south of the Zambezi.

The local memory of McNamara's operations is, however, absolutely at variance with Moore's report. In the Gwembe valley, McNamara was called *Vununa*, because, in his determination to tax boys who were now adolescent, he was not content with inspecting armpits but ordered them to remove their loin-cloths in public. When tax had been started in the valley, the chiefs had been taken to Lewanika's court to be told by him, in the presence of Company agents, that the hut tax was a modern variant of the traditional *mutelo* or tribute offered from time to time to their powerful Lozi neighbour by the Tonga. But from the Buni-Kariba region around Sijoba, as well as in the Kafue District, there

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68. 'Livingstone Mail', 27/10/06. Moore became a fierce critic of B.S.A.C. rule and an outspoken champion of the 'settlers' cause.

69. RI/Yohane Siamayiwa, as footnote 67 above.
were confidential reports of 'native unrest' and in mid-1907 Anderson went from Kafue to assist McNamara. Together they found 'malcontents' in hiding, around fifty of whom chased their Boma messengers with spears but were eventually driven off by gun-fire. Anderson was obviously nervous as, in the Kafue area, he 'had heard the murder of himself freely discussed' and believed 'that the natives had decided to refuse payment of tax this year and to murder all white people'. The Administrator, on receipt of these reports, told the High Commissioner that 'the condition of native affairs' was not 'entirely satisfactory'.

The Rev. G.E. Butt of the Primitive Methodist Church was on a visit to North-western Rhodesia at the time of the 'reported rising' there. 'I am obliged to take the official view', he wrote, '"That the trouble did not exist in fact". One of the officials received from a native a cock-and-bull story about what was taking place a hundred miles away...how the natives had refused to pay tax and were holding secret meetings', in which there was 'not a word of truth'. Yet Butt had to admit that there was 'much loose talk about coming trouble' in the territory and added that 'in most cases the wish is father to the thought. War

70. PRO: CO 879/95 African South no. 872, Anderson's Report on Buni-Kariba and Kafue, 15/6/07; Admin. to HC, 7/7/07; and NAZ: BS 2/96 sundry communications on Kafue area, 1907.
brings money and trade into the country and it means the hurried and brutal subjugation of the natives; and that harmonises with their own desire to kick and hammer them into shape'. 71 To the B.S.A.C. men in the field, no less than to their victims, there was no doubt that violence was in the air. The Barotse Native Police Commandant, J.E. Carden, ordered an armed patrol to move into the Buni-Kariba area 'to arrest as many hut-tax defaulters as possible'; and 'Kalapukila' Nicholls warned the S.N.A. of 'an impending rising'. 'From conversations which I have overheard', he wrote, 'the natives not only plotted to refuse payment of native tax this year but...to murder all the white population in their beds. I overheard my cook, a native of North-eastern Rhodesia...conversing with the Baila natives...of the method in which the white people could be killed'. He therefore wanted 'a new detachment of police with a Maxim gun...without delay'. The crisis sharpened when Nicholls sent a 'strictly confidential' telegram to the S.N.A. reporting 'trustworthy intelligence' that 'Lewani-ka sent to tell people not to pay tax this year'. The B.N.P. officer at Mumbwa expected an attack 'any moment' and begged 'immediate large supplies' of Martini-Henry rifles and ammunition. 72

72. PRO:CO 879/95 (as footnote 70); Commandant Carden, 4/7/07; Nicholls to SNA, letter (undated) and telegram 9/7/07; BNP, Mumbwa to Commandant, Kalomo, 10/7/07.
Presumably in face of the Company's swift military reinforcement, the threatened 'rising' did not materialise. The atmosphere of the time was, however, the context of McNamara's activities as 'collector' in the Gwembe Valley. The High Commissioner was at that time secretly urging that the Company should hand over the northern territory to the Crown in view of its unsettled state and the fact that hut tax could not be raised to the level required to make North-western Rhodesia economically viable. Selborne's anxiety was increased by persistent reports of the ascendancy of a 'reactionary party' in the Lozi kingdom who were overtly blaming Lewanika for having 'placed his unconquered territory' under British 'protection'. 'Barotseland' might soon require military pacification 'to maintain authority and restore tranquility'. But McNamara as one of the Company's 'strong men' was bent on procuring a maximal tax yield as a matter of urgency. When eventually Venables's reports on McNamara's behaviour appeared in official correspondence in late 1909, his extravagant conduct had been adversely affecting a wide and relatively populous area for about three years. Moreover, he had had as superior officer A.G. McGregor whose notorious 'ill-treatment of natives' later led the Administration to require his resignation.

73. Ibid: HC to CO, 11/11/07 and his report on NWR of same date.
Venables claimed that McGregor and McNamara were colleagues 'during the time when his (McNamara's) worst cruelties took place'. The charges which led to McGregor's resignation in 1909 concerned 'violence and injustice towards natives of the Balunda district while he was holding a magisterial appointment'. McGregor's defence was based on a statement which he claimed that the late Robert Codrington had made to him, on his appointment, to the sub-Boma of Mwinilunga, that he must 'treat the district as if in rebellion'. McGregor admitted that he had 'several times paraded the police and ordered them to strip...to be inspected for lice, and...had told them that they were "filthy beasts whose tails had been cut off"'. The climax of his outrages had been the flogging of a man at Kajavu's village who had refused to carry a load. Along with an African policeman, MacGregor inflicted 'over 110 strokes' of the lash, as recorded in the diary of Pound, who was with him. The victim was then forced to carry the load, though 'his back was in a very bad condition', being 'helped through the journey by the other prisoners to whom he was tied'.


75. PRO: CO 879/102, African South no. 932: HC to CO on 'retirement' of MacGregor, 6/12/09; and see NAZ: Mwinilunga District Note-book KSE 4/1; and BS 2/257, folio 49. Note also reference to Pound on p.297 above.
Robert Codrington moved from North-eastern Rhodesia to be Administrator of the North-western territory in 1907, and Gann claims that 'excessive punishments and other illegal practices were stamped out both by the energetic Codrington and his successor, Wallace'.

The High Commissioner reported Codrington's concern that 'the Native Affairs Department' was not exercising the influence it should over the natives' and 'confined its attention too much to the collection of taxes'. A similar view was expressed by Charles McKinnon when he moved from the North-eastern Rhodesia to be Resident at Lealui. McKinnon attributed the failures of the Department to 'languidness and want of energy'.

But Venables asserted that, in 1905 when certain districts were taken over by North-western from North-eastern Rhodesia, Mr Worthington...at an interview with the officials who had then become his subordinates...informed them that they might make use of the lash in dealing with natives...and that he would see that they did not get into trouble over it. One official who is still in the service and bears an excellent reputation asked to have this in writing which Mr Worthington indignantly refused...Mr McNamara was not present at that particular interview but', said Venables, 'I am strongly of the opinion that he was shielded by a similar assurance... (and) that Mr Worthington is directly responsible for a

76. Gann 'Birth' op.cit., p. 105.
77. PLG: BSA 9/157: HC to CO, 21/11/07; and PRO: CO 879/102, African South no. 932, McKinnon's Report, September 1908.
great deal of the ill-treatment of natives that has been going on for years in various parts of the Territory. 78

A man who was a B.S.A.C. administrative official in the Gwembe some years after McNamara put it on record, in the Northern Rhodesia Journal, that Venables's allegations were not accepted and that McNamara was reinstated. Venables he said was 'a queer customer', who 'used to give every male native between the ages of sixteen and eighty one of his work tickets so that if the Boma accidentally recruited one of them as a carrier or what not, there we were!' The records of the Colonial Office, however, do not support this record. In mid-1910, the Under-Secretary for the Colonies informed the Anti-Slavery Society that, after studying the findings of the enquiry at Buyamunyama (Ibwe Munyama), 'Lord Crewe placed on record his emphatic disapprobation of the proceedings of Mr McNamara generally and in regard to his action in compelling natives to go to work. I am told', said the Under-Secretary, 'that Mr McNamara has been suspended...with a view to removal from the service'. 79

Six months earlier, however, Wallace, Acting Administrator, had summoned headmen in the affected

area and accused them of lies and stubborn disobedience.

'You have paid tax very unwillingly and concealed your people...You, Sigongo, are the chief offender...in that you are a man of influence...It is from men like you that I expect implicit obedience to my commands, made known to you through my Native Commissioners...As for you Matope, you Kamweamusosa, you Muinga, you Nachidao, you Kachemalando and Karenga...the statements you made at the enquiry are full of lies. I see clearly that you have been determined to cause trouble...I am sending your Native Commissioner (McNamara) back to live amongst you...listen to his orders only and obey them. I have instructed him to write to me each month telling me how you behave'. Muinga, incidentally, had been, according to Venables, flogged so violently that 'the flesh on the affected part opened into gaping wounds'. The Acting Administrator told Venables that he was 'satisfied that McNamara's punishments were not excessive' and that 'European settlers should not incite natives to mutinous conduct'. Wallace's reaction was endorsed by High Commissioner Selborne who held that no brutality had been proved. In November 1909, Wallace quoted to the High Commissioner the statement by Worthington that "the educative value of these 24 beatings, spread

80. 'Livingstone Mail', 11/12/09, report of an indaba of Gwembe headmen held at Government House; and RHG.183 as footnote 79, Venables to Ag.Admin, 12/12/08.
over a period of 13 months, and distributed among a population of 22,900, will be fully understood". The High Commissioner's reply was that while 'McNamara did undoubtedly...inflict a number of illegal beatings', he was ready to accede to Wallace's plea 'to allow Mr McNamara's services to be reatined'.

In summary, the charges against McNamara, which were put on record by Venables, included the brutal flogging of Headman Muinga; numerous assaults of 'natives for not saluting'; widespread brutality, flogging and destruction of crops during tax collections. Codrington, said Venables, had arranged an enquiry into these matters but the report had not been completed on account of his death in October 1908. In a more specific list, Venables included verbatim statements by Headman Simaamba and by Masempela, a Boma messenger, who said: "I do not know how many strokes I used to give them...If it was one man I had beaten, I should know...if it is all the world, how can I know how many?"

Venables's allegations made repeated references to an instrument of punishment called a sibaba, and local Tonga testimony equates this with a whip, of greater power than the hippopotamus - or rhinoceros-hide sjambok. The sibaba of chibaba had, according to some local evidence, more than one thong and was fitted with pieces.

81. RH: as footnote 79, G.183, Wallace to Venables, 25/2/09 and 19/3/09; HC to Venables, 6/12/09; PRO: CO 879/102, as footnote 77, Wallace to HC, 10/11/09; and HC to Wallace, 6/12/09.
of metal like nails. The 'Livingstone Mail', which came to McNamara's defence, described it as 'a paddle-shaped weapon fashioned out of rhinoceros hide'. Wallace claimed that it was 'less brutal than the sjambok (which) may cause severe wounds which do not heal for days... sometimes weeks, and when they have healed, scars often remain which the native bears for the rest of his life'. Venables disputed this view, after listing victims of the sibaba who included Headman Chiunga, flogged because he had no money to pay tax for two old widows, and Headman Siagambuli who was thrashed by McNamara himself and who 'saw many people tied together by the neck as Mr McNamara passed to Buni'.

Venables's allegations included a lengthy statement about the death of a man whose widow, Nyemba, testified that he had been flogged so brutally that 'there was no skin on his buttocks and for some way down the thighs and maggots were coming out of small holes all over his buttocks'. This could well have resulted from the use of a whip with sharp metal in its thongs. Venables indicated that the incarceration of Nyemba in 'the private compound' of C.F. Molyneux, another Company...

82. Ibid: A-s and A.P. Society note-books summarising Venables's correspondence from November 1908 to January 1910, including 'List A' and 'List B' of complaints, other than Sigongo's, presented at the Buyamunyama enquiry held in1909; RI/Yohane Siamayiwa, Amitayi Siamanjela, Albert Siatwinda, 7/9/74 and verbal comment of Chipo Moonga, 22/10/75, on the 'sibaba'; and 'Livingstone Mail', 5/2/10.
agent, her attempted suicide and then her further isolation under the eye of one of McNamara's concubines, all pointed to fear on the part of the B.S.A.C. men that the allegations would be proved. But, in the protracted correspondence between Venables, the Company's Administrator at Livingstone, the High Commissioner and the Colonial Office, Wallace insisted that 'native evidence' was unreliable. Venables however, asserted that witnesses were subjected to severe intimidation, despite an initial assurance of safety; that Chief Sogongo was threatened with the deprivation of his chieftainship 'which he had inherited from his ancestors'; and that serious attempts had been made to prevent the local people from communicating with himself. 'Now that the Under-Secretary for the Colonies had admitted the truth of their complaints, these threats must be withdrawn... The natives know that the enquiry was held by order of the High Commissioner...the King's representative, and until this is done they can never again trust a British official'.

83. RH: as footnote 79, G.183, Venables to Imperial Secretary, Johannesburg, 15/1/10. Note that Molyneux ('Chibamubamu', the great hunter with the gun) was appointed Native Commissioner, Gwembe, in 1911 (NAZ: KTE 2/1, Gwembe District Note-book). Molyneux served in Mwinilunga District during the First World War, where he was known as Chipompomo, a word used to denote a noisy talkative drinker (NAZ: KSE 4/1).

84. PRO: CO 879/102, as footnote 77: Wallace to HC 10/11/09; RH: as footnote 79, G.184, Venables's report to A-S and A.P. Socy., 23/6/10 p. 15. Note that the Administrative capital of NWR was moved from Kalomo to Livingstone in 1907.
It was a matter of further shock to Venables that Wallace had gone to such lengths in his defence of McNamara. The Administrator had said that in 1906-07 "The Guimbi (sic) sub-district was practically in a state of armed revolt (and)...that the alternative to Mr McNamara's methods of keeping order...might probably have been the despatch to the district of a striking force, with great expense and some loss of life". Venables rejected this view, basing his statement on his five years residence in the Valley. He was sure that 'it was not until June 1907 after Mr McNamara had inflicted a series of illegal floggings that a portion of the district went into revolt'. 'History has proved', he added, 'that the lash tends rather to exasperate than to allay incipient rebellion'. By a letter written on the same date, 21st February 1910, the High Commissioner sought to reassure the Colonial Secretary, who had recorded his 'grave misgivings with regard to the administration of North-western Rhodesia', that the Company's rule in the territory was exercised 'according to the best British traditions'.

Charles Venables claimed to have friends among the Company's agents and testified that, in districts where the officials had 'nothing to do with the shameful

85: RH: as footnote 84, p. 10; PRO: CO 879/104 African South no. 948: Venables to Imperial Secretary, 21/2/10; HC to CO, 21/2/10, in response to the Colonial Secretary's strictures on the cases of MacGregor and McNamara (no. 7).
traffic in forced labour', and 'treat the natives in their charge with justice, consideration and kindness', tax payments were made 'willingly'. Such officials, however, were 'a minority' and subjected to 'ridicule' by the majority of their colleagues. He therefore made a written statement which indicated that brutality was a regular feature of B.S.A.C. rule. Collectors and others were, he said, 'as a rule most rigid in their exaction of homage from the natives who must all fall down and clap their hands or thighs at the sight of an official. Some appear to think it increases their authority to order a Chief's ears to be boxed at a general meeting, or if a Headman did not concur with what he is told, they consider the application of a sjambok as the most convincing argument. Such methods can scarcely be called cruel but they are extremely galling to the natives and highly injudicious...

Distinct from the above, there is a class of officials who are the terror of the natives whom they appear to take a delight in torturing and who brag of the cruelties they have inflicted...One often hears of cases of ill-treatment in different parts of the territory which are not enquired into, or are hushed up. The Administration of North-western Rhodesia appears to have peculiar ideas of justice'. McNamara's swoop on a village in search of taxes and the stampede of the people from it, leaving the Headman's old mother 'whose decomposed remains' Venables personally found ten days later, illustrated
the peculiar quality of inhumanity engendered by hut tax collections. The fear exercised by the visits of Company agents was widely extended by the activities of messengers who were continually touring the districts, cajoling and threatening, travelling 'in great style (when they are out of the official's sight)' and living 'on the fat of the land'.\textsuperscript{86} The role of Boma messengers from the inception of colonial rule to the coming of national independence is a factor of considerable interest and importance.

Earlier in this review, when we noted the personal testimony of Theodore Williams from various north-western districts, we were concerned with a period later than that of McNamara's oppressive regime in the Gwembe Valley. Indiscriminate flogging obviously did not end with McNamara's removal from the Company's service, not did the persistent coercion by B.S.A.C. agents in pursuit of tax, with the result that what was in the eyes of the local communities, tantamount to 'war' continued for a long time to come. To take only one example, in 1916 the Native Commissioner at Lukona near the Angola Border, in a tax report, said that it was 'very difficult to deal with these people without the chief's help, as at any sign of a visit from an official

\textsuperscript{86} RH: as footnote 84, p. 12; and G.183, Venables to Acting Admin. 12/12/08; and G.184, encl. with report to A-S and A.P.Socy. Underlining is mine.
or even at the sight of a messenger's uniform, the whole population runs away, either over the Portuguese border or into the inaccessible swamps of the Nyengo River'.

He urged that defaulters should be 'sent to Ndola for double the ordinary number of journeys and that, on their return, they should be made to pay tax for three or four years...and then made to assist in the clearing of the boundary in lieu of their previous taxes'. The Native Commissioner for Kalabo on the western side of the Zambezi beyond Mungu reported in 1921 that some success had attended tax collection 'since the policy of remitting some arrears to those who show a desire to pay has been adopted...Any harshness would drive them back into their swamps'.

The severity of taxation was accompanied by an element of haphazardness and inequity. The Pim Commission of 1938, despite its statement that 'no tax is so intimately connected with native welfare and to none has such careful consideration been directed', recorded how 'from 1914 until 1920 the rate of tax was 5/- for north-eastern districts and 10/- for north-western districts. In 1920 the tax in north-eastern districts was increased to 10/- notwithstanding the...

unanimous protest of the Provincial Administration, but in 1923 it was reduced to 7/6d...in 1929 (25 years after the inception of musonko) the taxation of plural wives was abolished as it had been found that it penalised natives who accepted responsibility under tribal customs'. Equally naively, the Report noted that 'in 1932 the natives of the Territory began to find serious difficulty in meeting their cash obligations'. In 1936, when the mineral wealth was being successfully exploited, musonko was still contributing 13% of the Territory's total revenue. It is therefore appropriate now to review the matter of the yield of musonko throughout northern Zambezia during the period under review and its importance to the overall undertakings of the Chartered Company.

(b) Musonko and the Finances of Conquest

If the British South Africa Company's London offices had not been destroyed by aerial bombing in 1941, it might have been possible to form a clearer picture of the financial relationship of the Company to its territories in Central Africa. Documents extant in the Public Records Office in London and elsewhere reveal that, in the beginning, the Directors offered their shareholders the prospect of good dividends accruing from their enterprises in Central Africa; assuring them, in 1894, that with the establishment of...
'a new source of revenue...the Hut Tax' it was 'anti-
cipated that at the end of the current year...the gen-
eral revenue of the country will more than cover the
administrative expenditure'. The Directors therefore
wanted to 'congratulate the shareholders upon the satis-
factory prospect'. Even after the first Ndebele war,
Jameson declared, as we noted earlier, that revenue was
'now practically balancing' expenditure.\textsuperscript{89} As early
as 1887, after 'Hut Tax' had been imposed in Bechuana-
land, the Resident Magistrate had seen the tax serving,
along with the 'compound system', the 'prohibition of
the sale of liquor to natives', and 'forced' labour,
as a major source of commercial prosperity as shown in
the 'good and greatly increased cash business' being
enjoyed by white traders.\textsuperscript{90} Such a process was bound
to be in the interests of those who were imposing their
rule on the territory. Moreover, as we observed above
from various public statements, the 'hut tax' was pre-

cented as a means of enabling the peoples of the annexed
territories to contribute to the costs of their 'pro-
tection'.

As the years went by, however, the Company
claimed with increasing insistence that it was forced,

\textsuperscript{89} RH:MSS.Afr.s.72 BSA Reports 1891-97, esp. 31/3/94,
p. 31, and 18/1/95 (speech by Dr L.S. Jameson,
p. 22); and see p.155 above.

\textsuperscript{90} BM/Parl. Papers 1888 LXXV (C.5524) p. 57, Report
of Resident Magistrate Taung, BechuanaLand.
by the costs of administration, to bear heavy annual deficits. In the earlier years, statements of revenue and expenditure placed both 'hut tax' and mining revenue, licences, sale of stands, etc. in the one revenue column, and so for instance, the Southern Rhodesia Financial Statement for 1898-99 revealed that the yields from 'hut tax' and from 'stamps and licences (including Mines Revenue, £40,000) amounted respectively to £71,000 and £79,000. 'Hut Tax' could thus be seen to be contributing 26% of the Company's total revenue of £273,000 for that year. The same Statement also gave the total expenditure on Native Affairs as £39,082; thus revealing that 'hut tax' yielded nearly twice what was spent on 'native administration', which presumably was debited with the total of salaries to Native Commissioners. The question arises: what use was made of the balance of £31,918?91 A few years later, however, the Company was insisting that its commercial and its administrative accounts must be kept separate.

As early as 1899 the B.S.A. adumbrated its practice of withholding from the Colonial Office a full picture of its financial activities in Central Africa. With regard to land and mineral concessions, 'it would be impossible, except at great labour and cost, producing little result, to prepare a statement of grants

made during the last eight years'. But, in 1904, the Administrator of North-western Rhodesia told King Lewanika that the Company could not consider granting him a % of the revenue of land sales because 'it cost very much to pay for administration and you do not pay anything towards it'; suggesting that administration was charged against commercial profits. In 1906 the Company raised with the Colonial Office the question of mining rights and a proposed Mining Law in northern Zambezia. This matter will be considered later. However, in the correspondence that followed, the Company argued vehemently that its mineral rights had been 'acquired under concessions from native owners...for valuable considerations' and that it was therefore in no way obliged to apply any commercial revenues to the cost of administering the territory. Significantly, the Company's letter of July 1908 was not answered for over six months when, under pressure from the Foreign Office, the Colonial Secretary bowed to the Company's demand.92 The corollary of this tardy recognition of the established practice of the Company, whereby its commercial accounts were not to be set alongside its administrative accounts, appears to have been that the

92. NAZ: KDE 2/37/1, Admin. to Lewanika, 23/9/04; PRO: CO 879/53, African South no. 559, BSAC to CO, p. 93 (undated, but 1898); CO 879/91 African South no. 802, BSAC to CO, 18/5/06; 879/88, African South 899, BSAC Secy. (D.E. Brodie) to CO 22/7/08; 879/102 African South no. 932, FO to CO 16/3/09 and CO to BSAC, 37/3/09. Underlining is mine.
Colonial Office was increasingly under pressure to take responsibility for the deficits published by the Company in respect of administration. For 1909-10, for instance, the B.S.A.C. told the Secretary of State that its deficits were as follows:

N.E. Rhodesia £29,195
n.w. Rhodesia £28,814
£58,009

It is worthy of note that the Company made a similar claim, in 1911, in respect of income from the sale of land, and was apparently uninfluenced by the Colonial Secretary's statement that he could not admit 'that land revenue could be treated as an asset accruing to the Company absolutely irrespective of any provision being made for meeting the expenses of administration'. The Company maintained its position, and in 1914 Dr Jameson, as President, told shareholders that the commercial accounts showed an increased surplus of revenue over expenditure, with capital, both cash and liquid, amounting to £1,741,370'.

Mineral royalties were obviously a large part of the revenue which the B.S.A. Company eventually derived from its territories. At the start of the period when both white supremacist ambitions and black nationalism would be striving for mastery of the huge region

north of the Zambezi, the exploitative nature of the Company's 'royalties' was attacked, for example, by Roy Welensky in 1948. Over a decade later, the Zambian case against the Company, led by the United National Independence Party, found friendly spokesmen abroad, like Fenner Brockway, a Labour Member of the British Parliament, who stated publicly that the B.S.A.C. - 'the real evil genius of Rhodesia' - was, as late as 1958, collecting over £8,500,000 annually in 'royalties' from the mineral resources of Northern Rhodesia. "Even in a lean year it is able to pay a dividend of 30%"; and it was stated aim of the Directors to build up a fortune of not less than £200,000,000. Moreover, the Company, which by the agreement then still current, was to receive half the proceeds of land sales effected by the Northern Rhodesia Government, also owned 99% of the shares of the Rhodesia Railway Trust along with mineral rights within 16,000 square miles of Nyasaland. In 1963, a major British newspaper gave the Company's 'royalties' revenue for 1962 as about £11,000,000. 94

In 1923, however, when the Company and the Crown were negotiating the cession of B.S.A.C. governmental authority to the Colonial Office, and when, of

course, the 'mineral royalties' were yielding very much less than they were to yield after the swift development of the Copperbelt in the nineteen-thirties, the Company managed to obtain from the Crown £3,750,000. Welensky's retrospective comment on the 1923 agreement was that he found it "difficult to express in decent English" how he viewed "the actions of a Government... (which) should sell, give, barter... the mineral wealth of a country for which they were trustees, to a private company, without ever consulting the people", by which presumably he meant the territory's white inhabitants. 95 Two years earlier, a report to Winston Churchill, as Colonial Secretary, had given the administrative deficit as £147,728 for 1921, listing the two previous years thus: 1918-19, £68,767; 1919-20, £130,472; and claimed that the total of deficits to 31st March 1919, was over £1,250,000. In 1913, the deficit had been declared at £51,708. 3. 2d. and Revenue returns had shown that 'hut tax' had yielded £70,562 of which £65,888 had been spent on 'native affairs', including the subvention to the Lozi king. 96

95. MSA Files: Agreement between the Secy. of State and the BSAC 'for the Settlement of Outstanding Questions relating to Southern and Northern Rhodesia' (sgd. by Duke of Devonshire) 27/9/23. This also included the commuting to a grant of the loan of £1,953,826 made to the Company for war purposes, 1914-18. See also 'The British South Africa Company's Claims to Mineral Royalties in Northern Rhodesia' (Govt. Printer, Lusaka, 1964) p. 2.

Another factor in the situation was the Company's attitude to the rejection of income tax by the white population of the territory. The early prophecy that northern Zambezia would not become a home for white people seemed to be being fulfilled as late as 1921 when the High Commissioner gave the following figures:

```
'South of Kafue - Livingstone  774
    Batoka             699
    Barotse           111

1,584

North of Kafue - Broken Hill
    Village          396
    Lusaka Village   243
    Chilanga District 701
    Other           261

1,601
```
giving a total of 3,185 white inhabitants. Had the white population been taxed, the revenue so accrued would probably not have been large, but what is interesting is the attitude of both the settlers' spokesmen and the officials of the Company to the principle of taxation. At the Bloemfontein Conference on Rhodesian affairs, held in early 1903, it was asserted that there must be no significant increase in customs duties until railway rates and the cost of living for the white population were reduced. Since Joseph Chamberlain as Secretary of State was not likely to meet such demands, 'the only alternative' was to 'increase Hut Tax', which the Company was ready to approve. In 1907, the High

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Commissioner was discouraging white settlement along the line of rail. 'They will not support the revenue either of the Administration or of the Railways', he said, '...because they will not be able to afford to pay taxes'. Since the rate of development did not make it easy 'for the hut tax of the natives to be raised to £1', he argued that the time had come for the Company to transfer the territory to the Crown.98

In the same year, the 'Livingstone Mail' noted that the 'hut tax' revenue was far from insignificant. 'It might appear that the proportion of revenue contributed by the white inhabitants, by indirect taxation through customs and other such fiscal arrangements, did not amount to more than one third of the total expenditure. But', wrote the editor, Leopold Moore, 'let us state at once that that fact would not affect the principle we are contending for; that we have an...indisputable right to representation proportionate to our taxation...(and) an equal voice with the Chartered Company's nominees in the control of the expenditure and...to half of the profits of the mineral concession..."No taxation without representation"...The form of government we are under is a dictatorship'.

In 1908, the 'Mail' claimed that £20,000 p.a. of the £60,000 'circulated' in the territory by the Company, came from the indirect taxation of the white population, and angrily refuted the description of this contribution by Sir Lewis Michell, one of the B.S.A.C. Directors, as "a mere bagatelle". 'Our contention is', said Moore, 'that we get absolutely nothing for our money; that the exaction of taxation without the consent of the taxed ... is an unlawful, unconstitutional and impudent violation of the acknowledged rights of all British subjects', adding that 'with the inconsistencies of the government of the native we are not, at the moment, concerned'. 99

The taxation of the incomes of white people was not started in Northern Rhodesia until 1921, and then only in face of 'unanimous' resolutions 'not to submit' to it, and at the time when, as the 'Livingstone Mail' declared, it was 'well known that the present regime was rapidly drawing to a close'. From 1921 to 1932 a white man was allowed an income of £600 free of tax, and his tax-free income was still as much as £380 in 1940. But musonko had 'always been reckoned as being equivalent to a full month's wages'. However, as Gann points out, 'The Company wished to attract colonists and taxation would merely have kept them out'. For this reason European income tax continued to be very

99. 'Livingstone Mail', 2/3/07. Phrase in brackets is mine; 13/2/08, 25/4/08, and 6/9/08. Underlinings are mine.
low right up to the time of Zambian Independence. On a salary of £1,700, a white man was paying £85 tax in 1958. 100

We now turn to musonko again. Having noted something of the methods by which it was collected, it is important now to ask what was done with the money accruing from it. When it was started, as we noted earlier, 'hut tax' could be paid in kind. In Lundazi district, for instance, 'if you were short of 1/-, they demanded a chicken...Sometimes...as many as four chickens for the 1/-'. In Chief Chikuwe's area in Chipata District, a man with four wives 'was compelled to sell 49 chickens at three pence each or to offer four goats' to meet the equivalent of four taxes at 3/-. In 1902, Coryndon told the London Office of the Company that when tax was paid in kind in the Batoka district, an extra levy was applied to cover the cost of carriage to the Boma. 101 The Company, however, quickly began to demand money, not only because there would be a limit to the amount of grain, eggs and livestock that any one


Boma could use, but because of the determination to force people to go to work in European employment, mainly south of the Zambezi. From the beginning of tax collection, 'collectors' and 'native commissioners' were required to submit returns of revenue and expenditure for their districts. In preparing material for what is now set down here, such returns have been examined in respect of the great majority of Bomas and sub-Bomas in both North-eastern and North-western Rhodesia.

The salaries of the Company agents were not included in such returns, but it is important to note average rates of salary at various times during our period. In the early years of 'effective occupation', while Alfred Sharpe was receiving £1,400 p.a. and Robert Codrington, as N.E.R. Administrator had a salary of £800, the average 'collector' in 1903 was earning about £300. The assessment of salaries seems, however to have been haphazard, for as early as 1901, Coryndon, the Administrator for N.W. Rhodesia, told Rhodes that District Commissioners were earning £500 p.a. and Colonel Harding, B.N. Police Commandant, £650. In 1913, Theodore Williams, as Native Commissioner was, on his own showing, receiving £240 p.a. which had risen to £375 five years later. 102

The significance of these figures will be seen on examining the balance of revenue over expenditure which distinguished the financial operations of the great majority if not all of the districts from the inception of musonko to 1924. As we have seen it was only in Lewanika's case that there was any discussion between the Company and the local ruler about the revenue from tax and the use of it. Elsewhere, as is borne out by Zambian testimony, the local people were not offered nor could they dare to seek any information as to how musonko was used. It would have been inadmissible for Company agents to take the local people into consultation. However many informants have testified that tax defaulters were made to give personal service to Boma officials while under arrest, which included gardening, carrying and chopping logs for firewood and drawing water for the Boma houses, and which must have affected the cost of living of officials. 103

The heads of expenditure listed in a Boma's annual statement of accounts included such items as: Native Establishment, Messengers, Upkeep, Subsidies, Roads, Public Works, District Travel, Prisons. No mention is made in any such statement of any expenditure related to social welfare. Sources of revenue

103. RI/ e.g. Ba Nakasese, Mshamba, Samfya, 19/11/74; Kapumfi, Chilubi, 20/11/74; Alberto Chisengelelo and others, Ching'ombe, 13/8/74; Albino Ngulube and others, Zarupango, 4/9/74; Benjamin Mpande, Kalwa, 19/10/73; Leo Chikambalala and others, Old Mkushi, 12/8/74; et al.
in the average rural district were generally limited to Licences, Fines and minor miscellaneous items, in addition to Hut Tax and Tax Arrears. In the districts in which white settlers were found, as, for example, Fort Jameson (Chipata), Livingstone, Chilanga, Kansanshi and elsewhere, the list of revenue items was generally slightly larger, as was the total amount ingathered. What is most significant is the large excess of revenue over expenditure in all the returns examined for the whole of our period. It is also notable that Native Commissioners regularly recorded an underexpenditure on the votes for their districts; the votes always being far below the revenue, both as estimated and actual. 104

On numerous occasions, particularly in the earlier years, returns of expenditure were not submitted, as, for instance, in Petauke for the years 1905 and 1906, when financial returns were simply given thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>At 30th September 1905</th>
<th></th>
<th>At 30th March 1906</th>
<th></th>
<th>and at 30th September 1906</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hut Taxes</td>
<td>£352.16.0.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Licences</td>
<td>6. 0.0.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fines, etc.</td>
<td>2. 0.6.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hut Taxes</td>
<td>657. 9. 0.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Licences</td>
<td>39.10.0.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fines</td>
<td>4. 8.6.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hut Taxes</td>
<td>402.12.0.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>5.17.6.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Licences and Fines</td>
<td>122.18.0.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

104. NAZ: Annual Reports for all Districts, and note also that some financial returns were recorded in District Notebooks.

105. NAZ: KSY 5/2, Petauke Reports 1905-06, submitted by H.S. Thornicroft.
Typical returns from various districts throughout our period are as follows, the (+) or (-) after the expenditure figure indicating over-expenditure or under-expenditure on votes, where these have been recorded:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1909-9</th>
<th>Revenue</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
<th>Balance of Revenue over Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALUBA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tax 1,126. 0. 0.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other 12. 6.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£1,126.12. 6.</td>
<td>183. 9.3(+)</td>
<td>943. 3. 3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHILANGA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tax 731.10. 0.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other 114.11. 7.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>846. 1. 7.</td>
<td>218. 4.0.</td>
<td>627.17. 7.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKUSHI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tax 1,644. 0. 0.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other 17.10. 0.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,661.10. 0.</td>
<td>605.16.3(+)</td>
<td>1,055.13. 9.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDOLA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tax 1,361.10. 0.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arrears 302.10. 0.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other 352. 1. 11.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,016. 1. 11.</td>
<td>697. 5.0.(+)</td>
<td>1,318. 6.11.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAROTSE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(Incl. 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>districts)</td>
<td>Tax 13,832. 0. 0.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other 724.14. 0.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14,556.14. 0.</td>
<td>4,087. 3.0.</td>
<td>10,469.11. 0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KASEMPA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tax 1,985. 0. 0.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other 684. 4. 11.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,669. 4. 11.</td>
<td>1,585.13.0(+)</td>
<td>1,083.11.11.106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ibid: BS 2/148, 2/150 and 2/149.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1910-11</th>
<th>Revenue</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
<th>Balance of Revenue over Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAGOYE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax, etc.</td>
<td>3,960. 8. 5.</td>
<td>337.12. 0(-)</td>
<td>3,622.16. 5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KALOMO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax, etc.</td>
<td>3,992.13. 2.</td>
<td>453.11. 1(-)</td>
<td>3,539. 2. 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BATOKA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax</td>
<td>3,778.10. 0.</td>
<td>26.19. 0.</td>
<td>3,805. 9. 0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>26.19. 0.</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,805. 9. 0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANSANSHI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax (Incl. a copper mine and Europ. pop-ulation)</td>
<td>1,998. 5. 0.</td>
<td>764. 7. 0.</td>
<td>2,762.12. 0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2,762.12. 0.</td>
<td>1,853. 8. 7(-)</td>
<td>909. 3. 5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BROKEN HILL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax</td>
<td>1,713. 5. 6.</td>
<td>613. 0. 2(-)</td>
<td>1,100. 5. 4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEIRA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax, etc.</td>
<td>9.151. 3. 7.</td>
<td>375. 8. 0(-)</td>
<td>8,775.15. 7.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUNDAZI</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax, etc.</td>
<td>1,126.15. 5.</td>
<td>503. 8. 3(+ )</td>
<td>623. 7. 2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPIKA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax</td>
<td>622.10. 0</td>
<td>613.16.11.*</td>
<td>1,236. 6.11. 487. 0. 0. 749. 6.11.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>613.16.11.*</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,236. 6.11. 487. 0. 0. 749. 6.11.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Including over £100 for ivory sales and £217 for Licences

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107. Ibid: BS 2/154, 2/156, 2/157; and KSD 7/1, Mpika, KSD 3/1 Lundazi.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1913-14</th>
<th>Revenue</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
<th>Balance of Revenue over Expenditure</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>PEATUKA</strong></td>
<td>Tax 1,509.15. 0.</td>
<td>113. 6. 6.</td>
<td>1,623. 1. 6. 418. 4. 0. 1,204.17. 6.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>KASEMPA</strong></td>
<td>Tax 2,412. 6. 0.</td>
<td>314. 4.11.</td>
<td>2,726. 4.11. 816.13. 2. 1,909.11. 9.</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>GWEMBE</strong></td>
<td>Tax 4,000. 0. 0.</td>
<td>98. 9. 6.</td>
<td>4,098. 9. 6. 574. 1. 0(-) 3,524. 8. 0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LEALUI</strong></td>
<td>Tax 5,351.10. 0.</td>
<td>48. 7. 0.</td>
<td>5,399.17. 0. 213.13. 2(-) 5,186. 3.10.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>KASAMA</strong></td>
<td>Tax 1,190. 8. 0.</td>
<td>580.11. 5.</td>
<td>1,770.19. 5. 423.10. 4(-) 1,247. 9. 1.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CHILANGA</strong></td>
<td>Tax, 1,918.15. 0.</td>
<td>1,519. 3. 6.</td>
<td>399.11. 6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(relatively large white population)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KAWAMBWA</strong></td>
<td>Tax, etc. 3,706. 3. 9.</td>
<td>1,290.10.10.</td>
<td>2,415.12.11.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KALABO</strong></td>
<td>Tax, etc. 2,818. 0. 0.</td>
<td>263.11. 1(-) 2,554. 8.11.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SERENJE</strong></td>
<td>Tax, etc. 1,491.13. 4.</td>
<td>291.12. 3(-) 1,200. 1. 1.</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

108. Ibid: KDG 8/1/2, Lundazi and Petauke; KDD 5/1, Kasempa; KDB 6/2/1, Gwembe; KDE 8/1/5, Lealui; KDH 1/1, Kasama; KSA 6/1,Chilanga; KSG 3/1, Kawambwa; KSH 2/1, Kalabo; KSK 6/1/2, Serenje.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Revenue</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
<th>Balance of Revenue over Expenditure</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BAROTSE</td>
<td>Tax</td>
<td>17,103. 0. 0.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,195.17.10.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>districts</td>
<td></td>
<td>18,298.17.10.</td>
<td>3,695. 7.10(-)*14,603.10. 0.</td>
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<td>KALABO</td>
<td>Tax, etc.</td>
<td>3,327. 0. 0.</td>
<td>711. 3. 2(-) 2,615.16.10.</td>
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<td>SERENJE</td>
<td>Tax, etc.</td>
<td>1,529. 5. 0.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>247. 7. 0.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,776.12. 0.</td>
<td>357. 9.10(-) 1,419. 2. 2.</td>
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<tr>
<td>GWEMBE</td>
<td>Tax, etc.</td>
<td>4,109.12. 2.</td>
<td>644. 4. 6(-) 3,465. 7. 8.</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAGOYE</td>
<td>Tax, etc.</td>
<td>5,256.17. 5.</td>
<td>731.13. 5(-) 4,525. 4. 0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KASEMPA</td>
<td>Tax, etc.</td>
<td>2,341. 9. 3.</td>
<td>704. 1. 2. 1,637. 8. 1.</td>
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<tr>
<td>KALOMO</td>
<td>Tax</td>
<td>2,443.10. 0.</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,807. 0. 3.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,240.10. 3.</td>
<td>409.10.4(-) 3,830.19.11.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDOLA</td>
<td>Tax</td>
<td>3,181. 0. 0.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Bwana</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3,687.19. 4.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mkubwa Mine</td>
<td></td>
<td>6,868.19. 4.</td>
<td>1,019.11. 3(-)* 5,849. 8. 1.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FORT</td>
<td>Tax</td>
<td>5,688. 0. 0.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAMESON</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>993.14. 9.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6,681.14. 9.</td>
<td>1,228. 2. 3(-)* 5,453.12. 6. 109.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Relatively large white population

The relationship between revenue and expenditure and the ratio of the favourable balance to the total annual revenue in the financial returns listed here can, on detailed examination, be paralleled for all districts and years not listed above. Moreover, the official

109. Ibid: KDE 10/2, Barotse; KSH 2/1, Kalabo; KSK 6/1/3, Serenje; KDB 6/2/1, Gwembe; KDB 6/6/3, Magoye; KDD 5/1, Kasempa; KSN 3/1/1, Ndola; KDG 8/1/3, Fort Jameson; KSP 3/1, Kalomo.
estimates for North-western Rhodesia for 1906-07 had forecast a surplus of revenue over expenditure in the Native Department of £4,222. It would appear that in the first years of taxation, expenditure sometimes exceeded the approved votes, probably because of the outlays incurred in taking census, etc. Very soon thereafter, however, three facts came to light that appear to apply to the whole operation north of the Zambezi.

Firstly the approved votes were far less than the tax yield, as, for example, Feira in 1910-11, less than 5%; Batoka in 1910-11, about 12%; Lundazi in 1913-14, just over 20%; Serenje in 1913-14, about 20%; Kalomo in 1919-20, less than 10%; Ndola in 1919-20, about 20%.

Secondly, musonko contributed by far the greater part of the revenue drawn from the districts. According to the figures listed above for 1908-09 'other' revenue items represented the following % of the whole: Baluba, 0.3%; Chilanga, 14%; Mkushi, just over 1%; Ndola, about 17%; Barotse 5%; and Kasempa about 25%. Eleven years later, as our 1919-20 figures show, the amounts collected from the four districts which listed revenue items other than 'hut tax', were as follows: Barotse, about 6%; Serenje, about 14%; Ndola, about 54% and Kalomo about 42%. But Ndola and Kalomo both had appreciable European populations at the time. Thirdly, the sum of salaries of European officials, which were not included in district financial returns would not, at any one station (from the staffing statistics available),
account for the use of more than a portion of the total favourable balance.

Because extant B.S.A.C. accounts are so incomplete, the question arises how the Company used the strikingly favourable balances of cash drawn from the districts and largely from 'native taxes'. When the taxation of European incomes began, it was reported that £1,000 was to be set aside for the European hospital in Fort Jameson. But hospitals, for white people only, had existed in northern Zambezia for some time. Kalomo's first hospital was erected in 1903. Livingstone had a European hospital from at least as early as the transfer of the administrative capital of Northwestern Rhodesia from Kalomo in 1910. In 1913 the senior Medical Officer in Livingstone gave the following figures of expenditure: Upkeep of Government Hospitals, £7,500; Annual Medical and Sanitary Expenses, £19,492; Salaries and Allowances of Medical Officers, £8,700. Broken Hill (Kabwe) was a segregated white township with improving amenities by 1910 and Lusaka had a Village Management Board to serve its white population by 1913. In the light of the sample financial returns we have reviewed here and of the fact that there were many more districts than those listed, it is pertinent to ask whether monies accruing from musonko were perhaps
used for the building, maintaining and staffing of segregated white hospitals. 110

There was also the matter of European schools. There was a small school at 'lusaka's' in 1905 which the B.S.A.C. presumably took over. Livingstone had a white school from 1912 and during the First World War, schools were opened at Kalomo, Broken Hill and Fort Jameson. The Codrington School at Mazabuka started in 1919.

In 1918 the Director of Education in Salisbury proposed that white schools north of the Zambezi should come under his department. As Northern Rhodesia had a long tradition of free education for white children, the question again arises where the Company found the funds for the running of these schools. Other matters like the cost of arresting and maintaining white prisoners may not have involved large expenditure, but there is a note extant from an official at Kalomo in 1907 asking that white prisoners should be moved south of the Zambezi and noting that the maintenance of such convicts in Southern Rhodesia gaols would cost North-western Rhodesia £35 per prisoner per year. The total cost of such penal action was, however, increased by the

fact that, for example, the Barotse Native Police, trained by Colonel Harding since 1901, were not allowed to apprehend white men. 111

Another concealed factor was the insistence of officials that African pupils of mission schools and of the Barotse National School should be liable to musonko on reaching puberty. It had been persistently argued, on both sides of the Zambezi, that a 14-year-old boy should be liable for tax, despite protests of missionary teachers. In 1911 a Committee of Enquiry into Native Affairs recommended to the Southern Rhodesia Legislative Council that tax should start at 15 as 'scholars above that age have generally earned sufficient to pay school fees - which in some institutions is a very substantial amount - and it is felt that they can earn sufficient to pay the tax as well'.

This specious argumentation obviously carried the day. In 1918, the Headmaster of the Barotse National School, while supporting taxation of pupils with no exemptions for fear of inequity, admitted that 'several boys here have been forced to absent themselves...for a considerable part of the year in order to obtain money for their tax'. Thus musonko not only made no contribution to African education but in fact became an impediment to it, since naturally some boys feared enrolling in

111. RH:MSS.Afr.s.1314(1) 'European Education in Northern Rhodesia', essay by Andrew Thom; NAZ: BS 2/227: Peacock, Kalomo to Secy. BSAC, London 22/2/07; and see 'Livingstone Mail' 1/9/06.
school because the school provided the tax collector with a convenient sphere for rigorous exaction. It would be wrong, however, to imagine that the indigenous peoples and their chiefs were not resentful of the Company's lack of concern for the welfare of the people whose tax paid the costs of 'administering' the territory. At an indaba at Mpika in 1913 Chief Luchembe called for funds for education, and in 1923 the Lozi King Yet killed produced a copy of a newspaper from Basutoland which quoted Government expenditure there on schools and hospitals at £37,000 and £20,443 in that year, and asked why the position was different in northern Zambia. Yet in 1950, twenty-six years after the end of our period, expenditure on African education in Northern Rhodesia, calculated as 3.2% of revenue from internal sources was less than in Nyasaland (6.6%), Tanganyika (9%), Kenya (4%) and Uganda (5%).

Musonko was, from all we have seen, a perquisite of the greatest importance to the B.S.A. Company.

Perhaps the situation might have been different if commercial profits had developed more rapidly. Certainly at the end of its period of direct rule, the Company's financial condition was widely regarded as parlous. The 'Livingstone Mail' claimed in 1919 that the Company was 'supposed to lose nearly £50,000 p.a. and we have nothing to show for it in 50 years'. The history of 'native taxation' confirms that there was no sense of any obligation to plough back funds into African education, health or welfare. On the showing of the Colonial Office, as we noted at the outset, there was nothing to report in any of those respects at the time of the transference of power to the British Government. It is thus startling to find a proposal made as early as 1908 that, in order to raise the loan needed for extending the railways, the Company should 'issue a £1,000,000 Stock at 4% secured on the Native Tax'. As late as 1922, however, the Administrator announced his intention to do everything possible to reduce expenditure to the level of revenue, noting that European Income Tax should raise £33,000 in 1922-23, but that 'if District Administration is radically cut down, the amount received in Native Tax will be decreased. The Secretary for Native Affairs made an admission however, in the Legislative Council in 1930 which merits attention: 'The natives of this territory', he said, 'pay for every service that Government provides for them, and if there is a balance it is rather in favour of the Government'.
As late as 1935 when the whole financial condition of the territory had been dramatically altered by ten years of intensive copper-mining (interrupted by the world economic slump), the first of two major African disturbances on the Copperbelt was sparked by a further increase in tax. 113

The Tables in Appendix II at the end of this survey summarise the relative contribution of musonko and of European taxation to the revenue of northern Zambezia, giving figures for the years 1911-12, 1919-20 and 1924-25. The examination of similar figures over the next fifteen years reveals that revenue from the taxation of Africans exceeded the cost of Provincial and District Administration in every year from 1911 to 1940, except in 1919-20 and 1933 when that item of expenditure slightly exceeded the yield of musonko. Four years after the end of the B.S.A. Company's direct control, the Government's determination 'that the sum of native tax collections will cover the cost of District Administration' was officially reaffirmed.

In summary, then, it appears that the relentless hunt for musonko, which the Company's agents began before thorough 'pacification' had been effected and continued to the very end of their thirty-four years' rule, was not pursued in order to benefit the voiceless tax-payers. The purpose was to relieve the Company maximally of the costs of 'administering' a territory to which they cling in the confidence that its famed potential wealth would accrue to their shareholders through the exploitation of 'treaties' avowedly spurious in origin and unilateral in exercise. Without the traffic in labour for the service of white enterprise south of the Zambezi, musonko would have lacked something of its sustained impetus and would of course have proved even more difficult to exact.
THE BRITISH ANNEXATION
OF
NORTHERN ZAMBIA
(1884 - 1924)
-
ANATOMY OF A CONQUEST
-

by
FERGUS MACPHERSON, M.A.,
Hons. Hist. (Edin.)

Vol. II
Today in any typical Zambian village the word chibalo evokes vivid memories in the minds of men who have either personally experienced its rigours or have lived in the aftermath of the extensive social disintegration that has resulted from it. But it is not easy to find people who know the etymology of the word. Yet its origin is simple, and a parallel for it is found in the name of a large suburb of Kitwe called Chamboli. According to the normal accentuation of Zambian languages, this word is often now called Chamboli. But
those who remember what took place in 1952 on the stretch of ground which later became the site of a high-density housing area, know that the accent originally fell on the last syllable, thus, Chamboli; because that place had been chosen for a great Boy Scout jamboree. Chibalo, so accented now, has a similar origin. Probably because a significant number of white agents of the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau were Scots, the word 'bureau' would often be heard as either 'bew-row' or more often perhaps 'baroo'. The African prefix chi- denotes the manner or customs of societies or institutions and so chi-baro - or chibalō, thus accented, expressed the whole concept of coercive labour recruitment. In modern usage the accent has tended to slip back to the penultimate syllable. But the R.N.L.B. was clearly the origin of the word.

As we noted at the start of this chapter, the extensive drive for cheap labour, carried out, under the auspices of the B.S.A. Company, during the whole of its period of rule in northern Zambezia, cannot be separated from musonko. Furthermore, as with the hut-tax, chibalo apparently did not lose its rigours with the passage of time. A missionary in the North-western Province, protesting reluctantly wrote thus in 1918: 'It means that a man must leave his wife, children and village and journey on foot a distance of 400 miles and

114. See p.283 above.
more and then sign on for twelve months' work. In most cases the journey is entirely new to him, as many of the natives have not been fifty miles from their homes before. He has to pass through the country of people whose language he does not know and to take work with people who are entirely unacquainted with the language he speaks. From the start, chibalo, like musonko, was subjected to condemnation on humanitarian grounds and therefore was defended from the start on moral grounds by its promoters. Harry Johnston explained in 1896 that 'a gentle insistence that the native should contribute his fair share to the revenue' was all that was needed 'to secure his taking that share in life's labour which no human being should evade'. Five years later, the B.S.A.C. Director, Philip Gell, argued that 'the moral ruin of the Native Races will rest on the Colonial Office unless it recognises frankly that the conquering Englishman has incurred the responsibility of disciplining, directing and educating the Native whose tribal discipline we have effaced'. to support his argument Gell quoted Scripture thus: "The Law must be their schoolmaster to bring them into the status of Christian citizenship". This required 'saying to the Native simply: "It is your duty to work. Idlers and vagabonds will have work found for them"'.

Both Harry Johnston and Cecil Rhodes had conceived of the great region beyond the Zambezi as a source of unlimited black labour. Johnston presented this programme persuasively in an article in 'The Nineteenth Century' of November 1902, 'as if', as Dr Hetherwick of the Blantyre Mission said, 'he represented the best interests of British Central Africa and the native peoples whom we have taken under our protection'. Hetherwick then recalled that 'when the Cape to Cairo railway scheme was first mooted, one inducement for its immediate construction put forward by the late Mr Rhodes was the prospect of tapping the immense wealth of native labour said to be lying idle...and conveying at an easy rate to the diamond and gold fields and other labour markets'. Surely, however, 'the one hope of British Central Africa is in the cultivation of its own soil by the hands of its own children whom we have restored to freedom and peace. It was for this that the yoke was torn from his (the African's) neck and not that he might be turned into the serf of the colonist and capitalist'.

Hetherwick's plea was an echo of the sentiments of the Blantyre Mission's newssheet 'Life and Work' which had warned, ten years earlier, against consequences of 'compulsory labour and oppressive taxation' similar to 'the melancholy spectacle that we see in the Cape, Free State, Transvaal and Natal Colonies'. The menace was

116. 'Scotsman', Edinburgh, letter by Rev. A. Hetherwick, 29/12/02. Phrase in brackets is mine.
already near, as shown in the newsheet's account of the exploits of a local planter who had told a member of the Mission that 'in the present dearth of labour he had no difficulty in getting workers. He simply...told the people that if they did not come and work he would burn their houses'. Hetherwick's was 'a voice crying in the wilderness'. From a fundamentally different standpoint the B.S.A.C. Directors had noted enthusiastically that the smashing of Arab power meant that whereas 'the natives...have hitherto been prevented by the Arabs from working for white men...now, a large supply of labour is available', whereby 'cost of transport will be materially lessened'. Meanwhile, in a letter stressing the need of labour for Kimberley, Johannesburg and Southern Rhodesia, Rhodes had proposed to Joseph Chamberlain that the mining companies 'should assist financially in railway construction to the north with the object of increasing, and thus of cheapening, labour'. Men from the north would cost only '2d per diem', while de Beers had to pay £1 a week for locally recruited labour because the great distance to be covered on foot by Zambezi men had 'prevented extensive employment of their services'.

Soon after the defeat of Mpezeni's Ngoni and before the Lunda and Bemba were conquered, Cecil Rhodes received a report from Arthur Lawley of Smitherman's plan, which we noted earlier, 'to bring labour from the Nyasa and Bangweulu to the mines'. Smitherman must have travelled extensively, not only to be able to assess the manpower potential of thirteen Zambian peoples, but also to propose a wage rate. 'At a low estimate', he said, 'in about two years after the first natives started to work, over 15,000 native labourers could be procured...They will probably sign on for six months although nine may be agreed to...and...they will consider a sum of 15/- per mensem as ample wages'. His estimates of man-power, including the 'Bagaranganzo' (sic) of Katanga, were as follows:-

'The Awemba - a very powerful tribe - could easily supply 3,000 men a year...very fine and big men and good workers. The Bausi - very good labourers, but require a lot of managing - have more spirit than the ordinary native...2,000 men p.a. could be obtained. The Balamba - very powerful tribe and I do not think they will be very much use for work...more akin to the Mashonas...and exhibit their bad traits of character...They are very timid and live in a state of filth and dirt...500 good workmen might be procured.

118. RH:MSS.Afr.s.228, Lawley to Rhodes, 7/12/98; and see p.283 above. Lawley was then Deputy Administrator in Matabeleland.
The **Ballala** (sic) - inhabit the country round Fort Elwes...the finest workers to be found north of the river - energetic, easily led, and furnish abundant proof that they are not idle by the way they cultivate their lands, plenty of native food being obtainable...could send at least 2,000 workers annually down to the Mines.

The **Besa** (sic;Bisa) - also very good workers - could supply about 400 men a year.

The **Chickunda** (sic) - good labourers - able to furnish quite 300 first class men p.a.

The **Baswacka** (sic) - along the banks of the Lusenfwa River - akin to the Ballala - good working qualities. 200 men could be obtained annually.

The **Balengi** (sic) - a warlike people...well armed and thoroughly in touch with the Portuguese slave dealers from both the East and West Coasts...impertinent and independent...not much good for labour - perhaps 200 men a year.

The **Baluana** (sic) - timid and lazy - about 300 men a year.

The **Vasenga** - very good labourers - 300 men.

The **Bagaranqanzo** (sic) - inhabit Katangaland and in the course of time, will send good labourers to Bulawayo as the chief sent me a message saying that, if I wanted any men, he could send them down...roughly 1,000 could be obtained.

The **Maehukulumbwe** - a very fine lot of men and keen for work - could supply about 3,000 men a year.
The Matutela (sic) - all very good labourers - unless prevented by the Chief Levineka (sic), could easily be persuaded to go to Bulawayo. About 2,000 could be procured.\(^{119}\)

Codrington declared, as we noted earlier, that white opinion was unanimous that it was essential 'to compel the natives to work', and this implied that, without such foreign pressure, the local people were idle. Wills's uninformed picture of the European intrusion supports this view when he says that 'Africans did not resent the tax but proved stubbornly reluctant to work for longer than was necessary to earn it. The first decade of the century was taken up with bitter settler recrimination over the "idleness" of the African and with resort to questionable methods of inducing men to work'.\(^{120}\) The testimonies of disinterested travellers did not support this view as they realised that the work that occupied the planning and action of village dwellers was the business of growing crops and hunting for food. It is certainly true that Africa was not in the main stream of industrial and technological change at the end of the 19th century. But a village with full granaries, nurtured fruit trees and grazing stock

\(^{119}\) Ibid: Smitherman's Report.

\(^{120}\) See p.283above - underlining is mine; and Anene J. and Brown G., op.cit., Chap 29, 'African Politics in Central Africa', by A.J. Wills, esp. p. 511.
bore testimony to work however it may have differed from western work patterns in terms of the products that came from it or the skills employed. This contradiction of Wills's inference finds unexpected support from the report of the Southern Rhodesian Native Affairs Enquiry of 1911, thus: 'It is frequently urged that native males lead an idle life at their kraals. This is not borne out by the evidence we have received. On the contrary they appear to do the bulk of the heavy work, and the woman is not the slave which she is so frequently alleged to be'.

The real motive of the plan for massive labour recruiting was expressed frankly in a letter to the Duke of Abercorn by Lionel Decle of the 'Daily Telegraph' on his return from Central Africa in 1900. Northern Zambezia was, he believed, 'ripe for colonisation', offering 'the immense advantage of an abundance of cheap and reliable labour' as '50,000 labourers could be found here at a few weeks' notice'. His only caveat was 'in the present state of Northern Rhodesia ...the men who are today the best and most reliable labourers were yesterday the fiercest of the inhabitants', and therefore 'the contact of these men with the natives of the south in whose minds the recollection

of the late rebellion is still vivid' might suggest to them 'the possibility of rising against the handful of whites who hold them in subjection'. To suggest that the European annexation of Central Africa was motivated by a philanthropic desire to lead Africans to enjoy the fruits of modernity is not merely to be facile. It is to obscure the relentless determination of the conquerors to use the conquered peoples to carry their loads and to dig in their mines and their fields.

Chibalo in Central Africa was different from the system associated with the European Slave Trade in its methods. In its objectives it was basically similar. Tragically the arguments of Rodney's book, 'How Europe underdeveloped Africa', find innumerable supporting data in Central Africa. Just as the British Government and the 'Livingstone Mail' apparently found no problem in applying to the taxation of black men totally different doctrines from those used in reference to metropolitan taxation, so the idea of compelling labour was applied to Africa with a startling universality at a time when the struggle for the emancipation of labour was well advanced in Europe. 122

At the outset, we are faced with a question: why did the burgeoning European enterprises south of the

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122. PLG: BSA 8/16, L. Decle to Duke of Abercorn, 14/2/00; and see Rodney W., (Bogle-L'Ouverture, 1972).
Zambezi require labour from the north? Oliver and Fage have said that, while south of the Zambezi 'most of the African population suffered some disturbance in their land use as a result of European immigration, in all the territories north of the Zambezi...the numbers affected were a very small proportion of the whole'.

The material which we are reviewing now suggests that this view is simplistic, and that there is reason to believe that, not only did definite dislocation and depopulation follow the introduction of musonko and chibalo, but the societies so affected suffered not just trauma but debilitation. The demands of the south appeared insatiable and, for example WENELA - the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association - was still operating in 1964 as far north as the Tanzania-Malawi-Zambia border area. Sixty-three years earlier, Rhodes had said that the current supply of labour was 'only 3,000 natives per month...Every effort had been made to get labour in South Africa. Transkei natives when engaged decamped, the Portuguese refused to export labour, and the supply from north of the Zambezi was poor...(But) the Government was fully alive to the absolute necessity of cheap labour, cheap coal and good railway communication'.

But a full answer to why South Africa and Rhodesia demanded to many thousands of labourers from

124. 'Cape Times', 1/6/01, Rhodes on 'Failure of the Native Supply'. Underlining is mine.
the north and indeed why the importing of Chinese, Indian, Malayan, Arab and other labour was undertaken simultaneously, cannot be sought here. What matters now is how chibalo affected northern Zambezia.

Once again however we cannot separate northern Zambezia from what was happening south of the river, nor can we overlook the radical consequences upon that situation of the racial wars of 1893 and 1896-7. From the Martin Report on 'Native Administration' it became clear that even Lord Grey acknowledged that 'the treatment experienced by the natives at the hands of prospectors and others was one, if not the greatest, cause of the rebellion'. In procuring labour, Native Commissioners used Native Police who 'were guilty of many acts of cruelty and extortion and', said Martin, 'I cannot but think that the Native Commissioners must have been aware of the conduct of their men'. Though a N.C. told the Enquiry that the people 'did not like supplying labour' but 'preferred remaining at the kraals doing nothing', a resident of Umzinbwane said: 'A proud and hitherto unconquered Matabele cannot be turned in a month, or a year, into a useful servant by kicks, sjambok and blows'. Yet he added that 'as to punishment of the rebels on their surrender, it might be suggested that they be put to work on the railway for two years or till it reaches Bulawayo, without pay, since, according to Matabele opinion, it is more degrading and therefore a greater punishment to be made to work than to be...
shot as an enemy'. Nonetheless Martin, who was in essential sympathy with the B.S.A.C. policy, acknowledged that, when it appeared 'that all heart had been knocked out of the natives' and that the Government could now 'place what exactions they thought fit upon them without fear of retaliation, compulsory labour began'.

This, Martin said, 'must have seemed nothing less than slavery itself', to 'the raw and hitherto independent Matabele'.

The quest for labour for Southern Africa reached amazing proportions at the turn of the century. As proposals for recruiting from China were being studied, the 'Chinese Anti-Immigration Committee' in Bulawayo warned the Colonial Secretary by telegram that it would be 'ruinous interest whole inhabitants and subversive morality civilisation'. A draft ordinance on the subject of labour for Southern Rhodesia expressly excluded immigration from British dependencies and limited recruitment to Asia; but it was noted that the importation of labour from China would 'raise a storm of objection from all the anti-Chinese Whites of South Africa'. Nevertheless, one former resident in Hong Kong urged the Colonial Secretary to put such objections aside. For the proposed Cape to Cairo railway, he said, 'I am sure

the Chinese are the best labourers...being obedient to overseers and able to endure all kinds of hardship' -
a remark that gains in interest in view of the Tanzania-Zambia railway project of the 1970's which has been undertaken by the Peoples' Republic of China. Philip Gell, a Company Director, made a romantic proposal, at the end of the World War, that 'Kanakas, Burmese, Indians, Japanese and Chinese Christians' should be recruited. He knew nothing of the Chinese, he said, 'but I suppose Chinese Christians would be different and I would like to offer them a haven of refuge in the Zambezi Valley'. There had also been a suggestion, in 1899, that West Indians should be recruited for South Africa, whereby the West Indian would 'return to his native soil, after the absence of about two hundred years, with this difference that, whilst he left it in savagery, he returns a civilised and able-bodied workman'. The B.S.A. Company then received a suggestion that Italian labour should be sought as 'it would increase a large and friendly population to overwhelm...the Boers', for 'Italian women are most prolific...as an instance, the Province of S. Paulo (Brazil) where after ten years the Italian population has reached to over one million'. The most serious efforts, under the Company's auspices, were, however, the attempts to recruit from Abyssinia and Somalia. But these projects foundered because Tulloch and Kusel, the agents, took '280 Abyssinians and Somalis' from the Somali Coast Protectorate 'under
circumstances which it would be difficult to distinguish from deliberate fraud'. The local Consul-General was highly offended and, in addition, through panic among the recruits on board the German vessel 'Herzog', a riot occurred in which one recruit was killed and 10 'severely wounded' along with some members of the Beira Police. The trouble began when 'the crew by way of amusement, informed them that it was the intention of their employer to sell them as slaves'. The local Beira paper commented that the incident was 'no loss to the Company as the crew...look about the most useless things on the face of the earth and will die like rotten sheep in Rhodesia'. This debacle only increased the Company's determination to procure labour from Mozambique, despite Portuguese objections, and its request for British Government intervention. Though some Arab labour was in fact secured, the Foreign Office expressed disapproval of attempts to find labour from other Protectorates.

It became vital, therefore, to draw as much labour as possible from north of the Zambezi. 126

126. PRO: CO 879/68, African South no. 656; Milner to Chamberlain, enclosing telegram, 23/7/00; 417/342, correspondence on labour for S.Rhodesia, 21/6/01, and 370 C.T. Robinson to CO, 4/3/02; PLG: BSA 7/256, memo by P.L. Gell (n.d.) after end of World War; and PRO: CO 879/68 African South no. 656, W.J. Calder, M.O. Bulawayo, to CO, 27/12/99; W. McNaughton to BSA, encl. letter from Florence on Italian labour, 20/8/00; BSAC to CO on Abyssinian recruiting scheme, 29/11/00; Consul General, Somali Coast to FO, 22/1/01 and BSA to CO, 15/1/01, which cited Beira newspaper comment; and 879/76, African South no. 694, FO to CO, 2/7/01.
The well-known 'sons of Ham' doctrine of African inferiority, found a spokesman in Sir Harry Johnston. 'The Negro', he wrote in 1899, '...has been marked out by his mental and physical characteristics as the servant of other races...He is possessed of great physical strength, docility, cheerfulness...a short memory for sorrows and cruelties, and an easily aroused gratitude for kindness...As he is usually a strong man and a good fighter, he has come into request, not only as a labourer, but as a soldier'. 127 Johnston's role as apologist for white herrenvolkism was of great service to the imperial thrust in Central Africa. A scholarly study of African labour, published thirty-four years later, offers in contrast this insight. 'Slavery...demoralised the society in which it existed and those tribes which experienced it will usually be found to be the most unsatisfactory workers. This, however, is an economic view; from the aspect of the establishment of any colour bar, the Arab influence had little effect, nor does it appear to have made the slaves as a whole embittered or dangerous, at any rate to the degree exemplified by the risings of Africans against their European masters in Haiti, Jamaica and elsewhere'. Its effect was 'immense and disastrous to the African' and was exacerbated by the fact that 'Protestantism doubted

the negro's possession of a soul'. Thus 'the black man was never to be allowed to rise from his servile state, education was denied him and inter-marriage was sternly dis counted. Significantly, and contrary to a still common view, this writer added that 'in South Africa the Dutch maintained to a considerable degree the Anglo-Saxon view'.

The use of labour from far away may to a certain degree have been started in face of the proven resistance of local communities to recruiting. As it developed, it relieved the employer of any but minimal concern for his employees, their means of travel or their home conditions. Thus the element of inhumanity was increased and the sanctions upon brutality reduced. As Orde-Browne says elsewhere in the book which we have just cited, 'The application of pressure to go to work...tends to reduce the interest of the employer in improving condition; in proportion as he can rely upon a certain supply of manpower, so does he cease to trouble about the welfare or contentment of his people. In the extreme cases, the system will become merely a method of extracting the largest possible amount out of the employee in return for the irreducible minimum of food and care; consequent exhaustion or illness being repaired by the discharge of the unfit and their replacement by others. At this stage the position is far worse than under honest slavery'.


129. Ibid: p. 31. Underlinings are mine.
Rotberg, in his Introduction to the second edition of Merle Davis's 'Modern Industry and the African', quotes a comment of an official on the Copperbelt situation, well beyond the limit of our period, to the effect that 'the Management at Nkana...simply wanted "to get two shillings' worth of work for one shilling's wage out of the bloody nigger"'.\textsuperscript{130} As was suggested earlier, it must be observed, with regard to labour in the B.S.A.C. territory north of the Zambezi, that though the system may perhaps have differed in degree from what obtained to the south, it was the same in essence.

Migration southwards from the Zambezi in search of work in the Witwatersrand and elsewhere had been going on for some time before the B.S.A. Company appeared in the northern territories. For two decades or more, a steady trickle of men had been moving, especially from the Tonga and Lozi areas, first to the Kimberley diamond mines which were opened in 1869 and then, after 1884, to the Witwatersrand gold reef. As soon as the Company began to cast its eyes northward, however, the rate of emigration greatly increased, as Rhodes's determination to procure cheap labour took effect. Colin Harding reported, as we noted above, that in 1900, labour 'touts' were at work in considerable numbers and men were 'being driven like sheep...\textsuperscript{130}

\textsuperscript{130.} Davis H.M., (Cass 1967, 2nd edition), p.x of Rotberg's Introduction, citing NAZ: Sec/Lab/16, Dickerson to Cartmel-Robinson (n.d.).
(and) improperly fed'. Far more were involved than was generally imagined and the death rate was rising. A visiting secretary of the Paris Missionary Society, on tour in the Lozi kingdom in 1904, described his meeting with 'many natives either coming back from the mines or coming up in gangs to work on fresh sections of the railway. But', he said, 'we met none hastening south to take the places of those returning... The latter were mostly in very poor condition, some quite starving and emaciated with wolfish eyes, others hardly able to walk... they cannot carry supplies enough to last them through the long trek... Many of them return ill, with chest complaints and dysentery, the latter from the coarse mealie supplied to them... Poverty of blood betrayed itself in large ulcers. Naturally, their poor distorted minds fly to sinister conclusions. "We are all going home to tell our own people not to come and work for the white man. The meal the white men give us has been ground in grinding machines greased with human fat. They want to poison us with it"... Such was the tale they kept telling Uncle F. (Francois Coillard). 131

The Company's Directors were exercised from the outset to find a way of procuring labour other than through the operations of 'touts', which had a high wastage rate as well as a scandalous reputation. Even Dr Jameson was sensitive to allegations of 'forced

131. See p.317 above; and PMS: DEFAP Library, 'News from Barotseland', No. 22 (1904) p. 26, Hon. Secy. on 'Tour in S. Africa'.
labour' as shown in his objections to Sir Richard Martin's Report in 1897 on 'Native Administration'. Martin had stated that Native Commissioners, having failed to obtain labour through indunas or headmen, 'procured it by force'. In 1901, P.L. Gell made a tentative proposal that, while white men should qualify for land tenure by offering military service, African tenure should be made conditional on giving labour which 'would not be unpaid but...would only be paid at subsistence rates, far below mining wages'. Gell obviously took it for granted that the land was now owned by the Company. Since the land had not cost the Company anything, it would obviously be of considerable financial advantage to employers of labour to be able to pay their employees at mere subsistence rates on the grounds that such labourers were thus eligible for a recognition of 'tenure' of a small piece of their own native soil. Nothing, however, appears to have come of Gell's proposal. Instead, the Resident Commissioner in Salisbury confirmed, at the same time, that the recruiting and distributing of labour in Mashonaland was entirely in the hands of Native Commissioners who were required to "use their utmost endeavours to induce the natives to work and to meet the demands of the various mines".

But the situation was taxing the resources of the recruiters for, when in 1899 'hut tax' had been 'arbitrarily collected in July...natives turned out to work in thousands' but immediately 'deserted to their homes'.

As with the imposition of musonko the Company thus faced a chaotic situation in respect of labour, aggravated by its agents' determination to obtain it at all costs. The Administrator of North-western Rhodesia was quoted as saying that he hoped that 'the tax will ultimately be raised to £5, if not £10, if no lower charge is sufficient to force the natives into the service of the mines'. Yet, at the same period, a memorandum from the Company's headquarters in Fort Jameson presented a much more gentle picture. 'Over 2,000 natives...have passed through Beira during this month (April 1903)...These people go down on their own initiative but are encouraged and assisted by our Native Commissioners. It seems probable that the employment of labour agents north of the Zambesi is not so effective as the quiet encouragement and assistance...given... by the Administration'. However, four months later, Codrington was advising his Commissioners to insist on the payment of tax in cash to circumvent the practice whereby 'natives are compelled to labour...to discharge their tax...(which) may become indistinguishable from

133. PLG: BSA 7/116, PLG to Chester Master, 10/9/01. Underlining is mine; 7/121 CO to BSA citing report on labour recruitment by Sir M, Clarke, Res.Comm., Salisbury, 3/10/01.
mere traffic in forced labour'. Yet, in the following year, 1904, the Native Commissioner, Serenje, remarked that, for local work, since '6d amounts to 5 days' work', it was better to pay with a length of calico or in the case of very small service with only a few beads'. 134

The picture thus emerges of a many-pronged system of duress which fully justifies the term 'forced labour'. Physical force was one element but less direct yet drastic coercion through taxation was at least as important. Before taxation was officially imposed, however, Harding reported in 1898 that about 500 men had recently gone south from Mpezeni's district. Presumably the activities of 'Changa-changa' and his associates had been drawing recruits from the Luangwa-Zambezi confluence area for some time, for as we saw earlier he had been collecting 'tax' there since 1897 and travelling extensively in search of 'boys' for the southern mines. 'Encouragement' to men in the confluence area and the Kafue district to go to Southern Rhodesia was officially reported in early 1902, before taxation started there. 135.


135. PRO: CO 468, BSAC Reports for 1897-98, p. 399; and see p.242above; and CO 879/76, African south no. 694, NER Accounts (annotated) 25/3/02.
Moreover, it was not only for work in the south that labour was being urgently sought at that time. On the Tanganyika-Nyasa plateau, the telegraph line and the enterprises of the African Lakes Company were demanding very large numbers of porters. In 1901, 31,188 loads were carried through Old Fife (Ikawa) for the telegraph project and in 1903-4 '1880 boys' were recruited for porterage from Isoka to Fort Jameson during the year, the number rapidly increasing till 1907; though 'the natives of Fife Division...are very "stay-at-home" people and do not readily come forward'. In the aftermath of the B.S.A.C.'s military action in the northern region, the threat to a chief that he must provide labour 'if he wishes to be friends with the white man' was certainly coercive. Yet Codrington reported in 1899 that even such pressure was often unavailing. A major project like the trans-continental telegraph involved forest clearing as well as porterage and the White Fathers at Chilonga recorded that, in March 1900, 1,000 men were being vigorously recruited. For this, 'our neighbour Worringham continues to terrorise the country...He is a morphinomane'. Right from the start the recruiters' task was to seek 'able-bodied men', without reference to the local community's need of its fittest citizens. The special urgency of recruiting north of the Zambezi was, as the Anti-Slavery Society observed, because the gold companies would need 15,000-20,000 men but 'the number of able-bodied men'
south of the Zambezi and not employed elsewhere was 'only 15,000'. The Society therefore begged Her Majesty's Government to be vigilant in this regard. 

With the development of mines in the Hook of the Kafue, the Benguela railway project and the extension of the railway line beyond the Victoria Falls in the direction of Katanga, there quickly arose a conflict between the demands of such enterprises and those south of the Zambezi. Harding reported in 1903 that the Ila country would have no 'surplus labour for employment in the Transvaal'. Moreover, Harding now realised that it was 'just as desirable for a native to remain at his kraal and provide, by extensive husbandry, sufficient food for the extensive requirements which follow the settlement of a white population in his country'. He was sure that no government could sanction 'forced labour'; that 'a native's labour is his capital and he is allowed to take it to the best market'; and that therefore dishonest recruitment must be checked. 'For instance', he said, 'the current wage in N.E. Rhodesia is from 5/- to 10/- per month and they are told that in the Transvaal they can obtain £2 or even more a month', without reference to the much higher cost of living. The sight

of maimed men returning with 'no food to see them to their homes' shocked Harding, who, as he did later in regard to tax-raiding, uttered a protest not altogether welcome to his employers. Yet the flow south increased, 'many thousands' going 'on their own initiative' in addition to those formally recruited, according to Resident Commissioner in Salisbury. 137

As recruiting agents, official and freelance, crossed the Zambezi, it seemed right away to the local people that indeed 'the white men came with war'. An agent of the North Charterland Company, wanting porters to carry loads - the work called tengatenga - was offered fewer men than he demanded. Smith and his kapitao, Nkhuwa, then burned the village of Kasangu, tied the chief up with bark-rope and carried off women whom they raped. Paying little heed to 'native witnesses', Codrington fined the 18-year-old Smith £25. An 'affray' occurred a few months later in November 1900 between 'the Batonka' (sic Batoka) of Sinakumpi's village and 'natives in the employ of Messrs Acutt and Crewe, Agents...working for the Southern Rhodesia Labour Bureau'. The recruiting band was armed, but this was explained by the statement that, Crewe having been killed in the siege of Mafeking, Acutt issued gun permits 'in complete

ignorance'. Very soon afterwards, Chief Chiawa, living on the north side of the Zambezi, was shot dead by a 'Portuguese native' called Jonas who was acting for a Mashonaland Labour Bureau agent. Milner, the High Commissioner, was concerned over the consequent 'failure of justice' due to the fact that the authorities in the south could not deal with a crime committed north of the river while witnesses from the north refused to go either south or to Fort Jameson. The interest of the Colonial Office does not appear to have gone beyond receiving the report with extra information to the effect that the agent, Pretorius, was stationed on the Kafukwe (sic Kafue) River and had recently thrashed Chief Chikobongo there and that his man, Jonas, had quarrelled with Chiawa because the chief refused to send one of his daughters to Pretorius. However, in a statement sent to his superiors in refutation of further allegations by the Anti-Slavery Society about 'forced labour', the Resident Commissioner wrote thus: 'While undoubtedly strong moral pressure is brought to bear on the natives to...work in the mines and elsewhere, no case of actual compulsion has come to my knowledge'. Moreover 'the incentive of newly acquired wants has caused a marked increase in the numbers offering to work on their own initiative'.

138. PLG: BSA 8/21, report on Dahna Smith, 21/4/00, and see p.252above; PRO: CO 879/69 African South no. 659, Res.Comm, to HC, 16/11/00 and 15/4/01; and 879/76 no. 694, ditto, 9/7/01. Underlining is mine.
The impression of a new kind of war in the land was further strengthened by the clashes between representatives of the 'authorities' and other white men also accompanied by armed Africans. We saw above the case of Ziehl and Bolle who were pursued by B.S.A.C. forces under Chesnaye in mid-1900. A similar battle took place in Ila country a year later between Harding and Gielgud with a mixed force of Ndebele and local 'friendlies' and a Maxim gun, on the one hand, and a trader called Garlo accompanied by 'chiefs of doubtful allegiance', on the other hand. 'Garlo with his people and cattle fled across the Kafue River' and once again the Company's mastery was confirmed. The fact that the Company's men always moved with 'armed askari' and, at the outset, furnished recruiting agents with similar support, meant that village dwellers had either to flee, submit or, as happened on a few occasions, offer resistance. Beaufort, the High Court Judge at Fort Jameson, reported considerable confusion caused in 1903 by the clash of authority between the B.C.A. Protectorate and North-eastern Rhodesia. B.C.A.P. patrols tried to seize men who came into the Fort Jameson district where work was available with the North Charterland Company and witnesses testified that a white recruiting agent at Zooli's (sic) had sent armed men to burn the houses

139. See pp. 258 above.
of those who had not displayed tax receipts, presumably in order to force them into his labour gangs. 140

Though Commissioner Sharpe was still reluctant to sanction the recruitment of B.C.A.P. men for work elsewhere, in view of the demands of the Nyasaland planters, Codrington confirmed in 1904 that in the previous year, 6,126 men from the B.S.A.P. had gone south via the Feira ferry over the Zambezi, while only 3,514 had returned. This exodus went on, said Codrington, despite the fact that 'they were robbed and murdered passing Portuguese territory, were swindled at the Zambezi ferries and died of thirst and starvation on unknown routes'. At the northern end of Malawi, the impact of press-ganged labour was felt over a wide area extending across the plateau to Lake Tanganyika. Indeed labour was being sought from the Bisa country to carry loads from Karonga, and in 1905, it was reported that because of the very high death rate on the plateau porterage routes, large numbers went to the Boma at Luena to beg 'to be imprisoned for six weeks rather than be sent on an ulendo (journey) to get tax money'. The pattern had now developed of a constant criss-crossing of the country by armed traders and labour recruiters which,

140. PRO: CO 879/76 no. 694, Harding's report of clash with Garlo, 2/9/01; and NAZ: BS 1/118 J.W. MacKenzie to Chesnaye on armed askari accompanying recruiters (n.d.); and BS 1/97, report by Beaufort, 22/4/03.
when added to the persistence of tax raids, created a situation of restlessness, fear and social upheaval. For example, in 1911 or 1912, a band of armed Ndebele men crossed into the Gwembe valley from the southern bank of the Zambezi, under the leadership of Johan Colenbrander, who had been the first Chief Native Commissioner at the end of the second Ndebele war. On the foray into the Gwembe, he was ostensibly reclaiming the offspring of cattle which he sent over the river for safety in 1896. A small encounter took place between his band and the askari of the local Native Commissioner, Molyneux, who imprisoned some of Colenbrander's associates. 141

The Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau was established in 1903 and gained a virtual monopoly in recruitment north of the Zambezi, especially while the collection of labour for the Transvaal was suspended. Gann points out that this enabled the Bureau 'to keep down wage rates by keeping competition away'. Despite its official standing, the Bureau made no effort to classify labour, simply directing gangs of recruits to the railhead for the journey south. It may be, as Gann says, that the R.N.L.B. could look after its recruits 'better than private touts'. Yet, seven years after its inception, as he records, 'even the introduction of railway transport' had failed to improve conditions.

141. Ibid: Codrington to Sharpe, 20/6/04; NAZ: KSZ 7/1/1, Luwingu 1902-13, report by ANC Luena, 31/3/05; and NRJ III,5, op.cit., pp. 421-2
In the words of a B.S.A.C. official who accompanied recruits from Kasempa, "The natives who have to sleep close to the sides of the boxes must, during the night ... catch their death of cold, as they are packed so closely that they are unable to move". The high mortality rate of recruits for the Southern Rhodesian mines was the subject of correspondence between the Company's Board in London and the Administrator at Fort Jameson in the beginning of 1907. Some time previously, the Chief Native Commissioner in Bulawayo had reported the death rate on the mines among North-eastern recruits as 'exceptional', though they were 'of excellent physique and apparently good stamina'.

The Company took account of 'the change of climate and the hardships inseparable from so long a journey', but considered that, if the death rate did not drop quickly, this 'importation' might have to be suspended. Moreover it would now be very difficult to accede to the renewed request of the Rand Labour Organisation for men from N.E. Rhodesia because of the health hazards of 'the high high plateau of the Witwatersrand'. Figures in the possession of the Company had shown the following comparison for the death rate per

1,000 recruits in the Kimberley and Witwatersrand mines in 1903:

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>De Beers</th>
<th>Rand</th>
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<tr>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td>42.64</td>
<td>61.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>27.72</td>
<td>85.70</td>
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<td>July</td>
<td>29.92</td>
<td>106.70</td>
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A pass system was therefore operated in many areas. Sheckleton was reported to have issued over 3,000 such passes in a short period in 1903 to men going south on their own. McNamara's refusal to issue passes for such men had led to various clashes in 1907; McNamara claiming that reports had been received 'that several hundreds of natives arrived annually in a very emaciated condition'. In 1910, Wallace told the High Commissioner that the system was necessary 'to prevent people from sleeping sickness areas, lepers and all who are physically unfit...from wandering uncontrolled...into the hands of recruiters and touts'. Despite such controls, however, the Colonial Office took note of figures showing increasing mortality in respect of recruits from North-western Rhodesia, thus:

1907-08 51.68 per thousand
1908-09 56.90 per thousand

From the Luwingu Sub-District in the northern province, the Annual Report for 1912-13 stated as follows: 'The percentage of deaths increased every year. Of the 376 engaged in 1909, 8% died; of 570 in 1910, 12% died (and 94 are still unaccounted for); of 557 engaged in 1911 the number of deaths reported to date is over 13%.'
The great majority of deaths reported during the year have been ascribed to pneumonia.\textsuperscript{143}

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, despite the publication of sundry statistics in respect of labour, the actual position was turbulent and virtually uncontrolled for many years after the B.S.A. Company began 'administration'. Moreover the situation in Nyasaland was no more susceptible of control. Sharpe, for instance, told the Colonial Office in 1910 that the annual total for migrant labour for South Africa was 'variously estimated at from 6,000 to 18,000'. Government officials all over northern Zambezia had, from the outset, been confronted by the flight of very large numbers of people hither and thither in face of the raids of armed agents of both musonko and chibalo. The Native Commissioner for Serenje, J.E. Hughes, had told Coxhead, his superior at Fort Jameson, in 1904, that he was facing the prospect of having 'a deserted country for some 50 miles this side of the boundary' with the Congo Free State, over which people were fleeing. On the matter of labour recruits, Hughes considered it 'a long way to expect a native to go to Tete or to the Copper Mines to find his three shillings for

\textsuperscript{143} NAZ: BS 1/33-34, BSAC Secy., London, to Admin., NER, 12/1/07; PMS: 'News from Barotseland', No. 21, p. 40, quoting official mine mortality rates; PRO: CO 879/79 African South no. 948, Ag. Admin. NWR to WO 12/2/10; Admin. NWR to HC, 9/9/10; African South no. 947, CO to HC, 31/5/10; and see NAZ: KSZ 7/1/1, Luwingu Annual Report, 1912-13.
his tax, etc.' But Coxhead replied that 'His Honour directs me to point out that people from the Northern Districts march longer distances to find work... and that the policy should be to insist on the natives of your District paying their tax in order to drive them to seek work on their own initiative rather than to exercising undue energy in finding employment for them'.

In 1908 in the Lundazi district east of the Luangwa, there was open resistance to Company rule and tax defaulters were 'far too numerous' to be arrested. 'They should be burnt out and shown that they cannot defy the Administration', was the comment in the Annual Report.

Worthington reported in 1905 that people were leaving the Sisheke district 'in great numbers and taking refuge' in the Caprivi Zipfel, in flight from the tax; and we have cited above other instances of this kind of movement. 'Chiana' Harrington recorded heavy migration to Southern Rhodesia from the Luapula in 1906 and wrote thus about the attempt to get labour for the Madona-Kambove road that Tanganyika Concessions Ltd. needed for the transport of their freight: 'Work was not popular as the natives did not care to come long

144. Ibid: 879/104 African South no. 947: Sharpe to CO on incidence of phthisis in Nyasa miners in SA, 5/3/10; and NAZ: KSK 3/1, Hughes, Serenje, to Coxhead, 26/3/04. Underlining is mine; KSK 6/1/1, Annual Report for Western Luangwa (Serenje) to 31/3/08; and KST 4/1/1, Annual Report, Lundazi, to 31/3/08.
distances to apply for work and perhaps be rejected and all the pay they got was 4/-.
3/- of this went for their Hut Tax and the 1/- they must spend to get home. The rejecteds must get home as best they could which was usually pretty hungry'. Since Boma officials were wont to command people to greet them and show deference to them, Melland's note from Mpika, that no chief or headman had either given him the customary basket of flour or chicken or offered any excuse for failure to do so, significantly confirms the depth of popular resentment to the Company's regime; especially since Melland was, from all reports, much less disliked than many of the Company's agents and has shown, in his writings, a sympathetic approach to local customs and beliefs. In 1909 Wallace urged that the 5/- tax of North-eastern Rhodesia should become 10/- as in the North-west because 'the younger men are endeavouring to migrate into those districts where only 5/- is paid'. The older men feared they would soon 'be reduced to a state of poverty' and, according to a report by Worthyington, 'large communities are fast becoming disintegrated and the native social fabric destroyed'. Yet Wallace was referring to the Kafue which had been recommended for intensive recruiting and in which there were copper mines. Moreover his conclusion was that the exodus would be stopped by doubling the tax in such districts as Kasempa. When, however, musonko was doubled in the Kasempa region, large numbers of young
and able-bodied men, instead of seeking employment at the Sable Antelope Mine as urged by the officials, either hid in the forests or left the district. 145

In 1909 Charles Venables came across a cutting from a periodical on tropical agriculture which he then sent to the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society. It included these words: "Nyasaland natives are not anxious to emigrate any more than Asiatics are, for they are fond of their homes and family ties like other human beings. Government has to devise ways and means...to secure revenue, as the hut tax cannot be paid by a people who have no money, so a system of emigration has been again started...The wisdom of this policy is disputed by all right-thinking residents who have the interest of the country at heart; besides the natives themselves object but, being told...that they must go, of course they obey. Although Government men say they are not pressed, all those behind the scenes know better...A much wiser policy would be to educate them and encourage them to grow valuable economic products, which they know full well how to do, as they are born cultivators". Venables claimed that the situation in North-western Rhodesia under the B.S.A.

Company was 'infinitely worse' than in Nyasaland under the Imperial Government. 'The official sends for all the able-bodied men who are collected... at the Boma for a meeting. It is not the official who tells them they must go but before the meeting, his native police and messengers... impress upon them that... when the official asks them if they want to do so, they must say that they do... Everything is stagemanaged'. Venables also said that an official of the Native Department had told him how Messengers, sent to collect labour, 'would return with gangs of natives tied in single file with ropes round their necks. When they approached the settlement the ropes would be taken off and the Messenger would order them to sing and those who did not they would encourage with sjamboks, and that he said was why the natives used to appear so delighted at the prospect of doing the particular work they were brought in for'. Moreover, though hard to prove, it was known that Company agents 'received a share of their commission from recruiting agents and presents from mine managements and others'.

It was perhaps in the Kasempa District that the most concerted resistance to chibalo as a corollary of musonko was encountered. Undoubtedly it was

146. RH:MSS.Brit.Emp.s.22 (G.184), Venables to A-S and A.P. Soyc., 23/6/10, encl. cutting from 'Supplement to the Tropical Agriculturist' (Nov. 1909) p. 479; Venables, 21/10/10 (see also PRO: CO 417/494); Underlinings are mine.
aggravated by the temperament of the Native Commissioner, W.H. Hazell, whom Theodore Williams described, as we noted earlier, as manifesting 'a great deal of power-fulness if very little of principle'. Hazell was in charge of the Kasempa District from 1910 to 1916, having come to Southern Rhodesia in 1893 and been a hunter and trader before joining the B.S.A. Company. The Kasempa District Notebook described him as 'a man who in the knowledge of the native mind had few equals'. His nickname, Makomani, seems to have referred to his severity. Before he became Native Commissioner there had been various troubles in the district. A white man called Dubin had caused so much fear and disturbance among the Lunda people in 1907 that the missionary at Kalene, Dr Fisher, reported him to the Boma. Early in 1909, the Boma clerk, Philip Jelf 'son of the late Master of Charterhouse', was dismissed over his alleged ill-treatment of a white prisoner serving a sentence for man-slaughter. At the inquest that followed, one witness was Tumiwa, 'a Kaundi (sic) capitao employed by Mr Frykberg', a local trader. At the same time a trader called Richardson was murdered on the Shambwila, a tributary of the Western Lunga River, by his Bemba porters who 'received considerable assistance from local head-men in effecting their escape. The reasons alleged for the murder were (1) the withholding of wages due,
and (2) flogging of the capitao for insisting that their wages should be paid'. 147

The floggings which eventually led to the 'retirement' of MacGregor, which we recounted above, had taken place in the Kasempa district. It was Codrington, MacGregor had claimed, who told him to treat the people as being in a state of rebellion. In the period of violence associated with MacGregor's residence in the Kasempa District, Bellis, the N.C., whom the people called 'Longwani' the long one or 'Chimukali' the big fierce one, was attacked and shot at Kasanza's village. The police patrol that combed the district after that event "had the misfortune to shoot a woman", according to information given to the High Commissioner, who added that 'the people were known to be suspicious of white control'. After this incident 'the Balunda in and around Kalene Hill...boasted to the missionaries that they had expelled the Government from their country'. Very soon after MacGregor's arrival, the Barotse Native Police company took flight, escaping prisoners were shot and one of them killed. 148 Thus the violence of 1908 and 1909 may have persuaded the Administrator to send a

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148. See p.328 above; NAZ: KDD 5/1, as in footnote 147; PRO:CO 879/102, Af. S. 932, HC to CO on Kasempa, 6/12/09; and NAZ: KSE 6/1/1, Annual Report, Balunda District, 1908-9, p. 4.
tough man, especially since the increased tax of 10/- was soon to be exacted. Hazell's report on the local campaign to prepare for the increase described the people's reaction as philosophical. 'They enquired in a jocular manner as to where the money was to come from'. When reminded of opportunities at the Kansanshi Mine which paid 10/- for a month's work, 'they accepted the position in a good humoured way'.

Nine months later, in May 1911, a Swede called Ohlund, who was developing a gold bearing property for the Kasempa Gold Mining and Development Syndicate on the Dingwe River, was murdered at a village called Shindamana, thirteen miles from the Boma. The murderers were named as Tumiwa, Tapoka and Kungwa. According to the record in the District Notebook, the trader Frykberg, who was also manager of the Kasempa Gold Mining Syndicate, had, in 1909 and 1910 "collected some 400 Bakahondi (sic Kaonde) natives for work at the mines in Southern Rhodesia". Nearly 100 of those men had died before returning home. The authorities apparently regarded this as the cause of Ohlund's murder. The three accused were not caught, however, for nine months. Hazell therefore began a major operation of collective punishment during which 'at one time all chiefs were called in and kept under observation at the Boma'. The Notebook praised the Native Commissioner for 'his methods

of bringing home to the natives...that the murder of a white man was a matter not lightly to be considered'. Villages were raided at night in an attempt 'to round up the party which had now grown to about forty men, together with a number of women and children'. When at last the three men were caught, and before they were publicly hanged, Tumiwa made a 'voluntary confession' that they had planned to murder Frykberg first 'to prevent their being recruited for Southern Rhodesia'. 'This', said the Notebook, 'was the end of recruiting for the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau in the Kasempa District'. When a Bureau agent visited the area two years after Ohlund's death, 'the attitude of all towards work in the south convinced him' that further recruitment could not be undertaken. 150

In a lengthy report on what is now Zambia's North-western Province, combining Kasempa, Solwezi, Mwinilunga, Kabompo and Zambezi (Balovale) Districts, the Administrator told the High Commissioner in early 1912 that Hazell was 'not at all satisfied with the attitude of the Bakahondi (sic) and Balunda people' who 'seem to interpret our patience as weakness'. The Kaonde were 'not only inimical but they, especially the younger men, will resent the arrest of any of their friends (and)...have shown a determination to take revenge which the possession of arms enables them to do,

150. NAZ: KDD 5/1 as in footnote 147.
sometimes successfully'. There was a considerable and apparently increasing traffic in arms and ammunition in the area. Hazell had information that in 1910, nearly 1,000 lbs of gunpowder in bulk passed through in transit from South Africa to Katanga. The Administrator was worried because Hazell wanted to effect disarmament by issuing an order for the immediate surrender of all arms. 'If for any cause they did not accept immediately, the only alternative would be war'. Indeed even to detain all headmen until weapons and powder were surrendered could spark a conflict. The despatch of a strong armed police force of not less than 50 men and their stationing near where Ohlund was murdered, a year earlier, would, the Administrator thought, force a general exodus to Angola, whereafter the police should 'patrol the border as a menace to recalcitrant villages that they will not be allowed to return'. Perhaps such a show of force would give 'a necessary lesson to the border tribes and...also to the whole country...without the shedding of blood'. He enclosed a copy of Hazell's report on his action after Ohlund's murder in which he described how 'to signify disapproval of the lawlessness displayed, the villages of the murderers were destroyed' on his order. Yet, in the first weeks of 1912, there had been 'an attempt to murder by shooting, a Government Officer, Mr Dillon, at Kansanshi'. Therefore since 'a great deal of deceit
...was used to prevent the capture of murderers, the Government could not distinguish their friends from their foes'. 151

Peace in any positive sense which would have become manifest in some serious forms of local development continued to elude the Kasempa and neighbouring areas to the end of our period. The D.C., Mwinilunga, considered 1914-15 a good year because his messengers had 'met with armed resistance' only once. As late as 1925 a confidential memorandum was submitted on the use of Kasempa as 'the most suitable spot to form a Fort or laager for defensive purposes against attack by natives'. The highly detailed nature of the memorandum suggests that the Boma was aware of a real danger of an armed rising in the local community. In such a case the Commandant would have to decide whether or not to admit 'friendly natives' to the laager with the Europeans, namely, messengers, mailmen and other Boma employees. 'Accommodation under the roof of the main fort for them would be difficult...(and) their women and children would probably have to be sent forth to fare as best they could in the case of a close siege'. 152

Further west, the Luvale people were also offering protracted resistance. In August 1911,

151. PLG: BSA 10/22, Admin. to HC 30/3/12, encl. Hazell's report of 25/3/12.
152. NAZ: Kse 6/1/3, Annual Report, Mwinilunga Sub-District (F.V. Bruce Miller) 1914-15; and KDD 5/1, notes on defence, 16/4/25.
policemen and a Boma messenger 'were set upon by armed Balovale, shot at twice, seized and beaten, and their belongings smashed'. They were saved by 'the interference of a Barotse induna. The Balovale stated that they had already refused the tax and they were now going to stop messengers and police from crossing the river at all, and sent many messages to a like effect'. The Assistant Native Commissioner for the sub-district believed that he could not get near the villagers concerned unless by a surprise attack. 'In that case it is quite probable they will make armed resistance'. The chieftainess Kutcheka had 'publicly stated she would have nothing further to do with the Government'. The official believed that 'to show softness...can have none but bad results', and therefore wanted authority from his superior office at Mungu to punish 'the villages which assaulted the police'. The N.A. urged caution for fear of open and widespread conflict. The situation was complicated by the fact that the border villages were doing business with Mambari traders and 'harbouring dangerous Portuguese natives', thus 'setting all law at defiance'. The senior chief Ndungu had been banished, and the A.N.C now proposed that he should be allowed to return, on condition of his acceptance of tax collection from his people and in the hope that he might bring Kutcheka and the other lesser rulers to submission. Thus it is clear that the most north-westerly kingdoms which Rhodes had stated to be part of Lewanika's empire,
were still far from submissive to the Company's rule and to the rigorous exaction of tax, despite over a decade of movement through northern Zambezia by armed B.S.A.C. agents. Moreover, chibalo had been effectively stopped among the Kaonde, Lunda and Luvale. J.H. Venning, who was the first Native Commissioner at Balovale in 1907 recounted both the widespread flight of whole villages on his approach and the dread in which 'the white man's rifle' was held, and how the public humiliation of chiefs, like Nyakulenga, was practised by the Company's men in order to 'pacify' the country.

Another factor which undoubtedly aggravated the turbulent situation in Luvale, Lunda and Kaonde country was the Company's persistent attempt to regard these peoples as subjects of the Lozi. The story of the B.S.A.C.'s attempt to extend Lewanika's domain, in order to exploit mineral resources far beyond the actual bounds of his effective suzerainty, makes amazing reading. As early as 1901, Val Gielgud had described the Hook of the Kafue region as knowing only the government of 'the older, stronger or more cunning' among the local people, and in no way subject to Lozi suzerainty. In 1902 Gielgud's recall was urged so that the boundaries of


North-western Rhodesia might be moved further east and north, it being noted that he had originally been sent to the Hook on Cecil Rhodes's instructions, Rhodes being of the opinion that until the Colonial Office confirmed the agreement with Lewanika, that portion of the country which contains copper deposits should not be admitted to belong to Lewanika'. In 1905 Coryndon and 'Chirupula' Stephenson disagreed sharply about the eastern frontiers of the Lozi state, Stephenson protesting that, far from having a common boundary with Mpezeni's kingdom on the River Luangwa, Lozi authority stopped 'far short of the Lunga and Kafue catchments'. Even at that date Lewanika was sending 'collectors' to Kapilimpanga's (sic) area in the Kasempa district, demanding tribute, much to the annoyance of the local N.C., 'Kankomani' Copeman. In 1909, the Administrator told the High Commissioner that he was trying to trade a westward extension of Lewanika's sphere in exchange for a full grant of land outside the Reserved Area, and that his negotiations included keeping the Luvale district outside the Reserve so that he could then persuade Lewanika to exchange it for the Kasempa district which he was still trying to claim. Behind all those manoeuvres lay 'a strictly confidential letter' from the B.S.A.C. Board to Codrington, of February 1904, which had urged the eastward extension of North-western Rhodesia to include the proposed railway development northwards, since 'the title asserted by the Company to mineral rights in North-western
Rhodesia is more easily susceptible of strict proof in case of need than to similar rights in North-eastern Rhodesia'. Though Codrington resented the suspicion thus cast on Johnston's Certificate of Claim in respect of the north-east, the Company 'attached great importance' to the realigning of the boundary in anticipation of the mineral exploitation of what was to become the Copperbelt. 155

From the point of view of the neighbouring peoples involved, the Company's sponsorship of visitations northward by Lozi indunas caused serious unrest, and it must have been known that the Native Commissioners in the northern Bomas opposed any Lozi infiltrations. In 1904, the Secretary for Native Affairs had suggested that 'Lewanika's definition of the Lealui and Sesheke districts must be taken to mean all the country situated between the headwaters of the Majili and Kabompo rivers', including 'a great part of the still undefined Kasempa district'. But, said the S.N.A., the people there were 'very lawless' and 'Lewanika from Lealui can have no control whatever over them'. The Lozi King had sent 'his representative indunas, Luiandombo, Ilomba and Kansimba' to the Kasempa area, and should be urged

155. NAZ: Sec/NG/13, incl. extract from letter of V. Gielgud, 21/4/01; PLG: BSA 8/67, memo by Milton on Kafue Hook area, 6/9/02; MSA Files, statement by J.E. Stephenson, undated (ref. MISC/G/165); Copeman to DC Lealui, 25/9/05; Wallace to Selborne, HC, 12/11/09; Richard Goode, Secy., to Admin., Salisbury, 26/10/21, citing BSAC, London, to Codrington, 13/2/04 and Codrington's reply, 19/4/04.
to send an induna to Mankoya (Kaoma), to prepare for tax collection there. But Melland of Kasempa, for instance, protested that the Kaonde had 'never admitted any overlord except Musokantanda, and the Southern Kaonde hardly admit him today'. A similar rejection by the Lunda of Mwinilunga was reported by the local Native Commissioner in 1916. As late as 1924, the District Commissioner of Kasempa was warning that 'to put any of the people living in these areas under the Barotse would be much resented...and...be bad...for the country'. 'Chirupula' told the Governor in 1925 that, while the Lenje chief, Chipepo, might possibly have occasionally paid Lewanika tribute', there was no possible justification for regarding the people of the Ndola, Chilanga, Mkushi and Feira districts as in any way subject to the Lozi. Yet 10% of their taxes had been paid to the Barotse Fund, thereby misappropriating 'some thousands of pounds sterling'.

In the years before the First World War, the impact of the Company on northern Zambezia as regards labour recruitment must have radically affected the life of the territory's various communities. The Native Commissioner at Isoka reported in 1908 that

156. NAZ: BS 2/181/I, SNA to Secy., Kalomo, 7/12/04; MSA Files: undated statement by F.H. Melland, who was in Kasempa from 1911 to 1922; Bruce-Miller, Mwinilunga, to Admin., 8/2/18; P.E. Hall, Kasempa, 9/10/24; NAZ: SEC/NG/13, Stephenson to NR Governor, Herbert Stanley, 10/9/25.
only 500 out of 7,000 taxable adults had paid musonko. The penalty was three months' imprisonment with hard labour, but the R.N.L.B. was available, and so 'they have no excuse for defaultery'. Official records and N.C.'s reports speak of the constant flow southwards as well as to Katanga of innumerable men going to seek work 'on their own initiative' under the relentless duress of musonko and involving 'the great majority of natives'; a situation agitated by the recruiters' use of 'runners' who used physical coercion freely and were rewarded according to the numbers of men thus enrolled. In 1909, disease among the cattle in the Lozi area, on which the people depended as a source of tax money, encouraged the Native Commissioner, Nalolo, to look for an increased migration to the south. A major crop failure in the Gwembe Valley in 1914 had a similar effect. Yet resistance to labour recruitment went on, notably in the populous Luangwa districts - where 'the demand...always exceeds the supply' - and among the ToKa where extensive use of fictitious names - 'Matches', 'Porridge' and the like - made it difficult for officials and agents to identify people. In face of sullen resistance to chibalo in the eastern districts, the R.N.L.B. proposed to 'let them bring one wife apiece to the mines', to extend service to eighteen months, to urge the payment of musonko in advance and to provide some compensation for rejected recruits. Many districts, like, for instance, Mwinilunga, witnessed what was called a 'general exodus'
of able-bodied men, accelerated by the low level of wages paid by local employers. The weight of evidence confirms that, despite formal denials for the benefit of the imperial government, the Company's Commissioners were heavily involved in the actual work of rounding up recruits. Presumably because the practice was so general, the S.N.A. sent a circular to all district officials in 1910 emphasising that they had no function in respect of labour other than to give information and advice to 'natives desirous of obtaining employment'. But Venables claimed in 1910, that such Commissioners received financial rewards for their activities in this respect. The roping together of press-ganged men was not uncommon, while capitaos, acting in excess of their instructions, were wont to make false promises of higher wages coupled with threats that the government, to which their employer was alleged to have paid £100, would punish those who refused recruitment severely. A strip of calico left at a man's house was, as in the Kasempa district in 1914, tantamount to an order to enter the labour gang. 157

The rigours of local porterage work for Boma officials were deeply resented. 'Carriers were paid half-rates for the time occupied in coming from and returning to their homes...(and) sometimes were detained in order to wait for the official...and often received no pay'. The Assistant Magistrate who made this statement was himself blamed for having 'illegally imprisoned' headmen for failing to produce the number of carriers demanded. However, the Company's men spoke of their intention to involve 'all able-bodied men' to meet the insatiable demands on both sides of the Zambezi. The conditions experienced in the Katanga copper fields were meanwhile the subject of persistently adverse reports; and the Anglo-Belgian Boundary Commission of 1914 treated its employees so harshly that it was officially rebuked. An increasing labour shortage at the Kansanshi Mine near Solwezi was officially attributed to poor food, compulsory overtime and a seven-day week which gave men no time to see friends. The resentment of the victims of chibalo was further increased by the system of deferred pay, whereby part of their earnings were made available only when the men reached their local Boma. The system clearly benefited local traders who were virtually all Europeans or, as in the Fort Jameson area, Asians; but it was but a further offence to the labourers concerned. Mortality rates continued to be high and compensation in case of death or accident was very low; the 1907 figures being £3 for partial and £5 for
total disablement while employed either in mining or in farming. The sudden application of a doubled tax, from 5/- to 10/-, upon the people of Mwinilunga in 1913-14, coupled with 'the constant call for labour', drove 'most of them to flee to Portuguese and Congo territories. At this point, it should be noted that the statistics provided by the B.S.A.C. and by R.N.L.B. cannot be taken as giving a true picture of the scale of migrant labour. While, for instance, the Bureau reported that it had recruited 10,902 men from northern Zambezia for Southern Rhodesia in the year 1913-14, and recorded the deaths of 771 of them, the N.C., Nalolo, stated that those who left his district on their own were considerably more than the number recruited by the R.N.L.B. 'There is no check kept on these', he said, 'and so it is impossible to state figures'. There is reason to believe that most other N.C.s could have said the same. 158

The outbreak of war in Europe inevitably had a drastic effect on the overseas possessions of the

warring imperial powers, despite the declaration of the Berlin Conference of 1885, which we noted earlier, that the Congo Basin region of Africa should be a neutral zone. For the people of northern Zambezia, the years 1914-18 were to bring a further intensification of labour recruiting upon rural communities already suffering from the effects of a decade of systematic depopulation through the various and increasing demands for able-bodied men. Nonetheless, tax raids also continued, as did the operations of labour agencies and private recruiters, like the white farmers of the Chipata district and the farming areas along the line of rail. The only fatal casualties of the war as a result of German military action were three Africans, two killed at Abercorn (Mbala) and one at Fife (Ikawa) in the first months of the war. No white soldiers on the British side died. When however the High Commissioner for South Africa declared at Lundazi, in December 1918, that 'the Principles of Right and Justice have triumphed over the forces of Tyranny and Oppression and our British Empire now stands stronger than ever before', there lay behind that consummation a record of hardship borne by black men of the territory for whom the Armistice and the Versailles Treaty did not bring any recognition of their rights as citizens and taxpayers.

159. See p. 50 above.

160. Brelsford W.V., 'The Story of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment' (Govt. Printer, Lusaka, 1954) pp. 30-32; including statement of the High Commissioner, at Lundazi, 30/12/18.
During the four war years and in addition to tengatenga work related to the transport of military supplies, labour continued to be procured under duress while tax collection lost none of its rigours. Indeed Colonial Office records show that, every now and then, the conduct of a Company official became the subject of an enquiry. This happened in 1914 when R.I. Hughes, Assistant Magistrate at Kalomo, was alleged to have demanded carriers for a journey being made by the former Secretary of Native Affairs, Worthington, and when the local headmen, Siakakoli and Masope, had not responded, arrested them. When carriers were at last provided, he forced them to work without pay. McKinnon, in proposing a disciplinary transfer, noted that the rapid growth of the European population was making tengatenga work increasingly unpopular. In self defence Hughes asserted that 'to send out messengers to themselves collect carriers, as was done by the late S.N.A. when he was D.C., Batoka, with a message to an induna to obtain them and, when brought in, to call them volunteers, is a mere travesty of truth'. Other officials like Dillon and Selby had, he claimed, made arrests as he had done and so he believed he was merely providing a scapegoat. In the Batoka area the Native Commissioner was demanding payment by, or on behalf of, a large number of deserted and divorced women. At an indaba at Fort Jameson at the end of 1915, the Administrator warned chiefs that failure to pay the tax increase, from 3/-
Moreover, a decision of the N.E.R. Agricultural and Commercial Association had been communicated to the Magistrate at Fort Jameson that it was 'in the interest of all employers of labour, including the Government, to cooperate and, in spite of the raising of Hut Tax, keep native wages as at present, viz. Dry Season labour 3/- + posho, Wet Season labour, 4/- + posho'.

In the Mankoya district in 1915-16, tax raiding was carried out so vigorously that the jail guards were unable to control the number of defaulters imprisoned. The demands for labour were meanwhile such that, as the Colonial Office observed, 'the Native Commissioner has to recruit it himself while district travelling'. Under the exigencies of war, the British Government was ready to recognise that this practise had been 'consistently maintained and...adopted elsewhere than in Rhodesia'. Meanwhile small subsidies were being offered to headmen of villages from which at least one-third of the able-bodied men were employed away from home. Yet 'defiance' continued to be shown towards the rough intrusions of messengers. In the Lozi area in 1916-17, there were 'a number of cases...of assaulting messengers and obstructing them in their duty and it was necessary to send 4 or 5 messengers together now to arrest criminals and tax defaulters'. Moreover, conditions in the Katanga mines were deteriorating. 'Many of the repatriates have returned in a very emaciated condition owing to sickness
and want of food on the way home, and some deaths have also been reported'. Their plight was aggravated by the fact that the B.S.A.C Administration refused to allow labour migrants to be accompanied by their wives for fear of losing a considerable number of them. The wives were expected to remain at home to look after their gardens. Miners therefore 'took to the Katanga temporary wives who might be passed from boy to boy and would soon become little better than common prostitutes'.

The use of village dwellers as war carriers was based on 'massive, coercive conscription'. The Luwingu district alone supplied carriers as follows during the five years of hostilities: 1914, 2,751; 1915, 9,897; 1916, 14,081; 1917, 10,836; 1918, 2,635. The total number of war porters taken from the Fort Jameson district in the years 1916-18 was 12,241, despite the constant high demands of local white farmers and the activities of the R.N.L.B. The Eastern Luangwa

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Annual Report for 1918-19 stated that 12,427 men had been drafted as war porters for service in Nyasaland, of whom 977 had died; while 4,313 had been supplied to the Rhodesian Column, of whom 108 had died and 40 were missing. From the Peatuke district, 2,448 went as military porters, of whom 146 died on service. War recruiting in Serenje District was so intensive that the R.N.L.B. engaged no one there for work in the south during 1914-15, local recruiting accounting for 5,780 as compared with 2,400 in the previous year. From the start of the war until March 1917, the following numbers of men were listed as having been employed as war porters in the territory:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N.E.Rhodesia</th>
<th>N.W.Rhodesia</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug.1914-31/3/15</td>
<td>42,528</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>42,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/4/15-31/3/16</td>
<td>92,337</td>
<td>15,042</td>
<td>107,381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/4/16-31/3/17</td>
<td>138,930</td>
<td>24,052</td>
<td>162,982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>273,795</td>
<td>39,094</td>
<td>312,891</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Administrator emphasised to the High Commissioner that the reason for the much smaller numbers recruited in North-western Rhodesia was that they were 'too far from the war area' and it was necessary to avoid denuding the farms and mines in the region of labour or seriously reducing the flow to Kaanga. For North-eastern Rhodesia alone, while 138,930 men were engaged on war work in the year ending 31/3/17, the number of
taxable males was listed officially as 119,506.\textsuperscript{162}

The drafting of labour on such an intensive scale was bound to involve placing very heavy loads on the shoulders of the men recruited. Before the war, it had been customary to make each man's load as heavy as possible. Local testimony about conditions in the Isoka district in the early years of the century has stressed this aspect of the rigours of white rule, as men struggled to support the weight of big steel boxes called \textit{vingongongo}. In early 1914, the Native Commissioner for Mwenga in the Kafue region reported gross overloading and the impossibility of taking action against employers responsible for it. 'Many loads though they do not exceed 50 lbs are of so awkward a nature that they are worse to carry than if they did'. There was however an improvement insofar as 'now most natives possess at least a blanket' since formerly 'they would sleep by fires in the coldest weather, naked, and many probably died indirectly from exposure to wet and cold'. Not till over two years after the end of the war did a Government Notice regulate maximum loads,
but even then porters were obviously still being over-loaded especially in view of the rough terrain through which they often had to pass and the very long distances they were required to cover. The 1921 rates for maximum loads were as follows, the loads for 2 and 3 carriers presumably being shared loads:

- 1 carrier - not exceeding 60 lbs
- 2 carriers - not exceeding 90 lbs
- 3 carriers - not exceeding 120 lbs.

In 1912, a carrier's daily wage was three pence plus food in North-western Rhodesia. 'About one shilling for 100 miles (reckoning the return journey) was the rate of pay for war porters recorded in the Lundazi Annual Report for 1915-16'.

Frank Melland in his book, 'In Witch-bound Africa', devoted a section to 'the war record of the natives', which was, he said, 'a fact about which people at home are far too ignorant'. Melland considered the figures impressive enough to 'speak for themselves'.

'In 1915-18 it was estimated that there were 8,629 taxable males in the district, of whom 7,400 were able-bodied adults.

'In 1915 and up to September, 1916, the following did war-work: War transport, 4,163; six

months' work in Katanga (copper production), 932; total, 5,095; percentage of strong adults, 68 per cent. Meanwhile ordinary (civil) work was being carried on.

'In four months (to Feb. 28, 1917) 793 more worked on war transport, bringing that total to 4959.

'In the next twelve months the figures were:
War transport (three months' engagements), 1997; total months at work, 5,991; equivalent numbers in constant employment, 499.1, besides which 4,167 natives were civilly employed. From April to October, 1918, another 2,000 did three months' work. (In all these cases of three month's work an average of five weeks (additional) was spent going to and returning from work). The total number written on for war work, 1915-18, was 9,888 men.

'Add to this an average of 4,000 a year (16,000 in all) on civil work - one gets a total of about 26,000 males employed. Divide by 4 one gets 6,500 per annum out of 7,400 able-bodied adults. 164

Those men were described in various official reports as 'volunteers', indeed in the same way as migrant mine workers were often said to go south 'on their own initiative'. However, the Administrator, in his summary of military porterage, wrote thus to the High Commissioner: 'The knowledge that the power of compulsion was in the Administrator's hands...and was occasionally used were the real reasons' for the steady

164. Melland F.H., op.cit., p. 27.
supply of tengatenga men from 1914-1918. A month earlier, however, the Fort Jameson half-yearly report stated that 'the slackers of the sub-district have been well raided and a big proportion of the fit population has now been or is at the front'. The Serenje report mentioned that 12 men had been imprisoned, in 1918, for refusal to serve as military porters and recorded that 'seven villages and many individuals emigrated en masse to the Congo Belge early in 1919, owing to the vigorous recruitment of military porters at the end of 1918'. At an indaba at Mkushi, messengers were ordered to 'rope in' the required number of carriers. The consequences of such a massive and relentless drive were bound to be manifold.

The Company's official at Lundazi, in a report on the despatch of 2,400 to northern Nyasaland in 1917-18, described how 'the majority...who returned... were in a pitiable state of emaciation due to starvation or dysentery'. Out of the first 1,000, 37 had died while carrying their loads and 15 more on the journey home; 77 had been 'discharged unfit', one was 'left sick', five 'deserted' and three were 'unaccounted for'. Moreover, 'many deaths...took place within ten days of return to the village'. Were these included, the mortality would approach 10%. The Lundazi figures

165. NAZ: BS 3/436, Wallace to HC, 11/10/18. Underlining is mine; Hunton, op.cit., p.3, para. 5 (a,b,c).
for 1918-19 were 42 dead, 2 desertions and 28 missing, out of a total of 845 porters. When their men were away, women had to struggle to maintain life in the villages. While agricultural production dropped, wild animals closed in on the villages and Cookson reported from the Chipata district: '50 killed by lions in the areas of (chiefs) Kakumbi and Chuala alone'. Behind all these bald figures lay a passionate, if suppressed, reaction which now and then found expression. Chief Mpezeni was described by the Boma as having 'worked particularly hard to supply porters for the military forces', and this was noted by his people. An anonymous letter to him in 1918, which reached the Native Commissioner, warned that 'the blood of these men who have died at the war will cry Ha, Ha, Mpezeni, the war has finished because of you...you must be cohabiting with all the boys' wives there (since) their husbands have already gone to the war'. 166

The Company's men had already intercepted a message to people in the Fort Jameson area from 'the White Bird Church' sent by 'C.M. Zwimba to R.J. Chilwa' which declared that the war was really 'the coming of the Afrikan (sic) blessedness for the Lord has handed ...a weapon of conquering to the inhabitants of Afrika',

166. Hunton, op.cit., p.4, para 5(c); NAZ: KDG 1/11/1, P.C. Cookson to SNA, 21/11/18; Hunton, op.cit., p.4, para.5(d); NAZ: KDG 1/1/1, anon. letter to Mpezeni, undated.
and announced that the White Bird Church counted among its saints victims of the Ndebele 'Chimurenga' rising of 1896. In November 1914 John Chilembwe, whose 'rebellion' was to lead to his death, wrote a letter to the 'Nyasaland Times', in consequence of which the Government seized a number of copies of the paper. Chilembwe bewailed the fact that 'in time of peace everything (is) for Europeans only. And instead of honour we suffer humiliation with names contemptible. But in time of war it has been found that we are needed to share hardships and shed our blood in equality. It is true', he said, 'that we have no voice in this Government. It is even true that there is a spot of our blood in the cross of the Nyasaland Government'. 167 It would be unrealistic to imagine that there was no similar reaction in northern Zambezia.

The state of tension in the Zambezi-Luangwa confluence region was further increased in 1917 by the outbreak of armed rebellion in the northern districts of Mozambique. There was word of '6,000 natives... marching on Tete' in March, 'rebels' were mustering at Zumbo in April, and in August, armed bands attacked Chiwawa's village in the Peatuke district while 'looking

for their people who ran away...into this district for refuge, that they might kill them because they refused to join them and fight against their masters'. The Portuguese authorities were demanding the return of 'rebels' who had crossed the Zambezi but Cookson, the Provincial Commissioner, advised the N.C. at Petauke that the Company's administration was not able to order the refugees back into Mozambique. One local chief, Chiutika, who had thrown in his lot with the Mozambique rebels, wrote to 'Doglossi' Thornicroft at Petauke begging permission to return. 'I am now sorry because I left you, sir. I am in great trouble...Sir, the people here cannot stand against the whiteman. I saw the war, against Mpeseni. The people can do nothing'. The war in Mozambique had driven over 4,000 people into Southern Rhodesia as well by September 1917 and Sir Drummond Chaplin commented to the Colonial Office that 'a deputation came over from one of the leading chiefs in rebellion to Mloko's, the leader being allowed to meet Chaplin. 'He was quite clear as to their wants, stating that the treatment they received from the Portuguese was intolerable and asking if we could not go in and occupy the country'.

168. NAZ: KSY 1/2/1, Cookson to Thornicroft, Petauke, 30/3/17 and 20/4/17; report by Dama of Chiwowa, 30/8/17; Cookson to Thornicroft, 19/2/18; Chief Chiutica to Thornicroft, 3/5/17; PRO: CO 417/601, Chaplin's report on Portuguese 'Native Rebellion (Tete area)', 27/9/17.
As the World War ended, the R.N.L.B. reported that it had recruited in 1918 5,547 men from north of the Zambezi, as compared with 1,768 from Mozambique and 117 from the Bechuanaland Protectorate, and that there were at that time just under 10,000 men from Northern Rhodesia working in Southern Rhodesia who had been recruited by the Bureau. Only 288 had been enlisted by the R.N.L.B. for work in Northern Rhodesia. In an attempt to induce more men to undertake farm work along the railway line north of Livingstone and around Chipata, wages were increased from 12/6 to 15/- a month. The North-western Rhodesia Farmers' Association complained that a high proportion of the labour recruits stayed for short periods only, going back to their villages for the planting season. In the east, farm labourers were still being given 3/- for 30 working days in the dry season and 4/- in the wet season with 1/- for rations. This led the Resident Commissioner in Salisbury to advise the High Commissioner that scarcity of labour was due to low wages and not to the permit granted to the R.N.L.B. to recruit 2,000 men for the Rhodesian mines from the Chipata district. Cookson, the Magistrate at Fort Jameson, said that, because of war earnings, there was still 'plenty of money in the villages'.

At the same time, however, the Anti-Slavery Society in London heard from W.A. Sayer of Fort Jameson that the B.S.A. Company had 'imposed conditions on the Natives in the Eastern Luangwa which, if not actual and complete slavery, was not distantly removed from such'. Men were being seized by physical force for work on privately owned estates as well as by commercial employers and there was a 'compulsory levy on native food'. Sayer wanted 'an immediate enquiry by Parliament' and was prepared to help the Society in any way 'to right these wrongs'. Cookson, on hearing of his complaints, retorted that they were based on 'spleen and petty spite' because of Sayer's imprisonment for six months 'for a serious assault on a native youth'.

In 1920 there were further adverse reports on conditions on the Katanga mines, and on the reluctance of men from Northern Rhodesia to go there as they had 'not yet forgotten the high mortality rate which occurred in the Congo during 1916'. The 'Barotse' District recorded a marked resistance to recruitment for work in the south by the official agencies which made deductions from repatriated men for clothing and travel expenses. The R.N.L.B.'s statistics for this part of the territory were therefore low. In the east, the

Petauke Native Commissioner recorded 'alarm' consequent upon the increase of tax from 5/- to 10/-. 'Money earned in the war is now spent, the enormous increase in the prices of native trade goods in the local stores having made it go more quickly'. In consequence, 'many natives are now wearing skins and barkcloth instead of calico and print as formerly'. The N.C. confirmed this situation a year later, and also reported thus: 'In addition to the 1,329 natives...who have either engaged with the R.N.L.B. or taken out passes to leave the province, it is estimated that over 3,000 have either crossed Portuguese territory to Southern Rhodesia or gone to the railway during the year. Quite 70 per cent of the able-bodied male population are absent from the sub-district'. In answer to the complaints of missionaries about the loss of 'a large number of their adherents', Cartmell-Robinson the N.C. at Fort Jameson remarked that 'if a Mission would take up the teaching of useful trades it would be a real benefit to the District'. The quality of labourers was not improving, he added, and 'native employees are becoming more insolent and less inclined to work', possibly 'due to the inexperience in handling natives among the new settlers'. For it was now that the impact of the land settlement scheme for British ex-servicemen began to take effect. 171

By 1922, the two posts of Administrator for Southern and for Northern Rhodesia were held by the same man, Sir Drummond Chaplin, despite the fact that the two territories were soon to take divergent paths in terms of their constitutional relations with Britain. Inside the northern territory, however, such matters do not appear to have affected the continuing situation in respect of any of the features of foreign rule which we have been reviewing. For instance, official reports recorded how, in the Chilanga area, because labour had been more plentiful during the 1922-23 rainy season, 'wages therefore dropped to a very low figure'. For their part, men returning from labour in the south and elsewhere were evincing no desire to settle tax arrears. In a comment on this situation, the Secretary for Native Affairs asked whether it might not be advantageous to waive a portion of the tax arrears of repatriated workers. 'A labour migrant from the Congo with only 30/- in his pocket, though in arrear for five years, might ... be asked to pay only one arrear and the current tax, leaving him with something to show for his work and encouraging others to go and do likewise'. With tax at 10/- such a returning migrant would have been left with 10/- on this suggestion. The S.N.A.'s proposal only serves to remind us that, up to the end of B.S.A. Company rule, men were being pursued for tax in arrears no less than for current tax, and that after nearly twenty years of such conditions, the average labour
recruit returned with nothing to show for his labour. Thus it was generally only the foreign trader in the neighbourhood who gained economically from the extended operation of chibalo through the system of deferred pay. Thus too, tax defaulters were still 'hiding in the bush'.

Penal rigours also continued, as evidenced by a report from Balovale in 1923 that 'when prisoners are actually working on the station they are not now chained together unless they are known to be bad characters or come from wilder parts of the sub-district'. Another ostensibly ameliorative measure was meanwhile proposed by the District Commissioner. The taxation of plural wives and concubines should be abolished, the measure to be offset by increasing tax to 12/- on all adult males. The post-war years saw the continuation of tax raids as of recruitment which was still being done by unauthorised agents, as, for example, in the Luano valley in 1921. The R.N.L.B.'s determined policy of deducting the cost of blankets and return travel from their recruits was increasing local resentment. Meanwhile in the situation of drastic depopulation, where moreover 'an unexpectedly large supply of prison labour' enabled the local Commissioner to effect savings

on his expenditure, man-eating lions increased their activities in Lundazi, villages fell into grave disrepair and inflated prices at local stores were driving people back to bark-cloth and skins in places as widely separated as Petauke and Mwinilunga. Petauke and other parts of the eastern region experienced severe famine in 1923, people having to walk 60 to 80 miles in search of food and many deaths being reported, especially among the old and the young. 173

Zambian testimony concerning chibalo has been recorded over a large part of the country. In the Lundazi district it was said that, under chibalo, the people worked in severe conditions, 'sometimes under constant beating from their masters...The reason for forced labour was the deliberate refusal by people to volunteer themselves for work on the mines...It was like sending people to jail and after working for six months, one was released and returned home', Chiefs 'tried their best' to resist the demands of the recruiters but 'they were threatened by the settlers and sometimes beaten'. Another witness claimed that 'during the time of chibalo none of us had the courage to show resistance and so we

spent our nights in the bush...There was not much re-
sistance from our chiefs because on their arrival, they
(the B.S.A.C. men) brought so much terror and fear among
us that our chiefs feared the Boma administrators and
the people feared their chiefs. At any time, word
would be received: "Chief So-and-so, we want so many
people from you area for chibalo". The Chief then would
order his village headmen to find people at once. If
people refused to go, that was the end of village head-
manship, and the chief also had his power withdrawn...
Because of this, our chiefs became powerless and so
people suffered such humiliation without resistance.
Moreover when one did not have the money for tax, he
ended up in jail...And when one attempted to escape,
they came to arrest his wife and kept her under arrest
until the husband came out of hiding'. Recruitment for
war porterage was remembered as being even more vil-
ent. 'We saw the coming of the majoni (white soldiers) in
1914 and 1915. They travelled through the villages
grabbing chickens. We left our villages and spent
nights in the bush for fear of them. Each time they
arrived and found you, perhaps at a beer-party, they
would bundle you up and force you to go with them. And
if anyone resisted, this was to invite beating. This
led to a lot of us fleeing into the forest...They then
burned down the houses'. The Ngoni chief, Pikamalaza,
was employed by the R.N.L.B. but the people did not resent his role as he stood between them and the Bureau's white agents. 174

In the Kasama district, some witnesses said that chibalo recruits sometimes actually received no money as their wages were sent back to their Boma and applied to tax arrears. In Ila country, 'many men hated leaving their families at home while the wives hated seeing their husbands taken for forced labour', for there was much beating of those recruited. There was particular resentment felt by those who were forced to carry not only the district officials but their wives, children and pet dogs in machilas. On such work, men 'travelled long distances, usually on empty stomachs. The only food they ate was wild fruits, honey and wild animals plus a little mealie-meal which barely lasted for two days, while some journeys took more than a week'. It was work that 'could be likened to slavery'. There as elsewhere, the official would announce how many men he required and 'once chosen you had to go...It was the duty of messengers to make sure you went along. Normally those who resisted were tied with rope and then sjamboked'. In the Namwala district, some witnesses stoutly maintained that no payment in cash was made to

men conscripted, for instance, for work on roads. 'People had to use their own hoes and axes...As for food, they received only packets of salt which they could exchange for edible foodstuffs with the people in whose areas they worked'. A University of Zambia student researcher has written thus: 'Henry Mushoto Shandambu and Bernard Moonda remember very well the links that existed between the whites of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa with those of Northern Rhodesia. The whites in the south paid their colleagues to get labour for them...Some however went south voluntarily, thinking that in this way they would evade taxation. Stories are told of the "Bachoni", those who never returned. The reasons for not returning were the low wages they received...They were provided with free food and blankets, and very little money at the end of the month. They were promised that they would get their money in their districts on leaving employment. Those who came back didn't get the money. Some were just too poor and therefore too ashamed to come home...This was the nature of migrant labour'. 175

In the Mkushi district, around the Jesuit Mission at Ching'ombe, the harsh methods of messengers

175. KKF/UNZA/UNESCO Project 1973, paper by G.R. Mwale on Kasama district; and papers by J. Chuubi and E. Kalapula on taxation and forced labour in the Namwala district.
have been described by local witnesses. 'If they found someone ill, they insisted that he was pretending'. Those imprisoned were 'very many' and there was much beating. A number of messengers employed at the Mkushi Boma were local men who 'were equally slaves. What could they do about it? They knew that the same treatment would be meted out to them if they dared to refuse to carry out orders. They were doing the work for which they were paid'. Chaponda Kondowe at Chief Shikabeta's village has given his personal testimony as one who carried some of these white men in their machila. '...We used to face a lot of hardships when the white men visited our villages. They would set up a tent where the European would sleep, while we spent our nights in the cold and wet. He was fast asleep while we were drenched in the open. And if the rain put out the fire outside the tent, the following morning the messengers would...beat the men for having neglected their duties'. In the area of the Nsenga chief, Mbuluma, similar evidence has confirmed that men did not wish to go south for work but were intimidated both by musonko and by the fear that their wives would be arrested if they themselves went into hiding. 'The messengers never came in peace...If they came to a village and could find no man there for labour, they would arrest the headman and the Boma punished him'. In Zarupango village, near Katondwe Mission, Albino Ngulube and his neighbours have said that, though the coming of white
men brought certain good things like clothes, they could not regard their coming as 'a blessing, for they treated us like dogs'. As officials were carried in machilas, the porters would sing thus:

"Ngwa kalubangwe, ee,
Ngwa kalubangwe, chenjela".

"Be careful, The hawk is coming who will catch your chicks". 176

It may well be that conditions of recruited labour varied according to the disposition of the recruiting agent. Chief Shaibila of the Lala has recounted how, in his area, villages were not denuded, the agent always ensuring that some men remained. 'If there were twenty men in a chief's village and twenty women, they would pick ten and so leave thirty'. Nonetheless that meant removing half of the able-bodied men. Shaibila also recorded that men, returning with 'wealth such as suitcases', came to regret that they had at first fled from the recruiters and their attitude led others to decide to go to work voluntarily.

But Nansala Manyeta, who could recall the period before white men arrived in Serenje district, told how both Chief Serenje and Chief Mailo 'were greatly menaced' by the first Boma officials like Kennelly and Willis, and

176. RI/Ba Chisenga, Ching'ombe, 13/8/74; John Mwelwa, 13/8/74; Leo Chikambalala and others, Old Mkushi, 12/8/74; Shikabeta's Court, Rufunsa, 2/9/74; Tiki Mazyambe, Mbuluma, 4/9/74; Albino Ngulube and others Zarupango, 4/9/74.
in consequence chiefs became 'just mere kapitaos' of the B.S.A. Company. Though *chibalo* did not affect his area as much as it did elsewhere, recruiting for *tenge-tenga* work during the 1914-18 war did. Manyeta's testimony also recognised benefits of European action such as the ending of the Ngoni wars. 'That was a good thing to most of us', he said. 'However, they substituted this with a very bad form of slavery, that of recruiting people into forced labour'. Not far from Manyeta's home, another senior witness has said that, as a result of labour recruiting 'very small numbers remained in the villages, mainly old men, women and children, and this caused perpetual food shortage in the land'. Other witnesses in the Serenje district have indicated that *musonko* caused more direct suffering than *chibalo* which provided for some a chance to avoid penalties related to taxation. 177

Zambian informants have indicated that many men who earned money under *chibalo* had to pay the taxes of numerous relatives. Various testimonies also confirm that there was no way in which the people could bring their protests to the notice of the white officials because of the universal fear of their buns and their anger. 'Those English guns were terrible. Could you challenge them with your African muzzle-loader?'

177. RI/Chief Shaibila, Mkushi, 14/8/74; Nansala Manyeta, Chief Mailo, Serenje, 15/10/73; Zebron Sambwa 16/10/73; Noah Nsakulula, 16/10/73; Yakobe Lusuma, 16/10/73.
The coercive nature of B.S.A.C. operations has been confirmed by Boma messengers. A senior headwoman of a village in the Petauke area has said that there was nothing good done for the people under colonial rule. 'We were oppressed. Our men were forced to work for nothing and we used to cut grass for them without being given anything. This was just slavery'. All witnesses have confirmed that people regarded chibalo as 'forced' labour; Senior Chief Kalindawalo of Petauke telling how even a chief would be conscripted for porterage and only released when his people who had fled from the recruiters gave themselves up. Another senior chief of the Petauke district, Nyamphande, has stated that the number of men taken by chibalo and tengatenga work greatly exceeded that of those who stayed at home, thus confirming the Native Commissioner's figure of over 60% of the district's able-bodied men absent. In some areas women did not cut their hair until their men came back. In Mpezeni's area, the arrival of labour recruiters, like that of tax collectors, often sent people fleeing into the hills. Memories of war porterage tell of men carrying huge bags of rice and other heavy loads to the war front in the north, of hunger on the
way and of some carriers being killed by wild animals. 178

People who kept cattle appear to have felt the rigours of musonko and chibalo less severely than those whose economy was in agriculture only. This is probably why, in parts of the Lozi kingdom, local memories are less bitter, though the special relationship between King Lewanika and the B.S.A. Company, at which we have glanced earlier, was probably the major factor in lessening the severity of Company rule there. In parts of Lundazi, on the border with Malawi, cattle-owners could sometimes avoid chibalo by selling their beasts. But Samson Maphara, for example, recalled that 'a bull would sell for as little as £1.10/-' or the equivalent of three men's tax for one year in the post-war period. The demands of chibalo fell heavily on his area, despite the possession of cattle, and so 'very few people remained behind in the villages'. Moreover, there is very little evidence, recorded from Zambian witnesses, to suggest that chibalo was regarded as a benefit to individuals or communities. 'They used to go and work for six months and could only bring back one blanket...

178. RI/Headman Chilembwe, Petauke, 17/3/75; Head Messenger Meki Chisenga, Petauke, 18/3/75; Ex-messenger Mutantika Jamu, Shikabeta, 5/9/74; Headwoman Chongololo, Petauke, 17/3/75; Senior Chief Kalindawalo, Petauke, 15/3/75; Verishoni Tembo and others, Wanya Village, Chipata, 4/3/75; Headman Kuyenda Phiri, Katete, 12/3/75; Headman Sam Banda, Chadiza, 8/3/75; Headman Sangwe Mvula, Katete, 13/3/75; Sitambuli and others, Petauke, 19/3/75; Nkoko Phiri and others, Chadiza, 9/3/75; Headman Malata Mwanza, Petauke, 18/3/75; and see NAZ: KDG 8/1/3, Petauke Report, 31/3/23, (sgd. H.A. Sylvester, NC).
The couple would share this at night and the wife would use it to wrap round her body by day'. These memories of Ba Nakasese near Samfya on Lake Bangweulu gave a picture of women hurrying to prepare flour and non-perishable 'relish' for the husband's journey to the south or west and of general disappointment that their men came back with so little to show for their hard work. Though musonko was applied with great severity to villages on the islands in the Lake, the numbers recruited there for chibalo were fewer than elsewhere, presumably because of the difficulties of travel. But on Chilubi Island, people still vividly recall harsh conditions on the Katanga Mines and long journeys to Harare in Rhodesia. The keenest memories appear to be those of the early tax collectors, initial resistance crumbling before the white man's gun, whereafter, as informants at Mbilima village have said, 'The Europeans began herding the people like cattle'.

As we have noted above, the Northern and Luapula Provinces were most affected initially by the telegraph project and the intensive operations of the African Lakes Company and other traders. The mines

179. RI/Bo Njamba, Sinanga, 29/7/71; Mundia Siyoto, Kalabo, 31/7/71; Samson Maphara, near Emusa, Lundazi, 21/6/72; Ba Nakasese, Mushamba, Samfya, 19/11/74; Headman Kapumfi, Chilubi Island, 20/11/74; Headman Mbilima and others, Chilubi Island, 20/11/74.
of Katanga then began recruiting there as well as along the Congo border with the North-western Province. In 1919, a L.M.S. Missionary remarked that 'the call of the Congo is increasingly irresistible to both skilled and unskilled workers'. During the war, proximity to the battle front around Fife, Mbala and the Saise River intensified war porterage. In those areas memories of harsh language, frequent beating and the constant carrying of guns by white men and their African employees are as strong as elsewhere. Around Mweru Marsh, witnesses described long journeys to Rhodesia, with a group of men sleeping in a circle round their belongings for fear of theft. In the southern mines, men were forced 'to work like slaves from sunrise to sunset', having joined chibalo 'voluntarily' for fear of the penalties of tax default. At Chiengi, the northernmost point on Lake Mweru, the first appearance of white traders has been recalled by various senior people. Their sudden arrival in a village, the snatching of hens, the very low prices which they paid for local salt and other commodities have been recounted with strong feeling. Moreover, 'even if a man was attending the funeral of his father or mother or child, they would still pick him up' if they wanted his services. The same was done by tax collectors. Labour recruiting agents sometimes seemed to make a point of visiting villages when people were drinking and tempting the men with offers of a blanket for every 'volunteer'. On the farms and at
the mines, men so recruited 'were treated like tools'.
While European trade replaced traditional barter and
imported salt was priced much higher than the old local
product, game reserves were declared and anyone found
shooting in them for the pot was arrested. As else-
where, people at Chiengi declared that 'the Balungwana
(Arabs) were better, they simply came for trade'. '...
The Europeans brought tax but never cared for the people
from whom they got this money...They did not create
local opportunities for employment...For those lucky
enough to find work, wages were appallingly low. They
oppressed us terribly. If you paid a visit to a rela-
tive on the line of rail, they would come and arrest
you'. Many Zambian testimonies indicate clearly that
such conditions continued well beyond 1924. 180

We shall consider later on the effect of B.S.A.
Company rule upon the ownership and use of land. The
regulations relating to grouping of villages should,
however, be noted here in connection with the twin op-
erations of musonko and chibalo. In 1898, a traveller
had reported that the coming of white men had resulted
in both the virtual destruction of the authority of

180. CCWM, C.Af.Letters, Box 18, Turner, Mbereshi,
2/4/19; RI/Sikapite brothers, Lukashya, Kasama,
30/5/72; Headman Sumbi, near Kayambi Mission,
31/5/72; Ba Nakulu Songwe, Kamushini Mponda, Ba
Mayengo, Daniel Mwape and the Chief, at Mukupa
Katandula, 24-27/11/74; Kapungwe Semushi, William
Pyanga, London Mwape, Nsakwa and others, Chief
Puta's village, Chiengi, 23/11/74.
chiefs and the disintegration of villages into numerous small settlements. Four years later Codrington commented that by such dispersion 'the risk of famine is minimised, the spread of disease is checked and the population increases rapidly'; though 'tribal ties' and general control suffered. The name chisanka was widely used to describe the compulsory movement of people into large villages and the prohibition of small family settlements. B.S.A.C. men began to interfere from the start in the siting of villages. Leyer, a Collector in the Kasama district, quarreled with a local chief on this issue in 1900. Three years later Cookson formally forbade the movement of villages without permission of the administration. In 1906 he published a plan for village grouping. The reason for such action by Company agents was obvious. The collection of taxes and the enlisting of labour recruits would be facilitated by forcing people to live in larger communities. As we noted earlier it would appear that before the Company's annexation of northern Zambezia, people were wont to live in small settlements in times of peace while naturally congregating together in face of hostile neighbours. In 1906, the White Fathers at Kayambi noted Codrington's plan for such grouping of villages and how Chief Sumbi was 'busy gathering villages forcibly round himself'. At the same time, the Fathers at Kapatu recorded that the Collector, Miller, had effected the grouping of 50 small villages into 14 large
ones. In those years some Missions were organising new villages at their stations, under the care of headmen who conformed with the Church's discipline. Missionaries tended to favour the village grouping programme in the interests of school building. The policy was being applied extensively. In Serenje district, for example, at the time when Malcolm Moffat was establishing the Chitambo station of the Livingstonia Mission, the N.C. was engaged on a major campaign of regrouping. The programme, however, evoked considerable hostility among the people themselves. 181

The chisanka programme came somehow to the attention of the Colonial Office in 1913 and it fell to the High Commissioner to explain it to Whitehall. The 'confiscation and removal of unauthorised villages' was, he said, undertaken by Native Commissioners on the instructions of the Administrator and after consultation with chiefs and headmen. The main purpose was 'to check petty crime'. Chiefs and headmen were complaining that they now had no power to control people's movements 'whereas formerly such disobedience would have been severely punished, constant disobedience

181. See pp. 494 ff. below; Geographical Journal Vol. 13 no. 6, 1899, p. 584, in article by Capt. F.F.R. Boileau on the Nyasa-Tanganyika Plateau; PLG: BSA 8/64, NER Report, 31/3/02; WF, Chilubula, 18/3/00, 25/5/03; Kayambi, 23/5/06, Kapatu, 1/10/06; Chilubula, 2/8/06; CCWM C.Af.Letters, Box 1, report on Kambole Mission village, 1900; Box 13, Report of LMS District Committee on 'mission villages', 10/7/05; RI/Yakobe Lusuma, Muchinka, Serenje, 16/10/73; Benjamin Mpande, Kalwa, Serenje, 19/10/73.
with death'. Wallace, the Administrator, therefore planned to follow the example of North-eastern Rhodesia and 'to forbid the indiscriminate spreading out of villages without the consent of their chiefs...by destroying if necessary the temporary ramshackle shelters they erect whenever they live in this manner in the bush'. Moffat Thomson meanwhile had reported, from Ndola district, that the destruction of such settlements had been done 'with chiefs and headmen present who appear grateful' and 'family villages will not in future be tolerated'.

Two weeks after the High Commissioner had written to London, a letter was written to him by Father J. Torrend, a Jesuit missionary in charge of a station called Kasisi, not far to the east of Lusaka. 'The most painful experience I have ever had in my life', said Torrend, 'is...that of finding myself in conflict with a British administration with regard to the law stopping Africans moving. The High Commissioner's law on the subject is, I suppose, the following: "13. District Headmen shall prevent the settlement of fresh villages or the removal of existing villages...without the consent of the Native Commissioner". My contention is that this law is misinterpreted when taken to mean,

it does: (a) that it deprives old men of the right they have enjoyed from time immemorial of freely shifting their huts together with those of their natural following, within the limits of the ground still belonging to their own tribe... (b) that it deprives married couples of the right of shifting from one particular village to another when life has become impossible for them in the first; (c) that the settling "near me" or "near a Church" of a married couple of this district is henceforth to be conditional upon the goodwill of a Native Commissioner'. The local N.C. had spoken of "exigencies of the Census Register". 'Can these exigencies be satisfied', Torrend asked, 'without making our natives practically the slaves of the Native Commissioner?' Torrend's appeal to the High Commissioner had been provoked by an angry reply from V.R. Anley, the Assistant Native Commissioner, to his first protest. Anley had described the move of Litongola and eight companions close to Kasisi Mission as such a 'glaring case' that he had sought permission from Livingstone to burn their huts down within four weeks time from now'. Torrend had told Anley his action would be 'tyranny and savagery unheard of in Bantuland' and asked: 'From whom did you buy these slaves? Even a slave master thinks twice before burning the huts of his slaves'.

As Acting Administrator, McKinnon informed the priest that it was difficult to detect crime when people lived 'in small hamlets by themselves'. As the law forbade such settlements the N.C. was 'only carrying out the laws of the land'. In reply, Torrend described Litongola as 'a grey-haired man...recognised by every native I know as a lawful head of an independent community...(who) has his own call-them altars. Your Honour calls that a case of "breaking away from tribal control". Let me reject that...as emphatically as I can'. If 'the law of the land' could be 'so interpreted as to make a grey-haired man and his following the bond-slaves of the Native Commissioner, that interpretation', said Torrend, 'was far away from the mind of the King when he gave his consent'. The depth of Torrend's feelings was further revealed thus: 'May I be allowed to tell Your Honour what I suspect when certain white people speak of crime in small hamlets like Litongola's or of the necessity of huddling the natives...into reserves or locations or big kraals? I suspect some of them have an eye upon certain springs occupied by small hamlets and would like to find "the law" quite favourable to replacing these by isolated farms or cattle ranches'. Litongola's settlement was beside a good spring which also served 'fields for early crops'. 'It is a fact', said Torrend, 'that several white people have an eye on this spring'. In the fierce correspondence that followed the Administrative Secretary censured
the missionary's 'discourteous tone', and McKinnon dismissed as 'grotesque' Torrend's belief that large villages increased the problem of tsetse fly. The Resident Commissioner said he could not sanction the forcible removal of Litongola from his settlement near Kasisi. The High Commissioner had recently received word from Harcourt, the Colonial Secretary, which may well have influenced him in this matter. 'The native is naturally gregarious', Harcourt had written, 'and does not desert a village without reason; and I should wish to be satisfied as to the efforts made to ascertain and remove the causes that are driving the natives into the bush before I can accept the view that a resort is justified to this forcible manner of driving them back to their villages'.

Thus overruled, McKinnon recorded his conviction, after twenty-two years' experience, that it was essential 'for the protection of the natives themselves ...to prevent them becoming mere handfuls of landless units and...practically homeless'. We shall look later at the matter of African land tenure under the Company's rule. Here it is worth noting that McKinnon went on to attack Torrend on personal grounds. 'His mode of

184. Ibid: A.Admin. to Torrend, 22/10/13; Torrend to A.Admin., 29/10/13; R. Goode, Admin.Secy., to Torrend, 13/11/13; McKinnon to HC, 27/12/13; Res.Comm. (Burns-Begg), to HC, 9/1/14; and HC to McKinnon, 27/2/14; Col.Secy., to HC, 10/1/14.
living cannot have an educative influence on the natives'. The local District Commissioner was quoted as saying that Torrend used his church building as a grain store and was "far more of a trader than a missionary". Moreover "the portion of the building inhabited by himself was in an indescribable state of filth and squalor. His only servants were about four or five native boys of not more than ten or twelve years...clothed in little but dirty rags'. Father Moreau of Chikuni Mission then dissociated the Jesuit Order from Torrend's 'doings, sayings and writings' and four months later the High Commissioner agreed that settlements around Kasisi should not be encouraged. Once again, as in the case of McNamara, which we noted earlier, who became an agent of R.N.L.B. on leaving the direct service of the B.S.A.C., the conclusion of the matter appeared to favour those who treated the local communities as conquered people. Moreover the ambivalent role which the situation forced upon certain senior missionaries demonstrated how difficult it was for them to be spokesmen of the people they had come to serve while at the same time being subject to a regime that was primarily based, not on 'protection', but on conquest.

185. Ibid: McKinnon to HC, 28/3/14; quoting DC's report; Fr. Moreau to Admin., 2/2/14; HC to Admin., 6/6/14; and see NRJ, III, 5, 1958, p. 419 for ref. to McNamara as RNLB's 'well-known' agent at Livingstone.
The same dilemma had been illustrated as early as 1899 in the L.M.S. field at the south end of Lake Tanganyika when a missionary who refused to cooperate with Boyd, the local Collector, was suspended and the Mission's District Committee noted the ruling from their London headquarters that 'if missionaries...are working in territory under the rule of a Civilised Power, the administration of justice should be left entirely to the civil authorities'. At that time, the Resident Magistrate at Ikawa (Fife) was Charles McKinnon. In 1907, another missionary at Niamkolo clashed with the local Native Commissioner over the compulsory removal of the people to the hills on account of the threat of sleeping sickness. Canoes had been 'stolen' by the Administration, he said, and no compensation had been offered for the loss of homes, fields, etc. Moreover, he had to pay a fine of 7/-, under protest, to effect the release of his 'boy John' whom the N.C. had arrested 'because he did not report himself at the Boma when passing'. John 'while unconvicted of crime' had been 'fastened to an askari and led about the country in that condition as a criminal of the deepest dye'. In the ensuing encounter, the Administrator told Wright: "You are unsupported by your Committee", while Wright expressed shock that 'the members of the Committee stand by a hard cruel and adulterous man (Miller, the N.C.) and be opposed to an ambassador of Christ in his efforts "to relieve the oppressed"'. The correspondence
revealed the missionary's opposition to the Company's practices in general. 'In 1907 your Kapitao Godfrey arrived here', he told the Magistrate at Abercorn, Hugh Marshall, 'and roped together a number of men for non-payment of taxes. In the gang was a blind man, one lame and several so old that I do not see how they could have walked to Abercorn. Fortunately I met them on the road and promptly cut them free'. Wright accused the officials of 'a travesty of justice'.

Sleeping sickness was bad again in 1912 and particularly so in the Luangwa basin. The Magistrate at Abercorn, on a visit to Kawimbe Mission, privately expressed his anger at the news that, despite the epidemic, labour recruiting for Southern Rhodesia was being intensified in the Fort Jameson and neighbouring districts and that the doctor at Abercorn had been withdrawn so that he could examine recruits going south. Meanwhile in the Northern Province, Robertson of Kawimbe reported that 'so many hundreds have gone South, North and West that the country is being rendered almost destitute of labour'. Nutter of Mbereshi Mission wrote to London thus: 'Just across the river is the Congo and there high wages and iniquity are the order: and

186. CCWM: A.Afr. Letters, Box 8, correspondence on suspension of Rev. Percy Jones, Niamkolo, 15/5/99; Box 14, R.S. Wright, Niamkolo, 8/12/08, 22/12/08, 22/6/09, encl. his letter to Marshall. Phrase in brackets is mine.
a little further away is Southern Rhodesia with very much the same kind of attractions'. The missionaries noted that 'facts' about the labour situation were being 'kept secret' not only from them but from the farmers and even from the B.S.A. officials. Some recruiters were 'crying out about it'. However, since they and the Company's men had 'to get their bread and butter out of finding labour for the south', they were 'not at liberty to divulge what it actually means nor to do anything to lead to its suppression'. An artisan missionary at Mbereshi made this comment on the endless migration towards distant places of employment: 'The Central African's ideal is at present a very definite one - to wear European clothes. Both trousers and hats and coats at one stroke make him feel transported into a firm civilization. Ah! Carlyle's philosophy of clothes - how true, how irrevokable!'\(^{187}\)

Missionary and government reports in the last decade of the B.S.A.C. rule give a picture of widespread hunger and of situations in which adverse weather conditions could bring about famine, against which, however, the Administration took virtually no measures. Instead, labour recruiting continued relentlessly, reinforced by increased musonko rates, the pressures reaching their

\(^{187}\) Ibid: Box 15, Robertson, Kawimbe, to LMS, London, 26/2/12, 18/5/12, 23/8/12; Nutter, Mbereshi, 15/8/12; and Turner, Mbereshi, 30/8/12, referring presumably to Thomas Carlyle's 'Sartor Resartus'. Underlining is mine.
peak during the World War. In 1916, a missionary, at
the L.M.S. station at Kyengwa, told how he had advised
the mission teachers to concentrate on cultivation 'until
the middle of May when they are forced to cease as the
ground is then hard'. But the N.C. then wrote to him
to say that, as 2,000 men were required for war porter-
age in less than a week's time, the teachers should stop
working for the Mission 'as he needed every man and
youth in the country'. In the post-war period there
was 'a terrible shortage of cash of all kinds...and all
employers including the government' had to 'resort to
"chits"', a shortage that would only be lessened by the
next tax collection. The L.M.S. missionary in charge
of Kambole station expected to find that many teachers
were 'in prison...as tax defaulters', thus adversely
affecting the work of education. Fifteen years earlier,
the White Fathers had spoken of the effects of taxation
as 'la misere noire' and mentioned the related pheno-
menon of widespread hunger around Kayambi Mission, for
instance, where recruiters from the Transvaal were
already hunting for labour not far south of the Tanga-
yika border. 188

It is not easy to assess in statistical terms
the impact of labour migration on northern Zambezia as

188. Ibid: Box 17, Walter Draper to L.M.S., London,
8/4/16; W.G. Robertson, 9/11/20 and 3/2/21; and
WF: Kayambi, 6/12/06 and 25/12/06.
a whole, for lack of adequate population census returns. It is clear, however, from the data we have set out above, that the areas off the line of rail and those regarded as unsuitable for European farming were most severely affected. Professor Audrey Richards said in 1935, for instance, that 'the poverty of the soil and the absence of railway communications has prevented European farming and the Bemba country can therefore be classed as a labour reserve for the industrial and mining developments of Northern and Southern Rhodesia'. She could well have included Katanga for which 54,573 men from North-eastern Rhodesia and 4,924 from the rest of the territory were recruited between 1914 and the end of 1925 for the Union Minière alone. Two years after the end of B.S.A.C. rule, the S.N.A. advised managers of mines in Northern Rhodesia to look first to the Fort Rosebery (Mansa), Luwingu, Kasama, Mpika, Serenje, Ndola, Kasempa, Solwezi and Mankoya (Kaoma) districts for labour, to which Mwinilunga, Balovale (Zambezi), Kalabo and Petauke might be added later - most of these being among the list of districts which Acting Governor Dundas would name in 1937 as 'uneconomic areas' in which taxation should be reduced. The Northern Rhodesia mines were still embarrassed by the annual drawing off of around 20,000 men to Southern Rhodesia and 10,000 to Katanga in the post-1924 period. By 1946, according to Lord Hailey, the Report of the Central African Council on Migrant African Labour
stated that Northern Rhodesia had 270,000 able-bodied males', of whom 180,000 were employed away from their villages and in work other than local agriculture; but the N.R. Annual Report on African Affairs for the same year recorded that 179,633 or 66% of a total of 377,935 taxable males were engaged on work other than cultivation for the feeding of the local population. 189

The specimen data on labour migration and the operation of chibalo, which we have reviewed above, confirm the picture provided by our material on musonko, namely, that the B.S.A. Company, which directly benefited from the prosperity of the mining and commercial enterprises in its territories in southern and central Africa, was consistently determined, through the whole of its thirty-four years of rule, to exploit northern Zambezia maximally as a reserve for cheap labour. In doing so, it acted as the unchallenged conqueror of the territory and was able to turn aside the misgivings of the Colonial Office and the documented memoranda of its opponents with confidence. Because it had come to subjugate and to exploit, the Company was only minimally concerned with the welfare of the local population, as

189. Richards A.I. 'The Bemba of North-eastern Rhodesia' in 'Seven Tribes of Northern Rhodesia', ed. Colson and Gluckman (Manchester 1951) p. 165; NAZ: 1/9/18/43/1, R. Williams and Co., to SWA 2/12/25; 1/0/18/3, correspondence, SNA and Mining Companies' Conference, Broken Hill, 16/11/26 and SNA to Cs, 14/6/29; and Hailey 'Native Administration in British African Territories' (HMSO 1950), p. 78.
long as the flow of labour recruits continued. Not only, therefore, was the land undeveloped except by white farmers for their own profit, but from the outset other natural resources were vigorously sought by traders and hunters without regard for the local economy. In 1892, the White Fathers at Mambwe recorded that an English trader called Crasschay (sic) whom the people called Mulozi, the Sorcerer, burned Chelesya village when the people did not provide him with a cow and some goats and slaughtered all the animals there before moving on. In 1900 Robert Codrington recorded that numerous traders had moved into the country and were 'rapidly denuding it of cattle, ivory and rubber'. Indeed, the beginnings of European trade in northern Zambezia were marked not by the traders' gestures of goodwill towards their potential local customers, but by numerous open conflicts and acts of violence. Val Gielgud testified to this in 1902: 'Threats of violence on the part of the white man, lies and insolence are part of his (the kapitao's) stock in trade, and although his white master would perhaps not instruct him to use such methods, he ...is quite content to shut his eyes...so long as trade is good'. Yet traders prospered, as in Fort Rosebery (Mansa), where most of the £5,000 brought back in 1905 by a large number of returning miners went to them.190

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190. WF: Mambwe, 21/11/92; PLG: BSA 8/20, Codrington to CS, 4/4/00; NAZ: BS 1/93, Gielgud to Admin., NER, 2/4/02; KDF 3/1, Fort Rosebery Report 1905 (folio 341). Phrase in brackets is mine.
As we have seen, some of the Company's agents were paternalistic men who, like Theodore Williams and Frank Melland, were troubled by the social consequences of the conquerors' actions. Colin Harding wrote sadly in 1903 that 'the charm of governing natives is gone as soon as they in any numbers leave. They leave their country as ignorant and tiresome children but return as offensive and often rebellious men who disregard the word of their own chiefs and ignore the word of the authorized authority of their own country, having learnt...all the vices of civilization without its redeeming influences'. King Lewanika was concerned because 'a large number never return'. Nonetheless, the recruiting drive was systematically intensified, the N.W.R. Administration confirming in 1907 that tax defaulters were sent to Southern Rhodesia and expected to pay tax arrears on their return. The death rate among recruits to Southern Rhodesia from N.W.R. was 43 per 1,000 in 1908-09, and Coxhead reported in respect of North-eastern Rhodesia that recruitment procedures and conditions were 'very unsatisfactory', with 16% of the 1,814 recruits dying in the first year of direct recruiting by the Southern Rhodesia Government which had taken over the work of the R.N.L.B. in his territory. While 'plausible scoundrels' were luring men into work as carriers for East African hunting expeditions, Coxhead admitted that work in the south was 'extremely unpopular'. Since tax payment was so essential a part of the admini-
stratification, Native Commissioners thus had to 'strike a happy mean' between 'inflicting obvious hardship' and 'exercising unnecessary leniency of which many natives are only too ready to take advantage'. In 1912 the N.C. Lundazi offered an abortive plan to compel men to leave financial provision for their families and for musonko before going away to work; though he noted that '50% of the deceased estates' of migrant workers were 'marked nil', which made him think that 'the amount of money brought back by repatriates was not excessive'.191

The 'Livingstone Mail' is an important source for information as to European attitudes to the situation north of the Zambezi from 1906 onwards. When Codrington mooted a plan for basic artisan training of Africans in 1907, the 'Mail' raised the question whether the country was 'to become entirely a white man's country or...a native dependency in which the whites will be the governing and directing class only, as in India?'

Since health conditions did 'not admit of sustained manual labour on the part of a white man', the 'Mail' tended to favour Codrington's idea. This provoked a sharp reaction from those who wanted 'to hear no more about Black Mechanics', and believed that 'the introduction of skilled native labour' would end the happy

position whereby the territory was 'free from a native problem'. Leopold Moore, the 'Livingstone Mail's' proprietor, openly defended musonko as a means of obtaining labour, but objected to the claims of Southern Rhodesia and the Transvaal on labour from the north and believed that the raising of the hut tax to 10/- was 'a frightful blunder', as it would mean raising 'native wages'. The 'Mail' welcomed the proclamation establishing the R.N.L.B. as a check on the activities of any 'touts' whose business was merely 'to deliver so many natives, like cattle, to the mine manager who employs him'. However, a cautionary note was sounded about lack of 'respect' for white traders by their black customers. 'A legitimate trader is one who does not forget that he is a white man', said one correspondent. Moore was further shocked by Winston Churchill's suggestion that Indians should be offered 'a compensating field' in equatorial Africa. 'The Law of Nature would postulate the subjugation of the conquered, stern repression as occasion demanded and intelligent restriction of their claims where...in conflict with those of the...conquering race'. The issue of compensation was therefore, in his view, irrelevant where white men had conquered. 192

192. 'Livingstone Mail', 13/3/07, 20/7/07 (letter from W. Eddle), 27/7/07, 10/8/07 (letter from 'The Colonel'), 12/10/07, 21/12/07, 10/1/08.
The people for whom Leopold Moore spoke were highly critical of the suspension, in 1908, of the 'pass law...under which every boy was bound to produce his pass and, if found loafing, was promptly dealt with.' They were angered by utterances of the General Missionary Conference, a body composed of 'foreigners...quite uninfluenced by the Imperial Idea'. Though the missionaries' plea for a grant from the Company for educational work was 'logical', this must not happen until the education of white children was financially supported by the Administration. Moreover, said Moore, 'the natural inferiority of the native cannot be abrogated by appeal to altruistic philosophy'. However, a report of starvation in the Kalomo-Kafue area following a drought was adduced as support for the paper's opposition to the increase in musonko which might well 'have caused the dearth of food'. Avoiwedly on grounds other than humanitarian, the 'Mail' believed it was 'bad policy to allow starvation to stalk through the land' since manpower for labour in European employment was 'one of the assets of the country'. Consistently, Moore opposed plans to direct all labour recruits from North-eastern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to the rail-head. The proposal would not end the Railway's operational deficit but would merely raise the cost per head of labour above the current figure of 10/- Moreover, the 'Livingstone Mail' had no compunction about forced labour, for 'to leave the native in the veld...is to leave him to
degenerate into a prolific nuisance. To force him to work is only to assimilate his condition to those of the white man'. This view echoed that of the Company's Director, Philip Lyttelton Gell, who had hotly contested the issues of musonko and chibalo with a Liberal Member of the British Parliament. To Markham's comment that no civilized government 'forces the inhabitants to labour in mines against their wish for the benefit, not of themselves but of a speculative company', Gell had retorted that 'the principle of compulsory service to the State is disowned only by Anarchists'.

We have noted that the number of labour recruits taken from North-eastern Rhodesia to work south of the Zambezi far exceeded the number drawn from the North-west. Yet a spokesman of the white farmers in the 'railway belt' declared in 1911 that 'the Bureau is bleeding Northern Rhodesia for the benefit of Southern Rhodesia'. By the beginning of 1914 the Administration in Livingstone was being encouraged to resist pressure for the abrogation of regulations against 'outing'. But as the World War ended, Bishop May declared: 'In all the districts that I know there is hardly a single

193. Ibid: 25/7/08; 16/5/08 and 5/2/10 comment on the Venables-McNamara issue.

194. PLG: BSA 7/155-6: Gell to A.B. Markham, M.P., 17/4/03 and Markham to Gell, 21/4/03.
native of the younger generation who does not...set out from his village in search of European employment...and large numbers return to it again and again'. Forced labour, he said, was tantamount to the methods of 'Huns and decadents'. The 'Livingstone Mail', having stated that it did not concern itself with 'native affairs', gave virtually no place to opinions which purported to speak for the African population. In 1919 however there appeared a letter, signed 'Freedom Hoper' which said that the B.S.A. Company had as its 'sole aim to exploit the natives and to enlarge the pockets of its shareholders'. Over a year later, another pseudonymous writer advocated a programme of aided education for Africans despite the fact that it would 'affect cheap labour adversely'. The writer then quoted Sir Lawrence Wallace as lamenting that "the Administrator is less well understood and less well loved" by natives today than...in the early days', adding that action must be taken to 'make the native see the benefit of our rule by giving him something tangible or we will not escape Nemesis'.

In the years following the end of the World War, there was a considerable stirring of humanitarian sentiment in Britain and Europe and colonial administrations

195: 'Livingstone Mail', 14/10/11, letter by A.A. Willis; 27/2/14; 13/12/18, statement by Bishop May; 11/4/19, 9/9/20 and 21/10/20, letters by 'Vox Clamantes'.
came under renewed scrutiny. Forced labour in East Africa was focussed in particular and the 'Livingstone Mail' carried a reference to 'the new slave policy' there. An East African Governor revealed the historical contradiction of British imperial practice by pleading the necessity now 'to combine the progress and prosperity of the Protectorate with the welfare of the natives' - objectives which should have been synonymous - thus confirming that what had been being 'protected' hitherto was something other than the well-being of indigenous peoples. In many cases, the critical comments of British churchmen were influenced by two cautionary notes. Firstly, they believed that conditions in British overseas possessions were better than in territories ruled by other European powers. German Tangan­ nyika, the Belgian Congo and the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique, by which Northern Rhodesia was bounded, were all regarded as crueller places than the B.S.A. Company's domain. Secondly, attention had to be paid to the emphasis laid by colonial administra- tors on labour as a cure for idleness. The Anti-Slavery Society was therefore impressed by an extract from a report by Sir Frederick Lugard on administration in Nigeria which said, _inter alia:_ "Government policy being radically opposed to coercion in any form...will not employ it in order to procure labour for private undertakings. Employers must, therefore, make the conditions sufficiently attractive to secure the labourers
they need. To effect this high wages are not necessary and they are to be deprecated... (as) an injury to the development of the country. Labour will be secured only by kind and fair treatment, decent hutsments, the entire absence of blows and rough usage, and the facilities already described". The weight of evidence available to missionaries and their British headquarters confirmed, however, that forced labour was prevalent in British African territories to such an extent as to contradict the principles of 'trusteeship' which had come into common parlance in the early years of the League of Nations. 196

It was probably true that, as the well-known African Christian, Dr J.K. Aggrey of the Gold Coast (Ghana), told a British Missionary Conference in 1921, he was able to 'preach cooperation in Sierra Leone, in Nigeria, the Gold Coast, the Camerouns and in the Belgian Congo,' whereas in Portuguese West Africa 'the only thing I could preach was heaven: they had nothing to live for but heaven. Sometimes work on the roads extends to six months instead of (the officially stated) twenty-eight days. They have no pay, they have to feed themselves and use their own tools... The conditions

196. 'Livingstone Mail', 21/10/20; USPG, C2, memo by H.E. Sir Edward Northey, 21/10/19; A1 (XXVIII, Bishop May's papers) extract from Anti-Slavery Society pamphlet 'What is slavery?' by Lord Cromer, citing Lugard's Report, p. 44, para. 107; memo on 'Native Affairs in the East African Protectorates', submitted to HMG by the Conference of British Missionary Societies, 24/5/21.
are awful; the women are not safe and the men are being practically crushed and killed'. 197 Nevertheless, as we noted earlier, critical comment in Northern Rhodesia at the end of our period revealed a system of pervasive injustice and exploitation; a situation that had continued unchecked since the net of perfidy was cast over the Lozi King and the other major African states of northern Zambesia succumbed to the devastating power of the Maxim gun and the Martini rifle. As late as 1919, a High Court Judge, presiding over the trial of some members of the Watchtower sect, wrote thus of the trial: 'Nearly all were young...It was a disquieting thing for the future...the old words, obedience to elders and headmen and chiefs, obedience to the Boma, had lost their meaning, one realised the delicate and fragile nature of our hold over these people and...saw the abyss opening'. The Judge, remote from the passions of the 'common man' as foreign rulers are bound to be, believed that British administration had been hitherto 'a rule over a willing people, above all over a non-critical one'. Now, he feared, it might 'become a rule over a highly critical people, sceptical of our intentions, distrustful of all we do'. 198


At the beginning of the century, the London 'Westminster Review' had carried a comment on 'the four chief colonial powers'. 'Great Britain', it said, 'leads both in regard to number and area as well as to population: the total number of her possessions being 52, their area 11,187,000 square miles and their population 356,781,000'. France, Germany and Holland followed in that order. 'The total imports of the British colonies amount to £215,000,000 annually. Great Britain by supplying 42% of this instead of 15% (which she averages in the commerce of other countries) makes an additional market for £58,000,000 of her products...thus increasing by 25% her total exports and creating by her colonial system a market for nearly 300,000,000 dollars worth of her products and manufactures'. The journal went on to comment thus on what was popularly called 'the native question', with regard to which there had recently been 'a marked deterioration': 'Owing probably to the increase of speculation, gold mining, diamond mining and the extending and strengthening of the purely commercial spirit, the native has come to be regarded, not as "an end in himself", as Kant would say, but primarily as a means for the production of wealth or profit for others'. 199 Chibalo in northern Zambezia, like musonko, cannot be understood otherwise than as the instrument of a vast commercial

199. MMS: cutting (undated but presumably around 1900) from 'Westminster Review', with ref. to a phrase used by the philosopher Immanuel Kant.
enterprise subtended by subjugation sufficiently decisive to enable its exploitative designs to be fulfilled.

The comment of Chief Jumbe at an indaba at Fort Jameson in late 1923 was thus recorded, without contradictory comment by a Company official: 'On all the farms they are beaten by the white men. 4/- and 1/- posho is not sufficient'. Moreover, as we have been remarking above that the rule of the B.S.A. Company north of the Zambezi cannot be distinguished in essence from its rule in the south, it is also true that the effects of chibalo in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia were intrinsically the same. The following notes, written in reference to the report of the Committee set up in Nyasaland in 1935 to study emigrant labour are therefore pertinent to our review: 'We have become more and more aware that this uncontrolled emigration brought misery and poverty to hundreds and thousands of families and that the waste of life, happiness, health and wealth was colossal - a flagrant breach of that ideal trusteeship...Complete failure of the pass system...No record of exodus'. A senior chief in the Mpika district made a passionate plea, ten years after direct B.S.A. Company rule ended, which underlines the aptness of the above comment to the Zambian situation: 'There are many taxes for people to pay. 10/- is the tax for all men...A man with a gun must pay 3/-. A man with a bicycle must pay 3/6. Our people go to the mines to look for work...and become weak and ill from hunger.'
On their way home they die of hunger because they have no money to find food on the journey...To earn money a man must stay away for many months. His wife is left with no one to cut (trees in preparation) for her garden. Then there is hunger in the village too...The lives of the people are spoiled and all our people are unhappy'.

(d) **Intimidation and the 'Rule of Law'**

Early comments by British visitors to northern Zambezia varied much more than the casual observer might imagine. A number of them, however, which came from agents of Rhodes's Company portrayed situations in which justice and law were in short supply. The extreme measures taken, for instance, by Chitimukulu of the Bemba against both his captured enemies and offenders within his kingdom were recorded by missionaries, traders and B.S.A.C. men alike. The despotic rule of Mpezeni of the Ngoni was also adduced in defence of the action planned for the subjugation of his kingdom. Among less cohesive or despotic societies, people were conceived of as living in a condition akin to anarchy.

Val Gielgud said of the Ila communities in the area of the Hook of the Kafue that 'in nearly every case a savage race is inclined to accept the rule of the white man as a relief from the despotism of their own rulers';

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for he said, among the Ila, government 'which is no
doubt the same as exists in any troop of baboons', was
merely the domination of 'the older, stronger or more
cunning' member of the community. Numerous examples
could be adduced to show that on both sides of the
Zambezi, spokesmen of the white conquerors assumed that,
given sufficient physical superiority to 'keep the native
in his place', it was not either obligatory or desirable
to refer to 'civilized' ideas of law. A veterinary
officer who put on paper his memories of the country
around the nineteen forties, made this comment on colo-
nial justice: 'During my first months I was told never
to explain anything to "Jim Fish". Tell the munt what
to do and see that he does it. If he doesn't, kick
his backside. It is the only language he understands'".201
As late as 1952 there was comment in the 'Northern News'
on the white man's 'right' to 'flog one's nigger'.

The importance for us of such data, in this re-
view, concerns the light they shed on concepts of justice

201. E.g. NAZ: BS 1/43-44, Codrington on Bemba, 15/6/99; Macpherson, op.cit., p. 34, citing letter of James Henderson of Livingstonia to fiancee, 14/5/96 (see Balantyne M.M.S. and Shepherd R.H.W. (eds.) 'Fore-runners of Modern Malawi' (Lovedale 1958), p. 159; Maugham Report, op.cit., Appendix Item 28, Warton to Forbes, 2/4/96; Item 31, Johnston to FO, 14/7/96; NAZ: SEC/MG/13, memo on BSAC 'mineral rights', quoting letter of V. Gielgud, 21/4/01; RH:Mss.a. 1315, Guilbride P., 'Paw-Paw Picnic' (undated MS), Chap. I, p. 12, 'by permission of
the author); NN, 24/4/52; and see also Cairns, op.cit., for a major study of such attitudes prior to 1900.
in the minds of the conquerors and of those over whom they took control in such a way that no authority could have precedence over theirs in any matter in which they saw fit to take action. Joseph Chamberlain's opinion in 1903 had been that there should be as little interference as possible 'with the native dynasties where their administration is at all tolerable' for 'the natives can work out their own salvation better in the expansion of their own institutions than by having ours suddenly forced upon them'. This outlook, which was to be echoed to a considerable extent twenty years later in Lugard's doctrine of indirect rule, implied a minimal intrusion upon African political and social structures and systems of law. On such a subject, as on others, Sir Harry Johnston had written this persuasive passage in 1898: 'It was theoretically supposed that justice to natives only was administered by native chiefs, but in reality the native courts are practically held by British magistrates in the name of the local chief or as his representative, for over most of the districts the native chiefs have surrendered to us by treaty their justiciary rights'. Johnston had elsewhere commented on the 'very clear sense of justice' characteristic of 'the negro', adding - with reference to the situation in the Shire Highlands - that 'Fortunately, now the native begins to understand that, if his European employer does not treat him fairly, he had redress at the hands of the nearest official'. In 1904, Coryndon,
the Administrator, told Lewanika that 'courts of Justice' would soon be established in which the judge would be guided by 'native laws and customs' in cases between black people. However, 'if your laws are against the Laws of England, the Judge...would judge by the Law of England as if the people before him were Europeans'. 202

We shall consider later the impact of B.S.A. Company rule upon the authority of chiefs. Here what concerns us is the administration of justice and the dispensing of penalties, and therefore we must note that from the outset, as we have seen, flogging was in constant use by Company officials and their messengers and *askari* all over northern Zambezia. In 1915 Beaufort, while serving as Judge of the High Court in Livingstone, quoted with approbation what Chamberlain had said in 1897, thus: "The punishment gives little trouble, it is swift and severe, it bears a kind of testimony to the personal power and superiority of the official who awards it". Chamberlain had noted, however, that "the more often it is inflicted, the more ready to disregard the pain or the suffering which it involves, becomes the man who deals in this species of punishment".

202. PLG: BSA 9/83, Chamberlain to Gell, 3/4/03 and see Lugard F.D. 'The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa' (Blackwood 1922); Johnston H.H., op.cit., p. 114; BM/SP 1896, LVIII (C.7925) Johnston to Salisbury on 'General Condition of British Central Africa', 29/4/96; PLG: BSA 9/116, Coryndon to Lewanika, 10/10/04. Underlinings are mine.
Therefore flogging should be used with discretion. Beaufort considered that the whip as a penalty had the advantage of being 'not costly' and obviating 'the probable contamination of prison habitues'. The evidence for our period is that it was used extensively, but that administrative officers were of the view that what was done in northern Zambezia was much less brutal than what prevailed in neighbouring territories under the rule of other European powers.

The Ross-Cramer Report on Portuguese Africa, issued in 1925, in its discussion of forced labour in Angola and Mozambique, stated that it was common practice for planters, in collusion with government officials to withhold pay from conscripted labourers. The worker who went to the government official was then 'told to come round in a couple of months'. However, 'if he has the temerity to do so, he is threatened with the calaboose and that ends it. It is all a system of bare-faced labour stealing'. Such extremes of depravity shocked some of the B.S.A.C. men. The veterinary officer we have just quoted was surprised, on his first visit to the Belgian Congo in 1939, to find 'chikotis' hanging from the roof of the verandah of a house which he visited, a bunch of 'leather thongs...weighted at

203. NAZ: BS 3/77, folio 152, L.P. Beaufort on whipping, 19/11/15, and see BS 3/78, 80, 81 et al for 'Whipping Returns' for the latter part of our period.
the end with large rocks'. He heard there how a 'Rhodesian boy' had visited the Congo 'without his pass'. The man 'received nine lashes...on entrance to prison and when his fifty days were up he was helped to the border with another nine'. The idea that other European colonists were more severe began, however, much earlier, as evidenced by the report sent from Ikawa in 1906 of the savage treatment of a man accused of stealing a cash box at the German Boma at Ikamba in Tanganyika. The man, Kerani, had his head shaved and was tied to a tree with water dripping on him constantly. 'The head was fixed between two boards, nailed to the side of the tree...so that he could not move his head in any way'. He had weals from severe beating and 'natives also took burning faggots and burnt Kerani all over the body' during the two months in which he was kept tied in the one position. Brutality reached such proportions in the Congo (Zaire) that international condemnation was evoked by responsible reports of beating, plundering, rape and the destruction of villages by state officers both before and after King Leopold ceded his sole authority over his 'domaine prive' to the Belgian Government in 1908. In Britain a 'Congo Reform Association' was formed to urge the
Government to bring pressure to bear on Belgium. 204

Lord Grey, the B.S.A.C. Administrator in Southern Rhodesia, told the Colonial Office in 1897 that 'Universal experience in South Africa has proved that until Kaffirs are convinced by failure it is useless for them to try and struggle against the power of the white man, they will fret under his yoke'. A decade later, the Colonial Office was told that 'the prospects of Southern Rhodesia' were good, the correspondent noting that 'quite kindly, even "negrophile" persons tell him of the black man's contempt for people who "spoil" him...the Kaffirs stand at a point of civilisation at which much we think humane seems to him abominably weak...The Boer attitude towards the Kaffir seems horrible...yet the Boer Republic has seldom any native trouble. Given the sense that he is being justly dealt with, the native does not resent even a severe flogging'. The writer considered however that it was not possible to give general approval to flogging in view of a recent incident in which a 'grey-haired respectable farmer in Salisbury', called Laidlaw, tied a man to a tree and 'flogged him until from exhaustion

204. Ross-Cramer Report, 1925, para. 9, quoted in Simon K. 'Slavery' (Hodder and Stoughton 1929), p. 165; Guilbride, op.cit., p. 143; NAZ: BS 1/96, report by McKinnon, Ikawa, on torture of Kerani, 10/2/06; see also Legum C. 'Congo Disaster' (Harmondsworth 1961), Davidson B. 'Africa Awakening' (Cape, 1955) esp. pp. 62-82, and note work and writings of Edmond Morel and Roger Casement on the 'Congo atrocities'.
he could flog no more'. The letter to the Colonial Office ended with a further misgiving about the image of white justice that was being projected in Central Africa. "If we offend against a white man", some Shona men had said to Taberer, Chief Native Commissioner, "we are hanged or imprisoned or flogged. If a white man kills us, nothing happens. Explain to us, our Father, how this is". Neither the report of savage flogging nor the recording of misgivings about the thrashing of adults by white colonists was by any means uncommon among the confidential correspondence of the Colonial Office. The protests of a missionary in Sierra Leone in 1892 had spoken of 'floggings to death' and listed the names of some inflictors of brutalities. The High Commissioner in South Africa, Lord Milner, voiced his disquiet in 1899 about 'the effect on the native mind of the apparent inability' of the British Government 'to protect Her Majesty's subjects', by which he meant Zulu victims of brutal floggings.205

The incidents of floggings in North-western and North-eastern Rhodesia, which we have noted so far,

indicate that the B.S.A. Company's men, their colleagues in the labour agencies, traders and prospectors approached their enterprises with the disposition of mind reflected in what we have just noted. Excuses of the stresses of climate, loneliness, frustration and ill-health were often offered, as in the case of McGregor, noted above, who was said to be suffering from a severe attack of haemorrhoids. It is noteworthy that McGregor's misconduct occurred very soon after the acquittal in Battlefields, Southern Rhodesia, of four white men accused of flogging three Africans to death. The High Commissioner had then expressed his concern that the incident, like the case of Laidlaw, could 'constitute a national disgrace and a public danger' but noted the comment of the Resident Commissioner about 'the difficulty of obtaining a verdict against Europeans on natives' evidence'. The Laidlaw case had also evoked a comment from the Attorney General, Tredgold, that, though it was clearly culpable homicide, the jury were afraid to give such a verdict at a trial involving a white man who had killed an African. In response, the High Commissioner had remarked: 'Though human justice has failed to deal with this case, neither the criminal nor the perjured jurors will escape Divine Justice'. There the case had ended. The general refusal to give credence to court testimonies by black men has thus to be noted as a major factor prejudicial to justice, as, for instance, when the Portuguese authorities in Angola
had clashed with the Lunda chief Samagala in 1906 and accused a missionary of giving the chief a British flag. The D.C. Lealui, reported that, though the charge was baseless, Schindler the missionary would find it difficult to prove his innocence 'since native evidence will not be accepted'.

As the first copper mines appeared in northern Zambezia in the Hook of the Kafue, the local Company officials recorded numerous cases of flogging by white miners. In 1900, Colin Harding was informed in writing by Lewis, Manager of the Northern Copper Company, that he had used the whip from the beginning in face of pilfering of properties of the mine and its white staff, in one case administering '50 with the sjambok'. This was clearly a 'summary penalty' not dependent on any form of trial. Heated resort to summary 'justice' was the order of the day, as evidenced also when there was a wave of anger in early 1903 over 'twelve cases of assault by natives on European women'. For this the death sentence was demanded, a matter which inevitably involved the Colonial Secretary. Chamberlain said that he would make no objection, 'taking into account the

206. See pp. 327 ff. above; and PRO: CO 879/98 Af.S.no. 899, HC to CO, 30/4/08 in correspondence on House of Commons question ref. the Battlefields case, and citing Res.Comm. to HC, 7/11/08; Attorney-General's comment on Laidlaw case, July 1908 and HC to Res.Comm., 27/7/08; 879/91 Af.s.no.802, DC Lealui on Portuguese-Lunda clash, August 1906. Underlining is mine.
condition of public feeling in the territory and bearing in mind that the objections which might be urged against such a proposal in a European community are not applicable with the same force in Rhodesia'. He would, on the same grounds, not set a limit to the number of lashes to be given to an African who was alleged to have committed this offence. At the same time, the Resident Commissioner in Salisbury commented with reference to the 'Immorality Suppression Ordinance' and the mandatory sentence of five years with hard labour in a case where the offence was committed with the white woman's consent, that 'the much commoner cases of misconduct between white men and black women...have not so far led to any public demonstration of disapproval'.

There is evidence to support the view that in matters of crime, the assessment of guilt and the dispensing of penalties, northern Zambezia under the B.S.A. Company featured a lack of equity and justice so marked as to allow the Company's agents to use the lash effectively as an instrument of subjugation. The McGregor case which we noted earlier, revealed that 'neither he nor Pound tried any native cases at all; every offence was punished out of hand, without judicial investigation of any kind'. McGregor pleaded that he had acted on

207. PRO: CO 879/68 Af.S.no.656, F.R. Lewis to Harding 30/4/00; 879/79 Af.S.no.717, Chamberlain to Milner, HC, 8/4/03 and 23/5/03; Res.Comm. to HC, 13/7/03.
'the verbal instructions' of Codrington, the Administrator, given 'in Mr Worthington's presence'. Moreover, 'he several times maintained that...he had only followed a local precedence of local standing'. Pound's willingness to give evidence against McGregor has to be noted along with Theodore Williams's remarks about Pound's reputation for similar brutality a few years later. McNamara's case was thus by no means unique. Moreover it elicited a comment from Wallace to the High Commissioner about 'unreliable native evidence', and from Worthington that it was 'expedient to have the power to flog (since) the native of this Province is not so advanced along the road to civilisation that all restraint, save that imposed by moral obligation, may be removed'. 'It is not so much the discomfort of physical pain that teaches a native...as the sting of ridicule', said Worthington, thereby justifying public flogging. In addition, he said that 'under the Punishments Regulation of 1909 in North-eastern Rhodesia, Mr McNamara's actions would have been quite regular'. The case drew a mild word of censure from the High Commissioner who had resolutely set his face' against 'the illegal flogging of natives'.

208. PRO: CO 879/102, Af.S.no.932, HC to CO, 6/12/09; RH:MSS.Af.s.779, Williams's letters of 8/5/13, 12/6/13; PRO: CO 879/102 as above, Wallace to HC, 10/11/09, encl. Worthington's comment, and HC to Ag/Admin (Wallace), 6/12/09.
The fully annotated letter-book of A.C. Anderson, D.C. for the Kafue District, covers some years from the beginning of 1904 and provides evidence of a considerable amount of violence on the part of white men in the area. A brawl between a man called Tamba and two white men who tried to seize his wives, for instance, arose over the question of payment for the women. An employee of the Northern Copper Company, nicknamed 'Kasabwa' the one who traps you like a fishing-net, was guilty of 'assault under somewhat aggravated circumstances of Chief Sibuluma'. The mines had a very high incidence of desertion, as noted by Anderson. The District Commissioner was apparently asked and agreed to attempt to arrest deserters. However, Anderson expressed disapproval of the action of T.G. Davey of the N.C. Company in flogging a deserter, Mwasikwa, ten times. He also drew the attention of the Mine Superintendent to the violent behaviour of an employee called Maddock who had struck an African interpreter and threatened to shoot him dead. Administrative action however was itself little less summary as when the A.D.C. Nkala, responded to a complaint by Lewanika against the sister of Chief Sezongo by raiding her village by night and seizing cattle. Anderson supported the A.D.C.'s action on the ground that 'the matter is undoubtedly one which affects the recognition by the natives of the white Government in the country'. Thus he also supported the A.D.C.'s apprehension of a headman called Maleka
who 'gave a point blank refusal to come to Nkala' in response to a summons. Not long afterwards, the man sent by the A.D.C. to buy grain in Maleka's area in Nkoya country was driven out by the villagers. In the Hook region, as in Kasempa and elsewhere, there was obvious resentment against the Company's attempts to have Lozi indunas interfering in local affairs. Yet it appears that, despite his determination to demonstrate 'the painful consequences of opposition to the Government', Anderson intervened from time to time on behalf of black men in white employ, as when, in late 1905, he required G. Osborne, a carpenter at Ninga to pay wages wrongfully withheld from 4 'boys'. 209

The situation in the Kafue district was persistently turbulent, and there is evidence to explain why, as we noted earlier, there was grave fear of a 'native rising' in the area in 1907. Anderson called upon a white man called Castens, living at Sitanda, to answer the allegation that he had 'wrongfully and unlawfully' taken the wife of one Chamrwanda (sic). Similarly he warned the N.C. Company's Resident Secretary not to allow a repetition of the brutality by which his messengers had seized a suspected thief and 'tied

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209. NAZ: KDC 1/1/1, correspondence of A.C. Anderson, 1/1/04, 9/1/04, 22/1/04, 7/2/04, 7/4/04, 18/7/04, 21/7/04, 16/8/04, 21/6/05, 2/10/05.
him up with hide in such a manner that he is seriously injured, his arms being cut so badly that the boy is practically helpless'. But whereas a 'deserter' from labour conditions of such rigour was sentenced to 30 days with hard labour, the perpetrators of such excesses, of whom there were many, received no more than a warning. Even if convicted, it appears that white men guilty of brutal flogging were mildly penalised, despite press publicity. The 'Livingstone Mail' thus reported how Henry McLuskie caused the death of a carrier in October 1907, the man being 'tied to a long pole lying against the camp fire and badly burned on the abdomen, legs and arms. Two days later he died from the effects...of his burning, flogging and kicking'.

The apparent judicial equity shown, as reported by the 'Livingstone Mail', in the imposition of a fine of £2 each on a 'white man Davis and native Mwaluka' for common assault, obviously penalised the European less. But the fundamental inequity of the situation was demonstrated more sharply when a sentence of 12 months with hard labour was given to an African who struck back at a white man, Harry Greaves, and shouted 'Europeans are dogs'; the Magistrate commenting severely.

210. See pp. 325 ff. above; NAZ: KDC 1/1/3, correspondence of A.C. Anderson, 9/1/06, 22/3/06 ref. torture of Shipopa, 2/7/06 with warning to Warren and Bullen of Sable Antelope Mine: 'Livingstone Mail' 12/10/07.
'upon the growing insolence observable among natives in the township' of Livingstone. Some time later, a Magistrate rejected a white man's plea of provocation for his assault on one Sitambi and then sentenced him to £1 or 14 days', with no mention of hard labour. The comment of the 'Livingstone Mail' in mid-1909 on 'the Law, the White Man and the Native' is noteworthy here. There were various approaches, the newspaper said, in the southern countries, from 'equality' to where the native is only theoretically differentiated from a slave'. In North-western Rhodesia, it seemed that the 'equality' policy was being followed, 'forced on us by the Home Government at the bidding of that degenerate and mischief-making section known colloquially as Exeter Hall, which has adopted the policy of altruism and endeavours to fit it, in its entirety, to all conditions, countries and races without discrimination. The havoc in this country', said Moore, 'is becoming rapidly apparent. Scarcely a week passes but some white man is "run" before a magistrate charged with some offence against a native'. Moore must have been aware of what was actually happening in the Gwembe, Kafue, Kasempa and other districts. Yet he claimed that 'the native, secure from personal chastisement or pecuniary loss, will speedily realise that he has the white man at his mercy'.

211. 'Livingstone Mail', 18/1/08, 10/4/09, 21/1/11, 24/7/09.
There was another case of violence on the part of a Company official which drew the attention of the higher authorities. R.A. Osborne, Native Commissioner at Luwingu in 1910, was found to have flogged a man called Jeremani and burned his house. In the opinion of the Colonial Office, the reason for requiring Osborne's resignation was his 'scandalous behaviour with native women'. The attack on Jeremani had taken place when the N.C. was 'going in search of a woman called Kasonde'. When the Anglo-Belgian Boundary Commission was at work in 1914, the S.N.A. received reports of frequent flogging by Belgian officials, in particular 'Bwana Polipoli'. That 'hard man' would seize a carrier, who put down his load so as to relieve himself in the forest, and thrash him severely. In most of the cases that were noted in official correspondence, the men who resorted to such action involved their messengers or askari in what they were doing. The numerous testimonies of Zambians which we have noted above confirm that the black servants of oppressive white men, be they administrative officials, traders or prospectors, played an important role in extending and sustaining the harsh nature of the regime. 'Everything was done through sheer force', as witnesses stated in the Isoka district. Presumably, messengers and askari were coerced into obedience to such orders because they themselves were regularly exposed to the lash.
Simon Kapwepwe, one of the early leaders of the United National Independence Party, has told how his father, the Head Messenger at Isoka, was involved in carrying out drastic action, on the orders of the Company's officials, in the collection of tax and the rounding up of labour and that there was a period of exceptional harshness between 1911 and the end of B.S.A.C. rule. The fact that the lash was used as a judicial penalty in so many cases judged by Native Commissioners, meant that the noise of the chikoti and the cries of those so handled were regular features of life around the Bomas throughout the territory. Boma 'whipping records' state that N.C.'s imposed such punishment for a wide variety of offences. 'Breach of prison regulations', 'contravening sleeping sickness rules', 'idleness at work', being 'in possession of tobacco', and 'witchcraft', received sentences of 6, 10, 6, 12 and 10 lashes respectively, in addition to more standard offences like rape (24 lashes), larceny (15), arson (10, robbery with violence (10), and assault causing bodily harm (10).212

212. PRO: CO 879/104 Af.S.no.948, CO to BSAC on Osborne's case, 13/5/10; RI/ e.g. Donald Siwale and others, Isunda, Isoka, 20/4/71; NAZ: BS 2/21, admission by C.J. Heblethwaite, ANC. Nalolo, of having administered 50 lashes to two askari, Kadiwere and Matongo, 10/10/08; Simon Kapwepwe, 8/11/69; NAZ: e.g. BS 3/74, folios 165 (Mweru-Luapula 1914), 168 (Batoka 1914), 171 (Luangwa 1914), and folio 163 (Serenje 1914), 165 (Mweru-Luapula), 171 (Luangwa), 175 (Ndola), and 181 (Solwezi); and see also BS 3/102 (e.g.) for the year 1922.
Missionary protests have been noted above about various cases of brutality, but not all such comments were communicated to the Company's senior administrators. In 1899, P.W. Jones of the L.M.S. wrote to his London directors to say that he 'could find nothing in the Society's regulations' to hinder 'one of their agents from taking all precautions to see that justice is administered to a teacher in their employ. In a country of this description', he said, 'where so-called magistrates can carry out any course which seems to suit their nature, it behoves missionaries, the only friend the helpless native has, to stand up against cruelty, adultery, injustice and murder'. Jones continued thus:

'Take for instance the following actions of these magistrates - (1) In a frenzy caused thro' morphia, one takes his fowling piece and shoots down women and children while harmlessly dancing. (2) Another one who keeps a small harem, sends to a village a man with a rope to fetch a native's wife to whom he has taken a fancy. If she will come freely, well and good. If not the man was to bring her by force. (3) Another one contracts syphilis from his native concubine. He at last discovers a Native who has in his (the magistrate's) absence been lying with this woman. The Native, finding he is discovered, runs away. The Magistrate sends a squad of soldiers to find the man, they in some mysterious manner after taking him prisoner shoot him.
'These and such like are no uncommon occurrence.

One of the Magistrates here was imprisoned and did time for excessive cruelty to a Native whose wife he (the white man) had stolen... The B.S.A. judged the case. After this man's term of imprisonment was up the B.S.A. engaged him as a Sub-Collector. This same official marched his soldiers into your village at Kambole, beat the headman and, it is reported, burnt some huts down. He keeps a large number of women and is habitually cruel to the Native.

'Another Magistrate is a morphia-maniac.

Another is such a liar, his word is believed by no man, he got turned out of the African Lakes Corporation for drunkenness. Their cruel, unjust and oppressive actions make one's blood boil. With such men acting as Magistrates, it is surely one's duty to protect the Native as far as one is able... To try to protect a Native from a white man who had a personal resentment against him, is this defiance? To attempt to prevent a man who was not in his senses, is this defiance? To hinder a Magistrate who knows no language but English, and is soaked in morphia and whisky from wrongfully condemning a Christian lad, is this defiance? I can produce evidence to show that this Magistrate was unfit to try any case at that time and can prove to you that a case he did try was settled in a most shameful manner, so utterly incompatible with humanity. If it is not a missionary's duty to protect the helpless, succour
the oppressed and stand up for justice, then I am afraid my idea of a Missionary is not a correct one'. 213

The White Fathers recorded severe flogging of villagers by Boma messengers who came in 1904 to the Kayambi area 'beating, chaining and plundering the people'. At Chilubi Mission, Raphael the cook stole meat in April 1908 which led to his being roughly arrested by askari and sentenced by Frank Melland to three months with hard labour. It was a severe penalty, said the priests, but 'will be a good and lasting lesson for our people'. We noted earlier the White Father's recording of a sentence of one year in the chain gang upon their cowherd who had stolen £3.8.0. Chain gangs operated to a great extent under the whip. Zambian Christians who witnessed Company rule in action in their home districts have clear memories today of the vulgarity that accompanied public floggings. For example, in recollecting early officials and their nicknames, William Kawandami and Aaron Mwenya of Mbereshi have told how Rennie, whom the people called 'Wampanta-Kasokolo', thrashed and kicked grown men, while Reardon ('Kantu mwi fungu' - the little thing underneath) stripped men naked before he beat them in the presence of women and children. 214

213. CCWM, C.Africa Reports, Box 1, Jones, Pwambo, 28/5/99.

214. WF, Kayambi, 17/7/04; Nyassa Diaries III, Chilubi, 16/1/08; and see p. 301 above. Also WF, Chilubi, 6/1/05; RI/Kawandami and Mwenya, Mbereshi, 9/5/73.
Note: the meaning of Wampanta-Kasokolo was 'You've kicked me with the back kick of a cock', i.e. as a cock kicks up dust.
The relentless infliction of punishment was aggravated by its indiscriminate application to whole communities. We have noted this in our review of musonko operations as a regular feature of 'government' on both sides of the Zambezi and in Nyasaland. In 1904, a messenger, sent by Anderson of Kafue to call a man to give evidence, was assaulted at Malimbeka. The D.C.'s reaction was to march on the village with Lieuts. Hamilton and Fowler and a detachment of armed police, surround it before dawn, seize the headman and arrest suspected ringleaders of local resistance. The Headman was not released until 'a fine of 1600 lbs of grain was paid by the kraal'. Sixteen years later, this procedure was still in use. Some trusses of cloth and blankets belonging to the African Lakes Corporation in Mansa (Fort Rosebery) were stolen but the culprits were not readily found. Invoking the Collective Punishment Proclamation 1912, Section 2e, Wallace the Administrator imposed fines on the villages of five chiefs and four headmen, the largest fine being £45. This form of penalty could close an issue, either by the burning of the houses of a community, as in earlier instances, or by the receipt at the Boma of the stipulated fine. It inevitably failed either to accelerate the tracking down of the real culprit or to demonstrate the rationale of the conqueror's concept of justice. Equally inevitably it created a sense of solidarity among the
people concluded together as victims of the rulers' wrath. Thus, some months after the Colonial Office had assumed the governance of the territory, Chief Chizera of the Kasempa District asked why the Boma continued to commandeer elephant tusks which had traditionally been within the prerogative of chiefs and at the same time punished chiefs and headmen for offences committed within their communities.\textsuperscript{215}

The proximity and power of the administration in northern Zambezia had a marked effect on the behaviour of some missionaries. We have already looked at some aspects of this situation. The problems of setting up what were tantamount to small 'theocracies' inevitably produced a number of confrontations. Sometimes they urged leniency upon local rulers, as when in 1891 Francois Coillard was instrumental in having the punishment of a thief commuted from death by drowning, as ordered by Lewanika, to being suspended on a pole in the middle of the village for a full day and night and then 'cut down' for 'further punishment in the shape of flogging'. Similarly Arthur Baldwin, in his woeful diary of the early years of the Primitive Methodists among the Lozi and the Ila, recorded how he had pled with local elders not to use the ordeal of boiling water to reveal the

\textsuperscript{215} See pp. 293 \textsuperscript{ff.} \textit{et al} above; and NAZ: KDC 1/1/2, Report on Native Affairs by A.C. Anderson, June 1904; BS 3/92, Admin. to HC, 27/2/20; KDD 5/1, Kasempa Dist. Notebook, report of indaba, October 1924.
guilt of a suspected thief. On various occasions, however, Baldwin and his colleague Buckenham, who suffered constantly from malaria, resorted to flogging recalcitrant labourers and house servants. Any reaction from a black man which was not acquiescent to his wishes, he apparently regarded as 'insolence'. In the north, the L.M.S. mission recorded in 1899 that the erection of the stone church building at Niamkolo had left 'ineffaceable marks' on some of the Fipa labourers who had been thrashed by the missionary in charge of the work. The Hemans case, which came to a head injured the L.M.S. community. Though, after investigation by Dr Laws of Livingstonia, the charges of brutality were pronounced, in effect, 'not proven', one missionary, by way of reassurance, stated that 'the Administration allows one to flog one's own boys'.

In 1924 a circular was addressed from London to all Magistrates, Native Commissioners and Justices which said: 'The Secretary of State has stated officially that he considers that the number of cases of corporal punishment in Northern Rhodesia is unduly large as compared with the figures given in the returns of

216. See pp. 194 ff. above; and MMS diary of Arthur Baldwin, 23/10/91, 9/9/94, 22/5/95, 10/9/95; CCWM, Central Africa, Box 8, May (Secretary) to London, 7/12/99, Ernest Clark, Niamkolo, ref. the Hemans, Box 13, letter from Dr Laws to London Secy., LMS, 29/5/05; and Wareham, Kawimbe, quoting comment presumably made by Rev. H. Johnson, 4/10/05.
of other African dependencies'. The Colonial Secretary obviously did not have access to statistics of flogging other than those submitted officially by Native Commissioners themselves. The actual situation in the territory was perhaps therefore more accurately indicated by a Confidential Circular by the Northern Rhodesia Law Department, issued two years later, which stated that there had been 'a marked increase in the number of cases in which corporal punishment had been inflicted'.

Though the conquest had been effected quarter of a century earlier, northern Zambezia was still restive under a harsh regime, and it seems not improper to suggest that in a situation in which the gun and the whip, the rigours of musonko and the unremitting demands of chibalo agents continued to afflict the country, the people's non-cooperation was a distinct token of their wellnigh universal hostility to the rule imposed upon them in the interests of the B.S.A. Company's grand plan of exploitation.

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217. NAZ: P 3/14/1, correspondence between Governor and Judges, 1926-31, incl. Colonial Office Circular no. 6 of 1924. Underlining is mine.
(e) The Seizure of the Soil

When we come to consider the objectives and actions of the British South Africa Company in respect of the use of the land within the huge area of northern Zambezia, we are again reminded of what was the actual position south of the river. It is important at the outset also to realise that the provision for 'Native Reserves' did not in any sense recognise the legitimacy of African land ownership; for, as was stated in the formal promulgation of 'Native Regulations' for Southern Rhodesia in 1898: "'Reserve' means land, the property of the British South Africa Company...set apart for the purposes of native settlements'. The Regulations then stated that the Company would 'retain the mineral rights in all land assigned to natives'. 'Matabili' Thompson, to whom we referred earlier, told the Colonial Office in 1914 that, as the man who had actually negotiated what was called the Rudd Concession with Lobengula of the Ndebele, he could vouch for the fact, which Maguire had personally endorsed in writing, that under the Concession they had 'claimed no land whatever'. It was Rhodes who had chosen to assume ownership of the land and who did not want the matter raised with Her Majesty's Government. The situation was explained to the Company's shareholders in 1895 so that they could be reassured that there would be no legal impediment to the Company's exploitation of mineral resources wherever they might be located. 'The Land Commission...may order
the natives to remove from such land'. Misgivings about injustice were then set at rest by the assurance that the B.S.A.C. Land Commissioners would then 'assign to them just and liberal compensation in land elsewhere'. When the 'Rhodesian Dilemma' was discussed in communications of the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society with the Colonial Office in the post-1918 period, the Society pointed out that the 1894 Order in Council had 'regularised the dispossession by providing for Native Reserves. But it nowhere gives security'. Based on 'a so-called land concession and arising from a military operation due to the alleged attack upon the Agents of the Company by the Matabele', a situation had been created whereby 'the entire Native community of Southern Rhodesia has been deprived of all land ownership rights'. The Society's statement, prompted by a proposal to evict well over 100,000 Africans from their homes, was supported by a letter to the Prime Minister from the Free Churches of England which said: 'Not a single native owns either individually or collectively, a foot of land in the country'. The 'Westminster Gazette' underlined this comment by pointing out that the Rudd Concession was 'now authoritatively adjudged by the Judicial Committee to have been a worthless document'. The dispossession of the people for the benefit of the new owners was, moreover, accompanied by 'rampant...fraud, disease and oppression' as the Company's agents ensured that Africans should not 'become
units in the march of progress'; and the Rev. John Harris of Bulawayo told the Anti-Slavery Society, 'I have not seen a single native shop, not a single native trader, not a single native owning a yard of his own country'.

In Bechuanaland in 1899 the people of Molepolole uttered a plea against the Riesle-Nichols Concession. 'We did not know what he (Riesle) was speaking about with our Chief Sechele... we heard that he had some money... with which he wanted to lease ground... the little birds told us this... We protested before our Chief Sechele... (who) agreed, so money sent back but Riesle wouldn't take it... We cannot live without the ground'. But the acquisition by Rhodes's men were now being made fast. Meanwhile in the British Central Africa Protectorate, the dispossession of the local communities was validated by Harry Johnston in 1898 in these words: 'As land was of little value before the establishment of the Administration and as undoubtedly settlers had

conferred great benefits on the country by clearing and planting, land was not rated at a high value. Three pence an acre was the maximum...Sometimes the value was computed at...a halfpenny an acre'. A settler in Nyasaland could thus buy 6,000 acres for between £12.10/- and £75. What actually happened in the British Central Africa Protectorate was in fact very different from the picture of equity and 'the inalienable occupancy of their villages and plantations' by the indigenous people, which Johnston described in 1898. Before the Livingstonia Mission established its training institution at Khondowe in the Rumphi District of Malawi in 1894, Alfred Sharpe reported to the Colonial Office that the B.S.A. Company 'owned' approximately '2,767,900 acres' of northern Nyasaland and also possessed 'mineral rights over very large areas in various districts'. It is right, therefore, to assume that the Company did not have a different formula for its dealings with the region now called Zambia. It is also very important to remember that the word 'concession' was wholly inappropriate as a description of the method by which the B.S.A.C. acquired land, as we saw in our review of the 'treaties' related to northern Zambezia.

Here then was another situation in which the British Government chose to practise \textit{laissez faire}, as shown in the Colonial Office's summary in 1913 of the B.S.A. Company's title to land. Though it was 'not necessary nor desirable to go into this extremely complicated question', Whitehall noted that when the Company's Directors visited Central Africa in 1907 'their rights were openly challenged' by people like Leopold Moore. But 'Mr Hawksley asserted that the Company "claimed to be owners of the land: they had got their concessions plus conquest plus occupation"'. Five years after the Berlin Conference and in the year of the Anglo-German agreement and of the Lochner Concession, a report on rumoured German probings towards the Zambezi from South-West Africa used these words: 'I mistrust these people when the land hunger is on them'. The 'scramble for Africa' has to be understood as the devouring of the then 'unoccupied' parts of the continent by voracious appetites of which the B.S.A. Company's was among the keenest.\textsuperscript{220}

The land situation in northern Zambezia was distinguished throughout from the time of the initial conquests to the transfer of power in 1924, by the fact that any land which a 'native' used must ultimately be

\textsuperscript{220} PRO: CO 417/536, CO memo on BSAC land title, 28/7/13; and RH:MSS.Afr.s.228, Rhodes's Papers 2A - Res. Magis. Walfish Bay to SNA, Cape Town, 23/7/90. Underlinings are mine.
land 'assigned' to him. The 1924 Order-in-Council made this explicit and thus echoed the North-eastern Rhodesia Order-in-Council of 1900 and the Northern Rhodesia Order-in-Council of 1911, which had both declared: 'The Company shall from time to time assign to natives inhabiting North-Eastern Rhodesia land sufficient for their occupation'. By this formula, the right to lease land was acquired by the B.S.A.C. and everyone living in the territory was thenceforth at best a tenant of the Company. Roy Welensky's statement, just before the imposition of Federation in 1953, that Africans in Northern Rhodesia were fortunate because '90% of the land is set aside for them', obscured the fundamental difference between the security of ownership and occupancy on sufferance, subject at any time to eviction in the interests of powerful foreign speculators. Welensky was then arguing that the only racial discrimination that existed in the Protectorate was in 'the African's' favour. The chronicle of the B.S.A. Company's exploits in both Rhodesias and of the drive for the amalgamation and, later, the federation of the territories in the middle decades of the century cannot, it is suggested, be understood without a grasp of the pivotal issue of ownership of the land. 221

From the beginning of the British thrust across the Zambezi, it was clear that its protagonists knew the importance of the land and would not be content with half measures. Despite the repeated affirmations of Johnston that the assignment of land and other natural resources would be made only within the terms of the Berlin Conference's prohibition of monopolies, he was determined not to allow a lot of independent land-owners to parcel out the territory. Rhodes's Company's claim to own the land was in keeping with this approach. Thus a pro forma 'Condition of Grant North of the Zambesi', of mid-1902, stated that pegging and setting of beacons was to be done as in Southern Rhodesia, with 50% of interest to the British South Africa Company. Full discretion over land was with the Administrator and no reference whatever was made to African 'land rights'.

In the controversy concerning the L.M.S. claim, voiced by Alfred Swann, to ownership of land in the Lungu kingdom, which we noted earlier, the important point is that, by the action of Johnston and Sharpe in 1904, the Lungu chiefs were completely ignored. Nor was there any reference to 'treaties' with the Lungu. By 1902, the Collector at Ikawa had supervised the grant of land to five settlers on the Tanganyika plateau, on the following terms: (a) free of purchase price, at per annum quit rent of £300; (b) free carriage of 1½ tons of equipment on Lake Nyasa and then by porter 'free of charge, thirty natives for a period of one month';
(c) seeds of wheat, rye, oats, barley and maize to be supplied in a reasonable quantity to each settler for the first year; and (d) 30 head of cattle on loan to each settler for a five-year period. A further plan for the settlement of white farmers in the Saisi valley, presumably in the western part of the Mambwe country, was also launched in the same year. 222

The Company's ownership of the land was still, however, not recognised by the British Government, and so L.A. Wallace, as Chief Surveyor, sent a memorandum for transmission to the Company's London Secretary in 1903. In it he claimed that all unalienated land was 'vested' in the Company which therefore would 'draw all revenues of quit-rents, etc'. He then went on to argue thus: 'Any scheme of purchase of land from Native Chiefs by the Company appears impracticable. The area is so vast...Take it at 145,000 square miles or 93,000,000 acres and the purchase price at a ¾d per acre, and less in these days could hardly be offered, and it comes to nearly £100,000'. In so arguing, Wallace had before him Government Notice no. 10 issued by Codrington from Fort Jameson in 1900, entitled 'Lands and Deeds Registry Regulations'. The Notice had clearly implied that the primary concern of the Administration was to regulate

222. See p. 49 and p. 206 above; NAZ: BS 1/24, folio 64, Pro Forma 'Condition', with accompanying letter, dated 28/7/02, to Matabele Gold Reefs and Estates Co., BS 1/52-55, folio 1 ff., correspondence from Fife (Ikawa), 21/8/02 and letter of R. Chiappini, Cheresia, NER, 15/7/02.
land assignments to white men whereafter 'All land set apart or required for the settlement of natives shall, when circumstances so require and permit, be surveyed and demarcated'. The Notice made no reference to the land rights of local communities or individuals. The Company was obviously acting decisively in the territory while still obliged to answer the misgivings of the Colonial Office as transmitted by the B.S.A.C. office in London. It is notable that the twin arguments, of the impracticability of buying lands from local rulers and the large sum that such purchase might require, were deemed adequate to convince H.M.G. 223

We have already examined the so-called 'treaties' which the Company used to give legitimacy to the British annexation of northern Zambezia. Now, as we consider the actualities of the B.S.A.C.'s conduct in relation to local communities in respect of the land, it should suffice to note that, on the one hand, the British Government continued to have misgivings throughout and beyond the period under review here; for instance, the Pim Commission of 1938 held that, under Johnston's Certificates of Claim of 1893, the chiefs with whom 'treaties' and 'concessions' were allegedly signed were 'the sole and only rightful owners of the land in question'. On the other hand, the situation had so

developed and hardened by 1930, when the Labour Colonial Secretary, Lord Passfield, turned his attention to Central Africa, that his implied censures upon the territory's segregationist and exploitative practices greatly angered the articulate section of the white community and made them look south, even more than before, for support. Passfield's disquiet was no doubt increased by the fact that the 1928 Order-in-Council, dealing with Crown Lands and Native Reserves, had taken the land policies of the B.S.A. Company a stage further and given settlers reason to insist that Crown Lands were exclusively for their use. For indeed that Order-in-Council had excluded only the 'Barotse Reserve' from the control of the Colonial Government which of course had ultimate control over all other 'lands set apart for the exclusive use of the natives'.

On the issue of 'Crown Land' a warning had been sounded as early as 1892 by the Scots Mission in

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224. See Chap. III above, and MS Report Vols. I and II; 'Report of the Commission to Enquire into the Financial and Economic Position of Northern Rhodesia' - the Pim Report - (Colonial no. 145); Gray, op.cit., as in footnote 221; NAZ: ZA 1/15/N/2, text of Order-in-Council, 1928. Note: the exact meaning of the term 'Crown Land' appears to have been far from clear in the beginning, but in 1901 the Colonial Office accepted a definition which radically altered the earlier view that 'ownership of the soil in the Protectorate does not vest in the Crown' (PRO: CO 879/76 Af.s.no.694, CO to FO, 19/12/01).
Blantyre. 'On behalf of whom is it claimed?' asked 'Life and Work'. 'We are forced to ask whether the "Crown" may not be a covering, not for Her Majesty, but for some less unselfish power...whether in this neighbourhood "Crown" spells "Company"! In his Part I, entitled 'Averted Eyes 1918-1939', Gray devotes a chapter to 'Land Policy' in which he says that, a decade or so after the end of direct B.S.A. Company rule, 'the land of Northern Rhodesia might be thought of under the three heads - African, European and Crown'. 71,000,000 acres would then be listed as African, while European land accounted for 9,000,000 and Crown Land for over 11,000,000 acres. 'African land' was either 'Native Reserves' or 'Native Trust Land', that is, land 'vested in the Secretary of State "to be administered and controlled for the use of common benefit, direct or indirect, of the natives of the Protectorate"'. Our submission here is that in our period and beyond, indeed until Zambia's attainment of Independence in 1964, the position was that the local communities lived on the soil and tilled it only insofar as it was 'assigned' to them by their foreign conquerors and rulers. This is why, with reason, Chief Kafwimbi of the Iwa in Isoka and his councillors were solidly opposed to the possibility of uranium mining in their area. 'Whenever wealth is found under our soil, the white men come and take everything from us' was the gist of their objection. This view was expressed not long before the imposition of the Central African
Federation and revealed what was not realised by many Government officials, namely that the local people were well aware of the history not only of their land but of Southern Rhodesia as well, where, as early as 1903, 'Native Reserves' were being reduced to provide land for white farmers. The memory was fresh there as elsewhere of the methods by which white property had been acquired in the territory. As Headman Sumbi recalled of the arrival of a settler as Nsunzu in his area: 'It was by force that he took the land. He actually closed the bridge we used to cross when going to Mbala and even shot at anyone who trespassed through his land...The people living on that land were his, they began to work for him...Whenever he had some work to be done, he would summon them...they were each paid 5/- until they finished cultivating all the farm. Others were employed as herdsmen'.

It is proposed now to review certain aspects of the land situation chronologically. In 1904, as we noted elsewhere, the Administrator of North-western Rhodesia refused to give a percentage of land sales to King Lewanika on the ground that the Lozi were not

contributing to the cost of administration. Coryndon was meanwhile emphasising his power to issue land to anyone whom he deemed 'a good and bona fide farmer or settler'. In the eastern region around Chipata, farmers had started to occupy land allotted to them. 'As their cattle increase, their land requirements increase'. But, said the Land Commissioner, 'the natives also might increase in numbers', therefore it was 'evident that the farmer would be crowded out or else that the natives must be reduced in numbers...The latter', he said, 'is preferable for every reason of policy and no injustice will be done'. It was necessary now to start moving villages out of land required by settlers, giving them a month's notice to quit and allowing them to reap their crops. 'They should be compensated for their old huts ...not more than three shillings a hut and less if the hut abandoned were old and should be allowed free wood in the reserve for the new hut'. The inference again was that the people had no right to use wood in the forest but should be given a special grant to do so as a quid pro quo for their eviction. Those who did not move would automatically become tenants of the settler, who would have power to allocate sites for their houses and receive their labour for sixty days or so. Thus a situation was fast developing closely akin to what concerned the Nyasaland judge who commented on 'a growing
tendency' there to treat the African individual as 'an unfree villein or scriptus qlebae'.

To counter the Colonial Office's concern about the infringement of 'native lands, villages, cattle posts, gardens and fountains' by European settlements in North-western Rhodesia, the High Commissioner sent to the Colonial Secretary, Lyttelton, in mid-1905 a Company leaflet on the subject. 'It appears to me', he said, 'that the interests of natives will be sufficiently safeguarded'. The legality of the B.S.A. Company's land operations was, however, questioned, early in that year by Rangeley, Magistrate in the North-west, who declared that any selling of land by the Company could only be done as 'Agents of Lewanika, and the purchase money becomes his'. Coryndon countered this by the view that 'the only course' was 'to claim confidently' that the clause in the 1900 Concession which allowed for the issue of land by the Company implied the right to sell and keep the proceeds, and that 'the word "trading" is to be interpreted in a liberal manner'. By 1907 the movement of settlers into the area in and around the Lozi domain was obviously increasing but there, as in the east, the discussion about compensation

was concerned not with the recompensing of African communities for the loss of land, but only for their 'huts' and in a few cases their fields. Thus the sums involved were small, such as '£5 to Malimbo and 30/- to Mukangando', village headmen, by a Mr Riddell for his farm on the Chilala stream in the Magoye district. The 50,000 acre estate acquired by George Horton near Kalomo cost him, on paper £120 in compensation to the inhabitants of five large villages, equivalent to a year's musonko for only 240 people. In the case of Major Gibbon's huge farm of over 60,000 acres, the bitter complaints of six headmen about his appropriation of the peoples' 'wells, fields and houses' were voiced on their behalf by Father Torrend of Kasisi Jesuit Mission.227

The High Commissioner was probably right when he told the Colonial Secretary in 1907 that 'the position north of the Zambesi differs from the south in only two ways: (1) no active steps yet to set up Native Reserves, and (2) the special position of Lewanika'. It was the

227. PRO: CO 879/86 Afr. S. no. 763, CO to HC, 7/1/05 and HC to CO, 3/7/05; PLG: BSA 9/119, Rangeley's judgment and Coryndon's comment, 18/2/05; NAZ: BS 2/197, sundry items under 'land grants to settlers', e.g. R.J. Hughes, Collector, Magoye, on compensation by Riddell, 10/2/08, G.T. Horton to SNA, 26/6/08, Torrend on behalf of Chasha, Kacha, Kasonkomona, Chikanjira, Chipyayira and Mushara-amuno villages to Admin. 13/10/08.
latter feature which specially drew the attention of the Colonial Office, to the exclusion indeed of many other serious issues in the rest of northern Zambezia. The position in North-western Rhodesia was aggravated also by the proximity to the line of rail of the territory of peoples whom Lewanika claimed as tributaries. The High Commissioner then proposed that part of the region should be declared 'native territory' and that this might include the Barotse valley since it was 'of little commercial value'. The B.S.A.C. Directors were insistent that the 1900 Concession gave the Company the right to appropriate the proceeds of land sales in 'Barotse-land - North-western Rhodesia' and informed the Colonial Office that they would apply such amounts to their administrative expenses, including the reduction of the accumulated administrative deficit. This concession could well be understood as a quid pro quo, by way of ensuring the British Government's de facto recognition of the Company's claim to own the land and appropriate the proceeds of all land sales. Moreover, they added that 5% of such revenue would be employed annually 'for the benefit of the natives'. On his side, while more and more traders and prospectors moved up and down in his territory, Lewanika was increasingly willing to agree to the Company selling land in the Toka and Ila countries over which he still claimed authority, however nominal.

Whereas the High Commissioner was probably anxious to limit the area of Britain's involvement in embarrassing situations created by B.S.A.C. exploits, the Company itself was of a different outlook, as it looked to the unfolding of its programme. Thus in 1906, when the extension of the railway was faced with a significant working deficit, Philip Gell, a leading Director, offered this suggestion: 'There does not seem to be much hope for a Railway traffic out of exported maize unless we deliberately fall back on the native cultivator, choosing districts out of reach of the Salisbury and Bulawayo markets. We could do this by giving natives Railway land to cultivate...on condition that they retained a fixed amount of the crop and delivered the surplus to the Railway Company at a fixed price...In this way, the Railway would ensure an output allocated from the first to export...not competing with farmers in their home market...and yet creating the nucleus of an export trade to which the white surplus would be welcomed'. However, the idea worried William Milton in Salisbury. The scheme, he believed, would be 'agriculturally difficult and governmentally dangerous' as it would 'provide natives with a good living' and thus impede the development of industry. 'If the bulk of the native population became peasant farmers having facilities provided for disposing of their produce at, to them, very remunerative prices, and thus providing for their very modest wants, the labour-using industries
must suffer in proportion'. As one of the Company's most influential policy makers in the field, Milton's next remark was significant: 'While to a government that had to look mainly to the interests of the native, this might not be of paramount importance, it cannot be disregarded by one whose primary object, in the interests of the whole of South Africa, is to promote and foster the settlement of Europeans upon the land'. Thus cautionary advice that Gell was given at that time was put aside, namely the warning that the Company should endeavour to improve the general conditions, welfare and industry of the African people 'to avoid the Nabob's difficulty of controlling such a large hostile native population'.

Yet it is noteworthy that the Company still felt obliged to rationalise its policies on moral grounds. For example, Milton's last word on the railway maize scheme was that 'it would not be altogether in the interests of the natives to encourage them to devote themselves entirely to agriculture' - which was not Gell's proposal - 'and thus become unqualified for other forms of work'. In view of the consistent policy of preventing Africans from learning skills whereby they might compete with the white men, this argument appears

specious. The last sentence, however, was even more illogical: 'The suggestion that Native Commissioners should purchase grain from natives for export should not for a moment be entertained. It would be far more objectionable than the recruiting of natives for work on the mines and farms which is forbidden by the Imperial Government'. Gell's response to this was a mild one. He appreciated that white farmers, 'accustomed to secure 10/- to 15/- a bag' would not favour extending cultivation 'to bring down the price', and that 'it would be unfortunate if the policy of Rhodesian farmers were broken down by stimulating uncontrolled native competition'. The safeguards he had had in mind for his scheme were that the Railway Company would allot the land, control the planting, fix the price, handle the export of the maize and 'get all the profits' without middlemen.230

Over the same period, the Company was in correspondence with the Colonial Office about the matter of legislation regarding mining in northern Zambezia. The attitude of the men in the field had been adumbrated in 1903 in a memorandum from the Administrator of North-eastern Rhodesia. In it, he referred to the map which was in use to illustrate the scope of Johnston's Certificate of Claim, and noted the consequences of

Johnston's emendation of the original 'treaties' whereby a royalty of 1% should be paid to the chiefs concerned in respect of almost the whole of the region (areas 4, 41 and 5), excluding only the strip on the Tanganyika border originally claimed by the African Lakes Company (areas 1, 2 and 3). Now, thirteen years after the production of the 'treaties', the Administrator observed that no action had been taken on Johnston's ruling as no mining had yet started. 'It would be difficult in these days', he added, 'to determine to whom such royalties should be paid and with shorn agreements to compound should be made, and certainly no idea that any such payment is due to them exists in the minds of any of the native chiefs'. In the meantime, the boundary of North-western Rhodesia was adjusted in 1905, so that Broken Hill (Kabwe) with its lead and zinc mines fell within what the Company claimed was territory covered by the Lewanika Concession. In 1906 the Company raised the matter with Whitehall and expanded the argument thus: 'The collection of such a royalty would give rise to much dissatisfaction' - to whom? - 'and be incompatible with the general commercial principles upon which...the Company desires to proceed in the development of its mineral rights'. Moreover, the Board had 'been informed that there would be considerable difficulty in tracing the representatives of the chiefs to whom payments would be due and in ascertaining their rights'. If the chiefs of the region had been generally deposed
and replaced by B.S.A.C. appointees, as was done in the Ndebele and Shona areas after the 1896-7 war, there might have been a germ of truth in this statement. In the situation of northern Zambezia, to suggest that the people would not know who had been their rulers sixteen years earlier merely revealed the Company's confidence in its ability to persuade the British Government to give legitimacy to its conquest.

The Company, however, added two further considerations: firstly, that 'the payment of large sums of cash to individual natives - as has been pointed out in connection with the hut tax in North-western Rhodesia - is a most undesirable practice'. Secondly, and in direct contradiction of Johnston's Certificate of Claim, 'it is open to question if any individual as distinct from tribal ownership ever existed and it is therefore the more appropriate that any monies derived from this source should be applied to the general benefit of the natives concerned'. But our review of the Company's expenditure throughout our period makes it clear that no funds were allocated to any social welfare or educational projects, other than the Barotse Fund which, as we saw, existed only because the Company was obliged to allow a % of tax revenue to be paid to King Lewanika. The B.S.A.C. then proposed 'commuting' the royalty in the districts covered by the Certificate of Claim by offering 'a half share of the claim rents which will be payable
when mining properties are worked for a profit'. 231

Nearly a year later, the Colonial Office replied, indicating continued misgiving. The Company then, in mid-1908, declared emphatically that the British Government had already approved the 'concessions' and recognised the Company's inalienable 'rights' to all minerals without royalty. Furthermore, the Company intended to keep its commercial undertakings wholly separate from its administrative revenue and expenditure. 232

Some months later, the significant triumph of the Company's argument was confirmed when the Foreign Office urged the Colonial Office that the 'exclusive mining rights' of the Company in N.E. Rhodesia could be paralleled by 'similar claims...made by other Powers in regard to their territories within the zone' of the Congo Basin as defined by the Berlin Conference. It was not possible for 'H.M.G....to question the exclusive mining rights enjoyed by the Union Minière' in the Congo, for instance, and so no other power could interfere in

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what the B.S.A. Company was doing. Thus reassured, on
ground relating to European international relations and
not to just dealings with the rulers and peoples of
northern Zambezia, the Colonial Office withdrew its obj-
ections. The High Commissioner then stated emphatically
that no royalty payments would be made to chiefs. 'All
that appears to be necessary in the interests of natives',
he wrote, 'is to embody...reservations', unspecified in
the correspondence, which the Colonial Office had sugges-
ted and which the Company had accepted. As late as
1927, the disquiet over this issue continued to smoulder,
however, and so the S.N.A. stated that it was doubtful
if any chief, then incumbent, could be described as 'the
chief recognised by Her Britanic Majesty as the para-
mount chief over such country, "as the Attorney-General
has suggested"'. 'Neither they nor their successors
would therefore be entitled to any royalty, except
possibly Kazembe'. Moreover, no chief had 'ever expre-
ssed any desire that the alleged right to royalties
should be recognised, nor', said the S.N.A., 'do I be-
lieve that any attempt was made...to get their consent
to any commutation of those rights'. Indeed, 'they
would be very much surprised to hear that any such right
existed'.

233. Ibid: 879/102 Af.S.no.932, FO to CO, 16/3/09, and
CO to BSAC, 27/3/09, and HC to CO, 8/4/09; MS Re-
port Vol. II, pp. 274-7, CO to BSAC, 26/1/11 and
MS Files, SNA (E.G.B. Taggart) to CS, Livingstone,
15/10/27. Underlining is mine.
The Company was at this period pressing for the amalgamation of North-western and North-eastern Rhodesia, meeting the misgivings of the Colonial Office by proposing 'one Administration with one Administrator... but under two separate Orders-in-Council'. To Lewanika, however, the High Commissioner, Selborne, said that the Company had no influence in the matters of Government, being merely 'the King's subjects (who) can only act in such matters of state as the King gives them leave'. The role of the Company as instrument of the British King's will, interpreted by His High Commissioner, had been granted to it 'because He thinks well of the work which the British South Africa Company has done,... and because He thinks it deserves His confidence and yours and that of your people'. The Order-in-Council was therefore 'in no sense... a document emanating from the Board' of the Company. As we have noted, the special position of Lewanika, rather indeed than of the Lozi Kingdom, continued unresolved throughout our period. But it is important to note two facts. Firstly, in 1909, the Administrator acknowledged that 'Lewanika and his Council have made up their minds for some time that... they exercise no control, almost no influence, outside the Barotse Valley'. Secondly, however, the Company in 1920 reasserted its claim to 'have full rights to land as well as minerals, outside the Barotse Reserve, in Lewanika's territories, that is to say, in North-western Rhodesia as it existed immediately before
the Order-in-Council of 1911' - amalgamating N.E.R. and N.W.R. - 'this being the territory covered by the Concession of 1909 and being the territory within which 10% of Native Tax is paid into the Barotse Trust Fund for the benefit of the Barotse'.

The Administrator's statement in 1909, just quoted, was made three months after the Company had extracted from Lewanika an Agreement whereby, in return for the recognition of his authority over the area between the Zambezi's west bank and the Angola border - as defined by the Arbitration of King Victor Emmanuel of Italy in 1905, the King agreed to give the Company 'for its use - or to dispose of as it thinks fit - all the land within the territory over which he is Paramount Chief, that is to say, within the boundaries of Barotseland - North-western Rhodesia'. The conditions agreed were '(1) That native rights to their present lands, villages, gardens and fountains shall be observed or the holders of such rights compensated; (2) that no native villages shall be removed from their present sites except by agreement with their owners or by consent of the High Commissioner, but when such villages

have been moved the sites will become vested in the Company; (3) Lewanika retains the right to graze cattle in the Batoka and Mashukulumbwe countries...'. On 12th November 1909, after signing the Agreement, Wallace told the High Commissioner that now 'the Company would own all the land whether granted to settlers or not'. The requirement of the Colonial Office, stipulated in 1897, that land could only be granted by the Company after the signing of an express agreement to that effect with the Paramount Chief, had thus, in Wallace's view, been met. But he was claiming much more power from the Agreement than the Colonial Office had in mind. Thus armed, he was able to instruct his District Officials to destroy the 'huts' of any people who moved their 'villages, portions of villages or individuals' without the permission of the Company's agents; for, he said, 'all land in the Territory, with the exception of (a) the Barotse Reserve and (b) land in actual occupation by natives, is now the property of the Company. It should be noted, with regard to (b) that, as early as 1906, Coryndon had signed a Notice that 'the ground open to Prospecting' was 'the whole of North-western Rhodesia, excepting only 'European areas', native mines, the actual land on which villages and gardens lay and 'land within 200 yards of any inhabited or occupied...
house or building'.

The settlers' view, as voiced by Moore of the 'Livingstone Mail', was that there was 'a logical – if not a humane – line of argument which could be rightfully maintained that (because) the native does not make the best use of his land... it should be confiscated by the stronger and more efficient race... and he may be made to pay rent for it'. This would provide the 'economic pressure' to force the local people 'into the labour market voluntarily'. Moore added that the third alternative to either 'economic pressure' or 'slavery, for that is what forced labour comes to', was 'white immigration'. The 'Mail' interpreted the 1909 Concession as the purchase of the right to ownership of the land designated, for the price of Lewanika's annual subsidy of £850. The Company could now sell what had been the King's 'property' at two shillings an acre. Only 4,250 acres, the size of a small farm, would thus have to be sold to enable the Company to start making clear profit on land sales. If they had this right as a commercial company, said the 'Mail', the territory was their private estate. If the Company held this right in its administrative capacity, then the position was the same as in Southern Rhodesia. Moore was

235. MS Files: Text of Agreement between Lewanika and BSAC, 11/8/09; PRO: CO 879/52, Af.S.no.552, CO to FO, 29/9/07; NAZ: BS 2/257, folio 6 on 1909 Concession; BS 3/498, Wallace to DOs, 1/1/11; 'Livingstone Mail', 7/7/06. Underlinings are mine.
annoyed by the Company's persistent assertion that its various undertakings were made on behalf of 'the Empire, the people, the natives, the whole world in fact'; for, he said, 'the settlers know that its activities have been directed to only one end - the conservation of the shareholders' interests'. 236

The data before us so far indicate that the difference between the situations in the two territories on either side of the Zambezi River was not one of policy. As Selborne, the High Commissioner, said in 1909, the difference was this: that in the two northern regions, 'there is a vast population of natives and an infinitesimal population of white people'. The 'rights' allowed to the indigenous people of northern Zambezia in respect of land were not in any sense based on land ownership, but only on the desirability of affirming minimal safeguards of 'huts' and 'gardens', to avoid the wholesale dispossession of villages by settlers to whom the Company granted the use of the soil. Hence Clause 44 of the Northern Rhodesia Order-in-Council, 1911, which set out penalties of £100 or 2 years in jail for anyone who forcibly evicted 'any native from his kraal' without official permission. For 'all questions relating to the settlements of natives on lands' in the territory were in the hands of the Administrator, subject only

236. 'Livingstone Mail', 18/11/11, 16/12/11, 18/1/13. Word in brackets is mine.
to the High Commissioner's review. Moreover, the policy of refusing the right to purchase land to Africans was reinforced by Lewanika's insistence that African land ownership was communal. Also, as we have observed, compensation to local villagers was in respect of their 'huts' and sometimes their gardens. It was in no sense in recognition of their status as landowners, either individually or communally.\(^{237}\)

The files of the B.S.A.C. Administration in Northern Rhodesia contain various records of 'the surrender of native rights' and the sums of money paid in compensation, mainly for the last twelve years of Company rule. According to the Resident Commissioner, the rates of compensation in 1913 were from £1 to £2 for 'huts' and 8/- to 10/- per acre of cultivated land. A man responsible for a wife and a brother would thus pay in one year's tax the amount he would receive in compensation for his house and one cultivated acre. A summary return for such compensation was issued, for the six months to the end of 1914, for the Barotse, Kasempa, Kafue, Luangwa and E. Luangwa districts with a note to the effect that no agreements had been entered into in respect of the Livingstone, Kalomo, Serenje, Awemba, Tanganyika and Mweru-Luapula districts which

together made up a large part of the country and in which there were some European estates by that time. 251 houses, inhabited by 472 'souls', and 1614 acres were involved in the 'surrenders of native rights' made in that half year. The total compensation paid was £194.8.0. Of the 472 persons involved, 305 entered into 'tenancy agreements' in the East Luangwa district, the preserve mainly of the North Charterland Company; while 16 made such agreements in other districts. In the second half of 1915 when severe demands of war porterage were being felt, a total of £21.0.0. was recorded as paid in compensation for the 91 houses of 264 people, all in East Luangwa, and their 77 cultivated acres. 50 of the 91 remained as tenants. From the 1914 figures, the average compensation per person was thus .43 of £1; while it averaged .075 according to the 1915 returns. For six months in 1919, the returns showed that 1,002 people, cultivating 601 acres, had received a total of £152.3.6. or .15 of £1 per head. In 1923, 147 people occupying 67 houses and cultivating 49 acres were moved, in the Mpika and Mbala sub-districts of the areas designated Awembia and Tanganyika, for a total of £34.18.6. or .23 of £1 per person. 238

238. NAZ: BS 3/399, Res.Comm. to HC, 29/9/13; BSA 3/127, Return of Surrender of Native Rights for half-year to 31/12/14, half-year ending 31/12/15, and half-year ending 30/6/19; BS 3/472 Awembia and Tanganyika returns, to 30/9/23.
These figures show that, for sums of money so small as to be insignificant, large numbers of people were under effective pressure to move from areas originally chosen because of water, humus, availability of timber and other such vital factors. There is nothing in the records to suggest that they were assisted in the selection of new sites. Nor indeed, is it recorded that the 'surrenders' were witnessed by administrative officials or the payments certified. Misgivings about the whole operation were voiced in 1914 by Moffat Thomson as Magistrate for the Chilanga and Luangwa Districts, who saw the process as shortsighted in view of the likely rapid increase of the local population. 'The ever-increasing population of the villages will require an ever-increasing amount of the farmers' land, and it is not difficult to conceive of some of the landlords being unwilling to grant large areas of their farms for the purpose. One wonders also', he added, 'whether the present-day population are justified in selling their land rights which in a sense belong to the coming generation as to this, while only the present generation receive any benefit from the sale'. But the process went on, wherever a white farmer wanted land. Yet, as we have seen, it was not a question of selling land rights, for no such 'rights' were countenanced. It

was merely a matter of accepting token compensation, under duress, for houses to be demolished and cultivated fields to be appropriated by the settler to whom a large grant of land had been made by the Company.

The removal of villages along the 'railway belt' must have been a well concerted operation, clearing an area extending at least fifty miles on either side of the line for European occupation. One grave consequence of this, whose entail was to be felt by Zambia after 1964, was that there was no opportunity for African farmers to establish market gardens in the vicinity of townships like Choma, Monze, Mazabuka and Kafue, let alone Livingstone, Lusaka, Broken Hill and the burgeoning towns of the Copperbelt. The testimony of senior local people, for instance at Nanzhila in the Namwala district, is emphatic that, when villages were removed, no compensation was paid. Instead the operation was remembered as a rough one, with guns in evidence, stirring deep resentment in the uprooted communities as they attempted to start afresh elsewhere, clearing the forest, living in grass shelters and facing a period of hunger. It was Chief Chongo, the Nanzhila witnesses said, who tried to voice the people's complaints and incurred the anger of the B.S.A.C. officials thereby. Those who wanted to move back had to become either tenants or squatters liable to summary expulsion. Villages, whose people resisted eviction, were burned. Moreover the evictions took place at a time when tax collection was
being carried on fiercely and was thus but another harsh experience at the hands of foreign conquerors. From the eastern Luangwa region where, since 1897, the North Charterland Company had made a heavy impact on the local communities and where the number of settlers was large, Zambian testimonies on evictions and on compensation are numerous and significant. Barnes, in his scholarly study of the Ngoni of Mpezeni, has said that, before their defeat by the British, 'the Ngoni were settled at a density in excess of the critical value...and the state was exhausting the wealth of its neighbours'. Whereas in many parts of Northern Zambezia there were not more than 20 people per square mile, in the Fort Jameson area, the figure was an average of 140. The social consequences of the brief war of 1897-8 cannot be assessed here. However we should note that, as Gann points out, the Ngoni 'lost much of their cattle, a great many more beasts being sold to European traders after the campaign was over, and the tribesmen were in despair'. All that followed in respect of 'surrender of rights' and evictions has to be considered in its relation to this fact of profound disintegration and misery. Gann says categorically, however, that, despite a plan, in 1904, to set 490 square miles aside as a native reserve in the area, with

240. RI/Headmen Benjamin Shankwaya and Chose Ngana and ex-teacher Shadreck Samalumo, Nanzhila, 19/4/73.
compensation at 3/- per 'hut', the 'overwhelming majority of Africans preferred to stay on the European farms, no African being ejected without his consent'. The local memory in various parts of the Eastern Province, rejects this and speaks of people being 'driven away', and local resistance overwhelmed.

In the Katete District, for instance, witnesses have recalled the activities of 'Kolokota' Sandford, so called because he hunted for the last possible man to serve as a war carrier as someone will scrape the bottom of his snuff-box with a piece of dry grass to extract the last drop of tobacco. That official was actively involved in moving people from estates within the large area belonging to N.C.C. People were told that they must move to make room for white farms. 'They would tell people: "Do not cultivate your fields this year because you are going to be removed. You had better begin looking for another place". From that time, they would visit the village regularly to make sure that the people were preparing to move. As soon as the crops were ready, the people would be told to start moving...

In the Charterland areas they were never provided with transport... And they never paid compensation'. Hardships inevitably followed, 'first of all, the problem

of carrying their possessions to new places, some of them far away. Secondly, people faced hunger as they hadn't sufficient time to attend to their fields because time had to be spent preparing the new place, building new houses, digging a new well and opening new fields. Only after living in a new village for two or three years were they able to produce enough food to feed their families'. Evicted people received no help in choosing sites for their new homes, and so eviction was most irksome for women whose husbands were away at work in the south or elsewhere. From Katumba's area, many people moved into Mozambique because 'the Europeans here had started to create a lot of problems for us'. The evictions forced some people to seek new sites in the tsetse areas where 'all their cattle perished'.  

Chief Kalindawalo of Petauke has also declared that, in the evictions carried out, for instance, in 1926, people were paid 'not a single compensation, not even salt. They simply sent instructions from the Boma, telling people to move'. In one case, 'they cheated people that there was an outbreak of a certain disease and that it was necessary to move people to safe areas'. The chief confirmed that notice of eviction was given to allow people time to reap a last harvest and that Boma messengers regularly inspected the villages to be

242. RI/Headman Kamphoza Mvula and others, Katete, 13/3/75; John Moyo Banda and Andreya Banda, Katete, 14/3/75.
sure that the orders were being obeyed. 'Those who tried to resist were forced to move...and some people even went to prison for trying to show resistance'. People were in little doubt about the motives behind the evictions. 'Whenever they saw that the land contained good soil, they said it was now the Government's land and forced people out. They called it Charterland. They snatched all good land...And even up to the present day, some of this land is still idle'. Transport was not provided when the actual removals took place. 'Who could have the courage to ask for transport? People carried all their possessions on their own heads'. The only compensation which Head Messenger Chisenga knew of was that paid sometimes when a new road cut through a village. 'But not when people were forced out of their old villages, they were just ordered to move...and even chiefs were affected. Chief Chimathe was forced to move although he resisted. Messengers were ordered to go and arrest him...and he was brought to the Boma'. In the eyes of the local community this led to the chief's early death. 243

One of the oldest men interviewed in the Chadiza area, Headman Mbingwa Banda, confirmed that

243. RI/Chief Kalindawalo, Petauke, 15/3/75; Head Messenger Meki Chisenga, Petauke, 18/3/75; Headman Nyathande Chirwa, Petauke, 17/3/75.
when officials, like Lane-Poole, announced that villages were to be moved to make way for 'Charterland', there was no payment of compensation in any form; and that people were not given time to arrange their removal. However when he and other headmen, like Mukwanda and Kulikwa, refused to have their villages moved, they were eventually left alone. People at Wanga village in Mpezeni's area traced the start of ndale, or polici-cal organisation among the local people, to anger over what they regarded as the unjust distribution of the land. 'The white men began to survey and divide the land into good farming areas and non-productive soils. They drove people out from the productive areas and settled them on poor lands'. No compensation was given, nor were those who opted to stay on the settlers' farms as tenants given conditions conducive to stability or contentment. Verishoni Tembo, now in his eighties, has testified thus: 'I personally worked as a labourer for Mr Erenesti (sic) and was paid twelve pence. We were given milk for ration. We were not allowed to cultivate private gardens. Where could one find time? So our wives would trek to the villages to find food and at the weekends, husband and wife would both travel home to fetch rations'. Tembo recalled accompanying Thomas Fox-Pitt, a Boma officer, to Kawaza's area at the time when Mpezeni and his people were to be evicted. 'We found the country very poor'. While Tembo himself as a cook at Mwami Mission was receiving 8/- a month,
farm labourers were being paid as little as 2/-, those with long service sometimes drawing 7/6d. No employer in the district offered anything but 'slave wages'. Farm work involved labouring in the sun 'from six to six', often with 'the Bwana watching you toiling and sometimes wielding his stick...If you failed to finish your portion, your ticket would not be marked and you would have to work then for two days to have it marked'.

The consensus of Zambian testimony in those eastern districts is that evicted people were not assisted to transport their possessions. 'After all, the Europeans had no transport themselves. They were being carried in machila'. Moreover, numerous informants have said emphatically that tenants on white farms, employed as labourers, were not given the time necessary for the growing of their own food. Chief Mpezeni has also stated that evicted villagers 'were forced to settle in areas where there was no good water or good soil or grazing ground for their cattle, and that is why there were constant famines among the people'. When the influenza epidemics developed soon after the World War

244. RI/Headman Sam M. Banda, Chadiza, 8/3/75; Verishoni Tembo, Nikazio Tembo, Chitimukutwa Soko and Wilson Mhlanga, Wanga, Chipata, 4/3/75. Thomas Fox-Pitt became a supporter of the Zambian nationalist struggle in the nineteen fifties and thereafter an active member of the Anti-Slavery Society in Britain.
ended and again in 1921-22, people, debilitated by lack of food and by endless long journeys in search of it, died in large numbers. Those who survived had to live 'on wild fruits and roots, and a few lived on milk'. A peasant farmer called Ndelemani, formerly a teacher of the Chitambo Mission in Serenje, has recalled that, in 1941, the Northern Rhodesia Government began to buy back some land from the North Charterland Company so as to resettle some people who had been evicted earlier and had had to struggle for subsistence on poor soil.  

Zambian testimony also makes it clear that local communities, under orders to move, did not regard themselves as having any constitutional means of expressing their attitude to such action or any hope of redress. To them, it would seem, the difference between eviction to let a white farmer occupy their homelands and removal ordered by Boma officials to a 'native reserve' had no significance. In official records, however, whereas individual settlers were advised that compensation should be paid and, in some cases at least, submitted returns of such payments, it was explicitly stated by the Board of the North Charterland Company in 1913 that 'Since these reserves are officially established, no question of compensation will arise'.

As the Maugham Report showed, there was considerable
disagreement between the N.C.C. and the Administration
about the relation of the Charterland Company and its
settler tenants to the African population. The N.C.C.,
in 1912, described the proposed 490 square miles of
'native reserve' as containing 'some of the most fertile
portions of the territory' which Zambian evidence does
not support. The Charterland Company also took excep-
tion to Wallace's instructions about compensation as
'very drastic' and doubted whether the Administrator's
requirement had the sanction of the High Commissioner.
'The position of the settler...is that he has now to pay
an average of £1 per hut...whether the native hut owner
removes...or not and...the native hut owner can culti-
vate any portion of the settlers' farm that he may
select'. Here again the testimony of men who recall
the period of evictions and of 'tenancy agreements' is
sharply at variance with the Charterland Company's
assertion. The situation was obviously complicated
by the lack of decision on the part of the Administra-
tion and its failure to check the serious social debili-
tation that followed the military defeat of the Ngoni.246

The reaction of the B.S.A.C. Directors to the
argument between Wallace and the N.C.C. must have further

246. Maugham Report, op.cit., p. 12, para 36, letter
of NCC Board to Manager (McKerron), 1913);
Appendix Item 50, NCC Memo, Dec. 1912.
embarrassed the Administration. The Board believed that Charterland had 'a legitimate grievance'. 'It is aware of your view', Wallace was told, 'that natives should be compensated on being required to move into the Reserves; but, having regard to the terms of Section 40 of the Northern Rhodesia Order-in-Council it can find no justification for this doctrine. Under that section it is stated that it is the duty of this Company, in Northern Rhodesia as in Southern Rhodesia, to provide sufficient land for the requirements of the native population...The Order-in-Council does not require that the consent of the natives should be obtained nor that compensation shall be paid to them. It has never been suggested in Southern Rhodesia that compensation should be paid...in order to free land for European settlement, and it is feared that the recognition of any such right might be highly prejudicial to European settlement and also lend itself to blackmail'. The Directors wanted Wallace 'to make it as easy as possible for the North Charterland Company to comply' with the provisions of 'the law' in the matter of land. It should be remembered that one of the purposes of Mr Justice Maugham's Enquiry in 1932 was to consider the demand of the North Charterland for compensation in respect of land, excised from what they regarded as their estate in 'the tract', to provide for 'native reserves'.

From the African point of view the mixing of people from one 'tribal' area with another to make a 'reserve' was most unwelcome and in 1915 Wallace expressed his awareness of the people's 'feeling of injustice inflicted upon them' by the whole process of European settlement. Meanwhile, his officials were busy trying to find a criterion for the calculation of how much ground the 'reserves' would require. Worthington, the Secretary for Native Affairs, suggested 4-5 acres per 'adult native'. The Assistant Magistrate proposed 3 acres. Grazing lands in Natal were $9\frac{1}{2}$ acres per head, in Cape Colony 12 and in Basutoland 17. Wallace therefore proposed a minimum of 10 acres in the eastern Luangwa region, with 'up to 38 where the country is poor'. By 1920, however, Cookson, the District Commissioner, was expressing grave concern that, with the rise in tobacco prices and the consequent rapid influx of white farmers and the Charterland Company's demand for the speedy demarcation of 'native reserves', the people of Munukwa and Mafuta were about to be moved to an area afflicted by tsetse fly, 'want of water and barrenness of soil'. Munukwa and Mafuta were meanwhile being 'harrassed and disturbed by new settlers'. The choice before the local people was not a happy one. On the one hand, the 'reserves' were known to be poor places in which to live; on the other hand, as an official in the Chilanga district, near Lusaka, observed in 1917, 'tenancy agreements between settlers and natives had
not been a success. **The tenant in time become more or less the property, practically, of the settler.** He works for less wages than he can earn elsewhere, he is expected to dispose of his surplus crops to the landlord, he is called out to work to suit the convenience of the landlord, often at a time when he should be cultivating his own field'. The two other alternatives open to the hapless man were then *chibalo* or voluntary emigration. Whatever course he followed, *musonko* for himself and all the adults in his care must be paid.\(^{248}\)

On the eve of the end of B.S.A. Company rule, the lot of African people in the only parts of their countries specially designated for them was thus most unsatisfactory. No action had been taken in response to the comment of the Colonial Secretary, in 1915, that 'it might perhaps have been preferable to have provided areas at the outset of sufficient extent to meet any increase in the native population', or to his query as to why compensation rates in the East Luangwa district were 'materially lower' than elsewhere. There was instead consolation for the Company in 1921 when, in response to a plea for action by the Anti-Slavery Society, the Colonial Office said that His Majesty's Government did not intend 'to take any steps for the

presentation of the Native Case'. Yet, early in 1923, the Colonial Office was to tell the B.S.A. Company that 'the grant to the North Charterland Company covering rights over an enormous area, does not appear to H.M.G. to be one which can be regarded as an ordinary administrative act and H.M.G. would feel considerable embarrassment in recognising this concession'. But it was that 'concession' and the upheavals that followed its exploitation of the area that had kept the indigenous communities in a state of insecurity on their native soil throughout the B.S.A.C. period.249

This insecurity was sensed by the first Governor of Northern Rhodesia, Sir Herbert Stanley, who therefore set up a Reserves Commission in 1924. According to Gann, that Commission, chaired by Mr Justice Macdonnell, gave serious attention to the plight of Africans, especially in the Fort Jameson district. We are now at that point in time to which we referred at the start of this review, when we noted the efforts of missionaries, led by men like the Anglican Bishop Alston May and the Methodist Rev. John Fell, to challenge the Administration to alleviate the plight of Africans. May was convinced that it was essential to remove their universal insecurity. In a note on the plan, later

cancelled, to move the people of the Msoro valley to make way for European cotton plantations - he said: 'If Dicky Goode said that "no such step as removal of natives can take place under present regulations",... he was simply talking through his hat. Such things are going on all over the Territory, wherever the White Man covets the Natives' land. Of course, the Native is not "removed" - not forcibly ejected. But he has got to go, and he does go, after receiving handsome "compensation"!...Every official of the Native Department in the Territory would agree with me'. May also commented significantly thus: 'You are quite right in saying...that the N.C.s are "on the whole native-siders"...Naturally, it is not always easy to get at their real minds...they have some hesitation as servants of the Chartered Company in quarreling with their bread and butter, and in some instances it is quite obvious that a sense of loyalty impels them "to make the worse appear the better"'. Thus, on the 'agreements' to 'surrender native rights' the Bishop added that it was obvious that the village dweller, who had 'not the least notion what the land is really worth' was likely 'to part with it for a mere song, especially when he is urged to do so by an official of the Native Department of whom he stands in wholesome awe'. The wholesale removal of large communities, such as was imposed on Mpezeni's people, had put them into a condition of dearth and malnutrition because their numbers were too great for
the capacity of the poor soil on which they and their cattle had been settled. 250

Bishop May's papers contained an extract from a confidential letter which he had received from a Native Commissioner. It illustrated, in May's view 'the sort of thing that happens when Ahab sets his heart on Naboth's vineyard'. The N.C. explained that plans for the Provisional Reserves in the Fort Jameson district were prepared with notable casualness. 'The opinion of Marshall has decided the point as to whether they are suitable. As Marshall's knowledge of the district was very scanty when he offered his opinion, one would suppose that he took the advice of someone who knew the district thoroughly. As a matter of fact, Willis, who had been N.C. for six months, did most of the selecting. P.E. Hall who had been in Fort Jameson...but 9 or 10 months, got together most of the statistics and drew the maps. When these reserves were put before H.H. (the Administrator) someone drew his attention to the fact that the Chiparamba - called the granary of the Fort J. district - was not included in a reserve. H.H. remarked that...the scheme was provisional and nothing was done...But then Marshall called in the Angoni of Musholo (sic Msoro) from that area and pointed out that ground had been

250. Gann 'History', op.cit., pp. 218-19; see pp above; USPG, A.1 (XXVIII) letters by May, 1/12/22 and 16/8/22; and see p. 30 above, quoting Father Guilleme 19/1/22. 'Dicky Goode' was Richard Goode (later Sir) who had once been Secretary to the NER Administration and was Acting Administrator of N. Rhodesia prior to the transfer of authority on 1/4/24.
allocated to them west of the Lutembwe; that they need not move at once, but if they stayed...they would eventually probably have to work for the North Charterland Exploration Company, being tenants. Musholo's folk moved out in large numbers, and their cattle came into touch with fly country and died in hundreds...The whole matter was put through between February and August 1913...
The wicked part about it all is this. The N.C.E. Co. were complaining that they could not find any land free of native rights to mark out...for European occupation. This Company is, as you know, a subsidiary company of the Chartered Company. Land set apart for the N.C.E. Co. benefits also the Chartered Company but not the government of the country after it ceases to be run by the Chartered Company. To my mind, the cart has been put before the horse. More attention has been paid to curtailing the land possession of the natives, who are the real inhabitants of the country...Further, unlike Kenya Colony, the Fort Jameson district is the most densely populated corner of the whole of N.E.R. and it is Fort Jameson which is being thrown open to European occupation'.

In the section on Northern Rhodesia in his 'African Survey', Lord Hailey pointed out that 'when

251. USPG, A.1 (XXVIII) folio 77, extract in May's papers from letter of a N.C., 30/6/22.
the Charter was in process of termination in 1923, the land question was not referred to the Privy Council as had been done in the case of Southern Rhodesia, and the rights of natives in the land did not come under judicial review'. But the British Government endorsed "the B.S.A. Company's title to the areas held by it in northeastern Rhodesia under the "Certificate of Claim", and also the concession to the North Charterland Company'. Moreover, the Company's demand for 'half the proceeds of all sales or leases of land in North-western Rhodesia up to 1965' was granted, thus allowing the B.S.A.C. to retain 'mineral rights over the whole of Northern Rhodesia except Barotseland'. Incidentally, Sir Herbert Stanley remarked privately in 1925 that the Company interpreted the word 'minerals' in its 'most general, extensive and comprehensive sense' to 'include water and also air', and that of course the local chiefs had no idea of the scope of the Company's exploitation. It is noteworthy that it was Yeta of the Lozi, whose position had been to some extent safeguarded by the Colonial Office's frequent queries on the Company's activities in N.W. Rhodesia, who protested strongly at what he regarded as its perfidious behaviour from 1890 to the termination of its direct rule. The B.S.A.C., he said, had entered his kingdom under false pretences, imposed 'concessions' while concealing their real intent and then laid claim to the land which the Lozi were expressly determined not to surrender. 'We claim,' he concluded,
'that all the land and its substances in the Territory belong to the natives'.

In 1921 the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society considered legal action on behalf of the Africans of Northern Rhodesia in the form of an appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council for a ruling on the matter of ownership of all the Native Lands in North-western Rhodesia and large areas in North-eastern Rhodesia, excluding only the Barotse Reserve. One of the men who was active in Britain on behalf of the African cause was the Rev. Arthur Baldwin of the Primitive Methodists, the pioneer missionary among the Ila whose tribulations we noted earlier. A petition was prepared in the name of King Yeta of the Lozi which rejected the B.S.A.C. claim. The Lozi asserted that there had been deliberate deceit in the way in which the Company's agents had materially altered the meaning of the agreements made verbally with Lewanika before obtaining his signature and those of his Council to such agreements in writing. 'It was the first and last wish of King Lewanika and all his Councillors', Yeta declared, 'never to sell or give away their land to any person, persons, Company or State'. Yeta, however, was unable to find the money needed to send a

252. Hailey W., op.cit., p.739; MS Files, Stanley to Sir John Chancellor, Gov. of S. Rhodesia, 'very confidential,' 17/3/25; and letter of Yeta III to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 2/7/23.
delegation to London, and no assistance was offered by the British Government. Moreover, he said: 'We are unable to obtain white witnesses as the Bishop or the Rev. Fell you mentioned is not near us'. Meanwhile the Anti-Slavery Society was informed by its lawyers that an appeal to the Judicial Committee would cost between £5,000 and £10,000. At the same time, however, Sir Drummound Chaplin, the Administrator for the two Rhodesias, expressed the view privately that it was possible that the Privy Council might rule that all unalienated land in Northern Rhodesia belonged 'neither to the Crown nor to the British South Africa Company but to the natives'. This was why he welcomed the British Government's apparent intention not to pursue the matter of Native Reserves. This intention, he believed, was 'due not to disagreement with a policy now well-established in South Africa', but to avoid action that 'might prove embarrassing' should the Privy Council establish, as the Buxton Commission had suggested, that the claim of the Company to land ownership was illegal. Indeed, 'in the opinion of the Secretary of State a claim by the natives to ownership of the land cannot be lightly dismissed'. 253

Nevertheless, Yeta made his 'cry and wail' in 1923 to no effect and, as the Company handed over control to the Crown, no answer came to his sad question: since 'the Imperial Government...in response to our request for Her Majesty's direct protection, had sent the British South Africa Company,...perhaps the Imperial Government gave the British South Africa Company right and power in the Charter to acquire sole ownership of land, minerals, etc. and those rights were to be perpetual. If this were so, why should then the Company claim to have acquired these rights from the natives, and again if it were so, why did not the Imperial Government notify us that it had given the Company such powers even after the expiration of its period of administration?!

The Duke of Devonshire, as Colonial Secretary, asked the High Commissioner to assure Yeta that, 'under the agreement' for the transfer of authority, 'he need not fear that his interests will not receive full consideration'. Yeta was, however, still protesting six years later, even though the B.S.A. Company had attempted to accuse him of asking for a new 'concession' so that he could increase his personal wealth. Yeta affirmed that the original 'concessions' had been acquired by B.S.A.C. men 'accompanied by an armed escort', and that Lewanika had been deceived by their claim to be making a 'treaty or alliance' on behalf of Queen Victoria. Ironically, a contribution to the correspondence of 1929 was made by Frank Worthington who had been with
Coryndon in 1897 when he established himself in the Lozi kingdom 'in a confusing dual capacity as British Resident and Agent for the British South Africa Company'. Worthington now said it had undoubtedly been the promise of protection that had originally secured the 'concession' from Lewanika, for the Lozi King had been 'well aware...of the trouble caused by the concession-hunters who overran Swaziland' and was 'merely aiming at the exclusion of hordes of white strayers who might molest him and disturb the peace of his kingdom'. Indeed, as Lewanika himself had said in a letter to Queen Victoria, in which he called Frank Lochner 'a liar', he wanted British defence against the danger of his country being 'divided into two parts between Portugal and Germany', for the B.S.A.C. had warned him from the start that that was how 'the scramble' might affect the Lozi if he rejected the Company's overtures.254

In this part of our review, in which we have been concerned with the land and natural resources of northern Zambezia, we have not given place to the growth of the mines in the earlier part of the period or to

254. PRO: CO 879/120 Afr.s.no.1096, Yeta to Judicial Committee, 2/7/23; NAZ: SEC/MG/13, Col.Secy. to HC, 20/10/23; Goode to HC, 15/1/24; MSA Files, Record of Questionnaire for Yeta from Attorney-General on relations with BSAC, 2/11/29 and memo by Worthington, 18/1/29; and Lewanika to Queen Victoria, (n.d.), para. 4.
the beginnings of what became the Copperbelt. These have been carefully recorded by both Hall and Gann. From our standpoint, what happened when mining began was that the Company put into operation the land policy which we have noted here and that involved (a) the claim to 'mineral rights' wherever minerals were found, (b) the ignoring and indeed annulling of the land ownership of the local rulers and communities, and (c) the extensive eviction of villages in the vicinity of the mining operations and European townships which inevitably developed in such areas. In the process of opening up mineral deposits, prospectors had the advantage of the 'phenomenally low cost of native labour', while, in order to secure that labour, musonko was raised, as in Kasempa in 1909 by 100%. As Gann observes, mining work was unpopular on account of 'harsh treatment, danger and the many minor abuses inseparable from the control of vast numbers of semi-conscripts by a small harassed staff'. The fact that those 'conscripts' were men who believed themselves to have been conquered by the people whose compatriots controlled the mines, meant that mining in the territory was yet another aspect of the situation of subjugation and injustice. 255

Musonko and chibalo, as we have seen, were of great use to the Company and contributed substantially to its revenue. They were also, no less, major instruments by which the conquest of northern Zambezia was consolidated relentlessly. It is suggested that this was as true of the Company's land policy which, while opening the way for European settlement and exploitation of the wealth of the soil wherever settlers should wish to move in, also forced the indigenous peoples into the position of subjugation, deprivation, debilitation, disintegration and radical insecurity. Thus, as the consensus of Zambian testimony shows, the indigenous peoples, though conscious of relief at the stopping of 'tribal war' and the 'slave trade', experienced virtually nothing of 'protection' and still less of development under the ruthless regime of the Chartered Company.
CHAPTER VI
CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONQUEST

(a) The Chiefs as Kapitaos

Shortly before the end of the B.S.A.C. rule in northern Zambezia, the British Government made a statement in respect of Kenya which was to provide a point of contention in the future development of the territory that eventually became Zambia. A rapid increase in the number of settlers in Kenya after the World War, combined with the economic and political influence exercised by the country's large Asian population, aroused anxiety in London over the dangers of conflict. The famous 1923 dictum of the Duke of Devonshire, then Colonial Secretary, brought a new factor into the arena by declaring 'that it is necessary definitely to record ...that the interests of the African natives must be paramount' and the Britain regarded herself 'as exercising a trust on behalf of the African population' which H.M.G. could not 'delegate or share' and whose objective was 'the protection and advancement of the native races'. Angered by this statement, the white community in Kenya began to look to a closer association with the white communities further south with a view to being able to assert their claims more effectively. This led, six years later, to the Hilton Young Commission's Report on the desirability and feasibility of a closer association between the British territories
in East and Central Africa. The Report rejected the idea that it was essential to buttress 'white civilization' by giving power to the settler communities. It also affirmed that what mattered most was 'the establishment of a rule of justice' which would win 'the loyalty of the native people'. Implicit in such pronouncements was the doctrine of what the League of Nations had called 'a sacred trust' laid upon the colonial powers to guide the progress and advancement of 'peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world'. This was in basic sympathy with the declaration of the Pan-African Congress in Paris in 1919, which had resolved that 'the natives of Africa must have the right to participate in the Government as fast as their development permits, in conformity with the principle that the Government exists for the natives, and not the natives for the Government'.

By 1930, this 'sacred trust' was stated by the British Government to be 'an axiom of British policy'. As Gray points out, however, the practice of 'delegating power to Native Authorities - or "indirect rule" - based partly on Lugard's experience in Nyasaland, Uganda and Nigeria, was developed by Sir Donald Cameron in Tanganyika and was only later introduced in Northern

Rhodesia and Nyasaland'. Such pronouncements, as we have noted here, must be understood as the reaction to the situation created by the end of the World War, rather than as the consequence of a struggle in Britain's 'dependencies' between the rulers and the ruled. Indeed, the power struggle being openly enacted closest to northern Zambezia at the end of our period was that going on south of the river, which led to the according of the status of Crown Colony to Southern Rhodesia under white settler rule. In this connection, it is interesting to note the statement of a leader of the Responsible Government Party there - which could well have been made by a Zambian nationalist forty years later - that 'Liberty in rags is better than well-fed tutelage...We have souls to be saved as well as bodies to be kicked'.

Our concern now, however, is not with the settler communities, but with the consequences of B.S.A. Company rule in northern Zambezia upon the territory's traditional rulers.

Colonial Office correspondence on this subject reveals that, as on other issues relating to Company rule, the Colonial Secretary had misgivings from before the turn of the century. Chamberlain was worried, in 1899, when he heard that a Native Commissioner in

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2. Gray, op.cit., pp. 4-5, citing Memo on Native Policy in East Africa, 1930 (Cmd.3573); Wills, op.cit., p. 244, quoting Sir Charles Coghlan as recorded in Wallis J.P. 'One Man's Hand: The Story of Sir Charles Coghlan and the Liberation of Southern Rhodesia' (1950).
Southern Rhodesia had appointed some sub-chiefs and that Taberer the Chief Native Commissioner had annulled his action and appointed other men. But, said the Secretary of State, 'Chiefs are appointed by the Administrator in Council...and...the appointment and removal of sub-chiefs does not rest with the Chief Native Commissioner...much less with his subordinates'. It was high time that a Secretary for Native Affairs should be appointed to check such irregularities. Yet the rank of the appointing official was of little consequence. What mattered was that chieftainship was not now being regarded as an office resting upon traditional and sacral criteria but upon the will of the conquerors. This same attitude to chieftainship was to become a casus belli between provincial officials of the Northern Rhodesia Government and the African National Congress in the 1950's. However, the British attitude had been 'legalised' in respect of Southern Rhodesia by the 'Native Regulations' promulgated in 1898 which stated explicitly that chiefs 'shall be appointed by the Administration and shall hold office during pleasure and contingent upon good behaviour and general fitness', their responsibilities including 'the prompt supply of men when ordered to supply the same...through Native Commissioners or Assistant Native Commissioners'.

therefore not be an exaggeration to say that the coming of the B.S.A. Company destroyed chieftainship in fact while retaining the semblance of it as an agency of subjugation. Nor is there reason to assume that the Company had a different policy for the region north of the Zambia.

A commentator on the governmental system in the Mbala area in 1897 described the rule of the chiefs as 'a patriarchal one, the people rendering to them certain services which are obligatory and in return for which the chief distributes a considerable part of the wealth he receives'. A few months later, a member of the Anglo-German Boundary Commission, who travelled extensively in the Tanganyika Plateau region, said this: 'Since the arrival of the white man, the chiefs in the administered country have lost nearly all their power. The tribal organisation, practically, does not exist, except with the Awemba. The headman or chief of a large village is nearly powerless...Many villages are in process of disintegration'. In 1899, Robert Codrington told the Colonial Office, as we saw earlier, that if a chief wanted to be 'friends with the white man', he had to obey the orders of the Company's agents when they wanted labour or any other form of service. Codrington then told the B.S.A. Company Directors that a consequence of the new regime in North-eastern Rhodesia was that, when an elephant was killed, 'the ground tusk must be paid to the Administration' since previously
it had been handed over 'to the Chief of the Country - because he was Chief'.

The early reports of missionaries took note of the importance of chiefs, as indeed Livingstone had done. When the L.M.S. missionaries were planning 'the opening of Mission work among the Babemba', in 1900, a visit was paid to Chief Mumpolokoso, 'a man of considerable intelligence...friendly to the European, while intensely interested in everything new'. On that visit, W.R. Johnstone, the Company official, was present when the missionary outlined to the chief their proposal to start schools in his area. In 1904, the missionary at Mbereshi reported the death of King Kazembe whereby, he said, 'the country has lost one of its greatest chiefs and strongest men...his death is a great loss to the Administration, to us, and to the thousands of people who regarded him as King'. Kazembe had not taken kindly to 'the invasion of his territory by the Administration - perhaps that was both natural and justifiable - but as he was brought to understand their motives and methods, they had no more loyal subject than "Kazembe wa Lunda"'. His death was likely to be followed by a scattering of the people into small settlements as was 'the tendency since the advent of the Administration'.

4. C of S Inventory 13, 'Aurora', 1/10/97; Geographical Journal Vol. 13, 1899, No. 6, pp. 577 ff., article by Capt. F.R. Boileau on 'The Nyassa-Tanganyika Plateau'; See p. 386 above; and PLG: BSA 8/15, Codrington to BSAC, 2/2/00.

5. CCWM: C.Africa Reports, Box 1, W.G. Robertson to London, September 1900; Box 12, Nutter, Mbereshi, to London, 24/1/04.
Kazembe, like Mpezeni, had had little choice but to make his accommodation with the B.S.A. Company on which their recognition of him was conditional. The price had been his cooperation as an agent, however reluctant, of their supremacy.

It is generally recognised that the B.S.A. Company operated 'direct rule'. The extent to which this was done and the consequent denigration of chieftainship is illustrated by what we saw in Chapter V above in our review of musonko and chibalo. At an indaba at Abercorn in 1906, an announcement was made by the Administrator, which was confirmed two years later, that if chiefs cooperated in enforcing chisanka and the abandoning of small settlements, forbade the pollarding of trees for ash-fertilisation of fields and assisted the Native Commissioners in tax collection, 'they might seek permission from him on his next visit to kill small game such as mpombo (duiker)'. The attitude of chiefs to the Company's rule was, therefore, understandably reluctant. The Native Commissioner recorded this with the comment that 'the inclination...of the chiefs' was 'to accept as little direct responsibility and authority as possible'. This meant that the N.C., who was trying to use 'the authority and influence of chiefs and headmen...as far as possible', had to undertake 'constant visiting throughout the division'. To the White Fathers in the Nchelenge area on the shores of Lake Mweru, it appeared that, as a result of the arrival of the Company,
the local chief, Kaliminwa, had not 'a shred of autho-

rity except what the Administration allowed to him'. 6

In 1907, the Administration of North-western
Rhodesia was privately discussing the possibility of King
Lewanika's death. On this issue, as on other matters
relating to the special position of Lewanika, the Com-
pany's action involved an element of diplomacy notably
lacking in its dealings with other chiefs. Thus the
S.N.A. advised the District Commissioner, in the event
of the King's death, 'to instruct the Ngambela to assemble
the National Council for...electing a successor in the
usual manner. You should inform him that the elected
Chief will have to be approved and confirmed by King
Edward's Government'. But, said the S.N.A., 'the
Council should not be definitely informed that this
Government nominates Letia and is prepared to support
his candidature'. However, 'it might well be said that
the election of Letia will without doubt receive approval
and confirmation'. It was of great importance to the
Company to have a successor to Lewanika selected before-
hand so that the relationship that had developed, despite
hazards and hostility, between the none too popular King
and themselves might not be upset by the National Council
choosing a member of the Lozi opposition. 7

6. NAZ: KTN 1/1 - Abercorn District Notebook, Vol. I,
reports on indaba, May 1906 and September, 1908;
and WF, Kapatu, 3/11/05.
7. PLG: BSA 9/153, SNA to DC, Barotse, 11/10/07.
Yet the Directors had reason to urge that 'direct rule' should be interpreted carefully. Philip Gell, for instance, warned that, should Company Officials 'administer the law directly and supersede Lewanika and his representatives', they would then 'come face to face with slavery. From the moment the British public and the Colonial Office realize the fact', he said, 'we shall find ourselves in hot water...The country is absolutely unripe for any sudden revolution abolishing the custom of slavery. Yet no one can doubt that if our Commissioners enforced the rights of the slave-owner or failed to treat the slave as a freeman our Charter would be in danger'. Then in a revealing sentence, Gell concluded his argument: 'So long as we can keep Lewanika, we avoid serious responsibilities of this sort and also postpone a heavy increase in our expenditure'. Some years earlier, Lord Grey had confided to Gell his belief that both the northern Administrators, Coryndon and Codrington, should 'go under Milton' in Salisbury for, he said, 'That terrible slavery ordinance of Codrington's gave me an awful shudder as to the mistakes which may occur unless these young men are under some supervision, and Codrington is a better man than Coryndon'. Some formula of 'indirect rule' should thus serve as a buffer between the Company's undertakings in the territory and the moral pressure from Britain to set about the healing of Africa's 'open sore' by surgical means. 8

So much for the distant Directors. For the men in the field, the institution of musonko demanded that they rule directly in such a way that no local community could escape their net, and for this they needed to commandeer the services of chiefs and headmen and punish them decisively if they would not cooperate. Every Native Commissioner must have known that 'hut tax' was deeply resented. It was therefore necessary to offer small subsidies to headmen or, as they were often called, indunas by way of inspanning them as tax agents. In a circular to all outstation officials in mid-1909, the Resident Magistrate at Mungu instructed that such subsidies should be disbursed at the end of March and December, but only if 'the N.C. reports favourably that the induna has given help in tax collecting'. Cooperative headmen each received about £5 for their work as tax agents in that year. Nine years later, the N.C., Lukona, was able to report how a Lozi induna, Muyumbana, had changed his district 'from a nest of defaulters to the best paying community in the Sub-District', for which he was rewarded by a subsidy, for 'pay would be according to results'. Meanwhile, the Administrators were required to call for meticulous returns of tax revenue - some figures being submitted to the last half-penny - and so, according to a report by Melland in 1910, office-work 'showed up' more for promotion, relations with local rulers were diminishing, chiefs were quietly recovering something of their lost status and the N.C.
was employed mainly in collecting musonko, compiling census returns, and gaoling offenders.  

Thoughtful officials were increasingly aware of the parlous ambivalence of the role forced upon chiefs and headmen by their rule. In the words of one of them: 'The policy...is, I understand, to buttress the position of native chiefs and headmen...and to strengthen their authority...In practice, however, it would appear that the influence of chiefs and headmen is slowly waning and unless some definite steps are taken it will soon disappear altogether. The root of the trouble seems to be that chiefs and headmen are given responsibilities without power and work without pay...(They are) held generally for the preservation of order...(and) expected to report all cases of crime, cattle disease or anything else...to the head-quarters of the district;...expected to notify tax defaulters...(and) authorised to settle minor disputes, though they have no authority to carry out their decisions'. Most of their duties were 'of a burdensome character' and though sometimes small 'subsidies' were given to them, 'in the great majority of cases, I understand, they receive nothing from the Government'. In some cases, 'native advisers' were called to sit with the N.C. to hear cases involving

local customs, but 'the decision is always that of the Native Commissioner'. At the same time, the Public Prosecutor for North-western Rhodesia put on record this opinion: 'Taken as a whole the standard of justice in this territory is a low one...I am by no means satisfied that real and substantial justice is habitually done...particularly in native cases. Yet real and substantial justice is, I should have imagined, the basis of all successful native administration'.

Subsidies were not only erratic but very small. From 1906 onwards, Chitimukulu, the Paramount Chief of the Bemba, received £1 per month, while his two senior subordinates received £6 a year and lesser subordinates as little as thirty shillings a year. Yet the Bemba kingdom was recognised as being one of the major parts of northern Zambezia. Mpezeni received £12 p.a. unchanged from 1903 and those under him were paid similarly to the Bemba subordinate chiefs. In 1921, Mpezeni's subsidy had risen to just over £14 a year. The vast difference between such subsidies and the subvention to Lewanika is an earnest of the price the Company had to pay for the persistent oversight by the Colonial Office of its dealings with the Lozi kingdom. Then, from 1914 onwards, chiefs were required to pay tax for

10. PLG: BSA 10/5, Report on Admin. of NW and MER, by W.L. Hichens, 24/1/10; NAZ: G 1/1, confidential minute from Public Prosecutor to Admin., Livingstone, 27/1/10.
themselves and since most of them were polygamous, this could easily amount to £4 or more a year.

Whatever may have been the early intention of Coryndon and Codrington, it is not easy to accept without qualification Lord Hailey's statement that the Chartered Company, in its policy of direct rule, used the chiefs as its agents while 'upholding their privileges as far as these were not incompatible with company rule', the general effect being 'to preserve the outward form of the indigenous systems but to undermine the authority of the Chiefs'. For very little of the outward form seems to have been preserved in a system whereby the chiefs were now in effect foremen or kapitao of the foreign regime, unable to escape from that position except by being deposed and incapable of serving their people except by cushioning the impact of the harsher rigours of 'direct rule'.

The Resident Commissioner in Salisbury apparently scrutinised administrative reports from north of the Zambezi. In 1915, his Secretary remarked that 'the influence that chiefs and headmen have over their people would appear to depend in large measure on the support they receive from their Native Commissioner'. But in

practical terms what did this mean? For their position vis-a-vis their people was such that they were bound to be conscious of a diminution of respect towards them. Therefore those chiefs who reported their people's demeanour to the N.C.s would be likely to receive the support of the Company agents in enforcing the orders and regulations which they were required to transmit to their people. The comment of the Native Commissioner for Mporokoso was probably much more perceptive, when he said: 'The taxation of chiefs tends...to lower their prestige to an unnecessary extent. It is not so much the actual cash spent...as the knowledge that they are not differentiated from the common herd'. In view of the relative small increase in revenue accruing from the taxation of chiefs, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that such a humiliating device, introduced over a decade after the start of Company rule, has to be understood as a coercive if not a penal measure designed to bring home to chiefs the power of the Boma. 12

It is not surprising, therefore, that a number of officials regarded chiefs, in the middle years of our period, as useless. Theodore Williams of Mwinilunga, for instance, was very worried in mid-1914 when he discovered that the transfer of Pound, his dreaded superior, was leading the people 'to think that "the millenium has come" and they can do as they like'.

began leaving big villages to build their own settle-
ments and this, said Williams, 'busts up your census and
"Who's who"'. Yet 'administration through the chiefs'
was 'scarcely existent' and so he had to start personally
threatening and cajoling people to choose between re-
joining the big villages or being driven over the Congo
border. A chief, he said, 'occupies in fact very much
the intermediary position of a prefect at a school, with
perhaps less in the way of perquisites of office. I
wouldn't be a prefect again for under £100 a year - and
if I were Kazumbazumba I wouldn't remain chief at any
price whatever. For until the people have got used to
this kind of control...they cannot help hating their
Chief as the tool of the Boma and despising him for his
dirty intermediary position. In the old days,...he
would at least have their fear and the orders he gave
would be all his own'. In 1918, when at Solwezi,
Williams told his parents of the arrival of Marshall,
the visiting Commissioner, and an auditor. 'It irks
me', he said, 'and I am ashamed to call in these poor
old chiefs and headmen just to sit in front of the
office verandah and be told they are all good boys
(which by the way is a lie and it puzzles them why we
should always be telling them the opposite) and hummed
and hawed at when they ask sincere or pointed questions'.

13 RH:MSS.Afr.s.779, letters of Williams, p. 363,
24/6/14; MSS.Afr.s.780, Williams, p. 217, 10/3/17,
and p.326, 19/8/18. Underlining is mine.
The gun, whether fired or not, had subdued the land. The constant display of modern firearms wherever B.S.A.C. men went had secured what Wills has called 'the African submission'. To the official who was required to rule his district and make it meet from 'hut tax' the costs of 'administration' and more, the sullen non-cooperation of the people and their rulers was, however, a constant irritant and served to increase the harshness of his 'discipline'. The statement by Bellis of Ndola in his 1914-15 Report was representative of the reactions of N.C.s throughout the territory: 'With scarcely one exception, there is not a chief in the District who has any real authority over his people and who is of any use to the Administration; and the number of Headmen who make the slightest endeavour to assist the officials...in any active way might be numbered on the fingers of one's hand'. Yet, as we have seen, throughout our review, B.S.A.C. rule used widespread coercion and intimidation. This non-cooperation must surely then be understood, not as a biological deficiency in the local people as some angry officials would have said, but as the sullen, corporate and unanimous resistance of communities whom the Company had subjugated by weapons vastly superior to any that those communities could have hoped to muster. But the chiefs had to stay in their impossible middle position and, during the years of the World War, were coerced even more insistently to provide the men required for
porterage. It could therefore be expected that, as reported from Serenje in 1918, people should begin 'to refuse all recognition of, and customary duty to, chiefs'. Elsewhere in the same Report, the N.C. praised those chiefs and headmen who had 'done their best' in the matter of war recruitment, 'at times risking decided unpopularity'.

In view of such statements, it is right to note here the interpretation that Meebelo puts upon the effects of the rigours of the War on the standing of chiefs, especially in relation to the impact of the 'Administration of Natives Proclamation, No. 8 of 1916'. Meebelo's view is that 'the recruitment of labour for the war which the chiefs and headmen had to carry out on behalf of the Administration under the proclamation, afforded them the opportunity of exercising a measure of authority over their people which until now they had eschewed. The sobering effect of the war, which for the most part prevailed over a people who in the past had almost invariably shown a defiant attitude towards authority, indeed made even more possible the exercise of these powers, and in a way restored the sense of self-confidence which the traditional rulers seemed to have lost during the previous two decades of white rule'.


In contrast to this is the impression given by the Lundazi Report for 1916-17 which described chiefs and headmen as 'very passive'.

As mentioned earlier, Frank Melland was widely regarded as outstanding as a liberal and forward-looking man who had a genuine sympathy with the communities over whom he ruled. Moreover, he did not hesitate to admit to the General Missionary Conference that 'the habit of treating the native as a commodity at the disposal of the white', coupled with 'the entire absence of any cooperation between us and the people most concerned - the natives themselves', had led to 'stagnation...(for) Law, order and discipline are not progress'. He also remarked that 'all our laws here...are either for the white, for the relations between white and black, or for the government and taxation of the black; not one for the blacks themselves'. There appears to have been a close understanding between Melland, when he was in Kasempa, and Theodore Williams, who recorded that Melland favoured the 'Divisional Headman scheme' that he was operating in 1919 and which he in fact had copied from Mporokoso. It was a scheme 'analogous to the Jamaica "Responsible Persons" apparatus...the appointment and management of intelligent commoners...each with a group of from 3 to 10 villages...who acts as mouthpiece for the Boma and for the Chief and as general tale-teller

against his people,...liable to be held to account for all misdemeanours...and paid according to deserts'.

Even in a district governed with some benevolence, however, 'traditional rulers' had to be servants of the 'conquering Englishman'. In a revealing statement in 1918, about the Lozi 'litunga' or King and the scope of the Lozi 'empire', the S.N.A. stated that the litunga's 'claims would die if the outside natives refused to recognise them and we did not support them. This should come', he added, 'with the general breaking down of all Chiefs' power'. 17

Elsewhere in the territory, the situation in the last few years of B.S.A.C. rule, as pieced together from District Reports, was unhappy. We noted earlier the comments, in the same year, of the judge at the Watchtower trial at Kasama. The continuing element of dishonesty in the Company's dealings with the indigenous people was illustrated, in 1920, by the comment of the Native Commissioner at Namwala that 'where a chief received payment for roads, he did not get anything from the Subsidy Vote'. He probably realised that the chiefs concerned were aware of being defrauded. It was most important, he added, 'that the matter should be made

plain and straightforward by recognising the subsidy and not confusing it with other payments'. The comments on the unhappy role of the chiefs made in 1910, which we have noted here, were echoed from Lundazi, twelve years later, by Lane-Poole. 'The position of Chiefs and Headmen is no sinecure', he said, '...and is regarded as carrying more burdens than privileges'. Younger headmen were obliged to leave home in search of work, with serious consequences. 'The suggestion made many years ago that Headmen of villages containing a certain number of huts should be exempt from taxation has more weight now than then, and would at least secure the permanent presence in the village of the person responsible for it'. The men ultimately responsible for the direction of B.S.A.C. policy had, as Lane-Poole said, been given advice which they had ignored, with disastrous results.

To the Anglican priest at Msoro, the position in 1922 was shocking. 'In this territory as in South Africa', he wrote to Bishop May, 'the natives have no representative...Take the case of the 10/- tax, this iniquitous robbery...(It) has done more than anything to break up the tribal system upon which the government of the country must depend until something can be produced which can replace it'. Yet Taggart, the Magistrate

for the Mweru-Luapula District, was still contending, in 1923, that musonko was a logical development from the customary tribute paid by every village dweller to his chief before Company rule began. Such tribute he said, 'whether it took the form of service or payment in kind was the test of his loyalty and of the stability of the government for the time being. Our tax takes the place of this tribute'. Taggart believed that tax default was far from diminishing which meant that there was 'a decrease in the observance by the mass of natives of one of their most important duties to the state'.

The claim of the B.S.A. Company to the right to appoint and depose chiefs wholly ignored the manner by which election to chieftaincy was traditionally made. Undoubtedly, as elsewhere in the world, the choice of a new imfumu, mulena, mwami, mwa(n)ta, themba or nkosi, would sometimes provoke factional enmities and even war. But all Central African chieftainships evidently required sacral rites for their confirmation. Among the Bemba, for example, the Chitimukulu is believed to be descended from a great ancestress and to inherit the guardian spirits or imipashi of the royal line. Taboos surround his life and sacred relics (babeny) of the chieftainship are preserved by his councillors or bakabilo, as symbols.

of the continuation of the royal line. Special rites attend the funeral of a Chitimukulu and the royal burial place at Shimwalule in the Chinsali District is forbidden to visitors. 20

Similar sacral rites surround the chieftaincy of other Zambian peoples. Like the Bemba, a number of such societies trace their cohesion and identity to a royal line associated with religious ceremonial and taboo. This is the case with the Kazembe line in the eastern Lunda as with their cousins, the western Lunda of the Mwinilunga area and the Luvale, all of whom have royal houses deriving from the imperial family of Mwatayamvwa (or Mwantiyanvwa) in the north between the Kasai and Boshimaie rivers. Kazembe, in recounting Lunda history, uses the first person when talking of his predecessors, in token of the continuity of the kingship. With the Lozi also the kingship has been the object of veneration despite the major dislocation of the period when they were conquered by the Kololo of Sebitwane (1840-64). Among them, a rich nomenclature of royalty survives, with a wide range of symbols and

20. See Richards A., 'The Bemba of Northern Rhodesia' in Colson E. and Gluckman M. (ed.) 'Seven Tribes of British Central Africa' (Manchester 1961) pp. 168-171; RH:MSS.Afr.s.1214, undated MS by Stephen Bwalya on 'Customs and Habits of the Bemba'; and Roberts A.D. op.cit., pp. xxx-xxx1. The titles for 'chief' listed here are as used by the Bemba and related peoples; the Lozi; Tonga and related peoples; Lunda and related peoples; Tumbuka and related peoples; and Ngoni respectively.
ceremonies; and the Lozi say 'Mulena ha'ashwa, sicaba sashwa - When the King dies, the nation falls into coma'.

In the east, Ngoni kingship had had a turgid history before the coming of the white invaders; but each of the modern kingdoms of Ngoni claims direct descent from the hero-king Zwangendaba by whom the original Jere were led as fugitives from Shaka's despotic rule in 1919 after a great battle on the Mhlatuze river in Natal and under whose command they crossed the Zambezi in 1835. 21

This pattern of royalty as the primary cohesive force of the community or nation can be extended to many more of the peoples of northern Zambezia. Its importance for us here is that, despite the hammering and humiliation which local rulers suffered under B.S.A.C. rule, the institution survived albeit often in a debilitated state. It is therefore suggested that the willingness of the incumbents to suffer such hardships can be explained by the immemorial roots of chieftaincy in their people's consciousness and by their people's continuing loyalty to the sacred office of chief or king,

despite its public humiliation. Obviously, it helps to explain the impossibly parlous position of chiefs south of the Zambezi in the 1970s, many of whom have no legitimacy for their office other than their appointment by an official of a regime established by foreign conquest.

Zambian testimony from many parts of the country makes it clear that people were acutely aware of what was being done to their rulers. Headman Guduza in Lundazi District has said that for years no one could 'question or challenge the white man's authority,...not even our chiefs. For, as soon as you were found questioning, you were thrown behind bars and beaten...If a chief tried to question anything, he was met with threats of losing his chieftainship and so he had to succumb...Our chiefs just acted as kapitaos for the white man'. Chief Zumwanda's personal evidence was recorded thus: 'They came and said, "Tomorrow, we want 20 men to carry our loads". By 8 o'clock the following day you reported at the Boma with 20 men. "Good, let us have their names. Tomorrow, we want 30 more"...This was slavery. If you dared to complain,...they said you were no longer a chief'. The Lala chief, Shaibila, has confirmed this testimony: 'People realised that their chiefs had lost their power and authority to the Europeans and that if a chief offended, he would land in trouble like any other person'. Moreover, under B.S.A.C. rule, though tribute service to the chief -
mulasa - was allowed to continue, the judicial authority of the chief was taken over by the Boma. 22

Because Chartered Company men employed messengers and *askari* who often acted beyond their instructions in order to force people's obedience, it was inevitable that chiefs should sometimes be subjected to rough handling along with their subjects. In the Soli area of Chief Shikabeta, the memory is still fresh of how 'a chief called Chikungu was murdered by Selesele's *askari*', a member of the royal house of Mbosha. As we have seen earlier, 'Chirupula' or 'Selesele' Stephenson was remembered as a fierce and cruel man and his *askari* may well also have been exceptionally rough; especially since 'when the white men came to the village, they never offered any respect to the chief...If the messengers found that all the young men had gone, the Collector would order that the headman or chief should be arrested and beaten, and even women were treated in that manner'. Chief Shikabeta, in recounting how tax raids were conducted by Boma messengers, has vouched for the fact that 'if someone died without paying tax, the messengers would take a sjambok and strike the grave'. While this kind of outrage went on, many testimonies confirm that the Collectors and Native Commissioners demanded servile respect from the people whose villages

22. Proceedings of Seminar-Workshop on Local History, Lundazi, June 1972, pp. 147 and 120; RI/Chief Shaibild, Mkushi, 14/8/74. Underlining is mine.
they visited and it fell to headmen and chiefs to lead their people in 'songs of praise and ululating and beating drums' and to present gifts of flour or chickens. 23

For some people, the subservience of their chiefs to the Company agents suggested that the imposition of *musonko* and other regulations had been 'first arranged and agreed between the chiefs and the officials'. That impression found seeming confirmation when a chief sent a messenger to gather people for tax collection. Near Lake Mweru one such messenger, Chipambala, has recalled how he used to summon people with an incantation like this:

> !All elders, gather to pay your tax.  
> I have been sent by the King.  
> This message comes from the Boma  
> Gather, all of you.  
> Even you mothers, the Boma is here,  
> Gather your young ones from all your houses.  
> Have you heard, you elders?  
> This is the end of the message.  
> I am Chipambala'.

To other people, the degradation of the chiefs was aggravated by the attitude of white agents of both the Boma and Missions towards traditional religion, prayer and sacrifice in which chiefs played a leading role, which led to the condemnation and sometimes the banning of certain customs. Also in Chiengi, senior people recall how the officials 'not only detained chiefs but withdrew their chieftainships...Included in this list were

23. RI/Chapenda Kandidwe at Chief Shikabeta's court, Rufunsa, 2/9/74; Simon Ngulube at Chief Mbuluma's court, Feira, 4/9/74.
Kalembwe, Lambwe Chomba, Chikwama, Chipungu and Munkumbwe'.

Near Mweru Marsh, in the area of Mukupa Katandula, it has been said by older men that whereas the Europeans seemed at first to come in peace, they quickly changed and began to degrade chiefs and headmen in various ways. This testimony accords with the view of Theodore Williams, when at Mwinilunga, that it was the determination to extract tax at all costs that destroyed the hope of good relations and constructive policies. One such informant has said that this brought widespread fear and precluded the possibility of resistance or even discussion. When asked 'Surely the people should have resisted such intrusion?', he replied thus: 'My son, resist whom? People were fully aware that these men with white skins were brutal, carrying guns under their arms, Could you dare to argue with such a man? When they first came, they appeared good and that is why people and their chiefs welcomed them'. On Chilubi Island in Lake Bangweulu, local memory gives place to a peaceable white man called Ngalamika - whose European name and time of arrival could not be traced - who stayed long enough to establish friendly relations in the community. When others came with different manners

and began the oppressive collection of *musonko*, people's resentment was kept in check at first because 'the power to order men to fight lay in the hands of the chiefs... and if the chiefs did not attempt to fight against a particular person, the people could never do so on their own'. 25

Zambian evidence is, moreover, unanimous that the customary tribute service, called in some parts *mulasa*, was essentially different from *musonko*. The words of one elderly woman on this subject are worth recording as being representative of testimonies received in widely separated parts of the country. 'Chiefs were greatly respected and they also had respect for their people. People used to offer free service to their chiefs, working freely on the chief's fields. In return, the chiefs would entertain the volunteers to a beer party and a feast. Then another group from another village would follow in working on the chief's gardens. During the time of weeding, women would also volunteer. They would harvest the cassava and pumpkins which they were free to eat as they desired. There was no opposition from any member of the community to offering such service to the chief'. 26 In the eyes of the subjugated communities of northern Zambezia, *musonko* was

25. RI/Kamushimi Mponda and others, Mukupa Katandula, 26/11/74; Headman Mbilima, Banakulu Tom, Mapulanga and others, Chilubi Island, 20/4/74.

26. RI/Ba Nakasese, Mushamba village, Samfya, 19/11/74.
totally different. It was a symbol of disrespect and oppression; it brought nothing in return; there was no rejoicing associated with it; but instead its exaction brought shame and humiliation upon chiefs and commoners alike.

In a land in which news passed quickly from village to village and kingdom to kingdom, the oppression of chiefs was regarded from the outset as oppression of all the people, as has been testified by the father of one of the early leaders of Zambia's United National Independence Party: 'It was a real war. Chief Mailo was ruling. Bwana Kandeche ordered all chiefs who owned cattle and ivory to surrender them. He arrested Chief Mailo and chained him. The chief, knowing the danger he was in, decided to move us with herds of cattle and goats to a safer place. In the event of his death, he wanted me to be safe so that I could succeed him. He then told his chief councillors, Chiboshi and Chibungo, to take care of me. I was then a young man. Chief Mailo was really tortured by the white man. In the end he sent for some cattle to offer to the white man in exchange for his release'.

Zambian chieftainship is distinguished by a rich treasury of praise-names. The chief was expected

27. RI/ Noah Kapika, own village, Serenji, 17/10/73.
to embody the wisdom and the wealth of the community. Not all African communities had kings or chiefs. But where the apex of government had been invested in such a person, 'they are', as Professor Mbiti has said, 'not simply political heads. 'They are the mystical and religious heads, the divine symbol of their people's health and welfare...their office is the link between human rule and spiritual government. They are therefore divine or sacral rulers, the shadow or reflection of God's rule in the universe'. It may well be that 'the office of the traditional monarch is losing its sacredness and seems to be degenerating to the unenviable point of being a political anachronism and an economic debit'.

As far as our review is concerned, however, there emerge from the data we have gathered together two main points: firstly, that the position of chiefs made them handy instruments for the effecting of policies of the B.S.A. Company which required 'pacification' and obedience in order to effect the exploitation of the territory; but that, secondly, the institution of chieftainship, though emaciated, generally survived the harsh treatment and public humiliation imposed upon it because it was deeply rooted in the whole socio-religious fabric of the communities on whom the impact of the Chartered Company fell.

(b) The totalitarian Colour Bar

As the twentieth century has progressed, the crisis in Africa has been increasingly associated with race relations and the 'colour bar', 'fundamental human rights' and the movement for 'total liberation'. But over fifty years ago, and at the end of the period which we are reviewing, such questions were already arousing deep emotions. In his review of a book called 'Africa - Slave or Free?' by J.H. Harris, the Rev. Arthur Cripps, a missionary in Southern Rhodesia, quoted this verse:

"He hangs, the Christ of Ham,
Worm and no man, these many years.
And who is there will take Him down
Of all the crowd He moves to tears?
Your Christ, Your God, five gaping wounds
Are in His hands, His feet, His side -
Eclipse of Faith, Stark Cruelty,
Slave-thirst, God Hunger, Japhet's Pride". 29

In passing, it should be mentioned that there is still need for a scholarly study of the role of 'involved' Christians of both races in the great continental struggle, for such evidence as has been studied suggests a more significant and widespread contribution than has been chronicled adequately so far.

The mental disposition of British people in the immediately pre-colonial period has been well documented by H.A.C. Cairns. Gann has provided an annotated historical picture of northern Zambezia that

29. USPG - C 2, Item 15, review by A.S. Cripps of Harris's book (S.C.M. Press), October 1920; and see Ranger T.O., op.cit., sundry refs. to Cripps and other missionaries.
gives consistent sympathy to the aspirations, endeavours and tribulations of 'white settlers'. The 'Northern Rhodesia Journal' produced, in its day, a series of readable portraits of 'the pioneers' who have been also well served by Brelsford and Gelfand. Our concern here is with the 'colour bar' in relation to the real nature of the Chartered Company's northward thrust and its consequent mode of 'government'; to understand the 'colour bar' as a corrolary of conquest and so, logically, as a root cause of the movement towards radical change that was led by Kenneth Kaunda and his colleagues in the middle of the century.

When Leopold Moore suggested, in the 'Livingstone Mail' in 1908, that many missionaries were 'quite uninfluenced by the Imperial Idea', he may well have been right in his diagnosis. For the essence of the 'Imperial Idea' in practice seems to have been that a 'civilised nation', which had the energy and the equipment necessary to enable it to annex territories beyond its own frontiers, thereby established its 'right' to exploit such territories maximally, the consequence being that 'native peoples' must be debarred from free access to the resources being so exploited and to the wealth accruing from those exploitative undertakings.

30. See Cairns, op.cit.; Gann 'History' and 'Birth' op.cit.; NRJ, sundry articles; Brelsford W.V., 'Generation of Men' (Manning 1965), and Gelfand M. op.cit.

31. 'Livingstone Mail 25/7/08; and see, e.g. p. 510-11 above.
Perhaps this debarring is essentially what the 'colour bar' is, a system that gained, almost as soon as it started, the accretion of historical, ethnic, biological, and cultural rationalisations which gave it both respectability and credibility in 'civilised' circles. But, if our judgments are to be just, we cannot assume that people placed on the other side of the bar could view it as it was viewed by those who took the initiative in raising the barriers.

Domination was a major element in the Chartered Company's thrust into northern Zambezia and inevitably it gave rise to profound and pervasive mistrust. This is surely a feature of all such conquests. The unavoidable language barrier therefore quickly became, on both sides, an instrument of deception. In 1898, for example, the Blantyre Mission's newssheet noted that labourers on the plantations were using a clever device of speech to make sure that the Azungu, as white men were called, could not understand what they were saying. This was done by interspersing sentences with -china-, placed between the two last syllables of certain words, and the 'language' so produced was called Chinalimuka. Another such code language was produced by simply putting the second syllable of a word before the first so that, for instance, nyumba (a house) became mbanyu. Much
could then be discussed which the white men could not understand.\textsuperscript{32}

When we recall the instances of violence that marked the first white incursions, it is easy to understand not only why black people wanted a code language but also that their remarks about the white men's behaviour must often have been bitter and angry. This is why the songs of the men who carried Boma officials and others in \textit{machila} are of interest, like this one from Chief Mbuluma's area in the Feira district:

\begin{center}
\textit{Tabela wee, tabela mante,}  \\
\textit{O tabela aye, tabela mambo!}  \\
\textit{Tabela wee, tabela mambo,}  \\
\textit{Tabela wee, O tabela mambo tabela!};  \\
\end{center}

the gist of which was: 'We have no more peace and are in slavery again, for the Europeans are troubling us'. Another such ditty from the Soli of Rufunsa ran thus:

\begin{center}
\textit{Mukulula, mukulula;}  \\
\textit{Washima moto, washima moto;}  \\
\textit{Mukulula, mukulula'}.
\end{center}

'Things are bitter, things are bitter and the fire is dead'. We noted earlier the carriers' chorus about the swooping hawk, and it appears that such songs were in very general use. Another such chorus, in the

\textsuperscript{32} 'Life and Work', June 1898; and note that Muzungu or Musungu (pl. Azungu or Basungu) has been defined by Zambians in the Isoka district as meaning 'the amazing person' from \textit{kuzungusya}, to cause wonder; while in Feira and Rufunsa, informants say it derives from \textit{kuzungulila}, to go round or encircle, since white men seemed to be encompassing a huge area when they entered northern Zambezia.
Bemba language, had run thus:-

'Ichikoti cha kwa Bwana chili fye chapambana, CHILETI chabelebeta, no mutima mu nda waya'.

Literally, it said that the white Bwana's whip was active and flashing, but the heart inside him was gone. It meant that by his seemingly careless brutality, he revealed that he knew revenge might come upon him. Such ditties may indeed parallel those plantation songs of southern America whose simple, repetitive words had deep and often 'political' meanings.33

In 1894 Harry Johnston said that Central Africa was 'not a country where the European of low class or bad morals is likely to thrive'. But the B.S.A. Company's early Administrators faced 'considerable difficulty' in checking the flow of white men across the Zambezi, 'many of whom would be adventurers of the lowest class', as was reported early in 1899. Company officials had 'no legal power' over such people who would certainly not submit to the laws or controls of any local ruler. The situation was 'most unsatisfactory', according to Lawley, who added: 'The prestige of the white man is being constantly injured and degraded' by the conduct of lawless Europeans. There

was 'a grave danger of such an organisation being set afoot as resulted in the Stellaland troubles of 1884-85'.
Many of this 'most undesirable class of adventurer' were coming to get cattle, 'failing fair means, by foul', and were accompanied by armed askari. 34

Three years later, however, Coryndon reported that not more than 200 white people were in North-western Rhodesia and that 'generally speaking the type of immigrants is good'. But in the press cuttings filed by Edwin Smith, who was perhaps the best known of the earlier Methodist missionaries, there were revealing extracts from newspapers of the crucial period. One gave the comment of a white man in the south that he had no problem in his relations with the 'Matabele and Zambesis' in his employ. 'It's not the black labour that is wrong, it's the white', he added. But the 'Rhodesia Herald' took a very different view: 'Blacks, as several hundred years' experience has demonstrated, are inferior to Whites and...will ultimately be treated here as elsewhere between Zambesi and the Cape. We regret that men should be hanged anywhere for shooting natives whether in cold blood or not...However the Boers treated the blacks, Britain is not fighting them.

on that point'. In 1903, there was, as we saw earlier, great anger in Southern Rhodesia over some cases of assault on white women by black men; and there was a marked increase in explicit statements of white superiority. A trader at Kazungula, called Kominsky, had his licence revoked and was ordered to leave Northwestern Rhodesia because he greeted a Lozi induna by squatting on the ground, after the manner of Lozi courtesy, and clapping his hands. 'A white man who offers such a salute to a native', said the Administrator's Secretary, 'not only brings himself into contempt but... injures the respectful feeling which natives entertain for white men generally'. Four years later, the High Commissioner, in personal conversation, rejected Lewanika's protest against the demands of white people that everyone of them should be accorded 'the salute he thinks he deserves' - a demand which the people felt 'sorely'. Selborne instead endorsed Codrington's ruling that people should 'take off hats to all white men' and that the King should instruct his indunas that 'scrupulous courtesy and respect' must always be shown to Europeans.35

In 1905, a plan was announced to start a 'Rifle Association' which would enrol all white people in the northwest as members. Its first meeting in Kalomo 'was attended by every white resident...and...marked by the greatest unanimity'. However, the Secretary of Native Affairs soon afterwards submitted a lengthy memorandum to the Administrator in which he asked for more magisterial power for district officials. Recent murder cases had involved African witnesses having to be 'detained without pay for sometimes four months' while awaiting the sitting of a court. No official had authority to do more than hold an enquiry in cases of white men versus black and so 'the native if he be the injured party must take his case before the Magistrate who is possibly stationed two hundred or more miles away'. Should the white man involved refuse to go to the district headquarters, the local official had to escort him in person, since no African policeman was allowed to do so, and this involved long periods of absence. 'The first white men to enter a young country are as a rule', said Worthington, 'of the worst class ...we have derelict sub-contractors, unauthorised labour touts, migratory Boers, prospectors and mechanics without means of support'. Despite the risk involved in giving judicial powers to sub-district officials, the graver danger, in the S.N.A.'s opinion, was that 'sooner or later the wronged natives will take the law into their own hands'. By making such officials 'Special
Justices' as in Southern Rhodesia, the situation could be safeguarded. 'In this manner only will the native receive that protection to which the payment of taxes entitles him'. Worthington, when he was Secretary to the Administrator in Bulawayo some years earlier, had recorded cases involving brutality and violence on the part of such white immigrants as he now described. Yet, as we saw above, he was personally not averse to the use of violence by Boma officials.36

The rigidity of the bar between the races had just been further exemplified when a group of white rioters had attacked shops in Livingstone, arousing indignation in the rest of the European community and presenting the authorities with the grave problem of how to control such behaviour, 'in consequence of the very reasonable prejudice' against using black police 'for the arrest of white men'. In consequence of this type of thinking Leopold Moore approved the enforcement of musonko by armed force in the area around the mines in the Hook of the Kafue, rejected taxation of Europeans outright and insisted that since "government is ultimately for the benefit of the governed and the governed nowadays have votes", the white community must demand the franchise. At the same time, the 'Livingstone

36. PRO: CO 879/86 Afr.S.no. 763, report on 'defence of North-western Rhodesia', 4/10/05; NAZ: BS 2/181/I - SNA to Admin., 11/10/06; see also, BS 2/159/I, Worthington's report on 'the affair at Mokobela's Kraal' in S.R., 22/4/99, and see p. 329 above. Underlining is mine.
Mail' was reporting the revolution of the Russian peasants, 'seditious movements' in India involving 'rustics armed with bludgeons' and the danger of a further rising in Zululand. Coryndon, however, was now realising that his district staff required some knowledge of local languages and so proposed that missionaries like Edwin Smith of the Methodists and the controversial Jesuit, Father Torrend, should be asked to undertake both the teaching and the examination of language proficiency.  

By 1910, as we saw earlier, Moor was persuaded that North-western Rhodesia was 'trying the "equality policy"', imposed by the British Government, and wreaking havoc thereby. But the leader of a Magnetic Survey team, on a visit to the territory had interpreted the situation otherwise. He saw it as potentially 'a white man's country from the Zambesi to Tanganyika'. The officials, he said, were 'just ordinary English gentlemen (who)...by the way they have obtained the respect of the natives and the just and sympathetic manner in which they treat the natives, really make one feel proud of one's countrymen...doing work here which will for generations be remembered to the credit of England'. It was this paternalistic view that so riled men like

Moore whose reactions must be understood as representative of a powerful force in the territory's affairs right up to 1964.  

The B.S.A.C. papers, held in the National Archives of Zambia, have preserved a statement on white superiority whose benevolent language echoed sentiments widely held in Britain in her imperial heyday. Because that statement by a Portuguese resident in Central Africa dates from 1909, during what appears to have been a crucial period in northern Zambezia, it merits quotation. Claiming that 'Divine Power' demanded that whites should rule, the Portuguese, M. Teixeira-de-Mathos, gave his views thus: 'Every decent white in Africa feels a certain responsibility for the natives which arises from our conviction of being a superior race. The natives recognise this superiority and are grateful for our protection and help. The government of the native races is a burden which we like to carry but one which we cannot shake off as long as they need our help'.  

The history of Southern and Central Africa, and indeed of parts of East and West Africa, has shown how readily this benevolent view agrees with


that of harsh despisers when it comes to deciding how
to deal with 'insolence' or 'rebellion' on the part of
local communities and nations.

It was the opinion of Selborne, the High Commis-
sioner, at that time that northern Zambezia, with its
'infinitesimal population of white people' required only
a 'government for natives'. A representative settler
held that the territory would be 'free from a native
problem' as long as black people were universally de-
barred from entering the field of 'skilled work'. But
what some British newspapers had earlier called 'the
thin red line of railway' was pushing northward and
increasingly the difference between the territories on
either side of the Zambezi, in terms of race relations,
was merely one of degree. When, therefore, King Le-
wanika was called to a meeting in Livingstone in 1910
to hear plans for the amalgamation of the two northern
B.S.A.C. territories, Wallace the Administrator stated
that, under Railway Company regulations, the King and
his retinue must travel third class on a slow train,
without access to either 'Refreshment Rooms' or Dining
Car. 40 This colour bar still obtained on the railways
in Northern Rhodesia in the 1950s, as it did in hotels,
restaurants, cinemas and all public places.

40. PLG: BSA 10/4, memo by HC, comparing SR and NR,
22/12/09; 'Livingstone Mail', 10/8/07; 'St. James
Gazette' and 'Bristol Times and Mirror', 12/1/99;
NAZ: BS 2/265, Admin to HC, 30/9/10.
In 1898, twenty-two years after the founding of the Blantyre Mission, its newssheet made a statement to the effect that it was 'apparent to even the most indifferent judge that they (African people) have as bountiful share of human nature in its good and bad aspects as any European nation...Those who have conscientiously studied the native must find in him traits worthy of our highest admiration...but he is above all human, and responds to the humane'. This was in harmony with the missionary editor's view of seven years earlier that the church must belong to white and black together and that 'it would be a great blow to the Church of Christ should there arise in the future a severance'. In 1911, however, some members of the Anglican Church in Livingstone sought the opinion of Philip Gell, the B.S.A.C. Director, about 'the propriety of admitting natives' into the church building. Bishop Hine had spoken a few weeks previously to the London headquarters of the Universities' Mission to Central Africa about the 'every great' impediments to church work caused by 'strong local prejudice to native mission work and native Christians'. Earlier, he had caused 'a great scandal' by taking his 'boy Stephen' with him to carry his service book, etc. At Evensong, one Sunday, he told the congregation that 'the Church if consecrated must be consecrated without any stipulation as to its use for Europeans only'. After assuring them that there would be little likelihood of
any black people appearing when white people were at service, Hine 'pointed out how illogical...it was to use native Christian cooks, clerks, houseboys, etc. and yet to forbid the same boys to worship in the Christian Church'. The Bishop was angered by the intervention of Leopold Moore, 'being an infidel'.

Gell replied to the Livingstone Anglicans thus:

'It would surely be wrong to forbid natives to enter the church under any circumstances. Lewanika always attended Church when he was in England...and the existence of any rule excluding civilized and educated Christian natives would probably alienate such men from the English and drive them under the influence of the Paris Mission, etc.' But, he said, 'For reasons of health, sanitation, vermin, etc., the Chartered Board (on advice) declined to give Mr Jalla' of the Paris Mission 'a site for his Church inside the white quarter and...it would be most undesirable that congregations of Raw Natives should alternate with Europeans...We are bound to believe that the superiority of the Englishman to the Raw Native is the result of his Christian civilization...It appears to me therefore that your Church ought not to be used as a "Mission Church"'.


42. PLG: BSA 10/19, Gell to Livingstone Church Council, (n.d.) 1911.
The last decades of the twentieth century are, as was inevitable, recording African rather than European comments on African history. It is therefore interesting to note what George Padmore, one of the early Pan-Africanists, quoted, a decade after B.S.A.C. rule ended in Northern Rhodesia, about racial doctrines in the Roman Catholic Church. 'The Tablet', a Church journal, stated that by the incarnation of 'the Eternal Word', not in a black or yellow or red or copper-coloured mother but in a 'White Maid', it was shown that white superiority was not 'white arrogance but...obedience to the course marked out by Divine Providence which requires white men to wield the hegemony of Christendom...It follows that the maintenance and enhancement of the White's moral prestige among those who wear other skins is of inestimable importance to religion and not only to imperial and secular interests'. In a similar vein, the 'Osservatore Romane' declared that 'colonization' was 'based not upon brutal domination but upon the principles of high morality...love, peace and brotherhood'.

In 1911, the 'Livingstone Mail' was reporting continued 'risings' in Southern Africa and commented that 'the two forces...that of civilisation and that of barbarism...solve the problem of who is to be master by

force and not otherwise'. In face of rumours of growing opposition to Lewanika's rule in the Lozi kingdom, Moore wanted stronger armed protection for white people in North-western Rhodesia. The reprieve of a black man sentenced to death in South Africa for assaulting a white woman had aroused anger and the 'Mail' spoke of 'the black peril'. The social bar must therefore be strengthened. In respect of labour, that meant that no white man could be expected to do work which was 'being performed on the next farm by natives', which would be 'a degradation, a lowering of the prestige of the white race'. The proximity of the Belgian Congo, with its 'freedom existing between the individual Belgian and the native which savours strongly of inexperience', was, in Moore's opinion, an irritant to the situation in the Chartered Company's territory.44

Leopold Moore's strictures upon the Congo were to lead to his imprisonment there when on a visit to Lubumbashi in 1913. In one offending comment, he remarked that 'in a country utterly unsuited to white women...there is every excuse for a white man who contracts what to him is an "irregular" marriage with a native girl, a marriage which is however quite regular to the mind of the girl and her relatives...We all know', he went on, 'that such liaisons are entered into by men

44. 'Livingstone Mail' 25/3/11, 5/8/11, 29/1/11, 23/9/11, 30/9/11.
of our own nationality in this country... But the average Britain keeps his native "wife" very severely in the background... The writer has seen a Belgian officer (in full uniform) walk up the Avenue de L'Étoile in Elizabethville arm in arm with his native girl and politely raise his disengaged hand in salute to a white woman and her husband'. Moore's sentiments may have appeared as British humbug to the type of Belgian whom he described, but he at least endorsed other contemporary comments on the situation in the Rhodesias. A Southern Rhodesian Member of Parliament said bluntly that 'the conqueror considered... that one of the fruits of victory was the women of the conquered race'. A British visitor who travelled through both territories before the First World War was 'convinced that the crimes of the Native against white women are largely influenced by the infamous behaviour of a considerable class of white men in their relations with Kaffir women. In Northern Rhodesia', he said, 'I found a great many of the white men living with Kaffir women... In Matabeleland the number living with Native women is positively appalling'.

B.S.A.C. records indicate that concubinage and miscegenation started as soon as white men appeared in Central Africa as indeed it had developed further south.

45. Ibid: 14/12/12; Keatley P., op. cit., pp. 244-6, quoting Max Buchan M.P., and Col. Sir Aubrey Wools-Sampson.
In 1899 Lewanika complained that 'some white men used to meddle with native women'. A comment sent to the Colonial Office in 1908, which we noted earlier, traced the irrational violence of the attitudes of 'the Dutch in the Old Colonies and in Rhodesia' and of other white people to 'a certain admixture in the blood of so many of them' which led 'these kindliest of people' to demonstrate 'a prejudice and cruelty respecting natives which is entertained like a religious duty'. In terms of social psychology, there are strong grounds for regarding the emotional illogic of such behaviour as the direct consequence of the deep awareness of the perfidious nature of the whole operation of conquest and exploitation. Be that as it may, however, the record of the conduct of many Company men, traders and others in northern Zambezia shows that there was no difference between their behaviour towards black women and that of their compatriots further south.

In 1899, the White Fathers at Chilonga, near Mpika, expressed shock at the conduct of Worringham and Croad of the B.S.A.C. who 'demanded a woman from Luchembe' and when this was refused, 'sent soldiers to take her by force'. Those men, they said, took with them 'a troupe of women, some in machila'. 'Voilà de beaux examples de monagamie pour les nègres polygames!' The


local people hated and despised such white men, they said. Worringham, whose nickname 'Chapalapata' denoted his habit of bruising people, was also, the Fathers said, a drug addict. In Chief Chikwanda's densely populated area, the people, 'having suffered the numerous "frolics" of Mr Worringham', were very anxious to find shelter with the Fathers. In 1903, Alfred Sharpe wrote to Codrington about 'a half-caste child of Chapalapata... miserably thin...and suffering from what appeared to be dropsy', found in the area north of Mweru Marsh where Worringham had established the Choma-Bama in 1893. In Chief Chipepo's area, west of Kabwe, senior men have recorded that the local community felt deep anger at men who cursed the people as 'dogs' and 'monkeys' while seizing their women and girls. There were, they said, many babies born as a result of such conduct but 'a number were killed'.

The Imperial authorities began to express growing concern about concubinage and miscegenation in 1910. Undoubtedly the MacNamara case focussed attention on it. Indeed the reason given for his eventual suspension was his 'having habitually practised concubinage...from December 1906 to September 1909, which

Gladstone, the High Commissioner, said was 'incompatible

47. WF, Chilonga, 8/12/99, 18/12/99, 27/1/00 and 12/3/00; NAZ: BS 1/97, Sharpe to Codrington, 9/3/03; and RI/ Chief Chipepo and councillors, 14/10/75.
with the maintenance of the prestige of a British Government'. In a report to the Colonial Office, the High Commissioner, enclosed a copy of his circular to senior Company officials in which he spoke of 'the growing evil' of the situation. 'While fully aware of the special difficulties inseparable from arduous...duties...in isolated native districts', he especially warned 'the younger men' that 'proved misconduct' would have 'very serious consequences'. The Acting Administrator, Col. John Carden, threatened 'instant dismissal' for an offence 'calculated to degrade the white man in the eyes of the native'. This was at the time when the 'Rhodesia Herald', in reporting the indignation of the white community at the reprieve by the Colonial Secretary of a black man sentenced to death for the rape of a white woman, declared that in America 'men had found it necessary to lynch and burn blacks who dare to molest women of the white race'.

Leicester Beaufort, then Acting Administrator in North-western Rhodesia, disagreed with the High Commissioner's statement on concubinage. He held the opinion, 'acquired in a long Colonial experience, that the concubinage of a European with a single native woman, maintained with constancy and decently veiled, stands

on a footing so different...that it could be of very
doubtful justice or expediency to condemn it before it
had given rise to scandal or trouble...Such a concubin-
age', he said, 'is often defended on many grounds, e.g.
health, the acquirement of native languages, ideas, mode
of thought, and the warning of projected crimes and
risings. It has been of material comfort and advantage
to many a lonely European; it is not the least degrading
to the woman of the country'. Beaufort acknowledged,
however, that there were cases of 'promiscuity, libertin-
age,...and abuse of power' which led to 'sickness,
native trouble, crime and the degradation of all con-
cerned'. But the High Commissioner was not ready to
modify his view.49

It was at this time also that, as a result of
the insistence of Charles Venables, the brutalities
committed by MacNamara had come to light. Venables
had been particularly incensed by MacNamara's action in
using his chief concubine as a virtual prison warder to
incarcerate and intimidate a woman whose husband had
died as a result of flogging. In informing the Colo-
nial Secretary of MacNamara's concubinage, the High
Commissioner said that it had also been learned that
Venables was 'addicted to similar practices. I am
therefore informing him', he added, 'that...I am not
prepared to pay further attention to his complaints'.

49. Ibid: Beaufort to HC, 4/10/10. - PRO: CO/879/104
A/5 s. 947
Lord Crewe at that point, announced that he could not 'contemplate any possibility of MacNamara's continuance in service', but he also told the Anti-Slavery Society that he would not correspond with them further on the matter. In rebuking Venables, the High Commissioner's Secretary, Rodwell, said that 'so far from being entitled to criticise the administration of natives', Venables was guilty of 'conduct calculated to degrade the white man...and to impair the prestige of the governing race'. To this, however, the white farmer replied that he had not concealed his relationship with a daughter of Chief Kanyemba of the Chikunda; that his charge against MacNamara was based, not on his concubinage, but on his use of a concubine to intimidate a witness at the Ibwe Munyama enquiry; and that Codrington himself had been known for his 'plurality of native concubines at the seat of his Government' in both North-eastern and North-western Rhodesia. Moreover, promiscuous concubinage was widespread and there were 'scattered throughout these territories half-caste children and families of half-caste children, the offspring of Magistrates, Native Commissioners and other officials entrusted with important government posts'. The same was true, he said, in territories like Nyasaland, Uganda and West Africa. In reply, the High Commissioner withdrew his charge against Venables. The B.S.A. Company, however, protested some months
later at the Colonial Secretary's failure to reject Venables's charges against Codrington. 50

Under Chartered Company rule, legislation dealing with 'immorality' in the relation of men and women of different race was in effect highly discriminatory. As Keatley records, a chief in Southern Rhodesia had declared that there could not be 'peace between the black man and the white' unless black women were protected as white women were. But one of those who warned that lynching would have to be used against black men assaulting white women was Charles Coghlan who was to be the first Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia in 1923, and whose popularity as spokesman of the white community was thus endorsed. The other side of the issue was the effect on indigenous communities on both sides of the Zambezi when white men seized their women, even if, as sometimes happened, they 'paid' for them by offering what was tantamount to a bribe to the father of a girl already betrothed. From the Zambezi-Luangwa confluence area, Castino Chintanda protested in 1899 about how 'Changa-changa' Clark took any girl he fancied and sent her back 'when tired of her'. 'But I can do nothing', said Chintanda, 'as Clark is a white man and professed to be representing the Government'.

50. See p. 323 ff. above; PRO: CO 879/104, Afr. S. no. 948, HC to Col. Secy., 11/4/10; Col. Secy. to HC and to A-S and A.P. Secy., 6/6/10; Imperial Secretary (Rodwell) to Venables, 21/4/10; Venables to Imp. Secy., 11/5/10; Rodwell to Venables, 21/6/10; and BSAC to CO, 16/12/10.
The British visitor to Central Africa, cited above, described how he had 'found that some women had been three parts paid for by Kaffirs...and then the white man came along and offered some payment and the girl's father had let them go. Whenever a Kaffir was treated in that way...he hated the white man'. The fact that such white men were armed and probably also ready with the whip and that some of them used armed askari to procure women for them meant that the fathers of these girls were not able to resist. Missionary testimonies, such as we noted earlier, and the evidence of Zambians, who recall the period which we are reviewing, are in agreement about this. 51

Against a background of such illicit behaviour on the part of a notable proportion of white men, a totalitarian colour bar appeared in northern Zambezia. Gann has described conditions of work in the early urban communities in this way: 'The Europeans were separated from their African hands by a rigid colour bar, culture, skill and living standards, even though the European in the early days was also very poor. The white foremen, faced with the unenviable task of having to handle crowds of men whose languages and beliefs they did not

51 Keatley, op.cit., pp. 246-8, and see p. 242 above; PRO: CO 879/57, Afr.S.no.574, affidavit of Castino Chitanda to Admin., 25/4/99; RI/Chief Chipepo and councillors, 14/10/75, Chapanda Kondowe and Lucheleng'umbo, Chief Shikabeta's court, 2/9/74, Leo Chikambalala and others, Old Mkushi, 12/8/74.
understand and whose incompetence irritated them, considered that tough treatment of Africans was the only thing possible, becoming convinced that there must be no "weakness" in dealing with them. Discipline was re-enforced by the Masters and Servants legislation, passed in 1908, which resembled a code of an army, making desertion and various other kinds of misdemeanour a criminal offence, as they already were south of the Zambezi. The measure was not specifically applicable to Africans but to unskilled labourers in general. But as there were no white unskilled workers in employment, the measure constituted an important new legislative barrier between the two races. The situation which developed in the territory and was to be accelerated by the meteoric growth of the Copperbelt, was one in which the bar between the races was visible everywhere. Far from promoting in black people a sense of being 'protected', it gave them a sense of being victimised and humiliated wherever they went. Moreover, the transfer of authority in 1924 had not altered the situation in any sense whatever which might have alleviated the universal consciousness of repression and deprivation in the minds of the indigenous people.

Seventy years after the Lochner Concession and the Thomson 'treaties', Kenneth Kaunda spoke as follows

52. Gann 'History', op.cit., p. 144.
of what the colour bar in Northern Rhodesia meant, at
the time when the adjective 'multi-racial' was being
used to describe the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasa-
land: 'EVERY PART OF OUR "MULTI-RACIAL" SOCIETY IS
CONDITIONED BY COLOUR', he said. 'When we are sick we
are taken to separate hospitals in separate ambulances.
When we sleep on a journey we must go to separate hotels.
When we eat we must eat in separate cafes; when we want
to enjoy ourselves we must go to separate cinemas.
When travelling overseas in Britain, I was treated with
courtesy everywhere. I was received in homes of the
highest and the lowest, and suffered no social embarrass-
ment. Back at home I remember going into a cafe in
Kitwe. It was in April 1957. I went to the counter
and asked for sandwiches, but was told "Boys are not
served here". I tried to reason with the assistant,
that all I wanted was service, but without success.
The next thing I knew I was being thrown outside by
fellow customers and "a free for all" followed. And
this, in the land of my birth! This kind of incident
is repeated countless times every day and is a source of
explosive bitterness in the hearts of my people. If
this was an economic bar we could overcome it as some
of our people are fast doing. One could even change
one's religion. But God has made me black, there is
nothing I can do about it. This does not mean that I
am not proud of my colour, but it is something to show
that I am being punished for a sin, if sin it is, that I never committed.'

From all the evidence available, it is clear that 'protection' and 'trusteeship' are most inappropriate terms by which to describe 'colonial rule' over northern Zambezia in the B.S.A.C. period. Instead, the conquest having been emphatically accomplished, a system was created, which not only ensured the exploitation of the Territory's human and natural resources, but made it impossible for black people to participate in its economic and industrial growth at other than a menial and subservient level. To be recognised as a worker in the eyes of the Company's Administration, a man had to be either coerced into Boma service or to be ready to serve the wishes of the conquerors by performing tasks whereby he was, in Shakespeare's phrase, 'dressed in a little brief authority'. The potential of the African people for adaptation to the impact of a system more complicated and technologically advanced than they had hitherto practised was not only untapped but seriously inhibited. Pacification was rendered synonymous with enforced passivity. Thus debarred from free advancement within the modern industries of the country, from entering the agricultural markets by which

54. Shakespeare, W., 'Measure for Measure', Act II, Scene 2, line 118.
the urban communities were fed and from social and cultural interaction with the immigrant European population, the indigenous population continued to suffer the afflictions of a conquered people at the hands of a regime immensely superior, by virtue of its conquest, in material power and wealth.

(c) The Rooting of Zambian Nationalism

During the period of heightened tension that led eventually to the birth of Zambia, sarcastic tributes were paid by black spokesmen to Sir Roy Welensky for his exposure of the true nature of what was sometimes called 'white supremacy'. In 1952, in one of the very first letters by a black man to be published in the 'Northern News', Reuben Kamanga said that Africans were 'proud of Mr Welensky for spreading his political knowledge into their political institutions. But,' he said, 'Africans have now reached the stage where they no longer require his teaching. As Mr Welensky has proved to be such a good political teacher for backward countries, he deserves a transfer to any of the countries which are still backward'. Shortly afterwards a member of the African Representative Council, Rev. Paul Mushindo of Lubwa, Chinsali, wrote thus about Welensky: 'He sacrifices himself for many Europeans in these two countries' — the two Rhodesias — 'who pretend to be Africans' friends Many thanks are due to Mr Roy Welensky for his revelation of Europeans to Africans. He has taught them what many
Europeans think and plan against Africans'. The story of the articulation of African protest against foreign domination has been recounted elsewhere; but the comment might be made that the above quotations suggest a very mild form of protest as late as twenty-eight years after the end of B.S.A. Company rule. The evidence we have collected above makes it clear, however, that the British annexation of northern Zambezia was not only effected by military conquest in the beginning, but was maintained by military power for over thirty years. 55

There were, as we have seen, a number of attempts by black people to resist their conquerors, but they were ill-organised and were not in any sense unified. Being sporadic, they were dealt with piecemeal. There was what appeared as religious protest as well, notably the 'Ethiopian Movement' which appeared in the Lozi kingdom around 1900 and was led by a Suto, Willie Mokalapa, a former evangelist of the Paris Missionary Society. The information given to Alfred Milner, the High Commissioner, was that Mokalapa's movement was led by 'men of bad character and fugitives from justice' as it was 'quite unusual for Southern African natives to wander great distances and among alien people on their own account and without the countenance and protection of a European'.

55. NN 1/2/52; Mushindo Papers (by courtesy of his son, Mr Patrick Mumba), letter to SNA, 1/3/52; see Macpherson, Hall, Rotberg, op.cit., and Mulford op.cit., esp. pp. 1-20.
Lewanika wanted to know why Mokalapa was banned by the Administrator. 'Now when the French Missionaries told you their invious (sic) you are going to stop Willi, why?' he asked. Lewanika had told people in England that all churches were welcome in his country and Mokalapa's group belonged to a well-established Church, 'erected in 1787 by coloured people belonging to the Methodist Society of Philadelphia'. In King Khama's country to the south, there was another similar emergence of Ethiopianism, one of whose leaders, a man called Mokone, wrote of the excitement caused by the visit of a Negro preacher named Rideout, 'the first time to hear an African preacher in the African language. I believe', said Mokone, 'that the whole of Africa will receive them' - Rideout and his party - 'Africa is the place of hospitality for any man before they were injured by the white man'.

Coryndon rebuked Lewanika in paternalistic language. 'It is true that your country is open to all good churches...but...the Ethiopian is not a good Church. You like them because their Missionaries are black people and...talk nicely to you and do not tell you when you do wrong as Coillard did...You know in your heart

that Mr Coillard and Mr Jalla are good friends of yours and that I am a good friend to you - do you think that you would be as contented as you are now if the Portuguese or the Germans had been seven years in your country?' Worthington had put the Company's view more bluntly. 'Two churches', he told Lewanika, 'cannot remain in Lealui without the one interfering with the good work of the other. Five years ago when Willie was still working for the French, he wrote you a letter ..."Do not listen to these white missionaries. They do not love you"...I see that Willie's Church newspaper says: "Whip the British back to the Thames"'.

The branch of the African Methodist Episcopal Church among the Lozi appeared to the French missionaries as 'treachery' and a grave threat to their work. 'The work of twenty years, in one of the hardest parts of the field, is threatened with destruction at the very time when we expected the harvest'. Mokalapa, by promising to provide a progressive school and a Church controlled by African leaders, thus made it appear again that the Paris Mission and the B.S.A. Company were allies against the Lozi. Opposition to white rule, however, was not overt in that early 'Ethiopian' movement which diminished in strength after Mokalapa left the country in 1905.

57. PLG: BSA 9/115, Coryndon to Lewanika, 5/1/05, and 9/117, Worthington to Lewanika, 31/12/04.
A private report on Southern Africa in 1906, said, with reference to the Zulu 'rebellion', that there was unrest throughout South Africa, but the writer did not agree with the 'general estimate of the mischievous and pernicious tendency of the teachings' of the Ethiopian Movement. He had interviewed Benjamin Khumalo, one of the leaders of a sect with over 40,000 followers, and discussed with him the problems of land, education, industrial training and 'last, the Franchise'. Khumalo maintained that the Commissioner for Natives did nothing at all 'in the interests of natives' and that white officials were concerned only with enforcing tax payments while Europeans were determined to check African advancement as far as possible and keep them in a servile condition. It was, as we saw earlier, the brutal enforcement of taxation in the Gwembe valley that brought 'the MacNamara Case' to light in 1909, and significantly it was a mung'anga or religious leader and healer, Malumo (whom the Europeans called a 'witch-doctor'), who inspired the Tonga to rise against Mac-Namara. Calling on them to fight through the wet months of the year, when presumably white-led troops would be impeded in their movements, Malumo declared that 'the black people must drive all the white people out of the country', for 'the tax must not be paid'. They must therefore 'burn the camp' of the Collector. The rising
was however overwhelmed by the Company's troops. 58

Elsewhere we noted the abortive overtures of the White Bird Church to Mpezeni's people. John Chilembwe's movement in Malawi was probably the most significant expression of religious protest north of the Zambezi during the period under review. But the Watch Tower drama in the Lala country in 1925, led by Tomo Nyirenda - known as 'Mwana Lesa - Son of God' - and resulting very quickly in a series of murders of 'witches' for which Nyirenda and the current Chief Shaibila were executed, merits note primarily perhaps as an instrument for the extension of the religious horizons of the Lala people to encompass the turmoil and dispersion that Company rule had set in motion. Tomo Nyirenda, a former student of the Livingstonia Mission in Malawi, carried with him a copy of Foxe's 'Book of Martyrs' and included in his millenarian utterances, a prophecy of the end of 'Chirupula' Stephenson's authority in the area where the ex-Collector had established his domain in the Mkushi district. Tax, he promised, would be reduced to one shilling. 59

58. Rotberg op. cit., pp. 58-59, incl. quotation from letter of Coillard to J. Bruce, 26/11/04; PRO: CO 417/464, memo by a Mr Grant on Zulu 'rebellion', 1906; and NAZ: A 2/1/3, record of Rex. v. Maluma. Mung'anqa is the Tonga form of the better known word Ing'anga.

Not long after the Colonial Office assumed control of the Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia, 'Welfare Associations' began to appear in the territory. It is noteworthy that a number of their leaders were men who had come westwards from Lake Malawi, having received their early education under the auspices of the Livingstoneia Mission of the Free Church of Scotland. Later they were in touch with the thinking and writing of the Pan-Africanist, Marcus Garvey. There is good reason to believe, however, that the first of such Welfare Associations to be formed in Zambia was in fact organised before the first World War; its founders being Donald Siwale and Peter Sinkala of Mwenzo, David Julizya Kaunda the pioneer Protestant missionary in the Chinsali district, and Hezekiah Kawosa Nkonjera, a Malawian, who had come into the Isoka district some years before from Livingstonia. Through the work of the Livingstoneia Mission and its westward extension, in 1894 under Alexander Dewar to Mwenzo on the Tanganyika-Nyasa plateau near Fife and in 1904 under Kaunda to Chinsali, there was a strong contact between the better educated men in northern Nyasaland and their colleagues west of the Luangwa.

1912 was the year when Welfare Associations were formed in Chinteche, Karonga and Mzimba. Donald Siwale has confirmed that the Mwenzo Association was formed at a Teachers' Refresher Course conducted by Dr James Chisholm and attended also by Isoka and Chinsali
teachers, the latter group led by David Kaunda. As Lubwa Mission began its own such teachers' courses after 1913 when a Scots missionary took up residence there, it seems probable that Siwale, Sinkala, Kaunda and Nkonjera formed their organisation as an extension of the movement in northern Malawi. The significant comment of Dr Chisholm that its formation might 'bring British guns' revealed that, even at its inception and despite the muted language of its constitution, it was significant as the stirring of a conquered people. Siwale has recalled that Chisholm arranged for the Mwenzo Association to meet 'Bobo' Young and West-Sheane when, he said, 'We told them point blank all we had to tell them, without mincing a word'. But 'they would not answer anything'.

As we have seen, Company men and others in Central Africa were well aware that the people whom they had subjugated might resist or 'rebel'. But the deduction from this drawn, for instance, by Val Gielgud, was that any such reaction should be dealt with by a further demonstration of physical superiority by the white rulers. Gielgud spoke of 'the difficulty that all civilised forms of government have...in dealing

with natives', whose 'whole life and way of thinking must be changed...by means of superior power'. Because of 'ignorance and stupidity', he said, the people 'having accepted...the benefits of our rule, have already forgotten their old troubles and oppressions and can only feel the irksomeness of the restraint put upon them by civilisation, which...looms bigger in their savage minds than their previous disabilities. The result is ...hostility to the white man and his government'. Success therefore depended on whether 'a sufficient respect for the prowess of the white race had been instilled into the minds of the natives' and whether there was 'a sufficiently armed force present to tangibly demonstrate the futility of armed resistance'. Then, equating the armed occupation of the country with the peaceful submission of the people to foreign rule, Gielgud remarked that there was 'always more chance of trouble' in such a situation after a few years than in the beginning. Thus the settler community, in Livingstone, vividly recalling the Ndebele and Shona wars of a decade earlier, demanded in 1906 that they should be armed against any possible rising by the Lozi or their neighbours. 61

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However, the comment by Norman Leys on Kenya applies equally well to Central Africa: 'Tribal risings ceased...because they were always hopeless failures. Naked spearmen fell...before machine guns, without inflicting a single casualty in return. Meanwhile the troops burn all the huts and collect all the livestock within reach...Resistance once at an end, the leaders...are surrendered for imprisonment and of the rest...some return to build their homes again, while others go to work for the conqueror in order to find the money to pay tax on these homes...A period of calm followed. And when unrest again appeared, it was with other leaders...and other motives'. After the interlude of apparent submission and even acquiescence, it then fell, as Robinson and Gallagher rightly note, to 'different nationalisms' to resume the struggle 'in the idiom of the Westernisers'. The mode of resistance had to change. The new phenomenon of African poetry in English, however, epitomised the deep, consistent and pervasive reaction of Africa thus:

'The white man killed my father.  
My father was proud.  
The white man seduced my mother.  
My mother was beautiful.  
The white man burnt my brother  
beneath the noonday sun.  
My brother was strong.  
His hands red with black blood  
The white man turned to me,
And in the Conqueror's voice said "Hey, boy! a chair, a napkin, a drink".  

Meaning an other view of the situation in Central Africa, less stark than Gielgud's, found expression in the writing of H. Marshall Hole and would have been echoed by those who wanted apartheid while paying homage to the idea of trusteeship. Hole admitted that the 'appropriation' of 'the country of the Bantu' by white men had been done in self-interest. The colonials, therefore, were, he said, 'bound in common honesty to regard their welfare as a trust'. But that trust would be best discharged, he suggested, 'if we disencumber ourselves of the ideal of raising them... to the European level', for 'the white man and the black man belong to essentially different species which may exist side by side in harmony but can never be welded'. This type of attitude led some settlers and many overseas commentators to look for a response of gratitude for benefits conferred upon the indigenous peoples by white rule. Indeed we noted early in this review that the African Lakes Company agent wrote in a reference to such 'benefits' in the text of the 'treaty' with Mambwe in 1885; and the B.S.A. Company protested

angrily in 1908 that it was under no obligation to give Lewanika any percentage of its profits from land sales or leases around the Victoria Falls as it was 'already incurring a heavy annual expenditure for the benefit of the natives'.

The forming of an accurate assessment of the Central African situation must take note of the view, expressed by Oliver and Fage, that the imperial governments left the responsibility for colonial administration with 'mere handfuls of men' such as Johnston, Sharpe, Codrington and Coryndon had at their disposal. Therefore, 'the Marxist stereotype, of brutal imperialists riding to power over the machine-gunned corpses of defenceless Africans, is far further from the truth than its opposite, which would maintain that colonial occupation was a bloodless process'. Oliver and Fage then note that 'the first task of every colonial government was to establish authority over its own subjects', the power to tax being 'the touchstone of such authority'. This interpretation, however, fails to give weight to the reactions of the conquered peoples who had no possible reason for accepting the status of 'subjects' except their awareness of the strength of the military

odds against them. Moreover, in view of the data which we have been examining, it is not possible to regard the 'first task' of an organisation like Rhodes's Chartered Company as being the establishment of authority. Pacification and the consolidation of conquest were essentially instruments of the primary purpose of using northern Zambezia as a source of cheap labour and seizing control of its mineral and other resources. 64

It is therefore submitted that, while pursuing the policy of constantly harrying village communities for labour and for tax throughout the years of its direct control, the Company, with equal consistency, withheld funds from the social welfare, education and health services, the need of which was increased, and not lessened, by the nature of B.S.A.C. rule. The argument that administrative revenue was inadequate cannot be accepted in explanation of this grave dereliction of responsibility. 65 The tardiness of an articulate and coordinated indigenous riposte can, however, be explained by the disintegrative consequences of the Company's constant pressures upon small communities, coupled with its consistent use of intimidation.

From the standpoint of people like Leopold Moore, the move towards Crown Government in 1923 was anticipated without pleasure, despite the 'Livingstone Mail's' long-standing criticism of the B.S.A.C. He expected that the Colonial Office would 'probably treat the country with its customary neglect, contempt and parsimony' which the white community would perhaps deserve 'for persisting in their constitutional behaviour and the unappreciated loyalty'. Certainly the Company was not unaware, on either side of the Zambezi, of the deep antipathy of a considerable number of its white subjects. Yet its restrictive policies towards 'natives' continued, unmodified. Thus when in 1917 the Native Schools Proclamation was in preparation, the Administration began to circumscribe more closely the service of African teachers in an educational network built up by Christian missions and entirely unaided by territorial funds. A L.M.S. missionary at Kambole noted that now no teacher was to be appointed without the approval in writing of the Native Commissioner who of course would not be an educationist. Moreover, a teacher might not cultivate the ground without the approval of the headman and then only enough for his household needs; and if a village was removed, the Mission and the teacher would have no right to compensation 'for any huts or buildings erected by them'. Another L.M.S. missionary protested against the demand that teachers must hold 'certificates of proficiency', which would disqualify
at least 50% of the young men then serving in the schools. The General Missionary Conference expressed distress at the 'spirit of intolerance' in the Proclamation as finally issued. The only grant to African education made before 1925 was £185: the cost of the Barotse National School coming, as we saw earlier, from the percentage of musonko allowed to the Lozi King. In the year 1924-5, the direct grant was £348, and by 1931 £14,448 was granted as compared with the spending of £27,000 on the education of 774 white children.66

In conditions in which nothing was being done to ameliorate the situation of social disintegration throughout the land, it was inevitable that marital infidelity, secret associations and a variety of illicit activities should develop. We noted at the outset the grave observations of missionaries on this at the meeting of the General Missionary Conference of 1922. One such manifestation of disintegration was the secret dance called 'Chipe' in the Fort Jameson area which

66. 'Livingstone Mail', 18/1/23; CCWM, Central Africa letters, Box 18, Robertson, Kambole, 18/1/17, with ref. to Dist. Circular of 15/1/17; and see Snelson P.D. 'Educational Development in Northern Rhodesia, 1883-1945' (Neczam, Lusaka, 1970) for a scholarly survey of his subject and note esp. pp. 130 ff.; CCWM, as above, Freshwater, Mporokoso, 8/9/18; NAZ: Minutes of General Missionary Conference, Livingstone, July 1919; Native Education Department Reports, 1925 to 1931, and European Education Department Report 1931; and see Appendix C.
Coxhead as Secretary for Native Affairs had reported in 1916 to the headquarters of the Dutch Reformed Mission in Bloemfontein. A song sung at such dances had a millenarian flavour and the S.N.A. thought that the Mission should know that a number of its teachers and pupils were participating along with the wives of men who were on the mines in the south. For 'the dance of God' might have sinister political significance. Yet in 1922 the Administrator for the two Rhodesias told his Deputy in Livingstone not to be perturbed by the Missionary Conference's call for the spending of 'a fair proportion of the proceeds of native tax, direct and indirect' for the 'immediate benefit of the native population'. The missionaries should remember that hut tax produced only £90,000 of the £99,000 required in that year for district administration.67

Missionary and other commentators often spoke of the fascination that European goods held for the indigenous people of northern Zambezia. Clothes, blankets, tools and later on bicycles and other articles were eagerly desired by the men and women who began to move into a money economy in the early years of the century. Yet this did not automatically beget prosperity. It was true, as a Paris missionary recorded

67. NAZ: BS 3/80, Coxhead to Rev. P. van der Merwe, 27/1/16; and BS 3/118, folio 45, Chaplin to Deputy Admin., Livingstone, 18/8/22.
in 1907, that copper mines had been opened, the railway brought north across the Victoria Falls, the town of Livingstone developed, and that new foodstuffs, like pawpaw, banana, rice and wheat, had come into use. But the conclusion that 'the foundations of prosperity' had been laid and 'the victories of peace' secured was somewhat naive. For, as Frank Worthington observed in retrospect, 'As soon as the trader had introduced blankets, print and coloured calicos, the cultivation of cotton by the natives ceased and their primitive looms were put away'. In the Luapula province, according to Cunnison, the industry in iron-smelting which had flourished on the Ng'ona and Kapweshi Rivers 'died out in accordance with the treaty which reserved mineral rights, among other things, to the British South Africa Company'. Zambian testimonies from many parts of the country tell of the ending of local smelting, the guilds of iron-smiths and the trade in such articles as woven fabrics, skins, hunting knives, copperware, salt, etc. The powerful westward thrust of the African Lakes Company from northern Malawi radically altered the situation found in 1890 by the Scots missionary, Kerr-Cross, in which every Nyika village "boasts of two or three looms". Thus, as has been said, 'if the arrival of the Arabs stifled local entrepreneurship, the entry of the Europeans dealt the death-blow to local production'. Yet another powerful force was in such ways contributing
to the general demoralisation of rural life.68

To have any authentic meaning, the word 'protection' would require to connote a system whereby the social and economic life of the indigenous peoples of a 'colonial' territory would be fostered in such a way that prosperity would increase and social services, like health and education, would be developed so that the territory as a whole would progress. Obviously 'protection' would not genuinely be equated with maintaining the status quo antea. If it were to signify how the situation would be organised, by those acting as 'trustees', so that the indigenous peoples could be enabled 'to stand on their own feet in the arduous conditions of the modern world', social and economic development was a duty of the exploiting European power. Without it, political development towards self-government must be gravely impeded. This is, it seems certain, what happened in northern Zambezia. The only process that might be called a 'social' development was the intermingling of men of different 'tribes' in the mines on both sides of the Zambezi. Though the solidarity that began to make 'the African voice' articulate

in the middle decades of the century undoubtedly drew strength from the urban welter, this was clearly not why people were encouraged to live in 'detribalised' conditions.

In 1953, on his appointment as Secretary-General of the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress and while attempting to organise a 'Pan-African' conference in Lusaka, Kenneth Kaunda hoped that 'our uniform suffering under the jack boots of our capitalist and imperialist oppressors should bring us together'.

But this sense of solidarity in suffering developed in spite of colonial 'native' policies which were certainly not designed to promote relations between the various subject peoples. Moreover it developed under the impetus of the acceleration of 'settler' demands for a sovereign white-ruled state in Central Africa. The educational equipment of the majority of proto-nationalists was very inadequate and this undoubtedly increased an apprehensive reluctance in many black people to challenge foreign rule. While in 1930, Northern Rhodesia spent £32,095 on the education of 79,131 black pupils against £33,110 on 879 white pupils, comparative figures for 1952 - on the eve of the imposition of Federation - show that the Protectorate was spending

proportionately far less than the British East African territories were spending on African education. 70

It had undoubtedly been the dream of the protagonists of European imperialism in Africa that white rule should continue for a long time and should ensure a steadily increasing flow of wealth to the metropolitan exchequers. In 1898, Henry Morton Stanley put such a forecast in writing under the title 'Africa in 1998'. For British East Africa, he prophesied great prosperity, 'similar to what Natal is at present', and a much brighter future than that of the German territories where 'military control permits no radical change among natives and does not conduce to moral and intellectual improvement'. There would, of course, be 'sectional revolts of blacks versus whites' throughout colonial Africa but, he said, 'any combination of negroes in the various states is impossible'. In addition to his forecast that the Cape to Cairo railway would be 'an accomplished fact before 1925', he prophesied manifold increases in Britain's trade as a result of her firm hold on her African possessions. 71

Cecil Rhodes and his successors were dedicated to such a vision. It had appeared to Lord Milner in


71. MMS: Stanley's article in a cutting from a London newspaper for 30/7/98, with the title line removed.
1897 that Rhodesia was 'in a pretty horrible mess' and his fear was that Rhodes would press on regardless, 'quite untaught by disaster'. Our review of the thirty-four years of Chartered Company rule in northern Zambezia gives no reason to believe that Rhodes's master-plan was abandoned or even modified. Yet to maintain it, the Company's agents had to refuse to take note of the known and documented facts of the situation. Social and moral disintegration and distress and economic collapse had befallen the rural communities of the land. The wholesale uprooting of able-bodied men from their family and community responsibilities and the process whereby money, hardly earned, came back to be spent on taxes and trade goods largely alien to the traditional economy, brought widespread poverty. The prosperity that followed what Gann calls the 'birth of a new economy' was reserved for foreigners. Moreover, the B.S.A.C. policy of forcing the territory, at all costs, to pay for its 'administration' by means of musonko committed the Company to maintain to the end 'government' by intimidation through what must rightly be described as military power.

It is not the conclusion of our review that the contact of very different cultures was per se bad.

73. Gann 'History', op.cit., title of Chapter Three p. 100 ff.
Nor is there reason to argue that it would have been better if the symbols of western European development had not been brought to Central Africa. The appraisal of the history of Central Africa in the later twentieth century must take note of Ndabaningi Sithole's summary of 'the positive role of colonialism' in his essay on nationalism in Africa, which he concludes by declaring that 'colonialism has fertilized, stimulated, invigorated and shaped African nationalism'.

Our conclusion is rather that the British South Africa Company's mode of annexation and control was such as to bring to northern Zambezia relentless exploitation and its inevitable fruits: not protection and general prosperity but disintegration and depression. In such a situation the notable endeavours of Christian missions were accomplished in spite of the regime rather than with its support. Such a policy, however, was shortsighted and could not but hasten the stirring of the conquered peoples and result in their determined drive, much sooner than could have been expected, to rid themselves of foreign rule and take control of their own destiny. Thus, eighty years after the Berlin Conference and within the bounds of the arbitrary frontiers drawn by the 'scramblers', once disparate African communities would be welded into the sovereign nation of Zambia.

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APPENDIX B

Map showing the areas covered by Sir Harry Johnston's Certificate of Claim, 25th September 1893 (by courtesy of Maxwell Stamp Associates).
These tables are compiled from the following sources:
B.S.A.C. Annual Reports and Accounts; N.R.G. Blue Books;
Pim Report, Appendix IX and X.

### TABLE I - REVENUE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Ordinary Revenue</th>
<th>African Tax Revenue</th>
<th>Personal Income Tax</th>
<th>No. of Companies Assessed</th>
<th>Total Income Tax Revenue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1911-1912</td>
<td>£116,946</td>
<td>£69,543</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919-1920</td>
<td>169,625</td>
<td>80,732</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>7,687</td>
<td>£34,851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924-1925</td>
<td>309,795</td>
<td>101,448</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>7,262</td>
<td>41,629</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE II - EXPENDITURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Ordinary Expenditure</th>
<th>African Education</th>
<th>European Education</th>
<th>Police and Regiment</th>
<th>Provincial District Administration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1911-1912</td>
<td>£188,806</td>
<td>No information given on allocation of expenditure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919-1920</td>
<td>274,581</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>£7,645</td>
<td>£38,783</td>
<td>£87,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924-1925</td>
<td>325,778</td>
<td>£348</td>
<td>7,772</td>
<td>47,713(1)</td>
<td>87,585(2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Of which £32,144 recorded as Personal Emoluments
(2) Of which £79,857 recorded as Personal Emoluments
APPENDIX D

SUMMARY OF SOURCE MATERIAL

I. ARCHIVAL SOURCES WITHIN ZAMBIA:

(listed in order of first citation within the text).

(a) Banda H.K. and Nkumbula H.M. - 'Federation in Central Africa', May 1949, duplicated memorandum (by courtesy of Mr Malama Sokoni).

(b) ANC - (files of the former African National Congress, founded in 1948 under the title Northern Rhodesia African Congress). These files were examined by permission of Mr Harry Nkumbula, M.P., then A.N.C. President, while they were still in the offices of the A.N.C. Numerous documents in this collection were unreferenced.

(c) NAZ - (National Archives of Zambia). The majority of documents cited are to be found in:

i. the BS (British South Africa Company)
   Series 1, 2 and 3;

ii. Secretariat files (e.g. SEC/NAT for 'native Affairs'; SEC/NG for 'Mining'; SEC/LAB for 'Labour');

iii. District Notebooks, e.g.
   KSG 3/1 - Kawambwa
   KSE 4/1 - Mwinilunga
   KSC 4/1 - Livingstone
   KTE 2/1 - Gwembe
   KSL 3/1 - Isoka
   KDD 5/1 - Kasempa
   KSZ 5/1 - Luwingu
   KSD 4/1 - Mpika
   KTN 1/1 - Abercorn
   KDH 1/1 - Kasama
   KDG 5/1 - Fort Jameson
   KSF 2/1 - Namwala
   KSK 3/1 - Serenje
   KDE 10/10 - Barotse Province etc., etc.

iv. District Reports e.g.
   KSJ 4/1 - Fort Jameson 1916-17
   KDF 6/1/6 - Mweru-Luapula, 1922-23
   KSY 5/2 - Petauke 1905-06
   KSD 7/1 - Mpika 1910-11
v. Sundry, including:

(1) Numerous files of correspondence etc. by districts, using refs. as in iii. and iv. above, e.g.

KDE - Mongu
KSK - Serenje
KSD - Mpika
KDG - Fort Jameson
KST - Lundazi

etc., etc.

(2) Documents in ZA series, P series, A series, ZP series, G series, and MISC.


(4) Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council Hansard.
(d) MACPHERSON - Personal Collection:

i. Proceedings of Seminar-Workshops on Oral Records of Local History: Mungwi, Kasama and Lundazi, June 1972;


iii. KKF, Quarterly Reports of the Research Historian (Dr. W.A. Hunton), 1968-69.

iv. Papers of the late Rev. Paul B. Mushindo, (by courtesy of his son, Mr Patrick Mumba).

(e) Official Reports, e.g.


ii. 'The British South Africa Company's Claims to Mineral Royalties in Northern Rhodesia' (Govt. Printer, Lusaka 1964).

(f) Archives of Roan Copper Mines (RCM), by courtesy of the Archivist:- File WMA 139.
II. RECORDED INTERVIEWS (RI)-

personal collection of transcriptions from tape-recorded interviews conducted in the language of the Informants (listed according to chapters in which they are first cited).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tape Reference and Date</th>
<th>Name of Informant(s)</th>
<th>Age/Sex</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Other Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N/CP/1 - 15/10/73 (Chap.III)</td>
<td>Nansala Manyeta</td>
<td>110+/M</td>
<td>Member of Mwenda family of Lala sub-chieftainship</td>
<td>P.O. Kanona</td>
<td>Mentally alert. Recorded visit of Moir of African Lakes Company to Lushibashi area of Serenje District.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/NP/2 - 21/8/75</td>
<td>Chief Nsokolo</td>
<td>50+/M</td>
<td>Senior Chief of Mambwe</td>
<td>P.O. Mbala</td>
<td>Chief interviewed along with members of his court, Simeo Sinyangwe, Stephen Simfukwe, Krispin Zombe and others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/NP/15 - 19/7/75</td>
<td>Richard Mutambo</td>
<td>60+/M</td>
<td>Court President of Chief Mweni Wisi, Isoka</td>
<td>P.O. Isoka</td>
<td>Recounted local memory of visit by (presumably) Sir Harry Johnston to Tambo area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/CP/2 - 14/8/74 &amp; 24/7/75</td>
<td>Chief Shaibila</td>
<td>60+/M</td>
<td>Chief of Lala</td>
<td>P.O. Mkushi</td>
<td>With senior member of court, Ba Chetulo. Denied existence of 'treaty'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tape Reference and Date</td>
<td>Names of Informants</td>
<td>Age/Sex</td>
<td>Status¹</td>
<td>Address</td>
<td>Other Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/CP/2 - 13/10/75 (Chap.IV)</td>
<td>Chief Chipepo</td>
<td>70±/M</td>
<td>Chief of Lenje</td>
<td>P.O. Kabwe</td>
<td>With councillors Kapopo, Lombe and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/CP/3-4 2-5/9/74</td>
<td>Chief Shikabeta</td>
<td>60±/M</td>
<td>Chief of Soli</td>
<td>P.O. Rufunsa</td>
<td>With Chaponda Khondowe (72±), Luchele Ng'umbo (80±), six group headmen and an ex-Messenger Mutantika Jamu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/CP/1 - 10/10/73</td>
<td>Zebron Sambwa</td>
<td>70±/M</td>
<td>Senior elder of United Church of Zambia</td>
<td>Old Serenje P.O. Kanona</td>
<td>Widely travelled; 1914-18 War carrier.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/CP/1 - 16/10/73</td>
<td>Yakobe Lusuma</td>
<td>75/M</td>
<td>Retired Teacher - Senior Elder, United Church of Zambia</td>
<td>Muchinka P.O. Serenje</td>
<td>Long service with the Chipambo Mission of the Livingstonia Mission (originally Free Church of Scotland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/CP/3 - 4/9/74</td>
<td>Simon Ngulube</td>
<td>80±/M</td>
<td>Senior citizen of court of Chief Mbuluma of Nsenga</td>
<td>P.O. Katondwe</td>
<td>Clear memory of first Europeans in area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/CP/2 - 4/9/74</td>
<td>Albino Ngulube</td>
<td>75±/M</td>
<td>Senior Citizen</td>
<td>Zarupango P.O. Katondwe</td>
<td>With other senior villagers, Albezyo Nyawa, Michael Kanguma, Paul Zyamba, Benedicto Kaunde.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tape Reference and Date</td>
<td>Names of Informants</td>
<td>Age/Sex</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Address</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/NP/6 - 26/11/74</td>
<td>Kamushini Mponda</td>
<td>70/M</td>
<td>Senior member of Mweru Marsh fishing community</td>
<td>Mukupa Katandula P.O. Munungu</td>
<td>With wife. Memory of first bomas in Tabwa country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/NP/7 - 27/11/74</td>
<td>Patson Chipili</td>
<td>71/M</td>
<td>Chief-elect, Mukupa Katandula</td>
<td>P.O. Munungu</td>
<td>Account of pre-colonial period and first B.S.A.C. agents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/NP/9 - 27/11/74</td>
<td>Mayengo</td>
<td>79/M</td>
<td>Headman</td>
<td>P.O. Munungu</td>
<td>Detailed account of pre-colonial period, Arab intrusions, first Europeans, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/NP/8 - 27/11/74</td>
<td>Daniel Mwape</td>
<td>75+/M</td>
<td>Senior citizen</td>
<td>Kapama, P.O. Munungu</td>
<td>As M/NP/9 above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/EP/3 - 8/3/75</td>
<td>Sam Banda</td>
<td>90+/M</td>
<td>Headman</td>
<td>Mbingwa Village P.O. Chadiza</td>
<td>Memory of Ngoni wars, defeat of Mpezeni, local customs, first Europeans, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tape Reference and Date</td>
<td>Names of Informants</td>
<td>Age/Sex</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Address</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/EP/15 - 15/3/75</td>
<td>Nyamphande</td>
<td>80+/M</td>
<td>Senior Chief</td>
<td>P.O. Petauke</td>
<td>Had worked in Rhodesian mines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/EP/2 - 17/3/75</td>
<td>Nyathande Chirwa</td>
<td>70/M</td>
<td>Headman</td>
<td>P.O. Petauke</td>
<td>Pre-colonial period, local industry, trade, traditional worship, aspects of B.S.A.C. rule.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K/LP/5 - 9/5/73</td>
<td>William Kawandami</td>
<td>75/M</td>
<td>Senior resident</td>
<td>Mbereshi P.O. Kazembe</td>
<td>Ex-carpentry instructor of London Missionary Society, son of member of pioneer missionary party at Mbereshi. Interviewed with Aaron Mwenya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/NP/6 - 18/10/54</td>
<td>Benjamin Sikombe</td>
<td>80/M</td>
<td>Retired Mission medical orderly</td>
<td>P.O. Nakonde Mwenzo</td>
<td>Remembered arrival of Rev. Alexander Dewar, 1894. Taken to Scotland in early 1900's.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tape Reference and Date</td>
<td>Names of Informants</td>
<td>Age/Sex</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Address</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/CP/1 - 19/10/73</td>
<td>Benjamin Mpande</td>
<td>70+/M</td>
<td>Senior citizen</td>
<td>P.O. Kalwa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K/LP/7 - 12/5/73</td>
<td>Simon Kawesha</td>
<td>70/M</td>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>P.O. Kazembe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/LP/4 - 21/5/73</td>
<td>Mwanawata Chibwe</td>
<td>60+/M</td>
<td>Former Head Messenger, Kawambwa</td>
<td>P.O. Kawambwa</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>PHL/17 - 12/9/73</td>
<td>David Ntondo Walima</td>
<td>90+/M</td>
<td>Senior citizen</td>
<td>P.O. Kazembe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHL/26 - 15/10/73</td>
<td>Jim Chilima</td>
<td>80+/M</td>
<td>Senior 'notable' at Chief's court.</td>
<td>Lukwesa P.B. Lukwesa</td>
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<td>Tape Reference and Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>K/LP/2 - 20/11/74</td>
<td>Kapumfi</td>
<td>80+/M</td>
<td>Headman</td>
<td>nr. Santa Maria Mission, Chilubi Island</td>
<td>Recalled David Livingstone as 'Mupundu-we-Lala (the mupundu tree in Lala country). Detailed account of early colonial period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/CP/4 - 4/9/74</td>
<td>Tiki Mazyambe Ngulube</td>
<td>60+/M</td>
<td>Retired employee of Kabwe Municipality</td>
<td>Mbuluma, P.O. Katondwe</td>
<td>Pre-colonial local history; 'Changa-Changa' Clark and other early Europeans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/CP/3 - 13/8/74</td>
<td>Albert Chisengelelo</td>
<td>80+/M</td>
<td>Peasant farmer</td>
<td>Ching'ombe Mission, P.B. Mkushi</td>
<td>With Mwakaira and Chipeta, who came to Ching'ombe long ago from Malawi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/CP/1</td>
<td>Leo Chikambalala</td>
<td>70+/M</td>
<td>Senior citizen</td>
<td>P.O. Mkushi</td>
<td>Interviewed at Old Mkushi, with Knife Lutato, Stanslas Kapita, Mukana Bulaya and others, on early colonial history.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tape Reference and Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>K/CP/2 - 17/10/73</td>
<td>Noah Kapika</td>
<td>70+/M</td>
<td>Ex-teacher of Chitambo Mission</td>
<td>Kapika, P.O. Kanona</td>
<td>Vivid account of early B.S.A.C. period.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/NP/11 - 31/5/72</td>
<td>Sumbi</td>
<td>60+/M</td>
<td>Headman</td>
<td>Sumbi, P.B. Kayambi</td>
<td>Comments on European appropriation of land.</td>
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<tr>
<td>N/SP/1 - 19/4/73</td>
<td>Benjamin Shankwaya</td>
<td>83/M</td>
<td>Headman</td>
<td>Nanzhila P.O. Namwala</td>
<td>With Headman Chose Ngana and ex-teacher Shadreck Sama lumpo. Account of early Methodist missionaries and of B.S.A.C. cruelties.</td>
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<td>Tape Reference and Date</td>
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<td>M/LP/2 - 20/11/74</td>
<td>Mbilima</td>
<td>60+/M</td>
<td>Headman</td>
<td>Santa Maria Mission, Chilubi Island</td>
<td>With Christopher Chisungu, Paul Mukwango and Banakulu Tom. Described pre-colonial situation and coming of Europeans.</td>
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<td>N/LP/1 - 19/11/74</td>
<td>Nakasese</td>
<td>70+/F</td>
<td>Villager</td>
<td>Mushamba, Chilubi Island</td>
<td>With Paul Mukango, on European rule, taxation, forced labour.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/SP/3 - 6/8/74 &amp; 7/9/74</td>
<td>Yohane Shamayiwa</td>
<td>80+/M</td>
<td>Former teacher of Methodist Mission</td>
<td>Kanchindu P.B. Maamba</td>
<td>Vivid memory of early missionaries and B.S.A.C. Interviewed with Amityi Siamanjela.</td>
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<td>C/CP/2 - 13/8/74</td>
<td>Chisenga</td>
<td>95+/M</td>
<td>Senior citizen</td>
<td>Ching'ombe Mission P.B. Mkushi</td>
<td>With Lwizi Kapalaza. Memories of life in stockaded villages and of early Europeans, e.g. 'Selesele' Stephenson.</td>
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<td>Tape Reference and Date</td>
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<td>N/CP/5 - 16/10/73</td>
<td>Noah Nsakulula</td>
<td>65+/M</td>
<td>Trader, Local Church Elder</td>
<td>P.O. Kanona</td>
<td>Comments on colonial rule and struggle for Zambian Independence.</td>
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<td>C/EP/1 - 17/3/75</td>
<td>Chilembwe</td>
<td>80-/M</td>
<td>Headman</td>
<td>P.O. Petauke</td>
<td>Pre-colonial period; B.S.A.C. rule, including removal of villages (chisanka).</td>
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<td>C/EP/3 - 18/3/75</td>
<td>Meki Chisenga</td>
<td>60/M</td>
<td>Head Messenger</td>
<td>P.O. Petauke</td>
<td>Comments on Arabs, pre-colonial period, B.S.A.C. rule.</td>
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<td>C/EP/4 - 17/3/75</td>
<td>Chongololo</td>
<td>60+/F</td>
<td>Headwoman</td>
<td>Chongololo P.O. Petauke</td>
<td>Tax collection, etc.</td>
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<td>N/EP/1 - 9/3/75</td>
<td>Nkoko Kwezenkani Phiri</td>
<td>7/M</td>
<td>Headman</td>
<td>Chikolola P.O. Chadiza</td>
<td>With Jabes Mvula (83), Kalianjena Banda, Eliya Phiri and others. Experiences of chibalo in Rhodesia.</td>
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<tr>
<td>M/EP/13 - 18/3/75</td>
<td>Malata Mwanza</td>
<td>75+/M</td>
<td>Headman and Trader</td>
<td>Malata P.O. Petauke</td>
<td>Accounts of early colonial period, musonko, etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>N/WP/1 - 29/7/71</td>
<td>Bo Njamba</td>
<td>85+/M</td>
<td>Retired river paddler</td>
<td>P.O. Senanga</td>
<td>Favourable view of B.S.A.C. rule.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/WP/1 - 31/7/71</td>
<td>Mundia Rice Siyoto</td>
<td>80+/M</td>
<td>Senior citizen</td>
<td>P.O. Kalabo</td>
<td>Served as carrier for Lozi royalty in youth. Loyal to Lozi royal house. Not opposed to racial segregation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/NP/2 - 30/5/72</td>
<td>Sikapite brothers</td>
<td>80+/M</td>
<td>Peasant Farmers</td>
<td>Lukashya P.O. Kasama</td>
<td>Originally from Chitipa (Fort Hill) in Malawi. One served as carrier for early Europeans.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/NP/1 - 23/11/74</td>
<td>Kapungwe Semushi</td>
<td>80+/M</td>
<td>Associate of Chief's Court</td>
<td>P.O. Chiengi</td>
<td>With William Nyamba, Nsakwa, Chinamo, London Mwape at court of Tabwa chief Puta.</td>
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<tr>
<td>M/EP/12 - 13/3/75</td>
<td>Kamphodza Mvula</td>
<td>77/M</td>
<td>Headman</td>
<td>Kamphodza P.O. Katete</td>
<td>Detailed reminiscences of land appropriation, removal of villages, etc.</td>
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<td>Tape Reference and Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>C/NP/7 - 25/4/73</td>
<td>Gabriel Chileshe</td>
<td>50+/M</td>
<td>Headman</td>
<td>Mwene Chilufya, P.O. Kasama</td>
<td>Pre-colonial system of government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/NP/1 - 23/11/74</td>
<td>Chipambala</td>
<td>70+</td>
<td>Ex-messenger</td>
<td>Puta, P.O. Chiengi</td>
<td>Recorded a song with which he used to call people to pay tax.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tape Reference and Date</td>
<td>Names of Informants</td>
<td>Age/Sex</td>
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**NOTE:** The above transcriptions have been selected for citation from a collection of over 160 such interviews recorded in all districts of Zambia except Zambezi (Balovale), Kasempa, Mwinilunga, Kabompo and Solwezi. Oral material collected at Seminar-Workshops at Mungu (August 1971), Mungwi, Kasama and Lundazi (June 1972) has also been studied. The testimonies of informants throughout the country, in respect of the hardships of B.S.A.C. rule, reveal a notable uniformity. The interviews recorded and the Seminar-Workshops represent the participation of approximately 1,000 persons in the provision of testimony on the subject of this thesis.
III. ARCHIVAL SOURCES OUTSIDE ZAMBIA

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(a) RHODES HOUSE, Oxford (RH):

(i) 103/1 and 103/2;

(ii) MSS.Afr.s.70, 71, 72, 76, 81, 84, 113,228, 350, 707, 776-81, 833, 1214, 1314, 1315, 1355, 1490;

(iii) MSS.Brit.Emp.s. 22 (G.59, 159, 164,183, 184) - Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society papers;


(b) BRITISH MUSEUM (BM): State Papers (SP) - alternatively called Parliamentary Papers (Parl. Papers), citing documents for period 1885-1922; and Reports (Hilton Young, Cmd.3234, 1929 and Pim, Colonial no. 145, 1938).

(c) PUBLIC RECORDS OFFICE, Chancery Lane and Portugal Street, London, WC 2, (PRO):

(i) Foreign Office (FO) - 2/54, 2/55, 2/127, 55/56, 84/1702, 84/1846, 84/2113.

(ii) Colonial Office (CO) - Series 417:
    nos. 342, 390, 450, 464, 480, 494, 536, 557, 601, 656, 675, 691.
    Series 879: nos. 29/358, 372, 392; 35/414; 36/426; 39/454; 40/461, 468, 484; 44/498; 47/517; 52/552; 53/559; 57/574; 62/628; 68/656; 69/659; 76/694; 78/702; 79/717; 84/746; 86/763; 91/802; 95/872; 98/899; 101/931; 102/932; 104/947; 107/969; 113/1003; 114/1015; 116/1034; 120/1085; 1096 and 879/432 - Africa West.

(d) GELL COLLECTION (PLG: BSA) - papers of Philip Lyttelton Gell, B.S.A.C. Director from 1899-1925, Chairman of the Board in 1922 (seen at Hopton Hall, Wirksworth, Derbyshire, by courtesy of Mrs A.E. Gell):- files 3/8, 43, 171, 229; 5/355, 365, 366; 7/97, 116, 121, 133, 152, 155-6, 217, 227, 231-2, 256; 8/13, 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 60, 64, 66, 67,

(e) MAXWELL STAMP ASSOCIATES (MSA) — (by courtesy of the Managing Director, 55-63 Goswell Road, London EC1V 7PT) — being working papers used by Maxwell Stamp Associates in preparation of their 'History of the Mineral Rights of Northern Rhodesia' (January 1967).

(f) ROYAL COMMONWEALTH SOCIETY — Northumberland Avenue, London, WC2 — (RCS) Mss.52.

(g) NATIONAL LIBRARY OF SCOTLAND — George IV Bridge, Edinburgh — (NLS) 7876; 7878, Folios 30, 134, 281; 7879, Folios 16, 76; 7883, Folio 44; 7906, Folios 150, 219.

(h) SCOTTISH RECORDS OFFICE — Register House, Edinburgh — (SRO) GQ 40.


(j) CONGREGATIONAL COUNCIL FOR WORLD MISSION — 11 Cataret Street, London, SW1 — formerly the London Missionary Society — (CCWM) — Central African Reports and Letters, Boxes 1-20, covering period 1886-1923.

(k) METHODIST MISSIONARY SOCIETY — 25 Marylebone Road, London, NW1 — (MMS) —

(i) Diaries of Arthur Baldwin, 3/1/90 — 3/2/97;

(ii) Papers of Rev. Edwin Smith, Box 4.

(l) LIVINGSTONIA PAPERS — by courtesy of Professor Shepperson, University of Edinburgh — sundry items of correspondence.

(m) CHURCH OF SCOTLAND (C. of S.) OVERSEAS COUNCIL — 121, George Street, Edinburgh — by courtesy of the Rev. N.C. Bernard — Inventory 13.

(n) UNITED SOCIETY FOR THE PROPAGATION OF THE GOSPEL — 15 Tufton Street, London SW1, (USPG) — papers of the Universities' Mission to Central Africa, especially files A1 and C2.
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(i) Nyasa Diaries, 1891-1894, 1895-1906, 1906-1912;
(ii) Mambwe Diary, 1891-1896;
(iii) Kayambi Diary, 1896-1905, 1915-1937;
(iv) Chilubula Diary, 1899-1907;
(v) Chilonga Diary, 1899-1914;
(vi) Lwapula Diary, 1900-1929;
(vii) Kapatu Diary, 1905-1929.

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(i) *Journal des Mission Evangeliques* - for period 1885-1927;
(ii) *News from Barotseland* - for period 1897-1916.
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Publisher/Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>ROTBERG R.I.</td>
<td>'Joseph Thomson and the Exploration of Africa'</td>
<td>Chatto and Windus 1971</td>
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<td>THOMSON J.</td>
<td>'To Central African Lakes and Back'</td>
<td>Sampson Low, Marston, 1881</td>
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<td>BARNES J.A.</td>
<td>'Politics in a Changing Society'</td>
<td>Manchester 1966</td>
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<td>JOHNSTON H.H.</td>
<td>'The Story of My Life'</td>
<td>Chatto and Windus 1923</td>
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<tr>
<td>GANN L.H.</td>
<td>'History of Southern Rhodesia'</td>
<td>Chatto and Windus 1965</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARNOT F.S.</td>
<td>'Missionary Travels in Central Africa'</td>
<td>Echoes of Service 1914</td>
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<td>WALLER H. (ed.)</td>
<td>'LIVINGSTONE'S LAST JOURNALS'</td>
<td>Murray 1874</td>
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<td>DEBENHAM F.</td>
<td>'The Way to Ilala'</td>
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<td>GOULDSBURY C. &amp; SHEANE H.</td>
<td>'The Great Plateau of Northern Rhodesia'</td>
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<td>ARNOT F.S.</td>
<td>'Garanganze'</td>
<td>Hawkins 1889</td>
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<td>MOLONEY J.A.</td>
<td>'With Captain Stairs to Katanga'</td>
<td>Sampson Low, Marston 1893</td>
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<td>CRAWFORD D.</td>
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<td>YOUNG T.C.</td>
<td>'Notes on the Customs and Folklore of the Tumbuka-Kamanga Peoples'</td>
<td>Livingstonia 1931</td>
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<td>SMITH E.W.</td>
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<td>TEMPELS P.</td>
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<td>MBITI J.S.</td>
<td>'African Religion and Philosophy'</td>
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<tr>
<td>RENAULT F.</td>
<td>'Lavigerie, l'eslavage Africaine et l'Europe'</td>
<td>De Boccard, Paris, 1971</td>
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<td>MACNAIR J.I.</td>
<td>'Livingstone the Liberator'</td>
<td>Collins 1940</td>
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</table>
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