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Mark Bolsover
Artistic Inspiration and the Figure of the Artist in the works of James Joyce and Friedrich Nietzsche

Mark Bolsover

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Introduction

This thesis will seek to examine the parallel which it will argue exists between the theorising of artistic inspiration and the resulting conception of the figure of the artist in the works of Joyce and Nietzsche. Recent critical work on the relationship between Joyce and Nietzsche has tended to focus exclusively on the question of influence. In ‘The Struggle against Meta (Phantasma)-Physics: Nietzsche, Joyce and the “Excess of History’”, for example, drawing his reading in particular from The Use and Abuse of History, Joseph Buttigieg gives a broad account of Nietzsche’s conception of history, but, in effect, uses his reading of Nietzsche to simply augment his reading of Joyce, arguing that his conception of the ‘postmodern’ Nietzsche can ‘illuminate and give depth’ to the works of the ‘modernist’ Joyce.¹ In The Aesthetics of James Joyce, Jacques Aubert discusses what he calls the ‘Nietzschean overtones’ of Joyce’s work.² Aubert focuses on what he argues is Hegel’s crucial influence on Joyce and appears to align Nietzsche, and Nietzsche’s influence on Joyce, with what he allusively refers to as ‘post-Hegelian’ or ‘Neo-Hegelian’ philosophy, though it is never clear precisely what he intends these to denote.³ In ‘Beyond Truth and Freedom: The New Faith of Joyce and Nietzsche’, Joseph Valente gives an illuminating account of Joyce and Nietzsche’s mutual rejection of metaphysics, but focuses exclusively on the later Joyce and Nietzsche. Again, Valente frames his argument specifically in terms of an influence, drawing on an idiosyncratic reading of the concept of the ‘superman’ and

³ 66. See references throughout. F.C. McGrath also seeks to characterise Nietzsche in this way, arguing that ‘turn-of-the-century aesthetics’ ‘was thoroughly imbued’ with Hegel and that ‘neo-Hegelianism’ had been made ‘widespread in Britain and Europe through the works of Nietzsche and Wagner’, though, again, he appears to offer little evidence to clarify Nietzsche’s ‘neo-Hegelian’ status, or to substantiate his historical claims. See F.C. McGrath, ‘Laughing in His Sleeve: The Sources of Stephen’s Aesthetics’, James Joyce Quarterly, 23, (1986), 259-275, 259-275 (see 260).
identifying Stephen Stephen as ‘recognizably Zarathustrian’.\(^4\) The central problem with the critical approach these accounts share in common, which concerns itself with the question of influence, is that it obliges itself to attribute a detailed and philosophically thoroughgoing reading of Nietzsche’s works to Joyce, one not always necessarily in evidence in the criticism itself. It must thus be at pains to stretch available biographical information on Joyce’s reading of Nietzsche, as well as examples drawn from Joyce’s texts, in order to fit a partial, incomplete or inaccurate characterisation of Nietzsche’s thought; threatening to transform Joyce into some kind of ‘Nietzschean’ and Nietzsche into some kind of anticipatory ‘Joycean’.\(^5\) By contrast, then, this thesis will seek to set aside the problematic question of influence from the outset, instead seeking to examine the mutually illuminating parallel which it will argue exists between the theorising of artistic inspiration and the resulting conception of the figure of the artist in the works of Joyce and Nietzsche. It will argue that this parallel has mutually illuminating consequences for an understanding of both Nietzsche and Joyce’s relationships to metaphysics and, through this, to Romanticism. It will be the task of this thesis to explain the way in which both Nietzsche and Joyce retain the key terms of Romantic accounts of artistic inspiration, whilst rejecting the metaphysical claims at stake in them.

My argument will be grounded in a reading of Nietzsche focussing on an in-depth close-reading of the opening sections of *The Birth of Tragedy*. In particular I will argue for a critical reappraisal of the Apollinian and Dionysian within the text,

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\(^5\) In his biography of Joyce, Richard Ellmann claims that Joyce had read some of Nietzsche’s work during 1903, but does not provide any details of the extent or depth of Joyce’s reading, nor of Joyce’s possible consultation of whatever critical material was available on Nietzsche at that time. This leaves little biographical evidence to on which ground a thesis of influence. See Ellmann, *James Joyce: New and Revised Edition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 142.
and of the relationship between them. I want to locate this reading in the context of recent critical debates which have sought to identify Nietzsche’s work as a philosophy of naturalism. These debates have focussed exclusively on the nature of Nietzsche’s naturalism in his later philosophy, from *Human, All Too Human* (1878-1880), onwards, dismissing *Birth* as part of an early Schopenhauerian, Wagnerian and Romantic ‘phase’ of Nietzsche’s work. Brian Leiter, for instance, argues that Nietzsche’s naturalism constitutes a ‘Methodological Naturalism’ (‘M-Naturalism’), according to which ‘philosophical inquiry […] should be continuous with empirical inquiry in the sciences’. It is a naturalism whose claims are not necessarily confirmed in a scientific manner and which therefore remains a ‘Speculative M-Naturalism’, and yet is also in part a ‘Substantive’ naturalism insofar as it holds ‘the (ontological) view that the only things that exist are natural’. For Leiter then, Nietzsche’s is a naturalism which remains ‘speculative’ insofar as it is intuitive and artistic and yet also empirical and, therefore, ‘substantive’ in its rejection of metaphysical explanations of phenomena; limiting its own project to an examination of natural drives and forces.

Engaging with the terms of Leiter’s understanding of Nietzsche’s naturalism, as well as Ivan Soll’s argument that Nietzsche’s philosophy of art forms ‘part of an overarching naturalism that grounds the value of any aspect of culture in the way it serves our most basic needs as living creatures’, I want to extend the range of the

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extant readings of Nietzsche’s idiosyncratic form of philosophical naturalism and its impact on his philosophy of art to argue for a critical reappraisal that sees it as already at stake in the account of artistic inspiration and creation in Birth.⁹ Employing the term ‘incorporation’, appropriated from Nietzsche’s later writing, as well as a reading of his definition of ‘lethargy’ in Birth as the purgation of lived experience, I will argue that, on the one hand, the Apollinian represents the sublimation of the natural drive to the incorporation of lived experience into the or by the pre-existing plastic art forms (sculpture, painting and epic poetry, for example). On the other hand, the Dionysian represents the sublimation of the natural drive to the purgation of lived experience into the non-imagistic art forms, such as music and dance. Nietzsche’s account of the conjunction of these two drives in the phenomenon of the lyric poet, as he presents this in Birth, constitutes the formation of a theory of artistic inspiration and creation. I will argue that to read Birth in this way—as a naturalistic account of artistic inspiration and creation—allows for a reappraisal of a subject of great concern in recent Nietzsche criticism: namely, of the relationship of his philosophy of art from Birth onwards to the legacies of both Schopenhauer and Romanticism. In particular, I will argue for a re-conception of the relationship of Birth to Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Against the prevalent contemporary critical trend to attribute an uncritical adoption of Schopenhauerian philosophy to the text, I will instead follow the opposing contemporary trend to locate the text within the wider context of Nietzsche’s early rejection of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics in his posthumously published notes and

early writings. This will allow me to argue that the deployment of Schopenhauer’s ideas and philosophical vocabulary in Birth is ironic.

For Schopenhauer, the artist is one who achieves liberation from subjective willing and attains access to the Platonic Ideas of which everyday objects are the imperfect expressions, or shadows. I will argue that in Birth Nietzsche implicitly opposes Schopenhauer’s ‘Platonic’ conception of art. By contrast, he establishes a conception of artistic inspiration as an intensely undergone disruptive experience in which the individuated everyday self of the artist is overwhelmed, and the chaotic tumult of natural drives suppressed in the creation and maintenance of that everyday self is unleashed, an experience which, adopting the term from both George Bataille and Gilles Deleuze, I will call ‘laceration’. In On Nietzsche, Bataille appropriates the term ‘laceration’ from the physiological context of extreme bodily wounding and translates it into a term descriptive of a psychological, explicitly erotic, mystical and religious experience: ‘extreme laceration […] awakens ecstatic moments’—moments of transportation (for Bataille both erotic, in the sense of being awakened by sexual desire, and criminal, in the sense of morally culpable)—and constitutes what he terms

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11 See Christoph Cox, ‘Nietzsche, Dionysus, and the Ontology of Music’, in Ansell Pearson, ed., A Companion to Nietzsche (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 495-531. Cox argues that the Apollinian and Dionysian are not concerned with the thing-in-itself and the appearance and that Nietzsche is not reverting ‘back to metaphysical, anti-naturalist distinctions – ontological distinctions between a “true” and an “apparent” world or epistemological distinctions between an unknowable given and ordinary experience or knowledge.’ (499)

an ‘impulse’ which ‘inexorably becomes the individual’s annihilation.’ The subject is torn apart in the experience of ‘laceration,’ and pushed into, what Bataille terms, an experience of an identity with ‘totality’; it annihilates the structures and processes of individual subjectivity and serves to plunge the subject into an immediate identity with their environs. For Bataille, this remains a religious and mystical experience. In \textit{Nietzsche and Philosophy}, Deleuze also transposes ‘laceration’ from a physical into an aesthetic context, defining the dual nature of artistic inspiration, which he dubs ‘Dionysian laceration’. In terms closer to those of Deleuze than Bataille and with recourse to a reading of ‘On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral sense’, I will argue that, for Nietzsche, ‘laceration’ continues to mean the annihilation of the subject in an intensely undergone aesthetic experience, but, in line with his nascent naturalism, he transposes this experience into linguistic and intellectual terms concerned with the ‘laceration’ of exhausted intellectual concepts and descent into experience stripped of conceptual and metaphysical prejudices, which, in ‘On Truth’ (in a way which will serve to illuminate the Dionysian of \textit{Birth}) he dubs ‘intuition’.

On the basis of the conception of ‘laceration’ which I will develop from Bataille and Deleuze, I will argue that for Nietzsche, artistic creation represents the ironic attempt to incorporate the experience of purgation by retrieving the everyday self as a register from which to draw images by which to articulate it. This is the movement or process of what I will call the fold in the self-creation of the artist. The conception of the fold in the self-creation of the artist that I am seeking to establish, in

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Gilles Deleuze, \textit{Nietzsche and Philosophy}, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (London: Athlone, 1986), 15
\end{itemize}
contrast to both Aubert and McGrath’s obscure, elliptical allusions to Nietzsche’s (supposed) ‘Neo-’ or ‘post-Hegelianism’, thus represents an ironic and anti-dialectical structure. It shares this feature with post-structural conceptions of ‘the fold’, particularly in the work of Jacques Derrida and Deleuze. For Derrida, in his reading of Mallarmé in ‘The Double Session’, the ‘figure of the fold’ represents ‘a kind of writing that describes itself, de-inscribes itself as it goes along, marking the angles and “coilings” or “reprises” that bring it back to itself; it is never simply a description of things’.

For Derrida, presence and/or self-identity are constructed as ideals. We can never enter into the presence of, or identity with pure ideas. Presence is always deferred by the text itself. Every text makes a claim to an ideal and a concomitant claim to unity with this ideal. In this sense, the ideal stands as the condition of the possibility of the text. The ideal is what makes the text possible; it is what grounds the project of the text and the metaphysical (political, cultural, natural, etc.) claims to presence that it makes. Nevertheless, identity with the ideal remains, for Derrida, impossible. At the heart of the text (of any given text) is something which makes it possible (grounds it and gives a foundation to its claims and projects) and yet which is itself impossible (can never be realised). The text already contains within itself the seeds of its own undoing (at the hands of a deconstructive critique). The ‘fold’, for Derrida represents such a condition simultaneously of possibility and of impossibility.

Whilst my own conception of the fold in the self-creation of the artist shares in common with Derrida’s the nature of an ironic anti-transcendental structure,

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representing as it does what I have called the laceration of the empirical self of the artist in the intensely undergone aesthetic experience of Dionysian ecstasy, and the retrieval of the empirical self as a register of ironic images by which to (poetically) embody this experience, as such, in the context of my current argument, it is concerned solely with the nature of art, inspiration, creativity and the figure of the artist. It is also therefore distinct from the terms of Gilles Deleuze’s attempt to trace the links between Leibnizian metaphysics and Baroque art.\(^{18}\)

In other words, one of my central claims is that Nietzsche ironically appropriates the terms of Schopenhauer’s philosophy of art to his idiosyncratic form of philosophical naturalism, itself fundamentally at odds with Schopenhauer’s Kantian and Platonic metaphysics:

[Nietzsche] opposes transcendent metaphysics, whether that of Plato or Christianity or Schopenhauer. He rejects notions of the immaterial soul, the absolutely free controlling will, or the self-transparent pure intellect, instead emphasizing the body, talking of the animal nature of human beings, and attempting to explain numerous phenomena by invoking drives, instincts, and affects which he locates in our physical, bodily existence. Human beings are to be “translated back into nature,” since otherwise we falsify their history, their psychology, and the nature of their values—concerning all of which we must know truths, as a means to the all-important revaluation of values. This is Nietzsche’s naturalism in the broad sense.\(^{19}\)

Janaway argues that Nietzsche rejects all concepts which can be seen to rest on claims to a transcendental metaphysical foundation. In particular, Janaway frames this rejection as one of the key concepts of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics: ‘the absolutely free controlling will’ and ‘the self-transparent pure intellect’, though also of the religious doctrine of the ‘immaterial soul’. For Nietzsche, Janaway argues, to try to understand human beings and human history (the history of the ‘human’) in light of

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\(^{19}\) Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness: Reading Nietzsche’s Genealogy*, 34
these claims to transcendent metaphysical principles is to effectively misinterpret and
to falsify that history. In opposition to transcendent metaphysics, then, the history of
‘humanity’ must be ‘translated back into nature’ and understood as the dynamic
interplay of natural drives, forces and affects, specifically in terms of the ways in
which this interplay forms the, apparently self-identical, phenomenon of ‘the body’. I
will argue that the terms of Janaway’s reading of Nietzsche’s naturalism are already at
stake in Birth. It will therefore be one of the key tasks of the thesis to offer a clear
explanation of these concepts and of the terms of Nietzsche’s rejection of them.

To read the account of artistic inspiration and creation at stake in Birth as
fundamentally anti-metaphysical in this way will allow me to argue for a re-
conception of the relationship of the text to Romanticism. In contrast, on the one
hand, to contemporary critical readings of Birth which argue for the text’s
thoroughgoing Romanticism, and, on the other, contrasting accounts which argue for
the text’s thoroughgoing rejection of Romanticism, I will argue that Nietzsche’s
account of artistic inspiration and creation represents his ironic appropriation of the
terms of Romantic accounts of artistic inspiration to an aesthetic which rejects the
metaphysics at stake in these accounts.20

This reading of the naturalism, ironic appropriation of Schopenhauerian
philosophy and Romantic aesthetics and the anti-metaphysics of Birth will form the
foundation of my argument for a critical reappraisal of the presentation of Stephen’s
aesthetic theory between Joyce’s Stephen Hero and A Portrait of the Artist as a Young

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20 On the ‘Romanticism’ of Birth see Aaron Ridley, Nietzsche on Art (London: Routledge, 2007) (9).
On Nietzsche’s straightforward ‘Anti-Romanticism’, see Adrian Del Caro, Nietzsche contra Nietzsche:
Creativity and the Anti-Romantic, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989); Judith
I will argue that the aesthetic theory forms an ironic appropriation of the terms of Aquinas’s philosophy, in particular his theory of beauty, analogous to that of Nietzsche’s appropriation of Schopenhauerian philosophy and Romantic aesthetics. It is this analogy that will therefore serve to ground the parallel between Joyce and Nietzsche that this thesis seeks to examine.

Insofar, then, as my argument hinges on a reading of the presentation of Stephen’s aesthetic theory, it is therefore engaged in the terms of a well-trodden but ongoing debate within Joyce criticism. On one side of the debate stand those critics who argue that the aesthetic theory cannot be read on its own terms. In *The Rhetoric of Fiction*, for example, Wayne Booth argues that the problem of the irony of Joyce’s prose, coupled with the dramatic context of Stephen’s exposition of his aesthetic theory, prohibits any critical reading of the aesthetic theory on its own terms. Booth argues that the theory can be taken as neither ‘true’ to Stephen’s character nor to the artwork (the text itself) at the point of its exposition. For Booth, the simulation of autobiography in Joyce’s texts is intentionally ironic and he argues that they (and *Portrait* in particular) remain essentially ‘authorless’. The other side of the debate is maintained by those critics who argue that the exposition of the aesthetic theory provides a form of critical key to Joyce’s own philosophical and aesthetic views, his relationship to his texts, and to the texts themselves. Ian Crump, for example, argues explicitly against Booth and maintains that the aesthetic theory represents Joyce’s ‘most complete expression of the ideas that he first promulgated in his Paris Notebook

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23 See esp. 329 and 333-334
24 Cf. 325-326
in March 1903.’25 Whilst Crump attempts to argue that Joyce evolved an ‘authority-less technique’ in the development of his texts (from the early essay ‘A Portrait of the Artist’, through *Stephen Hero* into *Portrait*), his reading is therefore nonetheless anchored in a conception of the texts’ relationship to Joyce, as both author and historical figure.26

Both sides of the debate, then, can be seen to be anchored in, and to fail to escape the trap of, a consciousness of or critical obsession with the autobiographical foundations of both *Stephen Hero* and *Portrait*, and the relationship of the texts and of Stephen to (the authorial and historical figure of) Joyce himself. Booth argues that the ironic, distanced relationship of *Portrait* in particular to its author, renders any reading of the aesthetic theory impossible. By contrast, Crump establishes an imperative to completely identify the theory with its author, reading it as a development of Joyce’s own thought and ideas. In contrast to both of these critical positions, then, instead of referring the aesthetic theory to the relationship of the texts to their author’s aesthetic views or authorial intentions; seeking to analyse Joyce as author through the texts on the basis of a form of biographical guesswork, I will seek to avoid the otherwise insoluble problems involved in such analysis. Instead of referring the aesthetic theory to ‘Joyce’ (as authorial and historical figure), I will adopt the name ‘Stephen’ as an epithet for the aesthetic that is produced in and by the texts themselves. The epithet will also serve to encompass the orthographical

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difference between the Stephen Daedalus of *Stephen Hero* and the Stephen Dedalus of *Portrait* (and, later of *Ulysses*).

Placing the pertinent passages in *Stephen Hero* and *Portrait* side-by-side, I will frame my argument through a comparative close-reading of the presentations of the aesthetic theory. This is an approach which, as far as I have been able to discover, has not been adopted in any extant criticism. Against the notion, emerging particularly from Booth’s critical position, for example, that the two texts represent the simple dramatisation of substantially different positions, the comparative close-reading will allow me to argue that a development exists between two texts which represents the *evolution* of the concept of the ‘epiphany’ of *Stephen Hero* into the ‘esthetic image’ of *Portrait*. I will argue that the aesthetic theory of the latter text incorporates, refines, rephrases and clarifies the diffuse material of the earlier text, and that studying the theory of *Portrait* in a direct comparison with that of the earlier draft helps to contextualise and clarify the ideas at stake within it.

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28 See *SH*, 217-218; *Portrait*, 229-231.

29 Whilst I will draw on Joyce’s own notes on aesthetics, collected in *Joyce, Occasional, Critical, and Political Writing*, I will do so on the basis of the *parallel* which exists between them and the ideas at
In particular, I will argue that the ‘esthetic image’ of Portrait refines the concept of the ‘epiphany’ by incorporating the distinct, but related discussion in Stephen Hero of the opposition of the ‘classical’ to the ‘romantic’ ‘tempers’ in art and privileging of the ‘classical’. I will argue that a parallel exists between this, the earlier identical opposition of the ‘classical’ to the ‘romantic’ ‘tempers’ in art and privileging of the ‘classical’ in Nietzsche’s writings on art (from Human, All Too Human onwards) and in T.E. Hulme’s later writings on Modern art, paying special attention to the influence of Henri Bergson’s philosophy on Hulme. In the context of this thesis, then, Hulme and Bergson will form a philosophical and art-historical bridge between Nietzsche, writing in the late-nineteenth century, and Joyce, writing in the early decades of the twentieth century. This will allow me, whilst avoiding the irresolvable problems associated with the question of (direct) influence, to locate Stephen’s aesthetic theory as part of the Nietzschean and post-Nietzschean tradition of debates on the philosophy of art which played a crucial role in the formation of self-styled neo-classical Modernism. Thus, whilst problematic in a larger historical and critical context, the terms ‘Romantic’ and ‘Modernist’ will be retained insofar as they will help to present my central argument in as clear a manner as possible. Through an extended comparison with the terms of T.E. Hulme’s writings on art, I will argue that a rejection of Platonism and (post-Schopenhauerian) late-Romanticism and the ironic appropriation of Romantic accounts of artistic inspiration and creation, analogous to that traced in my reading of Birth, is also at stake in the evolution of Stephen’s aesthetic theory.

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stake in the development of the aesthetic theory of the texts and to the extent that they serve to clarify these ideas and not as a source of the that theory.
In the final chapter I will argue that Stephen’s exposition of the more mature incarnation of his aesthetic theory in the ‘Scylla and Charybdis’ episode of Joyce’s *Ulysses* evolves from the implicit and philosophically thoroughgoing anti-metaphysical appropriation of Aquinas between *Stephen Hero* and *Portrait* and the rejection of the (specifically Yeatsian) late-Romantic account of artistic inspiration and creation that it is used to ground. I will argue that in order to understand the relationship of ‘Scylla’ to the turn-of-the-century debates on Irish National politics with which the episode engages, it is thus necessary to understand the philosophical and art-historical claims which underpin this engagement.

The thesis will end by examining the implications of the parallel between Joyce and Nietzsche for an understanding of the aesthetics and politics of the final incarnation of Stephen’s aesthetic theory in ‘Scylla and Charybdis’, drawing a parallel between Stephen’s aesthetic theory and my reading of the fold in the self-creation of the artist in *Birth*. I will argue against both post-colonial and exclusively theoretical readings of Joyce’s politics and against those which seek to position Joyce as an obsessively Irish-centric writer by focussing exclusively on biographical and historical context. By contrast, I will argue that approaching his work through the framework of its rejection of late-Romantic aesthetics and metaphysics, in conjunction with the biographical and historical context of the texts, serves to

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30 I will frame my argument that Stephen’s political position, as it is presented in ‘Scylla’, is founded upon his rejection of late-Romanticism and concomitant ironic appropriation of Romantic aesthetics, in relation to Andrew Gibson’s recent influential reassessment of Joyce’s biography (*James Joyce* [London: Reaktion Books, 2006]), in which he argues for a reconsideration of Joyce as an Irish writer and a rejection of what he argues is the contemporary critical trend to characterise Joyce as an internationalist and as a European writer. I will seek to qualify Gibson’s reading through a comparison of my reading of the politics of ‘Scylla’ with Joseph Valente’s reading of Joyce’s ‘Ireland: Island of Saints and Sages’ and his argument that Joyce emerges from a vociferous opposition to the context of contemporary Irish nationalism, moving through the perspective of an ‘exilic’ nationalism, to a final, synthetic position in which he sought to transcend the terms of both nationhood and of nationalism. (Joseph Valente, ‘Joyce’s Politics: Race, Nation and Transnationalism’, in Jean-Michel Rabaté, ed., *Palgrave Advances in James Joyce Studies* [Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004], 73-96)
contextualise their political, philosophical, cultural and artistic rejection of Irish Nationalism and Revivalism and fundamental political cosmopolitanism.

The thesis will thus argue that a mutually illuminating parallel exists between the conceptions of artistic inspiration and the figure of the artist in the works of Joyce and Nietzsche and that this parallel can help to clarify Joyce’s relationship to Nietzschean philosophy, Nietzsche’s relationship to neo-classical Modernism, and the relationship of both to the legacy of Romanticism. Both Nietzsche and Joyce reject the Platonic metaphysical opposition of an ideal other world to that of the everyday, which they regard as being at stake in Romantic and late-Romantic accounts of artistic inspiration and creation. By contrast, both attempt to ironically appropriate the terms of these accounts to anti-metaphysical and anti-Romantic ‘classical’ aesthetics. Both seek to redeem the legacy of Romanticism from its post-Schopenhauerian, late-Romantic fate. They seek to supplant the access to Platonic ‘Ideas’, at stake in Romantic and late-Romantic accounts of inspiration and creativity, with conceptions of the presentation of an intensely undergone aesthetic experience, focussed on an object of quotidian experience which represents the radical disruption of the subjectivity of the artist. The artist’s ‘image’ emerges as the articulation of that disruption, ironically retrieving the disrupted self as a symbolic register by which to articulate the experience of artistic inspiration: the process which I will call the fold in the self-creation of the artist.
Nietzsche’s early Schopenhauerian—anti-Schopenhauerianism: Intuition, Flux and Anti-metaphysics between ‘On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense’ and The Birth of Tragedy

At the outset of The Birth of Tragedy (1872), Nietzsche argues that Hellenic culture represented the ‘profound mysteries’ of its ‘view of art’ through the ‘intensely clear figures of the gods’. In particular, he singles out the figures of Apollo and Dionysus as embodying the two opposing artistic ‘tendencies’ of the plastic and ‘nonimagistic’ arts, respectively. These, he argues, find an analogy in the physiological phenomena of ‘dreams and intoxication’. He contrasts this physiological and mythological foundation for the comprehension of the ‘mysteries’ of Hellenic art and culture to that of abstract ‘concepts’.\(^1\) The terms of this contrast are echoed and clarified in the later essay ‘On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense’ (1873), in which Nietzsche sets out the terms of a critique of the intellect and its concepts, to which he contrasts intuition (Anschauung).\(^2\)

In this chapter I will begin by focussing on an examination of ‘On Truth’, and in particular on the parallel between Nietzsche’s contrasting of ‘intuition’ (as a projected new philosophical method) to the concepts of the intellect in the essay, and the analogous terms of the initial argument of Birth. I will analyse the terms of Nietzsche’s early rejection of Kantian and Schopenhauerian metaphysics, linking ‘On

\(^1\) Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of Wagner, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967) (hereafter, BT), §1, 33

Truth’ to the earlier critique of Schopenhauerian philosophy in the ‘On Schopenhauer’ fragment (1868). Whilst it is ostensibly Schopenhauerian, the fact that these two texts book-end the composition and the publication of Birth, I will argue, indicates its location in Nietzsche’s pre-existing and on-going critique of Schopenhauerian metaphysics and aesthetics. This will allow me to argue that Nietzsche’s concept of the ‘primal unity’ is implicitly anti-Schopenhauerian. Drawing on a parallel between Birth, ‘On Truth’ and Henri Bergson’s later contrast between ‘intuition’ and the intellect (‘analysis’) and conception of ‘duration’, I will argue that the ‘primal unity’ points, not to the metaphysical unity of the Schopenhauerian ‘will’, but to a dynamic arrangement and hierarchy of immanent natural forces. This in turn will allow me to argue that the ‘primal unity’ is located in far greater proximity to Nietzsche’s own later formulation of the doctrine of ‘the will to power’, read specifically through On the Genealogy of Morality, the material gathered in Nietzsche’s Late Notebooks, and Gilles Deleuze’s Nietzsche and Philosophy, than to the terms of Schopenhauerian metaphysics.

I – On ‘intuition’ and the laceration of the concepts of the intellect: Nietzsche’s early ironic anti-Schopenhauerianism

In ‘On Truth’, Nietzsche criticises what he sees as the arrogance of the human claim to knowledge, through the intellect, of the value of existence. He contests what he argues is the conceit of the intellect and the attempt to extend its remit beyond the realm of human experience. For Nietzsche, the concepts of the intellect are anthropomorphisms. In opposition to a conception of the intellect that would seek to

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1 ‘OTL,’ 114
portray it as a vehicle for ascertaining the truth of the value of existence, Nietzsche characterises it as the paragon of ‘dissimulation’: ‘allotted to these most unfortunate, delicate, and ephemeral beings merely as a device for detaining them a minute within existence.’ The intellect lies as a veil over existence as a means for the creation and preservation of the individual. Without the intellect, Nietzsche argues, existence itself would be unbearable. Whilst the intellect appears ostensibly as the means to knowledge and to truth, Nietzsche argues that its primary function is to conceal the plethora of phenomena which threaten to overwhelm the individual. It is not a means to self-knowledge but to self-deception:

What does man actually know about himself? Is he, indeed, ever able to perceive himself completely, as if laid out in a lighted display case? Does nature not conceal most things from him – even concerning his own body – in order to confine and lock him within a proud, deceptive consciousness, aloof from the coils of the bowels, the rapid flow of the blood stream, and the intricate quivering of the fibers!

According to Nietzsche, the intellect is engendered in order to conceal the multitude of natural physiological processes and drives. He argues that this repression is what renders the individual possible. By intimation, for Nietzsche, a thoroughgoing knowledge of the effect of physiological drives on consciousness, which the intellect is engendered precisely in order to prohibit, is necessary for any accurate self-perception and self-comprehension to be possible.

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4 Cf. 114-115
5 115
6 114: Nietzsche refers to the death, during childbirth of Lessing’s son, arguing that, without the intellect, the whole of humanity would have reason ‘to flee this existence as quickly’.
7 ‘OTL,’ 115. Cf. 119
For Nietzsche, natural existence constitutes the chaotic flux comprised of the myriad of natural drives and processes. The intellect is engendered in order to render the individual possible and, further, to preserve them against the suffering that a conscious awareness of, and inability to escape from, the confusion and contradiction of this flux would inevitably give rise to. The notion of the fiction of individuality, shared by ‘On Truth’, and, though in a different manner, as I will seek to demonstrate, by the Apollinian of Birth, anticipates the more thoroughgoing critique of subjectivity in Nietzsche’s later works, which is intimately tied both to his developing naturalism and to his aesthetic conception of what he will later name the ‘classical’.

In a note from a notebook of April—June, 1885, Nietzsche provides an apposite summary of his critique of the concept of the unified subject:

If I have anything of a unity within me, it certainly doesn’t lie in the conscious “I” and in feeling, willing, thinking, but somewhere else: in the sustaining, appropriating, expelling, watchful prudence of my whole organism, of which my conscious self is only a tool.9

Nietzsche argues that by virtue of the nature of our conception of ‘knowing’; that is, the nature of the intellect and its repression of the flux of natural drives, we must remain unknown to ourselves and alienated from ourselves. In this passage Nietzsche implicitly reiterates the notion of the necessity of this alienation. True self-knowledge and self-identity must remain impossible if the individual (the subject), and thus morality, are to be maintained. For this reason, he argues, no genealogist prior to himself has yet enquired as to the true origins and evolution of morality, for each has had a stake in the maintenance of the illusion of subjectivity.

Nietzsche, Writings from the Late Notebooks, trans. Kate Sturge, ed. Rudiger Bittner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2003), 34[46], 2-3 [2]. As I will argue, this conception of the fiction of the ‘I’ is crucial to understanding Nietzsche’s analysis of the process of artistic inspiration and creation in what I will call the fold of the self-creation of the artist in Birth. The philosophical naturalism of the notion of the selection, incorporation and purgation of reality underpins Nietzsche’s later definition of the ‘classical’ poetry of the future:

[T]he good poet of the future will depict only reality and completely ignore all those fantastic, superstitious, half-mendacious, faded subjects upon which earlier poets demonstrated their powers. Only reality, but by no means every reality! – he will depict a select reality! (‘Assorted Opinions and Maxims’ (hereafter HH IIa) in Human All Too...
The ‘watchful prudence’ of the ‘organism’ equates with the necessity for the formation of the individual in both the inauguration of the Apollinian in *Birth* and in the formation of the intellect in ‘On Truth’. The ‘I’ of the conscious ‘self’ here appears as a ‘tool’ for the processes of the sustenance of the ‘organism’: of the incorporation of necessary experiences and energies and the purgation of superfluous experience and energies. Nietzsche argues that language represents the means employed by the intellect toward this end. His critique of the intellect represents a theory of the formation of language. It is concerned with the origins and evolution of words and concepts.

In *The Beginnings of Nietzsche’s Theory of Language*, Claudia Crawford argues that Nietzsche’s account of the formation of words and concepts represents their division into two separate languages. The first constitutes an ‘unconscious formal language arising as the product of the instincts,’ whilst the latter constitutes ‘the translation of this unconscious language into the conscious language of fixity according to convention’. The formation of the first, unconscious and instinctive

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I will return to Nietzsche’s definition of the ‘classical’ aesthetic both in analysing the terms of Stephen Stephen’s aesthetic theory in the second chapter and in defining the nature of the conjunction of the Dionysian and Apollinian artistic drives in *Birth* in the third chapter. Suffice it here to note that I want to equate the ‘fantastic, superstitious, half-mendacious, faded subjects’ with the late-Romantic, particularly Schopenhauerian and Wagnerian metaphysical aesthetics from which Nietzsche sought to emancipate himself and to define his own philosophical project against, and the selection of reality with his naturalism and ‘classicism,’ which, I will argue, are intimately intertwined. What is significant here is the demonstration that these later categories are already at stake within *Birth* and ‘On Truth and Lies’. Unfortunately, there will not be sufficient room to address the development of this theme in Nietzsche’s writing in the depth that it deserves. On the self—the ‘I’—as a fiction, especially in relation to the doctrine of the will to power, the reader is directed to the following material in the *Late Notebooks*: 34[54]-34[55], 4; 34[131], 9-10; 35[35], 20-21; 37[4], 29-30; 38[8], 36-37; 40[42], 46; 1[58], 59-60; 1[87], 61; 2[91], 77; 2[152], 91; 2[158], 92; 2[193], 96-97; 5[3], 106; 7[1], 127-129; 7[63], 140; 9[91], 154-157; 10[19], 178-179; 11[73], 212-213; 11[113], 221-222; 11[120], 223-224; 14[79], 245-247.

language is a two-stage metaphorical process. First, ‘a nerve stimulus is transferred into an image \([Bild]\).’\(^{11}\) In an unconscious and instinctual reaction to a sensible stimulus the mind forms an image—a mental picture—of that stimulus. This is the ‘first metaphor’. In the second, ‘the image, in turn, is imitated in a sound.’\(^{12}\) The process evolves from the translation and transposition of a sensible stimulus into a mental image, to the further translation of this image (and not of the original stimulus itself) into a sound. This is Nietzsche’s naturalistic account of the emergence of language. The word is formed as ‘a purely natural reaction to a stimulus, whether a cry, a scream, or any other sound, it is primarily an action which reduces the tension created by the perception of the stimulus.’\(^{13}\) The formation of words is an attempt to articulate and discharge the natural reaction to a sensible stimulus.

For Nietzsche, a word becomes a concept at the point at which it transcends its function as referring solely to the unique, original experience ‘to which it owes its origin’: ‘a word becomes a concept insofar as it simultaneously has to fit countless more or less similar cases,’ ‘cases which are never equal and thus altogether unequal.’\(^{14}\) The word emerges as a response to a particular stimulus (as a vocalisation of the image). It becomes a concept at the point at which a vast field of such experiences are reduced to a small number of similarities and yoked under the aegis of a single word. For Nietzsche, the concept represents the elision of the differences

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\(^{11}\) ‘OTL,’ 116
\(^{12}\) ‘OTL,’ 116
\(^{13}\) Crawford, *Beginnings*, 203. There is no space here to trace the intellectual and philosophical influences of Nietzsche’s account of language in ‘OTL,’ but for an account of the influence of, in particular, Kant, Schopenhauer, Gustav Gerber, Eduard von Hartmann, and Friedrich Albert Lange, see Crawford, esp. xiv, 199-220.
\(^{14}\) ‘OTL,’ 117
between diverse experiences (stimuli) and the attempt to equate unequal phenomena. Utility gives birth to both the word and the concept in response to deeply felt needs. The individual word emerges from the need to discharge and articulate a particular sensible experience and stands at two removes from this original stimulus. The concept emerges from a need for this original articulation to be transmitted to and to be understood by others and thus stands at three removes from the original stimulus. Nietzsche defines this process as the invention of designation: the ‘legislation of language’. It is in this establishment of communal (linguistic) convention, Nietzsche argues, that ‘the contrast between truth and lies arises for the first time’. In other words, the concept arises from need to reduce the plurality of experience to a finite set of linguistic conventions in order to be able to establish socio-political consensus.

Nietzsche argues that by virtue of their artificiality and elision of difference, all ‘truths’, or concepts of the intellect are, in reality, lies. After the advent of the legislation of language, the concept of the ‘liar’ comes to designate the person who misuses the terms sanctioned by consensus for selfish or harmful ends by making ‘something which is unreal appear to be real’. What linguistically enabled human beings avoid, Nietzsche argues, is not deception itself—for this is of the quintessence of language—but being harmed by deception. ‘Truth,’ for Nietzsche, represents ‘the

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15 Cf. ‘OTL,’ 117: Nietzsche gives the example of the concept of the ‘leaf’. In a parody and rejection of the Platonic Idea or Form, he argues that the concept of the leaf is formed by arbitrarily discarding—by forgetting—the differences between individual leaves:

This awakens the idea that, in addition to the leaves, there exists in nature the “leaf”: the original model according to which all the leaves were perhaps woven, sketched, measured, colored, curled, and painted – but by incompetent hands, so that no specimen has turned out to be a correct, trustworthy, and faithful likeness of the original model.

For Nietzsche, the claim to know that such a self-identical Idea or ‘original model’ (the concept) inheres in things is a projection and false hypostatisation.

16 ‘OTL,’ 115
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
duty which society imposes in order to exist: to be truthful means to employ the usual metaphors’. Language is first engendered in order to suppress the chaotic flux and multiplicity of natural drives in order to render the individual possible as a fictitious unity. The intellect, its concepts, and the notions of truth and lies are engendered as a necessary consequence of this individuation, in order to render communal linguistic consensus and thus society itself, possible.

Like the individual, ‘truth,’ for Nietzsche, is an artifice. ‘Truth’ is art:

What then is truth? A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding. Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force, coins which have lost their embossing and are now considered as metal and no longer as coins.

For Nietzsche, ‘truth’ appears as a projection of epiphenomenal and purely human utilitarian physiological, psychological and social fabrications onto the realm of phenomena. What is crucial for Nietzsche is that this act of artistic projection, and the subsequent artificial legislation of language to which it gives rise, are not recognised by their human progenitors as works of art. The original linguistic act of creation is inevitably followed by an act of forgetting: ‘Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions’. The forgetting of the artistic origin and nature of language allows for the hypostatisation (the poetic or rhetorical intensification) of concepts and the false belief that they correspond absolutely to things as they are in themselves. Through an ironic inversion, Nietzsche argues that truths are revealed as lies. The possibility of truth is seen to rest on a foundation of falsehood upon which it is utterly

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19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 See Klein, *Nietzsche and the Promise of Philosophy*, 60
dependent. For Nietzsche, ‘truth’ emerges from lying, which both temporally and ontologically precedes it. It is only through the forgetting of the artistic nature of language, he argues, that the ‘will’ or ‘drive’ to truth (the formation of an intellectual conscience), which he identifies as characteristic of the intellect, is at all possible.\(^{22}\) It is this which gives birth to the unavoidable structural irony within the will to truth: when the will to truth unfolds itself fully through history (is carried to the extreme limits of what it is able to do) it must inevitably reveal, through its own stringent conscience and integrity, that its own foundation lies in falsehood. Thus, for Nietzsche, ‘truth’ and the will to truth must, ultimately, inevitably undermine and overcome themselves. It is the unconscious nature of lying which allows for the concepts of the intellect to become ‘fixed, canonical and binding’ and to appear to extend beyond their true anthropomorphic scope to a correspondence to things as they are in themselves.\(^{23}\)

The object of Nietzsche’s analysis is to demonstrate the artistic genesis of language and the fundamentally artistic nature of the concepts of the intellect. For Nietzsche, language is, in essence, purely metaphorical.\(^{24}\) It neither corresponds to, nor affords access to things as they are in themselves: ‘we possess nothing but metaphors for things – metaphors which correspond in no way to the original entities.’\(^{25}\) Nietzsche argues that ‘nature is acquainted with no forms and no concepts

\(^{22}\) Cf. ‘OTL,’ 115-116  
\(^{23}\) Cf. ‘OTL,’ 119. Crawford, 201  
\(^{24}\) ‘OTL,’ 116-117  
\(^{25}\) ‘OTL,’ 116. Cf. Crawford, 203. On Nietzsche’s rejection of the ‘metaphysical correspondence theory’, see Maudemaire Clark, *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), esp. 22. Clark argues that Nietzsche (in the works of his early and middle periods) commits himself to a rejection of metaphysical truth because he ‘accepts a theory of truth such that all truth is metaphysical, that is, is correspondence to things as they are in themselves’ (emphasis added). Klein identifies three types, or ‘tropes,’ emerging from Nietzsche’s critique: metonymy (the substitution of the name of an attribute or adjunct of the object in place of the name of the object itself,
and likewise with no species, but only with an X which remains inaccessible and undefinable for us.'\textsuperscript{26} For Nietzsche, knowledge of the thing as it is in itself (the thing = X) is impossible. This claim alludes to, and constitutes a criticism of, Schopenhauer’s appropriation of Kant’s distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal, and serves as an implicit refutation of Schopenhauer’s concept of the ‘Will’ (as a metaphysical unity).

Schopenhauer followed Kant in distinguishing between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself: ‘Kant’s greatest merit is the distinction of the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, based on the proof that between things and us always stands the intellect, and that on this account they cannot be known according to what they may be in themselves.’\textsuperscript{27} For Kant all that can be known of an object is that which appears within the limits of the human intuition of space and time.\textsuperscript{28} Space and time constitute the appearance’s form: allowing the manifold of appearance to be ordered according to certain relations. They constitute the condition of the possibility of the realm of appearance and sensible knowledge, but have no meaning if applied beyond it. For Kant, the thing-in-itself is conditioned by neither space nor time. Our understanding cannot transcend the limits of sensibility and therefore we can attain no knowledge of things as they are in themselves.\textsuperscript{29} That which is not an appearance cannot be an object of experience.

\textsuperscript{26}‘OTL,’ 117
\textsuperscript{28} See Dale Jacquette, \textit{The Philosophy of Schopenhauer} (Chesham: Acumen, 2005), 19
In his division of the world into will and representation, Schopenhauer retains Kant’s distinction of the thing-in-itself and the appearance. However, he refutes the method by which, he argues, Kant arrives at his deduction of the thing-in-itself. Kant refutes what he argues is ‘the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears’.\(^{30}\) In the criticism of Kant which he appended to \textit{The World as Will and Representation}, Schopenhauer accuses Kant of contradicting his own idealist distinction, by claiming that the thing-in-itself has an objective foundation, independent of subjective representation. He argues that Kant reached his account of the thing-in-itself via an erroneous application of the law of causality: that empirical perception and, more fundamentally, sensation, from which the former arises, must have an external cause. In contrast, Schopenhauer emphasises the subjective foundation of both causality and empirical perception.\(^{31}\) In opposition to what he claims is Kant’s attempt to locate the objective foundation of the thing-in-itself, Schopenhauer seeks to derive his own conception from the introduction of the element of self-consciousness:

\begin{quote}
[Sel-consciousness is a] knowledge which everyone possesses directly in the concrete, namely as feeling. This is the knowledge that the inner nature of his own phenomenon, which manifests itself to him as representation both through his actions and through the permanent substratum of these his body, is his \textit{will}. This will constitutes what is most immediate in his consciousness, but as such it has not wholly entered into the form of the representation, in which object and subject stand over and against each other.\(^{32}\)
\end{quote}

Schopenhauer argues that the thing-in-itself lies on the side of the subjective. The body is that of which the subject is most immediately aware. It represents the manifestation of the subject’s ‘inner nature’, but is also an object for the subject. As both subject and object it constitutes the most immediate form of representation.

\(^{30}\) Kant, \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, B 27.  
\(^{31}\) Cf. Schopenhauer, \textit{WWR}, I, 435-436  
\(^{32}\) 109
Through the body, Schopenhauer argues, the subject becomes aware of their ‘inner nature’: the force which precipitates their actions.\textsuperscript{33} As this precedes, and is the source of consciousness of the body and its actions, and therefore of the relationship of the subject and the object, for Schopenhauer it must thus exist prior to and outside of representation. He argues that the consciousness of this ‘inner nature’ of the subject’s ‘will’, known both directly and indirectly, can be extended to phenomena known only indirectly, as representations.\textsuperscript{34} As such, it becomes for him the ‘key to the knowledge of the innermost being of the whole of nature.’\textsuperscript{35} This, he argues, allows him to extend his understanding of the ‘will’ as the motive ‘force’ underlying subjectivity, to all vegetable and animate life, as well as mineral development and phenomena such as electro-magnetism and gravitation, all of which he thus portrays as phenomenal expressions of a unified and universal inchoate striving ‘force’.\textsuperscript{36} In contrast to Kant’s attempt to locate its foundation in objectivity, Schopenhauer extends his analysis of the subjective ‘will’ to the thing-in-itself. He argues that the willing of which the subject is conscious is the most immediate and adequate phenomenal expression of the noumenal.\textsuperscript{37} As such, he adopts the name of the subjective phenomena of the will in order to name the thing-in-itself. The ‘will’ is, for Schopenhauer, the ‘magic word’ which reveals ‘the innermost essence of everything in nature’\textsuperscript{38}.

\textsuperscript{33} See Bryan Magee, \textit{The Philosophy of Schopenhauer, Revised Edition} (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997): ‘The movements of the material object which is my body are known to me not only through external sense, as are the movements of other material objects, but also directly, non-sensorily, non-intellectually from within, as acts of will.’ (137) See also Jacquette, \textit{The Philosophy of Schopenhauer}, 73-74.
\textsuperscript{34} See Schopenhauer, \textit{WWR}, I, 109
\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{36} 110. Cf. Magee, 138, 144.
\textsuperscript{37} Magee 138. Cf. Julian Young, \textit{Schopenhauer} (New York: Routledge, 2005). Young qualifies Schopenhauer’s naming of the will as thing-in-itself by referring to it as the ‘world-will’ in order to distinguish it from the subjective will. (76-78)
\textsuperscript{38} Schopenhauer, \textit{WWR}, I, 111
In a fragment of 1868 (thus pre-dating the publication of Birth by four years), now referred to as ‘On Schopenhauer,’ Nietzsche offers a critique of what he identifies as the problematic nature of Schopenhauer’s conception of the thing-in-itself.\(^{39}\) Nietzsche follows Schopenhauer in refuting Kant’s method of arrival at his conception of the thing-in-itself, but, in a more thoroughgoing way, offers a critique of the deduction of thing-in-itself of both Kant and Schopenhauer. Nietzsche criticises Schopenhauer for not taking the ‘necessary’ step of going ‘beyond Kant’ and his thing-in-itself.\(^{40}\) He characterises Schopenhauer’s derivation of the thing-in-itself as will as having been ‘born with the help of a poetic intuition’ and argues that the logical proofs which Schopenhauer offers are, at best, unsatisfactory.\(^{41}\) For Nietzsche, the Schopenhauerian ‘will’ is a work of art.

At the outset of the fragment, he identifies the fictional, or projected artistic nature of the ‘will’ with what he sees as Schopenhauer’s reluctance or incapacity to ‘feel’ ‘the dark contradictoriness in the region where individuality ceases to be.’\(^{42}\) This point is crucial for Nietzsche’s later argument concerning ‘intuition’ in ‘On Truth’ and also for clarifying the nature of the concept of the ‘primal unity’ (Ur-Eine) in Birth, and I want to return to it in due course. Suffice it here to note that, for Nietzsche, to use the concept or phenomenon of the ‘will,’ as Schopenhauer does, to characterise the ‘region’ prior to, and beyond, individuation, is to project a false identity onto what is essentially a chaotic and contradictory flux. Nietzsche takes issue in particular with Schopenhauer’s claim that, in order to think the thing-in-itself (and

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\(^{40}\) Ibid.

\(^{41}\) Ibid.

\(^{42}\) 24
he retains Kant’s expression as what he describes as a ‘standing formula’) objectively, it is necessary to ‘borrow’ (the term is Schopenhauer’s, the emphasis is added by Nietzsche) ‘its name and concept from an object, from something in some way objectively given, and therefore from one of its phenomena.’ Nietzsche argues that Schopenhauer illegitimately drapes what must necessarily remain ‘a completely dark and ungraspable x’ with predicates, drawn from the world of phenomena, which are ultimately fundamentally antithetical to it. He argues that through his borrowing of phenomenal predicates Schopenhauer transforms the thing-in-itself into the ‘will’, which already belongs to the phenomenal realm. Schopenhauer ‘allows himself the human and completely non-transcendental use of the unity of the will, and really only then goes back to that transcendence where the holes in the system present themselves as obvious to him.’ Both the will and its (metaphysical) ‘unity’ are, for Nietzsche, artistic projections. The ‘dark drive’ of the Schopenhauerian ‘will’ already belongs to the realm of representation. In contrast to its supposed status as thing-in-itself, Nietzsche argues that the will is ‘brought about’ through a ‘representation mechanism’. Claudia Crawford presents the structure of the relationship of the ‘dark contradictoriness’ (in terms of Nietzsche’s later coinage of the Ur-Eine: ‘primal unity’), the ‘will,’ appearance, and representation, diagrammatically:

44 Nietzsche, ‘On Schopenhauer,’ 27. Cf. also Schopenhauer, WWR, I, 112
45 Nietzsche, ‘On Schopenhauer,’ 27
46 24
The ‘primal unity’ (*Ur-Eine*) is split between ‘Being,’ its intuition of itself (self- *Anschnauung*) as being at rest in its own self-identity, and ‘Will,’ through which it views itself as the perpetual becoming and dissolution of the world of appearances through the ‘representation mechanism.’ The realm of appearances constitutes the endless striving of the ‘primal unity’ to form ‘symbols’ by which to represent itself (as will). The human intellect here forms representations much in accordance with the limits of the human intuition of space and time, which constitute the appearance’s form: allowing the manifold of appearance to be ordered according to certain relations, as I discussed above in relation to Kant’s distinction of the thing-in-itself and the appearance. Crawford argues that Nietzsche ‘creates the split nature of the *Ur-Eine* as being (thing in itself) and will (will acts which create the phenomenal real world of appearances) in order to demonstrate the position that what is real is not the thing in itself, which is no concern of ours, but that reality consists of appearances.’

For Nietzsche, Schopenhauer’s ‘will’ belongs to the realm of appearances, and can tell

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48 218. Cf. 158-178
us nothing of the thing-in-itself, which, to reiterate Nietzsche’s later argument in ‘On Truth,’ constitutes ‘an X which remains inaccessible and undefinable for us.’

Already, in the ‘On Schopenhauer’ fragment, Nietzsche positions himself against metaphysics, the transcendental and what he dubs the ‘Otherworldly world,’ a rejection which he thus reiterates in his critique of the thing-in-itself in ‘On Truth.’ These two, patently anti-Schopenhauerian, texts (the one composed four years prior to the publication of Birth, the other, originally intended to form the latter portion of a companion piece, a year later) bookend Birth. Paul Swift has argued convincingly that, as such, any attempt to regard Birth itself as unproblematically Schopenhauerian (particularly any account which would seek to argue for an understanding of the ‘primal unity’ as thing-in-itself or for an unproblematic access to the thing-in-itself in the Dionysian) renders the text an unaccountable anomaly in Nietzsche’s bibliography. Birth is inextricably located in Nietzsche’s existing and continuing critique of Schopenhauerian metaphysics and it is this fundamental and ineluctable anti-Schopenhauerian, anti-metaphysical understanding of Birth which will underpin my own reading of the account of artistic inspiration and creation at stake within the text. In the ‘Attempt at a Self-Criticism’ (appended to Birth 1886), Nietzsche argues

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49 ‘OTL,’ 117


52 This reading is positioned against the claim to Nietzsche’s early uncritical adoption of Schopenhauer. See Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity, 261 (see also 282, 288, 296); and Ivan Soll, ‘Pessimism and the Tragic view of Life: Reconsiderations of Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy’, in Robert C. Solomon and
that in *Birth* he attempted ‘to express by means of Schopenhauerian and Kantian formulas strange and new valuations which were basically at odds with Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s spirit and taste!’ These ‘strange and new valuations’ represent Nietzsche’s naturalism and implicit anti-metaphysical stance in *Birth*, and the establishment of an ironic Schopenhauerian—anti-Schopenhauerianism.

This conception of the ironic appropriation of Schopenhauerian terms and concepts to an ostensibly anti-Schopenhauerian philosophical and aesthetic project refutes the argument, of which Julian Young acts as a representative, that *Birth* ‘incorporates without qualification Schopenhauer’s metaphysics’. Young argues that Nietzsche’s career can be divided into ‘four main periods’, ‘distinguished from each other by sharply contrasting attitudes to and about art’, hinging his argument particularly on Nietzsche’s relationship to Schopenhauer’s pessimism. Describing the ‘circular’ path which he argues the development of Nietzsche’s thought maps out, Young argues that the work of Nietzsche’s early period was uncomplicatedly and uncritically Schopenhauerian and correspondingly pessimistic. Young argues that in his ‘middle period’ (the ‘free spirit trilogy’: *Human, All Too Human, Daybreak*, and

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Nietzsche, *BT*, 17-27 (24). See 15n. on the appended title page/flysheet, added in 1886: ‘In the first edition of 1872 the title was *The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music*. A second edition with very slight textual changes was printed in 1874 and appeared in 1878. In 1886, the same year that saw the publication of *Beyond Good and Evil*, the remaining copies of *both* editions were reissued with the new title [*The Birth of Tragedy: Hellenism and Pessimism*].’ The original title was retained, but now followed the ‘ Attempt at a Self-Criticism’.


Cf. 1
The Gay Science), ‘Nietzsche turned against pessimism and against Schopenhauer. But in the end, reluctantly and making every rhetorical effort to disguise this from us and, more importantly from himself, he came back [...] to pessimism.\(^\text{56}\) Reading Birth as implicitly anti-Schopenhauerian undermines the precision of Young’s neatly compartmentalised chronology of Nietzsche’s works. If, from the very start of his published career, Nietzsche was already (ironically) at odds with Schopenhauer’s metaphysical pessimism, and, indeed, was pursuing an implicitly anti-Schopenhauerian project, then this undermines any conception of a straightforward rejection of Schopenhauer in Nietzsche’s subsequent works (whether or not we continue to seek to divide them into distinct periods), for Birth is already engaged in the criticism of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics observable both in earlier (posthumously published) fragments and in his later writings.\(^\text{57}\) In contrast to Young, (though the nature of pessimism will play a key role in my reading of Birth), I want to contextualise Nietzsche’s relationship to Schopenhauer, not in terms of pessimism, but in terms of the contrast of his nascent naturalism to metaphysics. Therefore, though the text may appear ostensibly Schopenhauerian and late-Romantic, acknowledging and foregrounding its anti-metaphysical philosophical naturalism will allow me to argue that, even while Nietzsche can be seen to appropriate the terms of Romantic accounts of artistic inspiration, the aesthetic of Birth is implicitly fundamentally opposed to the metaphysics of Romanticism and of post-Schopenhauerian late-Romanticism and that its terms are therefore much closer to

\(^{56}\) On a refutation of Young and the conception that Nietzsche possessed a ‘unified philosophy of art or aesthetic theory,’ see Matthew Rampley, Nietzsche, Aesthetics and Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1n, 8n (see 243). On the importance of the Schopenhauer fragment for Nietzsche’s argument in Birth see Sallis, Crossings, 62-68. See also Christopher Janaway, ‘Schopenhauer as Nietzsche’s Educator’ (esp. 18-19) and Maudemaire Clark, ‘On Knowledge, Truth, and Value: Nietzsche’s debt to Schopenhauer and the Development of his Empiricism’ in Janaway, ed., Willing and Nothingness, 37-78 (43-44). See also Aaron Ridley, Nietzsche on Art, 21-23.
Nietzsche’s own later account of the ‘classical’ (from Human, All Too Human onwards). This, in turn, will allow me to argue that the aesthetic of Birth is located in far greater proximity to the claims of neo-classical Modernism (in particular that of Joyce and of T.E. Hulme) than extant criticism of the text has acknowledged.

Against the conventional conception of Nietzsche’s early uncritical adoption of Schopenhauer (as typified by Young), and against Aaron Ridley’s claim that Birth does not wholly refute Schopenhauer but must be read as following either a psychological, or a ‘weak metaphysical’ thesis, the quotations and concepts drawn from Schopenhauer in Birth can, instead, be seen to represent an ironic appropriation of Schopenhauer to an anti-Schopenhauerian naturalism.58 As Henry Staten argues, the use of the Schopenhauerian concept of the ‘will,’ enters Birth and becomes problematic only in the later sections of the text (§§16ff.), in which Nietzsche attempts to argue for a modern rebirth of tragedy based on the operatic works of Richard Wagner.59 The ‘primal unity’ (Ur-Eine) of Birth is anti-Schopenhauerian. As Crawford argues, it belongs to the realm of representation: is itself ‘only one appearance among appearances,’ and does not constitute the thing-in-itself.60 It represents ‘a sign, a linguistic fiction, rather than a metaphysical reality’ and it is this notion of the thing-in-itself as an artistic projection which is at stake in the critique of

58 Cf. Ridley, esp. 21-31
59 Henry Staten, ‘The Birth of Tragedy Reconstructed’ in Nietzsche’s Voices (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 187-216 (esp. 192). According to Staten’s reading it is Nietzsche’s relationship to Wagner that proves problematic to a clear conception of his relationship to Schopenhauer and Schopenhauerian metaphysics. The influences of both Schopenhauer and Wagner on Birth are intimately connected. It is not within the scope of this thesis to address Nietzsche’s relationship to Wagner, and as such, I will not address the argument of the latter, patently Wagnerian, sections of Birth. Nor will I address Nietzsche’s argument concerning the death of tragedy at the hands of Euripides and Socrates. Instead, I will focus on a close reading of Nietzsche’s definition of the Apollinian and Dionysian and of the phenomenon of the Lyric Poet in the earlier part of the text (§§1-8). For a clear biographical study of the intellectual and artistic influence of Wagner on Nietzsche, see Dieter Brochmeyer’s influential essay, ‘Wagner and Nietzsche,’ in Ulrich Müller and Peter Wapnewski, eds., Wagner Handbook, trans. John Deathridge (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), 327-342 (on Birth in particular, 329-335).
60 Crawford, Beginnings, 218. Cf. Wayne Klein, Nietzsche and the Promise of Philosophy, 66
the intellect and the problem of the thing-in-itself and the supposed metaphysical correspondence of concepts in ‘On Truth’.\textsuperscript{61}

Nietzsche opposes his thesis of the three stages of (i) the artistic projection, (ii) the repression of the memory of act of projection, and (iii) the subsequent hypostatization of the concepts of the intellect, to what he argues is the false consciousness that they correspond absolutely to a metaphysical reality: ‘Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force, coins which have lost their embossing and are now considered as metal and no longer as coins.’\textsuperscript{62} Through the gradual process of their hypostatization, the concepts of the intellect become stale and dead metaphors, which, Nietzsche argues, no longer retain any connection to, or use value for, experience. They are no longer able to capture ‘vivid first impressions’.\textsuperscript{63} They become little more than the mode of expression of a (Platonic) philosophical and of a moral prejudice.

For Nietzsche, existing concepts, as ‘abstractions’ and petrified prejudices, serve to distort human life.\textsuperscript{64} In order to overcome the stultification of the exhausted metaphors of the concepts, and in order to revivify the fundamentally artistic drive of the intellect and grasp ‘vivid first impressions,’ Nietzsche opposes ‘intuition’ (\textit{Anschauung}) to the conceptual:

\begin{quote}
[The intellect] will now be guided by intuitions rather than by concepts. There is no regular path which leads from these intuitions into the land of ghostly schemata, the land of abstractions. There exists no word for these intuitions: when man sees them he grows dumb, or else he speaks only in
\end{quote}

\\textsuperscript{61} Rampley, \textit{Nietzsche, Aesthetics and Modernity}, 79
\\textsuperscript{62} \textit{Ibid.}
\\textsuperscript{63} Cf. Nietzsche, ‘OTL,’ 118
\\textsuperscript{64} Cf. 122
forbidden metaphors and in unheard-of combinations of concepts. He does this so that by shattering and mocking the old conceptual barriers he may at least correspond creatively to the impression of the powerful and present intuition.\footnote{Ibid. On \textit{Anschauung} in Nietzsche’s early writings, particularly in relation to Kant and Schopenhauer’s usage of the term, see Crawford, \textit{Beginnings}, esp. 158-178.}

For Nietzsche, the intensely undergone aesthetic experience—the ‘impression’—of the ‘powerful’ and ‘present’ ‘intuition’, lies outwith the field of possible experience outlined, sanctioned and policed by the concepts of extant linguistic convention. The intellect, he argues, is driven by the need to articulate—to ‘correspond creatively’ to—this experience. In order for this to be possible, it is necessary to lacerate the stultified surface of the ‘ghostly’ Platonic abstractions of the concepts (the ‘otherworldly world’ of ‘On Schopenhauer’ and of the thing-in-itself), bereft of life and lacking in both substance and any direct, visceral connection to the reality of lived experience. In the articulation of the intuition, the intellect becomes enmeshed in the process of the bathetic (‘mocking’) reanimation of the concepts, smashing the ‘framework’ of the concepts ‘to pieces’, throwing it into a state of confusion, and ‘pairing the most alien things and separating the closest.’\footnote{‘OTL,’ 122} In stark contrast to the ‘distortion’ of life, which he argues is implicitly at stake in the forgetting of the act of creation, and false Platonic reification, of the concepts of conventional linguistic experience, ‘intuition’, as a projected philosophical method of the future, is defined, for Nietzsche, by its capacity for self-conscious ‘dissimulation’, enacted with a good, clear conscience.\footnote{Cf. 122} Intuition sets the intellect free, and the liberated intellect in turn ‘copies human life’ in its new, bathetic, monstrous hybridised metaphors. In contrast to the hardened veneer of the extant concepts, inaugurated and preserved as a crutch for the ‘needy man’ (the ‘servant’)—‘the means by which weaker, less robust individuals preserve themselves’—the intellect, freed through intuition, is enabled to

\footnote{Cf. 122}
become the ‘master’ of life and of ‘deception’. Freed from its former ‘slavery’, the intellect ‘copies human life, but it considers this life to be something good’ and no longer needing to be redeemed or justified through falsely hypostatised, artistically projected (Platonic) concepts.

I want to move on in the next section to examine the parallel between Nietzsche’s opposition of ‘intuition’ to the concepts of the intellect in ‘On Truth’ and Henri Bergson’s conception of ‘intuition’ as providing access to the flux of the undivided continuity of states which he claims precedes and subsists beneath the individuated concepts of the intellect and which he calls ‘duration’. This is not to seek to identify Nietzsche with Bergson’s argument that metaphysics is empirically grounded. As I have already argued, from his earliest writings onwards Nietzsche is fundamentally opposed to metaphysics. Whatever the differences between their respective relationships to, or conceptions of, metaphysics, however, the opposition between intuition and the intellect of ‘On Truth’ is already at stake in Birth, and as such, the parallel between ‘On Truth’ and Bergson’s conception of duration will allow me to draw out what is at stake in Nietzsche’s concept of the ‘primal unity’ (Ur-Eine) in Birth, understood as fundamentally anti-Schopenhauerian and anti-metaphysical. The Bergsonian parallel will also allow me to argue that the ‘primal unity’ of Birth is located in far greater proximity to Nietzsche’s later doctrine of the will to power than to Schopenhauerian metaphysics and the metaphysical unity of Schopenhauer’s ‘will’.

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68 122 (115)
69 122
II – On the Undivided Continuity of States: the ‘primal unity’, ‘duration’ and ‘the will to power’

The origin of the emergence of a thing [...] anything in existence, having somehow come about, is continually interpreted anew, requisitioned anew, transformed and redirected to a new purpose by a power superior to it; [...] everything that occurs in the organic world consists of overpowering, dominating, and in their turn, overpowering and dominating consist of re-interpretation, adjustment, in the process of which their former “meaning” [Sinn] and “purpose” must necessarily be obscured or completely obliterated.[...] The whole history of a “thing”, an organ, a tradition can to this extent be a continuous chain of signs, continually revealing new interpretations and adaptations [...] The “development” of a thing, a tradition, an organ is therefore not its progressus towards a goal, still less is it a logical progressus, taking the shortest route with the least expenditure of energy and cost, – instead it is a succession of more or less profound, more or less mutually independent processes of subjugation exacted on the thing, added to this the resistances encountered every time, the attempted transformations for the purpose of defence and reaction, and the results, too, of successful countermeasures. The form is fluid, the “meaning” [Sinn] even more so… (Nietzsche, OGM, II, §12, 55)

In An Introduction to Metaphysics (1903), Bergson offers a clear summary of the distinction between ‘analysis’ (the conceptual) and ‘intuition’, established in his earlier works:

By intuition is meant the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible. Analysis, on the contrary, is the operation which reduces the object to elements already known, that is, to elements common both to it and other objects.70

‘Analysis,’ Bergson argues, breaks its object down into parts (‘elements’) corresponding to pre-existing concepts in which it participates with other objects.

These terms echo Nietzsche’s critique of the formation of the ‘Platonic’ concept of the ‘leaf’ in ‘On Truth,’ which was formed, he argued by discarding the differences between individual leaves: ‘This awakens the idea that, in addition to the leaves, there

exists in nature the “leaf”. This process reduces the object to these constituent elements and to their conceptual correspondences. By contrast, Bergson wishes to promote the method of ‘intuition,’ which, as it did for Nietzsche in ‘On Truth,’ aims to shatter the reduction of its object to pre-existing conceptual prejudices, and to place the observer back into an original state of disinterested, non-conceptual receptivity (‘intellectual sympathy’).

In terms which I will argue echo Nietzsche’s appropriation of Schopenhauer’s principle of individuation (principium individuationis) in Birth, beneath the hardened veneer of the fragmented and atomised spatio-temporal realm of the concepts—the ‘crust solidified on the surface’ of experience—Bergson identifies ‘one reality […] which we all seize from within, by intuition and not simply by analysis. It is our own personality in its flowing through time—our self which endures.’ Beneath the artificially differentiated, atomistic experience of things in conceptual space, and of moments in conceptual time, Bergson argues, subsists a foundation of undifferentiated states which he calls duration (durée): ‘beneath these sharply cut crystals and this frozen surface, a continuous flux which is not comparable to any flux I have ever seen. There is a succession of states, each of which announces that which follows and contains that which precedes it.’ Duration constitutes ‘one reality,’ seemingly paradoxically comprised of a continual flux of successive ‘states’. We are originally made aware of this flux, according to Bergson, through our consciousness of our own personality (internal intuition) and extend the principle to the outer phenomena of perception (external intuition). Apparently autonomous, these states nevertheless

71 ‘OTL,’ 117. See p. 27(n), above.
72 Cf. Bergson, *IM*, 25
73 24
74 25
interpenetrate, containing all those states which precede them and unfolding ineluctably into all those which are to follow. The ‘states’ of duration constitute neither a simple multiplicity, nor a simple unity, but, ‘instead of being distinct, as they are in any other [comparable form of] multiplicity, encroach upon one another.’\(^75\) They constitute ‘a continuity of elements which prolong themselves into one another’, a continuity which ‘participates in unity as much as in multiplicity; but this moving, changing, colored, living unity has hardly anything in common with the abstract, motionless, and empty unity which the concept of pure unity circumscribes.’\(^76\) The flux of duration represents an undivided continuity of ‘states’.

It is this flux of undivided continuity which the concepts rend asunder through the imposition of artistically projected individuated forms:

Pure intuition, external or internal, is that of an undivided continuity. We break up this continuity in the one case to distinct words, in the other to independent objects. But, just because we have thus broken the unity of our original intuition, we feel ourselves obliged to establish between the served terms a bond which can only be external and superadded.\(^77\) The concepts are generated through the formation and false hypostatisation of words (an echo of the formation of language in ‘On Truth’) and of independent objects. Once fragmented, for any form of discourse to be possible, it becomes necessary, Bergson argues, to artificially form bonds between the severed entities. This is the role of ‘analysis’.\(^78\) For Bergson, these bonds, whatever their use value (for language and for action), can in no way afford access to the flux of original intuition, but are, and must remain, external epiphenomena and, again, this echoes Nietzsche’s critique


\(^78\) Cf. *CE*, 4
of the conceptual quasi-Platonic prosthesis to experience in ‘On Truth’. Just as for
Nietzsche, for Bergson language emerges as a process of metaphorical transposition.

T.E. Hulme, in his summaries of Bergson’s philosophy, argues that these
metaphors ‘soon run their course and die. But it is necessary to remember that when
they were first used by the poets who created them they were used for the purpose of
conveying over a vividly felt actual sensation.’ Just as for Nietzsche, for Hulme
(following Bergson) language originally emerges from a need to articulate a vividly
felt sensible stimulus—an internal or external intuition. When this initial stimulus and
artistic projection have passed, the metaphor (the word) passes into popular usage
(becomes a concept). It becomes hypostatised and its artistic origin is forgotten. The
metaphor reaches the end of its capacity to articulate the ‘vividly felt actual sensation’
and becomes a mere ‘counter,’ akin to the pieces in a game of chequers, to be
manipulated (‘moved about’) according to the demands of practical utility.

For Bergson, the aim of intuition as method is to ‘recover [the] contact with
the real,’ severed in the formation of concepts and of ‘analysis,’ and to ‘restore
intuition to its original purity’. Echoing Nietzsche’s claim for the necessity of the
redemption of the intellect through ‘forbidden metaphors and in unheard-of
combinations of concepts’ in ‘On Truth,’ Bergson argues that intuition is ‘only truly

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80 Cf. Hulme, ‘Bergson’s Theory of Art,’ 151-152, 159-162, 165-166 and ‘The Philosophy of Intensive Manifolds,’ 176. The metaphor is also crucial to the notes gathered together under the title of ‘Cinders,’ 215-245.
81 MM, 241. Cf. Gille Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1988), 13-35 (esp. 14), and Suzanne Guerlac, Thinking in Time: An Introduction to Henri Bergson (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 63-64: ‘This is what Bergson is trying to do: to bring to philosophical awareness what has been absolutely repressed by thought and is structurally inaccessible to it’. (63)
itself when it goes beyond the concept, or at least when it frees itself from rigid and ready-made concepts in order to create a kind very different from those which we habitually use.\textsuperscript{82} The aim of intuition is, by an ‘effort,’ to break through the artificial surface of the conceptual and regain the undivided continuity of flux (duration) and what Bergson dubs ‘the intention of life, the simple movement that runs through the lines, that binds them together and gives them significance.’\textsuperscript{83} Bergson, and Hulme following him, dub this the ‘aesthetic intuition’, and both view art as the paragon of the attempt to lacerate the conceptual and to bring back new forms (new language, new metaphors, new images and new concepts) from the flux of duration: ‘This intention is just what the artist tries to regain in placing himself back within the object by a kind of sympathy and breaking down by an effort of intuition the barrier that space puts between him and his model.’\textsuperscript{84} For Bergson, as for Nietzsche, the aim of intuition is to overcome the institutionalised and complacent metaphysical prejudice of the concepts and to create new metaphors to in order to capture the ‘vividly felt actual sensation’.

The flux of the undivided continuity of states subsisting beneath the veneer of the individuated concepts of the intellect in Bergson’s conception of ‘duration’ and ‘intuition’ is what is at stake in Nietzsche’s analogous critique of the intellect and championing of ‘intuition’ in ‘On Truth’. For both Nietzsche and Bergson, the laceration of the concepts of the intellect in ‘intuition’ leads to a descent into the pre-individuated, undifferentiated flux, and a return with new metaphors and previously ‘unheard-of combinations of concepts.’ As I argued at the outset of the chapter,

\textsuperscript{82} Bergson, \textit{IM}, 30
\textsuperscript{83} \textit{CE}, 176-177. Cf. \textit{IM}, 21-22 and Hulme, ‘Bergson’s Theory of Art,’ 144 where the passage is reproduced verbatim.
\textsuperscript{84} \textit{CE}, 177. Cf. Hulme, 144. Hulme goes on to refer to the artist’s shattering of the conceptual and experience of flux as the ‘essentially aesthetic emotion’ (145). Cf. also 149-150 and 161-162.
Nietzsche’s opposition of ‘intuition’ to the intellect in ‘On Truth’ is already at stake in his contrast of ‘intensely clear figures of the gods’ to ‘concepts’ in the establishment of the terms of his argument in Birth. The laceration of the falsely hypostatised, individuated concepts of the intellect and descent into the flux of the undivided continuity of states of ‘On Truth’ (illuminated through the Bergsonian parallel), is what is ultimately at stake in the relationship of the Apollinian and Dionysian artistic drives and the ‘primal unity’ of Birth and, as I will argue in the third chapter, forms the foundation of Nietzsche’s account of artistic inspiration in the text. In Birth, Nietzsche argues that we should ‘not consider the question of our own “reality,”’ but instead ‘conceive of our empirical existence, and that of the world in general, as a continuously manifested representation of the primal unity’. Nietzsche argues that the empirical existence of the individual and the world which they inhabit are to be conceived of as artistically projected representations forged from the underlying undifferentiated flux of the ‘primal unity’. This is thus analogous to his later account of the formation of words and concepts and the sculpting of the ‘thing’ from the underlying flux of the undivided continuity of states in ‘On Truth’ and, as I have argued, this latter must be understood in the light of Nietzsche’s refutation of the thing-in-itself (the thing = x) in the essay, and his contrast of ‘dark contradictoriness’ to the metaphysical ‘unity’ of Schopenhauer’s ‘will’, as the thing-in-itself, in ‘On Schopenhauer’. As Crawford argues, the ‘primal unity’ remains firmly on the side of representation, prior to the imposition of the artistically projected individuated forms of the concepts. For Nietzsche, in Birth, whatever the stammering he is led into by his awkward adherence to Schopenhauerian and Kantian (metaphysical) ‘formulas’, there

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85 BT, §4, 45
can be no access to the thing-in-itself, already discredited in the earlier, unpublished fragment and re-emphasised in the later essay.\textsuperscript{86}

The ‘primal unity’ of \textit{Birth} represents the ‘eternally suffering and contradictory’ interpenetrating flux of natural drives.\textsuperscript{87} I want to conclude the current chapter by moving on to argue that this places the ‘primal unity’ in far closer proximity to Nietzsche’s later doctrine of the ‘will to power’, than to the metaphysical unity of the Schopenhauerian ‘will’. This will help to clarify the anti-metaphysics and naturalism of \textit{Birth} and my reading of Nietzsche’s account of artistic inspiration and creation. I want to understand the ‘will to power’ in terms of Gilles Deleuze’s reading in \textit{Nietzsche and Philosophy}, in contrast to that of Rüdiger Bittner, who argues that the ‘will to power’ is analogous to Schopenhauer’s ‘will’.\textsuperscript{88} In his introduction to Nietzsche’s late notebooks, Bittner claims that ‘[a]s far as its scope is concerned, Nietzsche’s “will to power” simply takes over the place of Schopenhauer’s “will”’.\textsuperscript{89} Bittner cites Schopenhauer’s claim that ‘it is one and the same will that manifests itself both in the forces of inorganic and the forms of organic nature.’\textsuperscript{90} As such, Bittner presupposes the unity or self-identity of the will in Nietzsche’s formulation of the will to power. This prejudice leads him to make the mistake of misreading the formulation, arguing that ‘the “will to power” \textit{does} mean “will for power”: a will to power is a will such as the thing willed is power.’\textsuperscript{91} Bittner reasons from the falsely assumed original unity of the will to the conclusion that it must be this unitary will

\textsuperscript{86} See ‘Attempt at a Self-Criticism’, \textit{BT}, 20, 24.
\textsuperscript{87} \textit{BT}, §4, 45
\textsuperscript{89} Nietzsche, \textit{Writings from the Late Notebooks}, xxi
\textsuperscript{90} \textit{Ibid.} The translation is Bittner’s own from \textit{Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung}, I, §27, 170. Cf. Payne’s translation, in Schopenhauer, \textit{WWR}, I, §27, 143: ‘in all the forces of inorganic and in all the forms of organic nature, it is \textit{one and the same will} that reveals itself’.
\textsuperscript{91} Nietzsche, \textit{Writings from the Late Notebooks}, xvii (emphasis added).
which wills for power. He concludes his reading of the will to power as follows:

‘While it is a defect that the present reading makes the doctrine of will to power come out false, it is not a decisive one: I see no reading intelligible in itself and reasonably true to the texts that does better.’\(^{92}\) Such a reading is in fact offered by Deleuze.

In his analysis of the concept of ‘genealogy,’ ‘sense’ and the philosophy of the will in Nietzsche, Deleuze defines the ‘sense’ of a ‘thing’ as ‘the force which appropriates the thing, which exploits it, which takes possession of it or is expressed in it.’\(^{93}\) For Deleuze (following Nietzsche), the sense of a ‘thing’ (an event, phenomenon, word or thought)\(^{94}\) is generated by the accession to dominance of a particular ‘force’ which had been vying for that dominance with rival forces: the appropriation of a quantum of reality.\(^{95}\) ‘The history of a thing’ expresses ‘the succession of forces which take possession of it and the co-existence of the forces which struggle for possession. The same object, the same phenomenon, changes sense depending on the force which appropriates it.’\(^{96}\) This precludes any notion of the thing’s unity or self-identity. For Nietzsche, Deleuze argues, a thing’s ‘essence’ would constitute ‘that one among all the senses of a thing, which gives it the force with which it has most affinity.’\(^{97}\) ‘Essence’ is that which allows the thing to go to the ends of what it is capable of achieving and does not serve to inhibit or debilitate it, and is neither a priori nor integral to the thing. With this conception of force, Deleuze argues, ‘Nietzsche substitutes the correlation of sense and phenomenon for the

\(^{92}\) xxii
\(^{93}\) 3. Deleuze takes as the basis of his reading of the ‘will to power’, *OGM*, II, §11, 55-56.
\(^{94}\) Cf. 4 (see also 29)
\(^{96}\) 3
\(^{97}\) 4
metaphysical duality of appearance and essence.\textsuperscript{98} In opposition to a Kantian-Schopenhauerian metaphysical distinction between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, Nietzsche posits a conception of a flux of natural forces. The ‘sense’ of a thing names its possession by a dominant force at any one point or moment in time and its ‘history’ names the succession of such possessions through time. Against Bittner’s misreading of the metaphysical unity of the ‘will for power’, ‘Nietzsche’s concept of force is therefore that of a force which is related to another force: in this form force is called will. The will (will to power) is the differential element of force’.\textsuperscript{99} The will to power, according to Deleuze’s reading, represents the ‘differential element’ between the natural forces (sub-wills) struggling for possession of a quantum of reality. It serves to define the sense of a thing, by expressing the force which has (however temporarily) triumphed in this struggle, and defines the ‘essence’ of the thing, by identifying with which force the thing has the utmost affinity.

Alongside the false assumption of the unity of the will to power, which he thus identifies as a (Schopenhauerian) ‘source’ of events, one of Bittner’s crucial mistakes is to fail to define the concept of ‘power’ itself correctly.\textsuperscript{100} Bittner argues that ‘the doctrine maintains that any living thing does whatever it does for the sake of gaining

\textsuperscript{98} 6. Cf. Nietzsche, \textit{Beyond Good and Evil}, trans.Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), IX, §260, in which, returning to the definition of the pre-history of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ and the ‘noble’ and ‘base,’ first addressed in \textit{Human, All Too Human} (\textit{HH}, I, §45, 36-37), and later more fully developed in the first essay of \textit{On the Genealogy of Morality}, Nietzsche distinguishes between what he calls the ‘two basic types’ of morality: the master and slave moralities. The former is defined by the nobility of a self-felt prerogative to create and legislate values from an overwhelming feeling of an overfullness or excess of power (cf. 205). The latter is ‘base’: ‘violated, oppressed, suffering, unfree, […] weary’, and from this exhausted, resentful state moralises (cf. 207). Nietzsche argues that in what he emphasises as all ‘higher’ and ‘more mixed cultures’ there is an ‘interpenetration and mutual misunderstanding of both, and at times they occur directly alongside each other]—even in the same human being, within a single soul.’ (204). This conflict and vying for dominance of the master and slave moralities,—of the active and reactive, supports the Deleuzian reading of the will to power and serves to refute Bittner’s conclusions.

\textsuperscript{99} Cf. Nietzsche, \textit{Writings from the Late Notebooks}, xx

\textsuperscript{100}
power or of augmenting the power it already has.'\textsuperscript{101} He is able to misrepresent the will to power as the ‘intention’ of a ‘living thing’ because he at first assumes the (internal) self-identity of the living thing. In fact, what I have already argued is the case in the imposition of the concepts of the intellect on the pre-individuated flux of natural drives in ‘On Truth’ (and of the parallel with the fictional status of the ‘I’ and the thing in the late notebooks), and is supported by Deleuze’s reading of force and ‘sense,’ for Nietzsche the discrete, self-identical ‘thing’ is sculpted from the underlying flux of an undivided continuity of states or forces through an artistic process of individuation. The will to power names an overcoming within what will be later dubbed the phenomenon (the Deleuzian ‘sense’ of the thing). Power, and the will to power, name, in the first instance, a self-overcoming and not the ‘intention’ of a living thing with regard to external phenomena, as Bittner argues.\textsuperscript{102} As Deleuze argues in his analysis of Nietzsche’s concept of value and evaluation: ‘the value of something is the hierarchy of forces which are expressed in it as a complex phenomenon.’\textsuperscript{103} The value of a phenomenon—its will to power—derives as an expression of which force has become dominant within it and which have submitted to this dominance.\textsuperscript{104} In contrast to the metaphysical unity and myopic struggle ‘for’ power of Bittner’s reading, the Nietzschean will is a plurality: a ‘complex’.\textsuperscript{105} As Deleuze argues, this multiplicity and complexity of the will is the ‘precise point’ of Nietzsche’s break with Schopenhauerian metaphysics.\textsuperscript{106}

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{102} On the importance of the primacy of self-overcoming to the will to power see especially Nietzsche, \textit{Writings from the Late Notebooks}, 34[250], 16; 35[15], 18; 36[22], 25; 38[8], 36-37; 1[44], 57; 10[87], 188 and 14[79],245-246.
\textsuperscript{103} Deleuze, \textit{Nietzsche and Philosophy}, 7
\textsuperscript{104} ‘[H]igh and low, noble and base, are not values but represent the differential element from which the value of values themselves derives.’ (2)
\textsuperscript{105} 7
\textsuperscript{106} Cf. \textit{ibid.}
Despite Nietzsche’s own claim in the text that the ‘primal unity’ represents the fundamental ‘metaphysical assumption’ underpinning *Birth*, it in fact names the flux of the multiplicity of natural drives, firmly anti-metaphysical and of the realm of representation, prior to and underlying the process of individuation, alluded to in the ‘On Schopenhauer’ fragment, clearly articulated for the first time in ‘On Truth’ and raised to the level of a philosophical doctrine in the will to power.\(^{107}\) In *Birth*, metaphysical, Schopenhauerian, vocabulary is ironically appropriated to a nascent anti-Schopenhauerian, naturalist philosophical project. In the third chapter I will argue that this underpins the appropriation of the drive to the incorporation of lived experience into culture in the forms Apollinian art, and the appropriation of the purgation of the natural drives into culture within Dionysian art, and finally in the conjunction of these art forms in the fold of self-creation of the lyric poet, conceived of as the Apollinian incorporation of the experience of Dionysian purgation. In the second chapter I want to move on to draw a parallel between Nietzsche’s early ironic appropriation of Schopenhauerian metaphysics and the development of Stephen Stephen’s aesthetic of the ‘epiphany’ into the ‘esthetic image’ from Joyce’s *Stephen Hero* into *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*. Stephen’s aesthetic, between the two texts, represents an analogous ironic appropriation of Thomist philosophy and the terms of late-Romantic (and especially Yeatsian Transcendental Symbolist) Platonic metaphysics to an emergent ‘classical’ aesthetic, analogous to both Nietzsche’s own later conception of the ‘classical’ and to that of T.E. Hulme. Combining my analysis of what is at stake in the ‘classical’ with my reading of Nietzsche’s early anti-metaphysics, in the third chapter I will argue that Nietzsche’s ironic appropriation of the terms of Schopenhauerian metaphysics underpins what I will identify as the

\(^{107}\) *BT*, §4, 45
Romantic—anti-Romanticism at stake in the text through an explication of what I will define as concept of the fold of the self-creation of the artist in Birth. Tracing the development of Stephen’s aesthetic in his later incarnation in Ulysses, in the final chapter I will demonstrate that this same shape of the fold is at stake in the conception of the ‘image’ of the artist presented in the ‘Scylla and Charybdis’ episode.
On ‘Art and Life’:
The ‘classical’ as Romantic—anti-Romanticism in the development of Stephen’s aesthetic theory between *Stephen Hero* and *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*

In the first chapter I contextualised Nietzsche’s implicit anti-Schopenhauerianism in *The Birth of Tragedy* through reference to the ‘On Truth’ essay which followed it and to the ‘On Schopenhauer’ fragment which preceded it. I argued that this underpins the latent anti-metaphysics of the text. Through a comparison of the ‘primal unity’ (*Ur-Eine*) of *Birth* with Bergson’s notion of duration as the flux of interpenetrating states, I argued that the ‘primal unity’ far more closely approximates Nietzsche’s own later formulation of the will to power, understood as the differential element (‘sense’) defining the hierarchy of forces vying for dominance of a given quantum of reality (the ‘essence’ of any one quantum naming the ‘sense’ with which it is most sympathetic) than it does the metaphysical unity of Schopenhauer’s ‘will’. In the present chapter I want to examine what I will argue represents the analogous ironic appropriation of the terms of Aquinas’s philosophy of art and theory of ‘beauty’ in Stephen’s aesthetic theory between Joyce’s *Stephen Hero* and *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*.¹

In the first section I will turn to the context of the early critical reception of the aesthetic theory of *Stephen Hero* and in particular of the concept of the ‘epiphany’. I will argue that there are two antithetical positions at stake in this reception, which still bear a strong influence on contemporary critical treatment of the development of Stephen’s aesthetic and its relationship to Joyce’s larger corpus. The first is that the concept of the ‘epiphany’ applies only to Joyce’s own early fragmented compositions

and cannot be applied beyond these to name a literary technique at stake in Joyce’s mature writing. The second is that the ‘epiphany’ can be used to name all of the structures of revelation at play in Joyce’s writing. I will argue for an alternative third critical position through a reassessment of Stephen’s ironic appropriation of Aquinas’s conception of beauty in the exposition of his aesthetic theory between Stephen Hero and Portrait. I will argue that the concept of the ‘epiphany’ is refined into that of the ‘esthetic image’ of Portrait, which retains the structure of ironic inversion at stake within the ‘epiphany’, whilst divesting it of the religious and metaphysical connotations which cling to it. This will allow me, in the second section, to argue that the aesthetic theory of the latter text synthesises both the concept of the ‘epiphany’ and the account of the opposition of the ‘classical’ and ‘romantic’ artistic ‘tempers’ of the former. I will argue that this is reconfigured in Portrait to form an implicit rejection of late-Romantic Platonic metaphysics and more specifically of Yeats’s transcendental Symbolism. By highlighting the parallel between Stephen’s account of the opposition of the ‘classical’ to the ‘romantic’, and privileging of the former, and those of Nietzsche and T.E. Hulme, I will argue that this locates Stephen’s aesthetic theory in close proximity to neo-classical Modernist aesthetics, and in particular to the terms of Hulme’s writings on artistic inspiration and creation, Modern art and Bergson’s philosophy. As such, Stephen’s allusion to Percy Bysshe Shelley’s account of artistic inspiration in A Defence of Poetry will be seen to represent an ironic appropriation of the terms of Shelley’s Romanticism to an implicitly anti-Romantic, anti-metaphysical, ‘classical’ aesthetic. I will conclude by drawing a parallel between the anti-metaphysics of the ‘esthetic image’ and the terms of Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to power, as I examined these in the first chapter. The conception of the anti-metaphysics of the ‘classical’ (understood as ironic
Romantic—anti-Romanticism) will lay the foundation for my reading of the idiosyncratic philosophical naturalism of Birth and Nietzsche’s account of artistic inspiration and creation as the fold in the self-creation of the artist. This will, in turn, form the basis of my reading of Stephen’s concept of the ‘image’ of the artist in his final textual incarnation in Ulysses in the final chapter.

I – On ‘applied Aquinas’: the evolution of the ‘epiphany’ into the ‘esthetic image’ between Stephen Hero and Portrait

In Stephen Hero, Stephen’s interpretation of Aquinas’s conception of ‘beauty’ follows on directly from his definition of the ‘epiphany’:

By an epiphany he meant a sudden spiritual manifestation, whether in the vulgarity of speech or of gesture or in a memorable phase of the mind itself. He believed it was for the man of letters to record these epiphanies with extreme care, seeing that they themselves are the most delicate and evanescent of moments.\(^2\)

In this initial definition Stephen identifies an ‘epiphany’ as a ‘manifestation’. It is a revelation—a sudden becoming visible or sensible—of something which had existed prior to the experience of its revelation and yet which had remained insensible and only latent. The ‘spiritual’ quality of the ‘epiphany’ alludes to the relationship of consciousness to itself, implicit in this notion of revelation. The ‘epiphany’ represents a bathetic structure of ironic inversion, suddenly and spontaneously revealing previously repressed psychological content, and thus bringing about a fundamental change in consciousness. This is brought about either by the observer’s relationship to

\(^2\) Joyce, SH, 216
some vulgar detail of quotidian discourse (‘speech or gesture’) or by a revealing, detached psychological event (‘a memorable phase of the mind’).

The ‘epiphany’, therefore, can take one of two potential forms. These correspond to the forms of Joyce’s own ‘Epiphanies’: a selection of short prose fragments composed between 1901/2 and 1904. The first is that in which what is revealed is done so through a ‘vulgarity of speech or of gesture’: a quotidian turn of phrase or expression through body language that captures something essential in both the agent and the observer. This is the sense in which Joyce’s brother Stanislaus described the “‘Epiphanies’—manifestations or revelations”:

3 Oliver St. John Gogarty argues that it was ‘Probably Fr. Darlington had taught him, as an aside in his Latin class—for Joyce knew no Greek—that “Epiphany” meant a “showing forth”. Gogarty, As I was Going down Sackville Street (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1937) 293-295. See Robert Scholes and Richard M. Kain, eds., The Workshop of Daedalus: James Joyce and the Raw Materials for Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1965), 7-8. William T. Noon puts forward the contention that in using the term ‘epiphany’ Joyce is ‘playing on the French ‘épiphénomène’ (that which at certain times attaches itself as if inevitably, though momentarily, to some other phenomenon)’. Noon, Joyce and Aquinas (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1957), 71. Florence L. Walzl provides the best summation of the term epiphany itself, building on Gogarty’s observation of Joyce’s having learnt the etymology and the meaning of the Greek term, and arguing that:

What Joyce meant by the term epiphany may be deduced etymologically. The basic meaning in Greek of epitaphos is appearance or manifestation, and the word is related to a verb meaning to display or show forth and in the passive and middle voice to shine forth. In the early Christian period epiphansea developed a religious denotation as a “visible manifestation of hidden divinity either in the form of a personal appearance, or by some deed of power by which its presence is made known.” (‘The Liturgy of the Epiphany Season and the Epiphanies of Joyce’, PMLA, 80 (1965), 436-450 [436])

Walzl cites William F. Arndt and F. Wilbur Gingrich, A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature (Chicago, 1957). The key terms here are ‘manifestation’ and ‘show forth’. The ‘epiphany’ is the becoming visible or sensible (a becoming aware) of something previously ‘hidden’.

Jim had always had a contempt for secrecy, and these notes were in the beginning ironical observations of slips, and little errors and gestures—mere straws in the wind—by which people betrayed the very things they were most careful to conceal. “Epiphanies” were always brief sketches, hardly ever more than some dozen lines in length, but always very accurately observed and noted, the matter being so slight. This collection served him as a sketchbook serves an artist.  

The first form of the ‘epiphany’ concerns small and seemingly unimportant errors through which can be observed a betrayal of something the agent had been at pains to conceal. Stanislaus’ description lays emphasis upon the ironic disposition of the observer. The ‘epiphany’ is ‘ironical’ in terms of the cynical detachment and distance of the observer from the observed. In their commentary on the prose fragments Litz and Whittier-Ferguson dub this form of ‘epiphany’ ‘dramatic’. The ‘dramatic’ epiphanies rely on the contexts of social relationships and situations and the failure of a social and emotional performance. The repressed ‘essence’ thus revealed, the motivation for its repression, the act of its repression, and the failure of this performance all conspire to form an ironic betrayal

The second form of the ‘epiphany’ concerns what Stephen refers to as a ‘memorable phase of the mind itself.’ This form of ‘manifestation’, rather than concerning a revelation through the quotidian, involves an ironic betrayal of the inward state of the observer. For this reason Litz and Whittier-Ferguson dub this form the ‘lyrical epiphany.’ The form of distance involved in the observation lacks the cynicism of the ‘dramatic’ form. It is more vulnerable and more affective, and hence

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6 Shorter Writings, 158 See also Scholes and Kain, The Workshop of Daedalus, 3-6

7 Shorter Writings, 158 On the distinction between the dramatic and lyrical epiphanies see also Michel Delville, ‘Epiphanies and Prose Lyrics: James Joyce and the Poetics of the Fragment’, in Louis Armand and Clare Wallace, eds., Giacomo Joyce: Envoys of the Other (Prague: Litteraria Pragensia, 2006), 101-130 (103-105).
more painful to the observer (however ironic it may nonetheless be). The ‘lyrical’ epiphanies take the form of ‘records’ of dreams or moments of solitude. Stephen defines the ‘phase of the mind’ as ‘memorable’ because, through the disruptive nature of the revelation, it is lifted beyond the continuum of quotidian psychological experience. It is a moment of involuntary self-intuition resulting in a fundamental change in self-knowledge which serves to illuminate—to render manifest—that which had been lost within the complacency of that continuum.\(^8\)

What Stephen describes as the delicacy and evanescence of the epiphanies, both ‘dramatic’ and ‘lyrical’, which otherwise appear as sharp, clean, and violent in their sarcasm (both toward the inanity of social performance and to any prior sense of self-certainty or self-identity in the observer), derives from the difficulties of accurately recording them. In committing them to paper, the artist risks omission or distortion of the many details and nuances of which the ‘epiphany’ is comprised. Through such omission or distortion, the artist would potentially compromise the significance which marks these moments out precisely as epiphanies. For this reason, particularly in regard to the dramatic ‘Epiphanies’, Joyce himself takes ‘extreme care’ when appending what Litz and Whittier-Ferguson describe as ‘place indications and stage directions’: important pieces of information and context (often records of

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\(^8\) In his article, ‘James Joyce’s Epiphanies,’ Joseph Prescott points out the ‘close coincidences between part of Joyce’s account of his theory of epiphanies and an entry in a notebook of his, portions of which are dated 1904, a year during which he was writing *Stephen Hero.*’ Prescott cites the passage from *Stephen Hero,* quoted above, laying particular emphasis on the ‘spiritual’ nature of the manifestation (the emphasis is Prescott’s own), alongside the brief extract from Joyce’s notebook: ‘Moments of spiritual life.—Notebook’ (for this latter Prescott cites Herbert Gorman, *James Joyce: A Definitive Biography* [1939, repr. London: John Lane and Bodley Head, 1941], 136). Prescott emphasises the significance and centrality of the theory of ‘epiphany’ to the composition of *Stephen Hero.* Though he does not differentiate between the two forms of epiphany in his article, his observation stresses the importance of the ‘lyrical’ (‘spiritual’) form for Joyce’s early writings. Joseph Prescott, ‘James Joyce’s Epiphanies’, *Modern Languages Notes,* 64, (1949), 346.
significant tone or gesture) of which both the writer and the reader must be conscious in order for the effect of the ‘epiphany’ to be achieved.\(^9\)

By way of contextualising my own comparative reading of the presentations of Stephen’s aesthetic theory and interpretation of Aquinas in *Stephen Hero* and *Portrait*, I want to briefly revisit the terms of the debate waged over the use of the term ‘epiphany’ between Florence L. Walzl and Robert Scholes in the late nineteen sixties. Walzl and Scholes represent two antithetical possibilities for assessing the legacy of the concept of the ‘epiphany’ in Joyce’s larger corpus. Walzl argues that the ‘epiphany’ should be used as a critical tool in analysing Joyce’s works. She argues that the *Dubliners* stories represent ‘epiphanies’ and allusions to the liturgy of the Epiphany season, ironically inverting the nine manifestations of the Epiphany cycle.\(^10\)

In response to Walzl, Scholes argues that the term ‘Epiphany’ should be used only as Joyce himself used it to name the prose fragments of 1901/2-1904. He argues that the term ‘Epiphany’ specifically designates a ‘prose genre’ in which Joyce worked, comparable to, and yet distinct from, the novel genre of *Portrait of the Artist*, *Ulysses*, and *Finnegans Wake*, and the short story genre of *Dubliners*.\(^11\) For Scholes, the arrangement of the fragments themselves is ‘fixed,’ and although he is not explicit on this point, his argument suggests that this order is strictly chronological.\(^12\)

\(^9\) *Shorter Writings*, 158

\(^{10}\) ‘Jesus is revered as a babe by the Magi, marvelled at as a boy by the doctors on the Temple, blessed as a youth by the Holy Spirit at his baptism, and confirmed in the eyes of his disciples at Cana.’ Walzl, ‘The Liturgy of the Epiphany Season and the Epiphanies of Joyce’, 450. See also ‘Symbolism in Joyce’s “Two Gallants”’, *James Joyce Quarterly*, 2 (1965), 73-81.


\(^{12}\) Scholes, Walzl, ‘The Epiphanies of Joyce,’ 152: ‘From 1901 to 1904 […] beginning with the famous “Pull out his eyes” Epiphany which appears early in *Portrait.*'
He does allow for Joyce’s having structured the narrative of *Stephen Hero* using the ‘Epiphany’ fragments, and also for their later inclusion throughout *Portrait* and *Ulysses*. His objection focuses on the use of the term ‘Epiphany’ outside of this narrowed context: ‘Joyce never used the word Epiphany in connection with *Dubliners*, or as a term for a structural device in longer fiction.’

The ‘Epiphanies’, Scholes argues, constitute a complete and separate work of Joyce’s early career and a specific prose genre, and should not be understood critically either as an abstract concept or as a literary structural technique with wider application to Joyce’s works. He argues that those critics who adopt the ‘Epiphany’ as an interpretive tool and as an abstract concept do an injustice to the specificities of the texts themselves and spuriously elevate much incidental material (‘many a tenuous *aperçu*’) to the level of a false significance, to which they could lay no claim without the term.

Walzl and Scholes’s positions continue to represent the two possible polar extremes for the relationship of criticism to the ‘epiphany’ concept. Either the critic, following Walzl’s example, accepts all instances of revelation or reversal in Joyce’s works as epiphanies, or, following Scholes, abandons the concept altogether. However, both Walzl and Scholes elide the relationship of *Stephen Hero* to *Portrait* and the development of the aesthetic theory, in particular the interpretation of Aquinas. In opposition to both Walzl’s argument for the simple, straightforward adoption of the concept of the ‘epiphany’ and Scholes argument for its outright critical abandonment, through a comparative close reading of the presentation of the aesthetic theory in both *Stephen Hero* and *Portrait*, I will argue that the relationship between the two texts, and the growing sophistication and qualification of the

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13 Ibid.
interpretation of Aquinas, constitutes the evolution of the concept of the ‘epiphany’ into that of the ‘esthetic image’.

As far as I have been able to discover, no extant criticism of Stephen’s interpretation of Aquinas’s theory of beauty in *Stephen Hero* and *Portrait* has yet presented the pertinent sections of these texts side-by-side.\(^{14}\) To do so can far better illuminate the parallels and contrasts between the two passages and the evolution of the former into the latter:

*Stephen Hero*:  
—You know what Aquinas says: The three things requisite for beauty are, integrity, a wholeness, symmetry and radiance.\(^{15}\)

*Portrait*:  
—To finish what I was saying about beauty, said Stephen, the most satisfying relations of the sensible must therefore correspond to the necessary phases of artistic apprehension. Find these and you will find the qualities of universal beauty. Aquinas says: *ad pulcritudinem tria requiruntur, integritas, consonantia, claritas*. I translate it so: Three things are needed for beauty, wholeness, harmony and radiance.\(^{16}\)

In both texts Stephen’s ostensible purpose is to interpret Aquinas’s definition of the conditions which it is necessary for a phenomenon to fulfil in order for it to be

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\(^{15}\) *SH*, 217

\(^{16}\) *Portrait*, 229.
considered beautiful. There are, however, significant differences between them. The *Stephen Hero* extract comprises a simple paraphrasing of Aquinas’s definition. The first quality requisite for beauty is vaguely defined as ‘integrity,’ suggestive of the persisting self-identity of the phenomenon. Stephen also defines it as ‘wholeness’ which suggests that the object does not lack any essential elements, that it is complete.\(^\text{17}\) In Stephen’s phrasing, integrity precedes wholeness in the definition of the first quality and this lends his definition an indistinctness, as it remains unclear if he means that the phenomenon must posses a wholeness, a completeness which persists, which is integral, through time. The second quality Stephen defines as ‘symmetry’. In order to be beautiful the object must be symmetrical. The final quality Stephen defines as ‘radiance’. The object must be radiant illuminating in order to be beautiful, though at this stage Stephen offers no definition of this ‘radiance’ or how it is achieved.

In *Stephen Hero* Stephen provides no specific context for his definition of beauty. He refers to no specific type of experience, but to all sensible experience. In *Portrait*, by contrast, he seeks to define ‘beauty’ not as an experience of general quotidian consciousness but as it realised through the ‘phases of artistic apprehension’. *Portrait* develops and refines the definition of ‘beauty’ in *Stephen Hero*. It qualifies the earlier general definition of beauty by making it conditional upon a knowledge of how an object of quotidian experience is transformed by a specific type of experience into the subject matter for art. The ultimate aims in

Portrait are to define both the beautiful and the nature of the experience which forms the condition necessary for the creation of the work of art.\(^{18}\)

The development in Portrait of the earlier definition of ‘beauty’ takes the form not only of the qualification of the definition by that of ‘artistic apprehension’ but by a refinement in the translation of Aquinas. In Stephen Hero, Stephen is content to provide only an allusive paraphrase of Aquinas (‘—You know what Aquinas says’…). In Portrait, by contrast, he provides Lynch with a bastardised translation of the specific passage from the Summa Theologica: ‘Aquinas says: \textit{ad pulcritudinem tria requiruntur, integritas, consonantia, claritas.} I translate it so: Three things are needed for beauty, wholeness, harmony and radiance.’\(^{19}\) Maurice Beebe argues that Stephen simplifies and misquotes the original Latin, providing a full citation: ‘Actually, Aquinas wrote: ‘\textit{Nam ad pulchritudinem tria requiruntur: primo quidem integritas sive perfectio; quae enim diminuta sunt, turpia sunt; et debita proportio sive consonantia; et iterum claritas, unde, quae habent color nm nitidum, pulchra esse}

\(^{18}\) In his discussion of the Thomism/non-Thomism of Stephen’s definition of ‘beauty’ in both texts, Noon argues against what he defines as A.D. Hope’s ‘attempts to save the Thomism of Stephen’s discussion,’ and misquotes from Hope’s article: ‘Joyce here is speaking of the “esthetic image,” that is to say, not the butcher’s boy’s basket at which he and Lynch are looking [Portrait, 230], but the artist’s image of it which, when reproduced in the medium of words or paint, will be the work of art.’ Noon overlooks the distinction which Hope is careful to draw between Joyce and Stephen: ‘Joyce’s hero is speaking of the “esthetic image”’. Hope, A.D., ‘The Esthetic Theory of James Joyce’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 21 (1943), 93-114, (108. Emphasis added). See Noon, Joyce and Aquinas, 45.

Noon argues that Stephen’s focus is the actual and ‘very particular basket’ and not the image of it, and that only at the end of his discussion of the three ‘phases of artistic apprehension’ does he obliquely cite Shelley by way of extending his argument to poetry. Noon maintains that Stephen is not applying his discussion/theory in this way, and that even if he were he would be in contravention of a strictly Thomistic reading of Aquinas. (\textit{ibid.} See Hope, 108-109)

In his attempt to assess Stephen’s ‘Thomism,’ Noon overlooks the shift in emphasis from general quotidian experience in Stephen Hero to ‘artistic apprehension’ in Portrait, as well as Hope’s own careful distinction between the ‘esthetic image’ and the ‘actual basket’. (109) Stephen’s focus is the transformation of the apprehension of the basket into ‘artistic apprehension’. However, in arguing that Stephen’s argument is Thomist, Hope refers not to the passage on beauty (as an attribute of a member of the Holy Trinity) but to Aquinas’s ‘theory of “imagination”’ (108-109), although Noon does not seem to take this into account. (Cf. 45)

\(^{19}\) Portrait, 229
Beebe follows the Dominican Fathers’ translation of Aquinas: ‘For Beauty includes three conditions, integrity or perfection, for those things which are impaired are by the very fact ugly; and then due proportion or harmony is required; and lastly, brightness or clarity, whence things are called beautiful which have a bright colour.’\textsuperscript{21} Integritas indicates the completeness of the object.\textsuperscript{22} Consonantia is defined as the ‘due proportion’ both of the object itself and of its parts and thus the relationship of these parts to one another: their ‘harmony’. In both texts, Stephen’s translation and interpretation of claritas as ‘radiance’ omits the qualification given in the full extract from Aquinas, translated by the Dominican fathers, as ‘brightness or clarity, whence things are called beautiful which have a bright colour’. Here claritas means that for an object to be considered beautiful its colour and lustre must be bright, sharp and clean. Stephen’s translation of claritas as ‘radiance’ elides all reference to the brightness or colour of the object. For him, ‘radiance’ is to have a more abstract meaning.

Although Beebe is right to assert that the ‘translation’ Stephen offers is a simplified version of Aquinas’s original Latin, and that it omits the qualifying comments of the original text, he overlooks the dramatic context in which Stephen cites the text. Stephen is reducing the textual citation to its key elements in order to put forward his own interpretation. This reading itself takes place in the dramatic context of the conversation with Lynch and represents a gloss of what is presented as

\textsuperscript{20} Maurice Beebe, ‘Joyce and Aquinas: The Theory of Aesthetics,’ \textit{Philological Quarterly}, XXXVI, Jan., 1957, reprinted in Connolly, ed., \textit{Joyce’s Portrait}, 272-289. See Aquinas, Thomas, \textit{Summa Theologica}, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, revised by Daniel J. Sullivan, II vols (Chicago: William Benton, 1952) vol. I, 1, 39, 8c. See Eco, \textit{The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas}, 65: ‘Three things are necessary for beauty: first, integrity or perfection, for things that are lacking in something are for this reason ugly; also due proportion or consonance; and again, clarity, for we call things beautiful when they are brightly colored.’

\textsuperscript{21} Beebe, 283-284

\textsuperscript{22} O’Reilly, \textit{Aesthetic Perception}, 22-24
Stephen’s own much more expansive theorising on art.²³ That Joyce chose to offer this theorising in such a distilled form is for the benefit of the reader as much as it is for the benefit of Stephen in articulating his thoughts, and the benefit of Lynch as reluctant listener within the dramatic context of the exposition.

Beebe argues that Stephen’s translation of *integritas* in *Portrait* as ‘wholeness’ ‘is probably even closer to the Latin text’ than that provided by the Dominican fathers.²⁴ It resolves the confusion of the suggestion in *Stephen Hero* that ‘integrity’ and ‘a wholeness’ are one quality. It also divests *integritas* of the notion of persisting self-identity suggested by ‘integrity’, emphasising instead the notion of the object as whole and independent (without suggesting its persistence through time and resistance to dissolution). In *Portrait*, Stephen dubs the second phase ‘harmony,’ arguing that each individual part must be necessary to the object, and have a necessary place within it, corresponding to that of all other parts. This accords with the Dominican fathers’ translation of Aquinas’s emphasis upon the necessity of the ‘due proportion’ of the object and of its parts. The enigmatic ‘radiance’ (and concurrent elision of all reference to the brightness or colour of the object) of *Stephen Hero* is retained.

Having identified, in outline, the qualities of beauty/’phases of artistic apprehension’, in both texts Stephen moves on to define the first quality or ‘phase’:

Your mind to apprehend that object divides the entire universe into two parts, the object, and the void which is not the object. To apprehend it you must lift it away from everything else; and then you perceive that it is one integral thing, that it is a thing. […] That is the first quality

The first phase of apprehension is a boundary line drawn about the object to be apprehended. An esthetic image is presented to us in either space or in time. What is audible is presented in time. What is visible is presented in space. But, temporal or spatial, the esthetic image is

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²³*Portrait*, 221-235
²⁴284
of beauty it is declared in a simple sudden synthesis of the faculty which apprehends.\textsuperscript{25} first luminously apprehended as selfbounded and selfcontained upon the immeasurable background of space or time which it is not. You apprehend it as one thing. You see it as one whole. You apprehend its wholeness. That is integritas.\textsuperscript{26}

The terms of the \textit{Stephen Hero} extract are deceptive. To suggest that the ‘synthesis’ of or within the ‘faculty which apprehends’ (which he will go on in his incarnation in \textit{Portrait} to qualify as the faculties of the ‘audible’ and ‘visible’) is ‘simple’ overlooks the complexity of the extract’s own central claim that the object is only apprehended when it is extracted from the sensuous continuum in which it is otherwise lost: ‘you must lift it away from everything else’. This sensory extraction is achieved spontaneously. It is involuntary. It constitutes a chance coincidence in apprehension—a sudden, unexpected alteration in the relationship of the subject and the object—that precipitates the division of the ‘entire [apprehended] universe’ into, on the one hand ‘the object,’ and on the other, ‘the void’ of all else that is ‘not the object’. A chance relation—a coincidence—brings the object into stark relief with its surroundings, foregrounding it and allowing the observer, for the first time, to see the object as object. The ‘first quality of beauty’ constitutes the revelation of the object: its extraction from the invisibility that it was subject to in the complacency of quotidian apprehension.

In \textit{Portrait}, Stephen goes on to elucidate this moment (and again the terms are a more refined articulation of the same idea) as the drawing of a ‘boundary line’ in consciousness around the object. This serves to emphasise the nature of separation and foregrounding in the first ‘phase of artistic apprehension,’ and the differentiation

\textsuperscript{25} SH, 217
\textsuperscript{26} Portrait, 230
of the object being apprehended from ‘everything else’: ‘the immeasurable background of space or time which it is not’. The first phase in both texts defines the object negatively. This reveals the object, bringing it into stark relief, and pushes all else in perception into an indistinguishable and ‘immeasurable’ background. It is this which accounts for what, in both his textual incarnations, Stephen is at pains to stress is the illuminating or luminous quality of the first moment, and accounts for the appearance of the object’s ‘wholeness’ (of ‘integritas’). The object is no longer subsumed under the conventional complacency of quotidian consciousness but is isolated and illuminated as object.

Noon argues that this translation of integritas is inaccurate, and that it ‘has for Aquinas a perfectly definite and different meaning which Stephen appears not to have noticed in his breezy citation’.\(^{27}\) Comparing the Thomist meaning of integritas to Aristotle’s statement in the Poetics that a drama, in order to be considered a drama, must have a beginning, a middle, and an end, Noon argues that ‘[Aquinas] has in mind the completeness or perfection which a being possesses when it is all that it ought to be.’\(^{28}\) This accords with the translation furnished by the Dominican fathers of integritas as ‘integrity or perfection’. However, Noon is wrong in accusing Stephen of having not noticed this meaning. Instead, Stephen’s definition of integritas as the extraction of the object from the quotidian and its concurrent illumination is precisely what shows the object as it ‘ought to be’: as a discrete object, rather than as an inconsequential and fleeting detail in quotidian consciousness. Stephen’s is an idiosyncratic interpretation of the Thomist notion of ‘perfection’. Otherwise rendered insensible or invisible within quotidian consciousness, the object is extracted and seen

\(^{27}\) Noon, Joyce and Aquinas, 47

\(^{28}\) Ibid. See Eco, The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas, 64
for the first time as a discrete, solid, self-identical object, and it is this which justifies
Stephen’s appropriation of the orthodox Thomistic definition of the ‘completeness or
perfection’ of the object.²⁹

Having defined ‘*integritas,*’ Stephen moves on, in both texts, to define the
second ‘quality of beauty’ or ‘phase’ of ‘artistic apprehension,’ which results from the
revelation of the ‘integrity’ or ‘wholeness’ of the object:

The mind considers the object in whole
and in part, in relation to itself and to
other objects, examines the balance of its
parts, contemplates the form of the
object, traverses every cranny of the
structure. So the mind receives the
impression of the symmetry of the object.
The mind recognises that the object is in
the strict sense of the word, a *thing,* a
definitely constituted entity.³⁰

Then, said Stephen, you pass from point
to point, led by its [the object’s] formal
lines […] you feel the rhythm of its
structure. […T]he synthesis of immediate
perception is followed by the analysis of
apprehension. Having first felt that it is
*one* thing you feel now that it is a *thing.*
You apprehend it as complex, multiple,
divisible, separable, made up of its parts,
the result of its parts and their sum,
harmonious. That is *consonantia.*³¹

In both texts, Stephen dubs this phase of *consonantia* ‘Analysis’: the ‘analysis of
apprehension’ (it is only at this point, in his definition of the second phase of ‘artistic
apprehension,’ in *Portrait,* that he refers to the first phase as the ‘synthesis’ defined
earlier in *Stephen Hero*). The revelation of the object and differentiation from
everything else in the continuum of sensory perception in its ‘synthesis’ allows its
previously unheeded structure to be examined for the first time—both the object as a
whole, and its manifold parts, passing from ‘point to point’—with a care and attention
never possible before its revelation as object. The second stage of revelation,
proceeding from the negative differentiation of the object from its surroundings, to an
identification and analysis of the positive content or qualities of the object as ‘a *thing,*’

²⁹ Cf. Eco, 99n. (248-249). Citing Noon’s argument, Eco argues that Joyce strips *integritas* of its
‘ontological character’ and renders it epistemological.
³⁰ *SH,* 217-218
³¹ *Portrait,* 230
creates an ‘impression’ on the apprehending subject. The subject now becomes aware of the object’s complexity and internal harmony. The awkward ‘symmetry’ of *Stephen Hero* becomes the more accurate ‘harmony’ of *Portrait*, yet in both texts the first and second ‘qualities of beauty’ or ‘phases’ of ‘artistic apprehension’ constitute ‘synthesis’ and ‘analysis,’ respectively.

Both Noon and Beebe are in agreement that Stephen’s interpretation of *consonantia* accords with that of strict Thomism: ‘Stephen’s interpretation of *consonantia* accords generally with that “due proportion” Aquinas noted as characteristic of beauty’. 32 Noon agrees that ‘Stephen’s description of consonantia […] is Thomistically accurate,’ but argues that he ‘speaks for himself and not for Aquinas’ when he defines *consonantia* as a ‘phase’ of ‘artistic apprehension’ rather than as a quality which inheres in the object. 33 Noon’s qualification highlights the psychological bias of Stephen’s interpretation of Aquinas in *Portrait*. His definition of the Thomist terms emphasises the process of ‘artistic apprehension’ as one taking place solely within the apprehending subject (the artist).

Noon goes on to relate Stephen’s definition of *consonantia* to that of *integritas*: ‘Having first felt that it is one thing you now feel it is a thing.’ 34 This definition fits with the reading I have offered of both extracts, and yet Noon then proceeds to argue that in fact, according to Stephen’s interpretation, the terms ought to be reversed—that first the object is seen as a thing (*integritas*) and then as one thing (*consonantia*). Whilst this reversal may be more ‘Thomistically accurate,’ (according to Noon’s own definition) it does not accord with Stephen’s definition of the process.

32 Beebe, 284
33 Noon, *Joyce and Aquinas*, 48
34 Ibid.
of artistic apprehension. According to Stephen’s interpretation, the object is first extracted from quotidian experience and is revealed for the first time to be one thing. The object’s having been revealed as one thing, distinct against the background or ‘void’ of all else in quotidian consciousness, allows, secondly, for the revelation of its properties and of their relationship to each other. For the first time the object is experienced as a thing: a complex, organised and harmonious whole, comprised of its parts. Though this may be inaccurate in strict Thomist terms, Stephen is right according to his own terms, in defining the progression from integritas to consonantia.

In its ‘synthesis’, the object is distinguished negatively from all that which it is not. This differentiation allows the observer to analyse the object for the first time as ‘a thing,’ extracted from quotidian experience. Having been thus revealed in isolation and examined, the object must now fulfil the criterion of the ‘third quality’ of beauty, or, in the terms of Portrait, both the object and the artist are enabled to pass into the third phase of ‘artistic apprehension,’ which Stephen, in both texts, following Aquinas’s terminology identifies as ‘claritas’:

For a long time I couldn’t make out what Aquinas meant. He uses a figurative word (a very unusual thing for him) but I have solved it. Claritas is quidditas. After the analysis the mind makes the only logically possible synthesis and discovers the third quality. This is the moment which I call epiphany. First we recognise that the object is one integral thing, then we recognise that it is an organised composite structure, a thing in fact: finally, when the relation of the parts is exquisite, when the parts are adjusted to the special point, we recognise that it is that thing which it is. Its soul, its whatness, leaps to us from the vestment Aquinas uses a term which seems to be inexact. It baffled me for a long time. It would lead you to believe that he had in mind symbolism or idealism, the supreme quality of beauty being a light from some other world, the idea of which the matter is but a shadow, the reality of which it is but the symbol. I thought he might mean that claritas is the artistic discovery and representation of the divine purpose in anything or a force of generalisation which would make the esthetic image a universal one, make it outshine its proper conditions. But that is literary talk. [...]ou make the only synthesis which is logically and esthetically permissible.
of its appearance. The soul of the commonest object, the structure of which is so adjusted, seems to us radiant. The object achieves its epiphany. You see that it is that thing which it is and no other thing. The radiance of which he speaks is the scholastic quidditas, the whatness of a thing. This supreme quality is felt by the artist when the esthetic image is first conceived in his imagination. [...] The instant wherein that supreme quality of beauty, the clear radiance of the esthetic image is apprehended luminously by the mind which has been arrested by its wholeness and fascinated by its harmony is the luminous silent stasis of esthetic pleasure, a spiritual state.

In Stephen Hero Stephen argues that following the stages of ‘synthesis’ and ‘analysis’ the apprehending subject now proceeds to make ‘the only logically possible synthesis’. Having revealed the object as one thing, and subsequently as a complex whole comprised of various qualities and parts in a harmonious relation, ‘the mind’ of the apprehending subject now takes the, for Stephen, necessary step of synthesising these two stages. This occurs when the ‘parts’ of the object ‘are adjusted to the special point’ which he dubs ‘exquisite.’ Combining the consciousness of the object as one thing and as a complex, Stephen argues, allows the apprehending subject for the first time to ‘recognise’ the object. In the synthesis of these two stages the parts of the object are adjusted in consciousness to reveal an uncommon completeness and high degree of perfection, previously repressed or overlooked in quotidian experience.

By interpreting Aquinas’s claritas as ‘radiance,’ and omitting the qualification in the Summa Theologica of the application of this term to the object’s brightness or colour, Stephen aims to express the concept of the object becoming a lens—a medium—through which its ‘essence’ shines forth. The interpretation of claritas as

35 SH, 218
36 Portrait, 230-231
‘radiance’ only goes so far as to identify the fact of the shining forth, however, and
cannot name or describe what is shown forth within this ‘radiance’. Stephen solves
the problem by identifying claritas with quidditas: ‘we recognise that it is that thing
which it is. Its soul, its whatness, leaps to us from the vestment of its appearance’. In
claritas the ‘whatness’ (quidditas) of the object is revealed.37 For Stephen, quidditas
is the content of claritas and claritas, in turn, is the means by which the quidditas of
the object is revealed. This is the moment that Stephen, in Stephen Hero, names
‘epiphany’. The object is extracted from quotidian consciousness and its previously
repressed or overlooked quiddity—‘that thing which it is’—‘leaps’ from the
‘vestment’ of this former appearance, in which it had been shrouded, and the object
‘achieves its epiphany’. The ‘epiphany’ constitutes the revelation of the quiddity of
the object, precipitated by a chance coincidence of a change or exquisite arrangement
in the disposition of the object with a concomitant change in the disposition of the
observer. It is an objective as well as a psychological event.

This same process is at stake in Portrait. Furnishing Lynch with the example
of the butcher’s boy’s basket, Stephen summarises the first two phases of ‘artistic
apprehension’: ‘When you have apprehended the basket as one thing and have then
analysed it according to its form and apprehended it as a thing you make the only

37 On quidditas as ‘whatness’, see Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (London: Routledge, 2003), 261. Stump argues that, for Aquinas, quiddity is linked to sense and the intellect. The proper objects of sense—
‘proper sensibles’—are ‘non-propositional objects apprehended by one or another sense faculty.’
Insofar as sense is related to its proper objects it is not deceived. (232-233) In the same way the
quiddity of the material thing forms the proper object of the intellect: ‘The proper object of the intellect
is the quiddity of a thing. And so as regards the quiddity of a thing, considered just as such, the intellect
is not mistaken.’ (Aquinas, ST Ia.85.6. Stump, 233) Stump argues that the intellect arrives at
knowledge of the quiddity of the material thing through a process of abstraction from phantasms: ‘The
process of abstraction is a matter of removing or ignoring the many material accidents of a thing as
preserved in the phantasm and focussing instead just on the thing’s quiddity.’ (264) For Aquinas,
according to Stump, quiddity means ‘that form of a thing that put it into one rather than another species
or genus, its nature or essence.’ (Ibid.) Natures ‘do not exist in the world on their own; in the world
they exist only as incorporated into the things that have natures’. (Ibid.) See also, 270-271.
synthesis which logically and esthetically permissible. First, the object is extracted from quotidian experience and apprehended as ‘one thing’ (integritas). Just as in Stephen’s interpretation in Stephen Hero, this revelation of the object as one thing allows the subject to apprehend the object as ‘a thing’—‘complex, multiple, divisible, separable’. Stephen dubs this the ‘analysis’ of the object ‘according to its form’. The object is now seen to be the result of the harmonious relationship of its parts (consonantia). Just as in Stephen Hero, in Portrait Stephen argues that the apprehending subject completes the process of ‘artistic apprehension’ by synthesising the ‘phases’ of integritas and consonantia. The revelation of the object as one thing through the drawing of a boundary line extracting it from quotidian consciousness is now synthesised with the revelation of the object as a thing constituted by the harmonious proportion and relationship of its parts to which, for Stephen, this first revelation inevitably gave rise. The synthesis of these two ‘phases’ precipitates the revelation of the quiddity of the object: ‘You see that it is that thing which it is and no other thing’. Again, for Stephen, the meaning of Aquinas’s claritas is quidditas: ‘The radiance of which he speaks is the scholastic quidditas, the whatness of a thing.’ The radiance of the object is the becoming visible of the quiddity of the object.

In both texts the definition of the third ‘quality’ of beauty or ‘phase of artistic apprehension’ revolves, for Stephen, around the problem of interpreting Aquinas’s ‘figurative’ and, according to Stephen, ‘inexact’ term, claritas. Noon argues that ‘Stephen is correct in describing it as a synthesis of integritas and consonantia.’ He does, however, offer a qualification of his confirmation of Stephen’s conformit to orthodox Thomist interpretation:

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38 Portrait, 231
39 SH, 218: ‘it is that thing which it is’.
40 Noon, Joyce and Aquinas, 51
With the usual reminder that Aquinas presents this third quality of the beautiful as an existential property in the object rather than as a “stage” or “phase” of the mind’s own act of knowing, most Thomists would probably agree that in the main Stephen gives at this point the most satisfactory interpretation of Aquinas’ thought.41

Noon is wrong to reduce Stephen’s interpretation of claritas to a “‘phase’ of the mind’s own act of knowing”. In line with my reading of ‘epiphany’ in Stephen Hero, whilst the process of ‘artistic apprehension’ outlined in Portrait does not incur any change in the object itself, it still relies upon an initial and fundamental change in the disposition of the object, coinciding with a change in the disposition of the apprehending subject. Just as was the case with the ‘epiphany’ in Stephen Hero, ‘artistic apprehension,’ constitutes both a psychological and an objective process. Nevertheless, it is important to take Noon’s claim that Stephen’s interpretation of claritas as the synthesis of integritas and consonantia conforms to orthodox Thomism into account in assessing the relationship of the aesthetic theory to Thomism.

In contrast to Noon, Beebe argues that, in both texts (with an especial focus on the latter), Stephen’s interpretation ‘sharply diverges from the orthodox interpretations’ of claritas.42 He cites the neo-Thomist ‘attitude’ of Herbert Ellsworth Cory: ‘Just what claritas meant to St. Thomas we may gather from his account of what the glorified human body will be after its resurrection. The glory of the soul, already in heaven, will glow through its restored body and make it splendid.’43 For Beebe, following Cory, the meaning of claritas can be ascertained with reference to Aquinas’s account of how the glory of the redeemed human soul will radiate from its

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41 49
42 Beebe, ‘Joyce and Aquinas: The Theory of Aesthetics,’ 284
resurrected body at the end of history. Beebe joins Cory in rejecting what Cory argues is Joyce’s reduction of *claritas* ‘to a sort of metaphorical materialistic sentimentality,’ in its application to objects of quotidian experience.\textsuperscript{44} In fact, this supposed ‘reduction’ constitutes Joyce’s *ironic appropriation* of the orthodox meaning of *claritas* as the radiance of the resurrected body. The coincidence which wrenches the object from being lost in and to the complacency of quotidian consciousness and which reveals its previously repressed quiddity, constitutes its ‘glorification’ after its ‘resurrection’ for consciousness: the object’s glowing through its ‘restored body’.\textsuperscript{45} This is ironic and not ‘metaphorical’. Still less is it ‘sentimental’. It is objective, insofar as it concerns an event within quotidian consciousness, but is in no sense ‘materialistic’. Though the apparently simple terms of this radiant clarity thus, in line with Noon’s assertion, correspond to an orthodox Thomism, the irony with which Stephen appropriates *claritas* precludes any attempt at an orthodox redemption of his interpretation.

Crucial to an understanding of this ironic appropriation of *claritas* is Stephen’s equation of it with *quidditas*.\textsuperscript{46} Whilst Beebe is right to argue that through this equation Joyce sought to ‘avoid the spiritual connotation’ of *claritas*, the invocation of *quidditas* does not form, as Beebe claims, a substitution for *claritas* but rather a qualification.\textsuperscript{47} Beebe fails to register the implicit irony of Stephen’s appropriation of

\textsuperscript{44} Cf. Cory, 227
\textsuperscript{45} In *Portrait* Stephen describes the role of the artist as that of a ‘a priest of the eternal imagination, transmuting the daily bread of life into the radiant body of everliving life.’ (240)
\textsuperscript{46} Eco quotes the passage from *Portrait* and argues that Stephen’s identification of *claritas* and *quidditas* is ‘felicitous’ in its paying credence both to the interpretation of *claritas* as ‘the appearance of universal value embodied in the individual’ (‘an organism signifies the universal which gives it life’), to the organism’s (the individual’s) signifying ‘*itself*, in its combination of universality with contingency, in the reality of its concrete form’, and to Eco’s own definition of *quidditas* as ‘substance’, to which I wish to return at the close of the chapter. Cf. *The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas*, 120n (252-253).
\textsuperscript{47} Beebe, ‘Joyce and Aquinas: The Theory of Aesthetics,’ 285
Aquinas, and this failure serves to undermine his subsequent claim that Joyce ‘confuses’ *quidditas* (‘which in scholastic philosophy means specific essence’) with the scholastic *haecœitas, individual thisness*. This represents, not the ‘confusion’ of *quidditas* with *haecœitas*, but a deliberate conflation on the part of Stephen of his conception of radiance as revelation with the ‘scholastic *haecœitas*: ‘individual thisness’. Noon also argues that Stephen’s equation of *claritas* and *quidditas*, would have been better rendered as *haecceitas* referring specifically to the philosophy of Duns Scotus.  

Both Beebe’s and Noon’s respective criticisms of Stephen’s aesthetic theory, however, assess only the orthodoxy of the Thomism of Stephen’s interpretation. Neither assess it according to its own criteria. To do so reveals the ironic, subversive relationship of the aesthetic theory of *Stephen Hero* and *Portrait* to their mutual Thomist source.

For Noon, the use of *quidditas* in *Portrait* is tied to the development therein of a realist aesthetic concerned specifically with the nature of the poem and of the poetic, developed in relation to (and, he argues, as a stark rejection of) Romantic and Symbolist poetry. Noon argues that Aquinas employed the concepts of *integritas*, *consonantia*, and *claritas* to refer to existential qualities of the object rather than to moments or ‘phases’ of the (poet’s) psychological experience of the object. As a direct result of this qualification he proceeds to argue that Stephen’s equation of *claritas* and *quidditas* is ‘questionable.’ From the perspective of orthodox Thomist interpretation, *quidditas*, Noon argues, is dependent upon a “real” (or actual) distinction between the existence of the object itself and that of its essence, rather than, as Noon argues is the case for Stephen, a purely “rational” (or notional)”

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48 Cf. Noon, *Joyce and Aquinas*, 51, 72
distinction.\textsuperscript{49} The difference between an object and its essence, for orthodox Thomists, is a real existential difference. For Stephen on the contrary, according to Noon, the difference is merely a psychological one concerning the experience of the object.

If his objection to Stephen’s interpretation of \textit{quidditas} is understood to rest on the conclusion that the interpretation of \textit{quidditas} is purely psychological and precludes its application to the qualities of the object, then Noon can be shown to be mistaken. He himself argues that Stephen ‘places his emphasis on the quiddity or essence as actuated, as “existential”’.\textsuperscript{50} Although he may be right that Stephen’s equation of \textit{claritas} and \textit{quidditas} deviates from orthodox Thomism, in Stephen’s exposition of the ‘phases of artistic apprehension,’ just as in the earlier definition of the qualities of beauty and the ‘epiphany’ in \textit{Stephen Hero}, the process of the revelation of the quiddity of the object requires not only a notional or psychological change in the observer, but also a corresponding change in the disposition of the object. In \textit{Portrait} the ‘“real” (or actual)’ and the ‘“rational (or notional)’ are fundamentally intertwined. ‘Artistic apprehension’ is an objective as well as a psychological process.\textsuperscript{51}

Stephen’s proposed syntheses of \textit{claritas} and \textit{quidditas} in the revelation of the quiddity of the object in both \textit{Stephen Hero} and \textit{Portrait} are identical. In \textit{Stephen Hero} Stephen’s statement of his equation of \textit{claritas} and \textit{quidditas} is made in a short sharp exclamatory ejaculation and then, apparently, dropped. Or, rather, the equation of \textit{claritas} and \textit{quidditas} is subsumed into the definition of the ‘epiphany’. In that

\textsuperscript{49} Noon, 49
\textsuperscript{50} Noon, 49
\textsuperscript{51} SH: ‘the object achieves its epiphany.’

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Stephen’s definition of the qualities of beauty follows directly on from his first reference to the epiphany as a ‘spiritual manifestation,’ it is clear that his interpretation of Aquinas is intended to pave the way for the definition of ‘epiphany’.52 Indeed, the definition of the ‘epiphany’ remains vague until Stephen provides his exegesis of Aquinas. This follows so hard upon the first reference to epiphany that in the space of a paragraph Stephen is transported suddenly through space and time south through the city from Eccles Street to the Ballast Office in order to expound his theory to Cranly.53 The most significant difference between the two texts is that in Portrait the ‘synthesis’ is not solely that which is ‘logically possible,’ as it was in Stephen Hero, but becomes ‘the only synthesis which is logically and esthetically permissible.’ The synthesis of claritas and quidditas in Portrait concerns the process of the creation of a work of art:

[F]inally, when the relation of the parts is exquisite, when the parts are adjusted to the special point, we recognise that it is that thing which it is. Its soul, its whatness, leaps to us from the vestment of its appearance. The radiance of which he speaks is the scholastic quidditas, the whatness of a thing. This supreme quality is felt by the artist when the esthetic image is first conceived in his imagination.

The ‘exquisite’ relation of the parts of the object is replaced by the artist’s feeling. The recognition of the apprehending subject (the ‘we’ of Stephen Hero) is supplanted by the experience of inspiration of/of the artist. The intuition of the quiddity of the object and the ‘supreme quality’ of beauty becomes the inspiration for the creation of art. The ‘leap’ of the essence of the object of Stephen Hero becomes the formation of the ‘esthetic image’ in the artist’s imagination in Portrait.

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52 SH, 216-219
The ‘esthetic image’ represents the refining of the earlier ‘epiphany’, from a concept applied to general experience and still explicitly loaded with religious connotations, to one concerned specifically with artistic inspiration and creation.\textsuperscript{54} Portrait is not, as Hugh Kenner argues, ‘drastically pruned’ of ‘key doctrines,’ such as the ‘epiphany’.\textsuperscript{55} Neither is it ‘curious,’ as Noon argues, that the term disappears in the later text, when he misreads the ‘esthetic image’ as being solely bound to\textit{ integritas}.\textsuperscript{56} The ‘esthetic image’ retains the structure of ironic inversion of the ‘epiphany’, developing from a foundation in an ironic appropriation of Aquinas’s concept of beauty. However, in\textit{ Portrait}, the experience of ‘beauty’ in general consciousness of\textit{ Stephen Hero} is refined into an analysis of the conditions of ‘artistic apprehension’, artistic inspiration and the creation of the artwork. I want to move on, in the second section of this chapter, to argue that in its final stage in\textit{ Portrait} this analysis constitutes an ironic appropriation of the terms of Romantic accounts of artistic inspiration, specifically that of Shelley in\textit{ A Defence of Poetry}. I will argue that this final stage represents the incorporation and refinement of the earlier opposition between the ‘classical’ and the ‘romantic’ artistic ‘tempers’, and

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{54} In contrast to Sam Slote, who in ‘Epiphanic “Proteus’,” in his review of the Joyce manuscripts acquired by the National Library of Ireland in 2002, argues that in\textit{ Portrait}; ‘Stephen’s argument elides the key-word “epiphany” and, instead replaces it with the more redoubtably Thomistic term claritas.’ Sam Slote, ‘Epiphanic “Proteus’”, \textit{Genetic Joyce Studies}, 5 (2005), <http://www.antwerpjamesjoycecenter.com/GJS5/GJS5lote.htm> [accessed 18 December 2011]. Since claritas is already a crucial (and unavoidable) element of Stephen’s ironic appropriation of Aquinas in the earlier text, Slote’s reading is untenable.}


\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{56} Noon, 65, 44. Noon argues that Stephen mentions the ‘esthetic image’ at only this one point in his interpretation of Aquinas. However, just as the outlining of the qualities of beauty in\textit{ Stephen Hero} culminates in the object’s achieving its ‘epiphany’, so in\textit{ Portrait} the process of the ‘artistic apprehension’ of the object concerns the necessary stages in the formation of the ‘esthetic image’. Noon elides Stephen’s most crucial invocation of the ‘esthetic image,’ which corresponds exactly to the description of the ‘epiphany’ in the earlier text. In fact, Noon elides altogether the centrality of the ‘esthetic image’ to Stephen’s interpretation of Aquinas in\textit{ Portrait}. He is right that Stephen first refers to it in relation to\textit{ integritas}: ‘the esthetic image is first luminously apprehended as selfbounded and selfcontained upon the immeasurable background of space or time which it is not.’ (230) However, Noon ignores that in the definition of\textit{ consonantia} which follows directly on from that of\textit{ integritas}: ‘Then, said Stephen, you pass from point to point led by its formal lines; you apprehend it as a balanced part against parts within its limits’ the ‘it’ refers explicitly to the ‘esthetic image’ (\textit{ibid.}).}
privileging of the ‘classical’ in the ‘Art and Life’ paper in *Stephen Hero*. The ‘esthetic image’ represents an attempt to forge a new trajectory for the legacy of Romanticism through a rejection of the aesthetics and metaphysics of late-Romanticism, in particular that of W.B. Yeats. I will argue that Stephen’s ironic appropriation of the terms of Romantic aesthetics and metaphysics lies at the heart of an attempt to forge an anti-Romantic classicism.

II – On the Becoming Actual of the Being of Beauty: anti-metaphysics and ironic anti-romanticism in the definition of the ‘classical’ in Joyce, Nietzsche and T.E. Hulme

The mind of the artist in that mysterious instant Shelley likened beautifully to a fading coal. The instant wherein that supreme quality of beauty, the clear radiance of the esthetic image, is apprehended luminously by the mind which has been arrested by its wholeness and fascinated by its harmony is the luminous silent stasis of esthetic pleasure. (*Portrait*, 231)

In the first section of this chapter I argued that Stephen’s aesthetic theory between *Stephen Hero* and *Portrait* represents an ironic appropriation of the terms of Aquinas’s theory of beauty to an implicitly anti-Thomist aesthetic project. My comparative close reading of the analogous extracts from *Stephen Hero* and *Portrait* revealed the refining of the concept of the ‘epiphany’ in *Stephen Hero*, as being concerned with general experience, into the ‘esthetic image’ of *Portrait*, with its more

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specific analysis of artistic inspiration and creation. In this section I will focus on
Stephen’s final definition of *claritas* in *Portrait*. I will argue that this constitutes an
implicit critique and rejection of Platonically metaphysical aesthetic at stake in W.B.
Yeats’s definition of Symbolist poetry.\(^{58}\) As such, it represents the incorporation and
refinement of the earlier opposition of the ‘classical’ and ‘romantic’ artistic ‘temper’,
and privileging of the ‘classical’ in the ‘Art and Life’ paper in *Stephen Hero*. I will
argue that the terms of the opposition of the ‘classical’ to the ‘romantic’ are identical
to those of both Nietzsche, in his writing on art from *Human, All Too Human* onward,
and T.E. Hulme. This parallel will form the foundation of a larger comparison of the
terms of Stephen’s exposition of the ‘esthetic image’ in *Portrait* with those of
Hulme’s writings on Bergson’s philosophy and Modern art (and the influence of this,
in turn, on Ezra Pound and on the Imagist movement in poetry).\(^{59}\) This will in turn
allow me to argue that Stephen’s adoption of the terms of Shelley’s definition of
artistic inspiration in *A Defence of Poetry*, in his definition of the ‘esthetic image’,
represents an ironic appropriation of Romantic aesthetics to an implicitly anti-
Romantic project. The ‘esthetic image’ will be seen to represent an attempt to forge a
new trajectory for the legacy of Romanticism through a rejection of the aesthetics and
metaphysics of late-Romanticism, in particular that of Yeats, and to lie at the heart of
an attempt to forge a Romantic—anti-Romantic classicism.

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In *Portrait*, Stephen employs his focus on artistic inspiration and creation to articulate the resolution of his struggle to interpret *claritas*:

It would lead you to believe that he had in mind symbolism or idealism, the supreme quality of beauty being a light from some other world, the idea of which the matter is but a shadow, the reality of which it is but the symbol.\(^{60}\)

Stephen opposes his own interpretation of *claritas* to that of its otherworldly interpretation according to the rubric of ‘symbolism or idealism’, which would consign reality to an inferior and subsidiary position to the ‘idea’. This, for Stephen, is mere ‘literary talk’, an artificial prosthesis to reality which would have the undesirable effect of making the ‘esthetic image’ ‘outshine its proper conditions’.\(^{61}\)

His rejection of this otherworldly idealism constitutes an implicit parody of the terms of W.B. Yeats’s Symbolism. In particular Stephen is opposed to what Charles Chadwick defines as the ‘transcendental’ mode of Symbolist poetry.\(^{62}\)

In his essay on William Blake’s illustrations to Dante’s *Divine Comedy*, Yeats offers a definition of Blake’s concept of ‘vision’ in terms of the ‘symbol’ and in contradistinction to ‘allegory’:

> A symbol is indeed the only possible expression of some invisible essence, a transparent lamp about a spiritual flame; while allegory is one

\(^{60}\) *Portrait*, 230. Cf. ‘Drama and Life’ (1900), *CW*, 23-29, where Joyce opposes himself to what he calls the ‘doctrine of idealism in art’ (27).

\(^{61}\) 231

\(^{62}\) I will follow Chadwick’s distinction between the ‘personal aspect’ of Symbolism, in which it attempts to express ideas and emotions, and its ‘transcendental’ aspect, in which it attempts to express the ‘ideal world’. Chadwick, *Symbolism* (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1971), 2-3. Joyce became familiar with the central tenets of Symbolism through his association with Yeats and through Arthur Symons’, *The Symbolist Movement in Literature* (London: William Heineman, 1899). In his biography of Joyce, Richard Ellmann states that Joyce had first read Symons’ work in 1900, and goes on to suggest that this formed part of Joyce’s early search for his own distinctive style as a writer (see Ellmann, *James Joyce: New and Revised Edition*, 76). Joyce met Symons through Yeats in 1902, when he stopped in London on his way to Paris. Symons befriended Joyce and made a promise, which he later delivered on, to publish some of Joyce’s early poetry. (111-112) Symons was a close associate of Yeats and dedicated *The Symbolist Movement* to Yeats as a friend and ‘the chief representative’ of the ‘movement’. See also Yeats, ‘The Symbolism of Poetry’ (1900) in *SCP*, 43-52 (43).
of many possible representations of an embodied thing, or familiar principle, and belongs to fancy and not to imagination.\textsuperscript{63}

Yeats’s Symbolism constitutes the attempt to articulate an ‘invisible essence’, in contradistinction to ‘allegory’, which is merely a representation of the material, ‘embodied’ object: of something concrete and familiar. In ‘transcendental Symbolism,’ Chadwick argues, ‘concrete images are used as symbols, not of particular thoughts and feelings within the poet, but of a vast and general ideal world of which the real world is merely an imperfect representation.’\textsuperscript{64} At the heart of the transcendental Symbolist aesthetic is an implicit metaphysics which opposes an ‘ideal world’ to that of the ‘real,’ ‘concrete’ world of experience. Yeats’s ‘transcendental’ Symbolism uses the quotidian world merely as register from which to draw symbols as a means to express the ‘ideal world’.\textsuperscript{65}

In ‘The Symbolism of Poetry’ (1900) Yeats elaborates on his earlier definition of the symbol:

All sounds, all colours, all forms, either because of their preordained energies or because of long association, evoke indefinable and yet precise emotions, or, as I prefer to think, call down among us certain disembodied powers, whose footsteps over our hearts we call emotions.\textsuperscript{66}

\textsuperscript{63} ‘William Blake and his Illustrations to The Divine Comedy’ (1896) in Yeats, SCP, 22-32 (22)
\textsuperscript{64} Charles Chadwick, Symbolism (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1971), 3
\textsuperscript{65} See Matthew Campbell, ‘The English Romantic Symbolists’, in David Holdeman and Ben Levitas, eds., W.B. Yeats in Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 310-319: ‘Blake taught Yeats that a symbol stands prior to and posterior to poet and poem, and poetry must return to it, seeking its “invisible essence.”’ (312).
\textsuperscript{66} Yeats, SCP, 43-52 (46). In the essay, Yeats distinguishes between two types of symbol. The first, in line with the passage quoted above, he calls ‘emotional symbols’. To these he contrasts ‘intellectual symbols’, which, he argues, ‘evoke ideas alone, or ideas mingled with emotions’. (49) In his definition of the limitation of ‘intellectual symbols’, Yeats is even more explicitly Platonic, and invokes the terms of his earlier reading of Blake: ‘symbols, associated with ideas that are more than fragments of the shadows thrown upon the intellect by the emotions they evoke, are the playthings of the allegorist or the pedant, and soon pass away.’ (50) These two types of symbol correspond to what Chadwick defines as the ‘personal’, and ‘transcendental’ aspects, respectively, of Symbolist poetry. (2-3) in ‘The Symbolism of Poetry’, Yeats privileges the emotional or personal symbols, relegating transcendental, intellectual symbols to a secondary role as mere shadows generated by their emotional counterparts. (SCP, 46)
For Yeats, either through the familiarity of atavistic association or by its possession of ‘preordained energies’, poetry (‘sounds’, ‘colours’ and ‘forms’) is capable of invoking ‘powers’ which lie beyond empirical experience. These ‘powers’, in turn, are experienced as precise emotional responses by the reader, which however, apparently paradoxically, remain ‘indefinable’. For Yeats, poetry is concerned not with the world of quotidian experience, but with a quasi-mystical invocation of ‘invisible essence[s]’ and ‘disembodied powers’. This accounts for what Chadwick defines as the necessary allusiveness and evasion of Symbolism (its ‘built in obscurity’):

[Symbolism is the] art of expressing ideas and emotions not by describing them directly, nor by defining them through overt comparisons with concrete images, but by suggesting what these ideas and emotions are, by recreating them in the mind of the reader through the use of unexplained symbols.67

Symbolism’s expression is achieved, not through direct description of material objects, but by comparison with ‘concrete images’ used as symbols, with no explanation proffered by the poet. Poetry, for the ‘transcendental’ Symbolists, must aim to express the ‘ideal world’ and recreate the experience of it in the mind of the reader and, as such, supersedes religion as the means of attaining the ‘ideal world’.68

Through his rejection of ‘symbolism’ and ‘idealism’ Stephen alludes to the implicit Platonic metaphysics at stake in Yeats’s conception of transcendental Symbolism. In particular, it forms an allusion to Plato’s conception of the two ‘Orders of Reality’, as outlined in The Republic.69 Its extreme brevity indicates that Stephen’s allusion to Platonic metaphysics is a rhetorical move, designed to render Yeats’s Platonism and transcendental Symbolism a foil for the exposition of his own aesthetic

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67 Chadwick, 2-3
theory, and it thus remains at the level of a caricature. Nevertheless, it is worth pausing briefly in order to summarise Plato’s conception of the relationship of the Forms to quotidian experience, in order to demonstrate its pertinence to an understanding of Yeats’s aesthetic metaphysics, and to clarify Stephen’s rejection of Yeats and transcendental Symbolism (and thus his relationship to Platonism) in his definition of the ‘esthetic image’.

Plato’s Socrates distinguishes between the world of the everyday experience of visible and sensible things—of becoming and change—and the unchangeable, eternal world of the ‘Forms’ or ‘Ideas’.\(^{70}\) The quotidian world is the shadow or image of the world of Ideas, which contains the patterns—the ‘absolutes’ or ‘essential realities’—which the physical world imperfectly imitates.\(^{71}\) In his definition of the philosopher, Socrates defines the Ideas through a series of polar opposites: beauty and ugliness, justice and injustice and good and evil. The terms of each pair, he argues, constitute ‘a single thing in itself’. However, each appears only as a ‘multiplicity’, ‘because it is seen in combination with actions and material objects and other characteristics.’\(^{72}\) He refers to the Ideas as ‘formal characteristics’. They are the forms in which actions and objects imperfectly participate.\(^{73}\) Nonetheless they have a real existence independent of the mind.\(^{74}\) Absolute beauty would not be identical with

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\(^{70}\) Though contemporary criticism of Plato privileges the term ‘Form’ over that of ‘Idea’ (which suggests ‘things in our minds’), I retain the latter term here as that available to both Yeats and Joyce and in deference to Stephen’s explicit rejection of ‘idealism’. See editor’s note in Plato, 234. See also, Terry Penner, ‘The Forms in the Republic’, in Gerasimos Santas, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Plato’s Republic (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2006), 234-257.

\(^{71}\) Ibid.

\(^{72}\) 238


\(^{74}\) 238. Penner argues that the Forms (Ideas) are not self-predicating but constitute ‘certain fundamental attributes’ of ‘the objects of sciences or expertises’. (237. Cf. 242-243) For Penner, the Forms tell us what objects are, and we look to the account the Forms provide in seeking to realise (embody) them in the objects of our activities. (242-243) According to Penner’s examples, the Forms underpin the
anything that is beautiful, but everything which is beautiful partakes of the ‘essential nature’ of beauty.\textsuperscript{75}

Socrates distinguishes between the ‘Intelligible’ world and the physical, ‘visible’ world by defining a hierarchy (the ‘Divided Line’) between them. The ‘Intelligible’ world of the ‘Ideas’ is the world of knowledge. He divides this into knowledge (or ‘power’) of pure thought, which begins and ends with the Ideas as ‘first principles’, and the knowledge of the ‘mathematical sciences’, which are subordinate to pure thought insofar as they ‘proceed from assumptions and not to first principles [Ideas]’ and must therefore be ‘reasoned out’ in contrast to the Ideas which are directly perceived.\textsuperscript{76} For Plato’s Socrates, the physical, ‘visible’ world is the world of opinion, as opposed to that of knowledge. It is comprised of physical things which are the objects of belief and the ‘images’ of objects which are the objects of illusion. In defining the ‘images’, Socrates refers both to shadows and to the images of objects in reflective surfaces such as water and glass. The quotidian world remains one of only opinion or belief. It can never be known because the object of knowledge is the world of the Ideas.\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{76} ‘§6. The Divided Line,’ 274-278 (277)
\textsuperscript{77} 276. Penner argues that this differentiation does not represent four different ‘types (or faculties) of cognition’ or four different ‘sorts of objects’ defined according to their respective ‘degree of reality’. (235) The Forms are not more real than the objects of the ‘mathematical sciences’, or the physical objects and their images or shadows. Instead, the differentiation represents the degrees of truth in the different conceptions of any one object. 235, 252-257 (esp. 257)
In order to represent our experience of objects Socrates uses the simile of prisoners chained to the floor of a cave:

Imagine an underground chamber, like a cave with an entrance open to the daylight and running a long way underground. In this chamber are men who have been prisoners there since they were children, their legs and necks being so fastened that they can only look straight ahead of them and cannot turn their heads. Behind them and above them is a fire burning, and between the fire and the prisoners runs a road, in front of which a curtain-wall has been built, like the screen at puppet shows between the operators and their audience, above which they show their puppets.78

For Socrates, we are the ‘prisoners’ of the constitution of our senses. We do not know objects as they exist in themselves, but only their projected ‘shadows’ or ‘images’. Because our senses are ‘fastened’ and our experience is therefore limited to the ‘shadows’, we are subject to a form of naïve realism in which we take the objects of our experience to be things-in-themselves. This, for Socrates, is the nature of the world of ‘belief’ and ‘illusion’.79 He represents the role of the philosopher in the figure of a man who is first liberated from his captivity and allowed to see the objects whose shadows are projected onto the wall and next steps outside the cave into the daylight (and thus ascends through the Platonic-Socratic hierarchy from the ‘visible’ to the ‘Intelligible’ world) and is able to see things as they are in themselves.80 For Socrates, ‘the mind as a whole must be turned away from the world of change until it can bear to look straight at reality’.81 Implicit in Socrates’ distinction is a seeming imperative to privilege the eternal, intelligible world of the Ideas and to renounce the ‘visible’ quotidian world.82

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78 §7. The Simile of the Cave,’ 278-286 (278-279)
79 279. Cf. 274.
80 281-282
81 283. See also 284.
82 Bornstein argues that Yeats ‘found support’ for his ‘drive from the actual at the ideal world’ and ‘habit of seeing mutable things as types of immutable beauty’ in the ‘psychological theories accompanying Plato’s doctrine of the forms.’ (Yeats and Shelley, 69)
Yeats’s definition of the ‘symbol’ as ‘the only possible expression of some invisible essence, a transparent lamp about a spiritual flame’ in stark opposition to the ‘allegorical’ poet’s focus on the ‘embodied thing’, represents an appropriation both of Platonic metaphysics’ distinction between the degrees of truth in the conception of the object and its imperative toward the renunciation of the quotidian world (of objects and their ‘shadows’) in favour of the eternal forms of the ‘Ideas’. What Stephen overtly rejects is the life-renouncing mysticism at stake in this poetical Platonic metaphysics. Stephen dismisses Yeats’s ‘Platonic’ assumption (‘symbolism or idealism’) of an other-worldly ideal, of which sensible experience (‘matter’) is a ‘shadow’ or ‘symbol,’ as a fantastical artificial prosthesis to experience: a purely ‘literary’ construct, to which he opposes that which is ‘logically and esthetically’ necessary (the ‘proper conditions’ of the ‘esthetic image’).

Stephen’s opposition of the ‘esthetic image’ to Yeats’s late-Romantic transcendental Symbolism incorporates and refines the terms of the opposition between the ‘classical’ and ‘romantic’ artistic ‘tempers’ and the privileging of the ‘classical’ in the ‘Art and Life’ paper in Stephen Hero. To draw out what is at stake in this incorporation will allow me to align Stephen’s aesthetic with the opposition of ‘classicism’ to ‘romanticism’ in the works of both Nietzsche and T.E. Hulme (and by

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83 In his discussion of the fin de siècle Irish literary scene in ‘A Symbolic Artist and the Coming of Symbolic Art’ (1898), Yeats renders the connection between his Symbolist aesthetic and mysticism explicit: ‘When I have written of literature in Ireland, I have had to write again and again about a company of Irish mystics, who have taught for some years a religious philosophy which has changed many ordinary people into ecstatics and visionaries’. (SCP, 33-42, [33]. Emphasis added). In a gesture which will prove important for my later discussion of the relationship of Joyce’s classicism to Yeats’s politics in the ‘Scylla and Charybdis’ episode of Ulysses in the final chapter, Yeats identifies the poet A.E. (George Russell), along with Althea Gyles, as being at the centre of this movement: ‘a beginning of what may become a new manner in the arts of the modern world,’ (34) ‘creating a new religion and poetry’. (37) In his early criticism, Yeats builds his definition of transcendental Symbolism and the revival and cultural-political role of (Irish) literary art on the foundation of this new ecstatic, visionary mystic religion and poetry. See Harper, ‘Yeats and the Occult’, The Cambridge Companion to W.B. Yeats, 144-166.
extension with the neo-classical Modernist aesthetic manifesto of the Imagist poets, in particular with the doctrine of the ‘image’).\(^{84}\) This will serve to locate Stephen’s ‘classicism’ within a wider context of late nineteenth and early twentieth century philosophical and artistic reactions against late-Romanticism.

In the paper ‘Art and Life’ which Stephen delivers to the Literary and Historical Society of his college in *Stephen Hero*, he defines literature in terms of the two contrasting ‘tempers’ of the ‘romantic’ and the ‘classical’.\(^{85}\) The romantic he defines as an ‘unsatisfied, impatient temper which sees no fit abode here for its ideals

\(^{84}\) Imagism is associated with the work of Ezra Pound, Hilda Doolittle (H.D.), John Gould Fletcher, Amy Lowell, Richard Aldington, F.S. Flint, and D.H. Lawrence, between 1912 and 1917. Its origins extend back to two poetry clubs founded by T.E. Hulme, the Poet’s club, formed in 1908; the latter, unnamed, formed with F.S. Flint in March 1909. (See Peter Jones, ed., *Imagist Poetry* [London: Penguin, 1972], 13-43 [13-16] and Stanley K. Coffman, Jr. *Imagism: A Chapter for the History of Modern Poetry* [Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951], 3-7) Pound first dubbed Aldington and H.D. *Imagistes* in spring 1912. (Jones, ed. *Imagist Poetry*, 17) In *Poetry* (March 1913), Flint published ‘Imagisme’, a brief article, supplemented by Pound’s ‘A Few Don’ts by an Imagiste’. Both pieces were intended to define the principles of the movement (Jones, ed., *Imagist Poetry*, 129-134. Coffman, Jr., *Imagism*, 9-10). In February 1914, under Pound’s direction, the movement published its first anthology, *Des Imagistes*, including poems by Joyce, Skipworth Cannell, Ford Madox Hueffer (Ford Madox Ford), Allen Upward, and John Cournos. At this time, spurred by his involvement in Wyndham Lewis’s Vorticism and friction with Lowell, Pound distanced himself from the Imagists (Coffman, Jr., *Imagism*, 21-25). Lowell assumed responsibility for the movement and the publication of a further three anthologies, in 1915, 1916 and 1917, under the title of *Some Imagist Poets*, including poems by John Gould Fletcher and D.H. Lawrence. The 1917 anthology was the last for the movement whilst all its participants were still alive, Lowell writing: ‘The collection has done its work. These three little books are the germs, the nucleus, of the school; its spreading out, its amplifications, must be sought in the unpublished work of the individual members of the group’ (Lowell, *Tendencies in Modern American Poetry* [New York: Macmillan, 1917], 255. Jones, ed., *Imagist Poetry*, 24).


I will not claim that Joyce himself was an ‘Imagist’. His inclusion in *Des Imagistes* stemmed from the patronage he received from Pound and from a desire to have his work reach the largest audience possible. ‘I hear an Army’ was originally published in *Chamber Music* (XXXVI) in 1907. Its inclusion in an anthology seven years later marks the attempt to extend its reception. (Jones, ed., *Imagist Poetry*, 83) Instead, I am concerned to draw a parallel between Stephen’s interpretation of Aquinas and rejection of Symbolism and ‘romanticism’ with Imagism. This has already been pursued by A. Walton Litz in *The Art of James Joyce*. Litz refers Joyce’s having published with the Imagists in *Des Imagistes*, but goes on to provide a definition of the ‘image’ (with a brief reference to *Portrait*) which allows him to define the entire texts of both Ulysses and Finnegans Wake as themselves constituting ‘images’. (A. Walton Litz, *The Art of James Joyce: Method and Design in Ulysses and Finnegans Wake* [London: Oxford University Press, 1961], 53-62) In contrast, I will focus solely on the parallel between Stephen’s explication of the ‘esthetic image’ and the principles of Imagism.

and chooses therefore to behold them under insensible figures.\textsuperscript{86} It is the ‘romantic temper’, whose dissatisfaction with and renunciation of lived experience and presentation of its ‘ideals’ through ‘insensible figures’ (symbols) which is at stake in Stephen’s later rejection of the Platonism of ‘symbolism and idealism’ in his incarnation in \textit{Portrait}. Against the life-renunciation at stake within the ‘romantic’, Stephen offers his definition of the classical: ‘The classical temper on the other hand, ever mindful of limitations, chooses rather to bend upon these present things and so to work upon them and fashion them that the quick intelligence may go beyond them to their meaning which is still unuttered.’\textsuperscript{87} For Stephen, the ‘classical’ artist, in contrast to the ‘romantic’, retains an ineradicable consciousness of their finitude. They do not seek, as does the ‘romantic’ artist, to exceed or to escape these bounds. Instead, the ‘classical’ artist focuses upon the ‘here’ of contemporaneous experience and upon ‘present things,’ in order to present experience and the objects of experience in such a way as to communicate their ‘meaning’: the ‘proper conditions’ of the ‘esthetic image’.\textsuperscript{88}

The terms of Stephen’s rejection of the ‘romantic’ and championing of the ‘classical’ echoes Nietzsche’s much earlier opposition of ‘classical’ to ‘romantic’ aesthetics, first formulated in \textit{Human, All Too Human}:

\textit{Classic and romantic}. – Both those spirits of a classical and those of a romantic bent – these two species exist at all times – entertain a vision of

\textsuperscript{86} \textit{SH}, 83. This forms a clarification of a far more ambiguous, yet analogous passage in ‘James Clarence Mangan’ (Cf. 53).
\textsuperscript{87} \textit{Ibid.} See Stanislaus Joyce, \textit{My Brother’s Keeper}. Stanislaus cites Joyce’s rejection of ‘poets for whom only what is imaginary possesses poetic value’, against which he posits Joyce’s conception of poetry that seeks ‘to capture moods and impressions, often tenuous moods and elusive impressions, by means of verbal witchery that magnetizes the mind like a spell, and imports a wonder and grace’. (166)
\textsuperscript{88} Cf. \textit{SH}, 90-91: ‘Art is not an escape from life. It’s just the very opposite. Art, on the contrary, is the very central expression of life. An artist is not a fellow who dangles a mechanical heaven before the public. The priest does that. The artist affirms out of the fullness of his own life, he creates…’. 
the future: but the former do so out of a *strength* of their age, the latter out of its *weakness*.

For Nietzsche, the ‘classical’ and the ‘romantic’ do not denote the art of specific historical eras, but instead represent tendencies, present and coexisting in the artistic works of all ages, aimed toward the future and marked by either all that which is affirmative and strong in a given age in the case of the classical, or all that is reactive and weak in the case of the romantic. In *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche develops this conception of the reactivity and weakness of ‘romantic’ art and defines the romantic type as they ‘who suffer from the *impoverishment of life* and seek rest, stillness, calm seas, redemption from themselves through art and knowledge, or intoxication, convulsions, anaesthesia, and madness.’ For Nietzsche, ‘romantic’ art is distinguished by a psychological-physiological need to escape from, and to renounce life. It names a need for a remedy for life: to be anaesthetised, paradoxically accomplished through the attainment of states of intoxication (or rapture), convulsion, and madness, all framed here as alleviations from existence. The ‘classical,’ by

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89 ‘The Wanderer and His Shadow’ (hereafter *HH IIb*) in *Human, All Too Human*, §217, 366.
91 The terms of Nietzsche’s critique of ‘romanticism’ in *The Gay Science* corresponds to his later critique, in *On the Genealogy of Morality*, of what he calls *ressentiment*. (*OGM*, 1, §10, 21-25, [esp. 23]) He defines *ressentiment* as belonging to ‘those beings who, being denied the proper response of action, compensate for it only with imaginary revenge.’ (21) It emerges from an incapacity to act in response to external stimuli, resulting in a further incapacity to fully discharge emotional and psychological responses to them. Instead, such responses become suppressed and continue to be harboured long after any opportunity to purge them has passed. Nietzsche locates *ressentiment* at the root of what he calls ‘slave morality’:

[S]lave morality says “no” on principle to everything that is “outside”, “other”, “non-self”, and *this* “no” is its creative deed. This reversal of the evaluating glance – this *inevitable* orientation to the outside instead of back onto itself – is a feature of *ressentiment*: in order to come about, slave morality first has to have an opposing, external world. (Ibid.)

The ‘reversal’ is that of what Nietzsche calls ‘Master morality’, which, in opposition to modern liberal and humanist politics, he argues, derives its notion of the ‘good’ not from altruism—from those to whom good is done—but from its own superabundance of life and energy, in contrast to that which it deems lowly and plebeian. (1, §2, 12-13. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche defines the ‘noble’ type who creates values out of a ‘feeling of fullness, of power that seeks to overflow, the happiness of high
contrast, is marked by ‘[r]igorous reflection, terseness, coldness, simplicity, deliberately pursued even to their limit, self containment of the feelings and silence in general.’

Nietzsche privileges ‘classical’ art over ‘romantic’ art. In contrast to the ‘romantic’ poet’s depiction of life-renouncing, other-worldly intoxication:

[T]he good poet of the future will depict only reality and completely ignore all those fantastic, superstitious, half-mendacious, faded subjects upon which earlier poets demonstrated their powers. Only reality, but by no means every reality! – he will depict a select reality!

The ‘classical’ is founded on metaphysical scepticism and pragmatism, rejecting the other-worldly anaesthetisation characteristic of the ‘romantic’. It focuses on the ‘reality’ surrounding the poet. This ‘reality’ is then subject to a restrained and refined process of reflection and selection. Nietzsche emphasises the accuracy and simplicity of the depiction of the selected reality.

tension, the consciousness of wealth that would give and bestow’ BGE, IX, §260, 205], and in the ‘Attempt at Self-Criticism’ preface to Birth, the ‘joy, strength, overflowing health, [and] overgreat fullness’ which underpin the birth of tragedy BT, ‘ASC,” §4, 211) In ‘slave morality’ the direction of this ‘evaluating gaze’ is inverted: the ‘slave’ must rely on an opposing ‘external world,’ which it can judge as ‘evil,’ in order to establish itself, negatively, as ‘good’:. ‘– its action is basically a reaction.’ (OGM, 1, §10, 22. Cf. 21-24) Unable to act, ‘slave morality’ transforms impotence to retaliate into ‘goodness,’ ‘timid baseness’ into ‘humility,’ and its forced submission to those it despises into ‘obedience’, especially obedience to God. (§14, 29-31 [30]) ‘Slave morality’, and ‘the man of ressentiment’, yearn for revenge and seek ‘consolation for all the sufferings of the world’ in the ‘phantasmagoria of anticipated future bliss’. (31) Nietzsche identifies this ‘phantasmagoria’ with the Christian conception of “the last judgment”, the coming of their kingdom, the ‘kingdom of God’ and argues that ressentiment lies at the root of the need for, and creation of, all ‘other worlds’. (Ibid.) See Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 104-138. Stephen’s rejection of ‘romanticism’ (SH), sublimated in the ‘esthetic image’ of Portrait, can thus be understood in terms of a rejection of the implicit ressentiment at stake in Yeats’s ‘Platonic’ transcendental Symbolism.

H Human All Too Human, (hereafter HH I), §195, 93-94. Cf. HH I, §171, 90.

HH IIa, §114, 239-240

In the third chapter I will argue that the terms of Nietzsche’s rejection of the metaphysics, the ressentiment of ‘romanticism’ and definition of the ‘classical’ in the ‘free-spirit trilogy’ of his ‘middle period’ is already at stake in the ostensibly Schopenhauerian and late-Romantic Birth. On the ‘classical’ and ‘romantic’ in Nietzsche’s later writings, see Rampley, Nietzsche, Aesthetics and Modernity, 125ff. (esp. 128), and Young, Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Art, 77-78, 140-142, 146. On Nietzsche’s ‘classicism,’ see also Kurt Weinberg, ‘The Impact of Ancient Greece and French Classicism on Nietzsche’s Concept of Tragedy’, in O’Flaherty, Sellner and Helm, eds., Studies in Nietzsche and the Classical Tradition (Chapel Hill: The University of Carolina Press, 1976), 89-108.
In his essay of 1911, ‘Romanticism and Classicism,’ T.E. Hulme draws on Nietzsche’s earlier critique of the ‘romantic’ and privileging of the ‘classical’.\textsuperscript{95} He qualifies Nietzsche’s conception of the ‘romantic’ by identifying it with what he argues constitutes the conception of the ‘human’ propagated during the French revolution. This, in turn, he argues, derives from the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.\textsuperscript{96} He summarises the ‘romantic’ conception of the ‘human’ as one which claims that ‘man was by nature good, that it was only bad laws and customs that had suppressed him. Remove all these and the infinite possibilities of man would have a chance.’\textsuperscript{97} Hulme argues that the ‘romantic’ conceives of culture as inherently corrupt and corrupting. In a ‘natural’ state, ‘man’ is innately ‘good’ and it is only the false finitude of legal and cultural constrictions which serve to corrupt ‘man’. Remove these constrictions and ‘man’ would be capable of realising ‘his’ innate goodness and infinite possibilities.\textsuperscript{98} In essence, Hulme defines the contrast between the ‘romantic’ and ‘classical’ as stemming from the contrast between opposing conceptions of the infinite and the finite. He identifies a fundamental resentment against life in romanticism, emerging from the perspective of the false politics of the infinite capabilities of ‘man’:

\textsuperscript{95} Hulme, ‘Romanticism and Classicism’ *Speculations*, 111-140
\textsuperscript{96} Cf. ‘A Tory Philosophy’, Hulme, *Selected Writings*, 61
\textsuperscript{97} 116
\textsuperscript{98} In ‘Humanism and the Religious Attitude’ (originally published in several instalments in *The New Age*, December 1915—February 1916), Hulme expands on his conception of the illusory infinitude of Romanticism and ties it to the politics of Humanism and to the artistic portrayal of sexual relations: ‘Romanticism […] confuses both human and divine things, by not clearly separating them. The main thing with which it can be reproached is that it blurs the clear outlines of human relations – whether in political thought or in the literary treatment of sex, by introducing in them, the Perfection that properly belongs to the non-human.’ (‘A Notebook’, *Selected Writings*, 180-222 [189]. An abridged version of the series is printed by Read as ‘Humanism and the Religious Attitude’, *Speculations*, 1-71) (See Patricia Rae, *The Practical Muse: Pragmatist Poetics in Hulme, Pound, and Stevens* [London: Associated University Presses, Inc., 1997], 49). Hulme’s rejection of ‘romanticism’s’ confusion of the human and the divine, treating of the human as if it were itself the divine, establishes a clear parallel with Stephen’s rejection of the Platonic projection of a false, otherworldly ideal in Yeats’s Symbolism. On Hulme’s own rejection of Plato, Yeats and the “‘mystical” account of the creative process, see ‘Notes on Language and Style’ (c. 1907), *Selected Writings*, 57. (Rae, *Practical Muse*, 33)
The romantic, because he thinks man infinite, must always be talking about the infinite; and as there is always the bitter contrast between what you think you ought to be able to do and what man actually can, it always tends, in its later stages at any rate, to be gloomy.99

For Hulme, because the romantic attitude emerges from this perspective of the false politics of the infinite capabilities of ‘man’ (‘what you think you ought to be able to do’), it must inevitably run up against the limitations of finitude. As such, it becomes motivated by the resentment that its inevitable frustration engenders.

In terms which again echo those of Nietzsche and those of Stephen, Hulme contrasts the attitude of the classical artist-poet to the gloom of this thwarted idealism of the ‘romantic’:

[E]ven in the most imaginative flights there is always a holding back, a reservation. The classical poet never forgets this finiteness, this limit of man. He remembers always that he is mixed up with the earth. He may jump, but he always returns back; he never flies away into the circumambient gas.100

In contrast to the imaginative flights of romanticism, away from life and into the rarefied atmosphere of ‘circumambient gas,’ Hulme defines the ‘flights’ of the classical artist as leaps which ineluctably return the artist to his finiteness, his ‘limit,’

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99 Hulme, ‘Romanticism and Classicism’, Speculations, 119
100 119-120. Cf. 126-127. In ‘A Tory Philosophy’, Hulme alludes to the terms of Nietzsche’s conception of the ‘classical’ (which clearly exercised an influence on his own), but rejects Nietzsche as a closet ‘romantic’, and seeks to distance himself from him:

Most people have been in the habit of associating these kinds of views with Nietzsche. It is true that they do occur in him, but he made them so frightfully vulgar that no classic would acknowledge them. In him you have the spectacle of a romantic seizing on the classic point of view because it attracted him purely as a theory, and who, being a romantic, in taking up this theory, passed his slimy fingers over every detail of it. (Hulme, Selected Writings, 61)

Although his own definition so closely echoes Nietzsche’s rejection of the ressentiment at stake in ‘romanticism’, Hulme goes on in particular to reject the terms of On the Genealogy of Morality. (ibid.) Hulme’s ostensible rejection of Nietzsche elides the importance and centrality of the ‘classical’ in Nietzsche’s definition of his philosophical and aesthetic project. As I will argue in the third chapter, it lies at the heart of his interpretation of Hellenic Greek art and culture in his most ostensibly ‘romantic’ text, The Birth of Tragedy. Hulme’s refutation, I would argue, represents his desire to lay claim to intellectual independence, rather than a legitimate critique of Nietzsche.
and to the earth with which he is mixed up and which forms his proper subject matter. In contrast to the flights of romanticism, Hulme posits the ‘dry hardness’ of classicism, ‘strictly confined to the earthly and the definite […] always the light of ordinary day.’¹⁰¹ In opposition to what he calls the ‘abysses’ and ‘eternal gases’ of romanticism, ‘classical’ art is concerned with the transposition of quotidian experience.¹⁰²

For both Nietzsche and Hulme, just as in Stephen’s rejection of ‘symbolism’ and ‘idealism’ on the grounds of the artificiality of the ‘Platonic’ ‘light from some other world, the idea of which the matter is but a shadow, the reality of which it is but the symbol’, the ‘romantic’ attitude is distinguished by its incapacity to reconcile itself with its own finitude and limitations. Insofar as his interpretation of claritas is conditioned by its implicit satirical caricature and critique of the Platonic aesthetical metaphysics at stake in Yeats’s transcendental Symbolism, Stephen’s definition of ‘artistic apprehension’ and the ‘esthetic image’ in Portrait is therefore firmly located in the philosophical and aesthetic rejection of the ‘romantic’ and championing of the ‘classical’, stretching from Nietzsche’s writings of the late eighteen seventies to Hulme’s writing on aesthetics.¹⁰³ Stephen’s rejection of Yeatsian aesthetical

¹⁰¹ ‘Romanticism and Classicism’, Speculations, 126-127
¹⁰² To ‘romanticism’s’ false politics of ‘man’s’ infinitude, Hulme opposes what he defines as ‘classicism’s’ conception of ‘original sin’: ‘Man is by his very nature essentially limited and incapable of attaining any kind of perfection, because either by nature, as the result of original sin, or the result of evolution, he encloses within him certain antinomies. There is a war of instincts inside him’. (‘A Tory Philosophy’, Selected Writings, 160. In the later ‘Humanism and the Religious Attitude’, Hulme defines this position as the ‘religious attitude’, in contrast to the politics of ‘humanism’, from which, he argues, the ‘romantic’ emerged. Speculations, 1-71 [esp. 47]. ‘A Notebook’, Selected Writings, 180-222 [208-209]). Hulme argues that the ‘classical’ attitude begins from a conception of the political and artistic expediency of the concept of ‘original sin’. ‘Man’ is essentially a chaotic flux of warring instincts and the only way to extract anything of value from ‘man’ is through the imposition of an artificial order: ‘The best results can only be got out of man as the result of a certain discipline which introduces order into this internal anarchy.’ (‘A Tory Philosophy’, Selected Writings, 160)
¹⁰³ A parallel thus also exists between the terms of Stephen’s exposition of claritas, the ‘esthetic image’ and ‘classicism’ and the principles of the later Imagist movement, of which Hulme is regarded to be the ‘philosopher’. (See Patricia M. Rae, ‘T.E. Hulme’s French Sources: A Reconsideration’, Comparative
metaphysics in his interpretation of Aquinas’ *claritas* and definition of the ‘esthetic image’ represents the refinement of the earlier concept of the ‘epiphany’ and its synthesis with the terms of the definition of ‘classical’ art of *Stephen Hero* and of Joyce’s own early critical writing.

For Stephen, as for both Nietzsche and Hulme, the ‘classical’ is marked by pragmatism, metaphysical scepticism, by a merciless, cold ‘selfcontainment’, ‘sincerity’ and fidelity to lived experience, and by the ‘[r]igorous reflection’, ‘terseness’, ‘simplicity’ and restrained process of ‘selection’ which these serve to condition. I want to move on to examine the consequences this has for Stephen’s conception of artistic inspiration. Building on the parallel between their accounts of the opposition of the ‘classical’ and ‘romantic’, I want to examine the important parallel that exists between Stephen’s account of the ‘esthetic image’ and the key terms of Hulme’s writings on Bergson and Modern art, in particular the ‘aesthetic intuition’, emphasising the influence of the Nietzschean-Bergsonian opposition of

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*Literature, 41* (1989), 69-99 [69]) In *Some Imagist Poets* (1915) Lowell (et al.) set out the principles of the movement:

1. To use the language of common speech, but to employ always the *exact* word, not the nearly-exact, nor the merely decorative word.
2. To create new rhythms—as the expression of new moods—and not to copy old rhythms, which merely echo old moods.
3. [...]  
4. To present an image (hence the name: “Imagist”). We are not a school of painters, but we believe that poetry should render particulars exactly and not deal in vague generalities, however magnificent and sonorous. It is for this reason that we oppose the cosmic poet, who seems to shirk the real difficulties of his art.  
5. To produce poetry that is hard and clear, never blurred nor indefinite.  
6. Finally, most of us believe that concentration is of the very essence of poetry. (Jones, ed., *Imagist Poetry*, 135; Coffman, Jr., *Imagism*, 28-29)

In their emphasis upon the use of the ‘exact word’ as the expression of ‘new moods’, the presentation of the ‘image’, and hard, clear concentration contra the ‘vague generalities’ of the ‘cosmic poet’, the Imagists align themselves with Nietzsche, Joyce and Hulme’s critique of the ‘romantic’ (and Stephen’s rejection of Yeats’s transcendental Symbolism) and championing of the ‘classical’. (See Wallace Martin, ‘The Sources of the Imagist Aesthetic’, *PMLA*, 85 (1970), 196-204. Martin argues that though they are markedly different, neither Hulme nor Pound’s conception of ‘the image’ ‘is historically derived from or theoretically similar to the aesthetic of the Symbolists.’ [197-198])
‘intuition’ to the concepts of the intellect. This will allow me to contextualise
Stephen’s citation of Shelley’s account of artistic inspiration in *A Defence of Poetry*,
defining the ‘esthetic image’ as an ironic appropriation of the terms of Romantic
inspiration to an implicitly anti-Romantic aesthetic and an attempt to wrest the legacy
of Romanticism away from (specifically Yeatsian) late-Romanticism.

In ‘Bergson’s Theory of Art’ Hulme offers a definition of the ‘aesthetic
intuition’ which sees it as a regaining of a consciousness of the ‘intention of life’ by
the artist: ‘This intention is just what the artist tries to regain in placing himself back
within the object by a kind of sympathy and breaking down by an effort of intuition
the barrier that space puts between him and his model.’ Hulme explains the
‘intention of life’ through the metaphor of portraiture. The portrait itself, he argues,
can be explained by the features of the model, by the style and temperament of the
artist, and by the use of colours. However, he argues that even when we do have
access to all this information, we cannot predict the form the finished portrait will
take. Alongside the basic formative elements, he argues, must be a ‘movement’ which
passes through these elements, binding them together and imbuing them with
significance.

For Hulme, the artist is an individual who seeks to regain the ‘intention of
life’. The artist ‘tries’ by an ‘effort’ to attain an immediate identity with the object
which forms their model. Hulme conceives of two levels of conscious experience. He

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104 ‘Bergson’s Theory of Art’ in *Speculations*, 141-169 (144) Hulme’s definition is a verbatim
repetition of Bergson, *CE*, 176-177. Cf. *IM*, 21-22, 31. Hulme’s terms thus echo both Nietzsche and
Bergson’s accounts of the opposition of the ‘the impression of the powerful and present intuition’
(‘OTL’, 122) and the undivided continuity of ‘states’ in duration (*durée*) to the fragmented and
atomised spatio-temporal realm of the concepts of the intellect (what Bergson defines as ‘analysis’), as
I sought to outline these in the first chapter.

105 144. Cf. Bergson, *CE*, 6-7
regards the ‘process of artistic creation’ as one of ‘discovery and disentanglement’ and the artist as one who ‘leaves the level where things are crystallised out into these definite shapes, and, diving down into the inner flux, comes back with a new shape which he endeavours to fix. He cannot be said to have created it, but to have discovered it.’ Hulme’s (Nietzschean-Bergsonian) concept of ‘discovery’ echoes Stephen’s ironic appropriation of Aquinas’s terms, *integritas, consonantia and claritas/quidditas*, to define the extraction and rebirth of the object from the oblivion of quotidian complacency and the discovery of its quiddity. In terms which echo Nietzsche’s account of ‘intuition’ in ‘On Truth’, Hulme opposes the experience of ‘aesthetic intuition,’ to the hard ‘crystallised’ veneer of established conventional experience. The artist seeks to break through this veneer (‘the barrier that space puts between him and his model’) and through a rediscovered ‘sympathy’ with the object to discover and to fix a new shape.

In ‘The Philosophy of Intensive Manifolds’ (composed from notes from four lectures delivered in London in 1913, intended to form the basis for a projected introduction to the philosophy of Bergson), Hulme develops the terms of his reading of Bergson’s opposition of ‘intuition’ to the conceptual. He argues that the artist has two selves. The first is the surface self, ‘a crust of clean cut psychic states which are separated one from the other and which can be analysed and described,’ which he dubs ‘extensive manifolds’. The second self is that which he defines the ‘fundamental self’: ‘only reached at certain moments of tension where all states interpenetrate.’ The ‘fundamental self’ represents the inner intuition of the

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106 149
108 esp. 185-186, 190
109 186
undivided continuity of states of (Bergsonian) ‘duration’. In contrast to the ‘extensive
manifolds’ of the ‘superficial self’, Hulme dubs this the ‘intensive manifold’. The
‘moments of tension’ through which consciousness of the ‘fundamental self’ is
reached are ‘aesthetic intuitions’.

In ‘Bergson’s Theory of Art’ Hulme defines the ‘superficial’ self as concerned
with practical application and with ‘action’. Again echoing Nietzsche’s theory of
language in ‘On Truth’, Hulme argues that we divide experience into discrete
‘extensive manifolds’ in order to create a universal consensus of meaning—
convention—in order, in turn, to be able to act and to communicate. Over time, he
argues, the extensive manifolds become stale as they are increasingly accepted with
complacency. They no longer fulfil their original practical quotient, but instead
become stifling clichés and bars to creativity. The role of the artist is to break with
the conventions necessitated by action and to discover and present reality. In
terms which echo Stephen’s account of the ironic inversion at stake in the ‘epiphany’ (and,
subsequently, in the ‘esthetic image’), the artist, for Hulme, is the individual who
cultivates an attitude in which they actively seek out the experience of ‘aesthetic
intuition’ in order to be able to ‘break through the conventional ways of looking at
things which veil reality from us at a certain point’ and to ‘pick out one element
which is really in all of us, but which before he had disentangled it, we were unable to
perceive.’ In line with his definition of the ‘classical’, then, for Hulme the artist is
not concerned with the ideal or with the infinite but with a shattering of the ingrained
habit of convention in order to reveal the more vital underlying reality over which

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110 Hulme’s terms echo those of Nietzsche’s critique of the basis of the formation of language in socio-
political utility and of the inevitable exhaustion of the concepts. (‘OTL’, 117. See chapter 1, pp. 40-42,
111 ‘Bergson’s Theory of Art’ 146-147
112 150
convention forms a contingent crust. In striving to attain ‘sympathy’ with the object—their model—the artist aims to discover new shapes, always already present within experience but repressed within extant linguistic and experiential convention.\(^{113}\)

This is the key to Hulme’s conception of artistic inspiration. Hulme’s focus is on the objects of quotidian experience: ‘an extraordinary interest in a thing, a great zest in its contemplation which carries the contemplator to accurate description’.\(^{114}\) In defining accuracy, Hulme contrasts poetry to prose. He argues that in prose, concrete things are represented by ‘signs and counters’ corresponding to the Xs and Ys of algebra. Poetry meanwhile aims not for representation but for presentation:

It is not a counter language, but a visual concrete one. It is a compromise for a language of intuition which would hand over sensations bodily. It always endeavours to arrest you, and to make you continuously see a physical thing, to prevent you gliding through an abstract process. It chooses fresh epithets and fresh metaphors, not so much because they are new, and we are tired of the old, but because the old cease to convey a physical thing and become abstract counters.\(^{115}\)

\(^{113}\) 168-169: Hulme argues that, for Bergson, the artist is someone who ‘makes you realise something which you actually did not perceive before.’ In ‘A Lecture on Modern Poetry’ (c. 1908), Hulme defines this shattering of conventional language and attempt to articulate reality and capture new shapes, in terms which echo those of Nietzsche’s claim that ‘the good poet of the future’ will ‘deict only reality […] Only reality, but by no means every reality! – he will depict a select reality!’ ‘Say the poet is moved by a certain landscape, he selects from that certain images which[,] put into juxtaposition in separate lines, serve to suggest and to evoke the state he feels.’ (Selected Writings, 64). For Hulme, as for Nietzsche, the poet must exercise pragmatism and restraint (the ‘discipline’ of ‘A Tory Philosophy’, Selected Writings, 160) in selecting from experience ‘images’ which, through their juxtaposition, serve to evoke the ‘state’ of the aesthetic intuition. To this extent, both Hulme’s ‘modern’ (‘classical’) poet and Nietzsche’s ‘poet of the future’ correspond to the ‘man of intuition of ‘On Truth and Lies’, who ‘speaks only in forbidden metaphors and in unheard-of combinations of concepts […] so that by shattering and mocking the old conceptual barriers he may at least correspond creatively to the impression of the powerful and present intuition.’ (OTL, 122) Hulme’s concepts of selection and ‘zest’ also echo Aquinas’s definition of the arrival of the intellect at the quiddity of the material object through a process of abstraction from the material accidents of the phantasm. (Cf. Stump, Aquinas, 264)

\(^{114}\) ‘Romanticism and Classicism,’ 136

\(^{115}\) 134-135. See also ‘Bergson’s Theory of Art,’ 151-152, 159-162, 165-166; ‘The Philosophy of Intensive Manifolds,’ 176 and ‘Cinders,’ 215-245. In his definition of ‘Vorticism’ (in an article first published in the Fortnightly Review, September 1914), which, as Jones argues, formed a ‘stricter form of Imagism’, in terms which echo Hulme’s and as Jones argues lie at ‘the heart of Imagism’, Pound binds this critique of conceptual ‘counter’ language to his rejection of Symbolism:

The symbolists dealt in “association”, that is, in a sort of allusion, almost of allegory. They degraded the symbol to the status of a word, they made it a form of metronomy. […] The symbolist’s symbols have a fixed value, like numbers in arithmetic, like 1, 2 and
Accurate description, for Hulme, is the essence of ‘classical’ poetry. It is visual (as opposed to aural) and presents concrete physical objects. Unlike algebraic prose, it does not employ language which seeks to represent its object by some abstraction that stands in for the object. It is an attempt to approximate as closely as possible a language that would directly embody the aesthetic intuition of reality and communicate it to the reader. It opposes existing poetical metaphors not simply from a negative reactionary impulse that would need to violently reject any pre-existing forms in order to define itself, but because these existing metaphors and poetical figures of speech have been reiterated by poets, artists, and have entered vernacular speech. They can no longer express what they were first engendered to express and have become stale, abstract, and devoid of content. Hulme argues that only through accurate description can the poet hope to arrive at ‘fresh’ epithets and metaphors capable of arresting the reader and of presenting concrete physical objects and thus avoid abstraction and allusion. At the heart of this drive to accurate description, for Hulme, is the ‘great’, or ‘intense zest’ which the poet-artist experiences in the contemplation of an object.

7. The imagist’s images have a variable significance like the signs a, b, and x in algebra […] the author must use his image because he sees it or feels it, not because he thinks he can use it to back up some creed or some system of ethics or economics. (Jones, ed., Imagist Poetry, 21)

Pound argues that the necessary in-built vagueness of the Symbolists constitutes a reductio ad absurdum. Symbols become reduced to esoteric figures with a fixed arithmetical value, associated with only with the one idea to which they allude or serve as an allegory for. For this reason they are all-too-easily used as mere vehicles for the over-arching political or philosophical agenda of the poet. He compares the effect of the symbolist poem to the monotony of counting of time according to the beats of a metronome. In contrast, he defines the image as deriving from and embodying the sensuous or emotional experience of the artist. The image is not intended to substantiate any metaphysical, moral, or political claims. For Pound, the image does not stand for, or equal something, but is evoked by the aesthetic experience. Unlike the symbol of the Symbolist its meaning is not fixed, but instead depends on the context of its use and the images with which it is contrasted. For this reason the image may potentially be used innumerable times, each time evoked by and presenting a different experience.
In ‘Romanticism and Classicism’ Hulme furnishes a ‘concrete example’ of this experience of inspiration:

If you are walking behind a woman in the street, you notice the curious way in which the skirt rebounds from her heels. If that peculiar kind of motion becomes of such interest to you that you will search about until you can get the exact epithet that hits it off, there you have a properly æsthetic emotion. But it is the zest with which you look at the thing which decides you to make the effort.\^[116]\n
For Hulme artistic inspiration arises from the peculiar disposition of an object, in this case the skirts of an anonymous woman walking down the street. This peculiar disposition (the skirts rebounding from the woman’s heels) reveals a previously imperceptible quality of the object. This revelation shatters the poet’s inert conventional perception of the object. The poet is placed in a new ‘sympathy’ with the object. This state is what Hulme defines as ‘aesthetic intuition’. It is the ‘curious’ or ‘peculiar’ nature of the experience of this revelation which arrests the poet, and makes them ‘search about’ for a fresh metaphor or epithet that will capture and recreate the experience. This state of arrest and concomitant need to articulate and to capture the peculiar nature of the experience, are what Hulme defines as ‘zest’: the ‘æsthetic emotion’. In an autobiographical comment on his own experience of artistic inspiration Hulme offers an apposite summation: ‘the first time I ever felt the necessity or inevitableness of verse, was in the desire to produce the peculiar quality of feeling which is induced by the flat spaces and wide horizons of the virgin prairie of western Canada.’\^[117]\n
\^[116]\ ‘Romanticism and Classicism,’ 136. See Hulme’s poem ‘Images’:

Her skirt lifted as a dark mist
From the columns of amethyst.
( Jones, ed. Imagist Poetry, 49)

necessitates the creation of the artwork in order to embody and recreate it so that both the poet and the reader can incorporate that experience.\(^\text{118}\)

For Hulme, the composition of verse is dictated by a need to articulate the aesthetic intuition. Hulme was heavily influenced by the work of the French psychologist and philosopher Théodule Ribot, in particular by the ‘conception idéale’

\(^{118}\) ‘Romanticism and Classicism,’ 137: ‘It isn’t the scale or kind of emotion produced that decides, but this one fact: Is there any real zest in it? Did the poet have an actually realised visual object before him in which he delighted?’ In his account of artistic inspiration in the later ‘Modern Art and Its Philosophy’ (a lecture to the Quest Society, London, 22\(^{rd}\) January 1914), Hulme appropriates Wilhelm Worringer’s concept of ‘space-shyness’:

The fear I mean here is mental, however, not physical […] a kind of “space-shyness” in the face of the varied confusion and arbitrariness of existence. In art this state of mind results in a desire to create a certain abstract geometrical shape, which, being durable and permanent shall be a refuge from the flux and impermanence of outside nature. […] In the reproduction of natural objects there is an attempt to purify them of their characteristically living qualities in order to make them necessary and immovable. The changing is translated into something fixed and necessary. (Speculations, 86)

For Hulme, in contrast to ‘vital’ art, which is inspired by a ‘delight in the forms of nature’, artistic inspiration in ‘classical’ art (in this context operating under the pseudonym of the ‘geometric’) stems from a state of fear inspired by the confused and arbitrary flux of the phenomena of ‘outside nature’. This ‘space-fear’ creates a desire to imbue the flux of external phenomena with a static form, or ‘shape’. Just as ‘vital’ art, for Hulme, ‘classical’, ‘geometric’ art still aims at the reproduction of natural objects. However, in terms analogous to his emphasis on ‘selection’ and ‘discipline’, in ‘classical’ art this reproduction aims to ‘purify’ phenomena, sloughing off all that is contingent in them, and drawing out all that is ‘necessary’, imbuing them with permanence and thus redeeming experience from its contingency.


[It is] because he [the artist of ‘abstraction’] stands so lost and spiritually helpless amidst the things of the external world, because he experiences only obscurity and caprice in the inter-connection and flux of the phenomena of the external world, that the urge is strong in him to divest the things of the external world of their caprice and obscurity in the world-picture and to impart to them a value of necessity and value of regularity. (18)

Worringer distinguishes this ‘fear’ in the ‘urge to abstraction’ from the ‘urge to empathy’, which, he argues, represents ‘a happy pantheistic relationship of confidence between man and the phenomena of the external world.’ (15) Hulme first refers to this ‘fear’ in ‘A Lecture on Modern Poetry’ (c.1908). In this earlier piece, however, he relegates it to the sole possession of the ‘ancients’ and distinguishes the relativity and rejection of ‘absolute truth’ characteristic of the ‘modern spirit’. (Selected Writings, 59-67 [62-63]) It is not until the later piece that he fully incorporates Worringer’s conception of ‘space-fear’ into his own definition of the ‘classical’ and modern art. See Helen Carr, ‘T.E. Hulme and the “Spiritual Dread of Space”’, in Edward P. Comentale and Andrzej Gasiorek, eds., T.E. Hulme and the Question of Modernism (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 93-112 (esp. 103). Hulme’s appropriation of Worringer’s ‘space-fear’ represents a development of the theory formulated in his earlier works on Bergson, qualifying the concept of ‘zest’ with the that of the artist’s ‘fear’ and instinctual recoil to their persisting prescience of flux.
(‘ideal conception’). Ribot argues that the ‘ideal conception’ has its foundation in a ‘unifying, synthetic principle’ of intellectual, emotional and unconscious factors which, in turn, have their foundation in the ‘organic’ or ‘physiological states’ of the artist. It represents a cluster of images or ideas that emerge from the original images of percepts that appear in the mind of artist at the beginning of the creative process, and which demand to be objectified. For Ribot, the need to objectify the ‘ideal conception’ does not derive from any metaphysical source but from ‘intellectual, emotional, and unconscious factors in the human psyche.’ The objectification of the ‘ideal conception’ stems from a ‘physiological need’. In terms which Hulme’s definition of artistic inspiration parallel closely, Ribot defines the ‘ideal conception’ as the necessity for a ‘fixed emotion’ to ‘realize itself in an idea or image that gives it body and systematises it.’ This need to articulate and incorporate an emotional stimulus is what is at stake in Hulme’s definition of ‘zest’ (the ‘aesthetic emotion’). Hulme follows Ribot in defining the attempt to articulate the aesthetic intuition against what he terms the ‘bad metaphysical aesthetic’ of ‘romanticism’.

119 See Rae, Practical Muse, 12
121 Ribot, ECI, 81. Rae, ‘Hulme’s French Sources’, 76. The ‘ideal conception’ therefore echoes Nietzsche’s account of the emergence of language as an attempt to articulate and discharge the natural reaction to a sensible stimulus. (‘OTL’, 116. See chapter 1, pp. 25-27, above) In Practical Muse, Rae argues that the ‘conception idéale’ ‘displaces’ the Symbolist’s Platonic ‘Idea’ with a ‘psychologised catalyst for creativity.’ (40)
122 Rae, ‘Hulme’s French Sources’, 75. See Ribot, ECI, 79.
123 Rae, ‘Hulme’s French Sources’, 78. Cf. 75-78
124 Ribot, ECI, 80
125 Hulme, ‘Romanticism and Classicism,’ 128, 131. In ‘Bergson’s Theory of Art’ Hulme argues that Bergson’s philosophy represents a reinterpretation and redemption of the terms of Schopenhauer’s ‘cumbrous machinery’: ‘Art is the pure contemplation of the Idea in a moment of emancipation from the Will,’ into those which would see art ‘as an actual contact with reality in a man who is emancipated from the ways of perception engendered by action.’ Bergson, for Hulme, marks the transition from a metaphysical conception of art into one concerned with ‘the intellectual, emotional, and unconscious factors in the human psyche.’ In La Philosophie de Schopenhauer in particular Ribot had also been concerned with a transposition of Schopenhauer’s aesthetics and metaphysics into these terms. Rae, ‘Hulme’s French Sources,’ 75-81 and Martin, ‘Sources of the Imagist Aesthetic,’ 199-202.
In deducing from his own experience of artistic inspiration a ‘fixed principle which
can be found by metaphysic.’ In particular, Hulme cites a passage from Ruskin on
the ‘imagination’:

There is in every word set down by the imaginative mind an awful
undercurrent of meaning, and evidence and shadow upon it of the deep
places out of which it has come. It is often obscure, often half-told; for he
who wrote it, in his clear seeing of the things beneath, may have been
impatient of detailed interpretation; for if we choose to dwell upon it and
trace it, it will lead us always securely back to that metropolis of the
soul’s dominion from which we may follow out all the ways and tracks to
its farthest coasts.

Hulme argues that for Ruskin the poet’s words ineluctably retain a trace or remnant of
the state of inspiration from which they have emerged. He argues that Ruskin casts
this state in sombre language as ‘awful’ and in his evocation of ‘shadow,’ depth, and
‘things beneath’, suggests that this state is an access to a ‘subterranean,’ that is an
unconscious, realm. Despite the clarity of the poet’s vision of the things populating
this underworld, Ruskin suggests that the poet’s experience is too fleeting and urgent
to allow for a full articulation of this vision. This urgency, he argues, stems from the
fact that all such creative acts emerge from the depths of the poet’s soul. In so far as
Ruskin’s description finds an echo in Hulme’s own analysis of the shattering of
conventional consciousness in the peculiar experience of the object, and a subsequent
descent into reality to retrieve new shapes in new metaphors, Hulme would agree.
Hulme also agrees with Ruskin that the aesthetic intuition must remain ‘essentially
unstateable’. What he criticises is Ruskin’s deduction that the state of inspiration is
evidence of what he calls ‘the metropolis of the soul’s dominion’. This, for Hulme, is
Ruskin’s failure, for where the intuition is evidence for Hulme of a fleeting and

126 Hulme, ‘Romanticism and Classicism,’ 130
2, Part III, Section II, Chapter III, §5, 160-161 (160)
128 129
contingent ‘attitude’ of the poet, Ruskin, he argues, seeks to find evidence of a ‘fixed principle of the cosmos’.  

In opposition to this ‘bad metaphysical aesthetic,’ Hulme defines the attempt to articulate the aesthetic intuition as concerned with ‘the intellectual, emotional, and unconscious factors in the human psyche.’ In ‘The Philosophy of Intensive Manifolds’, he defines the intuition in terms of the distinction between the ‘superficial’ and ‘fundamental’ selves. The artist constitutes the individual who seeks to break with the conventional consciousness of ‘action’ in the ‘superficial’ self in order to gain access to the ‘reality’ of the ‘fundamental’ self. Though this may seem to echo Ruskin’s deduction of a metaphysical ‘principle,’ Hulme argues that: ‘There is nothing infinite or ineffable about the fundamental self. It is a perfectly finite thing and at the same time there is nothing miraculous about one’s intuition of it.’ The fundamental self constitutes the constellation of finite intellectual, emotional, and unconscious forces at play within the individual (the artist). The aesthetic intuition is not ‘miraculous’—does not proceed from an ineffable or infinite metaphysical source—but instead constitutes a pathos of distance and resistance to the stultifying reiteration of set conventions for describing objects and experience brought about by the demands of everyday utility and the necessity of ease of communication.

Because it is impossible to ‘hand over’ the experience of intuition ‘bodily,’ the intuition itself, for Hulme, must remain ‘essentially unstateable’. Nevertheless, for

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129 Ibid. This explains in part why Hulme is criticised for attacking ‘Romanticism’ whilst ultimately holding to Coleridge’s concept of the ideal poem: one possessing organic unity. For Hulme it remains true that a poem is an organic unity. However, it cannot be derived from an appeal to a metaphysical principle. Rae, ‘Hulme’s French Sources,’ 70. Rae cites Murray Krieger, The New Apologists for Poetry (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956), esp. 35, 37.

130 188-189
Hulme the physiological, existential imperative to capture and incorporate the aesthetic intuition remains: ‘you must talk, and the only language you can use in this matter is that of analogy.’\(^{131}\) No direct communication of the intuition is possible. What the poet seeks is the ‘compromise’ language of ‘fresh’ epithets and metaphors. There is no ‘material clay to mould to the given shape’ of the intuition. However, a combination of metaphors ‘while it cannot state the essentially unstateable intuition, can yet give you a sufficient analogy to enable you to see what it was and to recognise it on condition that you yourself have been in a similar state.’\(^{132}\) The conjunction of images is presented by the poet as a ‘sufficient analogy’ of the state of inspiration in order to recreate it for the reader so that they might experience a ‘similar state’. In ‘Bergson’s Theory of Art’ Hulme argues that, although ‘[m]etaphors soon run their course and die’, ‘it is necessary to remember that when they were first used by the poets who created them they were used for the purposes of conveying over a vividly felt actual sensation […] conveying over the reality of the sensation experienced.’\(^{133}\)

The images or ‘metaphors’ of the poet are engendered to present a vivid psychological and physiological experience. As Rae argues, ‘though they may give “a sense of being united in another mystic world”, the ‘analogous images’, ‘owe their association simply to the working of intellectual and emotional forces within the poet.’\(^{134}\) This imperative metaphysical scepticism, pragmatism and psychological realism, established in contradistinction to the Platonic metaphysics at stake in the Symbolist aesthetic, accounts for the onus upon the poet to have recourse only to concrete things and to simple, precise language.

\(^{131}\) ‘Romanticism and Classicism,’ 129
\(^{132}\) Ibid.
\(^{133}\) ‘Bergson’s Theory of Art,’ 151
\(^{134}\) Rae, ‘Hulme’s French Sources,’ 91. Rae cites from Hulme, ‘Notes on Language and Style,’ in Further Speculations, ed. Sam Hynes (London: University of Nebraska Press, 1962), 77-100 (88)
Hulme defines this aim of ‘accurate, precise and definite description’ through the metaphor of the pieces of wood of certain curvature, used by architects to draw curves. Through a suitable selection from these pieces of wood, Hulme argues, it is possible to draw approximately any curve desired: ‘The artist I take to be the man who simply can’t bear the idea of that “approximately.” He will get the exact curve of what he sees whether it be an object or an idea in the mind.’ The artist, for Hulme, is the individual who seeks to avoid the approximation and complacency of conventional language. The artist seeks to slough off all that is inessential to the clear, precise presentation of the experience of the object which is their model, which Hulme defines as the ‘exact curve’ of the aesthetic emotion (and its synonyms: artistic inspiration and aesthetic intuition).

Hulme argues that two things are essential to this imperative to capture the ‘exact curve’ of the experience artistic inspiration. The first is ‘the particular faculty of mind to see things as they really are, and apart from the conventional ways in which you have been trained to see them.’ The artist, through a rigorous course of self-discipline, must develop a critical faculty designed to resist the impulse to first apprehend, then to comprehend objects of experience according to the existing epithets and metaphors of conventional language. They must conscientiously seek to break down the ‘ingrained habit’ that would compartmentalise the phenomena of experience into discrete units for the sake of convenience, utility, and the institution of a communal linguistic apparatus and that overlook the reality of the interpenetrating qualities of phenomena. The second essential thing is ‘the concentrated state of mind,

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135 Hulme, ‘Romanticism and Classicism,’ 132. Hulme uses the same metaphor in ‘Bergson’s Theory of Art,’ 159-160.
136 ‘Romanticism and Classicism,’ 133
the grip over oneself which is necessary in the actual expression of what one sees.'\footnote{Ibid.}

For Hulme, having established a faculty or capacity to resist conventional apprehension and comprehension of phenomena, the artist must strive through self-discipline to resist resurrecting convention in the attempt to articulate the experience of intuition.

Hulme ultimately views the goal of the articulation of the aesthetic intuition as impossible:

\begin{quote}
The psychology of the process is something of this kind. You start off with some actual vividly felt experience. It may be something seen or something felt. You find that when you have expressed this in straightforward language that you have not expressed it at all. You have only expressed it approximately.\footnote{‘Bergson’s Theory of Art,’ 161}
\end{quote}

Because the intuition can never be adequately presented through ordinary language, only ever approximated through the use of metaphor, of ‘analogous images,’ the experience can never be fully captured, communicated, and incorporated. Nevertheless, this ineluctable failure of the ‘process’ of articulation does not render the attempt itself futile:

\begin{quote}
You may start writing a poem in an endeavour to express a certain idea which is present in your mind in a very hazy shape. The effort to express that idea in verse, the struggle with language, forces the idea back on itself and brings out the original idea in a clearer shape. Before it was only confused. The idea has grown and developed because of the obstacles it had to meet.\footnote{‘The Philosophy of Intensive Manifolds,’ 211}
\end{quote}

Initially, the intuition has no clear shape. The artist is driven by the need to articulate and to incorporate it. The struggle of the artist to articulate the intuition is, by the very nature of the experience, doomed to failure. Nevertheless, the struggle itself refines the intuition and brings it to a greater state of clarity even if it cannot fully articulate
it. In the ‘zest’ and concentration of the artist the intuition is folded back upon itself and attains a clearer and more sophisticated shape. The intuition evolves. Each ‘poem’, each image, is only ever a provisional form, sharp and precise yet never attaining completion. This is what is at stake in Hulme’s assertion that the image cannot be reduced to an algebraic equation, but instead takes its meaning and significance from each new experiential context which gives rise to it.

The complete ‘sincerity’ demanded of the artist, Hulme argues, is unattainable. Because the ‘mental life’ of the artist-poet ‘forms a whole which cannot be analysed into parts’: ‘To describe accurately, then, any emotion—to give it accurately and not approximately—you would have to describe at the same time the whole personality in which it occurs’. To be truly sincere, and not merely approximate, would be to include everything in existence within and without the artist at the moment of the aesthetic intuition. A truly honest work of art would require that the artist recreate everything, but also always that they therefore include within that comprehensive act of recreation, a recreation of the act of recreation itself. The artist must recreate the act of recreating the act of recreating everything. The artistic process would be swallowed in an absurd, self-consuming infinite regress. The ‘sincerity’ demanded by the ‘classical’ artist’s pragmatism and metaphysical scepticism is ultimately impossible. The art of the image—the process of the articulation of the aesthetic intuition—is fated to be an art of provisionality: a perpetual process of self-becoming without the possibility of attaining self-identity.

185. Cf. Lowell, et al., ‘Preface to Some Imagist Poets 1916’ in Jones, ed. Imagist Poetry, 136-140 (137): ‘The sole excuse which a man can have for writing is to write down himself, to unveil for others the sort of world which mirrors itself in his individual glass… He should create his own aesthetics’. Rae, ‘Hulme’s French Sources,’ 74-75.
In ‘Notes on Bergson’, in an autobiographical commentary on his discovery of the work of Bergson (‘a personal confession’), Hulme offer an apposite summary and synthesis of the principal elements of his aesthetic which serves to draw out the full parallel with what is at stake in Stephen’s ironic appropriation of Aquinas and conception of the ‘esthetic image’. Hulme describes his attempt to articulate—to ‘fix down exactly’—the ‘influence’, the ‘great excitement’ and the state of ‘enthusiasm’ which his discovery of Bergson precipitated. He defines this state as a twofold ‘enthusiasm’:

In the first place, there was a simple sentiment of relief. A solution was given to a problem which worried me. I had been released from a nightmare which had long troubled my mind. [...] In the second place, the key with which this prison door was opened corresponded to the type of key which I had always imagined would open it.

The first element of Hulme’s ‘enthusiasm’ is ‘relief’: a redemption from what he describes as a preceding ‘state of siege’ (‘the nightmare’) in which he had been conscious of a ‘problem’, which he was, as yet, unequipped to resolve. The second element is the excitement in the recognition of the correspondence of Bergson’s work to the vaguely intuited solution that preceded Hulme’s discovery of him: ‘the delight of seeing something done perfectly that I had wrestled with clumsily and un成功fully.’ In line with his definition in ‘Bergson’s Theory of Art’ of the process of artistic creation as one of ‘discovery’, Hulme emphasises that this was not merely the case of ‘an intolerable state being changed into a pleasanter one; it was not merely that one state changed into its opposite. On the contrary, there was a certain

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141 Hulme, ‘Notes on Bergson’ (first published in five instalments in New Age, Oct. 1911-1912) in Further Speculations, 28-63 (28)
142 Cf. 28-29
143 30
144 29, 30
145 30
resemblance between the initial and the final stages. The initial state of ‘siege’ contained all the ‘elements’ of the succeeding state:

But these elements, which in the first state were tortured, vague, and confused, became in the second clear and definite. […] One saw clearly outlined in perspective the shape of things which before had only been felt in a muzzy kind of way.

Hulme’s account of this moment of ‘discovery’ contains all the elements of his aesthetic. His description of the tortured uncertainty of thought in the ‘nightmare’ corresponds to his later appropriation of Worringer’s conception of ‘space-fear’ as ‘the spiritual dread of space in relation to the extended, disconnected, bewildering world of phenomena.’ The release from this ‘state of siege’ is, in turn, analogous to his Nietzschean-Bergsonian conception of the ‘aesthetic intuition’ (as the artist’s laceration of conceptual convention, descent into flux and return, replete with new forms), and the corresponding properly ‘aesthetic emotion’, which forms his account of artistic inspiration. In the state of inspiration—the twofold ‘enthusiasm’ which is precipitated by the release from the ‘nightmare’—as Hulme defines it in ‘Notes on Bergson’, his Worringer-inspired concept of ‘space-fear’ becomes fused with ‘zest’ (‘relief’ and ‘delight). The definite clarity of the revelation of ‘the shape of things’, contained only vaguely and indefinitely in the state of the ‘nightmare’, corresponds to the principles of ‘selection’, sincerity and precision at the heart of Hulme’s classicism. The combination of all these elements forms an account of artistic inspiration as a process of ironic inversion, in which the solution to a problem, previously present but as yet indeterminate in consciousness, is realised through its correspondence with an external phenomenon (the work of Bergson).

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146 29
147 Ibid.
148 Worringer, Abstraction and Empathy, 16
The terms of Hulme’s analysis of the process of artistic inspiration are analogous to those of Stephen’s ironic appropriation of Aquinas’s theory of ‘beauty’ in his definition of the ‘esthetic image’. To recapitulate: first, the object is extracted from quotidian experience (integritas). This revelation of the object as an independent object allows, for the first time, the artistic assessment of the relationship of its parts and qualities. The object is then revealed as a unified, harmonious complex (consonantia). When these two stages of ‘artistic apprehension’ are combined, the object acquires a ‘radiance’ or luminosity through which, for the first time, its quiddity is revealed (claritas/quidditas). For Stephen the formation of the ‘esthetic image’ represents the resurrection—the retrieval and redemption—of the object from the oblivion of quotidian complacency. The stages in the redemption of the object correspond to the ‘torture’ and vagary (‘space-fear’) of the ‘nightmare’; the laceration of conceptual convention and descent into flux in the ‘aesthetic intuition’; the return with a new form and the resultant ‘zest’ of the ‘aesthetic emotion’ in Hulme’s writings on aesthetics.

The parallel with Hulme illuminates what is at stake in Stephen’s aesthetic theory in Portrait. For both Stephen and Hulme, artistic inspiration represents an intensely undergone experience of ironic inversion. The coincidence of a sudden alteration in the disposition of an object of quotidian experience with a concomitant alteration in the disposition of the artist results in the laceration of the conventional conceptual reception of experience (the loss of the object in the oblivion of conventional complacency) and the concomitant laceration of the (Hulmean) state of ‘nightmare’, in which the sense of the object is vaguely intuited but cannot be clarified or articulated. The artist is freed from the fetters of the conventional (the
‘nightmare’) and descends into the flux which lies beneath the artificial surface of the quotidiant. The object becomes radiant; a radiance through which its quiddity becomes visible (‘claritas is quidditas’). This engenders a need to articulate and to incorporate the revelation of the quiddity of the object (‘zest’). The artist ‘returns’ to the stage of the quotidian replete with a ‘new shape’, which resolves the ‘nightmare’ and redeems the artist from their ‘space-fear’, capturing the ‘aesthetic intuition’ (the formation of the ‘esthetic image’). The ‘esthetic image’ of Portrait thus refines the earlier concept of the ‘epiphany’, incorporating the definition of the ‘classical’ of Stephen Hero and of Joyce’s own early critical writings, creating a parallel with the key terms of Hulme’s writing on art. This parallel reveals a fully formed and articulated theory of artistic inspiration which, for both Stephen and Hulme, emerges from, and represents the quintessence of, the ‘classical’, in opposition to the ‘otherworldly’ Platonic ressentiment of (Yeatsian) late-Romanticism. Both the incorporation of the ‘classical’ and the parallel to Hulme serve to contextualise Stephen’s allusion to Shelley’s account of artistic inspiration in A Defence of Poetry and thus his ultimate relationship to Romanticism, as this is staged in Portrait.

Stephen alludes to Shelley in his definition of the inspiration of the poet in the moment of the formation of the ‘esthetic image’: ‘This supreme quality is felt by the artist when the esthetic image is first conceived in his imagination. The mind in that mysterious instant Shelley likened beautifully to a fading coal’.149

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149 Portrait, 231. See Noon, Joyce and Aquinas, 50-51. In his note to this reference (50) Noon comments that the ‘fading coal’ quote recurs on three occasions throughout Joyce’s writings: once in ‘James Clarence Mangan’, which concerns precisely the nature of poetic inspiration, and in which, Noon argues, poetic creation is seen by Joyce to emerge from the imagination, which is identified in the essay as the wind which breathes upon the ‘fading coal’ of the mind. (‘James Clarence Mangan’, 53-60 [56-57]). The second occasion is its occurrence in Portrait, in which, Noon argues, ‘the mind is considered as apprehending beauty, not creating it.’ The third instance is its occurrence within the ‘theory of Hamlet’ in Ulysses, in which ‘the mind is identified with the creative imagination in such wise that its light, though fading, not only illuminates what we see and what we are but is prophetic and...
A man cannot say, “I will compose poetry”. The greatest poet even cannot say it: for the mind in creation is a fading coal which some invisible influence, like an inconstant wind, awakens to transitory brightness: this power arises from within, like the colour of a flower which fades and changes as it is developed, and the conscious portions of our nature are unprophetic either of its approach or its departure.¹⁵⁰

Shelley defines artistic inspiration as the spontaneous and involuntary visitation of the mind of the artist-poet by an invisible ‘influence’, precluding any possibility of subjective volition in the act of creation. Timothy Clark defines Shelley’s theory of inspiration in terms analogous to those at stake in both Nietzsche and Bergson’s definitions of ‘intuition’, in Hulme’s account of the ‘aesthetic intuition’ in his writing on Bergson, and in Stephen’s exposition of his aesthetic theory:

Shelley’s is a theory of poetry as a “self-displacing energy” that sets off a series of generative, associative and disseminatory effects in the imagination of readers. Inspiration appears as a drive that defamiliarizes the received and worn associations of language and which forms, in metaphor, newly liberating connections and integrations of thought.¹⁵¹

For Shelley, Clark argues, inspiration is a ‘drive’ which lacerates both the conventional ‘self’ of the artist and conceptual language. This laceration, as it did for both Nietzsche’s ‘man of intuition’ in ‘On Truth’ and Hulme’s ‘classical’ poet, allows for the formation of new metaphors (the state of inspiration of the poet is then transmitted through their poetry to their reader who undergoes an analogous experience). However, Clark emphasises what he calls Shelley’s ‘curiously literal

reflective of what we are ourselves fated to become.’ In the both the last and first instances, according to Noon’s reading, the invocation of Shelley’s ‘fading coal’ is explicitly bound to the act of artistic creation, whilst in its occurrence with Portrait it remains concerned with apprehension only.

To qualify Noon, the quotation from Shelley in Portrait, in expressing the feeling of the poet in the instant of the conception of the ‘esthetic image,’ is bound with artistic creation. It in fact forms the bridge from the former—the passive mind acted on by imagination under inspiration—to the latter: the binding of the mind and creative imagination, and thus an intermediary stage in the evolution of Joyce’s aesthetic. See Haskell M. Block, ‘The Critical Theory of James Joyce’, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 8 (1950), 172-184 (esp. 177).

¹⁵¹ Timothy Clark, The Theory of Inspiration: Composition as a Crisis of Subjectivity in Romantic and Post-Romantic Writing (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), 143-169 (147) In ADP, Shelley defines ‘Imagination’ as ‘mind, acting upon […] thoughts so as to colour them with its own light, and composing from them as from elements, other thoughts, each containing within itself the principle of its own integrity’, (674) and defines the language of poets as ‘vitaly metaphorical’. (676)
He argues that Shelley’s account of inspiration appropriates contemporary discourse on ‘enthusiasm’ and recasts it ‘in the vocabulary of the Platonic dialogues’, alluding to Shelley’s drawing on Plato’s *Ion*, of which he had produced a translation (1819-21). Shelley binds his conception of inspiration to the key terms of Platonic metaphysics: ‘to be a poet is to apprehend the true and the beautiful, in a word the good’. For Shelley, to be inspired is to attain access (‘to apprehend’) the Forms of the true, the beautiful and the good.

Stephen’s account of artistic inspiration appropriates Shelley’s notions of unconscious spontaneity and involuntariness. In its Nietzschean-Hulmean parallel, the ‘esthetic image’ also echoes Shelley’s account of the ‘vitally metaphorical’ nature of poetic language, which, he argues, ‘marks the before unapprehended relations of things, and perpetuates their apprehension, until the words which represent them become through time signs for portions and classes of thoughts, instead of pictures of integral thoughts’. The centrality of ironic inversion and revelation to the ‘esthetic image’ and Nietzsche, Bergson and Hulme’s analogous accounts of the birth and lifecycle of conceptual language, all correspond to the terms of Shelley’s account of poetic language and artistic inspiration. Stephen’s aesthetic theory represents an appropriation of the terms of Shelley’s account of artistic inspiration, shorn of its Platonic vocabulary and corresponding metaphysics.

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148 Ibid.

150 Cf. 150. Clark refers particularly Madame de Staël’s *De l’Allemagne* as a source for Shelley’s conception of ‘enthusiasm’, arguing that it ‘introduced throughout Europe the German and now dominant sense of the term “Romantic”’. (148-149) See editor’s note in Shelley, 828.

154 Shelley, *ADP*, 677

676 Nietzsche, Bergson and Hulme’s accounts of the exhaustion of conceptual language also accord with Shelley: ‘if no new poets should arise to create afresh the associations which have been thus disorganized, language will be dead to all the nobler purposes of human intercourse.’ (677)
In contrast to Shelley’s characterisation of the indefinite ‘invisible influence’, a purely internal ‘power’ acting upon the poet-artist and giving rise to access to the Forms of the true, the beautiful and the good, Stephen defines artistic inspiration as an experience inextricably rooted in external quotidian relations. His explicit rejection of ‘symbolism’ and Platonic ‘idealism’, as well as the exclusivity of his focus upon the artist’s relationship to objects of quotidian experience (with the examples of the Ballast Office clock of Stephen Hero and the butcher’s boy’s basket in Portrait), serve to place Stephen’s aesthetic theory far more closely to the neo-classical aesthetics of Hulme and of the Imagists (as arising from the same post-Nietzschean philosophical and artistic milieu) than to Shelley’s Romanticism.\footnote{Just as was the case with his citation of the terms of Aquinas’s philosophy, Stephen’s allusion to Shelley represents an ironic appropriation of the terms of his Romanticism to an implicitly anti-Romantic, ‘classical’ aesthetic. It is an attempt to retrieve both Shelley and Romantic aesthetics from the perceived misfortune of their late-Romantic Yeatsian fate and to forge an alternative trajectory for the legacy of Romanticism.}

At stake in Stephen’s aesthetic theory in Portrait is a Romantic—anti-Romanticism predicated on a rejection of (particularly Yeatsian Platonic) metaphysics, framed through an ironic appropriation of Aquinas’s theory of beauty. By way of conclusion I want to return to what I have argued constitutes Stephen’s

\footnote{\textit{SH}, 218; \textit{Portrait}, 231}

\footnote{Bornstein argues that initially, in the 1890s, Yeats sought to define himself as a ‘\textit{fin de siècle} reincarnation of the original romantics’ (a group which for Yeats, Bornstein argues, included the ‘big six’: Blake, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Byron, Shelley and Keats, but also figures including Dante, Spenser and Milton up to the present) and that he claimed to be a ‘reviser of Romanticism’ and to ‘have fastened it to an Irish national landscape’. Bornstein, ‘Yeats and Romanticism’ in Howes and Kelly, eds., \textit{The Cambridge Companion to W.B. Yeats}, 19-35 (21, 27). On Yeats’s early relationship to Romanticism see also James Pethica, ‘Aesthetics’ in Holdeman and Levitas, eds., \textit{W.B. Yeats in Context}, 203-212 (204-205). On the influence of Shelley on the formation of Yeats’s transcendental symbolism see also Bornstein, \textit{Yeats and Shelley}. Bornstein argues that the ‘Platonic and Neo-platonic symbolism’ which Yeats ascribed to Shelley entered his own work, particularly in ‘The Rose’ and ‘The Tower’ poems. (xi. Cf. 70. On the influence in particular of \textit{ADP} on Yeats see 60-66).}
Thomist—anti-Thomism, and in particular to turn to Umberto Eco’s reading of Aquinas’s aesthetics. Offering a brief summary of the key terms of Eco’s reading will allow me to draw out what is philosophically at stake in Stephen’s ironic appropriation of Aquinas and to draw a direct parallel with the anti-metaphysical, specifically anti-Schopenhauerian, argument in Nietzsche’s early writings which I examined in the first chapter. This will serve to illuminate the inextricable foundation of the ‘classical’ artistic attitude propounded in the writings of Nietzsche, Joyce and Hulme in the terms of this anti-metaphysics, which I will go on to use in the third chapter to read Nietzsche’s account of the Apollinian and Dionysian artistic drives and the process of artistic inspiration and creation in *Birth*.

Eco argues that *integritas*, *consonantia* and *claritas* are intimately bound to Aquinas’s concept of ‘form’. He argues that for Aquinas, ‘beauty’ is grounded in form and that aesthetic value is connected with formal causality. Form is determined by *modus* (‘measure or dimension’), *species* (or ‘nature’), and *ordo* (order).\(^{159}\) Beauty is defined by perfection, which is itself understood as the complete realisation of form: the thing judged according to measure ‘in its material and efficient principles’ (*modus*), by means of number or the proportion of its constitutive elements (its particular *species*), and by its ‘inclination’ or ‘weight’ toward its ‘proper end’ (*ordo*).\(^ {160}\) These three terms correspond to Stephen’s reading of *integritas*, *consonantia* and *claritas/quidditas*, where *integritas*, as the revelation of the thing as one thing corresponds to the measure and dimension of *modus*; *consonantia*, as the revelation of thing as thing composed of the harmonious arrangement of its constitutive elements, corresponds to the proportion of constitutive elements of

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\(^{159}\) Eco, *The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas*, 66-67  
\(^{160}\) 67-68
*species* and the revelation of the quiddity of the thing through its *claritas* (the synthesis of *integritas* and *consonantia*) corresponds to its inclination toward its ‘proper end in *ordo*.

Form is not a ‘principle or an imminent pattern in things’ but ‘the thing itself conceived of as an “organism” structured and governed by the inner law of its composition’. It is the thing conceived of as ‘formed material’; as an ‘ontological quid’.¹⁶¹ Form, Eco argues, is thus ‘synonymous with the organisation and completeness of an experienceable object or a lived experience’:

It refers, not to the relations within [the thing], but rather to the thing itself as something organised and made what it is by those relations […] something in virtue of which an object lives and is what it is, but which itself possesses reality and character only in virtue of being materialised in the object.¹⁶²

The perfect realisation of Form embodies what is at stake in the complete process of ‘artistic apprehension’ in Stephen’s aesthetic theory. It points, then, not simply to the relations within the thing named in *consonantia*, but to the synthesis of *integritas* and *consonantia*, understood as the revelation of the thing and of the relationship of its properties or elements. It is this which actualises, which give the thing, its quiddity: ‘reality and character’.¹⁶³ It is what gives the thing life.

Eco identifies the perfect realisation of form—beauty—with ‘essence’, which is thus here synonymous with Stephen’s *quidditas*. He identifies ‘essence’ with ‘substance’, which, he argues, lives and unfolds only in ‘a being (ens)’:

*Ens* signifies a concretely structured thing, an organism governed by the inner relations which give it form and so give it being, but which also

¹⁶¹ Cf. 68  
¹⁶² 68  
¹⁶³ On the relationship of matter and form in Aquinas, see also Stump, *Aquinas*, esp. 36-37.
goes beyond those purely abstract relations since it validates them and confers existence upon them.\textsuperscript{164}

Eco lays emphasis on the concrete nature of structure. The thing (\textit{ens}), as organism, is given form—given its ‘essence’ or quiddity—by the particular nature of the relation of its properties or elements. It is not limited to or by this relation, however, but goes beyond it by virtue of being that which realises it and without which the relation would remain purely abstract. It is both the ‘actualizing principle’ of substance and substance itself.\textsuperscript{165} For Aquinas, Eco argues, beauty is intimately bound to formal causality. As a transcendental (formal cause) it is coextensive with being, but it is also actualised in the thing (the relationship of the properties of the thing), which therefore represents the becoming actual of the being of beauty.\textsuperscript{166}

Stephen’s theory of the ‘esthetic image’ ironically appropriates the terms of the Thomist account of the becoming actual of the being of beauty, as outlined by Eco. In line with the Romantic—anti-Romanticism and rejection of Yeatsian late-Romantic Platonic metaphysics which refine and synthesise the earlier account of the ‘classical’ of \textit{Stephen Hero} and the ‘James Clarence Mangan’ essay, whilst retaining its key terms, Stephen implicitly rejects the transcendental nature of Thomist beauty. The transcendental is supplanted by the notion of the ironic inversion of the consciousness of an object of quotidian experience. Shorn of recourse to the transcendental, the terms of Stephen’s account of artistic inspiration and the formation of the ‘esthetic image’ are placed in close proximity to those of Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to power, particularly in Deleuze’s reading, as I have analysed these in the first chapter, arguing that they can be seen to underpin the ‘primal unity’ of \textit{Birth}.

\textsuperscript{164} See 69. See also, Stump, \textit{Aquinas}, 264, 270-271.
\textsuperscript{165} 69
\textsuperscript{166} Cf. 66-67
The organism (ens) as being made ‘what it is’ by the internal relationship of its properties, corresponds to Deleuze’s definition of the ‘sense’ of a ‘thing’ (an event, phenomenon, word or thought), as ‘the force which appropriates the thing, which exploits it, which takes possession of it or is expressed in it’.\footnote{Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 3-4 (see also 29).} Stephen’s \textit{quidditas} (as ironic appropriation of Thomist ‘essence’), corresponds to Deleuze’s account of Nietzsche’s concept of a thing’s ‘essence’ as constituting ‘that one among all the senses of a thing, which gives it the force with which it has most affinity’.\footnote{4} The synthesis of \textit{integritas} and \textit{consonantia} in the revelation of the thing’s quiddity (‘\textit{claritas} is \textit{quidditas}’) in the ‘esthetic image’ corresponds to the will to power in its naming of the ‘differential element’ between the natural forces (sub-wills) struggling for possession of a quantum of reality, serving to define the sense of a thing by expressing the force which has (however temporarily) triumphed in this struggle, and in defining the ‘essence’ of the thing, by identifying the force with which the thing has the utmost affinity (its quiddity). In this sense, just as Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to power, in its ironic appropriation of Thomist metaphysics and aesthetics, Stephen’s aesthetic theory ultimately ‘substitutes the correlation of sense and phenomenon for the metaphysical duality of appearance and essence.’\footnote{3} Stephen’s aesthetic theory is grounded in, and emerges from, this quintessential anti-metaphysics. It represents the ironic appropriation of the terms of Aquinas’s theory of beauty to a philosophically thoroughgoing, disruptive anti-transcendental classicism. In the third chapter I want to move on to argue that the ‘classical’, conceived of as a form of Romantic—anti-Romanticism ineluctably grounded in the terms of an anti-metaphysics, as I have sought to define these in the first two chapters, are at stake in
Nietzsche’s account of the Apollinian and Dionysian artistic drives and their conjunction in what I will call the fold in the self-creation of the artist in *The Birth of Tragedy*. 
On the ‘artist’s metaphysics’: Romantic—anti-Romanticism in the fold of the self-creation of the artist in *The Birth of Tragedy*

Discussion of the nature of the Apollinian, the Dionysian and of the relationship between them in *The Birth of Tragedy* constitutes well-trodden ground in Nietzsche criticism. However, in this chapter I want to build on my reading of Nietzsche’s early anti-Schopenhauerianism and anti-metaphysics in the first chapter, in re-examining the Apollinian, the Dionysian and the relationship between them. I want to argue against the prevalent critical argument, typified by Julian Young, that the Dionysian provides access to the thing-in-itself and that in *Birth* Nietzsche is uncritically Schopenhauerian.1 This misreading of Nietzsche’s relationship to Schopenhauerian metaphysics, and thus of the Dionysian, inevitably leads to the further misreading, exemplified by David Allison, that the Dionysian is both ‘more primal’ and ‘more natural’ than the Apollinian.2 By contrast, I will argue that Nietzsche’s early anti-metaphysics and anti-Schopenhauerianism underpin the nascent and idiosyncratic form of philosophical naturalism which emerges in the text, attributed in contemporary critical debates exclusively to his later philosophy (from *Human, All Too Human* onwards), and that this undermines any attempt to attribute an ontological or temporal priority to the Dionysian.3 Rather, the Apollinian and Dionysian embody the antagonism between two distinct and fundamental natural drives (Triebe): the

1 See Julian Young, *Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Art*. As I argued in the first chapter, this conception is shared, for example, by Bowie, in *Aesthetics and Subjectivity*, 261 (see also 282, 288, 296) and Soll, ‘Pessimism and the Tragic view of Life: Reconsiderations of Nietzsche’s *The Birth of Tragedy*’ in Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins, eds., *Reading Nietzsche* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 104-107. See chapter 1, pp. 36-39, above.
3 See Leiter, *Nietzsche on Morality*, 3-7. Green, *Nietzsche and the Transcendental Tradition*, 4. See also Christoph Cox, ‘Nietzsche, Dionysus, and the Ontology of Music’ in Ansell Pearson, ed., *A Companion to Nietzsche* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 495-531. Cox argues that the Apollinian and Dionysian are not concerned with the thing-in-itself and the appearance and that Nietzsche is not reverting “back to metaphysical, anti-naturalist distinctions – ontological distinctions between a “true” and an “apparent” world or epistemological distinctions between an unknowable given and ordinary experience or knowledge.” (499)
drive to the incorporation of lived experience and the apparently antithetical drive to the purgation of lived experience. Nietzsche argues that these drives find their most fundamental expression in the physiological phenomena of ‘dreams and intoxication’. In Hellenic culture, he argues, the appropriation of the drives of incorporation and purgation into art was represented in the form of mythological analogy: ‘in the intensely clear figures of their gods’. In the first section of this chapter I will argue that the harnessing of incorporation into pre-existing plastic artistic forms was embodied in the figure of the god Apollo. Nietzsche dubs this artistic drive, analogous to the physiological phenomenon of dreams, the Apollinian. In the second section, I will argue that the harnessing of the drive to purgation, analogous to intoxication, was embodied in the figure of the god Dionysus and the artistic drive which Nietzsche dubs the Dionysian. I will argue that the Apollinian and Dionysian represent the expression of the two fundamental and antithetical natural drives in analogous modes of the sublime.

In the third section I will move on to argue that Nietzsche’s account of the birth of tragedy represents the process from artistic inspiration to creation through the conjunction of the Dionysian and Apollinian in the incorporation of the experience of purgation. Understanding the Dionysian and Apollinian as the harnessing of the

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4 BT, §1, 33
5 Ibid. As I argued in the first chapter, the contrast of the ‘intensely clear figures of the gods’ to ‘concepts’ at the outset of Birth is clarified in the contrast of the individuated concepts of the intellect to ‘intuition’ in ‘On Truth’. Cf. Klein, Nietzsche and the Promise of Philosophy, 96-99 and Jason Kemp Winfree, ‘Before the Subject: Rereading Birth of Tragedy’, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 25 (Spring, 2003), 58-77 (68).
6 In Nietzsche’s Voices, Henry Staten differentiates between the ‘state’ of the Dionysian (rapture), the ‘art’ of the Dionysian (music and dance), and the ‘reality’ of the Dionysian, which he attempts to identify with the ‘metaphysical’. He argues that the ‘art’ and ‘state’ of the Dionysian remain at a distance from the (metaphysical) ‘reality’. Whilst I will aim to refute Staten’s attribution of a metaphysical reality to the Dionysian, his insight into the importance of differentiating between the (physiological/psychological) ‘state’ and the ‘art’ which seeks to embody, prolong and to communicate it, will prove valuable to my own argument and will be extended to the Apollinian. I will also adopt Staten’s qualification of Kaufmann’s translation of the German Rausch as ‘intoxication,’ for what he argues is the preferable translation of ‘rapture’. (194)
natural drives to purgation and incorporation respectively will allow me to read their conjunction against the prevalent trend in Nietzsche criticism to view their relationship in *Birth* as simply dialectical. By contrast, and in line with my claim to the text’s implicit anti-metaphysics, I will argue that Nietzsche’s account of the Dionysian-Apollinian conjunction is ranged against the dialectic, denying any possible synthesis and, through a reading of Nietzsche’s parallel of the fate of the one who experiences the Dionysian to that of Hamlet, is incommensurate with any resolution of self-alienation. By contrast, I will argue that the Dionysian-Apollinian conjunction, exemplified in the phenomenon of the Hellenic Lyric Poet, embodies what I will define as the process of the fold in the ironic self-creation of the artist.

Although the text is ostensibly Schopenhauerian and late-romantic, I will argue that the naturalism of Nietzsche’s conception of art in *Birth* aligns the fold in the self-creation of the artist with Nietzsche’s later definition of the ‘classical’ and rejection of ‘romantic’, as I sought to define these in comparison with the terms of

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An “idea”—the antithesis of the Dionysian and the Apollinian—translated into the realm of metaphysics; history itself as the development of this “idea”; in tragedy this antithesis is sublimated into a unity; and in this perspective things that had never before faced each other are suddenly juxtaposed, used to illuminate each other, and comprehended. (271)

Kaufmann is at great pains to demonstrate the passage’s thinly veiled Hegelian allusions. He lays emphasis upon Nietzsche’s appropriation of Hegelian vocabulary such as *Aufgehoben* (which he translates as ‘sublimated’: negated, preserved, and elevated). He also points to “‘idea’” (*Idee*) as of Hegelian origin and to Nietzsche’s use of the term *Gegensatz*, which he translates as ‘antithesis’ (*ibid.*).

It is important to stress the irony of Nietzsche’s Hegelian reading of *Birth*. His use of Hegelian vocabulary is intended to parody such vocabulary as much as *Birth* itself. Nietzsche refers to a ‘translation’ of the opposition of the Dionysian and Apollinian into the ‘realm of metaphysics’. The drives themselves are not metaphysical. The meaning of the allusion to their ‘sublimation’ into a ‘unity’ remains vague and open-ended in this passage, and the reference to their juxtaposition suggests that the opposition remains, in spite of whatever it is that this sublimation might entail. In essence, the Hegelian here remains only a vague, if somewhat threatening odour.
Stephen’s aesthetic theory in its development between *Stephen Hero* and *Portrait*, in the second chapter. I will seek to extend the terms of this comparison and to argue that Nietzsche’s conception of artistic inspiration and creation in *Birth* represents an ironic appropriation of the terms of Romanticism to an anti-Romantic aesthetic, in contrast to the prevalent critical trend, concomitant with the misreading of the Dionysian and Apollinian, to conceive of the text as straightforwardly Romantic. On this basis I will attempt to show that this opens up new possibilities for a critical comparison between Nietzsche’s philosophy and the aesthetics of neo-classical Modernism.

I – On ‘Incorporation’ and the Apollinian sublime

In this section I will argue that the forms of Apollinian art represent the drive to the artistic incorporation of lived experience. The Apollinian represents the sublimation of the natural drive of dreams, understood as the means of incorporating lived experience, into art and culture. Nietzsche defines the Apollinian as the expression of the principle of individuation (*princpiatum individuationis*, a term he appropriates from Schopenhauer). It represents the drive to impose order on the otherwise chaotic flux of experience through limitation, selection and restraint, in order to forge first linguistic consensus, and ultimately society and culture. In the plastic art forms to which it gives birth, and in particular within epic poetry, the Apollinian drive is represented by the sublime triumph of an heroic protagonist over seemingly overwhelming ‘titanic’ forces. As individuals, we are created by the drive of the pre-individuated ‘primal unity’ to be redeemed through appearance. Apollinian art, engendered by our need to incorporate our individuated experience, appears as the highest incarnation of this natural drive to individuation.
At the outset of *Birth*, Nietzsche ascribes the genesis of the human experience of the gods to dreams, citing Lucretius Carus in *On the Nature of Things*: ‘the truth is that even in more remote antiquity the minds of mortals were visited in waking life, and still more in sleep, by visions of divine figures of matchless beauty and stupendous stature.’⁸ Although Nietzsche follows Lucretius in ascribing experience of the gods to ‘visitation’ by ‘visions’ in dreams, he does not adhere to the Lucretian-Epicurean ‘theory of images,’ which describes these ‘visions’ and ‘images’ as being formed by the reception by the mind of particles emitted from the surface of the gods, who themselves exist in an eternal state of apathetic serenity in the intermundane interstices in-between worlds.⁹ Rather, Nietzsche ascribes these dream visions to the incorporation of lived experience, and continual (and otherwise unconscious) physiological processes, such as digestion.¹⁰ Poetic inspiration, for the Apollinian Hellenic poet, Nietzsche argues, citing Hans Sachs in Richard Wagner’s *Meistersinger*, constitutes the experiencing, and subsequent interpretation, of dreams.¹¹

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⁹ On this theory see especially 4.30-324, pp. 101-109, and on dreams in this regard, 4.453-468, 112. On the apathy of the gods, especially 1.44-49, p. 4; 2.1093-1094, p. 63; 3.22-24, 68
¹⁰ In a chapter on ‘The Physiology of Dreams’ in *The Invention of Dionysus: An Essay on The Birth of Tragedy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), James Porter, citing Nietzsche, argues that Lucretius’s Epicurean theory of images draws ‘on a physiological account of religious superstition that stems from Democritus,’ (36-47 [39]): ‘The gods are traced back to natural events (Naturvorgänge) by Democritus and Lucretius.’ (ibid.) Porter’s argument serves to succinctly link Nietzsche’s allusion to Lucretius to an underlying anti-metaphysical naturalism in which the gods form ‘an expression of an internal, all-too-human need’, (39) which Porter refers to Democritus’ account of the ‘physiological sources of poetic inspiration’. (38, 179 n.3). This naturalistic interpretation of dreams and the origins of artistic inspiration is echoed in *Daybreak* (*Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale, ed. Maudemaire Clark and Brian Leiter, [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997] hereafter *D.*), §72, in which Nietzsche opposes Epicurus and Lucretius’s philosophy to Christianity’s ‘idea of punishment in hell’ and renunciation of the body (43-44).
¹¹ Cf. *BT*, §1, 34
Apollinian art represents the harnessing of the drive to incorporation, finding its fundamental expression in dreams, into the pre-existing plastic art forms. It embodies the transformation of the natural through culture. For Nietzsche, the gods are translations, derived from dreams, which transpose physiological and psychological responses to lived experience into mythic personages and narratives. He is thus able to compare the experience of the dreamer, or poet-interpreter, to the claim made by Schopenhauer that the philosopher is often able to ‘see’—to perceive or to intuit—people and phenomena as mere ‘phantoms or dream images’. Subsequently, the task of both the dreamer and the philosopher is to try to tear aside these phantoms and to arrive at knowledge of what lies beneath them: what it is that they are the phantoms or images of. Understood in this light, the dreamer-poet is conceived of as the ‘close and willing observer’ of dreams, which thus afford an ‘interpretation of life’. Dream images and the mythic figures and personages that the poet derives from them, embody and can thus be made to betray the physiological and psychological processes and drives which are their ground. They are a transposition and an interpretation of lived experience in images.

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13 Ibid.

14 See *HH I*, §13, 17-19:

– In sleep our nervous system is continually agitated by a multiplicity of inner events, almost all our organs are active, our blood circulates vigorously, the position of the sleeper presses on individual limbs, his bedcovers influence his sensibilities in various ways, his stomach digests and its motions disturb other organs, his intestines are active, the position of his head involves unusual muscular contortions, his feet, unshod and not pressing against the floor, produce an unfamiliar feeling, as does the difference in the way his while body is clad – all this, through its unusualness and to a differing degree each day, excites the entire system up to the functioning of the brain; and so there are a hundred occasions for the mind to be involved in puzzlement and to look for grounds for this excitation: the dream is the seeking and positing of the causes of this excitement of the sensibilities, that is to say the supposed causes.

Nietzsche argues that the figures and images of the dream arise through the dreamers’ attempt to fabricate fantastical causes for—to interpret and transpose—physiological processes and stimuli. In the preceding section (§12), he argues that the function of the brain upon which sleep and the images of dreams most encroach is memory. Whilst he is, in this section, dismissive of dreams as confused and
In dream and in myth, experience is not grasped conceptually but intuitively and aesthetically, ‘in the immediate understanding of figures,’ which symbolically embody experience and help render it ‘universally intelligible’. In dreams, ‘all forms speak to us; there is nothing unimportant or superfluous,’ since all the ‘forms’ are transpositions of experience. Even when the ‘reality’ of dreams is at its ‘most intense’, Nietzsche argues, a prescience persists that it is nevertheless a ‘mere appearance’. He contrasts this to a clear allusion to Plato’s ‘myth of the cave’ in Book VII of The Republic: the images ‘pass before’ the dreamer ‘not like mere shadows on a wall—for he lives and he suffers with these scenes—and yet not without that fleeting sensation of illusion’. Nietzsche argues that, in contrast to the fettered and frustrated ignorance of the Platonic cave-dweller, ‘our innermost being, our common ground experiences dreams with profound delight and a joyous necessity,’ citing his own experience ‘amid the dangers and dangers of dreams’ of having had the capacity to will the dream to continue: ‘“It is a dream! I will dream on!”’ The experience of the ‘joyous necessity’ of dreams is engendered by their function as the incorporation of lived experience. Dreams fulfil a necessary natural function as an affirmation even of pain, suffering, and all that is terrible and questionable in existence.
Nietzsche argues for the ‘higher truth’ and ‘perfection’ of the dream ‘states’ over ‘the incompletely intelligible everyday world’. Through dreams, experience is rendered intelligible and digestible. In this sense dreams stand in the same hierarchical relation to quotidian existence as the gods stand in relation to the human. Nietzsche can therefore speak of having revealed a contradiction. Whereas it would appear that of the ‘two halves of our existence, the waking and the dreaming states,’ the waking is the ‘infinitely preferable, more important, excellent, and worthy of being lived, indeed as that which alone is lived’, Nietzsche performs an ironic inversion of this valuation, by demonstrating ‘the very opposite value of dreams’: their superiority over waking existence.

Nietzsche warns that this ‘image of Apollo’ must include within itself a consciousness of the ‘boundary’ which the ‘beautiful illusion’ of dreams should not wounds, to replace what has been lost, to recreate broken moulds’. The capacity to incorporate experience is, for Nietzsche, the sign of health and creativity. It is the ‘power’ of a ‘nature’ (an individual, a people, a culture) to ‘draw to itself and incorporate into itself all the past, its own and that most foreign to it, and as it were transform it into blood.’ Such a ‘nature’ draws nourishment and sustenance from experience and is able to digest it and dispense with whatever is waste: superfluous or useless (62-63).

‘Incorporation’ also forms a crucial term in Nietzsche’s first written record of ‘the eternal recurrence of the same’ in notebook M III 1, Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studiensausgabe, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, 2nd edn., 15 vols (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter; Munich: dtv, 1988; CD-ROM 1995), vol. 9, (hereafter KSA) trans. Duncan Large, Diane Morgan, and Keith Ansell Pearson, as ‘16. Notes from 1881’ in The Nietzsche Reader, ed. Ansell Pearson and Large, 238-241. In his ‘Outline’ for the exposition of ‘The Recurrence of the Same’ (11[141]), a passage whose terms echo the concerns of Birth of Tragedy as I have begun to outline them, the term ‘incorporation’ becomes crucial. Amongst those elements whose incorporation Nietzsche deems necessary he ranks ‘the passions’ and ‘knowledge’ (Wissen and Erkenntniss), and indeed sees the teaching of the ‘doctrine’ of eternal recurrence as ‘the most powerful way of incorporating it in ourselves,’ of assimilating it and affirming it as part of our experience:

so as to create eyes for ourselves, temporarily abandoning ourselves to life so as to rest our eyes on it temporarily afterwards: to maintain the drives [of knowledge—the ‘errors’ and the ‘passions’] as the foundation of all knowing but to know at what point they become enemies of knowing: in sum to wait and see how far knowledge and truth can be incorporated. (238-239: Nietzsche’s emphases retained, words in bold being double underlined in the notebook entries).

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21 BT, §1, 35. See Sallis, 29.
22 §4, 44
be made to overstep. It would be dangerous to mistake the dream for ‘crude reality’ itself, he argues, for this would elide its function as transfiguration. It is necessary to remain conscious of the essential ‘measured restraint,’ enforced ‘calm’ and discipline engendered by the Apollinian. This ‘restraint’ acts as the measure of something which must itself be restrained (‘the wilder emotions’) in order for the Apollinian to exist.\textsuperscript{23} Nietzsche frames this restraint through an image borrowed from Schopenhauer’s presentation of the Kantian distinction between the thing-in-itself and appearance: ‘Just as the boatman sits in his small boat, trusting his frail craft in a stormy sea that is boundless in every direction, rising and falling with the howling, mountainous waves, so in the midst of a world full of suffering and misery the individual man calmly sits, supported by and trusting the \textit{principium individuationis}.\textsuperscript{24} The Apollinian represents the creation of the individual: the principle of individuation. In the figure of Apollo, Nietzsche argues, the ‘unshaken faith’ and ‘calm repose’ of the ‘man wrapped up’ in the principle of individuation, ‘receive their most sublime expression’. The Apollinian represents the necessity of the artistic creation of the individual as an ‘‘illusion’’ and, therefore, the ‘joy’ that the fulfilment of this process engenders.

To understand the nature of this necessity Nietzsche argues that it is necessary to deconstruct ‘\textit{Apollinian culture}’ in order to render its ‘foundations’ ‘visible’.\textsuperscript{25} He defines this process of deconstruction through a sculptural metaphor. At first, the images or representations of the gods themselves are encountered, their ‘figures’ standing on the ‘gables’ of the Apollinian. That Apollo seems to take his place among the gods and their deeds.is a deception: ‘for the same impulse that embodied itself in

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Ibid.}
\footnote{Nietzsche cites \textit{Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung} (\textit{BT}, §1, 35-36), and the passage is translated by Kaufmann, along with the rest of the text. The translation used here is taken from \textit{WWR}, I, §63, 350-357 (352-353).}
\footnote{Cf. §3, 41}
\end{footnotes}
Apollo [the artistic impulse to incorporation] gave birth to this entire Olympian world.”  

Nietzsche’s question is what ‘terrific need’ motivated the creation of the Olympian gods? He argues that this is not a question of ‘moral elevation,’ or of a ‘disincarnate spirituality,’ which would denigrate the body and renounce worldly existence. Instead, it is a question concerned with physiology, psychology, and the incorporation of lived experience; the formation of the individual and the redemption of existence.

For Nietzsche, the question of what need gave rise to the creation of the Olympian gods is one that seeks to define the foundation of the ‘fantastic excess of life’ which, he argues, typified Hellenic art and culture and rendered them an exception within history: an example and an artistic model to be revivified. Nietzsche seeks to comprehend what drives gave birth to the ‘exuberant triumphant life’ of the Hellene ‘in which all things, whether good or evil are deified’: in which all existence is affirmed. Abandoning a moral, specifically Christian, perspective for his nascent naturalism, Nietzsche argues that this ‘inexplicable gaiety unfolds itself’ and reveals its origins and constitution in ‘Greek folk wisdom’.

As the epitome of this wisdom, he cites the story of King Midas’s encounter with Silenus: the ‘demigod’ and ‘companion of Dionysus’. Having captured Silenus after a long pursuit, King Midas asked him ‘what is best and most desirable of all things for man.’ After giving a ‘shrill’ and sarcastic laugh, Silenus replied: “Oh,

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26 Ibid. Cf. Sallis, 34-35. Thomas Jonavoski is thus wrong to seek to separate the Apollinian from the Olympian in his reading of Birth, and this also true of his attempt to separate Homeric epic and mythology. (Jovanovski, Aesthetic Transformation: Taking Nietzsche at His Word [New York: Peter Lang, 2008], xxvii-xxix)
27 Ibid. Emphasis added
28 41. Emphasis added
29 42
wretched and ephemeral race, children of chance and misery, why do you compel me to tell you what it would be most expedient for you not to hear? What is best of all is utterly beyond your reach: not to be born, not to be, to be nothing. But the second best for you is—to die soon.”

According to the wisdom of Silenus, Nietzsche argues, suffering lies at the heart of the human condition. Non-existence, in its most radical form of never having existed, is revealed as preferable to existence and yet is impossible.

Pessimism lies at the heart of the ‘Greek folk wisdom’. It is this substratum of pessimistic wisdom upon which the edifice of Apollinian culture stands: ‘The Greek knew and felt the terror and horror of existence. That he might endure this terror at all, he had to interpose between himself and life the radiant dream birth of the Olympians.’

Conscious of the terrifying chaotic flux at the foundation of their existence, and in order not to be crushed beneath the weight of the pessimism this consciousness inevitably engendered, the Hellene was compelled to create the beautiful illusions of Apollinian culture:

That overwhelming dismay in the face of the titanic powers of nature, the Moira [—fate] enthroned over all knowledge, the vulture of the great lover of mankind, Prometheus, the terrible fate of the wise Oedipus […] the entire philosophy of the sylvan god, with its mythical exemplars […] all this was again and again overcome by the Greeks with the aid of the Olympian middle world of art; or at any rate it was veiled and withdrawn from sight.

For Nietzsche, the fates of Prometheus and Oedipus stand as ‘mythical exemplars’ of the inevitable state of pessimism inspired by the truth embodied in the wisdom of Silenus. In order to overcome this pessimism the Hellene interposed between themselves and existence the ‘middle world’ of Apollinian art. Thus the Olympian

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30 42
31 Ibid. Sallis, 36-37
32 42
gods relate to the wisdom of Silenus ‘as the rapturous vision of the tortured martyr relates to] his suffering’: as a ‘veil’ and as a remedy.\textsuperscript{33} Their creation stems from the Hellenic ‘excess of life,’ a will for life to continue in spite of pessimism: ‘it was in order to be able to live that the Greeks had to create these gods from a most profound need.’ The need to justify life and existence over and against the pragmatic honesty of pessimism and the ‘titanic forces of nature,’ in order thus to maintain them, motivated the birth of the gods. The edifice of the Apollinian stands on the foundation of the ‘titanic’. \textsuperscript{34}

Having thus deconstructed the Apollinian, Nietzsche proceeds to analyse the historical process of its development from the moment of its creation: ‘out of the original Titanic divine order of terror, the Olympian divine order of joy gradually evolved through the Apollinian impulse toward beauty.’\textsuperscript{35} Emerging from the foundation of the ‘titanic’, the Apollinian art impulse was engendered in order to create the edifice of the Olympian world as a ‘veil’ covering and transfiguring existence, overcoming the pessimism which it ineluctably inspired: ‘How else could this people, so sensitive, so vehement in its desires, so singularly capable of suffering, have endured existence if it had not been revealed to them in their gods, surrounded with a higher glory?’\textsuperscript{36} The same art impulse which gave rise to dreams and ‘which calls art [itself] into being’ as the interpretation and incorporation of existence, ‘was also the cause of the Olympian world which the Hellenic “will” made use of as a transfiguring mirror.’\textsuperscript{37} Just as with dreams, the ‘cause’ of the creation of the gods was a response to an immanent physiological and psychological need to incorporate

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{34} 42 \\
\textsuperscript{35} 42-43 \\
\textsuperscript{36} 43 \\
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
existence. Nietzsche argues that art is ‘the complement and consummation of existence’. It is the ‘complement’ insofar as it is the ‘transfiguring mirror’ held up to existence. It is the ‘consummation’ insofar as it represents that which makes life possible and desirable: ‘Thus do the gods justify the life of man: they themselves live it—the only satisfactory theodicy!’ 38 The ways of the gods are explained as the transfiguration and redemption of existence in and through ‘mere appearance’.

For Nietzsche, ‘illusion’ is thus necessary to ‘nature’. Art is a device employed by nature in order to ‘achieve her own ends’. The end, in this instance, is the seduction of man toward a continuation of existence: ‘The true goal is veiled by a phantasm: and while we stretch out our hands for the latter, nature attains the former by means of our illusion.’ 39 The Apollinian ‘phantasm’ is the means by which nature achieves the goal of redeeming existence from the pessimism inspired by consciousness of its ‘titanic’ ground. To understand the end of this process is to understand the meaning of the terms ‘nature’ and the ‘naïve’, as Nietzsche employs them in Birth.

The first moment of the process of the evolution of the Apollinian sublime as redemption is the primordial ‘titanic’: ‘the terror and horror of existence’. 40 The conscious acknowledgement of the ‘titanic’ engenders a nihilistic pessimism and desire to renounce existence that threatens the ‘will’. In response, the same ‘art impulse’ which gives rise to dreams as the incorporation of lived experience is harnessed to invert the ‘wisdom’ of pessimism into an affirmation of existence. This is the moment of theogony: Apollo gives birth to his fellow Olympian gods. In the

38 Ibid.
39 44
40 42
same sense that dreams represent the incorporation of experience, myth and the plastic arts are engendered in order to transfigure existence and surround it with a ‘higher glory’. In the final moment of the process nature attains its goal and redeems itself and existence in the ironic inversion of the pessimism inspired by the wisdom of Silenus into the affirmation inspired by the Apollinian ‘wisdom of illusion’. This, for Nietzsche, is the aetiology of myth and of the ‘plastic’ arts and, simultaneously, his account of Hellenic-Olympian theogony. Both here combine to form Nietzsche’s ironic ‘theodicy’.

Through the ‘transfiguration of genius and the world of art,’ that is, through the transposition of existence into the ‘higher sphere’ of art, the Hellenic Greeks rendered themselves able to feel ‘worthy of glory’ and therefore to affirm all of existence, without that ‘higher sphere’ acting as a ‘command or a reproach’: a moral judgment against their existence. The process of transposition was in-and-of-itself affirmed in this way, and Nietzsche compares this affirmation to his own insight into the nature of dreams: “‘It is a dream, I will dream on.’”41 This cry, on the part of the dreamer in the midst of illusion, which fails to shatter that illusion, is also, for Nietzsche, the cry of the artist. Just as the function of dreams is felt as necessary, and their experience is therefore accompanied by joy, so the Apollinian arts are experienced with ‘a deep inner joy in contemplation’.42 For Nietzsche, to become absorbed in the contemplation of the plastic art forms which embody the transposition of quotidian experience, is to be raised above this experience, to be freed from the confusion and striving which accompany it, and to comprehend it. This incorporation and release constitutes the state of ‘joy’.

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41 Cf. §§3-4, 44
42 §4, 44
Nietzsche argues that the need for the attainment of this state manifests itself as the ‘ardent longing for illusion and for redemption through illusion.’ He identifies this ‘longing’ at the heart of the drives (‘omnipotent art impulses’) which give rise to the dream and to myth and art. It is this which leads him to introduce what he dubs the ‘metaphysical assumption’ of Birth: ‘the truly existent primal unity, eternally suffering and contradictory, also needs the rapturous vision, the pleasurable illusion, for its continuous redemption.’ As I argued in the first chapter, despite Nietzsche’s own identification of the ‘primal unity’ with the ‘metaphysical’, the concept is far closer to Henri Bergson’s later definition of the flux of the undivided continuity of states of ‘duration’ and to Nietzsche’s own later formulation of the will to power. Distinct from any conception of the thing-in-itself and belonging firmly to the realm of representation, it represents the ‘suffering’ and contradiction of the flux of natural drives preceding, and at the foundation of, all individuation. Nietzsche argues that the ‘primal unity’ finds expression in the ‘titanic’ beings and forces of Hellenic myth and identifies it with the experience of the ‘terror and horror of existence’. It is this which acts as the motivation of the need for the ‘rapturous vision, the pleasurable illusion’ of the Apollinian. The Apollinian is sublime: it represents the heroic triumph of the individual (which Nietzsche sees as exemplified in Homeric epic myth) over the awful and abysmal chaotic ‘titanic’ forces (the ‘primal unity’) which threaten at all times to overwhelm individuation.

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43 Ibid.
44 Ibid., §3, 43. This serves to qualify the readings of Birth offered by Sallis and Rampley. Although both offer insightful readings under the rubric of the sublime, neither considers the Apollinian in and of itself as a mode of the sublime. To do so, and to understand this artistic mode of the sublime as analogous to the principle of individuation serves to clearly explicate the naturalistic foundations of the text. See Sallis, 9-41 and Rampley, 78-109.

45 BT, §3, 43. Nietzsche identifies the overcoming of the ‘barbaric’ and ‘titanic’ in the emergence of ‘the Homeric,’ heroic ‘world’ which developed, in approximately X-VIII centuries B.C. ‘under the sway of
A crucial distinction appears in his definition of the necessity of and ‘longing for’ the illusion of individuation on the part of the ‘primal unity’:

[I]f we do not consider the question of our own “reality,” if we conceive of our empirical existence, and that of the world in general, as a continuously manifested representation of the primal unity, we shall then have to look upon the dream as a mere appearance of mere appearance, hence as a still higher appeasement of the primordial desire for mere appearance.\(^{46}\)

We are compelled, Nietzsche argues, to accept individuation and thus ‘empirical existence’ as the ‘transfiguring mirror’ interposed between the human and the ‘titanic’ and ‘truly existent’ reality. It is a representation and a transfiguration of the ‘primal unity’ as a result of its ‘ardent longing’ for redemption through illusion. The dream,

the Apollinian impulse to beauty’ as the sublime triumph over the ‘empire of Titans’. \((BT, \S 3, 43. \text{ cf. Silk, M. S. & Stern, J. P., Nietzsche on Tragedy [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981], 66})\)

In his essay, ‘Homer on Competition,’ Nietzsche equates this triumph over the abysmal with the emergence of the central importance of competition in Hellenic culture, and especially with the parallel, drawn from Hesiod, of the ‘two Eris-goddesses on earth’. \((\text{The essay is reproduced and translated in Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, trans. Carol Diethe, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson 187-194. ‘Homer on Competition,’ ‘The Greek State,’ and ‘three other essays—on the topics of truth, the future of education, and Schopenhauer’ which Nietzsche presented to Cosima Wagner in the Christmas of 1872 as ‘Five Prefaces to five unwritten books’, were, originally, intended by Nietzsche to form parts or chapters of Birth of Tragedy: see Nietzsche, OGM, viii). The first of the goddesses was created by ‘Black Night’ in order to promote wickedness and war amongst men. The second, according to Nietzsche, created as a countermeasure by Zeus, promoted envy, and therefore the motivation for labour, and for competition between men: ‘Even potters harbour grudges against potters, carpenters against carpenters, beggars envy beggars and minstrels envy minstrels.’ \((\text{Cf. 189-190[\text{n}]. Nietzsche cites Hesiod, Works & Days II.12-26})\). This perpetual contest for excellence of the Hellenic citizens with one another, typified Homeric epic myth, Nietzsche argues, is that which motivated and drove the development of Hellenic culture, led the civilisation to prosper and precipitated its continual process of self-overcoming, over and against the brutality of pre-Apollinian ‘barbaric’ culture.

Allison argues that:

In Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, Nietzsche remarks that Heraclitus extended the notion of competition to the level of a cosmological doctrine, whereby reality itself consists in the play, the continual strife and resolution, of opposites, resulting in a dynamic world of becoming—a world of constant change and transformation (not a static world of being).’ \((\text{Allison, Reading the New Nietzsche, 33n. Nietzsche, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, trans. Marianne Cowan [Chicago: Regnery Publishing Inc., 1962], \S 5, 55})\)

The cosmological conception of a ‘dynamic world of becoming’—derived primarily from the influence of Hesiod and Heraclitus—is significant in this context as it demonstrates that the inauguration of the ‘period’ or age of Homeric myth can be seen to map the emergence (the moment of conception) of Hellenic Apollinian culture, through the extension of competition ‘to the level of a cosmological doctrine,’ which served thus as a glorification and justification of the process or principle of individuation. \((BT, \S 4, 45)\)

\(^{46}\text{Ibid.}\)
and subsequently myth and the plastic arts of the Apollinian, constitute the ‘mere appearance’ of this ‘mere appearance’. They symbolically transfigure empirical existence and render it intelligible. They thus represent a ‘higher appeasement’ of the original existential need for redemption through appearance. ‘[T]hat is why the innermost heart of nature feels ineffable joy in the naïve artist and the naïve work of art’: empirical existence and individuation emerge as the redemption of the ‘terror and horror’ of the chaotic flux of the ‘primal unity’.\(^{47}\) In turn, art emerges as the redemption and incorporation of empirical existence.

Nietzsche defines Apollo as an ‘ethical deity’ who hands down an ‘imperative and mandatory’ ‘law’ to his disciples and ‘exacts measure’ and ‘self-knowledge’: ‘the delimiting boundaries of the individual’.\(^{48}\) This restraint demanded by Apollo is the condition of the possibility of the individual and thus of society and culture. It appears as an ethical judgment against the ‘excess’ and ‘titanic’ nature of ‘pre-Apollinian’ and ‘non-Apollinian’ cultures. The Dionysian and its effects were also regarded by Apollo and Apollinian culture as ‘“titanic”’ and ‘“barbaric”’, and yet, as Nietzsche’s symbolic analogue of Raphael’s \textit{Transfiguration} illustrates, the Apollinian is itself dependent upon these ‘titanic’ forces.\(^{49}\) Without suffering and contradiction,

\(^{47}\) Cf. 45
\(^{48}\) 46
\(^{49}\) \textit{Ibid.} See ‘Appendix’, p. 272, below, where the painting is reproduced. Sallis is wrong to claim that Nietzsche argues that Raphael painted both Apollinian and Dionysian in the \textit{Transfiguration}. The Apollinian does not ‘become’ Raphael’s painting (in contrast to the Greek temple of his architectural metaphor, or ‘magic mountain’ of his description of Birth of myth and the Olympian). (38) For Nietzsche, the painting acts as a symbolic analogue for the emergence of the Apollinian from the ‘primal unity’. He argues that the lower half of the picture embodies the ‘demotion of appearance to the level of mere appearance,’ (45, emphasis added). Appearance here takes only the form of quotidian empirical existence. The ‘possessed boy, the despairing bearers, the bewildered terrified disciples’ stand as the symbolic embodiment of the ‘primal unity’ and are the ‘reflection’ or ‘“mere appearance”’; of contradiction and suffering in individuation. From this mere appearance of empirical existence there arises ‘like ambrosial vapour, a new visionary world of mere appearances’, just as, for Nietzsche, both the dream and naïve art arise as the incorporation and redemption of experience and existence. This second world of appearance remains invisible to those ‘wrapped in the first,’ who are thus condemned to their suffering. (45) Without art, as the highest manifestation and appeasement of the need for
Nietzsche argues, there can be no compulsion to individuation, redemption, and existential affirmation. Without excess is no restraint. The interdependence of the Apollinian and the ‘titanic’ is revealed. Within Hellenic culture itself, this was revealed to the Apollinian Hellene by the Dionysian: ‘his [Apollo’s and the Apollinian Hellene’s] entire existence rested on a hidden substratum,’ a substratum which the Apollinian itself was inaugurated and evolved in order to veil: ‘And behold: Apollo could not live without Dionysus! The “titanic” and the “barbaric” were in the last analysis as necessary as the Apollinian.’

In revealing the ‘ethical’ process of the suppression of ‘titanic’ drives and ‘wilder emotions’ entailed in the formation of individuation and Apollinian art, Nietzsche argues, what is revealed is the indestructibility of these drives and emotions. Apollo can only veil and not erase them. These drives must find release and it is this need which engendered the rebirth of the Dionysian.

redemption through appearance, the sufferers cannot comprehend and therefore transcend their suffering. They remain trapped in mere empirical existence.

The Transfiguration embodies the relationship between the Apollinian and its ‘substratum,’ the wisdom of Silenus, and their ‘necessary interdependence.’ (45) Apollo represents the sublime ‘apotheosis’ of the principium individuationis ‘in which alone is consummated the perpetually attained goal of the primal unity, its redemption through mere appearance’. (ibid.) This symbolical analogue reveals the necessity of ‘the entire world of suffering’ for ‘by means of it the individual may be impelled to realize the redeeming vision.’ (ibid.) If art is revealed as the highest form of fulfilment of the need for redemption through illusion and of the affirmation of existence, this redemption and affirmation, in turn, represent the redemption and affirmation of the necessity of suffering. See Porter, The Invention of Dionysus, 74-77.

Nietzsche echoes his reading of the Transfiguration in Daybreak, §8: ‘Transfiguration. – Those that suffer helplessly, those that dream confusedly, those that are entranced by things supernatural – these are the three divisions into which Raphael divided mankind.’ (10) He goes on to oppose the naturalism of his own philosophy to entrancement in the supernatural, proffering what he argues is a ‘new transfiguration’. (ibid., emphasis added) This new transfiguration is precisely that outlined in Birth: the transfiguration and incorporation of lived experience through art. See also note 6[30] from 1870 in Writings from the Early Notebooks, 31-32.

50 Ibid.

51 In ‘Before the Subject: Rereading Birth of Tragedy’ Kemp Winfree defines the Apollinian as a ‘form always marked by what it would need to exclude’: (61). In an early draft of Birth, ‘The Dionysiac World View,’ Nietzsche describes the sublime triumph of the Apollinian in terms which embody its role as transposition and incorporation: ‘It was the Apolline people who laid the chains of beauty on over-mighty instinct, who yoked and harnessed nature’s most dangerous elements, her wildest beasts.’ (Nietzsche, ‘The Dionysiac World View,’ trans. Ronald Speirs, in The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, trans. Ronald Speirs, ed. Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs, [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999], 117-138 [123]). Again, in contrast to Sallis’s argument, this passage indicates not a monstrous break with nature, but nature’s transfiguration. The apparent contradiction in the image
II – On ‘Purgation’ and the Dionysian sublime

For the rapture of the Dionysian state with its annihilation of the ordinary bounds and limits of existence contains, while it lasts, a \textit{lethargic} element, in which all personal experiences of the past become immersed. (\textit{BT}, §7, 59)

The two key elements of the Dionysian as a mode of the sublime are ‘rapture’ and the ‘\textit{lethargic}’. These elements, like the Apollinian and Dionysian themselves, are interdependent. The purging of ‘personal experiences’ is reliant upon the ‘annihilation of the ordinary bounds and limits of experience’ that the ‘rapture’ represents. In turn, the ‘rapture’ has this lethargic purgation as its goal. Nietzsche’s conception of lethargy derives from a notion of forgetting, which he associates to the river Lethe: the ‘waters of oblivion’. Nietzsche’s allusion here is to Dante Aligheri’s \textit{Purgatory (Il Purgatorio)}, the second ‘Cantica’ of The \textit{[Divine] Comedy}:

\begin{quote}
Into the stream she’d drawn me in my faint,
Throat-high, and now, towing me after her,
Light as a shuttle o’er the water went.

“Asperges me” I heard, as I drew near
The blissful brink, so sweetly as to drown
Power to recall, far more to write it here.

She stretched both hands, she seized me by the crown,
Did that fair lady, and she plunged me in,
So that I needs.must drink the water down;
\end{quote}

of beauty as imprisoning ‘chains’ is resolved in the appreciation that this represents the triumph of a will to order, selection and restraint over ‘over-mighty instinct’.

The image of a ‘harnessed’ instinct recurs in ‘On Truth’, in Nietzsche’s description of the ‘fatal curiosity’ of the will to truth in terms which echo the relationship of the Apollinian and Dionysian. The will to truth, he argues, ‘might one day have the power to peer out and down through a crack in the chamber of consciousness and then suspect that man is sustained in the indifference of his ignorance by that which is pitiless, greedy, insatiable, and murderous – as if hanging in dreams on the back of a tiger.’ (115) The sustenance of ‘man’, of the Apollinian Hellene and of the intellect derives from a power to suppress a substratum of powerful barbaric instinct. These terms recur in Nietzsche’s later definition of the ‘classical’. (\textit{HH} IIa, §114 and IIb, §217 and \textit{GS} V, §370). The constitution of the Apollinian in \textit{Birth} represents Nietzsche’s first articulation of the ‘classical’ and serves to bind Nietzsche’s nascent naturalism to his later, fully articulated, ‘classical’ aesthetic.
Then drew me forth and led me, washed and clean […]\textsuperscript{52}

The ‘blissful’ drowning of the ‘[p]ower to recall’ that leaves Dante the pilgrim ‘washed and clean,’ is preceded and rendered necessary, by what Dorothy L. Sayers, in her notes, refers to as a ‘violent psychological disturbance’, and which Dante the poet describes as a blending of ‘[t]error and shame’ at the memories of his infidelities to Beatrice.\textsuperscript{53} It is this guilt which is purged in his immersion in the Lethe.\textsuperscript{54} Purgation—lethargy—is precipitated by, and is inextricably bound to, a destructive moment of suffering.

Following his citation of the metaphor of the sailor in the frail bark to define the Apollinian, Nietzsche appropriates and qualifies the conjunction of suffering and bliss in Schopenhauer’s conception of the sublime in \textit{The World as Will and Representation}, in order to define the Dionysian: ‘Schopenhauer has defined for us the tremendous terror which seizes man when he is suddenly dumbfounded by the cognitive form of phenomena because the principle of sufficient reason, in some one of its manifestations, seems to suffer an exception.’\textsuperscript{55} In order to understand what is at stake in Nietzsche’s account of the Dionysian sublime, it is necessary to pause to offer

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{52} Trans. Dorothy L. Sayers (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1955), ‘CANTO XXXI,’ 315-321, ll.94-103 (317-318). ‘“Asperges me”’: ‘thou shalt purge me,’ see 320n—l.97 b.
\item \textsuperscript{53} In his discussion of the legacy of Heidegger’s critique of Nietzsche and Nietzsche’s relation of his philosophy to Plato, Sallis argues for the identification of Dionysus with Hades (the Greek underworld) and attributes the ‘lethargic element’ to Plato’s reproduction of the ‘story of Er’s descent into Hades’, which locates the river Lethe in Hades, in contradistinction to its location on Mount Purgatory within Dante’s cosmology. (\textit{Republic}, 621 C. Cf. Sallis, 1-2, 5) This latter source better suits the positive pathos of Nietzsche’s use of the term ‘lethargic’. I will argue that the notions of going-under and overcoming, representative of the apparently contradictory Platonic and Dantean senses and positionings of the Lethe, are intimately bound in and through Nietzsche’s Dionysian-Apollinian conjunction and that an analogy is formed in this conjunction of purgation and incorporation to the respective roles of forgetting and recollection (significantly, without guilt) of the rivers Lethe and Eunoe in Dante’s Purgatory.
\end{itemize}
a definition of Schopenhauer’s conception of the principle of sufficient reason and its undoing in the experience of the sublime in his aesthetics.

Schopenhauer defines the principle of sufficient reason in its broadest and simplest terms through the formula: ‘Nothing is without a reason why it is.’\(^{56}\) As I argued in the first chapter, he follows Kant’s argument in the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ that space and time are pure forms of intuition, constituting the condition of the possibility of experience. They constitute the forms of perceived objects: our representations. In On the Fourfold Root, Schopenhauer argues that all our representations can be seen to ‘stand to one another in a natural and regular connexion that in form is determinable A PRIORI. By virtue of this connexion nothing existing by itself and independent, and also nothing single and detached, can become an object for us.’\(^{57}\) For Schopenhauer, just as space and time are the a priori condition of the possibility of experience, understood as the necessary division of the world into the discrete quanta of individuated objects, so there must exist a principle which explains the connection that necessarily exists between these objects. No object of experience can stand alone but must have a necessary connection to all other objects of experience and ‘[i]t is this connexion which is expressed by the principle of sufficient reason in its universality.’\(^{58}\) The ‘root’ of the principle is fourfold: ‘The principle divides explanations of occurrence in the world as representation into four types of lawlike generalizations, including all logical, mathematical, causal and moral motivational phenomena.’\(^{59}\) Logical laws ‘satisfy the sufficient reason of knowing.’\(^{60}\)

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\(^{56}\) Schopenhauer, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (hereafter FFR), trans. E.J.F Payne (USA: Open Court Publishing Co., 2003), §5, 6. Schopenhauer adapts the formula from one adopted from Wolff: ‘Nothing is without a ground or reason why it is rather than is not’. (ibid.)

\(^{57}\) Ibid., FFR, §16, 42

\(^{58}\) Ibid.

They explain the truth of any proposition through the empirical truth of direct experience, the transcendental truth of the necessary presupposition of the *a priori* (time and space), the logical truth that the proposition must follow from the truth of another proposition or from the material truth of true empirical statement, and the metalogical truth of the law of logic (the laws of identity, contradiction, the law of the excluded middle and correspondence theory).⁶¹ ‘Physical’ or causal laws state that the coming into being and passing away of objects of experience and their interrelations is determined by sequences of causally interconnected events, which, in their entirety, constitute the history of the natural world.⁶² Dale Jacquette argues that, for Schopenhauer, these laws can therefore be said to ‘satisfy the sufficient reason of becoming’: they explain the causal reasons for the object’s coming into being and passing away.⁶³ Mathematical laws cover the framework of the sufficient reason of being of space and time (the pure forms of intuition) and form the basis of geometry and arithmetic.⁶⁴ Moral laws satisfy the sufficient reason of acting and concern ‘the empirical or will to life and its motivations’.⁶⁵ They represent causes ‘experienced from within’.⁶⁶ For Nietzsche, following Schopenhauer, when a phenomenon appears to occupy a space too vast to comprehend (such as a vast stretch of desert or ocean), or evokes a feeling of eternity (such as is the case with ancient ruins) the phenomenon then appears to exceed the bounds of space, time and causality and the principle of sufficient reason suffers an exception. This exception takes place in the exaltation of the sublime.

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⁶⁰ Schopenhauer, *FFR*, §49, 226. See Jacquette, 44
⁶¹ See Magee, 31
⁶² Schopenhauer, *FFR*, §49, 227. See Magee, 30
⁶³ Jacquette, *The Philosophy of Schopenhauer*, 44
⁶⁵ Jacquette, *The Philosophy of Schopenhauer*, 44
⁶⁶ Magee, 30
Schopenhauer’s conception of the sublime develops from an engagement with the tradition, emerging in, and from the eighteenth century, of aesthetic theories of the contrast between the sublime and the beautiful, in particular that of Kant, in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. Schopenhauer’s aesthetic is grounded in his appropriation and synthesis of the philosophical concepts of both Kant and Plato. The third book of *The World as Will and Representation* is dedicated to his analysis of the Platonic Idea as the object of art. In particular he attempts to synthesise the Kantian thing-in-itself and the Platonic Idea: ‘we find [...] those two great and obscure paradoxes of the two greatest philosophers of the West—to be, not exactly identical, but yet very closely related, and distinguished by only a single modification.’

For Schopenhauer, as I argued in the first chapter, the ‘will’ is the thing-in-itself. Following Kant, he argues that time, space and causality (the principle of sufficient reason) are the forms of our knowledge, which is knowledge only of the phenomenal realm, constituted by ‘plurality and all arising and passing away,’ to which the thing-in-itself (the will) is not subject. Schopenhauer uses his refutation of Kant’s claim to the objectivity of the thing-in-itself to draw a distinction (his ‘modification’) between the thing-in-itself and the Idea. He argues that, for Plato the phenomenal realm represents the realm of becoming. The objects of the phenomenal realm are only the imperfect shadow copies of ‘the real archetypes’ of the Ideas, which ‘always are but never become and never pass away’ and are thus not subject to time, space and causality. Schopenhauer argues that, for Plato, The Idea is nevertheless ‘necessarily object’: ‘something known, a representation’, and not the thing-in-itself. The Platonic Idea, Schopenhauer argues, represents the level or grade of the will’s most

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67 WWR, I, §31, 170
68 171
69 Ibid.
70 Cf. §§31-32, 171-175. On the Ideas and the Platonic myth of the cave, see chapter 2, pp. 86-90, above.
immediate objectivity. It is not subject to the principle of sufficient reason and is therefore independent of the ‘subordinate forms of the phenomenon’.71 However, ‘it has retained the first and most universal form, namely that of representation in general, that of being object for a subject.’72 The phenomenon constitutes, for Schopenhauer only the indirect objectification of the will. Between the phenomenon and the will stands the Idea, ‘as the only direct objectivity of the will.’73

The Idea under Schopenhauer’s Kantian-Platonic synthesis, represents ‘the most adequate objectivity possible of the will or of the thing-in-itself; indeed it is even the whole thing-in-itself, only under the form of the representation,’ of which the spatiotemporal representations (according to the principle of sufficient reason) are only so many plural copies, ‘multiplying the Idea in particular and fleeting individuals’.74 Schopenhauer argues that it possible to be raised from knowledge of particular things to the knowledge of the Ideas by a change in the subject’s apprehension of the object from its imperfect extension into space and time to its timeless Idea. In order to attain to knowledge of the Ideas, the subject must be elevated above individuality.75 This elevation consists, for Schopenhauer, in the tearing free of knowledge from service to the striving, suffering and interestedness of the will: ‘we no longer consider the where, the when, the why and whither in things, but simply and solely the what.’76 In aesthetic contemplation, just as the object is no longer the particular, individuated spatiotemporal object but the ‘eternal form’ of the

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71 175
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 175. To reiterate Nietzsche’s example in ‘On Truth’, phenomenal leaves represent only the plural, imperfect copies of the Idea of the leaf, itself the most immediate objectification of the leaf-as-it-is-in-itself (the leaf = X). (‘OTL’, 117)
75 §33, 176
76 §34, 178
Idea, the subject is no longer an individual and ‘[w]e lose ourselves entirely in this object’.\textsuperscript{77} The subject becomes the ‘pure will-less, painless, timeless subject of knowledge.’\textsuperscript{78} For Schopenhauer, the type of knowledge which continues to exist outside and independent of phenomenal objectivity and individual subjectivity is ‘art, the work of genius.’\textsuperscript{79} Art ‘repeats’ the Idea, apprehended through pure contemplation.\textsuperscript{80} This is achieved through the beautiful and the sublime.

Schopenhauer argues that ‘pleasure’ in the beautiful arises from the coincidence of the Idea and its ‘correlative’, the pure will-less subject of knowing.\textsuperscript{81} The beautiful, for Schopenhauer, constitutes a ‘delight’ in the ‘pure perception’ of objects. For Schopenhauer, the sublime differs from the beautiful not in kind, but by degree. Through it too we are raised elevated to the level of the pure, will-less subject of knowing.\textsuperscript{82} However, our subjective relations (that is the objective manifestation of the human subject: the body) to the ‘significant forms’ of sublime objects are radically different. Sublime objects, in contrast to the beautiful, in which we are disinterested, stand in a stark opposition to the subject, and, indeed, ‘may threaten it by their might that eliminates all resistance, or their immeasurable greatness may reduce it to nought.’\textsuperscript{83} For Schopenhauer this excess engenders the temporary cessation of the subject, who, although perceiving the obvious threat to his bodily form posed by the objects of the sublime, is nonetheless able to ‘tear himself from his will and its

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{78} 179
\textsuperscript{79} §36, 184. On the objectivity or disinterestedness of the ‘aesthetic method of consideration,’ see §34, 178.
\textsuperscript{81} §38, 195-196. Cf. §39, 200-201
\textsuperscript{82} §38, 199
\textsuperscript{83} 201
relations’. The subject is elevated above subjectivity, and is ‘filled with the feeling of the sublime; he is in the state of exaltation.’

For Schopenhauer the beautiful is universal: experienced by every subject (as an elevation beyond subjectivity) in the same way. A beautiful object is universally beautiful. It elevates us to the state of aesthetic contemplation and the ‘will-free subject of knowing’. Sublime ‘exaltation’, by contrast, is achieved via the struggle of an act of will against willing:

[W]ith the sublime, that state of pure knowing is obtained first of all by a conscious and violent tearing away from the relations of the same object [as that of the beautiful] to the will which are recognised as unfavourable, by a free exaltation accompanied by consciousness, beyond the will and the knowledge related to it.

The willing is no longer that of the subject, but of humanity in general. It is this which affects the ‘conscious and violent’ tearing of the will from its moorings in its mediated relations to the object, and elevates it to a direct knowledge of the Idea. The sublime, for Schopenhauer, represents an emancipation from subjectivity and willing.

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84 Ibid.
86 Schopenhauer identifies four degrees of the sublime, which he binds to the transition from the beautiful to the sublime, according to its relative force. (Cf. 203-205) The first represents the ‘faintest trace of the sublime in the beautiful’. (203) It constitutes the ‘profound peace’ induced by the absence of stimuli which are ‘favourable or unfavourable’ to the will. Schopenhauer equates it with the geographical phenomenon of a ‘lonely region of boundless horizons, under a perfectly cloudless sky’. (Ibid.) The subject’s response to the profound solitude and silence of such scenes drives them to a ‘contemplation’ which elevates them above the concerns of the will. When any trace of organic life or conditions for the subject’s maintained sustenance are removed from this hypothetical vista, the feeling of the sublime is correspondingly heightened to a ‘tragic’ degree. The emancipation from the will is imbued with ‘a fearful character.’ (204)

As the excess of force, the scale of the objects and the associated threat to the will increases, so too the feeling of the sublime is heightened. The ‘struggle with hostile nature’ becomes visible to the subject through the image of their own broken will in the contemplation of ‘turbulent and tempestuous motion; semi-darkness through threatening black thunder-clouds; immense bare, overhanging cliffs shutting out the view by their interlacing; rushing, foaming masses of water; complete desert [and] the wail of wind sweeping through the ravines’. As long as this ‘personal affliction’ does not overwhelm them, they remain the pure subject of will-less knowledge. The sublime here consists in the contrast of the violent motion of the object to the passivity of the subject. This contrast brings the sublime to its
Nietzsche adopts Schopenhauer’s key terms: the inciting of terror and the cessation of subjectivity in the exception to the principle of sufficient reason of the sublime, as his starting point in his analysis of the Dionysian. However, he offers a substantial qualification:

if we add to this terror the blissful ecstasy that wells from the innermost depths of man, indeed of nature, at this collapse of the principium individuationis, we steal a glimpse into the nature of the Dionysian, which is brought home to us most intimately by the analogy of intoxication.87

Space, time and causality, as the forms of cognition prior to experience, give rise to, and are the ground of, the principle of individuation. When these forms suffer exception, the (Apollinian) principium individuationis collapses. The individual is lost to the pre-individuated ‘primal unity’. The collapse of individuation is a source of terror. However, conjoined to this terror is a feeling of what Nietzsche terms ‘blissful ecstasy’. This arises from the release of the drives and emotions repressed with the Apollinian. There is an element of ineluctable and irreducible violence and ‘terror’ within the Dionysian sublime which stands as the condition of the possibility of the feeling of ‘blissful ecstasy’. This apparent contradiction can be most clearly highest pitch. All the more radical then is the passivity of the ‘unmoved beholder’ of such spectacles, which in turn serves to explicate the ‘twofold nature of consciousness’:

[H]e feels himself as individual, as the feeble phenomenon of will, which the slightest touch of these forces can annihilate, helpless against powerful nature, dependent, abandoned to chance, a vanishing nothing in the face of stupendous forces; and he also feels himself as the eternal, serene subject of knowing […] This is the full impression of the sublime. (204-205)


87 Ibid.
comprehended, Nietzsche argues, through the analogous physiological phenomenon of intoxication. The over-stimulation of the senses, loss of self-consciousness and frenzy associated with the phenomenon of intoxication, Nietzsche argues, find their analogous artistic counterpart in the Dionysian sublime.

The Dionysian sublime represents a mode of access to the pre-individuated, pre-Apollinian ‘primal unity’ through the laceration of the individual. The ‘primal unity’ is here understood as the chaotic flux of natural drives preceding, and as the ground of, all individuation, comparable to Bergson’s later definition of the undivided continuity of ‘states’ in the flux of duration. The Dionysian sublime anticipates Nietzsche’s definition of ‘intuition’ in ‘On Truth’ (and echoed in Bergson’s philosophy). In the same way that, for both Nietzsche and Bergson, intuition serves to rend the stale, stultified surface of the concepts of the intellect, in order to descend into the underlying flux and to return with new metaphors, so the Dionysian sublime, in *Birth*, represents the laceration of the forms of Apollinian individuation and a descent into the apparently paradoxical ‘bliss’ of the undivided continuity of the flux of natural drives of the ‘primal unity’. Whilst Nietzsche here ostensibly appropriates the key terms of Schopenhauer’s definition of the sublime, this appropriation is ironic. As I argued in the first chapter, the ‘primal unity’ remains closer to Nietzsche’s own later formulation of the will to power, understood as naming the differential element within the hierarchy of sub-wills from which the individuated ‘thing’ is sculpted, than to the metaphysical unity of the Schopenhauerian ‘will’. Both the Dionysian sublime and the ‘primal unity’ represent the beginning of Nietzsche’s attempt to redeem Schopenhauer’s aesthetics from his metaphysics.

88 It is this laceration of the concepts of the intellect and descent into the flux of experience in order to create new ‘unheard-of’ hybrid metaphors in ‘On Truth’ that is ultimately at stake in Kemp Winfree’s argument that ‘On Truth’ ‘repeats the question of the Dionysian’. (68. See p. 126[n], above)
As Claudia Crawford has demonstrated, the ‘primal unity’ in Nietzsche’s early writing remains firmly on the side of representation and cannot be identified with the thing-in-itself. Nor can it be identified with the timeless ‘real archetype’ of the Platonic Idea, specifically in its appropriation by Schopenhauer as the most immediate objective manifestation of the will. Nietzsche’s concept is fundamentally anti-metaphysical. Whereas for Schopenhauer the sublime engenders a sudden leap of the subject beyond individual subjectivity and its transformation into the pure will-less subject of knowing, with a corresponding consciousness of its object shorn of its individual phenomenal predicates, revealing the Idea, for Nietzsche, the Dionysian sublime reveals the undivided continuity of the flux of natural drives repressed and veiled beneath the artistic veneer of (Apollinian) individuation. ‘Essence’ remains, but in the form clarified by Deleuze’s analysis of the will to power, as the ‘one among all the senses of a thing, which gives it the force with which it has most affinity.’ The ‘primal unity’ and the Dionysian sublime represent Nietzsche’s first provisional formulation of an ironic Platonic—anti-Platonist aesthetic. The Dionysian represents the harnessing of natural drive to the purgation of lived experience into the pre-existing artistic forms of music and dance. Just as the Apollinian, the Dionysian represents the transformation of nature through culture.

89 Crawford, Beginnings, 161-162(n). See chapter 1, pp. 33-36, above.
90 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 4
91 Cf. GS, §99, 153, where Nietzsche returns to his earlier definition of tragedy in Birth. Though he here explicitly rejects the terms of Schopenhauer’s sublime (in the exception to the principle of sufficient reason and the principle of individuation, especially as what Nietzsche now identifies as the source of all morality) appropriated in Birth, he also explicitly rejects Schopenhauer’s ‘One Will’ and the philosophical prejudice of the Platonic Idea (‘all lions are at bottom only one lion’). See also §355, 300-302.
The conjunction of ‘terror’ and ‘blissful ecstasy’ constitute the Dionysian as a mode of the sublime: the revelling in the excess over which the Apollinian sublime had been seen to triumph (in the guise of the ‘Homerish hero’), and which now again collapses the Apollinian and the principle of individuation. The Apollinian was engendered by necessity: the ‘longing’ on the part of the ‘primal unity’ for redemption through illusion. Its dissolution is experienced with ‘joy’ by the same ‘innermost depths of man, indeed of nature’ which engendered it.\footnote{Cf. 36} For Nietzsche, in order to be able to elicit this ‘joy’, the release from the delimitation and restraints of the Apollinian must therefore represent an equal and opposite natural, psychophysiological necessity. The ‘Dionysian emotions awake, and as they grow in intensity everything subjective vanishes into self-forgetfulness.’\footnote{Ibid.} The ‘growth’ of the Dionysian emotions is comparable to the process of the evolution of Apollinian ‘order’ from the ‘titanic’. The emotions are awakened by the need of the ‘primal unity’. The Apollinian can only veil or repress these ‘emotions’. It can never fully extinguish them. Their repression causes frustration and tension which grow in intensity until the Apollinian is no longer able to restrain them, and they ‘burst forth’ and are purged in the ‘self-forgetfulness’ of the Dionysian state.\footnote{§2, 39} Nietzsche argues that in the Dionysian ‘the union between man and man’, which was severed in the Apollinian process of individuation, is ‘reaffirmed’. Nature, rendered ‘alienated’ and ‘hostile’ through the interposition of the restraint and delimitation of the Apollinian, ‘celebrates once more her reconciliation with her lost son, man.’\footnote{Ibid.} The ‘rigid, hostile barriers that necessity, caprice, or “impudent convention” have fixed between man
and man are broken’ and give way to ‘universal harmony,’ a state in which all individuals feel ‘as one’. 96

Nietzsche argues that this unity within a ‘higher community’ (one no longer simply composed of individuals) was expressed by the Hellene through song and dance. He contrasts these with the plastic art forms of the Apollinian. Whereas the Apollinian Hellene only saw the gods ‘walking in his dreams’, the Dionysian Hellene ‘feels himself a god’: ‘He is no longer an artist, he has become a work of art’. 97 The Dionysian Hellene experienced existence and the ‘primal unity’ directly and intuitively, without the need for the mediation of abstract concepts. Nietzsche refers to the physicality of the Dionysian—spontaneous movement, sound, dancing—as the ‘paroxysms of intoxication’: the unconscious and uninhibited physiological response to the ecstatic, in and through which ‘the artistic power of all nature reveals itself to the highest gratification of the primordial unity.’ This ‘gratification’ is higher than that afforded by Apollinian art because of its immediacy, power and direct expression through the spontaneous and unrestrained discharge of physical-emotional energies. 98

Nietzsche contrasts the ‘Dionysian Greek’, with their necessary shattering of the fetters of individuation, to the ‘pre-Apollinian’ ‘Dionysian barbarian’. The barbaric Dionysian festivals, he argues, were marked by ‘extravagant sexual licentiousness’ and ‘the most savage natural instincts were unleashed’. 99 In stark contrast to the Hellenic Dionysian, Nietzsche refers to the effect of these festivals as a

96 ‘[I]mpudent convention’ is a quotation from Schiller’s hymn ‘An die Freude (to joy)’ which Beethoven used in the final movement of the Ninth Symphony (the ‘“Hymn to Joy”’). See Kaufmann’s editor’s note, 37.
97 BT, §1, 37
98 Cf. 37
99 §2, 39
‘horrible mixture of sensuality and cruelty,’ as that ‘which has always seemed to me
to be the real “witches’ brew.”’

It was in response to the ‘terror and horror’ of this
barbaric Dionysian state that the Apollinian was inaugurated as a remedy. Nietzsche
alludes to the myth of Perseus and the Gorgon Medusa as the symbolic analogue of
this triumph: ‘the figure of Apollo, rising full of pride, held out the Gorgon’s head to
this grotesquely uncouth Dionysian power’. The Apollinian does not destroy the
Dionysian, merely petrifies it, freezing it and holding it in place like a statue.

However, when Apollo’s interdependence with the ‘titanic’ forces, and with it
the necessity of the Dionysian, was realised, the ‘opposition between Apollo and
Dionysus became more hazardous and even impossible’. When the Dionysian
‘impulses finally burst forth from the deepest roots of the Hellenic nature’ Apollinian
culture could no longer simply draw a veil over these drives, with their equal and
undeniable claim to necessary expression. Hellenic culture effected a compromise and
a ‘reconciliation’ in which the ‘barbaric’ forces were divested of their ‘destructive
weapons’. Nietzsche argues that this ‘reconciliation’ of the Apollinian and the
Dionysian represents ‘the most important moment in the history of the Greek cult’: a
moment of cultural revolution. ‘The two antagonists were reconciled; the boundary
lines to be observed henceforth by each were sharply defined’. This reconciliation
and mutual respect, however, was incapable of putting an end to the antagonism, but
served to inaugurate a new era in culture, and a re-birth, in a new and more powerful
form, of the Dionysian art impulse. In the bursting forth of the Dionysian the
‘destruction of the principium individuationis for the first time becomes an artistic

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100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 §2, 39
103 Ibid.
phenomenon.'\textsuperscript{104} For Nietzsche, the Hellenic Dionysian represents the sublimation of
the drive to the purgation of natural drives and forces (repressed within the
Apollinian) into the pre-existing artistic forms of music and dance.

If the Apollinian sublime appeared as the redemption of existence \textit{from} the
‘titanic’, then the Dionysian, by contrast, appears as the equal and opposite
redemption \textit{of} those forces. The Apollinian redeems existence from the ‘titanic’ but is
compelled to admit its interdependence with it. It is this admission which precipitates
the Hellenic re-birth of the Dionysian. Nietzsche identifies a contradiction at the heart
of this purgative and redemptive re-birth of the Dionysian in ‘the curious blending and
duality in the emotions of the Dionysian revellers.’\textsuperscript{105} For Nietzsche, this duality takes
the form of ‘the phenomenon that pain begets joy.’\textsuperscript{106} I have already traced this
‘phenomenon’ through reference to the parallel between Dante’s poetic conception of
purgation in the waters of the Lethe, and the paradoxical sense in which ‘ecstasy’ has
a moment or state of ‘agony’ (self-mortification) as the condition of its possibility and
at the root of its necessity. Nietzsche’s description of this paradoxical ‘phenomenon’
emphasises its strong sexual element as the harnessing and discharge of physiological
energies. As with Dante’s sublimation of erotic love for Beatrice into a spiritual and
artistic quest, Nietzsche argues that sexual physical energies are sublimated into an
incarnate and immanent ‘spirituality’ in art.

Nietzsche focuses on ‘Dionysian music’ as sublime: exciting ‘awe and
terror’\textsuperscript{107} The element which forms the essence of this sublimity is ‘the emotional

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid.
power of the tone, the uniform flow of the melody, and the utterly incomparable world of harmony.¹⁰⁸ This essence of music, Nietzsche sees as typified in the Dionysian dithyramb. In Dionysian music ‘man is incited to the greatest exaltation of all his symbolic faculties; something never before experienced struggles for utterance’. The Dionysian Hellene was impelled to engage all of the ‘symbolic faculties’ of movement, sound, and rhythm, in order to express the ecstatic rapture in which the ‘essence of nature,’ the drives and extreme emotions veiled and transfigured by the Apollinian, are ‘expressed symbolically’ embodied and discharged directly without interposition: ‘we need a new world of symbols; and the entire symbolism of the body is called into play’. Nietzsche calls this the ‘spirit’ of music: the ‘collective release of all the symbolic powers’.¹⁰⁹ In music, the experience of the Dionysian is expressed and discharged immediately through the simultaneous and mutually augmenting ‘faculties’ and ‘powers’ of bodily movement and gesticulation, rhythm, and sound.

For Nietzsche, the release of the ‘symbolic powers’ results from the laceration and ‘ecstasy’ of the Dionysian state: ‘man must have already attained that height of self-abnegation which seeks to express itself symbolically through all these powers’ in order to create music.¹¹⁰ Nietzsche continues his thinly veiled evocation of the sexual element in the constitution and purgative affect of the Dionysian. Into the Apollinian ‘world, built on mere appearance and moderation and artificially dammed up, there penetrated, in tones ever more bewitching and alluring, the ecstatic sound of the Dionysian festival’.¹¹¹ The Apollinian Hellene was forced to acknowledge their veiled

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.
¹⁰⁹ Cf. 40-41.
¹¹⁰ 41
¹¹¹ §4, 46
desire to unleash these ‘titanic’ drives through the enjoyment of an unrestrained ecstatic celebration. ‘The muses of the arts of “illusion” paled before an art that, in its intoxication, spoke the truth’ which the Apollinian had been engendered in order to veil: ‘excess in pleasure, grief, and knowledge’.\(^{112}\) The individual surrendered to ‘the self-oblivion of the Dionysian states, forgetting the precepts of Apollo. Excess revealed itself as truth. Contradiction, the bliss born of pain, spoke out of the very heart of nature.’\(^{113}\) The need to veil the truth, the longing for redemption through illusion, was shattered and overcome. No longer did the Hellene need to hide from the truth beneath a veil. Now their ‘bliss’ in the excess of pleasure, grief and knowledge was born from the ‘pain’ of ‘laceration’ and revelation. This irresistible ‘penetration’ of the Dionysian precipitated the final and most powerful reincarnation of the Apollinian in its militaristic apotheosis in Sparta: ‘the \textit{Doric} state’\(^{114}\).

III – The Lyric Poet: the fold in the self-creation of the artist

Having summarised his reading of the four-fold shape of Hellenic cultural and artistic history at the end of §4 of \textit{Birth},\(^{115}\) Nietzsche proceeds to use his intuition of the central role played by the Dionysian and Apollinian modes of the sublime in this history as the basis for reaching the ‘real goal’ of his ‘investigation’: ‘knowledge of the Dionysian-Apollinian genius and its art product.’\(^{116}\) Nietzsche seeks to define the nature of the conjunction of the Dionysian and Apollinian, symbolised in his

\(^{112}\) \textit{Ibid.}\(^{46-47}\)

\(^{113}\) 46-47

\(^{114}\) 47. Cf. Silk & Stern, \textit{Nietzsche on Tragedy}, 66: against the ‘new power’ of the Dionysian, the Apollinian in turn, in the fourth great period of Hellenic art (late VI and V, B.C.), was incited to rise to the ‘austere majesty’ of ‘the \textit{Doric} state’—Sparta—‘Doric art and the Doric view of the world’. Nietzsche dubs this culminating period in the history of Hellenic culture the ‘permanent military encampment of the Apollinian.’ (\textit{BT}, §4, 47)

\(^{115}\) §4, 47

\(^{116}\) §5, 48
hyphenation—‘Dionysian-Apollinian’—and of tragedy as the ‘art product’ which is created in this conjunction. The conjunction of the two modes of the sublime takes place, he argues, in the process of the self-creation of the artist. In his work on the influence of Schopenhauer on Nietzsche, Ivan Soll appositely summarises the distinction between the artist and the aesthete, outlining the difference between ‘the aesthete, who has the ability to see things aesthetically, and the artist, who has the ability to create works of art embodying such visions’, arguing that Schopenhauer failed to sufficiently recognise the distinction and that Nietzsche recognised this ‘failure to be sufficiently psychological.’ The distinction between the artist and the aesthete is implicit in Nietzsche’s account of, on the one hand, the fold in the self-creation of the tragic artist, and on the other in his account of the effect of tragedy upon its audience, with which I want to deal respectively.

In order to render the self-creation of the artist and the Dionysian-Apollinian conjunction intelligible, it is first necessary to reach an understanding of the need which motivates them. In order to accomplish this I want to disassemble Nietzsche’s argument concerning the origins of lyric poetry and the lyric poet and the evolution of tragedy in §§5-7 of Birth, and to reconstruct this in reverse order. I will begin with a reading of Nietzsche’s argument concerning the effect of the Dionysian and its relation to quotidian existence in §7 and then proceed to an analysis of the process of

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117 I will adopt the term ‘conjunction’ in preference to that of ‘synthesis,’ used by, for example, Silk and Stern in Nietzsche and Tragedy. (62-89) In their synopsis of Birth, Silk and Stern refer to the ‘synthesis of the tendencies’ of the Apollinian and Dionysian. (63) As I will argue, the Dionysian and Apollinian are not cancelled and resolved into a third and separate term, as the dialectical reading implicit in the use of the term synthesis would suggest, but remain distinct yet in a relationship of co-dependence. Sallis reaches a similar conclusion that ‘prohibits regarding tragedy as the mere synthesis of the Apollinian and the Dionysian, as a synthesis in which their opposition would be resolved into a higher unity’. He argues that Birth ‘is not to be differentiated from Nietzsche’s later writings in the manner proposed, for example by Gilles Deleuze […] namely, by its alleged dialectical […] character’. (57[n]. See Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 1-35)

the self-creation of the lyric poet and the evolution of tragedy from dithyrambic poetry and the chorus in §§6-7, returning to the end of §7 to define the nature of tragedy and to analyse Nietzsche’s final comment in the section on the role of the tragic chorus and the definition of ‘art’.

(i) – On Rapture and Nausea as artistic inspiration

The individual, with all his restraint and proportion, succumbed to the self-oblivion of the Dionysian states, forgetting the precepts of Apollo. Excess revealed itself as truth. Contradiction, the bliss born of pain, spoke out of the very heart of nature.\(^{(BT, \text{§}4, 46-47)}\)

Succumbing to the affect of the Dionysian sublime engenders an annihilation of self-awareness and consciousness of time and space, and a corresponding loss of the formal, ethical and spatial relations of the individual to their neighbours and surrounding environment. These constraints, necessary to the formation and perpetuation of culture, are dissolved in the excess of the Dionysian state. This excess is revealed as underlying and prior to all individuation, as that which precipitates the emergence of the principle of individuation and thus in turn reveals individuation as fabrication and illusion. The pain experienced in the laceration of the individuated empirical self gives birth to the ‘bliss’ of the purgation of the drives—identified by Nietzsche as ‘the very heart of nature’—repressed within individuation.

What is at stake is an antagonistic relationship between quotidian existence, which has the Apollinian ‘precepts’ of individuation as the condition of its possibility, and the purgative excess of the Dionysian state: ‘a chasm of oblivion separates the
worlds of everyday reality and of Dionysian reality’. The Dionysian, through its moment of the laceration of the bounds of individuation, attains a purgative discharge of repressed drives, and a corresponding forgetting of the empirical self: ‘[T]he rapture of the Dionysian state with its annihilation of the ordinary bounds and limits of existence contains, while it lasts, a lethargic element, in which all personal experiences of the past become immersed’. The ‘lethargic’, purgative moment of the Dionysian is what constitutes the ‘chasm of oblivion’ separating it as a fundamentally different mode of experience from the quotidian.

By the very nature of its extremity and power the Dionysian state rapidly exhausts itself. Nietzsche argues that the Dionysian ecstatic must return to consciousness of time, space and the manifold relations of everyday reality and the self-consciousness these ineluctably engender, but that ‘as soon as this everyday reality re-enters consciousness it is experienced as such with nausea.’ Nietzsche’s definition of the experience of nausea is crucial. The experience of the finitude and banality of ‘everyday reality’ is now experienced as absurd and ignoble. It is experienced with revulsion and nausea in comparison with the intoxication—the sublimity—of the experience of the unfettered power of the drives in the Dionysian: ‘an ascetic, will-negating mood is the fruit of these states’. The ineluctable return to the quotidian results in a desire to renounce life.

Nietzsche invokes Hamlet as a symbolic analogue for the experience of the return to the quotidian from the rapture of the Dionysian. Through the comparison,

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119 §7, 59
120 Ibid.
121 59-60
122 60
Nietzsche both illuminates the experience of post-Dionysian ‘nausea’ and concomitantly performs a reading of the play itself:

[T]he Dionysian man resembles Hamlet: both have once looked truly into the essence of things, they have gained knowledge, and nausea inhibits action; for their action could not change anything in the eternal nature of things; they feel it to be ridiculous or humiliating that they should be asked to set right a world that is out of joint. Knowledge kills action; action requires the veils of illusion: that is the doctrine of Hamlet, not that cheap wisdom of Jack the Dreamer who reflects too much and, as it were, from an excess of possibilities does not get around to action. Not reflection, no—true knowledge, an insight into the horrible truth, outweighs any motive for action, both in Hamlet and the Dionysian man.\(^\text{123}\)

The Dionysian reveller’s fate is analogous to that of Hamlet. Both have gained insight into the true ‘essence’ and ‘the eternal nature of things’. For the Dionysian reveller this entails the revelation of the smallness and absurdity of empirical quotidian existence and its alienation—separated by the ‘chasm of oblivion’—from the profundity of the Dionysian. This knowledge is coupled with the realisation that no action can alter this, even though it must now appear as ‘out of joint’. The demand to

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\(^{123}\) Ibid. Nietzsche’s interpretation of the character of Hamlet is established in contrast to Romantic readings of the text, in particular that of Coleridge. In his lecture on *Hamlet*, Coleridge argues that Shakespeare’s aim was to ‘portray a person in whose view the external world, and all its incidents and objects, were comparatively dim, and of no interest in themselves, and which only began to be of interest when they were reflected in the mirror of his mind.’ (Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ‘Hamlet’ in *The Major Works*, ed. H.J. Jackson [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000], 655-659 [655]) For Coleridge, Hamlet represents a type who takes no interest in the outside world until it is significantly reconfigured in his mind. Apathy and introspection create a stark division between the inner world and the outer world. Coleridge argues that Hamlet is absorbed in ‘endless reasoning and hesitating—constant urging and solicitation of the mind to act, and as constant an escape from action; ceaseless reproaches of himself for sloth and negligence, while the whole energy of his resolution evaporates in these reproaches.’ (ibid.) In contrast to Nietzsche, for whom the revelation of the true constitution of the world renders action futile, for Coleridge, Hamlet’s is a state of procrastination and impotent resolve. He is driven by his bad conscience to act, and yet loses himself in internal debate and speculation, failing to implement his resolve. In response, he inwardly tortures himself for his failure and procrastination, leading to a deepening of his bad conscience and a renewed resolve to act. This deepening leads to further debate and speculation: a more profound and pervasive interiority. Coleridge argues that Hamlet’s failure to act is ‘not from cowardice […] not from want of forethought or slowness of apprehension, for he sees through the very souls of all who surround him, but merely from that aversion to action, which prevails among such as have a world in themselves.’ (ibid.) Hamlet’s inaction results not from fear or cowardice but from a division between the ‘external world’ and the inner world of thought (the mirror of the mind), founded upon the self-lacerating circularity of the bad conscience. See Charles Mahoney, ‘Coleridge and Shakespeare’, in Frederick Burwick, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Samuel Taylor Coleridge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 498-514 (500, 506-509). On the relationship of Coleridge’s reading of *Hamlet* to the Romantics see Matthew Scott, ‘Coleridge’s Lectures 1808-1819: On Literature’, 185-203 (187-189).
amend the ‘nature of things’ appears absurd, humiliating and impossible. The absurdity of quotidian reality when compared to Dionysian reality across the gulf which irrevocably separates them, incites ‘nausea’—‘an ascetic will-negating mood’—in which all action is revealed as futile, for action would require the illusion of the ‘glory’ of individuation, now irrevocably shattered.\textsuperscript{124}

For Nietzsche the sublime ecstasy of the Dionysian state reveals the powerful chaotic play and contradiction of the ‘primal unity’. The depth and power of the play of the drives is experienced both with terror and exultation.\textsuperscript{125} This state of rapture in turn reveals the smallness of quotidian existence. Upon their return to the quotidian, the Dionysian reveller gains insight into the true and ineluctable organisation of the Dionysian and quotidian realities (and of the gulf which separates them). They become aware of the profundity and the energy of the drives suppressed within empirical existence in order to render this existence possible and yet, as an empirically existing individual, they know empirical existence too to be necessary as the redemption of the ‘primal unity’ in mere appearance.\textsuperscript{126} They know that this organisation of realities is necessary and that no effort on their part can alter it. Nonetheless, the smallness and banality of ‘everyday reality,’ compared to the exultation of the Dionysian, is experienced with incredulity, disappointment, frustration and grief. This presents an alternative to the orthodox critical interpretation of the relationship between the Dionysian and suffering, of which Wayne Klein offers an apposite summary:

\textsuperscript{124} §3, 43. Cf. ‘Why I am so Clever’, in Ecce Homo: ‘Is Hamlet understood? Not doubt, certainty is what drives one insane.—But one must be profound, an abyss, a philosopher to feel that way.—We are all afraid of truth’. (On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Kaufmann and Hollingdale, ed. Kaufmann, §4, 246)
\textsuperscript{125} §1, 36
\textsuperscript{126} §4, 45
Music reveals the essence of the world as eternal contradiction and pain. Images, not music, enable one to live on in the face of the knowledge that life is truly abysmal. Images are thus both a prophylactic and a stimulus to life, a necessary antidote to Dionysian music, which if experienced in their absence would cause one literally to expire.

Just as Hamlet’s seeing his father’s ghost affords insight into the world’s (the court of Elsinore’s) being ‘out of joint’, so the Dionysian reveller’s experience reveals the absurdity of quotidian existence, and it is this which precipitates nausea and not the experience of the Dionysian itself.

Both Hamlet and the Dionysian reveller are trapped in a divided shape of consciousness: a state of self-alienation. The Dionysian reveller has experienced the ‘feeling of fullness’ which is attained in the ecstatic state of the Dionysian sublime and has ‘gained knowledge’ of the essential nature of existence and ‘the eternal nature of things’. Having returned to the absurdity and futility of ‘everyday reality,’ they are now alienated from that essential state of ‘overgreat fullness’ and ‘nausea inhibits action’. Quotidian social relations are so constituted as to make it impossible for Hamlet and the Dionysian reveller to express and to realise their true self or ‘character’. Both are compelled to exhibit a character entirely foreign to them:

How strange or odd soe’er I bear myself;  
As I perchance shall think meet  
To put an antic disposition on

Their essential nature remains irrevocably other, sundered from ‘everyday reality’ by the ‘chasm of oblivion’. They are incapable of expressing and of realising their essential natures and so they suffer.

127 Klein, _Nietzsche and the Promise of Philosophy_, 117 (emphasis added)
At the heart of Nietzsche’s insight into the nature of ‘nausea’ and resultant pessimism is a fundamental inversion. Pessimism here is seen to result from a far more fundamental, profound and thwarted optimism: a deeply felt experience of the potential for creativity and vitality, inherent in the ‘nature of things’. This optimism is constitutionally incapable of pragmatic reflection on the chance and finitude in which ‘things’ (people, places, objects, times) are compelled by necessity to operate. Disappointment, yearning, frustration and resentment form the ground of pessimism. Quotidian existence fails to attain an impossible perfection: ‘Now no comfort avails any more; longing transcends a world after death, even the gods; existence is negated along with its glittering reflection in the gods or in an immortal beyond.’

Myth is no longer capable of incorporating and redeeming lived experience through its transfiguration into the narratives of the deeds of the gods, for this has been revealed as an artifice. Nor can the promise of the immortality of the individuated soul in ‘a world after death’ or ‘immortal beyond’ act as compensation. Here, where the danger of the renunciation of life and the threat to the ‘will is greatest’, Nietzsche argues, ‘art approaches as a saving sorceress, expert at healing.’

The need to redeem existence from ‘nausea’ is that which inaugurates the Dionysian-Apollinian conjunction and the birth of tragedy from the ironic self-creation of the artist.

(ii) – Nietzsche’s ‘Classicism’: the ‘artists’ metaphysics’ (the self-creation of the artist)

Nietzsche argues that the answer to the problem of the conjunction of the Dionysian and Apollinian is symbolised in the homage paid by Hellenic culture to two poets.

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129 BT, §7, 60
130 Ibid.
The first is Homer, who for Nietzsche represents the archetype of the purely Apollinian poet. The second is that of Archilochus whose face, Nietzsche claims, was placed side by side with Homer’s ‘on gems, sculptures, etc.’, by Hellenic culture, and who stands for Nietzsche as the archetype of the lyric poet. For Nietzsche, the figure of the lyric poet (with Archilochus as its archetype) embodies the Dionysian-Apollinian conjunction. This is the contrast with Homer, as purely Apollinian poet, which Nietzsche establishes in §5. In this passage, Nietzsche is not identifying Archilochus as the archetypal purely Dionysian poet. What is at stake in his comparison of Homer and Archilochus is the contrast of the two forms of poetry to which they gave birth and not an argument concerning their polar embodiment of the Apollinian and the Dionysian. Their originality and corresponding archetypal status, enables Nietzsche to use them to frame the aesthetic problem he sees at the heart of the attempt to understand the conjunction of the Dionysian and the Apollinian.

Nietzsche argues that this problem arises within what he dubs ‘Modern aesthetics’ as the misunderstanding and false contrast between the ‘“objective” artist’ and the ‘“subjective” artist’, with Homer standing as the archetype of objectivity, and Archilochus as the archetype of subjectivity. Nietzsche seeks to overcome this opposition: ‘because we know the subjective artist only as the poor artist’. The ‘we’ here forms a tacit assumption, by Nietzsche, of agreement with his position on the part of his reader in rejecting the categories and conclusions of ‘Modern aesthetics’

131 See §3, 44 and §5, 48
132 Ibid.
133 Silk and Stern identify Archilochus and lyric poetry as purely Dionysian: ‘the Dionysiac lyric with its progenitor Archilochus […]’, (135-136) reducing Archilochus to the status of the ‘drunken reveller’. (231-232) They elide Nietzsche’s crucial qualification, in which Apollo appears to inspire the Dionysian reveller to create poetry. (Ibid. BT, §5, 49-50) Allison also stresses the ‘singularly Dionysian cast’ of Archilochus, (45-46) misidentifying him as the ‘prototype of the lyric poet’. (49) Nietzsche in fact argues that he was the first lyric poet and not merely a prototype.
134 BT, §5, 48
135 Ibid.
and pursuing the argument that what is necessary to the creation of art is ‘the conquest of the subjective, redemption from the “ego,” and the silencing of the individual will and desire’. Art and poetry, Nietzsche argues, are impossible if the artist remains subjectively entrenched in his personal concerns and desires, and fails to attain objectivity. In the outpouring of his own vehement passions through his poetry, Archilochus, Nietzsche argues, would be defined under the rubric of ‘Modern aesthetics’ as a subjective artist. By contrast, Nietzsche seeks to define the way in which Archilochus, standing as the archetype of the lyric poet, transcends the opposition of the objective and subjective through the conjunction of the Dionysian and Apollinian.

The problem, for Nietzsche, becomes to understand how the lyric poet is possible as a true and objective artist, freed from what he argues is the poverty of merely ‘subjective’ art, when the archetypal lyric poet, Archilochus, who, though so esteemed by the Hellenes as to be granted equal honours with Homer, ‘is continually saying “I” and running through the whole chromatic scale of his [subjective] passions and desires’ in his poetry. The solution, Nietzsche argues, lies in Schiller’s ‘psychological observation’ on the ‘poetic process’ that ‘before the act of creation he did not have before him or within him any series of images in a causal arrangement, but rather a musical mood.’ For Nietzsche, following Schiller, there is no content in

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136 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
138 49. Nietzsche cites a letter from Schiller to Goethe, 18th March, 1796:

The preparations for so complicated a work as a drama set the mind in a strange state of motion. Even the very first operation of seeking a certain method in the work—so as not to grope about aimlessly—is no trifling affair. I am at present engaged with the skeleton and find that a dramatic structure, as in the case of the human body, is the most essential part. I should like to know how you set to work in such matters. With me the conception has at first no definite or clear object; this comes later. A certain musical state of mind precedes it, and this, in me, is only the followed by the poetic idea. (Correspondence
the mind of the poet prior to the creation of poetry. What precedes and acts as the motivation of the act of poetic creation is a ‘mood’ (stimmung). Nietzsche interprets Schiller’s formulation of the ‘musical mood’ as corresponding to his own conception of the Dionysian sublime as the laceration of individuation and descent into the undivided continuity of the flux of the ‘primal unity’. The ‘musical mood’ thus also corresponds to Nietzsche’s subsequent definition of ‘intuition’ in ‘On Truth’, to Bergson and Hulme’s conceptions of the ‘aesthetic intuition’, and to the moment of ironic inversion in Stephen’s conception of the ‘esthetic image’, as I sought to define these in the second chapter. In the Dionysian, Nietzsche, following Schiller, is concerned with defining the nature of artistic inspiration.

Has anyone at the end of the nineteenth century a clear idea of what poets of strong ages have called inspiration? […] The idea that one is merely incarnation, merely mouthpiece, merely a medium of overpowering forces. The concept of revelation—in the sense that suddenly, with indescribable certainty and subtlety, something becomes visible, audible, something that shakes one to the last depths and throws one down—that merely describes the facts. One hears, one does not seek; one accepts, one does not ask who gives; like lightning, a thought flashes up, with necessity, without hesitation regarding its form—I never had any choice.¹³⁹

Nietzsche describes ‘inspiration’ as the effect of forces that enter the subject from without as an overpowering ravishment. Conscious volition cannot engender a state of

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¹³⁹ Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘Thus Spoke Zarathustra’ in Ecce Homo, 295-307; §3, 300-301 (300)
inspiration. Inspiration is precipitated by the overwhelming, and temporary suspension, of subjective willing. The terms of Nietzsche’s definition of inspiration echo those of Romanticism, as I sought to define these in the second chapter, with reference to Shelley’s *A Defence of Poetry*.\(^{140}\) Whilst his conception of inspiration retains the notions of spontaneity and involuntariness crucial to Shelley’s account (‘this power arises from within […] the conscious portions of our nature are unprophetic either of its approach or its departure),\(^{141}\) in line with his ironic appropriation of the terms of Schopenhauerian aesthetics, Nietzsche rejects its implicit Platonism: ‘to be a poet is to apprehend the true and the beautiful, in a word the good’.\(^{142}\) In terms which serve to bind his definition to his early accounts of the ‘primal unity’ and intuition, and later doctrine of the will to power, Nietzsche lays emphasis on the plurality of the forces overwhelming the artist. Inspiration, for Nietzsche, is not a visitation by a gentle, invisible ‘influence’ but a violent experience of ravishment: ‘something that shakes one to the last depths and throws one down.’ He defines inspiration as a discovery: ‘The concept of revelation—in the sense that suddenly, with indescribable certainty and subtlety, something becomes visible, audible.’ Just as in the definition of ‘intuition’ in ‘On Truth’ (already at stake in the Dionysian and Apollinian of *Birth*) and the revelation of the ‘sense’ and ‘Essence’ of a quantum of reality in the doctrine of the will to power, something previously veiled or repressed is revealed in the experience of inspiration. Nietzsche’s later account of inspiration, already implicitly at stake in *Birth*, represents an ironic appropriation of the Romantic conception of artistic inspiration to an anti-Romantic philosophical project.

\(^{140}\) See chapter 2, pp. 116-119, above.
\(^{141}\) Shelley, *ADP*, 696-697
\(^{142}\) 677. See Clark, *The Theory of Inspiration: Composition as a crisis of subjectivity in Romantic and post-Romantic writing*, 143-169
For Nietzsche, following Schiller, the experience of the involuntary influx of overpowering forces in artistic inspiration is analogous to that experienced in music. However, he qualifies Schiller’s insight by indicating what he argues is ‘the most important phenomenon of all ancient poetry’: ‘the union, indeed the identity of the lyrist with the musician.’\textsuperscript{143} For Nietzsche, the experience of music lies at the heart of artistic inspiration and ‘the poetic process’. At the point of their birth lyric poetry and music—the poet and the musician—are identical. Nietzsche seeks to define this experience of music, inspiration and the ‘poetic process’ through reference to the ‘aesthetical metaphysics’ established in his analysis of the Dionysian and Apollinian modes of the sublime in §§1-4.\textsuperscript{144}

It is significant that at the outset of §5 Nietzsche inverts the order of the two drives in the hyphenation symbolic of their conjunction: ‘Dionysian-Apollinian’.\textsuperscript{145} This inversion indicates the priority of the Dionysian and thus establishes a temporal, though not an ontological, hierarchy between the two drives. Thus, in ‘the first place, as a Dionysian artist,’ the lyric poet ‘has identified himself with the primal unity, its pain and contradiction.’\textsuperscript{146} Through the experience of the Dionysian sublime the poet is divested of his empirical, subjective existence. This experience is what is intended by Nietzsche in his invocation of Schiller’s ‘musical mood’ and the revelatory influx of forces which precipitates poetic inspiration, and is that which underlies the identity of the musician and the poet.

\textsuperscript{143} BT, §5, 49
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid. Cf. §4, 45
\textsuperscript{145} §5, 48
\textsuperscript{146} 49
For Nietzsche, the lyric poet, as musician, transposes this experience of identity with the ‘primal unity’ in the Dionysian into music, which thus forms its ‘repetition’ or ‘copy’. This transposed ‘copy’ of the ‘primal unity,’ now, ‘under the Apollinian dream inspiration’ which seeks to render intelligible and to incorporate all lived experience, ‘reveals itself to [the lyric poet] again as a symbolic dream image.’ The experience of the divestiture of the empirical self and identity with the ‘primal unity’ in the Dionysian, for Nietzsche, inexorably engenders a need to express this ecstatic state in music. In turn, in the same way that the need to incorporate experience precipitated dreams, in order to capture, articulate and thereby incorporate the experience of music, the Apollinian is called upon to render it intelligible through the spontaneous generation of images.

The conjunction of the Dionysian and Apollinian occurs as the series of stages in the self-engendering ‘process’ of the lyric poet. The process is precipitated by the physical and psychological need to react to the powerful ecstatic experience of the Dionysian: ‘The inchoate, intangible reflection of the primordial pain in music, with its redemption in mere appearance, now produces a second mirroring as a specific symbol or example.’ For Nietzsche, music, as ‘mere appearance,’ embodies and reflects the ecstasy of the Dionysian. This reflection itself remains ‘inchoate’ and ‘intangible’: is only felt and therefore remains formless and frustratingly ungraspable and distant. The need to comprehend and to articulate this ‘musical mood’ precipitates the call upon the ‘Apollinian dream inspiration’ to embody the experience in ‘specific’ images.

\[^{147}\text{Ibid.}\]
\[^{148}\text{Ibid.}\]
\[^{149}\text{Ibid.}\]
The Dionysian-Apollinian conjunction thus results from a double transposition arising from the need to comprehend, articulate and incorporate Dionysian purgation. First music is engendered as its emotional and physical expression through the ‘symbolic faculties [….T]he entire symbolism of the body’: 150 

Through this bodily symbolism the Dionysian finds release. Nietzsche argues that a deeply felt need to comprehend and to incorporate the experience of the ecstasy of the Dionysian and its release in music now arises. This need engenders a call upon the Apollinian artistic drive, sublimating the process of individuation. 151 The Apollinian generates a ‘specific symbol or example’ intended to encapsulate the universal experience of the Dionysian and of music: transposing and projecting it organically and spontaneously into images. The process of the Dionysian-Apollinian conjunction is one of transposition from the purgative Dionysian to Apollinian incorporation: a process of sublime transposition.

This process suspends the subject/object distinction. In the fragment ‘On Music and Words,’ written at the same time as the latter sections of Birth (1871) and originally intended to form a part of the text, but which Nietzsche later omitted, 152 he

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150 Cf. §2, 40
151 Cf. §4, 45
defines the ecstatic experience of music against what he argues is the misapprehension that it arises from an excitation of emotion or ‘feeling’: ‘the whole realm of drives, the interplay of feelings, sensations, emotions, and acts of will’, he argues, ‘is known to us […] only as representations and not according to its essence.’\textsuperscript{153} Nietzsche argues that drives, feelings, and emotions are only appearances, ‘representations’ of the ‘will’ (understood here as synonymous with the flux undivided continuity of states of the ‘primal unity’), which, bowing to ‘rigid necessity,’ we cannot get beyond.\textsuperscript{154} He argues that within empirical experience we can know the ‘will’ only through these conscious and unconscious representations—only in sublimated form through Apollinian appearances—but we cannot know it as it is in-itself. Within the ecstatic experience of music, however, this veil of representations is torn aside and the ‘will’ and the ‘whole realm of drives’ is experienced directly.

Nietzsche argues that those who feel music merely as an effect on their emotions gain access only to the sphere of the representations: an ‘intermediate realm’ in-between the listener and that which the ‘musical mood’ reveals. Feelings can only translate and symbolise the experience of music but can never themselves generate music.\textsuperscript{155} The feelings, images and concepts that constitute our experience of the ‘will’ are already permeated by conscious and unconscious representations in that they are related to and arise from relations to particular objects of empirical experience. They are subject to the principle of individuation.

\textsuperscript{153} Dahlhaus, \textit{Between Romanticism and Modernism}, 107-108
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid. Cf. \textit{BT}, §4, 45
\textsuperscript{155} Cf. Dahlhaus, \textit{Between Romanticism and Modernism}, 111-112
For Nietzsche, the ecstatic experience of music suspends the subject-object relation arising from individuation and this gives rise to a new form of experience in which ‘the object of music [...] is given to us as the content (Inhalt) of our own intensely undergone aesthetic experience.'\(^{156}\) According to Nietzsche this ‘object’ is experienced directly, without the mediation of representations. What is experienced is not, an excitement or heightening of emotional relations, but proceeds from the ‘altogether different regions’ of the ‘primal unity’, released from the constrictions of individuation.\(^ {157}\) It is an experience of ‘dithyrambic world redemption jubilation’: the experience of the release, free play, and exaltation of fundamental creative drives and energies emancipated and redeemed from the constraints of quotidian finitude.\(^{158}\)

This experience of the Dionysian ‘redemption’ of the ‘will’ and the suspension of individuation, then, is what the lyric poet strives to symbolise through recourse to the Apollinian. Nietzsche names Archilochus as ‘the first Greek lyrist’ and thus the archetypal embodiment of the Dionysian-Apollinian conjunction: ‘it is not his passion alone that dances before us in orgiastic frenzy; but we see Dionysus and the Maenads, we see the drunken reveller Archilochus sunk down in slumber.’\(^ {159}\) Nietzsche argues that it is not simply his subjective passion which Archilochus portrays in his poetry, but his Dionysian experience is embodied and expressed in the mythic form of the figure of Dionysus himself and of his female devotees, the Maenads. Apollo now approaches the sleeping Archilochus ‘and touches him with the laurel. Then the Dionysian-musical enchantment of the sleeper seems to emit image sparks, lyrical

\(^{156}\) Allison, *Reading the New Nietzsche*, 65
\(^{157}\) Dahlhaus, *Between Romanticism and Modernism*, 112
\(^{158}\) Ibid.
poems, which in their highest development are called tragedies and dramatic dithyrambs.\textsuperscript{160} The ‘Dionysian-musical enchantment’ only \textit{seems} to emit ‘image sparks,’ for, as I have argued, the physiological-psychological need to comprehend, articulate, and incorporate this ‘enchantment’ is what gives rise to the call upon Apollo.

In contrast to the purely Apollinian ‘plastic artist’ and ‘epic poet’, ‘absorbed’ in ‘the pure contemplation of images,’ and the Dionysian artist-musician who is ‘without any images, himself pure primordial pain and its primordial re-echoing,’ the lyric poet represents a third type of artist: the conjunction and ‘highest development’ of the Apollinian and Dionysian.\textsuperscript{161} The lyric poet is neither solely absorbed in the pure contemplation of images, nor without images, but is ‘conscious of a world of images and symbols—growing out of his state of mystical self-abnegation and oneness.’\textsuperscript{162} The Dionysian origin of these ‘symbols’ means that the ‘world’ the lyric poet creates ‘has a coloring, a causality, and a velocity, quite different from those of the world of the plastic artist and the epic poet.’\textsuperscript{163} Whereas these latter derive their images from a purely Apollinian source, those of the lyric poet ‘grow’ from his initial Dionysian intoxication and ecstasy. This accounts for the variance in the ‘causality’: the differing courses of the development of the two types of imagery. In addition, whereas the ‘velocity’—the rhythm and tempo, and ‘coloring’—of the Apollinian artist’s images is one of calm serenity and ordered delineation, those of the lyric poet embody the ecstatic energy of the Dionysian.

\textsuperscript{160} \textit{BT}, §5, 49-50
\textsuperscript{161} 50. Cf. §1, 37
\textsuperscript{162} §5, 50
\textsuperscript{163} \textit{Ibid.}
The ‘plastic artist’ and the ‘epic poet’ live in their images and ‘only in them’. The nature of these images as a transfiguring ‘mirror of illusion’ creates and maintains a distance between the artist and his images, and ‘he is protected against becoming one and fused with his figures’: they are interposed between himself and reality. By contrast, the images of the lyric poet, having evolved as the embodiment and incorporation of the Dionysian divestiture of the empirical self and its recreation in music, ‘are nothing but his very self.’ It is here, for Nietzsche, that the subject/object distinction is suspended. The ‘self’ of the lyric poet is the embodiment of identity with the ‘primal unity’ and its recreation in music: ‘the “I” of the lyrist therefore sounds from the depths of his being: its “subjectivity” is a fiction.’ The ‘self’ of the lyric poet is an image through which the experience of identity with the ‘primal unity’ gains utterance. The ‘the whole chromatic scale’ of the lyric poet’s ‘passions’ are appropriated as images with which to articulate their intense aesthetic experience ‘so he, as the moving centre of this world, may say “I”’: may refer the ecstasy to an intelligible and known register of experience.

In ‘On Music and Words,’ Nietzsche refers to the ecstatic Dionysian experience of identity with the ‘will’ and defines its comprehension and articulation by the lyric poet in terms of ‘feeling’:

[T]he feelings of love, fear, and hope: [....T]hese feelings can serve to symbolise the music, which is what the lyric poet does when he translates this realm of the “will,” which cannot be approached by means of concepts and images and yet is the real content and subject of music, into the metaphorical world of feelings.

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164 Ibid.
165 Ibid. Cf. §3, 43
166 Ibid.
167 49
168 50
169 Nietzsche ‘On Music and Words,’ in Dahlhaus, Between Romanticism and Modernism, 111
As immediately physiologically and psychologically moving, empirical feelings are employed by the lyric poet as representations—provisional metaphors—in order to transpose the otherwise ungraspable and incomprehensible experience of identity with the ‘will’. The ‘self’—the ‘I’ articulating this experience—is thus ‘not the same as that of the waking, empirically real man, but the only truly existent and eternal self resting at the very basis of things, through whose images the lyric genius sees this very basis.’\(^\text{170}\) The images of the lyric poet are ‘projections’ which reveal the experience of identity with the ‘will’ and allow it to be comprehended and articulated by the lyric poet. This is the birth of tragedy—out of the spirit of music.

For Nietzsche the ‘empirically real’ self of the lyric poet, as it returns in their poetry, is itself an image, merely a cipher. The feelings (‘love, fear, and hope’) of empirical experience are accessed and grasped by the lyric poet as a register into which to translate the Dionysian-musical ecstasy. The poet, however, remains detached from this world of willing: ‘as Apollinian genius [the lyric poet] interprets music through the image of the will, while he himself, completely released from the greed of the will, is the pure undimmed eye of the sun.’\(^\text{171}\) Released from the bonds of the empirical self by the Dionysian-musical ecstasy, the lyric poet is free, Nietzsche argues, to interpret this experience through the most immediate and appropriate images gleaned from phenomena, which emerge as ‘image sparks’ suggested by the poet’s state of inspiration. For Nietzsche, Archilochus,

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\begin{align*}
\text{[the] passionately inflamed, loving, and hating man, is but a vision of the genius, who by this time is no longer merely Archilochus, but a world-genius expressing his primordial pain symbolically in the symbol of the man Archilochus—while the subjectively willing and desiring man, Archilochus can never at any time be a poet.} & \quad \text{\cite{BT, 5, 50}} \\
\end{align*}
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\(^\text{170}\) \text{BT, §5, 50} \\
\(^\text{171}\) \text{Cf. §6, 55} \\
\(^\text{172}\) \text{§5, 50}
The ‘Archilochus’ who says ‘I’ is no longer simply the quotidian, individuated man Archilochus, who is incapable of composing poetry. This quotidian self has been lacerated in the experience of artistic inspiration and now returns only as the ‘symbol,’ or symbolic register, by which the ‘primal unity’ (the ‘world-genius’) can express the ‘primordial pain’ of chaotic flux. The empirical self, Nietzsche argues, becomes a mask for the Dionysian-musical ecstasy. It is separated from the artist as ‘world-genius’ by the lacuna of the process of sublime transposition. The empirical ‘subjectively willing and desiring’ self can never be a poet. The lyric poet must have undergone the experience and process of ‘inspiration’ (the ‘musical mood’) in order to become identical with the ‘world-genius’ which retrieves and redeems the empirical self as an image.

It is not necessary, however, for the lyric poet to use only their empirical self. Indeed, for Nietzsche, it is not a matter of choice. The divestiture of self, identity with the ‘primal unity’ and the Dionysian-musical ecstasy which embodies this experience, necessarily, spontaneously and organically (that is, without the volition of the poet) generate mythic or imagistic representations from within themselves. The lyric poet’s empirical self functions as a projection and as a mask for their experience. However, ‘tragedy shows how far the visionary world of the lyrist may be removed from this phenomenon’.173 The mythic personages of tragedy may equally well function as expressions and masks of the Dionysian-musical ecstasy. The empirical self of the poet is merely that phenomenon which lies ‘closest at hand.’174 The empirical self is

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173 50-51.
174 51
divested in the Dionysian only to return as an image, born of music, to embody that experience.

For Nietzsche, the union of the Dionysian and Apollinian is not a moment in which the two drives are synthesised to form a third single phenomenon. Instead, it takes the form of a process in which the two drives are conjoined and yet remain distinct. A temporal hierarchy subsists in which the purgative Dionysian mode of the sublime, as first moment, necessarily engenders the Apollinian sublime mode of incorporation. This is not a qualitative or an ontological hierarchy, but the resulting conjunction represents the highest manifestation of both modes of the sublime: the Dionysian in the experience of identity with primordial pain and contradiction, and the primordial pleasure in appearance in the recreation of its effect in music, the Apollinian in its symbolisation of the Dionysian itself.\footnote{§5, 49} The process is that of a double transposition from the ecstatic divestiture of self and identity with the ‘primal unity’ in the Dionysian into its ‘reflection’ and re-creation in music, and the generation from this in turn of images in the Apollinian whose purpose is the incorporation of the experience of the Dionysian.

Laceration and self-destruction in the experience of the Dionysian sublime, Nietzsche argues, constitute the ‘objectivity’ of the artist. They are the condition for the revelation of the ‘primal unity’ and the condition of the possibility for the creation of art. For Nietzsche, only through undergoing laceration in the experience of the Dionysian can the artist-poet attain to the ‘redemption’ and purgation of the drives
and the incorporation of this ‘redemption’ in the mythic-symbolism of the ‘passions’ and ‘feelings’. This is the ironic self-creation of the ‘I’ of the artist.

The process of the Dionysian-Apollinian sublime transposition can be understood as a whole, then, as the process of a fold:

In *Nietzsche’s Philosophy*, Eugen Fink summarises this self-unfolding—self-enfolding process as the movement of the artistic consciousness in *Birth* in relation to ‘On Truth’:

The will comes to itself, becomes conscious of itself, takes possession of itself through consciousness and redeems itself in beautiful “semblance” […] The will must alienate itself in order to own itself and reunite itself from this alienation in order to realise its own self-consciousness.¹⁷⁶

What was at stake in Nietzsche’s reading of the ‘Dionysian’ in relation to the character of Hamlet was a shape of consciousness which had experienced the ecstatic free-play and ‘redemption’ of the chaos, pain and contradiction of the undifferentiated drives of the ‘primal unity’ in the Dionysian, and subsequently become alienated from this essential experience in the ineluctable return to the quotidian. Here a further phase of self-alienation becomes evident in which the artist having been divested of their empirical self, having attained identity with the primal unity, and having already represented this experience in music, now articulates and comprehends the music itself through the generation of images. According to Fink, the ‘will’ redeems itself by

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attaining self-knowledge, and through the subsequent creation of art (‘beautiful “semblance”’).\(^{177}\) The ‘will’ alienates itself from itself through the process of individuation in order to redeem itself: to know itself through the individual and to be transfigured again into art. The self-creation of the artist follows an analogous pattern. The artist becomes alienated from their empirical self through the laceration and ecstasy of the Dionysian and attains unity with, and consciousness of, the super-abundance and power of the drives unfettered from Apollinian individuation. The artist recreates this experience in music. Now, driven by an inner need to comprehend and incorporate this experience, the ‘*musical mood*’ of inspiration generates images which embody that experience.\(^{178}\)

In *Twilight of the Idols*, in a section on the ‘psychology of the artist’, Nietzsche clarifies what is at stake in the terms of the fold in the self-creation of the artist in *Birth*, in an analysis of what he calls the process of ‘idealizing’:

*Toward a psychology of the artist*. If there is to be art, if there is to be any aesthetic doing and seeing, one physiological condition is indispensable: frenzy […] What is essential in such frenzy is the feeling of increased strength and fullness. Out of this feeling one lends to things, one forces them to accept from us, one violates them—this process is called *idealizing*.\(^{179}\)

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\(^{177}\) Fink thus follows Nietzsche’s line of argument in his ‘aesthetical metaphysics,’ of the redemption of the ‘primal unity’ and the drives through the Apollinian drive, empirical consciousness emerging as ‘*mere appearance*’ and dreams and art as ‘*mere appearance*’, and thus as the highest manifestation of the Apollinian and the drive to ‘redemption through illusion’. Cf. §4, 45

\(^{178}\) Cf. Nietzsche ‘On Music and Words,’ in Dahlhaus, *Between Romanticism and Modernism*, 115. See also *Untimely Meditations*, ‘Richard Wagner in Bayreuth,’ (hereafter UM, IV): ‘[T]o translate visible movement back into soul and primordial life, and conversely to see the most deeply concealed inner activity as visible phenomenon and to clothe it with appearance of a body. All this constitutes the essence of the *dithyrambic artist*.’ (§7, 223)

Nietzsche argues for the foundation of all art in the ‘frenzy’ (Rausch) of natural drives.\textsuperscript{180} ‘Frenzy’ is thus synonymous with the laceration of individuation and identity with the ‘primal unity’ in the Dionysian sublime of Birth. Nietzsche argues that from the state of ‘frenzy’, the artist returns to the objects of empirical experience (in the context of the lyric poet in Birth, to their own empirical emotions, passions and feelings) and forces them to ‘accept’ the essence of this ecstatic experience. The artist violates these objects and uses them to embody his experience of ‘frenzy’. The objects, as images, become ideal. In terms which echo his definition of the ‘good poet of the future’ in Human, All Too Human, who, he argues ‘will depict only reality [. . .] Only reality, but by no means every reality! – he will depict a select reality!',\textsuperscript{181} in contrast to what he deems to be the ‘prejudice’ that ‘idealizing’ consists in the mere sloughing off of the ‘petty or inconsequential’ in both the artist and their model, Nietzsche argues that what is ‘decisive’ in ‘frenzy’ is ‘a tremendous drive to bring out the main features so that the others disappear in the process.’\textsuperscript{182}

The terms of Twilight’s ‘psychology of the artist’ explicitly reiterate those of Nietzsche’s earlier definition of the ‘classical’ in Human, All Too Human, with its emphasis on rigorosity and selection, which had remained only implicit within Birth, and serves to bind these to the relationship of the Dionysian and the Apollinian.\textsuperscript{183} Further, it serves to bind both the Dionysian-Apollinian and the ‘classical’ to Nietzsche’s definition of ‘intuition’ as the laceration of pre-existing conventional concepts and the formation of ‘forbidden metaphors and in unheard-of

\textsuperscript{180} Ibid. Amongst the different ‘types’ of ‘frenzy’ he identifies, he includes ‘sexual frenzy’. ‘the frenzy that follows all great cravings, all strong affects’; ‘feasts’, ‘contests’, ‘feats of daring’, ‘victory’, ‘all extreme movement’; ‘cruelty’; ‘destruction’; ‘meteorological influences’; ‘spring’ and ‘narcotics’.

\textsuperscript{181} HH IIa, §114, 239-240

\textsuperscript{182} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{183} Cf. HH I, §195, 93-94, §171, 90.
combinations of concepts’ in the attempt to ‘correspond creatively to the impression of the powerful and present intuition’ in ‘On Truth’, with its echo in the Bergsonian-Hulmean ‘aesthetic intuition’ and especially Hulme’s concept of ‘zest’: ‘an extraordinary interest in a thing, a great zest in its contemplation which carries the contemplator to accurate description’. Nietzsche is thus using this explicitly naturalistic interpretation of artistic inspiration and creation as the process of the transformation of ‘things’ into images, understood as the fold in the ironic self-creation of the artist through the process of sublime transposition, to clarify the contrast between the Apollinian and Dionysian artistic drives in Birth, ‘both conceived as kinds of frenzy,’ and their conjunction.

The Apollinian ‘frenzy’ constitutes the drive to incorporation, which, Nietzsche argues, ‘excites the eye above all’, so that its faculty is transformed into a ‘power of vision’ in which the quotidian, as in dreams, is transfigured and redeemed.

In the Dionysian state, on the other hand, the whole affective system is excited and enhanced: so that it discharges all its means of expression at once and drives forth simultaneously the power of representation, imitation, transfiguration, transformation, and every kind of mimicking and acting. The essential feature here remains the ease of metamorphosis, the inability not to react.

Whereas, for Nietzsche, the Apollinian sublime affects only the faculty of seeing, the Dionysian sublime affects all the faculties of the body ‘simultaneously’. The, thus excited, system is impelled to react to and to discharge its frenzy. It ‘drives forth’ first music and then the Apollinian in order to incorporate the experience of the sublime.

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184 Nietzsche, On Truth’, 122, Hulme, ‘Romanticism and Classicism,’ 136
185 §10, 519-520
186 Ibid. Emphasis added
187 Ibid.
The process of sublime transposition begins with the empirical individuated self of the artist. It then proceeds through a movement of the annihilation of the empirical self into a state of ecstatic ‘frenzy’ in which ‘the whole affective system is excited and enhanced’ and attains a heightened power and potentiality in the free play of the unfettered creative drives (what Nietzsche terms ‘strength and fullness’). At this point, divorced from willing and in their heightened state of mind, the artist enters into disinterested contemplation of the phenomenon of the will. They interpret and select from the phenomena of the empirical self those which embody and transmit the essence of their experience. The empirical self of the artist is re-created as a mask—an image (the ‘I’ of the lyric poet)—in order to narrate this experience. This is the fold of the self-creation of the artist. It is this which is at stake in Nietzsche’s otherwise enigmatic proclamation in ‘The Attempt at a Self-Criticism’, which he defines in a fragment of 1885-1886, that Birth contains an ‘artists’ metaphysics’:

Becoming, felt and interpreted from within, would be continual creating by someone dissatisfied, over-wealthy, endlessly tense and endlessly under pressure, by a god whose only means of overcoming the torment of being is constant transformation and exchange – illusion as the temporary redemption achieved every moment; the world as the succession of divine visions and redemptions in illusion.

In terms which are echoed in the later ‘Attempt’ preface and in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche describes the impulsion to art as resulting from a state of overfullness. Just as the Dionysian ecstasy of Birth gave rise to the feeling of

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188 Cf. BT, §6, 55 and ‘On Music and Words’ (Dahlhaus, Between Romanticism and Modernism), 112
189 See ‘On Music and Words,’ 115, where Nietzsche defines ‘what the lyric poet really is, namely, the artistic human being who must interpret music for himself by means of the symbolism of images and emotions but who has nothing to communicate to the listener.’ BT, §6, 52-56 (55)
190 ‘Notebook 2, autumn 1885 – autumn 1886’, Writings from the Late Notebooks, 2[110], 80-82 (81).
191 BT, ‘ASC,’ §2, 18, §7, 25
192 BT, ‘ASC,’ §4, 21, BGE, IX, §260, 205. In Daybreak, §50, Nietzsche defines a contrasting type whom, he argues, suffers from a ‘faith in intoxication’. In contrast to the impulse to create stemming from the ‘overfullness’ of life, this latter type is defined by exhaustion and resentment:

Men who enjoy moments of exaltation and ecstasy and who, on account of the contrast other states present and because of the way they have squandered their nervous energy
nausea upon the return to the quotidian, ‘overfullness’ generates an extreme tension and dissatisfaction with the stultified surface of (Apollinian) ‘being’. In terms which are echoed in both the account of artistic inspiration and creation in Birth and the aesthetic intuition as the laceration of the conceptual and the dive into underlying flux in order to return with new forms and new metaphors in ‘On Truth’ (and its parallel in Bergson’s philosophy), this state is redeemed through the laceration of the surface of ‘being,’ the purgation of repressed drives and the creation of the artwork: ‘transformation and exchange […] the succession of divine visions and redemptions in illusion.’ The ‘artist’s metaphysics,’ with deliberate irony, names the anti-metaphysical conjunction of purgation and incorporation in the fold of the self-creation of the artist.

The championing of a ‘classical’ aesthetic, with its emphasis on metaphysical scepticism, pragmatism, selection and precision in presentation, in opposition to ‘romantic’ ressentiment, central to Nietzsche’s later writings on art, is already implicit in the philosophical naturalism and rejection of metaphysics in Birth. In Nietzsche’s Voices, Henry Staten argues that Birth ‘focuses on the classical reference-points of what is called Romanticism (Rousseauistic primitivism, recourse to a transcendental subject, doctrines of genius and inspiration, idealization of the Greeks, [and] antipathy

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are ordinarily in a wretched condition, regard these moments as their real “self” and their wretchedness and misery as the effect of what is “outside the self”; and thus they harbour feelings of revengefulness towards their environment, their age, their entire world. Intoxication counts as their real life, as their actual ego: they see in everything else the oppressor and obstructor of intoxication, no matter whether its nature be spiritual, moral, religious or artistic. (32-33)

These terms echo those of Nietzsche’s definition of the ‘romantic’. Although both the ‘classical’ artist and the ‘Dionysian man’ of Birth share in common with those with a ‘faith in intoxication’ a pessimistic nausea in regard to quotidian existence’s ineluctable incapacity to attain identity with the ecstasy of purgation, in the cases of the former two ‘types’ this nausea results from a thwarted sense of an ‘overfullness’ of life, redeemed in the creation of the image. By contrast, in the case of the latter type of the intoxicated romantic, their nausea stems from the exhaustion of ‘nervous energy’ and a resulting wretchedness and resentment of life. Nietzsche’s distinguishes between the overfull artist and the intoxication infatuated aesthete.
to the rationalisation of nature). Adopting Staten’s definition of Romanticism, Nietzsche’s account of artistic inspiration and creation in *Birth* can be seen to reject each of its key terms. ‘Rousseauistic primitivism’ represents a forthright rejection of culture and a ‘return’ to a state of nature, such as is promoted in Rousseau’s *Émile*. Keith Ansell Pearson argues that in his early writings, ‘Nietzsche criticizes Rousseau’s paean to nature, and his belief in man’s natural goodness, which have their basis in romanticism.’ Nietzsche is critical of the ‘modern’ conception of the artist in terms of *Émile* and its corresponding idealisation of nature:

Rousseau’s portrait of Émile’s realization of his fundamental human nature and the achievement of oneness with nature, achieved by withdrawing the child and adolescent from the degenerative effects of corrupt social institutions and allowing his natural goodness to flourish, fails to recognise the dark and terrible forces of nature which must be overcome.

In contrast to Rousseau’s primitivism, for Nietzsche what is revealed through the suffering and contradiction of the ‘primal unity’ at stake within the emergence of Hellenic culture is that there can be no possible return to nature without a transformation through culture. Art is both necessary and inevitable. This conception of the intimate relationship of nature and culture also serves to qualify Staten’s claim to Nietzsche’s ‘antipathy to the rationalisation of nature’. Though Nietzsche is antipathetic to such rationalisation, his conception of nature itself is fundamentally at odds with that of Romanticism. His ‘idealization of the Greeks’ is founded in this ironic anti-Romanticism. Against the Romantic idyll, for Nietzsche Hellenic culture is defined by the strength of its response to ineluctable pessimism.

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As I have argued, implicitly at stake in Birth is a fundamental rejection of the terms of Kantian and Schopenhauerian metaphysics. What is revealed in the experience of Dionysian ‘intuition’ is the underlying undivided continuity of flux of natural drives. The fold in the self-creation of the artist represents the laceration and ironic reconstitution of subjectivity. The naturalism and implicit ‘classical’ aesthetic of Birth preclude any possibility of a ‘recourse to a transcendental subject.’ I have already argued that Nietzsche’s later account of inspiration in Ecce Homo, is already implicitly at stake in Birth. Both ‘genius’ and ‘inspiration,’ as they occur in text, represent an ironic appropriation of the Romantic ‘doctrines’ to an anti-Romantic philosophical project.

In contrast to Jürgen Habermas’s argument that the text represents a dangerous ‘metaphysically transfigured irrationality,’ to which, he suggests, Romanticism offers a preferable alternative, at the heart of Birth lies a philosophical naturalism and a ‘classical’ aesthetic which reject all forms of metaphysical ‘transfiguration’ and argue for the necessity of the transformation of nature through culture.194 In opposition to Aaron Ridley, who argues that Birth represents ‘an arresting example of German Romanticism at its headiest’, and Adrian Del Caro and Judith Norman, both of whom argue that Nietzsche’s position represents a straightforward anti-Romanticism, his relationship to Romantic metaphysics, aesthetics and conceptions of artistic

inspiration in Birth represents the creation of a Romantic—anti-Romanticism; one which reflects his ironic appropriation of Schopenhauerian metaphysical and aesthetic vocabulary. This serves to qualify Staten’s argument that Birth represents ‘the hinge between Romanticism and everything post-Romantic, including Nietzsche’s own later work’. Birth represents a ‘hinge’ in-between the Romantic and ‘post-Romantic’ insofar as it ironically appropriates the key aesthetic and metaphysical terms of the early Jena frühromantik project to one which is ineluctably at odds with this movement. This problematises any notion of the post-Romantic. Birth does not represent a radical break with Romanticism, but rather the ironic inversion of the Romantic project. This is the root of the parallel between Nietzsche and Joyce. Stephen’s ironic appropriation of the terms of Shelley’s account of artistic inspiration to a ‘classical’ aesthetic which seeks to reject the metaphysics of late-Romantic, specifically Yeatsian, aesthetics, parallels Nietzsche’s own appropriation of the terms of Romanticism in his definition of artistic inspiration and creation as the conjunction of the Dionysian and Apollinian in the incorporation of the intensely undergone aesthetic experience of purgation in the fold of the self-creation of the artist. Whilst apparently an ostensibly late-Romantic text—according to Nietzsche’s own later definition of the ‘Romantic’—under the influence of both Schopenhauer and Wagner, Birth aligns far more closely to the aesthetics of neo-classical Modernism. Both Nietzsche and Joyce seek to forge a new trajectory for Romanticism which redeems its conception of artistic inspiration and creation from their late-Romantic fate. In the

196 Staten, Nietzsche’s Voices, 187
final section of this chapter I want to move on to examine Nietzsche’s account of the birth of the phenomenon tragedy from the fold in the self-creation of the artist. I will focus on Nietzsche’s reading of the history of tragedy and his account of the tragic chorus, arguing that, for Nietzsche, tragedy represents the creation of an analogous experience in its audience to that undergone by the artist in the process of the fold. The function of the artwork for Nietzsche in Birth is to redeem existence from the ineluctable nausea of the quotidian.

(iii) – *In-between ‘exuberant mockery’ and the sublime: the Affect of Tragedy*

For Nietzsche, the process of transposition through which the Dionysian and Apollinian are conjoined in the self-creation of the artist is engendered in order to overcome the ‘nausea’ originally experienced in the return to quotidian reality from the sublime ecstasy of the Dionysian. This represents the overcoming of the nausea which inevitably results from self-alienation, and which finds its symbolical analogue in the figure of Hamlet. As such, what I have called the fold, for Nietzsche, forms the foundation for the resolution of the ‘problem’ of ‘the origin of Greek tragedy’. He states that the ‘tradition’ of scholarship on tragedy demonstrates ‘unequivocally’ that ‘tragedy arose from the tragic chorus’. The problem of the origin of tragedy becomes then, the problem of how it arose from the tragic chorus and how the phenomenon of the chorus itself arose.

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198 Cf. BT, §7, 56
199 Ibid.
Nietzsche argues that the chorus has its roots in the phenomenon of the ‘folk song’. He claims that scholarship on the subject has revealed that Archilochus, the archetypal lyric poet, was the first to introduce the folk song into culture. As such, the folk song embodies the process of the fold of the artist: it is the permanent cultural vestige of the Dionysian-Apollinian conjunction. Just as with the process of the self-creation of the lyric poet, the folk song emerges from an initial state of Dionysian ecstasy which finds its mirror in music, especially in melody. A physiological-psychological imperative now requires that this experience be comprehended and incorporated, and so it seeks for itself a ‘parallel dream phenomenon’: an embodiment in the symbols and language of feeling and the will. This form of symbolism is the ‘new world of poetry’ that Archilochus inaugurates. This communal cultural phenomenon of the folk song is the root of the chorus, which, in its dithyrambic and strophic songs thus embodies the Dionysian-Apollinian conjunction of the fold of the artist.

Nietzsche has already argued that ‘lyrical poems […] in their highest development are called tragedies and dramatic dithyrambs.’ He now argues that the ‘principles of art’ which he has uncovered—the original conflict and higher form of conjunction of the Dionysian and Apollinian, and the process of the lyric poet—allow him to ‘look into the heart of this tragic chorus as the real proto-drama’. This view of the chorus as arising from the Dionysian-Apollinian conjunction places Nietzsche’s
reading in contradistinction to what he dubs the ‘arty clichés’ of, in particular, A.W. Schlegel, such as that of the chorus representing the ‘people’—the public and the spectator—in contrast to the aristocratic region of the scene itself. \(^{207}\) Nietzsche seeks to liberate his analysis from political and moral interpretations by emphasising the ‘purely religious origins of tragedy’ which, he argues, excluded moral and socio-political considerations. \(^{208}\) Nietzsche defines his analysis against Schlegel’s conception of the chorus as ‘ideal spectator’. This distinction is crucial as it reveals the line of derivation of the chorus from the fold of the artist:

[W]e had always believed that the right spectator, whoever he might be, must always remain conscious that he was viewing a work of art and not an empirical reality. But the tragic chorus of the Greeks is forced to recognize real beings in the figures on the stage. \(^{209}\)

The chorus, in contrast to the ‘ideal’ spectator, cannot remain removed from the drama and treat it as a spectacle. Just as the lyric poet was divested of his empirical self in the ‘musical mood’, so the chorus inevitably loses consciousness that it is

\(^{207}\) *Ibid.* The terms of Nietzsche’s analysis of tragedy, especially his analysis of the tragic and comic, his focus on the nature of dramatic and particularly lyric poetry, musical feeling, the use of masks, and the relationship of tragedy to opera are all indebted to Schlegel’s earlier philological work.

In his *A Course of Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature*, Schlegel argues that the tragic chorus constitutes ‘the ideal spectator’. It had its roots, he argues, in the earlier phenomenon of the ‘feasts of Bacchus’ and had a ‘national significations’ for the Hellenic Greeks, which, despite what he calls the reversion to ‘heroic’ monarchical politics in Greek poetry (of which he provides Homer as the example), Schlegel ties to Republican politics and the centrality of ‘publicity,’ which, he argues, was essential to the completeness of every important ‘transaction’ for the Greeks. (69-70). According to Schlegel, for the Greeks the chorus was in essence a socio-political phenomenon: ‘Whatever it might be and do in each particular piece, it represented in general, first the common mind of the nation, and then the general sympathy of mankind.’ (70) It elicited, in the first instance, a quasi-patriotic, national sentiment and then moved beyond this to a more ‘general’ human ‘sympathy’.

The function of the chorus, according to Schlegel, is to act as a cipher between the audience and the drama: ‘It mitigates the impression of a heart-rending or moving story, while it conveys to the actual spectator a lyrical and musical expression of his own emotions, and elevates him to the region of contemplation.’ (70) It serves to diffuse the traumatic effect of the tragic action on the audience member by giving lyrical-musical vent to the emotions evoked by this action. By so doing, Schlegel argues, the chorus elevates the audience beyond their emotional state to one of contemplation. Augustus William [von] Schlegel, *A Course of Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature*, trans. John Black. Revised, according to the last German edition Rev. A.J.W. Morrison (London: Henry G. Bonn, 1846), esp. 43-77. In refuting Schlegel’s argument, even as Schlegel’s philological work remains a crucial influence, Nietzsche is placing himself in a Romantic—anti-Romantic position. See Ralph W. Ewton Jr., *The Literary Theories of Augustus Wilhelm Schlegel* (Paris: Mouton, 1972), 57, 90-93. \(^{208}\)

\(^{209}\) *BT*, §7, 56

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viewing a work of art from which it is removed: its members must suspend their disbelief and recognise the stage and the figures who people it, as ‘reality’.\textsuperscript{210}

Against the conception of the ‘ideal spectator,’ which, he argues, cannot but fail to account for this element of immersion and suspension of disbelief in the chorus, Nietzsche invokes the ‘valuable insight’ of Schiller, in the essay appended as a ‘Preface’ to the \textit{Bride of Messina}, that the chorus ‘constitutes a living wall that tragedy constructs around itself in order to close itself off from the world of reality and to preserve its ideal domain and its poetical freedom.’\textsuperscript{211} Tragedy removes itself and shuts itself off from the empirical and the quotidian. It is not constrained to represent socio-political reality. The chorus functions to preserve this closure and to suspend disbelief.

\textsuperscript{210} See Coleridge’s definition of ‘poetic faith’, in the context of Wordsworth’s \textit{Lyrical Ballads}. For Coleridge, the aim of the poems was the representation of ‘persons and characters supernatural, or at least romantic; yet so as to transfer from our inward nature a human interest and a semblance of truth sufficient to procure for these shadows of imagination that willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which constitutes poetic faith.’ In a later chapter he refers to this as the implicit request on the part of the poet of a ‘negative faith in the existence of such a being, which we willingly give to productions professedly ideal’ on the part of the reader. Coleridge, \textit{Biographia Literaria, The Major Works}, 314, 457-458. See Mahoney, ‘Coleridge and Shakespeare’, in Burwick, ed., \textit{The Oxford Handbook of Samuel Taylor Coleridge}, 500.

\textsuperscript{211} \textit{BT}, §7, 58. Friedrich Schiller, \textit{The Bride of Messina: A Tragedy with Choruses} trans. Adam Lodge, 3\textsuperscript{rd} Edition (revised) (London: T.F.A. Day, 1863), 1-14. In contrast to Augustus Schlegel’s conception of the socio-political function of the chorus, Schiller argues that it is the ‘artist that brings the Public to the level of his own conceptions’, and not vice versa (2):

\begin{quote}
The introduction of the chorus would be the last decisive step; and if it only served this end — namely, to declare open and honourable warfare against Naturalism in art, it would be for us a living wall which Tragedy had drawn around herself, to guard her from contact with the world of reality, and maintain her own ideal soil, her poetical freedom. (7)
\end{quote}

For Nietzsche, following Schiller and in contrast to Schlegel, the chorus serves not the end of a sublimated ‘publicity’ but to sever the participants, the drama and the audience from quotidian reality and to prevent any incursion of an attempt to copy nature or society (‘the actual’). (\textit{ibid.} See Lesley Sharpe, \textit{Friedrich Schiller: Drama, Thought and Politics} [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991], 122-130 [125])
With this conception of the chorus, Nietzsche argues, Schiller ‘combats the ordinary conception of the natural, the illusion usually demanded in dramatic poetry,’ and demonstrates that ‘it is not sufficient that one merely tolerates as poetic license what is actually the essence of all poetry.’\textsuperscript{212} What Nietzsche opposes here is what he terms the ‘illusion’ of (literary) naturalism (‘against all naturalism in art’) that it is desirable, or even possible to represent the ‘natural’ or the ‘real’ in art.\textsuperscript{213} The very condition of the possibility of poetic production is, on the contrary, the establishment and preservation of an ‘ideal domain’ in which the ‘world artist’ with whom the poet has become fused through the process of the fold, may discharge itself and appear in images unrestrained by consideration of the accurate portrayal of socio-political ‘reality’. This is what Nietzsche defines as ‘the essence of all poetry’ and ‘poetical freedom’. For Nietzsche, poetry is concerned, not with the claims of his contemporary literary realism and naturalism to the accurate presentation of quotidian existence, but, instead, is defined by the accurate transposition of the pathos of an aesthetic intuition (artistic ‘\textit{inspiration}’) into images.

In a ‘Note’ to \textit{The Case of Wagner} Nietzsche reflects on the definition of ‘\textit{actio}’ and ‘\textit{drama}’: ‘It has been a real misfortune for aesthetics that the word \textit{drama} has always been translated “action” \textit{[Handlung]}’.\textsuperscript{214} Nietzsche’s objection to this translation helps shed light on the constitution and affect of tragedy. He argues that ‘[a]ncient drama aimed at scenes of great \textit{pathos}—it precluded action (moving it \textit{before} the beginning or \textit{behind} the scene).’\textsuperscript{215} In line with his appropriation of the Schillerian ‘ideal domain’ of dramatic poetry, this serves to preclude the empirical—

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{212} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{213} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{214} Nietzsche, \textit{The Case of Wagner}, in \textit{The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of Wagner}, trans. Walter Kaufmann, §9, 174. Parentheses Kaufmann’s.  
\textsuperscript{215} Ibid.}
‘action’—from the stage. For Nietzsche, the excitation of this pathos constitutes the communication and discharge of the Dionysian. For Nietzsche, classical tragic drama aimed at the accurate transposition of the ‘great pathos’ of an aesthetic intuition.

In a metaphor echoing his earlier image of the architectural edifice of the Apollinian, and following the process of the fold the artist, Nietzsche describes the construction of the ‘ideal domain’: the chorus ‘built up the scaffolding of a fictitious natural state and on it placed fictitious natural beings.’\(^{216}\) The ‘reality’ of the scene was a fictitious world, freed from the fetters of representing the quotidian. However, in its totality, pathos, and insular isolation, the ‘fictitious natural state’ of the drama was absolutely compelling. Its inhabitants, ‘the fictitious natural beings’ were free to perform supernatural acts, and portray supernatural and superhuman emotional responses to this state, without disrupting the spectator’s immersion in the ‘reality’ thus portrayed.

From its very beginning in the chorus, tragedy ‘could dispense […] with a painstaking portrayal of reality.’\(^{217}\) Tragedy was concerned with the transposition, recreation, and communication of an aesthetic, fundamentally physiological experience—a ‘pathos’—and not with a didactic moral or political message. Despite this liberation from the constraints of literary ‘naturalism’ through the formation of its ‘ideal domain,’ the state of tragedy was by no means arbitrary. As with the process of transposition of the Dionysian into music and this again into the Apollinian image, the generation of the ‘pathos,’ figures, poetry and dialogue of tragedy were necessary. The world portrayed in tragedy had the ‘same reality and credibility that Olympus

\(^{216}\) §7, 58
\(^{217}\) Ibid.
with its inhabitants possessed for the believing Hellene. As with the Apollinian, the world of tragedy was rooted in a response to a physiological need to transpose and incorporate experience.

For Nietzsche, the fulfilment of this need, coupled with the suspension of disbelief, combined to form the essence of Hellenic ‘belief’. Hellenic religious faith was founded upon physiology and art as a theogonic projection and mythopoeia, and an imperative act of forgetting or repression of this act of projection. The function of the chorus is to create the ‘foundation’ or ‘scaffold’ of the projected and insular ‘ideal domain’ of tragedy and faith in its ‘fictitious natural state’ and ‘beings’: ‘the Dionysian chorist, lives in a religiously acknowledged reality under the sanction of myth and cult.’ The necessity of the drama, and thus of the role of the chorus, was the source of its acknowledgement by state religion under the ‘sanction’ of the necessary physiological and socio-political function of ‘myth and cult’ in the maintenance of the community.

The chorus, Nietzsche argues, emerged as an extension of the manner in which the Dionysian itself was reborn within Hellenic culture: in order to fulfil the deeply physiologically and culturally felt need to purge the drives repressed within the Apollinian. The chorist is ‘the voice of the Dionysian wisdom of tragedy’ and ‘bears the same relation to the man of culture [the Apollinian Hellene] that music bears to civilisation […] it is nullified by music’. Nullification (by which Kaufmann translates the German Aufgehoben: negated, preserved and elevated) here

218 Ibid.
219 Ibid.
220 Ibid.
221 58-59
59
refers to the essence of Hellenic faith. This faith consists in a mythic projection conjoined with a repression of the conscious knowledge of the act of creation. The repression enables a suspension of disbelief in the supernatural and superhuman world, figures, and actions, and accounts for the corresponding extremity of the pathos of the drama.

For Nietzsche, this nullification (aufgehoben) is ‘the most immediate effect of the Dionysian tragedy’: ‘the gulfs between man and man,’ generated within the Apollinian principle of individuation ‘give way to an overwhelming feeling of unity leading back to the very heart of nature’. For Nietzsche, tragedy is born from and embodies the fold in the self-creation of the artist. What is harnessed through the pathos of tragedy and the dithyrambic music of the chorus is the effect of Dionysian purgation. The artificial bonds of Apollinian individuation are lacerated and what is experienced is what Nietzsche describes as a feeling of ‘unity’: of identity with the reality and figures of the scene, with the chorus and with one’s fellow spectators. All are merged in the Dionysian transport of the ‘great pathos’ in which, just as in artistic inspiration, the unfettered power of physiological, emotional, sexual, and creative drives is experienced. The affect of tragedy on the audience is analogous to that undergone by the artist in the process from artistic inspiration to creation.

For Nietzsche, just as with Hamlet, for the Dionysian Hellene to have looked into the essence of things revealed to them the futility of individuation and quotidian reality: ‘the terrible destructiveness of so-called world history as well as the cruelty of

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222 Ibid.
This insight is the root of the self-alienation and ‘nausea’ of both Hamlet and the Dionysian Hellene. In order to overcome this dangerous state of ‘nausea,’ with its attendant threat ‘of longing for a Buddhistic negation of the will’, the phenomenon of the chorus was engendered as the symbol and embodiment of the eternal nature of the Dionysian, persisting ‘behind all civilization,’ ‘history,’ and indviduation. For Nietzsche, life engenders art, in the form of the chorus, in order to redeem itself from the ineluctable nausea of the Dionysian Hellene: ‘Art saves him, and through art—life.’ Art, embodied in the phenomenon of the chorus, emerged as the physiological-psychological remedy for the fall into nihilistic, self-destructive despair of the Dionysian Hellene. Life precipitates art and art saves life.

This is what is at stake in Nietzsche’s definition of art over and against literary ‘naturalism’. To reiterate Nietzsche’s point in the ‘Note’ to The Case of Wagner, in the formation of the space of tragedy by the chorus—the empirical space of the theatre itself and the dramatic ‘ideal domain’ of the scene—what was aimed at was not action but ‘great pathos’. What is crucial in art, Nietzsche argues, contrary to literary ‘naturalism’, is not its subject matter or content (its accurate representation of quotidian reality), but its form, pathos and affect. For Nietzsche, art’s purpose lies not on the level of moral or political didacticism but on what he argues is the much more profound level of the transposition and incorporation of a fundamental sublime physiological and psychological experience. Nietzsche contrasts this vitality with

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223 Ibid.
224 Ibid.
225 Ibid.
what he calls the ‘region of wax-work cabinets’ of the naturalist and realist movements in his contemporary literature.\textsuperscript{226}

The pathos embodied in the chorus is that of the ‘dithyrambic world redemption jubilation’ that Nietzsche describes in ‘On Music and Words’.\textsuperscript{227} In Birth Nietzsche calls this the ‘metaphysical comfort’ afforded by the chorus: ‘that life is at the bottom of things, despite all changes of appearances, indestructibly powerful and pleasurable.’\textsuperscript{228} This is the essence of the chorus as ‘the voice of the Dionysian wisdom of tragedy.’\textsuperscript{229} It acts to bridge the ‘chasm of oblivion’ separating quotidian reality from Dionysian reality and to redeem life from the threat posed by ‘nausea’ and nihilism:

\begin{quote}
[Art] turns these nauseous thoughts about the horror or absurdity of existence into notions with which one can live: these are the \textit{sublime} as the artistic taming of the horrible, and the \textit{comic} as the artistic discharge of the nausea of absurdity.\textsuperscript{230}
\end{quote}

Art, through the Dionysian-musical phenomenon of the chorus, transforms and elevates ‘nausea’ at the ‘horror’ of existence into a sublime aesthetic experience, and through the mockery of the comic, discharges the ‘nausea of absurdity’. In this sense the chorus is the ‘proto-tragedy.’\textsuperscript{231} In tragedy the need for the incorporation of the Dionysian experience generates Apollinian ‘images’. The chorus is ‘the womb that gave birth to the whole world of the so-called dialogue, that is, the entire world of

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\item \textsuperscript{226} Cf. 58. Art, through the chorus, ‘represents existence much more truthfully, really, and completely than the man of culture does who ordinarily considers himself the only reality. The sphere of poetry does not lie outside the world as a fantastic impossibility spawned by the poet’s brain: it desires to be just the opposite, the unvarnished expression of the truth and must precisely for that reason discard the mendacious finery of that alleged reality of the man of culture.’ (§8, 61)
\item \textsuperscript{227} Nietzsche ‘On Music and Words,’ in Dahlhaus, \textit{Between Romanticism and Modernism}, 112
\item \textsuperscript{228} BT, §7, 59
\item \textsuperscript{229} 58-59
\item \textsuperscript{230} 60
\item \textsuperscript{231} Cf. §8, 63
\end{itemize}
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stage, the real drama.'\textsuperscript{232} For Nietzsche, tragedy emerges from the process of sublime transposition of the fold in the self-creation of the artist. The world of the stage represents, ‘not Apollinian redemption through mere appearance’, but the embodiment of the Dionysian.\textsuperscript{233} Thus Nietzsche can speak of Dionysus himself as ‘the real stage hero.’\textsuperscript{234} The tragic hero, like the ‘I’ of the lyric poet, is merely a mask for the Dionysian. Tragedy achieves its affect only through the conjunction of the Dionysian and the Apollinian.

In the fourth of the \textit{Untimely Meditations}, ‘Richard Wagner in Bayreuth,’ Nietzsche summarises and clarifies the affect of tragedy.\textsuperscript{235} As with his reading of \textit{Hamlet} in \textit{Birth}, what precipitates the creation of art, for Nietzsche, is ‘\textit{looking into the face of reality}’.\textsuperscript{236} Having experienced the power and free play of the creative drives and affective system in the sublime Dionysian ecstasy, and having thus had revealed the horror and absurdity of quotidian reality, art is engendered in order to ‘redeem us from the fearful tension which the seeing man now feels between himself and the tasks imposed upon him.’\textsuperscript{237} Action would require the veil of illusion, which has now been torn irrevocably asunder.\textsuperscript{238} We ‘ascend’ to what Nietzsche terms ‘the topmost rung of sensibility’ through the process of sublime transposition.\textsuperscript{239} For Nietzsche, from this elevated perspective, the absurdity of the quotidian appears to the spectator as transfigured: ‘all that seems everyday to others to him is uncanny, and he feels tempted to counter the impression produced by this phenomenon with exuberant

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\item[232] 64-65
\item[233] 65, emphasis added
\item[234] 66
\item[235] UM, IV, §7, 225-226
\item[236] 225
\item[237] Ibid.
\item[238] Cf. BT, §7, 60
\item[239] UM, IV, §7, 225
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
mockery.’\textsuperscript{240} The nausea at the uncanny nature and absurdity of the quotidian is discharged through ridicule.

Nietzsche argues, however, that conjoined to this sarcastic impulse is the experience of the sublime ‘longing to descend from the heights into the depths, the living desire for the earth for the joy of communion.’\textsuperscript{241} This is the state that in \textit{Birth} Nietzsche defines as the ‘objective’. He recapitulates the process of the generation of the lyric poet and of tragedy which, he argues, is precipitated by the tension between sarcasm and the sublime: ‘the uncanny and exuberant sensation of surprise and amazement at the world is coupled with the ardent longing to approach this same world as a lover.’\textsuperscript{242} The artist becomes ‘\textit{clear-sighted}’ and ‘\textit{selfless}’.\textsuperscript{243} The force of inspiration compels every phenomenon with which the artist comes into contact to ‘discharge all its forces with fearful rapidity in a revelation of its most deeply hidden secrets.’\textsuperscript{244} Nietzsche argues that the artist is compelled to express this state of inspiration and revelation in a dithyrambic dance of ‘ecstatic gestures,’ which thus expresses the dual nature of the Dionysian: ‘as much dread understanding and exuberant insight as […] loving approach and joyful self-renunciation.’\textsuperscript{245} From the rhythm of this intoxication there arises the need to express the experience in words and in melody, and thus music is born. This music in turn ‘showers its fire into the realm of images and concepts’\textsuperscript{246} and generates an Apollinian ‘dream apparition’ which ‘condenses’ the experience of inspiration into ‘human forms […] the expression of a wholly heroic exuberant will, of an ecstatic going under and cessation

\textsuperscript{240} 226
\textsuperscript{241} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{242} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{243} \textit{Ibid. Cf. BT, §5, 48-49}
\textsuperscript{244} \textit{UM, IV, §7, 226}
\textsuperscript{245} \textit{Ibid. Cf. BT, §2, 40}
\textsuperscript{246} \textit{UM, IV, §7, 226. Cf. BT, §5, 50}
of will. Thus the ‘going under’ of the artist in the experience of the Dionysian—the divestiture of the empirical self or ‘will’—finds symbolic expression in the person and fate of the tragic hero: ‘thus does tragedy come into being, thus there is bestowed upon life its most glorious form of wisdom, that of the tragic idea.’ Tragedy is born from the fold in the self-creation of the artist:

The absurdity of the quotidian is transformed, elevated and beheld as ‘something sublime and significant’. The ‘dull echo of death’ in the fate of the tragic hero, annihilated as a sublime scapegoat for the transgression of individuation, and as a symbolic incorporation of the artist’s experience of Dionysian ‘inspiration’, becomes ‘the supreme stimulus to life.’ The nausea of the absurdity of quotidian reality are transfigured in-between sarcasm and the sublime.

This is the meaning behind Nietzsche’s infamous dictum in Birth. Nietzsche opposes his sublime transposition and psychological realism to naturalism’s conception of the moral purpose of art: ‘The entire comedy of art is neither performed for our betterment or education nor are we the true authors of this art world.’ As empirical, individuated beings, for Nietzsche, we are ourselves brought into being by the artistic impulses of the ‘true author’—the primal unity—for the purpose of its

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247 *UM*, IV, §7, 226
251 *BT*, §5, 52
redemption in ‘mere appearance.’\textsuperscript{252} We attain ‘our highest dignity in our significance as works of art—for it is only as \textit{aesthetic phenomenon} that existence and the world are eternally justified.’\textsuperscript{253} We attain our highest dignity, for Nietzsche, as manifestations of life’s self-perpetuation and redemption in art and we ourselves are redeemed in the fold of tragedy.

Nietzsche’s analysis of artistic inspiration and creation in \textit{Birth} ironically appropriates the terms of Kantian and Schopenhauerian metaphysics and the Romantic account of artistic inspiration in order to describe the artistic and cultural harnessing and transformation of natural drives in the incorporation of the intensely undergone experience of purgation in the fold in the self-creation of the artist. Although the text is ostensibly Schopenhauerian and late-romantic, the aesthetic of \textit{Birth} is founded on an idiosyncratic form of philosophical naturalism and implicitly prefigures the terms of Nietzsche’s later definition of ‘classical’ art and rejection of the ‘romantic’. At the heart of the text is an implicit ironic Romantic—anti-Romanticism. It is this which lies at the heart of the mutually illuminating parallel between Nietzsche and Joyce and the terms of Stephen’s aesthetic theory between \textit{Stephen Hero} and \textit{Portrait}. A comparison with Nietzsche’s relationship to Schopenhauer and anti-metaphysics in his early writings serves to illuminate what is at stake in Stephen’s ironic appropriation of the terms of Aquinas’s theory of beauty and in his theory of the ‘esthetic image’. In turn, the revelation of the ‘classical’ aesthetic implicitly at stake in \textit{Portrait} and the comparison which this opens up with both the terms of Nietzsche’s own definition of the ‘classical’ in \textit{Human, All Too Human} and that of T.E. Hulme, serves to illuminate how this same aesthetic is

\textsuperscript{252} Cf. §4, 45
\textsuperscript{253} §5, 52, cf. §24, 141
implicitly at stake in *Birth*. As I have argued, both Nietzsche and Joyce seek to forge a new trajectory for Romanticism which redeems its conception of artistic inspiration and creation from its late-Romantic mystical-metaphysical fate.

In the final chapter I want to synthesise the terms of my reading of Stephen’s aesthetic theory between *Stephen Hero* and *Portrait* and that of Nietzsche in *Birth* and examine the development and refinement of the doctrine of the ‘esthetic image’ of *Portrait* into that of the ‘image’ of the artist in Stephen’s reading of Shakespeare’s *Hamlet* in his final textual incarnation in the ‘Scylla and Charybdis’ episode of *Ulysses*. I will argue that the shape of the fold in the self-creation of the artist underpins the theory of the ‘image’ of the artist in *Ulysses*. To approach the aesthetic theory of ‘Scylla’ from the philosophical and art-historical perspective I have sought to establish in my readings of early Nietzsche and early Joyce can help to illuminate the politics of the text, especially in regard to its engagement with the question of Irish Nationalism and the Irish Literary Revival.
The Fold in the self-creation of the artist between ‘the smoke and breakers’ and ‘the rock’: Romantic—anti-Romanticism in Joyce’s *Ulysses*

“On the other side are a pair of cliffs. One of them with its jagged peaks reaches up to the spreading sky, wreathed in dark cloud that never parts. [...] Half-way up the cliff is a murky cave, facing north-west to Erebus, and doubtless it is past this, Odysseus, that you and your men will steer your vessel. [...] Inside lives Scylla, yelping hideously; her voice is no deeper than a young puppy’s, but she herself is a fearsome monster [...] She has twelve feet all dangling down, six long necks with a grisly head on each of them, and in each head a triple row of crowded and close-set teeth, fraught with black death. [...] No seaman ever, in any vessel, has boasted of sailing that way unharmed, for with every single head of hers she snatches and carries off a man from the dark-prowed ship.

[...] The other cliff lies lower [...] under it, awesome Charybdis sucks the dark water down. Three times a day she belches it forth, three times in hideous fashion she swallows it down again. Pray not to be caught there when she swallows down [...] No, keep closer to Scylla’s cliff, and row past that as quickly as may be; far better to lose six men and keep your ship than to lose your men one and all.” (Homer, *The Odyssey*, trans. Walter Shewring [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980], 144-145. Emphasis added)

Contemporary critical debate on Joyce’s politics has focussed on the nature of his relationship to Ireland, turn-of the-century Irish national politics and his status as an Irish writer, and has attempted to frame discussion of Stephen’s political position in the ‘Scylla and Charybdis’ episode of *Ulysses* through this larger political framework. In his recent and influential re-conception of Joyce’s biography, Andrew Gibson contests the contemporary critical trend to characterise Joyce as an internationalist and as a European writer. Gibson’s biographical and historical critical approach is ranged against recent post-colonial and theoretical attempts to appropriate Joyce. By contrast, he argues for what he sees as Joyce’s ‘Irish-centred agenda’ and for a reconsideration of Joyce as an Irish writer.¹

In contrast to Gibson, Joseph Valente argues for the necessity of a critical return to the relationship between the ostensible anti-nationalism of Joyce’s early critical writings and the nationalism of his early period in Italy in assessing his later politics.² Focussing on Joyce’s Italian lecture, ‘Ireland: Island of Saints and Sages’, Valente argues that Joyce’s early anti-nationalism and burgeoning nationalism while in self-styled exile, ‘dialectically resolved themselves into an idiosyncratic cultural transnationalism’.³ The ‘roots’ of this ‘post-exilic cultural transnationalism’, he argues, lie in the ‘specific nature of the counter-national discourse found in [Joyce’s] early writings and the ‘form’ which his later ‘nationalism’ took in ‘sublating the principles of his anti-nationalism.’⁴ In contrast to Gibson’s characterisation of Joyce as a writer with an ostensibly ‘Irish-centred agenda’, Valente’s argument frames Joyce as emerging from a vociferous opposition to the context of contemporary Irish nationalism, moving through the perspective of an ‘exilic’ nationalism (on the outside, looking in), to a final, synthetic position in which he sought to transcend the terms of both nationhood and of nationalism.

In this chapter I want to read Stephen’s final revision and exposition of his aesthetic theory in the ‘Scylla and Charybdis’ episode of Ulysses through the terms of Gibson and Valente’s readings of Joyce’s politics. At the centre of the mock-Platonic-Socratic dialogue of ‘Scylla and Charybdis’ is a debate between two opposed conceptions of turn-of-the-century Irish national politics, framed through a debate on

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³ 73. See Joyce, ‘Ireland, Island of Saints and Sages’ in CW, 108-126.
⁴ Valente, 73
two modes of Shakespeare criticism. The discussion is an allusion to the debate between John Eglinton (the penname of William Kirkpatrick Magee), W.B. Yeats, the poet AE (George Russell) Russell and William Larminie conducted in 1899 in the pro-union *Dublin Daily Express*. At its heart it rehearses the terms of the debate which took place between Yeats and Edward Dowden, centering around turn-of-the-century Irish politics and in particular the Irish literary Renaissance, the two opposing poles of which became framed through a debate on Shakespearean biography. On the one hand, Dowden argued for a patriotic, Anglo-centric, protestant Shakespeare, concerned with specifically ‘material interests’. He argued against what he perceived to be the ‘provincialism’ of the Irish Literary Revival, in which Yeats was a leading figure. On the other hand, on the side of the Revival, Yeats argued for a Shakespearean...
drawn to the ‘beautiful ineffectual dreamer’: an ‘anaemic and politically impotent poet of the Celtic Twilight’, representative of the cultural and political struggle facing the proponents of the Revival.  

What is at stake in ‘Scylla’ is Stephen’s rejection of two opposed political, aesthetic and critical inheritances of Romanticism, which develops from the earlier rejection of the ‘romantic’, and in particular the Platonic metaphysics implicit in Yeats’s late-Romantic Transcendental Symbolism, in the exposition of the earlier incarnation of his aesthetic theory in Portrait (itself stemming from and refining that of Stephen Hero and Joyce’s own early critical writings). The caricature of Yeats in

In 1904 Edward Dowden was one of Dublin’s distinguished scholars. He had been Professor of English Literature at Trinity College since 1867 and was the author of innumerable literary studies, of which the best known were those of Shakespeare and Shelley. [...] Dowden’s open house was closed only to one intellectual movement, the Revival which sprang up in Ireland during this time. He consistently refused to grant any real merit to the writings of Yeats, Synge, Russell, and the rest, refused to support [...] the new Irish theatrical movement, and because of his dislike of anything that suggested provincialism, was unhappy about the inclusion of his poems in a book of Irish verse. (32-33. See also, 39).

See also Kiberd, 159. On Dowden’s contention that the Irish were ‘inferior’ to the English and that English culture was ‘ineradicably rooted in Irish soil. The significant Irish culture was English’, see Gibson, Joyce’s Revenge, 63.

64. Clare Hutton draws attention to the restricted and parodic portrayal of Revivalism in Ulysses, singling out ‘Scylla’ (which she refers to as ‘the “Library” episode’) ‘because it promotes a view of “Literary Revivalism” as the affair of a haughty, self-involved Protestant minority’: ‘the institutions of the “Irish Literary Revival” (understood as an elite literary movement in which Yeats played a pivotal role) are represented in the “Library” scene of Ulysses’ and that the novel constitutes an exposé of ‘revivalism’s ideological deficiencies.’ (Hutton, ‘Joyce and the Institutions of Revivalism’, cf. 118, 124). Hutton argues that ‘Yeatsian Literary Revivalism, is a more important interpretative factor in this episode than the more centrally placed discussion of Shakespeare's life and work.’ (125) She argues, however, that Joyce’s parodic portrayal of Revivalism is far too narrow and ignores Revivalism’s cultural and generational plurality. (see 117-118) See also, Hutton, ‘Joyce, the Library Episode, and the Institutions of Revivalism’, in Andrew Gibson and Len Platt, eds., Joyce, Ireland, Britain (Florida: University Press of Florida, 2006), 122-138 and ‘The Irish Revival’, in John McCourt, ed., James Joyce in Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 195-204. On the origins of, and Joyce’s relationship to, Revivalism see Gregory Castle, Modernism and the Celtic Revival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), esp. 1-39.

Hutton’s argument is important in qualifying Joyce’s portrayal of Revivalism. However, in focussing solely on its larger political context, she elides the importance of Dowden and that of both the title and the style of the episode. In focussing on the caricature of the historical literary movement in ‘Scylla’, Hutton also elides the importance of its relationship to philosophy and to art history in its treatment of Yeats (the aesthetic and metaphysical debate which I will argue is at stake in ‘Scylla’), and Stephen’s attempt to formulate an independent and idiosyncratic aesthetic. Hutton therefore overlooks the crucial importance of both the Homeric parallel and the use of parody to that formulation.
‘Scylla’ represents a rejection of the essentialist, nationalist politics which is seen to emerge from Yeats’s appropriation of Platonic metaphysics (and its legacy in Romantic aesthetics), and the mysticism and Transcendental Symbolism which he used this metaphysics to ground.\footnote{That the discussion of ‘Scylla’ takes place on the 16\textsuperscript{th} June, 1904 and that it concerns the debate in the \textit{Dublin Daily Express} in 1899, means that the caricature of Yeats is concerned, as I argued in the second chapter is implicitly the case in \textit{Portrait}, with Yeats’s early thought and critical writing. In line with Hutton’s highlighting of the reductive and caricatured portrayal of Irish nationalism in ‘Scylla’, and against Dowden’s critique of Revivalism, Kiberd argues that Revivalism itself can be seen as a revolt against provincialism, specifically the provincialism of England. (159) Yeats, he goes on to argue, ‘made it perfectly clear that his Irish revival was a revolt against a provincialism of mind which can sometimes inhere in imitative nationalism, sometimes in complacent nationalism’. (161-162) The caricature of ‘Scylla’ then, explicitly concerns the early, Transcendental Symbolist, Yeats, and not his broader or later political and critical theories.}

The two polar antitheses of Yeatsian late-Romantic, Platonic mysticism and nationalism and Dowden’s Anglo-centric historical materialism, represent the two antagonistic forces of the episode’s Homeric parallel and the extension of this parallel into a political metaphor. In the first section of the chapter, I will argue that the

\footnote{On the question of Nietzsche’s influence on Yeats, though Otto Bohlman argues that Yeats would have been ‘aware’ of Nietzsche by 1896, he cites Yeats’s letters as evidence to the effect that he had not begun to read Nietzsche until late 1902, having been introduced by John Quinn (B.L. Reid argues in September 1902), having received Thomas Common, ed., \textit{Nietzsche as Critic, Philosopher, Poet and Prophet} (London: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1901), a selection of Nietzsche’s writings, as a gift. Bohlman, \textit{Yeats and Nietzsche: An Exploration of Major Nietzschean Echoes in the Writings of W.B. Yeats} (London: Macmillan, 1982), xi, 1-4. Cf. David Holdeman, \textit{The Cambridge Introduction to W.B. Yeats} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 54. Bohlman cites a letter which Allan Wade dates to 26\textsuperscript{th} September, 1902, in which Yeats refers to recently having read Nietzsche, a letter of 15\textsuperscript{th} May, 1903, in which Yeats claims to have been introduced to Nietzsche by Quinn, and also a letter to Lady Gregory dated approximately 9\textsuperscript{th} October, 1902 (though possibly dating from around December 1902 – January 1903). See Yeats, \textit{The Letters of W.B. Yeats}, ed. Allan Wade (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1954), esp. 379, 403. Reid, \textit{The Man from New York: John Quinn and His Friends} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 10.}

\footnote{Michael Valdez Moses, argues that, in fact, Yeats had ‘encountered’ Nietzsche ‘no later than April of 1896’ through both a series of articles by Havelock Ellis, appearing in \textit{Savoy}, and through Arthur Symons’s ‘Nietzsche and Tragedy’. (Michael Valdez Moses, ‘Nietzsche’, in Holdeman and Levitas, eds., \textit{W.B. Yeats in Context}, 266-275 [266]) Moses regards Quinn’s claim to have introduced Yeats to Nietzsche, having sent him a copy of \textit{Thus Spake Zarathustra} and, later, a copy of Alexander Tillie’s three volume edition of \textit{The Works of Friedrich Nietzsche} in 1902, as (at best) inaccurate, though he does concede that Yeats ‘immersed’ himself for the first time in Nietzsche’s works from late 1902-1903. (\textit{Ibid}) Thus, although Yeats may well have been ‘aware’ of Nietzsche by 1896, it is accurate to suggest that the discussion in ‘Scylla’, and especially in its allusion to the 1899 debate, predates the significant influence which Nietzsche was to have on Yeats’s later poetry and thought.}

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materialism of Dowden (in the guise of Lyster, Eglinton and Best) represents Scylla’s rock, whilst Yeats’s mysticism (in the guise of AE) represents the vortex of Charybdis. Just as in *The Odyssey*, Odysseus (Ulysses) must navigate the Strait of Messina, between Scylla and Charybdis, so, in the exposition of his theory of the ‘image’ of the artist, Stephen must navigate a safe passage between Dowden’s materialism and Yeatsian mysticism. In the second section I will move on to analyse how this navigation takes place through Stephen’s exposition of the final incarnation of his aesthetic theory.

In my analysis of Stephen’s aesthetic theory in ‘Scylla’, I want to combine the terms of the second and third chapters. The terms of Stephen’s ironic appropriation of Aquinas’s theory of beauty, the concept of the ‘esthetic image’ and ‘classical’ art in *Portrait* (themselves representing a refinement of the expansive aesthetic speculation of *Stephen Hero* and Joyce’s early critical writing) are refined in Stephen’s concept of the ‘image’ of the artist in *Ulysses*. I will argue that the process of the creation of the ‘image’ is analogous to Nietzsche’s conception of the fold in the self-creation of the artist in *Birth* and is underpinned by his earlier ironic appropriation of Romantic accounts of artistic inspiration to an anti-Romantic ‘classical’ aesthetic. Drawing on the parallel I have sought to establish between the evolution of Stephen’s aesthetic theory from *Stephen Hero* to *Portrait* to Nietzsche’s anti-metaphysics and rejection of Schopenhauer, I will argue that Stephen rejects Yeats’s post-Schopenhauerian, late-Romantic Platonic metaphysics and the mysticism, his Transcendental Symbolist aesthetic and the essentialist, nationalist politics which emerges from it. Just as Odysseus follows Circe’s advice to ‘keep closer to Scylla’s cliff, and row past that as quickly as may be’, as it is ‘far better to lose six men and keep your ship than to lose
your men one and all’, I will argue that in the exposition of his aesthetic theory Stephen navigates closer to Dowden’s mode of Shakespearean biographical criticism, braving proximity to its materialism rather than suffer complete wreck in the late-romantic Yeatsian vortex.\textsuperscript{12}

In the third and final section of the chapter, following the philosophical and art-historical approach that I have sought to establish through the previous chapters, and building on the parallel to Nietzsche’s aesthetics and anti-metaphysics, in contrast to Gibson’s reading, recent post-colonial readings of Joyce, such as that of Mark Wollaeger, and exclusively theoretical readings such as those of Eugene O’Brien and Shelley Brivic, I will argue that Stephen’s political position, as it is presented in ‘Scylla’, is founded upon his rejection of late-Romanticism and concomitant ironic appropriation of Romantic aesthetics.\textsuperscript{13} It represents a third, idiosyncratic political position, opposed to both those of Yeats and Dowden. It represents a qualification of

\textsuperscript{12} Homer, \textit{The Odyssey}, 145. Cf. Gibson, \textit{Joyce’s Revenge}, 66-67. See Joyce’s characterisation in ‘James Clarence Mangan’ of ‘the classical school fighting the materialism which attends it’, (\textit{CW}, 53) later qualified in more fervent terms in \textit{SH}: ‘the classical school fighting the materialism that \textit{must} attend it’. (83. Emphasis added). Kellogg argues that the aesthetic theory of \textit{Ulysses} derives directly from Joyce’s early critical writing, and that the twin poles of Scylla and Charybdis represent the early reference to the ‘classical’ and ‘romantic’ ‘schools’ as discussed in ‘James Clarence Mangan’: the classical school fighting the materialism which attends it, and the romantic school to preserve coherence, […] this unrest is the condition of all achievement […] and presses slowly towards a deeper insight which will make the schools at one.’ (53) Kellogg argues that the theory of ’Scylla’ represents precisely this projected synthesis, claiming that Stephen never truly abandons the romantic temper. The two poles of the debate in ’Scylla’ thus represent, on the one hand the ‘materialism’ which attends the classical, and, on other the threat of the incoherence of the romantic. Whilst I agree with Kellogg that the two artistic tempers are indeed at stake in the debate of ’Scylla’, in relating that debate directly to Joyce’s early critical writing, Kellogg elides the refinement and augmentation those ideas undergo in their revision through \textit{Stephen Hero} to the \textit{Portrait}. His argument that the tempers are synthesised also overlooks the structure and significance of the Homeric parallel. (Kellogg, ’Scylla and Charybdis’, in Hart and Hayman, eds., \textit{James Joyce’s Ulysses: Critical Essays}, 147-179 [149], 152-153).

Gibson’s conception of the ‘Irish-centred’ Joyce and an extension of Valente’s conception of Joyce’s ‘transnationalism’ in Joyce’s early critical writings.14

I – ‘The beautiful ineffectual dreamer who comes to grief against hard facts’: the two poles of the debate in ‘Scylla and Charybdis’

The dialogue of ‘Scylla’ takes place in the Librarian’s office of the National Library of Ireland. Present are the director of the Library, Thomas W. Lyster, the librarians Richard Irvine Best and Eglinton, AE (Russell), Stephen Stephen, and, towards its climax, Buck Mulligan. The Lyster, Best, Eglinton, and AE of ‘Scylla’ represent Joyce’s fictional portraits of the genuine historical figures with whom he had contact.15 These quasi-autobiographical figures cluster around two opposed political-critical poles. In this section I will argue that Lyster and Eglinton’s historical materialist approach to Shakespearian biographical criticism represents Joyce’s parody of Dowden. By contrast, AE stands as Joyce’s parodic representative of Yeats’s mysticism and nationalism and of the Irish Literary Revival.16 It is in opposition to both of these political, critical and philosophical positions that Stephen expounds his theory of the genesis of Hamlet and the ‘image’ of the artist.17

Lyster joined the library staff in 1878, becoming director in 1895. William Schutte lays emphasis on Lyster’s dedication to his duties and to making the library accessible to everyone.\textsuperscript{18} These characteristics are reflected in his caricatured portrayal within ‘Scylla’. The dialogue begins in \textit{medias res} with Lyster, purring urbanely, attempting to mollify and ‘to comfort’ the antagonists present in his office with ‘a solemn, banal pronouncement’.\textsuperscript{19} ‘—And we have, have we not, those priceless pages of \textit{Wilhelm Meister}? A great poet on a great brother. A hesitating soul taking arms against a sea of troubles, torn by conflicting doubts, as one sees in real life.’\textsuperscript{20} Lyster’s reference blends Goethe’s Wilhelm’s reading of \textit{Hamlet} as ‘the effect of a great action laid upon a soul unfit for the performance of it’ with a quotation from the play:

\begin{verbatim}
Whether ‘tis nobler in the mind to suffer
The slings and arrows of outrageous Fortune,
Or to take arms against a sea of troubles,
And by opposing end them\textsuperscript{21}
\end{verbatim}

To me it is clear that Shakespeare meant in the present case, to represent the effects of a great action laid upon a soul unfit for the performance of it. […] A lovely, pure, noble and most moral nature, without the strength of nerve which forms a hero, sinks beneath a burden which it cannot bear and must not cast away. All duties are holy for him; the present is too hard. Impossibilities have been required of him; not in themselves impossibilities, but such for him. He winds and turns, and torments himself; he advances and recoils; is ever put in mind, ever puts himself in mind; at last does all but lose his purpose for his thoughts; yet still without recovering his peace of mind.\textsuperscript{22}

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{19} Schutte, 30
\textsuperscript{20} U., 235
\textsuperscript{21} William Shakespeare, \textit{Hamlet}, 3.1. ll.56-59, 285
\end{footnotes}
Lyster’s invocation of Wilhelm’s interpretation of Hamlet’s rumination on the motivations and hindrances to action, serves, at the very outset of ‘Scylla’, to initially frame the episode’s engagement with Hamlet through a foregrounding of the psychological character of the protagonist of the play. Lyster expands upon his quotation from Goethe: ‘The beautiful ineffectual dreamer who comes to grief against hard facts. One always feels that Goethe’s judgments are so true. True in the larger analysis.’ The reference represents an unacknowledged quotation of Matthew Arnold’s epigram on Shelley: ‘The Shelley of actual life is a vision of beauty and radiance, indeed, but availing nothing, effecting nothing. And in poetry, no less than in life, he is “a beautiful and ineffectual angel, beating in the void his luminous wings in vain.”’ Arnold’s criticism of Shelley is itself framed in response to Edward Dowden’s Life of Percy Bysshe Shelley. In his critique of Dowden’s biography of Shelley, Arnold argues that Dowden became too much of an apologist for the poet, whilst at the same time presenting exhaustive biographical information on Shelley’s conduct of his romantic and political affairs which undermined the prevailing positive image of him held by his readers. Hence Arnold’s emphasised qualification of what he sees as Dowden’s portrayal of Shelley as an angel, a ‘beautiful and ineffectual angel’.

Lyster’s (apparently) blithe and placatory allusion to Goethe forms a dense preliminary nexus to ‘Scylla’. It serves to ostensibly bind the foregrounding of the

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23 U., 235
26 On the relationship between Arnold, Dowden and Shelley, see Wallace, 813. Wallace argues that, in his critique of Dowden, Arnold blames Dowden’s Irishness, his book coinciding with the year of the Home Rule Bill (1886). (813) In fact, though Arnold offers the possibility of the Home Rule Bill as a satirical speculation, he argues that the problems with Dowden’s text arise from Dowden’s own desire to be a poet. (See Arnold, ‘Shelley’, 307).
protagonist in the interpretation of Hamlet to Dowden and, through the allusion to Arnold’s critique of Dowden, to Shelley. It thus serves to bind both Lyster and Dowden to Romanticism and to a caricature of Romantic interpretations of Hamlet. Lyster’s appropriation of Arnold’s critique of Dowden’s over-emphasis on biographical detail in his reading of Shelley, also acts as a tacit allusion to Dowden’s study of Shakespeare. Dowden’s study represented his attempt to ‘connect the study of Shakspere’s works with an inquiry after the personality of the writer, and to observe, as far as possible, in its several stages the growth of his intellect and character from youth to full maturity’. Dowden’s ostensible aim was to ‘pass through the creations of a great dramatic poet to the mind of the creator’. In the preface to the third edition, he binds his reading of Shakespeare, and in particular Hamlet, to an allusion to Goethe:

“Hamlet” seems to have its roots so deep in Shakspere’s nature, it was so much a subject of special predilection […] We have the same feeling with reference to “Hamlet” which we have for Goethe’s “Faust”—that it has to do with almost the whole deeper part of the poet’s life up to the date of its creation.

The terms of Dowden’s comparison of Shakespeare (and especially the genesis of Hamlet) to Goethe form the model for Lyster’s opening remarks in ‘Scylla’.

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27 This binding of Lyster and Dowden to Romanticism serves, for example, to tie the allusion to Hamlet at the outset of ‘Scylla’ to the terms of Coleridge’s reading of the play. As I argued in the third chapter, in the context of Nietzsche’s interpretation of Hamlet in Birth, for Coleridge, Hamlet’s is a state of procrastination and impotent resolve. He argues that that Shakespeare’s aim was to ‘portray a person in whose view the external world, and all its incidents and objects, were comparatively dim, and of no interest in themselves, and which only began to be of interest when they were reflected in the mirror of his mind.’ (See Coleridge, ‘Hamlet’ in The Major Works, ed. H.J. Jackson, 655-659 [esp. 655]) Coleridge argues that Hamlet’s failure to act results not from fear or cowardice but from his division between the ‘external world’ and the inner world of thought. (See Charles Mahoney, ‘Coleridge and Shakespeare’, in Burwick, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 498-514 [500, 506-509]. On the relationship of Coleridge’s reading of Hamlet to the Romantics see Matthew Scott, ‘Coleridge’s Lectures 1808-1819: On Literature’ 185-203 [187-189]). See chapter 3, pp. 163(n), above.


29 xiii. Dowden is, however, careful to point out to his reader the error ‘of supposing I endeavour to identify Shakspere with any one of his dramatic personages’. (Ibid.)

30 v-vi
Dowden’s emphasis on beginning from a reading of the psychology of the protagonist to that of the artist (Shakespeare), echoing the terms of Romantic interpretations of *Hamlet*, forms the foil against which Stephen will establish the terms of his own reading of the relationship of Shakespeare’s biography (his life) to his art. I will argue that whilst he follows the terms of Dowden and of Romanticism’s readings insofar as they attempt to read back from the artwork to the life of the artist, he ultimately rejects their focus on the protagonist (particularly on Hamlet) as the key to understanding the psychology of Shakespeare the artist and the genesis of the artwork.31

Both Schutte and Gibson argue that Dowden is ‘behind’ Lyster, Schutte citing Stephen Gwynn’s claim that he was ‘Dowden’s most ardent disciple’.32 However, in his opening remarks, Lyster appropriates the terms of Arnold’s critique of Dowden. As Kiberd argues, Lyster’s praise of Goethe at the outset of ‘Scylla’ represents ‘purest Celticism’, incidentally aligning Lyster with the terms of Yeats’s reading of Shakespeare as a poet of the ‘Celtic Twilight’, upon which Arnold was a key influence.33 Apparently no more than a glib, platitudinous, and placatory gesture, Lyster’s opening remarks present a dense preliminary nexus to ‘Scylla’. They fuse together Wilhelm Meister’s interpretation of *Hamlet*, and an allusion to the play itself, with an allusion to Dowden’s biography of Shelley and work on Shakespeare and Matthew Arnold’s critique of Dowden, thus introducing both poles of the ensuing debate and the terms of Stephen’s exposition of his aesthetic theory. On the one hand

31 In this sense, a parallel thus exists between Stephen’s and Nietzsche’s rejection of Romantic interpretations of *Hamlet*. As I argued in the third chapter for Nietzsche, in contrast to Coleridge’s conception of Hamlet’s failure to act as a result of procrastination, this failure results from the revelation of the true constitution of the world, which renders action futile: ‘the Dionysian man resembles Hamlet: both have once looked truly into the essence of things, they have gained knowledge, and nausea inhibits action.’ (Nietzsche, *BT*, §7, 60)
33 Kiberd, 349. With reference to Lyster’s opening remarks, Kiberd emphasises Joyce’s rejection of ‘all Yeatsian attempts to Celticize a poet’ as well as Joyce’s opposition to Arnold. See also Gibson, *Joyce’s Revenge*, 64.
Lyster (his ‘disciple’) serves to introduce Dowden. On the other, his appropriation of Goethe and reading of *Hamlet* serves to introduce the terms of Yeats’s ‘Celticism’.

Stephen rejects both of these sets of terms in dismissing Lyster’s observation on Goethe and *Hamlet* as little more than a fatuous truism: ‘—Monsieur de la Palisse, Stephen sneered, was alive fifteen minutes before his death’.  

Schutte provides the context for Stephen’s sarcastic sneer:

> The soldiers of the Maréchal de la Palaisse, who was killed while fighting valiantly in the battle of Pavia in 1525, are reported to have said in trying to show how heroic his death was: “Un quart d'heure avant sa mort il est en vie.” This naïve statement gave Bernard de la Monnaye the idea of writing a whole series of ridiculously obvious truths about the hero.

For Stephen, Lyster’s quotation of Goethe, with, at its nucleus, a confluence of Dowden’s autobiographical approach with the ‘Celtic’ Yeatsian figure of the ‘ineffectual dreamer’, associating, as it does, the poet with the protagonist of the play, represents merely a platitudinous critical commonplace and provides no insight into the genesis of *Hamlet*. Already, in his first significant reaction to the principal figures of the episode and the debate, Stephen thus ranges himself against both Dowden and Yeats.

John Eglinton (Magee) joins the discussion in ‘Scylla’ with a rejoinder to Stephen’s sneer at the departed Lyster: ‘—Have you found those six brave medicals, John Eglinton asked with elder’s gall, to write *Paradise Lost* at your dictation? *The Sorrows of Satan* he calls it.’  

He links his mocking reference to Stephen’s alleged ambition to re-write *Paradise Lost* with a projected attempt to re-write *Hamlet*.

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34 *U.*, 235
36 *U.*, 235.
claiming that if Stephen needed ‘six brave medicals’ to re-write the Milton, he would need seven for *Hamlet*.\footnote{236} Eglinton’s patronising mockery forms an implicit parody of Marie Corelli’s *The Sorrows of Satan or The Strange Experience of One Geoffrey Tempest, Millionaire. A Romance* (1895) and her the earlier doctrines of ‘Electric Christianity’, propounded in *A Romance of Two Worlds* (1886). It also represents a tacit parody of Yeats’s mysticism, to which (Eglinton argues) the number seven was ‘dear’.\footnote{38} His defence of Lyster, framed as it is through a rejection of Yeats, serves to locate Eglinton on the side of Dowden within the terms of the debate.

Kiberd emphasises the importance of Eglinton’s background as a northern, Protestant humanist in contrast to the southern, Catholic proponents of the Revival.\footnote{39} According to Kiberd, he ‘saluted’ Dowden as ‘cosmopolitan’, in stark contrast to what he saw as the provincialism of the Revival.\footnote{40} Eglinton highlighted what he saw as the inherent xenophobia within the ‘national movement’.\footnote{41} Although he shared with Yeats and Russell the belief that ‘men were greater in the uncomplicated past than in the overburdened present,’ Eglinton ‘did not share AE’s confidence in the ability of modern man to recapture the heroic age’, and sympathised with Dowden’s Anglo-centrism to the extent that he insisted that,

it is no more absurd to ascribe all the woes of Ireland to the use of the English tongue than it is to try to reject the accumulated riches of English cultural development in favour of a new culture in a rude and undisciplined language. [Eglinton argued] that it has been the Anglo-Irish—not the peasantry as the zealots insist—who have consistently led

\footnote{236}{Ibid. See Thornton, *Allusions*, 152. Thornton cites George Bernard Shaw’s review of a dramatisation of Corelli’s *The Sorrows of Satan* by Herbert Woodgate and Paul M. Berton at the Shaftesbury Theatre, London, January 9\textsuperscript{th}, 1897: ‘Shaw discussed some of its “miraculous powers,” including “seeming to improvise on the pianoforte by playing at the dictation of angels.”’ (*Saturday Review*, January 17\textsuperscript{th}, 1897). On the significance of the number seven to Yeats, see Thornton, 153.}

\footnote{38}{Ibid. See Thornton, *Allusions*, 152.}

\footnote{39}{Kiberd, 156.}

\footnote{40}{159. On Russell’s (AE) praise of Eglinton’s own cosmopolitanism, see Schutte, 41. (Russell, ‘Nationality or Cosmopolitanism’, in *Imaginations and Reverie* [Dublin: Maunsel, 1916], 239).}

\footnote{41}{See Kiberd, 161-162.}
the nation in the fight for spiritual and intellectual independence. Thus, although he believed in the validity of inspiration drawn from the soil and in the deterioration of man since the Heroic Age, he could not approve of what seemed to him the artificial and sentimental methods by which the enthusiasts were trying to revive the “good old days.”

The terms of Eglinton’s relationship to, and rejection of, the Revival are crucial. As Boyd argues, Eglinton maintained a position of ‘materialism’: a ‘certain ironical detachment and scepticism’ in opposition to the ‘idealism’ of the ‘illusory, shadowy world’ of Yeats, and ‘the “Celtic Twilight” of the Yeats school’. In opposition to Yeats and Russell’s politics, he laid emphasis on the individual in contrast to the state, seeking to ‘regenerate patriotism’ based on inter-subjective relations and a relationship to ‘Nature’.

In the debate of ‘Scylla’, Eglinton’s ‘materialism’ leads him to defend Dowden’s biographical-historical materialist approach to Shakespeare criticism: ‘We know nothing but that he lived and suffered. Not even so much.’ Eglinton maintains Dowden’s position of reading from historical detail and available biographical fact into the text (of Hamlet). He anticipates Stephen’s exposition of his theory, characterising it as little more than paradox, citing Mulligan as a source. Following Dowden’s critical approach of seeking to identify Shakespeare with his protagonists and to read from them to the artist, he argues that ‘if you [Stephen] want to shake my belief that Shakespeare is Hamlet you have a stern task before you.’ Whilst he is ultimately in sympathy with Eglinton’s critique of the outright rejection of anglophone culture, and of ‘the artificial and sentimental’ character of the Yeatsian

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42 Schutte, 43. See Eglinton, Bards and Saints (Dublin: Maunsel, 1906), esp. 7-12.
43 Boyd, 60, 53, 52.
44 Boyd, 62, 60. See Schutte, 43-45.
45 U., 248
47 248
Revival, I will argue that Stephen is opposed to the terms of his ‘materialism’, maintenance of the conception of a past ‘Heroic Age’ and of artistic ‘inspiration drawn from the soil’, and the terms of the attempted regeneration of patriotism he founds upon them.

In his sarcastic (internal) response to Eglinton’s jibe on his desire to rewrite both *Paradise Lost* and *Hamlet*, Stephen alludes to Yeats’s and Lady Augusta Gregory’s *Cathleen Ni Hoolihan* (1902). The allusion is a parody of the play’s nationalist sacrificial mythology. In the play Cathleen (who represents Ireland) arrives at a family wedding and proceeds to tell the family her sad story. She succeeds in luring the young groom away to join the failed Irish Rebellion of 1798. When the groom leaves with her to be sacrificed in the Rebellion, Cathleen is noted by one wedding guest to be rejuvenated and to return to a state of youth and beauty. Richard Kearney links the (in Yeats and Gregory overtly political) sacrificial motif to the seasonal cycle of death and revival and to the sacrificial aspect of the Crucifixion. His parody of Yeats’s mythopoetic nationalism, places Stephen in a close proximity and strange sympathy to Eglinton. He recognizes this proximity, and in his pursuit of an idiosyncratic critical and aesthetic position, independent of the leading figures of the Irish literary scene, recognizes this in turn as identifying Eglinton as his ‘real opponent’ in the debate, especially in Eglinton’s implication that Stephen is complicit in Yeats’s mysticism.

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In stark contrast to Lyster and Eglinton, Russell (AE) is firmly rooted on the Yeatsian side of the political-critical debate at the heart of ‘Scylla’. He rejects the terms of Lyster, Eglinton and Dowden’s historical materialist approach to Shakespeare criticism and biography: ‘All these questions are purely academic, Russell oracled out of his shadow. I mean whether Hamlet is Shakespeare or James I or Essex. Clergymen’s discussion of the historicity of Jesus.’

Dismissing the ‘questions’ of Hamlet’s relationship to Shakespeare’s life or contemporary political milieu as ‘purely academic’, and therefore simultaneously opposing himself to the historical materialism and focus on biographical detail of Dowden’s scholarship (already obscurely alluded to in Lyster’s quotation of Arnold on Dowden’s Shelley), Russell puts forward his own (and, implicitly, Yeats’s) contention about the purpose of art:

Art has to reveal to us ideas, formless spiritual essences. The supreme question about a work of art is out of how deep a life does it spring. The painting of Gustave Moreau is the painting of ideas. The deepest poetry of Shelley, the words of Hamlet bring our mind into contact with the eternal wisdom, Plato’s world of ideas. All the rest is the speculation of schoolboys for schoolboys.

Russell’s definition of art as the revelation of Platonic ideas represents an allusion to Yeats’s definition of the symbol as ‘the only possible expression of some invisible essence, a transparent lamp about a spiritual flame’. As I argued in the second chapter, Yeats’s Symbolism constitutes the attempt to articulate an ‘invisible essence’, in contradistinction to the representation of the material, ‘embodied’ object: of something concrete and familiar. In ‘transcendental Symbolism,’ as Charles

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50 U., 236
51 Ibid. See also 242: ‘I mean, we have the plays. I mean when we read the poetry of King Lear what is it to us how the poet lived? […] We have King Lear: and it is immortal’.
52 ‘William Blake and his Illustrations to The Divine Comedy’ (1896) in Yeats, SCP, 22-32 (22). See chapter 2, pp. 84-85, above. It is significant in this regard that Russell invokes the example of Gustave Moreau, the French Symbolist painter whose work focussed on literary, Biblical, and mythological themes rather than on visual images and was an important precursor to the Symbolist movement in literature.
Chadwick argues, ‘concrete images are used as symbols, not of particular thoughts and feelings within the poet, but of a vast and general ideal world of which the real world is merely an imperfect representation.’ Russell’s aesthetic injunction thus forms an overt allusion to the Platonic metaphysics which I argued is at stake in Yeats’s transcendental Symbolism: opposes an ‘ideal world’ to that of the ‘real,’ ‘concrete’ world of experience. Russell’s injunction serves to bind the terms of Yeats’s aesthetic to the political debate of ‘Scylla’, ranging against Eglinton’s ‘materialism’ and Lyster and Dowden’s (quasi-Romantic) derivation of a reading of Shakespeare’s biography from his protagonist and thus also against Dowden’s anglo-centric Protestant conception of Shakespeare.

In his essay on Russell, ‘“AE”: Mystic and Economist’, Boyd argues that AE’s politics evolved from his mysticism; that the ‘economist’ George W. Russell evolved from the ‘the mystic poet’ AE: 54

The leitmotiv of “AE’s” poetry, and the fundamental postulate of his philosophy, is the divine origin of man, the gradual falling away of the human race from its heroic destinies, and its present enslavement to materialism. It is only when he is aroused by some noble idea, or some great memory, that man rises to a realisation of the divinity that is in him. 55

AE’s politics, then, emerged from his ‘philosophy’. In ‘Scylla’ this is characterised as itself emerging from what I have argued is Yeats’s self-styled late-Romantic Platonic metaphysics (what Boyd refers to as ‘mysticism’). By extension, through the caricatured figure of Russell, this late-Romantic Platonic metaphysics is portrayed as lying at the heart of the project of the Irish Literary Revival. At stake in Russell’s politics is the concept of a trans-historical, ‘divine’ essence of the Irish race, culture

53 Charles Chadwick, Symbolism, 3. See chapter 2, p. 84(n), above.
55 Boyd, 34
and nation. He shares with Eglinton the notion of a past ‘Heroic Age’ from which the modern represents a fall away. However, his conception of a ‘noble idea’ or ‘great memory’ by which the ‘divine destiny’ of the racial, cultural and national ‘essence’ is realised, represents what, as Schutte argues, Eglinton rejected as ‘the artificial and sentimental methods by which the enthusiasts were trying to revive the “good old days”’, conceiving of the ‘past merely as an escape from the present’.  

Boyd argues that this conception of the past, rooted in a desire to revive Celtic myth, was quintessential to the Irish Literary Revival and to Russell’s later nationalism: ‘an appeal for the building up of a rural civilisation, a co-operative commonwealth’; the ‘restoration of something approaching the ancient order’. It is this ‘spiritualism’, which, in turn, lead Russell to reject Eglinton’s ‘materialism’. I will argue that in the exposition of his aesthetic theory in ‘Scylla’, in an extension of the terms of his earlier rejection of Yeats’s Symbolism in Portrait as I sought to examine these in the second chapter, Stephen rejects absolutely Russell’s Platonic metaphysics and aesthetics and thus the terms of the nationalist politics of the Irish Literary Revival.

The historical materialism of Lyster and Eglinton (Dowden) on the one hand, and the late-Romantic Platonism, mysticism and ‘Celticism’ of AE (Yeats) on the other, represent the two poles of the aesthetic, critical and political debate at the heart of ‘Scylla’, between which Stephen must navigate. I will argue that, in the Homeric parallel of ‘Scylla’, although Stephen ostensibly rejects the closeted sterility of Dowden’s historical materialism and scholarship (in the guise of the Librarians) and the volumes of the National Library, in his own interpretation of Shakespeare

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56 Schutte, 43. Boyd, 63
57 Boyd, 34, 41 See U., 238-239: ‘[Russell:] The movements which work revolutions in the world are born out of the dreams and visions in a peasant’s heart on the hillside. For them the earth is not an exploitable ground but the living mother’.

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biography and theory of the genesis of *Hamlet*, he is much closer to the literary, critical and philosophical claims of this approach than to Russell’s Yeatsian Platonism and mysticism, which he rejects absolutely. This rejection stems from the terms of the earlier incarnation of his aesthetic theory in *Portrait*, of which the theory of the ‘image’ of the artist that Stephen expounds in ‘Scylla’ represents the refinement and the maturation. I want to move on in the second section to provide a reading of the ‘image’ according to both the terms of Stephen’s aesthetic theory in *Portrait*, as I sought to define these in the second chapter, and to highlight the parallel between Stephen’s exposition of the ‘image’ and the terms of Nietzsche’s early anti-metaphysics (between the ‘On Schopenhauer’ fragment and ‘On Truth’) and the fold in the self-creation of the artist in *Birth*. I will argue that in formulation of his aesthetic theory, Stephen makes a significant concession to materialism, akin to Odysseus’s sacrifice of men to Scylla, in ironically appropriating and inverting the terms of Dowden’s reading of Shakespearean biography in order to avoid total oblivion in the abyss of his own Yeatsian late-Romantic, mystic-Platonic Charybdis.

II – ‘*quintessential triviality*’: the genesis of *Hamlet* and the Romantic-anti-Romanticism of the fold in the ‘image’ of the artist

At this point the real answer to the question, *how one becomes what one is*, can no longer be avoided. [...] To become what one is, one must not have the faintest notion *what* one is. From this point of view even the *blunders* of life have their own meaning and value—the occasional side roads and wrong roads, the delays, “modesties,” seriousness wasted on tasks that are remote from *the* task. All this can express a great prudence, even the supreme prudence: where *nosce te ipsum* [know thyself] would be the recipe for ruin, forgetting oneself, *misunderstanding* oneself, making oneself smaller, narrower, mediocre, become reason itself. [...] Meanwhile the organizing “idea” that is destined to rule keeps growing deep down—it begins to command; slowly it leads us *back* from side roads and wrong roads; it prepares *single* qualities and fitness that will one
day prove to be indispensable toward a whole. (Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, ‘Why I am so clever’, §9, 253-254)

“Keep the craft away from the smoke and breakers and rather make the rock yonder, lest unawares you should let the ship drive the other way and should bring us all to ruin.

[…]

“So with much lamenting we rowed on into the strait.”

(Homer, *The Odyssey*, 148)

Stephen’s theory of Shakespeare biography and of the genesis of *Hamlet* rejects both Eglinton’s (Dowden’s) ‘belief that Shakespeare is Hamlet’, and Russell’s Yeatsian-Platonic injunction, expounded in opposition to Eglinton, that ‘[a]rt has to reveal to us ideas, formless spiritual essences’. As such, it represents a third, distinct critical position. I want to begin this section by offering a reading of the key points of Stephen’s theory of Shakespeare biography, before moving on to examine the way in which these underpin the theory of artistic inspiration and creation which is at stake in ‘Scylla’ and the way in which Shakespeare thus stands, for Stephen, as the paradigm for the figure of the artist.

In my reading of the aesthetic theory of ‘Scylla’, I will seek to synthesise the key terms of the previous chapters, drawing together the ironic appropriation of Aquinas in *Portrait*; my reading of Nietzsche, Bergson and Hulme’s conceptions of ‘intuition’; my conception of the fold in the self-creation of the artist in *Birth*; my reading of the will to power and Nietzsche’s anti-metaphysics and the opposition of the ‘classical’ to the ‘romantic’ in Joyce, Nietzsche and Hulme. I will argue that the aesthetic theory of ‘Scylla’ represents a refinement of the terms of Stephen’s ironic appropriation of Aquinas’s theory of beauty in *Portrait*. From the revelation of the

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58 *U.*, 248, 236
quiddity of an object of quotidian experience, Stephen moves on to refine the terms of his account of artistic inspiration, transferring the stimulus from the object to the artist themselves. The artist, for Stephen, becomes their own object. The process of artistic inspiration and creation in ‘Scylla’ becomes the structure of the self-laceration and ironic self-re-creation of the artist, which I will articulate and clarify through a comparison with my account of the process of the fold in the self-creation of the artist in Nietzsche’s Birth. I will argue that the aesthetic theory of ‘Scylla’ is rooted in, and represents the fruition of, the anti-metaphysics and ‘classical’ aesthetic at the heart of Joyce’s earlier works. The theory presents a conception of artistic inspiration, creation and the subjectivity (the ‘I’) of the artist as bound in a fragmented and provisional process of self-becoming, which I will argue underpins both the relationship of the text to Romanticism and, ultimately, the politics at stake in ‘Scylla’.

In his ‘belief that Shakespeare is Hamlet’, Eglinton characterises Dowden’s historical materialist approach, seeking to begin from the text (of any given play) and to derive a reading of biographical significance and detail from the character of the protagonist. By contrast, Stephen seeks to begin his exposition of his theory of the genesis of Hamlet from the historical and biographical context of the performance of the play:

—The play begins. A player comes on under the shadow, made up in the castoff mail of a court buck, a wellset man with a bass voice. It is the ghost, the king, a king and no king, and the player is Shakespeare who has studied Hamlet all the years of his life which were not vanity in order to play the part of the spectre.  

Beginning from the context of the performance and hinging his interpretation on a direct association between the players and their roles, Stephen identifies Shakespeare,
not with the prince, but with the phantom of the murdered father, King Hamlet. According to the terms of Stephen’s hypothetical dramatisation, Shakespeare, ‘the wellset man with a bass voice’, is far too mature to be able to play the part of the young prince. Instead, the ‘young player’, Burbage, Stephen argues, takes on this latter role. For Stephen, it is possible to argue from the biographical exigencies of performance and the identification of the players with the respective ages of the characters they portray to the underlying biographical origin of the play. Shakespeare, he argues, has ‘studied *Hamlet* all the years of his life […] to play the part of the spectre’. Shakespeare’s life itself, Stephen argues, constitutes preparation for the role of the murdered King, and the role, in turn, represents the transposition of Shakespeare’s life into art:

He speaks the words to Burbage, the young player […] calling him by a name:

*Hamlet, I am thy father’s spirit*

bidding him to list. To a son he speaks, the son of his soul, the prince, young Hamlet and to the son of his body, Hamnet Shakespeare, who has died in Stratford that his namesake may live for ever.

Developing from his reading of the exigencies of the performance of the play, Stephen argues that the father/son relationship is what is crucial to *Hamlet*. The ghost’s speech, for Stephen, carries a double significance. It is both dramatic and biographical. It represents the speech of Shakespeare the artist and actor, in the role of the King, to the ‘son of his soul’, the artwork Hamlet, and yet also, Stephen argues, the speech of the man (the historical figure) Shakespeare to the dead ‘son of his body’, Hamnet. It represents the transposition of life (of the ‘body’) into art (the ‘soul’).

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62 See also *U.*, 268
Stephen argues that there is only one ‘logical conclusion’ to be drawn from the ‘premises’ of this identification of Shakespeare with the King and of the prince with his son: ‘you are the dispossessed son: I am the murdered father: your mother is the guilty queen. Ann Shakespeare, born Hathaway.’\(^63\) It is on the basis of this inference of the relationship of the principal characters of *Hamlet* to the key figures of Shakespeare’s life that Stephen founds his theory of the genesis of the play. The theory revolves around the identification of Ann Shakespeare née Hathaway with Gertrude, and, as such, a identification of Ann Hathaway as ‘guilty’. From this deduction, Stephen argues that at the heart of the biographical genesis of *Hamlet* lies a foundational sexual trauma:

Do you think that the writer of *Antony and Cleopatra*, a passionate pilgrim, had his eyes in the back of his head that he chose the ugliest doxy in all of Warwickshire to lie withal? […] He chose badly? He was chosen, it seems to me. If others have their will Ann hath a way. By cock, she was to blame […] a boldfaced Stratford wench who tumbles in a cornfield a lover younger than herself.\(^64\)

Extrapolating from the portrayal of beauty and of passion in Shakespeare’s art, Stephen argues that it is not possible that he would have chosen to seduce Ann Hathaway, ‘the ugliest doxy in all of Warwickshire’. Instead, it is Ann Hathaway, according to Stephen, who seduced the young Shakespeare. The fact of this seduction; of his having been sexually overpowered by an older woman in his loss of innocence, Stephen argues, remained with Shakespeare as a permanent psychological scar:

Belief in himself has been untimely killed. He was overborne […] and he will never be a victor in his own eyes after nor play victoriously the game of laugh and lie down. Assumed dongiovannism will not save him. No later undoing will undo the first undoing.\(^65\)

In the wake of his seduction by Hathaway, Shakespeare’s ‘[b]elief in himself’, his sense of self-worth and self-confidence, was ‘killed’, like Hamlet senior, in an
'untimely' fashion. He was ‘overborne’ before his time, before the time was right or auspicious. Having been thus simultaneously seduced and defeated, in spite of any subsequent seduction on his part or possible affectation of sexual prowess, Shakespeare could never again perceive himself as a ‘victor’.

The trauma of his seduction and the concomitant destruction of his self-confidence, Stephen goes on to argue, was coupled to, and compounded by, a subsequent infidelity between Ann and Shakespeare’s brother Richard. Having been seduced and defeated, Shakespeare was then subsequently cuckolded by Hathaway.66 It is these biographical events which formed the inspiration for the ‘underplot’ of, and were expressed through, Shakespeare’s works.67 It is the need to purge this biographical experience of defeat and betrayal which ultimately, according to Stephen, underpins the genesis of Hamlet. Shakespeare’s biography is expressed, not in the plight of the prince, but through the character, plight and the haunting of the scene of his betrayal, of the murdered King.

In his reading of Shakespeare’s biography and its critical influence on the subject matter and structure of his work, Stephen remains in far greater proximity to Dowden’s historical materialist approach than to Russell’s Yeatsian-Platonic rejection of the life of the poet in favour of the eternal forms of the Ideas. However, as Gibson argues, Stephen inverts the terms of Dowden’s approach and ‘turns Dowden’s case on its head’. His theory still represents a ‘politicization’ of Shakespeare, but serves to strip him of the ‘stature’, ‘cultural eminence’ and ‘centrality’ which Dowden ‘takes

66 See U., 259, 268-272
67 See 271
for granted’. Gibson’s argument is crucial as it serves both to illuminate the nature of the sexual trauma at the heart of Stephen’s theory of Shakespeare biography and the political and religious claims which underpin it. Gibson argues that Stephen ‘counters’ the Anglo-centric Protestantism of Dowden by linking Shakespeare with Catholicism: ‘understanding him in Catholic terms’. Citing Frank Harris’s claim that Shakespeare represents an artist and a man broken by ‘passion and jealousy and madness’, Gibson argues that to ‘Shakespeare the English master […] Stephen counterposes a Shakespeare whose art proceeds from sexual trauma, a sexual wound that will never heal’. Stephen’s Shakespeare remains ‘strong’, but only in relation to ‘a terrible founding weakness’. At the core of Stephen’s reading of Shakespeare biography, lies a politically, socially and sexually disenfranchised and alienated, ‘Catholic’ Shakespeare, motivated to create in order to purge himself of the burden of his alienation and to take possession of it. His strength lies, for Stephen, in his capacity to turn his lived experience to account and to transpose it into art.

In Stephen’s exposition of his theory of the genesis of *Hamlet* and of the relationship of Shakespeare’s biography to his art, Shakespeare comes to stand as a paradigm for the artist. His transposition of his life into art comes to stand as a paradigm for the process of artistic inspiration and creation. In the genesis of *Hamlet*, according to Stephen, Shakespeare moves from the initial biographical stimulus of his sexual trauma, through the transposition, and concomitant purging, of the trauma into art and, finally, into the re-appropriation of the trauma as artwork. It is this process which underpins, and serves as an example of, the key terms of Stephen’s aesthetic

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68 Gibson, *Joyce’s Revenge*, 65, 67
69 67
71 Gibson, *Joyce’s Revenge*, 68. See also 75.
theory in ‘Scylla’. The stages correspond to the terms of Stephen’s ironic appropriation of Aquinas’s theory of beauty in its earlier incarnation in Portrait. As I argued in the second chapter, in the formation of the ‘esthetic image’, first the object is redeemed from the oblivion of the flux of quotidian experience (integritas). This revelation of the object as independent object allows, for the first time, for the aesthetic assessment of the relationship of its parts or qualities. The object is revealed as a unified, harmonious complex (consonantia). When these stages of ‘artistic apprehension’ are synthesised, the object acquires a ‘radiance’ or luminosity through which, for the first time, its quiddity is revealed (‘claritas is quidditas’). Through this process, the ‘esthetic image’ is conceived in the imagination of the artist.\textsuperscript{72} The process outlined in Portrait represents the ironic inversion of the consciousness of the object and the uncanny revelation of its quiddity, stemming from the coincidence of a change in the disposition of the artist with a concomitant change in the disposition of the object which serves as their model. As such, as I argued in the second chapter, it is intimately tied to lived experience.

In ‘Scylla’, Stephen translates the key terms of the aesthetic theory of Portrait into a physiological, cellular metaphor:

—As we, or mother Dana, weave and unweave our bodies, Stephen said, from day to day, their molecules shuttled to and fro, so does the artist weave and unweave his image. And as the mole on my right breast is where it was when I was born, though all my body has been woven of new stuff time after time, so through the ghost of the unquiet father the image of the unliving son looks forth.\textsuperscript{73}

The molecules of the body come-into-being and pass away. Beneath the apparent self-identity of the body (‘the mole on my right breast is where it was when I was born’)

\textsuperscript{72} Portrait, 229-231
\textsuperscript{73} 249
subsists, in fact, a modality of bodies, ‘woven of new stuff time after time’. For Stephen, the perpetual dissolution, regeneration and cellular becoming of the ‘body’ becomes a metaphor for the artistic process. This metaphor relies on two concepts expounded earlier in ‘Scylla’: Stephen’s ironic appropriation of the Aristotelian concept of ‘entelechy’ and that of his own concept of the ‘ghost’, derived from his reading of *Hamlet*.

Stephen’s first defines the concept of ‘entelechy’ which underpins his theory of artistic inspiration and creation in his internal response to his consciousness of being indebted to Russell for the loan of a pound:

> Wait. Five months. Molecules all change. I am other I now. Other I got pound.
> Buzz. Buzz.
> But I, entelechy, form of forms, am I by memory because under everchanging forms.
> I that sinned and prayed and fasted.
> A child Conmee saved from pandies.
> I, I and I. I.74

The term ‘entelechy’ derives from Aristotle, who used it to name the realisation or the complete expression of a function. Entelechy names the condition in which a potentiality has become an actuality.75 Stephen attempts, half-heartedly and with irony, to assuage himself of the consciousness of his debt to Russell (‘A.E.I.O.U.’) by

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74 242. ‘I that sinned and prayed and fasted,’ and ‘A child Conmee saved from pandies’ are both references to the *Portrait*: the former to Stephen’s ‘phase’ of penitence and contrition following the hell fire sermon (134-166), the latter to his schooldays at Clongowes and especially to the incident involving his pandybatting for having broken his glasses and subsequent appeal to Father Conmee (56-61).

separating his past experience into a modality of ‘selves’: ‘Other I got pound.’.\textsuperscript{76} In the five months since Russell lent him the pound, he sarcastically and bitterly reasons, all the molecules in his body would have passed away and been replaced by new molecules. However, Stephen is unable to divest himself of the debt. Memory, which retains a trace of the past and creates associations between the past and the present, constitutes an ‘I’ (a ‘self’) which transcends the mortality of the coming-into-being and passing away of past ‘selves’ and persists through time, acting as a substratum ‘under [the] everchanging forms’.

The concept of a modality of ‘selves’, ‘I, I and I. I.’, synthesised by an underlying ‘transcendental’ self (‘I’), serves to bind Stephen’s internal self-parody to the concept that recurs throughout \textit{Ulysses}, and is associated with the consciousness of Bloom, of ‘metempsychosis’. The first reference occurs in ‘Calypso’ where Bloom defines the term for Molly:

—Metempsychosis?
—Yes. Who’s he when he’s at home?
—Metempsychosis, he said, frowning. It’s Greek: from the Greek. That means transmigration of souls.\textsuperscript{77}

‘Metempsychosis’ names the transition of the soul into a new body after death. In ‘Lestrygonians’ Bloom recalls Molly’s mispronunciation: ‘Met him pikehoses she called it,’ and goes on to draw an association between it and the astronomical term ‘parallax’.\textsuperscript{78} Parallax names an apparent change in the position of an object caused by a change in the position of the observer. To bind together ‘metempsychosis’ and

\textsuperscript{76} 243
\textsuperscript{77} 77. The memory of Molly’s enquiry recurs throughout the day. It recurs during the ‘Wandering Rocks’ episode (346), in ‘Sirens’ (367, 372), and in ‘Nausikaa’ is associated with Bloom’s memory of his engagement to Molly and regret over the loss of his youth. (491–492, 498) It also recurs in ‘Oxen of the Sun’ (534) and is again associated with ‘parallax’. (542) In Bloom’s hallucination in ‘Circe’ Paddy Dignam claims his reappearance as spirit is made possible by metempsychosis (597) and in his fantasy of his world-domination a statue of ‘Venus Metempsychosis’ appears. (611) Bloom refers again to Molly’s mispronunciation in ‘Ithaca’ (803–804), as does Molly herself in ‘Penelope’ (893).

\textsuperscript{78} 194
‘parallax’ in this way suggests that the change in the object brought about by the change in the perspective of the observer precipitates the ‘death’ of an old self and the birth of a new self. Later in ‘Lestrygonians’, Bloom also links the term to the notion of karma: ‘Karma they call that transmigration for sins you did in past life the reincarnation met him pikehoses.’ This serves to bind the modality of ‘selves’ precipitated by changes in perception at stake within Stephen’s aesthetic theory to the concept of redemption and atonement for sins committed in a ‘past life’ through metempsychosis: the transmigration of the soul.

The association of the ‘entelechy’ of ‘Scylla’ with the recurring ‘metempsychosis’ concept in *Ulysses* serves to illuminate the concept of a modality of radically finite ‘forms’ or ‘selves’, whose coming-into-being and passing away (‘metempsychosis’) is precipitated by changes in the perception of objects of experience which themselves precipitate a change in the ‘observer’ (‘parallax’). Transcending these radically finite ‘selves’ is one which persists through time in the form of memory (‘entelechy’). The purpose of this entelechial ‘I’ is to redeem the bad conscience and debt associated with the memory of the past. It is this which is at stake in Stephen’s reading of the inspiration for the genesis of *Hamlet* in Shakespeare’s transposition of his foundational sexual trauma into art.

Beneath the ‘entelechy’ of the ‘transcendental’ (memorial) self which persists through time (as the memory of the mole and its position, as the memory of the many moles) lies the ‘metempsychosis’ of finite mortal bodies, dying and resurrected in an ineluctable modality of transmigrations. Stephen transforms the molecular coming-
into-being and passing away of the body into a metaphor for the artistic process. The artist ‘weaves’ and ‘unweaves’ their ‘image’. Stephen identifies the ‘image’ as the image of the artist themselves. The ironic inversion of the consciousness of the object and revelation of its quiddity at stake in the formation of the ‘esthetic image’ in Portrait is reconceived by Stephen in ‘Scylla’ as the revelation of the artist’s own quiddity. The process of the ‘weaving’ of the image reveals (claritas) the previously unrealised quiddity of the artist’s consciousness. The artist’s self-consciousness itself is the ‘object’, the consciousness of which is ironically inverted. The ironic inversion ‘unweaves’ the artist’s previous shape of consciousness (‘self’) and, in turn, precipitates the formation of a new shape of consciousness. The ‘weaving’ and ‘unweaving’ of the images of the artist, like the molecular becoming of the body, constitutes a continual process (‘from day to day’): the modality of ‘selves’ gestured toward in Stephen’s meditation on ‘entelechy’ (‘I, I and I. I’). It is the artist who is woven, unwoven, and rewoven.

Shakespeare’s transposition of his foundational sexual trauma and his relationship to both Ann Hathaway and his son Hamnet into the characters, relationships and tragic pathos of Hamlet stands as the paradigm of the process of the formation of the ‘image’ for Stephen. The identification of Shakespeare with the phantasmal King, provides Stephen with a metaphorical figure for the process. In his response to Eglinton’s dismissal of his theory of the genesis of Hamlet: ‘—He will have it that Hamlet is a ghoststory […] he wants to make our flesh creep’, instead of denying the accusation, Stephen offers a definition of the ‘ghost’: ‘—What is a ghost? Stephen said with tingling energy. One who has faded into impalpability through
The term ‘ghost’, according to Stephen’s definition, refers not simply to the return of the disembodied spirit after death: ‘One who has faded into impalpability through death’, but also through ‘absence’ and ‘change of manners’. The impalpability of the ‘ghost’ can result from within life, as well as after death. Absence names a geographical distance. The ‘change of manners’ names an emotional or social alienation. It is Shakespeare himself, Stephen argues, who is the ‘ghost’. The ghost of King Hamlet is the ‘image’ of Shakespeare.

It is in this sense that Stephen invokes this earlier definition of the ‘ghost’, in an allusion to Hamlet in the articulation of his aesthetic theory: ‘through the ghost of the unquiet father the image of the unliving son looks forth’. The ‘ghost’ is the figure who has passed into impalpability through distance: emotional, geographical or mortal. The ‘ghost’ is the superseded shape of consciousness of the artist. In Stephen’s account of the formation of the ‘esthetic image’ the consciousness of the object is ironically inverted and the quiddity of the object is revealed. This quiddity had always been implicit and yet had remained unconscious or repressed. The ‘esthetic image’ captures the moment of its revelation. It presents the caesura in-between the previous misapprehension of the object, and the newly formed shape of consciousness (consciousness of the quiddity) which supersedes it. In the metaphor into which Stephen transforms Hamlet, the ‘ghost of the unquiet father’ is the shape of consciousness still labouring under its misapprehension of the object (of itself), through which the ‘esthetic image’—its quidditas—the ‘image’ of the as yet ‘unliving
son’, ‘looks forth’. For Stephen the artist’s ‘image’ is always the image of the artist themselves.

Artistic inspiration and the process of artistic creation (the formation of the ‘image’) which it precipitates, are conceived of by Stephen in ‘Scylla’ as comprised of three stages. As I have argued these correspond, approximately, to the integritas, consonantia, and claritas/quidditas of Portrait (and thus of the earlier Stephen Hero).

In ‘Scylla’ this process is transfigured into the self-laceration and self-re-creation of the artist:

In the intense instant of imagination, when the mind, Shelley says, is a fading coal, that which I was is that which I am and that which in possibility I may come to be. So in the future, the sister of the past, I may see myself as I sit here now but by reflection from that which I shall then be.81

Shelley binds his conception of inspiration to the key terms of Platonic metaphysics: ‘to be a poet is to apprehend the true and the beautiful, in a word the good’.82 As I argued in the second chapter, for Shelley, to be inspired is to attain access (‘to apprehend’) the Forms (Ideas) of the true, the beautiful and the good. ‘Scylla’ represents the completion of Stephen’s ironic appropriation of the Romantic conception of artistic inspiration. The ‘esthetic image’ of Portrait, already a reconfiguration of the ‘epiphany’ of Stephen Hero, becomes the ‘image’—the ‘image’ of the artist—of Ulysses. For Stephen, the experience of artistic inspiration: ‘the intense instant of imagination’ (Shelley’s ‘mind in creation’) constitutes the laceration

81 U., 249. See Shelley, ADP, 677. Stephen’s definition of artistic inspiration forms an almost verbatim reiteration of his description of the conception of the ‘esthetic image’ in the Portrait: ‘This supreme quality is felt by the artist when the esthetic image is first conceived in his imagination. The mind in that mysterious instant Shelley likened beautifully to a fading coal.’ (Portrait, 231) See Noon, Joyce and Aquinas, 50-51. Noon comments that the ‘fading coal’ quote recurs on three occasions throughout Joyce’s writings: once in ‘James Clarence Mangan’, again in Portrait and within what he dubs the ‘theory of Hamlet’ in Ulysses, in which ‘the mind is identified with the creative imagination in such wise that its light, though fading, not only illuminates what we see and what we are but is prophetic and reflective of what we are ourselves fated to become.’ (50) See chapter 2, pp.116-117(n), above.
82 Shelley, ADP, 677. See Clark, The Theory of Inspiration, 147.
of an existing shape of consciousness—‘I was’—in the moment of the revelation of repressed *quidditas*: ‘I am’. The experience of artistic inspiration is enfolded and presented in the ‘image’: ‘I may come to be’. The *quidditas* revealed is that of the artist, and the ‘image’ is the image of the artist. The ‘image’ represents the ironic self-re-creation of the artist.

The terms of Stephen’s account of the self-laceration and ironic self-re-creation of the artist in the formation of the ‘image’ thus correspond to the bathetic shattering and ironic inversion of existing conceptual conventions in order to ‘correspond creatively’ to the ‘intuition’ in Nietzsche’s account in ‘On Truth’. Further, they correspond to Bergson and Hulme’s accounts of ‘aesthetic intuition’, both viewing art as the attempt to shatter the conceptual and to bring back new forms (new language, new metaphors, new images and new concepts) from the flux of ‘duration’: ‘This intention is just what the artist tries to regain in placing himself back within the object by a kind of sympathy and breaking down by an effort of intuition the barrier that space puts between him and his model.’ As I argued in the second chapter, in ‘Romanticism and Classicism’, Hulme furnishes what he describes as a ‘concrete example’ of the experience of inspiration. The peculiar disposition of the object—the skirts rebounding from the woman’s heels—reveals a previously imperceptible quality within that object. This revelation shatters the poet’s inert conventional perception and places them in a new ‘sympathy’ with the object, which

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83 It is this overcoming of misapprehension which is at stake in Bloom’s allusion to the function of ‘karma’ in ‘metempsychosis’: ‘Karma they call that transmigration for sins you did in past life the reincarnation met him pikehoses.’ (U., 233) The revelation of the previously unconscious or repressed *quidditas* corresponds to the redemption of the ‘sin’ of misapprehension. The overarching motif of ‘metempsychosis’ thus operates in the same way as did the ironic appropriation of the glorification of the resurrected body in Thomistic *claritas* in the ‘resurrection’ of the object for the apprehending subject in *Portrait*. See chapter 2, pp. 76-78(n), above.
84 ‘OTL,’ esp. 122. See chapter 1, pp. 40-42, above.
85 Bergson, *CE*, 177. Hulme, 144. See chapter 1, p. 47, above.
86 ‘Romanticism and Classicism,’ 136
Hulme defines as the state of ‘aesthetic intuition’. This state of arrest and concomitant need to articulate and capture the peculiar nature of the experience, are what Hulme defines as ‘zest’, the ‘aesthetic emotion: ‘It isn’t the scale or kind of emotion produced that decides, but this one fact: Is there any real zest in it? Did the poet have an actually realised visual object before him in which he delighted?’ As I argued in the third chapter, this structure of laceration and recreation, rendered clear and explicit in ‘On Truth’, is implicitly at stake in Nietzsche’s account of the Apollinian incorporation of the experience of Dionysian purgation in the fold of the self-creation of the artist in Birth, which Nietzsche returns to in his definition of ‘frenzy’ in Twilight: ‘Out of this feeling one lends to things, one forces them to accept from us, one violates them—this process is called idealizing.’

Stephen’s exposition of the ‘image’ in Ulysses thus serves to bind together and to clarify the key terms of my argument in the previous chapters, and, as I will move on to argue, underpins the parallel between Stephen’s theory of artistic inspiration and creation and the fold in the self-creation of the artist in Birth.

In the exposition of Stephen’s aesthetic theory in ‘Scylla’, the account of artistic inspiration and the process of artistic creation of Portrait is transformed into the shape of a fold. This shape can best be articulated through a comparison with the process of the Lyric Poet—the self-creation of the artist—in Nietzsche’s Birth. As I argued in the third chapter, for Nietzsche the phenomenon of the Lyric Poet represents the conjunction of the Apollinian and Dionysian artistic drives in Hellenic culture, the birth of tragedy and the apogee of all possible art. The Apollinian, for Nietzsche, is

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87 See chapter 2, p. 105(n), above.
analogous to the physiological phenomenon of dreams.\textsuperscript{89} It represents the transposition of physiological and psychological responses to lived experience into mythic narratives and plastic art forms and subsequent interpretation and incorporation of lived experience. Significantly the Apollinian represented the overcoming and suppression of the barbaric Dionysian forces which preceded its advent through the process of individuation. In contrast, Nietzsche defines the Dionysian artistic drive as analogous to the physiological phenomenon of intoxication.\textsuperscript{90} The Dionysian, in its reborn Hellenic form (as distinct from its pre-Apollinian incarnation), represented the overthrow of Apollinian individuation, the purgation of lived experience, and the free-play of the vital forces repressed within the Apollinian. Nietzsche identified the Dionysian with music.

For Nietzsche, the conjunction of the Dionysian and Apollinian took place within Hellenic culture in the process undergone by the lyric poet under the influence of artistic inspiration. Nietzsche differentiates the lyric poet from the poet whose sole source of inspiration is the Apollinian artistic drive to order. In contrast to the Apollinian poet, whose archetypal exemplar, Nietzsche argues, is Homer, the lyric poet takes their inspiration from the Dionysian. Under the influence of the Dionysian the lyric poet is divested of their empirical (Apollinian) identity. The underlying Dionysian forces, suppressed and frustrated beneath the veil or veneer of the Apollinian, undergo ecstatic purgation. The experience of ecstasy, the laceration of the empirical self, and purgation of repressed drives inspires the lyric poet to compose music as the direct expression of the Dionysian:

\textsuperscript{89} \textit{BT}, §1, 33
\textsuperscript{90} \textit{BT}, §1, 33
Comparing the return from the Dionysian to quotidian experience Hamlet’s existential dilemma, Nietzsche argues that the return from the Dionysian inspires ‘nausea’. A deep existential need arises to articulate the experience of the Dionysian (of artistic inspiration) in order to comprehend and to incorporate it and to stave off the life-renouncing nihilism which would result from an insoluble alienation from the Dionysian. This need engenders the emergence of the Apollinian drive. The Apollinian drive recuperates empirical experience as a symbolic register from which to draw the feelings and emotions which most aptly embody the experience of Dionysian purgation.

The process of the lyric poet represents the shape of a fold:

The fold embodies each of the stages of the process: from the laceration of the empirical self and purgation of the repressed creative drives, the direct expression of this experience in music and the precipitation of the Apollinian drive to incorporation.

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91 *BT, §7, 59-60*
The ‘I’ of the lyric poet is an ironic construct, appropriating the structures, feelings and emotions of empirical experience to incorporate an experience which represents precisely the undoing of these structures. As such, the fold represents the ironic self-creation of the artist as artist. The fold is a process of sublime transposition from the Dionysian into music, and from music into the Apollinian image (the ‘I’ of the artist) and it is this process of transposition which, in turn, underlies Nietzsche’s nascent ‘classicism’.

It is this same shape or process of the fold in the self-creation of the artist which is at stake in Stephen’s definition of the ‘image’ in ‘Scylla’. The ‘image’ incorporates the concepts of revelation and ironic inversion first formulated in the ‘epiphany’ of Stephen Hero, shorn of the encumbrance of the religious and metaphysical baggage it carried in its refinement and reconfiguration in the ‘esthetic image’ of Portrait. The ‘image’ refines the process of artistic inspiration and creation as the laceration and self-re-creation of the artist in Portrait—the ironic self-creation of the artist as artist:

\[\text{the image of the unliving son}\]

\[\text{the 'I' of the artist}\]

\[\text{ironic inversion}\]

\[\text{claritas}\]

\[\text{coincidence}\]

\[\text{IDO}\]

\[\text{I UNDO}\]

\[\text{I REDO}\]

The ‘I do, I undo, I redo’ of Louise Bourgeois’ sculpture ‘I do, I undo, I redo’ (December 2000, Tate Modern) to describe the stages of what he defines as the ‘dialectical process of creation, destruction, and recreation’ in the construction of subjectivity in Modernist literature. (Fordham, I do, I undo, I redo: The Textual Genesis of Modernist Selves [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010], 1. Emphasis added) This process, Fordham argues, has the ‘I – of the artist and of the audience’ as its ‘end product’. (Ibid.) Whilst, in line with my reading of the fold in the self-creation of the artist in Birth, I would argue that, like Nietzsche’s, the terms of Stephen’s aesthetic theory reject those of the dialectic, nonetheless, in essence, my own reading is in agreement with Fordham, and his appropriation of Bourgeois’ terms
The ‘image’ is the ‘I’ of the artist. Just as for Nietzsche, so too for Stephen this is an ironic construct. Just as for Nietzsche, for whom the experience of the laceration of the empirical self of the artist in the experience of the Dionysian was first transposed into music and then again into the Apollinian image, for the Stephen of ‘Seylla’, the artist’s shape of consciousness—‘that which I was’—is lacerated by the coincidence of a change in their disposition with a change in the disposition of an object of experience: ‘that which I am’. The ironic inversion of perspective reveals the quidditas of the now defunct shape of consciousness. It represents a caesura in-between the artist and the previous shape of consciousness and precipitates the formation of a new shape of consciousness: ‘that which in possibility I may come to be’. The coincidence, ironic inversion and revelation of quidditas form, for Stephen, the shape of artistic inspiration: ‘the intense instant of imagination’. It is this which precipitates the formation of the ‘image’ which thus embodies the laceration and self-creation of the artist. The ‘unquiet father’ of the former shape of consciousness is lacerated, and its quidditas, captured in the ‘image’ is carried forward as the foundation of a new shape of consciousness (the, as yet, ‘unliving’ ‘son’).

Stephen’s theory of the ‘image’ of the artist thus shares the conception of the fiction of the ‘I’, which, as I sought to argue in both the first and third chapters, is crucial to understanding Nietzsche’s analysis of the process of artistic inspiration and creation in the fold of the self-creation of the artist in Birth, is shared by ‘On Truth’, and anticipates the more thoroughgoing critique of subjectivity and the concept of the subject in Nietzsche’s later works, especially within the doctrine of the will to power. In a note from a notebook of April—June, 1885, Nietzsche provides an apposite

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represents a useful foil in clarifying the distinct phases of artistic inspiration and the creation of the ironic construct of the ‘I’ of the artist.
summary of this critique of the unified subject: ‘If I have anything of a unity within me, it certainly doesn’t lie in the conscious “I” and in feeling, willing, thinking, but somewhere else: in the sustaining, appropriating, expelling, watchful prudence of my whole organism, of which my conscious self is only a tool.’\textsuperscript{93} For Nietzsche, the unity of the ‘self’ (the ‘I’) constitutes a fiction; a ‘tool’ used to name the arrangement of underlying forces (‘sustaining, appropriating, expelling’), the ascension of a particular force and thus the hierarchy of forces in the organism at a given moment. It is this which is at stake in the ‘I’ of the artist produced in the fold in the formation of the ‘image’ in ‘Scylla’. The ‘image’ thus corresponds to the terms of my reading of the will to power in the first chapter, and of the parallel which exists between these terms and those of Stephen’s appropriation of Aquinas’s theory of the becoming actual of the being of beauty in the second chapter.\textsuperscript{94} As I argued in the second chapter, Stephen’s appropriation of Aquinas’s conception of the organism (\textit{ens}) as being made ‘what it is’ by the internal relationship of its properties in \textit{Portrait}, corresponds to Deleuze’s definition of the ‘sense’ of a ‘thing’ (an event, phenomenon, word or thought), as ‘the force which appropriates the thing, which exploits it, which takes possession of it or is expressed in it’.\textsuperscript{95} \textit{Quidditas} corresponds to Deleuze’s account of Nietzsche’s concept of a thing’s ‘essence’ as constituting ‘that one among all the senses of a thing, which gives it the force with which it has most affinity’.\textsuperscript{96} The synthesis of \textit{integritas} and \textit{consonantia} in the radiation of \textit{quidditas} (\textit{claritas}) in the ‘esthetic image’ of \textit{Portrait} corresponds to the will to power. It names the ‘differential element’ between the natural forces (sub-wills) struggling for possession of a quantum

\textsuperscript{93} Nietzsche, \textit{Writings from the Late Notebooks}, 34[46], 2-3 [2]. See chapter 1, pp. 24-25(n), above.
\textsuperscript{94} See chapter 1, pp. 49-52 and chapter 2, pp. 122-124, above.
\textsuperscript{95} Eco, \textit{The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas}, 68 and Deleuze, \textit{Nietzsche and Philosophy}, 3-4 (see also 29).
of reality (the thing). It serves to define the ‘sense’ of a thing by expressing the force which has, however temporarily, triumphed in this struggle, and defines the ‘essence’ of the thing by identifying that force with which it has the utmost affinity (its quiddity). The terms of the fold in the formation of the ‘image’: ‘that which I was is that which I am and that which in possibility I may come to be’ (I do, I undo, I redo), correspond to those of the will to power and of the ‘esthetic image’. 97 The lacerated shape-of-consciousness of the artist, ‘that which I was’ (I do), corresponds to the ‘sense’ of a thing (*ens*). The revelation of the quiddity of the artist: ‘that which I am’ (I undo), corresponds to the revelation of the ‘essence’ of the thing, giving the artist that force with which they possess the most affinity. The artist’s self-re-creation in the ‘image’: ‘that which in possibility I may come to be’ (I redo) presents the revelation of the artist’s ‘essence’ (quiddity) in the ‘will to power’. 98

Understood in this light, the terms of the aesthetic theory of the ‘image’ of *Ulysses* are analogous to those of Nietzsche’s anti-metaphysics. As I argued in the

97 *U.*, 249
98 The ‘image’, interpreted in this way through the will to power, represents the fruition of the concept of the ‘portrait’ first presented by Joyce in the early essay ‘A Portrait of the Artist’ and this earlier concept, in turn, can serve to illuminate the nature of the ‘image’: ‘a portrait is not an identificative paper but rather the curve of an emotion.’ (James Joyce, ‘A Portrait of the Artist’, in *Poems and Shorter Writings*, 201-218 (211). See *The James Joyce Archive*, vol. 7, 70-105. Joyce originally wrote the essay in 1904 for the Dublin review *Dana*, which was edited by Eglinton and by Frederick Ryan, who rejected the essay for publication. (See Joyce’s note to Sylvia Beach on the inside back cover of the notebook in which the essay was written, on his presentation of the notebook to Beach ‘20.1.1928’, in *James Joyce’s Letters to Sylvia Beach, 1921-1940*, ed. M. Banta and O. A. Silverman [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987], 133. Cited in the editor’s notes to ‘A Portrait’ in *Poems and Shorter Writings*, 276. The essay preceded Joyce’s composition of *Stephen Hero*. Incidents and details of the essay were transposed into both *Stephen Hero* and *Portrait*, in titling which Joyce returned to the essay, moving away from the identification with the ‘Hero’ of *Stephen Hero* to an ironic, retrospective narrative, following the process of refinement and revision which Joyce effected throughout his composition of the final text of the novel. See Lee Spinks, *James Joyce: A Critical Guide* [Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009], 78-79).

The narrator of ‘Portrait’ seeks to define a literary form which describes the ‘curve of an emotion’: the unfolding and realisation of an ‘emotion’ quintessential to character—the *quidditas*, or ‘essence’ as I have sought to define these terms—not according to the fixed number of external criteria of the ‘identificative paper’, but according to the presentation of the organic internal logic of this process of becoming and it is this which is at stake in the later concept of the ‘image’. The ‘portrait’ of the early essay becomes the ‘image’ of *Ulysses*. 245
first chapter, Nietzsche follows Schopenhauer in refuting Kant’s method of arrival at
the conception of the thing-in-itself, but, in a more thoroughgoing way, offers a
critique of both Kant’s division of the world into thing-in-itself and appearance and
Schopenhauer’s division of the world into ‘will’ and representation. Nietzsche
criticises Schopenhauer for not taking the ‘necessary’ step of going ‘beyond Kant’
and his thing-in-itself.99 For Nietzsche, the thing-in-itself is ‘an X which remains
inaccessible and undefinable for us.’100 Knowledge of the nature of the thing as it is in
itself (the thing = X) is impossible. Nietzsche argues that in attempting to name the
thing-in-itself as ‘will’, Schopenhauer illegitimately drapes what must necessarily
remain ‘a completely dark and ungraspable x’ with predicates, drawn from the world
of phenomena, which are fundamentally antithetical to it.101 He refutes
Schopenhauer’s conception of the ‘will’ as a metaphysical unity. For Nietzsche, the
Schopenhauerian ‘will’ is a work of art. Nietzsche argues that Schopenhauer arrived at
what he thus argues is the projected fiction of the ‘will’ (as thing-in-itself), through an
incapacity to fully acknowledge ‘the dark contradictoriness in the region where
individuality ceases to be.’102 For Nietzsche, this ‘dark contradictoriness’ remains on
the side of representation.103 In opposition to the thing-in-itself it represents the
undivided continuity of states in the chaotic flux of natural drives. The discrete quanta
of (linguistic) reality remain, for Nietzsche, hypostatised fictions, projected upon this
flux.

24-29 (25). See also, Janaway, Willing and Nothingness, 258-265. See chapter 1, p. 33, above.
100 ‘OTL,’ 117
101 Nietzsche, ‘On Schopenhauer’, 27. Cf. also Schopenhauer, WWR, I, 112
102 24
103 See Crawford, Beginnings, 161-162(n).
Nietzsche’s conception of the will to power as naming the hierarchical arrangement—the ‘order of rank’—of natural forces, the force in possession of the quantum of reality at any given instant and the force with which the quantum has most affinity (its ‘essence’), stands over and against the metaphysical unity of the Schopenhauerian ‘will’. As I argued in the third chapter it also stands in opposition to Schopenhauer’s appropriation of the Platonic ‘Idea’ in his philosophy of art. Whereas, for Schopenhauer, artistic inspiration lies in the tearing free of knowledge from service to the striving, suffering and interestedness of the ‘will’ in the beautiful and the sublime and the sublime’s capacity to engender a sudden leap of the subject beyond individual subjectivity and its transformation into the pure will-less subject of knowing, with a corresponding consciousness of its object shorn of its individual phenomenal predicates, revealing the Idea, for Nietzsche, artistic inspiration reveals the undivided continuity of the flux of natural drives concealed beneath the artificial veneer of individuation.\textsuperscript{104} As I have argued, in the will to power, ‘essence’ remains, but in the form clarified by Deleuze’s analysis of Nietzsche’s account in On the Genealogy of Morality, as the ‘one among all the senses of a thing, which gives it the force with which it has most affinity.’\textsuperscript{105} The will to power represents the redemption of Schopenhauer’s aesthetics from his metaphysics. In place of the Schopenhauerian-Platonic revelation of the eternal form of the ‘Idea’, Nietzsche puts forward a conception of the revelation of the ‘essence’ of a thing when all that is inessential has been refined away. It is this which is at stake in the Dionysian of Birth and in the experiential alchemy of ‘frenzy’ in the ‘psychology of the artist’ in Twilight of the Idols. It represents what I have called Nietzsche’s formulation of an ironic Platonic—anti-Platonist aesthetic.

\textsuperscript{104} On Schopenhauer’s philosophy of art, see chapter 3, pp. 147-150, above.

\textsuperscript{105} Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 4
The terms at stake in Stephen’s theory of the fold in the self-creation of the artist in the formation of the ‘image’ in ‘Scylla’ are analogous to those of Nietzsche’s anti-metaphysics and ironic Platonic—anti-Platonism. These terms develop from those of Stephen’s earlier implicit rejection of Yeats’s Platonist definition of the ‘Symbol’ in the definition of Aquinas’s claritas in Portrait:

It would lead you to believe that he had in mind symbolism or idealism, the supreme quality of beauty being a light from some other world, the idea of which the matter is but a shadow, the reality of which it is but the symbol. I thought he might mean that claritas is the artistic discovery and representation of the divine purpose in anything or a force of generalisation which would make the esthetic image a universal one, make it outshine its proper conditions. But that is literary talk.  

Stephen defines the ‘proper conditions’ of the ‘esthetic image’ and of art against the conception of the ‘light from some other world’ and ‘the idea of which the matter is but the shadow’ of ‘symbolism and idealism’. As I argued in the second chapter, this forms his rejection of Yeats’s definition of the ‘symbol’ as ‘the only possible expression of some invisible essence, a transparent lamp about a spiritual flame’, which represents an appropriation of Platonic metaphysics’ distinction between the degrees of truth in the conception of the object and its imperative toward the renunciation of the quotidian world (of objects and their ‘shadows’) in favour of the eternal forms of the ‘Ideas’. In Portrait, Stephen implicitly rejects the life-renouncing mysticism at stake in Yeats’s aesthetic metaphysics.

In ‘Scylla’, Stephen’s rejection of Yeats is rendered explicit. His internal response to Russell’s injunction that art must ‘reveal to us ideas, formless spiritual essences’: ‘Unsheathe your dagger definitions. Horseness is the whatness of allhorse’,

106 Portrait, 230-231
107 Yeats, ‘William Blake and his Illustrations to The Divine Comedy’, SCP, 22. See chapter 2, pp. 84-90, above.
parodies the Platonic Idea, in which no one horse would embody ‘Horseness’ but all horses would participate in or be imperfect images or shadows of the Idea of the horse, which would nonetheless remain pure and irreconcilably alien to its participants.  

Stephen sarcastically condemns Yeats’s concept of art’s pursuit of the Idea, championed by Russell: ‘Through spaces smaller than red globules of man’s blood they creepy-crawl after Blake’s buttocks into eternity of which this vegetable world is but a shadow.’ The reference is to Blake’s ‘A Vision of the Last Judgement’, an essay on his own painting of the Last Judgment (1810). In the essay Blake contrasts his conception of ‘Fable or Allegory’, which, he argues, represent an ‘inferior type of poetry’ and are bound to memory and to the finite and temporal, with ‘Imagination’ and ‘Vision’:

This world of Imagination is the World of Eternity; it is the Divine bosom into which we shall go after the death of the Vegetated body. This World of Imagination is Infinite & Eternal, whereas the world of Generation, or Vegetation, is Finite & Temporal. There Exist in that Eternal World the Permanent Realities of Every Thing which we see reflected in this Vegetable Glass of Nature.

Blake renders a Platonic differentiation between the ‘Eternal’ world of the Imagination which contains the ‘Permanent Realities’ of things and the finite ‘Vegetable’ world: a ‘Glass’ or mirror in which we see only the reflection of these permanent realities. His distinction is not between mind and body but between time and eternity: between mortality and immortality. The ‘Vegetable’ world is one of

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108 U., 238. On Plato and the Platonic Ideas/Forms, see chapter 2, pp. 86-89, above.
109 238
‘Generation’: of the coming into being and passing away of finite ‘Vegetated’ bodies. The role of the artist, for Blake, is to penetrate through to the world of ‘Imagination’ and the permanent realities which lie behind and beyond their ‘Vegetated’ reflections. ‘Vision’ is the form of poetry which penetrates to this (Platonic) reality, whereas fable and allegory are only concerned with the representation of finite, mortal, ‘Vegetated’ objects and relations.

It is significant that Yeats draws on Blake’s conception of poetry in his definition of Symbolism in ‘William Blake and his Illustrations to The Divine Comedy’: ‘allegory is one of many possible representations of an embodied thing, or familiar principle, and belongs to fancy and not to imagination’.113 It is in contrast to the representation of the ‘embodied thing’ (Blake’s ‘Vegetated body’) that Yeats defined Symbolism’s Platonic pursuit, through the symbol, of the ‘expression of some invisible essence’.114 Stephen’s rejection of Russell constitutes an extension of the aesthetic theory propounded (provisionally) in Portrait and a rejection of Blake’s Romantic Platonic aesthetical metaphysics. It represents a reformulation of his earlier rejection of transcendental Symbolism and its Platonic metaphysics and the racial-national essentialist politics founded upon it. This rejection lies at the heart of the caricature of the Irish Literary Revival in ‘Scylla’ and of the conception of the ‘Golden Age’ of the past, which, as Boyd argues, lay at the heart of Revivalism’s desire to revive Celtic myth: ‘an appeal for the building up of a rural civilisation, a co-

113 Yeats, SCP, 22-32 (22). Yeats differs from Blake in drawing a distinction between imagination and fancy, which Blake had posited in identity in ‘Vision’: ‘The Nature of Visionary Fancy, or Imagination’. (605)
operative commonwealth’; the ‘restoration of something approaching the ancient order’.  

The terms of Stephen’s rejection of the Yeatsian aesthetic and political Platonic Charybdis in ‘Scylla’ are underpinned by the opposition of the ‘schools’ or ‘tempers’ of the ‘classical’ and the ‘romantic’ in both Joyce’s early critical writing in ‘James Clarence Mangan’ and in the ‘Art and Life’ paper that Stephen delivers to the Literary and Historical Society of his college in Stephen Hero, which, as I argued in the second chapter, echo the terms of Nietzsche’s earlier opposition of ‘classical’ to ‘romantic’ aesthetics, particularly in Human, All Too Human, The Gay Science and Twilight of the Idols, and parallel Hulme’s later appropriation of Nietzsche’s terms in his writings on art.  

Stephen rejects the Romantic and late-Romantic Platonism of Shelley’s conception of inspiration as providing access to the forms of ‘the true and the beautiful, in a word the good’ and Yeats’s conception of the ‘invisible essence’. These embody what, in his earlier textual incarnation in Stephen Hero, he rejected under the aegis of the ‘romantic’ as being symptomatic of an ‘unsatisfied, impatient temper which sees no fit abode here for its ideals and chooses therefore to behold them under insensible figures’. In his reading of Shakespeare’s transposition into art of the sexual trauma at the root of his psyche, and in the terms of the fold in the formation of the ‘image’ which he derives from this reading, Stephen implicitly advocates an absolute fidelity to lived experience in terms which echo his earlier definition of the ‘classical’, which, ‘ever mindful of limitations, chooses rather to bend upon these present things and so to work upon them and fashion them that the

115 Boyd, 34, 41 See also U., 238-239.  
116 SH, 83. CW, 53. See Nietzsche, HH IIb, §217, 366; GS, V, §370, 328 (see Rampley, Nietzsche, Aesthetics and Modernity, 125ff. [esp. 128], and Young, Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Art, 77-78, 140-142, 146) See esp. Hulme, ‘Romanticism and Classicism’ Speculations, 111-140.
quick intelligence may go beyond them to their meaning which is still unuttered’.\textsuperscript{117} The ‘image’ thus incorporates the artistic injunctions to ‘sincerity’ and ‘selection’ shared by Joyce, Nietzsche and Hulme’s definitions of the ‘classical’.\textsuperscript{118} It is this aesthetic commitment to absolute fidelity to lived experience that places Stephen in such close proximity to Dowden.

Stephen rejects Lyster’s (Dowden’s) historical materialist scholarship: ‘Here he [Lyster] ponders things that were not […] what might have been: possibilities of the possible as possible: things not known’.\textsuperscript{119} The meditation on ‘things that were not’ is associated for Stephen with the ‘rest’, the stultification, and the ‘warm and brooding air’ of Lyster’s ‘discreet vaulted cell’.\textsuperscript{120} Lyster, Eglinton, and Dowden’s political, literary, critical and philosophical position is defined for Stephen by stagnation, hermetic self-enclosure, and an inability to engage with lived reality. The

\textsuperscript{117} \textit{SH}, 83

\textsuperscript{118} See Nietzsche, \textit{HH I}, §195, 93-94. In both ‘Romanticism and Classicism’ and ‘Bergson’s Theory of Art’, Hulme emphasises the ‘[o]riginal sincerity’ that motivates artistic composition: ‘Wherever you get this sincerity, you get the fundamental quality of good art without dragging in infinite or serious’. (\textit{Speculations}, 133, 161) In a letter to Harriet Monroe of January 1915, Pound also stresses: ‘Objectivity and again objectivity, and expression […] Every literaryism, every book word, fritters away a scrap of your reader’s patience, a scrap of his sense of your sincerity.’ (Pound, ‘Letter from Ezra Pound to Harriet Monroe, Coleman’s Hatch, January 1915’ in Jones, ed. \textit{Imagist Poetry}, 141-142 [141]). These terms also parallel the emphasis laid on exactness and clarity, in opposition to the vagaries of the ‘cosmic poet’ in the first Imagist manifesto:

1. To use the language of common speech, but to employ always the \textit{exact} word, not the nearly-exact, nor the merely decorative word.
2. To create new rhythms—as the expression of new moods—and not to copy old rhythms, which merely echo old moods.
[…]
4. To present an image (hence the name: “Imagist”). We are not a school of painters, but we believe that poetry should render particulars exactly and not deal in vague generalities, however magnificent and sonorous. It is for this reason that we oppose the cosmic poet, who seems to shirk the real difficulties of his art.
5. To produce poetry that is hard and clear, never blurred nor indefinite.

\textsuperscript{119} \textit{U.}, 248

\textsuperscript{120} \textit{Ibid.}

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thoughts enclosed in the library are ‘[c]offined’. They have no relevance to the world beyond the library and therefore no vitality, and yet Stephen’s own thought is permeated with, and articulated in reference to, fragmented quotations from and allusions to the books around him and his own theory of the genesis of Hamlet shares Dowden’s focus on the biography of the poet-artist. Dowden’s historical materialist scholarship represents Stephen’s Scylla.

This proximity to Dowden forms the crux of the episode’s underlying Homeric parallel. Just as Odysseus-Ulysses is advised by Circe to navigate closer to Scylla’s rock than risk oblivion in Charybdis’s vortex (‘“far better to lose six men and keep your ship than to lose your men one and all”’), in the biographical focus of his theory of the genesis of Hamlet and of the ‘image’ and in his rejection of the Platonic metaphysics at stake in Yeats’s definition of the ‘symbol’ and the politics which proceeds from it, Stephen steers a philosophical-critical-aesthetic-political course which avoids the Charybdian vortex and brings him into a close proximity with Dowden’s historical materialist scholarship. This is a reformulation of both Stephen and Joyce’s own earlier definitions of the ‘classical’. In ‘James Clarence Mangan’, Joyce pictures ‘the classical school fighting the materialism which attends it’, in terms later reiterated more emphatically by Stephen in Stephen Hero: ‘the classical school fighting the materialism that must attend it’. In rejecting the ‘insensible figures’ at stake in the ‘romantic’, both Joyce and Stephen argue, the ‘classical’ ‘school’ or ‘temper’ risks identification with ‘materialism’. However, both the terms of Stephen’s reading of Shakespeare biography—of the wounded, politically, socially and sexually

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121 Ibid.
122 Ibid.
123 Homer, The Odyssey, 144-145
disenfranchised and alienated, ‘Catholic’ Shakespeare—and the implicit anti-metaphysics at stake in his account of the formation of the ‘image’, redeem the aesthetic theory of ‘Scylla’ from any charge of ‘materialism’, both in the sense of a denial of any possible ontological priority of matter and the rejection of the anti-Irish, Anglo-centric Protestantism of Dowden.

The aesthetic theory of ‘Scylla’ is underpinned by Stephen’s Romantic—anti-Romanticism, first mooted in the opposition of the ‘classical’ to the ‘romantic’ in ‘James Clarence Mangan’ essay, revised and clarified in the corresponding terms of the ‘Art and Life’ paper in *Stephen Hero*, and refined into the exposition of the ‘esthetic image’ in *Portrait*. In ‘Scylla’, Stephen’s Romantic—anti-Romanticism focuses, as it did in both ‘James Clarence Mangan’ and in *Portrait*, on his ironic appropriation of the terms of Shelley’s account of artistic inspiration to an aesthetic fundamentally at odds with Shelley’s Platonic metaphysical claims. This is conjoined in *Ulysses* to Stephen’s concomitant rejection of Blake’s aesthetical metaphysics. This ironic appropriation of the key terms of Romantic inspiration represents the ostensible completion of the project, which had only remained implicit in *Portrait*, of Stephen’s attempt to liberate and to differentiate his conception of the philosophy of art from Yeats’s appropriation of Romanticism and self-styled late-Romanticism. In his rejection of Platonism in ‘Scylla’ Stephen refers to two earlier episodes of *Ulysses*. The first is his discussion with Deasy the schoolmaster in ‘Nestor’ and his rejection of Deasy’s conception of history: ‘All history moves towards one great goal, the manifestation of God’. 125 This proclamation comes in response to Stephen’s contrasting assessment: ‘—History, Stephen said, is a nightmare from which I am

125 *U.*, 42

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trying to awake.126 To the conception of the manifestation of divinity as the consummation and goal of history, Stephen opposes the quotidian:

Stephen jerked his thumb towards the window, saying:
—That is God.
Hooray! Ay! Whrrwhee!
—What? Mr Deasy asked.
—A shout in the street, Stephen answered, shrugging his shoulders.127

The excited, inarticulate cry is for Stephen the palpable and inescapable reality which Deasy’s idealist and positivist conception of history (projecting God into an idealised and inalterably alien yet-to-be-realised future state) would seek to reject, as much as Russell, in the debate in National Library later in the day, is seeking to reject biography and historical materialism in favour of a Platonic, Symbolist conception of art. Stephen’s invocation of the recent memory of his conversation with Deasy also embodies a parodic reference to Aristotle’s teaching method: ‘God: noise in the street: very peripatetic.’128 Stephen rejects Deasy, Plato and Aristotle. His recollection of his conversation with Deasy and parody of Aristotle’s ‘peripatetic’ method becomes associated in Stephen’s mind with his walk along Sandymount strand in ‘Proteus’:

Space: what you damn well have to see.129

Ineluctable modality of the visible: at least that if no more, thought through my eyes. Signatures of all things I am here to read, seaspawn and seawrack, the nearing tide, that rusty boot. Snotgreen, bluesilver, rust: coloured signs. Limits of the diaphane. But he adds: in bodies.130

The experience of space becomes for Stephen an ‘[i]neluctable modality’: ‘what you damn well have to see’. The modality is ineluctable both in respect of its Protean

126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid.
becoming—the irresistible process of change and movement both of the observer through space and of the finitude and impermanence of objects of experience—and in Stephen’s conviction of the absence of any underlying, other-worldly or ideal reality beyond the objects of experience. Each unfolding mode is a sign to be read and experience is the apprehension and concomitant interpretation—a semiology—of modes/signs. Stephen defines the conditions and the limits of experience as time (‘the nacheinander’: one thing after another) and space (‘the nebeneinander’: one thing next to another): ‘A very short space of time through very short times of space’. When he experimentally closes his eyes he also becomes conscious of the faculty of hearing: ‘the ineluctable modality of the audible’. ‘Seeing’, then, here refers not only to the faculty of sight but to discovery: ‘Shut your eyes and see’. This is the meaning of Stephen’s reference to the ‘diaphane’. In its adjectival form, ‘diaphanous’ names an allowing to shine or appear through: transparency or clarity. The diaphane of ‘Proteus’ forms an allusion to the interpretation of Aquinas and the equation of claritas with quidditas in the ‘esthetic image’ of Portrait. Stephen is at pains to distinguish his interpretation of Aquinas and the aesthetic theory he founds upon it from Platonic metaphysics, particularly in its manifestation in the (Yeatsian) late-Romantic transcendental Symbolist aesthetic. As such, his aesthetic theory opposes the objects of empirical experience to the Platonic Ideas as the raw material and inspiration of art and the ‘image’ to the Transcendental Symbol as the form of art. It is this which is at stake in Stephen’s reference to the ‘[I]imits of the diaphane’ in ‘Proteus’ and his continued emphasis on ‘bodies’, and it is this to which he again alludes in ‘Scylla’ when in rejecting Blake and Russell’s Platonism (and implicitly Yeats) he states: ‘Hold to the now, the here, through which all future plunges to the

131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
past’. To Russell’s ‘eternal wisdom, Plato’s world of ideas’ Stephen opposes the ‘[i]neluctable modality of the visible’: to the other-worldly life-renunciation of Russell’s Platonism, Stephen opposes the artist’s quotidian experience as the source and subject matter proper to art. In stark contrast to the figure the Platonic artist at stake in both Romanticism and Yeatsian late-Romanticism, Stephen places his theory of what I have called the fold in the self-creation of the artist. Against the revelation of Platonic Ideas or Forms through the Symbol, Stephen places his theory of ironic fragmentation and the self-becoming of the artist. Art becomes, for Stephen, the process, anchored in sincerity and an absolute fidelity to lived-experience, of the liberation from self-misapprehension, the revelation of quidditas, the sloughing-off of all the inessential that was out with quidditas, and the capturing and incorporation of that process of experience in the creation of the ‘image’: the fiction of the ‘self’—the ‘I’—of the artist.

At stake within the aesthetic theory of ‘Scylla’ is the concept of a process of self-becoming. T.E. Hulme’s conception of the possibilities and impossibilities of ‘sincerity’ at stake in the attempt to articulate the ‘aesthetic intuition’ perfectly illuminates this process. As I argued in the second chapter, for Hulme, the complete ‘sincerity’ demanded of the artist in the creation of the image-poem is unattainable. Because the ‘mental life’ of the artist-poet ‘forms a whole which cannot be analysed into parts’: ‘To describe accurately, then, any emotion—to give it accurately and not approximately—you would have to describe at the same time the whole personality in which it occurs’. To be truly honest would require the artist to include everything in existence within and without them at the moment of the aesthetic intuition in the

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133 238
134 Hulme, ‘The Philosophy of Intensive Manifolds’, Speculations, 185. See Rae, ‘Hulme’s French Sources,’ 74-75.
‘image’. A truly honest work of art would require that the artist recreate everything, but also always that they therefore include within that comprehensive act of recreation, a recreation of the act of recreation itself. The artist would be obliged to recreate the act of recreating the act of recreating everything, *ad infinitum*. The artistic process would become swallowed in a self-consuming infinite regress. The ‘sincerity’ demanded of the ‘classical’ is, ultimately, impossible. The articulation of the ‘aesthetic intuition’, Hulme argues, is fated to be an art of provisionality. The struggle of the artist to articulate the aesthetic intuition is, by the very nature of the experience, doomed to failure. Nevertheless, for Hulme, the struggle itself refines the intuition, providing it with a form, and brings it to a greater state of clarity, even if it can never fully articulate it. The intuition is folded back upon itself and attains a clearer and more sophisticated shape. The ‘poem’ is only ever a provisional form, sharp and precise but never able to attain completion.

It is this provisionality which is ultimately at stake in the fold of the ‘image’ in ‘Scylla’. In the laceration of the self-consciousness of the artist in inspiration, the ‘sense’ of that self-consciousness is unveiled. This leads to the revelation of the artist’s *quidditas* and to the creation of a new shape of consciousness. However, this new shape is not itself sacrosanct and will itself in turn be lacerated. Just as for Hulme, Stephen’s ‘image’ is only ever an ironic provisional form. The art of the image represents a perpetual, provisional process of approximate self-becoming, bereft of the possibility of ever attaining a complete and lasting self-identity.\(^{135}\) Art

\(^{135}\) Again, this process echoes and completes the concept of the ‘portrait’ (as ‘the curve of an emotion’) of Joyce’s early ‘Portrait’ essay. In contrast to a conception of time and, in particular, ‘the past’, which would seek to concretise it in its ‘iron memorial aspect’, at the outset of the ‘Portrait’ essay, the narrator seeks to define the past as a ‘fluid succession of presents, the development of an entity of which our actual present is a phase only.’ *(Poems and Shorter Writings*, 211) The past, then, for the narrator and for the protagonist of ‘Portrait’, is not a concrete unity divided from the present, but itself
itself becomes the process of an only ever provisional self-becoming. However, as I have argued, for Stephen, art nevertheless becomes the process, anchored in metaphysical scepticism, sincerity and an absolute fidelity to lived experience of the ‘classical’, of the liberation from self-misapprehension and the revelation of *quidditas* of the artist, the sloughing-off of all the inessential that was out with that *quidditas*, and the capturing and incorporation of the entire process in the artwork. Life is redeemed in the fold of the ‘image’. In the final section of this chapter I want to conclude by arguing that the Romantic—anti-Romanticism, anti-metaphysics and provisionality at stake in the aesthetic theory of ‘Scylla’ are what ultimately underpin the politics of the episode.

represents the ‘fluid succession’ of a plurality of ‘presents’, of which the contemporaneous present of the narrator and protagonist is only one more example. Each ‘present’ represents a ‘phase’ in the development of what the narrator describes as an ‘entity’: ‘the Artist’. In terms which are echoed in Hulme’s later critique of the relationship of art to language, the narrator defines the artist as one who ‘seek[s] through some art, by some process of the mind as yet untabulated, to liberate from the personalised lumps of matter that which is their individuating rhythm, the first or formal relation of their parts.’ (*Poems and Shorter Writings*, 211. See Hulme, ‘The Philosophy of Intensive Manifolds’, *Speculations*, 173-214) Just as the artist, for Hulme, is the individual who seeks to ‘break through the conventional ways of looking at things which veil reality from us at a certain point’ and to ‘pick out one element which is really in all of us, but which before he had disentangled it, we were unable to perceive’, so for the narrator of ‘Portrait’ the artist seeks through a new ‘process of the mind’ to combat the conventional ‘iron memorial’ conception of time—of ‘the past’—and thus to liberate from the inert ‘lumps’ of matter into which this convention transforms the objects of quotidian experience and the consciousness of the artist, what the narrator dubs their ‘individuating rhythm’. (211. Hulme, ‘Bergson’s Theory of Art’, *Speculations*, 150. In an entry dated 25th March 1903, a year before the composition of ‘Portrait’, in his ‘Paris Notebook’, in terms which are synthesised into the concept of the ‘portrait’ in the essay, and later again in Stephen’s exposition of his aesthetic theory in *Portrait*, Joyce recorded an early definition of ‘rhythm’: ‘Rhythm seems to be the first or formal relation of part to part in any whole or of a whole to its part or parts, or of any part to the whole of which its is a part… Parts constitute a whole as far as they have a common end.’ [103] See *Portrait*, in which, in line with the refinement of the ‘epiphany’ concept, the passage is revised to focus purely on art: ‘—Rhythm, said Stephen, is the first formal esthetic relation of part to part in any esthetic whole or of an esthetic whole to its part or parts or of any part to the esthetic whole of which it is a part.’ [223] ‘Rhythm’ also becomes an important element in Stephen’s meditation on the ineluctable modalities of the visible and the audible in ‘Proteus’. [U., 46])
III – The ‘present-day scientist’: On the Politics of Classicism in ‘Scylla and Charybdis’

Our civilisation is an immense woven fabric in which very different elements are mixed, in which Nordic rapacity is reconciled to Roman law, and new Bourgeois conventions to the remains of Siriac religion. In such a fabric, it is pointless searching for a thread that has remained pure, virgin and uninfluenced by other threads nearby. What race or language […] can nowadays claim to be pure? No race has less right to make such a boast than the one presently inhabiting Ireland. Nationality (if this is not really a useful fiction like many others which the scalpels of the present-day scientists have put paid to) must find its basic reason for being in something that surpasses, that transcends and that informs changeable entities such as blood or human speech. (Joyce, ‘Ireland: Island of Saints and Sages’, CW, 108-126 [118])

In the final section of this chapter I want to use the philosophical and art-historical approach I have sought to establish throughout the previous chapters to examine the political claims at stake in ‘Scylla and Charybdis’. I will argue that the binding of the terms of the critique of late-Romantic metaphysics and aesthetics, and the establishment of an anti-metaphysics and Romantic—anti-Romanticism at stake in Nietzsche and Stephen’s advocacy of the ‘classical’, underpin the politics of the episode. I want to begin by recapitulating and summarising the terms of my conception of the ‘classical’, before turning to Joyce’s early ‘Ireland: Island of Saints and Sages’ lecture and to Joseph Valente’s reading of Joyce’s politics, in order to demonstrate that the political claims within Joyce’s earlier critical writing are at stake in ‘Scylla’; extending Valente’s reading of what he calls Joyce’s ‘transnationalism’, and, at the same time, qualifying Gibson’s conception of Joyce, the ‘Irish writer’.

In ‘Scylla’, the creation of the artist’s ‘image’ represents the shape or process of a fold analogous to that which I argued lay at the heart of Nietzsche’s The Birth of
Tragedy. This process is implicitly underpinned by the terms of the exposition of Stephen’s aesthetic theory in Portrait, and begins in the coincidence of a change in the disposition of the artist with a change in the disposition of an object of quotidian experience (the artist’s model). This coincidence lacerates the artist’s shape of consciousness (‘self’), and reveals its quiddity. This experience of laceration and the revelation of quiddity is what is captured and incorporated in the formation of the ‘image’ of the artist. In turn, the ‘image’ underpins the formation of a new shape of consciousness (a new ‘self’, or the ‘I’ of the artist).

As I have sought to argue, this process of the fold in the self-creation of the artist is bound to the conception of the laceration of the stultified surface of the conceptual and the critique of language and of subjectivity at stake in Nietzsche, Bergson and Hulme’s respective accounts of (‘aesthetic’) ‘intuition’. As I argued in the first chapter, this critique lies at the foundation of Nietzsche’s later doctrine of the will to power and his conception of the ironic construct of the fiction of the ‘I’ and the impossibility of the self-identity of any given quantum of existence. The art of the ‘image’ represents a perpetual, provisional process of approximate self-becoming, bereft of the possibility of ever attaining a complete and lasting self-identity, and art itself becomes the process of an only ever provisional self-becoming.136

136 See Eugene O’Brien, The Question of Irish Identity in the Writings of William Butler Yeats and James Joyce (Lampeter Ceredigion, Wales; New York, Ontario: The Edwin Mellen Press, Ltd., 1998). In terms which my own parallel to Nietzsche’s will to power echo, linking his reading to Benjamin and Adorno’s concept of ‘constellation’ and the Joycean concept of the ‘epiphany’, O’Brien argues that, for Joyce, ‘identity and definition are always a process of becoming’. (189) O’Brien identifies what he terms Joyce’s ‘gnomic epistemology’ which, he argues, ‘refuses to see objects, or concepts, as essentials, or as fixed. Rather, O’Brien argues, objects and concepts are perceived by Joyce in terms of what Adorno would term a kraftfeldt (force-field) which consisted of the transactional and relational interplay of different, and sometimes opposing forces.’ (195) Importantly for my current purposes, O’Brien argues that Joyce arrived at this ‘epistemology’ in his rejection of the conception of fixed identity at stake in Yeats’s poetry. (189. On Yeats, see 123-183)
The marriage of epistemological and metaphysical scepticism, the advocacy of absolute fidelity to lived-experience, ‘selection’, sincerity and the concept of the ironic construct of the ‘I’ of the artist underpin the definition of the ‘classical’ in Joyce, Nietzsche and Hulme. I want to move on to argue that this definition of the ‘classical’ extends to the sphere of the political in ‘Scylla’. The politics of the episode develop from the rejection of Yeats’s late-Romantic Platonic metaphysics and aesthetics and the racial-cultural essentialist politics parodied in Joyce’s caricature of the Irish literary Revival.

In ‘Scylla’ this rejection of late-Romanticism and the Revival is qualified by the implicit rejection of the Anglo-centric Protestantism of Dowden’s historical materialism in Stephen’s reading of the sexually and politically wounded, ‘Catholic’ Shakespeare. I want to turn now to the early ‘Ireland: Island of Saints and Sages’ lecture and to Valente’s reading of Joyce’s politics. I will argue that the same essential political claims, crucial to Joyce’s early critical writing, underpin Stephen’s negotiation of a third, independent political position—between the Anglo-centric Protestant Scylla and the Irish Nationalist (Revivalist) Charybdis—in ‘Scylla’.

As I argued at the outset of the chapter, Valente argues for the necessity of a critical return to the relationship between the ostensible anti-nationalism of Joyce’s early critical writings and the nationalism of his early period in Italy in assessing his later politics. Focussing on ‘Ireland, Island of Saints and Sages’, Valente argues that Joyce’s early anti-nationalism and burgeoning nationalism while in later self-styled exile, ‘dialectically resolved themselves into an idiosyncratic cultural
The ‘roots’ of this ‘post-exilic cultural transnationalism’, Valente argues, lie in the ‘specific nature of the counter-national discourse found in [Joyce’s] early writings and the ‘form’ which his later ‘nationalism’ took in ‘sublating the principles of his anti-nationalism.’ Valente frames Joyce’s politics as emerging from an initial opposition to Irish nationalism, moving through the perspective of an ‘exilic’ nationalism, to a final, synthetic position, in which he sought to transcend the terms of both nationhood and of nationalism.

In ‘Ireland’, laying emphasis on the context of Europe and in particular on its intellectual culture, Joyce attempts a plural re-conception of the genealogy of the Irish race, nation and language. In stark contrast to the conception of the ‘Golden Age’ of the past and the ‘restoration of something approaching the ancient order’, which, as I have argued, lay at the heart of Revivalism’s desire to revive Celtic myth, and is at stake in his autobiographical caricature of George Russell, Joyce lists the various invasions that mark the history of Ireland, including the ‘Spanish and Gallic tribes’ and the ‘Scandinavian tribes’, and emphasises ancient Ireland’s influence on, and connection to, international culture. Joyce argues that each of these invasions was met, not with a final repulsion or expulsion of the invading colonial race, but with its assimilation or incorporation:

Finally, the victory of the usurper, Brian Boru, over the Nordic hordes on the sand dunes outside the walls of Dublin put an end to the Scandinavian races, which did not, however, abandon the country, but were gradually assimilated into the community, a fact we should keep in mind if we wish to explain the curious character of the modern Irishman.

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137 Valente, ‘Joyce’s Politics: Race, Nation and Transnationalism’ in Rabaté, ed., Palgrave Advances in James Joyce Studies, 73
138 Ibid.
139 Joyce, CW, 110-111.
140 Boyd, 34, 41. Cf. CW, 110-112. Joyce cites, in particular, Ireland’s connection to the Phoenicians and the Egyptians and its influence on the intellectual culture of Germany, France and Switzerland.
141 113
Colonial settlers were neither ejected, nor did they leave Ireland completely. Instead, they were absorbed into, and became part of, the indigenous population and, as Valente argues in his reading of the lecture, shared in their ‘afflictions, their ethnocultural identifications and their anti-imperialist attitudes’.\(^{142}\) This incorporation, Joyce argues, produced ‘a new Celtic race which was made up of the old Celtic stock and the Scandanavian, Anglo-Saxon and Norman races.’ In terms echoed in Stephen’s cellular metaphor for the artistic process in ‘Scylla’: ‘another national temperament grew up, in which the various elements intermingled and renovated the ancient body’.\(^{143}\) Like both the ‘body’ and the ‘image’ of the artist for the Stephen of ‘Scylla’, Joyce argues that both nation and race are woven, unwoven and rewoven in ‘an immense woven fabric’.\(^{144}\) Like the ‘molecules’ of the body ‘shuttled to and fro’, the ‘different elements’ are ‘mixed’ and ‘reconciled’: ‘In such a fabric, it is pointless searching for a thread that has remained pure, virgin and uninfluenced by other threads nearby.’\(^{145}\) No race or language, Joyce argues, can claim to be ‘pure’. In terms which echo Nietzsche, ‘OTL’ and find yet another echo in Hulme’s later Bergsonian critique of language, ‘Nationality’, for Joyce, represents simply another ‘useful fiction’, which (‘the scalpels of’) ‘the present-day scientists’ have dissected.\(^{146}\) For Joyce, both race and nation—as the individual, the artist and the ‘image’ for Stephen—represent provisional, fictional entities, cast from an international cultural,

\(^{142}\) Valente, 76. See Joyce, *CW*, 115. Importantly, Joyce also effects a concomitant re-conception of the relationship of Ireland to England, rendering the English occupation merely one in series of such (113), and laying a portion of the blame for the parliamentary union of Ireland and England at the feet of the Irish parliament which allowed itself to be corrupted by the bribery of the agents of the Prime Minister. (115-116) He is thus able to liberate himself both from the sentimentalism at stake in Revivalist politics and yet also the Anglo-centrism at stake in Dowden’s rejection of the Revival.

\(^{143}\) 114

\(^{144}\) See *U.*, 249. *CW*, 118. See 118-119: ‘In Ireland we can see how the Danes, the Firbolgs, the Milesians from Spain, the Norman invaders, the Anglo-Saxon colonists and the Huguenots came together to form a new entity, under the influence of a local god, one might say.’

\(^{145}\) *U.*, 249. *CW*, 118.

\(^{146}\) See 118
intellectual and political flux. As Valente argues, the concept of a nation represents ‘an historically engaged construct, the form or logic of a developing, internally varied experience’.  

Drawing in particular on what he himself calls a ‘Nietzschean’ conception of self-becoming, Valente distinguishes Joyce’s concept of Irish national identity in ‘Ireland’ from that of Revivalism:

[T]he death of “ancient Ireland” was not, for Joyce, an unmitigated loss or an incurable trauma, but part of a Nietzschean creative-destructive process, the “foundation” of a new body politic. Joyce’s famous barb, that the Irish value the dead above the living, carries a cultural point of reference as well, aimed at the whole range of recovery nationalisms.  

As Valente argues, in contrast to what, in the context of Eglinton’s conception of Irish nationhood, Schutte describes as the ‘artificial and sentimental methods’ of the attempt to ‘revive the “good old days”’ (of ‘ancient Ireland’) of what Valente here dubs the ‘recovery nationalisms’ (Schutte’s ‘enthusiasts’), Joyce posits a process, analogous to that of Stephen’s later account of the formation of the ‘image’, of the laceration of national identity, the incorporation of new, alien, racial and cultural forces, and the creation of a new form or ‘new body politic’.  

Continuing his own Nietzschean parallel, Valente argues that for the Joyce of ‘Ireland’, it is imperative that Ireland reject the sentimentalism and false hypostatisation of national self-identity at stake in the ‘recovery nationalisms’ conception of nationhood and embrace, reconcile itself to, and affirm, the ineluctable provisionality of nationhood:

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147 81. Significantly, Valente qualifies his reading by referring to the concept of the ‘portrait’ in Joyce’s early essay, which, as I argued in the previous section is carried forward into the conception of the process of provisional self-becoming which underpins the aesthetic theory of ‘Scylla’.  

148 Valente, 77  
149 Cf. Schutte, 43. See Eglinton, Bards and Saints, 7-12.
For Ireland to become a cosmopolitan European society, as Joyce had advocated back home, now meant that Ireland was to become what it already was, in the strong Nietzschean sense of that injunction, that is, to transvalue the present state of ambivalence and self-division in a constructive cultural perspectivism by refuting all romantic fictions, unionist or separatist, that predicated Irish well-being on a collective “unity of being” or staked the prospect of Irish self-determination on the consolidation of Irish self-identity.150

In contrast to the ‘romantic fictions’ of a ‘unity of being’ and the conception of the ‘consolidation’ of national self-identity, rooted in the Platonism of late-Romantic (and especially Yeatsian) metaphysics and aesthetics, Valente posits Joyce’s ‘transnationalism’. In terms which are echoed in my reading of the fold in the self-creation of the artist as the laceration of the artist’s shape of consciousness, the revelation of the quidditas (or ‘essence’) of that shape of consciousness and the incorporation of quidditas in the ‘image’ as the foundation for a new shape of consciousness, against the Yeatsian, Revivalist notion of a return to the quintessential Platonic ‘Idea’ of the nation, in ‘Ireland’, Valente argues, Joyce puts forward a conception of the imperative on Ireland to ‘become what it already was’. For Joyce, Ireland had to embrace its fundamentally plural and multi-cultural heritage. In this way it could become a ‘cosmopolitan European society’.

The provisional self-becoming and concomitant rejection of the Literary Revival and of Irish Nationalism of Joyce’s early critical writing is at stake in ‘Scylla’. As I have sought to argue, in ‘Scylla’ this conception of provisionality and self-becoming is rooted in the philosophical and art-historical engagement of the episode. It stems from the anti-metaphysics and from the ‘classical’ aesthetic of the episode, itself grounded in the ironic appropriation of the key terms of Romantic accounts of inspiration and creativity to a fundamentally anti-Romantic aesthetic

150 90
project. In ‘Scylla’ the Homeric parallel is extended to the plane of a metaphor for Irish politics at the opening of the twentieth century. As Odysseus-Ulysses navigates the Strait of Messina, between the rock of the monster Scylla and the vortex of Charybdis, skirting closer to the rock and sacrificing six men, rather than face total destruction in the vortex, so in ‘Scylla’, Stephen navigates between the Anglo-centric Protestant Scylla of Dowden’s scholarship and the Irish Nationalist Revivalist vortex of Yeatsian late-Romanticism. He sacrifices key critical and philosophical concessions to Dowden’s (historical) ‘materialism’ in order to evade completely the Platonism of Yeats’s Revivalism. Through his exposition of what I have called the fold in the ‘image’ of the artist, Stephen arrives at an independent third political position. Stephen’s definition of a projected ‘classicism’ underpins an identical conception of cosmopolitanism as that which is at stake in Joyce’s early ‘Ireland’ lecture: what Valente dubs Joyce’s ‘transnationalism’. This serves to qualify Gibson’s conception of Joyce’s ‘Irish-centred agenda’ and argument for a reconsideration of Joyce as an Irish writer.\textsuperscript{151} The politics at stake in ‘Scylla’ is indeed focussed on Ireland, but an Ireland reconceived of as an outward-looking, multicultural ‘modern trans-nation’.\textsuperscript{152} The final textual incarnation of Stephen’s conception of the ‘classical’, and the politics which this serves to underpin, are aimed towards a conception of the future Ireland as a ‘classical’, trans-national, cosmopolitan European republic.

\textsuperscript{151} See Gibson, \textit{James Joyce}, esp. 11-14
\textsuperscript{152} Valente, 90. See \textit{CW}, 125
Conclusion

Through a comparison of the development of Stephen Stephen’s aesthetic theory in Joyce’s *Stephen Hero, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* and *Ulysses* with the terms of Nietzsche’s account of artistic inspiration and creation from *The Birth of Tragedy* to *Twilight of the Idols* this thesis has attempted to bring together contemporary critical accounts of Joyce and Nietzsche’s aesthetics and their relationships to philosophy, and in particular to the philosophy of art. It has set out to argue that both Nietzsche and Joyce reject the Platonic metaphysical opposition of an ideal other world to that of the everyday, which they regard as being at stake in Romantic and late-Romantic accounts of artistic inspiration and creation. By contrast, both attempt to ironically appropriate the terms of these accounts to anti-metaphysical and anti-Romantic ‘classical’ aesthetics and theories of artistic inspiration. They seek to supplant the access to Platonic Ideas at stake in Romanticism and late-Romanticism with conceptions of the presentation of an intensely undergone aesthetic experience focussed on an object of quotidian experience. To the life-renunciation and essentialism which both view as being unavoidably at stake in Romanticism and late-Romanticism, they oppose conceptions of art as the transposition of lived experience.

For both Nietzsche and Joyce, the ironic appropriation of Romantic inspiration and creation takes the form of what I have called the fold in the self-creation of the artist. What is at stake for both in this is a structure of self-laceration and ironic self-re-creation. Laceration appears as a disruptive event which severs the apprehending subject (the artist) from their previously lived experience. It constitutes the destruction of a perceived ‘self’ of the artist: an inversion which grants a perspective of ironic distance from outside or beyond previous experience. From this new perspective, the
now defunct, lacerated ‘self’ of the artist can be critiqued and the revelation of its quiddity can form the foundation for a new shape of consciousness. The previous ‘self’, the moment of laceration and the revealed quiddity can be transposed into a work of art. Laceration, inversion and revelation together form artistic inspiration. They precipitate the formation of the ‘image’ by which the artist incorporates this intensely undergone aesthetic experience. The ‘image’ represents the self-re-creation of the artist: the ironic construct of the ‘I’ of the artist. For both Nietzsche and Joyce, art represents something torn from life: an attempt to articulate the essential within lived experience and to slough off the inessential dross.

A mutually illuminating parallel thus exists between the conceptions of artistic inspiration and the figure of the artist in the works of both writers and the relationship of both to the legacy of Romanticism. The parallel has consequences for understanding Nietzsche’s relationship to neo-classical Modernism. What I have called the ‘Romantic—anti-Romanticism’ at stake in Birth, anticipates the terms of his later opposition of the ‘classical’ to the ‘romantic’ and privileging of the ‘classical’. This serves to contextualise Nietzsche’s relationship to Romanticism from his early writing onward. From the outset, Nietzsche’s philosophy of art represents an attempt to ironically appropriate the terms of Schopenhauer’s and post-Schopenhauerianism’s aesthetic Platonism to an aesthetic fundamentally at odds with this metaphysics. As I have sought to demonstrate, this places him in a position of far greater proximity to the aesthetics of neo-classical Modernism than to those of Romanticism, than has thus far been entertained in Nietzsche criticism.
The parallel I have sought to illuminate has significant consequences for contemporary criticism’s engagement with Joyce’s relationship to Nietzschean philosophy. As I have argued, the key philosophical and art-historical claims which are at stake in the rejection late-Romantic aesthetics and in the evolution of Stephen’s aesthetic theory, are grounded in a rejection of (Platonic) metaphysics and an ironic appropriation of the terms of Romantic accounts of artistic inspiration. The key claims of the theory emerge from a thoroughgoing philosophical rejection of the transcendental and a concomitant conception of the impossibility of the self-identity of language and of subjectivity, which are illuminated through a comparison with the terms of Nietzsche’s philosophy.

The terms of parallel between Nietzsche and Joyce and resulting conception of Nietzsche’s proximity to neo-classical Modernism can, therefore, serve to liberate Nietzsche from the misapprehensions of his philosophy which inevitably arise from Schopenhauerian and Romantic readings of his work. Further, they serve to illuminate the philosophical and art-historical claims which underpin Joyce’s work and to contextualise the post-national, cosmopolitan ‘classical’ politics at stake within it, founded upon these claims.

Both Nietzsche and Joyce seek to redeem the legacy of Romanticism from its post-Schopenhauerian, late-Romantic fate through the formation of what I have called a disruptive, anti-transcendental classicism. This, finally, has wider critical consequences for understanding the fundamental epistemological, metaphysical, linguistic and political claims which underpin neo-classical Modernism and thus its relationship to Romanticism. Read through the terms of the parallel between
Nietzsche and Joyce that I have sought to examine, neo-classical Modernism can begin to be understood to form, not a simple rejection of, nor adherence to, Romanticism, but a subtle, nuanced and ironic appropriation of the terms of its artistic legacy.
Appendix

‘Transfiguration’ (1520)
Raphael,
Oil on panel,

1 ©Vaticano, Pinacoteca Apostolica Vaticano, Rome
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Raphael, ‘Transfiguration’, 1520 (Oil on panel), © Vaticano, Pinacoteca Apostolica Vaticano, Rome