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The Theological Anthropology of Eustathius of Antioch

By Sophie Hampshire Cartwright

A thesis submitted to the University of Edinburgh
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Declaration

I have composed *The theological anthropology of Eustathius of Antioch*, and it is my own work and has not been submitted in whole or in part for any other degree or professional qualification.

________________________
Sophie Hampshire Cartwright
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Many people have helped in my completion of this thesis, and to name them all would be impossible. My particular thanks to my supervisor, Dr. Sara Parvis, for her extensive and thoughtful guidance, and to my supervisor, Dr. Paul Parvis, for in-depth discussion of Eustathius’ writings and invaluable advice on translation. I would also like to thank Dr. Kelley Spoerl for numerous insightful suggestions and comments about Eustathius’ anthropology.

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Abstract

Eustathius of Antioch is recognised as a pivotally important ‘Nicene’ figure in the early part of the ‘Arian’ controversy but, largely due to the paucity of sources, there is very little in-depth discussion of his theology. The recent discovery that Eustathius wrote *Contra Ariomanitas et de anima*, an anti-subordinationist treatise focusing on the soul, now preserved in an epitome, both offers unprecedented opportunities for understanding Eustathius’ theology. This thesis examines Eustathius’ theological anthropology, an important aspect of his thought. It considers the question with regards both intrinsic ontology and the meta-narrative of human history – soteriology and eschatology – and situates it within the context of fourth-century metaphysics and the uncertainty surrounding questions of human society raised by Christianity’s new status under Constantine.

Eustathius’ picture of the relationship between the body and the soul relies on a hylomorphic dualism indebted to Platonised Aristotelianism, emphasising the interdependence of body and soul whilst sharply distinguishing them as substances. He regards the soul as passible in itself. Eustathius regards human beings as degraded both in existential state and in circumstance relative to the condition in which they were created and articulates the gap between human potential and human actuality primarily in terms of the relationship between Adam and Christ. Eustathius’ picture of Christ as perfect humanity is informed by a sense of radical disjunction between God and creation, typical of fourth-century metaphysics, and he consequently holds a relatively autonomous conception of human perfection. Eustathius regards free will as freedom to discern and choose the right thing, which relies on a fundamentally optimistic perception of human moral nature. Eustathius’ anthropology consistently grounds human essence and identity in earthly life and correspondingly founds his soteriology on the fulfilment of current potential, believing that Christ will reign, eschatologically, over an earthly kingdom.
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Abbreviations

Primary Literature

Athanasius

C. Ar.  Orationes Contra Arianos
C.G.  Contra Gentes
Hist. Ar.  Historia Arianorum
De Inc.  De Incarnatione

Athenagoras

De Res.  De Resurrectione

Eusebius of Caesarea

H.E.  Historia Ecclesiastica
P.E.  Preparatio Evangelica
D.E.  Demonstratio Evangelica
V.C.  Vita Constantini

Irenaeus

A.H.  Adversus Haereses

Methodius of Olympus

De Res.  De Resurrectione

Origen

De Princ.  De Principiis
Philostorgius

*H.E.*  *Historia Ecclesiastica*

Socrates

*H.E.*  *Historia Ecclesiastica*

Sozomen

*H.E.*  *Historia Ecclesiastica*

Theodoret of Cyrus

*H.E.*  *Historia Ecclesiastica*

**Secondary literature**

*ANRW*  *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*

*BZ*  *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*

*CPG*  *Clavis Patrum Graecorum*

*CPL*  *Clavis Patrum Latinorum*

*CUP*  *Cambridge University Press*

*CSEL*  *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*

*GCS*  *Die Griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte*


*JECS*  *Journal of Early Christian Studies*

*JETS*  *Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society*

*JTS*  *Journal of Theological Studies*
References to the Hebrew bible are according to the LXX, unless otherwise stated. Unless otherwise stated, translations of Greek and Latin literature are my own, under the supervision of Dr. Paul Parvis. I have made use of the translations indicated in the bibliography for other ancient languages. Quotations of Eustathius’ Syriac fragments are generally based on the French translation in José Declerck, *Eustathii Antiocheni, patris Nicaeni, opera quae supersunt omnia*, Corpus Christianorum, Series Graeca, 51 (Turnhout, Brepols, 2002).

For Eustathius’ fragments, I adopt the referencing system of José Declerck. For *Engastrimytho Contra Origenem*, I adopt the system of Rowan Greer and Margaret Mitchell.
Introduction

The objective of this thesis is to examine the theological anthropology of Eustathius of Antioch.

Eustathius was bishop of Beroea and then Antioch in the 320s.\(^1\) He is known for a highly unified conception of the Father-Son relationship, and a highly divisive, proto-Nestorian Christology. He is widely acknowledged to be a hugely important figure in the Constantinian Church. As the bishop of Antioch at the Council of Nicaea, a better grasp of his theology must be significant to our understanding of the early ‘Arian’ controversy. As a self-declared anti-Origenist, who nonetheless shared Origen’s unusual belief in Christ’s human soul, he is important to the history of Origenism in the fourth century.\(^2\) And, as perhaps the earliest example of adherence to what is in many respects proto-Nestorian Christology, he is important to understanding the background to the fifth-century Christological controversy.

Despite this, there is remarkably little scholarship on Eustathius. This is partly because the sources, until recently, have been extremely sparse. Other than one anti-Origenist treatise, there are a handful of fragments preserved by later writers. However, this has changed with the discovery that Eustathius is the author of *Contra Ariomanitas et de anima* [Ariomanitas], previously ascribed to Gregory of

\(^{1}\) The dates of his accession to both sees are disputed. See discussion in chapter 1.

\(^{2}\) This in turn could further our understanding of the ‘Arian’ controversy, the starting point of which has sometimes been seen as a dispute within Origenism. C.f. Manilo Simonetti, *La Crisi ariana nel IV secolo* (Roma, Institutum Patristicum “Augustinianum”, 1975), pp.55-60.
Nyssa. Though this is preserved as an epitome, the epitomiser is trying to get across Eustathius’ own arguments, and aims at completeness. It gives us unprecedented insight into Eustathius’ thought. The time is right for fresh scholarship.

In addressing itself to his theological anthropology, this thesis makes a necessary contribution to our understanding of Eustathius, and his place in the history of Christian theology. By ‘theological anthropology’ I mean the conception of the human person in a theological context. Matthew Steenberg has recently argued that a significant strand of patristic theology should be seen in an anthropological way, and this view has much to recommend it. Anthropology is central to most theology, because human reflection tends to find a place for humanity, even if it is not anthropocentric, as such. Fourth-century anthropology is especially important for several interrelated reasons.

Firstly, there was a very significant development in normative metaphysical assumptions in the fourth century, and this required a renegotiation of humanity’s relationship to God relative to second- and third-century anthropology. Roughly, there was a new certainty about and emphasis upon the categories of ‘having always existed’ and ‘having come to be’ as key for articulating the distinction between God and everything else. This carries with it, among other things, an especially sharp

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3 See José Declerck, (ed.), Eustathii Antiocheni, patris Nicaeni, opera quae supersunt omnia, Corpus Christianorum, Series Graeca, 51 (Turnhout, Brepols, 2002) and discussion in ‘modern research’ section below and in ‘Contra Ariomanitas et de anima’ section of chapter 2.
4 Matthew Steenberg, Of God and Man: theology as anthropology from Irenaeus to Athanasius (Edinburgh, T and T Clark, 2009).
5 This is discussed in detail in chapter three.
sense of the disjunction between God and humankind. The conceptualisation both of humanity in relation to God and of God incarnate are placed against a new backdrop.

Secondly, the ‘Constantinian revolution’ again raises fundamental anthropological questions. These questions are about both human society and the way in which the gap between current society and eschatological society relates to human potential.

The third reason that I identify for exploring fourth-century theological anthropology derives largely from the other two: we cannot fully understand the ‘Arian’ controversy without understanding the theological anthropologies of those involved in it. Many ways of understanding the controversy have been proposed. Often, they have been framed in terms of an attempt to find the lynch pin of the controversy. This is pointedly true of the work of Robert Gregg and Denis Groh, in which the authors argued that the ‘Arian’ view of Christ was driven by soteriological concerns.\(^6\) Rowan Williams depicts the key issues in cosmological terms, and Sara Parvis has followed him here, though she sees the participants in the controversy as divided firmly into two camps, where Williams sees more ambiguity.\(^7\) It is my opinion that a cosmological emphasis has much to recommend it as far as understanding the immediate question of dispute at Nicaea is concerned, but that

Gregg and Groh, among others, have identified important strands in the wider theological milieu surrounding Nicaea, and that this milieu cannot be ignored.

Lewis Ayres has focused primarily on the doctrine of God itself, and has identified four theological trajectories within the ‘Arian’ controversy: 1) “theologians of the true wisdom” who emphasise the “eternal correlative status of Father and Son.”

2) “The ‘Eusebian’ theologians of the ‘One Unbegotten’.

3) “Theologians of the undivided Monad.”

4) “Western anti-adoptionism: a Son born without division.” These provide a useful hermeneutical key which acknowledges the clear dividing line referred to above whilst allowing for the complexity and variety of theological positions within the ‘Arian’ controversy.

What is evident in so many reconstructions of the ‘Arian’ controversy is that anthropology considerably elucidates the question; soteriology is intrinsically anthropocentric, focusing on the gap between human possibility and its current actualisation. Cosmology often starts from the point of trying to understand the person’s place in the universe. Christology, the question of God becoming human, or taking on humanity is, again, entwined with anthropology. I am not proposing that anthropology is the, or a, defining theological issue in the question of the doctrine of God as played out at the Council of Nicaea. At least, I do not propose

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9 Ibid, p.52.
10 Ibid, p.63.
11 Ibid, p.70.
this in the sense that I do not think that anthropology is ‘what the opposing parties at Nicaea were arguing over.’ However, I believe that anthropology is a thread running through the various ways in which both pro-Arians and anti-Arians thought about and articulated the doctrine of God.

Eustathius of Antioch’s theological anthropology is particularly interesting. The work newly attributed to him focuses on the soul. This not only gives us enticing access to his anthropology, but shows that it was an important area of his thought, closely connected to his wider theology. Eustathius’ ideas on the soul, we shall see, are often strikingly original and reveal a particularly interesting negotiation of the problems arising in the fourth century. His negotiation of the novel metaphysical assumptions of the fourth century goes rather further than others in reducing the importance of the categories ‘perceptible’ and ‘intelligible’ and, correspondingly he has a highly developed concept of mental and emotional desire and suffering. With respect to the ‘Constantinian revolution’, he shows profound ambivalence which marks his discourse on freedom and power.

Eustathius’ anthropology is closely connected to his Christology: his argument in Ariomanitas rests on Christ’s full humanity. The main source for Eustathius’ anthropology therefore appears in a Christological context. This might be seen to raise the question of how one can examine Eustathius’ anthropology without first detailing his Christology. It is certainly true that one cannot say much about either of these topics without saying something about the other. I do not think
it is helpful to reduce either Christology or anthropology to a facet of the other in Eustathius’ case. However, if one were to seek to pinpoint one of the two as logically prior to the other, it seems to me that one would have to pinpoint anthropology. Eustathius’ *purpose* in writing the bulk of his (partially) extant works may have been Christological. However, he tends to base his Christological arguments on anthropology. The foundation of his Christological argument in *Ariomanitas* is that the Word bore a full human being. He then makes a number of anthropological arguments to elucidate what this means for Christology. This thesis will therefore focus on anthropology without extensive attention to Christology (though further work on Eustathius’ Christology would also be extremely valuable).

A word needs to be said about the manner of categorising various theological and ecclesial groupings in the ‘Arian’ controversy. The term ‘Arian’ has been widely criticised as a descriptor of subordinationist theology within the fourth-century disputes about the doctrine of God, often because it seems to exaggerate the significance of both the person and the theology of Arius within these disputes. These criticisms have much to recommend them and I have here opted instead for the term ‘pro-Arian.’ It could be argued that this fails to address the problem of the undue centralisation of Arius himself, and this might indeed be the case if some of Eustathius’ anti-subordinationist writings hailed from the later fourth century. However, (as I will argue) all of Eustathius’ anti-subordinationist polemic can be dated to the 320s and was almost certainly written between 323 and the end of 327.
In this context, Arius is neither the main protagonist nor, in real terms, the main issue. However, the participants at Nicaea itself and in the discourse immediately surrounding it can meaningfully be placed in two camps: ‘for’ and ‘against’ Arius. One’s position on Arius is, for this brief period, a focus of group unity. The subordinationist theologians justifiably identified by Ayres as “Eusebian” are, at this point, also specifically pro-Arian. ‘Pro-Arian’ is as meaningful a term as we are likely to find for subordinationist theology immediately surrounding Nicaea. ‘Anti-Arian’, expresses, similarly, the position of Alexander and his allies around the time of Nicaea. Neither term here designates theological homogeneity within these groups.

Furthermore, as I am examining Eustathius’ ideas, his own perception and construction of the dispute is highly relevant. As I will argue, the title Ariomanitas – “those stirring up war around Arius” was probably Eustathius’ own, and reflects a sense that one’s position on Arius was a defining feature of one’s place in the controversy, though it does not give Arius pride of place in the same way as the term ‘Arian.’

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12 For example, this is the view expressed by Richard Hanson who dubs the term ‘the Arian controversy’ “a serious misnomer” in The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God (Edinburgh, T and T Clark, 1988), pp.xvii-xviii, quote p.xvii.
13 See ‘Contra Ariomanitas et de anima’ section in chapter 2.
Eustathius in modern research

Several trends are prominent in the treatment of Eustathius in modern research. Firstly, Germanic and Francophone scholarship have generally shown more interest in Eustathius than its Anglophone counterpart. Secondly, a teleological approach to Eustathius is especially pointed, partly due to the fact that he appears more often in a catalogue of significant thinkers than on his own. His Christology is frequently discussed as an important precursor to Nestorianism, and his exegesis as an example of Antiochene ‘literalism.’ The conception of Eustathius’ theology as belonging to a specific tradition associated with Asia Minor and Syria, or more specifically Antioch, and held in contradistinction to an Alexandrian tradition, gained prominence in German Protestant scholarship in the early twentieth century, and recurs in various guises across much of the later research. There has also been a clear recognition that the circumstances surrounding his deposition are key to the contested ecclesiastical and imperial politics of the 320s-330s. Correspondingly, Eustathius’ deposition occupied Anglophone scholarship in the later twentieth century, even though it was otherwise not especially concerned with him. A large proportion of the scholarship is devoted to the elaborate task of reconstructing Eustathius’ corpus. The lack of comparable attention to Eustathian theology owes much to the difficulty of this reconstruction and the sheer scarcity of the sources. It is, therefore, unsurprising that there has been much fresh interest in Eustathius’ thought since Declerck’s publication of the epitomised *Ariomanitas*. 
Several editions and critical notes of Eustathius’ works were produced in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Then, 1905 saw an explosion of scholarship relating to Eustathius, and formative to later discussion of him. Ferdinand Cavallera devoted considerable attention to Eustathius in his *Le schisme d’Antioche*, highlighting his importance as an opponent ‘Arianism.’ In the same year, he published an edition of *Homily on Lazarus, Mary and Martha*, which he attributed to Eustathius. This attribution has proved an abiding, though far from uncontroversial, legacy in Eustathian scholarship. Very shortly after Cavallera’s publication, Louis Saltet argued that the homily’s Trinitarian theology and Christology were often drastically anachronistic to the fourth century. At the time, this seemed almost decisive, though the debate was to be reopened again by the

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discovery of a new manuscript.\textsuperscript{18} To the homily, Cavallera attached most of the extant fragments, though he did not reproduce in full those that were available in print elsewhere.

In *Le schisme d’Antioche*, Cavallera offered a vivid picture of Eustathius’ character and place in the church of the 320s, though he rightly acknowledged a great deal of uncertainty surrounding many of the details of Eustathius’ life. He presented Eustathius and Marcellus of Ancyra as the champions of Nicene orthodoxy after the death of Alexander. Correspondingly, Cavallera’s Eustathius is a tireless, recalcitrant, and uncompromising opponent of subordinationism. His wider understanding of the ‘Arian’ controversy is significant to the nuances of this picture. In contrast to some other scholarship, he makes a clear distinction between Arianism, *per se*, and a watered down version adhered to by the supporters of both Eusebiuses.\textsuperscript{19} Eustathius, he claims, was a staunch opponent of both. Eusebius of Caesarea is presented as Eustathius’ principal theological adversary, while Eusebius of Nicomedia is the political mastermind operating against him, and ultimately causing his downfall.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{18} See discussion of van Esbroeck below. In 1923, Friedrich Zoepfl, “Die trinitarischen und christologischen Anschauungen des Bischofs Eustathius von Antiochien”, *Theologische Quartalschrift*, 104 (1923), 170-201, pp.170-1, writes that the lack of knowledge of Eustathius’ theology is largely due to there being only one full extant work, assuming rather than defending the truth of Saltet’s claims.

\textsuperscript{19} C.f. Cavallera, *Schisme*, p.38. For scholarship that tends to see two ecclesial factions at Nicaea, c.f. discussion of Andrew Burn, below. This picture is also key to Sara Parvis’ construction of the ‘Arian’ controversy in her *Marcellus*.

\textsuperscript{20} Cavallera does note that Eusebius of Caesarea was the one to accuse Eustathius at the council which deposed him, but sees this as part of a plan which Eusebius of Nicomedia was instrumental in creating. C.f. his *Schisme*, p.36 and p.38.
Also in 1905, Eduard Schwartz produced a Syriac version of a synodal letter purporting to be from a council in Antioch, which he dated to 325. This discovery was radically to alter our perception of the ‘Arian’ controversy. Significantly for our purposes, it brought Eustathius, bishop of Antioch, to the centre stage (confirming Cavallera’s picture), though this did not in fact invigorate Eustathian scholarship in proportion to the fresh opportunities that the letter offered. Schwartz produced a Greek retroversion, which he acknowledged to be approximate, of the Syriac text. The initial response to Schwartz’s publication was mixed. Adolf von Harnack claimed that the letter was a forgery. Schwartz angrily defended the authenticity of his discovery, but Harnack stood his ground. In 1913, Erich Seeberg surveyed the controversy surrounding the Council of Antioch and ultimately defended the authenticity of the synodal letter. Some doubts about the authenticity of the letter still lingered, but Seeberg’s work prompted a shift in the debate in favour of the letter’s genuineness. Schwartz’s discovery has since been corroborated by the discovery of two more similar texts.

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24 Erich Seeberg, Die Synode von Antiochien im Jahre 324/5 (Berlin, Trowitzsch, 1913).
26 By François Nau, “Litterature canonique Syriaque inedite”, Revue de l’Orient Chrétien, XIV (1909), 1-31 and Henry Chadwick, “Ossius of Cordova and the Presidency of the Council of Antioch 325”, JTS 9 (NS) (1958), 292-304. The date of this synod has been the subject of disagreement. Parvis dates it to December 324 in her Marcellus, p.78. Because one of the tasks of the synod was to appoint a new bishop of Antioch, it must have occurred relatively soon after the death of Eustathius’
Schwartz also made various attempts to reconstruct the events of Eustathius’ life, within his extensive studies on the chronology of the ‘Arian’ controversy. Significantly, he argued for the Eustathian authorship of the pseudo-Athanasian *Sermo Major de Fide* and *Expositio Fidei*, which had been found, by Jerome, in the same dossier in the Eustathian library at Antioch.\(^{27}\)

Over a number of years, but also beginning at the turn of the last century, another German scholar, Friedrich Loofs, developed a picture of an ‘Antiochene’ theological school, in which he ultimately included Eustathius. In doing so, he offered categories for understanding Eustathius that were to recur, and be contested, in later scholarship.\(^{28}\) Loofs’ work on Eustathius particularly bears the mark of German Protestant scholarship in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries in its search for ‘biblical’ Christianity. His treatment can only be adequately understood within his wider picture of the development of Christian doctrine, and a connected long-term schism in the church at Antioch.

He first became interested in Eustathius in developing and reworking Theodor Zahn’s thesis on the ‘Asia Minor’ (*kleinasiatische* or *vorderasiatische*)

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\(^{27}\) Schwartz, *Der s.g. Sermo major de fide des Athanasius*, (Sitzungsberichte, Munich, 1924).

\(^{28}\) Loofs’ picture is in turn determined by the construction of Eustathius in ancient sources, notably the pro-Nestorian bias of Theodoret, who preserved a large portion of Eustathius’ work. The connection that Loofs made between Eustathius and Paul of Samosata was also, of course, far from novel. Socrates, *H.E.*, I.24 (CPG, 6028), writes that Eustathius was accused of Sabellianism at the council that deposed him.
tradition. This tradition ostensibly focused on the historical Christ and took an economic approach to the Trinity, in contrast to the philosophising approach of the ‘Alexandrian’ school. Ignatius of Antioch, Irenaeus and Marcellus were key figures in Zahn’s reconstruction. Loofs reworked Zahn’s thesis, focusing the tradition more specifically on Antioch. He ultimately concluded that the tradition was better labelled ‘Antiochene’, and added Eustathius. Paul of Samosata was key in shaping Loofs’ conception of this tradition (though Loofs claimed that he was less important than Eustathius to the later Antiochene School). He draws a line between Tertullian and Nestorius, and sees Eustathius, along with Paul of Samosata, as one significant mediator between the two.

Loofs emphasises divine unity in Eustathius’ theology, and cautiously concludes that Eustathius, like Paul of Samosata, believed that the Son went out from the Father at the time of the incarnation. Much of the later scholarship that otherwise echoes Loofs has sought to qualify his reconstruction of Eustathius’

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29 Loofs first addressed the idea of the ‘Asia Minor’ tradition in the article “Die Trinitätselehre Marcell’s von Ancyra und ihr Verhältnis zur älteren Tradition”, Sitzungsberichte der königlich preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil-hist Klasse (1902), 764-81 and developed his thoughts on it over a number of years. His fullest treatment of Eustathius appears with his Paulus von Samosata. Eine Untersuchung zur altkirchlichen Literatur – und Dogmengeschichte (Leipzig, J.C. Hinrichs, 1924).

30 The treatment of the ‘Asia Minor’ tradition in German scholarship has received some recent attention, thanks to the revival of interest in another of its purported adherents, Marcellus of Ancyra. C.f. Joseph Lienhard, “Marcellus of Ancyra in Modern Research”, Theological Studies 43 (1982), 486-503

31 Theodor Zahn, Marcellus von Ancyra: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Theologie, (Gotha, F.A. Perthes, 1867).

32 Eventually, as he drafted Eustathius into the tradition, Loofs changed his mind about Marcellus’ theology, deciding that Marcellus echoed Origenism as much as he did the tradition of Antioch. In this way, Loofs ended up emphasising significant differences between the theology of Marcellus and Eustathius.


34 Ibid, pp.296-300.
Trinitarian doctrine by allowing for greater distinction between the Father and the Son.\textsuperscript{35}

The state of the church at Antioch became a very important factor in the development of this tradition, in Loofs’ revised understanding of it. The two theological schools juxtaposed by Zahn became two opposing ecclesial factions at Antioch in Loofs’ thought. Cavallera had dated the schism of Antioch from Eustathius’ deposition.\textsuperscript{36} Conversely, Loofs argues that the church in Antioch had been divided since the time of Paul of Samosata, and had had simultaneous ‘Antiochene’ and ‘Origenist’ bishops.\textsuperscript{37}

In 1923, Friedrich Zoepfl also linked Eustathius to ‘Asia Minor’ theology, in an article examining his Trinitarian theology and Christology.\textsuperscript{38} In Zoepfl’s view, Asia Minor’s mark on Eustathius was evident in his strong soteriological emphasis on Christ’s humanity which echoed the concept of ἀνακεφαλαίωσις found in Ignatius and Irenaeus.\textsuperscript{39} This emphasis, Zoepfl claimed, was particularly reflected in Eustathius’ belief in Christ’s human soul.\textsuperscript{40} Zoepfl further noted what he saw as a corresponding sense that Christ’s humanity renders God visible. However, he also

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item[35] See discussions on Zoepfl, Sellers and Lorenz, below.
\item[36] Cavallera, \textit{Schisme}, p.43.
\item[37] Loofs, \textit{Paulus}, pp.180-6.
\item[38] Zoepfl, “Die trinitarischen und christologischen Anschauungen.” My chronology here reflects the fact that Zoepfl’s interest in Eustathius began later than Loofs’, particularly because Loofs’ wider work on ‘Asia Minor’ or ‘Antiochene’ theology is important to his analysis of Eustathius, but it should be noted that he was still to publish \textit{Paulus}, in which he discusses Eustathius at length.
\end{itemize}}
found Origenist Platonism in Eustathius’ Christology. Ironically, this is evident, for Zoepfl, specifically in Eustathius’ concept of Christ’s human soul because it mediates between the Logos and the material world and correspondingly undermines the sense that Christ’s humanity is what makes the Logos visible. Zoepfl thus depicted Christ’s human soul as pulling in two different directions in Eustathius’ Christology, but had the sense that the Eustathian doctrine of Christ’s human soul was inextricably linked to Origenism.

Zoepfl declined to label Eustathius ‘Nestorian’, but did note several parallels in the two men’s Christology. In Zoepfl’s view, it is only possible to speak of “Menschwerdung” – of God becoming human – in a very loose sense in Eustathius’ Christology; Eustathius, rather, conceives of the Logos as dwelling in, or putting on, the human Jesus. Zoepfl was more firmly persuaded that Eustathius was not a Sabellian; he believed that Eustathius’ Logos theology diverged sharply from Paul of Samosata’s, because, for Eustathius, the Logos had a separate, personal existence. In this respect his picture is very different from Loofs’.

Zoepfl subsequently wrote on the pseudo-Eustathian Hexamaeron, arguing persuasively that it was written too late to be Eustathian.
Shortly after Zoepfl’s article and Loofs’ monograph, Andrew Burn gave a lecture on Eustathius, in English. His picture of Eustathius’ life largely echoed Cavallera: Eustathius is starkly opposed not only to Arius, but also to both Eusebiuses and their supporters, and he is deposed as a consequence of the Eusebian party’s duplicitous machinations. Burn also followed the recent German scholarship in defining Eustathius as an ‘Antiochene’ theologian. However, he explicitly defended Eustathius’ Chalcedonian orthodoxy, taking a two-pronged approach (and risking self-defeat in the process). He argued both that Eustathius’ divisive Christology was merely speculative, whereas Nestorius attacked the church’s doctrine, and that Eustathius, anyway, saw Christ as “perfect God and perfect man.” A confessional, in this case Anglican, influence is, of course, as evident in Burn’s dissociation between Eustathius and Nestorius as it was in Loofs’ enthusiastic association of them.

In 1928, Robert Sellers produced what remains the only monograph on Eustathius’ theology in English. He also included a substantial discussion of Eustathius in his later Two Ancient Christologies. In both works, he juxtaposed Antiochene theology with Alexandrine theology, and saw them as competitors within

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44 Zoepfl, Der Kommentar des Pseudo-Eustathios zum Hexaëmeron (Munich, Aschendorf, 1927). See my discussion on works falsely attributed to Eustathius, chapter 2.
45 Andrew Burn, Saint Eustathius of Antioch, Nicaean lectures, no. 1 (London, 1926).
46 Ibid, pp.6-9. Because he is aware of the Council of Antioch, Burn is more decided than Cavallera in placing all of Eustathius’ subordinationist opponents in one theological camp: “there were only two parties [at Nicaea], for and against Arius.”, p.9.
48 Ibid, p.15 and p.22 respectively. He additionally allows that historiography may have been unfair in its analysis of Nestorius’ Christology.
the history of Christian doctrine. According to Sellers, Antiochene theology was defined by dyohypostatic Christology and literalist exegesis. He placed Eustathius squarely within the ‘Antiochene’ tradition, and drew a direct line between Paul of Samosata, Eustathius and Nestorius.51

Sellers’ treatment of Eustathius echoed the then recent German scholarship, though he placed less emphasis on economic Trinitarianism than the German tradition had done. He followed Zoepfl more closely than Loofs, particularly in that he believed that Eustathius allowed the Son a personal existence where Paul of Samosata had not. He criticised Loofs for failing to appreciate this. For Eustathius “the eternal Logos is ‘Son’ – ‘the Son’ is not set up with the indwelling of Wisdom in the Man” and “for Eustathius, the Son has His own hypostasis.”52 Sellers felt that Eustathius’ theology was superior to Paul’s in this respect. Like Loofs, Sellers saw something valuable in the ‘Antiochene’ tradition, and wished to safeguard its distinctiveness. This sometimes led to a problematically circular method of determining which works were authentically Eustathian.53

In 1933, Wilhelmine Brockmeier produced a detailed study of Engastrimytho’s grammatical style and diction.54 She noted that Eustathius’ style is

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50 Sellers, Two Ancient Christologies: a study in the Christological thought of the schools of Alexandria and Antioch in the early history of Christian doctrine (London, SPCK, 1940).
52 Ibid, p.122 and p.123 respectively.
53 See discussion of Eustathius’ letter on Melchizedek in chapter two.
54 Wilhelmine Brockmeier, De Sancti Eustathii episcopi Antiocheni dicendi ratione. Accedit index vocabulorum libri contra Origenem scripti omnium (Borna - Leipzig, 1933).
atticising, and that this is reflected in his vocabulary except where it is drawn directly from scripture.\textsuperscript{55}

Michel Spanneut is the foremost Eustathian scholar of the twentieth century. He produced a major edition of Eustathius’ works, with an extensive introduction, in 1948.\textsuperscript{56} He also wrote several articles on Eustathius.\textsuperscript{57} In his edition, he rejected the Eustathian authorship of \textit{Sermo Major de Fide} and \textit{Expositio Fidei}, proposed by Schwartz, arguing that they became attributed to Eustathius via Jerome’s misattribution to Athanasius.\textsuperscript{58}

One article focused on exegesis in \textit{Engastrimytho}, and marked a turning point in the understanding of Eustathius as an ‘Antiochene’ exegete, which was itself part of a wider development in the study of patristic exegesis.\textsuperscript{59} Though Spanneut sees significant parallels between Eustathius’ exegesis and that of later theologians often associated with Antioch, such as Theodore and Diodore, his picture of Eustathian exegesis complicates the category ‘literalist’: Eustathius, he argues “condemns a literalist conception of inspiration [of scripture] which, wrongly or rightly, he

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{55} Ibid, pp.3-4.
\item \textsuperscript{56} Michel Spanneut, \textit{Recherches sur les écrits d’Eustathe d’Antioche} (Lille, Facultés Catholiques, 1948).
\item \textsuperscript{58} Spanneut, \textit{Recherches}, pp.87-89.
\item \textsuperscript{59} Spanneut, “Eustathe exegete.”
\end{itemize}
attributes to Origen.”

He argues that Eustathius criticised Origen primarily for failing to regard scripture holistically. Correspondingly, both his approach to the question of Eustathius’ ‘Antiochene’ status and his conclusions differ from Sellers’ in important ways. He starts from an exposition of Eustathius’ exegesis, and moves to a comparison with Theodore and Diodore, rather than rooting Eustathius, from the outset, in this later tradition. Spanneut’s analysis thus avoids the sometimes problematic tendency, found in Sellers, to read Eustathius in light of later discourses.

Spanneut remained, until very recently, the last scholar to write extensively on Eustathius, but the next five decades were to witness sporadic interest in the contents of the Eustathian corpus and rather more persistent interest in the date and nature of his deposition. He otherwise appeared in works on other aspects of the ‘Arian’ controversy as an example of an ‘extreme’ Nicene, often compared to Marcellus of Ancyra.

Shortly after the appearance of Spanneut’s critical edition, Felix Scheidweiler wrote a series of articles on Eustathius, largely focusing on his corpus, and was, at least at first, more persuaded by Schwartz than by the more recent work of Spanneut. He initially accepted the Eustathian authorship of Sermo Major de Fide and Expositio Fidei and introduced the argument that Eustathius was the author of

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60 Ibid. p.553: “Eustathe condamne une conception littéraliste de l’Inspiration, qu’à tort ou à raison, il attribue à Origène.”
61 Ibid. p.553.
62 C.f. Hanson, The Search, pp.208-17.
Contra Theopa schita. He based his claim very largely on the similarity between it and the other two works. Accepting Eustathian authorship of these works supposes that Eustathius was still alive after the Council of Serdica, which Scheidweiler argues on the basis that he wrote Contra Photinum, which also clearly post-dates Serdica.

Scheidweiler later attributed all three works to Marcellus of Ancyra. He additionally proposed several emendations to Spanneut’s edition of the fragments.

Aloys Grillmeier rejected the picture of Eustathius as proto-Nestorian in his Christ in the Christian Tradition. Grillmeier notes the more unitive Christology in a few, probably early, fragments and describes the theology in them as “completely un-Antiochene, in the later sense of the word.”

Eustathius’ Christology did later become divisive, he claims, in response to Arianism: Eustathius noticed that logos-sarx Christology, favoured by the ‘Arians’, required the Logos to be the subject of Christ’s passions, and therefore undermined the Logos’ divinity. Eustathius clearly articulated Christ’s human soul to guard against this ‘Arian’ position.


Ibid, p.242. Photinus did not come to prominence until the 340s.


This work was originally written in German and appeared in two editions, both of which have been translated into English. The treatment of Eustathius can be found in vol. 1, rev. ed. (London and Oxford, Mowbrays, 1975), trans. Bowden, John, pp.296-301.


Ibid, pp.299-300. There is one particular fragment in which Eustathius explicitly makes this accusation against his opponents, D119b. Hanson draws on Grillmeier’s argument that Eustathius opposed logos-sarx Christology to safeguard the impassibility of the Logos. See above.
emphasising the defensive context of Eustathius’ divisive Christology, Grillmeier seeks to place it out with the realm of dogma.

In 1975, Michel van Esbroeck reopened the debate about the Eustathian authorship of Lazarus in a monograph examining several Georgian homilies. He published a further article on the subject in 1982. He based his argument on a Georgian version of the text, which had been discovered in 1930. Van Esbroeck argued that the Georgian manuscript was closer to the original Greek and showed that the original was, after all, Eustathian. Declerck has, however, demonstrated otherwise.

In 1980, Rudolph Lorenz defended the Eustathian authorship of Contra Photinum (which had been more assumed than defended by Scheidweiler). The silence surrounding Eustathius after his deposition is often considered compelling evidence of his relatively early death, but Lorenz argues that it can be explained by the fact that he insulted Helena, and was therefore destined to remain a persona non grata for the entire Constantinian dynasty.

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72 This is discussed in chapter 2 in the section on false attributions.
The extant fragments of *Contra Photinum* defend the author against the charge of believing in “three Gods” and maintain some clear distinction between *hypostasis* – of which there is only one - and *prosopon* – of which there are three – in the Godhead.75 Therefore, in arguing that the Trinitarian theology of *Contra Photinum* is that of Eustathius, Lorenz suggests a picture in which Eustathius’ emphasis on divine unity is qualified, and though echoing both Zoepfl and Sellers, he somewhat advances on them. He defends his attribution to Eustathius of a distinction between *hypostasis* and *prosopon*, by arguing that the use of *prosopon*, in *Contra Photinum* to refer to God’s nature echoes Eustathius’ use of ἰδιόν to refer to God’s nature in *Engastrimytho*.76

Both strands of Lorenz’s argument relatively downplay the relationship between theology and politics in shaping the ‘Arian’ controversy. The theological disagreement between Photinus and Eustathius overrode their anti-‘Arian’ alliance, and Eustathius’ deposition was firmly in the realm of imperial politics, to the extent that alterations in the relationship between the imperial administration and his theological faction did not affect it.

In the later twentieth century, there was some consideration of Eustathius’ exegesis and in particular his place in the history of exegesis, focusing on *Engastrimytho*: In 1989 Manilo Simonetti produced a new edition of *Engastrimytho*, together with the respective treatments of Origen and Gregory of Nyssa on the same

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75 The fragments are D142a-c.
Joseph Trigg shortly afterwards wrote an article examining the nature of Eustathius’ disagreement with Origen. He follows Spanneut in accepting that Eustathius and Origen represented opposed exegetical traditions but questioning the use of a dichotomy between literalism and allegory in understanding these traditions. The work of Simonetti and Trigg was part of a wider interest in the categories of ‘Antiochene’ and ‘Alexandrian’ in Christian exegesis in the third and fourth centuries, and an interest in readings of the witch of Endor narrative.

The last sixty years have seen significant discussion of Eustathius’ deposition and accession in Anglophone scholarship. I survey this scholarship here, and will discuss the topic in detail in chapter 1.

It is now conventional to date Eustathius’ accession to the See of Antioch to the Council of Antioch in 324/5. However, Paul Parvis has recently questioned this thesis. His argument is closely connected to a wider uncertainty surrounding the episcopal succession in Antioch.

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The chronology of the bishops of Antioch in the 320s has long been confused, principally because, whilst most ancient sources refer to Paulinus of Tyre as Eustathius’ predecessor, Philostorgius and serveral others refer to him as Eustathius’ successor, and this latter claim has been widely accepted. Philogonius of Antioch is, consequently, seen as Eustathius’ predecessor. However, Richard Burgess has argued that there would not have been time for Paulinus’ episcopate if he had succeeded Eustathius, and therefore believes that Paulinus was, after all, Eustathius’ predecessor. It is known that Philogonius died on 20th December, because this is his feast day. Much scholarship has assumed that this was December 324. However, Burgess places Philogonius’ death on 20 December 323, a year earlier than the conventional date.

Paul Parvis has developed Burgess’ thesis in a different direction, which in some ways reinvigorates Friedrich Loofs’ picture of a schism at Antioch, but ties it more closely to the ‘Arian’ controversy. Parvis suggests that Eustathius and Paulinus were simultaneous, rival bishops. He argues that Constantine’s so-called

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82 Richard Burgess, Studies in Eusebian and post-Eusebian chronography (Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1999) discusses the evidence in detail and I draw here on his analysis, pp.184-191. For example, Jerome, Chronicon (CPG, 3494), 232c, Theophanes, Chronicon (11.30, 13.27, 15.17), Nicetas, Thesaurus Orthodoxae Fidei. 5.6., name Paulinus as Eustathius’ predecessor. A few of the sources placing Paulinus directly before Eustathius are somewhat confused about Paulinus’ name because of transcriptional error. For example, Chronicle 724 refers to “Flavianus”, but this clearly leads us back to Paulinus when one considers the similarity of the names ‘Paulinus’ and ‘Flavinius’ in Syriac. Philostorgius writes that Paulinus was the predecessor of Eulalius, who was bishop after Eustathius, thereby suggesting that Paulinus succeeded Eustathius, H.E. (CPG, 3495), 2.7b, 3.15 and 15b. Jacob of Edessa also says that Paulinus succeeded Eustathius, but sees him as a rival “orthodox” bishop to the pro-Arian Eulalius. Burgess convincingly argues that Jacob has confused Paulinus I with Paulinus II, who was bishop of Antioch from 362-380 and whose title, according to Socrates (H.E. CPG 6028, 5.5.4.), was contested by Meletius, p.185. Details of the council, and what it can tell us about Eustathius, are discussed below.
83 On which, see below.
“letter to Arius and Alexander suggests” that there were two rival bishops of Antioch at the time of writing, and that this remained the case; this is why Constantine never travelled east. So, in Parvis’ view, Eustathius was a bishop of Antioch from the death of Philogonius in 323, and the (strongly anti-‘Arian’) Council of Antioch asserted his legitimacy over that of Paulinus. Paulinus was then recognised as bishop of Antioch by the emperor after Eustathius’ deposition.

Parvis’ argument has three main strands. Firstly, he follows Stuart Hall in arguing that Constantine’s letter was written to the Antiochene Synod of 324-5, not to Arius and Alexander personally. To this end, he notes that Eusebius says that Constantine ἐπιτίθησι the letter to Alexander and Arius, and that Eusebius only uses this term when he is introducing excerpts in the Vita Constantini, and that here it means that Constantine “presented” the letter in question. Eusebius does not say, therefore, that the letter was “written” to Alexander and Arius.

Secondly, Parvis argues that the text of Constantine’s letter refers to a disputed succession. Σύνοδος, he claims, should be read as ‘corporate body’ when

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84 Burgess, Studies, pp.186-7. Sellers had earlier suggested this reconstruction in Eustathius, pp.21-2.
85 Parvis, “Constantine’s Letter.”
86 Loofs had also pointed to Jerome’s belief that Paulinus preceded Eustathius as suggesting a “Paulianische” bishop of Antioch, following the tradition of Paul of Samosata, whilst Philogonius was the “katholischen” bishop of Antioch. This theory was based on his belief in a long-standing schism in Antioch, since the time of Paul of Samosata. See Loofs, Paulus, pp.186-187 and my discussion above.
88 Parvis, “Constantine’s Letter”, pp.91-2. For Eusebius, see V.C. (CPG, 3496), 2.63, and 4.34, respectively. In the latter instance, Constantine “presents” a letter to Eusebius himself.
singular. He further suggests that Constantine’s lament that “the honour of the synod be removed by impious dissension…” should be rendered as continuing “…from the congregations” i.e., δήμων, rather than either “through you” or “through us.”

Thirdly, he argues that Constantine’s admonition to his readers to “open to me the road to the east” indicates that he was prevented from making an imperial visit east because “an emperor could not be received by rival bishops. His adventus could not be marred by tumult.”

The discussions about Eustathius’ accession have tended to feed into discussions about his deposition, largely because of the close interrelation of the evidence. Eustathius was one of the bishops deposed from his see when Constantine came to favour the pro-Arian faction. Estimates of the date of his deposition range from 326 to 331.

A central consideration in dating Eustathius’ deposition is the deposition of Asclepas of Gaza, Eustathius’ ally. The synodal letter of the Eastern council of Serdica declares that Asclepas was deposed seventeen years previously. The Western council of Serdica says that he was deposed at Antioch “praesentibus Parvis, ibid., p.93, refers us to a discussion about property belonging to Christians in the so-called ‘Edict of Milan.’ Eusebius renders this by writing that it belonged to the Christians, τοῦτ’ ἔστιν τῷ σώματι καὶ συνόδῳ.

Ibid., p.93. The texts of Ivar Heikel, Eusebius Werke, I, GCS (Leipzig, J.C. Hinrichs, 1902), 70.6, and Friedrich Winkelmann, Eusebius Werke, I, 1, Über das Leben des Kaisers Konstantin, GCS (Berlin, Akademie-Verlag, 1991) 77.11, both read δι’ἡμῶν whilst Opitz, Athanasius Werke (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1934) Urkunden 17.10 reads δι’ὑμῶν.

Parvis, “Constantine’s Letter”, p.94.

This fact is well-established. C.f. Athanasius, Hist. Ar. (CPG, 2127), 1.4.
adversariis et Eusebio ex Caesarea. “95 Henry Chadwick assumed that this phrase implied Eusebius’ presidency at the synod that deposed Asclepas, whilst Hanson noted that it could refer simply to Eusebius’ presence there.96 Hanson argued that Asclepas may have been deposed on non-theological grounds and, therefore, under Eustathius.97

Socrates’ 347 used to be the most reliable date for Serdica, so Eustathius’ deposition was placed in 330-1.98 However, since the discovery of the Festal Index in 1848, it has become clear that the council of Serdica took place in either 342 or 343.99 Counting inclusively, this places Eustathius’ deposition at the latest between 326 and 327. Chadwick’s 326 date for Eustathius’ deposition is partly dependent on his dating Serdica to 342. Burgess, arguing for 328, suggests that those at Serdica miscounted, but Parvis argues that this is unlikely, especially as they were probably using a fifteen year cycle.100

94 Hilary, Fragmenta Historica (CPL, 436), III (2).11..
95 Ibid, II(1).6(118).
96 Chadwick, “Fall”, p.31, Hanson, “The Fate of Eustathius of Antioch”, ZKG, 95 (1984),”, p.176. Burgess allows Hanson’s point but thinks that the phrase probably did imply presidency in “The Date and Deposition of Eustathius of Antioch”, JTS, 51 (2000)”, p.157. Eduard Schwartz assumes that Eusebius took a leading role but regards it as uncertain that he was the chief presiding figure. He argues, however, that the see of Antioch must at this time have been vacant in his “Geschichte des Athanasius: Von Nicaea bis zu Konstantins Tod”, pp.395-6 = G.S., III, p.224.
97 Hanson, “Fate”, pp.176-177.
99 Sara Parvis examines the evidence extensively, and argues for 343, in her Marcellus, pp.210-17.
100 Burgess, “Date”, p.159, Parvis, Marcellus, p.102.
Chadwick and Timothy Barnes have both argued that Eustathius and Asclepas were deposed simultaneously. \(^{101}\) Burgess conversely suggests that there were two separate councils at Antioch quite close together, and that the first deposed Eustathius and the second deposed Asclepas. \(^{102}\)

Several documents potentially connected to Eusebius of Caesarea’s *Chronici Canones* make references which point to 328 as the date of Eustathius’ deposition. Burgess correspondingly favours 328, largely because of a particular understanding of the interrelation and reliability of these documents.

Firstly, the accession of Eulalius is entered in the *Chronicon miscellaneum ad annum Domini 724 pertinens* (Chron. 724) in the Syriac epitome of Eusebius of Caesarea’s *Chronici Canones*. Eusebius of Caesarea, Philostorgius and Theodoret all write that Paulinus of Tyre succeeded Eustathius and was himself succeeded by Eulalius, after six months. \(^{103}\) Here, it is the first entry after Athanasius’ 328 ordination as bishop and the second before the Dedication Council of Constantinople, May 330. \(^{104}\) Burgess argues that this suggests that it occurred between the two, allowing for another, interceding event, and therefore probably during 328 or possibly 329. Jerome’s Latin translation and continuation of *Chronici Canones*...

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102 Burgess, “Date”, p.158.
Canones says that Eustathius was deposed in the year 22-23 “Constantine”, which would, again, be 328-9.

Burgess was also the first to note that the Syriac Chron. 724 states that Eustathius was bishop for four years. He argues that both Jerome’s Latin translation and the Syriac epitome in Chron. 724 are drawing on a now-lost Greek continuation of Eusebius’ Chronici Canones, completed in Antioch in c350. He dubs this Continuatio Antiochensis and considers it reliable. Parvis seems dubious about the relationship of such a continuation to Jerome or the Syriac epitome and argues that, anyway, it would be less reliable than Serdica’s references to the deposition of Asclepas. Burgess, dating Eustathius’ accession to 325, places his deposition in late 328.

Eduard Schwartz argued for a 326 deposition on the basis of Asterius’ letter in defence of Eusebius of Nicomedia. He argued that Asterius must have written this letter during Eusebius’ exile, which he thinks took place through 325-7. He then noted that this letter refers to Paulinus of Tyre as μακάριος suggesting that he is dead. Schwartz believed that Paulinus succeeded Eustathius and therefore argued that Eustathius must have been deposed in time to allow for Paulinus’ brief episcopate and, therefore, in 326. Hanson objected on two grounds: μακάριος is

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104 Burgess, “Date”, p.154.
106 Parvis, Marcellus, p.102.
107 Eusebius of Caesarea, Contra Marcellum, I.4.17.
not exclusively applied to the deceased, and Asterius probably wrote in defence of Eusebius of Nicomedia after he returned from exile. He argues that Asterius, who sacrificed during the Diocletian persecution, was too cowardly to defend Eusebius whilst Constantine disfavoured Eusebius.  

The Empress Helena’s journey into the eastern empire has also been important in the discussion of Eustathius’ deposition. Helena went to Jerusalem, passing through Antioch, between the deaths of Crispus and Fausta (Constantine’s wife and one of his sons) in the first half of 326 and her own death, in Constantine’s presence, sometime in 327. Athanasius claims that Eustathius was putatively deposed for insulting Helena. Chadwick believed that Helena went on pilgrimage in a show of sorrow for the deaths of Crispus and Fausta and, therefore, in 326. Hanson argued that Constantine would not have permitted his mother to make such a pilgrimage, as it would have looked like a pilgrimage of reparation and consequently caused him further embarrassment over the deaths he was trying to downplay. He therefore concluded that Helena’s pilgrimage must have been rather later, in 327. Conversely, Sara Parvis has argued that, in order for Helena to have returned to Constantinople to die in Constantine’s presence even at the very end of 327, she must have started her pilgrimage in July or August 326.

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109 Hanson, “Fate”, pp.174-5.
110 Helena’s journey is generally described as a pilgrimage, though Drijvers argues otherwise in his *Helena Augusta* (E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1992), pp.55-72.
113 Chadwick, “Fall”, p.33.
114 Hanson, “Fate”, p.177.
The relative order of Eustathius’ deposition and the return of the handful of pro-Arians exiled by Constantine at and shortly after Nicaea has been perhaps the most significant point of disagreement within the wider discussion of the deposition.

Hanson argues that Eusebius’ return predated Eustathius’ deposition on the basis of a fragment from Eustathius’ work on Proverbs 8:22 [D79] which he reads as complaining about the Eusebians having recently gained powerful sees, and which Sara Parvis, conversely, believes to be a description of Nicaea. He also claims that the tone suggests that it was not written by a bishop in exile.115 The text mentions a Eusebius, and Hanson’s thesis is dependent upon the belief it refers to Eusebius of Nicomedia and not Eusebius of Caesarea.116 This is bound up with Hanson’s belief that Eustathius was deposed after Constantine allowed Arius, and subsequently Eusebius of Nicomedia, to return from exile.

Sara Parvis, conversely, sees Eustathius’ deposition as a trigger for Constantine’s ‘pro-Arian’ policies. Her argument is primarily based on Constantine’s letter to Arius, dated 27th November but of uncertain year. The letter asks why Arius has not yet appeared at court as requested. Parvis argues that Constantine must have written a previous letter summoning Arius sufficiently prior to 27th November that he could have expected Arius to have received it and made his

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115 Hanson, “Fate”, p.171, Parvis, Marcellus, pp.81-2 and Hanson, Search, pp.209-210 respectively.
way to court by then. Considering the time it would probably have taken for Arius to receive the letter and travel to court, she surmises that Constantine summoned Arius from exile in September of the same year. She notes that Theognis and Eusebius of Nicomedia petitioned to be allowed to return from exile after Arius had already been readmitted and, arguing that Eusebius was in exile for three years, she concludes that he and Theognis returned in 328. Parvis therefore argues that Constantine corresponded with Arius in 327.117

A number of different reasons have been given for Eustathius’ deposition. Richard Hanson argued that he was deposed for Sabellianism, whilst Williams accepted Athanasius’ claim that he lost his see for “insulting Helena.”118 Sara Parvis rejected this idea, instead picking up Philostorgius’ and Theodoret’s claim that he was deposed on trumped up charges of sexual misconduct – more specifically, for impregnating a young woman, perhaps a prostitute.119 Chadwick and Hanson had previously both roundly rejected this account as too typical of a hagiographical fabrication.120 Parvis, conversely, claims that it would be congruent with Constantine’s dramatic but frequently ill-informed behaviour towards the church. She also notes that it would explain the mysterious and sudden nature of Eustathius’ deposition.

117 Parvis, Marcellus, pp.104-105.
118 Williams, Arius, p.74.
119 Parvis, Marcellus, pp.105-6. Theodoret, H.E. (CPG, 6222), 1.22, Philostorgius, H.E. (CPG, 6032), 2.7, Sozomen alludes to such a report in saying that Eustathius was deposed for bringing the priesthood into disrepute through “unholy deeds.”
120 Chadwick, “Fall”, p.28; Hanson, “Fate”, p.178.
Rowan Williams and Sara Parvis both argue that Eustathius’ deposition was part of a chain of events that caused Constantine to change his mind in favour of the Eusebians, rather than a consequence of Constantine’s change of mind.\textsuperscript{121} This was to develop into a highly significant contour in the historiography: firstly, a position on whether Eustathius’ deposition helped to trigger, or resulted from, Constantine’s change of mind is mutually determining with the interpretation of several other key pieces of evidence about Eustathius’ deposition. Secondly, it has sometimes corresponded to a wider division in scholarly views on the ‘Arian’ controversy. Whilst Hanson does not believe that there was a conspiracy against Eustathius and Alexander’s other allies, Parvis does.

José Declerck’s edition of the entire Eustathian corpus came out in 2002. It included an anti-subordinationist epitome entitled \textit{Contra Ariomanitas et de anima}.\textsuperscript{122}

Following the publication of this new edition, there are many signs of growing interest in Eustathius. Robert Greer and Margaret Mitchell have published a new edition of \textit{Engastrimytho}, together with an English translation, which forms part of a wider study on patristic exegesis of 1 Kingdoms 28.\textsuperscript{123} Though the context of Declerck’s critical edition is doubtless significant, this work continues a trend begun

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\textsuperscript{121} Williams, \textit{Arius}, p.74.  \\
\textsuperscript{122} Declerck, \textit{Eustathii}. For Declerck’s discussion of the epitome, see especially pp. CLIV-CLXXXI. This is discussed in detail in chapter 2.  \\
\textsuperscript{123} Robert Greer and Margaret Mitchell, \textit{The Belly-Myther of Endor: interpretations of 1 Kingdoms 28 in the Early Church} (Atlanta, Society of Biblical literature, 2006).
\end{flushleft}
before Declerck’s publication in its obvious interest in Eustathius as a figure within the history of Christian exegesis, and in the Witch of Endor text.

Sara Parvis reopened, though did not develop, the question of Eustathius’ relationship to the ‘Asia Minor’ tradition in her monograph on Marcellus of Ancyra. In particular, she noted parallels between Eustathius’ conception of the image of God and that in both Marcellus and Irenaeus. She also suggested that Marcellus and Eustathius had a very similar doctrine of God, but that, although they can both, in different ways, be accused of proto-Nestorianism, Marcellus also has some strong similarities with Athanasius, lacking in Eustathius.

A series of articles on Eustathius has also followed Declerck’s publication. The Jesuit scholar Patricio de Navascués considered the philosophical currents in Eustathius’ thought. He argued that Eustathius was significantly at odds with both Platonism and Stoicism but had much in common with Aristotelianism, particularly Aristotelianism of a Stoicised form.

Subsequently, Kelley Spoerl has written two articles on Eustathius. The first compares the doctrine of God and Christology in Eustathius and Marcellus.

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124 Parvis, Marcellus, pp.57-60.
125 Ibid, p.58.
Spoerl’s point of comparison is determined more by the two thinkers’ putatively extreme position with the Nicene alliance, than by any potential connection with Irenaeus, and an older ‘Asia Minor’ or ‘Antiochene’ tradition. Spoerl argues that Eustathius and Marcellus were closer in Christology than in Trinitarian doctrine, nearly the reverse of the position more tentatively suggested by Sara Parvis. Spoerl’s second article explicates Eustathius’ physiology in a particularly opaque fragment from the new epitome of Contra Ariomanitas. She argues that Eustathius has a broadly Aristotelian physiology and links the soul particularly with the heart. I myself have recently written two articles on Eustathius, the first examining the disembodied soul between death and resurrection, and the second comparing his theology of the image of God with that found in Marcellus of Ancyra and Irenaeus of Lyons.

For a long time, Eustathius did not receive the attention that his place in the Constantinian church and his role in the early ‘Arian’ controversy merits. This was due in large part to the scarcity and fragmented nature of the sources, as is attested to by the comparably greater attention paid to the components of his corpus. The discovery of the epitomised Contra Ariomanitas et de anima provides a fresh opportunity. The work of Spoerl and Navascués begins to avail itself of the new opportunity to examine Eustathius’ relationship to Hellenic thought provided by our

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128 The fragment in question is D4. All references to the fragments are according to the edition of Declerck.

clearer understanding of his *Contra Ariomanitas*. The new epitome of such a major work provides fresh and exciting opportunities for further research on Eustathius of Antioch.

**Methodology**

The aim of this thesis is historical, and, therefore, so is the methodology. My purpose is to describe Eustathius’ conception of the human person, which is a piece of intellectual history, so my task is partly exegetical. The reconstruction of historical circumstance is also involved, in order to appreciate the historical context of Eustathius’ thought.

The fragmented nature of Eustathius’ extant corpus renders the exegesis of his writings especially problematic. This has shaped my approach to the sources in various ways. Firstly, I am extremely cautious about drawing any conclusions from omission. Secondly, with regards to the epitome, it is necessary to be aware that the wording is unreliable. Thirdly, I cautiously use *Engastrimytho* to clarify Eustathius’ other writings.

This thesis addresses a range of questions within anthropology. Some of them – such as the relationship between the body and the soul – are treated extensively and explicitly within Eustathius’ extant corpus. Others – such as soteriology and eschatology, are alluded to, but never treated fully. In the latter case, more extrapolation and reconstruction is required.
When reconstructing someone’s thought, the category ‘fact’ acts in a particular way. The fact sought is the author’s meaning. However, in many cases, even the author might not be able to expand on his or her comments without altering their sense slightly. The question “what did x think?” has an objective answer, but its objectivity is one that we can never fully grasp. It is possible to answer this question, but only approximately. One is trying to reconstruct an imaginative world. Historical context is partly collective; however, it is also, inevitably, partly personal.

One of the key questions that arises in intellectual history is how far it is useful to ask different questions about an author’s work than they themselves have asked. On one hand, asking questions that had not occurred to the author might suggest a failure to understand the author. On the other, it is not clear that asking the same questions that the author is asking elucidates his or her thought at all. I assume that it is meaningful, and useful, to ask questions that an author may not have asked. It is, nonetheless, also possible to frame questions in a way, or rely on assumptions, that suppose a different worldview to Eustathius’.

There are two mutually supporting components of the descriptive task that is key to intellectual history. The first is empathetic. We try to get inside the head of the author in question and to think in his or her terms. The second is expressive. If we were only to speak in the words of the author in question, this would be merely transcriptive; it would not elucidate, and could not communicate, the author’s ideas.
We must put the author’s ideas into new language, not because we wish to “shed the illusions of the epoch” or, indeed, those of the individual, but because we wish to understand them.\textsuperscript{130} We do this, to some degree, necessarily, whenever we read. Translation is interpretative. Correspondingly, so is listening, so is reading. We are more likely to describe well if we acknowledge that description involves this expressive externality.

It is not my intention to assess the value of Eustathius’ theological anthropology. Nonetheless, it is impossible entirely to divorce a description of a concept from an opinion of its worth, and a description that tries to do so entirely has a tendency to be less descriptive. I do not attempt to expunge my descriptions of assessments of their worth, and do on occasion explicitly acknowledge my value-judgements.

Partly, here, I am filling in the gaps left by the fragmentation of the corpus. This fragmentation poses problems in the reconstruction of Eustathius’ thought. His extant writings contain many ideas which, on the face of it, logically contradict each other but, because the corpus is so fragmented, it is difficult to establish whether these are genuine contradictions, or whether Eustathius elsewhere offers syntheses. This problem is further compounded by Eustathius’ exegetical method (which will be discussed in more detail in both chapter 2 and chapter 5). He often takes two or

more apparently contradictory passages, exegetes them individually, and then offers an overall synthesis. Occasionally, it is unclear whether we have a contradictory opinion from Eustathius, or one half of this exegetical method.

_Engastrimytho_ is a good bench-mark here, though it must be allowed that Eustathius expressed different ideas in different works, and developed his ideas and changed his mind over time. The epitome of _Ariomanitas_ can also help us in elucidating the rest of Eustathius’ corpus, because its purpose is to summarise the work of Eustathius. If anything, the epitomiser would gloss over uncomfortable contradictions, rather than accentuating them. Furthermore, the epitomiser had before him the original Eustathian text, and wished to convey its meaning. Although we have someone else’s interpretation of Eustathius in the epitome, we have an attempt to give us a sense of the whole text, from someone who was aware of it. Both _Engastrimytho_ and the epitome of _Ariomanitas_ show us an eclectic thinker who drew on a wide range of thought systems and ideas in forming his arguments, and tended to worry about the consistency of details when it related to the immediate arguments he was making. He stands in the middle of many intellectual cultures and his life spans the period when the Christian Church went from being an illegal, and persecuted, sect to the religion favoured by the emperor. Eustathius’ thought in many ways resembles a collage.

This thesis is very concerned with Eustathius’ engagement with Hellenic philosophy, which, I argue, is profound but highly complex. Patristic scholarship has
a somewhat dubious history when it comes to considering the influence of Hellenism on Christianity, often constructing a highly problematic, and reductive, Biblicist-philosophical divide. I avoid doing this, partly because it risks denying the Greco-Roman context of the New Testament and partly because it fails to appreciate the necessary process of interpretation in reading a text. If certain axioms of one’s worldview are Hellenic, this will impact one’s interpretation of the bible, even if one honestly intends to take one’s definitions of the world from scripture.\textsuperscript{131} Equally, expressing Christian dogma in philosophical language does not necessarily subordinate the dogma to the philosophy, but can reinterpret and reinvigorate it in a novel, Christian, direction. Philosophy can be used to focus on scripture as the foundational imaginative and conceptual resource.\textsuperscript{132} It is, additionally, difficult to categorise particular schools, because of their frequent interpenetration. This thesis identifies various strands and trajectories within late antique philosophy, without concerning itself with their ultimate origins.

Eustathius himself is not a devotee of any philosophical school, but is heavily indebted to Aristotle. He actively attacks Plato, but nonetheless assumes many ideas that were typical in many manifestations of late antique Platonism in constructing his own theology. He follows in a much broader late antique tradition in synthesising

\textsuperscript{131} For example, see my discussion on Eustathius in Germanic scholarship, above.  
\textsuperscript{132} This understanding of patristic attitudes to scripture draws on Ayres, \textit{Nicaea}, p.39: \textquotedblleft We might think of scripture in the fourth century as the fundamental resource for the Christian imagination.\textquotedblright
certain aspects of Aristotle and Plato, though the result is, at certain points, highly unusual.\textsuperscript{133}

My treatment of Origen’s legacy requires a note. Origen was a prolific writer and highly complex thinker who delighted in speculation. His most controversial work, \textit{De Principiis}, is not extant in anything close to its original form.\textsuperscript{134} It is, consequently, notoriously difficult to establish the original contents of Origen’s corpus, and even more difficult to establish which of the ideas expressed within it Origen held as dogma. He is perhaps best known for doctrines that it is not clear that he espoused, such as the transmigration of souls.\textsuperscript{135}

Much of Origen’s legacy is shorn of the most controversial metaphysical claims attributed to him, and we must appreciate this if we are to appreciate the distorted mark of Origenism on Eustathius. Nonetheless, the controversial aspects of Origen’s thought are also important for understanding his legacy, and more particularly the reaction against it, for two reasons. Firstly, where he refers explicitly to Origen, Eustathius is not engaging generously. Secondly, the unusual areas of Origen’s thought elucidate the rest of it; one is more likely to venture a circumspect suggestion if it makes sense, and if is useful in solving otherwise intractable

\textsuperscript{133} There are occasional suggestions that Eustathius’ preference for Aristotelian over Platonic anthropology might in fact owe something to a Syrian influence. I have noted these suggestions where they occur, but Eustathius is very much a Hellenic thinker.

\textsuperscript{134} It is preserved primarily in two Latin translations, one by Jerome and the other by Rufinus. For an overview of Origen’s corpus, c.f. \textit{Origen}, trans. Worrall, A.S. (Edinburgh, T and T Clark, 1989), pp.37-49, esp. 45-7 for \textit{De Princ.} (CPG, 1482)

\textsuperscript{135} Crouzel, ibid and Mark Edwards, \textit{Origen against Plato} (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2002) have both questioned Origen’s adherence to those elements of Platonism most problematic for Christianity.
conceptual problems. When I refer to ‘Origenism’, I am not seeking to weigh into or adjudicate discussions about which aspects of Origen’s legacy do him justice, but simply to denote that legacy.

Eustathius is repeatedly critical of Origenism, but is also influenced by it. He engages a great deal with Methodius’ critique of Origenism. This has recently been shown to be more complex, and less consistently negative, than was once supposed.\textsuperscript{136} The complexity of Methodius’ treatment of Origen is partly reflected in Origenist echoes in Eustathius’ anthropology. However, Eustathius himself interprets Methodius deliberately in an anti-Origenist way. Nor are all Origenist aspects of his theology shared with Methodius. He places himself in an anti-Origenist tradition with Methodius, but negotiates both thinkers independently.

Summary

Chapter 1 sets out the details of Eustathius’ life, focusing especially on his time at Antioch, and the controversial events surrounding his accession to and deposition from the See of Antioch. Chapter 2 discusses the available sources for Eustathius. It establishes the parameters of Eustathius’ corpus and describes the scope, purpose and context of his extant works.

Chapter 3 examines the relationship between the body and the soul in Eustathius’ thought. It argues that Eustathius emphasises the interrelation of body and soul in human identity and experience, whilst sharply distinguishing them as substances. This echoes certain key aspects of Platonised-Aristotelianism, specifically in suggesting a hylomorphic body-soul dualism. Eustathius deploys Aristotelianism in constructing an anthropological ontology that owes much to Irenaeus and Methodius of Olympus, but also refers to the soul, and its relationship to God, in ways that echo Origen. It is also argued that Eustathius emphasises the passibility of the soul, explaining human emotional experience in terms of his integrated anthropological ontology, and depicting sorrow as a proper aspect of human experience.

Chapter 4 examines the image of God in Eustathius’ thought, and identifies three main strands. Firstly, echoing Origen, Eustathius clearly distinguishes between humanity and Christ *qua* image and the eternal Son *qua* image, maintaining a sharp disjunction between God and humanity within the metaphysical framework of the ‘Arian’ controversy. Secondly, Eustathius’ image theology has an important soteriological dimension that invokes a parallel between Adam and Christ, and sees eschatological humanity as conformed to Christ. Thirdly, in locating the image of God at least partly in the human body, Eustathius emphasises the physical nature of human beings. There is also a suggestion that the image is visible, but incomplete, without the soul, echoing the hylomorphic dualism identified in the last chapter.
Chapter 5 examines Eustathius’ soteriology, partly drawing on the discourse about Adam and Christ parallelism in chapter 4. It argues that Eustathius has a strong sense of the lapsarian nature of the current human condition, which he conceives of in both existential terms – mortality, corruptibility, and inherited predisposition to sin, and circumstantial terms – slavery to the devil. This latter is tied in with a belief that the current world order in many ways limits and constrains our freedom. Correspondingly, Eustathius’ discourse on slavery to the devil reflects his observation of power in the Roman Empire, though it does not draw a direct parallel between the two. Eustathius’ also has a strong sense of the individual’s guilt before God and need for forgiveness, which features primarily in his discourse on Christ’s death. This chapter argues that the disparate strands of Eustathius’ soteriology meet in the concept of Christ as typical and archetypal human being.

Chapter 6 examines free will in Eustathius’ thought. It identifies in Eustathius two interrelated, and mutually qualifying, concepts of human free will: the liberty of indifference and freedom to discern and intend to carry out the right course of action. Eustathius identifies ultimate and total freedom with the latter. He believes that human freedom was hugely constrained by the lapse, but not entirely removed; currently, we are trapped, but have sufficient free will to ask for God’s help. His conception of ultimate freedom draws on common currents in both pagan philosophy and patristic thought, and is anthropologically optimistic, in that it assumes that human nature, as such, is good.
Chapter 7 examines Eustathius’ eschatology, drawing together various strands from previous chapters. It argues that Eustathius believed that Christ would reign over an earthly kingdom, commensurable to but vastly superior to the Roman Empire. This locates ultimate human identity in current identity and emphasises the importance of the current life. It also acts as a challenge and a foil to the current life, and reveals present manifestations of human society and government to be deficient. This chapter then considers Eustathius’ view of eschatological judgement. It observes a tension between a picture of universal salvation and one of divisive judgement, and argues that Eustathius did not believe in universal salvation, but that his soteriological system lends itself to this idea nonetheless.

This thesis fills a major gap in scholarship by offering badly needed fresh research into a key figure in the early fourth-century church. In certain ways, my claim that anthropology is important to Eustathius, and my analysis of the soteriological role of Christ’s humanity in his thought revive important strands in older Germanic scholarship, particularly that of Friedrich Zoepfl. It also offers an original picture of Eustathius’ anthropology qua anthropology, drawing heavily on the epitome of Ariomanitas, and therefore on a source that was unavailable to previous scholarship. In doing so, it opens a new window onto the conception of the human person in the philosophically and politically tumultuous earlier fourth century. This is an especially interesting picture because of Eustathius’ eclectic intellectual outlook.
Chapter 1: Eustathius’ life

Most of Eustathius’ life prior to the outbreak of the ‘Arian’ controversy is shrouded in mystery. A handful of facts can be pieced together from various ancient sources, chief among which are the writings of Athanasius, Jerome and Theodoret of Cyrus.137

Eustathius was from Side, a harbour town in Pamphylia.138 He was evidently highly educated. Not only does he have a classicising writing style, but he was at least reasonably familiar with Greek philosophy and medicine.139 His parents’ religious affiliation is unknown.

Eustathius was probably a confessor under either Diocletian or his successors, or, at any rate, was at some point arrested.140 Evidently, he became bishop of Beroea

138 Jerome, De Viris Illustribus (CPL, 616), 85.
139 Eustathius sometimes seems to be drawing on other patristic sources for his knowledge of the philosophers. See discussion in chapter 2.
140 Athanasius, Hist. Ar. (CPG, 2127), 4 and Apologia, (CPG, 2122), 3, and Theodoret (c.f. Eranistes, CPG, 6217, 1.33) both refer to him as such. Admittedly, Theodoret’s source may have been Athanasius; when introducing fragments from Eustathius, he writes that they are ὁμολογητοῦ, but he never discusses the status he accords to Eustathius, so there is little from which to address his sources. Jerome never writes that Eustathius is a confessor, which seems like an odd omission given that he writes relatively extensively, and always positively, of Eustathius. However, Athanasius’ testimony is in this case reliable, despite the fact that he was keen to present his ally in a positive light. As a contemporary of Eustathius, not only would Athanasius be likely to know whether Eustathius was a
before the outbreak of the ‘Arian’ controversy as, according to Theodoret, Eustathius received Alexander’s letter about Arius, *He Philarchos*, whilst bishop there.\textsuperscript{141} The date of *He Philarchos* would therefore help to give some shape to his later career. There has been much disagreement about this, which is closely connected to the debate about exactly when the controversy broke out, and a corresponding disagreement about its nature. The discussion is well-known and there is little need to go over old ground here. Sara Parvis has provided the most recent summary of the historiography of the outbreak, and of the relevant evidence.\textsuperscript{142} The key points are as follows.

Hans-Georg Opitz claimed that the argument began in 318, arguing that it started suddenly but developed slowly.\textsuperscript{143} Schwartz subsequently argued that the outbreak, which took some building up to, didn’t happen until 324 and that the disagreement then progressed very quickly.\textsuperscript{144} Schwartz’s argument relies on his belief that Constantine did not defeat Licinius until 323; he thought that the entire controversy must have taken place after Licinius’ ban on the meeting of synods had been lifted. In placing Licinius’ defeat in 323, he allowed the maximum time for the confessor, but he was writing for others who would know, including his opponents. He was writing in a context that was still keenly conscious of the persecutions under Diocletian and Licinius. Bad behaviour during the persecutions was often dredged up during the ‘Arian’ controversy. So, for example, Athanasius rather cruelly refers to “Asterius the sacrificer”, because Asterius sacrificed to the gods during the persecution in *De Decretis* (CPG, 2120), 8. Admittedly, *Hist. Ar.* was written after most who had suffered in the persecution were dead, but it was still, just, an event within living memory, and certainly one about which the current generation were well-informed. Had Athanasius lied about Eustathius’ confessor status, he would have risked this being pointed out by one of his opponents.

\textsuperscript{141} Theodoret, *H.E.* (CPG, 6222), 1.3.
\textsuperscript{142} Parvis, *Marcellus*, pp.68-75.
\textsuperscript{143} Opitz, “Die Zeitfolge des arianischen Streits von den Anfängen bis zum Jahre 328”, *ZNW* 33 (1934), 131-59.
necessary events predating Nicaea to have occurred within these parameters.\textsuperscript{145} Rowan Williams has posited 321.\textsuperscript{146} Parvis, whilst acknowledging that Williams’ suggestion is reasonable, argues for 322, following Schwartz’s assumption that one must allot the shortest time possible to the events between the outbreak of the controversy and the Council of Nicaea.\textsuperscript{147} She then argues that \textit{He Philarchos} and Alexander’s other letter to all bishops, \textit{Henos Somatos}, were written and dispatched simultaneously, and were versions of the same letter (one need not, in that case, allow time for both of them). It is clear that \textit{He Philarchos} was written in either 321 or 322, and that we can therefore safely assume that Eustathius was bishop of Beroea by then.

Very little is known about Eustathius’ time as bishop of Beroea. Trigg has described him as a “rising star” in the decade after the end of the ‘Great Persecution’, and the little available evidence seems to commend this picture.\textsuperscript{148} Despite Alexander’s very different theological leanings, Eustathius received \textit{He Philarchos} and Alexander also requested that he write to him on the subject of Melchizedek.\textsuperscript{149}

Eustathius’ theological context prior to the outbreak of the ‘Arian’ controversy bears the mark of Asia Minor and Antioch, and, explicitly, anti-

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\textsuperscript{145} Later, Schwartz decided that Licinius’ defeat must have happened in 324, after all. C.f. “Von Nicaea bis zu Konstantins Tod”, p.370 = GS III, p.191, note 1.
\textsuperscript{146} Williams, \textit{Arius}, pp.48-61.
\textsuperscript{147} Parvis, \textit{Marcellus}, pp.68-75.
\textsuperscript{148} Trigg, “Eustathius of Antioch’s attack on Origen”, p.220. This coheres with the pictures of both Burn and Cavallera, who see him as an almost uniquely important churchman during the Nicene Controversy. See introduction.
\textsuperscript{149} See discussion of \textit{In Melchisedek} in chapter 2.
Origenism. Eustathius was evidently a great admirer of Methodius of Olympus, to whom he refers in glowing terms in *Engastrimytho Contra Origenem*. This indicates a pre-existing disagreement with Eusebius of Caesarea, who wrote warmly of Origen and was to be one of Eustathius’ particular antagonists during the ‘Arian’ controversy.

A prior connection with key members of what was to become the anti-Arian alliance at Nicaea is also evident. Eustathius was clearly on good terms, and in anti-Origenist cahoots, with Eutropius of Adrianople, as he wrote *Engastrimytho Contra Origenem* at the request of Eutropius, who had complained that he found Origen’s interpretation inadequate. Eutropius is named by Athanasius as having been deposed because he disagreed with Eusebius of Nicomedia. Furthermore, in his attachment to theologians from Asia Minor, Eustathius apparently follows earlier bishops of Antioch. For example, Vitalis, Philogonius’ predecessor at Antioch, attended the Council of Ancyra in 314, and was the only bishop outside of Asia Minor to do so.

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150 *Engastrimytho*, 22.5. This work will be discussed in chapter 2. Lloyd Patterson has argued, somewhat persuasively, that Methodius was in fact influenced by Origen in many important respects, in his *Methodius of Olympus: divine sovereignty, human freedom and life in Christ* (Washington D.C., Catholic University of America Press, 1997), p.123 and pp.136-7. As will become apparent, this is also true of Eustathius, in different ways. See especially my discussion of the soul of Christ in chapter 3.

151 See below.


153 *Hist. Ar.* (CPG, 2127), 5.

Accession to Antioch

The See of Antioch was clearly already pitted against the pro-Arian cause prior to Eustathius’ accession, as Arians names Philogonius of Antioch as one of his opponents, despite claiming widespread support from Eastern bishops. However, the city of Antioch evidently hosted theological diversity on this point; Paul Parvis’ argument about episcopal succession at Antioch is very persuasive, as it accounts for the chronological confusion of the bishops, explaining why Paulinus is sometimes listed as Eustathius’ successor, sometimes as his predecessor. According to the pro-Arian faction at Antioch, Paulinus had been bishop there since Philogonius’ death but, according to the anti-Arian faction and the imperial administration, he was not bishop of Antioch until Eustathius’ deposition. Eustathius acceded to Antioch as the intended champion of anti-Arian theology.

The Council of Antioch 324

The creed produced at Antioch was strongly anti-subordinationist. Sara Parvis notes both its similarity with *He Philarchos* and its dissimilarity with the Creed of Nicaea 325. Eustathius’ involvement in this council shows him to have been highly important on the anti-Arian side of the controversy from a relatively early stage, vindicating Cavallera’s picture of him as a major player in the Constantinian Church.

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155 In a letter to Eusebius of Nicomedia, for which, see Theodoret, *H.E.* (CPG, 6222), 1.4.
156 Parvis, *Marcellus*, p.78.
The Council of Nicaea

Relatively little is known about Eustathius’ role at Nicaea. Hanson argues that Eustathius was responsible for the inclusion of the term ὁμοόυσιος in the creed, and that he pressured the reluctant Alexander on this point. Parvis notes the absence of the term ὁμοόυσιος in the creed produced at the Council of Antioch, and argues that this undermines Hanson’s suggestion. It remains possible that Eustathius conceived of the usefulness of the term ὁμοόυσιος between Antioch and Nicaea. However, there is no mention of it in his anti-Arian writings, which would be surprising if he were its champion, particularly because he does refer to his opponents’ failure to adhere to Nicaea. It is therefore unlikely that ὁμοόυσιος was Eustathius’ idea.

As observed in the introduction, Parvis identifies a Eustathian fragment as containing a description of Nicaea. The fragment in question is from Eustathius’ In Proverbia 8.22 and is preserved in Theodoret’s Historia Ecclesiastica [D79]. It is, unfortunately, extremely ambiguous, and Hanson has read it as referring to anti-‘Nicene’ intrigue several years after Nicaea. Here is the Greek text:

[Ὡ]ς δὲ ἐξητεύτω τῆς πίστεως ὁ τρόπος, ἐναργής μὲν ἔλεγχος τὸ γράμμα τῆς Εὐσεβίου προσβάλλετο βλασφημίας. Ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ ἀναγνωσθὲν, αὐτίκα συμφοράν μὲν ἀστάθμητον τῆς ἐκτροπῆς ἕνακ τός αὐτήκοις προμέχετο, αἰσχύνην δὲ ἀνήκεστον τῷ γράμματι παρεῖχαν. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὸ ἐργαστήριον τῶν ἀμφὶ τὸν Εὐσεβίου σαφῶς ἐάλω, τὸν παρανόμου γράμματος διαρραγέντος ὑπ’ ὅψει πάντων ὁμοῦ τινες ἐκ συσκευῆς, τοῦνομα προβαλλόμενον τῆς εἰρήνης, κατεσίγησαν μὲν ἀπαντᾶς τοῖς ἄριστα λέγειν εἰσοδότας. Οἱ δὲ Ἀρειομανῖται δεῖσαντες μὴ πῇ ἀρα τοσαύτης ἐν ταῦτῃ συνόδῳ συγκεκριμένης ἐξοστρακισθεῖν, ἀναθεματίζουσι μὲν προσηδόσαντες τὸ

157 Hanson, The Search, pp.171-2.
158 Parvis, Marcellus, p.80.
159 D6:3-5 [Ariomanitas].
Hanson argues that Eustathius wrote this after the start of the ‘Arian purge’ but whilst he was still in his see. This reading relies on rendering the phrase προεδριῶν…κρατήσαντες as “now that they have gained control of the leading position.”

Sara Parvis, however, reads it as referring back to Nicaea: “having held onto their seats.” She sees this as evidence that Eustathius was disappointed with the outcome of Nicaea.

Parvis’ reading of this fragment is more probable than Hanson’s, though its translation is highly problematic. Although Hanson’s translation of κρατέω as “to gain control” is perfectly plausible, κρατέω can also mean “hold onto” in the sense of “retain.” Whilst προεδρια can refer to a privileged position, it can also refer to a leading ecclesiastical office. Given that the context in this fragment is an ecclesiastical council, the latter does seem somewhat more likely. It is therefore equally possible to translate the phrase, as Parvis does, “after they had held onto their seats.” That Eustathius was less than happy about Constantine’s new role in the

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161 Hanson, “Fate”, 171-4.
162 Parvis, Marcellus, pp.81-2.
163 Ibid, p.82. It would also be possible to translate the phrase “having held onto the leading position”, which would suggest an even greater degree of frustration with Nicaea than Parvis argues for. However, given that Arius was exiled at Nicaea and Eusebius of Nicomedia shortly afterwards, and Eusebius of Caesarea was, at least, forced to sign up to Nicaea, this is not as plausible. Timothy Barnes opts for the translation “having gained their position as bishops” whilst noting as possible the rendering which Parvis was later to choose in his article, “Emperor and Bishops”, p.58.
church at the time of writing D79 is further implied by the claim that his opponents ἐκκλίνουσι τοὺς ἐφόρους. Timothy Barnes renders this phrase “they corrupt the secular rulers”, arguing that ἐκκλίνουσι cannot plausibly mean “to avoid.” This seems to me most probably correct; otherwise the text suggests that the secular rulers are trying to get the bishops, and failing, and it is not clear how this could be the case. I also follow this reading in part because I believe that Eustathius’ deposition must be seen as a trigger for Constantine’s change of mind, rather than a consequence of it, as I argue below.

Furthermore, Eustathius elsewhere expresses frustration at what he perceives as his opponents’ duplicity in signing up to Nicaea and then teaching against its theology: in Ariomanitas, he writes that “if [they say that the Word]…is susceptible to passions, they anathematise themselves, because they have denied his immutability in writing, in public and also in private, after having agreed to it in the assembly.” In this passage, Eustathius seems to have the impression that Nicaea failed to bring the pro-Arians in line, very much cohering with a sense that they kept hold of their seats when they should have lost them. The evidence suggests that Eustathius was frustrated with the pro-Arians’ continued place in the church, and that he blamed the attempt to compromise at Nicaea for this.

164 Barnes, “Emperor and Bishops”, p.58, text and note 40.
165 D6:3-5 [Ariomanitas].
166 Klaus Seibt, Die Theologie des Markell von Ankyra, Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte 59 (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1994), esp. p.241, has argued, in a different vein, that Marcellus of Ancyra, Eustathius’ ally in the ‘Arian’ Controversy, had a close friendship with Constantine. This seems at best overplayed and highly speculative, largely because there was relatively little opportunity for the two men to spend time together. Furthermore, one could partially accept Seibt’s thesis and still believe that this close relationship came crashing down at Nicaea, precisely because of Constantine’s role in Nicaea’s compromise position.
Deposition

I argue that Eustathius was deposed in 327 and follow Paul Parvis in arguing that Eustathius’ deposition was closely connected to a fracas during Helena’s visit to Antioch.\(^{167}\) I suggest the Helena’s pro-Arian theological leanings may have had a part to play in the events at Antioch during her visit.

Let us examine Hanson’s claim that Asclepas was deposed under Eustathius. This is very unlikely. In his *Historia Arianorum*, Athanasius lists Asclepas among those deposed by pro-Arian intrigue.\(^{168}\) It would be unproblematic, in itself, to dismiss Athanasius’ claim, since he was keen to construct a narrative of persecuted orthodoxy.\(^{169}\) Nonetheless, as a Eustathian ally during the ‘Arian’ crisis, it is very unlikely that Asclepas would have been deposed at Antioch whilst Eustathius was bishop. Considering Western Serdica’s claim that Asclepas was deposed *praesentibus adversaries et Eusebio ex Caesarea*, it is clear that Eusebius of Caesarea would not have presided over a synod there whilst Eustathius was bishop. The two men were fierce rivals, engaged in a pamphlet war and, anyway, why wouldn’t the resident bishop of Antioch preside over a synod at Antioch?\(^{170}\) Whether Eusebius presided at Asclepas’ deposition or not, we can assume that Eustathius was deposed either at the same time as or before Asclepas and, therefore,

\(^{167}\) Throughout this discussion, I refer to the wider historiography of Eustathius’ deposition, surveyed in the introduction.

\(^{168}\) Athanasius, *Hist. Ar.* (CPG, 2127), 4-5.

\(^{169}\) There has been considerable recent discussion on Athanasius’ narrative construction of ‘Arianism.’ David M. Gwynn has traced Athanasius’ construction of the pro-Arian group as an “Arian party” in his *The Eusebians* (Oxford, OUP, 2006), pp.51-99. I discuss Eustathius’ construction of his theological opponents in chapter 2.

\(^{170}\) Socrates, *H.E.*, 1.23.6-8 (CPG here and Sozomen, *H.E.* (CPG, 6030), 2.18.3-4 both write that Eustathius and Eusebius engaged in a pamphlet war.
that seventeen years prior to Serdica is the latest possible date for his deposition. Sara Parvis has persuasively demonstrated that 343 is the correct date of Serdica.\footnote{Parvis, \textit{Marcellus}, pp.210-17.}

Counting inclusively, seventeen years before Serdica is therefore 327.

Eustathius was almost certainly deposed before Asclepas. Burgess’ argument that Eustathius and Asclepas were deposed in two successive synods is convincing: Athanasius mentions both Eustathius and Asclepas as victims of the ‘Arian purge’, but he names Eustathius as one of the first to fall whilst referring to Asclepas separately later in the narrative.\footnote{Athanasius, \textit{Hist. Ar.} (CPG, 2127), 4.4 and 5.} Athanasius was in a good position to know about the relative order of these depositions, and had little motive to misrepresent it. According to Philostorgius, Eustathius was deposed by a synod at Nicomedia.\footnote{Philostorgius, \textit{H.E.} (CPG, 6032), 2.7.}

This is unlikely, as all the other church historians more plausibly report that he was deposed at Antioch.\footnote{} However, it does further undermine the connection between Eustathius’ deposition and Asclepas’. As Williams notes, twice-yearly provincial synods were by now prescribed, so it is not necessary to seek out large-scale councils as possible occasions for each deposition.\footnote{} Plausibly, Eustathius, a ring-leader and therefore \textit{de facto} protector of the politically weaker Asclepas, was removed, leaving Asclepas vulnerable. If the two were deposed at separate synods, Eustathius was deposed more than seventeen years before Serdica, which suggests he was deposed in either 326 or 327 but, as I argue shortly, 326 is too early for a number of other reasons.
Chron. 724, though cited by Burgess as evidence that Eustathius was deposed in 328, in fact rather more suggests that he was deposed in 327 if one works on the basis that Eustathius became bishop in early 324 and that Paulinus was recognised as bishop of Antioch for the period between Eustathius’ deposition and Eulalius’ succession. Even in this case, though, early 328 remains a possibility.

As we have seen, the author of Chron. 724 enters Eulalius’ accession directly after Athanasius’ 328 ordination to the episcopate. Burgess thinks that this suggests 328 because he believes that Paulinus preceded Eustathius, and therefore does not allow time for Paulinus’ episcopate before Eulalius’ succession. (Burgess takes Paulinus to have been bishop for six or seven months, following Chron. 724). However, if Paulinus was, in fact, a rival bishop alongside Eustathius, and then officially and widely recognised on Eustathius’ deposition, we must allow time for his ‘official’ episcopate in between Eustathius and Eulalius, which takes us more plausibly to 327 than 328.

Chron. 724’s claim that Eustathius was bishop for four years is, as Burgess asserts, a valuable piece of evidence, but its signification is determined by the date of Eustathius’ accession. It is certain that Eustathius was appointed to Antioch shortly before Nicaea, and therefore, a four-year occupancy places his deposition at 327-9.

175 Williams, Arius, p.73.
It immediately rules out Henry Chadwick’s very early date of 326 and the once-conventional 330/1 supported (for reasons other than the conventional ones) by Richard Hanson. More, specifically, if we place Eustathius’ accession at 324, it leaves us with 327.176

So, the evidence of Serdica points to 327 whilst most of the manuscripts surrounding Chronici Canones suggest 327 but also permit early 328.

Burgess offers another reference in support of 328-9: pseudo-Dionysius of Tel-Mahre, which may or may not have been dependent on Continuatio Antiochensis, dates Eustathius’ deposition to 640 of the Seleucid era. This would be 24 “Constantine”, or 1 October 328 to 30 September 329. Rubric 7 of Chron. 724 gives the same date. However, the list containing this date confuses Eustathius of Sebaste with Eustathius of Antioch. Burgess, bizarrely, sees this as improving the reliability of its evidence because it shows that the given date does not derive from a chronicle.177 Unfortunately, it also shows that whatever source the date did derive from is unreliable. Serdica is a more reliable witness.

It is necessary to examine the two pieces of evidence favouring 326 and 330 respectively. As observed in the introduction, Schwartz argues for the former,

176 Correspondingly, Sara Parvis, amending the date of Eustathius’ accession to early 324 and counting inclusively, sees a four-year episcopate as suggesting a deposition in early 327-8 in Marcellus, p.103.
177 Burgess, “Date”, p.155.
Hanson the latter, both on the basis of Asterius’ letter in defence of Eusebius of Nicomedia. Hanson’s claim that Asterius did not write in defence of the exiled Eusebius is weak; he constructs an entire moral character for Asterius from an instance of weakness under immense pressure. Nonetheless, he is right to note that the reference to Paulinus as μακάριος does not necessarily mean that he was dead at the time of writing. There is little concrete evidence, then, for 326.

The evidence in favour of 330/1 is found in Theodoret, who claims that Meletius’ exile occurred thirty years after Eustathius’ deposition. Meletius’ exile was conventionally dated to 361 but 360 is now the accepted date. Either way it jars with the other evidence. Burgess plausibly supposes that thirty was simply a “round figure.” Theodoret’s claim is, anyway, insufficient to outweigh the evidence of Serdica.

Athanasius’ claim that Eustathius was deposed for insulting Helena suggests at least a temporal connection between her journey East and his deposition. It is a rather specific claim, and therefore Athanasius’ reference implies that it was at least plausible; Helena almost certainly met Eustathius, and he was most probably deposed shortly afterwards. Sara Parvis is right to note that Helena must have started her journey in July or August 326, in order to be back with Constantine, to die in his presence, even by the end of 327.
Seeing Eustathius’ deposition as a trigger for Constantine’s change of mind, as Parvis does, becomes problematic if we accept that Eustathius was still bishop when Eusebius of Nicomedia returned. Sozomen, Socrates and Theodoret all place Eusebius’ return before Eustathius’ deposition.\textsuperscript{180} However, Parvis offers persuasive arguments against their reliability. She notes that Socrates confesses that his claim is based on inference from Eusebius’ \textit{Vita Constantini} on which, she argues, Sozomen also relies.\textsuperscript{181} She further argues that Theodoret’s chronology of these events is evidently confused as he refers to Eusebius as bishop of Constantinople at the time of Eustathius’ deposition, despite the fact that Eusebius did not become bishop of Constantinople until Constantine’s death.\textsuperscript{182}

Hanson’s argument that Eusebius’ return predated Eustathius’ deposition is bound up with his interpretation of the Eusathian fragment D79, partly because he reads it as complaining about the Eusebians having recently gained powerful sees, and claims that the tone suggests that it was not written by a bishop in exile.\textsuperscript{183} Eustathius must, then, have written it before being deposed, but after the pro-Arians had begun to take the upper hand.

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{178}] Theodoret, \textit{H.E.} (CPG, 6222), 2.31.11.
\item[\textsuperscript{179}] Burgess, “Date”, p.157.
\item[\textsuperscript{180}] Socrates, \textit{H.E.}, (CPG, CPG, 6028) 1.24.1-9, Sozomen, \textit{H.E.} (CPG, 6030), 2.19.1., Theodoret, \textit{H.E.} (CPG, 6222), 1.19..\textsuperscript{180}
\item[\textsuperscript{181}] Parvis, \textit{Marcellus}, p.103.
\item[\textsuperscript{182}] Ibid, p.103.
\item[\textsuperscript{183}] Hanson, “Fate”, p.171 and Hanson, \textit{The Search}, pp.209-210 respectively. See also the discussion on Nicaea, above.
\end{itemize}
Some of Hanson’s arguments for his claim that D79 refers to Eusebius of Nicomedia, not Caesarea, are weak. In particular, he gives a lot of weight to Eusebius of Caesarea’s claim that his own statement of faith was well-received at Nicaea.\(^{184}\) As Hanson argues, we know that Eusebius of Nicomedia did produce a controversial statement of faith at Nicaea;\(^{185}\) the passage could refer to either Eusebius. The next stage in Hanson’s argument is, however, deeply problematic. He argues that we cannot simultaneously hold that Eusebius of Nicomedia is the ‘Eusebius’ of D79 and that he was in exile while it was written; why, Hanson asks, would an exiled bishop be a target? This argument extrapolates too much about the content of *Proverbia 8:22* from the fragments available, and consequently concludes that it was directed primarily against the Eusebius referred to in this passage. Perhaps it would be odd for Eustathius to have written a work primarily aimed at Eusebius of Nicomedia were he still in exile, and looking likely to remain there. However, we do not have a work directed against either Eusebius, but only a fragment preserved by Theodoret of Cyrus, who was not especially interested in Eustathius’ circumstantially-determined political agenda. It is perfectly plausible that Eustathius attacked the exiled Eusebius of Nicomedia as part of a wider anti-Arian polemic.

Williams’ and Parvis’ causal chain most convincingly explains the return of Arius before Eusebius. It is not, otherwise, clear why the man who (for whatever reasons) ended up at the centre of the storm is allowed to return from exile, while

\(^{184}\) Hanson, “Fate”, p.172.  
\(^{185}\) Hanson cites Ambrose, *De Fide* (CPL, 150), 3.15.
those who took up his cause are not. It also coheres with Athanasius’ claim that Eustathius was an early ‘victim’ of the ‘Arian purge’, about which Athanasius would be certain to know, and have no reason to lie. The length of Eusebius of Nicomedia’s exile is therefore germane to the date of Eustathius’ deposition. We know he was exiled in 325, shortly after Nicaea. According to Philostorgius, he was in exile μετὰ τρεῖς ολιγος ἑνατούς.\(^\text{186}\) Bruno Bleckmann reads this as “three whole years” whilst Barnes reads this as “two and a bit years”, their disagreement deriving from divergent views of idiomatic usage.\(^\text{187}\) According to Philostorgius, Eusebius was exiled three months after Nicaea.\(^\text{188}\) Parvis plausibly suggests that “three whole years”, which she considers the most appropriate rendering, could date either from Nicaea – July/August 325 or from the exile – September/ October 325. Barnes’ reading correspondingly suggests 328. Significantly, Arius was readmitted before Eusebius of Nicomedia. If we accept Barnes’ reading, we may either place Eusebius’ return in 327, the latest point it allows, – as Barnes himself does – or we must conclude that Arius corresponded with Constantine, and was readmitted, in 326.\(^\text{189}\) The latter possibility seems problematically early – it would hardly allow time for Eustathius to have engaged in a polemical writing match with Eusebius of Caesarea, and particularly to have produced so substantial a work as *Ariomanitas*, which certainly postdates Nicaea. Eusebius, then, must have been readmitted in 328, suggesting that Arius corresponded with Constantine in September 327.

\(^{186}\) Philostorgius, *H.E.* (CPG, 6032), 2.7.

It was very probably an event related to Helena’s visit to Antioch that changed Constantine’s mind in Arius’ favour in September 327. George of Laodicea claims that Eustathius was formally charged with Sabellianism. Sabellianism is a plausible pro-Arian attack on Eustathius but, for that reason, is an insufficient explanation for his deposition. It relates closely to the theological dispute in which Constantine had, albeit lukewarmly, sided with the anti-Arians. The pro-Arians would need something else to depose the bishop of one of the most important cities in the eastern half of the Empire and, if one should wish to downplay the degree of pro-Arian intrigue against Eustathius, it is hard to imagine how Sabellianism came into the question. The claim that Eustathius was deposed for impregnating a prostitute does, as Hanson and Chadwick argue, bear an uncomfortable resemblance to a hagiographical fabrication. Sara Parvis’ suggestion that reports of such behaviour would have enraged Constantine admittedly puts it in a more plausible light, because such a cataclysmic reaction is necessary to explain Eustathius’ deposition. However, Paul Parvis’ reconstruction of the disputed succession at Antioch offers a more convincing explanation.

Although the idea that Eustathius ‘insulted’ Helena initially seems a little implausible, it is rendered intelligible when placed in the framework of events suggested by Paul Parvis. As already noted, he believes that Constantine was prevented from travelling to the east because there were two rival bishops at Antioch. Helena, he suggests, was sent in lieu of her son, and then conferred some degree of

188 Philostorgius, *H.E.* (CPG, 6032), 1.10.
189 Barnes, “Emperor and bishops”, p.61.
recognition upon Eustathius’ rival. Eustathius’ responded inappropriately during some part of the ceremonial associated with the imperial visit and its attentions to the Antiochene church, thus insulting Helena, and was consequently deposed.  

This picture is highly plausible in light of the unprecedented nature of Helena’s visit. Imperial visits to bishops had never taken place before. In a societal setting obsessed by etiquette, no one could be quite clear what the etiquette was. Throw into the mix rival bishops and attendant congregations, both of whom wish to be recognised by the imperial administration, and neither of whom wish to worship with each other, and you have a recipe for disaster. Eustathius may have tried to push his luck, but he may, just as plausibly, simply have been unsure what was expected of him. He may, for example, have been expected to receive Paulinus at a mass, and refused to do so. He might even have considered this a polite suggestion from Helena, rather expecting that she would accept his position and disinvite Paulinus, because Eustathius was, after all, the officially recognised bishop. It is also possible that he was somewhat more deliberately belligerent, particularly given his irritation at Constantine’s pacifying tactics at Nicaea. If, however, this looks foolhardy to the point of improbable, there is no need to invoke it to explain Helena’s part in Eustathius’ deposition.

The claim that Helena’s own theological leanings were pro-Arian may help to elucidate her relationship with the two bishops.  

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attempt to include, or make dialogue with, Paulinus and his pro-Arian congregation in line with her own beliefs. It is just possible that she even favoured Paulinus in deliberate disregard for Constantine’s recognition of Eustathius, though this is very unlikely. If so, her actions certainly had the effect of turning Constantine in favour of the pro-Arian faction, and perhaps this was her intention. However, if it was, this was a remarkably high risk strategy: ecclesiastical politics were uncertain, as was the outcome of any deliberate attempt to disrupt the situation in Antioch further.

We should also not assume, with the false clarity of hindsight, that the church’s position as favoured by the Roman State was absolutely secure. Constantine’s motives in favouring Christianity are a subject of considerable contention and far beyond the scope of this thesis. Suffice to note that, immediately after Nicaea, Constantine’s approval of Christianity probably still seemed somewhat conditional on its success, or at least on it not proving to be an outright liability. If we suppose that Helena had, by this point, become sufficiently committed to and involved in Christianity to promote actively her own theological viewpoint within the church, we must also assume that she would not have wanted to render it such a liability. A little belligerence on the part of Helena, adding to the belligerence of Eustathius, is, however, plausible. If Helena issued invitations to both bishops to come to meet with her, when Eustathius declined to attend, on the basis that Paulinus would also be present, she would, plausibly, have called Eustathius’ bluff and refused to disinvite

191 Parvis, “Constantine’s Letter.”
193 The relationship between Helena’s Christianity and Constantine’s is disputed. Remi Couzard, Saint Hélène d’après l’histoire et la tradition (Paris, Bloud, 1911), pp.11-12, argues that she was
the bishop whom she, anyway, preferred. Paulinus and the pro-Arians would then be afforded a golden opportunity to take the upper hand. Paulinus would probably have been very willing to attend with Eustathius as he was on a weaker footing anyway. This would have been the best offer he was likely to get. Constantine badly wanted an end to strife in Antioch, and it looked as though Paulinus was willing to compromise for the sake of peace, but Eustathius was not. It would then be a small jump to the suggestion that Eustathius had insulted Helena by refusing to cooperate.

In conclusion, it seems to me by far most likely that Eustathius was deposed in late 327, though it should be admitted that the evidence of Chronici Canones would also permit early 328. I believe that Paul Parvis’ reading of Constantine’s so-called ‘Letter to Arius and Alexander’ is correct, and that therefore we must suppose that Paulinus was a rival, pro-Arian bishop at Antioch during Eustathius’ episcopacy there, and that Helena’s journey was at least partly intended to take the place of Constantine’s thwarted imperial visit to the east, in which the major city of Antioch would have been extremely important. This also explains how it is that Helena became connected with Eustathius’ deposition: she had to negotiate the rift in Antioch in the unprecedented situation of an imperial visit involving the Christian church. Her theological leanings, Eustathius’ belligerence and the opportunism of the pro-Arian faction combined to result in Eustathius’ deposition, and the subsequent deposition of other anti-Arian bishops.

sympathetic to Christianity early in life whilst Drijvers, *Helena*, pp.35-8, argues that she was
The other reasons floated for Eustathius’ deposition – impregnating a prostitute, and Sabellianism – are both accusations that could either have been made at the time, as codicils to the main event, or arisen later.

**Eustathius’ Death**

Eustathius must have died in exile, probably before 337 and certainly before the Synods of Serdica. This is evident primarily because he did not try to return to his see with the other exiles from Constantine’s late 320s purge, who returned in 337. The Eastern Synod of Serdica also refers to him as *exitus*, which may denote his death, though Scheidweiler believes it does not, and he is justified in noting that the term itself is somewhat ambiguous. Eustathius’ death in exile would explain the silence following his deposition. Socrates produces an unsubstantiated report that Eustathius ordained Evagrius as bishop of Constantinople, which would mean he was alive in the 370s. Sozomen also says that Eustathius ordained Evagrius and adds that “having been recalled from banishment by Jovian, he lived privately at Constantinople, and devoted himself instructing those who held his sentiments, exhorting them to persevere in their view of the divine being.” However, most modern scholarship has concluded that these much later reports are a less reliable

converted by Constantine shortly after 312.

194 Schwartz, “Zur Geschichte des Athanasius, IX: Von Konstantius Tod bis Sardika 342”, p.475, f.n. 1 = GS III, p.273, f.n.1. Schwartz later, in Der Sermo major, p.59, assumes he must have lived until at least 344, because he thinks Eustathius wrote Contra Photinum. For Contra Photinum, see discussion of false attributions in chapter 2.


196 Declerck, *Eustathii Antiocheni opera quae supersunt omnia* (2002), p.CCCI. A few works dating after this period have been attributed to him, but the case for them is anyway weak. See below.


indicator of the date of Eustathius’ death than his total silence following his
deposition. This seems to me persuasive.199

199 Those who have concluded otherwise attribute much later works to him. There is circularity in
arguing that Eustathius could not have been alive after a certain time because he produced no work
thereafter and, consequently, this question is examined again, with specific reference to Eustathius’
writing in chapter 2.
Chapter 2: Eustathius’ writings

Although Eustathius wrote extensively, only his *De Engastrimytho contra Origenem* [Engastrimytho] survives in full. Fragments of other writings are cited in a wide variety of genres across several centuries. Declerck’s new edition of Eustathius’ corpus includes a newly attributed epitome of *Ariomanitas*, fragments of which exist elsewhere.\(^{200}\)

It is impossible to construct a complete and altogether reliable picture of any author’s theology when relying heavily on fragments. An epitome offers its own complications: it is, even more than a body of fragments, another author’s interpretation of the original work. However, an epitome is compiled with the express intention of capturing the thrust of the work it treats, which is not the case with the extant selection of Eustathian fragments. Declerck’s recent discovery of the Eustathian authorship of the epitome of *Ariomanitas* has therefore opened up new vistas of opportunity for understanding Eustathius’ theology, particularly in the important area of the ‘Arian’ controversy.

Most of the extant Eustathian fragments have been selected from Eustathius’ work by thinkers engaged in discourses different to his own. Because his belief in Christ’s human soul provided a valuable precedent to ‘Nestorian’ Christology, his work was a fruitful resource for those engaged in the Christological controversies of the fifth and sixth centuries. Aside from the aforementioned epitome, Eustathius’
fragments are overwhelmingly preserved by thinkers on different sides of these later controversies, most notably Theodoret of Cyrus.\textsuperscript{201} I address specific authors later. Here, I make the general observation that the circumstances in which the Eustathian fragments were selected have two interrelated consequences: later thinkers have placed his writings within disparate systems of meaning, vesting words and phrases with anachronistic significance.\textsuperscript{202} The themes and arguments that later authors considered significant in Eustathius are not necessarily what he had considered to be the central portions of his discourse. Furthermore, those citing Eustathius have often deliberately aligned his thought to theirs. Consequently, where we see an apparently coherent system emerging, it is not necessarily Eustathius’ system. Fortunately, Eustathius’ fragments are preserved in works on opposite sides of later disputes, so no one school has hegemony over our conception of him.\textsuperscript{203} It is, therefore, reasonable to suppose that ‘pro-Nestorians’ quoted him more frequently than ‘monophysites’ at least partly because he was more useful to them. Nonetheless, the sources remain problematic. In this chapter, through careful examination of the Eustathian corpus, I shall identify an appropriate methodology by which to construct Eustathius’ theological anthropology from the available material.

There are many potentially Eustathian fragments the authorship of which remains uncertain. Understandably, many scholars have tried to judge the authenticity of attributions to Eustathius by comparing the theology of the fragments

\textsuperscript{200} The nature of this work is the subject of much discussion. I expand below. \\
\textsuperscript{201} On Christ’s human soul, c.f. Hanson, \textit{The Search}, p.202. \\
\textsuperscript{202} C.f. discussion on \textit{Theotokos} below.
in question with what they believe to be Eustathian theology. I have already noted that Eustathius’ Christology and his exegesis have both been considered defining aspects of his theology. It is therefore necessary to discuss both Eustathian Christology and Eustathian exegesis here. The discussions in this chapter are not intended to be comprehensive, but to delimit the range of theologies that we may consider possible in Eustathius, in order to avoid the circularity of rejecting uncertain writings purely on the basis of ideas found in securely Eustathian writings.

I will now survey Engastrimytho and the fragments. I consider the authenticity of each group of fragments and their place in the Eustathian corpus, examining Eustathius’ writings chronologically as far as possible. Much previous scholarship, including José Declerck’s comprehensive edition, has addressed the works from which the most fragments survive first and has consequently privileged the later, anti-‘Arian’ works which have so strongly shaped the view of Eustathius as proto-Nestorian, thus unwittingly reinforcing the consequences of biased selection. Examining the fragments chronologically better reflects the development of their author’s thought within his own context.

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203 E.g., both the ‘monophysite’ Severus of Antioch and the ‘Nestorian’ Theodoret quote Eustathius approvingly in a Christological context.
False attributions

There are several works that have been previously attributed to Eustathius the misattribution of which is now fairly clear, and I will not discuss these texts in detail. I summarise the reasons for rejecting these writings:

**Homilia**: Cavallera attributed this work to Eustathius, acknowledging that there were some later interpolations. However, Louis Saltet subsequently noted that its Trinitarian theology and Christology were anachronistic to the fourth century. A Georgian version of *Homilia* came to light in 1930 and in 1975, Michel van Esbroeck reopened the debate about the Eustathian authorship of *Homilia* in a monograph, in which he examined six patristic homilies in Georgian. He published a further article on the subject in 1982. He believed that the Georgian version of the text was closer to an original Greek version than was the extant Greek. He argued that the Georgian version of the homily showed that the original was, after all, Eustathian. However, Declerck has convincingly established that many anachronisms remain. The arguments against the Eustathian authorship of *Homilia* are persuasive: it is written in extremely simple prose, in contrast to every known extant work of Eustathius. Esbroeck suggested that this was because it was aimed at a less elitist audience. Though this is not impossible, the huge difference in style must be considered a point against Eustathius’ authorship. The Georgian

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204 See introduction.
205 Most of these works have already been touched upon in the introduction.
207 Esbroeck *Homéliaires*. For Esbroeck’s case for the Eustathian authorship of the homily, see pp.285-92.
homily is at best a text that could be contemporaneous with Eustathius and which he would not have found positively objectionable. There is very little in it that actually echoes Eustathius, and much more that seems surprising.\textsuperscript{210} I will not reopen the discussion here.

Attributions of \textit{Commentariae in Hexameron} and \textit{Contra Photinum} both presume an improbably late date of death for Eustathius. Friedrich Zoepfl has demonstrated the extensive influence of late fourth-century sources on \textit{Hexameron}, notably Basil of Caesarea’s \textit{Homiliae in Hexameron}. It therefore must be dated to the third quarter of the fourth century, as Zoepfl argues.\textsuperscript{211} Photinus did not come to prominence until 343, so if one accepts that Eustathius wrote against him, it must be despite the improbability that Eustathius was still alive when Serdica took place. It is immensely implausible, both theologically and politically, that Eustathius would have written a work against Photinus, the avid disciple of his ally Marcellus of Ancyra and can therefore hardly be used as proof, in the face of opposing evidence, that Eustathius lived into the 340s.

Three pseudo-Athanasian works have been attributed to Eustathius by German scholars, and the cases for and against them are connected: \textit{Sermo Major de Fide}, \textit{Exposito Fidei} and \textit{Contra Theopaschita}. Both \textit{Sermo Major de Fide} and

\begin{footnotes}
\item[\textsuperscript{209}] See his extended discussion, Declerck, \textit{Eustathii}, pp.CCCCXX-CCCCLIII.
\item[\textsuperscript{210}] For example, it is Christ’s divinity that is said to vanquish death in Hades, in stark contrast to his very developed theology on the subject in both \textit{Engastrimytho} and \textit{Ariomanitas}; in these works, it is emphatically the human soul of Christ, by virtue of its humanity, that vanquishes death. [Paragraph 20]. References to the Georgian text are according to Esbroeck.
\item[\textsuperscript{211}] Zoepfl \textit{Hexaëmeron}, pp.28-34.
\end{footnotes}
Expositio Fidei were attributed to Eustathius by Eduard Schwartz, who supposed that they were both contained within a collection of writing that Jerome picked up at the Eustathian library.\textsuperscript{212} Spanneut argued persuasively that both works were attributed to Eustathius because of Jerome’s misattribution to Athanasius.\textsuperscript{213} Felix Scheidweiler initially accepted the Eustathian authorship of Expositio Fidei and Sermo Major and introduced the argument that Eustathius was the author of Contra Theopaschita, found in the same dossier as the other pseudo-Athanasian works.\textsuperscript{214} He based his claim very largely on the similarity between it and the other two works. Accepting Eustathian authorship of these works supposes that Eustathius was still alive after the Council of Serdica, which Scheidweiler argues on the basis that he wrote Contra Photinum, which also clearly post-dates Serdica.\textsuperscript{215} However, given that the Eustathian authorship of Contra Photinum is so dubious, quite irrespective of its lateness, this argument holds no water. Scheidweiler anyway later attributed all three works to Marcellus of Ancyra.\textsuperscript{216}

Allocutio ad imperatorem Constantinium was attributed to Eustathius in the eighth century but in the early eighteenth century Johannes Albert Fabricius convincingly argued that it was by Gregory of Neocaesarea and this has been widely accepted.\textsuperscript{217}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{212} Schwartz, Sermo major, pp.56-58.
\item \textsuperscript{213} Spanneut, Recherches, pp.87-89.
\item \textsuperscript{214} Scheidweiler, “Glaubensbekenntnis.”
\item \textsuperscript{215} Ibid, p.242. Photinus did not come to prominence until the 340s.
\item \textsuperscript{216} Scheidweiler, “Wer ist der Verfasser des sog. Sermo Maior de Fide”, Byzantinische Zeitschrift vol. 47 (2) (1954), pp.333-357. As Joseph Lienhard has observed, this was part of move in a radically new direction within Marcellan scholarship. See Lienhard’s “Marcellus”, pp.495-6.
\item \textsuperscript{217} Loofs, “Eustathius”, Realeencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche, t.5, (1898), p.627, Spanneut, Recherches, p.83, Declerck, p.CCCCCVIII.
\end{itemize}
Liturgia: though putatively Eustathian, there is little mark of Eustathian dogma or style and this work has been very widely rejected.218

Genuine works

In Proverbia

Spanneut places three other Eustathian fragments, which are preserved in Polychronius on Proverbs, in a single, otherwise unattested work “On Proverbs” [D127, D137, D138].219 Spanneut’s designation here is speculative. These fragments have generally been considered authentic, but Declerck accepts only D127. Declerck has noted a jarring lack of Eustathian vocabulary in D137 which, given that it is otherwise unattested and of uncertain derivation, is sufficient to designate it as apocryphal.220 Declerck’s main issue with D138 is that its exegesis, which is especially allegorising, is unique in the Eustathian corpus.221 Given the diversity of Eustathian exegesis and the fragmentary nature of the sources, it is insufficient to establish that D138 is apocryphal. It remains uncertain.

The Syriac work containing fragment D113 contains three further Eustathian fragments [D117, D118, D119b] from three separate works, of which they are the only extracts to survive.

218 C.f. Spanneut, Recherches, p.85, Declerck, Eustathii, p.CCCCXXVIII.
219 Spanneut, Recherches, p.63.
220 Declerck, Eustathii p.CCLII.
221 Ibid, p.CCLII.
De Tentationibus

D117 is introduced as “from the discourse on temptation.” It contains the word *Theotokos* and Sellers consequently rejects it.\(^{222}\) I have noted the methodological problem with this approach. Furthermore, to read into *Theotokos* the ‘monophysite’ intention that the Syriac author presents it as carrying risks anachronism. Admittedly, even in his own, fourth-century, context, *Theotokos* would have jarred with Eustathius’ sometime insistence that Mary was the mother of Christ’s humanity.\(^{223}\) Nonetheless, there are several reasons to think that Eustathius’ pre-controversy Christology had room for the term. It coheres with his Christology in *Engastrimytho*, where he often refers to the actions and experiences of Christ as those of God. It should be noted that Eustathius may not have actually rejected the term later in his career; it is in many ways consistent with his insistence on the divinity of the Word and *Theotokos* was very widely used, including at Antioch 324.\(^{224}\) At any rate, whilst *Theotokos* may be a reason for dating “the discourse on temptation” relatively early, and certainly before Nicaea, it is not a reason for rejecting the Eustathian authorship of the fragment.

*Oratio coram tota ecclesia* and *Secunda oratio coram tota ecclesia*

D119 is also attested in Greek in the thirteenth-century codex *Florilegum Achridesse*. Both versions are said to come from a Eustathian work “on the church.”

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\(^{223}\) C.f. D65a:7-8 [*Proverbia 8:22*].

\(^{224}\) C.f. Parvis, *Marcellus*, p.79.
The introduction to the Syriac D119 additionally references John 1.14 as a subject. As the fragment itself does not quote this verse, any mistake here is presumably accidental, and it is likely that John 1.14 was addressed. Sellers objects to D119 on the basis that, in it, God suffers. God the Word, in fact, is killed, so he also presumably dies. This picture could hardly form a sharper contrast to Eustathius’ anti-Arian polemic, which attributes suffering to the human in contradistinction to the Word.\(^{225}\) However, as I will argue, it is evident from *Engastrimytho* that Eustathius’ Christology was not always sharply divisive. In light of this, D119 looks less surprising; we may well imagine that Eustathius started out with a Christology in which Christ’s divinity suffered;\(^{226}\) *Engastrimytho* looks like a kind of bridge between Eustathius’ doctrine of God in *Tota ecclesia* and his doctrine of God in his anti-Arian works. In *Engastrimytho*, the Word is often designated as the agent of Christ’s actions, but Eustathius nonetheless emphasises the omnipresence and transcendence of the Word of God at other moments. The ground was prepared for an overt rejection of divine passibility in the ‘Arian’ controversy. D118 is described

\(^{225}\) C.f. D74:14-18 [*Proverbia* 8:22].

\(^{226}\) This need not suggest (rather contra *Engastrimytho*) that Eustathius’ earlier theology was strongly subordinationist, though I am aware that this assertion swims against the tide. It was once axiomatic that patristic theology rejected the notion of a passible God and, even more emphatically, a God susceptible to *suffering* and that, therefore, any idea of Christ’s divinity suffering implied considerable subordinationism. This is still the dominant view, but Paul Gavrilyuk offers a dissenting and, in my view, largely persuasive voice, arguing that patristic discourse on divine impassibility accommodated divine emotion, including suffering in, *The suffering of the impassible God: The dialectics of Patristic thought* (Oxford, OUP, 2004). This builds on, but also significantly challenges, Thomas Weinandy’s *Does God suffer?* (Edinburgh, T and T Clark, 2000). Like Gavrilyuk, Weinandy argues that the Fathers’ take on divine impassibility derived from scriptural ideas, and not the contrary influence of Hellenic philosophy. In patristic authors, he believes, divine impassibility protected, rather than undermined God’s love. See pp.83-112. Gavrilyuk also sees divine impassibility as *emphasising* God’s love in patristic thought, but part of this is that it is actually laid aside in certain contexts. This thesis is discussed, with reference to Eustathius, in chapter 5. For the idea that the Word becomes susceptible to suffering in the incarnation outwith the ‘Arian’ controversy, c.f. Irenaeus, *Demonstratio* (CPG, 1307), 71: “being the Spirit of God, Christ was to become a suffering man.”
as “from the second discourse on the church.” This second work may well build on themes from the first.

These works all very probably predate the outbreak of the ‘Arian’ controversy. Grillmeier and Declerck have both supposed this on the basis that their Christology is not strongly divisive as it is in Eustathius’ anti-‘Arian’ tracts.\(^{227}\) This is largely persuasive. Admittedly, the problems of circular methodology apply in a particular way to writings that are not overtly polemical; as most Eustathian tracts which can be externally assessed as dating post-Nicaea are overtly anti-Arian, it is not clear how far Eustathius’ Christology changed as a result of the controversy and how much, alternatively, he had a different emphasis when engaging directly with pro-Arian opponents. D117 and D119 focus on the crucifixion and their tone suggests a devotional emphasis on it rather than a strictly theological emphasis on unitive Christology. Nonetheless, the contrast between the attitude to divine suffering in D119 and in Eustathius’ later work does suggest that this devotional tone had not yet been forced to be reflective about its implications for the unity of God of divinity of the Word. If the title of the second discourse on the church may be taken at its word, it must postdate the first, but the two works might well be part of the same wider project. Eustathius’ first work on the church can thus be dated prior to c318 with some confidence, and this is probably also true of his second.

\(^{227}\) Grillmeier, *Christ in the Christian tradition*, p.244, Declerck *Eustathii*, pp.CCCCXIII-CCCCXIV.
De Hebraismo and In Joseph

Only one fragment [D120] from the exegetical work designated *De Hebraismo* survives, and only two from *In Joseph* [D121, D122]. It is unclear whether the titles of these works are original: the *In Joseph* fragments are found in a fifth-century chain on Genesis. Declerck speculates that it is possible either that the compiler had access to Eustathius’ works or that he was working from an existing dossier, which leaves the origin of the titles uncertain.228 The derivation of the phrase *De Hebraismo* is similarly unclear. In both cases, the titles refer to the subject of the very short passage that is preserved so, if the author quoting them was unsure of their derivation, these would be natural titles to add. In particular, within a chain on Genesis, the phrase “on Joseph”, could plausibly be added as a further detail after “Eustathius.”

In Samaritanam

Two identical Greek fragments preserved in iconodule works are introduced as “Of Eustathius, the holy bishop of Antioch, from the writing on the Samaritan woman.” This work is otherwise unattested.229 It is possible that the compilers were drawing on a single source, so the identical title does not confirm its authenticity. However, the passage quoted actually addresses 2 Corinthians 3.18, not the Gospel narrative about the Samaritan woman, again lending some weight to the title and at least suggesting that any mistake was accidental. It is anyway unclear whether “On the Samaritan woman” is presented as a title or simply a descriptor.
Sellers argues that the phrase τοῦ κυρίου παναγίαν σαρκα, which is found in this fragment [D123], is not Eustathian. Spanneut allows that the phrase is found nowhere else but does not find it surprising in Eustathius as he does use the term παναγίος in a different context, and refers to Christ’s body as αγίος. Furthermore, Spanneut argues, the “appropriation du corps par le Verbe” is common in Eustathius’ writings. Spanneut does, however, suggest that the Christology is insufficiently divisive for the period after the outbreak of the controversy. Declerck counters that the image theology of D123 is similar to that in the Council of Antioch 324.

In his analysis, Spanneut, not unreasonably, considers this phrase with regards to its Christology. If one is considering Christology from a purely mechanical standpoint, his claim that the theology implied in the phrase παναγίαν σαρκα echoes Eustathius is reasonable. Eustathius very often refers to the Word taking up the human body. Spanneut’s suggestion that the fragment’s Christology is too monistic to post-date the outbreak of the ‘Arian’ controversy also makes a lot of sense. However, everything about Eustathius’ theology that confirms Spanneut’s suspicions also suggests that the phrase itself is not Eustathian: Eustathius often refers to Christ assuming not sarx but soma and, in the later writings especially,

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228 Declerck, Eustathii, p.CCCXXI.
229 Spanneut, Recherches, p.80.
230 Sellers, Eustathius, p.67.
231 Spanneut, Recherches, p.80. Eustathius uses the term παναγία to describe the words of scripture in En gastrimytho, 26.9. Eustathius describes Christ’s risen body as αγίος in both Ariomanitas [D22ab:26-27] and In Proverbia 8:22 [D71:2-3], in the latter case referring specifically to Christ’s “limbs.”
232 Declerck, Eustathii, p.CCCXXV.
tends to couple this with *psuche*: “Christ did not take up a body alone, but also a soul.”

Despite a frequent emphasis on Christ’s assumption of the human body, it is only once signified by the term *sarx* in the extant writings, in the form of a quote of John 6.63: “the flesh profits nothing.” Declerck, in turn, fails to appreciate fully the strangeness of the phrase in Eustathius when he does not adequately address Spanneut’s discomfiture with fragment D123’s unitive phraseology as distinct from theology.

Despite this, it is unclear that this phrase is not Eustathian because the emphasis in referring to Christ’s flesh is here ecclesiological, and specifically Eucharistic, more than Christological: most of the instances in which Eustathius refers to Christ’s body are explicitly Christological, and often aiming at clarity with regards to the mechanism of the incarnation. Eustathius only uses the word *παναγία* in one other place; it is in *Engastrimytho*, and he writes about the “*παναγία* utterances” of the law, the prophets, and all the rest of scripture. It has a sense of the sanctity and unity of scripture, which plausibly coheres with its use in *Samaritan*, if the Eucharistic context is taken to have an ecclesiological dimension.

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233 D16a:11-12 [Ariomanitas].
234 D20:28-32 [Ariomanitas] respectively. Additionally, the Syriac fragment from *Oratio coram tota Ecclesia* [D119a] references and quotes John 1.14 “and the Word became flesh” as a subject. Eustathius also writes that Christ is descended from Jesse “according to sarx.” [D115ab:8], referencing Hebrews 7.3. This is a very complex passage and is discussed in chapter three. Here, *sarx*, if it does not refer to sexual intercourse, seems to refer to either the entire humanity of Christ, or to Christ *qua* human, rather than *qua* God. Citing Luke 24.39, Eustathius also refers to the Christ’s and the martyrs’ “flesh…and bones” at different points [D16a:4, D16b:5-6; D44:46, Ariomanitas] but here “flesh” clearly refers to a specific part of the corporeal portion of the person, not the whole of it. As I argue in chapter 3, Eustathius’ choice of *soma* over *sarx* is connected to a unified anthropology,
Furthermore, the Eucharistic context of Eustathius’ writing in Samaritan is also a liturgical context. This is a liturgical context in which sarx is used to refer to Christ’s body. Eustathius’ use of the word here would be almost expected, even though he does not use it in other contexts.

**De Engastrimytho Contra Origenem**

_Engastrimytho_ is an exegetical treatise on 1 Samuel 28:3-25 (LXX 1 Kingdoms), attacking Origen’s exegesis of the passage. Eustathius wrote it at the request of Eutropius of Adrianopolis.\(^{235}\) It evidently postdates the death of Methodius of Olympus in 311, as it refers to him as “one worthy of blessed memory.”\(^{236}\) In its current form, it is comprised of a reproduction of Origen’s otherwise lost exegetical treatise on 1 Samuel 28:3-25, probably altered, and Eustathius’ exegesis of the same passage.\(^{237}\) Declerck speculates that these two works were probably joined quite early.\(^{238}\) Whilst this text, which is the fullest example of Eustathian work, is outwith his dispute with the pro-Arians, it is not outwith a polemical context. The main aim of _Engastrimytho_ is to undermine Origen’s reading of the passage. Margaret Mitchell has detailed the deliberately adversarial nature of _Engastrimytho_ and the basis of its polemical manoeuvres in Hellenistic rhetoric.\(^{239}\) Frances Young sees it as emblematic of the fourth-century

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\(^{235}\) Declerck, _Eustathii_, p.LVII. On Eutropius, see discussion in chapter 1.

\(^{236}\) _Engastrimytho_, 22.5.

\(^{237}\) Origen, _In 1 Regum 28_.

\(^{238}\) Declerck, _Eustathii_, p.LVIII.

\(^{239}\) Margaret Mitchell, “Patristic rhetoric on allegory”, Greer and Mitchell (eds.), _Belly-Myther_, pp.lxxv-cxxiii.
“Antiochene reaction against Alexandrian allegory.” As I will demonstrate, this is a problematic understanding of the relationship between the two texts, if not their two authors.

Young’s claim is part of the very wide tradition categorising Eustathius as an ‘Antiochene’ exegete in varying degrees of contradistinction to ‘Alexandrian’ exegesis. Young’s own analysis contributes to a badly needed, and ongoing, reconsideration of these categories. Earlier scholarship, and particularly the Germanic scholarship that has been concerned with Eustathius, had tended to equate ‘Antiochene’ exegesis with ‘literal’ exegesis and ‘Alexandrian’ exegesis with a type of allegory that imposed alien, Hellenic conceptual frameworks on the biblical text.

Eustathius does explicitly attack Origen for ἀλληγορῆσαι in Engastrimytho, and similarly writes critically of allegory in Ariomanitas. He also expresses an intention of following τὸ τῆς ἱστορίας γράμμα – “the letter of the narrative.” However, the category ‘literalist’, as it appears in authors such as Sellers, is unhelpful because it fails to appreciate the breadth and complexity of hermeneutic that could, in Eustathius’ view, be involved in an interpretation of scripture that

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240 Young, Biblical Exegesis, p.161.
242 On which see the Introduction. Lewis Ayres addresses both the problems of this earlier approach and the strengths and weaknesses of more recent attempts to renegotiate it in his Nicaea, pp.31-40
243 Engastrimytho 21.1 and D23:11-12 respectively.
244 Engastrimtho, 2.1. In my translations of Engastrimytho, I have often consulted Greer and Mitchell’s translation, Belly-Myther.
priviliged τὸ τῆς ἱστορίας γράμμα. In line with Young’s analysis of ‘Antiochene exegesis’, he does often consider that scripture has a ‘typological’ meaning, taking figures in one part of scripture to be a kind of image of figures in another part, or to represent figures other than those named in the text (though Young has rightly questioned the wisdom of the term ‘typology’ as a descriptor).\textsuperscript{245} For example, he says that, in Isaiah 14, the prophet has “substituted the character of the Assyrian king” for the devil.\textsuperscript{246} Young’s reworked picture of ‘Antiochene exegesis’ is in large part descriptive of Eustathius’ method in \textit{Engastrimytho}.

However, as many scholars have observed, Origen seems readier to take the text at its word than Eustathius is: Origen believes that the witch really did did see Samuel whilst Eustathius claims she is lying.\textsuperscript{247} With regard to exegetical method, this is primarily a very interesting observation about Origen. Origen asserts the validity of allegorical exegesis to the exclusion of an historical reading for certain passages but declares that I Kingdoms 28 is not such a passage.\textsuperscript{248} Young’s analysis that Eustathius is reacting to “Alexandrian allegory” is therefore problematic, because the text to which Eustathius is reacting represents a point at which ‘Alexandrian’ and ‘Antiochene’ exegesis meet.\textsuperscript{249} Because of this, Eustathius has a problem attacking Origen. His strategy is to argue that Origen is wrong from every possible angle and, consequently, scholars have interpreted \textit{Engastrimytho} diversely, largely through focusing on one of Eustathius’ arguments above others. Eustathius’

\textsuperscript{245} Young, \textit{Biblical Exegesis}, p.152.
\textsuperscript{246} D29:16-18 \textit{[Ariomanitas]}. This is part of a very widespread reading of prophetic texts taken to refer to the fall of Lucifer, which is also evidenced in \textit{Engastrimytho}, and is discussed in chapter 5.
\textsuperscript{247} E.g. Wallace-Hadrill, \textit{Christian Antioch}, pp.31-32.
exegesis in this work is very often responding to Origen’s, and consequently threatens to undermine itself because, in its attempt to present Origen’s error as over-determined, it fails to offer a single hermeneutic or coherent hermeneutical system.

David Wallace-Hadrill argues that “the primacy of historical event as against that of the text narrating the event…is the burden of Eustathius’ attack upon Origen’s position.” He here draws on Spanneut’s argument that Eustathius prioritises the ‘sense’ of scripture whilst attacking Origen for prioritising the word. Certainly, the necessity of interpreting specific historical events in a particular way in order to maintain the coherence of Scripture recurs throughout Engastrimytho. For example, Eustathius emphasises the need for 1 Kingdoms 28 to cohere with the Levitical indictment of divination. However, this is additional, and supposedly complementary, to a word-by-word reading of the text before him, not alternative to it. Although Eustathius claims that the witch did not really raise Samuel, he claims that she was lying; he bases his argument on the literal meaning of the narrator in contradistinction to the witch. As Young points out, he respects the “narrative coherence” of the text. Joseph Trigg claims that Eustathius either fails to appreciate or ignores Origen’s argument that the narrator asserts Samuel’s

248 Origen, In 1 Reg. 28., 2.3.
249 Trigg notes a shared concern for the “literal sense” in “Eustathius’s attack on Origen”, p.229.
250 Wallace-Hadrill, Christian Antioch, p.31.
252 Engastrimytho, 11:12.
253 C.f. ibid., 21:1.
254 Young, Biblical exegesis, p.168.
Trigg is right to criticise Eustathius on this point, but more because he does not do justice to Origen’s argument than because he does not address it.

Important to Origen’s argument is the LXX’s claim that “Saul ἔγνω that it was Samuel”. He reads ἔγνω as “knew” and asks: how can Samuel know what is not true? Eustathius gives a veritable arsenal of counter-arguments, many deliberately misrepresentative of Origen, but among these he defends the wording of the text. Eustathius interprets ἔγνω as referring to Saul’s perception: “and Saul, being out of his mind, believed, from what he had heard that this was Samuel himself.” He thus brings the dispute away from the mechanism of textual authority towards the epistemological connotations of the term ἔγνω. This is coupled with another claim relying on the same hermeneutic: that everything suggesting that Samuel was raised is said in the voice of the necromancer, not the voice of the Holy Spirit. In both cases, Eustathius attempts to give an argument that maintains the priority of the voice of the narrator in scriptural interpretation. Eustathius’ argument may not convince. Nonetheless, in making it, Eustathius assumes that it is necessary to respect τὸ τῆς ἱστορίας γράμμα – “the letter of the narrative” – which he asserts to be his intention near the start of his treatise.

256 Origen, In 1 Reg. 28 (CPG, 1423.2), 4.7.
257 Enastrimonyo, 3.9.
258 C.f. Enastrimonyo, 3.4. As Mitchell notes in Belly-Myther, pp.civ-xix, he both argues, against Origen, that the text contains more than one voice, and proceeds to interrogate the various “witnesses” whom, he argues, it does offer. This attention to who is speaking in scripture is very common in patristic exegesis, and, as Ayres observes in his Nicaea, p.35, is natural in a context where written text is also spoken text.
259 Enastrimonyo, 2.1. See above.
Eustathius’ rejection of a certain kind of allegorical exegesis in *Engastrimyho* is an unreliable indication of his wider exegesis. In *Engastrimyho*, he is refuting Origen, the great champion of allegorical exegesis and it would be natural for Eustathius to wish not to appear *more* allegorical than him. We should not allow this to obscure an observation made in part by Young herself, and since advanced upon: it is often difficult to distinguish between typology, acceptable in the Antiochene school and allegory, associated with Alexandria.\(^{260}\) This is particularly so because, in order to claim that one set of events is an imprint of another, one must establish the order of the events that act as an imprint. Attempts to distinguish between metaphorical exegesis that respects the internal structure of a given text – typology – and metaphorical exegesis that does not – allegory – remain in danger of assuming that there is an ‘obvious’ structure, which can be accessed without reference to a particular community in which a text is read. This can still be a fruitful exercise, but is a dangerous exercise, which is significant for the purposes of establishing the authenticity or otherwise of putatively Eustathian works, especially in such a fragmented corpus.

In *Engastrimyho*, Eustathius is primarily concerned not with exegesis – Origen’s method is not that different from his own here – but with the theological consequences of Origen’s reading of 1 Kingdoms 28: he is concerned at the idea that anyone other than God has the power to bring souls up from Hades.\(^{261}\) Trigg argues that Eustathius’ principal issue with Origen is Origen’s willingness to see Scripture

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as ambiguous.\textsuperscript{262} This is not a principal concern of \textit{Engastrimy tho}, but in arguing that it is, Trigg makes a valuable observation. He notes Eustathius’ particular concern that 1 Kingdoms cohere with the Mosaic indictment of divination.\textsuperscript{263} It is necessary to subjugate some texts to others in Biblical interpretation, and here Eustathius subjugates 1 Kingdoms 28 to Leviticus. His motivation is theological. Young claims that Antiochene exegesis was concerned with the “overarching narrative of universal history.”\textsuperscript{264} This is true, but does not allow us to arrive at an understanding of Antiochene exegesis in which a given reading of a text is produced solely with reference to exegetical principles applied to the text in question. This is because the criteria by which an event is integral to a narrative are subjective. Consequently, “the over-arching narrative of universal history” cannot be a starting point for exegesis, but only another fruitful concern raising further questions; it is difficult to see how one could determine which events were integral to a given narrative without appealing to theological principles determined by factors other than exegesis.

Charles Kannengiesser argues that the ‘Arian crisis’ was “essentially one of hermeneutics.”\textsuperscript{265} In the ‘Arian’ controversy, theological presuppositions were at stake for Eustathius as they are in \textit{Engastrimytho}. Whilst scripture was central to these disputes, hermeneutics were not an independent factor in them, because the

\textsuperscript{261} Eustathius’ ideas about the ability of souls to leave Hades have been discussed much recently, and I consider them in chapter three, in the section on ‘the disembodied soul’.
\textsuperscript{262} Trigg, “Eustathius’s attack on Origen”, pp.236-7.
\textsuperscript{263} Ibid, p.237, see above, p.6.
\textsuperscript{264} Young, \textit{Biblical exegesis}, p.168.
sense of scripture is dependent on hermeneutics that are developed by particular communities in particular contexts, and influenced by these contexts; the role of scripture in theological discourse is therefore interdependent with the contexts in which it is read. This is of primary importance in understanding Eustathius. He will probably try to reconcile wider theological concerns, bound up with the thrust of Scripture, with the words of a particular passage. This is the case, for example, in his interpretation of the term ἔγνω as referring to perception rather than knowledge. He wants to argue that Saul did not see Samuel, but is determined to reconcile this with the claim that “Saul ἔγνω that it was Samuel”. Origen, by contrast, declares that it is acceptable to overlook the “narrative sense” of a particular passage where this sense is unhelpful. This is not a sentiment to which Eustathius is amenable; nonetheless, the ‘words’ are not Eustathius’ primary concern; the necromancer’s inability to call up souls from Hades is.

Young is right to offer the ‘sense’ as a hermeneutical priority, alternative to the “words”, to which Eustathius does hold. In Ariomanitas, Eustathius shows himself to be keenly aware of apparent contradictions in scripture, and committed to finding the message of scripture in a wider consistency. Correspondingly, he often juxtaposes two opposing perspectives before bringing them to a wider synthesis. For instance, he notes that Luke gives a different account of the thieves crucified next to Christ than Matthew and Mark; it is only in Luke that one of the thieves repents. Eustathius claims that Matthew and Mark describe both thieves initially

\footnote{266 Origen, \textit{In 1 Reg. 28} (CPG, 1423.2), 2.1-3.}
blaspheming, whilst Luke recounts the eventual repentance of one of them.\textsuperscript{267} However, Eustathius’ commitment to the ‘sense’ of scripture should not obscure the fact that this ‘sense’ is necessarily partially dependent on a wider theological framework. This is especially problematic when considering fragments as we cannot see how his exegesis develops.

In addition to exegeting scripture along typological-allegorical lines, in \textit{Ariomanitas}, Eustathius explicitly states that the most obvious meaning of a text will not always be sufficient to understand how the text fits together with the rest of scripture: “Everything that is demonstrated from the body of the text, one must take as a concrete reality. However, whatever things receive referents to a more mysterious design, to these rightly allot their own manner.” (Eustathius makes this claim in reconciling the divergent accounts of the thieves crucified with Christ in the synoptic gospels).\textsuperscript{268} We should not, therefore, read into his attack on Origen’s exegesis a purely ‘historical’ approach to scripture.

\textit{In Melchisedek}

Whilst Bishop of Beroea, Eustathius wrote to Alexander of Alexandria, at his behest, about Melchizedek. A fragment of his letter [D113] is preserved in a Syriac ‘monophysite’ work written before c562. Another three fragments [D114-116] are preserved in a fifth-century chain on Genesis.\textsuperscript{269} Fragment D115 is attested in four

\textsuperscript{267} See D26, D27. This is discussed further in chapter 5.
\textsuperscript{268} D26:26-9.
\textsuperscript{269} Declerck, \textit{Eustathii}, p.CCCLIII.
additional places, two carrying attributions to Eustathius.\textsuperscript{270} A portion of it is found in a homily on Melchizedek attributed to John Chrysostom, in exactly the same form as in \textit{Florilegium Coislinianum secundum alphabeti litteras dispositum} [\textit{Coislinianum}] [D115b] and its Eustathian authorship has consequently often been rejected, including by Sellers.\textsuperscript{271} Berthold Altaner subsequently discovered that, elsewhere in \textit{Coislinianum}, the entire fragment attributed to Chrysostom appears again. However, here \textit{only} the portion additional to the version of D115 found in the chain on Genesis [D115a] is attributed to Chrysostom.\textsuperscript{272} Therefore, as Declerck argues, the connection with the homily by pseudo-Chrysostom is no reason for rejecting the Eustathian authorship of D115.

Fragment D113 is described as deriving from Eustathius’ letter to Alexander, Archbishop of Alexandria, on Melchizedek, and Jerome testifies to the existence of such a work.\textsuperscript{273} In the chain on Genesis, D114-D116 are all described as deriving from a work “on Melchizedek.” All four fragments form part of the same discussion, in which Melchizedek is described as prefiguring Christ. Sellers has also objected to the authenticity of most of these fragments on several dogmatic grounds. D113, he says, confuses the natures of Christ, in contrast to Eustathius’ divisive Christology.

\textsuperscript{270} Declerck was the first to note the version of the fragment preserved in George the monk’s \textit{Universal chronicle}, ibid, p.CCCLIII. It was here wrongly attributed to Cyril of Alexandria, possibly because of the unified Christology which Sellers sees as contrary to Eustathius’s. Antonopoulou has established that a fragment attributed to the ninth-century Photius of Constantinople is in fact a version of frag. D115 in “Eustathius of Antioch and a fragment attributed to patriarch Photius”, \textit{JTS}, 57 (2006), 546-550.

\textsuperscript{271} Sellers, \textit{Eustathius}, pp.69-70. The parallel with pseudo-Chrysostom was noted by Baur, Chrysostome, note on Cavalleri, \textit{Homilia}, \textit{RHE}, vol. 8 (1907), 330-1.

\textsuperscript{272} Berthold Altaner, “Die Schrift Περὶ τοῦ Μελχισεδὲκ des Eustathios von Antiocheia”, \textit{BZ} 40 (1940), p.33.

\textsuperscript{273} Jerome, \textit{Epistola ad Evangelum} (CPL, 620), letter 73
He allows that the first half of the fragment may be Eustathian, but the second half is certainly not.\textsuperscript{274}

Sellers then objects that fragments D114 and D116b present Melchizedek as a “supernatural being” which was “surely not the opinion of Eustathius.”\textsuperscript{275} Sellers supports his incredulity with Jerome’s testimony.\textsuperscript{276} It is in itself possible that Jerome was being duplicitous in order to represent Eustathius favourably. However, an examination of the extant fragments, including D115, vindicates Jerome. In D115 Eustathius claims that Melchizedek was, in fact, of Canaanite descent but that scripture does not so refer to him so as not to associate him with the immorality of the Canaanites: “it was most unsuitable to force together the man who had achieved the peak of righteousness for himself with the race who had achieved the peak of unrighteousness.”\textsuperscript{277} In D114, Eustathius notes what Hebrews says about Melchizedek; this he could hardly contradict. He then explains precisely how it does not mean that Melchizedek had no parents. A key argument in the extant fragments is that Melchizedek was not a supernatural entity, but a flesh and blood human. Sellers, it turns out, is right to trust Jerome, but wrong to allow this to lead him to reject the authenticity of D114; had he been aware of the authenticity of the other Melchizedek fragments, he would have been able to reconcile his view of Eustathius’ theology with the contents of D114.

\textsuperscript{274} Sellers, \textit{Eustathius}, p.69, esp. note 4.
\textsuperscript{275} Ibid, p.69.
\textsuperscript{276} Ibid, p.69.
\textsuperscript{277} D115ab:16-18.
Sellers’ first argument raises an important question which will bring us back to a consideration of *Engastrimytho*: is dyohypostatic Christology a basis for verifying Eustathian authorship? This would involve rejecting otherwise secure fragments and is dangerously circular given our incomplete picture of Eustathian theology. As observed in the introduction, it has often been suggested that Eustathius’ Christology became more divisive with the outbreak of the ‘Arian’ controversy.

A significant shift in Eustathius’ Christology is very clear. As observed in the introduction, Grillmeier argued for a clear change in Eustathius’ Christology as a result of the ‘Arian’ controversy. *Engastrimytho* gives a somewhat more nuanced picture of Eustathian Christology. Eustathius often refers to Christ as “God” in this work. For example, when referring to Christ’s temptation in the wilderness, Eustathius writes that Satan tempted Christ but that ὁ κύριος responded θεοπρεπῶς.\(^{278}\) Elsewhere in *Engastrimytho*, Eustathius does refer to Christ’s human soul in contradistinction to the Word and it here forms part of an argument for Christ’s divinity, broadly speaking. This occurs in the context of Eustathius’ objection to Origen’s comparison between Samuel’s putative descent into hell and Christ’s. Here, Eustathius claims, Origen speaks of Christ “as though speaking of a mere human being, and no longer having any regard for his divine nature.”\(^{279}\) Eustathius goes on to give Christ’s human soul a central role in the salvation of the

\(^{278}\) *Engastrimytho* 10:15-16.
\(^{279}\) Ibid, 17:5.
souls in Hades.\textsuperscript{280} Christ’s human soul is able to save because it is “strengthened by
divine power because of the constant association (συνουσίαν) of God the Word…”\textsuperscript{281}
In Engastrimytho, Eustathius implies a dyohypostatic Christology most strongly
when talking about Christ’s soteriological role. His simultaneous emphasis on
Christ’s divinity in these soteriological passages might suggest that we should not
read a unitive Christology into other references to Christ’s divinity. It is clear,
however, that before the outbreak of the ‘Arian’ controversy, Eustathius wrote of
Christ in ways that, out of context, appeared antecedent to Cyril of Alexandria rather
than Nestorius. We therefore cannot reject the Eustathian authorship of a fragment
on the basis of apparently miahypostatic Christology.

There is a difference in emphasis between Eustathian works before and after
the outbreak of the ‘Arian’ controversy. However, especially where a fragment is
difficult to date, using Christology to do so is circular; it assumes total discontinuity
in Eustathius’ theology before and after Nicaea. It also assumes that the passage of
time and the events therein were the overriding factors in determining the nature of
Eustathian work. Christology is useful in dating fragments but can only be used in
this capacity extremely cautiously.

We may, then, safely assume that all three fragments putatively deriving from
\textit{In Melchisedek} are Eustathian. I have already noted that Eustathius’ letter to

\textsuperscript{280} This passage brings up many interesting points in relation to the dispute surrounding Eustathius’s
\textsuperscript{281} \textit{Engastrimytho}, 17:10.
Alexander shows good relations between the two men before the ‘Arian’ controversy was in full swing. It is worth considering that, aside from the controversy, these rosy relations between the Origenist Alexander, and the fiercely anti-Origenist Eustathius are a little surprising. Might this suggest that, at the time that Eustathius wrote this letter, alliances were already forming? I have noted the probability of a longstanding alliance between Eustathius and his predecessors at Antioch, Vitalis and Philogonius respectively. Perhaps Alexander, becoming increasingly uncomfortable with the possibility of a fight in which the Eusebian party would be his opponents, decided to make overtures to the Antiochenes. Writing to Eustathius, who apparently already had a reputation as a formidable exegete, to ask his opinion on a difficult collection of scriptural passages would be a good way to do this. This might place the date of this letter in the early 320s, or possibly just before. D113 does, it is true, contain Christology that would be surprising in Eustathius, were he keenly aware of the pro-Arian challenge: it is the Word who descended into the water (presumably at baptism). Here, the Word is the active agent, whereas, in Eustathius’ anti-subordinationist work, the Word almost exclusively bolsters and enables the human being’s agency. It is tempting to suppose that this marks Melchisedek as a relatively early writing and set it against Alexander’s apparent offer of friendship to Eustathius, which suggests a slightly later date. However, the Christology in Melchisedek closely echoes Engastrimytho, which was also probably written shortly before the outbreak of the controversy. Furthermore, the brevity of the fragment makes it impossible to discern whether Eustathius qualified his remarks. Therefore, I think we should take this work’s willingness to refer to the Word as the subject of Christ’s
action as a reflection on the lateness of his proto-Nestorianism, rather than the earliness of the work itself.

Eustathius’ argument against the interpretation that Melchizedek actually had no parents is relatively unremarkable.282 Jerome claims that Origen, and Didymus, Origen’s assistant, believed that Melchizedek was a heavenly creature.283 Though we may suspect Jerome of being unfair on Origen, he could well have been drawing on a reading of Origen with which Eustathius was also familiar. It is therefore possible that Eustathius’ letter to Alexander contains a veiled attack on Origen. More clearly, in arguing against a docetic understanding of Melchizedek, Eustathius argues against a docetic understanding of Christ. Such a docetic understanding is something that he is later to attribute to his pro-Arian opponents, precisely because they fail to appreciate Christ’s full humanity: “Desiring to allegorise, they agree with Marcion’s followers, taking away everything around Christ’s business, so that all things were done in seeming and by a charade.”284 This may well be an indication of the fact that, in the correspondence between Eustathius and Alexander, the battle-lines of the ‘Arian’ controversy were already being drawn.

Theodoret of Cyrus

We come now to a large body of works preserved and attested at least partially in Theodoret of Cyrus. Because of his importance to the Eustathian corpus, a brief comment is necessary. There is very wide consensus on the authenticity of Theodoret’s citations. \(^{285}\) This is corroborated by the fact that much of what he quotes appears elsewhere. The oft-noted exception is D133, which is identical to a writing by Didymus of Alexandria. \(^{286}\) Declerck argues that this false attribution was certainly accidental on Theodoret’s part: Didymus’ name would, after all, have been more impressive to Theodoret’s opponents than Eustathius’ was. \(^{287}\) Marcel Richard suggests that this mistake could have occurred because ‘Eustathians’ were interested in Didymus’ piece on the soul and so attached it to Eustathius’ work. \(^{288}\) It remains possible that Theodoret knew that the work was not Eustathian but did not know that it was by Didymus, in which case he would have had motive to lie in order to present Eustathius as author and, therefore, as favourable to his own Christology; this might be tempting if Theodoret were unaware that the true author of the work would, in fact, be more impressive. However, this is highly speculative. The picture painted by Richard and Declerck is more probable and a single false attribution is anyway insufficient to undermine Theodoret’s reliability substantially. Unfortunately, Theodoret’s selection and framing of Eustathius’ work is less trustworthy for a scholar of Eustathian theology. Theodoret was one of the main protagonists of the

\(^{284}\) D13.2-4 [Ariomanitas].
\(^{287}\) Declerck, Eustathii, pp. CLXXXVIII-CLXXXIX.
‘Nestorian’ controversy and cites Eustathius as a precedent for pro-Nestorian views. This suggests that we should be a little cautious of the picture he gives us, though, as the epitome of *Ariomanitas* testifies, there is much truth in the depiction of Eustathius as proto-Nestorian.²⁸⁹

It should also be noted that Theodoret here approaches his topic via anthropology, and therefore asks many of the same questions as I ask. His selection is biased, but it does provide a wealth of material from which it is legitimate to draw cautious conclusions about Eustathius’ anthropology.

*Inscriptio titulorum*

There are several fragments apparently deriving from a Eustathian work on the Psalms which is difficult to date. One fragment [D62] is preserved in Theodoret’s *Eranistes*. Declerck suggests that a further two fragments [D63ab, D64c] are preserved in *Collectio Coisliniana in Genesim*.²⁹⁰ Fragment 64 is also reproduced in two separate ninth-century iconodule works by Nicephorus of Constantinople. The introductions to these fragments vary but all carry attributions to Eustathius and include the claim that the fragment in question is taken from a writing τῆς στηλογραφίας. Significantly, this phrase is found in Theodoret, who almost certainly had direct access to the work in question, and it seems to be presented as a title. It seems likely that a Eustathian work of this title did exist.

²⁹⁰ Declerck, *Eustathii*, p.CCXXXIII.
Sellers has rejected the authenticity of the *Collectio* fragments because their exegesis is allegorical.\textsuperscript{291} As argued above, this argument is problematic, and allegorical/typological exegesis is attested in *Ariomanitas*. Spanneut has noted many Eustathian characteristics in these fragments.\textsuperscript{292} Declerck observes many further examples of distinctively Eustathian language. For example, the incarnation is described as ναούργια.\textsuperscript{293} The Eustathian authorship of these fragments is therefore fairly certain. The titles introducing all three fragments appear to be variations of each other, and *Inscriptio titulorum* is not one of Eustathius’ better known works. It is therefore likely that the two fragments in *Collectio* are, indeed, from the work cited by Theodoret, fragment D62.

Declerck has noted a previously unattested fragment on Psalm 55 [D129] attributed to Eustathius in an eighth-century work. He has convincingly established that the language and style of the fragment are Eustathian, and notes that, as Eustathian work was still circulating in the eighth century, the author plausibly had access to it.\textsuperscript{294} Declerck notes that fragment D129 could come from *Inscriptio titulorum*, but seems dubious.\textsuperscript{295} We must be aware of this possibility.

\textsuperscript{291} Sellers, *Eustathius*, p.68.
\textsuperscript{292} Spanneut, *Recherces*, p.66-67.
\textsuperscript{293} Declerck, *Eustathi*, p.CCXXXV. Compare D64:25 with D85:4 [*Ps. 92*].
\textsuperscript{294} Ibid, p.CCCXXVI.
\textsuperscript{295} Ibid, p.CCCXXVI.
In Psalmum 92

There are four extant fragments of this work, three preserved in Eranistes [D85-87], and one in Severus of Antioch [D88]. Severus selects a passage on the unity of God in order to persuade Sergius the grammarian that there must be some plurality of properties in Christ.\textsuperscript{296} This could imply that In Ps. 92 was relatively inoffensive to Severus, who would not wish to present Eustathius as Nestorian. However, Severus’ quotation is intended to emphasise division in Christ at least relative to his reader, and is also partly defiant in insisting that a passage, and even an interpretation of it, that lends itself to divisive Christology actually fits within a ‘monophysite’ framework. Severus’ use of these fragments does not undermine the impression that Theodoret would give us, that the work they derive from was basically dyohypostatic Christologically.

It is difficult to date this work exactly; Sellers has argued that it must have been written before the controversy because it does not mention ‘Arian’ opponents, but this is a weak argument because, as Declerck notes, each fragment is quite short.\textsuperscript{297} It probably dates before Nicaea: in D88, Eustathius insists upon “one hypostasis” in God, which suggests that he is probably writing after the outbreak of the ‘Arian’ controversy. Although, as we can establish from Enastrimytho, this phrase would have been perfectly consistent with his early doctrine of God, the

\textsuperscript{296} D88. See Pauline Allen and Robert Hayward, Severus of Antioch (London, Routledge, 2004), pp.42-44.
\textsuperscript{297} Sellers, Eustathies, pp.71-72, Declerck Eustathii, p.CCCCIX.
reference to “one hypostasis” is a specific and relatively technical articulation of
divine unity that suggests this unity had been directly challenged. However, the
nature of Eustathius’ opponents is undefined. Eustathius thus seems to have written
In Ps. 92 when he was aware of a subordinationist theological challenge but did not
yet regard it as a significant politico-ecclesial threat. Sara Parvis argues that
Alexander and his allies originally planned to hold the council that became Nicaea
325 in Ancyra and to use it to exclude the ‘Eusebian’ party; this changed when
Constantine hijacked the council.298 In this case, Eustathius may not have been as
worried by the Eusebian party before 325. It is plausible that Eustathius is writing in
response Alexander’s letter, *He Philarchos*. Eustathius’ θεὸς ἐκ θεοῦ is a logical
response to Alexander’s claim that Arius taught that the Son was not the Son of God
“by nature”, although, as X from X language was used in diverse ways by theological
opponents in the ‘Arian controversy’, it was not necessarily a successful response.299
Given the fragmentary nature of the sources, this dating must remain speculative.

*In inscriptiones Psalmorum graduum*

Three fragments from a work on psalms 119-133 are preserved in *Eranistes*,
and Abramowski posited an additional Syriac fragment [D84] ostensibly from a work
on the psalms. It is found with four other ostensibly Eustathian fragments in a pro-
Nestorian florilege containing some works of Gregory of Nazianzus and is quoted to

298 Parvis, *Marcellus*, pp.76-78. The original intention of holding the council in Ancyra is
uncontroversial.
299 Though the phrase is used in the creed of Nicaea, this does not suggest that Eustathius was
referencing it. C.f. Michel Barnes, *The Power of God: Δυναμείς in Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian
Theology* (Washington D.C., Catholic University of America Press, 2001), p.119. See *He Philarchos*
13.
demonstrate Eustathius’ support for dyohypostatic Christology. Declerck finds its putative origin plausible. Two of the fragments preserved in *Gregor-Scholien* are attested, as Eustathian fragments, in another Syriac translation, which renders the claim of their Eustathian authorship reasonably reliable. Declerck notes that, although subordinationism is not overtly mentioned, Eustathius refers to Christ’s glory in a manner very similar to that in *Contra Arianos*, and consequently dates this work after 320. The tone is very similar to *In Ps. 92*, so it seems likely that this work dates 320-325. We should note that all of the fragments from this work are preserved by those who wish to present Eustathius as Nestorian.

*Contra Ariomanitas et de anima*

The nature of this work was contested in earlier scholarship. Cavallera, among others, argued that it was a single work divided into two parts, the first addressing the relationship between the body and the soul and the second refuting ‘Arian’ *logos-sarx* Christology. Sellers and Spanneut have both posited two separate works, *de anima contra philosophos* and *de anima contra arianos*. In this case, the former would have been written before the ‘Arian’ controversy began. These arguments are interesting in themselves but have been superseded by Declerck. He has established that pseudo-Nyssene ἐπιτομή τοῦ κατὰ Αρειομανιτῶν

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301 Declerck, *Eustathii*, p.CCCCVIII.
303 Declerck, *Eustathii*, p.CCCCCVIII.
βιβλίου καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς is in fact a compilation of extracts from the Eustathian *Contra Ariomanitas*, thereby demonstrating that it is a single work.\(^{306}\) This discovery adds many new fragments to *Ariomanitas* but is incontrovertible; pseudo-Gregory contains many fragments attested elsewhere and generally accepted as part of *Ariomanitas*, including many preserved by Theodoret.

Cavallera suggested that fragment D151 may come from *de anima* which, within Declerck’s newly established framework, would make it part of *Ariomanitas*.\(^{307}\) Declerck rejects the Eustathian authorship of D151, acknowledging that its contents would fit but arguing that the language and style are untypical of Eustathius. He allows an exception to this in the phrase κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Δαυὶδ ὑμνολογίαν.\(^{308}\) Declerck is right that the syntax of this fragment is unusually simple for Eustathius, but, in a relatively short extract, a few surprisingly banal phrases are insufficient to establish that the text is apocryphal. D151 could be Eustathian, but, even if it is, any connection with *Ariomanitas* must remain speculative.

Declerck argues that a Eustathian follower, wishing to spread Eustathius’ ideas, added Gregory’s name to the text because he was a less controversial figure but had good relations with the Eustathian community in Antioch and was a sufficiently noteworthy name to draw attention to the text.\(^{309}\) This is plausible. In this case, the work’s title, as attached to the epitome - κατὰ Ἀρειομανιτῶν βιβλίου

\(^{306}\) Declerck, *Eustathii*, pp.CLIV-CLXXXI.
\(^{307}\) Cavallera, *Homilia*, p.87.
\(^{308}\) Declerck, *Eustathii*, p.CCCXXXVI.
καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς - may have been added with the false attribution to Gregory of Nyssa. However, it is more likely to be Eustathius’ own, because the term ‘Ariomanitas’ probably is. It is probably an earlier designation than ‘Arianism’, which it in some ways resembles. The word ‘Ariomanitas’ is, as Parvis notes, a pun on Aries, the god of war: in using it, Eustathius dubs his opponents as ‘those stirring up war around Arius’ rather than ‘followers of Arius’.310 The conception of the Eusebian alliance as ‘followers of Arius’ is made typical by Athanasius’ deliberate construction of the heresy of ‘Arianism’ in his Orations against the Arians.311 ‘Ariomanitas’ is a criticism that does not give Arius himself the same status.

It is possible that Eustathius was a principal source of the Orations’ conception of Arianism; Lewis Ayres plausibly suggests that the ‘construction of Arianism’ began with Eustathius and Marcellus, and that they influenced Athanasius.312 There was opportunity for this to occur, as all three were present at Nicaea. It would fit with Parvis’ thesis that Marcellus and Athanasius constructed ‘Arianism’ together whilst in Rome.313 Fought over as it was in heresiological disputes, one would expect references to ‘Arianism’ as a clearly-defined heresiological school to be well-represented by all those selecting the fragments, so we can, for once, trust the sources available to us in their relative scarcity of references to ‘Arianism’. This conception of Ariomanitas is partially borne out by the

309 Ibid, pp.CLXXIII-CLXXIV.
310 Parvis, Marcellus, p.180.
313 Parvis, Marcellus, pp.180-192.
text; within it, Eustathius, clearly constructs a narrative in which a particular, coherent group of people promote subordinationism, trying to advance it within the church. According to Ariomanitas, these people have not only a unified aim, but a unified strategy. This is evident in fragment D19. A relatively short version of this fragment [D19b] is preserved by Theodoret, and hints at a sense of deliberate intrigue:

Why do they consider it so important to show that Christ took up a soulless body, forming old wives deceptions? In order that, if they may be able to gradually corrupt some people, decreeing that these things are so, in this case having attached the alterations involved in passions to the divine Spirit, they might easily persuade them, as the mutable is not begotten from the nature of the immutable.

This passage from Theodoret is elucidated by the longer (though probably less accurate) fragment from the epitome (D19a), of which I take a section:

...they not only declare that the child of God was half god, but also [that he was] half human. And they do this in order that, having attached the alterations involved in passions to the divine spirit, they might seduce the simpler people recklessly, as the mutable is not begotten from the nature of the immutable. For if someone should grant to them that Christ did not take up a soul, they reply: 'What then is the thing dwelling inside the tabernacle that is passionately grieved? Isn’t it the very Spirit of wisdom? And if it is grieved and cries and becomes tired, it is capable of passions. And if it undergoes passion and changes, how then may we say that that which undergoes passions is begotten from the passionless?'

There is no reason to doubt that this is roughly how Eustathius’ original text continued; Theodoret quotes the fragment in order to establish the immutability of

314 The text here has the sense both of being grieved by passions in a technical sense, and of being greatly grieved. It is problematic to render this combination.
315 D19a:21-32.
the Word, so he had already said what was most useful to him. We have, then, the seeds of Athanasius’ narrative of Arianism: a unified, self-aware, calculating and duplicitous ecclesial-political faction promoting subordinationism and trying to lure the wider church away from ‘orthodoxy.’ However, certain aspects of Athanasius’ mature narrative are missing: Arius is not mentioned in Ariomanitas, and the word ‘Ariomanitas’ only appears there four times. Eustathius probably did influence the Athanasiand conception of ‘Arianism’, but Athanasius and Marcellus probably developed it further.

This text clearly post-dates Nicaea: it is here that Eustathius accuses his opponents of anathematising themselves because they are denying doctrines which they had “agreed to in the assembly.” Eustathius refers on two other occasions to the doctrines enshrined in the Creed of Nicaea. It therefore seems likely that Nicaea was important to the ‘Arian’ controversy in its immediate aftermath, or that Eustathius was trying to make it important. The implication that the pro-Arians are causing war in the church immediately after the Council of Nicaea supports Parvis’ thesis that Eustathius felt that Alexander’s cohort had failed to control the Eusebian party at the council. Apparently, Eustathius began to see the Eusebian alliance as a serious politico-ecclesial threat. This attitude could plausibly

317 D6:5.
318 This picture of Nicaea’s role in the Trinitarian controversies immediately following it is somewhat at odds with that recently suggested by Matthew Steenberg. In his God and man: theology as anthropology from Irenaeus to Athanasius (London, T and T Clark, 2009), p.111, Steenberg suggests both that the council was unimportant in its immediate aftermath, but that Athanasius later gave it importance when constructing the history of the Trinitarian controversies. This thesis has some merit, but must be modified to include Eustathius.
319 See below on discussion of In Proverbia 8:22.
accompany either Eustathius’ attack on ‘pro-Arians’ in his see directly after Nicaea or the machinations of the pro-Arian party that led to Eustathius’ deposition. It is therefore difficult to place within this period.

Eusebius of Caesarea and Theodotus of Laodicea are probably Eustathius’ particular targets in *Ariomanitas*. We know that Eustathius engaged in a pamphlet war with Eusebius around the time of writing.\(^{320}\)

Certain passages within *Ariomanitas* seem to be particularly directed against Eusebius of Caesarea. Specifically, there are passages that attack putative Platonism explicitly. Admittedly, this may be a wider attack on what Eustathius perceived as Platonising tendencies within his opponents’ thought systems. This would be congruent, after all, with his sustained attack on Origen in *Engastrimytho*.\(^{321}\) Nonetheless, some passages seem to address specifically Eusebius’ *Preparatio Evangelica*. These concern Plato’s doctrine of the soul. Eustathius attacks Plato both for his belief in the transmigration of souls and for his belief in the unoriginated nature of souls. Both of these criticisms were made by Eusebius of Caesarea, Eustathius’ fierce rival, in *Praeparatio Evangelica*, as a codicil to his generally positive attitude to Plato.

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\(^{320}\) Socrates, *H. E.* (CPG, 6028), 1.23.6-8; Sozomen, *H. E.* (CPG, 6030), 2.18.3-4.

\(^{321}\) Although Eustathius’ attitude to Plato in this work is ambiguous. See below.
Furthermore, Eustathius follows Eusebius in saying that the idea of transmigration comes from Egyptian thought.\textsuperscript{322} There are several reasons to think that Eustathius got this directly from Eusebius: firstly, Eustathius incorporates the claim about Egyptian derivation into a passage that paraphrases Irenaeus, who himself does not mention it.\textsuperscript{323} Secondly, in Eusebius, the Egyptian origin of belief in transmigration acts as an excuse for Plato because it suggests that it is alien to his mode of thought. This function is redundant in Eustathius, who never claims to like Plato. He doesn’t want to excuse Plato. Eustathius brings up the Egyptian myths because he is quoting Eusebius’ own words back at him and arguing that Eusebius’ theology in fact does imply Platonism. Additionally, several passages in \textit{Ariomanitas} draw heavily, and in detail, on ancient physiology and medicine. Kelley Spoerl has recently argued that this is because Eustathius is aiming partly at Theodotus, who was a doctor, and a close associate of Eusebius.\textsuperscript{324} This is a plausible explanation of Eustathius’ focus on physiology, and complements the evidence pointing towards Eusebius of Caesarea as Eustathius’ main target in this work.

This work aims not just at pro-Arianism, but at \textit{logos-sarx} Christology, which is hardly unique to it. (Here, the term ‘\textit{logos-sarx} Christology’ refers to the idea that

\textsuperscript{322} Eustathius, D31:17-18; Eusebius, \textit{P.E.} (CPG, 3486), 13.16. I explored Eustathius’ engagement with Eusebius in this passage in a paper given at the 16\textsuperscript{th} international patristics conference, Oxford 2011: “So-called Platonism and the humanity of Christ in Eustathius of Antioch.” Portions of the subsequent discussion are taken from this paper.

\textsuperscript{323} C.f. \textit{A.H.} (CPG, 1306), 2.33.1-3 and discussion in chapter 2.

\textsuperscript{324} This argument appeared in a paper given at the 16th International Patristics Conference, Oxford 2011: “Eustathius of Antioch on Jesus’ digestion.”
the Word took up a body/ flesh without a soul).\textsuperscript{325} One of the primary reasons for this is probably revealed in the above-quoted D19ab, as Hanson has argued.\textsuperscript{326} If the Word is the subject of passion in Christ, the Word is not really God. However, Eustathius’ disagreement with his opponents on this point must be rather more complex than Hanson allows, partly because Hanson’s reconstruction of pro-Arian theology as one based on the suffering of the Word is unpersuasive. This is a reconstruction that he shares with Maurice Wiles.

Certainly, a clearly articulated *logos-sarx* Christology is normative among all those whom Ayres identifies as “Eusebian theologians of the One Unbegotten”, including in Eusebius of Caesarea himself.\textsuperscript{327} The accusation that pro-Arian or Eusebian theology teaches that the Word is passible, and, specifically, suffers, can be found in several places.\textsuperscript{328} However, a concern with the Word’s suffering, is barely evidenced in what remains of pro-Arian writings. For example, it is nowhere mentioned Arius’ *Thalia*, which is primarily concerned with the relationship between the Son and the Father, and the metaphysical questions pertaining to it (rather than soteriological ones).\textsuperscript{329} One of the key pieces of evidence cited by Hanson is the *Homilies on the Psalms*, which first Marcel Richard, and subsequently Wiles and

\textsuperscript{325} This is admittedly a rather nebulous definition, as “flesh” can have a multiplicity of meanings in patristic usage, and because it is not always clear where someone stands on the subject of Christ’s human soul. In framing the issue in this way, I am framing it as Eustathius’ did, which gives us the best chance of understanding how it operates in his work.

\textsuperscript{326} Hanson, *The Search*, p.212. See also my introduction.


\textsuperscript{328} Notably in *He Philarchos*, and Athanasius later lists this as a characteristic of ‘Arianism’ in his *C. Ar.* (CPG, 2093), III.26.

\textsuperscript{329} A portion of Arius’ *Thalia* is preserved (perhaps inaccurately) in Athanasius, *De Synodis* (CPG, 2128), 2.15.
Gregg had attributed to Asterius the Sophist. These homilies are, admittedly, concerned with the suffering of God. However, Wolfram Kinzig argued persuasively against the thesis that their author was coming from a subordinationist position.

The Homilies, if anything, rather undermine the Hanson-Wiles thesis, in that they probably date from the fourth century, but don’t seem amenable to a ‘Eusebian’ theological position.

The most famous example of an explicit connection between logos-sarx Christology and the Word’s suffering is the creed generally attributed to Eudoxius (c300-370), bishop of Antioch and then Constantinople (This creed must substantially postdate Ariomanitas): “the whole person was one, composite nature. He was passible through the economy, for, if only soul and body had suffered, he could not have saved the world. Let them answer, then, how this passible and mortal person could be of one substance with God who is beyond these things: suffering and death.” Hanson and Wiles have magnified the importance of an idea, but they have not altogether invented it. Eustathius was almost certainly writing before the production of this creed, but it illustrates a lot of what he is worrying about. Hanson,


331 Wolfram Kinzig, In search of Asterius: studies on the authorship of the Homilies on the Psalms (Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990). Gavrilyuk has also more recently summarised the arguments against their Asterian authorship in his Suffering, pp.121-3.


333 The text can be found in August Hahn (ed.), Bibliothek der Symbole und Glaubensregeln der alten Kirche (Breslau, E. Morgenstern, 1897), 261, 262.
as noted, also cites Eustathius’ fragment D19 in evidence, and he is justified in doing so. Eustathius is not in general a reliable source for pro-Arian theology, but in this case we may trust that he is recording a real phenomenon; otherwise he has written an entire anti-Arian work that has no bearing on pro-Arian theology. 334 The existence of the Eudoxian Creed renders it perfectly plausible that a similar take on strongly subordinationist theology existed in the earlier portion of the ‘Arian’ controversy. It must, furthermore, be admitted that an interest in the Word’s creation in time is perfectly consistent with a concern for his passibility in time and, in arguing against Hanson’s thesis, we are making arguments from the omission of an idea from a very fragmented corpus.

Nonetheless, Eustathius’ focus on this relatively insignificant element of pro-Arian theology does not seem to be merited by pro-Arian theology itself, and must be sought elsewhere.

Eusebius of Caesarea, whom I have identified as a primary target of Ariomanitas, is himself rather circumspect about the Word becoming passible in the incarnation; though he subordinates the Word to the Father in a way that allies him with Arius, he tends nonetheless to see the Word as impassible, arguing that the Word was unconstrained in the incarnation. For example, he writes that the Word

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334 It is important to distinguish between having no bearing on pro-Arian theology and misrepresenting or misunderstanding it. Eustathius does misrepresent the Word’s suffering in even that portion of pro-Arianism concerned with it, as I argue later in this discussion.
“shared what belonged to him, but did not receive what belonged to others.”\(^{335}\) This might well suggest that *Ariomanitas* is also aimed at other pro-Arian theologians of a rather different stripe to Eusebius – the elusive figures who adhered to the passibility of the Word in the incarnation. However, I do not think it right to conclude that others are the *main* targets of this work, whilst the sections aimed specifically at Eusebius are asides jibing the man with whom Eustathius was engaging in a polemical writing match elsewhere. Rather, Eusebius is a target in Eustathius’ attack on theopaschite *logos-sarx* theology partly because Eustathius’ own anthropology leads him sincerely to see divine passibility implied in *logos-sarx* Christology. His attack on Eusebius in *Ariomanitas* suggests that he has misunderstood Eusebius, but not necessarily to the extent of believing that Eusebius trumpeted a suffering God – rather, in assuming that he must believe in one despite himself. Eustathius accuses Eusebius of allying himself with those who do think that the Word suffered in the incarnation, and therefore hopes to elucidate the danger involved in pro-Arian theology.

We can better appreciate how it is that Eustathius saw such a theology, so clearly, in the theology of Eusebius if we appreciate his conception of the soul. This topic is discussed extensively in chapter 3, and a brief sketch suffices for the moment. Eustathius regards the soul as passible. Where the Word is said to suffer “through the economy”, as in the Eudoxian Creed, this is a heightened version of the idea that the soul suffers through the body. For Eustathius, the vivifying principle in a human being *must* be passible in itself, because this is how human passions work.

\(^{335}\) Eusebius, *D.E.* (CPG, 3487), 7.1.23.
Logos-sarx Christology therefore immediately leads to either the native passibility of the Word, or docetism. So, Eustathius lays out the conceptual options for Christ’s suffering as follows:

What…is a better explanation? To say that the body suffers apart from the soul, whilst it is not able to obtain for itself, according to itself, one sensible perception? Or that a mutable thing and the divine Spirit are constrained to be in harmony? Or that a soul is joined together with the body? Or he suffered in seeming and not in truth all the things at to the time of suffering, and before the cross the lord did not receive the passions that are natural and unexceptionable?  

Eustathius, it should be noted, must have been aware that many of his allies also espoused logos-sarx Christologies and, evidently, ignores this fact in Ariomanitas. This confirms what the title, together with the context of the text would suggest – that his immediate concern for the doctrine of God is primary in Ariomanitas, although his manner of defending the Word’s divinity is driven by his anthropology.  

Contra Arianos

The authorship of these fragments is virtually uncontested. The nature and length of the work is, however, uncertain. Theodoret cites nine fragments from Contra Arianos in Pentalogos, the Greek original of which is now lost; the work is,

336 D9:5-12. I further discuss this fragment, and certain of my decisions about its translation, in my discussion of passions in chapter 3.
337 Eustathius evidently did believe that the Word was, in some sense, passible at some point in his earlier career, as I discuss in chapter 5.
however, preserved in Latin, having been appended to Pope Gelasius’ *De duabus in Christo naturis*. Other fragments appear in Latin in *Facundus Hermian*, an anti-monophysite work from c547, and in *Doctrina Patrum*, a late seventh-century heresiological catalogue with a strong anti-monophysite thrust for which Gelasius was probably the source. Three short fragments were quoted by Eulogius of Alexandria and preserved, in turn, by Photius. Photius reports that he found them in a work divided into two parts; the first half was a defence of the Tome of Leo, the second half a critique of what Severus of Antioch and Timothy Aelurus had said about the Tome.\(^3\)\(^{38}\) These fragments were, therefore, also selected to support an anti-monophysite agenda. One fragment is preserved in John of Damascus’s *Sacra Parallela*. Most of these fragments have thus been chosen by people wishing to emphasise divisive Christology.

*In Proverbia 8:22*

What remains of this work is preserved almost entirely in Theodoret, across all three sections of *Eranistes* and, in the case of one fragment [D79], in *Historia Ecclesiastica*. Theodoret’s interest in this text is unsurprising. From *De Fide*, it is clear that Eustathius argued against the ‘pro-Arian’ application of the phrase “the lord created me…” to the Word by applying it to Christ’s humanity.\(^3\)\(^{39}\) This results in extremely divisive Christology evidenced in the fragments of *In Proverbia 8:22* [*Proverbia 8:22*].\(^3\)\(^{40}\) Theodoret, however, has removed it from its defensive exegetical context. Two further fragments from this work [D80, D81] are preserved

\(^3\)\(^{38}\) Declerck, *Eustathii*, pp.CCLXXX-CCLXXXI.
in a Syriac work. Two of the fragments in Theodoret are attested elsewhere; D65 and D70, which Spanneut noticed in a twelfth-century chain on Luke’s Gospel. Additionally, *Gregory-Scholien* cites two of its five fragments as from this work [D80, D81b]. The further two follow directly, noting only “from the same.” Declerck wonders whether the latter two are also from *Proverbia 8:22* but notes that there is no real evidence that they are. Whilst it is possible that these fragments are from *Proverbia 8.22*, the weight of the evidence is against this possibility; whilst the introduction to D81b asserts that it is “from the same, from the same book” D124 is introduced only as “from the same” and D126 says “from the same *Mar Eustathius*.” “From the same” refers specifically to Eustathius and not the work of origin in the case of D81b, suggesting it may well in the latter two instances. Further, the two later fragments, though brief, do seem less emphatic about dyohypostatic Christology than *Proverbia 8:22*. As they are very short, this observation cannot be grounds for concluding that they are not from *Proverbia 8.22*, but it is, on balance, improbable. This work was certainly written after Nicaea, because, as I argued in chapter 1, fragment D79 complains about the pro-Arians duplicity there.

Loofs speculated that *Proverbia 8:22* may form part of *Contra Arianos* and Cavallera suggested that it and *De Fide* were a single work. Neither suggestion is

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339 D110.
340 C.f. D65.
342 C.f. Abramawoksi’s text, pp.145-6 [Syriac], p.166 [Latin translation].
343 Declerck, *Eustathii*, p.CCXII.
entirely impossible but both are unlikely: Proverbs 8:22 is evidently a focus of much of Eustathius’ anti-‘Arian’ writing as it was a central passage in the Trinitarian controversies. Consequently, scholars have sometimes been tempted to amalgamate different anti-‘Arian’ tracts; whilst all three works cohere theologically, Proverbia 8:22 is markedly different in tone, focusing more on God’s nature and attributes, particularly with reference to metaphysical questions, than Christ’s place in soteriology.\textsuperscript{345} It is also likely that several works that could be circulated fairly rapidly would be more useful to Alexander’s alliance in the period c325-327 than a few monolithic works.

\textit{De Fide Contra Arianos}

Severus of Antioch preserved four fragments from a single anti-‘Arian’ writing in a work against John the Grammarian. He introduces D109 as an extract from the work Eustathius wrote “against the Arians on the faith” and each successive fragment he introduces with the phrase “from the same” making a further reference to writing “against the Arians” before D110. Here Severus argues that Eustathius’ apparent Nestorianism is the consequence of his anti-Arian context.\textsuperscript{346} He therefore quotes Eustathius referring to \textit{ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ Χριστοῦ} in order to establish that there was not a time when the Word was not. These fragments are uncontested.

\textsuperscript{345} For example, in \textit{Prov. 8:22}, Eustathius writes that, “if the Word received a beginning of his generation, when, at the time after he had passed through his mother’s womb, he bore a bodily frame, it stands that he was ‘born of woman.’ But if we say that the Word and God was beside the Father from the beginning, and we say that ‘everything came to be through him’, then the one who is, and is the cause of all things that are made was not ‘born of woman.’ ” [D65a:1-6]. By contrast, \textit{Arianos} repeatedly demonstrates a concern for the actions of “the human being of Christ”. C.f. D93a:1-3: “the God-bearing human being, who decided voluntarily to sustain the passion of death himself because of its usefulness to human beings, received the prize of the contest…”

\textsuperscript{346} C.f. Declerck, \textit{Eustathii}, p.CCCLXIII.
Cavallera and Spanneut argue that the otherwise unplaceable D128, preserved in *The Chain of Polychronius on Proverbs* is part of the same work because D110 appears to be a slightly different version of the opening lines of the longer D128.\(^{347}\) Declerck is unconvinced, arguing that only the first phrase resembles an exact translation. However, Declerck’s normally excellent linguistic analysis is less reliable here because he is looking at a translation from Syriac. Spanneut’s theory is fairly persuasive: D110 seems to be at least a very close paraphrase of D128. The argument produced by amalgamating D128 and D110 is also typical of Eustathius’ anti-‘Arian’ theology. Having quoted Proverbs 8:22 and applied it to Christ’s humanity, D128 focuses on the soteriological value of Christ’s humanity. As Scheidweiler notes, this is a typical implication of ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ Χριστοῦ, which is used in the Syriac fragment.\(^{348}\) The thrust of *De Fide*, if D128 is included, is similar to the Eustathius we see elsewhere, such as in *Contra Arianos*, D93. D128 is therefore probably part of the same work as D109-D112. It is therefore necessary to amend Declerck’s order of the fragments to insert D128 between D110 and D111.

Cavallera argued that these fragments were part of *Proverbia 8:22* on the basis of their concern with this passage.\(^{349}\) Spanneut notes this view but reserves judgement.\(^{350}\) He considers that *De Fide* and *Contra Arianos* may be the same work.\(^{351}\) Severus does not reference such a work in introducing them. Cavallera is unaware of D109, and its introductory note “on the faith”, which has provided an

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\(^{347}\) Spanneut, *Recherches*, p.51; Cavallera, *Homilia*, pp.77-78.

\(^{348}\) Scheidweiler, “Die Fragmente des Eustathios”, p.76.

\(^{349}\) Cavallera, *Homilia*, p.77.

\(^{350}\) Spanneut, *Recherches*, p.75.
alternative title. Declerck seems to regard the introduction as proof that that they come from a work titled De Fide Contra Arianos.\textsuperscript{352} The reference to “the faith” is not as conclusive as Declerck seems to think as it could plausibly be a description of either Proverbia 8:22 or Contra Arianos. As noted above, the fragments designated De Fide carry a different emphasis to Proverbia 8:22; if this is not a separate work, it is more likely to be part of Contra Arianos. The title of this work is uncertain.

Miscellany

Two other fragments attributed to Eustathius [D139, D140] appear in Chain of Polychronius on Ecclesiastes. Whilst the compiler of Polychronius on Proverbs clearly did have some access to Eustathian writings, his attributions to Eustathius have proved unreliable.\textsuperscript{353} These fragments are controverted in modern scholarship. Sellers is dubious about them because they appear in the frequently unreliable catenae.\textsuperscript{354} Spanneut saw insufficient reason to reject them whilst Declerck, though eschewing Sellers’ method, agrees with him on this point.\textsuperscript{355} Declerck’s argument is convincing: in the considerable manuscript evidence for these fragments, D139 is rarely attributed to Eustathius, and D140 is in fact an amalgamation of two phrases from Gregory of Nyssa.\textsuperscript{356} As many Eustathian works have been confused with Gregory’s works, further misattributions become more probable. Declerck’s observation about D140 thus gives a plausible explanation for how the fragment

\textsuperscript{351} Spanneut, “Eustathe d’Antioche”, col. 20.
\textsuperscript{352} Declerck, Eustathii, p.CCCCXI.
\textsuperscript{353} See above on In Proverbia, p.10.
\textsuperscript{354} Sellers, Eustathius, pp.70-71.
\textsuperscript{355} Spanneut Recherches p.51, p.81; Declerck, Eustathii, p.CCLIV.
\textsuperscript{356} Declerck, Eustathii, p.CCLIV.
came to be attributed to Eustathius. Neither of these fragments is likely to be Eustathian.

**Conclusion**

We have evidence of eight Eustathian works probably dating from before the ‘Arian’ controversy, one – *Melchisedek* – as it was about to break out, and two from c320-325 and either three or four works probably written between c325-327, as the separate identity of *De Fide* and *Contra Arianos* is unclear. *Inscriptio titulorum* is undatable, and there are additionally several miscellaneous fragments. It is very unlikely that any of the surviving writings were written after Eustathius left Antioch. The exegetical emphasis of Eustathius’ earlier career is central to his anti-Arian polemic.

I can now construct a methodology on the basis of which to proceed. Evidently, the emphasis that a particular extract appears to carry is an unreliable indication of Eustathius’ focus. Where it was most useful to those preserving the fragments, the arguments presented may be subsidiary to the thread of Eustathius’ original narrative. Where many fragments from a writing remain, we can cautiously piece together the thrust of an argument. This method is most reliable and useful where a particular treatise is preserved in multiple works, so that no one individual has presented it. Nonetheless, it should be noted that Theodoret of Cyrus does not intend an exposition of Eustathius’ work; whilst he must have been concerned to present Eustathius as consistent, he is not primarily attempting to present the full
arguments of the works that he quotes. Therefore, although Theodoret’s selection of subject-matter will considerably skew the thrust of the narrative, we should not assume that any apparent structure is deliberately constructed, irrespective of the faithfulness of any construction to Eustathius.

There was a marked shift in Eustathius’ Christology as a result of the ‘Arian’ controversy but how much this signals a change of mind rather than emphasis is unclear because of the circumstances in which the sources were selected. Both Theodoret and his ‘monophysite’ opponents focused on very specific arguments in Eustathius, but the fragments point towards more theological richness in the complete writings. This is significant for the way we use Eustathian Christology to construct his conception of the relationship between the human body and soul. As anthropology was not a key factor in determining that he develop a divisive Christology, we can best understand his anthropology by looking for continuity in the anthropological implications of his Christology. As his tone is overwhelmingly polemical, and divisive Christology is at least partly a defensive manoeuvre, I shall be cautious in constructing theological systems around bold Christological statements, especially in short extracts where we cannot tell how his argument develops.

Regarding theological anthropology, elements of Eustathius’ theology that do not appear to be directly combative of pro-Arian doctrine are more significant; whilst Eustathius did, apparently, incorporate the conclusions of his defensive arguments
into his wider theology to some extent, *Engastrimytho* shows us that, in polemic, Eustathius tended to make bold statements without fully integrating their implications into his wider theology. Arguments that are directly defensive, such as Eustathian exegesis of Proverbs 8:22, are less significant than they otherwise might have been. I have observed substantial continuity in Eustathius’ theology before and after the outbreak of the ‘Arian’ controversy; my examination of *Engastrimytho* suggests that Eustathius narrowed the range of ways in which he described Christology after c322, more than developing a fresh understanding. Therefore, I will look for common threads across different periods of Eustathius’ life in order to piece together his anthropology.
Chapter 3: Body and soul in Eustathius’ anthropology

This chapter examines the human body and soul, and the relationship between them, in Eustathius’ thought.

Eustathius showed a keen interest in the nature of the human soul, and its relationship to the human body, in Ariomanitas, where his argument against logos-sarx Christology is overridingly anthropological. Eustathius’ conception of the soul and body is, correspondingly, well thought-out and broadly coherent. This chapter argues that this conception remained remarkably consistent in the face of significant changes to his Christology and for this reason I have approached it thematically rather than chronologically.

First, I consider Eustathius’ conception of the body and soul and their interaction with regard to human action. Eustathius’ anthropology is, consistently, literally dualistic in the sense that the body and soul are composed of different, and even radically opposed, substances. This dualism draws specifically on categories typical of Platonic metaphysics – intelligible and perceptible. However, the agency of body and soul is extremely integrated in his account of human action and Eustathius often describes the interrelation of body and soul in terms that echo an Aristotelian hylomorphism – that is, an understanding of the soul as the form of the body.
His view of body-soul interaction owes more to Aristotle than to Plato, though we can only appreciate how this is so if we also appreciate the complex relationship between Platonism and Aristotelianism in late antique readings of them. When referring to Platonism and Aristotelianism here, I refer to strands of thought that can be identified either in Plato and Aristotle respectively, or in those who avowedly draw on them. In reference to Platonism, I am here chiefly concerned with the use of ‘perceptible’ and ‘intelligible’ as central metaphysical categories. With regards to body-soul relations, I take it that, in Platonism, the body is perceptible, the soul is intelligible. With reference to Aristotelianism, I am chiefly concerned with its fairly integrated account of the relationship between body and soul and its tendency to see this relationship as that of matter to form. Unless otherwise stated, it is to these features of Platonism and Aristotelianism that I am referring.

Eustathius has both a strong sense of the distinction of body and soul and a strong sense of the unity of the person. He often suggests that the body and soul together comprise the agent in the person, which problematises a purely dualistic account. Eustathius’ attempts to reconcile substance dualism with hylomorphism may echo Aristotle himself and certainly reflect various contemporary efforts to synthesise Aristotle’s thought with Plato’s.

357 See my discussion on the nature of Ariomanitas, and the scholarship surrounding it, in chapter 2.
359 Herbert Granger has a detailed discussion on this aspect of Aristotle’s account of body-soul relations in his Aristotle’s idea of the soul, Philosophical Studies Series 68 (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996). See also below.
360 I identify other, highly related, areas in which Eustathius draws on Aristotelianism – for example, in physiology; again, the term ‘Aristotelian’ in these cases refers to ideas identified in Aristotle or those avowedly drawing on him. Parallel passages in Aristotle are noted.
I then consider body and soul in relation to the passions (πάθος). By passions, I mean emotions, including both psychological experiences of, for example, suffering and feelings of physical need and desire. This requires separate treatment largely because of its singular importance to Eusthalian anthropology. For Eustathius, both body and soul undergo passions in their own right and also appropriately – in contrast to Platonism. Further, Eustathius considers the whole range of human emotions, including grief, as ethically appropriate.

I then examine Eustathius’ picture of the disembodied soul. His account of the disembodied soul, inevitably, offers a much more divisive picture of human agency than is found in other aspects of his anthropology, but largely maintains an integrated approach to human identity. His conception of the resurrection shows both a physically-affirming attitude, and, more specifically, a conception of the body and soul as integrated in the human person.

Eustathius’ ideas on the body and the soul often echo both Irenaeus and Methodius and several times he seems to be positioned with Methodius, directly against Origen. Pointedly, Eustathius agrees with Methodius that embodiment is not

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361 The term ‘passion’, Greek pathos, roughly signifies emotions but can denote a range of things within this. Eustathius does not define his meaning when he writes of pathos, so it is difficult to do so with precision. I expand on Eustathius’ conception of pathos below. As I will argue below, in describing the human experience passions, Eustathius is very clear that both body and soul are involved. However, an important aspect of his argument is that the body and the soul are equally subjects of suffering. Where, occasionally, he suggests that one is the primary subject of passion, this is the soul (C.f. D7). All of Eustathius’ claims about the passibility of soul and body appear in the context of a person in whom body and soul are united. It is possible that Eustathius regarded the disembodied soul as passible and that the soul is passible irrespective of embodiment, but Eustathius only discusses the issue in relation to an embodied soul.
the cause of sin, and also more generally in seeing the body as intrinsically good. However, his descriptions of the soul owe a lot to Origen. In some ways, this reflects Origen’s not insignificant influence on Methodius himself, but at other times Eustathius seems to give the soul a role in cosmological mediation that is more likely to come directly from Origen. Nonetheless, there are other ways in which Methodius is closer to Origen than Eustathius is. Eustathius’ engagement with Origenism was clearly heavily influenced by Methodius, but was not fully mediated by him.

Metaphysical and cosmological presuppositions and beliefs are germane to the conception of human body and soul. They provide both certain categories within which body and soul are understood, and the wider landscape in which they exist.\(^{362}\) Platonism, unremarkably, was profoundly influential in shaping Eustathius’ metaphysics, but he follows a trajectory that is highly dominant in the fourth century in a particular negotiation of key aspects of Platonism: he interprets God’s uniqueness emphatically in terms of eternity. Only God has always existed. This is not a new idea in Jewish and Christian thought, but it is an idea about which Christians of earlier generations had been rather more ambiguous, and which they had not tended to emphasise to a comparable degree.\(^{363}\) This novel emphasis significantly alters the way in which the intelligible world is conceived, which affects the way that the categories of intelligibility and eternity are negotiated in relation to each other. Eustathius himself rejects the impassibility of the intelligible world out of hand; he divorces the capacity of intelligible things to undergo passion from any

\(^{362}\) Frede and Reis have noted this connection in the introduction to, *Body and soul in ancient philosophy* (Berlin; New York, Walter de Gruyter, 2009), p.2.
connection they have with the physical world. This negotiation with Platonic metaphysics is along the same lines as the wider fourth-century belief that intelligible things can be temporal *in their own right*; both of these subordinate the distinction between perceptible and intelligible things to the distinction between God and everything else. With regards to anthropology, Eustathius’ insistence that the soul is a subject of passion *in its own right* is highly significant for his conception of the soul and its role in the human person’s experiences.

**Body, soul and the person**

Eustathius’ anthropology combines substance dualism with a highly monistic approach to the mechanisms involved in human action and experience. A human being is made up of body and soul, which are made of sharply distinct substances. However, when body and soul are united, it is the human being who acts, rather than the body or the soul. This section seeks to demonstrate that Eustathius’ conception of the body-soul relationship echoes Platonised Aristotelianism.

As noted in the introduction, Patricio de Navascués has recently examined the philosophical basis of Eustathius’ thought, devoting considerable attention to the soul.\[^{363}\] He argues that Eustathius rejected Platonism but drew heavily on Aristotelianism, though diverging from it in certain respects. Navascués notes three respects in which Eustathius’ diverges from classic Aristotelianism: the definition of the soul as *πνεῦμα*; the use of *κρᾶσις* / *μίξις* in the case of the soul, including the

\[^{363}\] This is discussed in considerable detail later in the chapter.
voûς, and the immanence of divine presence. I do not address the third point in detail as it is not directly anthropologically significant. Navascués suggests that these three ideas show a Stoic influence and echo a particular Stoicising tendency within imperial Aristotelianism. He has made a hugely important contribution to our understanding of Eustathius. In particular, he has observed a tendency in Eustathius to conceive of the body-soul relationship in terms similar to that of Aristotle’s understanding of the relationship between matter and form. However, Eustathius’ explicit attack on Platonism leads Navascués to reject too hastily any possibility of more subtle Platonic influence on Eustathius and, consequently, his account fails to appreciate that Eustathius’ Aristotelianism is shaped more by its grounding in Platonic metaphysics - specifically in its use of the categories ‘perceptible’ and ‘intelligible’ – than by the influence of Stoicism.

A human being: a human body and soul

Human identity is located in the union of body and soul. In Engastrimytho, Eustathius writes that a human being is “one who has a proportionate mixture (κρᾶσιν ἀνάλογον) of both [body and soul].”365 This formula is foundational to Eustathius’ anthropology. It occurs twice more in his writings, both times in Ariomanitas: “[T]he soul does not gush forth tears apart from a body, and nor will a body cry joylessly asunder from a soul, but [the one who cries is] the one who has a

364 Navascués, “El sustrato filosófico.”
365 Engastrimytho, 5.3.
proportionate mixture from both.’”; “the one who has been proportionately mixed with a soul and body is ‘soul-like.’”

Eustathius’ appeals to the mutual importance of the body and the soul to human ontology and identity are informed by a conception of the human person which remained constant throughout the period in which he wrote. This is evident in the comparison of two arguments from different times in his life. The earlier one, which occurs in Engastrimytho, defends the necessity of the body to human nature. The later one, which occurs in Ariomanitas, defends the necessity of the soul. In the first instance, Eustathius is concerned to show that the ‘necromancer’ could not have called up Samuel or any part of him; the ‘necromancer’ could not have summoned Samuel, per se, because Saul did not see whatever she claimed to see, and he would have seen it if whatever it was had a body. If it was without a body “it was not Samuel that she raised up, but the form of a spirit. For Samuel is a being composed of soul and body, since a human being is one who has a proportionate mixture of both.”

Here, Eustathius rejects the possibility of referring to a disembodied human soul as ἄνθρωπος. It is significant that here, in Engastrimytho, Eustathius is specifically attacking Origen, who often treated the soul as the seat of human

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366 D7:6-8, D44:6-7 respectively [Ariomanitas]. In the second instance, Eustathius is putatively reporting a pro-Arian argument in favour of logos-sarx Christology: Adam is soul-like, Christ is spiritual – so where Adam had a soul, Christ had the divine spirit. However, the close similarity with the other passages cited indicates that the wording is his own. Eustathius does not object that Adam was not “one who has been mixed proportionately from body and soul”, but that Christ was also such a one.

367 Engastrimytho, 5.3.
identity, and that Methodius, whom Eustathius revered, attacks the location of human identity exclusively in the soul in his *De Resurrectione*.  

In *Ariomanitas*, he applies an identical exegetical move in reverse. Throughout this work, a body-soul anthropology is an assumption central to Eustathius’ argument that the Word assumed a human soul: “The lord did not take up a half perfect human being.”

Citing John 8.40, he argues that Christ must have had a soul since he referred to himself as ἄνθρωπος. Eustathius demands: “if he did not take up a soul, how is he an ἄνθρωπος?”

In the second case, he was opposing logos-sarx Christology by insisting that, if the Word assumed a human being, this must have included a soul. Eustathius’ latter argument is an inversion of his former argument: in *Enagstrimytho* he argues that a human being must have not only a soul, but also a body; in *Ariomanitas* he argues that a human being must have not only a body, but also a soul.

Key to Eustathius’ attack on logos-sarx Christology is the belief that the souls of human beings are of a specifically human kind. Therefore, Eustathius argues, if the Word acted in place of the soul in Christ, Christ simply was not human.

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368 For example, Origen interprets Genesis 2.7 (LXX) “and ἄνθρωπος became a living ψυχή” to mean that ἄνθρωπος was a ψυχή [De Princ. (CPG, 1482), 2.8.1.]. Eustathius uses the fact that ψυχή often denotes the person to argue in precisely the opposite direction: when Leviticus commands that someone’s ψυχή shall be the subject of punishment, ψυχή cannot be taken in the sense of soul, he argues. The language is therefore figurative and apparent equation between ψυχή and ἄνθρωπος in the Old Testament should not be taken as such. D51:5-37, where Eustathius cites Leviticus 17.10, 24.17, 24.18, Numbers 9.13. On Methodius, C.f, De Res. (CPG, 1812), I.34.4.

369 D11:1-2 [*Ariomanitas*].

370 D19a:19-21, quote 20-21 [*Ariomanitas*]. John 8.40, allegedly quoting Christ, reads, “[B]ut now you seek to kill me, a human being who has spoken the truth to you.”
Eustathius explicitly attacks Platonism for failing to appreciate this point. The humanity, specifically, of human souls, and human bodies, comes out strongly in an attack on transmigration: “There are different and manifold kinds of souls, just as of bodies. Because of this, whilst the small ones die easily, the large ones are resistant, as they have stubbornly undergone trials.” A human body has to have a specifically human soul to go with it, Eustathius argues, because kinds of soul, just like bodies, are specific to kinds of being. The adjective “human”, ἄνθρωπειος, is an ontological, rather than situational, descriptor.

It is noteworthy that, even whilst defending the distinctiveness of the human soul, Eustathius assumes some similarity between human souls and animal souls – otherwise, his comparison between the souls of small and large animals would be meaningless in the context of his argument. Human souls, then, are not incommensurable to other kinds of souls.

Eustathius’ attack on transmigration is indebted (whether directly or otherwise) to Aristotle, who criticises those who “only undertake to explain what sort of thing the soul is, without postulating anything about the nature of the body receiving it, as if it were true, as the Pythagorean myths suggest, that any soul can

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371 D53, entire fragment [Ariomanitas].
find its way into any body...Each craft must employ its own tools, and each soul its own body.”

In this attack on transmigration, Eustathius asserts that a human soul must have a human body and not a body of any other kind. In making this assertion, Eustathius grounds the whole person in its current context insofar as he sees the human body as the natural environment for the soul of a human being. This assertion also involves the proposition that the human soul, *qua* soul, is a peculiarly human thing. In believing this, Eustathius is at odds with Plato and employs a strand of Aristotle’s thought that was explicitly critical of Plato’s view of the soul. Aristotle’s claim that human souls require specifically human bodies (quoted above) also seems to imply that a particular human soul requires a particular human body – and therefore, that the identity of a particular human being requires a particular body.

What remains of Eustathius’ own attack on transmigration implies this much less strongly, if at all, as it focuses to a greater degree on categories of body and soul – referring to large and small animals, for example. However, it is worth noting at this juncture that Eustathius’ theology of bodily resurrection does, absolutely explicitly, make the claim that a particular soul requires a particular body, as I will argue below. This increases the probability that he might also have this idea in mind in his attack on transmigration.

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372 *De anima*, I.3. 407b20-27. Translation slightly amended from Walter Stanley Hett (London, 1935). This passage has a sense of the body as instrument which is on the whole absent from Eustathius’ anthropology. See below.

373 Though this is not absolutely clear. Abraham P. Bos, “‘Aristotelian’ and ‘Platonic’ dualism in Hellenistic and early Christian philosophy and in Gnosticism”, *Vigiliae Christianae*, 56, No.3 (August, 2002), 273-91, argues that Aristotle and, initially, his followers, attacked transmigration on
The ontological difference between body and soul

Eustathius’ picture of a mixture of body and soul assumes a sharp difference between the two. His mode of distinguishing between the body and the soul relies on broadly Platonic metaphysical categories in the sense that the soul is incorporeal and, in some sense, intelligible, the body is corporeal and, in some sense, perceptible: “human nature is cut into two parts, the perceptible [αἰσθητὸν] and the intelligible [νοητὸν].”\(^{374}\) This distinction manifests itself in various ways.

Souls are naturally invisible since Samuel’s soul, if it had indeed been summoned, would not have been visible – Saul would have seen whatever was summoned if it had had a body.\(^{375}\) Eustathius’ conception of the difference between body and soul is consistently framed within a wider metaphysical contrast between corporeal, visible things and incorporeal, invisible things.

Eustathius sometimes groups spirits and souls together: “demons do not have authority over spirits and souls [πνευμάτων τε καὶ ψυχῶν].”\(^{376}\) Similarly, he writes

the grounds that particular kinds of souls needed particular kinds of bodies, but not on the grounds that a particular soul needed a particular body.

\(^{374}\) D20:21 [Ariomanitas].

\(^{375}\) It is not absolutely clear, from this argument, that Eustathius regards a disembodied soul as necessarily invisible, but it is very likely that this was the case, as I argue below.

\(^{376}\) Engastrimytho, 3.3. In Ariomanitas, he makes the implied association between soul and spirit explicit as he describes the soul as ἀόρτον…πνεῦμα [D51:2]. This has been seen as evidence of a materialist conception of the soul, but, as I argue below, Eustathius almost certainly means to denote something incorporeal in the term πνεῦμα.
that a soul is an “invisible spirit.” Navascués seems to me to be mistaken in thinking that Eustathius uses πνεῦμα in a Stoic, materialistic sense. In Jewish and Christian usage, πνεῦμα very often has an incorporeal sense. This usage also coheres with Eustathius’ wider tendency to understand the soul within a Platonic metaphysical framework. Most pointedly, it coheres with his claim that “human nature is cut into two parts, the αἰσθητὸν and the νοητὸν.” This claim is unambiguous, unlike the reference to soul as πνεῦμα. Furthermore the αἰσθητὸν portion of the pairing is reiterated as the nature of the body within the definition of the soul as πνεῦμα: the invisible πνεῦμα, the soul, is juxtaposed with the organs belonging to the perceptible world, which it vivifies. This suggests that the definition should be read in light of the αἰσθητὸν / νοητὸν distinction.

Corresponding to the distinction between perceptible and intelligible things, there is a sense that the soul, like these other spirits, has more in common with God, ontologically, than the body does. Eustathius does sometimes refer to God’s incoporeality as if it were a unique attribute of God: “God dwelling in… [Christ], who is invisible [ἀόρατος] in nature, was not led like a lamb to death and slaughtered

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377 D51:2 [Ariomanitas].
378 Notably the use of the term πνεῦμα to refer to the divine Spirit in the LXX and New Testament, which was important in defining later Christian usage. C.f. Gen. 1.2; Mk. 3.29; Athanasius, C.G. (CPG, 2090), 7.29. This is connected, in turn, to its ambiguous place in some pagan philosophy and physiology. Peter Singer correspondingly argues that, for Galen, the πνεῦμα is the πρῶτον ὄργανον of the soul in Galen on the soul: philosophy and medicine in the second century A.D., unpublished PhD thesis (University of Cambridge, 1993), pp.195-6. This rather gives the impression that it mediates between soul and body, albeit from the body’s side of the divide.
380 D51:2-4: “On one hand, that it is invisible spirit is evident to everyone. On the other, the motion makes an image of itself from the organs of perception and, moulding the activities, it furnishes everything with visible marks.” This passage is discussed further below.
like a sheep.” He uses the categories ‘perceptible’ and ‘intelligible’ to describe a general metaphysical distinction and regards intelligible things as more similar to God than perceptible things, but also occasionally has a sense that God is more intelligible than other intelligible things. This ambiguous attitude to the God-intelligibility nexus is common in patristic thought. So, Origen, despite centralising a distinction between intelligibility and perceptibility, can assert that existing without any kind of body is “an attribute solely of the divine nature.”

A sketch of Eustathius’ cosmology reveals the prevalence of a distinction between the intelligible and the perceptible in his worldview, but also a certain flexibility in the application of this distinction. (Here, the term ‘cosmology’ refers to the conception of the structures of the created universe). Early Christian cosmology is diverse, drawing on a range of ideas and models from Greco-Roman and older, ancient near-eastern thought. Eustathius’ cosmology echoes this eclecticism, but the centrality of these categories is repeatedly evidenced.

In Eustathius’ cosmos, Hades is at the bottom, the earth is in the middle and the heavens, which are multiple, are on top. He frequently describes Hades as ‘beneath’, and the heavens as ‘above.’ For instance, he extrapolates cosmography from Isaiah’s “Hades beneath was made angry…” Similarly, passages referring to

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381 D87:3-5 [In Ps. 92].
382 De Princ. (CPG, 1482), 1.6.4. C.f. also Homily on Exodus, (CPG, 1414) 6.5.. This perspective does not equate embodiment with corporeality (though it does connect the two); its apparent incoherence stems from a Cartesian worldview.
384 D29:2 [Ariomanitas], quoting Isaiah 14.9 [LXX].
Christ’s descent and ascent are taken to refer, literally, to Christ’s journeys variously down from heaven, qua God, and to heaven and Hades, qua human. Eustathius evidently thinks that the heavens are multiple and God lives in the highest heaven. Paradise is also somewhere above earth, presumably in one of the heavens.

Eustathius’ cosmos is divided, broadly, into corporeal and incorporeal realms. The heavens, Hades and paradise are incorporeal realms, populated by souls, spirits and demons, which are incorporeal entities. Earth is a corporeal realm, populated by corporeal beings. Hades, for example, is inhabited by souls, as Samuel’s soul is called up from there. There is a certain distinction here between the earth, which is corporeal, and everything else, which is incorporeal. This presumably stems from Eustathius’ attempt to make sense of the world he knows in relation to things he cannot see, within the dominant conceptual frameworks available to him. Correspondingly, the boundary between corporeal and incorporeal realms is fluid.

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385 C.f. D71:5-13, where Eustathius argues that it cannot have been the Word who had not yet “ascended” to heaven, because the Word came from heaven (citing John 20:17). This cosmographic distance between Hades and heaven reflects a sharp sense of contrast. Though this may seem unremarkable, there are alternatives within early Jewish and Christian conceptions of Hades. For example, in the model implied in the Third Greek Apocalypse of Baruch, Hades is in the third heaven. C.f. Jean Delumeau, History of Paradise (New York, Continuum, 1995), p.24.

386 C.f. D40. I expand below. Eustathius also sometimes strongly suggests belief in what may crudely be termed God’s ‘omnipresence.’ For example, he refers to the Son as “the wisdom who surrounds everything that has come to be.” [D71:9]. The fragmented nature of the sources does not allow us to ascertain how far he synthesised these two concepts. This inconsistency is probably simply an instance of a populist-devotional image of God sitting alongside a divergent, dogmatic-philosophical conviction about God.
Eustathius occasionally suggests that corporeal bodies can exist within the heavenly realms. He quotes 2 Corinthians 12.1-4, in which a man is taken up into heaven. The man says that he is not sure whether he was embodied during this experience or not. (Eustathius believes that this was Paul himself). Nowhere in the extant text does Eustathius state an opinion as to whether Paul was bodily taken up to the heavens on this occasion, and Eustathius may well have been happy to remain as uncertain on this subject as Paul himself claims to be. In light of the well-established idea of the ascension, and the biblical idea of assumption into heaven, it would be remarkable if he did argue that this was physically impossible. Eustathius refers to Christ’s ascent to heaven, but does not develop this with regards to Christ’s body, and does not otherwise comment on the bodily assumption of, for instance, Elijah. It is therefore difficult to tell how Eustathius’ concept of embodiment relates to Eustathius’ concept of incorporeality.

The highest heaven is God’s abode, and is qualitatively superior to the other realms of heaven. When humans, other than Christ, ascend to heaven, they ascend to other heavenly realms. So, Eustathius reads 2 Corinthians 12.1-4 as indicating that Paul was taken up into the third heaven, often associated with paradise. When claiming that Paul did enter the third heaven, Eustathius emphatically distinguishes it from the highest heaven:

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387 Additionally, quoting Ps. 102.19 (LXX), Eustathius writes that Christ will sit on a throne “in heaven.” D103:6 [Arianos]. This is discussed in chapter 7. 388 C.f. D39:1-14 [Ariomanitas]. See further discussion below. 389 C.f. 2 Kings 2:11, which says that Elijah was taken up into heaven.
When Paul says ‘into a third heaven’, he reveals that there is also another one. For he says this not with an article, but without an article. But the Lord, proclaiming it with the addition of the article says: “no one has ascended into ‘the’ heaven.” The heaven that is higher than all, which is attached to the greater glory, into which the divine nature, shining forth most, is seen more distinctly by those who have been deemed worthy to proceed there. So, then ‘no one has ascended’ into this heaven, in which the Child himself will sit with the Father.390

In this passage, Eustathius is synthesising various scriptural passages, some of which refer to heaven in the singular, others of which refer the heavens in the plural. His qualitative distinction between kinds of heaven is apparently prompted by a need to explain this. In order to explain it, he employs themes typical of Platonic cosmology, in which the soul ascends, through various heavens, to God. He sees an apparent inconsistency in scripture, with regards to whether there is one heaven or many, and, in explaining how it is that the relevant passages actually cohere, favours multiple heavens.

Eustathius, unremarkably, conceptualises paradise both as a garden in Eden, on earth, and as a place where, now that Christ has opened it, souls go after the bodily death. So, he refers to “the paradise that God planted in Eden” where Adam and Eve lived but also emphatically believes that Christ’s soul led the soul of the penitent thief there on the day that they died.391 Although these may simply reflect conflicting narratives in Eustathius’ writing, they echo a well-established tradition of associating the earthly paradise from which Adam and Eve were banished with a

390 D40:1-8 [Ariomanitas].
391 On paradise in Eden, see Engastrimytho, 21.1. Christ’s soul’s journey to paradise is important in Ariomanitas and is discussed in detail in the next chapter.
paradise that is, at least at the moment, not earthly, and could point either to the belief that paradise had been transposed from earth to the heavenly realms, or to the belief that the earthly paradise foreshadowed the heavenly paradise.\textsuperscript{392} (It should be noted that the idea that the paradise to which Christ travels with the thief is not earthly does not in itself necessarily indicate that it was in the heavens; for example, in the desert fathers, we find the idea that paradise is “above the earth and outside the firmament”, rather than in a part of the heavens.\textsuperscript{393} However, Eustathius himself does locate paradise in the heavens, as we shall see). At any rate, Eustathius clearly believes that paradise was on earth when Adam and Eve dwelt in it, but identifies this paradise with a place that is now above the earth.

Significantly, Eustathius depicts Christ’s journey to paradise as a \textit{return}. This is what most clearly indicates that he identifies the paradise to which Christ leads the penitent thief with the paradise from which Adam and Eve were expelled. For example, he says that, in entering paradise, Christ “tamed (the) fiery sword and pacified the fear of the cherubim”, which is evidently a reference to the cherubim and fiery sword which God positioned to stand guard over “the way of the tree of life” once Adam was banished from it.\textsuperscript{394} In entering paradise, Christ is restoring Adam,

\textsuperscript{392} For example, in the \textit{Third Greek Apocalypse of Baruch}, paradise is in heaven, but contains the tree of knowledge, 1.24. Eusebius of Caesarea believes that, in 2 Corinthians, Paul describes himself being taken up into paradise, paradise, \textit{H.E.} (CPG, 3495), 3.24.4, but also refers to paradise planted in the east, \textit{D.E.} (CPG, 3487), 6.15. An interpretation very similar to Eustathius’, in which, on the day of his death, Christ \textit{reopens} the paradise from which Adam was banished on earth, is found in the pseudo-Athanasian \textit{Expositio Fidei} (CPG, 2804), 1.7. C.f. also Delemeau, \textit{Paradise}, pp.23-26.

\textsuperscript{393} \textit{The Bohairic life of Pachomius} (CPG 2356), 114.

and he must therefore be returning to the same place from which Adam was banished.\footnote{In the LXX (as in the Masoretic text) it is “Adam” who is said to be “driven out” of paradise.}

In both *Engastrimytho* and *Ariomanitas*, the souls of the dead are all in Hades prior to Christ’s descent there; between his death and resurrection, Christ goes to Hades and leads the souls imprisoned there to somewhere better. In *Engastrimytho*, Eustathius writes that “Christ…dragged off the captives as his plunder and went up bodily on high into [the] heavens.”\footnote{*Engastrimytho* 20.5.} Similarly, in *Ariomanitas*, Christ “leads the captives captive” from Hades.\footnote{D28:8-9, quoting Ephesians 4.8 and Psalm 67.19.} Here, Eustathius specifies that Christ “leads the human race into paradise.”\footnote{D22:19-20.} The fact that he can speak of Christ both leading the captives to paradise, and to the heavens, indicates that Eustathius did indeed locate paradise in the heavens, specifically, as opposed to somewhere else above the earth.

In the face of his own insistence upon the physical, and eschatological, resurrection of the body, Eustathius applies the term “first fruits of the resurrection from the dead” to the entrance of Christ’s human soul into paradise.\footnote{D21:10-11 [*Ariomanitas*]. Eustathius is alluding to 1 Corinthians 15:20: “first fruits of those who have fallen asleep.”} Eustathius was exegetically constrained to assert that Christ and the thief went to paradise while their bodies lay dead. In emphasising that they went to paradise in their souls, Eustathius is actually very consistent with his discourse on the resurrection; had he simply asserted that Christ and the thief went to paradise while their bodies lay dead,
he might have risked implying that they received other bodies after death and that they went to paradise in their souls and the new bodies to which their souls were now united. It is specifically Eustathius’ application of the Pauline concept of “first fruits” from the dead to the disembodied soul that is striking and rather jarring. This concept is important to his soteriology in many ways, discussed in the next chapter. His willingness to use it in this context, anyway, shows a certain ambiguity about the nature of paradise.

Eustathius’ cosmology is largely unremarkable: Hades is beneath the earth, multiple heavens are above it. Paradise was once upon earth, but now, when Eustathius refers to paradise, he thinks of it as heavenly. It is unclear whether he thinks that paradise has been transposed from earth to heaven, or whether he thinks that the earthly paradise foreshadowed the heavenly one. A broadly Platonic distinction between corporeal and incorporeal realms recurs throughout Eustathius’ cosmology. It is blurred, readily enough, in reference to the potentially bodily assumption of Paul (read as such within a well-established tradition).

400 Eustathius additionally once refers to “Gehenna”, but it is unclear where he places this within the cosmos, or whether he developed his concept of it within his cosmology at all. He writes of Gehenna only as part of a quote of Jesus from Matthew’s Gospel: “stop fearing things that kill the body, but that are not able to kill the soul. But rather fear the one who is able to throw both body and soul into Gehenna.” [Matthew 10.28, D51:34-37]. The reference is incidental to his main argument, which is that scripture uses the term psuche variously. Nonetheless, he apparently thought that this was a good opportunity to mention the reality of eternal punishment, which directly follows this quote, so he seems to associate Gehenna with a place of such punishment. It is possible that Gehenna forms part of a “new heaven and new earth”, but this is highly speculative.

401 C.f. Eusebius, H.E. (CPG, 3495); Methodius, De. Res. (CPG, 1812), I.55
The most striking examples of this distinction with reference to the soul occur in the context of discussion about Christ’s human soul, and careful examination of its relation to other human souls is required.

During Christ’s time on earth, his human soul was at times with the Spirit in heaven whilst his body was on earth: “The Word of God…allotted such great increase of authority to the human being who held him that, through the soul [the human being] at once both traverses the entire earth and dwells in the heavenly bodies.”402 In one sense, it is only Christ’s soul that is able to be in heaven whilst his body and soul are simultaneously functional elsewhere. However, Christ’s soul does this as a way of fulfilling human potential. Its ability to traverse the heavens in life, whilst its body is on earth, is, admittedly, consequent on its union with the Divine Spirit. This Spirit-soul relationship is evident in the way that Eustathius argues for the necessity of Christ’s human soul. In reference to earthly activities, he argues that the Word, being impassible, could not accomplish them.403 In reference to activities in Hades, heaven and paradise, he demands what use it would be if it were God, and not a human being, who did that. So, he claims that, if the Word alone led the thief to paradise “the thief entered paradise before Christ, and he himself became the ‘first fruits’ of the resurrection of the dead. Christ no longer unlocks the gates of paradise.”404 It would not have been soteriologically efficacious for the Word to travel to paradise without the human soul of Christ. The feats that Christ

402 D20:6-9 [Ariomanitas].
403 C.f. D6:8-13[Ariomanitas]: “But pain and tears and laughter and sleep and hunger and thirst and desire and longing and anger and wrath and things such as these, which are established to be passions,
accomplishes in his soul in Hades and paradise are the feats of a human being. This comes across strongly in Eustathius’ idea that Christ’s soul is “the first fruits of the resurrection from the dead.” This idea is discussed in detail in chapter 5. Here, suffice to note the strong sense that Christ is archetypically human.

Both in relation to Christ’s ascent to the heavens with the Spirit, and his journeys to Hades and paradise, Eustathius argues that the soul is the only part of a human being which could have done these things. The implication is that human souls have the ontological potential to be in the heavenly bodies, but only Christ in fact realises this potential. It is the human soul, not the human body, which is granted this privilege, because spiritual realms are proper to the human soul.

Eustathius’ picture of the relationship between Christ’s human soul and the Word shares a lot with Origen. For Eustathius, the soul is ontologically closer to the Spirit than the body is, and there is correspondingly the sense that the soul is a kind of *via media* between the Word and the body.

Navascués rightly notes Eustathius’ antipathy towards Platonism: he attacks the transmigration of souls and the unoriginated nature of souls in Plato’s thought.  

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404 D21:9-13 [*Ariomanitas*].

405 Navascués, “El sustrato filosófico”, esp. pp.152-5. For Eustathius’ attack on the idea of transmigration see D30:30-34 and D55 [*Ariomanitas*]. The attack on transmigration in D30 follows a diatribe aimed at the notion of the ‘water of forgetting’, and Eustathius refers to his opponents as “Pythagorases and Platos”, so he evidently associates belief in transmigration with Plato. For his
However, these aspects of Platonism are widely attacked by the vast majority of Christians, even those who are self-declared Plato sympathisers.\textsuperscript{406} In respect to underlying metaphysical and ontological structures, Eustathius owes much to Platonism.

\textbf{The soul as the vivifying principle of the human being}

For Eustathius, as for most ancient thinkers, the soul was the vivifying principle in the human being.\textsuperscript{407} Souls “breathe life-giving power” into bodies.\textsuperscript{408} Eustathius follows in a broad Jewish and Christian interpretation of Genesis 2.7 in thinking that when God breathed πνεῦμα into Adam, he breathed a soul into Adam.

This framework strongly suggests that the body is passive whilst the soul is active, and Eustathius himself intends this suggestion. Eustathius refers to Genesis 2.7 in two separate passages from \textit{Ariomanitas}.\textsuperscript{409} The first is putatively an account of his opponents’ position; the second is intended as a description of what really happened. The point at issue is whether the Spirit could have stood in place of the

\textsuperscript{406} See discussion above in this chapter and in chapter two on Platonism in Eusebius of Caesarea. For Eusebius’ criticism of the unoriginated nature of souls in Plato, see his \textit{P.E.} (CPG, 3486), 13.15. Eusebius provides numerous quotes from Plato’s works that support the theory of transmigration, within a section that lists various of Plato’s errors about the soul in \textit{P.E.}, 13.16.3-18. For an earlier patristic attack on transmigration in Platonism, c.f. Irenaeus \textit{A.H.}, (CPG, 1306) 2.33.1.

\textsuperscript{407} Woolf Hirsch, for instance, claims that the animation of the body by the soul is an idea “practically universal, and coeval with humanity itself.” Whilst this is in danger of oversimplifying the issue, he is right to note the widespread nature of the notion. C.f. his \textit{Rabbinic Psychology} (New York, Edward Goldston, 1947), p.20.

\textsuperscript{408} D1:8-9 [\textit{Ariomanitas}].
soul in Christ. In the earlier fragment, Eustathius quotes his opponents as describing the ensoulment of all bodies and then, specifically, Adam’s ensoulment. They ostensibly list the functions that he received with the soul, and then demand why the divine Spirit could not have done all these things in Christ.

Eustathius attributes to his opponents broad agreement with him on many points regarding what the soul does to the body, which is evident because the two accounts are very similar. In both instances, the body is inert before it receives the soul and active afterwards. The functions that Adam subsequently possesses are again virtually identical; movement, breath, thought and moral agency. In both passages, Eustathius emphasises the inertia of the pre-ensouled body: “the body of the first-formed which had been adorned, was sleeping, dead, unbreathing, unmoved” once ensouled “he received movement. And from that he walks and breathes, he governs, he reasons, he acts, he has control.” The soul animates the body and is therefore, in a sense, is more capable than the body. The soul’s higher functionality corresponds to a higher status; it is described as “the better part” of the person. There is a very significant sense in which the soul is the superior partner. The soul and body are equally necessary to being human, but the soul, qua independent entity, is superior.

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409 D1, D61. D1 is in the epitome, D61 is preserved by Theodoret. Though these fragments contain very similar ideas, they are too different to be separate versions of the same portion of text. It is, however, likely that they formed part of the same wider discussion.

410 He may attribute this agreement quite fairly, as his exegesis is unremarkable.

411 There are a few significant differences between the accounts, to which I return later.

412 D61:1-2 and D61:8-9 respectively. I examine this passage with reference to moral agency in chapter 6.

413 D11:14 [Ariomanitas].

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Nonetheless, Eustathius does not strictly regard the soul as the active agent in the human person.\textsuperscript{414} His sense of how the parts of the person operate in a given action varies. His overriding impression is that the κρᾶσις of body and soul is the agent. Body and soul rely on each other in any given operation. Eustathius refers to τὸ σωματικὸν...δργανον. This might echo Athanasius, who tends to use the phrase to mean that the body is an “instrument”, typically of the Word. Eustathius also refers to τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς...δργανον; in Ariomanitas, he refers to it as something that the Word took up.\textsuperscript{415} If the phrase does not simply denote the soul, it must mean that the soul is the Word’s instrument. The same may be true of the body. In Engastrimytho, Eustathius refers to the τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς...δργανον of Samuel, which is active whilst Samuel’s body is dead.\textsuperscript{416} Here, τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς...δργανον probably refers to the soul’s power of manifesting itself visibly, as this is the context in which it is discussed: “the very apparatus of the soul used to take shape in human form...”\textsuperscript{417} The soul’s δργανον in this case is a capacity of the soul, rather than a separate object employed by it. We therefore ought not to conclude that the phrase τὸ σωματικὸν...δργανον suggests that the body is the soul’s instrument.

Although it is typically the person who acts, the mechanism of this action can seem to require body and soul to be instruments of each other, in different situations. The idea that the body receives movement from the soul implies that it acts through

\textsuperscript{414} Jonathan Barnes discusses this question with reference to Aristotle and Tertullian in “Anima Christiana” in Frede and Reis, Body and soul, 447-64, pp.462-464.
\textsuperscript{415} D11:3.
\textsuperscript{416} On Athanasius c.f. De Inc. (CPG, 2091), 9:2:2; 43:4:5-6. On Eustathius c.f. D20:33 [Ariomanitas]; Engastrimytho 6.1. In Engastrimytho Eustathius writes: “perhaps you will say that the αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς δργανον took shape in human form?”
\textsuperscript{417} See below in this section.
the agency of the soul. It is evidently dependent on the soul in order to perform actions and so to fulfil its potential. Mechanistically, the soul is also dependent on the body because, when it operates in the corporeal world, it must operate via the body. However, Eustathius’ narrative is not typically constructed so as to draw out the soul’s dependence on the body, as it does the body’s dependence on the soul.\footnote{An important exception is to be found in his claim that, “the soul does not gush forth tears apart from a body, and nor will a body cry joylessly asunder from a soul, but the one who cries is the one who has a proportionate mixture from both…” [D7:6-8, Ariomanitas]; here, the point is the reciprocal dependence of body and soul on each other, rather than the greater dependence of the soul on the body. This passage is discussed further in the section entitled ‘Passions.’}

In imparting movement to the body, the soul does not so much use the body to move as enable the body to move. This comes across in his description of Adam’s body receiving a soul. The body enters the narrative prior to the soul, and, when the soul is imparted, a living, thinking being is the result. It could even be that the body is the active agent here; Eustathius describes the inert, pre-ensouled body, then proceeds:

\[\text{ὡς δὲ εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ δημιουργικῶς ἐνεφύσησεν ὁ Θεὸς, αὐτίκα τὴν κίνησιν εἴληφεν. ἐξ ἐκείνου δὲ βαδίζει καὶ ἀναπνεῖ καὶ φθέγγεται, ἀρχει λογίζεται πράττει διοικεῖ.}\]

What is clear in this passage is that the soul alone is not the active agent. The soul has enabled the body’s agency. In some respects, this increases the body’s agency relative to a conception of the body as an instrument, but in others it reduces it: because the soul is enabling the body rather than using the body, the body is the agent, or at least one of the agents, of a given action, rather than an instrument. However, in reducing the soul’s agency in relation to the body, Eustathius necessarily reduces the soul’s dependence on the body. The soul is certainly dependent on the body to be part of a human being, and so achieve its telos, but it is not as dependent on the body as the body is on it. Eustathius generally does not conceive of separate pursuits proper to the body and the soul. The body is involved
in mental processes, for example; once Adam’s body has received a soul, Adam “reasons.” The fact that the soul vivifies the body requires that the soul must be involved, to some degree, in all of the activities that ensouled body is involved in. The fact that it is Adam, the being that results from a body receiving a soul, who thinks, suggests that the body is also involved in all the activities that the embodied soul is involved in.

A distinction must be made between action internal to the person and action external to the person. The body and soul are both required to perform a given action because they contribute different things to that action. Eustathius’ description of how a person cries offers a good example: “applying fire, [the soul] heats the water, and when this is burning, it comes up through the eyes.” The soul provides the heat that gets the process going, and the eyes – bodily organs – provide a conduit through which the heated water can travel. In that sense, different functions internal to the person are proper to each. However, as the above-quoted description of Adam’s ensoulment and subsequent activity shows, it is the person who is the agent of any given act externally, that is, as it can be observed in the world. Anything that a person can be said to do, such as eat, move or think, is equally the province of the body and the soul.

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419 D61:9 [Ariomanitas].
420 D7:9-11 [Ariomanitas].
421 This echoes some readings of Aristotle. See Michael Wedin, “Keeping the matter is mind”, Frank A. Lewis and Robert Bolton (eds.), Form, matter and mixture in Aristotle (Oxford, Blackwells, 1996), p.1: “Aristotle’s psychology reserves for the person alone such things as thinking, desiring and feeling
Physiology and the soul as vivifying principle

One of the frameworks in which Eustathius explains the soul’s vivification of the body is physiological, and this mode of describing the relationship particularly emphasises the soul’s necessary, and proper, involvement in bodily functions.

...God declared: ‘anyone among the sons of Israel or the proselytes who would eat blood, I will stand my covenant upon that soul and expel it from the people.’ So, it is gently suggested that the soul is blood. For scripture forbids blood as nourishment. Because of this, when the blood flows forth, the body stands soulless and unmoving. And the soul is not simply blood, but properly flies in the blood itself.\(^{422}\)

In this passage, Eustathius closely links soul and blood, whilst maintaining a distinction between them – the soul “flies in the blood” and so, presumably, is distinct from it. He alludes to the soul’s vivification of the body – “when the blood flows forth, the body stands soulless and unmoving” – and infers from this that it must have some connection to the physiological processes that enable the body to function. Importantly, he interprets a collection of scriptural passages that might seem to equate the soul with blood in such a way as to deny this equation.

Eustathius draws heavily on physiological examples to demonstrate the soul’s involvement in bodily processes. Though the implied mechanistic relationship between body and soul is unremarkable, Eustathius’ examples are calculated to evoke a sense of the soul’s involvement in the grittier parts of corporeal existence.

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pain. The soul itself is the subject of none of these. Nevertheless, only in virtue of the soul…does the person manage to be in a given such state or to perform a given such act.”
In particular, he gives a detailed description of the workings of the digestive system as part of an argument for the necessity of the soul:

…these things being issued forth into humours and bile, some things being sifted beside everything, are delivered to the bulks of the body, whilst others are turned into blood. Flowingly, it withdraws into the blood vessels, others change into bile and phlegm, the roughness and excrement is passed in clots through the thicker of the intestines and into the outermost places and it is secreted through these.  

This is why Christ needed a soul.

It is, nonetheless, especially difficult to reconstruct Eustathius’ physiology. The most extended discussions of it appear in particularly confusing passages in the epitome. Because we cannot be sure that the words and phrases used are Eustathius’ own, we cannot reliably trace medical terminology. Furthermore, the grammatical construction of one particular fragment which contains Eustathius’ most extensive discussion of physiology is so strange as to call into question whether the epitomiser had a full appreciation of Eustathius’ meaning. Some of the words are so obscure that they may safely be considered Eustathian. For example the word ἔνδομα only appears eight times in the whole corpus of Greek literature catalogued by the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae. It appears in (pseudo) Galen Definitiones Medicæ and in a few medieval medical texts in the sense of “diminution of fever” which would fit the medical context. However, it is not clear exactly how this meaning would work in the context of the epitome. Here is the Greek text immediately surrounding it:

422 D51:5-12 [Ariomanitas].
423 D4:12-16 [Ariomanitas].
...ἀμφότερα μὲν ἠρεμεῖν ὑμοί, διάστασιν δὲ τὸις πόνοις ἐνδίδωσιν, ἵνα αἱ δυνάμεις ἐνδόμα λαμβάνουσιν μεταξὺ τὰς μὲν τῶν τόνον ἀκμὰς ἀνανεοῦσιν αὔθες, ἐπαναλαμβάνουσι δὲ τὰς τῶν ἵσχύων ἀναζωπυροῦσιν ἐπιτάσεις. 424

As ἐνδόμα follows closely on ἐνδίδωμι it could here be a derivative of this meaning something like ‘a giving up’ so, in this case, ‘a relaxation;’ 425 it appears to be used in a similar sense in Cyril of Jerusalem. 426 The phrase could then be rendered,

both [soul and body] together desire to keep still, and they give up the labours at an interval, in order that the powers might recuperate again, receiving relaxation between the strength of the tendons. In turn, resuming, they reignite the straining of bodily strength.

(Given that the relaxation is, specifically, “between the tendons”, a relaxation of the pulse may well be meant). However, in light of the passage’s medical context it is equally possible that Eustathius originally used the word ἐνδόμα in the former, technical sense but that a less educated epitomiser placed it in a different phrase so as to give its less technical meaning, which may have been the only one with which he was familiar and which was, anyway, intuitive. At any rate, it is difficult to construct a comprehensive picture of Eustathius’ anatomy from the epitome. 427

424 D8:7-10.
425 D8:8 I am grateful to Paul Parvis for this suggestion.
426 Cyril of Jerusalem, Catechesis ad illuminatos (CPG, 3585.2), 2.8.9.
427 The reconstruction of Eustathius’ physiology is further exacerbated by the fact that the period in which he wrote yields remarkably few sources on the subject, and has been categorised by Vivian Nutton as “a black hole in the history of medicine” in Ancient medicine (Routledge, London, 2004), p.292.
Eustathius refers to anatomy on many occasions but never gives anything approaching an analysis of it. He makes an especially close connection between the soul and blood, and the heart and the liver both seem to have a prominent place in his anatomical system, as was typical in ancient medicine, but the brain, though mentioned, does not seem as important in the passages we have.\textsuperscript{428} This suggests that Eustathius did not follow Plato and Galen in thinking that the “liver, the heart and the brain were the origins of three parallel systems, each of which has a different function.”\textsuperscript{429}

Kelley Spoerl provides a more persuasive alternative in claiming that Eustathius’ physiology is Aristotelian.\textsuperscript{430} Her arguments are based on fragment D4 of \textit{Ariomanitas}, which I quote in full:

\begin{quote}
Since God declared in many places of scripture that a heart together with the soul existed with him \([\text{καρδίαν ὀμοῦ τῇ ψυχῇ συνυπάρχειν ἀυτῷ πολλαχοῦ τῆς γραφῆς προύλεγεν ὁ θεὸς}], it is necessary to confess that it is a kind of intelligible heart – for the bodiless is not able to have a bodily part. Going along these lines, he will not need to say that Christ took up and bore a heartless body, will he? For if he did not need a soul, as those opposing say, \textit{neither did he need a heart, nor any of the internal organs, since each of these provisions has been created}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{428} He is clearly a vitalist in that he regards the body as teleologically created: each of the “internal organs” “has been created for the sake of the reception [of food].” \[D4:7-8\]. Therefore, with reference to the medical disputes current in the late Roman Empire, he follows Galen against Erasistratus’ and Asclepiades’ “mechanistic” approach, but vitalism seems an almost inescapable position for anyone who regards the body as deliberately crafted by God. Nutton \textit{Ancient Medicine}, p.233. Although the later triumph of Galenism may suggest it was already ascending, Nutton also notes the existence of Asclepedeans in fourth-century Asia Minor in \textit{Ancient Medicine}, p.296. The dispute between mechanism and vitalism was therefore probably a live one.

\textsuperscript{429} Ibid, p.233. In this system, the liver controlled nutrition, growth, and reproduction, the heart “conveyed heat and life” and the brain controlled nerves and feelings. See Frank Magill and Christina Moose, “Galen”, \textit{Dictionary of World Biography: the Ancient World} (London, Taylor and Francis, 2003), 447-51, p.449.

\textsuperscript{430} Spoerl, “Jesus’ digestion”, forthcoming. See introduction and chapter 2. I am very grateful to Dr. Spoerl for extensive and extremely helpful discussion of this passage.
for the sake of the stewardship of eating, in order that the body should ripen and feed and send the materials being brought in in the right direction. Then, these things being issued forth into humours and bile, some things being sifted beside everything, are delivered to the bulks of the body, whilst others are turned into blood. Flowingly, it withdraws into the blood vessels; others change into bile and phlegm; the roughness and excrement is passed in clots through the thicker of the intestines and into the outermost places and it is secreted through these. And if the entrails and throat and belly and the other holders of these things are prepared for the sake of food, and through these, for living – for this is germane to the question – then neither for these, did he need a soul that could move and revolve the bodily instrument, as I already said according to the true word. For in this case he entirely bore imperishable life itself, and he by no means needed the ripe things being delivered from the earth, because he was nourished from heaven and so lacked nothing. So therefore, according to these men, if indeed Christ, received the soulless bulk of a body, it was free from natural desire, without bowls, heartless and liverless, and, the overall, a statue and not a human being, the shape having been cast on from the beginning, and the innermost stamp having fled.

Spoerl claims that, in this passage, Eustathius links the heart with digestion and that this echoes Aristotle.\(^432\) She then notes the connection between the soul and blood made in this passage, and elsewhere (as discussed above) and, again, posits a debt to Aristotle: “Aristotle not only proposed a link between the soul, the heart, the digestion, and the blood; as a result of this link, he saw the heart as the center of consciousness, of sensation, motion, and emotion.”\(^433\) So, she suggests that Eustathius’ physiology is also cardio-centric in the sense that he adheres to cardio-centric consciousness.

\(^431\) ἀνήπατον with the double-meaning ‘passionless.’
\(^433\) She cites Aristotle, De partibus animalium ii.1.647a 25-32; On sleep and waking (Parva naturalia) ii.456a1-6, in which Aristotle claims that in human beings, “sense –perception originates in the same part of the body as movement…the heart.”
It seems to me that Eustathius does indeed, like Aristotle, link the heart with digestion and that some degree of cardio-centricity indebted to Aristotle would explain the important place that Eustathius gives to the heart in his physiology, and the apparent lack of importance placed upon the brain, in contrast to other ancient (also vitalist) physiological hypotheses. It is possible that Eustathius’ view of consciousness is also cardio-centric; this need not entail a materialist view of the soul, so his clear assertion that the soul is intelligible does not pose a problem here, and such a view would explain the close connection between soul and blood. It should be noted, however, that such a view is not required by the progression of his argument in fragment D4 (as Spoerl acknowledges). Here, Eustathius claims (as quoted above):

Since God declared in many places of scripture that a heart together with the soul existed with him, it is necessary to confess that it is a form of intelligible heart – for the bodiless is not able to have a bodily part. Going along these lines, he will not need to say that Christ took up and bore a heartless body, will he? For if he did not need a soul, as those opposing say, neither did he need a heart, nor any of the internal organs…

The idea he is refuting is that, when the voice of God in scripture refers to God’s soul, it is referring to the entity that acted qua soul in Christ. Eustathius responds that God also refers to his heart – is that the heart that acted as a heart in Christ?

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434 D4:1-5.
435 For instance, Lev. 6.11: “my soul shall not abhor you.” This argument would only suit a pro-Arian position if coupled with an insistence on divine impassibility and consequent assertion that this divine soul was not the agen(n)etos God. Eustathius explicitly accuses his opponents of attributing passions to the Word in order to undermine his full divinity. C.f. D19a and D19b.
436 For instance, c.f. III Kingdoms, 9:3: “And the Lord said to him [Solomon], ‘…my heart shall be there for ever.’ ”
Eustathius argues that when the voice of God refers to God’s ‘heart’ in scripture, this must be “a form of intelligible heart”, i.e., whatever God referred to when he referred to his “heart” could in no way resemble a human heart. Neither Eustathius nor his pro-Arian opponents want to say that this is the heart in Christ. It leads to the suggestion that Christ’s body, like Christ’s soul, was not really human. The immediate structural point of Eustathius’ reference to the heart here is that scripture sometimes refers to God’s heart, not that the soul is particularly more connected to the heart than to any other part of the body. Cardio-centric consciousness is a possible inference from this passage, but it is less strongly suggested than may initially seem to be the case. As far as the sources will permit judgement, it seems to me that Spoerl is right to posit a broadly Aristotelian physiology in Eustathius in that, for Eustathius, the heart seems to be the lynch-pin of the physiological system, as it was for Aristotle. However, it is less likely that Eustathius also followed Aristotle by extending this cardio-centrism to his view of human consciousness.

Eustathius’ ideas about physiological mechanisms reinforce his integrated anthropology. More significantly, Eustathius clearly articulates the view that the functions of the soul and all the bodily organs are interlocked: he has a clear sense of the interrelation of all the organs in a system when he claims that if one has no need of a heart, one clearly has no need of any of the other organs, either. Eustathius’ physiological discourse, on one hand, comes from a rather different place to his discussions of Christ’s soul accompanying the Word to heaven. However, the close involvement of the soul in physiological processes gives an especially strong sense
of his holistic conception of the person, which is echoed, in a different way, in the idea that the soul, throughout its journeys to heaven, is a human soul.

**A hylomorphic conception of the body-soul relationship**

Eustathius not only suggests that body and soul are closely united in the human person but, further, tends to suggest that they are mutually defining.

Eustathius often uses the picture of a statue to describe a body that has no soul (though not a body whose soul is not currently attached to it) and this evokes his conception of the relationship between soul and body well. Whilst the body and soul equate to the human person roughly in the sense of two elements added together, something happens in the union of body and soul that a concept of animation in which the soul uses the body are insufficient to explain. For example, Eustathius says that, in the pro-Arian picture of a soulless Christ, the internal organs are also absent and the “innermost stamp” has fled.\(^{437}\) The pro-Arians’ Christ, therefore, is “a statue of a human being and not a human being.”\(^{438}\) It is unclear whether the “innermost stamp” is the soul or the soul and all the organs; it is clear that the statue results from removing the soul. The soul, then, makes the body human. A statue is not half a person, but no person at all. The body is not really human without a soul (although an important distinction must be made between a body that is not currently ensouled – i.e. a dead body – and a body for which there is no soul).

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\(^{437}\) D4:27.  
\(^{438}\) D4:25-6.
It is striking how much this picture of the body-soul relationship echoes Aristotle, which might give a rather different picture than is suggested by my argument that Eustathius’ distinction between the body and the soul relies on Platonic categories.

Aristotle’s conception of the soul is itself a topic of much contention, which complicates any attempt to consider ‘Aristotelian’ influence on later thinkers. It is widely agreed that Aristotle regarded the soul-body relationship as a relationship of form to matter. Much discussion therefore centres on the question of his hylomorphism. The soul is the form of the body. So, what is form? One important aspect of this discussion, and the one that chiefly concerns me here, is whether Aristotle’s view of the soul was “attributivist” or “substantialist.” That is, did Aristotle regard the soul as a property, or a thing?439 Aristotle’s own view of the soul

439 I make use of Herbert Granger’s terminology from his Aristotle’s idea of the soul, Philosophical Studies Series 68 (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996), pp.1-14. Kirby also discusses the ways in which Aristotle’s “form and matter” model can be understood with reference to living things in his Aristotle’s Metaphysics, pp.70-99. For a ‘substantialist’ view, c.f. William Charlton, Aristotle: physics I and II, rev. ed. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992), pp.70-79 and Howard Robinson “Aristotelian dualism”, Oxford Studies in ancient philosophy 1 (1983), 123-144. For an ‘attributivist’ position, c.f. Julian Barnes “Aristotle’s concept of mind”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian society, 72 (1971/2), 101-114. Abraham P. Bos has recently argued for a much more robust kind of ‘substantialism’, which would move the discussion of the soul in Aristotle away from hylomorphism to a large degree in “‘Aristotelian’ and ‘Platonic’ dualism.” Aristotle, he says, attacks Plato’s view of the soul purely on the basis that it rejects the idea that there are certain kinds of souls that correspond to certain kinds of bodies. (With reference to this idea, see the discussion on ‘human being as human body and soul’ above). Most later ancient thinkers followed Aristotle, not Plato, in this. Bos’ argument about Aristotle’s own position is highly speculative, as it relies on a reconstruction of lost and incomplete works. Even taking Bos’ argument to be correct, he has only identified one strand in Aristotle’s thought, and, in his desire to distance it from Platonism, he downplays the fundamental influence that such a position would evidently owe to Plato’s own dualism. In arguing that many ancient “Platonists” were in fact Aristotelians, Bos is not as far from others who regard Aristotle as a dualist as he seems to be. Aristotle’s anthropology is, again, seen as a development on Plato’s more than a divergence. Late antique philosophy, either way, is influenced by a combination of Aristotle and Plato. If we accept Bos’ particular argument, that Aristotle is closer to Plato than even most
is beyond the scope of this thesis. I am concerned with the various strands of Aristotelian thinking that may have influenced Eustathius, without an immediate concern for their faithfulness to Aristotle.\textsuperscript{440} The relationship between Platonism and Aristotelianism is germane to the question of Aristotle’s attitude to body-soul substance dualism, because body-soul monism would diverge significantly from Platonism.

It is significant in this regard that there was a widespread tendency in late antiquity to read Aristotle in light of Plato. Richard Norris notes this tendency specifically of neo-Platonism but it can be found more widely, for instance, in Galen.\textsuperscript{441} In contrast to this growing tendency, George Karamanolis argues that Platonists were very ready to criticise Aristotle.\textsuperscript{442} It is not my intention to argue for a total synthesis of Platonism and Aristotelianism in late antiquity, but to observe a limited osmosis of ideas between the two. The category of Platonised-Aristotelianism is problematised by the fact that Aristotle was Plato’s pupil and self-consciously drew on him, as well as criticising him. On certain issues, Aristotelians and Platonists are grouped together in ancient philosophy, particularly in their

\textsuperscript{440} Although it seems to me that the source of this disagreement can be found in Aristotle himself. I am sympathetic to Granger’s thesis that Aristotle credits the soul with characteristics exclusive to ‘things’ and to ‘properties’ respectively. C.f. Granger \textit{Aristotle’s idea}, p.8.


opposition to Stoicism.\textsuperscript{443} Where Aristotle and later trends that draw on him seem to agree with Plato, it is false to categorise this as external to the Platonic tradition, to be brought into conversation with it. Nonetheless, I believe that the category ‘Aristotelian’ is a useful one to bring into conversation with Platonism with regards to body-soul relations because this is a point on which, at their most distant from each other, Platonism and Aristotelianism are strongly opposed.

The Hellenic context of Eustathius’ picture of the relationship between the body and the soul can most meaningfully be described as a Platonised Aristotelianism: it combines a body-soul substance dualism, in which body and soul are defined as perceptible and intelligible respectively, with a hylomorphic understanding of the way that body and soul interact to form the human person: that is, with an understanding of the body as the ‘matter’ of the person – the thing of which it is formed – which is only given its ‘form’ – and therefore, made human – by the soul. Eustathius’ picture of a soulless body as a statue makes most sense in this light. Though it is highly suggestive of Aristotle’s metaphor of a bronze statue, in which the body is the bronze from which a statue is made, and the soul is the statue shape, it is placed in a slightly different framework.\textsuperscript{444} Aristotle’s metaphor lends itself to substance monism, at least in the sense that it doesn’t allow for a separate existence of form and matter. It is an instance in which he talks about the soul as a property, not a thing. Eustathius’ metaphor not only talks about the soul as a thing,

\textsuperscript{443} C.f. Frede \textit{A free will: origins of the notion in ancient thought} (London, University of California Press, 2007), p.49.
\textsuperscript{444} C.f. Aristotle, \textit{Physics} 195a6-8.
but also allows for its separate existence, and this coheres with his more straightforward substance dualism.

According to Eustathius, the soul is an invisible, intelligible thing, but endues the body with an “innermost stamp.”\(^{445}\) This looks a lot like a substantialist interpretation of hylomorphism. Here, I am concerned with hylomorphism in body-soul relations, and by hylomorphism, I mean an understanding of the body-soul relation as one in which the body is the matter from which the person is made, and the soul is what makes the body into a person. So, Eustathius’ picture is substantialist in that the body and soul are separate substances – so the soul is a thing, rather than a property of the body; it is hylomorphic in that the body is the ‘matter’ of the person – the thing of which the person is made – which is only given its ‘form’, and therefore made human – by the soul. The entities involved in this substantialist interpretation of hylomorphism correspond, roughly, to a Platonic description of the body and soul respectively. Although Eustathius sees the soul as a superior partner to the body, he has an integrated view of human action. Eustathius’ description of God breathing a soul into Adam elucidates here:\(^{446}\) The body is inert without the soul – it “lies dead, unbreathing, unmoving”, but when the body receives the soul, the person becomes active. As noted above, the extant text is unclear as to whether it is the body or the person who becomes active; no noun is given as a subject in the sentence that describes the person’s/body’s acts, and they are referred

\(^{445}\) For Eustathius’ belief that the soul is intelligible, see D20:21 [\textit{Ariomanitas}] and discussion above in the section ‘The ontological difference between body and soul.’ Eustathius claims that a soulless body is without its “innermost stamp” at D4:27 [\textit{Ariomanitas}]. See discussion of the Eustathius’ description of a soulless body as a statue, above in this section.
to with third person singular indicative verbs. We may wonder whether this ambiguity derives partly from the fact that the distinction is not very important to Eustathius in this particular context; when the body receives the soul, the body becomes the person. At any rate, the person is certainly a third entity, neither simply body, nor simply soul. The person is the intermediary entity produced when form is imposed onto matter. This corresponds to the way in which the person, and not the body or the soul, is the agent of a given human action, in a thoroughly Aristotelian manner.

One key passage suggesting a hylomorphic conception of the soul-body relationship is found in *Ariomanitas*. It is, usefully, claiming to summarise the soul. However, as Declerck observes in his footnote to the text, it does not fit with what follows, and has evidently been lifted from some other part of the text: “On one hand, that it is invisible spirit is evident to everyone. On the other, the motion [ἡ κίνησις] makes an image of itself from the organs of perception and, moulding the activities [εἰδοποιοῦσα...τας ἐνεργείας], it furnishes everything with visible marks.”

Navascués argues that these sentences refer to the way in which the soul relates to the body and that there is a tension between an invisible soul and a visible body, which is resolved by the perceptible organs of the body being moved and shaped by the soul. He further argues that Eustathius wants to unite the soul with the

446 D61. See above.
body without rendering the soul movable. This thesis is largely persuasive, but requires some expansion.

We have already seen that, according to Eustathius, the soul imparts movement to the body. He also, more specifically, associates the soul’s activity, or connection with the body, with movement. So, he refers to “the movements of two spirits” as something that his opponents claim cannot dwell in one body. He goes on to argue that it is possible for Christ to have a soul whilst united with the Spirit, but the κίνησις as a referent to the action or presence of an intelligible partner to the body is not part of what he objects to. It is either his concept or a concept he shares with his opponents. We therefore have a reference to the soul enduing τας ἐνεργείας with a form.

Ἐνεργείας could carry several different senses here. It seems to me that it does not in this case exactly carry the technical Aristotelian sense of ‘actuality’, because τας ἐνεργείας seem to be a product of κίνησις’ machinations, rather than a change of state. Aristotle himself does not refer to movement, or the soul, as εἰδοποιοῦσα ἐνεργείας but Alexander of Aphrodisias writes that, before the matter is εἰδοποιηθῆναι it exists “potentially”, not ἐνεργεία, “in actuality.”

447 D51:2-4 [Ariomanitas].
449 D50:1-3 [Ariomanitas].
εἰδοποιηθῆ
clearly refers to the giving of form and the consequent actualisation of
the matter’s potential. In Eustathius’ text as it now appears, εἰδοποιοῦσα may be
similarly rendered as ‘moulding’ or ‘shaping’, but ἐνεργείας is not used in quite
Alexander’s and Aristotle’s sense, because τὰς ἐνεργείας either undergo a change of
state or are a product of a change of state. Neither quite has the sense that τὰς
ἐνεργείας are the new state into which the object of κίνησις’ machinations are
brought.

It is tempting to wonder whether the epitomiser has preserved the word
ἐνεργείας whilst misunderstanding its exact meaning, and whether Eustathius did
intend to say that the soul, via κίνησις, causes ἐνεργείας. As this passage bears little
relation to what follows, it seems to have been cut out of a much longer passage.
The epitomiser, in trying to summarise the salient points of this passage, might have
skewed its meaning. This possibility is attractive partly because it allows for the
widest range of meanings of ἐνεργείας. Even if we eschew the Aristotelian
‘actuality’, the word still tends to connote actions of some kind: activity or operation,
as opposed to fixed being, for example.452

This could plausibly have occurred in several ways: for example, if the
original text, or an earlier rendering of it, had contained an accusative and infinitive
clause in a sentence with several accusatives, the epitomiser may have mistaken
ἐνεργείας for an object where it had originally been a subject, associated with

452 C.f. Polybius, Historia, 1.4.7.
κίνησις, the form-endowing agent. Alternatively, ἐνεργείας could have been the
subject of another verb: so, for example, εἰδός and ἐνεργείας could both have been
subjects of ποιέω. Most plausibly, and along the same lines, the participle
εἰδοποιοῦσα stood as it is, but there was another participle, perhaps ποιοῦσα. This
may have been the verb corresponding to ἐνεργείας, εἰδοποιοῦσα being intransitive.
The epitomiser could have omitted the other verb deliberately, or either he or a later
scribe could have failed to copy it down. Accepting either of the latter
reconstructions, we would have a fairly straightforward substantialist hylomorphism:
the soul gives the body form in rendering it active.

At any rate, the phrase εἰδοποιοῦσα…τας ἐνεργείας does evidently convey
the idea that the soul realises the potential of the body. It closely echoes Eustathius’
statue metaphor, in connecting activity with form. Navascués notes as Aristotelian
primarily the fact that the soul is the cause of the body’s movement, but is not mobile
itself. Eustathius, he argues, wishes to link the soul with the body’s movement,
without equating it. This is true, but this passage is also, more specifically, part of a
substantialist hylomorphic understanding of the soul-body relationship.

A further caveat is necessary in light of the complexity of this passage. These
lines initially seem to resemble some ancient discussions about the mechanism of
sight. Could they in fact refer to seeing a moving object? The object impresses itself
upon the “organs of perception” – the eyes – and therefore realises their potential,

making them *actually* organs of perception. This would, again, echo Aristotle, who writes that “the perceptible object realises the potential of the faculty of perception to exist.” This would be in keeping with Eustathius’ physiological interest in this text. However, it is an improbable reading because it requires the epitomiser to have truncated a longer passage about the soul so that it looks like a summary of the soul. His reason for taking these short lines out of a longer discussion, and placing them here, is most likely to be either because they were, after all, a summary of the soul, or because his rendering of them summarised a much larger piece. Although the echo of ancient theories of sense-perception is worth noting, I do not think that it is, in fact, what these lines are about.

In articulating his view of the relationship between the body and the soul, Eustathius probably started from a belief in the simultaneous importance of physicality and of psychological experience, rather than from Aristotle, or any of his followers. However, he makes extensive use of various strands of Aristotelian thought which enabled him to hold together the importance of the body and soul with a clear substance dualism. It is very probable that he had a monistic conception of the soul, and, in this he was closer to Stoicism than either Platonism or Aristotelianism, but a Stoic influence is not really reflected elsewhere in his anthropological ontology.

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454 Aristotle, *De anima*, 431a:3-5.
Passions

In Eustathius’ thought, both body and soul are properly susceptible to passions. The concept of passion (πάθος) is complex in patristic texts, and, whilst Eustathius’ concept is evidently firmly grounded in wider Greek patristic discourse and its engagement with pagan philosophers, it is necessary to look for the sense of the term in his own writings for our definition. Eustathius uses the term to refer to emotions, desires and feelings. It applies equally to psychological experiences, such as sorrow, and physical experiences such as hunger.

Suffering is a specific kind of πάθος and is often a subject of particular concern in both philosophy and theology. This is particularly true of mental and emotional suffering which, in Stoicism, was thought to be based on a false understanding of reality.455 Eustathius distinguishes between feelings of desire such as hunger and feelings of sorrow, but he rejects the Stoic understanding of the latter as inappropriate.

Eustathius focuses particularly on suffering. This is partly because he wishes to explain how Christ could have done everything he is supposed to have done without God experiencing πάθος, if the incarnate Word was fully God. In particular, Eustathius wishes to safeguard the reality of every action that was soteriologically

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455 C.f. Margaret Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (London, University of Chicago Press, 2007). Graver argues that Stoicism in fact did allow for emotion as a legitimate part of virtuous human experience but sought “to understand what sorts of affective responses a person would have who was free of false belief.”, p.2. However, she further argues that grief is repeatedly rejected as the potential affective
necessary. This agenda centralises Christ’s crucifixion and death.\textsuperscript{456} Furthermore, the Stoic idea that grief, in particular, is an improper emotion placed passages that referred to Christ’s mental anguish in a key position in disputes about the mutability or passibility of the Word. The result is that the human soul is depicted as the natural recipient of suffering in contradistinction to the divine Word.

For Eustathius, as Navascués has observed, the soul undergoes passion appropriately and in its own right.\textsuperscript{457} The soul is sometimes depicted as the primary subject of suffering. A particularly striking passage from \textit{Ariomanitas}, which we have come across before, merits an extended quotation: “He did not say ‘my body is in greatest pain’ so that someone who had received this from above should not think that, while the Spirit itself was remaining for the soul, the very bodily temple suffered according to itself, but he said ‘my soul is in greatest pain.’ For the suffering principally falls upon the soul and has dealings with it.”\textsuperscript{458}

Here, Eustathius quotes Jesus’ words in Gethsemane according to Matthew 26:38 and Mark 14.34. Although Eustathius believes that the soul is involved in Christ’s bodily suffering on the cross, he marks out Gethsemane as the particular site of mental anguish in Christ’s passion. Marcellus and Athanasius do likewise.\textsuperscript{459} He is very close to Marcellus, in particular, in this respect, in that he refers to Christ’s

\textsuperscript{456} The next chapter considers the soteriological significance of Christ’s death for Eustathius.
\textsuperscript{458} D7:1-5 [\textit{Ariomanitas}].
\textsuperscript{459} See below in this section.
experience in Gethsemane partly defensively, as something that the Word could not have done. Marcellus refers to it to refute the claim that the unity of Father and Son resides in the unity of their wills.\footnote{\textit{C.f. Marcellus, Contra Asterius} (CPG, 2800), edition of Erich Klostermann., \textit{Gegen Marcell, Über die Kirchliche theologie, Die fragmente Marcells} (Berlin, Akademie-Verlag 1972) [K], frag. K73. Parvis in \textit{Marcellus}, p.6, and Spoerl in “Two early Nicenes”, p.136, have both argued that Marcellus also had a developed concept of Christ’s human soul, though I have argued that he probably did not in “The image of God”, forthcoming. This passage could also suggest that the vaguer “flesh” was the subject of this other will.} Eustathius is an early example of a growing tendency to find a place for Christ’s psychological experiences.

Eustathius is so insistent partly because the claim that the soul is a subject of suffering in its own right, as opposed to partaking in the body’s suffering, was radical enough in the middle-and-neo Platonic milieu in which he was writing.\footnote{Correspondingly, Navascués, “El sustento filosófico”, p.153, rightly sees Eustathius’ notion of the possible soul as evidence of Eustathius’ antipathy towards Platonism.} Eustathius has not simply replaced the subject of passion with the human soul, relative to pro-Arian \textit{logos-sarx} Christology. The \textit{mechanism} of suffering is different. I have already noted that, typically, in pro-Arian \textit{logos-sarx} Christology, the Word becomes passible through the flesh, or body. Unlike the Father, the Word \textit{may} become passible, but he is not passible in himself.

This is very similar to the place given to the soul in many forms of Platonism, and, consequently, in much patristic anthropology, where the soul stands as a bridge between the perceptible and intelligible worlds. It is susceptible to passions, but largely by the mediation of the body. This is reflected in a lot of Greek patristic Christology prior to and contemporaneous with Eustathius. The Word undergoes
passion through the flesh as the soul does. For example, in Athanasius’ *Contra Gentes* when the soul turns, erroneously, towards the body, it partakes of passions, and Athanasius correspondingly also writes of Christ’s flesh as the subject of Christ’s suffering.\(^{462}\) This is, pointedly, true of Christ’s mental anguish in Gethsemane:

> For the properties of the body would not have been in the incorporeal [Word], unless he had taken a corruptible and mortal body…when he was in a body suffering and weeping and toiling, these things, which are proper to the flesh, are ascribed to [the Word] along with the body…if he asked that the cup might pass away, it was not the Godhead that was afraid, but the human being.\(^ {463}\)

Eustathius, like Athanasius, thinks that Christ’s mental anguish is important, but attributes it to the soul, not the flesh. Gregory of Nyssa, similarly to Athanasius, claims that the soul is susceptible to passions through the body.\(^ {464}\) Interestingly, the Word is more involved in suffering in Athanasius than in Eustathius, because he is as involved as Athanasius allows any intelligible entity to be.

The soul has a kind of double agency with respect to passions. Its part in enabling the body to feel a given passion is the same as in Eustathius’ wider account


\(^{463}\) Athanasius, *C. Ar.*, III.56.

\(^{464}\) C.f. Gregory of Nyssa, *Homilies on Ecclesiastes* (CPG 3157) 284, 1-11 and Everett Ferguson, “Some aspects of Gregory of Nyssa’s moral theology in the Homilies on Ecclesiastes”, in Stuart Hall (ed.), *Gregory of Nyssa’s Homilies on Ecclesiastes*, 319-36, pp.326-7. Athanasius’ concept of flesh does not necessarily correspond to Eustathius’ concept of the body, but his use of it in this context certainly does involve the idea that the intelligible part of a human being suffers via its embodiment.
of human action, but it also undergoes the same passion itself. The soul both operates mechanically on behalf of the body, and feels the passions. The body is therefore dependent on the soul’s πάθος for its own. Thus, when he insists that the claim “my soul is in great pain” does indeed apply to the soul, he also argues that the body could not undergo passion alone because it has no sensation “according to itself.”465 Rather than the soul undergoing passions via the body, Eustathius occasionally suggests that the body undergoes passions via the soul. However, he makes this argument in order to assert that the body and the soul undergo passions together, and are mutually dependent in this process, in contrast to the more dominant association between passions and the body. His very assertion that the pain of the soul was exactly that in fact leads to the claim that “the soul does not gush forth tears apart from a body, and nor will a body cry joylessly asunder from a soul, but the one who cries is the one who has a proportionate mixture from both… these are passions of soul and body…”466 For the purpose of assessing the implications of this view for Eustathius’ picture of the experience of passions, it is significant that Eustathius is explicitly rejecting the idea that they act separately. He has in mind the picture of body and soul experiencing passion individually, and finds it wanting.

Eustathius does write that the soul receives desires from body: “he is said to be hungry and thirsty, [and] a yearning [ ödeme] for food and drink is put in the soul

465 D7:1-12. See also D9:7 on the body’s inability to undergo passion for itself.
by the body, [*lacuna*] supplying the desire [τῆς ἐπιθυμίας].”

This doesn’t problematise his sense that passions are proper to the soul – the point is that hunger and thirst require a body – but it does associate certain appetitive desires particularly with the body. It is nonetheless significant that Eustathius is connecting the soul to hunger, rather than distancing it. So, he says that Christ “defined the food as the soul’s business.”

Eustathius’ picture seems to be that various passions may originate exclusively in soul or body, but that they are manifested and experienced through both soul and body.

Although Eustathius acquired a particular defensive motive for emphasising the soul’s passibility in the ‘Arian’ controversy, there is no indication that he would not have asserted it before. As noted in chapter two, in his relatively early *Oratio coram tota ecclesia*, the Word is said to be killed. However, this is not, presumably, to the deliberate exclusion of Christ’s human soul. We might wish to speculate that this fragment predates Eustathius’ clear belief in Christ’s human soul, which we see already in *Engastrimytho*. However, it is implausible that what underlies Eustathius’ comment is a Christology involving both a human soul and the Word, and in which only the Word suffers. The most unusual element of the view that the soul is passible in itself is in the innate passibility of an intelligible entity. This operates in the same way if applied to the Word as if applied to the soul. We cannot tell whether this is what Eustathius envisaged when writing of the Word being

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467 D17:19-21 [*Ariomanitas*].
468 D10:7-8 [*Ariomanitas*].
469 D119a:7, D119b6.
killed, but, at any rate, the implied possibility of the Word in this passage says little about the passibility of the soul in Eustathius’ early thought.

Eustathius’ account of the soul’s relationship to πάθος implies a monistic conception of the soul. Eustathius does attribute to the soul qualities attributed to different parts of the soul in an Aristotelian or Platonic system. The soul that Adam receives is “rational” [λογική], and is involved in ὀρὲξ and ἐπιθυμία, often associated with a kind of gut desire. In the instances available to us, ὀρὲξ and ἐπιθυμία come via the body, but because they are ὀρὲξ and ἐπιθυμία specifically for food and drink, we cannot conclude that Eustathius would never conceive of the soul’s passions in these ways. At any rate, where the soul receives passion from elsewhere, this is very clearly from the body, the physical apparatus, and not from an ‘irrational’ part of the soul. This is underlined by the fact that Eustathius does not refer to σάρξ, which would have been more ambiguous, but to σῶμα. Despite the fact that this is within the epitome, we can trust that the word choice in this context is his own because it is part of the wider argument that a human being is a body and a soul, as he also writes in Engastrimytho. I have noted that Eustathius, in fact, hardly ever uses the term σάρξ, and only uses it to refer to Christ’s body when quoting scriptural passages that do so. This coheres with a sense that the soul, qua soul, should be undergoing passions. It also coheres with a corresponding rejection of

470 On Adam’s rational soul, c.f. D1:12-13 [Ariomanitas]. This is part of the description of Adam’s ensoulment attributed to Eustathius’ opponents. However, as argued above, the depiction of Adam’s ensoulment is common ground. This is confirmed in the case of the rational soul because, where Eustathius gives his own account of Adam’s ensoulment, he writes that Adam “reasons”, upon receiving a soul, reinforcing his agreement, in this instance, with the putatively pro-Arian picture. D61:9 [Ariomanitas]. On ὀρὲς and ἐπιθυμία in Eustathius, see above. R.A. Norris surverys the idea of the partition of the soul in Hellenic philosophy in his Manhood, pp.57-66.
both the compartmentalisation of the soul into rational and irrational parts, and the related idea that only what is irrational in the soul is a subject of passion.\footnote{See discussion on \textit{Samaritan} in chapter 2.}\footnote{Norris writes that the “doctrine [of the soul’s parts] is fundamentally the expression of an attempt to deal rationally with the question of the soul’s relation to its body and, more generally, to the sensible world as such” in his \textit{Manhood}, p.57. This is particularly so with the regard to passions. Because Eustathius finds the concept of the soul undergoing passions unproblematic, he has no need for this doctrine.}

Eustathius also seems to equate \textit{ψυχή} with \textit{νοῦς}: “[The Spirit] is happy to dwell with living souls, although they are not at all unpolluted – for the mind would partake of all filth by a short mingling…”\footnote{Norris writes that the “doctrine [of the soul’s parts] is fundamentally the expression of an attempt to deal rationally with the question of the soul’s relation to its body and, more generally, to the sensible world as such” in his \textit{Manhood}, p.57. This is particularly so with the regard to passions. Because Eustathius finds the concept of the soul undergoing passions unproblematic, he has no need for this doctrine.} It is unclear exactly what the mind is mingling with here, but it is fairly certain that it is used as a synonym for soul. The souls are polluted, and this is why – because they partake of filth. This is significant because it suggests that, when the soul grieves, the \textit{νοῦς} grieves: it suggests that there is no separation between the part of the soul that grieves and the part of the soul that thinks. Admittedly, it is not certain that these terms are Eustathius’ own, so we cannot draw firm conclusions from them. However, the use of these terms coheres with and reinforces his wider sense that the soul is totally, and unambiguously, embroiled in the person’s emotional experience.

Eustathius’ focus upon the soul as a subject of passion in its own right does not necessarily blur the distinction between rational thought and appetitive desire. It does, however, give emotions a legitimate and important role in human experience. Eustathius regards the capacity for emotional experience as a good, and correspondingly regards many emotional experiences as morally good, in such a way
as to place him sharply at odds with Stoicism. Pointedly, his emphasis on Christ’s grieving soul makes it evident that he sees Christ’s grief as a morally appropriate emotion and, simultaneously, suggests the extravagance and depth of this grief.

Eustathius does juxtapose the experience of appetites such as hunger and thirst with Christ’s suffering in Gethsemane and on the cross. Expanding on his accusation that *logos-sarx* Christology risks docetism, he notes, as one of its docetic implications that “before the cross the lord did not receive the passions that are natural and unexceptionable [τα...ἀδιάβλητα και φυσικά...πάθη...].” This rather implies that Christ’s suffering on the cross is not natural. The key to synthesising this with Eustathius’ reverence for Christ’s grief is the adjective ἀδιάβλητα. The word’s immediate context – a contrast between natural passions and their presumed alternative – might tempt us to hear an echo of the Stoic εὐπάθεια (which, it might be supposed, was the term originally used). However, this is implausible because it renders the rest of Eustathius’ argument incoherent by casting the other πάθη in this comparison – Christ’s on the cross – in a negative light. Clearly, there is no Stoicism here. The original sense is simply that other πάθη have no negative connotation, whilst grief is a response to something imperfect.

Eustathius’ attitude to grief is at

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473 D50:17-20 [Ariomanitas].
474 The most pointed instance of an emotional experience that is morally good is Christ’s suffering in Gethsemane. See discussion above in this section and in the next paragraph.
475 Graver notes that Origen is uncomfortable with Christ, even *qua* human, as having experienced grief, and explains it, accordingly, as simply initial, involuntary grief, *Emotion*, pp.85-108, esp. p.106 for Origen on Christ’s grief. The contrast with Eustathius could hardly be greater.
476 D9:10-11 [Ariomanitas].
477 This is the earliest instance of the phrase τά ἀδιάβλητα και φυσικά πάθη, though it is possible that this phrase is the epitomiser’s. Suffice to note that, if the words themselves are Eustathian, they are not operating within an established tradition. I discuss Eustathius’ attitude to grief in the context of ethics in chapter 5 in the section entitled “Human Suffering”, and his view of the imperfection of the current world order, also in chapter 5.
odds with aspects of Stoic ethical theory that had so far been dominant in patristic thought.

**The nature of the body-soul κρᾶσις in philosophical context**

It is difficult to establish whether Eustathius’ use of the term κρᾶσις is especially indebted to any given philosophical school. There was a complex discourse on the nature of mixture in antiquity, in which Stoicism, Platonism and Aristotelianism are all heavily interrelated, and this discourse is connected to questions of the union of body and soul. Eustathius never describes κρᾶσις in sufficient detail to trace his usage conclusively to a given school. \(^{478}\)

Both Aristotelian and Stoic discourse have a tendency to emphasise the mutuality of any change taking place in a mixture, and this tendency is cohesive with Eustathius’ sense of the interdependence of body and soul. Plotinus critiques a Stoic understanding of mixture with reference to body-soul relations, wishing to safeguard the soul from containment. \(^{479}\) Aristotle’s analysis itself allows for some ambiguity with regards the equality of the parts of a mixture. Κρᾶσις is a mixture whereby “any part of the mixture is the same as the whole.” \(^{480}\) However, if there is more of one substance than the other “the increase of the dominant is the result.” \(^{481}\) Richard Norris argues that, “Where one element in *krasis* is dominant, the relationship

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\(^{478}\) For a discussion of this discourse, see Norris, *Manhood*, pp.68-75. I draw on this discussion here.

The nature of mixture is an area of philosophy in which Stoics, Peripatetics and Platonists have much in common, and the point of disagreement is precisely on the subject of the materiality or otherwise of the mixture’s components. “Where one element in krasis is dominant, the relationship between the elements is analogous to that between form and matter, and one element is in effect transmuted into the other.”


\(^{480}\) Aristotle, *Generatione et corruptione* 328a:10-11.

\(^{481}\) Ibid., 328b.
between the elements is analogous to that between form and matter, and one element is in effect transmuted into the other.” This sounds a lot like Eustathius, but only insofar as Eustathius’ descriptions of body-soul relations already sound like Aristotle’s. Further, it should be noted that Aristotle’s primary term for mixture here is μίξις, so Eustathius has probably not lifted this directly from Aristotle. Any attachment to either a Stoic or an Aristotelian understanding that we might glean from Eustathius’ extant corpus rests on his understanding of the soul and body as found in his wider discourse; his use of the term κρᾶσις cannot, in itself, tell us very much about Eustathius’ philosophical sources, or lack thereof.

Navascués is justified in observing that Eustathius’ inclusion of the whole soul in this mixture jars with a dominant Aristotelian understanding. He is presumably thinking of Aristotle’s discussion in De Anima, where he says, of the νοῦς, that οὐδὲ μεμῖχθαι εὖλογον αὐτὸν τῷ σώματι - “it doesn’t make sense for it to be mixed with the body.” Eustathius, in contrast to Aristotle, clearly does think that the entire soul is in the κρᾶσις with the body. His sense that the κρᾶσις is the human being rather relies on it.

Aristotle excludes νοῦς from the κρᾶσις / μίξις of body and soul on the basis of his theory of κρᾶσις / μίξις in a wider context – Eustathius could simply reject, or be unconcerned with, Aristotle’s theory of mixture. However, this difference with Aristotle can also be readily explained if we accept that Eustathius has a monistic

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482 Norris, Manhood, p.69.
conception of the soul, as I have argued is probable. There is then no question of excluding a part of the soul from the κρᾶσις with the body. In this instance, Navascués’ picture of a Stoicised-Aristotelianism is helpful, and can be fleshed out as follows: Eustathius’ particular negotiation of Platonism and Aristotelianism with regards to body-soul relations owes a good deal to his unified conception of the soul, the principal resource for which is Stoicism. This means that emotions, or at least some of them, originate from the part of the person that is responsible for rationality. This is in contrast to both Aristotle and Plato, who posit a separate, appetitive part of the soul. Eustathius has taken a structure of the soul that echoes Stoic simplicity and used it to centralise and valorise emotions, including grief, in human experience. He is being deeply Hellenic, but eclectically so.

The disembodied soul

Whilst the soul and body are intertwined when united, their union is not metaphysically necessary. There is clearly an intrinsic connection between them, but this does not entail an intrinsic union. That is, they are necessarily defined in relation to each other, but this does not entail their inability to exist separately.

483 Aristotle, De anima 429a:24-25.
484 The question of how many parts of the soul are postulated by either of them is uncertain, and, at any rate, seems to vary according to the work in question. C.f. Fortenbaugh, William W., Aristotle on emotion: a contribution to philosophical psychology, rhetoric, poetics, politics and ethics (London, Duckworth, 1975), pp.38-40. Hendrik Lorenz argues that Aristotle was ambivalent on the partition of the soul, relative to Plato, in The brute within: appetitive desire in Plato and Aristotle (Oxford, OUP, 2006).
485 An earlier version of this material appears in my article “The human soul between death and resurrection.”
The most attested instance of separation of soul and body in Eustathius’ thought is death. Eustathius naturally regards death as the separation of body and soul: at death the κρᾶσις of body and soul is broken.\textsuperscript{486}

Eustathius’ picture of the human person when body and soul are separate both elucidates and complicates his wider anthropology; looking at the human person when body and soul are apart crystallises the individual ontological potential of both of them, not least by offering concrete examples of how this potential plays out in terms of experience. Eustathius does not articulate a theory of how the body and the soul exist when separate, but offers a number of rich anecdotes.\textsuperscript{487} The picture that emerges from these anecdotes gives a slightly different sense of the tension between monism and dualism to that found elsewhere in Eustathius’ anthropology. Eustathius simultaneously places particular emphasis on resurrection and the importance of the activity of the disembodied soul. This emphasises the radical difference between body and soul whilst maintaining that they are united in the eschatological, perfected human being, and are therefore ideally united.

The soul is separated from the body and retains active agency in the finite period between bodily death and resurrection, whilst the corpse is inert. Consequently, a discussion of the human person between bodily death and

\textsuperscript{486} D8:17. This idea is very widespread in early Christian thought, as in so much of the thought surrounding it. There are exceptions, notably within the Syrian tradition. For example, the fourth-century writer Aphrahat, \textit{Demonstration on Resurrection}, 8.22, suggests that the soul, or ‘spirit’ is trapped in the body at death.

\textsuperscript{487} These are contained primarily in \textit{Enastrimytho} and \textit{Contra Ariomanitas}, so this section will focus largely on these works.
resurrection is almost entirely a discussion of the human soul in this period. However, the very inertia of the body is anthropologically significant. The soul does not constitute a human being but it does in some sense act on behalf of the whole person when disembodied. The dead body also operates on behalf of the human person, in a sense, but the soul clearly has a superior kind of agency. By highlighting the soul’s unique capacity for independent active agency, Eustathius’ conception of the soul between death and resurrection emphasises his wider sense that the soul is the active agent within the human person. However, because the soul will achieve its telos when reunited with the resurrected body, disembodiment is a temporary and inferior state for it. The soul’s identity and experience between death and resurrection are connected to the person’s corporeal life, and correspondingly, to the particular body in which it lived.

Unremarkably, the soul is alive and active between death and resurrection. There are numerous examples of this: Christ’s human soul leads the soul of the penitent thief into paradise, “while his body was encompassed by the tomb” and “on the same day as the death of his body”\(^\text{488}\), souls are imprisoned in Hades when Christ arrives there;\(^\text{489}\) When discussing the putative summoning of Samuel in 1 Kingdoms 28, Eustathius clearly assumes that Samuel’s soul, although not called up by the necromancer of Endor, is active somewhere. His objection to Origen’s claim that Samuel really appeared in Endor rests on the improper power Origen attributes to the necromancer. Only God has power over souls: “demons do not have authority over

\(^{488}\) D22:21-22 and D28:2-3 respectively.
\(^{489}\) The soteriological implications of this are discussed in the next chapter.
spirits and souls, but God does, who rules over everything at once." It is not the capacity of the soul to be summoned, but the capacity of the one summoning it, that is the issue.

Having a soul that is conscious between death and resurrection is an intrinsic part of human experience. This is clearest in Eustathius’ conception of Christ’s human soul. I have argued that Eustathius’ principal argument in *Ariomanitas* is that Christ must have a human soul *in order to be human*. The same argument lies behind Eustathius’ discussions of Christ’s soul between death and resurrection. If Christ did not have a human soul to go to paradise, then the human Christ did not go to paradise, and the penitent thief was the first human being to go to paradise. In the case of Christ, the disembodied soul has a vital soteriological role to play, freeing souls from Hades and opening the gates of paradise. (This role will be discussed in detail in the next chapter). This reinforces, rather than undermining, the wider anthropological implications of his discourse; for the moment, suffice to note two interrelated points: 1) It is necessary for Christ’s soul, as opposed to the Word, to open the gates of paradise because it is necessary for a human being to open the gates of paradise. 2) Salvation of humanity is effected in Hades and paradise because these are, properly, human realms as much as anything else.

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490 *Engastrimytho*, 3.3.
491 Greer makes this point in *Belly-Myther*, p.lxi. However, he also argues that, for Eustathius, souls must wait in “hell” until Christ has harrowed it, p.lx. He thus sees a circumstantial bar to the souls of the dead appearing in the sensible world, though not an ontological one. *A priori*, this position coheres with Eustathius’s theology. However, it is not clear that Eustathius rejects that possibility of God recalling a soul from Hades under other circumstances.
492 This theme recurs in several fragments. C.f. D21, D22, D28.
493 See discussion above on cosmology.
Humans continue to be defined partly by their bodies between death and resurrection. Let us return to Eustathius’ claim that a human being is a “proportionate mixture” of body and soul. Significantly, this claim is made to contrast a human being – body and soul – with a disembodied soul on its own. Eustathius is therefore acutely conscious of the dipartite nature of the human person when body and soul are separated. Correspondingly, Christ’s soteriological activity in the intelligible realm of souls is paralleled by his soteriological (in)activity in the corporeal realm. He has also “partaken in the grave through the body.”494 Eustathius’ focus on the importance of the disembodied soul does not, therefore, preclude the importance of the body to human ontology or identity.

Correspondingly, his discourses about the disembodied soul occur against the backdrop of the resurrection to come, when the two distinct parts of the human being will be reunited.495 Whilst the soul can function without the body, this is not ideal for the soul. It is when the body is resurrected, and the soul is reunited with it, that both soul and body achieve their telos.

Nonetheless, the separation of body and soul at death inevitably emphasises the distinction between the two. At this moment, the fact that soul is incorporeal, the body corporeal, is manifested in strikingly disparate experiences for each. The

494 D28:31-2 [Ariomanitas].
union of the soul and body in the human person is ideal but, evidently, contingent. However the soul also has an intrinsic connection with the body. According to Eustathius, the soul retains a connection to its embodied life between bodily death and resurrection. However, Eustathius’ treatment involves a particular tension in the soul’s relationship to corporeality.

Although he clearly believes that disembodied souls are not intrinsically visible in the corporeal world, Eustathius shows some hesitation about whether or not the soul can be visibly manifested, looking like the body it was united to in life. The passage in question refers to souls appearing in dreams, and must be closely examined:

[P]erhaps you will say that the very apparatus of the soul used to take shape in human form according to age, in order that by its appearance the soul might foretell the future by prophesy. As everyone knows, sometimes in dreams spirits and souls appear to human beings, displaying the characteristics of humans with all their members…[but if that were the case here] why on earth didn’t the woman say ‘I saw a prophetic soul’ and not the opposite, ‘I saw a man standing’?  

Either, Eustathius takes it as common knowledge that souls appear to human beings in human form in dreams or, he does not accept this himself, but is mocking Origen, who does. I argue that the latter is more probable, but also suggest that Eustathius

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495 Rowan Greer, Belly-Myther, pp.xxxiv-lix, has correspondingly argued that Origen’s and Eustathius’ different approaches to experience of soul following bodily death are connected to different attitudes to bodily resurrection.
496 Engastrimytho, 6.1-2.
avoids being explicit on this point in part because he is caught between Methodius and Origen.  

Eustathius does not comment further on the difference between souls appearing in dreams and in other instances. Therefore, if we accept that he allows that souls appear in dreams, we must also accept that he allows that the kind of appearance that happens in dreams might be applicable to other circumstances, as he suggests that Origen would like to argue.

He proposes an argument that Origen might make to explain how it could be that Saul did not see Samuel, while the necromancer did. The suggested argument is that the necromancer saw Samuel’s soul, which had taken the shape of his body. Eustathius then explains why this could not have been the case. In order to establish whether Eustathius thinks that souls can appear, looking like the people they had been part of when alive, we need to establish the function of the phrase: “As everyone knows, sometimes in dreams spirits and souls appear to human beings, displaying the characteristics of humans with all their members…” οἷα δὴ κατὰ τοὺς ὦντος ἐνίοτε πνεύματα καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐφιστανται, παμμελεὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπειοὺς ἐπιδεικνυμέναι χαρακτήρας.

There are two strands to the proposition that souls can appear in the form of their bodies. One is partly about the intrinsic connection between the body and the

497 This emends an argument I made in “The human soul.”
soul, and partly about the soul’s relationship to visibility more generally. Can the soul look like its body when not attached to it? The other is about whether the souls of the dead manifest themselves, in any sense (visual or otherwise) in the corporeal world. With regards to the latter question, Eustathius believes, as Greer has noted, that only God can call souls from Hades and doesn’t spend much time worrying about whether God ever actually does so or not.

He does initially seem to accept the ontological possibility of the soul appearing in the shape of its body. He proceeds to list the many reasons why this could not have been what happened in the case presented in 1 Kingdoms 28. He has an idea of the manner in which souls return, temporarily, from the dead and what is described in 1 Kingdoms 28 does not fit it. The concept that dead people’s souls can, on occasion, and only at God’s behest, appear in the corporeal realm is rather implied within his argument. However, this implication is not necessarily indicative of Eustathius’ opinion. He is trying to present his argument as over-determined.

Origen himself evidently did believe that souls retain the form of the body after death.\(^498\) Methodius of Olympus referred to this belief as part of an argument, against Origen, against the incorporeality of the soul. He ultimately connects this to

Origen’s putative doctrine of a ‘spiritual’ resurrection.\textsuperscript{499} This can offer a key to Eustathius’ own view.

Eustathius writes that “Methodius…has written sufficiently about Origen’s doctrine [of the resurrection] and has clearly demonstrated to everyone that Origen unwisely gave an opening to the heretics, defining the resurrection as one of form, but not of the body itself.”\textsuperscript{500} The “opening to the heretics” is Origen’s doctrine of the resurrection itself, not his apparently related doctrine of the soul between death and resurrection. However, this phrase does suggest that Eustathius shares Methodius’ sense that Origen’s conception of soul’s relationship to the body is a slippery slope. Particularly in light of the immediate relevance of the “form of the body” idea to \textit{Engastrimytho}, it seems very likely that he means to include Methodius’ attack on it among the things that Methodius has demonstrated. Furthermore, this passage contains an apology for not addressing these issues himself, and, therefore, makes the fact that he does not explicitly and unambiguously attack the doctrine of the “form of the body” less surprising.

It is noteworthy that the belief that the soul retains the body’s form after death can be found in a wider range of authors and notably, in Irenaeus, who is often, somewhat justifiably, placed in contradistinction to Origen with regards to soul-body

\textsuperscript{499} For Origen’s doctrine of the spiritual resurrection, c.f. his \textit{Commentaria in Matheum} (CPG, 1450), 17.30: in which he claims that resurrected bodies will be ethereal, like those of the angels. Methodius’ and Origen’s categories for defining the soul as incorporeal or otherwise are related to Eustathius’, but also differ importantly. This is discussed in the conclusion to this chapter.

\textsuperscript{500} \textit{Engastrimytho}, 22.5.
relations. It is specifically Eustathius’ self-identification with Methodius’ thought, and not his wider belief in a bodily resurrection, which suggests that he rejects the idea of souls coming back, visibly, as ghosts.

Methodius’ attack on Origen, in this instance, relies on a gradated conception of corporeality. Eustathius shares aspects of this conception, but other aspects of it jar with his metaphysics, and, specifically, the arguments he makes in *Engastrimytho*.

Like Eustathius, Methodius initially presents his argument as overdetermined by claiming that *even accepting Origen’s picture of the disembodied soul*, Origen’s view of embodiment is incoherent, as it does not follow from this picture. He also, however, rejects the view that a soul retains the form of a body between death and resurrection, arguing that, insofar as it is physical, it is physical in itself. He contends that souls are spoken of as if physical “not because they had another invisible body but because, having been stripped of their entire covering, the souls themselves are naturally like that.” Methodius wants to demonstrate the souls are naturally visible, in the sense of being “visible to reason”, whereas God is completely invisible. This is part of his argument for the physical resurrection of the body.

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501 Irenaeus claims that the disembodied soul retains the “form” of the body, *A.H.* (CPG, 1306), 2.34.1.
502 For his argument, see *De Res.* (CPG, 1812), III.17.2-18.6.
503 Methodius, *De Res.*, III.18.5.
Eustathius’ view of the visibility of the disembodied soul echoes this picture in important respects: he conceptualises Samuel in a visible way when he writes of clothing ready for Samuel in heaven. Samuel’s clothing, and, one may speculate, his appearance, would have been an idealised form of how he used to look. Eustathius asserts that “imperishable garments from heaven, shining with flashing rays of light, are ready for the saints.” Eustathius then claims that Samuel’s soul, as ought to be obvious to anyone, would have been in “his priestly cloak…seen in a spiritual way.” This resembles Methodius’ claim that souls are “visible to reason.” However, whereas Methodius had set out to prove that the soul is visible in a spiritual sense, Eustathius allows it as a defensive manoeuvre. He does not describe the soul as corporeal. I have argued that Eustathius employs the category of incorporeality variously, sometimes to apply to a range of entities, including souls, and sometimes to demarcate God from everything else. This he shares with both Origen and Methodius. He draws on Methodius heavily in his picture of the disembodied soul, but does not adopt his framework for negotiating the nexus between God, corporeality and incorporeality. This problematises for him Methodius’ argument against Origen.

The ambiguous relationship between the soul and its earthly body in the period between death and resurrection is significant for the relationship between the perceptible and intelligible realms and human operation within them. Pointedly, Eustathius’ ideas about the realm in which the disembodied soul operates assume the

504 Engastrimytho, 6.7.
505 Engastrimytho, 6.8. The contrast here is to being seen in a body.
same distinction between the perceptible and intelligible worlds which is found in his wider anthropology. It is primarily here that we see that the categories ‘perceptible’ and ‘intelligible’ correspond to places.

There is a dialectic between hierarchy and mutual dependence in the disembodied soul’s activity. The soul remains dependent on the person’s bodily identity for its own. The body, however, has an absolute mechanical dependence on the soul; the partnership between soul and body entails mutual dependence, but the body is more dependent than the soul. Eustathius’ picture of the person between death and resurrection therefore reveals what is sometimes implied elsewhere; that the soul has more intrinsic agency than the body.

The imperishable clothing ready for the saints leads us to another kind of connection between the soul and the earthly body. The soul’s experiences result from the person’s actions in earthly life; broadly, the soul receives punishments and rewards for the person. An example is Eustathius’ take on the parable of the rich man and Lazarus; among other things, “each man had received his fitting reward in each place.”506 There is a causal connection between the person’s earthly actions and the soul’s experience between death and resurrection. Eustathius clearly thinks that the disembodied soul undergoes some form of punishment or reward prior to resurrection. When analysing how the soul is treated between death and resurrection, Eustathius seems to identify the soul with the whole person.

506 Engastrimytho, 14.11.
There is a tension between Eustathius’ ontology of the person *per se* and his narration of human experience. Specifically, this relates to the relative importance of body and soul in the location of human agency and identity. As we have seen, Eustathius’ insistence that neither body nor soul is the person on its own appears partly in the context of the disembodied soul. However, his narration of human experience repeatedly suggests that when things happen to the disembodied soul, they happen to the person. When the disembodied soul acts, it acts on behalf of the whole person. For example, when Christ’s soul entered paradise, *Christ entered “through Christ’s soul”* (διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς). Specifically the soul, and not the whole person, is the agent, but the soul provides a way for the person to act; it is therefore an instrument of the person. We must remember that the dead body is also acting for the human being. Christ “has partaken in the grave through the body.” There is occasionally a sense that both body and soul are instruments of the person who, paradoxically, is the sum of his or her instruments. Here, in contrast to Eustathius’ conception of human action when body and soul are united, there *are* separate tasks proper to body and soul. Eustathius’ picture of the soul between death and resurrection inevitably suggests a more disjointed account of the roles of body and soul in human agency than his picture of the person during the current life. Eustathius’ argument that Christ must have had a human soul because the human Christ must have gone to Hades and paradise between his death and resurrection only works if the soul can meaningfully act as the human being.
Here, there is a significant distinction between agency and identity. Between death and resurrection, both the body and the soul perform on behalf of the person to some degree, and therefore both have some kind of agency; however, the soul’s role is active, the body’s role is passive. The soul moves around, converses and is rewarded or punished. All the body does, and all it is capable of doing, is to be dead. Eustathius often emphasises this by contrasting the disembodied soul’s activity with the dead body’s inertia. His claim that Christ’s soul travelled to paradise “while his body was still encompassed by the tomb”\(^509\), for example, seems calculated to evoke such a contrast. The disembodied soul, unremarkably, has a qualitatively superior kind of agency to the soulless body. However, this hierarchical relationship is absent with reference to human identity. The body and the soul are equally the seat of human identity. When the soul goes to paradise, this is equivalent to the person going to paradise. When the body is dead, this is equivalent to the person being dead. The body, arguably, has more agency without the soul as this is the only time when operation, though passive, is independent.

In this complicated picture, Eustathius’ anthropological framework again draws on a broadly Platonic distinction between body and soul. However, the anthropology he builds on this framework diverges from typical Platonic conclusions: although the soul is the primary agent in the person and directs the body, human identity resides in

\(^{507}\) D28:1-2 [Ariomanitas]. Eustathius correspondingly ascribes to Christ all the activities performed δία τῆς ψυχῆς of Christ, while Christ’s body was dead. So, the soul is Christ is able to fulfil the promise that Christ made to the penitent thief whilst alive. See D21:1-5. [Ariomanitas].

\(^{508}\) D28:31-2. See above.
both body and soul, and this gives the body a kind of lesser independent agency when separate from the soul.\textsuperscript{510} Eustathius thinks, along with most other people in the ancient world, that the soul directs and vitalises the body during embodied existence. The way that he often ends up describing the disembodied soul as if it were the human person is a natural, if not necessary, consequence of this.\textsuperscript{511} However, it also reveals a strongly dualistic sense that bodies and souls naturally operate in different created spheres, with different metaphysical possibilities and limitations and that both of these spheres are proper to humanity \textit{per se}.

Within Eustathius’ conception of the disembodied soul, a relationship with the body is intrinsic to the soul, which corresponds to his take on the wider metaphysical distinction between the perceptible and intelligible realms; they are, for him, distinct but intrinsically connected. During embodied existence, the body and soul are partners; the soul’s continued active agency shows that it is the superior partner. However, it is bereft without, and defined by, the body. Eustathius thinks within the parameters of a Christianity influenced by Platonism. The questions he is grappling with are common, and are logically suggested by combining a Hellenistic metaphysics with a belief in physical resurrection. However, particular emphases give his structures particular values. In negotiating this common problem in his discussions of the soul between death and resurrection, Eustathius paints a picture of

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{509} D22:21-2. See above.
\textsuperscript{511} Thomas M. Robinson, \textit{Plato’s Psychology} (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1970), p.12, notes that Plato makes a similar “(apparently) unconscious” jump from “soul” to “self” in \textit{Protagoras} 313AI-C3. He argues that this \textit{does} here point to an equation of the two.
\end{flushleft}
a soul at once superior to and dependent on the body, and its embodied existence. He gives a narrative of the relationship of body and soul to human experience that differs sharply from his wider anthropological discourse because it must describe the soul’s existence apart from the body, but he tries to maintain, nonetheless, a holistic and integrated conception of the human person.

In another context, Eustathius describes the disembodied soul in a way that is less qualifying and apologetic in its Platonism. This is the context of Christ’s human soul, while Christ is on earth, and Eustathius’ take on it owes a lot to Origen. As mentioned above, Eustathius writes that Christ’s soul went to incorporeal realms with the Word whilst Christ’s body was alive and on earth. It is not altogether clear whether only Christ’s soul can do this, or whether all human souls can. There are contexts in which patristic authors speak of the soul of a living person being disembodied. For example, Athanasius writes of the soul “travelling to foreign places” while the body sleeps. However, the omnipresence of the soul is a highly unusual idea, and must be explained with reference to the extra “strength” that the Spirit provides to Christ. Whether the Spirit will ultimately provide this strength to other human souls is a complex question, discussed in chapter 5. For now, suffice to observe several points about what this says about the soul in relation to the body. Firstly, any idea that the soul has out of body experiences whilst the person is alive undermines the sense that a soul is properly embodied. Embodiment is still a proper state for the soul, but only one such state. Secondly, the omnipresence of the soul

512 Athanasius, C.G. (CPG, 2090), 31.
echoes the Platonic idea that the soul contains the body but is not, itself, contained by it.\footnote{See discussion on Eustathius’ cosmology in ‘The ontological difference between body and soul’ above.}

The resurrection of the body

The resurrection of the body is central to any discussion of anthropology because it is key to the nature of human τέλος. It is possible, to some extent, to read the rest of Eustathius’ anthropological ontology in light of his view of eschatological human ontology because in eschatological ontology we see what is intrinsic in Eustathius’ wider anthropological model. In this respect, the eschaton has a similar relation to the current life as the period between death and resurrection. This is, of course, only true insofar as Eustathius was consistent and he was not always so, as his ideas about the soul between death and resurrection indicate. Nonetheless, the resurrection is an especially important theological principle for Eustathius, so we may draw some inferences about Eustathius’ wider anthropology.

Eustathius regards the πνευματικόν body as corporeal, and emphatically the same in substance as the current body. He conceives of some change in appearance between the ψυχικόν body and the πνευματικόν body, but does not develop this further. The change that takes place is connected with the acquisition of moral perfection, which is the culmination of a process that begins in this life and which is

\footnote{C.f. Timaeus [36e], where Plato talks of the World-Soul interweaving with its body in this way. Norris has, I think rightly, noted Plotinus’ indebtedness to this passage in Manhood, pp.70-2. C.f Plotinus, Enneads 1.}
effected by the Holy Spirit. Eustathius diverges from much patristic anthropology in that he does not see human telos as involving an alteration of the way that the body and soul relate to each other in determining and carrying out the person’s actions so that, for example, the soul becomes directive of the body rather than vice versa. Eustathius also does not conceive of the Spirit, even in the context of a progression from ψυχικός to πνευματικός, as a ‘part’ of the person, but as an actor upon the person.

Eustathius makes numerous references to Methodius’ *De Resurrectione*, and, again, seems to be closely influenced by him. Eustathius’ discourse on the resurrection is therefore, also, self-consciously anti-Origenist. His arguments also echo thinkers predating Origen, often explicitly anti-Platonist. This contributes to our understanding of the ideological context of Eustathius’ attack on Origen: a large part of his antipathy towards Origen is based on a belief that Origen rejects or undermines the location of human identity partly in the body.

Eustathius insists that it is the body we have now that will be raised: “the bodies themselves, not different ones, are to be raised.” Christ’s resurrection body is an archetype for ours. Among the arguments he gives for this is that Christ’s resurrected body was clearly the same as the one that was crucified as it carried the

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515 Declerck has noted a number of allusions to Methodius’ *De Res.* in his annotations of Eustathius’ corpus. I both draw and advance on these here.
516 D45:1-2 (*Ariomanitas*).
nail and spear marks.\textsuperscript{517} This obviously relies on the similarity between Christ’s resurrection body and our own (which will be discussed in the next chapter).\textsuperscript{518}

Eustathius’ most forceful extant arguments asserting that the resurrection body is the same as the current one rely on the location of human identity in a particular body and soul, and are therefore cohesive with the bulk of his anthropological ontology, (though not his belief that, before the resurrection, the disembodied soul is punished or rewarded for the person’s actions). Eustathius is adamant that the body that is raised is the same as the one that was previously alive. He argues that justice demands that the person who performed an action must be the one who is punished or rewarded for it. This is part of his wider sense that a person is a mixture of body and soul which, as already observed, is indebted to Methodius. The fact that a human being is necessarily defined partly by his or her body is the axiom underlying this argument.

Those who deny that the body and soul of the resurrection are the same as the ones we have now are “attributing unjust judgements to God.”\textsuperscript{519} This argument is almost identical to Athenagoras’ argument in \textit{Resurrection of the Dead}. He addresses Plato’s view of judgement explicitly, and claims that the Platonic court is unjust because the person committed acts for which only the soul is judged.\textsuperscript{520} Athenagoras here explicitly refers to a scenario in which there is no resurrection. It

\textsuperscript{517} D45:2-3 \textit{[Ariomanitas].}
\textsuperscript{518} This echoes Methodius, \textit{De Res. III.2.3.}
\textsuperscript{519} D44:34-5 \textit{[Ariomanitas].}
is conceivable that Eustathius thinks that this scenario – where just a soul is judged – would be fairer than the scenario to which he explicitly refers – the original soul or body attached to a new counterpart. If so, his position here is closer to his position in relation to the soul between death and resurrection than it initially appears. However, it is more likely that Eustathius held the same view as Athenagoras for two reasons.

Firstly, Eustathius may even make the same connection to Plato that Athenagoras does; his discourse on the resurrection is connected to, and probably follows shortly after a derisive description of souls being judged in Hades according to Greek mythology, and connects this to Plato’s doctrine of the pre-existence of souls.521 Secondly, in another facet of the same argument, Eustathius defends the need for a body more directly. He follows Irenaeus in insisting that the bodies of the martyrs, since they have been tortured to death, must be raised.522 Eustathius’ arguments for the physical resurrection both especially emphasise the centrality of the body to human ontology. The latter, even more than the former, assumes the importance of the current life to human identity. Not only is the soul not the human being, but a disembodied soul would clearly be incapable of acting for the person before the judgement seat of God. This is in stark contrast to his discourse on the disembodied soul.

520 Athenagoras, De Res. (CPG, 1071), 20-23
522 D44:43-9 [Ariomanitas]. For Irenaeus, see his A.H. (CPG, 1306), 5.32.1.
Eustathius’ view of the bodily resurrection is part of a wider belief in the intrinsic value of the body. For instance, he insists that “the flesh profits nothing” does not mean that the flesh was “useless;” rather, it means that only the spirit is ‘life-giving.’\(^{523}\) The body, obviously, requires salvation, but it is as proper an object of salvation as is the soul. Eustathius’ picture of the resurrection falls within a broadly flesh-affirming anthropology.

In much patristic thought, the very resurrection of the body implies its weakness as well as its potential. There is at least an element of this in Eustathius’ conception of the resurrection. In so strongly connecting the final triumph of the resurrection body to martyrs’ bodies, Eustathius alludes to the idea that the resurrection body is strength made perfect in weakness. Gillian Clark gives a pertinent insight into the significance of martyrs’ suffering in ancient Christianity: “the suffering of the body is of central importance: it is not a temporary and finally irrelevant anguish, left behind as the triumphant soul ascends to God, but a glorious demonstration of God’s power manifested in what seems most vulnerable, human flesh and blood.”\(^{524}\) Clark correctly identifies two aspects of the tendency to see martyrdom in light of a triumphal resurrection, the latter of which requires some expansion: one is the centrality of human physicality; the other is the weakness of the

\(^{523}\) D20:28-32 [Ariomanitas]. Here we see both similarities and differences with Marcellus of Ancyra, who argues, in reference to John 6.63 “Flesh was not useful to the Word, because he is God” but it is useful to us, in *Contra Asterius* (CPG, 2800) fragments K117, K118. See my, “The image of God”.

body that is implied in the way God’s power is shown especially in manifesting itself in the body.

The way in which Eustathius relates to the latter aspect of thought is elucidated by comparing him with Irenaeus. Both make roughly the same factual claims about the connection between resurrection, soteriology and anthropology: the same body is truly resurrected, and both body and soul need salvation. However, they have divergent emphases. Irenaeus emphasises the resurrection of the body more than Eustathius. He therefore lays more stress on the body’s importance but also implies that it is particularly in need of salvation. He sometimes contrasts it with the soul, which does not need to be given access to immortality through the resurrection. Eustathius, by contrast, emphasises the soul’s need for salvation.

Nonetheless, within this narrative, the soul is held as superior to the body. The soul was assumed, because the Word would hardly neglect the “better part” of the human being. For Eustathius, the body is not further degenerated than the soul but it is, nonetheless, inferior to the soul. Consequently, whereas Irenaeus’ picture of the body’s degeneracy may point to an inferiority contingent on the lapse, the inferiority of the body is definitely intrinsic in Eustathius’ thought. With regards to the resurrection, this suggests that he sees the resurrection of martyrs’ bodies as

\[\text{525} A.H. (CPG, 1306), 5.7.1. \text{ This is shaped by Irenaeus’ anti-Gnostic context, on which c.f. Denis Minns, } \text{Irenaeus: an introduction, (London, T and T Clark int., 2010), 19-25.}\]
\[\text{526 D11:1-2 [Ariomanitas].}\]
\[\text{527 Eustathius’ conception of the primal lapse of humankind is discussed in the next chapter.}\]
strength made perfect in the weakest part of humanity. However, this must be distinguished from salvation effected in the most degenerate aspect of humanity.

Eustathius does not regard the resurrection body and the current body as altogether identical. The substance is the same, but it undergoes a change. Normally, where he suggests that the body will change when it is resurrected, he is directly quoting Pauline passages that focus on eschatological transformation. In many of his arguments for the identity of the resurrection body with the current one, there is some sense of change in addition to an overriding sense of continuity. Our identity with Christ, sometimes invoked to prove that the two bodies are the same, here entails a change. For instance, Eustathius writes, the lord “changing the lowly body of human beings, conforms it to his own.”

Eustathius’ discourse on the πνευματικόν body is part of an argument about the soul. Crudely, he is refuting the (putative) claim that Christ, being πνευματικός, had the Spirit in place of a soul.

He quotes the Pauline text: “the first Adam became a living soul, the last Adam became a life-giving spirit.” His opponents presumably defended logos-sarx Christology on the basis that Christ was the πνευματικός Last Adam and therefore had a spirit rather than a soul. It is uncertain whether Eustathius is being fair on his opponents, but his own point is quite clear. He moves, in the course of this argument, from a defence of the presence of the soul in the πνευματικός person to a defence of the presence of the corporeal body in the resurrection. The first

Adam, he argues, had a soul and a body; this is what \( \psi\chi\kappa\omicron\zeta \) means. If you want to argue that the last Adam had no soul, you must also accept that he had no body. The discourse about the nature of the body then begins.\(^{530}\)

Eustathius is arguing against a framework that he believes his opponents to be using, one that sees the contrast between \( \psi\chi\kappa\omicron\zeta \) and \( \pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha\omicron\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\zeta \) as characterised by a contrast between soul and spirit. Eustathius argues that, since the Last Adam evidently has a body, and therefore a soul, this framework for understanding the eschatological transformation of the human person is wrong. Specifically, he wishes to argue that neither component of the human person is replaced by something else. The biblical text referring to a \( \pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha\omicron\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\zeta \) person does not refer to a person one of whose parts has been replaced by the spirit. Thus he claims that “the one who is ‘soul-like’ is from body and soul, whilst the one who is spiritual has been brought together from divine Spirit.”\(^{531}\) He is then obliged to show that \( \pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha\omicron\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\zeta \) nature includes the body and soul which constitute \( \psi\chi\kappa\omicron\zeta \) nature and goes on to insist that the body that is resurrected must be the same as the one that previously lived:

For doubtless [the body ‘sown a ‘soul-like’ body, raised a spiritual body;\(^{532}\) is not soulless. For [Paul] does not show one human being raised up in place of another, as if, as Valentinus and his associates say, a different, intelligible thing is raised, apart from this perceptible thing.\(^{533}\)

\(^{529}\) 1 Corinthians 15.45, quoted at D44:2-3 \([\text{Ariomanitas}]\).

\(^{530}\) As the text is epitomised, it is possible that there may originally have been a longer section connecting the discussion about the soul with the discussion about the body.

\(^{531}\) D44:9-10 \([\text{Ariomanitas}]\).

\(^{532}\) 1 Corinthians 15.44.
These claims about the resurrection, which had themselves stemmed from a discussion of the soul, are part of a discussion of the totality of the eschatological human condition. A characteristically holistic anthropology under-girds the whole discussion. Whatever happens in the transformation from ψυχικός to πνευματικός happens to both the body and the soul.

The distinction between the ψυχικός and the πνευματικός has nothing to do with the distinction between perceptible and intelligible things. The passages referring to a ‘spiritual body’, Eustathius argues, denote a body and not a soul. He then asserts that an intelligible thing is not raised in place of a perceptible thing. Correspondingly, in contrast to much patristic soteriology Eustathius does not see salvation or the fulfilment of human potential as requiring the reorientation of the relationship between the body and the soul.

J. Patout Burns identifies two principal categories in third and fourth-century Christian anthropology, an asceticism which emphasised moral responsibility and Christian Platonism. Burns’ models obviously fall short of an exhaustive description of third-and-fourth-century Christianity. Nonetheless, in them he successfully identifies two dominant trends. The first involves the sense that the soul is in danger of being caused to sin by the body, and must resist. Elements of this idea can be found in the ascetic tradition, though perhaps under the influence of

533 D44:30-34 [Ariomanitas].
534 D44:32-34 [Ariomanitas].
Platonism. However, the ascetic emphasis on training the body more often seeks to see the body on its own terms. Methodius, whilst focusing on the training and purification of the body, writes of the need for the parallel training of the soul: one must reflect upon the values of virginity because “it is not enough just to keep the body undefiled.” Here, the same thing – virginity – purifies both soul and body, in different ways. Importantly for our purposes, the soul’s sin originates in itself. You could have a non-virgin soul whilst having a virgin body. Methodius’ rejection of the idea that sin derives from embodiment is similar to Eustathius’ sense that the transformation of the person occurs as a parallel transformation of body and soul, and does not involve a reorientation of the relationship between them.

Eustathius invokes the necessary continuous identity between the person who lived and the person who is raised while also, in the immediately surrounding discussion, making a distinction between perceptible and intelligible categories. In doing so, he suggests that the corporeality of the resurrection body means something very similar to the corporeality of the current body. In the resurrection, though the body will look in some way different from the way it looks now, will not be ethereal, and will still be flesh and blood. Eustathius’ view of the resurrection relies on the

537 Methodius, Convivium decem virginum (CPG, 1810), 1.1. Peter Brown, The Body and Society: men women and sexual renunciation in early Christianity (New York, Columbia University Press, 1988), pp.186-7, argues, in a similar vein, that Methodius gives to the virgin body the place ascribed to the mind in Porphyry, in self-conscious rejection of Origen’s view of soul-body relations. To achieve purification, the virgin must “banish…irrational desires from the body” and his conviction in the ultimate goodness of the body can accommodate a description of purifying the body as learning “to despise the flesh.” [Convivium, 1.1 and 1.2 respectively].
intrinsic physicality of the human person and on the importance of our ontological make-up in defining who we are. In this, he follows Methodius’ antipathy towards Origenism. His theology of bodily resurrection forms part of his wider picture of the human person as grounded in the current life.

In his use of the term πνευματικός, and the related picture of πνευματικός humanity that underlies Eustathius’ discussion of the resurrection, the body and soul are both equally degenerate and in need of transformation. In this respect, Eustathius echoes Methodius, and specifically Methodius’ form of asceticism. Eustathius’ view of bodily resurrection is perhaps where he is most clearly a follower of Methodius and most unambiguously at odds with Origenism.

The origin of the soul

Eustathius does not discuss the origin of the soul in much detail, except to reject several possibilities, and it is not possible to construct a detailed picture of his views with any confidence. However, as there is, to my knowledge, no extant discussion on Eustathius’ view of this subject, it is valuable to make a few observations about it in order to establish some useful contours.

Eustathius clearly believes that Adam’s soul came into being at the moment at which God breathed it into the body. This is germane to his relationship with Platonism, and will be discussed shortly. It is more difficult to establish exactly how
Eustathius thought that souls originated in that it is not altogether clear whether Eustathius is a creationist or traducianist of some kind.

Eustathius’ view of God’s action in the world would allow for either generationism or creationism as it incorporates both the idea that God acts through the perpetuation of a system built into the fabric of creation, and the idea that God directly and immediately intervenes in the world: in an extended passage from *Ariomanitas*, he describes the creation of the world and alludes to the Flood. According to this passage, God designed the world in such a way that it can then carry out specific functions. The rivers and lakes, for example, are designed to “become nourishing and fruitful.” God does, however, act directly upon the natural order to cause the Flood. These two positions are complementary rather than juxtaposed. Eustathius’ conception of divine action in the world cannot elucidate his view of the soul’s origins.

Eustathius’ exegesis of the passage in Hebrews which describes Melchizedek as “motherless and fatherless” might seem to suggest traducianism because it initially looks as though Eustathius may regard Christ and Melchizedek as having souls that were individually crafted by God, rather than received from human parents, but also as being exceptional in this. However, this is not the case. Melchizedek is described as “motherless and fatherless”, Eustathius argues, because he was a Canaanite; as the Canaanites were typically evil and Melchizedek was extremely virtuous, it was not

538 D34.
right to trace his line from them. Eustathius then says that Melchizedek was “genealogised concerning the things of the flesh according to the nature of the flesh, whilst... in another way he... [is] of unrecorded descent.” This, according to Eustathius, is just like Christ because Christ also “on one hand, is genealogised according to the body, but on the other, according to the highest order, has an indescribable birth.”

Is it possible that “according to the highest order” is a reference to the soul? In this case, the implication would be that Christ’s soul, like Adam’s, was specially created but other human souls are received from a person’s parents. As we have seen, Eustathius does elsewhere describe the soul as the “better part” of the human being. This could cohere with it being “according to the highest order.” However, particularly as this letter predates the ‘Arian’ controversy and Eustathius’ strongly divisive Christology, the phrase could refer to the generation of the Word. It need not, necessarily, imply a subordinationist understanding of the relationship between the Father and the Son. Furthermore, this interpretation does not really fit with what can be deduced about Eustathius’ argument, which is that there is nothing actually supernatural about Melchizedek, but that he was extraordinarily virtuous. Therefore, “according to the highest order” is more likely to be simply a general reference to

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539 D34:14-15.
540 Cf. D115. See Hebrews 7.3, which is itself referring to Genesis 14:18-20. This raises certain questions about corporate human identity, which are addressed in chapter 6.
541 D116a:2-3.
542 D116a:5-7.
543 Whether Melchizedek would, in this case, also have a specially created soul, or whether the analogy with Christ is less literal, is interesting but not of immediate relevance. It is difficult to be certain on this point given the fragmented sources.
544 D11:1-2 [Ariomanitas].
moral status. The overall sense of the passage is as follows: Eustathius presents the literal facts of Melchizedek’s parentage and then explains why these facts are not described clearly in scripture; the distinction between his begetting “according to the flesh” and “according to the highest order” is not a distinction between the respective ‘coming to be’ events of body and the soul therefore does not imply generationism.

A single passage in Ariomanitas comes closer to suggesting traducianism. Eustathius argues that, as the Spirit is happy to dwell with other people’s souls, despite their sinfulness, there is clearly no problem with the Spirit dwelling with Christ’s human soul:

For indeed the other holy men, who have been brought forth from bodily intercourse, and have been revealed as shabby temples, reaped the sweet smell of the Spirit by participation. And Christ is the only one who became embodied by the Holy Spirit, he did not produce the better nature from participation but ‘in him the fullness of the Godhead settled utterly.’

Here, the sin of human souls is somehow connected to human beings having come to be through their parents. Conversely, the sinlessness of Christ’s soul is connected to the fact that Christ “became embodied by the Holy Spirit.” This suggests, though it does not require, that the souls of most human beings are inherited from their parents. This interpretation is rendered more likely by Eustathius’ rejection of the idea that the body is the cause of sin. In the above passage, the soul is sinful because people come to be through their parents. Either a person’s soul and body both come

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As noted in chapter 1, Sellers ironically rejects the authenticity of these fragments because they do present Melchizedek as supernatural.

D50:23-29 [Ariomanitas].
to be through the person’s parents or only the body comes to be through the person’s parents, and the soul receives sinfulness from the body. The latter possibility would be inconsistent with Eustathius’ belief that the body is not the cause of sin. Therefore, his reference to inherited pollution suggests traducianism. We have insufficient evidence determine whether this is a doctrine that Eustathius elaborated, but he seems to make use of the idea here.

It must be appreciated that Eustathius clearly does not think that Christ’s soul pre-existed his body: his attack on a Platonic conception of the soul, we have seen, is embedded within his attack on logos-sarx Christology. The possible contrast is between Christ’s uniquely created soul and one inherited from his parents.

Where he describes the pro-Arian position on how souls interact with bodies, Eustathius attributes to it the claim that souls “have come to be in order that, having been left behind [ἐγκαταλειφθεῖσαι] in the bodies, they might breathe life-giving power into them.”547 This admittedly opaque phrase has the sense of souls being put in bodies from outside, and it would be difficult to reconcile generationism with this picture. It is anyway difficult to glean Eustathius’ own view on the origin of the soul from this passage, because it is neither the point on which he is attacking his opponents, nor the point on which he must agree with them for his argument to work. The term ἐγκαταλειφθεῖσαι may have sense that the soul is somehow out of its natural habitat in the body, which seems at odds with Eustathius’ normative view of

547 D1:8-9 [Ariomanitas]. Emphasis mine.
body-soul interaction, and might therefore suggest that he is jibing his opponents.\textsuperscript{548} We cannot, anyway, be sure that this term is Eustathius’ own, because this passage is found only in the epitome. Eustathius’ position on the question of traducianism remains unclear.

Eustathius’ ideas on the origin of the soul are very often at odds with Origen, but also sometimes indebted to him. Firstly, Eustathius rejects the pre-existence of souls. There is a live debate as to whether and in what sense Origen held this view himself, and adjudicating it is far beyond the scope of this thesis and it should be noted that many self-declared Origenists, such as Eusebius of Caesarea also rejected the pre-existence of souls. It does, however, seem likely that Eustathius attributed this idea to Origen, as Methodius seems to attribute it to him;\textsuperscript{549} as I have argued elsewhere, Eustathius’ attack on this idea, within \textit{Ariomanitas}, suggests that he is concerned about Platonism within Christianity, and that he sees this as the legacy of Origenism.\textsuperscript{550} Nonetheless, Eustathius’ doctrine of Christ’s uniquely sinless soul closely resembles Origen’s doctrine that Christ’s human soul is the only soul not to have fallen. This is discussed further in chapter 5, where the extent of his debt to Origen becomes apparent.

\textsuperscript{548} The verb ἐγκαταλιμπάνω is not often used of the soul, but it is used, in a similar sense, to refer to the mind being left behind in the body when it turns towards lower things, in \textit{Corpus Hermeticum}, X.24.7. In \textit{Corpus Hermeticum}, the word clearly has a negative connotation.

\textsuperscript{549} C.f. Methodius, \textit{De Res.} (CPG, 1812), 1.31-34 and Williams, \textit{Arius}, pp.167-70.
Conclusion

Eustathius’ picture of the relationship between the body and the soul needs to be viewed within the context of wider fourth-century metaphysics and, in particular, its engagement with Platonism. A discussion of how Eustathius’ metaphysics engages with Platonism must allow for the complexity and ambiguity of Plato’s intellectual legacy. Richard Norris suggests that a key metaphysical distinction in Platonism can be seen in terms of “mutability and changelessness…time and eternity” or “sensible and the intelligible, the visible and the invisible, the corporeal and the incorporeal.”551 However, Plato himself is unclear on the relationship between the perceptible and intelligible worlds; as Robert Berchman argues, he reached no conclusion, but bequeathed the question to his successors.552 His successors give different answers.

For this reason, I believe that Rowan Williams’ approach to the metaphysical questions underlying the ‘Arian’ controversy is insightful: there was in the fourth century a particular negotiation of the question of the origins of the cosmos, and the way it was posed in the Timaeus continued to be important in framing the questions that were asked.553 The question of the eternity of the cosmos had exercised Hellenic intellectuals since the time of Plato. A belief in the eternity of the intelligible world dominates ancient Platonism, and the eternity of the universe, in some sense or other,

550 I made this argument in a paper given at the 16th International Patristics Conference, “So-called Platonism and the humanity of Christ in Eustathius of Antioch’s Contra Ariomanitas.” On Eusebius’ rejection of the pre-existence of souls, c.f. his P.E. (CPG, 3486), 13.15. (See above).
551 Norris, Manhood, p.11.
is extremely dominant across most Greco-Roman thought.554 Christian intellectual culture of the fourth century decisively rejected this picture and, with it, important aspects in Origen’s cosmology in which the Son and the created order can both be seen to be eternal:555 only God has no beginning, everything else has a beginning in time. A nexus of metaphysical questions must then be renegotiated.556

Eustathius employs as a foundational metaphysical framework the distinction between the ἀγένητος God and γενητός everything else. This distinction is temporal; ἀγένητα have always existed, γένητα have come into being.557 Things that come into being are impermanent: “Everything that has as beginning also has an end. Everything that ends is capable of corruption.”558

In this respect, he follows normative fourth-century Christian thought in applying the categories ‘not having not existed’ and ‘having coming to exist’ to God and everything else respectively, and therefore not to the intelligible and perceptible worlds.559 He also does not regard intelligibility as entailing impassibility in any

553 C.f. Williams, Arius, pp.181-98.
556 Whilst, in one sense, this metaphysical development looks quite clear about the nature of God, it is also a question to itself. It became necessary to seek what Ayres refers to as a “‘grammar’ of God.” See Ayres, Nicaea, pp.13-15, quote p.14.
558 D108, whole fragment [Ariano].
559 C.f. Parvis, Marcellus, p.54. Alvyn Petterson, Athanasius and the human body (Bristol, Bristol Press, 1990), pp.20-24, notes this categorisation in Athanasius, and connects it to a more integrated
sense. This is much more unusual, but it is a logical development of the wider fourth-century engagement with Platonism. In the insistence that everything but God has a beginning, the categories of intelligibility and eternity have ceased to be mutually determining. In Eustathius’ thought, a similar thing has happened to the relationship between intelligibility and impassibility. Eustathius keeps the categories of ‘intelligible’ and ‘perceptible’, and they are important to his worldview, but they entail less than they do in most forms of Platonism and are therefore no longer a pivotal metaphysical reference point.

The soul is both the most fruitful and the most problematic arena for negotiating the relationship between the Platonic perceptible and intelligible worlds because, whilst it is supposed to be intelligible, it is hard to deny that it is involved in the sensible world. Norris puts the problem well: “The dualistic logic requires that the soul be regarded as a stranger in the world of sense; but the fact of the soul’s present situation demands that this judgement be somewhat modified. The soul, despite its intelligible and divine nature, cannot be wholly strange to the material world of becoming in which it is set.”

Eustathius, by contrast, believes that the two realms are supposed to be interconnected; because the distinction between them is properly blurred, an intelligible thing that is “set in” the sensible world is not problematic in his anthropology.

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anthropology than is found in Plato, but he does not really place this in the context of wider fourth-century Christianity.

A key part of the Platonic distinction between perceptible and intelligible, ‘always having been’, and ‘having come to be’ – cannot fit a distinction between two realms in any simple sense in fourth-century Christianity. Eustathius explicitly attacks Platonism on precisely this point. He objects to the claim that souls are “unbegotten and immortal”;\(^{561}\) this is language Eustathius only wants to apply to God. In this passage, his objection to Platonism is that it fails to acknowledge the chasm between God and everything else.

It is clear that fourth-century Christianity rejected the idea of an *eternal* intelligible world. This clarified the nature of the disjunction between God and the world that had always been a tenet of Christian thought, in order to defend it. Eustathius is typical in this regard. It is worth considering a view which suggests, ironically, that Origen provides a precursor to the rejection of the eternity of the intelligible world. Berchman has argued that Origen innovatively blurs the distinction between the sensible and intelligible worlds.\(^{562}\) Berchman claims that Origen’s fundamental metaphysical distinction is between being *per se* and being *per accidens*. Because the Word exists, like everyone else, by participating in the Father, the Word exists *per accidens*. Importantly, in Berchman’s Origen, the distinction is

\(^{561}\) D52:1-3 [*Ariomanitas*], quoting *Phaedrus* 245c,5 -246a,2, but claiming to quote *Phaedo*. Plato is misquoted in the text we have. Eustathius uses the term ἁγένητος whilst Plato’s text reads ἁγένητος. When Plato was writing, the words were more or less synonymous. In the ‘Arian’ controversy, however, the distinction is all-important as it has come to denote the distinction between ‘unbegotten’ – having no source and ‘uncreated’ – having always existed. ἁγένητος, even for Eustathius, applies only to the Father; in attributing its application, in place of ἁγένητος, to souls, he renders Plato’s assertion even more objectionable. Nonetheless, a deliberate misquote here does not fit with what we know of Eustathius’s argument; he is distinguishing souls from the Word, not from the Father, so ἁγένητος would have been more useful to him. He is, perhaps, quoting from a corrupt text copied early enough for the scribe to find the difference unimportant.

\(^{562}\) Rober Berchman *From Philo to Origen* (Chico, California, Scholars Press, 1984), p.121.
not temporal. However, the concept of intrinsic being is easily connected to the concept of “never having not been” when one believes in creation by God ex nihilo. Russell, at any rate, provides a more satisfactory analysis of Origen. He suggests that the Word’s participation in the Father, unlike everyone else’s, is intrinsic and that therefore the Word does exist per se even though it participates.\footnote{Russell, Deification, p.274.} This better captures the sense in which the Word is a genuine mediator in Origen: Origen’s point is that he has an intermediary ontological status. There is nothing in his thought comparable to the fourth-century ontological categorisation between γενητός and ἄγενητος.

Eustathius is more unusual in rejecting the impassibility of the intelligible world out of hand.\footnote{On the soul’s impassibility in Plato, c.f. Robinson, Plato’s Psychology, p.40. For neoplatonism, c.f. Richard King, Aristotle and Plotinus on memory, (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter 2009), p.20.} The ambiguous, intermediate status of the soul comes into play in Platonism with regard to the passions. The soul’s choice between the perceptible and intelligible worlds is presented as a choice to enter into the passions or not. If the soul underwent passions, it experienced them through the body, as opposed to of itself. Whether, and how far, an embodied soul can remain removed from passion was a subject of contention within pagan Platonism.\footnote{C.f. Carlos Steel, The Changing Self: a study of the soul in later Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus (Brussels, Paleis der Academiën – Hertogsstraat I, 1978), pp.34-51, where the author details Iamblichus’ rejection of the Plotinian idea that the soul can remain impassible.} A form of Platonism that saw the soul as becoming susceptible to passions through embodiment was clearly current in fourth-century Christianity in the eastern Empire, being found in Gregory of Nyssa and Athanasius. Among Eustathius’ contemporaries, the connection between
intelligibility and impassibility, complicated though it had always been, was still going strong.

By contrast, Eustathius himself clearly does not conceive of the human soul as impassible. It is true that the soul is the primary instance of an intelligible entity (other than God) that we have from Eustathius’ thought and, given its inevitably intermediate position, it does not seem best-suited to be treated as an archetype of an intelligible thing. However, this argument requires that the soul enters into passions only via the body, or that the highest part of the soul is protected from passion. As we have seen, this concept is entirely, and quite deliberately, absent in Eustathius.

Eustathius’ treatment of the human soul is part of a wider Hellenic and patristic tendency to relativise the category of ‘intelligibility’. I have noted that Eustathius shares with Origen a tendency to conceive of God as most incorporeal or intelligible, whilst applying the categories ‘incorporeal’ and ‘intelligible’ to a wider range of things, and places these things on one side of line, with God, in contrast to ‘perceptible’ things. However, in describing the soul as intelligible, Origen means to suggest that it is, of itself, impassible. An important passage in Methodius forms a sharp and revealing contrast. In it he very strongly insists upon the passibility of the soul, but then argues that it must, therefore, be corporeal.\footnote{Methodius, De. Res (CPG, 1812), III.18.1-2.} Eustathius gives an account of the soul’s role in human experience that is indebted to Methodius, but an account of its ontology that is indebted to Origen. Like both Origen and Methodius,
Eustathius draws a line between intelligible and perceptible things. Like Origen, he places the soul on the ‘intelligible’ side of the line. However, like Methodius, he maintains that it is passible in its own right.

Eustathius combines a belief in the ontological dissimilarity of body and soul with an integrated account of their involvement in human action and experience. The nuances vary according to the context of a given narrative, which can vary within a single work. So, when he writes of the soul between bodily death and resurrection, he often writes as if it is a proxy for the person. However, even in this context, he has a strong sense of an intrinsic connection between the body and the soul.

Eustathius’ discourse on bodily resurrection, and the disembodied soul, shows an antipathy towards Origenism. Eustathius repeatedly emphasises the properly physical nature of the human being. However, he combines this with a full and detailed discourse on the psychological and emotional experience of the soul, in which he involves the body. Eustathius’ holds together a belief in the intelligibility of the soul and a belief in the passibility of the soul, and thereby carries the wider fourth-century renegotiation of Platonic metaphysics further than many of his contemporaries.
Chapter 4: The image of God

The image of God is a central theme in a wide-range of patristic anthropology and important anthropological battlegrounds can be seen in disparate interpretations of it. The key scriptural texts for an anthropological understanding of God’s image are:

- Genesis 1:26-27: “And God said, ‘Let us make humankind [ἄνθρωπον] according to our image [εἰκόνα] and likeness [ὁμοίωσιν], and let them rule over the fish of the sea, and over the flying creatures of heaven, and over the cattle and all the earth, and over all the reptiles that creep on the earth.’ And God made humankind [ἄνθρωπον], according to the image [εἰκόνα] of God he made him. Male and female he made them.”

- Genesis 8:6: “[And God said] ‘whoever sheds the blood of a human being, his blood shall be shed in its place. For I made humankind in the image of God.”

- Romans 8:29: “Those whom he foreknew, he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the first among many brothers.”

- 1 Corinthians 4:4: “…Christ…is the image of God.”

- Colossians 1:15: “[Christ is] the image of the invisible God, firstborn of all creatures.”

567 This chapter contains substantial material from my article, “The image of God.”

568 Frances Young notes the sometime significance of Exodus 20:4: “You shall not make for yourself a carved image or likeness…”, to patristic reflection on the image of God in humanity, but she argues that, with the partial (though admittedly notable) exceptions of Athanasius, Cyril of Jerusalem and the Cappadocians, the connection between the prohibition on image-making, and the anthropological-theological nexus of Adam and Christ in God’s image had broken down by the fourth century. “God’s image: the elephant in the room in the fourth century?” SP, 50 (2011), 57-72. It is possible that there is some connection to discourse on idolatry in Eustathius’ reference to Adam as a “statue of God.” (See chapter 3 and below). However, this connection must remain highly speculative, and Eustathius, insofar as the evidence allows judgement, seems to me to bear out Young’s thesis.
The image of God is an interpretative key for the relationship between God, humanity, and Christ. In Christian theology, there is a strong tendency to equate the image of God with human essence. Because the term ‘image of God’ is used both in relation to Adam and Eve, and in relation to Christ, it denotes humankind both before the lapse, or the fall, and in its eschatological destiny.\textsuperscript{569} The anthropological understanding of God’s image is therefore particularly connected to a concept of actualised human potential. It is anthropological in part because it is soteriological.

It hardly needs adding that, relatedly, referring to human beings as ‘in the image of God’ has profound implications for the relationship between humanity and God. It implies a similarity of some kind between humanity and God. More specifically, it suggests that God is revealed in humankind. This is closely connected to the concept of Christ as image, which is itself connected back to Adam and the rest of humankind. ‘Image’, whilst implying identity, assumes distinction. Applied to Christ, this raises certain questions about Christ’s identity with, and distinction from, God. Consequently, 2 Corinthians 4.4 and Colossians 1.15 became key texts in the ‘Arian’ controversy.\textsuperscript{570}

\textsuperscript{569} As I will argue in chapter 5, ‘The Lapse’, the term ‘lapse’ is more appropriate than the term ‘fall’ to describe Eustathius’ ideas about Adam and Eve’s first sin, and the ensuing degeneracy of humankind, because the term ‘fall’ is not evidenced in his writings and has rather specific metaphysical implications that it is best to avoid attributing without sufficient evidence.

\textsuperscript{570} For example, Marcellus of Ancyra and Asterius argued over the image of God. Asterius claimed that referring to Christ as image clearly subordinated him to the Father, and Marcellus countered that the title ‘image’ applied to Christ’s flesh, or humanity, not to the Word. For Asterius, see Fragments 10 and 11 [edition of Markus Vinzent, \textit{Asterius von Kappadokien}, (Lieden, Brill, 1993) CPG, 2817-2818]. For Marcellus, see \textit{Against Asterius} (CPG, 2800), Fragment K96.
Eustathius’ extant writings contain no systematic discussion of God’s image: he refers to it three times explicitly. We are therefore left with the task of piecing together his thought from a few suggestive passages. The ‘image of God’ is a notoriously complex area of patristic theology. Furthermore, the various passages on which this theology is based point in rather different directions. They reveal the unsurprising conviction that human beings are in the image of God, but careful extrapolation is required in order to reach further conclusions.

Several significant anthropological points emerge from Eustathius’ concept of the image of God: 1) There is a strong ontological disjunction between God and ἄνθρωπος 2) God is revealed in humanity. 3) The human body is an integral and positive part of the human being. 4) Christ fulfils Adam’s potential and, correspondingly, is the archetype for perfect humanity. These are ideas that are fundamental in Eustathius’ wider anthropology. The image of God is not as prominent in Eustathius’ extant corpus as in several other patristic writings, and it is not possible to tell whether it led or followed other ways in which he thinks about anthropology. It is clear that it coheres closely with his wider anthropological ideas and convictions, and can therefore, in turn, elucidate them.

Two kinds of image: the Son versus Christ-Adam

This section examines Eustathius’ understanding of the structural aspect of the relationship between the Father, the Son, Christ, Adam and the whole human race
implied in the term ‘image of God.’ Eustathius refers to God’s image explicitly three times, and I treat these in turn before drawing them together.

One very significant passage must be quoted in full:

For Paul did not say, “like in form to the Son of God” but “like in form to the image of his Son”, showing that the Son is one thing and his image another. For, indeed, the Son, bearing the divine marks of the paternal excellence, is the image of the Father since, because like is begotten from like, the ones begotten appear as true images of the ones who begot them. But the human being whom he bore is the image of the Son, as images are made from dissimilar colours by being painted on wax, some being wrought by hand deliberately and others coming to be in nature and likeness. Moreover the very law of truth announces this. For the bodiless spirit of wisdom is not like in form to corporeal people, but the human express image having been made bodily by the Spirit, bearing the same number of limbs as all the rest, and clad in similar form to each.⁵⁷¹

This passage offers a hierarchical conception of the image relationship between the Father, the Son, the human Christ and Adam/ the rest of humanity: roughly, the Son is image of the Father, Christ is image of the Son and humanity is conformed to Christ; this might suggest that human beings other than Christ are images of Christ, the human being, but this is not explicit. However, the sense in which the Son is

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⁵⁷¹ D68 [Proverbs 8:22], of which I have quoted the entire fragment. The point intended in the rather strange last sentence is that Christ’s humanity is typically human (and this point is made with much sarcasm). This argument is very frequent in Ariomaniās, and the reference to the number of Christ’s limbs closely echoes, in particular, D9:13 “he had been equipped with limbs”. Elsewhere in Proverbs 8:22, Eustathius similarly describes Christ’s humanity as “[t]he one who had been formed out of all kinds of limbs” [D71:10-11]. The phrase “clad in similar form to each” is part of this argument, but here Eustathius seems to have in mind the idea that the soul is wearing the body. Though this might be seen to jar with his wider view of body-soul relations, it should not be taken too seriously because Eustathius is being humorously sarcastic and the way in which the soul relates to the body is not the point of this passage.
image of the Father is qualitatively superior to the sense in which Christ is the image of the Son. This is not simply a descending scale of images, from the Father, via the Son and Christ, to Adam, because a radical disjunction between the divinity of the Father and the Son, and the humanity of Christ and Adam, intervenes.

Eustathius explicitly contrasts the sense in which the Son is the Father’s image with the sense in which Christ, the human being, is the Son’s image. The Son is the Father’s image in the sense that “[when] like is begotten from like, the ones begotten appear as true images of their begetters.” Conversely “the human being of Christ” is not “true image”: “the human being whom [the Son] bore is the image of the Son, as images are made from dissimilar colours by being painted on wax, some being wrought by hand deliberately and others coming to be in nature and likeness.”

Eustathius’ hierarchical conception of the image of God echoes Origen, as does his distinction between the two kinds of image. He shares his understanding

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572 In Eustathius’ anti-Arian writings, the title “Christ” is reserved for the human being; Eustathius never uses it for the Word/Son, as opposed to the human being. By contrast, he does use it in a context where the human being as opposed to the Word/Son is intended. So, for example, in *Ariomanitas* Eustathius writes that “two others were crucified with Christ” [D26:11]. Given Eustathius’ insistence on divine impassibility, even in the context of the incarnation, by the time of the ‘Arian’ controversy, we “Christ” must here refer to the human being. See discussion in chapter 1, and further discussion in chapter 4. C.f. also D87:3-5 [Ps. 92]: “God dwelling in him…was not led like a lamb to death and slaughtered like a sheep.”

573 D68:5-6 [Proverbia 8.22].

574 D68:7-10 [Proverbia 8.22].

575 *De Princ.* (CPG, 1482), 1.2.6., in which Origen identifies two distinct meanings of the term image, applying one to the relationship between God and humanity, and the other to the relationship between God and Christ. 1) “an object painted or carved on some material” corresponds to the sense in which *anthropos* is God’s image. 2) “a child is said to be the image of its parent when the *similitudinum* of
of the eternal Word as image not only with the range of pro-Arian theology, but also with other anti-Arians, such as Athanasius. However, he differs sharply from Marcellus, to whom he is very often closest theologically. This reflects the eclecticism of his intellectual resources. It also, as Spoerl argues, indicates that he distinguishes Father and Son more than Marcellus. However, Eustathius emphatically deploys his Origenist view of image in favour of divine unity and, even more, the Son’s eternity.

Eustathius is acutely conscious of the fact that the term ‘image’ denotes identity between the image and the thing it images, whilst assuming a distinction between them. His double interpretation of the term ‘image of God’ reflects a desire on his part to emphasise the identity between the Father and the Son and the distinction between the Son and Christ. This is, in fact, the reason that he raises the question of the image of God: “Paul did not say, ‘like in form to the Son of God’ but ‘like in form to the image of his Son’, showing that the Son is one thing and his image another.” When applied to the Father-Son relationship, the term ‘image’ connotes sameness, whilst when applied to the God-human relationship, it connotes distinction, though it still necessarily denotes a degree of similarity. Eustathius’
distinction between the Son’s imagehood and Christ’s imagehood corresponds to his
wider distinction between the Son and humanity. The Son is begotten, humanity
(and everything else) is created: “if… [the Son] is a creature, then he is not begotten.
And if he is begotten, then he is not a creature, since it is not possible for the
classification of each of these to be wound round.”581 It is hard to believe that he
does not intend explicitly to refer to the wider created/begotten distinction. (We
might, indeed, wonder whether he is using Origen as a tool with which to beat
Eusebius of Caesarea).582

A Latin fragment from Contra Arianos initially appears to fly in the face of
Eustathius’ insistence on the Son’s full divinity and in particular to use image
language to distinguish sharply between Father and Son. However, it seems likely
that the Greek has been misleadingly rendered into Latin. The Latin reads: “Deus
Verbum eandem quam genitor portat imaginem, imago quippe existens divinae
substantiae.”583 If one retroverts imago to εἰκόνα and therefore translates it as
‘image’ the passage reads: “God the Word bears the same image as the begetter,
being an image of the divine substance.” In this case, the Son is not ‘of the same
substance’ as the Father. However, Parvis argues that this reading jars, not only
because it does not cohere with Eustathius’ concept of the Son elsewhere, but also
because the Father also “bears” an image, which makes very little sense. She
suggests that what has been translated as imago was actually χαρακτήρ rather than
εἰκόν. The passage, she argues, should therefore be rendered “God the Word bears

581 D107, entire fragment [Arianos].
582 See discussion in chapter 2 on Eusebius being the likely target of his many of his anti-Arian works.
the same *imprint* as the begetter, being the very *imprint of God’s being*” and would echo Hebrews 1:3.\(^{584}\)

Parvis’ argument is very persuasive, particularly because it does not lead us to the bizarre conclusion, otherwise suggested by this fragment, that Eustathius thought that the Father was himself an image. What could he conceivably be an image of? Furthermore, there is another respect in which the translation from Greek into Latin may be imprecise. Specifically, what is rendered as “eandem …imaginem” – “the *same imprint*” may have read in the Greek “τὸν χαρακτῆρα αὐτόν” – “the *very imprint* of the begetter”; this could have been misread as “τὸν αὐτόν χαρακτῆρα” though, admittedly, one must posit a change in the gender of the pronoun from Greek to Latin.\(^{585}\) This, like Parvis’ proposed amendment, moves away from the suggestion that the Son *has* something that the Father also has, towards the more typically Eustathian suggestion that the Son *is* something that the Father also is. This fragment probably does not contain the word εἰκών and therefore may not be directly referring to the discourse surrounding the nexus of biblical εἰκών θεοῦ texts. At any rate, it carries, if anything a closer sense of the Father-Son relationship than the passage from *Proverbia 8:22*. It is clear that this fragment does not represent a divergent aspect of Eustathius’ image theology.

\(^{583}\) D95:1-2 [Arianos].
\(^{585}\) I am grateful to Paul Parvis for this suggestion.
Eustathius’ concept of image evidently cannot be understood aside from his divisive Christology: “the human being of Christ” *qua* image, is distinguished from the Son, *qua* image. Also, the connection between Adam and Christ that is found within Eustathius’ image-theology relies on Eustathius’ emphasis on Christ’s humanity: though the later, divisive nature of his Christology is not logically necessary to this emphasis, it becomes very important to the way that Eustathius articulates it. We have almost entirely post-‘Arian’ sources for Eustathius’ image theology, which leaves us with the frustrating question of whether and how his image-theology shifted with his Christology. As Eustathius believed in Christ’s human soul prior to the outbreak of the ‘Arian’ controversy, his distinction between Christ as image and the Son as image would still have worked structurally. It is significant that his understanding so closely echoes that of Origen, who also had a clearly developed concept of Christ’s human soul. Nonetheless, he employs Origen’s distinction so as to maintain a disjunction between the God and humanity, which seems to fit, specifically, into his later, more divisive Christological framework.

**God’s image reveals God**

In Eustathius’ writings, the term ‘image of God’ denotes, among other things, something that reveals God. The Son, Adam and Christ are images of God in that they reveal God. The starting point for this is the revelation of God in the incarnation. The revelatory nature, and therefore the image-status, of both the Son and Adam are bound up in Christ’s revelatory nature: Christ reveals God because of
the Son dwelling in him, and humanity reveals God by becoming conformed to Christ.

The fact that Christ’s revelatory capacity relies on the in-dwelling Word is evident because he points, in the first instance, specifically to the Word, and only because he points to the Word does he point to the whole Godhead:

[T]he human being of Christ is a saviour…a bringer of light to the human race…[in order that]…we may behold the Word and God through him, through the Word we may behold the universally sovereign authority…through the one image looking at the dyad of Father and Son…in the dyad knowing the one Godhead.  

This understanding of God revealed in the incarnation is rich with paradoxes (some of which might threaten the coherence of the picture that they paint): the first paradox relates to unity and distinction within the Godhead: the Word both is God and reveals God. Eustathius’ hierarchical image theology jars with his emphasis on divine unity in that it appears to subordinate the Son to the Father. Also, despite attempts to the contrary, Eustathius cannot avoid implying more distinction between them than is found elsewhere in his writings. However, even within this hierarchical context, he wants to maintain the unity of God. This elucidates his distinction between the way in which the Son is image and the way in which Christ is image: Christ reveals God by pointing to something that he himself is not; the Word Incarnate reveals God because he is God made manifest.
The second paradox concerns the revelatory nature of Christ’s humanity: the mechanism of revelation described in this passage is that Christ reveals God because God is incarnate in him. Despite this, there is a strong emphasis on the revelatory capacity of Christ’s humanity. The rhetorical point of this passage is that ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ Χριστοῦ - “the human being of Christ” as opposed to the Son is the one “bringing light to the human race” and the one through whom we behold God.588 It is Christ’s humanity that reveals God. As Spoerl argues, “the ‘man of Christ’ is a visible image through which we perceive divinity.”589 There is something soteriologically important about the revelation of God in a human being.

Elsewhere in Ariomanitas, Eustathius clearly has the idea that Adam revealed God. Let us return to his description of Adam’s pre-ensouled body as a statue. Before God breathed a soul into Adam’s body, it was a “τοῦ θεοῦ πρωτότυπον ἄγαλμα”, “prototypical statue of God... most perfect copy of the most divine image.”590 The statue reference is evidently a reference, in some sense, to the ‘image and likeness’ of God attributed to ἄνθρωπος in Genesis 1.26-27. Describing the ‘image’ in terms of a statue emphasises its revelatory capacity, on two interrelated levels: firstly, statues are supposed to represent, and therefore to reveal, the things of which they are statues. In particular, Eustathius perhaps had in mind

586 D21:16-22 [Ariomanitas].
587 Parvis, Marcellus, pp.58-59.
588 There is a parallel here to Eustathius’ belief in the capacity of Christ’s human soul to be omnipresent.
590 D61:4-5 [Ariomanitas]. This fragment probably comes after the one just quoted, but we cannot be certain.
statues of the emperor, which represent him in his absence.\textsuperscript{591} In connecting God’s image with a statue of God, Eustathius chooses to emphasise this revelatory sense of ‘image’. Moreover, he emphasises the physicality of the image, linking it with its visibility.

This is important within the context of Eustathius’ metaphysics, in which corporeality corresponds to visibility. There is, perhaps, a bastardised Platonism here: the perceptible is an image of the intelligible.

In the passage describing Adam as a statue of God, the “most divine image” that Adam is a copy of is presumably the God the Word, not the human being of Christ. Adam does not image God the Word independently of God, because this is a description of God’s creation of Adam. However, the Word is not “dwelling” with Adam, as the Word is with Christ. This is somewhat in tension with the suggestion that Christ reveals God by virtue of God dwelling in him. It suggests that we should resolve the ambiguities of that passage in favour of the idea that ἄνθρωπος \textit{qua} ἄνθρωπος reveals God. Alongside Eustathius’ conviction of the radical ontological disjunction between God and humanity is a conviction that humanity reveals God.

\textsuperscript{591} On the connection between statues of gods and the image of God in Greco-Roman thought, c.f. George H. van Kooten, \textit{Paul’s anthropology in context: the image of God, assimilation to God, and Tripartite man in Ancient Judaism, Ancient Philosophy and Early Christianity} (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2008), pp.112-118.
Eustathius connects Christ’s role as “saviour” with his role as “a bringer of light to the human race.” There is a soteriological dimension to the revelation of God to humankind. This implies that part of the problem that Christ sets right is human ignorance of God. Revelation is part of the way in which the term “image of God” is soteriologically significant.

**Adam and Christ**

For Eustathius, Adam and Christ are both, in some sense, images of God. Unfortunately, it is unclear whether, and in what way, Eustathius synthesises these two ideas. However, there is a clue in Eustathius’ emphasis on Christ’s humanity, in contradistinction to his divinity, in this context. The image of God is found in the humanity that they share.

The term ‘image of God’ refers, among other things, to human telos. This is an extremely common patristic understanding of the term. Christ *qua* image is, therefore, the archetype for perfect, eschatological humanity. Correspondingly, he quotes Romans 8.29, and applies it, emphatically, to “the human being of Christ”: “For Paul did not say ‘conformed to the Son of God’, but ‘conformed to the image of his son’, showing the Son to be one thing, and his image another.” He then moves on to the central rhetorical point of this quote – the distinction between Christ and the Son, which we have seen above. He argues “the bodiless Spirit of wisdom is not conformed to corporeal people, but the human impressed likeness [χαρακτήρ],

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592 See D21:16-22 [Ariomanitas], quoted above.
having been made bodily by the Spirit, bearing the same number of members as all the rest, and clad in similar form to each [is conformed to them]." \( ^{594} \)

Eustathius describes Melchizedek as an image of Christ, and here has the idea that Christ is a model for Melchizedek, giving a similar sense to that in his exegesis of Romans 8:29:

Melchizedek, putting on the image of the type of Christ, and wearing visibly the imprint of his royalty, resembled Christ…he transmitted an image that resembled and was analogous to the person of Christ. According to John, it is the Word himself…having become a body, who is the archetype of the image and the imprint. \( ^{595} \)

Sellers objected to the authenticity of this fragment on the basis that its Christology is insufficiently divisive. However, the image theology implied in this passage is very similar to that in Proverbs 8:22, in that Melchizedek reveals God by revealing – in this instance, clearly by imaging – the Word Incarnate, or Christ. Furthermore, Christ’s role as God’s image is dependent on the Word. The sense that the embodied Word is the archetype of which Melchizedek is the image closely corresponds to the idea that human beings are conformed to Christ.

Eustathius’ exegesis of Romans 8.29 is part of a wider Adam-Christ parallelism drawing on Pauline motifs. So, in his exegesis of 1 Corinthians 15:44-

\[ ^{593} \text{D68:1-3 [Proverbs 8:22].} \]
\[ ^{594} \text{D68:11-15.} \]
\[ ^{595} \text{D113 [Melchisedek], from the French translation in Declerck, Eustathii.} \]
46, he clearly has the sense that Christ perfects Adam, advancing on the original condition: He quotes the Pauline text: “Adam, the first human being, became a living soul, the last Adam became a life-giving spirit. But the first Adam was not spiritual but soul-like, the second was spiritual.”

A little later, he writes that, “Paul wrote that a ‘soul-like’ body was sown, which has performed manifold sins through the soul, but he says that this body is raised spiritual, since he [God] changes the bodies of all those having been raised.”

Eustathius’ exegesis of Romans 8.29 strongly suggests that his image theology fits into this framework: Christ qua image fulfills the potential of Adam qua image. The claim that people are conformed to God’s image, i.e. Christ, has a strong soteriological dimension. Christ is the first new human being, the perfection of Adam.

The reference to the first Adam indicates that Eustathius thinks that, eschatologically, people will progress beyond the pre-lapsarian condition. However, he also thinks that ψυχικός people have “performed manifold sins.” Prelapsarian people, by definition, have not performed manifold sins, so this raises a question: how do the prelapsarian condition and sin relate to each other in Eustathius’ concept of ψυχικός? When he writes of the ψυχικόν body having sinned, he is clearly not thinking of Christ’s body before his death and resurrection. He is thinking of our bodies, before our death and resurrection. The body was not sown sinful, as Adam was not created sinful, but it has since sinned. All who are ψυχικός are now sinful,

596 1 Corinthians 15.45-46, Quoted at D44:1-4 [Ariomanitas].
597 D47:5-9 [Ariomanitas]. C.f. 1 Corinthians 15.44.
so Eustathius writes of the ψυχικός state as sinful state.⁵⁹⁸ The negation of this sin, and the progression beyond the prelapsarian condition, are held together in Eustathius’ picture of Christ as the perfect human being.

Eustathius believes that humankind must be renewed; its essential condition must be altered in a way that is partly a restoration to its original state, but is also more than that. Christ is not only the architect but also the archetype of this renewal: ultimately, humanity will be conformed to Christ, who is perfected ἄνθρωπος. Human perfection is therefore achieved in the incarnation. Christ is an archetype for what we will become. In this, Eustathius draws heavily on Irenaeus’ concept of ἀνακεφαλαίωσις – recapitulation – as Zoepfl claims, and as I have also argued elsewhere.⁵⁹⁹

Christ both restores to humankind something that Adam and Eve had, but lost, and advances it beyond this condition.⁶⁰⁰ Eustathius explains the progression from original ἄνθρωπος to perfected ἄνθρωπος with the Pauline distinction between ψυχικός and πνευματικός humanity: pre-lapsarian Adam was ψυχικός, Christ is

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⁵⁹⁸ It had, then, always been susceptible to sin. The point of bringing sin into this contrast could be that the πνευματικόν body that is raised is not susceptible to sin. The question of susceptibility to sin is discussed in chapter 6.
⁵⁹⁹ Zoepfl, “Trinitarischen und christologischen Anschauungen”, p.201. See also ‘modern research’ section in introduction. For my earlier argument, see my article, “The image of God.” Eustathius’ tendency to see God’s transforming action on the person in terms of an Adam-Christ framework may also echo elements of Syrian soteriology. See Sebastian Brock, “Some paths to perfection in the Syriac Fathers” SP, 51 (2009), 77-94, esp. p.94.
⁶⁰⁰ This is strikingly resonant of Irenaeus. For example, Irenaeus writes both that “what we had lost in Adam…we may recover in Christ Jesus” [A.H. (CPG, 1306), III.18.1] and that we will ultimately “receive a faculty of the Uncreated One.” [A.H., IV.38.3].
Humanity will progress to the πνευματικός state, thereby becoming “conformed to the image of the Son.”\(^{602}\) The Spirit is key to the transformation of human nature in Eustathius’ theology.\(^{603}\)

Within his discourse on the πνευματικός person, Eustathius clearly draws conclusions about human perfection from Christology. As Friedrich Zoepfl has argued, Eustathius tends to talk of the incarnation in terms of God clothing himself in humanity, rather than becoming humanity.\(^{604}\) Any ontological transformation is the consequence of God’s action as an external agent, upon Christ’s humanity. This is reflected in Eustathius’ understanding of what it means for a person to become πνευματικός.

The difference between the two states is characterised by a union between the person and the Spirit: “he who has been united (παγεὶς) with the Holy Spirit is πνευματικός, while he was has been mixed (κραθεὶς) proportionately with soul and body is, ψυχικός.”\(^{605}\) In this instance, Eustathius is contrasting Christ with Adam, and therefore his description of the union between the person and the Spirit is a description of the incarnation. This leads to a discussion of πνευματικοί in general, in which Eustathius writes of “fellowship of the divine Spirit” [τοῦ θείου

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\(^{601}\) D44:1-34 drawing on 1 Corinthians 15:45-47.

\(^{602}\) D68:1-3 in which Eustathius quotes Romans 8:29.

\(^{603}\) The Spirit had long sat at the juncture of soteriology and anthropology in Christian thought C.f. Wolf-Dieter Hauschild, Gottes Geist und der Mensch, Studien zur frühchristlichen Pneumatologie (Munich, C. Kaiser Verlag, 1972).


\(^{605}\) D44:5-7 [Ariomanitas].
The person’s union with the Spirit is pointedly weaker than the body-soul union. The Spirit does not function as a third portion of the person in Eustathius’ anthropology. Eustathius has no sense of a tripartite anthropology in which the Spirit ultimately becomes a part of the human person. The Spirit is seen as an agent acting upon the person. This is most evident in the fact that Eustathius thinks that the scriptural term πνευματικός means the same thing when applied to the saints on earth as when applied to the resurrected just. For example, he quotes Galatians’ reference to “spiritual ones” restoring those who have sinned. He then notes that “such a one is the one ‘sown a soul-like body, raised a spiritual body.’” The raising of the ‘spiritual body’ evidently comes later but, in connecting it to the ‘spiritual’ status of some Christians in the current life, he sees the resurrection as part of a process that is couched in terms of a change internal to the person more than the acquisition of an external substance.

However, Eustathius does very clearly believe that perfected ἄνθρωπος involves the Spirit in a way that original ἄνθρωπος does not. It is central to the transformation of the person. The presence of the fortifying spirit makes the person πνευματικός. This is clearest in Eustathius’ Christology, where the human being of Christ is “strengthened by the divine spirit.” Drawing an anthropological inference from Christology, we might suggest that, for all human beings, the change

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606 D47:1-2 [Ariomanitas]. The plural κοινωνίας might well suggest, instead “communications” and this is indeed a possible reading. However, “fellowship” seems to me a more likely sense here because Eustathius is examining Paul’s use of the term πνευματικός, and Paul often writes of this in connection with κοινωνία with the Spirit, where “fellowship” is meant. C.f. Philippians 2.1.

607 D44:29-30 [Ariomanitas].

608 Engastrimytho, 17.10
between ψυχικός and πνευματικός is less dramatic and the continuity between the original person and the saved person is strong. The person is transformed by God but this transformation relates very closely to what he or she is now.

Eustathius’ anthropological understanding of the image of God highlights some of the possibilities and limitations for relationship of humanity to God offered by his divisive Christology. As Christ’s humanity remains distinct from the divinity that it bears, eschatological humanity remains distinct from God. This stands in contrast to the incarnational theology of Irenaeus or Athanasius, in which the human person undergoes theopoiesis. Eustathius’ theology provides less opportunity for intimacy with God, but, correspondingly, provides more opportunity for human autonomy.

The πνευματικός person is distinguished from the current ψυχικός person partly in that the moral progress is completed: “the bodies change their ways [and] no one sins at all anymore.” The completion of the moral process is part of the same process as the transformation of the body and soul from ψυχικός to πνευματικός. The transformation of the body is part of an holistic transformation of the whole person, other aspects of which, apparently, may begin in this life.

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609 On Athanasius, c.f. Steenberg, *Of God and Man*, pp.158-189. The contrast is all the more notable because Eustathius’ theology is in other ways remarkably similar to Irenaeus’ as I have argued in my article “The image of God.” Unfortunately, there are no references to the eschatological transformation of the person in Eustathius’ pre-Arian writings, but it is quite possible that his idea of the relationship between the person and the Spirit would have been closer to Athanasius’ picture at this point.

610 The concept of ‘autonomy’ is fraught, and open to the charge of anachronistic value-judgement. I discuss the concept in detail in chapter 6.
The person is both physically and morally transformed. Eustathius sees the problem that requires resolution in the individual as twofold: both sin and mortality are constituents of the lapsarian human condition that will ultimately cease to exist. Progress towards sinlessness is evidently manifested first, as many of the saints are described as πνευματικός on account of holiness; although Eustathius is describing a different use of the word here, he sees a relationship between this use and its use to denote human telos. Importantly, the salvific process is gradual. Furthermore, the essential change that culminates eschatologically begins in this life though, invariably, is never completed within it. The current world order apparently allows considerable possibilities for the development of human nature, but they are intrinsically limited possibilities. This aspect of Eustathius’ soteriology focuses on the improvement of human nature from the state in which it was created, which is not primarily seen in terms of the correction of fault. This lends itself to a relatively positive attitude to the current situation: human imperfection is not a catastrophic error, but a stage en route to perfection. We shall see, in the following chapter, that such optimism regarding our current situation is far from

611 D47:8-9 [Ariomanitas].
612 In light of Eustathius’ integrated approach to the human body and soul, we should resist reading body/ soul dualism into this corruption / sin parallelism: sin involves both the body and the soul. There is some asymmetry in that the soul does not die – Christ partakes of death “through the body” – but the soul is nonetheless affected by death in that it is obliged to descend to Hades.
613 Compare Clement of Alexandria, “Through love, the future is present for him already”, Stromata (CPG, 1377), 6.3.
614 John Hick famously makes this point in his iconic Evil and the God of Love as part of a contrast between ‘Irenaean’ and ‘Augustinian’ theodicy. 2nd ed. (London, Macmillan, 1977), p.137. Denis Minns, though very largely agreeing with Hick in his assessment of Irenaeus and Augustine as anthropological optimist and pessimist respectively, notes that Augustine’s view of the facts of human history is very similar to Irenaeus’. (He couples Athanasius with Augustine in this comparison). Irenaeus, rev. ed. (Edinburgh, T and T Clark, 2010), pp.183-6. If we take Minns’ perspective
being Eustathius’ dominant soteriological motif, but we can only understand the entire tapestry of his soteriology, if we appreciate this aspect of it.

Eustathius’ indebtedness to Irenaeus’ idea of ἀνακεφαλαιωσις suggests, in turn, an interesting comparison with both Origen and Methodius. Methodius, like Origen refers to ἀποκατάστασις, “final restoration.”615 In Origen, this refers specifically to the restoration of souls, which is at odds with Methodius’ and Eustathius’ emphasis on the resurrection of the body. However, ἀποκατάστασις and ἀνακεφαλαιωσις are distinguished principally (and importantly) by the metaphysical frameworks in which they are placed. The idea of ἀνακεφαλαιωσις – the summing of all creation in Christ, and more specific sense that Christ restores and fulfils humankind – has many similarities, as a meta-narrative of human history, with ἀποκατάστασις.616 Methodius took various of Origen’s ideas and removed them from Origen’s cosmology and metaphysics. If Methodius had an idea of ἀποκατάστασις from which he has removed Origen’s ambivalence about ultimate embodiment, it begins to look as though he had something similar to a concept of ἀνακεφαλαιωσις. In this instance, in echoing what German scholarship dubbed the ‘Asia Minor’ tradition, Eustathius shares something with Origen.

615 Methodius, Convivium (CPG, 1810), 4.2.2 and 8.11.22. Lloyd Patterson observes this and sees it as evidence of Origen’s profound influence on Methodius in his Methodius, pp.136-7 and pp.144-55.
616 I am here drawing on Mark Edwards, who has drawn parallels between Irenaeus’ idea of progression from image to likeness and Origen’s in his, Origen against Plato, p.102.
Body, soul and the image of God

Eustathius clearly regards the human body as integral to the image of God in humankind. The place of the human soul in this picture is less clear. It can look as if he has two different pictures, one in which the whole person is the image, the other in which the image is simply the body. However, placed in the context of other discussion on the body-soul relationship, it becomes clear that it is almost certainly the whole person that is image in Eustathius.

That the body is integral to the image of God in humankind is evident both from his description of Adam as a “statue of God” and his insistence that Christ \textit{qua} image is physical. The description of Adam’s pre-ensouled body as a statue of God suggests that Eustathius located God’s image \textit{exclusively} in the human body.\footnote{As discussed in chapter 3. The description of Adam’s body as a statue is found in D61:4-5 [\textit{Ariomanitas}]. C.f. Parvis, \textit{Marcellus}, p.58.} This coheres with the idea that the image of God reveals God, because it is in the body that God is made \textit{visible}. However, this jars with Eustathius’ sense that Christ \textit{qua} image is the archetype for human completeness, because he is always adamant that human completeness involves both body and soul. It is, presumably, the entire human being that is conformed to the image of the Son.

Eustathius may simply use the term ‘image’ inconsistently.\footnote{There are many precedents for varied usage. Irenaeus, for example, sometimes writes that the ‘image of God’ is the body (C.f. \textit{A.H.} 5.6.1), and sometimes writes as if it is the whole person (C.f. \textit{A.H.}, 5.3.1), but his image theology nonetheless retains a wider consistency.} However, closer inspection of the statue metaphor suggests that, whilst “statue of God” does
allude to the “image of God” reference in Genesis 1.26-27, it is not intended to be synonymous with “image of God.” It is, rather, an aspect of that image. Eustathius’ description of Adam’s pre-ensouled body as a statue of God is reminiscent of his description of a hypothetical, soulless Christ, who, he argues, is the Christ of pro-Arian theology. (We have come across this passage before, so I quote only the most relevant section): “[I]f indeed Christ received the soulless bulk of a body,…he received a statue and not a human being, the shape having been cast on from the beginning, and the innermost stamp having fled.”

Though the description of Adam’s soulless body is decidedly more positive than the description of Christ’s hypothetical soulless body, the structural relationship between body and soul in both cases is the same. The latter description elucidates the former.

I argued in the previous chapter that Eustathius emphasises the inertia of Adam’s pre-ensouled body. There is simultaneously a sense of the perfection of the body that God has crafted, and an eerie sense of its lifelessness. The statue of God has a potential that can only be realised when it receives its “innermost stamp”, χαρακτήρ, and is no longer a statue. It is interesting that Eustathius uses the term χαρακτήρ, another word often connected to εἰκών. There is a sense that ‘statue’ and the ‘innermost stamp’ are both part of the complete image.

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619 D4:23-27 [Ariomanitas].
620 There is a parallel in Ps. Menander Sententiae e codicibus Byzantinis in which both the king and the queen are described as εἰκών ἐμψυχος θεοῦ. See 264 and 1.79 respectively.
The unapologetic physicality of the image of God is, nonetheless, striking. The contrast with Origen, and the later Origenism that Eustathius opposed, is pointed. It is particularly interesting because Eustathius shares with Origen the idea that Christ’s humanity is “image of the image.” Origen can distinguish between Christ qua image and the Son qua image without locating the image of God in the body because of the belief in Christ’s human soul, which he shares with Eustathius. The difference between them, in this case, hinges precisely on the importance of the body.621

The relationship between the soulless body – a statue – and the human being, body and soul – an image – both fleshes out and offers a solution to a problem that Zoepfl identified in Eustathius’ thought. Let us return to Zoepfl’s argument that Eustathius’ idea that Christ’s humanity revealed God was undermined by Eustathius’ Origenist sense that Christ’s soul mediates between God and the body.622 As argued in chapter 3, I believe that Zoepfl is justified in observing an Origenist schema of Word-soul-body in portions of Eustathius’ writing, and that this diverges from his other more dominant picture of body and soul as relating to God in basically the same way, as parts of the human being. In his statue-image schema, Eustathius clearly has the idea that it is the body that reveals God, and yet the body is not yet entirely itself, because it does not have the soul. Taking, admittedly, a slight conceptual jump, we might suppose that it is the ensouled body, the living human physicality, in which God is most fully revealed. In Eustathius’ theology of the

621 For Origen’s location of the image of God in the human soul, c.f. his Homiliae in Genesim (CPG, 1411), 1.13.
image of God, we see how he employs Origenist Christology and metaphysics to talk about anthropology and Christology in an Aristotelian way.

Eustathius is also drawing on Methodius in his understanding of how body and soul relate to the image of God but, again, he diverges from him in important respects. Methodius, like Eustathius, refers to human beings as statues of God. However, like Origen, he locates the image of God in the soul. There are also times at which he describes the body and soul as mutually defining with reference to the image, and this echoes Eustathius’ hylomorphism. So, he says that the body cannot be destroyed, because it was united to the image of God. Elsewhere, he describes human souls as the “divinities” of human bodies. Note that he does not write that the soul is the “divinity” of the human being, but of the body. This gives the impression that the soul, the image of God, infuses the body with that image, which echoes Eustathius’ idea that the soul makes the body more truly the body, more truly the image of God. It is tempting to conclude that this is also Eustathius’ position. However, Eustathius’ sense that Christ qua image is physical – and that therefore our bodies will be conformed to Christ qua image – cautions us against this position. It should be acknowledged that Eustathius’ theology of the body and soul probably does not, in general, give more importance to the body than Methodius’

622 See introduction.
623 Methodius, De Res. (CPG, 1812), I.34.2-3.
624 Methodius writes that “it isn’t enough just to keep the body undefiled, just as we shouldn’t give the impression that we think more about the temple of God than the image of God.” [Convivium (CPG, 1810), 1.1] This clearly distinguishes between the body, which is the temple, and the soul, which is the image.
625 Methodius, De Res. (CPG, 1812), II.24:2-4
626 Methodius Convivium, 1.1.
theology does, but his location of the image in the body, which Methodius seems to reject, is nonetheless important.

Eustathius’ use of the image of God motif to understand the human body and soul in relation to God echoes and diverges from both Origen and Methodius in important ways. However, he is not, in this case, torn between them. In some ways, Methodius is closer to Origen than Eustathius is. In locating the image partly in the body, Eustathius echoes Irenaeus where Methodius decisively departs from him. In his theology of God’s image, Eustathius stands very much in the so-called ‘Asia Minor’ tradition, but he nonetheless draws on both this tradition and Origenism creatively, to come up with a picture that his very much his own.

**Conclusion**

Eustathius’ theology of the image of God suggests an affinity between God and humanity, but it also pointedly maintains the ontological separation between God and humankind that is so evident in his negotiation with Platonism. It simultaneously finds a positive place for humankind, as separate from God, because it is as separate from God that humanity is God’s image, and this description must carry positive connotations. Humanity is conformed to the image of God, Christ, and is perfect in its humanity.

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627 For Irenaeus’ location of the image in the body, c.f. *A.H.* (CPG, 1306), 5.6.1.
The disjunction between God and humanity in Eustathius’ image theology echoes a wider tendency in fourth-century metaphysics to emphasise the ontological otherness of God. However, other image theologies of the fourth century tried harder to overcome this distinction. Eustathius’ take on God’s image is a natural, but not necessary, result of it.

Where Eustathius’ image theology touches upon the body-soul relationship, it tends to cohere with his wider picture of this relationship; it is not altogether clear whether the image is just the body, or the body and soul. However, if the former, then, even in describing the body’s image-status, Eustathius implies its incompleteness when bereft of the soul. In either case, Eustathius maintains a clear sense of the importance and essential goodness of the body. His location of the image of God in the body is all the more remarkable because it is in contrast to his contemporaries. It is pointedly in contrast to Origen, whom his image theology otherwise, surprisingly, echoes.

Eustathius’ theology of God’s image has an important soteriological dimension, in that we are conformed to Christ’s image, and this is tied in with a wider sense of progression from the ψυχικός to πνευματικός. This in some ways echoes Irenaeus idea of recapitulation, which Zoepfl has attributed to Irenaeus.628
See introduction.
Chapter 5: Anthropology in Eustathius’ soteriology

This chapter examines the anthropological implications of Eustathius’ soteriology.

Soteriology is, to a very large degree, anthropocentric. It is about the gap between the current state of human beings and the highest and best state that it is possible for human beings to attain; that is, it is about the gap between human actuality and human possibility. It therefore speaks of what a human being is, and what a human being can be. The concept of the salvation of humankind assumes that there is something imperfect about it, or about its situation, and that humankind can be perfected. Any given soteriological narrative therefore offers a description of what is wrong, or incomplete, in humankind and a vision of perfect humanity. For Eustathius, typically of patristic thought, it is also eschatological, because human potential is realised eschatologically.

The term ‘salvation’, and the related term ‘soteriology’, both have a broad semantic range and tend to refer specifically to being ‘saved’ from a bad situation; progress beyond the original condition cannot, strictly, be described in these terms. Nonetheless, in Eustathius’ thought, the concept of progress beyond the original condition is so interlinked with the concept of correcting the situation that follows from humankind’s moral lapse and ontological and circumstantial degeneration that I

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629 A soteriology focusing on the salvation of the whole of creation is, in some ways, an exception to this, though it still has an important anthropological dimension. I am here considering soteriology with
use the terms ‘salvation’ and ‘soteriology’ to refer to the process and consequence of achieving human telos, whether or not this process carries a negative connotation for the circumstance or condition left behind.

Eustathius conceives of soteriology both in terms of a transformation of human capacity and in terms of a defeat of the devil. These ideas are complementary, rather than competing. Eustathius very clearly believes that humans were created in a better condition than the present one, and that we have degenerated to this condition.

According to Eustathius, this has impacted both human circumstance and human nature, in interrelated ways. Ultimately, Eustathius holds together the idea that humankind is in bondage to the devil and the idea of a degenerate human condition. Human sin is both a cause and a consequence of both of these things. He also conceives of soteriology as a negation of everything that went wrong when Adam and Eve sinned, and as a progression beyond the condition in which humanity was originally created. The idea of Christ as the archetypal human being acts as lynch-pin of all of these strands and shapes Eustathius’ soteriology.

reference to humankind in the first instance, and soteriology with reference to the rest of the created universe only as it affects this discussion.
The Lapse

The idea that humanity has degenerated, both ontologically and circumstantially, from its original condition is fundamental to Eustathius’ soteriological narrative. Something has gone wrong with humanity, and it needs to be put right. Eustathius believes that Adam and Eve’s sin resulted in their essential degeneration, and that this degeneration was inherited by the rest of the human race. Eustathius’ chronology of these events is as follows: the devil falls through sin, the devil tempts Eve; Eve and Adam sin; humankind becomes degenerate.

If Eustathius ever formulated a precise definition of ‘sin’ (ἁμαρτία), the extant text will not yield it to us. Sin appears in much patristic (and later) theology as a self-evident concept, the boundaries of which differ, importantly, in different authors, but these boundaries are often undeclared. This may well be the case in Eustathius’ thought. His reference to the temptation of Eve links her sin, (or Adam’s) to the disobedience to God’s command not to eat from the tree of knowledge, and strongly suggests that sin is to some degree connected with disobedience to God’s command. There are ways that people ought to behave, and sin involves behaving in contrary ways.

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630 Eustathius writes that, “The devil, after he had fallen from his own virtue, was sentenced to live in Hades…”, D29:1 [Ariomanitas]. This shows both an interest in the devil’s sin, and a belief that this sin constituted a fall from grace. The devil’s fall is discussed below.

631 On Eve’s temptation, see D27:22-4 [Ariomanitas]. Though this tells us nothing about how divine command relates to any objective reality of good and evil – e.g., does it create it or describe it?
As a consequence of Adam and Eve’s sin, humans becomes mortal: “Through the sin of the first-formed, the death belonging to sin fell on, great and incurable.”\textsuperscript{632} It also becomes more inclined to sin, relative to its original created state. Slavery to the devil is also slavery to sin. So, once he has repented, the penitent thief has “escaped tyrannical hostility.”\textsuperscript{633} As observed in chapter 3, Eustathius regards human souls as “polluted.”, and thinks of this trait as at least partly inherited. He seems to regard this as an inherited trait, because he connects it to the fact that all people except for Christ (and, presumably, Adam and Eve) “have been brought forth from bodily intercourse…”\textsuperscript{634}

Eustathius tends to regard the devil as the root cause of human degeneration. The devil is “the sower of death in the human race.”\textsuperscript{635} It becomes clear from the immediate context that Eustathius does not mean to suggest that human sin had no part in creating the current human situation, but he does also hold the devil responsible for human sin. He may have in mind a division of responsibility between humankind and the devil, but this is never explicitly stated. Eustathius thinks that human sin first happened when Eve and Adam ate the fruit from the tree of knowledge in the Garden of Eden, and that the devil tempted Eve. The devil “masked as the serpent slinked up to Eve, in order that, shooting the poisonous words

\textsuperscript{632} D22:9-10 [Ariomanitas].
\textsuperscript{633} D27:64-65 [Ariomanitas].
\textsuperscript{634} D50:23-24 [Ariomanitas]. It is possible that the reference to bodily intercourse also points to a connection between sin and sex, but this is highly speculative and, even if this is so, this connection is suggested nowhere else, despite considerable discussion of sin, which cautions us against seeing it as an important aspect of Eustathius’ anthropology.
\textsuperscript{635} D22:11-12 [Ariomanitas].
from above, he might offer manifest proofs to many people.” The devil’s sin, then, was prior to human sin, and prompted human sin. Although it is through human sin that humanity became corruptible and mortal, the devil is blamed for “the sin of the first-formed.”

Eustathius’ account of the origins of human sin belongs to a school of thought that was ascending, but not axiomatic, in the early fourth century. Specifically, it in some ways echoes Origen’s account of “the fall” which was taken up, in different ways, by Methodius and Athanasius, among others. For Eustathius, as for Origen, Methodius and Athanasius, Lucifer sins and falls and, partly prompted by him, humanity sins and therefore lapses into moral and ontological degeneracy, becoming corruptible. However, there are certain important respects in which Eustathius’ account diverges significantly from Origen’s. He shares some key departures from Origen with Athanasius and Methodius. Pointedly, for Eustathius, Methodius and Athanasius, human souls are not pre-existent, so it is Adam and Eve, specifically, who sinned in the first instance, and passed their degeneration on to their ancestors. In this, they all reject a particularly controversial aspect of Origen’s concept of the fall. However, Eustathius may be further from Origen than Athanasius or Methodius in an important respect: he does not seem to have the sense of a fall of human beings from paradise, comparable to Lucifer’s fall from heaven and corresponding to

636 D27:31-34 [Ariomanitas].
637 On the devil’s sin, see note 630 above.
638 Eustathius refers to the devil tempting Eve. The sin ‘of the first-formed’ is presumably Adam’s sin, because Eustathius refers to Adam as ‘the first-formed’ in exegeting Genesis 2.7. See chapter 2. The relative importance and relative blame that Eustathius attributes to each of them apparently varies, though it is hard to tell because of the fragmentary nature of the sources. Where he draws a close parallel, it is Adam who is the inverse parallel of Christ.
Origen’s ‘fall of souls.’ For Origen, the fall is an historical event that took place between different spheres of creation with distinctive metaphysical limits and possibilities; it is a fall from one sphere to another. Neither Athanasius nor Methodius entertain the possibility of such a fall as an historical reality, but the metaphysical element of Origen’s idea is nonetheless important in their use of it; they both use the analogy of a fall between different metaphysical spheres to describe human degeneration, retaining the term ‘fall’ as a metaphor. Because Eustathius’ corpus is so fragmented, it is unclear whether he did hold this idea or not.

As I argued in chapter 3, Eustathius, in contrast to Origen, believes that the primeval paradise was on earth. However, because Origen’s profound legacy was often shorn of the most extremely Platonist (and, as some have argued, not clearly Origenist) metaphysical structures, we should not take this as evidence of the total absence of Origen’s influence. Nonetheless, in the absence of either a clear idea that humankind’s degeneration involved a geo-metaphysical fall or evident use of the term ‘fall’ as a metaphor in this context, I shall avoid using the term ‘fall’ to describe Eustathius’ understanding of the degeneration of human ontology and circumstance. I opt instead for the term ‘lapse’. When I remark upon the wider patristic context of Eustathius’ theology of the lapse, this often does refer to authors in whom the term ‘fall’ would be more obviously appropriate.

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639 For Origen on the fall of souls, c.f. De Princ. (CPG, 1482), 2.8.3.
640 For Methodius, c.f. his Convivium (CPG, 1810), 10.3 on humankind’s fall. For Athanasius, c.f. his C. Ar. (CPG, 2093), III.,10 on Lucifer’s fall and his C.G. (CPG, 2090), 3-4 on the fall of humankind.
Humankind as culprit and as victim: a note on the conceptual framework

I observe that throughout Eustathius’ writings, he depicts humankind variously as the victim and as the guilty party in the meta-narrative of human history. This observation is complicated by the difficulty of establishing Eustathius’ precise understanding of sin.

In particular, it is difficult to establish the role of knowledge in sin, and the related relationship between ability to do otherwise, responsibility, and sin. The next chapter seeks to establish Eustathius’ concept of human free will, as far the sources will permit. For now, I make a few observations about this topic as it relates to the reconstruction of Eustathius’ soteriology.

In this chapter, I identify the importance of the concept of slavery to the devil in Eustathius’ soteriology, and juxtapose it with the concept of human guilt. This might suggest that slavery provides an alternative to guilt as an explanation for the human condition; given that Christ saves partly by “bringing light to the human race” it might suggest that humans are not guilty because the devil’s bondage keeps them in ignorance.641 This must be greatly qualified; the fact that these concepts sit so readily side by side in Eustathius’ writings would, if anything, suggest rather the opposite (though both victim and culprit anthropological motifs are employed in a wide-range of patristic soteriology, by writers with hugely diverse views on the

relationship between sin and knowledge). However, Eustathius has a picture of a human being thrashing helplessly in the devil’s clutches which does more than simply evoke a sense of the person’s helplessness. It points the finger, away from the person, towards the person’s captor and therefore also connotes the person’s innocence, at least in relative terms. This connotation is importantly and substantially qualified by Eustathius’ undeniable belief that the lapsarian condition is a sinful condition, but it nonetheless requires to be hailed as a competing strand in Eustathius’ anthropological tapestry.

**Essential transformation**

The previous chapter examined Eustathius’ concept of progression from ψυχικός to πνευματικός. As noted, this narrative tends to focus on the difference between pre-lapsarian humanity and eschatological humanity; it need not be inconsistent with the lapse of humankind (and, in asserting that ψυχικός people have now sinned, Eustathius hints at a connection between a deficiency in the original condition and the sin that caused a departure from it), but does not lend itself to centralising this lapse within a narrative of human history. Eustathius’ soteriology also offers a picture of transformation from the effects of sin, and this is tied in with the defeat of the devil, who prompts human sin and holds humankind in bondage.
The devil defeated

Eustathius frequently describes salvation in terms of the defeat of the devil, and describes the lapsarian condition, correspondingly, as bondage to him. This narrative focuses on human circumstance. Although it is profoundly connected to Eustathius’ narrative of essential transformation, it has a different starting point, and a different emphasis.

Eustathius’ soteriology is intensely political in the sense that it concerns itself with the machinations of power and their relationship to the circumstances in which they operate. “From the New Testament through to the Cappadocians, the Christian felt himself to be involved in the warfare between God and the devil, good and evil, light and darkness, life and death, righteousness and sin.” Eustathius is no exception. He believes that God and the devil are at war: “it is… [the devil’s] custom to join battle with God.” Perhaps the most dominant of all his soteriological motifs is that humankind is saved because Christ has defeated the devil and has therefore saved humankind from bondage to him. Humankind was created free, but became enslaved to the devil. Through Christ, humankind becomes free once again. The redemptive narrative is also, as so often in Christian theology, a political narrative.

642 See chapter 4, especially the discussion on the sinfulness of the ψυχικός state.
644 *Engastrimytho*, 10.14. Here, as in many other instances, Eustathius sees this as asymmetric warfare. This is one of many tensions in Eustathius’s soteriology, and I explore it below.
In this narrative, the devil has power over humankind. For example, Eustathius refers to “the serpent’s tyrannical rule.” In succumbing to the devil’s temptation, humankind came under his power and remains in thrall to him until Christ defeats him. Eustathius nonetheless typically depicts the devil as always under God’s power, and sometimes suggests that the devil’s power over humankind is legitimate.

Eustathius’ discourse on the devil focuses on the nature of the devil’s power, and its relationship to other forms of power. This discourse is complicated, and can sometimes appear to be incoherent. It becomes illuminated, however, when placed within the wider context of early Christian political theology, and its ambivalence about the legitimacy and justice of any power other than God’s. Eustathius drew on the models of power available to him, and therefore on models of power as he had experienced and observed them.

Discourse on earthly power is entwined with discourse on the power of supernatural forces in both Christian and pagan Greco-Roman culture. In patristic discourse, sometimes, this came in the form of a connection between imperial power

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646 D32:58-59 [Ariomanitas].
and the devil; imperial power may set the stage for the devil, for example.  

Conversely, Christology is also connected to ideas about the emperor, though almost always in a context where the analogy between Christ and emperor is supposed to be imprecise.  Eustathius’ discourse on power echoes a wider patristic ambivalence about power and authority in the current world order, and such ambivalence makes a lot of sense for Eustathius in the immediate aftermath of Nicaea. He apparently does not draw an explicit parallel between imperial authority and the devil (as some patristic authors do) but his conceptual resources for articulating power are shaped by his perception of power in the late Roman Empire.

Patristic attitudes to earthly authority, and imperial authority in particular, are highly complex and hotly contested. An identifiable trend in early Christian literature pits the church against the empire, and sees imperial authority as essentially negative. Some scholars have seen it as declining early, and have emphasised its own self-qualifying tendencies.  It is widely acknowledged that an anti-imperial political theology persisted longer and with more force, in the West than in the East

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649 So, for example, Athanasius, arguing that the image of God, Christ, can also be God, writes that “[the emperor’s] image might indeed say ‘I and the emperor are one. I am in the emperor, and the emperor is in me.’ ” C.Ar. (CPG, 2093), III, 5. See Field’s discussion of “The Christology of emperorship” in his Liberty, pp.220-28.
650 C.f. Allen Brent, The Imperial Cult and the development of church order: concepts and images of authority in Paganism and early Christianity before the age of Cyprian (Boston, Brill, 1999). Brent argues that the Christian community self-consciously defined itself in opposition to imperial authority.
651 C.f. Dvornik, Early Christian and Byzantine political philosophy: origins and background, vol. 2, (Washington, Dumbarton Oaks Centre for Byzantine Studies, trustees for Harvard University, 1966). Dvornik considers Origen’s political theology a key turning point in a move towards a more accommodating attitude to the Roman state, p.604
(though this deserves to be qualified, as I discuss in chapter 7). It is almost otiose to add that there are many, and complex ways, of being ‘opposed’ to imperial authority, and this itself has been the subject of much discussion.

Scholarship has often tended to ask whether and how far various strands of patristic thought were positive or negative about the empire. This is, in my opinion, a meaningful question to ask, and can be useful, depending upon its context. However, the categories implied by it must be treated flexibly. Even the most positive descriptions of earthly authority tend to imply that “earthly royalty was but the reflection of the supreme royalty of Jesus.” Among the most negative we are likely to find a qualifying sense that earthly rulers are under divine sovereignty and are therefore ordained by God. This tends to correspond with a sense that, for all their faults, the world would be worse without their rulership. Irenaeus is so often rightly noted for following in the anti-imperial tradition of revelation. Nonetheless, he can also write that,

Earthly rule...has been appointed by God for the benefit of the nations – and not by the devil, who is never at rest at all, and does not love to see even the gentiles conducting themselves in a quiet way. This is so that under fear of it, people might not eat each other up like fish, but, by the establishment of laws, they might hold down the great wickedness of the gentiles. And in this way, earthly rulers are God’s ministers.

652 C.f. Ibid., p.606 and Field, Liberty, p.22.
653 Dvornik, Byzantine political philosophy vol., 2, p.600. Dvornik argues that this royalty motif was derived from Hellenism.
654 On which see note on O’Donovan’s and Lockwood O’Donovan’s analysis of Irenaeus, below.
655 Irenaeus, A.H., (CPG, 1306) 5.24.2.
Here, earthly authority is a consequence of human sin, but its institution is an act of divine mercy, helping to rein in the consequences of sin. Tertullian, similarly, argues that, through the power of juridical violence, God restrains pagan savagery. However, though earthly power is legitimate in this schema, there are often conditions placed on its legitimacy. In the same passage, Irenaeus says that earthly authority should be respected where it is doing what is right: a person’s requirement to submit to authority is contingent upon its morality, but it is not quite clear that the authority’s legitimacy is the same thing, or is contingent in the same way.

In the 320s, the relationship between the church and the state was extremely uncertain. Most of the facts shaping the picture are familiar enough, but deserve to be sketched here so as to contextualise Eustathius’ political discourse. Following the legalisation of Christianity in the final quarter of the third century, the opening decades of the fourth century saw peculiarly bad persecution of the church, particularly in the east, under Galerius, Maximinus and Diocletian. The ever-shifting relations between church and empire had undergone especially large fluctuations within living memory, and a number of the leaders of the church of the 320s had personally suffered violence, to varying degrees, at the hands of the imperial governance. This shaped collective Christian self-definition, as is

656 C.f. Tertullian, *De anima* (CPL, 2), 56.8.
repeatedly evidenced in the discourse of the Constantinian Church.\textsuperscript{658} The ‘Constantinian Revolution’ then offered the church much. However, it was soon to learn that it also demanded much.\textsuperscript{659}

As argued in chapter 1, Eustathius was disappointed by the compromise that Constantine’s intervention had produced at Nicaea. He must have remained conscious that this scenario was not the violence that he had witnessed, and perhaps experienced, under Constantine’s rival emperors some thirteen years previously, but it was not unambiguously positive, and the previous experience of persecution, though rendering Constantine’s behaviour relatively favourable, was also likely to render the church suspicious of the empire. Whatever he was feeling before Nicaea, its course clearly led Eustathius to reject the glowing picture of imperial support for the church that would be painted by Eusebius in his \textit{Life of Constantine}. Eustathius does not connect imperial power with the devil’s power, and it is unlikely that he intended an extended and explicit analogy between the two, but the ambivalence that he felt about imperial power provides conceptual resources for his discourse on the devil’s power.

\textsuperscript{658} For example, as part of his anti-‘Arian’ polemic, Athanasius calls Asterius “the sacrificer”, a derisive, and probably humiliating, reference to the fact that Asterius sacrificed to during persecution. \textit{De Decretis} (CPG, 2120), 8. H.A. Drake details the political fluctuations and complexities of the Constantinian Church in his \textit{Constantine and the Bishops: the politics of intolerance} (London, John Hopkins University Press, 2000).

\textsuperscript{659} Rowan Williams correspondingly argues the ‘Constantinian revolution’ appeared to offer unprecedented solutions to problems faced by the church, but these solutions proved wanting. See his \textit{Arius}, pp.236-239.
Eustathius often depicts the devil’s power as illegitimate. Specifically, he implies that it was acquired by illegitimate means. The devil is an “arch-plunderer.” He has somehow taken power away from God, or Christ. The title “arch-plunderer” is used within a description of Christ saving humankind from the devil. The most natural interpretation of this phrase is that the devil has plundered the human souls that Christ frees. The implication is that the devil has kidnapped humankind.

Eustathius firmly believed that Christ would reign, eschatologically, as king: “[Christ] the human being justly takes up supervening glories, having also been furnished with power, duly receiving the highest place and the throne of the kingdom.” This completes Eustathius’ political-soteriological narrative. The devil, “the tyrant” will be replaced by Christ as ruler: according to Eustathius, the devil’s crown is removed and given to Christ. The anthropological implications of Eustathius’ eschatology are examined in detail in chapter 7. Here, I want only to observe how his eschatology fits into his wider soteriological narrative. Ultimately,

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660 D28:61 [Ariomanitas].
661 The relationship between God’s power and Christ’s power in Eustathius’ thought is discussed in chapter 7.
662 As this descriptor is in the epitome of Ariomanitas, we cannot be sure that the wording is Eustathius’ own. However, the theme of the illegitimacy of the devil’s power is so frequent throughout the text that we can trust the wider sense of this word.
663 D100:5-6 [Arianos].
664 D32:74-81. Eustathius offers Ezekiel 21:25-27 in evidence: “thus says the lord: ‘remove the mitre and take off its crown. It will not be the same. You have brought low the high thing having brought high the low thing. I will designate it a wrong thing, until the one who owns it comes, and I shall give it to him.’ ”
one set of circumstances – bondage to the devil, is exchanged for another – Christ’s kingdom.\footnote{665} Both are expressed in political terms.

Eustathius repeatedly presents the devil’s relationship to humanity as a perversion of Christ’s relationship to humanity. This is particularly emphatic in his interpretation of Psalm 73 in which he contrasts the life-giving qualities of Christ’s body with the poisoning qualities of the devil’s body. (With reference to Christ’s body, he evidently has the Eucharist in mind):

if Christ, having hung on the cross, gives to us the exact representation of his body so that, once we have partaken of the sacred food, we may inherit incorruptible life, it follows that conversely, when the many-shaped serpent dies, he furnishes food from his body to those who have fled eternal light…\footnote{666}

An inverse parallel between Christ and the devil is treated as axiomatic in this passage. The devil’s ultimate pathos is juxtaposed simultaneously with Christ’s pathos on the cross and with Christ’s military victory, which is, achieved largely by the cross. Eustathius has a strong sense that the current, perverse scenario will ultimately be inverted and that, when it is, the devil (and his followers) will be punished. In placing a description of Christ on the cross beside a description of his violent victory of over the devil, Eustathius embraces in a paradox common in patristic theology.

\footnote{665} This has significant implications for Eustathius’ view of human freedom, which I discuss below. \footnote{666} D32:28-34 [Ariomanitas]. I discuss this passage with reference to its implications for Eustathius’ understanding of divine judgement in chapter 7’s section on ‘eschatological judgement.’
God the Son the saves the human race by becoming human and defeating the devil as a human being: “the Child of God…determined to punish the devil, the sower of death, through the same human race. He bore the whole human being, in order that… because he had conquered the evil one in this way, he might hold sway in incorruptible life.”667 This entire passage is ostensibly an exegesis of Romans 5.15, which Eustathius quotes in full: “For if we many have died by the transgression of one human being, how much more the grace, and the gift in the grace of Jesus Christ abounds in the many.”668 Christ defeats the devil by being sinless, and therefore negating the effect that the devil had in causing Adam to sin. Eustathius takes a passage that might more readily be taken to blame Adam for the lapse, but reads into it more Adam’s victimhood than Adam’s guilt.

Eustathius also sometimes depicts Christ as defeating the devil through a series of discrete events. For example, Christ tussles with the devil when he is tempted in the wilderness.669 Christ’s descent to Hades is a central event. Sometimes, it is depicted an important part of this series of events, commensurable to Christ’s temptation in the wilderness. At other times, it is depicted as the moment at which Christ defeats both death and the devil.670 Eustathius focuses on it a good deal in both *Engastrimytho* and *Ariomanitas* and, in both works, vests it with particular

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667 D22:10-15 [*Ariomanitas*].
668 Quoted at D22:6-9. Eustathius’ quotation diverges from the Pauline text in its most common form, which reads: οἱ πολλοὶ ἀπέθανον – “the many have died…” Eustathius writes that οἱ πολλοὶ ἀπέθανομεν – “we many have died…”
soteriological significance. These two ideas meet in the idea that Christ must be victorious in every sphere of human operation.671

Descending to Hades via his soul, Christ unlocks the gates of Hades, and leads humanity to paradise.672 According to both Engastrimytho and Ariomanitas, the souls of the dead are all in Hades prior to Christ’s descent there; between his death and resurrection, Christ goes to Hades and leads the souls imprisoned there to somewhere better. In Engastrimytho, Eustathius writes that “Christ…set up his victory trophy against the enemy, dragged off the captives as his plunder and went up bodily on high into [the] heavens.”673 In Ariomanitas, Christ similarly “leads the captives captive” from Hades (after Ephesians 4.8, and Psalm 67).674 As he leads them out of Hades, Christ “leads the human race into paradise.”675

The souls in Hades are, correspondingly, often described as prisoners. In these cases, it is clear that Eustathius is thinking of human souls in Hades as the devil’s prisoners – among several descriptors denoting captivity is the term αἰχμάλωτον, ‘prisoner of war.’676 Christ’s descent to Hades was important to

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670 Defeat of death, the devil and evil are conceptually connected and imperfectly distinguished in Eustathius’ writing.
671 As noted in the previous chapter.
672 C.f. Engastrimytho, 17.9. He is, simultaneously, already in paradise with the penitent thief.
673 Engastrimytho, 20.5.
674 D28:8 [Ariomanitas].
675 D22:19-20 [Ariomanitas].
676 D28:6. In this case, it is actually the people who are the prisoners, Christ taking the paradise “the souls of the prisoners of war” (emphasis mine).
patristic soteriology and Eustathius’ account is in many ways typical.\textsuperscript{677} Christ descends to Hades between his death and resurrection. Christ accomplishes two highly interrelated things in Hades: he vanquishes the devil, and he frees the souls trapped in Hades.\textsuperscript{678} An equation between lapsarian human circumstance and enslavement to the devil is necessary to this picture.

Christ’s ability to free the souls from the devil’s captivity derives in some sense from a ransom he offers in his death. Hence, Eustathius claims that “[Christ’s] soul ransomed souls of the same kind.”\textsuperscript{679} I examine Eustathius’ conception of Christ’s death as a sacrifice in more detail later in the chapter. It is important for the immediate question that Christ’s death is integral to freeing humankind from bondage to the devil. Eustathius gives almost equal soteriological value to Christ’s entrance into paradise, which he sees as simultaneous with his entrance into Hades.\textsuperscript{680} When he describes the destruction of lapsarian circumstance, he also offers an alternative. The effect of this is to underline the contrast between lapsarian circumstances and the circumstances of those rescued from it.

\textsuperscript{677} C.f. Irenaeus, \textit{A.H.} (CPG, 1306), 4.27.2; Origen, \textit{Homilia in Leviticum} (CPG, 1416), 9.5. Remi Gounelle gives a detailed account of the development of this idea in his \textit{La descente du Christ aux enfers: institutionnalisation d’une croyance} (Institut d’études Augustiniennes, Paris, 2000). Hilarion Alfeyev provides a useful shorter survey in his, \textit{Christ the conqueror of hell} (New York, St Vladimir’s theological press, 2009), pp.43-101. Both argue that, by the fourth century, a fleshed-out concept of Christ’s descent to Hades had been developed as an important part of soteriology. Variation in Eustathius’ account tends to fall within the normative range of patristic views, and where his account is distinctive, this reflects a distinctive aspect of his wider theology. For example, Eustathius believes that Christ’s human soul descended to Hades, and regards this as soteriologically necessary, while Athanasius gives this place to the Logos, reflecting the Christological difference between the two. C.f. Athanasius’ \textit{Letter to Epictetus} (CPG, 2095), 5-6.

\textsuperscript{678} We might be tempted to suppose that these two things are identical. However, this assumes that Eustathius uses these events as metaphors for Christ’s victory, while he understands them as historical. In this case, the defeat of the devil and the freedom of his prisoners’ may be closely connected, but they are not the same thing.

\textsuperscript{679} \textit{Engastrimytho}, 18.2.
In centralising the devil’s role in the human predicament, Eustathius depicts humankind primarily as a victim, rather than a culprit. Consider, for example, his description of the souls in Hades as “prisoners of war.” The picture Eustathius paints here is that those in Hades fought the devil and lost, and now their commander has come to rescue them.

Eustathius sometimes views the devil’s power over humanity as legitimate. This is most evident where he couches it in legalistic terms in which it is the proper consequence of human sin. Eustathius claims that humanity was “sold to the penalty of the curse.” Similarly, Christ “acquits the souls’ penalties.” The precise concept behind this phrase is difficult to determine, partly because it is unclear whether and how far it points to a worked out theological idea or a devotional mode of referring to the situation from which Christ rescues humanity. At any rate, the reference to a penalty suggests that humanity finds itself in slavery as a proper consequence of its actions. Eustathius’ reference to Christ as a “ransom from evil” fits well with the prisoner of war motif but also places humanity’s relationship to the devil in a legalistic framework. I expand on this theme when discussing Eustathius’ ideas about Christ’s death. It is primarily this legalistic concept that underlies Eustathius’ occasional suggestion that humanity is rightly held captive. Significantly, it combines an emphasis on the devil’s role in the lapsarian order with a sense that humanity is responsible for its lapsarian reality. There is an inverse

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correlation between the extent of the devil’s power and its legitimacy; where the devil is weak and basically subject to God, he can only have acquired dominion over humankind by right.

In Eustathius, legalistic interpretations of humanity’s enslavement sometimes suggest a dualistic approach to cosmic power and at other times, are partly attempts to insist that everything – including the devil – is subject to God. Correspondingly, sometimes, humans look more like prisoners of God than prisoners of the devil. Eustathius connects Christ’s death with forgiveness of sins (among other things). Freedom often seems to be a consequence of forgiveness, and occasionally, more specifically, seems to be freedom from punishment. This is not as dominant in Eustathius’ thought as the motif of freedom from the devil, but it qualifies and complicates the latter, more dominant, idea.

Eustathius believes that the devil was already under God’s power in some sense prior to Christ’s descent to Hades, which reveals an ambiguity about the devil’s role in the lapsarian order. This seems to lend itself in many ways to the legalistic strand of thought in Eustathius and, more particularly, to the idea that humanity is a prisoner of God and is free from the devil when forgiven its sins. However, this is not exactly the case: Eustathius’ belief that the devil was subject to God shares with some of his legalistic ideas a concern for God’s sovereignty.

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681 D70:19 [Proverbs 8:22].
682 D28:29-30 [Ariomanitas].
683 I discuss this in detail later in the chapter.
Eustathius believes that the devil was imprisoned by God in Hades when he fell, but that he was not defeated. Christ defeated the devil when he descended to Hades.  

Eustathius interprets Isaiah 14:9-15 as indicating that the devil is imprisoned in Hades by God. Pointedly, when the devil arrives in Hades, various human kings who are already imprisoned there mock him for his dramatic demise. The relevant biblical passage, which Eustathius quotes in full, is as follows:

Hades beneath is provoked, because it met with you. All those who have been great rulers of the earth have risen up together against you, those that have raised up all the kings of nations from their thrones. All will answer and say to you ‘you have also been taken, just as we have. And you are numbered among us. Your glory and your great rejoicing have come down into Hades. They shall spread corruption over you, and the worm shall be your covering. How has Lucifer, who rose in the morning, fallen from heaven? He that sent [orders] to all the nations is crushed into the earth. But you said in your heart ‘I will go up into heaven, I will set my throne above heaven’s stars. I will go up above the clouds. I will be like the most high.’ But now you will go down into Hades, and into the foundations of the earth. 

Eustathius also discusses the devil’s fall in *Engastrimytho*, using the same text from Isaiah, but beginning the quotation rather later, so that the problematic description of the imprisoned kings is not included. In both works, the devil’s sin was his attempt to be equal to God: as quoted above, the devil had said “I will be like the most high.” This coheres with his sense that the devil’s power over the current world order is a

684 The battle with the devil is also, in an important sense, ongoing. This is highly significant to this thesis, but not to this immediate argument, so it will be dealt with later.  
685 Interspersed through D29:2-16 [Ariomantitas].
perversion of Christ’s, or God’s. In *Engastrimytho*, the devil’s punishment seems still to be pending, as he insists that it is, after all, in *Ariomanitas*, despite the fact that the devil had already been “sentenced to live in Hades” where human souls are also imprisoned.686

Eustathius takes up an established tradition, stemming from Origen, in interpreting Isaiah 14 as referring to the devil’s fall.687 In doing so, he enters into a discourse that is rich with suggestion and he employs this suggestiveness in reflecting on the devil’s place in the meta-narrative of history. He notes Isaiah 14 as qualifying the picture of the devil as ruler of the lapsarian world order: “on one hand, the prophets all speak in agreement in saying where, having been condemned, the devil spends his time. On the other, they sometimes declare the punishments set before him, as if they are describing future events.”688 He does not think that the Isaiah passage relays what happened to the devil in a straightforward sense, but he claims that Isaiah is “speaking in a riddle.”689

This identification and resolution of apparent inconsistencies in the biblical text is a common exegetical method for Eustathius.690 For example, we have already come across his discussion of the disparate accounts of the thieves crucified next to Christ in Luke, relative to Mark and Matthew, and this will be discussed further

687 On Origen’s use of this passage, see his De Princ. (CPG, 1482), 1.5.4-5. For a similar interpretation in Athanasius, see his C. Ar. (CPG, 2093), III.17.
688 D29:24-7
689 D29:18
below. Similarly, in discussing the number of heavens, Eustathius observes that “both Moses and all the divine writings say that heavens are both multiple and singular” – and then argues that this points to a distinction between “the highest heaven” and the heavens in general.691 This passage has a remarkably similar tone to those other two instances: Eustathius not only acknowledges the apparent inconsistency, but goes into considerable detail about it. Eustathius’ exegesis here follows a roughly similar line, so it seems likely that he developed the significance of his distinction further. At any rate, he argues that the various ways of describing the devil’s situation point to a distinction between his initial imprisonment and his eventual punishment.

There is a certain tension between God’s ever-actualised will and God’s eschatologically actualised will in this distinction. The application of this passage to the devil’s fall threatens to problematise Eustathius’ picture of the devil as “the sower of death in the human race” because it suggests that human mortality and human sin predated the devil’s fall.

We cannot dissociate the claim that the devil is imprisoned in Hades from the claim that Christ defeated the devil and, in doing so, freed humanity: Eustathius describes the devil’s imprisonment in Hades in order to maintain that Christ did, in fact, descend to Hades to free the souls that were there. Specifically, in his

690 This is based on a form of exegesis common in patristic texts. C.f. Young, *Biblical exegesis*, pp.186-213 and my discussion on Eustathian exegesis in chapter 1.

691 D36. See D40 for Eustathius’ eventual synthesis.
discussion of Hades in *Ariomanitas*, he is trying to establish that Hades is a specific place, to which one might descend and cannot be identified simply with the grave. This is important to counter the suggestion that it was simply Christ’s body, rather than his soul, that descended to Hades. His analysis of quotations about the devil and Hades begins after he has described Christ’s descent to Hades, with the challenge: “if someone feigns ignorance, let him examine closely the voices of the sacred writings.” The fact that, prior to Christ’s advent, humanity was in bondage to the devil is the starting point for this argument: Christ freed human souls, Eustathius claims. He then describes Christ’s victory in Hades and only then goes on to describe how the devil came to be in Hades. He is trying to establish that the devil must have been in Hades because wherever the devil was, that is where his captive human souls were. He wishes to maintain his picture of Christ’s battle with the devil, not undermine it.

Nonetheless, Eustathius is uncomfortable with some of the implications of Christ’s battle with the devil, and consciously holds it up as a paradox. This is part of a wider self-qualifying tendency in Eustathius’ discourse on the devil’s power: at times, he sees it as legitimate – but it cannot be entirely so, because it is immoral. At others, he sees it as illegitimate – but, again, he finds this picture problematic because the rightful wielder of the power currently held by the devil is God, and it ought to be impossible to wrest power from God. This is the result of an attempt to understand how the devil is in power now, but everything is subject to God. The

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693 D28:21-22.
devil’s dominion is not absolute. It is also not simply an inversion of Christ’s eschatological rule, but rather, a perversion. Christ rules in power and glory. The devil, tragically, has power, but he wields it from a humiliated position. The devil himself has also fallen. His fallen state is a warped state. There is a dialectic running through Eustathius’ soteriology between the devil’s power and his pathos. In the devil’s pathos, another picture of his relation to humankind emerges. In this picture, the devil is not the root cause of human sin. The devil’s legal right to humanity may suggest that God is somehow constrained, but at least it does not suggest that he lost to the devil.

We can infer his theological priorities from the various accounts that he holds to be a valuable part of his elusive, wider narrative. There is a tension, in Eustathius’ thought, between human responsibility and human victimhood. Where humankind is a victim, it is a victim of the devil. The question of the devil’s responsibility for human sin is related, though not identical, to the question of the devil’s power; he appears much more responsible where he is more powerful; some ideas in early Christian soteriology see humankind as a culprit, while others see humankind as a victim, and these ideas are typically intertwined. Eustathius’ soteriology reflects this wider trend.
Conflict with the devil and the current world order

As a corollary of his cosmic power, the devil currently influences individual human beings directly. Eustathius’ synthesis of the evangelists’ divergent accounts of the thieves crucified next to Christ provides a good example.\(^{695}\) The penitent thief, Eustathius argues, initially also blasphemed Christ because he was possessed by the devil. It is this earlier blasphemy that Matthew and Mark record.\(^{696}\) The devil’s pervasive influence over human life and experience is fundamental to Eustathius’ soteriology.

In describing conflict with the devil, Eustathius paints a picture of a battle won by Christ, yet still fought by each Christian, and finally ended when Christ becomes king. For example, he claims that Christ destroyed the devil when he went to Hades, but also that, because of this “the devilish troupe gets its head broken daily.”\(^{697}\) This is part of a wider tension in Eustathius’ soteriology about when salvation is achieved. So, whilst Christ binds the devil when he descends to Hades, Christian martyrs nonetheless fight the devil. Eustathius thus has a profound sense of an ongoing struggle with the devil taking place now, yet connected both to the coming of Christ and Christ’s eschatological reign.

\(^{694}\) C.f. Athanasius, *De Inc.* (CPG, 2091), 6.6. where Athanasius juxtaposes human carelessness and demonic deceitfulness as possible causes of the fall.

\(^{695}\) In Matthew and Mark, both thieves blaspheme Christ. In Luke, one thief attacks him whilst the other rebukes the first for blasphemy and asks Christ to remember him “when he comes into his kingdom.” Matt. 27-38-44, Mk. 15:27-32. Luke 22:23-43. Christ promises that this second thief will be with him that day in paradise.

\(^{696}\) D27 [*Ariomanitas*]. See discussion of *Enastrymyto* in chapter 2.

\(^{697}\) D32:22-23 [*Ariomanitas*].
Correspondingly, the battle with the devil is, in some sense, ongoing, and it is a battle in which Christians fight. The struggle between the (soon to be) penitent thief and the devil is part of an ongoing war between ἄνθρωπος and the devil, stretching both backwards and forwards across human history. Eustathius therefore contextualises the thief’s experience by referring first to Paul’s advice about distinguishing between true and false spirits, and then to Eve’s temptation. This war is played out partly in martyrdom. Eustathius places Christ’s death at the centre of a cosmic conflict reaching backwards and forwards across history. The deaths of martyrs and prophets are a pale reflection of Christ’s death. The relevant passage is from a fragment in the epitome of Ariomanitas:

Many righteous men have been killed, and many prophets have been murdered, and many martyrs have been tortured during interrogation. They have been burnt through with sharp strokes, just like the bodily strength of the old chief priest Eleazar, at the victory feast of the seven brothers and their mother, not one of whom fell from the brotherly virtue. But who beheld any of these incredible narratives with wonder? For when who had died, did such great winds disrupt the entire earth, so that, being shaken root and branch, it moved out of the inmost parts, and the light of day changed into night as the sun failed? When who has died does the steward see that the rocks are broken?

The connection between Christ and the martyrs initially seems weak, since Eustathius is contrasting them. This might indeed have been the case if this passage primarily addressed martyrdom. However, placed within its own context, it shows that Eustathius associates martyrdom with Christ’s death. This passage is part of a

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698 D27:9-34 [Ariomanitas].
699 Christ’s death is discussed in more detail below.
refutation of the idea that someone else was crucified in place of Christ. No one else’s sacrificial death has had the effect that Christ’s had, Eustathius argues. What was so special about this other person, crucified in place of Christ, that it has these unique consequences? Martyrdom is almost incidental to his argument and it is for that reason that the reference suggests a connection between Christ’s death and martyrdom. In claiming that Christ’s death was unique, Eustathius compares it with deaths of the same kind. Eustathius has a very real sense of a battle with the devil, spanning all of human history, and played out in the blood and dirt of the arena.

Eustathius’ picture of martyrdom and confession in some ways suggests a negative attitude to the current world order, though he never uses it explicitly to contrast either the church and the empire, or the church and the world. Here, Eustathius’ concept of the devil’s power is connected to the earthly power (though not necessarily to Constantine’s power). His ambivalence about the power of the devil reflects a wider ambivalence about the current world order. This can elucidate the way that his ideas about the devil’s power echo much patristic discourse on imperial power, such as we have seen in Irenaeus and Tertuallian. I have argued that he uses this model of power because it is the one most readily available to him and not because he wishes to connect the devil with the emperor. However, it does not follow that he sees the devil and the emperor as operating in entirely separate

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700 D15a:7-18 [Ariomanitas].
701 Here he is focusing on the visible consequences, rather than the soteriological consequences implied in them.
dimensions. His sense of our enslaved circumstance is connected to his observation of the world around him, and a sense of its contribution to human slavery, and this brings human power structures into the question of the devil’s power.

**Christ’s death**

For Eustathius, Christ’s death is very important soteriologically. Unremarkably, it is a sacrifice that deals with sin. Eustathius talks about this sacrifice in various ways, some of which are mutually exclusive. Christ’s sacrifice breaks the bonds of the devil, forged by sin; it purifies humankind, and it procures forgiveness from God for humankind. Like many Greek patristic writers, Eustathius approaches the problem of human sin from many angles, and Christ’s sacrifice deals with them all. However, there is little evidence of a mechanical synthesis of these strands within his extant writings, and it is likely that he never elaborated one.

It will be helpful to define clearly the terms I am using to describe and contextualise Eustathius’ various ways of talking about Christ’s death, and they draw on a complex and diverse discourse on Christ’s sacrificial death in patristic literature. Many of the terms that I use have overlapping semantic ranges of

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703 There are several useful discussions of this topic. Gustaf Aulén provides a brief survey of patristic ideas on the subject as part of his famous argument for the dominance of a model combining a sacrifice of propitiation to God with a ransom to the devil in his *Christus Victor: an historical study of the three main types of the idea of atonement*, trans. A.G. Herbert (London, SPCK., 1969), pp.52-76. Young’s, *Sacrificial ideas*, whilst acknowledging its debt to Aulén’s account, emphasises the fundamental plurality of soteriological ideas about Christ’s death in Greek patristic thought and rejects Aulén’s claim that there was an overarching mechanical synthesis. For Young’s treatment of Aulén see esp. pp.143-4 and p.184. Eugene Teselle has provided a useful analysis, more specifically, of explanations of ransom in “The Cross as ransom”, *Journal of early Christian studies* reprinted in Ferguson (ed.), *Doctrinal Diversity: varieties of Early Christianity* (London, Garland Publishing Inc.,
meaning. Here, ‘propitiation’ refers to appeasement, or regaining of favour, and the prevention of punishment. In this case, a sacrifice of propitiation addresses the adverse effects of human sin on the relationship between God and the sinner. ‘Purification’ refers to a removal of sin. Whilst a sacrifice of propitiation is applied to the effects of the sin, a sacrifice of purification is applied to the sin itself. Sacrifices of propitiation and purification are sometimes offered by the guilty party, and sometimes on behalf of the guilty party by someone else. ‘Ransom’ refers to a price paid to a captor for the release of captives. These definitions are intended to clarify my descriptions of Eustathius’ theology and are not a set of a priori with which I approach the text. Eustathius describes Christ’s sacrifice in all of these ways.

Eustathius’ discussion of Christ’s death is found almost entirely in the epitome of Ariomanitas where the extant text contains the words λύσιν and λύτρον denoting ransom or recompense and ἀμοιβὴ, which can also refer to transformation. I have resisted the temptation to read detailed signification into the sometimes complex and specific meanings of these terms because, in this case, we have very little reason to regard the terminology itself as Eustathian; these terms are all connected with Christ’s death within a segment of writing in Ariomanitas [D27:89-95]. In Engatrimytho, we read that Christ áναλυτρόω τας the souls in Hades [18.2].

1999), 47-70. He identifies three variants of ransom soteriology: 1) “the metaphor of ransom” in which the devil has a just claim over humankind and Christ is a price paid to buy them back, as one would buy back a captive. 2) “Abuse of power” in which the devil has a right to humanity, but not to Christ, who has not sinned. In taking Christ, the devil goes beyond the legitimate bounds of his power, and humanity is forfeit. 3) “Overcoming death” in which Christ is offered to death rather than the devil. Death cannot hold him, and, in spitting him back up, releases the rest of humankind as well. Teselle attributes a further variant to Athanasius, in which humanity is held by death because of God’s dictate that whoever sinned would die. God must then undo his dictate, and thus offer to death.

The definitions I have formulated are partly indebted to Young, Sacrificial ideas, pp.161-217.
also, and primarily, are used more or less synonymously to refer to the function of Christ’s death in relation to human sin. Ransom is generally the primary sense, but purification and propitiation can also be implied. It therefore seems to me that an epitomiser is likely to have used these terms interchangeably. Because of the subtlety and ambiguity of the differences between them, even if the epitomiser intended to vest them with different meanings, we have no basis for supposing that these would reflect any differentiation Eustathius himself had made. My analysis shall therefore focus on the relationship between agents and events in the extant text, as this probably does, broadly, reflect Eustathius’ original writing.

The significance of Eustathius’ treatment of Christ’s death for his anthropology is manifold. Firstly, because Christ’s death is a sacrifice that deals with sin, his treatment of it reveals a strong sense of this sin and, specifically, a sense that human sin is the predicament from which humankind is rescued. The difficulty of reconstructing the mechanisms of this sacrifice in any detail leaves it less clear exactly how human sin manifests itself, but Eustathius’ writing is rich with suggestions. Secondly, for Eustathius, Christ’s suffering and death is the suffering and death of the archetypal human being. It therefore has profound implications for the place of suffering in human experience.
Eustathius connects Christ’s death strongly with sin.\textsuperscript{706} This understanding has various strands which overlap, but nonetheless require separate identification. Firstly, Christ’s death is an expiating sacrifice that purifies and heals sinners; secondly, it is a ransom; thirdly, it is a propitiating sacrifice, bringing about forgiveness. Eustathius refers to these ideas together and seems to regard them as different aspects of the same thing. However, the precise mechanism of this sacrifice, and the way in which ransom, forgiveness and purification are connected, is complex. Sometimes Christ’s blood is a ransom to the devil, sometimes it is a sacrifice of purification. Occasionally, it is a sacrifice of propitiation. The radical difference between these ideas has been noted and variously explained before. A few points are particularly pertinent to my investigation: a sacrifice of propitiation changes the person’s status before God whilst a ransom to the devil changes his or her circumstances. A sacrifice of purification changes a person’s existential condition.

The propitiating model adds something to Eustathius’ soteriology that otherwise scarcely features. Not only is humanity to blame for its situation, but it is the status afforded by this blame that is the problem. The purifying and ransom models meet within the concept that the devil’s dominion warps human nature, and that therefore its destruction brings healing.

\textsuperscript{706} This is normative in Greek patristic thought. Eustathius’ own frequent association between Christ’s blood and sin is, in fact, more typical of western thought. C.f. Young, Sacrificial ideas, p.145.
A particular passage in the epitome of *Ariomanitas* contains all these ideas, and gives a good sense of their interrelation in Eustathius’ thought. In this passage, Eustathius rhetorically addresses the penitent thief:

And if, when you arrived at the vineyard late, the fruit of your lips, though the very last, supplied a ransom [λύσιν] from evil for you, by declaring a confession loved by God, the recompense [ἀμοιβὴ] of Christ’s words became an eternal healing for you. And forgiveness, as if from a vessel for holy water, gushes out like a spring from the God-bearing body and purifies you. And the precious blood that has been cleansingly secreted from the tree of life marks you with a seal. And perhaps also the pouring out of the blood which had hastened from the dead limbs became a vital ransom [λύτρον] for you. For when you confessed Christ king, you carried before you the streams of blood falling in drops through all the holes.  

This passage suggests that Christ’s blood is a ransom from evil, has purifying results, and propitiates God. Whatever Christ’s blood is doing, the thief’s repentance and Christ’s consequent decision to save him are necessary to its efficacy. Hence, Christ’s blood “became a vital ransom” for the thief, but it is the thief’s own penitent words that provided a “ransom...from evil.” The thief is purified, partly by Christ’s blood, but partly by Christ’s words. Forgiveness gushes from Christ’s body and purifies him. Eustathius scarcely distinguishes between them; in the text we have at least, they are presented as complementary aspects of the same thing. The sense that these ideas are closely connected probably partly derives from the fact that we have a condensed version of the text. Nonetheless, it is plausible that these ideas did sit

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707 D27: 87-97 [*Ariomanitas*].
together in Eustathius’ original writing, especially as the lack of detailed mechanical explanation that this would imply is fairly typical in Greek patristic thought. 708

Eustathius frequently describes Christ’s death as purifying. In the quoted passage, this is associated particularly with Christ’s blood. The western-sounding emphasis on Christ’s blood as purifying recurs in Ariomanitas, again specifically with a περιραντηρίων– “a vessel for sprinkling holy water.”709 In this association of Christ’s death with ritual worship, it is evident that Christ’s death has liturgical connotations for Eustathius. His discourse on Christ’s death has a stronger devotional element than much of his soteriology. So, in one discussion, he refers both to “the pure washing” and “Christ having been hung on the cross [who] gives to us the exact representation of his body”, clearly thinking of the Eucharist.710

Repeatedly, Eustathius suggests that Christ’s death objectively changes the essential state of the one to whom it is applied. There is a strong sense that Christ’s death is a purifying sacrifice.

Where the thief is forgiven, a sacrifice of propitiation to God is implied. In the above quoted passage, propitiation has evidently occurred in that the relationship

708 C.f. Young, Sacrificial ideas, p.166.
709 D43:31 [Ariomanitas]. Emphasis on Christ’s blood was more common in Latin patristic thought than in Greek patristic thought partly because it drew on the Apocalypse of John [Revelation], the canonical status of which was more clearly accepted in the West than in the East from an earlier period. Eustathius’ references to Christ’s redemptive blood suggest that he may be drawing on the Apocalypse of John. This is discussed in chapter 7. For references to “the blood of the lamb” in the Apocalypse, c.f. 12.11.
710 D32:23 and D32:28-30 respectively. [Ariomanitas]. Eustathius writes of “the serpent” being destroyed by the lather, but then introduces a comparison between the Christ’s health-giving body and the serpent’s poisonous body, so he evidently intends to convey the positive effects of Christ’s body
between God and the thief is changed; the thief’s confession procures forgiveness for him from Christ. In the first instance, this is in the form of Christ’s reply, but it is immediately connected back to Christ’s blood, which suggests that the forgiveness is a direct consequence of Christ’s sacrifice, rather than a consequence of an essential or circumstantial change achieved by the sacrifice.

The efficacy of Christ’s blood evidently involves a transaction of some sort with God. Correspondingly, the thief’s change of status is key to the allusion to the vineyard, which is central to the entire passage. Eustathius here connects the ransom of Christ’s blood to a payment which is made or otherwise on the basis of God’s decision, rather than on the basis of the recipient’s actions or circumstances. Admittedly, it is in a sense a payment for the person’s actions; the labourer had to appear in the vineyard in the same way that the thief had to repent. Repentance, apparently, is necessary to the ransom, as to the forgiveness and purification. Salvation is not purely an act of God upon humanity or even of Christ, the human being, upon another human being. However, repentance is necessary because it alters one’s status in God’s eyes. Repentance also has a causal effect upon one’s circumstance or essential state, in that it causes God to forgive, to offer a ransom, and to purify, but this causal effect is indirect. The primary effect is to change God’s attitude to the thief.

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711 I discuss human agency and divine agency in salvation in chapter 6.
712 It is unclear whether this response to Christ’s sacrifice is voluntary on God’s part, or whether he is constrained by some metaphysically efficacious moral law. Eustathius probably did not consider this question.
The concept of propitiation jars with Eustathius’ recurring references to Christ as a “ransom.” We may be tempted to conclude that Eustathius holds something akin to Aulén’s “Classic theory of Atonement”: Christ’s death is both a ransom to the devil and a propitiating sacrifice to God. However, the concept of propitiation does not address what Eustathius generally considers the lapsarian condition to involve. God’s wrath does not feature prominently in any strand of Eustathius’ soteriology. Even where he refers to the temptation of Eve, this is in the context of humanity’s struggle with the devil, rather than human guilt. Humanity is guilty, and must be forgiven, but it is the fact of their sinfulness per se, and not of their guilt before God, that Eustathius sees as the root cause of the problem. Eustathius uses both a ransom and a propitiation model to explain Christ’s sacrifice, but the pairing of the two in reference to Christ’s death is not reflected in other areas of his soteriology.

Eustathius’ references to forgiveness are perhaps driven by devotional tradition more than they are by theological systematisation. Nonetheless, we should not assume that Eustathius jettisoned the theological reflection at this point. Forgiveness does, apparently, cause purification: “the recompense of Christ’s words” – Christ’s forgiving words – “became a healing…” Similarly, forgiveness is said to purify the thief. Mechanistically, forgiveness is a result of Christ’s sacrifice, but it is part of a causal chain within which its purpose is to transform its recipient. This

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713 We may do this whilst accepting Young’s observation that this combination is illogical.
coheres to some extent with Eustathius’ idea that a person is transformed by the Spirit, in that a disjunction between the person and God would prevent this transformation. Eustathius’ references to forgiveness best cohere with his wider soteriology if they are considered as pointing a subsidiary aspect of the problem of sin, and not as denoting a doctrine of propitiation *per se.*

The idea of Christ’s sacrifice as a ransom to the devil most coheres with Eustathius’ political narrative of soteriology because it explains how Christ’s death freed humankind from bondage to the devil.

Eustathius has some sense that Christ’s blood buys humankind from the devil. As noted, he refers to the souls in Hades as “prisoners of war.” In light of this, his ransom metaphor looks like an allusion to buying back captured warriors. However, as also noted, Eustathius makes several references to legal transaction that suggest that humanity’s captivity is just: he refers to the “those sold to the penalty of the curse” and “the souls’ penalties.”715 In either case, the mechanism of Christ’s sacrifice is the same, in that it pays the devil for humankind. In either case, also, the devil is guilty, as it is by succumbing to his temptation that humanity surrendered itself to the devil. The difference between these two understandings of ransom is therefore ultimately one of human moral responsibility.

714 See D27:32-34 [*Ariomanitas*] and ‘Conflict with the devil’ section, above.

715 D70:19, D28:29-30 respectively.
In going through death, Christ defeats death. In dying, Christ partakes of and thereby renews an aspect of human experience; he must come through death in order to overcome it. In this regard, he is changing the essential state of the human race. Lapsarian humanity is mortal, and he renders it immortal. Christ’s death transforms human nature here, in a rather different way to that implied in the sacrifice of purification. The problem it is solving is not so much sin as mortality. Correspondingly, Eustathius, drawing on Paul, claims that Christ is the “first-fruits of the resurrection of the dead.” It is necessarily Christ’s humanity that fulfils this role. This is evident from Eustathius’ analysis of Christ leading the penitent thief to paradise. Here, as noted, he argues that Christ must have had a soul to lead the thief to paradise. His argument for Christ’s human soul in this instance is different from usual. Most typically, Eustathius argues that, if Christ does not have a human soul, God Incarnate must be the agent of a given action. He then portrays this as variously absurd, impossible or soteriologically redundant. In this instance, however, the alternative agent is the penitent thief.

Eustathius applies the term “first fruits of the resurrection of the dead” to Christ’s ascent to paradise. He then argues that, if Christ’s soul did not go to paradise, it was not Christ, but the penitent thief, who was “the first fruits of the resurrection.” The presence of Christ’s divinity on the journey to paradise is irrelevant with reference to this quote because it is axiomatic to Eustathius that these verses apply to a human being. Christ’s death is therefore a lynch pin in his narrative

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716 D21:10-11 [Ariomanitas]. C.f. 1 Cor. 15.20, Col. 1.18.
of Christ reliving and therefore renewing human experience. His death therefore has value in that it is part of his taking on humanity.

In dying, Christ recapitulates an aspect of human experience. This is efficacious for salvation because, unlike Adam, Christ is not held by death.\textsuperscript{717} It is in this vein of thought that Christ’s soul is a “ransom” for the other souls. It is significant that it is specifically Christ’s soul here that is a ransom for the other souls because it indicates a clear parallel between Christ’s experience and normative human experience. This is connected to the fact that it is specifically his soul that has entered Hades, the place of the dead. Christ’s soul enters the place of the dead, as a ransom, but it does not remain there. Instead, it storms the gates. Christ, here, is a ransom that cannot be held. It is unclear whether it is death or the devil that has wrongly taken Christ, and must therefore surrender humankind. Death and the devil’s bondage are closely connected for Eustathius, so Christ defeats both simultaneously by giving an offering that the devil cannot hold.\textsuperscript{718}

We can elucidate how these different ideas of ransom are connected by returning to Eustathius’ expansive comments on Romans 5:15: The devil tempted Eve to sin. Adam and Eve sinned and, consequently, became mortal. Death is therefore part of the way in which the devil has dominion over ἄνθρωπος. There is a sense that it is by overcoming death that Christ defeats the devil, which parallels the

\textsuperscript{717} This concept resembles Teselle’s third variant of ransom. See above.
\textsuperscript{718} This resembles an amalgamation of Teselle’s second and third variants.
idea that he overcame the devil by obedience, in place of Adam’s sin. Christ defeats
the devil by negating the effects of his dominion.

This understanding of the destruction of sin does not cohere mechanically
with the conception of Christ’s death as an expiating sacrifice: where Christ’s blood
is said to purify the sinner, purification is an immediate consequence whereas it is an
indirect consequence if it comes about by defeat of the devil. A propitiating sacrifice
to God is still more irreconcilable. However, in the connection between the devil,
human sin and death, there is a clear sense of the emotive connection between the
defeat of the devil, the purification from sinfulness, and the forgiveness for the sins
committed.

**Human Suffering**

Eustathius also writes about the suffering of martyrs and other persecuted
Christians, which he relates to Christ’s suffering. Drawing on these discourses,
this section will consider how Eustathius regards suffering, with particular reference
to its place in the lapse. In Eustathius’ thought, suffering is an intrinsic part of
lapsarian nature whereas there is a sense in which sin remains contingent. However,
suffering also has positive aspects that sin lacks. Whilst it is an aspect of lapsarian
nature, and therefore intrinsically negative, it is often also a trial or contest for which
one will be eschatologically rewarded. Eustathius sometimes suggests, more
specifically, that it also provides a chance for improvement. Suffering therefore has
a teleological role similar to that of temptation. Hence, the endurance of suffering is equivalent to the negation of sin.

Christ’s humanity, like the rest of humanity, is weak and susceptible to suffering. This is a primary reason for Eustathius’ clear articulation of Christ’s full humanity: something in Christ must have suffered, and this can’t have been God. In respect to suffering, then, Christ is unremarkable. Suffering is a mark of humanness in the lapsarian world order. By contrast, Christ is morally perfect. Whilst suffering and sin are both aspects of the lapsarian condition, they relate to the fact of this condition differently. This difference manifests itself in a saviour who is weak, and suffers, but does not sin. It also corresponds to Eustathius’ wider concept of humankind. Although, humankind apparently retains some ability to make moral choices, it has lost the strength and incorruptibility that it had before the lapse, and will have yet more with the resurrection. Suffering is therefore part of the human condition. It is contingent upon the lapse, but is out with human control, whereas sin is, in some sense and to some degree, under human control.\(^720\)

There is little indication that Eustathius consciously connects this now-limited human freedom with Christ’s moral perfection. However, it is noteworthy that his sense that humanity retains some freedom, and that its lack of freedom resides primarily in weakness, gives coherence to his understanding of Christ’s full humanity.

\(^{719}\) C.f. D15a, and the discussion above.
Eustathius does, however, have ample room for temptation in his thought. Susceptibility to sin is an intrinsic part of lapsarian nature. The fundamental difference between suffering and sin is therefore that one is subjected to suffering, but one practices sin. It is for this reason that suffering is unique to the lapsarian condition.

Although it is an aspect of lapsarian nature, suffering is not unambiguously negative in Eustathius’ thought. Firstly, it can act as an aid to moral improvement. Secondly, mental anguish is most often depicted as an appropriate response to lapsarian reality, and to one’s experiences within it.

Eustathius sometimes depicts suffering, particularly suffering in martyrdom, as a trial: “For the judge would not have displayed the victory wreaths, unless rough struggles were present.” Specifically, here, suffering is an organised trial, a wrestling match, of which God is the judge. In this respect, Eustathius draws on a very common theme in Greco-Roman thought, which had readily been adopted by Christianity. For example, he echoes the suggestion, found in both Irenaeus and Origen that the world is “a gymnasium” designed by God for human improvement. He may also be drawing on ideas in medical practice, in which painful procedures were thought, ultimately, to cure. This take on suffering does not necessarily imply

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720 Post-lapsarian human moral freedom is discussion in chapter 6.
721 D32:90-91 [Ariomanitas].
that suffering is a good or a neutral thing *per se*, and this does not seem to be Eustathius’ conception of it. Martyrdom is discussed in the same passage with reference to overthrow of the devil; the martyrs are warriors, as is Christ, and they follow Christ in his fight against the devil. In one sense, the current situation is seen in terms of the power of the devil – suffering sits in the same ambiguous regard to God’s will as the rest of human and cosmic lapsarian nature. As the rest of this lapsarian nature, suffering is, in itself, intrinsically bad.

Eustathius’ descriptions of suffering should be read in light of the fact that he lived through and may also have suffered in the persecution of the early 300s. Sentiments that might strike a modern reader as trite platitudes on suffering are in fact attempts to make sense of personal and communal experiences.

Eustathius’ ideas on the ‘right way’ to react to suffering vary. Describing the suffering of the penitent thief on the cross, he does not say that it is a good thing, but that the thief’s pain is outweighed by his joy: “He is *unmindful* of death and wounds and suffering” because “he has escaped tyrannical hostility.” Eustathius’ description of suffering in these terms may, justifiably, dismay both those who regard Christianity’s frequent focus on suffering as masochistic, and those who urge a focus on the uniquely liberating capacity of a suffering God. However, this is

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723 As discussed in chapter 1.
724 This does not, of course, answer the question of whether they are helpful ways of understanding these experiences. Eustathius’ detailed references to medicine might suggest that he also has in mind painful medical procedures designed to cure.
725 D27:51-52 and D27:64-65 respectively. Emphasis mine.
not a glorification of suffering. Rather, the intrinsic evil of the suffering is implied in the juxtaposition with a greater good.

This description of the penitent thief as “unmindful of death and wounds and suffering” in some ways depicts him as attaining moral virtue in Stoic terms. For example, it echoes Stoicising tendencies in Origen’s treatment of Christ’s death, which we came across in chapter 3.727 So, the thief does suffer, but he does not feel grief about this, because he has a correct understanding of reality. The kind of grief that the thief avoids is exactly the kind of grief from which Origen wishes to protect Christ. As I argued in chapter 3, this is in sharp contrast to Eustathius’ picture of Christ, in which Eustathius is at pains to stress the reality of Christ’s grief. Eustathius’ dominant picture of grief is as a natural part of human experience, a proper response to a distressing situation. The comparison is, however, imperfect; the thief is happy because his situation has been materially improved – Christ’s has been materially worsened. Furthermore, the thief merely seems to think that his sufferings are outweighed by his blessings, not that they are not the worthy object of lament per se. Eustathius does echo Stoic ethics here, but there are divergences from Stoicism, even in this case, which cohere with his more frequent idea that mental anguish is appropriate in the lapsarian order.

727 See discussion on ‘Passions’.
In Eustathius’ analysis of Christ’s grief, we see another sense in which suffering can be good – suffering is an appropriate reaction to evil, and to pain. The tragedy of the lapsed order is not best dealt with by disengagement.

Eustathius regards susceptibility to suffering as an unavoidable aspect of the lapsarian condition, apiece with mortality. However, within this understanding, he suggests that suffering is often a test and an aid to moral improvement and he thus paints a picture of God working within the parameters of the lapsarian order to bring about his purpose. In one sense, this gives the current life a great deal of importance. However, it does threaten to exchange intrinsic value for teleological value. Although he does sometimes draw on Stoic ethical theory to suggest that one ought to be as unaffected by suffering as possible, he more often sees mental suffering as the appropriate response to adversity. This shares with his anthropological ontology an unwillingness to abstract his understanding of human beings from their current context; we must engage with our experiences in this life, not seek to ignore them.

**Human suffering and divine impassibility**

In Eustathius’ anti-Arian writings, “the human being of Christ” suffers in sharp contradistinction to the Word. This idea is woven into the fabric of Eustathius’ attack on *logos-sarx* Christology. It forms part of the ontological gulf between humanity and God. The paucity of evidence renders it impossible to reach a firm conclusion as to whether Eustathius had always held so strongly to divine
impassibility. This section argues that what evidence there is suggests that he did not.

It is tempting to assume that divine impassibility is a non-negotiable principle (perhaps one among many) from which other aspects of Eustathius’ later Christology developed.\textsuperscript{729} A close examination of the way in which Eustathius’ thought developed casts doubt on this assumption. He earlier did believe that God suffered in the crucifixion, vindicating the more nuanced picture of patristic attitudes to divine passibility offered by Paul Gravilyuk.\textsuperscript{730}

By the 320s, Eustathius has a picture to which four convictions are mutually determining. 1) God is one. 2) The Word, who became incarnate in Christ, is God. 3) God is impassible. 4) Christ suffers. The second of these propositions was the point of dispute in the early part of the ‘Arian’ controversy. These are all clearly and repeatedly articulated in Eustathius’ anti-subordinationist works and there is no reason to doubt his genuineness in asserting them.\textsuperscript{731} Nonetheless, in order to understand the emphases in his theological structure, it is necessary to deduce how far and in what ways each of these concerns was prior to the particular theological challenge that gave rise to this later theological structure.

\textsuperscript{728} See discussion in chapter 2.
\textsuperscript{729} Following a widespread interpretation of the ‘Arian’ controversy. “The Arian controversy did not involve any clash of opinions as to the divine nature, insofar as both sides affirmed it to be free from all change and passion.” Mozley, \textit{The impassibility of God} (Cambridge, CUP, 1926), p.74.
\textsuperscript{730} Gravilyuk, \textit{Suffering}. In \textit{Tota ecclesia}, Eustathius claims that God the Word was “nailed to a cross and killed” [D119:6-7]. See discussion in chapter 2.
In his anti-subordinationist tracts, Eustathius is writing (as he sees it) in defence of Christ’s divinity (and, correspondingly, God’s unity). Further, an examination of Eustathius’ earlier works suggests that his conception of the Godhead was always highly unified. This is evident in precisely the unified Christology he later jettisoned: in Engastrimytho, Eustathius often refers to Christ as ‘God’, whereas, with a less unified conception of the Godhead, he might have referred to Christ as Son, or Word.\(^\text{732}\)

Christ’s suffering is not mentioned as frequently in the (much sparser) pre-controversy sources as in the anti-subordinationist works, but the fragmentary nature of the sources means that this doesn’t tell us much about its importance to Eustathius in his earlier life. Where Christ’s death is mentioned in early works, it carries an entirely unremarkable, emotive tone which is also found in his later works. Significantly, however, in an early work, Eustathius suggests that the Word of God undergoes suffering: he is “killed” so he presumably dies.\(^\text{733}\) It is this that later changes.

It is difficult to determine how Eustathius’ early sense that the Word suffered during the incarnation related to his evident conviction that the soul suffers in itself

\(^{731}\) Grillmeier, whilst clearly delineating between Eustathius’ earlier and later Christology, downplays Eustathius’s later proto-Nestorianism on the basis that it is an anti-subordinationist tactic. See his *Christ in the Christian Tradition*, pp.243-9, and my discussion in the introduction.

\(^{732}\) C.f. Engastrimytho 10.16.

\(^{733}\) D119.7 [*Oratio coram tota ecclesia*].
and, therefore, that *whatever acted qua soul in Christ would have to likewise suffer in itself*. This rather suggests that a concept of the Word as possible *in itself* underlies his Christology in *Oratio coram tota ecclesia* which would, indeed, be surprising. Perhaps, Eustathius had picked up a devotional mode of referring to the suffering of Christ, such as that found in the *Homilies on the Psalms* and used it unthinkingly until the ‘Arian’ controversy forced him to become reflective on the subject. However, a more plausible explanation may be found in the Origenist, mediatory role of Christ’s soul. Perhaps the Word suffered, in this earlier theology, not through the body, but through the soul? This would be another example of his taking an important Origenist concept and placing it in a divergent framework, where its consequences are strikingly different.

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**Christ as typical and archetypal ἄνθρωπος**

A concept of Christ as typical and archetypal ἄνθρωπος pervades Eustathius’ otherwise diverse soteriology, and it is related to a connection between Adam and Christ. I have already demonstrated that Eustathius makes this connection in reference to God’s image. I have also noted Eustathius’ extremely strong emphasis on Christ’s full humanity. This section seeks to demonstrate that the concept of Christ as the perfect human being is inextricable from a concept of Christ as a typical human being, and offers a synthesis of Eustathius’ soteriological ideas.

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734 See the discussion on *Ariomanitas* in chapter 2.
Because this section addresses a synthesising paradigm in Eustathius’ soteriology, it necessarily revisits ground that has been covered already. It would be superfluous to cover it again in equal detail, so this section takes the form of a brief survey, highlighting the many ways in which the theme of Christ’s humanity is fundamental to Eustathius’ soteriology.

Eustathius writes of Christ as ὁλόκληρον ἄνθρωπον – perfect, or complete, human being.\(^\text{735}\) The idea of Christ as typical and archetypal ἄνθρωπος is necessary both to the Eustathius’ conception of the transformation of human nature and to his conception of Christ defeating the devil. As argued in chapter 4, Christ is perfect humanity in that he is what we will all become. Eschatologically, people are conformed to Christ. He is, as in Irenaeus, more Adam than Adam. He presumably only completed the process of perfecting Adam once he had risen, as 1 Corinthians 15 is central to Eustathius’ Adam-Christ theology.\(^\text{736}\)

It is fundamental to Eustathius’ ‘political’ narrative that Christ vanquishes humanity’s ancient foe. This concept forms part of a much richer tapestry in which humankind, its experiences and potential, are summed up and fulfilled in Christ. I have argued that Christ achieves victory in each realm, Hades and paradise through the soul, and achieves victory over death through his body, which dies. Here, I expand on the implications of this a little; salvation must extend to every sphere in which humans operate. Christ must go through all of Adam’s experiences and ‘redo’

\(^{735}\) D10:17-18 [Ariomanitas].
Adam in each place. The implication is that the effects of the lapse extend to every sphere of human existence.

Christ must go through death because he must go through the things which he is trying to negate; ergo he must “partake of the grave.” However, he must also overthrow it. Everything that went wrong in Adam goes right in Christ. He lives as a human being but does not sin; he dies but is resurrected; he fights the devil, but wins whilst Adam and Eve lost. His perfection is a manifestation and proof of his success. However, it is also presumably the cause of his success, as it renders his sacrifice efficacious. This is evident from Eustathius’ decision to quote Romans 5.15, and the juxtaposition of sin and obedience therein. In each instance, Christ’s actions are an inverse parallel of Adam’s actions. In order for them to be efficacious, the circumstances in which they occur must be the same, authentically human circumstances.

Christ must also have the same, authentically human condition: it is only by entering into the lapsarian condition that he may negate it. Correspondingly, before dying, Christ suffered from the effects of the lapse in his essential state; Christ is mortal. Eustathius quotes Romans 5.15 because he believes that the substantive point of distinction is that where Adam, and all the rest of humankind, transgressed, Christ was obedient. Through refusing to replicate the sin that saw humankind sold

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736 See discussion on existential soteriology above, and D44.
737 D28:32 [Ariomanitas].
738 This is complicated by the superhuman capacities of Christ’s soul. I expand below.
to the devil, Christ freed humankind from the devil. This is a key point at which Eustathius ‘political’ and ‘essential’ narratives intersect: sin has an ongoing causal effect on human circumstance, rendering humankind perpetually captive to the devil.

By being archetypal humanity Christ recapitulates human experience. This concept is fundamental across Eustathius’ soteriology. In defeating the devil, he wins a rematch of the fight that Adam and Eve lost. Where the first human being failed, Christ succeeds. Christ must be fully human in order to represent the human race in this rematch. This contributes to Eustathius’ insistence on the fullness of Christ’s humanity. In being what we will all become, Christ is the first fruits of the New Creation. As such, he leads the way to the places to which the rest of the human race will follow him – out of Hades, where human souls are prisoners of the devil, into paradise. It is similarly because he is a perfect human being that his ransom to the devil, or to death, is efficacious. Correspondingly he was “a ransom for the souls of the same kind (τὰς ὁμογενεῖς…ψυχάς).” It is because he is human that death takes him with the human souls of the dead, but because he is obedient that it cannot hold him, and he ascends to paradise and rises from the dead, fulfilling human potential. Obedience, as we have seen, is a stage in the process of becoming πνευματικός, and Christ’s obedience is directly contrasted with Adam’s transgression. Christ is without sin, but he must go through human life and death as a mortal and corruptible human being in order to destroy the death and corruption

739 Friedrich Zoepfl and Sara Parvis have correspondingly both argued for the soteriological importance of Christ’s humanity for Eustathius. Cf. Zoepfl “Die trinitarischen und christologischen Anschuuanen”, p. 201; Parvis, Marcellus, p.59.
740 Engastrimytho 18.2, emphasis mine.
that the devil has sown. Christ re-forms every aspect of human experience and emerges as the first πνευματικός human being. In doing so, he creates a path in which we, like the penitent thief, can follow.

In Eustathius’ conception of the lapse, there is a strong sense of an original humanity, and its original encounter with the devil, that must be reworked. Eve sometimes appears to be a more natural focal point for the original that must be reworked than Adam. Eustathius’ references to the lapse are scattered across his writings and there is no extant discussion devoted to it. Eustathius’ concept of Christ as ‘new ἄνθρωπος’ is heavily indebted to Paul and, where it is most explicit, it is expressed in direct quotation of Paul, so it is Adam with whom Christ is directly paralleled. However, Eustathius refers to the devil as the “sower of evil in the human race” but singles out Eve, rather than Adam, as the one in whom this evil was sown:

[I]f, because they are set alight by the spirit of the devil, the false prophets, speaking evil, charge Christ with evil, clearly the blood-thirsty one roused the murderous thief at that time, just as the one masked as the serpent slinked up to Eve, in order that, shooting the poisonous words from above, he might offer manifest proofs to many people.741

In order to appreciate the significance of this passage for Eustathius’ understanding of Eve, it is necessary to appreciate that he presents the devil’s temptation of Eve as the archetype of the devil’s current relationship to humanity. Eustathius is focusing on a specific case of the devil tempting an individual – the (soon to be) penitent thief. He wants to explain how the thief came from blaspheming Christ to repentance, and
he invokes the direct interference of the devil. This is not a remarkable thing, Eustathius feels. Rather, this is how the devil has operated since he first ‘shot poisonous words’ at Eve, and thereby ‘sowed death in the human race.’ Eve is not a vehicle for the sin of Adam, nor is her sin ancillary; she is compared to the penitent thief being tormented by the devil as he hangs on the cross, and is therefore the first participant in ἄνθρωπος’ long struggle against the devil.

Both where he singles out Adam and where he singles out Eve, Eustathius’ narrative is shaped by the biblical texts with which he is working. It is Adam whom Eustathius describes as the exact inverse of Christ, transgressing where Christ was obedient, ψυχικός where Christ was πνευματικός, because he is quoting Romans. Similarly, his choice of Eve as the archetypal failed warrior against the devil is presumably partly determined by the fact that she is the one directly in contact with the devil in Genesis 3. There is insufficient evidence to ascertain exactly how Adam and Eve relate to each other in the context of archetypal human sin.

Eustathius’ use of Eve as the archetype that Christ must fulfil suggests that his conception of the human condition is not exclusively androcentric. This is part of a wider tendency to focus on Christ’s connection to the whole of humanity over his connection to either Adam or Eve. When describing Christ’s full humanity, Eustathius almost always uses the term ἄνθρωπος. This is, in itself, completely

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741 D27:28-34 [Ariomanitas].
742 These are paraphrases of Eustathius adjusted for the syntactical context. See discussion on defeat of the devil above.
unremarkable and does not appear to tell us very much about either Eustathius’ attitude to the role of either gender or, specifically, Adam in Christ’s full humanity. It is, nonetheless, significant that this seems to be as an alternative to reference to Adam more than it is a part of it: except when he is quoting Paul, Eustathius does not refer to Adam, specifically, to describe Christ’s full humanity. Eustathius does understand the lapse as an historical event, and the way in which Christ fulfils human potential by negating the lapse strongly echoes an Irenaean tradition that focused on Christ as New Adam. However, Eustathius seems to emphasise Christ’s common humanity above his relationship to the historical person of Adam and the historical event of the lapse.\textsuperscript{743}

Eustathius believes that Christ’s fulfilment of human potential is completed in the eschaton, when he reigns eternally. When Christ receives authority, it is “restored” (\textit{reponenda sunt}) to him.\textsuperscript{744} By receiving it, he regains an attribute of Adam (and Eve?). There is a corresponding emphasis on Christ’s full humanity: it is emphatically “the human being of Christ” who reigns.

Eustathius’ various soteriological ideas meet in the concept of Christ being typically human, but doing it right, and therefore both restoring and fulfilling

\textsuperscript{743} Eustathius does, unremarkably, describe Christ’s humanity with specifically masculine adjectives (with which we must, admittedly, be careful because they are in the \textit{Ariomanitas} epitome). The Son “casts over himself a bodily organ in the form of a man and, having contracted itself in proportion with other human frames, not above normal in measure, not wanting in width, not leading in number or multitude of limbs…” [D3:5-8].

\textsuperscript{744} D103:4 [\textit{Arianos}]. This passage is discussed in more detail in chapters 6 and 7.
humanity. He goes through human life in the lapsarian world order, but does not succumb to sin, and therefore negates the effects of the lapse.

Conclusion

Eustathius’ soteriology focuses simultaneously on human plight and human sin, both of which have both circumstantial and ontological dimensions. Humanity is both enslaved to the devil, and warped by sin. Eustathius’ picture of the devil’s power is shaped by his view of power in the Roman Empire, and he occasionally points to scenarios in which the two kinds of power are connected. This does not suggest a deliberate connection between the devil and any particular earthly institution, but it does suggest a sense that the mechanisms and problems encountered in our current life contribute to constraining and enslaving us.

In achieving salvation, human beings are both freed from slavery to the devil and essentially transformed. This transformation both renders them immortal, and removes the predisposition to sin that is inherited from Adam and Eve.

Eustathius vests a great deal of soteriological significance in Christ’s death. In part, it is necessary to his defeat of the devil, both as a ransom and as an act of cosmic war. In part, it is a sacrifice that cleanses us from sin. Eustathius uses a host of common motifs to explain Christ’s death, with little mechanical synthesis.
The idea of Christ as the archetype for human perfection runs through Eustathius’ soteriology. Christ is what we will all become. This, in turn, underlines the importance of anthropology to Eustathius’ soteriology.
Chapter 6: Human Free will

This chapter examines Eustathius’ view of human free will. It argues that Eustathius thinks of moral freedom – ἐλευθερία – as the ability to determine the right course of action and that he also has a concept of the power self-direction - τὸ αὐτεξοῦσιον. These two concepts are connected insofar as action that is performed ἐλευθέρως is also performed αὐτεξούσιος – self-direction is a prerequisite for freedom. Adam and Eve originally possessed τὸ αὐτεξοῦσιον and a large measure of ἐλευθερία, though not as much as humankind will possess eschatologically. Humankind lost most, though not all, ἐλευθερία in the lapse, but remains self-directed.

Because ἐλευθερία was not entirely lost with the lapse, lapsarian humanity’s τὸ αὐτεξοῦσιον entails liberty of indifference. Lapsarian people can attain some

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745 There is a considerable body of literature discussing the concepts of freedom and the will in ancient thought. This literature is complicated, and partly driven, by disagreements about what is meant by ‘freedom.’ For example, this is the basis of Michael Frede’s respectful criticism of Albrecht Dihle’s approach in Dihle’s The theory of the will in classical antiquity (Berkely, University of California Press, 1982). See Frede, A free will, pp.6-7. At any rate, references to free will are especially common in Christian thinkers, relative to others in the late Roman Empire Justin Martyr frequently refers to humans as having τὸ αὐτεξοῦσιον, e.g. in his Secunda Apologia (CPG, 1078), 7.5.1., Dialogos cum Tryphone (CPG, 1076), 88.5.2.. The earliest surviving reference to ἐλευθερία τῆς προαιρέσεως – “freedom of the will” or “freedom of choice” is found in Tatian, Oratio adversus Graecos (CPG, 1104), 7.1. C.f. Frede, A free will, pp.102-3. The earliest instance of the term ἐλευθερία προαιρέσεως is in Philo, Quod Deus Sit Immutabilis, 114. C.f. Parvis, Paul and Minns, Denis, Justin, philosopher and martyr, Apologies (Oxford, OUP, 2009), p.241 n.6.

746 It is noteworthy that, in some patristic discourse, ἐλευθερία and τὸ αὐτεξοῦσιον are related concepts – Justin can refer to ἐλευθέρος προαιρέσεις as something like a liberty of indifference, echoing his use of τὸ αὐτεξοῦσιον as in, Dialogus cum Tryphone (CPG, 1076), 88.5, where he claims that God created both people and angels ἐν ἐλευθέρᾳ προαιρέσει καὶ αὐτεξουσίως and that, therefore, we are able to elect to do good or evil. Origen, Fragmenta in evagelium Joannis (CPG, 1453), 43.7, writes that, αὐτεξούσιοι ὁδεῖς οἱ ἄνθρωποι, τὸ προαιρέσειν ἐλευθέραν ἐξειν. In these cases, ἐλευθερία seems to mean lack of constraint, though the fact that the choice is unconstrained does not mean that the person is. Eustathius never uses the adjective ἐλευθέρος in a description of the liberty of indifference in the extant text.
measure of ἐλευθερία through the right exercise of this liberty. Importantly, liberty of indifference could not exist if ἐλευθερία – true liberty – were entirely lost, because there would not be morally various options. Being partially in bondage, as humanity is, means that self-direction operates as a liberty of indifference. The liberty of indifference is therefore true liberty in a state of becoming. Ability to make the right decision in lapsarian people is very limited unless they are strengthened by the Spirit; the Spirit enables one to progress towards true liberty. However, the lapsarian person is sufficiently ἑλευθέρος to decide to accept the Spirit’s help. Eschatologically, humanity will achieve total ἐλευθερία.

Eustathian terminology

There is little evidence that Eustathius showed much concern for technical philosophical discourse surrounding freedom and will. This chapter shall therefore focus primarily on his construction of particular human experiences, as they relate to freedom, or its lack, in reference to decision making. However, it will be helpful to establish what terminology relating to freedom, voluntary action and decision making, are evidenced in Eustathius, in order to establish what concepts might underlie his construction of particular human experiences.

Voluntary action, self-direction and freedom

According to Eustathius, Adam possessed moral agency prior to the lapse: upon receiving a soul, Adam διοικεῖ - roughly, he manages or is in control. It is

747 Eustathius sometimes describes the devil’s bondage as if it acts on the person as an external constraint, which gives the impression that the human power of self-direction was also impaired with the lapse, although it is not clear that Eustathius would himself have drawn this inference.
unclear whether Eustathius wishes to convey here specifically moral control, which the word sometimes denotes. If so, this is generally over another subject, rather than oneself.\footnote{For example, Gregory of Nazianzus describes a ψυχικός person as one whose body is διοικούμενον by the soul, rather than the Spirit, Oratio (CPG, 3010) XXX, 19.} At any rate he evidently does mean to attribute decision-making power to Adam. The connotations of control that the word διοικεῖ carries suggest that this is not a constrained power of decision-making, but is self-directed. This idea seems to correspond to what is described in other Greek patristic authors as τὸ αὐτεξούσιον;\footnote{C.f. note 743.} although we have no clear evidence of Eustathius using this term, the fragmented nature of the corpus renders this inconclusive and we may infer that his reference to διοικεῖ involves this very common concept.

Eustathius also uses the related ἐκουσίως. So, in Ariomanitas, he writes accusing the pro-Arians of suggesting that Christ did not “give up his own body ἐκουσίως.\footnote{D15a:1-2.} In a Latin fragment from Arianos, he writes that the human being of Christ “censuit sponte to sustain the passion of death” and it seems likely that ἐκουσίως underlies sponte.\footnote{D93a:1-2 [Arianos].} Similarly, he writes that the devil “shunned light” ἐκουσίως.\footnote{D29:18-19 [Ariomanitas].} He refers to action under compulsion by saying that Paul was forced to write about being taken into heaven ἄκοντά.\footnote{D39:32 [Ariomanitas].} In these instances, ἐκουσίως is presumably meant in the common sense of ‘purposefully and without external compulsion’. It is unclear exactly how this relates to the self-direction that Eustathius attributes to Adam. As the instances of ἐκουσίως appear in the epitome, it
could be that Eustathius’ term was αὐτεξοὑσίως, so I shall not endeavour to
distinguish between the two, though we must be aware that Eustathius might have
made some kind of distinction.⁷⁵⁴ The instances referring to disembodied souls,
post-mortem, and the prelapsarian will of the devil could not in themselves tell us
whether and how far Eustathius regards human decisions on earth in the current
world order to be made ἐκουσίως. However, the claim that Paul acted ἀκόντως
implies the possibility of acting ἐκουσίως. When I refer to ‘opting’ here, I mean to
suggest that the action referred to is performed ἐκουσίως.⁷⁵⁵

According, Christ brings people ἐλευθερία:

…the loosening locks having been suddenly prised up, the
gates being broken asunder, and by a royal gift [lacuna]
contributing the release, and reaping the freedom [ἐλευθερία]
by an amnesty, all the body guards of the arch-plunderer
melted and fell down before him.⁷⁵⁶

It is evident that Adam and Eve also possessed at least some measure of ἐλευθερία,
because people have ἐλευθερία specifically when the locks of Hades are broken; they
lacked ἐλευθερία because they were in bondage to the devil.

**Decision-making and motivation**

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⁷⁵⁴ The two terms can be used almost interchangeably. C.f. Eusebius of Caesarea, Commentaria in Pslamos (CPG, 3467) PG 23:317.35-8, Πάνο δὲ ταῦτα ἐκὼν ἐλελόη, ἀπεὶ δὴ αὐτεξοὑσίως ὄν, καὶ
dυνάμενος μὲν τὴν ἀγαθὴν μεταλθῆναι ὁδὸν, μὴ βουληθεὶς δὲ, “and clearly he elects to do these things voluntarily, given that he is self-directed and able to take the good path, but has decided not to.”
⁷⁵⁵ Eustathius also uses the verb αἱρέω to refer to the act of electing one thing over others. For example, he writes that he will lay out his opinion on the witch of Endor next to Origen’s so that scholars may “select [αἱρεῖσθαι] for themselves from both.” Engastrimytho, 1.5. The force here seems to be on the options laid before a person more than any process that the person goes through in
In *Ariomanitas*, Eustathius writes of the Son “having determined [βουληθείς] to punish the devil…” and then goes on to describe him taking up a human being in order to do so. There is a sense of both deliberation and decision to act (though this passage is in the epitome, so the wording is particularly unreliable).

Eustathius refers to προαίρεσις in *Engastrimytho*. Origen argues that, although Christ’s soul was in Hades, it was not like the other human souls, because it was above with respect to προαίρεσις. Eustathius responds that everyone, even the devil, is above with respect to προαίρεσις. He has read (or pretended to read) Origen as saying that Christ’s soul was different from the other souls in Hades because Christ didn’t want to be there. His response is that everyone wants to be elsewhere. Eustathius clearly understands προαίρεσις to entail a preference, but does not give us much of an idea as to whether he regards this preference as free.

It should be noted that it is not clear that this is Eustathius’ only sense of προαίρεσις opting for one over another. In the absence of any verb for “choice” in Eustathius’ writings, I avoid using it in this chapter.

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757 D22:12 [*Ariomanitas*].
759 *Engastrimytho*, 17.4-7. Eustathius and Origen both understand the word προαίρεσις to denote an internal disposition. (Whether rational or appetitive, and whether the distinction would be meaningful in this case, is unclear). That is, one’s having a προαίρεσις to do a certain thing does not entail doing it. This is a distinction which Michael Frede credits Epictetus with being the first to make, or, at any rate, articulate clearly in *Free will*, pp.66-88. Origen at least seems to use προαίρεσις in the sense of desire as opposed to “deliberate intention”. Albrecht Dihle claims that, in Cicero’s Latin, *voluntas* sometimes denotes “desire or spontaneous wish”, as well as acting as an equivalent for the Greek προαίρεσις and βούλησις, which denote deliberate intention. See his *The theory of the will in classical antiquity* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1982), p.134.
760 Origen might be supposed to disagree with him here. However, Origen’s difference with Eustathius is likely to be rooted in Origen’s soteriology: one’s distance from God is determined by
– he is here responding to Origen’s claim about Christ, uniquely, being above with respect to προαιρεσις and his usage is determined by Origen’s.

Eustathius also writes of ἐπιθυμία and ὀρέξις in relation to bodily appetites – hunger, thirst, and tiredness.\(^{761}\) The text does not reveal to us how such appetites relate to, or can be equated with, either προαιρεσις (in the sense of preference, the only sense in which it is attested), or βούλησις – a decision involving rational determination – or both. Eustathius’ view of the soul, and his view of passions in relation to it, both suggest that passions are not necessarily an alternative to reason as a motivating factor: firstly, the soul is a monistic entity. Secondly, emotions such as grief are appropriate and even required responses in certain situations. This suggests that ἐπιθυμία and ὀρέξις, which Eustathius connects to πάθος are involved in βούλησις.

**The individual in Eustathius’ theology**

The most extended instance within which Eustathius describes the act of opting for one course of action over another by lapsarian humanity is that of the penitent thief. The penitent thief is juxtaposed with the other thief crucified next to Christ. This is discussed in more detail below. Suffice here to note that Eustathius has a picture of the thief’s individuality when he describes him coming to repentance: “one of the criminals had been locked in a struggle…”\(^{762}\) Eustathius’

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\(^{761}\) D17:21 and D17:19 respectively [Ariomanitas]. See the discussion on the passions in chapter 3.

\(^{762}\) D27:46-47 [Ariomanitas].
idea of action that is αὐτεξούσιος/ἑκούσιος seems to be focused on the individual. (That is, unremarkably, it seems to be the self that is directed through αὐτεξούσιος action). However, Eustathius also often writes of human nature and history as if the human race were a single actor within history. This section examines the relationship between individual and corporate personhood in Eustathius’ anthropology in order to elucidate his concept of τὸ αὐτεξοὑσιον.

Some aspects of Eustathius’ theology are underpinned by a corporate anthropology – that is, a concept of humanity as a collective body, lapsed and restored as one, whilst others are underpinned by an individualistic anthropology – that is, a concept of individual human beings in whom the lapse is played out, being transformed.

These two ways of conceiving of human beings are highly related in Eustathius’ thought. For example, in Eustathius’ soteriology, it is sometimes implied that the individual partakes in a change that happens to the whole human race; it is then perfectly coherent to talk both of the human race being transformed and of a particular individual being transformed. Nonetheless, it is difficult completely to synthesise the corporate and individualistic aspects of Eustathius’ anthropology.763

763 I should note that Eustathius does not explicitly discuss the relationship between the individual and the human race. Here, more than elsewhere, I am considering the assumptions underlying his ideas, rather than reconstructing his arguments.
A corporate anthropology underlies most of Eustathius’ soteriology in some sense, in that it is necessary to the concept of Christ as a “Last Adam”, or the perfected human being. However, there is considerable variety in Eustathius’ articulation of Christ *qua* human telos, and a corresponding variety in the degree and manner in which it suggests a corporate anthropology: sometimes, Christ is, or undergoes, an essential change required for salvation, and, in doing so, effects this change in humanity. Here, there is a close ontological identity between him and the rest of humanity. Wherever an essential change in Christ effects or equates to an essential change in the human race, there is an assumption that the human race is *one thing* on an essential level, with a single essential identity.

Eustathius’ idea that Christ defeats the devil, and so frees humankind, also requires a basically corporate anthropology, but in a looser sense. The picture of Christ winning a rematch with the devil is fundamental to this narrative. As noted, Eustathius thinks that it must be a human being, and not God, who defeats the devil. The identity between Christ’s humanity and everyone else’s is required for this to be meaningful. However, here, Christ need only be able to act on behalf of humanity; the office of victor is, as it were, delegated to a particular member of the human race. One human being must be able to represent another human being, or the whole race. This requires a close identity between all human beings. However, it requires it in the sense that it requires that the wider forces involved – God and the devil – recognise an affinity, and that circumstance is changed on the basis of this
recognition. It does not require that a change in the essential state of one human being automatically causes a change in the essential state of humankind. Where Eustathius writes about essential transformation through Christ, he suggests that Christ has enabled humanity to transform, not that he has transformed humanity; the concept that salvation is complete in the person of Christ is side-lined in favour of the concept that Christ has provided the archetype according to which all will be moulded. Thus, Eustathius’ dominant conception of the interconnection between people is corporate in a loose sense.

Where Christ fulfils human potential, the fact that others have yet to fulfil it is important to his understanding. Consider Eustathius’ use of Paul’s notion that Christ is the ‘first fruits’ of the New Creation and ‘first born from the dead.’ In this understanding, Christ has temporal precedence over other human beings in achieving human telos and this temporal precedence allows everyone who partakes in the process of achieving this telos to retain his or her individuality to some extent. It allows that the process of salvation is not yet complete in each individual, and ties the salvation of each individual to the following in the footsteps of Christ. Christ’s attainment of human telos causes human salvation, but it is not equivalent to human salvation.

764 The fact that, for Eustathius, a human being must be the one to alter human circumstances demonstrates how deeply intertwined his political narrative of salvation is with his narrative of essential transformation.
765 This is in itself inconclusive regarding the questions of universal or particular salvation and of human freewill, both of which I discuss below.
There is a tension between the individual and the corporate identity of human beings in Eustathius’ understanding of how Christ and Adam relate to the rest of humanity. As we have seen, he quotes Romans 5.15: “For if we many have died by the transgression of one human being, how much more the grace, and the gift in the grace of Jesus Christ abounds in the many.”

Eustathius’ divergent reading – “we many have died” – carries a sense of personal inclusion in the human corpus that has died and thus emphasises the collectivity of the passage. Both in Paul’s thought and Eustathius’ reading of Paul, there is an assumption that the fate of all human beings is connected. However, this verse also self-consciously juxtaposes the one with the whole of which it is a part. To say that all lapse or are redeemed through the sin or obedience of one implies the individual impetus of the one who sins or is obedient as much as it implies everyone else’s connection to that one.

Eustathius’ descriptions of a person struggling with the devil assume a much more individualistic anthropology. In these instances, he tends to imply that the root cause of the individual’s lapsarian state can, and must, be addressed within the individual. In the more corporate understanding, the universal lapsarian state has its root in something that happened to the first human being. Individual sin, suffering and death are simply manifestations of this. An individual’s lapsarian state may, of course, still be caused by a primeval event that triggered the lapsarian state of each

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766 D22:6-9 [Ariomanitas].
subsequent human, and, in Eustathius, this is very clearly the case. However, where lapsed state is countered person by person, individual sin is a consequence rather than simply a manifestation of this primeval tragedy. The lapsarian state of each individual is a discrete phenomenon.

We have here two ways of thinking about ἄνθρωπος; one focuses on a person, the other on humankind, but they are closely connected. In Eustathius, as in most ancient writers, the most clearly articulated soteriological narratives assume a broadly corporate anthropology. A more individualistic narrative comes into play in trying to explain how the fact of corporate salvation – that is, the salvation of humankind per se – is experienced by an individual.

Both corporate and individualist anthropologies must be employed to make sense of Eustathius’ soteriological nexus. He juxtaposes ideas that assume a strong corporate identity with those that assume a clearly individualist identity. The apparent starkness of this contrast derives partly from the fact that Eustathius does not try to articulate the role of collectivity in anthropology, systematically or otherwise, but it probably points to an interrelation of corporate and individual understandings of humanity.
Moral agency and the lapse

Throughout Eustathius’ soteriology, there is ambivalence about the relationship between sin and the lapsarian state. This ambivalence results from competing, and, to some extent opposed, theological axioms.

Eustathius’ view of human moral agency is shaped around a collection of ideas about the lapse common in early Christianity. I have already touched upon them in the previous chapter. Eustathius believes that humankind has lapsed. He believes, unremarkably, not only that lapsarian humanity is sinful but also that the lapsarian condition is partly defined by this sinfulness. However, he also believes that the lapse was sin – the first sin; therefore, the greater propensity to sin that results from the lapse was caused by sin itself. The dilemma is common enough: the idea that humanity lapsed through sin implies that the original human condition also involved susceptibility to sin. Similarly, where the devil is seen as the chief culprit, the fact that humanity succumbed to his temptation suggests that it was already under his power. Paradoxically, sinful nature is a consequence, as well as a cause, of the lapse and the devil’s power over humankind is, likewise, a cause, as well as a consequence, of the lapse.

It is clear that the lapsarian state is peculiarly sinful in Eustathius’ thought. The way in which sinfulness is a distinctive part of the lapsarian state nonetheless raises some questions. This is evident in his distinction between ψυχικός and πνευματικός. Eustathius clearly regards sinlessness as a characteristic of the
πνευματικός state. A sinful person becomes sinless and, in so doing, undergoes an essential change. In a broad sense, Eustathius connects sinfulness with the lapse. However, it is difficult to see how the pre-lapsarian propensity to sin could have been qualitatively different from the lapsarian propensity to sin. Sinfulness was apparently prior to mortality. If the lapse was a sin, pre-lapsarian humanity was evidently capable of and susceptible to sin. This is reflected in the fact that Eustathius uses the term ψυχικός to refer to the original condition, but also associates it with having sinned. It is heavily implied that humanity will ultimately lose either the ability, or any desire, to sin: “no one at all sins anymore” – but this must be part of its progression beyond the created state. Eustathius never adequately defines the sinful state. This is partly due to a wish to maintain a sense of human moral agency. The effect, anyway, is to suggest that there is no a priori reason why lapsarian humanity should be more prone to sin than pre-lapsarian humanity.

Eustathius closely connects salvation with ἐλευθερία, and the implication is that we are not, now, fully ἐλευθερος. As observed in the previous chapter, it is unclear how far lack of freedom entails lack of culpability, but there is some connection. The various motifs of Eustathius’ soteriology, as noted in the previous two chapters, can help us to establish how lapsarian humanity is not free. Firstly, Eustathius’ sense that the revelation of God in Christ is itself salvific implies that freedom is limited or obscured partly by ignorance.

768 D47:5-9 [Ariomanitas]: “Paul wrote that a ‘soul-like’ body was sown, which has performed
Secondly, when Eustathius refers to bondage to the devil, he means it literally, if not only literally. The devil is acting upon the person, and causing him or her to sin.

Eustathius believes that the devil acts upon the person to tempt him or her to sin and also that the Spirit acts upon the person to make him or her πνεωματικός, and, consequently, to stop him or her from sinning. These two scenarios can look a lot like mirror images of each other. If this were strictly the case, we would have a picture of two external forces vying to remake the human person according to their respective desires. Eustathius does indeed suggest a parallel between the work of the devil and the work of the Spirit on the person. This is illustrated by his contrast between the penitent thief and the (continuously) blasphemous thief, in which he juxtaposes the Spirit’s influence with the devil’s influence: “each utters words through each spirit and, whilst one was aroused from the divine breath, the other was aroused out of the influx of devilish works…” A little later in the same fragment, Eustathius employs the same Spirit-devil contrast again, describing the thief’s struggle with the devil prior to repentance, and how the Spirit enabled the thief to triumph in this struggle.

However, a person torn between two competing forces is not quite Eustathius’ idea. Eustathius generally implies that the Spirit is more intimately manifold sins through the soul, but he says that this body is raised spiritual, since he [God] changes the bodies of all those having been raised.”

769 D27:14-17 [Ariomanitas].
involved with the person on whom it acts than the devil is; this is reflected in a contrast between Eustathius’ manner of describing the devil’s relationship to the person and his manner of describing the Spirit’s relationship to the person. For example, he refers to “fellowship of the divine Spirit” \(\tau\omicron\upsilon\omicron\omicron\upsilon\mu\acute{\iota}\alpha\omicron\omicron\zeta\ldots\kappa\omicron\iota\omicron\nu\omicron\omicron\iota\alpha\omicron\varsigma\)\(^{770}\), but writes that the devil “slinked up to Eve” and “shot poisonous arrows \textit{from above},”\(^{771}\) depicting the devil as an external assailant. This corresponds closely to Eustathius’ claim that the devil was the “\textit{sower of death in the human race}.”\(^{772}\) The devil’s effect on the human constitution is grave, but indirect.

This comparison between the Spirit and the devil in Eustathius’ thought elucidates the relationship between salvation as transformed circumstance and salvation as transformed essential state. Eustathius’ picture of the person torn between the Spirit and the devil is a key intersection between them: as the person struggles against the devil, the Spirit aids the person and effects essential transformation. In this way, Eustathius’ picture of the person being essentially transformed is part of his picture of the person at war with the devil, and ultimately freed \textit{from} the devil. Furthermore, the imperfect inverse parallelism between the Spirit and the devil more specifically echoes Eustathius’ sense that the devil’s status in the current world order is a perversion of Christ’s. The devil, and his war with Christ and humankind, is needed to explain the sinfulness that is so necessary to the

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\(^{770}\) D47:2-3 [\textit{Ariomanitas}].

\(^{771}\) D27:32, D27:34 respectively [\textit{Ariomanitas}]. The devil is in the character of the serpent in this passage, so Eustathius’ idea may be that he is speaking “\textit{from above}” [\(\varepsilon\kappa\;\tau\omicron\upsilon\omicron\upsilon\upsilon\lambda\omicron\sigma\omicron\tau\omicron\upsilon\zeta\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma\)] in the sense of ‘not (yet) crawling on the ground.’ The phrase could, admittedly, also be translated “\textit{from pride}” though, in deploying the image of the serpent as the devil, Eustathius would still be presenting the devil as external to those he is tempting.

\(^{772}\) D22:11-12 [\textit{Ariomanitas}]. Emphasis mine. See also the discussion in chapter 5.
narrative of essential transformation. Nonetheless, when Eustathius focuses on the transformation of the person, his emphasis shifts away from the nature of events and situations and becomes more inward-looking.

The issues arising in Eustathius’ treatment of human freedom are common enough: Adam and Eve lapsed whilst they were free (ἔλευθερος). Human sin keeps humankind in bondage. The overriding sense, however, is that humanity does not want to remain in bondage prior to Christ’s advent – humankind was in bondage to devil, and so was helpless to change its situation. It required a saviour to set it free. Lapsarian humankind is constrained. The logic of this is that the lapsarian essential state carries a particular propensity to sin, and we have already observed this idea in Eustathius. This propensity is part of our bondage. Eustathius’ conception of human moral freedom must be understood in light of both his political soteriology and his soteriology of essential transformation. The lapse entails our bondage to the devil and we are morally weakened by the lapse.\textsuperscript{773} We are less free because of the lapse.

Consider Eustathius’ sense of the role of the Spirit in soteriology in this light. His sense that we are weakened by the lapse coheres with the way in which Christ overcomes lapsarian nature. Christ is perfect because he is “strengthened” by the Spirit. We need to take the claim that the Spirit strengthens seriously because the implication is not so much that union with the Spirit removed temptation from Christ

\textsuperscript{773} It is worth noting the resemblance with original sin, though use of the term would be anachronistic, particularly in implying more theological reflection behind the concept than is evidenced in
– why would he require strength if that were the case? – but that it gave him the ability to withstand it. This, in turn, finds a parallel in Eustathius’ picture of the penitent thief, empowered to win his struggle with the devil by the Spirit’s intervention. God’s Spirit strengthens us, as it strengthens Jesus, in order to help us be moral.

Eustathius has a strong sense of God’s gift when he writes of the Spirit strengthening the thief: “munificent Jesus…when he saw that one of the criminals had been locked in a struggle with the traps of the evil one, took for himself [ἐξαιρεῖται] the fearless soul from among those bearing the traps of death.”

Subsequently, Jesus bestows the Spirit upon the thief, and the thief wins in his struggle against the devil. This passage is significant to Eustathius’ view of human moral freedom in several ways: the thief, before he has repented, is struggling against the devil, rather than working on the devil’s behalf. However, he is incapable of doing good without the Spirit. There is clearly a sense of Christ’s decision to help the thief here – he “took [the thief] for himself” – and a strong emphasis on Christ’s mercy. This suggests that he has lost the ability to do the


774 D27:45-49 [Ariomanitas].
775 The phrase “munificent Jesus” has a strong devotional tone, more especially because Eustathius only refers to Christ as “Jesus” thirteen times in his extant writings and seven of these instances are direct biblical quotes. (He also refers once to “Jesus Christ”, [D92a:4, D92b:1] quoting 2 Timothy 2.8). This instance occurs within the epitome, but the unusualness of it in this case suggests that it is Eustathius’ wording; whatever the relationship of the epitome to the original text, it is clear that this is not the epitomator’s usual mode of presenting the text.
right thing, and needs God’s help to regain it. He has not, however, lost the power of moral differentiation.\footnote{This seems to echo Romans 7.19: “I do not the good I want to do, but the evil that I do not want is}

The implication is that humanity lost Adam’s capacity to act rightly at the lapse. Nonetheless, Eustathius does not regard the thief as altogether devoid of this power prior to the intervention of Christ and the Spirit. Firstly, we must be cautious in extrapolating from Eustathius’ depiction of the thief’s experience to his understanding of lapsarian human experience \textit{per se}. On one hand, as already noted, the reference to Eve’s encounter with the devil deliberately ties the thief’s experience into a wider pattern of human experience. However, the fact that Jesus saw “that one of the criminals had been locked in a struggle…” points to the specificity of this thief’s experience; the other thief, evidently, is blaspheming Christ without struggling with the devil. There are, admittedly, reasons to suspect that this differentiation should not be taken too seriously for the purposes of determining Eustathius’ view of human moral agency: Eustathius is trying to demonstrate that it is possible for both thieves to have blasphemed on the cross \textit{and} for one of them to have repented. He is constrained by the fact that, in Luke’s gospel, one thief did not repent. It is also possible that the phrases “one of the criminals”, which emphasises this differentiation, may be a gloss added by the epitomiser. However, we should not overplay these problems. In the first instance, Eustathius’ theology is shaped by his reading of the Gospel passages as much as it shapes them.
In any event, he depicts an individual who is struggling against the devil; the devil does not hold this individual totally in bondage. The ambiguity arises in regard to whether the experience of struggling against the devil is the universal human experience, or merely a very common one. Most of what else we know of Eustathius’ theology suggests the latter: for example, when he describes people who were fed the devil’s “poisonous body”, these are people who are, by their own volition, in cahoots with the devil. One enslaved by the devil still retains enough ἐλευθερία that he or she may opt to fight him, and some do not.

Eustathius elsewhere shows a more mundane sense of the pressures under which moral decision-making are placed in the lapsarian world order. For example, in describing Joseph’s treatment by his brothers, Eustathius excuses Reuben and Judah saying that “they were holding against savage men” as Simeon and Levi had already committed a massacre. This suggests that Eustathius’ sense of a tension between human guilt and human victimhood reflects his wider worldview.

Eustathius’ idea of moral decision-making is, specifically, of a decision to be made between the devil and the Spirit. Eustathius sees an inverse parallel between the Spirit’s relationship to the person and the devil’s relationship to the person. It is this that is reflected in his view of moral choice. This is why Eustathius is able to

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777 D121a, quote D121a:2 [In Joseph]. According to Genesis 37: 21-28, most of Joseph’s brothers wanted to kill him. Reuben suggested putting him in a well instead, intending to rescue him later, and Judah suggested selling him into slavery rather than killing him. The latter took place. Eustathius interprets Judah’s suggestion as an attempt to save Joseph’s life.
believe simultaneously in the crippling nature of human circumstance and the reality of various moral possibilities for the lapsarian person: doing the right thing involves deciding to be helped by God.

Correspondingly, an individual must repent in order to receive the effects of Christ’s sacrifice. The Spirit is needed to reach full repentance, but the process of turning away from evil can be started without the Spirit’s intervention. This is evident in Eustathius’ discourse on the penitent thief.\footnote{See discussion in the section on “Christ’s death as sacrifice” in chapter 5.} The thief himself plays a role in procuring his own forgiveness, healing purification and ransom. He is only once actually stated to procure his own salvation, “the fruit of your lips, though the very last, supplied a ransom from evil for you.”\footnote{D27:89. In the epitome, the author is ‘addressing’ the thief and so uses the second person singular. For example, he exhorts him “O youth with an accursed soul.” D27:87 [\textit{Ariomanitas}].} He procures this only after Christ, with the Spirit, has intervened to save him; Christ’s intervention is Eustathius’ explanation for how it is that the thief went from blaspheming to confessing Christ. However, Christ intervenes for the thief because the thief was struggling against the devil: “seeing that one of the criminals had been locked in a struggle with the traps of the evil one, [Jesus] took for himself the fearless soul.”\footnote{D27:46-8 [\textit{Ariomanitas}].} Eustathius’ attempt to reconcile Luke’s account of the penitent thief with Matthew and Mark’s account of two blaspheming thieves requires us to read this as describing a struggle against the devil, and a struggle which is not (necessarily) a perpetual feature of the lapsarian state; both thieves were originally blaspheming, so the struggle cannot simply refer...
to the bondage to the devil in which we all find ourselves.\textsuperscript{781} This thief, in particular, struggled, and he is described as “fearless” for doing so, suggesting some moral content to his actions. The thief’s attempt to resist the devil preceded the intervention of Christ and the Spirit. Eustathius, further, apparently conceives of the thief’s subsequent repentance, aided by Christ, as a victory within the struggle between good and evil, God and the devil. Repentance is therefore necessary for salvation, but it is placed within the context of factors outside of the penitent’s control.

A lapsed person has some ἐλευθερία prior to the Spirit’s help, because he or she can decide to struggle with the devil or decide not to. He or she has is able to direct him or herself towards ἐλευθερία. Eustathius depicts a person being presented with the option \textit{either} to follow the devil or not, \textit{or} to follow the Spirit or not, rather than being presented with both simultaneously. The case of the penitent thief, who decided to struggle against the devil, illustrates the first instance. The second instance is illustrated by Eustathius’ understanding of people Paul defines as variously πνευματικός or ψυχικός:

The apostle tends to call human beings ‘soul-like’ inasmuch as, when they sin through the soul, the fellowship of the divine Spirit is turned away, and spiritual inasmuch as, through divinely inspired citizenship, they partake in the Holy Spirit, accepting its plenty.\textsuperscript{782}

So, a person needs the Spirit to resist the devil, but must \textit{first} decide to resist the devil. The implication is that there are two distinct moments of deliberation involved

\textsuperscript{781} D27:1-43. There is also the sense that the devil is particularly attacking the thief who will repent.
\textsuperscript{782} D47:1-5 [Ariomanitas].
when someone under the devil’s power makes the right decision: the first, against the devil, and the second in favour of the Spirit. In temporally differentiating these two decisions, Eustathius wants to avoid the suggestion that the person is simply torn between the devil and the Spirit, able only to submit to one or the other. The moral struggle cannot be adequately described in terms of rival tempters. Also, some of the native moral agency which God originally bestowed on Adam remains in the lapsarian person.

Eustathius’ depiction of martyrdom evokes a strong sense of the individual’s substantial and genuine moral agency. This refers to a context where the Spirit is already at work, so is not strictly comparable to the conversion of the penitent thief, but has the same sense that the Spirit enables and enhances the person’s agency. In particular, Eustathius frequently uses metaphors involving athletic games to describe martyrdom and persecution. In these metaphors, “the prizes for the best athletes lie displayed.” In placing the martyr’s eschatological glory in the context of reward, Eustathius implies that the martyr, rather than God, is responsible for his or her own victory.

Immediately following this he refers to the time when “each rightly contending is honoured.” This idea is particularly striking in a context that emphasises reward for action because it appears to recognise a degree of victory, or at least of credit, in the struggle. This can elucidate the somewhat ambiguous

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D32:88-89 [Ariomantas].
elements of the moral status of the thief’s struggle with the devil prior to Christ’s intervention. It suggests that Eustathius did indeed mean to contrast the soon-to-be penitent thief with the other thief on the basis that the former had chosen to struggle with the devil.\textsuperscript{785} This finds a parallel in his picture of souls in Hades, longing for better things, but unable to break the locks of Hades, as Christ will. Among other things, Eustathius feels that humanity must do what it can to be moral, but that what it can do without God is very limited.

The extent to which a person is free to choose salvation and morality in Eustathius’ thought depends partly on the context in which he is considering the question. His otherwise disparate soteriological narratives hold in common the implication that human action supported by God is fundamental to the individual person’s salvation. However, the relative importance of God’s action and the person’s response, respectively, in helping the person varies. In relation to the transforming action of the Spirit, human co-operation appears to be primarily assent to the Spirit. Where Eustathius depicts a person locked in combat with the devil, humanity appears to have a more active and more strenuous role in its own perfection. This is largely because the entire process is conceived of in more strenuous terms. However, this difference also reflects the disparate nature of the human predicament within each narrative; where the primary problem is something internal to the person, the person must submit to improvement and therefore to the

\textsuperscript{784} D32:89-90 [Ariomanitas].
\textsuperscript{785} This has implications for Eustathius’ concept of salvation as universal or particular, which I discuss below.
Spirit; the person must fight him or herself, so his or her efforts are directed inward and resemble passivity.

There is a tension in the different degrees to which a person contributes to freedom from the devil and purification from sin respectively. Where the primary problem is the devil, an external enemy, the person’s efforts against this problem are externally focused and therefore more obviously strenuous, though ineffectual without divine help. Where the problem is the person himself, he receives salvation, but where the person is a captive, he plays a part in freeing himself. This partly reflects a dialectic between dependence on God and human agency. It also suggests a connection between sin and weakness, in that a sinner cannot free himself or herself, but requires rescue.

Eustathius’ negotiation of the minefield of moral freedom presented by questions of the lapse plays out partly in his ambiguous approach to the devil. To say that humanity lapsed through sin necessarily implies that humanity was susceptible to sin prior to the lapse. The difference between susceptibility to sin before and after the lapse is therefore, presumably, merely quantitative, but this does not satisfy Eustathius’ notion of the gap between human actuality and humanity in its original created state, which is great indeed.

He apparently did not resolve this problem. He sees human nature as having degenerated from an earlier state. In light of this, the devil is necessary to explain
how lapsarian humanity is different from original humanity whilst insisting that humankind remains morally responsible; it is not so much human nature that changed with the lapse, but the devil’s power over humanity. However, emphasising the devil’s role simultaneously reduces the level of human moral responsibility in general. The tensions in Eustathius’ soteriology partly reflect an attempt to hold together various aspects of freedom and self-direction, and their degeneration.

The necessary implication of Eustathius’ picture of the lapse is that humanity has always been in principle susceptible to sin, and to the devil’s machinations. Succumbing to these, after all, is how Eve and Adam lapsed. The driving force of Eustathius’ thought on human morality is that susceptibility to sin and ability to resist it have both always been part of the human condition. Humankind becomes more susceptible to sin after lapsing primarily because its circumstances are changed; in opting to partake of sin, Adam and Eve came under the devil’s power. Eustathius nonetheless suggests that a greater tendency to sin was embedded in humanity at the lapse: it is when the penitent thief repents that he is free from the devil’s tyranny. This corresponds closely to the idea that moral “pollution” is inherited from ones parents. Our inherited moral pollution is part and parcel of our bondage to the devil, part and parcel of our lack of freedom.

I have argued that, according to Eustathius, eschatological humanity becomes sinless. Evidently, this is part of a progression from a ψυχικός state to πνευματικός

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786 D27:45-65 [Ariomanitas]. See also above.
state, and not a restoration to an original state. Given the Spirit’s morally fortifying role, it is likely that this *susceptibility* to sin is what ψυχικός Adam and Eve possessed, even before the lapse, that πνευματικός ἄνθρωπος, conformed to Christ, does not.

Sin relates differently to the lapsarian condition than mortality or weakness because it requires our active participation in the lapsarian condition. This perhaps explains why forgiveness and purification are so central to Eustathius’ narration of Christ’s sacrifice, despite jarring with his wider soteriology; sin comes directly from the person, and it is the person who must undergo alteration to address it. The notion of forgiveness is also, very simply, connected to the notion of guilt. The sinner is guilty, and requires forgiveness. Eustathius does suggest that we are morally strengthened by the Spirit and morally weakened by the lapse. However, throughout this change, he seeks to maintain the reality of moral choice.

**Christ’s humanity as saviour: God’s role in human freedom**

Eustathius’ insistence that Christ’s humanity is saviour initially suggests a high level of human agency; ἄνθρωπος extracts itself from its own dire predicament. However, Eustathius’ understanding of *how it is* that Christ’s humanity is able to be a saviour to the human race is shaped partly by a belief that lapsarian humanity is unable to save itself: that is why God had to assume a human being. By uniting with ἄνθρωπος, God renders human willpower what it should be, and thereby enables ἄνθρωπος to save itself. The same picture is evident in his descriptions of
individuals struggling against the devil, or being essentially transformed: the Spirit strengthens the person, and in doing so enables him or her to make the right decision and therefore to defeat the devil and move towards a πνευματικός state.

Eustathius’ conception of humanity’s role in Christ’s salvific actions, predictably, developed as his Christology became more divisive. In comparative terms, humanity becomes a greater agent of its own salvation as Eustathius’ delineation between the actions of Christ’s humanity and Christ’s divinity becomes greater, because, where he distinguishes between the Word and “the human being of Christ” as agents, Eustathius overwhelmingly thinks that the human being is the saviour. However, this dynamic is complicated by a persistent belief that Christ’s humanity can only perform salvific actions because it is helped by the in-dwelling Word.

The contrast between Eustathius’ view of Christ’s humanity in his early works and his anti-subordinationist works is pointed. In *Engastrimytho* Eustathius sometimes describes Christ’s actions as God’s actions. For example, with reference to Christ’s temptation in the wilderness, Eustathius asserts that “the Lord silenced the avenging spirit by patient endurance, for it is proper to God to bear everything with forbearance.”

In *Ariomanitas* and *Arianos*, Christ’s actions are human actions. Christ’s humanity was nonetheless already important in Eustathius’ earlier thought. Very significantly, Christ’s human soul is the principal agent of the journey to Hades.

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787 *Engastrimytho*, 10.16.
and paradise, “strengthened by the divine Spirit” as it is in his anti-subordinationist works. In his earlier writings, God and humanity effect human salvation together. In his later writings, it is barely an exaggeration to say that Christ’s humanity performs every salvific act. God strengthens and is united to the human Jesus, but the human being is the agent of any given action, as Eustathius’ soteriology requires. Salvation is a human act enabled by God. Any given salvific act cannot occur without God, but it is not efficacious unless ἄνθρωπος is its agent. Eustathius’ later soteriology therefore has a high view of intrinsic human potential, but this potential is dependent on God for realisation.

Eustathius sometimes describes God’s union with Christ’s humanity as if it made the human Jesus a kind of superman. The most striking instance is the omnipresence of Christ’s human soul; Christ’s soul was not only in Hades and paradise simultaneously while his body was dead, but also was in heaven with the Spirit/Word while his body was on earth. Evidently, it was simultaneously vivifying his living, walking, talking, body. He bases his argument on John 3.13: “No one has ever ascended to heaven, except the one who come from heaven, the son of ἄνθρωπος, who is in heaven.” He wants to get at the fact that it is an ἄνθρωπος

788 Engastrimytho, 17.10. In Ariomanitas, Eustathius writes that Christ was “strengthened by the power of the divine Spirit”, D21:11-12.

789 This is evident from the discussions of Eustathius’ emphasis on Christ’s full humanity, above. To reiterate a few examples: “the human being of Christ” must have descended to Hades [C.f. D28:4-7, Ariomanitas] and entered paradise [C.f. D21:28-30, Ariomanitas] and will be the one who receives the eternal throne of the kingdom [D100, whole fragment, Arianos].

790 See discussion of the ontological similarity between the Spirit and human souls in chapter 3.

791 Quoted in D20:2-4 [Ariomanitas].
who came from heaven, and so must have gone there before.\textsuperscript{792} He emphasises the humanity of Christ’s soul in talking about its extraordinary omnipresence. At the same time, he emphasises the superiority of Christ’s humanity. Christ can be in Hades and paradise at the same time “by the excellence of [his] soul.”\textsuperscript{793}

The unique strength and power of the human being of Christ works within Eustathius’ soteriology because Christ opens up paths in which others can follow: he has stormed the gates of Hades, and unlocked paradise, so no one else needs to be able to do these things. However, this power and glory is repeatedly declared to be reliant on the help of the Word who is united with the human being.

The Word’s strengthening of Jesus partly points forward to eschatological humanity, as observed in chapter 4. This affirms the salvific agency of Christ’s humanity in one sense: it is a perfect, and perfectly free, human being that saves the rest of the human race. However, the extent to which Christ’s humanity has no more divine help than the rest of humanity is also the extent to which humanity intrinsically needs God’s help.

It is perfectly possible that Eustathius believed that all human souls would eventually achieve omnipresence, as Christ’s soul did. As I observed in chapter 4,

\textsuperscript{792} Eustathius does not think that the reference to Christ “coming down from heaven” indicates the incarnation, or Christ’s birth; it is a reference to Christ’s humanity, and Christ’s humanity did not pre-exist his birth from Mary.

\textsuperscript{793} Engastrimytho, 18.4.
Eustathius sees an imperfect comparison between the way in which the Spirit is united with Christ and the way in which the Spirit is united with ρνευματικός Christians. This would cohere with the idea that Christ was the “first fruits of the resurrection from the dead.” In either case, it is clear that perfect humanity requires God’s help.

As observed in chapter 4, Eustathius’ view of the union between the person and the Spirit has a sense that God continues to bolster the person continually. Eustathius’ soteriology generally has a strong sense of God’s gracious gift, and humanity’s need for it, alongside his conception of humankind as at considerable distance from God. So, the whole chain of soteriological events, in which the humanity is to act, starts with God’s choice to save humanity. Significantly, Eustathius spells this out at the same time as emphasising Christ’s humanity; it is not an alternative thesis. Hence his reading of Romans focuses on the Son’s decision to become incarnate:

“For if we many have died by the transgression of one human being, how much more the grace, and the gift in the grace of Jesus Christ abounds in the many.”

Therefore assuredly, in the transgression of the first-formed, the death belonging to sin fell on, great and incurable. But the child of God…determined to punish the devil, the sower of death through the same human race, bore the whole human being, in order that…he might hold sway in incorruptible life.

The Child of God decided to train a prize fighter.

794 Romans 5:15.
Freedom and Perfection

Both the political narrative and the narrative of essential transformation within Eustathius’ soteriology suggest, to some degree, the ultimate negation of moral deliberation between various choices: in the essential narrative, the person conforms to the Spirit whilst in the political narrative the person becomes subject to Christ. Eschatologically, the person always makes the right decision. This section argues that this is bound up in a view of freedom that equated it with the ability to, decide and act rightly which was normative in philosophical as well as theological discourse in antiquity.796 Relatedly, the attainment of this eschatological freedom does not involve the loss of self-direction.

After being resurrected from the dead “no one sins at all anymore.”797 Eschatologically, the ambiguity about the unique sinfulness of lapsarian nature and the original propensity to sin is resolved: eschatological humanity has no propensity to sin. Here it is unclear whether humanity eternally retains the capacity to sin. Salvation is salvation from a lapsarian, sinful nature, so a vision of salvation is a vision of sinlessness. It is difficult to see how humanity retains moral choice in this situation.

795 D22:10-15 [Ariomanitas].
796 Although not universal. For example, Alexander of Aphrodisias objects to the Stoic concept of the will precisely in that it does not involve a genuine concept of choice between various options. See his De Fato, XIV.
797 D47:8-9 [Ariomanitas].
Similarly, Eustathius seems to believe that humans will be subject in the eschaton. Ultimately, Christ qua human receives authority over the cosmos. Christ then becomes ruler, replacing the devil. Eustathius regards Christ’s authority as an important aspect of his kingship. “The human being of Christ” receives “a sceptre of eternal authority (imperii).”  

In one sense, bondage to the devil is replaced by bondage to Christ. However, the prevailing motif within Eustathius’ political soteriological narrative is not so much submission to Christ as liberation from the devil. Insofar as Eustathius is concerned with wrong government, he is concerned with it because it means that human beings are not free. The devil, sin and death, as variously interrelated, enslave ἄνθρωπος and it is in submission to Christ that ἄνθρωπος is free of this enslavement. Eustathius explicitly connects Christ’s defeat of the devil with humankind’s universal submission to Christ (we have come across part of this passage already):

Then, the loosening locks having been suddenly prised up, the gates being broken asunder, and by a royal gift [lacuna] contributing the release, and reaping the freedom by an amnesty, all the body guards of the arch-plunderer melted and fell down before him, not being able to withstand the strength of the kingdom, as Paul indicates, ‘every knee will bow to Christ, not only in heaven and on earth, but also under the earth.’

Eustathius’ connection between the lapsarian state and enslavement is typical in patristic thought. As we have seen, he also makes an equally unremarkable connection between the lapsarian condition and moral imperfection. There is, in

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798 D90:2-3 [Arianos].  
Eustathius’ thought, a profound connection between moral perfection and freedom. This is evident in his tendency to depict struggle with the devil as moral struggle; when the battle is won, and the person is free from the devil, the person is moral. This comes across clearly in Eustathius’ picture of the penitent thief struggling on the cross, and in his conception (indebted to Paul) that Adam became enslaved through disobedience.

The link that Eustathius makes between freedom and moral perfection reflects a very common way of understanding freedom in ancient thought: broadly, freedom is freedom to make the right decision. For example, this idea is fundamental to the Stoic conception of free will. A similar concept is also found in Aristotle, in that the virtuous person will always make the right decision. This idea assumes, broadly speaking, that, when faced with multiple courses of action, there is a right course of action; it further interprets lack of freedom as inability to identify or carry out this right course of action.

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801 C.f. Frede, *A free will* p.87. A similar idea can also be found in Aristotle, who distinguishes mere voluntary action from action based on choice on the basis that, for an action based on choice is an action over which one has rationally deliberated. C.f. T.D.J. Chappell, *Aristotle and Augustine on freedom* (London, St Martin’s Press, 1995), pp.61-66.


803 This idea of freedom focuses on the person’s decision making process, as affected by external circumstance, rather than on the person’s external circumstance *per se*. In asking whether a person is free, it asks “are they free to intend to do this?” rather than “are they free to do this?” it sets the discourse of freedom firmly within the discourse of ethics: in conceiving of freedom in this way, Eustathius shows himself to be concerned with free will, rather than, more generally, unconstrained action. In this he picks up a concept of will developed by the Stoic Epictetus. C.f. Epictetus’ *Dissertationes*, 4.1.68-73 and Susanne Bobzien’s discussion in her *Determinism and freedom in stoic philosophy* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998), pp.331-2.
The liberty of indifference is necessary for the attainment of this ultimate freedom in some patristic discourse. So, in Irenaeus, humankind needed to start out with the liberty of indifference in order to reach the freedom of perfection eschatologically. Unless humanity had started out with the liberty of indifference, the freedom of perfection would not be genuine. Eustathius may share aspects of this idea, which would fit well with his similarly developmental soteriology. Importantly, in the lapsarian order, the liberty of indifference is always freedom in a state of becoming, because the devil would limit our options just as much as they appear to be limited eschatologically. The ability always to decide rightly occurs when this becoming is complete.

On one level, the political narrative seems to be coming from a rather different place because the person’s will appears to be an irrelevance. Of course one will be *allowed* to do good during Christ’s reign, but it does not follow that one will *decide*, ἐκουσίως, to do it. Where slavery is slavery of the person’s own desires, preferences or intuitions, being *allowed* to do the right thing is *being allowed* to decide to do it. The sense that, given this internal permission, the person *will* decide rightly depends on a conception of eschatological ἄνθρωπος as morally good; it makes morality a character attribute, so that ability to make the wrong decision is not a prerequisite for self-direction. By contrast, Christ’s kingship creates a space, free from the devil’s tyranny in which we can exercise our total freedom. In a society where government could be highly volatile, good government seems like a blessing.

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indeed, and a freeing blessing, but, in this context, it is freedom from, whereas the freedom granted by the perfection of our wills is freedom to.

Eustathius’ discourse on Christ’s eschatological rule also contains a more radical suggestion. When Christ receives authority from God, it is “restored” (reponenda sunt), implying that ἄνθρωπος possessed such authority prior to the lapse. 805 In referring to God’s giving of Christ’s authority as a “restoration”, Eustathius sees it as part of Christ’s fulfilment of human potential. This coheres with the list of attributes that Adam is said to have received when God breathes Adam’s soul into his body: “he walks and breathes, he governs, he reasons, he acts, he has control.” 806 This is presumably a reference to Adam and Eve’s lordship over creation: “[God said] ‘Rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of the sky and over the herds and over all the earth, and all of the reptiles that creep on the earth.’ ” 807

805 D103:4 [Arianos]. The whole fragment reads: “For one who has the throne of the kingdom, does not prepare another fate for himself, but for one who does not yet have the power of the throne. Therefore, this clearly concerns the human being of Christ. And these were neither going to be restored to the Omnipotent, to the one who has his own sceptre, nor to the Word who has the royal power itself, which the Father also has, but this will be said to Christ: ‘The Lord prepared his throne in heaven.’ For he will rule all creation alike by means of the mixing with the divine Word.” Eustathius’s denial that power and authority are restored to the Word strongly suggests that he believes that they are restored to the human being of Christ, given the nature of his argument. Eustathius is arguing over a collection of texts in which someone is given eschatological authority. His claim is this was not given to the Word, who already had it, but to Christ, the human being, who did not. What Eustathius declares that these passages do not say about the Word, he believes they do say about someone. Eustathius’ argument is that the human Christ is this someone. 806 D61:8-9 [Ariomanitas] emphasis mine.

807 Genesis 1.28 (LXX). Imperium probably translates the Greek ἐξουσία. Significantly, ἐξουσία can also refer to freedom. (C.f. Demosthenes, De corona, 44.5). The reference to the restoration of this authority, coupled with Eustathius’ picture of Adam’s original moral capacity, suggests that this is one of its connotations here.
Eustathius particularly emphasises the idea that Christ, the human being, receives authority. His argument here probably contains a similar soteriological thread to that so often found in Ariomanitas.\(^808\) “the human being of Christ” must be the one who receives the kingdom, because otherwise authority is not restored to ἄνθρωπος. Eustathius gives a less hierarchical picture of the eschatological society by connecting Christ’s authority with Adam and Eve’s authority. It suggests that authority is restored to all human beings. Further, the authority that God gives to Adam and Eve in Eden is not authority over other human beings, but over creation. In this picture, human beings are eschatologically subject to no one, because God has delegated power to them. In submitting to Christ, we share in his authority.\(^809\)

Strength is made perfect in weakness.

**Conclusion**

Eustathius believes that human beings were created with the capacity to deliberate between different moral positions. They are morally crippled, though not utterly incapacitated, by the lapse: they retain some ability to decide rightly, but this is largely an ability to try to be moral, rather than to succeed fully. The Spirit makes

\(^{808}\) This is, admittedly, often within a defensive exegetical context. The most pertinent passages are in Arianos. Eustathius’ opponents have apparently applied biblical passages where Christ is said to have received glory, honour and power to the Son. Eustathius wants to argue that all these attributes are eternal and intrinsic to the Son, so he says that it is “the human being of Christ” who received them. [C.f. especially D90, D100-103]. Nonetheless it fully coheres with his wider sense of the soteriological importance of Christ’s humanity, which, as I have noted, is already evident in Engastrimytho.

one likely to succeed. Ultimately, perfect human beings will possess the capacity, absolutely, to determine the right moral decision.

There are two mutually qualifying concepts of moral freedom in this picture. Firstly, the crippling nature of lapsarian circumstance and its effects on the person’s essential state are slavery. They are the reason that the person is not free. Total moral freedom is the freedom to make the right decision. This is not simply not an alternative to self-direction for Eustathius because he believes that people are intrinsically good and that human sinfulness is contingent on the lapse. Therefore, people are simply being themselves when they make the right decision. Secondly, lapsed people have some liberty of indifference. They can opt rightly or wrongly. This is necessarily related to the freedom of perfection – you must possess a partial ability to decide rightly in order to have morally various options.

The liberty of indifference itself often appears weak in lapsarian people within Eustathius’ writings, corresponding to his strong sense of the bondage into which we have lapsed. The penitent thief is able to direct himself towards good, but only, just. It is unlikely that Eustathius would claim that his action was, correspondingly, less ἑκούσιος/ αὐτεξούσιος as a result; rather, self-direction does not necessarily result in the liberty of indifference. The liberty of indifference existed more robustly in Adam and Eve, corresponding to their greater degree of ἐλευθερία. Total, eschatological ἐλευθερία, however, will involve perfection, with
the result that self-direction will not entail the liberty of indifference, much as it would not if one were totally lacking in ἐλευθερία.

How exactly Adam and Eve became enslaved is ambiguous, but it certainly involved a moral decision on their part, among other things. Similarly, the relationship between the moral slavery of lapsarian humanity and the moral imperfection involved in Adam and Eve’s ψυχικός condition is ambiguous and problematic. There are various possible syntheses, but as the fragmented sources do not offer them up, it is better to let the ambiguity lie.
Chapter 7: Anthropology in Eustathius’ eschatology

Eschatology is important to anthropology in the same way as soteriology, because it is typically the fulfilment of soteriology. It offers a vision of how human beings are supposed to be, and the world in which they are supposed to live. It acts as a yard-stick against which to measure all other human action, experience, and ontology, both before and after the lapse.

Its implications are therefore also intensely political because part of what it is measuring is human government. However, a range of eschatological motifs common in patristic thought can be, and were, deployed to reflect on political reality in the current order in diverse ways.

As chapter 5 argued, Eustathius participated in a political discourse that drew analogies between God’s power, human power and the devil’s power, and was ambivalent partly because the implications of such analogies are highly ambiguous and multivalent. It is often very difficult to establish, in both biblical and patristic texts, how close is the analogy between Christ’s or God’s power and human power, and what the implications of this closeness are. To define the ways in which eschatology reflects upon current political structures, we must ask how commensurable the eschatological order is to the current order.\textsuperscript{810} Chiliasm, the belief in Christ’s thousand year reign on earth, provides the most common and

\textsuperscript{810} This has led to an intense debate about the commensurability between the current world order and the eschaton in the Book of Revelation. Oliver O’Donovan summarises and draws out the
straightforward example of a vision of a commensurable eschatological society, but this commensurability, as we shall see, can be maintained whilst elements of the chiliastic narrative are jettisoned.

The commensurability of the eschatological order with this one enables eschatological society to act as a model for present society, even if it is acknowledged that lapsarian society will always fall short of this model. It is possible to look to a commensurable eschatological order, and see there what society should be like. The commensurability of the eschatological order gives us a framework for determining what kind of analogy a given author sees between particular aspects of the eschatological order and the current order, but it does not actually tell us the answer; commensurability between the eschaton and the current order tends to sharpen the comparison between them, but this comparison can still be deployed variously. The anticipation of a reign of Christ on earth was often intended as a challenge to imperial power. However, it need not necessarily be so.

Christian communities in the pre-Christian Roman Empire tended to see chiliasm – the anticipation of a reign of Christ on earth – as making a challenging implications of an important aspect of this debate – the commensurability of current and eschatological authority – in his “History and Politics in the Book of Revelation”, pp.25-30.

Correspondingly, Revelation is rightly seen as an anti-imperial text (though again, this raises as many questions as it answers). C.f. Christopher Rowland, Revelation, (London, Epworth Press, 1993), pp.133-4.

Gerbern Oegema, “Back to the future in the early church: the use of the book of Daniel in early patristic eschatology”, Patricia G. Kirkpatrick and Timothy Goltz (eds.), The function of ancient historiography in biblical and cognate studies (London, T and T Clark, 2008), 152-61, p.161, gives a good example, arguing that fourth-century writers reinterpreted Daniel favourably to the emperor, not by denying its millenarianism but by depicting the emperor favourably within an established sequence.
political statement to imperial power. This was clearly a use for which Irenaeus deployed the Book of Revelation, for example. Attempts to renegotiate the relationship between earthly and divine power in chiliasm are themselves recognitions that it is problematic. Chiliasm must, like non-chiliast eschatologies, imply the contingency and transience of earthly rule, and the closeness of the comparison in chiliasm often has the effect of driving this implication home especially sharply. It also offers a critique, and a suggestion, another way of being on earth. Eschatological claims were ambiguous, but they were not neutral. Chiliasm, by suggesting the commensurability between the eschatological and current world orders, is particularly challenging to the society in which it arises.

This chapter expands upon the observations about the resurrection of the body in chapter 3 and those about Christ’s eschatological kingdom in chapters 5 and 6 to argue that Eustathius’ eschatology emphasises commensurability with the current world order, both in human ontology – the resurrection body is the same in substance to, and very like, the current one – and, to an uncertain degree, in human society – Christ will reign in a society comparable to the one in which Eustathius lived. He engages with chiliastic ideas, but constructs them in respects that seem to soften their sometimes forceful political implications. His ideas about eschatological authority, however, suggest that he does intend his discourse about Christ’s kingship to place a question mark over the nature of Constantine’s authority.

\[\text{\footnotesize of events leading to Christ’s reign. For example, the emperor is often seen as holding the anti-Christ’s reign in check.} \]

\[\text{\footnotesize As noted by O’Donovan and Lockwood O’Donovan, in their introduction to “Irenaeus of Lyons”, pp.15-16.}\]
Another important aspect of Christian eschatology is judgement before God, which is closely connected to the question of who achieves salvation (though the connection is often far from straightforward). This chapter argues that Eustathius believes that some people will be eternally punished, but that his description of the eschatological fulfilment of God’s ends fails to reconcile this with his soteriology.

**Christ’s eschatological kingdom**

As demonstrated in chapter 5, Eustathius very clearly believes in an eschatological reign of Christ. However, if he ever wrote a detailed and explicit description of Christ’s kingdom, it does not survive. We should not conclude that Eustathius was uninterested in the nature of Christ’s kingdom. It is fairly evident that the eschatological reality concerned Eustathius in its own right.

The fragments of *Arianos* focus a good deal on Christ’s eschatological kingship. However, they give virtually no description of his kingdom. This is to be expected, in light of the process by which these fragments were selected. Theodoret’s selections are short, and his agenda does not recommend him to include any extended discussion of Christ’s reign.\(^{814}\) He is interested in Eustathius’ divisive

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\(^{814}\) *Arianos* is preserved in Latin fragments by Gelasius, who translated from Theodoret’s Greek. See chapter 1.
Christology, which arises in the context of Eustathius’ claim that “the human being of Christ”, rather than the Word, received or will receive authority.\textsuperscript{815}

The context of Eustathius’ original argument is germane to the eschatological significance of these passages. Some light may be shed on this by considering how his argument in the extant portion of \textit{Arianos} requires this context to work. Theodoret very probably has caught the pivotal point of Eustathius’ argument about Christ’s kingship, since it is precisely the contrast between human Christ and divine Word, or Spirit, which serves Eustathius’ anti-Arian argument.

In \textit{Arianos}, Eustathius’ argument is specifically exegetical: he is involved in a discussion about biblical passages that suggest (or, at any rate, were read to suggest) that Christ will receive authority, glory and honour from the Father, or from God. He is arguing that they do not mean that the Son receives authority from the Father. Arius’ letter to Alexander offers a good example of the claims Eustathius refutes: the Father “gave [the Son] the inheritance of everything” and “gave subsistence to his glories.”\textsuperscript{816} In \textit{Arianos}, Eustathius retorts that these passages refer to “the human being of Christ.”\textsuperscript{817}

Clearly, Eustathius believes that Christ’s kingdom will be corporeal. This is evident from his insistence on the resurrection of the body, and the strongly

\textsuperscript{815} C.f. D93a/b, D100 [\textit{Arianos}].
\textsuperscript{816} This letter is preserved in Athanasius, \textit{De Synodis} (CPG, 2128), 16,
physically focused anthropology underpinning it. Everyone will be resurrected, and the resurrection body is decidedly corporeal. The world in which resurrected human beings are to live must, therefore, also be corporeal. This conclusion is reinforced by the emphatic claim that “the human being of Christ” will be ruler over this kingdom: Eustathius does not regard a soul without a body as a person, and uses the title “the human being of Christ” to designate Christ’s full humanity within precisely this framework. It is especially unlikely that Eustathius would be inconsistent on this point, since his insistence upon the embodied nature of the human person occurs very often in the context of eschatological judgement. Furthermore, Eustathius actually refers to Christ’s body in the context of Christ’s kingship: “the human being, gracefully having been made a temple of justice from limbs and dwelling with the most sacred Word, has inherited by excellence the everlasting throne.”

Eustathius maintains his vivid picture of resurrected physicality in his depiction of the glorified Christ. The king is physical, and so must the kingdom be.

It is less clear whether Eustathius’ eschatological kingdom is, like Irenaeus’ eschatological kingdom, “a social and political reality, not just a physical one.” On one hand, most of the time that Eustathius talks about eschatological reality, he emphasises its commensurability with current reality, which might lead us to the tentative conclusion that he believed that the eschatological kingdom would be “social and political.” He also approvingly quotes a handful of biblical passages

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817 Echoing his theology in Ariomanitas.
818 D102:1-3 [Arianos].

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which suggest he conceived of it as other-worldly but, on examination, they do not appear to represent a central aspect of his eschatology. He quotes Paul’s claims that Christ’s throne is “prepared…in heaven” and similarly that “we are citizens of heaven.”

The contexts in which Eustathius implies a heavenly kingdom suggest that this implication was not very important to him, and perhaps not even intentional. In both cases, he is quoting scripture, and the ‘heavenly’ nature of eschatological life is not the reason that he offers the quotation. In both cases, the passage in question actually argues for the commensurability between eschatological reality and current reality.

In reference to Christ’s kingdom, Eustathius is simply giving an example of a phrase that should be applied to “the human being of Christ” rather than to the Word. His quotation does not tell us much about his concept of the eschatological kingdom. When he refers to our heavenly “citizenship”, Eustathius is quoting Philippians 3.20, and is interested in a later part of the quote, for its relevance to the congruence between Christ’s resurrection and our own. Here is the fragment in which the quote is contained:

819 This is Denis Minns’ observation about Irenaeus in his Irenaeus, p.145. O’Donovan, “History”, sees in Revelation a similar hope that ultimately “we may experience as political reality that authority of truth and justice which political society on earth has consistently failed to achieve.”, p.44.
820 D103:6 [Arianos], quoting Ps. 102.19 and D69:2-3 quoting Philippians 3.20 [In inscriptiones titulorum] respectively.
That the body has the same form as the human body, he teaches us more clearly, writing to the Philippians: ‘We are citizens’ he [Paul] says, ‘of heaven, out of which we received a saviour, the lord Jesus Christ, who will change our body of lowliness to become conformed to the body of his glory.’ And if, changing the lowly body of human beings, he conforms it to his own body, the slander of the enemies is revealed...to be obsolete.  

Eustathius is trying to prove that “the body has the same form as the human body.”

‘The body’ could here be referring either to Christ’s body, or to the resurrected bodies of other human beings. This passage makes most sense if we take it that the body referred to here is Christ’s. This fragment then fits well with the other fragments from Proverbs 8:22, forming part of the argument found in D68, in which Eustathius specifies that we are conformed to “the human express image having been made bodily by the Spirit, bearing the same number of members as all the rest, and clad in similar form to each” rather than to “the bodiless spirit of wisdom.” The emphasis on Christ’s physicality in D69 contributes to the impression that these fragments are drawn from one piece of argumentation about our bodies being conformed to Christ’s. It is evident that Eustathius refers to Christ’s resurrected body for several reasons: firstly, this fits into the wider pattern of his soteriology as outlined in chapters 4 and 5: Christ fulfils Adam and does so, partly, by going through death to defeat death. Adam is fulfilled only after Christ has defeated death. Secondly, the description of Christ’s body as ‘glorious’ makes most sense if Eustathius (and Paul) has the resurrected body in mind. The passage, then, is about the commensurability between Christ’s resurrection body and ours.

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821 D69 [Proverbs 8:22] emphasis mine.
822 D69:1.
823 D68:11-15 [Proverbs 8:22].
Eustathius’ reference to the Christian’s heavenly citizenship is actually part of an argument that we become conformed to the human being, Christ, rather than to God the Son. The connection between Christ’s resurrection body and our resurrection bodies is central to this argument. Admittedly, Eustathius does not explicitly state, in this passage, that resurrection bodies are commensurable to current bodies. However, the frequent Eustathian distinction between corporeal humanity and incorporeal God is emphasised in the face of a reference to ‘heavenly citizenship.’ This implies that the same ontological categories, with the same experiential implications, continue into eschatological existence.

Eustathius’ exegesis of Philippians 3.20 coheres with his sense of a wider link between ‘citizenship’ of the ultimate reality and the resurrection body. Elsewhere he refers to “divinely inspired citizenship” as part of a defence of bodily resurrection. This is in a passage we have already come across in examining Eustathius’ understanding of the resurrection, but here it is significant enough to merit quoting in full:

The apostle tends to call human beings ‘soul-like’ inasmuch as when they sin through the soul, the communions of the divine Spirit are turned away, and spiritual inasmuch as, through divinely inspired citizenship, they partake in the Holy Spirit, accepting its plenty. Because of this, he wrote that a ‘soul-like’ body was sown, which has performed manifold sins through the soul, but he said that this body is raised spiritual…

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824 Adam is not even fulfilled immediately upon Christ’s resurrection, because Christ’s eschatological kingship is part of the perfection of humankind, as I argue in the following section.
825 D47:1-7 [Ariomanitas].
As was demonstrated in chapter 3, the wider context of this argument is Eustathius’ insistence on the identity of the resurrection body with the current body. Eustathius connects “divinely-inspired citizenship” to the πνευματικός state in the more specific context of the πνευματικόν body. He also associates the πνευματικός state with congruence between the person’s actions and the Spirit in this life. Both in his analysis of the resurrection body, and his willingness to see the term πνευματικός as applying, albeit in a presumably qualified form, to current human behaviour, Eustathius insists that resurrected humanity is commensurable to current humanity. It is only in the context of human telos that he refers to a heavenly, ultimate reality and he consistently emphasises the commensurability of perfected humanity with current humanity. Eustathius’ reference to heavenly citizenship, suggests, if anything, that he regarded ultimate reality as commensurable to current reality.

The fact that the collection of biblical quotations referring to heaven all emphasise commensurability suggest that they do not form part of an alternative eschatological vision. We may simply conclude Eustathius does not, after all, locate the kingdom in heaven, given that heaven is never the point of the quotation. They may, however, anticipate heaven come down to earth, as in the final chapter of Revelation. Evidently, if Eustathius does believe that Christ will reign in heaven-on-earth, he emphatically does not mean to imply that heaven-on-earth will be unrecognisable as the earth on which we are living. Christ reigns qua human being:

826 C.f. Rev. 21.1-3: “I saw a new heaven and a new earth. For the first heaven and the first earth had passed away…and I saw the holy city, the new Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God…and I heard a loud voice from the throne saying “now the dwelling of God is with human beings, and he will live with them.”
as in his ontology, so in his analysis of human society – what we are now is to be fulfilled, not superseded.

For Eustathius, Christ’s eschatological kingdom is eternal: “the human being …has inherited by excellence the everlasting throne.”\textsuperscript{827} Similarly, in Proverbs 8:22 he refers to the apostles as “preachers of the everlasting kingdom.”\textsuperscript{828} He therefore evidently rejects the classically chiliastic idea that Christ’s earthly reign will be followed by the reign of God the Father.\textsuperscript{829} In this respect, Eustathius is evidently further from classic chiliast eschatology than Marcellus of Ancyra, who not only espoused the classic chiliast position that Christ’s earthly reign would be finite but also suggested that, upon the end of Christ’s reign, the Word would return to the Father and the incarnation would end.\textsuperscript{830} By contrast, Eustathius regards Christ’s kingship as dependent on the incarnation: “he will rule all creation alike by means of the mixing with the divine Word.”\textsuperscript{831}

Chiliast eschatology and its politically confrontational implications have often been thought to have been alien to fourth-century, Greek-speaking

\textsuperscript{827} D102:9 \textit{[Arianos]}.  
\textsuperscript{828} D67:34.  
\textsuperscript{829} On which, c.f. Irenaeus, \textit{A.H.} (CPG, 1307), 5.36.3. and Minns’ discussion in his \textit{Irenaeus}, pp.142-4.  
\textsuperscript{830} On Christ’s thousand year reign c.f. also Colleen McDannell and Bernhard Lang, \textit{Heaven: a history}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed. (Yale University Press, London, 2001), pp.48-53.  
\textsuperscript{831} See Marcellus, \textit{Contra Asterius} (CPG, 2800) fragments 117, 119, 121 and 120. Numbering is according to Erich Klostermann’s system in his edition, \textit{Gegen Marcelli}. It was Marcellus’ concept of a finite reign of Christ that was refuted in the Constantinopolitan Creed of 381, despite the once commonplace nature of such a belief.  
\textsuperscript{831} D103:6-7 emphasis mine.
Christianity. However, there are clear indications that chiliasm was not an outdated concept in the fourth-century Greek-speaking church. We have seen that Marcellus clearly believed that there would be an earthly reign of Christ. Athanasius adopts a chiliastic eschatology in *Historia Arianorum*, in which he wishes to attack the pro-Arian emperor Constantius. Chiliasm is clearly an eschatological nexus readily available to him. Eustathius echoes this eschatology in insisting on the reign of the human Christ over a corporeal, human kingdom, but diverges from it in claiming that this reign is eternal.

There are many possible reasons for Eustathius’ position on the eternity of Christ’s reign. The contrast with Marcellus is suggestive of a Christological/soteriological motivation. In avoiding the idea of an end to Christ’s reign, Eustathius also avoids the most problematic element of Marcellus’ theology: that the incarnation would end. As I have argued elsewhere, Marcellus and Eustathius share a sense that Christ reigns *qua* human being, and this has the effect of emphasising human autonomy over intimacy with God – humanity has its own kind of value, distinct from the divine. In Eustathius, we have seen, the human Christ’s authority and power is dependent on his union with the Word. A new kind of humanity is established with the incarnation. In Eustathius’ view, it is not an Athanasian, divinised, human being who rules eternally, but it *is* a human being strengthened and

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bolstered by the Word. Human beings need God’s grace, though not God’s substance, to be fully human, and this grace continues eternally.

Asserting the eternity of Christ’s reign must have some bearing on how far this reign is commensurable to the present reigns of kings and emperors. In both the Book of Revelation and Irenaeus’ *Adversus Haereses*, the earthly reign of Christ is, in a very significant sense, part of human history, prior to the final end that will be brought about with the “new heaven and the new earth.”835 This seems to me to contribute substantially to the way that Christ’s reign reflects negatively on particular manifestations of human power, in both texts. Rather a lot may rest on how Eustathius stands in relation to this framework. If he shares its sense of a final end of history, this has the effect of removing Christ’s reign from history, which makes it less commensurable with the emperor’s reign. If, conversely, he shares the sense that Christ’s reign is historical, he has extended this historical reign forever, magnifying its importance. The eternity of Christ’s reign stands as a sharp reminder of the transience and fragility of the emperor’s rule, and a reminder that would be all the more felt in a time when imperial power changed hands so quickly, and violently.

**God’s authority, Christ’s authority, and human authority**

The commensurability of eschatological vision with the current order vests this vision with particular resources to comment upon earthly power and authority whether or not the authority involved in the vision is part of what is commensurable.
The idea that life is to be entirely different in the eschaton either reflects entirely negatively on the present – the eschaton does represent objective perfection, but the present offers no opportunity to strive towards the perfection we see in the eschaton - or suggests that the eschaton does not provide an archetype for human society at all – if life is so different now, we may expect that human interaction, including structures of power and authority, will also be different, and the sharp contrast between the eschaton and the present does not reflect on either.

This section argues that Eustathius views Christ’s eschatological authority as deriving legitimacy from its relationship to God’s authority, and that this is a relationship which other human authority cannot share. Christ’s incommensurable authority is, however, placed in a political framework that is in other respects comparable. The validity of comparison is necessary to the contrast.

Writing to Alexander, Eustathius describes Melchisedek as a type of Christ specifically with regards to his “royalty.”

Significantly, Eustathius connects Melchisedek’s status as a “type” of Christ with Christ/ the Word being the archetype of the image, and so places it in a soteriological context. This suggests an analogy between Melchisedek’s royalty and Christ’s, though we don’t know how close this analogy is supposed to be. Arianos, however, gives a rather different picture.

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835 See Irenaeus, *A.H.* (CPG, 1307), 5.35 and note on Revelation, above.
836 D113:1-2. See Adam and Christ section in “image of God” chapter.
In *Arianos*, Eustathius implies that the way in which Christ’s reign receives legitimacy finds no equivalent in the lapsarian world order. Christ receives his authority from God. This is, in itself, entirely unremarkable but it forms an interesting parallel to the common idea that worldly rulers receive their authority from God. Eustathius frequently contrasts the authority of “the human being of Christ”, which is acquired, with the authority of God, both Father and Word, which is intrinsic and eternal:

And these were neither going to be restored to the Omnipotent, to the one who has his own sceptre, nor to the Word who has the royal power itself, which the Father also has, but this will be said to Christ: “The Lord prepared his throne in heaven.” For he will rule all creation alike by means of the mixing with the divine Word.

Eustathius believes that a human king will rule over the eschatological kingdom, receiving his authority from God. Eustathius’ view of humanity’s eschatological authority finds a parallel in his anthropological conception of God’s image: human destiny is properly separate from God. However, because Christ’s authority is received from God, it is not independent of God.

The concept that Christ receives authority from God points to the underlying idea that human authority is derived from God. However, as argued in the previous chapter, Eustathius connects Christ’s authority with the authority given to Adam and Eve by God, and lost, presumably in the lapse. The idea that authority lost at the

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837 C.f. Irenaeus, *A.H.* (CPG, 1307), 5.24.2, in which earthly rulers are described as “God’s ministers”, quoting Romans 3.16, and discussion in ‘the devil defeated’, chapter 5.
lapse is *restored* to humankind when it is bestowed on Christ implies that no commensurable authority has existed within the lapsarian world order.

We need not conclude that Eustathius completely rejected the legitimacy of all authority in the current world order, but he certainly seems to reject any identification between such authority and Christ’s authority. It is this divinely derived human authority that has been absent since the lapse. Eustathius’ Christology is important here, because his emphasis on the authority of the human being invites a comparison with the authority of other human beings more than a similar emphasis on divine authority would.

Christ receives authority “by means of the mixing with the divine Word” – that is, because of the incarnation. This does threaten to undermine Eustathius’ insistence that Christ reigns *qua* human being and touches, once again, upon a fault-line within his conception of Christ as the archetypal human being.\(^{839}\) It also emphasises the uniqueness of Christ’s derived authority. It is difficult to see how earthly authority within the lapsarian order could stand other than in negative contrast to Christ’s authority.\(^{840}\) Eustathius is not here attacking the emperor; he does seem to be rejecting a description of human authority favourable to Constantine.

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\(^{838}\) D103:3-8. This distinction is Eustathius’ immediate point in fragments D100-D103.

\(^{839}\) See discussion on ‘Christ’s humanity as saviour’ in chapter 6.

\(^{840}\) This should be distinguished from being diminished by contrast, which is a necessary consequence of belief in Christ’s eschatological reign.
The concept that authority will be restored to humankind in Christ has other implications for the nature of authority, already touched on in chapter 6. It suggests that we will all receive this authority, as we will all be raised πνευματικός. Our eschatological authority, then, relates to our current authority as our πνευματικός nature relates to our current nature: it is in a state of becoming, which must wait until the eschaton for fulfilment. Let us consider the idea that Christ acts as a delegate for humanity. Could an earthly ruler wield delegated authority connected to Christ’s via this state of becoming? I suspect not, because such an analogy would rely on a misinterpretation of the tension between Christ as unique and Christ as typically human. In the tension between the bestowal of authority on Christ and the bestowal of authority on all humanity, the former more hierarchical, suggestion derives from a desire to see Christ reign, the latter from a desire to see all of humanity restored and promoted. The rule of another individual human being (though it may aid them) fulfils neither of these.

We saw in chapter 5 that Eustathius draws an inverse parallel between Christ’s power and the devil’s power. Although his images of demonic power, and its ambiguous legitimacy, draw on structures of imperial power, he doesn’t want to ally the devil’s power with the emperor’s power, unlike the author of Revelation. Christ overthrows and binds the devil. He supersedes the emperor. Eustathius’ ideas about Christ’s kingship are suggestive of a sense that the authority of the empire is wanting. It is part of what is held back by the lapse, not part of what is, even now, reaching forward to Christ’s kingdom. These ideas do not, however, suggest an

841 See the discussion on ‘Freedom and Perfection’ in chapter 6.
attack on imperial power, so much as a refusal to give it a prime place in the narrative of salvation, worked out in history.

Correspondingly, Eustathius’ use of the Pauline motif of ‘heavenly citizenship [πολίτευμα]’ suggests that Christians owe their political allegiance to God rather than earthly rulers. It should be acknowledged that πολίτευμα might not refer to citizenship; it often refers simply to ‘way of life’. Although to claim that ‘our way of life is in heaven’ would still have implications for the way of life on earth, it would not invoke the political dimension of this life as the idea of citizenship does. However, it seems to me that ‘citizenship’ is, indeed, the best translation here because the other instance in which Eustathius uses biblical ‘heaven’ imagery is unashamedly political; it refers to Christ’s throne. It is a reasonable supposition that Eustathius conceived of citizens of heaven to correspond to the king in heaven, who will reign on earth, or in heaven come down to earth.

**Eschatological Judgement**

Eustathius’ eschatology shares with most Christian eschatology a dialectic between salvation and judgement. This is because two rather different motifs, both of which are common in patristic thought, govern his soteriology. One is Christ’s eschatological, total victory. The other is the eschatological judgement of each

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842 C.f. Tatian, *Oratio adversus Graecos* (CPG, 1104), 19
843 Athanasius complains that the ‘Arians’ treat the church as a πολιτεία of the senate in *Hist. Ar.* (CPG, 2127), 78. Though this work postdates all of Eustathius’ writing, it is noteworthy given the possibility that Eustathius was influential to Athanasius’ construction of ‘Arianism’. See discussion on *Ariomanitas* in chapter 2.
person before God. We have already seen a great deal of this first motif. To understand how this motif problematises that of divine judgement, we must remember that, within it, Christ rescues people from the devil. Several important and overlapping questions arise from this dialectic, and these are the subject of this section: 1) what is the relationship between punishment, reward and salvation? 2) what is the purpose of eschatological punishment? 3) does punishment last forever? 4) who achieves or receives salvation?

The fragmented Eustathian sources leave a dappled picture in response to these questions. In particular, Eustathius clearly has a picture of eternal punishment, but his soteriology overwhelmingly suggests that everyone will be rescued from captivity to the devil and achieve human τέλος. Eustathius’ soteriology is largely separate from, and inconsistent with, his conception of eschatological punishment and reward; his punishment-reward schema for the most part relates neither to the transformation of human circumstance that is involved in freedom from the devil nor, more remarkably, to the transformation of the human person. The two schemas sometimes overlap in the instance of reward because Eustathius couches it in terms of reward for success in battle and therefore connects it to humankind’s fight against the devil. Nonetheless, the salvation of God’s creation, including humanity, and eschatological judgement before God or Christ, are two irreducible axioms that sit side by side in his theology.

844 Clement of Alexandria refers to “the punishment of eternal fire” (Liber Quis dives salvetur CPG, 1379, 33) whilst generally explicitly espousing a universalist view of salvation, (C.f. Stromata CPG, 1377, 1.27). See Daley, Hope of the early Church, p.46. This should caution us against assuming the overriding conclusiveness of Eustathius’ statements about eternal punishment.
Eustathius clearly believes that everyone will be resurrected: this is most pointedly evident in his argument for the resurrection of the body, discussed in chapter two. Eustathius argues that justice demands that the whole person face the consequences of his or her actions. As he is refuting the idea that a different body, or only a soul, is eschatologically judged, the whole person element of this belief is undeniably Eustathius’ focus. Nonetheless, the idea that each person must face the consequences of their actions is a heavily implied corollary of Eustathius’ argument. The idea that people face the consequences of their actions is not a concession he makes to his opponents, but an axiom he shares with them. A belief in the eschatological judgement of each person before God is important to the picture on which Eustathius bases his argument. Eustathius makes an argument about the necessity of resurrection to the moral coherence of judgement. This argument would, admittedly, retain structural coherence if he believed that only some people were raised and referred throughout his argument only to the eschatological judgement of those people. However, such a basis would jar with the emotive thrust of his argument. We can assume, then, that everyone is raised, and that eschatological events are events that happen to the reunited body and soul.

Eustathius’ wider soteriological system, as outlined above, broadly lends itself to universal salvation in several ways. Most fundamentally, its assumption that Christ represents the human race, and reforms not just himself, but ἄνθρωπος in general, strongly suggests that every individual ultimately achieves human telos. This is true of much Greek patristic soteriology. It is pointedly true of the
soteriological understanding of the Christ-Adam relationship which Eustathius shares with Irenaeus: not only the salvific efficacy, but also the very meaningfulness of Christ recapitulating Adam is based on the idea that the salvation of one person means the salvation of all because humanity is, in the most significant sense, a unit. I have already observed several caveats in the corporate anthropological assumptions underlying Eustathius’ soteriology. These are also caveats to his implied universalism. Christ has temporal precedence over others in achieving salvation, and others must follow him in order to be saved; the possibility of not following is implied.

Eustathius’ depiction of Christ as a victorious warrior, again, lends itself to the idea that everybody is saved: Christ’s victory is total, and the freedom of those captive to the devil is central to Eustathius’ articulation of it. Christ is victorious in freeing humankind from bondage to the devil. Within this schema, in order to be totally victorious, he must free all of humankind. Eustathius’ understanding of Christ’s descent to Hades certainly suggests that all the souls imprisoned there at that time are freed. Samuel, and the just in general, are in Hades before Christ’s descent. Nonetheless, Eustathius does connect Christ’s descent to Hades with freedom from sins, and the redemptive power of Christ’s death. It is, for example, when Christ went to Hades that he “ransomed” human souls.\textsuperscript{845} It may be justifiably objected that Eustathius, presumably, regarded even the just as needing forgiveness. Nonetheless, in light of Eustathius’ strong connection between the devil’s dominion and human sin, Christ’s victory only really makes sense if it has an effect for the profoundly
guilty. It is implausible that, when he writes of Christ leading the human race to paradise, Eustathius conceives of Christ leading only the just out of Hades, to paradise, and leaving others behind.

Eustathius’ soteriological nexus, then, consistently and strongly suggests universal salvation. Nonetheless, Eustathius evidently did not believe in universal salvation. He often declares that some people will be eternally punished.

Eustathius frequently writes of eschatological reward and punishment in quite straightforward terms. Martyrs will receive “the wages of their pain” and the sinner, conversely, will be sent to “αἰώνιοι punishments.” The most obvious implication is that salvation and damnation are two possible options for the afterlife, and both result from human choice. Salvation does not apply to everybody because not everybody chooses that which results in salvation.

Eustathius does not detail reasons for eschatological punishment. He typically seems to regard it as retributive and sometimes describes it as “eternal” – αἰώνιος. There is, admittedly, some ambiguity about whether the term αἰώνιος denotes eternity, rather than simply a very long time. However, in the epitome of

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845 Engastrimytho 18.2.
846 D44:49 and D51:39-40 respectively [Ariomanitas].
847 In contrast to Origen, who explicitly states that punishment is remedial. See his De Princ. (CPG, 1482), 2.5.3.
848 This has pointedly been the subject of a debate on Irenaeus’ eschatology, in which Henri Lassiat argued that Irenaeus did not believe in eternal torment, and Adelin Rousseau argued that he did. C.f. Lassiat, Promotion de l’homme en Jésus Christ d’après Irénée de Lyon (Tours, Mame, 1974), pp.409-
Ariomanitas, αἰώνιος is complemented by a reference to “unquenchable fire”, which removes this ambiguity:

someone is given over to eternal punishments, and is sent out into the unquenchable source of fire through which things he is said to be utterly destroyed, paying the penalties in an endless cycle. 849

Here, retribution for sin is the aim of punishment, and this punishment never ends. It is difficult to see what purpose eternal punishment might possibly have other than retribution. It is tempting, in light of this passage, simply to equate reward with salvation and punishment with its lack. This stands in sharp contrast to the sense that Christ destroys the devil’s dominion and thereby saves humankind.

We might wish to seek a partial resolution in ideas common in the idea that people who live after the historical Christ event may fare worse than people living before it, common in Latin theology. In this understanding, Christ did lead all the human souls from Hades to paradise, but those who die after this event will not necessarily go to paradise. For example, Arnobius, in his Adversus nationes, writes that all those who died prior to Christ’s advent were freed by Christ but that, subsequently, only Christians receive this freedom. 850

A desire to see sinners punished makes a lot of sense coming from someone who had witnessed, and possibly experienced, persecution under Diocletian and his

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849 D51:39-42 [Ariomanitas].
successors, because it provides a mechanism by which the persecuted saints are avenged. The fact that Eustathius refers to punishment and reward primarily in the context of martyrdom strongly suggests that he has, indeed, linked eschatological punishment with persecution of the church.

A view of eschatological judgement as retributive for persecution does not require Arnobius’ belief that, of those living after Christ, only Christians will be saved. It in some ways threatens to undermine it, in fact, because, if one is not a Christian, whether or not one has persecuted the church is an irrelevance as far as God’s judgement is concerned. The parable of the Sheep and the Goats (Matt. 25:31-46) is an important text in these discussions, partly because of its very strong emphasis on divisive judgement. In Irenaeus, one of the many ideas we find is that the nations are to be judged on the basis of their treatment of Christians. So, he refers first to Christians regularly being dependent on pagans for their basic needs, and then refers to Matthew 25:36f: “For I was hungry and you gave me food…”

This view of eschatological judgement avoids the highly problematic idea that Christ came to damn, rather than to save. Christ does not open the gates of paradise only to slam them shut again; it is a structure that can better bear the soteriological weight that Eustathius places on Christ’s descent to Hades and ascent.

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850 Arnobius, *Adversus nationes* (CPL, 93), 2.32, 2.63, 2.77.
851 Irenaeus, *A.H.* (CPG, 1306), 4.30.3, but see also below for a different interpretation from Irenaeus. Lester Field has argued that it was primarily western theology that understood martyrdom as part of a cosmic conflict between God and the devil, played out in conflict between church and empire (in his *Liberty*, p.22). This claim unfairly homogenises the treatment of martyrdom in Eastern theology. Eustathius himself, as I have argued, has a very strong sense of martyrdom as cosmic conflict.
to paradise. However, even in this light, Eustathius’ descriptions of eternal punishment significantly undermine his depiction of Christ’s victory and humanity’s place within it. For example, Eustathius’ description of Christ opening the gates of paradise has a deliberately definitive feel: “for he…reclaimed (the) fiery sword and pacified the fear of the cherubim, but he removed the stubborn locks also, having opened the unopenable gates…”\textsuperscript{852} The bars to entering paradise were the locks on the gates of Hades, keeping souls in, and on paradise, keeping souls out. They have both been removed. Furthermore, Christ is said to have led “the human race” to paradise, not a large number of individuals, or particular collective. Eustathius’ picture of Christ as a victorious warrior only really makes sense if everyone is rescued.

Before the description of “αἰωνίους punishments” in \textit{Ariomanitas}, Eustathius suggests that rejection of salvation results in continued, even increased, enslavement to the devil. He refers to Christ “crushing the heads” of the dragon, equating it with Christ’s triumph over the devil in Hades.\textsuperscript{853} Then he continues:

[I]f Christ, who has been hung on the cross, gives to us the exact representation of his body so that, once we have partaken of the sacred food, we might inherit incorruptible life, it follows that also the many-shaped serpent, in dying, conversely, furnishes food from his body to the ones who have fled eternal light.\textsuperscript{854}

\textsuperscript{852} D22:15-19 [\textit{Ariomanitas}].
\textsuperscript{853} This reference to a many-headed dragon echoes Rev. 12:2.
\textsuperscript{854} D32:28-34 [\textit{Ariomanitas}].
In this picture, the destruction of the devil is actually a means by which people reap the results of rejecting “eternal light.” The emphasis here is not on punishment *per se*. God, or Christ (unusually for Ariomanitas, the distinction *is* a little ambiguous) “gives” the devil “as food” to those who have rejected Christ’s body. He is here, as in the other picture, an active and willing agent, perhaps *the primary* active and willing agent, in the destruction of those who do not receive salvation. Nonetheless, the causal link between a person’s choice and his or her ultimate destiny is more direct in this picture. This corresponds to a tension in Eustathius’ political soteriology because it is linked to a sense that humanity is, at least potentially, a culprit as well as a victim in the drama of salvation. Eustathius’ concept of starkly contrasting possible destinies is connected to a high view of human free will.

This description of people masochistically gorging on the devil’s corpse echoes another Irenaean view of damnation, in which, similarly, people shun the light for themselves. So, he claims that people receive punishment, in the form of separation from God, as a natural (we might suspect, strictly necessary) consequence of turning from God:

> on everyone who departs from God from their own resolve, [God] inflicts the separation from him that they have elected of their own accord…but God does not take the initiative in punishing them, but punishment falls upon them because they are destitute of everything good.\(^{855}\)

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\(^{855}\) *A.H.* (CPG, 1306), 5.27.2.
As punishment is separation from God, and the people receiving it have already separated themselves from God to some extent, there is a strong sense that people have not only opted for actions that deserve this punishment, but have actually opted for the punishment; that is, they have opted not just for their actions, but the consequences of their actions. Eustathius may be drawing on Irenaeus directly here, especially as the reference to the many-headed dragon sounds a lot like Revelation, which is a foundational text for book 5 of Adversus Haereses.

Here, the idea is that people opt to align themselves with the devil’s defeat. We should take this idea seriously in Eustathius, because it goes some way to offering a solution to the tension between humankind as victim and humankind as culprit, as it is formulated in his thought. There is a corresponding sense in which it also resolves the initial tension between limited salvation and the saviour’s total victory; Christ did defeat the devil who sowed death in the human race, and freed the entire human race; unfortunately, some of us have switched sides in the process. In another sense, the problem remains: Christ has still descended to Hades in order to free the devil’s captives and ended up partaking in the ultimate destruction of some of the said captives. He hasn’t altogether solved the problem he set out to solve being defeated, in the end, by Stockholm Syndrome.

Eustathius once suggests that human beings are punished for their sins after they have been made perfect. This is connected to an understanding of the
resurrection, in that everyone who is resurrected is πνευματικός. We have already come across the first portion of the relevant fragment:

The apostle tends to call human beings ‘soul-like’ inasmuch as when they sin through the soul, the communions of the divine Spirit are turned away, and spiritual inasmuch as, through divinely inspired citizenship, they partake in the Holy Spirit, accepting its plenty. Because of this, he wrote that a soul-like body was sown, which has performed manifold sins through the soul, but he said that this [body] is raised spiritual, since he changes the bodies of all those having been raised. The bodies change their ways, no one at all sins anymore, having stood before the divine tribune striking the breast, and, repenting of those things through which he slipped, he is led to punishment.

Admittedly, this fragment is very likely to elide two passages from different portions of a wider discussion about resurrection, because it is implausible that Eustathius intends to claim that those who have received the Holy Spirit are punished for it. However, it is impossible to explain the impression that sinless human beings are punished as a false impression given by the conflation of two separate passages.

The first sentence is an explanation of Paul’s use of the adjectives ψυχικός and πνευματικός and is most likely to have in mind people living before the eschaton, apiece with, if not part of, the discussion that we have evidence of in D44. There,

856 C.f. 1 Corinthians 2.14-15.
857 D47 [Ariomanitas]: ψυχικοὺς ὁ ἀποστολος ἀνθρώπους εἴωθε καλεῖν, ὅσοι διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἁμαρτάνοντες τὰς τοῦ θείου πνεύματος ἀποστρέφονται κοινωνίας, πνευματικοὺς δὲ τοὺς δι᾽ ἐνθέου πολιτείας τῷ ἁγίῳ κοινωνοῦσι πνεύματι, προσιέμενοι τὰς χορηγίας αὐτοῦ. Διὰ τοῦτο σπείρεσθαι μὲν σῶμα ψυχικὸν ἔγραφε τὸ διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς παντοδαπὰς ἐργασάμενον ἁμαρτίας, ἐγείρεσθαι δ’ αὐτὸ πνευματικὸν ἔλεγεν, ἐπειδή πάντα τὰ τῶν ἀνισταμένων σώματα μετασχηματίζει.
Eustathius analyses Paul’s use of the term πνευματικός in application to the saints on earth in order to elucidate 1 Corinthians 15:44: “he was sown a soul-like body, raised a spiritual body.” The passage in question here continues in the same vein – by claiming that 1 Corinthians 15:44 is about eschatological moral transformation. The phrase Διὰ τοῦτο σπείρεσθαι μὲν σῶμα ψυχικόν ἐγραφε τὸ διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς παντοδαπὰς ἐργασάμενον ἁμαρτίας, ἐγείρεσθαι δ’αὐτὸ πνευματικὸν ἔλεγεν ἐπειδὴ πάντα τὰ τῶν ἀνισταμένων σώματα μετασχηματίζει then, probably did originally follow the first sentence in the fragment, as it does here (though the epitomiser may have changed the sentence structure). This still seems to involve a claim that everyone is raised πνευματικός, but the force of claiming that πνευματικός people are punished is lost. Πάντα may well be a gloss by the epitomiser, intended to link this passage to the next one. Eustathius may not have intended to address the question of punishment here at all. Though there is a certain universalist logic – he seems to think everyone is resurrected, and here, he says that resurrection involves becoming πνευματικός – it is no stronger than in, for example, his claims that Christ saves the human race.

If we take it that we have two amalgamated passages, it seems likely that the phrase μὲν τοὺς τρόπους, οὐκετι δ’οὖδεὶς οὐδ’όλως ἁμαρτάνει πρὸ τοῦ θείου βήματος ἑστὼς τύπτων τὸ στῆθος καὶ μετανοῶν ἐφ’οἷς ἐσφάλη, δι’ὅν καὶ ἄγεται δίκας υφέξων belongs to the second passage. We must assume that μετασχηματίζω (or a synonym) is still the verb corresponding to τοὺς τρόπους here, so this phrase

μὲν τοὺς τρόπους, οὐκετι δ’οὖδεὶς οὐδ’όλως ἁμαρτάνει πρὸ τοῦ θείου βήματος ἑστὼς τύπτων τὸ στῆθος καὶ μετανοῶν ἐφ’οἷς ἐσφάλη, δι’ὅν καὶ ἄγεται δίκας υφέξων.
could be translated as “he changes his ways (or, everyone changes their ways?), no one at all sins anymore, and, repenting of those things through which he slipped, he is led to punishment.” The changing of ways fits well with the picture of repentance, and therefore does seem to belong to this passage, rather than the one about being raised πνευματικός. Eustathius may not wish to apply the verb πνευματικός to those being led to punishment. However, we still have the idea that, eschatologically, everyone attains moral perfection and that some people are punished. It is clear that Eustathius claimed both that everyone is resurrected and transformed, and that some are subsequently punished.

So, everyone is eschatologically transformed, to a significant degree, and at least some of these transformed people are subsequently punished. In the epitome, these passages come only shortly after the reference to “unquenchable fire.” It is, of course, difficult to ascertain how close together the two descriptions of punishment were in Eustathius’ original text. However, it is very likely that they were at least part of the same discourse which covers bodily resurrection and the nature of resurrected ἄνθρωπος.

This passage stands in sharp contrast to the one depicting the devil’s body as a perversion of the Eucharist. Here, people stand, perfected, before God’s judgement seat and receive punishment and, at the time of receiving punishment, they regret their previous misdeeds. Those who receive the poisonous anti-Eucharist still desire

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it. They do not exactly desire a punishment, because they do not see it as such, and this is not, anyway, exactly what is given to them.\textsuperscript{859} There are two substantially different pictures here. In one, unrepentant sinners are masochistic, and God ultimately gives them what they mistakenly want.\textsuperscript{860} In the other, there is no such thing as an \textit{ultimately} unrepentant sinner. People are punished, after the problem of their sin has been solved, and they see it for what it is. This latter picture is more typical of Eustathius. Let us return to his response Origen’s claim that Christ, when in Hades, was above “with respect to \textit{προαίρεσις}.”\textsuperscript{861} Everyone, Eustathius retorts “even those who have made no effort to lead a righteous life” were above “with respect to \textit{προαίρεσις}” because everyone wants to be delivered from Hades.\textsuperscript{862}

As demonstrated earlier, in \textit{Engastrimytho}, Hades is always somewhat negative but is a place of punishment specifically for sinners. This is significant now, because it means that Eustathius is saying, among other things, that obviously, no one actually \textit{wants} punishment whilst they are undergoing it. This jars with his

\textsuperscript{859} The ambiguous sense that they might be \textit{mistakenly} desirous to eat the devil’s poisonous body brings up interesting questions of the relationship between freedom and knowledge but the text, unfortunately, seems to me not to provide an answer.

\textsuperscript{860} This concept of \textit{mistaken} desire in the passage about the ‘anti-Eucharist’ threatens to undermine the high view of free will implied in the passage.

\textsuperscript{861} See \textit{Engastrimytho} 17.4-17.6 and Origen, \textit{In 1 Regum 28} (CPG, 1423.2), 8.2-3. Both writers agree that Christ was in Hades. Origen has been arguing against a position, contrary to his own, which Eustathius does not hold either. This is the idea that Samuel would not have been in Hades because he was a good man. Origen responds to his detractors that the souls in Hades required the prophets, Christ’s forerunners, for the same reason that they required Christ. The fact that Samuel was in Hades does not mean he was not righteous, Origen insists. It is simply in order to underline this point that Origen claims that both Christ and the prophets, whilst in Hades, were “above with respect to \textit{prohairesis};” essentially, his idea is that their ethical decisions were not deserving of Hades. As noted in the section on cosmography in chapter 2, Eustathius \textit{does} think that Samuel was in Hades prior to Christ’s descent. However, in contrast to his reading in \textit{Ariomanitas}, he argues that the just are in a pleasant part of Hades (drawing on the parable of Lazarus). Characteristically of this early, and somewhat heady work, he then goes in another direction, insisting that Christ’s soul was also \textit{actually} above while it was below (see discussion on the omnipresence of Christ’s soul).

\textsuperscript{862} Ibid, 17.7.
picture of the people receiving the devil’s body in place of Christ’s. It is, however, unclear whether the souls in Hades have repented of the sins for which they are being punished, as those beating their breasts before the divine judgement seat have. Eustathius here uses προαίρεσις to mean “preference”, and the context of his argument – of course no one prefers to be in Hades – does not require its connotation of a preferred course in matters of ethics. However, the terms in which Eustathius writes of people wanting to be delivered from Hades, whilst ambiguous, suggest an ethical slant. Eustathius writes that people desire “τῶν ἄνω φορῶν.” Greer and Mitchell, despite translating Eustathius’ προαίρεσις as “ethical purpose”, supply τόπων from the previous sentence and correspondingly translate the phrase “the fruitful lands above.” This could imply simply that no one wants to be in Hades because it is not a nice place to be. No repentance is required.

Declerck, conversely, evidently thinks that the passage refers to a kind of inner yearning for better things, because he suggests a parallel with Plato’s discussion of the ascent of musical motions. This reading of the text corresponds well to the picture of people beating their breasts before being led to punishment, though it reads rather a lot into what seems to be quite a straight-forward argument on Eustathius’ part.

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863 They render Origen’s use of προαίρεσις in the same way, and are probably right to safeguard the two authors’ shared terminology, especially as Eustathius is directly responding to Origen.
864 Plato, Leges, 747a.
At any rate, in his argument against Origen’s reading, Eustathius insists that a preference not to be in Hades is universal and unambiguous. The difference between Eustathius and Origen is readily explained by a difference in their soteriology: Origen believes that people continue in moral struggle after death, as this is part of their gradual, fluctuating progress towards perfection. Whilst we cannot preclude a concept of post-mortem ethical struggle in Eustathius, it does not seem to be in his thoughts here, within an anyway tangled picture of Hades. At this point, even those who have not sought to live a good life wish they had, Eustathius seems to be arguing. This also coheres with his picture of people in Hades as prisoners of the devil: now they see the devil’s tyranny for what it is, and long to escape it.\(^{865}\) In this passage, Eustathius may not envision penitent souls, but he does at least have a very strong sense that people have a clearer perspective on this life once it is over, if only because this is forced upon them by its consequences.

In Ariomanitas however, Eustathius goes further than this and suggests that people are punished when truly repentant and also transformed, even if not in the sense of being \(\pi\nu\varphi\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\varsigma\). This problematic passage must be considered in light of what else we know about Eustathius’ understanding of the resurrection and the \(\pi\nu\varphi\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\varsigma\) state. Drawing on chapter two, we can summarise as follows: 1) Salvation consists in essential transformation. This is, more specifically, conformity to Christ, that is, becoming \(\pi\nu\varphi\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\varsigma\) and is closely connected with the final

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\(^{865}\) This feeds well into the narrative of the rescue of the souls from Hades, to which Eustathius now turns.
resurrection. 2) Everyone will be resurrected. 3) Following resurrection, some people will be rewarded for their earthly lives, others will be punished.

How does this picture fit with Eustathius’ suggestion that everyone will be transformed? It is one natural conclusion of the belief that everyone will be resurrected. However, here he suggests that everyone will be transformed and that some will be rewarded, others punished. It seems, firstly, that everyone is not transformed to the same degree; though he does think that those punished are sinless and penitent, he does not, apparently, use the term πνευματικός in reference to them. This would not remove the problem presented by the association between resurrection and the πνευματικός state, but it would suggest that it belonged to a different discourse. It is also possible that the punishment described in this passage is retributive but not eternal. In this case, the accomplishment of perfection would not be squandered in eternal fire. Alternatively, he has, in this passage, synthesised the wider, universalist sense of his soteriology with his belief in eternal punishment. Everyone is saved from bondage to the devil, and is transformed into the ultimate human state, but they nonetheless get, as it were, what they deserve on the basis of their life in a lapsarian world. This rather chilling synthesis is, however, implausible because salvation is no longer a cause for rejoicing per se. It also ignores the very significant aspect of Eustathius’ soteriology which focuses on the forgiveness of sins. It is more likely that the people led to punishment here will eventually be released from it, and that this is either a qualification of Eustathius’ claims about αἰώνος punishment or simply another instance of inconsistency on the subject of salvation and judgement.
The dialectic between universal and particular salvation in Eustathius partially corresponds to his dialectic between lapsarian humanity as victim and lapsarian humanity as culprit. Where humanity is depicted as imprisoned, it is freed. Where it is depicted as guilty, individual members achieve salvation on the basis of reformation. This correspondence is imperfect because the distinction between human sin and human captivity is often blurred, and Christ’s redemptive sacrifice often appears to be universally applied. Thus Eustathius writes that “If, through one human being, salvation began for all human beings, clearly, [his] soul ransomed souls of the same kind.” Nonetheless, where salvation and its lack are seen in terms of morality and immorality respectively, the possibility of damnation maintains the variety of moral possibilities. Eustathius’ picture of the redemption of the penitent thief is a good example of this: the penitent thief is deeply sinful, but in struggling with the devil and, through Christ’s help, repenting, opts for salvation and wins a battle with the devil. Eustathius’ soteriology is inconsistent, once again, because he is grappling with how human free will plays out in human destiny.

Eustathius’ writings contain irreconcilable ideas about whether salvation applies to every member of the human race. His soteriology overwhelmingly suggests that it does, but he also very clearly articulates a belief that some people will be eternally punished, others rewarded. It is very likely that Eustathius did believe that some people would be eternally punished, in spite of his soteriological

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866 Engastrimytho 18.1.
system. However, we cannot altogether exclude the possibility that the ambiguities raised by much of his soteriology point to an alternative understanding.

The common tension between universal salvation and divisive judgement is a tension, in part, between two ways in which eschatological events render history intelligible.\textsuperscript{867} God’s providential ordering of history and God’s judgement for the sinfulness of history. There are two different ways in which God must redeem the tragedies presented by history: he must rescue what he has created, but he must also render human action in history meaningful, via judgement.

Conclusion

Eustathius believes that there will be a corporeal, and in some sense earthly, kingdom of Christ. Unfortunately, the details of this kingdom are unclear, but he does have a clear sense of commensurability between the current world and the eschatological world. This reinforces many other aspects of his theology and, notably, his insistence on the identity between the resurrection body and the current one. He does not want to conceive of ultimate human identity as removed from the world in which we currently live, having a strong sense that what we are is what we are \textit{now}. Consistently, therefore, he avoids conceiving of eschatological transformation as a transformation of our nature.

\textsuperscript{867} The idea that history may be rendered intelligible eschatologically can be found in O’Donovan, “History”, pp.28-9.
In patristic thought (though not exclusively there), history makes sense in light of eschatological events. Eschatology reflects on history. The manner, as well as the content, of its reflection on history was diverse across patristic texts. Because eschatology is an end, in which telos is achieved, history has teleological value. This is clear in both Irenaeus and Origen. However, Irenaeus also holds eschatological reality as commensurable to current reality, and in doing so vests history with *intrinsic* value, in addition to teleological value. In this respect, Eustathius is much closer to Irenaeus, and the apocalyptic tradition on which he is drawing, than to Origen.

Eustathius *does*, however, conceive of eschatological transformation; the world will be commensurable to what it is now, but it will be very different. This reflects negatively on the current world order (and, arguably, more negatively than an ethereal eschatology might tend to). This comes out most clearly in his discourse on Christ’s authority; because it is, emphatically, human authority, it is implicitly placed in contra-distinction to other human authority. Christ’s authority is authority restored to him on behalf of humanity, having been lost in Adam and Eve. This has two effects: firstly, it relativises the sense, noted in the previous chapter, of eschatological subjection to Christ. Secondly, it problematises any comparison with earthly authority, showing the contingent and partial nature of its legitimacy.
A number of themes in Eustathius’ discourse on power, whether directly or otherwise, are indebted to Revelation: the inverse parallelism between the devil’s power and Christ’s; the description of the devil as a many-headed serpent; the commensurability between current reality and eschatological reality. It is uncertain whether Eustathius regards Revelation as canonical, but he does seem to be drawing on a tradition in which it was an important imaginative resource.

Eustathius’ view of eschatological judgement contains a tension: he explicitly and clearly believes that some people will be eternally punished, but the dominant motifs of his soteriology all point towards universal salvation. This is a common dynamic in patristic soteriology. It is further complicated by disparate ideas about the experience of eternal punishment: sometimes, people are punished for sins of which they have repented, sometimes, they revel in their punishment. Eustathius’ view of eschatological judgement here reflects a host of competing axioms.

Eustathius’ eschatology, insofar as the sources permit judgement, bears some marks of a chiliasm which was declining during his lifetime. His use of it reflects both a commitment to embodied existence and an ambivalence about the current world order, which made him feel that it could not be this creation’s final manifestation. However, he has combined it with other ideas, and drawn on chiliasm loosely. He does not adhere to a chiliastic eschatological narrative in any straightforward sense.
Conclusion

Theological anthropology was profoundly important to the thought of Eustathius of Antioch. Eustathius’ approach to anthropology was inevitably shaped by his context – both the intellectual milieu of fourth-century Christianity, and his experience within and observation of the church and the Roman Empire in the tumultuous decades of Constantine’s reign.

Eustathius devotes a great deal of attention to anthropological ontology, within which he wishes to articulate human experience both in terms of embodied souls and ensouled bodies. He conceives of the relationship between the human body and soul in terms of a hylomorphic dualism. Within this framework, there is a sense in which the body’s potential is fulfilled by the soul, and a sense in which the human person’s potential is fulfilled by the union of body and soul.

Pointedly, body and soul can exist apart from each other. This allows Eustathius’ picture of the soul between death and resurrection to cohere with his wider anthropological ontology in a strictly structural sense. Nonetheless, Eustathius’ discourse on the soul between bodily death and resurrection does have a significantly different emphasis. This is because he vests a great deal of importance in the activity of the disembodied soul and does occasionally equate the disembodied soul with the person, despite his protestations to the contrary. Here he is drawing on a very common patristic collection of narratives about souls in Hades and paradise.
respectively and this leads him to a different place than his more explicitly philosophical reflections on the person in the present life.

Aristotelian influences are found across much of Eustathius’ anthropological ontology: his view of soul-body relations, his physiology, and his attack on transmigration. There is little evidence that Eustathius self-defined as a follower of Aristotle, but the influence on him of the Aristotelian tradition was very significant. This was, however, an Aristotelianism profoundly marked by Platonism. Eustathius is sincere in touting his dislike for Plato, but he cannot avoid Plato’s pervasive intellectual legacy. This is reflected in the fact that he adopts the broadly Platonic metaphysical categories, perceptible and intelligible and (perhaps accurately), interprets Aristotelian hylomorphism as cohesive with these categories.

Perhaps the most striking element of Eustathius’ anthropology is that he simultaneously insists that the soul undergoes passions and maintains a monistic conception of the soul. The experience of passions is not only inevitable for the soul, it is natural and desirable. This particularly comes across in his discussion of Christ’s grief on the cross: Christ’s soul should be grieving. This shows a profound concern for human emotional experience. It is not clear how this relates to rational thought, particularly in Eustathius’ concept of will, but it is evident that the rational faculty and the faculty of emotions such as sorrow are contained within the same entity, if they are not indeed one and the same thing. Eustathius also connects this
back to the body – the soul most often requires the body to undergo passion, just as the body requires the soul.

Eustathius’ theology of the image of God reinforces his sense of the body’s importance by locating the image partly, if not mainly, in the body. It is significant, however, that when he describes the body without the soul qua image, he still conveys a sense of its incompleteness.

A parallelism between Adam and Christ is evident in Eustathius’ image theology, and this comes out in a persistent emphasis on Christ’s full and perfect humanity across his soteriology. A key element in this soteriology looks to progress from beyond the original condition, and echoes a basically optimistic attitude to the world as it is, found prominently in the thought of Irenaeus. This is, however, held together with a strong sense of the lapse, and its catastrophic consequences. Humanity is degenerate and enslaved. The extant sources give rather more time to this aspect of Eustathius’ soteriology, but we cannot tell which, if either, of these ideas was more important to Eustathius. He himself, at any rate, places them within a single overarching narrative, as our salvation from slavery and degeneration culminates in our progression to the πνευματικός state. This he has in common with much patristic theology, but the clear echo of a more specific tradition, most often associated with Irenaeus, is still notable. Older German scholarship is to some degree vindicated in this respect.
A sense of disjunction between humankind and God recurs in many areas of his theology: his highly divisive Christology, and related sense that the Spirit strengthens, rather than imbues, the person; his claim that humanity is not “true” image of the Son, as the Son is of the Father; his belief that it is the human being of Christ who will reign eschatologically, placing eschatological society at a distance from God. This disjunction does strongly reflect a normative contemporary engagement with Platonism, which places God, definitively, on one side of a temporal-eternal divide, and everything else on the other. However, even a cursory glance at the theology of Athanasius should remind us that a radically, and necessary, disjunction between God and humankind is not an inevitable consequence of this metaphysics.

Eustathius’ theology can give a sense of isolation from God, although it must be allowed that this is only relative to other patristic interpretations of the God-human relationship, and is not absolute. All of the ideas suggesting that humanity is isolated from God also carry a sense of the person’s intrinsic autonomy. Eustathius (completely unremarkably) conceives of eschatological freedom in terms of the freedom to do the right thing, and this might seem to undermine, or at least, qualify, his emphasis on autonomy. However, to draw this conclusion is to misunderstand both the nature of Eustathian autonomy, and freedom to do the right thing. His concept of eschatological freedom is fundamentally optimistic about human nature. If human beings are acting wrongly, it is because they are constrained, in some sense, to do so. In locating the eschatological absence of sin in human nature he makes it a
fundamentally human endeavour, which has less to do with obedience than it does to do with a proper understanding of the situation, and an ability to act accordingly.

Eustathius displays a clear antipathy to many anthropological principles he associates with Origen, and here he draws on Methodius’ critique of him. However, his critique of Origen is, like Methodius’ own, complex. It is also independent. He not only rejects anthropological ideas that Methodius shared with Origen – such as the location of God’s image in the soul, rather than the body – but follows Origen in ways that Methodius does not – in the doctrine of Christ’s human soul, and the soul’s corresponding mediating role.

Throughout Eustathius’ theology, there is a desire to ground the fulfilment of human potential in observable reality. In his anthropological ontology, what the person was created to be must be commensurable with what the person is now. His eschatology is consistent with this: he has a concrete vision of a perfect society commensurable to the current one. This enables his eschatology to reflect a sense of discomfiture with the current world order and, more concretely, his dislike of the manner of Constantine’s involvement in the church.
These are translations of Declerck’s text, except where otherwise stated.

Note: I have not included fragments referred to only in introducing a writing, or only as part of a comment on word frequency. Occasionally, I have offered only the relevant sections of longer fragments. With regards to the epitome of *Ariomanitas* and the Latin fragments, I have generally attempted no retroversion to the original text (even where I have suggested a retroversion in the body of the thesis), but have sought to offer a translation of the text as it stands.

**Contra Ariomanitas**

1

[Questions of those stirring up war around Arius]: ‘After Christ had come to visit among human beings, like according to body, did he not also bear a human soul?’ Then they bring on “what then? It is absurd to think that the Lord bore the form of a human soul, since he appears after he has been united with the Holy Spirit. For the bodies of other human beings have been formed being unmoving in themselves. Therefore, the body needed the power of moving. On which account the souls have come to be, in order that, having been left behind in the bodies, they might breathe life-giving power into them, so that through these things the unmoving dwellings are led and moved to partake also of mind and thought and reason. Furthermore, once the unfeeling body of the first-formed was moulded, it received movement from the rational soul that had been moulded by the divine inflation.\(^868\) And as the body of Christ was holy through the Spirit, and lived together with it from beginning to end in this way, what did it need the soul for, when the “divine Spirit of wisdom”\(^869\) was dwelling in it and moving the instrument, and laying down will and mind and good sense as a foundation, teaching knowledge of the best and the most excellent things and offering the voice and written word?”

2

‘Two unlike natures do not dwell around the one nature of the body, as they are different from each other in nature. Nor is it right’ they say ‘that where the Holy Spirit was dwelling, the form of the soul had been mixed and was partaking in the reforming acts being done through him, as if the Spirit were not sufficient in abundant worthiness to be in place of the soul.’ And God himself is advanced, being made out as a witness, sometimes through the prophet Isaiah calling on the lawless

\(^868\) C.f. Genesis 2.7.
\(^869\) Exodus 31.3, 35.1.
Jews: “My soul hated your fasts and leisure and holy days”, sometimes through Jeremiah, calling prophetically upon Jerusalem: “be chastened, Jerusalem, lest my soul turns from you.”\(^{870}\) ‘And so here,’ they say ‘God says he has a soul. Not, of course, that he possesses a human soul; rather, he means the divine Spirit, which is invisible, limitless and incomprehensible. Thus it is necessary to think also about Christ. And Moses says in Leviticus “I will stand my covenant among you and my soul will not abhor you.” \(^{871}\) They are turned around in their own problems. For if, on the one hand, God and the Father took up human nature, as did his most divine Son, they would throw forward these sayings properly. But if, on the other hand, the incorporeal Father never yet for himself embraced a perceptible body, but his Child was made human, having cast around a way of life in human beings, what sort of coherence do these premises have?

3

Because whenever the all-ruling God talks as if he has a soul, as he is a divine Spirit and stands very far from a body, it is clear that he is not talking about a human soul but about an intelligible thing and some divine breath. And when his true Son cast over himself a bodily organ in the form of a man and contracted himself in proportion with other human frames, not above normal in measure, not wanting in width, not leading in number or multitude of limbs, it is a agreed upon everywhere at once that he has a soul with a body.

4

Since God declared in many places of scripture that a heart together with the soul existed with him, it is necessary to confess that it is a kind of intelligible heart – for the bodiless is not able to have a bodily part. Going along these lines, he will not need to say that Christ took up and bore a heartless body, will he? For if he did not need a soul, as those opposing say, neither did he need a heart, nor any of the internal organs, since each of these provisions has been created for the sake of the stewardship of eating, in order that the body should ripen and feed and send the materials being brought in in the right direction. Then, these things being issued forth into humours and bile, some things being sifted beside everything, are delivered to the bulks of the body, whilst others are turned into blood. Flowingly, it withdraws into the blood vessels; others change into bile and phlegm; the roughness and excrement is passed in clots through the thicker of the intestines and into the outermost places and it is secreted through these. And if the entrails and throat and belly and the other holders of these things are prepared for the sake of food, and through these, for living – for this is germane to the question – then neither for these, did he need a soul that could move and revolve the bodily instrument, as I already said according to the true word. For in this case he entirely bore imperishable life itself, and he by no means needed the ripe things being delivered from the earth, because he was nourished from heaven and so lacked nothing. So therefore,

\(^{870}\) Isaiah 1.14, Jeremiah 6.8 respectively.

\(^{871}\) Leviticus 26.11.
according to these men, if indeed Christ, received the soulless bulk of a body, it was free from natural desire, without bowls, heartless and liverless, and, the overall, a statue and not a human being, the shape having been cast on from the beginning, and the innermost stamp having fled.

D6

Let the opposition say, since the very Word of God is also God, whether he is impassible, or whether he is held fast inside by passions and change? For if, he is susceptible to passions, they anathematise themselves, because they have denied his immutability in writing, in public and also in private, after having agreed to it in the assembly. And if, on the other hand, he is unmoved - as he is - when he reaches the right time for bodily death, what was pained? Who is it who said “My soul is greatly pained until death”? But pain and tears and laughter and sleep and hunger and thirst and desire and longing and anger and wrath and things such as these, which are established to be passions, bring to light the mutability spoken of. If therefore, the divine Word is immutable, what is the thing that changes and that was subjected to sufferings of great pain? Isn’t it a soul?

D7

He did not say “my body is in greatest pain” in order that someone who had received this from above should not think that, while the Spirit itself was remaining for the soul, the very the temple of the body suffered according to itself, but he said “my soul is in greatest pain.” For the suffering principally falls upon the soul and has dealings with it. Therefore, the soul does not gush forth tears apart from a body, and nor will a body cry joylessly asunder from a soul, but the thing having a proportionate mixture from both does these things. Because the soul clings to it, digesting entirely pain and joy at once; applying fire, it heats the water, and when this is burning, it comes up through the eyes. Partly the liquid is turned into vapour, partly it is secreted through the larger well springs. That these are passions of soul and body, no one may deny. Indeed one must not apply these things to the divine Spirit, since the divine is far from all that lowers its condition.

D8

It is clear when he is sleeping visibly upon the ship that he is no less than the same image of union, leading humanity into perfection out of both parts. For, clearly, he would not have needed sleep, having been changed, if he had not indeed taken to himself the soul and the body. Therefore, whenever the body, being led around, would grow sufficiently weary, on one had the soul, taking heed of its own tent, shares in suffering with it, this change establishing the limit of the capacities. On one hand, both [soul and body] together desire to keep still, and they give up the

872 ἀνήπατον with the double-meaning 'passionless.'
873 Matthew 26.38, Mark 14.34.
874 John 2.21.
labours at an interval, in order that the powers might recuperate again, receiving relaxation between the strength of the tendons. On the other, resuming, they reignite the straining of bodily strength. And if at one time it is pained by greater toil, or by the sharp invasions of fever that comes afterwards, or by a broken piece in the deepest wounds, or having the colic and a spinning in the head mangling the inner parts, even by the pains themselves the soul is compelled to pay attention, in no way being able to be still. When sleeplessness lodges with the body, the soul supplies lack of strength. And, sleep failing, after bodily death attacks suddenly, the union of the two breaks off. Therefore, suffering is shared between body and soul. In the same way as it is the business of other human beings to sleep by being surrounded by rest through both soul and body, thus it is the business of the one who has been joined together [with the Word]. Someone acting the fool may not say persuasively that this relates to the perceptible body alone, bringing forward soulless bodies. For this is from a much inopportune mythology. Consequently, this passion was of a human being who had a soul, and not the divine which is far from every passion.

D9
And in these things, “having toiled on the journey”, and, resting himself “on the fount”\textsuperscript{875}, it hints at the context of these actions. For if the immutable Word is also God, what is the thing that has been surrounded from below in weariness and passions? “The body,” someone might perhaps respond. Testing this, someone might say “what then, o best of men, is a better explanation? To say that the body suffers apart from the soul, whilst it is not able to obtain for itself, according to itself, one sensible perception? Or that a mutable thing and the divine Spirit are constrained to be in harmony? Or that a soul is joined together with the body? Or he suffered in seeming and not in truth all the things at to the time of suffering, and before the cross the Lord did not receive the passions that are natural and unexceptionable?” For also, “eating and drinking”\textsuperscript{876} the things offered not unreasonably, he had been equipped with limbs, things able to receive food.

D10
Since these people purport to agree with what has been written, if the unchanging Spirit dwelling in Christ was present from beginning to end, given that he turned the mind to love of food, he was clearly hungry, and never yet without the soul did the body, according to itself, grasp at food. For, after the perceptible tabernacle of the psychic\textsuperscript{877} movements had been shared, he gave up neither food nor drink, since the Lord defined food as the soul’s business. He says, “Do not worry your souls about what you eat or what you drink,”\textsuperscript{878} as if the matter of food primarily concerns the soul. And the Lord used to eat openly in diverse distant feasts, sometimes sitting at

\textsuperscript{875} John 4.6.
\textsuperscript{876} Matthew 11.19; Luke 7:34
\textsuperscript{877} The adjective is ψυχικός. Eustathius seems to want to imply by this both something pertaining to properly the soul, and something pertaining to human life, in contradistinction to divine existence. This double-sense is difficult to render in English.
\textsuperscript{878} Matthew 6:25.
table among the disciples, sometimes eating together with the tax collectors, and, for the sake of the salvation of everyone, he did not decline to drink with the sinful, making them righteous. Hence, once the devil saw that he underwent desire, tempted him lavishly, as he lies in wait shamelessly for the souls of human beings. So he took up a soul, as he took a body, having put on the perfect human being.

D11

The Lord did not take up half of a perfect human being, having mutilated the better part. Although the divine writings, throughout which he acts like someone with a soul, might not actually say that he has taken up the organ of the soul, it is necessary to believe sincerely that he prepared a perfect temple for himself. For, since, where it is written that the first-formed human was created, this is not laid out according to nature and manner either, he will need to say that the first human being was a practice, without feet, without hands, without a stomach; but just as we believe from speaking and hearing and working and walking around, that all human beings proportionately have the appropriate constitution of limbs, thus also through the marks of Christ’s human passions and all his earthly movements, clearly one must hold that he was not soulless, nor was he formed as of statue of the best kind.

D12

Being thrown by argumentative words, and having been forced into a corner, they are compelled, not unreasonably, to allegorise the famine, the tears, the pain, the sleep and the toils. Therefore, if [lacuna] they handle these things allegorically, they will need to allegorise the whole bodily birth and be prepared to think of the way of death differently, and to interpret figuratively the information about the resurrection, and still indeed the cross and the beatings and the wounds of the spitting and all the sufferings that occurred at that time. But if they deem none of those worthy to be changed in some sense, but deem it worthy to receive as it is laid down, in order that they may not say that everything happened in seeming, but not truly, it is necessary to guard, unshaken, natural desire and the rest of the passions, as many as concern the body and the soul, which are siblings in these things.

D13

Proclaiming the words to be a metaphor, they change the acts. Desiring to allegorise, they speak in accord with Marcion’s followers, taking away everything around Christ’s business so that all things were done in seeming and by a charade. And they adduce as a witness the story of what happened to Abraham.\footnote{Eustathius refers to Genesis 18.1-15 throughout this fragment.} For, they say, at this time three men were seen, from among whom one was proclaimed to be judge and lord – this was Christ, but the others were clearly shown to be angels. Though these [visitors] were bodiless, they were indeed seen to have human shapes, and the patriarch prostrated before them and entered into his tent, after they had washed their feet with water and partaken of the suckling calf and the things that had been cooked.
and placed before them. Thus, they say that this was also how, having visited in the
last times, Christ seemed indeed to eat or drink or do all things as if he had a body,
but in fact he was bodiless and needed none of these things. But that each of these
people is raging and acting crazily, no one is likely to dispute. For what admits a
comparison of these things with those? For in the case of Abraham and Lot and all
of the others, these events passed over all in a brief moment, just as some righteous
men receive, in a manner, a share of a vision; some divine glory was also visiting
constantly, prefiguring the bodily presence of Christ. Therefore, the human form is
also imaged, partly through the judge of everything, partly through the angelic
spirits. And when the events were completed, in one case, not one outward
appearance was left, in the other, by clearer pursuits, God, having come through a
human being, was shown openly.

D15a

And saying that, they ascribe to him a great weakness, since he did not give up his
own body willingly into slaughter for the sake of the salvation of human beings –
how absurd – as he could not stop the attack of the enemies, and he betrayed the
blameless substitute to the blood-guilty men. The first thing is absurd; as to the
second, in addition to these other objections: who was this, who was crucified at this
time, and what kind of man was he and how old was he? For many righteous men
have been killed, and many prophets have been murdered, and many martyrs have
been tortured during interrogation. They have been burnt through with sharp strokes,
just like the bodily strength of the old chief priest Eleazar, at the victory feast of the
seven brothers and their mother, not one of whom fell from the brotherly virtue. But
who beheld any of these incredible narratives with wonder? For when who had died,
did such great winds disrupt the entire earth, that, being shaken root and branch, it
moved out of the inmost parts, and the light of day changed into night as “the sun
failed”?880 When who has died does the steward see that the rocks are broken? But in
order that I should not spend the time describing each according to its form and
nature, let’s just ask who, after he has died, raised the dead? For, he raised “many
bodies of the saints who had been asleep.”881 And if the one who was crucified did
this, clearly he was not a person who this happened to by chance, but he was our
supreme ruler himself, Jesus, who laid down the best accomplishment by these
deeds.

15b

Through very little it is possible to refute their ungodly slander. For, at best, unless
he willingly gave up his body into the slaughter of death for the sake of the salvation
of human beings, firstly they ascribe great weakness to him, suggesting that he could
not stop the attack of the enemies.

880 Luke 23.45
881 Matthew 27.52
D16a
If before the passion he used to predict his bodily death, every time saying that he would be handed over to those around the chief priests, and after the passion, having risen from the dead on the third day, while the disciples were doubting, he appeared, confessing that he had “flesh with bones”\(^{882}\) submitting the wounded side to their eyes, showing the “places of the nails”\(^{883}\), he taught them that it was necessary that, after Christ had suffered, he was raised on the third day from the depths – and God would not lie, speaking in bodily form through his own temple – and it is not possible that death happened without a soul or the thing that suffered everything, then Christ did not take up a body alone, but also a soul.

D16b
Indeed before the passion he used to predict his bodily death, each time saying he would be handed over to those around the chief priests, announcing the trophy of the cross. And after the passion, having risen from the dead on the third day, while the disciples were doubting that he was raised, after he had been shown to them in an actual body, he both confesses that he has entirely “flesh with bones”, and he submits to their gaze the wounded sides, showing them the places of the nails.

D17
If, also, the scriptures say mysteriously that God was made angry, inscribing anger and some other passions,\(^{884}\) because what is righteous avenges unrighteousness, he nonetheless never alters in proper virtue. And with this, it will not be necessary, using the same line of argument as the model, to take away the pain which has befallen the human being of Christ. For one mind is appointed to the divine Spirit, as it is said, whilst another is appointed to the humanity. Indeed, the pain falls upon the human being of Christ in addition to all the other harmless passions which occur throughout life. The pain is for the sake of the divine economy. For truly the passion falls on the deepest parts of the soul unseen, and, being hidden on one hand by the invisible nature of the unknown things, on the other, it is apparent to the many, being imperceptibly turned to good in the secret destiny. And he has clear tests of the wellsprings of tears and the downcast appearance. But to allegorise the tears is to deny the cross and the death. And if these things really happened, then neither is it fitting to speaking figuratively about the food or the drink nor to allegorise the hunger or thirst. And if he is said to be hungry and thirsty, a yearning for food and drink is put in the soul by the body, [lacuna] supplying the desire. Thus the soul was not separate.

D19a

\(^{882}\) Luke 24.39
\(^{883}\) John 20.25
\(^{884}\) E.g. Numbers 22.22; Psalm 2.5
Whenever we should hear of someone announcing, like the Marcionites, that Christ is seen in a shape here upon the earth, having been shown forth in seeming, a man-shaped statue of God, we shudder, we are smitten in soul, we turn to flight, we dart away from the heralds, we fortify the ears, we bridle the mouths, we force back the tongues, we gag the lips, we put to silence the organs of speech with every power, lest some who have heard should be defiled by the ungodly words. And whenever the ‘stirrers up of war around Arius’ introduce many new, hollow loves of popularity, we in no part agree to pass over the apostasy. For these very men say that the Son of God became a child of the all-powerful God in seeming, both having been created out of not being and not begotten from him. And they say that the Father is father in seeming, if indeed he did not beget naturally, and is not a father of a true child. And he took up the human being in seeming, and not a human being, but some other likeness that was fashioned as a parody of this. A human being is, properly, one from soul and body, not one who has been limb-formed, with only a soulless body. So, then he was not responsible for the salvation of the soul. And how did he speak when refuting the Jews: “why do you seek me to kill a person who has told you the truth”? But if he did not take up a soul, how is he a human being? Consequently, thinking superstitiously like the Greeks, they not only declare that the Child of God was half god, but also that he was half human. And they do this in order that, having attached the alterations involved in passions to the divine Spirit, they might seduce the simpler people recklessly, as the mutable is not begotten from the nature of the immutable. For if someone should grant to them that Christ did not take up a soul, they reply: ‘What then is the thing dwelling inside the tabernacle that is passionately grieved? Isn’t it the very “Spirit of wisdom”? And if it is grieved and cries and becomes tired, it is capable of passions. And if it undergoes passion and changes, how then may we say that that which undergoes passions is begotten from the passionless?’

D19b

Why do they consider it so important to show that Christ took up a soulless body, forming old wives deceptions? In order that, if they may be able to gradually corrupt some people, decreeing that these things are so, in this case having attached the alterations involved in passions to the divine Spirit, they might easily persuade them, as the mutable is not begotten from the nature of the immutable.

D20

From the same words of the saviour, it is possible to show the opponents babbling. For these words say “no one has ever gone to heaven except the one who came from heaven, the son of humanity, who is in heaven.” Consequently, not only did the unattainable Word of God “fasten himself to heaven, and was upon earth” but also

885 John 8:40, 7:19
886 The text here has the sense both of being grieved by passions in a technical sense, and of being greatly grieved. It is problematic to render this combination.
887 Exodus 3.31, 3.35
acting as God himself, he allotted such great increase of authority to the human being who had contained him that, through the soul he at once both traverses the entire earth and dwells in the heavenly bodies. For we say that the son of humanity, rather than the Son of God, has passed into heaven, and came from heaven itself, and being in heaven again, continues unshakably. He led the ascending occupations of the soul. Or let the pretenders say that Christ took up a soulless body. When he was on the earth opposite Nicodemus, addressing him, he expressly confesses that the son of humanity was going about and dwelling in heaven. Which of the human parts was able to do these things, except the form of the soul, which was led by spiritual impulses? But dwelling together with the divine Word, he held for himself such a great freedom that he entered heaven itself. Consequently, human nature being divided into two parts, the perceptible and the intelligible, it is necessary for us to think truly that, as Christ walked about here on earth in body, in soul he walked in the high heavens, and touched the foundations of the earth, and touches lightly upon the innermost depths, being treated far better than the angelic spirits, as he had been united with the divine Word. This is also shown from the words “And what if you should see the son of humanity going up where he was before. It is the Spirit that is life-giving, the flesh profits nothing. The words that I have spoken to you are Spirit and life.” He was by no means saying by this that his own flesh which he displayed was useless, but he taught clearly, that the life-giving thing is, in the first instance, the divine “Spirit of wisdom.” And if someone, looking at the bodily organ, does not know the holy movements of the Spirit and names them to be human and not God, he stumbles in judgement, and is able to be profited nothing from looking according to the power of sight.

D21

As Christ said to the thief, “today you will be with me in paradise,” unless he had a soul that was able to do these things, the opponents must say one of these two things: either he lies to the thief, and has not fulfilled his promise, or he was not shut up in the grave for three days. But if both of these unshaken things are deemed worthy to remain, by what method do they handle the narrative? “So behold,” they say “that the dead body was lying in the tomb, but the Word, having received the thief, led him into the pasture of paradise.” So the thief entered paradise before Christ, and he himself became the “first fruits” of the resurrection of the dead. Christ no longer unlocks the gates of paradise having been strengthened by the power of the Spirit. But, on the contrary, the Word himself fulfilled this on his own. So, therefore, he bore a human being and made him a shrine superfluously. No longer are all the causes of rejoicing in the public places through him. Furthermore, why do the divine writings prophesy that the human being of Christ is a saviour, a ransom, a guide, a doer of good, a king, a judge, a physician, a bringer of light to the human race? In order that we should behold the Word and God through him, through the

891 Exodus 3.31, 3.35.
892 Luke 23.43.
893 1 Corinthians 15.20. C.f. also Colossians 1.18.
Word we should behold the universally sovereign authority, on the one hand through the one image looking at the dyad of Father and Son, on the other in the dyad knowing the one godhead. [Lacuna] As Paul says “for if we many have died by the transgression of one human being, how much more the grace and the gift in the grace of one human being Jesus Christ abounds in the many.” Consequently, the soul of Christ dwells together properly with the Word and God, with the one who encompasses alike the whole creation of everything that has come to exist, cheerfully acting as a guide, led the soul from the same human race into paradise, inasmuch as he is also holding greater authority.

D22

Therefore, if the Word bore the human being of Christ, having been mixed by the harmony of the Spirit, in order that through the same race he might save the kindred souls together with the bodies from unrighteous destruction, then the human being himself is the cause of the salvation to the other human beings who believe, as Paul says in the letter to the Romans: “For if we many have died by the transgression of one human being, how much more the grace, and the gift in the grace of Jesus Christ abounds in the many.” Therefore assuredly, in the transgression of the first-formed, the death belonging to sin fell on, great and incurable. But the child of God, having looked ahead, determined to punish the devil, the sower of death through the same human race, and bore the whole human being, in order that, after having attached it by the divine harmonies, after he had conquered the evil one in some such way through this, he might hold sway in incorruptible life. For he himself reclaimed the “fiery sword” and pacified the fear of the cherubim, but he removed the stubborn locks also after he had opened the unopenable gates and the one bearing God entered into paradise with unconquerable authority. And if through the divine manifestation of Christ he leads the human race into paradise, then assuredly, on the very day that he was crucified, he foretold that he would lead the thief there, while his body was still encompassed by the tomb, then it is clear that Christ’s soul, dwelling together as Lord with the Word and God, the one who encompasses alike every creature who has come to exist, led the soul from the same human race into paradise. For it is not thus written that before the resurrection of the holy body, the thief’s body, having received the promise, was raised first. It is not thus written, because it did not happen. For if it had happened, it would have been written. But if someone is disposed to argue against the odds on this point, he must say how and where he solves the inclusion of everything that we are trying to include, in order that, establishing each boundary, he might accept that Christ’s body was lying dead in the grave and that, three days before his resurrection, the thief had entered paradise with Christ.

So, it follows, it is rational to reply that the soul, cheerfully acting as a guide to the kindred soul, as it indeed had greater authority, that very day both fulfilled the promise and entered into the assigned inheritance, opening paradise.
Therefore, at length the sinful Marcionites, when determining that Christ came without a body, first throw down this sign. For thus they say: ‘He bore the body in seeming, walking around here. Indeed, he said expressly to the thief who confessed him “today you will be with me in paradise.”’ But the body,’ they say ‘was itself lying dead and unbreathing in the tomb. And, according to this, he was not able to do these things at the same time, unless, indeed, it happened that the body of another was lying in the grave but he, treading air, was uttering prophecies.” But that these things are indeed irrational was shown before. But when they are asked for the solution, and concrete realities do not allow them to allegorise the purposes that have been fulfilled by a deed, they utterly destroy the economy.

How might someone say that Christ did not speak truly, if, on one hand, the body rose at the proper time and, one the other, the God-bearing soul, having gone before it, took away for himself the soul that witnessed to the truth, restoring it into the place of the just? For I, for my part, would not say that the malefactor broke out with the cry of the best confession without the aid of God, as nor was the other without the enemy spirit resonating in him. And it is fitting to focus on each of their narratives, since there are greatly different senses concerning them in the holy evangelists’ accounts. So, John said absolutely nothing about these things, except that two others were crucified with Christ, having left the narration about them to the others. And Matthew and Mark say that indeed the passers-by, like the chief priests and scribes, were blaspheming the Lord. And they said both thieves proclaimed the same things as the impious people. But Luke on the contrary says that whilst one speaks evil of Jesus, the other first rebukes the raving thief and after this says “remember me Lord, whenever you come into your kingdom.” Consequently, some people think that there is a great contradiction here. Those giving the account appear to differ a lot, since they say on the one hand that this thief’s character utters blasphemy, but then on the contrary that he utters pious words pleasing to God. Only it is not right to think that the evangelists struggle against each other, holding contrary opinions to each other, but now it is necessary to heed the more mysterious reference shrewdly, when there is no other resolution. Everything that is demonstrated from the body of the text, one must take as a concrete reality. However, whatever things receive referents to a more mysterious design, to these rightly allot their own manner.

897 Luke 23.43
Both Matthew and Mark, having determined that both thieves blaspheme, hint at an expressive meaning, wishing to make plain to those able to understand with more subtlety, that not only was the man shooting off profane words like arrows from on high, but that the devil, having crept in, spoke with evil from within, arousing the man at the same time, since he exhibited the deeds of the enemy the more. They spoke nothing concerning the other, having given way to the narration about him in Luke, and the narrative of visible things. And Luke, having taken up the web of reflection, shows one thief to have blasphemed shamelessly, having told us to think this also about the one with him, by deliberate omission of him. After this, he tells us the story of the other thief, who is stirred up with love of God, and imparts and confesses the power of the kingdom of Christ. So, each utters words through each spirit and, whilst one was aroused from the divine breath, the other was aroused out of the influx of devilish works, as Paul says writing to Corinthians: “Therefore, I make known to you that no one speaking in God’s Spirit calls Jesus accursed, and no one is able to call Jesus Lord except in the Holy Spirit.”

And the theologian characterises them like this in the first of the letters, saying “Beloved, do not believe every spirit, but test if the spirits are from God, since many false prophets have gone out into the world. In this know the spirits of God. Every spirit confessing that Jesus came in the flesh is from God, and every spirit that does not agree that Jesus came in the flesh is not from God. And this is one from the antichrist, whom you have heard is coming and is now in the world.”

Therefore, if, because they are set alight by the spirit of the devil the false prophets, speaking evil, charge Christ with evil, clearly the blood-thirsty one roused the murderous thief at that time, just as the one masked as the serpent slinked up to Eve, in order that, shooting the poisonous words from above, he might offer manifest proofs to many people. And just as, wearing a tragic costume on the outside, the mask having been placed around the feigned character, he is likely to conceal himself from sight wholly within. And the one feigning the character of the thief replied tragically, crying out in a loud call “If you are the Christ, save yourself and us.” So, you confess, o head defiled with blood, having cried out a frank question, that twice you peep out from the innermost parts. And indeed you are vexed and in uproar, looking at the completion of your destruction from below, seeing the victory trophy being established firmly against you. After that, from where did the thief try to vomit forth such cries, pretending to have forgotten the present pains? But munificent Jesus himself, displaying the marks of the heroic feat, seeing that one of the criminals had been locked in a struggle with the traps of the evil one, chose for himself the fearless soul from among those bearing the traps of death. Indeed then the young man, having been set alight by the divine Spirit and flourished sufficiently in virtue, both casts forth the body and forgets the present misfortune. He is unmindful of death and wounds and suffering. For if one calculates so as to find the truth, resolving the way in which he had been stretched from four points on the tree, the feet and the hands being nailed in this way, raised up and stretched out from the ends, and the limbs and tendons and bones having been bored through and pierced by the strokes of the nails, one must either heed the strength of the breaths or be ignorant in this and of who he was, or be

899 1 Corinthians 12.3.
900 1 John 4.1-3.
unwilling to hear the things that are said, as those in great pain are wont to suffer, being held in blindness and great darkness. For they are fainthearted like this and give up in the face of the punishments, rather than receiving some pain from the things to be done to them, suffering pain in many ways. But none of this dulls the soul of the one who has escaped tyrannical hostility, but he both keenly hears everything that is said, and also rejoins shrewdly and replies accordingly, and consequently silences the mouth defiled by blood through the blessing. Having been fixed on the tree as on the platform in a tribunal, shutting in the reckless tongue with unloosable muzzles, he makes a public speech within the hearing of everyone, rebuking him fiercely, having cried out. “Do you not fear God, you that are in the same condemnation? And we indeed rightly, for we receive what is worthy of what we did. But this man has done nothing wrong.”

And after he has turned to the Lord, he proclaims “remember me, Lord, when you come into your kingdom.”

And tell me o fiercest of men: Who told you that this man, who has been crucified upon the tree is Lord and where did this person hear it? For you were not educated in divine law, and nor have you listened to prophetic words. You were not trained with knowledge about the gospel. You have not received a proof of the apostolic doctrines. For before this time, when you had fallen into the chasms of apostasy, you went astray, roaming, stealing, selling freemen into slavery, burgling, cutting purses. If, without teaching, you knew Christ’s kingdom, then the Begetter himself, having filled you with the Spirit, taught you these things, as the saviour himself says: “No one is able to come to me, unless the Father who sent me draws him. And I will raise him up on the last day.”

Therefore, have confidence, o youth with an accursed soul. And if, when you arrived at the vineyard late, the fruit of your lips, though the very last, supplied a ransom from evil for you, by declaring a confession loved by God, the recompense of Christ’s words became an eternal healing for you. And forgiveness, as if from a vessel for holy water, gushes out like a spring from the God-bearing body and purifies you. And the precious blood that has been cleansingly secreted from the tree of life marks you with a seal. And perhaps also the pouring out of the blood which had hastened from the dead limbs became a vital ransom for you. For when you confessed Christ king, you carried before you the streams of blood falling in drops through all the holes.

Making this clear beforehand, the prophet Habakkuk cried out in the Spirit: “the stone will cry out from the wall of a house, and the beetle will answer from the timber.”

For not unreasonably one might find it fitting to represent idolatry with a wall since, after a fortress had been built with hostility by human beings, it caused a separation from the divine love. The Child of God carried off as a prize the whole human being whom he bore for love of humankind, and, having held sway by a royal proclamation in good order, he prophesies peace. And it seems that the one cheering from the places of the deceit of idols is like a stone. For I myself could call these stones, as all the soulless stone statues of gods sink like blind people. But, no less than turning around their words and deeds, they change their character, being called

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904 John 6.44.
905 Habakkuk 2.11.
by God. Furthermore, contrary to expectation, ensouled voices are said to be brought forward from the unfeeling walls, as having been fastened formerly, unmoving and powerless, they change to fruitfulness by God’s will. And I say that the thief is compared with the beetle, responding piously from the wood contrary to expectation. And why is this surprising, when the prophetic style compares the Lord to a worm because of the parable of the kernel? For the beetle of the parable seems to be worthless and insignificant and dark and murky. And, in short, being on the ground it flutters around and sits on materials that smell bad and, making the dung into balls, it brings in the bad smelling things from the earth. And, having entered into a torpid den and lain down there, it eats the trophies it has gathered for itself. Therefore, all who have lived like brigands are worthless or insignificant with respect to virtue, and are dark and gloomy with respect to souls. Inconsiderately escaping the day’s tasks, they desire to walk on air whilst sitting down, walking on walls, climbing ropes, running about on the roofs of houses. Then, appointing the spoils for themselves, they plunder in every way. And they don’t draw the line at grave robbing, tearing off the remains and unfolding ill-smelling cloths, tracking down the heirlooms. Then, having gathered together and put on many garments, and taken much gold and a multitude of coins as plunder, having made rounded bundles for themselves, they store it up in many secret places in the earth. Then, slipping home unnoticed, they feed upon the slimy trophy. The prophetic meaning seeing clearly into the life of thieves, seemed indeed to liken the criminal with a beetle. The thief who was fixed to the tree made it plain divinely. He changes the nature of his voice, no longer sending forth an inarticulate, deep hollow sound in consternation, but throwing forward the words of piety. He became the dishonour of Christ’s enemies, and, having stopped the devil’s mouth, he defeated him.

D28

Not only is it shown from irrefutable evidence that the Lord went into paradise through his soul on the same day as the death of his body, but also that he had authority to set foot in the heavens and to go down into the lowest parts of the earth, both bringing about a releasing freedom for those shut up there, and with a single blow, sending up the souls of the prisoners of war, according to the wise Paul. For writing about the prophetic text word for word, he says “Therefore he says ‘After having ascended into the heights, he led captivity captive and gave gifts to the human beings.’ And then, distinguishing the meaning of the line, he brings forth, “And what is this ascension unless he also descended first into the lower parts of the earth? The one who descended is also the one who ascended far above the heavens.” For if the body was lying in the grave, one must seek after who it was who went down into the deepest parts of the earth. For taking up a notion, one would not say that the grave was part of the infernal parts. And if some think this is the hollow in the lowest parts of the earth, they must say in which and what kind of part the souls are shut up. For until the resurrection its own place has been assigned to each, and I think that no one doubts that the place under the earth is different from the tombs.
But if someone feigns ignorance, let him examine closely the voices of the sacred writings. So, God, proclaiming to Job, says this: “And did you go to the source of the sea, having walked in the tracks of the deep? And do the gates of death open for you in fear, and the locked gates of Hades cower in fear when they have seen you?” So these are the “deepest parts of the earth” in which the souls are obliged to render punishment. Consequently, it follows that, whilst the body was lying in the grave, according to the divine words, through the soul, Christ, running through the deep and forbidden places, goes also to the repositories of souls and acquits the souls’ penalties, now visiting kindred, now removing the fetters of punishment. For, by having partaken in the grave through the body, he unexpectedly gives life to the remains shut up in the tombs, thus through the soul, having mixed with the earth’s groans, he sets free the souls from the prison not made of iron, bringing about freeing release. And besides, the Word according to nature arranges that, on one hand, the visible parts, the bodies, are attended through the visible body, whilst on the other the hand, the invisible soul that has visited among the invisible souls herds them together. And the thing that Jacob said by way of preface is witness: “and you will bring my old age down into Hades.” And in Numbers, concerning the people in the Core, divinely inspired Moses speaks: “And, the earth having opened greedily, it swallowed into itself the disobedient and their houses. And they themselves and everything that they had went down alive into Hades.” And David: “In Hades, who will give you thanks?” And elsewhere “the dead will not praise you, nor all going down into Hades.” And “their bones were scattered abroad beside Hades.” So indeed, prophesying to Job, God made the power of the name and the place clear. For first he laid side by side “the sources of the sea”, then “the tracks of the deep” and after this, “the gates of death” and last, “the gates of Hades.” So, these are the deepest parts of the earth. And through these Christ plainly reached. And in that place, having taken the enemy by siege, he bore off spoils. To this one “the gates of death were opened in fear” and very fast, and the gates of Hades fell, seeing that the human soul bearing God had ordered with authority, as he was living together with the divine Spirit. Then, the loosening locks having been suddenly prised up, the gates being broken asunder, and by a royal gift contributing the release, and reaping the freedom by an amnesty, all the body guards of the arch-plunderer melted and fell down before him, not being able to withstand the strength of the kingdom, as Paul indicates, “every knee will bow to Christ, not only in heaven and on earth, but also under the earth.”

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910 Job 38.16-17.
911 Genesis 42.38, 44.29.
912 Numbers 16.32-33
913 Psalm 6.6.
914 Psalm 113.25.
915 Psalm 140.7.
916 Job 38.16-17.
917 Job 38.17.
918 Philippians 2.10.
The devil, after he had fallen from his own virtue, was sentenced to live in Hades, as Isaiah says: “Hades from beneath was made angry when it met with you. All the great ones who have ruled over the earth have been raised up together against you. All will answer, and say to you ‘You have been taken just as we have, and were numbered among us. Your great glory has come down into Hades, and your great joy. They spread corruption under you, and the worm is your covering.’” 919 Then, wondering from what and into what he has suddenly fallen, he brings on: “How did he fall from heaven, as the morning star rising early, and how was the one sending orders to all the nations crushed into the earth?” 920 Then, shaming him again, he calls out: “For you said in your mind, ‘I will go up into heaven, I will set my throne above heaven’s stars. And I will sit on a lofty mountain, on the lofty mountains towards the north. I will go up above the clouds. I will be like the most high.’ And now you will go down into Hades, and to the earth’s foundations.” 921 And then Isaiah, having substituted the character of the Assyrian king, shows in a riddle that the devil, having freely shunned light, most certainly dwells in Hades once he has fallen. And the prophet Amos said that God menacingly proclaimed about the ungodly sinners: “And if they should go down from my eyes into the depths of the sea, there I will command the dragon, and he will bite them”, defining the abysses of the sea to be his dwelling. 922 And thus, with one opinion the prophets say where, having been condemned, the devil spends his time. However, sometimes, when talking about the punishments set before him, they speak as if defining future deeds. And Ezekiel, because he wished to show the suffering of his sudden turn to be incurable, said that “the deep mourned” for him, (and the things that follow that). 923 And moreover, God, proclaiming to Job, says on one hand that the deceiver dwells in the abysses, on the other that he has riches lying at the bottom of the sea. And Tartaros himself has been taken in the manner of a prisoner of war, having been laid under sharp skewers. For it says “the lair is made of sharp points, and the sea’s gold under him is as a multitude of clay. He makes the deep boil like a cauldron. He has dominion over the sea as over an unguent box and over Tartaros of the deep as a prisoner of war.” 924 Therefore, if he really boils the deep like a cauldron, gushing forth, driving over the many-edged waves, he arranged that the chaos dwell under the earth, he mines the streams, it says, from beneath. And this deepest thing has been named ‘under the earth of Hades’ and ‘Tartaros.’

D30 925

The children of the Greeks, undertaking either poetry or philosophy, name “one of the chasms in the earth”, surpassing the others in size, “Tartaros.” And into this chasm the rivers come together at one time and flow out of it again, for liquid matter and the bottom are not separated by the foundation. From there they say that the

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919 Isaiah 14:9-11.
920 Isaiah 14:12.
922 Amos 9:3
923 Ezekiel, 31:15
924 Job 41:22-24.
925 This fragment draws heavily on Phaedo, 111e6-114c2.
rivers are divided into four superior from others, and they are called Oceanus, and Acheron, and Pyriphlegethon and Cucuton, and from these comes the Styx lake. And they say that these flow out of the Tartaros and rolling around every hollow of the earth in a circle, they come again into the Tartaros. Therefore, the souls are sent into the river Acheron, attaching themselves to certain vessels and then from there they stop in the lake Acherousia and speaking before the judge in that place, some souls are cleansed again, others, being cast out again, are borne into the Tartaros, whilst those that are unrighteous, being turned back again, linger much in the chasm and are never yet raised from there. These, being divided into two, are cast out once again into the rivers by the waves, and the murders fall out into the Cucuton, and the father-murderers withdraw to the Pyriphlegethon, then from there they are mixed into the lake Acherousia. Those asking to receive an end to the pain or, being bent back again under the flood, are thrown back, presumably into the Tartoros itself. And they suffer these things continually, not coming to an end until they prevail on those whom they have wronged. And whichever ones are deemed to have carried life through to perfection are freed from these rivers, indeed being released just as from prisons, they mount upward into the pure dwelling at the top of the earth. But indeed those who do not piously perceive the strength of the divine nevertheless concede to the imminent judgement. And they introduce the greatest myth, that some souls transmigrate. For who, among human beings knows that he became a horse or a cow, or an ape, or a hunting dog, or some other such thing, in order that, having been raised up, he might define these as teachings?

D31

But since they know plainly that they are caught in that place, changing their purpose, they fabricate the water of forgetting of which, they say, everyone who drinks forgets the begetting of life’s images. But that these myths are very far from philosophy, no one in their right mind ought to be ignorant. For what do we say, o Pythagorases and Platos? Did you yourselves receive and drink the water that makes one forget, or did you escape this and flee? Therefore, if on the one hand you escaped the river of wandering in such a way, clearly many others did too. But if, having been dragged away in the common mist, you greedily drank the water of forgetting, how do you know that the souls of human beings change suddenly into asses and wolves and all kinds of living forms? And from what source did you know absolutely everything about the origins of those rivers? For either you did not make trial of the need for them, and you are ignorant of the bursting forth of these waters. Or, if you did come to be inside their designs; by forgetfulness, you obscured the memory of the means by which this happened, having spit out the

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926 This makes most sense, in the context of his attack on Platonism, if read as a pun; the myths, and Plato’s ‘philosophy’ are far from true philosophy, true ‘love of wisdom.’
927 C.f. Plato, Phaedo, 81e, 5-7
knowledge. But leading into these things with barbaric superstition, they stumble. Because they made use of Egyptian myths, they are brought down.

D32

On one hand, Christ was with the divine Spirit everywhere, on the other hand the Word and God made the younger and foreign ways up and down his own through the human soul, fighting the waters and the disturbing depths. “The waters saw you, God, and were afraid, the depths were disturbed.” And next, through the whole verse, Christ’s descent into Hades through his soul can clearly be picked out. For the high “clouds” let loose “voices”, applauding the most beautiful successes of the victory. And more quickly, Christ’s divine powers flew out of the sacred darts, sharply wounding the army of the blood-guilty one. For indeed in the whole world, just as in a “whirlwind”, the holy sound, through which he forgave salvation, let loose [lacuna]. And the deeds of his justice shone forth, flashing forth as if on fire and bringing light to the whole creation. And the earth was shaken at that time.

And this is also shown in the words, “You crushed the heads of the dragons upon the water. You smashed the dragon’s head. You gave him as food to the people in Ethiopia.” For Christ, having arrived at the innermost parts of the deep by Spirit and soul, subdued the wild beasts. And, through this same image, yet also now the many-headed serpent is destroyed in the waters of rebirth, and, in short, the devilish troupe gets its head broken daily by the pure lather. Therefore, he prophesied that the heads of the very other dragons were crushed, and of the many-faced beast himself, he spoke out plainly that the heads from many origins were crushed together. For on one hand, as the inedible bodies were crushed whole entirely, so, on the other, the one bearing the edible body will be given out as meat to the peoples of Ethiopia. For if Christ, having been hung on the cross, gives to us the exact representation of his body so that, having partaken of the sacred food, we might inherit incorruptible life, it follows that also the many-shaped serpent, dying, conversely, furnishes food from his body to the ones having fled eternal light, as God himself foretells to Job the destruction of the serpent, telling him, “the gentile race of the Phoenicians divided him up among themselves and fed on him”, clearly in this not meaning Phoenicians and Ethiopians, but those displaying pagan superstitions in the darkness of error, not inappropriately calling them Ethiopians. For he did not say that those having been allotted the land of Ethiopia alone profit from the serpent-like food, but all those gloomy in sin, to whom also, through the prophet’s mouth he proclaims “be washed, become clean” (and the things that follow that). For on one
had, concerning the sins of the ones who are fattened over the altars, they inspire the stains having become blood-red on the souls. On the other, the murderers and adulterers image the deeper places of sin as a berry from a kermes oak. These types the “washing of regeneration” undertakes to cleanse. For those springing from Phoenicia, for the most part, rage with unbridled mad passion. And everyone who receives his counsels fulfil his operations, those becoming full of his blood-defiled limbs swell up for the worse, being destroyed by the noxious poison. But on one hand, one must give to these ones, and to all who wish to fight against God, the snake-like food to be to be customarily feasted upon. On the other, that not even the Ethiopians were uninitiated of the divine calling, and nor are the Egyptians far from the leadership of divine voices, the prophet himself witnesses: “Leaders will come from Egypt, Ethiopia will offer her hands to the Lord” (and what follows that). It is appropriate, the serpent’s tyrannical rule having been destroyed, that the leaders fall before the king of the heavens himself, about to offer the victorious first-fruits of the wreath rightly. And Isaiah sings, saying “the Lord will bring the holy and great and strong sword upon the dragon, the unjust serpent, and will destroy the dragon on that day.” And if the sword is holy, being able to slaughter the invisible spirit of evil, undeniably he did not make it as out of idle and unmoving material. On the contrary, the most divine Word of God himself, according to the apostolic writing, strikes “sharper than any double-edged sword.” And he resembles the sword, because of the perceptible sheath of the human body. And Ezekiel, speaking as to the blood-guilty dragon, the leader of the Israelites’ apostasy, says, “And you, profane and wicked prince of Israel, whose day has come at the right time, an end unrighteousness, thus says the Lord: ‘remove the mitre and take off its crown. It will not be the same. You have brought low the high thing having brought high the low thing. I will designate it a wrong thing, until the one who owns it comes, and I shall give it to him.’”

So indeed, Christ, to whom the feat’s successes belong, was bodily at home in that place, and, having made the devil a prisoner of war, he took his mitre and crown of arrogance, and after he had made a path to the life of paradise for human beings, and destroyed the multitude of savage pleasures, he tamed the fiery heats of the passions having cut out each sin according to its form, through which things “he crushed together the dragons’ heads.” And practicing some unceasing drunken violence, some people still desired to be filled with the animal carcass bodies. For they do not know to tame the passions of the fierce demons or the defiled passions of desire. And it is necessary in the pit that the prizes for the best athlete lie displayed, each rightly contending is honoured. For the judge would not have displayed the victory wreaths, unless rough struggles were present, so that when all the contestants who have obtained the victory-bearing prizes should bind fast their brows with garlands, at this time all the limbs of the dragon’s body will be crushed.

936 Isaiah 1.18.
937 Titus 3.5.
938 Psalm 67.32.
939 Isaiah 27.1-2.
940 Hebrews 4.12.
942 Psalm 73.13.
[lacuna] the Lord, having come from heaven a second time, will slay the remnants of the tyranny lying opposite, then the prophesy will be fulfilled. “Where death, is your sting, where Hades, your victory?” The great apostle Paul furnished the speech, naming the devil Hades and death. Still plainly, the songwriter murmuring from Christ’s persona, says in the twenty-ninth psalm “I exalt you Lord, since you have raised me up.” And following, “Lord, you let my soul out of Hades.” And again: “but God will free my soul from the hands of Hades.” And again: “I will proclaim that your mercy is great upon me, and that you have raised up my soul from the depths of Hades.” And that “you will not leave my soul behind in Hades.” And that these words belong to Christ, no one may dispute. In this all the prophets speak in unison, being moved by the divine Spirit.

D34

Some say there are many heavens, some say there is one. One group, beginning from Moses having said “in the beginning, God made the heaven and the earth” and, having plucked for themselves many opinions from the writings of the prophets and evangelists which establish the singular number, they try to establish what is proper. And another group, again, from the same writings, think to establish the multitude of heavens. In no way will we say that the scriptures declare things opposite. And some say there are two, the one that was created in the beginning, and the later “firmament” that was formed, as is true. For God deemed it right to cut the boundless mass of liquid in two parts, so that, on one hand, the firmament which is above, hung up in mid-air in the manner of a roof, might moisten the dry land when it falls in drops, and, on the other the lower liquid, coming to an end in hollows and chasms, after it had flowed together, might make the seas and lakes and rivers so that the earth, having been adorned, should become nourishing and fruitful.

And if a season demands partly a cultivating of plants to be watered, partly for the unrighteous to be water-boarded, on one hand, keeping them in suspense, he summons the streams running along the surface from the sea, hanging them in mid-air and, on the other hand, he opens the shutters of heaven, as the most righteous God, judging, utterly destroyed the most beast-like giants. At this particular time, it says “all the springs were broken up and the shutters of heaven were opened, and a heavy rain came upon the earth for forty days and forty nights.” And it says this too: “the abyss calls upon the abyss to aid it.” For indeed, the abyss, ascending upwards, calls the deep to its aid, longing to benefit from the fellowship of its
kindred. And moreover, the one tending downwards, sending the moistures up through the winds and calling on the water-bearing clouds, calls its sister to its aid.

The deep was formed together with the waters because it does not say specifically the day on which it occurred. For just as when a tree bearing fruit had risen up from the earth, he did not want this to be defenceless or unstable, but much-cloven roots had been prepared on its behalf so that it would be firmly fastened to the ground and it was also inexpressibly held to the fruitful buds and it had been fastened to shaded branches and things able to sprout fruitful fruit - and if whilst nothing whatever is written of these things, we are weighed down to think of all the fruits and the whole covering together around the trunks - thus so it is fitting to think that God, the best of artificers, furnishing the flat bit of the earth, formed together in it the greatest capacities. He stretched up the mountains and ridges and stretched down the depths and chasms in the deep so that the earth, being cultivated through everything, might rear the sowings of the seeds. But he also prepared the sandy materials to fit well in order that, the wetness being allowed to flow down into many streams and the sand having been fortified as a circle, though the fierce waves might beat hard, the working sand should not allow the watery parts to overflow their bounds. And he moulded the very sources of the streams, producing and forming rivers.

D36

Excellently, both Moses and all the divine writings say that heavens are both multiple and singular.

D38

[Lacuna] and the great Paul himself says that he was seized into a third heaven.\textsuperscript{953} And Moses says “heavens rejoice with them.”\textsuperscript{954} For he rejoices with heaven’s corps for the sake of the salvation of human beings.

D39:1-14

And Paul, being forced because of the false brothers to narrate, with reference to type and nature, the labours of the contest, brings this in his writing: “But I will go on to visions and revelations of the Lord. I know a person in Christ who more than fourteen years ago, was seized up into the third heaven, whether in body or outside of the body I do not know, God knows.”\textsuperscript{955} Being modest, he controls the tale with an obscure utterance. Having attached the noble vision to what seems to be another man, he means to refer to himself. But he is caught out by shrewd minds, the words being coupled in the writing. For narrating the afflictions of his own trials, he brings upon: “I will go on to visions and revelations” as he interprets the things he has seen.

\textsuperscript{953} C.f. 2 Corinthians 12.2.
\textsuperscript{954} Deuteronomy 32.43.
\textsuperscript{955} 2 Corinthians 12.1-2.
But, having feared lest the charge of arrogance should be brought in reply to this, he
lies hidden cleverly, giving a twist to the tale.

D40

When Paul says “into a third heaven”, he reveals that there is also another one. For he says this not with an article, but without an article. But the Lord, proclaiming it with the addition of the article says: “no one has ascended into ‘the’ heaven.” The heaven that is higher than all, which is attached to the greater glory, into which the divine nature, shining forth most, is seen more distinctly by those who have been deemed worthy to proceed there. So, then ‘no one has ascended’ into this heaven, in which the Child himself will sit with the Father. So therefore, the Lord also says: “no one has ascended into heaven, except the one who came down from heaven.” [lacuna] no one has ever arrived at this farthest point, except only God’s Child, who traverses everything at once by a soul and a Spirit. Furthermore, conversing with Nicodemus, he said that the son of humanity was in heaven. Through the things he said, he made it plainly evident that on one hand, up until this time, living here he went to and fro with the visible limbs, whilst on the other, with the human soul he laid claim to the greatest of the heavens, soaring on high. For the soul was traversing with the divine Spirit, it was able to outstrip all the bodies, and consequently it is shown through these things also that Christ bore a soul. For on one hand whenever he talks about the soul’s ascending occupations, he pronounces that it did these things in its own right. Saying, “no one has ascended into heaven, except the one who came from heaven, the son of humanity, who is in heaven.” On the other, when he declares the migration of the body suspended in mid-air, having said it, he brings on directly, “And just as Moses lifted up the serpent in the desert, in this way it is necessary for the son of humanity to be lifted up, in order that everyone who believes in him may not die, but have eternal life.” And if in some respect, at that time, it said that the son of humanity was in heaven, and he will be lifted up again at the same time as he is a guest in the hollows of the earth, it is evident that the virtues of the soul shone forth separately, and the deeds of the body were nonetheless displayed.

D44

But the apostle, he says, directed the Corinthians, writing “the first Adam became a living soul, the last Adam a life-giving spirit. But the first was not spiritual but ‘soul-like’, the latter spiritual” (and the things that follow). And if these things hold thus, evidently, he who has been united with the Holy Spirit is spiritual, whilst he who has been proportionately mixed with a soul and body is ‘soul-like.’

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956 2 Corinthians 12.2.
957 John 3.13.
958 John 3.13.
961 1 Corinthians 15.45-46.
Consequently, through these things, they say, it is clear from the words that Christ was walking around hither apart from a soul.

Now we say one hand that the one who is ‘soul-like’ is from body and soul, whilst the one who is spiritual has been brought together from divine Spirit. For if he had not had a soul, neither would he have borne the limbs of the body, since, best naming him ‘spiritual’, [Paul] would have made mention of neither soul nor body. For if he was spiritual himself, according to himself, it is clear that he was also bodiless. For it did not say that he was both spiritual and had a body. And if he is a human being, it is clear that he became a human being after being united with a soul and body, and more than that, out of all, only one perfect human was produced, and accordingly, necessarily has all the virtues. If, therefore, out of the signification of these words, they present Christ as soulless, they present many of the chosen men as soulless. To begin with, writing to the same Corinthians, Paul said, “But the ‘soul-like’ human being does not receive the things of the Spirit of God. For they are foolishness to him, and he cannot understand them since they are spiritually discerned. And the spiritual human being discerns all things, and is himself discerned by no one.” And also “The first human being was from earth, earthly. The second was from heaven, spiritual.” And then, writing to the Galatians, he said “Brothers, if a person should be overtaken in some fault, you, the spiritual ones, restore such a one, in a spirit of humility.” Such a one is also the body “sown a ‘soul-like’ body, raised a spiritual body.” For doubtless it is not soulless. For he does not show one human being raised up in place of another, as if, as Valentinus and his associates say, a different, intelligible thing is raised, apart from this perceptible thing. For how are those repeating these things not filled with frenzy, attaching unjust judgements to God? For then, if some people become evil, others rise up and will be judged in place of them. One of the most unjust things about this is that those who have done the worst decline correction, whilst others, in place of them, pay the penalty in full. For it is necessary on one hand for the murderers to be punished, on the other for the blasphemous tongues themselves to be flogged, and the bodies of the unchastened to be set on fire, since neither does it make sense that some pluck recompenses in place of others or are punished. For if the bodies of the martyrs were confined in fetters and in prisons, the ribs were scraped, they were tortured in every way, they were cut limb from limb, they were surrendered into the gluttony of fire, and with all the flesh and similarly all the bones they have been set on fire, is it not by far the most just that the same bodies will be raised again, which went within the things of pain and affliction, about to receive the wages of the pains?

D45

Faith that the same bodies, not different ones, are to be raised is from the body of the Lord, in which the hands preserve the wounds of the nails, and the ribs preserve the

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962 1 Corinthians 2.14-15.
963 1 Corinthians 15.47.
964 Galatians 6.1.
965 1 Corinthians 15.44.
spear-head.\textsuperscript{966} This is believed, and the raising of Lazarus, being passed back to his sisters.\textsuperscript{967}

D46

And this is believed from other images. For it is not one who contends a complete contest with much labour in victory and another, having come from the sides and not within the pit, who receives the victory wreath. And it is not one contending in an equestrian, or the so-called heavily armoured event, and another, rushing passed, who is honoured.

D47

The apostle tends to call human beings ‘soul-like’ inasmuch as when they sin through the soul, the communions of the divine Spirit are turned away, and spiritual inasmuch as, through divinely inspired citizenship, they partake in the Holy Spirit, accepting its plenty.\textsuperscript{968} Because of this, he wrote that a ‘soul-like’ body was sown,\textsuperscript{969} which has performed manifold sins through the soul, but he says that this body is raised spiritual, since he changes the bodies of all those having been raised. The bodies change their ways, no one at all sins anymore, having stood before the divine tribune striking the breast, and, repenting of those things through which he slipped, he is led to punishment.

D50

Those stirring up war around Arius, in a difficulty of comprehension, say that the movements of two spirits are unable to dwell around the body’s one nature. From deeds and words themselves it is shown that Christ had a soul which was subject to human changes, and he bore a divine Spirit which was altogether unchanging. Indeed the Spirit also dwells there in those other humans that are made temples, just as it says that Stephen was “full of the Holy Spirit”\textsuperscript{970} as was Barnabas.\textsuperscript{971} But the Lord also said “the one who loves me will keep my word and my Father and I will come to him, and will make a mansion in him.”\textsuperscript{972} And if indeed the Spirit does not shun the opportunity to dwell with the soul, and nor does the weaker go aside to make room for the better, but, much more, this weaker one is made young again, being nourished towards virtue by the divine concourse, and the Father thus lives there willingly with the child, then clearly a form of a soul, is able to contain the divine Spirit in it, dwelling there together. And if he promises to dwell in other human beings, being satisfied to dwell with the living souls, although they are not at all unpolluted – for the mind would be a partaker of all the filth by a short mingling –

\textsuperscript{967} C.f. John 11.43-44.
\textsuperscript{968} C.f. 1 Corinthians 2.14-15.
\textsuperscript{969} 1 Corinthians 15.44.
\textsuperscript{970} Acts 6.5, 7.55.
\textsuperscript{972} John 14.23-24.
but indeed Christ’s soul is undefiled, pure and unpolluted, having absolutely no trace of sin, would it not much rather have dwelt with the divine Spirit, because of the superiority of purity and righteousness? For indeed the other holy men, who have been brought forth from bodily intercourse, and are shabby temples that have been shown forth, reaped the sweet smell of the Spirit by participation. And Christ is the only one who became embodied by the Holy Spirit, he did not produce the better nature from participation but “in him the fullness of the Godhead”\(^{973}\) settled utterly, as the apostle says. And if the Son of God is “fullness of the Godhead”, then he is perfect. And if he is perfect, clearly, he has been begotten from the Father’s perfection. The one who had been perfected to the highest virtue of divinity would not have prepared an imperfect temple, having been mutilated in the best part, but in himself he submitted the whole, healthy human race. He did not partially remedy but leave behind the more valued part unhealed, but, stewarding the whole, nurturing, took up our nature entirely.

D51

It is fitting to cover in a few words what in the world the soul is. On one hand, that it is invisible spirit is evident to everyone. On the other, the motion makes an image of itself from the organs of perception and, moulding the activities, it furnishes everything with visible marks.

In Leviticus Moses expressly writes that God declared: “[any] person among the sons of Israel or the proselytes who would eat blood, I will stand my covenant upon that soul and expel it from the people.”\(^{974}\) Thus it is gently suggested that the soul is blood.\(^{975}\) For scripture forbids blood as nourishment. Because of this, when the blood flows forth, the body stands soulless and unmoving. And the soul is not simply blood, but the soul flies in the blood itself. Because of this, on one hand as many of the limbs as are ensouled, when they suffer under a wound, the blood is secreted, flowing like a spring, and it bears the sharp perception to the one being smitten. And as far as it has survived death, no blood flows if the body is pierced, and nor does the blood furnish perception to the senses. From whenever it is parted from the soul, it is fixed, whilst before it was active because of the soul’s ‘enfiring’ nature. Consequently scripture, by a hyperbole of language, calls the blood a soul, showing it to be perishable, meaning the human being. “And whoever smites a soul of a human being, let him die.”\(^{976}\) And it says, “and if a person should be clean, and not far on a journey, and fails to keep the Passover”, what sort of punishment does he submit to? “That soul shall be cut off from its people.”\(^{977}\) So there are indeed many other things concerning the destruction of the soul in the books of the law, but let it be satisfied with these things, that the lawgiver names the cattle a soul, saying, “and whoever shall strike a beast and it dies, let that person render a soul for a soul.”\(^{978}\) Therefore, by a misuse of language, the lawgiver calls both the blood and the beast a

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\(^{973}\) Colossians 2.9.  
\(^{974}\) Leviticus 17.10.  
\(^{975}\) Declerck here supplies οὐ, but I reject his emendation.  
\(^{976}\) Leviticus 24.17.  
\(^{977}\) Numbers 9.13.  
\(^{978}\) Leviticus 24.18.
soul, because of the association of each, and, consequently, death is twice spoken of in the same language, on one hand by the separation of body and soul, on the other coming from sin, according to the prophetic saying “the soul that sins will itself die.”\textsuperscript{979} And the Lord in the gospels says, “stop fearing things that kill the body, but that are not able to kill the soul. But rather fear the one who is able to throw both body and soul into Gehenna.”\textsuperscript{980} And, what is more related to doctrine in these things, Christ, coming near to the very causes of chastening, names them destruction. For through these someone is given over to eternal punishments, and is sent out into the unquenchable source of fire through which things he is said to be utterly destroyed, paying the penalties in an endless cycle.

\textbf{D52}

In the \textit{Phaedo}, Plato says that Socrates said “Every soul is unbegotten. For what is unbegotten is also immortal.”\textsuperscript{981} This is the foolish doctrine of the Greeks.

\textbf{D53}

There are different and manifold kinds of souls, just as of bodies. Because of this, whilst the small ones die easily, the large ones are resistant, as they have stubbornly undergone trials.

\textbf{D55}

Those stirring up war around Arius, in the seasons of fruit and plants and many varieties of garden herbs, taking upon themselves to be sick with the fever of Greek superstition, consider that the souls board ships and, once upon these, say, as in old wives tales, “I do not cut the cabbage, lest it hold inside the soul of my grandmother or mother, but also not the melon. Because I fear lest I slay my father or grandfather.”

\textbf{D61}

Furthermore, the body of the first-formed which had been adorned, was sleeping, dead, unbreathing, unmoved, having been brought utterly into harmony according to outward appearance, and having been conspicuously adorned with beauty and a form, having been fashioned from him, prototypical statue of God, and having been modelled a most perfect copy of the most divine image,\textsuperscript{982} but imperceptible, voiceless, unbreathing. And when God breathed into his face creatively, straight

\textsuperscript{979} Ezekiel 18.4, 18.20 \\
\textsuperscript{980} Matthew 10.28. \\
\textsuperscript{981} Plato, \textit{Phaedrus}, 245 c5- 246a2. \\
\textsuperscript{982} Genesis 1.27.
away, he received movement. And from that time he walks and breathes, he governs, he reasons, he acts, he has control.

**Proverbs 8:22**

D65a

So, if the Word received a beginning of his generation, when, at the time after he had passed through his mother’s womb, he bore a bodily frame, it stands that he was “born of woman.” But if we say that the Word and God was beside the Father from the beginning, and we say that “everything came to be through him,” then the one who is, and is the cause of all things that are made was not “born of woman.” But he is by nature God, self-sufficient, limitless, incomprehensible. But the human being, who had been implanted in the virgin mother’s womb by the Holy Spirit, was born of a woman.

D67

Therefore, the Word made a temple, then bore a human being. Visiting among human beings in a body, he both demonstrated all kinds of miracles out of sight and sent the apostles, preachers of the everlasting kingdom.

D68

For Paul did not say, “like in form to the son of God” but “like in form to the image of his Son,” showing that the Son is one thing and his image another. For, indeed, the son, bearing the divine marks of the paternal excellence, is the image of the father since, because like is begotten from like, the ones begotten appear as true images of the ones who begot them. But the human being whom he bore is the image of the son, as images are made from dissimilar colours by being painted on wax, some being wrought by hand deliberately and others coming to be in nature and likeness. Moreover the very law of truth announces this. For the bodiless “Spirit of wisdom” is not conformed to corporeal people, but the human express image having been made bodily by the Spirit, bearing the same number of members as all the rest, and clad in similar form to each.

D69

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983 Genesis 2.7.
984 Galatians 4.4.
985 John 1.3.
986 Romans 8.29
987 Exodus 31.3, 35.31.
That the body has the same form as the human body, he teaches us more clearly, writing to the Philippians: “we are citizens” he says, “of heaven, out of which we received a saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ, who will change our body of lowliness to become conformed to the body of his glory.” And if, changing the lowly body of human beings, he conforms it to his own body, the slander of the enemies is revealed from every angle to be obsolete.

D70ab

But as the human being who is born of the virgin is said to have been “born of a woman”, thus it is also written that he was “born under the law” by which it means that he sometimes walked by the law’s instructions. Most clearly, when he was an eight day old infant, his parents eagerly hurried to circumcise him, just as the evangelist Luke relates: fulfilling the purifying offerings, “They brought him into the temple to present him to the Lord and to give a sacrifice according to what is said in the law of the Lord, a pair of turtle doves and two young pigeons.” If, therefore, the purifying gifts were offered on his behalf according to the law, and he bore circumcision on the eighth day, because of this Paul writes, not unreasonably, that he was born under the law. But the Word was not under the law, as the slanderers flout it, being the law himself. And God does not need purifying sacrifices, as he purifies and sanctifies everything with a sudden blow. But although, having received the human instrument from the virgin, he bore it and became under the law, having been purified according to the status of the firstborn, he did not himself need these means. He maintains the mode of worship but only so that those who had been sold to the penalty of the curse might be set free from the slavery of the law.

D71

For, the human being who died rose on the third day, and when Mary was eager to touch the holy limbs, objecting, he proclaims “Stop touching me, for I have not yet ascended to my Father. But go to my brothers and tell them ‘I go up to my Father and your Father, to my God and your God.” But the Word and God did not say “I have not yet ascended to my Father.” He comes from heaven and dwells in the Father’s bosom. Nor did the wisdom who surrounds everything that exists. Rather, the very human being said this. The one who had been made out of all kinds of limbs, and who has been raised from the dead and, whilst he had not yet gone up to the Father after death, was reserving for himself the “first-fruits” of this passage.

988 Philippians 3.20-21.  
989 Galatians 4.4.  
991 C.f. Galatians 4.5.  
992 John 20.17.  
993 1 Corinthians 15.23.
“No one takes my soul from me. I have authority to put my soul down, and I have authority to take it up again.” And if he had authority for both these things as God, then he yielded to those who thoughtlessly attacked the temple and, when he rose, he restored it more gloriously. By irrefutable evidence, it is proved that he restored and raised up his own dwelling place himself. And one must refer the great works of the Son also to the divine Father. For the Son emphatically does not perform works without the Father, according to the irrefutable words of holy scripture. For this reason, sometimes the all-divine Begetter is written to have raised Christ from the dead by grace and sometimes the Son promises to resurrect his own temple. If, therefore, it is shown from previous examinations that Christ’s divine Spirit is impassible, the polluted ones attack the apostolic decrees falsely. For if Paul said “the Lord of glory was crucified”, clearly looking at the human being, one must not, because of this, attribute passion to the divine. Why, then, do they weave this together, saying that Christ was “crucified through weakness”?

So, I will now proceed to the things that happened. What then? When, because of these things, a great council was summoned at Nicaea, two hundred and perhaps seventy, having been gathered together there – because of the multitude of men I am not able to write the exact number, nor have I tracked this information as far as possible with due care. As the manner of the faith was sought, the writing, a manifest proof of Eusebius’ blasphemy, was brought forward. And, when it had been read aloud to everyone, immediately it gave ever-growing grief to those who had heard it because of its heresy, and it inflicted irredeemable shame on the writer. After the gang of those around Eusebius was clearly convicted, the heretical writing having been torn asunder before everyone’s eyes, some men from the plot, putting forward the name of peace, silenced those who used to speak best. But those stirring up war around Arius, feared lest they should be banished, given that so great a council has come together. On one hand, they rush forward to anathematise the condemned doctrine, subscribing with their own hands to a common written statement. On the other, once they had held onto their seats through the greatest possible deviousness, when they should have fallen, sometimes covertly and sometimes openly, they are ambassadors for the rejected opinions, plotting against diverse refutations. And, being determined to establish the tares they have planted, they fear the learned, pervert the authorities and in this way attack the preachers of godliness. But even so, we do not believe that godless people can ever take the leading position over the divine. For “though they might grow again, they will again be defeated”, according to the venerable word of Isaiah the prophet.

In Psalm 92

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994 John 10:17-18
995 1 Corinthians 2:8
996 2 Corinthians 13.4.
He it is who, after violation was made formless and unsightly, then again was changed, having been “clothed with honour.” For God dwelling in him, whose nature is invisible, was not led like a lamb to death and slaughtered like a sheep.

**Contra Arianos**

And when Jesus is said for the second time to “know that the Father had given everything to his hands”, even thus he introduces the power of a human being and he declares how, taking up a sceptre of eternal authority, he had all authority, which had been entrusted.

But the God-bearing human being, who decided voluntarily to sustain the passion of death himself because of its usefulness to human beings, received the prize of the contest, in order that, so to speak, he might gain honour and power and, where it is received, glory, which he had by no means held at first.

God the Word bears the same image as the Begetter, being an image of the divine substance. Indeed a human being, being his true temple, is not the same as the builder of the temple, having sprung from a different race.

“Until the son of humanity sits on his throne of glory”; one character is seen to speak, but manifestly he speaks about another. Therefore, the divine Spirit is clearly speaking about the human being: “Until the Son of humanity will sit in his throne of glory”, undeniably foretelling that the human being justly takes up supervening glories, also having been furnished with power, duly receiving the highest place and the throne of the kingdom.

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997 Psalm 92.1.
998 C.f. Isaiah 53.7.
999 John 13.3
1000 C.f. Hebrews 1.2.
1001 Matthew 19.28.
“Everything has been given to me by the Father.” Manifestly, he is found to prophesy from the character of the human being, just as we demonstrated before. Such indeed anticipates the acquired powers, advancing towards better things with reference to dignity.

D102

It is to be considered how, speaking in this way by God and saying “you destroy cities”, he then introduces another Lord, advancing “And the Lord continues into eternity. He prepared his throne in judgement.” Most plainly, he is speaking to one concerning another. It signifies that there is a judge who prepared a throne for him. He seemed to speak about the one who did not have this honour at first; he was, as it were, revealing through prophetic figures, the human being who has gracefully been made a temple of justice from limbs and, dwelt with the most sacred Word, and has inherited by excellence the everlasting throne.

D103

For one who has the throne of the kingdom, does not prepare another fate for himself, but for one who does not yet have the power of the throne. Therefore, this clearly concerns the human being of Christ. And these were neither going to be restored to the Omnipotent, to the one who has his own sceptre, nor to the Word who has the royal power itself, which the Father also has, but this will be said to Christ: “The Lord prepared his throne in heaven.” For he will rule all creation alike by means of the mixing with the divine Word.

D107

Because, if he is a creature, then he is not begotten. And if he is begotten, then he is not a creature. Since, it is not possible for the classification of each of these to be wound round.

D108

Everything that has as beginning also has an end. Everything that ends is capable of corruption.

In Melchisedek

D115ab:1-20

1002 Matthew 11.27; Luke 10.22.
1003 Psalm 9.7.
1004 Psalm 9.8.
1005 Psalm 102.19.
“What then?” someone might say. “For Melchizedek is described to us as motherless. And yet indeed if he resembles the Son of God and, to say everything, is like him, the one bearing his image and carrying his type is neither motherless nor fatherless. For Mary is a mother to Christ, and he rises up from the royal line of David and the “rod of Jesse”\footnote{C.f. Hebrews 7.3.}, the bud of the sweet-smelling barely corn, for us, and he is genealogised from Jesse’s line according to the flesh. But Melchizedek is seen to be “of unrecorded descent.”\footnote{Hebrews 7.3.} Therefore one might say that Melchizedek was of unrecorded descent in this sense, in that he was not from the seed of Abraham, nor is he of Moses’ line, but he is of the Canaanite race, and begins from this accursed seed. But a righteous person being revealed according to himself, and not being anchored in the righteous people born before, nor from someone’s righteous seed, it was not fair to trace his descent to the line of Canaan, as he nears the peak of righteousness. For it was most unsuitable to force together the man who had achieved the peak of righteousness for himself with the race who had achieved the peak of unrighteousness. Therefore, it says that he is “fatherless and motherless”, not considering the ancestors worthy of the virtue of a righteous and wise man.

\textbf{D116a}

Therefore, plainly, if Melchizedek resembled the Son of God, he will be neither fatherless, nor motherless, nor of unrecorded descent\footnote{Hebrews 7.3.}, but on one hand he will be genealogised concerning the things of the flesh according to the nature of the flesh, whilst on the other hand, in another way, he will be seen to be of unrecorded descent, just like Christ. For Christ also, on one hand, is genealogised according to the body, but on the other, according to the highest order, has an indescribable birth, as we explained previously.

\textbf{In Joseph}

\textbf{D121a}

Reuben and Judah took the best counsel together, if it comes to that. For they were holding against savage men.\footnote{Genesis 37.21-28.} For Simeon and Levi had tasted murder immoderately. They had already become accustomed to it at the time of the deed, and they longed to creep skilfully around such a scent of victims. Thus they were daring and rash men, as they alone cut the throats of the Sychemites as a whole nation.\footnote{Genesis 34.25-29.}

\textbf{D121b}

\footnotetext[1006]{C.f. Hebrews 7.3.}
\footnotetext[1007]{Isaiah 11.1.}
\footnotetext[1008]{Hebrews 7.3.}
\footnotetext[1009]{Hebrews 7.3.}
\footnotetext[1010]{Genesis 37.21-28.}
\footnotetext[1011]{Genesis 34.25-29.}
Indeed therefore, Reuben and Judah together took the best counsel, if it comes to that. For they were holding against savage men. For Simeon and Levi, having tasted murder immoderately, hastened to the same deliberate purpose out of habit. For they alone killed the Sychemites with surpassing daring.

**In Samaritanam**

D123

Therefore, we see as in a mirror, with unveiled face, the Lord’s all holy flesh, through the shape in an image. So, holding the untroubled eye of the soul to the prototype, and looking to the form of the image, we glorify the archetype of the image.

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1012 Genesis 37.21-28.
1013 Genesis 34.25-29.
1014 2 Corinthians 3.18.
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