This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree (e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following terms and conditions of use:

- This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated.
- A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge.
- This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author.
- The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author.
- When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given.
The Translators

Negotiating the Contours of Glocal Policing

in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Jarrett Blaustein

Ph.D. in Law
The University of Edinburgh
2013
Abstract

In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), a paradigmatic example of a transitional post-conflict society governed by an externally-driven process of neo-liberal state-building, police reforms have played an important role in supporting the transposition of a particular variant of liberal order through security governance at the national and sub-national levels. This order is primarily constructed to reflect the interests of BiH’s supranational architect and benefactor since 2003: the European Union. It is less responsive to the interests or the needs of BiH citizens or constitutionally established governing institutions (Chandler 1999). Historically, prescriptions for police reform in BiH have been defined by various representatives of the international community in BiH rather than domestic policy makers or practitioners. They have also been glocally-responsive in their design. In other words, they have been introduced to generate policy alignment and to support the harmonisation of local policing mentalities and practices with the EU’s security interests in the Western Balkans as well as dominant ‘European’ approaches to controlling crime (Juncos 2011; Ryan 2011). In practice, however, it is evident that the outputs and outcomes generated by police reforms in BiH regularly deviate from their initial design. This is particularly evident in relation to a handful of community policing initiatives introduced in BiH over the past decade (e.g. Deljkic and Lučić-Ćatić 2011).

Using a meso-level analysis of two community-oriented policing projects implemented in 2011, this research draws on the conceptual framework of ‘policy translation’ (Lendvai and Stubbs 2006) to illuminate the agentive capacities of international development workers and local police practitioners and their role in shaping the conceptual and programmatic contours of glocally-responsive policing reforms in BiH. My first case study examines the translational capacity of international development workers at a major multi-lateral international development agency in BiH using an ethnographic account of my three-month placement with the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) ‘Safer Communities’ project in BiH in 2011. My second case study is used to illustrate the translational capacities of police practitioners working to implement an externally-initiated community policing project in Sarajevo Canton.

Drawing from these case studies, I determine that the international political economy of global liberal governance and the interests of powerful global actors play only a limited role in affecting outputs and outcomes generated by internationally-driven police reforms. Rather, I argue that the concept of policy translation demonstrates that relatively disempowered actors like international development workers and local police practitioners can draw upon their
agency and institutional resources to shape these policy making processes and in doing so, potentially contribute to more democratically responsive policing outputs and structures. My findings further suggest that important opportunities do exist for motivated reformers to foster deliberative forms of security governance in weak and structurally dependent societies like BiH and recognising and enhancing these can help to alleviate the potential consequences of introducing contextually or culturally inappropriate Western policing models to these societies. This is significant because it highlights the prospect of addressing the structural inequalities associated with global and transnational policing (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012), police reforms pursued in the context of liberal state-building projects (Ryan 2011) and donor-driven international police development assistance projects (Ellison and Pino 2012).
Acknowledgements

This research would not have been possible without a generous studentship from the School of Law at the University of Edinburgh and the ongoing support of two exceptional supervisors, Dr Alistair Henry and Dr Andy Aitchison. Alistair and Andy provided outstanding feedback and encouragement since I started my PhD September 2009 as well as the occasional ‘dram’ to celebrate various milestones along the way. I would also like to thank my examiners Mr Trevor Jones and Professor Richard Sparks for conducting a rigorous and rewarding viva and I must further acknowledge the wider contributions of the criminology team at the University of Edinburgh which has been instrumental in shaping my thinking on crime and security. Other members of the law school community who have influenced this research include researchers from the CITSEE project whose work has helped me to think critically about the role of Europeanization in the Western Balkans and various members of the Centre for Law and Society.

I would like to thank Professor James Sheptycki for introducing me to his work on global policing during his visit to Edinburgh as a MacCormick Fellow in April 2012 and Dr Graham Ellison, Professor Nathan Pino and Dr Barry Ryan for helping me to access their innovative research on police reform in developing and transitional countries. I also owe special thanks my research assistant and occasional interpreter Adnan Fazlić for all of his hard work and to his mentor at the University of Sarajevo, Dr Irma Deljčić, for her guidance and support during my time in Sarajevo.

It is also important to acknowledge that my field work in BiH would not have been possible without the gracious support of the Safer Communities team; UNDP in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the Ministry of the Interior for Sarajevo Canton; the Sarajevo Canton Police; the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation; and the various individuals who agreed to be interviewed and act as participants for my research.

Finally, on a personal level I am forever indebted to my wife Laura and our families for their generosity and support over the past four years.

Hvala vam.
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AVPP</td>
<td>UN Armed Violence Prevention Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Police Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBP</td>
<td>Community-based Policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Community Policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSF</td>
<td>Citizen Security Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>Community Safety Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS</td>
<td>Centre for Security Studies (Sarajevo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECPN</td>
<td>European Crime Prevention Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFUS</td>
<td>European Forum of Urban Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>European Union Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPM</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBiH</td>
<td>Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Conflict Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICITAP</td>
<td>International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERPOL</td>
<td>International Criminal Police Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPTF</td>
<td>United Nations International Police Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUP KS</td>
<td>Ministry of the Interior, Sarajevo Canton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MZ</td>
<td>‘Mesne Zajednice’ (local neighbourhood centre)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIT</td>
<td>National Implementation Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIC</td>
<td>Peace Implementation Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>Police Restructuring Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBM</td>
<td>Results-based Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDB</td>
<td>Resor Državne Bezbednosti (secret police in SFRY)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPZ</td>
<td>Rad Policije u Zajednici (Bosnian word for ‘community policing’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS</td>
<td>Republika Srpska</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSC</td>
<td>Regional security complex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SABiH</td>
<td>Small Arms Control and Reduction Project in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARA</td>
<td>‘Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBS</td>
<td>State Border Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDC</td>
<td>Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFRY</td>
<td>Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPA</td>
<td>State Investigation and Protection Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSAJP</td>
<td>DFID Safety, Security and Access to Justice Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN CIVPOL</td>
<td>International Civilian Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMBiH</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Table of Contents

Abstract ............................................................................................................................................. 1

Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................................... 3

Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................... 4

Chapter One: Introduction ............................................................................................................... 10

1.1 Policy Translation ..................................................................................................................... 12

1.2 Why Bosnia and Herzegovina? ............................................................................................... 14

Map 1 Bosnia and Herzegovina ........................................................................................................ 16

1.3 Background: Bosnia and Herzegovina .................................................................................... 16

1.4 Research Design ....................................................................................................................... 18

1.5 Structure of Thesis ................................................................................................................... 20

Chapter Two: Global Liberal Governance as Neo-Liberal Governmentality ................................. 24

2.1 Global Liberal Governance and the ‘New Humanitarianism’ ............................................... 24

2.2 Liberal State-Building in Bosnia and Herzegovina ................................................................. 27

2.3 From Faking Democracy to Empire in Denial? ........................................................................ 32

2.4 The ‘New Humanitarianism’ as Neo-Liberal Governmentality ............................................... 33

Chapter Three: Glocal Policing and Liberal Order ......................................................................... 35

3.1 Glocal Policing for Glocal Order ............................................................................................. 36

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1 The Archetypes of Global Policing</th>
<th>........................................................................... 37</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

3.2 ‘Democratic Policing’ as Glocally-Responsive Policing .......................................................... 42

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.2.1 Community Policing</th>
<th>........................................................................... 44</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.2.2 Community Safety Partnerships</th>
<th>........................................................................... 45</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

3.3 Glocal Policing and the ‘Freedom of Security’ ....................................................................... 49

3.4 A Framework for Democratically Responsive Policing ............................................................ 51

3.5 Glocal Policing as Nodal Security Governance ...................................................................... 56

3.6 Discussion .................................................................................................................................. 58

Chapter Four: Policy Translation .................................................................................................... 60
4.1 Globalisation and Policy Convergence ................................................................. 61

4.2 The Complexities of Policy Transfer ................................................................. 64

4.2.1 Voluntary and Coercive Policy Transfers ......................................................... 64

4.2.2 Analysing Policy Transfers ............................................................................. 66

4.3 Policy Transfer as Translation ............................................................................. 68

Chapter Five: Methodology ......................................................................................... 72

5.1 Safer Communities .............................................................................................. 73

5.1.1 Access .............................................................................................................. 74

5.1.2 Organisational Ethnography with United Nations Development Programme .... 76

5.1.3 Ethnographic Interviewing ............................................................................. 78

5.2 Community Policing in Sarajevo Canton ............................................................ 80

5.2.1 Access .............................................................................................................. 81

5.2.2 Reconciling Multiple Research Agendas ......................................................... 82

5.2.3 Participant Observation with an Interpreter ..................................................... 84

5.3. Data Collection, Analysis and Presentation ...................................................... 86

5.4 Methodological Limitations ................................................................................ 87

Chapter Six: Reforming the Police in Bosnia and Herzegovina .................................. 88

6.1. Policing Before ‘Dayton’ .................................................................................... 89

6.2 Towards ‘Policing for Democracy’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina .......................... 90

6.3 Europeanization and Policing Reforms .............................................................. 93

6.4 Towards Community Policing and Community Safety Partnerships ................ 95

6.4.1 Macro-level Initiatives .................................................................................... 96

6.4.2 Community Policing as International Development Assistance .................. 97

6.4.3 A National ‘Strategy for Community-based Policing in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ 101

6.5 Discussion ........................................................................................................... 104

Chapter Seven: Introducing Safer Communities ......................................................... 105

7.1 The United Nations Development Programme: Capacity Development through Non-core Funding ................................................................. 106
10.2.2 Performing for the Community ................................................................. 183
10.2.3 Performing for an International Audience ............................................ 185
10.2.4 Flawed Performances ........................................................................... 189
10.3 Discussion ............................................................................................... 192
Chapter Eleven: Conclusion ......................................................................... 200

1. What evidence is there to support the claim that processes of ‘translation’ account for
the differences between international policy inputs and domestic outcomes in the field of
community oriented policing in BiH? ............................................................... 200

2. Does the translation work of local actors serve to mitigate the potential harms of
externally imposed policy frameworks? ............................................................ 201

3. To what extent do local translators form part of a framework for democratically
responsive governance of policing in BiH? .................................................... 203

4. How do the concepts of ‘translation’ and ‘contact zones’ help to develop our
understanding of the interaction of the policy preferences of powerful external actors and
the situated knowledge and preferences of domestic actors in producing glocal forms of
policing? ........................................................................................................... 205

Bibliography .................................................................................................. 207

Appendix 1: Research Overview ................................................................. 225

Table A1.1 Research Phases ........................................................................... 225

Table A1.2 Interviews, Meetings and Select Electronic Communications (2010-2012)..... 225

Table A1.3 Timeline: Safer Communities Project, January 2009 – July 2012 .............. 228

Table A1.4 Timeline: Qualitative Evaluation of Community Policing In Sarajevo Canton. 229

Appendix 2: Unpublished Drafts, Documents and Primary Sources ......................... 231

Table A2.1 Unpublished Drafts, Project Reports and Primary Sources ....................... 231

Appendix 3: Aitchison and Blaustein (2013) ..................................................... 233

Appendix 4: Blaustein (2013) ......................................................................... 245
Chapter One: Introduction

This is a thesis about police reform and the ways in which different reformers and practitioners work to collectively shape the mentalities and practices of local policing in weak and structurally dependent societies. It is also a study of glocal policing\(^1\) and its function in a developing and transitional society affected by neo-liberal governmentality and supranational governance. It is a thesis about the interplay between structure and agency inherent to policy translation, a concept that illuminates the capacities of relatively weak and disempowered policy actors to assert their preferences and designs over the contours of internationally prescribed policing reforms. Finally, this thesis emphasises the capacities of individuals and organisations to affect positive change and promote deliberative forms of security governance amidst coercive and asymmetrical power structures that reflect the interests of powerful global actors.

In the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), a paradigmatic example of a transitional post-conflict society governed by an externally-driven process of neo-liberal state-building since 1996, police reforms have played an important role in supporting the transposition of a particular variant of liberal order through security governance at the national and sub-national levels. This order is primarily constructed to reflect the interests of BiH’s primary supranational architect and benefactor since 2003: the European Union (EU). It is less responsive to the interests or the needs of BiH citizens or constitutionally established governing institutions (Chandler 1999). Prescriptions for police reform in BiH have been defined by various representatives of the international community in BiH rather than domestic policy makers or practitioners. They have also been glocally-responsive in their design. In other words, they have been introduced to generate policy alignment and to support the harmonisation of local policing mentalities and practices with the EU’s security interests in the Western Balkans as well as dominant ‘European’ approaches to controlling crime (Juncos 2011; Ryan 2011). In practice, however, it is evident that the outputs and outcomes generated by police reforms in BiH commonly deviate from their initial design. This is particularly evident in relation to a handful of community policing initiatives introduced in BiH over the past decade (see Deljkic and Lučić-Ćatić 2011; also Chapter Six).

Analysed as policy transfers, it is possible, and indeed popular, to account for disrupted police reforms in developing and transitional countries like BiH as examples of policy failure. It is argued, for example, that community policing initiatives in particular are often miscalculated or poorly designed from the outset (e.g. Ellison 2007) or that weakened police institutions in transitional societies are inadequate for supporting these reforms (e.g. Ryan 2007). Other critiques suggest that ‘off-the-shelf’ models for democratic policing or community policing may fail to resonate with enduring cultural and historical understandings of police work (Brogden and Nijjar 2005). These critiques suggest that international reformers either struggle to translate their reformative prescriptions into locally-viable practices and structures or that they neglect to do so.

Rarely, however, do studies of police reform projects in developing and transitional states actually delve into the translational mechanics of these policy exchanges. In other words, the existing literature on international policing reforms and police development assistance tends to feature overly-linear and deterministic representations of the processes that generate these ill-fated policy outputs with the effect that the extent to which mediatory actors affect these processes are rarely addressed. Using a meso-level analysis of two community-oriented policing projects that were implemented in BiH in 2011, this research uses the conceptual framework of ‘policy translation’ (Lendvai and Stubbs 2006) to illuminate the agentive capacities of international development workers and local police practitioners and their role in shaping the conceptual and programmatic contours of glocally-responsive policing reforms in BiH. Through these case studies, I address the following empirical research questions:

1. What evidence is there to support the claim that processes of ‘translation’ account for the differences between international policy inputs and domestic outcomes in the field of community oriented policing in BiH?
2. Does the translation work of local actors serve to mitigate the potential harms of externally imposed policy frameworks?
3. To what extent do local translators form part of a framework for democratically responsive governance of policing in BiH?
Throughout this thesis, I also address the following conceptual research question:

4. How do the concepts of translation and contact zones help to develop our understanding of the interaction of the policy preferences of powerful external actors and the situated knowledge and preferences of domestic actors in producing glocal forms of policing?

I argue that the international political economy of global liberal governance and the interests of powerful global actors play only a limited role in affecting outputs and outcomes generated by internationally-driven police reforms. Rather, the concept of policy translation demonstrates that relatively disempowered actors like international development workers and local police practitioners can draw upon their agency and institutional resources to shape these policy making processes and in doing so, potentially contribute to more democratically responsive policing outputs and structures. My findings further suggest that important opportunities do exist for motivated reformers to foster deliberative forms of security governance in weak and structurally dependent societies like BiH and that doing so can help to alleviate the potential consequences of introducing contextually or culturally inappropriate Western policing models to these societies. My findings and conceptual framework represent important contributions to the established literature on police reforms in developing and transitional societies because they account for the possibility of addressing the structural inequalities associated with global and transnational policing (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012), police reforms pursued in the context of liberal state-building projects (Ryan 2011) and donor-driven international police development assistance projects (Ellison and Pino 2012).

With the remainder of this chapter, I introduce ‘policy translation’ as a conceptual framework for exploring the nodal and poly-centric power structures of international police reform processes. I then proceed to justify my selection of BiH as a single-country case study and briefly summarise my methodology and outline the structure of my thesis.

1.1 Policy Translation

The conceptual development of policy translation is attributable to work by Lendvai and Stubbs (2006) who draw from Latour’s (2005) ‘actor-network-theory’, also referred to as ‘the sociology of translation’, to address what they identify to be a deficiency in the mainstream literature on policy transfer: its linear and deterministic view of the policymaking process. From Latour
(2005: 39), the conceptual distinction between ‘policy transfer’ and ‘policy translation’ is apparent in the roles of ‘mediator’ and ‘intermediary’. Whereas an intermediary ‘transports meaning or force without transformation’, ‘[m]ediators transform, translate, distort and modify the meaning or the elements that they are supposed to carry’ with the effect that ‘[t]heir input is never a good predictor of their output’ (Latour 2005: 39). Mediators represent active participants in a process of transformation while intermediaries merely serve to transmit policies between contexts. Translation therefore implies that ‘...a series of interesting, and sometimes even surprising disturbances can occur in the spaces between the 'creation', the 'transmission' and the 'interpretation' or 'reception' of policy meanings’ (Lendvai and Stubbs 2007: 4).

Borrowing from Pratt (1991), Lendvai and Stubbs (2007: 6) describe these spaces as ‘contact zones’. According to Pratt (1991: 6; quoted in Lendvai and Stubbs 2007: 15), ‘contact zones’ describe ‘...the spatial and temporal co-presence of subjects previously separated by geographic and historic disjunctures, and whose trajectories now intersect’. These contact zones are important social sites where different actors interact and compete to shape policy meaning and content in relation to their individual and institutional preferences (Lendvai and Stubbs 2007: 16). Contact zones are actively constructed ‘through actor networks’ and therefore, they do not represent ‘pre-existing categories’ (Lendvai and Stubbs 2006: 6). In other words, a contact zone represents a shared space in which various stakeholders seek to translate their institutional preferences into policy prescriptions and ultimately, policy outputs.

Actors in the politicised space constituted by a contact zone and the security nodes that they bridge utilise different sources of influence in order to advance their own preferences within a shared system.2 Accordingly, Lendvai and Stubbs (2007: 16, original emphasis) write, '[i]n the 'contact zone' encounters are rarely, or rarely only, about words and their meaning but are almost always, more or less explicitly, about claims-making, opportunities, strategic choices and goals, interests and resource maximisation...'. Drawing on institutional resources, these translators compete to shape the language and prescriptions for policies in ways that reflect their own habitus. By habitus, I refer to the structured mentalities and dispositions that shape the practices and perceptions of individuals.3 The process of channelling one’s habitus through a

---

3 This simplified definition of habitus draws from definitions by Elias (2000) and Bourdieu (1968). It is intended to emphasise the idea that habitus is shaped by the continuous interplay between structure and agency and between objective and subjective forces. The idea that these seemingly diametrically opposed concepts are in practice mutually reinforcing and a key determinant of power serves as a recurring theme of this thesis, one which is explored in greater depth at the end of Chapter Four. Both Elias (2000) and Bourdieu (1977: 73-76) dismiss objectivist, structural theories which present habitus as ‘a vague notion that mechanically replicates social structures’ (quoting
universally appealing framework affords a translator a symbolic mark of legitimacy that serves to authenticate their subjective worldview and objectify it through the contact zone.

One can study the translational processes that generate policing reforms in developing and transitional societies as occurring within a nodal field or ‘network’ (Johnston and Shearing 2003: 160). Johnston and Shearing’s (2003) theory of nodal security governance provides an important conceptual framework for accounting for the interplay between the different actors, institutions and assemblages that collectively populate these poly-centric fields. Emphasising the mediated character of nodal security governance, they write:

‘...[this] model refuses to posit any correspondence between mentalities, the objectives, institutions and technologies associated with them, and governmental ‘outcomes’. For that reason we have been able to ask...whether the same mentality might, under different conditions, support normative programmes and substantive outcomes different from those which it is normally associated.’ (Johnston and Shearing 2003: 160).

Johnston and Shearing do not deny the existence of ‘power inequalities within nodal networks’ (Ibid: 160), rather they argue that structures alone are poor predictors of outcomes. This model is therefore appropriate for exploring the ways in which mediatory actors and institutions use policy translation to shape police reform processes and outcomes in weak and structurally dependent societies like BiH.\[^4\]

1.2 Why Bosnia and Herzegovina?

BiH represents a paradigmatic example of a transitional, post-conflict, and post-authoritarian society (Aitchison 2011). BiH is historically significant with respect to the development of the police reform literature. It was in relation to the work of the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) in the aftermath of the Bosnian War that the mantra of ‘democratic policing’ emerged as a universal prescription for pursuing police reforms in transitional and developing countries around the world (Bayley 2006: 7-8). Since 1996, BiH has been governed in relation to a concerted programme of liberal state-building, democratisation and most recently Europeanization at the behest of the international community. The European Union (EU) as the

\[^{4}\] I briefly review Johnston and Shearing’s (2003) work on nodal security governance in Section 2.4.
major ‘regional security assemblage’ in Europe is chief amongst the architects of state-building and police reform processes in BiH (Buzan and Wæver 2003). As of October 2012, the EU continues to play an important role in dictating the agenda for police reform in BiH, an agenda which is implemented via proxy through the work of different international organisations including the EU’s Special Representative to BiH, the Office of the High Representative in BiH (OHR), a European Union Police Mission (EUPM), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and a host of bi-lateral development agencies including representatives from EU constituent nations. Over the past decade, these agencies have worked to implement a glocal policing agenda aimed at aligning the governance and provision of public policing in BiH with the EU’s interest in securing its periphery and eventually preparing BiH for accession to the EU (Juncos 2011).

I focus my research exclusively on BiH in order to generate sufficiently detailed case studies that both complement and benefit from an established body of research that accounts for the international community’s involvement with peacebuilding (Fischer 2006), democratisation (Chandler 1999, 2006), criminal justice reforms (Aitchison 2011) and policing reforms (Collantes Celador 2007, 2009; Wisler 2005) over the past seventeen years. This literature was essential for initially identifying relevant nodes to research, sketching the contours of the fields which they inhabit, and contextualising my analysis. The existing body of literature on liberal state-building in BiH readily acknowledges the asymmetrical power structures that define the country’s relationship with the EU as well as their role in facilitating neo-liberal forms of governmentality in BiH (Merlingen and Ostauskaite 2005; Ryan 2011). It further questions the effectiveness of these reforms (Aitchison 2011), the contextual relevance of their outputs, and perhaps most significantly, their lasting impact (Belloni 2007). The asymmetric and coercive character of transnational, hierarchical power structures of liberal state-building are said to undermine the functionality of constitutionally established governing institutions and restrict the development of what Dryzek (2002) labels ‘discursive’ forms of deliberative governance throughout the country. It is in relation to this transnational, nodal field that police reforms are initiated in BiH and can therefore be studied.

I elaborate further on the composition and structure of the global policing field and the idea of ‘regional security assemblages’ in Section 2.1. Other countries in the Western Balkans that have undergone similar processes of ‘Europeanization’ with a concerted focus on police reforms might have provided viable case studies for this research and featuring multiple country case studies could have also added comparative dimension to my research on policy translation. However, I limited myself to a single country case study due to practical constraints (i.e. time, research funding) and my desire to explore multiple examples within a single context.
1.3 Background: Bosnia and Herzegovina

BiH is a former constituent republic of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) bordered by Croatia to the north and west, Serbia to the east, and Montenegro to the South. It is a multi-ethnic country in the sense that it features significant populations of Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs as well as smaller Jewish, Roma and Chinese populations. The last census taken in 1991 indicates that none of these populations formed an absolute majority. In April 1992, BiH declared its independence from the SFRY. During the three years which followed, the country experienced a particularly brutal interethnic conflict that prompted the international community to intervene and broker the Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995. While the Dayton Peace Agreement marked an end to the Bosnian War, as

---

a constitution for BiH its constitutional prescriptions have been criticised for establishing fragmented and dysfunctional political institutions (McMahon and Western 2009), creating dependency on the international community (Belloni 2001), and establishing the country as an international protectorate (Chandler 1999; Knaus and Martin 2003). As of August 2012, the international community remains an important source of influence over domestic governance in BiH due to the enduring presence of various international agencies and institutions in the country and the limited governmental capacities of the country’s political institutions.

BiH’s Dayton-prescribed government includes a weak central government based in the country’s political capital of Sarajevo, two entity level governments (Federation of BiH and Republika Srpska) and the Brčko District. While the entity-level government of the Republika Srpska remains highly centralised, that of the Federation of BiH (also based in Sarajevo) is subdivided into ten cantons, each with its own governing institutions. The effect of this political fragmentation is that the governance of low policing in BiH remains highly decentralised. This means that the implementation of local policing reforms has not been uniform and a significant degree of internal variation exists in terms of police capabilities and practices (International Conflict Group 2005). The fragmented political structures also mean that the high policing capacities of the BiH state were initially rather limited. As of 2012, the state level agency that deals with issues relating to organised crime and terrorism is the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) which forms part of the state’s Ministry of Security.

In addition to various policing agencies and state, entity and cantonal governmental institutions that are formally charged with governing security in BiH, other security nodes can be identified in relation to the various international actors and institutions involved with policing reforms since the late 1990s. These actors primarily populate nodes concerned with what Wood and Shearing (2006: 115) describe as the ‘governance of governance’ which means that they are not formal participants in policy making processes and nor do they actively contribute to the provision of policing. Rather, their role involves influencing policy making processes from a

---

8 Throughout this thesis, I make reference to Brodeur’s (1983; 2010) distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low policing’. ‘High policing’ refers to state-level policing designed to ‘protect national security’ while ‘low policing’ describes ‘everyday policing performed by uniformed agents and detectives’ (2010: 224). While Brodeur (1983) initially articulated this distinction in relation to the history of policing in France, he suggests that it is a relevant feature of policing in all modern societies, even though its structures and institutions may vary by context (2010: 224-225).

9 At the state-level, there also exists the BiH Border Guards (previously the State Border Service) that was officially activated in June 2000.

10 A possible exception is the Integrated Police Unit of the European Union Force ALTHEA (EUFOR) which is mandated to ‘conduct operations in support of BiH Law Enforcement Authorities, as well as in cooperation with other International actors or even autonomously’ (EUFOR 2012).
distance by lending their expertise, resources and influence to various initiatives that involve the governance of security. They also play an important role in facilitating policy transfers designed to modernise the police in BiH and improve its institutional capacities.

Examples of particularly influential nodal actors in BiH include major multi-lateral supranational institutions like the European Commission (EC), the European Union Police Mission (EUPM), the OHR and the OSCE. Also important are: multi-lateral international development organisations like UNDP, international non-governmental organisations such as the Saferworld Group; and bilateral development organisations like the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). Collectively, these organisations foster glocally-responsive policing reforms in BiH and thus, represent important activators of neo-liberal governmentality in the country. In Chapter Two, I argue that these governing activities are problematic with respect to the prospect of establishing democratically responsive police institutions in weak and structurally dependent societies.

This thesis examines this dynamic through case studies of two community-oriented police reform projects in BiH. The first project, initiated by UNDP, operated at multiple municipal-level sites in both the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and Republika Srpska (RS) while the second project, initiated by the SDC, operated at the sectoral level covering the entirety of Sarajevo Canton. While my research supports the idea that these projects were both heavily influenced by the interests and mentalities of powerful international donors, my analysis also suggests that this influence did not translate into predictable policy outputs or outcomes. The following section summarises how I proceeded to account for this idea of policy translation with my research design and further information relating to my methodology and methods is available in Chapter Five.

1.4 Research Design

My first case study examines the translational capacity of international development workers at a major multi-lateral international development agency in BiH using an ethnographic account of my three-month placement with the UNDP’s ‘Safer Communities’ project in BiH in 2011.11 I

11 I triangulate my use of participant observation by referencing a secondary literature on the history and structures of UNDP and the UN development system (Browne 2011; Murphy 2006), different
argue that this project, which was initially launched with UNDP ‘seed funding’ yet would subsequently attempt to redefine itself in order to attract non-core funding from European-based donors, constituted an important ‘contact zone’ (Pratt 1991) within the nodal architecture of security governance in BiH. My analysis of this contact zone suggests that the Safer Communities team’s institutional affiliation with UNDP afforded it important opportunities to utilise policy translation to define the Safer Communities model using concepts and project activities that were consistent with UNDP’s ‘capacity development’ ethos. Drawing on this ethos and their limited knowledge of the United Nations development system, I examine how the Safer Communities team devised creative solutions to this impending funding dilemma which allowed it to retain a local focus for the project.

With my second case study, I illustrate the translational capacities of police practitioners through a five-week qualitative evaluation of the implementation of an externally-initiated community policing project in Sarajevo Canton. Specifically, this case study accounts for the role of local community police officers (henceforth ‘RPZ officers/units’) in selectively implementing a model for community policing that was developed by the SDC and modelled on the ‘best practices’ of community policing in Switzerland and Anglo-American contexts (see Section 9.2). My data draws from: ethnographic observation and ethnographic interviews focusing on the two most experienced RPZ units in Sarajevo Canton (‘RPZ1’ and ‘RPZ2’); semi-structured follow-up interviews conducted with their station supervisors (n=2); semi-structured interviews with additional RPZ units operating in other parts of the Canton (n=3); and a semi-structured interview with the senior police officer responsible for overseeing the implementation of the SDC’s prescription (henceforth ‘RPZ Coordinator’).12

I use subcultural analysis vis-à-vis the dramaturgical metaphor (Goffman 1956; Manning 1977) to explore an evident disparity that existed between the SDC’s prescriptions for community policing and the actual practices that individual RPZ units generated as a result of their use of ‘dramaturgical translation’ to selectively implement these prescriptions. A preliminary analysis of the operational effectiveness of the implementation of community policing in Sarajevo Canton suggests that it is possible to characterise this initiative as a failed policy transfer. However, further analysis which accounts for implementation as a translational exercise

12 Additional perspectives are provided by follow-up interviews conducted with an active project associate for the SDC’s community-based policing project (henceforth ‘SDC Project Associate’) and Sead Traljic, one of the projects’ two external evaluators who had previously worked on DFID’s community-based policing project in BiH (see Appendix 1, Table A1.2).
indicates that the community policing was in fact utilised as an effective presentational strategy by officers from RPZ1. I argue that while dramaturgical translation may have limited the operational effectiveness of community policing in this context, it also provided these practitioners with a means of selectively incorporating desirable elements of the SDC’s ‘script’ into their habitus. Using strategic performances and audience segmentation, these officers also worked to translate the SDC’s prescriptions into mentalities and practices that they thought would better resonate with established subcultural understandings and societal expectations of police work. Thus, rather than analysing these translations as evidence of a policy failure, I argue that they illustrate selective adaptation and the incorporation of desirable elements of the SDC’s community policing philosophy into the local habitus of policing.

1.5 Structure of Thesis

With the remainder of this chapter, I introduce the structure of this thesis.

Chapter Two is the first of two literature review chapters that I use to introduce the concept of glocally-responsive policing as a framework for analysing internationally-driven policing reforms as technologies of transnational, neo-liberal governmentality. The chapter begins with a review of Duffield’s (1999; 2007) work on global liberal governance which I use to account for the hegemonic character of liberal order since the Cold War. I link these themes to Chandler’s (1999) critique of liberal state-building processes in BiH in order to illustrate the coercive and asymmetric character of the international community’s role in promoting and maintaining liberal peace in weak and structurally dependent societies. I proceed to link this discussion to work by Ignatieff (2003) and Duffield (2007) and suggest that we can analyse these interventions as mechanisms of neo-liberal governmentality designed to secure global prescriptions for local order through the formal institutions of state governance from a distance.

Chapter Three builds on this analysis by exploring the ordering function of glocally-responsive policing and police reforms amidst the coercive and asymmetrical power structures described in Chapter Two. I account for the ways in which policing reforms represent important mechanisms for generating glocal order in weak and structurally dependent societies as well as the politicised nature of international prescriptions for ‘democratic policing’, a popular framework for pursuing these reforms. Two templates for establishing glocally-responsive models of democratic policing are discussed: community policing and community safety partnerships. I then proceed to explore the political implications of the international
community’s role in promoting glocallly-responsive police reforms in developing and transitional societies before reviewing an alternative framework for pursuing ‘democratically responsive policing’ in these contexts. Finally, I conclude this chapter by elaborating on the value of analysing glocallly-responsive police reforms using a nodal framework to account for the diverse array of actors involved with these processes.

Chapter Four introduces policy translation as my conceptual framework for exploring the mediated character of glocallly-responsive policing reforms. I account for the significance of convergence in the era of globalisation and proceed to explore various critiques of ‘policy transfer’ as being overly linear and deterministic in its representation of how human agency impacts policy making processes. Drawing on work by Lendvai and Stubbs (2006), I argue that it is advantageous to use the alternative concept of policy translation to analyse police reforms as mediated processes that are influenced not only by the powerful architects of global policing and global liberal governance, but also by policy translators.

In Chapter Five, I review my methodology and the ethnographic methods that I used to complete my field work in BiH. I account for various challenges that I encountered while conducting my ethnographic case studies including access issues and reflexivity. I also account for how I analysed my extensive field notes and I conclude this chapter by briefly exploring the methodological limitations of my research.

Chapter Six provides specific, historical contextualisation of my case studies with a brief review of the police reform process in BiH since 1996. This discussion touches upon important themes identified in Chapters Two and Three including the domineering role of the international community in steering the police reform process in BiH and the popularity of templates for glocallly-responsive community policing reforms. Reviewing the implementation of two community-oriented policing projects that preceded UNDP’s Safer Communities project and the SDC’s community policing initiative in Sarajevo Canton also foreshadows concerns about the non-democratic character of police reforms as mechanisms for promoting neo-liberal governmentality and the limited responsiveness of important decision making processes to domestic political institutions.

\footnote{I initially developed this framework for ‘democratically responsive policing’ with Andy Aitchison as part of an article that is forthcoming in the \textit{European Journal of Criminology} (Aitchison and Blaustein 2013; see Appendix 3) however, my discussion of its discursive character which draws on Dryzek’s (2002) work represents an original contribution of this thesis.}
In Chapters Seven and Eight, I present my ethnographic case study of the Safer Communities project and explore the translational capacities of ‘local’ development workers at UNDP.\textsuperscript{14} Chapter Seven provides specific contextualisation for this case study by introducing the capacity development ethos that is central to the habitus of the international development worker at UNDP. This discussion also explores the extent to which this ethos problematized by the co-presence of core and non-core funding streams within the UN development system. I then proceed to review the specific origins of the Safer Communities project and account for key developments leading up to the start of my ‘internship’ which commenced in January 2011. I conclude this chapter by identifying the Safer Communities project as an important ‘concrete’ contact zone that linked local security nodes (‘Citizen Security Forums’) to various transnational nodes including UNDP and the EC.

In Chapter Eight, I present my ethnographic account of the Safer Communities project. I account for the use of policy translation by reflecting on the team’s attempts to render the Safer Communities project attractive for prospective European donors and the team’s subsequent decision to retain the project’s local focus on capacity development work and sustainability. This analysis suggests that this contact zone afforded members of the Safer Communities team important opportunities to structure the contours of the project and to generate policy prescriptions and support project activities that reflected UNDP’s capacity development ethos. It also illustrates the extent to which individual and institutional motives shape these negotiated processes and the outputs they generated. In my discussion, I also address my third research question regarding the potential role of policy translation in fostering democratically responsive policing in weak and structurally dependent societies like BiH.

Chapters Nine and Ten account for my second case study involving the SDC’s community policing project in Sarajevo Canton. Chapter Nine situates the SDC’s project by reviewing the structure of policing in Sarajevo Canton. I then proceed to account for the SDC’s prescriptions for community policing before analysing their effectiveness as an operational strategy in Sarajevo Canton. While my analysis suggests that this reform was initially unsuccessful in terms of generating a consistent set of community policing practices, these inconsistencies also highlight the agentive capacities of RPZ officers. Based on this recognition, I determine that there is value in analysing and re-examining this initiative as policy translation.

\textsuperscript{14} A previous version of these chapters has been accepted for publication by Policing and Society (Blaustein forthcoming; see Appendix 4).
In Chapter Ten, I introduce a new concept of ‘dramaturgical translation’ that is useful for analysing the translational capacities of police practitioners tasked with implementing reforms. Linking the work of Goffman (1956) and Manning (1977) to that of Lendvai and Stubbs (2006) and Pratt (1991), I define dramaturgical translation as the use of performances to selectively and strategically mediate the conceptual and programmatic contours of externally-defined prescriptions for institutional change in ways that reflect the structured entrepreneurial interests of ‘performers’ in an organisational setting. Using this framework to analyse my ethnographic observation of the officers from RPZ1, I account for the capacity of relatively disempowered police practitioners to affect the conceptual and programmatic contours of policing in positive ways using techniques involving performance and audience segmentation.

Finally, in Chapter Eleven, I revisit my research questions and reflect upon the prospective benefits of policy translation as a means of mitigating the potentially harmful or anti-democratic effects of externally-driven police development assistance programmes in developing and transitional societies.
Chapter Two: Global Liberal Governance as Neo-Liberal Governmentality

This literature review chapter contextualises the function and implications of locally-responsive policing reforms in weak and structurally dependent societies like Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). It accounts for the coercive and asymmetrical structures of international interventions designed to establish and enforce liberal order through the domestic architecture of developing and transitional states in the age of global liberal governance. Section 2.1 reviews the phenomenon of global liberal governance and the relationship between development and security in the age of globalisation (Duffield 1999; 2007). This accounts for the impetus behind international interventions targeting developing and transitional states since the 1990s as well as the coercive and asymmetrical nature of these interventions. Section 2.2 reviews Chandler’s (1999; 2002; 2006) work to illustrate the coercive structures inherent to liberal state-building projects and in Section 2.3, I argue that a comparable dynamic is evident in relation to the structural politics of the international development system (Hulme and Edwards 1997). Returning to Duffield’s (2007) work, I conclude this chapter by labelling these interventions forms of neo-liberal governmentality that serve to ‘distance’ the architects of liberal order from the coercive, non-democratic processes that establish and reinforce their prescriptions through the governing architectures of weak and structurally dependent states.

2.1 Global Liberal Governance and the ‘New Humanitarianism’

Duffield (1999) provides a critical analysis of the origins of globalisation by accounting for the emergence of a ‘development security’ nexus during the 1990s. He writes that this development can be attributed to the demise of ‘Third Worldism’ and the subsequent decline of the bi-polar international system beginning in the 1980s. Essentially, he argues that the lack of ideological competition at the international level cemented the dominance of the liberal discourse and contributed to the ‘reproblematisation of underdevelopment as dangerous’. This was significant, argues Duffield, because it served to ‘[suppress] those aspects of Third Worldism and international socialism that argued the existence of inequalities within the global system…[have] a direct bearing on the extent and nature of poverty (Ibid:28).’ This suggests that the political and economic character of global governance in the aftermath of the Cold War
was intrinsically liberal and that the international system no longer exists as a contested ideological field.

As a result of this important shift in the ideological power structure of the international system, characterized by the advent of what Fukuyama (1992) would enthusiastically (and prematurely) describe as ‘the end of history’, Duffield (1999: 30) argues that ‘development’, be it economic, political or social, emerged as an important strategy for consolidating liberal power and securing the preservation of liberal peace as prescribed by emergent ‘networks of global liberal governance’. In other words, the ideal of liberal peace is grounded in a belief that the causes of conflict are inherently linked with underdevelopment rather than structural inequalities. Development has therefore emerged as a strategy for not only reducing the risk of conflict in underdeveloped states, but also as a mechanism for preserving the integrity of the emergent liberal status quo (Ibid: 112).

In relation to this emergent global liberal order, Duffield (2007) argues that a broadened definition of security has been embraced by both international policy circles and by prominent academics working in the field of international relations (e.g. Doyle 1983; 2011). This broadened definition emphasised the idea that threats to international security are no longer limited to conventional military conflict between sovereign states but also included threats to ‘human security’ (Kaldor 2007), ‘a more diffuse and multiform threat associated with alienation, breakdown and insurgency emanating from the nominal populations of Southern states’ (Duffield 2007: 112). For powerful international actors of the Global North, facilitating the development of weak states through financial assistance represents an appealing strategy for regulating the risk that underdevelopment may lead to conflict. Managing this risk is significant due to a belief that localised conflicts can produce a ripple effect and threaten regional and global stability.

Before I expand on Duffield’s (2007) discussion of global liberal governance, it is important to account for the different global actors that define the contours of liberal order and security. During the 1990’s and the early 2000’s, prominent scholars in the field of international relations generally associated the hegemonic power structures of the international system with a single state actor: the United States (Huntington 1999; Caraley 2004; Chomsky 2004). However, subsequent analyses of the structure of international security politics and global and transnational policing indicate that global liberal order cannot be reduced to the strategic interests of a single hegemon. Rather, liberal order and security politics represent contested spheres. For example, Buzan and Wæver (2003) argue that prescriptions for global liberal order
are constructed through negotiated geo-political processes involving an array of ‘regional security complexes’ (RSC) such as the United States and the European Union (EU). Buzan and Wæver (2003: 491) describe RSCs as ‘set[s] of [political] units’ whose security interests ‘are so interlinked that their security problems cannot be reasonably analysed or resolved apart from one another’. These RSCs are said to shape the contours of global governance by using their regional influence to structure the international community’s response to specific issues or disruptions that affect their spheres of influence. This analysis is consistent with Bowling and Sheptycki’s (2012: 23) discussion of the poly-centric power structures that shape the contours of global policing as well as Andreas and Nadelmann’s (2008:21) recognition of the fact that ‘global prohibition regimes’ are shaped by various actors that include governments ‘able to exert hegemonic influence in a particular issue area’ and ‘transnational moral entrepreneurs’ with self-interested motives for promoting and advancing particular definitions for liberal order.

The degree of influence enjoyed by these actors inevitably varies in relation to specific geo-political contexts. For example, a regional security hegemon like the European Union plays a relatively greater role in shaping the agenda for regional security in proximate regions while relatively more powerful actors such as the United States or China appear to enjoy greater influence with respect to issues of global significance. The EU’s influence over regional security politics is particularly evident in the Western Balkans where this supranational polity has played the leading role in shaping agendas for governance and security since the early 2000’s. The EU’s interest in shaping the region is linked with its desire to secure its periphery as well as specific concerns about the ripple effect of political instability and conflict in countries like BiH and Kosovo (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 357-359).

The emphasis on securing liberal peace and preventing local conflict as well as the recurrence of conflict has thus created a powerful impetus for these Northern architects of global liberal governance to intervene in the domestic affairs of those states whose instability or underdevelopment is believed to jeopardise liberal order be it regionally or globally defined. Duffield (1999: 11) notes that during the early 1990s, this narrative primarily manifested itself in the form of ‘humanitarian interventions’ however, in the late-1990s, it was re-oriented towards ambitions of ‘conflict resolution and post-war reconstruction’. Duffield labels this emergent narrative ‘the new humanitarianism’ and suggests that it embodies a belief that international interventions have an ‘ameliorative, harmonising and transformational power’ that can ‘reduce violent conflict and prevent its recurrence (Ibid: 11)’.
As Chandler (1999: 13) observes, this belief reflects an emergent consensus in international policy making circles that ‘…new democracies are seen to be so fragile that, ‘even without any immediate or direct threat’, they may be susceptible to collapse’. In other words, this mentality demonstrates the international community’s embrace of a ‘regulatory’ approach to promoting and supporting democratisation. At the core of this regulatory mentality was the belief that ‘[w]ithout the cultural preconditions of civil society, the institutions of liberal democracy are seen to be little more than window-dressing’ (Ibid. 10). In the age of global liberal governance, this suggests that the autonomy of the liberal, democratic sovereign states is in fact problematic as there is no guarantee that they will independently and autonomously generate policies that reflect emergent global definitions of liberal order. Accordingly, Chandler (2010: 3) argues that the autonomy of developing and transitional states in particular is viewed as a threat to global liberal order ‘rather than the unproblematic starting assumption’. It is in relation to this mentality that a paradigm of international intervention with a transformative emphasis on liberal state-building (also referred to as ‘nation-building’)

15 and democratisation has emerged over the past two decades.

2.2 Liberal State-Building in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Historically, Duffield (2007: 7) writes that there exists no ‘essential relationship between liberalism and democracy’. Rather, he suggests that liberalism represents a technology of government but not necessarily of democratic governance. He illustrates this claim in relation to the apparent contradiction between the emergence of liberal democratic forms of government in Western Europe during the 19th Century and the persistence of ‘non-representative and despotic forms of imperial rule overseas’ (Duffield 2007: 7). This ‘paradox’, argues Duffield, has historically been resolved through the notion of a ‘developmental trusteeship’, a liberal construct which he argues ‘has once again entered the political foreground following the renewed wave of Western humanitarian and peace interventionism of the post-Cold War period’ (Ibid: 7). The coercive and asymmetrical character of international interventions designed to promote this ‘new humanitarianism’ is particularly evident in the case of liberal state-building projects.

15 The terms ‘nation-building’ (Ignatieff 2003) and ‘state-building’ will be used interchangeably in this thesis to refer to ‘a mechanism of ongoing relationship management which is capable of ameliorating the problems of autonomy, or of government, through the extension of internationalized mechanisms of government’ (Chandler 2010: 2).
In relation to liberal state-building initiatives of the past two-decades, Chandler (1999: 3) writes that this notion of democratisation has emphasised ‘building the capacity of individuals to be able to use their already existing autonomy safely and unproblematically’. In other words, democratisation as a focus of liberal state-building is not concerned with generating political freedom at the grass-roots level. Rather, it aspires to align local mentalities with global interests. This helps to ensure that political sovereignty does not conflict with global liberal order and the interests of the actors who affect its contours. To promote compatibility, international actors exercise their coercive powers to shape domestic governance in weak and structurally dependent societies like BiH. Thus, while political democratisation represents an important rhetorical element of liberal state-building projects over the past two-decades, the relationship between state-building and the idea of representative democratic governance is problematic insofar as state-building generally involves non-democratic practices that in certain circumstances, may also prove to be anti-democratic. Exploring the experience of liberal state-building in BiH illustrates this argument and also, the extent that important governing processes associated with state-building are structurally responsive to the interests of supranational actors often to the detriment of constitutionally established, domestic political institutions.

During the 1990s, BiH emerged as a prototypical case of international intervention and liberal state-building. Whereas the impetus to intervene in conflict-ridden states or humanitarian crises was previously evident in other countries including Somalia and Haiti, the international community’s role in overseeing the peacebuilding process in BiH was unique insofar as this intervention extended well-beyond conflict management or containment and included prescriptive aspirations for reconciliation and a long-term commitment to overseeing this troubled state’s ‘democratic transition’.16 Since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995, various representatives of the international and European communities have played a significant role in ‘steering’ the country’s liberal democratic transition with the ultimate goal of establishing BiH as a member of the EU. It is beyond the remit of this thesis to examine the intricate and complex history of BiH and nor is there room to provide an adequate review of pre-war BiH, the Bosnian War itself, or its immediate aftermath.17 Rather, I seek to

---

16 Other attempts at ‘third-party state-building’ during the mid-1990s included UN-led international territorial administrations over East Slavonia, Kosovo and East Timor (Caplan, 2004: 10).

17 Malcolm (1996) provides an accessible history of Bosnia and Herzegovina leading up to the Bosnian War while Mazower (2002), Ramet (2005) and Silber and Little (1997) provide examples of competing explanations for the collapse of the SFRY and the events leading up to the Bosnian War. Bose (2002) and Chandler (1999) provide useful discussions of the Dayton Peace Agreement as well as the international community’s intervention in BiH during the late 1990s. Chandler’s work has been particularly influential in drawing attention to critical themes relating to the international
provide a brief account of BiH’s experience as a relatively advanced case of a transitional, post-conflict society undergoing a concerted liberal state-building process.\textsuperscript{18}

BiH declared its independence in March 1992 following its 47 year history as a constituent republic of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Even prior to this event, however, tensions were high between the country’s three constituent nationalities. The imminent prospect of conflict and its perceived threat to regional stability compelled representatives of the international community to take an active interest in BiH’s projected transition to an independent, democratic state. Chandler (1999: 39) describes how in September 1991, the European Community’s (EC) Council of Ministers organised a peace conference which was specifically intended ‘to keep Yugoslavia as a loose federation composing one state.’ This is not to suggest that the international community initially supported BiH’s bid for independence but rather that these proposals projected a future role for the international community in ‘regulating’ or overseeing any future developments. In December 1995, the formalisation of the international community’s prescribed oversight over this transitional process coincided with the signing of a brokered peace agreement that ended the four-year Bosnian War. The Dayton Peace Agreement, which served as both a peace treaty and a constitution for the newly created Bosnian state, lies at the core of the coercive and asymmetric structures of liberal state-building in BiH.

Chandler (1999: 33) writes in drafting the Dayton Agreement, the international community afforded itself a legitimate remit for overseeing the long-term reconstruction of the newly created BiH state. In this respect, BiH emerged as the prototypical case of liberal state-building during the 1990s, an experimental platform upon which various strategies of intervention and regulation could be tested for future application to other post-conflict societies. The legal basis for the international community’s involvement in the domestic, sovereign affairs of this newly created state is evident from the eleven ‘Annexes’ listed in the Dayton Peace Agreement (see Office of the High Representative 1995). Given that this thesis is primarily concerned with police reform and the governance of security, it is worth recognising that Annex 11 of the

\textsuperscript{18} By ‘relatively advanced case of a transitional, post-conflict society’ I argue that BiH began its ‘transition’ years before other high profile examples of transitional post-conflict societies including Afghanistan or Iraq. Unlike these recent examples, the risk of a recurrence of conflict in BiH is perceived to be relatively low and external security forces play only a limited role in providing support and training to domestic providers. ‘Advanced’ does not imply however that BiH’s governing institutions are comparable in terms of their functionality to those of advanced liberal democracies.
Dayton Agreement formally established the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) to assist the signatories with ‘meeting their obligations’ in providing ‘a safe and secure environment for all persons in their respective jurisdictions’ and with ‘maintaining civilian law enforcement agencies operating in accordance with internationally recognized standards and with respect for internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms’. However, the most influential source of enduring power for the international community in BiH is Annex 10 of the Dayton Agreement which established the Office of the High Representative in BiH (OHR) as the institution tasked with overseeing ‘civilian aspects of the peace settlement’ (Ibid).

The OHR was initially established to function as the United Nations’ (UN) formal representative in BiH. Accordingly, the OHR’s mandate was officially endorsed by Resolution 1031 of the UN Security Council in December 1995 (Aitchison, 2011: 51; United Nations Security Council 1995). The true extent of this institution’s power can be inferred from Article V of Annex 10 of the Dayton Agreement which states that ‘[t]he High Representative is the final authority in theatre regarding interpretation of this Agreement on the civilian implementation of the peace settlement’ (Office of the High Representative 1995).

Caplan (2004: 55) suggests that while the institutional mandate of the OHR was initially weak compared to those prescribed for other ‘UN transitional administrators’ in Eastern Slavonia, Kosovo and East Timor, its powers were subsequently bolstered in December 1997 as a result of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) meeting in Bonn. Aitchison (2011: 50) writes that the institutional enhancement of the OHR was most evident in relation to the greater executive function which the PIC afforded it. Notably, the Council concluded that the High Representative should have the power ‘to make binding decisions, as he judges necessary (Peace Implementation Council 1997)’. The enhanced authority of the High Representative was specifically intended to address those cases where domestic actors were unable or unwilling to fulfil their legal obligations as defined by the Dayton agreement. Aitchison’s (2011: 51) analysis suggests that these newly afforded powers had a direct and immediate impact on the ability of the High Representative to make decisions. For example, only one decision was released through the OHR in 1997 however, after the OHR was afforded its ‘Bonn Powers’, this number increased to 31 decisions in 1998 and to 91 decisions in 1999. The nature and extent of these prescribed powers lead Knaus and Martin (2003: 59) to describe the OHR as a ‘European

---

19 Aitchison (2011: 50) adds that these conclusions were formally endorsed by the UN Security Council via Resolution 1144 in December 1997 (United Nations Security Council 1997b) and reaffirmed by Resolution 1184 the following year (United Nations Security Council 1998).
Raj’ with respect to its capacity to ‘interpret its own mandate’ and its ‘essentially unlimited legal powers’ which mean that ‘…it is not accountable to any elected institution at all’.

The international community’s role self-prescribed role in BiH has subsequently prompted influential academic dialogues regarding apparent normative and ideological contradictions associated with this form of prolonged international intervention. For example, Chandler’s (1999: 4) critique of the international community’s approach to democratisation in BiH suggests that ‘[t]he agency of democratisation is no longer held to be the ‘demos’ or people, through the growth of political freedoms or liberties, self-government and sovereignty, but the international regulatory bodies which are now overseeing the political process…’ In other words, Chandler argues that the international community’s prolonged intervention in BiH created ‘relations of dependency’ rather than relations conducive to empowerment and the activation of newly established BiH political institutions. Chandler accounts for this trend by arguing that democracy, as a blanket prescription for governance in transitional societies, describes a moral category rather than one with political significance. This leads him to conclude that ‘the process of democratisation concerns societal values and attitudes rather than political processes’ (Ibid: 28).

Chandler (1999) argues that the moralisation of democracy is fundamentally problematic in BiH because it undermines the ability of a society to independently govern itself in a manner responsive to public interests. The actualisation of liberal, democratic values and political processes through functional institutions of governance is precluded by prevailing structures that advance the interests of international actors while simultaneously limiting opportunities for domestic stakeholders to meaningfully shape this agenda. In this respect, it is evident that governance in structurally dependent societies like BiH is not consistent with deliberative forms of democratic governance (see Section 3.4).

Chandler’s (1999) analysis further suggests that there is a functional logic underpinning liberal state-building projects. In the aftermath of the Cold War, he writes that ‘the drive behind democratisation can be located in the needs of international institutional actors for new forms of co-operation and new ways of legitimating their international regulatory role’ (Ibid: 93). In other words, Chandler argues that democratisation served as the ‘perfect form for this ongoing process of international co-operation because there is no fixed end-point’ (Ibid: 193). A key consequence of this ‘mission creep’ in BiH is that the capacities of domestic political institutions remain limited as local political elites have been rendered ‘superfluous to policy development and implementation’ (Ibid: 194-195; also Belloni 2001).
Building on his arguments in *Faking Democracy After Dayton*, Chandler (2006: 8) has subsequently characterised the enduring presence of the international community in BiH as evidence of an ‘informal trusteeship’. He further concludes that that after ten years of concerted state-building initiatives, ‘the main transition which has taken place [in BiH] has been from the ad hoc policy-ownership of self-selected members of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) to direct regulatory control under the aegis of the European Union (EU).’ In other words, Chandler’s analysis suggests that the overall effect of this transition is that BiH ownership of these newly created institutions remains ‘limited’ and that ‘[t]he Bosnian public has effectively been excluded from the transition process’ (Ibid: 32-33).

### 2.3 From Faking Democracy to Empire in Denial?

David Chandler’s discussion of liberal state-building in BiH serves as an important platform for his later work which analyses the motives underpinning international interventions in other post-conflict societies during the 2000’s. Notably, Chandler (2002) elaborates on his argument that democratisation and international interventions are pursued by self-interested actors by exploring their motives. Focusing his analysis primarily on American and British-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, he associates these motives with the need for liberal actors to bolster their own domestic legitimacy ‘by exaggerating the legitimacy problems of peripheral or pariah states’ (Ibid: 224). In other words, Chandler suggests that powerful international actors embrace this ‘new humanitarianism’ narrative because it enables them to mask their own deficiencies by focusing on those of developing and transitional states like BiH. He argues that the actors who steer these interventions do so for reasons other than pragmatic security concerns associated with the idea of ‘human security’ discussed in Section 2.1. This argument also introduces an important distinction between ‘liberal imperialism’ of the 21st century and that of the 18th and 19th centuries. Whereas the latter variant is commonly associated with economic interests and empire-building, Chandler (2002) argues that interventions pursued within the framework of ‘new humanitarianism’ must respect enduring liberal norms of non-intervention, global justice and liberal peace.

Seeking to legitimise these interventions, Chandler (2006: 190) argues that the architects behind liberal state-building projects employ a ‘practice of denying empire’ in order to present their motives as a-political and deontological. Denying empire relies heavily on concepts like ‘empowerment’ and ‘capacity building’ which portray state-building processes as being
responsive to local development needs. Chandler (2002: 230) is dismissive however of the possibility that externally-driven democra
tisation processes may actually contribute to the ‘empowerment’ of individuals in recipient societies. Instead, he argues that prolonged external oversight of internationally governed democra
tisation or state-building processes actually undermine local responsiveness by ensuring the ‘dismissal of the political sphere as a viable mechanism for generating this change in recipient societies’ (Ibid: 230). This leads Chandler (2006) to conclude that politically ambiguous prescriptions for state-building and democra
tisation that emphasize the language of ‘local capacity building’, ‘local ownership’, and ‘empowerment’ are frequently compromised by the underlying structural politics of global liberal governance. The symbolic transfer of power and responsibility for liberal governance from international actors to domestic political institutions of weak and structurally dependent societies is therefore important because it outwardly renders them a-political. It also suggests that these processes can be analysed as mechanisms of neo-liberal ‘governmentality’ which Foucault (1991: 102) defines as:

“The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has at its target population, as its principle form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security.’ (Foucault 1991: 102)

2.4 The ‘New Humanitarianism’ as Neo-Liberal Governmentality

From Chandler’s work, it is clear that liberal state-building is driven by the interests of powerful, supranational actors and assemblages and that ‘the new humanitarianism’ promotes the relative subordination of local interests to those of powerful global actors. The emphasis on legitimacy and the need for these actors to respect liberal norms like sovereignty and non-intervention further implies that liberal state-building constitutes an important technique of neo-liberal governmentality because it enables powerful global actors to legitimately transpose their designs for governance upon domestic political institutions in weak and structurally dependent societies from a distance (Duffield 2007). In this respect, we might consider that interventions pursued within this ‘new humanitarian’ framework constitute important mechanisms for producing and securing glocally-responsive order in countries that are either unable or unwilling to do so on their own accord.

The hegemonic character of the governance that shapes these interventions is also apparent from the work of Ignatieff (2003) who describes liberal state-building or nation-building projects as manifestations of ‘empire lite’. This hegemony, argues Ignatieff, is primarily structured by American foreign policy interests. Lacking the status of a global hegemonic power however, Ignatieff (2003: 18%) writes that the Americans have effectively co-opted Europe into providing legitimacy and multilateral support for its ‘peacekeeping, nation-building and humanitarian reconstruction’ initiatives. Ignatieff’s (2003) analysis of international security politics is dated and overly simplistic but his argument that it is shaped by hegemonic power structures contributes to our understanding of the neo-liberal character of transnational forms of governance because it associates ‘Empire Lite’ with neo-liberal technologies of domination (Lemke 2001: 2) that involve the use of conditionality and indirect coercion rather than direct coercion or political suppression.

From Ignatieff’s (2003) work, it is also clear that governmentality is also a feature of the politics of the international development system. For example, he describes how powerful international actors use their political influence and economic capital to steer the work of international organisations in transitional, post-conflict societies:

> ‘These agencies – UNICEF, UNHCR, the International Committee of the Red Cross, - are dependent on Western governments for their funding, yet they struggle to keep a space free to meet humanitarian need irrespective of the political wishes of their paymasters. Yet humanitarian relief cannot be kept distinct from imperial projects, not least because humanitarian action is only possible, in many instances, if imperial armies have first cleared the ground and made it safe for humanitarians to act.’ (Ignatieff 2003: 20%)

Ignatieff’s (2003) analysis of the relationship between humanitarian aid organisations and ‘imperial powers’ focuses on the early stages of a post-conflict intervention yet his characterisation is consistent with Hulme and Edwards’ (1997) analysis of the structural politics of the international development system more generally. Specifically, Hulme and Edwards

---

21 Ignatieff’s (2003) primary examples of ‘empire lite’ focus on the post-9/11 American led occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq.

22 For example, Ignatieff’s (2003) work neglects to account for differing agendas between regional security assemblages (Buzan and Waever 2003) and the influence of these polities within their relevant spheres of influence. This is particularly evident in relation to the EU which plays an important role in steering development and state-building projects in the transitional states that constitute its periphery (e.g. the Western Balkans) (Holden 2009).
(1997: 12) account for a burgeoning interest amongst international donors in development work and NGO activity since the late-1990s. They argue that development aid and assistance allows these donors to influence agendas for development work without becoming directly involved in interventions or state-building processes. Conditionality is attached to development aid and this allows powerful donors like the EU and the United States to transpose their policy preferences on developing and transitional states via proxy. International development assistance programmes enable donor governments to assert their interests using various ‘aid frameworks’ that include provisions for non-core funding that can only be accessed by those development agencies and NGOs that align their goals with donor interests (Ibid; Browne 2006; Ellison and Pino 2012).

Linking the structural politics of the international development system with his discussion of global liberal governance, Duffield (2007) accounts for international development assistance as an important technique of neo-liberal governmentality that ‘offers donor governments several points of engagement with state incumbents and opportunities for selective capacity building without necessarily legitimising those incumbents’ (Duffield 2007: 118). In relation to the liberal emphasis on maintaining a balance between freedom and order, Duffield adds that governmentality is particularly innovative because it maximises the social distance between the powerful international actors that collectively advance the interests of global liberal governance and the recipients of this aid whose governing autonomy is marginalised as a result. The following chapter builds on this argument in exploring the ways in which glocally-responsive police reforms reinforce neo-liberal governance and enhance liberal ordering in weak and structurally dependent societies like BiH.

Chapter Three: Glocal Policing and Liberal Order

Building on the previous chapter’s discussion of global liberal governance and neo-liberal governmentality in developing and transitional societies, this chapter explores the significance of policing and police reforms as ordering mechanisms for transnational governance. Section 3.1 discusses why police reforms serve an important order maintenance function in aligning the governance of security in weak and structurally dependent societies with the interests of global policing and global liberal governance. It also introduces Bowling and Sheptycki’s (2012) critical theory of global policing which I argue is complementary to Duffield’s (2007) work on global liberal governance. In Section 3.2, I account for the hegemonic character of ‘democratic
policing’ as a framework for pursuing policing reforms around the world and I examine two influential templates for establishing glocally-responsive forms of democratic policing: community policing and community safety partnerships.

Section 3.3 accounts for the political implications of internationally-driven police reform processes with a review of Ryan’s (2011) work which suggests that neo-liberal governmentality fosters political disempowerment amidst the coercive and asymmetric structures of liberal state-building. This is determined to be particularly apparent with respect to their role in rendering local institutions responsible for the governance of security responsive to supranational interests rather than decisions made by domestic politicians. Seeking to confront the non-democratic character of internationally-driven police reform processes, I introduce an alternative framework for establishing ‘democratically responsive policing’ in Section 3.4. Building on this framework, Section 3.5 concludes this chapter by discussing the prospective benefits of analysing the policy transfers responsible for glocally-responsive police reforms through Johnston and Shearing’s (2003) nodal security governance framework. I argue that analysing the nodal fields through which these reforms are transmitted and constructed promises to illuminate various opportunities that exist for relatively disempowered mediatory policy actors and local practitioners to influence these reforms and potentially improve the democratic responsiveness of their outputs in relation to local interests and institutions of governance.

3.1 Glocal Policing for Glocal Order

In this section, I elaborate on the idea that police reforms represent important ordering mechanisms in weak and structurally dependent societies. My discussion proceeds with a review of Bowling and Sheptycki’s (2012) critical theory of global policing and the archetypical actors who promote glocal policing agendas through practitioner networks and transnational policy communities (Marenin 2007). I then proceed to elaborate on the significance of police reforms as mechanisms for securing liberal order in the aftermath of conflict with reference to Marenin’s (1982) early work and Hills’ (2009) discussion of ‘security sector reforms’ in post-conflict societies.

Bowling and Sheptycki (2012: 8) define global policing as ‘the capacity to use coercive and surveillant powers around the world in ways that pass right through national boundaries unaffected by them’. This suggests that global policing serves as an important ordering mechanism for aligning the governance of security in developing and transitional states with the
interests of global liberal governance. This ordering function involves the anticipation and control of local risks that pose a threat to global order (Ericson and Haggerty 1997: pp. 91-95; Beck 1999). To this end, global policing facilitates the consolidation of disparate power structures by contributing to the strategic dissemination of liberal mentalities, policies and practices that align national and sub-national policing structures with liberal mentalities and practices (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012: 25).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Archetype</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>the technician</strong></td>
<td>‘...the lynchpin of contemporary knowledge-based or intelligence-led policing...[t]he technician...is broadly concerned with the efficient gathering and management of data...an appendage of the surveillant assemblage’ (p. 87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>the diplomat</strong></td>
<td>‘...attuned to the nuances of legal, bureaucratic and political difference found in the multi-institutional settings in which policing takes place’, the ‘diplomat’ links different policing agents and organisations through formal structures and creates basis for cooperation and partnership (p. 88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>the entrepreneur</strong></td>
<td>‘...an agent of institutional change....busy advancing the next big idea.’ A proponent of the ‘technical wizardry of scientific policing’ that may also exhibit elements of ‘moral entrepreneurship’ (p.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>the public relations expert</strong></td>
<td>‘...acts to repress and circumvent some dilemmas in policing and dramatise others’. Key to ‘[shaping] the contours of the global policing mission’. (p. 89-90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>the legal ace</strong></td>
<td>Capitalises on the ‘double-edged quality of law’ and uses it creatively to advance the interests of transnational policing through the creative application of ‘civil, administrative and regulatory law as tools of disruption’ (p. 90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>the spy</strong></td>
<td>The ‘agent provocateurs’ of policing who use covert techniques to achieve utilitarian ends, these agents ‘further colour the legitimacy of an already tainted occupation’ (p. 91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>the field operator</strong></td>
<td>‘...the workhorse of policing....they manage both immediate issues of public safety and aim to avert future ills...major players in multi-agency policing, neighbourhood policing and community policing experiments in many jurisdictions’ (p. 91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>the enforcer</strong></td>
<td>‘...maximises the assertion that the use of force is the core task of policing’ (p. 92)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

23 Adapted from: Bowling and Sheptycki (2012: 87-93).
‘Glocal policing’ describes local (sub-national) and national police organisations that are responsive in their strategic orientation and practices to transnational issues that have implications beyond their national borders (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012: 25). Glocal policing, as a means for controlling local risk and promoting structural alignment, describes a form of indirect intervention and neo-liberal governmentality in the context of global liberal governance. This implies that promoting an agenda for glocally-responsive policing does not require powerful global actors like the European Union (EU) to outwardly exercise direct coercion in order to affect the governance of security in weak and structurally dependent societies. Rather, it allows them to influence policing mentalities and practices from a distance through liberal state-building processes and international development aid programmes. Accordingly, policing reforms can be said to represent important priorities for reformers working to promote democratisation, liberalisation and international development agendas in countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).

Bowling and Sheptycki (2012: 87-92) introduce a useful typology of the roles that different archetypical actors play in advancing global agendas for policing (see ‘Table 1: The Archetypes of Global Policing’). Many of these archetypical actors also play an important role in promoting glocal policing agendas in weak and structurally dependent societies as Bowling and Sheptycki write that different actors like ‘international liaison officers’ translate the global policing agendas from ‘the world stage’ to ‘the local street corner’ and that they do so using adaptive and potentially overlapping subcultural scripts that reflect a common ‘subculture of transnational policing’ (Ibid: 93). At the core of this ‘subculture’ is the notion that ‘policing agents can be solutions to the problem of authority’ amidst growing concerns regarding the pervasiveness of new forms of transnational crimes in an age of globalisation and their threat to liberal peace and order (Ibid: 78-84). Glocally responsive policing is thus embraced by these actors as a solution to this ‘problem of authority’ (Ibid: 25). Specifically, international liaison officers representing international organisations including international policing bodies like the International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol) and even international development organisations like the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) seek to foster the dissemination of global policing priorities by initiating and facilitating asymmetrical (global -> local) policy transfers that transpose the best of policing in Western liberal democracies in developing and transitional states (Ellison and Pino 2012: 2).

24 I review the history of policing reforms in BiH in Chapter Six.
Glocal policing as a technique of neo-liberal governmentality raises important questions about the legitimacy of the security governance outcomes it generates and it is also important to acknowledge that internationally-imposed criminal justice reforms modelled on the best practices of Western liberal democracies may also generate undesirable and potentially criminogenic outputs (Bowling 2012). Specifically, Cohen (1988) theorises the propensity of one-sided policy transfers to supplant ‘traditional’ systems and practices with dysfunctional and unjust Western models of policing and crime control in developing, ‘Third World’ countries. In this respect, Bowling and Sheptycki’s (2012) work suggests that glocally-responsive policing reforms may be harmful or ‘iatrogenic’ for recipient societies. The idea that police reforms may be iatrogenic draws from Illich’s (1977a) critique of the inadvertent harms generated by treatments within the medical profession. Drawing on Illich’s (1977a; 1977b) work, Cohen (1988: 191) identifies three different forms of harm that can also be used to account for the consequences of Western criminal justice reforms introduced to the Global South.

Clinical iatrogenesis accounts for the criminogenic effects of policies, similar to what Cohen (1988: 191) describes as ‘the harmful side effects of drugs, doctor-inflicted pain, unnecessary surgery, and the like’. In the context of criminology, Cohen likens clinical iatrogenesis to ‘the ironic ways in which control agencies create and stabilize deviance’ through their efforts to control it (Ibid: 191). The second type of harm described by Cohen is ‘cultural iatrogenesis’ in which new categories of deviance are established in recipient societies to reflect Western interests and mentalities on crime. This is said to displace local mentalities and strategies for addressing disorder and ultimately, lead to cultural homogeneity and intolerance of traditional behaviours and values (Ibid: 192). Building on these ‘clinical’ and ‘cultural’ harms, Cohen describes ‘social iatrogenesis’ as the propensity of such reforms to alter the expectations and the mentalities of recipient publics and render them insecure and overly dependent on the formal institutions of the state to provide them with security and justice (Ibid: 191).

The various consequences associated with international attempts to generate glocally-responsive policing reforms in developing and transitional societies implies that one must move beyond a functionalist account of why these reforms are pursued in order to analyse their sociological significance. This is the position taken by Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) who are critical of functionalist justifications of global and transnational policing and it also informs the ontological perspective of my research. With respect to the coercive and asymmetric structures underpinning police reforms pursued in developing and transitional countries like BiH, I argue that policy transfers pursued within a framework of intervention must be analysed as important
ordering mechanisms consistent with the previous section’s discussion of neo-liberal governmentality. This is to suggest that the aim of glocal policing cannot be reduced to functionalist aspirations of improving the governance of security in ways that address the needs of local citizens but rather, reformers use police reforms to transpose a particular variant of liberal order upon the state and to secure this order through the institution of policing. The belief that the police are intended to perform important order generating and maintenance functions is therefore crucial for understanding the importance of glocally-responsive policing reforms as order generating mechanisms in post-conflict, developing and transitional societies.25

Marenin’s (1982) early work on policing in post-colonial Africa introduces an important distinction between the ‘general’ and ‘specific’ order maintenance functions of policing, a distinction which remains relevant to the study of police reform and state-building in the context of global liberal governance. The essence of this distinction is summarised by Walker (1994: 25-26) who writes that policing as a form of general order maintenance involves ‘...preserving public tranquillity...’ while policing oriented towards the maintenance of a specific order is concerned with ‘...protecting the interests of those in a dominant political and social position...’ Writing from a critical perspective, Marenin (1982: 379) provides a powerful characterisation of the relationship between police behaviour and state power which suggests that ‘the police make real, by what they do or fail to do, the intentions and interests of the state and of those groups that attempt to control the state.’ In elaborating on this distinction between general and specific order, he writes:

‘A concrete order then has two aspects: a general-order aspect reflecting the interest of all in regularity- that is what the relative autonomy of the state means – and a specific-order reflecting the use of state power to promote specific interests – that is what the concept of “domination by the state” means.’ (Marenin 1982: 382)

However, Marenin (1982: 383) writes that general orders are culturally diverse, that is, defined by states and their populations. To illustrate this argument, he writes that ‘[t]he conception of general order during the cultural revolution in China is far different from that held in the Soviet Union under Stalin or from the liberal conception of the ‘rule of law’ (Ibid: 383). Drawing on the work of Engels (1959 cited by Marenin 1982), Marenin argues that the sociological

25 While Hills (2009) acknowledges that the public police represent a popular focus of international reformers, she also questions the ability of these reformers to achieve their anticipated security outcomes given that the public police are not the only or primary determinant of social order in any society. Thus, I describe this ordering function as a belief of reformers rather than an empirical reality.
distinction between general and specific variants of order remains universally valid insofar as social organisation and subordination represent intrinsic components of any modern society.

The advent of globalisation and global liberal governance during the 1990’s raises important questions about the enduring relevance of this distinction. For example, my review of work by Duffield (2007) and Chandler (1999; 2002) in the previous chapter suggests that in weak and structurally dependent states, legitimate orders are no longer defined primarily through domestic processes of democratic governance but rather in relation to global prescriptions for liberal order. This liberal hegemony may therefore be described as a ‘specific’ prescription for ‘general order’, one which derives its power and legitimacy from its emphasis on collective security at the global level. Any potential threat or disruption to the collective security of the international system emanating from an underdeveloped or conflict-ridden state is construed as a threat to the general order of all states. This creates an important justification for both military and humanitarian interventions as well as the long-term project of liberal state-building (see Section 2.1). I argue therefore that the distinction between general and specific types of order maintenance remains relevant to our understanding of policing in the age of global liberal governance but that Marenin’s (1982) articulation of the state as autonomous is obsolete. Rather, sovereign order at the national level represents an important building block of liberal peace and order, one that the architects of global liberal order and global policing believe must be secured before it can be nurtured and ultimately afforded genuine political freedoms.

The ‘new humanitarianism’ holds that it is a state’s responsibility to establish security necessary for liberal order within its borders and that failure to do so amounts to a justification for intervention or a call for help (Hills 2009: 2). The state is therefore rendered a functionary of global liberal governance through neo-liberal governmentality, its own legitimacy determined by its willingness and capacity to secure structural alignment and promote the modernisation of key governing institutions like the public police. In relation to the enduring appeal of the modern state as the vessel through which general order can be established in the aftermath of conflict, Hills (2009) observes that the ‘holistic’ concept of ‘Security Sector Reforms’ (SSR) has been embraced by representatives of the international community. SSR describes a broadened template for restoring security in the aftermath of conflict, one that emphasises the important relationship between democratic policing and ‘democratic governance’. Accordingly, Hills defines SSR as ‘the broad range of policies programmes and projects promoting democratic-style police reform in post-conflict [societies]’ (Ibid: 82).

26 Although one must also question whether local order has ever been defined solely in relation to domestic political structures and institutions.
Ellison and Pino’s (2012) research on international police development assistance programmes suggests that the actors and organisations that shape agendas for SSR in developing and transitional societies extend beyond the archetypes described by Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) and need not subscribe to a ‘subculture of transnational policing’. It is therefore necessary to consider that their involvement in policing reforms may be secondary to their interest in pursuing capacity development goals or a democratisation agenda and that these actors need not view security as an end in itself. Together with the archetypes of global policing and prominent academics who play an important role in conceptualising frameworks for ‘democratic policing’ (e.g. Bayley 2001), international development workers as proponents of SSR populate important ‘transnational policy communities’ (Marenin 2007: 179) that play an important role in shaping agendas for glocally-responsive policing in developing and transitional societies like BiH. The following section critiques the definitional contours of ‘democratic policing’.

3.2 ‘Democratic Policing’ as Glocally-Responsive Policing

‘Democratic policing’ has emerged as the one-size-fits-all solution for police reform in both mature and transitional democratic societies however limited consensus exists regarding what it actually means for a policing institution to be ‘democratic’. I argue that we must therefore view ‘democratic policing’ as a ‘moral category’ rather than a political concept. This position is consistent with Chandler’s (1999:28) argument that ‘democracy’ represents a rhetorical device used by proponents of liberal state-building in BiH rather than a genuine political reality. It implies that democratic policing is defined by the interests of its architects rather than actual democratic processes of governance that represent the interests of security consumers. The lack of consensus regarding what it means for policing to be ‘democratic’ is evident with respect to an academic literature that struggles to pin-point this concept and which fails to articulate a universally agreed upon model for what democratic policing might look like in practice. Accordingly, democratic policing has emerged as an important normative device that enables reformers to practice neo-liberal governmentality and align domestic police institutions with the hegemonic interests of global liberal governance.27

One of the more commonly cited definitions for ‘democratic policing’ that resonates with both academics and members of the transnational policy communities responsible for promoting

---

27 I developed this argument in an early draft of my forthcoming article in Policing and Society (see Blaustein 2013) but it is also necessary to acknowledge that Ellison and Pino (2012: 1) present a similar argument in the introduction to Globalization, Police Reform and Development.
police reforms in transitional, post-conflict societies is that of Bayley (2001 referenced by Hills 2009: 61) who defines democratic policing as ‘the idea that the police are a service, not a force, with the primary focus on the security of the individual rather than the state. Its definitive characteristics are the ‘responsiveness’ of the police to the need of individual citizens, and its ‘accountability for its actions to the public it serves’. Bayley’s emphasis on the criteria of responsiveness and accountability as important elements of democratic policing is consistent with certain articulations of liberal democratic governance more generally (Kuper 2004) but Chandler’s (1999) critique of the asymmetrical structures inherent to liberal state-building suggests that the prospect of actually establishing democratically responsive or accountable policing in countries like BiH is inherently problematic. The work of prominent police sociologists like Bittner (1978) and Manning (2010) gives us reason to further question whether these values are in fact practicable in advanced liberal democracies given the coercive function of the institution and the lack of transparency surrounding its activities.

Drawing on these critiques, Manning (2010: 9) concludes that the rhetoric of democratic policing lacks an empirical basis but rather, it represents a rhetorical device that serves to normalise coercion and control. In transitional, post-conflict societies like BiH, Manning adds that the aspiration of achieving ‘democratic policing’ is particularly problematic given that these contexts feature ‘institutional and cultural structure[s] that [do] not possess or support democratic policing’ (Ibid: 9). Analysed as a ‘moral device’, democratic policing provides reformers with an important hegemonic framework for legitimising their prescriptions for liberal glocal order.

Ellison and Pino’s (2012) work further indicates that the rhetoric of democratic policing also provides donors with an important framework for legitimising the conditionality they attach to non-core funding allocated for SSR projects in weak and structurally dependent societies. Recognising the politicised character of this concept and the coercive and asymmetrical power structures associated with the international development system, Ellison and Pino conclude that ‘policing and police reform cannot be divorced from other forms of [international development] assistance’ (Ibid: 1). Accordingly, they suggest that international police development assistance projects must be analysed in relation to established critiques of the international development system popular during the 1960s.28 Specifically, they argue that ‘neoliberal development’ work is fundamentally problematic because ‘it has at its core some level of geo-strategic manipulation and an emphasis on donor/national interest’ (Ibid: 35-35). They also add that such initiatives are

28 For example, Rostow (1960), Inkeles and Smith (1974).
unlikely to generate anticipated outcomes because they ‘[promote] a universalistic one-size fits all paradigm with similar development/reformist templates used in a variety of contexts that often differ greatly in terms of history, politics, culture and levels of social and economic equality (Ibid: 35-36)’. The following sub-section examines ‘community policing’ and ‘community safety partnerships’ as two popular templates for pursuing SSR at the local level.

3.2.1 Community Policing

Brogden (1999: 168) writes that community policing emerged as a North American invention that has since spread throughout Western Europe as a result of ‘…the hegemony of North American scholarship in police studies’. It has since been embraced by policy entrepreneurs and reformers around the world as an important template for establishing democratic policing at the local level. A comparative typology of different international models of community policing provided by Wisler and Onwudiwe (2008) who distinguish between ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ models of community policing; ‘state initiated’ and ‘social’ models of community; and models designed to control social behaviour and those designed to control crime. As an ‘export commodity’ for developing and transitional societies, state-initiated models of community policing are the norm as international reformers primarily focus their efforts on developing the institutional capacities of the public police rather than traditional or informal mechanisms of policing and social control that may also (or have previously) contributed to communal security governance. Beyond this distinction, however, the policies and practices apparent from various models of community policing that have been introduced around the world are diverse. This suggests that the popularity of community policing reforms is a function of its rhetorical appeal as a ‘buzzword’ (Skolnick and Bayley 1988: 4) rather than the demonstrated effectiveness of a particular set of practices.29

Given its underlying narrative which presents community policing as a strategy for improving collaboration between the public and the police (Manning 1984: 288) and the extent to which this strategy has historically appealed to domestic reformers in Anglo-American contexts at points when the institutional capacities and competencies of the police have been called into question (Alderson 1979; Bayley and Mendelsohn 1969), it is hardly surprising that this paradigm has gained credibility as a template for improving relations between the police and local populations in conflicted or underdeveloped societies. While it is clear that ‘liaison officers’ (Bowling and Shearing 2012) play an important role in promulgating familiar models

29 In linking the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation’s prescriptions for community policing in Sarajevo Canton to their Swiss and Anglo-American origins, I discuss ‘problem-solving’ and ‘information-sharing’ as two important elements of community police work in Section 9.2.
of community policing around the world, these entrepreneurial actors are not the only members of the transnational policy communities that contribute to the global dissemination of these models. Rather, in the context of transitional and developing societies, international development workers, local policy makers and local practitioners have also served as champions of community policing reforms. Previously documented examples of community policing projects in transitional and developing societies can be found throughout the Caribbean (Deosaran 2002); Latin America (Frühling 2007); Northern Ireland (Topping 2008a; 2008b); South East Europe (Ryan 2007; Vejnovic and Lalic 2005); and Sub-Saharan Africa (Brogden 2002; Brogden and Shearing 1992; Ruteere and Pommerello 2003).

Brogden and Nijhar (2005: 2-3) suggest that entrepreneurial prescriptions for community policing appeal to international development organisations and domestic reformers because they are widely marketed as ‘a policing elixir that will resolve all social ills’. In practice, however, the community policing practices and structures that are generated by these policy transfers appear to deviate from the initial prescriptions of their Western architects. This suggests that representatives of the international development community and local policy makers and practitioners play an important role in terms of adapting ‘off-the-shelf’ prescriptions for community policing to fit local contextual and structural circumstances. In the following Chapter, I account for these transformational processes by introducing the concepts of ‘policy transfer’ and ‘policy translation’ however, for the discussion at hand, it suffices to note that the practices and mentalities that are prescribed by reformers tend to reflect an amalgamation of various national models that have been promoted or imposed upon this context by different policy entrepreneurs and adapted selectively and strategically by international development agencies and local actors (Brogden and Nijhar 2005: 7-9).

3.2.2 Community Safety Partnerships

Proverbial depictions of the public police in the Anglo-American context describe this institution as the ‘thin blue line’ between order and disorder in the context of modern societies (Waddington 1998: 4)30 however over the past three decades, the primacy of the public police in the context of advanced, liberal democratic societies has been challenged by the realities of an increasingly pluralistic policing field. This section briefly examines this ‘preventative turn’ in crime control policies in the European context and the extent to which this trend has been replicated in the context of transitional and developing states. It is beyond the remit of this paper

---

30 This assertion primarily references the Anglo-American policing tradition which dominates the mainstream sociological discourses on both the observed and the theoretical relationship between this institution and modern societies.
to fully address the important question of why liberal and neo-liberal governments embrace and utilise crime control policies emphasising prevention however, it is useful to acknowledge that important factors include a combination of structural pressures, political culture and local contextual circumstances. This suggests that European crime control policies oriented towards prevention and partnership did not evolve uniformly but rather Crawford (2009: xvi) argues that these ‘models were heavily influenced by political ideology and reflected different assumptions about crime, behavioural motivations and appropriate ways of organising regulatory responses.’

Among the five common structural factors (or perhaps more accurately trends) identified by Crawford (2009)\(^\text{31}\), there is one factor which resonates particularly well with Foucault’s (1991: 102; see Section 2.3) concept of governmentality and the argument that the public police are playing an increasingly limited role in generating social order: a ‘[g]rowing acknowledgement of the limited capacity of formal institutions of criminal justice to adequately reduce crime and effect change in criminal behaviour, spurred by a recognition that the leavers of crime lie beyond the reach of formal institutions of control’ (Ibid: 2; see also Garland 1996). It is in relation to neo-liberal mentalities that various models for coordinating and governing the provision of plural policing became popular during the 1980s and 1990s. Notably, Rose (2000: 323) suggests that in the Anglo-American context, this mode of thinking was symptomatic of ‘advanced liberal’ forms of government that involve ‘a widespread recasting of the ideal role of the state, and the argument that national governments should no longer aspire to be the guarantor and ultimate provider of security…’ but rather a ‘partner, animator and facilitator for a variety of agents’.

While Crawford (2009: 8-11) acknowledges significant cross-national (and even intrastate) variance in terms of how community safety and crime prevention policies have manifested in Europe, he observes that many of the national ‘models’ with their distinctive character and origins have in fact become ‘hybridized’ in recent years. Drawing on the case studies included in his edited collection, Crawford suggests that hybridization is particularly evident in relation to the emergence of crime prevention policies in Southern European states like Italy (Melossi and Selmini 2009) and in former Soviet-bloc countries like Hungary and Slovenia where ‘the development of crime prevention strategies and an infrastructure to deliver them has been closely associated with the processes of transition’ (Crawford 2009: 13). This analysis is

\(^{31}\) Other factors listed by Crawford (2009: 2) include: public perception of crime and fear of crime linked with rising trends in property ownership; social fragmentation and the disruption of informal social control; a growing aversion to social –welfare based policies, and; ‘a political desire to explore alternative means of managing crime that avoid the economic, social and human costs associated with over-reliance on traditional punitive – ‘law and order’ – responses.’
supported by the idea that the EU plays an important role in facilitating policy transfers (Bulmer et al 2007), both within its borders and beyond. Promoting convergence through policy transfers therefore helps the EU to manage potential sources of insecurity through the practices of national and sub-national governments.

In acknowledging the convergent character of recent European manifestations of crime prevention policies, particularly ‘community safety partnerships’ (CSP), Crawford (2009: 14) attributes these convergent trends and the ‘internationalisation of crime prevention’ to ‘the development of transnational and supranational networks’ like the European Forum for Urban Security (EFUS), the UN-HABITAT Safer Cities programme, and the European Crime Prevention Network (ECPN) among others. These networks overlap with elements of the transnational policy communities that contribute to the dissemination of community policing to developing and transitional societies around the world and have been particularly susceptible to the influence of British and Dutch policy entrepreneurs, a factor which Crawford argues has contributed to the popularisation of situational and technological forms of crime prevention like CCTV (Ibid: 14).

The rhetorical influence of the British model of crime prevention with its emphasis on ‘the cultivation of community involvement and the dissemination of crime prevention ideas and practices’ (Garland 2001: 16) is perhaps most evident in relation to the ongoing efforts of international organisations and development agencies to establish CSPs in the context of transitional and developing countries since the mid-1990s. Noting variation between CSP’s across England and Wales, Edwards and Hughes (original emphasis 2009: 67) describe CSPs as a ‘hybrid’ policy which ‘sits at the intersection of attempts by the state to deliver welfare and security, and policing and control in local communities’. In the context of England and Wales, this emphasis on ‘community’ as the territorial unit best positioned to generate improved

---

32 Crawford elaborates on these convergent trends by citing the work of Jones and Newburn (2007) who suggest that the nature of this convergence has more to do with rhetoric than with actual policy content. This is an important consideration which I will return to when I examine the role that UNDP played in transferring the Safer Communities model to BiH.

33 The British model I speak of refers to developments in England and Wales during the early 1990s. Specifically, I reference the ‘Safer Cities Programme’ initiated during the late 1980s (Crawford 2002) and ‘Safer Communities’ which began in 1991 (Edwards and Hughes 2009). Note that this does not account for developments in Scotland that emerged in response to similar contextual circumstances as those which prompted important policy developments in England and Wales during the 1990s but were ultimately oriented towards social justice outcomes rather than ‘an unnecessarily narrow criminal justice agenda’ (Henry 2009: 87). The Scottish experience as well as the experiences of many other European nations have undoubtedly contributed to hybrid manifestations of CSPs in these transitional and developing contexts, however, it is beyond the scope of this research to explore the composition of these projects.
security and to implement crime prevention strategies and technologies reflected the growing neo-liberal aversion to social welfare policies during this period. As Rose (1996: 331) argues, this aversion compelled policymakers to embrace ‘the community’ as ‘a new plane or surface upon which micro-moral relation among persons are conceptualized and administered.’

The Safer Cities Programme is perhaps the most prominent example of the application of CSP initiatives in the context of transitional and developing societies. Created in 1996 ‘at the request of African Mayors seeking to tackle urban crime and violence in their cities’, the Safer Cities Programme was developed by UN-HABITAT in cooperation with EFUS and the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime to improve urban safety in the developing world (UN-HABITAT 2007: 2). The language employed by UN-HABITAT to promote this initiative clearly echoes important narrative elements of the preventative turn in Europe. For example, the UN-HABITAT brochure for the Safer Cities Project clearly states:

‘Local authorities have a key role to play in addressing the rising public demand to reduce crime and violence. Success depends on partnerships between local governments and other stakeholders.’ (UN-HABITAT 2007: 3)

Other examples of CSP initiatives in transitional and developing countries include UNDP ‘Safer Communities’ projects (BiH, Croatia and Kosovo) and CSP schemes initiated by development agencies and NGOs like the UK Department for International Development (BiH), the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (BiH and Romania) and the Saferworld Group (Kosovo, Bangladesh, Kenya, Nepal, Sudan and Somalia). While the specific activities and structures prescribed by these projects vary, their rhetorical emphasis on improving the provision of local security and safety through partnership and prevention remains consistent. It is also apparent that the pursuit of CSP initiatives in these contexts is often linked with attempts to implement localised forms of community policing, particularly in the case of those manifestations which draw their inspiration from the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ model of community policing with its emphasis on ‘notions of local police autonomy, delegation of policing powers to local governments and municipalities (sometimes even private actors), and plural policing agencies frameworks’ (Wisler 2010: 2).

Ryan (2011) acknowledges that plural forms of policing and security governance have become increasingly prevalent in the context of transitional societies and argues that these developments are illustrative of the broader shift of reformative emphasis away from the language of ‘police reform’ and in favour of the ‘holistic’ language of SSR. This is problematic, writes Ryan,
because it contributes to the erosion of political freedom in recipient societies by ‘institut[ing] mechanisms that would activate liberal sources of power and marginalize alternatives’ (Ibid: 12). The following section elaborates on the political consequences of glocally-responsive policing reforms with a review of Ryan’s critique.

3.3 Glocal Policing and the ‘Freedom of Security’

Ryan (2011: 7) argues that police reform, as an important aspect of an overarching process of liberal state-building and democratisation, constitutes an important form of ‘securitisation’ (Buzan et al. 1998)\(^\text{34}\), one that serves to supplant the ‘political freedom’ of the recipient society with what he describes as the ‘freedom of security’. Understanding the distinction between ‘political freedom’ and the ‘freedom of security’ is key to Ryan’s analysis of why the public police as an institution, and the prospect of democratising the police represent important components of any liberal state-building process. Political freedom is defined by Ryan (2011: 90) as ‘the freedom to question the validity of the status quo’. Conversely, his concept of the ‘freedom of security’ must be understood in relation the work of influential modern political theorists like Hobbes and Kant which accounts for the relationship between governance and security.

It is in relation to the work of Hobbes (1947) and his idea that ‘security is a unifying project’ that Ryan locates the utilitarian emphasis of police reform as a technology of neo-liberal governance. Ryan (2011) observes that Hobbes’ (1947) *Leviathan* posits that a symbiotic relationship exists between the values of freedom and security, one which suggests that ‘security is instrumental to the perpetuation of the common good’ (*quoting* Ryan 2011: 22, *original emphasis*). Hobbes equates the common good with the values of liberty and freedom however he suggests that these values must be ‘moulded to a common [sovereign] will’ (*orig. emphasis* Ryan 2011: 22). In this respect, Ryan notes that the Hobbesian perspective distinguishes between acceptable and unacceptable forms of freedom. Whereas acceptable forms of freedom refer to rational thoughts and actions that enable society to thrive, unacceptable forms of freedom refer to ‘the chaotic plurality of wills one finds amongst the

\(^{34}\) Buzan et al. (1998: 25) describes ‘securitisation’ as the ‘the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects’. They add that ‘[a] discourse does that taes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object does not by itself create securitization- this is a securitizing move, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such’.


heathen’ (Ibid: 7). With reference to the metaphor of the police as a ‘thin blue line’, Ryan writes that the police represent ‘an elemental aspect of liberal modern governance’ that provides security necessary for sustaining acceptable variants of freedom while simultaneously suppressing those manifestations that threaten to compromise this social and political order’ (Ibid: 7). In other words, policing serves to rationalise freedom through coercive practices.

While Hobbes’ work accounts for why coercion is necessary for securing order, Ryan (2011) suggests that it is Kant’s (1983) *Perpetual Peace* thesis that has had the greatest influence on neo-liberal mentalities of global liberal governance since the 1980s. Ryan (2011: 24) writes that it is in relation to the work of Kant and ‘selective readings’ of his ‘perpetual peace thesis’ that liberal internationalists of the 1980s derived their ‘philosophy of control and order’. For Kant, Ryan argues that freedom represents a moral ends in its own right. Whereas the Hobbesian perspective views freedom as a necessary component of social and political order, Ryan (2011: 23) writes that the Kantian perspective emphasizes that ‘[h]ow we discipline ourselves in our minds and create our inner freedom is postulated as a framework, and a starting point, for how we secure our societies and our international system’. In other words, the Kantian perspective argues that a liberal society must be comprised of liberal subjects who internalise its values and advance its cause. Drawing on Adorno’s (2007) reading of Kant, Ryan (2011: 24) notes that the Kantian prescription for freedom is in practice problematic because the actualisation of perpetual peace requires ‘coercive institutions capable of securing and liberating the individual’. This suggests that individuals, or in the case of global liberal governance, individual states, must be compelled to voluntarily embrace liberal values. However, as evident from the previous chapter’s discussion, some degree of coercion is necessary and justifiable for the purpose of instilling these liberal values through processes of neo-liberal governmentality.

It is in relation to this caveat that Ryan (2011) argues that liberal internationalists like Doyle (1983) drew upon Kant’s work and articulated their theory of liberal peace in the 1980s. This notion of liberal peace has subsequently underpinned the logic of neo-liberal governmentality and it continues to provide powerful Western actors with a liberal basis for intervening in the sovereign affairs of non-liberal states (Ryan 2011: 24). Critiquing the paradigms of liberal peace and the global liberal governance, Ryan (2011: 25) references Arendt’s (2000) critique of Kant in arguing that ‘a key feature of modernity’ involves ‘the colonization of freedom by security’. This suggests that neo-liberal forms of governance do not identify freedom as an ends in itself but rather they treat it as ‘a marginal phenomenon’ (Arendt 2000: 443 quoted in Ryan 2011: 25). Building on this critique, Ryan writes, ‘[f]reedom has become so instrumentalized, so
existential to the status quo, that it is indistinguishable from necessity…” (Ibid: 25). This leads Ryan to conclude that neo-liberal governance renders the pursuit of freedom and security as indistinguishable phenomena. The cumulative effect of their conflation for recipients of police reforms and SSR in weak and structurally dependent societies like BiH is that ‘political freedoms’ are supplanted by a ‘freedom of security’ that is ultimately responsive to the interests of powerful global actors like the EU. This is suggestive of Chandler’s (2006: 6) critique of liberal state-building processes which describes how ‘[t]he functional capacity of state institutions is privileged over their representational or policy-making autonomy and increasingly understood in technical or administrative terms’.

3.4 A Framework for Democratically Responsive Policing

In Section 3.2, I argued that the concept of ‘democratic policing’ as a prescription or a benchmark for desirable or legitimate policing in developing and transitional societies lacks objective meaning. This established that there is in fact no universally agreed upon framework for pursuing or measuring the attainment of democratic policing but that democratic policing constitutes a contested, hegemonic device that is defined by entrepreneurial members of a thriving transnational policy community that is responsive to elements of a subculture of transnational policing and neo-liberal mentalities associated with global liberal governance. With reference to critical and cultural theories of global and transnational policing (e.g. Bowling and Sheptycki 2012), one can further infer that this label affords these actors a vehicle for normatively validating their prescriptions for glocal order and security through the domestic political architecture of weak and structurally dependent societies. This process has been characterised as an important technology of governmentality with significant implications for the governance of security in recipient societies. Notably, Ryan (2011) argues that this process contributes to the securitisation of political freedom suggestive of what I label a ‘democratic policing deficit’. This is to suggest that the ‘democratic’ character of policing in weak and structurally dependent societies like BiH is rendered predominantly responsive to the interests of external actors rather than the security needs of local citizens.

Recognising the conceptual ambiguities inherent to ‘democratic policing’ and the risks associated with pursuing externally-defined prescriptions for this mantra, Aitchison and Blaustein (2013) have elsewhere developed an alternative framework for pursuing police
reforms that is consistent with deliberative theories of democratic governance and the idea of ‘democratic’ or ‘participatory policy analysis’ : ‘democratically responsive policing’. According to this framework, the key determinant of whether a police service is democratically responsive involves the qualified question of whether its governance and activities are primarily responsive to the interests of its demos. It is in relation to Kuper’s (2007: 103-4) work on global democracy that we derive our definition for ‘responsiveness’ which we identify as the key determinant of democratic governance. Kuper’s work suggests that there are two dimensions to ‘responsiveness’: horizontal and vertical:

‘Vertical responsiveness describes a situation in which the ‘reasonable contestations’ of citizens generate a ‘proper response’ from those in positions of authority. This is not a case of simple acquiescence to the demands of a majority, or a particularly vocal minority, and responses may vary from explanation through to policy change (Kuper 2007: 104). Horizontal responsiveness captures the checks and balances between political actors and institutions. The fact that a range of authorities are interdependent encourages them to build consensus and operate together

---

35 Cooke (2000: 947) defines deliberative democracy ‘in its simplest terms’ as: ‘a conception of democratic government that secures a central place for reasoned discussion in political life’ but adds that different theorists have articulated diverse and at times ‘dissimilar’ prescriptions and purposes for deliberative democracy (e.g.; Habermas 1994; Rawls 1997). My use of ‘deliberative democracy’ is consistent with Dryzek’s (2002: 17) concept of ‘discursive democracy’ which serves as a critique of mainstream ‘liberal constitutionalist’ theories of deliberative democracy which suggest that the ‘shortcomings’ of deliberative democracy can be resolved via constitutional amendment or legislation. By contrast, Dryzek’s concept of ‘discursive democracy’ stresses the notion that formal institutions of liberal democratic governance are incapable of addressing structural exclusion and disenfranchisement insofar as they serve the powerful.

36 Specifically, I refer to deLeon’s (1992: 125) argument that participation in policy making processes is a key determinant of their legitimacy given their ‘elite characterizations’ and the inevitable cultural disconnects that exist between policy actors and policy recipients.

37 Papadopoulos and Warin (2007: 450) note, ‘[p]articipatory and deliberative theories share a common target of improving legitimacy by improving the quality of public life – albeit by slightly different means.’ I focus my analysis on this idea of ‘participatory policy analysis’ rather than the broader notion of ‘participatory democracy’ in recognition of various issues associated with the latter concept however both concepts are oriented towards improving the legitimacy of governing processes. These issues are usefully summarised by deLeon (1992: 127) as those of ‘informed citizenry’ (i.e. do citizens have the necessary knowledge to make informed decisions?); ‘involved citizenry’ (i.e. apathy or disengagement with political processes); ‘technical problems’ (i.e. logistics of mass participation) and ‘functional problems’ (i.e. ensuring policy actors actually incorporate the public’s will into their decision making processes).

38 Aitchison and Blaustein (2013) also argue that ‘policing for democracy’ (see Section 6.2) represents a necessary but insufficient platform for democratically responsive policing.

39 With reference to the established literature on democratic policing (Jones et al 1996; Manning 2010; Marenin 1998) and the risks associated with majoritarian rule, particularly in the context of a post-conflict society with enduring ethnic divisions, we identify two further qualifications for a democratically responsive police service that focus on 1) equity and fairness of policing and 2) the capacity to deliver a minimum level of service and security. Kuper’s (2007) notion of ‘horizontal responsiveness’ represents an important means for achieving ‘equity and fairness’ while international support for ‘policing for democracy’ serves as a necessary platform for democratically responsive policing and fosters ‘delivery of service’.
Kuper’s (2007) work suggests that ‘responsiveness’ accounts for something more than acquiescence with a generally expressed will. In other words, responsiveness must exist as a deliberative process given that ‘no actor claims perfect knowledge’ meaning that ‘constellations of ‘knowers’ are forced to coordinate’ (Aitchison and Blaustein 2013). Thus, our framework for democratically responsive policing includes ‘separately conceived indicators and mechanisms that are oriented towards the principle of responsiveness’. We recognise that ‘responding might involve giving a reasoned refutation of such will and that police, and their governors may be called to ‘respond’ to a wide range of individuals, groups and institutions’ with different, and potentially conflicting expectations of the police (Ibid: see Appendix 3). We have therefore opted to incorporate a number of other criteria associated with ‘democratic policing’ into our headline concept of responsiveness.

‘Table 2’ accounts for this broadened conceptualisation of ‘responsiveness’ within an established literature on democratic policing (e.g. Bayley 2006; Jones et al 1996). Most explicitly, Jones et al (1996: 191) list ‘responsiveness’ as their third criteria for ‘democratic policing’ and write that ‘the police should be responsive to some expression of the views of the public’ deriving this from ‘the democratic principle that government should reflect the wishes of the people’. Our framework identifies a number of additional dimensions of ‘responsiveness’ consistent with Kuper’s (2007) definition: ‘distribution of power’; ‘competition’; ‘information’; ‘reaction’ to complaints; ‘redress’; ‘accessibility’; ‘participation’; ‘accountability’; and ‘congruence’.

With reference to the arguments of Ellison and Pino (2012) and Ryan (2011), it is clear that the prospect of external actors establishing democratically responsive policing in the context of transitional, post-conflict or post-authoritarian societies is problematic. Chandler’s (1999) analysis of liberal state-building in BiH suggests that this is due to a paradox whereby the intrusive and coercive character of externally-driven processes of liberal state-building and democratisation overshadow the domestic democratic institutions and processes of governance that they aim to support and risk becoming the predominant stimulus for political responses. In the case of BiH, it is evident that powerful external influences linked with the process of EU alignment and the prospect of EU accession have ultimately contributed to a democratic policing deficit whereby those aspects of public policing and security governance that
complement the EU’s interest in securitising the Western Balkans have consistently taken precedence over issues relating to the democratic responsiveness of public security provision.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Democratic Policing and Responsiveness⁴⁰</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualifier 2: Ability to provide minimum threshold of security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness (mechanisms for, or measures of)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Democratic policing deficits are problematic because democratically responsive policing, and indeed any form of democratically responsive governance, cannot thrive amidst governing structures that invest disproportionate power in the hands of unaccountable actors. These actors push their specific agendas and transpose their interests through inaccessible governing structures that constrain deliberation and thus, locally responsive governance. Under such conditions, the policing and the governance of security become responsive to the interest of external actors rather than the public interest. This conclusion is consistent with Ellison and Pino’s (2012: 198) argument that ‘[i]n many cases assistance with police reform is tied to the wider strategy interests of the donor state’ and add that ‘with few exceptions…local stakeholders such as civil societies groups, local governmental leaders and the citizenry are usually not consulted in any meaningful way or are pushed to the periphery of the process’.

⁴⁰ Originally published in Aitchison and Blaustein (2013).
⁴¹ Jones et al (1996) provide a hierarchy of criteria for democratic policing, indicated here by corresponding numbers.
The hegemonic function of governmentalities associated with neo-liberal globalisation can also be linked to Dryzek’s (2002) critique of ‘liberal constitutionalist’ forms of deliberative governance. Dryzek identifies the liberal constitutionalist model as the mainstay of contemporary liberal democratic theory but he suggests that the formal mechanisms and institutions of state governance do not foster meaningful deliberation insofar as they are inevitably constrained by the structural politics of a ‘transnational political economy’ (Ibid: 21).

The major implication of this claim for security governance in weak and structurally dependent societies like BiH is that democratically responsive policing is unlikely to manifest in these contexts due to structural inequalities that render formal mechanisms and institutions of state governance responsive to the architects of global liberal governance. This alignment may occur directly through the work of constitutionally recognised international bodies like the OHR or the IPTF (Chandler 1999) or indirectly through international police development assistance projects (Ellison and Pino 2012).

Based on this realisation, Aitchison and Blaustein (2013) have elsewhere argued that international reformers should seek to limit the scope of their involvement to cover only those aspects of police reform processes that aspire to the establishment of ‘policing for democracy’. In other words, we advocate that prolonged interventions and long-term international police development assistance projects that extend beyond what is necessary to ‘address, equitably, a public order security gap in divided, post-conflict or ‘failed’ states and to create a secure space within which open, democratic processes can take place’ may counteract the emergence of a ‘civil society’ and ‘public spheres’ of governance that foster democratically responsive policing (Ibid: see Appendix 3). These spheres constitute important nodes of governance or contact zones at which ‘policy sharing’ (deLeon 1992: 127; also Belloni 2001) might take place. They also present important ‘sources of democratic critique and renewal’ (deLeon 1992: 127) whereby prevailing norms and structures are subjected to negotiation and potentially transformation.42

Persisting donor interest in supporting police reform projects in developing and transitional states and the enduring appeal of a prevailing global liberal narrative that associates underdevelopment with insecurity and glocal security with the rhetoric of ‘democratic poling’ suggest that our prescription for restraint and moderation is unlikely to resonate with members of this transnational policy community who derive their professional livelihoods and or sovereign legitimacy (Chandler 2006; see Section 2.3) from prolonged interventions. In order to

42 deLeon (1992: 127) defines ‘policy sharing’ as ‘access to planning and policy decisions and an implied influence over subsequent operational decisions’.
foster public spheres of deliberative governance conducive to democratically responsive policing outcomes, the following section examines the prospect of using nodal security analysis to illuminate opportunities that exist for relatively disempowered policy mediators to shape the contours of globally-responsive police reforms processes in weak and structurally dependent societies like BiH.

### 3.5 Glocal Policing as Nodal Security Governance

Established critiques of the relationship between global liberal governance and policing reforms emphasise its coercive and non-democratic character. However, this body of scholarship also recognises that these reforms take place within ‘poly-centric fields’ (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012) that are populated by an array of actors and institutions that collectively facilitate the global dissemination and amalgamation of different templates for glocal policing including community policing and CSPs. In order to move beyond the fatalism of the global policing and police reform literatures, I draw on the work of Wood and Shearing (2006) in arguing that it is necessary to explore the nodal character of these fields in order to identify opportunities that exist for relatively disempowered actors to improve the responsiveness of policing structures and practices for domestic political institutions and local security needs.

Nodal security governance refers to an ordering process whereby the negotiations it fosters create ‘a set of explicit or implicit normative prescriptions or rules about the way things ought to be’ (Johnston and Shearing 2003: 22). Mapping the contours and relations that occur within a nodal security network can therefore illuminate the politics of this field and their influence on the construction of order within a society. While examining the micro-politics of individual nodes is useful for examining the ways in which individual agents and institutional habitus can shape security governance, Johnston and Shearing recognise that it is also important to study the networked relations between different nodes (Ibid: 146-147). Examining the spaces between different nodes of governance provides unique insights into how their relations shape the decision making processes and mentalities that ultimately assign meaning and content to the policies and practices that are generated through processes of nodal security governance.

Johnston and Shearing (2003) argue that neo-liberalisation and globalisation have effectively created plural policing landscapes around the world. They argue that this is due to the fact that these processes have ‘embedded’ responsibility for security in all aspects of governance and thus, established diverse networks of interconnected security nodes (Ibid: 23). In advanced
liberal democratic societies, they recognise that the state continues to play a limited role in ‘steering’ the governance of security but that it does so through these nodal fields. This implies that the governance of security exists as a ‘negotiated’ process shaped by actors and institutions other than those associated with the state (Ibid: 27) and that the ‘nodal cartography’ of security governance is increasingly responsive to private interests. This means that the ‘governance of security is increasingly oriented around risk, anticipation and prevention’ instead of promoting political freedom conducive to ‘just and democratic outcomes’ (Ibid: 160). Accordingly, the plural configuration of nodal security governance has prompted concerns about the prospect of governing security as a ‘public good’ (Loader and Walker 2001).

The idea that security governance is negotiated through poly-centric fields also prompts concerns that the policy outputs generated by these mediatory processes may contribute to ‘power inequalities’ (Johnston and Shearing 2003: 160). These inequalities marginalise disempowered segments of the public as Wood and Shearing (2006: 98) suggest that within a nodal field, ‘some [actors] have done better out of nodal governance than others’. They add that ‘the fault lines are closely associated with wealth’ meaning that the poly-centric power structures of this nodal field are characterised by power inequalities which affect how security is governed and consumed by different actors. In the transnational fields created by the confluence of global policing and global liberal governance, these power inequalities are evident in relation to the coercive and asymmetrical structures of liberal state-building and international development assistance programmes.

However, while Wood and Shearing (2006: 98) acknowledge that nodal structures harbour power inequalities, they also suggest that nodal analysis can afford us important insights into the sources of these inequalities and tell us ‘how nodal relations could be transformed to improve governance processes and outcomes for weak actors’. They base this claim on a theoretical assumption that ‘nodal reality carries within it new opportunities for finding solutions to old and enduring problems’ and that ‘[n]odal governance provides important opportunities that we should identify and harness’. Referencing Braithwaite’s (2004; with Drahos 2000) work that describes how regulation fosters the realisation of ‘established democratic values within nodal or decentred governance contexts’, Wood and Shearing (2006: 99-100) argue that nodal fields are advantageous for weak actors because their plural configuration creates more opportunities for them to access and influence the governance of security than do centralised, hierarchical governing structures. In other words, these poly-centric power structures facilitate participation beyond the formally established democratic institutions of the state. While the pluralisation of
the policing field raises questions about the ‘public’ character of security governance in advanced, liberal democracies (Loader 2000), these questions are perhaps less problematic in weak and structurally dependent societies like BiH where state institutions are denied political freedom and an independent governing capacity by supranational actors like the EU. Identifying opportunities for locally responsive actors to mediate the ‘overlapping hierarchies of governance’ (Aitchison and Blaustein 2013: see Appendix 3) that exist within these polycentric fields thus provides a viable starting point for rendering internationally-driven policing reform processes more responsive to the needs of local citizens.

3.6 Discussion

Structural analyses of the relationship between liberal state-building, security governance and policing reform processes typically reflect elements of Duffield’s (1999; 2007) critique of the relationship between development and security in the aftermath of the Cold War which suggests that the primary driver for development aid, humanitarian interventions, and liberal state-building initiatives since the early 1990s is a broadened, liberal definition of security. Empirical critiques of policing reforms and the actors that pursue them in the context of weak and structurally dependent societies suggest that prescriptions for ‘democratic policing’ generally reflect the interests of powerful international actors who use their power to colonise policing and police reforms as mechanisms for generating policy alignment and structural convergence (Bowling 2010; Ellison and Pino 2012; Ryan 2011). The evident implication of these critiques is that the policing practices and structures generated by foreign assistance programmes lack clear channels of local accountability or responsiveness. Building on this observed lack of local ownership and participation in policing reform projects that affect developing, transitional and post-conflict societies, these critiques also highlight practical concerns about the value of the practices and structures these prescriptions for policing reform generate (Pino and Wiatrowski 2006; Ellison and Pino 2012: 3). This is particularly evident in relation to research that documents the gap between community policing rhetoric and practices in developing and transitional countries around the world (Brogden 1999; Brogden and Nijjar 2005).

43 Some other examples include Albrecht and Buur (2009), Leeds (2007) and Sedra (2007),
In BiH, the question of local ownership (or lack thereof)\textsuperscript{44} and concerns about the outputs generated by policing reforms have been primarily voiced in response to initiatives by major multi-lateral international organisations however, since the mid-2000’s, major multi-lateral institutions including the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) and the OHR have substantially trimmed their support for low visibility aspects of the policing reform process. Since 2003, seemingly all of the major projects designed to establish community-based, gloally-responsive policing structures in BiH have been initiated by a handful of bi-lateral and multi-lateral development agencies.\textsuperscript{45} Much of this work has advocated ‘community policing’ and CSP models as templates for improving cooperation and service provision by the police and other municipal officials and improve their cooperation as well as a platform for linking BiH practitioners with counterparts in Western Europe through established networks like the European Forum for Urban Security.

These initiatives reflect a human security narrative that presents community policing and CSPs as complementary elements of a ‘holistic’ localised strategy for generating meaningful improvements in security governance.\textsuperscript{46} This suggests that community-oriented policing provides reformers with a platform for negotiating local orders in weak and structurally dependent societies from a distance. This in turn allows them to align local policing norms, mentalities and practices with what they identify as the best practices of Western policing. Policy transfers account for an important vehicle for fostering these reforms and thus serve as useful focal points for analysing the negotiated character of gloally-responsive policing reform processes. In order to illuminate the power politics underpinning these initiatives and the extent to which different actors and institutions influence their form and content, the following chapter reviews the policy transfer literature and introduces the concept of ‘policy translation’ (Lendvai and Stubbs 2007) to the criminological lexicon as a framework for accessing the mediated character of these reforms.

\textsuperscript{44} The issue of local ownership has also been a recurring theme in the wider literature on liberal state-building and governance in BiH (see Belloni 2001; Caplan 2005; Pugh 2002)

\textsuperscript{45} The important role of bilateral and multilateral development agencies in driving important aspects of the policing reform process in BiH since 2003 is consistent with the role of foreign policing assistance programmes driving such reforms in other ‘transitional’ societies (Marenin 1998). I elaborate on the role that specific agencies played in fostering these reforms in BiH in Chapter Six.

\textsuperscript{46} Examples of this narrative can be found in a 2007 UNDP Albania report which reviews activities in BiH (DeBlieck 2007). I elaborate on this posited relationship between community policing and CSPs in the context of BiH in Chapter Six.
Chapter Four: Policy Translation

Over the past two decades, policy convergence and policy transfer have been embraced as important conceptual frameworks for analysing global trends in criminal justice policy making. Jones and Newburn (2007) employ this concept to analyse convergence between the United States and the England and Wales over the past two decades while an edited collection by Newburn and Sparks (2004) links these concepts to the influence of political culture on criminal justice policy making trends in the age of globalisation. Growing literatures on comparative, international, supranational, and transnational aspects of criminology and criminal justice policy making also highlights the need to acknowledge the significance of policy convergence more generally. Aitchison’s (2011) work in particular suggests that this concept of policy transfer is relevant to the study of criminal justice transformation in the context of transitional societies. Within the sub-discipline of policing studies, policy convergence and policy transfer are central to a burgeoning literature that explores the prospect of democratising the police in developing, transitional and failed states. Examples include Bayley’s (2006) analysis of American foreign assistance to police reform projects in post-conflict societies and Brogden and Nijhar’s (2005) critique of the global export of community-based policing as a 'one-size-fits-all' template for democratising the police. Marenin’s (2007) discussion of a policing transnational policy community further suggests that human agency has played an important role in facilitating the dissemination of convergent prescriptions for policing over the past two-decades.

Despite criminology’s embrace of these concepts, it has yet to incorporate the alternative concept of ‘policy translation’ (Lendvai and Stubbs 2007) into its lexicon. In this chapter I introduce this alternative framework by examining its conceptual origins and discussing its utility as a tool for analysing the role that nodal actors play in mediating externally-driven policing reforms in developing and transitional countries specifically. I conclude that policy translation promises to enhance our understanding of criminal justice policy making processes by illuminating the ways in which structured-agency mediates policy transfers and shapes the outputs and outcomes generated by these processes.

Section 4.1 examines the concept of ‘policy convergence’ and includes a review of work by Bennett (1991) and Evans (2004) who associate this phenomenon with different aspects of

---

47 This latter assertion is consistent with the claim of Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) that with the advent of globalisation, governments are increasingly likely to look abroad for policy 'solutions'.
globalisation. While Evans’ discussion of policy convergence accounts for the important role that both macro-level structures and agency play in prompting these policy exchanges, I introduce the related concept of policy transfer in order to convey the complex and unpredictable character of these ‘exchanges’ in practice. Policy transfer is thus the focus of Section 4.2 and I draw upon the policy transfer literature to describe the important role that actors and institutions play in not only initiating these ‘exchanges’ but also their role in actively mediating them as a result of their oversight and involvement.

I recognise the that the concept of policy transfer establishes a viable framework for analysing how nodular relations and the micro-politics of specific nodes affect policing reform initiatives, however, I argue that the verb ‘transfer’ is inadequate for describing the negotiated, transformational character of these settings. I argue in Section 4.3 that the concept of policy translation is preferable to policy transfer because it encourages one to analyse these exchanges and from a social constructivist perspective. This approach is significant because it enables one to analyse the prescriptions and practices generated by different security nodes and ‘contact zones’ (Pratt 1991) as the sum of the collective actions and interactions which transpire within these settings. Introducing the work of Lendvai and Stubbs (2006) and discussing it with reference to the nodal model of security governance developed by Johnston and Shearing (2003), I conclude that the concept of policy translation enables one to examine the political character of different policing nodes and their role in mediating structural pressures for glocal policy alignment.

4.1 Globalisation and Policy Convergence

The importance of ‘agency’ as a theoretical element of policy convergence is evident from Bennett’s (1991) work. Kerr (1983: 3 quoted in Bennett 1991: 215) defines ‘convergence’ as ‘the tendency of societies to grow more alike, to develop similarities in structures, processes and performances.’ As Bennett notes, the ‘general convergence argument’ which emerged from the field of comparative public policy during the 1970’s and 1980’s originally focused on the existence of comparable public policy outcomes between ‘industrial societies’ as evidence of overarching processes of economic and political convergence. Bennett is critical of these ‘general-theory building efforts’ that infer the existence of ‘convergence’ based on spatial comparison because he argues that they ‘obscure’ the policy processes which actually contribute to comparable outcomes (1991: 217). In other words, he argues that this macro-level approach
fails to acknowledge the temporal dimension of this concept which denotes a comparable and concerted progression ‘over time toward some identified common point’ (Inkeles, 1981: 13-14 quoted in Bennett, 1991: 219).

Building on this critique, Bennett (1991) introduces the more nuanced concept of ‘policy convergence’ as an alternative framework for exploring the dynamics which actually produce comparable policy outcomes. Bennett (1991) goes on to review four drivers of policy convergence: ‘emulation’, ‘elite-networking and policy communities’, ‘harmonization’, and ‘penetration’. Agency is intrinsic to all of these drivers. In other words, policy convergence exists not as the mere product of passive alignment determined by common structures but rather, it is attributable to the decisions of actors involved in the policy making process. With reference to the literature on global policing and gloally-responsive police reforms, this agency is visible in relation to the archetypes by Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) as well as other actors that populate the transnational policy communities described by Marenin (2007; see Section 3.1).

With reference to ‘emulation’, Bennett (1991: 220-221) goes on to argue that this form of policy convergence must not be viewed as synonymous with ‘diffusion’, a concept which generally assumes that comparable policy outcomes can be explained through mere imitation (see also Collier and Messick, 1975). Instead Bennett (1991: 221) suggests that emulation involves ‘the utilization of evidence about a programme or programmes from overseas and a drawing of lessons from that experience’ with the effect that ‘the policy of another country is employed as an exemplar or model which is then adapted and, one would hope, improved upon.’ Bennett’s description of emulation is significant because it acknowledges that the outcomes of policy emulation and by extension, policy transfers cannot merely be inferred from the inputs of this exchange. Rather, he suggests that this process and its outputs are actively shaped by policy makers who acknowledge that imported policies must be adapted to local contextual circumstances before they can be implemented. This suggests that in addition to the transnational agents and institutions that facilitate policing reforms as technologies of neo-liberal governmentality, local policy makers and practitioners also play an essential role in facilitating policy convergence and policy adaptation.

Bennett’s (1991) emphasis on the centrality of agency to policy convergence does not amount to a rejection of the significant role that macro-level structures play in shaping these processes. This is evident in relation to his description of ‘harmonization’ which states that ‘convergence is driven by a recognition of interdependence’ that ‘facilitates the shaping of a common response
to common problems, to mitigate the unintended external consequences of domestic policy’ (*original emphasis. Ibid: 225*). In this respect, policy convergence can be analysed using Giddens’ (1984) theory of structuration which posits that structural factors affect the decision making processes of actors whose actions in turn shape these structural contexts. With respect to glocal policing, it is necessary to therefore acknowledge that global liberal governance and global policing represent important structural drivers of policy convergence over the past two decades because they produce powerful pressures for actors at all levels of governance to actively utilise policy transfers and lesson learning in order to facilitate policy synchronisation and glocal ordering.

It is also important to recognise that processes associated with globalisation account for important opportunity structures that foster policy convergence and lesson learning (Evans 2004: 2). Evans accounts for these opportunity structures by presenting a list of broad ‘empirical statements’ that describe this conceptually broad and contested concept (Ibid: 2). This includes both ‘a process of external ‘hollowing-out’[of the state]…. as a consequence of the differential impact of processes of globalization on domestic policy formation’ and ‘[a] process of internal ‘hollowing-out’ … in different countries as a consequence of the differential impact of processes of privatization, the marketization of public services, and decentralization on both the institutional architecture of the state and domestic policy formation’ (Ibid: 1-2). Responding to these structural pressures, Evans writes that ‘[p]ublic organizations in both developed and developing countries do not always possess the expertise to tackle the problems they confront and increasingly look outside the organization to other governments or non-governmental organizations for the answers to problems’ (Ibid: 3).

Referencing the work of Davies et al. (2000) and Pawson (2000), Evans (2004: 3) writes that for developed countries, policy convergence is generally associated with notions of ‘evidence-based policy-making’. This suggests that policy convergence represents ‘a rational choice for most developed countries’. This is indicative of the susceptibility of governance in advanced liberal democracies to the same neo-liberal mentalities of governance that they promote in weak and structurally dependent societies. However, for developing countries, Evans (2004) suggests that the ‘rational’ character of policy convergence may not reflect their ‘voluntary’ embrace of liberal order but rather, the influence of external actors over domestic policy making processes. Neo-liberal governmentality described in Chapter Two represents an important mechanism for

48 It is important to note that the ‘rationality’ that Evans (2004) ascribes to the propensity of policy makers in developed countries to engage with policy transfer actually implies ‘bounded rationality’.
promoting this influence and promoting policy convergence in weak and structurally dependent societies.

4.2 The Complexities of Policy Transfer

As a mechanism of policy convergence and structural alignment whereby ‘knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions etc. in one time and/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in another time and/or place’ (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996: 344), policy transfers represent complex and mediated processes. Evans (2009: 244) argues that the element of intentionality serves to distinguish the concept of policy transfer from that of policy convergence which he suggests ‘may occur unintentionally...due to harmonizing macroeconomic forces or common processes’. In this respect, policy transfers represent mechanisms for generating policy convergence and the two concepts are not synonymous. This section elaborates on the distinction between voluntary and coercive forms of policy transfer and discusses a number of conceptual issues that arise when one attempts to analyse these mechanisms of convergence.

4.2.1 Voluntary and Coercive Policy Transfers

Policy transfer is ‘an intentional activity involving the movement of ideas between systems of governance in the aspiration of forging policy change’ (Evans and Davies 1999: 251). Evans and Davies (1999: 366) write however that ‘...intent may be ascribed both to those who seek to borrow and to those who seek to impose.’ In acknowledging the wide range of interests that potentially drive the flow of policies from one context to another, one must consider that such exchanges need not be voluntary. With reference to the work of Ivanova and Evans (2004) and Duffield’s (2007) critique of contemporary development trends, it is evident that those exchanges which occur as part of an overarching process of liberal state-building are rarely (if ever) voluntary. Even those exchanges which occur between advanced liberal democracies need not synonymous be with ‘lesson drawing’ where ‘[c]onfronted with a common problem, policymakers in cities, regional governments and nations can learn from how their counterparts elsewhere respond’ (Rose, 1991: 4). Rather, processes of ‘lesson drawing’ and ‘emulation’ represent specific types of policy transfer that are typically driven by ‘some form of disaffection or problem with the status quo’ (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996: 346). Consider therefore that for agents to initiate a voluntary episode of policy transfer, they must be empowered and intrinsically motivated to do so.
Those transfer agents who are best positioned to initiate voluntary forms of policy transfer in the context of mature liberal democracies are domestic participants in policy-making processes.\(^49\) Nutley and Webb (2000, 15) suggest that this category describes ‘government ministers, senior civil servants and co-opted policy advisors’ as well as less obvious sources of influence over the policy-making process including ‘[p]oliticians and elected officials at local government level and other activists’ including ‘professional associations’, ‘pressure groups’, and ‘journalists’. They add that ‘[p]ractitioners…who operationalize policies, have their own distinctive role in shaping policies as they are experienced by clients or service users’ (ibid: 15). Voluntary episodes of policy transfer are therefore said to exist when actors recognize a need for policy innovation and thus commence a search for ‘lessons’ or knowledge. Lesson learning is not, however, simply a matter of transposing a policy from one context on another. Rather, Dolowitz (2009: 317) draws on Hall’s (1993) distinction between ‘simpler’ and ‘complex’ forms of learning to suggest that scholarly analyses of voluntary transfers tend to account for ‘simpler forms of learning’ that involve ‘little more than the emulation of the ideas and rhetoric used within other political systems’ (emphasis Dolowitz). What they neglect to account for, argues Dolowitz, is the extent to which the actual policy outputs generated from these processes frequently deviate from their anticipated designs.

Conversely, Dolowitz and Marsh (1996: 347-348) argue that an episode of policy transfer is coercive if the transfer agents that facilitate this exchange are compelled to do so by external pressures. These pressures may either be ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’. Dolowitz and Marsh (1996: 347-348) write that direct coercion occurs ‘when one government forces another to adopt a policy’ but that such forms of policy transfer are in fact ‘rare’. They illustrate direct coercion by describing ‘the spread of Western monetary policies to Third World countries’ through powerful institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Dolowitz and Marsh draw on Hoberg’s (1991) analysis of American influence over Canadian environmental regulation to suggest that indirect forms of coercive policy transfer result from ‘the role of externalities, or functional interdependence’ which ‘push government[s] to work together to solve common problems’ (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996: 348-349). They add that technological developments, economic pressures such as those resulting from economic integration, and regional or international political norms can also influence indirect forms of coercive transfer (Ibid: 349). Dolowitz (2009: 321-322) suggests that coercive forms of policy

---

\(^{49}\) Policy making is defined as ‘the process by which governments translate their political vision into programmes and actions to deliver “outcomes”’ (Cabinet Office, 1999: 15; cited in Duncan, 2009: 453 and Nutley and Webb, 2000: 14).
transfer are far more common than purely voluntary forms of policy transfer. However, I argue that this distinction between direct and indirect forms of coercive policy transfer is perhaps overly simplistic and difficult to apply when studying policy transfers in the context of developing and transitional societies given Duffield’s (2007) argument that the paradigm of global liberal governance fosters neo-liberal mentalities that involve managing risk ‘from a distance’.

Ivanova and Evans (2004: 96) add that policy transfers which occur between developed and developing societies contribute to, and are therefore constitutive of, a process of overarching structural transformation. Accordingly, they refer to these developing societies as ‘transitional societies’ because the latter term emphasizes the presence of a programme for prescriptive transformation which implies that the existing structures and institutions are inadequate for synchronisation with the emergent global prescriptions for liberal order. While Ivanova and Evans (2004: 96-97) acknowledge that voluntary forms of policy transfer do occur in transitional societies, they conclude that ultimately ‘this transformation must arise, at least initially, from policy transfer from exogenous sources’. The implication here is that a certain degree of coercion inevitably characterizes these exchanges and ‘governments in developing countries are often compelled…to introduce policy change in order to secure grants, loans or forms of inward investment’ (Evans 2004:3).

4.2.2 Analysing Policy Transfers

Evans and Davies (1999: 382) distinguish between 'soft' and 'hard' forms of policy transfer with the former category referring to ‘ideas, concepts, attitudes’ and the latter to ‘programmes and implementation’. However, they acknowledge that the distinction between soft and hard forms of policy transfer is not always clear cut and that one might equally define the ‘object’ of a policy transfer in terms of the ideas that prompted the exchange or alternatively, as the specific policies or practices that these ideas generated. Arguing that policy transfer can involve ‘policy goals, structure and content; policy instruments or administrative techniques; institutions; ideology; ideas, attitudes and concepts; and/[or] negative lessons’, Dolowitz and March (1996: 349-350) further suggest that policy transfers generally involve a combination of soft and hard content. This complexity is evident from Jones and Newburn's (2007) analysis of the transfer of ‘zero tolerance’ policing to the United Kingdom in the mid-1990s.

Jones and Newburn (2007: 224-225) suggest that initially, the mantra of 'zero tolerance' was designed to ‘[convey] a determination to use the criminal law to ‘crack down on’ something that has previously flourished.’ While this concept is perhaps most visibly associated with a policing
strategy made famous by former New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and former Chief of the NYPD Bill Bratton in 1994, it is important to note that its conceptual origins actually date back to Ronald Reagan's 'war on drugs' in the mid-to-late 1980s (Ibid: 106). Interestingly enough, the first reference to ‘zero-tolerance’ in the UK context also predated its association with policing as evident from a 1992 campaign against domestic violence in Edinburgh (Ibid: 2007: 108; also MacKay, 1996). Despite its lineage, Jones and Newburn (2007) suggest that the concept of ‘zero tolerance’ was only applied to policing in the UK in following widespread media coverage that documented its apparent success in the United States. Small-scale, zero-tolerance policing ‘experiments’ were therefore subsequently initiated throughout the UK, most notably by the Metropolitan Police in London and the Strathclyde Police in Glasgow.

Ultimately, Jones and Newburn (2007: 110) go on to question the impact of this transfer and suggest that ‘zero tolerance’ policing had a limited impact on the provision of policing throughout the UK. Specifically, they describe how the ‘zero-tolerance policing’ model was widely opposed both in principle and practice by most police chiefs in the UK who served as an important source of institutional resistance to the policy (Ibid: 110). On an ideological level, however, Jones and Newburn argue that the mentalities underpinning the ‘zero tolerance’ philosophy may have actually had a more discernible impact on UK policy. This is particularly evident with respect to New Labour’s embrace of the ‘broken windows’ (Wilson and Kelling 1982) hypothesis during the late 1990’s and their decision to incorporate its ideas into the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act and the 2003 Anti-Social Behaviour Act (Jones and Newburn 2007: 110-111).

From this example, it is possible to identify and analyse multiple components of a policy transfer. Whether one decides to prioritise soft content or hard content via their analysis is thus a matter of subjective interpretation but it is important to recognise that there are limitations to each option. Focusing on policy outputs overlooks context, yet focusing primarily on the ideas that prompted the transfer can obfuscate the intentionality of the transfer (Evans and Davies 1999: 370). To address this dilemma, Evans and Davies draw upon Wendt’s (1987) articulation of structuration theory in proposing a ‘multi-level’ framework for analysing policy transfer as a ‘dialectical synthesis’ of structures operating from the macro-level and through agents at the micro-level (Evans and Davies 1999: 370). They go on to argue that the benefit of this approach is that it serves to ‘overcome[s] the subordination of one to another’ in recognition of the fact that structures and agency are interdependent and interconnected. In attempting to bridge these two perspectives, Evans and Davies (1999) argue that one must focus on the role that ‘policy
transfer networks’ play in facilitating these exchanges. They add that identifying and mapping these networks becomes increasingly important when analysing policy transfers that have occurred over the past two decades given the combined effects of internationalisation, transnationalisation and globalisation which have effectively introduced a new range of actors and institutions.

While it is clear that policy transfers represent important mechanisms for exercising neo-liberal governmentality in weak and structurally dependent societies, analysing them remains methodologically problematic. Echoing Evans and Davies (1999), Dolowitz and Marsh (2000: 8) draw from structuration theory to develop a framework for analysing policy transfers as both ‘a dependent and an independent variable’. This holistic approach to studying policy transfers accounts for the structural circumstances that prompt the exchange (i.e. policy transfer as a dependent variable) as well as the impact of this process on the recipient context (i.e. policy transfer as an independent variable). Analysing policy transfers through the lens of structuration theory is important for understanding how these processes are shaped by the continuous interplay between structures and agency yet the prospect of applying this framework to empirical research also raises an important methodological question as to whether ‘transfer’ is actually an appropriate descriptor for the phenomenon being studied.

4.3 Policy Transfer as Translation

The concept of ‘translation’ is preferable for achieving a multi-level analysis of policy transfers because it accounts for these exchanges from a social constructivist perspective. The conceptual development of policy translation is directly attributable to the work of Lendvai and Stubbs (2006) who draw upon Latour’s (2005) ‘actor-network-theory’ to address what they perceive to be the deficiencies of the ‘mainstream policy transfer literature’. Lendvai and Stubbs (2006) account for the conceptual distinction between the concepts of ‘policy transfer’ and ‘policy translation’ in relation to that between 'mediators' and 'intermediaries'. Latour (2005: 39) suggests that whereas an intermediary ‘is what transports meaning or force without transformation’, ‘[m]ediators transform, translate, distort and modify the meaning or the elements that they are supposed to carry’ with the effect that ‘[t]heir input is never a good predictor of their output.’ The implication here is that ‘mediators’ represent active participants
in this process of transformation while intermediaries function as objective facilitators of a given exchange.\textsuperscript{30}

Drawing on this distinction, Lendvai and Stubbs (2007: 4) suggest that the concept of policy translation reflects an acknowledgement of the fact that ‘...a series of interesting, and sometimes even surprising disturbances can occur in the spaces between the 'creation', the 'transmission' and the 'interpretation' or 'reception' of policy meanings.’ In this respect, they are highly critical of what they describe as the ‘mainstream’ policy transfer literature for its tendency to account for this process and its outputs in relation to ‘binary oppositions’ (Lendvai and Stubbs, 2009: 677). These ‘oppositions’ are described as follows:

‘...either policy is institutionalised in another place or resisted; it either 'fits' or it does not fit: it is picked up by institutions and actors or it is blocked by veto players and/or at institutional veto points.’ (Lendvai and Stubbs, 2009: 677)

It is worth noting however that Lendvai and Stubb’s critique of these so-called ‘binary oppositions’ downplays the contributions of various scholars of policy transfer and legal transplant whose work previously acknowledged the fact that in practice, these exchanges are regularly adapted to local circumstances. For example, Karstedt (2004: 23-24) writes that ‘[t]he concept of path dependency implies the use of loosely coupled concepts instead of ‘strong’, unilateral and deterministic ones’ and observes that ‘[i]n socioeconomic theories of modernisation the unilateral model and the idea of convergence have been substituted by the concept of ‘path dependent’ modernisation.’

Watson (1974), in articulating the related concept of ‘legal transplants’ which describes ‘the moving of a rule or a system of law from one country to another, or from one people to another’ (Ibid: 21), further acknowledges the fact that ‘a successful legal transplant...will grow in its new body, and become part of that body just as the rule or institution would have continued to develop in its parent system’ (Ibid: 27). He adds, ‘[s]ubsequent development in the host system should not be confused with rejection.’ Watson’s concept emphasises adaptation as an important aspect of this transplant process. However, it is in relation to the work of Legrand (2001) and his critique of the idea of ‘legal transplant’ that the ‘disturbances’ described by Lendvai and Stubb’s (2007: 4) become apparent. Legrand (2001: 57) dismisses the concept of legal transplant outright and argues that it reflects a faulty assumption that ‘law is a somewhat

\textsuperscript{30} While Latour’s analogy is valuable for highlighting the core distinction between ‘transfer’ and ‘translation’, Lendvai and Stubbs (2009: 676) are inconsistent in their application of these terms and have generally employed the label of ‘intermediaries’ when describing ‘translators’ or ‘mediators’. 

69
autonomous entity unencumbered by historical, epistemological, or cultural baggage.’ Rather, Legrand writes:

‘There is more to ruleness than a series of inscribed words....A rule is necessarily an incorporative cultural form. As an accretion of cultural elements, it is buttressed by important historical and ideological formations. A rule does not have any empirical existence that can be significantly detached from the world of meanings that defines legal culture; the part is an expression and a synthesis of the whole: it resonates.’ (Legrand, 2001: 58)

The same critique applies to policymaking processes. In other words, policy outputs or outcomes cannot exist in rhetoric only; they are a product of specific contextual circumstances. This is consistent with Tizot’s (2001: 305) assertion that “exact” translations are impossible because of the irreducible differences between ideological contexts and historical evolution from one country to another, and … transfers are always imperfect and impure.’ In other words, the transferability of a policy from one context to another is not merely determined by resistance or compromise but rather, polices are transformed at multiple sites or nodes that foster negotiation. Within these sites and as a result of these processes, policies are afforded meaning.

Lendvai and Stubbs (2007: 15) identify the spaces within which translation occurs as 'contact zones'. This term is derived from the perspective of post-colonial theory that accounts for ‘the spatial and temporal copresence of subjects previously separated by geographic and historic disjunctures, and whose trajectories now intersect’ (Pratt, 1992: 6; quoted in Lendvai and Stubbs, 2007: 15). Pratt (1991: 1), who articulated this concept through a reflexive, anthropological analysis of her own experience teaching Spanish literature describes ‘contact zones’ as ‘social spaces where cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in contexts of highly asymmetrical relations of power, such as colonialism, slavery, or their aftermaths as they are lived out in many parts of the world today.’ A contact zone can thus be described as a shared space at which various stakeholders seek to translate their institutional preferences into policy prescriptions and ultimately, policy outcomes. With reference to the important role that contact zones play in enabling policy translation, Lendvai and Stubbs (original emphasis 2007: 16) write that ‘[i]n the 'contact zone' encounters are rarely, or rarely only, about words and their meaning but are almost always, more or less explicitly, about claims-making, opportunities, strategic choices and goals, interests and resource maximisation...’. This view is also supported by the work of Freeman (2009: 435) who suggests that these are spaces ‘... in which some kinds of association or translation are legitimated and authorised just as others are excluded or denied.’
Johnston and Shearing’s (2003) model of nodal governance suggests that contact zones may overlap with security nodes but that the two terms are not synonymous. Whereas security nodes refer to concrete sites at which security is governed, contact zones may also describe the spaces in between these sites. As Lendvai and Stubbs (2006: 6) suggest, contact zones are actively constructed ‘through actor networks’ and therefore they do not represent ‘pre-existing categories’. By contrast, security nodes can and often do refer to pre-existing categories. Examples of security nodes including the public police or a private security company may be linked by an abstract contact zone. Concrete examples of contact zones also exist in the form of newly established nodes that serve to improve or facilitate policy coordination or coherence within a pre-existing network of governance.

With reference to externally-generated policing reform projects being pursued in the context of weak and structurally dependent societies, concrete contact zones can be seen in relation to internationally funded development projects designed to implement community safety partnership schemes at the local level. In these cases, the projects simultaneously function as contact zones and security nodes in the sense they constitute important links between local and global actors and because they ultimately shape the ‘governance of governance’ (Wood and Shearing 2006: 113) within their respective local contexts. Analysing these interactions with reference to Johnston and Shearing’s (2003) nodal model of security governance thus enables one to develop a meso-level account of the power structure that define liberal state-building and policing reform projects in developing and transitional contexts. Clarke (2005: 8) writes that the social constructivist perspective inherent to policy translation ‘sheds new light on [policy] implementation, or how policy moves from policy formation to ‘front line’ practice’. Analysing the dispositions that emerge from translational policy processes thus affords us valuable insights into the politicised character of these nodal settings.

---

51 By ‘internationally funded’ I mean projects being funded by either multi-lateral or bi-lateral donors.
Chapter Five: Methodology

The issues associated with attempting to construct a multi-level account of a specific episode of policy transfer from an ‘outsider’ perspective are evident in relation to the work Ivanova and Evans’ (2004) who employ this concept for their case study of local government reforms in the Ukraine. While Ivanova and Evans (2004) provide a compelling description of the structural circumstances that prompted local governments in the Ukraine to band together and form a policy transfer network, their analysis primarily focuses on the outcomes of this network rather than the deliberations and interactions which shaped these outcomes. Similar issues confronted Aitchison (2011) who describes the difficulties that he encountered while researching policy transfers and policy convergence as drivers of criminal justice reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Aitchison writes:

‘While international aid and assistance may have brought numerous potential agents for transfer into the country, the multitude of nations represented within the international community suggests that the process of policy learning is complicated in these circumstances...Moreover, a simple line cannot be drawn between the country of origin of a particular expert and the model they advocate, even though respondents in the field sought to suggest that this was so...Thus while a large international presence may facilitate the exchange of policy ideas and models, it may in turn create a dynamic and multi-dimensional version of lesson drawing where policy and laws are not transferred or transplanted from one particular source country, but in which the local is merged with various different models available according to perceived needs and available resources.’

(Aitchison, 2011: 207)

The experiences of Ivanova and Evans and Aitchison illustrate that the dynamics of policy transfer and lesson learning are inherently difficult to represent via a post hoc analysis from the perspective of an outsider. In this respect, I argue that proximity enhances one’s ability to generate an empirical account of contact zones and security nodes. In this chapter, I elaborate on my research design that I use to apply the concept of ‘policy translation’ to the study of nodal security governance and policing reform in BiH. I also review a number of methodological issues that I encountered while completing my field work. Using a case study methodology, my research accounts for the ‘translation’ of two glocally-oriented policing reform projects into policy outputs and practices in BiH and explores the ways that policy mediators including international actors and local practitioners affect the conceptual and programmatic contours of externally-defined prescriptions for glocal policing.
Section 5.1 introduces my research design and describes the methods that I utilised while conducting my case study of United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Safer Communities project including a discussion of how and why my research design and research questions evolved in relation to my incremental engagement with the field, reflections on my use of ethnographic methods in this organisational setting, and a discussion of the collaborative nature of this research. In Section 5.2, I review the research design and methods that I utilised while conducting my second case study of community policing in Sarajevo Canton. Once again I reflect upon the nature of my access, the issue of utilising evaluative research for exploratory purposes, and practical issues that I encountered while completing this field work. I conclude this methodology chapter by accounting for the method that I used to analyse my data, describing the ethics of presenting my data and stating the limitations of this research.

### 5.1 Safer Communities

My first case study involves ethnography of the UNDP’s Safer Communities project that presents an institutional perspective on how mediatory nodes subsume the role of a contact zone and facilitate the translation of broadly defined policing reforms through interpretation, negotiation and practice. Through these processes, I argue that mediatory nodes play an important role in ascribing policing reforms conceptual and programmatic meaning and therefore, studying the interactions that occur within these nodal settings serves to generate a nuanced account of the power politics that define a limited segment within a network of governance. The value of using a single case study to generate an institutional perspective on policy translation is that it enabled me to approach this research inductively in order to generate intensive and reflexive data that illustrates the transformational character of this setting.

The data which I present in this case study was generated during a three-month ‘internship’ with the Safer Communities project that I completed between January and April 2011. This internship enabled me to research these processes from the perspectives of a member of the project team and it afforded me the opportunity to personally contribute to important institutional decision making processes and project activities. My immersion in this ‘contact zone’ allowed me to map the power politics of this setting while also reflecting on how my participation affected this translational process. The total ‘yield’ of my ethnography of the Safer Communities project includes over 25,000 words of personal journal entries documenting the work that was carried out within the Safer Communities office, meetings between the Safer
Communities team and different project stakeholders, meetings between the Safer Communities team and senior managers at UNDP’s BiH office, and informal follow-up interviews that were conducted with project staff via Skype. In presenting my case study, I also reference various project documents and working drafts that I have retained with permission from UNDP’s Project Manager in order to ‘triangulate’ my observations wherever possible and to provide illustration for my analysis (see Appendix 2). The remainder of this section elaborates on the nature of my access and my approach to conducting an organisational ethnography of UNDP’s Safer Communities project.

5.1.1 Access

The issue of access is an important determinant of my ability to develop an ethnographic account of nodal security governance including one which focuses on a concrete contact zone like the Safer Communities project. When I initially arrived at UNDP’s BiH office in January 2011 to begin my internship, I was not entirely sure what to expect. Having already met all of the members of Safer Communities team back in April of the previous year, I had received assurances that my needs would be looked after however I was not entirely certain what my needs were at this point. What did I know about development work? What did I know about ‘Safer Communities’? What did I know about community policing in BiH? All of my knowledge on these issues came from books or journal articles and I recognised that I lacked an understanding of these topics from a practitioner’s perspective. Essentially, I entered the field unsure of my objectives and questioning my ability to translate my seemingly abstract, theoretical knowledge of policing and community safety partnerships into a workable research project.

Over the next three months, my status in relation to UNDP’s Safer Communities project shifted through many of the categories identified by Adler and Adler (1987: 33). I went from being an outsider at UNDP to a peripheral member, to an active member of the Safer Communities team. In my capacity as an active member of the project, I authored a project brief and a policy brief, conducted a five-week qualitative study on community policing practices in Sarajevo, drafted numerous concept notes, contributed to the project’s sustainability report, and participated in regular, intense deliberation processes that would ultimately shape the future design and implementation for this project throughout the country.

---

52 See ‘Appendix 1 Research Phases’ for an overview of my fieldwork schedule. Further note that once my internship concluded, I retained my peripheral membership by continuing to lend my support to various project activities.
There are numerous factors that may prevent researchers from directly immersing themselves in an active and relevant contact zone or security node, but doing so is important for generating a detailed analysis of policy translation. First there are informal restrictions on access to consider. On a practical level, these factors relate to the fact that the active character of these settings is both spatially and temporally sensitive meaning that one must be in the right place at the right time in order to identify translational activities and the contextual circumstances that prompt them. The second issue relates to formal restrictions on access. Many of the security nodes and concrete contact zones at which policy translation takes place often lack transparency or are protected by institutional gatekeepers. In order to analyse these settings, a researcher must be granted permission to study them. However, access is frequently limited by the fact that institutional gatekeepers ‘have a practical interest in seeing themselves and their colleagues portrayed in a favourable light’ (Atkinson and Hammersly 2007: 50-52). Allowing an outsider to access these spaces for the purpose of researching their political character is therefore potentially risky for these stakeholders given that transparency may potentially undermine their ability to exercise power in this setting and shape decision making processes.

When I first arrived in April 2010 Sarajevo during the first phase of my field visit, my specific research design remained largely unarticulated, specifically with regards to which project(s)/agencies I would focus on, where I would target my case studies, and even the specific methods that I would employ. My primary goal for this two-week visit was to identify a suitable access strategy that would enable me to gain a greater sense of how international development agencies involved with community-based policing and community safety partnership (CSP) reforms in BiH were actively pursuing these projects. Drawing heavily on my supervisor Dr Andy Aitchison’s experience conducting fieldwork on criminal justice reforms in BiH, I formed the impression that many of these issues could only be resolved after I developed a personal understanding of contemporary developments in the field. Limiting myself to qualitative methods also afforded me significant flexibility in terms of adapting my research questions to the realities of the field.

During my initial two-week visit, I met with representatives of three organisations that were either actively involved with community-oriented policing reform in BiH or which had previously worked on these initiatives. These organisations included the Sarajevo-based Centre for Security Studies (CSS), UNDP, and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation.
My strategy for identifying these potential ‘sponsors’ or ‘gatekeepers’ relied heavily on a ‘snowballing’ technique consistent with a purposive sampling method described by Patton (2001: 106). This initial series of meetings helped me to achieve a better understanding of the type of projects that these three agencies were actively involved with, and a sense of their past progress and future plans regarding the implementation of these projects. It also earned me a formal invitation from UNDP to conduct my research on the pilot phase of the Safer Communities project.

Between May and December 2010, I finalised the terms of my access with the Safer Community team’s Project Manager and we produced two documents which defined my responsibilities and obligations as a project intern. The first of these documents was a modified version of UNDP’s standard ‘Terms of Reference’ document that I was required to agree to as a condition of my internship. The second document was a ‘Memo of Understanding’ that I developed with my supervisors to establish a protocol for issues relating to data collection, data usage, research ethics, and my scheduling commitments. This ‘Memo of Understanding’ also included a general summary of my preliminary research questions, my proposed methods, and a statement asserting my ownership over personal data generated during the internship. Key to our agreement was a mutual commitment to collaboration and transparency. In other words, both parties approached this internship with the expectation that it would be mutually beneficial. The internship offered me formal access to research the institutional node at which Safer Communities was being designed and the Project Manager expected to benefit from the presence of an in-house ‘expert’ on community-oriented policing in the Anglo-American context at no financial cost.

5.1.2 Organisational Ethnography with United Nations Development Programme

I secured my meeting with the CSS through Dr Irma Deljkic, an Assistant Professor of Criminalistics at the University of Sarajevo. I arranged for my meeting with UNDP after finding the Project Manager’s contact details listed on a job advertisement online and the Project Manager would subsequently connect me to the SDC.

I drew upon my extremely limited social network in BiH and through this individual, I organised a meeting with a project associate working at the CSS. I also secured my meeting(s) with UNDP by emailing the Safer Communities Project Manager whose email address was publicly listed on a job posting for a ‘Community-based Policing Advisor’. My encounter with the SDC (during a meeting with UNDP) resulted from my initial contact with UNDP.

I received no financial compensation for my participation in this internship and I was only reimbursed for research/travel expenses which related directly to my work with the Safer Communities project.
I utilised ethnographic methods to account for the work of the Safer Communities team and their role in designing and implementing the Safer Communities project. In many ways my fieldwork began as an anthropological exercise given that I entered this setting as an outsider with only a limited sense of what I might actually achieve through this placement. As Neyland (2008: 10) observes, the need for researchers to ‘develop their method in association with the field being studied’ is important for all forms of ethnography. This was particularly relevant in this case given that the context that I was studying was both culturally and institutionally unfamiliar. This necessitated that I initially generate descriptive data on cultural and social differences and similarities that I encountered over the course of my research before I could adequately contextualise the power politics of this setting. Due to the constraints associated with gaining access to conduct ethnography of multi-lateral development organisations described in the previous sub-section, it is important to recognise that there have only been a few other examples of researchers using ethnographic methods to account for the role that these agencies play in overseeing development projects in weak and structurally dependent societies. One such example can be found in the work of Mosse (2005) who drew upon his role on a UK Department for International Development (DFID) project in India during the 1990’s to develop an ethnographic account of the policy processes which he was involved with.

Similarly, Harper (1998) utilised ethnographic methods to examine organisational aspects of the International Monetary Fund however, his research was primarily intended to support managerial improvements within the organisation rather than critically analyse the institution’s function. This distinction is important because it illustrates Hammerlsey’s (1992; also Wakeford 2003) argument that an ‘ethnography of an organisation’ and an ‘ethnography for an organisation’ represent different types of research. While my research with the Safer Communities project was intended to function as an ethnography of an organisation (i.e. critical), it is also worth noting that the data I generated through my observation and participation in this setting also proved to be valuable to UNDP. For example, my critical reflections were particularly useful for helping the Project Manager and Community Policing Advisor to conceptualise various roles for the project and to recognise the implications of aligning the project with what we perceived to be the European Union’s (EU) interests in BiH. In this respect, my research suggests that an ethnography of an organisation can actually be complementary.

---

56 I elaborate on this conceptualisation process in Chapter Eight.
As one of four individuals who together comprised the Safer Communities team\(^{57}\), I was directly involved with important decision making processes involving the project’s design and conceptualisation. Participating in these tasks, I accounted for how the interplay between individual, institutional and structural factors shaped important decisions and deliberation processes. While my eventual status as an ‘active member’ may have been limited compared to the level of membership attained by my colleagues\(^{58}\), this membership role did allow me to utilise my own subjective reflexivity as data source as well as a means of validating my observations (Neyland 2008: 14; see also Davies 1999). In this respect, I argue that the active and ongoing reflection which is present throughout my field notes constitutes a unique and important element of my empirical data because it allows me to convey an experiential account of how policy translation occurred through narrative which presents important insights into the power politics of this contact zone.

### 5.1.3 Ethnographic Interviewing

Another qualitative method that I used to complement my participant-observation involved the use of informal or ethnographic interviewing. I utilised ethnographic interviews as part of my ongoing, daily interactions with my colleagues and I would also use this technique as part of my research with community-based police officers in Sarajevo Canton. Ethnographic interviews are distinct from formal interviews in that they represent a distinct kind of ‘speech act’, one which Spradley (1979: 331) loosely equates with ‘a friendly conversation’. In other words, he suggests that in an ethnographic interview, the informant is aware of the fact the conversation is ‘supposed to go somewhere’, but that this individual ‘only has a hazy idea about this purpose’ (Ibid: 331). However, over course of this conversation, Spradley adds that ‘the ethnographer gradually takes more control of the talking, directing it in those channels that lead to discovering the cultural knowledge of the informant’ (Ibid: 335). An ethnographic interview therefore requires the researcher to subtly educate or prompt the informant with regards to the type of cultural data which is being sought. This is achieved through the use of subtle cues and mutual feedback which, over time, enables the researcher to manage this series of interactions in a manner which builds trust and therefore generates honest and insightful data.

---

\(^{57}\) I introduce these individuals in sub-section 7.2.2.

\(^{58}\) Drawing on the work of Adler and Adler (1987: 50), I characterise my role with the Safer Communities project as a form of ‘active membership’ while my ‘colleagues’ at UNDP enjoyed ‘full membership’ in this field. At various points during this internship, it was clear that my degree of ‘membership’ would actually fluctuate depending on the specific tasks that I was performing.
The data that I generated from ethnographic interviews was valuable because it provided me with candid insights into key structural relationships and institutional culture at UNDP. Serber (2001: 71) observes that accessing this type of data can be particularly difficult in institutional settings ‘because a structural requirement of such institutions is to conceal the actual organisational processes that generate industry orientation’. Ultimately, my ability to account for the role that different individuals, institutions and structural factors played in shaping the conceptualisation and design of Safer Communities was a product of my ability to establish a strong degree of trust with my Safer Communities colleagues. I believe that this trust was based on their awareness of my ethical protocols and the fact that they considered my involvement to be of benefit to the Safer Communities project. The fact that I was able to generate such a strong degree of trust between myself and my colleagues did create problems of ‘over-rapport’ (Miller 2001: 170) because I was regularly presented with sensitive or potentially disruptive pieces of information regarding the project and the work of UNDP more generally. In cases where the information was of a personal nature and did not relate directly to the Safer Communities project or the work of UNDP, I excluded it from my field notes. I also omitted any specific information and private opinions that I accessed through personal communications or interviews with individuals who did not wish to be identified in my research. 59

I also acknowledge that my personal proximity to the Safer Communities team and UNDP restricts my ability to present an ‘objective’ representation of the events and processes that I document in this contact zone and I make concerted effort to reflexively account for the ways in which my relationship with the Safer Communities team and UNDP has influenced my field work and analysis of the setting. In the interest of full-disclosure, it is also important to state that I continued to maintain regular contact with members of the Safer Communities team until the project started winding down in March 2012. This afforded me frequent regular updates about the project’s future plans and access to subsequent project documents. In exchange for these updates, I provided my former colleagues with feedback on various project documents relating to the project including a final project report (unpublished). In the interest of upholding my

59 One such conversation took place with the senior representative for a major international organisation working in BiH. This individual presented me with two options at the start of the conversation. The first was that s/he would speak to me about her/his role candidly but that I would not be allowed to take notes or to reconstruct this conversation. The second option involved them providing me with the official institutional response to my questions, a prospect which they suggested would be of limited value to my research. This choice amounted to a ‘catch-22’ but I ultimately decided to go with the former option on the basis that this individuals authentic perspective would still be useful for validating my own observations and conclusions about police reform in BiH. Accordingly, no explicit reference to this conversation (or similar communications) is included in this thesis or in any of my publications that stem from this field work.
commitment to transparency and to protecting the interests of my research subjects and the work of UNDP, I also provided these three individuals with an advanced copy of an article that I submitted to *Policing and Society* (see Blaustein 2013). This afforded them the opportunity to raise any concerns or issues that they had regarding my analysis and presentation of my findings before it underwent peer-review. As of November 2012, I continue to have periodic contact with certain members of the team on a personal level.

5.2 Community Policing in Sarajevo Canton

My second case study explores the role that police practitioners play in dramatically translating strategic prescriptions for community policing into culturally and contextually relevant practices. I use interactive ethnographic methods including observation and ethnographic interviewing to examine how community police officers in Sarajevo actively interpret and implement a specific strategic prescription for community policing that was introduced by the SDC in 2007. My research design for this project featured a multi-site, single case study. In other words, it examined the work of two community policing specialist teams operating in different sectors sharing a common institutional structure and urban context. This multi-site design allowed me to combine observation, ethnographic interviews and semi-structured interviews in order to document the significant variation in terms of how a specific community policing strategy was being implemented in a shared context, Sarajevo. By limiting my multi-site ethnography to only two sites, I was able to develop a fairly detailed account of how each of the two teams worked to implement and adapt the SDC’s prescriptions through practice.

My field work involved observing two teams of community policing specialists working in different municipalities in Sarajevo over a period of four weeks. Following this period of observation, I also conducted semi-structured personal interviews with station commanders at both of these stations in order to account for a managerial perspective on how this project was being implemented as well as semi-structured group interviews with three additional community policing specialist teams that were also working to implement this project in Sarajevo. The final source of primary data on the implementation of this project was the Canton’s community policing coordinator (RPZ Coordinator) who served as both my institutional gatekeeper and an

---

60 My presence and affiliation with UNDP during this project meant that I was in fact a ‘participant’ in this research in the sense that these factors would ultimately shape the quality and type of data that I was presented with. However, during this research I would never achieve or indeed aspire to ‘full membership’ status given the professional/institutional and linguistic barriers that would inevitably prevent me from truly accessing the subjective perspectives of the officers that I was researching.
important source of candid data because he was keen to discuss the various difficulties that the Sarajevo Canton Police had experienced while implementing the ‘Swiss-model’ of community policing in Sarajevo.

5.2.1 Access

Prior to starting the internship with the Safer Communities project, I had previously identified micro-level community policing reform initiatives as the primary focus of my research (with community safety partnership initiatives serving as a secondary focus), however, due to various time constraints and pressures related to my work with UNDP, I decided to relegate my interest in community policing to secondary status. Ultimately, this decision proved to be beneficial because it allowed me to become more involved with various deliberation processes relating to ‘Safer Communities’. This in turn enhanced my level of informal access to this setting thereby allowing me to research this topic from the perspective of an active member. By actively contributing to the project rather than merely documenting it, I was also able to develop an important source of institutional support that ultimately provided me with formal access to conduct research on RPZ officers in Sarajevo via UNDP’s contacts in the Canton’s Ministry of the Interior (MUP KS). Without the institutional support of UNDP, I believe that my prospects for achieving this level of formal access and support from the MUP KS would have been extremely limited. According to the Safer Communities project’s Community Policing Advisor, this was partly due to the fact that the police in Sarajevo had grown tired of dealing with researchers in recent years given that they rarely received any meaningful benefits from their cooperation (personal communication, ‘Community Policing Advisor’, 16 February 2011).

In recognising the important role that UNDP played in acting as my institutional sponsor, it is important to note that I approached this study with two separate (albeit complementary) research agendas. My ‘official’ agenda reflected UNDP’s interest in developing a better understanding of the SDC’s progress with implementing its community policing project within Sarajevo Canton to this point. This objective was linked to the fact that the SDC’s budget for community policing related activities in BiH was scheduled to expire at the end of 2011. This promised to create a future policy vacuum and questions about which agency would provide ongoing support for micro-level community policing reforms in BiH, a void that UNDP was interested in addressing with the Safer Communities template. My ‘official’ or primary

---

Based on my ethnographic observation of community policing in Sarajevo Canton, I provided the RPZ coordinator with written feedback and recommendations for improving consistency between the different RPZ units. My findings would also influence my recommendations in the UNDP policy brief that I developed for the Deputy Mayor of Sarajevo.
objective as a representative of UNDP undertaking this research therefore involved conducting a brief qualitative evaluation of community policing operations in Sarajevo Canton that would enable me to assess whether the Swiss-model of community policing had been successfully implemented, whether it was having its intended effect, and if not, why not? My project manager with the Safer Communities project also suggested that by addressing these questions, I would also be able to generate some empirical support for a policy brief that I was simultaneously developing regarding the prospect of introducing the Safer Communities template in Sarajevo. In recognition of UNDP’s stake in the evaluative aspect of this research and the extent to which this would ultimately shape my analysis of the field, I use ethnographic reflexivity in the following sub-section to account for how my institutional affiliation with UNDP may have shaped or skewed my own study of this field.

5.2.2 Reconciling Multiple Research Agendas

My personal agenda as an academic researcher was linked with my broader interest in examining the transformation of micro-level community-oriented policing reforms in BiH. Drawing on my theoretical understanding of issues relating to path dependency and the concept of ‘legal transplants’ (see Section 4.3) and my awareness of how various implementation problems had affected the work of the Safer Communities project, I approached this study with a tentative hypothesis that community-oriented policing reforms are not only susceptible to transformation at the design stage, but that local actors and practitioners also play an important role in actively shaping their policy outputs and outcomes via their attempts to implement these policies. A combination of time constraints and logistical issues meant that I would not be able to study these implementation issues in relation to the Safer Communities project, however, the nature of my access with the MUP KS and the police meant that I would have an opportunity to study policy translation as it affected the implementation of the SDC’s strategic prescriptions for community policing in Sarajevo.62

In order to simultaneously address these research objectives, I completed approximately fifty-hours of participant observation with two community policing specialist teams operating in different municipalities in Sarajevo Canton. I selected participant observation as my primary method because I knew that it would provide me with first-hand account of what these officers

---

62 The fact that my research examines two different initiatives and organisations serves as a limitation in the sense that I cannot claim to provide a comprehensive empirical account of policy transformation based on a single case study. However, both cases are complementary in the sense that they address sequential stages in the policy transfer process and deal with glocal policies designed to improve local policing and security governance.
actually do. Such insights were essential for establishing what constitutes community policing in this particular context and I also anticipated that ethnographic observation would also provide me with an opportunity to spend a significant amount of time with individual police officers. This proximity allowed me to access to their personal reflections and experiences and it ultimately provided me with an enhanced sense of how these individuals respond to a combination of institutional and structural pressures while attempting to implement this strategy. Another benefit of this method was that it enabled me to observe certain interactions inherent to community police work that cannot be accessed through non-participatory methods like interviews.63

I identified Sarajevo Canton as a suitable location for researching community policing in BiH for a number of reasons. The first and most obvious reason involved practical considerations like time and cost commitments required for conducting this research in another municipality.64 Another consideration related to the prospect of gaining formal access to conduct this research, particularly given the limited timeframe of my internship. In discussing my options with the Safer Communities Project Manager, it was determined that I would be more likely to achieve good cooperation from the Sarajevo Canton Police because the project’s Community Policing Advisor had already established a number of relevant contacts within the department and would also be well-positioned to assist during my research should I encounter any resistance or problems.65 A final aspect of this location that appealed to my research involved the decentralised structure of community policing in Sarajevo Canton66, a feature which afforded me the opportunity to conduct comparative research within a single case study. In other words, the fact that community policing specialist teams operated in different sectors/municipalities

63 This was evident in a report developed by a consultant who was hired by UNDP to research community policing activities in Sarajevo in 2010. This individual issued ‘field diaries’ for the officers to complete during their shift in order to provide an indication of how they spent their time. The officers complied with the directive and coded their activities in the diaries however, this data failed to convey the significance of their actions or the context in which they took place.

64 Initially, my plan involved researching community policing in Zenica given that this municipality also served as one of the Safer Communities pilot sites and therefore, I believed that it could provide me with an opportunity to assess the Safer Communities hypothesis that ‘Citizen Security Forums’ (CSF) serve to enhance a community policing strategy. Once I arrived in Sarajevo, however, the Project Manager suggested that the prospect of commuting to Zenica from Sarajevo would be problematic and that it would potentially go against my Terms of Reference agreement for my internship. This created a dilemma for me given that my access was largely predicated on my institutional affiliation with UNDP however this affiliation was also creating restrictions for how I would be able to proceed with my research of community policing implementation.

65 It was also evident that the Safer Communities Project Manager was keen to use my research to explore the possibility of promoting the Safer Communities in Sarajevo given that this city represented an important strategic and symbolic location which could potentially benefit the Safer Communities project’s goal of long term expansion.

66 I describe the structure of policing in Sarajevo Canton in Section 9.1.
and were directly accountable to their station commander’s rather than the Cantonal RPZ Coordinator provided me with an opportunity to articulate multiple, highly localised holistic and multi-level accounts of the implementation of this project and to control for common structural and contextual factors in my analysis.

My four weeks of ethnographic observation focused on the activities of two community policing specialist teams. Both teams were established at the same time in 2007 as part of a micro-level community policing project that was initiated by the SDC. By 2011, however, the consensus was that one of these teams (RPZ1) was the most advanced community policing unit in BiH while the second team (RPZ2) had been less successful in implementing the Swiss-model within its respective municipality (personal communication, Sarajevo, 4 March 2011). During the final week of this study (Week 5), I also conducted a series of six semi-structured follow-up group interviews with three additional specialist units (RPZ3, RPZ4, and RPZ5), two station commanders (responsible for RPZ1 and RPZ2), and the Canton’s RPZ Coordinator.

No interpreter was required for my participant-observation with RPZ1 as three of the four community policing specialists spoke English and assisted me with interpretation in the field. The fact that I depended on these officers for interpretation amounted to a significant limitation for this research given that it restricted my ability to independently access and reproduce certain interactions. This issue was most problematic when it came to comprehending the content and nuances of dialogue and interactions that took place in Bosnian. In this respect, the language barrier provided my research subjects with a powerful means for controlling my access to the field. In order to study these interactions, I was forced to rely on mediated accounts of various events or meetings that were provided by my hosts. This limited my capacity to objectively evaluate their work but it was useful for developing trust with the officers and accessing their subjective understandings of community policing and the ways that they associated these narratives with different activities.

5.2.3 Participant Observation with an Interpreter

As my participant-observation with RPZ1 progressed, it was also clear that the language barrier and the privacy that it afforded these officers actually helped me to establish a positive rapport with these individuals. For one thing, it made my physical presence amongst the officers less threatening because I struggled to grasp all but the most basic conversations in Bosnian. This allowed the officers to ignore me while conducting private conversations in my presence. It also meant that my unannounced and unanticipated presence at various meetings and events involving third-parties was less problematic from an ethical standpoint given that the officers
served as a filter for any personal or sensitive information that could potentially create issues for other participants in this setting. In this respect, I argue that my dependency empowered my research subjects while simultaneously sensitising them to my personal limitations as a non-native researcher attempting to access their world. In providing me with interpretations, these officers functioned not only as my research subjects, but as key informants who facilitated my comprehension and reproduction of the field within my notes. As these narrative accounts regularly touched upon important structural and institutional issues that affected their work as RPZ specialists, these insights represented a key component of my ethnography.

I was less successful in accessing these narrative elements in my ethnography of RPZ2 because I was required to employ my own interpreter as none of the team’s three officers possessed more than a basic level of proficiency in English. The interpreter who assisted me in this capacity was Adnan Fazlić, a graduate student of Criminalistics at the University of Sarajevo who also served as my interpreter for three of the follow-up interviews that I conducted during the final week of this project.67 As a native Bosnian speaker with an academic background and local knowledge of the police, Adnan’s presence during the course of my field work with RPZ2 improved my comprehension of the various events and interactions which took place in our presence. This was particularly valuable because over the course of our field work with RPZ2, it became apparent that various meetings, activities and interactions were being staged for our benefit.68

Adnan’s involvement in my research with RPZ2 did create some limitations however. Most important was the fact that his ability to understand private conversations and to actively interpret the various events and activities meant that I did not establish the same degree of trust with these officers as I had with their colleagues from RPZ1. This made the officers of RPZ2 less willing to present us with what Adnan and I believed to be a ‘truthful’ representation of their roles as community policing officers. Given that this unit was generally regarded to be weaker than RPZ1, we also suspected that they were using my research to present their work in the best possible light given the risk that any problems or shortcomings might be perceived as a

---

67 Adnan served as my interpreter for my interviews with RPZ3, RPZ4 and C2 (Station Commander for RPZ2). Another intern from UNDP acted as my interpreter for my interview with RPZ5 while a police officer acted as my interpreter for my interview with C1 (Station Commander for RPZ1). I did not require an interpreter during my initial meeting or final interview with the RPZ Coordinator.

68 For example, during the first day of our field work with RPZ2, we went on ‘patrol’ with one of the RPZ officers who took us on a guided tour of her assigned neighbourhood and proceeded to introduce us to various ‘partners’ in the community. Adnan observed however that these interactions appeared to be ‘artificial’ in the sense that none of these encounters appeared to hold any substantive value for the work of these RPZ officers but rather revolved around our presence.
failure of individuals rather than the model itself, the institutional context, or structural factors. Despite these limitations, the data which I managed to generate from observation of RPZ1 and RPZ2 provided me with unique insights into important questions about rhetorical character of community policing in Sarajevo and a sense of the various constraints to ‘successful’ implementation which I discuss in Chapters Nine and Ten.

5.3. Data Collection, Analysis and Presentation

Appendix 1 summarises my research schedule and lists all of the interviews and personal communications that are referenced in my case studies. All of the data that I generated while completing my field work in BiH was initially hand written in a field journal and subsequently composited into a single Word document containing typed transcripts of all of my journal entries and interviews. The process of transcribing these written field notes into a typed document provided me with the opportunity to conduct a preliminary analysis of my data following my second visit to BiH (prior to my follow up visit in summer 2011). No qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) was used during this preliminary analysis or any subsequent analyses. Rather, the process of actually transcribing this substantial collection of notes in chronological order provided me with the opportunity to actively reflect on the experience and identify key themes of each case study that conveyed the active and transformational character of these nodal settings. Examples of themes identified through my analysis of my notes on the Safer Communities project included UNDP’s results-based management culture, UNDP in BiH’s relationship with the EU, and the conflicted nature of UNDP’s capacity development ethos. My thematic analysis of my second case study focused on themes such as the operational effectiveness of community policing, managerial influence over implementation and the role of discretion in shaping practice. Reflecting on these themes during subsequent readings of my field notes allowed me to categorise my data and expand upon these themes as translational processes. In addition to my personal field notes and interview data, I also retain electronic copies of various project documents relating to the Safer Communities project. This includes project reports and drafts of the different assignments that I worked on during my internship as well as project documents from previous community policing projects in BiH. A list of all of the

---

69 Given that my interviews were not recorded but rather recorded in notes and in many cases conducted through a translator, it is questionable whether using CAQDAS would have been appropriate for this particular project.
unpublished project documents and working drafts that are referenced in this thesis can be found in Appendix 2.

In presenting qualitative data to support these case studies, I have taken various measures to obscure the identities of research participants while simultaneously preserving relevant information relating to their role and background in order to situate their actions and mentalities. For my case study of the Safer Communities project, I identify my colleagues by their role in the Safer Communities team (i.e. ‘Project Manager’ and ‘Community Policing Advisor’) and I am careful to avoid identifying individuals when referencing potentially controversial or disruptive incidents (i.e. ‘One of the members of the Safer Communities team explained…’). Similar measures are used to obscure the identities of the individual officers that I conducted participant observation with from RPZ1 and RPZ2 as well as the other officers that I interviewed during this five-week evaluation. Perhaps the sole exception was the Sarajevo Canton Police’s RPZ Coordinator whose public profile and concerted efforts to publicise his leadership role make anonymity problematic in this case.

5.4 Methodological Limitations

Case study research is useful for illustrating the complexities of policy translation however the generalisability of my findings is inevitably limited by the unique contextual and historical characteristics of BiH. In other words, the translational processes and stimuli that I document through my ethnographic case studies represent products of their specific structural and institutional circumstances and they do not provide a reliable basis for modelling or predicting the form, the outputs, or the outcomes of future ‘episodes’ of policy translation.

It is also important to acknowledge that this research primarily focuses on manifestations of the gloally-responsive policing involving what Brodeur (1983) labels ‘low policing’ rather than those manifestations associated with the synchronisation of national technical and/or legal infrastructures for ‘high policing’. While high policing is most commonly associated with the work of ‘global cops’ within the global policing literature, focusing on gloally-oriented policing projects is useful for exploring the idea of neo-liberal governmentality in relation to the structural politics of the international development system. In the following chapter, I provide further contextualisation for my case studies by reviewing the police reform process in BiH.
Chapter Six: Reforming the Police in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Since 1996, police reforms have served as a major focus of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and they have been initiated at the macro-, meso- and micro-level. This chapter provides a brief, thematic review of the police reform process in BiH to illustrate its coercive and asymmetrical character. This is important for contextualising my case studies presented in Chapters Seven, Eight, Nine and Ten. I review the police reform process in BiH chronologically, initially accounting for macro-level initiatives designed to ‘democratise’ the police throughout BiH and subsequently in relation to local community policing projects. This review draws on a substantial body of secondary literature that documents and analyses various aspects of policing and police reform in BiH and I supplement this literature with primary data generated from interviews and personal observation.

Section 6.1 of this chapter describes policing in BiH prior to the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement. This section also briefly accounts for the transformation of this institution during the Bosnian War and the extent to which its reputation and general order maintenance capacities were tainted by the conflict. Section 6.2 describes macro-level police reform initiatives in BiH, particularly the work of the United Nations International Police Task Force’s (IPTF) between 1996 and 2004 which I argue played an important role in establishing ‘policing for democracy’ in BiH (Aitchison and Blaustein 2013). Section 6.3 reviews a subsequent shift of focus for macro-level policing reformers in BiH that I attribute to the European Union’s (EU) role in overseeing the state-building process since 2003.

Section 6.4 reviews the history of community policing in BiH beginning with two community policing initiatives that were implemented by international actors starting in the late 1990s. I acknowledge the limited interest of major international organisations like the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in pursuing localised community policing reforms and thus focus my discussion on the role of the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) and the Swiss Agency for Development and Communication (SDC) in piloting their respective national models for community policing in select municipalities. I also account for the role that these agencies played in subsequently drawing from their pilot projects to shape BiH’s national

---

70 Macro-level reforms deal with policing structures, meso-level reforms target the police organisation and micro-level reforms involve training for individual police officers. It is often the case that the initiatives described in this chapter have operated at multiple levels.
Strategy for Community-based Policing in 2007 (see Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Security 2007). It is against this backdrop that the two community-oriented policing projects that I examine with my case studies were initiated.

6.1. Policing Before ‘Dayton’

Policing in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) remains poorly documented in the English language policing literature71 however it is clear that institution exhibited elements of what Broduer (1983) describes as ‘high’ and ‘low policing’. High policing was evident from the centralised, state policing body known as the ‘Resor Državne Bezbednosti’ (RDB). The RDB was responsible for intelligence and counter-intelligence activities and was comprised of a paramilitary force of approximately fifteen-thousand officers who ‘...could be deployed in times of political unrest or disorder when the local police were expected to side with the populace against federal authorities’ (Soper, 2007). This suggests that the RDB primarily performed a specific order maintenance function within the SFRY by working to insulate the Yugoslav government and its political ideology from political dissidence. By contrast, low policing in the SFRY was decentralised and administered by each of Yugoslavia’s six individual republics following liberalisation initiatives of the 1960s and 1970s (Stojanovic and Downes 2009: 75-76).72 The fact that each individual republic had a certain degree of control over local ‘milicija’ (public police) meant that local policing varied throughout the SFRY. While descriptive accounts of low policing within these constituent republics is scarce, anecdotal evidence does suggest that its provision was generally viewed more favourably by the Yugoslav public than its state-level counterpart. This was at least the case in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina where Bringa (1995: 74) suggests that the local milicija derived a certain degree of legitimacy from its capacity to act as a de facto arbitrator of inter-ethnic disputes. The milicijia may have therefore performed an important order maintenance function in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina but this is not to suggest that the institution was highly regarded by the public it

---

71 I searched English-language scholarly databases and asked fellow researchers from BiH to search local academic libraries for any Serbo-Croat resources on policing in the former-Yugoslavia. The only Serbo-Croat reference that I have located on policing in the former Yugoslavia (pre-1991) was an NCJRS Abstract for Anzic, (1992). The abstract indicates that the article describes the repressive function of high policing in Yugoslavia but I have unable to access the full text.

72 Prior to liberalisation, public policing was overseen by the Federal Secretariat of the Interior. The six constituent republics of the SFRY included the Socialist Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia.
served. Nor is it clear that members of the public were overly keen to engage with their local police officers. I encountered anecdotal evidence of the public’s aversion to police contact during one of my interviews with a senior police officer in Sarajevo. The officer suggested that even today, older generations in BiH continue to mistrust the police because they associate sector-based policing with neighbourhood policing styles of the Yugoslav era (personal communication, ‘Station Supervisor’, 04 April 2011). A 2003 project proposal for DFID’s community-oriented policing project also supports this analysis and suggests that neighbourhood policing in the SFRY was characterised by ‘a lack of trust between police and communities’ (Atos KPMG 2003: 2).

If policing in the SFRY could not be described as ‘democratic’\(^7\)\(^3\), its role during the Bosnian War was clearly ‘anti-democratic’ (Aitchison and Blaustein 2013). Bieber (2010) describes how the collapse of SFRY during the early 1990s prompted the local police to redefine their function for the duration of the conflict while Aitchison (2007: 327-328) observes that between 1992 and 1995, local police officers actively participated in various human rights abuses including acts associated with ethnic cleansing, forced population transfers, mass detention, and mass murder. The role of the public police during the war and its complicity with human rights abuses inevitably tarnished the reputation of this institution as a legitimate provider of public security and further diminished its operational capacities for maintaining general order. It was in relation to the perceived non-democratic character of policing in the SFRY and its anti-democratic character during the Bosnian War that international reformers identified police reform as an important state-building priority in BiH beginning in the late 1990s.

6.2 Towards ‘Policing for Democracy’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The international community’s mandate for supporting police reforms in BiH is apparent from Annex 11 of the Dayton Peace Agreement which established the IPTF to assist the ‘Parties’ with overseeing the implementation of police reforms that would establish a ‘a safe and secure environment for all persons in their respective jurisdictions, by maintaining civilian law enforcement agencies operating in accordance with internationally recognized standards and with respect for internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (Office of

\(^7\)\(^3\) This is not to suggest that an objective benchmark or threshold exists for measuring the ‘democratic’ character of this institution, rather that it was not intended to be ‘democratic’ and nor does the limited anecdotal evidence suggest that it was viewed as democratic by citizens of the SFRY or prominent Western political scientists of the era like Rummel (1997) who associated the RBD with ‘democide’.
the High Representative 1995: Annex 11). Underpinning the international community’s interest in reforming the police was the notion that a ‘democratic’ model of policing was necessary for re-establishing general order throughout BiH and for ultimately establishing and sustaining liberal democratic governing institutions prescribed by the Dayton Peace Agreement. Elsewhere, Aitchison and Blaustein (2013) argue that between 1996 and 2003, the IPTF’s primary contribution to the police reform process in BiH involved fostering a model of public policing that was necessary for democratic governance: ‘policing for democracy’. Drawing from the international community’s role in supporting police reforms in BiH, we define ‘policing for democracy’ as ‘…policing which does not damage, but rather actively supports, the development of the core elements of a democracy and of democratic consolidation’. This definition emphasises the need for the institution of policing to demonstrate restraint with respect to their use of coercive force as well as their positive obligation to use their coercive powers to protect key democratic processes and institutions including fair and free elections (Ibid: see Appendix 3).

During the IPTF’s first year (January - December 1996), its most immediate priority involved addressing the public order security gap that existed in the aftermath of the war. During this initial period, Aitchison (2011: 82) writes that the IPTF’s prescribed role emphasised ‘monitoring and facilitating law enforcement activities, offering advice and training to police forces, advising government bodies, assessing threats and evaluating capabilities, accompanying and assisting police, and reporting human rights violations to the authorities…’. In other words, the IPTF lacked a formal policing mandate\(^{74}\) and was tasked with overseeing various police reform initiatives that were designed by the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMBiH) to improve the institutional capacities of BiH’s ‘decentralised and dysfunctional’ police forces (ICG 2002: 1; also Wisler 2005: 140).\(^{75}\)

In December 1996, Aitchison (2011: 82) notes the IPTF’s mandate was formally extended by UN Resolution 1088 (also Wisler 2005: 147). As noted in the 2002 International Conflict Group (ICG) report *Policing the Police in Bosnia*, the renewal of the IPTF’s mandate included a call for a greater focus on ‘the protection of citizens’ rights [through] the articulation of specific,\(^{74}\) As Wisler (2005 :145) notes, the UN CIVPOL mission (which included the IPTF) ‘was unarmed and not entrusted with law enforcement capacities’.

\(^{75}\) A 2002 report from the ICG suggests that the state and governmental structures that were prescribed for BiH by the Dayton Agreement would actually create major challenges for the IPTF and subsequent agencies involved with police reform initiatives because it effectively established 14 different police forces which lacked a mechanism of central coordination or an inclination towards cooperation.
observable standards’ (International Conflict Group 2002: 7; quoting Dziedzic and Bair 1996: 20, 28). Aitchison (2011) argues that around this time, the IPTF also became involved with a ‘lustration’ process designed to transform the police into a trusted institution through the implementation of a three-tiered accreditation process. The first stage of this process required individual police officers to register with a national database. The second stage required every officer being screened ‘by means of a self-completed questionnaire’ (Ibid: 83). During the third stage, police officers were required to pass a personal background check to ensure that they had not been involved with human rights abuses or war crimes (Wisler 2005: 148). Finally, before these officers could be certified and issued a UNMBiH identification card, there were required to complete mandatory training courses that covered human rights issues and training on more programmatic aspects of ‘democratic policing’.

In terms of its overall impact and legacy, the IPTF mission played an important role in re-establishing the general order maintenance capacity of the public police in BiH (ICG 2002: 1). This suggests that the IPTF supported the establishment ‘policing for a democracy’ in BiH but it was less successful in supporting the police as a democratically responsive institution. Specifically, the IPTF77 struggled to address the issue of police interference from nationalist politicians in the Republika Srpska (RS) while the fragmented political structures in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) also limited its capacity to implement reforms uniformly throughout its ten cantons. The IPTF’s attempts to ‘socially engineer’ the police in BiH (Collantes Celador 2005: 373) further highlights the non-democratic character of security governance in BiH. The powers afforded to the IPTF via Annex 11 of the Dayton Peace Agreement and UN Resolution 1088 effectively rendered it an important architect of structural alignment in BiH, its work primarily accountable and responsive to the international interests like the UNMBiH and the Office of the High Representative (OHR) which viewed the police as an important ‘transmission mechanism’ 78 that served to impart liberal democratic values throughout the wider social and political architecture of the newly established BiH state (Ibid: 373). The rhetoric of ‘democratic policing’ was attached to this transformative agenda (e.g. United Nations Security Council 1107) yet the governance of the police reform process remained inaccessible to democratically-elected BiH politicians who lacked the authority or

76 This accreditation process was initially introduced to FBiH in 1998 and only subsequently implemented in RS in 1999 due to ongoing resistance from nationalist political elites.

77 IPTF was not the only organisation/agency involved with police reform during this period however it was the most influential. Other contributors ranging from the U.S. Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are listed in ICG (2002: 7).

influence to positively shape these prescriptions. Instead, their designated role involved acting as intermediaries in legitimating and implementing the international community’s prescriptions for state-building through domestic governing institutions and structures (Chandler 1999).

6.3 Europeanization and Policing Reforms

On 1 January 2003 the EUPM replaced the IPTF as the primary agency tasked with overseeing the police reform process in BiH. The convergence between international and EU interests in BiH was effectively cemented in 2003 when the OHR took on the role of the European Union Special Representative in BiH thus intrinsically linking the processes of democratisation and Europeanization in this context. As the coordinating agency tasked with overseeing BiH’s democratic transition as well as its fulfilment of its various prescribed EU pre-accession criteria, the OHR played a significant role in subsequently shaping the agenda of the EUPM.79

Wisler (original emphasis 2005: 153) argues that this transition ‘opened the door to a new era of realpolitik in Bosnia by the EU…’, one that would signify a reformative shift from peace-building towards a specific, European brand of liberal state-building that called for BiH’s gradual integration into the structures and institutions of the EU (see also Centre for European Perspective 2008: 7). The EU’s interest in overseeing the police reform process in BiH was linked with its Common Security and Defence Policy. Notably, Osland (2004: 544-545) argues that police reform was viewed as a means of combatting the risks associated with state failure on the EU’s periphery, specifically organised crime, terrorism and narcotics trafficking. Furthermore, Juncos (2007: 46) argues that BiH would serve as an important ‘security laboratory’ for the EU which had recently emerged as one of two powerful ‘regional security actors’ in this region (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 343).80 Through its prospective role in overseeing the state-building process in BiH and its specific oversight of the police reform process, Osland (2004: 545) argues that the EU sought to generate important credibility for its European Security Strategy (Solana 2003) that was adopted in December 2003 and which subsequently served as an important test of the EU’s capabilities as a legitimate, regional security actor.

---

79 The European Commission also served as an important source of influence over the EUPM’s agenda as it was responsible for overseeing BiH’s pre-accession negotiations.
80 The other regional hegemon being the Russian Federation.
Drawing on the experience of its predecessor, the initial aims of the EUPM emphasised ‘improving [police] governance on the middle and higher levels’ and ‘de-politicising the police’ (Osland 2004: 553). During its initial three-year mandate, the EUPM worked closely with the OHR in attempting to address the issue of political interference through a plan which called for extensive restructuring of the police throughout BiH. In response to conclusions published in a 2003 European Commission Feasibility Study that advocated the need for European reformers to restructure the police in BiH, (see European Commission 2003; also Muehlmann 2008: 4-5), High Representative Paddy Ashdown and the OHR established the Police Restructuring Commission (PRC) in 2004 as a vehicle ‘for proposing a single structure of policing for Bosnia and Herzegovina under the overall political oversight of a ministry or ministries in the state-level Council of Ministers’ (Police Restructuring Commission 2004). The impetus behind this proposal also stemmed from the realisation that the established policing structures that the EUPM had ‘inherited’ from the IPTF were highly fragmented, dysfunctional, and susceptible to corruption. In other words, they were determined to represent a significant vulnerability to the prospect of establishing ‘rule of law’ in BiH. Accordingly, existing policing structures in BiH were identified as a major impediment to BiH’s progress in its pre-accession negotiations with the European Commission (EC) and the prospect of it signing a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (Muehlmann 2008: 3).

The EUPM’s main contribution with respect to the PRC’s proposal for a single policing structure in BiH involved designing the ‘second level of policing’ structures in BiH. This new design called for establishing new police regions that transcended the inter-entity boundary line between FBiH and RS. This proposal was received as a ‘contentious’ issue by Bosnian Serb members of the PRC who viewed it as a threat to RS’s autonomy. Their concern was that creating these new inter-entity regions could ultimately lead to the discontinuation of the RS ministry of the interior which had previously been responsible for coordinating policing in RS (Muehlmann 2008: 7). Ultimately, this resistance from RS politicians undermined the OHR’s attempt to restructure the police in BiH.

---

81 The EUPM’s mandate was initially prescribed to last for only three-years (January 2003 – December 2005). Osland (2004: 552-553) suggests the EUPM’s initial plan was to carry out its work over three stages. The planning stage was expected to overlap with the work of the IPTF and was intended to ensure a smooth transition between the two agencies. The second stage involved implementing various projects in order to ‘transform the BiH police into a professional, political and ethnically neutral institution for judicial enforcement’. Finally, the third stage emphasised handing over power to domestic actors and ensuring that the outputs generated were in fact sustainable.
While the EUPM’s involvement with the PRC served as an important highlight of its first mandate, Collantes Celador (2009: 240) notes that another issue which confronted the EUPM involved the prospect of introducing ‘European standards practices’ for policing to BiH. In fact, Collantes Celador suggests that the EUPM’s preoccupation with restructuring ‘led to the interruption or slowing down of programmes/projects under EUPM’s first mandate’ with the effect that its mission would subsequently be extended for another two years (January 2006 – December 2007). The EUPM’s difficulties in supporting programmatic reforms during its first mandate can be partially attributed to continued resistance and political interference from domestic politicians. However, Collantes Celador adds that the OHR’s focus on restructuring also contributed to a reduction in ‘political energy and resources available for crime-fighting’ and other programmatic and technical initiatives like community policing (Ibid: 240). These obstacles, combined with what Juncos (2007: 46) describes as the EU’s relative inexperience ‘in the field of civilian crisis management’ and operational issues such as the EUPM’s scattered presence throughout BiH raise important questions about the purpose and capabilities of the Mission. These concerns prompted the EUPM to redefine its mandate to focus exclusively on high profile issues like building the capacity of the BiH police to combat organised crime and political corruption as these issues were determined to represent significant impediments to the country’s prospective accession to the European Union (‘European Union Police Mission’, 2011). Subsequently, reforms focusing on low policing structures and practices were left to international development agencies, specifically DFID and the SDC which played an important role in shaping the national Strategy for Community-based Policing in 2007 (henceforth Strategy; ref. Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Security 2007).

6.4 Towards Community Policing and Community Safety Partnerships

In Chapter Three, I discussed how community policing has been embraced by policy entrepreneurs and reformers as an important prescription for democratic policing in the context of transitional post-conflict societies. As an export commodity (Brogden and Nijhar 2005: 4), community policing provides reformers with an important ‘buzzword’ (Skolnick and Bayley 1988: 4) and a ‘plastic concept’ (Eck and Rosenbaum 1994: 3) used to describe an array of activities relating to low policing. While various models of community policing exist, the

---

Note that the EUPM’s mandate would be formally extended on two more occasions from January 2008-December 2009 and from January 2010 until 30 June 2012.
Peelite narrative inherent to community policing presents it as the antithesis of ‘military-style policing with a central bureaucracy obedient to directive legislation which minimizes discretion’ (Brogden and Nijhar 2005: 2). In the context of weak and structurally dependent societies like BiH, community policing usually exists as an amalgamation of different national models that have been promoted or imposed upon this context by different policy entrepreneurs, international development agencies and domestic reformers who collectively constitute an important transnational policy community (Ibid: 7-9). This section presents a detailed account of the various initiatives that contributed to this amalgamation process by introducing different community policing models to BiH.

6.4.1 Macro-level Initiatives

The rhetoric of community policing was first introduced to BiH in the late 1990’s by the IPTF and it has since served as a recurring focus of international reformers. The IPTF’s role in initially introducing the rhetoric of community policing to BiH is documented in a 2003 report by the DFID which also describes the involvement of the United States Department of Justice International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Programme (ICITAP) (Atos KPMG, 2003: 2). This report also accounts for an important early conceptual link between community policing and democratic policing in suggesting that ICITAP’s aim in the late-1990’s was ‘to create a community-oriented police force that abided by democratic standards and observed and protected human rights’ (Ibid: 2). A subsequent report published by the US Institute of Peace also accounts for the collaborative relationship between ICITATP and the IPTF in describing how ‘… [ICITAP] trained and equipped local police directly or provided curriculum and equipment to the IPTF, which trained the Bosnians’ (Perito, 2007: 8). While these documents indicate that the rhetoric of community policing has been present in BiH since the early phases of the police reform process, the lack of documentation relating to these early initiatives indicates that their programmatic impact on subsequent community policing mentalities and practices was limited.

Between 2000 and 2002, however, more concrete attempts by the IPTF to promote community policing in BiH become apparent. For example, in 2000, the IPTF implemented a mandatory training course for all police officers that provided them with a basic understanding of the community policing philosophy (United Nations Secretary General 2000: 3). This initiative complemented the three-stage lustration process discussed in Section 6.2. It is difficult to assess the impact that this educational initiative had on subsequent community policing practices in BiH or the extent to which officers at the time actually understood or embraced these lessons,
but one indicator of the IPTF’s success in at least disseminating the rhetoric of community policing is the fact that by July 2001, ‘[t]he community policing programme [had] been completed in 60 per cent of the Federation and 88 per cent of Republika Srpska’ (United Nations Secretary General 2001: 2). The actual novelty of community policing from the perspective of local police officers in BiH is less clear however. For example, the 2003 Atos KPMG report commissioned by DFID notes that many of the rhetorical elements that were emphasised in the IPTF’s training programme including its emphasis on the need for police to maintain a presence within the communities they served and the importance of information sharing were recognised by BiH police officers as important components of the Yugoslav model of ‘sector policing’ (Atos KPMG, 2003: 2). This indicates that the IPTF’s training may not have actually introduced ideas like problem-solving and information sharing to BiH in a programmatic sense but rather, it provided these officers with a fresh vocabulary for familiar concepts and practices.

Macro-level support for community policing reforms began to dwindle between 2003 and 2005 under the direction of the EUPM and Wisler and Traljic (2010: 23) observe that the EUPM had ‘retreated from local policing issues in 2007-2008’. A project associate working for the SDC’s community policing project accounts for the EUPM’s decision to withdraw its direct support for community policing reforms in suggesting that the EUPM viewed them as time consuming, resource intensive and difficult to implement uniformly given the absence of a universal legal framework to compel interior ministries throughout BiH to adopt the reforms (personal communication, ‘SDC Project Associate’, 22 June 2011). This analysis is supported by Collantes Celador’s (2007: 6) analysis of the EUPM as lacking ‘...adequate resources and personnel...’ to simultaneously focus on macro-level restructuring and local improvements in the delivery of policing.

6.4.2 Community Policing as International Development Assistance

By the end of 2003, police officers throughout BiH were aware of the rhetoric of community policing but the training that they had received from the IPTF or through the police academies in Banja Luka and Sarajevo included limited or no emphasis on the practical skills necessary for actually doing community police work (personal communication, ‘SDC Project Associate’, 22 June 2011). Nor did this curriculum encourage police managers to incorporate this ‘policing style’ into their ‘every-day operations’ (par. Atos KPMG 2003: 2). Hoping to advance the programmatic development of community policing and community safety partnership schemes across BiH, two bi-lateral development agencies, the DFID and the SDC, initiated parallel
projects that would effectively introduced two different community policing and community safety partnership models to select municipalities in BiH beginning in 2003. The ‘lessons learned’ from these projects served as a platform for the agencies’ future collaboration in establishing and supporting the national Strategy.

DFID oversaw the larger of the two initiatives in terms of both scale and budget and established community policing and community safety partnership pilot projects in Žepče and Prijedor. This initiative formed part of the agency’s Safety, Security and Access to Justice Programme (SSAJP) financed by the UK Government’s Conflict Prevention Pool (Atos KPMG 2003: 3). The logic of pursuing community-oriented policing reforms as part of DFID’s broader interest in conflict prevention and stability in the Western Balkans suggests that the agency subscribed to the ‘human security’ narrative discussed in Section 2.1. The holistic emphasis on conflict transformation through development is evident from DFID’s 2003 technical proposal which stated that ‘...the goal of the project is that public bodies implement justice strategies that reduce local tension, conflict and prevent crime and disorder’ (Atos KPMG 2003: 3). According to the cluster manager for the SSAJP project, Prijedor and Žepče were specifically selected as the pilot sites for local community policing projects because they were identified as likely future hotspots for future ethnic conflict (interview, S. Traljic, 26 July 2011). This suggests that DFID embraced community policing as a potential mechanism for managing local conflict through the police as local security institution.

In translating the community policing philosophy into strategic programmes that could be implemented within these municipalities, DFID also aimed to generate greater levels of trust and cooperation between uniformed police officers and members of the public in order to improve the police’s ability to address any tensions and to manage the risk of escalation (Atos KPMG 2003: 4). The emphasis on community policing reform was further complemented by a second component of the project that involved establishing community safety partnership schemes at both sites to improve cooperation between the police and public agencies which had previously struggled with communication and had failed to address public security and safety issues in a collaborative manner (interview, S. Traljic, 26 July 2011; also Atos KPMG 2003: 4).

The two pilot projects were designed and implemented by a team of UK-based consultants employed by Atos KPMG through its contract with DfID. The team was led by a ‘Project Manager’ who had previously worked as an Assistant Chief Constable in Scotland and had subsequently served as an advisor for police reform projects in Namibia and Jamaica. It also featured four project associates who had previously advised or consulted on policing matters in
Albania, India, Kosovo, and Serbia and Montenegro. All of these individuals possessed previous experience working with community policing and community safety partnership (CSP) schemes in a UK context. At each pilot site, one associate was responsible for community-based policing initiatives while their counterpart was responsible for community safety initiatives. In addition to the project’s international consultants, the team also employed ‘local consultants’ ‘on a needs basis’ due to the lack of ‘local expertise’ that the ‘core team’ possessed (Atos KPMG 2003: 15). This indicates that during its pilot phase, DFID’s community policing project was primarily shaped by members of a transnational policy community involved with what Brogden and Nijhar (2005) describe as the global export of community policing.

The specific model for community that DFID introduced at these two pilot sites was based on an amalgamation of the best community-oriented policing practices from the UK and developing and transitional countries around the world. According to the Cluster Coordinator, the Atos KPMG team advocated a two-component model for establishing community-oriented policing which could be readily adapted to local circumstances and structures (interview, S. Traljic, 26 July 2011). Component 1 focused on institutionalising the idea that every police officer should perform their duties in a manner that reflected the philosophy of community policing (Ibid). It also involved establishing ‘strategic boards’, comprised of local officials and senior police officers, to: ‘review progress as community-based policing is introduced’; ‘advise on the strategic direction and endorse key decisions’; and ‘establish mechanisms to monitor and evaluate the introduction of community-based policing’ within these municipalities (Department for International Development 2005: 8). Component 2 focused on developing and managing ‘strategic partnerships’ at these sites to: ‘strengthen the capacity of the police to solve community problems’; ‘secure joint commitment across government to the new model…’; and ‘assist the police in developing and implementing local policing plans…’ (Ibid: 10).

In 2004, the SDC initiated its own pilot project for community policing in Zenica (FBiH) and subsequently throughout the entire Zenica-Doboj Canton (DeBlieck 2007: 23). Smaller than its UK-based counterpart, the SDC project team consisted of two full-time project associates from BiH and a Project Manager primarily based in Switzerland. The SDC worked to implement its own brand of community policing locally throughout BiH but it did not reject nor oppose DFID’s meso-level approach to institutionalising community policing. In fact, the SDC project associate whom I interviewed stated that the SDC recognised the importance of ensuring that

83 Sead Traljic was the Cluster Coordinator for SSAJP and the supervisor to the manager of the community policing project.
every police officer conducted their work in a manner that was consistent with the philosophy of community policing but questioned whether meaningful outputs could be generated and sustained through organisational acceptance alone. These concerns prompted the SDC to advocate strategic prescriptions for developing local, community policing specialist teams that would take a proactive role in implementing a problem-oriented approach to policing grounded in the ‘Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment’ (SARA) methodology (personal communication, ‘SDC Associate’, 22 June 2011).

Between 2004 and 2006, the SDC trained community policing specialists in Zenica-Doboj Canton and also provided managerial training ‘in areas such as field work, management, communication and public relations’ (Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Security 2007: 17). The SDC also established a citizen security forum in Zenica and provided financial assistance for crime prevention campaigns, police station refurbishments and the implementation of a public perception survey designed to identify local community safety issues (Ibid). During an interview with one of the SDC’s project associates, I was informed that the SDC had a number of reasons for pursuing community policing reforms in BiH. On an idealistic level, this individual suggested that the Swiss wanted to make a meaningful contribution to the post-war reconstruction and state-building process in BiH. However, on a pragmatic level, it was suggested that the project and the SDC’s work with community policing reforms in Romania reflected the organisation’s belief that investing in security sector reforms in proximate countries undergoing transition could contribute to a reduction in Switzerland’s refugee population and by extension, levels of petty crime throughout Switzerland (personal communication, ‘SDC Associate’, 22 June 2011). While this individual’s analysis must be treated as a personal opinion and thus highly speculative, their discussion of the instrumental motives underpinning the SDC’s support for community policing projects is suggestive of a holistic belief in the relationship between under-development and insecurity in transitional societies. Similar motives are also accounted for by Hvidemose and Mellon (2009: 3) who suggest that the primary objective of ‘Phase 10’ which refers to the SDC’s regional programme for police reform was to ‘...help law enforcement improve its ability to fight transnational crime, and [to] promote community policing as a means of conflict prevention’ (see also Uster 2007: 4).84

84 The third rationale which was presented by the project associate from the SDC was that Switzerland ‘is only a small country with an interest in showing the world that they know something’ (par. personal communication, ‘SDC Associate’, 22 June 2011). This rationale perhaps explains why the SDC continued to promote its particular brand of community policing in BiH despite the fact that the
In attempting to pilot their respective community policing pilot projects, both DFID and the SDC encountered significant institutional resistance from station commanders and senior police officers who proved hostile to their proposals or failed to follow through on their assurances of support. One explanation for this institutional resistance was the lack of a formal framework (either legal or policy-based) to function as a mandate for managerial cooperation (personal communication, ‘SDC Project Associate’, 22 June 2011). Another obstacle described by the former Cluster Coordinator for DFID’s SSAJ initiative was that police managers underestimated the strategic utility of community policing and failed to appreciate its value. Rather, he suggested that they viewed it as ‘child policing’ or ‘helping old ladies’ (interview, S. Traljic, 26 July 2011).

6.4.3 A National ‘Strategy for Community-based Policing in Bosnia and Herzegovina’

Despite the indeterminate success of their pilot projects, DFID and the SDC drew upon the lessons learnt from their pilot projects and the obstacles they encountered in supporting the federal Ministry of Security in developing the national Strategy which was approved by the BiH Council of Ministers in 2008 (Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Security 2007). The ‘Foreword’ to the Strategy states that it was developed by a working group that included representatives from key state, entity and cantonal ministries as well as representatives of different policing agencies and the EUPM yet the majority of its content was authored by DFID (interview, S. Traljic, 26 July 2011). DFID played the greatest role in steering the implementation of the national Strategy between 2008 and 2010 because of its budgetary resources that enabled it to fund a Secretariat position for the National Implementation Team responsible for disseminating the Strategy’s prescriptions throughout BiH, facilitating implementation, and monitoring progress (interview, S. Traljic, 26 July 2011). By funding this post, DFID was able to subsequently limit its direct oversight of localised community policing projects and instead focus its resources towards specific activities linked with the third Strategic Objective of the Strategy that emphasised establishing ‘Community Safety Boards and prevention campaigns’ to support the implementation of this Strategy in new locales (Wisler and Traljic 2010: 21). This Secretariat position allowed DFID to continue to shape the implementation of the Strategy from a distance in a manner illustrative of neo-liberal governmentality via a glocal contact zone.

---

2007 national Strategy for Community-based Policing in Bosnia and Herzegovina formally adopted DFID’s approach however as an explanation for why the SDC initially decided to invest in this project, it also appears to be highly speculative.
Lacking the budget or influence to shape the national Strategy and shape police reforms from a distance, the SDC instead aligned the second stage of its micro-level community policing project with the Strategy’s specific ‘objective’ of this framework. In authoring the template for the ‘Strategy’, DFID intentionally left certain areas of the framework ‘broad’ in order to accommodate the Swiss-model where it was contextually relevant as it was anticipated that this would encourage the SDC to support its implementation (interview, S. Traljic, 26 July 2011). Accordingly, the SDC subsequently focused its attention on supporting police-oriented activities rather than those which focused on mobilising community resources or generating support from local public officials (interview, S. Mihajlović, 28 April 2010; Schorer 2007).

Between 2007 and 2011, the SDC supported the national Strategy by: implementing opinion polls designed to identify local priorities for community police work; coordinating prevention campaigns that would assist RPZ officers in addressing these issues; providing RPZ officers with training that reflected the ‘best practices’ of community policing in Switzerland; providing managers with training on community policing; contributing to the National Implementation Team’s development of an Operational Handbook on Police-Community Co-Operation (Council of Ministers 2010); and lobbying for adjustments in performance management systems in order to account for the flexible nature of community policing. Seeking to facilitate greater trust between the police and the public, the SDC also provided officers with training in concepts like ‘transactional analysis’ and ‘security marketing’ aimed at generating greater public awareness of community policing (Schorer 2007; Wisler and Traljic 2010). Finally, the SDC also subsidised the refurbishment of public reception areas at police stations throughout the country including Banja Luka and Novi Grad in Sarajevo in order to improve the institution’s public image (personal communication, ‘RPZ1’, 7 March 2011).

By supporting the objectives identified by the national Strategy, the SDC also continued to promote its specialist model of community policing and in 2007, the SDC introduced this model to two municipalities in Sarajevo Canton and throughout RS (Petrovic 2007; see Section 9.2). In July 2010, the SDC commissioned an external review of its community policing project in BiH that was conducted by Dominique Wisler, a Swiss community-based policing expert with significant previous consulting experience and Sead Traljic who formerly served as the Cluster Coordinator for the SSAJP project until 2010. The language and conclusions of this unpublished evaluation indicate that the SDC was relatively successful in generating outputs that were consistent with the objectives that it defined for itself back in 2007. However, the report also

---

85 The Saferworld Group and the Sarajevo-based Centre for Security Studies were the main supporters of this ‘Handbook’. 
recognized that the SDC’s working methodology was output-oriented meaning that the SDC neglected to define or measure its ‘successes’ in relation to the actual impact of these reforms. In the following chapter, I note that this is common practice for international development agencies that adhere to a ‘results-based-management’ philosophy. It is also symptomatic of the limited ability of development agencies to anticipate the outcomes of the projects on the basis of project inputs or even the tangible outputs they generate.

In their report, Wisler and Traljic (2010: 13) also concluded that the SDC made significant progress in developing self-sufficient training regimes for RPZ specialists at the police academies in Sarajevo and Banja Luka. The evaluators stated that this progress was promising in terms of promoting sustainability for the project’s outputs and that ‘neighborhood policing is capable of reproducing itself as far as training is concerned without further technical assistance’ (Ibid: 13). This report also describes numerous successful applications of the specialist model in order to provide an indication of its potential to generate favorable outcomes. Many of these examples are drawn from the work of a RPZ team operating in Sarajevo Canton since 2007 which the evaluators suggest have ‘clearly invested a great deal of intellectual effort into understanding the concepts involved and translating this into practice’ (Ibid. 5).

Perhaps the most important conclusion of Wisler and Traljic’s (2010: 7) evaluation however was that the SDC project required a one-year extension (through 2011) so that the SDC could use its political influence to promote the legal institutionalisation of community policing and the RPZ role within entity and cantonal ministries throughout the country. They write, ‘considering the nature of the administration in BiH, the adoption of the aforementioned bylaw is a requirement for ensuring that CP stabilizes completely: currently, its implementation depends heavily on the police management good will’ (Ibid: 7). Ultimately, the evaluators concluded that the lack of a legal framework to support community policing served as a major impediment to the successful implementation of Strategy. Recognising the challenge of pursuing such legal

---

86 Compared to the 2007 review which was conducted by Uster (2007), Wisler and Traljic’s (2010) evaluation of the second stage of the SDC’s community policing project provides valuable insights into the working methodology of this organisation’s approach to implementing police-oriented activities in BiH. The analysis presented in this 2010 review is also noticeably more detailed than in Uster’s evaluation and it includes critical reflections on the value and impact of specific aspects of the SDC’s work.

87 This sentiment that the National Implementation Team had been unsuccessful in implementing the Strategy’s recommendations was shared by representatives of UNDP’s Safer Communities project during our initial meeting in April 2010. These individuals suggested that the difficulties generated by this lack of a legal framework were further compounded by the National Implementation Team’s lack of budgetary and human resources which served to restrict its presence on the ground (personal communication, ‘Safer Communities Team’, 26 April 2010). Further information regarding the Baseline Assessment exercise which generated these conclusions is provided in Section 7.2.3.
reforms at the state or entity-level in FBiH, Wisler and Traljic specifically advocated that the SDC pursue an ‘early-riser’ approach to promoting legal institutionalisation that would focus on compelling ‘cantons/entities that present the best conditions for an early adoption’ to make necessary changes to their book of rules as a model for others to subsequently follow (Ibid: 7). On the basis of these recommendations, the SDC was granted a one-year extension by the Swiss Government and its community policing project lasted until January 2012.

6.5 Discussion

The established literature on policing reforms in BiH combines post-hoc assessments of macro-level police reform initiatives (Hansen 2008; International Conflict Group 2002, 2005; Muehlmann 2008; Wisler 2005); critiques of the goals and objectives that have been pursued by international actors such as the UNMBiH (Vejnovic and Lalic 2005) and the EUPM (Collantes-Celador 2007, 2009; Maras 2009; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2005); analyses of the circumstances that drive policing reform initiatives in this context (Collantes-Celador 2005; Venneri 2010); and localised empirical evaluations of specific policing reform initiatives (Deljkić and Lučić-Ćatić 2011). This body of research contributes to a rich, descriptive account of the police reform process in BiH and highlights the important role that international actors play in shaping the rhetoric and content of policing in BiH. It further speaks to the hierarchical and non-democratic power structures underpinning their work and the neo-liberal character of different techniques utilised to promote glocal policing agencies in BiH. Building on this review, I present my case studies of community-oriented policing reforms in BiH to illuminate their translated character and the mediatory potential of different actors and institutions involved with their design and implementation.
Policies associated with community safety partnerships including ‘Safer Communities’ and ‘Safer Cities’ initiatives have proliferated globally over the past two decades (see Sub-section 3.2.2). An increasingly prominent feature of plural policing and crime control strategies in advanced ‘Western’ societies, the touted successes of this model and its purported contribution to generating more accessible and responsive models for local security governance have rendered these policies attractive templates for reformers involved with policing issues in developing, transitional and post-conflict societies (Crawford 2009). Its global dissemination through transnational policy communities populated by policy entrepreneurs, international development agencies and NGOs since the mid-1990s suggests that significant cross-national (and even internal) variation exists with regards to the conceptual and programmatic features of these ‘partnerships’ (Ibid).

In the previous chapter, it was noted that community safety partnerships were introduced to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) between 2003 and 2006 by the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) and the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation (SDC). Both of these agencies initially established citizen security forums (CSF) to complement their community policing projects. The logic underpinning these decisions was that community policing would serve to improve the public’s willingness to engage with the police and that local security forums would generate greater cooperation between the police and their counterparts from other local public service providers thereby improving the capacity of these officers to address community problems through partnership (Atos KPMG 2003: 3-4). Drawing from this narrative and the work of its predecessors, the United Nations Development Programme in BiH launched its own community safety partnership project in 2009.

In this chapter, I introduce my ethnographic case study of the Safer Communities project in BiH by profiling the project’s institutional sponsor, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and by reviewing its origins as an off-shoot of UNDP’s Small Arms Control and Reduction Project (SACBiH). Section 7.1 contextualises the habitus of the international development worker at UNDP by examining the conflicted role of this organisation and its increased dependency on non-core funding for pursuing its capacity development ethos. Section

---

88 A similar analysis was described by the SDC’s Project Manager during a meeting between the SDC and UNDP’s Safer Communities project that I attended in April 2010 (personal communication, ‘SDC Project Manager’, 26 April 2010).
7.2 reviews the institutional origins of the Safer Communities project leading up to the start of my placement in January 2011. This includes a discussion of the project’s implementation which began in 2010 and an analysis of its working methodology used to pilot the project which reflected UNDP’s capacity development ethos.

In Section 7.3, I discuss the implications of the international development workers habitus by challenging Bowling and Sheptycki’s (2012) claim that glocally-responsive policing is primarily responsive to a harmful ‘subculture of transnational policing’. I also discuss the project’s status as a contact zone that linked local community safety forums to the United Nations development system and international donors and I argue that the project’s unique positioning and limited resources enabled the Safer Communities team to design project activities that addressed local needs. These factors also afforded domestic stakeholders opportunities to participate in important decision making processes that shaped the local governance of security within their respective municipalities.

7.1 The United Nations Development Programme: Capacity Development through Non-core Funding

Profiling an institution provides insight into the historical, cultural, and structural factors that shape the habitus of its members. In this section, I sketch the ideational and operational contours of the UNDP, an international multi-lateral development agency encompassing a global network of regional and country offices, in order to account for an important institutional conflict that exists between UNDP’s capacity development mandate and its financial dependency on external, non-core funding. My discussion draws primarily from Browne’s (2011) institutional analysis of UNDP and Murphy’s (2006) official history of UNDP and suggests that this institution lacks a clear and distinctive purpose within the UN development system and that this question of purpose serves as an important source of ontological insecurity for both the organisation and its staff. Confronted by this insecurity, this review suggests that UNDP employees actively seek to align their work with the Programme’s capacity development mandate but that their ability to do so is often restricted by the increasingly limited availability of core funding for capacity development projects initiated in UNDP country offices.

89 The lack of independent scholarship that focuses on the structures and politics of the UN development system makes Browne (2011) and Murphy’s (2006) insider accounts important resources. Both accounts depict UNDP as an innovative yet troubled organisation, characterisations that are generally consistent with the data which I generated during my own participant observation of UNDP in BiH.
Limitations on UNDP core funding thus generate strong institutional pressures for UNDP staff to actively seek out non-core investment from international donors with the effect that their capacity development focus is frequently undermined.

Originally born out of a merger between two major international development funds (the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and the ‘Special Fund’) in January 1966, UNDP was initially created to function as a central coordinating network that would oversee the allocation of a unified technical assistance fund and ‘preinvestment’ services for all development-related work being carried out within the UN development system (Murphy 2006: 5). Over the next five decades, however, UNDP’s role as a technical assistance fund was greatly diminished as other UN agencies that depended on this technical assistance fund sought to re-assert their organisational autonomy in this complex and competitive institutional environment by actively seeking out sources of non-core funding that would bolster their institutional resources and enable them to expand their global operations. With UNDP’s levels of core funding inherently volatile and levels of non-core donor funding rising, UNDP began its transformation into a fully-fledged development agency during the 1990’s (Browne 2011: 5). By securing this additional non-core funding, UNDP was able to run its own projects and programmes through a network of regional and country offices that employ roughly 7,000 staff.

The significance of UNDP’s institutional transformation since the publication of the first Human Development Report (ul Haq 1990) is evident from Browne’s observation that as of 2011, non-core funding accounts for ‘no less than 80 percent’ of the organisation’s annual budget (Ibid: 5). This suggests that UNDP now simultaneously functions as both a central hub for core fund disbursement within the UN development system and a fully functional multi-lateral development agency that competes with other UN agencies (as well as non-UN agencies) for non-core funding (Ibid: 5).

In its capacity as a development agency, UNDP’s formal mandate emphasises the objective of ‘capacity development’, a concept that can be traced back to the publication of the first Human Development Report (ul Haq 1990). This innovative and ‘subversive’ report was authored by Pakistani economist Mahbub ul Haq and introduced under the leadership of William Draper who Murphy (2006: 242) credits with embracing a greater advocacy role for UNDP, particularly in relation to issues involving gender equality and poverty reduction. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the outbreak of a number of localised conflicts during the 1990s, UNDP also embraced ‘governance’ and ‘crisis prevention and recovery’ as additional focal points (Browne 2011: 96). While this ideational and operational flexibility has helped UNDP to retain
its role as a preeminent international development organisation (Murphy 2006), its propensity to adopt vague and ill-defined mandates like ‘capacity development’ has also served as an important source of ontological insecurity for this institution and its staff. Browne (2011: 90) argues that UNDP’s insecurity reflects the organisations concerns about its relevance and managerial efficiency as well as its awareness of the fact that it was not originally designed to function as an autonomous international development agency. He writes:

‘All of the entities of the UN development system were established to answer specific development needs… UNDP, on the other hand, was not so much an organization as an amalgam of two funding facilities, the “need” for which was based on the concern at the time to facilitate the transfer of technical skills from North to South.’ (Browne 2011: 90)

Since the 1990s, however, Browne (2011: 91) argues that UNDP has struggled to reconcile its prescribed role as the central coordinator and disburser for the UN development network with its invented function as an autonomous development agency. He writes:

‘UNDP’s search for a role has not been without ambiguity, the signs of which were visible in the early days. The real strength of the field network is to keep the organization’s ear to the ground, identifying the specific development priorities of each country. But while these highly differentiated needs are fed upwards, the organization has developed a set of centrally determined development priorities which it attempts to propagate downwards. One recent observer has characterized this tension as UNDP’s “riding two horses simultaneously.”’ (Browne 2011: 91)

These conflicting roles create important questions regarding what it is that UNDP actually does; what makes the agency unique amongst an increasingly populous field of bi-lateral and multi-lateral competitors with similar capacities and donor appeal; and perhaps most importantly, how can the organisation actually translate abstract objectives like ‘capacity development’ into tangible outcomes? UNDP’s attempt to address the latter question is evident from its advocacy of ‘results-based management’ at its regional and country offices. A 2006 report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and World Bank states that ‘[r]esults-based management asks managers to regularly think through the extent to which their implementation activities and outputs have a reasonable probability of attaining the outcomes desired, and to make continuous adjustments as needed to ensure that outcomes are achieved’ (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and World Bank 2006: 9).

---

90 A 2007 UNDP Evaluation of Results-based Management at UNDP suggests that different organisations employ the notion of results-based management differently. UNDP’s Evaluation references this
A 2007 internal *Evaluation of Results-Based Management at UNDP* (United Nations Development Programme 2007) observes that UNDP was ‘among the earliest UN organizations to introduce results-based management’ (RBM) back in 1999 as a strategy for ‘learning from empirical evidence based on past experience and using that information to manage’ (United Nations Development Programme 2007: i, 5). However, the *Evaluation* concludes that by 2007, UNDP had made limited progress towards successfully implementing RBM because UNDP embodies an institutional culture that is characterised by ‘a lack of clear lines of accountability’ with the effect that staff at its country offices face competing pressures to simultaneously manage capacity development projects for outputs and outcomes (Ibid: x). These pressures can be accounted for in relation to the significant influx of non-core funding over the past two decades.

While UNDP as a development agency continues to advocate capacity development as its primary ethos, Browne (2011: 119) argues that the re-orientation of UNDP from a network coordinator into a multi-faceted international development agency has fostered an opportunistic managerial culture at its regional and country offices. He explains, ‘[w]herever it has become clear that donors are willing to fund a particular incentive or program, a suitable proposal is sure to follow’ (Ibid: 119). While limited core funding continues to be disbursed to these offices to cover administrative costs, fund certain core programmes designed to address centrally defined priorities, and provide seed funding to encourage local staff to initiate projects that may potentially attract future non-core donor investment, UNDP’s core budget is insufficient. This means that the majority of development projects that are implemented by UNDP staff around the world are funded by external, non-core investment provided by national and international donors including the United States and the European Union (EU).

Faced with the need to finance their operations via external channels, Browne (2011: 119) suggests that projects implemented through UNDP’s regional and country offices are increasingly being defined in relation to what are perceived to be the interests of donors rather than the needs of recipients. Browne (2011: 119) further argues that ‘[t]here is little doubt that all these donor-driven initiatives have provided benefits to developing countries’ but acknowledges that the influx of non-core investment has created significant ‘operational distortions’ that affect the way in which UNDP actually operates. This means that project managers based at UNDP’s regional and country offices must frequently demonstrate the prospective benefits of any project they propose to donors in order to attract non-core funding.

---

quote as a relevant description for how RBM is pursued at UNDP (United Nations Development Programme 2007: 9).
When and if this funding is secured, they must then continuously work to assure these donors that their investment is being put to good use in a manner consistent with the guidelines agreed upon in the ‘project document’.

Monitoring and evaluation activities thus serve important elements of RBM at UNDP. Given that outcomes can only be measured via post-hoc evaluation, continuous monitoring and evaluation procedures requires project managers to invent predictive ‘indicators’ in order to demonstrate that the project is on-schedule, on-budget and generating pre-defined outputs. The demands of continuous monitoring and evaluation combined with the threat that donors may potentially withdraw funding if certain benchmarks or targets are not met has rendered UNDP’s managerial culture highly opportunistic and the parallel accountability structures which result from UNDP’s dependency on non-core funding are said to compel UNDP’s staff to align their projects and activities with what they identify as the interests of donors (Browne 2011: 107). Doing so is important for not only sustaining individual projects but for securing UNDP’s relevance within the international development system. These pressures highlight the extent to which the work of international development agencies is affected by neo-liberal governmentalities described in Chapter Two and the ontological insecurities that they generate represent an important, recurring theme of my ethnographic case study of the Safer Communities project.

7.2 Background: The Safer Communities Project

The goal of improving cooperation between the police and other municipal service providers with a role to play in community safety and local security governance served as the working narrative for the Safer Communities project during its pilot phase which officially commenced in early 2009. The project’s initial aims included supporting five previously established CSFs in Bratunac, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Višegrad and Zenica (see ‘Map 1 Bosnia and Herzegovina’) and drawing from these experiences to develop a strategic framework that would subsequently allow the Safer Communities team to support the project’s expansion throughout BiH with financial support (i.e. non-core funding) from European donors (interview, ‘Project Manager’, 26 April 2010; also United Nations Development Programme 2010). With reference to Johnston and Shearing’s (2003; see Section 3.5) work on nodal security governance, it is evident that UNDP aspired to develop a parallel architecture for governing security in BiH, one that was believed to enhance the policing capacities of state institutions through improved links between
various stakeholders including the police, municipal officials, and other municipal-level public service providers (United Nations Development Programme 2009a). During the pilot phase, each CSF constituted an important security node within this emergent security assemblage. UNDP in BiH also served as an important security node and contact zone in its capacity as a ‘non-governmental organisation’ (Johnston and Shearing 2003: 147) and institutional sponsor for the Safer Communities project. Specifically, it provided the project with seed funding that allowed the Safer Communities team to provide financial and technical support to these forums. To contextualise the work of the Safer Communities team, this section revisits the origins of the project through an analysis of its project document and a review of its working methodology during its pilot phase prior to the start of my internship in January 2011.

7.2.1 The Project Document

The Safer Communities project was established as a component of the Small Arms Control and Reduction project in BiH (SACBiH) in early 2009. Section 1.4 of the SACBiH Project Document states:

‘The safer community project will demonstrate how community members with commitment and ideas can work together to develop innovative approaches to crime prevention and reduction of supply and demand for SALW....The Small Arms Control Programme will support the implementation of the principles and characteristics of community-based policing to allow the police and the community to work tighter in new ways to solve problems of crime, disorder and safety issues to improve the quality of life... for everyone in that community.’ (UNDP 2009a: 15)

The link between Safer Communities and SACBiH was grounded in the belief that community policing and community safety partnerships could be used to support small and light weapons (SALW) related activities such as amnesty programmes and further contribute to an overall reduction in the levels of illegal SALW ownership in BiH by improving the overall level of security for citizens within their communities. Essentially, the Project Document forecasts that the SACBiH team’s support for community policing and CSPs would encourage greater cooperation between the police and other municipal officials and contribute to improvements in the governance and provision of local security that would ultimately reduce the incentives for private citizens to own illegal weapons. The Project Document also states that Safer Communities would ‘help communities develop and implement community-based solutions to problems that contribute to crime and SALW widespread presence’ by ‘[b]uilding partnerships with women’s organizations to encourage them to engage in the ‘armed violence against women’ issue and implement activities to try to understand and decrease men’s motivation for gun ownership and use’ (United Nations Development Programme 2009a: 15).
During the pilot phase of the Safer Communities project (2009-2012), the SACBiH project’s focus on SALW control and the posited link between community policing and community safety partnerships and a long term reduction in personal SALW ownership played an extremely limited role in terms of actually defining the range of project activities that were supported by the Safer Communities team. For example, during my three-month placement with UNDP, the Safer Communities team never actually approached any of its five pilot CSFs about the prospect of mobilising its members or local community police officers for activities designed to contribute to a reduction in SALW ownership. Nor did the Safer Communities team designate SALW collection as a strategic priority for these CSFs while working with them to develop operational plans. Rather, the majority of the project activities that the Safer Communities project reflected a broader objective listed in Section 1.4 of the Project Document:

‘...to reduce crime, increase public safety and enhance public education and awareness about the causes of crime through community tailored set of activities that entail direct support to the municipalities.’ (United Nations Development Programme 2009a: 15)

On a rhetorical level, it was also evident that the Safer Communities team’s Project Manager only referred to the link between SALW and Safer Communities when discussing the project with specific audiences. For example, not once did the issue of SALW arise at any of the four meetings that I attended between representatives from Safer Communities and local CSF representatives. Nor was it discussed at meetings between UNDP and other international agencies involved with policing reforms in BiH including the OSCE or the SDC (field notes, 16 January 2011 – 26 March 2011). However, this seemingly tenuous link was referenced on one occasion during a SACBiH project board meeting attended by key project stakeholders and donors including representatives from the European Commission (EC) and BiH’s Ministry of Security. At this meeting, the Project Manager spent the majority of his presentation reviewing the SACBiH team’s progress relating to munitions destruction and made only a passing reference to the Safer Communities component in suggesting that it was ‘linked with weapons collection activities’ (field notes, 04 February 2011). This example illustrates that the Safer Communities team consciously adapted the way that it presented the project to different audiences and the team’s motives adapting the rhetoric of the Safer Communities when addressing different audiences were directly related to the funding pressures described in the previous section. This example illustrates how audience segmentation (Goffman 1956) was used by members of the Safer Communities team to secure managerial autonomy and I elaborate on this translational technique in greater detail with my discussion of ‘dramaturgical translation’ in Chapter Ten.
The SACBiH project’s initial budgetary resources included 7.8 million USD including 4.2 million USD in non-core funding from the EC, 2.8 million USD in non-core funding from bilateral donors mainly from Europe, and 695,000 USD in core funding from the UN Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery budget (United Nations Development Programme 2009a: 1). None of the non-core funding for SACBiH was initially allocated for the Safer Communities project. Rather, the SACBiH team waited to initiate the Safer Communities component until December 2009 due to delays in receiving core funds from the UN Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (personal communication, 16 February 2012).91 Because the Safer Communities project was initially funded through UNDP seed funding rather than SACBiH’s non-core budget, there was no need for the Project Manager to justify their financial expenditure or report on the progress of the Safer Communities component to the EC. Rather, the Project Manager’s description of the Safer Communities project during this presentation to the EC can be explained in relation to the need for the SACBiH team to justify its decision to deploy its limited human resources to pursue activities that appeared to be unrelated to the munitions destruction and SALW reduction targets established within the Project Document. Facing significant pressures from European donors to hit these performance targets amidst significant delays, the Project Manager risked alienating these donors and being forced to return their allocated investment if it was thought that the SACBiH was unfocused or misallocating its resources. This dynamic produced an evident disconnect between the ‘official’ justification for the Safer Communities component and the actual work of the Safer Communities team between 2010 and 2012.

7.2.2 The Team

Having secured its seed funding by the end of 2009, the SACBiH team recruited a ‘Community-based Policing Officer’ (henceforth ‘Community Policing Advisor’) in February 2010. The Community Policing Advisor acted as the team’s resident expert and coordinator for all operational aspects of the Safer Communities project. This individual reported directly to the SACBiH Project Manager who continued to oversee the work of the Safer Communities team until late 2011. The Community Policing Advisor previously worked as a police officer in Republika Srpska (RS) for nearly ten-years but retired in the mid-2000’s to serve on UN police missions in other transitional, post-conflict societies around the world. As the newest permanent member of the SACBiH team, the Community Policing Advisor had limited previous

91 The Safer Communities project also attracted non-core investment from the Danish government during its pilot phase (also an undisclosed amount) however, a member of the Safer Communities team suggested that this was a relatively small grant with limited strings attached that was intended to supplement the component’s seed funding (personal communication, 16 February 2012).
experience working for international organisations involved with policy making and development work but had previously dealt with major multi-lateral institutions including the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) and the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) as a senior police officer in RS. These experiences influenced the Community Policing Advisor’s negative view of the international community’s ‘top-down’ approach to introducing their reforms to BiH and instilled in them an awareness of the risk that this approach often generates significant resistance from local policy makers and practitioners. Accordingly, the Community Policing Advisor readily identified with UNDP’s capacity development ethos and employed it as the guiding principle for building relationships and supporting project activities during the pilot phase of the Safer Communities project (personal communication, ‘Community Policing Advisor’, 26 April 2010).

The SACBiH Project Manager also played an important role in shaping the Safer Communities project during its pilot phase. A lawyer by training, the Project Manager joined UNDP in BiH in 2009 having previously worked as legal counsel for another major multi-lateral organisation involved with security sector reforms in BiH. The Project Manager’s managerial style emphasised tangibles and the need for the SACBiH project to deliver measurable results. This reflected the individual’s responsiveness to the managerial pressures of UNDP’s ‘results-based management’ system described in the previous section. Due to the demanding nature of the Project Manager’s role in supervising the SACBiH project, this individual was forced to limit their involvement with the day-to-day operations of the Safer Communities project. The final member of the Safer Communities team was a Project Associate who was primarily responsible for overseeing administrative tasks for both SACBiH and Safer Communities. This individual contributed to discussions and brainstorming sessions relating to the design of the Safer Communities project but played only a limited role in terms of contributing to the projects operations.

As BiH citizens and residents, the Project Manager, the Community Policing Advisor and the Project Associate were all classified as ‘local staff’. This meant that they were employed on temporary contracts that were linked to the continuation of the SACBiH project. It also meant that they enjoyed limited horizontal and vertical career mobility within the UN development system and were paid significantly less than the international staff that populated the upper echelons of management at UNDP BiH office. Compared to international staff, members of the Safer Communities project also lacked significant influence within the UN development system and their knowledge of its funding structures and budgets was comparatively limited. The
difficulties that these individuals encountered while attempting to access information about funding (discussed in the following chapter) also indicates that these individuals enjoyed relatively limited social capital within this institutional setting. The Project Manager represented a partial exception given their previous experience working for another major international organisation in BiH and their personal contacts amongst influential domestic political elites (field notes).

7.2.3 Planning Safer Communities

Between April and June 2010, the Community Policing Advisor, the Project Manager and the head of UNDP in BiH’s Safety and Justice Sector conducted a series of meetings and interviews with local and international stakeholders involved with different aspects of community policing reforms in BiH. This included over fifty meetings with various individuals including representatives from all levels of government; international organisation and local NGOs; the National Implementation Team for Community-Based Policing (NIT); local police officers; and representatives of other municipal-level public service providers. Based on these meetings, the Community Policing Advisor and the Project Manager created a Baseline Assessment report (United Nations Development Programme 2010; see Appendix 2) that was subsequently published by UNDP in June 2010. This report concluded that the implementation of the national Strategy (2007: 6) had experienced numerous obstacles and that poor cooperation between the police and municipal officials remained problematic in many urban communities that were working to implement its recommendations.

The Baseline Assessment report also summarises the working ‘methodology’ that the Safer Communities team used to select its five pilot sites (Ibid: 8). It describes how a number of possible candidates were initially eliminated due to their inadequate size based on the team’s belief that those municipalities which were too small were not suited to community-based policing. This elimination process was followed by a process of ‘positive selection’ whereby municipalities with desirable characteristics were effectively shortlisted for consideration. At our first meeting in April 2010, the Project Manager and the Community Policing Advisor confirmed that the most significant factor for determining whether a municipality was suitable for pilot status involved the question of whether key local stakeholders including current and prospective CSF members were motivated to implement changes. Essentially, the Safer Communities team was only keen to invest its limited time and resources into supporting CSFs in receptive communities that were unlikely to generate resistance. For this reason, Stolac which was initially identified by the Project Manager as one of seven possible sites for piloting
Safer Communities was eliminated from consideration after numerous unsuccessful attempts by the Safer Communities team to schedule a meeting with municipal officials to discuss the proposition (personal communication, ‘Project Manager’ and ‘Community Policing Advisor’, 26 April 2010).  

From the selection process described in the Baseline Assessment report it is clear that the Safer Communities team was keen to emphasise the values of partnership and cooperation as the core symbolic elements of its working methodology. These narrative elements were perhaps unsurprising given that they were consistent with what the Project Manager and a Project Associate identified to be the institutional mandate of UNDP: local capacity building (field notes, 21-22 February 2011).  

For the Safer Communities team, this ethos motivated them to distinguish the project’s reformative approach from what were perceived to be the top-down and coercive approaches utilised by other agencies involved with policing reform initiatives in the country. For example, the Project Manager stated that the Safer Communities project was not about forcing a specific model or structure upon these local actors but rather, the project’s core budget would allow it to provide technical and financial assistance to pilot CSFs and to subsidise project activities designed to address the local security needs of these communities. It was anticipated that this investment and the project’s formal ties with UNDP would also support increased collaboration between the police, local government officials, and other key public service providers who would be compelled to participate in these CSFs as a means of accessing the projects discretionary budget (personal communication, ‘Project Manager’, 26 April 2010).  

Essentially, the goal of the Safer Communities team during the project’s pilot phase was to demonstrate the value of the CSP model through an ‘early riser’ approach that might serve to generate future interest from other municipalities in BiH.

Having selected its five pilot sites in mid-2010, the Safer Communities team hired consultant to conduct an independent assessment of the NIT’s progress with the national Strategy and to develop a strategic framework for operationalizing the Safer Communities model in BiH. The successful bid was tendered by a small UK-based consultancy firm called XIX Services which at the time consisted of a retired Chief Inspector from Merseyside, England and a local research

---

92 Stolac was considered to be particularly attractive as a pilot site for Safer Communities because of its troubled history of policing following the Bosnian War and the extent to which the town’s Bosnian Croat majority continued to exercise totalising influence over local government and the police. Aitchison (2007: 332) has previously described how majoritarian politics in Stolac created significant obstacles for the IPTF during in the late 1990’s.

93 The terms ‘capacity building’ and ‘capacity development’ were used interchangeably by staff at UNDP in BiH.
assistant from BiH who was completing their graduate studies in RS. The chief consultant possessed extensive experience overseeing operational and training aspects of community-oriented policing projects in Merseyside and had previously served as an international police adviser and consultant for DFID projects in Sierra Leone and South Sudan (personal communication, ‘Community Policing Advisor’, 14 February 2012). Like the Atos KPMG consultants hired by DFID to design and implement its community policing project in BiH between 2003 and 2005, this individual represented a member of the transnational policy community responsible for the global dissemination of community policing described by Brogden and Nijhar (2005).

Between 28 September and 14 November 2010, XIX Services conducted a series of 78 interviews with different community policing stakeholders throughout BiH. This included police officers, local partners and community representatives in order to assess the NIT’s progress against the 14 key performance indicators published in the national Strategy and to identify important ‘issues that have affected the implementation of the strategy and the delivery of the strategic objectives’ in BiH (Gill 2010a: 2). The findings of this research were published in a Community Policing Strategy Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH) Evaluation Report (henceforth Evaluation, referenced as Gill 2010a) which concluded that ‘the CBP concept is embedded in police divisions throughout BiH’ but police officers, including the SDC trained RPZ specialists, working to implement these reforms regularly encountered problems due to a lack of support from ‘service delivery partners at the municipal and cantonal level’ (Gill 2010a: 21-22). The Evaluation thus concluded that this lack of cooperation indicated that ‘there is a need to migrate the CBP strategy into a CSP strategy with CBP forming a single workstream of this strategy’ (Ibid: 21-22).

XIX Services drew from this apparent ‘need’ to inform the development of its Community Safety Partnership Development Strategic Framework Document (henceforth Strategic Framework, referenced as Gill 2010b) which translated these ‘obstacles’ into strategic prescriptions for operationalising the Safer Communities model in BiH. The Strategic Framework recommended that the Safer Communities team should proceed with developing a functional, multi-level system for governing community safety partnerships in BiH. It also reaffirmed the team’s decision to establish CSFs at the municipal level and also called for the creation of a ‘Steering Group’ at the national level that could oversee the expansion of this project throughout the country and serve as a hub of coordination linking these CSFs.

---

94 Listed in Appendix 2.
95 Listed in Appendix 2.
Safer Communities project expired (Gill 2010b: 11-12). During the pilot phase of the Safer Communities project, the programmatic recommendations provided by XIX Services played only a limited role in influencing the design of the Safer Communities project. However, these reports did provide the project with an important source of external validation because it supported the team’s initial belief that community safety partnerships represented the only logical means of improving the local governance of security across BiH.

### 7.2.4 Piloting Safer Communities

Through its financial support for the Safer Communities project, UNDP in BiH aspired to develop a parallel architecture for nodal security governance in BiH, one that could enhance existing state structures and institutions by improving the links between different agencies and security actors and rendering their governance more accessible and responsive to the needs and interests of local security consumers (United Nations Development Programme 2009a). The goal of improving cooperation between the police and other municipal service providers with a role to play in community safety and local security governance reflected the capacity development ethos of UNDP and served as a working narrative for the Safer Communities project during its pilot phase. The remainder of this section examines the micro-politics of the Safer Communities project as an emergent contact zone within this nodal assemblage by reviewing the team’s methodology for selecting and identifying relevant project activities to be implemented through local CSFs. This analysis concludes that the Safer Communities team’s methodology was consistent with UNDP’s ‘local capacity development’ mandate with the implication that important domestic stakeholders, specifically local political elites who were involved with these CSFs, were encouraged to take ownership over their respective nodes and to use them to govern security in a locally responsive manner.

In order to support project activities designed to address the needs of local communities in BiH, the Safer Communities project had to first identify these needs. In order to access this information, the team hired a local, BiH-based ‘marketing media and social research agency’ to conduct a country-wide telephone survey to measure public perceptions of community security which conducted in November 2010 (henceforth Public Opinion Poll 2010). However, the survey’s limited sample size and impersonal sampling methods raised concerns amongst the Safer Communities team regarding the reliability of this data. For example, the final report states that only fifty households were surveyed at each of the five pilot sites and asked about their views ‘regarding the security situation in their areas of residence, their attitudes regarding the issues of safety and the level of concern shown for public safety by the authorities as well as
their experiences, aspirations and trends with regard to security’ (Public Opinion Poll 2010: 3). It was therefore clear that the sampling and data collection methods used in this telephone survey failed to account for the perceptions of certain groups in BiH at greater risk of victimisation or economic hardship (i.e. Roma or ‘returnees’).

While the Safer Communities team was well aware of these methodological limitations, the findings published in the Public Opinion Poll were also determined to be problematic because they did not support the team’s belief that there was a need for further improvements in the local governance of security. Most notably, the survey found that ‘the highest percentage of citizens felt mostly safe in their municipality of residence’ (orig. emphasis, Public Opinion Poll 2010: 6) while ‘the highest percentage of respondents (12.7%) who opted… [to identify a security issue as being most significant in their community]…considered stray dogs as the biggest problem’ (Ibid: 6). This was accounted for in relation to the finding that 89.7% of the sample ‘stated that they had not been the victim of criminal activity or any other form of socially unacceptable behaviour during the past two years’. In other words, the survey suggested that the BiH public did not feel particularly insecure when it came to the issue of criminal behaviour within their communities because frequency of incidents appeared to be relatively low (Ibid: 6). Another finding that was potentially problematic for the Safer Communities team was that ‘amongst the general population [only] 45.5% would like to introduce certain changes into the security management of their municipalities’ (Ibid: 6). This called into question UNDP’s popular mandate to support reforms designed to improve the local governance of security in relation to its capacity development ethos because it suggested that local demand was limited. This concern was particularly problematic with reference to the five pilot sites given that 91% of the residents sampled from four of the five sites (Bratunac, Prijedor, Sanski Most and Zenica) expressed that they felt ‘very safe’ or ‘mostly safe’ within their municipality of residence (Ibid: 9).

The Public Opinion Poll raised important questions about what the Safer Communities project could actually hope to achieve by introducing its CSP model to BiH however, any doubts regarding the necessity of this project or the legitimacy of UNDP’s capacity development mandate were neutralised by members of the Safer Communities team who constructed an alternative explanation to account for these findings. Specifically, members of the team suggested that the BiH public had limited expectations of security provision, particularly compared to public expectations of security in Western Europe. According to the team’s

---

96 Višegrad was not included in the survey.
Community Policing Advisor, these limited expectations were problematic because it meant that the police in BiH and other municipal institutions lacked an impetus to collaborate with each other to deliver security. The Community Policing Advisor added that public apathy threatened to create a vicious cycle whereby the public might become increasingly disinvested from the governance of security within their local communities with the effect that providers and institutions responsible for governing security might become even more lethargic (personal communication, ‘Community Policing Advisor’, 31 January 2011). Thus, rather than deterring the team from pursuing the project, these findings were creatively and selectively interpreted to justify the team’s decision to proceed with the project as planned.

While the Safer Communities team used neutralisation techniques to support their decision to proceed with implementing the project, the BiH public’s limited expectations of local security provision also created a significant managerial problem for the project because it meant that it would be inherently difficult to demonstrate the value of the project’s outputs with a RBM framework. This was due to the fact that many of the local issues prioritised by BiH citizens in the Public Opinion Poll (2010) did not involve security threats that could be readily measured using established indicators such as crime statistics. Thus, while investing in project activities designed to address the country’s stray dog population promised to improve the public’s sense of security in many communities, the return on this investment could not be readily communicated to potential donors. Similarly, investing in crime prevention technologies including CCTV designed to address signal crimes and support a ‘Broken Windows’ policing strategy would also fail to translate into measurable short-term gains that appealed to the interests of non-core donors.

Despite the uncertainty surrounding the question of how the team could implement and manage this project for ‘results’, the Community Policing Advisor presented the findings of the Public Opinion Survey (2010) to representatives from each the five CSFs and following a series of consultations, the Safer Communities team identified a range of tailored project activities that addressed local security issues defined by each of the municipalities. During its pilot phase, the Safer Communities used its seed funding to support the construction of stray dog shelters in Sanski Most, Višegrad and Zenica. In Bratunac and Prijedor, it invested in projects designed to improve road safety. CCTV technology was introduced to all of the municipalities and the Community Policing Advisor worked with local officials to ensure that the application of this technology was consistent with a charter for the ‘democratic use’ of this technology published by the European Forum for Urban Security (personal communication, ‘Community Policing
Advisor’, 13 December 2011; see European Forum for Urban Security 2010). The Safer Communities team also paid for the construction of a designated youth centre in Bratunac after members of its CSF suggested that it might help to prevent antisocial behaviour among youths. In Višegrad, the Safer Communities team purchased a lifeboat in response to a number of accidental drowning in the Drina River and in Zenica, it worked with the local CSF to develop a curriculum for addressing gender based violence through a training seminar (field notes, 16 January - 26 March 2012).

**7.3 Discussion**

The significance of international development workers as policy mediators is linked with the idea that the habitus of these actors is not primarily responsive to police subcultures. In other words, the international development worker operates as an ancillary of global policing by fostering neo-liberal globalisation through police reforms in developing and transitional societies. It is not, however, one of the principal archetypes of global policing. This suggests that the international development worker’s habitus is not primarily structured by the coercive and Manichean mentalities associated with what Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) describe as a ‘subculture of transnational policing’ (see Section 3.1). Rather, this habitus draws from a conflicted capacity development ethos that is first and foremost responsive to the institutional politics of the international development system. To this effect, the habitus of the international development worker is at once idealistic and opportunistic. It renders the international development worker both principled and savvy; an actor whose transient interest in policing and police reform projects is predicated on the circumstantial demand for such projects and the availability of funding to support such activities.

---

97 Chan (1996: 109) has previously incorporated Bourdieu’s concept of ‘habitus’ into her analysis of police culture and argues that it is particularly valuable for simultaneously analysing the ‘interpretive and creative aspects, as well as the legal and political context of police work’. Drawing on Sackmann’s (1991) framework for applying Bourdieu’s concept of habitus to the study of organisational cultures, Chan’s work (1996: 110) introduces a nuanced account of police culture which theorises it as the product of ‘interaction between the socio-political context of police work and various dimensions of police organisational knowledge’.

98 This is not to suggest, however, that police subculture does not affect the habitus of individuals who assume this ‘international development worker’ role. Rather, I argue that the capacity development ethos is prioritised by individuals who are compelled to respond to institutional and structural factors associated with the UN development system. This is evident in relation to the work of the Community Policing Advisor who continued to identify with police subculture for the duration of their involvement with the project yet would only consciously draw upon this and incorporate into his work if they believed that it would complement the capacity development aims of the project.
The international development worker’s ephemeral interest in police and security sector reform projects is key to understanding their translational function because it influences their approach to policing reforms and security governance as a means to an end which need not be primarily grounded in problematic aspirations for more or better forms of security (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012: 98-100; Zedner 2003). Rather, the conflicted capacity development ethos that shapes the habitus of international development workers compels these individuals to engage with policing reforms and the governance of security as vehicles for achieving broader outcomes linked with development, local ownership, democratisation and liberalisation. While Duffield’s (1999; 2007) work suggests that development objectives cannot be divorced from the concept of security, the pilot phase of the Safer Communities project evidences that the international development worker can use their agency to promote security as an ‘axiomatic’ phenomenon (Loader and Walker 2003: 16) rather than purposively or necessarily contributing to processes of securitisation (Buzan et al 1998).

Admittedly, the prospect of incorporating capacity development ‘outcomes’ into a ‘results-based management’ framework like the one which is utilised at UNDP and other international development organisations is challenging. Nevertheless, my ethnographic case study of the Safer Communities project suggests that the concept of capacity development continues to enjoy significant purchase with the international development worker who views it as an important part of their professional identity (Murphy 2006) and their role as an agent of glocal policy making. Accordingly, the Manichean worldview that Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) associate with a subculture of transnational policing is not a characteristic element of this habitus and it does not intuitively resonate with the international development worker’s interest in capacity building.

In its pilot phase, the flexible and indeterminate character of the project also represented an important asset to the Safer Communities team, one that allowed its members to invest the project’s limited resources in project activities that would help to improve the governing capacities of local political elites and practitioners throughout BiH. To this effect, the Project Manager suggested that the Safer Communities project represented a ‘perfect metaphor for the work of UNDP’ because ‘it can be used to do anything but it is difficult to define’ (personal communication, ‘Project Manager’, 17 February 2011). It is evident that during the pilot phase, each CSF constituted an important security node. UNDP also served as an important security node in this emerging network and afforded the project seed funding that allowed the

99 This description is consistent with Browne’s (2011) analysis of the weak and ill-defined mandate of UNDP.
Safer Communities project team to provide financial and technical support to these forums. With this seed funding, it was also evident that Safer Communities emerged as an important contact zone in this emerging network as well as a security node given the project’s role in initially coordinating (or governing) the work of local CSFs. This implies that certain security nodes take on characteristics of a contact zone in cases where their designated function and nodal positioning compels them to participate in the ‘governance of governance’, that is ‘governing the range of nodes and nodal assemblages that now function to produce security goods across local, national and international levels’ (Wood and Shearing 2006: 115).

The Safer Communities team’s decision to support this range of low profile project activities illustrates UNDP’s significant influence over this contact zone. This investment afforded to the Safer Communities team the chance to exercise a significant degree of autonomy in terms of how it chose to conceptualise the project and define its projected outputs so that they could address local issue without fear of under-delivering. In this respect, the designated ‘results’ for the pilot phase of Safer Communities remained largely intangible and intentionally ill-defined. UNDP’s economic resources in the form of seed funding also ensured that Safer Communities would be designed, managed and implemented by UNDP employees.

While the Safer Communities team’s role in governing the governance of security is suggestive of what deLeon (1992: 125) labels the ‘elite characterization’ of policy actors, their ‘elite’ positioning did not amount to a cultural ‘disconnect between policy actors and local users’ because the Safer Communities team continued to implement its project activities in a manner reflective of UNDP’s capacity development ethos which advocated ‘policy sharing’ as a means of identifying local needs. Specific examples of the Safer Communities team’s use of policy sharing included identifying project activities based on consultations with CSF members during the pilot phase of the project. This included maintaining regular channels of communication with local political elites involved with the forums, and employing local BiH citizens to manage and implement the project as members of the Safer Communities team. Local staff at UNDP represented a particularly important mechanism for operational reflexivity and their presence in this contact zone also fostered policy sharing by ensuring that their collective habitus was also responsive to their personal interests as BiH citizens in achieving meaningful and sustainable improvements in the local governance of security.

The Safer Communities project also functioned as an important link between local CSFs and other security nodes operating in this network. For example, representatives from the Sarajevo-based Centre for Security Studies (CSS), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) and the London-based Saferworld group were invited to attend a string of meetings between the Safer Communities team and local CSFs in February 2011. During these meetings, these different organisations presented CSF members with educational resources covering issues like community engagement and dealing with hate crimes (field notes, 8-10 February 2011). The majority of the interactions\(^\text{100}\) that took place during these meetings were consistent with UNDP’s capacity development ethos in that there was no expectation from these different organisations that CSF members would utilise their resources or enter into collaboration unless it was in the interest of their local communities. In this respect, the Safer Communities project and its individual members played empowered local CSFs by allowing them to govern security within their communities in relation to local preferences. However, the following chapter suggests that the habitus of the international development worker is mutable (Wacquant 2009: 137), shaped by historical experiences and contemporary circumstances and structured by cultural, social and political processes that contribute to the objectification of subjective dispositions, norms and values (Bourdieu 1977: 73-35).

\(^{100}\) One example of an interaction that I observed which does not fit this analysis was between a representative from the OSCE and members of the CSF in Prijedor. The OSCE representative attended the meeting to inform the police officers attending about new procedures that were being introduced throughout the RS for reporting hate crimes. The OSCE representative stated that these officers would need to familiarise themselves with these new procedures and that the police in RS would need to take responsibility for maintaining a database of all hate crime incidents as this was a condition of OSCE assistance. This is indicative of the susceptibility of this nodal assemblage to externally-responsive forms of governance and I explore this issue in the following chapter (field notes, 10 February 2011).
In this chapter, I reflect upon my three-month internship with the Safer Communities project to examine the negotiated character of this contact zone and the ways that policy translation impacted a policing reform project in a weak and structurally dependent society. Section 8.1 examines the Safer Communities project’s unique positioning as a concrete contact zone that linked local citizen security forums (CSF) to international donors and I analyse the ways in which nodal relations and structural pressures for policy alignment influenced the work of the Safer Communities team and momentarily compelled it to align the project with what were perceived to be the interests of the European Commission (EC) in the region. This realignment is argued to be problematic in a procedural sense because it appeared to undermine the capacity of domestic policy makers to exercise political freedoms and impart their policy preferences through the governance of the Safer Communities project as a contact zone. I conclude this section by presenting a redemption narrative for the project which suggests that opportunities do exist for seemingly disempowered individuals working for locally-based international multilateral development agencies to use policy translation in order to mitigate these intense structural pressures to align policing reform initiatives with the interests of supranational stakeholders.

Whereas Section 8.1 concludes with a cautiously optimistic assessment of the prospects for maintaining a habitual emphasis on capacity development amidst limited sources of funding and structural pressures for policy alignment, Section 8.2 presents a bleaker account of the ways in which institutional and individual motives influence the habitus of international development workers in relation to the issue of sustainability. An account of the difficulties faced by members of the Safer Communities team attempting to develop a sustainability report for the project suggests that the official aim of generating self-sustainable CSFs became conflated with the team’s concerns about the need to sustain the project itself in order to provide long term support for these nodes, United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) interest in sustaining its oversight and proximity to this nodal assemblage, and individual motives involving job security. At times, these ulterior motives conflicted with the capacity development ethos of the project and thus raise important questions about the democratic responsiveness of the Safer Communities project as a node of transnational governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).
In Section 8.3, I conclude this chapter by analysing this case study with reference to the glocal policing literature. My discussion of this case study recognises that the habitus of the international development worker is susceptible to structural interference that risked aligning the work of the Safer Communities team with the interests of powerful supranational actors. However, I also argue that the Safer Communities team’s continued use of reflexivity and creative problem solving provided it with means of mitigating these structural pressures and a platform for supporting a deliberative and locally responsive model of nodal security governance in BiH.

8.1 Translating Safer Communities

While the ambiguity surrounding the conceptual and programmatic contours of Safer Communities was advantageous insofar as it allowed the project team to focus on capacity development, it was also apparent that the lack of clarity regarding what the Safer Communities was meant to achieve in BiH was problematic and it was thought that capacity development outcomes would not appeal to prospective donors thought to be interested in tangible outputs (personal communication, ‘Project Manager’, 17 January 2011). As a project dealing with security sector reform in the Western Balkans, it was also believed that the EC represented the only remaining source of potential investment as most alternative sources of bilateral assistance had dried up by this point. Confronted with a need to attract a new source of revenue to sustain the Safer Communities project beyond 2011, a significant portion of my time in this contact zone was spent working with colleagues to negotiate and translate the conceptual and programmatic contours of Safer Communities into language that we believed would appeal to the EC.

Articulating a new identity for the project proved to be challenging because none of the team members (including myself) possessed a concrete understanding of how to attract non-core investment from donors. There was also confusion about what kind of policing reform projects the EC would be keen to invest in. As noted in the previous chapter, the three permanent members of the Safer Communities team were BiH citizens who lacked first-hand experience and knowledge of the higher echelons of the UN development system and the international community’s network of governance in BiH.101 As junior staff in the UNDP BiH country office, 

---

101 As a non-BiH citizen, I would have been considered ‘international staff’ had I been salaried during this internship. I initially lacked intimate knowledge of the key structures and processes involved with
the team’s Community Policing Advisor and Project Associate lacked the social capital necessary for directly acquiring this information from senior UNDP managers with a better understanding of the UN development system. While the Project Manager could periodically access these individuals, they were frequently preoccupied with addressing various obstacles that had arisen with the Small Arms Control and Reduction Project (SACBiH) meaning that the Community Policing Advisor, the Project Associate, and I were left to explore these questions through regular brainstorming sessions that generated various concept notes\(^\text{102}\) and prescriptions for aligning the project with European priorities. Reviewing these attempts to translate Safer Communities into language that would appeal to the EC as a prospective investor serves to illustrate an important and structurally coercive dimension to the relationship between liberal state-building, nodal security governance and policing reforms in BiH that is described in Chapter Three.

\textbf{8.1.1 Renegotiating Safer Communities}

Admittedly, this translational process proceeded on the basis of imperfect information about what the EC might be interested in funding. Such information was supplied by the Project Manager who suggested that we would need to identify a ‘selling point’ for Safer Communities that would readily answer the question of what these forums actually do (personal communication, ‘Project Manager’, 17 January 2011). The Project Manager added that Safer Communities projects in other transitional countries were linked with specific, topical issues designed to attract investment. In Kenya, for example, a ‘Safer Cities’ project had been implemented by UN-HABITAT which focused on the issue of developing safer housing. In Croatia, UNDP Safer Communities project stipulated that 20% of the project’s budget must be spent on gender related activities. By citing these previous examples, the Project Manager effectively suggested that the Safer Communities project in BiH would only appeal to donors if it was marketed as a strategy for achieving a clearly defined goal as opposed to marketing it as a template for improving security governance locally (Ibid.).

Similar ideas were expressed by the team’s Community Policing Advisor who believed that ‘the European Commission and other donors are only interested in seeing progress in the short term,'

\footnote{Concept notes were used by the Safer Communities team as a means of articulating a vision for the project and for clarifying its aims and objectives for external audiences including prospective donors. Reflecting on these documents provides insight into how the team’s habituated view of the project changed during this period. My participation in this process therefore necessitates an auto-ethnographic account of this translational process in order to present a reflexive analysis.}

\footnote{governance in BiH and more importantly, I lacked the social capital necessary for acquiring this knowledge without introductions provided by the Project Manager.}
demonstrated through tangible outputs’. They added however that this would be problematic for the Safer Communities project because ‘CSFs are ultimately successful when they are operating and being utilised to deal with local issues without an overreliance on external support and resources’ (*par.* personal communication, ‘Community Policing Advisor’, 31 January 2011). In other words, the team’s Community Policing Advisor believed that aligning the project with donor interests risked compromising its value as a mechanism for local capacity development. Despite these concerns, the team’s Project Manager remained adamant that the EC would not view capacity development or the creation of new structures or nodes as ‘results’ in their own right. Rather, the Project Manager suggested that European-based donors would only invest in projects with tangible outputs; projects that could be measured and evaluated (personal communication, ‘Project Manager’, 17 January 2011). These mentalities structured our search for a ‘greater selling point’ and prompted us to demonstrate that the Safer Communities model could be aligned with the EC’s agenda for BiH’s accession to the European Union.

**Safer Communities as ‘Social Capital’**

One of the first concept notes that we developed, at the request of the Project Manager, indicated that CSFs might provide a useful platform for combatting rising levels of social exclusion in BiH, an issue which was previously identified as being significant by a 2009 UNDP Human Development Report for BiH titled *The Ties That Bind* (United Nations Development Programme, 2009b). This report suggests that ‘the use of *štela* – personal and family connections – is widespread’ in BiH with the effect that different populations enjoy differential access to important networks of governance. The report adds that those populations which lack these connections are ‘network poor’ meaning that they ‘have lower levels of social capital and higher levels of material deprivation’. This implies that they are ultimately disempowered within and beyond their respective communities and prone to social exclusion (*Ibid*: 22).

Building on the theorised relationship between differential access to networks and social exclusion, I developed the following introduction to a draft for a concept note titled ‘Safer Communities Project 2012-2015: Security Governance as Social Capital’ in February 2011:

---

103 I took the lead in developing this report and feedback was later provided by the Project Manager and Community Policing Advisor.

104 The report also states that “[g]roups most likely to suffer from social isolation include [internally displaced persons], minority returnees, the elderly, women in rural areas and people with lower education” (*United Nations Development Programme 2009b*: 22).
‘The Safer Communities Project aims to reinvigorate meso-level social bonds in Bosnia and Herzegovina through the establishment of Citizen Security Forums (CSF) that serve to enhance the accountability and transparency of the process by which local security governance is provided. As it currently stands, the key structures and institutions that are tasked with governing security in Bosnia and Herzegovina are largely exclusive in that opportunities for citizen participation are limited and the availability and functionality of formal communicational channels designed to encourage information sharing remain underutilized and ultimately inadequate.’

(‘Safer Communities 2012-2015…’, February 2011)

Later in this concept note, I also emphasise the ‘tangible’ security risks associated with social exclusion in order to amplify the significance of this project for prospective donors.

Taking the lead in developing this concept note attuned me to the significant degree of influence and discretion that relatively disempowered international development workers are afforded over the prospective conceptual and programmatic contours of police reform projects. However, it also made me aware of the fact that reformulating the project’s narrative to appeal to prospective donors was indicative of a process of neo-liberal governmentality that is said to generate local alignment at a distance (see Section 2.4). It also constituted a creative process rather than an empirical exercise as the concept note neglected to account for what the Safer Communities model might realistically achieve and it instead reflected what we as policy translators believed that the project would need to achieve (or be shown to achieve) in order to attract donor investment. For example, I drew from the Public Opinion Poll (2010) and summary data from the XIX reports to provide empirical support for this posited link between social exclusion and insecurity. The draft of this concept note which I eventually submitted to the Project Manager in February 2011 thus stated:

‘This notable gap between security ‘providers’ and citizens is inherently problematic in that it serves to continuously erode the latter’s trust and confidence in the former. Furthermore, this lack of information sharing serves to negate the capacity of ‘providers’ at all levels of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina from effectively addressing key safety and security issues of relevance to citizens. This contributes to a vicious cycle resulting in two significant outcomes that represent fundamental threats to the long term sustainability of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independently governed state. The first ‘outcome’ is that citizen expectations decrease, particularly in relation to the provision of public safety and security. Related is the second ‘outcome’ whereby that the impetus for ‘providers’ to provide such services is thus reduced accordingly....

….Not only does this cycle serve to deprive these citizens and communities of these socio-economic benefits but perhaps most problematic of all, it contributes to the normalization of this social deprivation in the eyes of these ‘consumers’....

105 See Appendix 2.
In linking this dynamic to the “broken windows” theory, the mutually-dependent relationship between democratically responsive structures for local security governance and social capital is clear. Broken windows theory suggests that ineffective security governance within a community is likely to prove conducive to petty crime and anti-social behaviour. Over time the overt occurrence of this behaviour combined with its social and physical effects will ultimately be normalized in the minds of the public thereby cementing the further degradation of social capital in these communities.’ (‘Safer Communities 2012-2015…’ February 2011)

I concluded this concept note by presenting the Safer Communities project as an ideal platform for improving the responsiveness of police and municipal authorities to public concerns:

‘Citizen Security Forums (CSF) address this need for greater social cohesion at the community level by creating ‘linkages for developing sustainable changes in the living conditions and well-being of communities.’ When introduced to divided communities, these CSFs are also well positioned to have a significant impact on policies aimed at addressing the social and economic integration of individuals at risk of marginalisation…’

Specifically, the SCP is designed to have a significant impact on two forms of social capital: bridging social capital and linking social capital…’ (‘Safer Communities 2012-2015…’ February 2011)

The concept note was initially well received by the Project Manager and the Community Policing Advisor who later incorporated some of these ideas into a final project report. However, the ideas also evoked concerns from the Project Manager who questioned whether the abstract elements of this narrative could actually be translated into a set of empirical indicators used to manage the project and measure results (personal communication, ‘Project Manager’, 14 February 2011). In other words, the Project Manager was unconvinced that this vision would appeal to European-based donors who were thought to base their decision to invest in the project on the tangible benefits that it would generate. On the basis of the Project Manager’s concerns, this early attempt to translate the Safer Communities concept into language that lined a thematic, capacity development issue with the EC’s security interests in the Western Balkans was dismissed.

106 See Appendix 2. The possibility of linking this framework to the issue of refugees and returnees was also briefly discussed, albeit promptly dismissed once the Project Manager was informed by a senior UNDP manager based at the BiH country office that this was no longer an appealing issue for European donors (personal communication, ‘Project Manager’, 14 March 2011).


108 The Ties That Bind report describes ‘bridging social capital’ as ‘horizontal relationships – connecting people from different backgrounds’ and ‘linking social capital’ as ‘vertical relationships – connecting people with dissimilar social standing and spanning power differentials’ (United Nations Development Programme 2009b: 27).
Safer Communities as Crime Reduction

Subsequent attempts by the Safer Communities team to construct an attractive narrative for the project illustrate an important shift of power within this contact zone. The prospect of reducing crime through the work of the CSFs provided the Safer Communities team with a logical starting point but it was problematic in practice. Developing indicators to convey the tangible benefits of CSFs was difficult because it meant that the Safer Communities team would need to identify available statistics that could be used to demonstrate that these forums were having a positive impact in reducing levels of crime and public insecurity within their respective municipalities. This meant that the team would need to predefine the anticipated benefits of applying the Safer Communities model in municipalities throughout BiH for local CSFs, a prospect which went against the team’s capacity development ethos because it restricted opportunities for future CSFs to define their own performance indicators in relation to local contextual circumstances. Instead, the Project Manager felt that it was necessary to develop a single set of indicators that could be applied uniformly throughout BiH in order to convey the significance of this project on a national level to prospective donors who would not be interested in local outcomes such as a reduction in stray dog populations (personal communication, ‘Project Manager’, 02 February 2011).

On a pragmatic level, conveying the benefits of this project was also problematic given that the Public Opinion Poll (2010) indicated that initial levels of crime and public insecurity were relatively low. While the Safer Communities team attributed these findings to the public’s lack of expectations of security governance within their respective communities, it was also anticipated that the prospect of using these forums to boost public expectations might initially contribute to a statistical increase in reported crimes and possibly a greater sense of ontological insecurity. This speculation reflected our belief that functional CSFs would need to generate greater awareness of the public security issues that affected their respective communities before they could convince the public of their value as nodes for resolving these issues through collaboration. The team also anticipated that generating this awareness would lead people to become more proactive in reporting incidents to different agencies serving on these CSFs, particularly the police (field notes, 02 February 2011).

The prospect that functional CSFs might potentially contribute to increasing levels of reported crime in the short term was recognised as being problematic because the prescribed extension for the Safer Communities project was only three years. This meant that within this three-year period, the Safer Communities team must demonstrate progress towards achieving its
predefined performance targets or risk termination and repayment at the discretion of the EC. While the team was optimistic that CSFs would eventually generate meaningful improvements in the governance of security in BiH, the team was not confident that these improvements could be readily expressed as statistical reductions in local levels of crime or insecurity. This concern was particularly evident in relation to the Project Manager’s suggestion that crime prevention would need to serve as a primary function of these CSFs but that measuring prevention through indicators is extremely problematic given issues with causation (i.e. whether a statistical decrease in certain indicators can actually be attributed to the CSFs) and the methodological problem of measuring non-events (personal communication, ‘Project Manager’, 02 February 2011).

Methodologically, demonstrating the project’s success to donors was problematic because of the lack of credible baseline data available for comparison. Official statistics on crime and public insecurity in BiH appeared to offer the only available data source for longitudinal comparison but we anticipated that auditors from the EC would inevitably question their reliability. The option of hiring a local research consultancy firm to develop a new statistical methodology for continuously evaluating the project was also dismissed given the team’s concerns about the questionable sampling and data collection methods used by the research consultancy firm responsible for conducting the Public Opinion Poll (personal communication, ‘Community Policing Advisor’, 31 January 2011).

**Safer Communities as Europeanization**

The issue of developing a single set of indicators to convey the impact of Safer Communities to prospective donors proved a stress-inducing prospect for the entire Safer Communities team and prompted the Project Manager to seek out the advice of a senior manager at UNDP BiH office to help us determine what kind of indicators might appeal to the EC. During a meeting between the Project Manager and this senior manager that I attended in March 2011, the Project Manager explained how we were struggling to develop a set of indicators because of the ‘broad and flexible nature of this project’. The senior manager explained that part of the problem was that ‘we were missing the bigger picture’. In other words, they suggested that supranational donors increasingly recognised the need for a project to be managed flexibly and so there is no expectation that a funding proposal will contain finite indicators. Rather, they suggested that the EC would support the project if it was seen as facilitating BiH’s progress towards EU accession (*par.* personal communication, ‘Senior Manager UNDP BiH’, 14 March 2011).
Based on this feedback, we readily dismissed the possibility of marketing Safer Communities as a strategy for reducing crime and improving the governance of security in local communities and momentarily examined the possibility of aligning the project’s narrative directly with what we perceived to be the EU’s primary agenda in the region. In other words, we looked to determine how the Safer Communities project might be used to support BiH’s progress towards EU accession. To this end we reviewed two key accession documents, the *Copenhagen Criteria* (European Union 1993: 13) which lists three key benchmarks ‘that a candidate country must have achieved’ before it can become a member of the EU and BiH’s *Stabilisation and Association Agreement* (2008) which outlines the specific obligations that the country must fulfil before it can be considered a candidate for EU membership. From this review, we determined that the Safer Communities model could be linked with the *Copenhagen Criteria’s* emphasis on the need for ‘stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for minorities’ (European Union 1993: 13) and Article 78 of BiH’s *Stabilisation and Association Agreement* (2008) which prioritised ‘[r]einforcement of [i]institutions and [r]ule of [l]aw’ by ‘…developing adequate structures for the police, customs and other law enforcement bodies’ and ‘fighting corruption and organised crime’ *(Stabilisation and Association Agreement* 2008: 47-48).

The narrative that emerged from this deliberation process emphasised the prospect of establishing the Safer Communities model as a local extension of a vertically-integrated security model whereby CSFs might serve as an important source of local intelligence for state-level police organisations like the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) with its focus on combatting organised crime and terrorism and also for the BiH Border Police. The appeal of this proposal was linked to BiH’s fragmented policing landscape which contributed to coordination issues between different entity and cantonal police forces but the prospect of actually translating this narrative into functional practices was problematic for two reasons. The first problem was that we readily discounted the possibility of generating valuable intelligence on high profile criminal activities through local community policing practices and CSPs. Second, we determined that the nodular structures established by the Safer Communities project during the pilot phase lacked the hierarchical structure necessary for channelling relevant information upwards to relevant state-level agencies. The possibility of facilitating such

---

109 As of March 2012, BiH remains a potential candidate country for EU accession as it has not ratified its *Stabilisation and Association Agreement* which it signed in June 2008.

110 The State Border Police was renamed the BiH Border Police in July 2007.

111 This scepticism was supported by Tilley’s (2003: 3) doubts about the value of using ‘problem-oriented policing’ to support a National Intelligence Model in England and Wales.
exchanges through the creation of cantonal and entity level steering boards was momentarily explored but ultimately discounted by the Project Manager based on concerns that establishing another level of nodal governance would create ‘too much bureaucracy’ and merely add to an already crowded system of underperforming institutions (personal communication, ‘Project Manager’, 25 March 2011). Another concern was that establishing a new hierarchical structure for the Safer Communities model would effectively contradict the initial focus of the project which involved the needs of local recipients (personal communication, ‘Project Associate’, 24 March 2011). While Europeanization ultimately failed to provide us with a viable selling point, our exploration of this possibility did prompt an important dialogue amongst the members of the Safer Communities team that led us to conclude that the conceptual and programmatic contours of this project must continue to be oriented towards improving local security governance rather than increasing security.

8.1.2 Policy Translation and Social Exclusion

By March 2011, it had become apparent that our concerted efforts to rebrand Safer Communities amounted to a significant distraction from the development and implementation of project activities which had fallen behind schedule. For example, following a meeting of the Safer Communities team that dealt with the issue of indicators, the team’s Community Policing Advisor announced that ‘we already lost the game’ with reference to the fact that the substantial time that was spent negotiating the conceptual aspects of the project and speculating about the interests of potential donors had consequences for the Community Policing Advisor’s ability to successfully manage existing relationships with CSF partners and negated the prospect of expanding the project during the pilot phase in relation to its existing budgetary resources (personal communication, ‘Community Policing Advisor’, 24 March 2011). This observation denotes a significant shift in the power politics of Safer Communities project as a contact zone, one which served to prioritise the perceived interests of the EU. It further illustrates how the hierarchical structures associated with liberal state-building, Europeanization and donor-driven development allow powerful supranational actors to steer security governance from a distance (e.g. Duffield 2007, Ryan 2011). The significant economic resources of the EC as a potential investor allowed it to play an influential albeit indirect role in temporarily shaping the conceptual and programmatic contours of the project through a series of deliberations and negotiations that were conducted by the Safer Communities team.

With reference to UNDP’s capacity development ethos and the prospect of the Safer Communities project contributing to the development of more democratically responsive forms
of policing in BiH, this structural dynamic was problematic because it effectively restricted democratically-elected domestic policy makers from participating in important decision making processes that would potentially determine the future prescriptions for implementing the model throughout the country. This restriction was significant because it signalled that the preferences of CSF members including local political elites, police practitioners and members of the general public would ultimately fail to have a significant impact on the governance of security governance (Wood and Shearing 2006) through this nodal structure. It also conflicted with UNDP’s goal of eventually generating local ownership for the Safer Communities project and the Safer Communities team neglected to include these local stakeholders in this translational process.

This exclusion can be explained in relation to the limited economic resources of domestic policy makers and governing institutions as this effectively precluded their ability to act as potential investors for the project. These local policy makers were also physically excluded from this translational process and unaware of the fact that it was even taking place. This is evident from the fact that at no point during this three-month period did the Safer Communities team invite any Bosnian political elites to participate in this deliberation process. The inaccessibility of this contact zone is further illustrated by the fact that its deliberative boundaries overlapped with the physical boundaries of the Safer Communities office which was located in UNDP’s BiH headquarters and featured a secure entry system and a strict visitor protocol that would have physically prevented any individual without an invitation from UNDP to access this nodal setting. Emphasising the exclusion of these individuals is not to suggest that the Safer Communities team consciously or intentionally restricted these individuals from participating in this deliberative sphere. Rather, it was simply the team’s assumption that CSF members and other government officials had little interest in participating in this translational process and that they would have nothing to contribute to it.

An alternative explanation for why international development agencies have struggled to implement their capacity development ethos in BiH is evident from the work of Maglajlić and Rašidagić’s (2007: 156) who observe that ‘Bosnian social-sector professionals [find] themselves both unable to communicate with international aid agencies and incapable of adopting the style of work these agencies brought with them’. Accordingly, Maglajlić and Rašidagić suggest that it is the ‘local staff’ of international organisations like UNDP who must take on the role of

---

112 These elites might have included elected officials from different levels of government in BiH (i.e. municipal, cantonal, entity, state) as well as senior practitioners and representatives of local NGOs or citizen groups.
policy translators given their unique positioning in relevant contact zones that link international organisations like UNDP to local settings.

8.1.3 Salvaging Safer Communities

While pressures for the Safer Communities team to align this project with the interests of prospective donors present a fatalistic assessment of the underlying structures of nodal security governance in BiH, recent developments since March 2011 indicate that the team has identified an alternative solution to this funding dilemma that promises to reaffirm its link to UNDP and allow it to ‘govern the governance of security’ (Wood and Shearing 2006) in relation to its capacity development mandate. This solution can be explained by UNDP’s proximity to the Safer Communities project as an active contact zone and its habitual emphasis on managerial creativity as a means of achieving capacity development objectives amidst these financial pressures (Murphy 2006: 348). Creative problem solving in this instance was made possible by the fact that the UN development system continues to offer limited pockets of core funding that allows projects like Safer Communities that are not particularly resource intensive to remain independent of non-core investment if they can be linked with designated funding areas (Browne 2011: 119).

In March 2011 the Safer Communities team concluded that in order for the project to have a meaningful impact on the local governance of security in BiH and for the CSFs to be rendered locally accountable and sustainable the conceptual and programmatic prescriptions of this project would need to remain flexible. In other words, the ‘governance of governance’ (Wood and Shearing 2006) must remain responsive to the diverse needs and expectations of the CSF partners rather than rigid interpretations of the subjective interests of prospective supranational benefactors. Accordingly, the team determined that establishing and supporting the development of new municipal level CSFs throughout BiH must necessarily serve as the project’s primary focus and projected output (field notes, 25 March 2011).

This realisation seemingly negated the possibility of attracting investment from the EC and following a series of meetings between the Safer Communities Project Manager and a senior UNDP manager based in the BiH country office who possessed significant contacts and experience and knowledge of the UN development system, the Safer Communities team developed a creative proposal to pursue the expansion of the Safer Communities project as a component of the UN’s Armed Conflict and Violence Prevention Programme (AVPP) (personal communications, 12 April 2011 and 14 July 2011). This would enable the team to access core funding additional in the form of UNDP’s Crisis Prevention and Recovery budget and to work
alongside other UN development agencies like UN Population Fund (UNFPA) to develop a range of project activities that could be marketed to the CSFs. The idea was that CSFs would still be afforded the opportunity to choose which project activities they wished to pursue while the Safer Communities team could provide technical and administrative support for these forums and draw upon its position in the network to connect these forums directly to appropriate donors (personal communications, 13 December 2011 and 16 February 2012).

The benefit of this proposed solution (with reference to UNDP’s capacity development mandate) was that it promised to reduce the pressures for the Safer Communities team to manage the project on the basis of anticipated ‘results’. Instead it enabled the Safer Communities team to develop a flexible list of objectives relating to the project and to include this list in the project’s ‘Concept Note’ (Safer Communities 2012-2015…’, February 2011’) that was eventually submitted as part of the team’s bid for UNDP Crisis Prevention and Recovery core funding in early 2012.114

8.2 Sustainability and Translation

Along with functionality and local responsiveness, sustainability also represented an important priority for the Safer Communities team. It also served as a major source of confusion as it was not entirely clear what the Safer Communities team was actually meant to sustain. The official answer indicated the CSFs, meaning that the team would need to develop strategic recommendations to enable CSF members and prospective local stakeholders to continue to operate these forums once the Safer Communities project had expired. However, members of the Safer Communities team also recognised that the Safer Communities project played an important role as a central coordinating node for these CSFs and questioned whether they would continue to operate without its ongoing financial and technical support. Institutional motives also factored into this discussion. Notably, the team’s concerted search for a source of non-core funding meant that UNDP was also keen to sustain its presence within this contact zone. Finally, individual motives also factored into this question of sustainability as some members of the Safer Communities team knew that they would only retain their jobs with UNDP if they

113 See Appendix 2.
114 This is a reference to a later version of the document that I provided feedback on in December 2011, once my internship had finished. In exchange for this feedback, I requested permission to use this document for my research but provided assurances to the team’s Community Policing Advisor that I would not explicitly quote it or reference it for publication until the team received a decision on its application.
found a way to prolong the project. Reflecting on the Safer Communities team’s efforts to develop a sustainability report for the project between January and April 2011 provides useful illustration of these competing pressures, their influence on the habitus of the Safer Communities team and the extent to which policy translation is responsive to competing interests within a contact zone.

8.2.1 Sustaining Safer Communities…

Sustainability initially emerged as an important issue in January 2011 because the Safer Communities team had been invited by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) to contribute to the development of a new ‘Book of Rules’ for community policing that was being developed for the Ministry of the Interior in Republika Srpska (RS). As noted in Chapter Six, the SDC’s community policing project was granted a one-year extension by the Swiss Government in 2011 following recommendations from the project’s external review team (see Wisler and Traljic 2010) and so its primary objective during this period was to work to facilitate the adoption of relevant by-laws within entity and canton-level ministries that would formally recognise community policing as a specialist function and provide specialist units with a guaranteed budget line. The SDC brought this proposal to the attention of the Safer Communities project because it recognised CSFs to be important mechanisms for sustaining the outputs that it generated through its community policing project and because the SDC believed that these forums were necessary for generating holistic solutions to a range of

115 The Project Manager issued this assignment to the Safer Communities team via email on 6 January 2011 (personal email, ‘Project Manager’, 6 January 2011).

116 A ‘Book of Rules’ is a set of by-laws which describe the specific roles and responsibilities for different types of police officers. It is maintained by the different Ministries of the Interior at the entity-level in RS and at the canton level in FBiH and any changes must be proposed and approved by their relevant assemblies. Asked about the significance of the Book of Rules, the Safer Communities team’s Community Policing Advisor responded that ‘a vacancy must be defined in it in order for it to be budgeted and filled’ (personal correspondence, ‘Community Policing Advisor’, 02 April 2012b).

117 I only became aware of the fact that our work on the sustainability report was linked to the SDC’s plan in late March 2011 at a meeting with the Safer Communities Project Manager regarding a draft that I was developing with the Community Policing Advisor. After expressing my concerns about the lack of clarity regarding what the Project Manager expected us to produce for this document, the Project Manager informed me that the impetus for us to produce a sustainability report at a fairly early stage in the project was linked to the SDC’s imminent plans to introduce a revised strategy for community policing to the Ministry of the Interior in RS before its project expired at the end of 2011 (personal communication, ‘Project Manager’, 26 March 2011). A follow up correspondence sent by the Safer Communities project’s Community Policing Advisor suggests that the SDC’s plans never materialised. Nonetheless, the recommendations that we developed during this two month period were included in the ‘Concept Note’ that the Safer Communities team submitted with its funding proposal the following year (personal correspondence, ‘Community Policing Advisor’, 02 April 2012).

118 The SDC refers to CSFs as ‘citizen security boards’.
problems identified by specialist officers utilising their ‘Scanning Analysis Response Assessment’ (SARA) methodology. Without these CSFs, the SDC anticipated that its problem-oriented prescriptions for community policing would fail to materialise and the entire concept would lose credibility in the eyes of practitioners and the public alike. The prospect of sustaining a problem-oriented strategy for community policing in BiH (see Section 9.2) was therefore linked with the need to sustain local CSFs (Wisler and Traljic 2010: 10-11).

For the Safer Communities team, sustaining these CSFs was important because it was linked with UNDP’s capacity development ethos. In other words, if these forums were to cease their operations once UNDP withdrew its support, the project would fail to generate locally sustainable outputs that could independently contribute to improvements in the governance of security in BiH. The sustainability of these CSFs was therefore identified as an important measure of the project’s success by the team’s Community Policing Advisor and Project Associate who drafted multiple ‘sustainability reports’ designed to address this issue and ultimately supply the SDC with concrete recommendations to be included in the forthcoming proposal (personal field notes, 02 February 2011).

The first step towards developing these recommendations involved identifying various threats to the sustainability of these forums. This was achieved through a series of in-house deliberations that occurred between the other members of the Safer Communities team and I, as well as a series of meetings with the pilot CSFs that I attended with the team’s Community Policing Advisor in early February 2011.119 The Community Policing Advisor took the lead with this project and was influential in shaping our collective understanding of how this project could succeed in the long term. According to the team’s Community Policing Advisor, the primary threat to the sustainability of these forums involved the question of how we could keep CSF participants motivated once UNDP withdrew its support for the Safer Communities project. The Community Policing Advisor attributed the initial wave of interest in this project to the fact that participating in these nodes afforded different municipal actors with direct access to discretionary UNDP funds but expressed concerns that without this financial incentive, individuals would lack a tangible incentive to participate in this scheme (personal communication, ‘Community Policing Advisor’, 31 January 2011).

The Project Manager, Community Policing Advisor and local CSF members were also conflicted over the question of whether CSF members should be personally compensated for their CSF roles. For example, the Project Manager was concerned that unless the Safer

119 The CSFs we visited included Bratunac, Prijedor, Sanski Most and Zenica.
Communities team used its influence to compel local municipal assemblies to establish permanent salaried positions for CSF members, individuals would lack an incentive to effectively administer these forums. However, the team’s Community Policing Advisor was adamant that participation in CSFs must be voluntary because otherwise they would attract individuals that lacked an intrinsic motivation to develop holistic solution for local problems but were instead keen to draw a salary (personal field notes, 22 February 2011). During our meeting with the CSF in Bratunac, a senior municipal official and ‘permanent’ member of the municipality’s CSF expressed similar concerns about the risks of compensating CSF members for their participation. He suggested that this would spawn jealousy amongst members of the public who would ask, ‘why is he being paid to serve on the committee and not me’ (personal communication, ‘Senior Municipal Official’, Bratunac, 08 February 2011). This individual’s assessment suggests that compensating CSF members for the participation in these nodes might undermine their legitimacy in the eyes of the public because doing so would amount to paying municipal employees a second salary to perform their existing jobs.

During this series of meetings with the pilot CSFs, the need to institutionalise these forums was also addressed. For example, a senior member of the forum in Prijedor suggested that one of the difficulties that this CSF faced was a lack of support from the city’s Mayor. This individual added that the CSF in Prijedor was not formally recognised by the city’s municipal assembly with the effect that it lacked a mandate to generate compliance from its membership which generally underperformed and frequently failed to attend regularly scheduled meetings (personal communication, ‘Senior CSF Member, Prijedor’ 10 February 2011). These sentiments were viewed as being particularly problematic by the Community Policing Advisor who was convinced that if the well-established forum in Prijedor failed, the model would fail elsewhere (personal communication, ‘Community Policing Advisor’, 31 January 2011).

Following a series of deliberations, it was determined that institutionalisation would be crucial for the sustainability of local CSFs. This meant that the Safer Communities team would subsequently work to provide support for the five pilot CSFs in order for them to achieve recognition from their municipal assemblies through a ‘Terms of Reference’ document that would also provide them with a small annual budget line. This budget line was determined to be particularly important for the sustainability of CSF operations because it would afford these nodes with a renewable stream of discretionary funding that could be spent on collaborative safety projects (field notes, 25 March 2011). While fiscal constraints meant that the municipal funds allocated to different CSFs would be extremely limited, the Project Manager and the
Community Policing Advisor suggested that its very existence would serve to legitimise these nodes and that in the long term, perhaps compel different member agencies to embrace a partnership-based approach and use their own institutional budgets to support collaboration through CSFs (field notes, 22 February 2011).

While institutionalisation represented a seemingly viable option for sustaining these CSFs, the Safer Communities team’s approach to supporting this process actually conflicted with the capacity development ethos. Essentially, the Project Manager proposed that UNDP must use its influence to pressure BiH’s Council of Ministers\(^{120}\) to adopt a ‘memo of understanding’ that formally recognised CSFs as institutions of municipal governance. The logic was that once BiH’s Council of Ministers formally recognised these forums, municipal assemblies throughout the country would then be required to recognise the model and that this would in turn create a formal framework to support local CSFs throughout the country. While approaching the Council of Ministers provided the Safer Communities team with a seemingly straightforward plan for promoting institutionalisation, it embodied a top-down approach to imposing reforms through informal political back channels rather than democratic political processes.\(^{121}\)

This ‘top-down’ approach to institutionalisation reflected the Project Manager’s disillusionment with domestic political institutions and process in BiH. During a team meeting about the issue of sustainability, I confronted the Project Manager with the idea that using UNDP’s influence to steer policy making through domestic political institutions conflicted with its capacity development ethos. The Project Manager and Project Associate quickly corrected me and suggested instead that ‘we are not about imposing’ but rather that ‘we need to make the relevant cantons and entity-level bodies impose it for us’ (par. personal communication, ‘Project Manager’ and ‘Project Associate’, 22 February 2011). This response illustrates the extent to which the power politics that shaped this contact zone compelled the Safer Communities team to selectively interpret UNDP’s capacity development ethos to support its own agenda and

\(^{120}\) Annex 4, Article V, Section 4 of the Dayton Peace Agreement states that BiH’s Council of Ministers is responsible ‘for carrying out the policies and decisions of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ and for ‘reporting to the Parliamentary Assembly’.

\(^{121}\) On 7 February 2011 I attended a meeting between the Safer Communities team and an influential representative from the state-level Council of Ministers. During this meeting, the Project Manager introduced the Safer Communities project to this representative and proceeded to explain how the Council could support it. During the meeting, the representative appeared to be confused about what the Project Manager expected the Council to do regarding the issue. The Project Manager told the representative that they should review some published material on CSPs provided by the Safer Communities team and Saferworld and present it to the Council at the next meeting. The attempts by UNDP to use its influence to compel the Council of Ministers to develop a formal document that would recognise CSPs was ultimately unsuccessful and following the meeting, it was discussed that the representative failed to grasp what they were being asked to do (field notes, 7 February 2011).
hierarchical positioning within this emerging nodal assemblage. In other words, the capacity development ethos compelled the Safer Communities team to outwardly disassociate the interests of UNDP from its prescriptions for implementing the project. ‘Legitimately’ transposing this agenda upon the domestic political architecture of BiH therefore require UNDP to utilise the same techniques of governmentality as those utilised by the EU as a regional security actor working to advance its hegemonic interests in the Western Balkans (see Chapter Two; also Walters and Haahr 2005).

Generating local ownership remained a priority for the Safer Communities team however the nature of the relationships between the Community Policing Advisor and representatives of four CSFs122 regarding procedural issues and the implementation of different project activities raised doubts about whether the forums could effectively operate without this hierarchical relationship with UNDP once they had been recognised by their respective municipal assemblies. These concerns were particularly apparent during our February meeting with CSF members from Zenica. One of the forum members noted that the local media was creating negative publicity with regards to the forum by suggesting that it was not transparent and publicly accountable in its decisions. In order to address this problem, this individual suggested that ‘UNDP should step in to influence the media to do their job better’ (personal field notes, 09 February 2011) which implied that they viewed it as UNDP’s responsibility to address this issue rather than that of the forum. Later in this meeting, the Community Policing Advisor posed the question of how this forum would survive once UNDP was no longer supporting the project. A senior police officer and CSF member responded that the forum’s results and successes up to this point were directly attributable to UNDP’s involvement. Another CSF member explained that UNDP involvement is so important because ‘compared to local NGOs, UNDP is widely recognised as being neutral and not affiliated with and political parties’ (Ibid).

After the meeting, the Community Policing Advisor explained that these responses were disconcerting because they indicated that local political elites in Zenica associated the credibility and authority of their CSF with UNDP’s involvement in the project (personal communication, ‘Community Policing Advisor’, 9 February 2011). In other words, the Community Policing Advisor believed that measured coercion was necessary for managing these forums because it was normal in BiH and expected by CSF members who had worked for autocratic institutions of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and subsequently

---

122 The exception was the CSF in Prijedor which the Community Policing Advisor felt regularly demonstrated initiative and managed to sustain itself once its initial benefactor the UK Department for International Development withdrew its support in 2009.
under the direction of international organisations like the Office of the High Representative in BiH (OHR) (personal communication, ‘Community Policing Advisor’, 9 February 2011). For this reason, the Safer Communities team rationalised the practice of mobilising domestic political elites to support its agenda through a utilitarian logic which held that coercion was necessary for generating and ultimately sustaining policy outputs that reflected the public interest due to the limited governing capacities of domestic political institutions. This view also prompted the Safer Communities team to consider whether it would be necessary to sustain this Safer Communities project as a contact zone so that it could continue to provide local CSFs with access to different sources of financial and technical support. For this reason, the capacity development goal of sustaining these CSFs became conflated the idea of sustaining the actual project.

### 8.2.2 …or Sustaining the Safer Communities Project?

Another dimension of sustainability that affected the project involved UNDP’s desire to sustain its own role as the administrator of this contact zone. UNDP’s capacity development ethos constituted a powerful source of influence on the habitus of the Safer Communities team who believed that UNDP was the only international organisation in BiH that was qualified to effectively administer this contact zone in accordance with local interests. This belief reflects a romanticised auto-biographical description of UNDP staff by the organisation’s historian who writes:

> ‘The overwhelming majority of UNDP staff have been people who passionately believe in the goals of the organization, individuals who have overcome daunting obstacles- and often the conventional wisdom of the day—to develop hundreds of initiatives…Such creative results came about because UNDP has attracted people who not only believe in what they do, but who have been able to be creative in times of crisis, and been willing to put themselves on the line…’

(Murphy 2006: ix)

This is to suggest that UNDP’s capacity development ethos can also be studied as an important source of institutional hubris which is rooted in UNDP’s ontological insecurity described in Section 7.1. In other words, a capacity development mandate affords UNDP with a significant degree of flexibility with regards to the types of projects that it seeks to initiate however this flexibility also implies that UNDP is replaceable. In order to survive, UNDP as a development organisation must therefore encourage its staff to develop competitive project proposals designed to attract non-core funding and once it receives this funding, manage for results. I encountered evidence of this competitive culture in April 2011 when the Project Manager informed the Safer Communities team that another UN proposal for Safer Communities was
currently being developed by another UN agency in BiH. The Project Manager could not provide details of which agency was developing this bid, the nature of its proposal or the sources of funding that it was targeting but it was clear that this news was unwelcomed by members of the Safer Communities team who had spent the past three months struggling to develop a viable proposal to extend the project (personal communication, ‘Project Manager’, 12 April 2011). In the end, both of these proposals were subsequently amalgamated into a single multi-agency project bid for additional seed funding from UNDP’s Crisis Prevention and Recovery core budget (see Sub-section 8.1.3) but the example suggests that the UN development system embodies a plurality of interests.

It is also important to consider that strong incentives also exist for international development workers at UNDP to use results-based management (RBM) to extend their projects. Murphy (2006: 348) suggests that this is achieved through a creative problem solving mentality which is encouraged by senior UNDP managers and achievable due to a limited donor presence ‘on the ground’. The implication of this dynamic is that mission creep is not only problematic for UNDP but an important feature of its institutional habitus.

The prospect of mission creep was particularly evident in relation to the individual motives of some members of the Safer Communities team to prolong their employment with UNDP. Essentially, strong disincentives existed for members of the Safer Communities team to discontinue the project or concede their oversight of this contact zone to a competitor because this would effectively lead to the termination of their contracts. During a private conversation that I had with a member of the Safer Communities team, I asked this individual what they, as a BiH citizen hoped to achieve through their work with UNDP. This individual responded that given the seemingly insurmountable challenges facing BiH on a macro-political level, they were just ‘happy to draw a pay-cheque’ (personal communication, January 2011).

8.2.3 The Future of Safer Communities

As of March 2012, the future of the Safer Communities project in BiH remained uncertain. Even if UNDP’s proposal for core funding was successful, changes in project personnel and the emergence of new security nodes (i.e. through prospective collaborations with UN agencies) promised to generate new pressures within this contact zone. It is also questionable whether the Safer Communities project can ultimately generate and sustain local ownership of CSFs given domestic funding constraints and the absence of a domestic institution or actor to provide these forums with continuous administrative support. Once UNDP ceases its involvement with the
project, the Safer Communities team also anticipates that CSFs will need to actively seek out new sources of funding and partnership in order to subsidise project activities but it is clear that this would serve to establish new contact zones within this this nodal assemblage that may fail to appreciate the important of local ownership (personal field notes, 8-10 February 2011).

In terms of the functionality of these localised security nodes and the partnerships that they are said to foster, important questions also exist about how these forums can be rendered publicly accountable and transparent. The documented presence of extensive political corruption in BiH (e.g. Donais 2003) and the enduring role of informal political networks as important sources of power and social capital in BiH (United Nations Development Programme 2009b) raise an important question about the democratic responsiveness of these nodes and the desirability of the security outcomes they generate. The task of developing a functional accountability mechanism to oversee the activities of these CSFs once UNDP has withdrawn its support must therefore be addressed before it is possible to determine whether these outputs represent a positive contribution to BiH’s security landscape or a harmful phenomenon.

8.3 Discussion

The perceived need for the Safer Communities project to appeal to the interests of the EC as a prospective donor and the extent to which this influenced the team’s translational activities highlights some important issues about the responsiveness of this contact zone to hierarchical pressures for structural alignment. The prospect of securing additional non-core funding for the project served to passively introduce a powerful new supranational stakeholder into this contact zone and the EC’s significant economic resources allowed it to indirectly influence the shaping of the project’s conceptual and programmatic contours through the translational activities of local international development workers at UNDP. This analysis is therefore illustrative of the processes of neo-liberal governmentality (Ryan 2011) introduced in Chapter Two and it provides empirical support for the argument that powerful donors can use their substantial resources to indirectly align police reforms with the aims of neo-liberal globalisation (Ellison and Pino 2012). It also illustrates how certain events and processes (in this case the prospective influx of non-core funding into an active contact zone) have a momentarily profound effect on the habitus of international development workers and render their translational activities

123 broader concerns about the politics of community safety partnerships and their exclusionary potential are well in research on this model in Western European contexts (eg. Crawford 1999).
responsive to the ‘security politics’ (Loader and Walker 2003: 16) of global liberal governance. This possibility, and the frequency with which it is said to occur, forms the basis of Ellison and Pino’s (2012) argument that international police development assistance projects are invariably tainted by the same structural inequalities that characterise the international development system. Aspects of this analysis thus appear rather fatalistic.

While these critiques do not preclude the prospect that domestic stakeholders may ultimately benefit from the outputs generated by these policing reforms, they do suggest that important governmental processes are themselves problematic due to their inaccessibility and lack of responsiveness to local interests. The example of Safer Communities highlights the fact that the power politics which underpin the institutional work of multilateral international development organisations in weak and structurally dependent societies like BiH is inevitably skewed towards supranational and institutional interests rather than those of local citizens and this implies that the nodal cartography for security governance in these contexts is characterised by a democratic deficit that holds significant implications for the prospect of ultimately establishing locally accountable and democratically responsive nodal assemblages that can independently govern security as a ‘public good’ (Loader and Walker 2001; 2003).

Beyond this fatalistic assessment, this chapter has also presented a nuanced account of the relationship between liberal state-building and policing reforms, one which highlights the added benefit of exploring these power relations through a nodular framework and in relation to the conceptual framework of policy translation. As Johnston and Shearing (2003: 146) suggest, governance cannot be reduced to ‘the mere power of one agent over another’ but rather it exists as ‘a varying relationship between agents’. A key implication of this claim is that security governance in weak and structurally dependent societies like BiH cannot be reduced to purely hierarchical terms and this implies that the presence of asymmetrical power structures, self-interested donors, and the myopic prescriptions of policy entrepreneurs need not translate into undemocratic policing outcomes (Ibid: 147).

Deconstructing the nodal politics that shaped Safer Communities has therefore highlighted the dynamic character of power and governance within this nodal assemblage and identified ways in which seemingly disempowered actors and institutions were able to capitalise on their unique positioning in networks of governance (Wood and Shearing 2006: 98) in order to structure the contours of emergent contact zones like Safer Communities in relation to their own habitus. The fact that members of the Safer Communities team were momentarily compelled to examine the prospects for aligning the project with what were considered to be the EU’s security agenda in
the Western Balkans illustrates the significant role that hegemonic structures of global liberal governance play in shaping the local governance of policing. However, the Safer Communities team’s reflexivity allowed it to anticipate the long term impact of policy alignment on local populations thus illustrating the meditational capacities of the international development worker. In this example, the international development worker used their creativity and limited knowledge of the international development system to establish a new ‘space’ for pursuing the project with limited interference from powerful donors and thus retaining a habitual emphasis that reflected the ethos of capacity development work.

It was also apparent from this case study that international development workers might potentially use policy translation to foster more democratically responsive forms through their support of local partnership-based policing models. This is based on the fact that CSFs are potentially valuable frameworks for supporting ‘discursive democratic’ forms of security (see Section 3.4). With reference to the pilot phase of the Safer Communities project, this translational function was primarily evident in relation to the team’s periodic use of participatory policy analysis and policy sharing while identifying and pursuing locally responsive policy outputs including CSFs and various project activities. It is also worth considering that the philosophy of community policing and the related concept of community safety partnership provided field operators with important institutional frameworks for delivering security in ways that are democratically responsive to local communities.

As discussed in Chapter Seven, a local capacity development ethos plays an important role in structuring the habitus of the international development worker who is compelled to embrace the rhetoric of grass roots participation, local ownership, and empowerment as the preferential outcomes for their work. While difficult to achieve in practice due to the lack of clarity regarding how these outcomes might be measured and structural pressures within the UN development system that compel international development workers to manage their projects for outputs or ‘results’, these outcomes are potentially compatible with Dryzek’s (2002) prescription for deliberative democracy which he presents as an impugnation to the inaccessible and impenetrable formal institutions of liberal governance124. This was particularly evident with

124 Bender and Knaus’ (2007: 24) characterisation of BiH as an ‘international protectorate’ suggests that its formal institutions of governance are primarily responsive to the interests of supranational powers whose presence constitutes an additional layer of transnational governance that is structured in relation to the transnational political economy of the EU. This implies that these domestic institutions have limited autonomy compared to those of advanced liberal democracies while their questionable functionality in relation to the established architecture of governance in BiH suggests that their prospective value as discursive mechanisms of governance is inherently limited.
the Safer Communities project which was aptly described by the Project Manager as a ‘perfect metaphor for the work of UNDP’ (personal communication, ‘Project Manager’, 17 February 2011). This characterisation was illustrative of the team’s belief that the Safer Communities model represented a viable framework for improving the responsiveness of both policing and governance to the needs of local communities.

While it is important to acknowledge the ‘educative’ and the ‘community-generating’ potential (Barber 1984) of the Safer Communities model as a mechanism for supporting deliberative democracy, its value as a platform for supporting democratically responsive policing can be analysed in relation to the ideas that:

‘…the procedure of public deliberation improves the fairness of democratic outcomes…’

‘…public deliberation contributes constructively to the practical rationality of democratic outcomes…’

‘…deliberative democracy elucidates an ideal of democracy that is most congruent with whom we are’…” (Cooke 2000: 950, 952,954).

This is to suggest that citizen security forums can in theory improve the procedural fairness of policing and security governance by rendering these processes transparent and accessible to broader segments of the community. Procedural fairness represents an important means of legitimising policing outcomes (Cohen 1997: 73; referenced in Cooke 2000: 950) as well as an important mechanism for rationalising them. The idea that CSFs as nodes of deliberative governance might also contribute to more rational policing outcomes therefore corresponds with the second qualifier for democratically responsive policing: ‘efficiency’, ‘effectiveness’ and ‘delivery of service’ (See ‘Table 2 Democratic Policing and Responsiveness’). It also links with Marenin’s (1998: 169) emphasis on ‘congruence’.

Cooke (2000: 953) argues that deliberation provides a basis for compromise and action but notes that the outcomes generated from such compromises are can only be viewed as legitimate if they can be justified in relation to ‘an epistemic standard of rationality’ (Cooke 2000: 953; also Habermas 1996). The issue of congruence is particularly important in the context of weak and structurally dependent societies because powerful global actors play an important role in dictating this ‘epistemic standard of rationality’ so that it is congruent with the interests of global liberal governance. Insofar as CSFs might improve service delivery by supporting collaborations between the police and other municipal institutions in ways that reflect local security interests and needs, they can be said to foster congruence and promote governing
outcomes that reflect ‘whom we are’ (Cooke 2000: 954). However, if these forums are compelled to define their ‘epistemic standard of rationality’ in ways that conflict with or negate local interests and needs, both responsiveness and procedural fairness are sacrificed.  

The capacity of the Safer Communities team to use policy translation to buffer this contact zone from the EU’s security interests in the Western Balkan therefore suggests that international development workers can actively foster nodes of discursive democracy despite having limited resources at their disposal. The discursive character of CSFs was apparent from the fact that the SACBiH project initiated the Safer Communities project in order to improve cooperation between community police officers and municipal authorities at the local level. CSFs constituted governing nodes at which different security actors could hold each other accountable for their role in delivering security (i.e. ‘horizontal responsiveness’; see Kuper 2007). This collaborative platform was also determined by UNDP to be necessary for improving the capacity of these institutions to respond to the local security needs of local citizens (i.e. ‘vertical responsiveness’; see Kuper 2007). UNDP’s technical and financial support for these five CSFs thus established or sustained these nodes of discursive governance and provided local politicians and practitioners with the opportunity to collectively address enduring public safety issues like stray dogs that were indeed congruent public expectations of general order policing.  

In the following chapter, I build upon this assertion by exploring the ways that field operators utilise policy translation to selectively implement externally-defined prescriptions for community based policing using dramaturgical translation.

125 One must consider however that the outcomes generated by governing processes that are not procedurally fair may still appear to be legitimate or rational to disempowered citizens if these citizens are disinterested in policy making processes. They may also consider incongruent governing processes to be legitimate if they continue to derive benefits from these outcomes.
Chapter Nine: Community Policing as an Operational Strategy

Policy translation effects externally generated police reform initiatives at various stages of transmission. The previous chapter examined the ways in which seemingly relatively disempowered actors working for a mediatory, multi-lateral international development agency attempted to mitigate intense structural pressures for policy alignment by creatively translating the conceptual and programmatic prescriptions for Safer Communities to correspond to existing pockets of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) core funding that would preserve their capacity development mandate. Chapters Nine and Ten present a second empirical case study that accounts for the translational capacity and inclinations of members of a public police organisation who represent the recipients of an externally defined programme of police reform. An ethnographic study is used to examine the implementation of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation’s (SDC) prescriptions for community policing in Sarajevo Canton. My analysis focuses on an apparent disconnect between the rhetoric underpinning these strategic prescriptions and the diverse range of associated practices that I encountered during my observation of two different community policing specialist units.

In Chapter Nine, I provide contextualisation for this case study by briefly reviewing relevant policing structures in Sarajevo Canton and the SDC’s model of community policing. Drawing on my ethnographic observation and follow-up interviews with local police officers and project workers from the SDC, I then proceed to examine the operational effectiveness of this initiative. Analysed as an episode of policy transfer, my analysis suggests the SDC’s efforts to facilitate community policing reforms in Sarajevo Canton struggled to generate results that were consistent with the SDC’s designs and expectations for community police work in Sarajevo canton. My evaluation of two specialist units further suggests that while one of the teams (RPZ1) was partially successful in translating the SDC’s prescriptions for ‘problem solving’ into contextually-relevant practices, other units struggled to replicate their successes due to a lack of enthusiasm for community policing and limited support from supervisors and colleagues. This analysis highlights the mediatory capacity of local practitioners while further suggesting that the concept of policy translation provides a useful framework for exploring the agentive capacity of these officers.

9.1 Community Policing in Sarajevo Canton
Before I elaborate on the SDC’s role in introducing community policing to Sarajevo, it is necessary to briefly review the complex organisational structure of the Sarajevo Canton Police and to review the development of community policing in this context.\(^{126}\) As previously noted, the policing landscape in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is highly fragmented with the effect that each of the ten Cantons in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) has its own police force and police structure. This means that the accountability structure of policing in FBiH is decentralised and in Sarajevo Canton the police form part of the Canton’s Ministry of the Interior (MUP KS). The Minister of the Interior serves as the head of the Sarajevo Canton Police and is responsible for overseeing the internal rules and policies for the provision of policing in the Canton. The MUP KS also maintains a *Regulation of Job Classification* document that officially recognises and defines the specific duties and responsibilities of different roles within the Sarajevo Canton Police (see Appendix 2). While the MUP KS is responsible for proposing any changes to the *Regulation of Job Classification* document, these changes must ultimately be approved by the Cantonal Assembly. At the time of my research, the role of community policing specialists was not formally recognised by this document and therefore these officers lacked an organisational mandate within the Sarajevo Canton Police. This lack of formal recognition was identified by both the SDC and community police specialists as a major obstacle to the successful implementation of the SDC’s prescriptions (field notes, 7 March 2011; interview, ‘SDC Project Associate’, 26 June 2011).

Below the Minister of the Interior, the Sarajevo Canton Police has its own Police Commissioner who is appointed by an ‘Independent Board’ including ‘two representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and five members from amongst the citizens’ to serve a four-year term ‘with the possibility of extension for one more term of office’ (quoting Office of the High Representative 2002). The Police Commissioner is responsible for overseeing operational aspects of policing and for ensuring that police work is performed in accordance with the stipulations of the *Regulation of Job Classification*. As an organisation, the Sarajevo Canton Police features a central hierarchy that includes various administrators and managers who operate under the Police Commissioner and central units that provide coverage for specific policing functions for

\(^{126}\) This section does not discuss the status of plural or private forms of policing in Sarajevo. This is due to the fact that the public police remain the primary source of security for citizens in Sarajevo Canton despite recent growth of the city’s private security sector which focuses primarily on the commercial and diplomatic sectors. At the time of this research, multi-agency policing initiatives such as citizen security forums (CSF) had also yet to be established in Sarajevo Canton. Nor does this section provide a comprehensive overview of this large and complex policing organisation. Further information on police structures in Sarajevo Canton for can be found on the Sarajevo Canton Interior Ministry website (see ‘Ministarstvo Unutrašnjih Poslova’).
the entire Canton. These units include the ‘Office of the Commissioner’, ‘Crime Police’, ‘Legal, Personnel and Logistics’, and ‘Uniformed Patrol’. Uniformed Patrol is responsible for coordinating patrol activities throughout the canton however the day-to-day management of patrol work is coordinated through five different sectors. Geographically, the composition of these sectors is rather diverse and this produces evident variation in terms of the different approaches to uniformed patrol that are conducted throughout the Canton. Sectors 2 and 3 correspond with two of the City of Sarajevo’s urban ‘municipalities’ while Sector 1 incorporates two urban municipalities and Sectors 4 and 5 provide coverage for a number of outlying towns and villages (see ‘Table 3: Brief Descriptions of MUP KS Police Sectors’).

### Table 3: Brief Descriptions of MUP KS Police Sectors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sector 1</td>
<td>Covers two neighbouring urban municipalities in the city centre including ‘Old Town’ (Stari Grad) and the city’s commercial and government centre (‘Centar’). Sector 1’s headquarters is based in Centar with a satellite station based in Stari Grad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector 2</td>
<td>‘Novo Sarajevo’, an urban municipality in the city centre that is mainly residential.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector 3</td>
<td>‘Novi Grad’ is the largest municipality in BiH by population. Many residents live in Yugoslav-era apartment complexes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector 4</td>
<td>Includes outlying urban towns of Iliđa and Hadžići.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector 5</td>
<td>Includes rural towns of Ilijaš and Vogošća.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each Sector has a Chief and every station has a Commander and two Shift Commanders. Below these senior managers there is a cadre of mid-level managers and sergeants who are responsible for overseeing various administrative and supervisory functions. Finally, the ‘rank-and-file’ officers based at each station include a mix of uniformed patrol officers, traffic officers, criminal investigators for low profile incidents and support staff. The majority of rank-and-file police officers at each station are assigned to sector-based patrol work which, depending on the geography of the officer’s beat and the station’s resources, may be conducted by foot or by car. While most patrol officers spend a significant portion of their time out in the ‘community’ and have received some training on community policing by either international organisations like the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) and the US International

---

127 I have randomised the numbers assigned to the RPZ units so they do not necessarily correspond to those of the sectors described in this table. This is to help preserve the anonymity of individual officers.

128 High profile criminal investigations are conducted by a central unit.
Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Programme (ICITAP) or at the Police Academy in Sarajevo, the consensus amongst reformers and local researchers was that sector-based patrol officers had either failed or neglected to incorporate the philosophy of community policing into their routines (see Deljkić and Lučić-Ćatić 2011 180-181; also Gill 2010a: 5 referenced in Appendix 2).

In recognition of the evident limitations of generating reforms through a philosophy-based approach to community policing, back in 2008 the SDC supported the MUP KS in piloting two community policing specialist teams that would subsequently operate out of Sectors 3 (Novi Grad) and 1 (Centar/Stari Grad). An informal position was also created within the central ‘Crime Police’ unit for a community policing coordinator (henceforth ‘RPZ Coordinator’) who oversaw the work of these units, supported their ongoing development (with significant assistance from the SDC) and promoted their role throughout the Canton. In 2009, the original RPZ Coordinator was replaced by the current RPZ Coordinator, a veteran from before the war who prior to taking up this post had served on a UN Mission in sub-Saharan Africa.

In 2010, the MUP KS expanded its community policing project throughout Sarajevo Canton and new RPZ units were established in the remaining sectors. The original team that was based in Sector 1 was also split into two separate units that subsequently operated out of smaller municipal police stations. Individual officers were assigned to these newly created units by different sector chiefs or station commanders who were afforded a significant degree of discretion with regards to their selection criteria because the RPZ specialist role had yet to be officially recognised by the Regulation of Job Classification at this point. While most of these senior officers acted on the advice of the SDC and selected young, enthusiastic and in some instances highly educated officers to staff these units, others chose to capitalise on their discretion and staff the RPZ teams with undesirables including veteran officers close to retirement, poor performers or difficult to manage individuals (personal communication, ‘Community Policing Advisor’, 17 March 2011). The competing approaches to staffing these

129 The practice of staffing community policing posts with veteran or out-of-favour officers is documented in the Anglo American literature however; no empirical consensus exists with regards to which staffing approach is most effective. Rather, the existing research indicates that enthusiasm is generally an important determinant of whether community policing initiatives will be operationally effective from a police stand-point. Notably, Greene’s (2000: 341-342) research on community policing in Philadelphia (USA) suggests that ‘rookie’ officers are better equipped for problem-oriented community police work than veteran officers because they are open-minded. This sentiment was also expressed by members of the SDC and the officers from RPZ1 when discussing the suitability of their colleagues from RPZ2 (personal field notes, ‘RPZ1’, 21 March 2011). However, a functional justification for assigning veteran officers to RPZ roles can also be found in relation to Skogan and Hartnett’s (1997: 88) research which found that ‘older officers’ involved
units affected the two community policing specialist teams that I studied. RPZ1 was comprised of two male graduates in their 30’s with degrees in ‘criminalistics’; a female officer in her late 20’s; and an experienced male officer in his 40’s who had previously delivered lectures on community policing at the Police Academy in Sarajevo. To contrast, RPZ2 was staffed by a veteran male patrol officer in his late 50’s, a female officer in her late 30’s and a male officer in his early 40’s who had previous worked as a uniformed patrol officer and served with the tactical response unit prior to the community policing assignment.

The SDC continued to provide training and support for these units until the end of 2010 but it began to withdraw from the project in January 2011 and the Canton’s RPZ Coordinator and the experienced RPZ units subsequently took on the primary role of expanding the programme and supporting the ongoing development of the newly established RPZ units through training activities. They also assumed primary responsibility for promoting the project and the RPZ role both within the police organisation and to external audiences (see Chapter Ten). At the start of my research in early 2011, the consensus amongst my colleagues at UNDP, representatives of MUP KS, and the Canton’s RPZ Coordinator who served as my institutional gatekeeper for this research was that RPZ1 had been highly successful in implementing the SDC’s strategic prescriptions while RPZ2 had struggled by comparison (personal communications, 23 February 2011 and 4 March 2011). One of the initial aims of my research was therefore to identify the various factors that contributed to the success of RPZ1 and the shortcomings of RPZ2 as this was identified by the RPZ Coordinator to be a significant question with implications for how the MUP KS would eventually define the role of community police officers in the Regulation of Job Classification (personal communication, ‘RPZ Coordinator’, 4 March 2011). I revisit this question in Section 9.3 however it is first necessary to introduce the SDC’s strategic prescriptions for community policing in Sarajevo Canton.

9.2 Community Policing: The Swiss Way

The SDC’s prescription for community policing in Sarajevo Canton emphasized ambiguous concepts like ‘security marketing’ and ‘transactional analysis’ which represented amalgamations of popular community policing practices in Switzerland and Anglo-American contexts. The SDC published a summary of these prescriptions in a 2010 Manual for Community-Policing in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Swiss Agency for Development and...
Cooperation 2010; henceforth ‘Manual’). Analysing the SDC’s model in relation to the established, Anglo-American community policing literature reveals that these concepts were designed to provide local police in Sarajevo Canton operational frameworks for problem solving (Goldstein 1979, 1990) and knowledge brokering (Ericson and Haggerty 1997: 70-71). The lack of specificity surrounding these concepts meant however that successful implementation ultimately depended on the ability of local police officers to use their local knowledge and discretion to successfully translate ‘security marketing’ and ‘information sharing’ into contextually relevant practices.

The Manual describes community policing in relation to its ‘Peelian’ origins but it calls for police organisations to implement community policing programmatically, as an operational strategy carried out by specialist teams (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 2010: 18-19). The Manual also identifies problem solving as the primary function of community policing and suggests that these specialist teams should play a proactive role in identifying local problems and developing solutions through partnership-based practices involving ‘sustainable problem-solving’ methodologies such as ‘security marketing’ and ‘SARA’ (‘Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment’). The Manual does not provide a clear definition for ‘security marketing’ but it does include a fifteen-page guide designed to help local police officers achieve a ‘security marketing process’ (Ibid: 65-80). A quick analysis of this ‘guide’ indicates that ‘security marketing’ is consistent with Goldstein’s (1979: 236) description of policing as a ‘problem-solving process’ that involves:

‘Identifying these problems in more precise terms, researching each problem, documenting the nature of the current police response, assessing its adequacy and the adequacy of existing authority and resources, engaging in a broad exploration of alternatives to present responses, weighing the merits of these alternatives and choosing among them.’ (Goldstein 1979: 236)

Along these lines, the Manual proposes that the first step for ‘achieving a Security Market[ing] process’ involves identifying the ‘causes of insecurity of the population’ based on the perceptions of community police officers (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 2010: 65-66). Step two involves identifying local problems that affect ‘a large number of citizens’ (Ibid: 66). Third, the Manual states that community police officers should conduct a group analysis of the issues identified in steps one and two in order to develop ‘an objective perspective on the problem’ (Ibid: 66). Drawing from their analysis, step four encourages the

---

130 This Manual was published two years after the SDC initiated its community policing project in Sarajevo Canton but its content is consistent with the training that was initially provided to the officers from RPZ1 and RPZ2 when the project was first piloted in 2008.
officers to ‘realize that they cannot solve the problem alone’ and actively seek out local ‘partners’ who could contribute to addressing the problem ‘in a sustainable way’ (Ibid: 67). Step five advocates collaborating with these partners to develop and implement an appropriate solution to this problem and step six calls on the officers to evaluate ‘the result of the actions taken’ (Ibid: 65-67).

The distinction between ‘security marketing’ and ‘SARA’ is not entirely clear but the concepts appear to represent alternate methodologies for implementing ‘problem-oriented policing’. While ‘security marketing’ appears to provide community policing specialists with a methodology for addressing ‘complex security problems’ (Ibid: 81), the Manual also advocates the utility of basic ‘methods’ like ‘SARA’ for the officers to use when ‘solving local problems of lower intensity’ (Ibid: 81). The Manual also neglects to clearly distinguish between ‘complex security problems’ and ‘problems of lower intensity’ meaning that this distinction was left to the judgment of local police officers.

While the Manual includes a heavy emphasis on problem-solving, it also promoted the idea of community policing as a form of ‘knowledge work’ (Ericsson and Haggerty 1997) designed to communicate risk to internal and external stakeholders. The Manual refers to this practice as ‘intelligence sharing’ and suggests that community policing specialist teams should take the lead in presenting the local intelligence gathered via ‘security marketing’ and ‘SARA’ to colleagues throughout the organisation and partners in the community (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 2010: 56). The SDC’s emphasis on community policing as ‘intelligence sharing’ also exhibits elements of what has become known as ‘intelligence-led policing’ in Anglo-American contexts (Maguire and John 1995) however, the SDC’s concept of ‘intelligence sharing’ was not explicitly oriented towards targeting prolific or high risk offenders. Rather, the SDC advocated this information brokerage function as a means of fostering local cooperation and partnerships in the community that could be used to address holistic security problems with the help of local institutions and actors.

To perform this ‘intelligence sharing’ function within the police organisation, the Manual states officers should maintain an ‘affairs board’ within their station that lists recent incidents and events and that the officers present their analyses of these findings to their colleagues during daily briefings (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 2010: 54). It also suggests that community policing specialists should work directly with station managers and supervisors to streamline communications and by-pass hierarchical reporting procedures that restrict the flow of information within this organisational setting (Ibid: 55). To perform this intelligence sharing
function with external stakeholders, the Manual calls for community policing specialists to ‘know their area/sector of responsibility and the citizens living there’ (Ibid: 39) so that they can establish a functional network of partners throughout the community. Specifically, the Manual states:

‘Community policing officers should contact all citizens, whatever their social status, origin, culture and lifestyle might be. The should also partner with other stakeholders, mainly from the social and educational areas which requires (sic) good knowledge of stakeholders…Community policing officers will be asked various questions, which will not always be related to their scope of competences, but anyhow the attitude of service to the population should be a guide. CP officers will make efforts to find solutions, resorting to the partners’ competences and services.’ (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 2010: 46)

This emphasis on partnership and accessing local knowledge is therefore suggestive of what O’Malley and Palmer (1996) have previously described as ‘post-Keynesian policing’ in Anglo-American contexts. Theorising the significance of partnership-based community policing, Ericson and Haggerty (1997: 70-71, 73) reference the work of Stenson (1993) in writing that community policing constitutes a particularly important ‘institutional methodology for communicating risk management’ that is significant because it ‘constitutes the police as professional experts… [possessing]…abstract knowledge about risk that is valuable to others’. This idea is inherent to the SDC’s emphasise on ‘intelligence sharing’ which recognises that appealing to community values and interests through positive, non-adversarial interactions is particularly important for establishing police legitimacy and re-affirming the traditional role of the public police as an important institution for risk communication in the community. Establishing a network of contacts is also important in relation to this idea of policing as risk communication because it promises to afford the police what Ericson and Haggerty identify as ‘[improved] connections with the communications circuitry of other risk institutions’ (Ibid: 72).

The idea that a functional network of partners could enhance the capacity of the police to generate intelligence and perform knowledge work is also suggestive of neo-liberal governmentality and Garland’s (1996) concept of ‘responsibilization’. In this case, a state institution with limited governmental capacities was advised by the SDC to enrol local partners to contribute to the governance and provision of policing by participating in intelligence sharing practices. The SDC’s advocacy of responsibilization is also evident from the Manual’s concept of ‘transactional analysis’ a practice that involved ‘lead[ing] people to a direction enabling them to abandon negative or limited thinking schemes’ and to encourage individuals to reflect on their own behavior in order to ‘accept one’s own person…to bring about a change for the better
in every-day (sic) behaviour’ (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 2012: 31). By promoting these introspective transformations, the Manual suggests that community police officers can ‘create their own spaces of manoeuvre’ and ‘[increase] their professional capacities’ (Ibid: 31). This is further suggestive of Garland’s (1996: 11) idea that the mentalities of activated and motivated citizens and institutions can be aligned with the those of the state with the effect that ‘the centralized state machine is rendered more powerful than before, with an extended capacity for action and influence’ (Ibid: 11). In the case of the SDC’s community policing strategy in Sarajevo Canton however, this process is designed to align local mentalities with those of an international development agency rather than the public police. As Ryan (2011: 155) argues, promoting a partnership-based, community policing model in a country like BiH is conducive to the establishment of ‘complex assemblage of thin blue lines’ designed to activate an array of local institutions and actors as important agents of glocally responsive policing.

While the concepts of ‘security marketing’ and ‘intelligence sharing’ played an important role in structuring the mentalities of community policing specialists in Sarajevo Canton, it was ultimately left to the discretion of local police officers to translate these prescriptions into practice. An interview with a Project Associate from the SDC involved with both the development and implementation of the project revealed that these concepts were intentionally left vague so as to encourage local police officers to take ownership of them and adapt them to address local circumstances (interview, ‘SDC Project Associate’ 22 June 2011). While this decision can be partially accounted for by the fact that the SDC subscribed to a ‘capacity development’ ethos similar to that of UNDP, it is also important to consider that there were pragmatic reasons for the SDC to leave its prescriptions fairly ambiguous. Most notably, the SDC recognised that local knowledge was necessary for successfully adapting these prescriptions into a functional community policing strategy and that there could be no one-size-fits-all approach to implementing these prescriptions.\footnote{This SDC’s recognition of the need for local practitioners to use interpretation and negotiation to adapt generic prescriptions for community policing into local relevant practices also reflects the Scottish Government’s approach to promoting community policing between its eight regional police forces. Specifically, Henry and MacKenzie (2012: 317) describe how ‘the Scottish Government published the Community policing and engagement principles…against which Scottish police forces should refine their practice’ but that these prescriptions were ‘not intended to be prescriptive about the specific local forms that practice could take’.} However, as the remainder of this chapter indicates, translating these concepts into an effective operational strategy for community policing in Sarajevo Canton was difficult in practice and success varied between the two RPZ units that I observed. In the following section, I account for the obstacles that confronted officers working to operationalize the SDC’s prescriptions and in Chapter Ten, I elaborate on...
how officers from RPZ1 used ‘dramaturgical translation’ to incorporate the SDC’s prescriptions into an effective presentational strategy.

9.3 Community Policing as an Operational Strategy

In this section, I examine the shortcomings of community police work in Sarajevo Canton as an operational strategy designed to ‘improve the quality of life’ (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 2010: 24) for local citizens. I do so with an analysis that focuses on the primary strategic function of community policing that was identified by the SDC: problem solving. For the SDC, the key determinant of whether community policing was successfully implemented as an operational strategy in Sarajevo Canton was the question of whether these efforts consistently generated outcomes that addressed public sources of insecurity. My analysis suggests that they did not but that one of the two specialist units (RPZ1) was at least partially successful in using the SDC’s prescription for ‘security marketing’ to structure their work. Ultimately, however, their ability to generate actual ‘results’ or outcomes through security marketing was restricted due to a lack of support from municipal agencies that either failed to recognise the role of community police officers or refused to do so. By comparison, the second unit (RPZ2) struggled to incorporate this problem solving function into its operational routine due to limited support from senior managers and individual resistance or confusion regarding what security marketing actually entailed. Based on this analysis, I argue that the SDC’s prescriptions for community policing had not been successfully operationalised at the time of my research and that the officers’ use of ‘security marketing’ and the ‘SARA’ methodology did not generate holistic, partnership-based solutions to local problems.

Problem solving was identified by the SDC as the primary function of community police work and accordingly, concepts like ‘security marketing’ served as important scripts designed to inform the work of RPZ officers in Sarajevo Canton. While the officers from RPZ1 embraced these scripts and used them to inform their daily routine for community police work, their counterparts in RPZ2 either neglected or struggled to do so. The evidence that I encountered of RPZ1’s efforts to employ security marketing to address recurring issues throughout their municipality was abundant and it was clear that the SDC’s prescriptions and training had a significant effect upon their proactive approach to policing. Maintaining regular contact with various ‘partners’ throughout the municipality represented RPZ1’s primary strategy for identifying local problems and the team believed that promoting regular interactions between
the police and members of the community was necessary for generating trust and which in turn would facilitate information sharing and cooperation in addressing these problems (field notes, 22 March 2011). This proactive approach to problem identification was encouraged by the team’s Station Commander who suggested that ‘some people are still afraid to report crimes and that this is a problem that will take many years to resolve in order to improve public perceptions of the police and their willingness to engage with them’ (par. interview, ‘RPZ1 Commander’, 4 April 2011). Accordingly, the officers from RPZ1 held regular meetings with ‘partners’ representing diverse segments of the community including municipal officials, community leaders, school directors, charity workers, small business owners, and private citizens.132

Given the diverse range of actors that RPZ1 classed as ‘partners’, these encounters frequently served to draw attention to problems that did not fall within what these officers recognised as the traditional roles of the police. For example, one of the officers from RPZ1 informed me of a meeting with a local community representative who complained about a problem with broken street lighting and the failure of the municipal office to resolve this issue after repeated requests (personal communication, ‘RPZ1’, 9 March 2011). The officer explained that this was not really his responsibility as a police officer but as a community police officer, he often had to step in to deal with this ‘stuff’ because nobody else follows up. The officer went on to suggest that having a police officer serve as an advocate for these kind of issues is beneficial because in theory, he believed that it made the municipal authorities more likely to act on public complaints. With reference to this specific incident however, the officer acknowledged that his meeting with an administrator at the municipal office failed to resolve the issue but rather prompted the administrator to ask the officer ‘why is this your business?’ (Ibid). The response of the municipal official in Sarajevo Canton illustrates the significance of bureaucratic inertia and cultural resistance as impediments to partnership-based community policing and this obstacle is well-documented in Anglo-American contexts (e.g. Crawford 1999: 107-108; Greene 2004) and in Western Europe (e.g. Terpstra 2008: 219). Lacking formal recognition for the RPZ role from the Regulation of Job Classification document, the officer from RPZ1 suggested that they struggled to articulate a convincing response to this question (personal communication, ‘RPZ1’, 9 March 2011).

RPZ1’s failure to initiate a solution for the municipality’s stray dog problem population also highlights the difficulties these officers faced in translating the SDC’s prescriptions for security marketing into an effective operational strategy. This was evident from the proceedings of a

132 I had the opportunity to attend and observe a number of these meetings during my field work with RPZ1 (see Appendix 1, Table A 1.4).
community meeting that I attended with two of the team’s officers that was organised following an incident where a small child was attacked by a stray dog in front of a local school. The two officers began the meeting by informing the parents that they were well aware of the problem and that they were actively working to resolve it. To demonstrate their commitment to the issue, they presented a ‘project report’ for the stray dogs issue that they had clearly invested a significant amount of time in developing over the past two years. The report included a record of all of the complaints that the police in this municipality had received about issues relating to stray dogs as well as copies of numerous formal letters that the officers had previously sent to the municipality office informing it of the problem and requesting a response. When the officers suggested that they were powerless to resolve this issue without support from the municipalities in the form of funding allocated for the construction of a stray dog shelter, the room became increasingly hostile towards the officers and visibly dismissive of their ‘specialist’ function (field notes, 22 March 2011).

While the officers from RPZ1 were able to use security marketing as a means for identifying local issues and initiating partners throughout the community, their ability to actually generate multi-agency commitments to resolve these issues was largely restricted due to a lack of cooperation from municipal officials. Effectively, budgetary constraints and disagreements over which municipal agency was responsible for addressing the problems prevented the officers from RPZ1 from actually delivering results while also creating powerful disincentives for municipal agencies to even recognise the authority of community police officers lest they be held accountable for their lack of responsiveness or cooperation. This illustrated the refusal of different municipal agencies to accept responsibility for public safety issues, an attitude which severely restricted the operational effectiveness of community policing. Similar issues were experienced by members of another RPZ unit operating on the outskirts of Sarajevo. One of the officers described how the team brought a complaint from a local school director about broken street lighting to the attention of their municipality’s public works office but the administrator refused to acknowledge the agency’s responsibility for repairing the street lights and instead

133 This hostility was evident from the fact that members of the public were interrupting the officers and shouting at them while one of the officers would later tell me that one attendee commented that if the police failed to act, he would take it upon himself to shoot the dogs (field notes, 22 March 2011).

134 Similar problems relating to inter-agency cooperation and the unwillingness of municipal authorities to recognise the authority of community police officers is documented in relation to the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy by Skogan and Hartnett (1997: 162-163). Lyons’ (2002) research also draws attention to the possibility that weak partnerships or partnerships that attract only limited interest from the community may actually increase the exclusionary effects of local policing and fail to address the victimisation of its most marginalised populations.
suggested that this was a problem of the Ministry of Culture because the complaint had been lodged by a school official. When the officers later approached the Ministry of Culture about the problem, the received a similar response with the effect that the issue was never actually resolved (interview, ‘RPZ4’, 4 April 2011). Similar concerns regarding the lack of authority of community police officers to generate responses from municipal actors were noted in UNDP’s *Baseline Assessment* (2010) report and the SDC’s external review (Wisler and Traljic 2010), both of which proposed that developing community safety partnerships represented the best solution to this issue because it promised to promote transparency and public accountability.

For the officers from RPZ2, implementation was even less successful from an operational standpoint. Part of the problem was that their operational routines were defined primarily by their Sector Chief and Station Commander who regularly deployed these officers for ‘traditional’ policing jobs such as working protests or demonstrations in the city centre or providing security for visiting diplomats. While not enthusiastic about community policing, RPZ2’s Sector Chief was also not overtly dismissive or critical of this role. Rather, this individual viewed community policing as a secondary police function that did not represent a priority due to the sector’s limited resources and personnel. Thus, the Sector Chief argued that deploying the officers from RPZ2 for protests and diplomatic protection duties was a strategic decision as ‘[the officers] are used as go-betweens between the patrol officers and the citizens [and] they are not involved with repressive activities’. The Sector Chief went on to justify this decision in suggesting that ‘policing protests is … part of the work of the police in the community’ and that ‘these officers are supposed to talk with people and reduce tensions’ (par. interview, ‘RPZ2 Chief’, 5 April 2011).

Drawing from Skogan’s (2008: 24) discussion of institutional resistance to community policing reforms from middle and top-level police managers in the United States, it is necessary to consider that resource constraints may not have been the only explanation for why the officers from RPZ2 were restricted by management from operationalising the SDC’s prescription for

---

135 In this particular example, the officers from RPZ4 did not discuss the role of senior departmental colleagues in supporting their attempts to bring this issue to the attention of the public works office or the Canton’s Ministry of Culture. An earlier conversation with officers from RPZ1 suggests however that many senior officers were hesitant to intervene by approaching senior-level counterparts at other municipal agencies because they did not recognise the value of doing so or alternatively, they lacked the incentive to do so. This was particularly evident in relation to the work of the Canton’s RPZ Coordinator who chose to utilise his time engaging with local members of the community and citizens instead of capitalising on his senior rank to develop a network of powerful contacts throughout the city that could be held accountable for their agencies’ lack of response (personal communication, ‘RPZ1’, 22 March 2011).
security marketing. Specifically, Skogan argues that middle and senior police managers may be resistant to community policing and problem-oriented policing models because they afford a significant degree of discretion to rank-and-file officers and this is seen to erode the ability of senior officers to exercise hierarchical control over their subordinates out in the field. While the officers were permitted to schedule their community policing activities around their public order policing duties, this arrangement was problematic in practice because of the frequent and impromptu nature of protests and diplomatic visits to the sector. In other words, the officers from RPZ2 were hesitant to schedule meetings with established or prospective ‘partners’ in the community because of the risk that they might be forced to cancel at the last minute (personal communication, ‘RPZ Coordinator’, 4 March 2011).

Thus, the Canton’s RPZ Coordinator and the officers from RPZ1 identified managerial support as the primary reason for why the officers from RPZ2 struggled with implementation. One of the officers from RPZ1 explained, ‘the most important person is the chief because the chief makes all the station’s strategic decisions so if he doesn’t care about CBP or know about CBP it won’t work’. The officer elaborated on this claim by suggesting that if the chief does not support community policing, ‘CBP teams will not have money or resources to do their job well’ and adds that ‘if the chief is made to recognise the benefits of CBP approach as a problem-solving tool, they will facilitate it’ (par. personal communications, ‘RPZ2’, 7 March 2011 and 9 March 2011). According to the RPZ Coordinator, RPZ2’s first Sector Chief failed to support community policing and his replacement had only recently started to accept the need for the unit to enjoy greater operational autonomy but struggled to address the scheduling issue due to the sector’s shortage of uniformed personnel (interview, ‘RPZ Coordinator’, 13 April 2011).

The extent to which scheduling issues restricted the officers from RPZ2 from identifying local problems was evident from a series of encounters that I observed between the officers from RPZ2 and various ‘partners’ in the community who did not appear keen to make use of the unit’s problem-solving function. During an impromptu patrol, my interpreter Adnan and I accompanied one of the officers from RPZ2 to a series of unscheduled meetings with a secretary for neighbourhood community centre or ‘mesne zajednice’ (MZ); a bet shop owner; a school director; and the chief psychiatrist at a methadone clinic. None of these individuals revealed any ‘problems’ but rather, they repeatedly emphasised that ‘everything is ok’ (field notes, 14 March 2011). It was evident from these exchanges that these individuals had little interest in presenting their problems to this officer, perhaps because they did not believe that the officer possessed the authority or influence necessary to address the underlying issues. For example,
the MZ secretary informed the officer that diplomats at a nearby embassy were illegally parking their cars on a side street and that this was creating traffic problems for local residents. They commented however that when she previously brought this matter to the attention of the police, they responded that they were incapable of resolving it because they could not tow vehicles with diplomatic plates or issue fines to the embassy. The MZ secretary then explained that there had been some issues with drug dealing in the neighbourhood but suggested that it was ‘not really a problem’ because ‘everybody knows who is responsible and parents tell their kids to avoid them’ (par. personal communication, ‘RPZ2 and MZ Secretary 2’, 14 March 2011). On the basis of this assurance, the officer from RPZ2 did not appear to be interested in probing the matter.

The next day, an encounter between all three officers from RPZ2 and an MZ secretary at another community centre highlighted how individual resistance to, or confusion about, the nature of the RPZ role restricted the ability of these officers to establish functional partnerships throughout their sector. At the beginning of this meeting, the officers introduced me as a representative from UNDP and instructed the MZ secretary to discuss their relationship with the officers from RPZ2 for my benefit. The individual responded that ‘the partnership between the [community centre] and the police is ok, but it could be better’. When asked to elaborate on why the ‘partnership’ was lacking and how it could be improved, the individual responded that ‘[RPZ2] could visit more often’ but refused to elaborate further in the presence of the officers. This comment prompted an exchange of words in Bosnian between the secretary and the officers regarding a complaint that the secretary had filed and which the officers from RPZ2 had yet to follow-up on (field notes, 15 March 2011). After the meeting, Adnan explained to me that a number of local residents complained to the secretary about underage drinking and loud music coming from a local café. The secretary then brought this matter to the attention of one of the officers from RPZ2 at their previous meeting but the officer neglected to intervene. Based on this explanation, I asked one of the male officers from RPZ2 for his take on the matter and his response was that it was not a job for the police but rather ‘the job of environmental police’ (par. personal communication, ‘RPZ2’ 15 March 2011). The officer’s response evidences resistance to the RPZ role by at least one of the officers assigned to the unit. 136

136 Previous conversations between the other male officer from RPZ2 and I suggest that this individual was outwardly dismissive of community policing however the sole female member of the unit appeared to be both knowledgeable and enthusiastic about the assignment. It was clear however that this officer lacked the authority to take on a leadership role within the unit as she was the least experienced officer and this restricted her ability to incorporate the SDC’s prescriptions into the team’s habitus for police work (personal communications, ‘RPZ2’, 15 March 2011). .
Also problematic was the fact that the officers from RPZ2 had failed to establish meaningful contacts amongst a sizable Roma population that resided in their sector. More significant was the fact that they appeared to be disinterested in doing so. As one of the officers explained:

‘…they have their own system and culture which the police do not understand and that whenever there is a problem they prefer to handle it themselves…[we] are called to deal with a problem but when they get there the people pretend like nothing happened making the police look like idiots’ (par. personal communication with ‘RPZ2’, 14 March 2011)

Similar sentiments were expressed by the Canton’s RPZ Coordinator who excused the team’s inattention to the Roma population by suggesting that ‘we believe that people are people and we respect their processes of life’ but went on to describe their culture and lifestyles as criminogenic: ‘young [Roma] kids start as beggars, then they become thieves, then they get involved with drug smuggling or prostitution and then maybe they become murderers’ (par. interview, ‘RPZ Coordinator’, 13 April 2011). The RPZ Coordinator’s comments reflect the fact that the country’s Roma population is viewed as deviant by the BiH public. It also supports the idea that the officers from RPZ2 were highly selective in terms of how they defined the boundaries of the community they were willing to police and that the local Roma population was not included in this definition because they constituted social ‘others’.

While this dismissive attitude was problematic from a moral standpoint, it also restricted the unit’s ability to perform their problem solving role because it prevented them from identifying problems that affected or were caused by a ‘deviant’ population. This was particularly problematic because it meant that these officers did not work to address social issues that are said to affect Roma communities in the Balkans such as gender-based violence against Romani women and the exploitation of Romani children. Although poorly documented in NGO reports, the prevalence of gender-based violence in Roma communities is described by Hedina Sijercic, a Romani journalist who grew up in this particular neighbourhood in Sarajevo:

137 Hedina Sijercic, a Romani journalist who grew up in Sarajevo describes how two different Roma populations have historically existed in BiH, the Gureti-Chergash who would leave their homes during the summer and the Thanesko Gurbeti who maintained permanent residences. This example focuses on the latter group which had long maintained a permanent community in Sarajevo’s City Centre since before the war (Sijercic 2007).

138 I had previously encountered similar views expressed by various friends and colleagues after revealing the location of my apartment in Sarajevo in what was generally considered to be a ‘gypsy neighbourhood’.

139 I encountered anecdotal evidence of this attitude during a meeting between one of the RPZ2 officers and a local secretary from a community centre. After the secretary explained that a local resident recently went to the police to report the theft of his newly purchased shower unit from his home, the officer laughed and casually explained how ‘gypsies steal strange stuff which they try to sell off at the local markets’ (par. personal communication, ‘RPZ2’ and ‘Secretary’, 14 March 2011).
‘Along with all this society’s discrimination, our women suffer from domestic discrimination in their families as well. They work at home, rear the children, beg, and work for the men who are mostly alcoholic (sic). Our women also have cleaned other houses, and worked, and their husbands take this money to buy first alcohol and then food for the family. Men often beat the women and kids. Kids beat their mothers too, and often some of the men (sic) family members beat the women too.’ (Sijercic 2007)140

While it was evident that the officers from RPZ2 were aware of these problems, their attitudes suggested that they did not consider them to be their responsibility. For example, during one conversation about the issue of gender-based violence in Roma communities, one of the officers suggested that it is more common for the Roma to call the police when ‘wives beat their husbands’ (par. personal communication, ‘RPZ2’, 14 March 2011). A second officer nodded in amusement and it was clear that neither had fully considered the reasons behind this observation. Specifically, they did not appear to recognise that Roma women might have been actively prevented from reporting these incidents to the police by male relatives who in turn could use the threat of police intervention to enhance their own intimidation and control. It is further apparent that these officers neglected to address this complex issue through the SDC’s security marketing methodology. This was problematic for the operational success of community policing in the sector because it undermined the SDC’s belief that ‘[t]he main goal of community policing is to improve the quality of life’ by ‘solving problems in a sustainable manner’ (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 2010).

9.4 Discussion

As an operational strategy, the SDC’s prescriptions for community policing in Sarajevo Canton appeared to have had a limited impact insofar as community police officers either failed to generate results through a partnership-based approach or struggled to incorporate the methods of ‘security marketing’ or ‘SARA’ into their operational routines. A similar conclusion was

140 During my fieldwork, it was not uncommon to see unsupervised, visibly malnourished children (even infants) begging in the city centre. In the evenings, the children would then hand their money over to their guardians or handlers. During an interview with an RPZ officer from a different sector, I learned that the police were well aware of this problem but believed that there was little they could do to address it. Instead, the officer explained that many of these ‘beggars’ travel to Sarajevo from neighbouring countries like Serbia. Furthermore, the officer noted that it was very difficult to take coercive action against the guardians of these children because they would simply relocate to another part of the country instead of paying their fines or attending meetings with social services. Addressing this problem through social services was also impractical because so many of these individuals were not actually BiH citizens and they were not entitled to public benefits or support (interview, ‘RPZ3’, 05 April 2011).
published by the SDC’s external evaluation team which stated that the work of RPZ officers was generally limited to producing ‘outputs’ such as project reports or scheduled meetings rather than ‘outcomes’ (Wisler and Traljic 2010). In this respect, one might argue that the initiative was a policy failure or characteristic of an unsuccessful policy transfer. While the SDC attributed these operational shortcomings to the amount of time that the officers spent promoting their work to the public and also to problems with generating support from potential partner agencies (interview, ‘SDC Project Associate’, 22 June 2011), the officers from RPZ1 provided me with an alternative explanation for why they had yet to achieve results: the SDC’s expectations were unrealistic from the start (personal communication, ‘RPZ1’, 7 March 2011).

This is not to imply that the SDC believed that local officers could merely function as intermediaries and unproblematically adapt an off-the-shelf model of community policing for use in Sarajevo Canton. In fact, it was clear from my interview with an SDC Project Associate that the team was well aware of the challenges inherent to promoting community policing reforms in developing and transitional societies around the world (interview, ‘SDC Project Associate’, 22 June 2011). The problem was that the SDC appeared to equate the mediatory function of local police practitioners with a simple process of adaptation rather than one that would also require cultural and structural transformation.

The officers from RPZ1 actively embraced their mediatory role but they recognised that adapting the SDC’s prescriptions for community policing into a successful operational strategy in Sarajevo Canton would take time. Reflecting on their recent visit to Switzerland to observe a variant of the SDC’s community policing model in action, one of the officers from RPZ1 suggested that ‘yes, it all works but [the Swiss] do not have a lot of problems to begin with’. This conveys the officer’s recognition that operationalising community policing in Switzerland was inevitably different from the prospect of operationalising it in BiH. Unlike BiH, Switzerland did not continue to suffer from deep-rooted social divisions and structural problems linked with a recent history of conflict. The officer went on to explain that ‘CBP is a very good idea in terms of relationships and partnerships and building high levels of trust but the way we get to it is not the same’ (par. personal communication, ‘RPZ1’, 7 March 2011). This sentiment was echoed by a second officer working in another sector in the city centre who suggested that there is a different mentality in Switzerland to start with: ‘people respect the rules and take responsibility for their problems whereas in Bosnia they do not’ (par. interview, ‘RPZ3’, 5 April 2011).

---

141 This notion that community policing is likely to be most effective in stable, ‘affluent, ethnically homogenous middle-class areas’ is supported by Bayley’s (1992: 10) research.
These difficulties suggest that international development workers from the SDC played an important role in structuring the mentalities of local RPZ officers but that this would only have a limited impact in determining how the officers would translate these mentalities into culturally and contextually relevant practices. Furthermore, it suggests that the SDC lacked the ability to shape the mentalities of the BiH public and partner institutions directly. Rather, they depended on local RPZ officers to promote this governmentality through a practice that I identify as ‘dramaturgical translation’ in the following chapter. Thus, analysed as a translational process rather than a transfer, this case study illustrates the capacity of local police officers to strategically transform conceptual and programmatic aspects of policing and security governance in a manner responsive to local cultural understandings of police work and local structures.
Chapter Ten: Dramaturgical Translations for Community Policing in Sarajevo Canton

This chapter synthesises the concept of policy translation with Goffman’s (1956) work on dramaturgy to introduce an alternative framework for analysing how and why local practitioners selectively mediate externally defined prescriptions for policing into contextually and subculturally appropriate practices. Section 10.1 introduces the dramaturgical metaphor with a review of Goffman’s (1956) seminal work *The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life* and proceeds to examine its applicability to our understanding of police work in the Anglo-American context through a discussion of Manning’s (1977) *Police Work*. Manning suggests that police subculture is an important determinant of how presentational strategies are utilised by police practitioners and I argue that the posited existence of a ‘transnational subculture of policing’ (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012) supports the transferability of the dramaturgical metaphor as a framework for understanding the organisational sociology of the police in transitional democratic societies like Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).

In Section 10.2, I apply the concept of dramaturgical translation through my analysis of community policing as a presentational strategy in Sarajevo Canton. Specifically, I examine how performances and audience segmentation were utilised by a team of community policing specialists (RPZ1) to address certain operational deficiencies described in the previous chapter. My analysis focuses on two secondary functions of community policing prescribed by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC): information sharing and transaction analysis.

Selectively incorporating elements of the SDC’s model of community policing into strategic performances represented an important exercise in policy translation because it allowed the officers from RPZ1 to project their own definitions of the RPZ role to segmented audiences and achieve recognition and acceptance from sceptical colleagues and supervisors which in turn validated their projected definitions. For ‘internal’ audiences within the Sarajevo Canton Police, the officers from RPZ1 worked to communicate the value of community policing by linking their role with established subcultural definitions of police work, specifically the idea of policing as ‘crime fighting’. Conversely, performances to ‘external’ audiences including members of the community, partner agencies, international organisations, and the local media were used to promote a softened, non-adversarial definition of the RPZ role. These

---

142 As distinct from a ‘subculture of transnational policing’ (see Section 3.1).
performances were intended to distinguish these officers from their oft criticised colleagues and portray them as diligent and approachable problem-solvers.

My ethnography suggests that dramaturgical performances afforded the officers from RPZ1 operational autonomy and the discretion necessary for operationalising community police work as they saw fit. Dramaturgical translation not only allowed these officers to sustain their tenuous role as RPZ specialists but most importantly, it also empowered them to redefine the operational habitus of community policing so that it would reflect their collective interests in this contact zone. The same could not be said of the officers from RPZ2 whose flawed performances threatened to undermine the progress realised by their counterparts from RPZ1.

Section 10.3 concludes this chapter by discussing the significance of dramaturgical translation with respect to the capacity of local practitioners to negotiate the contours of reforms during the implementation process. Accounting for both the productive and damaging potential of dramaturgical translation illuminates the role that seemingly disempowered police practitioners play in mediating police reforms. While my observation of the officers from RPZ1 is indicative of the potentially productive function of dramaturgical translation by local police practitioners in terms of creating a space for pursuing partnership-based policing conducive to democratically responsive policing outcomes. The fact that other RPZ officers from Sarajevo Canton struggled to replicate this success raises additional questions about whether individual agency may itself generate new types of harm through translation. Addressing this prospect is useful for highlighting the indeterminate nature of policy translation with respect to the outcomes that it may generate and the extent to which flawed performances and the idea that the misuse of dramaturgical translation may actually generate undesirable consequences.

10.1 Dramaturgical Translation

This section introduces the concept of dramaturgical translation by reviewing Goffman’s (1956) *The Presentation of the Self*: It proceeds to discuss the relevance of dramaturgy to the study of modern police organisations through a discussion of Manning’s (1977) *Police Work* in which it is argued that strategic performances and audience segmentation represent important components of modern policing. I introduce the synthesized concept of ‘dramaturgical translation’ as a framework for exploring how local police officers transformed the SDC’s strategic prescriptions for community policing into a dynamic presentational strategy targeting a variety of audiences. I argue that the dramaturgical metaphor provides an effective sociological
framework for exploring the translational character of police reforms because it highlights the structured, agentive character of relatively disempowered local police officers as ‘performers’.

10.1.1 The Presentation of the Self

Dramaturgy involves managing the perceptions and expectations of others for the purpose of sustaining or advancing a definition of oneself (Goffman 1956). The mechanism of control described by Goffman involves structuring audience perceptions through strategic interactions, projected definitions and the concealment of alternative definitions that might otherwise serve to contradict this projection. Social actors and teams of actors are therefore described by Goffman as ‘performers’ insofar as every social interaction and setting requires them to take on a social role. Every social role embodies a front which includes a setting, an appearance and a manner. Collectively, these elements provide the audience with recognisable cues and shape their responses to the presentation and the presenter.

Performances benefit performers insofar as they provide these social actors with a means of outwardly structuring their relations with others however Goffman (1956:23) adds that they also benefit the audience by providing recognisable idealisations and a ‘reaffirmation of the moral values of a community’. For a front to be outwardly credible, its setting and the appearance and the manner of its performers must be coherent. Inconsistencies prompt the audience to question the authenticity of the entire performance and this in turn generates questions regarding the legitimacy of its performers (Ibid: 16). In presenting a front, Goffman writes that an individual’s ‘performance will tend to incorporate and exemplify the officially accredited values of the society, more so in fact than does his behaviour as a whole’ (Ibid: 23). This suggests that there is an inevitable disconnect between an individual’s outward projection of the self and their true behaviour.

The posited disconnect between the projected definition of the self (‘front region’) and one’s actual behaviour suggests that actors must consciously work to conceal what Goffman (1956: 70) labels their ‘back region’. Maintenance of the front region and the back region are mutually dependent in the sense that the front serves to obfuscate the back while the actions, the behaviours and the values associated with the back region enable actors to maintain their fronts. ‘Since the vital secrets of a show are visible backstage and since performers behave out of character while there, it is natural to expect that the passage from the front region to the back region will be kept closed to members of the audience or that the entire back region will be kept hidden from them’ writes Goffman (1956: 70).
Managing impressions therefore serves as an important strategy for preserving a projected definition of the ‘self’. One tactic for managing impressions involves audience segregation because different audiences have different expectations about what constitutes a legitimate performance (Goffman 1956: 42). Segregation is achieved by adapting one’s front to address the diverse expectations of different segments of the audience and by maintaining this separation through ‘proper scheduling’ which serves to limit the risk that a specific discrepancy will ruin the credibility of the entire performance for the entire audience (Ibid: 84). Managing impressions also influences the behaviour of individual actors backstage given that the threshold between front regions and back regions is never fixed. For this reason, Goffman suggests that teammates are compelled to incorporate elements of their front into their backstage behaviour in order to ‘sustain the impression that [they] can be trusted with the secrets of the team and that [they are] not likely to play [their] part badly when the audience is present’ (Ibid: 79). The need for performers to project their front to both external and internal audiences suggests that the dramaturgical metaphor can also be used to account for how individual members of an organisation define and negotiate their roles with respect to subculture.

Goffman’s (1956) argument that a front must ultimately resonate with the audience’s preconceived notions of a given role and that actors must work to manipulate this collective representation suggest that dramaturgy constitutes an important mechanism for negotiating what Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: 142) label symbolic power, ‘through which relations of force between the speakers and their respective groups are actualized in a transfigured form’. While performances are coercive insofar as the presenter uses a front to convince an audience of the authenticity or the objectivity of their projected definitions, they are also subject to reciprocity in the sense that a performance will only be successful if it is accepted by the audience. In other words, the audience is empowered by its capacity to reject a performance and to thereby discredit the performers. One must therefore consider that performances are not wholly reducible to an actor’s self-interest or their behavioural inclination towards self-aggrandizement but that they are inevitably shaped by the performer’s perceptions of the audience’s expectations of a given role as well as contextual variables ranging from tangible constraints to situational norms. A successful performer must therefore be attuned and responsive to the expectations of the intended audience as well as the contextual circumstances surrounding their presentation.

10.1.2 Dramaturgy and Police Work

---

143 This is what Mead (1934: 173-177) would label the ‘I’.
144 Similar to Cooley’s (1902) idea of the ‘looking glass self’.
Manning’s (1977) application of the dramaturgical metaphor to the study of public policing highlights the ways in which a public organisation and its members use presentational strategies for the purpose of enhancing their perceived legitimacy and to mask their coercive orientation and operational deficiencies. Manning recognises that the police function as the coercive mechanism of the state and takes this as the starting point for his analysis that the police symbolise ‘Leviathan enacted’ (Manning 1977: 4). Manning presents a functionalist argument which suggests that the police represent the guarantors of social and political order within a modern society and that it is in relation to their symbolic ‘capacity to deter citizens from committing acts that threaten the order they are believed to symbolize’ that they derive a ‘powerful instrumentality’ and institutional legitimacy (Ibid: 6). Manning summarises this idyllic ‘myth’ of modern policing in the following terms:

‘The police have become controlling factors in everyday life; they construct in many respects the meanings imputed to social control and to social order; they are implicitly trusted and invested with legitimacy in nearly all segments of society; and they control the available information by which citizens construct at least some measure of their notions about the quality of life.’

(Manning 1977: 10)

The reality of public policing in modern (and subsequently in post-modern) societies is markedly different from this idyllic representation and it is in relation to the evident disconnect between the ‘public’ and the ‘private meanings’ of police work that the ontological insecurity of modern police organisations and their practitioners becomes visible. Manning writes that one of the preeminent ‘institutional contradictions of the structural position of policing in Anglo-American societies’ is that the legitimacy of this institution is linked with its perceived capacity to oversee the maintenance of general order but this function of policing is inevitably compromised by the institution’s law enforcement function which requires it to ‘act in the interest of the powerful and the authoritative against those without power and without access to the means of power’ (Ibid: 6). In other words, Manning suggests that by working to maintain general order, the police are actually performing a specific order maintenance function that inevitably contributes to the marginalisation of certain segments of society (Ibid: 111). The conflation of the general and the specific ordering functions of public policing effectively undermine the projected ‘myth’ that this institution is responsive to the public.

145 Bittner (1978) expresses similar views regarding the coercive function of modern police organisations. 146 Manning (2010) incorporates these arguments into his later work while also takes into account various transformations of the policing field over the past three decades.
While this law enforcement function might appear to render the police accountable to the interests of the powerful, Manning acknowledges that in practice the police enforce laws selectively due to the significant degree of discretion that is afforded to police practitioners working at all levels of this organisation (Ibid: 6; see also Goldsmith 1990; McBarnet 1979; Walker 2000). The decision to enforce a specific law amounts to a decision to ‘use the law to legitimate an organizational decision’ argues Manning (1977: 111) who concludes that this selective law enforcement capacity renders the police ‘above the law’ rather than its servants. This implies that while the activities of modern police organisations contribute to the preservation of a status quo that serves the interests of the powerful, this is not their primary function or objective. Rather, Manning suggests that the primary objective of modern police organisations is self-preservation or institutional survival for the purpose of ‘maintain[ing] the deference granted by others’ (Ibid: 33). Manning concludes that police work is ultimately responsive to an institutional subculture and suggests that ‘[t]he significant others of the policemen – in social psychological terms, those to whom they address their actions, and from whom they expect rewards and sanctions – seem to be their fellow officers in considerable measure’ (Ibid: 15).

It is in relation to these institutionally-structured definitions of modern policing that Manning applies the dramaturgical metaphor to police work. His analysis suggests that police subculture roughly equates with the ‘back regions’ of modern police organisations while the various presentational strategies that police practitioners utilise to convey their enduring relevance and function generate various fronts (Ibid: 32). Accordingly, Manning writes that ‘[t]he police are dramatic actors and they must wrestle collectively and individually with the salient dramatic dilemmas of their role and occupation’ (Ibid: 17). Important presentational strategies utilised by Anglo-American police organisations generally focus on the ‘mandate and mission of the organization’ argues Manning and include ‘the professionalism rhetoric’ and ‘the utilisation of scientific management systems’, ‘the bureaucratic ideal’, ‘technology’, and ‘crime statistics’ as prominent examples (Ibid: 34, 127-138). In describing the presentational value of professionalism, Manning writes that ‘[e]xternally, professionalism functions to define the nature of the client, to maintain social distance with the clientele, and to define the purposes, the conventions, and the motivations of the practitioners’. ‘[I]nternally’, he adds that professionalism ‘functions to unify the diverse interests and elements that exist within any occupational or organizational group’ (Ibid: 129). This accounts for why employing presentational strategies and projecting them to external audiences allows the police to ‘mediate the contradictory aspects of their mandate’ and to obfuscate the realities of police work from
public view and also how the internal projection of presentational strategies via police subculture provides the organisation with an important source of cohesion and control over its members.

Internal cohesion and control within an organisational setting serves as a necessary prerequisite for effective external dramaturgical performance but this can be problematic given ‘the actual process and patterns of social interaction that can be observed in a police department’ (Manning 1977: 139-140). This has to do with the fact that the ‘organizational realities’ and ‘shared assumptions’ that ultimately structure police officers’ perceptions and dramaturgical projections of the police mandate and police work are continuously negotiated in the back region through police subculture. This implies that police subculture cannot be viewed as static but rather it is a contested field and Manning argues that various ‘interactive arenas’ exist within this organisation such as ‘the domain of procedural rules’ or institutional norms (Ibid: 40).

These ‘interactive arenas’ can be analysed as contact zones because they represent important loci at which police work is defined, contested and constructed through social and symbolic interaction. The collective meanings that emerge from these contact zones affect the operational habitus of policing and thus, the ways in which police officers perform police work for internal and external audiences alike. It is therefore necessary to consider that dramaturgical projections of police organisations cannot be reduced to the ‘rational depiction of instrumental aims’ but rather, these performances serve as institutionally-constructed veneers which mask the negotiated character of police subculture as a contact zone.

While Manning (1977) applies the dramaturgical metaphor to account for police work in the Anglo-American context, his emphasis on police subculture as the primary source of internal cohesion and control suggests that this dynamic effects modern, bureaucratic police organisations in other contexts. The transferability of this sociological framework is supported by Bowling and Sheptycki’s (2012: 26) work which acknowledges that police subcultures are partially shaped by local contextual circumstances but argues that ‘there remains a family resemblance among subcultures of policing around the world’ meaning that a ‘transnational subculture of policing’ exists. This is to suggest that the subculture of each police organisation fosters its owns definitions for police work which reflect cultural, contextual and situational factors but that these definitions are also similarly constructed with respect to the institutions’ societal function, public role, and ontological insecurities regarding issues like legitimacy.
Manning (1977) suggests that it is the need for this institution to maintain a cohesive front that renders the police resistant to externally imposed changes (Ibid: 336). He further distinguishes between ‘two general modes of policy’ that effect police organisations: ‘informal, tacit, inarticulated responses to the dilemmas of policing’ and ‘formal policy…dealing with external issues’ (Ibid: 342). It is the significant degree of individual discretion afforded to police practitioners and the lack of transparency characteristic of police work that enables individual officers to implement formal policies selectively and in ways that advance their interests within this organisational setting. Thus, in order for formal policies to gain purchase within this interactive arena and affect the operational habitus of police work, they must be incorporated into the ‘domain of procedural rules’ (Ibid: 40).

Lacking access to these contact zones, international reformers inevitably struggle to participate in these negotiations and are thus reliant on members of the police organisation to champion their proposals. Accordingly, these champions take on an important translational function as they are left to selectively interpret the reformer’s prescriptions for change and promote them within these interactive arenas in ways that reflect their own interpretations and interests. One can therefore analyse the processes by which police reforms are introduced to police organisations and incorporated into the operational habitus of police work as policy translations. Studying internationally-driven police reforms as policy translations promises to elaborate on the micro-politics of why these initiatives often fail to generate their intended outputs and outcomes.

In linking the dramaturgical metaphor to Lendvai and Stubb’s (2007) work on ‘policy translation’ and Pratt’s (1991) discussion of ‘contact zones’, I define ‘dramaturgical translation’ as the process of purposively manipulating the perceptions and expectations of others for the purpose of advancing or sustaining a projected definition of one’s self, role or situation. Before I proceed to apply this framework to my analysis of community policing in Sarajevo Canton, it is necessary to acknowledge that the dramaturgical metaphor is not the only possible framework for pursuing a constructivist analysis of police reforms as policy translations. With my analysis, I merely wish to demonstrate that a symbolic interactionist approach is particularly well-suited for examining the ways in which local police practitioners shape ‘interactive arenas’ or ‘contact zones’ that define the habitus of police work in Sarajevo Canton and BiH.147

147 This argument is similar to the concept of ‘negotiated orders’ which is also grounded in structuration theory and acknowledges the possibility that social and political actions and interventions can plausibly challenge the ways that things are, and can resist or re-imagine the ways that they are
10.2 Community Policing as a Presentational Strategy

The concerted efforts of community police officers in Sarajevo Canton to promote their function to internal and external audiences represented an important translational exercise that can be analysed using Goffman’s (1956) dramaturgical metaphor. The work of these officers was evidently dramaturgical insofar as the diverse range of practices and activities that officers engaged in were all designed to manage impressions (Ibid: 132), achieve acceptance and to ‘sustain the definition of the situation that [their] performance[s] fostere[d]’ (Ibid: 87). In this section, I explore the ways in which the officers from RPZ1 successfully translated their ‘information sharing’ function into an effective dramaturgical performances that served to generate subcultural acceptance for their role amongst colleagues, increase their authority, and preserve their autonomy within this organisational context. I argue that this was achieved by using strategic performances and audience segmentation to link the community policing role with an ‘internal’ communications function (Ericson and Haggerty 1997) that complemented existing subcultural definitions of police work as ‘crime fighting’. With the remainder of this section, I examine the extent to which the team utilised dramaturgy to enhance their operational mandate for community policing through their interactions with external audiences including local ‘partners’ throughout the community and international organisations. Collectively, these internal and external performances afforded the officers from RPZ1 the ability to negotiate and construct a functional platform for carrying out community police work in ways that reflected their individual and collective interpretations of the RPZ role.

10.2.1 Performing for Colleagues

In attempting to demonstrate their instrumental utility to colleagues and supervisors at their station, the community police officers from RPZ1 utilised their ‘information sharing’ role as part of an effective presentational strategy that involved linking abstract values like ‘trust’ and ‘partnership’ to established subcultural expectations of police work. This involved generating intelligence that would actively contribute to the stations’ crime fighting activities. RPZ1

becoming’ (Henry and McAra 2012: 341). This concept was formally introduced to the criminological lexicon in a special issue of *Criminology & Criminal Justice* published in September 2012 and I have not had the opportunity to fully-integrate its specific terminology into my analysis or to fully explore its conceptual linkages to the police translation literature. The idea of ‘negotiated orders’ does however appear to be entirely compatible with the structural-constructivist epistemology advocated by Bourdieu (1989) and Lendvai and Stubbs (2006) and thus, a promising avenue for conducting future research on the wider societal implications of policy translation.
utilised a number of different methods to present their intelligence to colleagues including a crime map and a daily affairs board that were prescribed by the SDC. During my first day of observation with RPZ1, one of the officers explained that the team was currently using a colour coded system to map out recent incidents of automobile thefts and a string of recent bet shop robberies in the municipality. The officer explained that bet shops presented ‘easy targets’ for armed robbers because they would keep about 30,000 KM\(^{148}\) on premises yet their owners neglected to provide any security or to purchase CCTV cameras because this money was insured and it was therefore more economical to simply write off these losses. Using the crime map, the officer explained that the team was able to work with its station commander to identify clusters of activity and to strategically position uniformed patrol officers near potential hot spots as a means for preventing future incidents (field notes, 7 March 2011).

It was also evident that the officers from RPZ1 drew upon this network of partners to generate criminal intelligence on specific incidents. This was evident in relation to another event that I observed: an attempted bank robbery that took place approximately 200 meters from the police station where we were sitting drinking coffee. My field notes record the incident:

‘Our discussion is then interrupted by a call over the radio...An armed bank robbery is in progress a few blocks away. The room becomes very tense. We wait for a while as the officers listen to the call. After a few minutes of listening they decide to respond, “Come on they say.” [Two officers] run ahead while I follow about 20 paces behind with [a third officer]. We are on the hunt for an armed robbery suspect...

...We reach the team’s car and drive a few blocks, get out and walk over to the scene of the incident, all the time the officers are scanning for possible suspicious individuals. The mood is tense but their guns are not drawn so I assume this means that they do not think the suspect is a threat if confronted. We stand around for a while, [two of the officers] talk with other [colleagues] who arrived at the scene before [we return] to the car and drive around in search of the nondescript subject….One officer notes that if the suspect isn’t found [RPZ1] will go around and ask for information.

[Later that day] We sit around drinking coffee for a while when all of a sudden [the] three officers start getting a bunch of phone calls. Then they start calling people. About 10 minutes later, without much sense of enthusiasm or achievement one of the officers announces, ‘that was a local shop owner who called …He gave us intelligence on the attempted bank robber from earlier. We know who he is now’. I ask the officer would he have given this information to any patrol officer. ‘No, because he doesn’t trust that they will keep his identity secret’ he said. (field notes, 7 March 2011)

[The next day one of the officers] states that once they received the information yesterday, they filed a report with the criminal investigation/inelligence unit which should lead to an arrest very soon.’ (field notes, 8 March 2011)

\(^{148}\) Approximately 15,000 EUR.
From an interactionist perspective, the decision of the officers from RPZ1 to respond to this incident was significant as it allowed the officers to communicate to their audience (rank-and-file colleagues) that they were still real police officers. Their presence on the scene was not essential and nor was it expected but it allowed the officers to publicly reaffirm their credibility as police officers and communicate the idea that community police work and ‘traditional’ police are compatible and complementary. Their guns represented important props for the performance, referent symbols of police identity meant to outwardly display their legitimate status and coercive powers as police officers.

RPZ1’s decision to respond to the incident and draw upon their contacts to generate intelligence in support of a criminal investigation was also intended to convey the strategic utility of community policing to their colleagues because it highlighted the unique capacity of RPZ officers to solicit sensitive information from the public. Key to this performance was their capacity to exercise discretion in treating an informant’s call as an anonymous tip. The message that this sent to colleagues was that knowledgeable informants were willing to come forward with intelligence when dealing with RPZ specialists because their discretion meant that they could be trusted not to file an official report or subsequently force the informant to make an official statement. While it was true that patrol officers were not actually required to include personal details of an informant in their incident reports, one of the station supervisors for RPZ1 suggested that many people were still hesitant to report incidents to regular police officers because they were not aware of this fact. Thus, the officer suggested that the public continued to associate their practices with the Yugoslav system whereby the personal details of an informant were required information. RPZ officers were for this reason more successful in soliciting this information from the public because they promoted the idea that they could be trusted (interview, ‘RPZ1 Supervisor’, 4 April 2011).

RPZ1 was also successful in brokering information within their station because their Sector Chief had initially afforded them the operational autonomy necessary for developing a network of partners throughout the community that fed them this type of intelligence. Using this network to contribute to ‘traditional’ policing activities provided the officers from RPZ1 with a strategy for validating the ‘specialist’ label that the SDC ascribed to them. It also helped the officers from RPZ1 to differentiate their role from that of ‘traditional’ sector based patrol officers who continued to function as neighbourhood police officers in Sarajevo Canton yet did so using a model of response-based policing which seemingly prevented them from developing a functional network of potential informants throughout the community.
The practice of presenting the role of community policing to colleagues in ways that would resonate with existing subcultural understandings and expectations of policing was important for three reasons. First, translating vague and unfamiliar concepts like ‘security marketing’, ‘information sharing’ and ‘transactional analysis’ into practices that complemented established subcultural roles for police work rendered them accessible to other police officers who began to accept this function and were subsequently less dismissive of the significant degree of discretion afforded to RPZ1. This meant that the officers from RPZ1 could continue to enjoy their operational autonomy while simultaneously retaining their credibility as police officers in the eyes of their colleagues. As one of the officers from RPZ1 described, it was previously the case that many of the patrol officers assumed that community police officers would use their time to ‘go and drink coffee at a shopping centre’ however these performances allowed the officers to convey the fact that even seemingly recreational activities formed an important part of the officers’ information brokerage function (par. personal communication, ‘RPZ1’, 7 March 2011).149

Second, these performances served to legitimise the role of RPZ officers in the eyes of senior managers who otherwise struggled to incorporate the preventative and partnership-based orientations of community policing into existing performance management systems utilised by the Sarajevo Canton Police. Lacking a functional methodology for measuring the impact of community policing within their stations, it was evident from the experience of other RPZ units that station commanders were disinclined to provide these officers with necessary resources unless they were confident that this expenditure would have a positive impact on communicable police statistics or generate positive media coverage in relation to high profile incidents. RPZ1’s success in translating the SDC’s prescriptions for community policing into an adjunct to the traditional crime fighting mentality enabled the officers to secure additional resources that further enhanced their productivity and thus allowed them to spend more time dealing with ‘partners’ in the community’. For example, RPZ1’s sector chief allowed the team to use his personal laptop to type up problem reports and to develop a local manual for community

149 A conversation with one of the officers from RPZ1 indicates additional reinforcement of the idea that community policing was real police work was achieved during an SDC sponsored team building event the previous summer where patrol officers and community police officers from RPZ1 participated in various activities and exercises that, according to one member of RPZ1, ‘helped to improve understanding of the CBP role’ with the effect that ‘now the patrol officers see [us] as full colleagues, not ‘others’’ (par. personal communication, ‘RPZ1’, 7 March 2011). The officer did not provide specific details of what these exercises actually involved but it is likely that they were similar to the activities of the ‘Civilian Courage’ programme which was developed by the SDC.
policing that complemented the one which was published by the SDC.\textsuperscript{150} Having access to this computer was also significant because it allowed the officers to avoid waiting in long queues in order to use one of the limited numbers of shared computers at their station (personal communication, ‘RPZ1’, 7 March 2011).

Third, these performances ensured that the officers from RPZ1 continued to enjoy a significant degree of operational autonomy that enabled them to conduct community policing on their own schedule. This meant that the officers were flexible in terms of the hours that they worked and this flexibility afforded them the opportunity to regularly attend local community meetings that would often take place outside their normal working hours.\textsuperscript{151} This autonomy allowed the officers to designate their own operational priorities, in this case implementing the SDC’s ‘Civilian Courage’ programme in local schools to promote ‘transactional analysis’.

One of the earliest priorities prescribed for community policing in Sarajevo Canton by the SDC involved youth outreach because, as one RPZ officer explained, ‘youth do not respect the police, especially teenagers in Grades 6, 7 and 8’ (interview, ‘RPZ3’, 5 April 2011).\textsuperscript{152} By promoting positive interactions between community police officers and school children at an even younger age, the SDC believed that these officers could potentially alter the perceptions of future generations of citizens towards the police and work to correct its tarnished, adversarial image. Building on their notion that partnership represented a necessary component of community police work, the SDC also envisioned that these interventions would serve to communicate values like personal responsibility and the consequences of individual actions to these children in an effort to promote greater responsibility amongst members of the community. This belief was evidently shared by an officer from RPZ1 who suggested, ‘these kids are at a crucial junction where in 2-5 years they will choose whether they become citizens or criminals’ (personal communication, ‘RPZ1’, 15 March 2011). Accordingly, the SDC hired an ‘organisational psychologist’ from Switzerland to develop a curriculum for these officers to implement in local schools that was based on the ‘theory’ of transactional analysis with its notion that ‘human beings are essentially good’, ‘everyone has the ability to think’ and ‘humans can influence their own fate and can, therefore, influence the outcome of events’ (Swiss Agency

\textsuperscript{150} The process of the local officers taking initiative in creating their own handbook for the RPZ role in Sarajevo Canton was particularly symbolic of their ability to redefine this role in relation to the local rather than international frameworks for community policing.

\textsuperscript{151} The ‘normal’ working hours for community police officers were from 07:30 – 16:00 however these meetings would frequently take place between 18:00 and 19:00 (personal communication, ‘RPZ1’, 7 March 2011).

\textsuperscript{152} Aged approximately 11-14 years old.
for Development and Cooperation 2010: 30). This programme was titled ‘Civilian Courage’ and it consisted of a number of games and trust building exercises that were designed to be implemented by RPZ officers in local schools.

In March 2011, I attended one of the ‘Civilian Courage’ sessions organised by three of the officers from RPZ1 at a local primary school. The officers began the session by greeting approximately 20 students aged between 10 and 12 years old and distributing promotional hats and t-shirts featuring the ‘Civilian Courage’ logo that had been paid for by the SDC. Following two icebreaker exercises, the officers introduced a third activity that required the children to critically reflect about different types of harms:

‘A scale ‘0’, ‘25’, ‘50’, ‘75’ and ‘100’ is laid out on the floor in the centre of the room in order of increasing relevance/severity. All the groups are given a [behaviour] (theft, rape, etc) and they are told to indicate using the scale on the floor how severe it is. The first group to go has ‘rape’. A boy proceeds to place his paper on ‘50’ and this stirs up some debate. I turn to [one of the officers] and tell him that I think this exercise is a bit problematic because these kids are very young and probably do not really understand what rape really means. He nods and shrugs his shoulders... As the kids each place their card with a violent action on the floor, [another officer] stands in the middle and leads a discussion about the activity and challenges [the students] when they don’t rate [an issue] highly enough. By the end of the exercise every option is being ranked at 100... The only issue which provokes any real debate between the kids is 'boxing' with many of the girls indicating that it is violent while the boys seem to suggest it is a sport.’ (field notes, 9 March 2011)

My observation of this exercise suggests that the officers demonstrated initiative in terms of taking the lead in coordinating these exercises and using the occasion to interact with the children however it also led me to question the value of this exercise as a method for conveying the underlying themes prescribed for transactional analysis. In other words, if one were to analyse this interaction as a form of neo-liberal governmentality, it did not appear to be particularly effective. Notably, the officers’ role in facilitating the discussion and correcting the students appeared to negate the purpose of the actual lesson which was to encourage the students to actively reflect upon hypothetical issues like ‘rape’ or ‘boxing’ in a critical and empathetic manner. I subsequently raised this concern with one of the officers from RPZ1 who acknowledged the challenges that the team faced in attempting to implement this programme yet remained adamant about their reasons for doing so:

‘...many of these kids, they lack family structure, many due to the war which destroyed many families and created single parent situations.... CBP officers work to show these kids a normal life

153 This language is suggestive of the ‘responsibilization’ narrative (Garland 1996) described in Section 9.4.
and the risks associated with criminal behaviour….the real challenge is convincing them of the negative aspects of a criminal lifestyle given the reality of life in BiH where they see criminals driving around in Mercedes with girls while citizens are forced to work long hours and at the end of the month their paycheck is never enough. (par. personal communication with ‘RPZ1’, 15 March 2011)

This suggests that the officers lacked the specialist knowledge to successfully translate the ‘Civilian Courage’ programme into age and context appropriate lessons and it is therefore difficult to gauge whether they actually made a meaningful and long term impact in terms of shaping the mentalities of local school children. Analysed as a series of performances, however, the officers’ decision to devote their time to implementing the Civilian Courage programme demonstrated their ability to capitalise on the operational autonomy that their internal performances had afforded them as a platform and shape definitions of police work inherent to the RPZ role.

Ever circumspect with their performances, the officers from RPZ1 recognised that their work with schools was potentially problematic in that these performances appeared to contradict their attempts to portray community police work as real police work. Specifically, the officers from RPZ1 were aware of their emerging reputation as ‘school police’ amongst colleagues and senior police managers working at other police stations in the Canton (personal communication, ‘RPZ2’, 15 March 2012). Within their own station, however, they were able to maintain their credibility as real police officers while continuing to perform as ‘school police’ due to the support of their station chief. Effective use of ‘impression management’ (Goffman 1956: 132) also helped them to convey that the time they spent on ‘Civilian Courage’ did not affect their ability to use their intelligence sharing role to support ‘crime fighting’.

10.2.2 Performing for the Community

Goffman (1956: 42) writes that performers must segment their audiences and alter their performance in relation to their diverse expectations. While the officers from RPZ1 worked to translate their information sharing function into practices that might resonate with the existing subcultural understandings of police work held by their colleagues and supervisors, they were careful to adjust their performances when dealing with partners in the community. These external projections were designed to differentiate their RPZ role from the image of their patrol-based colleagues in the Sarajevo Canton Police. This process involved making informal visits to different ‘partners’ and maintaining open channels of communication that these individuals knew they could utilise if any problems arose. While much of RPZ1’s partnership-building
efforts were focused on school administrators, the officers also engaged with a variety of other organisations including community centres, local businesses, religious institutions and local charities. For example, one of the officers explained how the team had built a relationship with ‘a Catholic theology school, a large church and several mosques in the municipality’ and that the leaders of these institutions, who were provided with the officers’ personal mobile phone numbers, would come to them ‘all the time’ with problems (par. personal communication. ‘RPZ1’, 8 March 2011).

Another example of RPZ1’s efforts to promote community policing through relationship building that I observed first hand involved assisting a local charitable organisation that provided day care services and socialisation for residents of the municipality with various mental disabilities including children and adults. According to the charity’s director, the organisation was struggling financially and its income was limited to the profits it generated from the sale of handmade crafts and foreign donations. While the officers were open about the fact that they lacked the influence to persuade the Cantonal government to step in and provide financial support for the organisation, they were able to assist the organisation in other ways such as requisitioning police vehicles for collecting supplies, driving children with disabilities to picnics and they even took the lead in organising a charity concert that helped to raise money for the organisation and promote its work amongst a number of senior police officers and officials from the Ministry of the Interior (MUP KS) that attended (field notes, 7-8 March 2011). The interactions that I observed between the officers and the staff and users of this day centre indicated that this partnership was well-established and could accurately be described as a ‘friendship’. It also demonstrated that these officers were willing to actively promote non-adversarial relations and partnership with segments of the population that were socially excluded or ignored by the police.

From an operational standpoint, it was not immediately evident what was the strategic value of this particular partnership for the officers from RPZ1 given that the police were in no position to address the financial problems that affected this organisation as the organisation itself did not

---

154 During my first week of observation with RPZ1, I attended meetings with school administrators at six different schools throughout the municipality (See Appendix 1, Table A1.4).
155 The officer did not specify whether the church was Catholic or Orthodox and nor did they elaborate on the specific nature of these problems.
156 This was the term that one of the officers from RPZ1 used to describe the team’s relationship with this charity (personal communication, ‘RPZ1’, 7 March 2011).
157 Following one of the meetings that I attended between the officers from RPZ1 and an administrator for the charity, the officers also explained that the organisation provided support for individuals experiencing post-traumatic stress from the war (personal communications, ‘RPZ1’ and ‘Charities Organiser’, 8 March 2011).
appear to be a hotbed of criminal intelligence. While it was evident that the officers had taken a
genuine interest in the organisation and had wilfully decided to prioritise this relationship, one
of the officers explained that even seemingly tangential partnerships served an important
communicative function because they helped to improve trust and promote the idea that these
specialists were approachable and different from regular patrol officers. He explained, if people
‘see you are interested when there is not a problem, this will build trust….you must always go
though, not just when you need something’ (added emphasis added personal communication,
‘RPZ1’, 7 March 2011). In other words, the officers from RPZ1 recognised that it was
necessary to devote a significant amount of time to substantiating their ‘specialist’ identity in
the eyes of the community and that this needed to be achieved by creating opportunities for non-
adversarial encounters between the public and the RPZ officers. Without this foundation of
trust, the officers believed that they would struggle to solicit relevant intelligence when it
mattered and this would in turn prevent them from marketing their utility to departmental
colleagues. Accordingly, these performances enabled the officers to strategically project their
approachability and their service orientation throughout the community. It was also apparent
that the officers enjoyed these performances and genuinely believed that engaging ignored or
excluded segments of the community was essential for promoting an accessible image for the
Sarajevo Canton Police.

10.2.3 Performing for an International Audience

The officers from RPZ1 also adjusted their presentational strategy when dealing with
international organisations including the SDC and the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP). Rather than presenting these organisations with an idealised image of community
policing and suggesting that the unit was fully operational, the officers were keen to draw
attention to the organisational and structural obstacles that they had experienced and what they
determined to be threats to the sustainability of this reform. Specifically, they frequently spoke
of their lack of formal recognition by the Regulation of Job Classification (see Appendix 2) as
the major impediment to their ability to achieve results with security marketing and they also
emphasised the importance of operational discretion and supportive senior managers as
necessary preconditions for the successful implementation of community policing (field notes, 4
March – 12 April). The issue of sustainability also informed the presentational strategies utilised
by these officers when interacting with international audiences because the officers knew that
attracting support from organisations like the SDC and UNDP would serve to strengthen their
mandates, enhance their access to limited departmental resources and afford them significant
political capital which ultimately proved necessary for institutionalising the RPZ role.
Somewhat ironically, it was the ‘advanced’ community police officers from RPZ1 and the Canton’s RPZ Coordinator who were forthcoming about the challenges they faced. By comparison, the officers from RPZ2 were less willing to concede that they might benefit from additional support, despite their evident operational deficiencies and scheduling issues.

The main problem, according to both the officers from RPZ1 and the RPZ Coordinator, was that sector chiefs held the power to structure whether and how RPZ officers defined their roles. While support from their sector chief was recognised to be a valuable asset for the officers from RPZ1, the fact that this individual was held in high regard by the newly installed Minister of the Interior was a source of concern for these officers who believed that their Sector Chief might soon be promoted to the role of Commissioner. Their fear was that his replacement might then fail to recognise the instrumental value of community police work and that this could jeopardise the implicit agreement which afforded them flexible and autonomous working conditions in exchange for intelligence (personal communication, ‘RPZ1’, 7 March 2011; interview, ‘RPZ Coordinator’, 13 April 2011).

These concerns were amplified during my final interview with the Canton’s RPZ Coordinator who explained how days earlier RPZ1’s highly supportive Sector Chief had indeed been promoted to Chief of Criminal Investigations. The RPZ Coordinator explained that while the Chief’s replacement was the Station Commander who was already familiar with community policing and accepted this agreement, the individual slotted to replace the Commander was ‘likely to be brought over from the traffic unit’ meaning that they had limited experience with community policing. The RPZ Coordinator suggested that this was problematic because the new Commander would be the one to deal with the officers from RPZ1 on a day-to-day basis (par. Interview, ‘RPZ Coordinator’, 13 April 2011).\(^{158}\)

Given that the role of RPZ officers remained informally and perhaps tacitly defined in each sector, these officers believed that their progress could only be sustained if the RPZ role was formally incorporated into the Regulation of Job Classification (interview, ‘RPZ5’, 7 April 2011). The prospect of the officers achieving this formal recognition without support from an

\(^{158}\) Skogan and Hartnett (1997: 92) also identify changes in leadership as a threat to community policing programmes in American cities; however, their discussion focuses on political actors. They write, ‘[i]n many cities, there has been pressure for rapid implementation of, and quick results from, community policing so that incumbents can enjoy the political benefits of the program during their term of office’. They also observe that ‘[p]olitical and department leadership changes also threaten the success of community policing, as new leaders sweep out the policy debris left behind by old ones and institute new programs in their stead’. Building on these claims, they conclude that the relatively stability of the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy was linked with ‘the capacity of the incumbent mayor [of Chicago] to hold his job’.
international advocate like the SDC was problematic because they lacked the political capital to introduce these changes and to have them approved by the Police Commissioner, the Cantonal Assembly and the MUP KS. The officers had previously voiced these concerns to the SDC’s external evaluation team which incorporated them into its recommendation that the SDC’s community policing project should be extended through 2011 while its team worked towards ‘regularizing the CP officers status’ within police organisations throughout BiH (Wisler and Traljic 2010: 16). They wrote,

‘[Due to] the lack of an official status within the organization, with definitive terms of reference, rank, numbers...[t]heir involvement in CP activities still depends on the good will of the police station chief who might be tempted to request their services for other duties. New regulations should ensure that CP officers are not treated as “second class” police officers and that there are enough incentives to keep the best police officers interested in becoming neighbourhood officers. Regularizing their status will not just allow Community Policing as a doctrine to be institutionalized but will also allowing retaining (sic) the new generation of motivated, experienced and skilled officers who were trained by the Project (sic). With a too high turn-over of Community Policing officers, the whole philosophy could quickly show poor results and be abandoned eventually.’

(Wisler and Traljic 2010: 16)

On the basis of these previous performances and the recommendations they generated, the SDC organised a working group in Sarajevo Canton to develop a proposal for introducing these changes to the Regulation of Job Classification rulebook in the summer of 2011.160

As a temporary representative of UNDP who was known to be actively working on the Safer Communities project161, I also represented an audience for the officers’ international performances. This was evident from the fact that the officers expressed concerns regarding sustainability and the difficulties they encountered in working to develop multi-agency solutions

159 The report confirms that the officers from RPZ1 and the RPZ Coordinator’s predecessor were amongst the interviewees for this national evaluation. While it is impossible to verify whether it was their specific interviews generated this recommendation, the excerpt is consistent with the concerns that these officers addressed to me as a representative of UNDP during my field work. This report also suggests that a similar mentality regarding the importance of achieving formal recognition for community policing was shared by other RPZ throughout BiH.

160 A Project Associate for the SDC described how these proposed changes were initially approved by the MUP KS and the Police Commissioner however ten days later, the Police Commissioner changed his stance and sent a formal letter to the SDC which stated that in his opinion, there was no need to make these changes. This letter prompted the SDC’s Project Manager to ‘intervene’ and two weeks later the Police Commissioner once again changed his stance and decided to approve the changes (interview, ‘SDC Project Associate’, 22 June 2011). The changes were subsequently approved by the Cantonal Assembly and in July 2011, the specialist role of community policing was officially recognised by the Sarajevo Canton Police (Atlantic Initiative, 2011).

161 I had previously discussed the idea of community safety partnerships in relation to the Safer Communities project with both the RPZ Coordinator and two of the officers from RPZ1 at a summit in February 2011.
to local problems and that they influenced my own view of the field and my own activities as a policy translator. Specifically, it impacted the recommendations that I included in two reports that I developed for the Safer Communities project during the final weeks of my internship with UNDP.

The first report was the evaluation report that I submitted to the RPZ Coordinator in April 2011. In the report, I asserted that in order for community policing to be sustainable, sector chiefs must be required to recognise the role of these officers and to afford them greater flexibility in terms of their work style given that requiring them to work ‘events such as protests…undermines both their professional identity and their capacity to manage their time and schedule effectively’ (United Nations Development Programme 2011, ‘internal document’, p. 7; see Appendix 2). The second report was my policy brief for the Deputy Mayor of Grad Sarajevo. I drew upon my field work with the officers from RPZ1 to evidence the potential benefits of introducing the Safer Communities model throughout the city of Sarajevo. Specifically, I wrote that establishing these forums might create an impetus for municipal agencies to respond to local issues that were brought to their attention by local RPZ officers. I wrote:

‘Based on the findings of a recent assessment of CBP activities (see parallel document 'From CSP to CBP')\(^{162}\) in Grad Sarajevo, it is our recommendation that a citizen security forum be established in [RPZ1’s municipality] at the earliest possible convenience as the municipality’s CBP team have already established a functional network of partners throughout the community that could be easily integrated into the CSP model. It is clear to us that launching this forum would help to reinforce the authority of these CBP officers in the eyes of their partners as well as to enhance their capacity to respond to less conventional community safety issues that they regularly encounter during the course of their duties. For example, such a forum would provide the officers with a functional venue for addressing issues such as stray dogs or poor street lighting as it would serve to enhance the transparency of this problem-solving process and create additional pressures on key service providers to respond to the community’s needs in a timely manner.’ (DRAFT Policy Brief... 15 July 2011)

The limited impact of my recommendations indicates that the RPZ officers overestimated my influence as a policy translator on their behalf but the examples are useful for highlighting the susceptibility of seemingly empowered institutional actors to the dramaturgical performances of relatively disempowered local police officers.\(^ {163}\) In this case, I never received an

\(^{162}\) See Appendix 2.

\(^{163}\) The idea that a researcher functions as a translator is described by Churchill (2005: 3) who describes ‘the ‘ethnographer’s mind …as a transitional space which in the act of translating field data into an analytic report (1) poses unique challenges to the ethnography’s claims for providing an accurate account of field situations while (2) simultaneously offering paths to insight which quantitative and
acknowledgement of receipt for the first report submitted to the RPZ Coordinator and my recommendations were ultimately omitted from the final version of the second report by the Safer Communities Project Manager.

10.2.4 Flawed Performances

While the officers from RPZ1 were highly successful in using dramaturgy to translate the SDC’s prescriptions for community policing in ways that advanced their own agenda, other units struggled to replicate their success. This was particularly evident in relation to RPZ2 which struggled to convey its utility to colleagues and supervisors given that it had struggled to establish a network of partners in the community (see Section 9.3). This created a seemingly insurmountable paradox whereby the officers from RPZ2 could not establish a functional network of partners without support from their sector chief yet the sector chief was unlikely to provide them with this support because they could not provide him with a compelling reason to do so. Policy translation provided the officers from RPZ1 with a strategy for overcoming this dilemma as they were able to market their information sharing function as a model of intelligence-oriented policing. The officers from RPZ2 were restricted from capitalising on their translational potential and therefore experienced the effects of a growing subcultural rift between their unit and their rank-and-file colleagues who were openly dismissive of their limited attempts to implement the SDC’s prescriptions.

One of the officers from RPZ2 who had previously been part of an intervention team described how former colleagues would regularly mock them about community policing because they considered it to be ‘a very easy job’ that had little to do with policing (personal communication, ‘RPZ2’, 15 March 2011).\textsuperscript{164} Another member of RPZ2 suggested that since taking on this community policing role and working as part of a team, their identity as a police officer had suffered because the team-based style of work prevented this individual from regularly socialising with former colleagues from patrol and this created a social barrier (personal communication, ‘RPZ2’, 15 March 2011). After discussing this rift with one of the officers from RPZ1, I learned that this officer had initially experienced similar issues but that they were able to improve their relationships with colleagues by working to actively demonstrate the value of their work to colleagues (personal communication, ‘RZ1’, 21 March 2011).

---

\textsuperscript{164} Elsewhere Wood et al. (2004) account for the emasculation of the community policing role as hegemonic contestation designed to reaffirm traditional cultural values and definitions of police work within an organisational setting.
While the officers from RPZ1 actively used internal performances to continuously convey their utility to colleagues, the officers from RPZ2 were overly dependent on common referent symbols to reaffirm their status as police officers. This was evident from a conversation that I had with two of the officers from RPZ2 about whether community police officers should wear different uniforms and carry a gun. My argument at the time was that wearing the same uniforms as patrol officers was problematic because it made it difficult for members of the public to differentiate between these two different roles. I also suggested the carrying a gun also appeared to be irrelevant for community police work and that it potentially conflicted with the non-adversarial image that the officers were trying to present. However, the officers were dismissive of my suggestions and it was evident that they were protective of their uniforms and their firearms because without these symbols, they feared that they would lose the respect of their colleagues and an important source of authority when dealing with members of the public (personal communication, ‘RPZ2’, 15 March 2011). In retrospect, I am sympathetic to the officers’ perspective given that the loss of these props risked delegitimising their status as real police officers capable of exercising legitimate coercion in their capacity as problem-solvers.

This protective mentality and the officers’ unwillingness to fully embrace the role of RPZ officers also served to discredit their performances to external audiences. This resistance was evident from their unsuccessful attempts to utilise security marketing described in Section 9.3. It was also evident from their hands-off approach to implementing the ‘Civilian Courage’ programme at a local school. Whereas the officers from RPZ1 took the lead in introducing the session and running the activities, the officers from RPZ2 asked the school’s psychologist and a teacher to lead the exercises while they walked around the room taking photographs. One of the officers would later justify their passive approach by suggesting that both the psychologist and the teacher had already received their certificates in ‘Civilian Courage’ from the SDC so they were qualified to lead the session and more capable of doing so because these students were only between the age of 8 and 10 (personal communication, ‘RPZ2’, 16 March 2011). This lack of engagement not only prevented these officers from capitalising on this opportunity to present a positive ‘front’ to potential partners and young citizens but it also conflicted with the performances of their colleagues from RPZ1.

Restricted by their paradoxical inability to gain the acceptance of either their colleagues or members of the public, the officers from RPZ2 devoted a significant part of their free time working to mask these deficiencies using shallow and unconvincing dramaturgical performances intended to convince police officers throughout the Canton that they were as
‘advanced’ as their colleagues from RPZ1. I witnessed one such performance during a meeting attended by all of the RPZ units in Sarajevo. The meeting was organised by the Canton’s RPZ Coordinator and held at RPZ2’s station. As members of one of the two most experienced RPZ units in the Canton, the officers from RPZ2 were asked to present their work to their colleagues in order to share their ‘best practices’ and demonstrate the potential uses and benefits of security marketing. The flaws of this performance as perceived by the other officers in the room were evident from their incredulous and discourteous reactions to the presentation by RPZ2’s most veteran officer.

During this presentation, the officer reviewed a number of RPZ2’s ‘project reports’ using a slide show to demonstrate the extent to which the team had previously incorporated the security marketing method into their routine. It was clear however that the officer’s attempts to illustrate their different examples actually served to discredit this performance because they relied upon highly stylised photographs of the three officers participating in various public relations events that appeared to have little to do with the issues the officer was actually describing. Rather, these photos showed the officers posing with each other during different media events and members of the public participating in activities like ‘Civilian Courage’ but they failed to show the officers interacting with members of the community. The audience’s scepticism was evident from its laughter which ultimately prompted the RPZ Coordinator to dismiss the officer from the podium and finish the presentation himself (field notes, 17 March 2011).

While the officers from RPZ1 partially attributed the shortcomings of their colleagues from RPZ2 to their questionable suitability for the RPZ role (personal communication, ‘RPZ1’, 21 March 2011), it was also evident that directorial issues also served to discredit their performances. For RPZ in Sarajevo Canton, the RPZ Coordinator assumed the role of the director but appeared to be more interested in attracting an audience than actually staging a compelling show. Lacking the authority to assert the autonomy of the RPZ units within their stations and the organisational influence necessary to compel their sector chiefs to do so, the RPZ Coordinator defined his role primarily as working with these RPZ units to generate publicity for their work through public engagements and media events. During our final interview, the RPZ Coordinator openly compared his role to that of a ‘king’s jester’ because he would ‘go around and entertain people in order to sell people on [community policing]’ (interview, ‘RPZ Coordinator’, 13 April 2011).

The instrumental rationale underpinning the RPZ Coordinator’s emphasis on promotional activities was based on the belief that media publicity was essential for raising the public profile
of community policing and that this awareness would translate into a public mandate that would in turn support the work of these officers. Accordingly, all of the RPZ units participated in various media events that were organised by the RPZ Coordinator such as a parade for the Sarajevo Kids Festival, a social networking event known as a ‘human library’ that was organised by a local student art-house cafe, and an open day for local school children at the headquarters for the Sarajevo Canton SWAT team which was organised in partnership with the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) (field notes, March, June-July 2011). The RPZ Coordinator readily acknowledged that individual RPZ units needed to continuously demonstrate their operational effectiveness to the public in order to sustain this front yet he continued to advocate this promotional strategy despite his recognition of the operational shortcomings of a number of RPZ units that either lacked support from their superiors or had failed to embrace their role as RPZ officers (interview, ‘RPZ Coordinator’, 13 April 2011).

10.3 Discussion

Dramaturgical translation represents an important mechanism of ‘policy translation’ for recipients of micro-level police reforms in developing and transitional societies. In other words, dramaturgy provides these practitioners with a ‘process of formation, transformation and contestation’ (Lendvai and Stubbs 2007: 15) through which they can mediate externally-defined models in ways that advance their individual and collective interests within an organisational setting. Dramaturgical interactions and audience segmentation enabled the officers from RPZ1 to translate the SDC’s prescriptions for community policing into concepts, norms and practices that advanced their individual and collective interests within this organisational setting. These meanings became ‘institutionalized in terms of the abstract stereotypical expectations to which [they gave rise]’ (Goffman 1956: 17). In this respect, the interactions between the officers from RPZ1, their colleagues, supervisors, various partners and international organisations can all be analysed as ‘interactive arenas’ (Manning 1977: 40) equivalent to contact zones because these negotiated spaces allowed the officers to use their performances to construct a desirable definition of community policing that was ultimately accepted by colleagues and supervisors.

With reference to Johnston and Shearing’s (2006) model of nodal security governance, it was also evident that these officers were able to strategically use dramaturgical performances to navigate hierarchical power structures in ways that served to amplify their status and power within this organisation. Intra-organisational performances involved translating their SDC-
prescribed information sharing function into risk communications that were accessible to colleagues who subscribed to narrow subcultural definitions of police work (Ericson and Haggerty 1997). This afforded them operational autonomy, enabled them to operate out with established performance management systems, and allowed them to bypass the chain of command in utilising security marketing. Dramaturgical performances to external audiences were also important because they allowed the officers to successfully contrast themselves with the bureaucratic and adversarial image of the Sarajevo Canton Police and to affect the work of a powerful international organisation such as the SDC.

In seeking to elaborate on the ways in which ‘creativity’ and ‘problem-solving’ enable field operators to act as policy mediators, one must first account for their contributory function to gloally-responsive forms of local policing. I argue that the notions of ‘field operators’ as ‘knowledge workers’ and ‘policing’ as ‘risk communications’ (Ericson and Haggerty 1997) are key to understanding the important function of these local actors in potentially mitigating potential harms associated with neo-liberal globalisation. Specifically, my case study illustrates that forms of intra-organisational knowledge work have an important impact on dramaturgical translations than affect the contours of externally-defined prescriptions for reform.

While global policing is essentially a macro-structural theory of control in the age of globalisation, Bowling and Sheptycki (2012: 73-77) acknowledge that the ‘global cops’ and international liaison officers who perpetuate this paradigm and work to advance its agenda(s) utilise ‘glocal’ networks to do so. As noted in Chapter Three, these glocal networks are populated by an array of actors who collectively foster these transmissions, yet do so selectively. From the perspective of the policy entrepreneurs who contribute to the global dissemination of Western models of policing, field operators including local police practitioners represent the ‘end users’ of knowledge exchanges.165 In other words, the ‘global cops’ who pursue gloally-responsive police reforms aspire to align the habitus of local field operators with the interests and mentalities of global policing and global liberal governance. Construed as neo-liberal processes of governmentality, their actions are said to allow powerful global

165 This assertion is based on Brogden and Nijhar’s (2005: 3) discussion of the ‘export’ of Western policing models and the lack of data on the impact of these models/reforms. The absence of such data is indicative of an underlying mentality whereby reformers view their role as improving the operational capacities of local practitioners rather than contributing to improvements in the governance of security as a public good. Accordingly, the reformer is less concerned with the effects that their models have on local communities but rather the ability of local practitioners to implement them effectively. This mentality is evident from the SDC’s 2010 evaluation report (see Wisler and Traljic 2010) which was clearly oriented towards measuring effective implementation rather than the social impact of the RPZ strategy.
architects of global liberal governance like the European Union (EU) to manipulate local security politics from a distance (Ryan 2011). Police reforms pursued in the context of neo-liberal globalisation can therefore be analysed as mechanisms for managing and controlling risk at the ‘glocal’ level. This process is essential for the preservation of global liberal order in the age of globalisation. It is also indicative of a glocalised variant of Ericson and Haggerty’s (1997) discussion of policing as a risk communication in the age of neo-liberal governance.

Ericson and Haggerty (1997) argue that the societal function of the public police has been fundamentally transformed in response to the underlying mentalities of neo-liberalism and that contemporary policing serves as a form of ‘knowledge work’.166 ‘Policing’, they write, ‘consists of the public police coordinating their activities with police agents in all other institutions to provide a society-wide basis for risk management (governance) and security (guarantees against loss)’ (Ibid: 3). This emphasis on coordination implies that knowledge work occurs through networks amounts to a process of linking various nodes for the purpose of generating a cohesive basis for social order.

Ericson and Haggerty (1997: 26) identify both an internal and an external dimension to policing as knowledge work. Within the police organisation, they argue that knowledge work focuses on ‘[ensuring] that knowledge is provided in proper form’ through paperwork and documentation exercises ‘with an eye toward ‘covering ass’” (Ibid: 21). Externally, Ericson and Haggerty, they add that contemporary policing is increasingly structured by ‘external demands for knowledge’ whereby ‘the police not only distribute knowledge widely but also make their own actions highly visible in producing that knowledge’ (Ibid: 26-27).167 Police officers are therefore described as ‘knowledge workers’ insofar as they serve as important agents of risk communication in networks of institutions that are collectively responsible for governing security (Ibid: 19).168

166 Subsequent work by Brodeur (2010: 3) challenges the idea that various agents of policing function as a cohesive network however, the functionalist logic of Ericson and Haggerty’s (1997) theory is most consistent with that of Bowling and Sheptycki’s (2012) theory of global policing. My emphasis on mediation and translational processes provides empirical illustration of both accounts however it is beyond the scope of this paper to address this debate in fuller detail.

167 The emphasis on making this knowledge work ‘highly visible; is suggestive of Manning’s (1977) discussion of the dramaturgy of police work.

168 Ericson and Haggerty (1997: 25) write that ‘[a]n institution consists of the relations, processes, and patterns associated with particular interests’.
Ericson and Haggerty’s (1997: 29) discussion of policing in the ‘risk society’ theorises greater connectivity between public police organisations and ‘externally driven social purposes’. With reference to the paradigms of global liberal governance and global policing, neo-liberal globalisation accounts for one such ‘externally driven social purpose’ that has significant implications for domestic institutions of governance in weak and structurally dependent societies. This is particularly evident in relation to externally-driven police reforms which Ryan (2011: 68) describes as part of ‘a strategy to produce consensus’ whereby ‘[t]he police officer, in theory, is therefore positioned as a nodal point in a network of thin blue lines that, if adequately connected, can bind an entire society so that it becomes one thinking unit’. This suggests that externally-defined models for glocally-responsive policing including community policing and problem-oriented policing provide the architects of global policing (i.e. ‘global cops’) with important platforms for instilling the mentalities and practices of risk-oriented governance into the habitus of local police organisations. It is through these processes that Bowling and Sheptycki (2012: 99) argue that the ‘script’ of global policing, with its neo-liberal mentalities, ‘transnational’ insecurities and Manichean worldview, becomes instilled within ‘the foundational structures of policing in local communities’. With reference to Ericson and Haggerty’s (1997: 71) analysis of community policing, one can therefore infer that global policing, as a ‘contemporary risk institution’ for global liberal governance, threatens to ‘constitute, absorb, and even extinguish traditional communities’ with the local police practitioners or ‘field operator’ playing an important role in fostering this process.

It is evident that the SDC’s programmatic emphasis on ‘security marketing’, ‘SARA’ and ‘information sharing’ as the key components of its community policing model are consistent with the idea that community policing functions (or is intended to function) as a strategy for risk communication. Specifically, this model emphasises prevention and the use of technology (e.g. ‘crime mapping’) to improve the communication of risk both internally within the police and to external actors. Security marketing was particularly important in this respect as it provided the RPZ officers with a professional basis for improving their communications network with external stakeholders in the community and demonstrating their value as ‘knowledge workers’. However, I argue that the difficulties that the SDC encountered in translating their designs for community work into what its workers identified as an effective operational strategy and the varied success of different RPZ units working to incorporate elements of these prescriptions into effective performances highlights the important mediatory function of ‘field operators’.

169 This argument challenges Garland’s (1996) analysis of the neo-liberal state’s withdrawal from governance.
My analysis of this case study suggests that the RPZ units tasked with implementing the SDC’s prescriptions did so in ways that improved their internal stature within the police organisation. For example, the ‘peerless’ officers from RPZ1 were selective in how they utilised security marketing and information sharing and my analysis of their use of community policing as a presentational strategy illustrates the extent to which their habitus was primarily responsive to ‘internal’ institutional factors (i.e. ‘subculture’) rather than ‘externally driven social purposes’ (Ericson and Haggerty 1997: 29) or a subculture of transnational policing. By using dramaturgical translation to gain credence from colleagues and supervisors, the officers from RPZ1 were able to take ownership of the SDC’s prescriptions and implement them in ways that reflected their local knowledge of the community. For the officers from RPZ1, this allowed them to focus on their relations with local schools and devote a significant amount of time to non-adversarial activities such as transactional analysis.

One must further consider that certain articulations of community policing are also consistent with deliberative processes and potentially permissive to democratically responsive policing outcomes (see Section 3.4). Elsewhere, for example, Aitchison and Blaustein (2013) observe that there is a degree of overlap between democratically responsive policing and certain philosophical articulations of community policing, particularly in terms of mechanisms which stimulate local input into policing priorities and require police to take account of these. A prime example can be found in Banton’s (1964) The Policeman in the Community which describes the seemingly mythical, symbiotic relationship between the police officer and the community via the symbolism of the 'bobby-on-the-beat' (also Loader 1997). Also, Walker (1993: 39) accounts for ‘community policing’ as ‘a fundamental redefinition of the basic police role’ which prioritises ‘[general] order maintenance and quality of life problems’ over a ‘“crime attack” model’ suggestive of Bittner’s (1978) classic characterisation of policing as coercive.

It is undeniable that policing as an institution must always embody a certain degree of coercion but we must also recognise that police practitioners enjoy significant discretion in actually determining when and how this coercion is exercised. This reasoning compels Goldsmith (original emphasis 1990: 91) to argue that we can embrace police discretion as ‘a potential resource in the formulation of rules governing police powers and practices’. While this case study is not explicitly concerned with rule-making, it does illustrate the ways that seemingly disempowered officers from RPZ1 used dramaturgical translation to promote a more inclusive and locally responsive model of policing in Sarajevo Canton. Specifically, RPZ1 was successful in incorporating the SDC’s prescriptions for security marketing into strategic performances that
resonated with internal and external audiences. This established a necessary platform for the officers to define their own priorities and the operational autonomy to devote their time and resources to less adversarial activities. Maintaining an active presence in the community allowed them to engage in information sharing practices that improved the vertical responsiveness of the MUP KS.

However, evidence of the capacity of RPZ officers in Sarajevo Canton to foster improvements in the horizontal responsiveness of policing was lacking. Part of the problem was the absence of established accountability mechanisms that the RPZ officers could use to hold their municipal counterparts responsible for delivering on their commitments. While the ‘partnership’ model has been criticised for its ‘instabilities’ (Hughes and Rowe 2007), specifically in terms of the perceived risk that centrally defined performance targets might serve as the primary drivers of security governance rather than ‘community-oriented work’, it is necessary to consider that in the context of Sarajevo Canton, these CSFs might also have helped to ensure that the work of RPZ officers remained congruent with local expectations of general order policing. In other words, CSFs could have constituted an important mechanism for structuring the habitus of RPZ officers and for rendering them accountable to transparent, deliberative processes. Finally, the absence of an institutional framework that formally defined the role of RPZ officers in the *Regulation of Job Classification* also meant that the operational discretion exercised by officers from RPZ2 may have actually counteracted the progress achieved by their colleagues from RPZ1.

Labelling the dramaturgical translations of the officers from RPZ2 ‘counterproductive’ implies that their inability or unwillingness to engage with the SDC’s prescriptions prevented these officers from successfully adapting the concepts of ‘security marketing’ and ‘information sharing’ into effective performances. Thus, while my observation of RPZ1 indicated that dramaturgical translation serves a potentially productive function in enabling local practitioners to adapt externally-defined models for police reform into the foundation for a contextually-relevant operational strategy, the experience of the officers from RPZ2 highlights the extent to which dramaturgical translation can amplify the spoiler effect of certain actors working to implement these models. Insofar as effective performances and audience segmentation enabled the officers from RPZ1 to thrive as institutional champions for this reform, the dramaturgical mishaps of the officers from RPZ2 and the Canton’s RPZ Coordinator threatened to undermine this translational process. These flawed performances fostered unrealistic expectations amongst
various audiences and amplified the operational inconsistencies of community policing throughout the Canton.

The officers from RPZ1 recognised the potential consequences of their colleagues’ flawed performances and they feared that the amplification of operational deficiencies would have a negative effect on how different audiences responded to community policing. These flawed performances were determined to represent a threat to the credibility of community policing as a non-adversarial policing philosophy and undermine the capacity of RPZ officers to act as empowered champions of this reform. With respect to external audiences in the community, the concern was that RPZ2’s mishaps would undermine the emerging reputation of the officers from RPZ1 as capable problem solvers. Finally, for international audiences, these flawed performances were problematic because of the perceived risk that the SDC and other international organisations might withdraw their support for the initiative if they interpreted these flawed performances as evidence of policy failure.

With the officers from RPZ2, it is still worth considering that these performances were not responsive to a glocal subculture but rather local police subculture which created pressures for institutional inertia which Skogan and Hartnett (1997: 71) have identified as an important organisational impediment to community policing reforms in the United States. Thus, while elements of what Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) label a ‘subculture of transnational policing’ are likely to influence the habitus of local police officers, particularly through externally-driven police reform processes, its influence is not deterministic of local policing practices, mentalities or policy outcomes. While the performances of the officers from RPZ2 were flawed and potentially counterproductive, they nonetheless illustrate the capacity of ‘field operators’, as the end users of externally-driven police reforms, to shape policy outputs and the outcomes that are said to contribute to the glocally-responsive policing structures.

Dramaturgical translation thus afforded these local police practitioners and their colleagues from RPZ1 with a means of ‘transform[ing], translat[ing], distort[ing] and modify[ing] the meaning or the elements’ (Latour 2005: 39) of the SDC’s prescriptions via their role in implementing them. This is consistent with Crawford and Jones’ (1995: 20) claim that ‘creativity is an important aspect of working within the tensions and oppositions that exist between different agencies and that are the product of differing organizational practices, cultures, priorities and management structures’. It also conveys the important role that seemingly disempowered actors can play in affecting positive change. However, the experience of the officers from RPZ2 also speaks to Crawford and Jones observation that this ‘creativity’
may also generate ‘unaccountable working practices’ of indeterminate or undesirable moral character (par. Ibid: 20).
Chapter Eleven: Conclusion

With this thesis, I have introduced the concept of policy translation (Lendvai and Stubbs 2006) to the criminological literature and presented it as an innovative framework for analysing the important transformational processes that mediate glocally-responsive police reforms in weak and structurally dependent societies like Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). To this effect, I have argued that the concept is useful for highlighting the capacity of policy makers and criminal justice practitioners to act as ‘mediators’ rather than ‘intermediaries’ (Latour 2005: 39; see Section 4.3). Applying this concept to my case studies challenges established theoretical accounts of the structural relationships between liberal state-building and police reform (Ryan 2011) and those which link international development assistance to police reforms (Ellison and Pino 2012). It also raises further doubts about the pervasive influence of police reforms as technologies of neo-liberal governmentality and securitisation. With this final chapter, I briefly revisit the four research questions posed in my introduction and I reflect upon the significance of policy translation as a policy mechanism for negotiating the contours of glocal policing in BiH.

1. What evidence is there to support the claim that processes of ‘translation’ account for the differences between international policy inputs and domestic outcomes in the field of community oriented policing in BiH?

Policy translation is useful for analysing the important transformational processes that contribute to the mediation of glocally-responsive police reforms in weak and structurally dependent societies like BiH. My case studies of the Safer Communities project and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation’s (SDC) community policing initiative in Sarajevo Canton illustrate the asymmetrical and coercive power structures introduced in Chapters Two and Three however my analysis suggests that structures are poor predictors of policy outputs and outcomes. In other words, the localised effects of internationally driven police reform processes and the policy outcomes that they generate cannot be readily inferred or predicted in relation to the international political economy of global liberal governance or the motives of archetypical architects of global policing identified by Bowling and Sheptycki (2012; see Section 3.1). Rather, these outcomes exist as the products of translations. They are mediated, negotiated and transformed by agents and organisations and their conceptual and programmatic
contours are shaped by the habitus of translators. These translators are themselves responsive to factors such as institutional culture and local contextual circumstances. This finding is consistent with Johnston and Shearing’s (2003: 92) argument that there is no necessary ‘correspondence between mentalities, the objectives, institutions and technologies associated with them, and governmental ‘outcomes’’ (see Sections 1.1 and 3.5).

The two translational roles that I have identified with my case studies include the ‘international development worker’ as a variant of the ‘diplomat’ archetype previously identified by Bowling and Sheptycki (2012: 88) and the ‘field operator’. The translational capacity of the international development worker was evident in relation to the Safer Communities team’s ability to negotiate the structural pressures of the international development system in order to establish a functional ‘contact zone’ through which it could continue to implement the Safer Communities model in accordance with the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) capacity development ethos (see Chapter Eight). For the ‘field operator’, also referred to as the local police practitioner, dramaturgical interactions provided a platform for translations. Dramaturgical translations allowed the officers from RPZ1 to adapt the SDC’s prescriptions for community policing into a series of performances that appealed to a variety of audiences whose support for the reform was determined to be a key ingredient for its long-term success. Conversely, the flawed performances of the officers from RPZ2 demonstrated the translational abilities of resistant or constrained field operators (see Chapter Ten) and thus supports the idea that policy makers and criminal justice practitioners function as ‘mediators’ rather than ‘intermediaries’ (Latour 2005: 39), even when their translations are problematic or potentially harmful.

2. Does the translation work of local actors serve to mitigate the potential harms of externally imposed policy frameworks?

The idea that reforms and policy transfers designed to establish gloally-responsive policing in weak and structurally dependent societies may be harmful was introduced in Section 3.1. Briefly, my review accounted for Bowling and Sheptycki’s (2012) argument that the actors who shape global policing are responsive to a common subculture of transnational policing. This subculture is in turn said to influence prescriptions for police reform in developing and transitional countries around the world (Ibid: 22). Bowling and Sheptycki go on to suggest that this subculture is problematic because it derives its aspirations and values from a Manichean
worldview premised on the notion that it is in fact possible to distinguish between ‘good-guys’ and ‘bad-guys’ (Ibid.: 94). Linking their claims to Duffield’s (1999; 2007) discussion of the security-development nexus, this review determined that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, this subculture of transnational policing appears to derive its hegemonic definitions for that which is ‘good’ from that which contributes to, or at a minimum does not conflict with, the interests of global liberal governance. In this respect, it was argued that the paradigm of global policing ‘serves and protects’ the poly-centric interests of global liberal governance just as a ‘democratic’ police service is said to ‘serve and protect’ the interests of citizens in advanced liberal democracies (see Section 2.1).

In practice, however, the adversarial and coercive function of modern police organisations in advanced liberal democracies is well established, particularly in the Anglo-American tradition of police sociology (e.g. Bittner 1978; Reiner 2000; Terrill et al 2003). Work by Bowling and Phillips (2002) and Hall et al (1978) further illustrates that the discriminatory outlook of modern police organisations contributes to the criminalisation, exclusion and marginalisation of individuals and communities cast as ‘others’. Thus, insofar as it is possible to construct a functional analogy between the positive contributions of global policing and modern policing in advanced liberal societies, Bowling and Sheptycki (2012; also Sheptycki 1998: 66) suggest that one can also compare their coercive orientation and their repressive effects. Global policing is therefore ‘iatrogenic’, argue Bowling and Sheptycki (2012: 94) because it serves ‘to reinforce a global sense of insecurity’ that ‘props up the notion that the transnational-state-system can containerize security’. Archetypical actors associated with this ‘subculture of transnational policing’ are said to render gloally-responsive policing an iatrogenic phenomenon by fostering, disseminating and reinforcing harmful mentalities and technologies that embody this Manichean worldview (Ibid: 92).

While Bowling and Sheptycki’s (2012) theory of global policing is pessimistic in its outlook, the authors recognise that certain archetypical actors may in fact play a valuable role in mitigating the harms inherent to this subculture. In other words, they recognise that the ‘subcultural drama of policing can be shifted’ by capable and willing actors such as ‘field operators’ who, ‘when successful…[prove] the claim that policing is centrally about facilitating the building up of civil society and fostering the conditions under which liberal democratic society can flourish’ (Ibid: 92). The same can be said of the ‘diplomat’ who has the ‘ability to

---

170 Specifically, Bowling and Phillips’ (2002) work on ‘stop and search’ in the UK illustrates the enduring significance of race as a parameter for ‘othering’.
see things reflexively from others’ points of view’ and their ‘ability to think creatively and solve problems’ (Ibid: 100).

My research supports this optimism by indicating that elements of a ‘subculture of transnational policing’ and the motives of self-interested donors play a limited and perhaps minimal role in structuring the habitus of both international development workers and local police practitioners. My first case study demonstrated that international development workers at UNDP derived their habitus primarily from a capacity development ethos (see Section 7.3) that emphasised the use of ‘reflexivity’ which Bowling and Sheptycki (2012: 88) describe as ‘the capacity to step outside of one’s own narrow world-view and frame of reference in order to see things from another’s perspective’. This was significant because it compelled the Safer Communities team to invest their limited resources in supporting project activities that addressed locally-defined needs (see Sub-section 7.2.4). For the ‘field operators’ from RPZ1, strategic performances reflected the need for the officers to utilise audience segmentation meaning that their habitus was responsive to a number of sources and not just the interests of the SDC or the Swiss Government. In this case, the need for the officers from RPZ1 to achieve recognition for the RPZ role rendered their habitus primarily responsive to local police sub-culture of policing and this in turn shaped local definitions for community police work (see Section 10.3).

While policy translation challenges the idea of a pervasive and influential ‘subculture of transnational policing’ with respect to police development assistance projects, one must also recognise that translation may potentially generate previously unanticipated harms. In other words, my thesis challenges structurally deterministic critiques of the harmful effects of global policing and international police development assistance programmes but it also recognises that there is no guarantee that human agency will contribute to beneficial or desirable outcomes. It is for this reason that my analysis of my first case study recognised that uncertainties remain regarding the long-term functionality, sustainability, and operational accountability and transparency of citizen security forums (CSF) established by the Safer Communities team (see Section 8.2). Similarly, my second case study drew attention to the potential consequences of inconsistent performances by the officers from RPZ2 which were harmful because they undermined and discredited the effective use of dramaturgical translation by their colleagues from RPZ1.

3. To what extent do local translators form part of a framework for democratically responsive governance of policing in BiH?
My research further suggests that the concept of policy translation and nodal analysis of police reform processes provide alternative frameworks for exploring the ways in which localised human agency can potentially contribute to more democratically responsive policing outcomes and security governance in weak and structurally dependent countries like BiH.\footnote{My first case study demonstrated that the capacity development ethos of the international development worker can be oriented towards the goal of establishing structures and institutions that foster what Dryzek (2002) labels ‘discursive democratic’ governance. This translational inclination was particularly evident in relation to the Safer Communities team’s periodic use of participatory policy analysis and policy sharing to manage the project during its pilot phase and in investing its resources in establishing locally governed policy outputs in the form of its CSFs. The ‘discursive’ character of these outputs was also evident from the fact that CSFs constituted governing nodes at which different security actors could hold each other accountable for their role in delivering security (i.e. horizontal responsiveness: see Kuper 2007). The Safer Communities team also anticipated that these forums would improve the capacity of local security providers to collaborate and better respond to the needs of local citizens (i.e. ‘vertical responsiveness’; see Kuper 2007).}

I have also argued in Chapter Ten that the elements of the philosophy of community policing and the related concept of community safety partnerships might provide local police practitioners with important habitual templates for performing police work in ways that render it more democratically responsive to the needs of local communities (see Section 10.3). Given that the function of modern policing is argued to be structurally coercive (Bittner 1978), the discretion of individual officers plays an important role in determining when and how this coercion is exercised. Too much discretion risks jeopardising the objective and professional image of the police however, Bowling and Sheptycki (2012: 92) and Goldsmith (1990: 91) also view discretion as a ‘potential resource’ for promoting positive change. The officers from RPZ1 used their discretion and operational autonomy to promote non-adversarial interactions with various segments of the community and this appeared to be conducive to a more inclusive and vertically-responsive definition of police work (see Sub-section 10.2.2). Equally, however, the capacity of RPZ officers to contribute to improvements in the horizontal responsiveness of policing was limited. Lacking official recognition for the RPZ role, the officers lacked the influence necessary to hold their municipal counterparts accountable for their actions (or more

\footnote{The concept of ‘democratically responsive policing’ was introduced in Section 3.4.}
frequently, inaction). Plural policing nodes such as CSFs might have also provided these officers with important mechanism for supporting this partnership-based approach but had yet to be tested in the Canton by the time I had completed my research (see Section 9.3).

4. How do the concepts of ‘translation’ and ‘contact zones’ help to develop our understanding of the interaction of the policy preferences of powerful external actors and the situated knowledge and preferences of domestic actors in producing glocal forms of policing?

My research has introduced the concepts of ‘policy translation’ and ‘contact zones’ as tools for unravelling the power politics underpinning externally-driven police reform processes pursued within the context of liberal state-building projects and international development assistance programmes affecting weak and structurally dependent societies like BiH. My analysis supports elements of Ellison and Pino’s (2012) work which suggests that police reforms represent an important technology of neo-liberal globalisation insofar as they afford the architects of global liberal governance with the ability to exercise their ‘coercive and surveillant powers’ (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012: 8) from a distance, as well as supporting Ryan’s (2011) argument that police reforms constitute important mechanisms of governmentality (Foucault 1991) designed to promote securitisation and establish liberal order amidst a set of international norms emphasising non-intervention and the enduring significance of political sovereignty in an era of globalisation. However, my research also demonstrates the extent to which internationally-driven police reform projects are mediated by contact zones which foster various opportunities for policy transformation via the work of capable and willing policy translators.

It is with respect to this nodular view of power relations and the agentive capacities of policy translators that my research challenges the overly-deterministic character of the existing literature. Instead, it suggests that there is indeed hope for fostering outcomes that reflect local interests and support the aim of governing security as a ‘public good’ (Loader and Walker 2001; 2003). This indicates that the glocal effects of neo-liberal governmentality are less pronounced than previously suggested by Ellison and Pino (2012) and Ryan (2011). My case studies further demonstrate the ability of the international development worker and the field operator to use their relative positioning in relation to contact zones to ‘shift the subcultural drama of policing’ (par. Bowling and Sheptycki 2012: 100) in ways that may potentially serve to mitigate the clinical, cultural, and social harms of global policing while ultimately contributing to more
democratically responsive forms of policing in otherwise structurally disenfranchised contexts. This ability is illustrative of Wood and Shearing’s (2006: 98) arguments that the power inequalities inherent to nodal structures can be transformed in ways that ‘improve governance processes and outcomes for weak actors’ (see Section 3.5) and that poly-centric power structures facilitate participation beyond the formally established democratic institutions of the state which, in the case of BiH, are primarily responsive to supranational interests (see Section 2.2). I conclude therefore that established theoretical accounts of glocal policing are unnecessarily fatalistic in their analyses of the implications of police reforms as neo-liberal globalisation and securitisation processes.
Bibliography


Blaustein, J. 2013. ‘The space between: negotiating the contours of nodal security governance through ‘Safer Communities’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina’. Policing and Society.


Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Security. 2007. Strategy for Community-Based Policing in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Sarajevo: CPU.


Department for International Development. 2005. Community-Based Policing and Community Safety: A Best Practice Toolkit. [Internal document, see Appendix 2].


223


Appendix 1: Research Overview

Table A1.1 Research Phases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>April/May 2010</td>
<td>Preliminary visit to BiH. Meetings with CSS, SDC and UNDP. Access strategy identified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>January – April 2011</td>
<td>‘Internship’ with UNDP Safer Communities project. Organisational ethnography based on personal involvement with the project and attendance at various meetings. Also conducted a five-week qualitative evaluation of community policing in Sarajevo Canton. Authored two UNDP project reports based on an evaluation of community policing in Sarajevo Canton and a policy brief for introducing the Safer Communities model to the City of Sarajevo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>June/July 2011</td>
<td>Follow-up visit to BiH. Interviews with SDC and former Cluster Coordinator at DFID.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>July 2011 – May 2012</td>
<td>Ongoing collaboration with UNDP Safer Communities project via Skype and email. Regular updates from Community Policing Advisor on project developments and provided with copies of emerging project documents in exchange for feedback.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A1.2 Interviews, Meetings and Select Electronic Communications (2010-2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Participants (Role)</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Format /Medium</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26 April 2010</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Safer Communities Project Manager and Community Policing Advisor</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>UNDP Headquarters(Sarajevo)</td>
<td>Informal Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 April 2010</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Safer Communities Project Manager and the Community Policing Advisor, SDC Project Manager and Project Associate</td>
<td>UNDP (host), SDC</td>
<td>UNDP Headquarters(Sarajevo)</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 April 2010</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CSS Project Associate</td>
<td>CSS, Sarajevo</td>
<td>CSS Headquarters(Sarajevo)</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 January 2011</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Irma Deljkic (Assistant Professor/Informal Contact)</td>
<td>University of Sarajevo</td>
<td>Cafè, (Sarajevo)</td>
<td>Informal Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 January 2011</td>
<td>Safer Communities <strong>Project Manager</strong>, OSCE Manager and <strong>Project Associates</strong> (n=2)</td>
<td>OSCE (host), UNDP</td>
<td>OSCE Headquarters (Sarajevo)</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 January 2011</td>
<td><strong>Deputy Mayor</strong> for City of Sarajevo, Safer Communities <strong>Project Manager</strong>, interpreter/research assistant Adnan Fazlic</td>
<td>UNDP, Grad Sarajevo</td>
<td>Municipality Building (Sarajevo)</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 February 2011</td>
<td>UNDP BiH <strong>Cluster Coordinator</strong>, Safer Communities <strong>Project Manager</strong>, Community Policing Advisor and <strong>Project Associate</strong>, SACBiH <strong>Project Associates</strong> (n=2), <strong>Representatives</strong> from EC delegation (n=2), <strong>Representatives</strong> from BiH Ministry of Defence (n=3), <strong>Senior Officer</strong> from Federalna Uprava Policije, <strong>Senior Officer</strong> from Granicha Policija BiH</td>
<td>UNDP, EU, BiH MoD, Federalna Uprava Policije, Granicha Policija BiH</td>
<td>UNDP Headquarters (Sarajevo)</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 February 2011</td>
<td>Safer Communities <strong>Project Manager</strong> and <strong>Project Associate</strong>, Representative of Council of Ministers (BiH), <strong>Project Associate</strong> for Saferworld, <strong>Project Associate</strong> for CSS</td>
<td>UNDP, BiH Council of Ministers, Saferworld, CSS</td>
<td>UNDP Headquarters (Sarajevo)</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 February 2011</td>
<td>Safer Communities <strong>Community Policing Advisor</strong>, Bratunac CSF members (n=3) including <strong>Mayor</strong> and <strong>Police Chief</strong></td>
<td>UNDP, RS Police</td>
<td>Municipality Building (Bratunac)</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 February 2011</td>
<td>Safer Communities <strong>Community Policing Advisor</strong>, CSS <strong>Director</strong> and <strong>Project Associate</strong>, Saferworld <strong>Project Associate</strong>, OSCE <strong>Project Associates</strong> (n=2), Zenica CSF members (n=5) including <strong>Senior Police Officer</strong> and the <strong>Mayor</strong> of Zenica Municipality</td>
<td>UNDP, CSS, Saferworld, Zenica-Doboj Canton Police, Zenica Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality Building (Zenica)</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 February 2011</td>
<td>Safer Communities <strong>Community Policing</strong></td>
<td>UNDP, Saferworld, Municipality Building</td>
<td>Municipality Building</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 February 2011</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advisor, Saferworld Project Associate, OSCE Project Associate, Prijedor CSF members (n=3) including CSF Leader, Senior Police Officer and Mid-level Police Officer</td>
<td>OSCE, RS Police (Prijedor)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 March 2011</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safer Communities Community Policing Advisor, Saferworld Project Associate, CSF members (n=3) including Police Chief and CSF Secretary</td>
<td>UNDP, Saferworld, Municipality Building (Sanskis Most)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 April 2011</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Station Commander for RPZ1 and station supervisor (translator)</td>
<td>MUP KS, RPZ1 Station, (Sarajevo)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 April 2011</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community-based police officers from RPZ4 (n=2), colleague from UNDP (translator)</td>
<td>MUP KS, RPZ4 Station, (Sarajevo)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 April 2011</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector Chief for RPZ2, Adnan Fazlic (interpreter)</td>
<td>MUP KS, RPZ2 Station, (Sarajevo)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 April 2011</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPZ officer from RPZ3 (n=1), Adnan Fazlic (translator)</td>
<td>MUP KS, Café, (Sarajevo)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 April 2011</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPZ officers from RPZ5 (n=2), Adnan Fazlic (translator)</td>
<td>MUP KS, RPZ5 Station, (Sarajevo)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 April 2011</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPZ Coordinator for MUP KS</td>
<td>MUP KS, Café, (Sarajevo)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 June 2011</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDC Project Associate</td>
<td>SDC, [Undisclosed]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2011</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Experienced Development Worker’ in BiH</td>
<td>[Undisclosed], [Undisclosed]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 July 2011</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sead Traljic, former Cluster Coordinator for DfD’s SSAJP and external evaluator for SDC’s Community-based Policing Project</td>
<td>Ex-DFID, Lucid Links Office, (Sarajevo)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 December 2011</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safer Communities Community Policing Advisor</td>
<td>UNDP, N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

July 2011: SDC Project Associate, SDC, [Undisclosed]

227
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 2009</td>
<td>Safer Communities project established as a component of the SACBiH Project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2009</td>
<td>Safer Communities project receives seed funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2010</td>
<td>SACBiH team hires <strong>Community Policing Advisor</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April – June 2010</td>
<td><strong>Community Policing Advisor</strong>, <strong>Project Manager</strong> and <strong>Cluster Coordinator</strong> carry out <em>Baseline Assessment</em> (published in June)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October – December 2010</td>
<td>Access negotiations with Safer Communities <strong>Project Manager</strong>; Delays with SACBiH Project creates distraction from Safer Communities project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 January 2011</td>
<td>Start of internship; <strong>Community Policing Advisor</strong> on personal leave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 January 2011</td>
<td>Meeting with <strong>Deputy Mayor</strong> for Grad Sarajevo, assigned the policy brief.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 February 2011</td>
<td>Meeting with <strong>Representative</strong> from Council of Ministers. Safer Communities team works to generate governmental support for CSP model.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 February – 11 February 2011</td>
<td><strong>Community Policing Advisor</strong> meets with five different CSFs about Operational Handbooks and project activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 February 2011</td>
<td>UNDP hosts Igman summit on youth justice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February – March 2011</td>
<td><strong>Community Policing Advisor, Project Manager</strong> and I develop various concept notes and sustainability reports for Safer Communities project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2011</td>
<td><strong>Project Manager</strong> attends meetings with UNDP senior management to discuss future of the Safer Communities project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2011</td>
<td><strong>Project Manager</strong> submits policy brief to City of Sarajevo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 December 2011 – 18 December 2011</td>
<td>I provide feedback to <strong>Community Policing Advisor</strong> on ‘Concept Note’ to link Safer Communities Project with AVPP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 December 2011</td>
<td><strong>Community Policing Advisor</strong> submits ‘Concept Note’ to UNDP Cluster Coordinator for review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January - February 2012</td>
<td><strong>Community Policing Advisor</strong> and <strong>Cluster Coordinator</strong> map AVPP activities; work to coordinate ‘Concept Note’ / project proposal with other UN development agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2012</td>
<td>‘Concept Note’ / project proposal submitted to AVPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2012</td>
<td>AVPP evaluators visit UNDP BiH to discuss ‘Concept Note’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A1.4 Timeline: Qualitative Evaluation of Community Policing In Sarajevo Canton

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23 February 2011</td>
<td>Access initiated via conversation with RPZ1 officers and RPZ Coordinator at Igmam summit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 February – 3 March 2011</td>
<td>UNDP submits formal access request to Minister of Interior for MUP KS who accepts the proposal and passes it on to Police Commissioner for compliance. Police Commissioner offers his support and designates RPZ Coordinator as my official organisational contact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 March 2011</td>
<td>Meeting to discuss access and research plan with RPZ Coordinator, initial introductions to RPZ1 and RPZ2, research schedule agreed upon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 March 2011</td>
<td>Day One observation with RPZ1. Key events included morning briefing, response to bank robbery, ethnographic interviews with members, visit to local charity, and coffee at a shopping centre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 March 2011</td>
<td>Day Two observation with RPZ1. Key events included ethnographic interviews with team members, coffee with station supervisor, visits to local schools, coffee with patrol-based colleague, response to vehicle accident, second meeting at local charity, RPZ officers pull over a young driver and issues him a warning, more school visits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 March 2011</td>
<td>Day Three observation with RPZ1. Key events included meeting with station commander, ethnographic interviews with RPZ1 officers, visit to local schools, implementation of ‘Civilian Courage’ training, lunch with RPZ1 officers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-11 March 2011</td>
<td>Days Four and Five. Observation cancelled with RPZ1 as their schedule consisted of ‘Civilian Courage’ training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 March 2011</td>
<td>Day One observation with RPZ2. Key events included ethnographic group interview, ‘patrol’ of sector and meetings with different ‘partners’ including MZ secretary, bet shop owner, school secretary, and Chief Psychiatrist at methadone clinic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 March 2011</td>
<td>Day Two observation with RPZ2. Ethnographic interviews with officers, brief encounter with RPZ Coordinator, meeting with second MZ secretary, lunch with officers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 March 2011</td>
<td>Day Three observation with RPZ2. Key events included ethnographic group interview, implementation of ‘Civilian Courage’, informal meeting with RPZ Coordinator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 March 2011</td>
<td>RPZ Meeting attended by all of the RPZ units in Canton Sarajevo. Presentation by RPZ Coordinator followed by presentation by an officer from RPZ2, interrupted and concluded by RPZ Coordinator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 March 2011</td>
<td>Day Four observation with RPZ1. Key events included ethnographic interview, meeting with Sector Chief, meetings with local schools, lunch, and administrative work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 March 2011</td>
<td>Day Five observation with RPZ1. Key events included ethnographic interviews with officers from RPZ1 and attendance at community meeting about the stray dog problem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 March 2011</td>
<td>Day Six observation with RPZ1. Attended EUPM sponsored SWAT team open day with community police officers and local school children.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Activity Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 April – 13 April 2011</td>
<td>Interviews with other RPZ units, station commanders and RPZ Coordinator (see Table A1.1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-April 2011</td>
<td>Submitted final evaluation report to <strong>RPZ Coordinator</strong>.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 2: Unpublished Drafts, Documents and Primary Sources

### Table A2.1 Unpublished Drafts, Project Reports and Primary Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Referenced as</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Org.</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Development Programme 2010</td>
<td>Baseline Assessment in the Selection of Prospective Communities for the Safer Communities Project (project report)</td>
<td>Aug. 2010</td>
<td>Safer Communities Project Manager and RPZ Coordinator</td>
<td>UNDP BiH</td>
<td>Preliminary assessment of policing and community safety in BiH designed to inform the selection of pilot municipalities for Safer Communities project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRAFT</td>
<td>Safer Communities Project 2012–2015…’, February 2011</td>
<td>18 Feb. 2011</td>
<td>Jarrett Blaustein</td>
<td>UNDP BiH</td>
<td>Draft of a concept note intended to link the Safer Communities project to the issue of social capital which was identified as a priority for BiH by UNDP BiH Human Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Near final draft of the policy brief for the Deputy Mayor.

This draft is referenced because it included specific recommendations for piloting the CSP model in the municipality of RPZ1.

### 'a quantitative research aimed at the collection of data on the views experiences and attitudes of the general population concerning security in Bosnia and Herzegovina and related issues. Commissioned by the Safer Communities project

### A set of by-laws that defines the role of police officers in Sarajevo Canton Police.

### Early draft of sustainability plan for the Safer Communities project. This draft was rejected by the Project Manager. The Community Policing Advisor continued to develop a plan over the next twelve months however no final version of the document was ever agreed upon.
Appendix 3: Aitchison and Blaustein (2013)

Available online from July 2013 at http://euc.sagepub.com/
Appendix 4: Blaustein (2013)

Available online from April 2013 at http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/gpas20