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THE UNCONSCIOUS LIFE OF OLD TOWN
A psychoanalytic study of Edinburgh’s historic city

by

KLAS HYLLÉN
(BArch (Hons), Dip Arch)

Degree of Master of Philosophy in Architecture
The University of Edinburgh

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THE UNCONSCIOUS LIFE OF OLD TOWN
A psychoanalytic study of Edinburgh’s historic city

by
KLAS HYLLÉN

www.klashyllen.com

The Schop Gallery - September 2010
St Mary Street - Old Town - Edinburgh
To Ruth
Author’s Declaration

I, Klas Hyllén, confirm that this work, submitted for the Degree of Master of Philosophy, is my own and is expressed in my own words. Any use made within it of the works of other authors in any form (ideas, text, figures, tables, etc) are properly acknowledged at the point of their use. A list of references employed is included as part of the work.

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Abstract

This thesis primarily considers the notion of “museumisation” in the context of the Old Town; Edinburgh’s historic city. It argues that the city has suffered a series of collective traumas which has left it in a state of urban stagnation where the romanticism of history has become Old Town’s raison d’être. This claim has been explored on two fronts; first, a body of text outlining a literary argument rooted in theory, and second, emerging from the first, a body of creative work that engages the theoretical argument with a wider public audience in an exhibition format.

The notion of history is explored primarily through psychoanalysis as it attempts to unlock the unconscious and subjective past of the city. Theories relating to the production of space and the history of thought extend this allegorical argument as an archaeological process explores an alternative interpretation of the past. This fragmented method culminates in a criticism of the contemporary understanding of the Old Town where the surface effect created by the authority of vision, as a symbol for conscious wisdom and reason, is argued to be rooted in a series of collective defence mechanisms repressing the city’s haunted past.

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“Do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same: leave it to our bureaucrats and our police to see that our papers are in order. At least spare us their morality when we write.”

Michel Foucault (1969)
'Your shoe,’ I repeated. ‘Perhaps you’d put it on.’
He continued to look downwards, though not at the shoe, with an intense but misplaced concentration. Finally his gaze settled on his foot: ‘That is my shoe, yes?’
Did I mis-hear? Did he mis-see?
‘My eyes,’ he explained, and put a hand on his foot. ‘This is my shoe, no?’
‘No, it is not. That is your foot. There is your shoe.’
‘Ah! I thought that was my foot.’
Was he joking? Was he mad? Was he blind? If this was one of his ‘strange mistakes’, it was the strangest mistake I had ever come across.

Oliver Sacks (1985, p.9)
The Man who Mistook his Wife for a Hat

Dr Oliver Sacks’ patient, Dr P, a well-known and respected musician, has started to make ‘strange mistakes’, inexplicable it would seem, as he is mostly ‘normal’ in all other aspects, but nonetheless odd enough for Dr Sacks, the psychologist, to spend an afternoon examining his mental behaviour. Dr Sacks concludes that Dr P “… had no body-image, he had body-music: this is why he could move and act as fluently as he did, but came to a total confused stop if the ‘inner music’ stopped” (Sacks, 1985, p.17). Dr P appears to have lost (due to a large tumour in his brain we are later to find out) the world of representation but has maintained that of music or movement (Sacks, 1985). One could quite casually agree with Dr Sacks’ initial reaction, that Dr P was mad, but one is still left wondering over his ability (or disability) to see the world in a new light. What if one could position oneself within his world, within the realm of the mad, what new light would one see?
Introduction

The Old Town, the city of Edinburgh’s historic centre, appears to have fallen into a state of urban stagnation where its primary function has been reduced to the signification of history. It has become an urban museum; a place of nostalgia and of romanticised history.

This thesis will concern itself with stories, or rather the idea, concept, perception or notion of stories, and more specifically, the development of stories into histories or history. As a very particular story in its own right, it begins with the suggestion that the Old Town is undergoing a process of museumisation which, from the word to muse, to ponder or to be absorbed in thought, is defined as a process of dedicating ‘a home to the muses’ or a repository for the preservation and exhibition of objects illustrative of history (Simpson & Weiner, 1989).

As the argument unfolds, this thesis will explore and evaluate this claim through an exploration of the psychic processes relating to psychoanalytical theory where the individual self is read and understood in the context of the collective city. The essay will argue that the city of Edinburgh has experienced a number of collective traumas which have left the Old Town in a state of alienation from the rest of the city. This, it is further argued, has led to an isolated interaction and a shallow relationship with the Old Town where the identity of the city will be shown to be repressed in the collective unconscious with further psychic defence mechanisms maintaining this relationship within rational and conscious structures of power.

Theories relating to the production of space, human geography and epistemology will further substantiate this exploration where a critical reading of Foucault’s texts on *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969) and *Madness and Civilisation* (1965) situates this thesis’ inquiry in Nietzsche’s tantalising, and well known, question; “what indeed does man know about himself” (Nietzsche, 1873, p.262)? Nietzsche’s texts form the foundation from which Foucault’s language largely develops and it is
in a similar spirit this thesis asks what we, as “artistically creating subjects” (ibid, p.264), can really say about a story, its language and its dynamic discourse, without forever turning it into something it was not at the origin? What can be truthfully said about history without forgetting that it is an illusion or “a metaphor of perception” (ibid, p.264)? As this thesis unfolds it will become clear that the reading of Foucault provides a primary source from which the psychoanalytical argument on the stagnation of the Old Town develops. The history of the Old Town is seen as a type of collective simulation, where its need for authenticity, origin, coherency and consistency will be shown to be rooted in rational and conscious thought, as well as in power and control. The value of stories in its sudden irruption appears to have disappeared in the contemporary city and instead the Old Town maintains the illusion that it is in control of its own destiny and history.

Consequently, this essay constructs its inquiry around the concept of the unconscious, as it is understood in psychoanalysis, or the subjective, as explored through cultural geography, and its methodology is inherently allegorical and literary. However, this thesis’ proposition has been explored on two fronts; (1) through the development of its literary argument and (2) through engaging that argument with a wider public audience through creative architectural practice. As a result, this thesis needs to be read and understood alongside a body of work that was exhibited in September and October 2010 at the Schop Gallery (figure 1) in the Old Town and which now exists as a website; www.klashyllen.com (appendix B - DVD). The exhibition was called (hi)STORY – Viewing the Old Town from Hermione’s window and was as much a half-way mark of the research as it was a probe for testing its proposition.
Hermione appears throughout the text as a thread that connects the various parts of the research. She is seen as a literary analogy and introduces herself as nobody and everyone, as a concept, a multiple of metaphors, or a literary embodiment of the unconscious and the subjective. Hermione is the personification of the ordinary, of the story in its irruption, of madness, passion and unreason; Hermione is the Other. Hermione as a literary tool is borrowed from Foucault’s account of the Renaissance drama *Andromaque* (1667) by Jean Racine, which in turn was based in part on the ancient classical tragedy *Andromache* (428-425 BC) by the Greek playwright Euripides, and in part on the third book of *The Aeneid* (29 - 19BC) by the Roman poet Virgil.

Racine’s *Andromaque* (1667) follows Orestes, son of Agamemnon, in the aftermath of the Trojan War, on his personal journey to pursue Hermione’s love, although disguised under his official assignment as Greek ambassador to pledge with Pyrrhus, son of Achilles, to turn over, or to have Astyanax, the son of Hector and of Andromache, killed, as it is feared that he might avenge Troy. Hermione, the daughter of Menelaus and Helen of Troy, wishes that Pyrrhus would see the love that she holds for him, but Pyrrhus is instead deeply in love with the widowed Andromache, whom he also holds captive. Pyrrhus refuses Orestes’ request at first, but on hearing that Hermione has agreed to leave with Orestes, changes his mind to avenge Andromache’s refusal of him since she wants to honour her late husband Hector. Pyrrhus then announces that he intends to marry Hermione, which leaves Orestes devastated while Andromache begs Hermione to help her save Astyanax, her son. Jealous of Andromache, Hermione refuses, and when Pyrrhus then offers to reverse his decision if Andromache agrees to marry him, which she does to save Astyanax while secretly planning to commit suicide shortly after to remain loyal to Hector, Hermione is infuriated. She pledges with Orestes to avenge her contempt for Pyrrhus and Orestes sees his chance to gain Hermione’s love (Racine, 1667).

In this epic tragedy, spanning over two thousand years of storytelling, Racine unlocks a chain of love, murder, betrayal, power, suicide and avenge, where
Orestes’ failure to gain Hermione’s love is presented as an image, or an idea, that he ultimately finds impossible to possess and therefore goes mad. Foucault, in his account of the drama, argues that madness is portrayed as the Other, or a metaphor for unreason and the unconscious, and claims that because this image is portrayed as erroneous Hermione therefore comes to symbolise the “ultimate truth of madness” (1965). Foucault’s claim that Hermione is confined by rational thought, at the break between Renaissance and Classical, or Enlightened, thinking, informs this thesis’ primary observation; that the Old Town has been confined to a state of non-being where its image is falsely projected, and falsely identified with.

Psychoanalysis and the City - The first part of this thesis, out of four, aims to establish an incision or to locate the problem. It begins by situating the use of Foucault under the headings History, the Unconscious and Simulacrum and Madness in an Age of Reason where key definitions relating to history, narrative, the conscious and the unconscious, the Other, madness, reason and unreason, simulation and simulacrum, are outlined. Like Alice, who tumbles through the rabbit hole in Alice in Wonderland (Carroll, 1865), Foucault’s account of the history of madness similarly explores the Other’s, or Hermione’s, fall into a realm of madness. The last chapter, under the heading Self-preservation; Repression and other Defence Mechanisms, extend these arguments into a conversation on trauma or psychic distress using psychoanalytical vocabulary to demonstrate what defences are at hand for the collective psyche to manage such distress. Mental concepts such as repression, introjection, projection, identification, humour and sublimation are juxtaposed with theories relating to human geography and the social production of space as this part of the thesis methodically reconstructs a psychoanalytic process that metaphorically puts the city on the psychotherapist’s couch.

The Field – The second part of the paper applies, under the heading The Madness of Old Town, the meta-narrative of the first part to this research’s field of study; the Old Town. Edinburgh’s maturity from a medieval city through the Renaissance to
the Enlightenment and Classical thinking into the modern perception of the city is methodically discussed and interspersed with the author’s personal work which formed part of the exhibited material in the Schop Gallery. These creative projects, collected under the heading *A Residual Anthology of the City*, were primarily carried out during the early stages of the research and form a critical body of creative work that represent a process of thinking, and of expressing ideas, about Edinburgh and the Old Town. The projects are perceived of as a mirror reflecting theory as well as a fragmented and archaeological investigation of the field and have, for this reason, deliberately been treated discreetly, as separate insertions into the text, so as to not interrupt the flow of the thesis’ narrative.

*Psychoanalysis and the City* - The third part of the essay introduces, in *The Mirror and Mourning*, a conversation on objects-relations and representation as well as a critique of vision as the predominant sense for experiencing and reading the spaces we occupy. Therapeutic concepts of transference, counter-transference, mirroring (as therapeutic) and the mirror analogy (as a reflective surface that projects a false image of the self), propose alternative ways of reading ones relationship with the urban environment in general and the historic city in particular. This approach emphasises the processes of self-realisation and reflection where the necessity to successfully mourn and accept loss is shown to be an integral part in the healthy development of personal and collective narratives. This chapter is concluded through a conversation on Foucault’s concept of suspension before introducing the main outcome of the thesis in *Viewing the Old Town from Hermione’s Window* where the suspended model of the Old Town hanging over a mirror in the Gallery informs a criticism of Edinburgh’s historic city.

*Conclusion* - Finally, the last part of the thesis concludes the research, under the heading *(hi)STORY*, with a critical analysis in three ways; (1) through a reflection on architecture and its relationship to objects, subjects and narratives; (2) through a conversation on imaginary cities as existing in literature that returns the thesis’ argument to the notion and value of story contra history, and (3) by suggesting
possible renditions of the thesis’ outcome as well as recommendations for its further application.
Part I

Psychoanalysis and the City
Author’s note to self in the autumn of 2010:

On my walk to the office through Edinburgh every morning, I often pass by a mother with her two daughters at about 8.35am as they hurry off to, presumably, school. Each time I smile to myself as one of the daughters look a lot like one of my old school friends, but as the moment passes my mind wanders to other associations as I pass by other regulars who seem to share my morning routine. These particular events, meetings and silent acknowledgments are probably insignificant in the grand narratives of the universe, but the passing of the young family has an effect on me. Some time ago I decided to send a message to my old school friend and we agreed to meet up soon. It is only on reflection that I realise that this regular passing in the mornings most definitely had something to do with that decision.

1:1:1 Stories and History

Foucault writes that “we must accept the introduction of chance as a category in the production of events” (in Berressem, 2005) and expands on this notion through the conversation on ruptures and discontinuities, in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969), as the very raw material of history. The chance meeting caused by a man passing a young family, and associating the look of one of the daughters to his old school friend, is an example of one of these ruptures giving rise to an event in that man’s life that ultimately shapes his story into a personal narrative or into an individual history (*his-story*). Life moves on in these patterns and we pay very little attention as to how they come about as we take them for granted. Most of the time these ruptures simply ‘just happen’, and sometimes one refers to them as ‘freaky’ or ‘weird’, but as will be expanded on; we take note of them unconsciously.

Kearney explains how the very definition of the city, from the Greek word *polis*, implies a collective ability to make stories memorable and writes that “it is only when haphazard happenings are transformed into story, and thus made memorable
over time, that we become full agents of our history. This becoming historical involves a transition from the flux of events into a meaningful social or political community” (2002, p. 3). For Kearney, the ancient definition of history is dynamic and evolving.

However, as Foucault argues; “the history of thought, of knowledge, of philosophy, of literature seems to be seeking, and discovering, more and more discontinuities, whereas history itself appears to be abandoning the irruption of events in favour of stable structures” (1969, p. 6). Foucault demonstrates how, traditionally, history was a tool to memorise monuments of the past and transform them into documents and criticises the modern understanding of history as a transformation of the document into a monument of history. He even argues that, “in our time history aspires to the condition of archaeology, to the intrinsic description of the monument” (1969, pp. 7-8).

This, he argues, has a number of consequences (1969, pp. 8-12). (1) Instead of concerning itself with relationships between events; history concerns itself with relationships of relationships, a situation of an escalating level of stratification where laws, boundaries and chronologies become the stuff of history creating a surface effect leading to individualisation and alienation (ibid). (2) The historians’ task is the rearrangement of discontinuities as the raw material of history into a continuity of events. However, within modern history, the discontinuous is no longer the obstacle or the external condition of analysis, but the working concept itself, which becomes an inversion of signs (ibid). (3) Instead of speaking of a total history, a structuralist concept within which all discontinuities exist under a homogenous umbrella and where relationships between events can be determined as a network of causalities, we are beginning to see the emergence of a general history; a history that analyses relationships of relationships, stratifies series, draws up tables, a history that “deploys the space of dispersion” (ibid). (4) It poses significant methodological problems that characterises this new history. Firstly, the necessity for a coherent corpora of documents, secondly, establishing a principle of
choice as to how one treats the documentation, thirdly, defining levels of analysis and relevant elements within the documentation, fourthly, specifying a method of analysis, fifthly, separate groups and sub-groups that illustrate the material, and lastly, determine relations in order to characterise those groups (ibid).

De Certeau expresses a similar opinion, although clearly constructing his argument on the back of Foucault, when he discusses the analysis of myth in linguistics. The isolation of documents, he claims, as a process of classification in literature aims for heterogeneity which extracts them from their “historical context and eliminates the operations of speakers” which means that we only seem to be able to consider knowledge in social bodies through static objects (1984, pp.20-21). His argument on proverbs (and other discourses) as having imprints of its past, of uses and acts that indicate a system of representation that signify operations relative to social situations, something he labels “everyday historicity” (ibid) and what Foucault calls “enunciative modalities” (1969, pp. 55-61), gives substance to the notion of a dynamic history; a history of discontinuities that is constantly manipulated by the Other. Discontinuities (threshold, rupture, break, mutation, transformation), the raw material from which stories originate and transform, are the on-going inquiries, of which Kearney writes, that make up social life. But, both Foucault and De Certeau seem to suggest that history as a doctrine is stagnating from within, that our methods are flawed or that the incision is particularly uninteresting yielding results propelling our inquiries into alienation.

1:1:2 The Unconscious and the Other

Foucault is particularly interested in the history of thought or knowledge where he argues that we are “afraid to conceive of the Other in the time of our own thought” and that “if the history of thought could remain the locus of uninterrupted continuities... it would provide a privileged shelter for the sovereignty of consciousness” (1969, p.13). Thus, as Foucault points out, it is as if historians are particularly frightened of the unknown, that continuous history appears a necessity.
for “the guarantee that everything that has eluded (man) may be restored to him” (1969, p.13). De Certeau writes that “the approach to culture begins when the ordinary man becomes the narrator, when it is he who defines the (common) place of discourse and the (anonymous) space of its development” (De Certeau, 1984, p.5). Thus, if the ordinary man is a metaphor for the unconscious, then culture exists, not within conscious thought but as repressed passion that man, as Foucault suggests, inevitably appears frightened of expressing in the history of knowledge.

The idea that there exists a repressive space for the confinement of inconvenient thoughts, experiences and traumas, or a parallel world over which consciousness has very little control, has been largely established in Western society. Freud, who first introduced the concept of the unconscious, considered it a necessary social tool to prevent the psyche from succumbing to uncivilised instinct (Bateman & Holmes, 1995). The unconscious as a container of trauma and psychic distress, or as a locus for repressed experiences and passion, is regarded as a natural defence mechanism (ibid).

Sarup suggests, that “it is because of the existence of the unconscious that we can never have an absolute knowledge of identity” (1996, p.38) and Freud writes that “the unconscious is another scene, a parallel process which works by its own logic... nested in the psycho-social-spatial field of everyday life” (Freud in Pile, 1996, p.76). Hertzberger used the term Musée Imaginaire to speak of “an unconscious, collective field of knowledge” (in Lüchinger, 1981, p.17) for the architect, which is a direct extension to Jung’s concept of a collective psyche that contains archetypes to which people respond individually (1974). Jung, writes in Dreams (1974) that “natural man is not a ‘self’; he is... a particle in the mass collective to such a degree that he is not even sure of his own ego” (ibid, p.155). Jung further writes about the solificatio (in medieval alchemy of the Alexandrian belief meaning to rise from a lower to a higher knowledge), a process that exists within the anima or animus (innate archetypes of the unconscious) and through which Jung argues that “the rational attitude of the conscious mind... never reckons with the fact that scientific
knowledge (the highest form of understanding according to Jung) only satisfies the little tip of personality that is contemporaneous with ourselves” and that “it is clear, therefore that a ‘lightening up’ of the unconscious is being prepared” (ibid, p.131).

Hence, the dual concept of the Other is inherent to human life where one, for example, needs pain in order to understand pleasure, evil in order to recognise good, or light in order to appreciate the concept of dark and the play of shadows on a wall (Tanizaki, 1977). In literature, the ordinary man (Freud, 1930), the Other, Nemo (De Certeau, 1984), everyman and nobody, are fighting for attention as they are seen as the embodiment of a kind of metaphysical metaphor for a collective unconscious; the essence of the discontinuous.

Bourdieu draws attention to the ways we “establish and mark differences by a process of ‘distinction’ which is not (necessarily) a distinct knowledge since it ensures recognition of the object without implying knowledge of the distinctive features which define it” (Bourdieu, 1979, p.237). Bourdieu called this semi-unconscious awareness *habitus* and quotes Kant when explaining that “taste is an acquired disposition to differentiate and appreciate” (in Bourdieu, 1979, p.237). Taste, as an example of distinction, can demonstrate how events necessarily, and habitually, occur unconsciously. In fact, the entire history of ideas, of knowledge, of the discontinuous, is constructed from this ability to argue for ‘this one’ over ‘that one’ and, intriguingly, much of this happens by chance and without necessarily being aware of it.

1:1:3 Clinamen, Simulation and Simulacrum

This notion of chance meetings, ruptures and discontinuities as the making of history and life dates back to Democritus’ ancient suggestion that atoms exist as the smallest indivisible material building block and from which Epicurus later developed his philosophy about life as a modest balance between good and evil (Inwood & Gerson, 1994; Gaarder, 1995; Craig, 2002). For Epicurus, pleasure (good) and pain
(evil) form two opposing motivational drivers where the drive towards pleasure is offset against the drive to avoid pain (Gaarder, 1995, pp. 111-113). Freud, famously, develops this argument into the balance in life between the pleasure-principle and the reality-principle (1914; 1930) which we will return to in more depth later. However, as the atom collides with other atoms new forms of life are created, and similarly, chance meetings, or collisions, give rise to pleasurable or painful ruptures and events that inevitably shape history. This concept was referred to in Latin as the *clinamen* by Lucretius to explain “the smallest possible angle” by which an atom unpredictably “swerves” and inevitably collides with other atoms (in Berressem, 2005, p. 53); if they did not then “nature would never have produced anything”, and this uncertain outcome was, for Lucretius, evidence of the free will granted each human being (Inwood & Gerson, 1994, p. 66).

Berressem (2005), in his account on Serres’ work *The Birth of Physics* (1977), illustrates how the concept of clinamen appears, directly or indirectly, in numerous texts contemporary with Serres; from Derrida’s *Différance* (1968) and Of *Grammatology* (1967), to Foucault’s *Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969) and *The Discourse on Language* (1970), to Deleuze and Guattari’s texts *Anti-Oedipus* (1972) and *A Thousand Plateaus* (1980), to Lacan’s *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis* (1973) and Baudrillard’s texts on *Symbolic Exchange and Death* (1976) and *Simulacra and Simulations* (1981). These bodies of texts, often grouped under the heading post-modern, represent, for Berressem, references for his text on the “intelligent materialism” that informs Serres’ and Deleuze’s work. “Intelligent materialism” considers matter as self-creating or “autopoietic” (Berressem, 2005, p. 51), which is an extended argument of Marx’s notion of “historical materialism” from his essay on Democritus and Epicurus (ibid, p. 54). In short, this concept states that history necessarily produces itself according to the necessities of a society, and for Deleuze “the clinamen manifests... the irreducible plurality of causes or of causal series, and the impossibility of bringing causes together into a whole” (in Berressem, 2005, p. 55). This, of course, inevitably questions the notion of origin and authenticity since it would seem impossible to
locate the very first atom’s collision with another and consequently history is incomplete, or fragmented, constantly changing and in flux where each little nudge of time, however immaterial, is the stuff from which stories are made and from which history grows into monuments of memory.

Deleuze expands on this argument in his text on *The Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy* (1969) where he discusses simulacra in the context of Platonic philosophy and situates this alongside Epicurus and Lucretius. Deleuze constructs an argument basing itself upon Plato’s triad of division; the unparticipated, the participated and the participant, or as Deleuze rewrites it; the foundation, the object aspired to and the pretender. What is brought into question is the concept of the foundation, which, due to clinamen cannot be reduced to a traceable sequence of events and therefore not be conceived of as a whole (1969). Consequently, the authenticity of the object is questioned, the pretender becomes a “false pretender” or a simulacrum, which “places in question the very notations of copy and model” (ibid, p. 256). Deleuze writes that “copies are secondary possessors (pretenders)… guaranteed by resemblance (while) simulacra are like false pretenders, built upon a dissimilarity” (ibid).

Baudrillard writes on the same subject in *Simulacra and Simulation* (1981) where he defines the simulacra as “the generation by models of a real without origin or reality” (1981, pp. 365) and he refers to “the hyperreal” as simulations of a false representation of an ideal reality (ibid, pp. 369-370). For Baudrillard, the hyperreal is a question of an operational reproduction which is no longer measured against an “ideal or negative instance” (ibid, p. 366) where the real is replaced by signs of the real, “its operational double, a metastable, programmatic... machine” (ibid).

Baudrillard explores this argument through a conversation on Disneyland to exemplify an irreferentiallity of images where simulation, he argues, “threatens the difference between ‘true’ and ‘false’, between ‘real’ and ‘imaginary’” (ibid). To “feign”, or in Delueze’s sense, copy or pretend, leaves a reference to the real while the simulated image, the false pretender, produces the real and therefore blurs the
boundaries between real and imaginary. For Baudrillard, the simulacrum, the simulated model of the real, conceals this fact and therefore saves the reality principle. For Deleuze, the simulacrum is, due to the processes of clinamen, a reality in its own right, but it is repressed and instead copies have assured themselves triumphant over the simulacra (Deleuze, 1969, p. 257). In both instances it is a question of power where “classical reason (has) armed itself with all its categories” (Baudrillard, 1981, p. 367); categories, in the case of history and as outlined by Foucault above, that aims to control.

Baudrillard clearly considers simulations and simulacra as negative and concealing of the real; “submerging the truth principle” (ibid), while Deleuze, although agreeing that simulacra are false, concealing, pretenders, claims that the loss of the real, where, according to Baudrillard “nostalgia assumes its full meaning” (ibid), is not due to the loss of a reference to origin, but to the repression of the simulacrum as a reality of its own value and right. It is from the notion that “throughout the history of Occidental culture, the Democritian tradition... has been submitted since its origin... to a powerful repression” (Derrida in Berressem, 2005, p. 53), that this thesis treats its inquiry and from which a criticism of the historic city develops. The museumisation of Old Town, or the disneyfication, objectification or touristification of the Old Town, will be considered as a simulacrum, which raise a myriad of questions around the representation and visual perception of objects, and around the production of the object and its image.

Consequently, in moving towards further analysis of the manifestations of the historic city, the unconscious offers a particularly intriguing starting point to understand the constitution of collective memory and stagnation. A conversation on trauma and psychic distress will explore the concept of repression and other defence mechanisms in subsequent chapters, where it will be shown that the control enforced by a conscious and rational collective self gives rise to a space referred to as the unconscious or the Other. Ruptures will be considered in their
disruptive and pathological sense where the forces at play to repress these will be further expanded upon. But first, we must turn our attention to a recurring theme in the texts of Foucault, Deleuze, Baudrillard, De Certeau et al, and explore the development of reason and the rise of a rational ideal that accepts simulations as “signs of reality; of second-hand truths... a panic-stricken production of the real” (Baudrillard, 1981, p. 369).

“All lunatics are simulators, and this lack of distinction is the worst form of subversion” Baudrillard argues, (ibid, pp. 367) and it is against this rebellion of the mad, of the Other or the unconscious, that reason has “armed itself”; a phenomenon that Foucault dates back to the break between Renaissance and classical, or neo-classical, thinking. Foucault argues that at this point rational thought developed into a societal norm where anything unusual or unreasonable was rejected from collective consciousness and his account of madness, as he traces the dominance of reason and the confinement of passion back to the end of the Renaissance, explores an intriguing past (1965). A critical reading of Foucault’s Madness and Civilisation will, in the next chapter, explore madness as a space so strongly associated with the unconscious and the Other; a space desperately repressed in collective memory in which, as we will see later, Hermione finds herself trapped.
1:2  Trauma in an age of Reason

Foucault’s inquiry, as has been discussed already, is rooted in a desire to expose a situation whereby history can be understood from a suspended perspective; from the point of view of the Other and in *Madness and Civilisation* (1965) he reconstructs the history of madness in an attempt, as he states at the beginning, to “return, in history, to that zero point in the course of madness at which madness is an undifferentiated experience, a not yet divided experience of division itself” (Foucault, 1965, ix). Foucault does not specifically speak of the unconscious but refers to vocabulary such as dream, passion, unreason and madness. He traces madness back to the end of the Middle Ages when leprosy largely disappeared leaving behind a structure of values, symbols and meaning attached to the lazar house; mainly signifying exclusion. But, as will be discussed further in the next chapter, the past, through buildings, haunts, the repressed returns (Pile, 1996, 2000; De Certeau, 1984; Bolas, 2009; Kearney, 2002) and so, the space of the Other needed replacing; “the formulas of exclusion would be repeated” (Foucault, 1965, p.7).

1:2:1  Madness and the Renaissance

At the beginning of the Renaissance, ships of fools are seen sailing into the harbours of Europe, a comical gathering of deranged minds that all had one thing in common; expulsion. Foucault argues that these madmen “were confined in the holy locus of a miracle” (ibid, p.10). The exclusion of the Other was convenient but it was also said to cure; to board the Ship sailing towards the horizon carried a purifying symbolism. The madman became “a prisoner of his own departure” with “his truth.., in that fruitless expanse between two countries that cannot belong to him” thus sailing out “over the sea of desires” (ibid, pp.11-12); an endless mirror reflecting his own destiny as he embarks on a journey of self-realisation. Foucault moves on to discuss
the necessity to immortalise the mad at the end of the 15th century through literature and iconography, from Brant’s *Narrenschiff* to Bosch’s *The Ship of Fools*. He argues that while “folly leads each man into a blindness where he is lost, the madman... reminds each man of his truth” (ibid, p.14). Thus the madman enters centre stage as a symbol of death to illustrate the “nothingness of existence” (ibid, p.16) where madness becomes spectacle to recall the one truth; that the end is near.

As the signification associated with Gothic symbolism began to fade, its meaning instead took on new forms where the “power is no longer to teach but to fascinate” (ibid, p.20), and the madman acquired a level of wisdom inaccessible to reason. This new symbolism is the domain of dreams, temptations and passion; the madman, in his innocence, already possesses this invisible knowledge “while the man of reason perceives only fragmentary images of it” (ibid, p.22). Thus, madness is linked to man and his weaknesses, his dreams, illusions and forbidden desires where the madman enjoys the freedom of expressing the clandestine without prejudice. Foucault argues that “it is because man is attached to himself that he accepts error as truth” and that “the symbol of madness will be that mirror which, without reflecting anything real, will secretly offer the man who observes himself in it the dream of his own presumption” (ibid, pp.26-27).

During the Renaissance madness becomes spectacle, and Foucault explains how contemporary playwrights expose madness by *romantic identification* (that between the real and the imaginary), *of vain presumption* (that of delusive attachment), *of just punishment* (that which, by punishment, unveils the truth) and *of desperate passion* (that of love deceived by the fatality of death which has no other resort than madness) (ibid, pp.28-31). Foucault demonstrates how Cervantes’ and Shakespeare’s masterpieces “testify more to a tragic experience of madness appearing in the fifteenth century, than to a critical and moral experience of *unreason* developing in their own epoch” (ibid, p.31). Consequently, Foucault arrives at what he will ultimately call the great confinement as he claims that
madness vanished in the “economy of narrative and dramatic structures” as authority returns, and with that, truth as the dogma of reason (ibid, pp.32-35).

1:2:2 Confinement and Classicism; the rise of reason

As other writers followed Cervantes and Shakespeare (mysteriously, they actually died on the same day in 1616) the perception of madness in social life changed. Reason considered it necessary to confine unreason and Foucault traces the maturity of the madhouse to expose a growing morality in Western Europe. The madhouse, the Hôpital Général, or the house of correction, developed into a tool of power for the authorities, for reason, where beggars, vagabonds, criminals, the unemployed and general sloths were all contained. Foucault writes that these institutions were “establishments of religion and public order, of assistance and punishment, of governmental charity and welfare measures, a phenomenon of the classical period” (ibid, p.43). Consequently, as opposed to outright expulsion, unreason was not driven away, it was confined “at the expense of the nation” (ibid, p.48) and there was a sense of responsibility by reason; “a new ethic of work, and also the dream of a city where moral obligation was joined to civil law, within the authoritarian forms of constraint” (ibid, p.46).

It was a tool to establish social order, introduce rightful ways of life and above all ascertain control since idleness was unethical and tied to religion; “does not reluctance to work mean trying beyond measure the power of God” Calvin asks (in Foucault, 1965, p.56). Thus, madness expanded its definition and now included an entire, socially useless, population. The symbolism of reason, of authority, was the house of correction, where the mad and the poor were put to work, and its directors given the powers of repression justifying their work in the name of a moral, prosperous and reasonable society; “morality permitted itself to be administered like trade or economy” (Foucault, 1965, p.61). The city developed into what Foucault calls a place of “pure morality” (ibid, p.60) with reason as the ethical police and the madhouse as a dense symbol of that controlling force conceiving of
itself “as the civil equivalent of religion for the edification of a perfect city” (ibid, p.63). Foucault even argues that “the real life of the city was suspended; order no longer freely confronted disorder; reason reigned in the pure state” (ibid, p.64) and madness left the centre stage of the imaginary, King Lear and Don Quixote were seen sailing into the horizon, never to be seen again.

Thus, while madness had been displayed as drama and spectacle in the Renaissance, confinement, with its secrecy, symbolised shame, and madness became the guardian of the inhuman. However, while unreason was silenced in the houses of correction, madness was as vibrant as ever as public spectacle, but for entirely different reasons than previously. The madman, “chained to the cell walls were no longer men whose minds had wandered, but beasts preyed upon by natural frenzy” (ibid, p.72). His animality was glorified through spectacle, except it lacked interaction with its audience; it was simply something to be looked at, through bars and at a distance. This demonstration by reason was aimed to distinguish, and threaten, moral man from that of unreason, from the immoral beast, inhuman and humiliated; “the scandal of madness showed men how close to animality their fall could bring them” (ibid, p.81). But madness also possessed an innocence and a liberty that only the animal could enjoy, thus reason manifested itself as man above nature, where the danger of unreason was “that threatening space of absolute freedom” (ibid, p.84).

As we have seen, madness lodges itself within a collective unconscious, not of its own free will, but by confinement or collective repression, and here it remains until this day according to Foucault. But as reason tries to rid itself of unreason, forces begin to stir in the collective psyche; the city is not at peace in its suspended state, one could argue that it has suffered a traumatic experience that is linked to the shame of confining unreason. By shutting out passion, “the meeting ground of body and soul” according to Descartes (in Foucault, 1965, p.86), a sadness descends over the city and, in this melancholic state, it finds itself at a loss. For passion, as Foucault
explains, is implicit to madness and “if it is true that there exists a realm, in the relations of soul and body, where cause and effect... still intersect in a web so dense that they actually form only one and the same movement... then we see that there can be diseases such as madness which are from the start diseases of the body and the soul” (Foucault, 1965, p.88).

Hence, an anxiety rests over the city and “without ever being attenuated” (ibid, p.91), if the trauma is not seen to, it will continue to irritate and agitate reason until madness transcends all social life and “a whole segment of the unity of soul and body is thus detached from the aggregate”; “the soul is not excluded from the body, but it is swept along so rapidly by it that it cannot retain all its conceptions; it is separated from its memories, its intentions, and thus isolated from itself” (ibid, p.92). This spiralling effect fragments reality, hallucinations distort truth and the city progresses towards a state of non-being, existing as a distant memory; it is losing its identity.

To access this distant memory Foucault, like Freud, Jung and many others, find recourse in the dream. In the dream, with its illusion of images, “the imagination forges impossible things and miracles... but there is no error in these things” Zacchias remarks, “madness occurs when the images, which are so close to the dream, receive the affirmation that constitutes error” (in Foucault, 1965, p.104). It is also in the dream that we come upon Hermione, as the erroneous image of love in Racine’s Andromaque, where she is seen as the ultimate truth of madness by Foucault. But she is yet to reveal herself in full, first we need to turn our attention to a central question for this thesis; how does the city endure under the regime of reason? What instruments are at hand for the collective psyche to refrain from simply falling into an eternal slumber where, at least, the prospect of perpetual night would seem a miracle?
Defence mechanisms are divided into three developmental categories; primitive/immature, neurotic and mature. These are not necessarily pathological but form part of everyday life as mechanisms for coping. They are also commonly unconscious and generally dynamic, although a sense of stagnation can occur in pathological formations (Bateman & Holmes, 1995, pp. 76-81). Bateman and Holmes explain how defences “are psychological configurations operating outside the realm of consciousness which minimise conflict, reduce tension, maintain intrapsychic equilibrium, regulate self-esteem and play a central role in dealing with anxiety whether it arises from internal or external sources” (ibid, p.76). As an act of self-preservation, it would appear that, naturally, we are equipped with unconscious tools that keep us from drifting towards madness. Consequently, if we are to trace the source of disruptive or traumatic events and expose an archaeology of the city’s collective unconscious, then we must penetrate the city walls and breach its defences.

This chapter will primarily outline terminologies, and more precisely terminologies relating to that aspect of psychoanalysis that discusses defence mechanisms. But rather than plainly delineate definitions, this chapter further aims to situate the use of these terminologies in a wider, geographic, context. We will trace six specific defence mechanisms, three primitive/immature (identification, introjection and projection), one neurotic (repression) and two mature (humour and sublimation), and as we progress to locate Old Town’s traumatic past, their specific application will become clear.
1:3:1 Repression; on ghosts, narrative and myth

Repression is the classic mechanism of defence and it is understood that there is an inherent tendency for repressed wishes to return causing anxiety and tension (Bateman & Holmes, 1995, p. 77). This, as exemplified by unreason’s fall into darkness in the classical age as an unacceptable wish by the collective conscious, powered by authority and disguised from reason, manifests itself within the realm of dream, passion and illusion where it sits uncomfortably, reminding reason from time to time of its existence, like ghosts.

Pile writes of the return of the repressed in Spectral Cities (2000), of ghosts that quite literally haunt our cities. He begins by quoting Gordon who argues that “the ghost is... a social figure, and investigating it can lead to that dense site where history and subjectivity make social life” (in Pile, 2000, p. 219), after which he moves on to discuss the films The Sixth Sense (by M. Night Shyamalan, 1999) and Bringing out the Dead (by Joe Connelly, 1998) to demonstrate how the ghost, as a social figure, is conjured up from peoples’ memories, a necessity to come to terms with the traumas of everyday life as a way of bringing back those stories. Pile’s argument is therapeutic, suggesting that ghosts are part of a healing process to understand the past.

Kearney agrees in his account On Stories (2002), where the process of re-telling and manipulating history is seen as a necessity to deal with particularly haunting pasts. The narrative forms a healing function where Kearney asks questions such as “how do we balance the poetic licence to recreate our past with the involuntary recall of the suffering of the being” and “what is the difference between literal and literary memory, between becoming a man by the power of a lie and becoming a madman” (2002, p.21)? He argues that humankind finds comfort in the story; truthfulness is of secondary importance as “narratives are fibs to ward off the pain off the real” (ibid, p. 22), emotion finds expression through media such as literature and drama. Perhaps it is also true, as TS Eliot writes, that “humankind cannot bear too much reality” (in Kearney, 2002, p.26), the past haunts and we let ghosts visit us because
we are as much in need of them as they are of us. History for Kearney is already suspended; reason’s search for truths is rendered impossible as the story, chameleon like, transforms according to the therapeutic needs of the society. It is a Kantian argument; “any entity which knowledge attempts to crystallize must dissolve again in the current of development. It is in the last phase of this development, and in this alone, that we have the right to say: ‘this is a fact’” (in Piaget, 1972, p. 15), and as such it shows the power of narrative as a repressive, yet healing, tool.

Bollas discusses what he calls the reverberation of the object in his account on the monument and the life and death of buildings (2009). He discusses how one attaches meaning to objects, such as buildings, through memories of the past, where the monument signifies layers of history, of deaths, which psychically links us to our ancestors. Of course, these meanings are individual, but, as Bollas points out, the monument has certain collective connotations, which we render differently (2009). Bachelard, on a similar notion, writes that “we feel a poetic power rising naively within us, after the original reverberation, we are able to experience resonances, sentimental repercussions, reminders of our past” (1958, p. xxiii); the monument, as an object of representation, reverberate death, but also our present aspirations as future resonances. We attach our hopes to these signifiers as legacies of our comings and goings and thus, when a building is torn down and replaced, that site will occupy, in our collective minds, multiple meanings; that of the obliterated object and that of the new one, and for many years to come, the ghosts of lost meanings are etched in our memories. Bollas explains how Freud attempted to use the analogy of the city as the embodiment of the “timeless preservation of the unconscious” (Bollas, 2009, p.48) but later abandoned it since buildings, like people, come and go. However, as Bollas argues, the demolished structure is still very much part of a collective psychic life, memories and stories reveal themselves as ghosts, located within a repressed unconscious world, and from time to time surfacing to remind us of their pasts.
Although De Certeau agrees that the memory of culture is repressed, he does not share Pile, Kearney, or Bolas’ curative optimism. He argues that while reason has imposed a methodology to extract meaning, everyday practices need to find their expression through “diversionary practices” and his argument is, just like Kearney’s, directed at what he calls “literary zones” where tales, games and other legends form “an internal manipulation of the system” as a process of trickery (De Certeau, 1984, pp.21-28). But rather than forming a therapeutic function, these practices seem to instead avoid the problem, which De Certeau, in his discussion on economy, also admits; “there are no longer any ghosts who can remind the living of reciprocity” (Ibid, p.27), our only recourse is in “diversionary practices”, a way of “making do”. This, of course, resonates with Deleuze’s argument earlier on the foundation and the pretender where myth “is the story of a foundation (that) permits the construction of a model according to which different pretenders can be judged” (1969, p. 255). To participate in the myth, always circular in structure, Deleuze further argues, is a question of establishing a “method of selection... which is not the specification of the concept but the authentication of the Idea... of the selection of lineage” (ibid, pp. 255-256). Again, Deleuze questions the ability to establish the origin of the Idea, of the myth, and therefore claims that it becomes nothing but simulacrum, a copy without resemblance. To ascertain a false sense of origin is, however, a conscious establishment of power, and myth is one of its controlling tools. But Deleuze claims that “nature is opposed to myth” where, according to Lucretius, “man’s unhappiness comes not from his customs and inventions... but from the side of myth which is mixed with them, and from the false infinite which it introduces into his feelings” (ibid, p. 278), and consequently, other defence mechanisms need activating within the collective psyche, which, for better or worse, further manifests reason’s superiority.
Identification, Introjection and Projection; on performance, *fitting in* and *making do* as processes of spatial production

It is understood that the object-relations model sees a person’s primary motivational drive as seeking relationships with others through mechanisms of identification, introjection and projection. These are referred to as primitive mechanisms of defence primarily because they refer to predominately unconscious processes and because they are most clearly observable within the development of children. These mechanisms, as proposed by Sandler, shapes the creation of an “internal world of representation, populated by the self, its objects and the relationships between them” where these internal childhood relationships become templates for future, external, ones (in Bateman & Holmes, 1995, pp. 40-41). This is part of a natural process called splitting, whereby one learns to “suspend one’s emotional distress in order to come to a decision, to make moral choices, or form an intellectual judgement” (Segal in Bateman & Holmes, 1995, p. 82), i.e. it is the foundation for a healthy mental life where the conscious and the unconscious are in intrapsychic equilibrium. Thus, it is a process where one learns to cope with the constraints of society and the normalised, and accepted, spatial (mental, social and physical) practices that leads to a sense of belonging.

However, Melanie Klein realised that since internal and external objects, or relationships, relate to the ego, splitting might also occur there, becoming pathological, and lead to disrupted or anxious relationships (Bateman & Holmes, 1995; Segal, H., 1973; Segal, J., 1992). She introduced the concept of *projective identification* to explore a process where a part of the self, rather than feelings or emotions, is projected into an object (in infancy commonly the mother). Klein argued that projection is the mental process itself whilst projective identification is the phantasy expressing it, and thus assumes an emotional response by the object (in Bateman & Holmes, 1995, pp. 82-87). These projections can be both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ and depending on the object’s response lead to either heightened self-esteem or a sense of a loss of identity or self. Consequently, when tracing what is assumed
to be a traumatic collective past in the historic city it appears that one needs to search for relationships with its objects and its unconscious mental life of representation. Clearly, this task remains an allegorical undertaking but is, as will be expanded on shortly, nonetheless particularly exposing.

Pile, not ignorant of De Certeau’s argument, poses a key question in his conclusion to *Spectral Cities*, one which is central to this thesis and will be expanded on in more depth later; how do we exorcise a city’s ghosts without further repressing their inquiries, how do we learn to live alongside the memories of our past (2000, p.237)? Pile turns to Freud’s writings on *Mourning and Melancholia* (1917) to explain that in mourning, by confirming and accepting loss, or trauma, a process of forming new attachments begins, while in melancholia the loss is turned inwards; it is internalised, or introjected, and later identified with leading to a stagnation of self as opposed to developing new identities (ibid, p.237). The distinction between Pile’s and De Certeau’s arguments lies in this notion; De Certeau’s concepts of “making do” and “diversionary practices” refer to melancholia, while Pile’s search for that place where “history and subjectivity make social life” (ibid, p.219) refer to mourning.

De Certeau explains that reason constructs systems of operations, or power relationships, within which everyday life occurs. Strategies, defined by reason, affords “a triumph of place over time” and “the power of knowledge (is defined) by this ability to transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces” (1984, p.36). Thus, De Certeau argues that within these controlling, observable, overseeing and sometimes disciplinary structures, or what Foucault termed panopticism (1975; Schmelzer in Caputo & Yount, 1993), the Other is left with nothing than “diversionary practices”. These operations are mere tactics where the Other can only “make do” within the system from which it has been displaced. Consequently, time finds itself wedged, uncomfortably, between its inevitable dynamic definition, and reason’s desire to control and delineate space. Clearly, place’s triumph over time gives substance to the idea of time rendered stagnant where reason’s attempt
to control and construct identities can only lead to questions as to what is hidden from view under the surface crust that this triumph creates. Fortunately, the Other appears to be able to escape the watchful eye of reason but without the ability to create a proper locus, thus De Certeau defining it as practices for “making do”. But this, he notes, inevitably requires the Other to identify with the system within which its tactical practices occur and this process of identification is, in the context of the repressed city, nothing other than a mechanism of defence.

Thus, as the panoptic eye disallows the Other a proper place, “diversionary practices” includes processes of internalising the trauma of such a state of being. The concept of introjection in psychoanalysis teaches us that objects, or rather meanings attached to objects, are symbolically absorbed within the unconscious (Colman, 2001), and within the historic city examples can be found in excess. When reason attempts to freeze moments of history, through power systems relating to economy, politics and history, etc., it does so, as De Certeau shows, as a triumph of place over time. Restoration, for example; defined as “reinstating something (most often a building) to its original form” (Simpson & Weiner, 1989), can never be anything other than a representation of history; time looses, and the Other must find “diversionary practices” to cope with this loss. By identifying with the power system in place, as a coping mechanism, restoration becomes “normalised” (Schmelzer in Caputo & Yount, 1993), or introjected; symbolically absorbed within the unconscious, and reason maintains control over space and place.

Deleuze further exemplifies this argument by claiming that “in order to speak of simulacra, it is necessary for the heterogeneous series to be really internalised in the system” (1969, p. 261) and since simulacrum internalises dissimilarity it becomes impossible to define the origin of it. Again, Deleuze’s argument refers to the maintenance of myth as a process of selection amongst reason’s models that aims to condition the unknown and the unfathomable; “making it the ruler of the unlimited” (ibid, p.259). The simulacrum implies the possibility of “becoming-mad” due to its huge dimensions “that the observer cannot master” where the pretension
of control and selection necessarily represses “models of the Other... to the bottom of the Ocean... in the name of a superior finality... or a meaning of history” (ibid, pp. 258-260). Deleuze also turns to literature; to Joyce’s *Finnegans Wake* (1939), to speak of a stirring resonance that characterises simulacrum where its multiple layering of parallel stories bubbles under the surface as a repressive power that here temporarily finds a proper place. As the simulacrum rises, the duality between what Deleuze calls the Same (the ruler of the unlimited) and the Similar (the condition applied to the unlimited), “fall under the power of the false” (ibid, p. 263) and becomes simulation, functioning through the simulacrum as a “will to power” (ibid, pp. 264-265). Deleuze concludes by arguing that this movement, “produced by the simulation”, is projected as a forced identity or an erroneous reflection that “reverses representation” (ibid).

Leach, in his efforts to construct a “theory of identification with space”, is coming from the point of view of architectural theory when he refers to Bourdieu’s notion that architecture is “a type of objectified cultural capital” (2000, p. 282) where its latent value is in the social practices that activate it. Leach, like many of his contemporary theorists, also refers to narrativisation as a process where tactics, in De Certeau’s definition, offer opportunities for the Other to occupy space; or territorialise it. Leach writes that “space is for De Certeau place made meaningful” (Ibid, p. 283), but as we have seen, De Certeau argues that this is a temporal locus, similar to discourse, a dynamic practice controlled by the strategies of authority. Leach also shows how De Certeau sees these practices as hermeneutic; a search where the production of spatial tactics is at the cost of a proper place (ibid, p. 284). His argument continues to open up a conversation on identification through the traumatic mirror-stage, as introduced by Lacan and something we will return to in depth in the third part of this thesis, where Leach, like Pile, sees this as a necessary mourning process to reconcile with the self. However, De Certeau’s argument remains that “we make sense of space” through temporal practices (tactics) “and repeat those... as a way of overcoming alienation” (ibid, p.284), and thus he maintains that identities are shaped through the power systems within which we
operate, clearly resonating Deleuze’s argument. The Other is still repressed, which Leach’s subsequent argument on belonging clearly exemplifies.

Leach refers to Butler’s notion of “performativity”, who argues that it is “our actions and behaviour that constitute our identity, not our biological bodies” (in Leach, 2000, p. 285), to point out that social codes are created through a process of “normalisation”, where, which is important for Leach, architecture becomes its silent stage; or put simply, architecture provides the place, while performances turns it into space. Thus, this process boils down to what Butler refers to as a “manufacturing (of) cultural and historical belongings which mark out terrains of commonality that delineate the politics and social dynamics of ‘fitting in’” (ibid, p. 286). Leach argues that this gives a much deeper meaning to the idea of belonging as it goes beyond straightforward narrative and gives supremacy to our collective and individual actions as an ephemeral process (2000, pp. 286-287), essentially that actions speak louder than words. Certainly, tactics are transitory, however, and especially in the context of the historical city, this performing process of “fitting in” or “pretending”, is repressed by the strategies in place.

The institution, previously exemplified by the madhouse, is reason’s controlling tool, the document, as Foucault has pointed out, its weapon. It falsely projects, as the definition maintains, feelings, impulses, or thoughts, onto other people (Colman, 2001), where the idea of the collective city is shaped through conscious constructs and strategies. We turn our attention to Lefebvre’s exhaustive work on The Production of Space (1974) which is the text upon which writers like De Certeau, Bourdieu, Leach and Pile construct their arguments. His text follows in the spirit of Foucault and Deleuze where Lefebvre’s work similarly also criticises reason’s hierarchal position in space (mental, social and physical). In his introduction he writes that “epistemological thought... has eliminated the ‘collective subject’, the people as creator of a particular language” (1974, p.4) as he sketches out a critical framework for what he calls an “abyss” between mental space and social and physical space, where he argues that his predecessors have
simply taken the mental for the social and thereby completely missed the point (ibid, pp. 5-7). His criticism of semiology and structuralist thought is evident and reinforces the notion of a process of identification with the power systems in place as has been exemplified above, something which Lefebvre also acknowledges as happening unconsciously (ibid, p.6). Lefebvre refers to the concept of hegemony as he discusses knowledge as a repressive tool of power or reason, exorcised over all societal life, and manifested, or projected, onto a (spatial) field through what he calls spatial practices.

Lefebvre constructs a conceptual triad (ibid, pp. 31-33) where spatial practices produce and reproduce space in the biological sense as well as through the working class through labour, and through the reproduction of social relations of production. These happen in particular locations, with characteristics specific to each social formation, ensure a level of competence specific to performances within a given societal structure and also guarantee a degree of cohesion (ibid). Representations of space are frontal relations of production, what Lefebvre calls the police, or the order which these relations impose on space and on knowledge through signs and codes, and are embodied within the institution and expressed through the monument (ibid). Representational spaces, on the other hand, refer to that space which embodies complex symbolisms, what Lefebvre calls clandestine or underground, and what this thesis has defined from its very beginning as the unconscious or the Other (ibid).

The relationships and juxtapositions between spatial practices to the institution and the unconscious are beginning to transpire. Baudrillard reminds us that when “nostalgia assumes its full meaning... there is a panic stricken production of the real” which for Baudrillard shows how simulations are strategies of the real (1981, p. 369). Deleuze repeats his earlier notion that simulations are produced by false pretenders while Caputo and Yount’s (1993) discussion on Foucault shows how power is embodied within the institution, where they argue for reason’s ability to seduce through its conscious production of the subject. These arguments imply that
the Other is not a separate entity; the body is attached to its soul, consciousness and unconsciousness are in inevitable psychic interaction, reason and unreason in constant combined motion. Thus, the Other necessarily produces itself as power is not repressive but productive (Caputo & Yount, 1993, pp. 3-10), just as Lefebvre suggests. Shields, in his text *Places on the Margin* (1991), helpfully juxtaposes the relationships between Lefebvre, Bourdieu and Foucault to point out that this unconscious world of representations, or the underground, is an often un-theorised realm (ibid, p. 54). Thus, what remains intriguing is to put these spatial practices, or these defence mechanisms or “diversionary practices” of “making do”, “fitting in” or “pretending”, into a Kleinian projective identification perspective.

To summarise; reason controls the places within which we operate to which our actions give meaning through spatial practices. This is a process of identification with the seductive illusions of representations of space as consciously projected onto a field that one necessarily internalises, or introjects, in order not to drift towards exclusion; essentially to avoid going mad. We identify with the power systems in place to belong, and although ghosts from the past visit us daily through narratives, and although one can (and will in the subsequent parts of the thesis) argue for the healing aspects of these, it is still necessary to acknowledge these “diversionary practices”, these “performativities”, as psychic defence mechanisms that deals with the distress of having been confined to this state of being in the first place. Thus, as this thesis is clearly investigating an idea that the historic city has found itself in a melancholic state due to traumatic events, where the city’s repressed past has been internalised and identified with, the place within which we operate has essentially been reduced to a question of representation, of what strategies exists to manage the normalisation of spaces, of what image reason projects to seduce the masses.
1:3:3  Humour and Sublimation; on dream, drama and illusion

Kearney suggested earlier that “narratives are fibs to ward off the pain of the real” (2002, p.22), that “humankind cannot bear too much reality” (TS Eliot in Kearney, 2002, p.26), and that we find comfort in literature and stories. But as Leach has pointed out, it is our performances and actions that truly construct a sense of belonging; narratives are primitive by nature simply offering opportunities for identification with the past, while performances are mature expressions. Freud also thought higher of defence mechanisms such as humour and sublimation, and honoured them as mature. They offer an opportunity, through creative expression, to articulate underlying desires, emotions and passions in a socially acceptable way, and are thought to enrich societal life. Through drama, poetry, art, music, comedy and festival, emotions find expression without offending or causing embarrassment (Bateman & Holmes, 1995, pp.92-93).

Freud shares TS Eliot comments when he writes, in Civilisation and its Discontents (1930), that “life imposed on us is too hard for us to bear” (p.13) and suggest that we cannot do without “palliative measures”, of which there are three groups; powerful distractions, substitutive satisfactions and intoxicants (ibid). For Freud, achieving happiness is our primary motivational drive. But naturally, as suggested by Epicurean philosophy, this presents a tension between the avoidance of pain whilst striving towards strong feelings of pleasure. Freud argues that man’s happiness “has no part in the plan of creation” (ibid, p.14) and maintains that the pleasure principle is substituted by the reality principle simply because we rather try to avoid suffering than obtain pleasure (ibid). Consequently, palliative measures, or defence mechanisms are necessary to control, or repress, overwhelming feelings of passion, desire and happiness into the realm of unconscious thought (ibid, p.15).

Defence mechanisms are, as we have seen, essential to cope in the spatial network within which we have been displaced. This is emphasised by the notion that we, since birth, constantly oscillate between spheres of conscious and unconscious thought, where defence mechanisms act as media connecting body and soul. Thus,
Distractions appear to sit comfortably next to De Certeau's notion of "diversionary practices" while humour and sublimation fall under the category of satisfactions, or performativities that offer a greater sense of belonging. On the other hand, Freud argues that intoxication, "in the struggle for happiness and in keeping misery at a distance, is seen as so great a boon that... entire nations have afforded them a firm place in the economy of the libido" (ibid, p.16). This, the third palliative measure, clearly offers the authorities yet another means of control, as it offers some relief from the constant suppression of the drives involved when succumbing to the reality principle.

However, a higher degree of relief, or pleasure, is found in sublimation as it does not involve the sating of primitive, physical drives. In the earlier reference to the notion of the solificatio as a "lightening up" of the unconscious through the anima or animus Jung mentions that "it seems to (the conscious mind) almost chimerical" (1974, p.131) and Jung suggests that it is in the dream, as a hallucinatory experience, that the unconscious mind finds expression. However, the artist at work, or the actor or musician on stage, offer a similar illusion where the imagination of the creative mind presents on outlet for waking desires (Freud, 1930, pp.17-19).

Consequently, we need to return to a conversation on madness, and the madman, who appears to be living a waking dream. We left Foucault's account of madness on the notion that the soul is separated from its memories, that the trauma of having confined unreason leaves "a whole segment of the unity of soul and body... detached from the aggregate" (1965, p.92). This fragmented reality leads to a state of non-being where hallucinations, illusions and chimeras positions social life in a cycle of error, or in Freudian terms; in a state of avoidance of the pain such desires might cause. Foucault explains that madness is not imagination, it is "beyond imagination, and yet it is profoundly rooted in it; for it consists merely in allowing the image a spontaneous value, total and absolute truth.; the madman surrenders to its immediacy" (1965, p.94). He also acknowledges that one surrenders to
madness only from being too preoccupied with the object; a Kleinian argument, where a part of the self is projected into the object (here the image). The language of madness must necessarily originate in reason, but it is “enveloped in the prestige of the image” (ibid, p.95), i.e. reason imposes a value on the image to which madness cannot relate, thus finding itself excluded. Still, the image expresses both reason and madness; a trickery and an illusion offered by the artist to which we appear to choose between the reality principle and the pleasure principle.

Deleuze refers to the theological, the oneiric and the erotic when discussing phantasms as elusive simulacra with a higher degree of independence and mobility as they exist beyond the realm of the visible (1969, pp. 275-276). Phantasms, he argues, “render the mind attentive” (ibid) and when it is separated from the external world, as in the case of dreaming, the anima can perceive repressed visions, “like ghosts”, that relate to desire and passion. Simulacra, he argues, can only be perceived as an aggregate or as image, due to the processes of clinamen where the “simulacra produce the mirage of a false infinite in the images which they form” which creates the “double illusion of an infinite capacity for pleasure and an infinite possibility of torment” (ibid, p. 277). It is in “amorous desire” that Deleuze finds evidence of “the bitterness and torment” associated with the drive towards pleasure as it must balance itself with the drive to avoid pain (ibid).

In Freud’s account on sexuality he uses the Oceanic metaphor, which Deleuze alluded to earlier, to describe a feeling of something eternal that threatens to flood our lives where reason suggests swimming in the calmer waters as a measure of self-control and abstinence (1930, pp. xii-xiv). It becomes impossible not to liken this metaphor to the Ship of Fools sailing out into the open ocean where the madman happily sets sail while reason necessarily stands back to instead admire Bosch’s painting of the occasion, at a distance but not embarrassed to look. Similarly, reason does not hesitate to position itself in the theatres where Alas! Hermione, at long last, approaches. Hermione; confined passion, unreason, the repressed unconscious, the Other, the common man and woman, the truth of
madness; finally enters centre stage and reason holds its breath waiting for the 
drama to unfold.

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As the first act begins, on the opening night of Racine’s Andromaque (1667), where 
Orestes enters Pyrrhus’ court in vain anticipation that Hermione will leave with him, 
the audience of reason bears witness to the first great tragedy of the classical 
period, at least if one is to believe Foucault’s account of the occasion in Madness 
and Civilisation (1965). The drama unfolds and the audience witnesses how Orestes’ 
love for Hermione leads him to promise that he will avenge her contempt for 
Pyrrhus, a task which he finds himself beaten to by his Greeks who murder Pyrrhus 
after finding out about his recognition of Astyanax as the King of Troy. Hermione, in 
the meantime, regrets her proposition to Orestes and on hearing about the murder 
kills herself on Pyrrhus’ body. Orestes now begins a tormented journey into the 
eternal night where the illusion of gaining Hermione’s love leads him into madness 
and delirium. The Erinnys come to carry Orestes away in furious punishment for 
his “amorous desire”, their sovereignty over unreason manifests itself as the “final 
destiny and truth” (Foucault, 1965, p. 114). As the curtain falls, it falls on the 
Renaissance as well, and madness enters a world of non-being, of dream and 
illusion, where it is no longer understood as a symbol of the Other but simply a 
symbol of nothingness. Where, in the last act of a Shakespeare or a Cervantes’ 
tragedy, madness liberated truth and restored reality, we now see the dawn of a 
new era where madness is simply portrayed as error.

The image of Hermione’s love leads Foucault to exclaim that she is “the ultimate 
truth of madness” (1965, p. 114) as she also boards the Ship together with so many 
Others and sets sail into the Freudian ocean of the unconscious. While the lights go 
up and the audience rises and under a growing murmur of voices leave the theatre, 
reason appears content with her confinement while Orestes slumbers behind the 
curtain. After this sublime experience by the creative mastermind reason re- 
emerges into a city whose night they know how to control; this night does not
belong to Orestes, it belongs to them, and satisfied with this tragic knowledge they disperse into a darkness that will soon turn to day, and light will again filter into the space of conscious thought.
Part II

The Field
2:1  Field(work) - Introduction

“intellectuals are still borne on the backs of the common people”
(De Certeau, 1984, p.25)

At the break between renaissance and classical thinking, a significant point in time in the history of madness, the collective city finds itself “swept away” by the force of reason as a part of the union of the body and the soul is detached from the aggregate (Foucault, 1965). It is the grievance associated with this psychically distressing process that we have traced in the preceding part of this thesis, where a literary, analogous, approach has been taken through two parallel themes. Firstly, by exploring the rise of reason and conscious thought along with the confinement of Hermione as a metaphorical image of error, the embodiment of the Other and the unconscious; and secondly, by outlining the psychoanalytical processes whereby traumatic experiences are dealt with psychically through a number of defence mechanisms that manifests themselves in collective social life and form part of a production of spatial perceptions. It is against these theories that the next part will now approach the historic city more specifically to apply the meta-narrative of the first part to this thesis’ field of study; to Edinburgh’s Old Town.

This part will not consider a total history of the Old Town in a vain attempt to present an alternative reading of its past. Instead it will construct a criticism of the Old Town to show its decline into simulacrum (Deleuze, 1969; Baudrillard, 1981); into the celebration of a generalised history (Foucault, 1969). It will be shown to have developed into a space that simulates the idea of history to such an extent that it has forgotten what De Certeau’s concept of “everyday historicity” (1984) really entails, where the Old Town has instead assumed a nostalgic “panic-stricken production of the real” as Baudrillard suggests (1981). These arguments will be interspersed with the author’s personal work which formed part of the exhibited material in the Schop Gallery in September and October 2010 (figure 1).
Foucault suggests, in his account on madness, that he had “not tried to write the history of that language, but rather the archaeology of that silence” (1965, p. xi), and in order to establish, or re-establish, a conversation between reason and unreason, between the conscious and the Other, between the modern man and madness, we gradually need to approach a relationship that can be likened to that between a therapist and the client where an archaeological process is necessary in order to expose a repressed and silenced past. Ultimately, in therapy, the client must face the past in order to positively move forward, a process whereby the therapist “holds” (Bateman & Holmes, 1995) the client; the past is suspended, and that silence is once again given a voice. The exhibition served an important part in facilitating such an exchange of views and was perceived of as a mirror reflecting theory as well as a fragmented and archaeological investigation of the field.

The creative projects function as archaeological “residua”, a reduction of stories to a point where they blur with history and opens to a realm occupied by the unconscious, which Kearney explains as a “struggle between story and non-story” (2002, p.22) leading him to a conversation on what he calls a “wounded space”, or what Deleuze earlier called a “stirring resonance” (1969, p. 261) in literature.

Subsequently, the short projects presented here have been collected under the title...
A Residual Anthology of the City\(^1\) which, just like the title implies, is a fragmented collection of stories that highlights the in-between and asks questions of the Old Town and its population with the aim to allow subjectivity to surface.

Five projects, *Studying Tertiary Layers within the Old Town, Walking the Old Town, The Postcard Study, An Alternative Elevation of the Royal Mile* and *Voices from the City*, have been selected out of a dozen and they are presented here in chronological order. However, these projects were, importantly, carried out at the early stages of this research as its argument unfolded; much like a fragmented (re)-collection of history, and therefore represents an early process for thinking about the Old Town and investigating the city’s relationship to it, rather than presenting precise conclusions. It is for this reason that the projects are presented as discreet insertions into the text, so as to not interrupt the flow of the thesis’ narrative.

Consequently, this thesis will now shift its gaze, but first, a word on the implications of such a task. Shifting viewpoints or perspectives relate to the idea that vision, as the dominant sense of perception, especially as seen through the eyes of reason, has been afforded a supreme position. The implied distance between viewer and spectacle, such as that between the madman in chains and the reasonable man studying him, or between the audience and the drama, or between the painting and the observer, originates in vision allowing objects and performances to be experienced with caution, at arm’s length, and according to accepted societal norms. Vision is perceived of as the noblest sense, beauty is in the eye of the beholder, and reason values the visible and the physically perceivable higher than that one cannot see (Pallasmaa, 2005; Deleuze, 1969; Foucault, 1965; Jung, 1958). Unreason, for example, was confined so that one could not see it and unconsciousness was, and still is, beyond what the human being can perceive visually as exemplified earlier in the conversation on dreams and chimeras. We will

\(^1\) A full summary of the exhibited material is presented in Appendices A and B.
need to return to this conversation in subsequent chapters as this notion forms a significant part in the concluding argument as this thesis’ outcome lies in its very ability to initiate a shift of gaze.
# 2:2 The Madness of Old Town

## 2:2:1 Background

Edinburgh has a very specific topography around which its built environment has grown and for several centuries the city’s activities were focused around the long and narrow ridge with the craggy, and, from all sides save its eastern, inaccessible summit to the west. The ridge stretches for about a mile down to a valley, defined by another two vantage points, where the Queen of England has her Scottish residence. The Holyrood valley, as it is known today, is defined by Calton Hill to the north and Arthur’s Seat to the south whilst Edinburgh Castle stands tall on that craggy summit to the west. The ridge forms the well known Royal Mile from which structures, sometimes ten stories high, cling to its steep northern and southern slopes. The outline of these buildings forms a very particular silhouette against the

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### Studying Tertiary Layers within the Old Town

This project came about as a response to the most obvious frontal relationship one has with the Old Town where the topography of Edinburgh gives it a very particular presence on the skyline. The Old Town is visible from most corners of the city where its elevated position gives it a visual hierarchy onto which values and meanings are projected by reason as well as projected onto the observer. This study uses graphite on paper and digital abstraction to allow details, or tertiary layers, within the skyline to surface and juxtapose these with the more familiar image of it in order to question which one embodies the more meaningful representation of space.

What is it that one really admires about the skyline? Is it the trajectory created by linking the points of the solid elements as contrasted by the background sky, or are there perhaps other elements within the skyline that we admire more? Are there more than one skyline? Should we perhaps not admire the evidence of life within the skyline rather than the trajectory it creates? Which has the greater meaning as a signifier of history?

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![Fig. 2](image-url)
sky that situates the Old Town in a visually prominent order within the city (figure 2). For centuries the topography of the ridge, with its built environment, defined a natural boundary to the rural landscape surrounding it. Here, rich and poor, nobles and merchants, shared Edinburgh’s reasonably horizontal, largely manmade, surface, albeit with vertical hierarchal division. Life was performed on “The Mile” and at the height of the Renaissance some claim that as many as 40,000 people took part in this everyday practice (Youngson, 1966).

Framed by the sandstone skyscrapers and the sky, the North Sea glimmers to the east as a distant reminder of what expulsion really meant from this sheltered community. There is still a pub in the Old Town known as The World’s End, situated at the old city gates, and the myth maintains that there was literally no return for the poor if they decided to venture outside this boundary as the tax for re-entry was higher than most could afford. Although Foucault most probably had other places in mind when describing the Renaissance city, Edinburgh nonetheless appears to have been the very city of his imagination; here, the spectacle of madness rubbed shoulders with everyday life where the fool could be found living in the same building as Mary Queen of Scots herself!

About a century after Racine’s Andromaque (1667), a decree is signed in Edinburgh; The Proposals of 1752 (Youngson, 1966), instigated by Lord George Drummond, suggested an extension of the city boundaries to deal with a city that was getting overcrowded. Where previously there was simply Edinburgh, there were now proposals for a new town, so where Edinburgh used to be there was now the Old Town and, to the north, the New Town emerged like a rival younger sibling. One can certainly observe the effects of Lord Drummond’s document in today’s Edinburgh; New Town, as outlined in the masterplan by James Craig (1766), is most definitely physically there, and so are the key infrastructural decisions; North Bridge (1763, completed 1772 and re-built 1894-97) and South Bridge (1775, completed 1788). The General Register House by Robert Adam (1774-1786) terminates the vista at the top of North Bridge while educational buildings such as Old College, also by Robert
Adam (1789, completed 1827), *New College*, by William Playfair (1846-1850), and *The Royal High School*, by Thomas Hamilton (1825-1829), followed a few decades later whilst the *City Chambers*, by John Adam (completed 1761), was inserted just off the Royal Mile on top of a series of existing closes. The *Mary King’s Close* below, today a well visited tourist attraction, is on display as the remains of one of these closes that was decapitated at mid-height to make way for the centrally positioned symbol of reason above (Youngson, 1966).

During the Enlightenment Edinburgh became synonymous with classical reason, not just through a re-birth of the classical building style, but also through a renewed emphasis on education, health, social morals and ethics linked to science and knowledge driven by conscious thought (Youngson, 1966). History maintains that Edinburgh rose from the dirt and left its medieval epithet of *Auld Reekie* behind and instead became known as the *Athens of the North* over the century that followed *The Proposals*. But it must be stressed that the collective unconscious ought to have felt uneasy about all these sudden changes, it cannot be a coincidence that a development of this magnitude happens in the wake of European ideals calling for the sovereignty of reason and the confinement of the Other.

2:2:2 Edinburgh and Stories

The New Town developed into a hiding ground for the wealthy, where reason could comfortably, and with a renewed sense of space, look onto the Old Town from its new vantage point, at arm’s length and at a distance where vision reigned undisturbed. For the first time in history, the city is divided, not just mentally and socially, but physically, with *Princes Street Garden* (1820), developed from the drained *Nor’ Loch* in the Waverley valley, acting as a suitably picturesque foreground and division between the old and the new.

The Old Town, at this point, becomes a symbol of history as the collective conscious projects its less desirable past onto the Old Town and this social rift has shaped the
collective perception of it ever since. Institutional buildings were strategically positioned, either at visually prominent sites surrounding the Old Town or inserted directly into its urban fabric as a reminder of a new order; an order controlled by a society that no longer socialised with its past. Old Town becomes synonymous with the collective unconscious or of the Other, and reason’s ability to sit back and study it from a distance reinforces this new reality. Not only did Old Town become a place populated by the socially unfortunate, it also became a place where the city’s darkest secrets resided as a dense symbol for the desire to confine during the classical period. Consequently, Old Town has grown to symbolise Edinburgh’s origin and history; a past from which all sorts of mythical stories of clandestine events has emerged.

Thus, for example, consider Edinburgh born R.L. Stevenson’s account of the schizophrenic character in *Strange Case of Dr Jekyll & Mr Hyde* (1886). It is possible to argue that this celebrated story grew out of a situation that the author wished to critically illustrate; the story is particularly easy to identify with because it presents the reader with a tool to access a past that has been repressed by the collective psyche. Furthermore, consider the infamous tales of the grave robbers (such as William Burke and William Hare) running errands in the name of scientific reason (for Dr Robert Knox), or the many guided tours that follow a story-teller into the underground vaults of the city to hear of the miserable conditions that the people of Old Town had to endure in the past. These myths and folk-tales, nestled comfortably within the collective mind, quite literally put us in touch with ghosts, linking us with the collective unconscious. Moreover, consider the wealth of stories that has emerged from Edinburgh since this time, from authors like the other two famous Roberts of Enlightenment literature, Burns and Fergusson, to modern writers like Ian Rankin and Irvine Welsh. One is left wondering where from this continuous flow of literary creativity originates and what drives its demand. Clearly, a necessity exists to narrate the past and this has developed into a narrative tradition that is now enveloped in the very identity of the city where Edinburgh, since 2004, is acknowledged as a UNESCO City of Literature.
Walking the Old Town

This project makes an enquiry into the development of stories, into the way they appear fragmented and rarely can be memorised as a whole without losing parts of its content. The account of a walk is much like a story, which is always, in one form or another, a re-telling of previous experiences, either physical or imaginary, and the documentation of it is necessarily transient. With this in mind, this project set out to methodically record six primary and three secondary routes within the Old Town. At five second intervals a photograph was taken and when viewed as a composition these reveal how stories come about; through fragments of information. However, following a second level of methodical abstraction, where eight photographs were overlaid at varying, but set, opacity levels, a new image emerges which offers a blurred view of a forty-second period of the walk. It reveals new connections and relationships that one did not have in mind at the outset of the walk, but as such explores the many unconscious connections one makes during walking and storytelling; processes that rarely happen in strict chronological or linear orders.

The city’s appetite for stories, especially the ones about the city’s underground past, has become normalised and part of a collective identity, introjected and completely identified with. Kearney’s notion that “narratives are fibs to ward off the pain of the real” (2002, p.22) seems particularly fitting whilst De Certeau reminds us that narration is a diversionary practice, a defence and a way of “making do” within the system into which one has been displaced. Narratives, as explored through the project Walking the Old Town in figure 3, are transient, ephemeral and fail to find a
proper locus which partly explains why Edinburgh finds itself repeating a centuries-old spatial practice; to narrate is a collective defence mechanism that deals with a traumatic past.

This argument does not necessarily apply exclusively to the Old Town; it transcends a national as well as a Western attitude to story and history. However, in the Old Town it remains difficult to maintain, as Pile, Leach, Kearney, and Bolas do, that these narratives are therapeutic; the signs of stagnation are too many and further investigation into what other defences are in operation is necessary.

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Through Lefebvre’s spatial triad, one can claim that the Old Town-New Town tension presents itself as a representational space in literature as the stage for the unconscious acting out of a repressed past that only acquires a proper place in the mental and social space; a metaphorical battle between the collective conscious and unconscious, between reason and unreason, between the rational and the mad. On the other hand, Old Town as a physical space, a space of representation or a frontal relationship between signifier and signified, between people and objects, has come to represent history. The conscious application of symbolisms onto the Old Town projects, onto its users, the idea, or image, of the city’s past; a thought that has been further explored and exemplified through the project The Postcard Study (figure 4). The value of these projections clearly has economic benefits through for example the tourist industry which relies on the stratification and classification of history (Foucault, 1969). This heterogenic process of objectification or commodification of Old Town’s past extracts the “historical context” in order to consider its knowledge through static objects (De Certeau, 1984) which, of course, leads to a simplification of a particularly rich cultural heritage. Deleuze and Baudrillard would, in the first instance, refer to it as copies or pretensions, but as we necessarily identify with this image to “fit in”, or to simply avoid going mad, it becomes, in the second, third, fourth… instance, simulation or simulacra; “necessarily internalised” (Deleuze). Reason values this image to such an extent that
The Postcard Study

This project again questions the obvious frontal relationship with the Old Town; the way it is commonly viewed at a comfortable distance and often from the vantage position of the New Town. This study frames a collection of postcards from Edinburgh, from various points in time over the past century, and presents them suspended with the messages facing the observer in front of a mirror so that the face of the postcard is still visible but hidden from immediate view.

A postcard from any city generally has particularly distinct symbols of spaces of representation on the front where the aim is to, in an instant, communicate the location of the sender to the receiver. A postcard from Edinburgh has changed very little over the past hundred years, its symbols remain rigid where a handful of images, albeit from alternating angles and perspectives, successfully identifies the city and have managed to transcend time. On the flip side, the messages fail to achieve anything but a temporal locus. Notes from the sender, of very ordinary experiences and familiar events, disappear, seemingly unnoticed. But which side of the postcard is the most important? Which side tells the most meaningful story, about life, experience and history?

documents now envelop and protect the Old Town, as well as the New Town, to such a degree that it risks suffocation. The “panic-stricken production of the real” (Baudrillard), of the nostalgic illusion that the Old Town is authentic, of the stratification of history, has brought progress to a virtual standstill where the documentation of static events takes priority over the dynamic process of history itself. Freud reminds us that “man has always sought to materialise memory” (1930, p.28) and it is perhaps this necessity to maintain Old Town as a space of representation, since we fear to literally go mad if we no longer have an object onto which we can project a lost part of the collective soul, that we have consciously constructed rational documentations that seek to protect it.
The conscious, overseeing authority of reason, what Foucault’s concept of the panoptic eye implies, controls spaces where its practices conform to reason’s ideals as a process of “making do”. The idea of history; an image, a mental construction and a melancholic state of being, has been fully introjected into the collective identity and projected onto the Old Town. The meaning attached to its objects can only be related to if one identifies with its practices; what De Certeau called “a triumph of place over time” (1984). Old Town has been converted into a monument of history; “the uncertainties of history” (ibid) have been successfully transformed into readable spaces by reason and evidence is visible all around. This thought is exemplified through the project An Alternative Elevation of the Royal Mile (figure 5), that discusses the scale and relevance of a particularly frontal elevation in the Old Town.

An Alternative Elevation of the Royal Mile

This study positions itself within the Old Town, rather than admiring it from a distance, and explores the perception of its built environment by asking questions around the notion of scale, relevance and awareness. It positions itself on the Royal Mile, which orders spatial practices within the Old Town through its many dominant spaces of representation, and studies its elevation. But rather than taking in the whole elevation as one composition, as one would typically represent it, this project studies the minute details within, much like the skyline project. Through a series of graphite rubbings or imprints at various points from west to east, and located in space not by means of Cartesian distance but by the author’s footsteps, one can present an alternative elevation of the Royal Mile. The relationship between these imprints, these traces of time and erosion, are thereby given a scale and proportion whilst maintaining a representation that questions the relevance of the obvious frontal relationship one commonly has with this well-known elevation. It also questions the awareness one has of the details that comprise it.

Fig. 5
It is tempting to conceptualise this argument through Hermione, as error, or the ultimate truth of madness. However, it is important to remember that Hermione necessarily produces herself as underlined by Lefebvre’s and Deleuze’s triads; the Other is not a separate entity, the body is inherently attached to its soul (Foucault), and so, as part of the self is projected into the object and possibly cause tension and anxiety, it is nonetheless clearly self-inflicted. The pretender relies on the foundation and the produced object for its existence (Deleuze), spaces of representation and representations of space are defined by spatial practices (Lefebvre) and consequently, reason and unreason are inextricably linked. The city is left with diversionary practices, or palliative measures, or defences, to minimise the pain as inflicted on the self but there is nobody to blame. As a result, it would seem fitting to instead admit defeat and join the crowds as they enjoy Hermione’s performance, according to Freud a more mature approach, unless, of course, one chooses another route, much more emotionally difficult and one which will have to wait for the next part of the thesis.

2:2:3 Edinburgh and Performance

In the meantime, let us consider the maturity of Old Town. If in literature one finds evidence of the city’s primitive defences against trauma with narrativisation as the tool that connects us with the collective unconscious of the city, then performances, like Leach suggests, are the acts that turn space into place proper. In few places is this statement as clearly evident as in Edinburgh which is perhaps most visited for one reason; The Edinburgh Festival. This annual event converts the entire city into an overwhelming display of art and performances where its inception in 1947 satisfied a post-war desire to bring happiness back into the everyday lives of the capital’s population. The Festival as a metaphor for a national defence mechanism to the traumas of wartime is rather obvious, but as expressing a city’s historic grievances perhaps a bit less straightforward.
Art was clearly one of the cornerstones in the new order that developed in the classical period of the Enlightenment, and Edinburgh was no exception. The city’s cultural capital is still considerable and finds expression in numerous ways. There are, of course, the many museums and galleries housing exhibitions that span from traditional renaissance and classical paintings to contemporary installations and shows. Many of these buildings were constructed under the management of reason during the late 18th and early 19th century (Youngson, 1966) such as the Royal Scottish Academy (1822-1826) and the National Gallery (1850-1857) by William Playfair followed by the National Portrait Gallery in 1889-1895 by Robert Rowand Anderson. The Galleries of Modern Art, the Scottish National Gallery of Modern Art (1825-1828) by William Burn and the Dean Gallery by Thomas Hamilton (1833), originally had other functions; the John Watson’s Hospital and the Dean Orphanage respectively, and they were converted into museums in the late 20th century involving amongst others Terry Farrell and Partners. Other museums and galleries, from the National Museum of Scotland (1999) by Benson + Forsyth Architects to small scale galleries such as the Fruitmarket Gallery (1991) by Richard Murphy or the Stills Gallery (1996) by Reiach and Hall Architects, are part of a present-day movement that seeks to re-interpret the visitor experience of art and make it more accessible and less intimidating to the common man and woman. The city prides itself on the wealth of experiences these institutions offer and again realises their economic function as visitor attractions. These buildings signify particularly frontal spaces of representation where the spatial practice one most obviously engages in, is that of the spectator who observes at a distance. The experience is predominately visual where it is socially acceptable, even considered intellectual, to examine and discuss the potentially clandestine or sublime, and often unconscious, messages of the artist’s representations.

It is impossible to know, with any accuracy, whether Edinburgh developed its taste for art as a result of reason considering it a necessity for the expression of an enlightened society or as an effect of reason’s repression of a whole range of socially unacceptable moral values leading these to find expression through such
mediums as art. It is, however, another fascinating coincidence that the city found it a necessity, in the aftermath of the rupture in renaissance and classical thinking, to control and present creative expressions through the authority of the museum, and that it still values it so highly today.

So, while the city nurtures its identity as a City of Literature it also cultivates one of culture and art, and especially through the museum, but in August every year it explodes in a display that is so overwhelming in scale that it is impossible to take in. The Festival, or The Fringe, as the name suggests, never discriminated or valued artistic expression differently. Consequently, The Festival can be argued to be the Other revolting against reason where Hermione escapes the confinement of the museum and roams free on the streets of the city; a reversal of signs where the surprised passer-by haphazardly gets caught up in an unexpected performance. Nonetheless, today The Festival is closely monitored and administered and Hermione has been somewhat tamed. On the Royal Mile, for example, reason overlooks and informs the street performer that he or she has a limited amount of time left as the next performance is due to start soon. Subsequently, panopticism nowadays enforces control, albeit subtly, but unfortunately at the cost of intuitive and spontaneous events, although for most that is the appearance reason succeeds in maintaining.

The Festival occupies the entire city but the epicentre of its madness is in the Old Town and more specifically on the Royal Mile where the Other finds expression in whatever media available and spectators struggles to keep up. The Royal Mile offers a stage where it is socially acceptable to meander from one form of madness to another. Under these circumstances Lefebvre’s triadic notion on the production of space (1974) becomes particularly comprehensible; in this environment, in this dominant space of representation, spatial practices that normally reside in the realm of the unconscious find a place proper where representations of space surface, at least temporarily, and a blurring between Old Town’s frontal relationship with its practices and the more underground activities occur. History as a stagnant,
frontal and simulated object, in Baudrillard’s negative sense, blurs with history in its immediate irruption or with the positive notions of simulacra as a false pretender that has a value in its own right as suggested by Deleuze.

It is hard to argue with Old Town’s existence as predominately relating to these two modes of existence as outlined above; through narrativisations and performances. These are clearly temporal practices that in De Certeau’s terms are diversionary, or, from a psychoanalytical perspective, defensive. These various modes of expression are projected onto the built environment of the Old Town that provides a static setting. What remains intriguing is the timing of the origin of this situation and also what would happen if that setting significantly changed. The frightening challenge lies in allowing unreason a proper place but in doing so the risk is that Old Town will change and painful collective memories attached to it will surface. Herein lies the essence of this thesis’ first argument and it relates to the initial observation, as made through Foucault, that it is as if historians are frightened of the unknown, that history strives towards the description of the monument, that there exist an underlying desire, or necessity, to extract context into isolated documents, which according to De Certeau “eliminates the operations of speakers” (1984). This state of existence can only lead to an alienated description of a general history that ignores elements of “everyday historicity” (ibid), i.e. our (in)ability to only consider knowledge in static objects inevitably leads to stagnation. The dynamism inherent in the performances of the mad must acquire a proper place in order to survive, or else they will remain at a shallow level of interaction between performer and spectator, forever experienced at a distance.

People’s relationship to the Old Town is two-fold as suggested by the extensive collection of “voices” in the project Voices from the City (figure 6). On the one hand, the cynical bitterness in acknowledging that the Old Town is driven by economic factors; on the other, that Old Town triggers spiritual, oneiric or passionate emotions that are almost phantasmatic by Deleuzian description (1969). These
Voices from the City

This study is a combination of two projects. First, a number of interviews were conducted around the city in order to collect sound bites from its population about their perception of the Old Town. Secondly, a section through one of the narrow closes was constructed that discusses the stratification of stories and history into which these sound bites were inserted as an exploration of the many alternative, yet similar, stories there are.

Altogether sixty people were interviewed in twelve different locations and they were each asked seven open-ended questions:

- What is the first thing that comes to your mind when you think of the Old Town?
- How often are you in the Old Town?
- What, if anything, do you like about the Old Town? Why?
- Is there anything you dislike about the Old Town? Can you say what, and why?
- Some people say that the Old Town is overly romanticised, do you agree/disagree? Why?
- Could you mention 2 things you would like to see in the Old Town in the future? Why?
- If given the chance would you live in the Old Town? Why? Why not?

The data collected from these interviews have been collated in two ways, by transcription and tabulation to tease out common denominators (Appendix A), and by editing the voice recordings into three typical sound bites (part of Appendix B), one for each “demographic ring”; the Old Town, the inner city ring and the outer city ring. It was these three edited sound bites that were inserted into the section.

perceptions, on the one hand, reinforce the Old Town as a space loaded with symbolical meanings, but, on the other, demonstrates the strategic manufacturing of it for reason’s financial gains. Generally, a reluctance towards any change in the Old Town was evident. Such an idea seemed adverse to its function as a signifier of history, and it was also clear that people identified with the Old Town through its many narratives and performative events. The fear seemed to be that if Old Town, as a space of representation, changed, then such an identification process would be altered, which for many was unthinkable. This, of course, further demonstrates the processes of introjection and simulacra, and instead it remains far more convenient
to maintain Old Town as it is, through palliative measures and pretensions such as art, literature, performances, spectacle, festival and comedy, manifestations of a city that has collectively matured, but not yet faced up to its past.

Voices from the City continued

The section through one of the Old Town closes, onto which so many clandestine narratives are projected, is a section through a representational space that shows how stories have various levels of frontal relevance. Our present day lives have meanings attached to it that are very different to what past generations had and will change and alter through generations to come. Thus, one can begin to speak of embedded stories, metaphorically subsiding into the fabric of the city as other stories replace or enrich them, as well as walls that whisper of events gone by. There is no judgement on the value of these stories, the sound bites are considered equally important to, for example, Ian Rankin’s bestseller accounts of the same space.

There are clearly numerous questions asked in this project, and also an abundance of answers. But this project, more than anything, asks whether one is prepared to listen to the silent whispers of the common people, whether one is prepared to hear out Hermione’s ordinary and sometimes mundane account of a space that is perhaps more vividly told by one of the city’s great authors. Whose story holds more meaning or value, and who is in a position to pass that judgement?

Thus, Old Town’s raison d’être has been reduced to representation, history expresses itself through residual texts and stories, the collective unconscious is given a temporal place through performance, and we have, as has been demonstrated, necessarily identified with this trajectory of events. The representation of a trajectory is exactly what both Foucault (1969) and De Certeau
(1984) use in order to exemplify the flattening out of history, of the surface effect such an action creates. To trace the form of a trajectory; to link a sequence of events so that it can be wholly and instantly perceived, reduces the value of each point on that line to representation. The eye can immediately understand such a projection onto, for example, a map, which aids the interpretation of its function, but it fails in communicating a deeper meaning as it becomes static and immobile. There is much more to be said on these notions, on vision, on representation, on objects, the image, on the gaze and the mirror, and on illusion, the imaginary and the real. These concepts will make up the concluding part of the thesis that will propose a double illusion, a trickery of the trajectory, to demonstrate the complexities involved in attempting the impossible task to document and contextualise the richness of Old Town’s history.
Part III

Psychotherapy and the City
3:1 The Mirror and Mourning

3:1:1 The Real and the Ego Ideal

As was first theorised by Freud in “On Narcissism” (1914), the early experiences of childhood constructs what he coined an “ego ideal”, from which the objects-relation model was later developed redefining Freud’s terminology of the repressed representation of the self into concepts of internalisation and introjection. Freud explains how one constructs ideals based on early relationships through objects such as parents as a way of projecting before oneself a lost narcissism that one enjoyed as a child where the ideal was oneself. This substitute forms a defence against future relationships that one experiences as unstable or insecure (ibid, pp. 415-417).

These psychic processes have been mentioned previously but we need to expand on them before moving on to a conversation on mourning rooted in Pile’s earlier question about how one exorcises a city’s ghosts without further repressing their inquiries. Thus, as the object-relations model has already taught us, one creates an internal world of representation where one internalises early relationships which subsequently form “templates” for future ones. These stem from motivational drives for seeking relationships with others which, like Freud suggested, act as narcissistic substitutes or defences against unsatisfying external relationships where pathological responses can occur if the object relationships fail (Bateman & Holmes, 1995, pp. 40-44).

Lacan’s entry into this debate is intriguing as it positions Freud’s writings in a wider social and cultural perspective. Like the object-relation theorists maintain, Lacan also argues that a process of identification occurs in infancy through relationships with desired objects. In order to successfully enter what he calls the Symbolic Order, which is the cultural world of representation that we are born into, one passes through the Imaginary mirror stage which is a process whereby one, narcissistically
and mistakenly, assumes the image in the mirror to be the true self. This phase of the Imaginary separates us from our childhood world of objects which is forever experienced as a loss and when confronted with the Symbolic Order of language a space is created that is immediately inaccessible to the conscious, i.e. the unconscious, or what Lacan called the *Real* (Lacan, 1966, pp. 441-446; Bateman & Holmes, 1995, pp. 14-15).

Thus, the “ego ideal” as constructed in infancy is forever beyond reach, and although the ego believes itself to be in control of the mind, just like reason assumes sovereignty over unreason, the Real is in fact the world of dreams, subjectivity and madness. Lacan writes that “we can thus understand the inertia characteristic of the formations of the I, and find there the most extensive definition of neurosis just as the captation of the subject by the situation gives us the most general formula for madness” (1966, p. 445). Lacan essentially arrives at a conclusion that positions madness at the core of human activity; to search, in vain, for that lost ideal self as we cannot know the Real. Nietzsche introduced this dilemma to us in the very first paragraph of the thesis; what can man indeed know about himself (1885-86), Freud has spoken of palliative measures (1930), Foucault has demonstrated the stagnation of history through the confinement of unreason (1965; 1969), Deleuze has argued for the simulacra as a repressed pretender with a value in its own right (1969), De Certeau spoke of the Other only acquiring a temporal locus (1984), Pile exposed the value of speaking to ghosts (2000), and in the end Hermione stands alone as the only truth of Lacan’s Real, as simulacra or as “the ultimate truth of madness”. This realisation would in itself seem to lead to a sense of stagnation or alienation with the world but as has been widely discussed already, much of these processes are not necessarily pathological as successful defence mechanisms prevent the healthy mind from descending into madness, although this is at the cost of ever knowing *the Real*.
3:1.2  Transference and Counter-transference

In working through pathological formations in the therapeutic setting, Lacan, as a psychoanalyst, agrees that he can “accompany the patient to the ecstatic limit of the ‘Thou art that’”, but adds that “it is not in our mere power... to bring (the patient) to that point where the real journey begins” (1966, p. 446). This notion, a subject of much misunderstanding in therapy, is one of the most important aspects of the discipline; the therapist can only contain and hold pathological experiences during the process of working through them but cannot provide the answers the patient might be seeking as these exist within the Real, and must therefore be interpreted by the patient.

The mirror is a powerful metaphorical tool in psychoanalysis, not only as a metaphor for a falsely projected image of a delusive sense of self, but also as the therapist as the metaphorical mirror for the client to reach a point of self-realisation. For Lacan, successful therapy involved the exploration of desires linked to the infantile relationships with objects and their effect on the Imaginary stage through the Symbolic Order as mediated by language (in Bateman & Holmes, 1995, p. 15) where the disentanglement of the Imaginary would eventually lead to “that point where the real journey begins”. For psychoanalysts like Klein, Bion and Winnicott, the self experiences a distortion of reality linked to unsuccessful object relationships or misperception due to processes of projective identification (ibid, pp. 23, 82-87). Regardless of theoretical approach, the psychoanalytic relationship depends heavily on the interaction between patient and analyst in therapeutic sessions through concepts referred to as transference and counter-transference which provide non-verbal tools to reach and expose a client’s internal workings. The mirroring analogies are obvious in this setting and the therapeutic interaction is an essential process in moving from a state of pathological melancholia into mourning.

Bateman and Holmes (pp. 95-118) explain how transference and counter-transference can be seen as a “four-way matrix” between the conscious and unconscious worlds of both parts involved in the therapeutic relationship. They
explain how in early, classical or Freudian, analysis, the analyst was seen as a cold mirror that simply reflected the unconscious emotions and meanings as projected by the client. The analyst, as the expert and aware of this transference, holds these unconscious projections and reflects them back when it is believed that they can re-internalise them in a more manageable form. Past traumas and psychic distress can therefore be re-experienced, re-constructed or re-presented as a necessary process of working through, and eventually overcoming, trauma. However, the contemporary view emphasises the interactive aspects of therapy where the analyst is part of a process of aiding the “emergence of latent meanings” (ibid) and forming new relationships that are based on past experiences. The analyst is still aware of these interactive processes and holds them for the client but there is much more focus on the subjective constructions and meaning of past experiences in the present life of the patient as opposed to simply re-constructing an objective past reality. Transference is seen as a “probe” that can provoke development rather than mere representation where the analyst’s personality comes into this matrix of unconscious exchanges.

Some see the transference relationship as “a personal narrative truth” and disagree with the notion of a reconstruction of an inner truth, of Lacan’s Real, as it is believed that there is only the construction of the past in light of the present, i.e. a modification where the emphasis is on the present and latent meaning (ibid, p.101). Others, coming from the point of view of projective identification and externalised (projected) internal objects, “cautions against a too simplistic a link between the representation in the present and the actual past” (ibid, p.101) since transference involves both fantasies constructed during Lacan’s Imaginary stage and reality. Essentially, these are variations on the same theme which all emphasise a positive development through the therapeutic relationship.

If transference is seen as the projection of emotions by the patient onto the analyst then counter-transference is the emotional response of the analyst, hence the notion of the “four-way matrix”. This is clearly closely linked to the concept of
projective identification and is considered “complimentary”, while “concordant”
counter-transference includes notions of empathy and what Sandler calls “primary
identification” or “automatic mirroring” (in Bateman & Holmes, 1995, pp. 111-113).
This emphasises the importance of the analyst’s attunement to their personal
unconscious reactions to the client’s projections and emotional identifications and
makes the therapeutic process a dynamic two-way exchange, individualised and
intrinsically subjective. Thus, the analyst’s ability for “affective resonance” to
empathy and primary identification is paramount in successfully aiding the client to
move through mental distress and trauma. This process demonstrates the mirror
analogy as subjective, active as well as interactive, complementary and above all
equal (Bateman & Holmes, 1995, pp. 113-117).

The contemporary view of the therapeutic relationship echoes earlier suggestions
by Lefebvre (1974) and Baudrillard (1981) of the constant production of space, or of
reality as produced perception. The active mirror re-produces the past but is tied up
in the present and also with the relationship with the mirror (the therapist) and it
therefore necessarily becomes a simulation. In the discussion on melancholia,
where psychic distress is turned inwards, or introjected, one must necessarily
acknowledge that processes of identification, through narrativisation and
performativities as explored by Leach, De Certeau, Deleuze et al, can only ever
serve as palliative measures, or defences, against events causing emotional distress
or trauma. These temporal tactics (De Certeau) as ways of “making do” are
essentially simulations of the Real, which, for Baudrillard, are negative where the
real is lost due to the “murderous capacity of images” (1981, p. 388) and the
Hyperreal is instead created out of the Imaginary (ibid). Baudrillard’s use of
terminology reverberates Lacan’s use of the same where the Real is inaccessible
and enveloped in images and representation.

However, in order to, as Pile asks, exorcise a city’s ghosts, one must necessarily face
the past, and through a process of, for example, therapy work through the effect of
past experiences that are necessarily difficult to deal with. This paradox is central to psychoanalysis and was first developed by Freud in “Mourning and Melancholia” (1917) and later expanded by Klein who explains how loss is a recurring aspect of human life and one must learn to approach it in order to grieve; going through the mirror stage, as introduced by Lacan, is essentially the first introduction to loss and the key to living a healthy mental life is in acknowledging and reinstating the lost object internally. By internalising the object it leads to an “enrichment of the inner world which can balance the sadness about what was gone” (Bateman & Holmes, 1995, pp. 72-73).

Consequently, in perceiving the value of a simulated Real one must approach the matter obliquely, in a Deleuzian (1969) sense, and instead argue that the simulacra must necessarily be valued in its own right which will, when internalised, form part of a “personal narrative truth”. In therapy, these narratives, or unconscious processes of clinamen, become perceptible; phantasms can surface and the oneiric is allowed to inhabit the waking space of the conscious. Thus, we narrate in order to put ourselves in touch with ghosts and we perform in order to acquire a temporal locus in the world of the unconscious, and these processes are perhaps simulations where the Real remains inaccessible, but they hold an immense value in their own right. So, the criticism of the Old Town does not refer to a critique of literature, or of art, or of performance, or of the constant production of the simulacrum, but to the simple fact that the simulacrum is repressed, to the fact that we do not ask ourselves why we narrate, or perform, in the first place.

3:1:3 On Vision and the Gaze

The final chapter, and the outcome of this thesis, will shortly discuss the main piece of the exhibition as displayed in the Schop Gallery; the suspended model of Old Town hanging over a mirror, but first Pile’s exhaustive work on The Body and the City (1996) must be given recognition within the text as one of the major references for this research. His account on the geographies and spaces of the subject through
a conversation on psychoanalysis and the production of space within the context of
human geography must be overlaid with some of the key concepts outlined so far.
Furthermore, we must return to Foucault’s notion on the suspension of history, a
concept which is metaphorically similar to the psychoanalyst’s holding. Together,
Pile and Foucault inform the conclusive argument that culminates in the creative
expression as displayed in the exhibition.

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Pile draws on fellow cultural geographers’, Sibley and Rose, who in turn draw on
Freud, Lacan, Klein, Winnicott and many others, to suggest that there is a “radical
uncertainty about identity” (1996, p. 92); this, of course, is a direct reading of
Lacan’s inaccessible Real. Pile expands on Freud’s and Lacan’s conversations on
sexuality, castration and the metaphorical suggestion about the boy’s discovery of
the penis as the instigator for realising that the mother is different, i.e. the Other.
This realisation is based on the Imaginary which assumes the domination of vision
as the sense which, falsely, assumes that “the eye provides all the information
about the body it needs” (ibid, p.92). For Pile, this opens up a conversation, under
the headings *Myth Placed* and *Misplaced*, on object-relations, power structures,
masculine and feminine spaces, social hierarchies, repression, myth, performance, desire, and what he calls a “flow of psychoanalytic ideas for thinking
about the relationship between subjectivity, society and space” (ibid, p. 94). These
notions have already been covered in much detail in previous chapters and do not
necessitate repetition, but what is of interest, are the conclusions and notions that
Pile draws on the primacy of vision and the mirror.

Pile is critical of Lacan and demonstrates numerous points of disagreement. One of
these is Lacan’s inability to specify the forms of identification that occurs during the
mirror stage, other than to imply that it “involves objectification and dialectic”,
another is that he only works “within a spatio-visual understanding (of)
identifications (that) occur through the I/eye” (ibid, pp.123-124). However, it is
clear that Lacan uses the short-comings of vision to demonstrate the misrecognition
and false sense of self as created during the mirror stage. Pile argues that the developing child is immediately “captured in space” since the mirror, through vision, only offers one perspective; a “sense of anatomical incompleteness” (ibid, pp. 124-125), and therefore an erroneous image. This alienating realisation is based on the primacy of vision which Lacan holds as deeply rooted in the Symbolic order of language, i.e. in the encounter with others. At this point, however, Pile reminds us that it is important to remember that the mirror is a virtual space without a reaction and can therefore not be taken as the Other, hence the tension created when the child must face the Symbolic.

Lacan famously notes that “I see only from one point, but in my existence I am looked at from all sides” (in Pile, 1996, p. 128) which informed his argument on the split between “the image” and “the constituting presence of the subject’s gaze”. This is to say that since one, as a subject, has expectations and preconceptions when looking at an object, the image becomes what one wants see, and one feels an anxiety rising from the fact that the object, gazing back from all sides, is inevitably at a distance from you. Pile argues that the gaze always lies beyond understanding and “escapes consciousness” and explains that a blurring, of what is essentially reality, occurs; “the object depends on the gaze, while the subject is also suspended in the gaze” (1996, p. 128).

Thus, the mirror, as a setting, the object and the subject are in constant interplay through which “fantasy and desire are threaded” (ibid). This sets up a dynamism, where Pile argues that Lacan undoes space as a “passive backdrop against which bodies and subjectivity can be mapped” (ibid, p.129); space responds and “looks back”. Pile concludes by arguing that:

“Space is dynamic and active; assembling, showing, containing, blurring, hiding, defining, separating, territorializing and naming many points of capture for power, identity and meaning. While the space of vision takes a privileged place in the relationship with others… the subject is never at the centre of this scene; subjectivity is always defined against another centre.”
3:1:4 On Vision, Images and Spatial Production

In his conclusion to the section *Spaces of the Subject*, Pile juxtaposes his arguments on Freud and Lacan with Lefebvre. He explores Lefebvre’s ambivalent approach to psychoanalysis as one-dimensional; Pile argues that Lefebvre only uses it when it suits him and that he assumes psychoanalytic approaches to space to be passive, fixed and only useful “for interpreting the social relations of reproduction and representational spaces” (1996, p. 152). Pile’s argument is that Lefebvre is indeed psychoanalytical and demonstrates this by overlaying his spatial triad with Lacan’s Real, Imaginary and Symbolic orders which he re-writes accordingly;

“(Real) Spatial Practice embraces not only the organising principles of production, reproduction and consumption which form the unconscious (in its topographical and dynamic senses) of society, but also the particular locations and spatial sets characteristic of each society. Because spatial practice always returns to the same place, it not only ensures continuity and some degree of cohesion, but is also constituted through contradictory tendencies for fragmentation and disintegration” (ibid, p. 156).

“(Imaginary) Representation of Spaces is tied to spatial practices, but exists as the ways that those spatial practices are represented; this is the realm of images – conscious and/or unconscious, perceived and/or imagined – and hence of knowledge, signs and codes” (ibid, p. 157).

“(Symbolic) Representational Spaces embody complex symbolisms, which have conscious and unconscious resonances and are therefore linked to ‘underground social life’, which take on meaning only in the process of exchange and as part of a system of differences; and, because meaning is associated with value, it is here that power relations are at their most visible” (ibid, p. 157).

Although this exercise is somewhat arbitrary and not quite as straightforward as it might seem at first; the Real and the Symbolic are quite different to Lefebvre’s
interpretation and Pile even acknowledges that damage has been done, it is nonetheless particularly helpful in explaining that there is essentially more to it in both models. Pile chooses to speak of Real, Imaginary and Symbolic spatiality to define subjectivity as a site of conflict between the Real and the Symbolic; a battle that the Symbolic most often wins (ibid, p.157). In this complex matrix of dynamic exchanges and interactions in social, physical and mental space, the individual, or the subject, suffers according to Pile; these fluid spatialities “represent specific constellations of alienation, power and resistance” (ibid, p. 158).

Pile eventually arrives at a conversation about the mirror which is based on the supremacy of vision as the primary sensory organ. Lefebvre, like Lacan, refers to the eye and the gaze when arguing that the eye is related to the selection of objects while the gaze refers to detachment and Pile writes that “the image kills” (ibid, p.158). The mirror is a surface, and therefore presumably shallow, which “informs us of space”; its specular image “places the subject in the world” and is tied to the separation of the eye from the gaze (ibid, p.159). But Lefebvre points out that the image has no substance, it reflects only a virtual world, it is a reversal of signs, of right from left, and this symmetry, or dualism, reflects both the Imaginary and the Real, “the mirror-image of the body becomes the sign of the body”, of the Same and the Other. Pile summarises; “the mirror... becomes the prototype... for abstract space; it prioritises the visual and the perspectival, it detaches, it alienates and it transforms into images, signs and codes... The mirror becomes the inescapable ‘arche-texture’ of abstract... and social space” (ibid, pp.159-161). This creates a gap, or a lack in a Lacanian sense, or distance, between the image and the subject which “unleashes (a) desire which cannot attach itself to any object” (ibid, p.158).

This clearly echoes Foucault’s earlier account on the madman’s relationship to the image, which boils down to a question of power. Remember Hermione as the only truth of madness, of the Other, or the Real, her language tied up in that of reason, or the Symbolic, but “enveloped in the prestige of the image” (Foucault, 1965, p. 95). The Other is “beyond imagination”, or the Imaginary, and Foucault considers
the image as abusive where the fixation to an image, or an idea, leads down the path of melancholia. The hallucination, the error, the non-truth, of images “constitutes delirium” (defined as a move away from the proper path of reason) and leads to a form of madness (ibid, pp. 95-101). In the Symbolic order, through language and discourse, one finds the control, or the hold, over “the totality of soul and body” (ibid, p.100) where madness necessarily forms in the order of classical reason. Madness is confined and inaccessible, it is nothingness and its manifestation is necessarily erroneous since the language of madness can only express itself through a visual logic (ibid, pp. 106-107). Foucault concludes that “madness is precisely at the point of contact between the oneiric and the erroneous; it traverses... the surface on which they meet... which both joins and separates them” (ibid). He alludes to the presence of the mirror, a texture, or surface, onto which the erroneous is projected, and arrives at the same criticism of vision as we have just seen; a reverberation of his fellow nationals’ arguments, such as Lacan, Deleuze and later Baudrillard.

Deleuze, who writes on the theological and on the creation of icons that “God made man in his image and resemblance... through sin man lost the resemblance while maintaining the image... we have forsaken moral existence in order to enter into aesthetic existence” (1969, p. 257), and Baudrillard, who claims that God himself is a simulation, “reduced to the signs which attest to his existence” (1981, p. 368), both direct their inquiries to the overwhelming value given to the sign. This, of course also relate to the dominance of vision, or what Baudrillard terms “strategies of the real”, as a tool of power that aims to control through the simulation of the real. Representations, or rather false representations or simulations, develop into simulacra and Baudrillard demonstrates the successive phases of the image as (1) a reflection of a basic reality; (2) a perversion of a basic reality; (3) a masking of the absence of a basic reality; and (4) as bearing no relation to any reality whatever; the image has become its own pure simulacrum (ibid). For Baudrillard, the four phases range from good appearances (1), to evil appearances (2), to “the playing at being” an appearance (3), to the simulation of an appearance, or the Foucauldian notion of
nothingness (4) (ibid). For Baudrillard, we have moved from an age of ideology, of signs that “dissimulate something to signs”, to an age of simulacra and simulation, where there is no longer a “last judgement to separate truth from false... since everything is already dead” (ibid).

Deleuze agrees to some extent, but, as has been explained before, affords the simulacra another dimension of value and explains through a conversation on the hierarchy of senses. As sensory experiences affect the anima or the animus some are emitted from “the depths”, such as sounds, smells, tastes and temperatures, whilst visual experiences such as form and colour, appear on “the surface” (Deleuze, 1969, pp. 273-274). However, these two kinds of experiences are linked as emissions from “the depths” must pass through “the surface”; “the superficial envelopes are replaced by formerly concealed strata” (ibid). Deleuze exemplifies by arguing that the surface simulacra is in need of light, which is emitted from the depths, in order to express its form and colour, and similarly noises become voices when passing through the surface of the speaking, articulating, subject. But emissions are always understood as qualities of an object that are perceived at a distance “relative to the state of simulacra... the obstacles they encounter, the distortions to which they submit... and at the end of a long journey, the visual envelopes do not strike us with the same vigour” (ibid). Consequently, the passions inherent to the senses of “the depths” subsist in the properties of an object, but lose definition when passing through the surface, i.e. a defensive mechanism that directs the conscious mind to calmer waters, and affords vision a dominant position in the hierarchy of the senses as we enter into an “aesthetic existence”. Deleuze concludes by speaking of touch as the only sense that interacts with the object without an intermediary; “what is apprehended when we touch the surface of the object is perceived as residing in its innermost depths” (ibid).

Deleuze returns to his earlier notion of phantasms, or of the theological, the oneiric and the erotic. Touch, of course, alludes to the passions of the erotic arising from “the depths”, whilst beyond the theological sign the sublime and overwhelming
spirituality evident in everyday life, such as the formations of clouds, the crashing of waves and the height of mountains, always leave a sense of impression. These are at a scale beyond the direct connections that we feel with objects that we, as conscious, thinking, beings, can control, and Deleuze refers to Edinburgh born Hume to explain the simulacra inherent to the concept of miracles (ibid, pp. 275-276). In the oneiric phantasm, as was explained earlier, the passions and desires related to the senses of “the depths” render the mind attentive (ibid) to the simulacrum of the unconscious. Consequently, the simulacrum is no more or less true; it is simply of a different truth, its emissions remain repressed beyond visual appearance.

Lefebvre suggests that “to change life... we must first change space, absolute revolution is our self-image and our mirage – as seen through the mirror of absolute space” (in Pile, 1996, p. 148). Baudrillard also admitted this earlier, although he considered the lunatics’ simulations as “the worst form of subversion” (1966, p. 367). But by instead reading the madman’s ability for absolute revolution as positive, as outlined by Foucault (1965), one can interpret Lefebvre’s intriguing exclamation as synonymous with the simple conclusion that one must face ones fixed images, ones misconceived perceptions, and ones false mirrored self, in order to change life or to move through for example melancholia or trauma. If one does not, then space, mental, social or physical, risks feeling stagnated, or alienated, separated, or isolated. Mourning can only begin in what Foucault has come to call a suspended state; and what is being suspended is the history of ideas, of thought and of knowledge. Only then, in this unpredictable and unbalanced state, can one paradoxically, ‘see clearly’.
3:1:5  **Suspension and History**

Foucault writes in the conclusion to *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969) that “the essential task was to free the history of thought from its subjection to transcendence... to cleanse it of all transcendental narcissism” (pp. 223-224), and he goes to great length in outlining a structure, to use a word he thoroughly opposes, for how history can be suspended. His enterprise, a breakdown of the methods and operations by which one measures and appropriates history; methods that he considers flawed, as was demonstrated in the first chapter, explores how history is dominated by the sovereignty of consciousness. This enterprise generalises his approach to culture, history and civilisation into a model that can be applied to various discourses, such as for example *Madness and Civilisation* (1965) which Foucault refers to as “a very imperfect sketch” (1969, p. 16).

Foucault urges us to “rid ourselves of a whole mass of notions, each of which... diversifies the theme of continuity” (ibid, p. 23) and these include unifying concepts of *tradition*; which concerns a “temporal status” of identical succession, sameness and permanence, *influence*; which concerns causal and repetitive processes of transmission and communication, *development and evolution*; which links events according to a presumed organising principle, *spirit*; which establish a “community of meaning”, symbolisms and the autonomy of a collective consciousness, *divisions and groupings*; familiar “types of discourse” such as philosophy and religion that define “great historical individualities”, and lastly *the book, the oeuvre or the document*, which are caught up in a web of references to other books, oeuvres and documents; a “node in a network”, and therefore cannot be judged on the merit of its individuality (ibid, pp. 23-27). These unifying discourses, accepted without questioning, must remain in suspense in order to “receive every moment of discourse in its sudden irruption” (ibid, p. 28); only then can one speak of origin, authenticity, simulacra or real events. Of course, the point of origin one is searching for remains elusive and the question asked is what was not said rather than what was; i.e. “discourse must not be referred to as the distant presence of the origin,
but treated as and when it occurs” (ibid, pp.27-28). Foucault does not wish to reject these concepts but wishes to “disturb their tranquillity” and argues that the suspense serves as an interruption of their “virtual self-evidence”; their locus is not the “basis on which other questions may be posed, but that they themselves pose a whole cluster of questions”, the result of their creation must be found out and the justification of their authority scrutinised, or in short, we must realise that things might not be what they appear to be (ibid, pp. 28-29).

Once suspended, Foucault raises a myriad of questions; why this particular statement over that one, what was being said in what was said, why could it not be any other than it was? (ibid, pp. 30-31) Foucault’s curious inquiry is with the cracks and voids created at the incision of an event which opens up an unexplored field. This field could be argued to be the unconscious, or the Other, or madness, or the subjective site of ghosts where “history and subjectivity make social life” that Pile (2000) is searching for and which De Certeau (1984) termed “everyday historicity”. It is not by “recourse to a transcendental subject or to a psychological subjectivity that the regulation of (discursive) enunciations should be defined” (Foucault, 1969, p. 60-61) and it is thus in the context of discourse as a totality, into which the subject is dispersed and where his/hers discontinuity can be determined (ibid), that this thesis has treated its inquiry.
3:2 Viewing the Old Town from Hermione’s window

The model of the Old Town\(^2\) (figure 1), suspended over a mirror in the Schop Gallery, embodies this research’s reading of Edinburgh’s historic city. The model was produced as a creative extension to the many simultaneous concepts and ideas as outlined so far and is part of a process that aims to reveal, and to further establish, a complex matrix of theoretical, social and psychological relationships. This chapter dedicates itself to explaining the construction of the model in the context of the Old Town; untangling the meanings attached to it and conceptualising the key theoretical arguments as made in the preceding chapters. Questions of representation, vision, simulacra, simulation, interpretation and identification will be methodically addressed and criticised where the model aims to mediate conclusions whilst remaining open for individual interpretation.

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\(^2\) Fully presented as part of Appendix B
3:2:1 The Idea; Conceptual Construction

At the beginning, the question of representation presents itself as a dilemma as has been theorised through Foucault, Lacan, Deleuze, Baudrillard et al, and it needs to be addressed from the outset. An image, or object, in an exhibition depends on the subject’s preconceptions and responses in “the depths” (Deleuze) for its interpretation and for the collective acquisition of meaning. Thus, the image or representation will immediately develop into simulacra, into something which the creator did not intend it to signify. This is not necessarily a problem, but it must be acknowledged, and as a consequence, and bearing this in mind, the representation of the Old Town in model form instead aims to pose a series of questions through which our relationship with the Old Town, with its many existing objects as particularly strong signifiers of history, can be explored.

First of all, the model sets out with the aim to trick vision; secondly it suggests that there are many different perspectives from which the Old Town can be seen; thirdly, and consequently, the model distorts the preconceived perceptions of the Old Town’s urban form to question its objectivity; and lastly, and again consequently, the suspended model encourages personal interpretation and collective reflection as a process of mourning that aims to encourage the establishment of new connections and identifications. However, before we can proceed to the analysis of what meaning the model could possibly hold, its construction must be understood as it is intrinsically linked to the finished exhibited object, just like madness is necessarily expressed through the language of reason.

Using Baudrillard’s notion of the four phases of an image one starts with a “good image”; (1) an idea that forms in the mind about the representation of the built environment of the Old Town; this idea is a reflection of a basic reality (1981, p. 368). Secondly, (2) a commonly accepted concept for the representation of such a reality is used and can be found in the map, and, in this instance, more specifically, in the OS map of the Old Town from 2007 (figure 2). The map, as a commonly
accepted basis for relating to the Old Town’s urban form, projects solid blocks (buildings) arranged around voids (streets, squares and closes) onto a flat surface which aids the navigation of the subject in space. Its urban form is often referred to as the fishbone structure with Edinburgh Castle as the head, the Royal Mile as the spine and the Holyrood Palace as the tail, with its secondary bones made up of the many closes perpendicular to the Royal Mile. This common architectural representation locates the Old Town in Cartesian space and its form is often identified with in terms of uniqueness and authenticity, and is apparently something one must pay close attention to in the development of new buildings. However, as a projected form it fails to communicate anything but a trajectory; it is a flattening out of all those things relating to history, subjectivity and life onto a one-dimensional surface and the map must therefore be treated with the same caution that Foucault treats the document. Baudrillard, consequently, would in the second phase of images consider the map an “evil image” in the sense that it perverts and masks a basic reality (ibid).

In the third phase, (3) the blocks on the map are extruded and a three-dimensional trajectory is achieved which leads to another common tool of architectural representation; the model. A model of the Old Town, based on the map with its solids and voids, represent a scaled illustration where the eye can overlook and take in Old Town’s form as a totality; the panoptic eye gives sovereignty to vision, reason and conscious perception. Still, such a representation fails to present any conversation on Hermione and her friends and the model is therefore seen as an
image that “plays at being” an appearance as it masks the absence of a basic reality (ibid).

In the fourth and final phase of abstraction, (4) the model is, in the first instance, suspended and, in the second instance, a mirror is introduced over which the model hovers. The suspended model does not, however, simply freeze a moment in time by flatly conceptualising Foucault’s notion on suspension. Instead the suspended object projects itself onto the mirror which produces an image that resembles the footprint of the Old Town but which is not, due to the one-dimensionality of the eye (one can only see the model and its mirror image from one perspective at a time), any longer true according to the Cartesian parameters of the map since that would involve dictating a perspective from which the two-dimensional mirror image of the three-dimensional model must be viewed. Consequently, in the third and final instance, these perspectives are further distorted as each block is considered individually and scaled depending on the distance at which it is suspended from the reflective surface. Such a simulation must happen at the expense of vision being able to physically perceive the totality of the model, and the image created in the mirror will therefore no longer “bear any relation to reality whatever” as it becomes pure simulacra; the final phase in the production of the image (ibid). However, this will be argued to, in the Deleuzian sense, instead restore the model’s truthfulness, as the true footprint of the Old Town exists beyond vision and what the eye can physically perceive.

Consequently, these are the parameters from which the conceptual construction of the model forms; they are its artistic language. Its physical construction, however, depends, in the same way that madness depends on the language of reason for its expression, on the parameters set by a rational collective conscious and the physical process of abstraction of the Old Town in model form must therefore be revealed; the language of reason must be explained and made available. The model depends on a high degree of accuracy and the methodology applied to the physical construction of the model has been developed from mathematical formulas, and
made use of instruments such as computer programs and laser printers, to make every effort to ensure precision. It is important that the model was constructed, or rather abstracted, correctly within the established language of geometry in order for an argument to be made for the model’s truthfulness, or correctness, as existing beyond vision; this process is presented in the next section.

3:2:2 The Model; Physical Construction

The model takes its starting point from the OS map (figure 2), printed at a scale of 1:1750, from which the three-dimensional blocks are extruded. When suspended over the mirror at a set distance from the reflective surface, the scale of the projected image is altered and distorted. Still, each block retains its geometric parameters when considered individually in the mirror, albeit at a different scale, and so, although the projected image is distorted due to the suspension, which the eye interprets as an erroneous image, the proportionate relationship between each block is retained as long as they are at the same distance from the mirror. However, the projected image, at this scale, remains remarkably similar to the printed version of the map. Thus, to further distort the image and amplify this abstraction, the blocks are randomly split into five levels, each at a specific distance away from the mirror surface. Each block must therefore be enlarged according to a set ratio depending on the distance from the mirror in order to retain the proportionate relationship to blocks that are suspended closer to the mirror. The further away a block is from the mirror, the larger the block needs to be for its perceived size to appear in proportion to neighbouring blocks closer to the mirror and vice versa. The ratio dictating the proportionate enlargement, 1+y/s, is outlined in the formula below (figure 3).
From figure 3 follows that when any block, as viewed at the centre point of that block in the mirror, is at a distance $s$ from the mirror, its perceived length is $p$. At an additional distance $y$ from the mirror, the block needs to increase by ratio $1 + \frac{2k}{p}$ to retain its perceived length $p$ when viewed from the centre point $o$. It also follows, from figure 4, that, in order for the block to retain its overall proportions, $\frac{2k}{p} = \frac{2f}{b}$, even when $b \neq p$. 

Fig. 3

Fig. 4
Since all blocks are of different sizes and geometries, the ratio $1 + 2k/p$ needs to be re-written in terms of their distance from the mirror, i.e. in terms of $s$ and $y$ as outlined below (figure 5).

\[
\text{ratio} = 1 + \frac{2k}{p}
\]

\[
T = t_1 + t_2
\]

\[
T^2 = \left(\frac{p}{2} + k\right)^2 + (s + y)^2 = (t_1 + t_2)^2
\]

\[
t_1^2 = \frac{p}{2} + s^2
\]

\[
t_2^2 = k^2 + y^2
\]

\[
T^2 = \left(\frac{p}{2} + k\right)^2 + (s + y)^2 = \left(\sqrt{\frac{p}{2} + s^2} + \sqrt{k^2 + y^2}\right)^2
\]

\[
\left(\frac{p}{2} + k^2 + pk + s^2 + y^2 + 2sy\right) = \left(\frac{p}{2} + s^2 + k^2 + y^2 + 2\left(\sqrt{\frac{p}{2} + s^2}\right)\left(\sqrt{k^2 + y^2}\right)\right)
\]

\[
(pk + 2sy)^2 = 4\left(\left(\frac{p}{2} + s^2\right)\left(k^2 + y^2\right)\right)
\]

\[
p^2k^2 + 4s^2y^2 + 4pksy = 4\left(p^2k^2 + \frac{p^2y^2 + p^2s^2k^2 + s^2y^2}{4}\right)
\]

\[
p^2k^2 + 4s^2y^2 + 4pksy = p^2k^2 + p^2y^2 + 4s^2k^2 + 4s^2y^2
\]

\[
4pksy = p^2y^2 + 4s^2k^2
\]

\[
4sy = \frac{p^2y^2}{pk} + 4\frac{s^2k^2}{pk}
\]

\[
q = \frac{k}{p}
\]

\[
4sy = \frac{y^2}{q} + 4qs^2
\]

\[
4syq = y^2 + 4q^2s^2
\]

\[
0 = y^2 + 4q^2s^2 - 4syq
\]

\[
0 = (y - 2qs)^2
\]

\[
0 = y - 2qs
\]

\[
2qs = y
\]

\[
q = \frac{y}{2s}
\]

\[
k = \frac{y}{2s}
\]

\[
\text{ratio} = 1 + \frac{2k}{p} = 1 + \frac{y}{s}
\]

Fig. 5

Thus, a ratio can be applied to each level of blocks and the blocks can be scaled accordingly using a set point of reference, i.e. each block’s centre point. When seen two-dimensionally, this trajectory of the Old Town, as suspended over five levels, instead looks like in figure 6.
Consequently, a blurring of what is perceived and what is true is achieved. When the suspended model is seen in the mirror, the only perspective from which each block can be truthfully perceived is at the centre point of that block in the mirror and each centre point is specific to each block. So, not only must one position oneself physically in the mirror, i.e. in the gaze of the image, to see the true footprint of each block, one must also achieve the physically impossible task of seeing each block from each centre point at the same time in order to perceive a geometrically truthful totality of Old Town’s footprint. The projected image of the Old Town’s footprint is therefore beyond vision, its truthfulness exists in imagination and through reasoning; a dialectic between the conscious and the unconscious, between reason and unreason, between the Real and the Symbolic, between Hermione as Other and Hermione as self.

3:2:3 Old Town Suspended; Theoretical Evaluation

The image (figures 7-12) presents itself to us through the surface (the mirror) onto which we project our individual perceptions of the Old Town and pretend to understand it. But due to the ephemeral nature of the image, changing its gaze as one moves around the model, one identifies with its images differently and consequently, the pretender (Deleuze), i.e. the exhibition visitor, perceives a mirror image where no perspective reveals an image that is any more or less truthful than when seen from the other side. The image becomes erroneous or simulacra; a visual mis-representation of Old Town, whilst every perspective presents an individual
image that is truthful in itself, yet inaccessible to vision, and open for endless personal interpretations. The image as exposing the true footprint of Old Town is only true in the same way that Hermione is “the ultimate truth of madness” and somewhere in the visual conversation between the objects (the model and the mirror), the subject and the perceiving I/eye exists a truth that is ultimately the only truth.

Similarly, beyond the visual mirror image history in its essence exists where each interpretation and event is allowed its individual value, in its irruption. The outcome of this project is in this self-realisation of the mirror image; a healing process of self-reflection. The mirror image does not tell you how to look at the Old Town, and in extension its history, the image only tells you that it is different each time you do look and that each time it has to be re-evaluated. History is dynamic, its narrative forever evolving and changing, its totality beyond what can be visually and consciously perceived, and the key to successfully mourn the continuous loss of history is in the move towards that space known as “everyday historicity” (De Certeau).

Thus, the suspended model of Old Town acts as a conceptualising tool to state a necessity for its history to become less rigid, to allow it to “emerge in its own complexity” (Foucault, 1969, p. 52), and dispense of the rules that appear to

Fig. 7 – ‘Hermione’; suspended model of the Old Town
currently govern it. But it is also a tool to state the impact that the sovereignty of reason has on the perceived value and meaning of the Old Town, and more importantly the hierarchal position reason gives to vision as the primary sense for experiencing its rich cultural capital. It further emphasises the complexities involved in allowing the unconscious “tactics”, interspersed in the relationships between the collective Real (Lacan), or spatial practices (Lefebvre), and the collective Symbolic, or representational spaces, more than just a temporal locus. These complexities exist in the three way interaction between the represented city or the foundation (Deleuze) (the suspended model), its projected image or the object aspired to (the mirror surface) and the perceiving subject or the pretender (the exhibition visitor) as well as between the visitor leaving the exhibition and stepping out into the Real world of the Old Town as physically, and frontally, represented, as Symbolically existing under the controlling eye of reason, and as the clandestine bubbling under the surface. Or, in short, one relates to the Old Town in two ways; as one

Fig. 8 – ‘Hermione’; suspended model of the Old Town
unconsciously perceives it, and how one is expected to consciously, and collectively, read, interpret, understand, and relate to it.

The Old Town is, topographically, as well as mentally and socially, collectively looked at from all sides, but as was suggested by Lacan, one will never see the Old Town from the place that it sees you. Thus, Old Town as an object, with its many projected meanings, is suspended in the gaze, it is caught in the Lacanian notion of an image that “escapes consciousness” since the subject sees it the way it wants to perceive it, as well as the way it is collectively expected to see it. This four-way interaction between the Old Town as object and subject, and the collective as object and subject, fails to recognise that they are suspended in each other’s gaze. It appears as a one way interaction, a dead-end, where the Old Town is objectified as it enters into the Deleuzian notion of an “aesthetic existence”, acquiring a

Fig. 9 – ‘Hermione’; suspended model of the Old Town
projected meaning which is in turn collectively introjected and in the end this “image kills” as Pile states. The Old Town is reduced to a surface, what Lefebvre calls a virtual world, where the image of it becomes the sign of its own body. This surface “detaches, it alienates and it transforms (space) into images, signs and codes” where the sign of the Old Town, the image, becomes an “arche-texture of abstract and social space” (Pile, 1996). Thus, as Pile concludes, this creates a gap, a distance or a lack, which essentially confines passion, desire and phantasms to the oneiric where vision produces a simulated reality that assumes sovereignty over the Real. This is a struggle for power between reason and unreason similar to the naturally occurring struggle between the narcissistic self and the external world, or the unconscious and the conscious, during the developmental stages of childhood where successfully accepting loss is integral to the maturation process. However, the collective meaning attached to the architecture (arche-texture) of Old Town appears fixed on signifying origin where it places, or projects, the Other (Old Town as subject) outside this four-way interaction, which inevitably leads to a state of melancholia and this pathological formation needs untangling.

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Fig. 10 – ‘Hermione’; suspended model of the Old Town
At the break between the Renaissance and the Classical period, as explored in the chapter *The Madness of Old Town*, it could be argued that Edinburgh went through the “mirror stage as formative of the function I/eye”. Perhaps, at this point in time, when the New Town positioned itself at a distance, both geographically, mentally and socially, from the Old Town, the city passed through the Imaginary stage where it narcissistically assumed the image of itself, of the New Town, to be its true self. When exposed to the Symbolic order of the language of reason, it separated itself from the world of objects and mistakenly assumed this brave new world to be truthful; the Old Town as the Other was thereby born and the Real became inaccessible to consciousness. Thus, the “ego ideal” as created by the New Town, assumed a certain control over the collective self and Old Town was confined to a world of subjectivity. The inertia that Lacan speaks of characterises this formation and one can easily accept the idea that the subject was captivated by the situation; “the most general formula for madness” (Lacan, 1966, p. 445).

Consequently, the model exposes the necessity to suspend all those notions that are so heavily embedded in the Symbolic order of Old Town, i.e. as collectively projected onto its many powerfully visual symbolic objects. These notions, to re-iterate Foucault (1969, pp. 28-29), include *tradition*; which governs the very essence of the Old Town, i.e. its spatial practices assume a very high degree of permanence, *influence*; which relates to the visual hierarchy as established by a conscious, and Symbolic, order, *development*; which assumes the necessity for “an organising principle” that transcends time and establishes a generalised history, *spirit*; which has created very distinct

Fig. 11 – ‘Hermione’; suspended model of the Old Town
“communities of meaning” in the Old Town where the sense of history, origin and authenticity are turned into commodities that link us collectively, groupings: which concern the whole discourse of history itself as a distinct, and therefore separate, field, and finally the book or the document; which confines, controls and overlooks the entirety of Old Town and ensures a degree of stability in the way it is collectively managed. These notions governs the ways in which one relates to the historic city, and, like Foucault suggests; it is absolutely necessary to disturb their tranquillity in order to question Old Town’s pathological existence as well as our perception of it as part of this collective matrix.

De Certeau has suggested that “intellectuals are still borne on the backs of the common people” (p.25, 1984), and so we must all be vigilant to the resonances of history. We must be brave enough to tune into these and feed them back at appropriate times; we must act as interactive and receptive mirrors to our own surroundings instead of engaging with the shallow reconstruction of past events.

Fig. 12 – ‘Hermione’; suspended model of the Old Town
We must realise our role in the four-way therapeutic matrix where the threading of desire and passion through time is an awe-inspiring process that deserves recognition.

The suspended model of the Old Town was given a name in the exhibition. Not surprisingly this name was Hermione, and the mirror, or the gaze staring back at the exhibition visitor, is the window one must necessarily position oneself in to view the Old Town from her perspective. Hermione introduced herself as nobody and everyone, particular mundane and exceptionally beautiful; a metaphor for the collective. It is Hermione, and in extension the collective, who possess that rare ability to navigate through the museum of stagnant objects and in the end, see beyond them. Clearly, this is an allegorical directive but one can position oneself quite easily in Hermione’s window; for example, the next time one of the many stories about the Old Town is being told or a performance on the Royal Mile enjoyed, just question its narrative or performance, but, by all means, please enjoy the dramas; they are the things we live by.
Part IV

Conclusion
4.1 (hi)STORY

4:1:1 Architecture and Regression

Author’s note to self in September 2009:

Irish architect Yvonne Farrell, of Grafton Architects, opened a lecture at the Lighthouse in Glasgow by saying that “architecture is the art of designing the in-between”. She went on to discuss the way architects often think of the design of buildings as a composition of physical elements or solid materials, but, as she said,” one never inhabits a wall, one only ever occupy the nothingness in between walls”. It is not the object and its appearance that matter; it is the space the subject produces within and in-between it and other objects.

The concept of “transitional space”, introduced by Winnicott (Bateman and Holmes, 1995, p. 42), insists on the importance of the interplay between internal and external objects as opposed to considering them separately. This transitional phenomenon was seen as the link between Freud’s notions of the pleasure contra the reality principles, where the infant moves into adulthood successfully through a process of conjuring up the “illusion” that it creates the objects in its world (ibid). If the “good-enough mother” provides those objects this illusion is maintained and leads to a healthy and creative self that can eventually face the loss of its narcissistic, omnipotent, constructions (ibid). However, if the mother is not “good enough” then a false sense of self arises and obscures instinctual drives which can lead to pathological formations. It is believed that this “transitional space” can be re-activated through “regression” in analysis later in life (ibid, pp.42-43).

The in-between separating buildings and objects is the subjective and unconscious space occupied by Hermione and its meaning is activated by the subject’s dispersion into a system of controlling signifiers projected onto these where the subject
“makes do”; a temporary practice that fails to acquire a proper locus. This is a dynamic process where objects are inherently nameless; the meaning attached to objects is transient, illusory and subjective, as Bollas’ suggests through his discussion on the “transsubjectivity of the object” (2009, p.54). Ultimately, objects are rendered differently and individually but the collective perception of objects still remains relatively permanent. In Foucault’s terms; the systems of formation or “the relation between surfaces on which they appear” (1969, pp.51-52) remain stable, but the space, Farell’s “nothingness”, in-between them changes. Meanings attached to spaces that we necessarily construct around us amalgamate, develop and transform constantly, and consequently the meaning attached to objects and buildings is inevitably part of an evolving narrative.

However, as has been widely argued, the Old Town rather fiercely resists this process; it is frightened to perceive of the unknown in its own time, and it would therefore seem quite relevant, if not urgent, to re-activate Old Town’s transitional space. The “nothingness” between walls, buildings and objects, and between Old Town and New Town, must necessarily go through a process of regression in order for new identities to form and allow the narrative of the Old Town to “emerge in its own complexity” (ibid, p.52).

It is important to emphasise that this suggestion is not a question of necessarily constructing new objects, and it is most definitely not a question of ridding ourselves of objects simply for the sake of starting again. It is instead, rather naturally, a question of allowing new relationships to form between and with existing objects. In architecture, this if often explored in terms of intervention which ought to be seen as a continuation of an existing building’s narrative through intervening with its built fabric to satisfy the needs of people using the building at present whilst maintaining, or enhancing, the integrity of the values attached to it. In the Old Town, such a continuation is particularly inert where development is instead enveloped in layers of controlling documents that dictates the form and type of interventions which therefore also controls the perception of the space in-
between Old Town’s buildings. As a consequence, one is left with relationships between surfaces that are inherently shallow; stories becomes mistaken for history and is, in the process, reduced and generalised through stratification and rearrangement into a continuity of events where vision has been given a particularly sovereign value.

Bollas defines city planning as “a type of psycho-spirituality... invested with the psychological task of bringing the spirit of life into a certain place” (2009, p.72). This poetic definition is certainly particularly difficult under the existing conditions imposed on the Old Town, and on a conceptual level Edinburgh’s controlling mechanisms must be suspended if one is to invest the city’s architects and planners with such a subjective task. The spirit of life of a certain place exists within the collective unconscious and cannot be defined, confined, and developed into planning strategies; placemaking is ultimately a subjective process, it is complex and must be allowed to emerge as and when it happens and without the prejudice imposed by rational thinking. Thus, architecture essentially looses the purpose of its ancient definition as texture giving sovereignty to a visual order and instead extends its definition to include a whole range of subjective notions.

One might be led to argue that this diminishes the role of the architect, but it rather makes the process of building and of building in the spirit of a certain place, even more complex. Instead it becomes far more interesting to speak about architecture, buildings and cities through the experience of Others where the narrative of, for example, a building exists in the rendition of its meaning rather than embedded within the molecules of its materials. Like the reader is necessary for a piece of literature to acquire collective meaning so is the user to a building or to the Old Town. Consequently, the story about Edinburgh’s historic city is not constructed by architects; it is produced by subjects whose interactions the Old Town bears witness to as a silent stage. However, the architect clearly serves a particularly important function, similar to the author, in creating a setting or the beginning of a story, yet it
is only one subject’s interpretation, and if that narrative is not allowed to develop and change in the re-telling by others it risks becoming alienated and stagnant.

Thus, there is perhaps the illusion that the architect creates the objects in the collective world, which perhaps also extends to include the illusion that these are created by a knowing, narcissistic and reasonable collective self. This claim, within the context of the Old Town, is certainly supported by rational documents that seek to protect the meaning that has been falsely projected onto these illusory objects. However, as Lacan suggests, the Real exists beyond this realm of Imaginary and Symbolic spatialities, and it is therefore necessary to call for a suspension of this state of existence and instead regress into Old Town’s transitional space. Here, as theorised through the suspended model, history is allowed to “emerge in its own complexity”; here, vision loses sight of its hierarchal positioning; here, the subject is no longer suspended in the object’s gaze; here, the ordinary man is the narrator of culture, here; narrative exists in its purest form, mad, desiring and passionate.

4:1:2 Imaginary Cities

One of the essential outcomes of this thesis is in its ability to state that cities are imaginary, that, as Lacan’s argument would suggest; cities exist within a repressed Real, or that, as Baudrillard’s argument claims; cities are simulations of a sense of reality that aims to mask that there is no knowable truth. Cities are conjured up from our encounters with objects that we necessarily identify with, but we do so mistakenly and falsely, or defensively and narcissistically. Instead, the truth of any city exists within the unconscious, which is inaccessible to all but the mad, and identity is therefore inherently ambiguous and transient. But, as Deleuze’s argument proposes; the simulated reality, shallow and stagnant, does not mask a truth that is ultimately the one truth, it masks that the simulacrum carries a truth in its own right; the truth of madness, of passion and desire, and of the unconscious. This truth, if allowed a place proper, threatens the control established by rational thought and by the collective and conscious self.
It is evident within the context of the Old Town that we have conjured up the illusion that we are the masters of our own collective destiny and history, which is of course yet another kind of madness. As Edinburgh was divided into a new and an old town, it simultaneously confined its less desirable past to the unconscious, which in itself can be considered a traumatic event, but rather than collectively internalising and successfully mourning this loss, the city instead repressed it and identified with the new order leaving the Other with nothing but transient spaces. This has lead to the alienation, separation, isolation, stratification or, as was initially proposed; to the stagnation of the Old Town. This thesis has exposed this pathological formation which can be found in abundance in the city’s many defensive spatial practices such as narrativisations and performativities as theorised through De Certeau, Pile, Kearney, Leach et al. As a result, the Old Town is frightened of losing its identity and it has instead contained itself as an urban museum; effectively celebrating the end of its own history.

Consequently, it has become particularly important to stress the necessity to reactive Old Town’s transitional space which is a question of awareness, of being in touch with the processes of transference and counter-transference, of allowing the resonances of history to reverberate in the present as suggested by Bachelard and Bollas, and of seeing the value in the oneiric and the subjective. Before this thesis draws to a close, it will extend this suggestion a little further by offering its concluding argument through the works of Bachelard’s *The Poetics of Space* (1958), Calvino’s *Invisible Cities* (1972) and Hollis’ *The Secret Lives of Buildings* (2009). These pieces of evocative literature best illustrate cities, and buildings, as imaginary constellations that necessarily form within the unconscious realm of the Real, but perhaps more importantly, that the meaning attached to cities and buildings remains elusive and intrinsically subjective.

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The concept of the “poetic image”, which for Bachelard constitutes a way of thinking about phenomenology as a way to “restore the subjectivity of images”, offers a transsubjective approach where “the reader of poems is asked to consider an image not as an object and less as the substitute for an object, but to seize its specific reality” (1958, p. xix). Bachelard speaks of poetry as an act of daydreaming; a conscious awakening of the soul, and considers the poem a reverberation that creates “a change of being” (ibid, p. xxii). Resonances refer to the everyday production of space whilst the reverberation is a “poetic creation” that informs these resonances and if touching the soul these will have repercussions in “the depths” (Deleuze). For Bachelard, the poetic image is defined by an authenticity that cannot be superior, it is always a question of origin as and when it happens, a question of emerging through an image that is always creative, a question of constant movement and fluidity, and Bachelard defines this state of emergence as “pure sublimation; a sublimation that is relieved of the burden of passion and freed from the pressure of desire” (ibid, p. xxix). He is cautious of the psychoanalyst, whom he regards as always aiming to “understand” the sublime image, to put it into context, so he considers pure sublimation as the creation of images that have not been experienced and to which one must be receptive (ibid). This “liquidates” the past and calls for a sensibility towards our environments that is perhaps best summarised by Jules Verne’s famous exclamation; “look with all your eyes, look!” (1876; in Perec, 1978).

Bachelard is intrigued that the poetic image is not more widely theorised within psychology (although it very clearly has been since his text), that very little is said about the image as “a direct production of the imagination” (ibid, p. xxxiv). The imagination, which “separates us from reality, faces the future”, or in other words, the imagination is creative and it offers future possibilities, established within the environment that we define as real (ibid). The oneiric house, on which The Poetics of Space is constructed, demonstrates how the house metaphor contains all those notions relating to early childhood experiences as the foundation upon which future relationships are made, the house cannot be described; it is a “thread of a
narrative... in the telling of our own story” (ibid, p. 5). Dwelling, for Bachelard, does not refer to the physicality of the space, but to the poetic “resonances” it gives rise to within the soul such as comfort and safety, or pathologically; anxiety and danger. Through Jung, Bachelard claims that the house contains the unconscious, it “shelters daydreaming” and it holds “dream-memory, lost in the shadow of a beyond of the real past” (ibid, pp. 6-15). The poetic image of the house is oneiric and “if we want to go beyond history... we must realise that the calendars of our lives can only be established in its imagery” (ibid).

Hollis’ account on the “retelling” of buildings through alteration and reuse is articulated in a similar language where buildings, like poetry, “are gifts, and because they are, we must pass them on” (2009, p. 14). Hollis demonstrates how some great monuments of the past have all changed over time, that they are still changing and that they have, through centuries, been the silent stages of brutal alteration, restoration, obliteration, fragmentation and, above all, idolisation. Buildings are invested with meaning by the imagination, as so vividly exemplified in Hollis’ description of the Parthenon in Athens, which has, during its life time, essentially been “liberated from physical being... (it has) become nothing but an idea” (ibid, p. 41). The Parthenon, scattered across the globe, is said to be preserved, but its physical being is long since lost, or rather, its physical being of today does not recall any of the grandeur of nearly two and half millennia ago, it is preserved within the imagination, and Hollis’ sarcastic notion that it is “at last... perfect” (ibid) resonates and reinforces this thesis’ common thread on stagnation. It is, however, important to remember that the image of perfection does not belong to poetry, it no longer holds the creative and evocative powers of the soul; it is rather, controlled by the rational mind.

Hollis continues to tell the story of the Ayasofya in Istanbul, which, like the Parthenon, also exemplifies the idolisation of the physical image which has reduced yet another monument of history to a museum in modern times. As Istanbul, or Constantinople, oscillated between Christian and Islamic rule, set as it is on the
threshold between the Occidental and the Oriental, the Ayasofya became the site of worship for both faiths, each borrowing or stealing from one another and investing, and re-investing, the Ayasofya with strata of theological meaning. Its museumisation was political to settle the dispute, as Hollis demonstrates (pp. 88-91), and although relative calm has been restored, its dynamism has lost its vigour.

In Edinburgh it is evident that the Old Town has also lost its dynamism; that it has been reduced to an idea of history that could be argued to be perfect which, in modern times, has become a question of restoring calm, a political motive that is also driven by power and control. But, at the beginning of Enlightenment it was also a matter of stolen identity, of a re-birth in classical thinking that left the Old Town confined to its past, of stylistic theft that earned the New Edinburgh its epithet The Athens of the North and which the Old found distressful to identify with. As Hollis’ account on the quadriga of bronze horses that once crowned the Basilica of San Marco in Venice demonstrates, this was certainly not the first time in history that theft of this kind was carried out (ibid).

Venice, like Edinburgh one millennium later, dreamed of prosperity and greatness resonant with its long gone heritage, and, as Hollis states; “decided to steal themselves a past, in order to conjure up a future” (ibid. p. 58), and looked to its thriving neighbour in the East, to Constantinople. Venice became “a transfigured Constantinople; but Constantinople was a transfigured Rome... and Rome a transfigured Greece before that” (ibid, p.46), and the quadriga acted as the triumphant trophy in this “cycle of theft and chain of borrowed authority” (ibid). The horses, following their last journey, have returned to Venice, after a sojourn in Paris during the Napoleonic dynasty, but have, as is so often the custom these days, been confined to the museum (ibid, p.67).

Nonetheless, it is not the aim of this thesis to free established icons from their chains in the museum; it is rather to simply allow the poetic images that created them a proper place, to think of them as “a thread of a narrative” (Bachelard, 1958, p. 5). To narrate, like Marco Polo does in Invisible Cities (1972), the travels of life as
a thread that ultimately is founded on ones oneiric image of a city upon which all other cities are perceived. Calvino’s poetic account of the conversations between Polo and Kublai Khan illustrate Polo’s inherent affinity for Venice, which transcends all stories that he tells Khan. Maurilia, for example, a city where the traveller must praise the postcard image as the one preferred to the present city (ibid, pp. 26-27); or Zaira, that consists of “relationships between the measurements of its space and the events of its past” (p. 9); or Zora, a city that the earth has forgotten, it is impossible to visit (p. 13); or Agalura, of which nothing that can be said is true (p. 59); or Fedora, with its museum containing all the Fedoras’ that never was (p. 28); or Moriana, which has no thickness, “it consists of a face and an obverse... which cannot be separated nor look at each other” (p. 95); or Eusapia, the city of the dead where the living simply copies the image of its underground copy, “there is no longer any way of knowing who is alive and who is dead” (pp. 98-99); or Zirma, the city of lunatics that “repeats itself so that something will stick in the mind” (p. 16); or Berenice, the just city thinking of itself as right but “the real Berenice is a temporal succession of different cities, alternately just and unjust” (pp. 145-146).

Polo’s story in equal measures frustrates and fascinates Kublai Khan since the great emperor does not wish for anything to be left beyond his control and understanding. But Polo gives a particularly truthful narrative of his oneiric city; Venice cannot, like Edinburgh, be explained or broken down into objective accounts. Cities endure like poetic images within us, they just simply need re-activating.

“The inferno of the living is not something that will be; if there is one, it is what is already here, the inferno... that we form by being together. There are two ways to escape suffering it. The first is easy for many: accept the inferno and become such a part of it that you can no longer see it. The second is risky and demands constant vigilance and apprehension: seek and learn to recognise who and what, in the midst of the inferno, are not inferno, then make them endure, give them space” (ibid, p. 148).
Within the scope of the thesis, Edinburgh’s Old Town has been given uncontested attention, but it is strongly felt that its argument is not exclusive to this city as similar patterns exist in many other historic cities, particularly those in the West, such as Venice, or Athens or Istanbul. It is therefore thought that an extension of this thesis’ inquiry, especially if setting Occidental culture against Oriental, could be of particular interest. Oriental culture promotes, as Shields suggests, a union of body and soul in all aspects of life which is “radically at odds with the Western vision of the body as a ‘container’ of the ego” (1991, p. 56) and such an inquiry, in light of the current rapid developments of the East compared to the fastidious and conservative attitude in the West, would most certainly offer a conversation that is both exposing and upsetting from both angles. If, in the West one celebrates the end of history, it seems that the Oriental rather brutally celebrates the death of it. However, this is an altogether different discourse, but the notions of trauma, identity, power, madness, repression, projection and simulation quite clearly offers itself to further research.

Foucault makes it clear, in his conclusion to The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969), that it would appear quite easy to criticise the outline of a programme that “leaves its future development to others... (since) no sooner have they been outlined than they disappear” (p.227). But what Foucault aimed to outline was a programme that encourages new possibilities, or as he writes in the preface to Madness and Civilisation (1965); “we must speak of that initial dispute without assuming victory, or the right to a victory” (p.x), his arguments emphasising their function as a probe to test and challenge established systems and perceptions. This thesis has established itself within this Foucauldian discourse and can similarly only offer as conclusions the possibility of future opportunities; it probes and asks questions to which answers cannot be truthfully established and which in turn offer in themselves another set of questions for others to answer and so on. This is what Lucretius’ ancient suggestion on the clinamen entails and shows that stories and
history cannot be brought together into a whole as it is forever causal, fragmented and dynamic.

The suspense of *The Unconscious Life of Old Town* can offer this however; go out there and mistake, like Oliver Sacks’ patient, Dr P. (1985), your shoe for a foot, or your wife for a hat; position yourself within the world of the mad where established objects are no longer what they seem to be; sail out into open sea and bring, for navigation, nothing but Bellman’s Map of the Ocean as presented to the crew in Carroll’s *Hunting of the Snark* (1876); “advance beyond familiar territories” (Foucault, 1969, p. 42) and expose yourself to the danger that all you might find is an empty space.

“Finally, a map that we can all understand” (figure 1) exclaimed the crew, for in it they saw only the possibility for endless opportunities.

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*Fig.1 - Map of the Ocean; Lewis Carroll* *Hunting of the Snark* (1876)
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And lastly, thank you Hermione, you know who you are...
Appendix A –

Voices from the City Transcript
The Outer Suburbs –

Pilton/Muirhouse
Leith
Colinton/Oxgangs
Cameron Toll/Liberton
The Inner Suburbs –

Stockbridge
Broughton
Newington
Bruntsfield
The Old Town