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STATES OF AMBIVALENCE: CERTAIN AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS OF GERMANY, 1888 TO 1917

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines certain of the ways in which Americans perceived the German Empire between 1888 and 1917. A background is provided by considering the influence of America's relationship with Great Britain on perceptions of Germany and by examining official relations between the United States and Germany, in which context the views of Germany expressed by American diplomats are discussed. The ways in which Americans looked at Kaiser Wilhelm II, at German Socialism, at the German cities (with particular regard to the works of Frederic C. Howe), and at social reforms in Germany (especially as they influenced, or were interpreted by, American Progressives), are considered and related to American conditions. The picture of Germany in American literature of the period is examined, particularly Mark Twain's relationship with the country. In these ways the essential ambivalence of American views of Germany at this time is exposed, the country being both admired and feared.
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INTRODUCTION

The original inspiration for this thesis derived from reading John Dos Passos's descriptions of how a huge number of Americans developed during the First World War a venomous hatred of Germany. This aroused curiosity as to how the Americans had seen that country in the decades leading up to the conflict. The thesis does not set out to explain why the Americans became so anti-German, a subject that has often been dealt with, by Frederick C. Luebke, for instance. He treats particularly the situation of the German-Americans; the presence of so large a group, the loyalties of which were doubted by many, did much to encourage irrational fears. These were increased by the fact that many German-Americans, in an attempt to maintain their status and identity, defended Germany, often in a tactlessly arrogant way, between 1914 and 1917. The real losers of the Great War were perhaps the German-Americans, who practically ceased to exist. Kurt Vonnegut wrote that his parents deprived him of his ancestral German culture: "They volunteered to make me ignorant and rootless as proof of their patriotism."¹

There were numerous other reasons for anti-German hysteria such as the influence of propagandists, feelings of insecurity about the identity of the U.S.A., the "exalted sense of righteousness" which John Higham saw as having been produced by the Progressive movement, and so on. The purpose of this thesis is to explore certain American perceptions of Germany during the long period of reform. 1888 is a convenient
starting point, since that year saw the accession to the throne of Wilhelm II, and 1917 was the year when hostilities officially began. It is necessary to continue up to that year in order to follow some developments, but less attention is paid to such aspects as propaganda and diplomatic relations in the neutrality years, which have been extensively written about. The same applies to the reasons for American entry to the war. 2

The first chapter deals with the British influence on the American-German relationship, since this was an essential underlying factor in American perceptions of Germany. There then follow examinations of how various groups of Americans saw particular aspects of Germany. These aspects have been chosen because they were important parts of German life, but more especially because they cast light on American life. The focus here is on America and American conditions, rather than on the objective reality of Germany. How Americans regarded Wilhelm II or German socialism or the German cities reflects their attitudes to their own society (and what they saw in Germany could affect their views). In the case of the cities the ideas of Frederick C. Howe are concentrated on, because he so particularly made them his own. The final chapter looks at the way in which American Progressives, and some other Americans, saw the reforms that had taken place in Germany, and how they related them to American experience. Two chapters deal with views of Germany in a wider sense, those of Mark Twain and some other American literary figures and those of American diplomats, mainly in Germany, which are discussed in the con-
As has been mentioned these particular areas have been chosen partly because of their importance and partly because they particularly illuminate American conditions but also because they have been either ignored or only touched on or dealt with in a restricted period in previous works dealing with the relationship between the United States and Germany. Of these the foremost is still Alfred Vagts's Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten in der Weltpolitik (1935), the translation of which into English is now half a century overdue. This immense work is packed with detail relating to the period between 1890 and 1906, its primary focus being on official relations, although it draws on a wide range of documents. A worthy sequel to it is Melvin Small's Ph.D. thesis, The American Image of Germany 1906–1914 (1965). This covers a large area of opinion, in terms both of sectors of American society and of aspects of Germany, and utilises a huge number of sources, but when considering American views of various aspects of Germany the width is sometimes at the expense of depth.

Useful background reading is provided by John G. Gazley's American Opinion of German Unification, 1848–1871 (1926), which shows that opinion was mainly favourable, and Count Otto zu Stolberg-Wernigerode's Germany and the United States of America during the Era of Bismarck (American edition 1937), in which the good relations after unification are detailed.
but the beginnings of conflict are traced from the eighteen-eighties. Clara Eve Schieber's _The Transformation of American Sentiment toward Germany 1870 - 1914_ (1923) draws on very limited sources, is superficial in its findings, and is sometimes positively misleading, for example in its discussion of the Kaiser's image in America. Jeannette Keim's _Forty Years of German-American Political Relations_ (1919) is very restricted, but quite sound as far as it goes. Hans W. Gatzke's _Germany and the United States : A "Special Relationship?"_ (1980) devotes little space to the period before the First World War, but provides a useful introduction. Manfred Jonas's _The United States and Germany : A Diplomatic History_ (1984) is a balanced study which ably brings out the main trends in official relations. Another book that must be mentioned as a fundamental text in the study of relations between the United States and Germany, although it is of a more specialised nature, is Jurgen Herbst's _The German Historical School in American Scholarship : A Study in the Transfer of Culture_ (1965), which shows the immense influence of the German universities on American education and academic culture between 1876 and 1914 and therefore reveals a great deal about the American view of Germany as the land of learning, an image that had existed at least since the days of Ticknor, Bancroft, Motley and the other early sojourners in Teutonic academia.

The sources that have been drawn on here range from diplomatic records to newspaper and magazine articles. A particular
attempt has been made to explicate contemporary books dealing with Germany, to show their significance in the American context, and literary sources have been drawn on wherever possible; in many ways fiction is the most revealing source for perceptions of other countries, because of what can be said that otherwise could not be and what can be assumed that otherwise would have to be explained. There is, however, not a great deal of American literature from this period dealing with Germany, a fact that is itself significant.

In this period America was taking its place as a world power, and therefore the way in which its citizens saw the world was changing and becoming of increasing significance. Their perceptions of Germany were to be of particular importance, for the world and themselves.
CHAPTER 1: THE BRITISH IMPACT ON AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS OF GERMANY

One country's perceptions of another can be influenced by numerous factors, such as the reciprocal attitudes of the second country, and what the first country thinks these are, and what the first country would like the second one to be like. All of these had an influence on American perceptions of Germany in the period before the First World War, but in this case there is a special factor that has to be taken into account, namely the effects that Britain had on the way in which Americans saw Germany. These effects derived from various circumstances, ranging from conflicts caused by the way in which international imperialism had developed in the nineteenth century to deliberate attempts by Britain, official or otherwise, to turn America against Germany. In various ways the development of the British-American Rapprochement during these years inevitably implied that relations between Germany and America could not improve beyond a certain point and, in view of the events of 1917, this was obviously of crucial importance.

British views of Germany were effectively disseminated in America through various channels. First, important statements of the foreign press, particularly British and German, were reported in the U.S.A., sometimes in newspapers but also in magazines, particularly Public Opinion and the Literary Digest, which published summaries of opinions on the question of the day and which had a fairly wide circulation among the educated public. Such reports were more beneficial to Britain than Germany, because of the nature of the press in each country. Journalists on the influential British newspapers came from
the same social and political groups as members of Parliament, high civil servants, and the like, so they tended to agree with official policies; in particular, with the policy of cementing friendship with America. This meant that anti-American quotations from British papers were very rare. On the other hand, although the German government directly influenced some papers, this was not true of the Bismarckian, Agrarian and anti-Semitic papers, which delighted in attacks on the American Republic, American capitalism, the Monroe Doctrine and so on, and these were frequently quoted in America, although, in fact, they did not reflect government policy and greatly upset the German ambassadors, particularly Sternburg and Bernstorff. Thus, as so often, comparisons were made by Americans between Britain and Germany, at the expense of the latter.

Secondly, the flow of European news to America was largely in the control of British press agencies, which often tended to bias the news in favour of Britain and against Germany. This was particularly true of the Associated Press, which, from its London and Hong Kong offices sent false reports during the Spanish-American War of German activities in the Far East. For example, on July 1, 1898 A.P. claimed that Germany had landed troops in the Philippines, and then it alleged that Germany, France and Russia were going to decide the future of those islands. These agencies distributed their reports to small newspapers all over America, so it was difficult for the German Embassy to deny them effectively. The Germans made their own attempts to influence some American magazines
and papers with measures like planted articles and subsidies, but these were generally ineffective.²

British ideas on world politics and much else also reached Americans through the practice whereby some American magazines reproduced articles that had been printed in British magazines. This is apart from the publication of original articles by British writers in American periodicals and newspapers, a means of intellectual distribution that was also open to Germans but obviously, for linguistic and other reasons, to a lesser extent. British writers in American magazines were frequently anti-German; one prominent example was Sydney Brooks, as in his article "Great Britain, Germany and the United States" in 1909. British books on Germany, sometimes of a propagandistic nature - such as German Ambitions by Vigilans sed AEquus or even Modern Germany by J. Ellis Barker (the Anglicised name of Julius Eltzacher), the American edition of which included a discussion of a pamphlet on a possible German war against America - were often published in America.³ German books on Germany were rarer, since they required to be translated, might find it more difficult to be taken up by a publisher, and, in any case would be written by people who were more cut off from America and therefore less likely to know what would appeal to American readers. Thus, there were more means by which the (generally critical) British views of Germany could be got to Americans, than by which the Germans could explain themselves or give their opinions of Britain. It is difficult to say how important this was, but it would have a particular effect on the educated public, whose views count
for a disproportionate amount in the totality of public opinion, and this in a country and at a time when public opinion was an important factor in foreign policy, so that their attitudes to Germany could actually affect America's behaviour.

In May 1903 the conservative Prussian newspaper Kreuz-Zeitung made a sensible analysis of the need for more direct communications between Germany and America, stating that (in American translation) "the two nations regard each other thru British spectacles". It continued,

London telegrams bring the first 'news' and the impression created is usually decisive. Then the 'editor' of the newspaper supplies it with a corresponding article, and here the English papers come into play.

The titles of some particularly jingoistic and anti-German papers were then mentioned:

... their articles being either worked over or simply copied outright. For a serious political article on a non-American question, the American newspaper publisher has little money to spare ... For a good article on German policy no more than $5 would be paid. It would not excite anybody, and so the ass's bridge of the London press is used.

And so, according to Kreuz-Zeitung, Americans believed that Germany was about to annex Holland or Denmark, or intended one day to invade America. It must be observed that this was typical of the German articles reprinted in the U.S.A. in that it was critical of America, even though this particular one was
bemoaning the lack of American-German links.

Later the same year *Kreuz-Zeitung* alleged that by flattery Britain had got America on its side and encouraged American activities against Germany and Russia. The propaganda necessary for this had been expensive, but, "A war waged in Great Britain's interest by the United States would bring back the original investment with a thousand per cent interest." Flattery was probably not an important element in the growth of the British-American rapprochement, but there certainly was British propaganda circulating in America. One of the most widely read examples was *German Ambitions as they affect Britain and the United States of America*, published in 1903. This consisted of articles, originally published in *The Spectator*, by Vigilans sed *AEquus*, the pseudonym of William Thomas Arnold. *The Spectator*, under John St. Loe Strachey, like the *National Review* under Leo Maxse, was devoted to an anti-German and pro-American policy, but Arnold was a slightly unusual figure for such company. He was the grandson of Dr. Arnold of Rugby, the brother of Mrs Humphrey Ward, and a Gladstonian Liberal who wrote for the *Manchester Guardian* for seventeen years. He thus shows that not only jingoistic Conservatives opposed Germany.

The book argued, largely on the basis of extreme pan-German pamphlets, that Germany feared increased commercial competition from the United States and wanted colonies in Brazil and a coaling station in the Danish West Indies, thus encouraging fears that existed in America. It claimed that Germany was
looking forward to leading a coalition of European powers against America, as well as being about to annex Holland and other countries. It concluded that the Pan-Germans hoped to defeat Britain and America separately but not together, therefore, Arnold wrote, "if I were asked to indicate in a sentence the supreme moral of these chapters, it would be ... friendship and if need be mutual aid between the great twin brethren of Anglo-Saxondom." This assertion of the joint interests of America and Britain would clearly have the effect of making some Americans more suspicious of Germany.

Unusually, Arnold does not lay great stress on the build-up of the German fleet; normally the British did not miss an opportunity to tell America that it was threatened by the German navy. For instance, in August 1901, the British-owned Shanghai Celestial Empire predicted that Germany would interfere in South America once its naval programme was complete. Kreuz-Zeitung complained at the end of 1902 that such British warnings increased American hostility to Germany because they were copied into the American papers. In turn, the British press said that this claim was prompted by the German Foreign Office, in an attempt to make German public opinion in favour of increasing the fleet. A. Maurice Low, a frequent British contributor to American magazines, wrote in the National Review that Germany was building up a fleet in order to infringe the Monroe Doctrine, and American magazines like Harper's Weekly printed articles on the potential situation in the Caribbean if Germany expanded its navy and obtained a coaling station; in particular, attention was drawn to the possible threat to
One of the reasons why Britain could call for American-British friendship in opposition to Germany, apart from strategic considerations, was the cultural link between the countries. The subject of the influence of British culture on America is an immense one, but it must be touched on in this context. British literature circulated widely in America, perhaps most widely in the form of short pieces in *McGuffey's Eclectic Readers*, the staple book in many American schools. Increasingly, towards the end of the nineteenth century, popular British novels were simultaneously published in America, reducing the necessity for such agencies as that of Joshua Lippincott in London, which organised imports of European literature into America. Of course, "European" in this case meant almost exclusively British, mainly because of the common language.

American intellectuals and academics were likely to know German because of the vogue up to the eighteen-nineties for being educated at German universities, but the great majority of people depended on translations of German literature, if they read it at all, and in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century these tended still to be of much earlier German writers, particularly Goethe but also Heine, Schiller and others. Very few translations of important contemporary German literature were published, apart from some of the dramas of Gerhart Hauptmann and Hermann Sudermann and a few pieces by Nietzsche. The few German plays that were performed in America were greatly outnumbered by performances of Shakespeare alone.
In November, 1901 the English critic Edmund Gosse wrote in *The Cosmopolitan* that Britain and America were cut off from contemporary German literature, and vice versa, pointing out that almost nothing was known in the English-speaking countries of Detlev von Liliencron, Theodor Fontane and their peers. He remarked that, "A chasm of the imagination lies between the two great races, and no-one dreams of building a bridge across it." This was very true (the paucity of American novels set in Germany will be discussed later), and it is an important underlying reason for international relationships. It is notable that Gosse assumes that the British and Americans form one race, a commonplace statement at the time despite the many other nationalities from which American immigrants were drawn, but in literary terms there was a good case for this argument and, as usual, the corollary was that Germany was even more cut-off from America because of the latter's close links with Britain.

In music the situation was quite different. The standard composers were mainly German (or Austrian), the greatest excitement in opera was still Wagner, and the most discussed modern composer was Richard Strauss. The other new influences from abroad were also German or Austrian, such as Humperdinck, Pfitzner and Mahler, and the last was one of the many Germanic musicians who conducted American orchestras. In comparison, Britain made little impact musically. However, the very fact that music is by its nature an international language meant that it could not promote the kind of communal feeling that a shared literature gave to Britain and America, and concrete
ideas are more readily expressed by words than by musical notes. 10

In The End of American Innocence Henry May shows that both Germany and Britain greatly influenced American culture, but he argues that, in the eyes of Americans, the "hierarchy of nations" was "clearly headed by the United States, with England close behind and Protestant, progressive Germany probably next." This was particularly true of the old-established American intellectual elite, the "custodians of culture" as May calls them, who were specifically attached to traditional English literature. These men still dominated American cultural life at this time, although their position was destroyed by the First World War. Ironically, they were the first Americans to declare their support for Britain when that war broke out. 11

Perhaps the main link between the cultural Anglophiles and those with more political power was the poet, journalist, historian, diplomat and statesman, John Hay. It might be expected that someone named after John Milton would be an Anglophile, but, in fact, at an early stage of his career Hay had disapproved of foreign monarchies and hoped for the universal victory of republicanism. However, as one writer put it, "The Paris Commune, his own experience of wealth, and the danger of great industrial strikes ... all combined with middle age to curb Hay's youthful enthusiasms." Like Theodore Roosevelt he was a friend of the British diplomat Cecil Spring Rice and numerous other important British figures, and he was already definitely pro-British before his appointment in 1897 as ambassador to
Britain. At that time and during his period in office as Secretary of State, from 1898 to 1905, he did everything in his power to align America with Britain. In this he was the central figure in a group of American and British diplomats, which included Joseph H. Choate, his successor as ambassador in London. Choate, at a banquet there in 1903, made a point of praising the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Lansdowne, who had been blamed for getting Britain involved with Germany in the Venezuelan affair, which many Americans had seen as an attack on the Monroe Doctrine. In turn, Lord Roberts told him that the American ambassador was not the representative of a foreign nation.  

Another member of this group was Henry White, the American chargé in London. It was to White that Hay wrote in 1899, after he had denied Democratic allegations that a secret treaty had been signed with Britain (allegations prompted by Hay's extremely pro-British policy), stating,

I simply refute the Democratic platform's charge that we have made "a secret alliance with England". This charge was having a serious effect on our Germans and it had to be denied. The fact is a treaty of alliance is impossible. It would never get through the senate. As long as I stay here no action shall be taken contrary to my conviction that the one indispensable feature of our foreign policy should be a friendly understanding with England. But an alliance must remain in the present state of things an unattainable dream.

The fact that Hay dreamt of such an alliance is significant enough. As time went on Hay became even more Anglophile and
Germanophobe, so that President Roosevelt could not trust him to deal with Germany. The British diplomats in Washington who belonged to the Hay group included Lord Pauncefote, Sir Michael Herbert (who, like many leading figures in British political life, had an American wife) and Spring Rice, and they were naturally eager to direct America towards Britain, and therefore against Germany. 13

These cosy diplomatic relations in Washington declined after the deaths of Lord Pauncefote and, six months later, of his successor, Herbert. The next ambassador was not Roosevelt's friend Spring Rice, but Sir Mortimer Durand, whom Roosevelt found too formal. The Germans, on the other hand, in 1903 sent Roosevelt's friend, Speck von Sternburg, as their ambassador. Roosevelt had in 1901 tried to get him appointed, so the German government, which was deliberately trying to improve relations with America, withdrew Sternburg's predecessor, Holleben, and replaced him with someone who would be welcomed by the President (and who also had an American wife). As N.M. Blake pointed out, Roosevelt's personal style of leadership meant that such matters were important, since his policies could be affected by his friends' opinions. Thus, until Sternburg's death in 1908 Roosevelt often inclined toward Germany, and his bad relations with Durand and his aloof successor, James Bryce, led to misunderstandings with Britain. Roosevelt tried to overcome this by negotiations with a British friend, Arthur Lee, M.P. Lee was one of a sizeable group of British correspondents of Roosevelt, including Edward VII, and
their letters were another means of getting British ideas across to the Americans, particularly about the threat from Germany. 14

Roosevelt's letters to his British friends tend to play up his liking for Britain and those to his German friends his liking for Germany, but perhaps his position was best summed up in a letter to Spring Rice in 1897:

I am by no means sure that I heartily respect the little Kaiser, but in his colonial plans I think he is entirely right from the standpoint of the German race ... If I were a German I should want the German race to expand in South Africa, and temperate South America. Therefore, as a German I should be delighted to upset the English in South Africa, or to defy the Americans and their Monroe Doctrine in South America. As an Englishman, I should seize the first opportunity to crush the German navy and the German commercial marine out of existence, and take possession of both the German and Portuguese possessions in South Africa ... As an American I should advocate - and as a matter of fact do advocate - keeping our navy at a pitch that will enable us to interfere promptly if Germany ventures to touch a foot of American soil ...

This is a view of international relations as a game for grown-ups, in which each player tries in whatever way is necessary to win and aggressive behaviour cannot be condemned on moral grounds. However, as President, Roosevelt showed a great desire to preserve peace and good relations among Britain, Germany and America, as seen, for instance, in his trying to placate everyone at the Algeciras Conference. 15

Roosevelt's successor, William Howard Taft, was much less concerned with foreign relations and, although he was more Anglo-
phile than Roosevelt, he was less aggressive in his attitude to Germany. He was, however, annoyed by the German refusal to sign an arbitration treaty with America, which contrasted with Britain's ready compliance. Woodrow Wilson was even more Anglophile again. He loved English history and traditions and had few contacts with Germany before 1914. In his historical works in the eighteen-nineties he was one of the first American writers to go against the traditional location of the origins of American institutions and character in the Germanic forests. He admitted the racial link, but insisted that American institutions had their origins specifically in England.16

It is doubtless true, as Melvin Small has argued, that personal and ideological links to Britain were stronger in the American ruling-classes and intellectual elite than among the general public, but obviously the former groups had a much greater effect on policy. Furthermore, their ideas could percolate down through society. One example of this was the Anglo-Saxon racial theory, which was both a source and a consequence of Anglophilia and an important advantage that Britain had over Germany in its relationship with America. Its use as an argument for closer relations between the United States and Britain was more important for the latter than the former, but in the eighteen-nineties the Anglophile North American Review frequently published articles on the subject. This began in 1893 with a piece by Andrew Carnegie, who was himself Scottish in origin, in favour of an Anglo-Saxon Union including the
U.S.A., Britain and the colonies. It was quickly taken up by the English-born historian Goldwin Smith, who in any case supported the annexation of Canada by the United States, then Arthur Silva White wrote in 1894 in support of an Anglo-American alliance, since the position of America, he claimed, depended on the maintenance of the British Empire. In the same year, Captain Alfred Mahan, the American originator of the modern sea power theory, and Admiral Lord Charles Beresford, one of the most pro-American people in British public life, wrote discussions of the possibilities of an Anglo-American Reunion. Mahan concluded that it was a slow process which needed to be given time to develop, while Beresford believed that there should be an immediate alliance to protect Britain's and America's common interests.  

In 1895 the subject was tactfully dropped, that being the year of Cleveland's condemnation of British activities in Venezuela, and such politicians as Henry Cabot Lodge pointed out the danger of European powers like Germany and France following Britain if its threat to the Monroe Doctrine were not crushed. However, Britain backed down, and in 1896 the *North American Review* printed an extremely vague piece by Sir Walter Besant, called "The Future of the Anglo-Saxon Race", which called for some kind of union. Throughout the period Carnegie returned to the idea; in an article in 1897 he wrote about a "pride of race" in America, which had meant that, even during the Venezuelan dispute, when it seemed that Germany and other countries plotted "the humiliation and ruin of Britain" in the Transvaal and were "taking advantage of the family quarrel", 
America "burst forth in one wild cheer" when Britain stood up to the threat. In 1903 Carnegie changed his terms slightly when he remarked, "I want the whole Anglo-Celtic race to get together." None of this was likely to lead anywhere in terms of a union or a formal alliance, but it did make many Americans look more kindly on their traditional enemy. The Anglo-Saxon cult was one reason for the American press opposing the German seizure of Kiaochow in 1897; as the New York Times wrote, "Our interest in the cutting-up of China is that the British lion shall get his share". Talk of Anglo-Saxondom and of alliance was given a new impetus after the public British sympathy for America in its war with Spain in 1898. Joseph Chamberlain made a speech at Birmingham which led to expectations of an alliance, and Brooks Adams wrote an article in The Forum urging that America protect Britain, since it was an endangered Anglo-Saxon outpost.¹⁸

The Anglo-Saxon link with Britain had never been taken very seriously in political terms in America, and the public expression of the idea began to decline after the early nineteen-hundreds. One of the last important manifestations of it was John Randolph Dos Passos's The Anglo-Saxon Century (1903), which expressed the belief that Britain and America had to come together because the rest of the world was planning to combine against them. Later works, like Homer Lea's The Day of the Saxon, had less effect, but the idea remained that Britain and America were especially close in racial terms, which were taken very seriously at this time. In 1904 William Dean Howells
wrote an amusing article on "English Feeling Towards Americans", in which he remarked,

One is told that Americans are not regarded as foreigners in England, and is left to conjecture one's self a sort of middle species between English and alien, a little less kin than Canadian and more kind than Australian, though not equally within the scope of a preferential tariff.

This is a sardonic expression of a general American feeling that they were especially liked by Britain, and the fact remains that Germany was excluded from Anglo-Saxondom, a fact that made the concept particularly annoying to the Germanophile H.L. Mencken. 19

The American ruling-class tended naturally to lean towards Britain because its ancestry was largely British (between 1889 and 1921 63 per cent of cabinet members were of English descent, compared with 5 per cent German), and if it was not, then that was even more of a reason to seek protective colouring and become Anglophile, as in the case of J.R. Dos Passos, the son of a poor Portuguese immigrant. An unusual example of an upper-class Anglophile was Poulney Bigelow. His connections with Germany largely relate to his relationship with Wilhelm II, so they are mainly discussed in that context. However, as well as having strong sympathies with Germany Bigelow was also very pro-British. It was not until 1914 that his feelings for Britain, which, like most of his class, he supported, sufficiently outweighed his German predilections to make him write in an explicitly anti-German way. 20
Prior to that, he often tried in print to balance his attractions to these countries and his own. In 1900 he wrote an article for the Contemporary Review, which was reprinted in American magazines, called "Germany, England and America." This blamed the friction among these countries on their respective newspapers, which, Bigelow claimed, stimulated jealousies and suspicions in order to make a profit. Carrying Teutonic race theory to one of its extremes he alleged that these troublemakers were all Jewish. The general tenor of his article was against the German bureaucratic system and he made a point that he frequently repeated in his books and very numerous articles, namely, that German emigrants developed best in American or British colonies, because German colonies were run for the benefit of officials, not settlers. This bureaucracy, he asserted, had launched a propaganda campaign in the German press, to get support for a navy directed against Britain and America. He thus seemed to find most fault with Germany, or a section of it, although he also blamed America for appointing Jewish consuls in Germany and Britain for fighting the Boer War to benefit Jewish financiers in Johannesburg. He concluded that Germans would do best if they peacefully traded within the British Empire. 21 This article is interesting in showing the high opinion that even so eccentric an American had of Britain, but it also suggests that people attached to racial theories might have difficulty in rejecting Germany entirely, since it was, after all, the original home of the Teutonic race.

A few Americans never rejected Germany, a particularly obvious
example being the historian and political scientist John W. Burgess. In the *Political Science Quarterly* for March 1904 there appeared an article by him, entitled "Germany, Great Britain and the United States". He insisted, with the supporting authority of his teacher, the German historian Theodor Mommsen, that "the three great Teutonic nations" had to work together to solve "the problem of the world's civilization". He argued that the three were linked by an "ethnical affinity", underlying an "ethical and political consensus", which took the form of respect for the individual, local self government, the development of the state through the "national principle" (he further explained that if there is a popular consensus, then a state is "really democratic, whatever may be the aspect of its governmental organs"), and a cultural community. However, the Teutonic race was being prevented from spreading civilisation and culture because some German chauvinists opposed Britain, and American "naval officers and those whom they influence" were hostile to Germany, as were many British people. He attached most blame to England, for being arrogant and for oppressing the Teutonic Boers, and he insisted that Germany was friendly to America and had been so historically, contrasting German support for the Union during the Civil War with the British and French attitudes. He acknowledged the effect of "the unfortunate episode in Manila Bay", but explained that Germany had not expected America to take the Philippines and was only trying to protect her own interests. He pointed out that Germany, along with Britain and Italy, had accepted the Monroe Doctrine in 1902 before taking action against Venezuela over unpaid debts, and he asserted that the German
government had no interest in Brazilian territory.\textsuperscript{22}

In all of this there is perhaps an element of protesting too much and an obvious feeling that Germany had to be defended and justified, which is a reflection of how strong American suspicions of Germany were. The article goes on to take a more subtle approach, describing American hostility to Britain since the Revolution, which, according to Burgess, had been overcome by the clever diplomacy of Salisbury and Chamberlain in 1897 to 1898, with the intention of drawing American attention away from the Boers. He continued:

But the republican fanaticism, I do not like to say conscience, of the people of the United States has become, as the English foresaw, so substantially modified by the new experience of colonial conquest and rule, that the discovery of the purpose of the extraordinary courtesy and deference of the British government during the conflict between the United States and Spain has had little modifying effect upon the newly established affection of the Americans for their British cousins.

This decline in American republicanism could be seen as reducing America's right to criticise Germany on political grounds, although Burgess did not say so. The examples he gave of the new British-American friendship were such things as the "flocking of American heiresses" to refurbish "the somewhat faded trappings of the British aristocracy", the implication being that America would not get much out of it, but nonetheless he stated that an understanding with Britain was essential for America. However, he argued that Britain should be told it could not have a close friendship with America at the expense
of American estrangement from Germany, since, apart from anything else, an Anglo-American alliance, leaving Germany out, would force the latter to ally with Russia, Austria, Italy and perhaps France. 23

To permit the Triple Teutonic Alliance, Burgess continued, it was necessary for the United States to abolish its anachronistic protective tariff (which was a cause of conflict with Germany): "If a state fails to discharge the great world duty of bringing its laws, institutions and policies into line with its own development and with the spirit of the age, it is an offender against the other states of the world." Many less pro-German Americans would no doubt have considered that this sentiment was more applicable to the militaristic and autocratic system in Germany. In fact, Burgess argued that the "internal political development" of Germany was being held back by its "enforced intimacy with the great despotism which is enthroned over the vast mass of anarchic elements", that is, Russia. He claimed that Germany did not dare to ask for an alliance with Britain and America, because it was threatened by Russia, so "it is the United States upon which the transcendent duty falls of taking the first steps to bring the Teutons of the world together in the great work of world civilization." 24

This article is illuminating in its rather desperate attempt to oppose the prevailing feeling that Britain and America were united in a special relationship and to find a place for Germany. Burgess knew that Britain could not be excluded, but
he was well aware of the danger to Germany that could result from the situation. In an unsigned review in the Political Science Quarterly, probably written by Burgess and certainly expressing his feelings, the propagandistic German Ambitions, discussed above, was described as

a book which should never have been written ... It is the most contemptible essay yet made to secure the friendship of the United States for Great Britain, by exciting hostility to Germany. By the concealment of his true name the author appears to manifest his own appreciation of the meanness of his work.

This was immediately followed by a review of Dos Passos's The Anglo-Saxon Century, of which the writer approved, since it contained no spirit of hostility, but again the danger of bringing America and Britain closer together was seen:

Mr. Dos Passos does not touch upon one thing which is probably essential to the bringing together of Great Britain and the United States: that Germany shall be included in the general understanding. Otherwise, Germany would be compelled to enter upon an alliance with Russia, and in such an event she would drag the mass of continental Europe with her. Of what use would close friendship with Great Britain be to the United States with the whole of continental Europe arrayed against those two nations? 25

This analysis of world politics was obviously incorrect, but it was an argument that could be used to try to improve Germany's position in America vis-à-vis Britain.

Burgess stuck to his pro-German views; for instance, in 1908
he said in a speech that America in being friendly to the mother
country should not forget her German grandmother. This met-
aphor was popular with Americans who wanted close relations
with both Britain and Germany; Herbert Baxter Adams was an-
other academic who used it. Burgess's support for Germany
was carried to unusual lengths for an American not of German
ancestry. At the outbreak of the First World War he was one
of the very few American academics actually to support Germany
against the Allies. The great majority, even if they had
scholarly and other connections with Germany as strong as Bur-
gess's, sided with Britain. It is, in any case, unlikely
that Burgess's proposal for a British-German-American alliance
could have worked, if only because of German policy. To
deal with internal dissent and strains Germany by 1900 was
launched on the policies of Flottenpolitik and Weltpolitik,
designed to mobilise the masses in support of the throne.26
The increases in the fleet depended on the existence of Britain
as a possible enemy, and the desire to gain colonies meant
that conflicts with Britain and America would arise.

It is necessary to consider some of the conflicts that arose,
involving the three powers, and American reactions to them.
Germany's late arrival as a colonial power meant that in its
search for territory it found itself squeezed between Britain
and the United States. It had to modify its plans in Southern
Africa and elsewhere to avoid opposition from Britain, and the
only areas that seemed open to new European colonisation were
in Latin America, and therefore within the scope of the Monroe
Doctrine. Thus, the very existence of the British Empire tended to force Germany and the United States into incipient confrontation. The American suspicions of German ambitions in South America and the Caribbean were exaggerated, although such German activities as the surveying of Santa Margherita Island (off the coast of Venezuela), the intense German emigration to part of Brazil, and the Venezuelan blockade did nothing to allay suspicions.²⁷

However, the first area in which German colonial aims brought a clash with America was Samoa, where, according to Walter LaFeber, the first signs of American imperialism were seen in the eighteen-eighties. German military intervention to maintain order led to conflicts with the United States, which reached a climax in 1889. The eminent German-American politician Carl Schurz warned Bismarck that America would be prepared to go to war, and, since Britain would not support Germany, the latter had to back down. There followed the establishment of the Tridominium, by which Samoa was jointly governed by Britain, Germany and the United States, a solution which pleased no-one. In terms of American opinion the system probably disadvantaged Germany most, since in the islands the general pattern was for the American and British consuls to oppose the activities of the Germans, a pattern which was to continue in the Far East and elsewhere in the Pacific.²⁸

The most important year in forming American perceptions of Britain and Germany in terms of foreign policy was 1898, when the Spanish-American War took place. On the one hand, Britain
openly sympathised with America, helped the American navy with coaling stations, and was credited with preventing a European coalition against America. On the other hand, Admiral von Diederichs's naval squadron was alleged to have behaved in a hostile way at Manila Bay, causing Admiral Dewey to say that America's next war would be with Germany. In fact, the Germans behaved in a perfectly correct way and had no intention of interfering in the Philippines, although the American government was annoyed by the German attempt to take advantage of the situation by asking for concessions in Samoa. The actual incidents of 1898 do not seem to explain why Americans believed Britain was with them and Germany against them, so the assumption must be that this derived from the already established attitudes of the American ruling classes, which were spread to a wider public via the press. Nonetheless, it was clear that Britain, unlike Germany, was actually in favour of American expansion in the Pacific, because America supported the British policy of the Open Door in China. Spring Rice, for instance, wrote to Hay in 1898 urging that America annex Hawaii before Germany demanded a quid pro quo. 29

British-American solidarity in the Pacific was further cemented by the incidents at Apia in Samoa in 1899, during which British and American forces bombarded rebel islanders and the German consulate. The American press presented a picture of brave Anglo-Saxons fighting together to preserve order, although quite a lot of publicity was given to contrary views. For instance, Henry Clay Ide, the American former chief justice
of Samoa, wrote several articles arguing that the rebels, who were supported by Germany, were in the right, since the Americans and British were interfering with the succession to the kingship. However, such legalistic arguments carried less weight with the public than glamorous descriptions of the fighting. The 1902 ruling of the arbitrator, King Oscar of Sweden and Norway, that Britain and the United States had been at fault, caused great surprise in America and served as a reminder of the joint action. There were several other occasions on which Britain and America found themselves lined up against Germany, such as the Hague Disarmament Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and the London Conference in 1908 to 1909, when both nations opposed German suggestions for more restrictions on the rights of navies during war. Obviously such repeated occurrences would promote the idea of British friendship and German enmity.

The Americans were not unaware of the fact that Germany and Britain were competing for their friendship. The most blatant instance arose at the beginning of 1902, with a revival of the question of European attitudes during the Spanish-American War. In the House of Commons it was announced by Lord Cranborne, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that Britain alone had prevented a European coalition against America in 1898, and the Associated Press published in America a faked report that Germany, France and Russia had been the powers opposed to America. The truth of the matter was that Austria-Hungary, which was particularly pro-Spanish, had the idea of a Note urging America to make peace, and Lord Pauncefote agreed
because he disapproved of the proposed American intervention in Cuba. However, he was immediately over-ruled by Balfour and the British government. In 1902 some of the American press came to the correct conclusion that Britain was trying to stir up trouble against Germany, partly to spoil the American visit of Prince Henry of Prussia, who was sent as part of a German attempt to achieve better relations, but a typical comment came from the Pittsburgh Gazette:

We are glad to have the nations of the earth competing for our friendship, but we have no need to pick a winner, even if we do remember with pleasure many of the courtesies of England during our war with Spain, and while we give a glad welcome to the brother of the Kaiser when he comes as the incarnation of German goodwill.

A cartoon in The Cleveland Plain Dealer showed England dressed as a woman shrieking, "Ha! I discover a rival. I have been undone", at the sight of Uncle Sam with a German girl. 31

Holleben sent a memorandum to Hay stating, "England wishes to impair the friendly relations between Germany and the United States, which arouse the jealousy of England", then came the German allegations, at first unofficial, that it was Britain which had tried to organise European opposition to America in 1898, and Germany which refused. The American press overwhelmingly refused to believe this. Holleben then officially declared that Pauncefote had suggested the Note, and the American papers were thrown into confusion. Many could not believe that Pauncefote could have done such a thing, but it was felt
by some that Germany was winning the argument. More lofty papers, such as the Boston Journal, continued to express amusement at the competition for American favour. The German-American press rejoiced, and predicted that British-American relations would decline. This did not, however, happen, to the puzzlement of outside observers such as the Paris Temps. Once again the U.S.A. could believe the worst of Germany but not of Britain.

Another attempt to embarrass Prince Henry was made by the British press agencies when they spread the story that he had apologised to Admiral Dewey for the Manila Bay incident; this was untrue, but it drew attention to the fact that Henry was in command of the German Hong Kong squadron at the time. The St. James Gazette gloated that the royal visit would make no difference to American opposition to German colonisation in Brazil. Soon after Holleben's accusation against Pauncefote, allegations appeared that Holleben had worked for Bryan in the election of 1900, in order to get a coaling station in the Caribbean. Even the Indépendance Belge assumed that English intrigue was behind this report, but the continual British fabrication of stories showing Germany in a bad light must have had an effect on American opinion.

British involvement in the Venezuelan dispute of 1895 to 1896 had caused a temporary set back in British-American relations, and Venezuela was the setting for another dispute that damaged Germany's standing in America. The first reports of the German
demands on Venezuela appeared in the American press in January, 1902. A few papers saw this as a threat to the Monroe Doctrine, but most saw the German case as legitimate. Indeed, the Springfield Republican suspected that Britain hoped for a war between Germany and the United States, in order to promote its own commercial position, so it concluded, "Let the two Powers that face each other across the German ocean come to blows, if they will; our business is peace." Nevertheless, the most eye-catching cartoons showed Germany as a sea-monster threatening Venezuela or as a belligerent figure about to stand on Uncle Sam's toes. The issue recurred in December, when Germany and Britain launched their joint action against Venezuela. A blockade was established to try to force the country and its president, Castro, to pay debts owed to investors and companies in the two countries. The latter had assured the State Department that they would not infringe the Monroe Doctrine.

The American press disapproved of Castro's refusal to pay his debts, but it also disapproved of the British-German scuttling of the Venezuelan navy, which seemed too aggressive and also a possible threat to the Monroe Doctrine. A cartoon in the Philadelphia Press, showing Germany hitting Venezuela, while England held him and Uncle Sam remarked, "I don't object to your method, but don't stay there too long", summed up American opinion at this stage. Very quickly, however, distrust of Germany and suspicion of its designs against the Monroe Doctrine were expressed, despite the protestations of Holleben. Many newspapers insisted that America was friendly to Germany,
but questioned whether the feeling was reciprocated. No such suspicions were directed against Britain; as the not very pithy caption to a cartoon in the *New York American* expressed it,

> Here is the real problem. The old gentleman in the middle (i.e., BRITAIN) is quiet and harmless enough – he has had all the war he wants for the present. The serious part of the problem is the two strenuous young men (i.e., Roosevelt and Wilhelm), each at the head of a great nation by accident, one by the accident of birth, the other by the accident of a national calamity. The probable attitude of these two young men toward a situation that could easily turn to violence and satisfy each one’s longing for glory is most important to the peace of the world.

This view was quickly backed up by reports of British opposition to the policy of co-operation with Germany, led, as usual, by the *National Review* and *The Spectator*. In fact, the outcry among the British public was such that ideas of a British alliance with Germany, promoted particularly by Chamberlain, were completely abandoned, thus driving Britain even closer to America.\(^3\)\(^5\)

The German-American press, led by the *New-Yorker Staats-Zeitung* insisted that the Venezuelan episode had been used throughout by Britain to cause bad relations between Germany and America, but the British press claimed that the precise opposite was the case and that Britain had fallen into a German trap. The latter explanation was more widely believed in America, though, in fact, both countries had been acting with regard to their own economic interests. In terms of American friendship
Britain came out of the affair much better. As a result, the German Ambassador Holleben was, as has been mentioned, withdrawn and replaced by Sternburg, a rather transparent action which the American press attacked. The Boston Advertiser was unusual in saying that Holleben had to go because the British hated him for revealing Pauncefote's actions in 1898.

At the beginning of 1903, just as the Venezuelan imbroglio was dying down, the British-German rivalry for American friendship reached new levels of triviality. It was reported in America that an account had appeared in Petermann's Mittheilungen of the discovery in a German library of the earliest known map to use the name "America", published in 1507. At once the Geographical Journal of London retorted that an even earlier map with the name of America on it had been discovered by an Englishman. The American Literary Digest reported this controversy without comment.

At the end of January, 1903 came the German bombardment of San Carlos in Venezuela, which was condemned by almost the whole American press. It seemed that Germany was trying to test the Monroe Doctrine or to destroy the Venezuelan Republic. The New York Times commented, "The British government is in the dark about this bombardment, and the English people regard it as they have regarded the entire transaction in which Germany has entangled them - with disgust." There was a new twist to the affair with a report that Britain had initiated the whole action. Some thought that Germany had made this up, but the London correspondent of the New York Tribune, I.N. Ford, reported
that the Balfour ministry was responsible, trying to overcome domestic criticisms that they were being led by the Kaiser. In any case, the American press asserted that the German government began the affair, since it approached the State Department in December, 1901. The Detroit Journal demanded to know why Washington correspondents were whipping up opposition to Germany while ignoring British involvement in Venezuela; the reason evidently was that by this stage the Eastern establishment was almost entirely on the side of Britain, but suspicious of German actions.38

Britain's determination to preserve its friendship with America was so strong that it was prepared to make such concessions as the settlement of the Alaskan boundary dispute in October, 1903. This was favourable to the U.S.A., and, although the Canadians were annoyed, the American press hailed it as another example of British amity. The excuse of joint Anglo-Saxon interests provided a justification for Britain's giving up its own interests in favour of America. Such magnanimous British statements as that of the St. James Gazette in July, 1901 referring to the growth of American trade, "... it's all in the family, the great Anglo-Saxon household; and we had rather be beaten by the Americans than by any other people" - contrasted with the frequent American reports of German complaints about the growth of American commerce and of rumours that Germany intended to form a European customs union against the U.S.A.39

Between the end of the Venezuelan affair and the outbreak of
the First World War, America tended to pay more attention to deteriorating British-German relations, rather than the relatively static relationship between Germany and the United States. Of course, one aspect of this was the continuing British-German competition for America's friendship; in August, 1903 the Literary Digest noticed that British papers, particularly The Times, were warning America that Germany was plotting to entangle her, while the German press warned that Britain was doing the same. However, after Venezuela the friendship between America and Britain was clearly established and it was impossible for Germany to supplant the latter in the former's affections, although the direct friction between Germany and America declined, so that in 1909 Maurice Low could write that, whereas ten years before America would have sympathised with Britain in a war with Germany, it would at that time be neutral. He was probably overstating the case, since the American government was more favourable to Britain and France as compared to Germany after the Algeciras Conference in 1906. Indeed, in the same year as Low's article, another, by H.R. Chamberlain in McClure's, said that war in Europe was likely and America would have to help Britain in order to protect its own interests. Comparisons between Germany and Britain were often made by the American press, generally to the benefit of the latter, the more democratic and less militaristic system of which met with approval. 40

In the middle of 1903 an American naval squadron was cordially greeted at Kiel by the Kaiser and then feted in Portsmouth and London by Edward VII, Lord Charles Beresford and so on.
Both of these receptions were widely reported, and the Washington Post took the opportunity of making the following points:

There is always present in Anglo-American reunions an atmosphere of genuine affection, which in German-American demonstrations is replaced by an almost pathetic travesty of good-will. In a word, the German Government nurses purposes hostile to our national welfare, and Germans of the governing class are in honest sympathy therewith; while the Englishman, tho he knows that his Government entertains precisely similar designs, is personally fond of his American cousin, and exploits that sentiment with unmistakable sincerity ... At the mercy of either Germany or England, our national existence would be about as precarious as the health of a fat lamb at the mercy of a hungry wolf, but it is conceivable that the lamb might have a preference in the matter of its devourer.

This is an unusually cynical point of view, but the fact that its proponent still came down in favour of Britain demonstrates how strong the preference for Britain over Germany was. In any case, most of the American press obviously believed that Germany was more likely to be a "devourer". In the Morocco Crises and other such incidents Germany was generally seen in America as the aggressor. 41

The attitudes of the wider American public towards Britain and Germany may have been mixed - in particular, German-Americans and Irish-Americans frequently favoured Germany rather than Britain - but in naval circles an early decision was made as to which was the real enemy. This was one of the results of the Manila Bay incident, and as George Dewey came to dominate the General Board of the Navy his anti-German feeling became more powerful. He insisted that the American fleet should be
mainly based in the Atlantic, as a protection against Germany, and he wanted a close relationship with the British navy.

This was despite a public statement that the efficiency of the German navy was "greatly overestimated" because of the lack of initiative of German sailors, who depended entirely on their officers. In the same interview Dewey stressed that, "The friendship of the masses of the English people for the United States is sincere and genuine," and he regretted that the Americans, as he saw it, did not understand that. In the resulting outcry over this article most of the press supported Dewey. As Alfred Vagts stressed, American naval opposition to Germany was not really influenced by events, although it took advantage of them; rather, Germany was needed as an enemy to justify a build-up of the American fleet, and therefore, in view of the British-German antagonism, Britain was even more firmly established as a friend. The Naval Intelligence Office was, however, convinced that Germany was responsible for the intervention against Venezuela and that it had ulterior motives. Even suspicious moves by Britain were interpreted charitably, as when Britain secretly fortified Jamaica in 1902, and the British alliance with Japan was not taken as a threat to America. However, as relations between Britain and Germany worsened, Britain was at pains to demonstrate that it did not foresee any break in friendship with America: in 1905 the garrisons in Esquimault and Halifax, which had once been intended as bases if there was a war with America, were recalled. The same applied to Jamaica. The British connections of naval officers and politicians close to them, like Roosevelt, warned that the
German fleet was intended for use against America, and Britain had by 1912 abandoned the two-power standard for its navy, demonstrating an assumption that the American navy would not be opposed to the British one. 42

Admiral Alfred T. Mahan also saw Germany as a threat to America, despite the large number of his German admirers, including the Kaiser (Poultony Bigelow wrote to Mahan in 1894 that Wilhelm was "devouring" The Influence of Sea Power). His correspondence shows his concern about the German navy's strength compared with America's, and he expressed this publicly, for instance, in an article called "Germany's Naval Ambitions". In this case he put most stress on the need to support Britain, stating that America should be more concerned about "this menace to another English-speaking community, in the welfare of which we have a great stake". The German navy also constituted a threat to the Monroe Doctrine, he stated. Mahan was genuinely motivated by both a consideration of American interests and his "honor, reverence, and affection" for Britain, for which country he felt "race patriotism". His pro-British and anti-German feelings were so intensified by the outbreak of war that his brother told Theodore Roosevelt that his death shortly thereafter had been brought on by the fact that the Wilson administration would not allow him to argue publicly for preparedness. 43

As has been stated, it should not be assumed that America's increasingly close relationship with Britain necessarily implied
hostility to Germany; for example, it will be argued in another chapter that the Kaiser formed a focus for positive attitudes towards Germany. However, in numerous ways - the existence of an Anglophile elite, links of culture and of information, the attitude of the American navy to its British and German counterparts, the belief in Anglo-Saxon affinities, the development of the three empires, and so on - Britain and America were tied together in such a way that Germany's position was as Bradford Perkins described it: "Often respected, positively feared only by a few, she was not allowed to forget that, in the fight for American affections, she could not challenge her great rival." The closeness between Britain and America had a profound effect on American perceptions of Germany, and this was to be of the utmost importance with the outbreak of war, when America had to decide whose version of events to believe. For example, Albert Bushnell Hart, professor of government at Harvard, said when the war broke out that he intended to give each side a fair hearing, but within months he had accepted the British explanation of the war. Similarly, Theodore Roosevelt, who had always had sympathies for both Britain and Germany, though leaning more toward the former, may have been finally converted to support Britain, following his initial neutrality, after reading a British translation of an obscure German treatise on a possible German-American war.

The importance of the British domination of European access to the American media was emphasised by the fact that Britain's first action on the declaration of war was to cut off German
access to the Atlantic cables, thus largely isolating Germany from America, and the British attempt to influence American perceptions of Germany became more organised and serious. The stress on alleged German atrocities in Belgium was particularly effective. However, in the cases of many Anglophiliac Americans such propaganda was not necessary to make them support the Allies. Such feelings were particularly strong among the old English-descended families in New England, and one interesting example is Howard Phillips Lovecraft. He was born in 1890, and at the time of the First World War he had not yet begun to establish his reputation as a writer of horror stories. He had a romantic attachment to the Colonial Loyalists and he was such an Anglophile that he hated Wilson for not entering the war in 1914. Later, in his stories set in New England he endeavoured to show that area as part of the old Europe, which reflects his belief that America should never have broken away from Britain. He accepted the idea that the U.S.A. and the British Empire should unite.

In 1915 he took up the popular hobby of amateur journalism, producing his own magazine, The Conservative, which he used to praise Britain and denounce Germany. In one article he extolled the "Teutonic stock" which dominated the world through Britain, Germany and the U.S.A. The history of America "is one long panegyric of the Teuton, and will continue to be such if degenerate immigration can be checked..." "The Crime of the Century", as Lovecraft saw it, was that Germany had set the Teutons against each other, whereas they ought to unite.
against "alien inferiors". These ideas are only a slight exaggeration of the more discreetly phrased writings described above, and not at all an exaggeration of such works as Madison Grant's *The Passing of the Great Race* (1916), which Lovecraft read. He shows how effective the dissemination of such racial theories could be on individuals and how they could form their perceptions of Britain and Germany. From the ideas circulating in 1915 and before Lovecraft also picked up a belief in "moderate, healthy militarism", a reminder that Roosevelt and his ilk could not very well attack Germany on the grounds of militarism, since they believed in it themselves. However, that would not make Germany seem any friendlier; on the contrary, the belief in struggle between states would make Germany seem a natural enemy.

It was possible to try to have it both ways; in *The United Amateur* in February 1916 Lovecraft wrote that "the excessive militarism of Kaiser Wilhelm and his followers" was deplorable, but preferable to "effeminate preachers of universal brotherhood", as he demonstrated with a poem, "The Teuton's Battle Song". Widespread American perceptions of Germany influenced some of Lovecraft's stories. In "Dagon" (written in 1917) a ship is captured by the Germans, but

The great war was then at its very beginning, and the ocean forces of the Hun had not completely sunk to their later degradation; so that our vessel was made a legitimate prize, whilst we of her crew were treated with all the fairness and consideration due to us as naval prisoners.
This indicates the very damaging effect that submarine warfare had on Germany's image (one wonders whether "sunk" is a deliberate reference to submarines), but in 1917 Lovecraft could still see some Germans in a good light. "The Temple" (1920) concerns an utterly unpleasant aristocratic Prussian submarine commander, who sinks lifeboats, kills his own men to preserve discipline, worships Germany, and keeps referring to his "German will". In this can be seen the total antipathy to Germany that overcame most Americans after their country entered the war, and which lasted into the post-war period. In "Herbert West-Reanimator" (1921 - 2) there is implied praise of those "many Americans to precede the government itself into the gigantic struggle", an indication that Anglophiles like Lovecraft would feel that their position in 1914 had been vindicated by American involvement in the war. However, Lovecraft's essay, "Supernatural Horror in Literature" (1926 - 7), implies a re-acceptance of Germany, since examples of its literature are admitted to the canon that Lovecraft admires. His earlier feelings against Germany were clearly affected by his attachment to Britain, which was probably influenced by his fear of other races (see, for instance, "Polaris" (1918), in which "squat, hellish yellow fiends" threaten a remote civilisation). It is possible that people like Lovecraft, from old families, could look to Britain for a sense of belonging which they lacked in America, and they would oppose Germany when it threatened that. In any case, he shows that some people took Anglo-Saxon theories seriously.

It should not be imagined that the British effect on American
perceptions of Germany was entirely negative. In later chapters some sympathetic British accounts of Wilhelm II will be discussed (and Stanley Shaw's popular book William of Germany (1913) was a further example of this), and the more scholarly works of William Harbutt Dawson, fair though not uncritical, will also be mentioned. The British humorous writer Jerome K. Jerome was popular in America and his Three Men on the Bummel (1900) was published there. This book describes a bicycling trip in Germany, of which country it contains much praise. Thus, German education is full of "commonsense", while the Germans have "a love of order" and are hard-working and kind-hearted. There are amusing descriptions of contretemps with German officials and a list of the absurd things that are illegal in Germany, but all of this does show a degree of discipline that many would admire - for example, German children are well-behaved - and the fact that the Germans are so "law-abiding" is more praiseworthy than not. The only part of the book that is not humorous is the section dealing with the Mensur or student duel, which is "ludicrous", "unpleasant", excites "blood thirst" and is fought "to satisfy a public opinion that is two hundred years behind the times". There is a very nasty description of the proceedings, which serve "no good purpose whatever". In expressing this point of view Jerome was in accord with most expressed opinion in America, although the Americans did display a great fascination with German duelling, as will be described later.48

This is the only black patch in Jerome's book; even the
drunken student Kneipe, a formal beer-drinking session, is said to display "discipline and order". The final chapter claims that the "placid, docile German of to-day" is not interested in the "individual liberty" of his "wild ancestor", does what he is told, and worships the police: "The German citizen is a soldier, and the policeman is his officer." This produces a contradictory impression of both harmless docility and possibly threatening militarism, but the overall effect is good, since the system is shown as effective, so much so that Jerome thinks the Germans might be "angels". They are "amiable, unselfish, kindly" and also possessed of "military virtues", but they lack initiative. Their schools teach "blind obedience", and the idea of social cohesion is increased by Jerome's (actually erroneous) assertion that there was little stress on class distinctions outside the aristocracy. Other remarks in this vein concern the absence of "ostentation", with everything "homely and friendly". He contradicts what he says about "blind obedience" by asserting that the Germans maintain their personal "independence", but this supports the idea of a unified collection of equals. There is a description of the improving situation of German women, which would appeal to feminist readers.

The book concludes that the Germans "are a good people, a lovable people, who should help much to make the world better", and this is immediately followed by a sarcastic reference to ideas of Anglo-Saxon superiority: the Germans consider themselves perfect ... They even go so
Elsewhere in the book Jerome shows the same lack of belief in Anglo-Saxondom, observing that the German system is the "antithesis of the Anglo-Saxon scheme", yet both societies are "prospering". However, he believed that the Germans were not competitive enough to beat the Anglo-Saxon countries in terms of trade, which implies a division between Britain and America on the one hand and Germany on the other, while also asserting that Germany was not a strong threat to the commercial interests of the other two (contrary to the economic evidence). Three Men on the Bummel demonstrates that from Britain to America could come some scepticism about the Anglo-Saxon idea as well as some praise of Germany. A book of this sort, and also the British-born Elizabeth von Arnim's numerous books painting a somewhat ambivalent picture of her life in provincial Prussia, would, however, be outweighed by the anti-German writings emanating from Britain, such as the war-scare stories which were exported in the years leading up to 1914.

The strengthening of the British-American link, to the exclusion of Germany, was promoted not only by British journalists, but also by Anglophile American correspondents, such as George W. Smalley, who, after being a foreign correspondent, was the American correspondent of The Times. Another example was Frederick William Wile, a reporter on the Chicago Record who became its correspondent in London (1900–01) and Berlin.
(1902 - 06). From 1906 to 1914 he was the chief correspondent for the Northcliffe papers in Germany, as well as contributing to the New York Times and the Chicago Tribune. During the war he wrote about Germany for the Daily Mail. His writing for American papers even before the war did little to promote good American-German relations. Like many American correspondents he sent back a constant stream of trivial gossip about the Hohenzollerns and other royal and aristocratic families. Under the pseudonym of the Duchesse de Belimere he wrote for the Chicago Daily News a gossip column "Queer Sprigs of Gentility", which was full of this sort of thing. He frequently pandered to the American fascination with German duels, and reported the efforts of improving American ladies, like Mrs. Hunt of Boston, who tried to spread the temperance movement in Germany, and Mrs. Solomon of Chicago, who set out to up-lift German women, but found them already "the newest of new women". He did not often mention German militarism, but when he did it was in strong terms. In 1903 Wile wrote that the case of a tutor who murdered a pupil has furnished a new and horrible example of the depth to which the idea of discipline and blind obedience is rooted in the German mind. Brutalities in the army, now perhaps the most vital military question in Germany, have shown to what excesses the notion of soldier discipline has gone.

Such articles would provoke strong feelings against German militarism, which some Americans were inclined to praise as instilling beneficial discipline and order. Wile was favourable towards the Social Democrats, especially the moderate
ones, who aimed to reform the German system and who were seen as supporting American economic interests, and unfavourable to the Agrarians, who opposed American agricultural exports. The tone of his articles for the pro-British New York Times was markedly more anti-German than in the reports for the Chicago papers.\(^{51}\)

Wile's book *Men Around the Kaiser* (published in America in 1914) contained high praise of Wilhelm II and many other leading Germans, but there were also criticisms. The description of the Kaiser ended with a comment that posterity would have to decide whether he was really peaceful; Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg was identified with the reactionary group preventing "parliamentary institutions and truly representative government"; Bebel and the Social Democrats were praised for opposing a "police régime"; professors like Hans Delbrück were accused of making the Germans militaristic; the artist Max Liebermann was described as being "at war with the goose-step régime"; and so on. However, the criticisms were fewer than the favourable points, and Wile frequently mentioned that Admiral von Tirpitz, Prince Henry of Prussia, Bethmann-Hollweg and various others admired Britain and America and wanted peaceful relations with them. In particular, Wile stressed that the Kaiser was most attached to his "American policy", aimed at friendship with the U.S.A. There were numerous manifestations of this, from the sending of Prince Henry to America in 1902 to the establishment of exchange professorships to gifts to American museums.\(^{52}\)
This "American policy" had been transformed in Wile's eyes by 1915 into a conspiracy. His book *The German-American Plot* was a propagandistic work giving full vent to his pro-British feelings. He alleged that Wilhelm had tried to seduce Americans as part of his preparation for war and he expressed in detail his paranoid fears of the German-Americans, whom he saw as working for Germany and against Britain. This allegation seems to have been sparked off by the fact that Wile believed he had been sacked by the *Chicago Tribune* for sending pro-British reports from London. In any case, Wile is a clear example of an American whose attachment to Britain and dislike of some aspects of Germany were greatly magnified by the outbreak of the war.

These, then, are some of the aspects of the triangular relationship among the United States, Britain and Germany. From books of various sorts, from journalistic developments, from the attitudes of important Americans, from racial ideas and from international relations it can be seen that from the eighteen-nineties a struggle was going on between Britain and Germany, not entirely consciously, for the support of America. It is not coincidental that this period saw the establishment of various organisations looking back to Colonial ancestors, such as the Daughters of the American Revolution, the Colonial Dames and the Society of Mayflower Descendants, as well as numerous societies devoted to British-American relations, such as the Pilgrims, and, in response, the founding of German-American societies, culminating in the National German-American Alliance, and of magazines like *Americana-Germanica*, as
well as a rapid development of history books asserting the position of Germans in American history (of which A.B. Faust's *The German Element in the United States* (1909) was the outstanding example). People like J.W. Burgess, Andrew Carnegie, Andrew Dickson White and others believed that Britain, Germany and the U.S.A. should unite. Supporters of this idea included some American Jews, motivated by hatred of Russia; Oscar S. Straus wrote to A.D. White in 1902 that these were "the three powers ... that can effectively carry forward the mission of civilization, and whatever contributes to cement these three should be hailed by all of us with enthusiastic gratitude."\(^\text{54}\) Despite such beliefs, it was only possible for two of the three rising empires to come together, and the fact that America and Britain were moving closer to each other had a fundamental effect on American perceptions of Germany.
CHAPTER 2 : THE AMERICAN IMAGE OF WILLIAM II

The question of contemporary American attitudes to Emperor William II from his accession in 1888 until the American entry to the First World War is significant for two major reasons. In the first place, Germany was, to a large extent, personified in William II for Americans. For example, political reports of the time frequently referred to the actions and policies of Germany as being those of the Kaiser. This practice was more justified than that, which was sometimes adopted, of attributing British policies to Edward VII, and so on, since the impression was given in Germany that William had established his personal rule, whatever the truth of the matter was. Thus, the American attitude to the Kaiser would deeply affect the attitude to Germany, and in the development of world events that was to be crucial.

The second reason is that national attitudes to external matters tend to reflect internal conditions, and, since the Kaiser was in international terms the dominant figure of this period, attitudes towards him would be particularly well-defined. No-one else was around for so long, no-one seemed to have so much power, and no-one did so much that was bound to attract attention. America was going through a period of reform, and, particularly in the Progressive era, this was largely associated with individuals who seemed larger than life. The Kaiser was perhaps the only foreign figure of the time who also seemed to be a giant, and so the question of the significance of the American view of William in the context of American political
and social developments must be considered.

There is a further reason for looking at William's image, which is that historians frequently assume that most Americans were suspicious of, and opposed to, William throughout his reign, and not only after the outbreak of the First World War. Such assumptions are understandable, given the benefit of hindsight, but, as will be argued, they are too simplistic.¹

John Charles Hennessy wrote a thesis entitled America and William II of Germany 1888 - 1918: An Inquiry Into the Origin and Nature of His Image in America. This lays too much stress on the spread of British views, since the Americans developed their own distinctive attitudes, and it is largely taken up with such matters as German influences in America, the ways in which American newspapers obtained European news, and what American schoolbooks of the nineteenth century reveal about attitudes to militarism, so that only one chapter is devoted to America and the Kaiser in the pre-war period, and that has few details of what his image in America actually was.² However, it is important to examine exactly how Americans saw the Kaiser, since his image was constructed from many, often contradictory, interpretations.

Kaiser Wilhelm I had been widely admired in the U.S.A. for his perceived role in the unification of Germany and for his personal respectability. John Kasson, who was Minister to Germany in 1884 and 1885, spoke for many Americans when he
enthused in 1888 about the late Kaiser's "admirable qualities", including the facts that he promoted Bismarck; fought wars in accordance with historical "principles", but believed in peace; insisted on his right to rule (instead of indulging in the "lazy repose" of other monarchs); and was "upright", "loyal", not attached to "ease and luxury", and interested in his people. Kasson believed that France had caused the war of 1870 and was waiting to cause another; he asked whether "any successor" could "meet the waiting storm from beyond the Rhine as the great Kaiser met it, and conduct another German army to the gates of Paris?" Walt Whitman expressed the national mood in "The Dead Emperor", where "Columbia" was "Mourning a good old man - a faithful shepherd, patriot." Such expressions suggest that Wilhelm II would find it difficult to live up to his grandfather's reputation, but some of the characteristics that Kasson found praiseworthy were to become attached to the new Kaiser, and some of them show that Americans did not necessarily expect the policy of foreign monarchs to match that expected from American presidents. The admiration for the first Wilhelm can be seen as setting a precedent for the image of the second.

When Wilhelm II came to the throne, however, the American press was largely hostile. During his brief reign, Frederick III had been identified with "peace, toleration, and liberty", as the Boston Advertiser put it, and his successor appeared to be an unpleasant contrast. The Philadelphia Record called him "an impetuous and self-willed soldier ... and a relentless
enemy of ... progressive liberalism". His grandiloquent addresses to the army and navy caused particular concern, and the Atlanta Constitution was not alone in predicting that he would bring about war, although other papers, such as the New York Herald, were more optimistic about Wilhelm.

The Diary of Alice James is an illuminating source for the examination of Wilhelm's image in his early days. Alice James, the sister of Henry and William, was an invalid who lived in England from 1884 until her death in 1892. She had visited Germany, so knew something of the country, and she was very critical of Britain over imperialist atrocities, particularly in Ireland. Nevertheless, she relied directly on British newspaper accounts for her views of William, so she shows how a relatively well-informed American interpreted these. In December, 1889 William's belief in divine right prompted her to write

The German Emperor is quite mad, no sort of doubt. Vanity, Vanity, what a pitfall thou art!

She exulted on the dismissal of Bismarck, disapproving of his "hideous anachronisms", but added

he did make for peace, while this whipped syllabub young man rushing it makes one feel as secure as if he were a child playing with matches in a powder magazine.

This was very typical of American feeling at the time. Alice James continued with an indication of why William was, neverthe-
less, so fascinating to Americans:

I should like to be Wilhelm for half an hour; he is such a perfect specimen; more completely under the illusion of his own individuality and absolutely remote from the possibility of taking his relative measure than any known contemporary quantity.

This description might well have been applied to the U.S.A. in the late nineteenth century, before it began looking to foreign countries, including Germany, for methods of overcoming its own problems, which thereby had to be recognised in relative terms. In any case, William was to be claimed as a quasi-American by many of Alice James' compatriots, as will be shown. Another of her remarks described him in American terms: he "seems to be a young man 'with whom it is always fourth of July'," as some one said of old Coggswell, the postmaster in Newport."\(^5\)

The last comment shows a refreshing irreverence which many Americans did not show towards William. Alice James sympathised with the working-class - in 1890 she exulted that May Day demonstrations "should make Emperors, Kings, Presidents and millionaires tremble the world over!" - and disapproved of the upper-classes and royalty. She considered that the Prince of Wales and "the colossal William" had "undermined" the traditions of monarchy, and she included the Kaiser in a list of "distended vulgarians", contrasted with the modest Moltke. And yet, she recognised William's personal integrity; he visited Britain in 1891 when the future Edward VII was involved
in a gambling scandal, and Alice James wrote

What a cunning trick of fortune to bring him of Berlin here, at this moment, to enhance the princely pose of "Uncle Wales" thro' the Baccarat Scandal; for however little one may admire that Imperial Barnum, he wallows not in the ignoble.

Even an American who disapproved of William believed in the soundness of his character, and this widespread belief was a strong foundation for his image in America. It was this, rather than the early suspicions which Alice James expressed so typically, which was to have the strongest effect in America up to 1914. Her complete opposition to monarchy, and her disapproval of Britain, were not typical; Leon Edel wrote that only an American living abroad would hold such views, and that is probably true as regards someone of her social class.  

American attitudes and American image are very wide terms. This chapter mainly examines the views of intellectuals, fairly widely defined, as they were expressed to what was seen as the politically literate public, by which is meant the readers of magazines. These publications ranged from the Political Science Quarterly and the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, the readership of which was limited to the intellectuals themselves, to The North American Review, which was more general but still read only by the elite (it abjured photographs), to popular magazines like McClure's, Munsey's and The Cosmopolitan, each of which had at times over half a million readers. The period from about 1890 to the
First World War was the golden age of American magazines -
almost every middle-class home took at least one magazine, and
they were also read by the educated working-class, in libraries
or even in their own homes, since the cheapest were only 10
cents. In every period one medium of communication is domi-
ant, and at this time in America the general magazine still
was, although it was being overtaken by the popular newspapers.
Nevertheless, while the genteel magazines like Harper's,
Atlantic and Century were declining, the more popular ones
continued to thrive. 7

These magazines probably had a great impact on people's ideas.
Their articles were easier to read in terms of style and time
than books, they tended to deal with subjects in the long term,
unlike newspapers, which were more influenced by immediate
events, and people could return to and re-read them. For these
reasons, as well as the fact that, unlike American newspapers,
they had a national distribution, the magazines are probably
the best repository of social attitudes in this period, at
least among the relatively well-educated. They show what the
writers thought, and perhaps what the readers thought.

The magazines were obviously going to be interested in so import-
ant, colourful and controversial a figure as William II, but
they were probably encouraged to give him as much coverage as
they could by the fact that articles on him permitted extensive
use of photographs, which were becoming one of the most popular
features of the less old-fashioned magazines. One could write
at length on the purely visual image of the Kaiser in America.
Almost every article on William in the illustrated magazines had at least one photograph of him resplendent in the uniform of the Death's Head Regiment or the Potsdam Regiment of the Guards or in one of the other uniforms from his vast collection. The Kaiser allegedly had one photograph of him taken for every day in his life, and Americans must have believed it after seeing an article on him in The Cosmopolitan for July, 1898, which contained forty-six photographs of him in twenty-one pages. He was almost never portrayed in civilian clothes; for instance, in 1893 he was featured in the McClure's series "Human Documents," which consisted of collections of photographs of famous people, like M. de Blowitz, Gen. Lew Wallace, and Col. A.A. Pope, the bicycle maker. The pictures of William covered the years 1869 (when he was 10) to 1892, but in only one, showing him as a student, was he not in uniform. The effect on the reader can only be guessed at, but he would probably find it difficult to believe the argument that William stood for peace when on the opposite page he saw him in the breastplate of a cavalry general, striking an aggressive attitude. Presumably the picture editor would usually be responsible for thus subverting the purpose of the writer. An exception was the enthusiastic birthday greeting in Munsey's for January, 1902, which supported its thesis that William stood for peace with a photograph of him in a wing-collar, under which the caption read, "Kaiser Wilhelm II, the most talented man in Europe."8

Caricatures of William also abounded. Punch's famous cartoon
by Tenniel called "Dropping the Pilot", on William's dismissal of Bismarck in 1890, was very widely reproduced in the U.S., and it promoted the idea that William was so eager to be independent that he had recklessly disposed of the pillar of his empire. The American magazine Puck also published cartoons of William as a militarist, and sometimes articles were illustrated with cartoons, invariably showing William as conceited or warlike. For some reason cartoons made William look peculiarly silly.

To return to the articles themselves: the men who wrote on William II - all of the articles consulted were by men, apart from one by H.R.H. The Infanta Eulalia of Spain - were almost all eminent. Most of them were academics, whether it was a Professor of Political Science analysing William's place in the German Constitution or a lecturer with a doctorate from Leipzig writing on "The Emperor William as a Huntsman." Some of these were German and others had German degrees. The next biggest group consisted of more or less distinguished journalists, some of whom were British or German, and the others were diplomats, novelists, and so on. The American magazines were proud of the fact that ordinary people could write articles for them, but the man in the street was not likely to know the Emperor William.

Few names recur, but one that does repeatedly is Poultney Bigelow. He wrote at least fifteen articles on the Kaiser for a large number of American magazines, as well as numerous
pieces on other aspects of Germany. His books included *The German Emperor and his Eastern Neighbours* (1892), *History of the German Struggle for Liberty* (1896–1903), and *Prussian Memories* (1915).

Poultney Bigelow, who lived from 1855 to 1954, was the son of John Bigelow, Lincoln's minister to France and a distinguished writer. The Bigelows were one of the leading families of Boston, but Poultney was perhaps more adventurous than most Bostonians. He circumnavigated the globe several times, was shipwrecked several times, and paddled up the Danube and other rivers. His journalistic career included working for James Gordon Bennett's *New York Herald* and being *The Times's* correspondent in the Spanish-American War of 1898. He also lectured in modern history and colonial administration. However, his claim to be the American authority on William II arose from the fact that between 1870 and 1872 he was the favourite playmate of Prince William and Prince Henry of Prussia at Potsdam. Thereafter, when he was at Yale and Columbia Law School, Bigelow corresponded with William, and when the latter ascended the throne he invited him to his first autumn manoeuvres, and Bigelow was his guest at that event every year until 1896. According to Bigelow in *Prussian Memories* and his later autobiography a split occurred in that year.

One reason he gives for this is the publication of his *History of the German Struggle for Liberty*, the Whig tendency of which was disliked by William and members of his court (although
in an article published in 1898 Bigelow argued that William was able to take an attack on himself, quoting as an example the way he had discussed this book with Bigelow in a friendly manner. The other reason for the split was Bigelow's annoyance at the telegram which William sent apparently giving support to the Boer President Kruger after the Jameson Raid. Bigelow wrote an article in an English review saying that the telegram was obviously a mistake by the Chancellor, Hohenlohe, who would have to be dismissed. After that the imperial invitations stopped coming. Bigelow could not admit at the time that his relations with William had broken down, since the friendship helped him to sell his writings; thus, in 1898, he told The Critic that the Kaiser had been delighted with his book, White Man's Africa, and the magazine commented that "busybodies" who said the friendship was over were wrong. Bigelow still wrote a scarcely less laudatory stream of articles on William up to 1905, when a combination of ill-health, dismissal from his Boston university post because of his anti-black views, and what he called a boycott by "the Roosevelt-Taft press" because of his attacks on the administration of Panama, led him to retire to his farm.  

Apart from the fact of his dominance of the American market for articles on William, which is a cultural phenomenon familiar at all times, Bigelow is particularly interesting because as early as 1896 he found the conflict between his pro-German and pro-British feelings to be almost too much, perhaps because he carried both to extremes - he was very proud of his English
ancestry. A lot of Americans in the ruling classes had the difficult task of balancing such sympathies, and in 1917 most of America abandoned its leanings towards Germany in favour of those towards Britain.

It is not clear why from 1896 to 1905 Bigelow continued to promote an essentially good image of William: perhaps he still believed it or hoped for a re-union, or perhaps articles praising the Kaiser sold better. In any case, after the outbreak of war in 1914 Bigelow wrote letters to magazines like Open Court attacking the Kaiser, and Prussian Memories was also critical. Eventually, however, William and Bigelow made it up, to some extent. In 1940 the former wrote to the latter, saying that Europe should unite to fight the Soviet Union, which threatened the world.

Bigelow disliked Harold Frederic, the author of probably the widest read American book on the Kaiser, The Young Emperor (that description seems to have stuck with William in the U.S. until he was about fifty). Frederic was a novelist and journalist who became head of the London office of the New York Times, in which newspaper his book was serialized before its publication in 1891. The impression it gave of William was mixed. Frederic showed that his democratic feelings made him dislike the institution of the War Lord, but he still felt that Americans would be interested in a complete list of William's 54 titles. He showed William's actions resulting from a conflict between gentleness and arrogance in his personality, and unlike some
writers approved of William's dismissal of Bismarck. However, despite his approval of many features of William's character - he went so far as to say that he was "physically and mentally the heir of the best things that European royalty has to offer", which was evidently intended as a compliment - such statements as that William "appeals to the German liking for lofty and noble visions of actions", but that it does not matter that the visions probably will never materialise, and other less than reverent points, show that Frederic's view of William was more balanced and sensible than those of many Americans who actually met him. It was, however, unusual for an American commentator to have a mixed view of William, as the magazine articles show.

One perhaps unexpected theme running through the magazine descriptions of William II is the idea that he represented an American type. The earliest expression of this seems to be in Poultney Bigelow's "Sketch of the First Three Years" of William's reign, published in Century for August, 1891, which concludes by referring to the Emperor's "simple and healthy tastes" and to Bigelow's idea of him as the "business manager of a practical political corporation", and then describes the reaction of an American officer presented to him in 1890, and who previously had a bad image of William, derived from Russia and France. This man allegedly remarked, "...he has a genuine Yankee head on him" - his highest compliment, said Bigelow.

Exactly a year later Bigelow wrote for The Forum an article on William's free trade tendency, which said that William was
contemptuous of the crooked methods used by Bismarck, since

He has the mind of a Yankee; he loves experiment; his methods are direct. He is the sort of man that forges to the front in a new country.

Bigelow explains that he can imagine, if circumstances had been different, William rising from the shop floor to chairman of the board. Bigelow continued to imply at every opportunity that William was really an American: in Harper's in 1894 he wrote that William was the first European monarch to appreciate American modes of travel, since he used an American train, on which he could work; and in Century in 1898, at the conclusion of a review of "Ten Years of Kaiser Wilhelm", Bigelow wrote,

He is about the only crowned head who could turn to and earn his living, either as a ship designer, a newspaper editor, or a military man. He has a Yankee head on his shoulders. This I said ten years ago and it remains true today.16

Whether true or not, constant repetition seemed to make it a commonplace. Writers sympathetic to William frequently referred to his possession of and admiration for American characteristics; the German Paul Lindenberg in 1897 described William praising American enterprise, order, and invention, and nine years later Professor E.W. Scripture, in the course of an essay on the recording of the Kaiser's voice, wrote,

The Emperor has often shown unexpected comprehension of American character, with its enterprise, energy,
and sterling, unselfish uprightness, and those Americans who have learned to know him have felt that he is really half-American in his sympathies and views of life.

Perhaps one can detect a certain scientific caution in the use of the term "half-American." In his book Germany and the Germans from an American Point of View, published in 1913, Price Collier wrote that the Kaiser "would have made a first rate American", and would have enjoyed "the risks, turmoil and competition" of American life. Soon after the outbreak of war in 1914, Edwin Davies Schoonmaker wrote an article hostile to Kaiserism, which nonetheless referred to William as a monarch of a new kind, "an alert, organized man of business". In that context William obviously could not be explicitly compared to an American, but the comparison is clearly implicit, showing that that image had become firmly established. After the American entry to the World War American propagandists preferred to forget this image, but at the end of 1918 David Jayne Hill, the former Ambassador to Berlin, referred to the Kaiser's former interest in the U.S., which had shown that even a young country could be great.

Clearly, writers who themselves liked the Kaiser and who wanted other Americans to like him often used this image of William as an American to praise him, and it is instructive that Americans should see themselves as a standard of excellence to which the best people in the rest of the world could aspire. This is an idea which seems to have been particularly strong in America during the reform era. At the same time it is possible
that Americans had a desire to absorb William, because they saw him as the outstanding figure in Europe. Thus, the idea of the Kaiser as an American could be a reflection of simultaneous parochialism and a looking outward in the U.S., perhaps typical of a period which saw concern both with reform at home and with expansion abroad.

An extension of the image of William as an American was the idea that he was a popular ruler, similar to an American president. This view would be taken by almost every favourable writer, but in America it was often expressed in the formula: if an election were to be held tomorrow, William would be overwhelmingly returned as ruler of Germany. Again, this was first stated by Bigelow in 1891, when he wrote that William embodied the courage, honesty and German-ness that Germans wanted, and in 1898 he repeated it, saying that only William could control religious and political differences at home and face up to foreign enemies. By that time Bigelow had come into conflict with William over the suppression of dissent in Germany, and one gains the distinct impression that he was trying to convince himself as much as his readers that William really was a popular monarch. However, in 1905 Andrew Dickson White, the former President of Cornell and former Ambassador to Berlin, wrote in his autobiography and in Century that an overwhelming majority of Germans would vote for the Kaiser with his existing powers, and White's enthusiasm for William shows that he had no need to persuade himself. 18

In the same year the author Edgar Saltus rather reluctantly
wrote in *Munsey's* that both William II and Edward VII would win popular elections in their respective countries; and in 1909 a distinctly critical essayist calling himself Anglo-American wrote in the *North American Review* that the great majority of Germans would oppose any change in the position and powers of the Kaiser. Similarly, Professor Jesse Macy in 1903 described William as ruling "by popular approval" (but added that he faced problems in Germany so serious that, "powerful, aggressive, and erratic though he is", he could not sensibly be regarded "as a menace to distant States", which, though suggesting a threat to William's position at home, at least argued that he was no danger to America). This argument of the Kaiser's hypothetical electoral popularity was of course quite disingenuous. As Price Collier stressed in 1913, Germany was not a democracy, and all comparisons with democratic modes were meaningless. It is quite possible that a plebiscite will approve of an autocrat, but only because of a lack of a democratic tradition or because of propaganda. However, writers used this image of William as an elected life president, who had merely omitted the formality of an election, to make Americans like him more, since Americans attached an almost mystical significance to the "will" of the majority. In this period various electoral reforms were proposed and enacted with the intention of allowing that will freer expression in the U.S.; but there was a reluctance to attack the lack of democracy in other countries, or at any rate a readiness to find excuses for it, and in the case of Germany the popularity of William, which may have been real, was used as an excuse for the absence of a democratic system, which would have made that popularity
impossible. It was not until after the outbreak of war in Europe that some Americans really faced up to the nature of the Kaiser's control of the Germans: for example, in December, 1914 James Harvey Robinson, the historian, wrote in the New Republic that the manifesto in support of German aggression signed by 93 scholars showed that the autocratic system in Germany trained all Germans to accept the Kaiser and his will.

The most particular way in which an attempt was made to relate William II to American experience was the comparison between him and Theodore Roosevelt. The earliest reference to this in print seems to have been in Ray Stannard Baker's "The Kaiser as Seen in Germany", published in McClure's in January, 1901. He wrote,

If William were an American, he would be classed in politics as a Republican with strong sentiments of imperialism and expansion, a supporter of the doctrine of high protective tariffs and sound money, and a steady champion of a larger army and navy. His enemies might even accuse him of a fondness for trusts. He has been compared in character and aims to Theodore Roosevelt, and the similarity of the two men in restless energy, honesty, wide culture and information, as well as admiration of things martial, is certainly most striking.

From the context the comparison is evidently complimentary to both, but two years later Mrs. Bellamy Storer, the wife of the American Ambassador to Austria, wrote to William Howard Taft that she feared a war over Venezuela because of the shared "strenuous hot-headedness" of the Kaiser and Roosevelt. In published writings, however, this comparison was used as
a form of praise - for example, in 1904 in the National Magazine Poultney Bigelow wrote, "The reason we love Roosevelt is because he is so much like William II". (Bigelow was in a better position to judge than most people, since he knew both men very well; but in his autobiography, published in 1925, he wrote that the resemblances between them were superficial, and that Roosevelt was "a glossomaniac" with whom conversation was impossible, because he listened only when he was being flattered, whereas William's talk was always agreeable. However, between 1904 and 1925 Bigelow had been described by Roosevelt as "an unspeakably putrid creature" because of his attacks on the administration of Panama, while the Bolshevik Revolution had made William look better again, so it is possible that his judgement of 1904 was sincere. 20)

References to the alleged resemblance between Roosevelt and William were so widespread that one has the impression that many Americans could not think of the latter without thinking also of the former. In 1905 A.D. White made the comparison, as did John W. Burgess in 1908. It was not only Americans who saw the resemblance - in November, 1904 there appeared in Punch a cartoon by E.T. Reed called "Kindred Spirits of the Strenuous Life", which showed William and Roosevelt, with identical moustaches, facing each other with their heads aggressively posed. (In Roosevelt's Autobiography of 1913 are reprinted without comment that cartoon and a later one about the confiscation by the Berlin police of the first one, the implication by Roosevelt presumably being : the difference
between us is that I can take a joke and he can't.) One American cartoon, in the New York World, sought to make the point that Roosevelt tried unsuccessfully to be like William. This picture, called "The Real Article", showed a uniformed Kaiser, with rampant moustaches and ferocious face, holding the enormous SWORD OF MY ILLUSTRIOUS GRANDFATHER and pointing to a notice reading, "Remember this, spare nobody! Make no prisoners! William" (a reference to the Kaiser's violent speech to soldiers sent to suppress the Boxer Rebellion in China), while behind him an emaciated Roosevelt in his Cuban uniform drops his little sword and pistol, with his hair standing on end so that his hat is jumping up. However, that was before Roosevelt had become President and had the chance to be compared to William on the international stage.

The Roosevelt image of William was so tenacious that even in 1918 James W. Gerard wrote in his ludicrously anti-German Face to Face with Kaiserism that William was very like Roosevelt; but perhaps in writing that Gerard was being more subtle than usual.

There were two interesting attempts to find a third partner for Roosevelt and William. In November, 1904, just before the Presidential election, Frank Munsey wrote in his magazine an enthusiastic article on Roosevelt, which included a lengthy comparison with the Kaiser. He listed their shared qualities, such as "watchfulness over the people and their interests" and "zealous devotion to duty", then stressed the total "Americanism" of Roosevelt, adding, "... the Emperor William, while German
to the core and pre-eminently the greatest of the world's
monarchs to-day, seems from some source to have absorbed ...
a tremendous infusion of Rooseveltian Americanism." He men-
tioned William's desire for peace and his inspiration of German
economic growth, concluding,

In a word he does things, and is not afraid to do them, even if the timid and slow of thought cannot follow him. He is greater than conventionality, and is not a slave to blighting precedent. In this respect again, Roosevelt and the Emperor William are markedly alike. And these two together reach back in sympathy and feeling to our great old President, Andrew Jackson, the three forming a striking trinity.23

Whatever the actual resemblances between the Kaiser and Jackson, it is very difficult to see those between the Kaiser and Jackson as Munsey would have conceived of him: the hero of democracy and destroyer of privilege. However, Munsey's views are very significant, because he was not an intellectual but he did usually express ideas which were widespread in America. As S.S. McClure once said, 10,000 readers might agree with Lincoln Steffens's taste, 50,000 with Ida Tarbell's, and millions with S.S. McClure's, but if Frank Munsey liked something, everybody liked it.24

The other attempt to get William and Roosevelt into a threesome was made by Andrew Carnegie, the third partner being himself. Poultney Bigelow claimed that in 1896 Carnegie tried to bribe him to persuade William to buy steel for his ships from Carnegie's company, but a decade later Carnegie was very much persona
grata with William, unlike Bigelow. This arose first from Carnegie's rectorial address at St. Andrew's in October, 1902, in which he portrayed William as the vital force of Germany, and said that he could bring about a United States of Europe, which would not be overwhelmed by America. In 1907 in his presidential address to the Peace Conference in New York, Carnegie said that only the Kaiser had the power to abolish war, and that the fact that he had reigned for 20 years without spilling blood showed that he was essentially peaceful (the American proponents of the Kaiser often stressed that his regime had never spilt blood, ignoring little things like South-West Africa). A number of pacifists and pro-arbitrationists, who were also friends of Carnegie, helped to promote the image of William as a peacemaker: these included the former Ambassadors to Germany A.D. White, Charlemagne Tower and D.J. Hill, and Nicholas Murray Butler, the President of Columbia University. They and Carnegie published articles on the peace-loving Kaiser, particularly Carnegie, whose opinion of William was firmly established after he met him in 1907. In Carnegie's mind the American counterpart of William was Theodore Roosevelt, and as J.F. Wall writes Carnegie had a fantasy in which the three of them would meet, Carnegie would explain his plan for world peace, and the other two would immediately accept it and put it into operation. The three of them were no doubt in Carnegie's mind the chief representatives of the Teutonic races, American, British and German, which should come together in a race alliance.

Carnegie spent a lot of time and money on trying to achieve
this fantasy: in 1910 he financed Roosevelt's safari to Africa, in return for which Roosevelt, who was sceptical of the whole thing, was to explain Carnegie's ideas to the Kaiser when he visited him in Berlin. However, the Kaiser told Roosevelt that the German people would never permit him to disarm, and the death of Edward VII prevented the second stage of Carnegie's plan, in which Roosevelt was to report secretly to a meeting of British politicians. Carnegie continued to believe in Roosevelt and William, even though Elihu Root wrote to him that the German government was "the great disturber of peace in the world". In June, 1913 Carnegie wrote for the New York Times Sunday Magazine an article entitled "Kaiser Wilhelm II, Peace Maker," which attributed Germany's "progress unequalled in Europe" to William's "reign of peace", and that same month he personally presented to William a document congratulating him on the 25th anniversary of his accession and thanking him for being "the foremost apostle of peace in our time". The idea of this had come from N.M. Butler, and the document was signed by seventy officials of American societies and corporations. Carnegie was not alone in hailing William's anniversary: the whole American press published congratulatory articles, and Woodrow Wilson sent an official telegram hoping for "a long continuance" of William's "benignant and peaceful reign." 26

One of the most extreme expressions of belief in William as a representative of peace appeared in The Outlook, which opined that he should be given the Nobel Peace Prize. He had overcome
the "war party" in Germany, having recognised that the commercial rivalry with Britain was no cause for war. Since his accession there had been peace, partly because he was prepared for war. These admirers of William as the guardian of peace seem to have accepted too uncritically Vegetius' "Qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum". The following week The Outlook agreed with Carnegie that William was "the most powerful ally" in the maintenance of peace. This magazine was always particularly favourable to William; in 1912 it provided an enthusiastic review of Alfred H. Fried's The German Emperor and the Peace of the World, the major statement of the case for William as "a famous up-holder of peace". Even in June, 1913, some voices of opposition to the glorification of William were raised; for example, The Independent pointed out that he had not promoted liberty in Germany and had "burdened Europe with a mad rivalry of armaments and taxes and debt". The journal believed that, "The people will rule, not kings", but this assertion of American ideals was the exception at this point. The Independent always tended to be critical of William; in 1908 it printed a criticism of Carnegie's praise of the Kaiser, alleging that his military power was a threat, but it is notable that this piece was written by a Swiss journalist, not an American. 27

Carnegie finished his autobiography, the last page of which dealt with the Kaiser's desire for world peace, a few hours before he heard that the First World War had begun. Even then he didn't turn against William: in October, 1914 he
published in the *Independent* an article called "A League of Peace - Not 'Preparation for War'," which praised the Kaiser for abolishing duelling in the German army. Carnegie had abandoned Roosevelt, who was by this time vociferously attacking pacifism, but he never completely came to oppose William; by February, 1917 he believed that the U.S. had to enter the war in order to defeat Germany, but he still blamed Bethmann-Hollweg and the German generals, not William, for starting the war. 28

Carnegie's was obviously an extreme case, but the recognition by certain pacifists that William II was in a better position than anybody else to bring about disarmament, because his was the lead that other countries would be most likely to follow, often led them into the self-deluding idea that William wanted, or could be persuaded to want, disarmament. To a certain extent there was some justification for them, since the prophecies of European war that had surrounded William's early years on the throne had proved, until 1914, to be unfounded. However, the image of William as a prince of peace seems only to have been held by people in the pacifist movement, many of whom ought to have known better. For example, White had been a delegate at the Hague Peace Conference in 1899, where he had seen the idea of compulsory international arbitration sabotaged by the Germans, but when he wrote about that in his autobiography and in *Century* in 1905 he carefully avoided attaching any blame to William. 29

Roosevelt of course had no such delusions. He was obviously
aware of the comparisons that people kept drawing between him and William, but despite British fears that he was under the influence of the Kaiser, he actually kept a very balanced view of him - in fact, a very consciously balanced view: in 1903 he began a letter to Arthur Lee, formerly the British military attache in Washington, by saying that he regretted Joseph Chamberlain's illness, immediately adding that he also regretted the Kaiser's illness. Roosevelt's letters to Speck von Sternburg, the German Ambassador to the U.S. for a time, emphasized his enthusiasm for certain aspects of William's character: for instance, in 1899, "He is a monarch - a king in deed as well as in name, which some other kings are not."

On the other hand, Roosevelt did not avoid praising the Kaiser in letters to such British friends as Cecil Spring Rice, as when William helped in the settlement of the Russo-Japanese War. Roosevelt did not take seriously the frequent communications he received from William about his fears of Britain, France and Japan; these merely increased his often-expressed feeling that the Kaiser was "jumpy" and erratic. He did genuinely like the Kaiser and Germany, and while John Hay was Secretary of State he personally dealt with much German business, because Hay was so much of an Anglophile that he hated the Kaiser and could not be trusted to deal with Germany. Roosevelt was a realist, and he saw that Germany and the Kaiser respected the U.S. as long as it was militarily strong, but that they didn't really like America. In 1902, when Britain falsely claimed that it had prevented Germany from organizing a European coalition to complain against the U.S. in 1898,
Roosevelt allowed George Smalley to report in The Times that he believed the British version, and it was widely believed in America that the Kaiser's note to his ambassador Holleben in 1898, telling him to have nothing to do with the protest, was a recent forgery. 30

The Kaiser tried to promote a friendship with Roosevelt, and when he visited Berlin in 1910 he was greeted with unprecedented honours. Prince von Bulow in his memoirs listed Roosevelt and Poultney Bigelow among "the long list of people over whom William II went into raptures, but who did not bring him much profit." 31 That may be true of Roosevelt, but if Bulow had read the American magazines he might have thought that Bigelow did a great deal to make American public opinion more favourable to William. That public opinion, which perhaps was perceived as being more pro-German than it actually was, limited Roosevelt's opposition on certain occasions to Germany, and the same was true of Woodrow Wilson later, in more crucial circumstances.

Wilson's collected papers, up to August, 1914, show a peculiar lack of interest in Germany and the Kaiser. His deep attachment to the British liberal democratic tradition meant that he disapproved of an autocrat, but his early belief in an organic theory of society meant that he believed that the German system could not be changed overnight. As he said in his frequently repeated address "Leaders of Men", first given in 1889,
The divinity that once did hedge a king grows not now very high about the latest Hohenzollern; but who that prefers growth to revolution would propose that legislation in Germany proceed independently of this accident of hereditary succession?

In 1910 Wilson's friend Mrs Peck wrote to him that she had attended a meeting of the Pittsfield Wednesday Morning Club, which had been addressed by Professor John W. Burgess. She scoffingly repeated his praise of the Kaiser, and Wilson evidently agreed with her: he was not the sort of person to be impressed by monarchs. From what one can deduce, Wilson's image of the Kaiser before the First World War seems to have been that of a possibly dangerous autocrat, but a necessary evil for the moment; and beyond that his interest does not appear to have stretched.

All of these ideas of William as an American, as a popular leader, as a German Roosevelt, fitted in with the image of William as a modernist. Practically every favourable writer stressed the influence that William had had in the commercial, industrial, colonial and military development of Germany, and the impression was generally given that he was personally responsible for the growth of railways, the development of shipping, the expansion of steel production, and so on. Terms like "guiding force" recur, and some writers, like Price Collier, portrayed the Kaiser as being the vanguard of progress among a backward and old-fashioned people. This modernist image of William was obviously a favourable one; another aspect of his character that found favour with some Americans was his religious
devotion. Harold Frederic wrote that if, as the Russians and French said, this was proof of madness, he should bite some other European sovereigns. Other writers, such as White and Collier, said much the same, and an article written for The Cosmopolitan in 1899 by the theologian Samuel Ives Curtiss, describing William's visit to the Holy Land, did much to promote the image of a Christian monarch. The religiously orientated Outlook praised William for "his sincere interest in advancing biblical knowledge" after he attended lectures by the theologian Frederich Delitzsch, and later praised him again when he criticised some of Delitzsch's heterodox ideas. Even in October, 1914, The World's Work pointed out that he was "a very devout Christian", as well as having an "ambition for world-power" and other unfortunate characteristics. 33

A constant theme in articles on William was his versatility, and if one were to believe such writers as Bigelow and White he would appear as a veritable Renaissance man. One aspect of this was his artistic abilities, although there was some debate over their quality. Bigelow's articles were sometimes illustrated by things like the Kaiser's own design for a battleship, and in 1894 in Harper's he seemed to be implying the existence of a remarkable talent when, after revealing that, as he had suspected, two copies of paintings turned out not to be, as alleged, by William, he wrote that his gifts were "different and more important." Four years later, an article by Henry Eckford called "Wilhelm II as Art Patron" appeared in Century. Although it was sympathetic to William's desire
to promote the arts in Prussia and Germany, it concluded that his methods were too autocratic and that "The fine arts are under the drill sergeant." In particular, Eckford objected to William's patronage of Adolf Menzel, who painted historical scenes from the period of Frederick the Great. In 1905 White described Menzel as the "greatest genius in all modern German art", and he eulogised William's promotion of "healthy" drama and art, as opposed to corrupt modern movements. White obviously represented a rather old-fashioned American point of view, and he was almost partisanly sympathetic to William, but four years earlier Ray Stannard Baker, whom one might expect to have been more objective, also praised William's involvement in art, particularly the placing of statues of Hohenzollern monarchs and their advisers in the Tiergarten. 34

These statues were also referred to in 1903 in an article by the National Magazine's German correspondent, Christian Luhnow, entitled "The New Berlin, A Monument to Wilhelm II", which told how by an "almost superhuman force" William had in ten years transformed a provincial capital into a great city, through which he could now ride being wildly cheered by the populace. Again this view was not unanimous (Collier referred to the new Berlin as a vulgar parvenu), but the idea of William as an urban reformer was likely to appeal to Progressive Americans, since urban reform was one of their chief aims at home. 35 A feature of magazines in this period was the frequency of pieces about the advantages of foreign cities, including Berlin, as compared with the corrupt, slum-ridden
towns of America. This is discussed in a later chapter. Similarly, rich Americans were becoming philanthropically involved in the arts on a new scale, so the Kaiser's artistic interests were likely to be applauded. On the whole, the artistic image of the Kaiser was a good one, since even his critics often had to admire some of his activities.

On one level, arguments that the Kaiser was really a displaced modern American were beside the point, since a large part of the American public, not realizing how lucky they were to be republicans, wanted to read about a real live Emperor, and even to meet one if the opportunity arose. The photographs of William contributed to this aspect of his image by showing him dressed like the hero of a Ruritanian novel. Munsey's Magazine specialized in purveying articles on European monarchs, aristocrats and orders, along with stories about grand dukes and the like. In that context it was hardly surprising that accounts of William were seldom less than adulatory. There were references to his "remarkable intelligence" and his "indomitable will". In 1904 Fritz Cunliffe-Owen, the magazine's chief expert on the courts of Europe, wrote an article on the German Crown Prince, in which he praised the Kaiser's paternal role. In this genre the foil to grandiose photographs was articles with titles like "The Home Life of the Kaiser", affording the reader a glimpse into the Imperial family circle. This subject generally arose in any article on William in the popular magazines: for instance, C. Frank Dewey's enthusiastic study in The Cosmopolitan claimed that every hour
of the Kaiser's day was "devoted to the public good", but, "He is a lover still, ever youthful and romantic; and frequently he steals half an hour from his busy engagements to consult the empress on important matters." 36

It was not just the gullible lower middle-class which was impressed by monarchy. In the early eighteen-nineties James Gordon Bennett's *New York Herald* attacked Americans who were overwhelmed by the splendours of the German court. William went out of his way to meet eminent Americans who were visiting Berlin, whether it was Mark Twain or Charles Schwab of U.S. Steel or academics like Nicholas Murray Butler, and these frequently returned to the U.S. full of admiration for the Kaiser. The same was true of American diplomats: at the end of the war D.J. Hill probably had himself in mind when he described the Kaiser as greeting all Americans as though they had broken through the barriers of formality so that now they and he could "open their hearts" to each other. In 1915 Bigelow complained, rather hypocritically, that some Americans, including officers, were so unbalanced from having once appeared at the Imperial Court that they became pro-German and filled their rooms with photographs of the Kaiser. He also complained that in 1895 William so overcame American naval officers visiting Kiel that he persuaded them to show him secret installations in their ships. It indicates a change in American awareness of the threat that Germany might pose that on a similar occasion in 1903 criticism in the popular press forced the American government to issue a statement saying that William had not
been shown any secret machinery. 37

After August, 1914 there was still a place in American magazines for gossip from the Hohenzollern court, whether from the pen of the Infanta Eulalia or humbler correspondents. Even in his anti-German books *My Four Years in Germany* and *Face to Face with Kaiserism*, published in 1917 and 1918, J.W. Gerard shows the American besottedness with the symbols of royalty by having printed on the endpapers facsimile reproductions of the Kaiser's and Crown Prince's visiting cards, invitations to a Court Ball, to the opening of the Berlin Royal Academy, to dine on the Hohenzollern, and so on. Woodrow Wilson might not have thought much of the divinity hedging William, but there evidently was enough of it to impress many of his fellow Americans.

Words like "impulsive" and "erratic" appear in all of the critical accounts of the Kaiser, and even his supporters had to refer to this aspect of his character, while explaining it away by saying that it was due to his energy or his sincerity. In Britain and Germany the incident that did most to underline William's erratic nature was the publication in 1908 of the *Daily Telegraph* interview, in which he said, *inter alia*, that the British were fools for not realizing that he was their best friend. Typical of press comment in America was *The World's Work*, which criticised the Kaiser, but thought that the German attacks on him showed "that Germany is not an autocracy but a constitutional government" and that "the time
seems to have passed when a whim or the manners or the impetuosity of the Emperor could menace the peace of Europe."

The Kaiser's image had been damaged, but the hostile reaction to him by the Reichstag and German opinion meant that his country's image in America was improved. There were exceptions, such as The Outlook, which praised William as "a strong man" who "dares to be unconventional" and "like President Roosevelt, believes in telling the whole truth, and telling it to all the people."38

The affair had an extra repercussion in the U.S. In August, 1908 William Bayard Hale of the New York Times interviewed William, and was told among other things that the British Empire would soon break up, that the Catholics were dangerous, and that William was organizing an alliance of Germany, America and China against the "Yellow Peril" of Japan. Hale was very pro-German (he was later an agent of the German government), so he showed his article to the German Foreign Office, which was shocked and asked for the attack on Japan to be removed. The New York Times showed it to Roosevelt, who advised them not to publish it. However, it was accepted by Century, which of course widely advertised the fact that its December issue would include an interview with the Kaiser. Then the Daily Telegraph scandal broke, and urgent messages from Germany asked Century not to publish the interview. The printed sheets and plates were handed to the German government. A German ship attempted to dump the copies of the interview in the Caribbean, but they floated and had eventually to be burned
in the ship's boiler. The news of the article's suppression caused a sensation in the newspapers, and there was a great deal of speculation as to what the Kaiser might have said. Some thought that he had been attacking America, and it might have been better for William's image if the article had been printed. Other reports said that William had expressed great friendship for America, which was against the German government's policy, so the Chancellor had suppressed the interview. This would improve William's standing with Americans but damage his country's. The Century affair, along with the Daily Telegraph article, did a lot to convince Americans that the Kaiser was indeed an erratic figure.39

Before 1914 William's critics found little expression in the magazines. One illuminating criticism, which appeared in Century in 1891, didn't mention William by name. It was a story called "The White Crown" by the novelist Herbert D. Ward, which described a world war in 1891 being prevented by the intervention of a supernatural, Christ-like figure. The young German Emperor appeared as a selfish militarist, who had "successively attitudinized" in a variety of roles, and whose enormous armies were held ostensibly in the interests of peace. He had forgotten that the continued sight of battalions of men drilled to the guns was as much the temptation to use them as the sight of cognac is the temptation to drink.

However, his power was destroyed by true Christianity.40 The fictional form allowed the expression of feelings about
the German Emperor that the magazine might have been loth to print otherwise.

Nearly twenty years later a similar story, "Convincing the Imperial Attache" by Frederick Palmer appeared in Hampton's Magazine. War was "declared by the ready on the unready", an unnamed "great power" using as an excuse the imprisonment of one of its subjects in the Canal Zone (this reflected fears of German activities in Latin America). The President remarks,

> While he talked friendship to lull us into security, the Emperor has been preparing for this hour. He outnumbers us in battleships. He has secretly built an overwhelming aerial flotilla.

Although Germany is not named, all the references obviously point to it, including the friendly approaches of the Emperor (which had succeeded only in raising suspicions in some quarters) and the development of air power; the same magazine printed a year and a half later an article stating that Germany's launching of airships armed with machine guns had given it "complete mastery of the air." Despite descriptions of William as peace-loving, such stories reflect deeply-held fears of him.

In the years immediately before the First World War, stories of this sort were encouraged by the war-scare literature emanating from Britain. There was even a play about a German invasion, but when it was put on in New York The World's Work
considered that it had "lost its power to thrill." This editorial remarked on the British expectation of war with Germany, and complacently concluded that such a war would benefit America. Many Americans did not take such an objective view; one particularly pro-British author, Richard Harding Davis, contributed to the war-scare genre with a story of his own, "The Invasion of England" (1912). This is a comic tale in which the German government is inspired by Erskine Childers's *The Riddle of the Sands* (one of the books about a German invasion) actually to invade, but turn back because of military manoeuvres set off by an American reporter's faking an invasion. It can not really be taken seriously, and yet the drift of the story and references to German activities in Morocco show an acceptance that Germany, under William II, was an aggressive state.42

A more intellectualised argument by Thomas Davidson in *The Forum* (1897) suggested that William's autocratic tendencies were accepted by the Germans because of, among other things, their remembrance of the Holy Roman Empire, under which they had been given the civil government of the world. Davidson said that William sought to restore that old Empire, but with himself as both Emperor and Pope, and he deplored this, while saying that it did not necessarily mean that William was unwise or bad. He concluded by hoping that the socialists would place their organisation at the service of the state, presumably establishing a sort of corporate system, since that was the only way for Germany to be both strong and free.43
The arguments of British critics of William were perhaps less abstruse. American readers could be exposed to these in several ways. In the first place, British periodicals were imported into the U.S., and some had editions printed in New York for American distribution. A wider audience was reached by the habit of some American magazines of reprinting articles from British journals. The Eclectic Magazine of New York and Littell's Living Age of Boston were particularly fond of doing this, the reprints being from such publications as the Contemporary Review and Blackwood's, and their articles on William tended to be hostile. One exchange of articles reprinted from the Contemporary Review in 1892 began with an anonymous attack on William as arrogant, extravagant, and incompetent, giving the dismissal of Bismarck as an example. Poultney Bigelow replied with a piece saying that the accusations were lies, going on to give various reasons why it was necessary to dismiss Bismarck: such things as his harsh treatment of the socialists and the Poles, his warlike foreign policy, and his protectionism. In the next issue another anonymous article defended Bismarck, concluding that under him Germany was regulated by a genius, but under William the Government did merely what would be popular with public opinion at a particular moment.44

Five years later an article by someone calling himself Germanicus appeared, saying that William was destroying civil liberties. He complained that William interfered in every aspect of life - that of course is the other view of his brilliant
versatility - and concluded that his attempt to retain a mediaeval system would end in ruin for his crown and country.\textsuperscript{45}

The British hostility to William would be likely to impress American Anglophiles, but it could also be counter-productive. There were important sections of American society which resented any continuance of dependence on Britain, cultural or otherwise; for example, some Irish-Americans tended to like anything that Britain disliked. Already in the pre-war period they were beginning to ally with the German-Americans, and it seems likely that they would look favourably on William, particularly since he dismissed Bismarck, the instigator of the anti-Catholic Kulturkampf.

The British journalists who wrote on William for American magazines tended to be more favourable to him. In 1902 an article by Sidney Brooks appeared in the \textit{North American Review}, in which he wrote that before his accession William was self-willed, theatrical, chauvinistic, and militaristic, but he had since been revealed as "a high strung, fearless, tempestuous nature, full of poetry and idealism ..., force and practicality". Brooks admitted that William had some faults, such as the fact that he could not know everything and so sometimes used his authority to support wrong ideas, but he concluded,

\begin{quote}
No man would change his uniform six times in a couple of hours for the mere fun of the thing. The Kaiser does it because it is his maxim that a thing worth doing at all is worth doing well; and if he carries out that maxim in little things, he does not forget it in great.
\end{quote}
This little homily verges on the ludicrous. The previous year Brooks had declared, "No-one today thinks of the German Emperor as a peril to European peace", which was rather too sweeping a generalisation, even in the American context, and he had explained that Germany needed a strong leader to combat localism.46

Another friendly view was that of A. Maurice Low in the Atlantic Monthly: in fact, this was one of the most favourable portraits to appear in America. Low described William defending his dying father from Bismarck - "single-handed against the Iron Chancellor's might, and standing like a lion whelp at bay between the hunter and his prostrate victim."
The rest of the article twisted the facts just as much: William's notorious speech urging his army to destroy the Chinese was apparently necessary to stir the emotions of uneducated men; he had single-handedly created the German fleet; and so on.47

This sort of thing coming from British writers would be particularly likely to impress Americans, but there might be a cyclical tendency in this, since both Brooks and Low had lived for long periods in the U.S., and may have picked up habits of thought which were current there. Furthermore, Low had German connections.

American magazines were also open to German contributors. For an American audience one of the more convincing critics
of William would be Karl Blind, a German veteran of the 1848 Revolution and colleague of Garibaldi and Mazzini. He was 75 years old when he wrote for The Forum in 1901 a piece entitled "The Kaiser's Speeches and German History", in which he showed the historical inaccuracies in recent speeches by William, in an evident attempt to deny historical validity to the Wilhelmine regime. He stated that although William attacked the risings of 1848, they were actually essential to bring about the unification of Germany, and Blind pointed out such inconsistencies in William's thought as his complaints about the spirit of brutality among German youth immediately after his speech urging his army to act like barbarians. The Forum was one of the more intellectual magazines, so its readership was limited, but an argument in favour of democratic nationalism was likely to be favoured among many of the people to whom Henry May refers as "custodians of culture", with their regard for British traditions. 48

On the other hand, ten years earlier The Forum printed an article by another democratically respectable, although perhaps more conventionally liberal, German, Friedrich Heinrich Geffcken, who as well as being Professor emeritus of international law at Strassburg, an Imperial Privy Councillor, and a friend of the late Emperor Frederick, had become famous when he was imprisoned on the orders of Bismarck and tried on the trumped-up charge of forging Frederick's diary. His article praised William, saying that he formerly had been seen as a reactionary and a militarist, but his dismissal of Bismarck, his pro-
motion of commercial treaties against the wishes of the Junkers, his pacific foreign policy, and various internal reforms showed that he was actually more of a modernising influence than even Frederick would have been. Geffcken said that William was not an absolutist, but he saw himself as "the centre of moral discipline." He concluded, "... at present there is perhaps no life more precious for Germany, as well as for Europe, than that of William II." Such an endorsement by so close an associate of the supposedly very liberal Frederick would do a great deal to improve the image of William among well-informed Americans of a liberal disposition.

The articles of less eminent Germans, like Christian Luhnow, could be expected to contain lines like, "It is fortunate for the German Empire that a man of such brilliant intellectual qualities as William II occupies the throne, else the ultra-aggressive instincts of the Prussians might bring about more serious complications." However, the German-American Wolf von Schierbrand was sometimes more ambivalent. He emigrated to America in 1872 after winning the Iron Cross at Sedan, and eventually became the Berlin correspondent of Associated Press and the New York Evening Post, before returning to the U.S. in 1901. An article in the North American Review the following year dealt with the Kaiser's influence on German affairs. He pointed out how in various ways the Kaiser was more powerful than a mere reading of the constitution would suggest. He gave the usual list of benefits this had had for Germany - increased national self-confidence, a great navy,
and so on — but concluded that these were outweighed by the decline in personal liberty and political standards, the destruction of a free press, and by William's influence on the arts, which von Schierbrand described as "noxious in the highest degree" since he suppressed Secessionism, Realism, and other new movements, replacing them with "tame mediocrity." Even when von Schierbrand was painting sentimental pictures of the Kaiser's family life in Lippincott's, the compliments were barbed, such as the description of William as "far more the good-natured, indulgent paterfamilias of the average Teutonic type than one would be inclined to suppose from his behaviour in public." 50

American readers would be intelligent enough to expect a bias in favour of William on the part of Germans, so when they criticized him it must have carried a correspondingly greater weight. Again, one doesn't know which writers would be most likely to be believed. White mentions that American academics were worried by a German work on Caligula, which implicitly compared the Roman despot with William, but he adds that most of them realized the resemblance was exaggerated. 51

After the outbreak of the war books and articles appeared in Britain and the U.S., seeking to prove that the Kaiser was insane. One of the earlier examples of this was "The Kaiser's Psychosis" by Dr. Allan McLane Hamilton, which appeared in the North American Review in 1915. Hamilton was a grandson of Alexander Hamilton, a specialist in nervous diseases, and a Professor at Cornell. One ought to point out that he was
not merely jumping on the wartime bandwagon: in 1904 an article by him had appeared which implied that William was a paranoiac with a delusional sense of greatness, a "semi-religious exaltation", and an exaggerated sense of his own importance. At that time it was unlikely to be believed, but there was a different situation in 1915. Hamilton was evidently the archetypal humourless psychiatrist: he quoted a reference made by William at the Dardanelles to the beautiful scenery forbidden to mortal eyes as evidence of "an apparent quasi-delusional condition", and said that the fact that he signed a letter to the Imperial Chancellor "Imperator Rex" showed delusions of grandeur, presumably unaware that the German Emperor and King of Prussia was entitled to sign himself thus. Further evidence of psychiatric disturbance, largely based on misunderstandings, was given. Even characteristics of the Kaiser which were formerly eulogised were turned against him: it was hinted that his withered arm (previously the cue for descriptions of his brave struggle against a handicap) might be due to a "cerebral anomaly." His versatility was said to be typical of unstable subjects of his sort. Hamilton described a visit to the Lenbach gallery, where he saw,

A frightful daub which purported to represent a naval battle. Aside from the first canvas of a schoolboy with his first box of paints, you never saw the like. It was boldly signed WILHELM.

William's famous picture of the "Yellow Peril" was described as "not only exceedingly bad, but suggestive of insane art at its worst." The "atrocious" statues in the Tiergarten, so
admired by White and others, and the literary endeavours of the Kaiser were ridiculed, and the article ended by saying that when a madman directs a war it can only end in defeat. 52

As was mentioned, there had been reports of alleged mental instability in the Kaiser long before the outbreak of war, but these were much more circumspect and were likely to be dismissed as malicious gossip. For example, Wolf von Schierbrand asked in Lippincott's Magazine, "Is Kaiser Wilhelm II of Normal Mind?" After describing examples of William's strange behaviour Schierbrand concluded that he was not insane, "But his mind is not quite normal." Even this completely unfavourable report kept to the usual standards of politeness, and Schierbrand added, "... let us hope William II will live to a ripe and hale old age." 53 This was obviously far milder than the wartime articles.

Hamilton evidently meant his diagnosis quite sincerely, but it shows a changed attitude in the U.S. after 1914 that such an attack should be accepted as a serious analysis. It is also suggestive in its complete lack of understanding of the Kaiser and his position; one gains the impression that a rational American scientist is in an entirely different world from something so mediaeval and irrational. Logically, people who accept a monarchy must be insane, as must someone who believes himself divinely chosen. It is impossible to base a generalisation on the views of one American scientist, particularly a psychiatrist, but it would be interesting to know
to what extent the American scientific community was incapable of forming an image of William, except as a lunatic. Of course, it made a difference if they actually met him: even American scientists were not immune to the glitter of majesty, and R.S. Baker mentioned one American professor at a reception given by William to an association of scientists. After watching the Emperor processing in gorgeous robes, preceded by chamberlains bearing the crown and insignia, the professor remarked, "I am a republican to the backbone, but I believe that if monarchs are necessary, they should be monarchs to the last bit of gold lace, just as William is Kaiser." 54

To return to articles on the Kaiser after 1914: the subject of propaganda in America during its period of neutrality is of course a very large one, as pro-German, pro-Allied and neutral elements tried desperately to justify their respective sides. Discussion of the Kaiser as a person tended to be subsumed within the debate on wider issues, and increasingly subtleties vanished as he was portrayed either as a peace-loving monarch who had acted to defend his country, or as the demonic War Lord. Increasingly the latter view came to predominate, but it seems likely that the good press William had earlier received in the U.S. would do a great deal to increase American opposition to involvement in the World War. 55

Magazine articles of course were not the only source of American views nor reflection of the American image of William, but as has been said they in some ways give a more accurate long term
impression. They were not entirely above events: John Brisben Walker, the editor of *The Cosmopolitan*, in 1898 introduced C.F. Dewey's piece on William by referring to the importance of understanding the Kaiser at a time when "much is being written of the possible end of friendly relations between the U.S. and the German Empire" (this was the time of the Spanish-American War); and on another level there were grateful articles by academics following William's gifts to the Harvard Germanic Museum. In the way in which it responded to immediate events the daily press probably gave a considerably worse impression of William, since he was likely to be in the news when something bad had happened. His autocratic speeches in 1900 and 1901 were reported in the *New York World* with such comments as that he was a mediaevalist and a madman, and after the outbreak of war in Europe the newspapers often printed hostile reports. On the other hand, space was found for Burgess's articles proclaiming that he had learned more from William than from any other man, and the Hearst press continued to have sympathy with William even after America had entered the war.  

There were also pamphlets and lectures on the Kaiser, and at least one supposedly humorous verse, "Hoch der Kaiser!", which referred to William's obsession that God was on his side and his aggressiveness, became widely popular after Germany had seemed to threaten the U.S. at Manila. There were books as well, such as Frederic's *The Young Emperor*, a stream of translations of generally hostile French works, which were probably
regarded sceptically, and others. The portrait of William in Collier's *Germany and the Germans from an American Point of View* (1913) was very favourable, although Collier added that it would be dangerous for Britain and the U.S. if all Germans were as able as the Kaiser. 57

In the general periodical press there appear to be about three articles giving a favourable impression of the Kaiser for each unfavourable one. After 1914 unfavourable accounts began to dominate. As has been implied, it seems unlikely that the situation before 1914 was a reflection of a great general feeling for the Kaiser in the U.S., because the people who were able to write about William tended, due to circumstances, to be biased in his favour. It seems likely that two sentences from William Allen White's exposure of the Tammany boss Croker in *McClure's* in 1901 are more illuminating than many of the articles in praise of the Kaiser. When attacking Croker's treatment of a court of enquiry, White wrote,

> Emperor William could have used no stronger language to the Reichstag. The mental attitude of the man who spoke thus was that of dictator. 58

White represented *par excellence* the mind of middle America, and to him the All-Highest was a dictator, a Tammany boss writ large. Nevertheless, the influence of people like Andrew Dickson White might have meant that that was not all that he saw him as.

Before 1914 it seems that few people who disliked William
cared enough or were sufficiently well-informed to attack him in the magazines - or possibly the formula of many magazines precluded attacks on foreign heads of state. In any case, it is an indication that muckraking was confined to American affairs.

The idea is often expressed that after 1890 American intellectuals, who had formerly seen Germany as a new, modern country, came to see it as reactionary and dangerous. However, insofar as the Kaiser personified Germany, it is clear that the two views still existed until the war, and there were two opposing images of the Kaiser: as a modernist and as a mediaeval figure. These images obviously would affect the American attitude to Germany. In 1917 almost all Americans turned violently against William and the Germans, and this hysteria becomes even more puzzling in view of the favourable image of William that many leading Americans had held; unless there was a feeling of resentment at having been misled.

The emphasis by such people on the supposedly good Kaiser meant that they paid insufficient attention to the reactionary system which supported him. Perhaps there was a tendency in America to attach too much importance to outstanding individuals. American academics like Burgess and Richard Hudson, and the German jurist Philip Zorn, even published articles in American journals demonstrating that the German system really was "democratic." These argued that the Emperor really had very little power; Burgess concluded that the system "is a constitu-
tional presidency; and if it needs any reform, it is in the
direction of more strength rather than less." 59

One of the most favourable American descriptions of William II
occurred in a novel, Gertrude Atherton's Rulers of Kings (1904),
which was dedicated to Poulney Bigelow. It is an unabashedly
elitist and anti-democratic book, the hero of which, Fessenden
Abbott, is taught Social Darwinism by his father. Young
Abbott is sent to the Adirondacks, to be brought up by farmers
called Nettlebeck, whose parents had come from Hamburg. The
Nettlebecks are described as having "the peaceful blood of the
German peasant in them", so they can not understand an "enter­
prising American lad"; presumably Mrs Atherton believed that
the Germans must all be docile, to enable someone like William
to rule them, in which case he had to be an absolutely untypical
German. 60

Fessenden studies "electricity, mechanics, banking" and other
practical subjects, and at university, inspired by military
drill, "dreams of war and glory" and imagines American ships
"forcing the Monroe Doctrine down the throats of Europe, perhaps
annexing the rotten old monarchies altogether." He makes
money by teaching German to the other members of his forestry
class (Americans knew that Germany was the foremost country in
the study of forestry). His father then re-appears, informs
him that "I am the richest man in the world", and explains that
he had had him brought up by "frugal but well-living Germans"
to remove him from "the temptations of wealth." Abbott here
There are going to be two controlling forces in the world in the next thirty years, yourself and William of Germany... Keep a hawk-eye on him and don't make the common shallow mistake of underrating him. He alone can block the progress of the United States; all the other nations put together are not worth considering. He only needs certain conditions to scoop in Europe like another Charlemagne.

This demonstrates what a dynamic figure William could appear to power-worshipping Americans, who took him at a valuation perhaps even higher than his own; but it also shows that the very power for which he was admired could simultaneously appear as a threat to the United States.

Mr Abbott will introduce Fessenden to William:

But if he fascinates you - as he probably will - make always this reserve: your future friendship for him depends upon his course towards the United States.

Fessenden is "contemptuous" of powerless monarchs, but when the Kaiser's yacht moors next to his father's he loquaciously and excitedly exclaims,

The German Emperor! I hardly know whether I am more anxious to see him or his yacht... The more I hear of Europe, the rottener it appears, with the exception of Germany. This man seems to be making an American city out of Berlin, and to have plenty of sand all round. Some one has said of him that he is an autocrat with a Yankee head on his shoulders...
Fessenden says that he will not wait "till I'm spoken to", but his father assures him, "He observes little formality up here, and less with Americans ..." In fact, Fessenden and the Emperor hit it off: "in spite of a flinty reserve in the background of both pairs of eyes, a mutual friendship was conceived at once." William asks innumerable questions about America, for instance, about the Nettlebecks' attitude to Germany and about the technical university (this latter because he was "bent upon modernising his country and making it the strongest industrially in Europe"). These over-written and effusive descriptions continue at length. 62

The two men realise that they are very alike:

Their personalities pushed aside the mask of their features and snatched the knowledge that for them it was love or hate, friendship or enmity, mutual assistance or a bitter lifelong struggle ...

In this Mrs Atherton seems to be personifying America and Germany and the possible course of their relations (Mr Abbott tells his son that William wants "Europe and South America"). Later, William is given a speech in support of divine right and denigrating elected presidents. He says that America should abandon the Monroe Doctrine, but Fessenden replies, "You can have Europe ... but you can't have South America." 63

The plot then becomes even more unlikely, involving William's designs on Austria and Fessenden's love for an Austrian arch-
duchess. Throughout are scattered complimentary comments on William, such as,

In William's brief career Germany had been reorganized, strengthened, incredibly promoted in industrial importance. William received an occasional snub and reminder that he was two-thirds mortal, but to associate the idea of failure with him was as unthinkable as to imagine him in the robes of a monk praying for humility.

Nevertheless, Fessenden succeeds in making the U.S.A. a great power and establishing the Monroe Doctrine as "a fact", although, "Like all of his countrymen who thought, he would infinitely have preferred the civilising forces of Europe in South America". However, he realises that the Doctrine is "sacred to the American people." 64

Meanwhile, William faces "antagonistic forces in Germany", but he plans war with Russia, Fessenden remarking that "... success in a great war would bind all parties (in Germany) in a common approval" - prophetic words. The book is full of references to things written about William in America; for instance, Fessenden's sister defends William against charges of insanity, saying that "the commonplace world always avenges itself on an unusual character" in that way. 65

Despite his support for William, Fessenden disapproves of the monarchical system and sees him as representing a historical force which will destroy it:
Every day envy of (the U.S.A.) grows in the European, ridden by police, his individuality cramped by social laws, his manhood dwarfed by a ridiculous institution that should have disappeared with the first year of free schools ... William of Germany will not admit it, but his mission is to sweep the kinglets of Europe off the board and unite their states into a peaceful whole which shall convert itself at the right moment into another great republic founded on the few sound principles of socialism ...66

This last word is indicative of the sympathy that many Americans felt to some of the aims of the German Socialists, that is, moderate reforms and the establishment of democracy, which, it was felt, would make Germany more like America, but Mrs Atherton was carrying that much further and imagining a United States of Europe.

Most Americans were glad that William had not gone to war, as had seemed threatened in the early years of his reign, but not Fessenden:

The world has waited and waited for you to do the great thing, not realising your difficulties, and that it was your purpose to make Germany strong and prosperous before launching it into a great war.

Fessenden gives William a secret weapon so that he can destroy Russia and possibly France, and thus control Europe. Mrs Atherton directs yet more adulation at William:

... no ruler had ever brought a more lofty enthusiasm to reform, and he had been thwarted by ignorance, and conservative stupidity, and personal hatred, until he sometimes felt ... he should shrug his shoulders and simmer down
into the routine of other sovereigns.

Now Fessenden lets him achieve his great ambitions, in return for the hand of the Archduchess Ranata. William assures him that he wants to rule men for their good, to have a vast empire in which human life shall be as protected, as safe, as it is in my own empire to-day, where all may have a chance to prosper and be happy, to worship God in their own way, where such tyranny of the mind and body as still exists in these benighted parts of Europe ... will be abolished.

In her authorial voice, Mrs Atherton backs this up:

William thoroughly believed in himself ... and no matter what the causes of discontent which had bred the German socialist of to-day - causes insignificant enough when compared with those of even Italy and Spain, leaving out Russia and other barbarous states - no one questioned the clockwork system of rule in his country, the security of life and freedom of conscience, and the solid industrial basis on which he had set it.67

Therefore, because William represented order, stability and paternalistic progress, he was to be allowed to rule Europe, leaving Fessenden to control the Western Hemisphere.

This book has been dealt with at some length because it reveals so clearly the way in which, and reasons why, many Americans admired William II so much, as well as exposing the absurdity of much of that admiration. Gertrude Atherton was disposed to have such a high opinion of William because she believed in
strong, centralised, nationalistic government, being very much a Hamiltonian (she wrote a novel about Alexander Hamilton, *The Conqueror* (1902), and edited his letters). She admired Great Men, partly because of her own "aristocratic self-esteem", as Charlotte McClure put it, which derived from her Southern belle mother and her descent from Benjamin Franklin and other notables. She also had some leanings towards Progressivism, supporting Rudolph Spreckels and James D. Phelan in their fight against corruption in San Francisco (although, typically, she was motivated more by a belief in strong men fighting against the old system than by altruism). In 1912 she spoke on behalf of Woodrow Wilson, but in her autobiography she confessed that she preferred Theodore Roosevelt, which fits in much better with her admiration for Hamilton and William. She actually wrote *Rulers of Kings* in Munich, where she gained a particularly favourable impression of Wilhelmine Germany. "Munich was a dream city", she wrote, full of palaces and art galleries, with no poverty or slums. There she moved in an upper-class circle, as she also did in London, and at this time she evidently felt no clash between her attractions to Britain and Germany. At a dinner party in London she expressed her admiration for the Kaiser and most of those present agreed, including Haldane, the Minister of War, who believed that William had no aggressive intent. However, when the First World War broke out she supported Britain, was involved in fund-raising for the French wounded, and wrote newspaper articles on alleged German atrocities to encourage America to enter the war. Her belief in the Anglo-Saxon race proved stronger than
her admiration for William. Her hopes that the strong man of Germany would work with America to dominate the world had come to nothing.

Grant C. Knight referred to *Rulers of Kings* as an example of American admiration for the Strong Man in the early twentieth century, and that is one reason why Americans should have found William attractive. There were various other reasons for American approval: some were overwhelmed by meeting the Kaiser; some saw him as a bulwark against social unrest or against Russia; some looked only at the material advances made by Germany and ignored the system behind them. In any case, it seems to argue something unhealthy in the state of American democracy that an anti-democratic regime could be so easily justified, and that war was necessary before some Americans realized that the rest of the world deserved democracy too. It is perhaps unfortunate that more eminent Americans did not share, or, any way, express, the image of the Kaiser of James McKeen Cattell, who, in August, 1917, shortly before being dismissed from his post as Professor of Psychology at Columbia University for supporting the rights of conscientious objectors, wrote,

> I opposed the German Kaiser and his military bureaucracy when Theodore Roosevelt was dining with him, the trustees of Columbia University were naming a chair in his honor, and Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler was saying that 'he would have been chosen monarch - or chief executive - by popular vote of any modern people among whom his lot might have been cast'.
There had been criticisms of the Kaiser but the evidence is that most Americans went to great lengths to see him as a positive figure in international politics. Perhaps one effect of Progressivism was to make them expect good things of strong political leaders.
CHAPTER 3 : MARK TWAIN AND GERMANY

Nowadays the name of Mark Twain (which, to avoid confusion, I shall use throughout, even where Samuel Langhorne Clemens might be more accurate) tends to be associated with books dealing specifically with America - The Adventures of Tom Sawyer, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn and so on - and Bernard Shaw's prediction to Twain, that one day his works would be as essential to the historian of America as those of Voltaire are to the historian of France, has proved to be largely justified. However, Twain's reputation as a writer was first established in 1869 with The Innocents Abroad, a travel book, and throughout his career he continued to write books and articles dealing with his life abroad - he spent about a third of his life outside the United States. This chapter deals with Twain's views of Germany, as he publicly and privately expressed them. The importance of these lies in their demonstration of the effect that Germany had on a man who was in many ways a typical American, but who was in a position to influence by his writings the general American image of the country. In order to trace the development of Twain's ideas, and in view of the fact that his earlier writings continued to be read throughout the period under consideration, it is necessary to go back to the decade before 1888.

Mark Twain first visited Germany in 1878. His primary purpose was to gather material for another travel book, and he chose to go to Germany largely because he had not been there before. However, there were more particular reasons, as he made clear in his letters and in the book he wrote, A Tramp Abroad, namely, to learn about music and art. This desire was clearly linked
to his position as a member of the group - a sort of intellectual aristocracy - that had formed at the Nook Farm community in Hartford, Connecticut. Twain wanted to keep up with the others by enlarging his education, and by this time Germany, education and culture were closely linked in the minds of Americans. This may also explain why Twain was so eager to learn the German language - an eagerness he never displayed with regard to any other foreign language - since a knowledge of German was practically a prerequisite for American intellectuals, at least up to about 1900. An obvious example to Twain was his close friend and literary adviser, the novelist William Dean Howells, who was so steeped in German language and literature that some of his early poems were mistaken for translations of Heine. Before the First World War almost all eminent American academics attended German universities or at least knew German, one of the rare exceptions being Woodrow Wilson. Twain began trying to learn German before he left the United States, but he found it very difficult. 2 This was the beginning of a virtual obsession with the language that lasted for the rest of his life and formed one of his strongest links with Germany.

The chief element of Twain's image of Germany on this first visit appeared in a letter he wrote to Howells on his arrival in Frankfurt:

Oh, I have such a deep, grateful, unutterable sense of being 'out of it'. I think I foretaste some of the advantages of being dead. Some of the joy of it.
Twain had personal reasons for this relief at having escaped from America. His circle of friends had been shaken by the Beecher scandal, Twain himself had been deeply upset by the embarrassment caused by his miscalculated speech at a dinner for John Greenleaf Whittier, and he had also got into business difficulties. Furthermore, as his novel The Gilded Age, written with Charles Dudley Warner, had shown, Twain disliked the corrupt state of American society and politics.3

All of these external factors affected Twain's impressions of Germany as they appear in A Tramp Abroad, which was published in 1880. The book describes the areas through which he passed, and in these descriptions the words "beautiful", "quaint" and "picturesque" constantly recur. Indeed, he keeps trumping his own superlatives: "Heidelberg by day ... is the last possibility of the beautiful", then that is surpassed by Heidelberg by night, and later, when Twain remarks that "Germany, in the summer, is the perfection of the beautiful", he adds that voyaging down the River Neckar on a raft is the height of this perfection. This escapist view of Germany is backed up by the Rhine legends (some invented) scattered through the narrative. There is no discussion of political matters, which usually came within the remit of nineteenth century travel books, and the society shown is an agrarian one. There are descriptions of women working in the fields, a sight that surprised Twain, although it did not shock him as it invariably did more genteel American observers. There are few indications that Germany was undergoing a steady process of industrialisation, though at a more controlled rate
than during the frenzied *Grunderzeit* which had ended with the crash of 1873. This is largely due to the fact that Twain chose to write about the rural areas of Southern Germany and the Black Forest, but he does mention in passing certain signs of development, such as Italian workers blasting the route for a new railway.

This description and Twain's observation of the neatness of the uniform stations that were built for the new railways lead to the remark that: "The keeping a country in such beautiful order as Germany exhibits, has a wise practical side to it, too, for it keeps thousands of people in work and bread who would otherwise be idle and mischievous." This image of order is another aspect of the idea that Germany was some kind of earthly paradise. On the second page of the book Twain remarked on the neatness and cleanliness of the people's clothes, the impressive uniforms, and the good manners of the Germans. He had written to Howells from Frankfurt: "What clean clothes, what good faces, what tranquil contentment, what prosperity, what genuine freedom, what superb government!" It seems odd that he should write in such terms at a time when the *Kulturkampf* against Catholicism was still going on (although dying down) and when Bismarck was beginning his attack on the socialists. In his letters and notebooks Twain mentioned the assassination attempt on Wilhelm I, which provided the excuse for the anti-socialist laws, merely in order to praise the aged Kaiser and to remark on the love that the Germans felt for him. The "tranquil contentment" evidently belonged more to Twain than to Germany, and it is obvious that
much of his praise of that country was really an attack on American corruption and incompetence. Nonetheless, the idea of Germany as the land of order was an important part of its external image, and Twain's writings contributed to this. At this stage few Americans were critical of the militarism that was the other side of German paternalism. They were more impressed by the apparent simplicity of the life of Germany's rulers, as when Twain felt sorry for a cheaply dressed old lady he saw in a church, who turned out to be the Empress.5

Twain's view of Germany as beautiful and ordered, of which there is a lot more evidence in his notebook, was obviously shared by many rich Americans, since the journey he undertook was typical of the kind of holiday that was popular with them, which explains why he met so many fellow Americans en route. It is ironic that, whereas America had the reputation of a place of refuge for poor Europeans, Europe had become a place where rich Americans could escape from the social, political and economic strains of America. Washington Irving was the first to glamorise Europe for the Americans, and Twain was following in that tradition.

As has been mentioned, the German universities had become very popular as places where American students could complete their educations, and Twain devoted several chapters of A Tramp Abroad to student life at Heidelberg. These are generally favourable. He describes the vast consumption of beer, and is surprised at the "companionable" way in which the professors drink with the students in the beer halls. Of the students he wrote: "Each can choose for himself whether he will work or play; for German
university life is a very free life; it seems to have no restrains." He found that the vast majority was hard-working, but continued,

It would be a mistake to suppose that the easy-going, pleasure-seeking student carries an empty head. Just the contrary. He has spent nine years in the Gymnasium, under a system which allowed him no freedom, but vigorously compelled him to work like a slave. Consequently he has left the Gymnasium with an education which is so extensive and complete, that the most a university can do for it is to perfect some of its profounder specialities.

"Twain says that foreign students in Germany "put a mansard roof on their whole general education", but the German student adds "a steeple in the nature of some speciality", and the rest of the time "lays up a good rest against the day that must see him put on the chains once more and enter the slavery of official or professional life." This specialisation was one of the features that began to be imitated in American universities, with, for example, the establishment of graduate schools. As in other areas, Twain's observations on German education were not original, but he was helping to spread such ideas among the American public.

It was not the academic aspects of German universities that interested Twain most, since he devoted three chapters to the custom of duelling. He gave a detailed description of the participants, the large room in which the duels between student corps took place, and the padding and goggles they wore. The point of these duels was to inflict injuries on the opponent's head,
and Twain describes the results as a "fearful spectacle."
There is a touch of voyeurism in such sentences as: "My eyes
were upon the loser of this duel when he got his last and
vanquishing wound - it was in his face, and it carried away
his - but no matter, I must not enter into
details." Despite
the horrifying descriptions of duels and the resultant scars
(and two or three deaths a year), Twain clearly sympathised
with the duelling students (who, he made clear, constituted only
a tenth of all the students) - he used words like "interest",
"excitement", "exhilaration" - these relating to his own feel­
ings - and applied to the combatants such terms as "fortitude",
and "endurance." In his notebook he even joked, "Here you can't
tell whether a man is a Franco-Prussian war hero or has a univer­sity education", and in A Tramp Abroad he wrote that the strict
laws of duelling made it a tournament, not a prize-fight. 7
German duelling was a subject that seems to have fascinated
Americans at the end of the nineteenth century - practically
every book on Germany had to have a chapter on the Mensur and
innumerable articles about it appeared in newspapers and magaz­
ines - presumably because of its picturesque medievalism, but
most educated Americans would not have been as sympathetic to
the institution as Twain evidently was.

The next chapter in A Tramp Abroad, "The Great French Duel",
makes this sympathy even clearer. It purports to describe a
duel between Gambetta and Fourtou of the French Assembly, fought
with miniature guns in a fog. Gambetta faints on top of Twain,
who thus becomes "the only man who had been hurt in a French
Twain's letters and notebooks are full of abusive remarks about France. During the Franco-Prussian War the sympathies of most Americans had been with Prussia, and this feeling increased with the Prussian victory and the unification of Germany, which was, like the U.S.A., a predominantly Protestant federation. In Twain's case there was also a hatred of what he saw as French sexual immorality, which caused him to be more pro-German than he might otherwise have been (nor was he alone in this). To return to duelling, Twain's experiences in the American West had given him some familiarity with the custom (he even claimed to have been challenged to a duel in Nevada), so the German practice might seem less outré to him. It was a subject to which he often returned, as in a later comparison of Austrian and French duels, again to the ridicule of the latter.

There was at Heidelberg an Anglo-American Students Club, which Twain addressed on July 4 in the mixture of English and German that was to become a speciality of his. For example, he said, "Die Anblick so viele Grossbrittanischer und Amerikanischer hier zusammengetroffen in Bruderliche concord, ist zwar a welcome and inspiriting spectacle." The pro-British sentiment here was typical of his feelings in the eighteen-seventies. He also met one of the students, Frank Harris, whose dislike he incurred by virulently attacking his fellow author, Bret Harte, a former friend with whom he had quarrelled and who in 1878 became American Consul at Krefeld in Westphalia. The American government had at this time the enlightened habit of appointing eminent writers to consulships. Indeed, the American minister to Germany at this point was another friend of Twain's, Bayard Taylor, who was
famous as the translator of Goethe's Faust.

His stay in Germany had much less effect on Harte than in Twain's case, but there is an odd parallel between their reactions to Germany; Harte asked in "Views from a German Spion", one of his Eastern Sketches, "Why are these people, physically in all else so much stronger than my countrymen, deficient in eyesight?"

Twain in A Tramp Abroad wrote,

In one place we saw a nicely dressed German gentleman without any spectacles. Before I could come to anchor he had got away. It was a great pity. I so wanted to make a sketch of him. The captain comforted me for my loss, however, by saying that the man was without any doubt a fraud who had spectacles, but kept them in his pocket in order to make himself conspicuous.

Harte concluded that the phenomenon was due to the use of the Gothic alphabet, while Train invented a legend of a "man of science" who, given a monopoly of the manufacture and sale of spectacles in Germany, reduced their price, so the emperor commanded

everybody to buy this benefactor's spectacles and wear them, whether they needed them or not. So originated the widespread custom of wearing spectacles in Germany and as a custom once established in these old lands is imperishable, this one remains universal in the empire to this day.10

Harte's explanation may sound more likely, but Twain says more about Germany. In any case, the suggestion that Germany was a nation of spectacle-wearers reinforces the image of order and of
studiousness, Germany as a land of thinkers and readers, which only gradually and belatedly gave way to recognition of Germany's practical abilities and militarism.

In *A Tramp Abroad*, as in *The Innocents Abroad*, Twain poked fun at art, but as before it was pretentiousness he was really attacking. Thus, he remarked that when he got back to the United States with his "fine European education", he too would be able to pretend that he liked the higher music and Turner's paintings. On the other hand, he approved of the genuine artistic nature of many Germans. On discovering that audiences still went to hear singers long past their best, he wrote,

Where and how did we get the idea that the Germans are a stolid, phlegmatic race? In truth, they are widely removed from that. They are warm-hearted, emotional, impulsive, enthusiastic, their tears come at the mildest touch, and it is not hard to move them to laughter ... We are cold and self-contained, compared with the Germans.

In this case he may have been disagreeing with a prevailing cliché about Germany, but the general tenor of the book was to support the idea of Germany as a beautiful and orderly country. Twain extolled the famous German efficiency, as in the theatre at Mannheim, where there were speedy scene changes; at concerts, which began promptly and where latecomers had to wait; and at Heidelberg, where lectures began and ended exactly on time. Sometimes he did satirise his own picture, for instance, of the picturesque and quaint: he stayed at an inn where Gotz von Berlichingen had lived and noticed that "The furniture was quaint old carved stuff, full four hundred years old, and some of the
smells were over a thousand." V. Royce West was too simplistic in stating that Twain's picture of Germany portrayed "the bewitchingly and truly romantic and chivalrous phases of the medieval" and in playing down the humour with which Twain regarded the country. It is true that Twain was impressed by "the open nature of the German people he knew" and by the German countryside, but he often managed to maintain his humorist's objectivity. West was only dealing with the generally favourable picture of Germany in A Tramp Abroad, and that in 1936 in a journal devoted to establishing good relations between America and Germany.11

Only half of A Tramp Abroad deals with Germany, the rest concerns Switzerland and Italy, but Twain had difficulty in writing the later sections of the book, so that the German chapters are the most interesting and sympathetic. In the period up to the First World War very few American literary works were set in or dealt with Germany, as opposed to England, France and Italy, apart from a large number of travel books, but few of those sold many copies. Furthermore, as Lafcadio Hearn pointed out in 1886, contemporary German imaginative literature was not popular abroad, particularly in America, where, for example, no translation of Fontane appeared until 1914. Thus, A Tramp Abroad must have had a very strong effect on how Americans looked at Germany, even if it only reinforced existing ideas, particularly since there was a lack of literary competition in doing so. The first edition sold 62,000 copies and there were at least nine American re-issues up to 1907. Testimony to its influence can be found in Happy Days, the autobiography of H.L. Mencken, who became one
of the most significant American interpreters of German culture. He wrote that, despite his German-American background, "It was A Tramp Abroad that made me German-conscious, and I still believe that it is the best guide-book to Germany ever written." However, Twain would not have been pleased that it also gave Mencken what he called "a vast contempt for the German language." 12

One of the appendices of A Tramp Abroad is entitled "The Awful German Language"; this is an amusing criticism of the complexities of German and one result of Twain's struggles with the language. He attacked parentheses, separable verbs, and the fact that "sie" can mean you, she, her, it, they or them. He claimed, "I heard a California student in Heidelberg say, in one of his calmest moods, that he would rather decline two drinks than one German adjective." He disliked compound words: "Some German words are so long that they have a perspective". He mentioned a few virtues, such as giving all nouns capitals, and proposed reforms, culminating in retaining "Zug" and "Schlag" and their pendants and discarding the rest of the vocabulary. More than thirty years later Twain's biographer, Albert Bigelow Paine, wrote, "The present Emperor of Germany is said to find comfort in this essay on his national speech when all other amusements fail." The German critic Paul Lindau claimed that it would begin a movement for reform, which does not seem to have emerged, and said the Germans had not been offended. 13 Indeed, it promotes a friendly spirit towards the Germans by its good humour.

In any case, the linguistic tie was probably the strongest link
between Mark Twain and Germany. In the eighteen-eighties practically the only interest that Twain displayed in Germany was in relation to its language. In September 1880 he published in the Atlantic Monthly a story called "Mrs. McWilliams and the Lightning", in which two Americans, confused by the cases, misunderstand the advice in a German book on what to do in storms, so that the husband ends up covered in metal, standing in a chair and ringing a bell. Twain often wrote sections of his notebook in German, and he, his relatives and members of the Hartford Saturday Morning Club gathered at his house each week in 1887 to learn German. For this class he wrote a comic play called Meisterschaft, about two pairs of lovers having to speak to each other only in the rather bizarre German phrases provided in the Ollendorff and Meisterschaft text-books. The play was published in the Century Magazine in January 1888. One character remarks "even German is preferable to death", which leads to some debate. In the eighteen-nineties, Twain translated Hoffman's Struwwelpeter, and later, in Vienna, he attempted to collaborate in the writing of German plays. The story of Cecil Rhodes and the shark in Following the Equator (1897) turns on a sentence in German, printed in Gothic script to make the greatest effect, and Twain is typically sarcastic about its convoluted phrasing, describing it as "as clean native German as anybody can put upon paper". Twain's family got into the habit of using German words, such as "Unberufen", a sort of verbal equivalent of touching wood, and the deep emotional attachment to German that Twain developed is seen in the fact that when his wife died in 1904 he had inscribed on her gravestone the words, "Gott sei dir gnädig, O meine Wonne."
When considering relations between Mark Twain and Germany it is necessary to look also at his relationship with Britain. It was of course possible for an American to like both countries; indeed, the picture of Germany that Twain gave in *A Tramp Abroad* reflected the official view in Britain, as well as in America, that the unification of Germany as an orderly entity was desirable, since it provided stability and a balance to France on the continent. However, as the First World War approached Americans increasingly had to choose in some sense between Britain and Germany. One of the first indications of conflict was the Samoan affair which led Germany and the United States apparently to the brink of war in 1889, and it became increasingly obvious with the development of the so-called Great Rapprochement between Britain and the United States in the late eighteen-nineties. The question of Twain's attitudes to Britain is complex. In the first place, he was very aware of his British descent. He was an Anglophile from 1872 to 1877, largely because of the enthusiastic reception he was given when he visited England in 1872. The British governmental system, with advancement in the Civil Service according to merit and government by what seemed like the best people, appeared to him preferable to the American system, and the constitution of The Curious Republic of Gondour, which he described in the *Atlantic Monthly* in 1875 was obviously derived from that of Britain. By the time that Twain visited Germany in 1878 his enthusiasm for Britain was declining, and in the eighteen-eighties he became almost rabidly anti-British, largely due to his dislike of Matthew Arnold's criticisms of the United States. (Twain's dislike of France and other factors had made him more pro-American by this time). Twain believed that Britain
was in many ways undemocratic, so that, unlike some Americans, he would not compare it favourably in that respect to Germany. His hatred of Britain, or at least of its hereditary institutions, was tied up with his life-long dislike of privileged elites; he had shown in _Huckleberry Finn_, in the characters of the so-called Dauphin and the Duke, his very low opinion of aristocrats. In the eighteen-eighties his notebooks were filled with attacks on both Britain and monarchy and in 1885 he showed his views on various nations in the words: "The English, the arrogant nation, The Americans, the material nation, the Germans, the patient nation, the Russians, the unclassifiable nation, the French, the volatile nation, the Scotch, the thrifty nation, the Italians, the hot-blooded kind-hearted nation, the Irish, the nation of chaste women." This shows that even a man who has travelled a lot can still churn out clichés, but there is an ambivalence in the word "patient" applied to the Germans: patience is a virtue, but there might be an implication that they have a lot to be patient about.

Twain's opposition to Britain found fullest expression in _A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court_, published in 1889, in which a nineteenth century American introduces the benefits, if they are that, of technology and republicanism to Arthurian England. There is evidence in the book that Twain was concerned to show that his opposition was to the institutions of monarchy, aristocracy and an established church, rather than to Britain per se. The Yankee at one point remarks, "There is plenty good enough material for a republic in the most degraded people that ever
existed—even the Russians; plenty of manhood in them—even in the Germans—if one could but force it out of its timid and suspicious privacy, to overthrow and trample in the mud any throne that ever was set up and any nobility that ever supported it."

This reflects the annoyance that was felt in America at reports of Wilhelm II's speech to his army when he succeeded to the throne: "I and the army were born for each other", and so on. Furthermore, the Prince of Wales and also the Kaiser had their faces used by the illustrator of the book, Dan Beard, in his picture of the royal "chuckleheads." In the early 1890's Twain's Anglophobia died down. This seems largely due to his increasing ambivalence about monarchy and nobility, which derived from his experiences in Europe. His notebooks show that he was aware of the effect that exposure to high social circles was having on him; he noted that Americans could be particularly liable to fall under the spell of royalty.16

It is clear that in the late eighteen-seventies Twain's enthusiasm for Britain was being transferred to Germany, but in 1890 to 1891 his comments before returning to Europe showed that he expected to find more to criticise there than, in the event, he did. In any case, The American Claimant, published in 1891, showed through the improbably named character the Hon. Kirkcroft-bright Llanover Marjoribanks Sellers, Viscount Berkeley of Chol-mondeley Castle, that Twain was regaining his high opinion of British aristocrats.17

Twain's first visit to Germany had been an escape mainly in a
spiritual sense, but when he returned in 1891 for a stay of more than two years he was escaping from the collapse of his fortunes. He had made unwise investments and it was only in Europe that he would be able to live on something like the scale to which he had become accustomed. Furthermore, he and his wife were suffering from rheumatism, which the German spas were supposed to cure. Before he left he made arrangements with W.M. Laffan of the *New York Sun* to send six articles for publication. These pieces were also reprinted in other papers and magazines, so they reached a wide audience in America. Twain wrote to Howells when he was leaving:

> Travel no longer has any charm for me. I have seen all the foreign countries I want to see except heaven and hell, and I have only a vague curiosity concerning one of those.18

Nonetheless, once he was in Europe he found a lot to interest him. The report "At the Shrine of St. Wagner", written in August 1891 at Bayreuth, describes the cult of Wagner's music very much in terms of a religion. Thus, "The devotees come from the very ends of the earth to worship their prophet in his own kaaba in his own Mecca." He was on the whole more respectful now to Wagner's music than he had been in *A Tramp Abroad*, when, at a performance of *Lohengrin*, "I lived over again all that I had suffered the time the orphan asylum burned down." By 1891 he liked *Tannhäuser*, at least, which reflects the acceptance of Wagner in America and the continuation of Germany's image as the land of music. However, as one would expect Twain was more concerned with social observa-
tion than with musical criticism. In particular, his comments on monarchy illustrate his opinion of that institution. He notices that the audience stares at an imperial princess:

This daughter-in-law of an emperor was pretty; she had a kind face; she was without airs; she is known to be full of common human sympathies. There are many kinds of princesses, but this kind is the most harmful of all, for wherever they go they reconcile people to monarchy and set back the clock of progress.

Further on he mentions a gallery, in which princes are displayed. It is sacred to (the audience;) it is the holy of holies ... the standing multitude turn and fix their eyes upon the princely layout and gaze mutely and longingly and adoringly and regretfully like sinners looking into heaven. They become rapt, unconscious, steeped in worship. There is no spectacle anywhere that is more pathetic than this ... It may be envy, it may be worship, doubtless it is a mixture of both ... A prince picks up grandeur, power, and a permanent holiday and gratis support by a pure accident, the accident of birth, and he stands always before the grieved eye of poverty and obscurity a monumental representative of luck.19

Of course, the audience at Bayreuth was actually neither poor nor obscure, since the Wagner festival was already well on the way to attracting the kind of international aristocracy, of achievement as well as of birth, which gathered there annually in the years before the First World War, but Twain's stress on the contrast between royalty and others, and the perceptiveness of his description of the commoners' attitude to monarchy, suggest that he to some extent shared these feelings. This may seem surprising in the ultra-republican author of A Connecticut Yankee, but one cannot be a real republican unless one realises the
attraction and significance of monarchy. Twain thus demonstrates ambivalence about monarchy as seen as Germany, recognising its power over people's emotions while strengthening thereby his own belief in democratic republicanism.

To show that not only Germans regarded royalty as gods, Twain mentions an English family (revealed in his letters as that of Routledge the publisher) who waited in the snow to see the Prince of Wales, whom they had already seen innumerable times. 20

On the whole Twain was impressed by Bayreuth. He admired the efficiency of the organisation and the "great and fine and real ... devotion" of the audiences, which he contrasted with America:

Here the Wagner audience dress as they please and sit in the dark and worship in silence. At the Metropolitan in New York they sit in a glare, and wear their showiest harness; they hum airs, they squeak fans, they titter, and they gabble all the time ... in large measure the Metropolitan is a show-case for rich fashionables who are not trained in Wagnerian music and have no reverence for it, but who like to promote art and show their clothes.

Thus, Germany is again shown as the land of true art, where opera is not merely an example of Veblen's conspicuous consumption. Twain admires the devotion of the Wagnerians, but cannot share it; he wrote, "always, during service, I feel like a heretic in heaven." The efficiency of German artistic enterprises, the genuine artistic nature of the people, and the informality of German clothes were all aspects of the country frequently referred to by Americans, usually in a comparison unfavourable to
the United States, and the latter two characteristics at least contrast with any image of Germany as regimented and militaristic. 21

Twain made a brief visit to Switzerland, whence he sent another article, "Switzerland, the Cradle of Liberty." This contained a hint of criticism of Germany that was missing from the German articles: "After trying the political atmosphere of the neighbouring monarchies, it is healing and refreshing to breathe in air that has known no taint of slavery for six hundred years." 22 Increasingly the impression is of a man trying to convince himself.

Twain and his family visited the spa town of Marienbad in Bohemia, from where he sent another travel piece. This time he returned to the beauty of the German countryside, with its picturesque castles, but there are some interesting remarks on German society, for instance, "In Bavaria everybody is in uniform, but here ... uniforms are so scarce that we seem to be in a republic." The propensity of the Germans to wear uniforms as members of the army reserve was often presented as evidence for the growth of militarism in Germany, but here Twain is also referring to the various public officials in uniform, so the comment may again reflect German orderliness and not be entirely critical. He returned to the romantic view of Germany when describing a trip into the woods, where he found the stillness of death. This is what the Germans are forever talking about, dreaming about, and despairingly trying to catch and imprison in a poem, or a picture, or a song - the adored Waldeinsamkeit, loneliness of the woods. 23
However, on this visit to Germany Twain was not only in rural areas, and he had the opportunity to experience and write about life at the centre of the German Empire. He and his family spent the winters of 1892 and 1893 in Berlin, where his second cousin, from St. Louis, was married to General von Versen, and where a friend of Twain's, William Walter Phelps, was American Minister. These two introduced him into society. His progress was at first impeded by the flat that his wife had taken in Kornerstrasse, the area being regarded as not quite socially acceptable. Twain wrote an amusing article about this embarrassment, but his wife refused to let him publish it. In any case, they moved to the Hotel Royal in Unter den Linden, and their path to high society was cleared.

Meanwhile Twain wrote perhaps the most interesting of his travel letters, "The German Chicago", in which he extolled the newness and the spaciousness of Berlin, which he compared with Chicago because of its rate of growth and the size of its population. He was one of the first to make this comparison, which became one of the firmest clichés in American writings on Germany. In every other way Berlin seemed superior; Twain described the whole city as being stately, substantial and beautiful, as well as the best-governed city in the world. Twain wrote that there were impartially enforced rules and efficient collection of taxes, while the police were informed of the important details of all of the inhabitants (although that fact irritated many American travellers, who disapproved of such close observation). He was particularly impressed by the controls on building:
One is not allowed to build unstable, unsafe, or unsightly houses in Berlin; the result is this comely and conspicuously stately city, with its security from conflagrations and breakdowns... The building commissioners inspect while the building is going up. It has been found that this is better than to wait until it falls down. These people are full of whims.

As so often, Twain's praise of Germany seems here to be largely motivated by a desire to criticise America. This is explicit when he states that the streets of Berlin are kept clean "not by prayer and talk and the other New York methods." If Twain really did tell the Kaiser at dinner that Berlin was "almost as beautiful as Chicago", as the Hanseatic minister later reported Wilhelm as claiming, it was no doubt a joke. 25

Twain had been aware of this contrast with the private opulence and public squalor of America on his previous visit to Germany. He had pointed out that American houses were more comfortable than European ones, but in an unpublished manuscript, which was intended as a chapter of *A Tramp Abroad*, he wrote,

> Outside of the house - well that is another matter altogether. When we come to that, America must take a back seat... In Europe an invisible eye seems to order and govern and watch over everything and everybody like a tireless and unsleeping providence.

American officials, he explained, were too concerned with their own re-election, one of the disadvantages of American democracy. 26 Articles in praise of Berlin and other German cities were a regular feature of American magazines up to the First World War. Twain's was one of the earlier examples, but the fact that such
pieces were being written at this time shows how concern with the problems of the American cities existed long before the Progressive period, in which these dominated political discussion. As a later chapter will show, many progressives, particularly Frederic C. Howe, advocated the adoption of the desirable features of German cities in America.

Twain lists various of these features: space regulations, sanitary inspection, an efficient fire brigade, no loud advertisements or other "unsightly things". He seemed particularly impressed by the police, to whom he keeps returning:

If there were an earthquake in Berlin the police would take charge of it and conduct it in that sort of orderly way that would make you think it was a prayer-meeting. That is what an earthquake generally ends in, but this one would be different from those others; it would be kind of soft and self-contained, like a republican praying for a mugwump.

Twain seemed to be caught up in the desire for orderliness, affected no doubt by the state of his own affairs as well as by the lack of order in American conditions. A few weeks after he had written in his notebook that there should be rebellions in all monarchies, he reported in the same place a mob gathering in protest at unemployment and lack of food, then merely commented that the Emperor and his relatives had shown their courage by riding past the demonstrators.27

Twain's only criticism of Berlin was a joking one, referring to the eccentric method of numbering houses, which, he suggests,
is responsible for a high suicide rate. The Berlin article ends with a description of a student *Kommers* or beer festival, held in honour of the seventieth birthdays of the pathologist Rudolf Virchow and the physicist Herman von Helmholtz, at which Twain sat at the professorial table, trying to look academic. He was impressed by the respect amounting to worship that the students had for Virchow and Helmholtz: "It seems to me that I would rather be flooded with a glory like that, instinct with sincerity, innocent of self-seeking, than win a hundred battles and break a million hearts." The climax of the celebration was the arrival of the historian Theodor Mommsen, at which the whole house rose, stamping, applauding and cheering. Twain was evidently carried along with the excitement:

> Then the little man with his long hair and Emersonian face edged his way past us and took his seat. I could have touched him with my hand - Mommsen! - think of it.

> This was one of those immense surprises that can happen only a few times in one's life. I was not dreaming of him, he was to me only a giant myth, a world-shadowing specter, not a reality (etc., etc.).

It is notable that, even though he was writing for a not particularly intellectual American newspaper, the *New York Sun*, Twain did not consider it necessary to explain who Virchow, Helmholtz and Mommsen were. In fact, these three were at the time internationally famous, and their names were continually appearing in the American press. This demonstrates that the high reputation for learning that Germany possessed had a very solid foundation. Of course, the American public has always had a very high regard
for foreign geniuses, even when it does not understand them, and although Twain's enthusiasm might seem excessive now, it was genuine and typical of American feeling. In nineteenth century America Mommsen had a reputation similar to Toynbee's earlier in this century. Twain proudly noted in his journal that he had been mistaken for Mommsen, although "on examination our brains proved to be different", and he must have been glad of the honour it would do his friend to write in the article that Mommsen had discussed Howells's works with a speechless American girl.

The piece ends by pointing out that Virchow had been for years a member of the Berlin city government. "I don't know", wrote Twain, that we in America could venture to ask our most illustrious citizen to serve in a board of aldermen, and if we might venture it I am not positively sure that we could elect him. But here the municipal system is such that the best men in the city consider it an honour to serve gratis as aldermen, and the people have the good sense to prefer these men and to elect them year after year.

This idea of government by the best people fits in with the American "good-government" reformers, who usually looked to British models, and also with the developing theories of city government that were put forward by American Progressives, with whom, in fact, Twain did not sympathise. He told his nephew, Samuel E. Moffett, who in 1894 wrote Suggestions on Government, proposing ideas for governmental action in society, that governments could not do good, so it was best to have as little government as possible. In Twain's case, what he praised in Germany did not
seem capable of transposition to America, or perhaps his philosophical pessimism caused him to change his mind.

While he was in Berlin Twain noted that the Catholic and Lutheran churches "appear to differ from each other nearly as much as a red-haired man differs from an auburn-haired man." This seems to show a lack of observation; in the eighteen-nineties the German Protestant and Catholic churches were diverging sharply. The unity of the latter had been increased by the effects of the Kulturkampf, while German Protestantism was being strongly affected by the so-called "higher criticism" and other modern philosophical movements. In fact, these theological debates were for many Americans of a more religious turn of mind than Twain the most interesting aspect of Germany in this period. In any case, Twain objected to the fact that both of these churches were supported by the government from taxes. His anti-Catholicism abated during the time he spent in Europe, but he always saw established churches as one of the enemies of progress, in accordance with the American doctrine of the separation of church and state. 30

Given his journalistic background, it is not surprising that Twain was always interested in the newspapers of countries he visited. In an appendix of A Tramp Abroad he complained about the lack of news in, and dullness of, German papers, but he praised them for not doing any harm. However, he liked the German humorous papers, a feeling shared by many Americans, since cartoons from papers like Der Wahre Jakob, Kladderadatsch and later Simplissimus were often reprinted in some American magazines. In
1908 Gardner Teall wrote that the international appeal of German caricatures was due to their "objective directness", a quality that he found everywhere in Germany and attributed to "the spirit of Teutonic militarism", which seems odd since the caricaturists whom he most praised "courted the imperial wrath" of Wilhelm II with their satire against him. Twain increasingly believed that monarchy and aristocracy could not survive if the press led the people in laughing at them, and in The Connecticut Yankee a newspaper is a weapon against mediaevalism. When Twain returned to Germany in 1891 he was impressed by the large number of papers in Berlin, but his unpublished travel article, "The Cholera Epidemic in Hamburg", shows that he still found the German papers ugly and lacking in news. They hardly mentioned the epidemic, which led Twain to wonder if they were forbidden to do so, but he concluded that it was merely a sign of their "eternal lethargy". He clearly believed that the state of the German press was unhealthy and that it was far too uncritical, and the rumours from Hamburg made him suspect that the famous German efficiency was lacking.31

Kaiser Wilhelm II was very fond of meeting Americans, particularly rich Americans, and the way in which he systematically invited all those available to dinner and other entertainments gives weight to the arguments of those who said that he deliberately set out to impress them and gain their support as part of his foreign policy. He had a lot of success with many, from Andrew Carnegie to Nicholas Murray Butler. It was thus not surprising that the Kaiser should invite Mark Twain to dine with him, although
the fact that Twain was related by marriage to one of his generals facilitated the invitation, which came in February 1892. Twain's first account of this meal was in his notebook:

Sat at the right hand of the Emperor. His brother, Prince Heinrich, sat opposite. Prince Radolin (Chamberlain) further along; fourteen at table; mainly great military and naval people. Two of my friends beside the von Versens were there. Rottenborg and Rudolph Lindau, both of the Foreign Office.

For some reason, Twain kept returning to this occasion and telling various contradictory stories about it. In December 1906 he dictated a description for his autobiography, and this section appeared first in the North American Review in March the following year. It gave a humorous but revealing picture of the Kaiser and his associates:

I noticed that the table etiquette tallied with that which was the law of my house at home when we had guests; that is to say, the guests answered when the host favored them with a remark, and then quieted down and behaved themselves until they got another chance ... there was a difference between his table and mine - for instance, atmosphere; the guests stood in awe of him, and naturally they conferred that feeling upon me, for after all, I am only human, although I regret it. When a guest answered a question he did it with a deferential voice and manner; he got it out of his system as quickly as he could and then looked relieved.32

This does not convey a favourable impression of the Kaiser; even Twain's confessed "awe" is attributed to the attitude of the other guests, not to Wilhelm's personality.

The North American Review account stressed the personal power of
the Kaiser with a story about a friend of Twain's who wanted a holiday so, in accordance with Foreign Office etiquette, sent in his resignation (this friend was evidently Lindau). Twain described how hard the German officials worked, then went on to explain that his friend knew that the Chancellor, Caprivi, was satisfied with him and that theoretically he should decide on the question of a holiday, but in fact the matter would go to the Kaiser - "no official sparrow could fall to the ground without his privity and consent" - and Twain's friend did not know what Wilhelm would decide. He told Twain that the length of time the Kaiser spoke to people after dinner indicated their standing with him, and that, as Twain put it, "in Berlin, as in the imperial days of Rome, the Emperor was the sun, and that his smile or his frown meant good fortune or disaster to the man upon whom it should fall." Again, this seems to imply that the Kaiser possessed too much power, rather than approving of his omniscience, although there is also an element of the latter. The story ends by reporting that the Kaiser spoke to Lindau for seven minutes and he got his paid holiday, which was still going on seven years later when Twain met him in Vienna.33

In the version of the Autobiography, edited by Albert Bigelow Paine, which was published after Twain's death, this section about the working of the German governmental machine was omitted for some reason and replaced with a story about Twain committing a faux pas by remarking on the mode of cooking of a potato before the Kaiser had spoken to him, so that the resulting coldness
only vanished after some hours and a lot of beer. However, in Paine's biography of Twain, published earlier, in 1912, he quoted another description of the dinner by Twain. This time, he said that he had argued with the Kaiser when the latter praised the American government for giving high pensions to former soldiers; Twain replied that it had become merely a method of buying votes, and the Kaiser did not speak to him again. These discrepancies seem to suggest that Twain felt he had to embellish his meeting with the Kaiser in order to provide good stories, but the forms these stories take show a deep unease on Twain's part when he was in the presence of such a powerful monarch and a feeling of social inferiority. The definite implication is that he did not like the Kaiser. It is also possible that he exaggerated or invented his contretemps with Wilhelm because in his later years he regretted his close association with the German ruling classes.

This association clearly led to Twain's adopting many of their assumptions, as his notebook shows. He described an enjoyable evening with the Princess von Reuss and her brother, the Prince von Stolberg-Wernigerode, when he was staying with a pastor in the Hartz Mountains. A doctor and his wife had been invited, even though the former was a baker's son, and when the doctor's wife held out her hand the Prince deliberately ignored it. Twain laconically remarks, "She had a cry that night." In the published edition of the Notebook Paine indignantly exclaims in parenthesis,

How leniently he deals with these people of rank. Imagine what he would have said had that incident occurred in England.
The country probably is not relevant; the fact is that coming into close contact with members of the aristocracy and royalty had caused Twain to accept them as individuals, and his ideas about the institutions they represented had clearly become mixed; his notebooks are full of sentences like, "I would like to be Emperor awhile." 35

Twain spent some months in 1892 in the spa of Bad Nauheim. He might as well have been staying in London, since almost everyone he met in this fashionable town seemed to be British, from Oscar Wilde to Henry Labouchere, and, especially, the Prince of Wales, with whom he became friendly. They met again in 1905, and Twain's approval of this member of the British royal family increased his regard for Britain; a marked change from the entry in his notebook in 1888, "In a constitutional monarchy, a royal family of chimpanzees would answer every purpose, be worshiped as abjectly by the nation, and be cheaper." 36

Twain expressed his disapproval of the dispute that arose between the United States and Britain over the Venezuelan boundary in 1895, and he told one reporter, "They were made to help and stand by each other." This was during a lecture tour of part of the British Empire, the size and efficient running of which increasingly convinced him that Britain and America should be allies. Although his Following the Equator criticised imperialist excesses, he explicitly stated that these were attacks on human nature, not on Britain. In February 1897 he wrote to Howells from London,
This has been a bitter year for English pride, & I don't like to see England humbled - that is, not too much. A little of it can do her good, but there has been too much, this year. We are sprung from her loins, and it hurts me. I am for republics, & she is the only comrade we've got, in that. We can't count France, & there is hardly enough of Switzerland to count. Beneath the governing crust England is sound-hearted - & sincere, too, & nearly straight. But I am appalled to notice that the wide extension of the suffrage has damaged her manners, & made her rather Americanly uncourteous on the lower levels.

The humbling of England refers in particular to events in South Africa - the failure of the Jameson Raid and Cecil Rhodes's involvement in the Transvaal - about which Twain was concerned, but he presumably also meant difficulties in British relations with Germany and Russia, and the fact that Britain had to withdraw from Siam in favour of France. The letter reflects Twain's continuing confusion about monarchies and the British monarchy in particular. On the one hand Britain stands for republics - apart, it seems, from "the governing crust" - but the democratic mass has been adversely affected by being enfranchised. The question of manners was always important to Twain in his opinions of countries, and from A Tramp Abroad onwards he expressed his approval of German good manners. Nevertheless, the letter makes it clear that he regarded Britain as the natural ally of America, and this feeling was strengthened the following year.

The Clemens family had gone to live in Vienna, where one daughter was a piano student. When the Spanish-American War began Twain found his country being criticised by everyone around him -
Austria was particularly pro-Spanish, for dynastic and religious reasons - but he defended America on the grounds that it was fighting for the liberation of Cuba. He made his position clear in an essay, "A Word of Encouragement for Our Blushing Exiles." When Britain seemed to support America, particularly during the Manila Bay incident, American gratitude was peculiarly exaggerated, as was opposition to Germany, and this was especially true of Twain, surrounded by supporters of Spain. In fact, as various historians have shown, the German ships were not opposing the Americans at Manila Bay, merely observing the situation, and Britain was not especially pro-American. Nevertheless, the Spanish-American War was the most important stage of the rapprochement between the United States and Britain, and it had a similar importance to Twain. In letters and comments to friends he repeatedly stated that he was glad the Spanish-American War had occurred, because of its effects on British-American relations.  

Twain seems to have particularly enjoyed staying in Vienna. It had the advantage of being a place where German was spoken, and Twain continued his humorous attacks on that language, for instance in a speech (Die Schrecken der Deutschen Sprache) given to the Concordia Club of left-wing journalists and writers. Furthermore, from the stress that Twain laid, in letters and essays, on the apparent lack of any outstanding Austrians, it might be that he saw that as beneficial, since it made him the most famous person living in Austria, something that had not been true in Germany. His huge hotel suites became the most important social centre outside the court, full of Austrian and German aristo-
crats and royalty, as well as eminent foreigners. Austria, like Germany, was also attractive to him because there his works were not only very popular but also taken seriously by academics. The atmosphere in Austria seems to have been more congenial to Twain than that of Germany; society in the former seemed somewhat less rigid, there was less militarism, and there was no immensely powerful Kaiser to over-awe Twain.

In the eyes of most Americans Austria was probably too unimportant to seem anything more than an appendage of Germany, but at about this time it did become distinguished for something. Saki in one of his stories describes a washerwoman who cornered the liqueur chocolates at a drawing-room At Home and ended up in the piano, claiming to be a parrot in a cage: "no one had heard anything like it, except Baroness Boobelstein who has attended sittings of the Austrian Reichsrath." The riotous nature of the Austrian Parliament was seized upon by the American press, and it became a running joke. This interest was established by an article that Twain sent from Vienna to Harper's Monthly after the first riots in the Reichsrat in 1898. "Stirring Times in Austria" describes the attempt to make Czech the official language in Bohemia and the disruption that the German members of the legislature caused to prevent the measure from getting through. However, this does not seem to have disturbed the image of extreme orderliness that belonged to the Germans in Germany. The American press reported that Twain had been struck by an official in the Reichsrat after waving his handkerchief and shouting, "Hoch der Deutschen", but he wrote that unfortunately no such thing had occurred. It shows that he was perceived in America as
being pro-German.

His article had mentioned Austrian anti-Semitism, and the resulting correspondence from Jews in America led him to write an essay, "Concerning the Jews". He drew most of his examples of anti-Semitism from Germany, while praising America and Britain for not persecuting Jews, and he found it remarkable that the German Anti-Semites should claim that 500,000 Jews out of a population of 48,000,000 controlled business, the law, newspapers, and practically everything else. His explanation of anti-Semitism was an economic one, namely that the Jews were better at business. This shows a lack of understanding of the deeper ideological and racial factors which were involved in German and Austrian anti-Semitism, but it is a clear example of an issue on which Twain saw Britain and America as being right, as opposed to Germany and also Austria, Russia and France. Many Americans sympathetic to Germany were also anti-Semitic, such as Twain's friend Poultney Bigelow, who wrote bemusedly in his memoirs of Twain's championship of the Jews.41

One of the main links between Britain and America was the common language and therefore a common literature. In discussing relations between Britain and Germany Paul Kennedy has denied that cultural ties count for much when it comes to politics, but the cultural connection between Britain and the United States was so deep that it necessarily led to some sense of community, and such influences would be particularly strong in the case of an author. Howard Baetzhold has listed many of the British writers who influenced Twain, and he was of course friendly with
many contemporary British authors, particularly Kipling. In contrast, German philosophical and literary influences on Twain were few. He did read one of Haeckel's books, but T.H. Huxley was more important in affecting his idea of an amoral evolutionary force. Despite some claims it is unlikely that he read Schopenhauer. However, there was at least one important influence on Twain from German literature as he made clear in "About Play Acting" (1898) and that was Adolf von Wilbrandt's *Der Meister von Palmyra*. Twain saw this play twice at the Burgtheater in Vienna. He was particularly impressed by its dream-like atmosphere, its idea of reincarnation, and the impressive figure of Death, which made "the fussy human pack seem ... hardly worth the attention of either saving or damning." Such ideas appeared in Twain's later writings, particularly *The Mysterious Stranger*, and Wilbrandt's play was clearly one of the many influences affecting them. Twain thought that such plays should be shown in New York instead of the musical comedies that were prevalent there; this comparison of the German and American theatres, greatly to the discredit of the latter, was typical of American commentators. 42

When he returned to America in 1900, Twain took up two positions that might have seemed rather contradictory. He joined the anti-imperialist movement, having been upset at the way in which the supposedly altruistic United States had annexed the Philippines. At the same time he became increasingly pro-British, and by this time in an explicitly anti-German way; he wrote to Howells, in relation to the Boer War,
For England must not fall: it would mean an inundation of Russian and German political degradations which would envelope the globe and steep it in a sort of Middle-Age night and slavery which would last till Christ comes again... Even wrong - and she is wrong - England must be upheld. He is an enemy of the human race who shall speak against her now.

During his years in Germany Twain had shown few signs of noticing any "political degradations". That he should do so now might be due to his anti-imperialist stance, but that could equally well be used against Britain - as Howells was arguing - so it seems that Twain turned against Germany because of being for Britain. 43

The North American Review frequently published articles by the anti-imperialists, and in February 1901 there appeared an essay by Twain, "To the Person Sitting in Darkness". This attacked the "Blessings of Civilization Trust" and its directors, McKinley, Joseph Chamberlain, the Kaiser and the Tsar. It was particularly directed against the German demands for territory and money from China in compensation for the deaths of missionaries. Twain's most savage attack was on an American missionary who had said,

I criticise the Americans. The soft hand of the Americans is not as good as the mailed fist of the Germans. If you deal with the Chinese with a soft hand they will take advantage of it.

These words show that in an age of imperialism German militarism could be seen as a good thing. This article is further evidence that Twain associated the worst aspects of imperialism with
One of his most bitter denunciations of the imperialist powers is "The Stupendous Procession", which he did not publish. He lets England off quite lightly, since its float is much smaller than the German one, which includes German missionaries bearing 680 Chinese heads. His most elaborate criticism is, however, reserved for the United States, presumably because it had least excuses.

In February 1902 Twain attended a dinner that the Mayor of New York gave for Kaiser Wilhelm's brother, Prince Heinrich of Prussia, whom Twain had met in Germany. This visit was a deliberate attempt by the Kaiser to gather American sympathy, and Heinrich distributed medals, signed photographs and mementos to as many eminent Americans as possible. People boasted about having met, or even seen, the prince, and this prompted Twain to write "Does the Race of Man Love a Lord?" He concluded that not only the English but also Americans and, indeed, all people are attracted by the conspicuous and powerful. He was by this time making the point that although monarchy and aristocracy were wrong, it was not the titled people who should be blamed, but the masses who allowed such institutions to exist. Evidently his close association with the ruling classes in Germany and Austria - as well as in Britain - had made him re-think his position. Two years later, in "The $30,000 Bequest", Twain referred to the attractions of German royalty to Americans when he provided, as the summit of the dreams of the hapless Posters, the idea of a marriage between one of their daughters and H.R.H. Sigismund-Siegfried-Lauenfeld-Dinkelspiel-Schwartzenberg Blutwurst, Hereditary
Grand Duke of Katzenyammer, and in 1907 he wrote that America would inevitably become a monarchy. 45

Being pro-British frequently also meant being imperialistic; Twain was furious when at one Anglo-American gathering (a huge number of which he attended and spoke at) a speaker remarked that being Anglo-Saxon meant that one took whatever one wanted, and most of those present applauded. There were other exceptions, such as Andrew Carnegie, in whose schemes for some kind of union of the United States, Canada and Britain Twain dabbled from 1893. Being both anti-imperialist and pro-British meant that Twain had a double impetus for opposition to Germany. The correspondence between Arthur Conan Doyle and Twain illustrates the genuine humanitarian and democratic idealism that could motivate those seeking close relations between America and Britain, and idealism of that particular individualistic sort, concerned above all with human rights, would not find much to praise in Germany. 46

Twain regarded the crowning honour of his career as being the honorary doctorate he received from Oxford University in 1907. He had not intended to return to Europe again, but he said that he would go to Mars for an Oxford degree, and he wrote in his Autobiography, "I am quite well aware - and so is America, and so is the rest of Christendom - that an Oxford decoration is a loftier distinction than is conferrable by any other university on either side of the ocean, and is worth twenty-five of any other." He had obviously changed his mind since writing thirty years earlier that German universities taught every subject
better than any others in the world, but in this he was, as so often, reflecting the prevailing American view. By 1900 the number of American students in German universities had fallen considerably and the great majority of Americans studying abroad went to Britain or France. Twain's last visit to Britain was triumphal, including an invitation to a Royal Garden Party, where he and Edward VII reminisced about their meetings in Germany. 47

Despite the obvious strength of Twain's attachment to Britain, he seldom explicitly attacked Germany. Only one source attributes any substantial statements of that sort to him, and that is Henry W. Fischer's Abroad with Mark Twain and Eugene Field: Tales They Told to a Fellow Correspondent. This was published in 1922 and clearly reflects the hatred of Germany that arose in the United States during the First World War. Fischer himself, who had been a European correspondent and was born in Germany, later becoming an American citizen, took the precaution of dropping the "c" from his surname. He painted various ludicrous scenes, such as Twain claiming in 1907 that after his dinner in 1892 with the Kaiser, Wilhelm "worked himself up into a fine frenzy about his U-boats ... Invasion was the least he threatened unless England helped him to exterminate France." Given Twain's hatred of France, he would probably have cheered at that point. Fischer claimed that Twain then advised Bram Stoker that Britain should build an electrified steel fence under the sea to keep out the German submarines. There are some anecdotes included that sound rather more likely, such as a criticism of militarism in Germany; Twain wrote articles against conscrip-
tion, and he attacked European militarism in a posthumously published article on the funeral of the Empress of Austria (although most of it was devoted to enthusiastic descriptions of the colourful uniforms of the various regiments present.) Fischer also claimed that Twain professed to prefer Austrian nobles to the Prussian variety, which "walks and acts as if he had swallowed the stick they used to beat him with when a youngster", and that he one day said,

The English love Liberty as their wife,
The French as their Mistress,
The Germans as a Granny, long dead,

which lines he attributed to Heine. That does have an authentic ring and does accord with the ideas that Twain held at the end of his life.

Mark Twain was not a systematic thinker or writer, and he could often make mistakes or be inconsistent, particularly about foreign countries. He wrote in 1895, when attacking Paul Bourget's book on the United States, "There is only one expert who is qualified to examine the souls and the life of a people and make a valuable report - the native novelist." In his writings on Germany Twain may not have succeeded in examining the souls of the Germans, but he did have some interesting insights into their life and he seems to epitomise general swings of American public and governmental opinion towards Germany. Thus, in the eighteen-seventies there was a friendly and perhaps slightly patronising interest, as in Twain's burlesque, "A Medieval Romance" (1870),
continuing through the eighties, although with some friction at the end of that decade. Then, in the eighteen-nineties, the Americans had some suspicions of Wilhelm II, but also a readiness to be impressed despite themselves by royalty and the like, and a recognition of the desirable features of Germany that America might adopt (although again, as in the case of Twain, the superficiality of American views vitiated any attempt to relate the situation of an industrialised Germany with agrarian values to the analogous problems of America). The turning point came with the Spanish-American War in 1898, after which America grew increasingly close to Britain, while its attitude to Germany became in general terms one of indifference and sometimes hostility. Mark Twain's writings reflected and probably reinforced these changes, which were part of the process through which America emerged as a world power.

As has been mentioned, American fiction in this period seldom dealt with Germany, but there were some examples apart from Mark Twain's writings, and they will be discussed now to provide a context for Mark Twain on Germany. In 1908 Arthur Bartlett Maurice wrote about American novels with foreign settings for The Bookman. He mentioned twenty-two set in England, twenty-one in France, twenty-four in Italy, but for Germany he referred only to Longfellow's Hyperion (which was not very up to date), two books by F. Marion Crawford, and Richard Harding Davis's The Princess Aline (really a novelette). In 1917 Clement Vollmer listed only the Crawford books, A Tramp Abroad and Gertrude Atherton's Tower of Ivory, opining that the paucity
of American novels set in Germany might have been due to the fact that other European peoples "exhibit more of the romantic and sentimental in their external life than the German", which seems highly unlikely, given the large degree of romanticism and sentimentality in the American image of Germany; indeed, all of the books mentioned above, with the exception of most of A Tramp Abroad, took a romantic and sentimental approach. This is particularly true of The Princess Aline (1895) by Richard Harding Davis, which, however, is not set in Germany, except for part of a page when a train passes through the country. This provides a cue for references to militarism: the French fortifications all point towards Germany, which is called "the land of low, shiny, black helmets and brass spikes", full of "old fortified castles". A passenger remarks,

How very military it all is! Even the men at the lonely little stations ... wear uniforms; and do you notice how each of them rolls up his red flag and holds it like a sword, and salutes the train as it passes?

The reader is invited to picture a country where militarism is so strong that it can be spotted from a train. The basic plot is, however, a romantic one, involving the infatuation of an American, Morton Carlton, for H.R.H. The Princess Aline of Hohenwald, whom he never actually meets (Lloyd Griscom explained in his memoirs that Davis wrote it after seeing Princess Alix of Hesse-Darmstadt on the Acropolis). Despite the sentimental story and Carlton's romantic idea of the statelet of Hohenwald,
there are one or two pointed references to German politics, as when, after Carlton, who has been asked by young German officers to decide which of them should dance with an American lady, partners her himself, and an equerry remarks that he "has added another argument in favor of maintaining standing armies, and of not submitting questions to arbitration." 51

Davis's stories are littered with such references to the implied aggressiveness of Germany and Germans. One of the villains of "The King's Jackal" (1896) is the German Colonel Erhaupt, who "as a duellist and as a soldier had shown a certain brute courage." In "The Grand Cross of the Crescent" (1912) a German tries to sell battleships to the Turks. "The Invasion of England" (1912) postulates an attempted German invasion. "The Reporter Who Made Himself King", a boys' story first published in 1891, is a direct reflection of the troubles in Samoa, which two years previously had, in the eyes of some American newspapers at least, brought Germany and America to the brink of war. The story concerns a young writer who becomes acting American consul on a Pacific island. A German force, headed by a bespectacled captain, annexes the island, so the reporter tries to start a war, after the Germans have fired on the American flag. The tone is humorous, but the story is packed with expressions of American patriotism, for the benefit of its youthful readers, and the Germans are obviously shown as troublemakers. The German nurse in "On the Fever Ship" (1899) is a bit more attractive, being "calm, impersonal", strong and sensible, but she is also unsympathetic to her patient
Davis had strong connections with Britain and he immediately supported the Allies in 1914. As Gouverneur Morris wrote, Davis's anti-German articles as a war correspondent, particularly "The March of the Germans through Brussels", meant,

That people are beginning to think tolerantly of preparedness, that a nation which at one time looked yellow as a dandelion is beginning to turn Red, White and Blue is owing in some measure to him.

His fiction also promoted such a transformation: "The Boy Who Cried Wolf" (1916) concerns a German spy "seeking gun sites" in the vicinity of New Haven, in preparation for a German invasion. However, as has been indicated, Davis was voicing such suspicions of Germany long before the war. One reason for views of this sort among rather gung-ho Americans like Davis was that they assumed that Germany was behaving in the way that they wanted America to behave; except that, as Albert Gordon puts it in "The Reporter Who Made Himself King",

... it's quite different with us; we don't want to rob (the Pacific Islanders) or to annex their land. All we want to do is to improve it, and have the fun of running it for them and meddling in their affairs of state.53

Gertrude Atherton also approved of American expansion, but she was inclined to approve of similar German aims, as her Rulers of Kings, discussed elsewhere, shows. Her Tower of
Ivory (1910) is set in Munich during Ludwig II's reign and mainly concerns the relationship between an English aristocrat and a German-American opera singer, so not much of Germany is revealed. Munich is described in romantic terms, whereas its citizens "drank enormously of beer and ate grossly", but they are, at least, "good-natured". That Mrs. Atherton considered Germany to be no threat to America is indicated by her heroine's assertion that the U.S.A. "could put Germany into her pocket and not hear it rattle." 54

The greatest of American expatriate writers, Henry James, did not write much about Germany. Evelyn A. Hovanec has written in detail about his relationship with the country, showing that he was basically indifferent and then hostile to it. He felt that German life, and the German language, were "opposed to life" (as he defined it). Hovanec wrote that for James Germany was too much like America, both, in particular, lacking "grace and style". In the eighteen-seventies to eighteen-nineties references to Germany are quite frequent in his stories, but these are generally neutral or uncomplimentary. Some additional references from James's writings could be mentioned. For example, in A Little Tour of France, which dealt with a country of which he was fond, he wrote of Touraine that "one remembers with a certain shudder that only a few short years ago this province, so intimately French, was under the heel of a foreign foe", and on a train he objected to Germans occupying the windows, making a military reference to them occupying "other strategical positions". These are, for an American at this time
unusually pro-French and anti-German sentiments. James was also, of course, pro-English, and such remarks as "our English race" are commonplace in his writings.\textsuperscript{55}

As regards the German lack of "grace and style", James seems to have felt this particularly as regarded clothes: Morgan in "The Pupil" (1891) is "as indifferent to his appearance as a German philosopher", while "The Two Faces" (1900) hinges on the fact that a young woman brought up in Germany therefore knows nothing about good taste in clothes. The sophisticated James evidently deplores the lack of fashionable clothes in Germany, whereas Twain had been sympathetic. Hovanec indicates unpleasant German characters in James's stories, but it must be pointed out that Dr. Staub in "A Bundle of Letters" (1879), although he is pompous, coldly scientific and arrogant, does not emerge badly in comparison with the English and French characters. His social observations are undeniably true, and the vibrant American, Miranda Hope, finds him interesting. Likewise, Count Vogelstein, the German diplomat in "Pandora" (1884) is serious and patriotic in a slightly absurd way, but he is basically sympathetic and his "very thorough" approach to the study of social class is reminiscent of his author's. Leon Edel wrote that only in "Collaboration" did James "create a sympathetic German", but that is much too sweeping a statement, and even if James did in 1872 refer to his "antipathy" to Germany, it is too simplistic to regard him as anti-German.\textsuperscript{56}

He became increasingly so as his attachment to Britain grew, though
and when, in December 1895, Cleveland criticised British activities against Venezuela, James, appalled at this break in British-American amity, said that Cleveland had caused America to sound like "the Germany of Bismarck". He supported Britain in the First World War, to the extent of becoming a British citizen in 1915, and such writings of 1914 to 1915 as "Within the Rim", "Refugees in Chelsea", and "The American Volunteer Motor-Ambulance Corps in France" show how affected he was by the German invasion of Belgium, so that he even attributed atrocities to the Germans, accusing them, for instance, of regarding Red Cross ambulances as "a good mark for their shots." 57 Such opinions were typical of pro-British Americans from 1914. However, it must be said that James's fiction, and other writings before the war, do not deal with Germany sufficiently to have had more than the slightest effect on American perceptions of the country.

The most widely-read cosmopolitan American novelist of the period was Francis Marion Crawford. George P. Brett claimed in 1909 that Crawford provided in one of his novels the "best description that we have" of life in Germany. Since Brett was the head of Macmillan, Crawford's publisher, this statement should perhaps be approached cautiously. The novel to which he was referring was presumably Greifenstein (1889), a tale of impoverished German aristocrats, set in the Black Forest, which reinforces numerous stereotypes. The nobles are obsessed with honour, to the extent of refusing to sell a crumbling castle or of committing murder and suicide. They demonstrate courteousness, conservatism and self-control.
There are romantic descriptions of the Black Forest and numerous descriptions of duels. The hero, Greif von Greifenstein, fights a duel to defend his family honour, which leads to an explanation of how honour is more important than poverty to German gentlemen and must be defended by duelling. Crawford adds,

And these things do not depend upon civilisation, since modern Germany is probably more civilised than modern England. They depend upon national character.

There is a long description of the Korps duels at university, stressing their educational value in teaching students "to fence with coolness and judgment", and an explanation of duelling as "a social institution", the existence of which requires Germans to take part in it. Later there is an even more sympathetic account of a duel, described as an exchange of skills. Crawford himself had taken part in duels at Heidelberg, so he would look more favourably on the practice than most Americans.

The chapters devoted to Greif's university life are almost entirely taken up with the Korps. Such organisations are described as "natural", given the individualistic life of German students, free from restraints, and the exclusivity of the Korps is justified on the grounds that German universities were open even to the very poor, so rich young men would be bound to band together. The Korps are said not to be "mere idle, riotous bands of students", because "almost every promin-
ent man in German public life has belonged to one of them ..."
As well as duelling, drinking in the Korps is discussed and defended, Crawford writing that the immense German consumption of beer had not harmed the nation's military, commercial or intellectual abilities, and at a Kneipe the students retain their "courtesy" and "dignity". He also believed that the students' "chorus singing indicates ... a national love of law and order". The Korps is shown as developing Greif's character, so that he believes in "organisation and law ... cold steel as the arbiter of right" and Germany as the "strongest" country. Crawford is evidently impressed by German "loyalty" and "patriotism". 59

As can be gathered from the above, Crawford presents an extremely sympathetic account of the life of the German upper-classes, perhaps influenced by the fact that his sister was married to a Prussian baron. There are numerous other complimentary remarks: it is implied that Germans are naturally forthright and truthful, and they are attributed with scientific "scepticism"; we are told that, "The Germans have a right to be proud of having elevated thrift to a fine art"; the beauty of German architecture is praised; and it is claimed that Germans place duty above all else. There is an exultant passage about "Germany's victories, Germany's unity, the glory of her imperial race, the pride of her iron statesmen, the untold possibilities of her future existence", and so on, and the country is described as having risen by "unbending principles". The Germans are shown as attached to the work ethic, Greif
taking "his amusement at the expense of his sleep rather than to the detriment of his work."\(^{60}\)

The book clearly shows the features of Germany that middle-class Americans found attractive at this time, particularly the Puritan virtues of thrift, duty, work and good character; the conservative virtues of patriotism, strength, organisation and tradition; and the romantic appeal of aristocracy, beautiful landscapes and buildings, and honour. All of these come together to present an approving picture of part of German life. Crawford's support for the standards of behaviour he describes is evident in various authorial remarks (for instance, he chooses as an example of an excusable crime the theft of money "in order to render possible the escape of a beloved sovereign from the hands of a blood-thirsty and revolutionary mob"), as well as the sympathetic tone in which he writes such scenes as the final one, when an ancient noblewoman hangs her husband's sabre over her grandson's cradle. Crawford's books were so popular that the proceeds enabled him to buy a palatial Italian villa that aroused the envy of Henry James, so his view of Germany would have been disseminated widely and presumably met with the approval of his large readership. (Greifenstein had an original New York printing of 10,000 copies and went into several other editions and reprints.)\(^{61}\)

Brett's claim for the book, however, is too wide, since it shows the life of only a small section of the German population, and only part of that life (not dealing, for example, with political activities). Thus, the Germany depicted is a very
old-fashioned one. The military power of the country is stressed, but there is nothing about other modern developments, except for the occasional passing reference. The rise of Germany is approved of, while German enmity to Britain is mentioned (Greif is "dressed like an Englishman" at one point, but it would have been to his "intense disgust" to be taken for one) without criticism. Indeed, occasional comparisons indicate a preference for Germany rather than Britain.

Crawford's other novel set entirely in Germany is A Cigarette-Maker's Romance (1890), but, although the action takes place in Munich, most of the characters are Russian, so not much is shown of German life. However, there are favourable references to the Germans: some workers have "honest German faces" and "honest blue eyes"; in Germany even girls are "taught in the common school to understand something of the methods by which society governs itself"; even cheap public houses are respectable; and so on. The obsession with German eye-glasses occurs again, there being many elderly men with "great beards and greater spectacles" in Munich.

Crawford's sympathetic but old-fashioned view of Germany no doubt derived from his experiences as a student at the Technische Hochschule of Karlsruhe from 1874 to 1876 and at Heidelberg University from 1876 to 1877. He was so taken with the beauty of the Black Forest that he almost devoted himself to forestry. In 1889 and 1890 he stayed in Munich, but again this was not the place to see the new industrialised Germany, which was concentrated in the north. His personal experience
of Germany is the reason why Crawford was one of the few American novelists who wrote about the country. His liking for it would have been increased by his dislike of Britain, which was unusual in such a cosmopolitan American (he was born in Italy in 1854 and spent very little time in the U.S.A.). Anti-British references occur in several of his works, such as With the Immortals (1888), in which the shade of Julius Caesar is made to say that Britain's power has declined since the eighteen-fifties and that this is a good thing. That same book contains praise of Germany: the first great dead person summoned by the psychic experimenters is Heine, who speaks up for romance in literature, and Leonardo da Vinci is made to describe Bismarck as

the incarnation of consistency animated by gunpowder. He has confounded the diplomatists of Europe for five and twenty years by telling them the truth. He goes upon the principle that honesty is the best policy for people who are able to hit very hard.

Caesar urges support for Caesarism, with a leader embodying national traditions, explaining that, "My empire ... was intended to be that of a democratic monarch, an expression now used emptily to flatter a king who is at the mercy of his rabble." The reader could contrast the state of Germany with such an undesirable arrangement, particularly since Caesar had spoken about the country, not entirely uncritically, earlier.

After attacking socialism, because it is against marriage, established religion and working, Caesar says that a government has to preserve "property", "religion" and "marriage".
The "new ..., vast, strong and successful" German Empire protects these, but "there is no country in the world where there are so many who deny religion" and "so many anarchists", who are undermining the country, so that, "unless there is a religious revival in Germany, she will soon cease to preponderate in Europe." Even for a pro-German conservative writer there were faults in the country, in the forms of strong opposition to the government and irreligion. John C. Moran wrote, referring to Greifenstein, "Few critics have perceived the prescience shown therein by Crawford concerning the coming militarism of Germany", but, in fact, the militarism that he described already existed and it is evident that he approved of it. Crawford's books show that the discipline and other perceived virtues of a military country could be the basis for a favourable picture of it.

Another cosmopolitan novelist who was famous at the time was Henry Harland, but he did not write about Germany, and the occasional references to the country in his works show that residence in Europe did not necessarily rid Americans of hackneyed views of other nationalities. In The Cardinal's Snuff-Box (1900) the English hero, having described himself and a weeping Italian cow as "Teutons", explains to Marietta the maid that, "Cows and Englishmen, and all such sentimental cattle, including Germans, are Germanic." In My Friend Prospero, Frau Brandt is worried about a princess's associating with an Englishman: "her voice was charged with gravity, for she was about to ask a question to the Teutonic mind of quite supreme importance - 'but is he noble?'" Sentiment-
ality and concern with rank were two characteristics widely associated with the Germans, and if a cosmopolitan promoted such cliches it would not be surprising if the mass of ordinary Americans believed in them.

Most writers lacked Gertrude Atherton's readiness to turn real royalties into characters in their novels, but the British novelist Anthony Hope's *The Prisoner of Zenda* (1894) started a vogue for books set at romantic, colourful and imaginary European courts. Numerous American examples followed, of which the most famous, and the one that provided a name for the genre, was George Barr McCutcheon's *Graustark* (1901). Grant Knight considers *The Princess Aline* to be of this group, but it contains far too little action to qualify. These books sold in huge numbers and as Knight observed they must have given their readers some impression of troubles in Europe. They were generally set in the Balkans or a small German kingdom, and Knight wrote that their net effect was probably to make the readers believe "that the Balkans were the powder-keg of Europe; that Austria, Germany and Russia were trouble-makers whereas England and France were anxious to preserve the status quo; ... that we should have as little to do with European politics as expediency might allow."67 These novels would thus cause unfavourable perceptions of Germany; and yet, their popularity does show a widespread fascination with romantic old monarchical Europe that makes the dearth of novels set in the real Germany seem all the stranger, unless, indeed, the modern industrial Germany had established its new image so strongly that it could not credibly provide a setting
for romantic tales.

Gore Vidal has pointed to a further development of the Graustarkian genre, but for children, in the form of L. Frank Baum's Oz books. He considers that the number of "resplendent titles and miniature countries" in these works were also derived from Baum's familial connections with pre-unification Germany; it is strange to think that Germany was masquerading in American fiction under this guise, but again it is significant that it is to the old Germany that the books relate. Vidal observes that there is no republic in them, in other words, they provided a pseudo-European dream-world for children, at the same time as their elders were finding a similar form of fictional escapism. This indicates another form of psychological isolationism: readers of that period did not want to read about the real Europe, perhaps because it was becoming too much like the America that they knew too well, or because it presented challenges to their own country, so instead they read books set in non-existent, powerless states with all the glamour of non-republican royalty.

As regards fiction set in the real world, John T. Flanagan wrote a suggestive essay on "The Germans in American Fiction", but again the lack of interest in Germany as a country is suggested by the fact that he deals almost entirely with works which contain German immigrants to America, those evidently being the Germans who were most written about by Americans, and even these, as Flanagan points out, are always
minor characters. He observes that in nineteenth century fiction they are mainly socialists, scientists or artisans, and one could see that as reflecting impressions of their homeland among Americans. In any case, there are few examples even of German-Americans in American fiction between 1888 and 1917, perhaps the most important being the socialist Berthold Lindau in William Dean Howells's *A Hazard of New Fortunes* (1890). From his examples drawn from a longer period Flanagan concludes that certain characteristics were often attached to German-Americans: they were "hard-working", "persistent and intractable rather than intelligent", possessed of large appetites, and successful through "organisation" not "leadership". The female characters tended to be good housekeepers but lacking style. These stereotypes might have become standard views of Germans in America, but it is difficult to tell how far they affected perceptions of Germany. For the majority of Americans, lacking other contacts with the country, their impression of German-Americans might well have been crucial in establishing their ideas of Germany.

There were some supporters of Germany at the beginning of the First World War who expressed themselves through fiction. The *Boston Daily Advertiser* printed a very short piece by Mary Boyle O'Reilly called "In Berlin", which shows sympathy with the suffering of some elderly Germans. It is noticeable that much of the Boston press tended to be favourable to Germany, perhaps because the Irish-Americans in the city out-numbered the Brahmins. In *Everybody's Magazine* appeared
another story, "Vengeance is Mine!" by Virgil Jordan, in which a British airman dreams that the Germans all commit suicide, then awakens to the sound of German guns, which seemed to speak in glorious, wide-mouthed joy of Til (sic) Eulenspiegel and the Young Siegfried.

I thanked God for the Germans.

The story contains other praise for the Germans and condemnation for the Allies, whom it blames for the war. Such contributions were, however, drowned in the deluge of pro-Allied writings.

As has been argued, Mark Twain was the only important American author in the period under consideration who had a close association with Germany, which he expressed in his works. Though generally favourable, the view that he presented was ambivalent, and, as has been said, it is significant that he preferred to stay in Austria, where he could experience the German language without the German system. It is possible also that he preferred the gloomy atmosphere of an empire in decline to the thrusting nature of a rising one, the former being more appropriate to his increasing pessimism. Gertrude Atherton and F. Marion Crawford showed that it was possible for American writers to look more positively at Germany, but the latter was interested only in the old Germany (after 1891 his books are set largely in the more picturesque Italy, with few German settings and those only for parts of books). Gertrude Atherton was unusual in that she, especially in
Rulers of Kings, extolled the new Germany, but even there ambivalence appears, since Germany is obviously a possible threat to America. This threat is emphasised by Richard Harding Davis, reflecting a belief in international struggle. Henry James's boredom with, and dislike of, Germany largely arose from personal reasons, yet is evidently typical of many American imaginative writers. The fact remains that Germany in this period held little appeal to American writers, even though literature set elsewhere in Europe was popular. Edmund Gosse wrote of the imaginative gap between Anglo-Saxons and Germany, and this is another example of it. Marc Pachter has written that American cosmopolitan writing was a search for a "relationship to a tradition from which (Americans) had been cut off", but it seems that this tradition was not connected to Germany. Writing about cosmopolitan novelists, D. Cheshire and M. Bradbury said that Europe was identified with romance and the past, not the "real world" in which America existed, so perhaps Clement Vollmer was right in thinking that Germany was not sufficiently romantic for Americans. His explanation for this was that Germans were too "introspective"; if by this he was referring to the image of Germans as stolid and rather boring there might be some truth in it. He also said that the Germans were too "individualistic", but their image was the opposite of that, and, in fact, the idea that they were all very like each other would be more likely to put writers off.71

Germany was not romantic mainly because it had become too
modern. Americans did not want to read about an industrialised, powerful, commercially successful, thrusting state, because they were living in one. This explains why the novels that were set in Germany took place in Munich, the Black Forest and so on, not in industrial areas. Germany had become too much like America to engage the American imagination, except, to some extent, in the case of Mark Twain, whose essential interest, even when he was abroad, was America.
CHAPTER 4: AMERICAN DIPLOMATS AND GERMANY

The way in which American diplomats perceived Germany is of particular interest, since they had the closest contact with the country at a governmental level and since their despatches affected the American government's views of Germany. This chapter examines the correspondence between the American government and the diplomats in Berlin, to see how relations developed and how the diplomats reported on them and on Germany. The structure of relations was obviously only to a small extent within the control of the diplomats, and that structure largely dictated their activities, but within it there was room for them to express opinions. As regards the American public's perceptions of Germany, the way in which relations developed was an important modifying factor. Other material that illuminates the position of the diplomats is used, and there is some consideration of the views of certain diplomats who did not serve in Germany but demonstrated opinions of the country. This examination only extends to the outbreak of the First World War, since diplomatic relations from then until American entry have been extensively written about.¹

In December, 1904 Frederick W. Wile wrote in the Chicago Daily News that "German-American relations are purely those founded on trade."² This is a slight exaggeration, since there was also the occasional international incident or conference, but its basic truth is confirmed by the fact that the correspondence between the State Department and the Amer-
ican Embassy in Berlin was dominated by questions relating to trade. These facts suggest a cold and businesslike relationship, unlike that between Britain and America, into which deeper interests and emotions entered. Trade may have been an important link there as well, but in the case of Germany America was continually accusing or suspecting Germany of using unfair methods, which inevitably meant that there was an atmosphere of hostility in relations.

The longest running problem concerned American exports of meat. This had begun in 1880 with the banning of certain pork products, then in 1883 all American pork was banned. Americans saw this as retaliation against the imposition of an increased duty on sugar in 1875, which affected German beet sugar. The affair was still dragging on in 1890 when the American Minister, William Walter Phelps, a former Republican Congressman, wrote to Secretary of State Blaine that the Foreign Office had not answered his request for copies of the laws restricting imports of American meat. He complained that "for seven years this government has shown its unwillingness to use frankness in the discussion, and even, except in extremity, to touch this subject." In a later despatch he told Blaine that he was trying to influence German public opinion in favour of such imports. The German government argued that American meat was often diseased, but Phelps and the American government continually denied this. They were supported by some German liberal politicians, who, like the Americans, said that exclusion was a form of protectionism to benefit the German Agrarians, and nothing to do
with sanitary measures. These liberals wanted imports, to reduce food prices. Phelps reported to Blaine that he lent documents to Theodor Barth, a liberal leader, to help him to argue against exclusion in the Reichstag, but he warned Blaine that any threat of economic retaliation would unite all of the parties against America, leaving probably only August Bebel, a leader of the Social Democrats, to argue for the American point of view. It is notable that the despatches from the Embassy tend to refer favourably to the left-wing liberals and the Socialists, because they, for their own reasons, favoured agricultural imports, which would benefit America, and they tended personally to be pro-American, whereas the conservative parties supported agricultural protectionism and usually disliked American capitalism. An examination of the American press at the time shows that these facts were widely reported. American diplomats in Germany tended to be rich and often upper-class, so they would not normally sympathise with radicals and socialists. In doing so in the German context they were merely foreshadowing attitudes that became widespread in America, as will be shown later.

Despite his recognition that the left-wing parties had a community of interest with America as regarded meat exports, Phelps retained the social instincts associated with his wealth and class, and his relations with many members of the German ruling-classes, including Bismarck, with whom he had become friendly at the Berlin Conference of 1889, were good. His exper-
ience as a Minister to Austria had prepared him to get on well with the Germans, and his personal connections were strengthened by the marriage of his daughter to von Rottenburg, a protege of Bismarck's. In a speech of 1889 Phelps said that Germany and America shared the virtues of "simplicity, industry, cheerfulness, brotherly kindness, and morality", and on his return to America he particularised this, saying that "the Germans and the New England folk to which I belong" were both "simple, intelligent, industrious, and without pretence". However, Phelps continually allowed his liking for the Germans, and his optimism, to influence his judgement, and in April 1891 he wrote to the State Department that he was sure the German government would permit pork imports as soon as they were sure that proper precautions were taken. The complete exclusion of American pork was indeed ended in September, but this was not the end of the problem. By August, 1892 Phelps was disappointedly writing to Secretary of State Foster that the Prussian authorities were re-examining American pork for trichinosis. It is, in fact, quite clear that American pork was frequently infected with trichinae - parasitic nematode worms - although Phelps seems to have been unaware of this, from the aggrieved tone of his despatches. Nevertheless, he kept insisting that the American government ought not to threaten the Germans, pointing out that the German government felt bound to warn consumers, but did so "in as mild a way as it could." Any pressure on that government would make it more aggressive, and Phelps insisted that the sympathies of the German government were entirely with the Americans. 4 In fact, German restrictions
on American pork continued to be strict throughout the period, in terms of examination for hygiene.

There were similar difficulties with American beef. In 1894 the Americans put a tariff on German sugar exports which effectively excluded them, and almost immediately Germany prohibited imports of American cattle and fresh beef, on the grounds that "Texas Fever" had been found in two shipments. The German government insisted that its action was not retaliatory, but Phelps's successor, General Theodore Runyon, the first American representative in Germany to hold the rank of Ambassador, pointed out that the action was taken by the Imperial Chancellor, Caprivi, himself. He was evidently less prepared than Phelps to believe in Germany's good faith, and in this he was reflecting a reduction in cordiality towards Germany in American public opinion. However, in January 1895 he warned Secretary of State Gresham that if America did not repeal the sugar tax, the Agrarians might lead Germany into a tariff war, even if the German government really was friendly to America. 5

Runyon was a judge from New Jersey, appointed by Cleveland in May 1893, despite a complete inability to speak German. This is no doubt one reason why his relations with the Germans were not close, his lack of money compared with Phelps being another, since that meant that he could only afford as an embassy a flat in an upper storey of an apartment-house. The United States at this time did not supply official res-
idences. As Poultney Bigelow pointed out, the location of Runyon's embassy meant that the Kaiser could not visit it, and the same presumably applied to other high dignitaries. Bigelow portrays Runyon as a "pathetic" figure, mistaken for a drunken waiter after an imperial banquet, but Bigelow had a tendency to exaggerate.6

Despite the inspections of American meat, continual demands for stricter examinations of it before export, and various other anti-American economic actions, some trivial and some, like the exclusion of American insurance companies from Prussia, more serious, no strong action was taken by the American government, and this concurred with the advice from the Embassy. However, in August 1895, John B. Jackson, First Secretary at the Embassy, took advantage of Runyon's absence to write confidentially to Alvey A. Adee, the Acting Secretary of State, pointing out that there were unconfirmed reports of cholera in Hamburg. He suggested that a quarantine against Hamburg shipping "would open a wide range of possibilities".

He then listed these:

Texas fever might no longer be found to exist among American cattle.

The treaty of 1868 ... might be found applicable to the case of an emigrant from the Reichsland ... (Jackson meant that American immigrants from Alsace-Lorraine might be recognised as American citizens). A different scale of freight charges on the railroads under control of the Prussian government might no longer be used ... in the case of American woods ... Corned brawn might be appraised as a hog product and not as a table delicacy at
the German custom houses.

The publication desired and necessary to secure international reciprocity in regard to patent matters might be made.

American insurance companies might be allowed to live in peace in Prussia ...

And so on ad libitum.

Commercial jealousy of the United States has been increasing for years in Germany, and, as we have on no occasion chosen to show our teeth, the conclusion has been reached that American interest may be attacked with impunity. 7

This is a most suggestive outburst on the part of an impatient and ambitious young professional diplomat (and former naval officer), showing how these trivial disagreements had continually built up. At this period there were practically no constructive aspects of German-American diplomatic relations. Instead there was this collection of arguments, and it is quite clear that if any serious disagreement were to break out between America and Germany it would be more harmful than if relations previously had been entirely cordial. Since all of these controversies were reported in the American press, it helps to explain why Americans were so ready to believe the worst of Germany's position in the Spanish-American War.

However, the American government preferred to keep commercial relations as normal as possible, rather than have the all-out trade war that Jackson's recommendations would have precipitated. As it was, the German attacks on American meat continued; for instance, local authorities would insist that shops selling it had to announce publicly that they could not
Runyon died suddenly in January 1896, whereupon Jackson immediately began to bombard the State Department with memoranda on various aspects of German life. One confidential despatch showed that he had developed a more subtle idea of the best way to deal with Germany. He pointed out that legislation in New York State against German insurance companies might make it more difficult to gain the readmission of American companies to Germany, observing, "Open threats are of little use in dealing with a nation in which sentiments play an important part in all its relations, as they are more than apt to unify public opinion by offending the national pride ...", therefore making it impossible for the government to make concessions without seeming weak. It is interesting that Jackson should consider public opinion to be so important in Germany, since many Americans believed that Germans only did what the government, and particularly the Kaiser, told them, and that the popular will was ignored. However, the idea that Germans, even those who disapproved of the government, would all unite together against a foreign threat was sometimes touched on in discussions of Germany, although the example of it that appeared in August 1914 still surprised many Americans. Jackson had, in any case, come to the same conclusion on commercial relations as Phelps.

The next American ambassador, Edwin F. Uhl, quickly showed irritation with the German government on the subject of agri-
cultural trade. In October 1896 he called for the lifting of the prohibition on American cattle and beef, sending the Foreign Office thirty-four typewritten pages on the subject, and in November he sent the State Department a cutting from the Tagliche Rundschau, alleging the presence of potato bugs, or, failing them, phylloxera, in American apples. Uhl said this was "illustrative of the great ingenuity constantly manifested among certain classes in Germany in discovering apprehended dangers from the introduction of any foreign product which is likely by competition to seriously affect the price in the home market of like products of German origin."

More arguments soon arose, about tonnage dues in harbours and freight charges on German railways, and a note from Alvey Adee shows how general was the idea in the State Department that the Germans were, in effect, cheats:

... a veiled discrimination was probably intended, to exclude American oak on the pretext of specific differences. The Germans are fond of that sort of thing.10

In June 1897 Andrew Dickson White, an eminent academic and Germanophile, who had been Minister to Germany between 1879 and 1881, became Ambassador, and there is a clear change in the tone of official despatches. The Ambassador sympathised with the Germans in their opposition to infected meat; for instance, when the Frankfurt agent of Armour & Co. was yet again discovered to be selling trichonous sausages, White wrote, "I take the liberty of remarking that Mr. Wohl's frequent 'bad luck' cannot fail to cause persons hearing of
it to be suspicious about American hog products." Furthermore, "The idea of eating dead trichinae is not pleasant, even if it can be shown that there is no danger in doing so." White opposed the idea of American retaliation, despite the anti-Americanism of the Agrarians, writing,

I have still faith in the feeling of justice which forms so strong a component of the German character, and in the gradual prevalence of a wise self-interest ... Experiences of my own during my former residence here as Minister strengthen this belief.

White was constantly referring to this earlier appointment and to the good German-American relations that had existed then, the return of which he was always trying to promote, but since that time the commercial and political rivalry between the countries had developed and was becoming stronger. He urged that America make some "sacrifice", such as giving up the tonnage dues, in order to improve relations, and in December 1897 he insisted that the American government ought to tighten up the inspection of meat, since there were many cases of certified but nonetheless infected pork. The American indignation at alleged German unfairness was all the more unjustified since the average duty on German exports to America in 1897 was 50%, whereas that in the other direction was only 9%.

Even White admitted that some of the German regulations against American produce seemed to be motivated by economic rather than sanitary considerations, but in February 1898 he strongly
opposed any retaliation, adding that von Bulow, the Foreign Secretary, would do "everything in his power" to promote cordial relations. The American government acted in accordance with this advice, although when White was absent in July 1899 John B. Jackson again urged - this time prompted by allegations of Texas Fever in American cattle - that the United States act, adding that this would strengthen the hand of German industrialists and manufacturers who opposed the Agrarian policy (he no doubt thought that the McKinley administration would be more likely to sympathise with those groups than with the Socialists and radicals who were also against the Agrarians.) The Second Secretary, George M. Fisk, who had a doctorate from Munich and had published *Handelspolitische und Volkerrechtliche Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten* ("Relations between Germany and the United States with regard to trade policy and international law"), took advantage of a brief spell as chargé, when Jackson too was absent, to put forward his solution to trade problems, which was to have a unified commercial treaty. American-German trade relations were complicated by the fact that there existed only treaties between the U.S.A. and some individual German states. The most important of these was the 1828 treaty with Prussia, but both sides differed greatly as to their interpretation of that. Germany wanted a most favoured nation treaty, which, for instance, would not give Cuban sugar advantages over German, whereas America wanted reciprocity, which would enable it to maintain protectionism as it liked. 12.
In fact, the German-American Commercial Agreement of July 1900 gave neither of these things. There were American concessions on tariffs for a few German exports, such as works of art and sparkling wine, changes in customs procedures, and there were to be negotiations on sugar duties. The resulting structure still benefited America, which had most favoured nation status, far more than Germany. However, when Germany increased its own protectionism a threat to American trade was posed, and Charlemagne Tower, who became ambassador in 1902, warned the State Department in 1905 that the Germans said there would have to be a new commercial treaty, since the old agreement would end in March 1906, when American goods would be subject to the full tariff. The American government showed no interest at all in this, so Tower wrote two more times, pointing out that German ministers would accept a reciprocal agreement. The fact was that the Senate was so devoted to protectionism that it rejected any idea of fair trade. It thus became clear that Germany could only receive the same minor concessions as before, since they lay within the competence of the President, along with changes in the method of valuation of German exports. In return, in February 1906 Bulow, by this time Chancellor, persuaded the Reichstag to pass a bill giving America most favoured nation status again. Tower's despatches made quite clear the sacrifice that Germany was making. He quoted Bulow as saying that he "will exhaust every resource to avoid a breach with the United States in spite of parliamentary opposition and numerous petitions from commercial bodies throughout Germany", and later he quoted Bulow's Reichstag speech in which he had defended
the American government. In May 1906 Tower wrote, "So far as the general relations between the two countries are concerned, it seems to me that they could not be better than they are at present", and he went on to explain the co-operation he received from the Emperor and his government. In fact, relations between Tower and Wilhelm II, who always had a penchant for American millionaires, were excellent, but it could hardly be said that the American government was putting itself out for the sake of Germany, nor even that Americans recognised the measures that Germany was taking for their sake. Indeed, sections of the American press attacked their government for even going so far as to change the method of valuation of German goods, and the State Department was sent numerous letters of complaint from businessmen and politicians. This whole matter reveals an attitude of contempt, or at least of indifference, to Germany on the part of many Americans, particularly those involved in commerce or politics.

The overwhelming impression from the diplomatic despatches is that the American government really did not care much about good relations with Germany. For example, Phelps did his best to try to get an extradition treaty, but, as he wrote in 1891,

When the United States asks for a criminal, the German authorities do all the work and return the criminal or refuse to return him, without charging the United States anything for the services rendered. When the German authorities ask for a criminal in the United States, they have to prosecute their own case, paying their own lawyers and all other expenses.
The Germans wanted this anomaly removed, as Phelps explained over and over again. He made various suggestions as to how the difficulty could be overcome, but nothing was done. 14

One of the chief difficulties that the American Embassy had to deal with was the so-called military cases. These involved Germans who had emigrated to America before performing the compulsory military service, and who on their return to Germany were arrested for desertion or forced to join the army. In such cases most of the American diplomats did as much as they could for the German-Americans, but it is noticeable that Edwin Uhl stressed the German point of view; for instance, he mentioned that the sons born in America of naturalised German-Americans who then returned and stayed in Germany were not called upon to join the army when German boys of the same age had to do so, and this formed a focus of discontent. Andrew Dickson White, who clearly saw such cases as an unnecessary threat to German-American relations, went further, sometimes refusing to give passports to German-Americans living in Germany. In his autobiography he explained the German case in detail, since there was so much criticism of Germany on this subject. One of his reasons for disapproving of the people concerned was that they gave America a bad name, and in his autobiography there are references to what had been called "predatory Hebrews"; he was evidently making an appeal to anti-Semitic feelings. In a despatch of 1900 he made clear his explicit sympathy with the German military authorities in this regard. 15
During the period under consideration the American navy and the American press were greatly concerned with alleged German threats to the Monroe Doctrine, particularly claims that Germany planned to establish a colony in South America. There is little of this in the diplomatic correspondence, probably because there was no truth behind the rumours, but when it was mentioned great notice was taken of it. In October 1897 Jackson sent the State Department an article from the "German Colonial Gazette" supporting German emigration to South America because German communities were maintained there, not absorbed as in the United States. Jackson said that this was evidence that Germany opposed the Monroe Doctrine. This despatch was sent on to President McKinley, who "carefully noted its contents". A few weeks later White urged the American government to help a German arrested in Venezuela, since it would show that the Monroe Doctrine could benefit Europe too, and, since "the German nation is at all times powerfully influenced by sentiment, in the better use of that word, an evidence of good will would do much to dispel the atmosphere of ill-will which some powerful agencies are constantly endeavouring to create." Again there is the idea that "sentiment" and public opinion were particularly important in Germany. White was practically obsessed with the bad image of Germany in the American press, and he continually sent despatches denying various harmful reports, such as that he had been insulted by officials of the Imperial court, that his wife had been run over by a bicyclist and grossly insulted, that the Emperor had said that American children
were ill-mannered and badly brought up, and so on. The fact that such reports were so common suggests that there was a clear anti-German bias in sections of the American press, and White's concern about them shows that he realised the damage they would do to American perceptions of Germany.

Jackson, as it happens, came to realise that there was no German threat to the Monroe Doctrine; in April 1901 he reported that rumours of a German attempt to buy a Venezuelan island were untrue, and several times he pointed out that the German government was interested only in the commercial possibilities of Latin America.16

Even after Jackson had moved on from Germany he retained an interest in the country. While Minister to various Balkan states he attended the German Colonial Congresses in 1902 and 1905 and in 1911 he wrote to the Secretary of State from Cuba, where he was Minister, to say that the report of the Third Congress showed that Germany's aims abroad were purely commercial, with no aggressive intent, and that the delegates had ridiculed Pan-German ideas and references to the danger from them in American and British newspapers. It is clear that his contact with Germany had greatly changed his views of it since the days when he was insisting on strong American action against it. It is doubtful, however, whether he was as pro-German as Andrew Dickson White, whose autobiography was published in 1905 and partly serialised in the Century Magazine. White gave an almost entirely favourable picture of Germany, starting with his days as a student in Berlin in 1856, where "I saw my ideal of a university not only
realized, but extended and glorified ..." His attachment to
the country was largely related to education and culture,
and he particularly valued the theatre in Germany, which,
"next after her religious inheritance, gives the best stimulus
and sustenance to the better aspirations of her people".
It spread "Kantian ethics" and was "ennobling ... clean and
wholesome". In this field, as in numerous others, Wilhelm
II, according to White, was an inspiration. He claimed that
the Kaiser did his best to strengthen parliamentary government,
that he had not opposed America in the War of 1898, that he
was entirely justified in his dealings with the "despotism"
of Venezuela. White made clear that he was answering crit-
icisms of Wilhelm that had been made in America, and when it
came to the idea that the Kaiser did not like the U.S.A.,
White listed various aspects of corruption in America, saying
that the Kaiser probably did not approve of these, but that he
admired the creditable features of America. Once again,
White felt it was necessary to defend the image of Germany
and its ruler, this time publicly. He also devoted some
pages to the "malignant" correspondents who sent false stories
to America, including those about himself, for the sake of
sensationalism.17

Dealing with the Reichstag, White praised Eugen Richter of
the Radicals and August Bebel of the Socialists, the latter
for his "earnestness". His remarks on Bebel are slightly
ambiguous: he was useful

as an irritant in drawing attention to the needs
of the working-classes, and so in promoting that steady uplifting of their condition and prospects which is one of the most striking achievements of modern Germany.

This indicates a greater admiration for the German system that could do this than for the Socialists who provoked it, but nevertheless White was displaying a relatively objective approach to different sectors of German politics, unlike those Americans who supported either the Kaiser or his opponents but not both. White also admired Theodor Barth, the liberal, and Count Posadowski, the minister of the interior. In his autobiography White was trying to promote a good image of Germany among the American public, as he had tried to promote good relations between the two governments. In his idealistic way, he saw America and Germany not as rivals but as allies in the work of spreading civilisation. In 1898, when the question of the German desire for colonies in the Pacific arose, White wrote to Secretary of State W.R. Day that

we should distinctly indicate to the German government our acquiescence in the idea that we prefer to see the regions of the east in the hands of the active, energetic commercial and civilizing powers, rather than under control of civilizations which are dead or of states which are dying ...

Furthermore, an assurance to this effect would benefit America-German relations, White wrote. His advice was always directed to this end, and perhaps it was his influence that affected Jackson. The latter wrote to Hay in 1902 agreeing with White's opinion that the visit of Prince Henry of Prussia
to America would create "a better political atmosphere" and encourage "a more direct exchange of communications between the two countries", which was necessary because "influences have been at work, in the press and elsewhere, to estrange the United States and Germany." Jackson took the opportunity to criticise two extremes in German politics, the Conservatives and Agrarians, who opposed the visit because they did not want people to know about a more liberal country, and the Socialists, who opposed it because they did not want the government to become more liberal and thus reduce the discontent on which they fed. The Agrarians always annoyed American diplomats but the Socialists could do so too, when they were not being seen in the context of American trade interests.

When White retired in 1902 his contribution to good relations was widely recognised. His autobiography includes some of the letters he received, and many admiring articles appeared in the American press. One such was by Wolf von Schierbrand, who praised White's role in reducing suspicions during and after the Spanish-American War. He explained that White had got him to place articles friendly to America in the German press, and that his friendly relations with the Kaiser had been particularly important.

Those who wanted close ties with Germany, like Schierbrand, were aware of the importance of diplomats in counteracting the influences leading to hostility. In the absence of strong mutual interests and deep relations between the countries,
greater stress was placed on the personal relationship between American diplomats and the Germans. As has been mentioned, White was succeeded by Charlemagne Tower, whose great wealth came mainly from Minnesota iron. Like most rich Americans, he got on well with Wilhelm II, even being accused of forwarding German interests more than American ones. This was the case with tariff negotiations, but as stated above he was only concerned to obtain an equitable and stable arrangement.

In 1906 he wrote to Root that the Germans would do anything to preserve good relations with America, attributing this policy to Wilhelm:

The powerful personal influence of the sovereign is emphatically for peace with the U.S. The Emperor has shown this upon a hundred occasions. His friendly reception of all Americans who come into contact with him ... prove(s) that. The Emperor ... lays a very high value upon the good qualities of the American character. I am convinced that it would not only give him pain, but would thwart considerably his political aims ... to have a serious breach with the United States. 19

The famous charm that Wilhelm exerted on Americans no doubt contributed to Tower's opinions.

Tower admired the country as well as its ruler, telling Root that the increased prosperity in Germany "can scarcely be equalled in any other country on the continent." Although he was not a polymath like White, he was a man of considerable culture, which would be another reason for his finding German society congenial. He brought about some improvements in
relations; for example, in 1907 the requirement that American pork must have a certificate that it was not infected with trichinosis was dropped. It was ironic, therefore, that he was involved in a diplomatic scandal in March 1908 over the appointment of his successor. Roosevelt chose David Jayne Hill, who had been a historian, a university president, Assistant Secretary of State, and Minister to the Netherlands and Switzerland, but Tower sent a telegram to Root saying that the Kaiser did not want Hill. He had agreed to the appointment in 1907, so the State Department could do nothing. The story then leaked to the press, the Roosevelt administration assuming that Tower was responsible. Lloyd Griscom, the American Ambassador to Italy, was then dragged into the affair. At a dinner in Berlin Wilhelm told him that he had devoted every effort to build up the most friendly relations between Germany and the United States. In this Mr. Tower has co-operated most skilfully, and has created for your Embassy a position never before equalled.

Hill could not keep up this position, being "ein ganz kleiner Mann", so the Kaiser wanted "some distinguished citizen who has a national position and influence", such as Griscom. This led to Griscom's being suspected by Roosevelt of trying to get the appointment for himself. Meanwhile, the American press was making a great fuss about the Kaiser's objections to Hill, alleging that the difficulty was Hill's relative lack of money. The Kaiser was widely criticised, and Root wrote to Hill, "You would have been much gratified to observe the strong and general feeling which arose immediately ...
over the idea that we should be represented abroad by wealth rather than by intelligence and learning." Tower believed that the German Foreign Office was alarmed at the "storm of disapproval" in the American press, but according to Griscom that institution had deliberately leaked the story to Elmer Roberts, the head of the Associated Press bureau in Berlin, to embarrass the Kaiser into leaving foreign affairs alone. 20

This adds an additional irony, since Roberts, the author of Monarchical Socialism in Germany was, like Tower, a great admirer of the Kaiser and the system he headed. Tower's desire to please Wilhelm had actually led to an incident damaging to American impressions of Germany. Another example of this desire to please was a diplomatic uniform that Tower designed and got his secretaries to wear, instead of the ordinary evening dress worn even in the day time by American diplomats. Hill wrote plaintively to Root that Tower had told him he should wear the uniform, to gratify Wilhelm, primly adding, "I told him that I should be very glad, when possible, to please the Emperor, but did not feel that I could wear a uniform ... unless it was authorized." He was no doubt aware of Root's antipathy to official uniforms. Unlike Tower, Hill was not overwhelmed by the Kaiser. After the Daily Telegraph affair he wrote to Root that the attacks on Wilhelm in the Reichstag marked a significant advance for "constitutional government", and he rather smugly quoted one speaker, who, referring to German-American relations, said that diplomats should be chosen for "personal
capability" not "social position." 21

In a "strictly confidential" despatch Hill criticised the "Imperial Cult" which centred on Wilhelm. Now the international dangers of his position were seen by the Germans, who wanted more control over him. Hill showed clearly where his sympathies lay: "It is a half conscious struggle between the armed pre-eminence of the Prussian kingdom based primarily upon military power and royal absolutism ... and ... the combined traditional and philosophical conceptions of the State as a moral organism ..." This gave Wilhelm cause for "profound depression", but he was "brave well-meaning and highly intelligent", so Hill expected him to adapt to the new situation. Hill, who was involved with the disarmament movement, perhaps another reason for Wilhelm's antipathy, was excited by the aroused public opinion in Germany, since it might lead to a recognition of the costs and superfluousness of militarism. Hill believed that the Germans had a "deep moral sense" and would never support a war of aggression. 22

Despite the initial difficulties and his pacifistic (and Prohibitionist) ideals, Hill's personal relations with the Kaiser were cordial, according to Joseph Grew, who served as Second Secretary under him from 1908 to 1911. His Turbulent Era, constructed from letters and diaries, gives an insight into his attitudes to Germany. He sent home glamorous accounts of royalty, but he was disturbed by strikes and riots in 1910 and by an "outrageous" attack by the Berlin police on British and American journalists. Most of this part of
his book deals with Theodore Roosevelt's visit to Germany, including an account of his admiration for the Kaiser. As a similar proponent of strenuousness, Grew evidently agreed. 23

In 1910 Grew, having attended a preparatory meeting for an International Hygiene Exhibition, wrote a report urging that the U.S.A. should send delegates, since it would be like a "great text-book of hygiene", but in a private letter to Paxton Hibben, Grew referred to a similar event as "a confounded medical congress". This perhaps suggests that diplomats (and others) felt that they had to express enthusiasm about German scientific advances in public, even if they did not actually feel it. Grew may have been influenced by the fact that Hill was very much in favour of American attendance at the exhibition, held at Dresden in 1911, but, in fact, the U.S.A. was the only important country not represented, Congress having refused an appropriation. This shows that, in practice, American interests in Germany advances in sanitation and the like was limited, despite enthusiastic reports of them in the press, and especially so in the case of politicians. 24

Although despatches from the Embassy often referred to political developments in Germany, the diplomats paid little attention to German social reforms. There was an annual ritual of sending the reports on Berlin street-cleaning to the State Department, for some reason, but otherwise the diplomats evidently felt that the Department would not be interested in the types of advances so widely discussed in America.
Sometimes enquiries came from individuals or institutions about certain progressive aspects of Germany, such as educational reform in Saxony, and these were usually passed on to the American consuls. Their remit was social and commercial matters, whereas the diplomats concentrated on political affairs and official relations. The consuls were frequently enthusiastic about the system they described. For instance, in 1910 the consul in Nuremberg considered German cities to be "the most economically administered, best governed, most sanitary and most beautifully built cities in the world."

In 1889 the Consul-General in Frankfurt provided the State Department with a more objective description of the German social system:

German politics are based upon the supremacy of authority, England's upon freedom, Germany struggles to aid her toilers while at the same time securing the governing power to lift up her workmen, England prefers to let them take care of themselves ... The Kartells offer Germany, in its new efforts to insure laborers, a security for which the Government is expected to manifest its gratitude by keeping hands off the Kartells. They offer more constant employment; hence less danger to society and much less to the government's scheme of pensioning or insuring workmen. The shady side of this picture represents the workmen as semi-serfs. Robbed of ambition, opportunity or even occasion to lift themselves from the herd of mere toilers, they become subjects of ... the mill-owners.25

As time went on, less stress was put by Americans on the bad aspects described here, and the positive benefits of the Kartell system, involving government-supervised syndicates, and of the ways in which the government looked after
the workers, became an influence on many American Progressives.

Phelps did report on the social insurance system in 1891, stating that the high standards of German administration, organisation, education "and other habits and virtues" meant that the scheme was likely to succeed. He paid contributions on behalf of his servants, despite being exempt, as a diplomat, because, "I thought it a good opportunity to show, at a point where the German Government had a peculiar interest, my appreciation of their many personal favours", thus demonstrating again his good relations with the Germans.26

A point of difficulty in German-American relations arose in 1908, following the Hague Conference on arbitration. The U.S. government proposed to Germany that there should be an arbitration treaty between them, the convention of 1904 never having come into effect because the Senate rejected it. Therefore it was suggested that a clause be inserted necessitating the consent of the Senate to the definition of the dispute in each case of arbitration, in order to satisfy that body. Germany, however, could not accept that each arbitration agreement was equivalent to a separate treaty and that a body with no international legal responsibility should be involved on the American side. All the other countries approached by the U.S.A. had agreed to the clause, and Root told Tower that failure to reach an agreement with Germany

would be regarded as an indication that the
strong friendship between the two countries is beginning to cool. This Government is very desirous that no such result should follow.

Tower's last official despatch said that Germany would definitely accept, but he was too optimistic. Hill ran into further difficulties, with the German government pointing out that it was responsible for all the German states whereas the American government did not accept responsibility for its constituent states. Hill was not sympathetic with these problems caused by German "centralization", as he informed Root:

I have insinuated that the moral isolation of Germany in the society of sovereign states now striving to organize international justice ... might be a worse calamity than the sacrifice of some of the purely theoretical inequalities that may appear to be involved ...

Hill had a tendency to blame Germany for any misunderstandings that arose; he reported to Root that when Chancellor von Bulow asked him the best man to send as ambassador to the U.S.A., he told him, "... it is not always easy for a foreigner who is accustomed to ascertain the sovereign's will by direct expression to estimate duly and accurately the value and meaning of public opinion in a democracy like ours", explaining the various ways in which Germans could misinterpret American opinion.27

In January 1909 Root wrote that the arbitration treaty problem was so difficult that the Department would "renounce the
attempt”. However, the National German-American Alliance urged that there should be a treaty, and the German Foreign Office made approaches, but nothing came of this renewed activity. The failure to sign an arbitration treaty was another example of the shallowness of German-American relations, with neither side willing to compromise even on this relatively trivial matter. Hill, with his interest in disarmament, was not pleased by the German position; in his Impressions of the Kaiser (1919) he wrote that Wilhelm had wanted friendship with America but had not been prepared to take any steps in the direction of disarmament, even arbitration, since his power rested on militarism. That book is further evidence that Hill held no grudge against the Kaiser for his objections to his appointment, since, even after the war, it described him as being personally "fascinating", "friendly" and "engaging", only criticising him in his role as the War Lord. Another issue during Hill's ambassadorship was the prevention by Germany of an attempt by some American businessmen to obtain potash at a rate below that set by the Kartell. One of the businessmen involved warned the State Department that Taft's support for conservation of national resources would be used by the German government to justify its position. That was the line that the Germans took, but Hill was sceptical, writing that the aim "is alleged to be" conservation. The Germans succeeded in this dispute, and Hill's position was damaged by what was seen as his failure.28
In August 1911 Hill was succeeded by John G.A. Leishman, who had once been vice-president of the Carnegie Steel Company but had served as a diplomat since 1897. Leishman was considered by Joseph Grew to be devious and secretive, but in his despatches he tried to clear up American suspicions of German activities in South America. In one, about the activities of a German company, the Hamburg-Columbien-Banana-Aktien-Gesellschaft, in the Uruba Gulf, Leishman explained that there was no evidence that the German government was directly involved or had any intention of obtaining territory in that area. While it was true that the government and large German companies co-operated closely, this was only directed at "harmonious and united action for the mutual benefit of both". The government was concerned to increase foreign trade as far as possible, and in South America, to that end, was forming close relationships with other governments.29

Leishman's sympathy for the German government extended to disapproval of the Socialists (perhaps a legacy from his work in the steel industry). In 1913 he complained about the resignation of Wermuth, the German Secretary of the Treasury, over the rejection of his plan to raise taxes. Leishman considered that he would have been "wiser and more patrician" to have acted with the rest of the government, "in view of the narrow majority in the Reichstag and large increase in the Socialistic section". Leishman shared the official German opinion that the Socialists were opposed to patriotism.
In another despatch he praised von Jagow, the Foreign Secretary: "He is a Prussian by birth and, as such, possesses the Prussian spirit of loyalty, devotion to duty and abnegation of self-interest ...." Leishman's high opinion of the German ruling-classes extended to a belief that they possessed a "markedly friendly disposition towards the United States." During his term in office the American government received favourable reports of Germany, but he was removed in 1913 by the new Wilson administration.

Meanwhile, Joseph Grew had returned to the Embassy in September, 1912, as First Secretary. In this rank he mixed in the highest social circles, including royalty. Waldo Heinrichs wrote, "To most Americans he and his friends would appear exclusive, aristocratic, and often snobbish", but he did maintain a certain objectivity, noting, for instance, that it was the bourgeoisie, rather than his upper-class friends, who loved music. Grew shared this love, and music was one of the reasons he gave in 1912 for considering Berlin to be the best diplomatic posting (the others being "good sport", "nice people" and "interesting Embassy work"). The lack of real issues in American-German relations in these years meant that the role of American diplomats in Berlin increasingly centred on social activities, so it was most important that they should get along with the German upper-classes, although they did tend to be cut off from the general life of the country, thus having a very restricted view of it, as was seen in the case of Leishman. Grew fitted in easily with the way of life of the German aristocracy, writing
understandingly in his diary about the practice of duelling (with guns) over insults. It was not until after the war had begun that he began to show an interest in wider social issues in Germany; in 1916 he sent a despatch about the Neu Orientierung movement, listing the aspects of reform, regarding the Prussian suffrage, disabilities on Socialists, the treatment of racial minorities, and so on, which it supported.31

Grew's absorption into German ways of thinking is seen in his belief that the war had been caused not by Germany but by her jealous rivals. This contrasted with the assumptions of most other members of the American upper-class, as can be seen in Grew's disagreement on the question with friends in the U.S.A. Again, however, he maintained some objectivity, writing of violent attacks on Russians in Germany that "the inherent barbarity of the German race never showed itself so strongly", and he soon expressed his support for the Allies. Grew evidently had strong feelings of class solidarity (he always tried to have appointed to Berlin young diplomats who, like him, had gone to Groton and Harvard), so it is not surprising that he quickly accepted his peers' view of the conflict.32

Grew expressed admiration for Woodrow Wilson, who replaced Leishman with James W. Gerard. Wilson had not wanted to appoint him, since he was far from a representative of Wilsonian Progressivism. He was a judge from New York and a member of Tammany Hall; many people joined that institution in
order to get on in New York politics, but, as Rachel West pointed out, Gerard caused annoyance to Wilson and his supporters by publicly defending it against charges of corruption. Wilson despised Gerard, but, as Arthur Link wrote, he gave his ambassadors very little to do, so Gerard's lack of ability did not matter much. After American entry to the war Gerard produced two propagandistic volumes, *My Four Years in Germany* (1917) and *Face to Face with Kaiserism* (1918). The former expressed hatred of the German "autocracy" and warned of "the greatest military power the world has ever seen". Gerard's description of his diplomatic life is trivial in the extreme, dwelling on such points as his being prevented from wearing a diplomatic uniform, and the fact that he was impressed by German royalty is evident in his praise, even at this stage, of the Kaiser's sons. Indeed, this book starts off being surprisingly fair-minded, in a superficial way, about the German ruling-classes; the fact that von Jagow, after his dismissal as Foreign Secretary, ran a hospital, "shows the devotion to duty of the Prussian noble class, and their readiness to take up any task, however humble, that may help their country", which echoes Leishman's praise of the same man.33

Fifty-four pages later Gerard remarked, "Of course, no one ever expected a Prussian nobleman to do any work except in the line of war or in governing the inferior classes of the country"; this was after he had got into his stride with denunciations of militarism and just before he launched into a description of the German system, which attacked all the
assumptions about progressive measures in Germany, that being a cause of sympathy for the country. The famous educational system was made to sound repressive:

You never see gangs of small boys in Germany. Their games and their walks are supervised by their teachers, who are always inculcating in them reverence and awe for the military heroes of the past and present.

Social insurance and other laws for the benefit of the workers "are in reality skilful measures which bind them to the soil as effectively as the serfs of the Middle Ages were bound to their master's estates". Gerard explained that insurance payments were so large that the workers could save no money. He provided details of other methods of social control, such as the honours system, but he considered that the Socialists had been ineffective opponents of the government because they were too extreme (thus revealing his own conservatism). It is significant that Gerard particularly praised Prince Max of Baden, who became head of the short-lived conservative government at the end of the war. However, Gerard's analysis of German society tended to be on the level of such comments as, "In peace times the Germans are heavy eaters", after which he mentioned the belief that German dietary habits made them "more aggressive and irritable, and consequently readier for war."34

Gerard's description of the diplomatic issues that arose during his ambassadorship and before the war shows how unimportant
they were, but, significantly, they generally involved angry feelings on either side, whether it was the German press inveighing against America because of its activities in Mexico, or American companies complaining about discrimination against American oil, *Face to Face with Kaiserism* is even more propagandistic and reveals little of Gerard's diplomatic activities. He laid much more stress on the role of the Kaiser than previously, but the lack of perspicacity in his analysis (or deliberate misinterpretation) can be seen in the fact that he claimed Wilhelm's telling him at length that Japan was planning to invade the U.S.A. showed "his subtlety of purpose", rather than eccentricity or downright insanity. Wilhelm had repeatedly warned Roosevelt against Japan years before. 35

In *My Four Years in Germany* Gerard praised the U.P. correspondent during the neutrality years, Carl W. Ackerman, for not being pro-German. Ackerman's reports show that Gerard was more impressed by the Kaiser than he later liked to pretend. In one article he absurdly wrote that Gerard was responsible for keeping America out of the war. He reported that Gerard and his wife were particularly popular with the Emperor and Empress because, after Wilhelm had banned officers from dancing the tango, Gerard followed suit and banned it in the embassy. In 1915 he reported that Mrs. Gerard had been presented by the Kaiser with Red Cross gold medals of the first and second class, the first time that a first class medal had gone to a woman not of royal blood (John B. Jackson, who had returned
to Germany to inspect prisoner of war camps, received second and third class medals). However, there is no doubt that Gerard also had difficulties with Wilhelm; in June 1915 he petulantly protested to the Secretary of State about Wilson's having received Bernstorff, the German ambassador, stating that Wilhelm had refused to see him for eight months. The State Department in return expressed surprise that Gerard had not previously reported this refusal, which is an example of his incompetence. It transpired that Wilhelm was annoyed at reports of American ships carrying munitions to the Allies, but the Foreign Secretary, Zimmermann, cleared up the matter. Woodrow Wilson's low opinion of his ambassador seems to have been justified, but Gerard generally got on well with the Germans, even if he did not do much for relations. Most of the work was left to Grew, but there really was not much to do; he, for instance, considered it "important" to persuade Congress to withdraw a duty of 15 per cent on German books, because the suggestion was damaging relations between the countries. 36

Rachel West has pointed out that it was just as well that American diplomats had little to do in the period before the First World War, since most of them were amateurs. This applies to the diplomats in Germany, although there were some professionals sent there, such as Jackson, Grew and Leishman. Whether they were professionals or amateurs does not seem to have a great effect on their perceptions of Germany, which were generally favourable. These diplomats cannot be seen as typical of American opinion, being mainly drawn from the
upper-middle classes, but they do show that members of those
groups could find Germany a congenial place. Those ambass-
adors with a lot of money probably got on best, since their
role was largely a social one: Phelps, Tower and Gerard
entertained Berlin society in a lavish manner, Tower even
being accused, at the time of the Hill affair, of having
wished the position "because it would give him a very conspi-
cuous social place and would enable him to make a spectacular
display of his great wealth." It was said that his wife's
activities as a hostess had led the Kaiser to call her "the
Moltke of Berlin society". The fact that social success was
so important for diplomats explains the great concentration
on royalty and especially the Emperor; the diplomatic des-
patches religiously reported any important news concerning
the royal family. Of course, fascination with royalty was
a widespread phenomenon among Americans, and the despatches
are also full of difficulties involving visiting Americans
who wanted to be presented to the Kaiser. A.D. White consid-
ered this "the most annoying business of all" in his diplomatic
work in Germany.37

White was not particularly rich, but his high academic and social
standing, as well as his great admiration for Germany, made
his ambassadorship particularly successful; yet it is diffi-
cult to see what exactly he achieved, except for preventing
relations from being worse than they would otherwise have been.
The American government, and even the State Department, had
little interest in Germany (within the Department German
affairs came under the tiny Near East division, most attention being given to the Far East and Latin America). Not only were American-German relations almost entirely concerned with trade, but, as W.T. Arnold observed, the troubles this involved made it "a source of permanent embitterment". Various other small irritations added to this. Theodore Roosevelt pointed out that international relations should be a matter of "give and take", but in America "a small section" often led to the demand "that it shall be all take and no give." Relations with Germany were a prime example of this.

Henry White was an important American diplomat who was not based in Germany, but whose views of it are significant. He was mentioned earlier as one of the group of Anglophile diplomats associated with John Hay. During his term in London White formed very close relations with the British upper-classes (his wife even dreamt about the Duke of Westminster), and his British friends often expressed fears of Germany. These friends, however, were also in the habit of employing German doctors and visiting German spas, especially Bad Nauheim, which, as was mentioned in connection with Mark Twain, was a popular watering place for rich Britons and Americans. William Randolph Hearst was particularly fond of Nauheim, frequently sending ailing friends and employees there, and White and his family also indulged in the habit. This is a reminder that for many people at this time Germany was perceived as the land of good health, hygiene and medical advances.
Despite his Anglophilia, White was not anti-German in personal terms. His daughter married a German, Count Seherr-Thoss, and White paid visits to his German relatives, with whose fear of Socialism he sympathised. White's preference for Britain was, however, clear, even in small ways; he told his daughter that the German General von Pфuel "has a charm of manner worthy of the best British officers", thus displaying the habit of using British standards as his criteria. His correspondence with John Hay shows that he shared the latter's suspicions of Germany in international affairs. They both disapproved of Andrew Dickson White's defence of Germany during the Spanish-American War, and A.D. White would have been appalled to know that Hay believed at least one of the sensational stories about alleged incivility to the American Ambassador that the Paris edition of the (anti-German) New York Herald printed. In 1898 Hay suspected Germany of having designs on Liberia, but the following year he wrote to White,

"Our relations with Germany are perfectly civil and courteous. They are acting badly about our meats and cannot help bullying and swaggering. It is their nature. But we get on with them."

Such perceptions of the character of Germans obviously coloured the views of international relations of people like Hay and White, but they did manage to get on with the Germans most of the time. However, Germany could never have the special sense of kinship with America that Britain had in the eyes of people like them, and which was expressed in so many ways;
as White's son wrote to him, "I don't think that boxing is an art much practised in Germany, as in England or America."  

As the First World War approached there was an increasing feeling among certain American diplomats (but, as Rachel West shows, a small minority) that British-German rivalry might lead to war. One young American diplomat, Lewis Einstein, promoted the idea that America's interests required it to align itself with Britain and against Germany. In 1913 he published an essay, "The United States and Anglo-German Rivalry", arguing thus. He claimed that America had benefited throughout its history from the fact that Britain maintained a European balance of power. The European situation was now threatened by the fact that Anglo-German rivalry contained no "concrete obstacle" that could be negotiated away, but consisted of irreconcilable ambitions, which could soon lead to war. That war would affect American interests profoundly, and if Britain were being beaten it would have to come to its support, to avoid being threatened by a victorious Germany. Although such ideas attracted little interest among the general public, they were supported by Admiral Mahan and other associates of Roosevelt. They also had a particular supporter within the State Department, in the form of Francis M. Huntington Wilson, who was extremely pro-British and anti-German.  

He expressed his views on foreign policy in a rather unusual form, namely a novel, which he wrote in 1913 and published anonymously the following year.

Stultitia: A Nightmare and an Awakening in Four Discussions
is far from a literary masterpiece and far from a best-seller, so it had little direct influence on the public, but it is revealing about the perceptions of Germany held by a highly-placed official. That country is not actually named, but it is clear that it is meant. The position of France, which is prepared for war, is contrasted with that of the U.S.A., where, "If the (War) Department and the Navy Department and the State Department can't beat some sense into Congress, their children are going to be made into sausage meat by some nation that's not too cocky to face facts." The image of beating Congress is appropriately Rooseveltian, and "sausage meat" is an immediate pointer to Germany as the aggressor. The opponents of American military and naval expansion are a Congressman with a German name, a pacifist, a temperance worker, an intellectual Senator, an Irish-American political boss and a foreign agitator. The possibility is presented of a European power seizing a South American port and sinking America's "paltry little fleet". However, Mr. Drake, who is given Huntington Wilson's opinions, calls for "co-operation - monopolistic combination of the spirit of the whole nation for the whole nation's good", which sounds very like the idea of the state that Rooseveltian Progressives derived from Germany. In this case, the purpose is not to promote reform but to become militarily strong. America does not listen and a European power which had been meddling in South America seizes the Panama Canal, then America loses the war because of workers striking and has to pay a huge indemnity. The book ends with the formation of a National Patriotic League to stop
such a thing happening again.\textsuperscript{42} Einstein and Huntington Wilson, in their different ways, show how even some diplomats, with access to details of foreign policy, perceived of Germany as a threat to America.

Huntington Wilson, who came from a rich family in Chicago, was Assistant Secretary of State until March 1913, when his resignation removed whatever influence he had. Enmity towards Germany of the sort that he displayed was rare; relations between America and Germany were so lacking in definition that even dislike did not fill the gap. The German Government provided artificial measures to try to create stronger relations, such as the gift of a statue of Frederick the Great to the American people and the creation of exchange professorships, but to little avail. Even when America presented a reciprocal statue of von Steuben, who had fought with Washington, the pro-German Professor M.D. Learned of Pennsylvania complained that Steuben was of a lower rank than Frederick the Great and was dismissed from the Prussian army.\textsuperscript{43} The best that could really be hoped for in American-German relations, thanks largely to the indifference of America, was not good relations but the absence of bad relations.

The diplomats reveal how Americans of their social class would perceive Germany if they were brought into close contact with it, but the majority of Americans had no contact with it. W.H. Heinrichs points out that Grew lived in a very restricted
social environment in Germany; this would mean that he had a restricted view of the country, and the same was true of many of the diplomats, but not all. They tended to sympathise with the government and with the ruling-classes, with whom, of course, they mixed. They saw the benefits of the Socialists in the context of American trade, but generally their class prejudices caused them to disapprove of the party. They all expressed some admiration for the country, and sometimes some suspicions, in which they reflected American opinion, but residence in the country obviously had an effect in making them pro-German, if they stayed long enough; thus, John B. Jackson, originally suspicious of Germany, was strongly in favour of it when the First World War came. The diplomats mainly did their best for American-German relations, but they had no control of external factors, within which those relations had to operate, and little influence on wider American perceptions of Germany.
Germany differed from the U.S.A. in possessing a political system that was in many ways undemocratic, and which was headed by a powerful monarch. As has been shown, that monarch, in the person of Wilhelm II, aroused a great deal of interest in America. Perhaps the next most important political difference between the two countries was the fact that Germany possessed a strong Socialist movement, which, in terms of votes and national representation, advanced during the period under consideration far beyond the achievements of the American Socialist movement. This fact also inspired a great interest within the U.S.A. It is a strange paradox that Germany should contain these two political extremes, both outside the orthodox political range of America, but, as in the case of the Kaiser, American attitudes to German Socialism were mixed and not necessarily what would be expected.

It was inevitable that Germany would be associated with socialism for Americans. Not only was the German Social Democratic Party the most important and successful socialist party from the eighteen-sixties to the First World War, but the American Socialist movement had derived directly from Germany. Joseph Weydemeyer, who arrived at New York in 1851, spread Marxism among German-American workers, as did Friedrich Sorge in the eighteen-seventies. In the late eighteen-eighties Socialists emigrated from Eastern Europe, and this, with the rise of Daniel De Leon, meant that American Socialism was less Germanic. The American visit of Edward and Eleanor Aveling and Wilhelm Liebknecht in 1886
helped to extend socialism among the English-speaking workers, the German-American Socialists having made little attempt to influence people outside their own community. Nevertheless, Germans and socialism were seen by Americans to go together, particularly since the American Socialist Party (established in 1901) was strongly under the influence of the German Social Democrats.¹

As in the case of the Kaiser, the best source for general American impressions of German Socialism is the general press, and that is what this chapter considers first. The approach is chronological, because built around reports of how the Socialists did in the respective Reichstag elections. These were obviously the occasions on which interest in German politics was highest, and it was always the Socialist vote that raised most interest in America. In order to examine immediate reactions on these occasions, reports in some newspapers from various parts of the U.S.A. are examined, as well as the more leisurely expositions in magazines. The popular magazines, rather than academic journals, are given most attention, since they had the greatest influence on public opinion and were most likely to reflect widespread American feelings. These magazines often contained articles on the German Socialists, even between elections, which demonstrates a high level of interest in the subject.

Thoughtful American opinion at the beginning of the period is well represented by an essay in The Unitarian Review. The writer described the German Socialist party as "a strictly class move-
ment" and lamented that

...we have today the appalling spectacle of the whole thinking, laboring world in the German Empire socialistic, with all that this word has come to mean of bitter, uncompromising hatred of the national government and religion.

These latter institutions were evidently held sacred, so it must have been a cause of worry that in America "the admixture of Teutons is introducing so many new phases into the old Anglo-Saxon order." The article shows a certain degree of sympathy with the "vast impoverished masses", but not with their "wild revolutionary attitude" to society. This shows that the way in which socialism was perceived in America was, at this time, the prevailing factor in attitudes to German Socialism, but the sympathy with the latter's supporters is a seed of change in those attitudes.

In the Reichstag elections of February 20, 1890 Bismarck's Kartell (the Conservatives, Free Conservatives and National Liberals) lost its majority in the Reichstag, while the Socialists received 1,427,298 votes and 35 seats. The American Press recognised the significance of the Socialist gains, though it showed little sympathy with the party. The Milwaukee Sentinel attributed its successes to Wilhelm II, stating that he had prevented the police from interfering with the Socialists' campaign, so that "Bebel and other extremists have been allowed to indulge in the most violent harangues without hindrance." This paper also claimed that the Socialist vote had been swollen by "many
the popularity of Virchow in America was such that mentioning his name in opposition to the Socialists would harm the image of the latter. In an editorial, Wilhelm was praised for allowing the Socialists to stand freely, and it was felt that such liberalism would benefit him: "Followed with sincerity and prudence, his effort to eradicate the evils of which there is just complaint will save to the throne all the power it is possible to maintain in this age." This shows that Wilhelm's policy of social reforms, proposed in opposition to Bismarck at this time, had gained some recognition in America. 3

The San Francisco Examiner put even more stress on the alleged extremism of the Socialists, accusing them of holding "concerted riotous demonstrations." This Hearst paper's usual idea of foreign news consisted of scandals about countesses, so it is perhaps not surprising that it bizarrely interpreted the election results as strengthening Bismarck's position. However, it showed some sympathy with the Socialists, quoting the statement of the poet Albert Traeger that soon Germany would contain only "millionaires and paupers ... and who can blame the latter if they become socialistic and try to snatch the life from the cruel hands that proffer them stones?" It also reported that Wilhelm's reforms were to benefit the poor and not politically motivated. 4

At this time most American newspapers contained hardly any foreign news. Thus, the Rocky Mountain News of Denver printed only a paragraph expressing surprise at "the enormous and
unequaled increase in the Socialist vote". Even an East Coast paper like the Baltimore Sun had little news from abroad, except from Britain, but on this occasion it published an editorial, "The Emperor's Game Failed", which erroneously claimed that Bismarck was behind Wilhelm's labour reform policy, in order to defeat the Socialists.  

The New York Times also believed that Wilhelm's rescripts on labour reform had been directed against the Socialists and had failed, but it stated that his government would not be any weaker, because the parties in the Reichstag were so divided as to make that institution virtually powerless. To this newspaper the Socialist gains were not particularly important, because "party government has by no means reached a high state of development in Germany." The paper was already critical of the German political system, but at this stage that did not make it sympathetic to the Socialists, who opposed that system.

It is not surprising that these newspaper reports should lack sympathy with socialism, which was seen as a threat to the American order. Trade union disturbances and the Haymarket Riot of four years earlier had given radicalism a bad name in the U.S.A., and Conservatives were no more in favour of foreign socialism. An academic, John H. Gray, wrote about one consequence of the election, which was that a bill to make the Anti-Socialist Act permanent was rejected by the new Reichstag. He explained how the Act had been introduced by Bismarck in 1878 and how it operated. The police could be given power
to control political and other public meetings, so that "the citizen is entirely at the mercy of the local police." Gray explained that the government's case was that it wanted "to suppress (socialism's) worst manifestations and to hold it in check until the passage of measures for so improving the condition of the laborers as to cause socialism to disappear."

That this had not happened was proved by a list of votes for the Socialists, showing a steady increase, despite another list of convictions under the act. The clear implication was that the growth of German Socialism was due to the repressive measures of the German government, thus pointing to a ground on which a more favourable American attitude to the party could be based.

A review in the *International Journal of Ethics* of Dr. A. Schaffle's *The Impossibility of Social Democracy* showed similar indications; although admitting that Schaffle put forward a constructive policy of State Socialism to block the Social Democrats, the reviewer felt that the case against the party was "impaired by the writer's Teutonic prejudices against democracy" and by his too evident sympathies "with the German monarch and with orthodox religion."

*Public Opinion* published a translation of a French essay on the "irresistible" rise of the German Social Democrats; this irresistibility was in itself another factor which would encourage Americans to come to terms with German Socialism, particularly since the U.S.A. was a nation that valued success so highly.

An early statement of approval for the Social Democrats came
from Frederic C. Howe, who had recently returned from studying in Germany. He attacked German autocracy and glorification of the state, and looked to the Socialists to overcome these:

...the future social history of Germany will revolve about the contest of this party for supremacy ... It is the conservative element in this party which represents true republican principles most closely and from it is to be hoped all advance in constitutionalism in Germany.

This was for the time a remarkably strong endorsement of the German Socialists, and an astute recognition of the future of German politics. Howe explained that the party was neither communistic nor anarchistic, and he strengthened the implication of Americanism in the word "republican" by claiming that "almost every German workingman" had a copy of Bellamy's Looking Backward. That was the book that had led masses of Americans to believe in a form of socialism, called "Nationalism", so Howe's readers might gain the impression that German Social Democracy was a similarly acceptable type of socialism. Since Howe concluded that "true constitutional government" was on its way, he too implied that victory for the Socialists was inevitable.

The German general election of 1893 saw a further increase of 300,000 in the Socialist vote, which was not beneficial to Wilhelm or Chancellor Caprivi. In fact, the New York Times stated that there was a "crisis" in Germany. It particularly regretted the break up of the Liberal party, which had stood for "a gradual, progressive, and continuous liberalizing of
the Government while maintaining the strength and prestige of the empire and rational loyalty to monarchical institutions," so that Wilhelm "could safely have leaned" on it. For the Times, the "burning question" was now, "whether, with the decided progress made by the Socialists in the recent elections, it will be possible to combine the various fairly conservative elements in a way to promote a steady and progressive Government." This clearly indicates a belief that the Socialists were not compatible with the desired aim and a sympathy with much more conservative reformers in Germany. The Times was taking a middle line, supporting neither socialism nor absolute monarchy.

The Milwaukee Sentinel carried an interesting article on the splits in various German parties, depicting Germany as a country where political disagreements led to "hate and vindictiveness unknown to the chivalrous Anglo-Saxon," thus linking Britain and America in contradistinction to the German situation. In particular, the report stated that opposition to the government led to official ostracism, instancing Virchow again. The Socialist opposition to the Army Bill was described, and that might be expected to produce some sympathy for the party, but this was followed by a description of a mob of Socialists breaking up a Conservative meeting, so that once again the party was identified with anarchistic violence.

By 1893 the San Francisco Examiner had greatly increased its foreign coverage, and it carried full reports on the election and its background. More than half of the front page on June
16 was taken up with the report of the results, including drawings of Socialist leaders. The headline "AGAINST THE EMPEROR" made clear the paper's interpretation of the Socialist gains, and the party's opposition to the Army Bill was sympathetically explained, with the comment that "peace-loving" Americans could easily understand. The paper stated, "Now the Germans, the most patient tax-payers and the most docile of subjects of any European nation, have openly rebelled against excessive militarism." That sentence encapsulates a strange paradox in the foreign image of the Germans, who were seen as both "docile" and militaristic. In this context it is clear that docility was preferred.

The following day an editorial emphasised this and looked at German socialism kindly. It drew attention to "the enormous increase in the strength of the Socialists", adding, "A Socialist Great Power, or even a Socialist State of any description, would be a novelty, but unless the whole current of German development can be turned aside that is what Germany will be at no distant day." That prospect was filling the German ruling classes with panic, but not the San Francisco Examiner, because it believed that the Army Bill was now dead, so, "Whatever else may be said about Socialism one thing is certain, that it makes for peace and international fraternity." The next day three columns were devoted to an interview with the German Socialist Liebknecht, who, although "slovenly dressed", expressed fairly moderate views, for instance saying that Wilhelm
possessed "traces of intellect" and was not unpopular with the Socialists, who preferred monarchy to anarchy. That day's editorial followed this up, stating that the Social Democratic Erfurt Platform of 1891 was "not a very dangerous program, from the American point of view." This idea evidently appealed to the paper, since an article in the next issue remarked, "Doubtless a surprising fact in the German elections ... to Americans, most of whom abhor socialism, is the displacement by the Socialists of the Freisinnige party, which has both American and English ideas of political and social progress." This newspaper, at least, was trying to explain why this phenomenon should not be surprising.

On June 16 the Baltimore Sun reported the sensational success of the Socialists. The first American reports of German elections tended to exaggerate the Social Democratic support, because these reports came from correspondents in Berlin, who got the results in that strongly Socialist city first. By the time the full results reached America, including those from rural areas where the Socialists were weakest, the story was considered worthy only of a small paragraph, if that, so that Americans might tend to get the impression that Germany was more Socialist than was actually the case. The Baltimore Sun explained something of this in an editorial. The paper printed detailed results from many towns, even including the names of candidates, which seems very strange; perhaps this was for the benefit of German-American readers. This report presented a favourable picture of Socialist voters crowded into
beer houses to await news of the election; they "preserved everywhere perfect order." German Socialists were being shown as no exception to the German standard of orderliness.

Some of the newspapers were now beginning to present a picture of the German socialists as moderate reformers and supporters of peace, in opposition to the traditional image of violent revolutionists. In *The Outlook* Arthur Reed Kimball explained that German Socialism was not a "mere class movement", but drew support also from an "intellectual proletariat", which arose from "over-education" in Germany, meaning that there were too many aspirants to professional occupations. Although the German educational system was generally praised, this criticism of it was quite often made. So the unemployed graduates see the "nouveaux riches ... lavish their wealth in vulgar display" while the "struggling masses" are weighed down by "unnecessary Government expense", and therefore join the discontented in the Socialist party. Kimball did not explicitly support the Socialists, but he was providing a sympathetic account of where some of their wide support derived from. The previous week's *Outlook* had criticised the Socialists on the grounds that they had always abandoned Caprivi "in every parliamentary emergency", despite his tariff reforms, the implication being that they were unreliable, and in the following month the journal editorially criticised the party again, because of its opposition to the German Protestant Social Congress, which sought to solve social problems by the application
of Christian principles (The Outlook was strongly religious at this time). The alleged irreligion of the German Socialists might have been a barrier to their acceptance in America, but since there was a general identification of Germany with liberal theology and criticism of the Bible, this would not necessarily have meant that the party was singled out for particular opprobrium on this issue. This magazine continued to be interested in the relationship between German Socialism and religion; nine years later it published an article explaining the antagonism between the state-supported Protestant church and the Social Democrats. The latter were in the majority in Berlin, where church attendance was therefore very low and religious education in schools had been reduced.16

The Outlook was more friendly to the Socialists in 1895, when it criticised Wilhelm's speeches celebrating the German victories of 1870, which caused "animosities". The Socialists, being opposed to war, refused to celebrate, so Wilhelm called them "traitors" and implied that the army had to be ready to "exterminate" them. The editorial considered this "folly", since the party received more votes than any other, and it added that the government's persecution of the Socialists would not succeed in "modifying political opinion." This shows an element of sympathy with the Socialists, vis-à-vis a repressive monarch, but is far short of endorsement, as was
a statement two months later that the Kaiser's repression of
the Socialists will make them seem "champions of the fundamental
rights of man", the implication being that in a democratic
system they would not appear in that light. Another editorial,
in 1897, made this explicit, stating that divisions among German
liberals had meant that the Socialists formed the opposition
to the "absolutism of the present emperor", so that it appeared
"as if a sound, wise, progressive Liberalism had become impos-
sible, and the issue lay between absolutism and an extreme form
of Socialism." 17 The German Socialists were still being seen
by many as extremists, even if their opponent the Kaiser was
an extremist too.

The previous year Gunton's Magazine had sought to explain the
German Socialists to its readers. Much of the article was
devoted to a defence of capitalism, and when it listed the
German party's aims it seemed happy that they had been "laughed
at or rejected by overwhelming majorities". However, it
expressed disquiet at the spread of such ideas to America,
since they appealed to "the least intelligent" and the "dis-
contented and unthrifty". Nevertheless, the lack of "class
antagonisms" in America would lead to their failure, and "here
and in England the evolution is in another direction" from
German Socialism 18. Such an unsympathetic view was typical
of orthodox American thought at the end of the nineteenth
century.

The Reichstag election of June 16, 1898 showed the continued rise
of the Socialists, with 2,113,073 votes and 56 seats, but the
American press was so preoccupied with the Spanish-American War that it scarcely noticed. This was particularly true of the jingoistic San Francisco Examiner, which claimed that the presence of the German fleet in the Philippines showed that Germany might be about to declare war on America: "It seems now more than probable that Emperor William, the 'Mad War Lord' of Germany, will try to stir up trouble with the United States." An editorial on the subject was headed "THE BULLYING KAISER", and reports of anti-Americanism in the German press contrasted with declarations of support for America from W.T. Stead, the Daily Mail and other British sources. With all this excitement it is perhaps not surprising that the paper omitted any mention of the German election, and such subtleties as the perception of the Socialists as the party of the peace, which the paper had proposed five years earlier, were evidently overlooked in the midst of war.

The Examiner's anti-German dispatches originated in London, as did reports in the Rocky Mountain News of a rumoured sale of the Philippines by Spain to Germany, that Admiral von Diederichs had been sent to Manila to prevent Dewey from bombarding the town, and so on. Clearly the British Press was doing its best to improve Britain's standing in the eyes of America and to damage Germany's. The paper found room only for a small paragraph on page 3 reporting Socialist gains. In contrast, the Milwaukee Sentinel, perhaps due to awareness that it was situated in a strongly German-American area, stressed German declarations of neutrality in the Spanish-American War. Its report of the German political situation was not, however,
encouraging, stating that if the Agrarians increased their power there would be measures against imports from America. The Socialists opposed the Agrarians most strongly, but this was not sufficient to prevent the statement that "the steady growth of the socialist strength is the worst feature of recent German elections." For some conservatives socialism remained a thing to be abhorred whatever country it was in. Yet no sympathy was expressed for the government parties, which were depicted as wanting to introduce the undemocratic three-class voting system in Reichstag elections, to reduce the influence of the Socialist vote. 20

The New York Times had become much more sympathetic to the German Socialists. An editorial a few months after the 1898 election said that in a few years the Socialists might be able to demand reforms in return for supporting the government, which would be "the first step toward disintegration". However, the party was depicted as a "movement of protest", supported by voters who merely wanted the "right of freedom of political opposition." The paper placed itself beside them:

No American can read of the insult, oppression, harassment, indignities, that they are subjected to without feeling that if he were in a land where such things were common he would join the victims of them, even if he did not have any great sympathy with their ideas, merely to assert his own rights and struggle to force their recognition.

This demonstrates clearly that those Americans who objected to the undemocratic nature of the German political system could for that reason applaud the Socialist advances. It marks a
change from the paper's stance in 1893; in the intervening years the hope of reform coming from "fairly conservative elements" had declined considerably. The editorial concluded that if German Socialists were dangerous it was the fault of the German government.

Although the circumstances of 1898 precluded much American interest in the German Socialists, it can be seen that the foundation for an appreciative view of them continued to be laid. However, those Americans who sympathised with the German regime continued to attack the party. Professor John W. Perrin wrote that it "seeks the overthrow of all existing order", opposing the state, patriotism, religion and even the family. He approved of Bismarck's repression of socialism, which followed its "logical outcome" in assassination attempts on Wilhelm I, and was thankful for the German electoral system, which prevented the party from putting "its pernicious program into the laws of the land." Nevertheless, it remained a threat to "the entire world." This extreme view might have influenced many ordinary Americans, since it appeared, shortly before the 1898 election, in a volume of the didactic magazine The Chautauquan devoted to German affairs, and it probably was not countered by a rather less forcefully argued piece published a few months before and written by Professor H.P. Judson, who pointed out that many dissatisfied non-socialists voted for the German Socialists, to oppose the repressive government. Perhaps an article by Edgar Milhaud, which appeared later in the year, made more of an effect, since it pointed out
the German socialist movement's interest in philosophical, political and economic matters and in education in these and other subjects, which made it sound rather like the Chautauqua movement itself.22

The Arena was a serious journal sympathetic to socialism, so it is not surprising that it published articles sympathetic to German Socialism, such as one by S. Ivan Tonjoroff. He showed the link of interest between the German workers and the Americans against the Agrarians over the attempted exclusion of American agricultural products, claiming that,

The notorious scarcity of meat at the tables of the German proletariat is a conspicuous commentary on the economic conditions that prevail in the German empire.

Such allegations, common at the time, are reminiscent of allegations against Eastern bloc countries now, as if Americans had to assume that alien political systems necessarily implied poverty and lack of food. Tonjoroff said that the revolutionary element in the German party had vanished and the party had organised itself to suit modern conditions, so that it "acts as an enormous industrial corporation that has set before itself certain problems, and proceeds to their solution in a systematic, conscientious, and practical fashion."23 Here the admired German efficiency was being transferred from the German government, which allegedly could not feed its own people and could not suppress socialism, to the Socialist party, which is made to sound ultra-modern and practical. The comparison to
an "industrial corporation", if inappropriate, adds to this and fits into the American conception of organisation.

The Outlook continued its interest in the Social Democracy. One editorial expressed the belief that most Socialist voters were only interested in the party's immediate programme, which could not "be characterized as revolutionary in Anglo-Saxon countries", but in the same issue Edward A. Steiner wrote a decidedly off-putting description of "Some German Social Democrats", including a "queer" ex-convict and a "noisy" woman, who were living in sin (it was explained that the socialists defended this practice); the "dirty", "unkempt" manager of Vorwärts; a "large number of queer-looking people" in a party bookshop; and Wilhelm Liebknecht, who frightened him because "a wild fire glowed in his eye" when he talked about the churches. This was a positively hackneyed description of foreign radicals, but it no doubt sent a chill down the spine of many Americans at the thought that such people might attain political power, albeit in a foreign country. Steiner was much more impressed two years later when he went to see Friedrich Krupp, enthusing over his company's welfare measures. In Essen the workers were trained to be "industrious, skillful, and frugal", all was "order and cleanliness", so that "the thought which filled my mind was, 'Oh! if it were this way everywhere'". This is a reminder that some Americans approved of social reforms in Germany but not of the Socialist party, the former being seen as a multiplier of order and the latter as an enemy of it.

However, more favourable views continued to be expressed. The
Independent reported that the Lubeck convention had not accepted Edward Bernstein's Revisionist ideas, particularly that the Socialists should officially accept the leadership of the social reform movement. The editorial remarked that such was effectively the case, and that had caused the increased vote, therefore this "more modern, more practical, less dogmatic" party should "stand for what it really is - a party of practical social reform, even though its ultimate ideal be still a co-operative commonwealth." This was an unusually frank acceptance of the double identity of the party as both reformist and aiming for a re-organisation of society.

A humorous view of the changing image of the German Socialists appeared in the Literary Digest in 1902, with a cartoon, reprinted from Jugend of Munich, called "A Socialist Party Fashion Plate." In 1875 the party was a ferocious, revolutionary figure, its left hand dripping blood and its right carrying a club marked PROGRAM; in 1890 the programme was on a large piece of paper and the party represented by a peasant; in 1902 the party was wearing a top hat and gloves, with the programme tucked in a back pocket; and in 1910 the party's representative was wearing court dress and a monocle, with no programme in sight. Unfortunately, the Kaiser did not recognise this progression, reminiscent of the British Labour Party, but after the 1903 election this view was widespread in America. Clearly the message was that the Socialists had become respectable and might even become a pillar of the monarchical state. It should be mentioned that this sequence was accompanied by a
less reassuring cartoon, from *Ulk* of Berlin, showing the party as an enormously fat woman with a pig-like face, unable to join a belt with the faces of Socialist leaders on it.\(^{26}\) The main impression was of grossness, and the political significance of disagreements among Socialist leaders would be lost on the majority of Americans.

The usual pattern of Socialist gains was seen in the 1903 elections, with a gain of nearly 43 per cent in the vote, the party being boosted by the unpopularity of Bulow's new Tariff Law. The *New York Times* made this point, adding that the industrial employers secretly supported them on this (a practical demonstration of the party's moderation). It went further: "The programme of the Social Democrats is very mild, and has little to remind us of the typical European 'Red', much less of the militant Anarchist." The Kaiser's opposition to the party was described as "almost comic, in view of the fact that his own 'paternalism' has so many of the characteristics of the State Socialism which they seek", but the writer distinguished between the two, particularly over the issues of increased military and naval expenditure and the tariff, issues that would make German Socialism seem more amenable.\(^{27}\)

A few days later another article said that the Kaiser's popularity would enable him to accept the Socialists as partners in government. This piece showed favourable attitudes to both: "To a man of the Kaiser's temperament the general attitude and temper of the Socialist leaders must be more attractive than the temper and attitude of the Centrum and the Agrarians."
This implies that Americans could see both the Kaiser and the Socialists as representing the modernising, dynamic, adventurous spirit of Germany, despite their opposition to each other. The article concluded that the Kaiser would benefit more than the Socialists from such an alliance; as Gordon A. Craig wrote, the "tragedy" of Germany is that such co-operation did not occur, but the New York Times was overestimating the Kaiser's power to re-make the political system in Germany. It stuck to its idea, however; the following week it said that it was only Wilhelm's determined personality that prevented co-operation, since there was only a small gap between their ideas and the Socialists respected the Kaiser. At the same time, it said that the Germans were so poor that it was surprising they were not all Socialists, thus exaggerating bad conditions in Germany, but accepting the legitimacy of German Socialism.28

The Milwaukee Sentinel had also changed its mind on the German Socialists. It approved of Mommsen's proposal that the liberals should unite with the socialists, adding that the Social Dem- ocratic Party represented

not theoretic or revolutionary socialism, but simply a set of liberal and practical reforms. It is the liberal and popular party of Germany and decidedly a source of strength rather than a menace to the state, and its accession of power will be welcomed by all but the reaction- aries and agrarians.

This is further evidence of the spread of the idea that the Socialist party was desirable in the German context and should
be accepted by the German government. The paper provided an additional reason for supporting German Socialism, since it opposed the tariff, "in which we are mainly interested."\(^{29}\)

The Rocky Mountain News took the same line, describing the German Socialists as "the Democratic Party" and expressing surprise that they didn't do even better. This editorial stated:

> The platform ... is composed of demands which may be found almost without exception in the Declaration of Independence and Constitution of the United States ... and there is nothing among them akin to the demands and declarations which are contained in the platform of the socialist party in the United States.

The German Socialists were here being identified with democratic America (to the example of which many of them looked), and the paper expressed the belief that the Social Democrats (and by implication democratic ideals) "would sweep the country", were it not that the Germans were "still so wedded to imperialism and militarism." This Western paper had no thought of co-operation between the Socialists and the Kaiser, stating that, "The party stands for the people rather than for the privileged, and is regarded as the enemy of the monarchy."\(^{30}\)

This was a more strenuously democratic interpretation of the Socialists' moderation than that put forward by the New York Times.

Many Americans congratulated the Socialists on their gains, as the Baltimore Sun reported. It too saw the Socialists
as standing for "a democracy instead of a monarchy", but it pointed out that the monarchists were still firmly in control. It pointed out that Socialist voters came from many classes, all "against the military despotism" and "the heavy burden of taxation and of the arbitrary dictation of the military government." The San Francisco Examiner expressed no opinion on the Socialist gains; at this period it carried very little foreign news and even a neutral report of the issues in the campaign was over-shadowed by a story about expulsions of American Mormons from Prussia. 31

None of the papers noticed the significance of the gains by the Centre, which made that party dominant in the government coalition. The continued rise of the Socialists attracted all their attention and, by now, their admiration. Such feelings were very widespread, and the American periodical press gave a lot of coverage to the election results. Before the election took place the Literary Digest printed foreign predictions that the Socialists would do well, along with cartoon drawings of Bulow, Bebel, and other German politicians, and afterwards it remarked that the Socialist gains were "very widely noted and commented on in the American press". It quoted some of these comments, at least half of which accepted that the German Socialists were democratic and reformist (for example, the Philadelphia Inquirer wrote that most of the party programme had already been achieved in the U.S.A.). Some papers approvingly commented that the Socialists were taking Germany toward a republic, but the New York Evening Post felt
that the changes "will only sting the devotees of absolutism into strengthening the army for fear, not of France, but of Germany, and into insisting more vigorously than ever on high tariffs." This latter move would harm American interests. The Evening Post was being realistic, but an altruistic optimism was abroad in the American press, with cartoons showing Wilhelm's ship of absolutism being struck by socialist lightning or Wilhelm retaining power as a Tammany-style Boss in a socialist republic (carrying the idea that the German Socialists were aiming for a state like the U.S.A. a little too far.)

Many newspapers and magazines, remarking that the German socialists were moderate, printed summaries of their programme to prove it. One such was The Outlook, which also carried an essay by G. Monroe Royce, explaining more precisely what the party stood for. Once again socialist support was partly attributed to education:

You cannot educate a whole nation of people, as the Germans are educated, and then expect them to be silent while their industrial and social interests are either wholly neglected or foully betrayed.

This assumption that people voted for the party because they were well-educated adds to German Socialism's progressive image. Royce explained that the Social Democrats did not stand for Bismarckian State Socialism, that being undemocratic and bureaucratic, nor for anarchism, violence or communism. He defined Social Democracy as "collectivism", meaning "municipal ownership of the means of production, and a just distribution
of the wealth produced." This would have sounded very appealing to many supporters of the American Progressive Movement, who were aiming at similar goals. The growth of Progressivism in America was an important reason for Americans being able to look at German Socialism more favourably (and the more radical wing of Progressivism faded into socialism itself). In accordance with this, Royce stressed that the German Socialists' concerns were industrial and social, not political or religious, but that economic change would lead to political reform. He stated that their leaders were not doctrinaire, quoting Mommsen's praise of the party (Mommsen being a popular figure in America), and that the party would introduce free trade, a militia instead of a standing army, and decentralisation of power, all of which would be regarded by most Americans as steps that would enhance Germany's image.33

The World's Work, a journal sympathetic to Progressivism, repeated that the Social Democratic programme did not seem radical to Americans, but made the point that it was revolutionary in the German context. This was true, since, for instance, making the government responsible to Parliament rather than to the Kaiser would have transformed the political system. At this point it was quite unusual for American commentators to see this from the point of view of the German government. Like many other articles, this one pointed out that the Socialists would have done even better, were it not for the unfair distribution of seats, which gave too little representation to the cities. It also identified the dangerous party as the Agrarians, now suffering a set-back, because their tariff
policies would harm America. Once again, one element in approval of the German Socialists was that they were seen as beneficial to American interests.

The Chautauquan also remarked on Socialist opposition to tariffs and stressed that non-socialists voted for the party, because it was "the effective opposition to the monarchical and absolutist tendencies in the German government" and "opportunist and moderate", aiming for reforms. Again, this journal used Mommsen's name to back up its favourable impression of the Socialists, stating that he "advised the progressive elements of the country ... to work with them ... for such practical and moderate measures as commended themselves to unselfish and independent men ..." Similar points were made in The Independent, but it was concerned that the German Socialists still held "a co-operative commonwealth" as their ultimate goal and that their recent success would lead to "an alarming growth of Socialist propaganda throughout Europe." Thus, sympathy with the opponents of an undemocratic regime did not necessarily allay worries about a political movement which was also seen as a threat to established democracies. The same issue of the journal carried a review of Wolf von Schierbrand's edition of Wilhelm II's speeches, and it is revealing that it focused on his opposition to the Socialists, quoting his attack on the party

which dares to assault the foundation of the State, which rebels against religion, and which does not even halt before the person of the most august ruler,
and sarcastically commenting, "A superb climax!"³⁵ German politics was overwhelmingly seen by Americans as a struggle between the Kaiser and the Socialists, which could affect their sympathies.

Wolf von Schierbrand himself wrote about the election results in the North American Review. He quoted some of the Kaiser's attacks on the Socialists, but claimed that the government was now happy with their advance, since they would support the necessary new commercial treaties, which had been opposed by the Agrarians. Von Schierbrand sympathised with the Socialists and opposed the Kaiser (for criticising whom he had been expelled from Prussia), so it is not surprising that he presented the Socialists' enemies, the Agrarians, as anti-American. He explained the electoral disadvantages of the Socialists and their exclusion from government and involvement in policy-making, adding that in Germany there was an unhealthy political situation. When the feelings and aspirations of almost one-half of the entire population are completely sub­merged and ignored, nay, directly and studiously antagonized, when their spokesmen, editors, and other representatives are sent to jail on every technical chance that presents itself, the political and social development of a nation cannot proceed normally.³⁶

Even given the widespread American sympathy for the German Socialists in 1903, this was an unusually forthright statement on behalf of the rights of the party. Unlike other comment­ators, Schierbrand was not arguing that the party was not
really socialist - in effect, making excuses for it, to make it acceptable in American eyes - but was straightforwardly stating that by democratic standards the party had a right to exist and to have a say, while Germany, by persecuting it, was showing itself to be not a democracy.

Von Schierbrand included some praise of the Kaiser's "open-minded" nature, but he considered it "very improbable" that, as some suggested, Wilhelm would now cooperate with the Socialists. However, he thought that eventually he might "abandon his illogical attitude towards that party whose men shape ... the destinies of the nation in no small degree." Even someone as democratically committed as von Schierbrand was still sufficiently impressed by Wilhelm's personality to hope that he and the Socialists could work together; or perhaps, given his attacks on the Kaiser elsewhere, he was actually presenting a picture of two opponents combining because he knew that both of them held an appeal to American public opinion.

Edwin Maxey in Gunton's Magazine identified the German tariff as anti-American, but he was more concerned with the effect of it and of high military expenditure in reducing the living standards of the people. He saw this as leading to a revival of the "spirit of the men of '48" (an idea that would appeal in a country which had received admirable immigrants of that vintage and had approved of those democratic revolutions), seen in Liberals and Socialists uniting against militarism. He also approved of the Socialists dropping "their more radical programs"
for the sake of "practical expediency", and he thought that they might gain a majority in the Reichstag, despite the biased distribution of seats. B.O. Flower of *The Arena*, which had Christian Socialist leanings, was even more favourable to the rising German Socialists. He saw their struggle as only part of the world fight between democracy and "class rule", a fight going on in the U.S.A., Britain and elsewhere. Flower was another admirer of Mommsen's call for unity between Liberals and Socialists, and he regretted that the Liberals did not respond, since "the Socialists of Germany are first and foremost Democrats", opposing "special privilege, class interest, and despotic reaction."\(^{38}\)

Two months later Flower enthused at great length about the Socialists' "wonderful victory", which was good news for "the friends of republican institutions". He was evidently one of those Americans who wanted foreigners to share the benefits of the forms of government existing in the U.S.A. Flower wrote that the "high-handed" government had provoked the Germans - "a sturdy, liberty-loving people, who hate injustice" - into voting Socialist. He explained that the party programme was progressive, practical and democratic, aimed at increasing freedom. Unlike those who worried about the international effect of the election result, Flower, with his left-wing sympathies, exulted that, "The victory in Germany will without question give a great impetus to the Social-Democratic movement throughout Western civilization."\(^{39}\) This was further than most of those expressing approval of the German Socialists would have been prepared to go, since they, unlike Flower, did not
desire similar Socialist successes in America.

Flower was annoyed by those reports in the "capitalistic and reactionary press of America", which had been "silent" for a few days after the election and then, because of an agreed upon "fabrication", pretended that the German Socialists were "not Socialists at all, as understood in America." This was not true; as has been shown, the immediate reaction of much of the press was to welcome the Socialist successes, and the idea of the party's moderation had been circulating before this election, having, indeed, been expressed in some papers on the occasion of earlier German elections. Flower himself was contributing to such ideas with his stress on the democratic rather than socialist nature of the German party. Presumably he believed that the American Socialists were similarly democratic and freedom-loving, and was irritated by the American press's acceptance of a movement within a monarchy which it did not accept within the American republic.

It is possible that the American press, in hailing a moderate German Socialist party, was reacting to an awareness of Revisionism, that is, the postponement of revolutionary aims and their replacement by a meliorative programme, as proposed by influential German socialists, especially Edward Bernstein. This development was certainly known about in American academic circles. In 1901 G.A. Kleene wrote enthusiastically about Bernstein's ideas, which he saw as a return to Lassalle ("this wonderful man") rather than Marx. Kleene objected to Marxism's
materialism, lack of morality and opposition to nationalism, so he approved of Bernstein's belief in "mental forces", "homely virtues" and "the national interest", as well as in democracy. Kleene believed that the German government would become amenable to reform, once the Social Democrats had shown that they were not a threat but the "movement for reform, for democracy, for social progress" that he believed them to be. With the spread of such moderation among the European Socialists, Kleene thought that "the social movement on the Continent may come to resemble more closely than before that of the great English-speaking democracies", that is, socialism is turning into Progressivism. Such ideas clearly lie behind the improving image of German Socialism.

Some sections of the American press also displayed a tendency to think the best of everyone. An editorial in The World's Work stated that the German upper-class should not be afraid of the Socialists, because many of their voters were just dissatisfied and a "more liberal" government would prevent the party's growth. Furthermore, two-thirds of the Germans believed in the monarchy. It also had a word of comfort for the Socialists, saying that the army, although loyal to the Kaiser, would never suppress them. Such articles give the impression that their writers thought everyone was as reasonable as themselves, so there could be no threat from Socialism.

A similar air of "balance" was given by Frederic Austin Ogg in The Chautauquan. He admitted that German government had its faults, but he drew attention to its "honesty ... frugality ...
justice and an unusual regard for the ordinary welfare of the people." He also admitted that the Socialists were "peaceable", not against private property or law and order, and voted for by liberals, but he did not admit that the party was entirely acceptable, stating,

... it may well be as the Kaiser recently intimated, that with continued growth the Socialists will gradually tone down into a moderate labour and reform party and so become a more openly acknowledged, and perhaps also more useful, factor in the state.43

This is unusual, in looking to the Socialists of the future as a moderate party; most American writers did not take a long-term view of the development of the identity of the Socialists, instead making up their minds on the basis of present circumstances. Ogg's reliance on the word of the Kaiser and attaching such significance to the interests of the state show a basically conservative position, which could not yet accept the Socialists, presumably because of awareness that they retained their long-term aims. There were thus indications that the almost universal good American image of the German Socialists at the time of the 1903 election was in decline.

The German election of 1907 was a set-back for the Socialists. The Chancellor, von Bulow, managed to get radical support for his coalition, and he used patriotic propaganda against both the Socialists and the Centre. The latter actually increased its seats, but the Socialists lost votes and almost half their
seats, being reduced to 43. The American press showed little interest in the election results, perhaps because they contradicted the usual line about the rise of the Socialists and its significance, and in January 1907 many of the papers were preoccupied with the Thaw case. The New York Times noted that the Socialists would have done better if the distribution of seats was fairer, and remarked that "a check to Socialism in Germany is a discouragement to Socialists the world over", apparently forgetting its arguments that the party was moderate rather than revolutionary. The San Francisco Examiner described Bulow as "Checking the Growth of Red Republican Socialism", while the Rocky Mountain News printed only a small paragraph describing the Socialist defeat.44

An editorial in the Baltimore Sun also focused on this aspect of the election, which "suggests that Socialism in Germany as a doctrine, and as an expression of economic and political discontent with the existing order of things, is decadent." The writer argued that prosperity had spread in Germany, so people were more satisfied. Many Germans still wanted "a larger participation of the people in the government", but this movement "is not socialistic, and aims chiefly at progressive liberalism, eschewing rash experiments."45 Again, the former sympathetic line on German socialism had been abandoned.

The Milwaukee Sentinel's headline, "KAISER WINS IN ELECTIONS", recognised the unbridgeable split between Wilhelm and the Socialists, and it was by implication denigratory to the latter
in an editorial comment that, "It is a great popular indorsement of the ambitious policy of Wilhelm II, and a proof of the fundamental loyalty and broad patriotism of the German people." In 1907 the American press gave up the argument that the German Socialists were a democratic, reformist, moderate party, presumably because the fact that its support had fallen showed that it was not as popular as had been thought, so the idea that it represented widespread protest seemed less valid. On the other hand, the increased vote for the government parties seemed to show the popularity of the Kaiser, whose position appeared more democratic and acceptable. It was only when the German Socialists were succeeding that American newspapers could give them support.

The same development can be seen in the periodical press, which, robbed of the opportunity to print yet more articles on the rise of the German Socialists, only printed brief editorial comments on the election, if anything. For example, The World's Work remarked that "the important thing" was that the Socialist vote had gone down. That sounds approving, as does this: "The prestige of both (Wilhelm and von Bulow) is greatly increased because a great danger has been avoided, for the time being." Again, the result is attributed to the government's appeal "to the patriotism of the nation"; at this period patriotism, whether American or foreign, was a sacrosanct principle to most Americans, and since German Socialism was being portrayed as opposed to German patriotism, the standing of the former was damaged further.
The German Harvard academic, Kuno Francke, criticised the Socialists in an article after the *Daily Telegraph* affair, which, he said, only they had exploited for their own interests (in view of Bulow's activities at the time, this is hardly accurate). He alleged that they would use the crisis to block necessary financial reforms. From a believer in "a strong, non-partisan, monarchical government", this was not surprising. Some voices still spoke up for the Socialists, however, such as Wolf von Schierbrand's: in an article on the inequitable franchise in the German states he particularly praised Theodore Barth and some Liberals, but pointed out that the Socialists had united with these in the fight for democracy and progress and that, indeed, their support was indispensable. This was, nevertheless, milder support than von Schierbrand had previously given the German Socialists.

An editorial in *The World's Work* suggests that, although the Socialists had lost some of their attractiveness, it was believed that they might recover it; the writer commented that if the party formed alliances with other parties, which was opposed by Bebel, it could gain "definite reforms" and lose its "impracticable dreams." 49

In 1912 occurred the last Reichstag election before the First World War. Almost all the parties lost support, except the Socialists, who had attacked tariffs and taxes at a time of high food prices, and whose representation rose from 43 to 110 seats, causing panic in ruling circles. *The New York Times*
considered the most important aspect of the result to be the failure of the German government's attempt to whip up feeling against Britain over Morocco. The Socialists were the only party completely opposed to jingoism and militarism, but they rose substantially, thus providing a discouragement to the "war parties" in both Britain and Germany. Once again, the image of the German Socialists as the party of peace was being admired in America.

In this vein, the San Francisco Examiner printed a cable from a German Socialist leader, Ludwig Frank, stating that the elections were "demonstrations for the peace of the world" and against imperialism. The paper attributed the Socialist success to opposition to increased spending on the army and navy. It also printed on its front page the programme of the German Socialists, beginning with abolition of the monarchy, and it stated that the party's demands "embrace practically the complete upset or change of all existing forms and regulations, national, political and industrial." There was no doubt an element of sensationalism in this, but it shows that the party had not regained its moderate image, in some quarters at least.

Meanwhile, the Rocky Mountain News was attributing peacefulness to the Kaiser rather than the Socialists, reporting that he might visit France to ensure that there was no war after his death. The paper printed nothing about the German elections, thus demonstrating the capriciousness of much of the American press as regards foreign news. The same might be said of
the Milwaukee Sentinel, which before the election claimed that it was the most important ever in Germany, since the Radicals were demanding "genuine constitutional government with a ministry responsible to the people" (the absence of which implied criticism of the existing German system) and the government might lose its majority, but afterwards made little of the result. 52

The Baltimore Sun, unlike the San Francisco Examiner, returned to the idea that the German Socialists' "aims are such as that most advanced radicals and many others would approve", including adult suffrage, the secret ballot, income and inheritance taxes, "state control over production", and redistribution of Reichstag seats and reform of the Prussian franchise (both measures that would increase Socialist representation). The party was made to sound practically innocuous, since it "contains many editors and writers, and has a certain academic and nebulous aspect." Its success was attributed to "great discontent in Germany, with the meagre results which have attended the Government's aggressive foreign policy, coupled with great unrest among the working classes." 53

1912 was a high-point for the American Socialists, and commentators' attitudes to the successes of the movement in the U.S.A. might have affected the way in which they regarded the advance of their German counterparts. This might be one reason why the German Socialists only partly regained their moderate, peaceful image in America at this time. Unlike 1903, mixed feelings were much in evidence. For instance, The Outlook,
after the augmented Social Democrats attacked the Kaiser in the Reichstag, saw this as evidence that "the Socialist party is gaining in audacity" and "the nation is rapidly getting out of leading-strings" - the latter, at least, obviously desirable - but the troubles showed "how difficult is the task of the very able man who rules Germany", thus demonstrating sympathy with Wilhelm too. The conclusion, that Wilhelm should realise that each "assumption of absolute authority ... evokes a definite challenge from a large group of his subjects", seems to come down on the side of the German opposition.54

The World's Work similarly balanced the Socialist aim of "a constitutional Germany" against an "able and brilliant" Kaiser. It pointed out that Wilhelm was a constituent of the Socialist member for Potsdam, Liebknecht, who had just been released from prison, where he had been sent for propagandising against militarism, and it commented, "Nothing could more emphatically declare the difference between the Kaiser's government and his people". The writer then made another American suggestion for an impossible historic compromise:

What a pity it is that the Emperor, with all his ability and brilliancy, is not sufficiently alive to the movement of the age to throw off the trammelling superstition of "divine right", break the shackles of bureaucracy, and put himself at the head of the popular awakening which has suddenly made Germany, despite its mediaeval government, one of the most progressive and prosperous of modern nations, and which might make it, under democratic rule, led by an Emperor as sympathetic with the aspirations of the people as he is bold, energetic,imaginative, and magnetic - the most enviable of all!
The misunderstandings displayed here are manifold. The idea of Wilhelm placing himself at the head of the Social Democracy is simply absurd, and it was not that "popular awakening" which had made Germany "progressive and prosperous", those developments actually deriving largely from the activities of the "mediaeval government" (such as the social reforms). The sycophancy shown towards Wilhelm quite overwhelms the sympathy for the democratic aspirations of the German people. Even given that the "'Socialist' vote of Germany does not denote belief in the doctrines of Socialism; it represents actually dissatisfaction with the present Government", it is difficult to see how anyone could have believed in the possibility of the suggestion put forward.\(^{55}\) The writer does not appear to have considered that the dissatisfaction might largely have been with Wilhelm, which reflects the glowing American picture of him. The attractiveness of Wilhelm to Americans meant that those of the latter who were attached to democracy had to try to imagine a conjunction between it and him.

*Hampton's Magazine*, in an editorial on the "World-Wide Growth of Democracy", went further than merely declaring the German voters to be not really socialist, in re-asserting that the German Socialists' programme "would not be termed socialistic in this country." Samuel P. Orth went even further than that rather negative argument in asserting the desirability of the German party, as part of a *World's Work* series on "The World-wide Sweep of Socialism". He disapproved of Germany's industrial development: "The old Germany, with its love for frug-
ality, for learning and modesty, has retreated before the rush of the money getter." Worship of money and militarism had been added to the old faults of a "mediaeval government" and social "castes". He strongly criticised all of these, then pointed out that, "Germany is the most 'socialized' nation in Europe". However, this form of public ownership merely increased the state's control over the lives of individuals. What the Social Democrats wanted, according to Orth, was democracy and freedom. Even at this stage, they were being persecuted because of their opinions and suffering official ostracism.

Orth indicated the good living conditions of the German workers, but wrote that these could not overcome their opposition to barriers between castes. He described the Social Democrats as "the most perfect political organization in Europe", giving details of their trade union, cultural and journalistic activities. The fact that it ran night schools, published literary classics for young people, tried to improve the tastes of its members, and so on made it sound decidedly worthy and in the American tradition of self-improvement. Orth had one criticism of the party, that it insisted on members joining unions and only bought from shop keepers who voted for it, but he praised it in many ways that would make it sound attractive to Americans. "The party is Democratic first, Socialist second" and its members are "anti-militarists but not anti-patriots." Nonetheless, he quoted Bebel to the effect that although the Socialists now saw their task as "transform-
ing, not overthrowing, society", they still retained their "ultimate goal of social ownership of the great forces of production and distribution", which would not have appealed to most Americans. Given that this was at the height of the Progressive era, they would have been more impressed by the fact that small businessmen were looking to the German Socialists as a way of opposing the trusts. This attractive picture of the Social Democrats was enhanced by illustrations: "The Kaiser's Faith in War" (a review of recruits), "The German Socialists' Impressive Vote for Peace" (a demonstration in Berlin for international amity), "Carrying the Burden of Militarism" (a woman carrying a huge load), and so on. This essay at least was an unequivocal assertion of the superiority of the German Socialists' beliefs over those of the Kaiser.

In the context of American opinion of the German Social Democrats, one particular group, the American Socialists, must be considered. American Socialists were, of course, inclined to look at German Socialism in a different way from other Americans. They were bound to respect it, as the most successful branch of the Socialist movement and the original one, and they did not have to be convinced of its merits by having it described as moderate and liberal. Indeed, they tended to object to that idea. B.O. Flower's rather paranoid reaction to such descriptions in the American press has been mentioned, and in the same year, 1903, American Socialist papers, such as the New York Worker, denounced claims that the German party was reformist, asserting instead that its aims were the same as
those of the American socialists: the destruction of capitalism and the establishment of a "co-operative commonwealth". When American socialists conceded the existence of revisionism in the German party, they tended to oppose it. Thus, William English Walling wrote against the German revisionists' plans for co-operation with the Liberals on the question of an inheritance tax. These revisionists he identified as "conservative and opportunist leaders of the trade unions", and he was concerned to assert the supremacy of the party over them, since he saw them as more dangerous than the defeated intellectual revisionists (perhaps reflecting American conditions). 58

Robert Hunter was rather more understanding about what struck him as the "extremely conservative" appearance of the German party. He saw that it was "not uselessly offending anyone": some positions were abandoned to keep "the less revolutionary elements" in the party, co-operation with the trade unions was "scrupulously" maintained, and no pretext was given to "the reactionary elements in the Empire" to attack the party, which relied on "parliamentary methods". Nevertheless, the party kept its "advanced" programme and "revolutionary aim". Hunter saw that it was gaining strength continually and so could wait until it was ready to play its "historic role". He found this policy

far seeing and profoundly wise. It is the peace, calm and power of a youthful giant. 59

Although accepting that the German party looked moderate, Hunter was arguing that it retained its commitment to ultimate revolution.
In the Progressive period, Socialist writers in America could gain access to the general periodical press. For example, A.M. Simons, editor of the *International Socialist Review*, wrote for *The World To-Day* an essay on "Socialism in Germany" since 1875. After describing the failure of Bismarck's attempts to repress socialism (one effect of which, he wrote, was to cause many German Socialists to go to America and help to found the Socialist movement there), he outlined the "magnificent organization" of the party, which combined "absolute democratic control" with "perfect centralized management." This picture could be seen as combining that efficiency and organization which Americans so admired in Germany with the democracy that the state lacked, so that the party could look like a reformed and perfected Germany in embryo. Simons dealt with the Socialist belief in the equality of women, which would appeal to feminists (his own journal had printed a translation of Edouard Milhaud on the "Socialist Propaganda among Women in Germany"), and referred to the split between Karl Kautsky and the revolutionary wing and Edward Bernstein and the Revisionists, but he did not express any opinion on this. He did, however, return to the attack on American interpretations of the party:

The American press has spread the idea that the German Socialists are in some way different from the Socialists in America. This is particularly absurd in view of the fact that, for many years and to some extent to this day, the Socialist movement in America was controlled by the same men who formulated the German Socialist platforms ...

Furthermore, "the same press that is now denying the existence
of any resemblance between the American and the German Socialist parties" used to attack the former by alleging that it was "a 'German importation'." 60

This argument could be taken as an attempt to let the American party share in the favourable image of the German party, but Simons immediately prevented that by saying that the American press had fabricated the alleged German Socialist platform that they praised so highly. He then quoted sections of the Erfurt Programme of 1891, setting forth the party's revolutionary aims, followed by a list of the immediate demands of the party. This was actually identical to the points printed in many papers and magazines, but in greater detail and expressed in more militant language, and it included demands for sexual equality, free medical assistance, taxes and labour laws, which were occasionally omitted elsewhere. Simons quoted the last paragraphs of the manifesto, which did attack militarism and the tariff, as had been reported (but again, in more extreme language), and also the undemocratic activities of the government. The final demand was for "the Socialist state", which, Simons wrote, proved the party still took a "revolutionary position." He produced more evidence for this, including panic-stricken headlines from European newspapers. 61 The clear implication of Simons' article was that he opposed Revisionism and upheld the revolutionary nature of the German party. He did not explain why the American press had embraced the German Socialists and was deluding itself by holding a false picture of them. It is possible that the undemocratic nature of the German system
had caused Americans to believe that its opponents must be democrats of their own sort, or that in trying to explain the increased support for the German party they were not prepared to admit that a genuinely Socialist party could be popular, as well as the fact that they put so much stress on the importance of the Revisionists.

Simons's article might well have had the effect of reducing the popularity of the German Socialists, but left-wing Americans usually tried to promote their favourable image in the press. For instance, John Mitchell, the President of the United Mine Workers, wrote a rather eulogistic article about the party after a visit to Germany. Of the "enlightened despotism" of Germany's rulers he wrote, "the despotism is more apparent than the enlightenment." He mentioned restrictions on liberty, militarism and repression, stating that many Socialist voters (many of whom came from wide groups outside the working-class) supported the party because it stood against these abuses and for immediate reforms. He concluded that the party "represents the struggle of the liberal minded and progressive Germans in their antagonism to the feudal government." It is perhaps not surprising that a union leader should sympathise with the Revisionist view of the German party.

Occasionally German Socialists got to speak for themselves in the American press, as in 1900 when Wilhelm Liebknecht wrote on "German Politics" for The Independent. He explained that German politics were hidden, government being controlled by a secretive small group, and that foreigners could not understand,
because German culture was so advanced, that the political system was on the same level as Turkey or Russia. He depicted a country where any criticism of the government led to jail, and contrasted the genuine constitutional monarchy of Britain with the disguised absolute monarchy of his own country, where the Reichstag was elected by universal (male) suffrage but had no control of the government. He denounced the Junkers, who controlled the state, as worthless sinecure-seekers, blaming them for the exclusion of American meat (an obvious attempt to engage the sympathy of his readers) and accusing them of immorality and stupidity. This article did not mention the Socialists, but it was calculated to create opposition to the system which they were opposing. 63

Liebknecht's son Karl visited the U.S.A. in October and November 1910, making speeches mainly to German-American Socialists. He had been invited by the American Socialist Party after Robert Hunter met him in Germany. Although he spoke in German, his speeches were reported in the English-language Socialist papers. In these he attacked American conditions, which he found even worse than those in Germany, where social reforms had taken place and there were, at least, state and municipal socialism in action, but he increased the morale of American Socialists by reminding them that some success had been achieved in Germany. This visit had no effect on the majority of Americans, but Karl Liebknecht became much better known in the U.S.A. after 1914, because of his opposition to the war, which led to his expulsion from the Social Democrats and his imprisonment. His standing in
America increased even more after American entry to the war, and thus meant a continuation to some extent of the good image of German Socialism.\textsuperscript{64}

On the outbreak of war in 1914 most American Socialists were critical of the S.P.D. for voting in favour of war credits. One such was William English Walling, who wrote in \textit{The Outlook} that in 1913 the party had voted in the Reichstag for increased military expenditure because it did not want to lose seats, which would mean that it could not promote reforms. Thus, an American Socialist was accepting that the German party had become reformist, although he disapproved. (Despite the fact that the party's vote in 1913 could be seen as being against American interests, by increasing Germany's military power, it was seen by sections of the American press as evidence of laudable moderation on the part of the German Socialists). Walling pointed out that a large minority of the German Socialists opposed the war, however, and that the party newspaper, \textit{Vorwärts}, still denounced militarism. The German people were thus not unanimously for the war, as the German government claimed and most Americans believed, and Walling expressed the hope that at the end of the war the German Socialists would establish a new, democratic government.\textsuperscript{65} He was here aligning the German Social Democrats with the desires of most Americans, rather than asserting a hope for socialist revolution.

Such hopes in Social Democracy became widespread in the U.S.A. For example, \textit{The World's Work} pointed out in 1915 that \textit{Vorwärts}
had been closed down for opposing the war and territorial annexations, and Karl Liebknecht, described as the leader of the anti-war Socialists, had been sent to the front. The writer considered that after Germany was defeated, the Social Democrats were the "logical party" for the Allies to make peace with, and they could bring about a democratic Germany, which would "lose its Hohenzollern Middle-Ages aspect which has kept it apart and out of sympathy with its neighbors." The German Socialists were thus being identified with what was to become the American war aim of a democratic world.

However, the socialist intellectual Max Eastman saw the half million or so revolutionary socialists who followed Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg and Clara Zetkin in opposing the war as not a democratic force but the "nucleus of a future revolution." Eastman expressed worries that the defeat of Germany would present a further "obstacle to the progress of her revolution", by increasing patriotism even more, so he hoped that neither side would win. Some American socialists thus continued to see hopes for revolution among the German Socialists, while a wider American public pictured them as peaceful, democratic moderates.

Another reflection of changing American perceptions of the S.P.D. before the war was the change in the treatment of August Bebel, the German Socialist leader most often mentioned in the American press. In 1890 he was an extremist to the Milwaukee Sentinel. In 1903, according to The Arena, he led "efforts to secure instalments of reform, while carrying
on a persistent educational agitation." In 1912 *The World's Work* quoted him as aiming at "transforming, not overthrowing, society", while keeping the "ultimate goal of social ownership". The American Socialists greatly admired him, but even Robert Hunter stressed his reliance on "parliamentary methods and strength."68

To the determined enemies of socialism, Bebel remained a dangerous and extreme figure. Even in 1910, John W. Perrin was denouncing him as the exponent of a "pernicious programme" and tried to show him in a bad light by quoting his statement, "In politics we are republicans, in economics socialists, in religion atheists", the latter two, in most American eyes, outweighing the virtues of the first. For Perrin, Bebel's party was "a constant menace ... to the entire world."69 It seems unlikely that many Americans would have gone as far as that.

When Bebel died in 1913, articles summing up his career appeared in many magazines, all expressing admiration. They also took the opportunity to admire his party, perhaps in a more informed way than previously. *The Outlook* pointed out that Bebel had opposed the Revisionists, but had made up for this by also opposing anarchism. He was one of the leaders of German progress. Americans who think of Socialism as an exotic, and who associate the word "Socialist" with the mad theorist, have little conception of the character of the Social Democratic party of Germany ... (which) represents many of the ideals of self-government which we take for granted in America ...70

These comments are rather ironic, considering some of the articles previously published in the magazine, but they show that the favourable picture of German Socialism was now very widely shared.

Similarly, *The Independent* published a thoughtful article on Bebel, remarking that even anti-Socialists had to recognise
his "greatness" and "historic importance". He had largely created "the most powerful and best disciplined political machine in the world", against a government sustained by "medievalism ... militarism and capitalism". This party "has not accomplished its purpose, but had done a great deal that it was not designed to do." That is, it had not brought a new order, but, despite its theoretical opposition to meliorative reforms, it had helped to bring them about. As Bebel and the other older members departed, according to the writer, the party would become more attached to "practical politics", because it was

not the immutable, impractical and irreconcilable entity that some would have it, but is capable of making itself useful under the present imperfect conditions, which is encouraging to those of us who believe that only step by step can real progress be made.71

In fact, by 1913 few Americans did believe that it was impractical and so on, but it is notable that this article saw the death of Bebel as moving it closer to practicality, showing that something of his revolutionary reputation still attached to him.

One of the most eulogistic notices on Bebel's death was actually reprinted from a British magazine, The Nation. It too pointed out that he created his party, against great opposition, and that the party provoked the government into making reforms. The German rulers were described as a "tremendous reactionary force", against which Bebel won victories, and his work built "the hope of international brotherhood and enduring peace." Also published first in Britain was Frederick William Wile's
book *Men Around the Kaiser*, which did not appear in the U.S.A. until after Bebel's death. As mentioned earlier, Wile was a pro-British foreign correspondent, whose articles in various Chicago papers often praised the German Socialists, especially the Revisionists, because of their opposition to autocracy.

One chapter of his book was entitled "August Bebel : The Red Napoleon", which, although Wile referred to his stand against the "moderate and modern wing of the party", presented a glowing account of Bebel. His party was described as

the only unterrified, tooth-and-nail foes of reaction, insensate militarism and class rule, the one voice which cries out insistently, fearlessly, implacably, against the injustices which, in the opinion of many patriotic men, are retarding the moral progress and sapping the vital resources of the German nation.

Wile was following in the tradition of praising the German Socialists for being something other than socialist; in this case, he was concerned to stress their patriotism, since that was the virtue claimed by the German government and its supporters. Even the famously efficient organisation of the Socialists was linked to this: "German Social Democracy, being made up overwhelmingly of men who have served with the colours and experienced the rigorous routine of barrack life, is very much of a military organisation itself." Furthermore, the Socialist demonstrations displayed "the best-drilled, best-dressed and most orderly body of working-men to be found anywhere in the world". Bebel himself was identified in these patriotic terms:
He delights in declaring that the moment the Fatherland is invaded by an aggressor, he and every other Social Democrat will shoulder his rifle with enthusiasm.72

As for Bebel's socialist policies, Wile scarcely mentioned them, reporting instead that he aimed at the "democratisation of governmental institutions" and that he "would simply re-organise the Empire" in recognition that it was now "a nation of manufacturers, traders and artisans." Wile referred to socialistic policies only to say that Bebel knew they were "impractical". He thus managed to depict the socialist who was for many Americans an extreme radical as a practical, moderate, democratic, patriotic, popular leader. Some academics had always managed to look at the German Socialists in a somewhat more objective way than many of their compatriots, so there had been favourable pictures of Bebel at an earlier stage; for example, in Richard T. Ely's French and German Socialism in Modern Times, which was first published in 1883 and re-issued numerous times thereafter, Bebel is described as a "sincere", able artisan. Ely, however, put more emphasis on the role of Liebknecht and other "men of learning and intelligence", who had "filled the world with German socialism", a not surprising attitude from a professor.73

Indeed, Ely in this book shows most sympathy with the "professorial socialists", Adolf Wagner, Gustav Schmoller and others, who provided the theoretical basis for state socialism, arguing on ethical grounds, and with the Catholic Christian Socialists. These groups came closest to his own beliefs,
but he also wrote understandably about the reasons for Social Democracy, describing the workers struggling for a "bare subsistence" while the capitalists were "surfeited in luxury". Even this early he wrote that some planks in the German platform "would find sympathy with the best people in America and England", such as a ban on Sunday work and on the employment of young children. It sometimes is not clear in this book whether Ely is merely describing the ideas of German socialists or agreeing with them, and it is written very warily, with a lot of qualifications and denials, as though Ely was trying to show that his evident sympathy for the socialists did not extend to support. In any case, since the book was so much used in American universities it must have influenced a large number of educated Americans to look more favourably on German Socialism.

Another book containing praise of Bebel was Wolf von Schierbrand's *Germany: The Welding of a World Power* (1902). Schierbrand's articles in support of the German Socialists have been mentioned, and he took the same line in this book, which attracted fairly wide attention. He described the Reichstag as dull, due to the "phlegmatic temper of the average German", but Bebel was the most "impassioned" speaker, with an oratorical style nearest to the American (another attempt to induce approval by assimilation). He explained Bebel's opposition to Revisionism, but repeatedly stressed that the party had, in fact, given up its revolutionary nature, with many liberals joining. Schierbrand produced a long list of justifications for the Socialists, claiming that the bene-
fits from the "Social Legislation" were not as great as many thought and that the working-class was oppressed in numerous ways. He concluded that the party had a "radical and democratic reform programme" and was the only "living and growing force" in German politics. Despite these sympathetic comments, Schierbrand's final chapter predicted that a new liberal party would appear, which would attract millions of Socialist voters. This chapter was packed with equally erroneous predictions, such as that Germany, Britain and America would form an alliance and become "the dictators of the world" and "the bearers of culture to the universe", and that the Agrarians and the army would decline. Schierbrand allowed his love of Germany to blind him to reality, and in the brilliant future that he foresaw there would be no necessity for the Socialists, but his writings made clear that in the existing circumstances they were a positive and desirable movement. This, or an even stronger admiration, was a widespread impression in America.

Alfred Vagts quoted Poultney Bigelow as telling Wilhelm II in 1890 that the socialist workers at a May Day demonstration in Berlin were "a cleaner, quieter, more self-respecting, and law-abiding crowd than could be shown by London, Paris or New York" and that the "disorderly people" of Germany would be considered "a rather respectable set" elsewhere. This personal respectability of the German Socialists, despite stereotypes of wild radicals, was one basis for their popularity in America. Another that he mentions was the German Socialists' use of America as a model for Germany. In the
years with which he was dealing American sympathy for German Socialism was fairly muted, but as has been suggested it reached a high-point with the successes of 1903, after which it died down somewhat, to be revived with the First World War, to some extent. Support for what was seen as a democratic, reformist movement was not surprising from Progressive America, especially when it agreed with American views on import restrictions, but German Socialism had to compete in American minds with its patent enemy, Wilhelm II, who was seen by many as a progressive figure, promoting reforms from above. The popularity of the Kaiser no doubt reduced the appeal of the German Socialists to many Americans, as did the fact that the party retained revolutionary aims. Irving Howe has written that reformist politics do not satisfy the urge for "the temptations of apocalypse" and that that perhaps explains why European Social Democratic leaders before 1914 retained

some of the "revolutionary" symbols and language of early Marxism, though their parties had ceased to be revolutionary in any serious respect ...

Their followers needed to believe that the immediate gains won by the social democratic parties and the trade unions were steps toward a complete restructuring of society ...

If this is true, then a surprisingly large number of Americans saw through to the reality, but many believed in the symbols and preferred the orderly government of the Kaiser. On the other hand, American socialists were inspired by the German party's successes and this contributed to their own smaller successes between 1902 and 1912. For the majority
of Americans, however, socialism seems to have been more popular when it was safely in Germany.
It seems to be Frederic C. Howe's fate to be mentioned in passing in books on Progressivism, and his works, particularly those dealing with Germany, never seem to be dealt with in detail. For example, Melvin Small wrote that city planning and administration formed the aspect of Germany most widely admired in Progressive America and that Howe was the most important interpreter of this, but he did not actually discuss what Howe said about it. As a historical figure Howe is afflicted with insubstantiality, perhaps because he unfortunately left no private papers. However, his published works reveal much about the development of his ideas, perhaps more than he intended. In particular, his writings on Germany, by showing what impressed him in the German cities, show a lot about himself and about the America of which he was part. These writings were not, it must be said, entirely original. Small neglects the fact that the German cities were seen as progressive by Americans long before the Progressive Era in America got under way, and earlier discussions of them must be looked at in order to place Howe in his context.

When Frederic Clemson Howe was born, in 1867, it was in a small country town, Meadville, Pennsylvania. The growth of the American cities, with which he was to be so concerned, was already well under way, but the German towns still awaited the impetus of German unification, which was to lead to their development and the consequent measures to deal with the urban problems that arose. At this time American writings on Germany
still dealt with a rural country, interspersed with pretty towns noted for their picturesque architecture and art collections, and they showed a general liking for the place. \(^2\)

In his autobiography Howe dates the real beginning of his life to his entering Johns Hopkins University in 1889. Here he encountered a very Germanic atmosphere, quite apart from the large German-American population of Baltimore. Johns Hopkins was the first American university devoted to graduate study, and Daniel C. Gilman had planned it on the German model, with the educational process centred on seminars. As Howe put it, the teachers brought "an atmosphere of the German university, of its freedom, its unconventionality, its enthusiasm for research work." Most of his lecturers had studied in Germany, including Herbert Baxter Adams, whom Howe considered "a great teacher." Adams's notes for his lectures reveal a deep concern with the Germanic origins of British and American political institutions, and with the continuing relationship of the three countries: if England was the mother of America, then Germany was her "grandmother." It may be significant, in view of Howe's future interest in the German city, that Adams, in his lectures on Modern German history, stressed Stein's municipal reforms in Prussia, which he described as "the foundation of a great system, the corner stone of the city government of Prussia and of the German Empire to-day." Adams also contributed to the idea, picked up by Howe, that academics should aid the government, by pointing out the benefits that arose from the close association between the Prussian government and the University of Berlin. This
lecture seems to have been written in 1884, long before Robert La Follette adopted a similar practice in Wisconsin. 3

Another of Howe's teachers with a German university education was the economist Richard T. Ely, who had been influenced by German neo-mercantilist theories, that is, the development of a collectivist outlook, particularly in economic matters, and the belief that the government should be actively involved in the economy. These theories had been developed in opposition to socialism, and they also encompassed social welfare reforms, such as the institution of social insurance. From Ely Howe learned for the first time of the exploitative nature of American capitalism and that there were alternative systems short of revolution. Ely had a particular interest in municipal reform, seeing the failure of the American city as a crucial symptom of the lack of community feeling in America. In his autobiography he recalled his return from Germany in 1880:

As I walked through the streets of New York, my heart sank within me. The city was dirty and ill-kept, the pavements poor, and there were evidences of graft and incompetence on every hand ... I thought of the clean, beautiful streets of Berlin and Liverpool, and the painful contrast made me want to take the next boat back to Europe.

As early as the eighteen-eighties Americans with progressive ideas were contrasting German cities favourably with American ones. In 1882 Ely wrote an article on the city government of Berlin, which even Andrew Dickson White considered too
favourable to German bureaucracy, but Albert Shaw, in the next decade, was the first American to write systematically on the German cities.4

Shaw was the most important influence on Howe. He was also born to a well-off family in a small town (Paddy's Run, Ohio). As a student at Johns Hopkins in 1881 he was led by Ely to an interest in municipal reform, and in 1888 he went to Britain and other European countries to study their cities, lecturing about them at various universities on his return. He became editor of the American Review of Reviews and was involved with various civic organisations, opposing political bosses and municipal corruption, which he blamed on the new immigrants.

Howe wrote that Shaw

Stirred my imagination as did none of the other lecturers. He lectured on municipal administration and painted pictures of cities ... that I wanted to take part in in America; cities managed as business enterprises; cities ... that owned things and did things for people. There was order and beauty in the cities he described.

These cities were not exclusively German, since Shaw drew his examples from Britain and the rest of Europe too, but, as he pointed out in his Municipal Government in Continental Europe (1895), the German cities had developed in "a more systematic, thorough, and businesslike way than any other cities."5

Howe's reaction to Shaw's lectures is highly significant in the context of American Progressive thought. Many of the leading
reformers who emerged in the years just before and after 1900 had come from a small town background, like Howe, and they wanted to impose the order and stability to which they were accustomed on the chaos of the cities. They often retained the values of small businessmen, as opposed to the large business conglomerations which were seen as contributing to the chaos. Howe typified this: "There was something in my mind that seized upon order, on plans, on doing things the way businessmen did them in their own shops and factories." This search for order and businesslike methods lay at the bottom of Howe's attraction to Germany. Stimulated by Shaw, he went to Germany in 1891, studying history and political science at the University of Halle.

He found Germany a contrast to the freedom that he valued so highly at Johns Hopkins. He was shocked by von Treitschke's "teachings of the divinity of kings and the necessity for military force," noting that many German students felt similarly. After his return to America he published an essay on German politics, which painted a dark picture of a police state, where criticism of the authorities was not tolerated. He disapproved of the subordination of the citizen to the state and of the state's role as "the center of all economic activity and incentive", which he believed discouraged personal initiative and led to German arts and industry being "twenty-five years behind her more progressive cousins in England and America." This was made worse by the civil service's absorbing the most talented men. He disapproved of Wilhelm II's autocracy and
foresaw the inevitable advent of constitutional government, to be brought about by "the conservative element" in the Social Democrats. These were the most critical statements that Howe made about Germany before the First World War, although he continued to express opposition to autocracy, and he later moderated some of these ideas, as he came to believe increasingly in public action. However, it was the city, not the state, that Howe saw as the engine of reform, and he praised the German cities as "unquestionably the best-governed in the world and the most free from any taint of corruption", as well as the "perfection" of the German civil service. His derogatory remarks on German industry were made at a time of depression, and the undeniable industrial success of Germany thereafter meant that Americans could not criticise the German political system on that account.

Howe read Shaw's book on European municipal government, although he would already have been familiar with many of its contents from Johns Hopkins lectures and from Shaw's essays in the *Century Magazine* and *Atlantic Monthly*, which spread to a wider readership knowledge of the subject. Shaw was directly concerned to present European cities as a model for America, contrasting the honesty and efficiency of their government with American "attempts to emancipate our great towns from the control of corrupt and inefficient men." Nevertheless, he pointed out difficulties in the path of transferring German municipal practices to America: Germany already had the most economical and effective system of public administration in the world;
the Germans have "a higher capacity for organized social action" than other peoples; and the dominance of political and military priorities in Germany meant there was a lack of private entrepreneurs there, so the need for public action was greater. When Howe came to write his works on the German city he made no mention of any such barriers. However, Shaw also pointed out similarities between the American and German cities, in particular denying the American claim that its urban problems, particularly the lack of facilities, arose from a uniquely rapid rate of urban growth. Shaw's figures showed that the German cities had grown even faster, and he made the point that the supposedly old European cities were, in effect, as new as American ones, but poorer. Furthermore, whereas American reformers were too concerned with reforming the political structure, rather than considering the aims of government, the Germans "have taken their old framework of city government ... and have proceeded to use it for new and wonderful purposes." This brings to mind the later situation in some American cities which adopted new, efficient forms of government, which then fell into the hands of bosses who could be more efficiently corrupt. Despite the qualifications, Shaw obviously presented Germany as an example for America to follow, and the reason for these qualifications was probably that he was concerned to stress French municipal reforms, which he felt were being overlooked because the
attainments of German scholarship in many directions are so colossal; the recent German applications of recondite scientific inquiry to the practical arts of life, have been so remarkable; and German energy and prestige are now so dominant, that in our admiration for the achievements of this younger people we are in danger, perhaps, of according less than her full due to France.10

This is a considerable testimonial to the status of Germany in the eyes of educated Americans in the eighteen-nineties. It is thus important to examine the particular aspects of German municipalities that impressed Americans, and which some of them wished to emulate.

Shaw pointed to the street plans in German towns, which enabled traffic to flow efficiently, and to the good quality of these streets. German cities could acquire land outside their boundaries, and thus plan their own expansion sensibly. Railway stations were placed in good locations and harbours developed. These facts were all in contrast to the general American situation, as Shaw sometimes stated explicitly, but he then went on to a chapter on municipal functions completely beyond the American experience, for instance, describing how Stuttgart and Berlin disposed of sewage by turning it into fertiliser, thus making a service profitable. He continually stressed the "business-like" conduct of German municipal government, making clear that he approved. Hanover and other cities modernised themselves "through the intelligent and wise application of business principles and methods to the conduct of municipal housekeeping", while the "splendid efficiency of German city
governments" in their various enterprises, which so impressed Americans, was due to the continuous nature of their administrations, which enabled them to use "sound business methods" in planning ahead, as opposed to the "wasteful political methods" of continually changing American city administrations.\textsuperscript{11}

This stress on business reflects the desire of American municipal reformers to involve respectable, educated businessmen in city government, replacing corrupt interests and bosses reliant on the votes of immigrants, a theme that Howe was to take up. It also demonstrates a desire to counter the idea that an extension of municipal activities was socialistic and therefore unacceptable to respectable Americans. Shaw explained the distinction between "municipal ideals of a thrifty burgher collectivism" and socialism, adding that German city governments were controlled by the "educated and thrifty classes", not the workers. He countered American allegations that the German systems of poor relief and social insurance were socialistic by saying that the German working-class was being made to support itself through insurance contributions, relieving other classes from taxation, whereas the poor relief systems of Britain and America were "more socialistic", because the richer people have to pay for them. It is suggestive that he lays more emphasis on the thousands of "the best citizens" who administered the German poor relief system, rather than on the poor who were helped. This suggests a parallel with the middle-class American reformers, and Shaw was also concerned to counter the idea that the German system could only be run by a mechanical bureaucracy,
another argument put forward by American opponents of such schemes. 12

As he proceeded with his description of German municipal functions, Shaw increasingly contrasted them with the American situation, stating, "The municipal self-consciousness has been marvellously awakened, with results that make the story of expansion and progress in our American cities seem quite prosaic." Again, this desire to awake a civic consciousness and sense of community was a feature of American reform. If American citizens felt in this way, then their cities too might have contracts with electric light and street railway companies that benefited the cities, as in Berlin and Leipzig, instead of allowing the companies to provide poor services at high prices. They too might have municipal pawnshops that protected the poor from the "sharks" prevalent in America. 13

Shaw's book has two main themes: the quality of German municipal administration was due to the "highly trained experts" (burgomasters and magistrates) in whose hands it lay, and the activities of the German cities were possible because there was a greater sense of community than in America. Discussing the strict building regulations that improved living conditions he added,

... all cities must come to the inevitable conclusion that the rights of masses in crowded communities are superior to the whims of individuals. The pretense that private ownership of land carries with it any absolute right to disregard general interests, is a baneful heresy...14
Both of these ideas were contrary to the prevailing American orthodoxy of the time, which supported municipal appointments on political grounds and economic individualism, but they were to be increasingly taken up by progressives, including Howe. The German chapters of Shaw's book form a prototype for Howe's voluminous writings on the German cities.

Shaw's last chapter on Germany deals with Hamburg and the sanitary reforms there after the cholera epidemic of 1892. This provided an opportunity to praise the city, of which Shaw said Americans had an erroneously low opinion, for its modern docks, which made New York's look "obsolete", and its system of complete home-rule, which would greatly benefit American cities, surrounded by legal restrictions on their activities, as well as the new filtration system which made the water safe from cholera. The idea of cleanliness was important in the American view of Germany - Shaw deals with street-cleaning and so on - as was the impression of Germany's advanced hygienic and medical research. According to Shaw, the world was indebted "to Germany more than to any other country" for sanitary reforms. 15

It was not only Shaw who praised Hamburg. At the time of the cholera outbreak Murat Halstead wrote favourably of the city's combination of good old institutions, such as a solid "business system", and "all the rapid processes" of "modern science ... and progressive invention", which had enabled the development of excellent harbour facilities, unlike (again) those of New York, where resources were inefficiently wasted. In Hamburg, "the people prosper, not through actions that cripple the
managers of business, but because there is general prosperity," an implicit comparison with labour unrest in America. Halstead summed up Hamburg's union of beauty and efficiency by calling it "Chicago and Venice in combination", which to Americans would seem a combination of opposites, the squalor of Chicago being notorious. This was soon to be even more the case with the publication of W.T. Stead's If Christ Came to Chicago! It is significant that in the imaginary vision of Chicago reformed near the end of this book the most important "reinforcement of ... moral forces" is said to be a municipal theatre based on the German model, bringing wholesome art to the people, and even more so that the chapter ends with the German Emperor riding through Chicago, having come to America "expressly in order to see for himself the ideal city of the world." The fact that it is this monarch who is chosen to give his imprimatur demonstrates the height of Germany's reputation in municipal matters, even this early.

It was in the late eighteen-eighties and early eighteen-nineties that Americans began to discuss the German cities as examples of modernity and to contrast them with American cities, to the disadvantage of the latter. There had been increasing interest in the German cities since 1870 - as early as 1879 Maude Porter complained that most American travellers only wrote about the cities, rather than the countryside - but at first it was their romantic, artistic and picturesque qualities that were described. Such touristic views continued into the later period: for instance, Anthony L. Underhill, in the Foreign
Letters he wrote for his own Steuben Farmer's Advocate of Bath, New York in 1895, dealt with churches, galleries, concerts and old houses in Hamburg, Berlin, Eisenach von Sachsen and Dresden, stressing the beauty of everything. Indeed, Unter den Linden was so beautiful that, "It reminded us of the principal street in Salt Lake City, Utah." Of course, an elderly former Knovathing would not be expected to be interested in German reforms, and the same doubtless remained true of many Americans.

A rather more sophisticated American writer on Germany, the poet and magazine writer Robert Haven Schauffler, tried as late as 1909, in his Romantic Germany, to paint again the old picture of the country. He claimed that there had been too much emphasis on modern aspects of Germany, which "still remains the land of the Nibelungenlied and of Grimm's Fairy Tales, of gnomes and giants, storks and turreted ring-walls, of Gothic houses in rows, and the glamour of mediaeval courtyards."

His stated purpose was to try "to lure" American travellers away from "Italy and France and England"; this reluctance of American tourists to visit Germany was often pointed out, for instance by the German novelist Friedrich Spielhagen, who urged Americans to visit Berlin.18 The fact suggests a rather forbidding aspect that Germany presented to those wishing to travel for pleasure.

Schauffler deals with such cities as Danzig, Potsdam, Brunswick, Goslar, Hildesheim, Leipzig, Meissen, Dresden and Augsburg,
which enable him to dwell on matters of ancient architecture, art, folk-lore, history and so on. His final, most enthusiastic chapter, "The City of Dreams", is about Rothenburg, "exactly the setting one would desire as the background for the most romantic story in the world." Almost as enthusiastic is the chapter on Munich, the good nature and artistic interests of its citizens being stressed. It is contrasted with Berlin, which is seen as "less an expression of its people than an embodiment of the character of its ruling family." The chapter on the German capital is the most interesting one; being "unromantic", Berlin is described less in terms of cliches, at least, of picturesque ones. The role of the Hohenzollerns is emphasised, and Wilhelm II is described ambivalently - "the keen eyes ..., their hint of coldness and hardness corrected by the kindly lines about them" - as is his city:

... sometimes, when surfeited with this martial over-emphasis, I think of the terrible frontiers of Prussia and how well she has guarded them, reflecting that, if she had beaten her swords into plow-shares, I should not now be enjoying the gallery or the Tiergarten, the Opera or the Krögl...

As well as pointing out the open militarism in Berlin, Schauffler had to praise the German advances in medicine and the growing industries - iron founding, electrical supplies, chemicals, textiles and so on. He quoted Richard T. Ely on the annual Berlin municipal report ("One finds it difficult not to believe it a description of some city government in Utopia"), but Schauffler was more critical: "The city is superbly governed,
but with a nagging, tedious paternalism that is at first amusing and then oppressive."\(^{19}\)

It is obvious that Schauffler disliked the "blasé" Berliners, and their city and Emperor: the cathedral "makes the heart sick ... it expresses in a way the present character of Berlin - its cold asperity and self-consciousness ... It is supposed to express the present Emperor's architectural taste ..."

This is symbolic of the way in which, for many Americans, the new, industrialised, militaristic, advancing Germany was destroying the old, artistic, romantic country that they had loved, and Schauffler shows that this could also be the case in the context of the German city. He expresses this revealingly when he writes that "in freshness, in youthful energy and initiative, the Hohenzollerns and the Berliners are more like Americans than like Germans." For Romantics like Schauffler, this was not cause for praise, and it is a reminder that as Germans became more like Americans, so they became a greater threat. Despite his attachment to the old Germany, Schauffler was sufficiently affected by the Progressive ideas which by this time were prevalent in America to continue:

And in the matter of municipal comfort they have left every one else far behind. Public utilities are managed by the city, and are such models of efficiency, cheapness and profitableness as to make an American sick with envy. Every street is thoroughly cleaned in the small hours of the night, and the humblest pavements are as immaculate as the asphalt of Unter den Linden ... after years in Berlin the advantages of the system neutralize one's irritation at being over-governed.\(^{20}\)
Even a book devoted to the re-assertion of the romantic image of the German city thus includes praise of its modernity; and Schauffler's contradictory views on the change reflect an ambivalence about Germany felt by many Americans.

Schauffler had expressed this also in an article the previous year, entitled "What Germany Can Teach Us", in which he took greater account of the fashion for admiring German advances. He began

Why are American cities worse governed than German cities? Why are they in many ways so much less modern and comfortable and beautiful? It is not because we lack the progressive spirit or the wealth, the love of comfort or the sense of beauty. The cause may usually be traced to a disrespect for law, to a laxity of discipline, to an insufficient public control of public utilities and beauties. The Germans have too many laws, and they respect them. We, too few, and do not respect them. There is something of the slave about them; something of the anarchist about us.

Despite this implication that the German system had gone too far in imposing order, Schauffler proceeded to enthuse about the modern German city, with its "varied, unmonotonous uniformity", cleanliness and elimination of ugly billboards and so on. He explicitly included Berlin in this praise, attributing such facts as the high standards of the street-cars to "the quality of the employees - who have all been educated in the army and brought to a high level of discipline", this being the other side of the "martial over-emphasis" about which he later complained. The World's Work, in which the article appeared,
had a great interest in reform, so Schauffler may have been taking his audience into account when stressing the good aspects of change in Germany, even singling out recent "commercial architecture", but his contradictory opinions on the old and new Germany are revealing of American confusions. Even in this article he seemed at his most enthusiastic in praising the archetypal symbol of the old Germany, music, and the German cities' involvement with it: "Good music is a necessity to them, a luxury to us." Nevertheless, he kept pointing out America's relative faults, and this even extended to the captions beneath photographs of such wonders as an ash-cart designed to spread no dust and artistically designed stamp slot-machines, that beneath a picture of the Berlin elevated railway remarking, "Artistic trestles and rows of trees along the line make a sharp contrast to elevated lines in New York." When Germany managed to combine the artistic and the modern it would please any American.

Schauffler's objections to the new Berlin were not unique: in 1891 Samuel G. Green, D.D. and Professor Edward P. Thwing remarked that, "The very architecture of the city, with its unbroken straight lines, speaks of the universal drill", but they admitted, even at that early date, the importance of German reforms, writing, "In Germany, the greatest problems of our time, social, political, and religious, are being discussed with a fullness and earnestness which tell upon the life of all civilized nations."  

Friedrich Spielhagen's picture of Berlin in 1893 was also mixed:
from being a "frugal, unpretentious" provincial town it had developed into a city with a "fever for enjoyment", "enervated ennui" and a lack of idealism, but it had also become "beautiful and magnificent", with "scrupulous cleanliness" in the streets" and "admirable order" among the pedestrians and traffic. This contradicts the Progressive belief that political and social reforms leading to order in the city would also improve the morality of its inhabitants, and when German cities were presented as a model for Americans, their moral failings tended to go unmentioned, being, in any case, far less serious than vice in America.

In the eighteen-nineties Shaw's book stood out as the main didactic presentation of the model cities of Germany, but as has been seen these cities could continue to be looked at in other ways. It is now appropriate to look at other examples of Americans looking to the German cities for experiments in reform. These all contributed to the American perception of Germany as a progressive country, and provided the atmosphere in which Howe could write his works on the subject. However, not all Americans accepted the idea that Germany could be an example for America. Some of the objections that Shaw tried to counter have been mentioned, but another came from Professor George E. Vincent, the Chicago sociologist, writing in 1897 in The Chautauquan, an avowedly educational publication. He admitted that German administration was more efficient and honest than that of America and Britain, but stated that the system had been imposed from above, continuing,
To set up German methods as models to be imitated in America is to disregard the fundamental differences in the governmental theories of the two nations. In Germany systems may be forced upon the people from above; in the United States they must grow ... out of public opinion.24

This would obviously have been true if an attempt had been made to introduce the entire German system to America, but there was no reason why particular institutions and methods, adapted if necessary, could not be introduced, provided that politicians were prepared to do it and that they were satisfied that their electorate would support such moves. The writers on German reforms were thus attempting to influence public opinion, or, at least, the opinions of those who could make their voices heard.

Despite Professor Vincent's strictures, the readers of The Chautauquan were presented with German models. In 1898 Emily M. Burbank wrote about the "perfect repair and scrupulous neatness of Berlin", as well as the "well-organised police system" that ensured order. She made contrasts with American cities: "On account of her marvelously rapid growth since 1861 she is often compared to Chicago", but pointing out that Berlin's growth had a more substantial foundation. She quoted Albert Shaw in support of the "solid and capable" nature of German city governments, unlike those of America. Seven years later Professor Otto Heller of Washington University, St. Louis wrote about the "astonished admiration" of the Americans who saw Germany's "magnificent exhibits" at the recent World's Fair, adding that Berlin was even more impressive. Unlike American
cities, he wrote, it had excellent lighting, street cleaning, police protection, postal services, newspapers and shops. There were no saloons or drunks, and no "hideous" bill-boards (this last fact and its legal enforcement were often commented on by Americans, for instance, in an editorial in *The Outlook* in 1903, suggesting that "disfiguring advertisements" were a particular cause for complaint in American cities). In another article Heller claimed that Germany had taken America as the model for its modernisation, and once again made the point about the Americanness of Berlin. The former claim is extremely doubtful, but it was calculated to make Americans look more kindly at Germany and would make the idea of interchange more acceptable, particularly since Heller concluded that, "Berlin has taken the lead in the transformation of that staid, even flow of life, formerly characteristic of the German people, into a swift current, ceaselessly rushing on and moving the nation forward to a new and larger destiny"; although, once again, there is something ominous in this surge of over-enthusiasm that might have disturbed as many Americans as it attracted.

After 1900 the number of American writings on the German cities multiplied, no doubt influenced by the increasing concern with the problems of American cities. As early as 1885 Josiah Strong in *Our Country* had pointed these out, blaming foreign immigrants and seeing the threat of socialism, and in 1904 *The Shame of the Cities* by Lincoln Steffens, first published in *McClure's* had a great effect, on Howe, for instance, in exposing municipal corruption. As Progressivism, or, at least, one strand
of it, turned increasingly to urban problems, it is not surprising that parallels were drawn with foreign experiences.

For example, Professor Edmund J. James of Chicago University described in the *World Review* in 1901 how Berlin had solved its problems with street railways, which, he said, had been even worse than those of Chicago. The Berlin companies were even reluctant to change to electricity, but when their charters came up for renewal they were extended to 1920, at which date the installations were to pass to the city, and a reasonable system of fares and other reforms were introduced. James remarked, "That a foreign city supposed to have a greater concern than American cities for the vested interests of capitalists should have made so good a bargain with its street railway companies ought to lead American cities to take a more determined stand for the rights of the people." The supposition in this statement is odd, given the number of writings on the reforms in Berlin, but the message is clear. Chicago had strong links with the country whose capital was so often compared to it, particularly through the Department of Sociology at Chicago University. Its head, Albion W. Small, had studied in Germany, like many of his colleagues, and *The American Journal of Sociology*, published in Chicago, often published articles on German reforms. One of these, again by Edmund James, was on "City Administration in Germany". He began by pointing out that for years there had been agitation in America to improve the conditions in cities, but little interest in this subject in Germany and he proceeded to give reasons: the German cities had "such a consideration of the
social and economic needs of the population as we in the United States have not begun to give the subject" and had instituted savings banks and so on, as well as controlling public works like water, gas, electricity and street railways. The administration of these functions was satisfactory, furthermore, so there was little cause for complaint. James approved of the fact that the three-class voting system, which gave control to high tax payers, "practically excluded from any direct participation in the city government a large part of what would be considered the undesirable voting population in an American city." This recalls the idea of reformers like Albert Shaw that urban corruption arose from the new immigrants from southern and eastern Europe, whose votes could be exploited by bosses. James found further evidence in support of such elitist reformism, writing that the German cities were well "along the road of social improvement and social amelioration, in spite of the fact that they are under the control ... chiefly of the very large taxpayers." The efficiency of the system derived from the "educated, trained, and permanent civil service." However, James found faults in the system, such as landowners trying to prevent expensive measures, and he concluded that there was a "great similarity" between the American and German systems, which was contrary to the usual argument.

The structure of the German municipal administrations, with an elected council choosing the Magistrat, a board of experts, and a Burgermeister to lead it, attracted much attention in America. Joseph Torrey Bishop wrote about the office of
Burgermeister, with its relatively high salary and social prestige, describing its extensive powers. He described its typical holder as "a level-headed, well-trained, administrative expert, and often a man of national reputation." American reformers might think this sounded like the sort of man they wanted to administer their city, and Bishop noted that a board system had operated well in Washington, D.C. and Galveston. However, he thought it "far from probable that the German system would prove generally satisfactory in America", since American traditions were different and, "To choose a German magistrate by manhood suffrage would be to alter greatly its conservative character, which is, indeed, its greatest merit; and where in America may be found that class of administrative experts from which the burgermeisters of the Old World are chosen?" In a footnote he added that the board system was gaining support in Boston and other Eastern towns, and that legislation to enable its introduction had been passed in Iowa.27

This system, also known as the commission plan, had first been introduced in Galveston after the devastating tidal wave of 1900, when an efficient administration was required. The "Des Moines plan" adapted it to give more popular control, and the system spread to over one hundred communities before 1914. Another reform that reflected the desire for efficiency was the appointment of a city manager, an expert administrator employed by a council to carry out its policies. The first
one was hired by Staunton, Virginia in 1908. These moves towards government by experts were expressions of American Progressive beliefs that were not entirely derived from Germany — there were also British and indigenous roots — and as Bishop implied there were considerable differences from the German system, but some inspiration was drawn from that and it provided one reason for many Progressives having a favourable picture of Germany. Such feelings are seen in World's Work in 1910: "German cities are the best governed in the world." Unlike America, "the German idea is that a municipality is a business, to be conducted on business lines. The office of Mayer (i.e. Burgermeister) is one requiring knowledge and skill of a technical, professional character." The writer finally exclaims, "Sensible people, those Germans!" 28

Such articles as this show the percolation through the American reading public of knowledge of German municipal advances, and are at the opposite extreme from academic writings like Howard Woodhead's four reports on "The First German Municipal Exposition" in The American Journal of Sociology. He listed the numerous departments of the exposition, held at Dresden in 1903, covering traffic, charities, public health, education, public art and so on, explaining that the wide range of German municipal undertakings was possible because the "German municipality is a business corporation, run on business principles, by competent and efficient men who aim to serve their city and who honor the positions which they hold." Again the stress on business methods and efficiency is seen, and like many admirers of Germany Woodhead referred to Shaw's book in support of
his arguments. The particular features that Woodhead praised included the laying out of streets ("a highly developed science in Germany") and their decoration, city railways, municipalised harbours (which "allows of their location at such points as shall be best for the whole city"), municipal charity (which helped people before they had become "public charges in institutions"), the German "science of street-cleaning", and the profitable enterprises which enabled German towns to reduce their taxes. No explicit contrast with American conditions was made, but it would have been obvious to Woodhead's readers, and he made it clear that other countries could learn from Germany: "One of the chief lessons taught by this exposition is that the city is a social organism". German municipal administrations saw their city as an "organic body" and directed its functions and growth in a co-ordinated way that would benefit the whole community. As has been seen, Shaw also stressed the German sense of civic community, and this alternative to uncontrolled individualism was picked up by many reformers, including Howe, who wrote, also in 1903, that his own Cleveland, under Tom Johnson's reform administration, was "becoming organized ... It is learning to think as a municipality." 29

Woodhead demonstrated the conservatism evident in many Americans who approved of the German municipal system when he wrote approvingly of government by a board of experts that "the centralization of such great and minute power in one body of men will make for extreme conservatism, at the same time that it secures for the city a harmony and unity". He also felt
bound to reply to those who felt that public interference with the supply of housing (housing conditions were admitted to be a problem in Germany) would lead to communism, arguing that conditions which "affect society as a whole ... must be cared for by the social body." 30 This is an argument in favour of an enlightened self-interest, a recognition that urban problems, which might harm each individual, can only be solved by communal action. It is an argument which Howe was to take up strongly, although he laid greater stress on communal values per se.

From these descriptions it is obvious that Howe did not create the American interest in the German city, but he was to become the major synthesiser of such ideas and his career shows their effect on a particular Progressive reformer. After leaving Johns Hopkins he became personally involved in American urban problems. He saw the poverty in New York and joined the Vigilance League, which acted against saloons breaking regulations, but resigned when he realised that high taxes caused the bad saloons. In 1894 he moved to Cleveland, Ohio, attracted by its beauty, and practised law there. He joined the Charity Organization Society, but resigned when he decided that charity should be a matter for the individual and that the society merely kept "poverty out of sight" for the benefit of its rich members, who caused the poverty by paying low wages and not introducing safety measures. These insights prepared him to accept the German model, where such problems were tackled by legislative action. Another influence in this direction had been the Irish in New York, who had impressed Howe. He saw that, unlike the Anglo-Saxons, they "wanted a state that did things for them",
and this "instinct for collectivity" had led to New York developing parks, public baths, municipal ferries, a library service, good schools, etc.  

Howe's involvement in Cleveland politics began when it was proposed that new public buildings be constructed there. Howe and a friend, Morris Black, who had also lived in Germany, "saw the possibility of combining these structures into a splendid group, as is done in many of the capitals of Europe." They prepared illustrated features about such groups in Vienna, Paris, Budapest, Dresden and Munich for local journalists, and organised a campaign for a similar civic centre in Cleveland. Howe was also the secretary of the Cleveland Municipal Association, which opposed corruption and supported the election of respectable men from business and the professions, with university educations; the sort of men whom Howe had come to see at Johns Hopkins as the best and the sort of men who controlled the German cities. He wrote enthusiastic descriptions of the Association's activities to his old teacher, H.B. Adams, but it is noticeable that he did not refer to the German example in these letters, instead seeing Britain as having marked out the political path that America would follow. Even for someone with Howe's German connections, the pull of Britain was still strong. On the Association's "good government" platform Howe was elected to the Cleveland City Council in 1901, as a Republican.  

The reformer and Democrat, Tom L. Johnson, was elected as mayor at the same time, and Howe quickly came under his influence, adopting his belief in Henry George's single tax by which all
taxation would be replaced by a levy on the increasing value of land, and supporting him in the council. Under Johnson, work began on the civic centre, for which the architect Daniel H. Burnham was engaged. Burnham was a leading figure in the "City Beautiful" movement, believing that Paris, Vienna and Berlin, in particular, presented an example of beauty that American cities should follow. In 1901 he had visited Berlin and other cities, before drawing up his plans for the improvement of Washington, D.C., and he was employed on public buildings by another reformist mayor, Hazen S. Pingree, in Detroit. It seems ironic that these American Progressives should support the architectural ideas of a man who saw cities of the past as a model for those of the future.  

Burnham's civic centre was never actually completed, and the Johnson programme ran into other difficulties, which further affected Howe's conceptions of municipal politics. An ordinance to provide a cheap gas supply was defeated because of bribery by the existing gas company, and although it was then passed, Howe discovered that his own election campaign had been financed by the company. Respectable reform councillors, of Howe's own sort, opposed playgrounds, public baths and other amenities, because they would lead to increased taxes and were "socialistic". In order to get parks and so on, Johnson had to rely on the old politicians, showing Howe the limitations of "good government" reformers. Howe lost his seat in 1903, but became chairman of the city finance commission and, from 1905 to 1908, a member of the Ohio Senate, so he continued to
work with Johnson.

Since hearing Shaw's lectures, Howe was interested in "a city planned, built and conducted as a community enterprise" and he made clear in his autobiography that he personally valued this idea for its own sake, rather than for reasons of "economy, efficiency, and business methods", although the number of references to such principles in his writings shows his awareness of their appeal to many Americans. It was for his idea of the communal city that Howe worked in Cleveland, his optimism being maintained by frequent visits to Germany, "especially to Munich". He was "drawn there by orderliness, by the beauty of streets, concern for architecture, provision for parks, for gardens and museums, for the rich popular life of the people." Howe wanted to introduce all of these to America; in connection with the last of them, his work in 1911 to 1914 as director of the People's Institute, a foundation in New York for popular education, comes to mind. At that time he also founded the People's Music League and the Drama League of America, demonstrating a belief that the widespread cultural involvement of the Germans, often commented on by American writers, could be emulated in America.

The main policies of the Johnson administration were public ownership of utilities, particularly the street-railways and electric lighting, and the reduction to three cents of the street-railway fare. These again were policies accepted in Germany, but in Cleveland they aroused great opposition from
conservative businessmen and professionals: the class to which Howe felt he belonged. In 1908 the street-railways were taken over, but two years later the old companies regained control. Johnson's administration had thus achieved relatively little, although in the Ohio Senate Howe had helped to pass measures strengthening the merit system for public appointments and establishing primary elections (the former, if not the latter, bringing the state closer to German practice), and as a member of the Cleveland Board of Quadrennial Appraisers between 1909 and 1910 he promoted changes in the basis of assessment for city taxes that increased the valuation of unimproved land and reduced that of buildings, so that there was less incentive to keep land empty while its value rose because of adjacent improvements. This was again following the German practice as well as being a move towards Henry George's system. In 1910 Howe moved to New York, having made enough money from practising law to become a full-time writer. 

The ideas relating to the German city that were circulating in the United States, America's own urban problems, and Howe's involvement with both of these have been discussed, so his own writings on the German city can now be considered. He had begun to write for the popular magazines in order to explain the Johnson programme, and this was also the purpose of his book *The City: The Hope of Democracy* (1905), in which he explained that the democratic system had failed because "privileged interests ... have taken possession of our institutions for their own enrichment." He expressed his opposition to those reformers, among whom he had once been numbered, who
believed that cities should be governed by experts and that a "businessman's government is (the) highest ideal." He was to return to such ideas when he presented the German model, but at this time he believed that only increased democracy could end "government by special privileges and big businessmen". In this book he did not see Germany as a model: Berlin was included, with New York and Chicago, in a list of cities where "the family often ends with itself", instead of there being a communal spirit, and he claimed that American cities had better fire brigades, parks, libraries and schools than those of Britain and Germany. Nevertheless, only some British cities had conditions as bad as America, although it was to British cities that he looked for an example of democratisation, and particularly to the growth of public ownership there. He pointed to the reduction of street railway fares in both Britain and Germany (an important issue in Cleveland), but the only major reference to Germany came during a discussion of the taxation of land, when he wrote, "In certain cities in Germany, it has become the policy to buy up surrounding land in advance of the city's growth, and thus retain the benefits and the unearned increments of the city's expansion." Howe strongly approved of this policy and he urged Johnson to follow suit in Cleveland, but the state laws of Ohio would not permit it. Howe adopted Johnson's belief in decentralization of power and "home rule" for the American cities, so that they could exercise the powers of their German counterparts.

In The City, Howe concluded that with public ownership of utilities, to prevent corruption, and taxation of ground rents,
to transfer the financial burden to the rich landowners, "the city would become in effect an enlarged home", with the growth of a new civic spirit, and so "the new civilization ... will be open to realization." Part of the importance of this book was the assertion that a new American democracy would begin in the cities, which writers like James Bryce had seen as the worst failure of the American democratic system. Part of Howe's inspiration for this idea had come from his knowledge of the German situation, although in this book he was concerned to assert American values and, in particular, to argue from the point of view of Cleveland, so he limited his German references. Also, since he was arguing for greater democracy, a feature lacking in the German cities, he referred to British examples instead, although he was critical of the undemocratic nature of the British Parliament. 38

By 1908 he had become even more critical of Britain, perhaps because at that time his crusade in Cleveland was going well, so that in The British City: The Beginnings of Democracy he could contrast British cities unfavourably with American ones. He admitted that the British cities had no corruption and had a "simple, direct, democratic" organisation, adding, "Great Britain has achieved what we in America have long prayed for. Her local politics are in the hands of her business men." This shows a return to the stance that he had repudiated in The City; presumably the brighter outlook in America had led him to believe again in less radical solutions. He even noted approvingly that the British municipal suffrage was "limited to the tax-paying class", so that there were "responsible"
councillors and no corrupt bosses. But despite these advantages, "poverty is at its worst in the British city." Howe blamed this on the overall control of an undemocratic Parliament, representing the owners of the land, the public utility companies and the slums. He explained that the landlords held on to their land, exempting it from direct taxation and not bothering to develop it, so that the ensuing land shortage pushed up the rents that they received, particularly from slum properties. This "tyranny of the past" he contrasted with the situation in "Germany, France, Holland, Switzerland, even Italy", where there had been reforms in land-ownership and the powers of municipalities to develop land.

Howe contradicted himself again in a chapter comparing British and American cities, where he boasted that the latter were more democratic and more prepared to help the poor. The British limitations on the suffrage might prevent corruption, but it also meant that the voters were obsessed with reducing municipal expenditure so as to keep their taxes low. Howe wrote of "the growing demand for municipal beauty" in American cities, "notably Cleveland", which "are doing many of the things that make the German city so attractive", whereas the parsimonious British city "is the ugliest city in Europe". Evidently, the British municipal system was not so attractive after all, and as the book proceeds Howe becomes increasingly critical of it. Whereas "France and Germany attacked the feudal system at its roots by abolishing the economic privileges of the overlord", in Britain the "land monopoly ... was left intact", so
that very few own land. When the British cities tried to buy the surrounding land - a "great success" in Germany - Parliament prevented them. Howe was clearly implying that the German cities were freer than the British ones, and he suggested that Britain was not freer than Germany at a national level, claiming that the British governing class was "almost as immune from criticism as is the Czar or the Kaiser." Britain was full of "symptoms of decay", and "Industry is lacking in that robust aggressiveness that characterises Germany and America". There was no "independent peasant farmer", as in South Germany and elsewhere.40

The number of unfavourable comparisons with Germany multiply. For example:

Many of the municipalities of Germany provide for the cheap and expeditious transit of working-men into the suburbs. In Great Britain the Town Councils have done what they could in this direction, but the monopoly of the land has thwarted their efforts to do very much.

Furthermore, in Britain and America transport is operated by private companies to make a profit, whereas in Belgium and Germany "the means of transportation are owned by the State, and are operated with a conscious policy of serving the people". He returned to the question of cities owning land, which was so important in Cleveland and accorded with the preoccupations of followers of Henry George. Howe explained that the Prussian government actually encouraged municipalities to buy adjacent land, so that they could improve housing conditions, writing,
"The land so acquired is laid out by the city in anticipation of the needs of the people." He described how builders had to stick to the plan, so that factories were kept away from houses, open spaces were preserved, and sub-standard housing could not be built. Public buildings and trees were included in the plan, and the appearance of the streets was taken into consideration. Howe enthused:

The German city has already developed a strong sense of the dignity and the possibility of the city, while the central government has accorded it ample powers for the working out of its life. It is this that explains the efficiency of the German city rather than the form of its government. It has a large degree of freedom and a fine sense of itself.

This freedom of the German cities to act as their administrations felt appropriate was very important to Howe, particularly in view of his experiences in Cleveland. It enabled them to own land and to plan their own development, whereas in America land was privately owned and owners could build on it as they pleased. Even nowadays, as S.B. Warner wrote, America has "rejected the social dimensions of property ownership" and most American cities are "forbidden by statute and state constitution to enter the private land market freely." 41

Howe wrote that both American and British cities lacked "any strong concern for human life", and were doing little to solve the housing problem, whereas the German cities tackled that problem at its root, by buying land to be used for building, by taxing land values, and sometimes by imposing an extra tax.
on undeveloped land. He explicitly stated that America should follow this example, and that cities had to be free from legislatures. This last chapter of his book was entitled "The City of Tomorrow", and he stated that America would probably lead the way toward it, but the overwhelming impression he gave was that the future city should be sought in Germany. Thus, a book that began by praising the British city ended by implying that it was actually constrained completely by a tyrannical Parliament and that real civic freedom was to be found in the German cities.

Howe evidently accepted the logic of his arguments, since after leaving Cleveland he concentrated on writing about the German municipalities. He also continued to write about British cities, but in an increasingly critical tone. For example, an article on "Old London" in 1910 emphasised the "tentacles of the past (which) cling ... tenaciously to the present" and "institutions which linger on ... untouched by the progress of democracy", protected by a "veneration for the past" unique to England, where "France, Germany, even Italy, have dared to use the knife on feudalism." Britain was thus no longer a pattern for Progressive Americans to adopt, although Howe, like Albert Shaw, was more enthusiastic about reforms in Glasgow.

Shortly before he left Cleveland Howe published Privilege and Democracy, a study of the "warfare of classes ... bent on the control of the government for economic advantage" in America. In particular, he looked at the way in which the rich used the law to maintain their position. This time Germany and Britain
were lumped together in a list of countries where "the land is still held in great estates", so that their "landless peasants" emigrated to America, where they could acquire land. Some pages later this was partially retracted, Howe admitting that "widely distributed ownership prevails" in South Germany, but not in Prussia. This meant, according to his argument, that the former was democratic, but the latter, like Britain, was aristocratic, which appears to leave the national situation in Germany ambiguous. In America, democracy had come from the West, where land was free (the influence of Frederick Jackson Turner is obvious), but corporations had illegally appropriated public land and established monopolies over natural resources and transportation. Remembering the teachings of H.B. Adams, Howe wrote that the "Roman idea of private ownership" had historically triumphed over "the German idea of common ownership under the village community" (a tradition that he evidently saw as living on in the communal spirit of German cities), and the problems of America arose from the growing demand for land, which had become concentrated in a few hands. These landowners, protected by the law, increased rents, thus causing poverty. The only solutions were socialism or "industrial freedom", as proposed by Henry George, and Howe argued in favour of the latter, supporting the abolition of legal privileges, nationalisation of utilities, and a single tax on land values. He brought forward, by implication, the German example in support of the second of these measures when he stated that only Britain and America failed to realise that the railways should be publicly owned, and he explicitly stated that most of the larger German cities already taxed the unearned
At this time it was evident that Howe was moving to the Left - in *Privilege and Democracy* he stated that his reforms would lead to the domination of labour in society - yet he increasingly pointed to the example of monarchical Germany, believing that the municipal structure there was distinct from and not dependent upon the national political system. He also believed that in Germany freedom was rising up from the working-class, as he showed in "The Peaceful Revolution", the first article of a series, "Industrial Democracy in Europe", for *The Outlook*. He saw Germany as the chief battleground for the European "conflict between privilege and democracy" arising from "industrial and social change." Bismarck's attempts to use social reforms to block socialism had carried Germany "into the camp of the proletariat", so that "Germany is expanding like the crust of the earth under the pressure of a volcano, in spite of a Constitution designed in the interests of autocracy and the landed junkers." Howe was here identifying himself with the German socialists, but it must be remembered that in the years immediately before the First World War such terms as "progressive", "radical" and "socialist" were often used loosely and interchangeably by advanced American reformers. Appealing to the preconceptions of his contemporaries, Howe pointed out that German reforms, apart from their inherent benefits, were also "a primary cause of her industrial efficiency." He proceeded to lay particular stress on the municipal activities - utilities, housing, labour registration offices, taxes on
land speculators, etc. - rather than on national reforms, such as insurance schemes, thus revealing his own preconceptions. Howe believed that in America reform had to begin at the city level, so he put too great a stress on German municipal activities rather than those of the German government.

Howe wrote, "Germany leads the world in social legislation. Germany gave modern socialism to the world, and its philosophy has saturated other classes." He thus had come to see socialism as the engine for reform and freedom in Germany and, indeed, Europe, but he recognised that the process still had some way to go. Germany was not yet fully democratic, unlike Switzerland and Denmark, which Howe described as the most democratic countries in the world, but in a later article he wrote that all three of these countries show "that the old philosophy of individualism has broken down, and that there are many activities which the State itself must assume in order to protect the people and promote their common welfare." Presumably he concentrated on presenting Germany as an example to America because they were more alike in size and output, and Germany was more dynamic than Switzerland and Denmark. Also, Germany gave Howe more to write about.

Howe returned to Germany for the last essay in his series, having also dealt with Switzerland, Denmark and Belgium. Despite his denial, quoted above, of being interested in municipal reforms on the fashionable grounds of efficiency, Howe derived from his religious, small town upbringing a passionate hatred of waste, which was obviously linked to his love of order.
This opposition to waste underlay much of the American interest in efficiency, as seen in the work of F.W. Taylor, and writers like Harrington Emerson claimed that poverty could be eliminated without any re-distribution of wealth, merely by eliminating waste in the economy and giving the savings to the poor. Howe did not believe in such simple-minded nostrums, and his hatred of waste was widely defined and altruistic, as demonstrated by "How Germany Cares for Her Working People." He wrote that the world had followed Germany's example in developing by-products, to avoid industrial waste, but only Switzerland "has followed her example in saving the waste of human lives which the mill and the factory produce." Germany recognised that the state could be used for good purposes and that "modern industry has made those who labor dependent upon other causes than their own thrift or willingness to work." This assertion of the importance of impersonal economic forces countered the Social Darwinist ideology which upheld American laissez-faire practices, and Howe went further in attacking the hypocrisy of those businessmen who proclaimed such ideas: Germany "has no written Constitution through which privilege can drive a four-horse team with ease but which closes fast around any attempt to use the powers of Government for the protection of the many." The obvious implication was that an ordinary citizen in monarchical Germany had more real freedom than his counterpart in supposedly democratic America, and this was going further in support of the German system at the national level than Howe had previously done.

He enthusiastically listed the ways in which Germany cared for
its people, this time stressing "possibly the most wonderful system of education in the modern world", the national insurance system and other national measures, but not forgetting municipal activities: he pointed out that German cities, unlike those in America, regarded it as their responsibility to provide "distress work" for the unemployed, especially in winter. Furthermore, city and government officials and academics were continually searching for new solutions to social problems. There was still poverty and a housing shortage, but "the impressive thing ... is that the nation views these questions in something of the same light that it does the building of Dreadnoughts, of railways, of canals, the adjustment of taxes, and the building of cities." Howe is here stressing not only the importance that one of America's chief competitors attached to social reforms, but also their practicality. In this article he recognized the wider, national context of reform, into which the municipal situation fitted.

Nevertheless, Howe's chief enthusiasm continued to be for the German cities, as expressed, in for example, another magazine article of 1910, "City Building in Germany." He declared that no modern cities compared with those of Germany, which he described in a positively visionary way, asserting that "the German people are expressing their pride in the fatherland and the imperial aspirations of Germany in monuments of ... permanent character and artistic splendor." Again he was drawing a connection between the success of the city and that of the nation, and showing an increasing sympathy to the latter; it was as if, having convinced himself that the forces of progress
were bound to succeed in Germany, he then anticipated their success and became prepared to accept Germany as a wholly progressive nation. On this occasion Howe stressed the aesthetic qualities of the German cities, the beautiful pattern of their "vision", "execution" and "outlook", which were more important to him than mere honesty of government and efficiency. This pattern was explicitly seen as part of a wider one, since in the army, the educational system and the economy, as well as the cities, there was the same use of science and that "far-sightedness" which "characterizes Germany in all things". Unusually for him, Howe here attributed to Wilhelm II the plan for developing cities so as to produce better people for industry, the army and the navy; a considerable change from his strictures on Wilhelmine autocracy in 1893, which shows the effects of Wilhelm's favourable image in America as well as Howe's developed belief in strong state action.

Howe stressed as usual the importance that the German cities attached to the interests of the community, as opposed to the liberty of the individual to do as he liked with his property, and he explained how Germany had developed the strict town-planning, which required this condition, into a science. Once again, he continually drew contrasts with America: "The American city is impotent before the owner and the builder, the sky-scraper and the tenement owner. It can take but little thought of the morrow." He described the public buildings, parks, beautiful streets, good utilities and sensible finance of German municipalities, adding, "When we consider
the relative poverty of the German people ... the attitude of our own cities toward these matters seems positively parsimonious and niggardly." He again made the point that the German advances were due to an acceptance of state action to improve life and promote the economy, whereas Americans were "obsessed with the idea that the laws of commerce are like the laws of nature ... that they cannot be controlled or aided by man." Of course, this situation was already changing in America, but by no means to the same extent as in Germany. The chief reward of government action, Howe implies here, is beauty, which, he explained, extends in Germany even to industrial areas, Dusseldorf harbour, for instance, being "as complete and symmetrical as a machine." As usual in Howe's writings, he swings between such idealistic points as that, and more practical points that would appeal to his audience; here he lists industrial developments and points out that 1500 small German towns make so much from their land-holdings that they do without local taxes. Furthermore, "If it is suggested that all this is socialistic, the German business man shrugs his shoulders and says: 'It may be, but it is good business.'" This shows a change from the days when Shaw denied that German municipal activities were socialistic; Howe was implying that German businessmen had accepted socialism, because it works, a further demonstration of his, and American reformers', move to the Left.

Howe concluded on that idealistic note he increasingly stressed: the German system "pays not only in the current coin of commerce,
but in the refinement, the cheerfulness, the happiness, and the outlook on life of the poorest citizen." There is a distinct air of exaggeration in this, and the impression is given that for Howe the German cities provided an excuse for him to present his own vision of the ideal city. They may have been the closest things on earth to the Platonic model, but he was looking through them to the latter. He wrote that "the German city has dreams, dreams which are fast being visualized", and it may be that for him these dreams coloured the reality.

Such impressions are heightened by an article written later in 1910, "Dusseldorf : A City of Tomorrow", in which Howe stated that the problem of the cities was probably the most important problem in America. He rejected his old solutions of a business administration or government by good men:

The solution consists in making the city a humanized entity, with purposes and plans, with foresight and dreams, with humanity and generosity; it consists in abolishing poverty and the costs of poverty, in training the people properly, in raising their standards of living, of happiness, of morals.

This sounds like a dream, and Howe stated that he dreamt of such cities and then saw them in Germany. As in the previous article, he singled out Dusseldorf for particular praise; as an industrial city, he wrote, it might have been ugly, corrupt, ruled by self-interested businessmen - like an American city - but in fact it was "managed with more scrupulous honesty, more scientific efficiency, and more devoted pride than almost any American business corporation" and was "built for the comfort
and convenience of its people." It owned enterprises from street railways to slaughterhouses, from art galleries to cemeteries; it could plan itself; and it could bring justice to the poor. It was "a socialized city managed by businessmen who do not believe in socialism." Here presumably was hope for America: it would be impossible to convert American businessmen to socialism, as a theory, but perhaps they could be persuaded to carry out socialist policies, if they too would benefit from them. Howe organised visits by groups of American businessmen to Germany, in the hope that they would be inspired by what they saw. 52

In his piece on Dusseldorf Howe listed, as usual, the attributes of the German city, especially the sensible use of land. Half the land in American cities, he wrote, was kept idle by speculators. He also stressed the recreational opportunities which made "life such a livable thing for the German workman." The idea of introducing the workers to beauty and recreation was popular with some American Social Gospel writers, such as Edwin L. Earp, who called it "the socialization of workingmen", but Howe's was a secular, not a religious, vision. The idea that ordinary Germans had cheap and easy access to the arts, as well as parks and so on, was frequently expressed by American writers on the country, and it was widely believed, as Howe put it, that they had "richer" lives than their American equivalents, despite lower wages. Thus, Germans knew how to enjoy themselves, and, on the other hand, German education made "efficient people", whereas "education in America seems
unrelated to life."53

Howe asked why the German cities had succeeded, unlike the American ones, and pointed to their traditions, the "sense of the supremacy of the fatherland", the dignity in official life, and the trained administrators. These enabled enlightened businessmen to carry out good policies, whereas Tom L. Johnson, Sam L. Jones, Brand Whitlock and Hazen S. Pingree had been thwarted by corrupt city officials and self-interested businessmen. Howe made the same points in "The German and the American City" and "The American City of To-Morrow". He found hope in the American development of the commission plan and so on, but he was aware that German ideas of town planning were moving faster than America could keep up with them. American cities were being laid out as checker boards, but, "Now the German city planners are protesting against any formal plan. Not uniformity but diversity, coziness, the unexpected is the thing to be studied in the laying out of city streets."54

"Howe contrasted Dusseldorf favourably with Pittsburgh, as did John S. Gregory in an article for The World's Work, which dealt with the German roots of John Nolen, who was attributed by J.L. Hancock with founding American city planning in 1907. Nolen studied at the University of Munich and became a city planner on being inspired by the pleasant cities of Germany. He had previously been a landscape designer, having seen American cities as places from which to escape. Gregory described the comforts of the German cities that had caused this change
of mind, from the abolition of noise to cheap transport, and, above all, their beauty. American interest in town planning was shown by the national conference on the subject held at Washington in 1909. Like Howe, all the participants were aware of the recent German experiments, having rejected Daniel Burnham's models from the past. However, since, as Nolen pointed out, there was really no town planning as such in the U.S.A., Howe was being over-optimistic in pointing to the latest German measures.55

He did so again in a paper to the 1911 annual meeting of the American Sociological Society, describing modern German streets as "works of art" and calling for American cities to be planned as a whole too. Howe was particularly attached to this idea of the unity of the German city, and his writings are full of references to the German city thinking as "an individual", which reflects the disunity that was being felt in contemporary America. In his address he claimed that American political corruption was due to institutions, not individuals, explaining that American voters were not interested in their cities because they lacked the extensive functions of the German cities.56

On December 4, 1911, the City Club of New York, an organisation interested in municipal reform, held a meeting on the subject of German city government. Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, talked about town planning, cheap houses for workmen, civic ownership of land, and extra taxation of vacant land
to encourage building: items that would appeal to his audience, as did the statement, "In German towns all works which have the character of a monopoly are to a great extent municipalised", which drew applause. Albert Shaw then discussed Germany's permanent expert municipal officials, which he still saw as the most important factor, after which Howe talked on "How the German City Cares for Its People". He said that the main difference between American and German cities was that the former worked for businessmen and the latter for all. Thus, in America there were protests against unfit meat, while German cities built slaughterhouses; in America private interests stopped the development of waterfronts, to prevent competition, while German cities built harbours. He continued in this vein throughout, contrasting the problems of New York, in particular, with the German solutions. A topical example was the use by bankers of the reserves of New York life insurance companies to build up industrial monopolies, whereas the German insurance funds were used to build workingmen's houses with low rents. All of these measures, he said, were accepted by German businessmen because they strengthened Germany; the implication was that the self-interest of American business weakened America. The appeal to American nationalism was not one that Howe often made, but it was a strong reason for many Progressives who advocated the adoption of German reforms.

Howe's ideas evidently went down well in New York, since after making this speech he was appointed director of the People's Institute. He mixed in radical circles, becoming increasingly
convinced that he was playing a part in a re-birth of American politics and culture. His articles on the German cities continued: "City Sense: Cities that Think" extolled their beauty, exemplified by "imposing, commodious, commanding" railway stations. He stated that town planning was the most important factor in the German municipal success, and he described the system of zoning, which kept factories away from houses, thus preserving living conditions. Howe's writings played an important part in the American adoption of this practice, which spread widely after the passing of the New York Zoning Law in 1916, but there were also indigenous precedents in California, where "nuisance-zone statutes" were directed against the Chinese.58

This article included the usual list of German civic achievements, with the usual American contrasts, ending with the assertion of German belief in community versus the pre-eminence of private business in America. A few months later, in "Where the Business Men Rule", Howe re-asserted the other side of this. Although European, and especially German, cities did "many things which we would call socialism", they were actually governed by men of business, who realised that it was in their own long-term interest to put the community before immediate business interests. Thus, high expenditure on "the amenities of life" attracted business and tourists, while the quality of the workers and the public facilities provided reduced the costs of industry. Howe admitted that the German government was "autocratic", but the German cities had "the most democratic administration in the modern world", presumably in the sense of working for all,
and because of this:

The efficiency of Germany is largely traceable to the big vision of the city, to an appreciation of the necessity of controlling the predatory greed of the few for the welfare of the many. It is the understanding of the fact that some business is, of necessity, public business ... that explains the prosperity of all business in that country. It is this, too, that explains the expanding power of Germany in the markets of the world and the comparative contentment of her people...59

Here he was not only appealing to the enlightened self-interest of American businessmen but also, once again, to the national interest. Germany was increasingly seen as a commercial rival of America's, so Americans might try to emulate its advantages.

Howe continued to advocate a tax on the unearned increment on land, pointing out that an imperial law of 1911 had extended such a tax throughout Germany, and he described how German cities acquired heavy debts which were, however, more than balanced by the profitable municipal enterprises thus financed.60 American cities were not allowed to spend in this way.

In 1913 appeared the summation of Howe's work on the German cities, European Cities at Work. Of its twenty-one chapters, fifteen deal entirely or mainly with Germany, five with Britain, and one with the comparative situation in America. Howe expressed optimism about the spread of commission governments, municipal ownership of utilities, city planning and other reforms in America, but asserted that American cities still did not
think as communities. Once more he was presenting the German model of the city as "a business corporation organized to realize the maximum of returns to the community", as opposed to the American city's identity as a "political agency of the state", within which individualism ran riot. He repeated the points he had made in his articles, many passages being lifted straight from them. He extolled the all-embracing vision of the German cities, writing that only the Germans recognised "the city as the permanent centre of the civilization of the future." 61

Howe showed himself au fait with the latest housing developments in Germany, such as the building of garden cities to accommodate the working-class, an idea that attracted attention from American architects and planners, particularly Benjamin C. Marsh. He also dealt with the model apartment houses, so different from American tenements, particularly those at Ulm, which the economist John F. Crowell had praised as long ago as 1899. These had been built by the city on land it bought, to combat overcrowding among the working-class. As Crowell put it, "In the housing of the working-class families the absence of an effective provident impulse toward self-help requires the community to make up what the class lacks as a means of attaining a high enough state of industrial efficiency to compete with other communities ..." 62 The patronising, dryly academic tone contrasts dramatically with Howe's enthusiastic descriptions of German reforms and community spirit, although Crowell was making the same point as Howe often made. Crowell was not, however, explicitly presenting a model for America to follow,
and the fact that Howe was doing so added an urgency and perhaps some exaggeration to his writing.

Workingmen's houses provided but one example of the beauty, comfort and convenience that Howe described. As he stated, the German practices went beyond the most radical American ideas, and yet were supported by all social classes. On and on went the list of health measures, beautiful public buildings, municipal enterprises, town planning, abattoirs (of which there was a particularly enthusiastic account, significant in view of the commotion aroused by Upton Sinclair's revelations in *The Jungle*), protection for workers, educational and cultural institutions, etc. etc. He described the development of the taxes on land values, another subject that had aroused interest in America, although, strangely, Howe remarked that the *Wertzuwachssteuer*, or unearned increment tax, was not supported by Henry George's followers, who wanted all taxation to derive from land. Howe was evidently sufficiently pragmatic to welcome a move that did succeed in discouraging land speculation. He described the expert administration of German cities, a point on which he usually put less emphasis than did Shaw. Here he described the *Magistrat* as "probably the most efficient administrative agency in the world", and he stressed the importance that Germans attached to official standing rather than wealth, which inspired businessmen to serve without payment. He referred in passing to the undemocratic three-class voting system in the Prussian towns, admitting that there was no real "free expression of the popular will", but he played down the importance of this by later pointing out that German councils
still had "dignity" and "authority", unlike American ones, and that American reforms were too concerned with "method" rather than "achievement", whereas Germany and Britain used their old systems to new ends (a point straight out of Albert Shaw.)

Such excuses, however, could not satisfy Howe's democratic radicalism, and in the next chapter he returned to the Prussian voting system, by which "the great mass of the people are denied any hope of control" and which "lies at the heart of reaction in Germany", giving control of the state to East Prussian landowners and of the city to rich businessmen. Yet this latter fact was one that Howe had often used to make the German city more attractive to the American middle-class; he was displaying an ambiguity about whether democracy or efficiency was preferable which was often seen in American Progressives' views of Germany. This very chapter was about the rule of businessmen in German cities, and how they, unlike the Junkers at the national level, worked on behalf of all the people, not just their own class. Throughout the book this fact about the respectability of men carrying out apparently socialistic policies was asserted, and the conduct of the German cities was compared favourably to that of American business corporations. Even the socialists, who might one day take over the cities, were described as businesslike and capable of keeping up standards.

Howe asked why the German city was "so efficient, honest, and business-like", replying that its citizens were devoted to it, because, unlike American cities, it had wide freedom of action.
Earlier, he stated that, "Much of the waste of the American
city is due to the limitation on its borrowing powers." This
was something that could be changed in America, but he also
explained that Germany had feudal traditions of the individual
being subordinate to the state, which would seem to make a
transfer less likely. On the other hand, the ambition of
Germany to become a world power, which Howe thought lay behind
government encouragement of the cities, was something not alien
to America. Howe added that the public ownership of utilities
was essential to the German sense of community, since private
ownership "divorces the talent of the community from politics",
by which he meant that the business and professional classes
found their interests opposed to those of the municipality.
His own Cleveland was in his list of American cities where such
conflict arose.65 Despite his radicalism, his middle-class
background was strong enough for him still to see that class
as the repository of talent, but in this he was typical of most
Progressives.

After a rather peremptory discussion of the British city, des-
cribed as full of poverty and bad housing, limited by the rate-
payers' dislike of expenditure, dominated by the feudal aristo-
cracy, and lacking professional city administrators, so therefore
"far less brilliant than the German city", Howe turned to the
American situation. He pointed out that American cities were
obsessed with such matters as the regulation of saloons, whereas
in Europe these were accepted and the cities could deal with
"more important issues". The lack of useful activities by
American cities meant that the citizens had little attachment
to them, while the system of checks and balances prevented even reformist administrations from doing much. Howe did not advocate wholesale imitation of European models, writing that the federal and commission plans would be effective, if controversial questions could be avoided at the local level, if the political system was simplified, and if cities gained home rule. He concluded optimistically, pointing to the successes of American reformers in shortening ballots, introducing the initiative and referendum, and so on, and he claimed that in America the city was becoming seen as "a conscious, living organism."66

In accordance with this optimism, Howe continued to praise the German municipal system as a basis for American reforms. In November, 1914 he read a paper at the Conference of American Mayors on Public Policy as to Municipal Utilities, producing European evidence in support of municipal ownership. He stressed, as usual, the "business-like" nature of the German cities, with their running of profitable as well as unprofitable services, but backed this up with the argument that the German cities believed in "community living", so that the provision of a good service was more important than a municipal profit. He enthused about the standards of these services and pointed out that, "The German city has carried socialisation further than any city in the world ... despite the fact that the German city is governed by businessmen, who, through the limitations on the suffrage, elect the members of the council, who in turn select the administrative agents." Previously Howe had used the fact that German cities were governed by businessmen to encourage their American counterparts to support
reforms, but here the tone seems more critical of Germany and the implication to be that if undemocratic Germany can do such things, democratic America should be capable too. He again made the point that in Britain and Germany the "best talent" could take part in city government, whereas in America it was tied to the utility companies. Only a small part of this paper concerned Germany; it was mainly devoted to British examples, and this perhaps shows Howe's awareness that the outbreak of the First World War had reduced his audience's sympathy to Germany.

It did not have much effect, in the short term, on his own attitude to Germany, since he saw the war as the result of imperialistic attempts by the various European ruling-classes to extend their undemocratic privileges abroad. Germany was thus not especially to blame, and Howe continued to praise its cities. However, his optimism about the effect of American reforms increased. In The Modern City and Its Problems, as in his previous book, he listed features of American cities, such as the tax system, which were more advanced than in Europe, and he indicated political reforms that had made a more direct line between voters and city governments. He even criticised those who based criticisms of American cities on a comparison with Europe, as if he had not done this repeatedly, reversing his previous argument that American and German cities were in effect the same age, in their modern form, to stress instead the long German traditions of order and multifarious municipal activities.
He still had five main criticisms of American cities: the lack of home rule; city charters that limited officials' actions; private ownership of utilities and services in the streets; the lack of public control over planning and building; and the regulation of the saloons by the state, not the city. All of these showed a lack of communal feeling and the dominance of an "individualistic philosophy ... inherited from England", and Howe proceeded to show that in Germany each of these faults was absent, making the German cities "the most wonderful cities the world has known". His only criticisms of them was that the property owners on German councils sometimes opposed reforms, to keep land values high, and that "property limitations on the suffrage" tied "Prussia, as well as her cities, to reaction." By this he presumably meant that the three-class voting system left the Prussian government in the control of the Junkers, but "reaction" was not a word he generally applied to the city governments. Once again, the strain between a desire for democracy and admiration for government by businessmen is evident. Howe's ambivalence as regards German "reaction" was even more evident when, after describing the numerous ways in which German cities cared for their poor citizens, he wrote, "All of these activities of the German city are part of a conscious imperial programme of human efficiency ... to conserve the health, the strength and the working capacity of all classes." Thus, a reactionary government was responsible for protecting its people more than any other in the world. The obvious implication was that a democracy ought to do as well.
The Modern City and Its Problems gave most praise to Germany, but it did commend the British cities for housing developments, such as the garden cities. Nevertheless, Howe pointed to German advances in that field too. One area in which he saw Germany as leading the world was that of recreation: only Germany "officially recognizes the leisure life of the people", with municipal cultural institutions, from opera houses to military bands, providing an artistic training for the whole people. Howe linked this to the People's Music League and Educational Dramatic League, which he had established in New York to bring art to the masses, but he stated that in America leisure was generally commercialised, which led to crime and vice. Despite such comparisons, the picture of the German city in this book was slightly less Utopian than previously, perhaps because Howe was so hopeful about the process of reform in the American cities. Nearly four hundred of them had democratised their charters and established the most democratic political machinery in the world. Most American municipalities still lacked the "new ideal of the city, a new sense of the obligations and possibilities of organized government", stressing the welfare of people, not property, but Howe saw public opinion moving in that direction. Nevertheless, his praise of the German city was still high: it was "one of the most efficient corporations in the world. There is no waste, no extravagance, rarely any suggestion of graft or corruption." 70

Howe's last published work dealing with his beloved German cities was Socialized Germany (1915). As the title suggests, the book's scope was wider than the municipal field, and its other aspects
are discussed elsewhere. This book is more critical of German militarism than Howe's previous works, presumably because of the World War, and this gives added force to the statement that, "The German city is ... Germany at her best." Howe was obviously aware that a large section of American opinion had turned against Germany, and he was clearly here trying to maintain belief in German municipal superiority, so that America could continue to aim at the same standards. He produced the usual list of virtues deriving from rule by experts, the constitutional position of the German cities and the belief in the common welfare. He remarked that in an autocracy one would expect "centralization" - as, he ironically added, was the case in France, Britain and America - but in fact the German cities had a great deal of power. He enthused about German town-planning, about which he was, as usual, up to date, being a reader of Der Stadttebau, the German journal. He repeatedly made the point that the "welfare of the community, of all the people" was the criterion for action and that "private property is subordinated to the public weal." In contrast, Americans still saw the city as only a "police agency."71

Howe was not the first American to praise the "most wonderful" of modern cities, as found in Germany, although he was the most enthusiastic. Throughout the period under consideration, the exemplary status of the German cities was something of a cliché, as can be seen by references in American literature. F. Marion Crawford in A Cigarette-Maker's Romance (1890) described a small tobacconist's shop, then continued, "As we are in Munich,
however, the side street is broad and clean, the pavement is well swept and the adjoining houses have an air of respectability and wealth." Once again an American was impressed by the Germans' avoidance of unsightly advertisements; in this street a "neat little iron kiosque" is provided, and on it are displayed "brilliant" posters. Neatness, convenience and solidity are the watchwords here, but twenty-four years later another romantic novelist displayed a wider appreciation of German municipal developments.

In The Democratic Rhine-Maid Franklin Kent Gifford described the imaginary Rhenish village of Ellenberg as "a spick-and-span modern German town", with good streets, but he also remarked that, "The very medievalism was largely a restoration of picturesque old types, re-executed with German thoroughness and fidelity", thus showing an awareness of German architectural and town-planning methods. Nothing "unsightly" was permitted to spoil the effect;

Neither was the riverside monopolized by dirty old wharves and decayed business blocks, but by gardens, parks and comely, well-chosen quays where business was transacted without offense. A pang of envy was in Alfred's American heart as he looked on all this civic decency and reflected that nowhere in the whole wide land of his birth could anything of the kind be found!

The detail displayed here and the explicit comparison with America reflect the concerns of the Progressive era and seem to show the particular influence of Howe's writings, since the beauty of German water-front developments was a theme that he
stressed again and again. 73

If Howe was ambiguous about the relationship between the German cities' efficiency and lack of democracy, Gifford, who was a Unitarian minister in New England, was frankly confused. He attributed German civic standards to German "democracy", but immediately stated that Ellenberg's attractions were due to the work of the local baroness and her father. Presumably the effect of the Bismarckian social reforms had been to make some Americans believe that in Germany democracy came from above. The point of Gifford's book is that the Baroness von Ellenberg is democratic in her principles, thus being a suitable partner for the American hero, Alfred, whose interest in reform is awoken by her and who therefore decides to become a muckraker. Prior to meeting Alfred the baroness has disapproved of Americans, considering that their worship of wealth made them undemocratic. 74 It is not too fanciful to suggest that in this undistinguished but mildly charming novel the widespread idea that monarchical Germany could yet be an example of reform to America found expression; and it is significant that Gifford represented German progressivism by a model town.

Non-fictional works intended to present Germany and the Germans to an American audience almost always contained a chapter on the German cities, which shows how widespread was awareness of their significance. Robert M. Berry's Germany of the Germans (1911) did so, approvingly describing investments in buildings and enterprises as well as the municipalisation of utilities. This was so that activities essential "to the
whole community should not be in the hands of private owners, who are striving only for their own benefit." In the midst of these descriptions came this comment: "So many of the cities of Germany are real models of municipal government that it is impossible to take one as a specimen and say: 'This is the model city'." Such enthusiasm is particularly noteworthy in a book that included many criticisms of other aspects of Germany.

An even more critical book was Price Collier's *Germany and the Germans from an American Point of View* (1913). Collier was a conservative Republican who believed that the Germans were enslaved by "socialistic legislation", yet even he had some words of praise for Berlin, with its famous street cleaning system and people of the type of Elihu Root heading the city government. What pleased him most about the German cities, however, was that they lacked the reformers who caused "confusion" in American politics. This does show the wide appeal that the German city could have in America, even outside the ranks of Progressives.

Collier's ire was directed particularly at moral reformers, and he was pleased by the lack of hypocrisy in Berlin, where there could exist "a palace of vice" selling champagne. The guide-book *Old Countries Discovered Anew: A Motor Book for Everybody* took a more positive view of this subject. Whereas Americans tended to think that the Germans lacked freedom,

There are no so-called blue laws in Germany. It
seems to me that we poor Americans... unable to buy a drink on Sunday or to make a bet at the races, unable to smoke on a street car platform... should beware of throwing stones.

Howe also expressed approval of this sort of freedom in German cities, to a certain extent; although he was concerned with immorality in American cities, he was not in favour of blue laws and such puritanical restrictions, believing, rather, that more wholesome entertainment should be provided for the people. As regards the consumption of alcohol, he would have sympathised with the picture painted by F. Marion Crawford:

There are not to be found in respectable Munich those dens of filth and drunkenness which belong to greater cities... In Munich, the strength of fiery spirits is drowned in oceans of mild beer...77

There are numerous other examples of American books on Germany which praised that country's cities. As has been shown, such writings began in the late nineteenth century, but there was an intensification after 1900, and for this Howe was to a great extent responsible. The cumulative effect of his numerous and repetitive works, which were very widely read, especially by people with Progressive ideas, made him the strongest influence on the American view of the German cities. In fact, he reversed the position of America as a model to the world and, at least in municipal affairs, presented Germany as "a City upon a Hill". This very expression was used by Tom Johnson to describe the Cleveland that he wanted to build. His struggle had been largely unsuccessful, a fact which had
a great effect on Howe; The Modern City and Its Problems is full of comparisons between failures in Cleveland and successes in Germany. For instance, Cleveland could not finish its civic centre, to which Howe was so attached, because Ohio limited its borrowing, whereas German cities could go heavily into debt for productive enterprises that benefited their citizens. These personal disappointments made Howe's picture of the German cities even more glowing, perhaps exaggeratedly so. They still held out hope for the possibility of his ideal city.

Although writers like Daniel Aaron regard Howe as a "non-utopian" reformer, because he tried to achieve practical goals in his political career, he can be seen as Utopian in his presentation of the German municipal example, a perfect system which could eliminate all of America's faults; faults which had actually prevented the achievement of apparently practical goals.78

This Utopian strain in Howe's writings on the German cities is evident if they are compared with the works of William Harbutt Dawson, a British writer whose books on Germany were widely read in America (by Howe, for instance). Dawson gave a generally favourable picture of the German system, but he was far more objective than Howe. In Municipal Life and Government in Germany he complained that there was too much state interference in the running of the German cities; that the elected town councils lacked effective power; that in municipal enterprises there were arguments about wages and about the propriety of making profits; that the local authorities felt their powers
were not wide enough, falling well short of autonomy; that the 
Socialist reforms in Mulhausen between 1902 and 1906 had proved 
too expensive for the bourgeois voters; and that the three 
class voting system was undemocratic. Howe only mentioned the 
last of these criticisms. Dawson also referred to the faults 
of German bureaucracy, although he wrote that it was not as 
bad as the British Local Government Board. He found the oper-
ation of the German cities much more effective than that of 
British municipalities, remarking that the German "institutions 
of the professional and salaried mayor and aldermen represent 
the highest and most efficient development of municipal organ-
isation reached in any country", so this British source served 
to strengthen the favourable American impression of the German 
cities, but he did not display the uncritical enthusiasm and 
almost evangelical tone which characterised Howe. 79

Howe's central point, the assertion of the importance of the 
community rather than of individual rights, was also one of 
the central tenets of American Progressivism. His work on 
the German cities presented a working model of that principle. 
However, he was also attached to another fundamental Progressive 
principle, the expansion of popular democracy, and he failed 
to face up to the fact that this was contradicted by the German 
experience. The German cities were so efficient because power 
was concentrated in their administrations, with a relative lack 
of democratic controls. Some Americans called for a similar 
system in America: an editorial in The World's Work stated 
that "corrupt municipal politics" could only be abolished with
"concentrated personal responsibility in government", while Charles W. Eliot supported small commissions of experts to run cities like business corporations. Town planners made the same points: Ernst Freund in 1911 stated that the remarkable achievements of Frankfurt had been obtained "by the exercise of authority and I think we can learn a great deal from that", and four years later A.L. Brockway remarked, "The autocracy of the Imperial German government is a tremendous asset and the respect for law on the part of citizens of Germany ... is the thing that makes success possible." Howe never regarded autocracy as an "asset", but he did call for cities to be run like businesses, which does not seem to be compatible with democracy. Presumably he supported the democratic election of city administrators with almost autocratic power, the lack of participatory democracy being compensated for by increased efficiency and communal benefits, but he did not make this clear.

The whole question of the role of businessmen in city administration was also dealt with in different ways by Howe. The overall impression is that he wanted city government to be in the hands of responsible people, and in the American context that translated as businessmen. However, he was opposed to rule by businessmen in the American sense of domination by certain interests. He was also at pains to explain that German municipal socialism posed no threat to the principle of private property and the social order, so could be accepted by businessmen, since it benefited them too. At other times he made clear his support for the German socialists as a demo-
ocratic force which would transform the existing political system in Germany, even though he believed that system had made the German workers better off than Americans. Howe saw the numerous problems of the American cities—control of politics by public service corporations, restrictions imposed by the state, inefficiency, slums, a lack of communal values, the absence of good men in city government, and so on—and he presented the solutions that he saw in Germany. The fact that he found a steady market for his works, despite their repetitive nature, shows that many Americans were prepared to share his vision, in the hope that order could be restored to the American cities.

As Howe's ideas developed, with, for instance, his conversion to belief in government by experts, so his attachment to Germany rather than Britain increased. He became much quicker to point out the faults of the latter, rather than the former, and it is evident that he believed Germany to be freer, as well as more efficient, than Britain. In this Howe was against the general trend in America, and for many municipal reformers, such as Shaw, the British city remained the principal model, but he is an example of those Americans who became attached to Germany because of some particular aspect, and his lack of sympathy for Britain reflects the feeling among many Americans that it was necessary to choose between the two countries.

The force that Howe's writings exerted on American opinion has been mentioned. It could be argued that in him American views of the German city had turned full circle, from the romantic
descriptions (as, for instance, in Mark Twain's writings on Heidelberg) to a scientific interest in reforms and back to Howe's new romanticism, in which the German municipalities were seen as almost heavenly cities, pointing the way to a splendid future. With American entry into the First World War this vision vanished, and perhaps Howe's post-war disillusionment, displayed in *The Confessions of a Reformer*, was partly due to this loss. Danish co-operatives, which had become more acceptable as a model for reform, were scarcely as inspiring as the cities of Germany.
Germany's image as a land of progressive measures in the form of labour reforms, social insurance, medical provision and other legislative actions that benefited workers, the poor, the sick, the young and the aged has already been mentioned. Added to reforms of this sort were institutions like state ownership of railways and other enterprises, municipal socialism, the allowing of cartels, under certain controls, to encourage economic development, and other facets of governmental intervention in the economy, contrary to the ideology of laissez-faire which prevailed in Britain and the U.S.A. in the nineteenth century. An enormous amount was written about all of these features in American magazines and books, and official attention was also paid to them from quite an early stage; for instance, in 1893 John Graham Brooks wrote on the German insurance system for the Bureau of Labor, although this had little effect at the time. ¹

From the late eighteen-nineties, as America entered its own Progressive Era, interest in the German experience increased. This was not surprising, since many of the measures supported by Progressive reformers resembled those that had been adopted in Germany. There was also an obvious difference, since American Progressivism was also concerned with the expansion of popular democracy, which led to such measures as the referendum, recall of elected officials, the short ballot, direct elections of more functionaries, and so on. Obviously, these measures found no parallel in Germany, which was notorious
for the three-class system of Prussia, whereby wealth determined the value of votes. Germany, it could be argued, presented an example of economic freedom, but not political freedom.

Historians have pointed to the major strands in American Progressivism, represented by Theodore Roosevelt's New Nationalism and Woodrow Wilson's New Freedom. In simple terms, the former believed in state regulation of large corporations, which were seen as beneficial because of their promotion of efficiency, while the latter supported the break-up of the corporations, to create more competition and thus to benefit smaller businesses; the former stressed the nation while the latter's stress was on the individual. As was mentioned previously, the letters and other writings of Roosevelt show him to have found Germany very attractive in many ways, while Wilson's sympathies lay with Britain and he paid very little attention to Germany until the First World War. This chapter looks at Progressives of both sorts, Rooseveltians and Wilsonians, and others, in order to discover whether there is a pattern in the approach that Progressives of different types took to Germany and, in particular, to German "Progressivism", as described above.²

Something of Theodore Roosevelt's attitude to Germany was described in relation to his views of Wilhelm II. His admiration for the country seems, as Stuart Sherman suggested, to have largely derived from a shared belief in aggression and military power. Numerous examples of this could be given; for instance, in 1897 he wrote to Cecil Spring Rice that the
Kaiser was "entirely right from the standpoint of the German race" in seeking colonies in South America and elsewhere. When he visited Berlin in 1910 he praised the "virile fighting virtues" and large armies. During his Presidency he seems to have shown little interest in German reforms directly, but later many of his associates explicitly referred to the German example; one such was George W. Perkins, while another was perhaps the most important ideologist of the New Nationalism that Roosevelt proclaimed in 1912, Herbert Croly. It is probably true, as A.M. Schlesinger, Jr., wrote, that Roosevelt was a greater influence on Croly than vice versa, but Croly's *The Promise of American Life* (1909) was the most important text of the Rooseveltian Progressive Party.

Croly wrote that Britain had been overtaken industrially by America and Germany because the British aristocracy had kept its control of politics, in return leaving economic matters, in a laissez-faire way, to individuals. British industry thus could not compete with foreign countries which had brought organisation to economic production. In contrast, the Prussian monarchy had kept its leadership and power in Germany, and had used them well, unifying the country and launching domestic reforms. The government planned and enacted measures to encourage economic development, so that,

In every direction German activity was organized and was placed under skilled professional leadership, while ... each of these special lines of work was subordinated to its place in a comprehensive scheme of national economy.
However, the German leaders were now making the mistake of not co-operating with the Socialists (who, Croly noted, were increasingly more nationalistic and less revolutionary). He showed some sympathy with the German reactionaries:

A nation, and particularly a European nation, cannot afford to become too complete a democracy all at once, because it would thereby be uprooting traditions upon which its national cohesion depends.

This is a typically Rooseveltian expression of belief in nationalism before democracy. Croly, indeed, urged that the democracy of America should become nationalistic. He summed up the national ideologies of Britain as "freedom" and of Germany as "the principle of efficient and expert official leadership toward what is as yet a hazy goal of national greatness". It was evident from his descriptions of the countries that he considered the latter to be more suitable as an example for America, so again liberal values were considered less important than nationalistic ones. 4

Here then was an assertion by one of Roosevelt's most important supporters of the value of German practices, particularly those relating to organisation and efficiency (although, by implication, the social reforms served these ends as well). Roosevelt himself recognised the similarities between his programme and that of Germany in an article he wrote for the New York Evening Mail in 1915. He called for military preparedness and particularly military training for all men,
which would teach "national solidarity" so that Americans "would understand that our haphazard system of social and commercial development to-day cannot continue if we are to hold our place as a great nation." He cited the example of Germany, whose "social and industrial efficiency" gave her "military efficiency." There, both the workers and business received fair treatment, and supported their country in return:

Germany has been far in advance of us in securing industrial assurance, old-age pensions and homes, a reasonably fair division of profits between employer and employed, and the like. But she has also been far ahead of us in requiring from the man who toils with his hands, just as much as from the man who employs him, loyalty to the nation.

Here Roosevelt was stressing the idea of a state which gave benefits to its members but demanded their loyalty in return, resulting in a tightly-bound, cohesive community. He explained further what he saw as the "constructive" German policy on big business, which he contrasted with American practice:

a German corporation would be organized under imperial German laws, and it would be aided in every way by the national help and prestige; and, on the other hand, it would be supervised so that no injustice could possibly be done by it to German citizens.

This was the sort of supervision that he wanted in America. Roosevelt explained that the German government intervened only when it had to, and thus encouraged initiative (which
was a quality that many critics of Germany claimed was lacking there). This article is the clearest statement of Roosevelt's admiration for the German system, although, again, he puts more stress on the questions of organisation and state intervention rather than on social reforms.

Despite Roosevelt's liking for Germany, which, as his autobiography shows, dated from his childhood, he had, by October, 1908, come to the conclusion that British fears of the Kaiser and Germany were perhaps justified, Wilhelm being too "jumpy". As he made clear in a letter to Admiral Mahan in 1911, he greatly preferred Britain to Germany. Nevertheless, when war came in 1914 he did not immediately support Britain, and for some months he continued to be equivocal. He soon became emphatically pro-Allied, and yet, as the article quoted above shows, he still believed that America could learn lessons from Germany, lessons that he had been teaching himself. For Roosevelt and Croly, then, Germany showed the New Nationalism in operation, in contrast to the anti-corporatist, individualistic New Freedom of Wilson and Brandeis. Some other Progressives who had dealings with Germany will now be looked at.

Frederic C. Howe has already been discussed in the context of American views of the German cities, but as was mentioned his admiration for German reforms went beyond the municipal sphere. The main expression of this feeling was his Socialized Germany of 1915, which, he wrote, was published in that year in order
to explain the wartime successes of Germany, up to that point, and, in particular, to explain why Germany was so efficient. He wrote that, because of "a new kind of social statesmanship ... Germany is more intelligently organized than is the rest of the world." In order to catch up with Germany, America would have to introduce similar reforms, such as public ownership, social legislation, an effective educational system, and the removal of political power from business interests.7

The book goes into details of these features, such as the careful planning of an integrated transport system, involving the state-owned railways (the role of which in the development of Germany he stressed), canals, harbours and so on. He contrasted this with the American situation, where railways used unfair methods to destroy other means of transport and the system was not integrated with the needs of industry. Howe also dealt yet again with the German cities and their powers and benefits. He devoted a chapter to the economic advance of the country, due to such measures.8 However, the largest number of chapters was devoted to German responses to social problems and the numerous ways in which the German state took care of individuals.

Howe explained that "Germany hates waste", which led both to efficient industrial methods and to measures to protect human lives. These latter measures in turn increased economic efficiency (presumably by making the workers stronger and happier). Howe attributed the social reforms to the Hohen-
zollerns' and Bismarck's "sympathy with the common people". Thus, they established labour exchanges (in 1916 Howe followed this example and set up the first experimental federal employment bureau in New York) and industrial courts, provided advanced sanitary measures and medical care, and, most importantly, were responsible for the foremost system of social insurance in the world. Nevertheless, Howe admitted that there was still poverty and inequality, remarking that, "the unrest of the workers and their political demands are all justified by conditions." However, they were given protection against complete destitution. 9

Howe also discussed the excellent German educational system, from the "thoroughness" of elementary schools through the vocational education which promoted "industrial efficiency" to the technical schools and universities. The Germans were "the most highly educated nation in the world." It all resembled Howe's usual glowing picture, but, although he claimed, "I have tried to write the book as though there were no war", he was more critical of the German system than usual. He stated that "much of the beauty and charm of old Germany has been crushed under the heel of the (Prussian) feudal autocratic caste", which seems strange, since he had always admired the modernity of Germany rather than its old image as a rural land of philosophers and poets. He postulated the existence of two Germanys, one representing "politics, militarism, and aggression", while the other was described by "culture, sweetness, efficiency, and life." 10 It is odd that politics should be
placed in the first list; this suggests that Howe liked to think of Germany as a place where there were no political disagreements and everyone fitted into a co-operative system (which is, indeed, the impression given by his writings on the cities), and it is also odd that efficiency appears in the second list, since it tended to be associated with the new, militaristic Germany rather than the old, romantic one. It seems that, under the influence of the war, Howe was trying to claim that all of the features he admired belonged to the old Germany, since the new Germany had come into disrepute.

At two points in the book Howe dealt with the German concept of the state. He contrasted this with America:

> We have so weakened the state that great aggregations of wealth have become more powerful than the community, while Germany has so strengthened the state as to devitalize the individual.

Despite this, he considered that Germany's state socialism gave its citizens a different kind of freedom from that of America, and not necessarily less, that is, the Germans were more economically free while the Americans were more politically free. In the final chapter Howe showed that he considered the benefits of the German system to outweigh the disadvantages. He referred to Germany's "emphasis on human welfare" and "unity", stating that "no other country has so greatly improved the well-being of so large a portion of the people", and he attributed Germany's power to that rather than to
weapons. He admitted that there was too much conformity and a lack of initiative, but blamed these on the ruling class and stated that the German institutions could also exist in a democracy (but he avoided examining that assertion closely). He concluded that state socialism has largely made Germany what she is, a menace and model, a problem to statesmen of other countries, and a pathfinder in social reform.

This idea that Germany's advancement made it a danger to the rest of the world had been prefigured in Howe's earlier writings; for example, he wrote in *European Cities at Work* (1913), that

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All Germany, in fact, seems organized with the definite ambition of becoming the dominant force in the world.11
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Such statements would damage Germany's image in one way, even while it was being presented as a model for America.

By 1915 most Americans saw Germany as aggressive, in any case, but Howe was still presenting it as a model. As has been said, he was trying to separate its efficiency and organisation from its militarism, but not very convincingly. The Rooseveltian admirers of Germany would not have attempted to make that distinction, since military efficiency was one of the German features that they admired. It is therefore significant that Howe did not support Roosevelt. In 1911 he had become secretary
of the National Progressive Republican League, which became the basis of the Progressive Party. The presidential candidate of the latter in 1912 was Roosevelt but Howe could not support him, considering him unprincipled because of his backing for Tom Johnson's opponent in the Cleveland mayoral campaign of 1907. Instead, he voted for Woodrow Wilson, who had taught him at Johns Hopkins and who made him Commissioner of Immigration in New York in 1914. Two years later he supported Wilson more enthusiastically, seeing him as the candidate for peace and reform. After American entry to the war, Howe was accused of pro-Germanism, because of his humane treatment of German internees. The American hysteria made him turn against the state and against Wilson, particularly since the latter was associating with big businessmen and abandoning Progressive ideals. Howe's feelings on these matters show his extreme attachment to democracy, which contrasts strangely with his extreme attraction to the paternalistic German system. In both of these matters he seems far from being a typical Wilsonian.

In fact, Howe was not really a Wilsonian. His favoured candidate for the presidency had been Robert M. La Follette, whom he had come to admire greatly while lecturing in La Follette's state of Wisconsin. As a result, Howe wrote a panegyric to La Follette's achievements, called Wisconsin: An Experiment in Democracy, which pays the state the high compliment, by Howe's standards, of continually comparing it to Germany. The opening words are:
Wisconsin is doing for America what Germany is doing for the world. It is an experiment station in politics, in social and industrial legislation, in the democratization of science and higher education.

The parallel is drawn throughout: La Follette had established co-operation between the state government and the state university, which provided information, advice, researchers, and academics to sit on state boards. Furthermore, a merit system had been established in the civil service. Howe saw these as following the German example of co-operation between the state and universities and of employing expert administrators. The state legislature had removed many limitations on cities; Milwaukee had set up a Bureau of Economy and Efficiency, headed by "a kind of unofficial burgomaster"; the first chairman of the railway commission, set up by La Follette, had studied transportation in Germany; employers' liability insurance companies were formed, following German models; continuation schools were set up, as were labour exchanges, a state life insurance company, and a forestry board, which conserved the woods; and on and on. In every case Howe pointed out that Wisconsin was following German models.

The book is full of sentences like, "Wisconsin is making the German idea her own", and Howe keeps using words like "thorough" and "efficiency", which were invariably associated with Germany. His enthusiasm for Wisconsin must have derived from the fact that his oft-repeated advice to America, that it should imitate Germany, had been taken in that state, and this precedent meant that it was not impossible that the American cities might
transform themselves into municipal paradises like the German cities.

It was not surprising that Howe should admire La Follette, under whose rule, furthermore, there had been great extensions of popular democracy, undreamt of in Germany. La Follette himself had little, if any, contact with Germany; his autobiography does not mention the country, and it explains that he obtained his belief in service by the people to the state and vice versa from John Bascom, who was president of the state university when La Follette was a student. However, many of the academics who were involved with the Wisconsin Idea, such as Richard Ely, E.A. Ross and John R. Commons had been strongly affected by German state socialism, whether directly or indirectly, and Charles Van Hise, a friend of La Follette's and president of the University of Wisconsin, had urged the state authorities, in his inaugural address in 1903, to follow the example of Germany and utilise the expertise of the university, so that it could be "the instrument of the state in its upbuilding". Charles McCarthy, the head of the Legislative Reference Library and ideologist of the Wisconsin Idea, later wrote that it had largely been based on German practice. Wisconsin had, of course, a large German-American population (48 per cent born in Germany or with German parents), but it is not clear how important this fact was in the establishment of the Progressive system, since many of them tended to be conservative. However, some of them, like Dr. B.H. Meyer, filled high positions and had experience of German conditions.
Wisconsin under La Follette, with its combination of efficiency and democracy, was the model of Progressivism that Howe admired most, rather than Roosevelt's New Nationalism or Wilson's New Freedom, and it was the model that corresponded most closely to what he admired in Germany. Another admirer of Germany, of quite a different type, was Senator Albert J. Beveridge. Although he was associated with La Follette in the Senate, he was very much a Rooseveltian, and has been described as "one of the most brilliant eulogists and defenders of the virile President." As an imperialist, Beveridge grouped together the Americans, the British and the Germans as the master races. In one of his most famous speeches, to the Senate in January, 1900, he declared,

God has not been preparing the English-speaking and Teutonic peoples for a thousand years for nothing but vain and idle self-contemplation and self-admiration. No! He has made us the master organizers of the world to establish system where chaos reigns...

From this it can be gathered that Beveridge admired Germany as a dynamic, aggressive and militaristic state (he was attracted to military matters from his youth). Claude Bowers pointed out that as a Hamiltonian he admired strong, centralised governments, even going so far as to support the Tsarist regime in Russia, which was very unusual among Progressive Americans. He was similarly attracted to the government of Germany, which he visited in 1901, getting on well with Bulow and members of the Prussian aristocracy. In 1912 he made the keynote speech at the National Progressive Convention, enunciating the doctrines
of New Nationalism, such as,

We mean to try to make little business big, and all business honest, instead of striving to make Big Business little, and yet letting it remain dishonest.

This corporatist attitude, as well as his support for labour reforms, care of the aged, and so on show an affinity with the economic system and social reforms of Germany.\(^1\)

The same could be said of an attack on Jeffersonian individualism, in which he wrote that "the very basis of true democracy today demands the social idea rather than the savage individualistic idea", an idea that accords with the German belief in an organic state, with stress on the community rather than the individual. Beveridge had the opportunity to see how such ideas were affecting Germany during the First World War. In 1910 he had lost his seat as a Senator from Indiana and in December 1914, having unsuccessfully stood as a Progressive Party candidate, he went to Germany to investigate the situation there for Collier's Weekly. He met von Moltke (the Chief of the German General Staff), businessmen like Max Warburg, and intellectuals like Houston Stewart Chamberlain. He even met the Kaiser, but at the request of the German Government did not record their conversation. In a letter to Mark Sullivan, editor of Collier's, he worried about the reception of his articles, opinion on the war being "abnormal, savage, not quite sane." In fact, the articles, which were published in various magazines, were pro-German in tone, stressing the qualities
that were enabling Germany to do well in the war. Sinclair Lewis, then working for a publisher, wrote in admiration, as did the Hon. Rudolph Leeds of Indiana, a former National Commit­
tee man of the Progressive Party, who particularly liked the interview with von Tirpitz, remarking, "after finishing it I was more pro-German than ever." John T. Adams, a member of the Republican National Committee from Iowa, wrote to say that the articles should be printed as a book for the benefit of "benighted people". German-American publications wrote in praise of Beveridge, and a German-American from Arizona told Beveridge that he should stand for President. Such enthusiasm shows the feeling among pro-German people that their point of view was not being represented in the press.

The articles were published in expanded form as a book, What is Back of the War. It criticises British interference with neutral shipping and presents an unfavourable picture of Belgian refugees in the Netherlands. Life in Berlin is described as quite normal, the way in which "men of all professions" flocked to the colours is enthused about, and the physical condition, morale and education of the German soldiers is highly praised. The description of the Kaiser is almost adulatory: he was "democratic in manner", "strong", possessed of "magnetism" and "immense vigor", "brilliant" and "deeply religious". He is presented as a man of peace, yet "masterful". Beveridge also enthused about Tirpitz, who blamed Britain for the war and for the bad American picture of Germany. Beveridge praised the German-Americans to Tirpitz, who asked whether America was helping the Allies in order to gain more German citizens.
Hindenburg was treated in the same admiring style and his statements on German superiority in the war quoted. Beveridge added to these with sustained praise of the German soldiers. He singled out German Jews for particular praise, extolling their "eagerness to sacrifice everything for German victory"; this was no doubt directed particularly at American Jews, whose dislike for the anti-Semitic Russian regime often made them favour Germany. Beveridge also referred repeatedly to German efficiency:

...You wonder why private enterprise has developed no such efficiency on such a scale; or why the rewards of private industry bring forth no such devotion...

Even in the midst of war, Beveridge was speculating on the role of efficiency in national life and in the economy. He thought that the war might be a struggle between "irreconcilable ideas", without spelling these out, but from the context he evidently meant efficient organisation based on communal values versus individualism, and he obviously favoured the former.17

Beveridge tried to relate this new phenomenon to the old Germany, as seen in America, stating that the German will to victory is a strange mingling of the practical and poetic, a composite of the thoughtful and the mystical, the simple and the sublime. In short, it is the German character of tradition, moved from its profoundest depths to its highest manifestation.
This high-flown appeal to American idealism was backed up by a list of debts that America owed to Germany, such as that the economic and humanitarian reforms which were the objectives of the popular movement in America during the last decade were German in their origin and example,

which demonstrates quite clearly that one branch of Progressivism saw itself as deriving from German practice. Beveridge had expressed similar views in 1911, and in 1906, when he drew up a meat inspection bill, he described it as being "quite as good as that of Germany", so he was not merely reacting to the wartime situation. 18

Beveridge insisted that, despite their collective ideology, the Germans were capable of thinking for themselves, something denied by their critics. Nevertheless, he showed his sympathy with those who entered fully into the spirit of war, such as bellicose women insisting on their wounded sons returning to the front. This belief in struggle and patriotism appealed deeply to him. On the other hand, he approvingly dealt with the theologian, Professor von Harnack, who denied that there was any militarism in Germany. When interviewing him, Beveridge returned to the idea that even Americans unfriendly to Germany say that they love and admire the German people, and the Germany of Goethe and Schiller, but that this Germany has given way to a commercialized, military Germany.
Evidently Beveridge was concerned to close the gap between these two perceptions, and Harnack helped by stressing the growth of interest in "metaphysical and spiritual subjects in Germany" and by pointing out that economic development derived from intellectual endeavour. Under Beveridge's questioning he also denied the influence of Nietzsche on Germany, pointing to humanitarian measures to help the weak.  

Beveridge found a living example of a combination of the old and new Germany in Walter Rathenau, president of the General Electric Company of Germany and writer on philosophy, thus merging "speculative learning and practical efficiency." Rathenau made various comparisons between Britain and Germany, to the detriment of the former, regarding education, duty, work, and so on. Again, the German ideal of "mutual helpfulness", which led to "humanitarian laws", was mentioned. The idea of Germany as a united community was continued in a chapter dealing with the socialists who supported the war. The German measures to benefit the workers were mentioned over and over again by Dr. Albert Sudekum, a Socialist leader interviewed by Beveridge, as evidence against allegations of German "barbarism". When Beveridge raised Karl Liebknecht's opposition to the war, Sudekum said that he was almost alone and was a traitor.  

The way in which Beveridge presented his material, portraying Germany as a progressive, dynamic, humanitarian country beset by jealous enemies, reflects his pro-German feelings, even
though he tended, on the whole, to let the Germans he interviewed speak for themselves. The chapters dealing with France were quite sympathetic, though without the enthusiasm with which Beveridge approached Germany, but the British chapters stressed disunity, working-class ignorance, the lack of democracy, strikes, and opposition to the war. Beveridge, despite including the British with the Germans and Americans as the master races, always tended to what John Braeman called "a Fourth-of-July type of Anglophobia", and, furthermore, the British authorities had not co-operated with him, unlike the Germans, who had more reason to be worried about their image in America. 21

The last chapter of the book expressed the belief that the war would lead to an "immeasurable advance of democracy, expressed in terms of collectivism". Beveridge denied that the war pitted absolutism against democracy, since this "democratic collectivism" existed on both sides. In fact, he saw Germany as having taken the lead in this, because of its reforms. Although he claimed not to be saying whether such changes were right or wrong, the use of expressions like, "Almost it would seem that ... the soul has broken the bands of self and is mounting upwards on wings of light", make it obvious on which side Beveridge stood, as regarded nationalistic collectivism. 22

There was some criticism of Beveridge's book from pro-British quarters, but most of the reviews were favourable, although sales were not as good as he had hoped. To one admirer Beveridge wrote,
The German articles were toned down a great deal, the French articles were toned up a little bit, and the English articles toned up a very great deal indeed. If I had written of the German situation in all its excellence and of the English situation in its deplorable and indeed unbelievable features, I feared that our people would consider me prejudiced, because of the British "falsehoods" that had "deluged" America. It is difficult to see how Beveridge could have been more favourable to Germany. Ironically, Beveridge had criticised in his diary a similar toning down in Price Collier's Germany and the Germans from an American Point of View, which he read on his way to Germany:

I think he really is very pro-German without the courage to tell the truth without qualifying it. What a rotten state of mind. Suppose he feared it might prevent his getting material for his English book.

This shows more about Beveridge than Collier, with its assumption that pro-Germanism would not be acceptable to Britain (or America), even before the war (when Collier was writing). Also, Beveridge was probably attributing his own pro-Germanism to Collier. That it existed before he went to Germany, despite his protestations of neutrality, can be seen from another diary entry:

If Catherine had come, I should be tempted to go nowhere except Germany as she has spent so much time there, loves that country so much and we were married in Berlin. As our feelings are the same, the trip would be a second honeymoon.
These feelings were evident to Henry Van Dyke, the American Minister to the Netherlands, who was on the same ship; he wrote that Beveridge was filled with a "Teutonic virus", which made him obsessed. Van Dyke, being a member of the old American aristocracy, was pro-British.23

Further evidence that Beveridge was biased towards Germany even before he got there in 1914 comes in yet another diary entry, where he praised Elmer Roberts's Monarchical Socialism in Germany, which gives a favourable picture of the system of social legislation and state ownership in Germany, as "excellent and accurate." Given all of these facts, it is obvious that What is Back of the War would be pro-German. Beveridge, however, seems to have been unaware of any bias, writing in his diary that, "Our people ... will know that whatever I write is the truth and will believe what I say."24

Beveridge is a prime example of a Rooseveltian Progressive who held a high opinion of Germany because of its social reforms, its collective outlook, its strong army, its incorporation of industrial trusts into national life, its efficiency, and its sense of national unity. Roosevelt himself disapproved of Beveridge's being so pro-German in 1915; the former was by then pressing for military preparedness, but Beveridge opposed that, despite his belief in military service, because of its anti-German character. John Braeman has pointed out that Beveridge wrote his feelings about the war into his biography of Chief Justice Marshall, whose neutrality in the war
between Britain and France he stressed. Nevertheless, Beveridge's nationalism caused him to support his country when it entered the First World War. 25

Braeman states that Beveridge saw Europe as corrupt and America as a model for the rest of the world, but it is evident that he excepted Germany from this, since he explicitly stated that it had been an inspiration for American reforms. Braeman points to the most important basis of Beveridge's Progressivism, the belief that only federal regulation of big business (and social reforms to help the workers) would prevent action to break up the large corporations, which he opposed in the interest of business efficiency. The German reforms, and acceptance of government influence over trusts, had similarly maintained the system there. One American who disapproved of the tone of Beveridge's articles praising German efficiency was the historian William E. Dodd. In August, 1915 he wrote to Beveridge that when he was a student in Germany, "I then feared, and I now fear, their devotion to efficiency at the expense of freedom." 26 Here is the voice of a proponent of the New Freedom speaking out against the tendencies of the New Nationalism.

As well as being a distinguished historian, Dodd was a close friend of Woodrow Wilson, a founding member of the American Association of University Professors, and, from 1933 to 1937, American Ambassador to Germany. In the eighteen-nineties he attended the Virginia Polytechnic Institute, where the
teacher who impressed him most was Edward Sheib. He had gained his Ph.D. at Leipzig, and he persuaded Dodd to go to that university after he graduated in 1895. The letters that Dodd received while studying in Leipzig give illuminating glimpses of the perceptions of Germany current in the southern milieu of which he was part, and it is interesting to see what ordinary people thought of the country. Dodd's cousin, Herman Horne, wrote

When my mind dwells on the South, I am inclined to congratulate myself on being at Harvard. But when I think of the sights, the cities, the antique things, the rare music and countless hosts of similar delights with which you are ever surrounded, the present environments begin to seem not the most desirable in the world.

This is an unusually late expression of an American feeling of inferiority when contemplating the Old World, and it shows that some Americans still retained the old image of Germany as the land of art and culture. That the attractions of the German universities also remained strong for some Americans is seen in the fact that in 1907 Horne gave up his job at Dartmouth College in order to become a student in Berlin. 27

Further evidence that the old romantic ideas of Germany lingered on in Southern backwaters like Clarksville, Virginia, is provided by a letter from a young friend of Dodd's in 1897.

I can scarce imagine anything more pleasant than to stay for a time in that land of history and quaint fable. I should like to read Goethe in his own land. I would like to be a student and wander like Faust out in the country ... to pass
through the shades of the Black Forest and watch the witch dance on the Sartz Mountains.

For these people Germany had still not taken on the identity of a great industrial power. This letter continues, "Do not forget to fulfill your promise to me to give your views of the effect of unbelief and skepticism on the German people". Such a request was not surprising from the son of the Rev. Perry of Wylliesburg, Virginia, nor were the questions of Dodd's brother, Walter, who was studying for the Baptist ministry:

Do you attend the Baptist Church? What is the difference between the German Baptist and the American Baptist? I have heard that those German B. pastors were the most devoted men in the world. Do you know anything about how the country pastors live?

Dodd's background was very religious, so it is not surprising that his correspondents were so interested in German religious matters, but articles in magazines like The Outlook and the Literary Digest showed that this interest was quite widespread. Just as the foreign correspondent tends to look at the subjects which will interest the readers back home, so the historian tends to look at those features of the past which seem most significant to the present. However, for many Americans of the time, the chief significance of Germany was in religious, not economic or political, terms. It was the birthplace of Protestantism and latterly a centre of attacks on the traditional Christian beliefs and even on the bases of Christianity. Since
the early nineteenth century, when George Bancroft was warned to beware of German irreligious tendencies, Germany had produced Biblical Critics of varying degrees of heterodoxy.  

Some American Christians hoped, like Americans interested in other fields, that Germany would adopt American standards of religion. When Dodd offered in 1897 to write about the religious endeavours of German students for Men, the international paper of the Y.M.C.A.s of North America, the assistant editor replied

... there is in Germany, especially among the ultra-nationalistic class, a strong feeling against the adoption of any form or methods of Christian work which have "American" blown in the bottle. Nevertheless, the progressive and earnest element among German students are looking to the larger experience of American student workers for advanced ideas.

He stressed that, since the German student Christian movement was so far behind that in America, it was necessary to help the former without any public mention of the desirability of Germans adopting American models.  

This is indicative of an American perception of Germany as anti-American, even before the Spanish-American War.

One of Dodd's fellow students at Leipzig was Elliot H. Goodwin, the nephew of President Eliot of Harvard, who on his return to that university tried to spread the German methods of teaching history. In 1899 he wrote to Dodd that at the graduate
students history club,

I ... held up as a model the seminary system in Leipzig over that at Harvard ... I thought this line would arouse great discussion ... but most of them agreed with me and admitted that lack of a preparatory course in which the principles of criticism are taught.

Goodwin went on to become Secretary of the Civil Service Reform Association, a genteel organisation supporting a civil service appointed on merit, but his letters show no indication that the German system, using trained experts in administration, or any other German conditions, influenced his political views. Similarly, the only positive influence that Germany seems to have had on Dodd was in terms of historical training. He continued to be friendly with Professors Erich Marcks and Karl Lamprecht, meeting them on their visits to America. He reviewed Lamprecht's books, explaining his teacher's cultural concept of history, in which the "chaos" of facts was reduced to structurally simple interpretations from an intellectual point of view. Thus, Nietzsche dominated German history of the past twenty years - Dodd was reviewing this in 1902, long before that philosopher became a general figure of hatred in America - and young Germans were filled with belief in inequality and struggle. Dodd clearly agreed with Lamprecht in this interpretation, but he also disapproved of such tendencies. Dodd sent some of his own students to study under Lamprecht at Leipzig and he translated Lamprecht's What Is History? in 1905, but it sold very badly. He also defended Lamprecht against other historians, like William R. Thayer,
who thought that he over-simplified. 30

What Dodd seems to have found most attractive in Lamprecht's work was the fact that he looked at history in terms of mass movements, especially cultural ones, and was not interested in great men and heroic figures, seeing them as unimportant. In his own work on American history Dodd tried to deal more than most writers with "group feelings and interests", particularly "the intellectual and religious life of the people."

The preoccupations of Lamprecht perhaps explain why he was not very popular in an America which was obsessed with Great Men, like Theodore Roosevelt and Wilhelm II. Dodd's opinion of those two archetypes reflects his belief in democracy and the people: he disapproved of Roosevelt as undemocratic, as he wrote in 1912, and as early as July 27, 1914 he blamed the Kaiser personally for starting the war and dismissed his pretensions to be "a second Napoleon". Dodd foresaw Wilhelm's dethronement, and a month later he described him as "a menace to mankind." 31

Dodd's contact with Germany does seem to have had a negative influence on his political views. In a commencement address at the Oak Ridge Institute, North Carolina in 1903, on the subject of "Public Morality", Dodd said, "When censuring Bismarck's selfish policy in seizing the land of neighbouring princes in the presence of German students I have been reminded (by them) of American injustice in 1844 - 47", and he had come to believe that the Mexican War ended America's position as a moral nation; in the war with Spain, for instance, America
had acted only for its own benefit, just like a European power. At about the same time, in the North Carolina News and Observer, Dodd attacked imperialism because it would lead to the rise of socialism, as in European countries; he was obviously thinking of Germany in particular. He does not seem to have paid much attention to German examples for Progressivism, like his friend Woodrow Wilson, although he was obviously aware of their existence: in 1912 he reported an address by Albion Small, the President of the American Sociological Society and a member of the Rooseveltian Progressive Party, who saw Germany as "a great sociological laboratory at the head of which stands Emperor William" and warned American political leaders that they should emulate the Kaiser to overcome American problems. 32

Although Wilson had no interest in Germany, there were those who saw him as a Germanic figure. Albert B. Faust, Professor of German at Cornell and the historian of the German-Americans, wrote to Dodd in 1912 that he had voted for Wilson and hoped that he would prove that the much-maligned professor can also become a great factor in national life. The trained man, the scientist, the theorist is scorned in practical affairs, and as a result our civilization does not make the progress it should, we divorce theory and practice, while in some countries, notably in Germany, they go hand in hand, aiding one another. 33

As has been mentioned, the German scientist Rudolf Virchow, who died in 1902, particularly impressed Americans because
as well as being a professor he was also a leading political figure.

Dodd certainly agreed that German professors were in a better position than American ones, and in March 1914 he wrote in that sense to John Dewey, who had sent out a circular concerning the proposed association of American college professors:

... We ought to develop a stronger esprit du corps among the teaching and research branches of our university life. I have seen something of the German professors and their attitude toward their calling and it does seem that we might seek somehow to build up a similar spirit in this country. Why not emphasize the research side of our life, and attempt to convince ourselves, if not the outside world, that this is a worthy thing, that we have a distinct place in the national evolution.

Arthur Lovejoy made similar points in a letter to Dodd. However, the First World War changed Dodd's mind about the worth of the political involvement of German professors; he criticised them for "puerile reasoning" in support of the war and in 1915 he wrote to Dewey that the Association of American College Professors should fight every case involving academic freedom, otherwise "we shall one of these days be reduced to the impotency of the German university man who dares not oppose the system at any point." 34

The fact that so many academics studied in Germany can lead to exaggeration of the German influence on America, since merely going to a German university did not necessarily make Americans pro-German. Meade Ferguson, a Virginian mathematician, wrote
to Dodd from Gottingen in 1900 interpreting current German politics as an economic and political attack on America. He believed that the Agrarians were to gain exclusion of American meat and in return the Kaiser would get the large navy he wanted because he had his "eye on a slice of South America". Similarly, Elliot Goodwin wrote in the same year that he feared German interests in South America, and the fact that the German navy would be bigger than the American one in 1907 was "almost criminal". In 1912 Andrew C. McLaughlin, another historian educated at Leipzig, wrote,

A second class German is I think a little more objectionable than second class Americans. I enjoy cultivated folks who don't talk loud all the time,

but he admitted that there were many such in Germany.

On the other hand, apart from their academic qualities, German universities could also be a refuge for American intellectuals. T.M. Campbell, who was studying German literature at Leipzig, wrote to Dodd in 1904 that American students were too concerned with sports; they have no idea what a large part of their organisms consists of muscle instead of brain ... Higher spiritual (geistig) interests in America are at a minim-issimum ...

Campbell particularly enthused about the commercial art galleries in Leipzig. On his return to Virginia he found that American
universities were still not "geistig" enough; publishers rejected his edition of Morike's poems because "our colleges do not study the literature of German (or French) - they endeavour to impart a reading knowledge alone." This lack of interest in German literature has been mentioned before. It implies the absence of any deep desire to understand Germany, and is no doubt a cultural manifestation of America's isolationist psychology. Campbell's letters, like those of many Americans who studied in Germany, are littered with German words and expressions, and doubtless the German influence on America intellectuals was an important cause of the Germanification of American English, but Americans remained largely ignorant of German literature, as Campbell complained in 1913 when writing on Morike, Grillparzer and others. 36

When the First World War broke out Dodd immediately blamed Germany and as a result he broke with Professor Marcks. He wrote to a German-American that the Germans were "deluded" in thinking that the world hated them; it merely feared the German "military system", which dominated the country. To Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy and an old friend, Dodd wrote in 1915 that he and Andrew McLaughlin believed that "if they had only a one or two men like Wilson in high situation in Germany all this crime of the age would have been avoided", and his opposition to militarism meant that he opposed American military development too. 37

Only a few of those Americans with German educations but not
of German family continued to support Germany after 1914, but Thomas Campbell was one of those, so great was his attachment to German culture. He wrote in November, 1914,

Germany's organization for offense and defense is a revelation to the world. So also the 'religious' patriotism of the nation - revealed in so many ways in letters from the Vaterland - is an inspiring sight.

Few Americans, apart from a section of the German-Americans, would have agreed. Campbell may have been influenced by the fact that his wife was German. Dodd was much more typical of American intellectuals. He told his wife that he was "almost ashamed" to have a German doctorate and he wrote to the British M.P. and author, Gilbert Parker, that, although he was friendly to the Germans and recognised the things they had done for the world, he now saw that militarism had spread from the "official mind" to indoctrinate "the whole population". In the late eighteen-nineties, he added, he had heard anti-English declarations by professors, which the students applauded. He continued,

It seems to have been the set purpose to train modern Germany to hate Great Britain. The importance of this I did not then recognize, for I could not think such teaching could be general and dictated from above. I think now it was the official program and it seems to have been effective beyond anything ever imagined by English-speaking people, for I think we English or Americans could not bring our people to such obedience.

This suggests that the Germans' reputation for thoroughness
and efficiency, and, indeed, education, could be used against them. Dodd added that the American public was not yet ready to support American intervention, but if the Germans were to sink a ship with American passengers the mood would change (this was only three months before the sinking of the Lusitania). 38

He had taken a rather different line in writing to Professor Marcks in October 1914, when he promised to get a letter of his explaining the German point of view into the Chicago Herald, adding, not very tactfully, "all Southerners can feel for Germany, for Southerners know what a disastrous war means." He hoped that Germany's people would "come out whole and her nation remain unbroken to bless the world with her learning and her art and her science!" However, four months later Dodd was telling Parker that he blamed the German people as much as their rulers, and this is typical of the anti-Germanism, sometimes extreme, that spread among American intellectuals, often those with some German connection. It should, however, be added that Dodd was not one of the German-haters, and in other letters he pointed out that the German peasants were against militarism and that there were indications that "a good many" Germans did not believe in "the Prussianism of the present war." 39

In 1933 Dodd wrote a brief autobiographical sketch, in which he stressed the bad aspects of Germany in the eighteen-nineties. He wrote that he had been appalled by the nationalistic lang-
usage of the professors and that his best German friend, Johann Hoffmann, liked Nietzsche, continuing,

I had already noticed that young Germans loved to talk of Macht, conquest, "der Tag" and so forth. Nietzsche, war, world conflict - once . . . the discussion was directed by Hoffmann to: "How helpless would the United States be if invaded by a great German army?"

On Dodd's visits to Berlin,

there was too much of war spirit everywhere.

But when I went nights to the Staatstheater and there was "Othello" and "Nathan der Weise" in perfect form, the scene shifted . . . I felt that Shakespeare was more appreciated in Berlin than anywhere in England or the United States.

It is possible that hindsight caused Dodd to exaggerate the belligerency of Germany when he was a student there, but such impressions would explain his readiness to believe the worst of the country in 1914. On the other hand, the artistic nature of the Germans would enable him to play down the significance of unpleasant features at the time, so that, "I loved Germany, in spite of her warlike talk." 40

This manuscript goes on to remark that Dodd worried about getting a job on his return, because

I knew a letter written in German by Marcks or Lamprecht would not be read in North or South Carolina, where reconstruction politics had practically destroyed all the older folk who knew Europe and looked for trained scholars.
Whether "reconstruction politics" had anything to do with it or not, it is significant that Dodd perceived a decline in appreciation of Germany in Southern intellectual and political circles, although, judging from the letters he received, such was evidently not the case among his friends. Dodd has been considered here in the context of his friends and relatives, to show the ideas of Germany by which he would have been influenced. These were clearly favourable, but also unrealistic, still portraying Germany as the romantic land of art, history and beauty. The only bad aspect concerned religion. Germany was also still seen as possessing high academic standards and the status of German professors was considered enviable, but the letters of Dodd and his fellow students in Germany demonstrate that actually going there could damage their views of Germany, since they were exposed to militarism, inegalitarian philosophies, and so on. In the case of Goodwin, this encouraged him to believe in strengthening American militarily, while Dodd was made even more opposed to imperialism and militarism, so that he stood against American imperialist activities and military preparedness. What he had experienced also prepared him to blame Germany for the war, when it came.

It is instructive to compare Dodd's essay of 1916, "The United States of Tomorrow", attacking calls for universal military service (as made by Beveridge in a letter to Dodd), because it allows the rich to control the poor and leads to a militaristic ideology, with Roosevelt's article of the previous year, "Germany's Lessons for the United States", which, as has been mentioned, advocated universal military training to promote
national solidarity. Roosevelt placed himself with those who had praised the remarkable modernisation of Germany, when he called for an imitation of German corporatism, because German social and industrial efficiency had led to military efficiency, whereas Dodd referred disapprovingly to "the rapidity with which the old Germany of philosophy and poetry was converted into the modern ambitious and grasping empire of real politik", with historians and scientists working for "the subjugation of the world." These two viewpoints show how differently Germany could look to believers in the New Nationalism and New Freedom.

Dodd had tended to support the radical wing of the Democratic Party, voting for Bryan in 1900 and advising him in 1908. As a professor at Randolph-Macon College between those years he opposed the Democratic Party machine in Virginia, and he considered it disastrous that the South had come under the control of upper-class conservatives. His interest in reform was therefore mainly of a political nature, supporting the political liberation of the individual and opposing political corruption. He stressed that individuals had to become involved in making moral choices in politics, and he extended this to a particular concern that historians should play a part in public life (this latter belief was presumably influenced by the German example). His belief in individual liberty led him to join the Anti-Imperialist League and to oppose courses in military science at Chicago University, on the grounds that America should not imitate Germany. In 1912 he made speeches in support of Woodrow Wilson and advised him
after his election. His friendship with Wilson led to his writing *Woodrow Wilson and His Work* (1920) and co-editing *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson* (1924 - 1926). Dodd wrote in 1914, "I have no creed political or otherwise", and this was true, in that he placed individual rights above political ideas. This explains why he was so outraged by the invasion of Belgium, why he believed that the U.S.A. would have to fight Germany and its militarism if the Allies were defeated, and why he supported Wilson's policies of reducing conglomerations of power in order to return more of it to individuals. 43

Given these facts, it is obvious that Dodd could not share Roosevelt's belief in corporatism nor his view of Germany as, in some ways, a model for America. Dodd expressed this clearly in a letter to Professor Marcks:

> It matters not to me that the Germans have a good government, nor that they conserve their resources, both in men and things, better than we do. It does matter when Germany undertakes to compel other peoples, let them be small or great, to submit to their methods.44

This is a statement of the priority of democracy over efficiency, typical of the Wilsonian Progressives, and a criterion by which Germany would inevitably be found wanting. Germany could not be a model for political reform in America.

Dodd's co-editor on Wilson's papers was Ray Stannard Baker, the Progressive journalist, magazine editor and author, who also became a close associate of Wilson's. Robert C. Bannister
wrote that Baker was "uniquely in tune with his culture - the
culture ... of literate Americans of the middle-class born
in the third quarter of the nineteenth century", which makes
it particularly interesting to examine his perceptions of
Germany. Baker visited that country from March to July, 1900,
in order to write articles for McClure's Magazine. Other arti-
cles were sold to magazines and newspapers by the McClure
Syndicate, and Baker expanded all of these into the book Seen
in Germany, published in 1901. His notebooks mainly reveal the
typical reactions of American tourists: he admired the opera,
was astonished by the omnipresence of the police, saw signs
of prosperity, complained about having to give tips, noted every
sighting of the Emperor and other royalties, and "visited all
the wonders" of Nuremberg. More significantly, he wrote after
visiting a colonial and marine exhibition at Jena that "one
who wished to write of German expansion and development could
take no better text than this exhibition". He was particularly
impressed by models of military camps and ships, and the train-
ing of German soldiers and the development of German ship-
building were the themes of two of his articles. 45

He showed great sympathy with Germany's universal military
service, which created "order, system, discipline" in the
nation. He did not consider Germany to be militaristic, remark-
ing that the country was "deficient in military enthusiasm."
It had become "the greatest of military powers, with the most
perfectly organized fighting system and the most perfectly
trained individual soldier" because it had faced the choice of
"defense or death". He thought that Germany had no aggressive intent, and he enthused about the beneficial effects that military training had on the Germans, as regarded their appearance, strength, education, patriotism, and so on. The German soldiers had "strength and determination", but lacked initiative; his whole training, indeed, the whole life of the German empire, tends to crush out individuality, to train him that he is nothing, and that his company and his regiment and his emperor are everything, that he must obey implicitly.

Despite the implied criticism in this, the main effect of the piece is to convey admiration for "the greatest military system the world ever saw", particularly the private soldiers in it. Both this system and German ship-building demonstrated "thoroughness", one of the favourite words of writers on Germany.

In Baker's earlier books and articles in America he had shown most interest in questions relating to industry and public services, and this interest was continued in his investigation of Germany. He wrote about the conditions of the German workers, describing their idyllic family activities on Sundays: "compare the simple, care-free, temperate Sunday of the average German workman with what is too often the spendthrift, viciously idle, and drunken Sunday of many American and more English workmen." However, the German workers' lives also contained "toil, poverty, and restriction", with long working hours, small wages, expensive food, over-crowded houses, a lack of political power, and so on. He felt that the workers were careful and thorough, but
slow, that their military training had reduced their individuality, and that they had no opportunities to advance. He admitted that the government "trained, protected, and encouraged" the workers, but he felt that the latter were seen, not as people, but as tools "to carve a way for Germany", and although compulsory insurance "has made poverty almost unknown" (he was contradicting himself), it also destroyed individual responsibility. He claimed that if a German worker "does begin to consider his condition ... he either becomes a socialist or he commits suicide." 47 This was obviously not a favourable view of the German industrial system, looked at from the standpoint of the workers.

Another article praised the Physical and Technical Institute at Charlottenburg and particularly government financing of it: "In this large and liberal attitude toward science and the recognition of its value to the state, Germany must certainly be accorded the chief place among the nations." This enlightened attitude was again approved in a piece on the Jena glass works, which included a description of the profit-sharing scheme and other philanthropic activities of the Zeiss company. He said that the glass works were run as businesses, but their involvement with the state made them resemble "public institutions"; he added that "they indicate perhaps what may be the future condition of all great business enterprises", a reference to corporatist developments. 48

However, the people at McClure's were not very enthusiastic
about some of these articles. Joseph Rogers, one of its editors, wrote to Baker, "The Krupp article is all right", but he advised him not to waste time on a Serum Laboratory or on sugar beet and the Agrarians, instead suggesting that he concentrate on writing about the Emperor and the army. This advice was repeated in a letter from John S. Phillips, the Treasurer of the McClure Company, who wrote, referring to an article on Student Duels,

This ... is of no use to us, and I doubt if it would be saleable at any fair price to anybody, because it is on one of the most threadbare subjects that the American journalist ever tackled.

This latter point is certainly true, since, as was mentioned in connection with Mark Twain, the theme of duels in Germany was one that seems to have obsessed American magazines and newspapers. This obsession was certainly not at an end, since this very article appeared in Collier's Weekly and, when Baker's Seen in Germany was published, the reviewers spent more time on the duelling chapter than on anything else. In this Baker dealt not unfavourably with the student corps duels, explaining that, "Everything proceeds with decency and in order", and that special sword skills were required. As in the case of Twain, there is a sense of titillation in remarks such as "... the excellence of the performance depends on a liberal flow of blood" and, of a wounded duellist, "His appearance is not to be described in this place." Lurid violence in the midst of civilisation evidently held an attraction for
American readers. Some years later, an article by George Pullen Jackson attributed the American interest in the duelling corps to their "unique and picturesque" nature, but Jackson found the arranged duels disappointingly unexciting. On the other hand, the duels of honour, satisfying an insult, were really "spectacular", because there was more danger. Despite detailed description of the barbaric activities, Jackson evidently found it all very interesting, and he described the Kaiser's support for the corps. In the case of Baker, it seems surprising that someone concerned to destroy old abuses should not have been more opposed to the institution of duelling.

Phillips continued, "... there are comparatively few subjects over there that are good enough and important enough to devote much time to." He considered that shipbuilding and the physical laboratory, on which Baker had already sent articles, were not important subjects, had no news value, and were not what the public wanted. He wrote,

We must get bigger things ... A great article on Haeckel would have been a good thing ... A good article on the German Emperor would be a first rate thing, and immediately publishable, because there is an unquenched interest in that man and his doings. Likewise Mommsen and Virchow are great subjects. I wish you would confine yourself to the more important topics ... I hope the German Emperor article is on its way, for that should be the best of the lot. Don't let yourself get too far away from America and American interests ...
ents to write about those aspects of a country which will interest the home audience, rather than those which are most significant to the natives. It also shows the quite remarkable American interest in the Kaiser that he should not be considered a "threadbare" subject, despite the immense amount already written about him.

In any case, Baker did send an article on "The Kaiser as Seen in Germany". This piece, which took the common adulatory approach, has been referred to earlier. It called Wilhelm "a great man", compared him to Roosevelt, and identified him with German development. Baker also sent a piece on Ernst Haeckel, which McClure's entitled "Search for the Missing Link". This presented the usual picture of German professors as giving Germany "her present high place among the nations ... intellectually, industrially ... commercially", and as being "simple" in their life-styles, hard-working, "often impractical, sometimes visionary, with an infinite capacity for taking pains, and in the long run of getting results." Even the new industrial Germany could be seen in this way as the land of scholarship. Baker particularly praised Haeckel, and mentioned his Darwinian theories in the context of German development. He quoted Haeckel as saying that the German "tendency is all toward the centralization of power in the government, the removal of individual responsibility, and the working together of large masses of men as one man", whereas in America the individual was important. Neither Haeckel nor Baker expressed an opinion as to which situation was preferable. Baker worried about the
evolutionary effect that military training would have on European races as opposed to Americans, and he interpreted Haeckel as predicting a struggle for survival between nations, in which "the strongest, most easily adaptable, most resourceful nations will win." This accords with Baker's interest in Social Darwinism and his praise of America's commercial development and support for imperialism, at this time.\(^{52}\)

These articles elicited a letter of praise from Phillips, who was particularly pleased by the piece on the Zeiss lens works, presumably because it dealt with social measures benefiting the workers there. However, the predilections of the popular press were underlined by a letter from Rogers:

> I am very sorry that you did not go to Geneva. The Sun had a three column story about Madame Helene, the wonderful psychic creature.\(^{53}\)

These letters imply that serious interest in German conditions was limited.

Baker's visit to Germany had some effect on his own ideas. He wrote to his father, "I came back more than ever convinced that there is no place quite like our own land, and yet I see many things now in which our systems of government and education might be improved by adopting features in use in Germany." He had written about new educational ideas in Germany, being particularly impressed by technical schools which stimulated manufacturing industries; commercial schools which bene-
fitted foreign trade, the use of statues, school gardens, and the like in teaching; and the German realisation of the importance of specialised education to suit people for jobs. The aspects of government that impressed him were presumably the state encouragement for economic activity and scientific research. The picture that he gave of the general political system was mixed, but the general impression was that Germany was over-governed, although that did have advantages in, for example, reducing crime.54

Contemporary reviews of Seen in Germany show that Baker's favourable descriptions of the German system made an impression. The Milwaukee Journal, a paper with a large German-American readership, commented "we feel that we have met with ideas that we should like to have awakened and perpetuated in our own country." It was particularly impressed by co-operation among the government, scientists and industry. R.H. Stoddard wrote in the New York Mail and Express that the book showed the "really important ways in which Germany is contributing to the universal welfare", and many other reviewers used similar expressions. However, the Milwaukee Evening Wisconsin picked out the "spirit of repression" shown in the book, and one might expect that to be a popular objection to Germany in a democratic republic. The thirty-six American reviews among the Baker Papers show that American opinion was divided on this (as, indeed, does a general reading of American comment on Germany). For example, the San Francisco Argonaut remarked that German life might be highly regulated, but this
made life "secure, orderly and comfortable." On the other hand, the Boston Budget thought that this explained why foreigners became anarchists in America:

They are like over-governed children, who are either the worst-behaved children in the world as soon as the parental eyes are off them, or else stupid little cowards. America can learn much from Germany in the way of accuracy and painstaking and high ideals in the paths of science, but in true freedom and the growth of the individual, America leads, and will lead, all nations ... 

Nevertheless, Baker's complimentary portrait of the Kaiser convinced even this reviewer, and only the Philadelphia Press seems to have dissented on that point, remarking that "the general impression is that this potentate is one of those to whom distance lends about the only enchantment possible." 55

Several papers, including the Boston Budget and the Boston Evening Transcript, took the opportunity to repeat one of Baker's points (and one of the most common American views of German progress), that is, that the country had formerly been an artistic dreamer, then a philosophical scientist, and now it was coming to the forefront of world politics and commerce, and, therefore, posing a threat to America. And yet, this very threat derived from features that many Americans, particularly Progressives, found themselves admiring; the Chicago Tribune dwelt on the economic aspects of the book, pointing out that each German corporation had its own scientists, "not as here, to discover what can be used to make people think they are getting what they want, but to discover how to give the people
the best there is at a figure that will render the trade profitable and below competition." This reflects the consumerism that grew as one aspect of Progressivism, leading to pure food and drug laws, for instance, and this was one source of the great admiration for German efficiency or "thoroughness". Baker was obviously aware that Germany was a pioneer in protecting the consumer, since in 1892 he wrote an article for the Chicago News-Record on pork infected with trichinae being sold in Chicago, it having been rejected by the government inspectors who were required to examine meat for export because of strict German laws on the subject. In 1901 the New York Evening Sun summed up the general feeling of the reviewers with, "the ideal way to live would be under a judicious combination of the American and German systems." 56

It is interesting to look at the reviews to see how Baker's views of Germany were regarded in America. The book was widely reviewed, it sold well and it was used by the Chautauqua Reading Circles, and the articles on which it was based were widely disseminated, so Baker must have had a considerable influence on American perceptions of Germany at the very beginning of the twentieth century. He received many letters from readers, which suggests a greater interest in Germany than the staff of McClure's suspected. At some points in his book Baker explicitly contrasted Germany favourably with America, for instance on military economy (he wrote that it cost less to run the German army than America paid out in military pensions), workers' pastimes, and government support for science.
The concluding chapter also expressed admiration for a country which gave "the impression of tremendous activity and vitality, of change and improvement." Baker thought that Germany was more aware of its own abilities and how to use them to advance than any other nation, but he then pointed to problems: socialism, the Agrarians, a government preventing freedom, militarism, and localism. Earlier, he had written "American discipline is from within; German from without", which sums up his objections to the German system. However, the book was more favourable than unfavourable to Germany, as can be seen in the conclusion—"... one cannot but feel that the sober and practical sense of the German citizen, combined with an intelligent and powerful administration, will ultimately prevail, and that Germany will continue to go forward and upward"—which absorbs Germany into optimistic American ideas of history as progress, particularly prevalent in the Progressive Era. 57

American emulation of some German advances was already under way; for example, the American Bureau of Standards was largely based on the Reichsanstalt, which Baker praised highly. He clearly gathered many ideas for reform in Germany, so it is significant that at this period he approved of Theodore Roosevelt, as his comparison of the Kaiser with him suggests. As Robert Bannister pointed out, Baker at this time, like Gertrude Atherton and innumerable others, believed in Great Men as leaders. Baker also showed tendencies that would have led him to look with favour on German corporatism, writing what Richard Hofstadter called "faintly eulogistic articles" on
the conglomeration of American big business into trusts before he was launched on his career as a muckraker. He began in that field in 1903, with articles attacking abuses in trade unions, which elicited praise from Roosevelt, but he strongly disapproved of Roosevelt's speech of April 14, 1906, which criticised the reform writers and gave them the name of "muckrakers". Baker felt that Roosevelt's approach to America's problems was superficial, and that he based it on "moral judgments", not clearly thought out "principles". Like Beveridge and Howe, Baker was a member of the National Progressive Republican League in 1911. His favoured candidate for the Presidency was La Follette, because he aimed at both "strong and honest political machinery" and the application of scientific principles to problems. On the question of trusts, Baker had come to believe in the theory of La Follette's associate Charles Van Hise, that large corporations, short of monopoly, should be allowed, but controlled by the state. The influence of the German example can be detected in Baker's ideas on big business and on the use of scientific methods in public affairs, so it is unusual that he criticised Roosevelt for failing to adopt the latter, since Roosevelt associated himself with the German principle of efficiency. In this, Baker, like Howe, saw La Follette as best representing such principles as well as being most attached to democracy.

Baker wrote that after La Follette's collapse he became an "ardent follower" of Woodrow Wilson, believing that he had the same methods as La Follette, since he wanted "thorough
inquiry and careful thought before going to the people with propos­als for changes." Baker also approved of Wilson's choice of expert advisers and of his belief in democracy. Apart from the latter, these were qualities often associated with Germany, so Baker was strangely seeing Wilson as being more in accord with desirable German methods than Roosevelt. This, at least, is the impression given by Baker's autobiography, but Robert Bannister has noted that Baker's opposition to the individualistic economic theories of Wilson and Brandeis meant that his support for Wilson in 1912 was reluctant and that it was actually some years before he became an "ardent follower" of Wilson's.59 This would mean that Baker's case was analogous to Howe's, voting for Wilson because of opposition to Roosevelt. Since he did not accept Wilsonian ideas wholeheartedly, there was no real clash with his admiration for Germany.

In 1901 Sir John Murray, the naturalist, wrote to thank Baker for "Scenes in Germany" (sic), and he mentioned that Louis Agassiz, the American scientist, had predicted war between the U.S.A. and Germany in the not too distant future. Agassiz was of course right, and the First World War changed Baker's opinion of Germany even before American entry. He wrote in May 1915 that he would not write on American preparedness because he did not sympathise with it, adding, "I should feel about it as I should feel about going to Germany and writing of the excellence and efficiency of the German system". He had done just that fifteen years ago, but the war had caused
him positively to dislike German efficiency and everything associated with it. Baker's conviction that America should stay out of the war made him an enthusiastic Wilsonian; on August 18, 1914 he wrote that it was fortunate that proponents of peace were in government. His view of the war developed with Wilson's, and by 1916 he saw that Germany had to be defeated, for the sake of democracy, so he made speeches in the Mid-West and wrote articles on that basis. 60 Baker had moved from being a Rooseveltian favourable to many aspects of Germany, to a supporter of La Follette, sympathetic to certain German-derived ideals, to an anti-German Wilsonian.

One strand of Progressivism which derived much inspiration from Germany was the conservation movement. One of its leading exponents was Gifford Pinchot, who learned the science of forestry conservation in Germany. Despite this, he never showed much friendliness to that country, being attached only to his teacher, Sir Dietrich Brandis. One reason for this was that his family was French in origin and he maintained contacts with that country, always stressing that he had also been educated at the French Forest School in Nancy. Furthermore, as an extreme Prohibitionist he was appalled by the "drinking bouts" in which the Germans indulged. American reformers with a particular concern for matters of morality rarely sympathised with the German system. Pinchot even wrote in his autobiography that Brandis used French rather than German methods of forestry, because the latter were too concerned with perfect detail and tended to eliminate "executive aggressiveness",
this implying subordination to fixed rules. He observed that most German foresters did not bother about the people living in the forest, considering them to be mere peasants. Pinchot was interested in Brandis's involvement in social work, Christian missions, workingmen's clubs and the like, but not, it seems, in German social legislation and official reforms. He very much disapproved of the German governmental system, and in an article for *The World's Work* he asserted the importance of America's conserving its national resources, on the grounds that "it is the manifest destiny of the United States to demonstrate that a democratic republic is the best form of government yet devised ... and to exercise, through precept and example, an influence for good among the nations of the world." Someone holding these views would be unlikely to see Germany as a model for America in anything. Pinchot did encourage other American foresters to go to Germany, but only to study under Brandis.61

Linked to Pinchot's belief in conservation, which would avoid waste and benefit the public, was his support for government controls over big business, again to protect the public interest. He considered that the Progressive Party's programme in 1912 was not strong enough against the possibility of monopoly and he disliked corporatist theories, yet he supported his friend Roosevelt. In 1912 those Progressives who had been Republicans, like Pinchot, tended to vote for Roosevelt. As one would expect, Pinchot supported the Allies immediately on the outbreak of war. He went in 1915 to the occupied part of France
to distribute food, then was expelled from Belgium by the Germans because his sister was the wife of the British Minister at The Hague (another relationship that made him pro-Allied). On his return in May, he issued a statement saying that the sinking of the *Lusitania* had brought home to Americans that the war meant that "an autocratic military empire is trying to seize the domination of the world at the expense of the self-governing nations." In 1916 he supported Hughes for the Presidency, because Wilson had let Germany get away with sinking the *Lusitania* and other ships and because he had not done enough on conservation, civil service reform, increasing government efficiency and other Progressive policies. It was unusual for someone so committed to Progressivism to vote for Hughes.

Wartime newspaper cuttings that Pinchot collected show his interest at this belated stage in the development of German efficiency. These include a piece from *The North American* (Philadelphia) on the increase of state power in Germany. A quotation from General Groener has been marked - "The mobilization of labour and economic resources is not a temporary or halfway measure; it is an evolution from one organic state to another, embracing and affecting the whole nation" - as has another line, about Germany, France and Britain" transformed almost over night, putting into practice on a stupendous scale economic and social devices which have been regarded as the visions of impractical theorists." Presumably Pinchot saw this as evidence that the measures to promote conservation
and efficiency that he had supported were capable of being introduced in America, and this seems to be confirmed by the marking of a third passage, stating that America will have to adapt to face the post-war situation, with "complete state socialism" in Europe: "We cannot meet the highest organization man has developed with the loose and wasteful, if pleasant, individualism of our American scheme." It seemed that the war required the use of government regulation and other Progressive measures, and when the U.S.A. entered the war it used state control of the railways and other forms of governmental intervention in the economy, but these did not, in fact, last in the post-war world.

Despite his support for Roosevelt and his own debts to Germany, Pinchot did not share Roosevelt's sympathy for German developments paralleling American Progressivism. His case shows that personal and familial considerations, as well as an attachment to democracy and individualism, could over-rule the attractiveness of Germany to Progressives, even of the kind most interested in conservation, with which Germany was particularly associated.

Nevertheless, from the cases which have been discussed a pattern emerges. Supporters of Theodore Roosevelt tended to admire the order, discipline, military strength, paternalistic reforms and encouragement of economic concentration in the interests of efficiency, which they saw in Germany. To the names that have been mentioned could be added John W. Burgess
and Albion W. Small, as examples of academics who drew their ideas from Germany and influenced the New Nationalism. Jurgen Herbst has described how they adopted German collectivism, and how, as he put it, "In the New Nationalism of 1912, the historical school of social science had its moment of triumph". However, Burgess was so right-wing that it seems absurd to call him a Progressive; he was so attached to the German regime that he frequently denounced German Socialism as a threat to civilisation. Albion Small had also been a student in Germany and based his work in sociology on German theories. He was, furthermore, married to the daughter of a German general. In the American Journal of Sociology, which he founded, he promoted German ideas, making statements such as "A large part of the strategy of constructive social science in the next few generations in the United States must consist in conscious and deliberate practice of the composite methods of research which have achieved prestige in Germany in place of methods of unreal abstraction." He described German history as phases in which first the state had to be protected, then the citizen vis-à-vis the state, then the majority against the rich, and since 1871 there was "a permanent policy of promoting human improvement", using social science, and he urged American social scientists to follow the German example.65

Small was a member of Roosevelt's Progressive Party, and like Roosevelt he had some suspicions of Germany, the government of which he saw as lacking morality. He blamed Germany most for the militarism that caused the First World War and in
1915 in a letter to the German sociologist Georg Simmel, published in a British journal, he rejected the arguments of German professors that Germany was in the right. He wrote that he had not expected the whole German people to support the "hideous cult" of militarism, and he expressed the hope that the war would end with "a stalemate". This is the case of a Progressive who approved of the social system of Germany but not of the militaristic impulse that was one of the factors holding it together. In that Small differed from the typical Rooseveltian.

According to Jurgen Herbst the Wilsonian and La Follette Progressives disapproved of the German collectivist ideas in the New Nationalism. This was certainly true of the Wilsonian Progressives, even in the case of W.E. Dodd, with his German connections, but the evidence shows that such supporters of La Follette as F.C. Howe and R.S. Baker were very much in favour of such ideas, even though, for reasons of their own, they voted for Wilson instead of Roosevelt. The fact that they were as attached to democratic freedom as to efficiency may have been a factor in this. Richard T. Ely was another associate of La Follette's, who was largely responsible for bringing the German ideals of state action to Wisconsin. He also had an influence on Roosevelt, who attributed much of his radicalism to him. Ely did not oppose the German influence in the New Nationalism, but he found Roosevelt unconvincing in 1912. He had already decided not to support La Follette, who, he believed, put too much emphasis on democratic political reforms. He therefore voted for
Wilson, who had been one of his students at Johns Hopkins, despite the fact that he shared few political beliefs with him. Benjamin Rader has shown that Ely became increasingly conservative after he was accused of teaching socialism in 1894, so he presumably saw Wilson as a conservative reformer, the gentleman scholar in politics. Ely thus joins Howe and Baker as examples of Progressives with German sympathies who had supported La Follette but moved into the Wilsonian camp. The German influence in American Progressivism cannot therefore be seen as a simple matter of Rooseveltians on one side and Wilsonians on the other.

In any case, that admiration of German reforms and German collectivism was widespread in America can be seen from the number of articles and books about them. As was shown in the previous chapter, F.C. Howe alone contributed enormously to this flood. The Socialist Charles Edward Russell wrote on "the comforts, the cheapness, and the convenience" of the state-owned railways, which exhibited "the precision of a perfect machine", killed fewer people in a year than the American railways killed in a week, and had fair rates. He also praised the German government's control of insurance companies, remarking, "It is odd to reflect how much we have accomplished in the world by showing others what not to do", but he condemned the German class system which resulted in "ragged savages, the products of inequality and autocracy" pouring through Berlin on New Year's Eve. This last is most untypical of American observations and reflects Russell's
stance to the left of Progressivism, but his favourable comparison of German conditions to American was widespread. The World's Work saw "Some Lessons from Germany", which included state insurance, a good postal service, vocational schools and the potash monopoly. The article made the familiar point that many of those supporting such measures in Germany "would resent its being described as Socialism", adding, "whatever it is, it is interesting." 68

This interest was strong enough to extend into books, especially in the years immediately before the war. Throughout Frederic Austin Ogg's Social Progress in Contemporary Europe (1912) there is praise for German commerce, railways, sanitary legislation, social insurance, education, and so on. A chapter was devoted to the "remarkable set of ameliorating and conserving instrumentalities which Germany has brought to bear upon the conditions surrounding her working classes", conserving people as well as resources. The country had developed "conservation and efficiency" more than any other state, and thus promoted "national power" and individual "well-being and contentment". This enthusiasm was only slightly abated by a chapter on German politics, which displayed "a segregation of social classes which is unwholesome and a distribution of political power which is grossly inequitable." 69

The following year saw the publication of Elmer Roberts's Monarchical Socialism in Germany, which was admired by Beveridge. This was the most detailed American description of the use of state power in Germany to intervene in the economy,
to control the railways, to turn the people into skilled workers, to give work to all, to protect the people by insurance, and to do all the other praiseworthy things. Roberts explained that the German system had developed from the European tradition that

The individual has had a less important place in the organism. The strength, welfare, and health of the whole has been the ruling conception

Since he continually praised the results, Roberts evidently felt that this point of view was justified. A chapter on the government's encouragement of trusts pointed out that even the Socialists supported this, and that the latter were the equivalent of the American radicals who were most against economic concentration. He explained that large-scale production was most efficient, that the syndicates could export cheaply, and that they stabilised the economy. He showed little sympathy with the Socialists, whom he described as opposing "that wonderful body of men that leads militant industry and enterprise", evidently preferring monarchical or "aristocratic" socialism to the real thing. Since the book is concerned basically with describing a desirable economic system, it is revealing that Roberts felt it necessary to include a chapter on the German navy, explaining that the country only wanted peace and was no danger to Britain. Presumably he felt that it would help Americans to accept German reforms if they were assured that to do so in no way implied an endorsement of anything that was anti-British. Similarly,
a chapter on Wilhelm II sought to answer those criticisms that had been made of him; he may not have been elected, but he "and the ruling group near him are no doubt more sensitive to criticism than they would be were they elected by the people or responsible to parliamentary majorities", and his administration was ruled by "clean living, hard work, and knowledge." His intelligence, ability, honesty and other virtues were detailed, as were those of his officials. 70

Sensitivity to criticisms of Germany was also reflected in the final chapter, "The Play Instinct in Germany", which, as though in reply to allegations that the Germans were boring and just cogs in a machine, asserted that they could enjoy themselves immensely with music, nature, gymnastics, and so on. The final image, of the Emperor, Empress and 250,000 Berliners going on one day to see the cherry trees blossoming at Werder, implied that the perfection of the German system enabled the Germans to appreciate beauty, and in no way dulled their aesthetic senses. That was the end of the last chapter, but there were also appendices, the last one of which returned to the Kaiser, detailing his good relations with America and Americans. The last sentence of the book concerned the possibility that America would finance Germany if it went to war with Britain and France, but events were to prove that for most Americans the attractions of Germany were not sufficient to overcome the less progressive, in all but the democratic sense, attractions of Britain. 71

The Socialist William English Walling was considerably less
impressed by the German system in his Progressivism - And After. He admitted that German progress in industrial organisation had greatly exceeded that of Britain and America, but asserted that those countries were bound to take over the lead, since Germany was "limited by an antiquated form of government". Nevertheless, the book details the developments that had taken place in Germany. Walling had not expected the increased strength of the German Revisionists, and he included a denunciation of the undemocratic methods of the S.P.D. He considered that the State Socialist system in Germany had benefited the ruling-classes more than the workers, which might have been an argument against it from the Socialist point of view but would have been a further recommendation for many Rooseveltian Progressives. In fact, Walling identified the programme of New Nationalism with State Socialism.

It can thus be seen that there was great interest in what was seen as German progressivism. Obviously, the attractiveness to American Progressives of these economic and social developments was well-known to German sympathisers in America, and when the First World War began this was one of the grounds on which writers of pro-German propaganda sought to gain American support for Germany. Perhaps the most sustained attempt of this sort was Frank Koester's Secrets of German Progress, published in 1915 by The Fatherland Corporation (which was headed by George Sylvester Viereck, the chief German-American propagandist). Koester was a German-American engineer, who had before the war pointed to the German science of city-
planning as an example to Americans. *Secrets of German Progress* presented Germany as the most advanced country in the world, which had been beset by jealous rivals, causing a war "between fortified sloth and challenging efficiency". The problems that faced America had been solved by Germany, despite having fewer resources, so America should emulate German methods. Koester attacked American criticisms of Germany as a militaristic and unfree country, claiming that it had to build up its strength in self-defence and that there was "more real personal liberty in Germany than in the United States." Those liberties that were lacking had been voluntarily given up for the sake of the threatened nation, but Americans could not understand, being free from foreign menaces.73

Koester proceeded to explicate the German system, in which the state and the individual owed duties to each other. This led to such benefits as public control of utilities and natural monopolies; conservation of resources; strong municipalities, without the scandals of American cities and with "business-like" administrations; government encouragement of science, as opposed to American trusts discouraging invention; a welfare system that looked after Germans "from the cradle to the grave" and which inspired "the worker with a sense of loyalty to the organization of which he is a member, which is quite unknown in other countries, particularly in the United States and England"; the best education system in the world, intended "to make Germany a great nation"; an immense growth in foreign trade and internal economic development; and far
more support for the arts than in America. Koester continually stated that America could learn things from Germany, such as city-planning, which made German cities "the most desirable ... in the world." On housing, Thomas A. Edison was quoted:

I saw what made me ashamed for my own United States, I am afraid. The workingmen of New York City are not housed as are these Berliners. What a contrast to the dreadful tenements which disgrace and deface New York's crowded districts.

According to Koester, the biggest problem facing America was that of the trusts, but Germany had managed to protect small businesses by government action. At the same time, the German government saw the advantages of trusts, in the form of cartels, and worked with them, encouraging economic progress. Koester stated that Americans were wrong to believe in "unbridled competition." 

The book thus provides a summation of all the aspects of Germany that American Progressives had admired, and it contrasted these advantages with the situation in America. One cannot help feeling that this approach was not very tactful in 1915, when Germany's enemies were complaining about its arrogance and imperialism, since Koester was proclaiming the superiority of Germany and stating that other countries should be like it. Be that as it may, his case was summed up in the assertion that "the spirit of co-operation or collectivism" predominated in Germany; that was attractive to those Americans who felt that individualism had gone too far in their
Koester's book is useful in showing the features that had attracted Americans to Germany, but he also set out to answer criticisms. One chapter, called "The Greatest Secret of German Progress", was intended to counter Germany's undemocratic image. This states that the German government "is able to accomplish its purposes, the purposes of all governments, that of carrying out the will of the people, in a more effective manner than that of any other existing form of government". This implies that it was truly democratic, indeed, according to Koester, more so than Britain. It was "not a monarchy", the Kaiser having "vastly less actual power than the President of the United States". Koester claimed that power lay with the states and the Bundesrat, so, "The German Empire ... is in reality a republic ..." He continued in a similarly bizarre vein, complaining about faults in the American political system and alleging, "Enfranchisement without property qualifications is really taxation (for property owners) without representation." This open attack on the usual definition of democracy was unlikely to endear Koester's case to Progressives, even though he praised the efficient German bureaucracy.

Another chapter complained about British "lies" in the American press, and stated that government controls on the press in Germany meant that there was "vastly more freedom from the press, and from the destructive license and pollution of
public opinion to which the readers of American newspapers are subjected." Again, this is scarcely a convincing reply to criticisms of the lack of press freedom in Germany. The benefits of discipline and efficiency derived from the German army ("the greatest organization which has ever been perfected by the brain of man") were described and Germany's need for a navy asserted, in reply to allegations of militarism. Germany's continued "pre-eminence in the arts" was claimed, in opposition, presumably, to claims that it had become wholly materialistic. There was even a chapter on German women, telling Americans that they were wrong to think that they were "placid, portly and industrious" housewives.

This work is, therefore, a compendium of American attitudes, both favourable and unfavourable, to Germany. It tries to argue against the latter and to use the former, in accordance with the tradition of presenting Germany as a model for America, to create better relations between Germany and America. Furthermore, Koester recognised that America's attachment to Britain stood in the way of this, so he continually sniped at the latter country, for instance, describing it as a "plutocracy" and pointing to the danger of an Anglo-Japanese pact against America. However, the fact that he continually linked Britain and America in contrast to Germany, stating, for example, that they had higher illiteracy rates and that they both lacked the abilities that enabled Germany to do so well in foreign commerce, might have given a reader the impression that they had a lot in common with each other, even if they
needed to improve, and that the allegedly superior Germany was a danger to them both. The last two chapters might have been meant to counter any such impression: one proclaimed that the whole world owed a debt to German advances in science, while the final one denied that Americans were Anglo-Saxons, being more Germanic than British, claimed that the Germans liked America more than the British did, and stated that Germany and America had the same interests. The reader is finally presented with the choice between declining, unprogressive, plutocratic Britain and progressive Germany. In 1915 the defenders of Germany were trying to appeal to the traditional American Progressive attraction to Germany, but the war had changed things too much for most Progressives (although as late as January 17, 1917, Albert Beveridge was writing to W.E. Dodd that America's enemy was not Germany but Japan.) 78

Even before the war some Germans had realised the attractiveness of a Progressive image. When diplomatic difficulties arose over the attempted purchase by American businessmen of a potash mine, in order to get round the monopoly position of the German potash cartel, which purchase was blocked by the German government, the German Ambassador, Bernstorff, persuaded the Taft administration that the German policy was due to a desire to conserve natural resources. 79 In this way, a policy designed to increase national strength and wealth could become acceptable to some Americans if expressed in Progressive terms.
Not only Progressives were impressed by the German system. In 1908 F.W. Wile reported in the Chicago Tribune that William J. Conners, a Democratic boss from Buffalo, New York, who was visiting Berlin, remarked:

I think it's the greatest burg in Europe for cleanliness and swell buildings ... They told me the Germans was slow. Slow be d-d! It's swift they are, and Berlin proves it ... I've always been given to understand the Kaiser was a d-d nice fellow ...

This may well be an archetypal expression of the popular American view of Germany. Another American who cannot really be described as a Progressive, but for entirely different reasons, was Randolph Bourne. This political and literary radical demonstrated great sympathy for Germany after returning from a visit there. In 1915 he contributed an essay, "American Use for German Ideals", to the New Republic, asserting that "German ideals are the only broad and seizing ones that have lived in the world in our generation". He praised German "spiritual energy", town-planning, "civic art", and collectivism, seeing everywhere "the realization of the individual through the beloved community." He demanded that America adopt the same ideals, which would be magnified in their effectiveness by being set in a democratic, peaceful state. Bourne differs from Rooseveltian Progressives in supporting a greater degree of collectivism and in doing so for aesthetic and ethical rather than economic and nationalistic reasons. He is reminiscent of Howe in seeing German
collectivism as a means of raising the individual above the level on which she or he existed in America.

Bourne disliked Britain and Anglo-Saxonism, as did Henry Louis Mencken. Few Americans would have rejected the label "Progressive" more vigorously than this Baltimore journalist and author. He wrote that his father believed that reform was mainly only a conspiracy ofprehensile charlatans to mulct taxpayers. I picked up this idea from him, and entertain it to the present day.

Denunciations of moralistic "uplift" are common in his writings, public and private, as in a letter to Theodore Dreiser:

The uplifters have sworn to put down the villainous practice of copulation in this fair republic ... If I ever get out of my present morass I shall begin the serious study of German, to the end that I may spend my declining years in a civilized country.

It was mentioned earlier that those Progressives who were interested in moral reform found little attractive in Germany (although there was the occasional attempt, as when the Anti-Saloon League of the State of Washington used pictures of, and quotations from, Wilhelm II in its propaganda) and Mencken's admiration for the country sprang partly from the same reasons. His chapter on "Munich" in *Europe After 8.15* dwells hedonistically on the beer, girls and other pleasures to be found there. 81

And yet, despite his opposition to reform, Mencken expressed
some approval of Theodore Roosevelt in the years before 1914, which is a reminder of how many different things "Progressivism" can mean. He was not averse to what he called Roosevelt's "deification of efficiency", and he paid him what was for him the high honour of calling him a disciple of Nietzsche, remarking that Roosevelt's "strenuous philosophy is violently anti-Christian". Mencken was the most important American interpreter of Nietzsche in the early twentieth century, writing about him frequently, particularly in _The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche_, which Randolph Bourne dismissed as a "crude ... summary". Mencken extracted from Nietzsche's ideas whatever fitted in with his own beliefs. He used him to attack socialism, as seen in the 1910 exchange with the socialist Robert Rives La Monte, _Men vs. The Man_. Mencken expressed his idea of progress in Nietzschean terms, saying that the philosopher believed "the aim of the human race should be constant progress upwards", but through the struggles of "the strong man", not by the actions of the "mob". This sounds not entirely dissimilar from some of the ideas of Rooseveltian Progressivism, but Mencken believed that "Nietzschism" would not advance in the U.S.A., that country being too tainted with Christian ethics. Mencken continued to see Roosevelt in German terms after the war, seeing a "philosophical kinship to the Kaiser" in his belief in "strongly centralized states, founded upon power and devoted to enterprises far transcending mere internal government."
Despite these elitist ideas, Mencken often criticised the ruling classes in Germany. He wrote in an editorial for the *Baltimore Herald* in 1905,

> There are many things in the German Emperor's make-up that no good American admires ... In many ways Wilhelm misses by far our Yankee ideal of high leadership ...

Despite these faults, "He is Germany incarnate", which indicates that Mencken had criticisms of the country as well as of its ruler. Later that year he contrasted Wilhelm with Bismarck, who was "a constructive statesman," only using war because it was necessary for German unification, but in his dealings with France in Morocco,

> Wilhelm has no such lofty motive ... If he fails to take warning (from British support for France) — if, in place of decency and justice, he continues to rely upon the mailed fist — then, indeed, the work of Bismarck may be overthrown in a day.

This sounds strange from a writer who was not only pro-German but professed to reject systems of morality, but it could be argued that in 1905 he had not fully developed his ideas, or that he had to accord with the editorial policy of the newspaper. Mencken seems to be more consistent with his beliefs two months later in an article on the German Socialists, who had "little of coherence or permanence". He claimed that "Socialism in Germany, as elsewhere, simply means discontent", which is a more unsympathetic expression of the belief that the German Socialists were really a reformist party. As
usual, Mencken rejected reform, concluding that the only way to improve the lot of the masses was "to let generation after generation fight it out, with the unfit perishing and the fit surviving." In 1905 Mencken was critical of both the Kaiser and the German Socialists, and in a review of Sudermann's _Magda_ he referred to a "family tyrant" and a stupid woman as "essentially German" types. 83

However, Mencken became increasingly sympathetic to the aspirations of the German people, as opposed to their rulers. For the _Baltimore Sun_ he wrote enthusiastically in praise of the Germans, and in largely progressive terms. After dismissing the "popular view" of them as "stolid, unsocial and clannish boors", Mencken wrote of their "honesty", "vitality", "common sense", "love of beautiful things", and so on. In tune with the predilections of his time he wrote that they "stood for progress, sanity, cleanliness", and established "decent government, comfortable homes, good schools and a respect for the law". Mencken added his own touches by praising the Germans for being "always socialist enough to subscribe to Karl Marx's materialistic conception of history", instead of adopting sentimental ideas, and for rejecting puritanism. He approved of German women, because each "sends a healthy, clean-minded son into the world to serve his fellow-men."84 Again, Mencken was stressing the moral and progressive qualities of the Germans, despite his own stated opposition to such things. Either he put aside Nietzschean ideas when dealing with the Germans, or else he
was deliberately praising them in a way that would impress his readers.

Mencken's admiration for Bismarck, perhaps inherited from his grandfather, was expressed in a review of Charles Downer Hazen's text-book *Europe Since 1815* (from which Mencken's *Europe After 8.15* impudently derived its title), when he referred to Bismarck's "gallant fight" against socialism; but already that year, 1910, he had written in support of Socialist demonstrations against the Prussian voting system, describing it as "unfair and mediaeval" because it prevented the majority from ruling, and praising the Socialists' "self-restraint and self-possession". In July and August he wrote a series of articles on the same subject and on the wider issues of the position of the German people. He wrote that "the common people feel themselves sorely put upon, and with good reason", because they were economically, legally and politically exploited by millionaires and aristocrats. The "swindled voters" had joined the Socialist party, which had become "a sort of general movement against privilege, much like the insurgent movement in this country". He repeated these points in various articles, including at least one signed one. This sympathy for the struggles of the German masses and criticism of internal conditions went along with admiration for German achievements in foreign commerce: "No other country in the world shows half of Germany's resourcefulness and enterprise in trade getting".

Mencken also continued to lack sympathy with Germany's rulers; in a review of a translation of Wedekind's *Such is Life*, he
described it as "a delicious reductio ad absurdum of the whole pompous piffle of royalty", which had caused a great commotion in Germany.  

Mencken stated his belief in the primacy of the German masses rather than the rulers most clearly in a review of Price Collier's Germany and the Germans. He criticised the fact that "the author's attitude toward the German people, as opposed to their rulers, is too often that of half-amused contempt", and claimed that Collier's "fundamental error" was to believe that German progress came from the top, "that the German people have been hauled up to civilized grace by their hereditary lords and masters." Mencken praised the role of Bismarck, but added that "domineering and ruthless leadership" would have been ineffective without "willing and enthusiastic following". Furthermore, German leaders could only be successful when the people agreed with them, so, in that sense, the German people chose their leaders. This is somewhat reminiscent of those apologists for the German system who described it as being really democratic, except that Mencken did not generally regard democracy as something praiseworthy, as he immediately showed, writing that "more than any other people on earth" the Germans

have respect for the trained man, the professor, the expert. Our American doctrine that the consensus of opinion among ordinary men is worth more than the individual opinion of the extraordinary man is one that they reject as absurd and indefensible.
He gave the example of trained mayors devoted to "efficient service", and attributed "the progress of modern Germany" to "discipline", "social organization" and "division of labour". Once again his praise of Germany made him sound like one of the country's Progressive admirers, but he next launched an attack on American reformers; even "the wildest anarchists and Socialists" in Germany were "more moderate and intelligent" than William Jennings Bryan, while "our vice crusaders and prohibitionists" would just be ignored in Germany. He was thus also praising Germany for its lack of reform of certain sorts: but, in any case, he was stating that German virtues resided in the masses. Wilhelm II was specifically denigrated, Mencken saying that when he opposed public opinion, as over the Daily Telegraph interview, "he has seen his 'divine right' go glimmering overnight." 86

Similar attitudes are evident in Mencken's description of Munich in Europe After 8.15. He is offended by the sight of a cropped-haired lieutenant, "that military gargoyle, half lout and half fop", who is clearly the representative of Prussian authority. Mencken prefers "the Munich of honest Bavarians", describing the simplicity of these ordinary, "bovine", "innocent" Germans. The book also contains a chapter by Willard Huntington Wright on the "innocence" of the real Berlin, but it is evident that Mencken preferred South Germany, where there was less stress on militarism and royalism. 87

As has been described, Mencken's great attraction to Germany
sprang from reading *A Tramp Abroad* (and it must be said that *Europe After 8.15* has touches reminiscent of that book) not from his German-American background. This attraction is displayed throughout his work, most notably in the use of German words. He was also anti-British and anti-Anglo-Saxon, so it is not surprising that in 1914 he, like his friend Dreiser, hoped for a German victory. Mencken's expressions of pro-Germanism were controversially extreme and therefore, it seems, avidly read; Ellery Sedgwick, the pro-Allied editor of the *Atlantic Monthly*, wrote him a series of letters in 1914 and 1915 inciting him to produce articles that would outrage his readers. One that he requested concerned the social benefits that America would gain if it were invaded; Mencken wrote such a piece, again demonstrating his approval of German Progressivism, but it was not printed, because of the sinking of the *Lusitania*. In a letter to Sedgwick he wrote that "the astounding efficiency" of Germany was due to Nietzsche's influence. Thanks to him,

... the old aristocracy of birth and vested rights has given place to a new aristocracy of genuine skill, and Germany has become a true democracy in the Greek sense. That is to say, the old nobility has taken a back seat and the empire is now governed by an oligarchy of its best men.

This way of looking at Germany, ignoring the aristocrats and the Kaiser and seeing control as being in the hands of experts, enabled Mencken to give whole-hearted support to the country. The old hereditary rulers, of whom he disapproved, were, in
his opinion, no longer ruling. This new way of looking at the situation reduced the importance he had attached to the German people as an initiating force. He told Sedgwick that "public opinion, in Germany, runs from the top downward", which contradicted what he had written in connection with Collier's book, exactly one year earlier. 88

Mencken stuck to his new line on the real ruling elite of Germany. In an article called "Are the Germans Immoral? Of Course!", he wrote that in the American "mobocracy",

the belief (i.e., superstition) of the farmhand is the policy of the nation. But this is by no means true of nations that have attained to a higher degree of governmental sanity and efficiency, and it is surely not true of Germany. The greatness of that country resides in the vast power wielded by its actually superior men, in the strength and intellectual daring of its aristocracy of competence and sound knowledge. To confuse that ruling aristocracy with its liveried servants and policemen, the Junkers, as all English and American chanters upon the war do ... is ludicrous.

This article turned the assumptions of most Americans upside down. Mencken expressed gladness that Germany had not let sentimental morality stand in its way during the war, and regret at the Kaiser's famous attachment to Christianity and at the fact that some German leaders had felt bound to make excuses for German actions. Germany had become, in his eyes, the living embodiment of his interpretation of Nietzsche's ideas. In various newspaper articles he proclaimed that Britain was being defeated, so Woodrow Wilson and others were supporting the wrong side; that Karl Liebknecht and
"every other German" were fighting for their Fatherland (he did not mention that Liebknecht had been forcibly sent to the Front); that a "striking difference between German Kultur and American culture is the difference between Beethoven and the phonograph"; and so on. 89

In order to promote the German case further, he went to Germany as a war correspondent in December 1916 and sent back to the Baltimore Sun and other papers a stream of reports, making such statements as that the Central Powers were fighting for "freedom and their right to exist as a nation", their determination only increased by the Allies' rejection of peace proposals. He claimed that conditions in Germany were excellent: the beer was as good as ever and the Germans were efficiently adapting to circumstances, producing artificial replacements to fill shortages of materials. He observed that the government was taking complete control of the economy, so there would soon be "through-going state socialism". He brought a new twist to the praise of German cities by Progressives like Howe by describing the immense advances brought about in a Lithuanian town invaded by the Germans, who turned it into a model community. He observed that,

The Germans fight filth almost as ardently as they fight the Russians ... It will seem a pity to turn this lovely country back to the Russians, once the war is over. The Germans in little more than a year have cleared it and civilized it.

The diary that Mencken kept in February 1917 largely consists
of material used in his articles, but in it he complained that the German Foreign Office did not understand or care about foreign opinion; he had evidently realised one of the disadvantages of behaving like a Nietzschean hero.  

Back in America, Mencken wrote an article on Ludendorff, praising his ability and efficiency (he was evidently a chief representative of Mencken's meritocracy; whenever he wrote about him he always mentioned his non-aristocratic origins), which appeared in the Atlantic Monthly in June 1917. At last, now that America was in the war, Mencken's views of Germany were taken seriously; this piece attracted wide interest in the press, The Cincinnati Times-Star, for instance, saying that America now had to have state control of the economy too: "We must meet efficiency with efficiency, economy with economy, system with system, even if for a time we shall have to tear a leaf from the book of autocracy."  

In July 1915 Mencken had written to a friend that America should "borrow a few useful ideas" from Germany, "instead of harping forever on the moral string". He was here summing up two strands of thought in Progressivism, the movement for practical reforms and the urge to improve morals (to which the desire for greater democracy can be related). Mencken identified Roosevelt and supporters of efficiency with the former, and Woodrow Wilson and numerous others with the latter. It can clearly be seen from Mencken's writings
on Germany that Henry May was wrong to write that he "re-
pudiated progress, root and branch." He was against the
"Uplift", puritanical, moralistic reform. He expressed
some sympathy with Roosevelt (though at other times he de-
nounced him), because Roosevelt supported change on the
German model, but he was completely opposed to Wilson, writing
in 1916, for example, that he was "more the Puritan than the
democrat: on the political side he has a great weakness
for strutting in the Kaiser's last year's pantaloons."
Given Mencken's disapproval of the Kaiser, this was a doubly
damning remark. (Wilhelm II did not reciprocate the feeling;
in 1928 he cited Mencken as an ally in criticising democracy,
Mencken having written that standards in Germany had declined
since the abolition of the Prussian suffrage system). The
alterations in the way in which Mencken looked at Germany
suggest that he treated it as he treated Nietzsche, trying
to form it in his own image and pointing to those aspects
of it that fitted in with his own preoccupations. This was
also the way in which, he said, the Germans had treated Niet-
zsche, taking only those ideas which "agreed with their
aspirations."92 Thus, Mencken sympathised with the ordinary
German people against their masters until he could see an
elite which he could admire, and Progressives, Socialists
and others either adopted or rejected aspects of Germany,
depending on their own ideas. The way in which they per-
ceived Germany provides a mirror for their aspirations and
the relative strength of different political urges within
them. Although Germany was widely perceived as a progressive
nation at this time, that progressivism was accompanied by clearly reactionary elements, so Americans had to balance these. The splits among American Progressives in the way that they perceived Germany reflects the fact that American Progressivism was an extremely diverse movement, containing impulses that were frequently contradictory.
CONCLUSION

The fundamental structure of relations between the United States and Germany encouraged ambivalence in American perceptions of the latter. These relations were businesslike, and cordial only in the sense that open antipathy was absent, except on particular occasions, such as the Venezuelan crisis of 1902 to 1903, although there were continual irritations over trade and other matters. The German government's efforts to fill the void had little success, particularly since the great influence of Britain on the U.S.A. was largely directed to turning Americans against Germany, so that they would be all the readier to support Britain. However, Germany could not credibly be seen, most of the time, as an enemy of the U.S.A., therefore it was ambivalence, rather than outright hostility, that characterised the way Americans saw Germany. Suspicions and fears were aroused by German policies, particularly with regard to Latin America, but those could not consistently be maintained at a high pitch, because of the lack of hard evidence of malevolent intent to back them up. It cannot, therefore, be said that American distrust of Germany was building up in the years before the First World War, since opposition to Germany tended to be cyclical, relating to particular events, rather than cumulative.

The lack of deep connections between the two countries is also seen in the paucity of literary contacts: few American readers read German literature and fewer American literary writers wrote about Germany. Those writers who did set
books in the country tended to be concerned with the picturesque, old-fashioned areas of it, rather than dealing with Germany as an industrial and military power. This was true also of Mark Twain, to some extent, although in essays and other forms he did discuss the modern Germany, of which he was not entirely uncritical; as was seen, he preferred to live in Austria rather than Germany. American writers, like many other artistic Americans, were attached to the famous old Germany, the land of learning, philosophy, music and art, not to the new country, which was too like America. In the years before the First World War, however, anti-Establishment figures like Randolph Bourne and H.L. Mencken began to see that certain elements in German society and art could be a stimulus to American life.

For Progressives, also, Germany could provide an example. The most convincing aspect of this was the picture of the German city, which contrasted vividly with its American counterpart. It was perhaps the most important case in which Americans were urged to emulate Germany, because the state of the American city seemed to be that country's most pressing problem in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Frederic C. Howe became almost obsessive about the contrast, and he and others were greatly influential in promoting the idea of Germany as an urban paradise. This to some extent provided a satisfactory replacement for the old rural Germany, but it did little to engage the American literary imagination, which was too occupied in writing about the cities of its own country. But even Howe demonstrated ambivalence, both about the wider
German system, with its lack of freedom, and about the conflict between democratic ideals and efficient, businesslike government within the cities.

The unity, cohesion and communal values of the German city appealed to many Americans, and the same was true of the wider German collectivism. Germany's social reforms and economic organisation were attempts to deal with problems that the Progressives were approaching in America, so some of them advocated the adoption of similar measures. The stress was on German efficiency, but this was opposed by others who stressed the political freedom that was lacking in Germany. This disagreement could be seen as bringing into opposition those who believed above all in the nation and those who believed in the individual, but it was not as simple as that, since Progressives as different as Frederic C. Howe and Albert Beveridge saw the German system as raising individuals to a higher level, both in terms of living in better conditions, physically, spiritually and artistically, and in terms of rejecting selfishness and working for the good of all. In any case, the American perceptions of German reforms and efficiency demonstrate deep ambivalence; few Americans accepted the entire structure without reservations.

However, German collectivism could be seen as improving the lot of the German workers and increasing national unity, which appealed to American Progressives of the statist, nationalistic, Rooseveltian type, or as destroying individuality
and strengthening autocracy, which made it repulsive to Progressives of the Jeffersonian, democratic, Wilsonian type. People who fitted into neither of these groups could interpret it in their own way and react accordingly; Frederic Howe is an example of someone who extracted from the German system only what fitted his own ideas and criticised the lack of democracy. Much of the appeal of Germany to Americans derived from their perception of it as a land of order, in contrast to the chaotic conditions in their own country. However, those reformers who sought to transform America by instilling morality found little to attract them in Germany, with its vast consumption of beer, its Socialists denouncing (in some cases) bourgeois standards, its irreligion, and so on. The distaste of such people for Germany is suggested by the speech of a Prohibitionist candidate after American entry to the war, who said,

The Prussian lust for world conquest which leads the Kaiser through the blood of millions in search of the phantom of his deluded mind, is identical with the greed of that un-American foe within our country which through drink would destroy the minds, the souls and the bodies of a free and happy people.¹

This is referring in particular to the German-American brewers, but their homeland is clearly identified with the evil that they propagated.

Whereas many Americans condemned the lack of democracy in Germany, Roosevelt and many others admired its efficiency.
This admiration was often increased by the German successes in the early stages of the war, even if those involved actually supported the Allies. Roosevelt expressed such feelings in a letter to Henry White in March 1917:

Well, there is one thing that our Government at least has done. It has removed all possibility of my hating Germany! I desire to go to war with Germany; but there is an immense amount about Germany that I both respect and like; whereas the Government of this country inspires nothing but contempt.2

For Roosevelt, the progressivism of Wilhelm II continued to be preferable to the Progressivism of Woodrow Wilson.

Another way in which ambivalence comes into American perceptions of Germany is with regard to its political system. As has been shown, the Kaiser could be attacked as a dangerous, war-like, mentally unstable, undemocratic, mediaeval believer in divine right, or praised as a stabilising, peaceful, brilliant, popular, ultra-modern servant of his people. As well as these completely contrasting interpretations of Wilhelm, there could be different valuations placed on the same interpretation. Thus, if it were agreed that he was aggressive and militaristic, those Americans who approved of such characteristics, like Gertrude Atherton and Alkert Beveridge, would admire him for possessing them, while others, like Frederic Howe or James McKeen Cattell, who disapproved, would criticise him. Ambivalence about the Kaiser in America depended first on what people saw in him and secondly their opinion of the characteristics that they saw.
Similarly with German Socialism: in the eyes of those who opposed the Left, Germany could be condemned as a nest of vipers or the government sympathised with for trying to stop the spread of Socialism, while American radicals would hail Germany as the fountain of Socialism and an example of Socialist success, while condemning the reactionary German authorities. But again, the division was not as simple as this, since there were many Americans who saw the German Socialists as not being really revolutionary but, rather, democratic and reformist. Many were led to this belief because they disapproved of the authoritarian system which the Socialists were opposing, while some American conservatives, like John W. Burgess, strongly approved of that same system, and so condemned the German Socialists. Admirers of the Kaiser and of German Socialism endeavoured to claim them as being in some way American.

It was also possible for an individual American to like both the Kaiser and German Socialism, since both could appear to be modernising forces, or to dislike both as extreme. The pendulum swung definitely in favour of the Socialists with American entry to the First World War, as symbolised by Percy MacKaye's sonnet "Liebknecht or Hohenzollern?" with its final words, "Long live Liebknecht and Liberty!".

Although German progress in commerce was greatly admired by Americans, it was also seen as a threat to American interests. In The World's Work appeared an enthusiastic description of
German commercial achievements, explaining how, from childhood, Germans were "industrial units", educated for their economic role. The Germans gave customers what they wanted, and so their export trade was rising faster than that of America. Despite the tone of praise, this piece was entitled, "The Menace of German Trade". An account of the "Industrial Advance of Germany" in the North American Review some years earlier presented a mass of facts to demonstrate the German progress, but no threat to America was explicitly mentioned. An ominous note was, however, added, when the author described the advances as "so striking as to command admiration, however we may deplore the military system and the autocratic tendency of the present regime." The latter was bad enough in its own right, but the addition of economic power would make it even more threatening.

Earl Dean Howard's The Cause and Extent of the Recent Industrial Progress of Germany attracted a lot of attention in 1907. It attributed the "most extraordinary" German developments to various national virtues, such as "economy", quickness "in adopting the improvements of others", "excellent technical schools", the Kartells, which adapted production to demand, "physical vigor", and so on. The book showed German progress as deriving from the whole social organisation of the country, which it continually praised. Again, however, these remarkable advances could be seen as a threat to America's position. Thorstein Veblen's Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution reached only a small audience. Despite its denial of being a "eulogy", it showed how remarkable German progress
was and attributed it to such qualities as the "industrious, healthy and intelligent population", but Veblen's main point concerned Germany's advantages as a late starter in industrial development, which meant that it could avoid the mistakes and structural disadvantages of Britain. Veblen was implicitly critical of the German political system and the military system which supported it.  

Unavoidably the questions of German commercial and industrial advance and its military power were tied together, since the latter seemed to underlie the former. Even so sympathetic a writer as Frederic Havre could say that Germany's ambition was to dominate the world, and, although he was referring to peaceful means, a country that depended so strongly on military might would generally be seen as prepared to carry on the struggle by military means, if necessary. Only those Americans who were over-optimistically devoted to the cause of peace would have agreed with Andrew Carnegie, who told the Master of Elibank, the Liberal Chief Whip, that Germany would never start a war for expansion because it could do so well from within its own boundaries.  

As has been shown, German militarism was attacked by many Americans, who would see its relationship to commercial expansion.

In reply to criticisms of the German military system a number of writers pointed out benefits of it. Karl O. Bertling listed ten in *The Outlook*, concentrating on the efficiency, education and national unity deriving from military service...
and the fact that Germans were expected to serve the state, which served them. Ray Stannard Baker, as has been seen, made similar points, while regretting the loss of individuality caused by German military training. Wolf von Schierbrand, who won the Iron Cross at Sedan, admitted that, "Those habits of discipline, that sturdy health ..., that sense of order and cleanliness of person which distinguish the modern German of every class, are in large measure due to his military training", but again he considered that it was "inimical to ... individualism". Poultney Bigelow was typical of American conservatives of a militaristic bent in not only admiring the German army but urging that America should emulate the German system of universal military training, so as to become "a democracy of soldiers." These were the sorts of arguments that appealed to nationalists and Rooseveltians, who would admire the German army for its efficiency, but therefore fear it all the more as a possible adversary.

Backing up the military image of Germany was the country's association with gymnastic activities and the like. German immigrants to America had brought the Turnverein, an organisation devoted to gymnastics, which spread widely in the U.S.A. One of the most famous strong-men of the late nineteenth century was Eugen Sandow, whose book Strength and How to Obtain It (1897) told people how they could become as muscular as him. It also included autobiographical chapters, beginning with his delicate childhood in Konigsberg and describing his successful displays of strength in the U.S.A., where he spread his system of physical development. The
popularity of this can be seen by the number of letters from, and photographs of, American pupils reproduced in the book, and he mentioned that thousands of Americans adopted the system. The ideas of Nietzsche could also be taken as supporting force; Jack London was one of those who picked up from him the "glorification of the Teutonic Superman." The famous German duels, which interested Americans so much, are another example of German brutality. Americans seem to have got a thrill out of the idea that mediaeval violence was permitted in the midst of civilisation; although many condemned it, a large number did not. Price Collier was an extreme example of the latter, supporting the institution because, "I prefer a world of slashed faces to a world of soft faces", but for many of his countrymen duelling, violent brutality in an ordered and advanced country, was, in itself, intriguingly ambivalent.

In these various ways Germany was identified with physical strength and physical force, but it is clear that many Americans had contrary perceptions. The Germans were often described as "docile", which is the opposite of aggressive; yet, docility could also imply that they were ready to do what their leaders told them to do, including the waging of war. On the other hand, ideas of the Germans as continually eating and drinking, as bespectacled and learned, as being busily engaged in inventions or other hard work of a civil nature, were totally against the image of Germany as militaristic. In his unsympathetic _Germany and the Germans_, Price Collier presented the Germans in this light, complaining
that they were over-educated and unhealthy, with not enough
sport in the schools. He considered that the German army
and navy were essential as "manhood-training schools" for
these enfeebled people, but even those institutions were too
soft, shown by the fact that not enough recruits were killed.
He described at length the over-work, "lassitude", and ill-
nesses that abounded in Germany. He insisted that it was
only because the Germans were "pitiably tame" that the systems
of municipal administration and social legislation worked,
so they would not be transferable to America. He described
the prevalence of alcoholism and moral laxity. His chapter
on the army praised it for being patriotic and instilling
discipline, but the main effect of this book would be to make
its readers believe that there was little danger from people
in such physical decline. Collier's was an extreme state-
ment of such ideas, but they were widespread perceptions.
From his right-wing perspective, Collier was criticising
aspects of Germany which he disliked, but which made it less
of a threat to America, and praising German military virtues,
which did pose a threat.

There was an American perception of Germany which was seen to
contrast, as Gertrude Atherton put it in her autobiography,
with Germany's "manly" and military image, but it is diffi-
cult to know how widespread it was at the time, since it was
a matter that could not be discussed publicly. This was
the belief that homosexuality was particularly prevalent
in Germany. Mrs. Atherton wrote that there were estimated
to be two million homosexuals in Prussia alone and she was
surprised to find that they were accepted in the night life of Munich. One of the most open statements of this occurred in her novel *Tower of Ivory* (1910), in which, although it was set in the time of Ludwig II, she put down her own contemporary experiences of Munich. She wrote,

... only in Munich, perhaps, a city too artistic to have a moral left, would army officers and their almost respectable partners rub elbows, in the best restaurant in the town, with painted young men come on the same quest as the floating female.

The hero of the book is inspired by these impoverished, decadent aristocrats to vow never to fall to their "horrid level". It was quite daring for a popular novel thus to touch on what Mrs. Atherton called Germany's "rotten spot", especially in such an explicit way. Any references to the subject were usually much more veiled.

There had to be some references to it, since one of the most important political events of Wilhelm II's reign was the exposure by Maximilian Harden of *Die Zukunft* of the homosexuality of Philipp zu Eulenburg and other intimates of the Emperor. This led to the collapse of the "camarilla", which had exerted great influence on the Emperor's policies. The American press generally made vague references to "immorality", but some publications, such as the gossipy *Current Literature*, were more specific. Its first report concentrated on the political aspects of the matter, attacking the camarilla's belief in absolutism, but a later article,
after Harden had been found not guilty of libelling one of those implicated, went into details of the scandal, such as,

The Darling of these cabalistic utterances is again no other than Emperor William. For the coterie ... referred to his Majesty among themselves as their Darling precisely as ... they called one another pet names, such as "Sweet", "My Own", "Heart of my Heart" and "Kissable". But ladies were not eligible to membership in the Round Table. Hence the scientific interest of the scandal from the standpoint of the student of erotics.11

This article was not signed, but in it can be detected the unmistakable style of George Sylvester Viereck, an associate editor of the magazine and not yet a paid propagandist for the German government.

Such explicitness was unusual, more typical being Frederic William Wile's references in his chapter on Harden in Men Around the Kaiser to "unspeakable conditions" and "moral laxity", but probably most of his readers knew what he meant. Wile was at pains to point out that the scandal left the Kaiser himself "untarnished". Another much-publicised scandal involving homosexuality surrounded Friedrich Krupp, the head of the armaments firm, who died soon after allegations about his activities were published by Vorwärts. The story aroused even more interest when the Kaiser denied the allegations after Krupp's death, but again the language used was vague, A.M. Simons, for instance, referring to "a series of charges as to the private life of Herr Krupp, who
had always posed as a highly moral character." This could mean almost anything, but it is quite possible that contemporary readers could interpret such expressions. The Literary Digest expressed itself in terms that would be clear to those with a classical education, reporting that Krupp's "sudden death was caused by 'slanders' linking his name with the infamies of Tiberius at Capri". It also reported allegations that the Socialists had slandered him because of his "philanthropy."\textsuperscript{12}

Other manifestations of German homosexuality, such as the photographs of Baron von Gloeden, would be known to few in America (or, in the case of these photographs, their homosexual implications would be recognised by few; the photographs were popular with a wider public as examples of "neoclassical romanticism"), but it seems likely that many Americans would have some inklings of the idea that there was a lot of homosexuality in Germany.\textsuperscript{13} Although this is something of which they would disapprove, it would tend to undermine Germany's image as an aggressive military power and increase that of European decadence (most Americans of the time not being aware of the connections between militarism and homosexuality), but the effect was probably marginal. For most people, Germany and militarism went together.

The friends of Germany in America were aware of the importance of American perceptions of that country, since public opinion could influence foreign policy, and none more so than Hugo Münsterberg, a professor of psychology at Harvard. He wrote
many articles to try to present a favourable picture of Germany: commenting on one of these efforts, an editorial in The Outlook stated,

To many Americans ... the German is a gross creature who never bathes, takes beer with his breakfast, always smokes a long pipe, wears spectacles, prostrates himself before the higher classes and deals insolently with the lower, spends his time filling out reports for the police and getting a "von" before his name.

Reading American articles and books up to the First World War shows how widespread elements of this caricature continued to be. The Outlook may have believed that the Germans were actually "exceptionally well governed" and that they "love music and art ... are kindly, cordial, and open to every sort of honourable sentiment", and, indeed, many Americans believed this too, but Munsterberg was well aware that unfavourable ideas persisted, and as a self-appointed propagandist he set out to combat them. He wrote to another psychologist, James McKeen Cattell, "I have given especial attention to those questions of feeling and of emotional values in the problem of international relations"; his observations as a German in America no doubt suggested this specialism, and inspired him to try to make American feelings lean toward Germany. In another letter to Cattell he told him that he had written some articles "about various aspects of German life with the intention of bringing them into popular magazines and in this way to spread the interest in new German movements." It is significant that those favourable to Germany felt that
actions of this kind were necessary in America.

Munsterberg also felt obliged to intervene in particular crises, being aware of how the lack of deep relations between Germany and America could lead to these getting out of hand. He frequently wrote to leading politicians and others offering advice on difficulties in relations; for example, he wrote to Roosevelt in October 1907 about the annoyance that had been caused by the appointment of a professor who was a Canadian citizen to one of the exchange professorships in Berlin, and urged the appointment of D.J. Hill as ambassador (this was before the Kaiser's objections had become known) to show that Tower's "luxurious life" was not necessary for an ambassador in Berlin. In a speech in 1905 he urged that German-Americans had to make an effort to improve relations between the two countries, particularly with regard to disagreements over tariffs. It was clear at the time that American opinion of Germany would have to be considerably transformed if British-American relations were not to squeeze Germany out, and this is why people like Munsterberg, Kuno Francke, Andrew Dickson White and others were so concerned about the way in which Americans perceived Germany. Some German-Americans, as has been mentioned, had already tried to show the importance of their group's role in American history, to counteract the Anglo-Saxon stress.  

This thesis has sought to show various expressions of American perceptions of Germany, and these expressions in turn would
affect the perceptions of those who read or otherwise received them. Those whose perceptions were formed by direct contact with Germany spread them more widely in America. However, perceptions are always clouded by preconceptions, and the traditional stereotype of Germany, as detailed by The Outlook above, to which could be added other features, such as belief in military power, must have served as the image of Germany in the minds of millions of Americans. Stereotypes linger on tenaciously; in the nineteenth century Americans were frequently appalled by the sight of women working in the fields, an image that was still being used in 1925 in Anita Loos's Gentlemen Prefer Blondes, where the heroine and her friend, in 'Germany,

saw quite a lot of girls who seemed to be putting small size hay stacks onto large size hay stacks while their husbands seemed to sit at a table under quite a shady tree and drink beer ... So Dorothy and I looked at two girls who seemed to be ploughing up all of the ground with only the aid of a cow and Dorothy said, "I think we girls have gone one step too far away from New York ..."

Miss Loos was obviously poking fun at the stereotype, but it is significant that it still lasted. In a more recent American novel, Walter Abish's How German Is It, the first chapter lists the clichés about the German nature - cleanliness, order, cream cakes, art, and so on - which still exist and which were being propagated in America before the First World War.16 A stereotype of this sort obviously exists at a deep level, underlying more intellectually acquired ideas, but the fact that intellectuals, who would put much more
weight on more substantial perceptions, were so influential in America in the period under discussion, means that their ideas of Germany had great significance.

Americans displayed both admiration and love, and suspicion and fear, of Germany, among other feelings, and a mixture of these could be present in any one person. The country could be a model for reform and an example of political backwardness, sometimes simultaneously. Its economic performance could be praised, while recognised as a danger to American interests. Its militarism could be attacked or praised, but that, and the concurrent naval expansion, was generally seen as some kind of threat to America. The same applied to its famous efficiency. The word most used by Americans in this period to describe Germany was "thorough"; it was usually used in a positive sense, but when the First World War came it was easy to see Germany as thoroughly bad. Those things that undermined German efficiency, such as drunkenness, were criticised, even though they might objectively have been to America's benefit.

From 1888 to 1917 American perceptions of Germany became increasingly defined as the country was recognised in its new role as a Great Power. These perceptions reflected American conditions, since how Americans saw Germany depended largely on how they saw America. Conservatives, Progressives, Socialists and others could see in the other country, because it was both so like America and so different from it, their
hopes or fears for America being acted out. It is particularly noteworthy that many Americans were prepared to overlook the lack of democracy in Germany because of the orderliness and social legislation there, which suggests that for them democracy came second to reform. When America and Germany went to war, a situation which was partly due to Germany's exclusion from the British-American partnership, the hopes were destroyed and the fears of Germany proved well-founded. Progressive America went to war against what had turned out to be its mirror-image, and even formerly favourable perceptions could be transformed into an intensification of the hatred of Germany.

FOOTNOTES : CHAPTER 1


3. E.g., the Eclectic Magazine of New York and the Living Age of Boston often carried articles that had appeared in Blackwood's or the Contemporary Review; Sydney Brooks, "Great Britain, Germany and the United States", Living Age (July, 1909); Vigilans Sed AEquus (W.T. Arnold), German Ambitions (London, 1903); J. Ellis Barker, Modern Germany (New York, 1907).


5. Literary Digest, XXVII, 6 (August 8, 1903), 174 - 5.


8. E.g. in McGuffey's Sixth Eclectic Reader of 1879 about half of the literary selections are British, with only one German item (a translation of a poem by Herder).


10. Numerous books of the period show the connection between Germany and music, e.g. Mrs William Howard Taft, Recollections of Full Years (New York, 1917), pp. 2, 17, 30 and Amy Fay, Music-study in Germany (New York, 1880 and later editions), passim.


15. Roosevelt to Spring Rice, August 13, 1897 in The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, I (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1951), pp. 644 - 5 (this letter also remarks that "the Germans are below us", i.e. the Americans and British); Roosevelt to Whitelaw Reid, April 28, 1906 in ibid., V (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), pp. 230 - 51.


23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.


27. A.E. Campbell, op. cit., pp. 43 - 44. This imperial conflict was amusingly expressed in a cartoon from Ulk, reproduced in Literary Digest, XXVII, 4 (July 25, 1903), p. 114, which showed Roosevelt, Bulow and Chamberlain blowing bubbles marked with the names of their respective empires and hoping, "If only the bubbles do not collide!"


32. C.S. Campbell, op. cit., p. 247; Literary Digest, XXIV, 7 (February 15, 1902), p. 207; Literary Digest, XXIV, 8 (February 22, 1902), pp. 246-7.


35. Literary Digest, XXV, 25 (December 20, 1902), pp. 823-4 and 26 (December 27, 1902), pp. 859-60; Perkins, op. cit., pp. 189-92; C.S. Campbell, op. cit., Cap. XIII.


39. C.S. Campbell, op. cit., Cap. XV; Literary Digest, XXVII, 17 (October 24, 1903), pp. 535, 570; ibid., XXIII, 3 (July 20, 1901), p. 83; e.g. "Germany, the British Empire, and the United States," Literary Digest, XXIV 3 (January 18, 1902), p. 89. Arnold, op. cit., p. 25, also refers to the idea of a European Zollverein.


41. Literary Digest, XXVII, 4 (July 25, 1903), pp. 96-7.

42. See Perkins, op. cit., pp. 141, 52-3 (Irish-Americans and German-Americans formed the Anti-British Alliance Association); Richard D. Challener, Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy 1898-1914 (Princeton, 1973), pp. 28 ff (this is the best book on naval opposition to Germany); Perkins, op. cit., p. 245; "Dewey scores Kaiser's Navy", Newark Evening News, March 26, 1903, and cuttings in Dewey Papers; Alfred Vagts, "Hopes and Fears of an American-German War, 1870-1915, II", Political Science Quarterly, LV, I (March, 1940),
The question of co-operation between Irish-Americans and German-Americans became more significant after 1914: see James K. McGuire, The King, the Kaiser and Irish Freedom (New York, 1915), especially Caps. II, V, VII and XXIV, and Charles Callan Tansill, America and the Fight for Irish Freedom 1866 - 1922 (New York, 1957), pp. 166 - 7, 176 - 7, 180 - 1, 190 - 9. Only a minority from each community were involved in such activities.

43. Bigelow to Mahan, May 26, 1894; e.g. Rodgers to Mahan, March 25, 1909 (Mahan Papers); Mahan, "Germany's Naval Ambitions", Collier's Weekly (April 24, 1909), pp. 4 - 5; Mahan to Colonel Sterling, February 13, 1896; F.A. Mahan to T. Roosevelt, February 11, 1915 (Mahan Papers).


47. Ibid., p. 106; H.P. Lovecraft, "Dagon", Dagon and Other Macabre Tales (London, 1967), p. 3; Lovecraft, "The Temple" in ibid., pp. 73 - 85; Lovecraft, "Herbert West-Reanimator", in ibid., p. 142; Lovecraft, "Supernatural Horror in Literature" in ibid., pp. 345 - 413; see Prawer, op. cit.; Lovecraft, "Polaris" in op. cit., p. 20.


50. Ibid., pp. 251, 244 - 5; see R.H. Schauffler, "The Real Elizabeth in Her German Garden", The Outlook, LXXXI (September to December, 1905), pp. 775 - 9.

51. See the two volumes of Smalley's Anglo-American Memoirs (London, 1911 and 1912); the reference to Wile's articles are drawn from the clippings in the Wile Scrapbooks.
52. Wile, Men Around the Kaiser (London, 1913), pp. viii, 26, 88, 117, 168, 6, 52 - 3, 21, 185 - 6; see Manfred Jonas, The United States and Germany (Ithaca and London, 1984), Cap. III.


54. Alfred Vagts, "Die Juden im amerikanisch-deutschen imperialistischen Konflikt vor 1917", Jahrbuch für Amerikastudien, XXIV (1979), pp. 56 - 71. The present writer has in his possession Straus's copy of A.D. White's autobiography, in which a passage criticising Russia has been copied out.
FOOTNOTES CHAPTER 2


7. See John C. Hepler, "Muted Voices from the Past", in Poole's Index Date and Volume Key (Chicago, 1957), pp. 49 - 61.


11. Poultney Bigelow, Seventy Summers (London, 1925), I, pp. 76 - 7; II, p. 50; Bigelow, "Ten Years of Kaiser Wilhelm", Century Magazine, N.S. XXXIV (May to


27. "William II", The Outlook, CIV 8 (June 21, 1913), pp. 365 - 6; ibid., 9 (June 28, 1913), p. 420; ibid., CII, 16 (December 21, 1912), p. 866; "A War Lord's Jubilee", The Independent, LXXIV, 25 (June 19, 1913),


37. See Kurenberg, op. cit., p. 200, Hill, op. cit., p. 85; Bigelow, Prussian Memories, p. viii; Perkins, op. cit., p. 245.


43. Thomas Davidson, "The Imperialization of Germany", The Forum, XXIII, 2 (April, 1897), pp. 246 ff.


55. On war-time propaganda, see H.C. Peterson, Propaganda for War (Norman, Oklahoma, 1939).


62. Ibid., pp. 76, 77, 81-3.
63. Ibid., pp. 84, 86, 87 - 8.
64. Ibid., pp. 130, 156 - 7, 160.
65. Ibid., pp. 201, 192, 204.
66. Ibid., p. 233.
FOOTNOTES : CHAPTER 3


4. Twain, A Tramp Abroad, pp. 88, 171, 193, Appendix B., etc.; ibid., pp. 12, 107; e.g. ibid., pp. 131 ff, 154; ibid., p. 110; c.f. R.A. Musselman, Attitudes of American Travelers in Germany 1815 - 1890, Ph.D. thesis (Michigan State College, 1952); Twain, op. cit., p. 133.


7. Ibid., caps. V - VII; ibid., pp. 39, 40, 43; Mark Twain's Notebook, p. 136; A Tramp Abroad, p. 44.


11. Ibid., pp. 209, 74, 75, 28, 86; V. Royce West, "Mark Twain and Germany", The American-German Review, II, 4 (June 1936), p. 37. For Twain's praise of the German character see, e.g., A Tramp Abroad, p. 146.


16. Twain, A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court in The Favorite Works of Mark Twain (Garden City, New York, 1939), pp. 661 - 890; e.g. Mark Twain's Notebook, p. 336.

17. See Arthur L. Scott, Mark Twain At Large (Chicago, 1969), p. 163; Twain, The American Claimant and Other Sketches (New York, 1923), p. 2 etc. The hero is an aristocratic radical who wants to give up his title.


22. Twain, "Switzerland, the Cradle of Liberty", The Complete Essays of Mark Twain, pp. 110 - 111.

23. Twain, "Marienbad, a Health Factory", ibid., pp. 100, 101, 104.


27. "The German Chicago", pp. 91 - 3; Mark Twain's Notebook, pp. 217, 223.


30. Mark Twain's Notebook, p. 223.


33. Ibid., pp. 563 - 5.


35. Mark Twain's Notebook, pp. 220 - 1, 222.
36. Baetzhold, Mark Twain and John Bull, p. 196; Budd, op. cit., p. 161; Long, op. cit., p. 219; Mark Twain's Letters, pp. 366 - 7; Mark Twain's Notebook, p. 200.

37. Quoted in Baetzhold, op. cit., p. 207. In the same year Twain made a speech in Australia, opposing any idea of a British-American war and demonstrating the sympathies arising from his English descent by asking, "Why should it make my heart bound to think that eight thousand Englishmen under Henry V had slaughtered sixty thousand Frenchmen under the French King and the chivalry of France?" (Paul Fatout (ed.) Mark Twain Speaking (Iowa City, 1976), p. 305); see Baetzhold, Mark Twain and John Bull, pp. 182 - 3; Twain to Howells, February 23, 1897 in Mark Twain - Howells Letters (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1960), II, 665; e.g. Twain, A Tramp Abroad, p. 2 and Mark Twain's Notebook, p. 148.


39. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 350; Twain, "Die Schrecken der deutschen Sprache (The Horrors of the German Language)", Mark Twain's Speeches (New York, 1923), pp. 168 - 75; Twain to Twichell, November 19, 1897 in Mark Twain's Letters, II, p. 650 - 1; ibid., pp. 657, 672.


43. Budd, op. cit., pp. 175 - 7; Twain to Howells, January,

44. Twain, "To the Person Sitting in Darkness", The Complete Essays of Mark Twain, pp. 286 - 7, 282; Twain, "The Stupendous Procession" in Fables of Man (Berkeley and London, 1972), pp. 403 - 19.


46. Baetzhold, Mark Twain and John Bull, p. 208; see, e.g. Mark Twain's Notebook, p. 229; Welland, op. cit., p. 225.

47. Quoted in Baetzhold, Mark Twain and John Bull, pp. 241 - 2; Twain, A Tramp Abroad, cap. IV; Baetzhold, op. cit., p. 242.

48. Henry W. Fischer, Abroad with Mark Twain and Eugene Field: Tales They Told to a Fellow Correspondent (New York, 1922), pp. 29, 42; e.g. "The Austrian Edison" (1898); Twain, "The Memorable Assassination", The Complete Essays of Mark Twain, pp. 540, 542; Fischer, op. cit., pp. 43, 160.

49. Twain, "What Paul Bourget Thinks of Us", The Complete Essays of Mark Twain, p. 168; Twain, "A Medieval Romance", The Complete Short Stories of Mark Twain, pp. 50 - 56.


64. Moran, op. cit., pp. 70, 13, 73, 10; Crawford, With the Immortals (London and New York, 1890), pp. 244, 24, 79, 255, 111 - 2.

65. Ibid., pp. 90 - 1; Moran, op. cit., p. 32.


70. Both stories are reprinted in The Masterpiece Library of Short Stories, XX (London, n.d.).

Unless otherwise stated, despatches below are derived from the sections relating to Germany in Record Group 59 of the General Records of the Department of State, on microfilm in the National Archives of the U.S.A.

1. See Introduction, n.2.


4. H.M. Herrick, William Walter Phelps: His Life and Public Services (New York, 1904), pp. 213, 228, 246, 268; Poultney Bigelow, Seventy Summers (London, 1925), pp. 52 - 4; Phelps to Blaine, April 27, 1891, September 3, 1891; Phelps to Foster, August 25, 1892; White to Day, June 24, 1898; Phelps to Foster, September 22, 1892. On the origins of the dispute, see Louis L. Snyder, "The American-German Pork Dispute, 1879 - 1891", Journal of Modern History, 17 (March, 1945), pp. 16 - 28.

5. Runyon to Gresham, October 29, 1894, January 5, 1895.


7. Jackson to Adee, August 8, 1895.

8. Runyon to Olney, August 17, 1895.


10. Uhl to Olney, October 10, 1896, November 4, 1896; Adee to Faison, December 18, 1896.

11. White to Sherman, September 7, 1897, September 8, 1897, November 17, 1897, December 27, 1897, December 28, 1897.


letters in State Department Records, Minor File 1906 - 10, Roll 1201.

14. Phelps to Blaine, October 3, 1891, March 16, 1892, etc.

15. Uhl to Sherman, May 25, 1897; Autobiography of Andrew Dickson White (New York, 1905), I, pp. 534 - 6, 575, 593, II, pp. 171 - 3; White to Hay, April 21, 1900.

16. Jackson to Sherman, October 29, 1897; White to Sherman, December 11, 1897, January 21, 1898, March 26, 1898; Jackson to Hay, April 24, 1901, October 13, 1902, etc.


18. Ibid., p. 154 - 5; White to Day, July 13, 1898; Jackson to Hay, March 12, 1902.


20. Ibid; note in Roll 50, State Department Minor File; Tower to Root, March 21, 1908; Root to Tower, March 25, 1908; U.P. to State Department, March 25, 1908; Tower to Root, March 27, 1908; Lloyd Griscom, Diplomatically Speaking (London, 1941), pp. 251 - 3; Root to Hill, May 25, 1908; Tower to Root, March 29, 1908.

21. Hill to Root, n.d.; Hill to Root, November 17, 1908. Unfortunately, Tower did not leave a record of his embassy; the book Germany of Today, which Jonas, op. cit., p. 315 attributes to him is actually by Charles Tower.

22. Hill to Root, December 9, 1908.


24. Grew to Hill, February 18, 1910; Grew, op. cit., p. 79; Acting Secretary of the Treasury to State Department, April 15, 1910; Consul-General in Dresden to State Department, May 4, 1911.


27. Root to Sternburg, January 20, 1908; German Memorandum attached; Root to Tower, April 13, 1908; Tower to Root, June 3, 1908; Hill to Root, July 23, 1908; Hill to Root, October 17, 1908.


29. Grew, op. cit., p. 115; Leishman to State Department, June 6, 1913.

30. Leishman to State Department, March 18, 1912 and January 11, 1913.


34. Ibid., pp. 71, 72 - 3, 81 - 2, 74, 84, 203, 29 - 30.

35. Ibid., pp. 33 - 4; Gerard, Face to Face with Kaiserism (London and New York, 1918), p. 2; Jonas, op. cit., p. 90.

36. My Four Years in Germany, p. 30; cutting from Evening Telegram in Ackerman Papers; New York Evening Sun, November 11, 1915; Gerard to Secretary of State, June 6, 1915; State Department to Gerard, June 12, 1915; Gerard to State Department, June 14, 1915; Grew, op. cit., p. 112.


38. West, op. cit., p. 19; Vigilans sed AEquus (W.T. Arnold), German Ambitions (London, 1903), p. 49; Theodore
Roosevelt, "Nationalism and International Relations", The Outlook, XCVII (April 1, 1911), p. 717.

39. Margaret White to Muriel White, January 27, 1900; see e.g., A.C. Lyall to Margaret White, January 13, 1896 and August 30, 1901; see, e.g. Lord Pembroke to Margaret White, November 8, 1894 and Lord Bath to Margaret White, March 7, 1895 (White Papers); see W.A. Swanberg, Citizen Hearst (New York, 1961), pp. 295, 407, etc.

40. White to Margaret White, September 26, 1911; White to Countess Seherr-Thoss, September 21, 1910; White to Hay, August 16, 1898; Hay to White, January 20, 1898; Hay to White, November 21, 1898; Hay to White, September 9, 1899; John White to White, March 18, 1903 (White Papers).


42. F.M. Huntington Wilson, Stultitia (n.p., 1914), pp. 12 - 12, 22, 28, 36, 52, 43 - 4, 75, 134, 168, 171, 179.

43. West, op. cit., pp. 14, 18 - 19; Learned to President Taft's Secretary, February 10, 1910.

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER 5


4. San Francisco Examiner, February 20, 1890, p. 1; February 23, p. 3; February 24, p. 1.

5. Rocky Mountain News, February 21, 1890, p. 1; Baltimore Sun, February 22, 1890, p. 4.


13. Ibid., June 17, 1893, p. 4.

14. Ibid., June 18, 1893, pp. 1, 4; June 19, 1893, p. 5.


16. A.R. Kimball, "One Side of German Socialism", The Outlook, XLVIII, 3, (July 15, 1893), pp. 114-5; "The Result in Germany", The Outlook, XLVIII, 2 (July 8, 1893), p. 63; "German Protestants and Socialism", 
The Outlook, XLVIII, 6 (August 5, 1893), p. 272; Christian Luhnow, "Social Democracy and the Church in Germany", The Outlook, LXX, 12 (March 22, 1902), pp. 720 - 1.

17. The Outlook, LII, 14 (October 5, 1895), p. 533; The Outlook, LII, 25 (December 21, 1895), p. 1060; The Outlook, LV, 12 (March 20, 1897), p. 768.


20. Rocky Mountain News, June 17, 1898, pp. 1, 3; Milwaukee Sentinel, June 17, 1898, pp. 4, 7.


27. Craig op. cit., p. 278; The Literary Digest, XXVII, 1 (July 4, 1903), p. 28.


29. Milwaukee Sentinel, June 19, 1903, p. 4.


37. Ibid., p. 199.


40. Ibid., pp. 315-6.


43. Frederic Austin Ogg, "Germany and the Program of Socialism", *The Chautauquan*, XLI (April, 1905), pp. 116-22.

January 26, 1907, p. 4.

45. Baltimore Sun, January 27, 1907, p. 4.


54. "A Rebuff to the German Emperor, The Outlook, CI, 6 (June 8, 1912), pp. 284 - 5.


57. Ibid., pp. 151 - 9.


1900 to June 1901), pp. 713 - 8.


63. Wilhelm Liebknecht, "German Politics", The Independent, 52 (1) (January to June 1900), pp. 1241 - 5.


65. Egbert and Persons, op. cit., p. 311; William English Walling, "Are the German People Unanimously for the War?", The Outlook, CVIII, 13 (November 15, 1914), pp. 673, 675, 678. Walling had already criticised the German Socialists for becoming reformist earlier that year, in his Progressivism - And After (New York, 1914), Cap. XV, Appendix B and passim.


70. The Outlook, CIV, 17 (August 23, 1913), p. 879.


74. Ibid., caps. XV and XVI, pp. 203, 205.


FOOTNOTES CHAPTER 6


8. Howe, Confessions, p. 6; Shaw, op. cit., pp. v - vi, 290 - 1.


10. Shaw, op. cit., p. 3.

11. Ibid., pp. 297 - 8, 300, 303 - 4, 322, 300-1, 331 -2.


15. Ibid., pp. 381, 387, 398, 345, 401, 380.


24. Vincent, "Imperial Germany and Imperial Rome", The Chautauquan, XXVI (October 1897 - March 1898), pp. 34, 35.


26. Josiah Strong, Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis (New York, 1885); Lincoln Steffens The Shame of the Cities (New York, 1904); Howe, Confessions, p. 182; Quoted in The Outlook, LXVIII (May 1901), p. 12; James, "City Administration in Germany", The American Journal of Sociology, VII (July 1901), pp. 29, 30, 34, 43, 46, 52.


32. Ibid., pp. 80, 85, 92 100. Howe is vague about dates, but the entry on him in the Dictionary of American Biography, Supplement 2, written by Landon Warner, is helpful. Howe to Adams, Sept. 16, 1897, May 9, 1898, Feb. 18, 1899 in Herbert Baxter Adams Papers.

33. Howe op. cit., p. 95; Mario Manieri-Elia, "Toward an 'Imperial City' : Daniel H. Burnham and the City Beautiful Movement", in Giorgio Ciucci et al., The American City from the Civil War to the New Deal (London, 1980), pp. 64, 52, 58. Howe gave the title "The City Beautiful" to a chapter of his The City : The Hope of Democracy (London, 1905), in which he hoped (p. 240) that American cities would be beautified as German cities had been by their monarchs.


35. Ibid., pp. 114, 113, xx.

36. Ibid., pp. 115, 124, 126, xii, 230, 232.


42. Howe, op. cit., pp. 354-5, 360, 344.


48. Ibid., pp. 940-6.


50. Ibid., pp. 603, 604, 606-9, 610, 611, 612, 613.

51. Ibid., pp. 614, 604.

52. Howe, "Dusseldorf: A City of Tomorrow", Hampton's Magazine, XXV (December 1910), pp. 697-8, 699; see, e.g. Howe, "Where the Business Men Rule", The Outlook, CIII (January 25, 1913), p. 209, where he mentions a visit with a group from the Boston Chamber of Commerce.


60. Ibid., pp. 208, 207.


70. Ibid., pp. 289 ff, 316 - 317, 314 - 5; Howe, Confessions, p. xx; Howe, Modern City, pp. 317, 369, 124.


74. Gifford, op. cit., pp. 66, 361, 100.

75. Robert M. Berry, Germany of the Germans (New York, 1911), cap. XXVII.


77. Ibid., pp. 218 - 9; Ernest Talbert, Old Countries Discovered Anew: A Motor Book for Everybody (Boston, 1913), pp. 73 - 4. This book also contains numerous favourable descriptions of various German cities. Crawford, op. cit., p. 70.

78. Howe, Confessions, p. 113; Howe, Modern City, p. 73; David Aaron, Men of Good Hope (New York, 1961, (originally 1951)), p. 245.


Alfred Vagts argued that *A Tramp Abroad* was perhaps responsible for the popularity of Heidelberg with Americans, because of the romantic image it imparted, but it seems more likely that the university, with its many American students, was responsible for this ("Mark Twain at the Courts of the Emperors", *Jahrbuch für Amerikastudien*, 9 (1964), p. 149); see Howe, Denmark: A Cooperative Commonwealth (New York, 1921).
FOOTNOTES : CHAPTER 7


8. Ibid., caps. VII - IX, XX - XXIII, V.


10. Ibid., pp. 222, 245, 214, 3, 12.


17. Beveridge, What is Back of the War (Indianapolis, 1915), pp. 4 - 5, 9, 11, 19 - 20, 25 - 6, 27 - 9, 55 - 6, 60 ff, 68, 83, 108.

18. Ibid, p. 134, 136; Beveridge to H.M. Miller, November 10, 1911, Beveridge Papers; Beveridge to Albert Shaw, May 26, 1906, Beveridge Papers.

19. Beveridge, What is Back of the War, pp. 139, 162, 170 - 1, 175.

20. Ibid., pp. 185 ff, 188, 195, 206, 208.


24. Entries for December 16 and 13, 1914, Diary Notes, Beveridge Papers.


27. Dodd's autobiographical manuscript "Brief note 1933"
28. Warren A. Perry to Dodd, December 22, 1897, Dodd Papers; Walter Dodd to Dodd, January 7, 1898, Dodd Papers; as regards the interest in religion, one of the sections into which the Literary Digest was divided each week was called "The Religious World", and this frequently contained articles to do with Germany; David Levin, History as Romantic Art: Bancroft, Prescott, Motley, and Parkman (Stanford, 1959), p. 5.

29. C.H. Fahs (?) to Dodd, April 9, 1897, Dodd Papers.

30. E.H. Goodwin to Dodd, April 30, 1899, "Dodd Papers; review by Dodd of Karl Lamprecht, Zur jungsten deutschen Vergangenheit, erster Erganzungsband in American Historical Review (July, 1902); Macmillan's to Dodd, July 6, 1905, Dodd Papers; on Lamprecht, see J. Herbst, The German Historical School in American Scholarship (Ithaca, 1965), pp. 152 - 4.

31. See review of Zur jungsten ... and "Karl Lamprecht and Kulturgeschichte" in Dodd Papers; Dodd to Franklin Hoyt, June 11, 1914; Dodd to Julius S. Mason, October 31, 1912; Dodd to Mrs. Dodd, July 27, 1914; Dodd to William L. Chenery, August 22, 1914.

32. "Public Morality" (Commencement address, Oak Ridge Institute, N.C., May 20, 1903), Dodd Papers; article for News and Observer (c. 1903), in Dodd Papers; Dodd to Chicago Tribune, December 1912, Dodd Papers.

33. A.B. Faust to Dodd, November 28, 1912, Dodd Papers.


35. Meade Ferguson to Dodd, March 14, 1900; Goodwin to Dodd, July 12, 1900; A.C. McLaughlin to Dodd, December 23, 1912 (all Dodd Papers).

36. T.M. Campbell to Dodd, April 29, 1904, November 26, 1907, and July 30, 1913 (Dodd Papers).

37. Dodd to Herman Maurer, November 11, 1914; Dodd to Josephus Daniels, January 6, 1915 (Dodd Papers).

38. Campbell to Dodd, November 11, 1914; Dodd to Mrs. Dodd, August 25, 1914; Dodd to Gilbert Parker, February 16, 1915 (Dodd Papers).
39. Dodd to Marcks, October 11, 1914; Dodd to Parker, February 16, 1915; Dodd to G.M. Trevelyan, May 19, 1915; Dodd to Professor Lavisse, July 8, 1915 (Dodd Papers).

40. "Brief note 1933", Dodd Papers.

41. Ibid.

42. Dodd, "The United States of Tomorrow", The Nation (January 18, 1917); Beveridge to Dodd, February 28, 1916, Dodd Papers. Beveridge wrote that such training would be "democratic".

43. Goodwin to Dodd, April 13, 1900; Dodd Papers; see entry on Dodd in the Dictionary of American Biography; Dodd, "Public Morality"; note (late May 1916?) in Dodd Papers; Dodd to H. Maurer, November 11, 1914, Dodd Papers; handwritten autobiographical account, Dodd Papers; Dodd to Maurer.

44. Dodd to Erich Marcks, May 20, 1917, Dodd Papers.


47. Ibid., pp. 97 - 100, 102 - 4, 112, 116, 124, 118 - 9, 120 - 2.


49. J.M. Rogers to Baker, April 13, 1900; J.S. Phillips to Baker, June 15, 1900 (Baker Papers). See the reviews collected in Baker Papers.


53. Phillips to Baker, June 28, 1900; Rogers to Baker, August 21, 1900 (Baker Papers).

54. Baker to father, July 31, 1900 (Baker Papers); Baker, Seen in Germany, pp. 273 - 5, 279 - 8, 1, 8.

55. Milwaukee Journal, December 11, 1901; Mail and Express,
November 6, 1901; Evening Wisconsin, December 21, 1901; San Francisco Argonaut, December 2, 1901; Boston Budget, March 23, 1902; Philadelphia Press, December 29, 1901.

56. Boston Evening Transcript, March 19, 1902; Chicago Tribune, December 7, 1901; Chicago News-Record, November 18, 1892; Evening Sun, November 2, 1901.

57. Baker, American Chronicle (New York, 1945), pp. 113; Baker, Seen in Germany, pp. 84, 100, 165, 313-6, 123, 317.


60. Sir John Murray to Baker, November 30, 1901; Baker to J.S. Phillips, May 1915; Baker, Notebook III, p. 77 (Baker Papers); Baker, American Chronicle, p. 303.


63. Clipping of "Back to Sparta", The North American, January 5, 1917, in Subject File: Germany, Pinchot Papers.

64. McGeary, op. cit., p. 21. Beveridge could not understand Pinchot's attitude; for him in 1915 Pinchot was "incoherent mentally" about Belgium and Germany (Bowers, op. cit., p. 471.)


68. Charles Edward Russell, caps. VII and VIII of Soldiers
of the Common Good in Everybody's Magazine, XIV (February, 1906), pp. 178 - 89 (see also Carl S. Vrooman, American Railway Problems in the Light of European Experience (New York, 1911), which advocated government ownership); "Some Lessons from Germany", The World's Work, XXII, 5 (September, 1911).


70. Elmer Roberts, Monarchical Socialism in Germany (New York, 1913), passim and pp. 9, 102 - 3, 123, 127, Cap, XI, pp. 145, 147, Cap X.

71. Ibid., cap XII, Appendix C.


74. Ibid., pp. 20, 27, 95ff, 119, 118, 144, 147, 176, 177, 215, 227, 272, 253, 244, 106, 108 - 10, 45, 47.

75. Ibid., 153.

76. Ibid, pp. 53, 64, 54, 56, 75.

77. Ibid., pp. 87, 94, 109, 189, 202, 268, 163.

78. Ibid., pp. 10, 187, 214, 296, 299, 305 - 6; Beveridge to Dodd, January 17, 1917, Dodd Papers.


80. Chicago Tribune, November 28, 1908; Randolph Bourne, "American Use for German Ideals" in War and the Intellectuals (New York and London, 1964), pp. 48 - 52. Christopher Lasch deals with Bourne's comparison between America and Germany, to the disadvantage of the former, attributing this to German order, and he quotes Bourne's readiness "to renounce all ideals of individualistic freedom, if the German scheme will produce a civilization so superior" (The New Radicalism in America (New York, 1965), pp. 78, 80). On the other hand, Philip Rahv quotes Bourne's dislike of both Britain and Germany, the latter being both too "pushing and sentimental" (Discovery of Europe (Boston, 1947), pp. 417, 423 - 4).

82. Mencken, "Theodore Roosevelt", Baltimore Evening Sun, June 17, 1910; Mencken, "A Wild German", ibid., July 2, 1910; Mencken, The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche (Boston, 1908); Bourne, "H.L. Mencken", War and the Intellectuals, p. 164; Letters of H.L. Mencken, pp. vii, 6; "A Wild German"; Mencken, "Roosevelt", Selected Prejudices (London, 1926), pp. 210, 209, Many of Mencken's newspaper articles were unsigned, but they are gathered in scrap-books in the Mencken Room at the Enoch Pratt Free Library, Baltimore.


84. "The German", Baltimore Sun, January 24, 1908.

85. Happy Days, p. 92; review of Europe Since 1815, Baltimore Evening Sun, July 15, 1910; "Socialists Fighting for a Square Deal in Prussia", ibid., May, 1910; "The German Volcano", "The German Insurgents", "In Germany", ibid., July to August, 1910; "How the Germans Do It", in ibid., May 14, 1910; review of Such is Life, Smart Set, XXXVIII, 2 (October, 1912), p. 152.

86. "Getting Rid of the Actor", Smart Set, XLI, I (September, 1913), pp. 156 - 8.

87. Europe After 8.15, pp. 92 - 3, 95 - 6, 111 - 142.

88. E.g., the Hudson is described as making the Rhone "look like a country creek": "The whole thing is a matter of press-agenting", etc. (ibid., p. 25); see V. de P. Fitzpatrick III, Two Beasts in the Parlor: The Dreiser-Mencken Relationship, Ph.D. thesis (State University of New York, 1979), p. 234; Sedgwick to Mencken, August 31, 1914, September 10, 1914, April 2, 1915, May 18, 1915, November 24, 1915

90. Baltimore Sun, January 28, 1917; Evening Sun, March 12, 1917; "German Occupancy Has Changed Russian Town to Model Community", New York Evening Mail, March 21, 1917; Mencken, A Record of Events Before and After the Break in Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Germany, p. 39, (Enoch Pratt Free Library, unpublished).

91. "Ludendorff", Atlantic Monthly (June, 1917); "Uncle Sam Must Answer Ludendorff", Cincinnati Times-Star, June 5, 1917.

FOOTNOTES : CONCLUSION

1. Richmond Palladium and Sun-Telegram (Indiana), June 23, 1917.


(December 20, 1902).


15. Münsterberg to Roosevelt, October 31, 1907 (State Department records, M862, case 9687); Heinrich Charles, The Commercial Relations between Germany and the United States (New York, 1907), p. 8. This booklet quotes numerous American figures in favour of better trade relations. Among the very numerous contemporary writings on the German-Americans' part in the U.S.A. is H.H. Pick, "German Contributions to American Progress", Education, XXII (September, 1901 to June, 1902), pp. 363 - 72, which begins by stating that it is a mistake to see Americans as being only of English descent.

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