THE REAWAKENING OF ISLAMIC CONSCIOUSNESS

BY

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Most of all, this study was made possible by the grant provided under the Academic Staff Training Scheme (Sekim Latihan Kakitangan Akademik) of the Universiti Sains Malaysia and also partly by the scholarship awarded by the Public Service Department, Malaysia. To those responsible, all I can say is 'Jazākum Allāhu khārīn kathirā'.

FADZILLAH BIN MOHD. JAMIL

Edinburgh,
Thursday, 16th June, 1988.
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This study is concerned with the history of Islam in post-independent Malaysia, particularly the subject of the reawakening of Islamic consciousness among the Muslims in the decades of the 70s and 80s. Accordingly, particular attention has been devoted to the role of three major da'wah (Islamic missionary) movements, namely, Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM or the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia), Darul Arqam and Jama'at Tabligh, which have the support especially of young educated Muslims in the country. Responses to these movements, which have come from various quarters within the Malaysian milieu, are also discussed. In this context, the process of Islamisation and its impact upon Malaysian society are considered and so is the problem of Islamic heterodoxy, which has in a way hampered the smooth development of Islamic da'wah. Further, some consideration is given to the problem of ethnic rivalry among the Malaysians of diverse religious backgrounds and this problem is assessed in the light of the current Islamic revival. Also the impact of Islam upon Malaya's/Malaysia's foreign policy is briefly evaluated.

As a background to this study, we consider briefly the nature and development of Islam in the pre-colonial Malay States, the changes related to Islam during the colonial period and the position of Islam in post-independent Malaya/Malaysia until the late 60s. Simultaneously, the relationship between Islam and the rise of Malay nationalism and the role of political parties are also discussed. Without such discussions, it will be hard for us to appreciate the developments of the 70s and 80s.
A Note on Transliteration:

In the absence of a standard form for the spelling of various Arabic/Islamic terms in the vast literature dealing with Malaya/Malaysia, the researcher has decided, for the sake of convenience, to adopt the following rules:

1. Arabic/Islamic terms:

In this case, a modified version of the Encyclopaedia of Islam's system of transliteration as used by the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies, University of Edinburgh is adopted, except that words ending in та’ marбутah is spelt with 'h', for example:

Sharifa and not Sharfa.

2. Malay words:

As for Malay words, modern spelling is used. However, as spelling is not standardised, the researcher has quoted spellings as found in sources used. As a result, there are some inconsistencies. In general, Arabic words have been quoted in an Arabic
transliteration rather than the Malay version, except when the word occurs in a purely local context. For example:

*dakwah* rather than *dakwah*.

*Bulan Dakwah* and not *Bulan Da’wah*.

In another case, *shu’bah* (Ar. department) is spelt as *syukbah* in Malay contexts, while *qādi* (religious judge) is given as *kathi* or *kadi* as these forms occur at different times in the various documents.

3. **Names of Local Muslims and Others:**

Names of local Muslims and other local personalities are spelt according to local usages. For example:

Abdul Rahman and not *‘Abd al-Rahmān*.

4. **Names of non-Malaysian Muslims:**

Names of such persons are spelt with the proper diacritical marks as often used in academic works. For example:
Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and not Jamaluddin al-Afghani.

5. **Honorary and Hereditary Titles:**

Malaysians are generally fond of honorary and hereditary titles, which bring great respectability to the persons who carry them, even more so at the present time as they also provide some political and economic connotations. Such titles are:

- **Tengku** (prince or princess in Kelantan).
- **Tunku** (prince or princess in Kedah).
- **Dato'** (ancient title of Malaccan origin, but now in use for state peers)
- **Dato' Sri, Tan Sri** (titles created after independence in 1957).
- **Datuk** (Federal awarded honorary title).
- **Tun** (a Malaccan title, now revived as the highest title for a commoner in Malaysia).
List of Abbreviations:

The following is a list of abbreviations used in the thesis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABIM</td>
<td>Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFMSA</td>
<td>Australian Federation of Muslim Students Associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALIRAN</td>
<td>Aliran Kesedaran Negara (National Consciousness Society)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASAS 50</td>
<td>Angkatan Sasterawan 50 (Generation 50 Writers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BARISAN</td>
<td>Barisan Nasional (National Front)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BERJASA</td>
<td>Barisan Jama'ah Islam Se Malaysia (Pan-Malaysian Muslim Front)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BERJAYA</td>
<td>Bersatu Rakyat Jelata Sabah (Peoples' Union of Sabah)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BINA</td>
<td>Angkatan Nahdatul Islam Bersatu (United Islamic Renaissance Front)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMF</td>
<td>Bank Bumiputra Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Consumers' Association of Penang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbr.</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCCs</td>
<td>Chinese Consultative Councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAP</td>
<td>Democratic Action Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DBP</td>
<td>Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka (Language and Literary Agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEB</td>
<td>Dasar Ekonomi Baru (New Economic Policy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FELDA</td>
<td>Federal Land Development Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOSIS</td>
<td>Federation of the Students' Islamic Societies of United Kingdom and Eire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAPENA</td>
<td>Gabungan Persatuan Penulis Nasional Malaysia (Union of National Writers Associations of Malaysia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAPIM</td>
<td>Gabungan Penulis Islam Malaysia (Union of Muslim Writers of Malaysia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAMIM</td>
<td>Hizbul Muslimin (Party of Muslims)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HELWA</td>
<td>Hal Ehwal Wanita ABIM (ABIM's Women Affairs Bureau)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IESCO</td>
<td>Islamic Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIFSO</td>
<td>International Islamic Federation of Student Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>Islamic Representative Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISA</td>
<td>Internal Security Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISEAS</td>
<td>Institute of Southeast Asian Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JKKK</td>
<td>Jawatankuasa Kemajuan dan Keselamatan Kampung (Village Development and Security Committee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBI</td>
<td>Koperasi Belia Islam (Muslim Youth Cooperative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIMMA</td>
<td>Kongres India Muslim Malaysia (Malaysian Indian Muslim Congress)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMM</td>
<td>Kesatuan Melayu Muda (Young Malay Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KRIS</td>
<td>Kesatuan Rakyat Indonesia Semenanjung (Union of Peninsular Indonesians)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUTH</td>
<td>Lembaga Urusan dan Tabung Haji (Hajj Fund and Management Board)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAGERAN</td>
<td>Majlis Gerakan Negara (National Operations Council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARA</td>
<td>Majlis Amanah Rakyat (Peoples' Trust Council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATA</td>
<td>Majlis Agama Tertinggi Sa Malaya (Highest Religious Council of Malaya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCA</td>
<td>Malayan Chinese Association (Pre-Sept. 1963) / Malaysian Chinese Association (after Sept. 1963)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>Malayan Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIC</td>
<td>Malayan Indian Congress (Pre-Sept. 1963)/Malaysian Indian Congress (after Sept. 1963)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNP</td>
<td>Malay Nationalist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPAJA</td>
<td>Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSA</td>
<td>Muslim Students' Association of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NASMA</td>
<td>Parti Nasional Malaysia (National Party of Malaysia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOC</td>
<td>National Operations Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSA</td>
<td>Official Secrets Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAP</td>
<td>People's Action Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAS</td>
<td>Parti Islam Se Malaysia (Islamic Party of Malaysia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBS</td>
<td>Parti Bersatu Sabah (Sabah Union Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERKIM</td>
<td>Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (Muslim Welfare Organisation of Malaysia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKPIM</td>
<td>Persatuan Kebangsaan Pelajar-Pelajar Islam Malaysia (National Union of Muslim Students of Malaysia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMIP</td>
<td>Parti Islam Sa Tanah Melayu (Pan-Malayan Islamic Party, an old name of PAS)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PPP  Peoples' Progressive Party

PSRM  Partai Sosialis Rakyat Malaysia
      (Socialist Peoples' Party of Malaysia)

RISEAP  Regional Islamic Council of Southeast Asia and Pacific

S. A. W.  Ṣallā Allāhu ‘alayhi wa-sallam

SDP  Social Democratic Party

SITC  Sultan Idris Training College

TABUNG HAJI  Lembaga dan Urusan Tabung Haji (Hajj Fund and Management Board)

TAKAFUL  Takaful Malaysia Sendirian Berhad

UDP  United Democratic Party

UIA  Universiti Islam Antarabangsa (International Islamic University)

UKM  Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (National University of Malaysia)

UMNO  United Malays National Organisation

UMNO (Baru)  New UMNO

UNHCR  United Nations High Commission for Refugees

USNO  United Sabah National Organisation
WAMY  World Assembly of Muslim Youth

Y.A.B.  Yang Amat Berhormat (The Most Honourable, a phrase which is used as an address to a respectable political leader of the ruling party)

YADIM  Yayasan Dakwah Islamiah Malaysia (Islamic Dakwah Foundation of Malaysia)

YPEIM  Yayasan Pembangunan Ekonomi Islam Malaysia (Islamic Economic Development Foundation of Malaysia).
Since the 1970s, the Islamic world has undergone a great change. The phenomenon of Islamic consciousness, which has affected every aspect of Muslim life, has aroused great interest throughout the world, as is evident from the scores of studies currently available on the market. From all of this interest, there have emerged such clichés as the 'Islamic resurgence', 'militant Islam', 'dagger of Islam' and the like, sensational phrases which suggest that anxiety, fear and suspicion still persist among some Western observers towards Islam in the contemporary world. However, upon a close scrutiny one will find that the present situation vis-à-vis Islam is not predominantly of such a dreadful nature as some may have depicted it, and indeed that there are various dimensions of Islamic consciousness operating at present within the Muslim milieu.

At the same time, there is nothing absolutely new in this development. Among the Muslims, there is a belief that a revival will be triggered each time Islam faces a decline. This is based on the hadith, which states:

"Allah will raise for this ummah at the beginning of each century such people as
those who will renew (yuḍaddidu) its faith for it”.

Narrated by Abū Hurairah in Ṣunān Abū Dāwūd, (Malāḥim, 1).

In terms of history, there have been earlier revivals associated with such personalities as Ibn Taymiyyah, Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, Sayyid Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Sañūsī, Muḥammad Aḥmad al-Mahdī, Shāh Wali Allāh Dihlawi, ʿUthmān Dan Fodio, Muḥammad ʿAbduh and so on. In the Nusantara (Malay World), including Malaysia, there were also instances of Islamic revivals as manifested in the career of Imam Bonjol of the Padri Movement and Islamic intellectuals like Shaikh Daud Patani, Shaikh Tahir Jalaluddin and Syed Shaikh al-Hadi. Besides reacting to local conditions, these revivals were inspired by the more illustrious muṣliḥūn (reformers) and muṣaddidūn (renewers of faith) of the Middle East and Indian Sub-Continental. Similarly, the contemporary rise of Islamic consciousness in Malaysia, as we shall see, has been and is still shaped by local conditions as well as by external influences from the Middle East and beyond.
a. The Subject of this Study:

This study is concerned primarily with the history of Islam in post-independent Malaysia, particularly the subject of the rise of Islamic consciousness among the Muslims in the decades of the 70s and 80s. Accordingly, particular attention has been given to the role of three major da'wah (Islamic missionary) movements, namely, Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM or the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia), Darul Arqam and Jama'at Tabligh, which have the support especially of young educated Muslims in the country. Simultaneously, responses to these movements, which have come from various quarters within the Malaysian milieu, are discussed. In this context, the process of Islamisation and its impact upon Malaysian society are considered. From yet another aspect, the problem of Islamic heterodoxy, a reemergence of one of the past trends, is discussed vis-à-vis the complications that it has caused to the progress of da'wah activities in Malaysia.

To complete the study, we also devote some attention to the problem of ethnic rivalry among Malaysians of diverse religious backgrounds and assess this problem in the light of the current Islamic revival. In addition, the impact of Islam upon
Malaya's/Malaysia's foreign policy is briefly evaluated.

As a background to the study, we consider briefly the nature and development of Islam in the pre-colonial Malay States, the changes related to Islam during the colonial period and the position of Islam in post-independent Malaya/Malaysia until the late 60s. At the same time, we look at the relationship between Islam and the rise of Malay nationalism and the role of political parties. Without such discussions, it will be hard for us to appreciate the developments of the 70s and 80s.

b. The Objectives of this Study.

So far little has been written about the history of Islam in Malaysia and even less on the contemporary situation. Perhaps this is so because of the sluggishness of events, including those affecting Islam, which have taken place in the country until the 70s, when compared to the situation in the ever volatile Middle East. Most of the few available works by such scholars as W. R. Roff, C. S. Kessler, S. Q. Fatimi, M. B. Hooker, Fred von der Mehden, N. J. Funston, Syed Muhammad Naguib al-Attas and so forth, deal only with specific topics like the coming of
Islam, the nature and importance of Islamic mysticism among the Malays, the *Kaum Tua/Kaum Muda* dichotomy, Islam and the rise of Malay Nationalism, Islam and *adat*, traditional Islamic education (*pondok* and *madrasah*), the growth of Islamic administrative and legal institutions as well as Islam, development and politics.

At this juncture, it will be of great benefit for us to look briefly at some of the works referred to in this study. Concerning Islam and the Malays in the early Malay States, one would find that Richard Winstedt's book, *The Malays: A Cultural History* (revised in 1981 by Tham Seonv- Chee) is still a valuable source. However, this should be supplemented by the views cogently argued by Prof. Syed Muhammad Naguib al-Attas in his famous work, *Islam dalam Sejarah dan Kebudayaan Melayu* (1972), which has not only provided us with more insight into the role of Islam in Malay historical thought, language and literature, but also contains a list of some of the valuable local Islamic works and chronicles written by the *Nusantara* scholars and court scribes and works by Europeans. With regard to the subject of Islamic mysticism and the Malays, there is nothing as yet that can replace Naguib al-Attas's seminal work, *Some Aspects of Sufism as Understood and Practised Among*
the Malays (1963). As for the nature of Malay feudalism, the Malay Annals (a translation of Sejarah Melayu by C. C. Brown), remains the best reference. As a supplement to this classic, one can also refer to A. C. Milner's article, 'Islam and Malay Kingship', in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, (1981) and J. M. Gullick's, Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya, (reprinted 1965).

Meanwhile, there are some good expositions of the relationship between Islam and Malay adat (Ar. 'Adah). Among these are included 'Two Forces in Malay Society', Intisari, vol. I, Pt. 3, (1963) and 'Malay Customary Law/Family', Intisari, vol. II, Pt. 2, (1963) by Hj. Mohd. Din b. Ali; Ahmad b. Mohd. Ibrahim, 'Islam, Customary Law/Malaysia', Intisari, vol. II, Pt. 2, (1963); Othman Ishak, Hubungan Antara Undang-undang Islam dengan Undang-undang Adat, (1979) and M. B. Hooker, Islamic Law in South-East Asia, Chap. 3, (1984). Regarding the development of Islamic institutions, legal or otherwise, during the colonial era, the best account thus far is provided by Moshe Yegar, Islam and Islamic Institutions in British Malaya: Policies and Implementation, (1979), while extensive materials concerning Islamic education in Malaya/Malaysia can be acquired in such works as, Badriyah Hj. Salleh, Kampung Haji Salleh dan Madrasah
Lately, some scholars, for example, Judith Nagata, Chandra Muzaffar, Muhammad Abu Bakar and Fred R. von der Mehden, have written on the subject of Islamic revival (or some prefer to call it resurgence) in contemporary Malaysia. However, their works in the form of books or articles, are not comprehensive in that they cover only the period of the 70s and mid-80s and in some cases suffer from defects in spelling and translation of Malay and Islamic terms and even contain some factual errors. For instance, Nagata renders *seni silat cekak* as *seni silat cekah*, *kepercayaan* (belief) as *percayaan*, *jahiliyah* (ignorance) as unbelievers (Ar. *kāfirūn*) and *tamrīn* (leadership training) as only leadership (Ar. *qiyyādah*). Besides this, she states that Nasrul Haq, a local *silat* (Malay art of self-defense) cum mystical order of dubious origin, had enjoyed the patronage of the late Tun Abdul Razak in 1978, whereas the Prime Minister was already dead in early 1976.

As for Muzaffar, notwithstanding his seriousness in making a study of the Islamic resurgence in Malaysia and producing some good observations concerning it, his work is, however, flawed by the fact that he is too concerned with the physical aspects of the matter as if there is nothing spiritual in this life. For example, he perceived the growth of
Islamic consciousness among the Malays as being mainly a manifestation and reassertion of Malay ethnic identity, supported by such other causes as modernisation, urbanisation, the capitalist approach to development and so forth.\textsuperscript{12} This makes his study more politically motivated than anything else. In considering the phenomenon, whether in Malaysia or elsewhere, one just cannot surely dismiss, however irrational it might seem, that some individuals after having indulged themselves in secular kind of life simply and uncompromisingly adopted a pious approach to life on account of being exposed to Islam as al-Din. From here it follows that that these born-again Muslims have found their own 'spiritual bliss' within Islam after having undergone some process of 'soul-searching' and hence they are not interested in safeguarding their own ethnic interests based on a Bumiputra/non-Bumiputra or Malay/non-Malay dichotomy.\textsuperscript{13} What they simply desire is to be truly Muslims and in this respect they view Islam as the only passport to salvation. This is a possibility which should not be ruled out. Besides this, Muzaffar makes no mention at all of the problem of Islamic heterodoxy, which has to a certain degree affected the progress of da'wah and also created more apprehension towards Islam within the Malaysian milieu. In another case, he unwittingly translated 'Darul' as 'country'
or 'land'¹⁴, whereas anyone who is familiar with Arabic language will recognise that it is simply the proper noun 'Dār' which means a 'house', 'home', 'abode', 'land' or 'country', while 'al' which means 'the' being a definite article as in the case of Dār al-Argam (the House of Arqam).

Hence, this study tries to give a more comprehensive picture of Islam in Malaysia and correct the discrepancies concerned. With regard to the former, it will discuss Islam in its various forms ranging from the popular religion of the rural areas, the pondok tradition, the Sufi groups, Islam of the Establishment, the revivalists or reformists currently associated with the da‘wah phenomenon and so on. Further, some detailed discussions concerning inter-party rivalry between PAS (Parti Islam Se Malaysia or Islamic Party of Malaysia) and UMNO (United Malays National Organisation), within UMNO itself and between these two parties and others, the Islamisation programme and its impact, and the problem of Islamic heterodoxy will be made. Simultaneously, the subject is given a historical treatment, combined with some analysis based on sociological and Islamic standpoints. In this context, historical events are followed in sequence and attempts are made to relate the past to the present, while the behavioural pattern
of people within certain groups or communities, religious or otherwise, is analysed and commented upon, and matters of Islamic importance are discussed and explained. In addition, the process of change, tension and continuity which seems to be working within the fabric of the Malaysian society is considered. As part of the conclusion, this study attempts to explore some of the possibilities that may come about in Malaysia as a result of the present development vis-à-vis Islam and to suggest a few general solutions for the preservation of goodwill and stability within the country.

c. Scope of the Study.

This study concentrates mainly on Islam in West Malaysia or Peninsular Malaysia (previously the Federation of Malaya) as most of the changes taking place, that is, the da'wah phenomenon, the Islamisation of institutions, work ethics and so forth, are more visible on the peninsular than in East Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak). Besides this, the situation in West Malaysia alone provides us with more than enough materials to work on. Nonetheless, the situation in East Malaysia is referred to in a more general way whenever it becomes necessary for us to do
so. In terms of period, this study extends up to late 1987.

d. Sources.

In the preparation of this thesis, the researcher has utilised primary and secondary sources, which are available in Bahasa Malaysia/Bahasa Indonesia (the Malaysian language/Indonesian language) and English. The Malaysian sources referred to are mostly written in Romanised script, with a few in Jawi (that is a Malay script borrowed originally from Arabic). These sources can be broadly classified into historical, religious (Islamic and Comparative Religions), sociological and anthropological studies as well as books and articles on Islamic literature. Some of these have already been studied by other scholars, but there are others which have never been used or made available outside Malaysia.

The primary sources consulted can be divided into four categories. The first category is made up of organs of political parties and various Islamic organisations or groups, memoirs, official reports, pamphlets and written speeches (published or unpublished). In the second category, we have the cassettes, which are specifically concerned with Darul
Arqam and the issues of Imam Mahdi and Tariqat Muhammadiyah. Thirdly, we have the newspapers. Lastly, we include within this category of sources a number of interviews conducted in Malaysia.

The secondary sources consulted are in the form of books, journals, magazines, theses and working papers. Some of these materials cited in the thesis were collected by the researcher over the past few years, while others were acquired recently in Edinburgh, London and Malaysia. Furthermore, fresh information was obtained and interviews were conducted by the researcher during his short field trip to Malaysia in mid-1986. For details concerning the sources, see the bibliography provided at the back of this thesis.

Notes


3 Ibid., p. 33.


6 These works seem to be glaringly absent from the bibliography provided by Richard Winstedt.


8 Ibid., p. 9.

9 Ibid., p. 25.

10 Ibid., p. 82.

11 Ibid., p. 67.


13 This point is taken up in detail in Chapter 5 above. See pp. 318 - 319.

CHAPTER 1
Islam and the Malays:
The Pre-Independent Era.

It is a little over five and a half centuries since the Malays adopted Islam as their religion. The whole process had evolved out of the general development in the Nusantara region. Today, the Malay culture is still associated with Islam, both in its urban and rural setting. However, this is not to say that the Malays have not been affected by other traditions of the past like the ancient animism, Hinduism and Buddhism or for that matter modern western values. Nonetheless, whatever might be the degree of his religiosity, a Malay still declares himself a Muslim and refuses to accept anything other than that. This response towards Islam still continues and as we shall see has in itself undergone a number of phases of development before once again blooming into what is now known as the revival of Islam.

While the Malays have been Muslims for quite a long time, scholars have not been able to agree regarding the exact date when Islam was introduced into the Malay States. Likewise, they still differ regarding the manner in which it was first introduced into the peninsula and from where it came, that is,
via India, China or directly from Arabia. However, most of them agree that it was from Malacca, the great trading emporium, founded by Parameswara, a Palembang prince, that Islam spread to the rest of the Malay Peninsula, most parts of the Nusantara, and even to Patani, now a part of Thailand. Further, it is generally accepted that the conversion began from the top, that is, that the conversion of the ruler to the new faith led to the acceptance of Islam by the rest of the population. Conversion had come about rather easily as Islam was introduced among the Malays through peaceful means, that is, by way of trade, persuasion, marriage and even good examples set by the early Muslim du'at (missionaries). Moreover, the Malays by tradition being unquestioningly loyal to their ruler were eager to follow the example set by their master. Beyond that the early missionaries were careful enough not to make great changes, except to lay more stress on personal imān (faith) and the basic tenets of Islam.

a. Salient Features of Malay Islam.

From the outset, conversion had occurred rather gradually through the da'wah efforts of Muslim traders and Sufi teachers. These teachers were, in fact, mystics rather than theologians. As a result, the
Islam that was established among the Malays had never really been rigidly orthodox. In fact, elements of Hindu-Buddhist beliefs and practices and also animism still survived within the fabric of Malay society. For instance, the beliefs in *semangat padi*, that is, that the padi has a *semangat* (soul) and that the earth's spirits are responsible for a bad harvest, and that the *penunggu* (guardian spirits) may cause all sorts of human ill-luck and sufferings, are all survivals of the ancient animism. Similarly, the practice of charms and black magic among some members of the Malay community indicates a remnant of an animistic tendency. In addition, a large portion of the subject matter in the classical Malay Literature like the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata* epics are relics of the early Hindu period. Nonetheless, recent developments have shown that there is an increased awareness among a sizeable number of the Malay populace of the non-Islamic character of these traditions. This is without doubt related to the present revival which is sweeping across the Muslim world, and as a result efforts are being made to eradicate local superstitions and whatever relics still exist of the Hindu past.

The Malays have always been *Sunni* and have adhered to the *Shafi'i* Madhhab, except in the state of Perlis. However, this does not mean that Islam has
been accepted in toto by the Malays, that is, so that it is fully implemented in every sphere of life or practised strictly according to the Sunnah (traditions) of the Prophet and the Ahl al-Salaf (The Early Three Generations of Muslims). On the contrary, the Sharī'ah has been evidently observed mainly in the realm of Muslim Personal Law, that is, in matters pertaining to marriage, divorce and funeral services, together with the rites and rituals of prayer, the hajj, the fast of Ramaḍān, the collection of zakāt, and the celebration of the religious festivals.

Apparently, hudūd (punishments for crimes like drunkenness, fornication and apostasy) as mentioned in the Malay Legal Digests of the pre-colonial era, have been largely ignored or in certain cases modified. Further, even in areas where Islamic injunctions have been observed, Islam has been syncretized with the local adat and Hindu-Buddhist practices, which proved to be in direct conflict with the central doctrine of Tawḥīd. In socio-economic matters, zakāt, which was imposed at the earliest during the reign of Sultan Muhaiyuddin Shah of Pahang (1592 - 1614 A. D.), has been understood to be merely a religious tax on padi. Above all, feudalism with its usual forms of oppression and not the Islamic concept of justice (al-
(a) and social equality, governed the relationships within society. 15

(b) Impacts of Islam upon the Malays.

The coming of Islam has brought about very little change in the Malays' notion of kingship and kerajaan (government). 16 For instance, the Malayo-Muslim polity, as in the pre-Islamic era, centred on the Raja 17 (King), who was the owner of all the land in his territory and also the possessor of all laws, with his raffiyah (subjects) as his patek (slaves). 18 Again, within this system, the kerajaan is associated with Raja. Hence, it was the Raja who became the primary object of loyalty and not the Malay race or the Islamic ummah (community). 19

As mentioned earlier, the divergences from orthodoxy originated from the fact that the early Muslim duʿāt were mostly mystics rather than theologians. Besides this, the theologian, if such a person happened to be present, found that it was more of a priority for him to focus on the basic principles of Islam, that is, ʿIlm al-Tawhīd, as a means to extirpate the influence of Hinduism-Buddhism and animism. It is probable too that these early preachers found that it was safer for them not to tread upon the
sensitivities of the Malay aristocrats by talking about issues which were in contradiction to their world-view, given the fact that feudalism was then at its height.

Nevertheless, the coming of Islam brought about some changes in Malay cultural life. For example, Bahasa Melayu (Malay Language), which is the basis of the present Bahasa Malaysia began to be used more widely, that is, not only as a language of trade but also in religion and literature, after the introduction of Islam into the Nusantara. This whole process started with the adoption of the Arabic alphabet and script as a medium of writing in the Malay Language. Also, as a result of the influence of Islam, the Malay Language developed further and was enriched through the borrowing of a large number of Arabic and Persian words. Hence, the Malay Language acquired the status of a literary and religious language and became the medium of religious preaching and the lingua franca, taking over the previously important role of the Javanese language in the whole region.

With the adoption of the Arabic script, Muslim writers began to write on various branches of Islamic studies such as Islamic Law, tafsir (exegesis of the
Qur'an), hadith, theology, philosophy, sufism and so forth. In addition, Arabo-Persian works, including epics and romantic literature and shafir (Ar. shīr) were written or translated into the Malay Language, thus enriching the various genres of classical Malay Literature. At the same time, some efforts were also made to Islamise Hindu literary works, for example, by omitting Hindu terms, and names and discarding Hindu concepts and religious ideas; in their places Islamic alternatives were given.

All these developments had taken place under the patronage of the two great Malay Muslim empires, that is, Acheh (1511 - 1650), now a part of the Indonesian Republic, and Johore-Riau (1650 - 1800). After the fall of Malacca, these two empires, one after the other, became the main centre for the spread of Islam to the Malay Archipelago. In this connection, each in its turn became also the disseminating point of Malay culture. However, while the process of Islamisation was continuing slowly throughout the region, the Malays found themselves face to face with the increasing threat of Western imperialism as represented both by the British and the Dutch. Of the two rival powers, it was the British who soon gained the upper hand and were destined to rule over the
Malay States until the middle part of the present century.

In terms of diet, once the Malays embraced Islam they categorically abandoned the consumption of pig's flesh and other kinds of food and drink which are considered ḥarām in Islam. As for attire, it has become somewhat common for the religious-minded Malays, especially the 'ulamā' and the bujjāj, to wear the serban (turbans) and katayap (skull-cap) and at times to appear in the jubbah like their co-religionists in the Middle East. However, the Muslim rules of purdah were ignored, in that Malay women did not wear the veil and they might appear in the presence of men other than their husbands and kinsfolk. Nevertheless, they did not participate in the entertainment of their husband's guests nor were they allowed to travel without the escort of a kinsman or a trusted friend.

Thus far, we have seen that the influence of Islam upon the Malays in general in the early Malay States was not very profound. Rather the Islam that they professed was somewhat limited in scope, strongly inclined towards sufism and tainted by local adat, which combined within itself both the experiences of animism and the Hindu-Buddhist legacies of the past.
Nonetheless, this state of affairs slowly began to change, coinciding with the development of the modern system of government introduced by the British following their intervention.

c. Islam in British Malaya:

On the eve of British intervention, the greater part of the Malay States were in a state of anarchy. There was constant warfare between the sultans, and civil war between chiefs and rival claimants to a throne had also become almost a frequent affair. The old system of government that was inherited from the Malacca Sultanate had broken down. As the authority of the sultans had decayed, there was nothing to check the feuds of the petty rulers. Beginning from 1866, a civil war had broken out in Selangor. In the midst of this, the rival Chinese miners in the state soon joined up with the Malay warring factions on the opposite sides. From 1870 – 1873, these alliances waged a fierce war against each other, bringing destruction to Kuala Lumpur and the surrounding areas. Another great trouble spot of the period was Perak. A succession dispute had broken out in the state in 1871. By 1872, a full-scale war was again in progress in the district of Larut between two rival Chinese secret societies, the Ghee Hin and the Hai
Soon, each of these societies became the supporters of Malay rival groups, and the situation became extremely tense. Besides this, piracy was still a menace along the western coast of the Malay States. All these incidents brought complaints from the merchant community of the Straits Settlements, as it had lost much of its investment. However, it was other developments which were to influence the British into reversing their policy of non-intervention in the Malay States.

At this juncture, both the Straits merchants and the Colonial Office feared foreign intervention in the Malay States, which in turn would mean the loss of a market and a source for investment as well as the tin resources. With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, European interest in the East had increased. Competition came not only from the Dutch and the French, but also from newcomers like the Germans. Simultaneously, by 1860s, there was an increased demand for tin in the West. This was reflected in the export figures of Malayan tin from Singapore to Britain and North America. Fearing that they would lose to other Europeans, the British authorities embarked upon a policy of direct intervention in the Malay States, much to the pleasure of the merchant community.
British intervention in the Malay States had come rather gradually and its impact upon these states varied in intensity. It began in 1786, when by a treaty Penang Island was acquired from the Sultan of Kedah. In the same manner, the island of Singapore was taken over in 1819, to be followed shortly by Malacca. However, direct and widespread intervention in the affairs of the Malay States occurred only after 1874. With the signing of the Treaty of Pangkor in 1874, Perak came under British rule. Following this, by other similar treaties, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang were brought under British control. It was not until after the turn of the Twentieth Century that Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Trengganu and Johore accepted British rule. Despite the differential impact of British rule on various Malay States, in the long run the consequences, as will be seen, were much the same.

d. British Administration, Islam and Adat:

Initially, once the British protection system was established in each of these states, the rule was that the Sultan or the Chief, as in the case of Sungai Ujong, one of the principalities that later made up Negri Sembilan, had to accept a British Resident whose advice then must be asked and acted upon on all questions other than those touching Malay religion and
This meant that the British Resident would administer the affairs of the Malay States which had accepted British protection, except in matters pertaining to Islam and Malay adat which were to be left in the care of the Sultan or the Chief, as the case might be. But in practice, British officials did intervene in both of these spheres. For example, in Perak and Selangor the Resident and his officers put forward candidates for appointments as kathis (qādis) and made recommendations for the administration of Muslim personal law. Further, during the Residents' Conference in 1905, the Resident of Negri Sembilan did discuss the position of the kathis. It was decided that the form of kuasa (power), that is, the letter of nomination, description of authority, and commission, in use in Perak for kathis and naib-kathis should be adopted in Negri Sembilan as well. All laws, those dealing with matters of religion not excepted, were drafted by British personnel and passage through State Councils, which were later created, was little more than a formality. In the Federated Malay States, the British also intervened directly in the work of the committees, whose functions included nominating of kathis and religious teachers, considering points of Islamic law and practice or appeals from lower religious courts, supervising religious publications and dealing with religious legislation.
However, while intervention did take place, British officials were tactful enough to continue showing public deference to Islam and adat in matters of ceremony and public holidays and in token financial support for the Islamic institutions which were later organised. Only in matters of personal beliefs, rites and rituals, and also social practices like marriage, festivals, divorce and funeral services, were the Malays left entirely on their own to cater for their own needs. This is not surprising at all, as such things were unlikely to jeopardise British political and economic interests in the Malay States.

Several reasons could be given for the discrepancies seen between the practices of the British administrators and what had been the avowed policy of the colonial government. Firstly, it was difficult to define Malay custom which in practice seemed to be interwoven with their religion. Hence, when British introduced administrative reforms, which touched upon all areas of human activity, they inevitably intruded into the spheres of Malay custom and religion. Secondly, being part of a cultural tradition which had been steeped in secularism, the officials felt that it was absolutely right for them to intervene in Malay public life, which no doubt involved political decision and law-making processes,
the religious not excepted. On the other hand, there was no really organised group of 'ulamā' to challenge the British whenever they meddled in Islamic affairs and Malay custom. The Malay political élites were not really conversant with their religion and did not raise any objection to the reforms made as the British were careful not to allow the Christian missions to proselytize among the Malays and to keep up the fiction that the rulers were still sovereigns in that they were the protectors of Malay religion and custom, and could keep their old titles and outward trappings of power. In such a situation, more often than not British intervention in religious matters had almost complete Malay consent, and at times actually responded to the wish and instance of the Malay Rulers.

e. The Establishment of Islamic Institutions:

Before discussing the establishment of Islamic institutions in the Malay States, it will be necessary for us to look briefly at the general development of the British administrative system. After the residential system was established, British officials set about organizing the affairs of the Malay States concerned.
To establish law and order, small police forces were formed in each state. Courts were established and presided over by British magistrates. The system of taxation was organised. To facilitate the transport of tin and other produce to the ports, railway lines were laid down, thus helping to open up the country even further. Besides this, as revenue became available, roads were built where they were most needed, to stimulate economic development. To streamline the administration and make expenditure and resources more manageable and evenly distributed among the states, Britain opted for a centralised form of administration. The Federated Malay States or rather the 'Protected Malay States', as they were officially known, were formed out of Selangor, Perak, Negri Sembilan and Pahang on 1st July, 1896, with Kuala Lumpur as its capital. Subsequently in 1909, the Siamese-controlled Malay States of Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Trengganu accepted British protection. It was also at this time that the fixed boundary of the present West Malaysia was really established.

However, the four northern states together with Johore, which accepted British rule in 1914, refused to join the existing federation for fear of losing their 'independence'. Instead, each of them accepted a British Adviser whose function was purely to advise.
In practice, there was little difference between what went on in these states, and the situation in the Federated States.

All in all, by the second decade of the Twentieth Century, the whole of Malaya came directly or indirectly under British control.\textsuperscript{51} For administrative purposes, Britain had divided up Malaya into three administrative units: the Federated Malay States, Unfederated Malay States and the Straits Settlements.

Before the establishment of British rule in Malaya, Islam was not institutionalized as the national religion. No public rituals of a distinctively Islamic character were practised to legitimize the rule of the sultans.\textsuperscript{52} Indeed Malay court ceremonies have been very much influenced by Hindu traditions. Further, although the Sejarah Melayu (Malay Annals) did mention kathis in the time of Sultan Mansur of Malacca (1456 - 77) and a kathi is referred to in the Kedah Laws which appear to date from 1700s, their functions as Islamic judges were not clear.\textsuperscript{53} Instead, the Bendahara (a Sanskrit title often translated as "prime minister") was described as the "chief justice in all civil and criminal affairs" in 15th century Malacca.\textsuperscript{54} Then, in the detailed
descriptions of late 19th century Pahang, written to brief the first British Resident of that state, there is no indication that legal questions were handled by a kathi. Furthermore, no central Muslim institutions existed to act as focal points for religious activities or observances within any state. Although Shari'ah influenced legal codes and expressions of Malay adat in some states, these Islamic laws appear to have been largely ignored in administration and in the settlement of disputes.

The colonial era witnessed greatly improved communications and consequently increased internal contacts within traditional society and greatly intensified exchanges with foreign cultures. At the beginning, the most obvious changes in Malay society did not involve religion, but the cumulative effect of improved communications gradually brought about significant changes in Malay religious institutions, beliefs and practices.

With regard to Islamic religious institutions, some efforts were made to restructure them. For example, after 1884, various states began to create for the first time a centralized administrative structure and legal systems for Muslim affairs. The Islamic religious courts established in each state
enforced both Muslim and adat law. Within each district, a kathi was appointed to administer Muslim affairs, to try cases within his jurisdiction and to supervise the operation of the mosques in his district. At the mukim level (a sub-district within the jurisdiction of a mosque) the kathi would be assisted by a naib-kathi. However, in the Unfederated Malay States, these courts were called Shar’ah Courts and not the Kathi or Naib-Kathi Courts. Further, the court system in the Unfederated Malay States developed much more slowly and somewhat later when compared to the changes going on in the Federated States. This was because British penetration into these states had occurred rather late.

While Muslim affairs in the Malay States were legally the responsibility of the Ruler, over the years a confusing variety of committees and offices were created by various Rulers to assist them in or to relieve them of these duties. These included a Majlis Agama (Council of Religion), a Shar’ah Committee (to interpret Muslim Law) and a Kathis Committee. In some states like Kelantan, Perak and Kedah, a Department of Religious Affairs was established to administer religious matters.
Constitutional and administrative changes wrought by the British reflected their urge to impose Western concepts of rule, that is, the introduction of written constitutions in Johore and Trengganu, codification of the unwritten adat and the Sharī'ah, and modern legislation on religious matters. All this was done by the Europeans, though often on Malay initiative.  

Meanwhile, in the Straits Settlements, the Muslim communities (Arab, Malay and Indian Muslims) had their own kathis, recognised as such on grounds of piety, scholarship, or good works. On assuming control, the British authorities recognised this arrangement, though they did not appoint such 'ulamā' to any official post. It was only in August 1880 that the appointment of kathis was undertaken by the Government, following a number of petitions made by members of the Muslim community of the Settlements. By the early years of the Twentieth Century, more kathis were appointed on the recommendation of the Muslim community. However, the role of the kathis in the Settlements was confined to the registration of marriages and divorces; they did not enjoy wider powers, as their counterparts did in the Malay States.
With the establishment of Muslim religious institutions, British rule had come to affect Islam in Malaya in various ways. First of all, the codification of civil and criminal law resulted in the strengthening of Muslim law at the expense of the adat more than ever before. Despite the fact that both Shari'ah or, as it was usually called, 'Mohammedan Law', and adat had been given a place in British Malaya, there were occasions when British statute law usurped the place of both of these laws, in matters of waqf, zakāt, fitrah and bayt al-mal. In addition, there was a tendency toward a firmer State control of waqf especially in Kelantan, and a move towards reducing the number of waqf, particularly personal and family ones, a process speeded considerably by new legislation and court decisions. Apart from this, Muslim courts had few powers and very narrow jurisdiction. In comparison with the administration of the other state programmes, Muslim administration was haphazard and lethargic. This was because those who were charged with responsibility for the administration and leadership of religious affairs were either the traditional political élites of Malay society or the rural conservative religious élites who
were the products of the village pondok schools or the Malay vernacular primary schools.

Prior to British rule, education in the Malay States had not been widespread and formally organised. Generally, what had really happened was that the children were taught passages of the Qur'ān by rote and also some basic tenets of Islam. This was done by Muslim divines and bujjāj. In any case, the coming of the British heralded swift reforms in the school system of the Malay States. As recruits were needed to man the Civil Service, the British found it necessary to educate the sons of Malay aristocrats. In line with this, secular types of education were started in both mediums, English and Malay. Initially, this attempt proved to be a failure, as Malays generally distrusted the new system of education which they believed would turn their children into Christians. In order to erase this suspicion, after some thought the British authorities took the step of stimulating and strengthening religious education. In this connection, Quranic education was added to the curriculum of Malay schools in Perak in 1891 and this gave the essential impetus to its expansion. Village ʿulamāʾ were also employed as teachers of the Qur'ān, hence helping to neutralize fears of alien influences. By the beginning of the...
Twentieth Century, religious afternoon classes were extended to cover schooling in Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang, though in many places, the mosques and surau (prayer house) were still important centres of weekly religious teachings. Those who wished to pursue their religious learning further might go to a sekolah pondok (religious boarding school) in a northern state, or a centre in Sumatra (Indonesia) or even as far away as the Middle East.

However, Quranic instruction did not remain as part of the government's school system for long. Instead, in the Malay schools more stress was put on the study of the Malay language and the basic skills of reading, writing and arithmetic together with gardening and handicraft. Meanwhile, in the English schools, which were opened for the scions of Malay Rajas and aristocrats, the students were provided with a curriculum which was similar to that of the schools in England. Besides this, in 1905, the Malay College, an 'Eton-like' Malay Boarding School, was established for the selected sons of Rajas and aristocrats. It was also provided with a British Headmaster and teachers with English public school backgrounds. In about 1920, a small concession was made by the Board of Governors of the school, that is, to admit Malay
'probationers', some of non-aristocratic origin, selected from other English schools, to attend the special government classes organized for Malays who had already completed their Standard Seven Examination. Specifically, this scheme was planned to absorb the cream of the graduates of the Malay College into a governmental role.

On the other hand, in 1922, the Sultan Idris Training College (S.I.T.C) was established at Kuala Kangsar, Perak, for the purpose of training Malay teachers. The curriculum of this college was mainly concerned with normal 'secondary' education, and only marginally with 'professional' teacher training. In this connection, apart from academic training, the teacher trainee had to do practical work in the school's vegetable plots and to learn the skills of basket-making and other handicrafts. In addition, two hours per week throughout the three-year course were set aside for Islamic religious instruction. Teaching was done entirely in Malay. Totally divorced from these two categories of Malay and English educated students were those who continued to pursue pondok education in the northern Malay States. Hence, as a result of these developments, we eventually come across Malays who have different world-views and aspirations in life. The English educated, who made up
the administrative elites, tended to be more secular and Western-oriented, whilst the Malay educated have generally identified themselves with the wider Malay world, especially Indonesia, and as a result of that influence may be inclined towards leftist politics or in some cases choose Islam if they have had a strong religious upbringing. But, generally it has been the pondok educated and later also the madrasah educated group who provide the bulk of the leadership and indeed the followers of Islamic political parties. These three different groups, because of their respective orientation, have been locked in serious rivalry since the later part of the colonial period and continue to be so in independent Malaya/Malaysia. The situation is made more complex by the presence of the immigrant communities of Chinese and Indians, whose immigration had been encouraged by the British administration in order to ensure rapid economic development of the Malay States.

In the Unfederated Malay States, educational development took much the same course as in the Federation, but with a more pronounced stress on the Qur'ān and religious instruction. Initially, the supervision of religious schools in the Federated States was entrusted to British officers by the wish of the sultans for the sake of greater efficiency, but
by the 1930s, special committees for religious instruction were formed in all the four states. On the other hand, in the Unfederated States, the supervision was in the hands of senior ‘ulamā’, for example the Shaikh al-Islam in Kedah or in the case of Kelantan under the Majlis Agama. At any rate, higher Muslim education was only started about two years before Malayan independence, beginning with the establishment of the Muslim College (Kolej Islam) in 1955.

Improved communications had also caused more and more people to perform the hajj than ever before. This, in turn, gave more vigour to Islamic sentiments in Malaya during the British period. As opposed to the Dutch in Indonesia the British encouraged and facilitated the hajj. As a result, the number of pilgrims to Mecca rose from year to year. Although contacts with Arabia were temporary and superficial, the hajj did involve intensive indoctrination and brought the Malays into contact with Muslims from other parts of the world. This gave rise to an awareness among the hujjāj that the Malays in general had all along been involved in non-Islamic practices and that these would have to be got rid of. Besides this, since the 19th century some men of Malay ethnic stock, mostly of Patani and Indonesian origin, had settled down and even taught at the Masjid al-Harām in
Mecca. Those Malays who studied under them came back to Malaya, imbued with more purified ideas concerning Islam. Further, improved communications led to the incorporation of Arabs and Indian Muslims (known locally as Jawi Peranakan) into elite positions in Malay society. These people were respected by the locals on account of their attachment to orthodoxy in comparison to the indigenous Malay leaders. All these factors gradually brought about changes in the character of Muslim religious elites, thus creating tensions between the folk religion of the Malay kampong and the demands of orthodox Islam.

On the other hand, because the Straits Settlements were not regarded as "Malay States", but rather as Crown Colonies directly under British control, Islam was not recognised as the official religion in Penang, Malacca and Singapore. Accordingly, policies protecting Islam did not apply there. Instead, the Church of England was the established church and received a small annual grant in addition to donations of public land for church buildings. However, even in the Straits Settlements, British administrators discouraged (but did not prohibit) Christian missions from working among the Malays for fear of possible Malay reaction to such efforts. This policy of preserving and protecting Islam provided the Malays
with a psychological assurance that the country continued to be theirs despite the influx of great numbers of Chinese and Indians, of course with British approval.¹⁰⁴

Meanwhile, without official recognition, Islam in the Straits Settlements managed to develop in the urban centres through the efforts of the Arab community and the Jawi Peranakan, with the support of some scholars from Patani, Aceh, Palembang and Java - most of whom had previously studied in Mecca.¹⁰⁵ In the late 19th century, these people were mostly concentrated in Singapore, which was then already a noted commercial port and also a centre of Islamic life and learning. The Arabs carried the honorific titles of Sayyid ¹⁰⁶ or Shaykh.¹⁰⁷ As a community, the Arabs had for centuries won the admiration of the Malays who respected its members for being pious and knowledgeable in Islam, in addition to the fact that they were often wealthy and related to the Prophet.¹⁰⁸ In Singapore, the leading members of this community were active in charitable and social welfare work among Muslims.¹⁰⁹ They helped to endow hospitals, built mosques, gave land for a burial ground and sponsored large public gatherings on the occasion of Islamic festivities, which were attended by their co-religionists.¹¹⁰ At the beginning of the Twentieth
Century, they together with the Jawi Peranakan had published a growing body of religious and secular publications which marked the start of a change in Malay society in the years to come. This development was to have an impact not only in the Straits Settlements, but throughout the Malay Archipelago.

From Islamic Reformism to Malay Nationalism:

The introduction of new religious ideas and the presence of some expatriate religious élites created divisions between the society and the élites, as well as among the élites themselves. After the turn of the century, there developed a factional split between the Kaum Muda (Young Faction) and Kaum Tua (Old Faction), who were close to the Palace Circle. The Kaum Muda élites were influenced very much by the "Manār Circle" and al-Azhar University in Cairo. The leaders of this movement were urban-based Arabs, Jawi Peranakan or Indonesians, and were frequently the products of Arabic education in madrasah schools or had obtained an Islamic education abroad, either in Egypt or India. Initially, few of the Kaum Muda were of peninsular Malay origin. The most famous among them were Shaikh Muhammad Tahir Jalaluddin al-Azhari (also al-Falaki), Sayyid Shaikh b. Ahmad al-Hadi.
Hj. Abbas b. Mohd. Taha and Shaikh Muhammad Salim al-Kalali. Normally, they operated from Singapore and Penang where they had no worries about Islamic religious censorship, which could be enforced against them in the Malay States. By the 1930s, the Kaum Muda movement had become highly politicized. It began to challenge the leadership of the traditional elites in Malay society. Among other things, it accused the traditional religious leadership of jumūd (stagnation) and instead called for ijtihād and the need to return to the Qurʾān and hadīth. It also rejected some of the adat and beliefs found among the Malays as being pure bid‘ah. In addition, it discussed such ideas as nationalism and called for the improvement of Malays' social and economic condition. Its ideas were vehemently propagated through the journals and newspapers like al-Imam, Neracha, al-Ikhwan, Seruan Azhar and Saudara. Besides this, the exponents of Kaum Muda established the madrasah schools for the dissemination of their ideas. The islahi ideas of Kaum Muda had also found support from a prominent Kelantan ‘alim, Hj. Wan Musa b. Hj. Abdul Samad (1874 - 1939) of Kota Bharu. However, through his early exposure to Sufism this man was more inclined towards the reformist ideas of Shāh Wali Allāh Dihlawi.
In Malaya, outside of the coastal cities, the Kaum Muda made little headway as they were blocked by the alliance of Muslim traditionalists and Malay secular power. However, their influence spread into the islands that later became Indonesia. Although the Kaum Muda movement never became a mass movement, it did help to generate nationalist and anti-colonialist sentiments based on pan-Islamic doctrines.

As the appeal of the reformist group was weak, its place was taken by secular-oriented Malay nationalists once there was an upsurge of anti-British feeling following the end of the Second World War. Meanwhile, the eclipse of Kaum Muda influence from Malay politics did not mean that reformist ideas had become completely extinct. Instead, Kaum Muda activists channeled their thought and energies into the fields of education, journalism and to a lesser extent into economic pursuits. This was not accidental. Rather, it developed out of the realisation on the part of their leaders that independence would not mean anything but self-destruction, and this in itself is contrary to Shar'iah, unless all Bumiputra (in this context, Malays) had acquired sufficient skills and education in all spheres and not only in religious knowledge. Besides this, they stressed the necessity of acquiring
enough wealth for the Bumiputra as a prerequisite to independence. The whole question may be easily understood, if we take into account what Shaikh Tahir Jalaluddin himself had said:127

"... independence requires a number of conditions and in my opinion it is not yet the time for us to rule on our own. If it is that what we require, then it is incumbent upon us, bumiputra, to acquire sufficient education in all spheres and not religious knowledge alone, but all knowledges and skills of the Europeans; [we] must first acquire enough wealth for the bumiputra. When all this has been sufficiently acquired, then only [we] could hope for security and independence. If not, this ambition could not be realised. Even if it is attained, it will bring about danger upon us, [and] this is not permitted by Syarak ".

In line with this strategy, Kaum Muda activists set up more madrasahs. Shaikh Tahir Jalaluddin himself had encouraged business activities in the area of Padang Rengas, Perak, so that by the end of the 1930s there were almost 30 shops belonging to the Malays in the locality.128 Further, through their journals and newspapers the reformist group continued to discuss religious matters and to talk of the social and economic problems faced by the Malays in the light of the newly established plural society in Malaya. By the end of the 1940s, the activists had provided shelter to Malay nationalists within the compounds of their madrasahs, especially in Perak.129 However, it was
only after the Second World War that the real fruit of the Kaum Muda struggle was borne. This was the formation of Hizbul Muslimin (HAMIM or Party of Muslims), the forerunner of the present Parti Islam Se Malaysia (PAS).

h. The Rise of Malay Nationalism:

Prior to the Second World War, unity was not non-existent in Malaya. Rather, the loyalty of the Malays was entrenched in the state where they come from or more accurately was identified with the individual sultan. This was because there was absolutely no administrative unity to bring about the people together in some form of closer association.

Unlike Indonesian nationalism, Malay nationalism had developed rather late. The seeds of national consciousness which had been sown by the reformists had not fully bloomed until the late 1930s. Specifically, the early efforts of Malay nationalism only came to fruition on 6 August, 1939, that is, when the Conference of Pan-Malayan Malay Associations was held in Kuala Lumpur. This was a step towards national unity. A third conference was planned, but it had to be cancelled when the Pacific War broke out.
At this stage, Malays were divided into two political groups. The first group, often identified as the Rightists, was the main sponsor of the above-mentioned conferences. As a group, it subscribed to the principle of 'Malaya for the Malays', and was led by the English-educated Malay aristocrats, usually associated with the Malay College. On the other hand, the Leftists led by Ibrahim b. Hj. Yaakob came under the influence of Indonesian nationalism and even Marxism. Members of this group were generally Malay-educated and often graduates of 'S. I. T. C.'.

However, of the two groups, it was the latter that dominated the Malayan political scene till after the war. In 1937, this leftist group formed the Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM or Young Malayan Union), with the object of attaining independence for Malaya and the incorporation of the peninsular into Indonesia Raya (Greater Indonesia). Although the KMM was dominated by secular-oriented leftists, it also attracted Islamic-educated elements, especially at the grassroots level. Possibly this happened as these people were also inspired by Indonesian nationalism.

Realising that the aims of the KMM threatened their position and interests, the British government arrested all its leaders in 1940. But soon, with the
sudden fall of Singapore, the British released them. During the Japanese occupation, the KMM leaders reorganised the party and as a tactical move collaborated with the Japanese authorities. But this 'cooperation' failed to disguise their avowed intentions, and by June 1942, the Japanese banned the party.\textsuperscript{135} Despite this, the leadership remained intact, and in their own interests, the two sides continued to 'cooperate' in spite of the ban.\textsuperscript{136} At this time too, the KMM formed contacts with the Chinese-dominated Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA).

Following the banning of KMM, a new party, Parti Kebangsaan Melayu (or it was more popularly known, as the MNP, that is, Malay Nationalist Party) was formed by the leftist group, with the intention of winning full independence for Malaya. Towards the end of the war, the KMM group sponsored another organisation, Kesatuan Rakyat Indonesia Semenanjung (KRIS or Union of Peninsular Indonesians) and tried to win an independence for Malaya through a union with Indonesia.\textsuperscript{137} But their efforts failed, as Japan suddenly surrendered in August 1945.\textsuperscript{138}

Following their return, the British authorities kept a close watch over all left-wing political
parties. Soon after 1948, when the Emergency Regulations were proclaimed in the face of an increased Communist threat, all Malay left-wing parties were banned by the British Government, hence crippling all left-wing movements in the Malay Peninsular. With this development, Malay nationalist leadership was consolidated in the hands of the more moderate elements who in UMNO determined to gain independence by more constitutional means.

1. The Road to Independence:

The Malay nationalism which developed after the war was one of internal self-defence, that is, in the face of a Chinese-dominated communist movement and the attempt of the British masters to create the Malayan Union 140, thus removing the Malays from their special position and giving the Chinese community more power. Furthermore, this nationalism for the first time focussed its attention on Malaya itself and involved all classes of the Malay community. 142

Amidst mounting threats, the old political elite under the leadership of a prominent Malay aristocrat, Dato Onn b. Ja'afar, created UMNO in May 1946. The main programme of UMNO then was to preserve Malaya for the Malays as expressed by the slogan 'Hidup
Melayu' (Long live the Malays). From the very beginning, the leadership of UMNO had fallen largely into the hands of the Malay aristocratic class. With the support of the Malays, UMNO was able to defeat the Malayan Union scheme. Following this, a long negotiation ensued between the Malay Sultans and UMNO on the one hand and the British government on the other, resulting in the establishment of the Federation of Malaya on 1st. February, 1948.

Meanwhile, as a conservative and moderate party, UMNO was opposed by the radical MNP whose programme called for full independence and non-cooperation with the British government. In sum, the party's aims remained very much the same as the defunct KMM and KRIS. The leadership of this party was dominated by the secular-oriented leftists, often with Malay education, English education coming next in importance. But initially, they were also some prominent religious-educated individuals like Dr. Burhanuddin al-Helmi, Musa Ahmad and Baharuddin Tahir among the rank of its activists. At this juncture, it was possible for the three different elements to work together on the basis of a common fight against colonialism, as the question of ideology was not viewed as something urgent and hence was not stressed.
With the encouragement of some MNP leaders, the first Islamic party, Hizbul Muslimin, was formed on 14 March, 1948. It was the product of the 'People's Congress' held at an Islamic school, Ma'ahad al-Ihya' ash-Sharif (usually called al-Ihya' ash-Sharif) of Gunong Semanggol, Perak. Although to a certain degree, this new party was influenced by Indonesian nationalism, for instance, adopting the 'red and white' of the Indonesian flag as its symbol, unlike other parties it was more committed to Islam. Its objectives were three-fold, that is, to attain independence for the Malayan nation, to found an Islamic society and ultimately to establish the Dār al Islām (Islamic State) in Malaya. Its leadership consisted of Ustaz Abu Bakar al-Baqir as President, Engineer Hj. Ariffin of Johore as Deputy President, Uthman Hamzah as President of the Youth Section and Mohd. Asri b. Hj. Muda as the Secretary to the party's Supreme Political Bureau cum Private Secretary to the President.

Soon after its formation, the party won wider support, especially among the more religiously inclined Malay masses, who had hitherto been politically non-committal. For UMNO, this was an increase in the strength of the anti-UMNO forces. In response, Dato Onn repeatedly warned about the "danger
from the gunong (mountain)" and cynically charged that the party was "red", that is, communists.¹⁵⁸

Meanwhile, since 1946, the MCP asserted that it did not recognise the unilateral talks between the British government and the sultans and the UMNO. Subsequently, it began to increase its militancy, hence endangering the peaceful political change achieved by the UMNO. To top it all, the MCP launched an uprising in June 1948, as a means to wrest Malaya from the Colonial regime.¹⁵⁹ This aggravated the situation. As a result of Dato Onn's continued campaign against the leftists and the ever present British fear of Malay radicalism, the leaders of both MNP and HAMIM were arrested under the Emergency Regulations in July and August of 1948.¹⁶⁰

With the leftists and the reformists out of the way, UMNO was able to dominate the Malayan political scene. Under the liberal and easy-going Tunku Abdul Rahman ¹⁶¹, the UMNO worked to establish effective links with the older conservative leadership in the Chinese and Indian communities, who had formed the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC).¹⁶² Parti Perikatan (The Alliance Party), formed out of these three constituent groups, became the prominent political force in the
Federation of Malaya. This federation consisted originally of Peninsular Malaya (including Penang and Malacca, hitherto parts of the Straits Settlements), minus Chinese-dominated Singapore which was made a separate colony, enjoying a large measure of internal autonomy.

By the early 50s, Britain began to introduce some measures of self-government into the federation, thus opening the way for eventual independence. In this connection, Britain was encouraged to grant such a system in view of the fact that UMNO was able to foster close cooperation with the leaders of the Chinese and Indian communities via MCA and MIC. In the first election of 1955, the Alliance won an overwhelming majority. This was possible as communal tensions and conflicts were eliminated through the cooperation established among the Alliance leaders.

On 31st August, 1957, Malaya gained its merdeka (independence) under the premiership of Tunku Abdul Rahman. Meanwhile, the Islamic conservatives, who were dominant then, had opted for a pragmatic and adaptationist approach within the country's political arena.
Notes:

1 According to the Malaysian Constitution, a Malay is defined as meaning "a person who professes the Muslim religion, habitually speaks Malay, conforms to Malay custom and: (a) was born before Merdeka Day, in the Federation or Singapore or born of parents, one of whom was born in the Federation or Singapore, or was on Merdeka Day domiciled in the Federation or Singapore: or (b) is the issue of such a person." (Article 160 (2)).


6 Syed Muhammad Naguib al-Attas, a Malaysian scholar, is of the opinion that Sufis were actually responsible for the propagation of Islam in Malaya (Malay States). See Syed Naguib al-Attas, Some Aspects of Sufism As Understood and Practice Among the Malays, Singapore:


10 Za’ba, op. cit.,

11 Since 1930s, the northern Malay State of Perlis had come under the influence of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah, whereby the adherents of this school of thought accept the rulings of the four famous madhahib, oppose bid'ah and call for the implementation of ijtihād. See Dr. Ismail Hamid, Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah: Kajian Satu Gerakan Islam di Perlis, monograph, Institut Bahasa, Kesusastraan dan Kebudayaan Melayu, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Bangi, 1986 and Prof. Madya Abdul Halim El-Muhammady, Perbezaan Aliran Mazhab Fiqh: Perkembangan dan Masalah, Kuala Lumpur: Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM), 1986, pp. 42 - 45.


13 Since pre-Islamic days, the Malays have known three systems of adat. These are Adat Perpateh, Adat Temenggong and Adat Kampung. Adat Perpateh, which originated from the Minangkabau area of Sumatra, is presently practised in the greater part of Negri Sembilan and the Naning District of Malacca. It is more rigid in its family structure and tends to favour


16 Among the changes which did take place were the adoption of grandiose titles and descriptive formulae usually used in the Persianized Muslim world. For example, the Malay Rulers assumed the titles of Sultan, Shah and prefixes like Ri'ayatuddin (Defender of the Faith) and al-Mu'azzam (The August). Simultaneously, the states were given names like Dâr al-Amân (Abode of Peace) for Kedah, Dâr al-Ridzwân (Abode of Grace) for Perak and Dâr al-Ihsân (Abode of Beneficence) for Selangor.

17 The term raja originates from Sanskrit. It was first adopted as a title for the ruler when the Malays were Hindus.


19 Ibid.

Malays call the adopted Arabic script *tulisan Jawi* (Jawi script).


Ismail Hamid, op. cit., p. 37.

Ibid., pp. 38 - 41.

Ibid., pp. 41 - 48.

Ibid., pp. 21 - 22.

Malacca was captured by the Portuguese in 1511, thus bringing to an end its role as the centre of Malay power and trade and also of Islam.

Some modern Malays, especially in the urban centres, do consume alcoholic beverages under the pretext of being 'modern' and 'progressive' or simply as a means of overcoming the stress and strain of modern life.


Ibid.


From the mid-nineteenth century, there had been a great influx of Chinese into the Malay States. They were attracted largely by tin mining activities in Selangor and Perak.

J. Kennedy, op. cit., p. 143.

Ibid., p. 139.
The Straits Settlements consisted of Penang, Malacca and Singapore, which had been colonised by the British since the days of the East India Company.

The four northern Malay States of Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Trengganu accepted British protection in 1909, thereby putting an end to Siamese intervention in these states. Johore was finally pressured into accepting a British Adviser in 1914.

The Malays had never used the name 'Malaya' for their homeland. For them, it has been known as 'Tanah Melayu' (Malay Land). The term 'Malaya' first appeared in Leyden's Dirge of the Departed Year, written in 1806 and again in Captain Sherard Osborn's book Quedah, published in 1857. See Sir Richard Winstedt, Malaya and Its History, London: Hutchinson's University Library, n. d., p. 8.
52 Means, 'The Role of Islam', pp. 268 - 269.

53 Milner, 'Islam and Malay Kingship', p. 47 and also Brown, Malay Annals, p. 129.

54 Milner, op. cit., p. 47.

55 Ibid.


57 Moshe Yegar, op. cit., p. 261; Gullick, op. cit., p. 139.


59 Means, op. cit., p. 274.

60 Moshe Yegar, op. cit., p. 184.

61 Ibid.


63 Means, Ibid.

64 Moshe Yegar, op. cit., p. 264.

65 Ibid., p. 149.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid., p. 151.

68 Ibid., p. 264.

69 Ibid., p. 265.

70 Ibid.

71 Muslim courts only had powers to deal with Muslims and their responsibility was to register Muslim marriages and divorces and to distribute property after death or divorce. In civil cases, these courts were limited to disputes of less than M$25.00, and in criminal cases the maximum penalty was a M$10/- fine.
Means, op. cit., p. 275.

Roff, op. cit., p. 8 and Gullick, op. cit., p. 140.

Roff, op. cit.


Surau as an institution is believed to have been started by the Sufi Shaykhs for the benefit of their novices, that is, disciples. Five daily prayers and the Tarawih prayers are regularly held in the surau, but not the Friday and Id prayers, which are performed in the mosques. See Dr. M. A. Rauf, 'Islamic Education', Intisari, Malaysian Sociological Research Institute Ltd., vol. II, no. 1, Singapore, n. d., p. 18.


Pondok is a modification of the Arabic word funduq, that is, a place of temporary residence. In Bahasa Malaysia it literally means 'hut'. Usually, a pondok is made up of a cluster of huts built by a religious teacher close to his house on a piece of land which is alienated as tanah wakaf (waqf land). The murid (student) is allocated a hut as his residence during his study at the pondok. As a student, a person is also required to participate in cooking and other chores. See Dr. M. A. Rauf, Ibid., p. 22 and Shafie Abu Bakar, 'Ke Arah Pembaikan dan Pembangunan Sistem Pendidikan Islam', Jurnal Pendidikan Islam, Bil. 2, Okt. 1984/Muharram 1405, Kuala Lumpur: ABIM, pp. 24 - 44.

In Indonesia, a similar type of traditional religious educational institution is found. However, it is known as pesantren or langgar.


Richard Winstedt, a noted Malay scholar, as the Assistant Director of Education (Malay) between 1916 -
1921, had recommended that Government provisions for Quranic instruction be stopped. See P. L. Fook Seng, op. cit., p. 27.

85 Gardening and handicraft were stressed as part of the programmes of the British officials to keep the bulk of the Malays, who were rural-based, in their traditional way of life as agriculturists. During these early years, at no time had the British officials thought of giving the majority of the Malays more extensive educational opportunities.


88 Ibid., p. 23.

89 Ibid., p. 29.

90 Ibid.

91 Ibid.

92 Ibid.

93 Some Malays who were educated in Malay medium schools, including S. I. T. C., have become somewhat influenced by socialism through contact with Indonesian political activists.

94 Madrasah is a religious school which became popular especially after the First World War, with the spread of the influence of the reformist ideas of the Manār group and of Muhammad ʿAbduh. It provided an alternative form of religious education higher than that of the pondok and made its students more aware of the general situation in the Muslim world at large.

95 Moshe Yegar, op. cit., p. 265.


97 Moshe Yegar, op. cit., p. 265.


99 For information on Malay community (Iāwā community) in Mecca during the 19th century see P. M. Holt et. al., The Cambridge History of Islam, pp. 172 - 173;

Sayyid is an honorific title used throughout the Muslim world for an Arab who claims descent from the family of the Prophet.

Shaykh, in this case, is a title adopted by a common-born Arab and is often associated with religious knowledge and piety. In Malaya, especially Penang, the title has also been adopted by some Indian Muslims.

*Kaum Tua* refers collectively to the official religious hierarchy, the traditional Malay élite and the rural 'ulamā'.

*Madrasah* schools were established privately in urban areas to teach Qur'ān, hadith, Arabic and other branches of religious studies as well as non-religious

Shaikh Muhammad Tahir Jalaluddin was born in Bukit Tinggi, West Sumatra in 1869. He had studied in Mecca and also at al-Azhar. While in Cairo, he had befriended Rashīd Riḍā. In 1906, he settled permanently in Malaya. As an ʿālīm, he had combined within himself the reformist spirit of the Meccan ʿulamāʾ of the 1880s and 1890s and also the Salafi ideas of ‘Abduh and his disciples. See Roff, op. cit., pp. 60 - 61; Hamka, op. cit., pp. 169 - 171 and Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia: 1900 - 1942, East Asian Historical Monographs, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1978, pp. 33 - 35.

Syed Shaikh al-Hadi was born about 1862 in Malacca. He was of Malay-Arab (Hadhrami) descent. Although he was not an ʿālīm of Shaikh Tahir's calibre, he had nevertheless been very active in religious activities from his youth. In fact, he was instrumental in the founding and running of the journal al-Imām and remained a close friend of Shaikh Tahir till his death in 1934. See Roff, op. cit., pp. 62 - 63 and Mohd. Sarim, op. cit., pp. 40 - 53.

Hj. Abbas b. Mohd. Taha was born in Singapore in 1885 and was probably of Minangkabau parentage. He had studied in Mecca. In 1908, he succeeded Shaikh Tahir as the editor of al-Imām. See Roff, op. cit., pp. 63 - 64 and Mohd. Sarim, op. cit., pp. 35 - 39.

Shaikh Muhammad Salim al-Kalali, though a resident of Singapore, was in fact an Achinese of Hadhrami descent, with extensive trading interests throughout the Archipelago and with Arabia. He had also contributed some articles to al-Imām, but was better known as a businessman. See Roff, op. cit., pp. 64 - 65.


126 Bumiputra literally means 'son of the soil', that is, the indigenous inhabitants of a country. Originally, the term was used to describe the Malays,
but after the formation of Malaysia in September 1963, it has also been extended to include the indigenous tribes of Sabah and Sarawak.

127 Quoted by Mohd. Sarim in, 'Gerakan Islah Islamiyyah', p. 160 from Diary 1923 found among 'Shaykh Tahir's Papers' in the National Archive, Malaysia.


129 Ibid.


131 N. J. Ryan, op. cit.

132 Ibid.


134 Safie b. Ibrahim, op. cit.

135 Ibid.

136 Ibid.

137 N. J. Ryan, op. cit., p. 213 and Funston, op. cit., p. 35.


139 N. J. Ryan, Ibid., p. 214.

140 The Malayan Union scheme came into being on 1st April, 1946, that is, on the termination of military rule by the British. It was designed to give the British direct rule over the whole of Malaya, with the exclusion of Singapore. See R. S. Milne and D. K. Mauzy, Politics and Government in Malaysia, Singapore: Times Book International, 1980, p. 26 and V. Purcell, op. cit., p. 107.
141 Voll, op. cit., p. 229; Benda, op. cit., p. 205; Milne and Mauzy, op. cit., p. 27.


144 Gullick and Gale, op. cit., p. 85.


146 Dr. Burhanuddin al-Helmi was a unique leader who combined within himself features of the Malay, pondok, Arabic, English and Dutch education. Besides being influenced by Indonesian nationalism, he was also an ardent exponent of Islamic reformism. See Safie Ibrahim, op. cit., p. 188 and Kamarudin Jaffar (compiler), Dr. Burhanuddin al-Helmi: Politik Melayu dan Islam, Kuala Lumpur: Yayasan Anda Sdn. Bhd., 1980, p. 4.

147 Safie Ibrahim, op. cit., p. 187.

148 Ibid., p. 188.


150 This congress, also known as MATA Congress, was organised by the Majlis Agama Tertinggi Malaya (MATA) or The Supreme Religious Council of Malaya), formed at al-Ihya' ash-Sharif in March 1947. The aim of MATA was to unite the administration of Islamic religion in Malaya under one central authority and thus to improve the teaching of Islam and to raise the awareness of the Muslims in the struggle for independence.

151 Al-Ihya' ash-Sharif was the centre for islāh in the 1940s. For details see Nabir b. Hj. Abdullah, Ma'ahad Il-Ihya' Assyarif Gunong Semanggol: 1934 - 1959, Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Sejarah, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1976.


154 Ustaz Abu Bakar al-Baqir was the mudir of al-Ihya' ash-Sharif and had been the backbone of Islamic reformism in the school and HAMIM.

155 Uthman Hamzah later became an active member of PAS.

156 Muhammad Asri (now Dato') was PAS' President from 1971 - 1982.


158 The reference to the 'gunong' clearly indicated that what Dato' Onn was hinting at was the threat posed by Islamic forces based at Gunong Semanggol.


160 However, British repressive action against HAMIM was severe even by comparison with their treatment of MNP leaders. See Funston, op. *cit.*, p. 91.

161 Tunku Abdul Rahman, a Kedah prince, took over the leadership of UMNO in 1951, when Dato' Onn resigned from the party's presidency and also left the party on account of UMNO's rejection of his multi-racialism approach as a means to acquire independence from the British.


CHAPTER 2
Islam in Post-Independence Malaya/Malaysia:
1957 - late 1960s.

Independence had come rather easily to Malaya. When the Malayan Delegation, composed of representatives of the Rulers and the Alliance Ministers, went to London in 1956 to negotiate with the British Government, there was almost no argument about the granting of independence ¹, and the talks concentrated mainly on the type of constitution that the independent nation should have. This was resolved when the Alliance Party suggested that a Commonwealth Commission should be formed to draft the constitution. ² Eventually, a Constitutional Commission known as the Reid Commission was duly approved, with Lord Reid as its chairman and other members being appointed, one each from the United Kingdom, Australia, India and Pakistan. ³ No one from Malaya, who presumably would know about local needs, was appointed as a member of this commission. Five specific matters were given to the Reid Commission as points of reference: there should be a strong central government with some autonomy for the states, secondly, the special position of the Rulers should be protected; thirdly, there should be a common nationality; fourthly, a Head of State should be
appointed under this constitution and fifthly, the special privileges of the Malays and the legitimate interests of the non-Malays should be protected.* Suggestions made for the formulation of the Malayan Constitution indicated that some intensive bargaining had been going on between the three parties representing the three major communities that made up the Alliance. In this respect, the provisions like the special functions of the Rulers, the choice of Islam as the State Religion and the decision that the Malay Language (Bahasa Melayu) should be made the only official language beginning from 1967, were all part of this bargaining. In March, 1957, the commission produced a draft constitution based on the memorandum submitted by the Alliance Party.

The Malayan Constitution which came into force with the declaration of independence was a Federal Constitution. 5 In practice, the powers of the Central Government were considerable compared with those of the states. Secondly, the basic structure of government was to be Constitutional Monarchy, that is, there was to be a king who would rule through Parliament. 6 This King, the Yang Di Pertuan Agong (the Paramount Ruler) was to be chosen once every five years from among the Rulers of the Malay States. 7
As provided for by the Constitution, a bicameral parliament was set up. It consisted of a Dewan Rakyat (House of Representatives) all of whose members were to be elected for a period not exceeding five years and a Dewan Negara (Senate), whose members were partly nominated and enjoyed limited powers. As in pre-independence days, the legislative and executive powers were divided between the Federal and State governments. At the federal level, the government was headed by a cabinet of ministers under a Prime Minister to be chosen from the majority party in the Dewan Rakyat.

Other important points of the Constitution concerned the special position of the Malays, citizenship and the national language. It was agreed that the special position of the Malays in respect of such matters as recruitment to the public service, award of government scholarships, Malay land reservations, and the grant of permits for certain types of business activity were to be safeguarded by the King. But in the discharge of his duty, the King was to act on the advice of his cabinet (in which the non-Malay communities are always represented) and also to safeguard the legitimate interests of the non-Malays. On the language issue, it was agreed that Bahasa Melayu would be the national language, but for
the next ten years English would be a second official language.

Concerning citizenship, the qualifications were further relaxed. Thus all children born in the federation after independence would be citizens by \emph{jus soli}, but not retrospectively.\footnote{12} By this provision, the concept of Malayan nationality was developed and refined.

When Malaysia was formed in September 1963, all these main provisions were retained in the new Constitution. However, the Malaysian Parliament, with the approval of two-thirds of its members, has made amendments whenever necessary in conformity with the political climate of the country.

\section{Islam and the Malaysian Constitution:}

Under this subtitle, we shall examine the position of Islam \textit{vis-à-vis} the Malaysian Constitution. In this connection, we shall look at some of the provisions in the Constitution and try to analyse their implication.

Islam was first proclaimed as the religion of the Federation of Malaya in the Constitution of 1957 and this was again entrenched in Article 3 (1) of the
Malaysian Constitution. However, this practice is not a novelty in itself. Other Muslim countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria have such a provision in their respective constitutions.

Moreover, among the pre-independence Malay States, both Johore and Trengganu had proclaimed Islam to be the 'Religion of the State', while ensuring freedom of worship for other religions found within their boundaries.

It was on the suggestion of the Alliance Party that Islam was declared the religion of the federation. In its memorandum, the party stated:

'the religion of Malaysia shall be Islam. The observance of this principle shall not impose any disability on non-Muslim natives professing and practising their religions and shall not imply that the State is not a secular state'.

However, at no time has the party asked that the Constitution should also declare, as did the Pakistan Constitution, that Malaysia be an Islamic State. In fact, the issue of the Islamic State never received any serious consideration among the Malays of Malaysia during these early years, except that it was discussed just a few days before the declaration of independence by Dr. Burhanuddin al-Helmi, the then President of
PAS, in the course of his talk at the party's general assembly. 

The provision to make Islam the religion of the Federation was at first opposed by the Malay Rulers on the advice given to them that if the Federation had an official religion, then logically the proposed Head of the Federation would become the Head of the official religion throughout the Federation and this would be in conflict with the position of each of the Rulers as Head of the official religion in his own state. To overcome this fear, the Alliance Party explained that the intention of making Islam the official religion of the Federation was primarily for ceremonial purposes, that is, to enable prayers to be said in the Islamic way on official occasions such as the installation of the Yang Di Pertuan Agong, Merdeka Day, and similar occasions; and that the position of the Rulers as Head of Islam in their own states would be respected. As this explanation was accepted, the proposed clause was included in the Constitution.

Although Islam was proclaimed the religion of the Federation, the Constitution guaranteed religious toleration as spelt out under the various articles embodied within it. For example, to Article 3 (1) of the Constitution was added 'that other religions may
be practised in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation'.\(^{21}\) Besides this, Article 8 (2) states 'except as expressly authorised by this Constitution, there shall be no discrimination against citizens on the ground only of religion...in any law or in the appointment to any office or employment under a public authority or in the administration of any law relating to the acquisition, holding or disposition of any property or the establishing or carrying on of any trade, business, profession, vocation or employment'.\(^{22}\)

After Merdeka, the Malay States Constitutions, which carried the provisions that only a Malay or a Muslim may be appointed Menteri Besar (Chief Minister), were amended to enable the Ruler to appoint a non-Muslim as Menteri Besar provided that, in the Ruler's judgement, he is likely to command the confidence of the majority of the members of the State Legislative Assembly.\(^{23}\) At the federal level, there is nothing in the Constitution which provides that the Prime Minister or any Minister or high official must be a Muslim.\(^{24}\)

Article 11 of the Federal Constitution provides that every person has the right to profess and practice his religion and subject to Clause (4) to
propagate it. In this connection, Clause (4) provides that state law and in respect of the Federal Territory federal law may control or restrict the propagation of any religion, doctrine or belief among persons professing the Muslim religion. There is, however, freedom to carry on missionary work among non-Muslims. Further, it is also provided that no person shall be compelled to pay any tax, the proceeds of which are specially allocated in whole or in part for the purposes of a religion other than his own. Every religious group has the right to manage its own affairs, to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes and to acquire and own property and hold and administer it in accordance with the law.

In various states, laws have been passed to restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or belief other than the doctrine and belief of the Muslim religion to any persons professing Islam. In this connection, it becomes an offence to engage in missionary activities among Muslims. State law also prohibits the teaching (except in one's own residence and in the presence only of members of one's own household) of any doctrine of the Muslim religion without written permission; and the teaching or expounding of any doctrine or the performance of a
ceremony or act relating to the Muslim religion in any manner contrary to Muslim law. 29

With regard to education, the Malaysian Constitution guarantees certain rights. For example, Article 12 (1) forbids discrimination against anyone based solely on religion in matters of administration of any educational institution maintained by a public authority, and in particular, the admission of pupils or students in any educational institution (whether or not maintained by a public authority and whether within or outside the Federation). 30 Meanwhile, Article 12 (2), which was amended in 1976, states that 'it is lawful for the Federation and State governments to establish or maintain or assist in establishing or maintaining Islamic institutions or provide or assist in providing instruction in the religion of Islam and incur such expenditure as may be necessary for the purpose'. 31

It may be noted that the powers under Clause (2) of Article 12 quoted above have been extended to the whole of the Federation, including Sabah and Sarawak. 32

Even though Islam has been proclaimed the religion of the Federation, there is no Head of the
Muslim religion for the whole of the Federation. The Yang Di Pertuan Agong is the Head of Islam only in his own state, in the states of Malacca and Penang, in the Federal Territory, Sabah and Sarawak and also for Singapore until its separation from Malaysia. In other states, the position of the Sultan or Raja as the Head of Islam remains intact. However, for the sake of uniformity, the Federal Constitution provides that whatever religious acts or observances or ceremonies are agreed upon for the whole of the Federation by the Majlis Raja-Raja (Conference of Rulers) shall be declared by the Yang Di Pertuan Agong as their representative. This is provided for in Article 3(2) of the Constitution concerning such matters as the starting of Ramadān, the celebration of ‘Īd il-Fitr and ‘Īd il-Adhā. In another example, the Majlis Raja-Raja has empowered the Yang Di Pertuan Agong to issue tauliahs (letters of authority) to religious teachers for the Armed Forces after the individual teachers have been duly chosen separately by the Rulers of the States.

Under the present constitutional structure, the Sultan does have a great deal of influence on the appointments of religious officials, especially the Mufti, and in the direction of religious affairs in the State. The Sultans too are very jealous of their
position as heads of Islam, so much so that we find that through the influence of the respective Sultāns, Kedah and Pahang have chosen to stay out of the National Council for Islamic Affairs. ⁴⁹ Besides this, fatwas which are based on other than the doctrines of the Shafiʿī Maddhab require the approval of the Sultān. ⁵⁰ Nonetheless, legislation can only be exercised by a Bill passed by the Legislative Assembly and assented to by the Sultān, and to that extent the elected ministers and members of the Legislative Assembly can influence the administration of Muslim law in the States. ⁴¹ As for the Yang Di Pertuan Agong, in the exercise of his functions as the Head of Islam in the various states mentioned, he has to act on advice and thus the influence of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet are more significant. ⁴²

While undoubtedly Islam has been given favourable treatment in independent Malaysia, nevertheless, the Islamists, especially those within PAS and academics, have complained that it is subjected to certain constraints. For example, the Malaysian Constitution sees Sharīʿah only as Muslim Personal and Family Laws to be implemented among Muslims within the jurisdiction of the States, except for the Federal Territory. ⁴³ Within the scope of these laws are included the Muslim Law relating to succession,
testate and intestate, betrothal, marriage, divorce, dower, maintenance, adoption, legitimacy, guardianship, gifts, partitions, and non-charitable trusts; Muslim wakfs and the definition and regulation of charitable and religious trusts, the appointment of trustees and the incorporation of persons in respect of Muslim religious and charitable endowments, institutions, trusts, charities and charitable institutions operating wholly within the State; zakāt, fitrah and bayt al-mal or similar revenue; mosques or any Muslim public place of worship; the creation and punishment of offences by Muslims against the precepts of Islam, Muslim courts, the control and propagation of doctrines and beliefs among Muslims, the determination of matters of Muslim law and doctrine and of Malay custom.\(^4\)

From the above list, it can clearly be seen that the jurisdiction given to the State and to the Sharī'ah courts is limited. Even in matters included in the State List, there are many federal laws which limit the scope and application of State laws. For instance, in the field of succession, testate and intestate, account has to be taken of the Probate and Administration Act and the Small Estates (Distribution) Act with the result that the Kathis are only given the functions of certifying the shares to
be allotted to the beneficiaries under the Muslim Law.\textsuperscript{45}

Further, in the field of criminal law in particular the jurisdiction of the Sharī'ah courts is very limited. It has jurisdiction only over persons professing Islam and it has jurisdiction in respect of offences only as is conferred by Federal Law.\textsuperscript{46} In this regard, the Muslim courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 1965 provides that such jurisdiction shall not be exercised in respect of any offence punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding six months or with any fine exceeding 1,000 dollars or with both.\textsuperscript{47} In addition, the Sharī'ah courts are not permitted to exercise jurisdiction in respect of the hadd offence of zinā' in accordance with the rulings of the Qur'ān and Sunnah.\textsuperscript{48}

In Malaysia, the Sharī'ah courts are not recognised as having the same status and organisation as the civil courts. Thus the position of a kathi today is lower than that of a magistrate.\textsuperscript{49} It is also to be noted that in Malaysia, it is the Constitution which is the Supreme Law.\textsuperscript{50} It is also significant that the definition of law which is contained in the Constitution does not mention Islamic Sharī'ah.\textsuperscript{51} While it is true that since independence the Federal
Parliament has not been able to make laws dealing with the *Shari'ah* (except now for the Federal Territory) as Islamic law is a State responsibility, the State Legislatures can make laws and the laws cannot be held void simply because they contravene the *Shari'ah*.

In view of the prevalent conditions *vis-à-vis* the Federal and State Constitutions, Islam as a law still remains limited in scope and in public life it is constantly being challenged by secular norms and standards.

b. Malaysian Islamic Policy and Its Implementation:

Prior to Malayan independence, religion was in practical terms a state matter. Since independence, Islam has become more and more of a federal concern. Thus, the Rulers' Conference, composed of all the Malay Rulers, began to consider religious matters from a federal perspective and the Keeper of the Rulers' Seal, that is, the Secretary to the Conference, exercised some authority for the coordination of Muslim affairs at the federal level. Similarly, after 1957, large sums of money were allocated to the states for mosque construction, Muslim administration and Muslim welfare.
Most probably, federal involvement in religious affairs came about as a result of the fact that the constitution sanctions a system of special rights tied to religion. In this context, the Malays are given legal privileges in four general areas, that is, admission to public service, award of government scholarships, allocation of permits and licences for certain trades and businesses and also ownership of land in areas designated as "Malay Reservations". As these special rights are given with a religious qualification, a Malay who abandoned his religion would also lose his claim to these rights. In any case, the inclusion of this system of Malay special privileges in the constitution has thrust religious questions into the centre of political controversy, making a secular approach to politics almost impossible.

Once religion had been sanctioned as a federal and state matter, the federal government instituted a number of policies designed to promote Islam. Thus, all schools, including government-aided Christian mission schools, are required to provide compulsory Islamic religious education for Muslims if more than fifteen Muslims attend a school. This is certainly true, but things are not so simple as they appear, since the curriculum for Islamic religious knowledge
provided in these schools has been so designed as not to expose the students to ideas which might challenge the status quo. Besides this, Islamic religious knowledge is not taught to students in Form Six, that is, during the final two years of pre-university education, with the exception that Islamic History is offered as an optional subject to Muslims. Furthermore, students in the science stream as they go into the higher classes have to drop the subject altogether due to the demands of their major subjects. Most seriously of all, the Ministry of Education gradually dropped the teaching of the Jawi character as a school subject in primary schools in the later part of the 60s. This of course created a great problem among young Muslims in that they were cut off from the bulk of the religious literature which was still written in Jawi script. In addition, those who had not pursued extra religious classes in their spare time found it difficult to read the Qur'ān. At the same time, they were exposed via the media to various elements of more sensual culture imported wholesale from the West. As a result, religious consciousness and practices began to wane among the younger people.
reflected to a certain extent an ambiguity in the application of Islamic principles, contrary to what is claimed by Means. In this connection, the Board of Film Censors, while prohibiting public viewing of any films which might offend Muslims or run counter to Islamic teachings, especially regarding political ideologies like Communism and religious heterodoxy, still permitted sex and violence to be displayed on the screen. Further, in late 1966, there were protests concerning the impropriety of Malay girls participating in beauty contests. But these protests failed to find receptive ears in higher circles. For instance, the Prime Minister claimed that he failed to see anything in Islam that forbade the participation of Muslim girls in these contests.

Despite the fact that Islam has been proclaimed as the State Religion, in practice, the ruling government has only implemented certain aspects of the Shari‘ah, particularly those related to family matters. With regard to criminal law, the jurisdiction of the Shari‘ah Courts is very limited. It has jurisdiction only over persons professing the Muslim religion and in respect of offences only as conferred by Federal Law. In addition, the Shari‘ah Courts are not given the power when dealing with the hadd offence of zina', to impose the punishment fixed by the Qur'ān and
In this respect, the status of the Sharī'ah has not changed very much from what it used to be under the colonial administration. When Islam has been pushed into public view, it has always been more in the form of ceremonies or celebrations like the Maulid al-Nabī (the Prophet Muḥammad's birthday), the Isrā' and Mi'raǰ and the first of Muḥarram, which marks the start of the Hijri Calendar.

For the purpose of promoting Islam in the country, the federal government also set up a number of Islamic institutions. For example, the Masjid Negara (National Mosque) was officially opened in 1965. The complex itself was equipped with a lecture hall, classrooms and a library. Today, the mosque continues to play an active role in spreading knowledge through its religious classes, lectures, forums, seminars and publications. Soon after, in March 1966, a class for memorising the Qur'ān and learning the art of recitation was started at the Masjid Negara. On 17th October, 1968, a further step was taken to coordinate the administration of Islamic affairs by the establishment of the Majlis Kebangsaan Hal-Ehwal Agama Islam (National Council for Islamic Religious Affairs) by the Conference of Rulers. In August 1969, Lembaga Urusan dan Tabung Haji (LUTH or the Hajj Fund and Management Board), was set up to facilitate the...
pilgrimage to Mecca as well as to help the Muslims economically, that is, through savings and investments.\textsuperscript{75} Besides this, the federal government has promoted the conversion of non-Muslims to Islam through \textit{PERKIM (Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia)}\textsuperscript{76} or The Malaysian Muslim Welfare Organisation, which was founded by Tunku Abdul Rahman, the then Prime Minister of Malaya, in 1960.\textsuperscript{77} These policies are still current in Malaysia today. However, in reality, they do not make Malaysia, or even for that matter the former Malaya, an Islamic State for the simple reason that the \textit{Sharī'ah} has never been fully implemented and made the supreme law of the land.\textsuperscript{78} In fact, the ruling elites, within \textit{UMNO} and the rulers of the states, have not at any time expressed strong support for this.

c. Islam and Politics until the late '60s:

Although Islam had been part of Malay culture since its introduction into the Malay States, it only became a political issue of national importance after Malayan independence. More particularly, it came into the centre of the political arena after the \textit{Parti Islam Se Malaya} (PMIP or Pan-Malayan Islamic Party) started to pose a serious challenge to the ruling Alliance Party in 1959.\textsuperscript{79} However, it should be noted
that some of the early founders of the Islamic party emerged from a group that broke away from UMNO in the early 50s. This group was then joined by others from the radical nationalist and Islamic reformist elements in Malay nationalism.

Initially, PMIP did not start off as a political party. In the early 50s, it was merely a religious wing of UMNO known under the name of Parsatuan ʿUlama Se-Malaya (Pan-Malayan ʿUlāmāʾ Union). However, at a meeting held in Kuala Lumpur in August 1951, the union decided to establish an independent political party. This was based on the assumption that such a political party was necessary to bring about Islamic unity and the centralisation of Islamic affairs, which were deemed to be impossible within a secular-oriented party like UMNO. As a result, the PMIP was formally formed at a meeting in Butterworth, Penang in November 1951.

Despite this, the party was no more than an Islamic welfare organisation, without any clear political goal. It was only in early 1954 that the relaxed policy on membership was changed and PMIP members were prohibited from joining other political organisations. Incidentally, this move came about as a result of the growing influence of anti-UMNO forces.
within the party, including the ex-members of MNP and HAMIM. 87 The party was registered as a political party a day before the nomination day in the 1955 Federal election. 88 Following this, at a party conference of late December 1958, the name Persatuan Islam Se Malaya was amended to Persatuan Islam Se Tanah Melayu. But, the initials of the English version, that is, PMIP remained unchanged. Finally in 1971, it was amended to Parti Islam Se Malaysia (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party). 89 However, the party is better known by its acronym PAS.

As a party, PAS since its birth had been predominantly Malay and had the support of the deeply religious East Coast, that is, Kelantan and Trengganu, where education and customs have maintained a strongly Islamic character. It is also this area that has sent an increasingly large number of students to the Middle East. After the East Coast, the main areas in which support for PAS is fairly strong are the northern states of Kedah and Perlis and also Krian, a northern district of Perak, which have been famous for their Islamic religious education and a more religiously oriented way of life.
PAS and Other Political Parties:

To its political opponents within UMNO and the non-Malay parties like MCA, MIC, the defunct Socialist Front and People's Progressive Party (PPP), Democratic Action Party (DAP), and others, the PAS appears to be a party espousing intolerant Islamic communalism. This is attributed to the fact that it has been calling for the establishment of an Islamic State in which Malays will be caused "to adopt Islamic principles in the life of the individual, the society and the State".

PAS and Inter-party Rivalry:

As a party, PAS is both radical and conservative. However, it is far from being otherworldly. In fact, it calls in Islamic terms upon its followers to adopt an energetic and committed stance in this world. In terms of ideology, until the mid-70s it subscribed to both Islam and Malay nationalism. Nonetheless, for PAS Islam is an organic whole, involving not only a system of belief and dogmas, but also politics, economic, social values and et cetera. This is where it differs from UMNO, which condemns the mixture of religion and politics.
One of the main issues fought out between the UMNO and PAS concerned the close cooperation between the former and the non-Muslims within the Alliance and the administration. Another point of conflict between the two was the issue of the socio-economic development of Malaysia. This did not mean that PAS rejected material development altogether. Rather it stressed that development should be carried out in conformity with the teachings of Islam. In this connection, PAS criticized the use of lottery funds to build and maintain Muslim religious edifices on the ground that lotteries involved gambling and thus should not be used for religious purposes. It also opposed the sale of liquor and called for Friday to be made a weekend holiday for the whole of the Federation. Besides this, it successfully moved a resolution banning the serving of liquor at official functions.

With regard to economic policy, both parties focused primarily on the Malay economy. However, unlike UMNO, PAS proposed to uplift the Malays through a system based on Islamic principles, mid-way between capitalism and full state control. In line with this, it called for the nationalisation of all major industries, less reliance on foreign loans, the promotion of cooperative societies and the restriction
Further, it called upon the government to provide more social and economic services to the workers.

As far as foreign policy was concerned, PAS also differed a great deal from UMNO. UMNO was influenced above all by anti-communism and pro-Western sentiments, though it also showed concern for regional solidarity and towards the end of the 1960s toned down its anti-communist stance and made cautious overtures to the Afro-Asian bloc. On the other hand, PAS was strongly anti-colonial, advocated an active neutralism, and placed special emphasis on good relations with Islamic and neighbouring countries, particularly Indonesia. PAS, as an Islamic-based party, criticised the Alliance government for having recognised Israel. In a similar vein, it condemned the government for ignoring the plight of the Muslim minorities in Patani and the Philippines. Besides being pressured by PAS, UMNO was also facing some criticism from the 'ultras' within its own party, who wanted its policy to be more in tune with Islam. In some cases, this group seemed to express similar opinions to those championed by PAS.

In response to these pressures, the Alliance Government began to take organizational steps to prove
that it was for Islam. For example, in 1959, the UMNO organised an "Ulamâ' Section to influence religious elements within the party and others outside it.\textsuperscript{107} As pressure kept on mounting from within and without, the more Westernized central leadership of UMNO laid more stress on Islam in their political speeches to the Malays.\textsuperscript{108} Also in an effort to attract Muslim voters, UMNO poured more money into such projects as the building of mosques and surau, promoting Islamic education, a Musâbaqah Tilâwat al-Qur'ân (Qur'an reading Competition)\textsuperscript{109} at state, national and international levels, and the pilgrimage to Mecca.\textsuperscript{110} Religious teachers were also made primary targets of political indoctrination by the UMNO-dominated government in specially organised meetings and civic courses.\textsuperscript{111}

Although Islam as a political issue had already gained significance in Malaysian politics prior to the early 1970s, it was not the only issue being fought out among the political parties. Other issues like the threat of Communism \textsuperscript{112}, the economic imbalance between Malays and non-Malays, the backwardness of Malays in education, citizenship rights for non-Malays and the establishment of Malay as the national language for Malaysia had also occupied the mind of Malaysian politicians.
As for the language issue, the majority of the Malays wanted Bahasa Malaysia, which is based on the Malay language, to be established as the national language of the Federation as provided for in Article 152 of the Malaysian Constitution. Against the agreement that had been reached during the Merdeka negotiation, the majority of the Chinese wanted Mandarin, their written language, to be used liberally as the medium of expression in their schools and in official transactions. On the other hand, English educated elites of all races wanted English to continue as their common medium of communication even at official level. The then Prime Minister and the Minister of Education were reluctant to implement the Bahasa Malaysia policy. Eventually, with the excuse that parliamentary democracy had to be safeguarded and also that members of parliament and the judiciary were not fluent in Bahasa Malaysia, the Parliament tabled a bill allowing both English and Bahasa Malaysia to be used in Parliamentary and State Councils, while all secular courts were allowed to hold their proceedings in English. This did not pacify the anger of the Malay activists and their sympathizers. Aside from some sporadic protests against the Language Bill, nothing serious really happened till the eruption of May 1969.113
As usual, PAS sided with those who accused UMNO of being unduly compromising over language and education.\textsuperscript{114} Both issues were seen mainly in terms of their contribution to a national cultural identity, although there was also some stress on the importance of technical education and support for those campaigning for the Bahasa Malaysia and education as a means to uplift Malays economically.\textsuperscript{115}

d. Students and Issues of the 60s:

Like other Malaysians, university and college students of the 60s were never free from involvement in the socio-economic and religious issues of the time. In fact, the students themselves seemed to reflect the mood of Malaysian society at large. They were vigorously involved in campaigns for or against any of the issues, depending on the ideology or worldview that they subscribed to. Nonetheless, Islam was just a marginal issue, popular among a minority of Muslim students within the various campuses. The main body that espoused Islam among the Muslim students then was the Persatuan Kebangsaan Pelajar-pelajar Islam Malaysia (PKPIM or National Muslim Students' Association of Malaysia) founded in 1961.\textsuperscript{116}
Initially, PKPIM drew its membership from various teacher and agricultural training colleges and also from the Islamic College. Besides being involved in the national language issue, it was also concerned with broader social issues and displayed a distinctly reformist bent. In this connection, at the Muslim Students' Congress held in 1966, it called for the establishment of an Islamic University in Malaysia. The following year, it was involved in a Seminar on Islamic Civilization where the concept of the Islamic University was discussed. Beginning in 1968, it launched a programme known as Gerakan Kempen Kesedaran (The Consciousness Raising Campaign), whose intention was to draw the attention of rural Malays to broader issues relating to health, economic and political problems, with the dual aims of promoting Malay development and instilling a true spirit of Islam.

However, for some of the student leaders, especially in the University of Malaya, socialism seemed to be the panacea for all Malaysian socio-economic problems. In general, the Malay youths of the 60s were fascinated by a popular culture which was largely imported from the West, and to a lesser extent influenced by Hindustani-Indonesian cultural imports.
e. Ethnic Rivalry and Change:

Under this sub-heading, we shall be looking briefly at the situation which led to the eruption of the racial riots of May 1969, commonly known as the May 13th Incident, and the changes that it brought about in the following years. As we have already observed, the independence of Malaya had been attained in 1957 through the 'bargaining process' worked out between the components of the Alliance, namely the UMNO, MCA and MIC. Later, when Malaysia was formed in 1963, joining together the territories of Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore with the Federation of Malaya, the compromise agreed upon by the major races of the Federation, that is, the Malays, Chinese and Indians initially seemed to be left undisturbed. Of course, since independence several political parties representing non-Malay interests like the Chinese-dominated Socialist Front, the People's Progressive Party (PPP) and United Democratic Party (UDP) had been championing the interests of the non-Malays, especially the Chinese, in politics, economic and education as well as language, as opposed to the Alliance's policy of safeguarding the Malay rights enshrined in the nation's constitution. However, the threat which these parties posed to the Alliance and
the Malay community in general had not been really serious.

The situation began to change with the entry of Singapore into Malaysia. A more bitter rivalry between the Malays and the Chinese in particular began to take shape in 1964, when the Chinese-dominated *Peoples Action Party* (PAP) headed by Lee Kuan Yew, the ambitious Premier of Singapore, led an onslaught on Malay rights within the context of a multi-racial Malaysia. As a means to diffuse the racial tension which had developed, Tunku Abdul Rahman firmly decided to expel Singapore from the federation. As a result, Singapore unceremoniously left Malaysia in August 1965. This, however, did not reduce the intensity of communal politics in West Malaysia. Eventually, the volatile inter-ethnic rivalry erupted into the tragic May 13th Incident of 1969.

Many reasons have been given for the outbreak of the tragedy. However, one could say that it was mainly because of the mutual frustrations and the threat felt by the Malays and the non-Malays alike in the years after independence, especially during the 60s, that led to open clashes particularly between the Malays and the Chinese. The suspicions that existed over the years among the members of these
respective communities as a result of their past political experiences were further ignited by the fact that political campaigns during the 1969 National Election had been unrestrictedly communal in content.\textsuperscript{130}

Tragic as it may have been the incident has become a watershed in Malaysian history. It has ushered in a new era, that is, an era of great changes. In order to restore law and order, the Malaysian Government immediately proclaimed a State of Emergency, whereby parliamentary democracy and the Constitution were temporarily suspended. The whole country was then placed under the rule of the Majlis Gerakan Negara (Mageran or the National Operations Council) headed by the late Tun Abdul Razak, the Deputy Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{131} This council ruled by decree. As for the Tunku, with the establishment of the Mageran, he gradually drifted away from the centre stage and left political decisions largely in the hands of others.\textsuperscript{132}

Under the Mageran administration, government leaders, particularly Malay leaders, reassessed the direction of Malaysia's political development and began to introduce several important changes. Briefly, UMNO leaders acted to entrench their own political position, partly by reorganizing and revitalizing
UMNO, by attempting to correct previous shortcomings in government assistance to Malays in the fields of education and economics, and partly by using ideology and para-military organisations to mobilise the masses and also by drawing former opposition parties into an UMNO-controlled grand Alliance, known as the Barisan Nasional (BN or National Front). Further, several restrictions were introduced, particularly, regarding the 'sensitive issues', as a measure to avoid a future recurrence of racial conflict.

In order to ensure that their base in the Malay community remained firm, UMNO leaders shifted the Malaysian political system more decidedly in a Malay-oriented direction, though at the same time care was taken not to disregard important non-Malay rights.

As we shall see, this government response to 13 May had several implications for the Islamic revival of the following decades. To safeguard their own and UMNO's position within the Malay community, government leaders adopted a number of policies which placed greater stress on Islam. In this connection, steps were taken to expand the religious bureaucracy under the Prime Minister's Department as a means to promote more Islamic programmes at the federal level. Besides this, the government also expanded the
opportunities for Malays to pursue tertiary education after 1969. The majority of these new students came from rural areas, and often had a stronger Islamic background, thus helping to boost the growth of Islamic societies within the various campuses. The inclusion of PAS in the coalition government in 1973 also led in a way to the strengthening of the government's commitment to Islam.

With regard to the Malays, the incident rudely shocked them out of their 'deep slumber'. Almost overnight, most of them, especially the young, 'returned to Islam', not as lip-service, but with a new sense of commitment, very much in contrast to the life of complacency that they used to lead. With a new spirit and a newly found confidence, they accepted the challenges of the business world, and also rushed for the opportunities that a tertiary education and the technical and professional careers had to offer on a very much greater scale than ever before.

Apart from the internal changes that we have described above, the Muslim Malays of the late 60s were also influenced by a number of international events, especially those occurring in the Middle East and South-East Asia. However, further developments in
modern post-independence Malaysia will be dealt with in more detail in the following chapters.

Notes:


2 Ryan, op. cit., p. 248; Gullick and Gale, op. cit., p. 98.


4 A. S. Musa, Ibid., p. 2.


6 Ryan, op. cit.,


8 Gullick and Gale, op. cit.; Ryan, op. cit., pp. 248 - 249.


10 Gullick and Gale, op. cit., p. 99.

11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.


17 Ahmad Ibrahim, op. cit., p. 53.

18 Pengarang Panji, op. cit., p. 15.

19 Ahmad Ibrahim, op. cit., p. 49.

20 Ibid.


22 Ahmad Ibrahim, op. cit., p. 51; M. Suffian Hashim, Intisari, op. cit.

23 Ahmad Ibrahim, op. cit.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.


29 Ahmad Ibrahim, op. cit., pp. 51 - 52.


31 Ahmad Ibrahim, op. cit., p. 52.
Ibid.

Ibid., p. 50; Tun M. Suffian, *An Introduction*, p. 245.

Ahmad Ibrahim, *op. cit.*


Ahmad Ibrahim, *op. cit.*

Ibid., p. 59.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ahmad Ibrahim, *op. cit.*

Ibid., p. 59.


Ahmad Ibrahim, *op. cit.*


Ahmad Ibrahim, *op. cit.,* p. 65.


Ahmad Ibrahim, *op. cit.*

The Conference of Rulers was first instituted in 1948 by the Federation of Malaya Agreement. See Tun M. Suffian, *An Introduction*, p. 45.
Malay special rights based on their status as the Bumiputra had been legally recognised by the Colonial government, but the term Bumiputra has only become current since Malaya attained her independence. This protective policy had been developed during the colonial era on account of Malay backwardness in economic and educational fields as compared to the non-Malays. The rationale was that without such a policy, the Malays would have been deprived of their rights as the original inhabitants of the Malay States in the face of the more aggressive approach of the non-Malay immigrants, namely the Chinese and the Indians, in both the economic and the educational spheres.

Although Islamic brotherhood and equality are stressed, feudalism and racial chauvinism are subjects which have never been discussed.

Mohamed Jusoh, 'Pelajaran Ugama di Sekolah Menengah', MASA, Jurnal Pusat Penyelidikan Islam Malaysia, Bil. 1, Tahun 1, Pusat Penyelidikan Islam Malaysia, Jabatan Perdana Menteri (Bahagian Ugama), 1978, p. 131.

Surprisingly, this had never happened during the Colonial era.

Without the knowledge of Jawi, these people found it impossible to read and memorise the collection of prayers (ad'iyah) given in the religious manuals. This will affect their religious and also social standing within the Muslim community.

However, those in Kelantan, Trengganu and Johore were better off in that they were able to join various religious classes in the nearby madrasahs, sekolah agama or pondoks, particularly in the afternoon or during the weekend. In other states, only the lucky ones, that is, if their kampong happened to be within the vicinity of a madrasah or the home of a religious teacher, could still enrol in extra religious classes. But for the majority, they were deprived of this opportunity, thus missing the essential part of
religious training that would make them better practising Muslims throughout their lives. This was the time when pop music, Western dancing and mini skirts had affected the young.


66 From mid-sixties till the early seventies, foreign films classified as 'adult films' had been screened until a public uproar put a stop to it. At present, government owned T.V. Malaysia screens American television series, which depict sex and double-dealing within the business world, such as 'Dallas' and 'Falcon Crest'. At the same time, violence under the guise of 'arts' is being shown with very minimal censorship.


68 Ahmad Ibrahim, op. cit., p. 59.

69 Ibid.

71 The Malaysian Islamic Centre, a handbook jointly published by Islamic Affairs Division, Prime Minister's Department and Utusan Melayu (Malaysia) Bhd., Kuala Lumpur, 1985, p. 11.


73 The Malaysian Islamic Centre, Ibid.

74 Tun M. Suffian, An Introduction, p. 246.


76 Originally, it was known as Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaya.
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78 For one view of the characteristics of an Islamic State, see S. Abul A'la Maududi, Islamic Law and Constitution, 8th Edit., Islamic Publications Ltd., Lahore, 1983, pp. 201 - 252.


81 The union was formed at a meeting sponsored by UMNO.


83 Ibid.; Funston, Malay Politics in Malaysia, p. 93.


85 Funston, Malay Politics in Malaysia, p. 94; Y. M. Marican, op. cit.

86 Y. M. Marican, Ibid., p. 298.

87 Safie Ibrahim, op. cit., p. 62; Funston, Malay Politics in Malaysia, p. 95.


89 Safie Ibrahim, op. cit., p. 63.

90 Von Der Mehden, op. cit., p. 510.

91 Ibid. Quoted from Malaya, Radio Malaya Press Statement, Director of Information, 7/59/181.


PAS' ideas on Islam have been influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, the Jama'at-e Islami of Pakistan and also the Masjumi (now defunct), the Islamic party of Indonesia. See Safie Ibrahim, op. cit., p. 76.

Van Der Mehden, op. cit., p. 611.

K. J. Ratnam, 'Religion and Politics', p. 357.

Van Der Mehden, op. cit., p. 614.

UMNO refused to accept PAS' proposal that Friday be made a holiday as this in its views would be uneconomical since the international market operates on that day. See Ibid., p. 613.

Funston, Malay Politics in Malaysia, p. 148.

Ibid., p. 153.

Ibid., pp. 150 - 154.

Ibid., p. 151.


Funston, Malay Politics in Malaysia, p. 157.


Thus, resolutions to the UMNO General Assembly in 1964 urged that steps be taken toward making khalwat (close proximity between unmarried couple) an offence under civil law, and in increasing the number of officials responsible for enforcing Islamic moral laws (Pegawai-pegawai Pencegah Maksiat or Moral Enforcement Officers) and banning indecent films, literature, dances and beauty contests. op. cit., p. 147.

Von Der Mehden, op. cit., p. 613; Means, 'The Role of Islam', p. 279.

Von Der Mehden, op. cit.


Von Der Mehden, op. cit., p. 609.

Since the beginning, Communism in Malaya had been a predominantly Chinese movement. It was finally defeated in 1960, after a bloody struggle of twelve years. However, the remnants of the Communists are still operating in the jungle areas bordering Thailand. It is due to half-hearted cooperation of the Thai authorities and the lawlessness prevalent in the southern part of the country that the Communists manage to survive to the present day.


Funston, op. cit., p. 156.

Ibid.


Nagata, Ibid.


Ibid.

Nagata, op. cit., p. 60.

These student leaders were influenced by the ideas of socialist-oriented academics, prominent among whom was Dr. (now Professor) Syed Husin Ali, the then committee member of Partai Sosialis Rakyat Malaysia (PSRM or Socialist Peoples' Party of Malaysia).

Among the urban youth, it became sort of a passing fad to emulate Western film stars and singers as well as their Hindustani and Indonesian counterparts. This trend was encouraged with the help of the local film industry and the entertainment magazines which in most cases popularised such cultural imports.
This party was formed in 1962 when the breakaway members of the MCA led by Dr. Lim Chong Eu wanted a new political platform to face the Alliance. It remained a Penang-based party until its dissolution in 1968.


Prior to his departure from Malaysia, Lee Kuan Yew was already moving towards becoming the great hero of the Chinese and overall leader of the opposition to the discomposure of UMNO and even its Chinese ally, the MCA. In fact, he had bluntly said that he was ready to oust the MCA as the representative of the Chinese in Malaysia.

After the 1969 Malaysian Parliamentary Election, racial clashes had broken out in Kuala Lumpur and the surrounding areas in Selangor following the rowdy 'victory parade' staged by members of the opposition parties, predominantly Chinese, who hurled abuse and insults at the Malays. Consequently, parliamentary rule was suspended till some two years later. See Stanley S. Bedlington, *Malaysia and Singapore*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978, pp. 146 - 147.

The Malays were indeed made to believe by their leaders that Malaysia had been formed to salvage their future. But soon, they felt themselves to be overwhelmed by the presence of non-Malays, especially the Chinese, who conspicuously began to be more vocal with the entry of Singapore into Malaysia. To this fear was added the frustration which the Malays in general felt on seeing that a majority of them were still backward in education and economic fields even after more than ten years of independence. This certainly was no exaggeration then as most of the Malays were still agriculturists living in the rural areas, with very little share in business, technical and professional fields, while those who migrated to big towns ended up mostly as labourers, drivers or even unemployed, living in makeshift squatter's homes with very minimal amenities.
The Chinese community generally felt that they ought to have a bigger say in the country's politics, while maintaining their economic supremacy. As an expression of this, the urban-based Chinese supported the more chauvinistic political parties in opposing the Alliance. By doing so, they in fact challenged the long-accepted 'political contract' or 'bargain' of Malay political dominance in the federation. Thus, the clash was inevitable.


The Mageran had ten members altogether, made up of leading political figures and members of the civil service and security forces. See Funston, *Ibid.*, p. 212.

As a result of the May 13th Incident, the Tunku was discredited as the leader of the Malays. He was condemned as being too pro-Chinese in a number of open letters (including that of Dr. Mahathir Mohamad) and made the chief target of tertiary students' agitation in July, August and early September 1969. See Milne and Mauzy, *op. cit.*, pp. 86 - 89 and Funston, *op. cit.*, pp. 223 - 224.


CHAPTER 3
Islam in the Seventies and Eighties:
The Winds of Change.

In this chapter, we shall focus our discussion mainly on the development of Islam in Malaysia since the 70s. In this connection, we shall study the various trends which have emerged within Malaysian society and which up to the present have been associated in one way or another with the rising tide of Islam. Before dealing with the subject-matter, however, we shall consider the general changes that have taken place in Malaysia since May 1969. This is necessary as these changes have had some influence on the developments of the following decades.

a. Post-1969 Malaysia:

Following the racial riots of 1969, the Malaysian authorities initiated a number of measures to restore peace and stability within the country. In this context, while emphasizing that it would act without discrimination on behalf of all races, it also took care to appoint non-Malays to various government bodies, including the Capital Investment Committee. Besides this, it set up a National Goodwill Committee, which was soon broadened to include committees at
state, district and area levels. The general functions of these committees were to foster goodwill among the communities and to solve any problems that might hinder this. At the same time, the Department of National Unity was established with the main function of drawing up a Rukunegara (that is, a National Ideology). This rukunegara was officially proclaimed on 31st August, 1970. It was not intended to be included in the Constitution, but was to "guide Malaysians of all races in their everyday affairs in a conscious effort to bring about a single united and strong Malaysian nation". (See Appendix A).

In January 1970, the government set up the National Consultative Council (NCC), whose members were drawn from various political parties (excluding the DAP since it nominated an official still under detention and the PSRM which abstained in protest against the arrest of two state assemblymen), professional groups, trade unions and religious bodies. With this council as a platform, issues which were considered communally sensitive were discussed in camera and recommendations were made on how to handle them as a means of avoiding the recurrence of violence. Despite the fact that the proceedings of this council were confidential, free discussion of all issues was permitted. Before this, the government
also demonstrated its communal impartiality by taking stern action in mid-July 1969 against Malays opposing the Tunku and calling for a more Malay-oriented government. In the same vein, it temporarily launched a major anti-corruption drive in March 1970, resulting in the removal of the Malay Menteri Besars of Perak and Trengganu from their posts and disciplinary action against several public servants. While all these efforts were being made, the government began to take serious action to redress the economic and educational problems of the Malays also.

To correct the economic imbalance that prevailed among the Malays, the government introduced the Dasar Ekonomi Baru (DEB or New Economic Policy), which had as its prime objectives the eradication of poverty regardless of race and the increasing of Malay participation in modern sectors of the economy. This two-pronged approach was most clearly enunciated in the Second Malaysia Plan (1971 - 1975), and has continued in subsequent plans to the present day. By means of this policy, it is hoped that by the year 1990 the Bumiputra will have achieved a 30% equity in the modern corporate sector of an open market economy traditionally dominated by the Chinese and foreign concerns.
Simultaneously, several measures were enacted by the government to help in the uplifting of the Bumiputra, ranging from loans and training and investment projects for aspiring businessmen, to employment quotas within the civil service, commerce, industry and enrolment quotas for universities. By 1975, through a generous programme of allowances and scholarships, Malay university enrolment had reached 57.2% of the whole, and by 1978 - 1979, a new Malay enrolments (for all five universities) had reached 66.4%. At the same time, there has been a concerted effort to redirect Malays from the arts and social sciences to the natural sciences.

Besides this, educational strategies since the early 70s have also involved sending a growing number of Bumiputra students abroad, that is, to Britain, Australia, North America, India and many countries in the Middle East. Since then, many have returned to occupy a variety of government and university posts. However, while overseas, some of these students have acquired Islamic values and an Islamic way of life through reading and contact with other Muslim students and emigres, notably from Pakistan, Egypt, Libya and Saudi Arabia. Such organisations as the Federation of the Students' Islamic Societies of United Kingdom and Eire (FOSIS), the Muslim Students' Association of
America (MSA) and the Australian Federation of Muslim Students Associations (AFMSA) have been equally responsible for inculcating a sense of Islamic consciousness among the Muslim students studying at various universities and colleges in the respective host countries. In addition, the students concerned have had the opportunity to study Islam with the help of a few Muslim graduates, who had gone to study in the West after having completed their studies at Middle Eastern universities. Consequently, these people have raised serious doubts concerning the Western value system and these misgivings have undoubtedly been reinforced by the economic and political successes achieved by some Middle Eastern countries, and the resurgence of the Muslim world in general. Perhaps also, some of these students have opted for an Islamic way of life "as an apparent reaction to the garishness and permissiveness of a Western environment". Hence, instead of being imbued with Western cultures, they now return with renewed commitment to Islam, which to some of them even means the adoption of the *gallâbiyyah*, *jîlbâb* and the like.

Meanwhile, in order to curb any opposition to the rapid expansion of Malay special rights and privileges, the government took special care to define the whole question pertaining to these matters as a
"sensitive issue" within the Rukunegara. 19 Further, under the provisions of the new constitutional amendments and the Sedition Ordinance of 1970, public criticism of all such policies was prohibited. 20

In another move to reduce political dissension, UMNO leaders, then under the leadership of Tun Abdul Razak, began to negotiate with opposition parties for the formation of a coalition government, whereby these parties would retain autonomous structures and gain limited access to informal political bargaining structures in return for accepting restrictions on their public pronouncements and mobilization activities. 21 By the end of 1972, most opposition parties, including PAS, had agreed to the coalition form of government. In Peninsular Malaysia, only the DAP, the extremist Chinese party, was denied access to the broadened Alliance system. 22 Hence, the established Barisan Nasional (BN or National Front), as the coalition is known, came to dominate the Malaysian political scene in place of the Alliance Party. Through this arrangement political stability was restored, though the realities of communal politics had forced parliament to surrender most of its powers and functions to extra-legal and informal political institutions. 23
b. The Barisan Nasional: Cooperation and Dissension.

The establishment of the BN had brought about the strengthening of Malay nationalism as UMNO and PAS were united. Simultaneously, Kelantan, which had been under PAS since 1959 Parliamentary Election, was reintegrated into the mainstream of the country. On joining the coalition, Dato' Muhammad Asri, the then PAS President, had to drop his insistence on any rapid implementation of an Islamic socio-political order. However, the coalition with UMNO, which PAS had before denounced as the betrayer of Islamic principles, placed considerable strain on the rank and file of the party and even caused the resignation or expulsion of some of its leading members.

Besides facing internal problems, PAS also had to face the attempts made by UMNO to break its hold upon Kelantan. The opportunity to wrest the state from the PAS came as a result of a leadership crisis which developed openly within the party at state level towards the end of 1977. It is interesting to note that the whole episode which later led to the crisis had its beginnings in the appointment of the Menteri Besar (Chief Minister) of the state back in 1974, that is, just after PAS had joined the BN. In this connection, Tun Abdul Razak, the then Prime Minister,
in his capacity as the head of the coalition government, had insisted on appointing Dato' Muhammad Nasir, a PAS man of his own choice as the Menteri Besar rather than accepting the man suggested by PAS. This Menteri Besar was by no means a charismatic leader. Rather he was widely respected by the people for his integrity and amiable character. On the other hand, he was strongly opposed by the PAS state assembly members as he was more conciliatory towards UMNO's interests and also threatened to jeopardise their political careers by exposing land deals made by the previous PAS administration. In response to his stand, they campaigned vehemently for his removal as Menteri Besar.

At this point, it should be noted that PAS in comparison to UMNO has been a party of limited financial resources. Moreover, by sticking to its own policy, it has deprived itself of any federal grant. To overcome its financial straits, the PAS administration decided to mortgage part of the state's land to the Timber Mine Company of Singapore as well as to effect other business transactions.

Eventually, the crisis reached a peak when the 20 PAS state assemblymen carried a vote of no confidence against the Menteri Besar. In response to this
development, UMNO came out in support of Nasir by opposing a rival group known locally as 'Kumpulan 20' (The gang of 20).

Through well-planned political manoeuvres, the manipulation of the mass-media and UMNO-supported anti-PAS demonstrations, a state of emergency was created, thus giving the Barisan government the pretext to take over Kelantan. UMNO also gave its blessing to Nasir when he and his supporters founded a new Islamic party, the Barisan Jamaah Islam Se Malaysia (Berjasa) and even promised to consider his application to join the BN. By 13 November, 1977, PAS was officially expelled from the Front. Subsequently, while its opponent, PAS was in disarray, UMNO held a snap election in March 1978.

In the new cabinet that followed, Dato' Muhammad Nasir was given the post of Minister to the Prime Minister's Department, with the special function of looking after Islamic affairs at national level.

c. The Islamic Revival in Malaysia:

Meanwhile, during the period when the relationship between PAS and UMNO seemed to be cordial, another development was taking place within the Muslim
community of Malaysia. By the mid-seventies, this change had become perceptibly widespread, especially among the youth and intellectuals in a number of urban centres. This phenomenon has come to be known as the revival of Islam (Kebangkitan Semula Islam). Usually, it is associated by scholars and writers with the activities of the various da'wah movements (gerakan dakwah).

Literally, the term dakwah, as used in modern Bahasa Malaysia, originates from the Arabic da'wah, which has its root in the word da'ā or yadā (to call or invite). In its fullest sense, it means to call or invite others (mankind) to Islam which is in itself an act incumbent upon all the Muslims. Historically, da'wah in its generic sense has been associated with a wide range of expressions and meanings from an almost unspoken, but implicitly accepted duty, to identification with specific political causes. As far as Malaysia was concerned, prior to the 60s, da'wah as a term was little known or used, except by 'ulamā' familiar with religious vocabulary. Further, it drew little public attention and stirred no controversy. But today in contrast, even when used in its original meaning, da'wah has the power to stir many more and stronger emotions, and its use is commonly associated with some value-laden message of
approval or disapproval. To label another individual as "da'wah" is to register a judgement, positive or negative, of both the individual concerned and of the orientation in general. In some instances, da'wah in Malaysia is associated with organisational activities of certain religious movements or bodies, which for many Malaysians have become the epitome and totality of what da'wah is all about. In this connection, three organisations are usually referred to: ABIM (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia or Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia); Darul Arqam (House of Arqam), named after Arqam bin Abi Arqam, a companion of the Prophet (s. a. w.); and Jama'at Tabligh.

In addition, da'wah as commonly understood in Malaysia, is linked with the individual, that is, to say whether a person is affiliated or sympathetic towards a certain religious organisation or not. Thus, in terms of da'wah, a person is said to be "an ABIM supporter"; "a member of Darul Arqam" or "a Tabligh sympathizer". Apart from this, a person is bound to be dubbed 'da'wah', if he or she exhibits types of behaviour now generally identified with the popular images of da'wah. For example, if a person appears in turban, jubbah and sandals, while at the same time wearing a long beard, he is quick to be labelled "a Tabligh man".
Nonetheless, da'wah as a missionary or propagatory activity is nothing really new in Malaysia. It was the means through which the Malays were converted to Islam in early Malacca and for that matter in other parts of the peninsula.

In the early sixties, there were already freelance missionaries operating among the Muslim population of Malaya. Most of these people were the products of local madrasahs or pondoks, while some had had their training at al-Azhar or other religious centres abroad. With enthusiasm, they began to espouse Islam and urged the Malays to uphold the teachings of the Qur'ān and hadith. In this context, they not only worked for the purification of Islam from superstitions but also for a total liberation of the Muslim Malays from an unislamic "mental bondage". Receiving neither salary nor other monetary rewards from the society they served, these preachers regularly organised kuliah subuh (early morning lectures, that is, after the dawn prayer) and kuliah maghrib (lectures after the early night prayer) and even held weekend classes. Some of them were also active in institutions of higher learning where they delivered talks on the principles of Islam and their practicality in modern times. Among this category of duʿāt were also included those who operated through
Islamic organisations like al-Rahmāniyyah, based in Kuala Lumpur, and Jama'at Tablīgh.

Beginning from 1960, PERKIM too started to propagate Islam among non-Malays. At the same time, such activities such as the annual Qur'ān reading competition, the celebration of Maulid al-Nabī and the broadcasting of religious programmes have not only helped to create an atmosphere conducive to the growth of da'wah activities, but also have made the whole country conscious of the living role of Islam.

However, what is regarded as new, in the sense a change, is that da'wah activities have developed on a large scale and have attracted more and more of the Malay youth and intellectuals, even those who decades ago used to idolise Western and Hindustani film stars as well as entertainers like Elvis Presley and the Beatles, John Wayne, Marilyn Monroe, Dev Anand, Shashi Kapoor and the like. Furthermore, the da'wah of the seventies has also brought about a change in the mode of dress, in that women have turned to more modest forms of dress, such as the mini-telekung, worn over baju kurung, that is a conventional Malay dress, while a minority has chosen to wear gloves, jubbah and purdah. Equally, some men have taken to the green or white jubbah and turbans, accompanied by skull-caps as
a manifestation of the Sunnah of the Prophet (s. a. w.). Mosque attendance has been on the increase, especially among the young.⁵¹ Besides this, there is the proliferation of public religious lectures and conferences while events of religious significance are announced and better-attended than ever before.⁵² Islamic moral conduct pertaining to the relationship between members of the opposite sex is strictly adhered to in public meetings, particularly those organised by da’wah activists or sympathizers, much to the annoyance of the secularists. Of late, it has become quite frequent for one to hear Quranic recitals or nasyid (religious song) or even religious talks being played over the tape-recorders of passing vehicles instead of the usual 'pop' songs. In keeping with the Islamic dietary rules, those involved in da’wah are becoming more fastidious about food and this has also influenced some members of the public who have come under their sway.⁵³ Accordingly, they reject any food prepared by non-Malays which they consider to be ritually unclean.⁵⁴ Consequently, since the mid-70s, this development has led to the rise of Muslim food producers (including some converts), particularly in producing foodstuffs of Chinese origin such as beancurd, soy sauce, mee (noodles) and the like.
Frequently, da'wah in its contemporary form focusses primarily upon the existing Muslim population, turning inward to inspire a renewal of commitment to Islam among flagging followers. There are also attempts to transcend traditional modes of religious teachings, which in Malaysia consist largely of rote learning and verbal recitations of the Qur'ān, without really trying to understand its whole meaning. In this instance, more and more young Muslims (Malays and non-Malays) are learning Arabic either through formal means or by attending classes during the weekend. Lately, some of the more ambitious working individuals have even taken up diploma courses in Islamic studies offered over a period of three years by the Islamic Faculty, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. Also of significance is that, contrary to the old ways, more and more questions are now being asked and answers are in turn provided, within the usrah (study circle) and other forms of da'wah gatherings. This could be explained by the fact that most of the da'wah followers are drawn from the ranks of urban, educated middle class youth.

As a result of the da'wah activities, there has arisen a conflict between Islam and Malay adat. Like the Kaum Muda of the early Twentieth Century, da'wah
supporters have condemned unislamic practices such as the traditional Malay marriage ceremonies, the use of bomohs (folk curers) and the performance of the wayang kulit (shadow-puppet play) with its Hindu themes. This development often leads to conflict with other members of the Muslim community.

Besides this, the rise of Islamic consciousness has led to the growth of Islamic publications, thus exposing Muslim readers to various works of local as well as foreign origin. As a logical extension to this development, the Muslim youth are more exposed to the sirah of the Prophet (s. a. w.), the lives of the sahābah, ʿulamāʾ and mujaddidūn (religious reformers) than ever before. Perhaps as part of this change also, we now see more Muslims returning to traditional Arabo-Muslim names such as ʿAbdul Rahmān, Fāṭimah and Jamāluddin rather than choosing more fanciful names for their newly-born babies.

As in the rest of the Muslim world, daʿwah in Malaysia lays emphasis on Din (Islam as a comprehensive way of life), jihād (striving in the cause of Allah to establish the truth), criticism of the unislamic elements in the realm of adat and Western values, and the need to carry out tajdid (renewal of faith) and islāh (reform). Contrary to
popular belief, ardent Muslim activists flourish better among those who lead a relatively secure life. Among those who turn eagerly to Islam are doctors, engineers, university and college lecturers, teachers and civil servants. In their deep love for Islam, they even reject the ideas of those reformists like Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muḥammad ʿAbduh, Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, Abul Kalām Āzād and so forth, who are looked upon as Muslim apologists because of their compromising attitude towards Western civilization.

In short, these fundamentalists, once they have chosen to fashion themselves into committed Muslims, begin to interpret the world around them in accordance with their newly cherished value preference. As a generation imbued with Islamic ideals, they work virtually round the clock towards the Islamisation of the Malaysian society.

d. Daʿwah Movements:

The most significance manifestation of current Islamic revivalism in Malaysia is the emergence of various daʿwah movements. Most of these movements date from the late 60s and early 70s. However, in our subsequent discussion, we shall devote our attention only to the most important of these movements, namely
ABIM, Darul Arqam and Jama'at Tabligh. Each of these movements is voluntary, having a core of dedicated members, with an indefinite number of sympathizers who occasionally attend lectures and other activities and may influence their kinsmen and friends to do likewise.

i. Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia:

The first idea of forming ABIM was formulated in August 1969, that is, during the annual General Meeting of the PKPIM. This movement was then launched in July 1970. Subsequently, after some delay due to bureaucratic problems, it was registered under the Societies Act in 1972. Among its founder members were included both religiously and secularly educated young Muslims, who had been trained as Islamic workers in universities and colleges at home and abroad. ABIM, as its protagonists put it, was established as a necessary solution to the greatly-felt vacuum in Islamic activities on a nation-wide level; to generate an Islamic movement as the path to Islamic revival in Malaysia; to implement ‘amal jama‘i (collective responsibility in fulfilling religious duties) and to carry out da‘wah so that mankind will sincerely submit to the will of Allah in every aspect of their life.
ABIM states its additional objectives as:

- to uphold and strive for the realization of Islamic objectives in line with the teachings of al-Qur'an and as-Sunnah.
- to progressively carry out Islamic da'wah to all people.
- to unite and harness the potential forces of the Muslim youth of Malaysia at international level.
- to carry out other beneficial activities which are not against the teachings of al-Qur'an and as-Sunnah.

Since its establishment, ABIM has undertaken to present Islam as al-Din, which encompasses all aspects of life necessary for the realization of Man as the Khalifah (Vicegerent) of Allah on this earth and for his salvation in this world and in the Hereafter. For this purpose, it strives towards building a society based on the principle of Islam. This approach is entirely new to the Malaysian scene in a way that many people, including those in power, find most disturbing.

ii. Leadership and Membership:

Till now, ABIM has been able to draw on the support of the young and 'youthful people'. However, its membership involve a cross-section of Malaysian society, ranging from academics and professionals to peasants, workers and trishaw-pullers. By 1986, it
had acquired 41,000 members and several thousands of sympathizers. At the beginning, it won adherents mostly from the educated class, whether in Malay or English. Over the years, as its da'wah programme has spread, many Arabic and religious-educated individuals have also joined the organisation, thus toning down its image of being a society dominated by the English and Malay-educated group.

Significantly, many educated Muslim women chose to join ABIM as in it they saw a chance to play active roles in society. This is, however, not the case with the Darul Arqam or Jama'at Tabligh and even PAS, which prefer to give very limited opportunities to their own women. Currently, more than 60% of ABIM's women members are professionals. As members of the movement, they work actively in tandem with their male counterparts, within Hal Ehwal Wanita, ABIM (HELWA or ABIM's Women Bureau). In this connection, with a slight different of emphasis in their roles as women, they have organised seminars and lectures and also helped to run kindergartens and the like. By the 80s, ABIM's branches were firmly established at state and district levels throughout Malaysia.

From the beginning, ABIM was led by both secularly and religiously educated Muslim intellect-
uals and professionals. Most of the thirteen original leaders of ABIM, including Anwar Ibrahim, its most famous President from 1974 - 1982, were born in the mid-1940s. Given the structure of the educational system during their childhood, most of these leaders had primary schooling in Malay, followed by a transfer to an English-medium secondary school in a larger urban centre. Later, all of them had some kind of tertiary education, either in a university, polytechnic, or training college. Some of them, that is, six of the original office holders, were trained in religious institutions of higher learning, such as the Islamic College in Malaysia or al-Azhar. More recently, an increasing number of ABIM leaders and lecturers have been graduates of the Islamic Studies Faculty of Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM or National University of Malaysia). Apart from this, certain individuals with madrasah and pondok backgrounds have also joined the movement. In common with Anwar, all of these leaders were active in various student organisations at home and overseas prior to their appointment in ABIM.

Many of these leaders, especially those from overseas, have been accused by their detractors of being lacking in religious experience and learning. As part of the programme to improve their education
and experience, ABIM has secured the services of some already established and respected scholars like Syed Muhammad Naguib al-Attas, Deliar Noer, an Indonesian with a Cornell Ph. D. and till recently teaching in Australia, the late Prof. Ismā‘īl Rāgī al-Fārūqī of Temple University, Prof. Khurshid Ahmad, a prominent Islamic scholar and economist from Pakistan, and the like. With their wide experience and scholarship, these scholars have been able to expose what they perceived as the fallacies of Westernism and at the same time to spread the message of international da‘wah among the exponents of ABIM. In addition, a deeper understanding of Islam is also disseminated through usrah, fardu ‘ain classes and so forth, conducted through the efforts of religiously educated members.

Anwar Ibrahim was initially ABIM’s public relations officer, serving under the movement's first president, Ustaz Razali Nawawi, now dean of the law faculty of International Islamic University. Later, he rose to the post of ABIM’s Secretary General and was finally its President till his resignation to join UMNO in March 1982. Before the formation of ABIM, he was active as the president of both the Malay Language Society at the University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, and PKPIM. More than anything else, Anwar has been
acclaimed by some observers as a charismatic leader. Indeed, he is. However, it is not his charisma alone that attracted the Muslim youth to join ABIM and induced the religious educated group to stay with the movement. Rather, as a prominent ABIM activist put it, "ABIM’s popularity stemmed largely from the movement’s basic philosophy that Islam was a din, a way of life". The phrase "Islam as a way of life" revealed the enormous potential that lay hidden in the religion, as it implies that Islam is more than prayers, fasting, hajj and zakat. Simultaneously, it presents Islam as being a living religion that addresses itself to politics, economic, education and other social issues. Hence, for young Muslims "who found a certain hollowness in secular education, the approach was immensely attractive". Besides, ABIM has also gained popularity through the efforts made by PKPIM, that is, in spreading its ideas among the Muslim youth. As we have mentioned, educated Muslim women have also preferred ABIM to other da’wah organisations, as it provides them with better opportunities to serve the society.

Anwar’s abilities as a leader were recognised as early as 1971 by the late Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak. He repeatedly invited the young man to join UMNO and build up his political career in the
footsteps of his father, Hj. Ibrahim. Instead, Anwar persistently refused the offer and preferred to pursue the independent course of working within ABIM. Again in recognition of his leadership, Tun Razak asked Anwar to represent Malaysia at an International Youth Seminar organised by the United Nations. Following this, he became the leader of the Malaysian Youth Council and also a member of the United Nations Advisory Group on Youth. At international level, Anwar also served as the representative of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) for the Asia-Pacific region.

As a youth leader, Anwar "has consistently argued that Malaysian Muslims must undergo a complete transformation emerging from religious faith and becoming manifested in a social system with high moral values guaranteeing peace, harmony and equality". Accordingly, after his election as ABIM's president in 1974, Anwar articulated ABIM policy in matters associated with social and economic issues. In this respect, he argued that Islam is not anti-development, but "development must have a moral basis. It must be just, not exploitative".

With Anwar's departure, the presidency of ABIM was taken over by a learned Muslim intellectual, Siddiq
Fadil, who had served under the former since 1978 as his deputy. Despite his humble and unassuming appearance, Siddiq is a great orator and an accomplished author of several books, including the famous *Kebangkitan Umat: Kenyataan dan Harapan* and *Di Bawah Lindungan alQur'an* (a translation of the Sayyid Qutb's *Fi Zilāl il-Qur'ān*) and also of many articles. 110 During his early years, he had undergone both Malay and *pondok* education. 111 Following this, he joined the *Sekolah Menengah Agama Izzuddin Shah* (Izzuddin Shah Religious Secondary School) and *Maktab Perguruan Bahasa* (Teacher's Language College). 112 In 1971, he enrolled as a student at the University of Malaya and played a prominent role in both the Islamic Society of the University of Malaya and *PKPIM*. 113 With such a background, it is not surprising to find Siddiq fluent in Bahasa Malaysia and Arabic as well as English. Besides being involved in da'wah activities, he is now lecturing at the *Institut Bahasa, Kesusasteraan dan Kebudayaan Melayu* (Institute of Language, Literature and Malay Culture), Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. 114

iii. ABIM's Organisation and Activities:

In pursuance of its objectives, ABIM operates through a number of committees. 115 These committees
are elected by shūrā (consultation) in the annual Muktamar (General Assembly). The highest Executive Committee is the Central Executive Committee headed by the President. The Committee organizes projects and activities. At the state and district levels, similar kind of committees have been created to assist in the running of the administration and planning and implementation of the movement's programmes. In this respect, any form of campaigning or jockeying for position is totally discouraged.

Although essentially fundamentalist in orientation, ABIM has been able to adapt its programmes to the realities of a modern, multi-ethnic society. This perhaps explains why it has widespread support among Muslim youth, including some recent converts. To help the saudara baru (new converts) and also non-Malays to understand Islam as al-Dīn, ABIM with the cooperation of WAMY has been distributing reading materials in English and giving free religious classes every weekend through the programme 'Islamic Outreach - ABIM'. Further, to spread its ideas, several ABIM members have established a number of private schools, Yayasan Anda Akademik, which attempt to combine the best features of religious and secular education, without really abandoning the requirements of national education policy. What it does really is
to provide a balanced programme of intensive Islamic studies, including Arabic, as an alternative to what it sees as the materialistic, mechanistic western approach to knowledge. However, English is made mandatory.\textsuperscript{121} Discipline and cadre-like training are also provided within the \textit{usrah}, \textit{qiyām al-layl} (night vigil) and the various \textit{kuliah}s, after the \textit{Maghrib} and \textit{Subuh} prayers.

Initially, the \textit{Yayasan Anda Akademik} at Pantai Baru was established in 1971 with the aim of ameliorating the drop-out problem among Malay students.\textsuperscript{122} Eventually, however, this school caught the attention of other categories of students. Today, the headquarters of the \textit{Yayasan Anda Akademik} at Pantai Baru has more than 1,200 students, while its branch at Kampung Baru has more than 400 pupils.\textsuperscript{123} The students came from all parts of Malaysia, including Sabah and Sarawak. Accordingly, many of them are provided with residence at an attached hostel or in certain cases are assisted to find their own accommodation at some nearby place.\textsuperscript{124} Outside the capital, the schools have several branches, for instance, in Bukit Mertajam, Ipoh, Kuala Trengganu, Kota Bharu and so forth.\textsuperscript{125} Today, more than one hundred students from \textit{Yayasan Anda Akademik} have graduated from the University of Malaya, while several
have gone on to higher studies in the United Kingdom and the United States.\textsuperscript{126} Equally interesting is that educationists from other countries, especially from the Middle East, have visited these schools and addressed the teachers and students.\textsuperscript{127} This is certainly an attraction, which has been missed by most Malaysian schools.

However, contrary to the assumption made by Nagata that ABIM has stressed "Malay exclusiveness" in the schools\textsuperscript{128}, the Yayasan has opened its doors to the non-Malay students.\textsuperscript{129} One of the main reasons that these schools have become popular is that they have charged moderate fees, thus enabling even the poor to join them.\textsuperscript{130} Another possible answer to this is that the teachers concerned are known for their tremendous dedication and sacrifices. In terms of dedication, a former student commented, "one of the most heartening features of this school is the personal attention the teachers give to the pupils, especially those who are backward in their studies".\textsuperscript{131} Besides this, the founder teachers, including Anwar himself, were university graduates, yet they were ready to receive salaries ranging from M$150 to M$250 each, while their contemporaries, with the same educational qualifications, were earning much more by way of remuneration from other schools.\textsuperscript{132} At the same time,
among its teachers are also included volunteers from local universities and colleges. Such behaviour as shown by these respective teachers could only come from individuals fired with a strong sense of mission, often caused by profound religious conviction.

Further, to implement its tarbiyah (educational programme, which involves not only the imparting of knowledge, but also character-building), ABIM has set up more than 200 Islamic kindergartens and a number of nurseries throughout Malaysia. These kindergartens are operated by ABIM members, guided by a specially-prepared curriculum and consolidated by a teacher-training scheme. This development has attracted the attention of the Minister of Education, who recently studied the model of Islamic kindergarten provided by ABIM, with a view to adopting it for the government-run primary schools. On the other hand, it also stirred up uneasiness among certain quarters within the Barisan administration, who claimed that these kindergartens are being used for political ends. In response, ABIM's Secretary General dismissed the claim and explained the purpose of having such Islamic kindergartens, while one of its Vice-Presidents called upon the government to be more tolerant.
Beyond this, ABIM has completed the designing of a special curriculum on Islamic education for the primary level, which it hoped to implement at its own primary school towards the end of 1986. As we can see, all these measures taken by ABIM have embodied some practical aspects of its own campaigns since early 1972 for the improvement of Islamic education in Malaysia.

Again as a means to publicise its ideas, ABIM has published a voluminous amount of literature, with some translations from English, Arabic and Urdu. Original works in Bahasa Malaysia and English are also published and these include its official organ, Risalah, which until very recently was prohibited by the government from being openly sold. Diskusi and Potensi, the two monthly journals for secondary schools and pamphlets and books on religious problems in a modern society. These books and other publications are sold through ABIM’s book sales agency, Dewan Pustaka Islam. At the same time, ABIM also maintains an Islamic Library at its headquarters, which holds over 3,000 volumes, under the charge of its Educational Bureau.

As part of its activities, ABIM organises talks, seminars, forums, muktamar (congresses) and interviews
through which it condemns the sale of alcoholic drinks and gambling (which are fully legalised by the government), drug abuse, beauty contests, prostitution, corruption and so forth. For ABIM, all these social ills are due, "to the choice and practice of life based not on divine morality, but on sensuality and as such not according to truth and justice". As a result, it has called upon the government and people of Malaysia to implement Shari'ah fully as Islam, it argued, "can solve human problems and create a truly just society".

In an effort to develop a ribā-free economy, ABIM launched the Koperasi Belia Islam (Muslim Youth Cooperative) on 30th May, 1977. The main aim behind this venture was to conduct economic and welfare services for the benefit of ABIM members in particular and the Muslim community in general. So far, KBI has been able to accumulate enough funds to give out short-term loans and even to help its members to buy land in certain areas of the country. Since April 1983, KBI has extended its business with SANYO and HITACHI, two Japanese firms dealing in electrical goods. At the same time, it has launched a special borrowing scheme for the buying of motor vehicles. Besides this, some ABIM members have also set up shops in order to provide halāl food and other daily needs
of its members and Muslims at large. As an extension of its welfare services, ABIM set up a charitable trust. Meanwhile, ABIM Wilayah Persekutuan (ABIM of Federal Territory) has opened its own medical centre at Kampong Pandan since late 1980. This has been made possible through the voluntary services provided by 15 doctors.

iv. ABIM and Contemporary Issues:

Since its establishment, ABIM has addressed itself to practically all matters of public policy. This stance of ABIM is closely related to its emphasis on Islam as al-Din, which also makes the movement the most directly political of all the da'wah groups in the country. In line with its convictions, ABIM has called for the full implementation of Islamic legal, educational and economic systems as well as political reforms that would end corruption and the misuse of power and simultaneously guarantee basic political freedoms. For ABIM, all these measures should be implemented as part of the islāḥī process, that is, "involving a change from fasād (destruction) to ṣalāh (construction), from detriment to betterment, a striving for the attainment of ḥaqq and good values, and not change for the sake of change". In making such calls, ABIM leadership has taken into account the
multi-racial character of the Malaysian society. At its 1979 Muktamar Sanawi (Annual Conference), it passed a resolution urging the Malaysian government to adopt an Islamic solution to the country's communal problems and to create unity among the people despite their different religious beliefs. For the same reason, ABIM since the late-70s has regarded race relations as one of its major problems and has taken steps to convince all sides, especially the government and the non-Muslims, of the superiority of the Islamic approach in overcoming the problem of communalism.

To substantiate its argument, its leadership quoted Sūrat al-Hujurāt: 13, which states, "O Mankind! We have created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other". On the basis of this verse, ABIM tried to show that racial variety in itself is not a problem but rather a means provided by Allah for the people to know each other and cooperate for the establishment of a better human society.

In this connection, ABIM also constantly pointed out that under the Sharī'ah, non-Muslims are given the right to practice their religions and to adopt their personal laws as both the Qur'ān and Sunnah guarantee the freedom of belief and worship. Further, it asserted that the non-Muslims were allowed to hold
public office or engage in economic activity, as discriminatory laws are repugnant to Islam. To support this assertion, it quoted parallels from the Islamic historical past, for instance, the special treatment received by the Najran Christians during the time of the Prophet (s. a. w.), the Muslims/non-Muslims relationships laid down by the Constitution of Madinah and the presence of Hindus within the Mughal administration in India were often cited. Nonetheless, this idea has not yet been received favourably by the non-Muslims.

Nationalism too has been rebuked by ABIM. As a philosophy, it is seen as being disruptive and alien to the spirit of Islam which calls for unity among the Muslims based on the principles of Tawhid and Ukhūwwah Islāmīyah (Islamic Brotherhood). Thus, as a logical extension of this, ABIM categorically rejected nasionalisme Melayu (Malay nationalism) as being incompatible with the universality of Islam. In this connection, Siddiq Fadil stated:

"Malay nationalists in their justification of nationalism often used the phrase Malay=Islam and Islam=Malay. Although this phrase is specifically used in the Malaysian context, yet it still brings about a negative impact upon the purity of Islam as a universal religion. This phrase implies that Islam is being given the Malay character as if it is solely the property of the Malays. Further, it means the denial of the role and importance of the non-Malay Muslims. Islam,
with such an image, will not be acceptable to the non-Malays. Obviously, such a form of Malay nationalism will jeopardise the development of Islamic dakwah among the non-Malays.

In addition, he unequivocally rejected the argument of the nationalists which emphasized that Malay nationalism should be promoted as a means to elevate the position of the poor Malays as "strong Malays mean strong Islam". In this instance, he said: ¹⁶⁷

"Malay nationalism is claimed to be for the purpose of helping the poor Malays, but in practice, it is obvious that in many matters the already rich Malays are in fact getting considerable help, and the policy of promoting Malay nationalism helps to create millionaires out of a few Malays who are already rich. They also use the logic "strong Malays=strong Islam". This logic could be disputed if the Malays who are being strengthened are secular Malays, materialist Malays or Malays who do not adhere to the teachings of Islam".

These criticisms of Malay nationalism by ABIM's leaders and also by other Muslim intellectuals caused the Malay nationalists within UMNO to be on the defensive. ¹⁶⁸

Another issue which is very popular with ABIM to this day, is the question of al-‘adl (justice) in all spheres, especially in the economy and politics. ¹⁶⁴ In
this respect, as it has been emphasizing al-‘adālah al-ijtimā‘iyah (social Justice) in dealing with economic issues, it has been branded as being 'Islamic socialist'. However, in the eyes of ABIM's activists, social justice is an integral part of Islam as al-Dīn and thus cannot be separated from the fundamental Islamic doctrines of Tawḥīd, āmānah, jihād and ‘amal ṣāliḥ (good deeds). For the same reason, its leadership criticised some prestigious projects put up by the government and instead called for thriftiness in public expenditure and the need to improve the general welfare of the people.

Synonymous with the call for justice is ABIM's preoccupation with the issue of development. For it, development means an integrated programme of construction as well as the restructuring of human society both at individual and group levels in conformity with the teachings of Islam. On this basis, ABIM again condemned the lopsided, that is, materialistic approach towards development propagated and implemented by the ruling government. At the same time, it called for less dependency on external trade and foreign loans, while stressing the need to provide basic necessities and a more equal distribution of income.
Meanwhile, tarbiyah has also been a major issue with ABIM. Just like development and other issues, it is articulated within the whole process of Islamisation, that is, the moulding of every aspect of human endeavour according to Islam. Thus, besides setting up its educational institutions and programmes, ABIM also untiringly campaigned for a comprehensive system of education. In this regard, it called for both ‘ulamā‘ and Western-trained intellectuals who love Islam to cooperate with one another in correcting the existing secular-oriented system of education. Further, it discussed and provided some ideas on how to improve teaching techniques by emphasizing the role of the teacher vis-à-vis Islamic ethics and the content of the curriculum from an Islamic perspective.

Of great significance too was ABIM’s campaign for an Islamic state. For example, it condemned the former Malaysian Premier, Tunku Abdul Rahman, for making a plea that Malaysia should always remain a secular state. As in many other issues, it blamed secularism, which in its view is originally a colonial import, for the continued opposition to the idea of an Islamic state.
Apart from this, ABIM also took up other social issues, for example, the need to overcome alcoholism and drug addiction, as well as the importance of breast-feeding and the like.

Politically, among other things it attacked corruption and the lack of political freedom within the country. In the early 70s, ABIM leaders were among those who campaigned vigorously against the former Selangor Menteri Besar, Datuk Harun Idris, who was later convicted on several charges associated with corruption. Concerning political freedom, ABIM incessantly criticised the use of the Internal Security Act (ISA) by the government as a means to silence its critics. Instead, it called for a review of the Act so as to ensure justice. It also led a campaign of some 48 societies and associations against the controversial Societies (Amendment) Bill, introduced by the government into the Dewan Rakyat in March 1981, which called for all societies to register themselves as either "political" or "friendly", in the face of the gathering momentum of Islamic resurgence among the Muslims of Malaysia. As Von der Mehden put it, although this act was supposedly promulgated to cover all societies, its primary target was ABIM. Moreover, by this act, the government could control the foreign links of associations and also any
group that sought to influence state policy by asking them to declare their status.\textsuperscript{186}

Despite the antagonism that persisted between ABIM and the members of the Malaysian establishment, it did not stop the movement from cooperating with the authorities in some of its activities. For example, in 1977, it jointly organised the first Asian Youth Seminar on Dakwah, with the cooperation of WAMY and the Islamic Division of the Prime Minister's Department as well as the government-controlled Dakwah Foundation.\textsuperscript{187} Again in 1978, it organised the Muslim Youth Camp for the Asia-Pacific Region with the cooperation of the Islamic Division; the camp was opened by the then Foreign Minister Tengku Ahmad Rithaudeen.\textsuperscript{188}

v. International Connections:

Internationally, ABIM has gained the recognition of various Muslim countries, thus making it more significant in national politics. ABIM leaders have often travelled across the globe or have been invited to attend various conferences in the Middle East, Pakistan, Australia, the Pacific islands and the Far East.\textsuperscript{189} To maintain its contacts with foreign Muslims, ABIM has published the monthly newsletter
Perspective since late 1979. Besides this, it enjoyed the respect of such organisations as the Islamic Council of Europe, the Islamic Foundation in United Kingdom, the Jama'at-e Islami of Pakistan, the Muhammadiyah of Indonesia, the Rābiṭah al-Ālam al-Islāmī of Saudi Arabia and so forth. Beginning with Anwar Ibrahim, a number of ABIM's leaders have served within the secretariat of WAMY. Together with other world Muslim movements, ABIM observed March 16, 1979, as Solidarity Day to mark the success of the Iranian Revolution. This move of course stirred up the emotions of some people within the Barisan administration, who had seen it as an attempt to bring the revolution nearer to the doorstep of Malaysia. However, ABIM strongly denied that it had been influenced by Iran, though it admitted that some of the changes taking place there were in accord with Sharī'ah.

Apart from this, ABIM has maintained close ties with other student bodies abroad. Among them are the International Islamic Federations of Student Organisations (IIFSO), the Muslim Students Federation of Bangladesh, the Australian Federated Muslim Students' Association (AFMSA) and so forth. Meanwhile, as part of its emphasis on ukhūwwah Islāmiyyah, ABIM criticised the Barisan government for
practising 'double standards' in its dealing with Muslim minorities, in that it remained silent in the face of oppression in Thailand, the Philippines, India and Burma, while calling for Muslim unity at home and the Middle East. Again as part of its expression of Islamic solidarity, it vehemently supported both materially and morally the struggle for freedom of the Islamic Mujahidin in Afghanistan, the Muslims of Lebanon and the Palestinians and most of all the liberation of Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{194} In fact, it sponsored the Afghanistan Liberation Fund and maintained contact with the representatives of the Mujahidin and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), long before these liberation movements gained any official recognition from the Malaysian authorities.\textsuperscript{197} Besides this, ABIM organised an anti-Soviet demonstration in front of the Soviet Embassy in Kuala Lumpur in January 1980.\textsuperscript{198} However, ABIM's popularity overseas and the impact of its connections on Islamic resurgence in Malaysia caused much concern among members of the ruling élite. Thus, as mentioned before, the government introduced the Societies (Amendment) Bill of 1981. Following this, the Registrar of Societies directed ABIM to sever all ties with foreign organisations.\textsuperscript{199} In response, ABIM strongly denied having any affiliation with foreign organisations and stressed that it had organised
functions together with other bodies after referring to the government first. As a result of concerted opposition organised by ABIM and the entry of Anwar into the government, the Bill finally reverted to the original Act of 1966 in March 1983. At the same time, the Home Minister announced that a number of points had been improved and almost all the requests made by the societies which were considered reasonable had been met. Significantly, the major amendment which resulted in the controversy, that is, the classification of a society as political ceased to exist under the new amendments. With that, the whole affair came to an end.

vi. The Post-Anwar Era:

With the departure of Anwar Ibrahim, some people tended to see ABIM as having lost its dynamism. ABIM had also been branded by certain quarters as having collaborated with UMNO or of having been 'bought off'. These criticisms had been made especially by those who identified themselves with PAS’s struggle or by hardliners who saw ABIM’s only legitimacy as a movement in being radical and in open confrontation with tāghūt. Thus, some of them left the movement in order to be openly active in PAS, while others simply withdrew active support from
ABIM. Certainly, there had been some confusion among ABIM's rank and file when their former leader joined UMNO. This was because Anwar had been greatly admired among his followers and the unexpected move was too much for those who lacked the deep understanding of ABIM's orientation as a da'wah cum tarbiyah movement. Secondly, most people from within and without ABIM saw Anwar as simply a PAS supporter and a would-be successor of Asri. Hence, his sudden change was viewed by some people as something beyond comprehension and even as a treachery. Thirdly, some simply did not believe that he could change the secular tendencies prevalent within UMNO and the government.

To check the disillusionment and confusion among certain ABIM members, its leaders resorted to an all-out campaign of explaining and reemphasizing ABIM's role as a non-partisan movement, with its main preoccupations being the revival of Islam through the processes of da'wah, tarbiyah and islāh. Of greater importance too was that Siddiq Fadil spelt out ABIM's stand on all issues since the very beginning of its existence and reiterated its position as a non-partisan movement. Again in answering to the criticism that it had been less vocal under the new leadership, Siddiq said:
"Da'wah Islamiah should not be static in the form of mere rhetoric. Amar ma'ruf should be tackled more in terms of lisān al-hāl - the provision of services, models, suggestions and concrete programmes. Amar ma'ruf should be increased in the form of problem-solving, with ready suggestions and practical answers to contemporary issues. Equally, nahi munkar should not be implemented only by throwing out abuse and provocations, nor by emotional condemnation from which you get full satisfaction when there are issues to be exploited. Nahi munkar should come as honest and constructive criticism, accompanied by arguments based on data, facts and figures, to be presented in the corteous language of a dā'ī, for du'āt always address themselves to human intellect and innate nature. Indeed, a dā'ī is a saviour and not one who curses and condemns, others to damnation. Du'āt are callers and not those who simply attack, neither they are irresponsible opposers nor blind supporters, they are al-āmirūna bi'l-ma'ruf wa 'n-nāhūna 'ani 'l-munkar - the callers of good action and the preventers of munkar".

Besides this, Siddiq also ruled out foolhardiness in the attempt to carry out Islamisation of every aspect of life, when he said, "We need not be rash and careless". To substantiate this, he quoted that isti'jāl (hastiness) had been rejected by the Prophet (s. a. w.) for it was not suitable for the promotion of Islam. Meanwhile, ABIM's Secretary General argued, "Just because there is no sensationalism in the way we handle things, it does not mean we no longer play an active role in society". Further, he added, "Another significant reason for the change in style was the early realisation that ABIM cannot rely
on rhetoric alone" and "We wanted to offer an alternative and this meant sitting down together, thinking things out carefully and planning a systematic da'wah programme to show how Islam affects all aspects of life". In explaining his past experiences, another founder member said, "ABIM had a lot of shaking and shouting to do. We had to create the awareness that there was a religious vacuum in the society. We had no choice but to be vocal". While, his colleague added, "ABIM reacted harshly in the 70s and early 80s because the political climate was harsh". Another reason put forward by ABIM's leadership for the change in its approach is the question of maturity. In this regard, Prof. Muhammad Kamal Hassan of the UIA testified that there was certainly a genuine process of maturing within ABIM, if one analysed the speeches and private conversations of its leader.

Aside from all these explanations, ABIM went about implementing its own programmes and commenting on issues as it saw fit. For example, under the new leadership, the tarbiyah process had been accelerated, thus leading to the establishment of more than 200 Islamic kindergartens, and a number of nurseries. As mentioned earlier, ABIM also designed and has recently implemented its own curriculum and teacher-
training programme as well as publishing more Islamic works.\textsuperscript{224} With regard to economic problems, it continued to carry out its own projects through KBI.\textsuperscript{225} At the same time, it jointly organised a symposium on "Contemporary Issues and the Development of the Ummah" in cooperation with the multi-racial Consumers' Association of Penang (CAP) and the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sport on July 13, 1986.\textsuperscript{226} Among the issues discussed at this meeting were the problem of a narrow-minded approach in dealing with the needs of the people, Youth National Policy, economic inflation, and financial mismanagement and its impacts on consumers.\textsuperscript{227} This is interesting, especially with regard to the last issue, when it is considered in the light of the BMF (Bank Bumiputra Finance) scandal, which had cost Malaysia a loss of some $2.5M billions and was being officially treated with more than usual discreetness.\textsuperscript{228} On yet another front, it strove to help Muslim converts and to spread Islam among non-Muslims through the programme known as the 'Islamic Outreach - ABIM'.\textsuperscript{229}

Meanwhile, in its capacity as the 'spokesman of the ummah', that it claimed to be, it continued to call for the implementation of Aslamah \textsuperscript{230} (Islamisation) of every sphere of life instead of accepting the piece-meal process of Penerapan Nilai-
nilai Islam (Inculcation of Islamic Values) carried out by the Datuk Sri Dr. Mahathir's administration since early 1982.231 In this context, it assertively called for more fundamental changes, that is, the full implementation of the Sharī'ah vis-à-vis politics, economic, education, administration, defence and so forth.232 Simultaneously, it campaigned for the eradication of things which were overtly contradictory to the Qur'ān and Sunnah.233 While welcoming the banning of Muslims from gambling at the famous casino at Genting Highland, it argued that the ban should also cover all forms of gambling throughout the country.234 In the same vein, it called for the banning of the sale of alcoholic beverages by pointing out that such drinks were banned in Madinah [at the time of the Prophet] and recently in Khartoum (Sudan).235

Further, it emphasized that ukhūwah Islāmiyyah should be given priority in the whole Islamisation programme.236 This comment was made in the light of a serious crisis that has developed between PAS and UMNO since late 1984.237 Together with other responsible organisations, including the independent Persatuan ‘Ulamā’ (‘Ulamā’ Association), it tried to pacify the opposing parties by calling for the cancellation of a much-publicised debate on T. V. Malaysia and instead
suggested a behind closed door *muzākarah* (discussion) to be held to end the antagonism.\textsuperscript{238}

For the same end, it reiterated its opposition to the use of the Internal Security Act as a means to stop dissension. For instance, it argued that the arrest of Muslim activists under the *ISA* would not solve the problem, but would aggravate the situation.\textsuperscript{239} Commenting on the White Paper issued by the government to justify such action, it unequivocably argued that if the allegations were true and based on a sound foundation, then the people concerned should be brought to trial and given the chance to defend themselves.\textsuperscript{240} This, it maintained, was in tune with Islam and should be pursued as part of the overall Islamisation process.\textsuperscript{241} At the same time, it rejected the *takfīr* (the branding of others as *kāfirūn*) approach alleged to have been adopted by certain *PAS* members in their dealing with their opponents within *UMNO*.\textsuperscript{342} While stressing that Islam should be propagated by way of *da'wah* and proper *tarbiyah*, based on sound as well as wise reasoning, it also pointed out that the *takfīr* approach was an encroachment upon a Muslim's dignity and contrary to the *da'wah* of the Prophet (s. a. w.).\textsuperscript{243}
In mid-1986, ABIM again attracted the attention of the Muslim population of Malaysia when it took positive steps to solve the problem created by Kassim Ahmad, the former chairman of the socialist party, PSRM, who questioned the authenticity of the hadith. According to Kassim, who had been trained only in Malay Studies, all the hadith were false and could not be accepted at all as the second source of the Shari'ah. Instead of following others in calling for an outright ban on the controversial book, ABIM invited Kassim to defend his hypothesis in a closed muzākarah. As the writer failed completely to defend his views, yet doggedly refused to change his stand, ABIM, as represented by its panel of scholars, saw fit to expose the fallacies of the writer concerned. Accordingly, the finding was made public at a press conference. Following this, it also distributed copies of the video-tape of the muzākarah and published a number of articles and books on the issue of hadith. These things were done in an effort to protect the Muslims from confused and misleading ideas concerning Islam. As a result of this campaign, together with the refutations made by various 'ulamā', Kassim's book has been banned.

In the same year, ABIM came out in defence of a number of Muslim trainee nurses who had been dismissed
because they chose to wear the mini-telekung, together with long-sleeved shirts and long trousers while on duty. In this regard, it questioned the sincerity of the authorities in harping on the inculcation of Islamic values, while oppressing those who seriously wanted to adhere to the Islamic code of conduct concerning dress and paying no attention to those who dressed indecently. Consequently, through all these activities, ABIM has been able to hold its own, despite the departure of Anwar. Its members, including those who were quiet for some time, have begun to be active again. In fact, it would not be an exaggeration to say that its presence is still causing great concern among the nationalists and secularists.

Darul Arqam:

Another well-known Islamic group in Malaysia today is the ṣuṭṭī-oriented Darul Arqam. Since early 1986, some of its beliefs and practices have been characterised by several respected ʿulamā‘ as being out of tune with Islamic orthodoxy. However, strange as it might seem, up to the time of writing, no ban has been imposed on the movement even though the National Fatwā Committee itself had given the fatwā (legal ruling) that Hj. Ashaari, al-Arqam’s chief, has written a book which “contains teachings opposed to
the Islamic Syariah". Probably, the Malaysian authorities have decided not to take any firm action against the movement for fear of political repercussion. Whatever is the case, for the sake of convenience, in this study, we shall continue to treat the movement as part of the da‘wah organisation, while not ignoring its equally important unconventional characteristics.

Darul Arqam was started as a halaqah (study circle) by Ustaz Ashaari Muhammad (now known as Sheikh al-Arqam) at Kampung Datuk Keramat, Kuala Lumpur, in 1969. Until mid-1986, its activities were disseminated from Sungai Penchala, an Islamic village situated some 17 miles from Kuala Lumpur, among various sections of the Malay population.

i. Leadership and Membership:

Ustaz Ashaari Muhammad was born at Kampung Pilin, Rembau, Negri Sembilan in the year 1938. During his childhood, however, his family moved to Selangor, where he remained until mid-1986. After finishing his early Malay education, he joined the religious school, Maahad Hishamuddin. On the completion of his secondary education, he became a religious teacher at a number of government-run schools. But after 20
years of teaching, he decided to leave and for some time was a member of PAS and other Islamic organisations. However, finding PAS's brand of politics incompatible with his own aspirations, he left the party in order to form Darul Arqam. Since then, he has been the leader of the movement. Apart from being a dā'ī, Ashaari Muhammad is also something of a mystic and a poet. Another noted figure of Darul Arqam was Ustaz Hj. Mokhtar Yaakub, who was Naib Sheikh al-Arqam (Deputy Shaykh al-Arqam) and also Mudir Shukbah al-Tarbiyah wa al-Taklim (Head of the Education and Instruction Department) until his departure from the movement in May 1986. Ustaz Mokhtar, a soft-spoken and slight man, is the holder of an M. A. in Shariah from al-Azhar. As Ashaari himself admitted, he used to be 'the main source of reference' for him in religious matters. Another leading member was Hj. Akhbar Anang, a former economics lecturer at Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (The University of Technology, Malaysia), who was the Head of the Economic Section until he and his six friends were expelled from the movement in 1979. Other top leaders of the movement are the products of either pondok, madrasah or al-Azhar. However, very few of them have ever obtained a tertiary religious education. These asātidhah (religious teachers) have been supported by some secular-educated leaders,
especially in the running of the economic and social welfare programmes.

Darul Arqam has attracted Muslim youth from both urban and rural background.\textsuperscript{265} Most of these people have had a secular education, ranging from the primary to the university level, either at home or abroad.\textsuperscript{266} Besides this, some civil servants, including a few highly placed ones, lecturers and professionals have joined or sympathized with the movement.\textsuperscript{267} Nonetheless, the movement seems to have attracted mostly those who are acquiescent and mild-mannered, and inclined to a life of religious contemplation, simplicity and ever-ready submission to an accepted authority.\textsuperscript{268}

In line with their training, many of the members of the movement are somewhat inward-looking. They reject a luxurious life-style, forsaking the use of Western furnishings, televisions and other amenities in their own homes. However, televisions equipped with video cassettes and tape-players are used quite often for da'wah purposes, especially during an al-Argam publicity campaign. Al-Argam members also invariably drive cars or ride motor-cycles to work.\textsuperscript{269}
Organisational Structure and Activities:

For the first four years of its existence, Darul Argam only operated as a halaqah. It was only in 1973, that is, with the establishment of the commune at Sungai Penchala, that its activities really spread far and wide. Physically, the village itself consisted of a small community of approximately fifty houses, a school, a surau and a shopping centre. It stood on a piece of land of about five acres, bought with its members' own money. Such types of settlement have also been set up in Perak, Trengganu and Kedah as branches of Sungai Penchala.

Despite the existence of various syukbahs (departments) on economy, education, da'wah and so forth, in practice, the movement seems to have been centred on one man. In this regard, S. Othman Kelantan, a lecturer and a writer, has said that the movement was set up along the lines of a tariqah. As an illustration, he asserts that unlike ABIM, the members referred everything to their leader, the Sheikh al-Argam. In fact, no activity could be carried out without the prior approval of this leader. Further, it emphasized uniformity in 'ibadah (the act of worship) and kept to strict secrecy in matters pertaining to its chosen
ARQAM. This arrangement has certainly been able to instil discipline and unite all the members for the purpose of da'wah activities, but it cannot avoid the risk of being labelled as authoritarian, a charge often made against the Sheikh al-Arqam by its former members since 1979. Meanwhile, Ustaz Ashaari himself has admitted that the movement has no constitution, and it is not registered. Thus, a person can be a member simply by participating in its prescribed programmes, which include attending religious classes and the willingness to make necessary sacrifices.

The movement claims that it has been interested in eradicating "elements of Jahiliyah in Malay society" and "the creation of a society based on revealed religion". However, its committed members are few in number, although there are thousand of sympathizers throughout the country. Since the very beginning, it has been advocating a literal return to the Qur'an and, as far as possible, tries to adopt what it envisages as a Muslim form of dress. In this context, its male members wear either green, white or black jubbah and turbans, and women members adopt the mini-telekung and jubbah, while some even prefer purdah.

Besides converging in their communes, the members of this movement are also engaged in a lecture
circuit. To publicise its cause, it has since July 1977 published the newspaper *Al-Argam*, printed in Jawi script \(^{282}\), accompanied by one or two short articles in English.\(^{283}\) It also publishes a number of books, journals and tapes on the discourses given by the Sheikh al-Argam. Ashaari and his assistants conduct classes (kelas fardhu 'ain) every Wednesday night in subjects pertaining to Quranic tafsir, tawhid, fiqh and so forth, which are also open to the public. Occasionally, al-Argam hold its own al-Argam Expo to exhibit its products and to attract the people to its cause. \(^{284}\) On such occasions, one may see a video showing the Sheikh al-Argam in action, that is, delivering his lectures to the members of the commune. Of course, these displays, and the projection of the man himself in almost every publication of the movement, have led outsiders to make the charge that the movement thrives on a 'personality cult'.\(^{285}\)

Another feature of the movement is that it has emphasized economic berdikari (self-sufficiency), not only for its members but also for the rest of the Muslim community. It has managed several agricultural projects, including vegetable and fruit cultivation and cattle, chicken and fish farming.\(^{286}\) These are made possible by the fact that most of its settlements are rural-based. In addition, it has set up a number
of mostly small back-yard industries to produce halal products such as soya sauce, mee, bread, beef and so forth. Other products which are marketed include tooth-paste, talcum powder and a variety of religious articles such as prayer-beads and books. Despite all these laudable efforts, one just cannot deny that the qualities of its manufactured products such as jam, pickles and tooth-paste still leave much to be desired.

Since the 80s, Darul Arqam has opened its own clinics to provide modern and traditional medicines and other modes of treatment. Meanwhile, its Welfare Section has been looking after orphans, widows and making marriage arrangements as well as preparing bodies for burial.

As part of its tarbiyah programme, al-Argam set up its own schools, with its headquarters at Yayasan al-Argam, Sungai Penchala. The school at Sungai Penchala was only started in 1975. Al-Argam's schools provide both religious and secular (academic) education with the object of producing pious individuals who are also successful in the academic field. Apart from teaching religious subjects, the schools also provide instruction in English, agricultural science, arithmetic and so on.
activities include attending classes on fardhu 'ain, usrah and so forth. As the students originate from all over Malaysia, they are provided with hostel facilities.

Within the commune, male-female segregation is strictly observed, in that male students are normally made to sit in front, while female students occupy the back part of the class-rooms. At the hostels, the students always cook their own food and rotate their own responsibilities as in any other commune. However, the religious schools have not been registered with the Majlis Agama Islam as required in each state. With regard to this, the late Mufti of the Federal Territory advised the Sheikh al-Arqam to register his school with the religious authorities in his territory. Another peculiar aspect of the school system is that all of the students' letters going in and out of the commune are closely censored. The same applies to their reading materials to the extent that only al-Arqam publications have been allowed at any time. Consequently, most of these students have developed a narrow perspective in their understanding of the world at large.
iii. Darul Arqam and Socio-Political Issues:

As a movement, Darul Arqam has been involved in a number of issues, though generally people have assumed that it is not greatly inclined to politics.³⁰² Lately, this assumption has been proven to be untrue, for it is noticeable that not only has the movement accepted government grants channeled through the Ministry of Social and Welfare Services, contrary to its earlier stand, but some of its leaders have also come out in support of government policy. For example, a top leader of al-Arqam has claimed that no political party in Malaysia has really adopted a policy based on al-Qur'ân and hadîth.³⁰³ This statement was seen by many as a challenge to PAS, whose struggle has all along been linked with these two sources. In another instance, a number of al-Arqam's top leaders were reported to have been sent to Pahang in order to halt the growth of PAS's influence in the state.³⁰⁴ This apparent tilt towards UMNO has caused some of its members to quit the organisation.³⁰⁵

Evidently, al-Arqam has addressed itself to some of the problems affecting the Muslim world in modern times. Among the issues discussed are the problems of development, economic self-sufficiency, leadership, unity, good moral character, asceticism and so on.
However, after a close scrutiny of the printed materials available one is bound to conclude that the views expressed within the organisation are rather unsophisticated, lacking in depth and intellectuality and at best a repetition of the same themes.\(^3\)\(^0\)\(^6\) Besides, no concrete evidence based on hard facts has been given when a criticism or an allegation is made against anyone or any group.\(^3\)\(^0\)\(^7\) Such shortcomings do not help anyone to have a better understanding of the issues under discussion, thus defeating the very purpose of tarbiyah as it is generally understood.

iv. Overseas Connections:

As a movement, Darul Arqam has maintained connections with Malaysian students overseas and some foreign groups. For example, its leaders have visited Australia, the United States of America, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Thailand and so on and established contacts with students in these countries.\(^3\)\(^0\)\(^8\) However, it has not been very successful in winning over adherents from among those who are more critical-minded. Besides this, their duqāʿāʾ have visited and lectured at the Dargawi Institute, Norwich, England and have also met other ṣūfī groups in Jordan, Morocco and so forth.\(^3\)\(^0\)\(^9\) Nonetheless, the movement seems to be influenced more by local Nusantara traditions plus some streaks of
Shi‘ism, rather than pure Salafi doctrines. This particular point will be discussed under a fresh subtitle.

v. Controversies Surrounding Darul Arqam:

Since the 70s, the movement has been enmeshed in a number of controversies. In their course, outsiders have dubbed it as being fanatic, out of date, anti-social, a polygamous association and a haven for false teachings. Its leaders simply took such hostile comments as a sign of ignorance or mere prejudice on the part of others towards the movement. However, there is no denying that some of these comments have brought the whole movement into question. In the following paragraphs, we shall be looking at some of these issues.

Although the movement for some time seemed to be running fairly smoothly at its various centres, several incidents of dissension have recently been reported. These leaks and exposés have to be taken seriously in view of the fact that these statements were made by some of its former senior members, who had been dutifully devoted to its programmes.
Some 'ulamā' have criticised the movement for its emphasis on polygamy. They make the charge that al-
Arqam's leaders are not only taking advantage of the situation by marrying more than is necessary, but are also encouraging other members to have more than one wife. The issue has become so notorious that there is now a standing joke that if one wishes to have more than one wife, he should join Darul Arqam.

However, of all the issues which have come to the surface, there is nothing which is more perplexing than the case involving the relationship between Darul Arqam and Tariqat Muhammadiyah. The issue first came into the open in March 1979, with the expulsion of Hj. Akhbar Anang, the former naqīb of al-Arqam's Economic Section, and his six associates. In this case, what is important is that all of these men, with the exception of Anwar Ismail, were once nuqabā' (group leaders), that is, trusted assistants of Ustaz Ashaari. Following their expulsion, rumours abounded. According to Hj. Akhbar the charges levelled against them kept on increasing until they reached a total of 25. Among the charges made were that the group tried to wrest power from Ashaari, implementing economic projects without first consulting the Amir and the Syura, that Akhbar had blocked the publication of Ashaari's books and cassette and so forth.
response, Akhbar and his associates distributed their own 46-page rebuttal, answering point by point all the allegations and simultaneously exposing the weaknesses of the movement and the false teachings associated with Ashaari himself.

From this disclosure, one has been able to learn a great deal more about Darul Arqam. The crux of the whole matter was the controversy surrounding the Tariqat Muhammadiyah and the Aurad Muhammadiyah, that is, an epistle containing a collection of prayers which is claimed by Ustaz Taha Suhaime, a grandson of Sheikh Muhammad b. Abdullah as-Suhaimi and the present head of Tariqat Muhammadiyah in Singapore, to have been received personally by his grandfather from the Prophet (s. a. w.). Closely associated with this is the controversy concerning the Manâqib Kiyâl Agung Asy-Syeikh as-Sayyid Muhammad b. Abdullah as-Suhaimi, that is, a biography plus mystical adventures of the founder of Tariqat Muhammadiyah, which has been part of the literature to be read and believed in by anyone performing Aurad Muhammadiyah.

Although, as mentioned above, other reasons were given for the purge, the evidence seems to indicate that it was carried out because of the readiness of Akhbar and his friends to question the practice of
this unconventional tariqah. This can be deduced from the fact that the dismissal was executed swiftly and unceremoniously, that no reason was given for the action taken, and that no opportunity was given to those condemned to discuss the matter with the Sheikh al-Arqam.\textsuperscript{322} In fact, when Akhbar and his friends asked for an audience with Ashaari, his then deputy, Cikgu Abdul Rahman, briefly said, "The door has been closed and Ustaz [Ashaari] is a firm man".\textsuperscript{323} Subsequently, other requests for a peaceful settlement based on Islamic principles were turned down flatly.\textsuperscript{324} Akhbar, however, learned that the decision to dismiss them was made in the house of Pak Kiyai Mat, the spiritual adviser of Ustaz Ashaari, in Klang.\textsuperscript{325} Of significance too is that the dismissal had come in the wake of Akhbar's attempt to see Ashaari himself in order to obtain clarifications concerning the tariqah.\textsuperscript{327}

Following the expulsion, Ashaari resorted to making charges against the group, even to the extent of delivering personal attacks on their characters.\textsuperscript{328} They were also totally ostracized, in that others were not allowed to speak to them at all.\textsuperscript{329} Despite all the allegations, al-Arqam members say that "Hj. Akhbar was a very energetic person who contributed much to the movement's economic projects and helped in the
setting up of the Darul Argam clinic". Furthermore, since their expulsion, Akhbar and his friends have not taken any step to set up their own da'wah organisation in competition with their former chief, thus casting doubt on Ashaari's charge that prior to their dismissal they were out to wrest power from him. In view of this, only a very serious issue such as the practice of the tariqah and all its related controversies could have led to these uncompromising actions.

Finding themselves exposed to all sorts of smear campaigns, Akhbar and his friends took the logical step of making the whole issue public, thus disclosing the hidden aspects of al-Argam and its leader. Among the charges made were that the objective of the movement was hazy, that the syura had not been effectively functioning as the Amir acted more like a dictator, and that the Amir, in contradiction to his own policy, had criticised other movements without making any effort to advise the parties concerned. At the same time, Akhbar argued that as the appointed editor, he had temporarily blocked the publication of only one of the leader's book and a cassette, because they contained material which in his view would bring about serious repercussions with other Islamic movements if it were not omitted.
Regarding the tarīqah, his revelation seemed to bring to light a number of highly unorthodox beliefs and practices prevalent among the top leaders of al-Argam. For example, they believe that the founder of the tarīqah, Sheikh Muhammad as-Suhaimi, an ʿālim of Javanese descent, who died in Klang in 1925, is the Imam Mahdi, that is, the awaited Messiah, whose appearance will bring about justice and tranquility throughout the world. In line with this belief, they say that the Mahdi is now in ghaybah (occultation) and thus he is not dead, but is in hiding at Alas Kotonggo (Kotonggo Forest), near the town of Pacitan in Central Java. It is also believed that he is simultaneously the awaited Ratu Adil (Just King), whose coming had been predicted by Jayabaya. In both roles, he can be invoked by a devoted member of the tarīqah to help him in times of danger, distress and to enable him to overpower his enemies physically and to reduce him to silence.

Despite these disclosures, Darul Arqam continued to grow. Pusat Islam, that is, the religious affairs section of the Prime Minister's Department, could not find any justification for banning the movement. The same problem reemerged in June 1986 and this time on a much serious scale, as it involved the religiously educated Naib Sheikh al-Arqam and others who were once
known to be the vanguard of the movement. Simultaneously, another sensational piece of news, regarding the movement spilled out into the open, which was that al-Arqam had abandoned its main settlement at Sungai Penchala.\textsuperscript{340} In the wake of this, a number of al-Arqam's former members disclosed that Ashaari's faction had resorted to vandalism within the abandoned settlement on the orders of its master, so as to make the settlement totally useless for Ustaz Mokhtar's group.\textsuperscript{341} Such was the fury that developed between the two opposing camps.

As in the previous case, rumours were rife. To clear the air, Ustaz Mokhtar explained that he left the movement simply because he disagreed with the \textit{aqidah} of Ustaz Ashaari and a great number of his followers, who claimed that the founder of Tariqat Muhammadiyah is the Imam Mahdi.\textsuperscript{342} Following this, he made a full disclosure of the whole issue, thus confirming what Akhbar Anang and his friends had said in 1979.\textsuperscript{343} In addition, he brought out a new point that the adherents of this tariqat had added the names of the \textit{Khalifah al-Rashidin} and \textit{al-Mahdi} to the usual formula for the \textit{shahadah}, which they recite while chanting the \textit{aurad}.\textsuperscript{344}
Ustaz Ashaari denied all the charges made against him and launched an attack on his former deputy and the breakaway group. He asserted that Ustaz Mokhtar had left the movement after having failed to wrest power from him and also because of his inability to popularise Tariqat Naqshabandiyah. But all these counter-charges were refuted by Ustaz Mokhtar, who now revealed that Ashaari had evaded and even turned down his repeated attempts to discuss the tariqat, with the view to correcting the deviations.

Meanwhile, other 'ulama' too had given their personal opinions concerning al-Argam and the controversial tariqat. For example, Datuk Hj. Ishak b. Hj. Baharom, the Mufti of Selangor, said, "it is a deviation (sesat) of those people who believe that Sheikh Suhaime is Imam Mahdi". Hj. Harussani Hj. Zakaria, the Mufti of Perak, said, "Tariqat Muhammadiyah is divided into two groups; one is correct and the other, that is, the one practiced by Hj. Ashaari, contravenes Islam". Dr. Maghfur Mohd. Osman, a man of Javanese descent, presently attached to Islamic Studies Centre, MARA Institute of Technology, stated, "[those] who believe in such a matter [Sheikh as-Suhaimi being the Mahdi] are involved in a deviation (sesat)".
Meanwhile, a further leak concerning al-Arqam became known to the public, when a cassette containing the confession of al-Arqam's chief about his belief that "asy-Syeikh Muhammad as-Suhaimi is the promised Mahdi", which was made in front of Ustaz Taha Suhaimi, the tariqat's head in Singapore, fell into the hands of a New Straits Times' reporter. This, of course, contradicts all the denials made by Ashaari himself. As mentioned earlier, the National Fatwa Committee had ruled that Ashaari's book contained teachings opposed to the Islamic Shari'ah. Despite all this, up to the time of this writing, Pusat Islam has not really taken any concrete step to ban the tariqat or to declare al-Arqam a deviant movement.

What it had done was to issue a rejoinder clarifying certain points found in Ashaari's book, Aurad Muhammadiyah Pegangan Darul Arqam and confirm that the aurad contained false teachings and beliefs and that the tariqat should be avoided by all Muslims in order not to go astray. On 24th February, 1986, the Religious Affairs Department of the Federal Territory had called for Ashaari to explain his case once again in the light of the new developments. But he failed to turn up at the appointed hour, with the excuse that he had migraine, and instead sent his three aides to represent him. Thus the meeting had to be
postponed.\textsuperscript{357} Up to the time of this writing, nothing more has been heard about the affair.

From the issues discussed, we can say that both al-Arqam and the tariqat have in some ways been influenced by Shi'ite traditions. One of these is the concept of taqiyah (dissimulation), that is, the concealment of one's true belief in times of danger or persecution.\textsuperscript{358} An instance of this is that when the Sheikh al-Arqam was under cross-examination at Pusat Islam on July 19, 1979, he categorically denied that he believed Sheikh as-Suhaimi to be the promised Mahdi.\textsuperscript{359} However, interestingly, in his new book, the Aurad, he states that he exercised tawāqquf (a wait and see attitude) in the matter.\textsuperscript{360} Meanwhile, in the tape concerned, he confessed to Ustaz Taha that he believed in it.\textsuperscript{361} Besides this, the Manāqīb of Ustaz Taha, differing in this from the original Javanese version, mentioned the disappearance of Sheikh as-Suhaimi and the fact that he would return as the Mahdi at the appointed hour. This is exactly the concept of rai'ah (return) popular within the Shi'ite traditions.\textsuperscript{362}

Aside from Shi'ite influence, the Manāqīb of Ustaz Taha seemed to be influenced by Javanese-Hindu mysticism. This is clearly the case in the issue
related to Ratu Adil as predicted by Jayabaya. Of significance too is the fact that Alas Kotonggo, which is believed to be the hiding place of the Mahdi, is also according to Javanese traditional belief a sacred place of gods (dewa-dewa). Furthermore, Ustaz Ashaari himself disclosed that the Khulafāʾ of Sheikh as-Suhaími for the whole of the Malaysian Peninsular are a number of personalities of Javanese descent. In any case, the traces of syncretism associated with al-Arqam’s practices via the tariqat have strengthened the Malaysians’ suspicion and hostility towards the movement. But, based in its new retreat at the more isolated Kampong Sempadan, near Karak, Pahang, it will probably be more difficult for the authorities to monitor its controversial activities.

**Jama'at Tabligh:**

*Jama'at Tabligh* is an Indian-inspired movement which had its beginning at Mewat, an area south of Delhi, in 1927, when it was launched by Maulānā Muḥammad Ilyās. However, its founder preferred to call it Tahrīk-i ʿImān (Faith Movement) rather than anything else. It was founded mainly to revitalize the ʿImān of the Muslims, whom the Maulānā viewed as being apathetic and flagging in their commitment to
the Islamic faith. Currently, its nerve centre and organisational stimulus are still located at Nizamuddin, in Delhi. Nevertheless, through an extensive network of missionaries (muballighin), it has gained a foothold in all the continents of the world.

\textit{Jama'at Tabligh} was first introduced into the Malay Peninsular in the 1950s, to help reinforce the flagging spirits of Southeast Asian Muslims. Compared to the two movements already discussed, it is the least structured. Initially, it managed only to find adherents among a small number of urban Muslims, particularly the Indian and Pakistani Muslims, within the business communities of Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and Penang. But, with the recent revival of Islamic consciousness, it has been able to win the hearts of more Malays than previously.

1. \textbf{Membership, Organisation and Activities:}

As a movement, \textit{Jama'at} directs its attention to males alone, although wives of followers are encouraged to hold their prayers and discussions in the seclusion of their own homes. Followers of this movement usually wear a green or white \textit{jubbah} and turbans or skull-caps. Each core congregation, under
the leadership of an *amir* or teacher, is loosely attached to a particular mosque, usually associated with the Indian community. Presently, their two most important centres of congregation in Malaysia are the Masjid India in Kuala Lumpur and the Masjid Pakistan in Penang. The language of the sermon and lectures is still in Urdu or Tamil or less commonly in Arabic, but recruitment of Malay-speaking lecturers or translators is more common today. Although it has been able to win the support of some educated people, most of its adherents are still found among those who are less educated and prefer a life of religious contemplation, remaining indifferent to the complexities of the developing Malaysian society and of the world at large. At the same time, the movement has the backing of some wealthy merchants of Indo-Pakistan origin.

It is estimated that the movement has about 5,000 followers in West Malaysia, but probably only one fifth of these are fully committed, with the majority vacillating on the fringes of this and other *da'wah* groups. Some of these members, including university lecturers and professionals, were recruited during their studies overseas. *Tabligh* sessions are held in various retreats (usually in mosque and *surau*) beginning from the *'asr* prayer. In such a session,
apart from listening to the talk given by the amir or his assistants, the congregation perform their salāt, recite the Qur'ān and the prescribed waza'if (daily portion of devotional readings or dhikr) and have their dinner (and also breakfast) together. Throughout this session, one can see Islamic brotherhood, solidarity and humility expressed openly among the congregation. All of this seems to encourage most regular attenders to remain in the movement. The gathering can last for a day and a night, three days and three nights or more. On such an occasion, no contact with the "outside" is allowed. It is also at such a meeting that members of the congregation are asked to commit themselves to a tablīgh tour of three days per month, forty days in a year or even four months in a lifetime. In addition, members are persistently urged to include in this tour a visit to the Delhi headquarters. This approach has caused some members of the public to complain of harassment or even for some of its own members to abandon the movement completely. Besides organising weekly local meetings, Jama'at activists also sponsor an occasional grand ijtima' (gathering) which involves members from all over the world.
Essentially, the activities of the *Jama'at* are non-political in nature, in conformity with the rules set down by its founder. It lays more stress on self-purification and this has caused its members to be less concerned with the material well-being of this world. In this respect, the movement closely follows the asceticism prevalent within *sufi* traditions of the past. In fact, Maulana Muhammed Ilyas incorporated certain *sufi* ideas and practices in his teachings and these remain an essential part of the movement. The *tabligh* works that the Maulana established are based on seven principles, six positive and one negative. These are the *kalimah* (the first article of faith), *salat* (prayer), *ta'allum* (acquisition of knowledge) and *dhikr* (remembrance of Allah), respect towards fellow Muslims, sincerity of *niyyat* (intention), that is, to perform every act for the sake of Allah alone, the devotion of some time to preaching tours, and lastly not engaging in idle, unlawful and unnecessary talk or actions. In following the rule of political abstention, some of the *Jama'at* members have even refused to participate in the administration of irreligious institutions. In this context, their revulsion against the secularist attitude entails a total rejection of the existing political order. It is this abstention from politics, which is in itself a political dimension,
that has caused much worry among Malay leaders within the Barisan government as they have always hoped to gain more support from the Islamically-oriented Malays. This orientation of the movement has also caused the Malaysian Indian Muslim Congress (KIMMA), which competes with the MIC for Indian support, to lose the chance of becoming a viable political party. At the same time, those who have joined the movement in the hope of finding a more comprehensive answer to their religious needs, eventually have to abandon it either for ABIM or Darul Arqam.

Notes:
1 Funston, Malay Politics, p. 217.
2 Ibid., pp. 217 - 219.
3 Quoted from the Malayan Digest, 4th September, 1970, p.3 by Milne and Mauzy, Politics, p. 92.
4 Funston, op. cit., p. 217.
5 Ibid., p. 128.
6 In this connection, Dato' Sri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad (the present Malaysian Premier) was expelled from UMNO, while Dato' Musa Hitam (his deputy until 16th March 1986) was dismissed from his post as a Deputy Minister to the Deputy Prime Minister.
7 op. cit.
8 Means, 'Public Policy', p. 394; Milne and Mauzy, Politics, pp. 326 - 327.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Mohamad Abu Bakar, *op. cit.*

Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid., p. 194.

Ibid.


28 Daane, op. cit.

29 See Halim Mahmood, op. cit., pp. 56 - 57; Lotfi Ismail, op. cit., p. 5.


31 The anti-Nasir faction, consisting of top politicians in Kelantan, had the support of Dato' Asri himself.

32 13 UMNO Assemblymen and a lone MCA member of the state assembly staged a walk-out together with Nasir when the vote was taken on 15 October 1977.


34 Berjasa has never developed into a national party. Its leader, Dato' Muhammad Nasir, until his retirement in 1982, had been kept busy by his ministerial activities in Kuala Lumpur and thus could not provide effective leadership to the party. Besides this, it has so far failed to develop a clear-cut policy and merely remains in the shadow of UMNO.

35 Giving the recent disturbances in Kelantan as its excuse, the government banned all political rallies. See Milne and Mauzy, op. cit., p. 388.


38 Surah Ali Imrān, 104.

39 Nagata, The Reflowering, p. 82.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid., p. 83.

42 See Ibid.

43 See Ibid.

44 Mohamad Abu Bakar, op. cit., p. 1040.


46 Ibid.


48 See Chapter 2 above, p. 86.

49 Mini-telekung is a specially designed head-cover which extends to the shoulders and chest. It is fashioned after the telekung, that is, a long, loose, chador-like dress worn by Muslim women while performing salāt.


51 Nagata, The Reflowering, Ibid. Also see Muzaffar, Islamic Resurgence, p. 5.


53 Ibid.; Muzaffar, op. cit., p. 3.
54 Contrary to the claim made by Nagata, they do not reject only Chinese dishes or food, but anything viewed as ritually unclean based on their understanding of Islamic dietary rules.


56 Since the early 80s, Arabic has been offered as a subject in the government run boarding schools. PERKIM too is presently offering Arabic lessons twice a week, especially to the residents of the Federal Territory.

57 Among them are also included some top civil servants.

58 However, the question and answer sessions have not become a feature of the Tabligh movement.

59 The bersanding (that is, sitting in state) ceremony, which originated from Hindu culture, has at some stage become an integral part of a Malay wedding. In this instance, both the bridegroom and his partner are made to sit on the dais in full view of the guests, including the ajānib (those outside the family circle). Lately, those influenced by da'wah have refused to participate in this and other similar ceremonies like the bridal procession and have instead opted for the much simpler but solemn religious rites prescribed by Ḡarīfāh.


61 Nagata, op. cit.

62 This point was raised by Prof. Dato' Hj. Shahnnon Ahmad, a novelist and Director of the Islamic Centre, Universiti Sains Malaysia, in an interview on 18 June, 1986.

63 Such works were translated from the books written by eminent writers like Husayn Haykal, 'Abbās al-Aqqād, Abul Ḥasan ‘Alī al-Nadawī and so forth.


65 Mohamad Abu Bakar, op. cit.
The Islamic activists, however, accept the idea of pan-Islamism and the need of *ijtihād* as propagated by al-Afghanī and 'Abduh.

Fundamentalism in this case means going back to the *Qur’ān* and *Sunnah* of the Prophet and also the examples set by al-Salaf al-Salih (Early Generations of Pious Muslims), while not abandoning the material aspects of life, including the benefits provided by modern science and technology.


Revival of Islam in Malaysia: The Role of ABIM, a pamphlet issued by ABIM, Kuala Lumpur, n. d.

See pp. 94 - 95 above.

Revival of Islam, ABIM, *op. cit.*


Revival of Islam, ABIM; Rose Ismail, *Group Changes Its Style*, *New Straits Times*, July 9, 1986.


Revival of Islam, ABIM.


Revival of Islam, ABIM.

Ibid.

Rose Ismail, *New Straits Times, op. cit.*

Mohamad Abu Bakar, *'Islamic Revivalism'* , p. 1046.

Rose Ismail, *op. cit.*

Ibid.


Ibid.

Recently, Helwa even organised an educational visit to Thailand. See *Risalah*, Tahun ke 10, Bil. 1, 1404/1984, pp. 14 - 15.
86 Revival of Islam, ABIM.

87 Nagata, The Reflowering, p. 89.

88 Ibid.

89 Ibid.

90 Ibid., p. 90.

91 Ibid.

92 For example, Ustaz Hj. Abdul Hadi Hj. Awang, now of PAS, prior to his study at Madinah and al-Azhar had been a student at his father's own pondok. See Mohamad Abu Bakar, 'Ulama Pondok dan Politik Kepartian di Malaysia: 1945 - 1985', in Khoo Kay Kim et. al. (eds.), Malaysia Masa Kini, 1985, p. 117.

93 Nagata, op. cit.

94 Ibid.

95 Ibid., p. 88.

96 Ibid.


98 Rose Ismail, New Straits Times, July 9, 1986.

99 Ibid.

100 Ibid.


102 Morais, op. cit., p. 3.

103 Ibid.

104 Ibid., p. 4.

105 Ibid.

106 Ibid.
193

107 Mohamad Abu Bakar, 'Islamic Revivalism', p. 1048.
Von der Mehden, op. cit. p. 173.

108 Morais, op. cit. p. 6.

109 Ibid., p. 8.

110 Pembina Generasi, (Biodata), Keluaran 5, Mei/Jun
1985, p. 50.

111 Ibid.

112 Ibid.

113 Ibid.

114 Ibid.

115 Revival of Islam, ABIM.

116 Ibid.

117 Ibid.

118 Ibid.


120 This is similar to the Free Schools of Shaikh
'Abdul Hamid Ben Badis, established in Algeria during
the 1930s.

121 Asiaweek, Aug. 24, 1979, p. 22; Morais, op. cit.,
p. 5.

122 Morais, Ibid., p. 4.

123 Ibid., p. 5.

124 Ibid.

125 Nagata, The Reflowering, p. 93.

126 Morais, op. cit.

127 Ibid.


129 Asiaweek, Aug. 24, 1979, p. 22.

130 Ibid.; Morais, op. cit.

131 Morais, Ibid., p. 6.
132 Morais, Ibid., p. 5.

133 Nagata, The Reflowering, pp. 92 - 93.


139 Morais, op. cit., p. 8.

140 Among the works translated are those of Maududi, Hasan al-Banna, Fatih Yakan and Abul Hasan 'Ali Nadawi.

141 Nagata, The Reflowering, p. 93.

142 Revival of Islam, ABIM.

143 Ibid.

144 Funston, 'Malaysia', p. 175; Asiaweek, Aug. 24, 1979, p. 21.

145 Mohamad Abu Bakar, op. cit., p. 1046.

146 Ibid.

147 Revival of Islam, ABIM.

148 Risalah, Bil. 2, Th. 9, 1983, p. 22.

149 Ibid., pp. 22 - 23.

150 Funston, 'Malaysia', p. 174.

151 Ibid.


153 Funston, op. cit., p. 175.

154 Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Funston, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

AsiaWeek, Aug. 24, 1979, p. 22.


ISA, which provides for detention without trial over an indefinite period of time for any person deemed to be a security threat, was part of a colonial legacy. It was first introduced in Malaya in 1948 in...


186 Ibid.


188 Morais, op. cit., pp. 16 - 17.


189 It is issued in English.

190 Mohamad Abu Bakar, 'Islamic Revivalism', p. 1048.

192 Ibid.


199 Morais, Ibid.

200 Ibid.

201 Ibid., p. 54.
In this capacity, it is more open and more prepared to adapt in the face of a changing situation. As ABIM's Secretary General put it, "In upholding amar maaruf and preventing munkar, we emphasize more the discretion of du'at rather than the approach of qudah (judges)". Risalah, Bil. 1/86, p. 7.


S. Latif dan C. Wariya, *op. cit.*, p. 145.


Siddiq Fadil, *Dā'i - Pembina 'Aqidah, Pembangun Ummah*, pp. 9 - 10.


New Straits Times, July 9, 1986.

*Risalah*, p. 12.


*Rose Ismail, New Straits Times*, July 9, 1986.

Muhammad Kamal Hassan, *The Response of Muslim Youth Organisations to Political Change: HMI in*


225 See discussion on page 141 above.


228 The whole saga became known to the Malaysian public when an investigation started in Hong Kong following the murder of Jalil Ibrahim, a Malaysian Bank Officer and special investigator, sent out by Bank Bumiputra headquarters in Kuala Lumpur to look into the affair. As late as January 1987, Anwar Ibrahim, now the Minister of Education, was still calling for those national leaders mentioned in the BMF case being heard at Hong Kong to clear their names. See *Utusan Malaysia*, January 23, 1987.

229 See *Risalah*, Bil, 3/86, p. 31.

230 *Aslamah* is used here to describe a process of making every thing Islamic.


237 See *Panji Masyarakat*, Nov. 1984, pp. 6 – 8. For a detail discussion see Chapter 5 above.


239 Siddiq Fadil, *Dāʻi – Pembina Aqidah, Pembangun Ummah*, p. 25.

241 Ibid.

242 Ibid., pp. 15 - 18.

243 Ibid., pp. 16 - 17.


245 Ibid., pp. 17 - 18.


249 New Sunday Times, op. cit.

250 New Straits Times, July 9, 1986.


252 Ibid., p. 18.


254 An Introduction to Darul Arqam: An Islamic Movement in Malaysia, a pamphlet issued by Al-Arqam Information Services, Kuala Lumpur, n. d.


258 Ustaz Asaari, Ibid.


Abdul Rahman Hj. Abdullah, *op. cit.*

Ibid.


An exception are Ustaz Roshidi Yusuf, Sheikh Abdul Rahim b. Sheikh Ahmad and the former deputy of Sheikh al-Arqam, Ustaz Hj. Mokhtar Yaakub.


Those who are critical-minded cannot survive long within the movement. Such was the case of Akhbar Anang and his friends, which will be discussed later.

Nagata, *op. cit.*

Ibid.

This is logical as until late 1972, Ustaz Ashaari was still a member of PAS, while he was also active in a body called Jamiah. Subsequently, he was for some time a member of ABIM. See *Biodata, op. cit.*


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Abdul Ahmad, 'Perkampungan Islam Darul Arqam, Sekolah tidak, pondok pun tidak', *Dewan Masyarakat*. 

278 Ibid.

279 Mohamad Abu Bakar, 'Islamic Revivalism', p. 1048.

280 *Darul Arqam*, (pamphlet).


282 Later, a Romanised edition of *Al-Arqam* has also been published, together with the magazines *Al-Munir*, *Al-'Ain* and *Al-Mukminah*.


284 Ibid., p. 51.

285 Apparently, most *Al-Arqam* publications carry the picture of its supreme leader, while all his lectures are given prominence. See for example such books and magazines as *Pada Hemah dan Pandangan Ustaz Hj. Ashaari Muhammad, Huraian Ke Arah Membangun Negara dan Masyarakat Islam, Yang Tersirat Di Surat dan Fardhu 'Ain*, (1980 - 1986).


288 Nagata, Ibid.

289 Muzaffar, *op. cit.*, p. 47.


291 Ibid., pp. 51 - 52.


293 Ibid.


296 Ibid.

297 Ibid.
298 Ibid.

299 Manaf Abdul Rahman, op. cit., p. 43.


301 Ibid., p. 125.

302 Judith Nagata and Mohamad Abu Bakar appear to hold this view.


304 Ibid.


306 See for example the lectures of al-Arqam's chief in such works as Pada Hemah dan Pandangan Ustaz Ashaari Muhammad, Perjuangan Menurut Islam. Apa itu Masyarakat Islam dan Yang Tersirat di Surat.

307 Ibid.

308 An Introduction to Darul Arqam, (pamphlet).


312 In this case, the 'ulama' concerned do not oppose polygamy per se. Their objection is that it has been practised rather loosely so that some young female undergraduates have been persuaded to abandon their studies in order to marry one or another of the movement's leaders. Another question put forward is whether the ruling set by the Shar'iah in terms of polygamy has been properly and justly observed in such marriages.
The name *Muhammadiyah* has nothing to do with a reformist movement of the same name in Indonesia.

*op. cit.*


However, as Ustaz Ashaari himself admitted in his new work, *Aurad Muhammadiyah*, p. 15, "99% of Darul Arqam's members do not know about this matter [the identity of Imam Mahdi] as the *Manaqib* is not easy to find". Thus, there is here an element of secrecy concerning the *tarīqah*, even though the members are encouraged to practice the *Aurad*.

*New Sunday Times*, July 20, 1986; Akhbar et. al., *op. cit.*, pp. 2 and 8.


Pak Kiyai Mat is the name by which Muhammad Abdullah b. Muhammad Khairullah as-Suhaimi, the grandson of Sheikh Muhammad b. Abdullah as-Suhaimi, is known to al-Arqam's members. His other aliases are Pak Mat Kelang and Pak Mat Kontrektor, since his normal occupation is that of a building contractor. He is said to be the one who had given Ustaz Ashaari the permission to spread the *tarīqah*. Akhbar et. al., pp. 2 and 10.

The Sheikh al-Argam had attacked ABIM for organizing forums and seminars. For him such activities and also the taking of minutes at a meeting, are all part of being westernised and jahiliyah. See Akhbar et. al., pp. 23 - 24 and 28.

The book in question, now in its third edition, still carries the cynical criticism of other Islamic movements, at home and abroad, which Akhbar had tried to edit out. See Huraian Ke Arah Membangun Negara dan Masyarakat Islam, pp. 33 and 82.

Sheikh Muhammad as-Suhaimi was born at Kampung Sudagaran, in the territory of Wonosobo, Java in 1259H. Later, he studied at Mecca, after having completed his education at various local pondoks. His descendants claim that he was of the family of the Prophet (s. a. W.). See Manaqib, p. 3 and Nasab (Genealogy) Chart, Appendix B.

For Imam Mahdi see ahadith transmitted by al-Tirmidhī, Abu Dāwūd, Al-Hākim, Ahmad and al-Tabarānī. These traditions are regarded as mutawātir (most established tradition). Al-Haqr Hamiza, op. cit., pp. 43 - 51.

Akhbar et. al., p. 5; Manaqib, pp. 49 & 54; Ustaz Ashaari, Aurad, p. 56.

Alas Kotonggo is believed to be a 'city of awliyā', though it usually appears as a tropical forest to non-disciples. See Manaqib, p. 51.

Ratu Adil is a messianic hero figure of the Javanese legend usually associated with agrarian revolts in Central and East Java. The oldest such movement was the Diponegoro revolt of 1720. See Sartono Kartodirjo, Protest Movements in Rural Java, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1978, pp. 65 - 66; P. M. Holt et. al., op. cit., pp. 151 - 152.

Jayabaya (Javanese - Joyoboyo) was a Buddhist ruler of Kediri, who lived in the 12th century. His name was mentioned in the ancient epic Bharatayuddha (Brata-Yuda) written somewhere around 1157, which is

339 Akhbar et. al., *Lampiran 2*, p. 5.


343 *Utusan Malaysia*, 12 Julai, 1986.


345 *Utusan Malaysia*, *op. cit.*


349 See his discussion concerning the *Manāqib* in Appendix C.

350 Al-Haqir Hamizan, p. 60.

351 Cassette no. 3, *Keyakinan Ustaz Ashaari tentang Sheikh Muhammad as-Suhaimi sebagai Imamul Mahdi, Perkhidmatan Tabung Ananah Jamaah*, n. d. (The cassettes come in a set of three, with numbers one and two containing the main part of the briefing and discussions about the *tariqat*, *aurad* and *al-Arqam*).


353 All the materials concerning the *tariqat* and *al-Arqam*, including the cassettes have been handed over to Pusat Islam. See *New Straits Times*, July 2, 1986.


358 For a discussion on *taqīyah* see Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba'i, *Shī‘īte Islam*, (trans. and ed. by

359 Al-Haqr Hamizan, pp. 71 - 72.

360 See Ashaari, Aurad, p. 184.

361 See Cassette no. 3.

362 For raj'ah see Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba'i, op. cit., pp. 211 - 214.


364 It is common for silat (Malay martial art) groups to use the title khilifah for their top leaders.

365 Ashaari, Aurad, p. 78.

366 Utusan Malaysia, 17 Februari, 1987; Utusan Malaysia, 4 Mac, 1987; Utusan Malaysia, 6 April, 1987.

367 Sungai Penchala now only remained as a small branch of al-Arqam, without the glamour that it used to enjoy.


369 Ibid., pp. 45 - 46.


373 Nagata, op. cit.


376 Nagata, Ibid.

377 This can be observed in Penang and Kuala Lumpur.

Tabligh means preaching, communicating or imparting of Islamic teachings.


Ibid., p. 119.

Ibid., p. 118.

Ibid.


Mohamad Abu Bakar, op. cit., p. 1049.

M. Anwarul Haq, op. cit., p. 46.


Dhikr involves the recitation of Subhāna 'llāh (Praise be to Allāh), Alhamdu li'l-lāh (Thanks be to the Lord), Allāhu Akbar (Allāh is great) and so forth.


Mohamad Abu Bakar, op. cit., p. 1049.

Ibid.
CHAPTER 4

Islamic Heterodoxy.

In this chapter, we shall discuss Islamic heterodoxy, which is still a part of the Malaysian scene, and in fact has had some influence upon the general development of Islam within the country. Currently, across Malaysia, there are numerous heterodox groups (kumpulan ajaran sesat) which have been mistakenly identified by Nagata as localised da'wah movements. Despite the fact that these groups have had some impact upon the local scene, no one who is really familiar with Islam in Malaysia will be ready to classify them as da'wah movements, unless as some times happened, for the purpose of discrediting other da'wah movements, in the course of defending or promoting his own political ends.

Islamic heterodoxy is not new to Malaysia or for that matter the whole of the Nusantara region. For instance, Ustaz Abdul Fatah Haron Ibrahim of the Usuluddin and Philosophy Department, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, has stated that these uneducated groups had their beginning with the coming of Islam to Nusantara. They spread among the local population through oral transmission and also by way of written works found in Malay Literature.
(Associate Professor) Muhd. Sulaiman Hj. Yassin, head of the same department, and also a sūfī in his own right, argued that these groups were not tariqah, although they had tried to link themselves with tariqah activities, in order to gain legitimacy among the people. He also added that they were simply promoting false teachings (ajaran-ajaran palsu) for the sake of gaining material benefits, that is, fame, power and fortune and also because of the distorted minds of their leaders. In pursuing their goals, these people have even associated their teachings with the doctrine of Imām Mahdī and have given vague Rātīnī (esoteric) interpretations to Quranic āyāt (verses) and hadīth. In defining deviant teachings, Mohd. Amin Salleh of Pusat Islam, wrote that "these are teachings and practices which contravene the Sharī‘ah and sources of Islamic law, even though they claimed to be from Islam and are being taught to the members of the society in secret or at times openly ...". In fact, he asserted that in Malaysia these teachings "exist in the form of syncretism between animistic beliefs, Hindu-Buddhist influence and other pre-Islamic practices."

The deviant groups exist in both urban and rural areas of Malaysia, each of them focusing around a specific leader. Paradoxically, they are found most
frequently in Kedah and Kelantan, long considered to be the most "religious" of Malay States. Upon being discovered, some of these groups have been labelled as "deviant", "confused" or "false" (songsang, menyeleweng or salah) by both religious and da'wah authorities and also by government spokesmen. We shall look below at a number of cases concerning these deviant movements and simultaneously assess their impacts upon Islam in Malaysia.

a. Taslim.

One of the most famous of these deviant groups is the Taslim or the Matahari movement, as it is known in Kedah and Penang. According to one of its former members, the name Taslim was derived from the word taslima (surrender) in verse 56 of Surat al-Ahzab, in the Qur'an. In this connection, according to Taslim's interpretation, the word taslima in the ayah (verse) concerned means the total surrender of a follower, his wife and children as well as his property to the 'prophet', that is, the leader of the movement or in case of his death to his 'khalifah' (successor) at Kampung Seronok, Bayan Lepas, Penang. If this is not carried out, then in Taslim's view the person's Islam is not valid at all. Besides this, the movement is also called Matahari (Sun) as its
founder the late Hj. Ahmad b. Shafie, a man of Sumatran origin, had pointed to the sun when he was asked about God by Sheikh Abdul Rahman al-Jarumi, a well-known Kedah alim, following a munāzarah (discussion) between him and the man. As a result of this incident, Hj. Ahmad was known as "Hj. Ahmad Matahari" and was banned forever from entering Kedah. However, in making this gesture, Hj. Ahmad was in fact upholding the Rātīnīyah's doctrine of wahdat al-wujūd (pantheism).

Besides unconditional submission to the leader, Taslīm requires that the shahādah be pronounced before the leader or his khālīfah in order to validate it. Further, it rejects the Qur'ān as mere fabrication, with the 'authentic one' residing in the person of the 'prophet' of the Taslīm; Friday prayers simply means a union between Adam and Eve, and thus the performance of the jamā'ah (congregational prayer) means to have sexual union; the hajj can be performed only by going up the Bukit Payong, a hillock close to the house of the leader at Kampung Seronok, while dhikr, which is carried out in the dark, reaches its peak of revelry far into the night, with the members involved in group sex sessions. Adultery is encouraged within the movement as the offspring of such unions are considered blessed. Most interesting of all is that
sins can be absolved by the leader on payment of a certain sum of money. It is argued that these teachings influenced those involved because of their sheer ignorance of Islam, their use of drugs and their desire for adventure.

At present, the movement, which started in the 40s, has been on the wane as more people learn of its heterodox nature and also because of more stringent religious control.

b. Nasrul Haq.

Another group which used to promote dubious teachings is the Nasrul Haq. According to its adviser, a man of Indonesian origin, the name of the movement was derived from Nasr al-Haq (The Help of the Truth) only in 1976. Its famous khaliffah and patron, Datuk Hj. Abdul Samad Idris, the former Malaysian Minister of Youth, Culture and Sports, claimed that he had acquired the spiritual knowledge from his grandfather and parents and that he later perfected it after learning silat at Jawa Barat (West Java) and a further study of its teachings at its original home in Sumatra Barat (West Sumatra). Essentially, Nasrul Haq is a combination of martial arts and spiritual knowledge, which include the
performance of dhikr. In practice, it involves an oath-taking ceremony, the observance of good moral conducts and an emphasis on strong bonds of love and loyalty between members of the movement.\textsuperscript{27} In this connection, it shares the features common to all 
\textit{sufi} orders and secret societies.

In its brief life, the movement developed many branches, only to be pruned prematurely. Like other \textit{silat} groups, it had its own styles and techniques of self-defence and modes of disciplines.\textsuperscript{28} By 1978, its membership reached at least 300,000.\textsuperscript{29} But the fact that it was sponsored in the name of Islam in an era of heightened sensitivity to religious niceties and was simultaneously under the patronage of a certain contentious cabinet minister caused the movement to be exposed to much public attention and heated debate.\textsuperscript{30} Religiously, it was viewed as a body which had overstepped the legitimate conventions of \textit{silat} proper and was indulging in some dubious practices which wrongfully invoked Islam, somewhat in the manner of Indonesian-style mystical cults (kebatinan), as when its members engaged in \textit{sufi}-like chanting until they achieved a state of trance.\textsuperscript{31} Further objections were raised when the movement's leaders began using Islamic titles like \textit{khalifah}, giving sermons, and demanding a personal oath of loyalty, thereby encroaching upon and
insulting the true faith. Meanwhile, da'wah activists rejected it as being an embodiment of the adat-influenced, syncretic Islam of the old Malay tradition that they have condemned and are trying to change.33

Initially, the movement did flourish as its patron had the advantage of being the Minister of Youth, Culture and Sports and also an influential politician in his home state of Negri Sembilan. Through his office, he could channel financial resources and influence Malay youth into joining the movement, and also construct silat arenas and muster giant rallies in Kuala Lumpur, amidst much publicity and pageantry.34 On the occasion when the Nasrul Haq House was opened in Kuala Lumpur in 1978, it was inaugurated by no less a prominent patron than Tun Hussein Onn, the Prime Minister.35 In the speech, Tun Hussein praised the movement and called upon its members to use their arts in defence of national interests.36 In view of this, some observers suggested that the movement at this time was seen by UMNO leaders as a useful weapon to counter PAS's Islam.37 But soon it got out of hand.

By mid-1978, its leader was constantly attacked by religious circles, particularly da'wah activists, and
also by his political rivals, who feared his growing power. He was first forced to relinquish the title of khalifah and then to ensure that none of his followers misused Quranic verses or mosque buildings for their self-defence activities. Eventually, the movement was banned following its condemnation as sinful and deviant by the National Council of Religious Affairs. Following this, the fortune of the minister himself began to wither, so that he lost power as a youth leader and finally even his place in the cabinet.

c. Crypto.

In the mid-70s, the Muslims of Malaysia were shocked to discover that there was yet another heterodox teaching spreading in their midst. This was the Crypto. The word "crypto" itself originates from Greek. The choice of this name with its associations of "hidden and secret", as we shall see, fitted very well into the teachings and modus operandi applied by the movement in question.

The teachings have been known to operate at various centres in Tel Aviv, Switzerland and Chicago. In fact, they spread in the United States of America since the 1880s and are believed to have
been founded by Jews.\textsuperscript{43} In Malaysia itself, it was first discovered in 1977/78.\textsuperscript{44}

The founder and leader of this movement was Mokhtar Hassan, who until the time of his arrest was a resident of east Jelutong, Penang.\textsuperscript{45} This English-educated person used to travel to Singapore, while serving as an employee of Datok Keramat Smelting Company in Penang between 1968 - 1971. Most probably, he had been influenced by these teachings during such visits, as Singapore is also a centre for \textit{Crypto} in Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{46}

Essentially, \textit{Crypto} is an amalgamation of three religions, that is, Islam, Christianity and Judaism.\textsuperscript{47} This is evident from its own literature and also the English translation of the \textit{Qur'ān} entitled '\textit{Ashab al-Kahf}', rendered of course in the fashion of \textit{Crypto}'s beliefs.\textsuperscript{48} Besides this, \textit{Crypto} doctrines totally contradict the \textit{Sharī'ah}. Among these are the claim that the five daily prayers are unnecessary, and if required they can be reduced only to two, with another prayer to be offered late at night in the \textit{Crypto} way; there is no such thing as fasting; \textit{zakāt} is to be paid to Mokhtar Hassan himself; \textit{Hajj} means only circumcision, while free sex is encouraged and the leader (Mokhtar), who himself claims to be the \textit{Mahdī}
and 'Isa al-Masih (Jesus, the Messiah), thus at the same time infallible (ma‘ṣūm), can even have sex with his followers' wives in the tradition of droit du seigneur. Mokhtar also claimed that he received the wahy (revelation) and that he belonged to the Jewish race, the greatest of all mankind. Amusingly, each prayer (du‘ā') is to be recited in Latin.

Like Taslim, Crypto was spread through secret contacts. Similarly, its doctrines display a clear influence of Shi‘ite ghulāt, that is, extremism related to Bātini interpretations of Islamic doctrines. Drugs and magic (sihr) plus silat were used to draw the intended followers. Convinced that Crypto was a threat to the nation's security, especially when documents pertaining to its "Theocracy" were discovered, together with its own identity-cards, visas, money, flag and para-military uniforms, the government had Mokhtar and his lieutenants arrested under ISA on March 23 and 24, 1983. As a result of this, the movement collapsed.

d. Tariqat Noor Zaman.

Some of these dubious movements can really be dangerous. For example, on 16 October, 1980, a group known as Tariqat Noor Zaman, under the leadership of
Muhammad Nasir Ismail, a Cambodian refugee who claimed himself to be the Mahdi, attacked a police station at Batu Pahat, Johore. In this bloody incident, six of the attackers, including Nasir, who claimed himself to be invincible, were killed, while twenty-three other members of the public were seriously wounded.

To control his followers, Nasir had made use of sihr and hypnotism. Among his teachings were included complete loyalty to the leader as a passport to paradise, a change in the shahādah, that is, replacing the phrase 'Muḥammad Rasūlullāh' with 'Mūsā Kalīmullāh', and the change in the rules and manner by which salāt are to be offered.

The fact that there are numerous heterodox groups in Malaysia has in a way hampered the smooth development of genuine da'wah in the country. For example, some parents not only refused to let their children join any da'wah movement for fear of being involved in heterodox teachings, but also chose to attack da'wah activities indiscriminately. Further, their very existence has given the opportunity to some unscrupulous politicians, as we shall see in the next chapter, to brand any da'wah movement which is critical of their Machiavellian ways as being deviant and thus requiring to be persecuted. At the same time,
it exposes innocent people who are interested in religious practices to unnecessary exploitation, while deepening the suspicions and misunderstanding of the non-Muslims towards Islam. At any rate, such a state of affairs has helped to increase tension that has been building up within the fabric of the multi-racial Malaysian society.

Notes:

2. Interview on 14/7/86.
3. Ibid.
4. Interview on 16/7/86.
7. Ustaz Abdul Fatah, interviewed on 14/7/86.
9. Ibid.
11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.


17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.


22 S. N. al-Attas, *op. cit.*

23 Ibid., p. 95; Hj. Abdullah, p. 31.

24 It could operate more freely in Penang under the colonial administration.


26 Ibid.

27 Ibid., pp. 70 -71.


29 Ibid., p. 66.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid., p. 37.
Nagata is mistaken in naming Tun Abdul Razak as the Prime Minister who officiated at the ceremony for the man was already dead at that time.

op. cit., p. 67.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 68.


Ibid., p. 2.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Mohamed Jusoh et. al., pp. 2 - 3.

Ibid., p. 2.

Ibid., p. 3.

Ibid., pp. 3 - 4; Hj. Abdullah, p. 63.

Mohamed Jusoh et. al., p. 3; Hj. Abdullah, op. cit.

Hj. Abdullah, Ibid.

Mohamed Jusoh et. al., p. 6.

Mokhtar is an exponent of a silat called Silat Panca Indra.

Hj. Abdullah, op. cit., p. 165; Mohd. Amin, op. cit., p. 32.

Mohd. Amin, Ibid.

Hj. Abdullah, op. cit., p. 165.

Ibid., pp. 166 - 167.
CHAPTER 5
Responses Towards Islamic Consciousness.

This chapter will be devoted to a discussion of the prevalent responses to Islamic consciousness in Malaysia, considering both the positive and negative aspects. As we have seen, Islamic consciousness, particularly that associated with the da'wah phenomenon, has courted and is still courting various responses from Malaysians of all creeds and ethnic origins. In the ensuing discussion, we shall consider the issue in detail and also analyse its effects upon the general situation vis-à-vis Islam in Malaysia.

a. Islamic Revival and the Malaysian government:

On the whole, the Malaysian government has shown an ambivalent attitude towards the rising tide of Islam in the country. So far, it has adopted five different approaches at one time or another; coercion, cooption, establishment of support groups, invoking the threat of internal and external enemies of the state, and the development of symbols of legitimacy. As will be seen, at times these policies flow into one another and may also be mutually reinforcing.
It is the fear of fundamentalist ideas more than anything else which accounts for the mixed reactions exhibited by the ruling powers in Malaysia. By encouraging *da’wah* activities, it hopes to forestall the growing influence of the non-government *da’wah* groups, besides showing the Muslim public that it is after all striving for Islam. In this light, the government has stepped up its own *da’wah* activities. For instance, it launched the nation-wide *Bulan Dakwah* (Missionary Month) in late 1978.² On this occasion, the then Prime Minister Datuk Hussein Onn called upon the Muslims to adhere strictly to Islamic principles in propagating Islam and to follow the examples of the Prophet.³ However, on seeing that the event had given rise to more Islamic fervour among the youth and that it had become another avenue for the spread of fundamentalist ideas, the government decided to bury it indefinitely. Besides this, it has sponsored the annual Qur’ān reading competition both at national and international levels, the latter held in Merdeka Stadium with the prime minister and other members of his cabinet attending.⁴ The media have been widely used to underscore the importance of these events.

Apparently, with the growing pressure of Muslim fundamentalism, the government is forced to speak favourably of *da’wah* activity and to call for the
adoption of the Islamic way of life within the nation. On one occasion, the Minister of Law called for the revision of the national legal system so that it could be more in line with the Islamic creed.⁵ Even the concept of national development has been increasingly discussed and presented to the people in religious terms since mid-1971.⁶ In this spirit, Dato' Sri Dr. Mahathir, the then Minister of Commerce and Industry within Hussein Onn's cabinet, tried to foil the opposition of some religious groups to foreign investment by arguing that the promotion of investment is in accordance with the teachings of Islam.⁷ More interesting still is that government ministers too prefer to start their speeches with "Assalamu'alaikum" and some even pepper their speeches with phrases like "Alhamdulillah" and "Insya Allah" - utterances which had once been the normal practice only among asātidhah and religious-minded people. Besides this, more and more Islamic programmes have been broadcast over the radio and television, including the azan, Qur'ān reading and a short commentary on the hadīth.⁸ Just as in Egypt, since the era of Nasser, ministers and other dignitaries are often televised while attending the Friday prayer at the Masjid Negara in Kuala Lumpur.

Further, the government also took the initiative in sponsoring da'wah organisations and activities. By
the early 70s, the activities of the Majlis Kebangsaan Hal Ehwal Agama Islam was expanded to encompass also instruction in Islam, publications of Islamic materials, an Islamic Research Centre (Pusat Penyelidikan Islam) and in April 1974, the Institut Dakwah dan Latihan Islam (INDAH or Islamic Missionary Training Institute). The importance of this council was also emphasized by the appointment in 1973 of a Deputy Minister to oversee its activities. Such activities have also been the preoccupation of various states, where da'wah sections have become an established part of the religious bureaucracy.

However, government da'wah agencies differed from the non-government da'wah groups in that they laid more stress on the moral and spiritual teachings of Islam. In this connection, one local da'wah observer argues:

"[government missionaries] seldom showed a critical attitude towards government policies. Rather, they generally raised aspects of Islam that supported the position of the government or touched on Islam in a general manner, such as emphasizing that it endorsed progress, or that it was the religion of Allah. A few government missionaries [out of their own faith] who went beyond these limitations were considered unsuitable or too radical, and were eventually shifted to other positions or forbidden to teach".

Fearing that the rise of fundamentalism could endanger its own position and also bring about racial conflict, the government thus far has taken several steps to dislodge the fundamentalists from their position of influence in Malay society. These efforts range from indirect discouragement and tacit approval of certain other da'wah activities to outright condemnation and even physical prevention of their religious activities. The favourite themes of the government leaders have been to brand da'wah activists as "extremists", "fanatics" or "anti-national", without actually naming the group or the person whom they have in mind. This often leads the most alert of the Islamists to reply that "a good Muslim is one who adheres fully and strictly to the precepts of the Qur'an and hadith". It is also becoming current for supporters of the Islamists to sarcastically refer to the government's emphasis on Islam as 'ketam mengajar anaknya berjalan betul' or 'cakap tak serupa bikin'.

Apart from branding the fundamentalists with such labels, the government also tries to discredit the da'wah groups by harping on dakwah songsang (false da'wah), thus implying that their activities are, to say the least, unislamic. Following the Kerling Incident of 1978, when a few followers of a splinter
group desecrated a Hindu temple, some government supporters took the opportunity to hit out at da'wah "extremists". The same ambiguous criticism was made after the attack on the Batu Pahat police station by a certain misguided splinter group. ABIM together with other da'wah organisations also voiced their opposition to religious intolerance such as the case in Kerling. Besides this, from time to time it pointed out that the government itself with its pro-Bumiputra policy had been guilty of intolerance and injustice.

Another means of controlling da'wah activities in Malaysia is the implementation of a variety of regulations such as the printing permits. The best example of this is when ABIM's organ Risalah was refused a permit for several years. Simultaneously, efforts have been made to ban religious talks on the grounds of sedition or incitement. For example, in various states, religious councils, in conjunction with district officers uneasy at the activities of certain religious leaders, whether of the traditional guru or urban da'wah variety, are refusing to provide the requisite permits to speak publicly or at times even set up roadblocks along crucial access roads. On several occasions, ABIM was denied the use of a hall or a mosque to carry out its da'wah programmes,
while other bodies were advised against cooperating with the movement.\textsuperscript{23}

However, out of sheer desperation in the face of mounting opposition towards their policy, the Malaysian authorities, like the former colonial government, have at times made use of the draconian Internal Security Act (ISA) to silence its critics. It was under this act that Anwar Ibrahim, the former president of ABIM, was detained for two years without trial, following the mass anti-government demonstration in support of the deprived people of Baling in late 1974.\textsuperscript{24} Some opposition members, including those of PAS, have been detained under the same act.\textsuperscript{25} Even now, with the Islamisation programme in progress, ISA is still being used as an instrument against dissent. The Printing Machine and Publication Act of 1984 is also an extension of State control towards what it deems to be detrimental to the "national interest".\textsuperscript{26} Another major effort made to control the da‘wah phenomenon was the implementation of the Societies (Amendment) Act of 1981.\textsuperscript{27} But a more coercive process was employed in the case of the Memali incident of late 1985, when three police forces, including the dreaded Federal Reserve Unit (Unit Simpanan Persekutuan) and the commando-like unit, the Police Field Force (Pasukan Polis Hutan)\textsuperscript{28}
backed by two fully equipped armoured cars, were used in an attack on the much inferior group of the late Ustaz Ibrahim Mahmud (nicknamed Ibrahim Libya), a respected religious leader and a supporter of PAS, at Kampung Memali, Baling, Kedah. 29

Meanwhile, the cooption of individuals or groups known to have been critical of the government and the development of supportive networks used in the dealing with the Islamic revival have been far more frequent in Malaysia. One great leap in terms of cooption was the recruitment of Anwar Ibrahim, the former ABIM leader, into UMNO and also the federal cabinet. 30 This move by Dato' Sri Dr. Mahathir was nothing new in Malaysia. In fact, the same tactic was used by the late Tun Razak when he created the Barisan. Nevertheless, this latest move brought into the government a serious potential political and religious foe as well as providing it with a legitimate and recognised Islamic spokesman known for his charisma and independence. 31 Anwar, on his part, rose rapidly to become the present Minister of Education and one of the most influential UMNO Naib-Presiden (Vice-Presidents). 32 Equally importance, he has been a principal actor in the campaigns against political opponents such as PAS. 33 In another case, an al-Argam
delegation was invited to lecture to a group of the Police Field Force on the theme of "divine service through defence", back in 1981.34

Apart from setting up or expanding their own religious agencies as mentioned in the previous pages, the Malaysian authorities also support a number of da'wah organisations. Such bodies include the Yayasan Dakwah Islamiah Malaysia (YADIM or Islamic Dakwah Foundation of Malaysia), which for a number of years was headed by the Speaker of the Dewan Rakyat, the late Tan Sri Syed Nasir 'Ismail, PERKIM led by Tunku Abdul Rahman, the former Prime Minister of Malaysia, the United Sabah Islamic Association (USIA or Persatuan Islam Bersatu Sabah) and Angkatan Nahdatul Islam Bersatu (BINA) of Sarawak.37

Until today, the most important and influential agency in league with the government for the promotion of Islam is the revitalized PERKIM, which concentrates its efforts mainly towards the conversion of non-Malays to Islam.38 Since 1974, it has been led personally by the Tunku, with the help of some dedicated non-Malay da'at, including the late Hj. Ibrahim Ma, Hj. Adam Chao, Hj. Hussein Yee Loan Yuan, Hj. Ishak Ma, and the Indian-born Yasin Muhammad Sultan and Puan Marhaban. Besides this, PERKIM has
also engaged assistant muballighs to carry out da'wah among the Malays, Orang Asli (Aborigines) and Europeans. 40

Besides da'wah, PERKIM's main activities include the provision of material welfare and assistance to needy Muslims, promotion of Islam through education and publication, coordination of activities with other Islamic associations, strengthening of national unity and loyalty through the official religion and so forth. In terms of welfare and educational activities, PERKIM has provided its services largely in kindergartens and medical clinics, which cater to Muslims and non-Muslims alike. 41 Adult education programmes are also provided, while special instruction on Islam is available for new converts. 42 Through its clinics and three mobile medical units, PERKIM provides free medical services to needy Malaysians. 43 To step up its da'wah activities, PERKIM set up various branches throughout Malaysia, with its headquarters now situated in a five-storey complex at the junction of Jalan Maxwell and Jalan Ipoh, Kuala Lumpur. 44 To finance the building of this headquarters, the Tunku sought financial aid from various Arab countries and individuals as well as raising local funds. 45 Similarly, to acquire enough money for the running of the organisation and its multiple
programmes, PERKIM has set up its own businesses, which include 'City Perkim Book Centre', 'Fileman Sdn. Bhd.', 'Taman Willis Sdn. Bhd.', 'Usaha Perkim Kedah', 'Usaha Perkim Pulau Pinang', 'C. P. Fast Food Sdn. Bhd.', and 'Institut Perkim-Goon'. In addition, funds are raised through 'Pustaka Perkim', a PERKIM bookshop and the buying of shares in such institutions as Bank Islam (Islamic Bank). So as not to remain a mere recipient of funds, PERKIM also fulfils its obligations by donating its proceeds to Jamiah, an Islamic organisation in Singapore, the Women's Rehabilitation Centre at Bercham, Perak, the Attaqwa Religious School in Chiangmai, Thailand, and the financing of the publication of the Qur'ān in Braille for the Persatuan Orang Buta Malaysia (Association for the Blind, Malaysia).

Also, for the purpose of enhancing its da'wah activities, PERKIM has established its own Institut Dakwah PERKIM (IDP or PERKIM Dakwah Institute), which by 1984 had produced 362 muballighin (missionaries) of all nationalities, including 14 Kampucheans, 2 Filipinos, 5 Koreans and 2 Chinese from Hong Kong. Some of these students from IDP were directly financed or co-sponsored to further their studies at Kolej Islam (Islamic College), Kelang, Universiti Islam Antarabangsa (International Islamic University),
Islamic College in Jakarta and even al-Azhar, Islamic universities of Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Libya. To date, PERKIM has set up two Islamic settlements, Wangsa Maju PERKIM, Wilayah Persekutuan, and Perkampungan Islam, Sungai Dua, Pahang, for the converts. As a result of PERKIM's efforts, there were in 1984 some 60,000 Muslim converts or Saudara Baru (New Brethren) as they are locally known. The majority of these are Chinese. As one of its projects, PERKIM has also aided Kampuchean Muslim refugees and even successfully arranged for their permanent settlement in Malaysia. This particular effort has gained the support of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) since 1975.

To propagate Islam and its related projects effectively, PERKIM publishes a Chinese-language magazine, Noor Islam, Suara PERKIM in Malay, Islamic Herald, a bi-monthly English magazine and scores of booklets and newsletters in Chinese in Chinese, Tamil and English. In 1985, through the efforts of a Chinese-born Muslim, Shamsuddin Tao, PERKIM published a Chinese tafsir of the Qur'ān. Meanwhile, in league with Rābiṭah al-‘Ālam al-Islāmi, PERKIM set up the Regional Islamic Council for South-East Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP) in 1980, with its headquarters based in Kuala Lumpur. This move has
unmistakably confirmed Malaysia's place as an important Islamic centre for da'wah in the East in the latter part of this century.

Efforts to legitimise UMNO's and the government's position vis-a-vis Islam have been stepped up since the beginning of 1982, with the start of Dr. Mahathir's premiership. The whole process has been dubbed as Islamisation, which according to Dr. Mahathir means the inculcation of Islamic values in the country's administration and not the enforcement of Shari'ah to cover also the non-Muslims. At the same time, he asserted that "these values are universal and can be accepted by all parties".

Aside from the da'wah programmes already described, Mahathir's era has seen the establishment of Bank Islam (Islamic Bank), with branches operating in some major towns of Malaysia, Universiti Islam Antarabangsa (UIA or International Islamic University), Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Sendirian Berhad (Islamic Insurance Company Private Limited of Malaysia), extensive involvement in international Muslim organisations, efforts to make Islamic religious holidays national in scope, greatly increased religious programming on state-run radio and television and constant media attention to
religiously-oriented activities of the prime minister and other UMNO cabinet members. 64

The Bank Islam, a major institution in the drive towards the Islamisation of the Malaysian economy, was opened in July, 1983. 65 Although it was established for the purpose of promoting non-riba transactions, thereby encouraging more Muslim participation in the nation's economy, it has also interestingly drawn the support of a small number of non-Muslim depositors. 66 Structurally, it is similar to commercial banks except for the addition of a parallel supervisory council of 'ulamā' to ensure that the bank's activities conform to Islamic Law. 67 Besides this, it is run on the basis of mudarabah (joint-partnership) between the bank and its clients, where both of them equally bear the success or failure of a venture. 68 As for the capital, it is provided by the federal government, various state Religious Departments, PERKIM, Tabung Haji 69, State Islamic economic agencies like Islamic economic foundations and Bayt al-Māl and other Islamic organisations. 70 Following the lead set by the bank, the Minister of Rural and National Development proclaimed that the Cooperative Movements involving Muslims would seek an Islamic credit system. 71 Moving along the same lines, Yayasan Pembangunan Ekonomi Islam Malaysia (YPEIM or Islamic Economic Development
Foundation of Malaysia) has implemented the Amal Jariah (Islamic Social Welfare) scheme, whereby Muslim employees are encouraged to voluntarily contribute a minimum of $1/- M per month to the foundation. To avoid any untoward incident such as fraud, for every contribution made a receipt is issued through Bank Islam or Tabung Haji. A Board of Trustees, headed by Dr. Abdul Halim b. Hj. Ismail, the Managing Director of Bank Islam, was also appointed to run the foundation. As for Takaful, it was launched in June 1985, with an initial capital of $10/- million Malaysian. The insurance covers both general and family matters and transactions are based on mudarabah. To guarantee that every transaction is carried out in line with Islamic regulations, a Shari'ah Committee led by Prof. Ahmad Ibrahim of UIA was appointed to oversee the whole activities of the company.

The UIA started its first academic session on July 18, 1983 at its temporary campus in the former Islamic College in Petaling Jaya near Kuala Lumpur. It is sponsored and owned jointly by a consortium of Muslim nations, with Malaysia being the host country and a co-sponsor. Since June 1987, a diploma course in education was added to the two existing disciplines of law and economics. In explaining the difference
between the UIA curriculum and that at other local universities, Tan Sri Prof. 'Abd al-Rauf, its Egyptian-born rector said, "we try to inject relevant Islamic values in the study of other ['traditionally 'secular'] subjects". In short, the UIA presents a unified approach to Islamic education, with both Arabic and English being the media of instruction. Other educational measures taken to inculcate Islamic values in Malaysia include the introduction of a course on Islamic Civilization in all universities and colleges, the establishment of an Islamic Teachers' Training College in Petaling Jaya, increased instruction in and use of Jawi script and the adoption of an integrated approach to teaching Islamic knowledge in schools.

Besides making changes in economic and educational spheres, Mahathir's administration has also taken steps to institute reforms in legal and judicial matters. For instance, a decision was taken to upgrade the position of kadis and Sharī'ah courts to the level of magistrates and civil courts, and to implement Penal Code Amendments directly related to religion. The Malaysian government also set up a national steering committee on zakāt to streamline the administration and enforcement of the collection of tithes under Islamic Law. Further, a committee has
begun drafting a law to ensure the correct display of halāl signs so as to protect the Muslims from being deceived by irresponsible food manufacturers. 88

On yet another plane, religious discipline has been enforced in the armed forces, with some British military customs, such as the firing of a volley and the sounding of the Last Post during the funeral of a Muslim soldier, which were found to be incompatible with Islamic beliefs, being replaced with Islamic prayers. 89 At the same time, a religious corps has been established, thus helping to assimilate Islam in the administration of the armed forces, while religious education is stressed during the six-month or one year training for officers and men. 90 To ensure that the Islamisation programmes run smoothly, the government set up a Shūrā Council whose members consist of Muslim scholars of different political persuasions. 91 Anwar, besides being the chairman of this council, is the main force behind the Islamisation programmes that have been progressing in the recent years. In this connection, the Malaysian authorities have been very fortunate in receiving the support and expertise of Muslim scholars from within and without for their Islamically oriented programmes.
Indeed, some of the changes made in recent years have gone beyond the symbolic gestures of the previous period. For example, some of these projects like the Islamic Bank, Takaful, UIA, the establishment of the Islamic Teachers Training College and the Shūrā Council can no longer be perceived as mere concessions. Certainly, these new developments have at times thrown the government’s opponents, especially PAS into disarray. The latter has to show itself to be really more Islamic rather than to depend on rhetoric alone. This problem will be pursued in greater detail later in this discussion.

However, the Islamisation programmes have not been free from criticism, especially by those in the opposition. Some of them questioned the piecemeal process of the whole exercise. Beyond that some people still see the programmes as attempts to out-manoeuvre the government’s Islamic opponents in view of the fact that mismanagements such as the BMF affair, personal rivalries, the luxurious life-style of the nouveaux riches, and the liberal use of money to gain support continue to be common practices among UMNO members, including those in the top echelon. For the same reasons, the recent claim made by some UMNO top leaders that the party was the third largest Islamic
party in the world was rejected by its opponents.\textsuperscript{94} Slogans such as 'leadership by example' (\textit{kepimpinan melalui teladan}) and 'clean, efficient and trustworthy' (\textit{bersih, cekap dan amanah}) which were popularised by Dr. Mahathir have also exposed the government to the ridicule of its opponents who point to the continuing factional rivalry within \textit{UMNO} itself, the leadership squabbles and the financial mismanagement that beset its senior partner, the \textit{MCA} \textsuperscript{95} and other components of the \textit{Barisan}. At any rate, the Islamic stance taken up by the Mahathir administration has helped to accelerate Islamic consciousness and in turn to stimulate general demands for more change towards the implementation of an Islamic order in Malaysia.

\textbf{b. Responses of Political Parties:}

Outside government circles, there are varying degrees of responses towards Islamic consciousness. An important example of this is the case of \textit{PAS}. In the wake of the present Islamic revival, the party has been able once again to gain some ground, though it is still far from regaining power in any of the states. Since its recovery in 1982, it has managed to win the support of more younger Muslims, including Western-trained intellectuals, professionals and members of
well-established UMNO families. However, as might be expected, accompanying this rejuvenation of PAS there has been a clear-cut radicalisation of its leadership and a major part of its rank and file. As part of this new mood, the party's 'Young Turks' like Ustaz Hj. Abdul Hadi Awang, Ustaz Hj. Fadhil Nor and Ustaz Nakhaie Hj. Ahmad, all of whom were formerly prominent members of ABIM, with the support of the Dewan Ulamak ('Ulama' Council) ousted the 'Old Guard' under the much mellowed Dato' Muhammad Asri following the defeat of PAS in the 1982 General Elections. Under the new leadership, PAS has also discarded its nationalist mantle for that of universal Islam and a more fundamentalist approach. In line with this new image, it has sharply attacked ethnocentrism, that is, Malay nationalism, which it identifies with 'asabiyah and thus declares unislamic. At the same time, the new leadership has shown its admiration for the Islamic Republic of Iran, and its concern for the Muslims of Afghanistan and Palestine and those in Muslim minority countries. In this connection, like ABIM, the present PAS is committed to an untainted Islam, an Islam which is pure and pristine. Similarly, it shares with ABIM the same rhetoric about the evils of secularism and all other Western ideologies.
Another important feature of the post-Asri PAS is that it places more stress on the role of the ‘ulamā’ in determining the policies to be followed by the party.\(^{104}\) This led its former president, the ousted Asri, to make the bitter accusation that the ‘ulamā’ were "obsessed with the idea of Shi‘ite rule and [aiming to] adopt the [Iranian] system by violent means if necessary".\(^{105}\) The then PAS Youth chief, Mustaffa Ali retorted that "...The reason Asri and others have been raising the Iran issue and the Sunni-Shi‘ite problem is because they want to cling to power, not because they believe that the ulamas are imposing Shi‘ite philosophy on their Sunni followers. We are all Sunnis. There is no reason for us to follow the Shi‘ite principle".\(^{106}\) The Shi‘ite issue also seems to be a popular political ploy waged by UMNO and its controlled media to discredit the PAS in the eyes of Malaysians, in the wake of some disturbing reports about Iran coming from Western media. However, there is nothing to suggest that the party has adopted a Shi‘ite or Iranian political system since otherwise it would not have attracted the attention of some non-Muslims, mainly Chinese, since early 1985.\(^{107}\)

In this regard, to match its own rhetoric for universal Islam with action, PAS organised a symposium on "Islam and National Unity", among whose
participants were included Dr. Tan Chee Khoon, a respected ex-parliamentarian and Dr. Chandra Muzaffar, a Muslim convert of Indian descent and President of Aliran (a Penang-based multi-racial and more socialist oriented reform movement). Again as a move to outdo UMNO, it appointed a Chinese Muslim convert as head of the PAS Kampung Baru branch and following that another Chinese convert, Kamal Koh, who had been recently elected a member of PAS Youth Executive Committee, as head of the PAS Siputih branch. In another unprecedented move, it established in mid-1986 a number of Chinese Consultative Councils (CCCs), that is, liason committees that linked PAS to the Chinese community at state level and through them tried to gain the support of the Chinese towards PAS in the 1986 General Election. Such an unexpected move caused the embarrassed UMNO to condemn the party vehemently with the support of its controlled media, especially the Utusan Group.

As we have seen, the changes within PAS brought it into serious conflict with its traditional foe, UMNO. Among the issues which bitterly split the two important Malay parties were the implementation of Islamic law, and the related subjects of Islamisation, secularism, takfir, nationalism, cooperation with non-Malays, the BMF, the ISA and so on. Concerning
Islamisation, PAS rejects it as a 'mere cosmetic' and instead calls for the full implementation of Islamic Shari'ah. It also condemned secularism and depicted its protagonists within UMNO as being guilty of spreading 'deviant teachings' (ajaran-ajaran sesat), an accusation which was often levelled against it by UMNO itself. The situation was aggravated when UMNO charged that PAS leaders in contradiction to the Islamic principle of tasammuh (tolerance) had branded its members as kāfirūn (unbelievers). This takfīr issue was blown out of proportion by the vested interests within the media so that even the non-Malays for the first time became aware of and interested in the matter. In this case, PAS were often projected as the 'villians'.

On several occasions, the government-run T.V. Malaysia showed its own edited films calling for the Malaysian Muslims to unite, while simultaneously claiming that PAS were propagating disunity through the takfīr issue which was linked to some other subsidiary issues like the two-imām affair (isu dua imam), separate graveyards for PAS members and so on. Meanwhile, an independent study of the issue of disunity among the Muslims in Malaysia, a part of which includes the takfīr question, carried out in 1983 by ABIM in cooperation with the 'Ulama' Association of Malaysia, al-Argam, Persatuan Timur Tengah (Middle Eastern
Association) and academics of several local universities disclosed that there was really a split among the rural Malays of Trengganu and Kelantan and that this was caused by a number of factors including the unfair practice of distributing agricultural subsidies such as fertilizers and so on only to UMNO members and supporters.  The same explanation was given by another writer, who also added that there were cases where the state authorities dismissed PAS members from the Jawatankuasa Kemajuan dan Keselamatan Kampung (JKKK or Village Development and Security Committee) in order to make way for UMNO nominees. Such practices, argued the same writer, were probably engaged in because UMNO leaders regarded development as a 'favour' that should be appreciated and should be reciprocated by undivided loyalty to the government.

The issue of having separate burial grounds occurred as a result of some misunderstandings on the part of certain people. In July 1982, there was a case where a PAS supporter at his own request was buried on a piece of his own land, which was ungazetted as a burial ground. However, this was interpreted by a number of UMNO supporters as an unwillingness by PAS members to be buried together with UMNO men at the officially gazetted grave-yards. According to Azmi
b. Mohd. Ali of the Law Faculty, Universiti Malaya, this issue of separate burial grounds was an isolated affair, which was sensationalized by the local press. 124

The two-imām affair occurred partly because the Religious Affairs Department of Trengganu had dismissed the local PAS-oriented imām of Masjid Kampung Gong Pasir, who had served at the mosque for the last 18 years and replaced him with UMNO supporters. 125 Surprisingly, the dismissal letter was signed by Dato' Bendahara Dalam, the Commissioner for Religious Affairs of Trengganu's Religious Affairs Department and not by the Sultan himself, who usually decides in cases of appointment or dismissal of a religious official. 126 Concerning the question of takfīr and social boycotts some sources revealed that these were mutually enacted, involving some ordinary members of the two parties in the east coast of Peninsular Malaysia, and not, as alleged, the fault of PAS alone. 127

The tragicomedy of the UMNO-PAS rivalry did not stop at this level. In fact, matters came to a head when UMNO through its belligerent president issued a challenge for a debate with PAS in late 1984
concerning the takfīr issue and the related problem of Muslim disunity in Malaysia. However, a direct televised confrontation of the two parties was avoided when on the initiative of several Muslim organisations, including ABIM, the Yang Di Pertuan Agong intervened and stopped the schedule debate. The pretext for stopping the debate was the preservation of Muslim unity. At any rate, the move clearly brought relief to UMNO for the Tunku himself had said, "PAS will have nothing to lose, but everything to gain." 

On the political front, the cancellation of the debate did not reduce the antagonism between the two parties. As a result of a heated campaign in the local election for Padang Terap Constituency, a bloody clash broke out at Lebuk Merbau between PAS and UMNO supporters. One PAS party worker was killed and this embittered the party, while others also were as puzzled when the prime minister went on television the next day and blamed the opposition party for the disturbance, though the facts had shown, according to Muzaffar, that it was started by a group of strong-arm men associated with the ruling party. The political atmosphere continued to rise, with charges and counter-charges being made until it culminated in the tragic Memali incident of November 1985. Meanwhile,
with mounting opposition and instability within UMNO itself and with similar problems faced by its components within the Barisan, as well as the continued threat of economic recession, UMNO decided to call a truce and hold a muzākarah (discussion) with PAS, an idea which had been proposed as a replacement for the debate since late 1984 by ABIM and other Islamic organisations and individuals.134 Thus, by mid-1986, UMNO represented by both Mahathir and Anwar, met and held secret discussions with PAS leaders, comprising the President, Hj. Yusof Rawa, Hj. Fadhil Nor and Syed Ibrahim, concerning the possibility of ending the hostility and working towards Muslim unity within the country. Despite these friendly exchanges, nothing concrete really developed out of the meeting.

Away from politics, PAS under the new leadership developed its own economic and educational programmes, although UMNO constantly claimed that it had done nothing for Islam. For example, PAS Temerloh branch, Pahang, has offered shares worth about $M1,5000 per share to all members of the party throughout Malaysia.135 According to the Assistant Commissioner of PAS for Pahang, "every member of PAS who buys the share concerned will be able to own a piece of land with an area of 1/4 acre".136 The same kinds of scheme for the establishment of modern self-contained Islamic
settlements have been started in Kedah, Perlis and Pulau Pinang. Since 1985, the Batang Padang PAS branch in Perak has operated Darul ‘Aitham, a school for orphans, which provides both academic and religious subjects. Besides this, PAS members run some other schools, for example, the Madrasah Masriyah of Bukit Mertajam, Yayasan Budi and Institut Berakan, which are open to all Malaysians. In fact, the idea of setting up an Islamic university, which was then called Universiti Rakyat (Peoples’ University) was passed at the conference organised by the educational wing of Hizbul Muslimin (a forerunner of PAS) at Bukit Semanggol in 1948, before it was taken up again in the 60s and the 70s by PAS and the Muslim students and finally implemented by the Mahathir administration.

In terms of publication, in recent decades, PAS activists have set up a number of their own publishing companies. Apart from continuing with its old organ, Suara Islam, PAS on the initiatives of its younger members, has published the newspapers Gema Pemuda of PAS Youth Council, Harakah Berita PAS of PAS Tambun, Perak, and scores of books, newsletters and cassettes. Under the new image, these newspapers and newsletters seem to carry comparatively serious discussions or exposés on various subjects like the Official Secrets
Act (OSA) Amendments of 1986, Singapore and the Zionists, the Muzakarah PAS-UMNO, crises within UMNO, reports and speeches from PAS's own muktamar (conferences), international issues and so on.\textsuperscript{141} For its part, UMNO, despite its Islamisation programmes, continues to publish a more popular version of its own organ, Merdeka, which even carries business advertisements, a few special pages of comic strips and special items on such topics as 'Joan Collins and Dynasty' and 'Christopher Reeves and his role as Superman'.\textsuperscript{142}

The non-Muslim parties understandably are unhappy about the new Islamic trend in the country although they seldom, if at all, air their concern openly. The DAP, a dominantly Chinese opposition party, for example, protested against the attempt of the Negri Sembilan state government to ban Malays from working in bars.\textsuperscript{143} In another case, Karpal Singh, a leading member of the same party who never agrees with the government, supported UMNO when the prime minister criticised a certain party for trying to establish a mullah form of government in Malaysia.\textsuperscript{144}
c. Individual Responses to Islamic Consciousness:

At individual level, responses towards Islamic consciousness come in various shades of opinion or reactions. Despite his contributions to Islam at national and international level, while in power and outside it, the Tunku has remained very much a controversial figure vis-à-vis Islam in Malaysia. For example, during his 80th birthday party celebration, he warned that Malaysia should never be turned into an Islamic State.\(^\text{145}\) He also stressed that attempts to introduce Islamic laws and morality laws must never be allowed.\(^\text{146}\) Naturally, such comments brought criticisms from PAS \(^\text{147}\) and ABIM.\(^\text{148}\) However, undaunted by such reactions, the Tunku unreservedly dismissed the penal law concerning the caning of those found guilty of drunkenness and khalwat as obsolete, following the decision of Shariah Court of Kota Bharu to implement it in January 1987.\(^\text{149}\) In response, the head of UMNO Youth stated that "such a negative statement comes from those who have inherited a colonial mentality, which regards the Shariah as unsuitable for the present era".\(^\text{150}\) Meanwhile, the PAS president condemned the opinion as something that "can destroy one's faith".\(^\text{151}\) Finding his stand abhorrent, a number of PERKIM's leaders urged the Tunku to relinquish his post as the president of the
organisation for the reason that his remark had tarnished the image of the body concerned.152

Another arch-secularist, Tun Hussein Onn, the third Prime Minister of Malaysia, supported the Tunku in his call not to make Malaysia an Islamic State.153 Like the former, he has a long history of disagreement with Islamic fundamentalism. For instance, in the mid-70s, he had one of his daughters deprogrammed with the help of an ustaz, after she returned from England dressed in a mini-telekung.154 In his latest outburst, he called upon UMNO to reject "super leaders" who would move the party away from a moderate stance and turn it into an organisation with extremist views on religion and nationalism.155 Significantly, this call came as the party was approaching its own internal elections and just less than a month after the penal law had been implemented in Kota Bharu. Besides the two former premiers, Tun Mohamed Suffian, the recently retired Lord President of the Malaysian Court, also strongly opposed the move to introduce a wider application of Islamic laws as demanded by various Muslim organisations.156 Of late, he has commented that it is unfair to dismiss the Malaysian Constitution as unislamic.157 It might be argued that the three individuals concerned represent the old Western-oriented Malay élite who find the current
situation engulfing the Muslims, especially the youth, unpalatable as far as their own beliefs and experiences are concerned.

On the other side of the picture, we find individuals who reacted favourably to the new situation. For example, Prof. Datuk Ahmad Ibrahim suggested that a clause should be included in the Constitution to the effect that, "if there is any law in Malaysia that contravenes the Shari'ah, then such law is null and void to the degree that it is so". He also advocated that Islamic Law should be respected and accepted in toto, though its implementation could be undertaken gradually. Prof. Dr. Muhammad Kamal Hassan, also of UIA, is of the opinion that development should be based on Islamic principles, involving both spiritual and material dimensions so as to ensure al-falah (the ultimate success). Likewise, he counselled that Islamic values should be instilled into the Malaysian educational system at all levels so that a more integrated approach could be pursued for the sound development of society. In another case, Prof. Madya Dr. Abdul Rashid Hj. Dail of the Islamic Faculty, UKM, made a critical analysis of the Fourth Malaysia Plan and in conclusion suggested that economic development in Malaysia should be pursued along Islamic principles. Also, in harmony
with the new mood, Tun Dato' Hj. Mohamed Salleh Abbas, the Lord President of the Malaysian Court, suggested that both the civil and Sharī'ah courts should be united as an initial step towards the Islamisation of National Law. Such a suggestion is of importance indeed, in view of the fact that the head of the Malaysian judiciary has lately come out in support of the Islamisation programme, particularly in the field of law, which in the seventies was the concern only of PAS and Muslim youth.

Besides the two categories of people mentioned, there are also individuals who remain on the fringes of Islamic society, completely unassociated with either the da'wah stream or with the Islamic establishment, 'ulamā’, gūf or otherwise, but who still address themselves to certain Islamic issues. Within this category falls Dr. Chandra Muzaffar, the president of Aliran Kesedaran Negara (commonly called Aliran). As a social scientist, devoid of any basic religious training, Muzaffar tends to see Islam from a clearly materialistic standpoint, with its spiritual, dogmatic, theological and ritualistic dimensions being blurred in his mind. At best, one can say that he is a modernist. No doubt, Aliran under his presidency had done some good in informing the people about certain cases of abuses and malpractices within the
country, but in dealing with Islamic issues its views are still shrouded in confusion. For example, Muzaffar persistently claimed that some Muslim ladies have adopted the mini-telekung and other modest forms of dress for the preservation of their 'Malayness'. He has also given the same explanation for their (and male Muslims') preoccupation with halāl food. However, anyone who is really familiar with the local da'wah phenomenon cannot discount the fact that these changes have come about as a result of soul-searching and deep religious conviction. Otherwise, why would such educated ladies be ready to face all the persecutions such as those of certain Muslim nurses and students, who have accepted expulsion from their respective vocations rather than abandon their newly found attire?. Besides this, the Qur'ān and fiqh literature have provided the guidelines for halāl food and also on 'awrah (modesty) to be observed for both Muslim men and women. Another individual of this category is Kassim Ahmad, the former chairman of PSRM, who tried to popularise the idea of 'Islamic Socialism' (Sosialisme Islam), as an ideology to solve the socio-economic problems of the Muslims. In early 1986, Kassim created an uproar among the Muslims of Malaysia when he wrote a book criticising the 'ulamā' and rejecting the authenticity of the hadīth as one of the sources of Islamic law.
Despite the commotion they caused, these individuals have remained marginal within Malaysian society and their impact seems to have been minimal.

d. Non-Muslims and Islamic Consciousness:

Prior to the 70s, the non-Muslims generally were either indifferent to or not really aware of the Islamic presence since the sort of activities the State organised were largely ritualistic or symbolic in nature. Such activities as mosque-building and Qur'an-reading competitions did not affect the non-Muslims directly.\(^1\) But with the State focusing more on the implementation of social values and the setting up of Islamic institutions in the economy and in education, the situation has changed. In this regard, the rise of Islamic consciousness among the Muslims in the last decade appears also to have stirred up a parallel development of religious consciousness of some kind among the non-Muslims, particularly in the urban areas.\(^2\)

This phenomenon is perhaps more noticeable in urban areas than anywhere else, because it is there that wider contacts have taken place between the various ethnic groups of diverse religious backgrounds. Obviously, such contacts breed more
awareness among them. Moreover, it is usually in these areas that any idea, religious or otherwise, can easily spread with the availability of education and a more advanced system of communications. It is also there that the government has introduced more institutional changes designed to promote Islam as a state religion. Given such a setting, coupled with the ever-present communal distrust nurtured during the colonial era and often instigated by vested interests within the media and political parties, it is not at all surprising that any sign of stirring within a particular community is bound to generate a similar reaction in others.

The Chinese, who form the largest non-Malay community in Malaysia today, are not religiously homogeneous. Some of them are Christians, while the majority are Buddhists, Taoists or Confucians or combinations or local varieties of these, Muslims, Bahais and Free-thinkers (a local name for Atheists). Generally, the Chinese are by nature religiously eclectic. Nonetheless, it has been observed that those educated individuals who have accepted Islam or Christianity after having undergone a spiritual quest of their own, tend to be more committed to their new-found religion. It is equally true that except for the committed Chinese Muslim converts or those with no
political inclination, the Chinese, despite their different religious affiliations, have joined together in their opposition to any programme that they perceive as endangering their own interests. Thus, out of fear, they have united with other religious groups under the leadership of Rev. Paul Tan Chee Ing, a young Jesuit director of the Catholic Research Centre in Kuala Lumpur in opposing the government's Islamisation programme. In another case, the MCA which is affiliated to UMNO and the DAP, a main Chinese opposition party, have in spite of their constant antagonism, concertedly attacked the CCCs for endorsing PAS's idea of an Islamic State. In the estimation of these parties, and also other Chinese groups, an Islamic State would mean unequal opportunities for non-Muslims and a perpetuation of Muslim dominance.

Anyway, there are certain individuals among the non-Malays who simply do not see any problem for their ethnic groups if they are willing to assimilate themselves into the Malay society. For example, Prof. Khoo Kay Kim, a well-known local historian, said that "the Federal Constitution itself was very liberal in determining the status of an individual as a Pribumi [that is, Rumiputra]." He added that, "It recognised as Pribumi those who embraced Islam,
practised Malay customs and spoke Malay" and "As such, it is up to the Chinese to adjust to the requirements". Regarding assimilation, he argued that "one reason why not many grouses were heard from this community [the Malacca Baba community] on their position was that they could adapt to the local Malay Pribumi community". Further, he asserted, "The Baba community was even willing to forsake some of their original cultural traditions and absorb almost all aspects of the way of life of the Malay Pribumi community". Meanwhile, Tun Tan Siew Sin, the former MCA president and the Finance Minister in the Tunku cabinet, said that his family which had originated from mainland China could accept Malay customs and dress like Malays without any difficulty.

In the Chinese community at large, there is a striking revival of the innovative Theravada Buddhism and also of the more traditional Chinese variety of Mahayana Buddhism. The former, which historically, has only rarely been associated with any of the Chinese religions or with Malaysia, appeals most to the middle class, urban and young educated Chinese, who abhor the traditional syncretic form of Mahayana Buddhism. This new development comes about among the educated Chinese as a result of their awareness
that they need a more innovative rational religion to reassert their own identity and socio-economic survival in the wake of the changing situation vis-à-vis the Muslim Malays of Malaysia.\textsuperscript{148}

With the support of their brethren from the neighbouring Theravada Buddhist states of Thailand, Burma and Sri Lanka, they emphasize that the basic tenets of their faith are universalistic and applicable to a multi-ethnic country like Malaysia and beyond.\textsuperscript{149} This brand of Buddhism too condemns such vices as corruption, lotteries, drug taking, excessive drinking and the behaviour of the self-interested elites.\textsuperscript{150} Simultaneously, it endorses selective technical and other forms of modernisation associated with the West and unapologetically draws its economic ethics from Schumacher's concept of "small is beautiful" \textsuperscript{151} and his chapter on "Buddhist economics".\textsuperscript{152} In these respects, its orientation as compared to the Mahayana Buddhism of the traditional Chinese community is solidly materialistic.\textsuperscript{153} Whatever the case, the revival of both forms of Buddhism among the Chinese, with the emphasis on ethnic identity, serves to widen the gap between them and the rest of the Malay/Muslim community, who have been more occupied with Islam itself.
The Indians, who make up the third largest ethnic group in Malaysia, are also religiously diversified. The majority of them are Hindus, with others being Muslims, Christians, Sikhs and Bahais. However, religious revival is less evident among the Hindus than the Chinese. Nonetheless, among the young and educated Indians, there is concern for a more intellectual and enlightened "rational" variety of religion, that is, one capable of giving meaning to the new kind of life-styles of today's middle-class, which feels alienated from the religious traditionalism of the old generation. On the other hand, the Indians as a community appear to be less vocal about Islam than the Chinese. On one occasion, the Indian press did make a sweeping comment against Muslim extremism following the Kerling incident of 1978. In 1980, the Tamil language daily, Tamil Malar, published an article slandering Islam, thus leading to its banning by the Malaysian authorities. But soon, it was allowed to resume its publication under a different name.

Among the Christians, there is apparently a revival of religious awareness, especially among the Chinese and Kadazan, the main Bumiputra group of Sabah, East Malaysia. It has been particularly striking in the increase of the charismatic Christian
movement in the form of such Christian sects as the Pentecostalists and Seventh Day Adventists and in more syncretic combinations of Christianity and traditional Chinese elements. Some local Catholic churches have also been influenced by the new trend in that priests have been given formal dispensations to practice exorcism of spirits.

Also of significance is that the local Christians seem to receive the support of their brethren from Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines and elsewhere in their attempts to exert their identity and gain more converts. Utusan Malaysia, a popular Malay daily reported that the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia had stated that the government would act firmly against illegal immigrants from neighbouring countries who tried to propagate Christianity among the Muslims. Recently, in January 1987, Datuk Dr. Yusof Noor, the Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister's Department in charge of Religious Affairs revealed that he had received a cheque via the post amounting to $10 millions Malaysian in an attempt to induce him to allow the Pentecostalist Christians to hold a "Pentecostal World Conference" at the prestigious Pusat Dagangan Dunia Putra (Putra World Trade Centre) in Kuala Lumpur in 1988. This meeting is scheduled to bring together ten thousand Christian adherents of
the movement to the Malaysian capital.\textsuperscript{202} However, the application for the meeting was rejected by the management section of this UMNO complex and the cheque concerned was handed over to the police by the Deputy Minister for further investigation.\textsuperscript{203} Obviously, the reports mentioned indicate that the Christians are trying to generate more widespread religious activity within the country and these moves have naturally stimulated nervousness among the Muslims in the heat of the current Islamic reawakening.

Meanwhile, to allay the fears of the non-Muslims, the Muslim leaders within the government explained that the Islamisation programme was intended to instil universal Islamic values in society and that the non-Muslim minorities had nothing to fear as their interests would be safeguarded.\textsuperscript{204} Besides this, Sanusi Junid, the UMNO Secretary-General added, "Islamic laws and Islamic institutions are for the Muslim community only. The Indians and Chinese should fear PAS, not UMNO".\textsuperscript{205} Nonetheless, the non-Muslims are far from satisfied with such assurances.\textsuperscript{206} In fact, their apprehension was intensified with the recent implementation of an Islamic penal code in some Malaysian states, though the measures taken in such cases fall below the penalties prescribed by the Shari'ah.\textsuperscript{207} At the same time, the alarms raised
against a wider implementation of Islamic law by several Muslim secularists within the country have encouraged a hardening of attitude among disenchanted non-Muslims towards the whole process of Islamisation.

e. Islamic Consciousness and the Arts:

It should be noted that the rise of Islamic consciousness among the Muslims of Malaysia has also spilled over into the realm of the arts, particularly in literature. As a result, some preliminary discussions have taken place concerning what constitutes Islamic literature among some Muslim intellectuals and literary figures since the mid-70s. 208

Islam has had a place in Malay literature since the days when Islamic learning flourished in Aceh (1511 - 1650) and Johore (1650 - 1800). But until the 1970s, no serious effort was made to define what really constituted Sastera Islam (Islamic Literature). Instead, R.O. Winstedt and other scholars who followed him merely classified Sastera Melayu Islam as Arabo-Persian works which were adapted and translated into the Malay language, without even considering the question of the value system (Islamic or otherwise) that these works projected. 209
With the development of modern Malay literature, the influence of Islam began to wane and almost disappeared until the early 70s. In the 50s, the main trend which dominated the literary scene in Malaya (including Singapore) was that of a revolt against tradition which was a philosophy borrowed from the West. This was basically the idea propagated by a group of writers known as Asas 50 (Angkatan Sasterawan 50 or Generation 50 Writers), whose slogan was 'Seni untuk Masyarakat' or 'Art for Society'. In their literary struggle against imperialism, exploitation, and the class system found within society, these writers did not fall back on Islam per se, but rather upheld socialistic, existential, humanistic and rationalistic tendencies. Finding this trend too radical and unsuitable to their more hedonistic taste, a number of writers led by Hamzah Husain broke away from Asas 50 to form the association known as 'Persatuan Angkatan Persuratan Melayu Baru' or 'Association of New Generation Malay Writers' in 1954. This secessionist group wrote under the slogan 'Seni untuk Seni' or 'Art for Art's sake', thus concentrating on romanticism rather than appealing to the mental faculty. Despite the emergence of a few new writers with religious training in the 60s, the trend remained more towards nationalistic and other secular tendencies.
However, the rise of *da'wah* has brought some changes, though still at the preliminary stage, within literary circles. Polemics began to take place between those who subscribed to the idea of the West as the conveyor of modernism in Malay literature and those led by Prof. Syed Naguib al-Attas, whose contention is that it is Islam with its Tawhidic world-view and nothing else that promotes modernity within Malay culture, which also includes literature. Simultaneously, ideas proposed by Naguib al-Attas began to spread and challenge the status quo through student bodies like PKPIM, various Muslim student societies and some members of GAPENA (Gabungan Persatuan Penulis Nasional Malaysia or Union of National Writers Associations of Malaysia) and ABIM. The culmination of these efforts to promote *Sastera Islam* was the formation of GAPIM (Gabungan Penulis Islam Malaysia or Union of Muslim Writers of Malaysia) on 30th May 1976. Among the prominent writers who have been producing Islamic oriented works in the form of novels, essays, poems and short stories are included Prof. Datuk Hj. Shahnon Ahmad, S. Othman Kelantan, Ustaz Uthman el-Muhammad, Nahmar Jamil, Norhisham Mustaffa, Shafie Abu Bakar and Mana Sikana. By the early 80s, GAPIM had ceased to function as a number of its top committee members were more inclined towards politics.
Upon its premature death, those individuals who were really interested in making literature in Malaysia more Islamic in spirit as well as in content set up a new association called Persatuan Penulis-Penulis Islam (Association of Islamic Writers) in 1984. In June 1987, the Education Minister made an announcement that an Islamic Literary Award would be introduced from that year with attractive cash prizes for local Islamic novels and literary works in Bahasa Malaysia. With such an impetus, it seems that Sastera Islam will have a bright future in Malaysia.

On the other hand, the rise of the da'wah phenomenon brought direct attacks upon traditional Malay art forms such as the wayang kulit (shadow puppet plays) and dance dramas (bangsawan and Ma'yong) on the grounds that like much of Malay adat they contain non-Islamic, that is, Buddhist and Hindu, elements and themes. Similarly, opposition has arisen to visual arts such as painting, sculpture and photography which depict the human form as being a manifestation of idolatry or a form of pornography. As a result of this, some arts departments in universities and colleges are experiencing a decline in intake of Muslim students, save for those dealing exclusively with graphics, calligraphy and abstract designs.
Meanwhile, the Malay martial arts (silat) has also come under serious questioning in certain da'wah quarters, especially when it involves the invocation of spirits or the use of amulets or of Hindu or "pagan" rituals as a prelude to the performance. However silat as a form of exercise and self-defence minus all the extra 'help' mentioned is welcomed and even taken up by some da'wah individuals.

f. Islam and Foreign Policy:

Since its independence, Malaya's (later Malaysia's) foreign policy has been pro-Western in orientation, with the maintenance of strong ties with Britain and the Commonwealth. This was to be expected as the Tunku and his most senior colleagues in the cabinet were British-educated and had fond memories of the British democratic system and way of life, the more so in that Britain had granted Malaya its independence through a peaceful transfer of power. In late 1963, following the violent Indonesian Confrontation against Malaysia, which it claimed to be a neo-colonialist project of the British, the Tunku's administration was forced to make contact with African countries and to revive its links with the Muslim world, while remaining close to the West to safeguard its sovereignty and independence. As Malaysia wooed
Muslim and Afro-Asian countries during the Indonesian Confrontation as a means to counter Indonesian diplomatic offensives, its foreign policy in the 60s became more Islamic and its relations with Britain became less paramount. As part of this new development, Malaysia hosted the regional conference of the World Muslim Congress in 1964. To offset Indonesian diplomatic and propaganda offensives, Malaysia opened diplomatic missions in Morocco and Nigeria in 1965 and 1966. At the same time, Malaysia called for Muslim unity and supported the Islamic cause to restore Al-Aqsa Mosque to its pre-June 1967 situation at the Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference in Jeddah in 1970. However, all these diplomatic initiatives could not dislodge the special relationship that PAS had with religious dignitaries in various Muslim countries. Thus, outside official circles, the Malaysian government still had problems in trying to maintain a good Islamic image as compared to most PAS leaders, who had the advantages of being religiously educated and representing an Islamic party as well as being able to converse with their co-religionists in fluent Arabic.

As da'wah became an important phenomenon in Malaysia, the Malaysian government under the late Tun Abdul Razak tried to cultivate closer ties with the
Islamic world community. As part of this policy, more visits were made to the Middle East by Malaysian leaders; Malaysia also supported the Islamic Secretariat (whose first Secretary-General was the Tunku himself) and took the initiative to host the Fifth Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference in 1974. Besides political reasons, Malaysian leaders have looked hopefully to the Middle East as a source of trade, investment and economic aid. So far, there has been only a small growth in these areas. At any rate, the pro-Islam and pro-Arab policy earned Malaysia a loan of $M25.1 million from Libya in January 1977.

With the ascendancy of Mahathir as the Prime Minister of Malaysia in July 1981, the role of Islam in Malaysian foreign policy became more important. In terms of priority, the Islamic world was placed in the same bracket as East Asia, that is occupying a second rank after the neighbouring Asean states of Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and later Brunei, with the West given the last consideration. In line with this policy of cultivating closer political, economic and cultural relationships with the Muslim world, Mahathir visited the United Arab Emirates, Bahrein and Oman soon after his assumption of office;
preceded in time by the state visit of the Yang Di Pertuan Agong to Saudi Arabia. At the same time, the Prime Minister granted full diplomatic status to the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and declared in no uncertain terms Malaysia's support for the PLO and the legitimate Arab struggle against Zionist aggression and for the return of occupied Arab lands. For the same reasons, Malaysia's Foreign Affairs Ministry declared March 21 as "Afghanistan Day" and the country itself has contributed a total of $M420,870 to a special fund for Afghan refugees. Subsequently, in 1985, the Malaysian government offered Kuala Lumpur as the point for global distribution of news on the Mujahidin struggle, after allowing the Afghan resistance movement to open an office in the federal capital. These particular moves were unprecedented in that Malaysia was the only nation to grant such an official recognition to the Mujahidin. In yet another case, Malaysia through the RISEAP has agreed to subsidise Muslim pilgrims from Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan to Mecca in what has essentially been a Malaysian scheme. This was an extension to the services already accorded to the Muslims of Australia and New Zealand. All these efforts were made partly to bolster the support for UMNO among the Islamic fundamentalists.
Further efforts to promote Islamic cooperation were made when Malaysia helped the Republic of the Maldives to build a "floating" mosque and an Islamic centre in Male, the country's capital. In 1985, additional assistance was given to the Maldives in various fields apart from the existing technical aid. For her part, Malaysia has also benefited a great deal from espousing such a policy. For example, Kuwait offered petroleum technology training to her students, besides undertaking to bear the full cost of reconstructing the Madrasah al-Mashhur in Penang at a cost of $M800,000/-. Malaysia and the United Arab Emirates have also agreed to make greater efforts to increase the total volume of trade following the inaugural meeting of the joint committee of the two countries in October 1984. On the same occasion, Malaysia requested the UAE to make available 20 Arabic language teachers as well as places for Malaysian students to study Arabic in the country. In addition, Malaysia has joined the Islamic Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (IESCO) at a ceremony in Kuala Lumpur, in an attempt to cooperate with other Muslim countries in eradicating illiteracy. Equally important are Malaysia's ties with Pakistan. For instance, during President Zia al-Haq's five-day visit to Malaysia in November 1982, both countries signed an Economic and Technical
Cooperation Agreement. At the same time, Pakistan agreed to provide more places in its institutions of higher learning for Malaysians and also promised to provide doctors at the request of Malaysia.

An exception to the rule are Malaysia's ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Although trade links and diplomatic relations have been forged between the two countries, Malaysian authorities still keep a firm check on the infiltration of Shi'ite revolutionary ideas and have closely monitored the visits made by members of the Muslim opposition party to Iran. As for PAS and other Islamic groups, their links with the 'ulamā' and Muslim activists in the Islamic world and beyond remain intact, despite what the Malaysian authorities have done to improve their relations with the Muslim countries.

Another exception in terms of Malaysian foreign policy is its readiness to preserve goodwill among Asean countries even at the price of offending some fellow Muslims. In this regard, its stand concerning Muslim minorities in these countries has at best been ambivalent. Despite its calls for Muslim unity and cooperation as well as its defence of the Palestinians and Afghan mujāhidīn causes, it has been less enthusiastic in supporting the Patani Muslims of
Thailand and the Moro of the southern Philippines. For instance, in an attempt to avoid straining its relationship with the Thai government, Malaysia joined Indonesia in preventing representation of Patani Muslims at the Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference in Tripoli, Libya, in 1977. In the same conference, it attempted to tone down a resolution condemning the Philippines on the Moro problem.

In the 80s, for the same reason, the Malaysian administration has continued the policy of its predecessors vis-à-vis the Muslim minorities in the Philippines and Thailand. This was also extended to the case of Burmese Muslims, who were excluded from participating in the government-sponsored International Dakwah Conference in Kuala Lumpur in the interests of diplomatic relations with Burma. Such an attitude naturally caused the government to incur the criticism of a number of Muslim groups within the country.

From the above discussions, it is clear that Islamic consciousness in Malaysia has thus far given rise to varied interpretations and responses in various quarters. Whatever the case, during the last two decades Islam has been propelled to the centre-stage of Malaysian life. At this juncture, it seems
unlikely that it will sink into oblivion or even play
a more subordinate role to other systems.

Notes:
1 Fred R. Von der Mehden, 'The Political and Social
Challenge of the Islamic Revival in Malaysia and
Indonesia', The Muslim World, vol. LXXVI, no. 3 - 4,
2 Mohamad Abu Bakar, 'Islamic Revivalism', p. 1050;
3 Mohamad Abu Bakar, op. cit.
4 Von der Mehden, op. cit.
5 Mohamad Abu Bakar, op. cit., pp. 1050 – 51.
6 Funston, op. cit., p. 181.
7 Mohamad Abu Bakar, op. cit., p. 1051.
8 However, cynics are quick to dismiss the move as
mere 'vote-ccatching' or 'pulling the wool over
Muslim's eyes', for no sooner do these programmes
leave the air, then one can again see Hollywood soap
operas like Dallas and so forth or hear local pop
songs with suggestive lyrics.
9 See p. 94.
10 All these institutions are parts of the religious
section of the Prime Minister's Department. See Von
der Mehden, op. cit., p. 230; Funston, op. cit., p.
180; Institut Dakwah dan Latihan Islam, (a booklet),
Tabatan Perdana Menteri, Kuala Lumpur, n. d.
11 Funston, op. cit.
12 Quoted by Funston, Ibid., pp. 180 – 181.
13 Mohamad Abu Bakar, op. cit., p. 1052.
14 The above quoted Malay proverb literally means 'a
crab teaching its young one to walk straight'. But
more than that it signifies hypocrisy.
This phrase literally means 'speaking contrary to action'. But again, it suggests hypocrisy and is enough to arouse the fury of the authorities.

Mohamad Abu Bakar, *op. cit.*

Interestingly enough, in this case, no attempt was made to differentiate between those who were genuinely involved in da’wah and the deviants. They have been lumped together as "extremists".

Mohamad Abu Bakar, *op. cit.*

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Mohamad Abu Bakar, *op. cit.*


See Chapter 3, pp. 147–148.

*The Police Field Force was originally formed for the purpose of combating the Communists.*


Von der Mehden, *op. cit.*

Within just five years, Anwar had served as UMNO's Youth Leader, holding the portfolio of Minister of
Youth, Culture and Sports and Minister of Agriculture before taking over the Education Ministry.

33 Von der Mehden, *op. cit.*

34 Barraclough, *op. cit.*, p. 969.

35 This agency has published a monthly magazine *Dakwah*, which disseminates a more pro-government view of Islam.


39 The late Hj. Ibrahim Ma, a well-known Chinese-born Muslim, was the Chinese Consul in Malaya before the Second World War.

40 25 TAHUN PERKIM, p. 29.


42 Nagata, *op. cit.*; 25 TAHUN PERKIM, pp. 30 and 35; Utusan Malaysia, *op. cit.*

43 Suara PERKIM, Th. 8, Keluaran 2, 1985, p. 8; 25 TAHUN PERKIM, p. 36.

44 25 TAHUN PERKIM, p. 27.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid., p. 28.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid., p. 29.

49 Ibid., p. 32.

50 Ibid., p. 33; 'Perkim Anniversary Celebration', p. 27.
Upon conversion, these converts usually face pressures and hostility from their own kinsmen and communities, while in the case of death of the spouse, or ill-treatment or divorce of the wife, there is a possibility that the convert may abandon Islam or become less concerned about it. On the other hand, some of the Malays also for some reasons, imaginary or otherwise, harbour suspicions towards the new converts, thus alienating them from the main stream of the Malay society. Hence such settlements have been set up to give proper protection and guidance to the converts and avoid the risk of these people reverting to their old faiths or living a life of laxity, as had happened in the past.

Utusan Malaysia, 7 Apr., 1986; 25 TAHUN PERKIM, p. 35.

Ibid.

Utusan Malaysia, op. cit.

Ibid.; 25 TAHUN PERKIM, pp. 36 - 38.


Islamic Herald, vol. 8, no. 7 & 8, 1984, p. 28.

Shamsuddin Tao fled from China when the Communists took over the country.

25 TAHUN PERKIM, p. 31.

'Perkim Anniversary Celebration', pp. 28 - 29; Suara PERKIM, p. 4 - 5.


Ibid.

By 1986, there were 16 branches of Bank Islam. See Islamic Herald, vol. 10, no. 2, p. 44.

Von der Mehden, op. cit., p. 232.

66 Islamic Herald, vol. 9, no. 2, Ibid.
67 Mauzy and Milne, op. cit., p. 639; Morais, op. cit., p. 58.
68 Mauzy and Milne, op. cit.
69 See p. 85 - 86.
70 Mauzy and Milne, op. cit.; Morais, op. cit., pp. 56 - 57.
73 Ibid.
74 Berita Harian, 4 Julai, 1984.
77 Al-Nahdah, op. cit.
79 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 The philosophy of this university is based on the recommendations of the first conference on Islamic education held in Mecca in 1976.
83 Islamic Herald, vol. 7, no. 5 & 6, p. 5.
84 Mauzy and Milne, op. cit., p. 638.
85 Kelantan was the first state to implement the amended ruling, as a result of which a Muslim was caned in January 1987 for having been guilty of drunkeness. Utusan Malaysia, 21 Januari, 1987.
86 Al-Nahdah, op. cit.; Mauzy and Milne, op. cit.
87 Islamic Herald, vol. 8, no. 5 & 6, 1984, p. 44.
88 Al-Nahdah, vol. 6, no. 1, 1986, p. 49.
89 Islamic Herald, vol. 9, no. 2, p. 43.
90 Ibid.
91 Al-Nahdah, vol. 6, no. 1, p. 50.

92 On the very day that an executive committee member of UMNO’s Youth Section condemned beauty contests as being useless and nothing more than pastimes to benefit only a few businessmen, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is a Muslim, gave away prizes to the winners of 'Miss Wonderland 1986'. See Pembina Generasi, Keluaran 7, 1985, p. 4.


94 The UMNO Secretary-General was the first person to proclaim that the party was actually the third largest Islamic party. See Berita Minggu, 11 Okt., 1981.

95 Tan Koon Swan, the President of MCA, was jailed for two years in Singapore in late 1986 for abetting a criminal breach of trust. Berita Harian, 27 Ogos, 1986.

96 For example, Hj. Khalid Abdul Samad, the newly elected Secretary of Dewan Pemuda PAS (PAS Youth Council) is the younger brother of Datuk Shahrir Abdul Samad, the former Welfare Minister and an ex-member of the UMNO Majlis Tertinggi (Supreme Council).


98 Mohamad Abu Bakar, op. cit., pp. 165 - 166.


101 Ibid., pp. 9 - 13, 16 - 18.

102 C. Muzaffar, Islamic Resurgence, p. 56.
PAS was criticised for holding the symposium at Dewan China Selangor (Selangor Chinese Hall) and displaying a poster in Chinese characters to advertise the meeting. However, PAS in its reply disclosed that its application to use the City Hall of Kuala Lumpur for the event had been categorically rejected. See Pembina Generasi, Feb./Mac 1985, no. 3, p. 11.

112 See p. 158.


114 Hj. Abdul Hadi Awang, op. cit.


116 Ibid.

117 The two-imām affair revolved around the issue that PAS members refused to pray behind an UMNO-appointed imām as the party in their perception had transgressed Islamic principles and thus assembled behind their own imām for the congregational prayer.

118 op. cit., pp. 64 - 90.

119 Dr. Mohd. Nor Nawawi, 'Islam di Malaysia', p. 20.

120 Abdul Razak Ayub, op. cit., p. 78.
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid., p. 72.
123 Ibid.
124 Quoted by Abdul Razak Ayub, Ibid.
125 Ibid., p. 65.
126 Ibid., pp. 65 - 66.
128 Panji Masyarakat, Nov. 1984, pp. 6 - 8; Pembina Generasi, Keluaran 1, Nov. 1984, p. 5.
133 See below pp. 229 - 230.
134 Yahya Ismail, Krisis UMNO, p. 80.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
138 Berita PAS, 2/86, Terbitan PAS Tambun, Gopeng, pp. 10 - 11.
141 See Harakah, Bil. 1:2, Apr. 1987; Harakah, Bil. 1:3, Apr. 1987; Gema Pemuda, 1 - 15 Mac, 1986; Gema Pemuda, 15 - 28 Mac, 1986; Berita PAS, 2/86; Muzakarah

142 See Merdeka, Bil. 45, Th. 6, Dis. 1984, pp. 3, 12, 21, 24 - 25 and 28; Merdeka, Bil. 50, Th. 7, Feb. 1985, pp. 6, 10, 22, 24 - 25 and 28.

143 Mohamad Abu Bakar, Islamic Revivalism, p. 1057.


146 The Star, op. cit.

147 The Star, Feb. 11, 1983.

148 Risalah, Bil. 2, Th. 9, 1983, p. 12.


154 Nagata, The Reflowering, note 1, p. 254.


156 Perspective, Nov. 1979, p. 6.

157 The Star, June 20, 1986.


159 Ibid.


165 Ibid., p. 6; C. Muzaffar, Islamic Resurgence, p. 7.

166 op. cit.; C. Muzaffar, op. cit., pp. 7 - 8.


172 Kassim Ahmad, op. cit., see above p. 158.

173 Muzaffar, Islamic Resurgence, p. 87.


177 Muzaffar, Islamic Resurgence, p. 92.

178 Ibid., pp. 92 - 93.

179 New Straits Times, 10 November, 1986.
For details on Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism see J. R. Hinnells (ed.), *A Handbook of Living Religions*, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Pelican, 1985, pp. 290 - 298.


Ibid., p. 206.

Ibid., p. 207.


Ibid., p. 208.

Ibid., p. 211.

Ibid.

See pp. 227 - 228.


Ibid.

Utusan Malaysia, 11 Okt., 1986.


*Mingguan Islam*, *op. cit.*
204 Mauzy and Milne, op. cit., p. 645; Asiaweek, Sept. 14, 1984, p. 27.

205 Asiaweek, Ibid.


207 In the Kelantan case, a young Muslim found guilty of taking alcoholic drink was given only 6 lashes, whereas the hadd punishment in Islam prescribed 80 or 40 lashes for wine-drinking. See the discussion on hadd in Fatawa Ibn Taymiyyah, vol. 4, p. 262f, quoted by al-Qaradawi, op. cit., p. 78.


210 Ibid., p. 13.


212 Shafie Abu Bakar, op. cit., see footnote 40.

213 Ibid., p. 40.

214 Ibid.

215 Ibid., pp. 15 - 17.

216 The term was popularised by the late Prof. Ismā'īl R. al-Fārūqi, with the meaning that Tawhid is the central theme in Islam and other aspects are extensions of it.


218 Ibid., p. 17.

219 Ibid.

220 Interview with Prof. Datuk Hj. Shahnon Ahmad on 18/6/86.

221 Ibid.

224 Ibid., p. 183.
225 Ibid., p. 184.
226 Dato' Abdullah Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
227 Ibid., p. 109.
228 Ibid., p. 113.
229 Ibid., p. 115.
230 Ibid., p. 117.
231 Funston, 'Malaysia', p. 182.
234 *Islamic Herald*, vol. 6, no. 3 & 4, 1982, p. 40.
235 Ibid.
236 Ibid., p. 46.
237 *Islamic Herald*, vol 9, no. 2, 1985, p. 44.
238 Ibid.
239 See p. 234.
241 Ibid.
243 *Islamic Herald*, vol. 8, no. 7 & 8, 1984, p. 42.
244 *Al-Nahdah*, vol. 5, no. 3, 1985, p. 43.
245 *Islamic Herald*, vol. 6, no. 3 & 4, 1982, p. 44.
246 *Islamic Herald*, vol. 8, no. 7 & 8, 1984, p. 44.
247 Ibid.
248 *Al-Nahdah*, vol. 4, no. 4, 1984, pp. 53 - 54.
249 *Islamic Herald*, vol. 6, no. 9 & 10, 1982, pp. 39 - 40.


CHAPTER 6:
The 1986 General Elections and After.

In this chapter, our discussion will be focused on recent developments in Malaysia, particularly the events surrounding the 1986 General Elections and the period following it. In this regard, we shall assess the position of Islam in the recent UMNO-PAS rivalry and the internal struggle for power within UMNO itself.

a. The UMNO-PAS Rivalry:

Amidst political instability, as a result of a power struggle within UMNO, the BMF scandal, leadership squabbles and mismanagement of cooperative societies within the MCA, the Memali incident and the Sabah political contests ¹, as well as the general economic recession besetting the country, Mahathir decided to call a snap election.² Accordingly, the Malaysian General Elections were held on 2nd and 3rd August 1986, despite protests from several Muslim organisations and individuals that it was unjustified and inappropriate to hold elections while about thirty thousand Muslims were away on hajj.³ As usual, PAS was the main Muslim/Malay opposition party to enter the fray with the determination to wrest power
from UMNO in the name of Islam. However, slightly differently from the previous situation, PAS this time carried with it the support of the various CCCs. Nonetheless, it failed to get the cooperation of the small parties, Nasional Malaysia Parti (Nasma), Partai Sosialis Rakyat Malaysia (PSRM) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) right to the end of the election period, even though they had signed an electoral pact with PAS to fight against the BN on 14th July, 1986. Meanwhile, the DAP provided the Chinese-dominated opposition to BN.

Among the issues bitterly fought out between the PAS and UMNO were the questions of development, an Islamic state, takfir, a fatwa on whether those killed in the Memali incident were shuhadā' (martyrs), the University Act §, corruption, PAS cooperation with unislamic parties, discrimination against the hijāb and so forth. It is also interesting to note that just four days before the election, the Prime Minister himself openly said that priority in terms of development and the allocation of funds would be given to Barisan areas. In another case, the Minister of Agriculture ordered the Fisheries Department to reissue licences to operate pukat Apollo (Apollo nets), that is, a form of drifting-net for fishing in the open sea, which were banned in November 1984 on
the grounds that they deprived the small-time inshore fishermen of their livelihood.\textsuperscript{8} Within the same period, some government sources also revealed that all state muftis would be appointed as executive committee members of state cabinets after the election.\textsuperscript{9} Besides this, a member of the Barisan top leadership pledged to raise the income of the Kelantanese if his government came to power in the election.\textsuperscript{10} However, the most interesting of all the issues brought against PAS was the allegation that some of its local leaders in Selangor were running a slave camp at Rasah, near Kota Kubu Baru, about 64 kilometres from the Malaysian capital.\textsuperscript{11} An interview with two 'victims' was televised all over the nation.\textsuperscript{12} As the campaign heated up, some university students left their campuses in order to campaign for PAS.\textsuperscript{13}

The results of the elections came as a shock to PAS and even surprised UMNO itself as a few days before the polls it had expected that PAS would increase its seats in Kelantan, Trengganu and Kedah.\textsuperscript{14} On the contrary, PAS managed to retain only one of the parliamentary seats which it had had before the polls and 15 State seats (10 in Kelantan, 2 in Trengganu and 3 in Kedah).\textsuperscript{15} However, the percentage of votes it obtained in its traditional areas of support remained constant, ranging from 44 – 47% in
Kelantan and 38 - 41% in Trengganu for the 1978, 1982 and the 1986 elections. PAS also fared better in Kedah this time, polling some 36% of the total valid vote compared with 32.7% in the 1982 election. Simultaneously, its percentage in votes also increased in the West coast states of Malacca, Johore, Perak and Selangor.

In an attempt to explain the PAS electoral defeat, a number of factors were cited by some analysts. A local academic argued that it was because of poor strategy, that is, that PAS spread its resources too thinly instead of concentrating on its traditional strongholds. Others offered different reasons, for example that PAS's failure stemmed from its lack of an organisational structure in that conflicting policy statements were made by its leaders and there was no one who could coordinate official policy; lack of discipline among party members in terms of making public pronouncements and taking actions; recent constituency adjustments which diluted PAS's strength in certain areas; the timeless "Protector" mentality in the Malay community which prevents it from adopting an evaluative and critical attitude towards the UMNO leadership; Barisan's ability to control information flow to the rural areas so that the electorate there had hardly any access to
reports and analysis on the various scandals and only received whatever information the authorities wanted them to have; and PAS's inability to exploit issues and relate its policies to the practical needs of the people. But most observers agreed that PAS's greatest blunder was to form the Opposition pact and to issue a joint declaration with Nasma, PSRM and SDP concerning the setting up of an Islamic State which the latter parties for ideological reasons could not defend. Equally problematical in this respect was PAS's strategy of associating itself with the non-Muslims within the CCCs, which was really a novel idea, but had come too soon for the rank and file, especially in the more traditional east-coast states, to be able to comprehend it, let alone digest it. This was the more so in that UMNO with its strong propaganda machine could severely embarrass PAS over this issue, given the fact that PAS in the past had vehemently condemned such a strategy. Not to be forgotten also was the lure of material benefits and the relative stability which the UMNO-dominated government had provided and was promising to provide in the future. Among the conservative-minded Malays (including some members of the bureaucracy), the radical style of PAS campaigning in certain areas, like the shouting of "Allahu Akbar" and the use of the
slogans like "PAS Parti Allah" (PAS, the Party of Allah) was enough to scare them off.²¹

As for UMNO, besides having strong financial resources, it also had the advantage of inducing some Islamic-educated members of the elite to be its own electoral candidates, thus adding more weight to its claim to be protecting Islam and to want genuine Islamisation.²² Further, it had the backing of HAMIM, an Islamic-based party led by the former PAS chief, who because of his own experience was more than eager to deprive his now staunch enemies of any power.²³ The effectiveness of non-Muslim parties' campaigns, including those of the DAP concerning the danger of Islamic fundamentalism and an Islamic State were highly influential in robbing PAS of the possibility of obtaining non-Muslim votes, thus helping the Barisan to attain a two-thirds majority.²⁴ Sensing the potential threat of PAS to its well-being, UMNO throughout the campaign period concentrated its attacks on that party so that the DAP was less troubled and was able to capture 24 seats, making it the strongest non-Muslim opposition party in the Malaysian Parliament.²⁵

As one writer put it, the recent election was really also one of race versus religious identity.²⁶
Besides other factors, PAS was defeated because it tried to work with the non-Muslims through the CCCs. It seems that young educated Muslims are more receptive to an Islamic identity, while older Malays have difficulty separating the two. Nonetheless, PAS still has a future role to play in Malaysia and it can be more effective if only it can be more organised, sensitive and truly sophisticated in handling issues and recognizing Muslims' needs, which also include material stability and not mere rhetoric. In terms of overt public policy, PAS has however succeeded in its role as an opposition party. Its constant challenges and criticisms have pushed UMNO into a more Islamic mould, prompting it to recruit an increasing number of Islamicists and appointing them to influential positions.

By late 1986, both UMNO and PAS had set up their own branches in Sabah. Probably, if peace is not restored between the two parties, the battle to win the hearts and minds of the Muslims and non-Muslim Bumiputras will be extended to East Malaysia. Further, things will become more complicated as both parties find themselves at odds with the ruling party, PBS.
Following the elections, PAS also tried to reassess its position. In the latest Muktamar at the Markaz Tarbiyah PAS Pusat (National Training Headquarters of PAS), its president emphasized the need for *tajdīd haṣārī* (renewal of civilization), that is, to revive seriously the tradition of acquiring and disseminating knowledge; to improve the faith of the people and to provide more constructive training for its *nugābak* so that they would be able to arouse Islamic awareness within the society. Simultaneously, he reminded PAS's members to give the responsibility of running the party only to those who were committed to PAS's *fikrah* (ideas) and *manhaj* (method of operation). He also added that no other trend should be brought into PAS, thus signaling that extremism and different methodology as practised by some new members of PAS, often associated with the Islamic Representative Council (IRC), a student organisation which originated in Britain, should not be allowed to dominate the party. An outcome of this was that a popular and able religious-educated former student leader was elected to be the new head of PAS's Youth Council, with the former deputy chief of this council, a leading IRC figure, being given a less commanding position. Also of significance was that a number of veteran PAS members who had left the party in the wake of the conflict of the late 70s reattended
the muktamar, thus indicating that the party was regaining its support.\textsuperscript{35} In yet another perspective, PAS decided to continue its contact with the Chinese community through a new Chinese party to be formed following the dissolution of the CCCs.\textsuperscript{36} Therefore, it remains to be seen how far PAS will be able to recover from its latest setback and play a more effective role in realising its religious goals in Malaysia.

b. The struggle for power within UMNO:

Since the 60s, UMNO had been affected by factionalism.\textsuperscript{37} However, the internal struggles seemed lately to be so acute that nothing more could be done to shield these unhealthy trends from the public's view. The events that developed within UMNO in the 80s had their beginnings in the late 60s and the 70s. As a result of the implementation of the DEB\textsuperscript{38} following the May 13th Incident of 1969, more Malays than ever before became rich. This new found affluence created a small group of nouveaux riches, often associated with UMNO or sympathetic to its causes. However, often lacking in religious training and guided more by material considerations, these individuals were more generally motivated by personal gains and this led in turn to intrigues, bribery and other insidious practices. Part of this new trend is
the currently famous cliche 'money politics', whereby money is used for securing power, favours and even position. To add to the complications, there seems to be no shortage of ambitious people within the party itself.

Out of these clashes for power, there evolved the most interesting drama of all thus far within UMNO, that is, the rift between Mahathir and his deputy, Datuk Musa Hitam and the eventual departure of the latter from Mahathir's cabinet, which in turn helped to shed some light on other issues surrounding UMNO in the immediate past and the period following it. To understand this complex episode in the history of the Mahathir-Musa estrangement, one will have to go back to the early 80s. Musa, an old ally of Mahathir during the days when he opposed the Tunku, became the Deputy Prime Minister, the second most powerful man in Malaysia, after he had defeated Tengku Razaleigh, a Kelantan prince, for the post of the party's deputy president in 1981. Subsequently, he again defeated the prince in the same contest in 1984, hence securing for himself a very strong position within the party and the government. However, local observers knew that on both occasions Musa would not have won without the backing of Mahathir himself. Initially, everything seemed to be right for the '2M' admin-
istration. Very few people were really aware that conflicting ideas and life-styles existed between the two prominent figures. For instance, as opposed to his fun-loving deputy, Mahathir since he came to power appeared to lead a more sober kind of life. In terms of Malaysian economic well-being, Mahathir strongly propagated the 'Look East Policy', that is, having close relations with Japan and South Korea and seeking their help in acquiring efficient management and better technical know-how, whereas Musa still favoured the West. Moreover, while Mahathir emphasized Islamisation, Musa seemed more concerned with nationalism.

Gradually, the differences between the two men began to appear, although they were constantly shown as being friendly in public. However, the break came out into the open when Musa sent a seven-page letter of resignation to the Prime Minister on 26 February, 1986. In the letter which soon became widely-circulated in Kuala Lumpur, he gave his reasons for resigning from the posts of the Deputy Prime Minister, Home Affairs Minister and UMNO Deputy President. Among these Musa claimed that he was disappointed with the Premier for doubting his loyalty towards him; and that he had had enough of 'money politics' and the abuse of power for political interests. In response to this,
during an emergency session, Mahathir produced a letter written by Musa in July 1984. In this letter, Musa as the re-elected deputy president of UMNO warned that he would resign in July 1985, if the former reappointed the defeated Razaleigh in the cabinet. This revelation stunned the members of UMNO Supreme Council, causing them to pledge their support to the Prime Minister. Nonetheless, all of them agreed that Musa, who was then in London, should be urged to return and withdraw his resignation. Accordingly, a four-member delegation was despatched to London.

At any rate, some political analysts confirmed that in 1984 Musa had tried to consolidate his grip on the party and the government. For instance, he wanted a transfer to the Foreign Ministry and important portfolios for some of his close associates. However the attempt failed. At the same time, Musa was unhappy over what was termed Mahathir’s ‘Kitchen Cabinet’. This included the appointment of Premier’s close friends or loyalists as Finance Minister and UMNO treasurer, party Secretary General and the like. Of great importance too was that Musa’s camp was uncomfortable over the presence of Anwar Ibrahim, the main figure behind the Islamisation programme, in UMNO and was worried about the resurgence of Islam. Another point of friction between Mahathir and his
former deputy was the way in which the latter handled the Memali incident, leading to bloodshed and causing great embarrassment to the government.\textsuperscript{57} Besides this, Musa did not show much enthusiasm for Mahathir's pet projects like the Penang Bridge and the 'Proton Saga' national car, which he viewed as "a waste of public funds".\textsuperscript{58} In this regard, Musa had always advocated austerity. To sum up, it was differences in lifestyle, ideals and political ambitions which led to the break between the two leaders, thus creating a wave of nervousness among the Malaysians.

In the meantime, the delegation failed to persuade Musa to withdraw his resignation, except as UMNO deputy president.\textsuperscript{59} With the impending elections, a truce was for a while restored between the rival camps within UMNO. Nonetheless, Musa by his latest move had indicated that he was still interested in making a comeback and challenging Mahathir at a later date. In order to stabilize the situation, Mahathir selected Ghaffar Baba, a wealthy and respectable veteran politician, to be his new deputy, while he himself took over the Home Ministry.\textsuperscript{60} Despite all the problems described, and the fear among UMNO members that PAS would capture the northern Malay-dominated states, the Barisan managed to win a landslide victory in the elections. This was also a great triumph for
Mahathir, as a reduced majority would mean a forced retirement for him as the Prime Minister and party President. With a new mandate very much in his favour, the Prime Minister was able to continue with his Islamisation policy, though austerity was now observed as a serious recession was still gripping the country, accompanied by a slight modification in the country's foreign and trade policies with the West, including Britain. On the home front, Mahathir was poised to face the UMNO General Assembly meeting for the elections of party officials.

As scheduled, the 38th UMNO General Assembly was held on 24th April 1987, thus ending for a spell the most bitter infighting that the party had ever known. In the heat of the campaigns, especially for the party presidency, charges and counter-charges were made by the rival camps. Among these were included allegations of mismanagement, autocracy and favouritism against the party president. Nonetheless, Mahathir managed to retain the presidency after beating his main challenger, Tengku Razaleigh by only 43 votes. This slim majority indicated that there was widespread dissatisfaction with his leadership, besides revealing that the split within UMNO was really serious. On the other hand, the Islamists within UMNO, including Anwar Ibrahim, who was elected
as one of the three vice-presidents, got the highest number of votes, while Musa lost the deputy presidency to his rival Ghaflar Baba. At the same time, seven Musa-Razaleigh supporters were elected to the Supreme Council. In a dramatic move, Razaleigh and a Musa supporter Datuk Rais Yatim resigned from Mahathir's cabinet, while three other ministers and four deputy ministers, who belonged to the Musa-Razaleigh team, were dropped from the cabinet by the Prime Minister himself. Since then, the secularists within UMNO have been held in check. But, the struggle for power was far from over, despite the calls for unity within the party.

Contrary to what most observers had expected, the next round of bitter struggles even started earlier than 1990, the year when new national elections will be held. Failing to overthrow Mahathir through the ballot boxes, eleven UMNO members, who belonged to Razaleigh's team, applied to the Malaysian High Court to have the general assembly and party elections declared illegal on the grounds that some delegates who had participated in the meeting and the elections had represented 30 unregistered UMNO branches. In this connection, they also wanted an order compelling UMNO and its Secretary-General to arrange for fresh delegates' elections and a fresh UMNO general assembly

and election to be held after that. Consequently, much to the dismay of all UMNO members and the Malays in general, the High Court judge declared UMNO an illegal party as provided for in Section 12 of the Societies Act 1966. On this count, UMNO itself was trapped by the very Act which it had passed in order to eliminate organisations unfavourable to its aspirations. This political circus was soon followed by a greater farce when the Tunku, on the occasion of his 85th birthday celebration, was brought out of his retirement with an announcement that he and a group of former UMNO members had formed a new party called UMNO Malaysia. However, before this Tunku-led party could even get off the ground, its application to be registered was dismissed by the Registrar of Societies. Thus, the coup de theatre executed by Mahathir's dissenters had failed miserably.

Mahathir, on his part, strengthened his own position by making a brilliant, if somewhat belated, move by registering a new party called UMNO Baru (New UMNO), which put people who had planned to isolate him on the defensive, and which at one fell swoop neutralised troublemakers from the old deregistered party. As its name suggests, this new party seems to be moving in the new direction that Mahathir has charted so far. By emphasizing loyalty to the party
leadership as a prerequisite for membership of UMNO. Baru, Razaleigh and his supporters had been kept out in the cold. 74

Meanwhile, as a result of the split among the Malay Muslims within and without UMNO, the MCA and the DAP, whose raison d'être had been to protect Chinese interests, and also the MIC, once again began to question the mutually accepted National Language policy and together with it the national education policy as well as the DER. 75 At this stage, however, the Malay Muslim leadership within the Barisan administration managed to stifle the unrest, while also breaking the opposition posed by both the Malay secularists and other dissenting parties. 76 Simultaneously, the Islamisation programmes at the official level and private da'wah activities have continued to flourish throughout the country.

Notes:

1 The legal right of Joseph Pairin Kitingan, the Chief Minister and leader of the Christian-Kadazan dominated party, Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS), to rule over Sabah was challenged in court by Tun Mustapha of the United Sabah National Organisation (USNO). At the same time, Harris Salleh, whose party BERJAYA was unseated by PBS in the state election of 1985, was working behind the
scenes to help his archrival Tun Mustapha gain power. See Asiaweek, Mar. 16, 1986, p. 41.

2 The Barisan government had until early 1987 to call a new election.


4 For the text of the Electoral Pact see Harian Kota, 17 Julai, 1986.

5 The University and University College Act of 1971 and its Amendments of 1975 ensure greater control over student affairs in that students are prohibited from supporting or joining political parties, trade unions or other bodies without university approval. Vice-Chancellors were given greater disciplinary powers; the Ministry of Education and Public Service Commission can decide on the appointment, promotion or dismissal of a lecturer, sabbatical leave, creation of new courses, new departments, new universities and other academic activities.


7 The Star, July 29, 1986.


11 Ibid.

12 To the present, nothing more has been heard of the case.

13 Harian Kota, 29 Julai, 1986.

14 Berita Harian, 6 Ogos, 1986.


16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.
Despite the recent meeting which took place in the United States between Anwar Ibrahim and Hj. Abdul Hadi, nothing has happened to improve the relationship between the two parties.

31 Harakah, Bil. 1:2, 1987, pp. 1 & 3.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
36 Ibid., p. 1.
38 For a discussion on DEB see pp. 102 - 113.
39 Yahya Ismail, op. cit., p. 12.
40 For example, UMNO's Permanent Chairman disclosed that some people from his own Muar Division were
offered $M20,000 as a reward for toppling him from the post. See Watan, 10 - 12 Jan., 1987.


42 Ibid., pp. 107 - 109.

43 Ibid., p. 91; Yahya Ismail, op. cit., p. 12; Asiaweek, Mar. 16, 1986, p. 33.

44 S. H. Al-Attas mentioned that Musa was a regular visitor to discos. See Ibid., p. 64.


47 The split was rumoured and denied repeatedly for almost two years.


49 Asiaweek, loc. cit.

50 Ibid., p. 31; S. H. Al-Attas, op. cit., pp. 86 - 87.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid., p. 40.


54 Asiaweek, Mar. 16, 1986, p. 33.

55 Yahya Ismail, op. cit., p. 13.


58 Ibid., p. 40.


60 Berita Harian, 8 Mei, 1986.
In an effort to improve diplomatic and trade relations with Britain, Mahathir visited the country and held talks with its Prime Minister in July, 1987.

In a rather unexpected move, Musa and his former rival Razaleigh formed an alliance in an effort to oust Mahathir.


See the election's result, Berita Harian, 26 Apr., 1987.


Mingguan Malaysia, Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.


In October 1987, for security reasons, Mahathir arrested more than a hundred people of various shades of opinions, including two top leaders of DAP, President of Aliran, PAS Youth's chief and his outspoken Secretary, some UMNO supporters and also Communist cadres, under the ISA. By early 1988, most of these people had been released, except for those still viewed as security risks.
CHAPTER 7

Conclusion.

In discussing Islam in modern Malaysia, we notice that there is a pattern of continuity, tension and change at work within the nation's history. This pattern begins to unfold when we take into consideration the various developments that have been taking place in the country since the beginning of direct colonial intervention in the late 19th century.

As we have observed, Islam in the pre-colonial Malay States had never really been a strong force. It had a very limited role in the political, social and economic spheres. In fact, it had to share its very development within Malay society with adat, which at times promoted unislamic ideas and practices, consisting of legacies from the Hindu-Buddhist and local animistic traditions.

At the same time, there was no central Muslim institution in any of the Malay States. Unlike the situation in the Muslim heartland of the Middle East, there was no clear-cut evidence to show that kathis had been employed at the Malay royal courts. Although the Sharif'ah had influenced certain aspects of legal codes and expressions of Malay adat in some states,
it was never really applied in the settlement of disputes and was largely ignored in the day to day administration. Ironically, British intervention brought about many changes in this area in Malay States. For the first time, Islamic religious institutions were set up as part and parcel of the administrative changes being made within the acquired territories. Simultaneously, the administration and practices of Islamic law, especially in the realm of personal law, were regulated to fit in with the requirements of the time. However, when compared with other developments - economic, communication and the like - Islam still remained a backwater in the scheme of colonial administration. It was neither totally ignored nor was it given the stimulus to move farther into the realms of politics, economics and so on. In this connection, the colonial masters with their own alien tradition and background could not alone be held responsible for the stagnation of Islam in the Malaysian environment. Equally responsible in this matter were the traditional political élites and the majority of weak and subservient ʿulamāʾ. Associated with these internal factors was the fact that feudalism, which was rigidly observed within Malay society, thereby forcing everyone to submit to the whims of the ruling class, had hampered the
development of a more intellectually dynamic and all-embracing Islamic order among the Malay Muslims.

Nevertheless, by the early decades of the twentieth century, some Salafi ideas which originated in the Middle East had begun to trickle into the Malay States via the Straits Settlements which were ruled more directly by the British. Being outside the jurisdiction of traditional Malay political and religious élites, the Jawi Peranakan and some foreign Muslims of Arab, Indian and Indonesian descent were free to propagate islāhi ideas, thus giving rise to what was locally known as the Kaum Muda. With some local support, the Kaum Muda managed to promote the cause of improving the socio-economic position of the Malays and began to press for Malayan independence. However, because of strong opposition from the traditional Malay political élite and its allies among the secular nationalists, this movement remained a marginal force within Malay society. Later, with the suppression of the reformists by the British authorities, politics in Malaya were dominated by the secular nationalists, who eventually won independence for the country.

Following independence, the Malaysian authorities, beginning with the former Federation of Malaya, have
been taking the initiative to promote Islam, while simultaneously continuing the past policies of the colonial government. As secularism remained very much a part of the local scene, the Alliance administration, and later its successor, the Barisan administration, came under heavy attacks from the Islamists within PAS. The rivalry between UMNO and its opponent PAS became acute from 1959 onwards. The main point of friction until the early 80s was that PAS wanted the Islamic order to be fully implemented in Malaya and later Malaysia, and to defend Malay rights, but UMNO advocated a more liberal, capitalistic and multi-racial approach to politics and economic matters, while selectively promoting Islam as well as defending Malay rights. Then, between 1973 until 1977, peace was restored between the two antagonists when PAS joined the Barisan and had the opportunity to rule Malaysia together with the other component parties of the BN.

From the early 70s, the whole of the Muslim world had been perceptibly undergoing a great change. This was the revival of Islam with its multifarious dimensions. By the mid-70s, this phenomenon, which started off as an effort to reassert Malay identity in the multi-racial Malaysia following the 13th May incident of 1969, assumed a more Islamic character. At the same
time, it became more widespread, especially among the young educated and urban-based Muslims, who in turn managed to influence some members of the old generation and even establish some kind of rapport with certain traditional ulama. Accompanying this development were of course the changes in ideals and aspirations prevalent among these people. For instance, in voicing their socio-economic demands they often emphasized them in Islamic terms rather than Malayism or Bumiputraism. In due course, they even rejected Malay nationalism as a vehicle for Malay unity. In addition, they have been more than happy to play their role in maintaining Muslim interests throughout the world. This can be seen clearly, when we consider how these fundamentalists have supported the Muslim struggle in Patani, the Southern Philippines, Afghanistan and so on. Simultaneously, they passionately called for the full implementation of the Sharfah and laid emphasis on an integrated approach to knowledge as well as development. In yet another perspective, they not only questioned traditional norms and standards, but also condemned Western philosophical traditions which have influenced some Malaysian civil servants, teachers and politicians. Hence, the divergent views that developed between the ruling power and some members of the
population could not bring anything else but tension within the society.

In Malaysia, this phenomenon has been linked with da'wah activities of a personal or group nature. In dealing with the da'wah activities, we have focussed on three major organisations, that is, ABIM, Darul Arqam and Jama'at Tabligh. Although all of them shared certain basic characteristics like emphasizing Tawhid and the need for the Muslims to return to the Qur'ān and Sunnah for their salvation, they nevertheless differed in their approach towards attaining their Islamic goals. For example, ABIM has always stressed da'wah and tarbiyah, while also concentrating on establishing educational and economic institutions and addressing itself to socio-economic and political issues at home and abroad. Contrary to the other two groups, its approach has also been more intellectual in that it has carried on dialogues with both Muslims and non-Muslims. Meanwhile, Darul Arqam in its recent history seemed to be more traditional and syncretist in character. While recognizing its contribution to the growth of small-trade and agro-based economy among the Malays, we cannot ignore the fact that its educational system lacks a programme that can lead to the development of an Islamically healthy, intellectual and dynamic society which can effectively with-
stand the challenges of modern life. Tabligh, which is an offshoot of the Delhi-based movement is more inclined towards sufism, with a strong emphasis on self-purification and brotherhood and is unconcerned with politics. Nonetheless, each of these movements has attracted the attention of the Malaysian public. But, given its skill in articulating issues and handling a wide range of activities, ABIM has certainly generated more fear, apprehension and even respect from various quarters.

Also of great importance was that while Islamic consciousness was rising in Malaysia, there emerged mysteriously within its midst a revival of Islamic heterodoxy often in the guise of turuq or mystical movements. The presence of such movements, however, created more suspicions and fear among the people, thus to a certain degree hampering the development of genuine da'wah activities and giving the authorities the excuse to act against any individual or group deemed to be a threat to the status quo.

Since independence, the UMNO-dominated Malayan government and later its successor the Malaysian authorities have implemented a number of programmes designed to promote Islam. However, certain anomalies continued to be visible just as under the colonial
administration. For example, Sharī‘ah is still confined to the realm of family law, without any jurisdiction over crimes like theft, embezzlement, corruption, abuse of power and the like. In addition, Sharī‘ah courts, a misnomer in themselves, cannot pass any sentence, except as provided by Parliament. Even though some states have recently opted to impose caning in cases of drunkenness among Muslims, they have stopped short of implementing the full hadd punishment as prescribed by the Sharī‘ah. All these cases, to mention only a few, have had their precedents in the administrative system of the British during the colonial era.

Apart from this, government control of religious affairs, just as during the days of colonial administration, extends even to the spheres of education and Islamic da‘wah. In all schools and colleges, Islam is taught as a compartmentalised subject, without its philosophy being extended to cover the teaching of such subjects as history, economics, sciences and so forth. Hence, a secular approach to education is still the mainstay of the Malaysian educational system, despite the implementation of some changes like the introduction of Arabic in some residential schools and the teaching of a subject called 'Islamic Civilization' in colleges and
universities. Even if at times Islam is explained as al-Dīn, it is done with great care by government religious teachers so as not to offend the status quo. \(^2\) With regard to Islamic da‘wah, it is controlled through the tauliah system. However, the monitoring of da‘wah activities at times goes far beyond what the British administrators had done. Also as a means to control dissent within the country, the Malaysian authorities have made use of the ISA to detain opponents without trial, much the same tactic as that adopted by the previous colonial government.

With regard to changes, these have tended to come rather slowly in Malaysia. In the 60s and early 70s, many of the Islamic programmes implemented by the Barisan administration seemed to be more symbolic and rhetorical than structural, with the purpose of appeasing the people and ensuring support for the administration. But since the rise of Islamic consciousness and the more so with the introduction of the Islamisation programme in the early 80s, more coverage has been given to Islamic religious matters on the government-owned television and radio network. Besides this, economic development in Malaysia has been interpreted in Islamic terms, although the liberal capitalistic approach of the past is still maintained in many sectors of the economy. In this
context, to ensure greater Muslim involvement in the national economy, the government has created such institutions as the Bank Islam and the Takaful. At the same time, the authorities have taken initiatives to streamline the administration and enforcement of the collection of zakāt under Islamic Law; while the YPEIM has been given the responsibility of increasing saving and investment among the Muslims through the Amal Jariah (Islamic Social Welfare) Scheme, with the cooperation of Tabung Haji and Bank Islam. More or less similar initiatives have been adopted in certain states. Obviously, these efforts, official or otherwise, have dispelled the myth propagated by some scholars that Islam is anti-development. 3

In terms of education, a great leap has been made with the establishment of UIA, whose first batch of graduates has now begun serving in the administrative, economic and educational sectors of the nation. Further, to increase the ratio of qualified bumiputra and to guarantee success for the Islamisation programme, the authorities have concentrated on sending more Malays for higher studies, including those who are involved in Islamic Studies. All these activities among other things have been implemented through the efforts of Islamists within and without the administration. Simultaneously, the role of PAS has been no
less important in bringing about more Islamisation within the country. Its constant criticisms of UMNO caused the party to be more careful and to steer it more towards Islam, so as not to appear less Islamic in the eyes of the general Muslim population.

At any rate, as more Islamic programmes were implemented the government found itself at odds with various groups, including some of its own Malay supporters. Apparently this, coupled with other factors, has caused a split within UMNO as seen in the last party election and eventually led to the court case and the demise of UMNO itself. Amidst this unsettled situation, opposition from the non-Malays has reemerged towards the government's more Islamic and pro-Bumiputra policies. However, the Premier with the support of the Islamists managed to overcome all these challenges, established a new party, UMNO Baru and appears to have remained in control of the country.

Taking all these points into consideration, there are a number of possibilities which can come about in Malaysia in the near future. It should be noted that despite the presence of radicalism among certain PAS members and the occurrence of such incidents as those of Batu Pahat and Kerling, which were in themselves
aberrations, there is not likely to be another Iran in Malaysia. This is simply because Islam in Malaysia has all along been more docile and subservient to the establishment. Partly, this is due to the entrenchment of feudalism among the Malays. Besides this, among the Sunni Muslims, there has never been a parallel tradition of strong and independent 'ulamā' as in Shi'ite Islam. Moreover, there is no parallel to the state of socio-economic and political affairs that prevailed in Iran during the time of Muhammad Reza Pahlavi. For their part, the Malays by nature have been more gentle and accommodative in their stand and are unlikely to be like their more emotional brothers of the Middle East. In such circumstances, radicalism will not appeal to them very much.

This does not mean, however, that the Malays will care less or abandon all the achievements that have been secured in the name of Islam and for the well-being of the Bumiputra. It is already an established fact that Islam has reached the centre-stage in Malaysia and it is unlikely that it can be pushed back into the wings. Hence, Islamisation will go on, but its growth may slow down somewhat if infighting among the Malays continues unabated into the future. Nonetheless, at individual level, religiosity will continue to grow among young educated Muslims given
the fact that they now have more opportunities to learn Arabic, the availability of more religious works and the existence of movements to urge them towards Islam. Beyond this, with improved communications the Muslims of Malaysia have come into closer contact than before with their brethren in other parts of the world, thus keeping the faith more alive as well as enhancing their commitment to it.

Meanwhile, the call for the establishment of an Islamic State will arise from time to time among the Islamists outside the administration. But in all probability, Malaysia in the near future will remain a secular state with the Malay Muslim-dominated Barisan still at the helm of power, as there is as yet no other party able to command enough confidence from the people. However, what is most important to the Muslims and Malaysia as a whole is that the Muslims as a majority group need really to unite and practise Islam as well as to explain their religion to others in such a manner as to remove their misgivings. In this regard, one of the things to be considered at this juncture is the promotion of more integrated, non-racial and dynamic approach to Islam via education and mass media and the putting of less emphasis on the introduction of more draconian rules and regulations.
At the same time, the economic atmosphere within the country should be improved, this including creating more facilities for investment and employment for all, while also not forgetting to provide more economic outlets based on Islamic principles for the Muslims. In this way, no one can justly complain of being ill-treated. For the Muslims, more changes can be initiated through the exercise of *ijtihād* and *ijma’*, especially in matters pertaining to *mu‘āmalah* (social transactions), by the ‘ulamā’, with the cooperation of Muslim intellectuals.

By any standard, such measures as these are not easy to attain. But, with determination, positive thinking and sincerity on the part of all the responsible Malaysian élite goodwill may some day triumph in the country.

Notes:

1 The Malaysian Parliament has passed an act, that is, Muslim Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 1955, Act of Parliament no. 23 pf 1965, which provides that Shari‘ah courts cannot preside over a criminal case if the judgement exceeds a prison sentence of over six months or a fine of $M1,000 or both.

2 There have, however, been cases where the teachers themselves have overstepped the limit prescribed.

OUR NATION, MALAYSIA, being dedicated to achieving a greater unity of all her peoples; to maintaining a democratic way of life; to creating a just society in which the wealth of the nation shall be equitably shared; to ensuring a liberal approach to her rich and diverse cultural traditions, to building a progressive society which shall be oriented to modern science and technology;

WE, her people, pledge our united efforts to attain those ends guided by these principles:—

Belief in God
Loyalty to King and Country
Upholding the Constitution
Rule of Law
Good Behaviour and Morality

(This translation of the Rukunegara declaration is taken from John Funston, Malay Politics in Malaysia: A Study of UMNO & PAS, Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books (Asia) Ltd., 1980, p. 219.)
Erliyaa:

“Tiap-tiap anak bagi seorang bapa maka nasabnya adalah kepada bapanya, kecuali anak-anak Fatimah maka sesungguh-nya akulah bapa mereka.”

(Riwayat Ath-Thabrani)

Nabi Muhammad s.a.w. telah bersabda:

وَلَدَ نَاطِقَةَ بِنْيَانٍ أَنَّ أَبُوْهُمْ وَعَضُينِهِمْ

(رواية الطبراني)
APPENDIX C:

Dr. Maghfur Othman, who was born in Java, in his preliminary findings concerning Manaqib Syeikh Suhaimi among other things stated the following:

1. Aurad Muhammadiyah in its activities stands on its own and is not a part of any other tariqat.

2. According to the claim of the grandson of the tariqat's founder (Haji Taha Suhaimi), Syeikh Suhaimi received the aurad from the Prophet in the Ka‘bah, whereas in the original manaqib, whose author was Fadhlullah Suhaimi (the son of Syeikh Suhaimi), this story has not been mentioned.

3. The original manaqib (authored by Fadhlullah Suhaimi) contains twenty five parts, while the edition produced by Taha Suhaimi has twenty nine parts. This means that Taha Suhaimi has added four parts, besides making a number of changes. The result of this change and addition causes those who practiced Aurad Muhammadiyah to deviate from the belief of Ahlus Sunnah and prefer to enjoy all sorts of superstitious and amusing stories.
4. In the original *manāqib*, Fadhullullah Suhaime stated that Syeikh Suhaime died in Klang in the year 1925, while in the Malay version of Taha Suhaime it is stated that he is not dead, but merely in temporary occultation and shall return as the *Mahdi* at the appointed hour.

5. In the original *manāqib*, the author has never declared Syeikh Suhaime to be *al-Mahdi*. But in the new *manāqib*, there are additions and changes made with the clear intention of instilling Taha Suhaime's own beliefs into the disciples of *Aurad Muhammadiyah*, that is that the founder of the *aurad* will return as *al-Mahdi*.

6. The son of Syeikh Suhaime states that his father's name is Muhammad Suhaime b. Abdullah and not Muhammad b. Abdullah as-Suhaime as written in the Malay version of the *manāqib*.

7. In the original *manāqib*, the author has only written the genealogy of Syeikh Suhaime up to the name of Abu Bakar Asy-Syaibani. In the new *manāqib*, Taha Suhaime has written the genealogy of his grandfather until Rasulullah via Saidina Hussein. According to Taha Suhaime, he has found
the genealogy of Abu Bakar Asy-Syaibani in the newspaper *ar-Robitah*.

8. In the original *manāqib*, it is not stated from where the *Aurad Muhammadiyah* has been taken, while in the new *manāqib*, it is stated that Syeikh Suhaimi received the *aurad* directly from the Prophet in the Ka'bah.

9. In the [new] *manāqib*, it is stated that the forest at Alas Kotonggo is really the city of the *aulia*.

People living around Alas Kotonggo are members of a society still strongly influenced by mystical teachings plus Hindu-Buddhist beliefs. According to the traditional belief of Javanese society, Alas Kotonggo is the place of gods (*dewa-dewa*) and it is regarded as a sacred place in their religion.

10. In the *Manāqib* of Syeikh Muhammad Suhaimi there is the prediction of Jayabaya (Javanese - Joyoboyo) that foretold the birth of a Javanese person who shall one day be known as *Ratu Adil*. From this prediction, Taha Suhaimi claimed that *Ratu Adil* is none other than Syeikh Suhaimi as he...
is of Javanese-Arab descent. Joyoboyo was a Javanese king, whose religion was Buddhism.

11. It should be noted that the original Manāqib of Syeikh Suhaimi was written by Hj. Fadhlullah Suhaimi in the Javanese language in the year 1931, that is, about six years after the death of Syeikh Suhaimi. Besides being the son, Fadhlullah Suhaimi was also a student who was most intimate with his father. In his work, there is nothing which states that Syeikh Suhaimi has vanished and will return at the end of time as Imam Mahdi. He admitted that his father was really dead and buried at Klang, Selangor. It was Hj. Taha who made the additions and changes in the Malay translated version of the work in 1967, that is some 36 years after the death of Syeikh Suhaimi.


1 The term dewa-dewa has been derived from Sanskrit diva.
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