LORD MONBODDO'S OF THE ORIGIN AND PROGRESS OF LANGUAGE:
ITS SOURCES, GENESIS AND BACKGROUND, WITH SPECIAL
ATTENTION TO THE ADVOCATES' LIBRARY

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Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
University of Edinburgh
1985
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I should like to thank my supervisors, Professor David Abercrombie and Mr Alan Kemp, for their advice and encouragement; and also the staff of the National Library of Scotland, who have been of considerable assistance from the outset.
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ABSTRACT

LORD MONBODDO'S OF THE ORIGIN AND PROGRESS OF LANGUAGE: ITS SOURCES, GENESIS AND BACKGROUND, WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE ADVOCATES' LIBRARY

This thesis examines the sources and early development of Lord Monboddo's Of the Origin and Progress of Language (6 volumes, 1773-1792) against its contemporary intellectual background in order to gain a fuller understanding of the aims and significance of the work in the context of its time. The thesis is particularly concerned with Monboddo's wide use of the holdings of the Advocates' Library and the influence on him of the sixteenth century humanist tradition of Scottish jurisprudence associated with its foundation.

The thesis concentrates on the first two volumes of OPL, which deal with the natural history of language and universal grammar, because they contain the essence of Monboddo's views on language. However, rhetoric (the subject of the remaining four volumes) is essential to the background and is therefore dealt with in a general way.

It is argued that Monboddo's main purpose was to offer a solution to the linguistic, cultural and philosophical problems confronting Scotland after the Union; and that his solution
involved restoring the Scottish Enlightenment to its original humanist principles. That is, in place of the empirical science of Man proposed by Locke and Hume, Monboddo proposed a human science based on the Aristotelian principles of languages of art. It is also argued that Monboddo's philosophical, linguistic and legal views are completely consistent.
### ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>OPL</td>
<td>Of the Origin and Progress of Language</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Monboddo Papers</td>
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<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>Ancient Metaphysics</td>
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<td>NLS</td>
<td>National Library of Scotland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAL</td>
<td>Catalogue of the Advocates' Library</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cloyd</td>
<td>E.L. Cloyd, James Burnett, Lord Monboddo (Oxford, 1972)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRSE</td>
<td>Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EB</td>
<td>Encyclopaedia Britannica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PB</td>
<td>Pocket Book (Monboddo Papers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JHI</td>
<td>Journal of the History of Ideas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV</td>
<td>Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSLL</td>
<td>Monograph Series on Language and Linguistics</td>
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Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

1. The aims and structure of the thesis

This study of the monumental Of the Origin and Progress of Language (6 volumes 1773-1792) by James Burnett, Lord Monboddo (1714-1799) is based upon both editions of the published text, upon the eighteenth century catalogues of the Library of the Faculty of Advocates (now the National Library of Scotland), and upon the Monboddo Papers which are housed there.

It examines the sources and early development of Monboddo's unfinished work (henceforth referred to as OPL) against its contemporary intellectual background with a view to gaining a fuller understanding of the aims and significance of OPL in the context of its time.

Although an attempt is made to refer to all Monboddo's sources of any importance, the commentary on his philosophy of language is restricted to the first two volumes (1773 and 1774) - that is, those dealing primarily with the philosophical history of language and with universal grammar. These two volumes contain the essentials of Monboddo's ideas on language. The remaining four volumes, which are an exposition of ancient rhetoric - and in any case make no claim to originality - are accordingly dealt with only in a general way.
As a member of the Faculty of Advocates working in the Advocates' Library Monboddo was at the centre of the cultural life of Scotland during its greatest period. The thesis is particularly concerned with Monboddo's wide use of the holdings of the Advocates' Library (of which he was a curator from 1751 to 1756) and with the influence on him - albeit modified by Cambridge Platonism - of the humanist tradition of Scottish jurisprudence which went to the making of that library. 2

Tracing the genesis of OPL in relation to the holdings of the Advocates' Library should illustrate in a particular and detailed way the role of the library as the armoury of the Scottish literati. (It may at the same time give some indication of how changes in its holdings in the course of the eighteenth century reflected the intellectual influences from England, France and Holland which contributed to the Scottish revival of letters. However, this is not discussed.)

2. OPL and the catalogues of the Advocates' Library
The idea of the Advocates' Library was first projected by Sir George Mackenzie of Rosehaugh, (1636-1691), then Lord Advocate, around 1680. He accomplished his plan as Dean of Faculty in 1682. 3

The first printed catalogue appeared in 1692. 4 It is a class catalogue listing holdings under four headings: law, history, theology and miscellaneous. Legal works take up 89 of the 158 pages. However, history, classics and philosophy (including Descartes, Bacon and Hobbes) are well represented. Modern literary works are rare. The majority of the legal works listed belong to the
seventeenth century and are Continental, frequently Dutch, in origin. The works of the natural lawyers, Grotius and Pufendorf, which were to have a formative influence on the Scottish Enlightenment, are already in evidence. However, most of the key figures of the sixteenth century French school of historical-philological jurisprudence are also included: for example, Budé, Hotman, Bodin, Cujas, and J.J. Scaliger. In fact, the preface by Sir George Mackenzie dwells on this French humanist connection and not the later influence of seventeenth century Continental natural law. Furthermore, the catalogue is dedicated to Joseph Scaliger and George Buchanan, pointing up the Continental connections of traditional Scottish humanism and the fact that it was the Renaissance which paved the way for the revival of Roman law.

In considering this humanistic tradition it is worth noting that a history of the French Academy is listed - an influence which was to be reflected in later catalogues. It is, of course, not surprising to find the works of Demosthenes, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Quintilian and Cicero included.

The policy of the library was to build up full collections of canon and civil law, of Greek and Roman classics, and of British history and antiquities; and this continued throughout the early part of the next century. Nevertheless, there were already literary, as well as legal, ties with the Continent. From 1688 there was a regular order for two influential journals: the Journal des Scavants and Bayle's Nouvelles de la république des lettres. Moreover, the catalogue lists several travel books.
In 1709 the library was given permission to receive a copy of every book published at Stationer's Hall, London. As a result, it grew rapidly from about 5,000 volumes early in the century to 25,000 volumes by 1742. By the middle of the century, when the Scottish literary revival had already begun, it was recognized not only as the national library of Scotland but as "one of the great research libraries of Europe".  

Thomas Ruddiman (1674-1757), a figure of importance in the history of Scottish humanism, became Keeper in 1730. He has been called the second founder of the library because it was under him that it became the armoury of the Scottish Enlightenment. In 1742, together with Walter Goodall, he published a complete author-catalogue; a large folio volume of some 25,000 entries modelled on the catalogue of the library of Cardinal Imperiali at Rome.  

The 1742 catalogue reflects the importance of Bacon and Locke; of the early French Enlightenment (Bayle and Voltaire); of Continental natural law (mostly Grotius and Pufendorf); and of travel literature. All these sources provided inspiration and materials for the Scottish philosophers' investigations of man and society.  

Natural philosophy is represented by the works of Bayle, Copernicus, Kepler, Petty, and Newton; and by the transactions of both the Académie Royale des Sciences and of the Royal Society. John Wilkins, a member of the Royal Society school and the inventor of a philosophical language which impressed Monboddo, is also represented.
On the other hand, the Scottish and Continental philological tradition of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was by no means ignored: Buchanan, Budé, Bodin, Cujas, Hotman, the Scaligers, Vossius and Salmiasius (whose *De Hellenistica* was used by Monboddo) are all well represented. J.C. Scaliger's *De causis linguae Latinae* is particularly important. The influence of the French academies is noteworthy, particularly the Académie Française, whose dictionary is included, and the Académie Royale des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres. The *Mémoires* (1710-1725) of the latter were to have an important influence on Adam Smith and Monboddo and on the development of the study of belles lettres in Scotland.  

The influence of Port Royal is also noteworthy. The 1742 catalogue includes the *Grammaire générale et raisonnée* (Amsterdam 1703), the *Méthode nouvelle* for Latin (Paris 1681) and the *Méthode nouvelle* for Greek (Paris 1696).  

Hume's period of tenure as Keeper (1752-1757) almost corresponded to the period during which Monboddo was one of the curators (1751-1756): and their different views on the character of the library reflected the difference between their philosophical positions. In 1754 Hume attempted to improve the collection of modern classics: but Monboddo and his friend Hailes (both to become Lords of Session), who still saw 'the Advocates' Library as a repository of "useful learning" as Ruddiman had done, ordered three "indecent" volumes removed. Three years later, Hume was succeeded in the post of Keeper by Adam Ferguson.
However, by 1773 the absence of French belles lettres, modern poetry and fiction was noted in a curators' report as an omission, and the concept of a gentlemanly library of polite letters began to influence holdings. 16

In 1776 another catalogue appeared listing the books added since 1742: and it is in this catalogue that the largest number of works cited by Monboddo in OPL are to be found. Most of these are travel books containing information about the manners, customs, institutions and languages of various peoples. Many of them must have been acquired during the time that Monboddo was one of the curators. 17

Apart from this marked increase in travel literature, the 1776 catalogue shows, as might be expected, many more signs of the impact of the French Enlightenment: for example, the works of Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, Buffon and the Encyclopédie itself. There is also an increased emphasis on natural history - besides Buffon, there is a remarkable number of works by Linnaeus - a tendency which is continued in the Appendix to the catalogue published in 1787. Of course, Bacon, Locke, Newton and Continental natural law are still very well represented. 18

For the most part, these additions reflect the growth of Lockian empiricism. Montesquieu, Buffon, Rousseau, and the encyclopedists drew on travel literature for data which would, when properly arranged, constitute the natural history of man. And their works (which became in turn, sources of these facts) were of major importance to the development of OPL and the Scottish Enlightenment as a whole. 19
Monboddo may therefore be seen as reconciling the two, apparently opposed, traditions reflected in the holdings of the Advocates' Library: the old Aristotelian rationalism which characterised Roman law, and the new eighteenth century Lockian empiricism which characterised the French Enlightenment. (This at least is how contemporaries tended to see matters. In fact, both rationalist and empiricist strands are present in Locke's works, as Monboddo seems to have understood. Nor was the French Enlightenment by any means free from the influence of Cartesianism.)

Another important aspect of the 1776 catalogue is the presence of the transactions of several Continental academies: for example, those of the Berlin Academy (L'Académie Royale des Sciences et Belles Lettres); the Académie Royale de Montpellier; and the Mémoires of the Académie Royale des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres (1710-1763) which the library had been accumulating since before 1742 and which seems to have had a wide influence on the debates of the Scottish literary societies. The new interest of the Keeper and curators in building up the collection of belles lettres is further illustrated by the inclusion of translations of several key works by Charles Rollin, Professor of Eloquence at the Collège Royale and a member of the Académie Royale des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres: Method of teaching and studying the Belles Lettres, with reflections on Taste (London 1768); Ancient History of the Egyptians etc. (5th edition London 1768); and History of the Arts and Sciences of the Ancients (3 volumes London 1768).
Adam Smith knew Rollin's works; and, although Monboddo opposed the cult of taste, the connection of the second and third items with his interests is obvious. This is particularly true of the History of the Arts and Sciences of the Ancients whose second volume dealt with grammar, philology, poetry and rhetoric.\textsuperscript{22}

A supplement to the 1776 catalogue (notable for the further expansion of travel literature) appeared in 1787, and a third folio in 1807. Since Monboddo was still working on OPL up to his death in 1799, the 1807 catalogue is cited whenever a work is not listed in an earlier catalogue.\textsuperscript{23}

These catalogues are cited as CAL 1742, 1776, 1787 and 1809 after the entry of each work from the library consulted by Monboddo. Works consulted in the Bibliothèque royale in Paris are listed separately. There is a short list of other works which Monboddo used but which were evidently not in the Advocates' Library: we may assume that Monboddo owned some of these.

Although it can be shown that OPL is closely related to the holdings of the Advocates' Library, the relationship is not altogether simple. In the first place, the absence from a catalogue of a work used by Monboddo does not prove it was not in the library at the relevant time: works were sometimes missed and appeared in a later catalogue. However, this situation does not often arise.\textsuperscript{24}

Secondly, Monboddo recommended books to the Keeper, so the existence of a work in the catalogues of 1776 and 1787 does not necessarily mean that Monboddo borrowed it from, or read it in, the library. But Monboddo does not often seem to have had the
opportunity of reading works before recommending them. Certainly his own library appears to have been limited. In any case, we know that — like Hume, Kames and Ferguson — he borrowed heavily from the library: and there is a quite remarkable degree of correspondence between Monboddo's reading and the library holdings. 25

Thirdly, and finally, Monboddo obtained some of his early material during three visits to France in 1763, 1764 and 1765. During these visits he borrowed a few books from the Bibliothèque Royale which were crucial to the inception of OPL. 26

3. The Monboddo papers and OPL

The principal collection of Monboddo Papers in the National Library of Scotland is one of the most extensive collections relating to any of the eighteenth century Scottish philosophers. The collection comprises letters, notebooks and over 300 numbered manuscripts besides legal papers. 27

Apart from a few very early manuscripts, the Monboddo Papers may be roughly divided into two periods: those evidently written during the ten years or so before 1765 — when Monboddo undertook OPL — and those belonging to the long period of thirty-four years during which he was composing the six volumes of his unfinished work. Many of the earlier papers are in the form of bound folios. These often deal with various aspects of Scottish jurisprudence that demonstrate its connection with the study of language and society: for example, rhetoric, the origin of government, the migrations of peoples and the relations between different languages. Others illustrate the
importance of metaphysics, philosophy and history — especially the
history of man, language and society — in Scottish jurisprudence. Here Aristotle, Cicero and the Stoics are the dominant classical
influences. 28

Some of these early papers — notably "A Discourse on Language" — seem to be connected with debates in the Select Society, the literary society of which Monboddo was a leading member and which played a key role in the development of the Scottish Enlightenment. Most of the papers deal with subjects which concerned the other Scottish philosophers — particularly Adam Smith, a seminal figure and a fellow member of the Select Society whose thought was also deeply influenced by the study of jurisprudence. 29

The papers in the second group (1765 onwards) were written after the demise of the Select Society and were begun immediately following the last of Monboddo's visits to Paris on behalf of the Douglas Cause — the visit of 1765, which was crucial to the genesis of OPL. These papers are dominated by notes from Monboddo's wide reading for OPL, by essays which were eventually incorporated in some form into OPL and by drafts of chapters of OPL. There are also notebooks belonging to the late 1770s, the 1780s and 1790s which relate largely to Monboddo's other work: Antient Metaphysics (6 vols. 1779-99). 30

Echoes of most of the Monboddo Papers may be found in OPL. But since Monboddo repeatedly returned to the same subjects, often using almost the same words, it is frequently difficult to relate particular papers to particular parts of the text; and, in general, no such
attempt is made. On the other hand, the papers are quite often dated: and the attempt has been made to date those that are not.

The obsessional quality of the Monboddo Papers is undeniable; and there is little sign of any evolution in Monboddo's thinking. It is true that Monboddo was obsessed with ancient philosophy — particularly with Aristotelian hylomorphism — and this contributed to his work being undervalued for so long. On the other hand, this obsession is not wholly surprising. Aristotelianism did claim to be all-embracing. Lawyers tend to be conservative in their views in any case. And by the date of the earlier group of papers Monboddo was already middle aged: by 1765 he was 51. Furthermore, Monboddo was a humanist who wished to turn the clock back in philosophical and cultural terms to the sixteenth century. He was also a consistent, systematic thinker anxious to account for the entire corpus of evidence he had collected in relation to barbarous languages by the same rationalist principles with a view to tracing the intellectual history of man.

Thus, in spite of the influence of Cambridge Platonism, the Monboddo Papers, like the published text of OPL, amount to a single-minded defence of Aristotelian rationalism: and in both there is a forensic quality about the style and the argument. Monboddo's subjects are fundamentally method and language: and OPL illustrates the systematicity of the art of genera and species which he is defending.
4. Outline of chapters

Chapter Two outlines Monboddo's life, emphasizing his humanist background and discussing in general terms the humanist principles which underlay the Scottish Enlightenment and which are expressed in OPL.

Chapter Three indicates the connection between this humanist tradition and Scottish jurisprudence and their joint importance to Scottish culture. It also briefly examines the role of the advocates and the Advocates' Library both in the late seventeenth century revival of humanism and in the Enlightenment. More specifically, it deals with the principles of the sixteenth century French school of jurisprudence which influenced Scottish jurisprudence, the Advocates' Library and Monboddo himself.

Chapter Four outlines the linguistic, cultural and philosophical problems of the eighteenth century Scotland. Monboddo saw these as the outcome of the decline of Scottish humanism and in OPL offered a solution to the dilemma.

It will then be necessary to examine OPL in relation to the two major intellectual aspects of the Scottish Enlightenment: the Lockian Science of Man - the philosophy of the British moral empiricists - and Ciceronian rhetoric. These are dealt with in Chapters Five and Six respectively. Both were concerned with the establishment of a true human science based on language; and Monboddo attempted to return both to their original Renaissance principles.
Chapter Seven examines OPL in the narrower context of two Scottish literary societies - the Select Society and the Glasgow Literary Society. The literary clubs were closely associated with the cult of rhetoric, the improvement of English, and - in the case of the Glasgow society - the Greek revival. OPL may be said to have made an important contribution to all three of these aspects of the Scottish Enlightenment; and the Select Society may be regarded as its cradle. The same chapter examines the role of the Glasgow Hellenists in the early years of the Scottish Enlightenment and the parallels between their interests and Monboddo's.

Having dealt with the more general intellectual background of OPL, and the work of the literary clubs which reflected it, we turn to the debate which was closely connected with both the Science of Man and the cult of rhetoric: the debate on the origin and progress of language. OPL I may be regarded as the outstanding British contribution to this debate and also one of the most distinguished examples of the genre in which it was conducted - the genre of philosophical history.

Chapter Eight deals with the background of the debate, referring primarily to Locke and Mandeville - against whose theories OPL is directed.

This brings us to the discussion of Monboddo's major sources. First, the French sources will be dealt with: the Encyclopédie (Chapter Nine); Rousseau's second Discours (Chapter Ten) and Buffon's Histoire Naturelle (Chapter Eleven). All three were of
special importance to the Scottish Enlightenment; indeed, Adam Smith - a key figure in the background of OPL - recommended them to aspiring Scottish authors. As far as Monboddo is concerned, the chapter on the Encyclopédie is perhaps more in the nature of a background chapter; but it is no less important for that, and it clearly belongs with Buffon and Rousseau, who were major contributors to the Encyclopédie.

Chapter Twelve deals with Monboddo's only Scottish source of importance: Adam Smith's Considerations concerning the First Formation of Languages. Smith himself owed a good deal to Rousseau's second Discours and to articles on language in the Encyclopédie.

Then, in Chapter Thirteen, OPL will be examined in relation to Monboddo's one major British source, James Harris's philosophical grammar Hermes. Monboddo regarded OPL as complementing Hermes, so this chapter has special importance. Its principal themes are Cambridge Platonism and Aristotelian grammar.

Having dealt with the background and sources of OPL, the genesis of Monboddo's work is finally traced in Chapter Fourteen. This chapter is based almost entirely on the evidence of the Monboddo Papers. It traces the development of OPL up to 1766. That is, it concentrates on the crucial early stages of OPL rather than attempting to trace the long process of composition which continued up to Monboddo's death in 1799.

The lists of the works Monboddo consulted while writing OPL are an essential part of the thesis. The works are listed under six
headings - Classical literature, Travel literature, Language, History, Law and Miscellaneous - in order to bring out the importance to Monboddo of Classical sources and travel books published from the sixteenth century onwards. This dual nature of Monboddo's sources may be said to reflect one of his purposes - to reconcile the ancient and the modern sciences of man. However, it is inevitable that a few legal, grammatical and travel works appear under the heading of Classical Sources.
Chapter Two

LORD MONBODDO'S LIFE AND HUMANIST BACKGROUND

1. Family background

The Burnetts of Monboddo were a cadet branch of the Burnetts of Leys in Aberdeenshire - an ancient family that had produced many successful clerics and lawyers, frequently with literary or philosophical inclinations. Such landowning families with an interest in preserving the status quo had a long-standing connection with the legal profession.¹

Like most such families, particularly in the north east of Scotland, the Burnetts were Episcopalians and Jacobites. Episcopalians were usually Jacobites (and frequently, like Monboddo, also Freemasons). Their ties with England and the Continent were of the greatest importance to Scottish culture during the religious troubles of the seventeenth century: they kept Scotland in touch with new currents of thought. For example, Thomas Burnet of Kemnay was a correspondent of Leibniz who wrote letters on a multitude of subjects, including Dalgarno's philosophical language; while Sir Thomas Burnet, physician to Charles II and friend of Sir Robert Sibbald, was one of those Scots - like Sibbald, Pitcairne and David Gregory - who brought the new philosophy back from abroad.²
Episcopalians were also closely associated with the old, transcendental, humanist culture which contrasted with the doctrinaire narrowness of Presbyterianism. Owing to a compromise between the Episcopacy and the Presbytery after the Reformation, this Episcopalian culture still influenced the north east of Scotland in the eighteenth century. ³

These Episcopalian families of the north east frequently even had Roman Catholic connections. For example, Thomas Innes (1662-1744), the historian and antiquary, attended the College of Navarre and the Scots College, Paris. His brother, principal of the Scots College, played a significant role in the early development of the Scottish Enlightenment. ⁴

During the religious disturbances of the seventeenth century, Episcopalians were often exiled. Sometimes, like Alexander Burnet (1614-1684), Archbishop of Glasgow, they took orders in the Church of England. Gilbert Burnet F.R.S. (1643-1715) the historian - a brother of Sir Thomas Burnet - became Bishop of Salisbury. ⁵

Gilbert Burnet was a relation of Monboddo's; and there are several parallels in background, interests and career between Monboddo and members of Gilbert Burnet's family. ⁶

Gilbert's father was, like Monboddo, a Lord of Session. Gilbert himself excelled at Greek at King's College, Aberdeen and became a friend of the Cambridge Platonists. One son, Sir Thomas Burnet F.R.S. (1694-1753), who studied in Holland and became a judge in London, had views on Locke and the ancients which closely resembled Monboddo's. The titles of two of his many publications speak for themselves:
Our Ancestors as Wise as We: or Ancient precedents for modern facts (1712) and The History of Ingratitude (1714).\(^7\) Another son, also Gilbert, was, like Monboddo, a rationalist critic of Hutcheson's "moral sense" - the basis of the fashionable eighteenth-century Scottish philosophy of Common Sense.\(^8\) All these tendencies can be related to the traditional humanist background of such Episcopalian families. Monboddo's education illustrates the pattern.

2. Education

Monboddo attended the parish school at Laurencekirk, near Monboddo, Kincardineshire, where Thomas Ruddiman (1674-1757), who was well known to the Burnetts, had taught towards the end of the previous century. Ruddiman - who was amongst other things a printer, grammarian, Latinist, Clerk Depute of the Faculty of Advocates and Keeper of the Advocates' Library - may also have tutored Monboddo in law in 1732. A friend of Pitcairne and Sibbald, Ruddiman was the outstanding champion of the Scottish humanist tradition in the early part of the century when that tradition was declining.\(^9\)

After being taught at home by a tutor with the highest regard for the ancients, Monboddo attended King's College, Aberdeen (Ruddiman's old college) from 1728 to 1732. There his regents seem to have been more competent in Greek than any of the other subjects for which they were responsible. In contrast to Marischal, the other Aberdeen college, King's had preserved something of the spirit of the old Episcopalian humanist culture until the close of the seventeenth century; and it remained the more traditional of the
two colleges throughout the following century. However, Monboddo also attended the lectures of Thomas Blackwell the younger, the principal of Marischal College. Blackwell was the leader of the Greek 'revival' in the north east and a devotee of Shaftesbury's fashionable Hellenism. He seems to have helped to develop Monboddo's interest in the Greek origins of the Roman world and in the historical approach in general - interests which distinguish Monboddo's view of humanism from Ruddiman's. (But these interests were also characteristic of the French humanist school of historical-philological jurisprudence from which Scottish jurisprudence originally stemmed: and it was to this that Sir George Mackenzie, founder of the Advocates' Library, like Monboddo himself at a later date, wished to return in order to preserve the oldest traditions of Scottish humanism.)

From 1733 until 1736 Monboddo studied Roman law in Holland - at Groningen and perhaps also at Leyden - where Scottish law students had studied since the Reformation. It is possible that at this time Monboddo may have come under the influence of Tiberius Hemsterhuys (1685-1766) whose ambition was to establish a norm of correct Greek. As one of the earliest items among the Monboddo Papers shows, he was certainly already interested in language in general.

3. London life and legal career

During the 1745 Rising Monboddo went to London where he met several literary and political figures, perhaps including James Harris, the Cambridge Platonist and nephew of Shaftesbury. Harris was the author
of Hermes - a philosophical grammar which had a profound influence on OPL. Monboddo was to revisit London at regular intervals throughout his life. Eventually he became something of a literary lion in the Capital.15

After his return to Scotland in 1746 Monboddo's career flourished. Furthermore, he became a curator of the Advocates' Library and a charter member of the most influential improving society of the Scottish Enlightenment - the Select Society. Both events had important consequences for the genesis of OPL.16

The high point of Monboddo's legal career was probably his decisive role in the famous Douglas Cause, the Douglases being a family to which he was himself related. Between 1763 and 1765 he made visits to Paris on behalf of his clients - visits which were crucial to the inception of OPL. He met two literary figures (one an encyclopedist); visited the Cabinet du Roi - which Buffon described in his Histoire naturelle and which contained the famous stuffed "orang-outang"; interviewed a "wild girl"; and borrowed books from the Bibliothèque Royale which led him to undertake OPL. In 1767, about two years after beginning OPL, he became a judge of the Court of Session with the title Lord Monboddo.17

4. Literary career

Of the origin and progress of language, Monboddo's great work - which was to occupy him until his death - remained unfinished. Although the first three volumes went into second editions, it was generally not very well received by the critics - particularly the Scots.
Its philosophical views were out of fashion and some of its anthropological data - especially concerning the orang-outang - aroused ridicule.18

Monboddo's other work, *Antient Metaphysics* (1779-99), which also consisted of six volumes and dealt with similar themes from a more strictly philosophical viewpoint, met with even less critical success. Nevertheless, Monboddo became something of a celebrity in fashionable London circles and, late in life, made disciples at Oxford.19

In Scotland, where Monboddo's eccentricity and single-minded devotion to ancient philosophy had already made OPL the victim of a campaign of ridicule, *Antient Metaphysics* was almost completely unsuccessful - as Monboddo had expected. Yet *Antient Metaphysics*, like OPL, was a very Scottish undertaking. Monboddo recognized the validity of the new science but wished to give Newtonian physics a metaphysical foundation consistent with ancient philosophy and revealed religion. Thus his purpose may be compared with the concern of Colin Maclaurin to place Newtonian fluxions on the basis of ancient geometry.20

So, ironically, it was Monboddo who remained loyal to the traditional humanist principles of Scottish culture which underlay the Scottish Enlightenment and contributed to its particular character. And it was Monboddo who saw that Locke's so-called 'new logic' was really no system of logic at all. His stand may be compared to that of a later learned Aristotelian, Sir William Hamilton, the editor of Reid, who, however, was also to point the way forward from Aristotle's logic.21
5. **Friends and correspondents**

Monboddo's many friends and correspondents included several notable linguists, grammarians and philologists: Grim Thorkelin, the first editor of *Beowulf*, (with whom he discussed Icelandic and the language of Greenland); Sir William Jones, with whom he corresponded on Sanskrit and on Egypt as the source of the arts of India; Sir Charles Wilkins, the authority on Greek and Sanskrit; and John Young, professor of Greek at Glasgow. We may also include in this group the Latinist John Hunter. As Monboddo's clerk, Hunter assisted in the preparation of OPL I for publication. He later became Professor of Humanity at St. Andrews and contributed significant additions to both Ruddiman's Latin grammar and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. In the latter instance, Hunter was instrumental in disseminating Monboddo's views via subsequent editions of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* well into the following century.\(^{22}\)

However, Monboddo numbered distinguished men in many other fields among his friends: for example, Sir Joseph Banks, the President of the Royal Society (with whom he corresponded on natural history); Sir George Baker, the President of the Royal College of Physicians; Thomas Burgess, fellow of Corpus Christi College, Oxford and later Bishop of Salisbury (with whom he corresponded on philological and philosophical subjects); George Isaac Huntingford, fellow of New College, Oxford; Richard Price, the economist; Welbore Ellis, Lord of the Admiralty and Secretary for America; Henry Dundas, later Viscount Melville; Lord Thurlow; Dugald Stewart,
professor of mathematics at Edinburgh; and Samuel Horsley, Bishop of St. David's and of Rochester, the editor of Newton. 23

The Edinburgh literati were a close-knit group; so, as a distinguished lawyer, a noted eccentric and a prominent member of the Select Society (to which all the literati belonged) Monboddo knew virtually all the great figures of the Scottish Enlightenment. However, he disapproved of David Hume (1711-1776) - and possibly his friend Adam Smith (1723-1790) - on philosophical grounds. Henry Home, Lord Kames (1696-1782) a fellow Lord of Session (and, like Smith, a seminal figure to whom all the Scottish philosophers owed something) was his literary rival. Monboddo's friends included Sir David Dalrymple, Lord Hailes (1726-96), the historian and Lord of Session; James Boswell (1740-95), the biographer, the son of Lord Auchinleck, another distinguished Lord of Session, and an advocate himself; William Smellie (1740-95), printer, antiquary and editor of the Encyclopaedia Britannica; and James Beattie (1735-1803) poet and moral philosopher, who enjoyed a high standing in London literary and political circles - largely on account of his attack on David Hume in his Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth (1770). However, Beattie, and perhaps Smellie, turned against him. 24

Lord Monboddo married Elizabeth Farquharson, a lady of Jacobite family, by whom he had three children: but his wife, his son and his second daughter all died young.

Monboddo himself died on the 25th of May 1799 in his eighty-fifth year.
6. Monboddo and the survival of Scottish humanism in the eighteenth century

In many respects Monboddo was a typical Scottish philosopher of the eighteenth century and was at the very centre of the Scottish revival of letters. He was a notable advocate at a time when the Edinburgh lawyers were leading the movement to "improve" Scotland by making it more polite, tolerant, enlightened and prosperous. He was an outstanding member of the Select Society - a debating society dominated by lawyers - which played a crucial role in the improvement of Scotland. He was, above all, closely associated with the Advocates' Library - by 1750 one of the great libraries of Europe - and, like several other Scottish philosophers, drew heavily on its resources when writing OPL.25

However, the humanist values of OPL, values which had played a part in the genesis of the Scottish Enlightenment, were largely out of keeping with its dominant spirit of Lockian empiricism. The principles revered by Monboddo - those on which the Advocates' Library was founded - were embodied in Scottish humanism and in the original form of Scottish jurisprudence: but during the seventeenth century the former had declined under the impact of empirical philosophy - a decline hastened in the early eighteenth century by the rising popularity of Locke - and the latter had been modified by
Dutch legal scholarship. Consequently Monboddo was, in general, opposed to the principles of his fellow literati. However, it must be said that, in spite of the fashionable emphasis on empiricism, something of the early seventeenth century view of the world and of man's place in it — a priori, abstract, deductive and rationalist — continued to influence Scottish thought throughout the Enlightenment. In fact, in spite of its apparent homogeneity, the mid eighteenth century Scottish culture of the literati, the Presbyterian moderate and the Whig utilitarian overlay — and, indeed, was influenced by — the old Episcopalian humanist subculture which had been associated with the first stirring of the literary revival at the end of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth.

It has been pointed out, for instance, that the publications of the Foulis brothers, which played such an important part in the early development of the Scottish Enlightenment, tend to reflect their Jacobite latitudinarian sympathies and have more in common with the Christian humanism of Fénelon and Chevalier Ramsay than with the ideals of the French Enlightenment.

So, in spite of his important position in the intellectual life of eighteenth century Scotland, Monboddo belonged to what has been called the "considerable subculture of the Scottish humanists, the Scotland of the old European Scot, the Tory and Jacobite". It follows that he regarded the Reformation, the Revolution settlement of 1688 and the Union of 1707 as misfortunes. Nor could he entirely endorse the cultural views of his fellow literati and the
Presbyterian moderates - much less the Whiggish belief in luxury, mercantilism and utility as the criteria of progress:

"When the Scots humanist pondered the nation Scotland had become after the ousting of the Stewarts, the eclipse of the old religion and the church hierarchy, the dissolution of the Scots parliament, the severance of the old continental alliances, and the change from a classical to a neo-classical culture, he saw discontinuity, and unnatural break in his nation's culture and history effected for an alleged utility. In his mind the Whigs had built a new Scotland at the expense of its past."31

Monboddo was therefore obsessed with re-establishing the continuity of Scottish institutions which he regarded as being founded on Roman law. His concern for restoring order to what he saw as the disarray of social and intellectual life involved deep respect for the founders of Roman law and the collective wisdom of the ancients in general.32

Although the emphasis on the principles of Roman law gives Monboddo's humanism a specifically Scottish character, he may be ranked with English humanists like Pope, Swift, Gibbon, Burke and his own friend James "Hermes" Harris. All of them believed that mind was the essential human attribute and that science is secondary to moral philosophy. All regretted the same features of the contemporary world which Monboddo opposed: mechanism, relativism, capitalism, industry and the new philosophy of Newton and Locke.33 So before examining the specific influence of Scottish jurisprudence on Monboddo's thought, it will be useful to point out some general humanist features which characterise OPL.
Firstly, Monboddo's view of the universe, of man's place in it, of mind and of language is essentially hierarchical - an ideal state of order associated with classical antiquity. In this perfect Scale of Being which is both ordered and diverse, everything has its proper place. Furthermore, provided a civilization is sufficiently advanced in abstract thought, the Scale of Being is perfectly reflected in the hierarchy of ideas. This hierarchy, which constitutes the intellectual world, is expressed in language. 34

Thus there is a close relationship between the mental development of a people and their language. Both vary on a scale from barbarous to various degrees of civilization: but the underlying principles of mind and language are fixed so that they can be evaluated according to a fixed scale based on their degree of abstraction. (In this respect he resembles Scottish Latinists like Pitcairne and Ruddiman who followed the Renaissance ideal of bringing the vernacular up to the level of the best Latin - except that Monboddo is concerned with standard English and his model is Greek.) 35

Reason and speech - which are not innate but acquired - elevate man above the beast. Eloquence is the hallmark of civilized society and linguistic corruption a sign of its decay. When reason and speech are deficient, communication is impaired and the due subordination essential to social hierarchy becomes impossible. 36

Neither mind nor language develops automatically or by chance. Both are the result of the exertions of man's free will in its efforts to overcome barbarity. Man is limited by his senses but
he is a free agent. In short, like all humanists, Monboddo opposes Epicurean notions of blind causality and fortuitous order. He is particularly opposed to Mandeville's conception of private vices leading to public benefits and the notion of unintended social outcomes in general. This involves rejecting determinist mechanisms like Adam Smith's "invisible hand" and Hutcheson's moral sense which was supposed to exist prior to reason. Such mechanisms may be regarded as part of Whiggism. 37

Finally, although traditions and the wisdom of our forefathers help us to overcome barbarity, man does not evolve to a state of perfection. History is cyclical. Traditional wisdom merely provides a degree of stability. 38
Chapter Three

THE ADVOCATES' LIBRARY AND THE TRADITION OF HUMANIST JURISPRUDENCE

1. The influence of the Faculty of Advocates on the Scottish Enlightenment

The fact that the Library of the Faculty of Advocates was a law library established early in the golden age of Scottish jurisprudence is significant as regards the genesis of both OPL and the Scottish Enlightenment as a whole. ¹

When tracing the development of the revival of letters in Scotland it is difficult to exaggerate the importance of either the study of jurisprudence or of the Edinburgh lawyers themselves, who enjoyed enormous social prestige. ²

The influence of the members of the Faculty of Advocates stemmed ultimately from the central place of jurisprudence in Scottish life and culture. Because Scottish humanism had long been identified with Scottish culture, the humanistic study of jurisprudence had likewise become closely bound up with the intellectual life of the country. Indeed, since the beginning of the seventeenth century, when the Scottish court moved to London, the advocates had been virtually the guardians of the national culture; and their close ties with the Continent had contributed to its enrichment. ³

The broad-based study of Scottish jurisprudence had developed under the influence of Continental Roman law, which Scottish lawyers
had studied in France until the Reformation and thereafter in Holland, going to Utrecht, Leyden or (like Monboddo) to Groningen. Consequently, two stages may be distinguished in the development of Scottish jurisprudence. At first it derived from the so-called "mos Gallicus", the French historical-philological tradition (which also emphasised rhetoric and criticism): then, in the seventeenth century, the great period of Dutch learning, it came under the influence of Hugo Grotius's Protestant revival of natural law. The latter blended moral philosophy, legal philosophy and what is now called political science.

It was characteristic of Holland, in contrast to France, that there was much less interest in Greek than in Latin: and it was from this source that seventeenth century Scottish humanism inherited the notion of continuing Roman values and institutions through the study of Latin literature.

When the revival of letters began to gather momentum after the Union of 1707 it was inevitable that the Edinburgh lawyers, and particularly the advocates, should become the leaders of the campaign to improve and enlighten Scotland. Furthermore, it must be remembered that those Scottish philosophers who (unlike Monboddo and Kames, for instance) were not actually advocates themselves, had at least trained in law: and there was a close connection between their study of man and society and the study of Scottish jurisprudence - which dealt with the principles of law in relation to morality, social custom and political economy.
It was therefore no accident that the century of the Scottish Enlightenment was also the great age of Scottish jurisprudence; nor that the Scottish philosophers excelled in moral philosophy and in the fields of history, criticism and rhetoric - which the founder of the Advocates' Library described as the handmaidens of Scottish jurisprudence. Nor was it accidental that when the lawyers (together with some professors and the Moderate clergy) planned a revival of letters and a polite redefinition of Scottish culture based on rhetoric and moral philosophy, the literati turned to the Advocates' Library as their primary resource.

2. The foundation of the Advocates' Library and the late seventeenth century revival of humanist culture

This was not the first time that the Advocates' Library had been associated with a cultural revival. It owed its existence to a patriotic movement to preserve the distinctive traditions of Scottish humanism - a movement which began after the Restoration and resulted in a brief flowering of the traditional Episcopalian humanist culture. Among the leaders of this movement were the codifiers of Scottish law, James Dalrymple, first Viscount Stair (1619-1695) and Sir George Mackenzie of Rosehaugh (1636-1691), whose comprehensive statements of jurisprudence connected with the late Aristotelian tradition of the sixteenth century Scottish universities and the constitutional writings of George Buchanan.

In many ways the situation seems to have resembled that which had existed in sixteenth century France. The Scottish advocates,
the guardians of the national culture, were interested in a broad, humanistic cultural programme based on Cicero and the Stoics which was intended to revive learning and to foster religious toleration and national unity. (If economic prosperity is added, this would equally well describe the programme of the eighteenth century Scottish advocates.)

But in seventeenth century Scotland there was an additional problem: the lawyers were particularly alarmed by the decline of Latin - the language of European scholarship in which the sixteenth century Scottish humanists had won their international reputation. Despite the growing use of English since 1603, scholars wrote it with less assurance than Latin. Furthermore, Latin provided a link not only with the great days of Scottish humanism but, as we have seen, with the institutions, values and literature of ancient Rome.

Although this late seventeenth century revival of Episcopalian humanist culture may have delayed the spread of Anglo-French neo-classicism on which the Scottish Enlightenment was largely based, it may equally be said to have paved the way for the Enlightenment. This is most clearly seen in its crowning achievement: Sir George Mackenzie's establishment of the Advocates' Library, which was to be crucial to the eighteenth century literary revival.

In spite of being primarily a law library, the Advocates' Library evidently functioned from the first as a national library: and if Sir George Mackenzie's plans had been fulfilled it would also have been the home of a debating society in which a wide range of
literary and philosophical questions would have been discussed - as they were to be in the Select Society, which was dominated by advocates.  

The first catalogue of the library (1692), which is prefaced by a Latin oration delivered by Mackenzie at its formal opening in 1689, is dedicated to the great Calvinist humanists George Buchanan and J.J. Scaliger. This is significant because Sir George Mackenzie's speech pays tribute only to the original humanist tradition of Scottish jurisprudence associated with the sixteenth century French school of historical-philological jurisprudence. Although the works of the seventeenth century Continental natural lawyers are already prominent in the 1692 catalogue, Mackenzie makes no mention of Grotius or Pufendorf. On the contrary, he appears to disparage the influence of Dutch Protestant legal scholarship which he evidently regarded as a threat to the Scottish humanist tradition.

3. Sir George Mackenzie's humanist principles and the Advocates' Library

Sir George Mackenzie's oration expresses the values of traditional Scottish humanism on which he evidently believed the Advocates' Library should be founded. Since these were the values on which Monboddo's philosophy also rested, the speech repays careful examination.

Mackenzie makes it clear that the library is to be devoted to the principles of Roman law and humanist jurisprudence. It is only to contain works conducive to the study of jurisprudence, which he
regards as the "queen of the sciences". However, the range of the science of jurisprudence is so wide that this means the library must contain "all the fruits of Greek and Roman wisdom" besides what the scholars of later ages - notably the commentators on Roman law - have added to the discoveries of the ancients.

Among the works on Roman law, Justinian's Digest ("the text itself") takes pride of place as the basis of the library and the legal profession. The Digest is the expression of "absolute Reason" answering "the sum of man's wants". It is even "a divine achievement which we owe more to Heaven than to Rome, vouchsafed to us on earth to be a pattern to legislators and an arbiter among the races of men". Consequently, the restoration of the textual purity of the Digest is a matter of prime importance.

For Mackenzie, Latin remains the international language of scholarship - the "natural utterance and abode of the sciences". But the restoration of the textual purity of the Digest also depends on a thorough knowledge of Greek and of the three handmaidens of jurisprudence: history, criticism and rhetoric.

From the ancient Greek and Roman historians we may trace the origin and progress of the civil law. The "dawn of jurisprudence first broke over Athens and Sparta" and for 600 years Roman law wore a Greek aspect. Hence the history of civil law begins with "the first promptings of rational nature" among the early Greeks and proceeds to the rule of right reason and the Greek commentators of Constantinople. In short, the history of law is the history of mind.
Mackenzie's words show how the preoccupation of the founders of Roman law with the origin and progress of law and government led to an interest in the history of peoples and their social institutions in general, particularly language, - which was seen as the expression of mind.

Mackenzie also insists on the importance of criticism. The force and significance of Greek and Latin words commonly used in law cannot be understood without a detailed study of classical literature and poetry. They are a valuable source of commentaries on the famous Digest title "De Verborum Significatione". Consequently the ancient commentators were badly handicapped by their ignorance of the "sciences" of history and criticism. 20

The importance of rhetoric to the study of jurisprudence is equally clear. Rhetoric is the expression of mind, and mind is the essence of the law. Furthermore, rhetoric embellishes truth. 21

As well as this work of restoration Mackenzie calls for a volume on comparative law and another on the universal rational standard which he assumes will arise from this comparison - "the standard set by reason". The Scottish philosophers evidently derived their comparative approach to the history of society from this legal tradition of the Renaissance. Monboddo's comparison of languages (representing various degrees of civilization) derives from the same source: and, like Mackenzie, he compares languages in order to arrive at a rational standard by which all languages can be judged. 22

In short, Mackenzie's Latin oration, delivered with the authority of his position as Dean of the Faculty of Advocates, is imbued with
the spirit of humanist jurisprudence. This tradition derived from the "culture de robe" of sixteenth century France and ultimately from the Italian jurisconsults to whom Monboddo frequently refers. It is significant that Mackenzie mentions the major humanist lawyers and that they are already represented in the first Catalogue of the Advocates' Library; notably the apostolic succession of Lorenzo Valla, Guillaume Budé, Andrea Alciati and Jacques Cujas. According to Mackenzie, it is the task of the advocates to continue their work in philology — the science established by Valla (c1406-1457) on the basis of the Ciceronian studia humanitatis (grammar, rhetoric and history). 23

Monboddo's views — like those of Mackenzie — seem particularly close to the ideas of Guillaume Budé "le plus grand Grec de l'Europe". In view of the connection between French and Scottish jurisprudence and also the European reputation enjoyed by Budé — who was identified with the promise of the new philology for the future of man — this is not surprising. 24

4. Guillaume Budé and the French school of humanist lawyers
Budé (1467-1560), a major figure of the Renaissance, may be taken as representative of the entire school of French humanist jurisprudence which influenced the development of Scottish jurisprudence. 25

Budé translated and commented on Greek literature and his treatises on language led to the establishment of philology as a discipline. He was instrumental in founding the Collège de France (established to encourage humanistic studies) and the Bibliothèque
Royale - which was to have considerable importance for the
genesis of OPL and for the Scottish Enlightenment as a whole. He
was also the correspondent of the major scholars of his day,
including Erasmus and Thomas More. 26

Like Mackenzie and Monboddo, Budé regarded Roman Law as the
science of things human and divine - an ideal synthesis of doctrine
and eloquence. Budé wished to restore Latin and the authority of
antiquity for the good of society; but in spite of criticising
scholastic logic, he did not reject conventional Aristotelian
philosophy. He saw philology as a store of classical learning, a
science based on the Ciceronian studia humanitatis which involved
the historical interpretation of texts in the light of the humanist
encyclopedia - a view which was shared in eighteenth century
Scotland where the study of law was closely allied to philosophy
and other subjects. 27

On the one hand, he saw language as the source of misunderstanding;
on the other, as the educator of thought - even as thought itself.
This ambivalent attitude was to lead to the work of Scaliger and
Sanctius and the pursuit of a philosophical language in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 28

Like most other members of the school of historical jurisprudence,
Budé was interested in linguistic change. As with laws, change in
languages is governed by the history and customs of the society
using them; and the "science of language" could explain these
changes. Since words reflect reality, in order to recover antiquity
we must rescue obsolescent words as Theodore Gaza had done. The
key to the progress of mind is the restitution of languages. But like Monboddo, Budé also wished to transcend language and pursue the logos in its supernatural form. Finally, Budé introduced the comparative method which sought parallels between ancient and modern institutions. But whereas Bude was a relativist, Mackenzie and Monboddo are interested in the timeless, universal truths of reason which they assumed would emerge from these comparisons. 29

5. The mos Gallicus and the concept of perfect history

Sir George Mackenzie's speech also reminds us that the idea of "perfect history" - later to be known as philosophical, rational or conjectural history - grew from the mos Gallicus.

Regarded by the French humanist lawyers as the "most certain philosophy" because it explained the causes of events, it was developed by the same scholars named by Mackenzie - Budé, Alciati, and Cujas - and others who appear in the first catalogue of the Advocates' Library, notably Jean Bodin (1530?-1596) and François Hotman (1524-1590). Jacques Cujas (1520-1590), who certainly influenced Monboddo, became the leader of the historical school of Roman law during its golden age (1559-1590). His followers, like Monboddo himself, regarded Athens as teaching the civilized world through Roman law: and consequently they tried to restore ancient jurisprudence by tracing the "origin and progress" of Roman law. This obsession with the origin of law - and other institutions - is typically humanist and is reflected in a Digest title which had many commentaries: "On the origin of law". 30
Their conception of universal history had rhetorical roots going back to Cicero and Quintilian. History, a repository of examples, concerns the orator because it embodies memory. Moreover, it is concerned with things not words, with man rather than nature: and the history of man, the rise and progress of civilization, is more admirable than natural history. (This is precisely the argument used against natural history - in the eighteenth century, the paradigm of science - by Monboddo.) That is, history explains the causes of events. Like jurisprudence, it enables us to achieve wisdom: through history we ascend to the knowledge of human and divine things, gaining a perspective on the achievements of man. How should this universal history - the story of mankind - be undertaken? 

It must begin at the very beginning, as Diodorus Siculus and Polybius had done. It must include the history of barbarous peoples like those of the New World, who, lacking a written history, had to have their history reconstructed on the basis of information from ancient and contemporary travellers. In other words, the method of the sixteenth century French historical school of jurisprudence was precisely that adopted in the eighteenth century by the French and Scottish philosophers. 

In the view of the historical school of Roman law, scientific (or perfect) history was more reliable than philosophy: it solved present problems and made the future predictable.

The origin and progress of all arts and sciences was studied by the French historical school of jurisprudence, but the history of
languages was its particular interest. Like all things, language has an origin and progress; it suffers corruption and comes to an end. Furthermore, there are close correlations between languages and other institutions of the same culture, as well as the social structure itself. 34

Furthermore, there is an obvious parallel between the comparison of all known human societies in order to arrive at universal law - the criterion of good and bad laws, according to Mackenzie - and the establishment of universal grammar by the comparison of all known languages. It was no accident that the golden age of the historical school of Roman law was also the age of Scaliger and Sanctius, the late Renaissance grammarians most admired by Monboddo and James Harris. 35

It is difficult to believe that Monboddo did not realize that in answering Locke by the "historical, plain method" associated with Locke's name he was in fact returning to the tradition of humanist jurisprudence. Not only was Monboddo acquainted with the work of the French school of historical jurisprudence (that of Budé and Cujas in particular) but the same methods had been applied to Scottish law by sixteenth century Scottish lawyers whose works were well-known to him. 36

As Monboddo was at pains to emphasise, the connection between the study of language and jurisprudence goes back to the Stoics. It was they who first associated language with logic and epistemology, equating knowledge with conformity between our ideas and the real things of nature. Such conformity was essential to the moral life
of man and his harmonious participation in the Chain of Being. This was the reason why the jurisconsults who founded Roman law investigated both the origins of words and the species of things which words reflect. The famous title of the Digest "On the Meaning of Terms", to which Mackenzie refers, was from Valla onwards the subject of numerous commentaries dealing with the origin of words, etymology and linguistic change.  

6. Thomas Ruddiman and the decline of humanism

It is clear that Sir George Mackenzie saw that humanist jurisprudence and humanism in general were already in decline on the eve of the publication of Locke's Essay. By the 1720s this process had accelerated. The decline of Scottish humanism paralleled the decline of Jacobite and Episcopalian circles in Edinburgh. It was replaced by the spirit of Lockian empiricism and by the cultured liberalism of the Presbyterian Moderates with their passion for Shaftesbury's Hellenism. Soon, with the advent of the cult of taste, Latin would become no more than a gentlemanly accomplishment.  

The humanist tradition was carried into the next century principally by Thomas Ruddiman (1674-1757), who, as keeper of the Advocates' Library from 1730 until 1752 and compiler of its second catalogue (1742), was to do much to make the library the armoury of the literary revival.  

As early as 1718 Ruddiman founded a club to encourage Classical studies. This was in opposition to the philosophically oriented Rankenian Club, which was a breeding ground of the Enlightenment.
And, like Monboddo, he was totally opposed to Locke - especially Lockian views on education and language - and to the fashionable cult of taste.  

As keeper of the library Ruddiman made the traditional distinction between 'useful learning' - the recovery of truths revealed to the ancients - and polite accomplishment. (Monboddo and Hailes as curators were to follow the same policy of excluding modern classics and belles lettres - as Hume, the new keeper, discovered.) For Ruddiman, as for Monboddo, the gateway to 'useful learning' - that is, to all certain knowledge - was the rule-based study of Latin and Greek. Superior to any modern language, the learned languages provided universal models for both learning and regularizing English.
Chapter Four

THE LINGUISTIC AND CULTURAL DILEMMA OF EIGHTEENTH CENTURY SCOTLAND

The linguistic and cultural dilemma which had troubled Sir George Mackenzie at the Restoration became far more acute with the rapid decay of Scottish humanism in the early eighteenth century. Scots had been in decline as a literary language since the Union of 1603 when the Scottish court moved to London: and, as we have seen, cultivated Scots like Mackenzie had generally continued to prefer Latin to English. This meant that by the early eighteenth century, when Latin was clearly no longer the language of international scholarship, Scotland was left without a literary language. On the other hand, after the Union of Parliaments of 1707, English — which Scots spoke, and to some extent wrote, in a manner unacceptable south of the Border — became increasingly important.1

Furthermore, as humanists like Monboddo were particularly aware, Scotland's linguistic crisis was related to an even more fundamental crisis of national identity. Scottish humanism had, as we have seen, long been identified with the national culture as a whole; and the Union of 1707 had not only deprived Scotland of her Parliament, but united her to a far more powerful and advanced neighbour.2
The result was an overwhelming sense of backwardness in Scotland and an intense Scottish desire for general cultural improvement. Progress seemed to lie with the cultivation of the English language and the English philosophy — the philosophy of Bacon, Newton and Locke on which the French Enlightenment was largely based. This union of rhetoric and philosophy deriving from Cicero was, of course, the cultural programme which the Enlightenment as a whole had inherited from the Renaissance: but in Scotland it had a special significance, both because of the linguistic dilemma and because of the close connection with Scottish humanist traditions. 3

By the middle of the century, when the study of rhetoric and belles lettres had become fashionable as part of the general cult of taste, this desire on the part of the Scots to improve their ability in English amounted to a passion as intense as their sixteenth century passion for Latin. If Scotland was not to be completely eclipsed by her new neighbour, she would have to play her role as an equal partner. It was not just that Scotsmen in large numbers would now have the chance to make their careers in England and in British possessions overseas. If there was to be a renaissance of letters as part of the hoped-for general cultural revival it would have to be in English. So Scottish men of letters became preoccupied with the problems of form and style — and the avoidance of "Scotticisms". 4

And in seeking a solution to their problems Scottish men of letters also followed the English and French example, establishing
literary clubs in which members could present their literary work for discussion. Since these societies took the Renaissance humanists' Ciceronian view of culture as the union of rhetoric and philosophy, their discussions were not limited to literary questions. They were devoted to improvement in general - improvement of the economy as well as manners, taste, learning and composition - and they debated a wide range of questions relating to language, mind, epistemology and the development of man. In particular, conjectural history was seen as a partial solution to problems of philosophy and form. 5

Some of Moboddo's early papers on language - which eventually found their way into OPL - seem to have been written for presentation at Select Society meetings. 6 The Society may therefore be regarded as the cradle of OPL just as other literary societies nurtured the works of other Scottish philosophers and rhetoricians.

Several Scottish humanists, Ruddiman included, were interested in the revival of the vernacular; but Monboddo was not involved in this movement. Interest in Gaelic, on the other hand, was apparently minimal. Until the advent of Ossian and the dawning of romanticism the language was associated with barbarism. However, Adam Ferguson spoke Gaelic and Monboddo had some interest in it from a comparative point of view. 7

In any case, the Scottish philosophers could not help but be aware of Gaelic and the associated declining Highland culture,
particularly after the Jacobite Rising of 1745-46. This awareness must have had a catalytic effect on their thinking about language and society, especially in Monboddo's case. Not only did he have long-standing Jacobite connections, but his estate virtually bordered the Highlands. 8

Similarly, the stripping of Scotland's political institutions as a result of the two Unions itself stimulated the Scottish investigation of man, language and society. 9 As Hume put it:

"Is it not strange that, at a time when we have lost our Princes, our Parliaments, our independent Government, even the Presence of our Chief Nobility, are unhappy in our Accent and Pronunciation, speak a very corrupt Dialect of the Tongue which we make use of; is it not strange, I say, that in these Circumstances we should really be the People most distinguished for Literature in Europe?" 10

It is appropriate to quote Hume at this point because his sceptical philosophy - which derived, according to Monboddo and Reid, from Locke's way of ideas - introduced another problem: the problem of scepticism.

This philosophical problem played a crucial role in the development of the Scottish Enlightenment. It may be regarded as the catalyst not only of OPL but of the Scottish Common Sense Philosophy - and to some extent of Scottish moral philosophy in general. 11

The philosophical dilemma was seen by Monboddo to be inseparable from the literary and cultural dilemma. All three were aspects of the same problem: the decline of Scottish humanism.
This brings us to the cultural programme of the Enlightenment in general which was so enthusiastically adopted by the Scottish improvers and which is essential to an understanding of OPL: the union of Ciceronian rhetoric and the Science of Man - that is, the all-embracing moral philosophy of the British moral empiricists which derived from Locke and the Continental natural lawyers.¹²

As Monboddo was well aware, the very concept of a union of rhetoric and moral philosophy derived from the Renaissance. Both the cult of rhetoric and the Science of Man (or Science of Morals) were connected with the Ciceronian humanist ideal and were therefore concerned with establishing a true human science based on the study of language. Furthermore, both were, for this reason, inextricably connected with another Renaissance theme which Locke had revived: the conjectural history of the origin and progress of language.¹³

OPL must be seen primarily as a refutation of the Lockian Science of Man in favour of an Aristotelian Science of Man; the latter being based on a modification of Ciceronianism which, in Monboddo's belief, restored Cicero's rhetoric to its original Aristotelian principles.¹⁴

We will turn first to the broader questions of the Science of Man and Ciceronian rhetoric, by way of a general introduction to OPL; and then to the more specific question of the debate on the origin of language involving amongst others Locke, Mandeville, Condillac, Rousseau, Smith and Monboddo himself.
Chapter Five
OPL AND THE LOCKIAN SCIENCE OF MAN

1. Introduction

Above all OPL must be seen in the context of moral philosophy - that all-embracing eighteenth century subject, closely affiliated to the study of jurisprudence, which dominated the Scottish university curriculum during most of the Enlightenment and to which the Scottish moral philosophers made the most distinguished contribution.¹

This Scottish investigation of the nature of man and society was evidently stimulated by the traumatic effect of the 1707 Act of Union, which had deprived Scotland of its political institutions.² However, it was deeply rooted in the work of the seventeenth century Continental natural lawyers and in the British tradition of moral empiricism. Hume saw his own work in the latter context, naming the moral empiricists - Locke, Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Hutcheson and Butler - as his predecessors. He regarded these philosophers as the founders of the new Science of Man which would anatomize mind and reduce human nature to a few principles. From Hutcheson and Hume onwards the Scottish philosophers were preoccupied with reducing the moral world to general laws by treating it as a form of natural history. The key figure in this development was John Locke.³

The new Science of Man sought for principles of orderly thought: a method of enquiry and exposition for the moral and physical worlds.
By means of this method both moral and physical facts could be collected, arranged and classified producing a unified view of knowledge as a rational hierarchy - an all-embracing form of natural history. The method advocated was actually Newton's analysis and synthesis: but in practice the Science of Man was associated with induction - the Baconian collection of data.  

By the middle of the century, when the Scottish Enlightenment was already well under way, this idea of an "enchaînement de sciences" was being enshrined in the great French Encyclopédie which showed man as part of nature. It was to have an incalculable effect on eighteenth century Scottish thought, reinforcing the influence of Locke himself.

It was with good reason that Monboddo regarded Locke as the enemy of humanism. According to Locke's principles, the so-called wisdom of the ancients was superstition: in particular, the a priori transcendental system of Aristotle, which had supposedly linked the human and divine worlds, had no place in a science of man based on experiential data. Aristotle's metaphysics had been replaced by Locke's own analysis of the human mind, which had revealed the limitations of human knowledge and the impossibility of any science of causes. Aristotle's logic - which, as Bacon had pointed out, led to meaningless scholastic disputes - had been replaced by mathematics.

Following Locke's lead, the Scottish philosophers took up the Science of Man in a secular spirit. For Monboddo their approach was too secular; and, in any case, too closely associated with Locke's
empiricism and the resulting scepticism of Hume. The Scottish moralists saw their investigation of the processes of mind and socialization as, above all, empirical. The traditional rational approach was avoided. Monboddo, on the other hand, held that rationalism and empiricism were complementary - although he attempted to show the superiority of the former.\(^7\)

The Science of Man, or the Science of Morals, was founded on a desire to trace the origin of ideas - including, of course, ideas of morality and virtue:

> "These ideas made intelligible the external world, God and even the self, and to understand their origins was the key to understanding the principles of morality, justice, politics and philosophy."\(^8\)

The Scottish investigation may be said to have begun with Gershom Carmichael's teaching (1694-1729) of the moral philosophy of the Continental natural lawyers, Grotius and Pufendorf; and with the seminal lectures (1729-1746) of his pupil Francis Hutcheson. Hutcheson's lectures were based on the work of Carmichael, on Lockian psychology and on the ethics of Cicero and Shaftesbury. He substituted Shaftesbury's moral sense - a Ciceronian concept - for the rational foundations of the natural jurisprudence of Grotius and Pufendorf (Monboddo would reject both in favour of a more Aristotelian and humanist interpretation of jurisprudence).\(^9\)

Cicero's *De Officiis* remained the crucial classical text. Pufendorf's *De Officio Hominis et Civis*, which was edited by Carmichael, taught the Ciceronian offices according to the principles
of natural jurisprudence: it was introduced into Scottish universities as the basic textbook of moral philosophy which would teach students their moral and civic duties.  

The names of Cicero and Shaftesbury, who were Addison's intellectual ancestors, remind us of the crucial part played in the genesis of the Scottish Enlightenment by the essays of Addison and Steele published between 1709 and 1712. The Select Society and many other Scottish clubs devoted to the improvement of manners, taste, learning and composition reflected their influence. Thus there is a close connection between the interest of the Scottish philosophers in moral questions and their passion for rhetoric, belles lettres and the cult of taste in general - which was also Ciceronian. Thus, whether in ethics or in rhetoric, the influence of Cicero remained paramount.

Hutcheson was partly concerned with refuting the materialism of Bernard Mandeville, the cynical opponent of Shaftesbury. Mandeville (who, like Shaftesbury, had considerable influence on the work of the Scottish moralists) was a disciple of Hobbes. Hobbes's nominalism - his contention that general terms, including moral terms, bear no relation to anything real - and his materialistic explanation of mind in terms of matter and motion, had marked the real beginning of this British debate on the nature of man's mind. But by the middle of the eighteenth century the mantles of Hobbes and Mandeville had fallen on the shoulders of David Hume, whose scepticism may be regarded as the catalyst of the Scottish Enlightenment.
Hume's Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) had claimed that, contrary to Christian belief, reason did not furnish any of our ideas of morality, justice, politics or religion. They were rather the product of imagination, custom and habit.\(^{13}\)

Although Hume was the prime target, it should be noted that views of his friend, Adam Smith, were also dangerously sceptical. In his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), the outcome of his important Glasgow lectures (1752-1763) on morals and jurisprudence, Smith had shown that moral sentiments were merely shaped by social interaction; and later, in the Wealth of Nations (1776) that virtue was no more than a form of propriety.\(^{14}\)

1763, a year or two before Monboddo undertook OPL, seems to have been a crucial year for Scottish philosophy:

"By 1763, when Smith retired from the Glasgow chair, Scottish academic philosophy had run into difficulties on ethical grounds. Rationalist and sentimental attempts to discuss the Ciceronian offices had exploded in a mass of relativism. It had become possible for students to believe that morality was simply an extension of the study of the social history of man and that virtue was simply a code word for adaptability to the values of an increasingly materialist world."\(^{15}\)

That is, in the search for ways of teaching the Ciceronian offices and accounting for the origin of ideas of morality and justice, Scottish moral philosophers had been led from rationalism and sentimentalism to scepticism and materialism.\(^{16}\)

The Scottish philosophy of common sense was the outcome of an attempt to answer the challenge of Humean scepticism. Like Hutcheson and Turnbull before him, Thomas Reid set out in his
Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764) to show that various fundamental beliefs – about the self, God and the existence of the external world – were universal and embodied in all languages. They therefore could not possibly be the products of experience as Hume had claimed.\textsuperscript{17}

Monboddo, like Reid, saw Hume’s scepticism as the inevitable result of the theory which dominated the philosophy of the Enlightenment: Locke’s influential theory of ideas. Monboddo also therefore was concerned to answer the outstanding philosophical question of the day: "What is the origin of abstract ideas?", or "How do we classify things"? But instead of appealing to the ancient notion of a sensus communis Monboddo attempted to revive Aristotelian-Thomist hylomorphism.\textsuperscript{18}

The peak of the Scottish investigation of the Science of Man – and of the Scottish Enlightenment as a whole – may be said to have been reached in the 1760s.\textsuperscript{19} Since OPL was not undertaken until 1765 and the first volume not published until 1773, Monboddo's contribution was relatively late. This enabled him to survey the achievement of the Enlightenment in general and the Scottish Enlightenment – which contemporaries referred to as the "revival of letters" – in particular. In fact, OPL must be seen largely as a reassessment of the Enlightenment in the light of its sceptical and materialistic tendencies.

2. The influence of continental natural law

As has already been stated, the ultimate source of this new
metaphysics, the Science of Man, lay before Locke in the seventeenth century Continental school of natural law which had reformulated natural law after the Reformation. Its leaders, Grotius and Pufendorf, regarded the science of jurisprudence as empirical: natural law was based on the facts of human nature, which could be confirmed by introspection and observation. This approach, reinforced in the early eighteenth century by Locke's philosophy, had important influences on Scottish jurisprudence, Scottish university education and Scottish moral philosophy. 20

However, although Hutcheson was deeply indebted to Continental natural law, Kames, Smith, Hume and Millar could not fully accept the system of Grotius. They respected it but regarded it as insufficiently empirical. It was still too close to the changeless principles of Roman law - which they also respected but refused to regard as "reason in writing". 21

They planned (although the plan was never carried out) to modernise natural law to meet the needs of the age by making it more empirical - that is, by applying the methods by which Newton was thought to have advanced natural philosophy their object was "to trace back the history of society to its most simple and universal elements - to resolve almost all that has been ascribed to positive institution into the spontaneous and irresistible development of certain obvious principles". 22

Kames was the first to adopt this historical approach to the study of law, tracing it from its first rudiments among savages, through successive stages to its highest development.
He hoped that by collecting the facts about different legal systems and arranging them in a regular system of causes and effects he could prove that the progress of the law has been the same in all nations.\(^{23}\)

Kames was evidently influenced by one of the most important works by a follower of Locke: Montesquieu's *De l'Esprit des Lois* (1748) - which was, in part, an attempt to rescue morality and natural law from scepticism and relativism.\(^ {24}\)

Adam Smith took this approach further. Combining the sociology of Montesquieu with the historicism of Kames, he "attempted to account, from the changes in the condition of mankind, which take place in the different stages of their progress, for the corresponding alterations which their institutions undergo".\(^ {25}\) John Millar, who was more critical of Roman law than either Kames or Smith, followed Smith's lead.

Monboddo adopted the same method as his fellow literati - a method closely associated with philosophical jurisprudence - but he used it to establish very different principles. There is also a remarkable consistency between his philosophical and legal principles on the one hand and the linguistic principles expounded in OPL on the other. Indeed, OPL may be regarded as an expression of the humanist ideal of the unity of knowledge.

Like Kames, Smith, Hume and Millar, Monboddo disagreed with the fundamental assumption of seventeenth-century natural law that man is essentially rational and social. Monboddo claimed the contrary - that reason and sociability are acquired. For
him man's natural state was that of an animal and therefore he was subject only to the law of animal nature which we call instinct.\textsuperscript{26}

That is, Monboddo adopts an equally empirical stance but limits the scope of natural law to the state of nature - which, like Kames, he evidently regards not as a hypothesis but as man's real aboriginal condition. Furthermore, applying the historical method to philosophy itself, as is his custom, he claims that the project of a fully empirical system of natural law had already been accomplished - insofar as it is possible - by the jurisconsults who founded Roman law. According to these philosopher-statesmen, the only law of nature is that which is "common to the whole animal race".

Like the jurisconsults themselves, Monboddo contrasts the state of nature with the glory of humanly constructed Roman law, which is the highest expression of reason. It was founded on the basis of Aristotelian philosophy, especially "the method of science by definition and division" - i.e. genera and species.\textsuperscript{27}

This is in accordance with the clear distinction made by the founders of Roman law - but not by most commentators - between the law of nature and the law of nations. The latter arises from human reason and society. It is therefore founded on the secondary or acquired nature of man; and its obligation is based upon compact.\textsuperscript{28}

It is from this law of rational and social nature that the
rights and duties of man are derived — the rights of war and peace as Grotius calls them. In short, according to Roman law war is not, as Hobbes would have us believe, the natural state of man. 29

Monboddo's division between natural law and the law of nations reflects his humanist principles. Humanist lawyers had not been interested in natural law so much as in humanly constructed law: their inspiration was Cicero's De Inventione which regarded eloquence as the means by which man had progressed to civility, humanity and culture. 30 By the 1570s and 1580s humanists, particularly Protestants, had married this Ciceronian tradition to Aristotelian moral and political theory: and this was the late Renaissance Aristotelianism with which traditional Scottish jurisprudence had close connections. 31

That is, as was also his intention with regard to both philosophy and grammar, Monboddo wished to return to the moral philosophy of the ancients, to the Stoic principles of natural law which had prevailed during the Renaissance and which had influenced Roman law. 32 He understood the anti-Renaissance and anti-Aristotelian tendency of seventeenth-century Continental natural law. 33

By going back to the original state of nature when men were animals, and so only subject to the law of nature, in order to trace the history of mind and language (the expression of mind) Monboddo is therefore following the example of the jurisconsults as well as Locke, Montesquieu and the other Scottish philosophers. And the method which enabled the jurisconsults to construct Roman
law is that which had also enabled philosopher-grammarians to construct languages of art: the Aristotelian art of genera and species. This alone reduces the confusion of nature to order and method.

Thus Monboddo's humanistic division between natural law and the humanly constructed law of nations is reflected in his distinction between barbarous languages and languages of art—and in his overwhelming interest in the latter, as the only true languages.

Unlike Smith in his *Considerations concerning the First Formation of Languages*, Monboddo has little interest in languages characterized by the unanalyzed event name—a propositional equivalent reflecting the confused impressions of men not far removed from the state of nature. 34

Nor does he, as Smith did, regard the progress from these barbarous languages as a "spontaneous and irresistible" development. Neither mind nor language develops automatically. They are the result of the exertions of that free will by which we overcome barbarity. 35

Monboddo's collection of facts about barbarous languages serve the same purpose as Kames's collection of data concerning different legal systems: their comparison is intended to lead to the universal, rational principles governing language. This brings us to a more detailed consideration of Monboddo's method in OPL I, which—unlike his philosophical and legal principles—resembles that of his fellow literati. It is, in
fact, the method associated with the names of Locke and his disciple Montesquieu.

3. **OPL as philosophical history and the debate on the origin of language**

In order to arrive at a natural history of language that disproves Locke's account of mind and reinstates Aristotle's, Monboddo adopts the method recommended by Locke - "the historical, plain method". As its title indicates, OPL (although only in its first volume) is an example of the most typical of Enlightenment genres, so-called "philosophical history" - otherwise known as rational, theoretical, conjectural and even natural history.36

Although it had been revived by Locke, this method of "perfect history", as we have seen and as Monboddo must have known, originated during the Renaissance in the same French humanist school of historical-philological jurisprudence whose principles inspired advocates like Sir George Mackenzie and Monboddo himself. But after being revived by Locke it became the most popular genre of the Enlightenment - not least among the Scottish philosophers who were its most notable practitioners.37

The technique of philosophical history was applied to all human institutions. However, it did not attempt to trace the actual development of an institution - which was subject to all sorts of accidents and was in any case mostly a mystery - but its ideal course of development, its simplest or most natural progress:
that is, the development in which the various stages blend into each other leaving no gaps. This supposedly both revealed the principles of the institution and also pointed the way to further improvement. 38

Such histories were intended to establish a great chain of cause and effect linking civilized societies with their barbarous origins. By systematizing and supplementing the scattered evidence of the diversity of human manners and institutions provided by the abundant travel literature - accounting for them in terms of social circumstances or the principles of human nature - they justified the Enlightenment belief that human nature was the same in all times and places, and frequently confirmed facts that would otherwise have seemed incredible. In short, their purpose was to demonstrate the order underlying the apparent diversity of human institutions and the provision of nature for human progress. 39

Philosophical history was also regarded as a solution to the major question of the Enlightenment: method - the problem of arranging the principles of knowledge in the most 'natural' order for the diffusion of enlightening views. Hence the historical sketches of the rise and progress of a discipline that so often prefaced the lectures at Scottish universities, affirming the triumph of empiricism and the reality of progress. Lockian empiricism had destroyed the intellectual coherence of rationalism: philosophical history provided new principles of order. 40

The most important aspect of human development was, of course, the history of mind - which the encyclopedists regarded as branching
into universal grammar, logic and ethics: and so, under the influence of the third book of Locke's Essay, the origin and progress of language assumed great importance in the search for principles of mind - the basis of the Science of Man. 41

The evolution of language from barbarous languages to languages of art illustrated the development of man's powers of abstraction and thus the principles of both universal grammar and Locke's "natural logic". Moreover, since it revealed the universal principles of thought and language it would make possible the improvement of both. 42

As a philosophical history of language, OPL I is not concerned with language as an end in itself but with language as the expression of mind. It may be compared with Adam Smith's less ambitious Considerations Concerning the First Formation of Languages (1761). And, largely owing to Smith, in the second half of the eighteenth century the origin and progress of language - and the principles of universal grammar it established - became the recognized method of introducing Scottish university students to the philosophy of mind. 43

However, like other Scottish philosophers, Monboddo claimed that his account of the history of language was so well supported by facts drawn from ancient and modern travellers as to transcend the limitations of conjectural history: it amounted to nothing less than a natural history of man's mind, outdoing the natural histories of animals generally regarded as paradigms of scientific method. That is, he claimed that the historical-philological method based on manners and introspection and supplemented by reason is more revealing...
than the mere Baconian collection of facts relating to the flux of the physical world. In short, he too claimed to be applying a method of scientific analysis to moral things; but his principles were not those of Newton and Locke but Aristotle's. 44

4. Monboddo's revival of Aristotelian hylomorphism

In this way Monboddo's defence of humanism, Aristotle and the ancients came to be conducted within the context of an international debate on the origin and nature of language. By tracing the history of language - and therefore the history of the ideas it signifies - Monboddo intends to reveal the hylomorphic principles of language and mind. At the same time, since hylomorphism is also the basis of the physical world, such a history will demonstrate that the hierarchical semantic structure of a philosophical language - the ideal to which all languages of art aspire - will in some sense reflect the genera and species of things in the real world. At the other end of this scale of abstraction, the most general ideas of which man is capable extend into the spiritual world: 45

Thus hylomorphism is the basis of everything in the physical, intellectual and spiritual worlds. The hierarchy of genera and species extending from sense-perceptions to the divine mind restores to human knowledge the coherence and certainty which empiricism had destroyed. 46

As we have seen, Monboddo's preoccupation with the Aristotelian art of genera and species goes back to the Stoics who influenced the
founders of Roman law. Believing that knowledge depended on the conformity of our ideas with the real things of nature, they associated language with the moral life of man and his harmonious participation in the Scale of Being. In short, as Cicero said, language involved the study of things, not just words. Consequently, the jurisconsults both investigated the origins of words and accurately divided the species of things according to the art of genera and species. They understood that the investigation of language leads into philosophy — specifically, into logic and metaphysics.47

There is much here that is reminiscent of Locke himself. How does Monboddo use Locke's method to disprove the Lockian account of mind and language?

Like Locke, Monboddo takes the origin and nature of abstract ideas as fundamental to the allied problems of language and philosophy: and, like Locke, he denies the existence of innate ideas, equating Aristotle's genera and species with ordinary abstract ideas derived from sense-data.48 But whereas Locke had alleged that abstract ideas are uncertain, Monboddo claims that when properly abstracted they do (as Aristotle said) bear a necessary relation to things — although he concedes that they do not represent the essences of things.49 Consequently, Monboddo was also involved in a contemporary debate about the reality of species in which the protagonists were Buffon and Linnaeus.50

This is the basis of Monboddo's restoration of Aristotelian-Thomist hylomorphism. It involves the restitution of much else that.
Locke had rejected: syllogistic logic; the doctrine of definition by genus and differentia; and belief in the certainty of human knowledge. His system (which bears a close resemblance to that of John Sergeant, a seventeenth century critic of Locke) attempts to expose the folly of naive empiricism. Although rationalism is superior to empiricism, the deductive and inductive methods are seen as complementary. 51

The resulting unified view of knowledge as a rational hierarchy reaffirms the ancient principles of the Scale of Being, which in the eighteenth century had merely become part of the natural history tradition. 52 Furthermore, Monboddo demonstrates that the Epicurean idea of the origins of man and language - which Locke, Mandeville and others had so successfully revived - could be reconciled with a transcendental view of the universe.

According to this view, man could gradually rise by means of his faculty of abstraction from his original immersion in sense and matter to a state of moral and intellectual excellence only a little lower than that of the angels. 53 Since language reflected a people's status in the Scale of Being (that is, the degree of abstract thought of which they were capable) there was also a scale of languages. These ranged from prelinguistic forms of communication through barbarous languages to languages of art - that is to say, languages which have been deliberately invented. At the highest level, languages of art are philosophical languages like Greek or Sanskrit. Having a semantic structure based on the same hylomorphic principles as the Scale of Being itself, such languages are capable of reflecting
a Hellenic vision of the whole. In short, Monboddo's view of the development of language is teleological. 54

Thus there is a close relationship between the notion of philosophical history and that of the Scale of Being. Philosophical history enabled an eighteenth century philosopher to look back over the progress of a language (or any other institution) and fix its position in the scale of abstraction. This in turn revealed the future course which improvement must follow. 55

5. Conclusion
To sum up, in his examination of the natural history of language Monboddo deals with a complex of related questions focussing on Locke which had been taken up by various French philosophers and embodied in the great Encyclopédie: notably, philosophical and natural history as answers to the problem of method; and universal grammar (the product of the philosophical history of language) as the key both to the principles of mind and the improvement of natural languages.

This would seem to make OPL part of the Scottish lawyers' forward-looking campaign to redefine Scottish culture - a campaign of 'improvement' based on the philosophy of Locke and on a new approach to logic and rhetoric which Locke had influenced. 56

But we have seen that, despite its form and typical Enlightenment concerns, OPL is actually a criticism of Locke and therefore of the course of the Enlightenment as a whole. Monboddo's criticism is based on his allegiance to the complementary traditions of Scottish humanism and Scottish jurisprudence. Both were enshrined in the
Advocates' Library - on whose resources Monboddo drew so heavily while writing OPL. Thus Monboddo upheld the long-standing traditions of Scottish jurisprudence and of Scottish culture as a whole at a time when they were being modified or abandoned by Scotland's intellectual élite - the advocates themselves.  

Monboddo's attack on Locke was not the first by a leading advocate nor the first by a member of the Burnett family. In fact, his opposition to the materialism and scepticism implicit in Lockian philosophy seems to have been partly the result of his family background and early education.

In keeping with his humanist views, Monboddo's criticisms of contemporary philosophy were largely the result of his insistence on examining the origins and principles of the Scottish Enlightenment. On the one hand, he claimed that contemporary philosophers had deviated from the humanist principles which originally inspired the Enlightenment and linked it to the Renaissance - a deviation which had begun with the naive empiricism of Bacon and Locke and led, inevitably, to the scepticism of Hume. On the other hand, he seems also to imply that in blindly following Locke his contemporaries had failed to recognize Locke's unacknowledged debt to the ancients whose system he had criticised so severely. In short, OPL is a defence of humanism against Locke's experimental philosophy - the very foundation of the Enlightenment.

Like Locke and Hume, Monboddo sees his Aristotelian version of the Science of Man as having far-reaching effects. The clarification of the nature of ideas and mental processes is nothing less than a
complete system of metaphysics affecting logic, rhetoric, criticism, morals and political philosophy. Therefore Monboddo's comprehensive attack on Locke's theory of ideas embraces the complementary principles of universal grammar, logic and rhetoric - the three parts of the medieval trivium - all of which arise from the history of language. Of these, rhetoric bulks largest: four volumes of OPL are devoted to it.

Monboddo's explication of the principles of grammar, logic and rhetoric is related not only to the general Enlightenment problem of method and language but to Scotland's specific linguistic and cultural problem.

Thus, because it attempts to answer Locke in his own terms, OPL not only deals with the major questions of the age but is in many respects typical of its time in form and approach; and it can, furthermore, be related to most of the important aspects of the Scottish Enlightenment.

The influence of the Aristotelian tradition of Scottish jurisprudence on Monboddo was modified by Cambridge Platonism - a school with which Episcopalian humanists had long had a close affinity. As a result, Monboddo attempts to reconcile not only empiricism and rationalism but Aristotelianism and Platonism. Nevertheless, it may be said that Monboddo's system is fundamentally Aristotelian: in fact, it bears a marked resemblance to the account of language and mind given by St. Thomas Aquinas - although, as in his treatment of universal grammar, Monboddo was unaware of the medieval character of much of his thought. 60
Shaftesbury, whose Ciceronian influence permeated eighteenth century thought, had himself drawn on the work of the Cambridge Platonists for arguments against the nominalism and materialism of Hobbes.\textsuperscript{61}

This brings us to the tradition of Ciceronian rhetoric which has already been touched on in the present chapter; and which Monboddo regarded (at least when it had been restored to its Aristotelian principles) as embracing the true Aristotelian Science of Man.
Chapter Six
OPL AND CICERONIAN RHETORIC

1. Ciceronianism

The Ciceronian humanist ideal, which inspired Shaftesbury, may be said to have provided the Enlightenment as a whole with its cultural programme. It was the source of many eighteenth century concerns repeatedly discussed in the pages of the great *Encyclopédie*: for instance, the encyclopedic ideal of knowledge, the union of eloquence and wisdom, and the origin and progress of human institutions, particularly language.¹

Consequently Ciceronianism also forms the background to all the most important aspects of the Scottish Enlightenment: not only the humanistic traditions of Scottish jurisprudence (which, of course, dated back to the sixteenth century) but the activities of the literary societies, and the entire cult of rhetoric. The latter includes Adam Smith's seminal lectures, the elocutionary movement, the replacement of logic by rhetoric in the Scottish university curriculum, and also the new rhetoric of the Scottish philosophers which sought to replace Cicero and Aristotle and embrace Lockian empiricism.²

In fact, as we have already seen, in eighteenth century Scotland the influence of Cicero - whether direct or via Shaftesbury - was everywhere. Hutcheson's lectures on moral philosophy had blended
the ethics of Cicero and Shaftesbury with the psychology of Locke.³

The crucial essays of Addison and Steele, which had an enormous Scottish vogue, likewise drew on Cicero and Shaftesbury. Addisonian words like "improvement", "politeness", "taste" and "moderation" constantly appear in the proceedings of the literary clubs which played such an important part in the growth of the Scottish Enlightenment.⁴

Finally, the Scottish Common Sense philosophy drew heavily on Cicero and Shaftesbury. Ciceronianism, with its avoidance of dogma, had inspired Shaftesbury's arguments against the dogmatic extremes of Calvinism. Following Cicero, Shaftesbury had appealed to common notions, innate ideas and the universal consent of mankind revealed in common language: and these arguments were used against Hume's scepticism by Thomas Reid and the Scottish Common Sense philosophers.⁵

Since Ciceronianism was so important in eighteenth century Scotland, it will be useful to outline its general characteristics, concentrating on Ciceronian rhetoric, before discussing Monboddo's views.

The Renaissance studia humanitatis - which consisted of rhetoric, grammar, poetry, history and moral philosophy - derived from Cicero's reunification of philosophy and rhetoric after their separation by Socrates. (The latter sought a cultural programme based on philosophy - that is, on the knowledge of things human and divine, of principles and first causes.)
Cicero's *De Oratore* discusses the ideal relationship between these two sides of the *studia humanitatis*. The orator and the philosopher both accepted "logos" as man's distinctive quality: but for the former it meant speech ("oratio") and for the latter it meant reason ("ratio"). This contrast implied different views of man's intellectual and moral life. 7

The basic issue in *De Oratore* is the question whether the orator should have a wide general culture. Cicero believes that he should. His vision of culture is a union of rhetoric and philosophy in which philosophy is presented elegantly and persuasively. Provided the orator is an eclectic, uncommitted to any one school, the culture of rhetoric can benefit the community via the study of philosophy and ethics. Thus, the man of affairs - a lawyer or a gentleman - could be a philosopher and yet live in society. 8

In short, Cicero's humanistic ideal was the effective use of knowledge in the guidance of human affairs. If the statesman-philosopher is to be good and virtuous he must combine eloquence with wisdom. That is, he must be trained in philosophy, ethics and politics as well as rhetoric. 9

On expanding this ideal further, its Stoic elements become even clearer. According to Cicero, eloquence embraced the origin and progress of all things. It was eloquence that gathered primitive man - who had been living a solitary, brutish existence - into groups; and eloquence that finally led him into civilization. Eloquence therefore embraced all natural moral principles. When combined with universal knowledge it showed how all things in nature
are part of one system. It therefore constituted virtue as well as wisdom - i.e. pulchrum et honestum, which distinguishes men from brutes. In short, elegant, knowledgeable discourse is the basis of culture: and the orator, who surpasses others in the supreme human capacity for "discourse of reason" is the most powerful influence for good in the state.¹⁰

Petrarch and the early Renaissance humanists agreed with this cultural programme. In their opinion, legal studies and philosophy in general had declined since Socrates separated oratory from philosophy.¹¹

2. Ciceronian rhetoric and OPL

Ciceronian rhetoric is, inevitably, also the background of Monboddo's lengthy exposition of the philosophy of rhetoric in OPL. After dealing with the origin and progress of language in his first volume, and its "science and philosophy" (i.e. grammar and logic) in volume two, Monboddo turns naturally to rhetoric - the third part of the medieval trivium. That is, of the six volumes of OPL four are devoted to some aspect of rhetoric - whether style, composition or criticism. This fact alone testifies to the importance of rhetoric in the Scottish Enlightenment.¹²

Monboddo's purposes in volumes three to six match his purpose in volume two. In volume two he attempts to restore Aristotelian grammar and Aristotelian logic - and to re-establish the connection between them. The latter had long been under attack: it had also been considerably modified by the Ramists, who tended to be associated
with Calvinism. From volume three onwards, Monboddo is concerned to restore the third part of the trivium: the ancient rhetorical system of Cicero - whose works had been published at Glasgow by the Foulis brothers in the middle of the century.\textsuperscript{13}

Cicero had been the supreme authority on rhetoric since the Middle Ages and was as closely identified with rhetoric as Aristotle was with logic: and the rhetorical doctrine Cicero had attempted to expound was that of Aristotle. In fact, the two systems were completely intertwined: Ciceronian rhetoric was inseparable from Aristotelian logic.\textsuperscript{14}

Furthermore, like Aristotelian logic, Ciceronian rhetoric had long been under attack and had been modified by Ramus. Ramus had separated logic and rhetoric, making subject-matter and arrangement the sole concern of the former and style and delivery that of the latter. However, he was not alone in this desire to modify traditional rhetoric. Both the Port Royal Logic and Bernard Lamy's \textit{La Rhétorique, ou l'art de parler} were among several works which attacked the topics as being irrelevant and out of date.\textsuperscript{15}

Monboddo wished to join rhetoric not only with logic but, as Cicero had intended, with philosophy as a whole. He believed that knowledge of things and knowledge of words cannot be divided without injury to both: "logos", after all, meant both reason and speech. Their separation had led to orators despising wisdom and philosophers despising the eloquence of practising lawyers: it had even led, as Cicero had said, to the plurality and discord of schools of philosophy.\textsuperscript{16}
However, Monboddo wished to accomplish more than the restoration of the full Ciceronian rhetoric. Believing that Cicero had not studied Aristotle sufficiently, he attempted to base traditional rhetoric more clearly on its Aristotelian principles. In this respect, he resembled Fénelon, some of whose key works had been published by the Foulis brothers earlier in the Scottish Enlightenment. Indeed, the Christian humanism of Fénelon and the brothers Foulis bore a close resemblance to Monboddo's.17

Primarily, Monboddo equates Aristotelian principles with method. If the orator is to join philosophy to rhetoric, he must be learned in all the arts and sciences, especially everything concerned with human life – laws, government and ethics: and, to express this universal system of things, the orator must have recourse to method.18

Method and system in any subject, as Cicero himself had seen, depend on the art of genera and species – an art which also involves the precise definition of terms for the resulting hierarchy of classes. The outcome will be a complete, systematic art or science according to the Aristotelian ideal. This art is the foundation of Aristotelian logic. It was also the method followed by the jurisconsultes who founded Roman law and whom Monboddo frequently invokes.19

OPL itself may be seen as a defence of the art of genera and species as the basis of thought and language – and, indeed, of universal coherence. This theme may be found in the essays on Cicero's de Oratore among the early Monboddo Papers. These deal primarily with the twin humanistic themes of the unity of learning
and method (or system). Both are related to a major question of de Oratore: is there a science of rhetoric? Monboddo's answer is that "exactness of order and method" may be obtained by employing the Aristotelian art of definition and division. And his own systematic exposition of Aristotelian/Ciceronian rhetorical principles (paralleling his equally systematic earlier exposition of the philosophy of language) is evidently based on this same Aristotelian art which was so much a part of traditional Scottish jurisprudence. In fact, this probably accounts for the rigorous, forensic argument of OPL as a whole.20

The Ciceronian union of rhetoric and philosophy is of crucial importance to Monboddo. He regarded it as the key to Scotland's past cultural achievements and those of the future. It had been the basis of the work of the Scottish humanists of the sixteenth century - the period to which Monboddo (like Ruddiman and Sir George Mackenzie, the founder of the Advocates' Library) looked back so nostalgically and hoped to revive.

Just as Monboddo hoped to revive ancient philosophy by publishing his second volume, he is here concerned with reviving the "taste and knowledge" of ancient literature - Scotland's "greatest ornament" during the sixteenth century. However, his ultimate concern is moral and philosophical.21

Monboddo relates the humanist ideal of the perfect orator, learned in rhetoric and philosophy (especially laws, government and ethics) to the contemporary situation in Britain - and, more particularly, in Scotland - which was dominated by the spirit of empiricism.
Only the study of the all-embracing subject of oratory can produce statesmen with the necessary elevation of mind. Neither mathematics nor natural history - the paradigm of science closely associated with the Lockian Science of Man - can save a wealthy nation from being poisoned by its own luxury. This is a view that doubtless reflects Monboddo's perception of the Faculty of Advocates as the cultural elite of Scotland and the guardians of the Scottish humanist tradition. And it is clear from one of the early Monboddo papers that - in the fashion of Ciceronian rhetoric - Monboddo's interest in the origin and progress of language was from the first related to this moral question. 22

Monboddo clearly regarded Ciceronian rhetoric as the counter-part of Ciceronian ethics; and, when correctly interpreted in Aristotelian terms - that is, primarily, when reduced to a science - saw it as constituting the basis of the original (i.e. humanist) Science of Man. Like Locke and Hume, Monboddo views this Aristotelian Science of Man as a complete system of metaphysics embracing not only logic, rhetoric and criticism, but morals and political philosophy. 23

3. Rhetoric and the cult of taste

The cult of rhetoric is inseparable from the ubiquitous cult of polite taste. The cult of taste, which succeeded Anglo-French neo-classicism as the dominant influence in eighteenth century Scotland, began in seventeenth century France and England as a reaction to formal Aristotelian rhetoric. 24
It became widely believed that rhetoric did not after all depend on Aristotle's rules but on the faculty of "taste". At the same time rhetoric gradually ceased to be regarded as a separate art. It was instead seen as all-pervasive. By extending it to include all forms of expression - history and philosophy, for instance - the humanistic ideal of the unity of the arts could, it was believed, be finally guaranteed. Thus it can be said that the cult of taste continued the seventeenth century interest in form (or method) but shifted the balance of the traditional alliance between rhetoric, grammar and logic in favour of rhetoric. Monboddo, while fully recognizing the importance of rhetoric, evidently saw his task as the restoration of this balance.25

A key work in the cult of taste - one on which the article "Rhétorique" in the Encyclopédie draws heavily - was Bernard Lamy's so-called Port Royal Rhetoric: La Rhétorique, ou l'art de parler. Published in 1668 it was translated into English at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Lamy not only extended rhetoric to belles lettres but associated it with another humanistic study: the origin and progress of language. The combination of rhetoric and the philosophical history of language with a concept of universal grammar deriving from Scaliger and Sanctius was to become fundamental to the philosophies of Adam Smith and Monboddo - although Monboddo's view of rhetoric was opposed to Smith's. In fact, after about 1750, this combination of subjects became an important part of Scottish university education.26
In OPL Monboddo mounts an attack on the fashionable belief that a writer with taste or genius need not imitate the ancients; and that criticism, being a matter of taste, could never be reduced to rule - that is, achieve the status of a science or art. In Monboddo's view, just as English can only be improved by the study of Latin or Greek, so style can only be improved by imitating classical models. He attacks the critics of classical education, the "foppery of modern languages and foreign wit" and particularly the fashionable English authors influenced by France. 27

Monboddo's opposition is even more understandable when we consider that the cult of taste tended to substitute belles lettres for the study of Aristotelian formal logic. The importance of this aspect of the cult in eighteenth century Scotland can hardly be exaggerated: as we have seen, the fashion for rhetoric and belles lettres had special significance there. 28

The rhetorical approach to logic, which derived from Cicero and Quintilian, had begun as early as the fifteenth century, when scholastic logic (which had originally borrowed heavily from grammar) began to give way to rhetoric - the third member of the trivium. Following the lead of Ramus, who was exceedingly influential in Protestant countries during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Aristotelian logic was eventually widely replaced by the so-called "natural logic" of John Locke during the century of the Enlightenment. 29

4. Adam Smith and the replacement of logic by rhetoric in Scottish universities

At Scottish universities the replacement of ancient logic and rhetoric
by the study of literary taste and style seems to have been connected
with the reformation of the universities which occurred during the
first three decades of the eighteenth century. Edinburgh and
Glasgow followed the pattern of Leiden and Utrecht, attempting to
meet the needs of a secularly minded gentry and professional class
aware of its civic duties. (At Edinburgh, for example, besides
rhetoric and belles lettres, great importance was attached to civic
history, natural law, natural theology and medicine. The dominant
names were Locke, Newton, Grotius, Pufendorf and Boerhaave on the one
hand; and, on the other, Cicero and Shaftesbury.)

The transition could be seen in the classes of John Stevenson,
Professor of Logic at Edinburgh from 1730 to 1775 - classes which
profoundly influenced future leaders of the Scottish revival of
letters. Stevenson made students translate Longinus and Aristotle's
Poetics from the Greek, and taught Aristotelian logic and metaphysics
in Latin. But he also drew on Bacon and Locke, Bossu and Dacier;
and on the papers of Addison and Steele. However, the key role
was played by Adam Smith - who was also the first of the eighteenth
century Scottish philosophers to take up the debate on the origin of
language.

Smith was a seminal figure of great importance in the history of
the Scottish Enlightenment, especially with regard to the cult of
rhetoric and the Science of Man. Furthermore his range of interests
parallels Monboddo's closely: and it is probable that OPL is as much
an attack on Smith's Lockian and somewhat sceptical views as on those
of his friend David Hume.
Smith, a founder member of both the Select Society and the Glasgow Literary Society, helped to foster Scottish interest in the works of the French Enlightenment, especially Buffon, Rousseau and the Encyclopédie. And his early lectures, essays and letters discuss the nexus of major questions which were exercising the encyclopedists and were soon to preoccupy the Scottish philosophers. These may be summed up as method, mind and language. However, it is also important to remember that Smith had been taught by Gershom Carmichael and was therefore, like Monboddo, from the first immersed in the philosophy of law and the history of civil society. 32

From 1748 until 1750 Smith, having spent six years at Oxford University, gave a series of lectures on rhetoric and belles lettres in Edinburgh under the patronage of Lord Kames. Interest in the subject had already been fostered by journals like the Tatler and Spectator; and by the teaching of John Stevenson. However, Smith's lectures may be said to mark the transition from the study of formal rhetoric to that of polite literature. 33

The lectures eventually led to the installation at Edinburgh University of Hugh Blair (another protegé of Kames) as the first Regius Professor of Rhetoric and Belles Lettres in Britain: and Blair openly acknowledged his debt to Smith's lectures. 34

The lectures also had a more immediate effect. Smith evidently used some of the material from them both in his earliest lectures as Professor of Logic and Rhetoric at Glasgow in 1751 and subsequently as the Glasgow Professor of Moral Philosophy (1752-1763). Going beyond Stevenson, he delivered a system of rhetoric and belles lettres.
instead of the logic and metaphysics of Aristotle. 35

In his logic classes (which continued after his appointment to the chair of moral philosophy) Smith gave only a brief account of Aristotelian logic "to gratify curiosity with respect to an artificial method of reasoning which had once occupied the universal attention of the learned" - exactly as his friend Lord Kames was to do in his *Sketches of the History of Man*. The rest of his time was devoted to a system of rhetoric and belles lettres on Lockian grounds: "the best method of explaining and illustrating the various powers of the human mind... arises from the examination of the several ways of communicating our thoughts by speech and from an attention to the principles of those literary compositions which contribute to persuasion or entertainment". 36

That is to say, in Smith's view - as in view of other Scottish philosophers - there was a very close connection between the study of rhetoric (or criticism) and the Lockian Science of Man (or Science of Morals). So the lectures on rhetoric and belles lettres (which included the history of philosophy) complemented those on moral philosophy - which embraced ethics, politics, jurisprudence, natural theology and the history of civil society. 37

Both series of lectures had a wide influence (affecting John Millar, William Robertson and Adam Ferguson among others). Similar subjects were debated by the Select Society, which was founded with Smith's support in 1754; and the rhetorical approach to the philosophy of mind became standard at Scottish universities. 38
When the notes of these lectures are compared with Smith's early writings on philosophical subjects (which evidently belong to roughly the same period) the parallel between the interests of Smith and Monboddo becomes clear. Both focussed on the relationship between mind and language. Both were concerned, on the one hand, with the principles of mind - which are also regarded as the principles of scientific discovery and exposition; and, on the other, with the studies which reveal these principles - rhetoric, universal grammar and philosophical history. Both attached special importance to the philosophical history of language as the key to the principles of universal grammar and mind. Both were concerned with the classification of phenomena and the discovery of a chain of causality linking every part of the Science of Man; philosophical history itself was, of course, a method of describing phenomena. 39

Furthermore, in their discussion of these subjects, Smith and Monboddo frequently draw on the same contemporary and classical sources; and both show marked respect for classical philosophers. Smith's treatment of the ancients contrasts with that of many Encyclopedists and is in keeping with the conservative tone of the Scottish Enlightenment. Like Monboddo, he shows great interest in the history of philosophy and seems to be concerned with reconciling the ancients and moderns. 40

The most obvious parallel is between OPL I and Smith's third lecture "Of the Origin and Progress of Language" - with which Monboddo was certainly familiar, at least in its fuller, published form. The title itself was a familiar topos of French Renaissance
jurisprudence. As Considerations concerning the First Formation of Languages it appeared in 1761 together with translations from several articles from the Mémoires of the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres. That is, the circumstances of its original publication themselves point to the connection between the conjectural history of language (revived by Locke) with humanist rhetoric; just as its eventual inclusion in the third edition of Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments (1767) point to the connection with the Science of Morals. 41

OPL has much in common with another early conjectural history of Smith's: The Principles which lead and direct philosophical inquiries illustrated by the History of Ancient Logics and Metaphysics. Like OPL it is concerned with what Smith regarded as the greatest difficulty in abstract philosophy: the contemporary problem of the origin of general ideas. 42

However, although Smith was strongly influenced by Locke (his "Of the External Senses" derives from Locke's Essay and imitates his method) he also refers to many classical themes and sources relevant to the problem of the origin of abstract ideas. All of these are also discussed in OPL. For example, Aristotle's Metaphysics, Plato's Timaeus, Porphyry, Pythagoras, and the Cambridge Platonists are frequently mentioned. And Smith discusses the history of the word 'idea'; ideas as artificially formed by abstraction; ideas as Aristotelian species; and the Platonic doctrine of specific essences. He also compares Aristotle's notion of universals with
Plato's and discusses the Aristotelian doctrine of potential existence. 43

So the combination in OPL of a philosophical history of language, mind and society with an exposition of the principles of philosophical grammar and rhetoric emerging from this history (four volumes are devoted to rhetoric) exactly mirrors the interests of Smith - and the connection between rhetoric and the Science of Man. However, whereas Smith was primarily influenced by Locke, Monboddo based his analysis on the Aristotelian principles which Smith claimed had been superseded.

According to Smith, the Newtonian method in didactic discourse - which is applicable to moral as well as to natural philosophy - is preferable to the Aristotelian because it deduces phenomena from one principle, uniting them into a single chain. 44 Monboddo wishes to demonstrate that the Aristotelian art of definition by genera, species and differentiae (which was fundamental to Scottish jurisprudence and had been used by the ancient rhetoricians) is not, as Smith had alleged, unconnected; but is in fact, superior to the Newtonian in its ability to deduce phenomena from a few principles and unite them into a single chain. Consequently, the art of genera and species is also the principle of a language of art, whose function is to describe phenomena: and it was inevitably adopted by John Wilkins for his philosophical language. 45

Although he makes no direct attack on Smith, Monboddo implicitly disagrees with him on other fundamental questions. Philosophical systems - at least Aristotle's - are not mere inventions of the
imagination. Furthermore, the "experimental" technique admired by Smith has its limitations. Aristotle's method (like Newton's in fact, as Colin Maclaurin explained) was both analytical and synthetic.46

Nor do men - as Smith and Mandeville claimed - contribute to unintended outcomes in the course of pursuing their selfish objectives. Neither language nor society (which it reflects) depends for its orderly progress on Smith's doctrine of the "invisible hand".47

Finally, Smith's experiential approach included a preference for the appeal to precedent as used in the Common Law of England - as opposed to the principled approach of Scottish Roman Law, which Monboddo upheld. This defence of custom against reason is clearly associated with Smith's dismissal of the orders and classes of formal rhetoric. According to Smith, Cicero's adherence to the ancient union of rhetoric, logic and morals merely showed the low state of philosophy at that time: this was then the only highly developed science. Furthermore, Smith claimed that cause-effect relations are difficult to establish, particularly in the field of human behaviour.48

As Smith and Monboddo were not only fellow members of the Select Society but played leading parts in its activities, Monboddo must have been completely familiar with Smith's views on rhetoric and moral philosophy long before their publication. The Lockian (and therefore sceptical) nature of these views was enough to ensure Monboddo's opposition, quite apart from the friendship between Smith and Hume. So it is quite possible that OPL reflects discussions in the Select Society; and that it is directed not only
against the cult of taste, the new rhetoric and the Science of Man in general, but also against Adam Smith – the Scottish philosopher who did most to encourage their development. The fact that there is no direct attack on Smith in OPL is entirely characteristic of the manner in which the Scottish philosophers conducted themselves in print.

Adam Smith's views on rhetoric are to be seen as part of an attempt by Scottish philosophers to create a new rhetoric and a new logic deriving from (or, at least, supposedly deriving from) Bacon and Locke. Besides Smith himself, the Scottish philosophers principally involved were George Campbell, Thomas Reid and Hugh Blair. 49

OPL as a whole may be taken as an indictment of the new logic – the Baconian method of induction wholeheartedly endorsed by Kames, Reid, Campbell and Dugald Stewart. Reid's influential "A Brief Account of Aristotle's Logic, with Remarks", which was written between 1767 and 1773, was their manifesto. It first appeared as an appendix to a philosophical history by Monboddo's literary rival which dealt briefly with the origin of language: Lord Kames's Sketches of the History of Man (1774).

We have seen how Monboddo turns Locke's argument against himself: thought, as the history of language shows, necessarily involves a process of abstraction by which we classify reality into genera and species – and these are indeed what Aristotle is talking about.

However, Monboddo's position regarding Smith's rhetoric
- which must be distinguished from Campbell's - was more complicated than this, largely because there was really little that was new about it.

Smith saw his rhetoric as deriving from Bacon and Locke in two respects. Firstly, he saw rhetoric as concerned with the communication of ideas rather than persuasion. This meant that it had to deal with the whole range of composition - historical, poetical and didactic. Secondly, he recognized that the plain style associated with Locke, Thomas Sprat and the Royal Society is the only acceptable modern style for historical and didactic purposes.

But in order to bring rhetoric into line with the needs of the time, Smith does little more than reject the elaborate Ciceronian rhetoric: he endorses the simpler rhetoric of the Greeks - that of Aristotle and Demosthenes. He condemns neither the system of topics nor the syllogism. Unlike Campbell, he does not even propose inductive procedures.

In all this there is not such a great difference between Smith and Monboddo, except that Smith does criticise the system of topics and that he is eclectic - borrowing from Ramus and Quintilian as well as Aristotle. There is a much greater contrast between OPL III-VI and Campbell's *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* [2 vols, London 1776] with its constant appeals to Bacon. However, Campbell was based in Aberdeen and his work did not appear until OPL III was published, so Monboddo was not responding to him specifically.
Monboddo's point appears to be that Smith should have acknowledged that for the most part he was, like Fénelon, attempting to distil the essence of Aristotle and that there is nothing specifically Lockian about his system. For example, Smith calls his two methods of didactic composition - analysis and synthesis - Aristotelian and Newtonian (or Cartesian) respectively. But both are to be found in the Aristotelian art of genera and species which is, Monboddo claims, the basis of all thought. Cicero himself recognised this but, in Monboddo's opinion, did not emphasize it sufficiently in his rhetorical system.

That is, once again, Monboddo takes a historical view of the question, making much the same point about so-called Lockian rhetoric as he appears to about Lockian "logic" - that, insofar as it was valid, it derived from Aristotle.

5. Rhetoric and the influence of the French academies

It has already been mentioned that in his Christian humanism and approach to rhetoric Monboddo resembles Bishop Fénelon (1651-1715), who had himself been deeply influenced by Greek culture. Indeed, Fénelon appears to have had some considerable influence on the earlier stages of the cult of rhetoric in Scotland through the publication in Glasgow of his key works. In 1750 the Foulis brothers published his Dialogues concerning Eloquence; his Letter to the French Academy concerning Rhetoric, Poetry and History; and
his Discourse on his admission to the French Academy. 50

The connection between Fénelon and the French Academy brings us to an important, but perhaps little noticed, aspect of French influence on the Scottish cult of rhetoric: the influence of the French academies, in particular the Académie Royale des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres. Such academies were, of course, a link with the Renaissance and the French school of humanist jurisprudence; and they undoubtedly influenced the establishment of the Scottish literary societies, which had similar aims. 51

The Mémoires of the Académie Royale des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres are of the greatest value for our understanding of the humanist background of the cult of rhetoric in Scotland, showing its connection not only with Hellenism in general but with specific aspects of OPL.

The Monboddo Papers frequently refer to certain articles in the Mémoires, notably those by Fréret and de Guignes. Fréret's paper on Chinese characters and the art of writing in general, which was delivered in 1718, appears to have been particularly influential. 52 It refers to several sources constantly used by Monboddo himself, including La Hontan, Wilkins and de la Vega. It also refers to various subjects discussed by Monboddo, such as Sanskrit, Egyptian hieroglyphics and the picture writing of the Mexican and Canadian indians. De Guignes, whom Monboddo met in Paris during the early 1760's also contributed articles on Chinese characters and Egyptian hieroglyphics which influenced Monboddo. 53

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However, the importance of the Mémoires does not depend on these particular articles but on the similarity between the general themes discussed and those of OPL, the early Monboddoo Papers, Adam Smith's early lectures and the Select Society debates. Many of these themes will, of course, also be found in the Encyclopédie, which was another major source of linguistic information - at least for Smith. But the humanistic emphasis of the Mémoires is distinctive. Belles lettres and rhetoric - on which there are many papers - are seen as a corrective to the dangers of an exclusive interest in mathematics and physics. Demosthenes, 'Longinus', Cicero and Dionysius of Halicarnassus are constantly mentioned. Other subjects are equally humanistic: for instance, history, travel, grammar, philology and languages. The variety of languages discussed is particularly interesting. There are papers on Celtic, Chinese, Hebrew, Persian, Phoenician, Egyptian and Greek - and on the possible connections between languages such as the last three. The historical papers frequently concern the origins of languages and nations - and the value of etymology in establishing the latter. There are also papers on the "origin and progress" of various other subjects - rhetoric, tragedy and comedy, for example. Several papers on the merits of the ancients - and the merits of the ancient grammarians, in particular - compared with the moderns, almost complete the parallel with Monboddoo's interests.

In fact, most of the elements of Renaissance humanism are to be found in the Mémoires: the studia humanitatis (grammar, rhetoric, poetry, history and moral philosophy); the placing of jurisprudence...
and moral philosophy above natural philosophy because of their concern with man and society; the desire to return to origins, especially the earthly origin of man; and the desire to rediscover the unity of knowledge - to reconcile Plato and Aristotle, moral philosophy, natural philosophy and theology. 57

Although Monboddo may be said to have been the only uncompromising humanist among the Scottish philosophers - the only one to make a conscious attempt to revive all these Renaissance principles - interest in the themes discussed in the Mémoires was not by any means confined to him. The Scottish philosophers as a whole shared similar interests to a considerable extent - particularly Adam Smith, who was an influential figure. However, many of these humanistic themes were also to be found in the French Encyclopédie. The influence of the Mémoires is proved only in the cases of Monboddo and Smith.

Smith's connection with the Mémoires was very close. His Considerations concerning the First Formation of Languages originally appeared in the first volume of The Philological Miscellany (London 1761) - a collection of articles translated from the Mémoires of the Académie Royale des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres. Possibly they were collected or translated by Smith himself. The fact that there was to be a further volume including articles from the Encyclopédie makes this more likely. 58

The very first essay in this collection deals with a recurrent theme of OPL and Harris's Hermes: the importance of philology in the face of the increasing study of mathematics and natural philosophy.
The article emphasises that the revival of polite learning had its roots in grammatical studies and the restoration of purity to Latin. J.C. Scaliger and Sanctius - so greatly admired by Harris and Monboddo - are mentioned in this connection. From the study of grammar came criticism and, subsequently, the rules of taste. History - including the study of the origins of language and government - followed.59

Of course, several of the humanistic topics discussed in the Mémoires were already part of Scottish legal studies, in which Smith, Kames, Monboddo and others were particularly interested: and Scottish jurisprudence had derived largely from the humanist traditions of French Renaissance jurisprudence - which the Académie Royal des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres was evidently concerned to preserve.60 So, although the Mémoires bore fruit in the case of Adam Smith and Monboddo - if not those of other Scottish philosophers - it was because the ground had been well prepared.

6. Thomas Sheridan and the elocutionary movement
Closely associated with the passion for rhetoric, the cult of taste in general and the widespread desire to 'methodize' English was the elocutionary movement, which spread rapidly after about 1750.61 In 1761, at the invitation of the Select Society, Thomas Sheridan (1718-1788) delivered two series of his already famous lectures on elocution and the 'genius' of the English language to Edinburgh audiences in which advocates were prominent. So successful were Sheridan's lectures that under his guidance the Select Society set up
a subsidiary society to be largely directed by members of the Scottish Bar - the Select Society for Promoting the Reading and Speaking of the English Language in Scotland. 62

The elocutionary movement continued to flourish throughout the second half of the eighteenth century and beyond. 63 Since it expressed many widely held ideas about language which Monboddo shared, it will be useful to outline the views of Sheridan - who may be taken as representative of the movement - and discuss the respects in which they differed from, or resembled, Monboddo's.

It will be immediately apparent that, although he was influenced by Locke, Sheridan's primary source is Cicero.

In the first place, the elocutionary movement may be said to have been an expression of orthodox epistemology and psychology. Its principal aim, expressed most clearly by Sheridan, was the perfecting and fixing of the tones, looks and gestures accompanying articulate speech - which were thought to constitute a universal, natural language of passion. 64

The concept of a language of passion was discussed by many eighteenth century writers including Buffon and de Brosses. But it was adopted wholeheartedly by the Scottish Common Sense philosophers whose treatises on rhetoric and taste may have helped establish the elocutionary movement. They made natural language a first principle of their epistemology. They saw it as evidence that the mind is not, as Locke had implied, a tabula rasa: for the relationship between sign and meaning in such languages is revealed by an innate faculty prior to reasoning or experience. 65
By the use of the God-given language of passion, suitably refined and reduced to rule, Sheridan hoped to illuminate the part of the mind Locke had ignored - the imagination and the "seat of the passions" - and so clarify the much-discussed notion of taste. 66

Furthermore, by analyzing the passions and imagination he thought knowledge and social behaviour could be improved, Christianity spread, and good taste diffused. In short, he believed that the revival of ancient oratory with all the modern advantages of Christianity, Locke's philosophy and the British constitution would lead to the perfection of society. 67

Above all, the revival of oratory would enable philosophers to "refine, ascertain and fix" the English language - still widely considered barbarous, variable and lacking the "copiousness" and durability of Greek and Latin - on the foundation laid by Dr. Johnson's recently published Dictionary (1755). 68

Because of the intimate relationship between words and ideas pointed out by Locke, the improvement of knowledge, politeness and the arts in general depended upon the improvement of language. In particular, philosophers writing in such a defective language as English could neither make progress in their science nor communicate their ideas adequately. 69

Sheridan believed, like Monboddo, that the solution was to follow Cicero's plan and restore the ancient union of oratory and philosophy which Socrates had misguidedly destroyed. It was, in his opinion, the destruction of this union that had led to sectarian disputes which were really about words. Perfect knowledge of things (that is,
knowledge of their causes) and of words (which symbolize things) must be pursued together. As Aristotle said, the world is a copy of God's ideas, and man's ideas are copies of the world: so words should, as far as possible, be perfect copies of the ideas in our minds. In short, words are our means of acquiring, preserving and displaying our knowledge of the world. 70

To pursue perfection in language we must be aware of the universal principles of languages of art. Words (the marks of ideas) have the two aspects of meaning and sound. The former must be precise (to arouse always the same ideas) and copious (so that every idea may be separately marked); the latter - sound - must be distinct (so as to avoid confusion) and agreeable to the ear. 71

To see how Latin and Greek were perfected by philosophers we must trace their "rise and progress". And if English can be similarly corrected, enlarged, ascertained and fixed in its principles so that it can be taught by rule, the benefits will not only be intellectual but political, cultural and moral. 72

The union of England with Scotland, Wales and Ireland - where different dialects and tongues reflect different inclinations - can be completed by the "universality of one common language". 72

Furthermore, if the vulgar are taught "certain and rational principles" - the laws of the language - they will become its guardians. This could be achieved by the joint example of the Bar, the pulpit, Parliament and the press. In this way English could avoid the fate of Latin: that is, it could avoid being undermined
by luxury, depravity and love of novelty. Otherwise, like all languages - and like the political systems and governmental laws which they reflect - English will be corrupted again. Because usage is all powerful, what has been designed by a rational elite can be destroyed by the custom of the people. That is, the vulgar can destroy language just as they can destroy liberty. 74

With the reuniting of philosophy and oratory, the neglect of language - which has led to ignorance, false taste, false knowledge, luxury and variety of opinion - can be corrected. Oratory, in fact, is the source of all the arts and the guardian of prosperity, stability and morality in the state. The corruption of the state and the corruption of language both derive from a failure to observe laws. Thus oratory leads not only to the diffusion of good taste but also to virtue. 75

Although it is doubtful whether Monboddo shared Sheridan's millenialist ambitions - he certainly did not agree, for instance, that the common people could ever become the guardians of the language nor that English could ever rival Greek as a language of art - he evidently agreed with most of this.

Indeed, Sheridan's views as expressed in his influential British Education (1756) are reminiscent of some of the early Ciceronian Monboddo Papers in bound folio volumes written at about the same date - notably the "Discourse on Language" - which probably reflect the preoccupations of the Select Society in the late 1750s and early 1760s. 76
However, Sheridan misinterpreted Cicero, taking Ramism to such an extent that he reduced rhetoric to mere voice and gesture. And when Sheridan published his lectures, he attempted, as we have seen, to make his theory of rhetoric the complement of Lockian philosophy. 77

In the face of this, it is no wonder that Monboddo emphasised Cicero's advocacy of the Aristotelian method of genera and species; nor that he felt, as Fénelon had done, that the revival of the true rhetoric of Aristotle and Cicero would be of greater value for encouraging speaking and writing - and also resisting the "savage onslaught from the methods of science and the new epistemology". 78

In short, in his rhetorical views Monboddo was largely a man of his time: but he was anxious to restore Ciceronian rhetoric to its original Aristotelian principles in order to counter the influence of Locke. The same is true of Monboddo's concept of language in general and of his speculations on its origin and progress - a topic which, as we have seen, was associated with the study of rhetoric and universal grammar.

It is clear from what has been said that Monboddo shared Sheridan's conventional concept of the "language of art". Such languages consist of arbitrarily constructed signs for abstract ideas. They are instruments of intellectual progress and their degree of lexical copiousness, reflecting the stock of abstract ideas, is a measure of their speakers' civilization. Their neglect leads to irregularity and disorder. Monboddo only differs on the importance of a systematic grammatical structure reflecting
underlying logical propositions - an aspect of language which was not Sheridan's concern. 79

In addition, Sheridan's sketch of the development of language in his published lectures has remarkable affinities with OPL. According to Sheridan, the first man, like all animals, possessed natural cries intended for the preservation and propagation of the species. But, unlike animals, man - the link between animal and spiritual beings in the Chain of Being - is able to perfect his nature. He reaches his physical optimum as a matter of course, but the development of his mental faculties depends on society and therefore on language. Man, however, was given only the organs of speech: language - which involves agreement upon certain articulate sounds as the symbols of certain ideas - is the product of his own efforts. And the development of language followed the development of man's mind, step by step. 80

In short, nature followed her general rule - "to furnish nothing but what was absolutely necessary and leave the rest to his own industry; from the exertion of which his merit was to arise, and his pretensions to stand a candidate for his admission into a higher and happier order of beings". 81

So far as it goes, this is an accurate summary of Monboddo's theory except that Sheridan, who was not primarily concerned with the origin of language, glosses over the crucial contractual stage. How did men come to agree upon certain articulate sounds? The question had already been raised by Condillac and Rousseau; and Adam Smith
discussed it in the same year (1761) in which Sheridan's Edinburgh lectures were delivered. Yet Sheridan's obviously inadequate account contained an equally obvious solution. It was a small step from seeing man's natural "language of passion" as the unchanging complement to his languages of art, to seeing it as the raw material from which developed first barbarous languages and finally languages of art themselves. In fact, Sheridan appears to imply precisely this.

From Monboddo's viewpoint, the danger was that the process of development from the natural language to the barbarous stage might appear to be instinctive or organic. Once this was admitted it might in turn imply (as Adam Smith and others suggested) that so-called languages of art were also - at least, partially - the result of organic evolution. If this were so, there must be a faculty of language and mind must play a largely passive role. Consequently, Monboddo was forced to regard barbarous languages as at best unsuccessful, ad hoc attempts at language, virtually without system. Such languages could only possess a small measure of art. They would be so variable as to be subject to all the effects of chance, so imperfect that they would have to be eked out by tones, looks and gestures - that is, by the "natural language" of man.

So what Sheridan calls the "natural language" of man, Monboddo does not regard as a language at all. It is either a pre-linguistic stage of communication or a set of paralinguistic features characterising barbarous languages. In its refined form it is a part of oratory but not a language.
Monboddo therefore refused to agree with Sheridan, Reid and several of the Scottish rhetoricians that language may be defined as any method of communicating thoughts and feelings - tones, looks and gestures being the signs of emotions as words are of ideas, and articulate sound being only one convenient way of realizing language. Such an admission may have seemed to Monboddo dangerously close to admitting that there is a faculty of language - or at least a capacity for using signs as Reid called it - and that popular usage (involving chance, habit and imitation) could have produced the complexity of linguistic structure. (Hamilton, Reid's editor, pointed out that this is the implication of Reid's linguistic philosophy - although Reid stopped short of recognizing a faculty of language.)

Thus Monboddo's conception of language having been invented twice might have been suggested by the commonplace distinctions between the language of nature, barbarous languages and languages of art: or, rather, by the need to counter any implication that there was a natural process of organic evolution involved even in the transition from the first stage to the second.

In short, Monboddo's intention was to save the rationalist hypothesis. And although empirical evidence forced him to admit a greater degree of systematicity in barbarous languages than he had intended - sometimes giving the impression that he believed they had, indeed, evolved organically - Monboddo insisted that the three species of language were distinct, and that the only true languages were languages of art.
7. **OPL and the improvement of English**

Although he was opposed to the principles of rhetoric and logic in which his fellow literati believed, Monboddo agreed that for the Scots the future lay with the improvement of their English speech and writing - and with the improvement of the English language itself. One of his aims in writing OPL was to establish the universal principles of the ideal language of art in order to fix English in the scale of languages and lay the foundations for its improvement. This aim was inseparable from his attempt to revive the humanistic study of Greek language and literature. Greek (and later also Sanskrit) was his model for a language of art; and the universal principles of languages of art are consequently those of Aristotelian logic. 87

Thus OPL is related on the one hand, to the contemporary desire to standardize, refine and fix English; and, on the other, to the so-called Greek revival. 88 The former aim must be seen in the context of the seventeenth century view of language which influenced Monboddo.

During the seventeenth century language had been increasingly seen in terms of a system of nomenclature; and speculations on the origin of language seemed to show that it must have begun with naming the categories of things. That is, like natural history, language classified the world into a hierarchy of genera and species. Hence the problems of natural history - classification and nomenclature - became bound up with the problems of constructing a scientific (or philosophical) language. 89
But the most important English attempt to construct a language that would function as a tool of inductive science — that of John Wilkins of the Royal Society school — turned out to be based on the Aristotelian Categories. This fact, which Monboddo exploits in OPL, probably contributed to the demise of the entire notion of philosophical languages in England. During the eighteenth century the improvement of natural languages was the major preoccupation.90

Bacon and Locke had pointed out that natural languages were often inadequate for the expression of clear ideas and a frequent cause of misunderstanding. However, in the eighteenth century, under the influence of Locke, the improvement of natural languages was still seen primarily as a matter of enriching terminology and defining terms by reducing them to their radicals — that is, to simple ideas.91

The lack of a rational standard for English was widely believed to have resulted in corruption of the language which was, in turn, connected with moral licentiousness. This attitude was especially characteristic of elocutionists like Sheridan who believed that the revival of the art of speaking and the study of English would cure "the evils of immorality, ignorance and false taste".92

The publication of Dr. Johnson's Dictionary in 1755 was a major step. During the decade 1760-1770 — which saw the genesis of OPL — an abundance of works on English rhetoric and grammar appeared, frequently by Scottish writers.93

Although OPL illustrates this trend it must be borne in mind that Monboddo like James (Hermes) Harris, was more interested in the
underlying universal principles of a language of art than in practical prescription. This preoccupation with first principles and philosophical foundations was itself part of the tradition of Scottish humanism and jurisprudence.
Chapter Seven

LITERARY SOCIETIES, HELLENISM AND THE GENESIS OF OPL

1. Introduction

The importance of the Scottish literary societies, with their humanistic view of culture as the union of rhetoric and philosophy, has already been mentioned. It has also been pointed out that this profound Scottish desire for general cultural improvement on the basis of rhetoric, moral philosophy and Lockian empiricism was particularly intense because of Scotland's cultural and linguistic dilemma.¹

The literati were preoccupied with questions of form and style; and, as in England and France the clubs gave them the opportunity to present their literary work for discussion. A wide range of topics was debated: particularly questions relating to language, mind, epistemology and the progress of man.²

The Rankenian Club (founded 1717), a seed bed of the Enlightenment, typically combined an interest in metaphysics (or the philosophy of mind) with the cultivation of English. The Scots Magazine of May 1771 credits the society with encouraging liberal ideas, habits of clear thinking and "attention to composition".³ Members, who were deeply influenced by the philosophy of Berkeley, included John Stephenson, Professor of Logic at Edinburgh, and
George Turnbull, Professor of Moral Philosophy at Marischal - both of the first importance to the early development of the Enlightenment in Scotland. Stephenson, although a transitional figure, began the process of replacing traditional rhetoric with belles lettres, and Aristotelian logic with the "natural logic" of Locke. Turnbull, who was Reid's teacher, made the Ciceronian appeal to common language - used by Berkeley and frequently discussed by Rankenians - the foundation of an anatomy of mind, a form of "moral Newtonianism" that had a considerable influence of Reid's Common Sense refutation of scepticism. 5 In contrast to the Rankenian Club, Ruddiman's Society for Improving Classical Studies (founded in the next year) was begun largely in the hope of restoring the glory of Scottish humanism and stemming the advance of the new ideas being discussed by the Rankenians: yet it too was preoccupied with the question of style and form (or method). 6

2. The Select Society

The Select Society (founded 1754), of which Monboddo was a founding member, was of even greater importance for the development of the Scottish Enlightenment. Its membership included "the ablest men Scotland ever produced": David Hume, Adam Smith, Hugh Blair, William Robertson, Lord Kames and Sir David Dalrymple, for example, were members. About half the members were advocates - several of them were, or became, law lords like Monboddo - and consequently its debates represented the interests of an influential, cultural elite. 7
From the first its aims were philosophical inquiry and improvement in the art of speaking - that is, a combination of philosophy and rhetoric reflecting the contemporary revival of the Renaissance view of a general culture, which was characteristic not only of the clubs but of Scottish philosophy as a whole. These complementary aspects in the Society's interests are shown by the titles of its subsidiary societies: in 1755 members organized the Edinburgh Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Science, Manufactures and Agriculture; and in 1761 the Select Society for promoting the Reading and Speaking of the English Language in Scotland - of which the directors were mostly lawyers. 8

The latter Society - which planned to provide schools of English - was the outcome of the two courses of lectures on elocution and the English language delivered to the society at its invitation by Thomas Sheridan in June and July, 1761. These lectures from the high priest of the elocutionary movement can be profitably related to the early Monboddo Papers and the genesis of OPL. They were patronized by the leaders of public taste - the most eminent advocates and judges as well as professors and some clergy - and, according to the Rev. Thomas Somerville, as a result, elocution became the rage in Edinburgh. Somerville wrote that "since this time correct pronunciation and elegant reading have in Edinburgh been reckoned indispensable acquirements for people of Fashion". 9

Elocution, however, must also be understood in the wide sense of literary culture: and there is no doubt about the important part
played by the Select Society in the revival of letters that was already under way. Tytler, Kames's biographer, describes the Society as diffusing the taste for letters in Scotland and the published works of its members as "marking the commencement of the literary era". Like other such societies, it seems to have followed the Rankenian practice of hearing an essay on a prescribed subject before discussion. 10 We know that Monboddo played an active part in the proceedings. He was one of the first six to be chosen as annual presidents - with Sir David Dalrymple and the Rev. William Robertson - in January 1757 and again in 1758. 11 Since some of the early Monboddo Papers were obviously composed for oral delivery it seems likely that they were intended to be read to fellow members. The year of the Select Society's foundation (1754) is also the approximate date of the earliest of the extant bound volumes of manuscript (Bound Folio MS 4) - suggesting that the Monboddo Papers were begun in response both to the Society's debates and the need for regular contributions. 12 Many of these carefully composed papers - notably the "Discourse on Language" - eventually found their way, in some form, into OPL. (In the same way the Literary Society of Glasgow was evidently the cradle of Adam Smith's essay on language and the Philosophical Society of Aberdeen nourished several works including Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric.) Furthermore, the demise of the Select Society (circa 1763) coincided with the start of the period of literary activity which led to OPL: Monboddo seems to have been left with more time and a number of papers relating to language and the history of man. 13
The subjects discussed by the Select Society - according to the "Minute Book of the St. Giles or Select Society" (National Library of Scotland) - were favourite topics of Monboddo's to which he refers throughout OPL: population; education; genius; taste; the superiority of abstract reasoning; the decline (or progress) of man; barbarity versus civilization and luxury; moral philosophy versus natural philosophy; and, particularly, the ancients versus the moderns in questions of manners, knowledge and the arts. Similar subjects were debated by other societies and Monboddo's interest in such matters shows how far he was a man of his time: but there is a conservative tendency about the debates of the Select Society (seen for instance in the popularity of the ancients versus moderns theme) that may reflect the influence of the advocates, if not of Monboddo himself. Mostly the topics are too general to connect them with particular parts of the Monboddo Papers, but there are two debates on language which appear to reflect philosophical questions raised in the "Discourse on Language" - and, later, Monboddo's general approach to language in OPL: "Whether the decay of the language of a people be not a mark of the decay of arts and sciences among that people?"; "Whether without any knowledge of the Grammatical Art, and with the Use of speaking only, but not the Science, a man may not make very great progress in Metaphysics and every branch of Philosophy?"15

Numerous passages in the Monboddo Papers and OPL deal with these questions - OPL as a whole might be said to answer the latter: they imply a view in which linguistic structure mirrors a hierarchy
of abstract ideas that connect mind, law, society and the world into one system. (A similar view of language was held by Monboddo's friend James Hutton, the geologist, who was also a member of the Select Society; and by Sheridan in his lectures on elocution). Both questions, of course, relate closely to the contemporary linguistic and cultural dilemma facing the Scottish literati.\textsuperscript{16}

Of all the Scottish literary societies perhaps the Belles Lettres Society was closest to the Select Society in spirit, to judge from its debates. However, like the Glasgow Literary Society it seems to have had a particularly marked bent for history. Legal studies and the manners of nations were also emphasized. The connection between these interests and the topics dealt with in OPL need not be stressed.\textsuperscript{17}

3. The Literary Society of Glasgow and Hellenism
The other Scottish society worth considering in some detail because of its bearing on Monboddo — although he was not himself a member — is the Literary Society of Glasgow. Founded in 1752, it was dominated by Reid, Smith and Glasgow professors associated with the Hellenistic movement. For this reason, its meetings reflected certain aspects of eighteenth century Scottish Philosophy expressed by OPL more clearly than Select Society debates. In particular, it was concerned with the Greek 'revival' initiated by Hutcheson, Dunlop, Leechman and others under the inspiration of Shaftesbury: and within this Hellenistic vision of the whole it too concentrated
on language, epistemology, mind and the perspective of conjectural history. 18

The names of its members are some indication of the importance of this relatively little noticed society. The original members included Adam Smith (Professor of Moral Philosophy); James Moor (Professor of Greek); James Clow (Professor of Logic); William Cullen (Professor of Medicine); and Hutcheson's friend Dr. William Leechman (Professor of Divinity). These were later joined by David Hume (1753); Robert Simson, Professor of Mathematics and the father of the Scottish restoration of Greek geometry; Robert and Andrew Foulis, the University printers, whose editions of the classics became famous; Thomas Reid, Professor of Moral Philosophy (1764); Joseph Black, Professor of Medicine (1756); John Millar, Professor of Law (1761); and Lord Cardross, later Earl of Buchan. This is arguably a more impressive list than the membership of the Select Society. Besides these, several lesser known academics and others who wrote or lectured on some aspect of language joined at various times: John Callendar of Craigforth, antiquary, and philosopher; George Moorhead, Professor of Humanity and Moor's literary collaborator (1753); William Richardson, Professor of Humanity; George Jardine, Professor of Logic; John Young, Professor of Greek (1773/4); Archibald Arthur, Professor of Moral Philosophy. 19

The "Record Book of the Literary Society of Glasgow", which covers the period 1764-79, records discourses and debates reflecting interests identical with Monboddo's. Most of the papers on language - like those read to the more famous Philosophical Society (or the
Royal Society of Edinburgh - concerned Greek. At the fourth meeting, on January 30th, 1752, James Clow, Professor of Logic, read an account of James Harris's recently published *Hermes* (London, 1751). This universal grammar - imbued with the spirit of Shaftesbury, which must have appealed to the Society - evidently had a considerable influence in Scotland and was of great importance to the genesis of OPL. In 1764 James Moor, Professor of Greek, who continued Hutcheson's attempt to "restore" Greek and Greek philosophy, read a paper on the "structure" of Greek and the meaning of its particles, and in 1766 another on Greek prepositions - which was published by the university press that year.20

The Society seems also to have been the cradle of a work of greater significance that drew exclusively on the classical languages although purporting to be a history of "the origin and progress of language" (its original title): Adam Smith's *Considerations on the First Formation of Languages*. This, the supreme example of conjectural history in the opinion of Dugald Stewart, had influence on OPL (although Monboddo and Smith, in spite of being fellow members of the Select Society do not appear to have been close friends).21

The conjectural history of language was a subject closely associated with the new rhetoric, as was the debate on the value of Greek and Latin as the basis of education (1767) and Jardine's paper of 1778, "What is the business of a Logic class"? It was Jardine who developed the new approach to logic on lines laid down by Adam Smith: that is, the replacement of Aristotelian logic by an introduction to the powers of mind based on rhetoric, universal grammar and the
conjectural history of language in the manner of Lamy. The debate on pronunciation (1777) dealt with a topic of particular interest to the anglicising Scots 'improvers' which also echoed the concerns of Sheridan and the elocutionary movement.\textsuperscript{22}

In spite of Moor's slightly less speculative contributions, the Glasgow Literary Society, like all such societies (with the possible exception of the Royal Society of Edinburgh), was pre-occupied with a "philosophical" approach that saw language not as an end in itself but as the key to man's mind and its history. In keeping with this typical eighteenth century view, many papers on the philosophy of mind dealing with abstraction, memory, common sense and the "active powers of mind" were delivered by Reid between 1765 and 1779. These relate clearly to his published works. The nature and limits or human knowledge as a whole were also discussed (1767 and 1777). But the most popular theme provided a historical perspective for all these: the conjectural (philosophical, or rational) history of man's progress in society - i.e. the history of mind or civilization, a topic of great interest to the 'improving' literati. Between 1765 and 1770 there were numerous papers on the origin and progress of the arts and sciences in society - sometimes, like OPL, stressing the gradualness of the natural order in which they supposedly arise and decline. Rousseau, whose works - like those of Montesquieu - enjoyed the greatest popularity in Scotland, was discussed in this connection: in 1768 Reid examined the validity of his social contract theory. In 1778 a question about the distinguishing qualities of man was debated whose wording was
reminiscent of OPL: the question was whether man was distinguished from animals by reason, moral sense, imagination, religion, or (as Monboddo believed) a capacity for improving (or debasing) his moral and intellectual faculties "through all the degrees of a long scale", - in contrast with the animals, whose instincts, although on the same Scale of Being, are fixed.23

This last debate might have been prompted by the appearance of OPL, but there is no doubt that the records of the Glasgow Literary Society provide evidence of the discussion of questions fundamental to Monboddo's inquiry - evidence going beyond that of the Select Society debates. The pattern of the subjects discussed by the Glasgow professors accords perfectly with the aims and methods of OPL - which, in the fashion of Renaissance humanism, attempts to trace the connexions between language, mind and epistemology via conjectural history in order to provide a universal, unified system of knowledge. But is this to say more than the obvious: that Monboddo, like the Glasgow professors, was associated with the 'revival' of Greek language and philosophy? The Glasgow society certainly represents this aspect of the Scottish Enlightenment better than any; but numerous parallels could be found in works that originated in the Aberdeen Philosophical Society - and in the works of the eighteenth century Scottish philosophers and rhetoricians in general, with their emphasis on mind and the vision of the whole. Monboddo's transcendental rationalism with its reliance on a universal, semantically-based grammar has some similarities to the Common Sense
philosophy of Turnbull and Reid which emphasised innate faculties and the Ciceronian appeal to common language. Even Monboddo's debt to Harris's *Hermes* and Smith's *Considerations* offers no evidence of any connexion with the Glasgow Literary Society: he was acquainted with both men and the works were widely admired.

There are, however, remarkable parallels between Monboddo's reading and that of James Moor (1712-79), Professor of Greek at Glasgow, which at least show how closely Monboddo was identified with the Hellenistic movement - and may even suggest that the Glasgow group had some influence on Monboddo's reading.

4. The library of Professor James Moor

Moor's library naturally had a strong bias towards Greek grammar and he owned several grammars used repeatedly by Monboddo - notably Lascari and Gaza - as well as Salmasius's *de lingua Hellenistica* (1643), another work to which Monboddo constantly referred. Like Monboddo, he took an interest in other languages, including Anglo-Saxon, Swedish and, evidently Chinese - since he owned two copies of Du Halde's *History of China*, which Monboddo consulted in the late 1750s or early 1760s.24

Besides this, the character of the library as a whole reflects interests identical with Monboddo's: there are many works, for example, on Aristotelian logic, moral philosophy, natural law and Egypt - many of them Continental, frequently seventeenth century Dutch. Sanderson's famous *compend* (Oxford 1741) may be taken as an example of the early eighteenth century revival of Aristotelianism.
centred on Oxford, and Hutcheson's (Glasgow 1759) as representing the Scottish attempt to blend Aristotle and Locke — that is, the transcendental and rationalistic with the empirical. Moral philosophy is dominated by the works of Shaftesbury, Herbert of Cherbury and the Cambridge Platonists — especially Cudworth's *Intellectual System*, a favourite book of Monboddo's, and Henry More's *Dialogues on the Attributes of God* (Glasgow 1743). Moor owned several copies of works by all these transcendental rationalists: and although the empiricists, Hobbes and Locke, whom they opposed, are also well represented, the bias of Moor's interests is clearly the same as Monboddo's.

Abstract, universal systems of moral philosophy naturally dominated Moor's collection of classical works as well. Besides Plato, there is the characteristic early eighteenth century emphasis on Pythagoras (Hierocles on the *Aurea Carmina* and Iamblichus's *Life*); Porphyry (Ammonius' commentary and the Aristotelian *Categories*); Epictetus; Antoninus, *Meditations* (Glasgow 1742, 1749 and 1764); Iamblichus on Nichomachaean arithmetic (Arnhem 1668); and Ammonius on Aristotle's *De Interpretatione*. The Monboddo Papers and OPL are full of references to all these.

The predominant influence of Roman Dutch law is apparent also. Here the principal author is Grotius, with Pufendorf, de Vries and Justinian's *Institutes* well represented in Dutch editions. The tradition of humanist philology and jurisprudence is represented by Hotman's *Franco-Gallia* (London 1711) and his work on Roman population (1585).
Among the books on Egypt, there are two seventeenth century works - one on the wisdom of Egypt (Paris 1618), the other on hieroglyphics (Paris 1647) - as well as Warburton, Perizonius (1711), Jablonski (1758) and the Scotsman William Jameson (Glasgow 1720). 30

The cult of polite taste is represented, typically, by Longinus on the sublime (of which there were several copies), James Harris's Dialogues on art, music, painting (1744) and Foster on accent and quantity (Eton 1762) - all of them works to which Monboddo frequently refers. 31

Most of the books in Moor's library were clearly identified with Roman-Dutch legal culture or with the new spirit of tolerance, culture and free thinking which the Glasgow professors and the brothers Foulis attempted to diffuse from the late 1730s onwards. But, although the parallels with Monboddo's reading are remarkable, the library could be taken as a reflection of some general trends in Scottish eighteenth century thought which deeply affected Monboddo.

However, there is evidence that Moor and the Foulis brothers - who, together with Muirhead, Professor of Humanity, undertook an edition of Homer (4 vols, 1756 and 1758) - had Continental contacts in common with Monboddo; and, since Monboddo corresponded with Muirhead and John Young, Moor's successor, (if not with other Glasgow professors), on questions of Greek philology, it is likely that, in this respect at least, his association with the Glasgow Hellenists was crucial to the genesis of OPL. 32
5. **The continental connections of Moor and the Foulis brothers and their relevance to OPL**

Moor visited Jean Capperonier (1716-75), Professor of Greek in the College of France in 1748 to discuss Pappus — the restoration of ancient Greek geometry being a subject in which there was great interest in eighteenth century Scotland, as OPL testifies. 33 Capperonier was also librarian of the Bibliotheque Royale; and it was in this capacity that the brothers Foulis also visited him (with an introduction from Moor) in 1751 in connexion with the proposed edition of Plato. They also consulted the Abbé Claude Sallier (1685-1761) at the Library — another acquaintance made by Moor in 1748. 34 (The Foulis brothers had previously, in 1738, visited Father Thomas Innes, Principal of the Scots College, Paris, in search of classical, especially Greek, material: and letters from Innes testify to their part in the early Enlightenment.) 35 This Scottish connexion with the Royal Library and its librarian seems to have been used by Monboddo fifteen years later when he was searching for grammars of 'barbarous languages' in Paris. In a long footnote to OPL he acknowledges the help of Capperonier, who permitted him to borrow Sagard — the work from which he says, OPL principally sprang — for an extended period. 36

The long Continental trip of Robert and James Foulis (1751-1753) began with an even more significant visit to Holland — where by this time Greek scholarship was flourishing more successfully than in France. At Leyden (the university where Monboddo himself had, like so many Scots, studied Roman Law in the 1730s) they consulted
Hemsterhuis (1685-1766), the greatest Greek scholar of the day, and Ruhnken (1723-98), his pupil. This visit provides a clue to the channel by which some of the ideas of Hemsterhuis may have reached Moor and the Glasgow Hellenists - and through them, Monboddo - before they were published. It also illuminates a little known aspect of the influence of Dutch culture on eighteenth century Scotland.

Monboddo's theory of the origin of Greek - which he derives systematically in the manner appropriate to a philosophical language, from a few elements or 'duads' - seems to have been closely associated with the genesis of OPL: it is mentioned in one of his earliest papers on de Brosses. The close resemblance of the theory to that of Hemsterhuis and the Dutch Graecists aroused comment and Monboddo went to considerable lengths to discuss the remarkable coincidence and deny plagiarism. As he was usually scrupulous about acknowledging his intellectual debts, there is no strong reason to suppose Monboddo was not writing in good faith, yet a connexion - although doubtless not a conscious one - seems undeniable. Monboddo's studies at Leyden during the early 1730s took place before Hemsterhuis's theory had been developed; and (while other works by Hemsterhuis and his school existed in the Advocates' library), as Monboddo himself pointed out, his theory of the origin of Greek had never been published - although it may well have been widely discussed by his students at Leyden during the 1750s. In Monboddo's case, the most likely source seems
Muirhead - who was associated with Glasgow Hellenism since the early '50s and corresponded with Monboddo on Greek philology from that time. Monboddo's friendship with Young, Moor's successor, might have been too late for him to be considered in this connexion; but Monboddo does refer to a "Glasgow Professor of Greek" in OPL - possibly Moor himself. The essence of Hemsterhuis's theory of the origin of Greek is simply stated and might have been mentioned casually, without reference to its originator, particularly if it had become common currency at Glasgow, where professors exchanged ideas fully and students' notes had a wide circulation. This hypothesis is strengthened by the accusations levelled against Monboddo in the notorious review by Gilbert Stuart in the Edinburgh Magazine and Review. In the first place, the review charges Monboddo with undisclosed borrowing from Moor's Greek grammar - which originally appeared as *De Analogia Constructionum Linguae Graecae Regulæ generales* (Glasgow 1755 and 1756) and later in its fuller version, as *Elementa Linguæ Graecæ* (Glasgow 1770). More important, but far more difficult to prove, was the charge that Moor's lecture repeatedly inculcated all that OPL had to say on "the derivation and composition of the Greek language". Unfortunately notes of Moor's lectures have not survived; but, prima facie, the evidence of Monboddo's theory of the origin of Greek suggests that it was transmitted to Moor by the Foulis brothers around 1754, and borrowed, probably indirectly, by Monboddo in the early 1760s. Although Monboddo might have suppressed his debt to Moor (perhaps out of jealousy of his reputation as a Greek scholar)
this would have been uncharacteristic. More likely, Hemsterhuis's theory and other parallels with Moor are to be explained by Monboddo's contact with the Glasgow Hellenists over a period of years - particularly if Moor's ideas, including the theory of the origin of Greek, had become common knowledge at Glasgow.
Chapter Eight

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY DEBATE ON THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE

IN RELATION TO SCOTLAND

1. The background of the debate

Although the origin of language was discussed in ancient times and the subject was closely associated with the Renaissance tradition of historical-philological jurisprudence, the eighteenth century debate may be said to have begun with Hobbes, Locke and Mandeville. The discussion was then taken up by Condillac and other philosophers of the French Enlightenment before reaching Scotland in the 1750s through the Encyclopédie and Rousseau's second Discours. In Scotland, although Adam Smith was the first to participate, Monboddo's was the outstanding contribution.

The purpose of the eighteenth century inquiry into the origins of language was to establish the principles of mind (of which language was assumed to be the expression) as well as those of language itself, and hence to understand the nature of man. By means of conjectural history it sought to distinguish what man has acquired from what is natural to him. Thus its point of departure was a consideration of the needs of man in the hypothetical state of nature.¹

The debate had been revived by Hobbesian nominalism. According to Hobbes, reason is only the joining together of conventional names. That is, universals exist neither in nature nor in the mind: our
mental images consist only of concrete particulars, and what we call 'universals' are merely the names designating their classes. Thus Hobbes's conception of language and reason set the scene for the controversy about the origin of language: "as an artifact language is not an essential part of man's original nature, and thus neither is human reason; therefore man is an animal, an animal: mechanism..."\(^2\)

In short, contrary to both scholastic and Cartesian metaphysics, mind had no special status. However, it was only after the publication of Locke's Essay that the debate got under way.

2. The influence of Locke

John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689) expounded an empirical philosophy of mind and cognition which had a profound influence on the whole course of the Enlightenment. Locke's aim was to enquire into the origin, certainty and extent of human knowledge; but, discovering the close connexion between words and ideas, he found himself forced to examine language. In other words, he recognized that many epistemological problems concern the nature, use and meaning of language. Although Locke did not himself pursue the origin of language very far, he introduced the genetic approach and hinted at the importance of language in tracing the progress of man's mind. Furthermore, in the Second Treatise of Government he posited a conjectural state of nature - the means of investigation which his successors were to apply to language.\(^3\)

According to Locke, language - which has both a communicative and cognitive function - consists of general words (i.e. not proper
names). These words are signs of general (or abstract) ideas in the speaker's mind: and apparently, words have no meaning unless accompanied by clear and distinct ideas. So the central question according to Locke's genetic approach is "What is the origin of general (or abstract) ideas"? or "How do we divide things into kinds"? 4

Locke's answer to this question is that since the mind is a blank tablet at birth, these general ideas are not innate but derive from sensation or reflection (introspection). By joining or separating simple ideas we form complex ideas and from these in turn we form general ideas by abstraction. It is at this stage that language becomes important: and the faculty of abstraction which enables us to separate the properties constituting a class of things with the same name is what distinguishes us from mute beasts. 5

According to Locke, "words... stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them", although they are supposed to stand for the reality of things; and the "whole mystery of genera and species which make such a noise in the schools" is no more than abstract ideas with names annexed to them. 6

That is, the formation of general ideas is equivalent to division into genera and species which was the basis of Aristotelian philosophy. But, contrary to the doctrine of Scholasticism, we have no knowledge of the essences of things and there is no natural order of classes, so the taxonomy of ordinary language is inevitably vague. 7

In short, universals are not real: they are inventions of the mind. Consequently, language is a major source of error, especially
in scholastic systems. Confusion of thought often results from the limitations of natural languages whose terms are not clearly defined. 8

In an influential passage Locke described how names for abstract ideas are derived from names for sensible particulars, thus paralleling the derivation from sense data of the abstract ideas themselves. Locke himself did not develop this idea; but from the mid eighteenth century many others were inspired by this isolated passage to take up the genetic problem from a Lockian viewpoint. Several of these - Charles de Brosses and Adam Smith, for instance, both important to the genesis of OPL - were led by Locke's genetic theory to consider derived meanings as corruptions of the original homogeneity of the primal language of names. Later, Horne Tooke, another of these Lockian etymologists and a retarding influence on the development of English philology, was to mount a famous attack on the philosophy of mind shared by Lord Monboddo and his friend James Harris. 9

OPL was intended primarily as an attack not only on Locke's view of language, but on the whole Lockian epistemology, which dominated the Enlightenment - and which Monboddo, in common with Thomas Reid and the Scottish common sense philosophers, believed had led to the scepticism of Hume. And there are several deficiencies in Locke's account of language which provided Monboddo with ammunition - or at least the chance to provide an account of the origin of language and ideas which would not only improve on Locke's but restore mind to its special status.

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In the first place, Locke belonged to the experimental tradition of Robert Boyle and the Royal Society, and was largely concerned with regularizing language for scientific purposes. Thus, like John Wilkins, he tended to ignore formal linguistic properties and treat language as a collection of signs. He consequently concentrates on nouns and adjectives and ignores syntax.  

Secondly, Locke's sketch of the origin of language is extremely vague. When he conjectures how children or Adam or savages might have originated language, he assumes at the outset the mental structure whose progress he is supposed to be tracing: he says words "came to be made use of" as the arbitrary signs of general ideas - but prior to that stage mind evidently developed by itself.  

More important is the fact that Locke apparently held that words have no meaning unless they are accompanied by clear and distinct ideas. The implication of this, as Monboddo and Reid recognized, was semantic idealism: we can talk only of our own mental experiences. It was also inconsistent with Locke's position on the status of genera and species. Words cannot have a clear and steady meaning unless there is a natural order of genera and species which is reflected in thought and speech.  

Finally, Locke uses the word "idea" very loosely. Thomas Reid held that all Locke's errors (and those of Berkeley and Hume too) could be traced to this source. And Monboddo, although he does not always agree with Reid, also makes Locke's confused notion of ideas central to his attack on Lockian empiricism.
3. **The role of Bernard Mandeville**

After Locke, Bernard Mandeville must rank as the most important influence on the debate about the origin of language. Condillac, Rousseau and Adam Smith were each in turn indebted to him, whether directly or indirectly.

Mandeville's views on the subject were outlined in "An enquiry into the origin of moral virtue" in the first part of his *Fable of the Bees; or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits* (1714) and more fully expressed in part two (1728). 14

Mandeville's satire was aimed at Shaftesbury and was, in effect, a defence of Hobbes's view of man's natural state. According to Mandeville, man is neither sociable nor compassionate nor endowed with "moral sense" as Shaftesbury had claimed. On the contrary, he is motivated by pride, competitiveness and self-interest. However, these private vices ultimately work for the public good. 15

Mandeville's ideas on the origin of moral principles were notorious, particularly in Scotland where his attack on Shaftesbury provoked a response from Francis Hutcheson - whose Shaftesburian views led eventually to Reid's common sense philosophy. Yet more of the Scottish Philosophers owed a considerable debt to Mandeville; notably for the principle of man's unconscious attainment of ends - including the achievement of language - a principle which Monboddo alone was at pains to refute. 16

It was Mandeville's denial of human sociability that led him to consider the genesis of language. His unorthodox, naturalistic account, which both circumvented the doctrine of a divine origin and
rejected the Cartesian idea of a conscious rational invention of language, appeared to degrade man. Reactions were further coloured by the notoriety of Mandeville's views on morals. Adam Smith felt that Rousseau had "softened, improved and embellished" the principles of Mandeville stripping them of "that tendency to corruption and licentiousness which has disgraced them in their original author". 17 In an early paper on language Monboddo also refers to Mandeville's licentious principles. 18 However, both were indebted to him either directly or indirectly. Mandeville himself, of course, owed a debt to Lucretius, Diodorus Siculus, Vitruvius and Horace, on whose theories Monboddo also drew. 19

For Mandeville, as for Monboddo, speech is no more natural to man than society and must, therefore, as Hobbes had claimed, have developed very gradually. In fact, there must have been a slow mutual progress of language, understanding and society. Need makes man a social being: and in society language and the latent faculty of understanding are developed. 20

Initially savages had an inflexibility of tongue that prevented them from articulating. Only after a long period in civilized society did articulation become possible: and then new sounds were introduced haphazardly by children. Only very gradually did articulate speech with its greater capacity for expression replace the language of nature - that is, gestural language involving the simultaneous use of natural cries and facial expressions. Natural language sufficed for a state of simplicity in which man had few needs. 21
That is, according to Mandeville, a natural language of gesture allowed for the creation of an institutional language of arbitrary signs. However, the nature of the transition between the two is not explicit. It was to be more clearly stated in Condillac's *Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines* (1746) — a work based on Locke's *Essay* which put forward a theory of the origin of language corresponding closely to Mandeville's. Condillac in turn influenced Rousseau's *Discours sur l'origine et les fondemens de l'inégalité parmi les hommes* (1755). Evidently it was largely through Rousseau's work that Monboddo was influenced by Mandevillean notions of the origin of language. However, it is difficult to believe that Monboddo had not read Mandeville: and, in any case, Mandeville's notoriety would have ensured that his views on the origin of language were well known.

When the principles of Mandeville's sketch are compared with Monboddo's much fuller theory of the origin of "barbarous" languages — whose origin, it must be noted, is completely separate from that of the infinitely superior languages of art which are Monboddo's main concern — the similarities between the two theories are obvious.

However, Monboddo's intention is not to degrade man but to show how far he has risen in the Scale of Being by means of art — that is, ultimately, by means of the art of genera and species which is the basis of all arts in his view. The unconscious attainment of ends plays no part in the formation of languages of art, of course: and Monboddo does not admit its importance even in the development of barbarous languages — which Monboddo in any case refuses to regard
as languages in any serious sense. 24

Finally and most crucially, Monboddo wishes to demonstrate that the naturalistic, empirical principles of Mandeville and Locke are not incompatible with the rehabilitation of the Aristotelian philosophy of mind. On the contrary, the principles of Mandeville and Locke - which were fundamental to the Enlightenment's view of man as part of nature - actually suggested that a rehabilitation of Aristotelian philosophy (and the philosophy of the ancients in general) was long overdue.

Monboddo was also indebted to Adam Smith's *Considerations Concerning the First Formation of Languages* (1761) - a work inspired by Condillac as well as Mandeville and Rousseau. And there is evidence that Monboddo consulted at least one of the many articles on language in the Encyclopédie - the first volumes of which were purchased for the Advocates' Library in the early or mid 1750s when David Hume was keeper and Monboddo one of the curators. 25 It is probable that, like Smith, he read others. But if he did, he must have profoundly disapproved of their Cartesian or Lockian principles. Finally, Charles de Brosses's Lockian *Traité de la formation méchanique des langues* (1765), which had influenced several of the encyclopedists in manuscript, played a part in goading Monboddo to write OPL. 26

So far as Monboddo and the Scottish literati as a whole are concerned, the most important of these figures apart from Locke were Rousseau and (frequently via Rousseau) Mandeville and Condillac. Condillac's *Essai* was known to Adam Smith, but Monboddo seems to have
had only very limited knowledge of it through a review. Adam Smith's *Considerations* exerted some influence on OPL. But Smith's primary importance is as a seminal figure: the first of the Scottish Philosophers to discuss the origin of language in the context of his influential, early lectures on rhetoric; and the leading member of the Select Society where questions of language were frequently debated. Smith's views on language, as he admitted, owed much to the great French *Encyclopédie* whose influence on the Scottish Enlightenment as a whole is probably incalculable.

Consequently, separate chapters are allotted to Rousseau, Smith and the *Encyclopédie*. There is, in addition, some further discussion of Mandeville in the chapter on Rousseau's *Inégalité*.

Monboddo's views on language were also profoundly influenced by James Harris's philosophical grammar *Hermes* (1751). In fact, Monboddo regarded OPL as the complement to Harris's work.

Because of its importance as part of the background of the debate on language, the *Encyclopédie* will be discussed first.
Chapter Nine

OPL AND THE FRENCH ENCYCLOPEDIA

1. The Encyclopédie in eighteenth century Scotland

As a synthesis of the views held by the philosophers in mid-century, the Encyclopédie is of major importance for Enlightenment studies. And because of the close connexions between the French Enlightenment and the revival of letter- in Scotland, it might be expected to have particular relevance to the development of Scottish philosophy in the eighteenth century.¹

The period 1751-1765 during which the 17 volumes of letter press appeared certainly coincides quite closely with the burgeoning of the Scottish Enlightenment. This was also approximately the period of Smith's lectures and essays, of the Select Society's rise and decline, and of the early Monboddo Papers from which OPL took its origin.² The decade from about 1765 onwards - that is, the year the ten final volumes of letter press appeared - may be regarded as the peak of the Scottish Enlightenment. It coincides with the reaction of the Scottish philosophers to Hume's epistemological scepticism - which they saw as the logical outcome of the Cartesian and Lockian philosophy of ideas adopted by the Encyclopédie.³ It also coincides with the period of the early drafts of OPL, which must be seen as part of that reaction. The validity and extent of this apparent connexion between the Encyclopédie and the rapid development of the Scottish
literary revival has yet to be examined.

However, although the influence of the Encyclopédie on eighteenth century Scottish thought awaits full investigation, there is evidence that it did arouse exceptional interest in Scotland. This interest was evidently confirmed by the appearance in 1771 of Smellie's Encyclopaedia Britannica (a work which made use of OPL in its second edition). Furthermore, there is evidence linking the Encyclopédie specifically to Adam Smith, the Select Society, OPL and the Moderates' plans for a literary revival in Scotland. 4

The first volumes of the Encyclopédie (which appeared between 1751 and 1757 at a rate of roughly one volume a year) were bought for the Advocates' Library in the early or mid 1750s - that is, during the time that David Hume was keeper (1752-1757) and Monboddo one of the curators (1751-1756). 5

Adam Smith, who was already delivering his seminal Glasgow lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1752-1764), consulted them there in or before 1755 - the year in which he ordered the work for the Glasgow University Library and recommended it to all aspiring Scottish writers in what has been called "the most eulogistic" contemporary British review of the Encyclopédie. 6

Smith's programmatic letter of 1755 was written to the Edinburgh Review - a journal which had been launched by the improving Moderate presbyterians to further their cultural ambitions for Scotland. (Its chief editor, Wedderburn, was, like Smith and Monboddo, a member of the Select Society.) Since Scottish writers had scarcely begun to make a name for themselves, Smith advises the
editors to broaden their horizon and include reviews of French works. Besides the *Encyclopédie* itself and d'Alembert's "Discours préliminaire", he recommends works by Rousseau and Buffon which were important sources both for the *Encyclopédie* and for OPL.7

Smith urges aspiring Scottish writers to study the *Encyclopédie* as it appeared in order to benefit from the creativity of the English philosophers and the methodical exposition of the French. It included the elements not only of English experimental philosophy but of moral philosophy as well - the science of human nature which British philosophers had established by applying Newtonian empirical analysis to the moral world. And it set out the rules of this new science simply, clearly and precisely in articles on morals, criticism, belles lettres, the metaphysics of mind, and "all the nicest subtleties of grammar".8

Smith regards these articles as scientific treatises, comparable to the natural histories of Buffon and Réaumur. And he recommends them as models of clear description and 'natural' arrangement, composed according to the principles of Cartesian method. The study of method, which was not alien to the Scots, distinguished French philosophers from the unsystematic English.9 (Smith, obviously following Hume, has Locke in mind.) In short, Smith believed the *Encyclopédie* provided the Scottish literary revival with both a subject and a model for its exposition.

The Scottish philosophers did, in fact, make their reputations in the science of human nature (especially in the genre of conjectural
history) and were preoccupied with the problem of literary form as a means of disseminating enlightenment. Whatever the impact of Smith's letter may have been, his Glasgow lectures, which began in 1751, evidently helped to establish this pattern. In these lectures and his early essays Smith's interests are identical to those of the Encyclopédistes: rhetoric, belles lettres, universal grammar and method - under which are subsumed conjectural history, natural history and the principles of scientific exposition in general. His discussion of these subjects was directed towards explaining the powers of the human mind. 10

The same group of topics is also dealt with in the early Monboddo Papers. These bear such a remarkable similarity to Smith's early essays - which were published only posthumously - that they probably reflect informal discussions with Smith or other Select Society members with the same interests - such as Hutton, who was a close friend of both men and edited Smith's essays. 11 The mid-century view of the science of man as expressed in the Encyclopédie may in fact be seen as creating the climate of ideas in the Select Society and in Scottish literary circles in general. However, in the case of the literary societies, as elsewhere, it is difficult to separate the influence of the Encyclopédie from that of the elocutionary movement and of works by individual encyclopedists - notably Rousseau's second Discours.

Since the Encyclopédie reflects the intellectual climate in which OPL was undertaken, it will be useful to compare it with OPL in general terms before discussing the possibility of Monboddo's
indebtedness to any specific article. This will at least be sufficient to demonstrate how far OPL is a product of its time and indicate the strategy of Monboddo's attack on Locke. In any case, a monumental encyclopaedia which synthesises ideas already in circulation itself becomes part of the climate of ideas, so its general tendency and character is likely to be more important than particular articles.

Both the *Encyclopédie* and OPL focus on the theme Hume had taken up from earlier British philosophers: the Science of Man, which claimed to apply Newtonian analysis to the moral world of ideas and so provide a new metaphysics, a science of sciences. This concern with mind as the foundation of human knowledge involves investigating the crucial problem of epistemology - the relation between ideas and things. The Encyclopaedists and Monboddo view the question in essentially Lockian terms as the empirical study of the origin and nature of ideas, which are seen as deriving from sensation and reflection (or, according to some articles in the *Encyclopédie* influenced by Condillac, from sensation alone). Within this framework of the metaphysics of mind, they both establish rules of analytic and synthetic method - principles of orderly thought constituting a technique of inquiry and exposition for the moral and the physical worlds. And both hope by means of method to present a unified view of knowledge as a rational hierarchy. Just as a particular science is a system of knowledge reduced to rules, knowledge as a whole should be an "enchainement des sciences" by which it is possible to proceed from facts and first principles to
remote consequences. In fact, they see their task of gathering, analysing, arranging and classifying moral facts essentially as a form of natural history.12

Since the moral and physical worlds were regarded as one, all subjects could be dealt with by this 'empirical' method - showing that man was, as the Chain of Being represented him, part of nature. Thus it was possible to talk of the natural history of society, institutions and manners. Comparing it with Réaumur's natural history of insects (the work cited by Smith in his letter of 1755), Monboddo describes OPL as a natural history of man's mind established by observation and experiment.13

Three words sum up this science as it appears in Smith, OPL and the Encyclopédie: mind, method and language. Abstraction, the principal faculty of mind, binds these together - for all knowledge arises from sense-impressions by means of abstraction. Only by forming abstract ideas can we analyse our thoughts and classify reality. Without abstraction neither thought not language would exist. It is the semantic aspect of language that is crucial: language as the expression of abstract ideas. Language can therefore clarify the problem of knowledge - the relation between ideas and 'things'.14

Because it dominates both the Encyclopédie and OPL, a closer examination of this identification of language with mind and method is called for. d'Alembert, in the "Discours préliminaire", defines grammar - together with logic (method) and ethics - as a branch of the study of mind. This view is borne out in hundreds of articles
which are given the title "grammaire" or "gram. moral". To be a
philosopher or metaphysician is to be a grammarian. In fact, the
term "grammarien - philosophe" is used. The connexion between
language and method is also made at the beginning of the
Encyclopédie. The Baconian tree of knowledge relates grammar (which
is to be understood in the broadest possible sense as the study of the
universal nature of language) to the science of man via the science
of communication and logic. This is why Smith regarded belles
lettres, rhetoric and universal grammar as the best introduction to
the powers of mind.

In OPL as in the Encyclopédie, grammar is identified with both
aspects of method (or logic) - enquiry and exposition - and also
with the discovery of the rules of orderly thought. That is,
language is regarded as the instrument of reason, the means of
communication and the key to the principles of mind. Therefore, the
improvement of mind and method depended on the improvement of language.
Let us take each of these aspects in turn.

2. OPL and the natural history of mind

Confusion in thinking was seen to arise from uncertain connexions
between words and ideas. If knowledge was to be based on clear,
distinct ideas - as Descartes and Locke had advocated - language
had to be ordered and fixed. Only by analyzing the ideas expressed
by words could they finally lead to "things".

Improving language in this way would also result in the
improvement of communication, particularly the communication of
scientific knowledge. Consequently it is a major preoccupation of
the Encyclopédistes. In attempting to present "l'ordre et
l'enchainement des connaissances humaines" the Encyclopédistes and
Monboddo expressed the same "esprit philosophique". They were
involved in arranging the facts and principles discovered by
'empirical' analysis in their most 'natural' order for the diffusion
of knowledge. Monboddo was mainly concerned with the principles
from which he believed all knowledge could be derived, although his
account is supported by anthropological and linguistic data. 18

Like Smith's Considerations, OPL I is an example of a particular
type of methodical arrangement much favoured by the Encyclopédistes:
conjectural, philosophical or theoretical history. And the
conjectural history of language had a special status because of its
implications for the history of mind - that is, the Science of Man.
By presenting the parallel developments of language and mind in
their ideal sequence, such a history constituted a great chain of
abstract ideas, a 'natural' order of principles binding human
knowledge together. 19 Monboddo, like other Scottish philosophers,
going further, claiming that his corpus of data concerning barbarous
languages constituted a natural history of mind on a par with natural
histories of the physical world. That is, OPL traces the actual
development of man's mind through the progress of the art which is
"le premier germe des progres de l'esprit humain" as Diderot puts it
in his article "Encyclopédie". According to Monboddo and the
Encyclopédistes, language, like all arts, has a fixed order of
development conforming to "la marche de l'esprit". This is the
'natural' order of discovery: the mind progresses from sense impressions to increasingly abstract ideas by means of its faculties of abstraction and comparison. And in tracing his natural history Monboddo demonstrates the dual function of the method as described in the Encyclopédie: it is a method of discovery and of presentation. OPL both 'discovers' the principles of language and mind and arranges them for the purposes of enlightenment.20

Thus the Science of Man - or the natural history of mind as Monboddo calls it - was a unified concept with a single structure. As described in the Encyclopédie and OPL, its three aspects - language, method and mind - are structurally identical. All three are based on a hierarchy of general ideas and terms classifying reality. The "things" of the moral and physical worlds are, ideally at least, reflected in the universal concepts of the intellectual world. Language was therefore primarily a system of nomenclature analogous to the terminological systems of natural history.

It followed that languages reflect the level of civilization of their speakers. The more civilized a nation was, the further its ideas had progressed up the ladder of abstraction representing the progress of mind. An advanced people required a sophisticated lexical system to reflect their intellectual world. In contrast, the language of a barbarous nation could not be other than impoverished, crude and unsystematic.21

Seeing language largely as a system of nomenclature, the Encyclopédie and OPL discuss the improvement of language in terms of
the enrichment of terminology and the classification and fixing of meanings. 'Plenitude' was an important characteristic of natural and philosophical languages, because lexis should be sufficiently rich and systematic to signify the hierarchy of abstract ideas which connects all knowledge into a single whole. Thus Monboddo describes a language or art as a family tree of words linked by the three great arts of language: inflection, derivation and composition. Meaning can be classified by reducing words to their radicals. And definition is important because by defining words we define "things". However, this implies that the Encyclopédie - "un dictionnaire universel et raisonné de la connaissance humaine" - must also be based on the logical principles of a universal grammar which govern the analysis of ideas. In the course of tracing the natural history of language OPL reveals the nature of these logical principles fundamental to a language of art.

This discussion of natural history brings up the crucial issue dividing Monboddo and the Encyclopédistes: the debate on the reality of species. The debate, in which the principal protagonists were Buffon and Linnaeus, is central to the history of eighteenth century thought.

3. The debate on the reality of species

In spite of their reliance on the faculty of abstraction as the basis of method and mind, the Encyclopédistes have a sceptical attitude regarding the status of abstract ideas or universals - an epistemological scepticism similar to Hume's which severely limited
the scope and certainty of human knowledge. Neither the species of natural history nor abstract ideas (particularly the meaning of moral terms) stand for anything real. Genera and species are inescapable and invaluable. They are the basis of the Science of Man and therefore of all philosophy. In fact, we cannot think without them. But they represent our mental limits rather than universal truths. Since they bear no relation to the essences of things, any classification of the physical world or the moral world is arbitrary. In reality there are no universals, only individuals. The Encyclopédistes acknowledge Locke as the source of this nominalism which strikes at the roots of human knowledge but the first volume of Buffon's Histoire naturelle was an important influence.  

In addition, some Encyclopédistes denied the existence even of the Lockian faculty of reflection, and followed Condillac in basing psychology on pure sensation. Like early critics of Locke, Monboddo saw this as a tendency to materialism which was implicit in the Essay.  

The rejection of universals by the Encyclopédistes was consistent with their rejection of Aristotelian logic, which rests on the theory of universals. By the mid-eighteenth century their attitude was accepted by most philosophers and the Encyclopédie may be regarded as the final step in the gradual decline of interest in formal logic which had begun in the previous century under the influence of experimental science. The Encyclopédistes echoed Bacon's view that because scholastic logic was not a tool of scientific discovery it led only to verbal disputes.
In the place of formal logic they aimed to perfect practical heuristic procedures, inductive reasoning that would lead to a knowledge of "things" - i.e. method. Although inspired by Bacon and Locke, this was associated with the Cartesian ideal of clear and distinct ideas, and clear exposition. In fact, the influence on the Encyclopédistes of the Port Royal Logic (1662) and Descartes' Discours de la méthode can hardly be over-emphasized. Furthermore, their conception of universal grammar as the basis for fixing and defining French derived from the Port Royal Grammar (1660). Its authors, Arnauld and Nicole, had intended to raise grammar to a science by placing it on a logical foundation - a task which the Encyclopédie continued. All languages, says Beauséjour, are subject to the universal, unchanging laws of the logical analysis of thought which are the concern of the science of general grammar. That is, before it could be expressed, thought had to be analysed into its constituent ideas by the faculty of abstraction, yielding an underlying universal word-order. These underlying 'natural constructions' present ideas in the order required by the "état des choses" and are connected with "une espèce de metaphysique d'instinct" presiding over the formation of languages.

Even the Encyclopédistes' interest in the conjectural history of language which yields the universal principles of grammar and mind stems from Lamé's so-called Port Royal Rhetoric as much as from Locke (who was in any case influenced by Port Royal). Thus, in spite of its foundation in Lockian epistemology and emphasis on 'Newtonian' analysis the Encyclopédie contains an
important Cartesian element. Although knowledge is derived from sense-impressions and we know nothing of the essences of substances the sensations have to be interpreted and the ideas ordered. A philosopher or metaphysician must be a grammarian - a "grammairien philosophe". Grammar, of course, is to be interpreted broadly as the study of nature, origin and philosophy of language.

What is Monboddo's position on Aristotelian logic and the associated problem of universals or species? Like the Encyclopédie, OPL starts from Locke's sensualist epistemology with its rejection of innate ideas, but it arrives at the opposite conclusions. Contrary to the claims of the Encyclopédistes, Monboddo attempts to show that Aristotelian logic and metaphysics are not merely platitudinous - an expression of the form of human language and the limited scope of the human mind. It is, in fact, he claims, an instrument of discovery leading to a knowledge of things and not to verbal disputes. By re-establishing Aristotle he also contradicts the sceptical and nominalist tendency of the mid-eighteenth century which the Encyclopédie reflected. For his version of Aristotelianism implies that universals and species do in some sense have a real existence; that analysis can be reconciled with definition; and that the mind has a natural affinity with things.

What strategy does Monboddo adopt to achieve these ends? His problem was the same as Reid's: how to circumvent the theory of ideas which Locke had inherited from Descartes. On the one hand, Lockean epistemology meant, as the encyclopedists understood, accepting the uncertain, limited nature of knowledge. On the other hand, any
thoroughgoing theory of innate ideas had long been discredited. Reid's solution was to adopt the principles of common sense. This intuitionist standpoint evidently savoured too much of Hume's irrationalism in Monboddo's view. His own answer was even more traditional: a return to the unfashionable theory of Aristotle. Particularly in its Thomistic version, this offered both an antidote to scepticism and a compromise between rationalism and empiricism. Both solutions had been put forward in the previous century: Reid's by Herbert of Cherbury and Monboddo's by John Sergeant, who had also adopted a Thomistic interpretation of Aristotelianism.\(^{35}\)

By tracing the history of speech in terms of this theory Monboddo intends to demonstrate that the principles of language prove the real basis of method and mind - and therefore of the fashionable Lockian Science of Man - to be unfashionable Aristotelian hylomorphism. This solution was probably suggested by Locke's third book which identified Aristotelian genera and species with abstract ideas; by the ambivalent contemporary attitude towards abstraction expressed in the *Encyclopédie* which derived from the same source; and by Locke's vague definition of the term 'idea' - a defect pointed out by Hume. And since Locke had only attacked a naive version of innate ideas which few held, Monboddo had merely to show that we possess innate capacities - the more generally accepted form of innatism which Locke had not attacked.\(^{36}\)

By presenting an Aristotelian solution Monboddo is perhaps also making a historical point - that scepticism in its contemporary form
derived from Descartes, who was the first to philosophise without the ancients. (Reid also points out that Lockian theory of ideas was originally Cartesian.) This did not prevent OPL from expressing something of the infectious Cartesian spirit in its presentation of Aristotelian theory. Monboddo is in addition claiming, quite correctly, that Locke and Descartes owed much to Aristotle - an echo of the Ancients and Moderns controversy that had been taken up in the previous century by a member of Monboddo's own family. OPL is therefore at one level an exercise in the history of ideas - a subject in which, as we have seen: the Encyclopédistes, Smith and the Scottish philosophers in general were equally interested. Monboddo is 'restoring' Aristotle much as Harris and the Scottish Greek geometers restored the ancients. And thus he is going back to humanist principles of the Renaissance which the Enlightenment recognized as its source.

Monboddo adopts the same approach to the major grammatical source of the Encyclopédie, the Port Royal Grammar (1660). Following Harris, Monboddo traces the principles of universal grammar beyond this generally accepted work to its origins in earlier grammars which had attempted to place the subject on a logical basis and transform it into a science. Of these sources the most important was J.C. Scaliger's De causis linguae latinae; and its Thomistic version of Aristotelianism profoundly influenced OPL.

The Port Royal Grammar, which must be considered jointly with the Port Royal Logic, began the vogue for universal grammar that culminated in Hermes and OPL. It may be seen as the product of a
trend towards semasiological grammar that began in the early seventeenth century and was continued by the Encyclopédistes — a tradition evidently related to an increasing interest in heuristic procedures at the expense of formal logic and grammar. By taking this tradition back to its Aristotelian beginnings in the post Renaissance period, Monboddo implies that syllogistic logic is indeed a scientific tool as Scaliger had believed. It is therefore the proper basis for a language of art or a philosophical language — the search for which had been inspired by this same seventeenth century tradition. **40**

In fact, OPL may be seen as nothing less than a criticism of the development of the Enlightenment and an attempt to restore it to its humanist foundations. Thus analysis and classification (which the Encyclopédistes identify with Newton, Locke and Buffon) and method (which they derive from Descartes and Port Royal) are all traced to Aristotle. Monboddo makes these historical points in the context of an ostensibly demeaning theory of the descent of man on the basis of current epistemology and natural history. His purpose in demeaning man, however, is only to raise him higher and show that even a pessimistic view of human origins is compatible with christianized Aristotelianism. **41**

Thus a general comparison with the Encyclopédie strongly suggests that Monboddo's dialectic is forensic. He adopts the philosophical assumptions of his time in order to disprove the sceptical conclusions drawn from them by Hume and the Encyclopédistes.
It also suggests that when writing OPL Monboddo had the Encyclopédistes in mind together with Hume as the intellectual heirs of Locke. The alternative is to suppose that Monboddo knew so little of the Encyclopédie that he did not realize its debt to Lockian epistemology and the experimental philosophy of Bacon and Newton — that is, the prevailing climate of opinion against which OPL is avowedly directed. This seems impossible. We know that Monboddo did consult the Encyclopédie — in view of his position as curator of the Advocates' Library in the 1750s it would be surprising if he had not. And the most casual examination of the Encyclopédie would have established the philosophical opinions of its authors, particularly for a scholar so sharply aware of the history of ideas. These opinions must in any case have been common knowledge amongst the Scottish literati who were evidently profoundly affected by the Encyclopédie, concerned with Hume's epistemological scepticism, and interested in the history of thought. Furthermore, the close connexion between the Encyclopédistes and Hume was well known.

Monboddo's implied criticism of the Encyclopédistes need not have prevented him from taking an ambivalent attitude towards their achievement. He knew de la Condamine, admired Rousseau and Buffon and apparently had a high regard for French philosophers apart from outright materialists and atheists — who were in any case not typical of the encyclopaedists. Their error was the error of the Enlightenment as a whole: the adoption of the theory of ideas which Locke had derived from Descartes.
4. The influence of the Encyclopédie on Monboddo

In view of Monboddo's linguistic interests during the 1750s (to which the early Monboddo Papers clearly testify) and his position at the Advocates' Library during the same period, he must have consulted some of the hundreds of articles on language in the Encyclopédie - probably about the same time as Adam Smith. 43 This seems all the more likely because language was, as we have seen, central to the Encyclopaedists' conception of their work. As a universal rational dictionary it was concerned with diffusing 'real' knowledge by connecting words with 'things' via clear, distinct ideas. This required a precise analysis of the principles of language and the meanings of words. Because of the identity of language, mind and method articles on every kind of topic tend to revert to linguistic problems. But the nature of any successful encyclopedia makes it difficult to demonstrate direct indebtedness to particular articles. As a reference book, it is taken for granted; and it inevitably becomes part of the climate of ideas. It reflects current ideas and quotes from works already in circulation. For instance, several encyclopaedists - notably Buffon, Rousseau and de Brosses - certainly had a direct influence on Monboddo, and it is difficult to distinguish the influence of the Encyclopédie from theirs. A notable example is Rousseau's second Discours (1754) which is discussed in d'Alembert's "Discours préliminaire" and quoted at length in Beauzée's article "Language". But Rousseau was popular in Scotland in his own right, and Monboddo may not have needed Beaufé to underline the importance of Rousseau's famous questions about the origin of language. 44
Similarly, although a large number of Monboddo's references are to works frequently cited in the *Encyclopédie*, they are mostly mentioned also in Buffon's *Histoire Naturelle* (1749) and de Brosses' *Traité* (1765) - sources as important to Monboddo as they were to the Encyclopédistes. This is especially true of de Brosses whose work had been known in manuscript to Buffon and other philosophers for years.45

Certainly some articles must have offered a challenge to Monboddo's Aristotelianism. The article "Espèce" is a good example. In order to show that abstract ideas are merely the result of human reasoning and do not yield knowledge of the essences of things, the history of the Aristotelian notion of 'visible species' is described, including the function of the active intellect - which Monboddo emphasises in OPL. The counter arguments given include the change in the size of images according to distance, which is a subject Monboddo deals with at length.46

However, if Monboddo did attempt to answer questions raised by particular articles, the best candidate is Diderot's *Encyclopédie* (1754). With a very few significant exceptions, its ideas (and to some extent its references) are paralleled in OPL. In fact, most of the article might serve as an introduction to OPL. And the crucial early paper "A Discourse on Language", which appears to relate to a debate in the Select Society in the 1750s, may well have been intended as an answer to Diderot.47

The parallels between the ideas of Diderot and Monboddo may be summarized as follows. Language originated in necessity but has
been improved (or even invented) by philosophers [639]. As a system of nomenclature its purpose is to communicate knowledge, especially to posterity. Since all sciences and arts are based on communication, language is the basis for all intellectual progress - "le premier germe des progrès de l'esprit humain" [637] Diderot calls it - and by inventing words or perfecting syntax a few geniuses can greatly advance a nation in a few years [639]. It must be fixed and transmitted to posterity in perfection. It also follows that the history of language is the history of mind. Language and mind are mutually dependent and advanced jointly from sensation to abstraction. Consequently the degree of abstraction and the number of 'scientific' terms in a linguistic system reflects its speakers' cultural level [638-9]. By this criterion, Monboddo and Diderot agree, the Greeks excelled the Romans - although they disagree on the status of the moderns compared with the Greeks in the fields of ethics, logic, grammar, metaphysics and natural history.48

Greek is the linguistic ideal for Diderot as for Monboddo; and both refer to the discussion of its tone and harmony in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, De compositione verborum [640]. They saw it as a linguistic system based on an encyclopaedic analysis of ideas and things. In their view, Greek was so well integrated that an adequate knowledge of its syntax, morphology and lexicon meant that the meaning of any term was self-explanatory [639]. This was an ideal widely discussed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in connexion with artificial universal languages and applied by Monboddo and others to Sanskrit as well as Greek. Monboddo, Diderot
(and the Encyclopédistes in general) believed modern languages could be improved and fixed on this model: that is, according to analogy, "etymology" (morphology) and universal grammar, [640] which is based on unchanging right reason. [637]

Thus a language of art and a universal, rational dictionary of science must both be based on a universal rational grammar. [636] Language is variable and requires an invariable standard of fixed rules by which difficult cases can be decided. For Diderot this meant the Port Royal Grammar with the notes of Duclos [639-640]: for Monboddo it meant the earlier tradition of universal grammar from which Port Royal had derived. And whereas Diderot calls for an "alphabet raisonné" based on the mechanism of pronunciation like that of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, [639] Monboddo considers the original Greek work to be unsurpassable. (This is consistent with Monboddo's general predilection for the ancients, but his view may have been influenced by Diderot's obvious reference to de Brosses whose manuscript was in the Encyclopaedists' possession. In any case, particularly for Monboddo, the physical aspect of language is much less important than the mental.)

Both authors emphasise the supreme importance of the double relationship of language to the world of ideas (mind) and the world of things. And both cite Dionysius of Halicarnassus as one of the Greeks who saw that this was what made language worthy of philosophy. [638] Since words represent ideas and ideas reflect things, by defining words we define things. [636] The inventor or improver of
language bases his work on the principles of universal language which in turn reflect encyclopaedic knowledge: so his aims and methods are almost identical to those guiding the lexicographer or encyclopaedist. They are all philosophers in the sense of being concerned with perfecting the classification of knowledge and the means of labelling its categories - that is, with clarifying, enriching and fixing the meanings of linguistic terms other than radicals, and perfecting syntax. Both Monboddo and Diderot aim at a work based on real knowledge of the nature of things and on universal, unchanging right reason. The essence of philosophy are immutable, eternal rules. [637] According to Diderot, in this sense an encyclopedia, like a language, summarizes a stage in the advance of mind. It crystallizes the language in which knowledge is preserved for posterity and can be regarded as a major step towards the invention of a universal language. [638]

Thus, like the inventor of language, the encyclopaedist must (as Bacon had advocated in De augmentis scientiarum) first reduce to order and method those scattered items of knowledge, ancient and modern, which learned societies had collected. By this means it is possible to arrive at the first principles of knowledge and an enlightening "enchaînement de connaissance", revealing the universal system of nature and art.

Monboddo's preoccupation with order and method dates from the period of the early Monboddo Papers many of which appear to have been written for the Select Society - whose debates evidently reflect the influence of the Encyclopédie. Unlike the Encyclopédistes,
however, he rejected Baconian empiricism as naive and physicalist—the beginning of a tendency that had led to scepticism. Instead he stressed the Ciceronian and Aristotelian origins of the Cartesian notions of order and method.\textsuperscript{49}

In the rationalist view of Diderot and Monboddo, order and method could only be achieved by considering the "reasons of things" with the help of metaphysics. By assigning things to their proper genus and defining specific differences, metaphysics claimed to reveal first principles and trace connexions between the sciences. It clarified, ordered and consolidated the bewildering diversity of things. In the process it also exposed the imperfections of natural languages which lumped together heterogeneous things.\textsuperscript{50}

Although the general view of language expressed by Diderot was common to the Encyclopédistes as a whole, and indeed most contemporary philosophers, the cumulative effect of the parallels with Monboddo's writings is remarkable. This is particularly true of the important early paper, "A Discourse on Language" which may have been written for delivery to the Select Society in the 1750s. It seems quite possible that this was written originally to refute the Encyclopédistes' view of species, a subject which, as we have seen, greatly exercised the Scottish philosophers.\textsuperscript{51} For the conclusion of Diderot's article "Encyclopédie" is out of keeping with the optimistic tone of the earlier part.

Diderot's article (1754) does not express the extreme epistemological scepticism of some others—particularly, it seems, those in later volumes (notably the ten volumes which appeared in 1765 and
which may well have helped to crystallize Monboddo's plans for OPL which were made in that year). However, Diderot's tone is ambivalent. On one hand, the Encyclopédie is to be a basic work permanently established upon the eternal rules of philosophy, real knowledge of the nature of things, and unchanging, universal, right reason - in other words, he takes the view Monboddo was to take of OPL. On the other hand, it appears at the end that this must be regarded as an unattainable ideal, although evidently it is an ideal worth pursuing. However carefully we classify our knowledge of things, Diderot says, we can never arrive at the perfect system. Nature is like a huge, complex machine with an infinity of connexions so that we can never understand its system. Some phenomena do not seem to fit at all and the infinity of particular objects shading into one another makes classification difficult. We must conclude that a perfect universal plan is beyond us. Reality is infinite and its description a matter of viewpoint. All systems of classification are therefore arbitrary to some degree. We can only hope to achieve orderly, extensive and enlightening views. Such views, of course, were one of the great ideals of the Enlightenment: but Monboddo, by contrast with Diderot, believed they could be established on a secure metaphysical basis.

Monboddo's "Discourse on Language" appears in Bound Folio MSS 5 [pp.145-193] - a volume which seems to date from the 1750s. Its early essays clearly relate to Ciceronian rhetoric. But in this context he deals with subjects that were in the air at the time and
discussed in the *Encyclopédie*: eloquence, method, the unity of learning and number and measure in discourse. 53

After these Ciceronian essays come "The General Plan of Aristotle's Philosophy"; an essay on Aristotle's Ethics; one on the history of Aristotle and Plato's philosophy; and then an essay on the philosophy of mind and its relation to government and manners. According to this last essay, false philosophy, luxury and idleness in government lead inevitably to the cynicism of Mandeville: that is, they lead men to believe that private vices are public benefits; that luxury is the mother of the arts; that religion is harmful to society; and that the ancients were inferior to the moderns. 54

This last essay on the philosophy of mind relates clearly to the theme of the "Discourse on Language" which comes later. The theme shows how far Monboddo saw language in the framework of moral philosophy. According to Monboddo, the corruption of language reflects the corruption of its speakers - a connexion which also preoccupied Sheridan and the elocutionists. In Monboddo's view, such corruption is due primarily to foreign conquest (leading to a "spurious, bastard language") and to luxury and vice (which corrupt all learning, and all the arts including grammar). This obviously relates to a debate in the Select Society which probably took place when Monboddo was one of its presidents. 55

The "Discourse" begins with the crucial question about the relationship between words and things which Diderot took up in his "Encyclopédie" article. Indeed it was the question that lay behind
the *Encyclopédie* as a whole, the movement for the improvement of language and the issue of the reality of species. It was also, of course, the question which OPL was to answer.

Again, like Diderot, Monboddo discusses the theme of melody in language in reference to Dionysius of Halicarnassus - a favourite of both philosophers. It was a theme he was to return to frequently in MP and OPL.56

Certain remarks in the "Discourse" seem even to echo Diderot's article. For example, Monboddo says that because it is founded on theorems and propositions the art of language "runs fast into Logic and even Metaphysics"; that the art and science of language is based on abstraction and is therefore the key to all knowledge - we cannot even think without "marking things by names"; that words are the essential signs of our general ideas as numbers are in arithmetic. Since "logos" in Greek means both speech and reason it follows that if speech decays, so will other arts.57

Such statements certainly seem to be echoes of the *Encyclopédie* in general and Diderot's famous article in particular. But, of course, these questions were in the air - largely because of the extensive influence of the French Encyclopaedia. Conspicuously absent from the "Discourse" however is any reference to a work frequently cited in the *Encyclopédie* and closely associated with it: the Port Royal Grammar. Evidently regarding it as a source of sceptical tendencies and a mistaken view of universal grammar, Monboddo almost never refers to this work either in MP or OPL.
Whether or not the "Discourse" can be related to Diderot's well-known article, Monboddo's elitist views on the relation between language, morality and government expressed in this early paper are certainly completely opposed to what he must have regarded as the sceptical and subversive tendency of the Encyclopédie.

According to Monboddo, society should be governed by philosophers. Lack of ability or lack of time exclude the vulgar from attaining the necessary proficiency in philosophy. In a philosophizing nation every man will be wiser than the laws of his country. He will speculate and dispute rather than accept the moral precepts handed down from ancient wisdom. Such a man will despise authority and pride himself on his ability "to overturn everything established in the common practice and opinion of men". 58

Monboddo is obviously thinking of Mandeville. But the reference is also, implicitly, to Hume - who, by the 1750s, was inheriting Mandeville's reputation. Monboddo almost never mentions Hume by name.

Monboddo's views about the relation between language, morality and government are in keeping with his belief in the hierarchy of species in language, mind and the universe. They are also what might be expected from a person of his eminence in the legal hierarchy of eighteenth century Scotland. Although everywhere implicit in OPL, these elitist opinions are probably nowhere so explicitly stated as in this seminal paper.

Thus the "Discourse on Language", clearly relates to several
contemporary issues: the Science of Man; Hume's scepticism; Scotland's linguistic and cultural dilemma; and, perhaps, disillusion with the Enlightenment as represented by the French Encyclopédie.
Chapter Ten

THE INFLUENCE OF ROUSSEAU'S SECOND DISCOURS

1. Rousseau and the Scottish philosophers

Rousseau enjoyed an enormous vogue in eighteenth century Scotland. He appeared in several Scottish editions and his works are listed in various library catalogues. The Advocates' Library Catalogue for 1776 includes the eight-volume Neuchatel edition. However, it was probably acquired much earlier, possibly soon after its publication in 1764, when discussion of the second Discours - Discours sur l'origine et les fondemens de l'inégalité parmi les hommes - was at its height.2

Although the second Discours was published in 1755 it evidently did not become a "fashionable topic" until after the first translation had come out in 1762. The records of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society and the Select Society, as well as the publications of the Scottish philosophers, attest to the interest this work aroused in Scotland. And, on the whole, the Scottish response seems to have been fairer and more enthusiastic than the English.3

Besides Monboddo, admirers of the Discours included James Boswell, Adam Smith and Monboddo's friends, John Gregory and James Beattie. Its detractors included Thomas Reid and Adam Ferguson.4

Although the Scots themselves had been influenced by Locke, Mandeville and the natural law tradition, the Scottish adoption of Locke's "historical, plain method" derived largely from Montesquieu's
De l'esprit des lois (1748) and from Rousseau's second Discours. The former introduced the comparative, factual study of savage and civilized societies. The latter brought the philosophical history of civil society into vogue, concentrating the attention of Smith, Monboddo, Ferguson and others on the crucial role of the progress of language. This species of history became an obsession in Scotland. Besides the general history of society, the literati were interested in the origin and progress of particular aspects of human culture resulting from man's capacity for self-improvement which Rousseau had described. And by developing the ideas of Montesquieu, Rousseau and the natural law tradition of Grotius, Pufendorf and Locke, they attempted to formulate the economic laws governing this progress. That is, starting from the facts, they sought the universal principles and causes of social change. The result was their well-known four-stages theory: the theory that all societies go through four stages of economy which correspond to differences in manners, customs and social structure.  

The Scottish philosophers selected mode of subsistence as the key to these four stages of society - hunting, pastoral, agricultural and commercial. Implicit was the assumption that each stage was an advance on the previous. It was a view which was completely opposed to Rousseau's claim that economic specialization and intellectual development were causes of human misery, and it was out of sympathy with his primitivism.  

This Scottish interest in the history of civil society - which dates from about 1755, the year in which Rousseau's second
Discours appeared - may have been largely motivated by rapid changes in Scotland's own economic, social and cultural situation. The literati were evidently concerned to link the origin, present condition and final nature of culture and society into one pattern. And their preoccupation focuses on a key figure in the Select Society and the Scottish literary revival, Adam Smith - and on his review of the second Discours.  

Smith's review appeared in a letter to the Edinburgh Review of 1755-56 - the journal which expressed both the Moderates' desire for self-improvement and their sense of cultural inferiority to France and England. This is the same programmatic letter in which Smith advocates the study of French literature for its "taste, judgement, propriety and order" and particularly recommends two other works destined to have enormous influence in Scotland: the Encyclopédie and Buffon's Histoire naturelle. Rousseau was a major contributor to the former; and the latter was one of his principal sources for the second Discours.  

Smith makes much of the affinities between the second Discours and Mandeville's notorious Fable of the Bees - which influenced most of the Scottish philosophers, including Smith himself. Both, for instance, he says, dispense with the notion of social instinct; claim that laws were invented to maintain social inequality; and suppose that the arts - including the crucial art of language - must have progressed infinitely slowly. In Smith's opinion Rousseau's achievement is to have transformed moral philosophy by softening.
and improving Mandeville's influential work, and stripping it of "corruption and licentiousness". However, Rousseau's talent is literary rather than philosophical. His ideas are vague; and, since the work consists almost entirely of "rhetoric and description", it is difficult to analyse.  

A similar view was later taken by James Beattie. In his popular attack on Hume - the *Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth* (1770) - he describes Rousseau as a major opponent of scepticism. However, he regarded the *Discours* as a jeu d'esprit rather than a philosophical inquiry: and in the fourth edition criticises Rousseau's tendency to "mistake declamation for proof and hypothesis for fact". The two discourses are "diffuse, inaccurate and often weak". They are also perverted by the vague assertions of travellers and the ideas of "certain French philosophers". 

Monboddo's friend John Gregory went so far as to rewrite the second *Discours*, trying to compromise between Rousseau and his opponents. *A Comparative View of the State and Faculties of Man with those of the Animal World* (1766) was read to the Aberdeen Philosophical Society and went through seven editions in eleven years.

Adam Ferguson's criticisms of the second *Discours* were the most trenchant of all. He, too, believed that by inventing fictions like the noble savage and the state of nature Rousseau "substitutes hypothesis instead of reality, and confounds the provinces of
imagination and reason, of poetry and science". Man has not changed by moving from the state of nature to the civil state; he was born in society. Nor did he acquire reason and arts as habits: he was born with the capacity for them. In short, human nature is uniformly the same in all ages and societies because it is the expression of "instinctive propensities". The state of nature has never changed. It is here and now. Thus we can learn nothing by comparing man with other animals as Rousseau does. Even in his rudest state man is "distinct and superior". The use of the hand and the similarity of shape and organs do not make orang-outangs men.

In Ferguson's view what is required is a more empirical history than Rousseau's second Discours: a true natural history of man based on data from different societies and the history of language, which rises very gradually from facts to values, from science to morals.

The ambivalent response to the second Discours of most of the Scottish philosophers and Ferguson's harsher strictures seem to have affected Monboddo, who was probably Rousseau's most enthusiastic Scottish admirer. On the one hand, he regards Rousseau as the most original moral philosopher of the time and bases OPL on assumptions similar to Rousseau's: on the other, as we shall see, OPL I may be regarded as an attempt to produce both a more empirical and a more 'philosophical' work than the second Discours - and thereby to answer Ferguson.
2. The natural history of man in OPL and the Inégalité

Monboddo is frank in his admiration of Rousseau and acknowledges his debt to the second Discours in several places. In the preface to OPL he describes him as "a very great genius... who has been thought whimsical and odd for having said so much in commendation of the natural state of man".  

The fact that Monboddo devotes his preface to the connexion between man's natural state and the origin of language is an immediate indication of the influence of the second Discours on OPL. But it should be noted at the outset that for Monboddo the concept of the state of nature is evidently not merely a hypothesis, as Rousseau intended. Like nearly all the Scottish philosophers, he accepts it literally and therefore regards Rousseau as a radical primitivist.  

Monboddo argues that without knowing man's original state neither the natural history of man nor the natural history of language - with which it is so closely linked - can be complete. Yet in an age in which natural history is the pre-eminent science, the essential aspect of the most important animal - the natural history of mind - has not been fully investigated. However, Rousseau has pointed out the way.  

For Monboddo Rousseau's originality consists in his ability to distinguish between man as nature made him and man as the product of society. Echoing Rousseau himself, he criticises modern natural law philosophers who, like Hobbes, had based their notions of
primitive man on facts drawn from contemporary European society, supposing that "man is the same in all ages and nations" - that is, that he is innately rational and social. They should, instead, have made use of the discoveries of travellers which show man actually existing in the state of nature. Such factual reports prove that man was a "wild, savage animal till he was tamed and... humanized by civility and arts". When philosophers imitate Rousseau and make use of this data to reduce the elements of man's original nature to a minimum they will find, like him, that language and even sociability are acquired. 18

For Rousseau man is naturally solitary. For Monboddo, as for Aristotle, he is midway between a solitary and a gregarious animal. But both agree that he began in the solitary state and that his progress was infinitely gradual - a basic principle of the history of man which, Monboddo emphasises, does not apply to the eternal, unchanging world of nature. And both regard the progress of mind as depending on the interaction of a minimum of innate potentialities with man's circumstances and needs. Man is basically lazy. It is only wants, real or imaginary, which excite him to action. When society was in its infancy, man's wants were few and so were his arts. As men multiplied, wants increased and more arts were invented. 19

For both Rousseau and Monboddo man's innate potentialities include the potential faculty of self-improvement which distinguishes animals from men. This in turn depends on the more basic faculty
of comparison which makes possible the crucial development of abstract ideas - the foundation of the progress of mind. However, neither of these can develop without two interrelated factors: language and society. The chief purpose of language is not the communication of wants and desires (which animals achieve by gestures and inarticulate sounds) but the communication of ideas. Consequently, after the invention of language, accidental discoveries did not perish with their inventor.  

Both authors see man's development as a series of stages, one leading to another, beginning with mere animal nature. However, although there are signs of the four-stages theory in the *Inégalité* and a truncated version appears in OPL, neither Rousseau nor Monboddo states it fully.  

There are, nevertheless, significant differences between Monboddo and Rousseau regarding the natural state. Both see primitive man as belonging to the animal world: neither rational nor social, he wanders alone among the other animals of the primeval forest without language, industry or a home. But for Rousseau, man, like other species, must have had ideas of a crude sort from the beginning simply because he has senses. Like all animals, man is physically an "ingenious machine" and therefore subject to the "mechanism of the sense and the formation of ideas". Furthermore, although Rousseau admits that a crucial difference between men and animals is the capacity to form abstract ideas, another basic distinction (apart from the faculty of improvement) is man's free-will.
Animals operate by instinct, but man's will-power is "purely spiritual and wholly inexplicable by the laws of mechanism".  

Monboddo does not see men in Cartesian terms as machines. And, although he agrees on the question of free-will, the crucial faculties are those of self-improvement and comparison. For it is by developing his powers of abstraction that man progresses towards the perfection of his reason and eventually participates in the divine mind. Yet in order to emphasise the remarkable achievement of these faculties, the gradual but inevitable progress of mind, and the ultimately benevolent purpose of the Divinity, he degrades man's origins further than Rousseau. Primitive man is subject only to instincts and sensations. He is sunk so far in sense and matter that his mind is "a perfect void and in a kind of lethargy". That is, he has no ideas worthy of the name — since for Monboddo, 'sensible ideas' are not ideas at all.

In pursuing these ends, Monboddo employs a conception of philosophical history which differs from Rousseau's and, to some extent, from that of the other Scottish philosophers.

Rousseau's remarks on philosophical history may be summarized as follows. Man's potential faculties could never have developed without "different accidents" — "the fortuitous concurrence of many foreign causes that might never arise, and without which he would have remained forever in his primitive conditions". As we do not possess factual knowledge of these events we are entitled to use "hypothetical reasonings, rather calculated to explain the nature
of things than to ascertain their actual origin; just like the hypotheses which our physicists daily form respecting the formation of the world".\textsuperscript{24} It is also permissible when two given facts require to be "connected by a series of intermediate facts, which are unknown..." to supply such 'facts'.\textsuperscript{25} Such conjectures "become reasons when they are the most probable that can be drawn from the nature of things, and the only means of discovering the truth".\textsuperscript{26}

Monboddo echoes this at one point: "If we have discovered so many links of the chain, we are at liberty to suppose the rest, and conclude that the beginning of it must hold of that common nature which connects us with the rest of animal creation".\textsuperscript{27}

However, their approaches differ in some other respects. Firstly, Monboddo ties the evolution of language more closely to social circumstances. Secondly, Monboddo supports his theory with a much greater abundance of data drawn from a wider range of sources: from Diodorus Siculus and Herodotus; from travel literature, particularly de Brosses's collection of voyages in the South Seas; from the natural histories of Buffon and Linnaeus; from interviews with travellers and with the "Wild Girl"; and from his own observations of a stuffed "orang-outang". Thirdly, he subjects this data to a more systematic analysis and uses it in support of a priori principles.

Of these differences, the first two follow the general trend of the Scottish philosophers and their four-stages theory of social development - of which Monboddo makes some use.\textsuperscript{28} In this respect
the Scottish philosophers may owe something to Turgot's article "Etymologie" in the sixth volume of the Encyclopédie which claimed that since, according to travellers' reports, different societies showed different degrees of primitiveness and barbarity, it was possible by choosing appropriate examples to do without conjecture and trace the actual sequence of events. That is, it was possible to outline the natural stadial development followed at differing speeds by all nations. Although Monboddo does not refer to Turgot's article, it is quite likely that he read it since he certainly consulted the Encyclopédie in the Advocates' Library.29

Special mention must be made here of Monboddo's use of Rousseau's data on "wild men" and the "orang-outang" - a term under which he includes the chimpanzee and gorilla. In general, Rousseau's footnotes may be said to have served as examples of empirical method and perhaps indicated some useful sources - Buffon, for example. But in these two instances they provided Monboddo with valuable material and probably even suggested key aspects of his argument. And, as usual, Monboddo freely acknowledges his debts.30

In the case of "wild men" caught in Europe, Monboddo relies heavily on note 3 of the Discours, although he disagrees with Rousseau on one point: man is not naturally erect. Like articulation, walking upright is an acquired habit. In the case of "orang-outang", Monboddo acknowledges that his belief in its humanity - he regards it not as an ape but as a primitive man - was
anticipated in note 10, where Rousseau disagrees with both Linnaeus and Buffon on this question. And the fundamental thesis of OPL - that language (pace Buffon) is acquired - evidently received some stimulus from the same source. But once again, Monboddo expands Rousseau's note into a detailed and closely argued disquisition citing evidence from Buffon, Linnaeus and (in the second edition of OPL) Tyson; and from various travel books - principally Bontius, Purchas and de Brosses. He also refers to his personal contacts with travellers; his discussion with his friend, Sir John Pringle, President of the Royal Society; and his own observation of the stuffed chimpanzee in the King's Cabinet in Paris. 31

As to Monboddo's characteristic use of deductive and inductive reasoning, this appears to be closely connected with his Aristotelian legal training. Indeed, his tone and method are forensic: he builds his case like the advocate he was, skilfully using the factual evidence to support his argument, and vice versa: "if it shall appear that from the facts the theory naturally arises, and that the theory again explains and illustrates the facts, it is hoped very little doubt will remain of the truth of my system". 32 That is, a priori reasoning may be regarded as a conclusive when it is corroborated by a large corpus of data from ancient to modern writers: and it may, in turn, confirm the credibility of travellers' reports, however doubtful.

The effect of these differences is to minimize the conjectural
element in OPL. Monboddo seldom refers to conjectures and accidental circumstances in the manner of Rousseau. Although the origins of language are necessarily somewhat speculative, Monboddo feels able to make strong claims for his stadial analysis of its subsequent development - that is, when more data are available. Provided such data are in accordance with reason - the result is neither merely conjectural nor merely factual, but a superior species of natural history: the natural history of mind.33

The basis of this neglected species of natural history is the comparison of data from barbarous and civilized languages: since words express ideas, language is the index of the necessary, stadial development of mind - or, more specifically, of our capacity for abstraction. Furthermore, the natural history of language and mind - which evolve together - is more important and more certain than the natural history of the human body. When we trace the development of things of our own making such as abstract ideas - as opposed to the development of natural things - we arrive at their principles. Natural things, on the other hand, can only be classified by their external qualities, since we know nothing of their internal structure.34

Thus the natural history of mind is the model for the natural history of physical things, and not vice versa. And since by 1750 natural history was regarded as the paradigm of scientific method, this has far-reaching consequences. Mind, not matter, is the basis of creation.

Monboddo opposes his Aristotelian conception of natural history to the views of Buffon and Linnaeus - the foremost natural
historians of the age, and the major participants in the contemporary epistemological debate about the nature of species. By participating in this debate, Monboddo aims to demonstrate that the mistaken methodologies of Buffon and Linnaeus result in equally mistaken views of the nature of man and language. And, furthermore, by attacking the methodology of the queen of sciences he wishes to invalidate extreme empiricism and reaffirm the role of reason in natural philosophy. Further still, his natural history of mind is intended to reinstate the universal rational principles of Aristotle.  

Essential to Monboddo's view of natural history are two great related commonplaces of Greek thought, still influential in the eighteenth century, which helped him reduce the infinite variety of man to rule: the principle of plenitude and the concept of man as the microcosm of the universe.  

Monboddo regards the former, a principle closely related to the concept of the Scale of Being, as Aristotelian. According to this principle, everything that can exist does exist. That is, every gradation in the scale must be filled because a universe in which all possible potentialities of being are realized best expresses God's infinite creativity: so the orang-outang contributes to the perfection not only of the hierarchy of man but of the scale of nature as a whole. The principle of plenitude, which was also invoked by Buffon, largely accounts for what appears to be Monboddo's credulous attitude towards bizarre stories like Keopin's account of men with tails - a story which he, nevertheless, took pains to check with Linnaeus.
The idea of man as the microcosm having the elements of everything found in nature was another image of order. It emphasized the unity of all life in one continuum animated by a single spiritual principle. Thus, according to Monboddo, man is at first not even a complete animal - hardly more than a vegetable. He becomes an animal when he develops memory and imagination: and a higher animal when he acquires reason - the faculty by which we compare sense impressions. But he is not a man until he begins to acquire intellect: that is, until he begins to form general notions and opinions. According to Hume, this was as far as man could ever go. According to Monboddo, it was not: the "summit and completion of our nature", the man of intellect and science is reached by those few who learn to form perfect ideas. 36

Thus, even more than most Scottish philosophers, Monboddo clearly relates man's evolution to the Scale of Being "rising by proper gradations from mere matter and sense to intellect": and substitutes for Rousseau's view of human development as a chapter of accidents with an underlying pattern of a limited kind, a more literal and orderly interpretation - an infinitely gradual, but inevitable, stadial progression. And although Monboddo stops short of the full four-stages theory advanced by Smith, Kames, Dalrymple and others, it is because the development of society is not his primary concern. His view of conjectural history reflects the benevolent universal order of the Scale of Being even more markedly than theirs. 39
The final effect of Monboddo's approach to natural history is typical of the Scottish philosophers: it is to emphasise the providential inevitability of man's development. And it is this that enables Monboddo safely to degrade man's origins further than Rousseau. For, although man starts as little more than a zoophyte, his future development is assured because the seeds of divine reason are innate. In this manner alone is Monboddo able to answer Rousseau's question about how general ideas are acquired. 40

In connection with Monboddo's attempt to emphasise man's achievements by demeaning his origins, it is necessary to mention the relationship between OPL and Mandeville's *Fable of the Bees*. Like his fellow Scottish philosophers and like Rousseau, Monboddo inevitably owed much to Mandeville's observations on the origins of language and society. And he, too, condemned Mandeville's materialism and "licentiousness". An early manuscript makes this clear and suggests that OPL I was written, in part, to refute Mandeville's theories systematically: not only the specific theory of private vices leading to public good, but also the more general law of unintended social outcomes which many of the Scottish literati, including Ferguson, adopted. 41 That is not to deny that OPL is part of the Scottish reaction to Hume. By the middle 1760s, when the vogue for Rousseau was at its height and OPL was under way, the mantle of Mandeville had fallen on Hume's shoulders. And Monboddo, like the Scottish common sense philosophers, saw the challenge of scepticism, nominalism, materialism and moral
relativism as part of the same perennial problem deriving from the empirical tradition represented by Locke.\textsuperscript{42}

However, OPL is also directed specifically against Hume's attempt to go beyond Locke – that is, to follow Berkeley and minimise the difference between Lockian sensation and reflection. Although Monboddo claims to adopt the approach of the natural historian, he is opposed to empirical extremism. He wishes to demonstrate that empiricism is the complement of rationalism. General laws are established by observing phenomena: then other phenomena are explained and predicted by those laws. This 'Newtonian' method of analysis and synthesis was, in fact, originally Aristotelian. And by using this method in the history of mind, ultimate principles are indeed obtainable. In this way Monboddo turned Hume's remarks on the Science of Man against Humean scepticism. Since the natural history of language traces the history of man's mind it deals with relations of ideas. That is, it is actually more certain than the natural history of physical things – which is based only on observation and experience.\textsuperscript{43}

Thus OPL is a major example of the Scottish philosophers' attempt to reduce moral philosophy to the Science of Man – and, in Ferguson's words, to rise gradually from facts to values. As Monboddo says in an early paper, in tracing the natural history of man he is concerned to discover how man is to be perfected and made happy in society – the two ends of moral philosophy: "In short, the history of the animal appears to me not to be complete, and
if so, the philosophy cannot choose but be imperfect too". 44 This accords with Rousseau's own purpose in writing the second Discours: "If the reader... retraces the lost and forgotten road by which man must have passed from the state of nature to the state of society... he will find the solution of a number of problems of politics and morals which philosophers cannot settle." 45 Unless OPL is also seen in the context of the all-embracing study of moral philosophy (which included ethics and politics) we distort Monboddo's intentions.

In fact, Monboddo's description of his own intentions resembles Smith's description of Rousseau's achievement: Monboddo's misunderstood purpose was not to debase man's origins but to show to what heights man had raised himself by the arts and sciences. As Smith said of Rousseau, "the principles and ideas of the profligate Mandeville seem in him to have all the purity and sublimity of the morals of Plato". 46 But Monboddo aimed to achieve this 'philosophically', by a combination of reason and empirical data, not by "rhetoric and description". 47 Since Smith was an influential figure who talked freely at the Select Society, it is likely that this view of the Discours - which was shared by Ferguson and Hume - became something of a commonplace. That is, like the Scottish philosophers in general, Monboddo is concerned to avoid the charges of vague speculation, rash conjecture or system making. 48
3. Rousseau and Monboddo on the origin of language

We are now in a position to discuss Monboddo's account of the origin and progress of language in more detail and compare it with Rousseau's. Because of the close relationship between OPL I and the second Discours, it will first be necessary to outline Rousseau's views.

Rousseau's views on the origin of language are brief, conjectural and scattered. And his speculations largely serve to raise bewildering questions about how it became possible at all - questions which Monboddo endeavoured to answer.

Rousseau's observations - which, as he acknowledges, derive largely from Condillac - are divided between the two sections of the Inégalité. In part one he attempts to question Condillac's assumption that some "kind of society must already have existed among the first inventors of language". But without this assumption - which he is forced to accept in the second part - Rousseau finds the problem insoluble. If Mandeville was right, primitive man was solitary and had no need for language. How then did it come about? It could not have arisen spontaneously within families as Buffon supposed.

Even assuming that language had somehow become necessary, how was primitive man able to invent it?: "if men need speech to learn to think, they must have stood in much greater need of the art of thinking, to be able to invent that of speaking". How, for example, could they have arrived at conventional signs for abstract ideas.
without speech? And what were the motives for such an agreement? Above all, what of the general ideas on which man's self-improvement depends? Until they were distinguished, every object must have had a particular name, leading to a proliferation of vocabulary. Yet it is difficult to see how such ideas could ever have been arrived at without observation and definition; that is, natural history and metaphysics - the complementary aspects of science whose mutual dependence Monboddo was to emphasize. Being purely intellectual, general ideas cannot be formed by the imagination. As Berkeley had pointed out, the interference of imagination inevitably makes ideas particular. Their formation finally depends on definition - and therefore on language and propositions.52

When Rousseau considers the immense complexity of grammar and logic involved in forming a language of art he is overwhelmed. All his questions resolve themselves into one dilemma: "For myself, I am so aghast at the increasing difficulties... and so well convinced of the almost demonstrable impossibility that languages should owe their original institution to merely human means, that I leave to anyone who will undertake it, the discussion of the difficult problem: which was most necessary, the existence of society to the invention of language, or the invention of language to the establishment of society."53 This is the conundrum which Monboddo undertook to answer.

Although he admits his account assumes that the early inventors of language had skills they cannot have possessed, Rousseau
puts forward several conjectures about the origin of language even in part one. The first "language" was the instinctive "cry of nature" in some emergency, signalling danger or need. As men associated more closely, their ideas increased so that the need arose for a more sophisticated form of communication. At first the instinctive gestures, tones and imitative sounds were multiplied to provide more signs. But their limitations were recognized and by some means or other men agreed to use articulate sounds as arbitrary signs. Rousseau does not pretend to know how this agreement could have been reached without language or how men invented articulate sounds — a subject to which Monboddo devotes much attention. 54

Ignoring this problem, Rousseau assumes that at first single words must have expressed entire propositions. Parts of speech were then slowly analysed by means of abstraction. However, without the knowledge of genera and species, nouns must have been only proper names. And adjectives, which are purely abstract ideas, presented particular difficulties. 55

This account must be supplemented by what Rousseau says in part two. Here an elementary form of society is assumed to exist — a temporary, loose association for mutual benefit. And it is explicitly linked to a universal "language" of inarticulate cries, gestures and imitative sounds. This language of nature is expanded by the addition of some conventional articulate sounds (whose "first institution" is still a mystery) — a process which
is assumed to have led eventually to particular "rude and imperfect" languages similar to those still spoken by savages. 56

These advances facilitated others. Men became industrious, inventing simple implements, building huts, introducing a kind of property and establishing families that became miniature societies. This in turn led to the improvement of speech in each family - a different idea from Buffon's conjecture about language originating in the family. 57

From this outline it is clear that besides Condillac, Rousseau relies heavily on a classical source which Monboddo, by contrast, openly acknowledges: Lucretius's De rerum natura, book V. However, since this is an exposition of Epicurean materialism, neither author could adopt it unreservedly.

Like all Greek philosophers, Epicurus believed that articulate speech was intimately bound up with society, thought and moral judgement: and Lucretius elaborated his arguments on the debate about whether the origin of language was natural or conventional. Epicurus had argued that although speech originated in instinctive animal cries it was refined by reason: and that accident as well as social compact played a part in the long process of its development. 58

The Epicurean belief that sense-perceptions are the basis of all knowledge was revived by Gassendi, influenced Hobbes, Locke and Mandeville, and enjoyed a notable resurgence in the eighteenth century. Monboddo was certainly aware of the classical provenance of the second Discours and of the debate in general. Besides
Lucretius, he not only cites Vitruvius and Diodorus Siculus, but adopts a quotation from Horace as his epigraph. However, although he rejects the Stoic theory that man has an inherent social instinct, he follows Cicero in modifying Lucretius along Aristotelian lines: he insists that the peculiarity of man lies in his latent reason - a potentiality that eventually reveals itself through a long but inevitable process. This was evidently what Rousseau meant by man's "perfectibility": but the Ciceronian and Aristotelian ideas are more clearly expounded in OPL I.

Although Monboddo's systematic and scholarly deployment of these classical ideas helps to distinguish his account of the origin of language from Rousseau's, his frequently acknowledged debt to the Discours is undeniable. The general resemblances are immediately apparent. For Monboddo, as for Rousseau, language is a habit acquired gradually over a vast period of time. Since words stand for ideas, its development necessarily keeps in step with their growth, yet also facilitates further intellectual progress. Above all, Monboddo's answer to the most important of Rousseau's questions is the one implied by Rousseau himself: society must have existed long before language was invented. He supposes language to have originated in man's need to associate for mutual benefit and to co-operate by means of gestures and animal cries. Furthermore, like Rousseau and Condillac, he supposes that there was a long period of loose, temporary association during which cries and gestures sufficed; and that the first savage languages were developed by articulating these cries. Monboddo concedes that tones may have
been part of the unconscious, pre-linguistic stage of communication. But, having found no onomatopoeia in barbarous languages, he restricts imitative words to languages of art.  

However, although, as Monboddo acknowledges, his account of the origin of language closely resembles Rousseau's, the same two crucial differences already mentioned must again be borne in mind: the quantity of Monboddo's data and the systematicity of his theory.

Monboddo's large corpus of data on 'barbarous' languages is drawn from a variety of sources including his own interviews with the so-called "Wild Girl" and with travellers - his friends la Condamine and Roubaud among them. Above all, Monboddo draws on travel literature and missionary reports. His most important sources are the three dictionaries which he consulted in Paris in 1764-1765: the dictionary of Huron with a preface attached to Gabriel Sagard's *Le Grand Voyage du Pays des Hurons* (Paris 1632) which evidently inspired Monboddo to write OPL; Breton's dictionary of Carib; and la Salle de l'Etang's dictionary of Galibi. Rousseau, by contrast, in spite of several references to travel books with regard to primitive peoples, does not discuss any specific languages but only refers briefly to the general characteristics of savage languages as usually described in such works.  

As has already been indicated, the theory which Monboddo builds on his collection of data is based on a minimum of principles and demonstrates how one stage in the development of language could have led to another. And here the most important factor is the closer
link which Monboddo establishes between the development of language and man's increasing need to co-operate. The result is that - as the other Scottish philosophers do with regard to social evolution - Monboddo distinguishes the stages in the progress of language more clearly than Rousseau and emphasises their necessary sequence. 69

In OPL, the long period of co-operation by means of inarticulate sounds is plainly characterized as pre-linguistic. Monboddo, unlike Rousseau, refuses to call these instinctive animal cries a universal or natural language. But this period is nevertheless essential to the future development of language. While working together, men not only learned to associate more closely but learned to think increasingly in terms of ends and means. (Since human beings learn by observation and experience, this was inevitable: as Rousseau had observed, they are distinguished from other animals in not being bound by instinct.) They must therefore have formed some general ideas - which Monboddo regards as prerequisite for the next stage: the development of the first languages. 70

That is, although men first herded together to carry on some common task, language proper did not emerge until the "strict intercourse" of civil society had been established. And in OPL the need to expand the pre-linguistic mode of communication is more clearly formulated: natural cries became inadequate when increases in population caused parallel increases in wants and occupations - and, therefore, in ideas also. This is not to say that language arose in some organic fashion. Although he may sometimes seem to
be on the verge of attesting the dangerous idea that these original languages could have arisen without the intervention of mind, Monboddo, like Reid, rejects the possibility. With Rousseau, he evidently considers even primitive languages as deliberate constructs - ad hoc and imperfect though they are. That is, language is not an unconscious achievement of the group as Mandeville and others had suggested, although this interpretation fits Monboddo's hypothesis that language arose in society. 

To meet the need for a greater variety of sounds to express the increase in ideas, Monboddo, like Rousseau, supposes that the original inarticulate, vocalic animal cries were varied and made more distinct. However, again his account is far more detailed and precise than Rousseau's. First, he supposes, tones were tried. These were later superseded by the more difficult method of articulation favoured by Rousseau and Condillac. But in OPL the continuing influence of these original, inarticulate cries results in two characteristics of barbarous languages: long words and a preponderance of vowels.

Thus Monboddo links this first stage of language exclusively to man's need to co-operate more closely on an increasing number of tasks, supposing that further cries were articulated as the need arose. The process of naming the limited number of known objects - which Rousseau put first - is postponed. This enables him to reject the widely-accepted view, attested by Rousseau, that substantives must have first begun as proper names - a notion which
Monboddo regards as contrary to the nature of language. Monboddo's position - that language is the expression of ideas already formed - is in keeping with the eighteenth century Lockian commonplace which Rousseau himself endorses elsewhere in the second *Discours*: that language is the result of abstraction - the primary faculty of mind. This position however, does not prevent Monboddo from agreeing that language facilitates the acquisition of further general ideas, particularly at a later stage when ideas of a very abstract kind are involved. 73

But, as Rousseau had wondered, how did man invent this difficult art of articulation? Once this question was answered, there only remained the problem of the institution of the arbitrary sign. The rest of language might be assumed to follow. After pointing out that articulation involves possessing the necessary speech organs, Monboddo's answer is to link the accidental discovery of both tones and articulation to man's superior powers of imitation: he must have learned them by imitating birds. This is almost the only point at which Monboddo accepts Rousseau's view of the accidental character of man's history. 74

A final important difference between the *Discours* and OPL is Monboddo's development of another of Rousseau's ideas: the humanity of the "orang-outang". Monboddo first expressed his opinions on the connection between the humanity of the orang-outang and the origin of language in an early paper, "Of the Orang-Outang and whether he be of the Human Species" (MP109). This was incorporated in different
sections of OPL I: Book 2, chapters iv and v, and Book 3. He uses data on the orang-outang to illustrate key points in his theory.

Above all, the orang-outang proves that language is an art not an instinct: that after the idea of language has been conceived from observation and experience, it must be established as a habit and improved gradually. Unlike the "jackos" mentioned by Linnaeus and the "pygmies" of the ancients, orang-outangs have not been in society long enough to learn the art - showing how difficult an art it is. They must have already taken the first step by forming some general ideas. According to de Brosses they accomplish "things of council and design" so they probably have as many as dumb people. But, although their speech organs are capable of it, they have not yet taken the next extremely difficult step and learned to articulate. While it might be possible to teach a young orang-outang to speak, it would probably not have the necessary "disposition of mind and aptitude of organs". Wild men, like wild fruits, require centuries of cultivation. 75

Furthermore, the fact that the orang-outang lives in society without speech, clothes or fire proves that these are arts of refinement, not necessity. Evidently, like all animals, man can subsist, form a kind of society for mutual defence, and even invent certain arts without language. Man's whole history is a progression from one state to another; and he must have continued long in this and earlier states before he progressed further via the abstraction of general ideas from sense perceptions. And if even the Hurons, who must have existed for thousands of years, have so few abstract
ideas, early man, who had nothing to imitate, must have emerged from sense and matter infinitely slowly.\textsuperscript{76}

The principal stages in the development of language are therefore as follows. First, savages learn a little articulation, but not enough to communicate their thoughts without the use of gestures. Next, the process of articulating animal cries goes far enough to produce barbarous languages like Huron - rude and imperfect tongues hardly worthy to be called languages but adequate for the limited communicative needs of primitive society. The greater the degree of abstraction and articulation to be found in such languages, the further they are from animal cries. But the ad hoc procedures of the first inventors of languages can only produce a limited degree of art even in the most advanced barbarous languages: more than this proves the language has been borrowed. The final stage is reached when these ad hoc procedures are abandoned and barbarous languages are completely reconstituted as languages of art. For Monboddo there is no structural connection between the two varieties of language. Barbarous languages merely provide the matter (sound) from which languages of art are formed.\textsuperscript{77}

What was the structure of these early attempts at language and how did they develop into more sophisticated languages? In his examination of these questions Rousseau implicitly accepts the traditional distinction between barbarous and civilized languages: since languages expressed reason, they must reflect the cultural and intellectual levels of their speakers. But Rousseau's discussion
is superficial. He assumes the first languages resembled those still spoken by savages, but only refers to some generally accepted characteristics of such languages without providing any data, much less comparing them with languages of art. Above all, he puzzles over the question of how the abstractions and complexities of (supposedly universal) grammar could have been invented by savages. 78

When Monboddo attempts to answer Rousseau's question and improve on his account of the progress of language, he too accepts the distinction between barbarous and civilized languages. And he too has no alternative but to attest the analyses of missionaries who were themselves biased in favour of Indo-European linguistic structure, especially that of Latin and Greek.

For Monboddo, as for Rousseau, barbarous languages reflect the undeveloped powers of abstraction characteristic of the savage mind. And in OPL this becomes the principal theme. Still immersed in sense perceptions, the savage is incapable of classifying reality into genera and species: his ideas therefore reflect the confusion of nature itself. Since the savage's intellectual world is unstructured, there can be little semantic structure in the languages which reflect that world. 79

And just as the ideas expressed by such languages are close to sense perceptions, so their sound is not far from the original animal cries. Furthermore, since barbarous languages are only attempts at art, there can be no syntax either. Insofar as syntax does exist, it resembles the original "language" of gestures: savages, like children, use words without connecting them. 80
The consequences of the lack of abstraction are not far to seek. In the first place, languages as imperfect as Huron have no words for the higher genera such as animal, vegetable and so on. And not until "all the necessaries of life were supplied and till men had found leisure to philosophise", would men of intellect discover "those remote likenesses which constitute such ideas as those of body, substance, matter, space and the like". The savage has no need of such general ideas. The wants of life only require him to form ideas of the species of animals he knows.

In fact, in barbarous languages individual and specific qualities may be so mixed together (as they are in nature) that there may be, for example, different words for a small bear, a large bear and so on - but no word for the species bear. Similarly, since substances are not abstracted from their qualities, there will be no adjectives: for, as Rousseau had said, "every adjective is an abstract idea, and abstractions are painful and unnatural operations". This means that even in more advanced types of barbarous languages, there is no analogy, derivation or composition: words signifying similar things are not connected to the same roots - a crucial requirement of languages of art. And, according to Sagard, not only are tenses, numbers and persons distinguished by tones, but cases and parts of speech in general are so undeveloped that 'words' often express whole propositions. This idea of the propositional word as characteristic of barbarous languages was a commonplace. Monboddo found it in Smith as well as Rousseau.
As has already been mentioned, the lack of systematicity in such languages is due to the ad hoc procedures of their inventors who never went beyond immediate necessity. As savage life became more complex, further consonants were introduced into natural cries. Unconnected by analogy, derivation or composition, the words multiplied until speakers memories were overburdened. The language had become "too bulky and cumbersome for use". It was at this point that the ad hoc procedures were abandoned and the language began to be reduced to rule and method. In short, barbarous languages became languages of art. 85

Languages of art may themselves be evaluated by the same criteria of abstraction and systematicity. In fact, a similar principle applies to their development. At a certain stage in the invention of a language of art, as in the invention of a machine, the system becomes "too intricate and complex in ... structure" and has to be simplified. 86
Chapter Eleven

THE INFLUENCE OF DE BUFFON'S "HISTOIRE NATURELLE"
ON THE GENESIS OF OPL

1. MP76: "Notes from Buffon's account of the varieties of
the human species"

Jean-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon (1707-1788) and
Louis-Jean-Marie Daubenton (1716-1800) published the first three
volumes of their celebrated Histoire naturelle in 1749, and by the
middle 1760s - when the Scottish Enlightenment was at its height
and Monboddo was undertaking OPL - the greater part had already
appeared. It was particularly successful in Scotland, where in
1755, in a "Letter to the authors of the Edinburgh Review",
Adam Smith contrasted the Cartesian principles adopted by Buffon
and Daubenton in their description of the King's Cabinet with the
lack of methodical arrangement in English works of science.¹

The purchase of the first three volumes in their second edition
(1750) - and possibly the fourth volume (1753) - was made on
behalf of the Advocates' Library in March 1754 by its keeper,
David Hume, and approved by two curators - one of whom was
James Burnet (later Lord Monboddo).²

Of the three existing manuscripts in the Monboddo Papers dealing
with Buffon, the earliest appears to be MP76: "Notes from Buffon's
account of the varieties of the Human Species". This is based
mostly on Buffon's chapter of the same title in the third volume of the *Histoire* (pp. 371 ff) — but Monboddo appears also to have read at least the "Dissertation on the nature of animals" which begins volume IV.

As with MP143, "Observations on the Galibi and Caribee Languages", (which is dated 1764), Monboddo's comments in MP76 develop into an exposition of his views on the origin and progress of language. The word "notes" in Monboddo's title is, however, misleading. The manuscript is possibly too coherently organized to be even a first draft and the handwriting (which is Monboddo's) is unusually neat: also — particularly in the second half of the paper where Monboddo is developing his own ideas — there are long, tidy marginal additions indicating careful reworking. In fact, there was another paper, MP75, probably written just before, dealing with a related theme and doubtless inspired by Buffon as the title indicates: "Of the Distinction of Animals into Genus and Species — Of the Care of Nature in the preservation of Species — Of Final Causes". This, however, is lost.

A reference in MP76 to Monboddo's visit to the Cabinet du Roi in Paris to see the stuffed "orang outang" (in fact, a chimpanzee) and unmistakable references to de Brosses' *Traité* (published 1765), date the manuscript as circa 1765-66, at the earliest. As MP14 ("Continuation of the Subject of Abstract Ideas") which also deals with Buffon's *Histoire naturelle*, and develops views expressed towards the end of MP76, is dated 4th January 1767, it seems all
the more likely that MP76 can be assigned to the productive period which followed Monboddo's return from his third and final visit to Paris. Further, the absence of relevant material concerning apes from volume XIV of the Histoire (1766) - which Monboddo drew upon for his third paper on Buffon, "Of the Orang Outang and whether he be of the Human Species" (MP109) - suggests that before writing MP76 he had not yet had the opportunity to consult Buffon's latest volume. (Detailed records of acquisitions were evidently not kept after Hume's resignation as keeper, so we do not know when the remaining volumes were purchased for the Advocates' Library.)

MP76 includes many ideas, facts and bibliographical references from this chapter of the Histoire naturelle volume III, and several of these formed the basis of Monboddo's own account of savage peoples and wild children in OPL I. The significance of the manuscript is increased by the presence of discreet ink marks, now faded, in the margins of the copy of volume three (second edition, 1750) of the Histoire in the National Library of Scotland. This volume, which formerly belonged to the Advocates' Library, was evidently the one purchased by David Hume in 1754. And, in nearly every case, the marks have been made beside a passage describing some racial characteristic which Monboddo cites, along with the page number in Buffon III, in MP76: for example, the descriptions of an Indian race with one monstrous leg and of men with tails in the Philippines, Formosa and the Nicobar Islands.
One of these, the last, found its way into OPL I after Monboddo had checked the report of a certain Captain Koeping in Linnaeus's *Amenitates academicae* vol.6. He also wrote to Linnaeus for his opinion and obtained a copy of Koeping's book (published Stockholm 1743) - of which he had the relevant section translated. It is ironical that this crucial traveller's tale, which reviewers thought typified Monboddo's credulity, was only included in OPL after its authenticity had been rigorously checked.

This careful checking of sources is evident throughout Monboddo's account of savage peoples in OPL I. With the exception of personal accounts given to him by acquaintances like de l'Epée, Braidwood, Sir Joseph Banks and Father Roubaud S.J., and the works of a few classical writers like Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus, almost all Monboddo's sources for this major part of the first volume of OPL are to be found in Buffon's chapter on the varieties of mankind: but it is clear from the page references given, the editions used and the inclusion of material not mentioned by Buffon that, whenever possible, Monboddo read books he refers to - mostly travels - himself. That is to say, his scholarship was scrupulous: facts from Buffon were checked against printed sources, personal accounts and the accounts of the ancients - who were closer in time to man's early history and had, he believed, access to documents that had since disappeared.

But more important than accounts of racial peculiarities is Buffon's discussion, in the same chapter, of savagery - and of the North American Indians in particular. In the copy of the third
volume of Buffon's *Histoire naturelle* held by the National Library of Scotland, the beginning of this section is marked in the same manner as the passages already mentioned.

Here Buffon not only discusses the significance of savages and wild children for the scientific study of man, but also refers to the wild boy discovered in the Hanoverian woods, interviewed for Monboddo by Sir Joseph Banks (later President of the Royal Society) and the wild girl found in the woods of France — evidently Memmie le Blanc, whom Monboddo met in 1764 or 65. The meeting may well have been arranged by la Condamine who had edited an anonymous account of Memmie — *Histoire d'une Fille Sauvage* — which Monboddo had had translated by his clerk, Robertson, and published with an anonymous preface by himself in Edinburgh in 1767.9

In addition, Buffon's bibliographical references for this discussion of savages include not only la Hontan (1702), Charlevoix (1744) and the *Lettres édifiantes* — well known works used by de Brosses as well as Monboddo (la Hontan's work, incidentally, also having been acquired for the Advocates' Library in 1754) — but a travel book by another Jesuit so rare that Monboddo knew of only two copies, one in the British Museum and the other in the Bibliothèque du Roi: Gabriel Sagard Theodet, *Le voyage du pays des Hurons* (Paris, 1632). This is the work which Monboddo borrowed from the Royal Library — now the Bibliothèque National — during the autumn of 1764 or 1765 and which, according to his letter to James Harris and a footnote in OPL, along with other dictionaries

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and grammars of savage American languages, prompted him to undertake his history of the origin and progress of language.\textsuperscript{10}

It is not, of course, certain that Monboddo had read the chapter in volume three of the \textit{Histoire} dealing with the varieties of mankind by that time, but there is strong evidence that he was acquainted with the chapter and more. Buffon's reference to the Wild Girl, Sagard Théodot, and the origin and languages of the North Americans\textsuperscript{11}—the last being a subject Monboddo had already discussed in the Bound Manuscripts\textsuperscript{12}—are not the only indications in favour of this hypothesis. In volume III Buffon also deals with the significance of training deaf-mutes to speak, the exceptional primitiveness of the Caribs,\textsuperscript{13} la Condamine's account of the language of an Amazonian tribe;\textsuperscript{14} and, in volume IV (1753), even the relationship between apes and men—the passage\textsuperscript{15} in the Advocates' Library copy being marked in the same fashion as those in the third volume. Is it mere coincidence that while in Paris during 1764 (and, perhaps 1765) Monboddo also visited two teachers of deaf-mutes (one the Abbé de l'Epée); consulted a dictionary of Carib and wrote an important paper dealing with that language; discussed barbarous languages with la Condamine; and visited the stuffed "orang outang" in the King's Cabinet? Surdmutism, wild children, orang outangs, and savage peoples and languages were, it is true, much discussed in the 1760s. And, as we know, Monboddo had read of the Caribs in Rousseau's \textit{Discours}\textsuperscript{16}—and also something about orang outangs in a footnote in the same source, if not elsewhere. Charles Bonnet's \textit{Contemplation de la Nature} (largely written 1747-52) for instance,
was actually published in the crucial year 1764. It discussed the same stuffed "orang outang" seen by Monboddo - and described in detail in Buffon's *Histoire* - in terms remarkably close to Monboddo's own. Nevertheless, it is surprising that so many elements crucial to the development of OPL should be found in the single chapter of Buffon which is the basis of MP76.

If Monboddo read this chapter before his second visit to Paris in 1764, it provides us with a connexion between most of the crucial events associated with the genesis of OPL I. And if we conclude that Monboddo was acquainted with this much of volume three of the *Histoire* by autumn 1764, we may equally suppose him to have read the first pages of the third volume - which are similarly marked in the National Library copy - and so include his visit to the Cabinet du Roi. Yet it is unnecessary to speculate even this far, since Monboddo had most probably developed an interest in orang outangs from several sources - and because the *Histoire* as a whole was based on the collection in the King's Cabinet this would account for his visit.

However, attempts to reconstruct the stages in the genesis of any author's work are always speculative and it is therefore necessary to state the case against them. There is no doubt that the events of 1764-65 can be reconstructed without supposing Monboddo had ready Buffon III by that time. And this is particularly worthwhile because it emphasises the crucial role of Charles Marie de la Condamine (1701-73) in the genesis of OPL - a fact quite independent of the question about the date of Monboddo's reading of Buffon.
La Condamine was a noted traveller who had been sent on a scientific expedition to South America by the French King and published an account of this \textsuperscript{18} which was reprinted several times. Thus, although la Condamine was hardly a major figure of the Enlightenment, there is no need to suppose that Monboddo first came across his name in Buffon's references to his observations on a primitive language of the Amazon basin from la Condamine's \textit{Relation abrégée d'un voyage fait dans l'interieur de l'Amérique Méridionale} (1745) although this, and his account of the Wild Girl are the only works Monboddo used.\textsuperscript{19}

However Monboddo came to hear of la Condamine - and he probably visited him on account of his first hand knowledge both of the Wild Girl and primitive American languages - there is no doubt that la Condamine played a vital part in the genesis of OPL. He gave Monboddo permission to publish a translation of a history of the Wild Girl which he had edited and assured him of its authenticity. He most probably arranged the interview with the Wild Girl. He also lent Monboddo at least one dictionary and grammar of a savage American language. Monboddo does not say much about the importance for him of this account of Garani, a Paraguayan language, by a Jesuit, published in Madrid in 1639 - perhaps because its description of "a regular-formed language, as much as any that is spoken at present in Europe" suggests that it had been learned from a more civilized people\textsuperscript{20} - but he does admit that he discussed the language with la Condamine, who compared its distinction between the inclusive and exclusive forms of the first person plural with a language spoken
in Brazil. We may surmise that their discussion of barbarous languages went further than this and that la Condamine's more flattering view of such languages led Monboddo to consult other grammars and dictionaries available in Paris - a dictionary of Galibi published there in 1763 (probably just a year earlier) and a dictionary of Carib published at Auxerre in 1665. The latter was the work of another Jesuit missionary Raymond Bretton. The former had been compiled anonymously by Simon-Philibert de La Salle de l'Étang (c.1700-1765) and was based on information from various Frenchmen who had visited this South American colony. 21

Monboddo's paper on Galibi and Carib dating from 1764, the basis of nearly half the discussions of barbarous languages in OPL I, 22 may antedate even Monboddo's reading of Sagard Theodet if we take Monboddo at his word - he wrote to Harris in 1766 that he had borrowed that work when he was "last at Paris" (i.e. in 1765). More probably it is contemporary with his readings in Le voyage du pays des Hurons. If so, Father Bretton's description of Carib must be one of those accounts of savage languages spoken in America which Monboddo later told Harris he had found in the King's Library. In either case, it looks as though Monboddo's discussion of barbarous languages with la Condamine led to the researches from which OPL sprang.

We cannot assume a simple cause and effect relationship between Buffon's frequent references to the primitive Caribs and Monboddo's decision to investigate their language. However, Rousseau's quotations from Père du Tertre's account of their primitiveness had already convinced him that they exemplified an early stage of human
nature and Breton's book might have been known to Roubaud (or another of Monboddo's Jesuit friends). In any case, the majority of these seventeenth and early eighteenth century accounts of barbarous languages had been written by Jesuit missionaries, and Monboddo's friend at the Bibliothèque de Roi, the keeper M. Caperonier, could have guided him to the works of both Breton and Sagard Theodet - since he gave Monboddo permission to borrow the latter's work for several weeks.

But in spite of these alternative possibilities, it does seem too great a coincidence to suppose that it was only on his return from Paris in 1764 or 1765 that Monboddo read a chapter in Buffon III referring to the very subjects, books, and people that had so recently concerned him - Amerindian languages, la Condamine, the Wild Girl, and Sagard Theodet, to name only the most important.

In support of the evidence for Buffon's influence on the genesis of OPL - his influence on its content will be clear when MP76, MP14 and MP109 are compared with Buffon III and OPL I - we may point to Buffon's reputation in Scotland, the Scottish interest in natural history, the affinity between that study and the idea of the Scale of Being, the presence of the first three or four volumes of Buffon's Histoire in the Advocates' Library since March 1754, and Monboddo's approval of their purchase by Hume. When we add to this Monboddo's interest in the problem of species raised by Buffon - an issue which is central to OPL itself and to the Scottish Enlightenment - we must conclude it is more than probable that Monboddo was familiar with the work long before 1764. Adam Smith, a fellow member of the
Select Society, admired its system of description as early as 1755, and its philosophical implications must have been frequently discussed by the metaphysically minded literati of Edinburgh. (Condillac, several of whose works were in both the Advocates' Library and the library of Adam Smith, had commented on Buffon's views in his Traité des Animaux [1755].) The chapter on the human species, in particular, would have aroused enormous interest among philosophers so concerned with the history of man and so well aware of the moral significance of the infinite variety of races and customs of mankind. In the circumstances, it would seem impossible, especially in view of what we know of Monboddo's intellectual interests from the earliest Monboddo Papers, to suppose that Monboddo was unaware of Buffon's arguments until he returned from Paris late in 1764/65 - and virtually impossible to suppose he had not dipped into volume III of the Histoire himself.

Thus we may be almost certain that at some time in the late 1750s or early 1760s - when, as we know, he was already preoccupied with the history of man as manifested in the history of language - Monboddo read at least Buffon's chapter on the varieties of mankind in volume III of the Histoire (and probably also the first part of volume IV dealing with man's relationship to the apes) and that this led directly to events in France during 1764-65. He had, most probably, already read Rousseau's Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité which convinced him of the value of "those discoveries made by modern travellers" which have added to our
knowledge of the natural history of man by showing that the primaeval human condition still existed. Rousseau's works, like several others of importance to Monboddo, were purchased for the Advocates' Library when Hume was keeper - in March 1754 (just three weeks before Buffon's *Histoire*). The enormous popularity of Rousseau in Scotland is well known, and there is no doubt that Rousseau's *Discours* which dealt in a general speculative way with the history of man and the origin of language, and included a footnote on the orang outang, was, as Monboddo acknowledges in OPL I and MP71, a vital early source of inspiration. It was also an excellent model for a conjectural history such as OPL I.

But the consequences of Monboddo's reading of the *Histoire* were, perhaps, greater. This is especially so, if, as it seems, he read volume III before visiting Paris in 1764-65, because it means that Monboddo was familiar with Buffon before he encountered the *Traité* of Charles de Brosses - a work which represented the same philosophical viewpoint as the *Histoire*. In fact, the authors were friends. Buffon, like D'Alembert, read the *Traité* in manuscript as early as the middle 1750s and his work complements that of de Brosses. Both provided Monboddo with inspiring information and ideas about the history of man - one from an anthropological, the other from a linguistic, standpoint. Yet, at the same time, both challenged his rationalistic assumptions about the nature of mind and its relation to the physical world.

The significance of Buffon's chapter on the varieties of the human species for OPL I, can be seen when both are compared in
detail with MP76 - first in relation to bibliographical references and then to ideas.

2. Bibliography
At the beginning of MP76 Monboddo praises Buffon's collection of facts about barbarous nations ("from an infinite number of books of travels and histories") as the fullest he has met with. Although other manuscripts in the Monboddo Papers reveal that he consulted many works of this type besides those in Buffon III, there is a remarkable correspondence between the titles cited in Buffon III and in MP76 with OPL I - as the following list shows - so the contribution of this chapter of Buffon's Histoire to Monboddo's own account of savage peoples and languages can hardly be overestimated.

Most of the works are listed in the Advocates' Library Catalogue for 1776: only one is to be found in the earlier catalogue of 1742. There is no way of knowing whether these were already available in the Library during the 1760s but the "Register of the proceedings of the Curators and Keeper of the Library" which begins in 1725 and goes up to 1754, when relations between the Curators and Hume declined, shows that a remarkable number of books of this type were acquired after about 1748. Six such works - including Bosman's description of Eastern Guinea (which Buffon used in his account of the orang outang) and Dampier's voyage around the world (used by Buffon and Monboddo) - were purchased in June 1749 alone. Under Hume, in April 1754, the library acquired, among other travels, Labat's account of Africa and the voyages of Bernier and La Hontan.
All were used by Monboddo, particularly the last, which was a major source for his account of North American languages in OPL I.27

Works cited in Buffon III, MP76 and OPL I:
Charlevoix, Pierre Francois Xavier de

Histoire et description générale de la Nouvelle France
Paris 1744 [CAL 1776]

Dampier, William

Voyage around the world... 3 vols London 1703
[CAL 1776]

Frézier, A-F.

Relation du voyage de la mer du Sud... 2 vols
Amsterdam 1717 [CAL 1742]

la Condamine, Charles Marie de

Relation abrégée du'un voyage fait dans l'intérieur de l'Amérique Meridionale... 1745
[CAL 1807]
also in Histoire de l'Académie Royale des Sciences et Belles Lettres... 1745
[CAL 1776]

la Vega, Garcias Lasso de

l'Histoire des Incas, rois du Pérou, Paris, 1744
[CAL 1776]

le Gobien, Charles

l'Histoire des Isles Marianes... Paris 1700

included in

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Callander, John

Terra Australis cognita... 3 vols Edinburgh 1766

[CAL 1776]

Polo, Marco

Delle cose de Tartari...

in Ramusio, G. Navigazioni e viaggi diversi

3 vols. Venice 1554 [CAL 1776]

To these we must add works cited in Buffon III, OPL I, and various manuscripts in the Monboddo Papers:

la Hontan, le Baron de

Nouveaux voyages dans l'Amerique Septentrionale...

2 vols. The Hague 1702, 1704 [CAL 1776]

Sagard Theodet, Gabriel

Grand Voyage du pays des Hurons... Paris 1632

[CAL 1807 The catalogue lists separately

Sagard Theodet's "Dictionnaire de la langue Huronne..."]

In this third group also are Lettres édifiantes et curieuses concernant l'Asie, l'Afrique et l'Amérique [CAL 1776] compiled from reports made by Jesuit missionaries. Although in OPL I (467) Monboddo only cites volume 26 (which included Father Pons' account of Sanskrit) - a reference he found in de Brosse's Traité - the Monboddo Papers show he consulted at least one of the volumes used by Buffon, vol. 23.
Another possibility is the History of Kamschatka compiled by the Russian academy. Monboddo used James Grieve's translation, *Natural History of Kamschatka* (Gloucester 1764) [Cat. Advoc. Lib. 1776] and also read an account in the Annual Register for 1764. Buffon III refers frequently to Kamschatka and there is no doubt that Monboddo was influenced by Buffon's theory that the American indians had come to the new continent via that region. It is not sure, however, that he used a French translation of the same account.

Both writers refer frequently to Linnaeus. Monboddo's attack on Buffon III is largely based on the *Systema Naturae* 4 vols (Vindobonate 1767) [Cat. Advoc. Lib. 1776] and *Amoenitates academicae* 6 vols (Lugduni Batavorum 1749). But Buffon III refers almost exclusively to a different work, evidently not used by Monboddo: *Fauna Suecica* (1746).

For the most part, these were well known works, and it is likely that they were available in the Advocates' Library in 1766. The one exception, of course, is Sagard Theodet (1632) which Monboddo consulted in the Bibliothèque de Roi. It is not listed in the Catalogue of the Advocates' Library until 1807; but we may surmise it was acquired in the late 1790s due to the influence of Monboddo (who made lists of books he thought should be in the Library) or of his first volume - which frequently refers to the *Grand voyage du pays des Hurons*. 30

Besides these there are a few items which appear in Buffon III and MP76 (or, more frequently, other manuscripts among the Monboddo
Papers) but are not cited in OPL I. There are also of course, works of the same type - though very few - which are cited in OPL I and in various manuscripts other than MP76, but are not mentioned in Buffon's account of the variety of the human species. And finally, as already noted, there are many travel books - frequently containing descriptions of barbarous languages - which Monboddo mentioned only in the Monboddo Papers. 31

An important instance of this first category is J.B. du Tertre, L'Histoire naturelle et morale des isles Antilles (3 vols. Paris 1667-71 cf. Cat. Advoc. Lib. 1776). This, one of Buffon's major sources in the chapter on the species of mankind, deals with the Caribs - a race whose primitiveness fascinated Monboddo, as we have seen. Buffon, in fact, asserted that these people were incapable of thought. 32

Most of Buffon's references to du Tertre occur during his long discussion of savagery - the beginning of which (on p. 490) in the Advocates' Library copy of volume III appears to have been marked by Monboddo; and MP101 - "Notes from le Pere Tartar's [sic] Account of the Natives of the Antilles Islands..." - is devoted entirely to du Tertre. However, at the time of writing the letter to a young landowner - of which MP71 appears to be a copy - Monboddo states that this work, which he believed gave the best account available of the early stages of human nature, was unknown to him - except from some quotations given by Rousseau in his Discours 33 MP71 tends to confirm that Monboddo read Rousseau before he read Buffon II - that, in fact Rousseau's Discours whetted his appetite.
for accounts of barbarous peoples and laid the foundation for OPL.

However, Monboddo made use of two other works not mentioned by Buffon in writing his account of the Caribs for OPL I: la Borde34 and Charles Caesar de Rochefort. The latter - which he read in the translation by John Davies, History of the Caribby Islands35 - had been quoted by Ray in his Wisdom of God, one of Monboddo's favourite works.36

In this same category are references to travellers' tales which Monboddo apparently followed up in sources other than those used by Buffon - notably the descriptions of the language of the Hottentots which Buffon had found in da Gama and other writers. These travellers had compared the sound of Hottentot speech to sighing - or the gobbling of a turkey.37 In MP76 and elsewhere among the Monboddo Papers, Monboddo cites this together with la Condamine's similar remarks about the speech of a tribe in the Amazon region38 - but only includes the latter in OPL I. This may be because he later discovered more specific information on the Hottentot language by consulting another of Buffon's sources: Peter Kolben's Caput Bonae Spei Hodiernum; or A particular account of the several nations of the Hottentots, their religion, government, laws, customs, ceremonies, and opinions (London 1731 cf. Cat.Advoc.Lib.1776). This work includes an account of the language of the Hottentots.39 The occurrence of this reference in MP109, "Of the Orang Outang and whether he be of the Human Species" - a manuscript based on Buffon XIV [1766] and probably written quite soon after MP76, tends
to confirm that he consulted Kolben later, possibly as a result of reading Buffon III.

Buffon III also discusses the Esquimaux and the Greenlanders— which Monboddo thought should be considered as belonging to the same race on the grounds of their similar languages. By the time he published OPL I Monboddo had consulted Dobbs' vocabulary of Esquimaux — and during the late '80s and early '90s he wrote to Grim Thorkelin on the subject of the language of the Greenlanders.

We know from OPL I and the Monboddo Papers that Monboddo supplemented the works Buffon had used with other sources: notably, travels and histories composed in ancient times by such as Diodorus Siculus, Herodotus, Strabo and Polybius. (See especially MP80, "Collections from ancient authors concerning Natural Curiosities and Strange Countries") but also contemporary works published after the first three volumes of the Histoire had appeared (1749). One of the most important of these was a collection of travels by the author of the Traité, Charles de Brosses, which Buffon himself had encouraged. Histoire des navigations aux terres Australes (Paris 1756 cf. Cat.Advoc.Lib.1787). It is unlikely, however that Monboddo was aware of the connexion because he consistently ascribes the work to a Monsieur de la Brosse — the name of a traveller cited in Buffon's third volume. The work was well known among the literati of Edinburgh. It had been partially translated by John Callander of Craigforth, the antiquary and philologist, and published in Edinburgh in 1766 — the year in which Monboddo read

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Buffon III and composed MP76, among many other manuscripts— in a collection entitled Terra Australis Cognita (cf. Catalogue of the Advocates' Library 1776). There is evidence that Monboddo was familiar with the work. 43

OPL I appeared too soon for Monboddo to make much use of published accounts of Captain Cook's voyages of 1768-1771, although he does refer to them in later manuscripts. John Hawkesworth's account, for instance, published in 1773, and listed in the Catalogue of the Advocates' Library 1776, included vocabularies of Tahitian and several other Pacific languages. But it was based largely on the journals of Monboddo's friend, Sir Joseph Banks—from whom Monboddo was able to obtain first-hand information on Tahitian. 44

Other works of a similar nature cited in OPL I but not in Buffon III include: Bougainville, Voyage autour du Monde (Paris 1771); 45 Maturin Veyssière de la Croze, Histoire du Christianisme des Indes (2 vols. The Hague 1758); 46 and Benoît de Maillet, Description de l'Egypte (Paris 1735). 47 The last was one of those books of travel purchased for the Advocates' Library in 1754 under Hume. 48

So Monboddo was indebted to Buffon, and several of Buffon's sources, for much of the anthropological data for his history of man; for the facts discovered by modern travellers, which Rousseau had taught him revealed the primitive pre-social state of man described by the ancients—and, consequently, the wonderful progression of our species. Modern philosophers had made the mistake of drawing
their data from modern European man, and therefore concluded that human nature is the same in all ages and nations.

Without making a large collection of data of this sort - as Buffon had done in his chapter on the varieties of mankind - we can complete neither the history nor the natural history of man (the two complementary aspects of the Scale of Being). Nor can we form schemes for the improvement of man and of his happiness in society - which were the ends of the all embracing study of man, including Ethics and Politics, known as Moral Philosophy. That is to say, the history of man, like the history of language which reflected it, was teleological. In completing it, Monboddo proposed to determine both man's present place in the Scale of Being and his potentiality for ascending further. The history of man, like the history of language - for there must be an absolute scale of languages reflecting the scale of civilization - had a moral and a practical purpose in eighteenth century Scotland. The literati nurtured a passion for improvement in general - social, economic, cultural and linguistic - and improvement implied a scale of values, which could only be established empirically.

However, although Buffon's influence on Monboddo's reading of travels and histories is beyond dispute, we cannot assume a simple relationship between Buffon III, MP76 and OPL I. The holdings of the Advocates' Library at this period are an important factor and we can only speculate on the possible effect of Buffon (particularly volume III) on the choice of books made by its Keeper and Curators.
Buffon's influence on Monboddo's reading may not always have been direct. Nor was it unique. Works of this nature - especially relating to the New World - enjoyed enormous popularity in both France and Britain. (In Britain, this popularity was doubtless partly related to the numerous military and political reports from North America currently appearing - in the Scots Magazine, for example - which referred to treaties or skirmishes with various Indian tribes.) The extent of the general interest in Scotland can be gauged from the readings of others besides Monboddo. It can hardly be overemphasized that in his reading Monboddo was very much a man of his time and native country.

3. **MP109: "Of the Orang Outang and whether he be of the Human Species"**

It has been mentioned that MP76 refers briefly to the Wild Girl, the "orang outang" and to Monboddo's own visit to the Cabinet du Roi of which Buffon was the director. It was there that Bernard de Jussieu (1699-1777), sub-demonstrator of plants in the Jardin du Roi, showed him the stuffed chimpanzee which he refers to as an orang outang.

After this Monboddo became preoccupied with the anthropoid ape and his place in the Scale of Being. MP109, "Of the Orang Outang and whether he be of the Human Species", probably belongs to 1766 or a little later. It cannot be earlier because it is based on volume 14 of Buffon's *Histoire Naturelle, générale et particulière*, avec la description du Cabinet du Roi which appeared in that year.
In view of the enormous Scottish interest in the work it was probably added to the earlier volumes in the Advocates' Library quite soon after publication. Evidently following a hint in a footnote to Rousseau's second Discours, Monboddo is concerned to establish that the "orang-outang" is actually a primitive man — contrary to the arguments of Linnaeus and Buffon who ranged man just above the orang outang. Monboddo draws mostly on chapters one and two of Buffon's work: "Nomenclature des Singes" and "Les Orang-outangs ou le Pongo and le Jocko". Chapter two contains a mass of data on anthropoid apes from scientists and travellers and in MP109 Monboddo cites much of this: he refers especially to Linnaeus, Bontius, Purchas, Gassendi and to Edward Tyson's Orang-Outang, sive Homo Sylvestris: or, the Anatomy of a Pygmie compared with that of a Monkey an Ape and a Man (London 1699).

MP 109 is the basis of two chapters which Monboddo added to the second edition of OPL I: Chapters four and five of book two — "Of the Orang Outang. The Account Buffon and Linnaeus give of him examined".

Tyson's book, which Buffon refers to at length, but which Monboddo had not previously consulted, was of the greatest importance. It convinced Monboddo that Buffon was wrong in denying humanity to the "orang outang" primarily because Tyson had no doubts about its capacity for speech — something on which Jussieu had apparently misled him, as Monboddo wrote to the President of the Royal Society, Sir John Pringle.
Reviewing in detail the evidence of Tyson's dissection and that of several travellers quoted by Buffon, Monboddo concludes that the "orang outang" is indeed a man: the evidence is sufficient to meet the Aristotelian definition of man as a rational animal capable of intellect and science. Buffon errs in making the faculty of speech part of man's nature and in regarding the state of nature in which man was without speech as purely imaginary. Contrary to Buffon's belief, articulation must have been acquired very slowly over a long period. Language could not have evolved easily within the family as de Brosses and Buffon had supposed. In the Advocates' Library copy of volume fourteen of Buffon's *Histoire* the passages dealing with these subjects have been marked with a quill pen. 55

According to Monboddo, Linnaeus, who admits that the "orang outang" belongs to our genus but not the human species, is misled by his method of classification based on detailed observation of physical characteristics. Monboddo advocates the ancient method of dividing things into genera and species based on mind, which requires definition as well as division. In short, although observation and experiment have their place, logic is the foundation of science.

As to Buffon's doubts about the validity of any method of classification, "there can be no science of individuals and we have no knowledge of anything but by the genus or species to which it belongs". Monboddo's statement summarizes the argument of OPL. 56
Chapter Twelve

ADAM SMITH'S DISSERTATION ON LANGUAGE

1. The influence of Condillac

Adam Smith's short conjectural history of language, Considerations concerning the First Formation of Languages (1761), originated in a lecture entitled "Of the Origin and Progress of Language" - one of his famous course of lectures on rhetoric and belles lettres delivered at Edinburgh and at Glasgow University. Like OPL, it owes a good deal to Rousseau's second Discours - Discours sur l'origine et les fondemens de l'inégalité parmi les hommes (1755) - which Smith refers to and which he had reviewed in the year of its publication. However, it appears to owe even more to Rousseau's major source, a work of which Monboddo evidently had no first-hand knowledge, but which Smith owned: Condillac's Essai sur l'origine des connoissances humaines (1746).

Although the limited scope of Smith's dissertation precludes a close comparison, Smith certainly shared Condillac's approach to the origin of language - an approach which largely derived from Locke, although Condillac took Lockian epistemology further in the direction of sensationalism. Condillac's assumptions may be summarized as follows.

The principles of language are revealed by its history, not by the rules of grammarians. The history of language shows that it is...
not an intellectual construct but the product of nature - that is, of sensation and man's instinctive response to needs. Specifically, language is the result of man's ability to decompose his sense perceptions by means of his faculty of abstraction. Finally, the first languages possessed a natural perfection which has been destroyed by grammarians.  

Even the narrow range of Smith's essay is defined by a question which Condillac had raised. Smith deals primarily with the manner and order in which the parts of speech could have been developed. The problem, which preoccupied many eighteenth century philosophers after Condillac, was how the primitive originators of language were capable of the necessary abstraction and generalization. It was one of Rousseau's two fundamental questions about the origin of language. How could man have mastered the subtleties of logic and grammar before he had the use of language itself?  

Like Condillac himself, Smith regards nouns, verbs, adjectives and prepositions as the most important parts of speech. Furthermore, the development of adjectives and particularly prepositions must have required a high degree of intellectual sophistication. And in Smith's theory this assumption, shared by both philosophers, has important consequences.  

Like Condillac again, Smith assumes that the difficulty of inventing a part of speech must have determined the stage at which it emerged. However, Smith does not see the twin faculties of comparison and abstraction as the only faculties of importance: there is also systematization - or "love of analogy". Thus the
amount of abstraction is not exclusively linked (as it is in OPL) to the systematicity of the language. There is also the natural process of inflection - which is a method of avoiding abstraction. Inflection retains something of the simplicity and unity with which the primitive mind conceives events in nature - that is, it retains something of the quality of event-names (another concept deriving, at least in part, from Condillac).

Finally, chance - the mixing of nations - is allowed to interrupt the continuous process of linguistic evolution envisaged by Condillac. In other words, Smith's Considerations is not exclusively a conjectural history.

2. Smith's theory of linguistic development

Although he believed, like Monboddo, that verbs must at least have been "coeval with the very first attempts towards the formation of language", Smith begins his hypothetical account with two savages giving particular names to familiar objects - that is, he adopts the suggestion which Locke made but then abandoned. As their experience grew, they would gradually perceive that these objects belonged to classes and be able to generalize the terms. That is, they would proceed, as children do, from proper to common nouns (nouns substantive).

Necessity would then require them to distinguish one particular thing from others of the same class. Eventually this would be achieved by distinguishing the peculiar qualities of things (e.g. "the green tree"); and later still by specifying their relations with
other things (e.g. "the green tree of the meadow"). That is, adjectives (nouns adjective) and prepositions would be developed. However, these are very abstract parts of speech and, as Rousseau said, the inventors of language cannot have been capable of "the different mental operations of arrangement or classing, of comparison and abstraction" which must have gone to the invention of even "the least metaphysical" of adjectives (colours). Consequently, the primitive men who first produced language were forced to find an expedient which required no abstraction.8

They discovered that by varying the termination of nouns it was possible to represent a whole range of qualities (not only gender and number). And a similar contrivance could be used to avoid the need for the invention of the still more difficult preposition (as in the Latin "fructus arboris": the fruit of the tree). This was, in any case, a more natural method of representing qualities and relations, since in nature they are inseparable from their particular substances or their co-relative objects.9

When necessity finally demanded the invention of adjectives it was equally natural that they would be given the same terminations as the nouns to which they applied - "from that love of similarity of sound... which is the foundation of analogy in all languages".10

Thus the difficulty of forming abstract terms led to the complexity of the declensions of Greek and, to a lesser extent, Latin. This complexity is even more marked in their conjugations.

The first species of verb to be invented was probably the impersonal verb: that is, verbs "which express in one word a complete
event, which preserve in the expression that perfect simplicity and unity which there always is in the object and in the idea. The Latin word "pluit" ("it rains"), for example, supposes "no abstraction, or metaphysical division of the event into its several constituent members of subject and attribute". Like "lucet" ("it is day") it expresses "a complete affirmation, the whole of an event, with that perfect simplicity and unity with which the mind conceives it in nature". The division of the event into two parts is "altogether artificial and is the effect of the imperfection of language".

However, because of the infinite variety of events, necessity forced men to divide them into their "metaphysical parts expressed by the different parts of speech". That is, just as they learned to divide words into their elements (letters) instead of using ideograms, so they learned to divide events into words. And the advantages and disadvantages were the same. The invention of the alphabet required more symbols to represent one word, but it simplified the writing system. The invention of words meant that the expression of each particular event became more complex but "the whole system of the language became more coherent, more connected, more easily retained and comprehended".

When verbs became more personal the problem of inventing pronouns arose. Being extremely abstract, this was also avoided by adding terminations to the verbs. The result was that the conjugations of original languages like Greek became even more intricate than their declensions. This process resulted in
increasingly systematic highly-inflected languages whose complexity was no problem to the native speaker and which ensured an increasingly simple composition.

However, when two nations mixed, the grammar of the dominant language became simplified because individuals naturally tended to supply their ignorance of the ancient declensions by the use of prepositions, and their ignorance of the conjugations by the use of auxiliary verbs. ¹⁵

That is, it is a general rule that "the more simple a language is in its composition, the more complex it must be in its declensions and conjugations" and vice versa. ¹⁶

The supreme example of the former case is Greek, an uncompounded language derived from some 300 primitives - proof that when new words were required they were not borrowed but derived (by composition or derivation) from a native word. ¹⁷

Latin, being compounded, is less complex grammatically. French and Italian are less grammatically complex than Latin but therefore more complex in their composition. The simplest language from a grammatical point of view, but the most complex in its composition, is English. ¹⁸

Smith compares this process of simplification to the development of a machine: "All machines are generally, when first invented, extremely complex in their principles... Succeeding improvers observe that one principle may be so applied as to produce several... movements; and thus the machine becomes gradually more and more simple, and produces its effects with fewer wheels and fewer...
principles of motion." But whereas the simplification of machines makes them more perfect, the simplification of the rules of languages has the opposite effect. It makes them more prolix, less agreeable to the ear and limits a speaker's power to transpose the order of the words - which facilitated the composition of the ancients.¹⁹

3. Smith's Considerations and OPL

There is no doubt that Monboddo was completely familiar with Smith's Considerations. He cites it several times in OPL; and although he sometimes disagrees with Smith, he generally professes admiration for the essay.²⁰ Indeed, it is possible that the idea of undertaking a much more extensive work with the same title as Smith's original lecture - but directed against its sensationist epistemology - was prompted in part by Smith's brief and inconsistent account of the origin and development of language.

This is made more likely by the fact that OPL seems to be a refutation of Smith's Lockian views on rhetoric in general - the context of the original lecture.²¹ It is possible that Monboddo heard Smith's Edinburgh lectures on rhetoric and belles lettres; but, in any case, he must have known Smith's views from Select Society debates - including, of course, the scepticism implicit in Smith's moral philosophy which was reminiscent of his friend Hume.²²

Certainly the Considerations are restricted in scope and subject to obvious methodological limitations of which Monboddo must have been aware. At the same time, there are several points of similarity between OPL and Smith's work: and sometimes Monboddo seems to have made
skilful use of Smith's concepts to further very different philosophical ends. (However, it must be remembered that Monboddo was also influenced by Rousseau's second Discours - a source of Smith's).

In the first place, Monboddo supposed, like Rousseau and Condillac - and to a greater extent than Smith - that the gradual growth of language reflects the mind's increasing powers of abstraction and generalization gained from the comparison of sense data; and that there was, therefore, in some sense, a "natural" sequence in the development of language based on the degree of "metaphysical abstraction" involved in the slow process of classifying reality. However, he does not mean to imply that this could have been a continuous organic process governed by nature, instinct and necessity. Quite the reverse. Systematic language required the deliberate intervention of philosopher-grammarians. That is, in order to rebut naturalistic theories like Smith's, he emphasises the traditional distinction between barbarous languages and languages or art. He is not principally concerned with the former, but with the latter - and with distinguishing the two as clearly as he can. Barbarous peoples are only capable of a limited degree of linguistic systematicity - and even that is evidently the result of deliberate, if ad hoc, intervention. Monboddo talks of "nature" and "necessity" in connection with barbarous languages, but he is careful to restrict the achievement of these factors as far as possible. 23

Secondly, like Smith, Monboddo assumes that the world can be classified according to the traditional Aristotelian categories

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(substance, quality, relation, action etc.) and that these are universally reflected in language.

However, according to Monboddo, they are only very imperfectly reflected in even the most advanced of barbarous languages: and the degree to which they are accurately represented in a language is a measure of its art. Whereas Smith makes a passing reference to Aristotelian genera and species in Lockian terms, Monboddo makes it his major theme: he investigates the origin and nature of abstract ideas (a subject which Smith deals with elsewhere) through the history of language. That is, what Smith discusses in the course of his lectures on rhetoric and early writings, Monboddo subsumes under the title of OPL.

Thirdly, like Smith, Monboddo emphasises the development of the parts of speech. But, unlike him, he does not assume that the nature and causes of linguistic structure can be discussed solely in terms of lexical categories.

Fourthly, although Monboddo assumes the universality of the traditional lexical categories for languages of art, he does not, as Smith does, base his account of the development of primitive languages on obviously inadequate data. Whereas Smith restricts himself to the classical languages, French, Italian and English, Monboddo draws on a wealth of data concerning barbarous languages. This is one of the most important features of OPL.

Finally, Monboddo adapts the concept of the event-name (of which he also found brief mentions in du Halde and in Rousseau's second Discours). But, as with Smith's other principles, he examines it in
greater depth and applies it much more consistently. This is worth examining in some detail.

He begins with the principle (which is only implicit in Smith) that everything in nature is mingled. It follows that the first impressions of primitive men — which must have preceded the first languages — must also have been pre-categorical chunks of experience. That is, they involved no abstraction and were therefore not ideas at all.

This jumble of sense-impressions was reflected in the unanalysed event name, which is fundamental to Monboddo's account of barbarous languages. To begin with, a savage considers the action, the agent, the object and the manner in which the action is performed, all in a lump — as they exist in nature. When he does begin to abstract, his first ideas will consist of substances mixed with their principal qualities; or of actions mixed with circumstances which chanced to attract his attention.

Because of this, barbarous languages do not have names for any substance considered abstractly. Qualities belonging to species will be mixed with those belonging to individuals. That is, at first there will be a multiplicity of imperfectly analysed bits of event names rather than parts of speech.

Barbarous languages continue expanding their partially analysed vocabulary without developing either morphology or syntax. Eventually they become impracticable, and art must intervene. Monboddo hints at a preliminary stage at which the most intelligent men do not succeed
in producing a language of art. Evidently the limited amount of morphology and syntax to be found in some barbarous languages is the result of their conscious ad hoc attempts at systematization. But he is more concerned with the later stage at which philosopher-grammarians are able to remake the language entirely.

In short, morphology and syntax are not the natural product of conceptual analysis: and languages of art, like Greek, must be regarded as a completely separate category from unsystematic barbarous languages.

When grammarians did intervene more successfully and formed a language of art - which (pace Smith) should always be as simple as such a complex artifact can be - there must have been an intermediate stage in which the language was too complex in structure and had to be simplified. In this way the development of languages of art resembles the invention of machines.

That is, because Monboddo regards such languages as deliberate constructs, he is able to assert a complete correspondence between the degree of semantic abstraction and the degree of linguistic systematicity - and therefore to apply Smith's mechanical simile more appropriately. (Smith had been forced to say that, unlike machines, the analytical languages resulting from further abstraction were retrogressive.) In short, Monboddo makes a closer parallel between the advance of mind and the advance of language. There is a preordained sequence of abstraction resulting in a hierarchy of languages: but evidently the process of abstraction itself is not instinctive but an acquired habit.
It is true that Monboddo agrees with Smith about the superiority of highly inflected languages in general - and Greek in particular. But he does not identify inflection with the event-name, nor does he regard Greek as an organic development. Quite the opposite. Inflection is a deliberate imposition of system and Greek is the highest achievement of conscious intellection.
Chapter Thirteen

THE INFLUENCE OF JAMES HARRIS'S HERMES

James Harris (1709-1780)

1709 Born Salisbury, 20th July, the son of James Harris and Lady Elizabeth Ashley, sister of Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury.

1725-33 Attended Wadham College, Oxford, and Lincoln's Inn. Accepted the empirical philosophy associated with Newton and Locke.

1733-61 Retired to Salisbury to a life of study. Revised his view of the Ancients, devoting fifteen years to classical literature and philosophy.

1744 First edition of Three Treatises concerning Art,... Music, Painting and Poetry, ... and Happiness.

1751 First edition of Hermes: or, a Philosophical Inquiry concerning Language and Universal Grammar.

1752 Professor James Clow reads a paper on Hermes to the Glasgow Literary Society. Publication of Upon the Rise and Progress of Criticism.

1755 Three Treatises (1744) reprinted in Principes de littérature by Abbé Batteux.

1756 Thomas Blacklock publishes his Essay on Universal Etymology (Edinburgh) based on Hermes.

1760(? ) A Short Account of the Four Parts of Speech according to Aristotle, as explained in Hermes.

1761 M.P. for Christchurch.

1763-65 Lord of the Admiralty and subsequently Lord of the Treasury.

1766 Beginning of correspondence with Monboddo.

1771 3rd edition of Hermes.
1st edition of Smellie's Encyclopaedia Britannica (Edinburgh) including the article "Grammar" based largely on Hermes.

1772 3rd edition of Three Treatises.

1773 Hermes published in Dublin. Monboddo publishes the first volume of OPL.

1774 Harris becomes Secretary and Comptroller to the Queen.

1775 Philosophical Arrangements published - part of a work on Aristotelian logic directed against the French materialists.

1780 Died 22 December.
German translation of Three Treatises.

1781 Philological Inquiries published.
4th edition of Three Treatises.

1784-85 German translation of Monboddo's OPL.

1785 Histoire littéraire du moyen âge - a translation of part of Philological Inquiries.


1788 German translation of Hermes.

1794 5th edition of Three Treatises.
5th edition of Hermes.

1796 French translation of Hermes by Francois Thurot.

1801 The Works of James Harris edited by his son, Lord Malmesbury.

1802 New edition of Philological Inquiries.


1816 New edition of Hermes.

1825 New edition of Hermes.


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1. Introduction

Although Harris and Monboddo may originally have met much earlier, their correspondence appears to have begun early in 1766, perhaps following a London meeting during the previous year. Thereafter they wrote to each other quite frequently, usually on various aspects of Greek language and philosophy - which both hoped to revive in their respective countries.¹

In the same year Monboddo wrote in MP144 - one of the manuscripts which was eventually incorporated into OPL - that he must often refer to Harris's philosophical grammar *Hermes* because it is "a complete work of the kind, explaining language in all its parts, distributed according to order and method".²

In OPL Monboddo describes Harris as "a very learned man though not in a learned age" and *Hermes* [1751] as "a work that will be read and admired as long as there is any taste for philosophy and fine writing in Britain".³ He constantly refers to *Hermes* at key points in the first two volumes of OPL, frequently quoting Harris or Harris's sources. In fact, except for Monboddo's rigorous exclusion of Roman authors and more extensive treatment of the Aristotelian commentators, his classical references are almost identical to Harris's. While he occasionally disagrees with Harris - notably on the article and on the system of tenses - he frequently refers the reader to *Hermes* for a fuller account.⁴ Monboddo also mentions Harris's *Three Treatises* [1744] - as the supreme example of Plato's "diaeretic method" - and describes his as yet unpublished *Philosophical Arrangements* [1775] as "the best
book of metaphysics in the English language. But, excepting Aristotle and his commentators, in the crucial volumes (I and II) of OPL, Hermes is his major source, ancient or modern.

However, it is not merely a question of the number of references to Harris and his sources in OPL I and II. The two works are similar in aim and spirit — indeed, Monboddo himself regarded them as complementary. As to their aims, both support the ancients against the moderns in the longstanding 'quarrel' which had begun during the Renaissance. That is, both uphold the ancient Greek philosophy of mind against the fashionable empirical philosophy associated with Bacon, Newton and Locke — which they regard as having led to scepticism and materialism. More specifically, their intention is to refute Lockian empiricism and reinstitute Aristotelian logic as the basis of human thought.

This amounted to rejecting the prevailing spirit of the Enlightenment and reversing the accepted view that Locke had superseded Aristotle — a view that Harris himself had held until about 1740. Yet Monboddo and Harris do not attempt to revive ancient rationalism as the antithesis of modern empiricism. On the contrary, in spite of their preference for pure reason, they wish to show that rationalism and empiricism are complementary; and that modern philosophy rested on the achievements of the ancients. OPL may even be described as an exercise in the critical history of ideas. By demonstrating Locke's debt to Aristotle, Monboddo evidently wishes to restore the Lockian concepts of Enlightenment philosophers to their original foundation in the
ancient philosopher whom they illogically opposed.

As to the spirit in which these aims are pursued, both works are imbued with the Neoplatonic tradition: indeed, it is here as much as in the tradition of 'Aristotelian' grammar, that Harris's influence on Monboddo can be traced most clearly.

In the light of the Neoplatonic tradition Harris and Monboddo saw Stoicism, Platonism and Aristotelianism as aspects of a single, perennial philosophy - an attitude deriving largely from Cicero and authors of later antiquity, like Porphyry, Iamblichus and Ammonius, who are constantly cited in *Hermes* and *OPL*. This Neoplatonic vision of an unchanging universal truth that has always enlightened man owes much to Stoic concepts incorporated into the Platonic tradition by Plotinus (205-70). However, Stoicism also had an independent history which had a formative influence on Monboddo long before he read *Hermes* and embraced Neoplatonism.

Stoicism (which included Pre-Socratic, Platonic and Aristotelian elements) affected the Renaissance via Cicero, Seneca and the Greek commentators on Aristotle. It also had a lasting effect on Roman law, again via Cicero and Seneca: an influence which can be seen most clearly in the natural law tradition, where it combined with Aristotelian and Christian notions. Because of their connection with Roman law, Stoic concepts pervaded Scottish legal philosophy. The Episcopalian founder of the Advocates' Library, Sir George Mackenzie, was a notable Stoic. And the early Monboddo Papers, so closely
associated with the Select Society, are imbued with Cicero's legal philosophy. In fact, the traditional Stoic emphasis on the rationality of man and the ideal of an orderly universe runs through the Monboddo Papers as a whole and OPL itself. 7

The attraction of Stoicism was that it offered an all-embracing philosophy connecting epistemology, logic and ethics into a rational whole. The universe consists of active mind and passive matter: and the organising principle of all things, which providentially determines their orderly development, is active mind or pneuma - which becomes logos (reason) in mature human beings. Since an equally rational set of moral truths matches the coherence of nature, man's logos enables him to grasp both the cosmic and the moral order. Thus man shares in the divine rationality of God or universal Nature - which is conceived as a world-soul, immanent in everything. 8

By the eighteenth century Stoicism had become widely diffused, influencing Shaftesbury and Bishop Butler among others. The widespread vogue for "moral Newtonianism", of which Reid's Scottish Common Sense philosophy is the outstanding example, owes much to the Stoic spirit. And OPL may be regarded as offering an analysis of mind similar to Reid's but which deliberately returns to Hellenistic origins. Indeed, Monboddo's vision of the whole resembles that of Francis Hutcheson - the disciple of Shaftesbury, founder of the Greek revival at Glasgow and progenitor of the Common Sense philosophy. And his purpose is the same: the combatting of
scepticism and materialism, whether associated with Hobbes and Mandeville, or Locke and Hume. It is difficult to separate Stoicism from Neoplatonism, but the Stoic strain in Monboddo's thought must have predisposed him to accept Harris's Neoplatonic response to the same challenge.  

Monboddo regards Hermes as having superseded the seminal work of the Enlightenment, Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), maintaining that Locke's criticisms of Aristotle were based on the misrepresentation of the scholastics: "But now Mr Harris has opened to us the treasures of Greek philosophy, to consider Mr Locke still as a standard book of philosophy, would be ... continuing to feed on acorns after corn was discovered".  

What Monboddo saw as Harris's rediscovery of the genuine Greek philosophy was based largely on the later (late 5th and early 6th century) Neoplatonic commentators of the Alexandrian school - Ammonius, Simplicius, and the Christian, John Philoponus, for instance. Following the example of Porphyry and Iamblichus, these scholars tended to emphasise the agreement of Aristotle and Plato. Monboddo believed, with some justice, that they could illuminate the abstruse parts of Aristotle because they had access to philosophical works that had since been lost. However, Harris's Neoplatonism goes beyond this, reflecting the influence of his uncle Lord Shaftesbury and the seventeenth century Cambridge Platonists. And when already engaged on OPL Monboddo modified his Aristotelianism in accordance with Harris's views.
In this connexion Monboddo's earliest extant letter to Harris, dated 26th March 1766, is of interest. The letter, which is of considerable importance regarding the genesis of OPL, thanks Harris for a copy of the second edition of *Hermes* (1765) and confirms that OPL was already under way as the result of Monboddo's visits to the Bibliothèque royale (later the Bibliothèque nationale) in Paris in 1764 during his investigations on behalf of the Douglas Cause - the famous case in which he was soon to make his name as an advocate. He writes: "I have one work in view, which ... would not make a bad second part ... to your *Hermes* ... a work shewing the origin and progress of this most wonderful of all the arts of man - the art of speech. What set me upon this train of thinking was the study of some most barbarous and imperfect languages spoken in America, from grammars and dictionaries which I got out of the King's library when I was last at Paris." That is, although he describes OPL as a sequel to *Hermes*, he does not suggest that Harris's philosophical grammar inspired OPL in any specific way. Not even the idea of publishing his linguistic investigations as a refutation of Locke's history of mind is attributed to his friend's influence. However, Monboddo acknowledges a large debt to Harris's "works" in general: "As your works first introduced me to the Greek philosophy, so this present [of *Hermes*] ... has revived my taste for that study, which tho' never quite extinguished, had been lost for some time amid the hurry of law business." From what we know of Monboddo's education it is impossible to take this claim literally. Monboddo's
Aristotelianism seems to have stemmed from his early tutors; from the traditional atmosphere of King's College, Aberdeen; and from his training in Scottish legal philosophy. In addition, while at Aberdeen he attended the Marischal College lectures of Thomas Blackwell, the disciple of Shaftesbury and leader of the so-called 'Greek revival' in the north.  

Monboddo may of course be flattering Harris, although this would not be in character. Alternatively, he may mean that Harris's *Three Treatises* (1744) — the second edition (1765) of which had just appeared — had reawakened his early passion for Aristotle. Both editions are listed in the *Advocates' Library Catalogue* of 1776; as, indeed, are the first and third editions of *Hermes* (1751, 1771). Monboddo can scarcely be implying that he is already acquainted with the philosophical parts of *Hermes* in its first edition, although it is possible that he knew of Harris's views on 'Aristotelian' grammar through Thomas Blacklock or even perhaps Harris's *Short Account* (? 1760). Not only is there no sign of the influence of *Hermes* in the Monboddo Papers dating from before 1766, but the same enthusiastic letter of March that year suggests Monboddo has no previous knowledge of Harris's major work. He says that he immediately "fell ... greedily" on the Aristotelian chapter dealing with general ideas — "the foundation of all science and knowledge". Furthermore, he confesses to being "entirely addicted" to Aristotle, whom he regards as having rescued Greek philosophy from Plato's "enthusiasm and mystic genius". .
In particular, he contrasts the "mysterious and enigmatical terms" of the Platonic theory of ideas with the clarity of Aristotle's. This is significant because Monboddo's uncompromising Aristotelianism is quite out of keeping with the Neoplatonism of most of Hermes - at least in its philosophical, as opposed to its grammatical, sections. It is also out of keeping with the published text of OPL, which owes a good deal to Harris and to the Neoplatonists who had influenced him. Evidently in March 1766 Monboddo does not yet know Hermes very well. (Alternatively, he is being outspokenly critical of its author's Neoplatonic views - an interpretation which does not fit the tone of Monboddo's letter.) We are thus forced to conclude that Harris's Neoplatonism had little or no influence on Monboddo until some time after March 1766 - that is, about eighteen months after he began his research into the history of language in Paris.

It is worth pausing to notice how surprising this delay is in view of the status of Neoplatonism in the Scottish Enlightenment, not to mention the Episcopalian cultural revival of the Restoration which prefigured it - a revival, which resulted in the foundation of the Advocates' Library. The Cambridge Platonists were popular with Episcopalian scholars of the late seventeenth century for the same reasons that recommended them to the Moderate leaders of the eighteenth century Enlightenment: their opposition to Hobbist materialism on one hand and to the narrow-mindedness of Calvinism on the other. But the Moderates were even more greatly influenced by
Shaftesbury who himself owed much to the Cambridge men. Indeed, Shaftesbury's notion of moral sense was the origin of the Scottish philosophy of Common Sense which countered Hume's scepticism and dominated British philosophy until well into the nineteenth century.17

Harris's Hermes itself enjoyed considerable popularity among the Moderates even before the publication of OPL I. It was discussed for instance by the Glasgow Literary Society as early as 1752. This society was closely associated with the Greek revival and linguistic questions, and Monboddo knew several of its members.18 Furthermore, in 1756 Monboddo's close friend Thomas Blacklock (whose ideas on the origin of language are discussed in OPL) published his Essay on Universal Etymology which was based on Hermes. So it is likely that Monboddo knew something of Harris's 'Aristotelian' grammatical views, at least at second hand.

Yet until the end of the Douglas Cause in July 1766 - or until he became a judge in 1767 - Monboddo was apparently too immersed in his career to reconsider Aristotle's philosophy as a whole in the light of Neoplatonism.

If Monboddo had not been won over to Neoplatonic interpretations of Aristotle, OPL would have been a very different book. Although he remained more of an Aristotelian than Harris, his references to the Neoplatonic tradition in general, and the Alexandrian commentators on Aristotle in particular, tend to be fuller than Harris's. So OPL may be seen partly as a learned commentary on Harris emphasising the history of Neoplatonic ideas in relation to Aristotle.
In accordance with the Neoplatonic tradition, Monboddo identifies the mythical Hermes Trismegistus with Thoth, the Egyptian god of wisdom credited with the invention of writing. He also recognizes the contribution of Pythagoras and the Christian Platonists of Alexandria - Philo, Clement and Origen. 19

In both works the names of the Platonic succession - Plato, Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus and Proclus - frequently appear; but Monboddo, in particular makes much use of Porphyry's lives of Pythagoras and Plotinus and of his famous introduction to Aristotelian logic. 20 Porphyry and his pupil Iamblichus were important because they began the tendency to assimilate Plato and Aristotle - a tendency continued by Proclus, the great synthesiser of Neoplatonic doctrines who had studied at Alexandria. But it is the high point of the Alexandrian school - represented by Ammonius, Simplicius, and John Philoponus - which concerns Monboddo most. For these were the Aristotelian commentators who regarded Aristotle as the supreme master in logic, metaphysics and natural philosophy (along with the Timaeus of Plato). 21

Both Harris and Monboddo seem to regard themselves as liberal-minded rationalists in the mould of the Cambridge Platonists. That is, they do not reject science out of hand (some of the Monboddo papers indicate an early admiration for Newton) but oppose the materialistic and sceptical tendency of Baconian empiricism. And, like the Cambridge men, their principal target is the Hobbist belief that the universe is a chance product of the motion of matter,
undirected by mind. (Monboddo actually knew little of Hobbes in 1766 but regarded Locke as belonging to the same materialist school of thought.) Consequently the principal theme of Hermes and OPL is the same as Cudworth's: the restoration of universal order by reinstituting the traditional Christianized form of the Scale of Being - which had entered the eighteenth century via Locke deprived of its religious context. Monboddo had first-hand knowledge of Cudworth's principal works: The True Intellectual System of the Universe (1678) and A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality which had been posthumously published in 1731.22

The concept of the Scale of Being in its secularized form was widespread in the eighteenth century - and, perhaps significantly, it seems to have been particularly influential in Scotland. It was originally derived by Plotinus from Aristotle's Historia animalium and De partibus animalium and from the Platonic "principle of plenitude". And its subsequent development had been influenced by the Neoplatonics Proclus, Porphyry and Iamblichus, as well as Dionysius the Areopagite (Pseudo-Dionysius) who exerted a lasting influence on scholasticism through Thomas Aquinas. In Cudworth's words, it was "a scale or ladder of perfections in Nature, one above the other, as of living and animate things above senseless and inanimate; of rational things above sensitive".23

In OPL and Hermes, as in Cudworth, the concept of the Scale of Being is inseparable from the status of innate ideas as the criteria of absolute truth. Human beings are held to understand singulars via ideas of their universal intelligible natures. And
the human mind is believed to have a divine spark which enables
us to participate in God's rational nature. Consequently, mind,
not matter, is the basis of all motion and consciousness. 24

Both Harris and Monboddo reject the doctrine of innate ideas
in its naive form but accept the existence of rational principles.
These are the Stoic and Neoplatonic "rationes seminales" -
innate eternal principles of divine truth and virtue. Such "common
notions" were upheld by Herbert of Cherbury, Shaftesbury and
Thomas Reid - with whom Monboddo, in general, agreed. They were
also upheld by John Ray the naturalist, whose Wisdom of God in the
Works of Creation (1691) was one of Monboddo's favourite books. Ray
was a disciple of the Cambridge school, and "common notions",
immediately evident to all men, are central to Cambridge Platonism.
As Harris says, they constitute the "internal vigour" of man's
immaterial, self-moving mind. They are innate active powers
cognate with the divine mind that animates the universe, and
directs it regularly towards its final cause by means of the spirit
of nature - the all-pervasive spirit producing universal harmony. 25

Therefore the soul was not a tabula rasa (as Locke was thought
to hold): and man's mind was after all, congruent with the world
of things. Common notions lead the soul to truth via the
"intellectus agens" - the agent intellect. This creative principle
of mind is a Thomist concept and is, significantly, discussed in
some detail by Monboddo. Indeed, the marked resemblance between
the systems of Monboddo and Thomas Aquinas is largely due to the
fact that both drew heavily on the blend of Stoic, Christian and
Aristotelian notions which constituted the natural law tradition. 26

But how do these Stoic and Neoplatonic ideas connect with the attitude towards language shared by Harris and Monboddo? In particular, what is their relevance to the 'Aristotelian' philosophical grammar expounded in Hermes and OPL? The answer is that these ideas provided Aristotelian grammar with an ethical dimension. And this, furthermore, depended on the central role assigned to language by Stoicism - a role which it retained in medieval, especially Thomist, philosophy and in the Renaissance concept of the unity of learning.

Although Stoicism embraced physics, logic and ethics within a single, coherent system, 'logic' was its key. What was called 'logic' was divided into rhetoric and dialectic, and dialectic further into language and things signified. That is, logic was identified with language: and it included not only grammar and rhetoric but epistemology as well. Monboddo stresses this basic connection: logos, which is unique to mature human beings, means both reason and speech. And, since all knowledge - including moral knowledge - consists in the conformity of our ideas with the real things in nature, internal discourse (verbum mentis) is essential to life in accordance with nature and reason. 27

In short, for Harris and Monboddo as for the Stoics, language expresses reason and therefore mediates between the moral and physical worlds. However, for Harris and Monboddo the central role of language depends on a fundamental distinction which is associated with Aristotle or the Neoplatonists rather than
Stoicism and finds fullest expression in the medieval Aristotelian tradition revived by J.C. Scaliger and Sanctius.

Although Harris and Monboddo believe the divine mind permeates the universe, nature is reason immersed in matter. This Neoplatonic notion of the divine spark of reason being at first submerged in matter and sense is fundamental to Hermes and OPL - although it is naturally more explicit in the latter since Monboddo traces the progress of language. Only by abstracting the forms (essences) of things does man raise himself towards "unbodied" divine reason. He slowly creates an intellectual world of abstract universals which (with the aid of the intellectus agens) accurately reflects the world of things. That is, knowledge itself lies confused and immersed in matter until separated and arranged - a Ciceronian theme which is pursued in the early Monboddo Papers. In OPL Monboddo's purpose is to show how this process is both mirrored in and aided by the development of language as it becomes increasingly capable of expressing abstract ideas.

That is, although Harris and Monboddo synthesise Stoic, Aristotelian and Platonic concepts, Aristotelian hylomorphic theory - the theory of matter and form and of the hierarchy of forms - is the key to their universal view of language.

In accordance with the fundamental distinction between matter and form, Harris, like Monboddo, distinguishes clearly between voice and ideas - the material and formal aspects of language. Although it became associated with 'Aristotelian' grammar, this distinction
too was originally made by the Stoics. In fact, Stoic logic recognized three aspects of the linguistic sign: sound, meaning and the object signified by significant sound. As Harris realized, Stoic logic was the parent of grammar.28

The same distinction appears in the Neoplatonic tradition, however. For example, Cudworth parallels the mixture between matter and form in nature - where pure reason is immersed in matter - with the situation in language. The pure reason of man's mind (verbum mentis) - the universal mental structure underlying discourse - contrasts with the reason embodied in external discourse (verbum oris). The latter too is reason immersed in matter - senseless, articulate sound impressed with pure reason as nature is impressed with divine wisdom.29

Similarly, Harris and Monboddo never tire of emphasising the superiority of ideas to voice - that is, of mind to matter. Ideas represent a single, unchanging, universal logico-semantic system which underlies the various phonetic realizations of language. The existence of such underlying universal forms is proved by the possibility of translating all languages, however ancient or exotic. And this "common identity" of all languages is the subject of universal, or philosophical, grammar. Just as the "thing" is more excellent than the sign, so ideas are superior to sound, and universal grammars to grammars of particular languages.30

Harris and Monboddo were not alone in regarding abstract ideas as crucial to the science of man. Eighteenth century philosophers generally agreed that abstraction was the basis of thought and that
man's intellectual progress depended on analysing and classifying phenomena by the twin faculties of abstraction and composition. Man starts with the data of sense perception and rises through a sequence of increasingly general ideas by fixed stages. The question was, what was the status of these abstract ideas? Hobbes and Locke had held that words only reflected the speaker's subjective ideas, not the structure of things in terms of real or metaphysical genera and species. Furthermore, the abstract ideas of which words were signs did not represent universal truths.\[31\]

Although, like Locke, Harris and Monboddo reject the naive theory of innate ideas, we have seen that they assume the existence of implicit rational principles which are "occasioned" by our sense perceptions. These Neoplatonist "common notions" are not far removed from the Thomist doctrine that the mind contains germs of knowledge, \(\text{scientiarum semina}\). That is, although the intellectus agens abstracts intelligible species from things themselves, the mind is disposed to attain reality. It follows that abstraction does not just happen to be the process by which we unavoidably think about things, as many of the Encyclopédistes believed. On the contrary, for Harris and Monboddo abstract ideas are identical to intellectual 'forms' - genera and species. They are the basis of universal reason and 'science': that is, a unified, universally valid, system of fixed, certain knowledge based on logic. They are also universals reflecting the Chain of Being - the invisible chain of genera and species unifying the divine, intellectual and physical worlds.\[32\]
Since abstraction is the basis of reason it is also the basis of language - language having been formed to express thought. Furthermore, language inevitably classifies things into genera and species: a language reflecting "the infinity of changing particulars" would be an impossibility, nor could any language consist solely of proper names. And since language is the expression of mind (ideas) we can only arrive at a theory of language by "viewing the mind during its process" and discovering the origin of ideas. We find that, as Aristotle claimed, the fundamental process of mind is the gradual separation of ideas from sense-data in ascending degrees of abstractness by means of its innate faculty of abstraction: and, by means of the complementary faculty of composition, their unification into propositions, syllogisms and, finally, systems of "science". That is, language is only capable of expressing general truths and communicating "science" (systems of propositions) because words symbolize abstract ideas.33

The inevitability of this intellectual process does not, however, imply the organic evolution of language. Language is not an instinct but a habit - an artificial system of words significant by compact, as Aristotle stated. Language was invented by mind as its instrument of communication: and languages can be evaluated by their degree of abstraction and systematicity. Harris, unlike Monboddo, does not extend these criteria to barbarous languages but considers only languages of art. A true language of art, like Greek, is philosophical. And it is philosophical to the degree that it provides a comprehensive view of nature and art as
a scale of abstraction (the more general being included in the less
general); and to the degree that this intellectual world which
language represents is a true reflection of the real world.
Provided that the processes of abstraction and composition are complete
a hierarchy of perfect intellective forms will reflect the actual
species and genera of nature - where only imperfect sensible
forms are combined with matter. There must also be a "just
deduction of derivatives and compounds" so that the language
system accurately expresses the "connections and oppositions" of
those general ideas whose archetypes are genera and species.
When this is achieved, there will be a unified hierarchy of
grammatical classes corresponding to the hierarchy of natural
species which is the object of natural history. For example,
the linguistic system, like the system of animals, will possess
intermediate species serving as links between its different levels. 34

The conception of language so far outlined runs through both
Hermes and OPL. However, although Harris does not deal with the
origin and progress of language at any length, Hermes does contain
some interesting observations on the subject which are mostly only
implicit in OPL - hints which reflect both the application of
'Aristotelian' philosophy to language by J.C. Scaliger and Sanctius
and also the far-reaching influence of Stoicism.

Grammar, says Harris, reflects logic as well as nature: and
only those parts of speech unite in grammar whose archetypes unite
in logic and nature. From the natural concord of substance and
attribute (accident), for example, arise "the logical concord of
subject and predicate, and the grammatical concord of substantive and attributive”. Thus in a "regular and orderly" sentence, the nominative case denotes three things: "nature's substance, the logician's subject and the grammarian's substantive".35

That is, although language is not an instinct, its development is governed by practical necessity and, like all rational constructs, it obeys the laws of nature revealed by science. For example, prepositions originally referred to sensible objects and derived from relations of place - the basic relation of all natural substances to each other. They were necessary to form the "visible whole" of the universe. Furthermore, the invention of parts of speech reflected the metaphysical progress of mind. For example, men must have perceived the diversity of physical things very early, so "disjunctives" must have preceded causal conjunctions - which necessitated the analysis of the four types of cause. Similarly, man must have acquired the tenses and the moods reflecting the perceptions or volitions of his soul in a certain order. And there will therefore be a 'natural' number of these.36

Thus both Harris and Monboddo regard languages as deliberate constructs, developed in step with the increasing abstraction of man's ideas, yet depending on a predetermined developmental sequence of latent faculties. Man starts with concrete particulars - what is lowest, first in perception and closest to the animal world - and works upwards through increasingly general concepts by fixed stages. As man reaches more general concepts he increasingly perceives the
unity of the whole and finally arrives at the most "transcendental comprehensions" from which all other things are derived - the Aristotelian categories. Furthermore, a complex language of art is a form of nomenclature applicable to the intellectual and spiritual, as well as the physical, worlds. In spite of the transcendentalism of Hermes and OPL, this approach resembles that of the seventeenth century inventors of philosophical languages - like Urquhart, Dalgarno and Wilkins. That is, for Harris and Monboddo, a language of art resembles the terminological systems of natural history, which by 1750 had become the paradigm of science. And in the contemporary debate about the reality of genera and species they supported Linnaeus against Buffon. 37

These connections are made explicit by Monboddo in his attempt to complement Harris's universal grammar. He devotes considerable space to Wilkins, for instance, arguing that highly developed languages of art like Greek and Sanskrit are, in effect, philosophical languages in Wilkins' terms. 38 But, above all, he extends the scope of Harris's universal grammar by examining its 'Aristotelian' principles in the context of the philosophical (or conjectural) history of language - which was supposed to establish the rules of universal grammar.

Monboddo's philosophical history of language involves the consideration of languages which had not concerned Harris. These were the so-called 'barbarous' languages whose relative lack of abstract terms and systematicity compared with languages of art like Greek and Sanskrit was traditionally supposed to reflect the
undeveloped state of their speakers' minds. However, Monboddo does not admit a continuity of development between these two great categories of language: barbarous languages are only the matter from which philosophers construct artificial languages. And when Monboddo discovered that barbarous languages displayed varying degrees of art he did not conclude that they were the product of some kind of unconscious, organic development. Since this would separate the structure of language from that of mind, Monboddo is careful to reject such a dangerous view - although he may have been tempted by it. Even barbarous languages are consciously developed, albeit in ad hoc fashion. Consequently, at best they contain only the rudiments of art. If their systematicity goes beyond this, it proves they are borrowed from some more civilized people. As the divine mind created the world regularly and artificially for the sake of a final cause, so the most advanced human minds created languages of art for the expression of reason. Neither language, mind nor the universe are accidental products of matter in motion.

Thus Monboddo builds on Harris's foundations to bring together three complementary disciplines which link the late Renaissance with the seventeenth century: philosophical grammar, philosophical history and philosophical language. In common with Harris, he is partly inspired by J.C. Scaliger - who applied Aristotelian principles to universal grammar more rigorously than the scholastics and who, along with Sanctius, laid the foundation of the parallel seventeenth
The philosophical history of language is the corollary of these not only because it established the principles of universal grammar but because it was developed shortly after Scaliger's conception of a science of language and for the same reasons - to create a humanistic 'science' of mind which would oppose nominalistic empiricism.  

Indeed, it is with this aim that Monboddo, like Harris, attempts to revive the humanist concept of the unity of learning: the idea of wisdom embodied in the Ciceronian union of philosophy, logic and rhetoric. This union, which had been gradually destroyed by the rise of empirical science, is the basis of Cicero's humanistic ideal - the effective use of knowledge for the guidance of human affairs. It is specifically upheld by both authors and confirmed by the structure of OPL as a whole. Seen as a synthesis of general ideas producing truth, speech relates to "things" - that is, to logic and philosophy. When seen in relation to its hearers, speech relates to rhetoric. By restoring *logos* - language as the expression of reason - to its central position in the intellectual world, Harris and Monboddo reaffirm the coherence of language, mind and epistemology which had also been part of the medieval grammatical tradition. This coherence was guaranteed by abstract ideas - the foundation of universal reason (Aristotelian logic) and therefore of universal grammar. For it was the hierarchy of abstract ideas which constituted an invisible chain of genera and species linking the divine, moral and physical worlds. Further, by reaffirming the primacy of divine, all-pervasive reason, they
restore man to his central position in the Scale of Being where he partakes of both the spiritual and physical worlds. In fact, Hermes and OPL may be seen in terms of a humanist cultural programme deriving largely from Shaftesbury — Harris's uncle — and from the Cambridge Platonists. Elitist, transcendental and eclectic, it presented a Hellenistic ideal of gentlemanly culture which spread north to transform Scottish philosophy, religion and university education. This was an aspect of the ubiquitous cult of taste which was closely associated with the elocutionary movement — a movement of considerable importance to the genesis of OPL and the Scottish Enlightenment in general. It is therefore no accident that Adam Smith and other Scottish professors adopted a similar view of moral philosophy — a subject which was central to Scottish university education and closely connected with the philosophy of law. Their approach, which lasted into the next century, owed much to the natural law tradition: it blended logic, rhetoric, universal grammar and the history of language in a manner resembling OPL. Furthermore, it is possible to see a repetition of other, less overt, humanist aims in their cult of eloquence and general educational programme: a justification of the hierarchy of order and degree in the state. This is certainly true of Monboddo.⁴¹

We have seen that OPL may indeed be regarded as a "second part" to Hermes — to use Monboddo's own words in the letter of March 1766. And it was evidently not until then that Monboddo thought of relating his philosophical history of language to Harris's philosophical grammar, and validating its 'Aristotelian' grammatical principles.
against his own corpus of data about 'barbarous' languages.

In fact, the Monboddo Papers do not indicate that Monboddo originally intended to incorporate a universal grammar into OPL at all. If this is so, Monboddo's debt to Harris is even greater than at first appears: for by devoting most of volume II to a philosophical grammar largely based on Hermes he considerably enlarged the scope of his philosophical history - and it seems to have been Harris's grammatical ideas that led Monboddo to compromise with Neoplatonism.

Before discussing Harris's and Monboddo's attempt to restore 'Aristotelian' universal grammar, it may be as well to summarize what has been said so far, and clarify certain points.

Monboddo's investigation of universal grammar, like Harris's, is intended to refute extreme empiricist philosophy and its consequences - sensualism, materialism, nominalism, and epistemological scepticism. Without denying the role of empirical validation, they reaffirm the rationalist principles on which believed all science to rest but which contemporary science largely ignored. These principles were embodied in the humanistic study of language.

Their case depends primarily on the fundamental philosophical question of the status of abstract ideas. They wish to show that these are universals and not - as Hobbes, Locke and contemporary philosophers alleged - mere figments convenient for classifying reality or the inescapable outcome of our intellectual limitations. In contrast with the "sensible ideas" of the empiricists, abstractions are definite and steady - the only way
to categorize the confused, mutable, infinite world of particulars in which natural philosophers were immersed. In particular, they criticise Locke's misuse of the term 'idea' for both general and particular - that is, intellectual and sensual - operations. 42

Language provides convincing evidence of this superiority of abstraction (and its complement, composition) to empirical methodology. That is, language proves that intellectual, not physical, perceptions make nature comprehensible. As opposed to the physical dissection of natural philosophy, abstraction is finite. It comprehends both the intellectual and the physical worlds. It analyses "the causes, and principles and elements of things" - making the fundamental distinction between matter and form, which experimental philosophy ignores. Ultimately it even discovers the divine mind - the source of all goodness, truth and beauty. In short, mind is superior to matter because it enables us to rise gradually to divine reason. 43

However, besides nature's imperfect sensible forms there is also a pre-existing world of perfect Platonic ideas forming a corresponding system. So sense-perceptions only arouse the mind to recollect general ideas. The soul already contains "clear and precise ideas" which descend from the mind of God. That is to say, knowledge does not depend primarily or solely upon external causes (as the empiricists claimed) but rather upon the mind's internal vigour. Speech itself is a "publishing of some energy of the soul". 44

The philosophical investigation of language also proves that
the universal reason governing our minds - and therefore all philosophy and science - is based on the same innate faculty of abstraction. It is nothing less than the syllogistic logic of Aristotle - which empiricism has made unfashionable. Thus the study of speech leads us back to 'true' science, the unity of learning and the primacy of mind. It shows that the roles of universal grammar, logic and rhetoric are interdependent.

Monboddo is a typical Enlightenment philosopher in regarding himself as the heir of the Renaissance. But he is untypical in his attempt to establish the continuity of an all-inclusive, humanistic conception of science based on language as the expression of human reason. For this involved the return of the dominant Lockian "science of man" to its classical roots and the restoration to the Enlightenment of its original 'Aristotelian' principles - just as J.C. Scaliger had restored them to the Renaissance. Ultimately, it also involved the reconciliation of empiricism and rationalism. And the vehicle for all this was the 'Aristotelian' tradition of universal grammar.

2. Harris, Monboddo and the ancient grammarians

In Hermes James Harris attempts to avoid what he regards as medieval distortions of the ancient grammatical tradition and return to its original principles. That is, he follows the humanists' example of restoring the grammar of the ancients. And, as in the case of Monboddo, his identification with humanist aims is of the greatest importance. Like other eighteenth century
philosophers they regard the Enlightenment as a continuation of
the Renaissance. However, in the quarrel between the Ancients and
Moderns they support the Ancients. For them the Renaissance is the
point of contact with antiquity: and their aim is to return to the
sources of the Enlightenment so as to reinstate the ancient
principles from which they believe the philosophical movement has
deviated. Even their historical approach (Locke's 'historical,
plain method'), which identifies origins with first principles,
although typical of the Enlightenment, actually derives from the
Renaissance. And they are evidently aware of its provenance.

In one respect, however, Harris and Monboddo were misguided.
Scholasticism, which long coexisted with humanism, had remoulded
classical grammar: so, in attempting to restore the ancients, the
humanist grammatical tradition inevitably borrowed from the Middle
Ages - the period it affected to despise. And the heritage of
scholasticism seems to have been particularly marked in England
where humanism was slow to discard the medieval view of the world. In any case, this unconscious debt remained an important element in
universal grammars from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century,
including those of Harris and Monboddo.

The principal names in Harris's list of ancient grammarians are
Aristotle, the Stoics, and Apollonius Dyscolus of Alexandria
(second century A.D.). Harris is therefore appealing to what he
considered to be the Aristotelian grammatical tradition which had
been developed by the Stoics and Alexandrians. This tradition is
nowadays often referred to as the Apollonian tradition, and
Apollonius was indeed an important link in the chain. Known
as the founder of western syntactic description, he codified the
work of his predecessors, echoing, for instance, the Stoic
distinction between form and meaning.46

For Harris, as for the humanists, the route to Apollonius Dyscolus frequently lies through the late Roman grammarian Priscian (sixth century A.D.) whose Institutiones grammaticae could be used to reconstruct missing sections of Apollonius's Syntax. (Like Donatus (c350), Priscian had codified ancient Greek grammar at the end of the period of antiquity and joined classical with medieval grammatical studies. Consequently much Renaissance grammar of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century is little more than a restatement of these grammarians.)47

Significantly absent from Harris's Aristotelian grammatical succession - although his name is mentioned by Monboddo - is the other Alexandrian to exert a crucial influence on western grammar: Dionysius Thrax (first century B.C.?). The reason for Harris's omission is not far to seek.

For Harris, as for Monboddo, language is above all the expression of reason: and universal grammar is the key to human understanding. In this he is again a thinker of his time - a philosophical grammarian concerned with the logical bases of language and the 'science' of mind. Harris, however, identifies intellectual processes, not with the fashionable logic of Port Royal, but with the unfashionable logic of Aristotle - to which
Port Royal, as some contemporaries realized, owed more than was generally recognized. Thus Harris and Monboddo differ from the majority of humanists as well as their contemporaries. The Renaissance accepted the Aristotelian grammatical tradition but largely rejected Aristotelian logic because of its scholastic associations. Harris and Monboddo on the other hand regard the two are inseparable. Consequently they base their defence of the Aristotelian view of mind on universal grammar. And it is to this end that Harris refers to Porphyry on syllogistic logic and Alexander Aphrodisiensis on the *de Anima.*

Predictably, Harris largely ignores aspects of ancient and Renaissance grammar that were out of keeping with his 'philosophical' and logical approach - that is, the appeals to usage and formal criteria. Instead he emphasises meaning. The semantic approach, as Harris and Monboddo recognize, had been implicit in Aristotle. It was continued by the Stoics and by Apollonius Dyscolus - who appealed to meaning whenever the criteria of form and meaning conflicted. Such appeals were however untypical of Dionysius Thrax: and this is clearly why Harris excludes him from the list of universal grammarians stemming from Aristotle.

The difference between Apollonius and Dionysius Thrax is most striking in their definitions of the eight parts of speech established by the Alexandrian school. Whereas Dionysius Thrax employs mostly formal terms, Apollonius appeals to the supposedly universal, logical and philosophical criteria characteristic of
the Stoics. According to these, nouns, for example, signify substance and quality while inflected verb forms represent mental states. The Aristotelian basis of such definitions is evident. 49

This is not to say that in the interests of preserving Aristotelianism Harris departs from the main humanist tradition. In spite of the mixture of formal and semantic criteria which the Renaissance inherited from antiquity, the dominant trend of early humanist grammar has been described as being already 'semasiological'. Harris may thus be said to trace the intellectual ancestry of Hermes to the ancient founders of the western grammatical tradition; and also to have indicated that, Dionysius Thrax apart, the tradition was primarily Aristotelian - that is, a tradition of universal grammar based on semasiological criteria. 50 (In view of Harris's omission of Dionysius Thrax it is interesting that some modern commentators suggest that most of the Téchne grammatiké belongs not to the first century B.C. but to somewhere between the third and fifth centuries A.D. This would make it more recent in date than the work of Apollonius Dyscolus. The theory is strengthened by the fact that Apollonius apparently only once mentions his predecessor, and this reference does not tally with our text. 51 It is, of course, impossible to say whether Harris himself suspected that the work of Dionysius Thrax belonged to a later period. It was enough for it to be out of keeping with the Aristotelian tradition.)

It follows that Harris may equally be said to trace English grammar back to Aristotle. And, while Harris himself evidently
takes it for granted, it is worth remembering that there was a
native tradition of humanist grammar behind Hermes reaching back
to Linacre - one of the founders of Greek studies in England.
Harris must have been familiar with the work of Linacre and his
popularizer, Lily: for they alone represented English Renaissance
grammar and carried the Apollonian (or Priscianic) tradition into
the eighteenth century and beyond. Furthermore, Linacre, like
Harris, reinstated ancient grammar, naming the Stoics, Apollonius,
Priscian and Gaza as his principal sources. Indeed, it has been
claimed that the continuance of Greek features in English grammars
long after their disappearance elsewhere is owing to Linacre's
influence.52

However, because the scholastics reshaped classical grammar,
Linacre's de Structura (1524) may equally be said to have a strong
medieval character - notably in its recognition of a rational
substructure to language. In this respect Linacre anticipates a
late Renaissance work which influenced Hermes and OPL considerably
and whose great importance for the tradition of universal grammar
Harris was one of the first to recognize: Sanctius's Minerva of
1587.53

It may be added that Harris's blend of Aristotle with Plato,
Cicero and Quintilian is equally in the English Renaissance
tradition. English humanists used these authors to justify the
hierarchy of order and degree in the state just as Monboddo did.

That is, we see in Hermes not only the influence of Cambridge
Platonists like Cudworth, but the continuance of an English
humanist tradition which embraced the Cambridge movement. And it is in the light of this tradition that Harris considers the history of universal grammar - and particularly the crucial turning-point of the later Renaissance.

3. The influence of Scaliger and Sanctius

As a philosophical grammarian concerned with defending Aristotelian rationalism against empirical science, Harris has a good reason for focussing on the later Renaissance. The sixteenth century saw the start of the conflict between humanist culture and 'experimental philosophy' (the Battle of the Books or the quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns) - and the opposition of words to things which was its reflection.

On the one hand, although the medieval tradition of the Grammatica speculativa declined in the early Renaissance, Aristotle and the scholastic method remained influential at the universities throughout the seventeenth century and even beyond. On the other hand, natural philosophers were increasingly interested in developing a new instrument of discovery based on the 'Baconian' principle that knowledge derives from experience alone. Harris and Monboddo direct their main attack against this principle with good reason. If only perceptible things are real, abstract ideas (universals), and the words representing them, are merely names. And if, as Bacon claimed, our minds also distort knowledge received from the senses, even our knowledge of things is doubtful. That is, the experimental philosophy was not only incompatible with the
Aristotelian world-view. It led inevitably to nominalism and scepticism.

Sixteenth century grammar and rhetoric already reflected these trends. Grammar, with its increasing appeal to extra-linguistic criteria, concentrated on lexis and nomenclature rather than grammatical function. Ignoring the intermediate concepts that, according to the Modistae, structure the sensible world, it identified names directly with things. That is, in keeping with the prevailing sensualism, grammar developed a nominalistic tendency. About the same time rhetoric became merely ornamental, having been separated from the other arts by Ramus in the interests of scientific limitation. Consequently verbosity was despised: things, not words, were emphasised. 54

By the seventeenth century these attitudes had led to a widespread distrust of words, which were no longer felt to signify the reality of things. This view, which was especially associated with Bacon, Locke and the Royal Society, was reflected in the seventeenth century obsession with philosophical languages and the desirability of an exact one-to-one correspondence between words and things. 55 And these are subjects which Monboddo discusses in some detail in an attempt to reconcile the Royal Society and rationalist traditions.

In short, the concentration on sense-data which began in the sixteenth century was the antithesis of the medieval view of mind as structuring reality and led to a trend away from precise grammatical definition. Renaissance grammar in general was therefore characterised by the gradual loss of the scholastic concept
of the linguistic sign, with its twin facets of form and meaning and its consignification of grammatical function - distortions which were to be repeated in the seventeenth century by the Port Royal grammarians. But in 1540 began a return to medieval concepts of signification which was of the greatest importance for the history of universal grammar and which profoundly influenced Hermes and OPL.

It was accomplished by a group of late sixteenth and early seventeenth century scholars who wished to bring universal grammar again closer to things. Realizing that linguistic studies were yielding to experimental philosophy because humanism had not solved the problems of heuristic methodology raised by the advance of learning, they attempted to make language itself an instrument of discovery.

Their method was to apply Aristotelian conceptions of the metaphysical structure of reality to language more rigorously than the scholastics and so establish a philosophic basis for linguistic analysis. That is, they opposed empiricism and the nominalism associated with it by reviving much of the medieval synthesis of grammar, philosophy and logic.

The contrary tendency was to dismiss Aristotle's ten categories as a totally inadequate epistemological framework. Most notably the Grammatica (1559) of Pierre de la Ramée (Ramus) sought to establish an empirical basis for the study of language. Ramistic attempts to modify Aristotelian logic and introduce formal
grammar met with considerable success for a time especially in Presbyterian areas - lowland Scotland, for instance, with the conspicuous exception of Monboddo's Episcopalian north east.  

The outstanding members of the group of anti-Ramist scholars were J.C. Scaliger (1484-1558) and Franciscus Sanctius (Francisco de las Brozas Sánchez, 1554-1628). Harris, like Monboddo after him, frequently refers to Scaliger's De Causis linguae Latinæ (Lyons, 1540) and to Perizonius's edition of Sanctius's Minerva: seu de causis linguae Latinæ which was originally published in 1562 and revised twenty five years later (Salamanca 1587). They make less use of G.J. Vossius (1577-1649) although his De arte grammatica (Amsterdam 1635) was also a major influence on the first half of the seventeenth century. The reason may be that Vossius places rather more emphasis on formal criteria.

The influence of these writers on the subsequent history of universal grammar, - and therefore upon Harris and Monboddo, who are concerned with tracing that history - is well established. Scaliger, in particular, made grammar conform to reason and follow a method and, in spite of a Ramistic element, Sanctius followed his lead. They sought to re-establish grammar as a science based on the "communis ratio" of language; to reveal the underlying "causae" (mental events) of speech; and, especially in the case of Scaliger, to reaffirm, by appealing to efficient and final causes as well as material and formal, the connection of grammar with the Aristotelian categories of mind and reality. As in the Grammatica
speculativa of the Hodistae, language mirrored the universe, dividing phenomena into res permanentes and res fluentes; the word comprised phonic structure as well as meaning; and syntax was the surface actualization of underlying mental concepts. This notion of underlying logical structure is particularly important in Sanctius, who placed more emphasis on syntax than Scaliger. 60

It was largely owing to Scaliger that by the end of the sixteenth century Aristotelian criteria were being used by even conservative humanists. Grammar was no longer determined by usage and authority: no words were identified directly with things. 61 And during the seventeenth century Scaliger's concern with the harmony of language and nature, reminiscent of the Stoics, was continued by Bishop Juan Caramuel y Lobkowitz (1606-1682) in his Grammatica audax (Frankfurt 1654) and by Tommaso Campanella (1568-1639) in his Philosophiae rationalis partes quinque (Paris 1638). They were part of a reaction against Ramus and Calvinism but their return to scholastic logic and a medieval world-view contrasted with "the vague lexicographical approach" of most seventeenth century grammarians. 62 They also had an important influence on the philosophical-language tradition and Monboddo knew of their work via Bishop Wilkins' Essay towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language (London 1668) - a work to which he devoted considerable space. 63

Even more crucial was the influence of Scaliger and Sanctius (particularly the latter) on the Port Royal Grammar and the third
edition of its associated Latin grammar - C. Lancelot's Nouvelle Méthode pour apprendre facilement et en peu de temps la langue latine (Paris 1654). The importance of Arnauld and Lancelot's celebrated Grammaire générale et raisonnée (Paris 1660) can scarcely be exaggerated. It was the principal source of most seventeenth and eighteenth century universal grammars. It also influenced Locke and the Encyclopédistes. Their emphasis on the connections between methodology, epistemology and language - and especially the idea of the science of universal grammar as the key to the science of mind - stems largely from Port Royal. 64

The influence of scholasticism here is not far to seek. Following Scaliger and Sanctius, the Port Royal grammarians saw language as the mirror of the world; linguistic processes as the expression of mind; and the sentence as the embodiment of a logical proposition. 65

In short, it was due largely to the Port Royal Grammar that the Enlightenment inherited so much from the Middle Ages. Yet, as Harris and Monboddo realized, it represents a decisive break with the Aristotelian grammatical tradition and its authors, like Locke and the Encyclopédistes, consciously rejected the Aristotelian foundations to which they were indebted. The Port Royal Grammar and the logic with which it was closely associated - Arnauld and Nicole's La Logique ou l'art de penser (Paris 1662) - had Cartesian connections. According to the Port Royal Logic, the Aristotelian syllogism was not an instrument of discovery: neither was knowledge attained via the senses as Aristotle had claimed.
It was attained only via ideas. And this view is reflected in the Port Royal Grammar where a word merely signifies a concept - its formal component and consignifying grammatical function being ignored. That is, Arnauld and Lancelot separate the mind from reality - or words from things. It was therefore nominalistic and sceptical in tendency. Certainly Monboddo saw that the source of Hume's scepticism was the theory of ideas which Descartes had bequeathed to Locke. Furthermore, the Port Royal Grammar together with Locke's *Essay* had been the basis of empirical-materialist works on the origin and nature of language by French philosophers which played a crucial part in the genesis of OPL and perhaps of *Hermes* as well.

It is now clear why Harris and Monboddo virtually ignore the Port Royal Grammar and return instead to its principal sources, Scaliger and Sanctius. Their rationalist systems of grammar, written to counter the nominalism of the Renaissance, were highly relevant to the important contemporary debate which is central to *Hermes* and OPL: the debate on the nature of abstract ideas and the reality of species. And it is on this question that Scaliger and Sanctius differ from the Port Royal Grammar most fundamentally. They emphasise the Aristotelian distinction between matter and form, reaffirming the presence of species (the forms of things) in the mind. They guarantee the congruence between concepts, words and natural phenomena by the "intellectus agens", which renders sense impressions intelligible - a Thomistic faculty ignored by Port Royal and ridiculed by the Encyclopédistes but emphasised by
Monboddo. As a result, in Scaliger and Sanctius words do not merely signify concepts, as they do in the Port Royal Grammar. By reinstating Aristotelian views about obtaining knowledge through the senses and by accepting the entire medieval epistemology they bring words and things together once more. That is, Scaliger and Sanctius see truth as a Thomistic natural conformity of things with the understanding — a view similar to those held by the Cambridge Platonists in their opposition to Hobbes and by Monboddo's contemporaries, the anti-Humean Scottish Philosophers of common sense. It is significant that the Cambridge Platonists, Cudworth especially, influenced not only Harris and Monboddo but also the improving Scottish Moderates — particularly those disciples of Shaftesbury associated with the so-called "Greek revival".

The full significance of the historical approach of Harris and Monboddo is now apparent. By returning to their Renaissance origins, the first principles of the struggle between the Ancients and Moderns (that is, between humanist philology and empirical science) could finally be resolved — and these principles concerned the very conception of 'enlightenment' itself. By supporting Scaliger and Sanctius they too reaffirm the connection between the science of universal grammar and the Aristotelian categories of mind and reality abandoned by the philosophers. And by tracing the Port Royal Grammar to its roots in Scaliger, Sanctius and the western grammatical tradition they are restoring philosophical grammar to its original principles. For only in its original form
could universal grammar hope to restore Aristotelian rationalism and counter the nominalistic, materialist tendencies of empirical science.

That is, for Harris and Monboddo, as for Scaliger, "Grammatica est de signis rerum" - although they were unaware of their connection with the medieval Grammatica Speculativa. When the philosophes claimed, under Locke's influence, that grammarians had to be metaphysicians, they were unconsciously repeating a cliché of the Modistae that had been ridiculed by many humanists. Harris and Monboddo wish to show that language and mind indeed rest upon metaphysics - but that the metaphysics was Aristotle's original 'science of sciences', and not Locke's distorted version.
Chapter Fourteen

THE EARLY MONBODDO PAPERS (c1750-1766) AND THE GENESIS OF OPL

1. "Of the Chinese language"

In a letter to James Harris of 26th March 1766 thanking him for a copy of his universal grammar, *Hermes*, Monboddo wrote that he had a work in view that would make an appropriate second part to Harris's. His intention was to show the origin and progress of language, the most wonderful of all the arts of man; and, in doing so, to trace the progress of human understanding more accurately than Locke had in his *Essay*. The idea had come to him the previous autumn while he was in Paris on behalf of the Douglas Cause:

"What set me upon this train of thinking was the study of some most barbarous and imperfect languages spoken in America, from grammars and dictionaries which I got out of the King's Library when I was last at Paris."

The early Monboddo Papers (c1750-1766), which cover the years leading up to the genesis of OPL and the first draft of volume one, add much to this account.

The earliest extant paper on language, however, is one of two dating from his student days at Groningen, and predates the beginning of this period of literary activity by some fifteen years. It shows that Monboddo was already deeply interested in the study of language by c1735 and had established philosophical principles relating to its origin and progress that were to change little in
nearly forty years. The primary sources of the paper are the two major - and opposing - influences on the philosophy of language during the eighteenth century, whose ideas Monboddo and other Scottish philosophers attempted to reconcile: Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* and the *Grammaire générale et raisonnée* of the Port-Royal School in Paris by Arnauld and Lancelot. The title, "Of the Chinese Language", is misleading unless we bear in mind the significance of barbarous languages for philosophers following the publication of Locke's *Essay*. Although it deals in passing with phonetic analysis and the social function of language, the paper's main concern is with the origin and progress of language. Quoting the lines of Horace beginning "mutum ac turpe pecus", which became the epigraph of OPL, Monboddo traces language from its beginnings in gestures and inarticulate cries to the stage of "articulate sound". The influence of Locke on Monboddo's early theory is apparent: monosyllables sufficed to express the simple ideas of savage man until the more complex needs of society and the consequent development of man's ideas made complex words necessary. However, Monboddo is careful to stress that this growth is not automatic but "the effect of art and contrivance". That is, although a very gradual process and not the result of any one person's efforts, the development of speech was not organic. It was a conscious process, "the effect of time and experience, long meditation and assiduous observation". Furthermore, like the development of all arts and sciences, it depended on the faculty of abstraction. This means the most important aspect of language is semantics - the ideas it expresses:
"since words are the representations of what passes within us... it follows that we cannot rightly understand the nature of words... without knowing... the operation of the human mind of which they are expressions." ²

These operations are basically perception and reasoning (or judging). Perception furnishes the mind with objects of thought, the materials on which reasoning operates; nouns are examples of the former, verbs of the latter.

Monboddo’s debt to Port Royal at this point is clear. By the 1750s, when he returned to the subject with a sharpened awareness of the sceptical implications of Locke’s views on language, his rationalism would owe more to the ideas of the Stoics. Consequently, the principle that "we can have no good idea of the representation without knowing in some measure the thing represented", already stated in "Of the Chinese Language", became the cornerstone of his philosophy of language; and the importance of abstraction, admitted by all philosophers of language in the early eighteenth century, turned into an obsession with the hierarchy of genera and species. However, this paper of c1735 shows that he was already conscious of the moral and epistemological consequences of admitting the existence of a faculty of language.

The crucial and traditional distinction between barbarous languages and languages of art is even more clearly drawn in the essay, although the criteria by which it is established were to be refined. For Monboddo, Chinese remained a barbarous language, in spite of arguments to the contrary, on the grounds of its monosyllabic structure as well as its writing system; and in this he agreed with Shuckford
whose History he had consulted.³ [Although Monboddo's ideas about 
Chinese were unfashionably traditional and remained so, they were no 
less accurate than those of sinophiles like du Halde and, in 
particular, Leibniz, according to whom it represented a philosophical 
language. Indeed, this paper reveals Monboddo's eagerness to 
substantiate his theories by the facts as he understood them - a 
characteristic attested by other papers. At the age of about twenty 
one he took the trouble to find a speaker of Chinese (although, perhaps, 
not a native speaker) to provide him with information. Unfortunately 
he does not record any of the data obtained as he was to on later 
occasions.]

2. Volume four of the bound folio manuscripts

It may be significant that Monboddo's earliest extant manuscript on 
language should have been written towards the end of his studies in 
Roman Law at Groningen; for the philosophy of Roman Law had close 
connexions with the study of language. Certainly the papers next 
in date (volumes four and five of the bound folio manuscripts) show 
that by 1750 at the latest Monboddo had become deeply influenced by 
this subject; and that the rationalist principles of OPL are rooted 
in legal philosophy, and particularly in developments made by the 
historical jurists of the Renaissance. But although the manuscript 
of 1735 suggests that these ideas were reinforced by his studies in 
Holland, they must have been originally established even earlier.
The influence of Continental Roman Law on legal philosophy in Scotland,
and thence on Scottish education and culture as a whole, was so pervasive that Monboddo's education in these principles may be said to have begun with his study of moral philosophy at King's College, Aberdeen in the 1720s and been confirmed by the tuition of Thomas Ruddiman, later curator of the Advocates' Library, whose lifelong ambition was to revive the glory of Scottish Renaissance latinity.4

Most essays in volumes four and five of the bound folio manuscripts deal with purely legal matters or subjects relating to Scottish legal history and philosophy. Volume four (apparently begun c.1750) largely concerns the history of Scottish law and government: it shows an elitist, primitivist bent, an interest in preserving the social hierarchy, and a nostalgia for the feudal constitution of Scotland - all of which are consistent with Monboddo's view of language. This is particularly clear in an essay on the Union of 1707 (then over forty years old, as he says) and a most important essay, "Of the Constitution of our Parliament and Courts of Justice and of the Origin of our Laws" [pp.53-84]. This appears to have been written for oral delivery and may well have been read to the Select Society in the 1750s - perhaps during Monboddo's term as one of its presidents. The paper illustrates how the study of the origins of feudal law was bound up with speculations about the development of society and the migrations of peoples; and how these studies involved language - the most lasting monument of man and therefore "the strongest argument of any in matters of antiquity" [60]. On the
evidence of place-names Monboddo concludes that the original inhabitants of Britain were Celtic; and recognizes that similarities between Welsh, Breton and Gaelic prove the Scottish highlanders are also of Celtic origin. (This interest in the origins of the Scottish people, and particularly the relationship of Gaelic to other Celtic languages, is reminiscent of the concerns of Dr Archibald Pitcairne and Sir Robert Sibbald, two precursors of the Enlightenment, early in the century.) In this connexion he cites Edward Lhuyd (1660-1709) whose comparative etymology and grammar of Welsh, Irish, Cornish and Breton had been published in 1707. (Archaelogia Britannica: an Account of the Languages, Histories and Customs of Great Britain... Vol.I. Glossography.) Lhuyd had circulated in Scotland separate copies of the Irish - English dictionary from this work with an Irish grammar and preface attached. The latter was translated by David Malcolm, the philologist (d1748) and published in the prospectus of a proposed Gaelic dictionary based on Lhuyd's manuscripts which was encouraged by the General Assembly but never appeared.5 It was reprinted in his Letters, Essays and Other Tracts illustrating the Antiquities of Great Britain and Ireland, together with many curious discoveries of the Affinity betwixt the Language of the Americans and the ancient Britons to the Greek and Latin ... Also specimens of the Celtic, Welsh, Irish, Saxon and American Languages (London 1744). This was the work Monboddo read. It was perhaps his first introduction to the Amerindian languages whose origin and affinities preoccupied eighteenth century philologists.
He also consulted the influential and well documented history by Thomas Innes (1662-1744), vice-principal of the Scots College at Paris and friend of Ruddiman, who, like Ruddiman, Pitcairn, Sibbald and Monboddo himself, had his roots in the old Episcopalian culture of the North East that had so much to do with the early stirrings of the Enlightenment. This work, *A Critical Essay on the Ancient Inhabitants of the Northern Parts of Britain, or Scotland* ... (London 1729), the result of researches in the Advocates' Library in 1724, appears to have stimulated Monboddo's interest in the language and culture of the Highlands before the advent of James Macpherson's Ossian. It also convinced him, again on the evidence of placenames, that Pictish was related to Gaelic.6

Monboddo's interest in the affinities of languages and nations appears elsewhere in volume four in papers mainly concerned with the location of the "officina gentium" - which, on the evidence of the structural similarities between German and Persian, he places in Tartary (Scythia). These parallels had been noticed by the Flemish traveller Ogier Ghislain de Busbecq (1522-1592) whose collected works, listed in the Advocates' Library Catalogue (*Opera*, Oxon. 1660); are often cited by Monboddo; and also by the great humanist and jurist, Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) in his edition of Procopius' *de bello Gothico*. Grotius, the pupil of J.J. Scaliger, and the founder of the law of nature and nations, who had enormous influence in Scotland through his *De jure belli ac pacis* (the eighteenth century catalogues of the Advocates' Library list many editions of this and other works by him), is constantly quoted in the Monboddo Papers. He is an excellent

Two other papers, - the first to be subsequently endorsed "to be printed", - relate to the same theme: these are notes on Abulgasi Bayadur Chan, Histoire généalogique des Tartars ... (Leyden 1726) and Demetrius Cantemir, History of the Growth and Decay of the Othman Empire ... (London 1734). Both works are listed in the Advocates' Library Catalogue for 1776.

Three later papers in volume four come even closer to major themes of OPL: "Of Ancient Egypt" (pp.190-198); "Of the History of China from du Hald" (pp.220-245); and "Of the Philosophy of the Roman Law" (pp.255-265).

In the first, based mostly on Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus, Monboddo explores the possible influences of Egypt on Ancient Greece that would establish a cultural and linguistic link between Asia and Europe; and it is worth recalling that Thomas Blackwell, whose lectures at Marischal College, attended by Monboddo, had much to do with the 'revival' of Greek, began his course in history and chronology with the peopling of Greece, drawing on Herodotus, Diodorus, Strabo, Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus - all favourite authors of Monboddo's.7 The other major influence in the paper is, predictably, that of the rationalistic principles of Scottish jurisprudence.

Monboddo already believes that the Greeks must have borrowed the rudiments of the arts and sciences, including language, from Egypt -
where they had been developed by colleges of priests operating according to theory and principle (i.e. not inductively). At the same time, the mother of the arts is ultimately necessity; and from this it follows that the invention of agriculture must have preceded the invention of letters by thousands of years. Only a highly developed society required, and was capable of sustaining, such a philosophical élite as the Egyptian priesthood. 8

But arguments in favour of the Egyptians as the originators of civilization had to face the problem of the Chinese: as Monboddo says, they too had a long history of civil society recorded by an exact chronology, and their account of the beginnings of society closely resembled the classical one which was his starting point. What is more, they possessed a remarkable writing system widely believed to constitute a universal character. But for Monboddo their failure to perfect their perennially monosyllabic language - still completely devoid of inflection, composition or derivation - marks them as barbarians. Their 4000 years of culture is merely the result of observation and patient induction: they lack the knowledge of system, of principles and causes, associated with geometry, hylomorphic theory and Aristotelian logic. 9

These twenty five pages on China consist of observations on an enormously influential work by a Jesuit that had already been used by Rousseau: Jean Baptiste du Halde's *Description géographique, historique, chronologique, politique, et physique de l'empire de la Chine, et de la Tartarie Chinoise.* (4 vols. Paris 1735) - which is
listed in the Advocates' Library Catalogue of 1776 along with the English translation by R. Brookes (London 1736). Together with Lettres édifiantes et curieuses [1702 etc.], which Monboddo also refers to, and Mémoires concernant les Chinois [15 vols. 1776-89], this account was inspired by the mission of the French Jesuits to Peking and initiated a period of sinophilia in Europe. Monboddo's refusal to share in this universal admiration for everything Chinese was based on his conviction that the crucial expression of Chinese civilization, its language, was barbarous. In his opinion du Halde was completely mistaken to regard the word-sentences of Manchu Tartar as proof of concision and therefore of the highly desirable quality of "copiousness". On the contrary, they prove that the language (like Iroquois) reflects the disorder of things as first perceived by savages, and so belongs to that early stage of language with which even Greek, the greatest of languages of art, began. Such propositional words merely prove the inability of speakers to abstract qualities from a subject and mark each with a distinct name; that is, to arrive at the abstract ideas of genera and species which are the basis of languages of art. This ignorance of the principles of hylomorphic theory also results in an infinite multiplication of words - another vestige of "the beginning of language". 10

This long essay inspired by du Halde shows that by the mid or late 1750s Monboddo was once again preoccupied with the implications of barbarous languages - well before his crucial visit to the Royal Library in Paris during 1765. It ends appropriately with an account of the rationalistic principles of a language of art - a
subject leading directly to the next paper in volume four, which
deals with the philosophy of Roman Law.

While the philosophical message of this next essay will be
familiar to any reader of OPL, its basis in the study of natural
jurisprudence may be less apparent. Roman Law, Monboddo asserts, is
based on reason (logos) - the defining human characteristic as he
claims here [although not elsewhere] - and upon a comprehensive
knowledge of the nature of things. It therefore takes in everything
in human life, embracing philosophy itself and guaranteeing the
cohesion of the intellectual world that had been shattered by the
epistemological scepticism which, as the Scottish philosophers agreed,
Hume had developed from Locke's philosophy. That is, Monboddo saw
the answer to Hume in a return to the first principles of Roman Law,
the Law of Nature - a concept then under attack by some other
Scottish lawyers and philosophers who were adopting a more flexible,
sociological approach. 11

Monboddo claims for the founders of Roman Law, the jurisconsults,
a knowledge of the art of abstraction acquired from the Stoics that
enabled them to make accurate divisions and discriminations of the
species of things. This, the principle of all arts and sciences -
including language - had made it possible to collect laws into one
comprehensive, universal system. This strict reasoning of the
jurisconsults admitted no relaxation of the fixed rules and
principles of law - regardless of precedent and equity - and in
this way they had maintained the system of law and the institutions of
antiquity. [Monboddo's contemporaries, by contrast, were in his opinion
diluting the one and rejecting the other. Scottish law, formerly based firmly on principle, was in danger of being ruled by precedent, like the law of England].

Monboddo describes this body of law as a "science" - as had the Renaissance jurists who influenced Vico. Jurisprudence was scientific because "it dealt with things in terms of cause and effect and because it was universal, though, unlike natural philosophy it had as its goal human welfare" [D.R. Kelley 1976]. These are the claims made by Vico on behalf of his New Science and by Monboddo for OPL and the hylomorphic theory it expresses. Furthermore, like Vico, Monboddo stresses the role of language in arriving at the first principles of law: studying the origins and progress of law involves learning the languages in which they were written - as he told the Select Society in the paper "Of the Constitution of our Parliament..." already described. This was a principle sixteenth century Scottish lawyers had learned from historical jurists of the Renaissance like Hotman and applied to the law of Scotland in works well known to Monboddo. In fact the parallels between Vico, Monboddo and the historical orientation of the Scottish eighteenth century philosophers in general, so often noticed, can be explained by their common roots in the "studia humanitatis" of the Renaissance and the human "science" of law. The very conception of conjectural histories (like OPL I) held by the Scottish philosophers, and by Scottish professors who prefaced their courses with accounts of the rise and progress of their particular discipline, parallels the Renaissance ideal of 'perfect history'. But Monboddo went further than any other
Scottish philosopher in one respect. He maintains in these early papers (unlike Harris in his Hermes) that the species man abstracts from external phenomena are real: that is, they actually exist in things and are not convenient ways of describing the world, as natural historians like Buffon believed. In this he was returning to the view of Renaissance science which saw in Aristotelian logic and hylomorphism a heuristic method.

Monboddo makes it quite clear in this paper on Roman Law that the body of "science" marking and distinguishing the different species of things in the hierarchy of being is based on the classificatory methods of Aristotelian logic, and that these are identical with the semantic structure of a language of art - which will therefore be sufficiently "copious" to express everything in the Scale of Being in an orderly, connected fashion. This predicamental classification had been adopted by almost all seventeenth century inventors of universal or philosophical languages: notably John Wilkins, whose Essay (1668) Monboddo knew well, and two Scotsmen - Sir Thomas Urquhart (Logopandecteison 1653) and George Dalgarno of Aberdeen (Ars signorum 1661). By the early eighteenth century it was widely criticised in Britain.

Consequently two of Monboddo's stated purposes in writing OPL - the restoration of ancient learning and the examination of the principles of languages of art - are identical with his position regarding the philosophy of law. The dominant themes of OPL are already expressed in these papers of the 1750s: the existence of a uniform human nature underlying the superficial (although remarkable)
differences between various races and cultures - differences that are the inevitable result of man's capacity for change; and the existence of an ordered hierarchy of being extending from matter to the divine mind which guarantees the relation of mankind to God and all creation. Both themes were sanctioned by Roman Law interpreted in the traditional terms used by James Dalrymple, Viscount Stair (grandfather of Monboddo's friend and colleague, Lord Hailes) in his *Institutions of the Law of Scotland* (Edinburgh 1681) - a key work, which codified Scottish law for the first time and showed a sharp awareness of the dangers of scepticism. This paper on the history of Roman Law sets out the philosophical assumptions that underlie all the papers on this history of language and OPL itself. Mind is equated with the faculty of abstraction by which man discriminated the genera and species actually existing in things, and so, by transcending sense and matter, gradually moved up the Scale of Being. In short, the origin and progress of society, law, mind and language are all interdependent because they are based on this ascent. So the conjectural history of language becomes at once the proof and the supreme example of the Scale of Being - the hierarchy of abstract ideas which constituted universal knowledge and reflected the structure of creation. In opposing barbarous languages to civilized languages of art and assigning them to quite separate stages of human development, Monboddo is therefore opposing the disorder of the savage state, drowned (as he puts it) in sense and matter, to the order of the truly civilized state ruled by mind - although this has only been reached by the ancients.
In the next volume of the bound folio manuscripts, volume five, Monboddo concentrates on the linguistic aspect of the same subject - the art of genera and species. He draws largely on Cicero's *de Oratore* for essays on eloquence, numbers, and measure in discourse, the unity of learning, and, in particular, the method and system of the great art of abstraction. He believes the rejection of this art has led to the breakdown of order in society, philosophy and the arts - particularly in the art of language. The separation of the study of language from philosophy was the first rift in the unity of learning. As he says in his essay on Roman Law in the previous volume, the jurisconsults had learned from the Stoics that the study of language involved not only words, but things - not only grammar and rhetoric but logic and epistemology. That is, they adopted the Stoic view that knowledge consisted in the conformity of our ideas with the real things in nature and this led them to investigate the origin of words and make accurate divisions of the species of things. According to this notion, the study of language was also relevant to moral life, since right conduct meant living in harmony with nature - in other words, with the hierarchy of genera and species by which nature is ordered. Thus it appears from these papers that Monboddo's aim in writing OPL was to return to the first principles of language and restore its philosophical foundations - an approach deriving from the historical jurists and characteristic of the way eighteenth century Scottish philosophers treated all subjects. (As G.E. Davie
has pointed out, the approach was reflected in the university curriculum.) By restoring the links between language and both the intellectual and external worlds, he intended to refute materialism and scepticism.

Stoicism, embodied in the influential philosophy of Roman Law, had been used for this purpose by Hutcheson and was a popular subject for discussion in various literary clubs. Monboddo's papers in this volume include one on the Stoics and Epicureans - in addition to essays on Plato, Aristotle and Cicero. He makes it clear that they are directed against the false philosophy of those who ridicule ancient wisdom and institutions, pretending that the Greeks were barbarians, that private vices are public benefits and that luxury is the mother of the arts. This reference to Mandeville is significant. Mandeville's version of Hobbes' degrading view of man created a furore in Scotland and his attack on Shaftesbury led Hutcheson to undertake the work on which the entire anti-sceptical Scottish philosophy of common sense was founded (see Chapter Eight, Section 3). It was not only Mandeville's denial of innate principles that made him notorious. He also originated the idea of unintended social outcomes echoed by Hume and Vico: that is, he believed that man had created social institutions accidentally without perceiving their ends. Furthermore, he put forward a theory of the origin of language in his work - The Fable of the Bees; or, Private Vices, Public Benefits (1728) - that suggested such a development. This naturalistic account, with its denial of an innate faculty of language and emphasis on the role of signs and gestures and the enormous time necessary for the
development of language, closely resembles Monboddo's as we saw earlier—except that it does not make the crucial distinction between the *ad hoc*, accidental development of barbarous languages and the planned development of languages of art. For Monboddo, rational behaviour was the glory of civilized man and involved conscious awareness of principles, ends and means. As in the divine framework so in the language of art: nothing happens by chance. On the whole, this teleological view of human institutions was shared by the other Scottish philosophers. For although Adam Smith, Lord Kames and Dugald Steward emphasised unintended social outcomes they reinterpreted Mandeville in the light of Hutcheson, claiming that God had so ordered things that the pursuit of selfish ends promotes social good. (Only Adam Ferguson in his lectures on moral philosophy later in the century applied Mandeville's concept to language in an unambiguous way. Cf. *Principles of Moral and Political Science* 1792.)

When we take into consideration the remarkably close parallels between Mandeville's theory of the origin and development of language and Condillac's in his *Essai sur l'origine des connoissances humaines* (1746) — Mandeville's work was translated into French in 1740 — Monboddo's alarm becomes even more understandable. Monboddo claimed that he had never read Condillac's *Essai* but only the review of Nugent's translation — the subtitle of which recognized Condillac's debt to Locke — in the Critical Review (II 1756). In view of the likelihood of Monboddo's debt to Mandeville's theory of language, this may well be true — in spite of the similarities between OPL and the
Essai pointed out by Hans Aarsleff. 21 In any case, Condillac had influenced both Rousseau's Inégalité and Adam Smith's Considerations so Monboddo must have known the nature of the theory of the origin of language outlined in the Essai before his visits to Paris in the 1760s. It is against this background that we must examine the major essay in volume five of the bound manuscripts, remembering that Monboddo rarely refers directly to any modern philosopher except Locke - whom he regards as the unwitting progenitor of scepticism and materialism.

The title of this paper - "A Discourse on Language" - and its endorsement "to be printed" suggests its importance. 22 Although the endorsement in no way proves that OPL was already projected when the essay was written, the "Discourse" is a forerunner of Monboddo's great work, and draws together the themes of earlier essays in volumes four and five. As there are no clues pointing to his readings in the King's Library in Paris it must probably be dated before 1765 and perhaps belongs to the early 1760s - when the discussion of language in the Select Society was at its height. The references are mostly either classical or to natural lawyers and philologists of the sixteenth, seventeenth and early eighteenth century. The following works are frequently cited.

Salmassius, Claudius, De Hellenistica (1643) [CAL 1742]
Ctesius, Cnidus, Ex ejus Persicis et Indicis (1556) [CAL 1776]
Busbequius, A.G. Opera (1660) [CAL 1776]
Once more Monboddo stresses that the arts of language (and "science" of grammar) is based on abstraction and therefore cognate with logic, metaphysics and mind itself. Consequently, in a true language of art words must reflect the real natures of things - as they were supposed to in the rationalistic philosophical languages devised by Urquhart, Dalgarno and Wilkins in the previous century. Through imitation and habit, the vulgar can perform the operations of the art, but the art itself cannot be theirs - any more than it could have been invented by barbarians. It is, he implies, impossible that the analogy and complex structures of languages of art could have arisen from usage, as Mandeville had suggested. There cannot therefore have been a continuous development from the barbarous sounds of the early Greeks to the supreme language of art we know.23

In the "Discourse" Monboddo also speculates about the existence of an Indo-European family of languages. The similarities between Greek, Persian, German, Celtic and "Indian" (as well as supposed
connexions with Hebrew and Arabic) indicate that there must have been a common parent language in Egypt or Asia. Busbequius had pointed out the structural parallels between German, Greek and Persian; Pezron and Malcolm the affinities between the Celtic languages and Greek; Ctesius had listed many words common to Sanskrit and Persian; and structural affinities between Greek and Hebrew had been maintained by several writers including Squire. According to Salmasius, Hebrew was the older since the words are commonly monosyllables or disyllables: Greek words had been lengthened deliberately by the addition of letters, syllables and inflections - the "effect of time and cultivation". Like Malcolm, Leibniz and many other philologists, Monboddo was interested in establishing the world-wide family of languages described by Moses. The main problem was posed by the languages of America, of which, as Monboddo admits here, philologists knew too little to judge. His caution contrasts favourably with the enthusiastic speculations of many other writers, including Malcolm.

Thus the "Discourse" brings to a head the recurrent theme of volumes four and five, further emphasizing the linguistic implications of hylomorphism, and looks forward both to Monboddo's theory of the origin of Greek and to his researches into American languages in the Bibliothèque royale in Paris.

4. The beginnings of OPL

Volume six of the Bound Folio MSS is exclusively preoccupied with the same logical and metaphysical concerns. There are essays on
Aristotle and the Stoics; on the "Invention of Science"; on "The use of Metaphysics and the Progress of the science"; and on the differences between arts and sciences, particularly between the art of language and the science of grammar. Whether or not Monboddo was yet contemplating an expansion of the "Discourse", he was establishing the philosophical principles on which an expansion would have to be based. Volume seven deals with Scottish legal records, and volumes eight and nine are missing.

Volume ten also deals largely with purely legal topics but it illustrates the close connexion of historical jurisprudence with the history of races and languages. There are two papers of some relevance to the development of OPL: "Of Pelloutier's History of the Celts" and "Notes from the History of Naples by Giannone". The former refers to Simon Pelloutier, Histoire des Celtes (La Haye 1740-50 two volumes). This work provided him with information about the migrations, laws and language of a 'barbarous' people of major importance to the history of Europe. The latter - Pietro Giannone's Civil History of Naples - he read in Ogilvie's translation. It deals with the rise and progress of law and government and seems to have enjoyed a high reputation among the Scottish literati. Monboddo constantly returned to the themes of both essays.

The essays are continued in a crucial volume of the bound folio manuscripts, volume eleven. This opens with the earliest extant version of the dissertation on the duadic origins of Greek which was later added to OPL II: "Of the Origin and Formation of the Greek Language". It marks an important step towards OPL because, as the
supreme language of art, Greek provided the standard for all other languages — and so posed the question of the origin of language in its most crucial form. Monboddo's own marginal note testifies to the importance of this essay to the genesis of OPL: "read after this what is said upon the language of the Hurons in Paris Pocket Book". This is a reference to his missing notes on the work by Gabriel Sagard which he found in the Bibliothèque du roi in 1765 and which, as he wrote to Harris, marked the beginning of OPL.

The other important essay in volume eleven is "Of the Progress of Mind in the Formation of General Ideas", which continues the theme of metaphysics and the progress of science discussed in volume six. This essay, which is endorsed "to be printed" is one of the earliest extant drafts of any part of OPL. Monboddo describes it as "part of an Inquiry into the Origin and Progress of Language in loose sheets" — a description which evidently refers to a missing paper entitled "A Treatise on the origin and Progress of Language" listed in Monboddo's Index (MP219) under "Loose Sheets" but crossed out. Evidently "Of the Progress of Mind" may be fairly confidently assigned to 1765 — the year in which, according to his own letter to Harris, he began OPL as the result of his researches in the Bibliothèque Royale.

Additional evidence that this essay was probably written in or before 1765 is provided by an unbound paper, MP44, continuing the same subject, which is endorsed "Of Aristotle's Last Analytics, Paris 1765". The full endorsement, which summarizes Monboddo's views on the origin and progress of language, read: "of the impossibility that Science could be invented among men, none of whom had any ease
or leisure - Men in the Savage state could not form General Ideas with any accuracy, and therefore could not have Science - Of the progress of Science in Greece".

However, notwithstanding Monboddo's remark to Harris, it is possible that the origin of OPL may be traced to his visit to Paris one year earlier - in 1764. This is because MP143, an unbound paper dated 1764, refers to the essay on the origin of Greek as being in "Volume 11th in the beginning". A more likely explanation is that Monboddo was already speculating on the origin of language in 1764 but did not actually undertake OPL until 1765. That is, the papers on the origin of Greek and the progress of ideas in volume eleven may have been written a year or so before OPL was actually projected and subsequently endorsed as suitable for inclusion in OPL. This probably also applies to some earlier papers as well, although they do not seem to have been printed verbatim. Indeed, Monboddo deals with the same themes so frequently and in such similar words that it is seldom possible to trace a sustained passage of OPL to a single manuscript. The task of assembling the various papers into volume I of OPL was entrusted to John Hunter, Monboddo's clerk, who became Professor of Humanity at St. Andrews and carried Monboddo's ideas into the nineteenth century through his contribution to the Encyclopedia Britannica.29

Thus volume eleven and the earlier volumes of bound manuscripts which precede it illustrate the extent of Monboddo's preoccupation with the progress of ideas at the time he was searching the Bibliothèque du roi for information about the structures of barbarous languages -
languages which could provide evidence of the progress of mind. Indeed, besides the two major essays already mentioned and others on Aristotelian logic and geometrical analysis, volume eleven contains accounts of three works referred to in OPL which are concerned with barbarous peoples and languages. These deal with d'Acugna's voyage down the Amazon, Hennepin's travels in North America, and La Borde's account of the Caribs.

The unbound paper of 1764 already referred to, MP143, is of crucial importance to the genesis of OPL. It shows that before Monboddo came across Sagard's Grand voyage du pays des Hurons - the work which according to his own evidence, inspired him to write OPL - he was influenced by two other works on barbarous languages. These were also evidently obtained in Paris. The endorsement on the wrapper of MP143 indicates that it too eventually became a contribution to the same enquiry: "Observations on the Galibi and Caribee Languages and upon the Origin and Progress of Language".

This title was not the original. The manuscript originally consisted of two short accounts: "Observations on the Grammar and Dictionary of the Galibi, published at Paris in 1763" (pages 1-3) and "An Account of the Language of the Caraibes contained in a book entitled Dictionaire Caraibe François composed by Father Raymond Breton, missionary in the Caribbee Islands. Printed at Auxerre in the year 1665" (page 3-12). The paper ends with seven pages on the origin of language as a whole; the role of abstraction, the separate stages of barbarous and civilized languages, and the Greek duads as examples of the wonderful art of languages. This general
discussion includes a reference to La Condamine's essay on the Amazonians. At some later date Monboddo added forty-five pages continuing the discussion which indicate that the plan of OPL was already taking shape. As Monboddo (who usually dates his endorsements scrupulously) mentions no other date, the paper could have been expanded in the same year of 1764 - the year of Monboddo's second visit to Paris.

The contemporary grammar and dictionary of Galibi, published anonymously in the year of Monboddo's first visit to Paris may have been a crucial influence on his decision to write OPL. For the preface, while broadly supporting Monboddo's view of barbarous languages, suggested (although not as enthusiastically as du Halde) that such languages were by no means totally devoid of system. In fact, MP143 refers back to Monboddo's essay on du Halde's account of Tartar - again, as if he were already thinking of combining his papers into a continuous work. It may be that Monboddo was prompted to seek for details about a language whose primitiveness was less in doubt and found it in the introduction to the seventeenth century dictionary of Carib by a Jesuit missionary - a work he might have obtained through one of his Jesuit friends who accompanied him to France.

The preface to the work on Galibi suggested that, in spite of its defective syntax (due to lack of inflection) and the absence of composition and derivation, Galibi possessed all the parts of speech. For Monboddo this implied that the Galibi had made all the distinctions between the different species of things. That is, they had achieved
a relatively high degree of abstraction. Consequently we can discern in Galibi "the progress towards perfection in the art of language" — although, as always, he is careful to add that barbarous languages can show only the rudiments of art. It appears that this discovery spurred Monboddo to further investigations into the origin and progress of language. 31

Carib, by contrast, had no words for abstract ideas but only word-sentences which expressed things with their attendant circumstances. That is, there was no abstraction of the various parts of speech. To Monboddo, this proved the Caribs were savages who considered things in the lump, as they exist in nature. Such a language was, in his opinion, devoid of art and can have no grammar. Breton had, in fact, published a grammar of Carib but Monboddo did not know of it. 32

Monboddo's comparison of these two languages leads him to divide the development of barbarous languages into three stages: signs and gestures; word-sentences; parts of speech. Proper syntax characterizes languages of art. He then proceeds to a remarkable defence of the study of the history of language that foreshadows OPL. 33

The human mind is formed with the necessary faculties to perceive genera and species — and this ability is the basis of all science, as Cicero says in de Oratore. Since the progress of man's ideas is reflected in language, the study of barbarous languages provides us with the facts on which to base a history of mind. Indeed, "when the reasonings are grounded upon the fact and at the same time
explain and account for the fact, then we may be said to proceed from mere history to philosophy" - a philosophy, moreover, more worthy than contemporary philosophy of the title "experimental". This is a philosophy that illustrates the role of abstraction in the progress of man's ideas and so restores the neglected study of metaphysics to its rightful place. Contemporary philosophers were concerned only with the study of minute particulars - which is natural history and cannot explain the causes of things. Nothing in Monboddo's work more clearly expresses the Scottish concern with abstraction and the comprehensive knowledge implied in the Scale of Being. In Britain, universal, abstract ideas have always had a moral significance.

A true language of art must be 'copious' enough to express this comprehensive knowledge, yet derive its lexis from a few simple radicals. Greek does this, but so do Celtic and Gothic, commonly thought barbarous - proving that they are actually less barbarous than contemporary European languages.

This seminal paper of 1764 brings us to the final trip to Paris in the autumn of 1765 when so much took place: the visits to the Bibliothèque Royale and to the stuffed "orang outang" in the royal cabinet; the meetings with de l'Epée, La Condamine, Jussieu and the "Wild Girl".

5. The influence of Charles de Brosses
The next volume of the bound folio manuscripts, volume twelve, is missing. But according to Monboddo's Index it contained a remarkable
series of papers apparently written up from notebooks kept during his final trip to Paris. The first paper was a discussion of a work based on Lockian principles which in manuscript form had already influenced the great Encyclopédie: Charles de Brosses' Traité de la formation mécanique des langues et des principes physiques de l'etymologie (Paris 1766). Immediately afterwards came the first definite proof that OPL was under way. It took the form of a detailed, 150-page plan of OPL: "Plan of work to be entitled the Origin and Progress of Languages". This, in turn, was followed by an account of Monboddo's conversation with the "Wild Girl", Memmie le Blanc, and some papers on barbarous peoples and languages. The most notable of the latter discussed the Huron dictionary included in Gabriel Sagard's Grand voyage du pays des Hurons (Paris 1632) which Monboddo read in the Bibliothèque Royale in the autumn of 1765 and which in March 1766 he described to Harris as the inspiration of OPL.

We know from references in OPL I that Monboddo made some use of de Brosses' Traité, but if the index to volume twelve is studied and compared with existing papers written around the same time it is apparent that the influence of the Traité was considerable.

The title of the missing 43-page discussion of the Traité indicates which aspects most interested Monboddo: "Observations upon a French book concerning the Mechanism of Language where there is a good deal said both of the Formation of Language, and of the Progress of the Human Mind in the formation of its Ideas, likeways of Etymology, and of all the Languages of Europe coming originally
from the East". These subjects had already found their place in several papers written since the late 1750s. The importance of de Brosses' work to Monboddo at the time OPL was being planned is suggested by the missing essays on barbarous peoples that followed this account of the Traité in volume twelve. Except for the account of the "Wild Girl", all the subjects eventually incorporated in OPL in some form had been previously discussed by de Brosses: the arithmetic of the Tahitans, wild men, Bullet on Celtic languages, Algonkin and, most significant of all, Huron. Furthermore, many of the references in OPL I and II (apart from those already established by earlier volumes of the bound folio manuscripts dating roughly from 1750 to 1764) are also to be found in the Traité.

Since the Traité had been circulating among the philosophers for some ten years before it was finally published in 1766 it must have been widely discussed when Monboddo visited Paris for the third time in the autumn of 1765 on the eve of its publication. Furthermore, the encyclopédiste de La Condamine whom Monboddo met is frequently cited by de Brosses in the Traité and is quite likely to have read it in manuscript. So it is probable that Monboddo knew something of de Brosses' work by the autumn of 1765, if not earlier. In any case, its principal ideas must have been commonplace in French intellectual circles. It has been mentioned that MP143 (which was begun in 1764) suggests that Monboddo was already preoccupied with the subject of OPL. It is quite possible that it was the ideas of de Brosses - whether or not Monboddo knew their source - that sent him to the Bibliothèque Royale in search of
evidence about barbarous languages. Certainly the general discussion in MP143 is concerned with repudiating a theory of the origin of language based, like de Brosses', purely on sense and matter. It occasionally even appears to echo the terminology of the Traité. Since the bulk of the paper appears to have been added later, it may well have been written late in 1765. In any case, MP143 leads us into two important papers of 1766 - Monboddo's most productive year - which relate unambiguously to volume twelve of the bound manuscripts and to the beginning of OPL. And at least one of these was certainly written in answer to de Brosses.

The first of these papers, MP142, is endorsed "Of language considered as formed, and particularly of the derivation of language by the Example of the Greek". The manuscript is divided into chapters and described as a "continuation of what is contained on p.67 vol.12" - that is, the introduction to the missing 150-page plan of OPL. Under the heading "Part 1st. Of Language considered as perfectly formed" the various chapters deal with the matter of language, written language, the formal part of language, derivation, composition and inflection. MP142 states the central theme of OPL: that the formal (i.e. semantic) aspect of language, which treats words not as sounds but as significant of things, is by far the most important because it is relative to the operations of mind. This was the theme that had preoccupied Monboddo as early in 1735 and which was also his friend Harris's preoccupation. The explanation of the progress of mind which is reflected in language is to be found in the great Chain of Being - the arrangement of genera and species.
without which the intellectual world would be "tares and confusion". This hylomorphic system classifies everything in creation and so provides us with all the objects of contemplation a perfect language must express. The system is the basis of language because it alone can circumscribe infinity: the only way a finite number of sounds can express the variety of the world is by naming generals (abstract ideas) not particulars. And this formal order and method must be reflected in the structure of the language: the wonderful progression of ideas must be expressed through a genealogy of words descending from a minimum number of radicals. This can be achieved with the aid of the three great arts of language - derivation, composition and inflection. 39

There is no direct reference to de Brosses, but MP142 is a refutation of the populist, organic principles which found their most notable expression in the Traité. And at least three of its principal sources are also cited by de Brosses: Bullet (Mémoires sur la Langue Celtique [1754]): Bergier (Sur Les Eléments Primitifs des Langues [1764]); and, most important, the letter of Father Pons on Sanskrit in du Halde's Lettres édifiantes et curieuses volume 26. 40 The last describes Sanskrit as the perfect language of art and system. Being free from the corruptions of usage it is even more regularly derived from its roots than Greek, and therefore Monboddo compares it to Wilkins’s philosophical language. Apart from Kempfer on Japanese, the other citations refer to Greek: Clarke’s system of Greek tenses; Henry Stephens’s Greek lexicon; Harris’s Hermes; Theodore Gaza; and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. There is
also a comparison of his own theory of the duadic origin of Greek with that of Hemsterhuis. Monboddo admits the similarities but denies any indebtedness. 41

MP144 was begun by Monboddo at the beginning of June 1766 - just over two months after his first letter to Harris about OPL - and completed in Edinburgh the following October. The two endorsements are as follows: "Of Etymology and the first beginnings of Language. Monboddo 2nd June 1766" (page 20) and "Of Etymology and whether words are naturally significant. Of the Origin of Language, and of abstract Ideas, as distinguished from Metaphysical Ideas and Entia Rationis. Edinburgh 11 October 1766."

The manuscript evidently continues from MP142. Chapter One is entitled "Whether words are significant naturally or only by Institution" - a topic which de Brosses had dealt with at great length. It concludes Monboddo's discussion of the nature of a perfect language which constituted part I of his projected work. An eight-page discourse, "Etymology and the origin of Language" and another chapter "How language first began" belong to "Part 2nd of the Origin and Progress of Language."

Monboddo refers disparagingly to the Traité several times in MP144 and the paper as a whole is an attack on de Brosses' idea that inflected languages of considerable regularity and great powers of expression could develop by a natural process. For de Brosses this process was completely physical. Language developed necessarily from instinctive cries according to the conformation of our vocal apparatus: there was no need for man to learn how to vary
these cries. Consequently a group of children deprived of contact with adults would develop a language of sorts by the time they had grown up - although, as de Brosses admits, a more efficient language would take an infinitely longer time. Such natural languages expressed simple ideas based on sense-data - the only true ideas. Abstract ideas - the foundation of Monboddo's rationalist system - belonged to the final most decadent period of linguistic evolution when art intervenes. And once the original, expressive simplicity of a language is destroyed it is destined to die. This is what has happened to Ancient Greek. For abstract ideas are merely figments of the mind - *entia rationis* without any archetypes in nature.\(^{42}\)

It was, above all, this extreme Lockian position on abstraction which incensed Monboddo and he devotes fifteen pages of MP144 to its attack. In Monboddo's view, de Brosses commits two principal errors. Firstly, he confuses general, moral ideas with metaphysical ideas - that is, with the Aristotelian Categories which reduce the infinity of things to ten classes. Secondly, he maintains that such ideas have no archetypes in nature, regarding them as mere fictions or chimeras. For Monboddo this opened de Brosses to changes of materialism and epistemological scepticism. And although this was not de Brosses' intended position, he did assert the infinity of things and of our ideas about them. Furthermore, truth for him was equivalent to the physical fact of existence. There was no science but physical science. These ideas, which derived from Locke, as Monboddo was well aware, were to have an enormous influence on Horne Tooke - the arch enemy of Harris and Monboddo.\(^{43}\)
On the other hand, Monboddo agrees that men must at first have practised speech without theory. They cannot have begun, as Rousseau had suggested, by analysing sounds. But neither could there have been a continuous instinctive development from animal cries. The process must have involved abstract ideas, however crude. And because barbarians can only corrupt art, grammarians and philosophers must have eventually intervened to remake the confusion of barbarous languages according to the principles of order and method - that is, according to the art of genera and species. 44

Thus Monboddo's distinction between barbarous and civilized languages is as absolute as de Brosses' distinction between natural and artificial languages. For de Brosses languages of art, like Sanskrit and Greek, are impractical philosophical constructs with no potentiality for organic growth. For Monboddo the natural "language" of gestures and cries is merely prelinguistic.

Such cries tie early man to the animal world. In MP144 Monboddo already compares him to the beaver and the "orang outang" - evidently under the influence of Rousseau's second Discours, and volume fourteen of Buffon's Histoire naturelle, which contained a great deal of material on anthropoid apes. Man could never have evolved from this prelinguistic animal stage without the two faculties of abstraction and articulation - the latter being necessary for the variation of inarticulate animal cries and the production of propositional words. 45

However, there are two differences between MP144 and the published version of OPL. The faculty of articulation was later
abandoned in favour of the idea that articulation could have been acquired by man's general tendency to imitate. And any possibility that a language of art might borrow structurally from a barbarous language was rigorously excluded. These changes seem to relate to contradictions within MPL144 itself.

Monboddo twice refers to the twin "faculties of speech and intellect" as the "seeds" of language and even says that, functioning together, they might enable a language to be invented more quickly than we might suppose. This is very different from the idea expressed elsewhere that speech must have followed the development of intellect step by step. It looks as if momentarily he was trying to reconcile his rationalist beliefs with the view supported by the *Traité* and an increasing amount of evidence from savage tongues - that language was in some degree innate and separate from mind. Finally he appears to have recognized that even the recognition of a faculty of articulation was a dangerous compromise.

Nevertheless, there remains in OPL an element of vagueness about the evolution of savage languages. Evidently Monboddo believed that any art they may display is either borrowed or has been invented in some ad hoc fashion. But some readers have had the impression that Monboddo meant that language developed organically during its barbarous stage, and was then reduced to an art by grammarians. This would have been very close to de Brosses' theory that language could be achieved unconsciously.

Some of Monboddo's references in MPL144 are familiar: Proclus on Plato's *Cratylus*; and Ammonius on both the *Cratylus* and
Aristotle's *De interpretatione* (Monboddo is still critical of Platonic mysticism at this stage). The references to Fréret, de la Vega, and Frezier as well as de Brosses' collection of travels appear to be due to his reading of the *Traité*. But Monboddo only approves of de Brosses' account of Egyptian hieroglyphics and Chinese characters.
Chapter Fifteen

CONCLUSION

Monboddo is frequently mentioned in books and articles on the history of linguistics; but his views on the origin of language and the principles of universal grammar are usually discussed only briefly and outside the context of OPL as a whole, much less the contemporary intellectual context. OPL is treated in much the same way as Harris's *Hermes*: as if the work had interesting things to say about language, provided these are detached from the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophising.

This attitude is understandable. Except for its philosophical content, OPL seems in many ways a typical eighteenth century work. OPL I is a philosophical history of language; OPL II a philosophical grammar; and OPL III-VI a philosophical rhetoric. At the same time, there is something baffling about the philosophical content so far as the modern reader is concerned. On the one hand, it is a dauntingly learned work — presumably one reason why no modern edition has appeared, although there have been facsimile reprints. On the other hand, the Platonised Aristotelian philosophy is presented as if it is self-evident: as if its principles, like those of Reid's Common Sense Philosophy, had only to be repeatedly expounded in simple terms and supported by a bewildering wealth of linguistic data to win complete
acceptance. This approach has something to do with the nature of Aristotelian metaphysics, which is concerned with analysing the self-evident principles and categories we necessarily use but which give us information about reality: the categories of substance and accident, for example, or the distinction between act and potentiality. On the other hand, it also has something to do with Monboddo's own unshakeable convictions; the consistency of his Aristotelianism - whether applied to language, law, logic or philosophy; and the forensic style of an eighteenth century Scottish advocate steeped in the principles of Roman law.

Furthermore, with a few exceptions such as Buffon and Linnaeus in the second edition of OPL I, Monboddo's targets - particularly his contemporaries - are not clearly specified. Thus, for example, Hume is scarcely mentioned; while the Considerations of Adam Smith is praised (sincerely, evidently) although Monboddo's philosophical position is opposed to Smith's. Monboddo avoids commenting on his contemporaries by adopting a historical approach which concentrates on Locke as the intellectual descendant of Epicurus and Gassendi - an approach to which he, like other Scottish philosophers, was in any case inclined.

Monboddo's reticence is related to the fact that the Scottish philosophers were all on familiar terms and therefore conducted their debates politely. OPL consequently has something of the atmosphere of a long carefully prepared speech delivered in a courtroom or debating society where the underlying issues and antagonisms are understood by everyone. For this reason also
OPL requires explication.

This thesis has, it is hoped, gone some way towards explaining the aims and significance of OPL in the context of its time, although it is impossible to deal adequately with all aspects of the background, sources and genesis of such a learned and wide-ranging work. The thesis has attempted to establish the following.

Firstly, in writing OPL, Monboddo, probably more than any other Scottish philosopher, made extensive use of the Advocates' Library.

Secondly, OPL draws on the same materials as the French philosophers and the Scottish moral empiricists - particularly the facts about barbarous languages available in travel books - in order to refute the Lockian philosophy on which their works were largely based. Monboddo wishes to establish that the natural history of mind as traced in Lockian fashion through the history of language does not support Locke's empiricism at all, but rather the unfashionable philosophy of Aristotle which Locke claimed to have superseded.

Thirdly, in writing OPL, Monboddo was inspired by the humanist principles associated with the foundation of the Advocates' Library, Scottish jurisprudence and the traditional culture of Scotland - principles which were also endorsed by the Cambridge Platonism of Harris.

Fourthly, I have attempted to show the connection between Monboddo's work and various inter-related aspects of the
Enlightenment - in particular, the Lockian goal of establishing a Science of Man based on the conjectural history of language and the Ciceronian humanist ideal of a union of rhetoric and philosophy. The former dominated eighteenth century philosophy and the latter was the basis of the cultural programme of the Enlightenment as a whole, but had a special significance in Scotland.

That is, in spite of Monboddo's opposition to contemporary movements of thought, OPL is in many respects a work of its time; and this is true even of its reflection of the humanist undercurrents of the Scottish Enlightenment. Monboddo seems to have seen humanism not merely as a movement completely opposed to contemporary trends but rather as the source of the Enlightenment: and his aim was to restore the Enlightenment to its original humanist principles which he considered had been distorted by the naive empiricism of Bacon and Locke. Cartesianism in the form of the influential Port Royal Grammar with its distortion of "Aristotelian" universal grammar, seems also to have been a target. In short, OPL may be seen as a historical critique of the Enlightenment as a whole, as represented in the French Encyclopedia.

The form of OPL itself may be seen as part of this critique. Although OPL I is in part a philosophical history of language (balancing the philosophical grammar and the philosophical rhetoric which constitute the rest of OPL), Monboddo regards it as a natural history of language and mind: that is to say, it
is as valid scientifically as the natural history of physical phenomena which was the paradigm of eighteenth century scientific method.

But Monboddo's modification of conjectural history goes beyond basing it more firmly on the anthropological and linguistic data available in travel books - which was also done by other Scottish philosophers. He claims that the facts alone, considered independently of reason, establish nothing - that is the weakness of contemporary natural history in general, as it is of the Lockian science (or natural history) of man.\(^2\) Empiricism and rationalism complement each other as Aristotle understood. A true (i.e. Aristotelian) science of man - as opposed to that of Locke and the Continental natural lawyers - must be based on the reasons of things as well as the facts.

Probably influenced by Monboddo, his friend William Smellie takes the same position in the preface to his translation of Buffon's *Natural History* (1780). Smellie praises Aristotle's *de Partibus Animalium* for supporting general philosophical principles with particular facts, and for basing his distinctions between species on mind and behaviour as well as physical characteristics.\(^3\) In Smellie's opinion, as in Monboddo's, a system of natural history should help to ascertain relations in the Scale of Being. That is, it should unite with the most "sublime philosophy". The value of Buffon's work is reduced by his fashionable French prejudices against God and Aristotelian final causes (i.e. teleology): "a
universe without design and intelligence is more incomprehensible than an active machine without a moving principle". It is the duty of a philosopher to trace the great chain of causes and effects in both the natural and the moral worlds which is intended to promote "general felicity". As we have seen, the Scottish philosophers in general saw this as their duty; but Monboddo alone addressed himself systematically to the problem of species.

Regardless of our ignorance of the essential natures of things, which he admits in the second edition of OPL, Monboddo is preoccupied with establishing the reality of Aristotelian genera and species - that is, universals. They are the foundation of logic and of all true science - the science of the causes and principles of things as opposed to mere geometry, mechanics or natural history. Only Aristotelian science reveals "the wisdom and goodness of God".6

The clearest illustration of the reality of genera and species - and of the inclusion of the latter in the former - is to be found in the universal structure of languages of art, which are the expression of mind. According to this structure, things that have a common nature receive a common name. Furthermore, "to predicate one term of another, is merely to say that there is not any thing contained under the name of the subject to which that of the predicate does not apply".7 This is the basis of logic.

OPL was by no means the swan-song of the Aristotelian doctrine that the only thing more divine than science is intellect - the form of forms, which cannot (as Locke and Condillac maintained) be explained in terms of mere sensation. For example, the same
spirit of Aristotelian transcendentalism is seen in the work of John Gillies F.R.S. (1747-1837), the Historiographer Royal for Scotland. A native of the North East like Monboddo, he was educated at Glasgow, where he imbibed the Hellenism of Leechman and Moor. The long introductions to his translations of both Aristotle's *Ethics and Politics* (1797) and the *Rhetoric* (1823) contain an Aristotelian theory of language very similar to Monboddo's. Against Locke, Kames, Reid, Stewart and Horne Tooke (the critic of Harris and Monboddo) he asserts that Aristotle's logic is founded on the universal structure of language:

"The same word in Greek denotes both reason and speech because in speech the acts of the mind are marked, expressed and recorded; namely, those analyses and inductions, those comparisons, abstractions and conclusions which constitute ... reasoning."^{9}

The purpose of a language of art - itself the result of analysis - is to classify and explain the facts of experience. This was also Aristotle's aim. Like all knowledge, language was originally acquired inductively. By comparing and classifying individual objects abstracted from the confusion of nature, it has led man to the loftiest principles. Therefore, to the extent that they themselves are based on accurate analysis, languages keep us on the right path.\(^{10}\)

In support of his contention that, contrary to current opinion, the syllogism is the primary and essential form of reasoning, Gillies quotes a prize-winning work by Marie-Joseph Degérando (1772-1842): *Des Signes et de l'art de penser, considérés dans leurs rapports mutuels* (Paris, 1800).\(^{11}\) It is ironic that, as one of the
ideologues. Dégérando saw himself as working in a field opened by Locke and developed by Condillac.

Gillies's was therefore not a lone voice, nor did Aristotelian logic die out. During the eighteenth century there were many textbooks on the subject, and in the early nineteenth century there was a widespread reaction against Locke and the Scottish philosophers. It was widely said, echoing Kant, that neither logic nor rhetoric had made any progress since Aristotle. Sir William Hamilton (1788-1856) - according to some, Monboddo's only superior in Scotland in ancient learning - was a major figure in this reaction.

An advocate as well as professor of logic and metaphysics at Edinburgh, Hamilton's philosophy was cast in the mould of Aristotle. As the editor of Reid's Works he defended the syllogism against Reid's criticisms and delighted in tracing modern ideas to their Aristotelian origins. Like Monboddo, he admired J.C. Scaliger; and in approaching any subject he was said to divide, distribute, divide and arrange in the manner of Aristotle, as Monboddo claims to do in OPL.

Thus the Aristotelianism of OPL points forwards as well as backwards. To see Monboddo merely as a laudator temporis acti is to adopt the mistaken view of many of his Scottish contemporaries. He realized, as they did not, that Lockian empiricism was anti-logical. In spite of Leibniz - another critic of Locke - it may be said that modern (i.e. mathematical) logic did not begin until 1847. Indeed, there are still logicians who adhere to Aristotle on the grounds that distinctions embodied in syntax and vocabulary are more...
likely to be sound.\textsuperscript{15}

Since the remarkable consistency of Monboddo's linguistic, legal and philosophical principles - a consistency essential to his concept of the unity of learning - depends on his thorough grasp of Aristotelian principles, it can best be appreciated if those principles are briefly surveyed. Indeed, OPL itself seems to have been intended partly as an introduction to Aristotelianism based on the principles of language. Such a survey would also be a suitable way to round off this final chapter.

For Monboddo, as for Aristotle in his \textit{Analytics}, induction is the universal process that leads us from the particular to the universal, from the finite to the infinite, from the world to God. Furthermore, induction establishes the major premisses from which the particular sciences (including universal grammar) are deduced by syllogistic logic.\textsuperscript{16}

However, although there are no innate ideas in the literal sense, this gradual ascent from the material to the divine is not possible without a God-given principle, a hidden energy in the mind. Sensation awakens this potential understanding to actual understanding. The universal, which is in innate potentiality, is slowly established in our minds from a multitude of particulars.\textsuperscript{17}

In the sense that we have intuitive knowledge of the common principles essential to understanding - the axioms - knowledge is reminiscence. These axioms, as opposed to the principles of particular sciences acquired by induction, are divine, necessary and universal. When dealing with them we are dealing indirectly
with God.\textsuperscript{18}

This is, in outline, the logic of Aristotle and Aquinas—whose great summation of Christian philosophy closely resembles Monboddo's attempt to reconcile empiricism and rationalism, the Epicurean view of man as part of nature with the transcendent idea of the Scale of Being. Monboddo, in a different way from Reid (who relied on the \textit{sensus communis}), seeks to establish a perennial Christian philosophy which will restore the Scale of Being to its original hylomorphic principles.

Like Plato, Descartes, Fénelon, Malebranche, Bossuet, Leibniz, Cudworth and Aquinas himself, he believes that we rise through phenomena to some knowledge of ideas which are a true reflection of God's. For Monboddo, as for them, visible things represent God's divinity and eternal power.\textsuperscript{19} He wishes to reawaken reason and thereby religion, thus reversing the influence of Bacon, Locke, Hume and the Encyclopédistes. By criticising the axioms of Aristotelian philosophy they had criticised God, and at the same time failed to recognize their debt to Aristotelian induction.

In Monboddo's view all knowledge ultimately rests on the rational structure of reality and the correspondence between it and our minds. This was also the basis of Reid's Common Sense philosophy which likewise sought to combat Locke's way of ideas.\textsuperscript{20} However, although Reid failed to recognize the continuing validity of Aristotelian logic (putting his faith in Baconian induction) he appealed to the evidence of common language. In this one respect he was more Aristotelian (or Thomistic) than Monboddo.
Monboddo cannot admit that language - the best illustration of the self-evident principles of Aristotelian metaphysics like matter and form - developed these principles without the intervention of philosopher grammarians. Language might then be seen as a faculty separate from reason - as, indeed, Reid unconsciously implies. Just as it is the job of the metaphysician to explicate what is implicit - to clarify our ideas - this is also the task of the inventors of languages of art.

To the modern reader this thesis may appear to have been unduly preoccupied with philosophical questions, but as Hans Aarsleff has said, the history of the study of language must be written in these terms:

"... during the years under consideration, language study - even when called philology - was not merely a matter of knowing the forms, syntax, phonology, historical relationships, and other aspects of particular languages. It involved questions of wider significance. What, for instance, was the origin of thought? Did the mind have a material basis? Did mankind have a single origin? ... Could etymology be made instructive without lending support to skepticism? It is possible to separate philology as a scholarly discipline ... from these questions. But it is not possible to deal with its history without including them, provided that the aim is not merely to record but also to seek to understand and explain the connections between events."21
Appendix I

A LIST OF THE PRINCIPAL ADDITIONS TO
THE SECOND EDITION OF OPL I (1774)

Where a complete chapter has been added the page numbers are bracketed.

Preface  i-xi

Book I  Chapter 6  pp.64-8; note pp.68-71
         Chapter 9  pp.129-32
         Chapter 12 pp.155-9
         Chapter 16 pp.201-6

Book II Chapter 3  pp.253-7; note pp.262-9
         Chapter 4  (pp.270-312)
         Chapter 5  (pp.313-60)
         Chapter 7  (pp.367-81)
         Chapter 14 (pp.437-41)
         Chapter 15 (pp.442-55)

Book III Chapter 6  (pp.489-98)
         Chapter 10 pp.569-74
Appendix II

WORKS IN THE ADVOCATES' LIBRARY CONSULTED BY MONBODDO

1 WORKS ON LANGUAGE

Académie Royale des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres. Histoire, avec les Mémoires de Littérature, tirés des registres de cette académie...

[1710-1763] Paris 1736 [CAL 1776]

[ALDUS, Manutius the elder]

Etymologicon magnum Graecae linguae
Venetiis 1549 [CAL 1742]

idem., cum notis Friderici Sylburgii
apud Comelinum 1594 [CAL 1776]

ASTLE, Thomas,

Origin and progress of writing, as well hieroglyphic as elementary...
London 1784 [CAL 1787]

BAXTER, William,

"Philological letters to Dr Geeky" in Archaeologia
vol. I, p. 205 ff. [CAL 1776]

BOCHARTUS [BOCHART] Samuel,

Opera omnia
3 tom. Lugd. Bat. and Trajecti ad Rhenum
1692 and 1707 [CAL 1742]

BULLET, [Jean-Baptiste]

Dictionnaire Celtique
(including "Mémoires sur la langue Celtique")
3 vols. Besançon 1754 [CAL 1776]

CAYLUS, le Comte de,

Recueil d'Antiquités Egyptiennes, Etrusques, Grecques, Romaines et Gauloises.
7 tom. Paris 1752-67 [CAL 1776]

CHEKUS, Joannes [Sir John Cheke]

De pronunciatione linguae Graecae
in: HAVERCAMPI sylloge scriptorum de lingua Graeca, vol. 2 [Bas. 1555] [CAL 1776]
COURT de GEBELIN [Antoine]
Monde Primitif analysé et comparé avec le monde moderne...
9 to. Paris 1773 [CAL 1787]

DESPAUTERIUS, J.N.,
Commentarii grammatici
Paris 1537 [CAL 1776]

du HALDE Jean-Baptise, S.J.,
Lettres édifiantes et curieuses écrites des missions étrangères par quelques missionnaires de la Compagnie de Jésus
17 to. Paris 1717; 1734 [CAL 1776]

FRERET, Nicolas,
"Réflexions sur les principes généraux de l'art d'écrire, and en particulier sur les fondemens de l'écriture Chinoise" [delivered 1718]

FRESNE, Carolus du, Dominus du Cange
[DU CANGE, Charles du Fresne, Sieur]
Glossarium ad scriptores mediae and infimae Graecitatis
2 to. Lugduni 1688 [CAL 1742]

GAZA, Theodorus,
Introductionis grammaticae
Tibri IV, Graece
Basileae 1523 [CAL 1742]
Paris 1518 [CAL 1787]

GRANT, James, Advocate,
Essays on the origin of society, language, property, government, jurisdiction, contracts, and marriage, interspersed with illustrations from the Greek and Gaelic languages
London 1785 [CAL 1787]

GREENMAN, Heinrick Moritz Gottlieb,
Dissertation on the Gipsies...translated from the German by Matthew Raper
London 1787 [CAL 1807]

GUIGNES, Joseph de,
Lettre de Pekin sur le génie de la langue Chinoise, et la nature de leur écriture symbolique, comparée avec celle des anciens Egyptiens...
Bruxelles 1773 [CAL 1787]

"Essai Historique sur l'étude de la philosophie chez les anciens Chinois" [delivered 1770-71]; ibid., vol.38, Paris 1777, pp.269-311.


HARRIS, James, Hermes; or A philosophical enquiry concerning language and universal grammar London 1751
London 1771 [CAL 1776]

HERRIES, John, Elements of Speech. London 1773 [CAL 1776]

IHRE, Johan, Glossarium Suio-Gothicum... Upsalitae 1769 [CAL 1807]

JONES, Sir William, Poesios Asiaticae commentariorum Libri VI... London 1774 [CAL 1776]

Asiatic Researches, or transactions of the society instituted in Bengal for enquiring into the history and antiquities, the arts, sciences and literature of Asia, Calcutta 1788 and c. [CAL 1807]

KIRCHER, Athanasius, Oedipus Aegyptiacus; hoc est, universalis hieroglyphicae veterum doctrinae, temporum injurii abolitae, instauratio 3 tom. Romae 1652-1654 [CAL 1807]
La CROZE, Maturinus Veyssière de,  
Lexicon Aegyptiaco - Latinum, quod in compendium  
redegit Christianus Scholtz, notulas quasdam et  
indices adjicit Carol. Godofr. Woide  
Oxonii 1775 [CAL 1787]

LASCARIS, Constantinus,  
Grammaticae Graecae compendium  
Venetiis, apud P. Manutium 1557 [CAL 1742]

LUIDIUS, Edwards [Edward Lhuyd]  
Archaeologia Britannica: Giving some account of  
the languages, histories and customs of the  
original inhabitants of Great Britain and Ireland  
Oxford 1707 [CAL 1742]

LOWTH, Robert, D.D., Bishop of Oxford,  
Introduction to English Grammar  
London 1771 [CAL 1776]

LYE, Edward,  
Dictionarium Saxonico et Gothico - Latinum...  
Edidit... Owen Manning  
2 Vol. Londini 1772 [CAL 1776]

NARES, Robert,  
Elements of Orthoepy  
London 1784 [CAL 1807]

PARSONS, James,  
Remains of Japhet; being historical inquiries  
into the affinity and origin of the European  
Languages  
London 1767 [CAL 1776]

PONS, Père Jean François (1698-1753),  
"Lettre du P. Pons au P. du Halde"  
in: Lettres Edifiantes et Curieuses concernant  
L'Asie, L'Afrique, et l'Amérique  
See du Halde.

PORT ROYAL Messieurs de [Lancelot C. & A. Arnauld]  
Grammaire générale and raisonée  
Amsterdam 1703 [CAL 1742]

SALMASIUS, Claudius,  
De Hellenistica  
Lugduni Bat. 1643 [CAL 1742]
SANCTIUS, Franciscus,
Minerva; sive de causis linguae Latinae
commentarius, cum notis et anima versionibus
G. Scioppii et longe uberioribus Jacobi Perizonii
Francquerae 1693 [CAL 1742]

SCALIGER, Julius Caesar,
De causis linguae Latinae
Apud Pet. Santandreanum 1580 [CAL 1742]

SHERINGHAM, Robert,
De Anglorum gentiis origine disceptatio
Cantabrigiae 1670 [CAL 1742]

SKENE, Sir John,
"De verborum significatione"
in: Regiam Majestatem, Sive Scotiae veteres
leges and constitutiones, libri IV
2 tom. Edinburgh 1609 [CAL 1742]

STEELE, Joshua,
Prosodia Rationalis: or, An Essay towards
Establishing the Melody and Measure of Speech
London 1779 [CAL 1807]

STEPHANUS, Henricus [Henri ESTIENNE d.1520]
Ciceronianum lexicon Graeco-Latinum
Apud Ipsum Steph. 1557 [CAL 1742]

THOMASSINUS, Ludovicus,
Glossarium universale Hebraicum...
Paris 1697 [CAL 1742]

URSINUS, Georgius Henricus [George Heinrich URSIN]
Observationum philologicarum
Ratisponae 1679 [CAL 1742]

VOSSIUS, Gerardus Joannes,
Grammatica Latina
Lugduni Bat. 1644 [CAL 1742]

De historicis Latinis
Lugduni Bat. 1651 [CAL 1742]

WARBURTON, William, Bishop of Gloucester,
Divine Legation of Moses...
WELLERUS, Jacobus,
Grammatica Graeca nova...
Amsterdam 1715 [CAL 1742]

WILKINS, Charles,
Bhagavat-Geeta, or dialogues of Kreehsna and Arjoon... translated from... the Saanskreet...
London 1785 [CAL 1787]

WILKINS, John, Bishop of Chester,
Essay towards a real character, and a philosophical language
London 1668 [CAL 1742]

WORMIUS, Olaus,
Danicorum monumentorum
Hafniae 1643 [CAL 1742]

Danica literatura antiquissima, vulgo Gothico dicta...
Hafniae 1636 [CAL 1742]

2 TRAVELS AND VOYAGES

ABULGASI BAYADUR CHAN,
Histoire généalogique des Tartars, traduite du MS Tartare, avec des remarques sur le véritable estat présent de l'Asie Septentrionale
Leyde 1726 [CAL 1776]

ACOSTA, Joseph de [Richard SIMON]
Histoire naturelle et morale des Indes, tant 'Orientalles qu' Occidentalles, traduite en Françoise de Castillan...
Paris 1606 [CAL 1776]

Natural History of the West Indies, translated from the Spanish... by E.G. [Edward Grimestone]
London 1604 [CAL 1776]
d'ACUGNA, Christopher [ACUNA Christoval de] et al.
Voyages and discoveries in South America:.:
by Christopher d'Acugna... by M. Acarete...
by M. Grillet and Bechamel.
Done into English from the originals
London 1698 [CAL 1807]

ADAIR, James,
History of the American Indians
London 1775 [CAL 1787]

BELL, John,
Travels from St Petersburg in Russia to diverse parts of Asia
2 vols. Glasgow 1762 [CAL 1776]

BERNIER, Francois,
Voyages, contenant la description des états du Grand Mogul de l'Hindostam... 
2 tom. Amsterdam 1710 [CAL 1776]

BOUGAINVILLE, Louis de,
Voyage autour du Monde
Paris 1771 [CAL 1776]
The same translated by Jo. Rheinhold Forster
London 1772 [CAL 1776]

BOSMAN, William,
Description of the coast of Guinea, translated into English
London 1705 [CAL 1776]

BRUCE, James, FRS,
Travels to discover the source of the Nile...

BUSBEQUIUS, A.G. [Busbecq, Ogier Ghislain de]
Opera, Oxon 1660 [CAL 1776]

BYRON, John, Commodore,
Voyage round the world in the years 1764, 1765 and 1766 in his Majesty's ship the Dolphin, containing a description of the Streights of Magellan and of the gigantic people called Patagonians
London 1767 [CAL 1776]

CALLANDER, John [of Craigforth],
Terra Australis Cognita; on voyages to the Terra Australis during the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries [translation, with additions, of de Brosses 1756]
3 vol., Edinburgh 1766 [CAL 1776]

CARVER, J.,
Travels through the interior parts of North America [1766-1768] London 1778 [CAL 1787]

CHANDLER, Richard, D.D.,
Travels in Asia Minor and in Greece
2 vol., London 1776 [CAL 1787]

CHAPPE d'AUTEROCHE l'Abbé [Jean]
Voyage en Sibérie
2 tom. Paris 1768 [CAL 1776]

CHARDIN (Chevalier du),
Voyages en Perse et autres lieux de l'Orient
4 tom. Amsterdam 1735 [CAL 1776]

CHARLEVOIX, Pierre François Xavier de,
Histoire et description générale de la Nouvelle France, avec le journal historique d'un voyage fait par ordre du roi dans l'Amérique Septentrionale
6 tom. Paris 1744 [CAL 1776]

Histoire de l'isle Espagnole, ou de S. Domingue, écrite... sur des mémoires manuscrits du P. Jean Baptiste le Pers, Jesuite, missionaire...
2 tom. Paris 1730 [CAL 1776]

Histoire de Paraguay...
3 tom. Paris 1756 [CAL 1776]

[CHURCHILL, Awnsham and John],
A Collection of Voyages and Travels
6 vol. London 1704 and 1732 [CAL 1742]
8 vol. London 1752 [CAL 1776]

CRANTZ, David,
History of Greenland
2 vol., London 1767 [CAL 1787]

CRAWFURD, Quentin,
Sketches chiefly relating to the history, religion, learning and manners of all the Hindoos
London 1790 [CAL 1807]
CTESIUS, C.,
Ex ejus Persicis et Indicis
1556 [CAL 1776]

DALRYMPLE, Alexander,
Historical collection of the several voyages and discoveries in the South Pacific Ocean
2 vol. London 1769 [CAL 1776]

DAMPIER, William,
Voyage round the World and other voyages and descriptions
3 vol. London 1703 [CAL 1776]

de BROSSES, Charles,
Histoire des navigations aux terres Australes
Paris 1756 [CAL 1787]
see CALLANDER

DIDEROT, Denis,
Mémoires géographiques, physiques et historiques sur l'Asie, l'Afrique et l'Amérique
6 vol. Yverdon 1767 [CAL 1776]

DOBBS, Arthur,
Account of the countries adjoining to Hudson's Bay...
London 1744 [CAL 1776]

DOLOMIEU, Deodat de
Voyage aux Iles de Lipari
Paris 1783 [CAL 1807]

DOW, Alexander,
History of Hindostan... To which are added a dissertation concerning the religion and philosophy of the Brahmins, and an appendix containing the history of the Mogal empire...
3 vol. London 1768 [CAL 1776]

du HALDE, Jean Baptiste, [S.J.],
Description géographique, historique, chronologique, politique, et physique de l'empire de la Chine, et de la Tartarie Chinoise
4 tom. Paris 1735 [CAL 1776]
Translation by R. Brookes
4 vol. London 1736 [CAL 1776]
[du HALDE, J-B, S.J. and Charles le GOBIEN S.J.]
Lettres édifiantes et curieuses écrites des missions étrangères, par quelques missionnaires de la compagnie de Jésus...
17 tom. Paris 1717, 1734 [CAL 1776]

du PRATZ, le Page,
Histoire de la Louisiane
3 tom. Paris 1758 [CAL 1776]

EDWARDS, Bryan
History civil and commercial of the British Colonies in the West Indies
3 vol. London 1739-1801 [CAL 1807]

FALKNER, Thomas [S.J.]
Description of Patagonia...
Hereford 1774.

FORREST, Thomas,
Voyage to New Guinea and the Moluccas... during the years 1774-75 and 76; to which is added a vocabulary of the Magindano tongue
London 1779 [CAL 1807]

FORSTER [Johan] Georg [Adam]
A Voyage round the World [in his Britannic Majesty's Sloop, Resolution, commanded by Captain James Cook] during the years 1772-75
2 vols. London 1777 [CAL 1787]

FRÉZIER [Amédée-François]
Relation du voyage de la mer du sud aux côtes du Chili, du Pérou, et du Brésil... 1712-1714
2 tom. Amsterdam 1717 [CAL 1742]

GRIEVE, James [translator]
Natural History of Kamschatka
[by E.-P. Kracheninnikof]
Gloucester 1764 [CAL 1776]

GROSE, John Henry,
Voyage to the East Indies [1750-1764]
2 vol. London 1766 [CAL 1787]

GUMILLA, Joseph, S.J.,
Histoire naturelle, civile et géographique de l'Orenoque...
traduite de l'Espagnol
3 tom. Avignon 1758 [CAL 1807]
HALDE, See du HALDE.

HARRIS, John,
Complete Collection of Voyages
2 vol. London 1744 [CAL 1776]

HAWKESWORTH, John,
An Account of the Voyages undertaken... for making discoveries in the Southern Hemisphere, and successfully performed by Commodore Byron, Capt. Wallis, Capt. Cartaret and Capt. Cook...
3 vol. London 1773 [CAL 1776]

HENNEPIN, Louis,
Description de la Louisiane
Paris 1683, 1688 [CAL 1742]

[H Voyage qui contient une] Nouvelle découverte d'un très grand pays situé dans l'Amérique...
Utrecht 1697 [CAL 1742]
Leide 1704 [CAL 1807]

HOLWELL, J.Z.,
Interesting historical events relative to the provinces of Bengal and the empire of Indostan; with the mythology and cosmology, fasts and festivals of the Gentoos... and a dissertation on the metem-psychosis of the Bramins...
London 1766 [CAL 1776]

IRWIN, Eyles,
Series of adventures in the course of a voyage up the Red Sea... in the year 1777
London 1780 [CAL 1787]

KAEMPFER, Engelbert,
History of Japan, translated from the High Dutch by J.G. Schenchzer...
2 vol. London 1728 [CAL 1742]

KOLBEN, Peter,
Caput Bonae Spei Hodiernum: Or a particular account of the several nations of the Hottentots...
London 1731 [CAL 1776]

KEATE, George, F.R.S.,
Account of the Pelew Islands...
London 1789 [CAL 1807]
LABAT, Père Jean-Baptiste (de l'Ordre des Frères Prêcheurs),
Voyage aux îles de l'Amérique; contenant l'histoire
naturelle de ces pays, l'origine, les moeurs, la
religion, et le gouvernement des habitans anciens et
modernes...
Nouvelle edition 8 tom. Paris 1742 [CAL 1776]

La BORDE, Sieur de la [Jean Baptiste S.J.
Relation exacte de l'origine, moeurs, coutumes, religion,
guerres et voyages des Caraïbes, Sauvages des Isles
Antilles de l'Amérique.
Leide 1704 [CAL 1787]

La CONDAMINE, Charles-Marie de
Relation abrégée d'un voyage fait dans l'intérieur de
l'Amérique Méridionale, depuis la côte de la mer du
Sud, jusqu'aux côtes du Bresil et de la Guyane,
en descendant la rivière des Amazones
Maestrecht 1778 [CAL 1807]
Also in: Mémoires de l'Académie des Sciences de Paris 1745.

La CROZE, Maturin Veyssière de,
Histoire du Christianisme des Indes
2 tom. la Haye 1758 [CAL 1787]

LAFITEAU, R.P. Joseph Francois S.J.,
Moeurs des Sauvages Amériquains...
Paris 1724 [CAL 1776]

La MARTINIERE, de, Count de Beaurepère,
Voyage into the northern countries, being a
description of the manners, customs,...
and habits of the Norwegians, Laponians...
London 1674 [CAL 1776]

La HONTAN M. le Baron de,
Nouveaux voyages dans l'Amérique Septentrionale...
2 tom. Haye 1702, 1704 [CAL 1776]

La VEGA, Garcilasso de la,
Royal commentaries of Peru,... rendered out of Spanish...
by Sir Paul Rycaut
London 1688 [CAL 1742]

LEEMIUS, Canutus,
De Lapponibus Finmarchiae, eorumque lingua, vita, et
religione pristina commentario
Hafniae 1767 [CAL 1776]
Le GOBIEN, Charles S.J.,
Manners and customs of the inhabitants of the
Marian or Ladrone Islands
[Histoire des îles Mariannes Paris 1700]
In: CALLANDER, John, Terra Australis cognita...
Edinburgh 1766 vol. III, p. 40 ff. [CAL 1776]

LONG, J.,
Voyages and travels of an Indian interpreter and trader,
describing the manners and customs of the North American
Indians.
London 1791 [CAL 1807]

MAGALHANES, Hernando,
Voyage to the South Pacific Ocean in 1520
In Dalrymple's Collection of voyages I, p. 1 [CAL 1776]

MAILLET, Benoit de,
See MASCRIER.

MARSDEN, William, F.R.S.,
History of Sumatra...
London 1783 [CAL 1787]

MARTIN, Martin,
Description of the Western Isles of Scotland
London 1703 [CAL 1742]

MASCRIER, M. l'Abbé Jean Baptiste le,
Description de l'Egypte... composée sur
les mémoires de M. MAILLET
Paris 1735 [CAL 1776]

Mémoires concernant l'histoire, les sciences, les arts, les
mœurs, les usages, etc., des Chinois par les Missionnaires
de Pékin
15 tom. Paris 1776-91 [CAL 1807]

MOORE, Francis,
Travels into the inland parts of Africa
London 1738 [CAL 1776]

MURÁTORI, Ludovico Antonio,
Relation of the Missions of Paraguay...
done into English...
London 1751 [CAL 1787]

NIEBUHR, Carsten,
Voyage en Arabie
2 tom. Amsterdam 1776-80 [CAL 1787]
POLO, Marco,
Delle Cose de Tartari e dell Indie orientali
In: Ramusio, G., Navigazionii e viaggi diversi
3 tom. Venetia 1554 [CAL 1776]

PRATZ le Page de,
Histoire de la Louisiane
3 tom. Paris 1758 [CAL 1776]

PURCHAS, Samuel,
Pilgrimes, in five books, containing the voyages
and peregrinations made by ancient Kings,
Patriarkes, Apostles, Philosophers and others
London 1625-26 [CAL 1776]

QUIROS, Fernand de,
Voyage to Polynesia and Australia in 1606
In: Callander's collection of voyages
vol.2, p.142 ff. [CAL 1776]

RENAUDOT, Eusebius,
Ancient accounts of India and China by two Mohammedan
travellers... translated from the Arabic
London 1733 [CAL 1776]

ROBERTSON, William, D.D.,
History of America
2 vol., London 1777 [CAL 1787]

[ROCHEFORT, Charles Caesar de],
History of the Caribby Islands...
with a Caribbean vocabulary, rendered into
English by John Davies
London 1666 [CAL 1787]

ROQUE, Jean de la,
Voyage fait par l'ordre du Roi Louis XIV dans
Ta Palestine...
Paris 1717 [CAL 1776]

SAVARY, Sieur le Claude
,Lettres sur l'Egypte, ou l'on offre le parallele des
moeurs anciennes et modernes...
3 tom. Paris 1785 [CAL 1787]

SEPP, Anthony, S.J. and Anthony BEHME,
Account of a voyage from Spain to Paraguay:
translated from the High Dutch
In: Churchill's collection of voyages II.
SMITH, William,  
History of the province of New York  
London 1776  
[CAL 1787]

SPARRMAN, Andrew,  
Voyage to the Cape of Good Hope, towards the Antarctic Polar Circle, and round the world...  
translated from the Swedish...  
2 vol. London 1785  
[CAL 1787]

TETRE, Jean Baptiste du,  
Histoire générale des Antilles...  
Paris 1667-1671

VENEGAS, Miguel,  
Natural and civil history of California;  
translated from the Spanish  
2 vol. London 1759  
[CAL 1807]

VOLNEY, Constantin Francois Chasseboeuf, Comte de,  
Voyage en Syrie et en Egypte pendant les années 1783-85  
2 tom. Paris 1787

WINDUS, John,  
Journey to Mequinez, the residence of the present Emperor of Fez and Morocco  
London 1725  
In: Pinkerton's voyages XV p.442.

3 CLASSICAL WORKS

AELIANUS, Claudius,  
Historia varia cum notis Jacobi Perizonii  
Lugd. Bat. 1701  
[CAL 1742]

ALCINOUS  
Institutio ad Platicam Philosophiam cum commentario Jac. Carpentarii  
Paris 1573  
[CAL 1742]
ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS
De fato...
Gr. Latin. London 1658
See MP61 (p.18 note) which specifies this edition.

AMMONIUS HERMIAS,
In libri Aristotelis de Interpretatione sectionem secundam commentarius
Gr. Lat.
Exist. cum Alexandro Aphrodisiensi De Fato
See MP142 (1766) pp.36,52; MP144 (1766) pp.2-3 note.

In quinque voces Porphyrii commentaria Venetiis 1545
In Aristotelis praedicamenta Venetiis 1545

ANTONINUS, Marcus Aurelius, Imperator,
Meditationes... cum commentariis Thomae Gatakeri Cantabrigiae 1652
Meditations, Englished, with notes... Glasgow 1742

ARISTOTLE,
Categoriae cum Simplicii commentariis, Graece. Venetiis 1499
Physicae auscultationis libri VII cum Simplicii commentariis, Graece. Venetiis apud Aldum 1526
Analytica priora, cum Jo. Gram. Philoponi. commentariis, Graece. Venetiis apud Aldum 1534

ARISTOTLE,
De anima, libri III, cum commentariis Jo. Philoponi Graece VENETIIS 1535
De Coelo, libri IV Graece, cum commentariis Jo. Simplicii Venetiis... 1526
ARRIANUS,
De expeditione Alexandri Magni libri vii cum historia Indica
1575, 1688, 1704 [CAL 1742]

CAESAR, C. Julius,
Opera
Lugd. Bat. 1593 [CAL 1742]
Glasguae, apud Foulis 1750 [CAL 1776]
twelve other editions are listed.

CARPENTARIUS, Jacobus,
Platonis cum Aristotele in universa philosophia, comparatio
in ALCINOUS, Institutio ad Platonicam Philosophiam

CICERO M. Tullius,
De Oratore
Oxon 1714 [CAL 1742, which also lists a Paris edition of 1543. CAL 1776 lists a Cambridge edition of 1732 and a Glasgow edition of 1749 annotated by George Ross]

Opera omnia... commentarium, cura Josephi Oliveti
9 tom. Parisiis 1740-1742 [CAL 1776]
20 vol. Glasguae 1749 [CAL 1776]
See MP9, p.8.]

De natura Deorum...
Cantabrigiae 1718 [CAL 1742]

Orations, trans. William Guthrie
London 1745

De officiis... cum commentariis Hieronymi Wolfii
Basilae 1569 [CAL 1742]
Amst. 1688 [CAL 1742]

CLEMENS (Titus Flavius) Alexandrinus,
Opera, cum annotationibus D. Heinssii and F. Sylburgii
Lutetiae 1629 [CAL 1742]
DEMOSTHENES,
Opera cum commentariis Ulpiani
Lutetiae 1570
See PB22, p.51.

Idem. cum notis J. Taylori
Cantabrigiae 1747
See MP208, p.11.

DIODORUS SICULUS,
Bibliothecae historicae... cum notis castigationibus H. Stephani
Apud ipsum Stephanum 1559
This edition cited by Monboddo MP42, p.6.

Idem. recensuit P. Wesselingius, H. Stephani, L. Rhodomani, F. Ursini etc. Amstelodami 1746
This edition cited MP81, p.36.

DIOGENES LAERTIUS,
De vitis, dogmatibus, apophthegmatibus clarorum philosophorum cum notis Is. Casauboni
Coloniae Allobrogum 1615
See MP34, pp.4-5 ("Life of Plato") and MP98, p.17 ("Observations on Diogenes Laertius")

DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITA,
Opera
Antverpiae 1634

Georgii Pachymerae, Paraphrasis... Dionysii Areopagitae, Paris 1738
George Pachymera is cited by Monboddo (PB4, p.4)

DIONYSIUS of Halicarnassus,
Opera (ed. Sylburgiis)
Francofurti 1586
This edition cited by Monboddo MP109, MP142 (1766), p.53, MP154 (1768) passim.

Antiquitatum Romanarum
Parisiiis 1590
Judicia de Isocrate, de Demosthene, etc.
Exst. in Stanno aurali del ben parlare [CAL 1742]
DIONYSIUS THRAX,
Ars Grammatica
Exst. in Fabricii bibliotheca Graeca
[Cal 1742 see
tom. 7, p.26
MP154 (1768) p.11, 14.]

EUCLID
Opera omnia... ex recensione
Davidis Gregorii
Oxoniae 1703
[Cal 1742, which
lists six editions]

Idem. ed. Robert Simson, Glasgow 1756, and
1762
[Cal 1776, which
lists six other editions.]

[Cal 1787
Seven more editions are listed in Cal 1807 including
Alexander Ingram, Edinburgh 1799.]

FABRICIUS, Jo. Albertus,
Bibliotheca Graeca
14 tom. Hamburgi 1705-1728
[Cal 1742
Monboddo made considerable use of this work. See
epecially MP68 passim.]

HERODOTUS,
Historiarum... ex editione Jacobi
Gronovii...
9 tom. Glasguae 1761
[Cal 1776]
[Three 16th century editions listed in Cal 1742.
Cal 1787 lists the Amsterdam edition of 1763 with
notes by T. Gale, J. Gronovius, L.C. Valckenar, P. Wesseling
which Monboddo used.]

HESIOD,
Opera... ex recensione Jo. Geo. Graevii...
commentaria Jo. Cleria... notis variorum...
Dan. Heinii...
Amst. 1701
[Cal 1742
This is the edition Monboddo used. Several others
are listed.]

HIEROCLES ALEXANDRINUS,
Commentarius in aurea carmina Pythagorae adscripta...
recensuit, notasque... Pet. Needham
Cantabrigiae 1709
[Cal 1742 See
PB36, p.88: Also editions of 1583, 1673, 1682 and a
French translation by Dacier in his La vie de Pythagore.]
HOLSTENIUS, Lucas,
De vita et scriptis Porphyrii philosophi dissertatio
Cantabrigiae 1655
See PB1, p.25. [CAL 1776]

HOMER,
Opera... interpretatione Didymi...
Lugduni Batavorum 1656 [CAL 1776]
See MP132, p.195. Glasgow (Foulis) ed. of 1756 is also listed.]

---Iliadus, cum Eustachii commentariis...
3 vol. Florentiae 1730 [CAL 1776, see MP21]

---Ilias... cum annotationibus Samuelis Clarke
2 vol. Londini 1754 [CAL 1787, see MP31 passim, MP132 passim (1777). CAL 1766 lists James MacPherson's translation (London 1773)]

---Opera omnia... cum notis Samuelis Clarkii
5 vol. Lipsiae 1759

---Odyssea
2 tom. Glasguae 1758 [CAL 1807]

HORACE,
Opera
Venice 1494 [CAL 1742]
London 1735 [CAL 1742]
In all, about twenty editions between these dates are listed. See MP53, MP164, MP230.]

ISOCRATES,
Opera cum versione and commentariis Hieronymi Wolfii
Basilae 1750 [CAL 1742]
lists three other editions. See PB22, pp.38-48, 115-34 and many other references to the edition of Wolfius.]

JAMBLICHUS, Chalcidensis,
De mysteriis Aegyptiorum etc...
Marsilio Ficino interprete
Venetiis, in aedibus Aldi 1516 [CAL 1776]
see PB34, pp.172-8.]

Idem. cum notis Thomae Gale
Oxonii 1678 [CAL 1776]
see PB1, p.30.]
De vita Pythagorae cum notis Ludolfi Kisteri
[includes Porphyry, De vita Pythagorae ex versione
L. Holstenii]
Amst. 1707 [CAL 1742
Monboddo used this edition. See PB12, p.79; PB1,
pp.23-4; MP226 (1784) "Notes from Porphyry... and
from Iamblichus"]

JOSEPHUS, Flavius,
Opera omnia, cum notis... Joannis Hudsoni... recensuit...
Sigibertus Havercompus
2 vol. Amst.1726 [CAL 1742
See MP73 ("Of the Jewish Government") p.38.]

JULIANANUS, Imperator,
Opera... ex recensione E. Spanhemii
Lipsiae 1696 [CAL 1742
See MP65 ("From Spanheim's ed. of Julian's works...
Leipsick 1696")]

JUSTIANUS, Flavius, Imperator,
Institutiones
Venetiis 1568 [CAL 1776
lists a further seven editions and CAL 1742 a total of
nine editions beginning in 1473, mostly 16th and 17th
century. Notable are the Leyden edition of 1678
"Additi sunt tituli Digestor: De Verborum Significacione
et regulis juris" (CAL 1776); and the London edition of
1756 with notes by George Harris.]

LACTANTIUS (L. Caecilius Firmianus)
Divinarum institutionum... sive de justitia, accurante
D. Dairymple de Hailes, Eq.
Edinburgi 1777 [CAL 1787
The editor was Monboddo's friend and colleague Lord Hailes.]

LEO (Joannes) Africanus,
Africæ descriptio
2 vol. Lugduni Bat 1632 [CAL 1742
see PB27, p.27.]

LIVY, (Titus),
Historiarum ab urbe condita... cum notis J.B.L. Crevier
4 tom. Parisiis 1735 [CAL 1742
This is the edition Monboddo used. See PB1, p.35; PB5
passim; MP127 ("Observations on Livy" July 1779)).
LUCRETIUS CARUS (Titus),
De natura rerum... cum interpretatione et notis
Thomae Creech
Oxoniae 1695
[CAL 1742, which lists six other editions. CAL 1776 lists four editions: two are based on Creech. One of these is the Glasgow edition of 1759. Monboddo used Creech's edition: see MP64, pp.60-2, MP132, pp.187-9.]

MARCELLINUS, Ammianus,
Historiarum
[CAL 1742, which also lists two editions of 1591 and 1693. See MP200 ("Notes from Ammianus Marcellinus... Of the Antiquities of the Barbarous Nations who invaded the Roman Empire")]

NICOMACHUS GERASENUS,
Arithmeticae
Paris 1538
[CAL 1776. See MP21 passim and MP30 passim. CAL1742 lists the commentary of Jamblichus (Arnhemiae 1668) which Monboddo used. See MP21, pp.72-3.]

PHILO JUDAEUS,
Opera
Paris 1552
[CAL 1742, which also lists the Paris edition of 1640. CAL 1776 lists two more; one of 1613, the other of 1742. See MP 184 ("Theory of the Earth from Philo-Judaeus, and of Generation")]

PLATO,
Opera omnia... ex versione Marsilii Ficini
Francofurti 1602
[CAL 1742 This was the edition Monboddo preferred. See MP34, p.2, MP38, pp.2-5, MP152, p.3 which refers to the Frankfurt edition.]

PLINY,
Historia mundi, sive historia naturalis
Lugduni Bat. 1669
[CAL 1742. Also seven other editions from 1496 to 1685, most of them 16th century. See PB1, pp.24-5, 27, 30, 90 and other pocket books.]

PLOTINUS,
Opera... cum commentariis Marsilii Ficini
Basileae 1580
[CAL 1742. This is the edition Monboddo used. See PB38 ("Observations upon the Enneads of Plotinus") passim.]
PLUTARCH, 
Opera omnia ex versione H. Cruserii & G. Xylandri, cum 
notis Xylandri & H. Stephani 
Francofurti 1620 [CAL 1742, which 
lists several other editions including Paris 1624 edited 
with a life by Jo. Rualdum. It is not clear which of 
these Monboddo used, but it may have been the Paris edition. 
See PB41, p. 3.]

POLYBIUS, 
Historiarum... interprete I. Casaubono 
3 tom. Amst. 1670 [CAL 1742, which 
also lists two French translations (1558 and 1729). CAL 1776 
has Venice 1498, Antwerp 1582, Paris 1609 - the last with the 
notes of Casaubon which Monboddo criticizes in PB5, pp. 34-41. 
See also pp. 1-3, 25-6 and PB1, p. 89.]

PORPHYRY, 
Institutio ad Aristotelis categoriarum doctrinam... 
J. L. Strebaeo interprete. Parisiis 1548 [CAL 1776 See 
PB11, p. 93.]

De vita Pythagorae... ex versione L. Holstenii, cum notis 
Conradi Rittershusii 
Exst. cum Jamblichio de vita Pythagorae Amst. 1707 
PB1, p. 23, PB11, p. 79, MP226 (1784).]

PROCLUS, Lycius, 
De providentia & l fato, & l eo quod in nobis, tractatus, 
Latine, G. de Morbeka Corinthi Archiep. interprete 
Exst. in Fabricii bibliotheca Graeca 
Tom. 8 p. 465. [CAL 1742 
Monboddo used this version in the Bibliotheca Graeca of 
Fabricius. See MP61, p. 35 note]

In Platonis politicen, sive libros de republica 
Exst. in Platonis Timaeon commentariorum, Basileae 1534 
PB6, p. 59, PB36, P. 87, MP42, p. 14, MP53 passim, etc.]

PROCOPIOUS CAESARIENSIS, 
Historiae Vandalicae... Gothicae... Hugone Grotio interprete 
Exst. in Historia Gothorum, Vandalorum & Langobardorum... 
Amst. 1655 [CAL 1742 See 
MP204 ("Notes from the Historians of the Northern Nations...")]

339
QUINTILIAN,
Institutionum oratoriarum, ed. Petro Burmanno
3 tom. Lugduni Bat. 1720 [CAL 1742
Monboddo refers to this edition in PB1, pp.51 and 58 and
MP231 (1787), p.2. However, CAL 1742 lists four others,
two 16th century and two 18th century.]

SALLUST,
Opera... ex recensione G. Cortii
Glasgow 1751
Idem. Edinburgh 1755 [CAL 1776, which
also lists two other editions (Amsterdam 1742, Birmingham 1773)
and three English translations including John Mair's of
Cortius's edition (Edinburgh 1770).]

— Beli Catilinarii et Jugurthini historiae
Edinburgh 1739 [CAL 1742 See
PB1, p.84; PB23, pp.121-6.]

— De Deiis et mundo libello
in Thomas Gale, Opuscula mythologica, physica et ethica,
Amst. 1688 [CAL 1742
Monboddo frequently refers to Gale's work. See for
example PB1, 80-2.]

SIMPLICIUS,
In praedicamenta Aristotelis commentaria
Venetiis 1588 [CAL 1776]

— In quatuor libros Aristotelis de coelo
Venetiis 1584 [CAL 1776]

SOPHOCLES,
Tragoediae (ed.) T. Johnson...
Glasguae [CAL 1776]

STRABO,
Rerum geographicarum...
Amst. 1707 [CAL 1742 See
MP200 (1776) passim. CAL 1742 also lists editions of
1512, 1516 and 1620, but Monboddo probably used the
Amsterdam edition of 1707 which was annotated by Casaubon,
Palmer, Holstein, Salmasius, Bochart, Vossius et al.]

SUETONIUS,
Vita XII Caesarum
Paris 1543 [CAL 1742, which
lists several editions of this work, mostly 17th century.
See PB29, pp.56-84 where Monboddo describes the work as valuable
for its account of the government and manners of the Romans.]
TACITUS,
Opera, ex editione Jac. Gronovii
4 vol. Glasguae 1753 [CAL 1776
which also lists two 18th century Continental editions. See PBI passim.]

THUCYDIDES,
De bello Peloponnesiaci libri viii
Amst. 1731 [CAL 1742 which
also lists other editions. Monboddo evidently used the
Amsterdam edition. See MP160 (1779), p.106.]

"TIMAEUS LOCRUS",
De anima mundi et natura in Thomas Gale, Opuscula
 mythologica, physica & ethica
Amst. 1688 [CAL 1742
In the 18th century the ideas of Plato's Timaeus were spread
largely through the vogue of this treatise which was supposed
to be by the Pythagorean Timaeus himself and to have been
later used and improved by Plato. According to A.D. Lovejoy,
it is in fact only a poor abridgment of part of Plato's
dialogue of a much later date. There were at least thee
17th century editions and two 18th century French translations,
one by Batteux. (See A.D. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being
p.339, note 31.)]

VARRO M. Terentius,
Opera... cum notis J. Scaligeri
Apud H. Stephanum 1581 [CAL 1742
De lingua Latina cum notis Dionysii Gothofredi
Exst. inter auctores Latinae linguae Gothofredi, col.1.
[CAL 1742 See
MP110 ("Of the Radical Words in Language") P.12.]

De differentiis vocabulorum
Ibid., col.1375 [CAL 1742

VIRGIL,
Opera omnia et cum Servii Honorati commentariis
Venetiis 1480 [CAL 1742

XENOPHON,
Opera... J. Leunclavio interprete.
Francofurti 1596 [CAL 1776
Monboddo
refers to this edition in PB40 (p.52), but he also used that of
Stephanus (1561) listed in CAL 1742. CAL1776 also lists three
Glasgow editions: Lacedaemoniorum respublica (ed. Leunclavius)
1756; De Socrate commentarii 1761; Graecorum res gestae
(ed. Edward Wells) 1762.]
ANDERSON (James),
Historical Essay, showing that the Crown and Kingdom of Scotland is imperial and independent, in answer to Mr. Atwood.
Edinb. 1705 in 8. [CAL 1742]

Annual Register, or a view of the history, politics and literature of Great Britain from the year 1756
London varis annis [CAL 1776]

BAILLY, Jean Sylvain,
Lettres sur l'origine des sciences, et sur celle des peuples de l'Asie, adressées a M. de Voltaire...
Londres, Paris 1777 [CAL 1789]

CANTEMIR, Demetrius,
History of the Growth and Decay of the Othman Empire, translated from the Latin into English by N. Tindal
London 1734 [CAL 1776]

DUCAS, Michel,
Historia Byzantina
tom.25, Paris 1649 [CAL 1742]

FORDUN, John,
Scotichronicon... ex editione Tho. Hearnii
5 tom. Oxoniae 1722 [CAL 1742]

GAGNIER, Jean,
Vie de Mahomet...
2 tom. Amsterdam 1732 [CAL 1776]

GIANNONE, Pietro,
The civil history of the kingdom of Naples, translated into English by Capt. James O'GILVIE, 2 vol. London, 1729, 1731 [CAL 1742]

GIBBON, Edward,
History of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire,
3 vol. London 1776-81 [CAL 1787]

GROTIUS, Hugo,
Historia Gothorum, Vandalorum and Langobardorum...
Amst. 1655 in 8 [CAL 1742]
Dissertatio de origine gentium Americanarum, cum notis and observationibus Joan. de Laet.
Amst 1643 in 8

HENAUT, Charles-Jean Francois,
Nouvelle abregé chronologique de l'histoire de France
Haye 1747

HYDE, Thomas,
Historia religionis veterum Persarum
Oxonii 1700

INNES, Thomas,
A Critical Essay on the Ancient Inhabitants of the Northern Parts of Britain, or Scotland.
London 1729

La CROZE, M.V.de,
Histoire du Christianisme des Indes
2 tom. la Haye 1758

LENGLET du FRESNOY, Nicolas
Histoire de la philosophie hermétique
3 tom. la HAYE 1742

MALCOM, David,
An Essay on the Antiquities of Great Britain and Ireland
Edinburgh 1738

MALLET, Paul Henri,
Northern Antiquities, or... the manners, customs, religion and laws of the ancient Danes and other northern nations, including.. our... Saxon ancestors, with a translation of the edda... and other pieces from the ancient Icelandic...
London 1770
Introduction à l'histoire de Dannemarc, ou l'on traité de la religion, des loix, des moeurs et des usages des anciens Danois
6 tom. Genève 1763 [CAL 1776]

MARTINIERE, Bruzan la,
Le grand dictionnaire géographique et critique
10 tom. Venise 1737 [CAL 1776]

MEZERAY, F.E.de,
Histoire de France
Paris 1685 [CAL 1742]

MOSHEIM, J.L.,
Dissertationes ad historiam ecclesiasticam pertinentes
2 vol. Altonavieæ et Flensburgi 1733 [CAL 1776]

PELLOUTIER, Simon,
Histoire des Celtes
Paris 1771 [CAL 1776]

PEZRON, Paul,
L'Antiquité des tems rétablue
Paris 1687 [CAL 1742]

Antiquities of Nations
London 1706 [CAL 1742]

RIDPATH, George,
Historical account of the ancient rights and power of the Parliament of Scotland.
Edinburgh 1703 [CAL 1742]

SHUCKFORD, Samuel,
Sacred and Profane History of the World
2 vol. London 1728 [CAL 1742]

WINCKELMANN, J.,
Histoire de l'art chez les anciens
Amsterdam 1766 [CAL 1776]
Acts of Sederunt of the Lords of Council and Session
1552-1677 [CAL 1742]

CRAIG, Thomas,
Jus Feudale
London 1655 [CAL 1742]

idem,
Edinburgh 1732 [CAL 1742]

CUJACIUS, Jacobus,
Opera
4 tomo. Lugduni 1608 [CAL 1742]

idem,
Paris 1658 [CAL 1742]

idem,
Hanoviae 1602 [CAL 1742]

GROTUS, Hugo,
De jure belli ac pacis
Lugduni Bat. 1696 [CAL 1742]

L'OYSEAU, Charles,
Oeuvres
Paris 1666 [CAL 1776]

PUFENDORF, Samuel,
De jure naturae et gentium
Tibi viii Amsterdam 1688 [CAL 1742]
Idem. Amsterdam 1698 [CAL 1742]
Idem. Amsterdam 1706 [CAL 1742]

SELDEN, John,
Titles of Honour
London 1631 [CAL 1742]

VOET, Joannes,
Compendium juris juxta seriem Pandectarum
Lugduni Bat. 1693 [CAL 1742]
6. MISCELLANEOUS

BAXTER, Andrew,
Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul
London n.d. [CAL 1776]

BUFFON, Jean-Louis Leclerc, Comte de,
Histoire naturelle, générale et particulière: avec la description du Cabinet du Roi
17 tom. Paris 1750-1771 [CAL 1776]
Idem. [CAL 1787]

Catalogues Librorum... bibliothecae regiae
Parisiiis 1739 [CAL 1776]

CLARKE, Samuel D.D.,
Correspondence with Leibnitz relating to the principles of natural philosophy and religion
London 1717 [CAL 1776]
Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God...
being... sermons preached at Boyle's Lecture
London 1716 [CAL 1742]

CUDWORTH, Ralph,
The intellectual system of the Universe... wherein all the reason and philosophy of Atheism is confuted...
London 1678 [CAL 1742]

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POCOCKE, Richard, (Bishop of Meath),
Description of the East and some other countries...
2 vol., London 1743, 1745.

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[See Chapter Fourteen.]
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BODLEIAN LIBRARY, Oxford University. MS. Eng. Letters C. 133, ff.136-89; C. 140, f.46. A large number of letters from Lord Monboddo to Thomas Burgess. Extracts from many of these letters will be found in J.S. Harford, Life of Thomas Burgess, D.D. (London, 1840).

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Chapter One: INTRODUCTION

1. Of the Origin and Progress of Language, 6 vols.  

Page references to OPL I throughout refer to the second edition. There were no changes in the second edition of OPL II, but there were substantial additions to the second edition of volume one. The major additions are listed in an appendix to this thesis. Of these the most important are:

a) Preface (i-xi). This acknowledges the influence of Rousseau's Discourse on the Origin of Inequality and dwells on the natural state of man - which Monboddo, unlike Rousseau, regards as an actual aboriginal condition, not a hypothesis. That is, as he says in the preface, he considers OPL as a natural history of man - and particularly of man's mind - not a conjectural history. This natural history reveals that man is a creature of art. He claims that he has read nothing of E.B. de Condillac's Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines (1746) except a review of Thomas Nugent's translation (An Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge; being a supplement to Mr. Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding [1756]) in the Critical Review II (1756), 193-218. See Chapter Ten.

b) Book I 68-71. Note denying that we have any knowledge of the essences of substances:

"All we know of them is certain properties or qualities; and these are nothing else but relations to other things."
This is a point of fundamental importance regarding Monboddo's restoration of Aristotelian hylomorphism. His view resembles that of Aquinas. That is, he is not concerned with the physical composition of material things. Metaphysics is not the same thing as empirical science. See F.C. Copleston, Aquinas [Penguin Books 1955] 35-6.

c) Book II 262-9. Note attacking Buffon for not believing in the existence of men with tails. The note probably aroused more ridicule, but Monboddo was right. (See Oscar Sherwin, "A Man with a Tail - Lord Monboddo" Journal of the History of Medicine, July 1958, 435-68.) Also see Chapter Eleven.

d) Book II Chapters Four and Five (270-312; 313-60). These are two complete chapters dealing with the "orang outang" and attacking the accounts of Buffon and Linnaeus. He appears to have been previously unaware that his account of orang-utangs was opposed to Buffon's. See Chapter Eleven.

2. See Chapter Three.


4. Ibid., 171.

5. See Chapter Three.

6. "A Josepho Scaligero in Epitaphio Georgii Buchanan's mutuatum." For Julius Caesar Scaliger (1484-1558) and George Buchanan (1506-82) see Chapter Three.

7. See Chapter Six.


10. Dickson, 173.


12. See OPL II, Book 3, Chapter 13: "Of the philosophical language invented by Bishop Wilkins".

13. See Chapter Six.
14. Monboddo's earliest paper on language "Of the Chinese Language" (MP250) written in Holland in about 1735 when he was 21, draws heavily on the Port Royal Grammar. However, in OPL his revival of ancient "Aristotelian" grammar implies a rejection of Port Royal. See Chapter Thirteen.


16. Douglas Duncan, Thomas Ruddiman (Edinburgh 1965), Ch.III.

17. See list of books in the Advocates' Library consulted by Monboddo.


19. See Chapter Five.

20. See Chapter Nine.

21. See Chapter Six.

22. ibid.

23. Dickson, 174.

24. I owe this information to Mr Patrick Cadell of the National Library of Scotland.

25. Box 21 of the MP contains the Burnett Family Papers. Among these is a notebook listing books sold from Monboddo House during the 1830s. Unfortunately, the descriptions of the books are so vague that it is of little value; but it does suggest that Monboddo's own library was limited. Of course, books could have been sold at an earlier date; but, as an advocate, Monboddo had had access to the Advocates' Library from 1737 (See Cloyd, 12).

26. See Chapter Fourteen.

28. See Chapter Fourteen.

29. See Chapters Six, Seven, Nine, Fourteen.

30. See Chapter Fourteen.

31. See Chapter Nine.

32. See Chapters Nine, Twelve.
Chapter Two: LORD MONBODDO'S LIFE AND HUMANIST BACKGROUND


2. ibid. For Sir Thomas Burnet, Sir Robert Sibbald (1641-1722), Archibald Pitcairne (1652-1713) and David Gregory (1691-1708) see DNB. For Burnet of Kemnay, see Dugald Stewart, Works (Edinburgh 1854-60) I, 604.

Douglas Duncan, Thomas Ruddiman (Edinburgh 1965) 16-22 has interesting information on Pitcairne which illustrates the intellectual orientation of Episcopalians. Note particularly his interest in languages, including Gaelic.


4. DNB.

5. ibid.


7. DNB.

8. ibid.

9. Duncan, op. cit. In spite of the general decline of humanism, Episcopalian and Jacobite influence was strong amongst the gentry and professional classes in the early 18th century. It aligned them with liberal thought until the rise of Presbyterian Moderatism in mid-century. (ibid., 21.)


12. See Chapter Three.

13. Cloyd, 6-7.
14. Monboddo's system of Greek bore a close resemblance to the work of Hemsterhuis, whose influence Monboddo denied. See OPL II, 541-2 and also Chapter Seven, 5 of this thesis.


The same idea was expressed by Herder who wrote the introduction to the German translation of OPL: Werk von dem Ursprunge und Fortgange der Sprache, trans. E.A. Schmid (Riga 1785). For the Dutch Graecists in general, see J.G. Gerretzen, Schola hemsterhusiana (Utrecht 1940).

Monboddo's paper is entitled "Of the Chinese Language" (MP250) and is inscribed "written in Holland about 50 years ago. 1785." Although it does briefly discuss Chinese characters and monosyllabic sounds, it also deals with articulation, the alphabet and the origin of language (citing the lines from Horace's Satires I, iii, 100-4 from which he took the epigraphs for OPL I and II). Above all, he discusses the relation between words and ideas which was to preoccupy him in OPL, concentrating on the faculty of abstraction: that is, he was already interested in language as the expression of mind. Nearly half the paper deals with the word classes: these are based on the mental operations of which they are considered to be expressions.

The primary influences appear to be the Port Royal grammar and the third book of Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding. He also refers to two English grammars - probably Ben Jonson's English Grammar (1640) and The Royal Grammar Reformed (1695).


16. Cloyd, 16-19. He became Sheriff of Kincardine in 1760 (ibid., 2.).

17. On the Douglas Cause see Cloyd, 23-34. See also Monboddo Papers, Box 19. On Monboddo's visit to Paris see Cloyd, 22, 25-8. On the orang-outang see Cloyd 161-8 and Chapters Ten and Eleven of this thesis.

For the attack in the Edinburgh Magazine and Review on OPL II and III see Cloyd, 53–6. For a list of reviews of OPL see R.C. Alston, A Bibliography of the English Language, vol. I, (1965).

Herder, however, who wrote an introduction to the German abridgement of OPL, thought highly of Monboddo and accurately attributes the poor reviews to a literary conspiracy arising from Monboddo's rejection of Lockian metaphysics and fashionable belles lettres.

Herder praises the principles of Harris and Monboddo, comparing OPL favourably with Kames's Sketches of the History of Man - which he describes as an unprincipled collection of facts. He agrees with what Monboddo says about the formation of ideas; says that his work on the comparison of languages will always remain the preliminary study of a master; and on the subject of the origin and progress of language - on which Herder himself had written - he "yields him the palm".

Nevertheless, Herder criticises Monboddo's credulous use of travellers' tales. The orang outang is not a man, nor were human beings ever without language. Nor does he believe languages were invented. See J.G. von Herder's preface to E.A. Schmid tr. Des Lord Monboddo Werk von dem Ursprunge und Fortgange der Sprache (Riga, 1784–5). See also Paul Salmon, "Herder's Essay on the Origin of Language, and the Place of Man in the Animal Kingdom", German Life and Letters, New Series, vol. 22 (1968–9).


Ian Michael points out that the article "Grammar" in the first two editions of the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1768–1771; 1777–1784) relies heavily on James Harris while the third edition (1788–1797) deals more with the origin of language.
Monboddo's friend William Smellie (1740-95) was the original editor and wrote most of the articles in the first edition.

The article in the third edition seems to owe a great deal to OPL.

It remained unchanged until the appearance of the ninth edition late in the next century except for two addenda by John Hunter on the theory of the verb in the seventh and eighth editions.

According to the seventh edition (1842 volume X 640), the article as a whole expresses the principles which Hunter put forward in his lectures on universal grammar as Professor of Humanity at St Andrews (1775-1835). Since Hunter had been Monboddo's secretary and was credited with putting OPL together from Monboddo's papers, it is not surprising that what Hunter had to say on universal grammar resembled Monboddo's views.

Hunter read a paper to the Royal Society of Edinburgh in June 1784, "A Grammatical Essay on the Nature, Import and Effect of certain Conjunctions; particularly the Greek ΔΕ" (TRSE I [788] Pt.II ii 113-34). He also edited the twenty second edition of Thomas Ruddiman's influential Rudiments of the Latin Tongue (1820) adding a long, logical disquisition on "The Moods and Tenses of the Greek and Latin Verb" which was intended as a contribution to universal grammar. By 1826 this had reached a fourth edition (DNB). G.E. Davie, The Democratic Intellect (1961) cites this as an example of the Scottish penchant for philosophical discussion of fundamental principles.

23. See Cloyd: for Sir Joseph Banks (1743-1820) 98, 103-4, 181; for Sir George Baker (1722-1809) 98, 104, 128, 157; for Thomas Burgess 103; for George Isaac Huntingford (1748-1832) 93-4; for Richard Price (1723-91) 98, 100-1; for Welbore Ellis, Ist Baron Mendip (1713-1802) 14, 98; for Henry Dundas (1742-1811) 16, 24, 156-8; for Edward Thurlow (1731-1806) 136, 157-8; for Dugald Steward (1753-1828) 100-2; for Samuel Horsley (1733-1806) 98-103.

Many other names could be added to this list. For example, Sir John Pringle M.D., (1707-82), President of the Royal Society; and John Hope (1725-1786), Professor of Botany and Materia Medica at Edinburgh and Superintendent of the Royal Botanic Gardens. William Knight, Lord Monboddo and some of his Contemporaries (London, 1900) prints letters from most of these. But there are many mistakes and omissions as can be
seen when they are compared with originals among the Monboddo Papers. Box 22 of the Monboddo Papers contains 127 letters.

Cloyd lists other sources of letters such as the Beattie Correspondence (King's College, Aberdeen) and the Grim Thorkelin Correspondence (University of Edinburgh). See Cloyd, 180-1.

Part of the correspondence with Lord Lyttleton (1709-1772) is published in Rose Mary Davis, The Good Lord Lyttleton (Bethlehem, Pa., 1939); and extracts from the letters to Thomas Burgess are in J.S. Harford, Life of Thomas Burgess, D.D. (London 1840). See also W.R. Dawson (ed.) The Banks Letters (London 1958).

24. For Beattie see Cloyd 47-8, 64-6. Beattie made use of Monboddo's ideas for his "The Theory of Language" (Dissertations: Moral and Critical [London 1783]) without acknowledgement but attacked Monboddo nevertheless (ibid. 65). For Smellie see Cloyd 49, 56, 186.

Alexander Gillies and Smellie, were both involved in the Edinburgh Magazine and Review which attacked OPL II and III viciously, devoting sixty-four pages in seven issues to unbridled criticism of universal grammar and rhetoric. (Cloyd 53-6).


26. See Chapter Three.


In 1742 Chevalier Andrew Michael Ramsay wrote of Hume and Locke in words that Monboddo was to echo: "He [Hume] seems to me one of those philosophers that think to spin out Systems, out of their own brain, without any regard to religion, antiquity or Tradition, sacred or profane". Another example was Descartes - but even he was far superior to "your thin, superficial, meagre, lean skeleton Locke" (Mossner [1980], 95).

29. Freeman, loc. cit.

30. ibid., 23.

31. ibid., 25.

33. Freeman, *op.cit.* 29-31 OPL I Book 1, especially 86-151.

34. Freeman, 29-30 OPL I Book 3, especially 514-73.

35. Freeman, *loc.cit.* See Chapter Six of this thesis.

36. Freeman, 31-2. See Chapter Six of this thesis.


38. *ibid.*
Chapter Three: THE ADVOCATES' LIBRARY AND THE TRADITION OF HUMANIST JURISPRUDENCE


2. Clive, loc. cit.

3. ibid.; Douglas Duncan, Thomas Ruddiman (Edinburgh 1965) 24-5, 36-8.


6. Duncan, op. cit., 150.


9. Ross, op. cit., 28; Duncan, op. cit., 36.


14. Sir George MacKenzie's Speech (tr. Loudon) 278. For the Select Society see Chapter Seven.

15. See the Catalogue of 1692: Catalogus Librorum Bibliothecae A Facultate Advocatorum. See MacKenzie, op.cit., where he refers to the "speculations" of moral philosophers on natural law as "trifles" and "nihil ad Edictum Praetoris" (282). See also Stein, op.cit., 161.

The juristic works of MacKenzie reflect his training at Bourges in the humanistic school of commentators established by Jacques Cujac (Cujacius). See Ross (1972), 22.


17. ibid., 278-9.

18. ibid., 282-3.

19. ibid., 280-1.

20. ibid., 283.

21. ibid.

22. ibid., 282; cf. OPL II Book 3.

The Roman jurist found the jus gentium in the points in which the laws of nations agreed as Jenisch found his ideal of a perfect language (Greek) by comparing the languages of ancient and modern Europe (Sayce, 1900, 32). See D. Jenisch. A Philosophical and Critical Estimate of Fourteen ancient and modern European Languages (Berlin 1796). The Essay, which won the prize of the Berlin Academy, expresses principles similar to Monboddo's.

23. ibid., 279, 283.


25. ibid.

26. ibid., 59. His Annotations on the Pandects (1508) introduced a new method of criticism into Roman law. His aim was to reform society by restoring the purity of ancient doctrine
Budé promoted philology in *Study of Learning* (1527) and *Philology* (1530). His *Commentaries on the Greek Language* (1529) laid the foundation of Greek lexicography.

27. ibid., 64-6.

28. ibid., 62.

29. ibid., 62, 75-9; MacKenzie (1689) 282; OPL I v-vi, 7-8, 35-6, etc.


32. ibid., 134.


34. Kelley 80-4; Huppert 115. Huppert discusses, in particular, Chapter Two of Loys Le Roy's *De la vicissitude, ou varieté des choses en l'univers* (1575) — which followed the method of Jean Bodin. Huppert points out that Le Roy, who saw man evolving in response to economic challenges, has all the characteristics of 18th century philosophic history.


36. For example, Sir Thomas Craig of Riccarton (d.1608) *Jus Feudale* (London and Edinburgh 1655; Leipzig 1716; Edinburgh 1732).

37. MacKenzie 283; Kelley 89; OPL I 432.

38. Duncan, *op. cit.*, 147.

39. Duncan, 93.

40. ibid., 146-9.

41. ibid., 88-89. For the superiority of Latin and Greek see the preface to Ruddiman's *Rudiments of the Latin Tongue* (1714) which superseded Despauter. It reached its 7th edition by 1732 and its 17th in 1769 and continued to be reprinted until the third quarter of the 19th century. James Hunter, Professor of Humanity at St. Andrews, formerly Monboddo's clerk, added long notes on the relation of thought to language.
For the continuation of the humanist attitude to "barbarous" languages see many articles in the Encyclopaedia Britannica throughout the 19th century, e.g. "Philology" E.B. 6th ed. (1823) XVI 283; "Languages" E.B. supplement (1824); "Language" 8th ed. (1857) vol.XIII 194-9. See also Sayce: "the artless jargons of barbarous tribes". (Sayce 1900).
Chapter Four: THE LINGUISTIC AND CULTURAL DILEMMA
OF EIGHTEENTH CENTURY SCOTLAND


2. See in general David Daiches, Scotland and the Union (London 1977); and especially his The Paradox of Scottish Culture (London, 1964).


4. ibid., McElroy, loc. cit.


6. Cloyd, 17-18. Most of these are in the folio notebooks and the most important is the "Discourse on Language" (MP Bound Folio MS5), see Chapter Fourteen.

7. For the vernacular revival and Ruddiman's part in it see in general Duncan, op.cit.; Daiches (1964, 1967); F.W. Freeman, Robert Fergusson and the Scots Humanist Compromise (Edinburgh 1984) Chapters One and Two.

Dr Johnson considered Gaelic "the rude speech of a barbarous people, who had few thoughts to express"; and as early as 1616 an act of council of Scotland stated that English should be encouraged by establishing schools in the Highlands - Gaelic being a chief cause of barbarity. (Alexander Campbell, A Journey from Edinburgh through Parts of North Britain... 2 vols., [London, 1802], 186-7).


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12. See Chapter Five.

13. See Chapter Six.

14. ibid.
Chapter Five: OPL AND THE SCIENCE OF MAN

1. See in general:


3. ibid., 20-1.

4. Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: an Interpretation (London 1973) vol.2, Chapter 4, especially pp.174-87. Also see in general:


5. See Chapter Nine.


9. ibid., 29.

10. Phillipson (1983), 91. See also Richard Tuck's comments page 104.


16. ibid., 97.


18. See section 4 of this Chapter.


22. ibid., 160.

23. ibid., 157. See Lord Kames, Historical Law - Tracts (Edinburgh, 1758).

24. ibid.

25. ibid., 159. Stein is quoting Dugald Stewart's assessment of Montesquieu. But Stein claims that this was just what Montesquieu does not do. (See Duncan Forbes, "Scientific Whiggism: Adam Smith and John Millar", Cambridge Journal, 7 [1954] 646.)

26. OPL I 428-36.

27. ibid., 432-3.
28. ibid., 434.

29. ibid., 435. It was also the aim of Smith and his followers, as well as Montesquieu, to save natural law from the Hobbists. (See Duncan Forbes, "Natural Law and the Scottish Enlightenment", The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment ed. R.H. Campbell and Andrew S. Skinner (Edinburgh 1982), 191-2.

30. The first pages of Cicero's De Inventione were the locus classicus for the humanist lawyers' idea of eloquence as leading man from brutishness to civility. See Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: their origin and development (Cambridge 1979), 33-4.

31. ibid., 44. On the connection between the Aristotelianism of the late 16th century Protestant humanists and Stair's Institutions of the Law of Scotland (1st ed. 1681, improved 2nd ed. 1689) - which marked the beginning of the golden age of Scottish jurisprudence - see Neil MacCormick, "Law and Enlightenment" (op. cit., 151).

32. See Richard Wollheim on the Stoic origins of this early concept of natural law:

"The simplest and oldest account of the 'naturalness' of justice is to be found in a conception of the universe which originated with the Stoics Zeno and Chrysippus... The whole universe... is governed by laws which exhibit rationality. Inanimate things and brutes invariably obey these laws... Man, however, has the capacity of choice... Nevertheless,... it is only insofar as he obeys them that he acts in accord with his reason. 'Follow nature' is therefore... the principle both of non-human behaviour and of human morality... Since the universe is a rational whole... the analogies between the laws of non-human behaviour and those of human morality are very strong." (Richard Wollheim, "Natural Law", Encyclopedia of Philosophy, V, [New York and London, 1967] 451.)


33. Tuck, op. cit., 176.
Perhaps Monboddo not only recognized that Grotius had turned against "the more accurate reading of Aristotle presented at the Renaissance" but that his theory had scholastic roots. (ibid., 176.)
34. See Chapter Twelve.


38. On this subject see Chapters Nine and Ten of this thesis; Dugald Stewart, op.cit., 296; and D'Alembert's "Discours préliminaire" to the French Encyclopedia (1751).

Stewart makes much of the influence of Montesquieu's L'Esprit des lois (1748), published in Edinburgh in 1750. But on this see Duncan Forbes (1954) op.cit., 646 and Peter Stein (1970) op.cit., 159.

John Millar, Professor of Law at Glasgow, said "The great Montesquieu pointed out the road. He was the Lord Bacon in this branch of philosophy. Dr Smith is the Newton", (cited by Forbes, loc.cit.).

Montesquieu, in any case, was the disciple of Pietro Giannone, whose Civil History of the Kingdom of Naples was consulted by Monboddo. It was translated by James Ogilvy in 1729 (see H.R. Trevor-Roper, "The Scottish Enlightenment" in Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, lviii [1967]).


41. See D'Alembert's "Discours préliminaire" and the remarks of Adam Smith: "a Rational Grammar... may prove not only the best system of grammar, but the best system of logic in any language, as well as the best history of the natural progress of the human mind in forming the most important abstractions upon which all reasoning depends... (Letter to George Baird, 7 February 1763 in relation to William Ward's An Essay on Grammar as it may be applied to the English Language [1765]. Quoted Bryce [1983] op.cit.)
On Locke see Hans Aarsleff (1967), op. cit., Chapter One, especially 28-33.


43. See the remarks of Thomas Reid on the teaching of logic at Glasgow by Smith's pupil and successor, Professor Jardine, quoted by J.M. Lothian in Adam Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (Edinburgh 1963) xxxi.

44. See Monboddo's preface to OPLI (2nd ed. 1774) and R.L. Meek, Social Science and the Ignoble Savage (Cambridge 1976) Chapters 4 and 5.

45. OPL I 53-93.

On hylomorphism see M. De Wulf, Medieval Philosophy Illustrated from the System of Thomas Aquinas (Harvard 1922).

46. OPL I, 175 ff.

47. ibid., 432-3.

48. ibid., 42 ff.

49. ibid., 68-71 note.


52. See A.O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge, Mass. 1936), Chapters VI-VIII.

53. OPL I, 175 ff.

54. ibid.

55. Dugald Stewart, op. cit.; Henry Guerlac, op. cit.


Largely thanks to Kames's historical approach, which derived from Montesquieu, "by the end of the century the
profession was more conscious than it had been of the need to keep the law in touch with the changing social and economic state of the country, and more conscious too of its particular attributes as Scots law, a system peculiar to the Scots". (ibid., 156.)

58. See Chapter Two. Sir William Anstruther of Anstruther, a Senator of the College of Justice, like Monboddo, opposed Locke in his Essays, Moral and Divine (Edinburgh 1701). His grounds were, like Monboddo's, ultimately religious. Compare the religious Stoicism of Sir George MacKenzie and Some Thoughts concerning Religion (1750) by the Rt. Hon. Duncan Forbes of Culloden. (McCosh, The Scottish Philosophy, op. cit., 268.)

59. OPL I, 47-53.

60. For Cambridge Platonism see Chapter Thirteen. For the system of St Thomas Aquinas see F.C. Copleston, Aquinas (Penguin Books 1955) especially 84-93, 97-106, 108-10. The major difference is that Monboddo (unlike Reid) cannot make any appeal to common language.

61. See McCosh, op. cit., Chapter IV.
Chapter Six: OPL AND CICERONIAN RHETORIC


5. A.C. Clark, "Ciceronianism" in English Literature and the Classes, edited by G.S. Gordon, (Oxford 1912), 119, 139-40.


7. Seigel, xi.

8. ibid., 6-7, 29.


11. Seigel, 12, 41.


18. MP Bound Folio MS5, "Method and System", pp.54-5. Monboddo's position actually seems close to that of Socrates and Plato: rhetoric had to adopt philosophical methods - which Cicero said was impossible because rhetoric was not a science of certainty (see Seigel, op.cit., 10-11).

19. MP Bound Folio MS5, loc.cit.; OPL I 432-3.

20. OPL I 515-6. See MP Bound Folio MS5, pp.54-5, "On Method and System" (which derives from Cicero's de Oratore I §42); and pp.55-6 "On the Unity of Learning", (de Oratore III). Other Ciceronian essays in the same manuscript are: p.14 "On the Difficulty of Studying Eloquence" (from Pro Caelo); pp.16-18 "On the Difference between Eloquence Antient and Modern" (ibid.); pp.52-54 "In Praise of Eloquence" (de Oratore); pp.56-58 "On Numbers and Measure in Discourse" (ibid., III §44); and pp.59-61 "Orator".


22. MP Bound Folio MS5, pp.99-119.
23. ibid., pp.145-93 ("A Discourse on Language, shewing wherein the Beauty of Language consists.") where he stresses that grammar "runs fast into logic and even metaphysics"; and, since the corruption of the people goes hand in hand with the corruption of language, also "politics and morals" (176-9).


27. OPL III xix.

28. See Chapter Four; also Lothian, op. cit.

29. Howell (1971), Chapter V.


32. See Chapter Nine.

33. Lothian, op. cit., xxiii.

34. ibid., xxi.

35. ibid., xvi.


37. ibid., xvii. See also Phillipson in Porter and Teich, op. cit., 21-22.

38. ibid., xxx-xxxi.

39. See Chapter Nine.

40. ibid.

41. Adam Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres edited by J.C. Bryce (Oxford 1983) 10, 26-9. Smith may have compiled the collection himself. The title is:
The Philological Miscellany; consisting of select essays from the Memoires of the Academy of Belles Lettres at Paris, and other foreign Academies... London 1761.


43. ibid. See also the general introduction by D.D. Raphael and A.S. Skinner, 1-21 and Wightman's introduction 5-27.


45. OPL II 26 ff., 440-82, 483 ff.


47. See Chapter Eight.


Adam Smith's famous quotation comes from the Wealth of Nations. He says every individual uses his capital to support domestic industry: "he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention." Monboddo disagreed strongly with such a Whiggish doctrine. See D. Forbes, "Scientific Whiggism: Adam Smith and John Millar", Cambridge Journal, 7 (1954) 646 ff.


50. Fénélon's Dialogues sur L'Éloquence, composed in 1679, were first published in 1717 (English translation 1722). Fénélon was concerned to "emphasize the inner realities rather than the external forms of ancient rhetoric" with a view to improving sermons. (Howell [1971] op.cit., 446.) See also Howell's Fénélon's Dialogues on Eloquence (Princeton 1951).
Fénelon's idea of forming an ideal system of oratory from Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian and Longinus was outlined in his "Lettre à M. Dacier Secrétaire Perpétuel de l'Académie Française, sur les Occupations de l'Académie" (1714). This was his famous "Projet de Rhétorique" which had considerable influence on the development of eighteenth century British rhetoric. (Howell 83-96.)

On the publications of the Foulis brothers see Richard Duncan, Notices and Documents illustrative of the Literary History of Glasgow, (1831) 75 ff.

51. See Chapter One and also the 1776 Catalogue of the Advocates' Library under "Academy".


For a list of articles in the Mémoires see Table générale et méthodique des Mémoires... de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres... E. De Rozière et E. Chatel, (Paris 1856).

The paper by Nicolas Fréret [1688-1749] on Chinese characters (Volume VI, 609-63) is entitled: "Réflexions sur les principes généraux de l'art d'écrire, et en particulier sur les fondements de l'écriture Chinoise". See OPL II, 204.

The paper, which was delivered in 1718, refers to a number of sources which Monboddo himself used including La Hontan, Scheffer and de la Vega.

Like Monboddo, Fréret discusses the Canadian indians as being the same natural state as Europeans originally were (612). He also, again like Monboddo, compares their picture-writing to that of the Mexicans (of which there was an example in the Bibliothèque du Roi). He then proceeds to Chinese and Egyptian writing and to the Sanscrit alphabet. Throughout Fréret, like other eighteenth century commentators, relies on the missionary reports of the Jesuits.

Fréret also delivered a paper in 1720 entitled "Sur la langue Chinoise" (Volume V, 303 ff).

See MP91 ("Observations upon the work of Lafitau entitled Moeurs des Sauvages") p.39 and MP 144 ("Whether words are significant naturally or only by Institution") p.11. The latter was written in 1766 - probably Monboddo's most productive year.
53. The two articles by Joseph de Guignes F.R.S. [1721-1800] which influenced Monboddo are:

   a) "Mémoire dans lequel, après avoir examiné l'origine des lettres phéniciennes, hébraïques, etc., on essaye d'établir que le caractères épistolique, hiéroglyphique et symbolique des Égyptiens se retrouve dans les caractères des Chinois, et que la nation Chinoise est une colonie égyptienne." (Volume XXIX 1ff., delivered in 1758).

   b) "Essai sur le moyen de parvenir à la lecture et à l'intelligence des hiéroglyphes égyptiens" (volume XXXIV 1770 1-55). See OPL II 207, 257.

De Guignes delivered this second paper in 1766. He also read others on the same subject. He is indebted to a letter from a missionary in Pekin and there are many references to Le Comte de Caylus, Recueil d' Antiquités Égyptiennes, Etrusques, Grecques, Romaines et Gauloises, 7 vols., Paris 1752-1767 [CAL 1776]. Monboddo cites de Caylus OPL II, 255.

Monboddo may also have read an essay in volume XXXVIII (1777) which also discusses the connection between Egyptian and Chinese characters. It finds that Chinese philosophy conforms to the doctrines of Pythagoras ("Essai Historique sur l'étude de la philosophie chez les anciens Chinois" 269-311) and is partly indebted to J.B. du Halde, S.J., Description géographique... de la Chine... 4 vols., Paris 1735 [CAL 1776].

The same volume contains another article by his friend de Guignes on another subject of interest to Monboddo: "Réflexions sur un livre Indien intitulé Bagavadam" (312-36).

There are references to the articles delivered in 1758 and 1766 in the Pocket Books: PB1 (p.21); PB15 (p.21); PB16 (pp.35-49); PB25 (p.94). The reference in PB15 calls de Guignes an "author whom I knew" and PB1 has a note "M. de Guignes, Paris 1760". Since the Pocket Books seem to date from a rather late period, when Monboddo was writing AM, Monboddo may have been originally influenced by de Guignes in person.

54. See the paper by the Abbé du Resnel delivered in 1741 (volume XVI) the translation of which is discussed below (note 60).

55. Papers on Greek include one by the Abbé Renaudet on the origin of Greek letters (volume II); one on Greek accents by the Abbé Arnaud delivered in 1762 (volume XXXII); and one on vulgar Greek by d'Ansse de Villoison delivered in 1772 (volume XXXVIII).

Papers on Celtic include one by Duclos on Celtic and the Romance languages.
56. Many of the papers on lexicography, grammar, and philosophy are by the Abbé Sallier: for example, "Du mérite des anciens grammairiens..." delivered in 1726 (volume VII 197 ff.) - a subject of primary concern to Harris and Monboddo. And in this connection it is worth noting that François Thürot's translation of Harris's Hermes (1796) was discussed in a paper delivered the following year.

Of the many articles on rhetoric, the series of twelve dissertations on the origin and progress of rhetoric in Greece delivered by M. Hardion should be mentioned (1732-47 volumes IX-XXI).

In addition, several articles on Demosthenes, Dionysius Halicarnassus, Longinus, and Cicero demonstrate the parallel revivals of ancient rhetoric in eighteenth century Britain and France.

57. See "Humanism in Italy" by Peter Herde DHI vol. II, 515-24. See also J.E. Seigel (1968).

58. See J.C. Bryce's introduction to Adam Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, (Oxford 1983), 26-7. See also note 41.

59. The article is based on one by the Abbé du Resnel (see note 55). Its title is: "General reflexions upon the usefulness of the Belles Lettres and upon the disadvantages of the exclusive taste which seems beginning to take place in favour of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy", (Philological Miscellany 1-32).

Other essays chosen, possibly by Smith himself, cover the following subjects: the controversy between the ancients and the moderns; the origin and progress of various institutions (including language); and the origin and mixture of ancient nations. The last is a summary of various articles by Freret and emphasizes the value of linguistic evidence - a subject also dealt with in the programmatic article by the Abbé du Resnel (page 15).

The collection also includes a letter from Maupertuis to the King of Prussia discussing the Terra Australis, Patagonia, the North West Passage, Africa and the Pyramids (pp. 348-86).

60. See Chapter Three and also the note above.

See also G.P. Mohrmann's introduction to Thomas Sheridan, A Discourse being introductory to his course of lectures on Elocution and the English Language 1759 (Los Angeles 1969), iv.

62. See Chapter Eight. See also Lothian, op. cit., xxv; McElroy 161.

The lectures were first presented at Oxford and Cambridge 1758-9. Sheridan gave the same series of lectures all over England and Ireland. Hume and Johnson were distressed by his enthusiasm. (Mohrmann 1969, ii)

The Scots Magazine of July 1761 (XXIII 389-90) contains an account of Sheridan's Edinburgh lectures. Eight were on elocution and eight on the 'genius' of the language. They were specially adapted to include an account of "Scotticisms". Three hundred gentlemen - "the most eminent in rank and abilities" - attended.

Another indication of the success of Sheridan's Edinburgh lectures is the long account of his British Education (1756) in the July 1761 issue of the same magazine. (Scots Magazine XXIII, 365-9; 415-21; 478-81).

Sheridan's ideas were fairly commonplace by the mid eighteenth century. Similar views were held by the English orthoepists. See, for example, James Burgh, Art of Speaking (1761) and John Walker, Elements of Elocution (1781).

Sheridan was greatly influenced by Locke's views on education (see his British Education which quotes Locke on pages 11-12, 15-17, 23-4).

Sheridan published the lectures as A Course of Lectures on Elocution (1762) [Menston 1968]. His other works, which mostly reiterated the same principles, include: British Education (1756); A Dissertation on the causes of the difficulties which occur in learning the English tongue (1761); A Plan of Education for the young nobility and gentry of Great Britain (1769); Lectures on the Art of Reading (1775); A General Dictionary of the English Language (1780) 2 vols. [Menston 1967]; A Rhetorical Grammar of the English Language (1781) [Menston 1969]; Elements of English (1786) [Menston 1968].


64. Mohrmann (1969), op. cit., v-vi. Mohrmann points out that the "language of the passions" was a commonplace and traces contemporary speculation to Descartes' Les passions de l'âme (Amsterdam 1650). He cites Lord Kames' Elements of Criticism (1762) and Joshua Steele's Essay towards establishing the Melody and Measure of Speech (1775). Monboddo encouraged Steele and his book includes letters from Monboddo. It was reissued in 1779 with further letters under the title Prosodia Rationalis - a title suggested by Monboddo, whose view of English intonation was changed by Steele. (Cloyd 52.) See David Abercrombie, "Steele, Monboddo and Garrick" in his Studies in Phonetics and Linguistics, (London 1965).


Reid (followed by Dugald Stewart) argued that without such a primordial language of passion the artificial language of articulate sounds could never have been invented. (See Essays on the Active Powers of Man [1788]). In this connection see Chapters Eight, Ten of this thesis.

Two of the Scottish philosophers who adopted the idea, Lord Kames and Hugh Blair, actually attended Sheridan's lectures of 1761. See Kames, Elements of Criticism (1762) II, Chapter XV; Blair, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1783), lectures V-VII, and XXXIII. Lecture XXXIII cites Sheridan. (Mohrmann 1966, 120.)

66. See Sheridan's "Introductory Discourse" to his Course of Lectures on Elocution: together with Two Dissertations on Language... London 1762. (Menston 1968), ix-x.

67. ibid.

68. ibid., xvi-xvii.

69. ibid., vii-viii, xi-xii.


The commonplace character of this conception of the relation between language and the world is shown by Sheridan's citation of a paper in the Spectator (Number 166). The view may be found in its most naive form in the moral philosophy of
George Turnbull (Thomas Reid's teacher): see his *The Principles of Moral Philosophy* (London, 1740).

71. ibid., 142-3.

Sheridan believed that English had been relapsing into the "barbarism" of monosyllabic structure and proliferating consonants since the introduction of rhyme. (ibid., 221.) It should, as Dr Johnson had recently said, have been fixed at its most "copious" stage, when it had been enriched by Latin and Greek - that is, at the end of the Renaissance or early in the seventeenth century. But the disturbances and corruption of the Commonwealth and the Restoration had made this impossible. (ibid., 180.)

Thus, as far as language is concerned, Monboddo's wish to return to the principles of the Renaissance was widespread. (See Mohrmann [1966] 116; [1969] iv).

72. ibid., 176, 141-2. Since his contemporaries could draw on Aristotle, Plutarch, Longinus, Cicero and Quintilian it was possible to make a more perfect compendium of rhetoric than was available to the Romans. (ibid., 178.) Dr Johnson's dictionary would be the cornerstone. (ibid., 276.) See OPL II 496 for the relation between the decline of language and the decline of culture.

73. ibid., 160.

74. ibid., 183-5.

75. ibid., 384-7.

76. MP Bound Folio MS5.

77. W.S. Howell, *op. cit.*, 214-44.

78. W.S. Howell, *Logic and Rhetoric in England 1500-1700*, (Princeton 1956) quoted in Mohrmann (1969), *op.cit.*, iv. Sheridan's concentration on delivery - endorsed by Demosthenes, Cicero and Quintilian... - reflected the contemporary preoccupation with ineffectual sermons, which were criticised for failing to combat scepticism.


81. ibid.

82. See Chapter Twelve.

According to the list of subscribers, Adam Smith, Hugh Blair, Lord Kames, James Boswell and Sir David Dalrymple were among those who subscribed for the publication of the lectures.

83. OPL I, Book 3.

84. OPL I, 461 ff. See also Chapter Ten.


86. OPL II, 5-18.

87. OPL II, Book 1.


89. OPL II, 440-83.

90. ibid.


92. See above.

93. Ian Michael, English Grammatical Categories and the Tradition to 1800 (Cambridge 1970) lists 273 grammars, most of which fall within the period 1760-1800 (see Michael, Appendix VI, 547-87).

See also R.C. Alston, A Bibliography of the English Language from the Invention of Printing to the Year 1800, vol.I, English Grammars Written in English, (Leeds 1965); vol.VI Rhetoric, Style, Elocution, Prosody, Rhyme, Pronunciation, Spelling Reform, (Bradford 1969).

Examples by Scottish authors, who were frequently schoolmasters, include the following:


John Burn, *A Practical Grammar of the English Language*, (Glasgow 1766; 8th edn. 1802).


William Scott, *A New Spelling, Pronouncing, and Explanatory Dictionary of the English Language*; ... to which is prefixed ... elements of English grammar, (Edinburgh 1777; 1786; 1802).

Chapter Seven: LITERARY SOCIETIES, HELLENISM AND THE GENESIS OF OPL

1. See Chapter Four.


9. ibid., 195.

10. ibid., 189 quoting Tytler, Life of Kames, I 175.

11. ibid., 68, 182-3.

12. For the Select Society see McElroy, passim.

13. ibid., 187.


15. ibid., 597.


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19. McElroy, Appendix A. See also The Literary History of Glasgow, (Maitland Club 1831), 132-4.

20. ibid. See also "Record Book of the Literary Society of Glasgow", op.cit. The titles are:

"Discourse on the Structure of the Greek Language and the Method of Ascertaining the meaning of the Particles of that Tongue", (Nov. 30th 1764).

An Essay on the Prepositions of the Greek Language (1766).

Note the early use of the term "structure" which evidently derives from natural history. In 1770 Mr Cumin read a paper on "the structure and formation of Hebrew".


22. "Record Book of the Literary Society of Glasgow", op.cit. There were also debates on the genuineness of James MacPherson's Ossian in 1770 and 1777, showing a new trend: the growing, although still "polite", interest in a language hitherto widely regarded as barbarous and therefore seldom mentioned by the Scottish philosophers. This trend began with MacPherson's Fragments of Ancient Poetry Collected in the Highlands of Scotland... (1750) which had an influential introduction by Hugh Blair, Professor of Rhetoric and Belles Lettres at Edinburgh. Monboddo compared MacPherson's Fingal (1761) to the Iliad and the Odyssey (MP106, pp.31-2; MP123, pp.25-6). Later in the century an advocate applied Monboddo's principles to Gaelic: see James Grant, Essays on the Origin of Society... (1785). In general, see E.D. Snyder, The Celtic Revival in English Literature (Cambridge, Mass., 1923).

23. "Record Book of the Literary Society of Glasgow"). Some of Moor's papers were collected as Essays read to a Literary Society at their weekly meetings within the College at Glasgow, (Glasgow 1759).

24. The information in this section derives from Bibliotheca Mooriana which was published sometime after Moor's death in 1779.

Like Rousseau, Monboddo made much use of Du Halde i.e.: Jean-Baptiste Du Halde. Description géographique, historique, chronologique, politique et physique de l'Empire de la Chine et de la Tartarie Chinoise. (Paris 1735), 4 voix., [CAL 1776] See Bound Folio MSS5, pp.220-25. Many of Monboddo's ideas on Chinese derive from this source. Salmasius (1643) [CAL 1742] is an important source in his "Discourse on Language", (Bound Folio MSS5).


27. For the influence of Cambridge Platonism on Monboddo see Chapter Thirteen.

28. See, for example: "Notes from the aurea carmina of Hierocles" (PB37, pp.49-55) which Monboddo took from Needham's edition (Cambridge 1709) [CAL 1742]; and "Notes from the Life of Pythagoras by Porphyry and Iamblichus", (PB38, pp.156-71). See also MP226 (1784) where Monboddo used the edition of Kuster and Holsten (Amsterdam 1707) [CAL 1742] - the same edition was in Moor's library.

Moor himself translated part of the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, (Glasgow 1742, 1749, 1764) - the rest was translated by Hutcheson. Moor probably also superintended the edition of the original text brought out by Foulis in 1744. (See David Irving, Lives of the Scottish Writers, [1839] 293.) Monboddo evidently used Thomas Gataker's edition (Cambridge 1652) [CAL 1742]. See PB41, pp.50-51.

For Monboddo's use of Ammonius see Chapter Thirteen.

29. For the influence of Roman Dutch law and French school of humanist jurisprudence see Chapter Three.

30. For Monboddo's interest in Egypt see OPL I, 626-665. Monboddo, like Condillac, made considerable use of Bishop Warburton's Divine Legation of Moses (1737-1741) where Condillac had found the doctrine of the language of action and gestures. Monboddo was particularly interested in the section on Egyptian hieroglyphics (Book Four). Monboddo used the 1755 edition [CAL 1776]. See MP3 (1769), pp.16-32 which is mostly concerned with hieroglyphics. On Condillac's use of Warburton see Aarsleff (1967), 21-2. See also OPL I 376.

31. MP240 (1788), 241, 242, 243. The last (1789) was intended as part of the 7th volume of OPL.

32. See, for example, the letters to Young in Knight op.cit. (45, 263).

For the restoration of Greek geometry see the work of Moor's friend and fellow member of the Glasgow Literary Society, Robert Simson whose edition of Euclid's Elements was published by the Foulis brothers in 1756. For a general account of the Scottish restoration of Greek geometry see G.E. Davie (1961) passim.

34. Murray, op.cit., 17. Thomas Blackwell, Professor of Greek at Marischal whose lectures Monboddo attended offered to furnish critical notes and an account of Plato's life and philosophy for the edition of Plato for the proposed edition of Plato's works (Irving 296-9; Murray 23).


36. OPL I, 472.

37. Murray, op.cit., 16.

38. MP142 "Of Language considered as Formed, and particularly of the Derivation of Language, from the example of the Greek", (1766), p.34.

39. OPL IV, 54-5.

40. OPL II 159 note. See also the reference to Professor Moor on page 176 and to borrowing a Greek manuscript from Glasgow on page 196.


42. Edinburgh Magazine and Review I, 370. Stuart compares OPL II 506, 507 and 517 with Moor's Elements, 121 and 160.

43. Irving, op.cit., 300-1.

44. The possibility that Monboddo had some connection with Moor is increased by the friendship between Moor and Monboddo's close friend Sir David Dalrymple, Lord Hailes, who was a curator of the Advocates' Library with Monboddo. The Advocates' Library has a volume of Moor's papers consisting of annotations and a letter from Hailes (August 20th 1758) to Moor about a collected edition of Greek lyric poetry.
Chapter Eight: THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY DEBATE ON THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE IN RELATION TO SCOTLAND


2. John Viertel, "Concepts of Language underlying the 18th Century Controversy about the Origin of Language", MSLL 19, p.112.


5. ibid.


7. ibid., 406-8.

8. ibid.


11. Stam, op.cit., 34.


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18. MP Bound Folio MS5, p.111.

19. F.B. Kaye (1924), 137.


21. ibid., II 285.


23. Adam Smith, loc.cit.

24. OPL I Preface; OPL II 5-17.

25. See Chapters Nine and Twelve.

26. See Chapter Fourteen. For de Brosses see Aarsleff (1967), 34-36. De Brosses had considerable influence on various articles in the Encyclopédie. (Aarsleff 36.)

27. See Chapter Ten and the Preface to the second edition of OPL I ix-x. The review, in the Critical Review II (1756), 193-218, was of Thomas Nugent's English translation of Condillac's Essai.


29. Chapter Ten.

30. See Chapter Thirteen.
Chapter Nine: THE ENCYCLOPÉDIE IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY SCOTLAND


2. See Chapters Six, Seven, Fourteen.


4. See Chapters Six, Seven. The most important evidence is provided by Smith's "Letter to the Authors of the Edinburgh Review", Essays on Philosophical Subjects, ed. W.P.D. Wightman and J.C. Bryce (Oxford 1980), 244-50. See note 7, below.


8. ibid., 247.


12. Herbert Dieckmann, "The Concept of Knowledge in the Encyclopédie", Essays in Comparative Literature, by H. Dieckmann, H. Levin and M. Motekat (Missouri 1961), 73-107. See especially Diderot's article "Encyclopédie" (volume V) which may have goaded Monboddo. By attacking the principles upon which the Encyclopédie was based Monboddo was, of course, attacking its sceptical and materialist tendency recognized by the Rev. Archibald Maclaine (see Lough, 1970, p.12).
Lough notes that Diderot and Buffon were elected honorary members of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland in 1781 - evidence of the impact made by the Encyclopédie in Scotland (Lough 1970, p.15). Equally important evidence is the appearance of the first parts of William Smellie's Encyclopaedia Britannica in 1768 (ibid., 14).

13. OPL I, iv.


The influence of Charles de Brosses' Traité de la formation mécanique des langues (1765) was particularly important, even before it was published (Aarsleff, 1967, p.36). Since it had circulated in manuscript among the Encyclopedistes, Monboddo may have heard of it on one of his visits to France. See Chapter Fourteen.

"Grammaire" (vol.VII, 1757) by Beauzée and Douchet is strongly influenced by Port Royal ideas and stresses the distinction between particular grammar and general grammar - the latter being concerned with the universal principles underlying all languages and the nature of mind itself. It is "la science raisonnée des principes immuables et généraux de la parole... dans toutes les langues".

"Langue" (vol IX, 1756) by Beauzée, which is also strongly influenced by Port Royal, deals with the twin linguistic themes of the Encyclopédie: the conjectural history of language and universal grammar.

Referring to Diodorus Siculus, Vitruvius, Richard Simon and St Gregory of Nyssa (see OPL I, 367-81), Beauzée discusses the origin of language. According to Rousseau, the first men lived alone like animals, and uttered inarticulate sounds. Gradually they herded together and necessity led them to adopt conventional signs for their ideas. Several pages of Rousseau's second Discours are quoted, his notes on wild children are cited and his question about whether language or society came first is raised.
But Beauzee rejects Rousseau's theory as a revolting hypothesis. It also denies that mind and voice are unique to man: it is, therefore, incompatible with the rational principles of universal grammar. (Monboddo, of course, attempts to prove the contrary.)

Beauzee refers to several other sources used by Monboddo: notably, Bullet on Celtic; de la Condamine on the Amazonians; Bishop Warburton on Egyptian hieroglyphics; and "Les Mémoires de M. le président de Brosses" which he quotes at length on "la langue primitive".

It may be significant that the volume containing Beauzee's article appeared in 1765 - the year in which OPL was begun and in which Monboddo read de Brosses. We do not know whether volume IX was in the Advocates' Library in 1765, nor can we be sure that Monboddo read it. But we know that he did consult the Encyclopédie, and this would surely have been an article which would have attracted his attention.

17. See especially Diderot's article "Encyclopédie", (vol.V).
19. See d'Alembert's "Discours préliminaire".
20. However, Monboddo distinguishes between the order of presentation and the order of discovery: "the method of science requires that we should begin with the principles and causes, and from them deduce the facts, though the order of investigation and discovery be just the reverse. And if it shall appear that from the facts the theory naturally arises, and that the theory again explains and illustrates the facts, it is hoped very little doubt will remain of the truth of my system" (OPL I, 515-6).
21. See d'Alembert, "Discourse préliminaire" which says the first languages must have been bizarre collections of signs of various species drawn from physical objects. See OPL I, 532-73.
23. See Diderot's article "Encyclopédie". In "Grammaire" Beauzee and Douchet say that universal grammar must be based on a comparison of the different grammars of the learned and vulgar languages.

25. See especially the articles "Art", "Botanique", "Method", "Espece" which are influenced by Buffon.

26. OPL I, 47-52.

27. For these Baconian views, which must have incensed Monboddo, see "Analyse", "Philosophie", "Logique", "Définition", "Espèce", "Baconisme" and d'Alembert's "Eléments des Sciences". The article "Espece" is particularly interesting because it discusses Aristotelian species as merely a stage in the history of man's mind - exactly as Thomas Reid did in his "A Brief account of Aristotle's Logic" which was published as an appendix to Kames's Sketches of the History of Man (1774).

Monboddo was not alone in opposing this trend. Later in the century Dr John Gillies (1747-1836), the Historiographer Royal for Scotland and translator of Aristotle's Politics, Rhetoric and Ethics criticised Reid's views. So did Sir William Hamilton (1788-1856) the editor of Reid's Works. (Howell [1971], op. cit., 379).

28. See especially the articles "Logique", "Art" and de'Alembert's "Méthode".

29. See "Grammaire" (volume VII, 1757) by Beauzée and Douchet.

30. See "Construction" by Dumarsais.


32. See "Adjectif".

33. See "Construction" (Dumarsais), "Prenom" (Beauzée).

34. Although Monboddo often writes as if we do have knowledge of the essences of substances, he added a note to the second edition of OPL I (68-71) specifically denying this. Evidently his position was similar to that of Aquinas. See F.C. Copleston, Aquinas (Penguin Books, 1955), 35-6.


37. See Chapter Two.

38. See d'Alembert, "Discours préliminaire".

39. See Chapter Thirteen.


41. For Newton see "Analyse", "Définition", "Mot" and d'Alembert's "Méthode"; for Buffon see "Art", "Botanique", "Espèce"; for Descartes see "Logique", "Art", and especially "Méthode".

42. Among Hume's admirers were President de Brosses, Turgot, Duclos, Chastellux and Helvétius. See E.C. Mossner, The Life of David Hume, (Oxford 1980), 423.


44. See Chapter Ten.

45. Aarsleff (1967), 36.

46. OPL I, 25-35.

47. See Chapters Seven, Fourteen.

48. "Encyclopédie" (V, 1755), 638.

49. "Method and System", MP Bound Folio MS5, pp.54-55.


52. "Encyclopédie", 641.

53. "On the Difficulty of the Study of Eloquence", (Cicero, pro Caelio), 14; "The Difference betwixt Eloquence antient and modern", 16-18; "In Praise of Eloquence", (Cicero, de Oratore), 52-54; "On Method and System", (Cicero, de Oratore), 54-55; "On the Unity of Learning", (Cicero, de Oratore), 55-56; "Numbers and Measure in Discourse", (Cicero, de Oratore), 56-58.
Cicero's de Oratore had been recently translated by William Guthrie, (London 1745, 1755) and edited by George Ross, (Glasgow 1749). CAL 1776 lists both works and also Ross's manuscript.

54. MP Bound Folio MS5, p.11.

55. "A Discourse on Language, showing wherein the Beauty of Language consists and comparing the Greek and Latin with the modern languages and particularly with the English." (MP Bound Folio MS5, pp.145-193.) This paper is endorsed "To be printed".

The passages on the corruption of language (pp.179-80) appear to relate to the debate in the Select Society "Whether the decay of the language of a people be not a mark of the decay of arts and sciences among that people". See Chapter Seven.

56. MP Bound Folio MS5, pp.146-7.

57. ibid., 176-8; 179.

58. ibid., 187.
Chapter Ten: THE INFLUENCE OF ROUSSEAU'S SECOND DISCOURS


3. ibid., 230, 242.


7. ibid., 107-30.

8. ibid., 112.


13. ibid. See also Meek, op.cit., 150-5.
14. ibid.
15. OPL I iii (note).
16. ibid., i-vi.
17. ibid., i-x.
18. ibid., 142-5, 152 (note).
20. OPL I, 149 ff. Inequality 54-8.
22. Inequality, 53-4.
23. OPL I, 199.
24. Inequality, 45.
25. ibid, 75.
26. ibid., 74.
27. OPL I, 146.
29. See Chapter Nine.
30. OPL I, 186-90.
31. OPL I, 270-360. These two chapters were added to the second edition. Much of the material derives from MP109 ("Of the Ouran Outang and whether he be of the Human Species" pp.1-47).

The work which convinced Monboddo that Buffon was wrong about the capacity of orang-outangs for speech was Edward Tyson's, Orang-outang, sive Homo Sylvestris: or, the Anatomy of a Pygme [i.e. a chimpanzee] compared with that of a Monkey, an Ape, and a Man, (London 1699). Tyson added a "Philologial Essay" intended to prove that the pygmies, satyrs, etc., of the ancients were actually apes or monkeys.
A facsimile edition with an introduction by Ashley Montague appeared in London in 1966. According to Montague it influenced thinking in man's place in nature for 160 years. It was Tyson who sparked the idea that the chimpanzee was "the nexus of the animal and the rational", (Epistle Dedicatory vii-viii), thus providing the link in the Great Chain of Being between man and the rest of the animal kingdom. See also: William Smellie, The Philosophy of Natural History, (1791); T.H. Huxley, Man's Place in Nature, (1863); Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man, (1871); M.F. Ashley Montague, Edward Tyson (1650-1708) and the Rise of Human and Comparative Anatomy in England, (Philadelphia 1943).

Peter Camper (1722-1789) proved the existence of two distinct species of apes, the chimpanzee and the orang-outang, in his De l'orang-outang et de quelques autres especes de singes (1779) but the term "orang outang" continued to be used in reference to any large ape until the mid nineteenth century. (Montague 1966, p.10).

In a letter to Sir John Pringle of 16th June 1773 Monboddo wrote that in Paris Jussieu had misled him about the capacity of "orang-outangs" for speech. Tyson's book had set him right. However, in 1779 Camper showed that apes could never learn to speak: see, "An Account of the Organs of Speech of the Orang Outang", Philosophical Transactions LXIX (1779), 139-59. Camper's article was written as a letter to the President of the Royal Society, Sir John Pringle, and may have been an attack on Monboddo.

For Memmie Le Blanc, the "wild girl" interviewed by Monboddo in France see: William Robertson (ed.), An Account of a Savage Girl caught wild in the Woods of Champagne, (Edinburgh 1768). Robertson was Monboddo's clerk and the book has a preface by Monboddo. This was a translation of a French work by de la Condamine which has been re-edited quite recently: i.e. Franck Tinland (ed.), Histoire d'une jeune fille sauvage, (Bordeaux 1971).


32. OPL I, 515-6.
33. ibid., iv.
34. ibid., Preface, 140 (note).
35. ibid., 270-360.
38. ibid., 17-46.
40. OPL I, 367-81, 437-41.
41. MP Bound Folio MS5, p.11.
42. See Chapter Eight.
43. OPL I, i-xi, 140 (note), 515-6.
44. MP71 ("A Sketch of the History of Man").
45. Inequality, 103.
47. ibid
49. Inequality, 58.
50. ibid.
51. ibid., 59.
52. ibid., 61-2.
53. ibid., 63.
54. ibid., 60-1.
55. ibid., 61.
56. ibid., 79.
57. ibid., 79-80.

59. OPL I, 367-75.

60. Viertel, op.cit., 117-8; OPL I, 21-25, 40-46.

61. OPL I iii; 152, 415. See also MP71 ("A Sketch of the History of Man") p.4: Rousseau's representation of human nature is completely "different from what is given by our ordinary philosophers who make society not only necessary for our well being, but even for our very being and existence".

62. OPL I, 21-25, 201-6.

63. ibid.

64. ibid., 474-513.

65. ibid., 469-74.


67. See the list of travel books consulted by Monboddo.


70. OPL I, 456-8.

71. ibid., 456-89.

72. ibid., 499-513.

73. ibid., 476-8.

74. ibid., 469-99, especially 490-2.

75. ibid., 270-360. See also Hester Hastings, Man and Beast in French Thought of the Eighteenth Century, (Oxford 1936);

76. ibid.
77. ibid., 532-79.
78. Inequality, 59-61.
79. OPL I, 514-38.
80. ibid., 537.
81. ibid., 524-5.
82. ibid., 519.
83. Inequality, 61.
84. ibid. See also Chapter Twelve.
85. OPL I, 529-30.
86. ibid., 568.
Chapter Eleven: THE INFLUENCE OF DE BUFFON'S "HISTOIRE NATURELLE" ON THE GENESIS OF OPL


2. See manuscript FR 118 in the National Library of Scotland: "Register of the Proceedings of the Curators and Keeper of the Library in relation to their Office Beginning Anno 1725".

3. MP8 and MP71 seem also to owe something to Buffon III.


5. Buffon III 401-2, 396; MP76 p.2.

6. pp.234-6. Note that in this chapter all references to OPL I are to the first edition.


10. Buffon III, 493-94; OPL I, p.316; Letter to Harris of 26 March 1766 (Knight p.49). Buffon mentions Sagard Theodet's book again in volume VIII (1760) [p.298] during his account of the beaver - from which Monboddo also drew inspiration - but it is unnecessary to assume Monboddo had read this volume before his visits to Paris in 1764 and 1765.


12. Bound MS4, p.245.


15. p.97.

16. MP71, p.11.

18. See Bouguer and La Condamine, la Figure de la terre...
   Paris 1749. [Catalogue of the Advocates' Library 1776.]

19. Further, this account of his voyage to Brazil, Guiana and
   the Amazon - to which Monboddo refers as early as 1764 in
   his paper on Galibi and Carib - was published in the
   Mémoires de l'Académie des Sciences that year. This
   is a publication which Monboddo certainly consulted a good
   deal in the Advocates' Library - which purchased the
   volumes for 1710-1740 and 1748 and added to them
   subsequently.

20. OPL I, 381.


22. See especially pp.364 ff.

23. MP71, p.11.

24. OPL I, p.316.

25. MP71, pp.9-10.

26. See "Register of the Proceedings of the Curators and
   Keeper of the Library", NLS (FR118).

27. OPL I, 177, 324, 335-40, 375-77, 383-4.


31. For a comprehensive list of those containing linguistic
   information, see Bibliotheca Marsdeniana, (London: 1796).

32. Buffon III, 496 ff.

33. MP71, p.11.

34. OPL I, 241, 258.


38. MP76, p.5; 27.
41. MP76, p.1.
42. Edinburgh University Library, Grim Thorkelin Correspondence.
43. PBI, p.1, PB3, p.6.
44. OPL I, Book 2, Chapter 2.
45. Cf. OPL i, 206-7 and Cat. Advoc. Lib. 1776.
46. Cf. OPL I, 466-7, MP81, and Cat. Advoc. Lib. 1787.
47. Cf. OPL I, 249, MP81, 85 and Cat. Advoc. Lib. 1776.
48. See Register of the Proceedings of the Curators and Keeper NLS (FR118), MP81 "Notes from Monsr. Maillet's Account of Egypt" - which is dated 17th September 1766 - suggests it was among the books he read during the crucial period 1765-66.
49. MP71, pp.4; 9-10.
50. See for example, Diderot's Memoires géographiques, physiques et historiques sur l'Asie, l'Afrique et l'Amérique (6 vols. Yverdon 1767 cf. Cat. Advoc. Lib. 1776) Cf. MP80 "Notes from a Collection of Travels in the South Sea and of many Barbarous Nations" in which he describes collection as containing "many curious facts... concerning barbarous nations" - some living a life entirely brutish - and praises the accounts of Jesuit missionaries (p.15).
51. See, for instance, the Diary of George Ridpath, Minister of Stitchel 1755-61 (Edinburgh 1922).
52. Monboddo had quite probably been introduced to Jussieu by C.M. de la Condamine (who was also editor of the book on the Wild Girl which Monboddo later had translated): Jussieu's brother Joseph (1704-1779) accompanied la Condamine to Peru on the expedition sent by the French King to measure an arc of meridian.
53. OPL I, 270-360.

54. MP. Letter to Sir John Pringle, 16th June 1773. A facsimile edition of Edward Tyson's book appeared in London in 1966 with an introduction by Ashley Montague. See also Ashley Montague, Edward Tyson M.D., F.R.S. (1650-1708) and the Rise of Human and Comparative Anatomy in England, (Philadelphia, 1943). According to Montague, it was Tyson who started the idea that the chimpanzee was the link in the Chain of Being between man and the rest of the animal kingdom. This was the view expressed by Monboddo's friend, William Smellie, the translator of Buffon, in his book The Philosophy of Natural History (1791).


55. OPL I, 270-304.

Chapter Twelve: ADAM SMITH'S DISSERTATION ON LANGUAGE

1. The Considerations concerning the first formation of Languages, and the different genius of original and compounded Languages was first published in The Philological Miscellany (1761). Smith later added it to the third edition of his The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1767). For the background of the Considerations see Adam Smith: Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, ed. J.C. Bryce (Oxford 1983), Introduction 23-27. For the original lecture see Bryce 9-13.

See also two articles on the Considerations: C.J. Berry, JHI 35 (1974), 130-8; S.K. Land, JHI 38 (1977), 677-90.


Smith owned copies of Condillac's Essai and his Traité des sensations (1754). See Bryce 203.


5. Smith, Considerations (Bryce 205-6).

6. ibid., 207-16.

8. ibid., 205-7.
10. ibid., 208.
11. ibid., 215.
12. ibid., 216.
14. ibid., 216-17.
15. ibid., 220-21.
16. ibid., 221-22.
17. ibid., 222.
18. ibid., 222-23.
20. OPL I 568, 577; II 89, 103, 110-11.
21. See Chapter Six.
22. See Chapter Five.
23. OPL I, Book 3.
25. OPL II, Book 1.
26. See Chapter Ten.
27. OPL I, 514-39.
29. ibid.
31. ibid., 568.
Chapter Thirteen: THE INFLUENCE OF JAMES HARRIS'S HERMES


2. MP144 (1766), pp.49-50. The first and third editions of Hermes, or a Philosophical Inquiry concerning Universal Grammar, (1751, 1771) are listed in CAL 1776. My references are to the third edition.

3. OPL II, 239, I 8.

4. Syntax, for instance, is "so fully, accurately and elegantly explained in Hermes that he "will not say a word more upon the subject" (OPL II, 343).

5. OPL II, 21-2. Three editions of Three Treatises (1744, 2nd ed. 1765, 3rd ed. 1771) are listed in CAL 1776. Significantly the work is dedicated to Shaftesbury. The first dialogue, "concerning art", summarizes Monboddo's views on language. Art implies reason and volition. It is not accidental. It is based on habit and experience: i.e. it is learned. Art is therefore to be distinguished from the rule-governed events of the natural world and the instinctive skills of animals. Art is a power (or energy) in man and is peculiar to him. It is directed by a system of rules and the beginning of every art is the absence of something good or needful. We began as savages in the forest and raised ourselves by art. (First Dialogue, pp.1-45.)

That is, Harris considers art with respect to the four causes of Aristotle (efficient, material, final and formal). The footnotes refer to Plato, Aristotle and Aristotle's commentators, especially Ammonius. Also frequently mentioned are Cicero, Quintilian and Scaliger's de Causis Linguæ Latinæ (1540) - which made grammar conform to reason and follow a method.

Harris's Philosophical Arrangements (London 1775) appears in CAL 1776. It is a detailed exposition of Aristotelian metaphysics.

Harris's Philological Inquiries (London 1781) was in the Advocates' Library by 1782. Part one deals with the origin
and progress of criticism. Man reasoned before logic and rhetoric were invented. The first critics attended to the meanings of words and this led them to consider the nature of man, reason and the passions (pp.7-8).

He distinguishes philosophical criticism - which is concerned with the unchanging principles of good writing - from the historical criticism of commentators, lexicographers and grammarians. Among the former are Aristotle, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Longinus, Cicero, Horace and Quintilian. Among the latter are Simplicius, Ammonius and Philoponus on Aristotle (17-18). To write well upon a liberal art we must write philosophically, that is, we must base our criticism on the First Philosophy of Aristotle (19). See also Hermes, 128, Philosophical Arrangements, 367.

Among modern historical critics he lists several grammarians including some frequently mentioned by Monboddo: Lascaris, Gaza, Vossius, J.C. Scaliger and Sanctius. He singles out the Minerva of Sanctius as an "invaluable book" to which he owed his first rational ideas of grammar and language. (21).

7. See Chapters Two, Three, Five, Six.
9. ibid., 246-7.
10. OPL I, 53.
11. ibid., 56 note.
13. ibid.
14. See Chapter Two.
15. Knight, loc.cit.
16. See Chapter Fourteen.
18. See Chapter Seven.


J.L. Mosheim edited and translated Cudworth: *Systema intellectuale huius universi seu de veris naturae rerum originibus commentarii* (Jena 1733) and it was this edition that Monboddo used.


31. See Chapter Five.


34. *ibid.*

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36. ibid., 265-71, 245-6, 252-8.


38. OPL II, 440-82.

39. OPL I, 482-8, 514-73.


See also Hermes 242-7, 258, 264; OPL II 236 where Monboddo cites Scaliger's De causis Linguae Latinae (1540).

41. See Chapter Six.

42. OPL I, 47-93. Hermes, 353-80.

43. ibid.

44. Hermes, 327-59.


51. See Kemp, op.cit., 100.

52. Padley, 36-7.

53. ibid., 53, 56, 58. For commentary on the Minerva: seu de causis linguae Latinae (Salamanca 1562) of Francisco Sánchez de las Brozas (alias Franciscus Sanctius Brocensis)
see Padley 92-3, 97-110, 113, 195. In his Philological Inquiries (London 1781) Harris describes the Minerva as an "invaluable book" to which he owed his first rational ideas of grammar. He used the 1733 Amsterdam edition of Perizonius (Philological Inquiries, p.21). See also Hermes 5, 36, 163, 171, 175, 202.

55. ibid., 56, 133.
56. ibid., 64.
57. ibid., 57.
58. ibid., 77-96.
60. Padley 60-76, 97-114, 261.
61. ibid., 31.
62. ibid., 162, 178.
63. OPL II, 440-82.
64. Padley, 74-6, 211-3, 217-25, 240-52.
65. ibid., 261-2.
66. ibid., 244, 261-3.
67. See Chapters Five, Eight, Nine, Fourteen.
68. Padley, 233-5, 238, 244.
69. See Chapter Seven, section 4.
1. Knight, 49.
2. MP250, pp.2-3.
3. Samuel Shuckford (d.1754). 
   *The Sacred and Profane History of the World*, 2 vols,
   (London 1728).
4. See Chapters Two and Three.
5. MP Bound Folio MS4, p.61. 
   David Malcolm (d.1748), philologist and minister of
   Duddingston, near Edinburgh, author of *An Essay on the* 
   *Antiquities of Great Britain and Ireland*, (Edinburgh 1738)
   of which his *Letters, Essays and other Tracts*, (London 1744)
   was an expanded version.
6. MP Bound Folio MS4, loc.cit.
7. Thomas Blackwell, the younger, (1701-1757) Professor of 
   Greek and Principal of Marischal College, Aberdeen. He
   was the author of *An Enquiry into the Life and Writings of* 
   *Homer* (1735). For his influence on Monboddo see John Ramsay 
   of Ochtertyre, op.cit., 291-4, 351. See also Douglas Duncan, 
   op.cit. and DNB.
8. MP Bound Folio MS4, pp.190-8 ("Of Ancient Egypt").
9. ibid., pp.220-45 ("Of the History of China from Du Hald").
10. ibid., 244-5.
11. ibid., pp.255-65 ("Of the Philosophy of Roman Law"). On 
    Monboddo's view of the law of nature see Chapter Five.
12. ibid., pp.256-7.
13. See Chapter Three. Roman law is *"Rerum divinarum et 
    humanarum scientia"*, (p.255). This paper makes the 
    connection between Roman law and Monboddo's addiction to


16. MP Bound Folio MS5, pp.52-61. Note in this connection his "Speech against the Jurisdiction Bill": "Our forefathers gave up their Parliament, gave up their kingdom, consented to be swallowed up and to disappear as it were in a greater and more powerful nation for the sake of those very articles which we now deliberate about altering", (p.49). This presumably refers to the abolition of Heritable Jurisdictions (1747).


18. MPBound Folio MS5, 126-33 compares Stoic and Epicurean philosophy in the midst of a long paper on the philosophy of mind dealing with abstraction, genera and species, discursus mentis, etc. This merges into a discussion of government, corruption in the state, etc.

19. ibid., p.111. If the rulers lack wisdom and sound philosophy because they are rich, luxurious and idle, the people will be ignorant and "false philosophy" will flourish, ridiculing ancient institutions and extolling modern philosophy. "Such philosophers will maintain that private vices are public benefits, that luxury is the mother of the arts, sciences, civility and good government... that religion is... hurtful to society..." See also note 23 below.

20. See Chapter Eight, section 3 and Shneider, op. cit.


22. MP Bound Folio MS5, pp.145-93, ("A Discourse on Language, showing wherein the Beauty of Language consists and comparing the Greek and Latin with the modern languages and particularly the English.")
23. ibid., 181-3, "the vulgar aiming at science or philosophical enquiries"... can be "destructive of good order". This is the natural order of things. Nature admits nothing superfluous in the scheme of things, so only those who have time and ability should meddle with philosophy. "A philosophizing nation is a monstrous absurdity in politics and morals, for in such a nation every man will be wiser than the laws of his country." He will speculate and dispute instead of following the rules handed down from the wisdom of former ages. Such a philosopher will have contempt for all authority. (183-7.)

24. ibid., 189ff.

25. Of all these sources only Squire was not in the Advocates' Library.


27. MP Bound Folio, MS11, pp.1-29, 100-11. cf. OPL II 513-42.

28. This must have been the pocket book in which he made notes of his reading of Gabriel Sagard's Le Grand voyage du pays des Hurons, (Paris 1631), which he borrowed first from the Royal Library in Paris with the permission of the librarian M. Caperonier and later from Principal William Robertson - who was using the book for his History of America (2 vols., London 1777). It was this work of Sagard (or Sagard Theodet as he was also known) which inspired Monboddo to undertake OPL. See OPL I, 471-2 note.

29. See Chapter Two, section 5.

30. Christoval d'Acuña (b 1597), Nuevo descubrimiento del gran río de las Amazonas... (Madrid 1641); translated as Relation de la rivière des Amazones (Paris 1682), 4 vols. Louis Hennepin (b 1640), Description de la Louisiane, (Paris 1683, 1688) and Nouvelle découverte d'un très grand pays situé dans l'Amérique... (Utrecht 1697). In 1720 the latter appeared with Voyages du Sieur Laborde aux iles Caraibes.


32. Raymond Breton (1609-1679), Grammaire caraïbe (Auxerre 1664).
33. His ideas on the development of barbarous languages are identical with the views expressed in OPL and some of the paper seems to be an attack on de Brosses, whose work was already circulating in manuscript: "Although the expressing of a thing with its several circumstances by one word may seem to shorten a language much and make it very energetic... yet in reality it multiplies words so much as... to make a language unfit for use." [12] See Chapter Twelve and OPL I 514ff.

34. Monboddo's defence of the study of the history of language is worth quoting at greater length:

"there is a necessary connection betwixt the progress of men's ideas and that of their language; and the study of a barbarous language affords us a history of the human mind in the first steps of its progress, which... cannot otherwise be deduced from fact and experience. And in these matters... mere speculative argument without fact, is apt to lead into error. But when the reasonings are grounded upon fact, and at the same time explain and account for the fact, then we may be said to proceed from mere history to philosophy; and such as I think better deserves the name of experimental philosophy than what is commonly known by that name, as it explains the causes of things, which our modern experimental philosophy does not." (pp. 26-7.)

This may be compared with the views of the French humanist lawyers discussed in Chapter Three.

35. MP143, p.46. Monboddo at this stage offers no explanation for this "surprising" fact about some barbarous languages.

36. Aarsleff (1967) 34-6, 36 note, 39-40 note. The work was based on mémoires read to the Academic Royale des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres in 1751.

Monboddo met the Abbé de l'Épée (1712-1789) in Paris. He was the author of Institution des Sourds et Muets (1774).

37. Jean-Baptiste Bullet (1699-1775), Memoire sur la langue Celtique, (Besançon 1754, 1759, 1770). Bullet was a correspondent of the Académie Royale des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres. For Algonkin, Huron, etc. see OPL I 514ff.

38. Aarsleff 36.

39. MP142, pp.1-49.


42. MP144, pp.27-37.

43. ibid. For John Horne Tooke and Monboddo see Aarsleff (1967), 43, 58.

44. ibid., p.13ff.

45. ibid., pp.19-20, 22-3.

46. Compare OPL I, 482ff.

47. "the natural faculties of speech and intellect,... lying hid... in their seeds and not yet exerted in the production of language" (20-21).

48. For Nicolas Freret (b 1688) see OPL II, 204 and Chapter Six, section 5.

Garcias Lasso de la Vega (1530-1568) was the author of *Histoire des Incas, rois de Pérou*, (Paris 1633) originally published in Spanish in 1609.

Amédée-Francois Frézier (1682-1773) was the author of *Relation du voyage de la mer du Sud aux côtes du Chily et du Pérou*... (Paris 1714).
Chapter Fifteen: CONCLUSION


2. OPL I, 292, 310.


5. ibid., xii. See also Smellie's The Philosophy of Natural History quoted in Bryson, op.cit., 62.


7. John Gillies, A New Translation of Aristotle's Rhetoric (London, 1823), 55. This quotation may be compared with OPL V, 359: "all syllogism is founded upon this proposition, that the genus contains the species, and the more general idea the less general."


Gillies, probably the first Scot to read the work of Vico, also wrote A History of Ancient Greece (1786) which was for many years the standard text. He claimed that the economic ideas of all modern writers (including Montesquieu, Smith and Hume) derived from Aristotle. He was the elder brother of Lord Adam Gillies, Senator of the College of Justice.


10. ibid., 32-3.

11. ibid., 54.


13. See Miss E Hamilton's article in the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1880) volume 11 p.420. See also McCosh, op.cit., 415 ff.
14. 1847 saw the publication of Augustus De Morgan's *Formal Logic* and George Boole's *Mathematical Analysis of Logic*. For the antilogical tendency of Locke see the article "History of Logic", *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, volume four, p.541; also W & M Kneale, *The Development of Logic* (1962), 310, 312.


