THE THEOLOGICAL QUESTIONS AT ISSUE BETWEEN AZ-ZAMAKHSHARĪ AND AL-BAYḌAWĪ WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO AL-KASHSHĀF AND ANWĀR AT-TANZĪL.

presented by

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Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Arts, University of Edinburgh.

- 1977 -
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In the name of Allah, The Compassionate, the Merciful.

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this thesis, as its title indicates, is to investigate the differences between az-Zamakhsharī (d. 1144 A.D.) and al-Bayḍāwī (d. 1286 A.D.) in respect of Muslim theological doctrines and the extent which al-Bayḍāwī manages to refute az-Zamakhsharī's views.

The significance of az-Zamakhsharī and al-Bayḍāwī in Muslim theology is that their works al-Kashshāf and Anwār at-Tanzīl respectively, represent the views of the two famous schools of Islamic thoughts called the Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites.

Az-Zamakhsharī as a Mu'tazilite, gave Reason priority to Revelation. Al-Bayḍāwī as an Ash'arite maintained that Revelation is prior to Reason.

Chapter one describes the historical backgrounds of the two scholars and the different environments in which they were brought up.

Chapter two illustrates how the two scholars discuss the concept of the attributes of God, in particular the visibility of God and the speech of God.
Chapter three considers the relation of Reason and Revelation in az-Zamakhsharī and al-Dayfāwī. Topics discussed include the question whether God always does "the best", the question of good and evil, the question whether angels or prophets are superior, the nature of the karāmāt (miracles) of the saints, and God's giving of sustenance.

Chapter four deals with a number of topics concerning faith (Īmān), unbelief (kufr), repentance (tawba), and Muhammad's intercession (shafā'a).

Chapter five discusses the concept of God's justice and the associated question of man's free will.
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The system of transliteration used in this thesis is that recommended by the Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies of the University of Edinburgh.
CHAPTER ONE

PART ONE

THE LIFE OF AZ-ZAMAKHSHARĪ

His full name was Maḥmūd b. ʿUmar b. ʿAbd Allāh, his Kunya was Abū-l-Qāsim, and his laqab "Jär-Allāh" (the neighbour of God) indicating his sojourn in Mecca. The nisba az-Zamakhsharī is derived from the small town in Khwārizm called "Zamakhshar". He was born there on 27th Rajab 467 (March 18, 1075).

Az-Zamakhsharī was born during the rule of Malik Shah as-Saljūqī and his famous vizier Niẓām-al-Mulk. Niẓām al-Mulk was a religious and scholarly person, who loved all branches of knowledge, was always accompanied by jurists; he established many institutions for higher learning. Therefore, it is not surprising that Khwārizm became the centre of learning for many centuries.

His family background

There are very scanty materials telling us about az-Zamakhsharī's family background, but one can deduce from his poems that his parents were very pious and az-Zamakhsharī states that the piety of his parents was very well known among the people of Khwārizm; his father fasted during the day and got up during the night for 'ibāda,\(^1\) while his mother had subtle feelings, full of hospitality even towards the animals. One day, az-Zamakhsharī caught a bird and fastened it with a thread; as a result, the foot of the bird was cut off due to the pressure of the thread. His mother was very depressed, and said that God would cut her son's foot as he had cut the foot of the bird.\(^2\) Az-Zamakhsharī seems to have been impressed by his mother's remark and eventually the same event happened to him. When asked what happened to his foot, he frequently replied that it was the benediction (baraka) of his mother's invocation.\(^3\)

Az-Zamakhsharī also tells us that his father was imprisoned by Mu'ayyid-al-Mulk (d. 494). He made a

\[\text{(Footnotes)}\]

1. Diwān, ff, 85a, 72b.
2. Wafayāt, II, 82.
strenuous effort in order to release his father, but it proved to be unsuccessful. Eventually his father died in the prison while he was still young. This, however, was indicated by az-Zamakhsharī through his poem.\(^1\)

Az-Zamakhsharī mentions nothing about the reason for his father's imprisonment. It is rather difficult to presume whether it was related to politics or not. However, the death of his father, of course, affected his life, especially at the time he was away.\(^2\)

**Az-Zamakhsharī's education**

Owing to the good background of his family, az-Zamakhsharī had the opportunity of pursuing knowledge. His preliminary education, like others, generally, started in his home town Zamakhshar. At least he learnt how to recite the Qur'ān. For further education, he travelled to Bukhārā while he was very young.\(^3\) His travelling to Bukhārā is due to the fact that Bukhārā was the main centre of learning of the century, attended by many celebrated scholars who were specialists in various fields of knowledge.\(^4\)

\begin{itemize}
  \item 1. Diwān, fol. 97a.
  \item 2. Ibid, fol. 72b.
  \item 3. Wafayāt, II, 82.
  \item 4. Ath-Tha'ālabī, Yatīmat ad-Dahr, IV, 101.
\end{itemize}
His teachers

Az-Zamakhsharī, like other eminent scholars, has had many teachers. Perhaps the most outstanding figure who managed to influence Az-Zamakhsharī was Abū-Muḍar Maḥmūd b. Jarīr ad-Ḍabbī al-Īṣfahānī (d. 507) who was well versed in Arabic grammar and literature. It was he who introduced the Muʿtazilite doctrine to the people of Khwārizm. Owing to his having the science of knowledge, he was called "the unique of his time" (waḥīd āṣrī-hī). Az-Zamakhsharī's relationship with his teacher Abū-Muḍar was very close. He did not only impart his knowledge to Az-Zamakhsharī, but supported him financially. It is natural that Az-Zamakhsharī's eagerness for knowledge and his teacher's sponsorship, one way or another developed their relationship, and Az-Zamakhsharī confesses that he was greatly indebted to his teacher Abū-Muḍar.


1. Irshād, VI, 145; Bughya, II, 279.
2. Diwān, fol. 91a.
3. Ibid, ff. 64a, 57a.
4. Irshād, VII, 147; Bughya, II, 279; Al-Ḥifī, ʿAḥmad Muḥammad, Az-Zamakhsharī, p. 49.
5. As-Suyūṭī, Tabaqāt al-Mufassirīn, p. 41.
Az-Zamakhsharī studied literature under Abū-'All al-Ḥasan b. al-Ḥadīr al-Naysābūrī. While in Baghdad, he studied some books of linguistics under Abū-Manṣūr Mawhūb b. Abū-Ṭāhir Ahmad al-Jawāliqī (d. 539) who was well versed in literature, and therefore was considered as one of the prides of Baghdad (min mafākhir Baghdaḍ). The meetings between az-Zamakhsharī and Abū-Manṣūr al-Jawāliqī, was described by Ibn-al-Qiftī in which he states that he himself saw az-Zamakhsharī twice studying some books of linguistics under Abū-Manṣūr al-Jawāliqī in the year 533 A.H. in order to obtain Ijāza. It is said that he met the Hanafite jurist Abū-'Abd-Allāh Muḥammad b. 'Alī ad-Dāmīghī and he was warmly welcomed by a celebrated scholar called Hibat-Allāh b. ‘Alī Abū-as-Saʻāda known as Ibn-ash-Shajari. While in Mecca, az-Zamakhsharī studied Kitāb Sibawayh under ‘Abd-Allāh b. Ẓalḥa al-Yābīrī (d. 518).

The fame of az-Zamakhsharī spread out almost all over the world of Islam during his time onwards. Wherever he

1. Irshād, IV, 147; Bughya, II, 279.
3. Wafayāt, II, 142.
5. Wafayāt, II, 83.
visited, he was always met by many people studying or discussing the branches of knowledge. Of course, a great scholar like az-Zamakhsharī must have had many students studying under him. Now we shall try to give a list of the names of his students as follows:

I In Zamakhshar, Abū-'Umar 'Āmir b. al-Ḥasan as-Sammar. He is also said to be a cousin to az-Zamakhsharī.

II In Tabarstān, Abū-l-Maḥāsin Ismā'īl b. 'Abd-Allāh at-Ṭawīlī.


IV In Samarqand, Abū-Sa‘d Ahmad b. Maḥmūd ash-Shāṭī and others.

V In Khwārizm, Abū-Ṭāhir Sāmān b. ‘Abd-al-Malik al-Faqīh, al-Muwaффaq b. Aḥmad b. Abī-Sa‘īd who was known as the best speaker in Khwārizm. He could speak Arabic fluently and was knowledgeable in jurisprudence and literature. Also among them is

1. Inbā', III, 266 ff.
3. Al-Insāb, p. 278.
'Ali b. Muhammad al-'Amrānī al-Khwārizmī Abū-l-Ḥasan; a lettered man. He is best known with the
"proof of the eminent" (ḥujjat al-afāḍil), and the
"pride of the teachers" (fakhr al-mashāyikh) (d. 560 A.H.) He studied literature under az-Zamakhsarī.¹

VI Muhammad b. Abū-l-Qāsim Bayjūk, Abū-al-Faḍl
al-Yaḍālī al-Khwārizmī al-Adamī, known as the
"decoration of the teachers" (zayn al-mashāyikh).
He studied Arabic language and the science of
syntax under az-Zamakhsarī.²

He studied Arabic grammar and literature under
az-Zamakhsarī.³

VIII Abū-1-Ḥasan 'Ali b. ʿĪsā b. Ḥamza b. Wahhās,
Amīr of Mecca. It was he who encouraged
az-Zamakhsarī to write al-Kashshāf.⁴

IX Zaynab bint ash-Shagrl who conferred Ijāza to
Ibn-Khallikān.⁵

1. Irshād, V, 412; Bughyā, II, 195.
2. Irshād, VII, 77.
3. Irshād, VII, 304.
5. Wafayāt, II, 83.
The journeys of az-Zamakhsharī

As previously stated, az-Zamakhsharī's first journey took place when he was very young; it was probably after finishing his preliminary education in his home town Zamakhshar. He travelled to Bukhārā for higher learning, because Bukhārā at that time was well known as a centre of higher learning and intellectual gatherings since the Sāmānids came to power in 204 A.H.

After studying various branches of knowledge, az-Zamakhsharī returned to Khwārizm. Perhaps his return was also due to the death of his father, under the reign of Mu'ayyid ad-Dawla (d. 494). Az-Zamakhsharī seems to have been away at the time of his death.

From the beginning, az-Zamakhsharī was very ambitious, not only in pursuing knowledge but also for the high post (mansab) in the governmental office. His self-confidence of his knowledge and his desire for the post caused him one way or another to approach the vizier Nizām-al-Mulk (d. 1092) under the Sultan Malik Shah. Az-Zamakhsharī praised Nizām-al-Mulk and complained about the situation

1. Wafayāt, II, 82.
3. Diwān, fol. 72b.
in the governmental office in which there were less capable officials who were admitted to the office. Az-Zamakhsharî thought that he was capable enough to be given the high post. Unfortunately his complaint was not heard even when he was introduced to Niẓām al-Mulk by his beloved teacher Abū-Mudar.

A question arises, what is the reason for his "unsuccessfulness" in achieving the post while he was well qualified? Was it because of his Mu'tazilite view? This does not seem to be possible, since az-Zamakhsharî himself states that his teacher Abū-Mudar had a close relationship with Niẓām-al-Mulk and informed him about az-Zamakhsharî's brilliance. Another alternative perhaps is due to the fact that az-Zamakhsharî was so proud of being the most learned scholar in various branches of knowledge while others were not. Whatever the reason was, his desire to obtain the important governmental post in Khwārizm was futile. There seemed to be no way of removing his frustration other than to leave the country, then he decided to travel to Khurāsān.

1. Ibid, ff. 95a, 95b.
2. Ibid, fol. 104a.
3. Ibid
4. Ibid, fol. 94a.
5. Ibid, fol. 37b.
While he was in Khurāsān, he was close to several government officials and praised them; such as Mujīr ad-Dawla Abū-l-Fatḥ ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn al-Ardastānī, and Muʿayyid-al-Mulk ʿUbayd-Allāh b. Nizām-al-Mulk.

After all his efforts to obtain the governmental post in Khurāsān failed, he went to ʿIsfahān, the capital city of the Saljuq. ʿIsfahān at that time was under the rule of Muḥammad b. Abī-l-Fatḥ Malik Shah (d. 1092). Az-Zamakhsharī praised him and his successor Muʿizz-ad-Dīn Sanjar.

It was in 512 A.H. that az-Zamakhsharī suffered a serious illness (nāḥika) and mundhira (warning). As the result he made a vow, not to approach any government officials, nor to offer his service to them. Instead, he promised himself to devote all his lifetime to writing and teaching.

After his recovery from the illness, he went to Baghdad to see many scholars.

1. Ibid, fol. 23b.
2. Ibid, fol. 97a.
3. Diwān, fol. 20a.
4. Maqāmā, p. 6
5. Taʾrīkh Abī-l-Fidaʿ, III, 16.
Having met these scholars, he travelled to Mecca, hoping that God would forgive his sins and decided to stay there.\(^1\) It was there that he was welcomed by the great man of the city called Abū-l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. Ḥamza b. Wahhās,\(^2\) az-Zamakhshārī praised him describing his love and indebtedness to him.\(^3\) During his two years stay in Mecca, he visited Hamadān in Yemen and praised the family of the vizier.\(^4\)

After staying about two years in Mecca, he was affected by the memory of his home town and then decided to leave Mecca for Zamakhshar.\(^5\) It was there in Khwārizm, the desire for high post again influenced him. In order to obtain the post he praised Muḥammad b. Anushtakin known as Khwārizm Shah\(^6\) and afterwards his son Atsiz (d. 551).\(^7\) It is probable that az-Zamakhshārī's praise helped him to obtain some gifts even if he was not very satisfactory.\(^8\) Later on he decided to

\(^{1}\) Diwān, ff. 42a, 42b.
\(^{2}\) Ibid;
\(^{3}\) Ibid, 27a, 74a; al-Kashshāf, I, 3.
\(^{4}\) Diwān, fol. 111b;
az-Zamakhshārī, Asās al-Balāgha, I, 78.
\(^{5}\) Diwān, fol. 5a.
\(^{6}\) Ibid, ff. 107a, 107b.
\(^{7}\) Muqaddimat al-Adab, I, 2.
\(^{8}\) Diwān, ff. 41a, 41b.
travel to Mecca for the second time. Perhaps his journey to Mecca this time was due to the conflict of the soul in which he thought that it could be solved by staying in Mecca. On his way to Mecca, he passed through Syria for a while and praised Tāj-al-Mulūk (The Crown of the Kings) Tughtakin (d. 526), the ruler of Damascus, and his son called Shams-al-Mulk, after his father's death. Presumably, at this time, az-Zamakhshari's praise was not for the purpose of obtaining any reward, but it was full of sincerity.

Az-Zamakhshari's second stay in Mecca took place in 526 A.H. for a period of three years. It was at this time that he wrote his Tafsīr, receiving great hospitality and honour from Ibn-Wahhās.

Having stayed there about three years, he returned again to his home town for the second time, and lived there until his death.

1. Ibid, fol. 41a.
2. Ibid
3. Ibid, fol. 41a.
4. Ibid.
5. Dīwān, ff. 79b, 80a.
The Mu'tazilite influence in Khwarizm

The coming of the Buwayhids to power, in 320 A.H., started the open door policy of welcoming indiscriminately Shi'ites or Mu'tazilites of different shades of opinion, even if they themselves were politically Twelvers. The traditional Shi'ite festivals such as GhadIr Khum etc. were introduced into their territories. The vizier known as as-Sāhib ibn-'Abbād (d. 995 A.C.) under Mu'ayyid-ad-Dawla and Pakhr-ad-Dawla is said to have had Mu'tazilite leanings by means of granting them the high posts in the governmental office.

As a result, it is not surprising that the majority of the Shi'ite jurists were theologically Mu'tazilites and the quarrel among the masses frequently took place.

In general Khwarizm was dominated by the Mu'tazilite views; it is very difficult to find someone who is not Mu'tazilite. If he is not a Mu'tazilite, the only way to let people know about his stand is to deny that he is a Mu'tazilite, otherwise he will be included among them.

1. C. Collin Davies, "Buwayhid" in EI², p. 1352.
2. Irshād, II, 274; cf. The Islamic Dynasties, p. 96.
3. Irshād, II, 274-76; cf. The Majesty that was Islam, p. 218.
5. Irshād, VI, 155.
This shows that in general the people of Khwārizm are Mu‘tazilite. It was in this environment that az-Zamakhsharī was brought up and finally became a distinguished scholar of the Mu‘tazilites. The unique scholar of that time known as Abū-Muḍar Maḥmūd b. Jarīr ad-Dabbī (d. 507 A.H.) is said to have introduced into Khwārizm the Mu‘tazilite views and later on took an initiative part in the propagation of their views. As a result, he was met by many people and they were attracted to his views. Of course, az-Zamakhsharī, besides being greatly influenced by his teacher Abū-Muḍar, was also interested in using reason as a criterion in contemplation and discussion. Therefore, his teacher’s view is always consistent with his reasoning. It is not surprising that his relation with his teacher Abū-Muḍar was very close. The fact that az-Zamakhsharī liked to be called Mu‘tazilite is obvious. That happened when he visited his friend and was asked who was standing at the door? He quickly replied it was Abū-l-Qāsim al-Mu‘tazzī who was standing at the door.

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2. Atwāq adh-Dhahab, p. 46.
3. Wafayāt, II, 82.
The reasons for his writing al-Kashshaf

It was during his second stay in Mecca that he began writing al-Kashshaf. That was in the year 526 A.H. It took almost two years for him to complete it, since he states that he finished writing al-Kashshaf on Monday 23rd Rab\'\'al-Awwal, 528 A.H.\(^2\)

In his introduction to al-Kashshaf (p.3), az-Zamakhsharî states that the idea of writing al-Kashshaf was originally motivated by the great need of the Mu'tazilites in Mecca for a Qur'anic exegesis which explained the Qur'ân in accordance with their Mu'tazilite views. They found az-Zamakhsharî's explanation interesting and they suggested that he should write the Qur'anic exegesis and call it al-Kashshaf (The Unveiler). Az-Zamakhsharî was not happy with their suggestion and begged to be excused, but they insisted that he should carry out the task, and finally he accepted. Perhaps their insistence is not the main reason for az-Zamakhsharî's later decision, since he considered it afterwards as obligatory (far\'\'ayn) upon

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1. Al-Kashshaf, I, 3. cf. Al-Juwaynî, Mu\'tafâ a\textsuperscript{\textregistered} S\text-superscript{\textregistered}wî, Minhâj az-Zamakhsharî fî Tafsîr al-Qur'ân, p. 76, in which he mistakenly states that the period of az-Zamakhsharî's writing al-Kashshaf is three years.

2. Al-Kashshaf, II, 570.
him to fulfil it. This, however, is due to the fact that az-Zamakhsharī himself was fully aware about the real situation at that time and the less capable of the people of Mecca intellectually. His old age did not prevent him from carrying out the task since he was mainly motivated by his religious consciousness. Of course, besides this, he was encouraged by Ibn-Wahhās, the Amīr of Mecca who welcomed him and offered him many facilities in completing his tafsīr. It appears that az-Zamakhsharī's completion of writing al-Kashshāf in the period of two years was unexpected, because he himself estimated that he should be able to finish it only in more than thirty years. Finally, az-Zamakhsharī confesses that his "success" is due to the baraka (benediction) of the Holy Shrine (Ka'ba).

The death of az-Zamakhsharī

Az-Zamakhsharī, after spending many years in different places in the world of Islam, returned to his home town Zamakhshar, and lived there until his death in 537 A.H./1144 A.D. He was buried at a place called Jurjāniyya.

1. Ibid, 1, 3.
2. Ibid
The works of az-Zamakhsharī

The works of az-Zamakhsharī can be divided into those that have survived, and those that are missing. Of those that survive the following can be said.

1. Al-Kashshāf 'an Ḥaqā'iq Ghawāmiḍ at-Tanzīl wa 'Uyūn al-Aqāwīl fī Wujūh at-Ta'wīl

This has been considered as the most important work of az-Zamakhsharī, completed in 528 (1138). In spite of its Muʿtazilite view it was widely read and commented upon in orthodox circles. The most famous orthodox commentator was al-Bayḍawlī in which he tried to surpass him in the accuracy of the grammatical explanation and in quoting variant readings. It was published for the first time by W. Nassau Lees and the Mawlawis Khadin Ḥusayn and 'Abd-al-Ḥayy, Calcutta, 1856. Later it was published in Cairo, 1307, 1308, 1318 and 1948 in Beirut (4 vols.) n.d. Besides all these, there are sub-commentaries on the work.

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1. Wafayāt, II, 81.
2. Brockelmann "al-Zamakhsharī" in EI, iv, 1205.
3. GAL, I, 345.
2. **Kitāb al-Unmūdhaj fī an-Nahw**

A book on Arabic grammar autographed by Broch, Christiania, 1867, printed in Tehran, 1269, Tabris, 1275, Cairo, 1289, Istanbul, 1299.

3. **Asās al-Balāgha**

This work was printed in Cairo, 1299, Lucknow, 1311, Cairo, 1972.

4. **Kitāb al-Amkina wa l-Jībāl wa-l-Miyāh**

This work was published by M. Salverda De Grave (Auspice T.G. Juynboll), Leiden, 1859.

5. **Kitāb al-Mufrad wa l-Mu'allaf fī an-Nahw**

It was published by Mubārak in Istanbul, 1300, Cairo, 1324, 1328, Damascus, 1966 by 'Abd al-Mu‘īn al-Maluhī.

6. **Al-Mustaqsā fī Amthāl al-'Arab**

It was printed in Hyderabad by Majlis Dā‘irat al-Ma‘ārif in 1962, while in 999 a selection from

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1. Wafayāt, II, 81.
2. GAL, I, 347.
3. Wafayāt, II, 81.
4. GAL, I, 348.
5. Ibid.
8. Wafayāt, II, 81.
it was made by Ibrāhīm al-Gallipoli with Persian commentary and Turkish glosses under the title Zubdah al-Amthal.¹

7. Al-Muhājāt wa Mutammim Mahāmār Arbāb al-Ḥājāt fī-1- Aḥājī wa 1-Ghāz.²

This work was edited by Dr. Bahijah al-Ḥasanī and published by Baghdad University in 1973.

8. Mas'ala fī Kalimā' ash-Shahāda³

This work was also edited by Dr. Bahijah al-Ḥasanī and published by Majma‘ al-‘Ilm al-‘Irāqī, vol. XV, p. 121 in 1967.

9. Rabī‘ al-Abrār⁴

Unpublished Ph.D. thesis submitted to Cambridge University in 1965 by Dr. Bahijah al-Ḥasanī.⁵

10. Sharḥ Abyāṭ Kitāb Sibawayh⁶

This work is still in manuscript form in Aḥmad 3, Istanbul. The work is being edited by Dr. ‘Abd-Allāh Darwish.⁷

1. GAL, I, 348.
2. Irshād, VII, 151; cf. Wafayāt, II, 81; GAL, I, 347.
11. **Nukt al-I'rab fI Gharib al-I'rab**

The above work is also being edited by 
Dr. 'Abd-Allâh Darwîsh.¹

12. **Dîwân ash-Shi'îr²**

This work is still in its manuscript form, 
preserved in Dâr al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, no. 529 
(adab). The MS consists of 120 folios, in clear 
writing.

13. **Kitâb Nuzhat al-Muta'annis wa Nuzhat al-Muqtabis³**

It remains in manuscript form preserved in the 
Aya Sofia, no. 4331.⁴

14. **Al-Minhâj fî-l-Uûsûl⁵**

This work is preserved in Landh.⁶

15. **Al-Kashf fî-l-Qirâ'ât⁷**

This work is preserved in Maktaba Ribât Sayyid 
'Uthmân.⁸

¹- Ibidt XV, p. 94.
²- Wafayât, II, 81
³- GAL, I, 350
⁴- Ibid.
⁵- GAL, supp. I, 513.
⁶- GAL, supp. I, 511.
⁷- Ibid.
⁸- Ibid.
16. **Ru'ūs al-Masā'il fī l-Fiqh**


17. **Al-Durar ad-Dā'ir al-Muntakhab fī Kinayāt wa Isti'ārāt wa Tashbīhāt al-'Araab.**

   This work was edited by Dr. Bahā'jah al-Ḥasanī, and printed in Baghdad in 1968.

18. **Al-Qīstās al-Mustaqīm fī 'Ilm al-'Arūd**

   It was edited by Dr. Bahā'jah al-Ḥasanī and published in Baghdad by Maktabāt al-Andalus, in 1969.

19. **ʿAwāq adh-Dhahab fī l-Mawāʿīz**

   This work was translated by H.L. Fleischer, Leipzig 1835, by G. Weil, Stuttgart 1863, translated and edited by C. Barbier de Meynard, Paris 1876, printed in Beirut in 1293, 1322, 1314, Istanbul with Turkish translation in 1286, Cairo 1321 with commentary Qalā'id al-Adab by Mirzā Yusuf Khan Asir,5 1328 by Matba'at al-as-Saā'ida, 1381.

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1. Wafayāt, II, 81.
5. GAL, I, 349.
1910, with commentary by Muḥammad Saʿīd ar-Rāfīqī.

20. **Khaṣṣāʾīs al-ʿAshara al-Kirām al-Baraqa**

   This work was edited by Dr. Bahījah al-Ḥasanī, and published in Baghdad in 1969.

21. **Nawābīgh al-Kalīm**

   This work was edited and illustrated by H.A. Schultens, Leiden 1772, Cairo 1287, 1305, Beirut 1306, and Cairo 1960-1961.

22. **Mugaddimāt al-ʿAdāb**


23. **Aʿjāb al-ʿUjub Sharḥ Lāmiyyat al-ʿArab**

   It was published with a commentary by Mubārak in Istanbul 1300, Cairo 1324, 1328, Damascus in 1966.

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24. **Al-Fā'iq fī Gharīb al-Ḥadīth**

This work was published in Hyderabad in 1324, Cairo in 1945-48 by Dār Iḥyā' al-Kutub al-'Arabiyya. Edited by ʿAlī Muḥammad al-Bajāwī and Muḥammad Abu-l-Faḍl Ibrāhīm.

25. **Maqāma fī-l-Mawā'iz**

It was published in Cairo in 1313, 1325, translated by O. Rescher, Beiträge Zur Magamenliteraturg. Fasc. 6, Greifswald 1913. This work is also under the name an-Nasā'īḥ al-Kibār.

26. **Mukhtasar al-Muwāfaqa bayna Ahl al-bayt wa ʿaṣ-Ṣaḥāba**

This work is still in its manuscript form preserved in the Library of Aḥmad Timor.

27. **Masāʿil al-Ghazālī**

This work is still preserved in Berlin.

2. GAL, I, 348.
5. *Irshād*, VII, 151.
8. Ibid.
28. Al-Qaṣīda al-Baʿḍiyya

It is also preserved in Berlin.¹

29. Al-Mufaṣṣal²

This work was published by J.B. Broch, Christiania in 1859, 1879, in Cairo 1325, 1905, Alexandria in 1291, Delhi in 1891 by Mawlawi Muḥammad Yaʿqūb Rasbūrī, Paris 1876, Lugduni Batavorum 1772.

30. Sharḥ al-Maqlīmāt

This work was published on the margin of al-Maqāmat, Cairo, 1325.³

From az-Zamakhsharī's works which are missing, the following may be mentioned:

1. Ar-Rā'īd fī-l-Farā'īd⁴
2. Kitāb al-Ajnās⁵
3. Diwān at-Tamthīl⁶

²Irshād, VII, 151.
³Ibid.
⁴Ibid.; Wafayāt, II, 81.
4. **Diwan ar-Rasā'il**
5. **Diwan Khīṭab**
6. **Mu'jam al-Ḥudūd**
7. **Ṣamīm al-ʾArabiyya**
8. **Jawāhir al-Lughā**
9. **Kitāb Mutashābih Asmāʾ ar-Ruwāt**
10. **Ḍallāt an-Nāshid**
11. **Kitāb 'Aql al-Kull**
12. **Al-Amāli fī an-Nahw**
13. **Tasliyāt ad-Ḍarīr**
14. **Shaqā'iq an-Nu'mān fī Ḥaqā'iq an-Nu'mān fī Manāqib al-ʾImām Abī-Ḥanīfa**
15. **Risālahāl-Mās'ama**

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1. Ibid.
2. *Irshād*, VII, 151.
3. Ibid., *Wafayāt*, II, 81.
5. *Irshād*, VII, 151.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
16. Risālah al-Asrār

17. Shāfi'al-'Ay y min Kalām ash-Shāfī'

18. Ar-Risālah an-Nāsiha

19. Sawā'ir al-Amthāl

20. Ḥāshiya 'Alā al-Mufaṣṣal

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1. Irshād, VII, 151.

2. Ibid., cf., Wafayāt, II, 81.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Irshād, VII, 151.
PART TWO

AL-BAYDĀWĪ'S LIFE

His full name was Abū-Sa'id 'Abd-Allāh b. 'Umar b. Muḥammad b. 'Alī Abū-l-Khayr Nāṣir-ad-Dīn. His birthplace was al-Bayḍā', situated in the province of Fārs, north of its capital called Shīrāz.²

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1. This honorific title (kunya) "Abū-Sa'id" is what al-Bayḍāwī calls himself in the preface to the Nizām at-Tawārīkh. Ḥājī Khalīfa styles him Nāṣir-ad-Dīn Abū-Sa'id 'Abd-Allāh b. 'Umar al-Bayḍāwī. Āḥmad ar-Rāzī in his Haft al-Iqlīm calls him Qāḍī Nāṣir-ad-Dīn b. Qāḍī Imām Badr-ad-Dīn 'Umar b. Fakhri-ad-Dīn 'Alī.


Ibn-Zarkūb Shīrāzī, Shīrāz-Nāmah, 136;

Brockelmann, GAL, I, 530.

Khudā-Baksh Khān, Maḥbūb al-Albāb, 11.
Al-Bayḍāwī, by which 'Abd-Allāh b. 'Umar is well known, is derived from the small town of al-Bayḍā.

Unfortunately, sources do not tell us the year of his birth. Judging from the fact that in 674 A.H., he had compiled a book called "Nizām at-Tawārīkh", and about the same year that he had held the office of Chief Justice of Fārs, it can be presumed that he was born during the reign of the Atabak Abū-Bakr b. Sa'd I (628/1231 - 658/1260). It was at this time that the province of Fārs as a whole was at the height of its glory.

During his reign, Atabak Abū-Bakr geared his great effort towards developing his country by the setting up of hospitals, and many religious institutions for higher studies with facilities for those who were thirsty for knowledge in which capacity Shīrāz flourished as the centre of learning. Thus, it is not surprising that many scholars had recourse to it.

His rule over the country was a prosperous one, and

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1. Mirkhond, The History of Atabak, p. 34;
Tabaqāt Nāṣirī, pp. 179-180.

his sagacity well known. For this, the great poet, Shaykh Sa‘dī Shīrāzī (d. 1292 A.D.) dedicated to him some beautiful verses in the preface to the Gūlistān, describing the city of Shīrāz as one of the most populous on earth under the rule of the Atabak, while the surrounding districts were suffering from an uprising of savage Turks.

The population of Fārs were Sunnites of the Shafi‘ite rite although a few were Hanafites and there were also Shi‘ites.2 Even though the Iranian Sunnism was chiefly Shafi‘ites and Hanafites, these two schools were not often on good terms;3 similar reasons held between the Shafi‘ites and the Shi‘ites. Thus it was not surprising that al-Baydāwī who was a Shafi‘ite Ash‘arite, bitterly attacked the Shi‘ites and the Mu‘tazilites.

Al-Baydāwī was brought up into a prominent family about which we know little. At least we know that his family was renowned for its scholarship. His father ‘Umar, held the office of Chief Justice of Fārs. His

1. The Gūlistān, tr. by Edward B. Eastwick, p. 11.
2. Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī, Nuzhat al-Qulūb (English translation, p. 11).
ancestor 'All, was also appointed to the office of Judgeship. According to the account given by Ibn-Zarkûb Shírāzī, al-Bayḍāwī's father was appointed Chief Justice of Fārs by the viceroy of Iraq-i 'Arab and Fārs called Noyan Suqunchaq, who was working under Abāqā Khān2 (663-683 A.H.). This appointment took place when he visited Fārs in 670 A.H. Moreover, Ibn-Zarkûb Shírāzī states that the appointment received a very warm welcome.3 Therefore, the account given by Brockelmann4 that 'Umar was appointed Chief Justice under the Atabak Abū-Bakr b. Sa'd I, does not seem to be correct.

'Umar appears to have won reputation for his resolution, perfection and devoutness5 which possibly influenced his son al-Bayḍāwī.

Unfortunately, sources do not make any mention of the family's economic situation. However, it can be presumed that it was comparatively wealthy, for the position of Chief Justice which some of its members held, was a profitable career. As W.M. Watt said,6 "Fewer of the

2. Descendent of Qubilay's brother Hūlegu, who ruled Persia from 654/1256 - 754/1353. He (Abāqā) was the second.
4. GAL, I, p. 530.
scholar jurist could afford to fulfil such duties without renumeration."

‘Umar died in 673 A.H., and was buried in Maghribī school in Shīrāz.¹

Al-Bayḍāwī's education

No dates are recorded for al-Bayḍāwī's education except that the biographer al-Yāfi‘ī² (d. 768 A.H.) tells us that al-Bayḍāwī studied under his father, who was a student with Mujir-ad-Dīn Maḥmūd b. Abī-al-Mubārak al-Baghdādī ash-Shāfi‘ī, who was a student with Mu‘īn-ad-Dīn Abī-Sa‘īd Manṣūr b. ‘Umar al-Baghdādī, and the latter was a student with "the proof of Islam" Abū-Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī.

After the foundation of his education had been laid down by his father, who was a Shāfi‘ite-Ash‘arite scholar, it is not surprising that al-Bayḍāwī became a Shāfi‘ite and strongly defended the teaching of Shāfi‘ite in jurisprudence and Ash‘arite in theology.

As his father was a scholar, he was normally visited

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¹ Shīrāz-Nāmah, p. 136.
² Mir‘āt al-Janān, IV, 220.
by the scholars of the district: problems and disputes concerning religion and law were considered and argued about, and helped enrich al-Bayḍāwī's education.

Presumably, there were many other teachers who were responsible for laying the foundation of his education, besides his father, because al-Bayḍāwī did not only pursue Islamic sciences, but he also pursued such scientific studies as logic and metaphysics. If al-Bayḍāwī had only received education from his father, he would not have achieved the distinction he did. It is not easy to find a person, like him, who has gained such distinction in a particular craft, and at the same time, has mastered another.¹

His occupation

It was traditional that the sons of scholars would follow in the footsteps of their fathers. Al-Bayḍāwī, like his father, held the office of Chief Justice of Fārs. According to a statement given by Ibn-Zarkūb Shīrāzī² (d. after 748), al-Bayḍāwī was appointed Chief Justice of Fārs after his father's death (d. 673 A.H.).


As a matter of fact, to be appointed to the office of Chief Justice requires a very wide knowledge of Islamic sciences, especially jurisprudence, and sometimes, it also needs considerable understanding of the government's policy. Al-Bayḍāwī, undoubtedly, had fulfilled all requirements, otherwise, he would not have held the office of Chief Justice. It was under the reign of Abāqā that al-Bayḍāwī succeeded to the office of Chief Justice.

Abāqā, who was not a Muslim, was influenced by the great Shi‘ite scholar Nāṣir-ad-Dīn Ṭūsī. It is not surprising that he was very sympathetic towards Shi‘ites rather than Sunnites.

Al-Bayḍāwī became Chief Justice of Fārs for a considerable period of time and afterwards, in accordance with as-Subkī, was dismissed from his judgeship and went to Tabrīz. He entered a school there and took one of the back seats, because no-one there knew him. The instructor posed a question to those present which he said none of those present could solve or repeat. Then al-Bayḍāwī started to answer. The instructor said, "I will not listen until I know that you understand the question."

Al-Bayḍāwī said, "You may choose whether I should repeat the question word for word or give the sense of it." The teacher was surprised and said, "Repeat the question word for word." Then al-Bayḍāwī repeated it and then gave the solution and showed that the teacher had not stated the problem accurately. Then he confronted the instructor with a similar problem and requested him to solve it, but the instructor begged to be excused. The vizier happened to be present and called al-Bayḍāwī to his side and when he found out who he was he had al-Bayḍāwī restored to his position in Shīrāz.¹

If this story is true, the object of al-Bayḍāwī's visit to Tabrīz was obviously to be appointed to the office of Qaḍāʾ. Yet we still do not know the reason for his dismissal. Perhaps it had some connection with religious antagonism that existed between Shi'ite and Shafi'ite in which the ruler himself, even though not a Muslim, was influenced by Shi'ite opinions which often contradicted with Sunnites in general.

Another source² mentions that al-Bayḍāwī, having increased his knowledge of Islamic sciences and Arabic grammar, went to Tabrīz in order to be appointed to the

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1. As-Subkī, Tabaqāt, V, p. 59.
post of Qāḍāʾ. Apparently his first attempt was not very successful. It was through the intercession of Shaykh Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Kaykānī (d?) that he succeeded to the office of Qāḍāʾ. Shortly afterwards, he left the post, because he had been impressed by the Shaykh's remark that being a judge, he was doomed to purgatory along with the commander (āmīr).¹ If this account is correct, his "seeking the intercession" might have been connected with political motives; because politics entered into appointments, as said W. M. Watt "It is normal for a government or ruler whether autocratic or democratic to support those views which promise to gain the greatest volume of support."²

His journey to Tabrīz after his dismissal was possibly due to the fact that Tabrīz was made capital city of Fārs, instead of Shīrāz, by Abāqā³ in which appointments may have normally passed through the central office. Yet we know nothing about the time when he was dismissed from his judgeship in Shīrāz, and decided afterwards to spend the whole of his life in Tabrīz. Based on a statement given by 'Alī b. 'Abd-Allāh b. Abū-l-Ḥasan b. Abū-Bakr al-Ardabīlī, best known, Tāj-ad-Dīn (The Crown of Religion) Abū-l-Ḥasan

2. cf. Muslim Intellectual, p. 100.
at-Tabriz (d. 746 A.H.) it is presumed that al-Baydawi had moved to Tabriz before the year 683 A.H. In his statement, he writes that he had met al-Baydawi in Tabriz, and had sat with him without learning anything from him.¹

It was during his stay in Tabriz that he composed his great commentary called Anwar at-Tanzil wa Asrar at-Ta'wil.² Al-Baydawi's abandonment of the worldly position makes it seem likely that he was unable to conceal his identity altogether, and that many important people in Tabriz took advantage of the presence of this great scholar.

The reason for his writing Anwar at-Tanzil

Al-Baydawi states that the idea of writing his tafsir Anwar at-Tanzil which would consist of the important views of the Companions of the Prophet, and the technicalities of reciting the Qur'ān (wujūh al-qirā'āt) had long been his ambition, but the task was delayed for a while due to his personal circumstances.³ Other evidence tells us that it was suggested by Shaykh Muhammad b. Muhammad al-Kaykhāni to write his commentary of the Qur'ān while he was in Tabriz.⁴

Al-Baydawi's death

The information available about the year of his death is vague and contradictory. There are various opinions given regarding al-Baydawi's death. According to Tashkuprizade, al-Baydawi died in 641 A.H.; but this account does not seem to be correct, because in 674 A.H. al-Baydawi was still alive in which year he had written a book called Nizam at-Tawarikh and about the same year he was appointed to the office of Chief Justice of Fars. Other evidence suggests that Tadj-ad-Din at-Tabrizi had met al-Baydawi before he left Tabriz in 683 A.H.

Hamd-Allah Mustawfi held that al-Baydawi died in 685 A.H. in Tabriz. Hajj Khalifa gives the same year as Hamd-Allah Mustawfi, while Isnawi and al-Yafi give the year of al-Baydawi's death as 691 A.H. and 692 A.H. respectively. According to Br. Mus. Manuscript,

1. Miftah as-Safa'da, I, 436, (without mentioning the place of his death).
al-Baydawi died in Tabriz in 716 A.H. Ibn-Zarkub
Shirazi, however, maintains that al-Baydawi died in
Tabriz in 708 A.H., and was buried at a place called
Jurundab. 1

Al-Baydawi's works

The works of al-Baydawi can be classified into those
that have survived, and those that are missing. Of those
that survive the following can be said:

1. Anwar at-Tanzil wa Asrar at-Ta'wil 2
(The Light of Inspiration and Secret of Interpretation)
A commentary on the Qur'An which has been
considered as the most valuable work of al-Baydawi
and it has been recognised even by non-Muslim scholars.
The reason for al-Baydawi's great fame is that his
book has received more careful study by later Muslim
scholars than has that of any other commentator. As
a matter of fact, there have been more than eighty
different books by Muslim commentators based on
that of al-Baydawi. 3

Bughya, II, 50.
3. Calverley, Edwin E. "Al-Baydawil's Matali' al-Anzar"
in Muslim World, 43 (1963) p. 293.
This work was printed in many places:

I Cairo in 1263 A.H. by Būlāq (on the margin of Shaykh Zādah's gloss), 1282 A.H. (with super-commentary by Shaykh Zādah), 1283 A.H. (on the margin of al-Khaḍājī's gloss, A.D. (1865), 1330 A.H. by Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya al-Kubrā (with the commentary of Kāzarūnī in the margin) also with the same commentary was printed by Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya al-Kubrā, (n.d.), 1339 A.H. printed in type used by students in the advanced classes on theology at al-Azhar University.

II Tehran ? 1856 A.D. (with a super commentary by Bahā' ad-Dīn al-Āmili).


IV Leipzig, 1846 A.D., edited by Germany's great Arabic scholar H.O. Fleischer. The Index was afterwards published separately by W. Fell, in Leipzig in 1874. (Edited with a preface, and a table of errata to the text of al-Bayḍāwī's commentary by H.O. Fleischer.)

V London, 1894, translated and explained by Margoliouth of Oxford on Surah Three of the Qur'ān,¹

1. GAL, I, 530-532.
1957 (Glasgow) translated by Eric Francis Fox, Bishop, on Surah twelve of the Qur'ān, then in 1963 (London) and 1974 (Oxford) both translated by Beeston, A.F.L. on the same Surah (Surah twelve).

VI Constantinople, 1285-86 A.H. (super-commentary to al-Dayāwi's commentary accompanied on the margin by a second commentary by Ibn-at-Tamjīd, 1300 and 1303 A.H. (with the commentary of the Jalālāyin on the margin).

2. Ṭawāli' al-Anwār¹

A book on scholastic theology. It has been printed from type in Cairo in 1305 A.H./1888 A.D. and printed from type in Cairo in 1323 A.H./1902 A.D. These include the commentary of Abū-1-Thanā' Shams ad-Dīn Maḥmūd al-Īsfahānī (d. 740 A.H) and also printed in Constantinople together with Maṭāli' al-Anzār 'Alā Maṭāli' al-Anwār of Maḥmūd al-Īsfahānī, and gloss by Sharīf al-Jurjānī.²

1. As-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt, V, 59; Bughya, II, 50.
2. GAL, I, 533.
3. **Miṣbāḥ al-Arwāh**

(The Lamp of the Souls)

A book on scholastic theology which is still in its manuscript form: British Museum, 171 (Add 7455), Ambrosiōna, 319, Escorial, 2652, Leiden 1545.

4. **Minhāj al-Wuṣūl ilā 'Ilm al-Uṣūl**


5. **Lubb al-Albāb fī 'Ilm al-I‘rāb**

A treatise on Arabic Grammar which is still in its manuscript form: Qawala, 11, 119, Paris, 4120, Cairo, IV, 25, II, 79, Chester Beatty, no. 4315.

6. **Fi Mawdū‘at al-‘Ulūm wa Ta‘ārīfi-hā**

Still in its manuscript form, Cairo, VII, 482.

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7. **Sharḥ Maṣābīḥ as-Sunna**

A commentary on the *Maṣābīḥ as-Sunna*, a collection of traditions by Abū-Muḥammad al-Ḥusaynī b. Masʿūd al-Farrāʾ al-Baghwī (d. 510/1117 or 516/1122). Al-Bayḍāwī called it *Tuḥfat al-Abrār* which is still in its manuscript form in Chester Beatty Library, no. 3529.¹

8. **Al-Ghāya al-Quswā fi Dirāyāt al-Fatwā**

A manual book of law as an abridgement of *al-Wasīṭ al-Muḥīṭ bi Aqṭar al-Basīṭ*, the "medium" Shafiʿī law manual of Abū-Ḥāmid al-Ghazalī (d. 505/1111). This is still in its manuscript form: Chester Beatty Library, no. 3298, and also no. 3821, Cairo, 111 2466, Paris 1024.²

9. **Muntahā l-Munā**

British Museum manuscript no. 6418.³

10. **A Chinese Chronicle**

A book on the history of China, tr. (from

1. A Hand list of the Arabic Manuscripts, vol. III, p. 15
3. GAL, I, 533; A Hand list of the Arabic Manuscripts, II, 23.

11. Nizām at-Tawārīkh

A book on the history of the world from the time of Adam until the year 674 A.H./1275 A.D. It has been printed in Hyderabad in 1930 A.D. (Persian text) with explanatory notes in Hindustānī by Sayyid Maṃṣūr.

From al-Baydāwī's works which are missing, the following can be said:

1. Sharḥ Minhāj al-Wusūl ila 'Ilm al-Uṣūl

An explanatory work to his Minhāj al-Wusūl on the principles of jurisprudence.

2. Sharḥ al-Muntakhab

An epitome of al-Muntakhab of Fakhr-ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī (d. 606 A.H.) on scholastic theology.

1. Bughya, II, 50; Miftāḥ as-Sa‘āda, I; 436;
   al-Bidāya, XIII, 309.

2. Bughya, II, 50; al-Bidāya, XIII, 309;
3. Sharḥ at-Tanbīh (4 volumes)¹

4. Sharḥ al-Maḥṣūl ²

A treatise of al-Maḥṣūl of Fakhr-ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī (d. 606 A.H.) on the principles of jurisprudence.

5. Al-Īdāḥ fī Usūl ad-Dīn³

A book on theology.

6. Maṭāli⁴

A book on logic.

7. Sharḥ al-Maṭāli' fī-l-Mantiq⁵

8. Sharḥ al-Mukhtasār⁶


2. Ibid.
5. Bugḥya, II, 50; Miftāḥ as-Sā‘āda, I, 436.
6. Ibid.
9. Mukhtasār al-Kāfiya li-Ibn-al-Ḥājib.\textsuperscript{1}

A book on grammar.

10. Mirṣād al-Afham fī Mabādī al-Aḥkām.\textsuperscript{2}

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\textbf{1.} As-Suyūṭī called this book Sharḥ al-Kāfiya; 
\textit{Bughya}, II, 50; \textit{GAL}, I, 534.

CHAPTER TWO

THE CONCEPT OF GOD'S ATTRIBUTES

The attributes of God

The question whether terms predicted of God in the Qur'an, such as living and knowing and powerful, imply the existence in God of life and knowledge and power as real incorporate beings, which though inseparable from the essence of God, are distinct from it, is not to be found in the Qur'an itself. Presumably these terms were later the invention of the theologians (mutukallimun). Afterwards it became the centre of one of the chief disputes between the Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites.

According to ash-Shahrastani, the Mu'tazilites utterly reject (the ascription of) eternal qualities, saying that He is knowing, powerful and living as part of His essence; not that knowledge, power and life are eternal attributes or personal subsistences (ma'anti) inherent in Him. For if the qualities should partake of His eternity which is the exclusive description of His essence, they would partake

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Ash-Shahrastānī, however, tells us that the Mu'tazilites reduced the attributes of God to knowledge and power; perhaps, these two attributes are sufficient to represent the whole attributes in theological discussion.

Indeed, al-Ash'arī describes that not only most of the Mu'tazilites and Kharajites, but also Murji'ites and some Zaydites held that God is knowing, powerful and living by Himself (bi-nafsi-hi), not by knowledge, power and life, and they allow the phrase "God has knowledge" only in the sense that He is knowing.

The power of God as presented by az-Zamakhsharī (qudrat Allāh)

Az-Zamakhsharī, like most of his Mu'tazilites' predecessors, approached this problem by قدرت الله "41:15" "He was mightier than them," that God is powerful in the virtue of His essence. In other words, he allows the phrase "God has power" in the sense that He is powerful by His essence.

2. Ibid. p. 31.
A more difficult question arises for az-Zamakhsharī, in interpreting a Qur'ānic verse 2:20: "Truly, Allah is powerful over everything" (inna-llāha 'alā kulli shay'in qadīr) since the text itself implies two important points: the impossible things, and the human actions, whereas az-Zamakhsharī affirmatively maintains that they are, at any rate, not to be connected with the essence of God.

It is reasonably clear from the interpretation that his main concern is to observe the principle of justice. In support of his standpoint, az-Zamakhsharī had to explain away this Qur'ānic verse, laying stress however, on two main words: shay' (thing) and qadīr (powerful). As far as shay' is concerned, he says, it can be applied both to the existent (al-mawjūd), and the non-existent (al-ma'tūm) which is permissible to exist. In defining qadīr, however, he writes: "He whose deed shall not be impossible." When God says, "He is powerful over everything" He means over what is logically possible (shay'mustaqīm) and not the impossible ones.¹ There is no specific opinion given by az-Zamakhsharī in interpreting the text, regarding whether or not God is the author of the human actions, but it is understood from his interpretation of the verse by forwarding the word "mustaqīm" that human beings are free to act whatsoever according to their wills since they

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are the authors of their deeds, in conformity with the principle of free will which shall be discussed later in a separate chapter.

As far as the "rationale" of the ḍudra is concerned, az-Zamakhsharī says that the impossible things are excluded. If they were subjected to the power of God, as claimed by the Mujbirites and the Nawābitām, it would be possible to describe God as impotent (tājiz) since there is no "second eternal" (thānī l-qadīm) besides Him. Moreover, az-Zamakhsharī declares that there was no such description that really happened, except as a matter of pride and a change of the reality made by the Ashʿarites.

For al-Baydawī, who has maintained the Ashʿarite spirit of orthodox Islam, asserts that God is the sole agent whose foremost and exclusive prerogative is unlimited and gratuitous activity.

As far as a Qurʾānic verse 41:15 is concerned, al-Baydawī shows no disagreement with az-Zamakhsharī. In contrast, he affirms that God has power though His essence.

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1. Ibid, I, 559 (17:88).
Concerning the interpretation of the verse '2:20'
al-Bayḍāwī, however, refutes az-Zamakhsharī, starting with
the word shay'. Al-Bayḍāwī, in his definition, gives a
specific meaning to it, saying that shay' is restricted to
the existent and the thing that God wills it to be
existent, thus including the impossible ones since God is
only the sole agent, and creator of all beings. Al-Bayḍāwī
bitterly attacks az-Zamakhsharī's definition, and
considers it as weak since the definition by itself still
includes the impossible things, whereas az-Zamakhsharī,
in his interpretation, tried to avoid the obvious meaning
of the text. Al-Bayḍāwī accused him of basing his judgment
(i.e. exception of the impossible thing and human acts in
his definition of shay') only on reasoning without giving
proper consideration to the wording of the Qur'ānic text.
In order to strengthen his argument in this respect,
al-Bayḍāwī proceeds to quote verse '39:62' "Allah is the
Creator of everything" and equates this verse with the
previously mentioned verse '2:20'. It is obvious that
al-Bayḍāwī's declaration of the two verses should be
generally understood as referring to all things without
Istithnā'.

Another controversial point between the two scholars
is concerned with the etymology of the word qadīr. In
opposition to az-Zamakhsharī's definition, al-Bayḍāwī
defines qadīr as "He who if He wills to do anything does it
and if He wills to leave it leaves it." Thus, al-Bayḍāwī's main emphasis seems to be on God's omnipotence, yet without repudiating the concept of God's righteousness and justice. Al-Bayḍāwī, however, maintains that human decree (maqḍūr al-'abd) comes from God, since it can be materialised as "thing" while referring to the verse '2:20'. Moreover, he emphasises that God's power is connected (yata'allaqu) with all determined things because these things are possible (mumkin) and depend for their coming into existence on God's power.  

From their arguments, it becomes clear that while az-Zamakhsharī is defending the Mu'tazilite point of view, al-Bayḍāwī is trying to refute him and then establishing the Ash'arite doctrine.

The attribute of knowledge (al-ilm)

As we already know, the Mu'tazilites rejected the external quality of knowledge in order that they would not partake of divinity.

Az-Zamakhsharī, also maintains that God is knowing in the virtue of His essence. Such a view can be seen from

1. Anwār, I, 102-3; cf., vol. IV, p. 4 (19:9) for al-Bayḍāwī's denial of the non-existence (al-ma'dūm) as a "thing".

2. Ṭawālī', pp. 72-3.
the following verses:

I 21:4: "He saith: My Lord knoweth what is spoken in the heaven and the earth. He is the Hearer, the Knower." Az-Zamakhsharī holds that God is a knower through His essence. ¹

II 23:68: "And if they wrangle with thee, say: God is best aware of what ye do" means that He is knowing through His essence. ²

III 3:99: "God is not heedless of what you do" -- He is knowing in the virtue of His essence.³

Commenting on a Qur'anic verse 18:12: "And afterwards we raised them up that we might know that (li-na'lama) which of the two parties would best calculate the time that they had tarried," az-Zamakhsharī says that if it is asked why God created His knowledge depending on their calculation of the time, the reply is that God has been eternally knowing through His essence. The connection of God's

1. Al-Kashshāf, II, 40.
4. A similar reason also given by az-Zamakhsharī regarding God's connection of His knowledge to the creatures in the following verses: I. (2:143) Ibid, I, 80.
knowledge to their calculation of the time is merely to bring such a thing into existence. By so doing God meant to increase their faith, and on the other hand to demonstrate His grace (lutf) to all the believers at that time. Moreover, az-Zamakhsharī states that God knows everything in the past, the present and the future; He knows the states of His servants, the movement of their hearts, belief or disbelief, but he declares that God's foreknowledge of something has no causative function.

For al-Bayḍāwī, he holds that God has the attributes of perfection (ṣifāt al-kamāl), such as power, knowledge, etc. He, however, asserts that God has knowledge through which He is knowing. In defence of his view, al-Bayḍāwī quotes the Qur'ānic verse '7:52' "Verily we have brought a scripture which we expand with knowledge," and maintains that this verse clearly declares that God is knowing through His knowledge.

Coming to his views relating to the question in discussion, al-Bayḍāwī clearly states that God's knowledge is distinct from His essence. At the same time it

1. Ibid, I, 565
2. Ibid, I, 326 (7:3).
3. Ibid, I, 338-9 (7:89)
(knowledge) is an external attribute which is inherent in His essence, through which He is said to be knowing. In truth, this problem became the centre of discussion between the two theologians. The heart of the difficulty is that to say that God's knowledge is different from His essence in turn means that the knowledge itself is eternal, hence there would be gods (each attribute a god) as the Christians claim that the three Aqānim (persons) are hypostases of existence, life and knowledge, and God has said this in '5:72'. 'Those who say that God is the third of three are unbelievers'. A question arises as to what is to be thought of those who assert eight gods and so on...

For al-Bayḍāwī, the Muʿtazilite emphasis on the oneness of God and their refutation of His attributes, would not, in any way, impair the view of those who asserted God's attributes. In replying to the Muʿtazilites' objection regarding this point, al-Bayḍāwī says that there is a great difference between the concept of eternal essence, and the eternal attributes. To explain this point, al-Bayḍāwī refers to the Qur'ānic verse '5:72' which tells that the Christians are unbelievers for asserting that God is the third of the three. He points out that the Christians are called unbelievers in this verse because they equated the eternal attributes (ṣifāt al-qadima) with the eternal essence (dhāt al-qadima) by means of transferring the ḥaqīqah "logos" (knowledge)
to the body of Jesus. Thus, al-Bayḍāwī concludes that the view that the "knowledge" is an eternal attribute does not lead to belief in two eternal gods. Moreover, al-Bayḍāwī points out the difference between the aspects of God's knowledge; knowledge in relation to God's essence which is an eternal attribute and has special connection with His essence, and the other aspect of His knowledge is that related to His creatures. Knowledge in this respect is connected with every known thing (maʿlūm) because of the equality of the relationship of all known things to Him.

As far as knowledge is concerned, al-Bayḍāwī, however, holds that it is eternal, hence God knows every known thing. His knowledge does not change, what changes is the relative connection, not the essential knowledge, because this (knowledge) is necessary for Him. It is proper for Him to know. Everyone that lives can properly know.

After debating that God's knowledge is not identical to His essence and so on... al-Bayḍāwī proceeds to set out some proofs which indicate that God is knowing:

1. Ṭawāliʿ, pp. 75-6.
2. Ibid., p. 74.
3. Ibid., p. 73.
4. Anwār, II, 3 (3:5).
I  
God is a free agent (mukhtar), and for every free agent it is impossible to turn His intention to the unknown thing. Therefore, every free agent is knowing (alim).

II  
He has performed firm (muḥkam) and perfect acts, and everyone who does the like is knowing by necessity. Now that He performs such acts is manifest to whoever considers His creation such as the heavenly bodies, animals, etc.

III  
God's essence is a pure Huwiyya (he-ness) through which He becomes a knower. He is the agent of all the object of existences. He who knows the object of the existences knows everything.

IV  
God is abstracted (mujarrad), and every abstracted things is necessary to know His essence and all the abstracted things.\(^1\)

The attribute of will (al-irada)

Az-Zamakhshari's treatment with regard to the will of God, is nearly the same as his treatment about the human

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1. Tawāli', pp. 73-74.
will. When God willed something, He disliked its opposite. This is obvious when az-Zamakhsharī defines the meaning of will (irāda) itself. He says that the meaning of will "is to create for the living a state by which the action occurs in particular form, not the other."\(^1\)

According to az-Zamakhsharī, the will of God is originated (muḥdath). His views with regard to the will of God can be seen in the following Qur’ānic verses:

I When God says '7:143' "And when his Lord revealed (His) glory to the mountain", az-Zamakhsharī means that "when God applied His command, and His will (irādatu-hū) to the mountain." So God’s will, according to az-Zamakhsharī, is originated.\(^2\)

II When God says '30:25' "And of His signs is this. The heaven and the earth stand fast by His command" (an-taqūma bi-amri-hī), he means "It was God’s will" that made them stand fast.\(^3\)

III When God says '16:40' "And our word unto a thing,

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2. Ibid., I, 349.
3. Ibid., II, 188.
when we intend it, is only that we say unto it be! and it is", it is very clear for az-Zamakhsharî that God's will is originated. When He wills the existence of something, He just says to it, Be! it happens immediately. Az-Zamakhsharî, further, pointed out that there was a difference between God's will and the human will even though His will was originated, since God's will does not necessitate the object of the will.¹

As far as "will" is concerned, az-Zamakhsharî declares that God does not absolutely will disobedience (ma'sîya). He does not will His servants to be disbelievers. On the contrary, He wills them to be obedient, faithful and so on.²

In support of his view, he proceeds to quote some Qur'ânic verses as follows:

I '6:149' "They who are idolaters will say: Had God willed, we had not ascribed (unto Him) partners neither had our fathers, nor had we forbidden aught. This did those who were before them give the lie (to God's messengers) till they tested of the fear of...

1. Ibid, I, 526.
us. Say: Have ye any knowledge that ye can adduce for Us? Lo! ye follow, but an opinion. Lo! ye do but guess. '7:150' "Say - for God's is the final argument had He willed He could indeed have guided all of you."

Commenting on the verse, az-Zamakhsharī branded the Sunnites as Mujbirites for holding the same opinion as those who were unbelievers, since they said that all things were dependent upon God's will, but the fact was that God denied their beliefs and considered their views as based only on guess-work.¹

II When God says '39:6' "He is not pleased (la yardā) with thanklessness for His bondsmen", az-Zamakhsharī means that God is not a willer (murād) of His bondsmen's thanklessness.²

III When God says '11:34' "My counsel will not profit you if I were minded to advise you, if God's will is to keep you astray." (ighwā')

Az-Zamakhsharī maintains that it is not God's will to lead people astray.

¹. Ibid, I, 316-7.
². Ibid, II, 293.
As far as the "connection of God's will" in this verse is concerned, az-Zamakhshari holds that "it is only to those whom God already knew would never become believers." For az-Zamakhshari, however, ighwāl is related to those who will not become believers whatever, while the word "guidance" (hidāya) is applied to those who accept His favour.¹

IV 40:31 "And God willeth no injustice for (His) slaves."

Commenting on the verse, az-Zamakhshari equates this verse in this case with the verse 41:46 "And thy Lord is not at all a tyrant to His slave." Then he proceeds to say that if God Himself has had no will of injustice at all, of course, to do injustice is far removed from Him, since God denied to do injustice to His slave.² It is obvious that az-Zamakhshari's defence of the originated will of God, and his emphasis on the applicability of it (will) only to the righteous things, is merely to observe his doctrine of oneness and justice of God.

Al-Bayḍāwī's refutation of the main theme of

1. Ibid, I, 441.
2. Ibid, II, 316
az-Zamakhsharī’s view concerning God’s will is that God’s will is not originated, but it is eternal, only that the object of God’s will (murād) is originated.¹

In support of his view in this respect, he introduces the following arguments:

I

The existence of every originated thing is completely dependent upon God’s will (irādat Allāh). If God’s will was originated (muḥdath), he argues, it would have necessitated another will, hence it would have been an endless chain.

II

The existence of quality (ṣifa) by itself is not reasonable (ma‘gūl), and in addition, the specializing of His essence to His quality is not by the specializer (mukhāṣṣīḥ) because the relation of the quality to all His essence is equal.² Furthermore, al-Bayḍāwī asserts that the connection (ta‘alluq) of God’s will with the temporal object (murād) is by the virtue of His essence, and not others, therefore, it was eternal.³

1. Anwār, I, 162 (2:70).
2. Ṭawāliʿ, pp. 77-8.
3. Ṭawāliʿ, pp. 77-8.
Coming to his views concerning the Qur'ānic verses which are quoted by az-Zamakhsharī in this respect, al-Bayḍawī sometimes refutes them, and sometimes leaves them without any comment. This can be seen from the following statements:

Concerning a Qur'ānic verse '6:149' al-Bayḍawī, instead of attacking az-Zamakhsharī, had to admit that God did not will polytheism (shirk) and unbelief. Furthermore, he says that the verse supports az-Zamakhsharī's view that God does not even will such a thing.¹

In connection with the verse '39:6' al-Bayḍawī, does not seem to refute az-Zamakhsharī.²

Commenting on the verse '11:34', al-Bayḍawī says that God's will can be connected with ighwā', since there is nothing which could contradict His will.³

As far as the verse '40:31' is concerned, al-Bayḍawī gives no detailed explanation about the will of God. Instead, he states that the connection of God's will to

1. Anwār, II, 212. cf. Misbāh fol.210a, in which he states that God wills the unbelief.
2. Ibid, IV, 124.
injustice is denied in the verse itself. He seems, in this verse, to have supported az-Zamakhshari’s view rather than to criticise him. On the other hand, he appears to understand the text as referring to the unbelievers.¹

In order to explain this, a number of al-Bayḍāwī’s orthodox views regarding "will" are better quoted as follows:

God is a willer (murūd) to the faith of the unbeliever and all things which contradict His will are impossible. In defence of his view, he proceeds to quote the following Qur’ānic verses:

a. ¹6:108¹ "Had God willed, they had not been idolatrous."²

b. ¹6:12¹ "They would not believe unless God so willed." Al-Bayḍāwī considers this verse as a clear proof against az-Zamakhshari’s.³

c. ¹6:113¹ "If thy Lord willed they would not do so. So leave them alone with their devising." Al-Bayḍāwī declares that God willed what they were doing,⁴ not only the polytheism and unbelief, but

¹. Ibid, V, 38.
². Ibid, II, 203.
³. Ibid, II, 204.
⁴. Ibid, II, 204.
all things willed by Him. ¹

II

The command of God (aman), according to al-Baydawi, is sometimes separable from His will, and it (command) is not the will itself. He proceeds to refer to some Qur'anic verses as follows:

a. '10:26' "And God summoneth to the abode of peace, and leadeth (yahdi) whom He wills to a straight path." He says that the specializing of hidā (guidance) with mash'ā (will) in this verse is clearly to indicate that the command is not the will. ²

b. '11:118' "And if thy Lord had willed, He verily would have made mankind one nation, yet they cease not differing." Al-Baydawi explains that God did not will fman (faith) for everyone, otherwise all of them would be faithful. So "command" in accordance with al-Baydawi, is not the will itself. ³

c. '2:70' "They said: Lo! if God wills, we may be led aright." Al-Baydawi points out that, if there were no difference between the command and the will, the "conditional" (sharp) in this verse, would give no meaning. ⁴

¹. Ibid, I, 62.
². Ibid, III, 90.
³. Ibid, III, 125.
⁴. Ibid, I, 162 (2:70)
"The speech of God" (Kalam Allah)

Whatever discussion had taken place between the Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites regarding the doctrine of the Qur'An, whether or not it was created, it should be faced with the fact that the Qur'An, at any rate, is a speech of God, and it appeared in time.

Az-Zamakhsharî, like most Mu'tazilites, believes that the Qur'An was created. To announce that the Qur'An was created, is implying that the speech of God also was created. In order to justify his view with regard to the creativeness of the Qur'An, az-Zamakhsharî tried to explain away a Qur'anic verse '7:143' "And when Moses came to our appointed tryst and his Lord had spoken to him...." by saying that God did not address Moses by Himself; instead He created His speech in the bush; likewise, He created it (Kalam) in the "preserved tablet" (lawh mahfuz) 85:21. Therefore, it was God's speech that addressed Moses, not God Himself, and Moses listened to it without looking at Him, because He was covered by hijab (veil).

An interesting remark also given by az-Zamakhsharî

with regard to the question in discussion, was when he explained the Qur'ānic verse '2:227' "And if they decide upon divorce (azamū ʿ-Ṭalāq) God is Hearer, Knower."

As we already know the "intention" (ʿazm) is something very internal, and thoroughly different from the speech, which consists of a word and a voice. So how could God become a listener to the "intention"? In order to justify his view, az-Zamakhsharī proceeds to say that a sort of dispute and wrangle for the intender (ʿazim) to divorce are inevitable before the divorce occurs. At least, the "intender" must have been talking to himself. Az-Zamakhsharī further says that this kind of speech, however, could only be listened to by God; likewise, He could listen to the whisper of Satan. Speech, according to him, is something that can be heard, therefore it consists of a word and a voice.¹

In dealing with the subject-matter, az-Zamakhsharī again had to explain away a Qur'ānic verse '41:21' "And they say unto their skins: why testify ye against us? They say: God hath given us speech who giveth speech to all things, and who created you at the first, and unto whom ye are returned."

Az-Zamakhsharî says that if it is asked how their skins will testify against them, and how their (skins) could speak, the reply is that God will make the skins speak in the same way that He created His speech in the bush.¹

While interpreting the Qur'anic verse '7:88' "Say: verily, though mankind and the jinn should assemble to produce the like of this Qur'ân, they could not produce the like thereof, though they were helpers one with another" az-Zamakhsharî, however, declares that the Qur'ân was created. In his arguments, he attacked the Ash'arites and branded them as Nawlibit, since they claimed that the Qur'ân was eternal (qadîm) and at the same time they admitted that it (Qur'ân) was mu'jîz (miraculous).

In order to make it clear, az-Zamakhsharî proceeds to explain that 'aţîz (inability), in accordance with him, is absolutely opposite to qudra (ability). Based on this account it is said that God is gâdir (able) to create all the bodies whereas all human beings are 'Aţîzûn (unable) to do so.²

1. Ibid, II, 329.
2. Ibid, I, 559.
While Al-Bayḍāwī as an adherent to the Ash'arites maintains that the speech of God is eternal, it was God Himself who addressed Moses, and not His speech that He created in the bush, as claimed by az-Zamakhsharī. In order to justify his view, he proceeds to say that Moses' listening to God's speech from all directions indicates that he listened to His eternal speech, and not to the originated ones.¹

Of course, speech, according to al-Bayḍāwī, is eternal without consisting of a word and a voice.² And the Qur'ān, at any rate, is muqṭāḍū at-Tā'alluq, eventhough it appeared in time, since all the creatures could not produce the like '7:88'.³

According to al-Bayḍāwī, the necessary connection (muqṭāḍū at-Tā'alluq) does not entail the creativeness of the speech; likewise, the connection of God's knowledge to the object of knowledge (ma'ālūm).⁴ So God's speech is an idea inherent in His essence which is entirely different from His knowledge, and His will. Since God contradicted His knowledge and His will, when He commanded Abū-Lahab to

¹. Anwār, III, 26 (7:143)
². Ibid, V, 56 (42:51); Tawālī', p. 78.
³. Anwār, III, 210-11.
be a believer whereas He had already known eternally that Abū-Lahab would never be a believer.¹

Al-Bayḍawī, while winding up his argument in this respect, confessed that human intellect (aql) however, is too limited to perceive the essence and the attributes of God.²

**The vision of God (ru'yat Allāh)**

The doctrine of the vision of God has its origin not only in the Qur'ān but also in the traditions of the Prophet.

According to the commentators the dogma itself cannot be doubted; because it is based on the Qur'ān and the Tradition. Details, however, are quite uncertain (mutashābih); it is, accordingly, based on the Qur'ān, not on reason (thābit bi-n-nāṣṣ ʿaql).³

In applying their logic to theological matters, the Mu'tazilites were led to deny that God could be physically perceived by man either in this world or in the hereafter.

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1. Tawāli', p. 79; Misbāh, ff. 198a, 198b.
2. Ibid.
3. Wensinck, Muslim Creed, p. 229.
Az-Zamakhsharī maintained that his position as far as ru'ya (vision) was concerned was exactly as the Mu'tazilites. The following verses are presented by az-Zamakhsharī in his justification of the doctrine of the vision of God:

I 6:104 "Vision comprehendeth Him not, but He comprehendeth (all) vision. He is the subtle, the aware" (lā tudriku-hu l-abṣār wa huwa yudriku l-abṣār wa huwa l-latīfu l-khabīr).

Commenting on the verse, az-Zamakhsharī holds that the vision of God is impossible since the reality of God cannot be attained by "vision". On the other hand, "vision" cannot comprehend Him. The heart of the difficulty, perhaps, is in the meaning of "bāṣar" itself of which az-Zamakhsharī had his own interpretation. He defines bāṣar (vision) as a subtle substance (al-Jawhar al-Laṭīf) which is conveyed by God only to the sense of sight by which all the seen things (mubṣarāt) can be comprehended. Hence, his definition seems to be restricted only to temporal matter. Since God is neither accident nor body, he argues, "vision" could not comprehend Him.¹

¹ Al-Kashshāf, I, 307.
II

'7:143' "He said: My Lord! show me (Thyself), that I may gaze upon Thee. He said: Thou wilt not see Me, but gaze upon the mountain! If it stands still in its place, then thou wilt see Me. And when his Lord revealed (His) glory to the mountain He sent it crashing down. And Moses fell down senseless. And when he woke he said: Glory unto Thee! I turn unto Thee repentant and I am the first of (true) believers." (qāla rabbī-arinī anzur ilay-ka qāla lan tarānī wa lākin unzur ilā l-jabali fa-in istaqaqrā makāna-hū fa-sawfa tarānī fa-lammā tajallā rabbu-hū li-l-jabali ja‘ala-hū dakkan wa kharra mūsā sa‘iqan......)

Concerning this verse, az-Zamakhsharī maintains that Moses already knew that "vision" of God was impossible. Being a prophet, he was supposed to know better than his people. As a matter of fact, az-Zamakhsharī explains that Moses confessed before God that his people were ignorant. '7:155' "And Moses chose of his people seventy men for our appointed tryst and, when the trembling came on them, he said: My Lord! if thou hadst willed thou hadst destroyed them long before, and me with them, wilt thou destroy us for that which the ignorant among us did? It is but Thy trial (of us). Thou sendest: Thou wilt lead astray and guidest whom Thou wilt. Thou art our protecting friend, therefore, forgive us and have mercy on us, Thou, the
best of all who shows forgiveness."

Coming to his view regarding the verse in question, az-Zamakhsharī, however, declares that they were told that "vision" was impossible, but they insisted that Moses ask God to appear before them. As a result, Moses beseeched God to appear on behalf of his people. Az-Zamakhsharī adds that, his (Moses) request was not more than a rebuke to the ignorant people who wished to listen to a verse which would prove that "vision" is impossible. Moreover, az-Zamakhsharī argues that since Moses himself was denied seeing God, the ignorant people were even further from seeing Him.

In order to explain, az-Zamakhsharī points out that

a. "lān" in the verse (lān tarānī), is the eternal negative for everything in the future. Likewise, the Qur'ānic verse '23:73' "Lo! those on whom ye call beside God (will never create) (lān yakhluçū) a fly though they combine together for the purpose." This is necessary, according to him, implying that the vision of God is impossible (forever).

b. The conjunction "but" (läkin) "gaze upon the mountain", according to az-Zamakhsharī means that "Looking towards Me" is impossible (muḥāl), therefore, do not ask God for a vision, but look to the mountain which trembles in consequence of your request to see Me face to face. See how I make it move!"
Furthermore, az-Zamakhsharī equates the request for the vision of God with the claim that God has a son. '20:90-91'.

c. God connects "vision" with something which is not possible: The firmness of the mountain in the state of its crashing down.

d. Moses himself confessed that he was the first (true) believer who believed that God was invisible.

e. God made a great matter of their seeking for a vision of Himself. And how God the Almighty made the mountain tremble because of their seeking for His vision, and He attached blame to it. After all, Āz-Zamakhsharī was wondering about those who claimed themselves Ahl as-Sunna, and how they had taken this matter "without questioning how" (bi-lā kayfa).

III '75:22-23' "That day will faces be resplendent, looking towards their Lord." (wujūnhun yawmā'idhin n-nādira ilā rabbi-hā nāzira).

1. Ibid, I, 348; cf. vol. I, p. 418 (10:14), vol. I, p. 139 (3:19) in which he considers those who believe in the doctrine of the vision of God are not in the religion of Islam since Islam is the unity of God and His justice.
Commenting on this verse, az-Zamakhsharî, however, emphasises that the vision of God is impossible. In order to justify his view, he interprets His words "Looking towards their Lord" in regard of expectation and hope (at-tawaqqu' wa r-rijâ') not of sight.  

IV '83:15' "Nay, but surely on that day they will be covered from their Lord."

Concerning this verse, az-Zamakhsharî had to explain away the obvious meaning of the text, saying that "they will be covered from their Lord" is figurative only. According to az-Zamakhsharî, the verse indicates their contempt and disregard before God the Almighty. Furthermore, az-Zamakhsharî proceeds to exemplify God as a king on the ground that only those honourable positions are allowed to see Him, and not the dishonest. Therefore, the main emphasis of az-Zamakhsharî's interpretation, no doubt, is to deny the vision of God.  

V '4:153' "They asked a greater thing of Moses aforetime, for they said: Show us Allah plainly. The storm of lightning seized them for their

1. Ibid, II, 509.
2. Ibid, II, 532.

As far as this verse is concerned, az-Zamakhsharī asserts that God had disdained the children of Israel, because "vision" of Him is impossible. Moreover, he says that if they had not asked the impossible, they would not be called wicked (az-Ẓālimīn). In order to strengthen his view, he referred to the story of the prophet Abraham who asked God to show him how to give life to the dead, so far as he was not called wicked, and the storm did not seize him. 1

VI 142:51 "And it was not (vouchsafed) to any mortal that God should speak to him unless (it be) by revelation or from behind a veil, or (that) He sendeth a messenger to reveal what He will by His leave. Lo! He is exalted, wise."

According to az-Zamakhsharī, the event of God's addressing Moses actually took place, but Moses could not see Him since His essence was invisible. In order to justify his arguments, he proceeds to quote two traditions as follows:

1. Ibid, I, 237, I, 57-8.
a. The Prophet is reported to have said that Moses had not seen God.

b. 'A'isha, the wife of the Prophet, is also reported to have said that, "He who claimed that Muhammad had seen his Lord, was a great liar." Then she said, "Why do you not listen to your Lord when He says: '4:153'. "

VII '10:27' "Those who do good shall receive a most excellent reward (al-ḥusnā) and a super abundant addition (ziyāda). Neither dust nor ignominy cometh near their faces."

Az-Zamakhsharī, however, maintains that al-ḥusnā is a most excellent reward, and it is obligatory that every true believer should receive it as a result of his good work. However, ziyāda is interpreted by az-Zamakhsharī as a grace (tafaddul) which not every true believer will receive. In defence of his view, he proceeds to refer to the Qur'ānic verse '5:173'. "Then as for those who believed and did good works, unto them will He pay their wages in full, adding unto them of His bounty."

1. Ibid, II, 344.
As far as this verse is concerned, az-Zamakhshari mocked the Sunnites, and branded them as Mujbirites, because they believed that ziyyada meant the vision of God.

In commenting on a prophetic tradition which was used by the Sunnites, such as: "When the believers enter Paradise, the veil will be uncovered, and they will look at their Lord." Az-Zamakhshari considered such a tradition to be marfu'.

For al-Baydawi, the meaning of the vision of God is that He reveals Himself (yankashifu) to believing creatures on the last day like the uncovering of a visible full moon.

In refuting az-Zamakhshari, al-Baydawi, however, emphasises that "vision" is possible (mumkin) in the next world. He goes on to say that the arguments given by az-Zamakhshari with regard to the Qur'anic verse 16:104 are weak. He points out that ru'ya is more particular than idrāk (perception) since idrāk has a general meaning.

Of course, al-Baydawi, at any rate, admits that a vision of God by all means of His essences and attributes (kulli dhawati-hi wa sifati-hi); is impossible. As for al-Baydawi, he maintains that it is not necessary for the

1. Ibid, I, 421.
2. Tawāli', p. 80; Miṣbāḥ, fol. 201a.
denial of a "vision" in the sense of generality (iṣḥāta) implies the denial of vision absolutely, since "vision", according to him, is more particular than idrāk. The verse, however, according to al-Bayḍāwī, means "vision" (all) comprehendeth Him not (lā tudriku-hū jamī al-absār). Therefore, he concludes that the verse does not contradict if "vision" (some) (baʿd al-absār) comprehends Him.

Al-Bayḍāwī also affirms that the "negative particle" in the verse is not always applicable. He presumably means that "vision" in this world is impossible, but it is possible in the next. Al-Bayḍāwī again declares that the "negative particle" is not for all the people, because only the believers, according to him, will be able to see their God.  

Concerning the verse '17:143', al-Bayḍāwī, however, maintains that Moses asked God to appear in a vision before him. If it were impossible, he argues, his request would be ignorant and worthless, especially about God of whom Moses should know better: what is impossible and possible in relation to Him. So Moses cannot have asked his God what was impossible, hence the "vision" is possible. Moreover, he points out the reason why the "vision" of God was impossible in this world by saying that the "vision" absolutely depends on the preparation of the seer (muʿidd li-r-rāṬ). It is implied that if the preparation was

1. Anwār, II, 202; Ṭawāliʿ, p. 81.
existent, "vision" would be possible. Presumably, he tries to solve the problem of Moses who fell down senseless in which az-Zamakhsharī strongly supports that it was an indication of the impossibility of the vision of God. Al-Bayḍāwī, however, criticised az-Zamakhsharī who claimed that Moses had asked the "vision" on behalf of his people, in order to rebuke them for their stupidities, for Moses already knew the impossibility of "vision". Al-Bayḍāwī in denouncing this view, says that if the "vision" was impossible, it would be necessary for Moses to ignore their request, and to dispel their uncertainties as he actually did for them when they said: '7:138' "O Moses! make for us a god even as they have gods." Another verse, '7:142' "Do right, and follow not the way of mischief-makers." As far as these verses are concerned, al-Bayḍāwī emphasises that Moses, however, did not follow their request since it was impossible. Moreover, al-Bayḍāwī maintains that to assert the impossibility of "vision" altogether is to commit a great mistake, since there is no information which states that the invisibility of God to Moses means that God is invisible forever, and none will ever see Him, especially if we remember that ruʿya is more particular than idrāk — therefore, it is not impossible. After all, he makes a bitter remark to az-Zamakhsharī asking whether he knew the reality of vision (ḥaqīqat ar-ruʿya) and claimed it to be impossible. In this case, he is doomed to be arrogant or else he did not know it
(the reality of vision). In this case, he is ignorant about it.

As far as the standstill of the mountain in the verse is concerned, al-Baydawi holds that God was capable of rendering the mountain firm by which, if He had done it, Moses would have seen Him. On the other hand, to connect "vision" with the possible, it becomes possible. And Moses said: Glory unto Thee! I turn unto Thee repentant." Al-Baydawi, however, emphasises that Moses had asked God to see Him without His previous permission. As a result, he fell down senseless, and confessed that he was the first believer who believed that God was invisible in this world.

Commenting on the interpretation of verse '75:22-23', al-Baydawi, however, affirms that God can be seen in the next world with the sight of eyes where all the things will be forgotten except Him. But, this situation will not remain very long. Of course, the vision of God, according to al-Baydawi, is the most precious of the gifts lavished upon believers in the next world. Al-Baydawi strongly attacked az-Zamakhshari who said that the verse meant the regard of expectation for reward by saying that God cannot mean in the virtue of the verse the regard of expectation,

1. Ibid, III, 26-27; Tawali', p. 80.
since it was connected to "face". The verse, therefore, must have meant the vision of the eyes.

Secondly: To interpret "it" (looking) in its general meaning is contrary to the fact.

Thirdly: It is not correct to say "towards" with reference to the regard of expectation, since the regard of expectation does not become transitive by the proposition "towards".¹

Coming to his view relating to the Qur'anic verse '73:15' al-Bayḍāwī endeavours to refute az-Zamakhsharī's arguments, and claims that only the "faces" of the non-believers will be covered from seeing their Lord, but not the believers. Moreover, al-Bayḍāwī proceeds to say that az-Zamakhsharī who denied the vision of God, even by believers, made the verse in discussion, as an example for their contempt, as those who were not being allowed to see their king.²

Commenting on the interpretation of verse '4:153' al-Bayḍāwī, however, pointed out two main reasons which made the "vision" impossible:

I Their wickedness, not because the "vision" was

1. Ibid, V, 163.
2. Ibid, V, 178.
Their request at that time was impossible, because they were not granted "preparation" to see their Lord. Furthermore, al-Baydawí concludes that even though the vision of Him was impossible in this world, it does not mean to deny the "vision" in the next. But the vision of God "without asking how" (bi-lā kayfa), according to him, happened to some prophets in certain states (ahwāl) in this world, and the same will happen to the believers in the next. It is presumable that al-Baydawí tried to support that the Prophet Muhammad must have seen his Lord.

Refuting the interpretation of verse 142:51, al-Baydawí asserts that the verse is clearly to indicate that the vision of God is possible.

Concerning verse 10:27, al-Baydawí, instead of attacking az-Zamakhsharí, maintains that his position, so far as this verse is concerned, is exactly the same as that of az-Zamakhsharí.

1. Ibid, II, 126.
2. Ibid, I, 154. Al-Baydawí did not state the names of the prophets who had seen God in this world.
3. Ibid, III, 90.
CHAPTER THREE

REASON AND REVELATION

The problem of the relation between Reason (‘aql) and Revelation (shari‘a) is the point of conflict between the Mu‘tazilites and the Ash‘arites in pursuing the knowledge of God (ma‘rifat Allāh) since "knowledge" in the Mu‘tazilite view means "rational insight religion". ¹

The question at issue now is whether knowledge of God becomes incumbent upon man as soon as he acquires a mature-capacity (mukallaf) for reasoning; or whether it becomes incumbent upon him only after a messenger has been sent to his community to inform it of all that is necessary for a man to know. To this, az-Zamakhsharī supports the former, saying that the knowledge of God is obligatory upon man since he is a rational being. He maintains that Reason is a guide to the truth and capable of comprehending the knowledge of God. Therefore, Reason, in accordance with az-Zamakhsharī is self-sufficient in making the knowledge necessary. However, it is implied that the "sending of the prophets" is not necessary since Reason alone can

¹ Wensinck, Muslim Creed, 135.
grasp what is there to be grasped intellectually (i.e. the knowledge of God). So what is the purpose of sending the prophets? To find out the answer let us examine az-Zamakhshari's viewpoint concerning the following Qur'ānic verses:

I

17:15 'We never punish until we have sent a messenger.' (wa mā kunnā mu‘adhdbīn ḥattā nablatha rasūlan).

Az-Zamakhshari says that the purpose of "sending the prophets" was to remind people of what they had forgotten about the necessity of reflection (nazār).1 This verse, however, has little implication for az-Zamakhshari, in denying the occurrence of divine punishment before the coming of the law, since he states that, "Even if God does not send the prophet, it is still incumbent upon man to believe in God and His unity," because Reason has the potentiality to know Him through His signs 64:10, "But those who disbelieve and deny our signs (āyāti-nā) are the inmates of the fire, they will abide therein - a helpless journey's end!"2 Another reason for the sending of the prophets, according to az-Zamakhshari, is as a

1. Al-Kashshāf, I, 544.
2. Ibid, I, 53.
refutation to disbelievers' presupposed argument against God after the messengers. 1 The more extreme views of az-Zamakhshari regarding Reason can be seen from his interpretation of the verse '3:50', "I come unto you with signs from your Lord" that the prophets themselves deduced the truthfulness of their message through Reason in which God created for them signs leading them to know their own message. 2 According to az-Zamakhshari Reason can even conceive the need of repenting the sin even though it was committed by the unbeliever, but Revelation restricts it to the believer only. 3 The tradition, the consensus and the analogy, however, should come after the proofs of Reason (adillat al-bql). 4

Az-Zamakhshari's main emphasis as far as Reason is concerned is that Reason has the potentiality to know the creator of this world even though there is no Revelation. And his view that the "sending of the prophets was to remind their people" cannot be considered as of secondary importance to Reason since it is inevitably relevant to each

1. Ibid, I, 240.
other, because the performance of the orders of the sharī'a such as as-ṣalā (the prayer) according to him, is dependent upon ʿīmān. By ʿīmān, he means Revelation.¹

Perhaps what he means by reflection (nazar) is to know the creator of this universe grossly. If a man dies without hearing about the messenger and consequently has not believed in God, according to az-Zamakhsharī, he will be punished because in his lifetime there has been the condition necessitating ʿīmān, and that condition is Reason.

Another question is, "What is the value of ʿīmān based merely on the authority of others rather than on reasoning and logical proof, such as the common people who were not trained at all in reasoning and the art of dialectics?"

Before going any further it is, perhaps, relevant to quote the important passage from al-Baghdādī concerning the Muʿtazilite view on the belief in the authority of others:

The Muʿtazilites are divided on this point. They who

¹ Ibid., I, 544; cf. vol. II, 345 (52:52), az-Zamakhsharī explains that ʿīmān consists of many things; part of them can be grasped by Reason, while others can be obtained by Revelation.
consider knowledge as being of a primary nature say that he who believes the truth, believing it as something axiomatic, and not marring this condition by mortal sins is faithful. If such a one should, however, mar his condition by mortal sins, he would be fāsiq, that is, neither faithful nor infidel. Whoever believes the truth, but does not regard it as something of a primary nature, is under no obligation to believe. Those Mu'tazilites, however, who say that knowledge regarding Allah, His books and His Apostle, is knowledge acquired by reasoning and deduction, are of different opinions concerning him who believes the truth on the authority of others. Some say that he is fāsiq on account of his neglect of reason and deduction; and a fāsiq according to them, is neither faithful nor infidel. Others say that he is an infidel, whose repentance is invalid through his neglect of one of his legal obligations.¹

As far as taqlīd is concerned, az-Zamakhsharī, however, is in opposition to it since from the very beginning, he emphasises that reason is capable of comprehending the knowledge of God. In strengthening his view, he alludes to the Qur'ānic verse '20:16' "Let none bar thee from it, 

¹. Usūl, p. 225.
2. Ibid, II, 22.
that believes not in it but follows after his own caprice, or thou wilt perish," saying that the destruction (al-halāk) and the peril are always due to taqlīd and its followers. Az-Zamakhshari, however, conceives that not all people can avoid the taqlīd. By this, he means that taqlīd, to some extent, is permissible. For instance, he opposes the muqallid who does not know what he does '17:36' "(O man), Follow not that where of thou hast no knowledge." ¹ For az-Zamakhshari, a muqallid is obliged to some extent to use his reason (i.e. to know whom he follows) in order to follow the right 'ālim (al-‘ālim al-muhtadī). ²

As an advocate of al-Ashʿarī, al-Bayḍāwī, however, maintains that the knowledge of God is made obligatory by Revelation or the divine law. The obligatory nature of the knowledge of God, al-Bayḍāwī asserts, has nothing to do with Reason. The most important proof-text for al-Bayḍāwī is the verse '17:15', "We never punish until we have sent a messenger." This verse evidently denies the occurrence of divine punishment before the coming of the law. Al-Bayḍāwī argues that as far as this verse is concerned, there can be no obligation at all before God's sending a messenger and before the prophetic call reaches

¹. Ibid, I, 549.
². Ibid, II, 172.
Concerning the Qur'ānic verse '4:165', al-Bayḍawī in strong opposition against az-Zamakhsharī, says that the sending of the prophet is necessary (darūra) since Reason has insufficient potentiality to know God, \(^2\) (i.e. especially the naive belief of the common people). Therefore, the sending of the prophets, according to al-Bayḍawī, is a completion of God's Revelation since the obligatoriness is based solely on the evidence of divine words.

Al-Bayḍawī emphasises that the prophets did not know the truthfulness of their message except through Revelation. For al-Bayḍawī, this Qur'ānic verse '52:52' "Thou (Muḥammad) knewest not what the scripture was, nor what the faith" provides strong proof to criticise az-Zamakhsharī's argument that the prophets knew their message by means of Reason. \(^3\) A question arises that if the prophets themselves, according to al-Bayḍawī, did not testify their message except through Revelation, what about the common folk? Did they know God before the "sending of the prophets," through Reason?

3. Ibid, IV, 57.
According to al-Ash'arî, he who believes the truth on the authority of others (taqlīdan) is neither a polytheist nor infidel. Yet al-Ash'arî does not in general apply the qualification "faithful" to such a one, and his doctrine compels him to admit that the sins of such a one may be forgiven, since he is neither a polytheist nor an infidel.1

Al-Bayḍāwī maintains that the belief in the authority of others is not permissible for a mukallaf who is capable of reflection (nażar)2 but he does not consider the mukallaf who follows a prophet or a mujtahid as muqallid. In fact, he calls him the "follower of what has been revealed."3 It is very clear that al-Bayḍāwī does not wholly share al-Ash'arî's view, since he affirmatively declares that the following of the right 'ālim is permissible.

Good, evil and the best

As we already know, the problem of reason and revelation is one of the most persistent problems in

1. Usūl, p. 255.
2. Anwār, III, 202, 218 (18:15)
3. Ibid, I, 209 (2:170), II, 172 (5:104)
theological discussion between the Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites, since the opinions differ as to the right precedence of the criterion of reason and revelation.

According to the Mu'tazilites, reason is the criterion of good and evil. God is good. He is all-wise. The wise can only do what is best for His servants. Therefore, evil (qabīḥ) cannot be the negation of His wisdom, since the existence of it (i.e. evil), is incompatible within a God who is at once omnipotent and benevolent.

Az-Zamakhsharī is in line with the view held by the majority of the Mu'tazilites when he says that a thing is good or bad in itself (qabīḥun aw ḥasanun bi-dhāti-hī) through the judgement of reason. For instance, to fill up the measure (al-mīzān) is good while to decrease it unjustly is bad according to reason. Similarly lying (al-kidhb) is also bad in itself as even the unbelievers realised who did not know the law (sharī'a).

Even the goodness of God is judged by the same standard

2. Al-Kashshāf, I, 451 (11:85)
3. Ibid, II, 147 (27:49). This verse refers to the story of the people of the prophet Šāliḥ who planned to kill him, but then did not allow themselves to do so, owing to their unwillingness to become liars (al-kādhibīn).
as that of men. He maintains that God's deeds (af‘āl Allāh) are all good and wise, even if there are some aspects of the goodness still hidden to human intellect. Az-Zamakhshari alludes to the Qur'ānic verse '2:30-31'. He said: "Surely I know that which ye know not. And He taught Adam all the names." God does not will polytheism (ash-shirk) and disobedience (al-ma‘ṣīl). In contrast, He encourages them to do good things (jamīlī-hā).

As regards evil (al-qābh), az-Zamakhshari maintains that God did not even will evil acts, it was only the Mujbirites who attributed such acts to God. He interprets the Qur'ānic verse '7:180' "... and leave those who blaspheme His names..." by saying leave those who attribute the evil acts to God alone, since it is inadmissible for God to do any act of evil (lā yajūzu 'alay-hi l-qābh). The inadmissibility of Him to do such an act is due to His having no incentive (ad-dā‘ī).  

1. Ibid, I, 51.  
4. Ibid, I, 360-1.  
6. Ibid, I, 326 (7:28). cf., vol. II, pp. 188-9 (30:27) in which az-Zamakhshari equates qābh (evil) with muḥāl (impossible) since both of them could not be applied to God.
Taklīf. (The imposition of duty)

Does God impose some responsibility on man in consideration with the principle of good and evil?

In order to avoid the attributing of evil to God, az-Zamakhsharī, like other Muʿtazilites, maintains that God does not impose duty on man beyond his capacity. He bases his view on the Qur'ānic verses such as 50:29: "I wrong not my servants." Of course, for az-Zamakhsharī, God's praising Himself that He can do no evil, would be useless if He imposed duty on man beyond his capacity. Another point given by az-Zamakhsharī refers to the Qur'ānic verse 16:90, "Surely Allah bids to justice and good doing..." in which he maintains that contained in the justice of God is the non-imposition of duty beyond His servants' capacity (fawqā ʿūqābi-him).

As regards "the best", az-Zamakhsharī in defending his Muʿtazilite view, maintains that God would not do anything for His servants but the best. He alludes to some Qur'ānic

1. Ibid, II, 404.
2. Ibid, II, 535; cf., II, 303 (39:60) in which az-Zamakhsharī considers that those who maintain that God imposes on human beings the impossible things are great liars against God.
verses as follows:

116:9 "And Allah is the direction of the way (wa'alā-lāhi qaṣdu s-sabīl), and some (roads) go not straight (wa min-hā jā'irun). And had He willed He would have led you all aright."

Az-Zamakhsharī says that the direction of the way leading to the truth is necessary for God. He clarifies the passage by citing '92:12' "Lo! ours it is (to give) the guidance (ḥudā)."

Az-Zamakhsharī places emphasis on the words wa min-hā jā'irun. A question arises, why did God not say wa ʿalay-hā jā'irun? In answer to this, az-Zamakhsharī states that such words are to declare that the unstraight way should not be attributed to God. If it were true, as the Mujbirites said, he continues, God would say wa ʿalay-hā jā'irun. As far as the proof-text is concerned az-Zamakhsharī seems to have considered himself in this respect as a victor against the Mujbirites. Furthermore, he interprets the verse, "And had He willed He would have led you all aright" as meaning "by force" (qaṣran), but God did not will to do so, since He granted them "free will" to distinguish between the right and the wrong as clearly stated in the verse. Therefore, God does only what is good for His servants.1

'21:23' "He will not be questioned as to that which He doeth, but they will be questioned."

(Lā yus'ālu 'ammā yaf'ālu wa hum yus'ālūn).

As far as this verse is concerned, az-Zamakhsharī tries to draw our attention to everyday life. He says that if it is customary not to question kings concerning their rules even if they do injustice (fasād), God the Almighty would not be questioned as to that which He does. It is especially conceivable that His deeds are reasonable (ma'qūl) and are motivated by His wisdom (al-ḥikma). Therefore, any mistake or act of evil cannot be attributed to Him.1

'64:2' "He it is who created you, but one of you is a disbeliever and one of you is a believer."

(Huwa-lladhī khalaqa-kum fa-min-kum kāfirun wa min-kum mu'minun).

Az-Zamakhsharī maintains that human beings are the authors of their unbelief (al-kufr) and their being unbelievers should not be attributed to God, since He is the wise the knower of all evils, then all His deeds should be considered good. Therefore, His creation of the author

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of evil should be considered good and even if the aspect of goodness still cannot be conceived by human intellect, yet it does not impair His goodness. In order to make it clear, az-Zamakhsharī sets forth an example by saying that "Likewise our ignorance of knowing God's motivation in creating some beautiful creatures, does not impair their goodness."¹

IV 91:7-8' "By the soul, and that which shaped it and inspired it to lewdness and godfearing!"
(wa nafsīn wa mā sawā-hā fa-alhama-hā fujūra-hā wa taqwā-hā).

Az-Zamakhsharī states that the right and the wrong have been inspired (alhama) by God, so it is up to Reason to distinguish between the two, and choose willingly. In supporting his view, he refers to the Qur'ānic verses 91:9-10' "Prosperous is he who purifies it, (qad aflaḥa man zakkā-hā), and failed has he who seduces it" (wa qad khāba man dassā-hā). He says that Reason is the cause of growth or the stunting of it, not God. The basis of his argument is that the "doer" (al-fā'īl) in "zakkā-hā and dassā-hā" is Reason (al-'aql) not God. Furthermore,

¹. Ibid, II, 463.
he says that only the Mujbirites attributed such a thing to God who is the exalted.\footnote{Ibid, II, 546.}

According to the Ash'arites, Revelation is the criterion of good and evil. Reward and punishment are only the consequences of God's being well pleased or displeased.\footnote{Milal, p. 30.}

\textit{Al-Baydawî} maintains that a thing is good or bad when it is proved by law (\textit{sharî'a}) and not judged by Reason.\footnote{Anwâr, III, 7 (7:28) cf. II, 212-13 (6:148-9) in which al-Baydawî admits that the verse supports the view of az-Zain al-sharî that God does not will the evil acts (\textit{f'lu l-qabâ'ihi}).}

As regards the \textit{taklîf}, \textit{al-Baydawî} maintains that God can impose duty on man beyond his capacity (\textit{taklîf mā lā yuţâq}). He bases this view on the second part of the Qur'ânic verse '2:285' "... our Lord, do Thou not burden us beyond what we have the strength to bear." He says that if \textit{taklîf} is inadmissible, the invocation (\textit{du'ā'}) in the verse would be useless, while in his interpretation of the first part of the verse "Allah charges no soul save its capacity" he maintains that God will not impose the \textit{taklîf} on man beyond his capacity, although He could.\footnote{Ibid, I, pp. 273-4; cf., vol. I, p. 244 (2:233).}
Judging from his two statements, al-Bayḍawî tries to balance his view between the attributing of evil to God by means of imposing duty on man beyond his capacity and the "rationale" of the taklīf itself as understood by az-Zamakhsharî.

Al-Bayḍawî strongly attacks az-Zamakhsharî's view regarding "the best" (al-īslāḥ) by saying '16:9' that it is not necessary for God to guide people to the right way (ṭarīq mustaqīm). If He does so, it is a mere grace (faḍl) and mercy (raḥma) from Him, because if He had willed, He would have guided them collectively to the right way. Al-Bayḍawî argues that it is God's unwillingness that made them disbelieve, and not any misuse of their Reason. Therefore, God is not bound to do what "is best".¹

As far as verse '21:23' is concerned, al-Bayḍawî says that God will not be questioned as to what He does because He is almighty and is the sole agent of power. Hence, He can do what He wills even if the act involves evil (i.e., the creation of unbelief). For al-Bayḍawî, it seems that Good and evil are relevant only to human acts and cannot be attributed to God whether the consequence of His deed

¹. Ibid, III, 176.
is good or not for His creatures since He will not be questioned about what He does.¹

Concerning the Qur'ānic verse '64:2', al-Bayḍāwī believes that God already created human beings whether disbelievers or not. If God willed someone to be a believer, He would have created something which would lead him to become a believer and so on. Therefore, the principle of "the best" according to al-Bayḍāwī, remains as no obligation to God.²

As regards verse '91:7-8', al-Bayḍāwī, however, maintains that the inspiration of the wrong (fuṣūr), and the right (taqwā) is dependent upon Revelation, not Reason, since the "doer" (al-fā'il) in the said verses refers to God while az-Zamakhsharī believes that it should refer to Reason.³

In the light of the above arguments between az-Zamakhsharī and al-Bayḍāwī, it can be concluded that az-Zamakhsharī, who was a supporter of the Mu'tazilites, believes that human reason is capable of knowing the ḥasan and the qabīḥ without the assistance of any

¹. Ibid, IV, 38.
². Ibid, V, 134.
prophetic revelation. In order to correspond to this principle, az-Zamakhsharī has to say that God is bound to do what is best for human beings. Goodness, according to az-Zamakhsharī is a real quality inherent in things which are rationally known to be good. Similarly badness is a quality that is inherent in things which are rationally known to be bad. Al-Bayḍūlī, however, believes that goodness and badness are determined things (i.e. by God). Furthermore, the goodness or badness of a thing is not a real quality of things inherent in them but a function of the divine will. Therefore, the principle of "the best" has no place in al-Bayḍūlī's theology.

Sustenance (rizq)

As far as "sustenance" is concerned, az-Zamakhsharī maintains that God would not produce an "unlawful sustenance", since He attributes the rizq to Himself, and it is only that sort of thing (i.e. lawful sustenance) which is called "sustenance". '2:3' "... and spend of that we have bestowed upon them."¹ Az-Zamakhsharī argues that God has granted everyone his own "sustenance" including food, drink etc. in the right way so that sustenance can only be called "lawful sustenance". Az-Zamakhsharī's argument,

¹ Al-Kashshaf, I, 18; cf. (8:22) vol. I, 495.
therefore, is taken to imply that God can grant no "unlawful sustenance".¹ It is very clear that az-Zamakhsharī's strong defence that only "lawful sustenance" can be attributed to God, is to avoid attributing evil things to Him since He is the wise, and the wise always does what is best. On the other hand, his treatment of the subject is rather peculiar which can be seen through his interpretation of the verse '11:6' "And there is not a beast in the earth but the sustenance thereof dependeth on Allah" (‘alā-llāhi rizqu-hā).

The obvious meaning of the verse is that it is necessary for God to sustain His servants. Az-Zamakhsharī, however, tries to explain the text by saying that the words "‘alā-llāhi rizqu-hā" mean a "grace" from God. Having assured that He would sustain them gracefully, however, it became obligatory (wājiban) as when someone makes a vow.² Of course, its obligatory nature, according to az-Zamakhsharī, is due to His promise that He would sustain them gracefully, since God is truthful, az-Zamakhsharī argues, He will fulfil His promise.

Al-Bayḍāwī, however, maintains that "sustenance" can be both lawful and unlawful sustenance, since it is God who

2. Ibid, I, 436.
provides sustains them both. God's attribution of sustenance to Himself, does not mean that only the lawful ones can be considered as "sustenance". Moreover, he says that the attributing of sustenance to God is merely for exaltation (ta'zîm), and encouraging people towards "charity". As far as the verse '11:3' is concerned, al-Baydâwî admits that the sustenance is taken to mean "lawful sustenance" because God admires it. Thus what really concerns al-Baydâwî is not the verse itself, but the concept of rizq in general, and whether or not it can be used in its general meaning. Al-Baydâwî, however, declares that the term rizq can be generally applied to both the "lawful" and the "unlawful sustenance". He alludes to a prophetic tradition saying that "God has sustained you by what is good (ţayyiban) then you have chosen what has been prohibited by God from His rizq in place of what has been made lawful to you."

Al-Baydâwî argues that if it were not called rizq (sustenance), the consumer in the whole of his life, would not also be called "one sustained" (ghayra marzûqin), since God said '11:6' "And there is not a beast in the earth but the sustenance thereof dependeth on Allah." For al-Baydâwî, as far as rizq is concerned, there is nobody who will escape from being sustained by God whether the rizq is lawful or not.¹

¹ Anwâr, I, 58.
More evidence given by al-Bayḍawī is that '5:88' "Eat of that which Allah has bestowed on you as food lawful (ḥalālan) and good (ṭayyiban).

Al-Bayḍawī says that if the rizq does not imply "unlawful" (al-ḥarām) the mention of the word ḥalālan (lawful) in the verse would be useless. ¹

The questions of the superiority of angels and prophets.

Before going any further it is, perhaps, relevant to quote the important passage from al-Baghdādī concerning the angels and the prophets:

"The large majority of our friends maintain the superiority of the prophets over the angels; they do not, however, mention anyone individually. The followers of Tradition do not teach the superiority of the angels over the prophets except al-Ḥasan ibn-al-Ṭaḍl al-Bajālī. The Mu‘tazilites are divided on this point. The majority of them are of the opinion that the angels are more superior to every prophet. Others, however, say that those angels who have committed no sin are more excellent than

the prophets, whereas those who have committed
even the slightest sin, such as Harut and Marut,
are inferior to the prophets. This is the
opinion of al-Asam."^1

Az-Zamakhsharī asserts (positively) that the angels
have superiority over the prophets by referring to the
following Qur'anic verse:

1.4:172: "The Messiah will never scorn to be a
slave unto God nor will the favoured angels; who-
so scorneth His service and is proud, all such
will He assemble unto Him." (lan yastankīfa 1-
masīhu an yakūna ‘abdan li-llāhi wa lā 1-malā'i'ikatu
1-muqarrabūn....)

Commenting on the text, az-Zamakhsharī, however,
concentrates on the words "nor will the favoured angels"
wa lā 1-malā'i'ikatu 1-muqarrabūn. By this, he means that
"not even those (angels) who are superior to the Messiah."
The source of this interpretation which we have just
mentioned, however, is based on the science of rhetorics
(‘ilm al-ma'tānī) because it necessitates this particular
interpretation of the verse. On the other hand, this verse
was revealed to invalidate the Christians' claim of the

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1. Uṣūl, p. 295 Sq; cf., p. 166 Sq.
raising of Jesus’ position beyond "slavery standard" (al-manzila al-‘ubūdiyya). If this occasion of revelation (sabab an-nuzūl) was correct, he argues, the verse should be interpreted to mean that even the favoured angels who are not too proud to worship Him, will never escape from being called "slave" (‘ubūdiyya), let alone the Messiah. Therefore, it is a clear proof for az-Zamakhsharī that the specializing of al-muqarrabūn in the verse was to indicate a special privilege given to them (bestowing superiority on them over other creatures). Finally, az-Zamakhsharī makes a short remark concerning the technicality of reciting the word ‘abd(slave) in the verse. He says that the caliph ‘Alī himself has his own technicality which differs from the text. ‘Alī, however, is reported to have styled it (‘abd) into "diminutive noun" (ism at-Taṣghīr), therefore the word becomes ‘Ubayd. It is obvious from his interpretation that az-Zamakhsharī’s attempt to denounce the superiority of the Messiah over the angels involves all of the other prophets in the text, and this has become a major discussion as contained within the Mu‘tazilite and the Ash‘arite theology.

II 21:19 "And those who dwell in His presence are not too proud to worship Him, nor do they weary" (wa man ‘inda-hū lā yastakbirūn ‘an ‘ibūdati-hī wa lā yastahsirūn).

Concerning this verse, az-Zamakhsharī says that man linda-h-u are the angels, favoured and honoured by God. The reason for their being honoured and highly regarded, he argues, is a result of their constant obedience and humility to God as shown by the text. The prophets, however, have not possessed such behaviour. Moreover, az-Zamakhsharī proceeds to argue that all the descriptions given to them were indicative of their superiority over other creatures. Therefore, it is suitable, according to az-Zamakhsharī, that they are positioned nearest to the kings where they are favoured, and preferred over others.

III '12:31' "This is not a human being. This is no other than some gracious angel." (mā hādhā basharan in hādhā illā malakun karīmun).

As far as this verse is concerned, az-Zamakhsharī tries to draw our attention to the handsome and even beautiful physical appearance of Joseph. He also points out that the ladies were surprised to find Joseph physically attractive. As a result of this, he explained that they denied his "manhood" (al-bashariyya) and affirmed that Joseph's beauty was not that of a human being but that of an angel. Az-Zamakhsharī even goes further by

1. Ibid, I, 42.
describing the basic nature of the creation of the angels and Satan which will lead us to his principle of good and evil. However, he states that there will be no more beautiful among His creatures than the angels, and their beauty, he argues, is by nature. Likewise, there will be no more hideous than Satan by nature. Therefore, it is not surprising that God always sets out examples of good and evil with the angels and Satan respectively. Implicit in his statements is the very fact that he tried to make a fair justification between Reason and Revelation.

Having explained all the points with regard to the verse, az-Zamakhshari began attacking the Sunnites for their concept of the superiority of the prophets over the angels, and accusing them of changing the realities (ḥaqāʾiq), and denying the "immediate science" (ʿulūm ad-Darūra).¹

IV 14:10 "They said: Ye are but mortals like us. (Qālū in antum illā basharun mithlu-nā)

Their main argument in this respect is based on Reason (ʿaql); in other words "what they have already in mind" regarding the superiority of the angels over the prophets. For az-Zamakhshari, the text this time is a

¹ Ibid, I, 471.
clear proof to support his opinion. For example such an unsatisfactory attitude showed by the unbelievers asserts that they are mortals like them. If there is no difference between us and the prophets, they argue, why have they been chosen as prophets and not us? Their doubts, according to az-Zamakhsharī, at least, could be removed by sending a prophet from the angels.

After a careful study of his interpretation in this respect, az-Zamakhsharī, however, does not realise that what they had in mind concerning the subject matter did not occur (i.e. there was no prophet from the angels). So far as az-Zamakhsharī's explanation of this verse is concerned, his main emphasis is obviously to strengthen his view of the superiority of the angels over the prophets.

V 7:20 "He said: Your Lord forbade you from this tree only lest ye should become angels or become of the immortals." (wa qāla mā nahā-kumā Rabbu-kumā 'an hādhihi sh-Shajarati illā an takūnā malakaynū wa tālārū mina l-khālidīn).

Az-Zamakhsharī's rational interpretation of the verse in this case is chiefly dependent upon the success of Iblīs in persuading Adam and his wife Eve to eat the

forbidden fruit. The reason for "God's forbidding the fruit" according to Iblīs, is clear from the text that "Lest they should become angels (malakayni) or immortals (khālidayni)." According to az-Zamakhsharī, Adam, however, has already conceived that by being an angel he will be superior than his present position as a prophet. Adam's desire, and his act of transgression of the limit of God, according to az-Zainakhsharī, shows clearly that "angelhood" (al-malakiyya) is superior to the "manhood" (al-bashariyya).  

VI '21:26' "And they say: The Beneficent hath taken unto Himself a son. Be He glorified! Nay, but (those whom they call sons) are honoured slaves." (wa qālū t-takhadha r-Rahmānu waladan subḥāna-hū bal 'ibādun mukramūn).

As far as this Qur'ānic verse is concerned, az-Zamakhsharī maintains that the angels with their excellent gifts and characteristics (viz. lack of pride, and lack of weariness) make people think that they are the sons of God. But the very fact is that their claim was wrong as "strongly denied by the text." "Nay, but they are honoured slaves." However, az-Zamakhsharī's objective is merely to reflect the beauty of the angels by nature which is,

1. Al-Kashshāf, I, 324.
therefore, superior to other creatures.¹

VII '17:70' "Verily we have honoured the children of Adam; we carry them on the land and the sea, and have made provision of good things for them, and have preferred them above many of those whom we created with a marked preferment." (wa laqad karramnā banī Ādama.... wa faḍḍalnā-hum ‘alā kathīrin mimman khalaqnā tafḍīlan).

Az-Zamakhsharī's strong defence of his view concerning this verse is mainly centred on the words "and we have preferred them above many of those whom we created" (wa faḍḍalnā-hum ‘alā kathīrin mimman khalaqnā). To him the words "kathīrin mimman khalaqnā" do not include the angels (al-malā'ika). Perhaps, the same reason can be referred to the things we have already explained. Az-Zamakhsharī's bitter attack on the Sunnites with regard to the subject-matter leads to his falsifying some of the prophetic traditions. For example, the tradition which is narrated by Abū-Hurayra who reported that the prophet said that the believer is more honourable before God than the angels. However, he accused the Sunnites, in this respect, of being prejudiced towards their "manhood" (bashariyya).

Another main controversial point is referred to the word

¹. Ibid, II, 44.
kathîr (many). For the Sunnites, they mean jamî' (all of His creatures, including the angels). Az-Zamakhsharî, however, considers the case as a crime. Moreover, he points out that the Sunnites' committing of the crime is an act of their antagonism towards the angels. On the other hand, he says that they have no feeling at all. As a result they have defied the real meaning of the verse.\footnote{Ibid, I, 555.}

VIII '38:75' "He said: O Iblîs! What hindereth thee from falling prostrate before that which I have created with both my hands? Art thou too proud or art thou of the high exalted?" (Qūla yâ Iblîsu mā mana'â-ka an tasjûda limâ khalâqtu bi-yadayya astâkarta am kunta mina l-‘alîna).

This Qur'ânic verse is concerned with az-Zamakhsharî's assertion that there are two main reasons which made Iblîs refuse to prostrate before Adam.

Firstly: Iblîs' sole objective was to worship only God. One would suppose that Iblîs would have considered bowing down to Adam to be a deviation from his ultimate goal of worship.

Secondly: This idea is justified by reference to the different nature of his creation compared to Adam, for he
was created from fire whereas Adam was created from clay, because of this, he (Iblīs) considered himself better than Adam. If this is so, why should he fall prostrate before Adam?

Az-Zamakhsharī, however, considers Iblīs' arguments as improper, since he has misunderstood God's command. For az-Zamakhsharī, God does not command anything without any purpose. He points out that the sujūd in this respect, was not for 'ibāda (worship) as conceived by Iblīs, but it was for respect and homage (takrīm) to the new creature (i.e. Adam). According to az-Zamakhsharī the bowing down (sujūd) does not imply that the person to whom the prostration was made (i.e. Adam) (al-masjūdu la-hū) is superior to the prostrators (as-sājidūn) since the sujūd was made out of respect (takrīm wa tabjīl). The angels, who are favoured by God, he argues, made sujūd without any objection, because they merely followed the command. In order to make it clear, az-Zamakhsharī gives an example of everyday life. He equates God's command to Iblīs and his refusal with that of a minister who has been commanded by his king to visit some areas which are full of poor servants. The minister refuses to do so, because he thinks he is better than them in rank, while they are in a low position. As a result the king becomes angry with him and says to his minister: What prevents you from visiting them as both you and they (the poor) are my subjects?¹

1. Ibid, II, 290.
We may deduce from this discussion that az-Zamakhsharī's view of the angels is that they are superior to the prophets. However, from his treatment of the verse concerning Adam and Iblīs, it seems that az-Zamakhsharī considered Adam as even inferior to Iblīs.

The Ashʿarites, with the exception of Abū-Bakr al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013) and ʿAbd-Allāh b. al-Ḥalīmī (d. ?) held that the prophets were superior to the angels. Al-Bayḍāwī's view regarding this point and whether or not he was a true adherent of the Ashʿarite view, can be found in his criticism of az-Zamakhsharī.

Concerning the Qur'ānic verse 4:172, al-Bayḍāwī in his refutation, concentrated on the occasion of revelation of the verse since it became a central point of az-Zamakhsharī's treatment of the subject-matter. Al-Bayḍāwī, however, makes a fierce attack on az-Zamakhsharī by saying that the verse was to refute those who worshipped Jesus and those who worshipped the angels, and not to refute the concept of Christianity which raised Jesus from "slavery standard".

However, al-Bayḍāwī's account relating to the occasion of revelation is very relevant to the verse which came before

1. cf., Ẓawāliʿ, p. 92.
it, and is presumably correct. The verse runs as follows:

"4:171' "O people of the Scripture! Do not exaggerate in your religion nor utter aught concerning Allāh save the truth. The Messiah, Jesus, son of Mary, was only a messenger of Allāh, and His word which He conveyed unto Mary, and a spirit from Him. So believe in Allāh and His messengers, and say not 'Three' - Cease! (it is) better for you! - Allāh is only one God. Far is it removed from His transcendent majesty that he should have a son. His is all that is in the heavens and all that is in the earth. And Allāh is sufficient as defender."

Supposing that this verse were to deal with the concept of the Christianity or raising the standard of Jesus from the "slavery level" as claimed by az-Zamakhsharī, he argues that the conjunctive particle (ḥurf al-‘ṣf) "and" (al-waw) in the verse: wa lā 1-mala‘ikatu 1-muqarrabūn which is connected to ʿaṣa‘a‘al yastankifa l-Masīh an yakūna ʿabdān li-llāh would possibly give an emphatic meaning by means of increasing the numbers (li-t-takthīr), and not for the magnification(li-t-takbīr). Nevertheless, this does not serve az-Zamakhsharī's argument. Therefore, the meaning of the verse runs:

The Messiah will never scorn even if he is alone (shakhsun
wāḥidun) to be a slave unto God nor will the many persons (al-ashkhāṣ al-kathīra) among the favoured angels. In order to make it clear (i.e. li-t-takthīr), al-Bayḍāwī, however, gives an example from everyday life. He states that when people say that "he has become the commander in chief, in which case neither the president nor his subjects oppose him," they only mean to multiply the numbers. Another supposition with regard to the emphatic meaning in the sense of takbīr is also inevitably exposed to al-Bayḍāwī's criticisms. If the "conjunctive particle" in the verse was projected to emphasise the takbīr, he argues, its object would lead to the concept of the superiority of the favoured angels over Jesus. So far, al-Bayḍāwī concludes, it still does not, in any way, entail the superiority of the angels in general over the prophets.¹

Evidence given by az-Zamakhsharī regarding the Qur'ānic verse 121:19 "That their humble, and their constant obedience etc." makes them superior to the prophets, has been unacceptable to al-Bayḍāwī when he definitely confesses that they were favoured and honoured.² However, he states that such evidence – even though in

2. Ibid, IV, 37.
one sense is correct - is not a strong proof compared to the arguments against their superiority over the prophets.¹

Al-Baydawí's view with regard to the interpretation of the Qur'anic verse '12:31' in one sense, is likely to support az-Zamakhsharí. For instance, his illustration concerning the special characteristics of Joseph or the angels; namely that they have admirable beauty, excellent perfection and infallibility ('isma). But all of these attributes are, perhaps, not those which make the angels superior to the prophets. However, so far as this Qur'anic verse is concerned, al-Baydawí makes an indirect reference to az-Zamakhsharí's views.²

Concerning the Qur'anic verse '14:10', al-Baydawí explained that it only refers to the unbelievers' view that they would not accept a messenger unless he was an angel. Thus, it seems that al-Baydawí is following az-Zamakhsharí's explanation of the verse.³

Commenting on the verse '7:20', al-Baydawí rejected az-Zamakhsharí's assumption that the verse refers to the

1. Ṭawālī', p. 93.
3. Ibid, IV, 37.
desire of Adam and Eve to become angels as in indication of their superiority to the prophets. According to al-Baydāwī, such a desire was not realised.ⁱ Al-Baydāwī, however, confesses that the Qur'ānic verse '7:20' implies the superiority of the angels over Adam only at the time of speaking (i.e. between Adam and Iblīs). When Adam realised that such a remark was only a story related to Iblīs, the verse (i.e. the superiority of the angels) no longer had significance.⁲ Therefore, it does not support az-Zamakhsharī's view.

Al-Baydāwī's view with regard to the Qur'ānic verse '21:26' is exactly as az-Zamakhsharī's, even though he does not clearly state the reason why the unbelievers considered the angels to be superior to the prophets.³

Al-Baydāwī's emphasis on the verse '17:70' about the superiority of the angels over the prophets in general indicates his adoption of the moderate view between the Sunnites (the Ash'arites) and the Mu'tazilites. However, he confesses that the archangels (khawwāṣ) are superior to human beings (i.e. the prophets). Al-Baydāwī in this respect, has agreed with az-Zamakhsharī, but the general-

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1. Ibid, III, 6.
3. Anwar, IV, 38.
ization of angels as a whole made by az-Zamakhsharî was the centre of controversy. Al-Baydawî, however, refuted it (i.e. the generalization) by saying that it is not necessary to consider the superiority of a group of the angels (ba‘du-hum) over the prophets in the verse infers looking down on some of the prophets who are superior to the angels.

Al-Baydawî's disagreement with the view held by the majority of the Ash'arites in this case, can be drawn from his statement regarding the word kathîr (many) in the verse. He states that kathîr does not mean al-kull (all) as claimed by the majority of the Ash'arites. Moreover, he considers the interpretation given by the Ash'arites as contrary to the obvious fact (khilaf az-Zâhir). On the other hand, the allocation of kathîr, instead of kull, has no significant meaning at all (ta‘assuf).¹

Al-Baydawî's attack on az-Zamakhsharî's view regarding Iblîs' refusal of sujûd in the verse '38:75' is mainly based on his view that Adam is superior to certain angels.² Another reason he refers to is the nature of Adam's creation itself which consists of lust, etc. which is, according to him, better than the creation of the angels.

1. Anwâr, III, 207.
2. Ibid, V, 22.
For al-Baydawī, the bowing down (sujūd) implies inferiority such as the inferiority of the commanded angels (al-ma'mūrūn bi-s-sujūd) to Adam. He points out that the Wise one (al-hakīm) would not command those who were excellent to serve those who were inferior to them (lā ya'mur al-afdal bi-khidmati 1-mafḍūl). Bearing this view in mind, however, al-Baydawī unconsciously follows the Mu'tazilite principle of good and evil. So far as the verse in our discussion is concerned, al-Baydawī's description of Iblīs' refusal of sujūd is proper (ṣahīh), since God has the power of commanding those whom he likes in the same way as a master who has the authority of asking his slaves to serve his other slaves, because they are (all) in the same position before their master. On the other hand, al-Baydawī asserts that Adam who has more prestige than certain angels (i.e., the prostrators), deservedly received the sujūd. Whatever reasons are given about Iblīs' refusal of sujūd, al-Baydawī maintains that Iblīs was obliged to do so (i.e., sujūd) since he is also a slave of God. However, the fact is that, as al-Baydawī insists, Adam is superior to some of the angels.

In order to support his view regarding the superiority

1. Ibid, I, 141.
2. Tawāliʻ, p. 92.
3. Ibid, V, 22.
of the prophets to the angels, he proceeds to refer to some Qur'anic verses as follows:

I 2:31' "And He taught Adam all the names, then showed them to the angels saying: inform of the names of these, if ye are truthful."

Al-Baydawi affirms that Adam is superior to the commanded angels (i.e. who fell prostrate) since he (Adam) knew better than them. Then al-Baydawi proceeds to refer to the Qur'anic verse '39:9' "And those who know equal with those know not?" 1

II 2:34' "And when we said unto the angels prostrate yourselves before Adam, they fell prostrate, all save Iblis. He demurred through pride, and so became a disbeliever."

Al-Baydawi maintains that Adam is superior to the angels who fell prostrate before him. (al-ma'murun bi-s-sujud). This, however, implies that some angels are superior to Adam. His moderate view in this respect is perhaps, due to the fact that there are among the angels those who are not infallible (ghayra ma'sumun) even though the majority of them are. Likewise some people are also

1. Ibid, I, 136-140; cf., Tawali', p. 92.
III  A prophetic tradition declaring that the works of worships (‘ibādā) most worthy of reward are those which are difficult to perform.

Since human beings were not created naturally to be obedient like the angels, it would be difficult for them to fulfil the religious obligations. Therefore, their deeds are highly appreciated, and deserve great reward.²

IV  '3:33' "Lo! God preferred Adam and Noah and the family of Abrahām and the family of ‘Imrān above (all His) creatures."

Al-Bayḍāwī declares that those who were mentioned in this verse including Jesus and the Prophet Muḥammad, are superior to the angels.³ It is implied that those who were not chosen, are inferior to the angels.

Judging from his arguments with az-Zamakhsharī about

1. Ibid, I, 141; Ṭawāli‘, p. 92.
2. Ṭawāli‘, pp. 92-93; Miṣbāh, fol. 226b.
3. Anwār, II, 14; Ṭawāli‘, p. 93; Miṣbāh, fol. 226a.

It is noted that az-Zamakhsharī explains away this verse without referring to the superiority of either the angels or the prophets. cf., al-Kashshāf, I, 143.
the superiority of the prophets over the angels, al-
Baydawi firmly takes a moderate view between the Mu'tazilites
and the Ash'arites. The opinion that al-Baydawi is a true
Ash'arite, however, is not compatible with his own view
and therefore, does not seem to be correct.

The miracles of the saints (karamat)

In fact, the Mu'tazilites strongly oppose the view
that the karâma is possible for the saints (awliyâ'). They
say that if the karâma is granted, it will be confusing to
distinguish between the prophets and the non-prophets. On
the other hand, karâma is against the natural course of
things, and no human being can cause any disorder in the
course of nature. While the Ash'arites affirmatively
maintain that the karâma is possible for the awliyâ'
since it is not meant to silence opponents. Therefore it
is quite different from the mu'jiza as the mu'jiza sought
to silence opponents, and it was usually faced with
opposition (tahaddâ) and da'wa (claim). On the other hand,
for the Ash'arites, karâma is a favour from God which He
can bestow on the awliyâ'.

1. Ar-Razi, Kitab al-Arba'in, pp. 384-88; Usul, pp. 170-
185.
In order to investigate az-Zamakhsharî's view regarding the karâma, we had better refer to his interpretation of some Qur'ânic verses related to this point:

I

'3:42' "And when the angels said: O Mary! Lo! God has chosen thee and made thee pure, and has preferred thee above (all) the woman of creation."

Az-Zamakhsharî places emphasis on the incident which took place between the angel and Mary. He says that the incident was the result of Zachariah's miracle or the sign foretelling the prophecy of Jesus, and not Mary's karâma.

II

'3:37' "Whenever Zachariah went into the sanctuary where she was, he found that she had food. He said: O Mary! Whence cometh unto thee this (food)? She answered: It is from God. God giveth without stint to whom He will."

As far as this verse is concerned, az-Zamakhsharî tried to explain away the verse, and left it without referring to whether or not the food which came to Mary was a result of her miracle or Zachariah's.

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1. Al-Kashshâf, I, 146.
2. Ibid, I, 145.
"He is the knower of the unseen, and He revealeth unto none His secret, save unto every messenger ( rasūl) whom He hath chosen, and then He maketh a guard to go before him, and a guard behind him."

Commenting on this verse, az-Zamakhsharî, however, emphasises the words "Save unto every messenger whom He had chosen" ( illā man irtadā min-rasūl). He points out that though the saints were chosen by God, yet they were not His messengers. Therefore, they are excluded from the obvious meaning of the verse. Moreover, he says that this verse was to repudiate the miracles of the saints, since they were not the messengers of God, and God gives the miracles only to His messengers.

In order to make it clear, az-Zamakhsharî proceeds to give us an example by saying that this verse is also to repudiate the divination ( al-kahāna), and the astrology ( at-tanjîm). The reason for God's repudiation, according to az-Zamakhsharî, is due to the fact that both the diviner and the astrologer have not been granted the sanction of God ( al-irtidā'), instead, they are subject to the wrath of God.1

1. Ibid, II, 497.
Al-Bayḍāwī, in agreement with the Ashʿarites concerning the miracles of the saints, maintains that the karāma is possible for the saints.¹

Concerning the Qurʾānic verse ‘3:42’, al-Bayḍāwī maintains that the angels "talking to Mary face to face" was the result of her karāma and not Zachariah's miracle as claimed by az-Zamakhsharī. However, he asserts that the karāma is not impossible for the saints.²

Al-Bayḍāwī's criticism regarding the Qurʾānic verse '3:37' is obvious. He says that the verse itself, however, is indicative of the possibility of karāma for the saints.³

Al-Bayḍāwī, in his interpretation of the Qurʾānic verse '72:26, 27', strongly repudiates az-Zamakhsharī's view. He points out that the word rasūl (messenger) in the verse, means the angel (al-malāk), and not the prophet as claimed by az-Zamakhsharī. On the other hand, he argues that the significance of using the words "illā man irtaḍā min rasūl" is to show that there is no intermediary (bi-ghayri wasṭin) between God and the angels if He has

1. Tawāliʿ, p. 93; Miṣbaḥ, fol. 225b.
3. Ibid, II, 16.
chosen them to know the unseen (al-ghayb). In order to make his view clear, he states that the karāma of the saints on the unseen (al-mughayyabān) is through the intermediary of the angels. Likewise, our knowledge of the eschatological matters, he continues, is dependent on the intermediary of the prophet.¹ Inevitably al-Baydawī's interpretation of the word rasūl to mean the angel, however, implies that the karāma is not impossible for anyone who has been chosen by God, even though he is not a prophet. Therefore, the karāma, based on al-Baydawī's argument, is also possible for the saints.

¹ Ibid, V, 156.
CHAPTER FOUR

INTERMEDIATE POSITION, PROMISE AND THREAT

This chapter is to examine az-Zamakhsharī's view regarding the fundamental Mu'tazilite principles of "Intermediate Position" (al-Manzila bayn al-Manzilatayn), "Promise and Threat" (al-Wa'd wa l-Wa'Id). On the other hand, it is to expose al-Dayāwī's criticism of az-Zamakhsharī's regarding the fate of the grave sinner (murta-kib al-Kabīra), the concept of Īmān, etc.

According to a widely accepted view the doctrine of the intermediate position started with Wāsil or 'Amr declaring that the grave sinner was in an intermediate position and then withdrawing from al-Ḥasan's circle.¹

Az-Zamakhsharī's support to this doctrine of the intermediate position can be seen from his interpretation of certain Qur'ānic verses:

I. 17:9-10 'Surely this Qur'ān guides to the way that is straightest, and gives good tidings to

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the believers who do deeds of righteousness, that theirs shall be a great wage, and that those who do not believe in the world to come we have prepared for them a painful chastisement."

The verses integrally deal with two categories of people; the believers and the unbelievers without even mentioning the wicked. To this, az-Zamakhsharī maintains that people at that time belong whether to believers or hypocrites, then come the follower of the intermediate position. However, az-Zamakhsharī's view suggests that the "doctrine" was not known during the revelation.

II 12:26 "He leads none astray save the wicked." (wa mā yuḍillu bi-hi illa 1-fāsiqīn)

Az-Zamakhsharī emphasises that fāsiq is in the intermediate position since he is disobedient to the law of God by committing grave sins. Therefore, he should be eternally punished. Az-Zamakhsharī states that there are two verses in the Qur'ān which have been used regarding fāsiq; II 149:11 "An evil name is ungodliness after belief."

II 9:67 "The hypocrites - they are the ungodly."

1. Al-Kashshāf, I, 543.
Az-Zamakhsharî states that this doctrine is taken from Wāsil Ibn-'Atā'.

Al-Bayḍawi agreed with az-Zamakhsharî in defining fāsiq as a man who commits an act of disobedience against the command of God, but he disagreed with az-Zamakhsharî about the fate of fāsiq or the grave sinner in which az-Zamakhsharî strongly maintains that he is in the intermediate category; neither a believer nor an unbeliever, and he will remain forever in the fire if he does not repent.

In order to make his refutation clear al-Bayḍawi divided the grave sinner (al-fāsiq) into three categories:

I He who commits grave sin and considers it abominable (mustaqbihan). To this, al-Bayḍawi calls it at-tagḥābī.

II He who commits grave sin habitually without considering the consequence is called al-inhimāk.

III He who commits grave sin and considers it licit (mustahillan) is called al-juḥūd. At this fāsiq, ̈̂̊̆̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍̓̐̂̃̆̂̊̈̂̊̍ blonde.

1. Ibid, I, 49.
al-Baydāwī admits that he is no longer to be called a believer, while the other two are still believers since the name of a believer could not be removed so long as it was ascribed to the taṣdīq of which was called ʿīmān. Implicit in his statement is that the grave sinner is not in the intermediate category. Therefore, the fate of him is not forever in the fire. The third category of fāsiq, however, will eternally be punished on the basis that he is an unbeliever, not because he commits grave sin.

"Grave" (kabāʾir) and "venial" sins (ṣagḥāʾir)

The demarcation between grave and venial sins as well as their punishment (ʿiqāb) was the object of serious controversy in early Islam. However, the term "kabāʾir" itself has its origin in the Qurʾān "53:33" "kabāʾir al-ithm wa l-fawāḥish" (heinous sins and indecencies) which has become the pivotal basis of the distinction of sins.

Perhaps, its first stage, as Wensinck says, may be found in the traditions in which the Prophet is asked about the greatest sin. The answer is: polytheism (shirk).

1. Anwār, I, 127.
2. Muslim Creed, p. 36.
Then it is asked: What next? The answer is: Killing one's own child, or: inhuman treatment of parents. The third in the list is either adultery or false witness.¹

According to al-Ash'arī, the Mu'tazilites in general recognised the basic demarcation between "grave" and "venial" sins by saying:

"Everything for which there is a threat (wa'Id) is "grave", whereas any act of disobedience for which there is no wa'Id is "venial". Others took the view that not only everything which is the direct object of wa'Id is "grave" but also everything which is similar to it in degree, and that everything for which there is no wa'Id or anything analogous to it can be either entirely or partly "venial" and partly "grave", but it can never happen that such an act should be neither "venial" nor even partly "venial". Ja'far b. Mubashshir of the Baghdad School taught that all intention (to commit a sin) was a "grave" sin, all those who committed an act of disobedience intentionally were grave sinners.²

Az-Zamakhsharī had a somewhat different definition to give about the distinction between these two kinds of sins. He clearly states that a "grave" sin is one whose punishment

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could not be pardoned except by repentance (tawba).\(^1\)

Whilst al-Bayḍāwī declares that the definition of "grave" sin (kabīra) is that for which a definite legal punishment has been fixed by the lawgiver (ash-shāri'), or the lawgiver threatens a punishment (wa'īd).\(^2\)

Having explained the position of "grave" sin, it has become clear that az-Zamakhsharı lays stress on tawba. Later on, his definition will become the fundamental basis of his judgement about the fate of the "grave" sinner (murtakib al-kabīra) as we shall discuss later.

The fate of the "grave sinner" (murtakib al-kabīra)

As a continuation of the concept of "al-manzila bayn al-manzilatayn", the Mu'tazilites maintained that the "grave" sinner would remain in fire forever unless he repented. While the Ash'arites asserted that he would not be eternally punished since sin did not remove the sinner from his belief.

\(^{1}\) Al-Kashshāf, II, 418 (4:31); cf. vol. I, 204 (4:31) in which az-Zamakhsharı considers "grave" or "venial" sin when it is compared to the disobedience or reward or punishment of its doer (fā'ilu-hā).

\(^{2}\) Anwār, II, 82.
In both his "Ibāna" and "Maqālat",\(^1\) al-Ash'ari representing the people of Truth and Sunnah, declares that, "We profess that we do not exercise Takfīr against any member of our community because of a sin he has committed. Like adultery, drinking wine etc. while in his "Ibāna" he adds that, "We teach that whoever commits a "grave" sin, or anything like it, holding it to be allowed, is an unbeliever, since he does not believe in its prohibition."

According to al-Baghdādi,\(^2\) people in the life-hereafter, are divided into three categories:

I Sābiqūn Muqarrabūn (The outstrippers who are near stationed to God.)

II Aṣḥābu l-Yamīn (The Companions of the Right).

III Aṣḥābu sh-Shimāl (The Companions of the Left).

Al-Baghdādi explains that the first category belongs to those who will go to Paradise without accountance (bi-lā ḥisāb). The second category consists of believers while the third consists of unbelievers. Moreover, al-Baghdādi

maintains that the grave sinner among Muslims either belongs to the first category or the second one. At any rate, he will finally go to Paradise with the mercy of God.

The dispute between az-Zamakhshari and al-Baydawi about "grave" sinners, whether they will be eternally punished or not, can be seen through the following verses:

I 

I 4:481 "God forgives not that aught should be with Him associated; less than that He forgives to whomsoever He will, whoso associates with God anything, has indeed forged a mighty sin." (Inna llah la yaqfiru an yushraka bi-hi wa yaghfiru ma duna dhaliqa li-man yashaa' wa man yushrik bi-llahi faqad iftarar ith-man 'aziman)

The explanation of az-Zamakhshari in terms of the Mu'tazilite creed is that God would forgive the person who had associated some other deity (ash-shirk) provided that the person guilty of association repented (ba'da an yatuba), and that He did not forgive the remaining grave sins, except when the guilty person repented. Az-Zamakhshari, however, conceives that the fate of the unrepented grave sinner remains the same as the polytheist. In interpreting this verse, az-Zamakhshari concentrates on the words, "Less than that He forgives to whomsoever He will" (wa yaghfiru ma duna dhaliqa li-man yashaa'). According to az-Zamakhshari
the first part of the verse "God forgives not that aught should be with Him associated" (Inna llāha lā yaghfiru an yushraka bi-hī), refers to him who does not repent, while the second part "less than that He forgives to whomsoever He will" (wa yaghfiru mā dūna dhālika li-man yashā'), refers to the person who repents (li-man tāba). Az-Zamakhsharī proceeds to give an example from everyday life. For instance, a person might say: The ruler (amīr) does not spend even a single dinār for one person, but he spends a heap of gold for another person, if he wishes. This implies that the ruler does not spend a dinār on a person who does not deserve it, but he is prepared to spend even a heap of gold for another who is really deserving.¹

Al-Daydāwī refutes the above argument of az-Zamakhsharī and claims that the Qur'ānic confirmation that God forgives all else except association with Himself (ash-shirk bi-hī) includes both "grave" and "venial" sins whether before or after repentance (qabla at-tawbati aw ba‘da-hā), and God's assertion that li-man yashā' (whomsoever He will) denotes that He forgives all the sins (i.e. except ash-shirk), not for all persons but for some since His pardon is not an obligation, but a "grace" (tafaddul), and "beneficence".

(ihsān). Moreover, he considers that az-Zamakhsharī’s interpretation of the first part of the verse "Inna llāha la yaghfiru an yushraka bi-hi" as a reference to him who does not repent (huwa man lam yatub) and the second part wa yaghfiru ma dūna dhālika li-man yashā’ refers to the person who repents (li-man tāba) as "reservation" without having substantiated it by burden of proof (taqyīd bi-lā dalīl), therefore, it implies weakness. In his Tawālī‘ al-Anwār (p. 100), al-Baydāwī states that wa yaghfiru li-man yashā’ should be interpreted as qabla at-tawba (before repentance), otherwise, it makes no difference to the first part: Inna llāha la yaghfiru an yushraka bi-hi. In doing so, the verse 14: 48 is in complete opposition to verses concerning threat (āyāt al-wa‘īd) whose meaning imply universality (‘āmma), such as the verse 14: 93. Again, al-Baydāwī assumes that the interpretation of az-Zamakhsharī regarding the above proposition contradicted the Mu’tazilite views; the necessity of punishment (wujūb at-ta‘dhīb) before repentance, and the necessity of forgiveness after repentance (ba‘da at-tawba) since both cases entirely depend on the will of God (mashīḥat Allāh) as clearly demonstrated by the verse, "Whomsoever He will" (li-man yashā’). Moreover, al-Baydāwī argues that since their claim entails God’s forgiveness of all else except association with Him from him who repents (li-man tāba) is also dependent upon the will of God, therefore, there is no obligation upon God to forgive the repented grave sinner.¹

¹. Anwār, II, 92.
Ill. '4:93' "And whoso slays a believer wilfully, his recompense is Gehenna, therein dwelling forever, and God will be wroth with Him, and curse him, and prepare for him a mighty chastisement.

(wa man yaqtul mu'minan muta'ammidan fa-jazā'u-hū Jahannamu khālidan fī-hā, wa ghadiba-lūhū 'alay-hi wa la'a'ana-hū wa a'adda la-hū 'adhāban 'azīmā).

From the outset of his approach to the verse, az-Zamakhshari clearly states that the verse is lofty intended to warn "believers" (mu'minīn) not to cause any bloodshed to their fellow-brothers by design (muta'ammidan), since, by doing so, it constitutes a "grave" sin, and thus will result in severe punishment for eternity. Az-Zamakhshari, however, conceives that the verse in discussion strongly substitutes his claim, and emphasises that "it" has great importance (amrun 'azīm) to the believers. In explaining the text, az-Zamakhshari lays stress on the assumption of the universality of the threat, and asserts that the personal pronoun "man" (whomsoever) in the verse, should include "any killer" (ayyu qātil kāna), whether he is a believer or unbeliever, repentant or unrepentant. But the repentant, az-Zamakhshari assures, is excluded from the effect of the universality of the verse by the previous verse '4:48'. In order to make his view very clear, he refers to a few traditions:
a. Ibn-'Abbas is reported to have said that the repentance of him who kills a believer (muta'ammidan) will not be accepted.

b. Sufyân ath-Thawrî is also reported to have said, "The 'people of knowledge' if asked (about the killing) said, 'His repentance will not be accepted', etc."

Az-Zamakhsharî greatly presumes that such judgement (from them) is taken from the Sunna of the Prophet, otherwise, he argues, all sins are forgiven by Tawba.

Having explained the traditions, az-Zamakhsharî mocked the Ash'arites who believed that God would forgive him who killed a believer by design, even if he did not repent, and accused them of wanting more than their right; either they did not study the Qur'ân and the traditions or their hearts were sealed. Furthermore, az-Zamakhsharî challenged them to bring such stronger proof than the verse '4:93' to refute his view.¹

Commenting on the verse, al-Baydâwî states that the verse is purported to him who did not repent. For the repentant, he explains, God will forgive him. He alludes to a Qur'ânic verse as a proof '20:82' "Yet I am all-forgiving

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¹ Al-Kâshshâf, I, 223.
to him who repents." A question arises, why such a statement comes from an Ash'arite who affirmatively maintains that the grave sinner (šāhib al-kabīrā) will not be eternally punished? In settling the question, al-Baydawī explains that the verse is absolutely for him who kills a believer by design and considers it licit (mustaḥillān la-hū). According to al-Baydawī, this view is strongly supported by the occasion of revelation that Maqīs b. Dabābā found his brother, Hishām dead in the place of Banū an-Najjur without having any knowledge about the killer, then the Prophet (peace be upon him) asked Banū an-Najjur to pay blood-money (diyya) to him. Afterwards, he (Maqīs) suspected a Muslim of killing his brother, then killed him, and went back to Mecca renegade (murtaddan). According to the Islamic point of view, he who considers illicit things as licit or else, is uneligible to be a member of the Islamic community. In other words, he is an unbeliever. Therefore, the verse should be attributed in accordance with al-Baydawī's view as wa-man yaqtul mu'minan muta'amīdan mustaḥillān (considers it licit) fa-jazā'u-hū Jahanām....)

Another interpretation presented by al-Baydawī in his refutation with az-Zamakhsharī is that the word "khālidan or al-khulūd" in the verse means "for a long stay" (al-makthat-ţawīl), not forever. Furthermore, al-Baydawī affirms that there are many proofs which indicate that the grave
sinners will not be eternally punished as we shall discuss later.

III 2:275' "God has permitted trafficking, and forbidden usury. (wa aḥalla-lāhu 1-bay'a wa ḥarrama ar-riba). Whosoever receives an admonition from his Lord and gives over, he shall have his past gains, and his affair is committed to God; but whosoever reverts (wa man‘āda) those are the inhabitants of the fire, therein dwelling forever. (fa-ulā'ika ašíhabu an-nār hum fī-hā khālidūn).

As far as this verse is concerned, az-Zamakhsharī emphatically affirms that "grave" sinners will remain forever in fire. However, he clings to the words "fa-ulā'ika ašíhabu an-nār hum fī-hā khālidūn" and declares it as a clear proof to support his view. Moreover, he interprets the words "wa man‘āda" as a reference to "usury" (ar-riba). Therefore, whosoever reverts to "practising usury" he will be eternally punished, whether he considers it licit (istiḥlāl) or not, since "committing usury" itself is a grave sin.

While Al-Bayḍāwī strongly opposes az-Zamakhsharī's

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2. Al-Kashshāf, I, 129.
view and maintains that only the "grave" sinner who considers "usury" as licit will remain in fire forever. Al-Bayḍa‘wī interprets the words "whomsoever reverts" as a reference to him who considers "usury" as licit. Therefore, he who commits "usury" alone, will not remain forever in fire as long as he is a believer.¹

After refuting az-Zamakhsharī about the fate of the "grave" sinner, al-Bayḍa‘wī proceeds to provide his proofs which indicate that the "grave" sinner will not be eternally punished as follows:

1. 99:7 "Whoso has done an atom's weight of good shall see it (fa-man ya‘mal mithqāla dharratin khayran yara-hū).

Al-Bayḍa‘wī explains that he who has done an atom's weight of good, should not see it except after his punishment (ba‘da ‘iqābi-hū). This statement, however, implies that even an atom's weight of good done by a "grave" sinner, will be rewarded, but this reward will take place after his being punished in the fire.² While Az-Zamakhsharī maintains that it is only "true believers" (su‘ādā‘) who

1. Anwār, I, 268.
2. Ťawālī‘, p. 99; Miṣbāḥ, fol. 233b.
can see "it", not the "grave" sinners. Az-Zamakhsharī attributes the verse as fa-man ya‘mal mithqāla dharratin' khayran min farīqi as-su‘adā', therefore, the "grave" sinner, in accordance with az-Zamakhsharī, will be eternally punished.

II '3:48' "God forgives not that aught should be with Him associated; less than that He forgives to whomsoever He will, whoso associates with God anything, has indeed forged a mighty sin."^2

III '3:25' "But how will it be, when we gather them for a day whereon is no doubt, and every soul shall be paid in full what they have earned, and they shall not be wronged?." Al-Bayḍawi maintains that the fulfillment of the believer's faith and his work will not take place in the fire or before entry into it, therefore, it should come after salvation.^3

IV '49:9' "If two parties of the believers fight,

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3. Anwār, II, 11.
put things right between them."

He maintains that the grave sinner is still a believer. It is on these grounds that Muqātil Ibn-Sulaymān and Mūrji‘ites hold that they will not be punished.¹

V The Prophet said that he who uttered there was no god but God, would enter Paradise."²

VI Consensus (ijmā‘) that God was forgiving. In order to show His forgiveness, He omits the punishment from the grave sinners.³

The concept of Ḥīmān

Az-Zamakhsharī defines Ḥīmān⁴ as follows:

The true Ḥīmān consists in a man being convinced of the truth, then expressing his inner conviction by the tongue, and then confirming it by his deed. Therefore, a

1. Ibid, V, 88, I, 127; Tawāli‘, p. 98.
The man who lacks the inner conviction is a hypocrite, however much he may confess verbally and do good works. He who lacks the verbal confession is an unbeliever, while he lacks "doing" is a fāsiq.

Az-Zamakhsharī, however, maintains that ʿImān which is accompanied by good work alone will deserve "divine guidance". He bases his view on many Qur'ānic verses such as "Surely those who believe, and do deeds of righteousness, their Lord will guide them for their belief (bi-ʿ Imāni-him) beneath them rivers flowing in gardens of bliss."

As far as this verse is concerned, az-Zamakhsharī concentrates on the words "for their belief" (bi-ʿ Imāni-him) in which it should be understood as referring to good deeds since it is mentioned clearly after the words "Imān and good work".

In fact, the definition of good work (ʿamal ǧāliḥ) given by az-Zamakhsharī is controversial to the Ashʿarites in which he defines it as "what is fairly right, as given

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1. Al-Kashšāf, I, 18 (2:3)
2. Ibid, I, 417, I, 267, verse (5:65); cf., II, 410 (51:5) in which he considers good work and ʿImān as inseparable from one another. cf., Il, 413 (52:21).
evidence by reason, the Qur'ān and Tradition. 1 Al-Baydāwī gives a different definition by saying that "good work" is what the law has approved and considered it to be good. 2 At any rate, al-Baydāwī stresses the good work on sharī'a while az-Zamakhshārī on reason first, then the Qur'ān and Tradition.

Az-Zamakhshārī's stress on good work inevitably leads to saying that the right to enter Paradise is not as the result of tafaddul (grace) any more, since it totally depends on merit (i.e. good work).

In fact, al-Ashʿarī as an eponym of Ashʿarites, has two definitions of ʿImān:

In his Lumaṭ, he defines ʿImān as an assent (taṣdīq). Al-Ashʿarī maintains no "saying" nor "doing" as part of ʿImān. 3 While in his Ibāna, he defines ʿImān in the Ḥanbali tradition as "word" (gawāl) and work. 4 Perhaps, his former definition was to refute the Muʿtazilites who maintained that confession and work are included in ʿImān, while with the latter, he tried to please the Ḥanbalites.

1. Ibid, I, 43 (2:25)
2. Anwār, I, 118 (2:25)
3. Lumaṭ, p. 75.
4. Ibāna, p. 11.
However, later Ash'arites attribute to him the definition of Ḥīmān in different ways. Al-Bayḍāwī states that Abu-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī says, "Ḥīmān is an assent to God, and to His rasūl (messengers) with regard to their reports; but this tasdīq (assent) is sound unless accompanied by "knowledge of God". While Ash-Shahrastānī defines Ḥīmān in accordance with the Ash'arite view in his "Milāl" that Ḥīmān is an assent to God while saying and doing are only its branches.

Al-Bayḍāwī's definition of Ḥīmān is that "Ḥīmān is an assent to what is known to have come from Muhammad (peace be upon him) such as the unity of God, the prophethood, the resurrection, and the reward. In order to attain the perfection of Ḥīmān, al-Bayḍāwī concludes that Ḥīmān should consist of inner conviction, confession and work. Yet

1. Usūl, p. 248. cf., Ḥārāq, p. 343, in which he points out that the central controversy refers to the question whether Ḥiqār and the acts of obedience should be called Ḥīmān.

2. Milāl, p. 73. cf., Ḥārāq, p. 472. Ash-Shahrastānī sometimes defines Ḥīmān as "knowledge of God, pre-existence and the attributes of the Creator and sometimes, he defines it as mental speech (qawl bi-nafs) which contains the knowledge of God.

3. Anwār, I, 55; Misbāḥ, fol. 234b.
"work" for al-Baydāwī is not part of Īmān. In strengthening his view, he alludes to several Qur'ānic verses which indicate that Īmān is only taṣdīq as follows:

I

The inscription of Īmān to the heart:

a. '58:22' "Those - He has written faith upon their hearts."

b. '16:106' "Whoso disbelieves in Gd, after he has believed - excepting him who has been compelled, and his heart is still at rest in his belief."

c. '5:41' "O messenger, let them not grieve thee that vie with one another in unbelief, such men as say with their mouths 'We believe but their hearts believe not.'"

d. '49:14' "The Bedouins say, 'We believe'. Say: 'You do not believe'; rather you say, "We surrender." (aslama).  

1. The meaning of aslama is discussed by M.N. Bravmann under the title "On the spiritual background of early Islam and the History of its principal concepts" in Meseon 64 (1951) pp 8-27; cf., The spiritual background of early Islam by the same author, pp. 7-26; Watt, Formative Period, pp. 130-1.
II The accompaniment of "good work" with ʿIman in many places such as 2:25: "Give thou good tidings to those who believe and do good work."

III The link of the faith (ʿIman) with the sins in the same verse such as:

a. '2:178' "O believers, prescribed for you is retaliation, touching the slain..."

b. '6:82' "Those who believe, and have not confounded their belief with evil doing..."\(^1\)

IV A prophetic tradition saying that ʿIman consists of seventy odd parts, the most excellent of which is the testimony that there is no god but God and the lowliest is the removal of harm (imāta al-arihā) from the road." According to al-Bayḍāwī, this tradition means "branches of ʿIman" (not part of it); because the removal of harm is unanimously agreed by Muslim Ulama' to be not a part of ʿImān.\(^2\)

All these verses, he says, even though, they are slightly different indicate that ʿImān is only an assent (taṣdīq).

1. Anwār, I, 55; Niṣbāḥ, fol. 234b.
2. Tawāli', p. 102; Niṣbāḥ, fol. 234b.
Al-Bayḍāwī's emphasis on the essentiality of taṣdīq is similar to al-Ashʿarī's definition of Īmān in his "Luma". This, however, raises a question. Is taṣdīq alone sufficient to be called a muʿmin or should it be accompanied by confession (iqrār)?

Al-Bayḍāwī's solution to this question is that "confession" is inevitable for him who is capable of professing himself publicly. The very basis of his view is due to God's condemnation of the obstinate (al-mutanid) being more than the negligent ignorant (al-jāhil al-muqassir).

Even though al-Bayḍāwī maintains that "work" is not part of Īmān, only as a token (dalīl), he admittedly states that it, sometimes, includes "work", because "work" comes to confirm Īmān. In another word, work for al-Bayḍāwī is a perfection of Īmān. It is on these grounds that Īmān varies in degrees, increases and decreases.

Since al-Bayḍāwī believes that work is inevitable, as part of Īmān, it is not surprising that Īmān for him, can increase and decrease.

1. Ibid, I, 55 (2:2)
There is no disagreement between al-Bayḍāwī and az-Zamakhsharī regarding the increase or the decrease of ʿImān, since al-Bayḍāwī maintains that the avoidance of work is almost inevitable.

The real centre of controversy between him and az-Zamakhsharī as far as the conception of ʿImān is concerned refers to the question, who is a muʾmin?

Certainly al-Bayḍāwī's concentration on taṣdīq is to include the grave sinners in the community, therefore, it is an attempt to reject az-Zamakhsharī's view of the Muʿtazilite influence.

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The concept of Ḥibbat and Takfīr.

The general meaning of the Mu'tazilite's concept of Ḥibbat and Takfīr concerning "obedience"1 (tarā'a) and "disobedience" (maš'īa) is given by 'Abd-al-Jabbar al-Mu'tazili (d. 1024) in his book "Usūl al-Khamsa". He states that a mukallaf has two alternatives: either he deserves to be rewarded, or else punished. In both cases, he explains, if the "act of obedience" is greater in quality than the "act of disobedience" or the contrary is the case, the smaller will be removed by the greater.2

Az-Zamakhshari, in conformity with the Mu'tazilite view, declares that Takfīr is the removal of a punishment from him who deserves to be punished either by means of increasing his reward or due to his repentance.

As to the definition of Ḥibbat, az-Zamakhshari states

1. According to al-Baghdādi, tarā'a means that a man acts in conformity with what somebody else has commanded him to do. Anyone who does so is "obedient" (muți'i), while maš'īa means that a man acts against what he has been commanded to do, and does what he has been prohibited to do." Usūl, pp. 251-252; cf. Izutsu, The Concept of Belief, p. 36.

that, "It is the removal of the reward (which is opposite to takfīr) by means of increasing his punishment, or due to his regret for his "act of obedience"."¹

It is obvious for az-Zamakhsharī that the concept of ōbāt and takfīr plays a major role in deciding the fate of grave sinners. However, az-Zamakhsharī's view can be seen through his interpretations of certain Qur'ānic verses:

I

'2:25' "Give thou good tidings to those who believe and do deeds of righteousness, that for them await gardens." (anna la-hum jannātin...)

In his interpretation of the verse, az-Zamakhsharī maintains that the mukallaf will deserve his reward by his "faith" and "good" work. Moreover, he states that there are two things which can fail man's reward: "unbelief" (kufr) and "grave" sins (kabīra). On the other hand, he should not regret what he has done for the act of obedience and his unperformed act of disobedience. Concerning īhsān (the act of righteousness), az-Zamakhsharī conceives that he who performs "it" will definitely deserve a reward and praise (thanā') so long as he avoids what will damage his īhsān.² In order to strengthen his view, az-Zamakhsharī

¹ Al-Kashshāf, I, 204 (4:31)
² Al-Kashshāf, I, 43.
proceeds to refer to another Qur'anic verse 139:65: "If thou associatest other gods with God (la-in ashrakta), thy work shall surely fail (la-yahbatanna 'amalu-ka.)

Az-Zamakhshari asserts that, if this verse was intended for the Prophet, who is the noblest of creatures of God, in order not to associate other gods with Him, what about others! Az-Zamakhshari is fully aware that the Prophet would never associate other gods with God and his work would never fail. But, he states that the verse is a hypothetical one though it is impossible for the Prophet. Moreover, az-Zamakhshari states that such "impossibility" can be presumed for certain purposes. Furthermore, he interprets the words (wa Ic-L-takunanna mina I-khásirin) (thou wilt be among the losers) as a reference to the failure of their work (hubūt al-‘amal).

II / 49:2/ "O believer, raise not your voices above the Prophet's voice, and be not loud in your speech to him, as you are loud one to another, lest your works fail (an tahbaṭa a‘mālu-kum), while you are not aware (wa antum lā tash‘urūn).

In his explanation of the verse, az-Zamakhshari

1. Ibid, II, 305, regarding az-Zamakhshari's remark following the verse (39:65).
clearly states that the verse concentrates mainly on two things: the act of committing grave sins will fail the work, and some of the sins which are not being realised, also will fail the work. Therefore, believers should be very careful in their daily life; likewise those who walk on a "thorny way" (ṭāriq shā'ik). What az-Zamakhsharī really means is that if a believer commits a grave sin, it will fail his "good work", therefore, he shall be eternally punished even if he did not repent. 1

III 47:33 "O believers, obey God, and obey the Messenger, and do not make your own works vain (wa lā tubṭīlū aʿmāla-kum).

As far as this verse is concerned, az-Zamakhsharī lays stress on the words wa lā tubṭīlū aʿmāla-kum. He says that the verse should be interpreted as "Do not fail your works by committing "grave sins" (lā tuḥbīṭū aṭ-ṭāʿāt bi-l-kabāʾîr). In order to support his view, az-Zamakhsharī proceeds to refer to some sayings of the Companions of the Prophet as follows:

Abu-l-ʿĀliya is reported to have said that the Companions of the Prophet maintain that sin does not

1. Ibid, II, 391.
do any injury where there is "faith", just as acts of obedience are of no use where there is shirk until the verse was revealed "wa lā tubṭilū 'mālakum". Then the Companions of the Prophet became afraid of "grave sins" that would fail their works.

Qatāda is reported to have said that God will bless His servant as long as his bad work does not fail his good work, etc.

Al-Bayḍāwī refutes az-Zamakhsharī regarding the concept of iḥbāṭ '2:25' by saying that grave sins will not fail a believer's work. Therefore, he is not eternally punished. Al-Bayḍāwī has strong grounds for believing that since "faith" (Imān) in accordance with him, does not include "work" it is only an assent (taṣdīq). Al-Bayḍāwī also maintains that God is not bound to reward the believer even if he does "good" work since "reward" (thawāb) is a mere "grace" of God (fadl Allāh). But he believes that God will grant His reward on the basis of His promise. As far as the concept of iḥbāṭ is concerned, al-Bayḍāwī declares that it only happens to a man in his state of unbelief. In strengthening his view, he refers to the verse '2:217' "And whomever of you turns from his religion, and dies

1. Ibid, II, 381.
disbelieving (fa-yamut wa huwa kāfirun) their works have failed (fa-ulā' ika habībat a'mālu-hum).

Al-Bayḍāwī says that God has restricted him who dies disbelieving - his work has failed but not the grave sinner. Furthermore, he concludes that since God did not mention the ihbāṭ in the verse in discussion '2:25', it means that grave sins will not fail their works.¹

Concerning the verse '49:2' al-Bayḍāwī clearly states that the verse concentrates on those who raised their voices above the Prophet's voice scornfully, since such an act leads to unbelief. According to al-Bayḍāwī, this verse, however, has nothing to do with other grave sins.²

Commenting on the verse '47:33' al-Bayḍāwī strongly refutes az-Zamakhsharī by saying that this verse has nothing to do with az-Zamakhsharī's claim, since "unbelief" and hypocrisy of course failed their works, not the grave sins.³

The following are some of the examples presented by

2. Ibid, V, 86.
3. Ibid, V, 80.
az-Zamakhshari in conformity with the Mu'tazilite concept of takfir:

I

'4:31' "If ye avoid the grave sins which ye are forbidden, (in tajtanibū kabā'ira mā tunhawna 'an-hu) we will remove from you evil deeds (nukaffir 'an-kum sayyi'āti-kum)."

Az-Zamakhshari affirmatively maintains that the avoidance of grave sins nullifies divine punishment for venial sins. In order to strengthen his view, he interprets the words "nukaffir 'an-kum sayyi'āti-kum" as to mean "we will remove from you what makes you deserve to be punished among the venial sins by increasing the reward as a result of your avoidance of grave sins. However, az-Zamakhshari's remark seems to imply that it is necessary for God to forgive a man's venial sins just when he avoids the grave sins.¹

II

'29:7' "And those who believe, and do righteous deeds, we shall surely remove from them evil deeds. (jadi-nukaffirannya 'an-hum sayyi'āti-him).

As far as this verse is concerned, az-Zamakhshari

states that the verse is intended either for the believers who do good works then commit venial sins, or it is intended for the polytheists who become believers and do good works. For the former, az-Zamakhsharī maintains that their (venial) sins are forgiven by their avoidance of the grave sins, while for the latter, he states that God will remove their previous sins; unbelief, disobedience, etc. by increasing their reward after being Muslims.\(^1\)

As we already know, the Ashārites deny the concept of takfīr. Al-Baydāwī, however, maintains that it is not necessary for God to forgive the venial sins when the grave sins are avoided. In strengthening his view, he interprets the verse \(^4:31\) "nukaffir `an-kum sayyiāti-kum" as to mean "naghfir lakum saghā'ira-kum" (we will forgive your venial sins). His interpretation, however, implies that "forgiveness" is up to God. Therefore, there is no obligation for God to forgive. Al-Baydāwī, however, does not deny that God will forgive the venial sins when the grave sins are avoided, since it is dependent upon God's will.\(^2\)

Commenting on the verse \(^29:7\) al-Baydāwī maintains that God will remove evil deeds from a believer when he

\(^1\) Al-Kashshāf, II, 174.

\(^2\) Anwār, II, 82; cf. vol. V, p. 103 (53:33).
performs the acts of obedience. Likewise He will remove evil deeds from an unbeliever, when he becomes Muslim.\footnote{Ibid, IV, 135.} Al-Baydawi's interpretation of the verse, at this time, however, seems to support az-Zamakhshari's view, but if his previous interpretation of the verse 4:31 is justified, it is certain that God has no obligation to forgive him who commits even venial sins.

After refuting az-Zamakhshari's arguments, al-Baydawi refers to quote a Qur'anic verse in order to support his view 3:25 "When every soul shall be paid in full what it has earned and they shall not be wronged." \(\text{wa wuffiyat kullu nafsin mā kasabat wa hum lā yużlamūn).}\n
Al-Baydawi maintains that "obedience" will not be failed by "disobedience" and the grave sinner will not be punished forever, since the fulfilment (tawfiyya) of his "faith" and his "work" should not take place except after the punishment.\footnote{Ibid, II, 11, cf., vol. III, p. 202 (17:36) in which he maintains that a mere intention to do the act of disobedience (ma'sīa) is even sinful.}

\begin{itemize}
\item 1. Ibid, IV, 135.
\item 2. Ibid, II, 11, cf., vol. III, p. 202 (17:36) in which he maintains that a mere intention to do the act of disobedience (ma'sīa) is even sinful.
\end{itemize}
The concept of Repentance (Tawba)

As we already know from the Mu'tazilite concept of iḥbāṭ and takfīr, a mukallaf has two alternatives: either his "act of obedience" is greater in quality than his "act of disobedience" or else the contrary is the case. For the former, it is not necessary for him to repent since he is not a grave sinner. For the latter, it is necessary for him to repent in order to escape from the fire, and God is bound to forgive when a repentance is made.

Az-Zamakhshari, in conformity with the Mu'tazilite creed, defines tawba as return from the evil (al-qabīḥ) and the breach of what is necessary in Islamic law (iḥlāl bi-l-wājib) with regret (nadam) and the determination not to return to it in future (an lā yuʿāwida).  

Repentance, for Az-Zamakhshari, is the only way to escape the grave sinner from the punishment. Az-Zamakhshari maintains that if he dies unrepentant, he should remain forever in the fire since there is no difference between him and the unbeliever. In strengthening his thesis, he proceeds to quote a Qur'ānic verse 14:168:

"Surely those who disbelieve and act wrongfully (zalāmū), God would not forgive them, neither guide them on any road..."

Az-Zamakhshari, however, asserts that the verse is mainly intended for the unbelievers and the grave sinners since there is no difference between them without tawba.

Az-Zamakhshari's arguments concerning tawba can be seen through his interpretation of the following verses:

'I 39:53' "Say: O my people who have been prodigal against yourselves, do not despair of God's mercy; surely God forgives sins altogether; surely He is the All-forgiving, the All-compassionate."

Commenting on the verse, az-Zamakhshari maintains that God is not disposed to grant forgiveness except to those who repent. He emphasises that the condition of "repentance" is frequently mentioned in the Qur'an, even though it is not stated in this particular verse, yet it has been a common judgement (hukm) since it is impossible to be contradictory to one another. In strengthening his argument, he proceeds to refer to the technicality of reciting (qirā'āt) of Ibn-'Abbās in which he has a slightly different interpretation. He reads yaghfiru dh-dhunūba jamī' an li-man yashā' (whomsoever He will) to the original verse, then interprets

1. Ibid, I, 241.
it to mean "li-man tāba" (those who repent). Az-Zamakhsharī, however, gives a special reason for his own reservation of tawba in the verse by saying that the "willing of God" follows His wisdom, and His justice, not His ownership and His sovereignty.¹

II

13:6 'Thy Lord is forgiving to men, for all their evil doing ('alā žulmi-him), and thy Lord is terrible in retribution."

Az-Zamakhsharī interprets the words "'alā žulmi-him" to mean "zāлимīn li-anfusi-him". Then he gives three alternatives for its interpretation:

a. God would forgive the venial sins if the grave were avoided.

b. God would forgive the grave sins after a repentance was made.

c. Maghfira (mercy) in the verse was to mean "concealment" (as-satr) or "delay" (imhāl).²

1. Ibid, II, 302.

2. Ibid, I, 491.
Az-Zamakhsharî, however, lays stress on tawba, since it is inevitable. Otherwise, they are included among the zâlimîn.

With regard to the repentants who remember their sins, az-Zamakhsharî maintains that they should renew their repentance since az-Zamakhsharî believes that the repentants should remain in a state of constant regret until their death.\(^1\) Even though az-Zamakhsharî did not mention the repentants who returned to their normal states, it is understood that it is more necessary for them to renew their repentance when they returned to the sins. It is on these grounds that az-Zamakhsharî was probably among those who maintained that those who repented, and then returned to their former state, should repent of their sins from the beginning.\(^2\)

According to az-Zamakhsharî, a true repentant is one who has to fulfil three conditions:

a. To give up all the acts of disobedience.

b. To regret his sins constantly.

c. To do good work.\(^3\)

\(^1\) Ibid, II, 91 (24:31)

\(^2\) Magâlît, I, 307.

\(^3\) Al-Kashshâf, II, 116 (25:71)
Al-Bayḍāwī's definition of tawba is as follows:—

Confession of the sins (al-i‘tirāf), regret for them and a firm determination not to return to them again.¹

Al-Bayḍāwī's definition of "repentance" is "to return" but when it is described to God's servant, it means "to return" from the act of disobedience, and when it is described to God, it means "to return" from punishment to forgiveness (al-maghfira).²

Al-Bayḍāwī, however, states that repentance is not the only way for the grave sinners to escape the fire, since it is dependent upon God's will whether or not He forgives the repentants since "His will" follows His sovereignty and His omnipotence. Al-Bayḍāwī quotes certain Qur'ānic verses as proofs:

I

⁴⁸:¹⁴ "God's is the kingdom of the heavens and the earth. He pardons whomsoever He will and punishos whomsoever He pleases. God is forgiving and merciful."³

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1. Anwār, I, 143 (2:37)
2. Ibid, I, 144 (2:37)
3. Ibid, V, 83.
'3:129' "His is all that the heavens and the earth contain. He pardons whom He will and punishes whom He pleases. God is forgiving and merciful."

Al-Bayḍāwī refutes az-Zamakhsharī regarding the necessity of tawba in order to escape from punishment. He says that the two verses are contradictory to the necessity of punishment before a repentance is made as well as forgiveness after repentance.⁴

Commenting on the verse '39:53', al-Bayḍāwī refutes az-Zamakhsharī by saying that it is not true that for forgiveness of sins, tawba is necessary. However, Al-Bayḍāwī declares that tawba is only required for shirk. Moreover, al-Bayḍāwī says that to restrict tawba for forgiveness is contradictory to the obvious meaning of the text which gives the universality of its meaning except shirk.²

With regard to the verse '13:6', al-Bayḍāwī affirmatively maintains that the text is a clear proof to show the possibility of forgiveness before repentance, since the repentant, he argues, is like one who has no sin.³

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1. Ibid, II, 42.
2. Ibid, V, 30.
3. Ibid, III, 147.
Therefore the verse should mean that forgiveness before tawba is permissible for the grave sinners.

Al-Baydawi did not mention the repentants who returned to their former state. Perhaps he agreed with the Ash'arite view that "They should renew their repentance from the second commitment, since the first commitment had already been forgiven." ¹

**Intercession (Ash-Shafā‘a)**

It has been maintained by the Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites that the intercession should take place in the next world since the idea of intercession occurs in the Qur'ān many times. But the question is to whom it would be granted and what its objective would be.

Wensinck suggests that the orthodoxy's adoption of the doctrine of intercession is due to the need for something to counter balance predestination and the influence of Christian idea,² while Professor Watt maintains that, "It is to serve the purpose of relieving the despair caused by excessive moral earnestness."³

² Wensinck, Muslim Creed, p. 180.
In fact, az-Zamakhsharî does not reject the nature of intercession, but what has become a central discussion is the Ash'arites' excessive use of the intercession for all Muslims including the grave sinners.

To study his views on the matter, let us examine his interpretation of certain Qur'anic verses:

'2:48' "And beware of a day when no soul for another shall give satisfaction, and no intercession shall be accepted from it, nor any counterpoise be taken, neither shall they be helped."

(Az-Zamakhsarat in conformity with the Mu'tazilite creed, maintains that the intercession shall not be accepted for the grave sinners (al-`uṣūt) since God clearly states that the soul (an-nafs) fails to give satisfaction to another (soul) (lā tajzi nafsun `an nafsin). This, however, implies that the soul has a limited capacity which is sufficient for itself when it does reach the standard needed, otherwise it will suffer and hope for no intercession. Therefore, it varies in degree in accordance with its deed. Another statement given by az-Zamakhsharî is that God denies the acceptance of any intercession for
the grave sinners and nor should any counterpoise be taken
(wa lā yuqbalu min-hā shafā'atun).

In order to strengthen his view, he tries to explain the grammatical structure of the verse by saying that the pronoun "it" in the verse "nor intercession shall be accepted from it" can be referred either to the second soul (an-nafs ath-thāniya) "nor soul for another (soul)" (nafsun 'an nafsin) which is the "disobedient soul" (an-nafs al-‘āsiā) which deserves no intercession, or it refers to the "first soul" because if it were interceded for, it would be rejected by God. In both cases, az-Zamakhshārī argues, the intercession is impossible for the grave sinners.

II 1:192. "The evildoers shall have no helpers" (wa mā lā-i-z-zālimīna min ansār).

As far as this verse is concerned, az-Zamakhshārī maintains that there will be no helper (nāširun) for the evildoers, neither by intercession nor by others. For az-Zamakhshārī, since God Himself has denied any sort of help (nuṣra), intercession is impossible. God's denial of

1. Al-Kashshāf, I, 55-6.
2. Ibid, I, 119.
nusra (help) implies also His denial of intercession since the word nusra is universal.

III '2:54' "O believer, expend of that wherewith we have provided you, before there comes a day wherein shall be neither traffic, nor friendship, nor intercession (wa lā shafā'a); and the unbelievers— they are the evildoers."

Az-Zamakhsharī asserts the impossibility of having friend or intercessor to intercede for the grave sinners, as the intercession on that day will be only to increase the grace. By this, he means that the intercession will not free the grave sinners from punishment, because there will be no intercession for them at all on one hand, and on the other the intercession on that day will be to increase the grace for the believers.¹

IV '40:18' "..... and the evildoers have not one loyal friend, no intercession to be heeded."

The hypothesis given by az-Zamakhsharī regarding the impossibility of intercession is that the intercessors, in accordance with az-Zamakhsharī, are the friends of God (awliyā' Allāh), and they will only love and sanction

¹. Ibid, I, 183.
those whom God loves and sanctions. Indeed, God will not love the evildoers, hence they will not help and intercede for the grave sinners. Moreover, he says that the purpose of intercession is to increase the grace for the adherents of reward (i.e. believers). He bases his view on a Qur'anic verse '24:37' "... God may recompense them for their fairest works and give them increase of His bounty."  

V '74:48' "Then the intercession of the intercessors shall not profit them."

Az-Zamakhshari maintains the complete rejection of all sorts of intercession for the grave sinners, whether it comes from the angels, the prophets or others, by saying that it will be worthless, since the intercession in the next world is only for those whom God sanctions, and in order to increase the grace.  

VI '78:39' "Upon the day when the spirit and the angels stand in ranks they shall speak not, save him to whom the All-merciful has given leave, and who speaks aright."

In dealing with this verse, az-Zamakhshari states

1. Ibid, II, 312-3.
2. Ibid, II, 506.
that since the spirit (ar-Ruh) and the angels who are the
noblest, the most respectable and the closest creatures to
God, should not speak before Him, what will be the position
of others among the natives of heaven and earth! Of course,
az-Zamakhshari's remark is to ridicule the Ash'arites who
declared that the intercession is possible for all Muslims
including the grave sinners. However, az-Zamakhshari
explains that there are two conditions for the intercession
to be accepted as follows:

a. The speaker (al-mutakallim) should be given a
sanction to speak.

b. He should speak the truth.

The implication of these two conditions is that the
intercessors should receive leave from God beforehand, and
they should not intercede for those to whom God does not
give His sanction. '21:27' "They intercede not save for
him with whom he is well-pleased." ¹

Before examining al-Baydawi's view regarding the
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¹. Ibid, II, 520; cf. vol. II, p. 300 (39:44) in which
az-Zamakhshari affirms that the two conditions for
the intercession are not eligible for the grave
sinners.
intercession, it will be better to know the main body of orthodoxy's idea of intercession. Abū-Ḥanīfa in his Fiqh Akbar II, art 20, states that the intercession of the Prophet Muḥammad (peace be upon him) is a reality for all those who belong to the inhabitants of Paradise, even if they should be guilty of mortal sins. Al-Ash'arī in his "Maqālāt" firmly maintains that God will release a few out of Hell, on account of Muḥammad's intercession after they have been scorched there.

Al-Bayḍāwī, as an Ash'arite, maintains that the intercession is for the grave sinners. This view, however, contradicts az-Zamakhsharī's, and becomes the central point of disagreement between the two scholars.

To study al-Bayḍāwī's refutation against az-Zamakhsharī, we have to go through the above-mentioned verses.

In referring to the verse 2:48, al-Bayḍāwī refutes az-Zamakhsharī by saying that the denial of nūṣra (help) does not negate the intercession since nūṣra is rather specific. Another argument given by al-Bayḍāwī is that the verse in discussion is specially intended for the unbelievers

1. Wensinck, Muslim Creed, p. 130.
as it was shown to refute the belief of the Jews who claimed that their ancestors would intercede for them, but not the grave sinners among the Muslims.  

A somewhat similar argument is also pointed out by al-Baydawi concerning the verse '3:192' in which he recognises that the reason for their being in Hell, and cut off from receiving the help (nusra) is due to their wrong deeds (zulmi-him). But he disagrees with az-Zamakhshari's conclusion of denying the intercession for the grave sinners. He argues that the denial of nusra in the verse, however, does not imply the negation of the intercession since nusra, according to al-Baydawi, is to mean "a forceful prevention" (da\'un bi-qahrin), therefore, it differs from "intercession".

As far as the verse '2:254' is concerned, al-Baydawi, however, maintains that the intercession for the grave sinners is not impossible by the sanction of God since the intercession is to free the grave sinners from the punishment, and not to increase the grace of the believers.

1. Anwar, I, 152.
2. Ibid, II, 520.
3. Ibid, I, 257.
Al-Baydawi's commentary on the verse '40:48' as well as the verse '74:48' is that they were specially revealed for the unbelievers, and nothing to do with the grave sinners whatsoever.

With reference to the verse '78:39', al-Baydawi holds that this verse is to confirm the verse which preceded it, '78:37' "Lord of the heavens and earth, and all that between them is, the All-merciful of whom they have no power to speak." Nevertheless, it does not imply the rejection of the intercession for those to whom God gives His sanction.

To refute az-Zamakhshari's views about the intercession in general, al-Baydawi states that the intercession is not for all people nor for all time. Moreover, he says that if the intercession is general as considered by az-Zamakhshari, he believes that "it" is restricted by virtue of certain Qur'anic verses.

In strengthening his views, al-Baydawi quotes certain Qur'anic verses and prophetic traditions as follows:

1. Ibid, V, 37.
2. Ibid, V, 161.
I

God ordered the Prophet to implore His pardon on behalf of his community (umma) for their sins.

'47:19' "Ask forgiveness for thy sin, and for the believers, men and women."

II

The grave sinner is a believer,¹ hence the Prophet implored God for pardon for the sins in order to show obedience, and al-Baydawi concludes that God will accept his seeking pardon in order to fulfil His good pleasure. '93:5' "Thy Lord shall give thee, and thou shalt be satisfied."

III

The Prophet is reported to have said that his intercession shall be on behalf of those of my community who have committed grave sins.²

IV

The "honourable station" (al-maqṣām al-Maḥmūd) is the station of intercession (maqṣām ash-Shafā'a)

'17:79' "It may be that thy Lord will raise thee up to an honourable station." The Prophet is also reported to have said that the "honourable station" was the station at which he would intercede for his community.³ Moreover, al-Baydawi maintains

1. Ṭawālī', p. 98.
that the intercession is among the duties of the Prophet to intercede for the grave sinners.¹

Conclusion. In az-Zamakhsharî's view, intercession will be granted only to the believers whom God sanctions. It is understandable that any intercession for the grave sinners will be rejected as they are in the intermediate position, and the purpose of the intercession, for him, is only to increase the grace among the believers. Al-Baydawayn, however, maintains the intercession is for the believers including the grave sinners, because the grave sinners, according to him, are believers also, therefore the intercession should be accepted for the grave sinners to free them from punishment.

An interesting remark given by al-Baydawayn is that "intercession" is among the duties of the Prophet. However, this implies a great hope for the idea of intercession.

¹ ibid, II, 97 (4:64).
CHAPTER FIVE

THE CONCEPT OF JUSTICE OF GOD

Free will (硃uriyyat al-Irāda)

The principle of justice (al-'adl) is one of the five Mu'tazilite principles which stands primarily with the doctrine of free will. Their self-entitlement "People of Justice and Unity" (Ahl at-Tawhīd wa l-'Adl) is closely connected with this principle.

Az-Zamakhsharī follows this principle and praises the Mu'tazilites for their strong defence of "justice and unity" by means of introducing very clear proofs and rational evidence. ¹

¹ Al-Kashshāf, II, 139 (3:18). "Allah (Himself) is witness that there is no God save Him. And the angels and the men of learning (ūlū l-'ilm) (too are witness) main His creation in justice. There is no God save Him, the Almighty, the Wise." Az-Zamakhsharī, however, interprets "ūlū l-'ilm" as the people of justice and unity. For his praise for them cf. vol. I, 121 (2:225), vol. I, 271 (5:77), vol. I, 326 (7:28) in which he also defines "justice" as what is uprightly good (mustaqīmun ḥasanun) commonly held by reasonable persons. cf. vol. I, 556-7 (17:75), vol. II, 240 (4:165), vol. II, 568, for his invocation (duʿā') for the part of the Surah 112.
In accordance with his belief in the freedom of human will, az-Zamakhsharī sought to explain away the verses of the Qur'ān which stress God's omnipotence and make man a self-sufficient being.

It will suffice to examine az-Zamakhsharī's view by giving some passages which are regarded as adverse to the principle of human will as follows:

I 16:126-7: "And whomsoever it is Allah's will to guide, He expandeth his bosom unto the surrender (yashraḥ sadra-hū li-l-Īslām), and whomsoever it is His will to send astray (wa man yurid an yudilla-hū), He maketh his bosom close and narrow (yajāl sadra-hū ẓayyiqaḥ ḥarajān) as if he were engaged in sheer ascent. Thus Allah layeth ignominy upon those who believe not. This is the path of thy Lord, a straight path."

The meaning of the text plainly describes the almightiness and the omnipotence of God while men are completely subordinate to this over-ruling power of God. Whether they are to become believers or not, that is not their question since it is God alone who determined their inner feelings. This text, of course, contradicts the majority of the Mu'tazilite view which maintains that faith (Īmān) is a man's acquisition, and not a divine gift.
Az-Zamakhsharī, however, tries to explain away the obvious meaning of the text by saying that whosoever God wills to grace, He expands his bosom to Islam by granting to him His grace (al-.luṭf) which will make him love Islam and feel at ease to it in order that he accept it (Islam). Contrary to whom God abandons (yukhdhilu-hū), He discontinues His grace by making his heart hard to accept it, then goes away from the reality in order that he will not become a believer. Az-Zamakhsharī goes on to explain the words "This is the path of thy Lord" by saying that this is the path of God which always follows the wisdom and custom for succour (tawfīq) and abandonment (khidhlān).

For az-Zamakhsharī "guidance" (hudā) or "leading astray" (dalāl) should not be really attributed to God.

1. Ibid, I, 311.

2. Az-Zamakhsharī states that God's guidance must be taken to mean God's succour and His grace. cf., vol. I, 500 (14:4), II, 292 (39:3). cf., the Qur'ānic verse (2:2), vol. I, 16. However, az-Zamakhsharī maintains that the Qur'ān is to be said as a "guidance" (hudan) only for those who are on the point of accepting the guidance, and not those whose hearts have already stamped "unbelief" (al-kufr).

since it implies the invalidity of human freedom. In order to maintain his view, he replaces the words "guidance" and "leading astray" with "grace" and "abandonment" respectively. As far as the verse is concerned, az-Zamakhsharī seems to have difficulty in defending his Muʿtazilite view since the text is self-sufficient to stand against the view of human freedom. Anyhow, his self-styled interpretation could come a little bit closer to his view of human responsibility.

IT 15: 41, "He whom Allah wills to expose to trial, (wa man yuridi-llāhu fitnata-hū) thou (by thine efforts), wilt avail him naught against Allah. Those are they for whom the will of Allah is that He cleanse not their hearts (lam yuridi-llāhu anyuṭahhira qulūba-hum) theirs in the world will be ignominy, and in the hereafter an awful doom."

This verse is concerned with the sins (al-maʿāṣī) which though committed by man, are due to the will of God (irādat Allāh) and His predetermination. Therefore, a man has no alternative to do what he really wants to, since God already pre-ordained his destiny. In strengthening his Muʿtazilite view, az-Zamakhsharī maintains that God does not will anyone to be a sinner (al-ʿāṣī), in contrast, He wills him to be obedient (al-muṭīʿ) and have a clear heart. According to az-Zamakhsharī, the sin "committed" is a result of his own deed, therefore, he is held responsible for it.
Moreover, az-Zamakhsharī states that his commitment of the sin occurred by means of God's exposing him to the trial (fitna) and his abandonment (khidhlān) of him and not by directly making him do it. He whom God does not will to cleanse his heart, He will not grant His grace since He already knows that His grace for him would be in vain, because he would not make use of it.¹

III '3:8' "Our Lord! Cause not our hearts to stray after Thou hast guided us, and bestow upon us mercy from Thy presence. Lo! Thou, only Thou art the Bestower." (Rabba-nā lā tuzīgh qulūba-nā ba'āda idh hadayta-nā wa hab la-nā min ladun-ka raḥmatan...)

Implicit in this text is that it is God who leads astray a man or guides him while a man just follows the will of God. Az-Zamakhsharī's interpretation of this Qur'ānic verse "Our Lord! Cause not our hearts" is that Our Lord! do not withhold your grace from us since you have already granted it to us. It is obvious that az-Zamakhsharī's explanation is merely to correlate it with his view of human will. The idea of attributing "evil

¹ Ibhid, I, 258. cf., vol. I, 317 (6:148) in which he states that whoever says that the evil of unbelief and ma‘āṣī are the result of God's will is a liar against God, His books and His prophets.
things" to God can, however, be avoided since He is not the directly responsible agent (i.e. for unbelief).\(^1\)

IV 

'2:272' "The guiding of them is not thy duty (O Muhammad), but Allah guideth whom He will." (laysa 'alay-ka hudā-hum wa lākinna-ilāha yahdī man yashā').

This verse describes the function of the Prophet as limited to conveying the message to people. The Prophet, however, could never have the power to guide them by means of making them believers since God is the only sole agent who can guide whom He likes to the truth.

Az-Zamakhsharī, in consistence with his view, states that God will guide whomsoever He already knows that His grace would be fruitful for them (by granting to them His grace). For az-Zamakhsharī, the "granting of the grace" is a matter of completion of their good deed. Moreover, "hudā" is not the creation of God, but is for the men themselves who have to acquire it.\(^2\)

V 

'18:17' "He whom Allah guideth, he indeed is led aright, and he whom He sendeth astray, for him

\(^1\) Ibid, I, 137

AZ-ZAMAKHSHARI maintains that this verse is concerned with the "people of the cave" who are being praised by God for their hard struggle and full submission to Him. As a result, God granted His grace to them and led them aright. Furthermore, az-Zamakhshari emphasises that whoever chooses the way adopted by "al-muhtadīn" will attain the salvation (al-falāḥ). On the contrary, whosoever is opposed to "khidhlān", will not find a guiding friend who will lead him (after God's abandonment). According to az-Zamakhshari, a man cannot have a guiding friend when he is abandoned by God, but it is not God who leads him astray. Therefore, the factor leading to going aright or astray is the attitude chosen by man himself; and the involvement of God's will cannot be described as arbitrary. God's pre-knowledge, however, does not affect his being led astray since he goes astray by his own choice and is provoked by Satan.

VI '16:93' "Had Allah willed He could have made you (all) one nation, but He sendeth whom He will astray and guideth whom He will, and ye will indeed

1. Ibid, I, 565.
2. Ibid, I, 326 (7:30).
be asked of what ye used to do."

Az-Zamakhshari's interpretation of the verse is that had God willed, He could have made you (all) one nation by force (qasran), but God had not willed to force them to believe even if He could do so since He gave them "free choice". Moreover, he declares that God will grant His grace to those whom He already knows will choose the faith (Imān). On the contrary, He will abandon (yakhdhula) those whom He already knows will choose the "unbelief" (al-kufr).

For az-Zamakhshari, the faith or unbelief is a matter of man's choice and not already predestined.

The last words "Ye will indeed be asked of what ye used to do" is a strong proof for az-Zamakhshari in defence of human responsibility. He points out that if God had forced people to believe or disbelieve, what is the point of asking their deed when they had been forced to!

Az-Zamakhshari's rational argument, however, has led to the concept that God is bound to do what is best for man. Therefore, it would have been unwise for God to
punish anyone whom He had forced to disbelieve.¹

Al-Bayḍāwī on this problem represents the view attributed to Ahl al-Sunna. According to ash-Shahrastānī, the people of the Sunna maintain that the justice of God lies in His dealing as possessor and Lord, and in making decisions according to His will as He pleases. Justice, in fact, consists in giving things their place, and this implies acting as Lord according to His own will and knowledge. The opposite is injustice and it is inconceivable that He should be wrong in His decisions and unjust in His dealings.² Al-Ashʿarī himself says.... Allah, therefore, is master of His creation. He does what He wishes and decides what He desires, and if He were to send all created beings to Paradise there would be no injustice done, or if He sent them all to Hell there would be no tyranny. Wrong-doing (zulm) consists of disposing of things one does not own or misplacing them. But since He is the absolute owner, no wrong-doing can be imagined of Him, nor can injustice be ascribed to Him.³

As far as the verse '6:126-7' is concerned, al-Bayḍāwī

2. Milal, p. 28.
3. Ibid, p. 73 f.
affirmatively holds that he whom God wills, He guides him
to the truth (al-ḥaqq), and makes him accept it. For
al-Bayḍāwī the words "yashraḥ ṣadra-hū li-l-Islām" have
metaphorical meaning since they refer, in fact, to God's
making the soul accept the truth. In explaining the real
meaning of the verse, al-Bayḍāwī alludes to a prophetic
tradition saying that, "It is a light which God has thrown
into the heart of the believer through which he becomes a
believer." On the contrary, al-Bayḍāwī continues, whomso-
ever it is God's will to lead astray He sways away from
accepting the truth and then he will not accept it.¹
However, al-Bayḍāwī maintains that belief or unbelief is
already predestined by God. Therefore, there is no room
for human freedom in choosing the right or the wrong.

Al-Bayḍāwī's bitter attack on az-Zamakhsharī's view
of human freedom is obvious in this verse 541 maintaining
that he whom God dooms to "stray" (ḍalāl) or "disgrace"
(faḍḥiḥatu-hū), will be unable (lā yastaṭṭī') to refuse it
since it comes from God. Al-Bayḍāwī, however, has a firm
reason for refuting az-Zamakhsharī saying that "ūlā'ika-
lladhī lām yuridi lluḥū an yuṭahhira qulūba-hum" is a clear
proof for invalidating az-Zamakhsharī's view. According

¹. Anwār, II, 207, III, 8 (7:30); cf., V, 26 (39:18)
in which al-Bayḍāwī states that "guidance" is obtainable
by the act of God and the readiness of the soul to
accept it.
to al-Bayḍāwī if God had willed it he could have been a believer.\(^1\) Al-Bayḍāwī's interpretation of removing the rationalistic view of az-Zamakhsharī makes the scope of understanding the verse more orthodox, dependent merely on God's will, without giving new effort to man to improve his own responsibility.

As far as verse '3:8' is concerned, al-Bayḍāwī maintains that it is God who leads man astray so a man has always to pray to God for His "guidance" in order that He will not discontinue it (i.e. guidance). It is understandable that without the continuity of His guidance, human effort in keeping it will be in vain. For al-Bayḍāwī guidance is a divine gift, and not acquired. In order to strengthen his view, al-Bayḍāwī refers to a prophetic tradition saying that the heart of the believer is between the fingers of the Merciful.\(^2\) Therefore, it is

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1. Ibid, II, 150; cf., II, 207–8 (6:126) in which al-Bayḍāwī maintains that everything that happens in this world is due to God's predestination since the able is God alone. cf., IV, 91 (25:20), al-Bayḍāwī states that "fitna" (test) to particular people such as the prophets etc. is already predestined by God.

2. Ibid, II, 5.
not surprising that al-Baydawi denies the concept of human freedom since he believes that all things are already fixed by God while man only follows what has been predetermined.

Commenting on the Qur'anic verse 2:272, al-Baydawi says that "guidance" comes only from God, and He guides or leads astray whom He likes. The task of the Prophet is restricted to telling people the truth and cannot make them become believers since God alone is the mainstream of guidance.¹

As far as verse 18:17 is concerned, al-Baydawi, however, places emphasis on God's succour (tawfiq). He who is granted the succour will become a believer, otherwise, he will be led astray.²

With regard to the verse 15:93, al-Baydawi maintains that God had not willed all people to be believers, otherwise they could have been Muslims. Al-Baydawi's interpretation of the words, "And ye will indeed be asked of what ye asked to do" is rather peculiar compared to previous ones, since he understands that the verse should

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1. Ibid, I, 266; cf., III, 147 (13:7), al-Baydawi states that God did not will to guide them because they were already predestined to be disbelievers. cf. IV, 156 (32:13).
be taken as metaphorical expression and as a matter of rebuke. While az-Zamakhsharī has interpreted the verse in discussion literally, it is obvious that al-Bayḍāwī's avoidance of such interpretation is primarily to widen the way to the omnipotence of God by narrowing it to human freedom.

Here are some passages from the Qur'ānic verses used by az-Zamakhsharī in conformity with his view of the human free-will and al-Bayḍāwī's refutation against it:

I

'25:17-18' "Upon the day when He shall muster them and that they serve, apart from God, and He shall say, 'Was it you that led these My servants astray, or did they themselves err from the way?' (fa-yaqūlu a antum ādqalātum 'ibādī hā'ulā'ī am hum dalū ṣ-sabila?) They shall say, 'Glory be to Thee! it did not behove us to take unto ourselves protectors apart from Thee; (qālū subḥāna-ka mā kāna yanbaghī lanā an nattakhidha min dūnī-ka min awliyā') but Thou gavest them and their fathers enjoyment of days, until they forgot the remembrance, and were a people corrupt.' "

1. Ibid, III, 190.
These verses clearly show that the angels, the prophets, etc. are not responsible for the cause of leading people astray (idlāl). It is up to them to decide their own destiny. This, however, gives a real support to az-Zamakhshārī in which he maintains that if the attribution of leading astray is strongly denied by the angels, the prophets and what they serve apart from God (wa mā ya‘budūn) in their own words, "Glory be to Thee! it did not befit us to take unto ourselves protectors apart from Thee" while replying to God's question, "Was it you that led my servants astray...?" az-Zamakhshārī argues, God is definitely far removed from it (idlāl). According to az-Zamakhshārī, the very nature of God's question followed by their own answer is to show the falsity of their attributing ġalāl to their worshipped things (ma‘budāti-him) since God already knows everything from its eternity. Az-Zamakhshārī, however, maintains that God does not lead people astray in reality (ḥaqīqatan) because it is a man's own choice besides the initiative of Satan. If ġalāl is applied to God, it should be understood as metaphorical. Further, az-Zamakhshārī argues that if God does lead man astray in reality, the answer to God's question in the verse should be, "It was You (God) who led them astray" (bal anta ādālaltahum). Therefore, man must have free will in determining his own destiny.¹

¹. Al-Kashshāf, II, 105.
"And Satan says, when the issue is decided, God surely promised you a true promise; and I promised you, then I failed you, for I had no authority over you, but that I called you, and you answered me. So do not blame me, (fa-lā talūmūnī), but blame yourselves; (wa lūmū anfusa-kum) I cannot aid you, neither can you aid me. I disbelieved in you associating me with God aforetime."

As far as this verse is concerned, az-Zamakhsharī strongly maintains that man is a free agent to act according to his own choice; whether to choose "bad luck" (ash-shaqāwa) or "good luck" (as-sa‘āda). God plays no major role in deciding man's fate as well as Satan. Az-Zamakhsharī calls the role played by God as "at-Tamkīn" (to make it able) while the role played by Satan is called "at-Tazyīn" (to decorate). The pivotal point of az-Zamakhsharī's concentration, however, is on the words "So do not blame me, but blame yourselves" in which he argues that if the case, as it was claimed by the Ash'arites, that God is the creator of dālāl and so on, Satan would have said, "So do not blame me and yourselves" (Fa-lā talūmūnī wa lā anfusa-kum) since God had predetermined your unbelief and compelled you to it. To prove that Satan has, at least, the role of tazyīn, az-Zamakhsharī equates the words, "I had no authority over you" (wa mā kāna lī 'alay-kum min Sulṭān) with the verse '15:42 'O My
servants thou shalt have no authority, except those that follow thee, being perverse (illā man ittaba‘a-ka minal-ghāwín). However, az-Zamakhsharī is convinced that Satan's argument in the verse is real and supports his view of human free will.

Al-Bayḍāwī in confrontation with the verses which indicate human free will, tries to use the intermediate cause between God and man as a means of finding a solution to his predestinarian view. This is what he calls "al-kasb" (acquisition).  

As far as the verse '25:17-18' is concerned, Al-Bayḍāwī maintains that the attribution of ṛaḍāl to God as well as to the unbelievers through their own deeds (bi-kasbi-him) in the verse, is the belief of the Ash'arites. Therefore, it does not fully support the view of human free will since ṛaḍāl is a product of both God and man. However, Al-Bayḍāwī seems to have difficulty in defending his view of God's pre-ordination, and has to admit that


3. Ibid, IV, 91.
the verse in discussion is against the pure predestinarian view.

The same difficulty faces al-Bayḍāwī concerning the verse '14:22' in which he says that the verse is not a good proof for the Muʿtazilites in supporting their view. Perhaps it refers to the fact that man's capacity in choosing ḍalāl, according to al-Bayḍāwī, is endowed by God to man while man acquires it, therefore man is not an absolute agent of free will.

Human acts (afʿāl al-ʿibād)

As ash-Shahrastānī says: The Muʿtazilites are agreed that man can and does create his good and evil deeds, so as to merit reward or punishment in the next world. Therefore, the Muʿtazilites had to deny that God wills all the acts of men, good as well as evil, for they maintained that God cannot will the disobedient acts of men.

As far as human acts are concerned, az-Zamakhsharī

1. Ibid, III, 159, cf., vol. II, pp. 312-313 (6:148-9) in which al-Bayḍāwī admits that the verse is a good proof for the Muʿtazilites in supporting their view of free will.
maintains that man is an author of his own deeds since he is to be held responsible for reward or punishment. The main focus of concentration regarding the subject-matter refers to the Qur'anic verse '37:96', "When Allah hath created you and what ye make." (wa mā ta'īmalūn). In order to explain this, az-Zamakhshari endeavours to set forth the verse before it '37:95'. "He said: Worship ye that which ye yourselves do carve (mā tanḥatūn). After all, he declares that this verse '37:95' is equivalent to the verse '21:56' "He said: Nay, but your Lord is the Lord of thy heavens and the earth, who created them (idols) (alladhī fatāra-hunna); and I am of those who testify unto that."

Az-Zamakhshari's main purpose in bringing the two verses together is to maintain that "mā" in the verse '37:96' as "al-mawsūliyya" (definite conjunctive) is similar to "alladhī faṭara-hunna" in the verse '21:56' and not "al-masdariyya" (infinitive noun) as understood by the Ash'arites. Therefore the verse should mean God created you and created your idols in particular, not (all) that you do (i.e. your acts). Az-Zamakhshari admits that the substance of the idols was created by God, while man only carved them.

In order to maintain that "mā" in the verse as "al-mawsūliyya" and not "al-masdariyya", az-Zamakhshari
introduces the following arguments:

I He says that it is contradictory to Reason (al-‘aql) and the Qur'ān, since if it is thought that God has stated that the worshipper (al-‘ābid) and the worshipped (al-maḥbūd) (i.e. idol) are His creation, how can a creature (al-makhlūq) worship another creature (al-makhlūq) while one of them carves and decorates the other?

II To say that "God has created you and (created) your deed" is not reasonable since it is not an argument against them (i.e. disbelievers). On the other hand, it has no conformity (ṭibāq) with what you have already said, especially the words "wa mā ta‘malūn" which are an interpretation of the words "wa mā tanḥatūn". Furthermore, az-Zamakhsharī considered that those who make "mā" as the "al-maṣdariyya" are prejudiced without having enough knowledge of the science of rhetoric and the style of the Qur'ān.

In contradistinction to the Muʿtazilites, the Ashʿarites reduced human acts to the point where it became almost

illusion; they maintain that an act is created by God and acquired by man, then they call it "acquisition" (al-kasb).¹

As far as the verse '37:96' is concerned, al-Baydawi asserts that acts of man are created by God while man is empowered to do the acts, but his acts are dependent on incentives (dawāʿa) and the materials (al-ʿudad). On the other hand, he says that if the particle "mā" in the verse is for "al-maṣdariyya", it should be understood in a metaphorical sense. Al-Baydawi goes on to maintain that the words "mā taʿmalūn" are to mean the "event" (al-hadath). Moreover, he says that if the acts of men are God's creation, that such acts which are dependent upon them (i.e. men) are also created. Al-Baydawi emphatically states that the last meaning (event) is the most reasonable, by which he means "al-kasb".²

To strengthen his view, al-Baydawi tries to refute the Muʿtazilites regarding human acts as follows:

I If in the time of action, a man is not able to leave the act undone, he will be compelled (majbūran)

[Notes]
2. Anwār, V, 8.
and not free to act. If he is able to leave it undone, that means that he needs a specializer (mukhasssīs) to make him able to do the act, and not leave it. In this case, this specializer will need another specializer and so on... which is impossible.

II If a man were a creator of his acts out of free choice, he would have a detailed knowledge of the acts, but this is not the case in man's action.

III If a man is a free agent, and his will contradicts God's will, either the two wills would be fulfilled or both wills would not be fulfilled, or one of them fulfills the other without "propendorator" (murajjiḥ)\(^1\). It seems, for al-Bayḍāwī that all the alternatives are impossible.

According to al-Bayḍāwī, human acts result from the power of God and the acquisition of man.\(^2\) However, he admits that his preference for his theory of Al-Kasb is due to the fact that Al-Kasb is a moderate position between compulsion (al-jabr) and free will (al-qadar).\(^3\)

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1. Tawāli', p. 82; Miṣbāḥ, fol. 206a, 207b.
2. Tawāli', p. 84; Minhāj al-Wuṣūl, 73; Anwār, III, 93 (10:74), III, 159 (14:22).
3. Anwār, III, 189 (16:90). He maintains that God always asks his servant to be moderate, especially regarding the doctrino.
The "sealing of the heart" (al-khatm)

The sealing of the heart is one of the main issues in az-Zamakhsharî's theology since it is against the principle of justice. Az-Zamakhsharî as a Mu'tazilite, tries to transcend God from any act of evil because God already knows that such a thing would not necessitate Him. However, a question arises when God says, '2:7' "Allah has sealed (khatamâ) their hearing and their hearts, and on their eyes there is a covering, theirs will be an awful doom."

Whether they are warned or not, this verse clarifies that it is all one for the disbelievers, since God has sealed their hearing and their hearts. Again, this verse shows that the basis of their disbelief was due to God's will.

As far as this verse is concerned, az-Zamakhsharî tries to explain it carefully by saying that the meaning of the khatm should be taken to imply metaphorical sense (majâz). According to az-Zamakhsharî, the word "khatm" has two alternatives. When it is applied to God, it will give a metaphorical meaning, and while applying to His creatures, it will mean literal ones (haqiqa).

In order to avoid the real attribution of khatm to God, he has to set forth various ways of its interpret-
Due to their (disbelievers) stubbornness and denial of the truth, God told them that their hearts were sealed as if they were characterised to behave in such a way. In other words, "khatm" was a result of disbelievers' action, and not prior to it.

Khatm should be taken as a metaphorical expression, since their hearts were empty of intelligence (fitan), so it does not mean to prevent them from believing or force them to disbelieve.

The real author of khatm was Satan or disbeliever. God attributed such a word to Himself, because it is He who empowered Satan or disbeliever to do so.

The impossibility of being believers for them, are not existent except by force (qasran), so God expressed their "impossibility" with "khatm" as the ultimate aim of their stubbornness and their disbelief.

It should be read in conjunction with the declaration of the Jews that '41:5' "Our hearts are protected from that unto which thou (O Mohammad) callest us, and in our ears there is a deafness, and between us and thee there is a veil. Act, then, lo! we also shall be acting." Likewise '98:1' "Those
who disbelieve among the people of the scripture and the idolaters could not have left off (erring) till the clear proof came unto them" by which they were not responsible to their disbelief since it was impossible for them to gain access to truth owing to the covering on their hearts. To this, az-Zamakhsharī says it is like the ones who believe in "jabr". In reply to this, God told them that their hearts have been impressed with disbelief because of their persistent refusal to accept truth and not because their hearts had been wrapped up from the beginning in such a way as to render them incapable of listening to truth.¹

As far as khatm is concerned, al-Bayḍāwī, like other Ash'arites, affirmatively maintains that all things come from God. Therefore the word "khatm" in the verse means the real sealing.²

Al-Bayḍāwī appears to have produced nothing about his own view regarding the subject-matter, apart from describing the difference between az-Zamakhsharī's and his own stand.

². Anwār, I, 74.
CONCLUSION

The conclusion is reached that on most points al-Bayḍāwī refutes az-Zamakhsharī, but that he sometimes makes no comment on the latter's views and sometimes admits the weak points in his own case. This is then illustrated in detail.

Az-Zamakhsharī's rejection of the eternal attributes of God in order that nothing apart from God should partake in eternity is strongly attacked by al-Bayḍāwī, since he maintains that to say that God has eternal attributes is not implying something besides God partaking in eternity because there is a difference between the equalisation of the eternal essence (dhāt al-qadīma) and the eternal attributes (ṣifāt al-qadīma). For the former it leads to unbelief while the latter does not.

Az-Zamakhsharī's rational argument of his denial of the vision of God in general, besides his religious arguments, is based on his belief that only body and accident can be perceived by vision. Since God, the Almighty, is neither body nor accident, the vision of Him is impossible. Al-Bayḍāwī maintains that vision of Him is possible. For instance, he argued that the denial of vision in general does not imply the denial of vision absolutely. Therefore the vision is possible for the next world for certain believers.
Regarding the speech of God, az-Zamakhsharī maintains that "it" is created; it consists of a word and a voice and can therefore be heard, while al-Bayḍāwī strongly opposes the view saying that God's speech is an idea inherent in His essence which is entirely different from His knowledge and His will.

Concerning Reason and Revelation, az-Zamakhsharī maintains that the knowledge of God is made obligatory upon man by Reason without the assistance of Revelation, since Reason is self-sufficient; a guide to the truth. The coming of the prophets, in accordance with az-Zamakhsharī, is only to remind people of what they have forgotten about the necessity of Reflection, while al-Bayḍāwī opposes this view, saying that the knowledge of God is made obligatory by Revelation. The obligatory nature of the knowledge of God has nothing to do with Reason, since the verse '17:15' evidently denies the occurrence of divine punishment before the coming of the prophetic calls. Therefore, the sending of the prophets, according to al-Bayḍāwī, is a completion of God's revelation.

Az-Zamakhsharī's view that human reason is capable of knowing the right and the wrong, leads him to believe that God is bound to do what is best for man. Goodness or badness are real qualities inherent in things which are rationally known to be good or bad. Al-Bayḍāwī, however, rejects the
principle of "the best" and considers that the goodness or badness of a thing is not a real quality inherent in them, but a function of the divine will.

Az-Zamakhshari’s view that God would not produce "unlawful sustenance" since God has attributed the rizq to Himself, is criticised by al-Baydawi who maintains that God's attribution of rizq to Himself is for glorification. Furthermore, al-Baydawi argues that if it were not called rizq, the consumer would not be called "one sustained" at any time in his life.

Concerning the superiority of all the angels over the prophets due to their humble obedience, and their creation as maintained by az-Zamakhshari, al-Baydawi attacks this view, although he confesses that the archangels (al-khawwas) are superior to human beings in general. Al-Baydawi argues that since human beings are not naturally created to be obedient like the angels, it would be difficult for them to fulfil the religious obligations. Therefore, their deeds are highly appreciated and deserve great reward.

Another main reason given by al-Baydawi is that it is not necessary to consider that the superiority of a group of angels over the prophets, infer looking down upon some of the prophets. Adam is superior to certain angels (i.e. who fell prostrate before him), while the Prophet Muhammad and Jesus (peace be upon them) are superior to all the angels.
Therefore, al-Bayḍāwī firmly adopts a moderate view between the Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites.

The basis of az-Zamakhshārī's denial of the miracles of the saints refers to his interpretation of the word rasūl in the verse '72:26,27', in which he interprets it as meaning "messenger", therefore, the miracle is only for the prophets. Al-Bayḍāwī, on the other hand, interprets it as the angel (al-malak), hence, it implies that the karama is not impossible for anyone who has been chosen by God, even though he is not a prophet. Therefore, the karama based on al-Bayḍāwī's argument is also possible for the saints.

The question of who is a believer is one of the main centres of controversy between the two scholars.

Al-Bayḍāwī's definition of Īmān as only assent (taṣdīq) excluding words and works as maintained by az-Zamakhshārī, leads to his different treatment regarding the fate of the grave sinner and its relevance. Al-Bayḍāwī strongly maintains that the unrepentant grave sinner will not be eternally punished since his character as the believer could not be removed so long as it was ascribed to the taṣdīq of which was called Īmān. Az-Zamakhshārī, on the other hand, maintains that he will be eternally punished, since he is in the intermediate position. Al-Bayḍāwī's concentration on
tasdīq, however, is to include the grave sinner as a member of the Islamic community. Therefore, it is an attempt to reject az-Zamakhsharı’s doctrine of the intermediate position.

Az-Zamakhsharı’s emphasis on the necessity of punishment before repentance and forgiveness after repentance is strongly criticised by al-Bayḍāwī, since he considers it as reservation without having substantiated it by the burden of proof. Therefore, it implies weakness.

Az-Zamakhsharı’s concept of Iḥbāt and Takfīr, that good works will be negated by the grave sins and unbelief, and that God is bound to forgive when the grave sins are avoided, respectively, are exposed to al-Bayḍāwī’s attack since he maintains that the concept of Iḥbāt should be applied only to a man in his state of unbelief, while in Takfīr, al-Bayḍāwī maintains that it is not necessary for God to forgive when the grave sins are avoided, since it is totally dependent upon God’s will.

As far as Intercession is concerned, both az-Zamakhsharı and al-Bayḍāwī agreed that it should take place in the next world. But the question is to whom it would be granted and what its objective would be. Az-Zamakhsharı maintains that Intercession will be granted only to the believers whom God sanctions. And the purpose of Inter-
cession is to increase the grace among the believers, not the grave sinners. Al-Baydawi opposes the view of az-Zamakhshari and maintains that it is for the believers, including the grave sinners in order to free them from punishment.

The dispute between az-Zamakhshari and al-Baydawi concerning the concept of God's justice, however, refers to their different definitions of God's justice itself. For az-Zamakhshari, God's justice implies "human free will". Therefore, he explains away the Qur'anic verses which stress God's omnipotence and make man a responsible being. For az-Zamakhshari, the guidance, leading astray, sealing of the hearts and human acts, should not really be attributed to God, since it implies the invalidity of human free will. Therefore, the factor leading to going aright or astray is the attitude chosen by man himself, and the involvement of God's will cannot be described as arbitrary.

Al-Baydawi, who is mostly in line with the Ash'arites, disagrees with the view of az-Zamakhshari, and maintains that God's justice lies in His dealing as possessor and Lord, and in making decision according to His will. For al-Baydawi to say that man is a free agent would mean that God is not absolute. Therefore, guidance, leading astray, and sealing of the heart, should be really attributed to God.
Concerning the verses which support God's justice, al-Baydawi alludes to the theory of *al-kasb* in which man is empowered by God to do his acts, therefore, he is not a free agent.

In general, al-Baydawi's interpretations which remove the rationalistic views of az-Zamakhshari make the understanding of the verses more orthodox, dependent merely on God's will without giving new effort to man in order to improve his own responsibility.
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