MUSLIM THEOLOGY

as presented by
M. b. YÜSUF AS-SANÜSĪ

especially in his
AL-‘AQĪDA AL-WUSTĀ

by

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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

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Title of Thesis Muslim theology as presented by M. b. Yūsuf as-Sanūsī, especially in his al-‘Aqūda al-wustā

M. b. Yūsuf as-Sanūsī (d. 895/1490) is one of the most important representatives of late kalam, and from his own lifetime his works became the most commonly taught manuals on this subject in African Islam.

This thesis (viii and 286 pp., and 27 pp. of Arabic text) has three chapters. The first contains a detailed study of his life and times and an analytical list of his works.

The second chapter is an edition and translation of al-‘Aqūda al-wustā, exclusive of the commentary, based on 24 manuscripts selected from 58, which amount to three roughly distinguishable main traditions. The author maintains that al-‘Aqūda al-wustā with its commentary represents as-Sanūsī's most original and synthetic in-depth presentation of Muslim theology.

The third chapter is a résumé of the commentary with reference numbers on the top of each page to the corresponding section of the text in Chapter II. Included with the résumé is anything additional or corrective found in as-Sanūsī's other works, so as to present his complete theological thought and its development of position on various questions.
Acknowledgements:

In presenting this work I am heavily indebted for my formation in Arabic to the staff of l'Institut pontifical d'études arabes in Rome and to many Arab teachers and specialists especially in Tunis and Cairo. Credit is due to the same for my acquaintance with things Islamic, and also to very many Muslims whose friendship I enjoyed, to helpful library staff in Edinburgh, London, Paris, Tunis, Tripoli, Cairo, Ibadan, Sokoto and Algiers, to the community at l'Institut dominicain d'études orientales in Cairo, and particularly to Professor W. Montgomery Watt, moderator of this thesis.

As for financial provision during the past four years, living expenses were covered by an alms of $2.00 per day channeled to me by my Dominican brethren when the equivalent was not otherwise forthcoming. Travel and other major expenses were covered by some remunerated labor and occasional gifts from a number of kind people, especially my Aunt Miss Elizabeth Henry. To clarify a point, my study and work is towards rendering a service of truth from within the Catholic Church as requested by its official representatives, yet it has in no sense been commissioned by the Church or any other organization so as to make me their agent. And, while paying full fees with no reduction of any charges at the University of Edinburgh, I received no grant from the Vatican, the United States, British or any other government, or from any foundation, agency or organization whatsoever, except for a student's grant by the government of Tunisia for the year I was there, for which I am profoundly grateful.

Finally, thanks are due to my parents and to innumerable people who helped me in so many varied ways.
The fifteenth century theologian of Tilimsän, M. b. Yūsuf as-Sanūsī stands at the end of the development of classical Muslim theology. His credit is to have synthesised and popularized what was said before him in long treatises containing endless digressions on metaphysical concepts and logical points which few could read. As-Sanūsī also stands at the beginning of a period of fossilized repetition termed by Louis Gardet "l'Ash'arisme figé", which was challenged only by the somewhat different approach of Muḥammad 'Abduh at the beginning of this century and the current quest for an approach taking into account the experiences, outlooks, and knowledge of people now.

If as-Sanūsī is a fair representative of middle of the road classical orthodoxy, it cannot be said that he is typical of modern Muslim thought and the trends operative in it. Nevertheless for several centuries his books have been used as the basis of theological teaching in the main centers of African Islam north and south of the Sahara, and have molded a traditional outlook which is still influential. A study of as-Sanūsī may help to understand this factor of the many sided situation of modern Islam.

As-Sanūsī has mainly been known through his popular and short al-‘Āqīda as-sughrā and to a certain extent his Muqaddimāt. His larger treatises, even the published al-‘Āqīda al-kubrā are rarely referred to. Yet this and the subsequent al-‘Āqīda al-wustā and Sharḥ al-Jazā‘iriyya represent as-Sanūsī’s really serious theology. The present study includes an edition and

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Preface

translation of al-'Aqīda al-wustā exclusive of the commentary, and a synthesised résumé of the teaching contained in all as-Sanūsī's available theological works. The latter is based on the order of al-'Aqīda al-wustā, and ready reference numbers make an easy comparison between Chapter II (the text) and Chapter III (the commentary).
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CHAPTER I
THE LIFE AND WORKS OF AS-SANUSI

A. Sources referred to:
   a. Principal:

1) Al-Mallālī. The major source for the life of as-Sanūsī is the work of his student M. b. 'U. b. I. al-Mallālī, 'al-
Mawāhib al-quddūsiyya fi l-manāqib as-sanūsiyya, finished at the beginning of Jum. II 899/ March 1494. It is a long work - the
Bibliothèque Nationale manuscript 6897, used for this thesis, contains 122 folios at 31 lines per page - but is so filled with
excursuses on all topics of Islamic learning and selections from as-Sanūsī's works that little room is left for biography. The
biographical material itself is rather a description of the model shaykh, illustrated by incidents cast by the admiring
disciple into ideal shapes where facts are few and hard to discern.

An idea of the book's contents can be had from the chapter titles, with the folio references of the Paris manuscript:
1. His masters (5a - 16a)
2. His discernments and wonders (16a - 24b)
3. His learning, asceticism, preaching, piety, zeal, kindness, patience, propriety of action, and character (24b - 74b)
4. His writings (74b - 79b)
5. His explanation of various Qur'ān verses (79b - 95b)
6. His explanation of various ḥadīths (95b - 108b)

See below, D, c, n. 14.
7. His explanation of certain sufi verses (108b - 112a)
8. Various words which he wrote for people (112a - 116a)
9. His last illness and death (116a - b)
10. Poems written by him or about him (116b - 121b)

2) Ibn-’Askar. The only other independent Arabic source is a. ‘Al. M. b. ‘A. b. ‘U. b. al-’Yu. b. Miğbāḥ al-’Hasanî, known as Ibn-’Askar, Dawhat an-nāshir li-mahāsin man kān min al-Maghrab min ahl al-qarn al-’Ashir, written in 985/1577. The Bibliothèque Nationale manuscript 5025, used in this thesis, contains 76 folios, of which ff. 67b to 68a are dedicated to as-Sanūsî. This work was loosely translated by T. H. Weir, in The sheikhs of Morocco in the sixteenth century (Edinburgh: Morton, 1904); the section on as-Sanūsî is on pp. 34-38.


4) GAL, that is, Brockelmann, Carl, Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur (Leiden: Brill, finished 1942). The sections on as-Sanūsî, II, pp. 250-252, and SII, pp. 352-356, however inadequate, are yet valuable for locating not only works long known to be of as-Sanūsî, but also other works not mentioned in his biographies.

b. Secondary:

\[2 \text{GAL II, p. 455, SII, p. 678.}\]
1) A. al-`Ubbādī\(^3\) wrote a brief biography of as-Sanūsī in 991/1583, which was translated by Charles Brosselard in "Retour à Sidi Senouci - Inscripties de ses deux mosquées," Revue africaine, v. 5, n. 28 (July 1861), pp. 241-260; the translation occupies pp. 243-248. The manuscript, as Brosselard describes it, consists of four folios bound with a collection of other works, and, to judge from the materials it contains and a reference to al-Mallālī, is merely an abridgement of al-Mallālī, except for adding another possible date of birth.


The work referred to as "AB" is his voluminous collection of biographies entitled Nayl al-ibtihāj bi-taṭrīz ad-Dībāj, completed "after 7 Jum. I 1005/28 Dec. 1596. It is itself a supplement to ad-Dībāj al-mudhahhab ft maʿrifat aʿyān ʿulamāʾ al-madhhab of I. b. 'A. b. M. b. Faṛūn.\(^5\) In the printed edition

\(^3\)Brosselard merely gives "el-Abbadi", which could represent any number of Arabic forms. I am taking a guess that it represents a nisba of al-`Ubbādī, a suburb of Tilimsān. On the other hand, it could possibly be identified with A. al-Ubbadi of GAL SII, p. 371, who lived shortly before as-Suyūtī (d. 911/1505).


\(^5\)P. 363 of the printed edition.

\(^6\)Faṛūn's work was completed in Shaʿbān 761/June-July 1360; cf. p. 362 of the printed edition.
(Cairo: 'Abbās b. 'Abdassalām b. Shagrūn, 1351/1932-3) the section on as-Sanūsī goes from p. 325 to p. 329. This work is also a primary source for many of the contemporaries of as-Sanūsī.

A third work, not used in this thesis, is Kifāyat al-muhtāj li-maʿrifat man lāyī d-Dībāj. It also touches upon as-Sanūsī, but is only a popular abridgement of the preceding work.

3) IM, that is, M. b. M. b. A. ash-Sharīf, known as Ibn-Maryam, al-Bustān fī dhikr al-awliyāʾ wa-l-ʾulamāʾ bi-Tilimsān, completed in 1011/1602-3. In the edition by Ben Cheneb (Algiers: al-Maṭbaʿa ath-thaʿālibiyya, 1326/1908), pages 237-248 copy, with some few variants, the section on as-Sanūsī in AB. This work gives information on many individuals not included in AB.

4) Bargès, J. J. L., in his Complément de l'histoire des Beni-Zeiyān (Paris, 1887), pp. 366-379, gives a résumé of the life of as-Sanūsī which contains nothing new. The book is useful, however, for information on the times in which he lived.

5) Ben Cheneb, Mohammed, wrote the article "al-Sanūsī" for the first Encyclopaedia of Islam, which adds nothing new.


b. 5 I, As - 360 biographies - as-Sanūṣī is n. 55 - this work describes an ijāza which gives information on how as-Sanūṣī's works were transmitted through his principal students.

B. The historical background against which he lived:

As-Sanūṣī's works and al-Mallālī's biography tell us very little about the political situation of the city of Tilimsān, where he was born, lived, and died. As-Sanūṣī only gives a hint when he speaks of "this difficult time wherein the sea of ignorance overflows, and falsehood has spread beyond limits and thrown in every direction of the earth waves of denial of the truth, hatred for those who hold the truth, and coloring over of falsehood with deceptive trappings." Although these words apply strictly to the state of religious learning, in an Islamic state this is inseparable from political well-being.

The dynasty Banū-Zayyān, of the tribe Banū-'Abd-al-Wād, ruled Tilimsān throughout the lifetime of as-Sanūṣī. To begin


9Al-'Aqīda as-sughrā (See below, E, n. 6), p. 15.


Basic Arabic sources for the period before as-Sanūṣī are 'Ar. b. Khaldūn, al-'Ahr wa-dīwān al-mubtada' wa-l-khabar fī ayyām al-'Arab wa-l-'Ajam wa-l-Barbar, part 3 (Būlāq, 1857),
with the years of turmoil just preceding his birth, we have the following members of the dynasty who would have closely affected his life:

1) Abū- Malik ʿAbdalwāyid b. a. Ḥammū Mūsā, with the help of the Sultan of Fez, overthrew his brother on 16 Rajab 814/ 3 Nov. 1411. His rule went rather well until Abū-Fāris, the ʿAfṣiqd Sultan of Tunis, who regarded Tilimsān as his dependency, deposed him on the grounds of fiscal maladministration. Abū-Fāris entered Tilimsān on 13 Jum. II 827/ 12 May 1424, and appointed Abū-Mālik's nephew to his place. ¹¹

2) Abū-ʿAbdallāh M. b. a. Tāshufīn, the new ruler, soon became estranged with his master Abū-Fāris, who was occupied with war with the Europeans. ¹² In the meantime, the deposed Abū-Mālik failed to get help from Fez, and turned to Abū-Fāris, sending him emissaries and letters to sell his cause. Abū-Fāris was won over, and gave him a small army to send against Abū-ʿAbdallāh. In the engagement Abū-Mālik lost, and as he had foreseen, Abū-Fāris himself came out to defend his honor. Abū-Fāris placed


The following material is based mainly on M. at-Tanāsī (See below, D, b, n. 3), Nazm ad-durr wa-l-ʾiqyān fī dawlat Banī-Zayyān, part 1, fī t-taʾrīf bi-ḥasabīḥ ʾt-Thāhir (i.e. al-Mutawakkil), ch. 7, fī bayān sharaf Banī-Zayyān, in the Bibliothèque Nationale ms. 5175, ff. 48a-77b; and a. ʿAl. M. b. I. al-Luʾluʾī Zarkashī, Taʾrīkh baʿd ad-dawla al-muwahhidyya wa-nabūgh ad-dawla al-Hafṣiyya wa-dhikr man malak minhum, Bibliothèque Nationale ms. 1874; the last date occurring in the latter work is mid-Muḥ 882/ end of April 1477 (f. 105b). For the last quarter of the fifteenth century there are virtually no sources.

¹¹Az-Zarkashī, f. 81a-b.
¹²Az-Zarkashī, ff. 81b-82a.
Abū- Malik back in power over Tilimsān in Rajab 831/ April-May 1428.

Abū- Fāris had no sooner departed than Abū-' Abbālāh raised an army in the mountains, came down and retook Tilimsān on 4 Dhū-1- Q. 833/ 25 July 1430. The next day Abū- Malik was discovered and killed.

Abū- ' Abbālāh's was a short victory. On hearing the news, Abū- Fāris sent his army back, and besieged Abū-' Abbālāh in the mountain fortress to which he had fled only eighty-four days after his restoration. Abū- ' Abbālāh gave himself up, and was brought a prisoner to Tunis, where he died in 840/ 1436–7. In his place it seems that Abū- Fāris appointed a European mercenary, whom he left to govern for seven months before appointing a man from the traditional ruling house.

3) Abū- l- ' Abbās A. b. a. Ḥammū Mūsā took over Tilimsān on 1 Rajab 834/ 15 March 1431. The beginning of his reign was marked with energy in endowing religious schools, punishing criminals, and establishing order and security in his domains. In 837/ 1433–4, seeing Tunis threatened by the Europeans, Abū- l- ' Abbās declared himself independent. Abū- Fāris started off against him, but died before he could get there.

13 On the last point see Bargès, Compl., p. 228, who follows an appendix to "his" manuscript of Ḥy. b. Khaldūn.

14 Az-Zarkashi, f. 83b.

15 Cf. Bargès, Compl., pp. 295–6, who follows the same appendix.

16 Cf. at-Tanasi, ff. 72a–73a. At-Tanasi says it was on a Friday, but this date is a Thursday.

17 For varying accounts of his death, see az-Zarkashi, f. 84b, and IM, pp. 231–232.
Another threat came from Abū-l-`Abbās' brother Abū-Yahyā. In 838/1434-5 the latter mustered a force and marched upon Tilimsān. Failing to take it, he established himself in Wahrān (Oran). There were many battles between him and his brother until the month of Sha‘bān 852/ Oct. 1448, when Abū-l-‘Abbās' army took Wahrān by storm.

In the meantime, a member of another branch of the family, Abū-Zayyān M. al-Musta‘īn bi-llāh, left Tunis with an army and took Algiers on 19 Rajab 842/ 4 Jan. 1439. Abū-Zayyān was assassinated by the population of Algiers on 2 Shawwāl 843/ 7 March 1440, but his son al-Mutawakkil continued the conquest as far west as Wahrān. Tilimsān was weakening. Although an insurrection which took place in the city on 27 Ram. 850/ 16 Dec. 1446 was unsuccessful, the regional chiefs and nomadic Arabs dependent on Tilimsān proceeded to revolt, leaving the region in anarchy. Into this situation al-Mutawakkil moved his army, and took Tilimsān on 1 Jum. 1 866/ 1 Feb. 1462. Abū-l-‘Abbās was exiled to Granada.

4) Abū-`A. M. al-Mutawakkil ‘alī llāh b. a. Zayyān M. b. a. Thābit b. a. Tāshūfīn b. a. Ḥammū Mūsā (II) b. a. Yq. b. a. Zayd b. Zk. b. a. Yy. Yaghmūrāsan, only a few months after taking over Tilimsān, had to face a. ‘Amr 'Uthmān of Tunis before the gates of Tilimsān. He accepted the overlordship of ‘Uthmān, who then went away. 18

Soon afterwards the deposed Abū-1-`Abbās returned from Spain with an army and besieged Tilimsān for fourteen days before he was killed, on 13 Dhū-l-Hijjah 867/ 29 Aug. 1463. The partisans of Abū-1-`Abbās then rallied around another leader, M. b. 'Ar. b. a. 'Uth. b. a. Tāshufin, and tried again to take Tilimsān, but failed. Another rebellious and marauding chieftan, M. b. Ghāliya, was defeated on 13 Shawwāl 868/ 19 June 1465, and his head brought to Tilimsān. ¹⁹

Al-Mutawakkil tried to rule as independently as he could, but trembled and showed submission any time 'Uthmān seemed to be on the move. At the end of Jum. II 868/ mid-Feb. 1464, the Qāḍī of Tilimsān, M. b. A. al-'Uqbānī²⁰ arrived on one of his missions to Tunis, bringing a present from al-Mutawakkil to 'Uthmān. In Dhū-l-Qa'dah 868/ July-Aug. of the same year 'Uthmān sent a gift in return.

Then, towards the middle of 870/ early 1466, a deputation of Arabs from the country of Tilimsān came to Tunis and alleged that al-Mutawakkil had thrown off his allegiance and was plotting with certain nomadic tribes. They asked to have Abū-Janāl Zayyān b. 'Abdalwāḥid b. a. Ḫammū as their ruler instead. The caliph agreed, and equipped the new leader with an army, which went victoriously westward until it began the siege of Tilimsān in Rābi' II 871/ Nov.-Dec. 1466. The first day a violent battle ensued, which was stopped by nightfall. The besiegers planned to take the city the next day, but were prevented from acting by

¹⁹ Cf. at-Tanāsī, ff. 73a-77b. With these incidents the account of at-Tanāsī ends.

²⁰ See below, D, b, n. 8.
a heavy rain. Then the Shaykh al-Ḥ. Abarkān and the qāḥ came out with a document of submission signed by al-Mutawakkil. The treaty made was reinforced by al-Mutawakkil's giving his daughter to 'Uthmān's son. 'Uthmān then turned back, leaving on 7 Sha'bān 871/ 14 March 1467.

Perhaps associated with the massacre of Jews in Fez at the end of 870/ July 1466, on the occasion of the overthrow of 'Abd-al-Ḥaqq b. Saʿīd, who had favored them and given them positions of authority, is the supposed bloody persecution of the Jews of Tilimsān in 1467. No other event is noted until the death of al-Mutawakkil in Ṣafar 873/ July-Aug. 1468.

5) Abū-Tāshufīn (II), the elder son of al-Mutawakkil, succeeded him, but held power only forty days, or four months according to others, when he was deposed by his brother.

6) Abū-'Al. M. ath-Thābitī b. al-Mutawakkil, the brother of the former, continued in power until 910/ 1504. In the first

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21See below, D, b, n. 8.

22It is not indicated whether this is M. b. A. al-'Uqbānī or his successor I. b. Q. al-'Uqbānī; see below, D, b, nos. 8 and 9.

23Az-Zarkashi, ff. 102b-105a.

24Spoken of by Bargès, Compl., pp. 419-420, note; he gives no source for his information.

25According to Bargès, Compl., p. 398, again following a note on "his" manuscript of Yy. b. Khaldūn; see p. 412 to correct a mistaken figure on p. 398. Georges Marçais, in "'Abd-al-Wādids," EI2, also gives 873/ 1468, apparently following Bargès.


27Cf. G. Marçais, ibid.
year of his reign he compelled the famous writer al-Wansharisi to flee from Tilimsân. No other events are recorded for his rule while as-Sanûsî lived. Yet it can only have been one of gradual decline, with the advance of the Spanish and Portuguese from the West, and of the Turks from the East.

C. Events of his life:

a. Name, dates, and family:


As for his birth, al-Mallâli says that as-Sanûsî told him a year or two before his death that he was fifty-five, which gives the year 838 or 839/ 1435-6. Al-`Ubbādî, however, says that as-Sanûsî died at the age of sixty-three, which gives the year

28 See below, D, b, n. 6.

29 "al-Hasani" is the full name given by al-Mallâli, f. 1a. In ch. 1 (f. 5b) he says that "as-Sanûsî" is a nisba of the well known tribe in the Maghreb. Bargès, Compl., p. 367, says that the Banû-Santis are a Berber tribe. "Al-Hasani" (or "ash-Sharif al-Qurashi"), al-Mallâli, f. 78b) refers to an alleged descendancy from Ḥasan, grandson of Muḥammad. Al-Mallâli, f. 5b, calls as-Sanûsî's father Yūsuf "al-Jasanî", while AB, p. 325, assures us that this descendancy is on the part of the mother of Yūsuf as-Sanûsî. IM, p. 238, mistakenly places it on the part of the mother of as-Sanûsî himself.

30 Evidence for this date is his tombstone inscription, given by Brosselard, p. 247; see above, A, a, n. 3. Al-Mallâli, ch. 9 (f. 116b), pinpoints the hour; cf. also AB, p. 238; and IM, p. 244. Disagreement with this date is found in Cherbonneau (see above, note 7), who gives 892/ 1487". This is repeated as the first of two dates given by Brockelmann. Bargès, Compl., p. 378, gives the year 895, but "le 12, selon les uns, le 18, selon les autres, le djomâda II," I have no idea who "les uns" may be.

31 Ch. 4, f. 79a.

Ahmad Būbā also, after quoting from al-Mallālī, says that he saw it asserted by someone (al-‘Ubdādī?) who asked al-Mallālī and received the answer that as-Sanūsī died at sixty-three. Therefore he gives the date of as-Sanūsī's birth as "after 330". As-Sanūsī's relation to Ibn-Marzūq al-ḥafīd suggests the later date as the more likely.

Of his relations, we hear only of his father, his half-brother 'Alī, his wife, his daughter, the son of his brother, and a small grandson, the son of his daughter. Ibn-Maryam gives the biographies of a string of as-Sanūsīs whose academic chains go back to our as-Sanūsī, but there is no indication of any blood relationship to him.

Ibn-Maryam also mentions an a.-Zayd 'Ar. as-Sanūsī r-Rafīʿī (alternatively "ar-Raqīʿī") dāran who, with one Būyadī (? ) b. as-Sanūsī, recounts many of the tales in as-Sanūsī's biography of al-Ghamārī, reproduced in Ibn-Maryam's work. In as-Sanūsī's biography of Abarkān, this 'Ar. as-Sanūsī is said to have urged

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33AB, p. 328 = IM, p. 247.
34See below, D, a, n. 15.
35See below, D, a, n. 1.
36See below, D, a, n. 9.
37These three, unnamed, are mentioned by al-Mallālī in ch. 9, f. 116a-b.
38Al-Mallālī, f. 63b.
39As-Sanūsī was the master of M. b. Mūsā 1-Wajdījī (See below, D, c, n. 12), who was the master of Yy. as-Sanūsī (See IM on al-Wajdījī), who was the master of M. b. Yy. as-Sanūsī (IM, pp. 265-266), who was the master of M. b. M. b. Yy. as-Sanūsī (IM, ibid.).
40IM, p. 277.
41See below, E, n. 51.
Abarkān to join him in begging Abū-Fāris' clemency during the siege of Tilimsān in the reign of a. 'Al. M. b. a. Tashufīn (Rajab 831/ April-May 1428). There is no indication of a relationship between our as-Sanūsī and these two.

**b. Indications of character:**

Ibn-'Askar remarks that the learned men of Tilimsān admire as-Sanūsī for his perfection, holiness, and being withdrawn to God, but Ibn-Zakrī for the depth and extent of his learning. Al-Mallālī too, without minimizing as-Sanūsī's erudition, places greater emphasis on his holiness and mystic knowledge (‘ulūmuhu l-bāṭiniyya al-ḥaqīqiyya). Much of what al-Mallālī says is stereotyped panegyric: how much he prayed, fasted, and stayed up nights, how kind he was, and how he possessed every virtue to the fullest. But some details allow the individual character of as-Sanūsī to stand out.

Once the Sultan Abū-'Abdallāh sent his vizier a. 'Al. M. al-Ubbādi to as-Sanūsī, offering him a benefice from the revenues of al-Madrasa al-Jadidiyya. As-Sanūsī's letter of refusal, given in full by al-Mallālī, politely explains that he does not need

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42. IM, p. 79.
43. F. 68a. On Ibn-Zakrī, see below, D, b, n. 1.
44. F. 30a.
45. Cf. especially chapters 2 and 3.
46. These names do not help at all in dating the incident. Both al-Mutawakkil and his son and heir were "a. 'Al.". The name of the vizier I have seen nowhere else.
47. F. 37a-b. See the summary of it in AB, p. 326 = IM, p. 240.
the benefice, that God takes care of him while he sets his mind on the riches of the next world, and, more pertinently, that he has no right to the revenues of the school, since he neither works there, nor lives there, nor provides it any service; to accept would be to rob others of their due. May God give the Sultan a mind for the good things of the next world.

Other stories tell how as-Sanūsī went out of his way to avoid meeting the Sultan, refused gifts from him, his son, and his officers, even while protestingly accepting gifts from ordinary people, and refused to present a tafsīr of the Qur'ān in his presence, although he consented to write to him whenever he was requested. The impression these incidents give is that as-Sanūsī avoided high political circles not merely from a sense of otherworldliness, but also because he disapproved of the holders of the political power.

This impression is confirmed by other acts of as-Sanūsī which were not revolutionary, but certainly were calculated acts of civil disobedience. “Anyone who committed a crime and feared from the Sultan or anyone else for his life or property fled to as-Sanūsī and stayed in his private quarters. No one dared to take the person out; even if the Sultan ordered, the Shaykh would not hand him over.” As for al-Mallālī’s use of the word “crime”, we must remember that he was writing while al-Mutawakkil was still reigning, and would hardly accuse him overtly of punishing non-crimes.

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48 Which one we do not know.

49 Al-Mallālī, ff. 57a-b and 59b-60a; AE, pp. 326-327 = IM, p. 241.

50 Al-Mallālī, f. 63a.
As-Sanūsī would hardly harbor a real criminal, at least against a fair process. Al-Mallālī continues with a story of how as-Sanūsī refused to hand over a terrified woman to the Sultan's messenger, even when the messenger had been sent three times to arrest the woman.\footnote{F. 63a-b.}

Such incidents reflect the powerful social position of a shaykh or wāli as portrayed in as-Sanūsī's Manāqib al-arba‘a al-muta‘akhkhārin.\footnote{See below, D, b, n. 1. The same image is continuous throughout the biographies of Ibn-Maryan and Ibn-‘Askar.} Sultans and princes humbly sought the advice and blessing of these holy men, and feared their curse, because of their access to divine secrets and power.

Another aspect of as-Sanūsī's character was his attitude towards his opponents and critics. Al-Mallālī says that he treated even his enemies as his beloved friends, so that you could not distinguish his friends from his enemies by the way he treated them. In particular, as-Sanūsī's creeds drew a storm of opposition from many of his contemporaries, who considered them an outrageous innovation (min akbar al-bid'a). He was at first greatly disheartened by this opposition, but then gathered the strength to endure the opposition and win over his enemies by kindness and the exemplarity of his life.\footnote{Al-Mallālī, ff. 61a-b and 66a.}

One of those won over was Ibn-Zakri.\footnote{See below, D, b, n. 1.} In as-Sanūsī's commentary on his first theological work, al-‘Aqīda al-kubrā, with the pedantic flush of a new scholar, he indelicately attacked Ibn-
Zakri on some minor points, not giving his name, but referring to him as "a certain present-day Tilimsânian, in his commentary on the 'Aqîda of Ibn-Ḥâjib". Ibn-'Askar also explains that "between Ibn-Zakri and as-Sanûsî there were arguments and discussions (muḥâwarât wa-mubâyâthât) concerning the science of kalâm. Ibn-Zakri maintained that as-Sanûsî was one of his students, and when someone told that to as-Sanûsî, he said, 'By God, I did not learn more than one question from him.'" Ahmad Bēbî speaks of "contention and ill-will" (munāza‘a wa-mushâhana) between them on various points, "each one answering the other; were it not for fear of length, we would mention some of them." Another point which may have discolored as-Sanûsî's view of Ibn-Zakri is, as Ibn-'Askar remarks, that Ibn-Zakri had a far spread reputation and great honor with kings and such like.

In as-Sanûsî's al-'Aqîda al-wustâ and subsequent theological works he makes no further mention, directly or indirectly of Ibn-Zakri. The relations between the two men must have then begun to improve, so that we hear from al-Hallâlî of "a learned man contemporary to as-Sanûsî" coming to him in his last illness to beg pardon. Having received it, he mourned for as-Sanûsî a long time after his death. Since al-Hallâlî was writing in the lifetime of Ibn-Zakri, he does not mention him by name. Ibn-'Askar, however, identifies Ibn-Zakri as having mourned as-Sanûsî in poems,

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55 Al-'Aqîda al-kubrâ (See below, E, n. 2), pp. 325, 382, and 399
56 F. 67a.
57 AB, p. 84.
58 F. 68a.
59 F. 66a; cf. IM, pp. 242-243.
in spite of what had gone on between them. 60

A point of contention involving several of as-Sanūsī's contemporaries was M. b. 'Abdallāh al-Maghili's action against the Jews of Tuwāt. 61 He had "brought upon them humiliation and degradation; moreover he had fallen upon them, fought them, and knocked down their synagogues." 'Alī al-Usmūnī, Qādhī of Tuwāt, condemned this action. Al-Maghīlī thereupon wrote for opinions on the question to a. 'Alī at-Tanasi, 62 a. 'Alī ar-Raqqā, Muftī of Tunis, 63 a. Mahdī 'Isā l-Mawāsī, Muftī of Fez, 64 a. b. Zakrī, Muftī of Tilimsānī, al-Qādhī a. Zk. Yy. b. a. l-Barakāt al-Ghamārī t-Tilimsānī, 65 'Arī. b. Sab' at-Tilimsānī, 66 and as-Sanūsī.

As-Sanūsī replied praising at-Tanasi, who alone, among the others consulted, sustained al-Maghīlī's action. On receiving the replies of as-Sanūsī and at-Tanasi, al-Maghīlī went ahead and ordered his band to demolish the synagogues, killing anyone who opposed them. No one opposed them. Then he said, "Anyone who kills a Jew will have seven weights of gold from me;" and this was done. Whether as-Sanūsī approved of the murders, we do not know. In any case, the incident reflects his bigotry against any

60 F. 67a.

61 On al-Maghīlī see below, D, b, n. 2. The story which follows is from AB, p. 330 = HH, pp. 253-254.

62 See below, D, b, n. 3.

63 Died 894/ 1488-9; cf. AB, pp. 323-324.

64 Died 11 Rajab 896/ 20 May 1491; cf. AB, p. 194.

65 Possibly the individual noted in AB, p. 359, who died in 910/ 1504-5.

66 I found no information on him.
but Ash'arite Sunnite Muslims, at least in his earlier works. 67

As-Sanūsī's fame spread to the East and the West in his own lifetime. 68 He remained active until the end, expressing the desire two days before his final illness to retire from teaching in the mosque because it was too distracting. 69 He was bedridden ten days before dying. 70

D. His intellectual contacts:

Although as-Sanūsī praises traveling in search of knowledge, 71 the only travel we know he made was to Algiers and Wahrān, where he met I. at-Tāzī. 72 The only other indirect reference to any travel is al-Mallālī's remark that as-Sanūsī wore black shoes instead of his usual sandals when he was going far. 73 Except for I. at-Tāzī, it can be presumed that all those listed below had contact with as-Sanūsī only in Tilimsān.

a. His masters:

The order here followed is that of al-Mallālī, chapter 1.

In their biographies of as-Sanūsī, Ḥamd Bābā 74 and Ibn-Maryam 75

67 See below, Chapter III, passim, regarding the Philosophers, Christians, Mu'tazilites, ar-Rāzī, al-Ghazālī, and blind-acceptors; see Ch. III, A, c, for an easing of his position in his Muqaddima.

68 Al-Mallālī, f. 74a.

69 Al-Mallālī, f. 23b.

70 Al-Mallālī, f. 116a.

71 Al-'Agīda al-kubrā, p. 49.

72 See below, D, a, n. 13.

73 F. 73a.

74 AB, p. 325.

75 IM, p. 238.
give the same names but in different order. Ibn-‘Askar gives only some of these names, and some others of his own, placed at the end of this list.76

1) Abū-Yq. Yūsuf b. ‘U. b. Shu‘ayb as-Sanūsī l-Ḥasanī taught his son when he was small how to recite part of the Qur'ān.77

2) Naqr az-Zawāwī,78 one of the greatest students of M. b. Marzūq (al-ḥafīd),79 but not originally of Tilimsān,80 taught him Arabic.

3) Abū-‘Al. M. b. Q. b. Tūnart as-Sināḥī t-Tilimsānī81 taught him arithmetic (ḥisāb) and inheritance laws (farā‘īḍ). As-Sanūsī said that he could not understand his lectures, and received private tutoring from him at night.

4) Abū-l-H. 'A. b. M. b. M. b. ‘A. al-Qurashi l-Basāṭī, known as al-‘alaqādī,82 moved from Spain to Tilimsān before 831/1427-8,83 from there to Tunis before 17 Jum. 851/1 Aug. 1447.84

76F. 68a. 77Al-Mallālī, f. 5b.
78Cf. al-Mallālī, f. 6a-b; and AB, p. 348 (quoting al-Mallālī and Ibn-al-Azraq) = IM, p. 295.
79See below, D, a, n. 15.
80IM, p. 82 (on Abarkān), tells of his coming to Tilimsān.
81Cf. al-Mallālī, f. 6b; AB, p. 321 (quoting as-Sanūsī) = IM, p. 237. The form "Tūnart" is in al-Mallālī; IM has the more familiar "Tūmart"; while AB has "Tūzat"!
83Since one of his masters there, al-Qādī a. 'Al. M., known as Ḥammū sh-Sharīf, died in that year; cf. AB's biography of the latter, p. 290.
84Since one of his masters there, a. 'Al. M. b. M. b. I. b. ‘Uqqāb al-Judhdhāmī (?) t-Tūnusī, died on that day; cf. AB's biography of the latter, p. 308.
from Tunis to Cairo and Mecca, then back to Granada, and finally to Béja, in Tunisia, where he died in the middle of Dhū-l-Ḥijjah 891/early Dec. 1486. The author of fifty-three works, which Ahmād Bābā lists, he taught as-Sanūsī arithmetic and inheritance laws, possibly during his stay in Tilimsān en route to Tunis.

5) Abū-l-Ḥajjāj Yūsuf b. a. l-‘Abbās A. b. M. ash-Sharīf al-Ḥasanī taught him the seven readings of the Qur'ān, completing with him two recitations and a good part of a third. As-Sanūsī mentions this master in the commentary he began on the Qur'ān.

6) Abū-`Al. M. b. A. b. ‘Īsā l-Maghīlī t-Tilimsānī, known as al-Jallāb, whose specialty was legal opinions (fatāw), died in 875/1470. He taught as-Sanūsī the Mudawwana.

7) Abū-`Al. M. b. A. b. Yy. b. al-`Abbās al-Jabbāli at-Tilimsānī, one of whose specialties was the astrolabe, died in 867/1462. Having studied this under him, as-Sanūsī wrote a commentary on his treatise on this instrument.

8) Abū-`, Al. M. b. al-`Abbās b. M. b. ‘Īsā l-`Ubbādī t-Tilimsānī...
sānī,²¹ author of three works listed by ʿAlīmad Bāḥ, died in 871/1466-7. He taught as-Sanūsī a bit of the fundamentals of religious science (uqūl), and covered with him the Jumal of al-Khūnajī from beginning to end.²²

9) Abū-l-H. ʿAlī b. M. at-Talūtī l-Anṣārī,²³ a half-brother of as-Sanūsī on his mother's side,²⁴ died on Tuesday night, 5 Ṣafar 895/29 Dec. 1489.²⁵ He taught as-Sanūsī in the latter's youth the Risāla of Ibn-a. Zayd al-Qayruwānī.²⁶

10) Al-H. b. Makhlūq b. Masʿūd b. Saʿd b. Saʿīd al-Mazīlī r-Rāshīdī, known as Abarkān,²⁷ and famous primarily as a holy man, died at the end of Shawwāl 857/ the beginning of Nov. 1453, at the age of nearly one hundred years. As-Sanūsī attended his


⁹²See below, E, n. 23. Note that IM, p. 238, adds fiqh and bayān to the subjects taught as-Sanūsī by Ibn-al-ʿAbbās. This addition is not substantiated by al-Mallālī.


⁹⁴"On his mother's side:" is in AB and IM, but not in al-Mallālī, but is corroborated by as-Sanūsī himself, quoted in IM, p. 830 (on Abarkān) and p. 233 (on al-Hawārī).

⁹⁵According to the tombstone inscription, reported by Brosselard, "Tombeau...," p. 248.

⁹⁶The standard work of Ἡβλικ law by a. M. ʿAl. b. a. Zayd Ar. al-Qayrawānī n-Mafzāwī (d. 386/996); cf. GAL I, p. 177, SI, p. 301.

⁹⁷Cf. al-Mallālī, f. 10a-b, and AB, p. 109 (quoting as-Sanūsī, and referring also to Ibn-Saʿd's Rawdat an-nisrīn). The fullest biography is in as-Sanūsī's Manāqib al-ʿarbaʿa al-mutaʾakhkhirīn, reported in IM, pp. 74-93. Note that in place of "al-Mazīlī" al-Mallālī has "al-Mazālī."

As-Sanūsī's biography of Abarkān relates incidents which as-Sanūsī no doubt admired as typifying the social position of a shaykh: Abarkān refused gifts from the Sultans Abū-'Abbālāh and Abū-Fāris.98 By his prayer and divine intervention, a man was freed from Abū-'Abbālāh's prison and gained sanctuary with Abū-Fāris.99 Again by his prayer, Abū-Fāris had a dream deterring him from his plan to deliver Tilimsān to pillage for three days because it did not open its gates to him in time.100 The Sultan Abū-l-'Abbās also sought him out, but when he came to see Abarkān during his teaching, Abarkān paid no attention to his visitor, and made him wait.101

11) Abū-l-Q. al-Kanbāshī l-Bijā'I t-Tilimsānī102 taught as-Sanūsī and his half-brother 'Ali tawhīd, specifically, the Irshād of Imām-al-Ḥaramayn,103 and gave them an ijāza for all that he had to pass on. It is too bad we know so little of this source

98 IM, pp. 89-90.
99 IM, p. 75.
100 IM, pp. 79-80. The incident is no doubt in the siege of 831/1428.
101 IM, pp. 87-88.
102 Cf. al-Mallālī, f. 11a, quoted by "AB, p. 226 = IM, p. 152. "Al-Kanbāshī" is the form given by IM; al-Mallālī has "al-Kanbāshī", and "Al-Kanbāshī"; I trust that in editing IM, Ben Cheneb may have been familiar with the correct forms of Algerian nisbas. "Al-Bijā'I" is from "AB; "at-Tilimsānī" is from IM.
of as-Sanūṣī's knowledge of theology.

12) Abū-Zayd 'Ar. b. M. b. Makhluṭ ath-Thālibī l-Jazā'irī was born, according to Aḥmad Bābah's calculations, in 786 or 787/ between Feb. 1384 and Jan. 1386. He studied under various masters, whom Aḥmad Bābah lists, going from Algiers to Bījāya (Bougie) in 802/1399-1400, from there to Tunis in 809 or the beginning of 810/1407, then to Egypt, and back to Tunis in 819/1416-7, dying in 875/1470-1. The author of seventeen works, listed by al-Mallālī and Aḥmad Bābah, he taught as-Sanūṣī the ḥadīth of al-Bukhārī, that of Muslim, and other works of ḥadīth, giving him an ījāza. Al-Mallālī remarks that he was also interested in medicine, as was as-Sanūṣī.

13) Abū-Sālim a. Ishāq I. b. M. b. 'A. al-Lanāt t-Tāzī l-Wahrānī was one of the leading sufis of his time. He had various sufic and academic masters in his home town of Tāzā, on pilgrimage in Mecca and Medina in 831/1427, then in Tunis, in Tilmisān before 14 Shawābān 842/30 Jan. 1439, and in Wahrān before 843/1439-40, dying on Sunday, 9 Shawābān 866/9 May 461.
1462. Al-Mallālī says that when as-Sanūsī came from Algiers, he entered the city of Wahrān, and sat by the Shaykh I. at-Tāzī for about twenty-five days; during these days the Shaykh I. at-Tāzī robed as-Sanūsī with the noble, bright, and purified khirqa. Al-Mallālī then reports the chain of men from whom at-Tāzī received the khirqa, all the way back to Muḥammad, and gives similar chains, with ḥadīth explanations, for other sufic blessings given to as-Sanūsī, such as aq-diyya (which consists in giving the guest murīd dates and water), al-muṣafahā (the clasping of hands), al-mushābaka (the passing of a rosary), talqīn-adh-dhikr (the transmission of a sufic prayer), and, finally, the spitting into his mouth.

Al-Mallālī says that there are other alleged masters of as-Sanūsī, but that he omitted mentioning them because there is no certainty about them, whereas the previous were mentioned and praised by as-Sanūsī and his half-brother 'Alī. Ibn-‘Askar names some others as masters of as-Sanūsī:

14) "Al-‘Alim ar-raḥbāl al-Ubbali, who was the first to introduce the science of kalām to the Maghrīb in recent times," that is, M. b. I. b. A. al-‘Abdarī t-Tilimsānī, known as al-Ubbali. He could not have taught as-Sanūsī, since he died in

15) "Abū-'Al. Marzūq, the commentator of the Burda," that is, a. 'Al. N. b. A. b. M. b. A. b. M. b. M. b. a. B. b. Marzūq al-ḥafīd al-'Ajīsī t-Tilimsānī, 115 who wrote three commentaries on the Burda, 116 and died on 14 Sha‘bān 842/ 30 Jan. 1439. Ibn-Marzūq’s 'Aqīda was the unacknowledged model and basis of as-Sanūsī’s al-'Aqīda al-kubrā, 117 and one of his commentaries on the Burda is quoted in as-Sanūsī’s commentary on the poem of al-Jaza‘irī. 118 As-Sanūsī could have heard him as a boy of ten years old if he were born in 832, but in none of his theological works does he claim this famous name among his teachers. It is probable, therefore, that as-Sanūsī was born rather in 838-9.

16) "Ash-shaykh a. l-'Abbās a. b. ZA‘." I haven't a clue who he may be.

17) "Ish-shaykh a. Al. Qarqār." Nor have I any idea who this person may be.

18) "Ish-shaykh a. 'Uth. Q. al-'Ugbānī, 'who should be a. 1-Faql a. l-Q. b. Sa‘īd b. M. al-'Ugbānī t-Tilimsānī; 119 "Abū-'Uth." is the kunya of his father Sa‘īd. 120 Qāsim al-'Ugbānī


117See below, E, n. 2.

118N. 27h; see below, E, n. 16.


120AB, p. 125 = IM, p. 106.
was a muftī and qāḍī in Tilimsän who held some opinions differing from Mālikī law, and was opposed by Ibn-Marzūq al-ḥafīd; he died in Dhū-l-Q. 854/ Dec. 1450-Jan. 1451. As-Sanūsī certainly had the opportunity to study under him, but perhaps did not claim him as one of his masters because of his unorthodox opinions.

One who can be presumed to have been a master of as-Sanūsī, even though he is not mentioned by al-Mallālī or Ibn-'Askar is:

19) A. b. al-Ḥ. al-Ghamārī, a sufi, the wonders of whose life as-Sanūsī relates in his Manāqib al-arbaʿa al-mutaiakhkhirin. 121 He died on 12 Shawwāl 874/ 14 April 1470.

b. His contemporaries:

1) Abū-l-'Abbās A. b. H. b. Zakrī l-Mi'rāwī, 122 muftī of Tilimsän, died at the beginning of Safar 900/ the beginning of Nov. '494. His Bughyat at-tālib fi sharh 'Aqidat Ibn-Ḥājib was attacked by as-Sanūsī. 123

2) Abū-'Ā. M. b. 'Abdālkarīm b. M. al-Maghīlī t-Tilimsānī, 124 the author of twenty-three works, traveled as far as Kano, and

121 IM, pp. 31-38 (See below, E, n. 51.). A brief notice of this man is given in AB, p. 80.

122 Cf. AB, p. 84 = IM, pp. 38-41; Ibn-'Askar, ff. 67a-68a; and GAL SII, p. 357, also SI, pp. 539 and 672. The full name and the date of his death are from the tombstone inscription; cf. C. Brosselard, "Le tombeau de Sidi Zekri retrouvé," Revue africaine, v. 5, n. 29 (Sept. 1861), pp. 334-336. In place of "al-Mi'rāwī", AB has "al-Mānawi"; he also gives Safar 899 as the date of his death. GAL gives the date 906.

123 See above, C, b, and note 55.

I, D, b.

3) Abū-'Al. M. b. 'Al. b. 'Abdaljalīl at-Tanasi t-Tilimsānī, author of several works, including the historical work noted above, died in Jum. I 899/ Feb.-March 1494. Aḥmad Bābā quotes A. b. Dāwūd al-Andalusī as saying that "knowledge is with at-Tanasi, goodness (ṣalāḥ) with as-Sanūsī, and leadership (rī'āsa) with Ibn-Zakrī."

4) Abū-1-Abbas A. b. 'll. al-Jazā'iri z-Zawāwi wrote a theological and Sufic poem in basīt meter rhyming in ḍam, on which, at his request, as-Sanūsī wrote a commentary. Al-Mallālī remarks that al-Jazā'irī was pleased with the commentary and praised as-Sanūsī for it, and adds that the outward meaning of some of its expressions was incorrect, but was interpreted in a correct sense by as-Sanūsī. Al-Jazā'irī died in 834/ 1479-80.

5) Abū-'Al. M. b. 'Ar. al-Nawāṣī wrote a creed in rajaz meter, on which, at his request, as-Sanūsī wrote a commentary. He died in Tilimsān in Dhū-l-Q. 910/ April-May 1505.

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125 See above, C, b.
127 B, note 9.
128 Cf. al-Mallālī, f. 76a; AB, pp. 82-83; and GAL II, p. 252, SII, pp. 356-357.
129 See below, E, n. 16.
130 Cf. al-Mallālī, f. 76a; and AB, p. 332 = IM, p. 252.
131 GAL SII, p. 992, n. 32. 132 See below, E, n. 15.
There remain a few names who are not recorded in connection with as-Sanüsi, but whom he inevitably knew and had contact with, since they were in Tilimsän with him and had many masters and students in common with him:

6) A. b. Yy. b. M. b. 'Abdalwä4id b. A. al-WanshariSī133 studied under the masters of Tilimsän until the beginning of Muâb 874/11 July 1469, when he fell out with the Sultan (a. 'Al. at-Tâbiit b. al-Mutawakkil) and his house was confiscated. He fled to Fez, where he wrote a number of works, including al-Mi`yar al-mu`arrab 'en fatāwī 'ulamā' Ifriqiya wa-l-Andalus wa-l-Maghrib, an important source for the biographies of Ahmad Bābā. He died on 20 Safar 914/19 June 1508, at the approximate age of eighty.


8) H. b. A. b. Q. b. Sa'id b. H. al-`Uqābānī t-Tilimsānī136 seems to have directly succeeded his grandfather137 as qādī of Tilimsän. He was still qādī in 868/1463-4, when he brought a present from al-Mutawakkil to the Sultan of Tunis, but shortly thereafter was removed from office. He died on 23 Dhū-1-Ḥ. 871/1466.

133Cf. AB, pp. 87-88 = IM, pp. 53-54; and GAL II, p. 248, SII, p. 348.
135See above, D, a, n. 15.
136Cf. AB, p. 318 = IM, p. 224. 137See above, D, a, n. 18.
26 July 1467.


c. His students (alphabetically by ism):

1) ʿAr. al-Majdūlī, known as at-Tūnusī, is said to have taught Zarrūq the creeds of as-Sanūsī.

2) Abū-ʿAbbās A. b. M. b. ʿIṣā ʿIr-Burnūsī ʿĪsā, known as Zarrūq, was born on 28 Muḥ. 846/8 June 1442. Besides learning directly from as-Sanūsī, he studied as-Sanūsī's creeds under ʿAr. al-Majdūlī. He went to Cairo to study and teach, and died in Safar 899/Nov.-Dec. 1551.


4) Abū-ʿAbbās A. b. H. b. M. b. Yy. al-Madiyūnī ʿI-

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138 Cf. AB, p. 57 = IM, p. 57.
139 According to IM; not 880 as in AB.
140 Cf. AB, p. 172, and the biographies of Zarrūq by AB and IM; see below, n. 2.
141 Cf. AB, pp. 84-87 = IM, pp. 45-50; and GAL II, p. 245, SII, p. 360. In his Nujrat ahl ad-dīn (See below, E, n. 50.), f. 245b, as-Sanūsī speaks of meeting the young man (ṣāḥib) a. ʿAbbās A. al-Burnūsī (with wāḥ), known as az-Zarrūq, when the latter was going on pilgrimage in 846. I suspect this date, which does not fit the presumed birth dates of either man.
142 Cf. AB, p. 88 = IM, p. 52. On this man's father, see above, D, b, n. 7; on his grandfather, see D, a, n. 15.
Wahrānī, known as Ibn-Jayyida, studied under as-Sanūsī his Muaddimat as-Sughrā and died in 951/1544-5.


6) I. al-Wajdī f-Tilimsānī died in the fourth decade of the tenth century/1523-1534.

7) Ibn-Malūka is said by Ibn-'Askar to have led the people during the Turkish persecution, and to have died in 1530.149

8) M. b. .. b. a. 1- Faql b. Sa'id b. Sa'd at-Tilimsānī wrote two historical works: an-Najm ath-thāqib ff mā li-awliyā'

143Cf. AB, p. 92 = IM, pp. 52-53. In place of "Jayyida" (or "Jīda"?), AB has "Hurra", which is not substantiated by the occurrence of the name in the i̇żas of 'Abdalqādir al-FāṣI and al-Manjūr; see below, D, d, and note 177.

144See below, E, n. 10.

145Cf. AB, p. 88, and IM, pp. 8-24. He is mentioned in AB's and IM's biographies of as-Sanūsī. In place of "Yabdarī", AB has "Baydarī". IM, p. 8, explains that Ibn-al-Ḥājī acquired this nisba because he moved to the valley of Yabdar.

146Reproduced in IM, pp. 9-10; cf. also GAL SII, p. 355.

147The opening lines are given in IM, p. 10.

148Cf. IM, p. 64. He is mentioned by AB and IM in their biographies of as-Sanūsī.

149Cf. Weir, pp. 51-52. He is mentioned by AB and IM in their biographies of as-Sanūsī.

150Cf. AB, p. 330 = IM, pp. 251-252. He is mentioned in AB's and IM's biographies of as-Sanūsī. Brockelmann does not mention this person or his works.
Allāh min al-manāqib, frequently quoted by Ahmad Bābā, and Rawdat an-nisrīn fī manāqib al-arba‘a al-muta‘akhkhirīn. 151 As will be discussed later, 152 the latter work is likely an editing of the work of as-Sanūsī. Ibn-Sa‘d died in Rajab 901/ March-April 1496.

9) M. b. 'Īsā is merely mentioned without further detail. 153

10) Abū-'Al. M. b. a. Mādān at-Tilimsānī 154 is an important teacher of as-Sanūsī’s works. 155 According to Ibn-Maryam, he died in Jum. II 915/ Sept.-Oct. 1509, but Ahmad Bābā says he was still living in 920/ 1514-5.

11) Abū-'Al. M. b. M. b. al-‘Abbās as-saghīr at-Tilimsānī, 156 the son of as-Sanūsī’s master, 157 studied as-Sanūsī’s works under M. b. a. Mādān 158 and directly under as-Sanūsī. He was still living after 920/ 1514-5.

12) M. b. Müsā l-Wajdījī t-Tājīnī t-Tilimsānī, 159 himself

151 In place of "al-muta‘akhkhirīn", AB has "gālipīn".

152 E, n. 51.

153 IM, p. 225. In the biography of Ibn-Jayyida (See above, D, c, n. 4.) by IM he is said to be a student of as-Sanūsī and a master of Ibn-Jayyida. But in that by AB, "M. b. Müsā" (See below, D, c, n. 12) is given instead of "M. b. 'Īsā".

154 Cf. AB, p. 334 = IM, p. 259. He is mentioned by AB and IM in their biographies of as-Sanūsī.

155 He taught Ibn-al-‘Abbās as-saghīr (See below, D, c, n. 11.), and is mentioned in the ijāzas of 'Abdalgūdir al-Fāsī and al-Manjūr (See below, D, d, and note 177.).

156 Cf. AB, p. 334 = IM, p. 259. He is mentioned by AB and IM in their biographies of as-Sanūsī.

157 See above, D, a, n. 8.

158 See above, D; c, n. 10.

159 Cf. AB, p. 335 = IM, p. 260. He may be the same as or related to I. al-Wajdījī of AB, p. 329 = IM, p. 248.
the master of many students, was still living around 930/1523-4.

13) M. al-Qal'160 died before as-Sanūsī and was buried by him.

14) M. b. 'U. b. I. al-Mallāhī,161 the author of as-Sanūsī's biography and a commentary on his Sughrī,162 is otherwise unknown.

15) M. b. Yy. b. Mūsā d-Maghrawī t-Tilimsānī r-Rāshidī163 learned from as-Sanūsī tawhīd, fiqh, usūl, exposition (bayān), logic, arithmetic, inheritance laws, and grammar. The date of his death is unknown.


17) 'U. al-Aṭṭī165 is mentioned as a companion of al-Maghrawī166 in studying under as-Sanūsī.

18) Abū-s-Sādāt Yy. b. M. al-Madiyunī t-Tilimsānī167 studied fiqh, usūl, exposition, and logic under as-Sanūsī. There is no record of his death.

19) Abū-Zk. Yy. as-Sanūsī is mentioned as a student of al-
Wansharīsī\(^{168}\) in the biographies of the latter by Āḥmad Bābā and Ibn-Maryam, and as a master of al-Yasītīnī in Āḥmad Bābā’s biography of the latter.\(^{169}\) His connection with as-Sanūsī is verified by the isnād of the ijāza of ‘Abdalqādir al-Fāsī.\(^{170}\)

20) Ābū-Yq. Yūḥūf al-‘Aṭā’ī is mentioned as a student of as-Sanūsī in Ibn-Maryam’s biography of M. al-Jadīrī.\(^{171}\)

21) Abū-‘Uth. Sa‘īd al-kaff al-Manawī,\(^{172}\) presumably a descendant of Ā. ‘Uth. Sa‘īd al-‘Uqbānī,\(^{173}\) and possibly to be identified with Sa‘īd al-kaff ar-Rāshidī, who taught tawḥīd to M. b. M., grandson of Yy. b. M. al-Madiyūnī,\(^{174}\) is reported as a student of as-Sanūsī in the ijāzas of ‘Abdalqādir al-Fāsī\(^{175}\) and al-Manjūr.\(^{176}\)

d. The spread of his works to West Africa:

As-Sanūsī’s works spread in many different directions

\(^{168}\) See above, D, b. n. 6.

\(^{169}\) AB, pp. 338-339.

\(^{170}\) Ben Cheneb, "Etude...," p. 191, where he is directly linked with as-Sanūsī. The ijāza of al-Manjūr (See below, D, d, and note 177.) links him to as-Sanūsī indirectly, through M. b. Ā. Madyan (See above, D, c, n. 10.).

\(^{171}\) IM, p. 285.

\(^{172}\) This full name is given in the ijāza of al-Manjūr (See D, d, and note 177). AB, p. 338, mentions Ā. ‘Uth. Sa‘īd al-Manawī” among the masters of al-Yasītīnī.

\(^{173}\) See above, D, a, n. 18, and note 120.

\(^{174}\) IM, p. 174.

\(^{175}\) Ben Cheneb, "Etude...," p. 191.

\(^{176}\) See below, D, d, and note 177.
according to many complicated lines of transmission. One line of interest is that through the family of Ahmad Bābā, to West Africa. Tracing upwards from Ahmad Bābā, the biographer from Timbuktoo, we have:

- Abu-l-'Abbās A. b. 'A. b. 'Ar. b. 'Al. al-Manjūr (d. Tuesday, mid-Dhū-l-Q. 995/ 17 Oct. 1587), with whom Ahmad Bābā had indirect contact 177

- Abu-`Al. M. b. A. b. 'Ar. al-Yasītinī (d. 1 Muh. 959/ 29 Dec. 1551) 178

- Abu-'Uth. Sa'id al-kaffif (D, c, n. 21)

- Abu-Zk. Yy. as-Sūsī (D, c, n. 19)

- Abu-'Al. M. b. a. Madyan (D, c, n. 10)

- Abu-'Al. M. b. a. Madyan (D, c, n. 10), directly

- Abu-l-'Abbās A. b. Jayyida (D, c, n. 4)

- Ahmad Bābā's father A. b. A. b. 'U. (d. 17 Sha'bān 991/ 6 Sept. 1583) 179

- The latter's uncle Maḥmūd b. 'U. (d. 16 Ram. 955/ 19 Oct. 1548) 180

- Negiraddin M. b. Ḥ. b. 'A. b. 'Ar. al-Lağāni (d. Sha'bān

177 Cf. AB, pp. 95-98, and GAL SII, p. 697. The contact was only with his generation (ṭabaqa), since Ahmad Bābā arrived in Morocco in 1494, after al-Manjūr's death. The relation of al-Manjūr to the following is given in the ijāza of 'Abdalqādir al-Fāsī (Cf. Ben Cheneb, "Etude..., " p. 191) and that of al-Manjūr, written in his own hand in the Escorial ms. 697, f. 2b. Note the variation "al-Manjūrī", which occurs in some references, e. g. GAL I, p. 372, and SII, p. 335.

178 Cf. AB, p. 338.


180 Cf. AB, p. 343.
958/ Sept.–Oct. 1551), whom Maḥmūd met in Cairo in 915/ 1509–10
- Ṣārin (D, c, n. 2).
- Ṣāgin al-Laqqānī, directly, during the pilgrimage of 956/ 1549–50.
Both Ḍāḥmād Bābā and his father wrote commentaries on as-
Sanūsī’s Ṣughrā.

Westward of Timbuktoo, there is evidence that at least as-Sanūsī’s Kūbrā, Wustā, Ṣughrā, Ṣighrat-as-Sughrā, and Ṣiğaddīmā were well known in what is now northern Nigeria in the second half of the eighteenth century, where they have remained standard works. The details of this transmission demand further research.

E. His works:
This enumeration of as-Sanūsī’s works follows that of al-Mallālī in chapter 4 of his biography. Works not included in his list are placed after. Roman numerals indicate the numeration of GAL, SII, where it differs from II. To avoid further reference to Ḍāḥmād Bābā, it may be noted here that he testifies

181 Cf. AE, p. 93.
182 All these works are mentioned by ‘Uth. b. Fodio in his Bayān rujā‘ ash-shaykh as-Sanūsī ‘an at-taṣḥīḥ ‘alā t-taqlīd fi ‘ilm at-tawīd; I used a manuscript copy kindly lent to me by the Narafe of Sokoto. ‘Al. b. Fodio, brother of ‘Uth., wrote a versification of as-Sanūsī’s Wustā, completed in 1207/ 1792–3 (in the University of Ibadan, nos. 82/84, and CAD/42).
to having seen copies of numbers 1-11, 13-20, 24, 26-20, 39, and 40. 184

1 = V and XXIX) Sharḥ fi farḍ al-Ḥawīfī, a commentary on the work on inheritance laws of A. b. M. b. Khalaf al-Ḥawīfī l-Qalāʾī (d. 588/1192). 185 As-Sanūsī composed this when he was eighteen or nineteen years old, and won the praise of Abarkān for it.

2 = I) Al-‘Aqīda al-kubrā, the larger creed, whose official title is ‘Aqīḍat ahl at-tawḥīd al-mukhrīja bi-‘aww Allāh din zulamāt al-jahl wa-ruqbat at-taqīlīd al-murghīma bi-faḍl Allāh ta’ālā anf kull mubtadi‘ wa-‘anīd. 186 This was as-Sanūsī’s first work on tawḥīd. Although he does not say, a comparison makes it obvious that he modeled his creed after, and to a large extent copied from the creed of Ibn-Narẓūq al-Yafid, entitled ‘Aqīḍat ahl at-tawḥīd al-mukhrīja min zulamāt at-taqīlīd. 187 Nevertheless as-Sanūsī’s version is considerably expanded, enough to grant him the title of originality.

3 = I) A commentary on the preceding, entitled ‘Umdat ahl at-tawḥīd wa-tazdīd fi sharḥ ‘Aqīḍat ahl at-tawḥīd. 188 This, with the preceding, has been published in a number of editions. The one used in this thesis is that published in Cairo by Muṣṭafā

184 AB, pp. 328-329.
185 GAL I, p. 384, S1, p. 663.
186 P. 12 of the printed edition.
187 See above, D, a, n. 15. The manuscript used is that of Istanbul, Sūleymaniya, n. 1561, ff. 112a-116a, in the microfilm collection of the University of Edinburgh "MiC. O. 158".
188 P. 13 of the printed edition.
I, E.

1-Ḥalabī, 1354/1936, with the gloss (ḥawīsh) of Ismā'īl b. Mūsā b. 'Uth. al-Ḥāmidī.

4 = III) Al-ʿAqīda al-wustā, the intermediate creed.

5 = III) Its commentary. This and the preceding are discussed in detail in Chapter II, A.

6 = II, including VII and XVIII?) Al-ʿAqīda as-saghīrat, the smaller creed. As-Sanūsī does not give it any title, but in his commentary on it refers to it simply as "a creed small in volume" (aqīda ṣaghīrat al-jīm). In printed editions and popular references it is called Umm al-barāḥīn, or simply as-Sanūsiyya. There are a number of European translations and studies of this work. 190

7 = II) Its commentary, which bears no special name. The edition of the creed and its commentary used for this thesis is that published in Cairo by Muṣṭafā 1-Ḥalabī, 1358/1939, under

189 P. 19 of the printed edition; see the following n. 7.

190 There is a French translation by J.-D. Luciani, Petit traité de théologie musulmane par Abou Abdallah Mohammed ben Mohammed (sic) ben Youasef Senoussi (Alger: Fontana, 1896), and two German translations: by Ph. Wolff, Al-Senūsīs Begriffsentwicklung des Muḥammādānischen Glaubensbekenntnisses (Leipzig, 1948), and by Max Horten, Muḥammadanische Glaubenslehre, Die Katechismus des Fudāli und des Sanūsī ʿübersetzt und erläutert (Kleine Texte für Vorlesungen und Übungen, hsg. von Hans Lietzmann, Heft 159, Bonn, 1916), pp. 45-53.

the title Ḥāshiya 'alā Sharḥ Umm al-barāḥīn; the Ḥāshiya is by M. b. A. b. ʿArafa ad-Dasūqī.

While the Sughrā with its commentary is of a lesser scale altogether than the Kubrā or the Wustā, in as-Sanūsī's estimation and its widespread popular use it is his most important work.¹⁹¹ The commentary says of the creed, "Although it is small in volume, it is large in knowledge, containing all the articles of tawḥīd together with decisive demonstrations adapted to anyone who has a proper use of reason. Besides, I have concluded it with something I have not seen any of the older or recent theologians do: I have explained the two statements of the shahāda...to show how they include all the articles of faith. You have here a creed without parallel, as far as I know."¹⁹²

8 = II.A.) A yet smaller creed, called Sighrat as-Sighra (or Sughrā as-Sughrā, or yet Sighrat as-Sughrā), composed especially for al-Mallālī's father, who found the Sughrā too difficult.

9 = II.A.) Its commentary, which has no special title. There is an edition of the creed and commentary printed in Cairo by Matbaʿst at-tagdüm al-qulūmīyya, 1322/1904-5, which is used in this thesis with the control of the Escorial manuscript n. 697, ff. 252b-277a.

10 = VI) Al-Muqaddimā (or al-Muqaddimāt), which was meant to explain terms and presuppositions in the Sughrā.

¹⁹¹ On the use it has had in Cairo, see Jacques Jomier, "Un aspect de l'activité d'al-Azhar du XVIIe aux débuts du XIXe siècles: Les 'aqāʾid ou professions de foi," communication faite au colloque d'histoire tenu au Caire 27 Mars-4 Avril 1969 à l'occasion du Millénaire du Caire.

11 = VI) Its commentary, which bears no special title. There is an edition of it by J.-D. Luciani, *Les prolégomènes théologiques de Sanoussi*, texte arabe et traduction française (Alger, 1903), but this thesis generally uses in preference the Escorial manuscript n. 697, ff. 194b-224b.

12) Another *'aqidah*, written at the request of one of his students. In it, al-Mallâli says, are cogent reasons against those who assert that ordinary activating-links produce effects. This work seems to have perished.

13 = XXVIII) *Sharh asmā' Allāh al-husnā*, a commentary on the divine names. From a look at an incomplete copy of this in the Bibliothèque Nationale manuscript n. 6480, it seems more of sufic than of theological interest.

14) *Sharh at-tasbih*, on the practice of saying at the end of the canonical prayers "Subhān Allāh", "Al-ḥamdu li-llāh", and "Allāhu akbar" thirty-three times each, and a final "Lā ilāha illā llāh". The text of this is given in chapter 6 of al-Mallāli's biography. 193

15) A commentary on the *'aqidah* in *rajaz* meter by al-Ḥawdī. 194 I know of no copy of it.

16 = IV and XXVI) A commentary on the theological poem of al-Jazā'iri, 195 often listed as *al-Minhāj as-sādīd fi sharḥ Kifāyat al-murīd*. There are a good number more manuscripts of

193 Ff. 95b-96a.
194 See above, D, b, n. 5.
195 See above, D, b, n. 4.
this work than Brockelmann mentions, especially in Tunis and Cairo.
The manuscript used for this thesis is that of al-Azhar, n. 4388
(283), which is of 448 folios at 15 lines per page. References
to it give not only the folio number of this manuscript, but also
the number of the faṣr, and a small letter for the nass concerned
in each faṣr; this is simply a matter of counting, and will
facilitate reference to any manuscript at hand.

17 = XX) Mukmil Ikmāl al-Ikmāl, an abridgement of the Ikmāl
al-Ikmāl, on the Sahih of Muslim, by M. b. Khalīfa b. 'U. al-
Washtāṭī l-Ubbi (d. 828/1424). 196

18 = XXX) A commentary on the Sahih of al-Bukhārī, which
as-Sanūsī did not finish.

19) Sharḥ li-mushkilāt waqā'at fi ḥkhir al-Bukhārī, a com-
mentary on problems occurring at the end of al-Bukhārī. At least
part of this work is reproduced in chapter 6 of al-Kallālī. 197

20) Mukhtasar az-Zarkashi, an abridgement of at-Tan T li-
alfāq al-jāmi‘ as-saḥīḥ, on al-Bukhārī, of M. b. Bahādūr b. 'Al.
at-Turkī l-Miṣrī z-Zarkashi (d. 3 Rajab 794/27 May 1392 in
Cairo). 198 I know of no copy of this work.

21) Mukhtasar Hawāshī t-Taftāzānī 'alā Kashshāf az-Zamakhsharī,
an abridgement of Sharḥ al-Kashshāf by Sa‘daddin Mas‘ūd b. 'U.
at-Taftāzānī (d. 2 Muḥ. 792/10 Jan. 1390). 199 The work of at-

196 Cf. AB, p. 287; GAL SI, p. 265.
197 Ff. 96b-103b.
199 GAL II, p. 280, SII, p. 304.
Taftāzānī is a commentary on al-Kashshāf ‘an haqā’iq at-tanzīl wa-'uyūn al-aqāwil fi wujūb at-ta’wīl, on the Qur’ān, by 1-Q. Maḥmūd b. ‘U. az-Zamakhshārī (d. 9 Dhū-l-Ḥ. 538/ 14 June 1144). I know of no copy of this work.


25) A commentary on the Mukhtasar on logic of a. ‘Al. M. b. M. b. ‘Arafa al-Warghānī (d. 750/ 1350). Al-Mallāḥī says that as-Sanūsī did not finish this work, because he was too busy and

201GAL I, p. 471, SI, p. 858.
203GAL II, p. 142, SII, p. 177.
204GAL II, p. 247, SII, p. 347.
as-Sanūsī did not finish this work because he was too busy and it was extremely difficult. Brockelmann has no reference to this work of Ibn-‘Arafa. Nor have I seen any trace of the commentary.

26 = VIII) Mukhtasar fī l-mantiq, on logic.

27 = VIII) A commentary on the preceding.

28 = GAL on al-Ḥabbāk) A commentary on the poem Bughyat at-tullāb fī ʿilm al-asturlāb, on the astrolabe, by his teacher al-Ḥabbāk.205

29) A commentary on the Urjūza fī t-tibb, on medicine, of a. ʿAl. al-Ḥu. b. ʿAl. b. Sinā (d. 428/1037).206 Al-Mallālī says this work was not finished. I know of no copy of it.

30) An abridgement of "a book" on the seven readings (of the Qur'ān).

31) A commentary on ash-Shāṭibiyya al-kubrā, that is, Hirz al-amānī wa-wajh at-tahānī, or al-Qaṣīda ash-Shāṭibiyya, by a. ʿ1-Q. a. Ḥamīd al-Q. b. Fīrūh b. a. ʿ1-Q. Khalaf b. a. ar-Raʿaynī ash-Shāṭibī (d. 18 or 28 Jum. II 590/11 or 21 June 1194).207 Al-Mallālī says this work was not finished when he saw it. I know of no copy.

32) A commentary on the Dabt of al-Kharrāz on the orthography of the Qur'ān (rasm), that is, ad-Durar al-lawāmiʿ fī ašl maqraʿ al-imām Nāfiʿ - or less likely a second work, Mawrid az-zamān

205 See above, D, a, n. 7.
206 GAL SI, p. 823, work n. 81.
207 GAL I, p. 409, SI, p. 725.
I, E.

I, E.

I, E.

I, E.

I, E.

I, E.

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I know of no copy of this abridgement.

38) An abridgement of Bughyat as-sālik fi ashraf al-masālik, on sufism, by 'Al. M. b. M. b. A. b. 'Ar. b. I. al-Ansārī s-Sāhili l-Mālaqi l-Mu'amman (d. 754/1353). This work was not finished, and is not known to have survived.

39 = XXIII?) A commentary on verses on sufism by al-Imām al-Albārī. I have not been able to identify this person. The text of the verses and the commentary are given in chapter 7 of al-Mallālī's work, in the third place.

40 = XXIII?) A commentary on verses on sufism by "a sufi" (li-ba'd al-'ārifīn). The text of the verses and the commentary are given in chapter 7 of al-Mallālī's work, in the first place.

41 = XXIII?) A commentary on other verses on sufism by "a sufi". The text of the verses and the commentary are given in chapter 7 of al-Mallālī's work, in the second place.

42) A commentary on al-Murshida, that is, al-'Aqīda al-murshida by M. b. Tūmart, called "al-Mahdī" in the Maghreb, and "al-Mahdawi" in the East (d. 524/1130). The only copy of this which I know of is in the private collection of M. ash-Shādhili l-Naifar in Tunis. It consists of thirteen folios.

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214 Ff. 110a-111b.
215 Ff. 103b-109a.
216 Ff. 109b-110a.
217 GAL I, p. 401, SI, p. 697, and SII, p. 993, n. 42. An edition of this creed has been published by Professor Turki and Mr. Naifar in their edition of al-Fārisiyya (Tunis, 1968), but they did not make use of two al-Azhar manuscripts I located.
without a date, but the copy is approximately from the eleventh century H. The second work in the volume is by "al-Jarbi" (from the island of Djerba), who possibly is the copyist. The incipit, after the blessings, is "wa-ba'd, kasānī llāh wa-iyyāka libās at-taqwa..."


44) A commentary on Jawāhir al-`ulūm, that is, Jawāhir al-kalām, muktaṣar al-Mawāfiq, by 'Aḍudaddīn 'Ar. b. A. b. 'Abdal-Jaffār aṣ-Ṣidīqi 1-Ṣaḥīl 1-İjī 7-Ṣafar 7-š-Širāzī (d. 756/ 1355). This work on kalām was supposed to be modeled after the philosophical method of al-Baydāwī's at-Tawālī'. Al-Mallālī remarks that this is an extraordinary work (kitāb 'ajīb), but difficult. Unfortunately no copy of it is known to be extant.

45 = XIX) A tafsīr of the Qur'ān up to Sūra 2, v. 5. Al-Mallālī reproduces in chapter 5 of his work all of this, going up even to verse 7.

46) A tafsīr of Sūra 33 (ṣ) and the following. Al-Mallālī did not know how far as-Sanūsī got in this work. It is not known to have survived.

Besides the works listed above, Ḥāmid Bābā and Ibn-Maryām...
add the following two:

47 = XXVII) Tafsīr hadīth al-‘umda, bayt ‘ad-dā‘ wa-l-hamiyya ra’s ad-dawā‘ wa-asl kull dā‘ al-barda‘. I have not had the chance to check al-Mallālī again to see if this is included in his chapter 6, in the miscellaneous passages between ff. 106a-108a.


There must also be added:

49 = XVI?) Two prayers (wird) reproduced in chapter 8 of al-Mallālī’s work. 224

50 = IX-X) Nusrat ahl ad-dīn wa-ahl al-hagg wa-l-yaqīn ‘alā man ta’arrad fī t-tāriq fī r-radd ‘alā Abī-l-Ḥasan as-saghīr, a polemical work defending sufic practices. In this thesis, reference is made to the British Museum ms. Add. 9521, ff. 245a-258a.

51) Manāqib al-arba‘a al-muta‘akhkhirīn, biographies of four recent sufic figures. Ibn-Maryam identifies these four as al-Hāwārī, I, at-Tāzī, al-Ḥ Abārkān, and A. b. al-Ḥ al-Ghamārī. 225

The work can be reconstructed by assembling the passages which Ibn-Maryam quotes from it. There is a quotation in Ibn-Maryam’s introduction, pp. 6-8, which must have been from the introduction of as-Sanūsī’s work. The biographies of M. b. ‘U. al-Hāwārī (d.
I, E.

843/1439-40), pp. 228-236, Abarkan,226 pp. 74-93, and al-
Ghamari,227 pp. 31-38, explicitly acknowledge quoting from this
work of as-Sanusi. That of I. at-Tazi,228 pp. 58-63, does not;
rather it simply follows Ahmad Babā, who quotes from Ibn-Sa’d’s
an-Najm ath-thāqib229 and from al-Mallāli. The quotations from
an-Najm ath-thāqib are factual and objective, whereas al-Mal- lāli’s
style matches the hagiographical legendary style of the other
three biographies attributed to as-Sanusi. I suggest that al-
Mallāli’s section on I. at-Tazi is based on as-Sanusi’s biography.

Furthermore, until the Rawdat an-nisrin fi mantagib al-arba’a
al-mutā’akhkhirin of Ibn-Sa’d is found, I suggest that it is an
editing of written or oral information gathered from as-Sanusi,
and that Ibn-Maryam is quoting not directly from a work of as-
Sanusi, but from this edition by Ibn-Sa’d. This seems the best
explanation of the first person singular pronouns on p. 31,
which cannot refer to as-Sanusi, but fit Ibn-Sa’d well. This
also explains Ahmad Babā’s ambivalence regarding the source of
his information for Abarkan.

Possibly associated with this work is the short biography
of M. b. Q. b. Tūnart,230 which Ahmad Babā and Ibn-Maryam
attribute to as-Sanusi.

52) A letter (or fatwā) to M. al-Maghīli concerning his

226 See above, D, a, n. 10.
227 See above, D, a, n. 19.
228 See above, D, a, n. 13.
229 See above, D, c, n. 8.
230 See above, D, a, n. 3.
action against the Jews of Tuwāt, found in Ḥamd Bābū's and Ibn-
Maryam's biographies of al-Maghīlī, ²³¹ and in a shorter form in
their biographies of at-Tanāšī. ²³²

53 etc.) I leave from consideration Brockelmann's numbers
XII, XIII, XIV, XXI, XXII, and XXV, since to identify them
adequately would require an examination and comparison of the
texts.

²³¹ See above, D, b, n. 2.
²³² See above, D, b, n. 3.
A. Introduction:

a. Date, title, and position among his works:

The Wustā is the only one of as-Sanūsī's theological works which is dated. It was finished on the day of 'Arafa (9 Dhū'l-Ḥ.) 875/29 May 1471.¹

No title is given to the Wustā either in the creed or in the commentary. As for the titles given by Brockelmann, "al-Jumal", which appears in the beginning of the creed (N. 1), is simply a common noun, not a title. "Al-Murshida" does not appear in the creed or the commentary, and may be a confusion with as-Sanūsī's commentary on the Murshida. Brockelmann's third title, "'Umdat ahl at-taqdīq wa-t-taqdīq", has no foundation whatsoever, and possibly is some copyist's imitation of the title of the commentary on the Kubrā. Both the Sharḥ al-Jazā'iriyya /12c, f. 186b/ and the Muqaddima /P. 67/ have a reference to the commentaries "on the Kubrā and the Wustā" (fī sharḥ 'aqīdatinā l-kubrā wa-l-wustā). This reference is the nearest we can come to an official title for the work under consideration.

In the Wustā, reference to the Kubrā means only that the latter is the larger of the two.² But the use of the term "intermediate creed" (Wustā) implies the existence of the Sughrā, an

¹Ms. El, f. 83a.
²The introduction of the Wustā /Ms. El, f. 4a/ gives the official titles of the Kubrā creed and commentary, but references elsewhere are simply to "Sharḥ 'aqīdatinā l-kubrā" or the like.
implication which is confirmed by unacknowledged quotations from it in the Sharḥ al-Jazā'iriyya. The Sughrā itself contains no reference to any other work, but from the position of the works in the list of al-Mallālī and from the normal tendency of an author to abridge and popularize a longer complicated work, we can suppose that the Sughrā came after the Wustā. The Sighrat as-Sighra and the Mugaddima contain a number of advances in synthesizing and adjusting positions on matters where Sharḥ al-Jazā'iriyya simply repeats the Kubrā or the Wustā; therefore they may be placed after it.

There is the complication in dating works that a matn is usually composed before a commentary. Only the Wustā gives the appearance of a simultaneous composition of matn and sharḥ. Yet in the case of the other works there is no indication that another composition intervened chronologically between the two parts; therefore they can be treated together.

I propose the following succession of as-Sanūsī's available theological works: the Kubrā (works 2 and 3), the Wustā (works 4 and 5), the Sughrā (works 6 and 7), Sharḥ al-Jazā'iriyya (work 16), Sighrat as-Sighra (works 8 and 9), the Mugaddima (works 9 and 10).

As for the scale of these works, the Kubrā, the Wustā, and the Sharḥ al-Jazā'iriyya are major works, treating in detail all the major questions of kalām, while the other works are introduc-

\[\text{321c, f. 447a, on the three marks of a prophet.}\]

\[\text{4\'Utth. b. Fodio supposes the same in his Bayān ru'ū ash-shaykh as-Sanūsī 'an at-tashdid 'alā t-taqlīd fi 'ilm at-Tawhīd, ms. cit.}\]
tory abridgements for beginners or popularizations. A short-
coming of the Kubrā is that its logical format is not worked out
in detail; an occasional faṣl does not really help. This may be
because the Kubrā is simply patterned after the creed of Ibn-
Marzūq.

The Wustā, being an entirely original work, has not only a

clear logical format, but also a more concise and reworked presenta-
tion of the material. In his introduction, as-Sanūsī says that

some people found the Kubrā too difficult and its commentary too

long /Ms. E1, f. 4v/. The Wustā, he says, "is more pertinent and
easier to understand (akhaṣṣ wa-aqrab), and although it is

shorter, it contains exact demonstrations for easy learning and

remarks on credal details which are not found in longer works,
much less in shorter ones." Nevertheless, we must turn to the

long and sometimes abstruse digressions of the Kubrā for full

information on certain points.

The Sharḥ al-Jazā'iriyya, on the other hand, being later,

claims authority over the Wustā, but in fact it contains little

further development. Long sections are merely copied from the

Kubrā and the Wustā, while it does not have the logical layout

of the Wustā, since it is a commentary on another man's poem.

It has some entirely new sections on certain legal, moral and

sufic questions which do not belong in a treatise of kalām, but

are there because they arise in al-Jazā'iri's poem.

Therefore, for a study in depth of Muslim theology as pre-
sented by as-Sanūsī, the Wustā is the best focal point, while

his other works are necessary to supplement or correct it.
b. Manuscripts and editions:

There are three rare printed works containing the *Wusta*, none of which are critical:


2) M. b. Yūsuf as-Sanūṣī, Sharḥ al-*Wusta* (Tunis: Maṭbaʿat at-taqaddum al-wataniyya, 1327/ 1909),

3) Abū-Isḥāq I. al-Andalusī s-Saraqusī, al-Ḥiba wa-l-*‘atḥ* fi sharḥ al-'Aqīda al-*wusta* (Tunis, 1345/ 1926-7), which contains only the matn and as-Saraqusī’s summary of the commentary.

Of the manuscripts listed by Brockelmann, I was unable to look into those of Berlin, Constantine, Damascus, Mawṣil, Rāmpūr or Fez. Presumably Istanbul too has many manuscripts, but these would only represent the traditions of Tunisia and Algeria from where they would have been taken; and I have examined sufficient specimens from this area.

The following is a list of manuscripts I have seen, giving the location, catalogue number, date of copy, and, if used in the thesis, a siglum. Generally "E" represents Escorial, "A" the Azhar, and "T" Tunis, but manuscripts from different parts have been grouped under these sigla according to their tradition.

**Escorial:**

697, ff. 3b-83b, 25 lines/ page, H. 948-989  

This is the oldest of the manuscripts located. In 277 folios, it contains six works, five of them by as-Sanūṣī. They are all of the same script except the opening folios which include the *ijāza* of al-Manjūr, dated the end of Rajab 989/ end of Aug.
One of as-Sanūsī’s works within the volume, Shahr Muqaddima Ḥaṣṣaghūjī, is dated Friday, 29 Ṣafar 948/ 24 June 1541. The hand is an exquisite, but crammed, old Maghribine.

Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional:
320, 4 (5127), 11 ff., 18-0 lines/ page, no date
This manuscript contains only the matn, is poorly written, but fundamentally of the same hand style as E1.

Rabat, Bibliothèque Générale et Archives:
D397, ff. 1b-115b, H. 1055
The hand is much like that of E1.

Algiers, Bibliothèque Nationale:
2007, ff. 93a-172b, H. 1281
2024, ff. 121b-235a, H. 1177

Tunis, Bibliothèque Nationale, Sūq al-‘Attārīn:
Although now housed under one roof, the manuscripts are catalogued according to the former separate libraries. The new numbers are given:

al-Maktaba al-wataniyya:
369, pp. 113-210, H. 1134
904, H. 1143
1171, before H. 1171 (date of colophon)
1234, no date, but old
991, H. 1173
4813, H. 1134
773, H. 1188
995, H. 1311
4253 (3060), H. 1317
197, H. 1319
171, no date, recent
1254, no date, recent

al-Maktaba al-‘abdaliyya:
6907, H. 1003

5F. 2b. See Ch. I, D, d, and note 177.
6F. 192b. See Ch. I, E, n. 24 on this work.
Maktabat ar-ridwān:
8081, no date

Maktaba Jāmi‘a ‘Uqba bi-l-Qayrawān:
17169, H. 1312, incomplete.

Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale:
Ar. '12/5, no date
This manuscript is incomplete, and a portion of the folios are bound out of order. The hand and the reading variations place it among the poorer samples of the group represented by "T".

Cairo, Dār al-kutub:
no number on film, H. 1108
The hand indicates a Tunisian or Algerian origin. The reading variations place it among the T group.

Tripoli, Maktabat al-awgāf:
Cairo, al-Azhar:

as-Saqā 28604 (2635), H. 1044, Maghrebine hand A2
930 (46), H. 1065, Eastern hand A3

4434 (329), pp. 8-16, matn only, no date, Maghrebine hand A4

2205 (114), pp. 46-76, matn only, H. 1114, Eastern hand A5

as-Saqā 28623 (6254), pp. 8-34, matn only, H. 1098 (not available)

4293 (233), H. 1108
2180 (105), H. 1133

Zakī 41007 (3145), H. 1144

5930 (241 Majāmī'), pp. 25-48, matn only, H. 1205

2186 (110), no date

4396 (291), no date

20069 (2214), no date

Hākim Bāsha 33376 (2775), no date

42992 (3332), no date

2006 (99 Majāmī'), pp. 203-312, no date.

Tripoli, Makttabat al-awqāf:
II, A, b.

Fihrist Waqt an-nāˈib, n. 298, §1, no date, but recent.

The manuscript is entitled Ḥāshiyya ʿalā l-ʿAqīda al-ṣūṣā; the author is not indicated.

c. The lines of tradition:

So many manuscripts are bound to have large numbers of variations, and they do. But since the work is relatively recent, the variations, including interpolations and omissions, are generally copyist slips attributable to inadvertence or misunderstanding. There is no basis for constructing exact and well defined families of manuscript traditions. Nevertheless, from a comparison based on the more significant variations a fairly distinct pattern emerges in the case of certain manuscripts.

The most significant variation occurs in the commentary, even though a thorough examination was limited to the matn which is being edited. In the commentary on N. 17 some manuscripts have about three additional lines denying the immediately preceding statement that a muqallid is a kāfir. These lines neither fit the grammatical construction of the passage, nor agree with as-Sanūsī's position in the rest of the ṣūṣā, nor are found in the earliest manuscripts. They can only be regarded as a deliberate interpolation. Therefore we can immediately separate into one group the manuscripts which do not have this interpolation, namely the Escorial E1, the Tunisian E2, the Azhar E3, the Rabat E4, and the Algerian E5. I was not able to examine the passage in the Tunisian A1 or T10, while M, T3, A4, and A5 contain only

7Ms. E1, f. 9a. See Ch. III, A, c, note 7.
The other differences are not serious, but for those of any importance the E group and the Azhar manuscripts agree to a noticeable extent. The Tunisian A1 can be added to these, but T3 and T10 differ too much. M differs a great deal, but stands apart, agreeing with E1 in many odd details.

d. Guidelines of this edition:
In the selection of various readings, the E group, and within it E1, was given paramount authority. Next, the A group was given special consideration, while M and the T group were noted where many of them have the same variation or where there is disagreement within the E and A groups.

As-Sanûsî's work is divided by bab, faṣl, and further by alternating nass and sharh. I have enumerated the nusûs, and placed before each one its number and the folio number of the E1 manuscript where it begins. The nass number can be used to refer to the translation in this chapter, and to the corresponding part of the commentary summarized in Chapter III.

The following abbreviations are used:

E - س - الإسكربال
A - ق - الأزهر، القاهرة
M - م - مدريد
T - تونس
Adds - ز - يزيد
Omits - ن - ينقص
Substitutes with - ع - يوضع ب
B. Text and translation

of

MATN

AL-‘AQİDA AL-WUSTA
The text of
the intermediate creed
by Muḥammad b. Yūsuf as-Sanūsī

1. Prase be to God the lord of the worlds; blessing and peace be upon our master and protector Muḥammad, the seal of the prophets and imām of those who are sent; and may God the most high be pleased with all the companions of the Messenger of God and those who follow them in doing good until the day of judgement.

These are abbreviated statements by the understanding of which an encharged person can, God willing, find his way out of much blind acceptance in his faith to correct reasoning in harmony with his faith.

2. For this you must first know that a determination of intelligibility is restricted to three categories: necessity, admissibility, and impossibility. These three categories are the pivot of all the investigations of the science of kalām.

Something necessary is what is inconceivable in its intelligibility as non-existent, as occupying space for a substance, for example.

Something impossible is what is inconceivable in its intelligibility as existent, as a body being devoid
الحمد لله رب العالمين والصلاة والسلام على سيدنا ومواليد محمد ﷺ، نبي الدين وامام المرسلين ورضي الله تعالى عن أصحاب رسول الله ﷺ، معناهم ومن تبعهم باحثاً على يوم الدين.

وقد نرى جمل مختصرة يخرج المكلفة بنهما ان شاء الله من التحليل المختلفه في إيمان صاحبه إلى النظر الصحيح المجمع على إيمان صاحبه.

وذلك ان تعلم أول ان الحكم العنفي ينبهر في ثلاثة اسم الووجب والجواز والاستحالة وعلى هذه الثلاثة مدار مباحث علم الكلام كلها.

والواجب ما لا يصوور في العنف عمه كالتحيز مثل للجواز والمستحيل ما لا يصوور في العنف وجودته كحرو الجرم مثلًا.

ومولانا محمد، وأنا
 تعالى، وأما ت
 جمل، ع جملة، أربع نسخ من ت
 الله، ز تعالى، قا، وأربع من ت
 والجواز والاستحالة، ع والاستحالة والجواز، س، ت، ع، ت
 م، وسبع من ت
 للجواز، ع للجرم، س، ع، ف، م، وسبع من ت
of both motion and rest, for example.

Something admissible is that whose intelligibility permits
its existence or non-existence.

3. Chapter (I): The world's having come into being, and the
establishment of a decisive demonstration thereto.

4. If you are aware of this, then the first thing for you
to think about is the fact of the world's having come into being,
meaning by the world everything besides God the most high. If
you think about it, you will find that it is entirely made up of
bodies in which there inhere the accidentals of motion, rest,
and whatever else. Then you say to prove that it came into being:
Were any body in the world, such as the sky and the earth, to
have existed for the eternal-past, during the eternal-past it
would have to have been either in motion, or at rest, or neither
in motion nor at rest. But the three alternatives are impossible
for a body for the eternal-past. Therefore it is impossible for
a body to have existed for the eternal-past, since its existence
is unintelligible devoid of the three alternatives.

The explanation of the impossibility of the third alterna-
tive is clear, since it is without intelligibility that for the
eternal-past and unending-time a body should be neither station-
ary in a space nor moving from it.

As for explaining the impossibility of the second alterna-
tive, which is a body's being at rest for past-eternity, the
point is that were this to be so, the body would never be capable
of being in motion, since its being at rest is by this supposi-
tion from eternity. But what is from eternity is incapable of
non-existence, since if it were capable of
عن الحركة والسكن
والجزاء ما يصح في العقل وجوده وعدمه كموم الوحد منا
اليوم أو غدا

(17a)

باستدلال حدوت العالم وإثارة البرهان
القاطع عليه

(18a)

ناذأ أرغم هذا نالوا ما تبدأ به من النظر النظر في
حوت العالم وهو كل ما سوى الله تعالى نازأ نظرت فيه تجد
جميعه أخراجا تقوم بها أعراض من حركة وسكن وغيرهما نتجت
فإبى برهان حدوته لم كان جرم من أجرام العالم كالسماء والأرض
متالا موجودا في الأزل لم يخل اما ان يكون في الأزل متحركا او
ساكنا او لا متحركا ولا ساكنة والانظام الثلاثة مستحبة على
الجرم في الأزل نبكون وجود الجرم في الأزل مستحيل لأنه لا
يعمل وجوده عاريا عن تلك الانظام الثلاثة
اما بيان استحالة الاسم الثالث نظاهر لأنه لا يعقل
جرم في الأزل ولا ن في ما لا يزال ليس عابتا في الحيز ولا منتقل
عنقه

واما بيان استحالة الاسم الثاني وهو كون الجرم ساكن
في الأزل نوجه انا لا كان كذلك لا قب ان يتحرك ابدا لأنه
سكونه على هذا النفور تقدم واليدم لا يقبل العدد ان لو قب

(1a) b

بياء ع به، ساء م
القسم، ن، سب، تاء، وثمان من ت
non-existence its existence would require a particularizing agent because of its admissibility in that case; therefore it would have been brought into being; yet it was supposed to be from eternity; thus we have a contradiction without intelligibility. But the evidence that rest is capable of non-existence is the fact of our witnessing motion in some bodies, and that proves the admissibility of motion for all bodies because of their similarity to one another.

As for explaining the impossibility of the first alternative, which is a body's being in motion for the eternal-past, the point is the same as you are now aware of regarding the impossibility of the second alternative, with the addition of another aspect of impossibility: It is that the reality of motion is inconceivable as being from eternity, since it is a transferral from one space to another; therefore it can only be adventitious to a body, and unavoidably there must precede its existence its having been in the space from which it was transferred. But it inconceivable that something from eternity should be adventitious, or that something else should precede its existence.

5. Chapter (II): The establishment of a decisive demonstration of the existence of the Most High, and an explanation of the world's requiring him, the majestic and mighty.

If the world came into being after definitely having not existed, unavoidably it had someone to bring it into being, since it is inconceivable in intelligibility for it to have been transferred from the non-existence in which it was to an adventitious existence without an activating-link. Were there no agent freely choosing its existence whenever he wanted and with what measures and attributes he wanted, it
العدم لاحتياج وجوده إلى مخصوص لجوازه حينئذ يكون محتملاً وقد
فرض تدريماً فإذنا تحاققه لا يعقل ودليل قبول السكون العدم
مناهذهما الحركة في بعض الأجرام وذلك ينفي جواز الحركة على
جميع الأجرام لتعالجها
اما بيان استحاله القسم الأول وهو كون الجرم نيء الأول
متحركاً بالوجه نفسه ما عرنت الآن في استحاله القسم الثاني
ويبعد هذا القسم بوجه آخر من الاستحاله وهو أن حقيقة الحركة
لا تتغيل نديمه إذ هي الانتقال من حيز إلى حيز نهي إذا لا
تكون إلا طارئة على الجرم ولا بد أن يتقدم على وجودها الكون
في الحيز المنتقل عنه والقدم لا يتصور أن يكون طارئ ولا
كن يتقدم على وجودوه غيره.
ففجع لك بهذا البرهان القلبي كون العالم كله
حادثاً من عرشه إلى نره لا يتصور نى العقل ان يكون شيء منه
قدماً

(23)
necessarily would have remained in the non-existence it was in for ever and ever, because of the equality of all measures, attributes, and times in relation to the world's essence.

Regarding existence and non-existence, it has been said that they are equally admissible in relation to the essence of the world; therefore it is impossible for existence, which is of equal strength and adventitious, to prevail without an activating link.

It has even been said that preceding non-existence is more in keeping with the world because of its priority in the world and its not needing an activating link. But if having one of two equal things prevail over the other without an activating link is impossible, then to have existence, which is of less strength in relation to the world, to prevail over this (non-existence) without an activating link is all the more (impossible).

6. Chapter (III): The reason for his necessarily being from eternity - the majestic and mighty - and his necessarily being everlasting.

Then, he who brought the world into being is necessarily from eternity, in the sense of having no beginning to his existence. Otherwise he would be in need of someone to bring him into being, and the consequence would be either a continuous-regress - which would amount to the infinite running out - or a circle - which would amount to something preceding itself. But both these alternatives are impossible and without intelligibility.

It follows that he is necessarily everlasting, in the sense of having no end to his existence, since if it were possible for non-existence to reach him his existence would be admissible, not necessary, since you are aware that the reality of something necessary is what is inconceivable in its intelligibility as non-existent; but under the supposition that this existence is capable of non-existence it would be admissible, since something admissible is what is legitimately
توجد النص الذي ينص على أن يبقى على ما كان عليه من العدم أحد الآباء لاستواء
المفادات والصناديق والزمان بالنسبة إلى ذاته
وما يوجد والعزم نقله بالضرورة إلى ذاته سواء

لا يستطيع أن يشرح الواقع المساري الطائر بلا سب
وقبل العدم السابق أوليه به لصالحه فيه وعدم انتقاله
إلى سب وإذا كان ترجيح أحد المتساويين بلا سب مثال
ناتج ترجيح الواقع المرجح بالنسبة إلى العالم على
هذا بلا سب أخرى

بـ_________________ب الدليل على وجوه قدمه جل
وعز ووجه بنائه

ثم يجب أن يكون محدد العالم نديما للاولية لوجوده
والآ لانترنت إلى محدد ويلزم التسلسل نيلوي إلى فراخ ما لا
نهائية له أو الدور نيلوي إلى تقدم البيت على نفسه وكلاهما
مستحيل لا يعقل

ويلزم أن يكون واجب البياء للي لا آخرية لوجوده إذا لو
قبل ان بلحقه العدم لكان وجوده جائز لا واجبا لما عرنه ان
حريتة الواجب ما لا يتصور في العقل عدمه وهذا الواقع قد
فرض أنه يقبل العدم سيكون جائزا إذا الجزاء ما يصح فيه

بـ ترجيح، ع ترجيح؛ مارا، تع
العالم، ع العالم ؛ شمان من ت
أو الدور، ع والدور ؛ سا
ويلزم، ع وجب؛ ستة


existent or non-existent. But it is impossible for something admissible to happen without an activating link. Therefore this admissible existence requires an activating link. Therefore it has been brought into being. But the necessity of his being from eternity has already been demonstrated. Therefore the supposition that something which has been demonstrated to be necessarily from eternity is not necessarily everlasting is a contradiction without intelligibility.

7. Chapter (IV): The reason for the necessity of the Most High's otherness from things that come into being and of his not uniting with anything else, and an explanation of the reason for the necessity of the Most High's self-subsistency.

8. It follows also that he who brought the world into being is not a bodily-mass or an attribute of a bodily mass, since you are aware of the necessity of bodily masses and their attributes to have come into being.

9. Nor is he united with something else, in the sense of it being one with him. If this were so, they would either remain two existing things, and therefore would still be two, not one; or they would not remain two existing things, in which case they would not be united either. This is clear if both of them ceased to exist and a third thing came into existence; likewise if one of them ceased to exist and the other remained, since something non-existent does not unite with something existent.
الوجود والعدم والجائز يستحيل أن يقع بلا سبب يحتاج إذاً

هذا الوجود الجائز إلى سبب يكون محدداً وقد تام البرهان
علي وجبه قدمه نافذة نقض عدم وجب البقاء في ما تام البرهان
علي وجب قدمه تناقض لا يعقل

(25a)

بلا مقابلة الدليل على وجب مخالفة تعالى
للحوادث وعدم اتخاذه بغيره وبيان الدليل على وجب نيامه
تعالى بنفسه

(25a)

ويلزم أيضاً أن يكون محدد العالم ليس بجرم ولا صفة
للجرم لما عرته من وجب الحدوث للأجرام وصناتها

(25a)

ولا استحالة بنية، لي يكون معه واحداً والآخر بتياء

اً موجودين نهما بعد اثنان لا واحد وان لم يبقا موجودين لم
يشتدا اياً أنه ان عدم كل منهما ووجود عالك نظاهر وأن عدم ا
احدهما وبقي الآخر كذلك لأن المعدوم لا يتحد بالوجود

ني ما، ع، ن، كل ما، ت، ما، وس، من، ت
وجه قدمه، ع، وجهه: سا،
اً أيضاً، ن، سا، م
ولا، ع، واياً لا: سا، م
بعد اثنان لا واحد، ع بعدان اثنين لا واحد، تا، 120، 947، 1201، 1201 - بعدان اثنان لا واحد، تا، 947
10. Nor is he in a direction, since only bodies are situated in a direction.

Nor is there a direction within himself, since it is one of the accidentals of bodily members: Up pertains to the head, down to the foot, right to the right side, left to the left side, front to the stomach, and behind to the back. But if it is impossible for someone to be a body, self-evidently it is impossible for him to be qualified with these members or things consequential to them.

11. It is necessary also for the Most High to be self-subsistent, that is, an essence, with no need of a subject and no possibility of being an attribute. There are some who interpret the Most High's self-subsistency as his independence from a subject and a particularizing agent. This is a more restricted interpretation than the former, and it excludes a substance from sharing this attribute with him.

12. The reason for the Most High's independence from a particularizing agent is the same as the preceding reason for the necessity of his being from eternity and everlasting.

(The reason) for his independence from a subject is that if he were an attribute, it would be impossible for him to be qualified with adjectival or substantive attributes, since an attribute does not inhere in an attribute.

Besides, if he were an attribute he would require a subject to inhere in. Then, if the subject were a deity like the attribute, there would have to be a multiplication of deities. But if the attribute alone possessed
وان يكون ليس في جبة من الجهات لأنه لا يعمها إلا الإجرام

وان لا تكون له هو أيضاً جبة لأنها من عوارض الجسم نفوذ من عوارض عضى الرأس وتحت من عوارض عضى الرجل وعين من عوارض العضو الأيسر وامام من عوارض البطن وخليل من عوارض الظهر ومن استحال عليه أن يكون جرباً استحال ان ينصت بهذه الأعضاء أو لوازمها على الضرورة

ويجب أيضاً أن يكون تعالى دائماً صنعاً لي ذاتا لا ينعت

إلى محل ويرجع ان يكون صنعة ومنهم من نسر قيامه تعالى

بنفسه باستثناء من المجل والمختص وهو اختيار من التنسيب الأول

ويخرج مشاركة الجوهر له في هذه الصنعة

والدليل على استثنائه تعالى عن المختص ما سبق من وجوب

قدمه وثبت

وعلى استثنائه عن المجل انه لم كان صنعة لاستحال اتصاله

بالصنات المعنوية والمعاني إذ الصنعة لا تقوم بالصنعة

وكان أيضاً لم كان صنعة لانتقرا إلى محل بتوبه ثم ان كان المجل الباه مثل الصنعة لزم تعد الألبة وان انفردت

نفوق، ع ونفوق، ع، ق، م، والآله من ت

ا 10

ا 12
divinity and its properties, there would have to be an attribute inhering in a subject without the subject being qualified with its determination. And this is impossible.

Besides, there is no reason why the attribute should be a deity rather than its subject.

13. Chapter (V): The reason for the necessity of the Most High to possess substantive attributes and their determinations, and the necessity of all these to be from eternity and everlasting; and what is related to that. In (five) sections:

14. Section 1, The necessity of power, and its determinations.

It follows also that he who brought the world into being is powerful - otherwise he would not have brought anything in the world into existence -

with a power - because there is no intelligibility in someone being powerful without having a power -

which is not united with his essence - otherwise it would follow that two are one, which is impossible and without intelligibility -

and is from eternity - otherwise its opposite, which is incapacity, would be from eternity and therefore would never cease to exist, since you are aware that what is from eternity is incapable of non-existence; consequently he would be impotent forever. But the things he made testify to the impossibility of that. Besides, had his power come into being,
بالالوهية واحكامها لزم قيام صفة بحل ولا يتصف المخل بحكمها
وهو محل
وأيضاً ليس كون الصفة البها بالله من كون محلها البها

(29a) 13

دليل على وجوب صناعة المعاني
وجوب احکامها له تعالى وجوب القدم والبتاء لجميعها وما
 يتعلق بذلك ونها نصول

(29b) 14

النص الأول في وجوب القدرة واحکامها
وبلزم أيضاً أن يكون محدث العالم نادراً واللاأ لما اوجد
شيئاً من العالم
بقدرته لأنه لا يعقل قادر لا تدرا له
غير متحدة بذاته واللاأ لزم كون الاثنين واحداً وهو محل لا
يعقل
نديمة والاكان ضدها وهو الحجز قديماً فلأ بندعم ابدا لما
عرفنا أن التدین لا يقل القدم نبلزم إن لا يقدر ابداً
ومصنوعاته تشيد باستحالة ذلك وأيضاً لؤ كانت القدرة حادهة

لزم، ز جوار، سه، قا، وت من ت
ونه، ز خمسة، ثمان من ت
ابياً ن، ساء
وأيضاً ع ايضاً س؟ أ ل
كانت، ع كان؛ ساء
it would have required another power to bring it into being, and the consequence would be a continuous regress.

It follows that this power is related to all possible things, since if it were related to some without others it would require a particularizing agent, because of their equality as far as the reality of possibility is concerned; therefore it would have come into being, whereas you already are aware of the necessity of its being from eternity. But if its particularization were supposed to take place without a particularizing agent, it would follow that something admissible has been turned impossible.

15. Section 2, The affirmation of his will, and its determinations.

16. It follows also that he who brought the world into being is willing, that is, intending what he does, since were it not for his intending to particularize what he does with existence in a particular time with a particular measure and a particular attribute, it would have remained as it was, with all that not-existent forever and ever.

17. If his essence were posited to be a cause of the existence of the world, or to have given it existence by nature, so that his will were not required for the world to come into existence from him, the world would have to be from eternity, since a cause is necessarily concomitant with what it causes, and likewise nature with what it produces. But you are already aware of the necessity of the world's having come into being.

18. One objection is that the maker of the world is a nature, but the world did not exist
لاحتاج إلى إحداثها إلى قدرة أخرى ولزم التسلسل
ويلزم أن تكون هذه القدرة متعلقة بجميع السمات إذا لم تعلمت بعضها دون بعض لاحتكاف إلى مخصى لاستوائها حتى تحقق الامكان نتائج حادثة وقد عرقت وجب ندمها وان نظر تخصيصها
بغير مخصى لزم انقلاب الجائز مستحبلاً

الفصل الثاني في اباع الارادة واحكامها

ويلزم أيضاً أن يكون حدث العالم مريدًا لي قادمًا لفعله
اذ لو لم تصدق لتخصص الفعل بالوجود في زمن مخصص على مدار مخصص وصة مخصصة للزم بناوة على ما كان عليه من عدم ذلك
كله ابد الإبادة

وان قدرت ذاته علة لوجود العالم أو موجودة له بالطبع
حتى لا يحتاج في وجود العالم عنه إلى ارادته لزم حينئذ قدم العالم لوجب اشتران العلة لمعلولها والطيعة لمطوعها
وقد عرقت وجب حدوده

والاعتراض على هذا بأن صانع العالم طيبة وما لم يوجد

زمن، ع زمان، س 206، م، واربع من ت
with him in the eternal-past because of an eternally-past impeding agent which impeded it from existing at that time; thereupon, when the impeding agent ceased to be for unending time, at that time nature brought the world into existence. This hypothesis is wrong, because it entails that the world should never exist, since the agent impeding it is by this supposition eternally-past, and therefore it is impossible for it not to exist, since you are aware that if something is surely from eternity, it is impossible for it not to exist.

Another objection is that the maker (of the world) is a nature, but the posteriority of the world to it in the eternal past is because the world's existence is contingent upon a condition which did not exist in the eternal-past, but when the condition came into existence for unending-time, at that time the world came into existence from nature. This hypothesis is also wrong, because any discussion about that condition's having come into being and its posteriority to the eternal past is like the discussion about the world (as a whole). Therefore the condition too would require either positing an eternally-past impeding agent - and consequently the condition of the world would never have come into existence, and the world which depends on this condition would never have come into existence - or positing another condition which comes into being - and the discussion turns to it, and the consequence is a continuous regress.

From this it is sure that he who made the world exist is willing and choosing, and is not a cause or a nature.

19. It follows that that (willing) takes place by a will which is from eternity and extensive to all possible things, good or evil, for the reasons you are aware of from above concerning power.

And his will is not for the sake of an objective for himself - otherwise he would be deficient in his essence and achieving perfection by what he does, and that is impossible - nor for the sake of an objective for his creation - otherwise it would be necessary for him to provide what is good and best for them,
العالم بعيد في الأزل لوجود مانع ازلي معن من وجوده حينئذ
فلما انتهى المانع في ما لا يزال يوجد الطبيعة حينئذ العالم
نادى لأن هذا التقدير يستلزم أن لا يوجد العالم ابدا لأن مانعه
على هذا النفر ازلي في تحمل عده لما غرنت ان ما غبت تدهم
استحال عدهم
وكذا الاعتراف بأن المانع طبيعي وتأخر العالم عنها في
الأزل لتوافر وجوده على شرط لم يوجد في الأزل نلما وجد الشرط
في ما لا يزال وجود العالم عن الطبيعة حينئذ نادى ابدا لأن
الكلام في حدوث ذلك الشرط وتاخره عن الرز كالكلام في العالم
نحتاج هو أيضا إلى تقدير مانع ازلي نبئز أن لا يوجد شرط
الأزلي ابدا انا ينحدر العالم مشروطه ابدا أو تقدير شرط آخر
حادث ننقل الكلام الدي ونبئز التسلسل
نشت بهذا ان موجد العالم هيد مختار لا علة ولا طبيعة
(33) 19

وتبئز أن يكون ذلك بارادة قديمة عامة في جميع
الممكنات خيرا كانت او شرا لما غرنت قبل في القدرة
وان تكون ارادته لا لغرض له والا كان ناقصا في ذاته
متكمل بنعله وذلك محل
ولا لغرض لخلقه والا وجب عليه مراعاة الصلح والإجلام لهم

العالم، ع المانع: سه، وخمس من ت
ابداء، ن: س، م، ع
ننتقل، ع فينتقل: س، م، ت، ق، ت، ت، ك، ت، أ، 12، 4، 2، 1
كان، ع لكان: س، ت، ق، ع، ع، ع، 13

أ و
A
which is impossible, as will be shown later.

Just as it is impossible for the Most High to will or do anything for the sake of an objective, so also it is impossible for his determination of an act as obligatory or forbidden or with any other determination of revealed-law, to be for the sake of any objective, since all acts are equal in that they are his creation and production. Therefore the specification of certain acts as obligatory and others as forbidden or with any other determination takes place by his pure choice, which has no activating-link. Intelligibility has no place at all in it; rather it can be brought to awareness only by revealed-law.

In summary, the acts and determinations of the Most High have no cause. Any ascribing of causes to them in the discussions of the professors of revealed-law must be interpreted as signs or something similar which is permissible.

20. Section 3, That the Most High necessarily has knowledge; and what is related to that.

21. It follows that he who brought the world into being is knowing, because of the intricate makings and wonderful mysteries the world contains.

And that (knowing) takes place with a knowledge which is from eternity - for the reasons given above concerning power - above constraint and reasoning - otherwise it would be accompanied by harm or would be coming into being - and is related to all the categories of a determination of intelligibility - otherwise it would require a particularizing agent, as has been said before.
وهو مجال لما سبائي
وكمما امتحان أن يريد سباحته أو يفعل خرقاً كذلك امتحان
أن يكون حكمة على فعل بوجوب أو تحرير أو غيرهما من الأحكام
الشرعية لخغر من الأفعال لأن الامتثال كلياً مستنوداً في نينا
خلقه واعترافه تشبيه بعضها للإجاب وبعضها للتحريه أو غيره
واقع بعض الاختيار لا سبب له ولا مجال للمعتقل نية اجلاً وانما
يعترن بالشرع نقط
وبالجملة فانعاله تعالى واحكامه لعلاقة لها وما يوجد
من التحليل لذلك في كلام أهل الشرع نصيّ بالامارات أو نحوها
ما يصح

(35a) 20

النصрас الثالث في وجوب علمه تعالى وما
يشتغل به

(35a) 21

ويلزم أن يكون محدد العالم عالما لما أحتوى عليه
العالم من حقائق الصنع وعجائب الإسرار
وكان ذلك بمعلم قديم لما سبق في القديمة
منزلاً على الفرورة والنظر والأقاربه الغير أو كان كناصاً
ويتغلب جميع اقسام الحكم العقلي واللازم الانشطار الى
المخصص كما سابق

بالامارات، ع بالاماماء: مزا
منزولاً سع من ت: فنزة: اثنان من ت
a 21
22. Section 4. The affirmation of hearing, sight, and speech; and what is related to that.

23. It follows that the Most High is hearing, seeing, and speaking,
with a hearing and a sight which are from eternity and are related to every existent thing,
and with a speech which is from eternity and inhering in his essence. It does not consist of letters and sounds, is not renewed or interrupted by silence, and is not qualified by priority and posteriority of utterance, by beginning or ending, nor by being in-whole or in-part. It is related to all that knowledge is related to.

Intelligibility points to the Most High's being qualified with these three attributes because of the impossibility of his being qualified with their opposites; transmitted-authority does too, and is of greater weight.

Concerning apprehension, the accepted opinion is to refrain from judgement, because transmitted-authority does not mention it by affirmation or denial.

24. Likewise, concerning whether his mounting (the throne), his hand, his eye, and his face are names of attributes other than the eight, or whether they are to be interpreted as taking possession, power, sight, and existence, or whether one must abstain from interpreting them and entrust their meanings to God the most high after declaring him aloof from their outward impossible meanings, which is a matter of consensus, there are three (opinions), that of the Shaykh al-Ash'arî, that of Imâm-al-setDefault, and that of the Fathers.
ويلزم أن يكون تعالى سببا بعصرا متكلما
بسم وبصر قديمين متعلقين بكل موجود
وبكلام تقديم قائم بذاته ليس بحرف ولا صوت ولا يتجلد ولا
بطرأ عليه سكوت ولا يعمر القصد ولا تأخير ولا ابتداء ولا
انشبياء ولا كل ولا بعض وتعلق بكل ما يتعلق به العلم
وبدل على اتصانه تعالىa هذه الثلاثة العقل لاستحاالة
انصانه باضدادها والنقل وهو أولى
ومن ثم كان المختار في الأدراك الوقفت لعدم ورود النقل
فيه بالاثبات أو النفي

او في كون الشموع واليد والمعلوم والوجه اساهي لصنات
غير الشمائية أو مؤولة بالاستبالة والقدرة والبصر والوجود
او بوفق عن تأويلها وتفويض معانيها إلى الله تعالى بعد
التنزية عن ظواهرها المستحيلة اجماعا ثلاثة للشيخ الاميري
وامام الحرميين والسلج
25. Section 5, That the Most High necessarily possesses life, and the establishment of decisive demonstrations that everything with which the essence of our Protector - majestic and mighty - is qualified is necessarily from eternity and everlasting, and that he is above being qualified by things that come into being.

26. It follows that the Most High is living - otherwise he would not be qualified by knowledge, power, will, hearing, sight, and speech - with a life that is from eternity - because the things of which life is a condition are necessarily from eternity, as was mentioned above, and it is impossible for a condition to be posterior to that of which it is a condition - and necessarily everlasting - otherwise it would cease to be from eternity, but by now you are aware of the necessity of its being from eternity.

27. Likewise the other attributes which inhere in the essence of the Most High are necessarily from eternity and everlasting, since if they were capable of non-existence they would have come into being, since you are aware that what is from eternity is incapable of non-existence. But it is impossible for the Most High to be qualified with an attribute which has come into being; otherwise his essence would have been capable of it for the eternal past, since had his capability for it come into being in his essence, his essence would require another capability to receive that capability, and so on in a continuous regress. But if his capability for that attribute which was supposed to have come into being had to exist for the eternal past, then he could legitimately be qualified for the eternal past with that attribute which came into being, since that is the only meaning
النص الخامس

الإجابة ما شاء الله وعفى به شهداء

ولللمسلم أن يكون تعالي حياً ولا يتعالى بعلم ولا فجرة ولا

أرادة ولا سمع ولا نظر ولا كلام

حياة نديمة لما سبق من وجوه ندم مشروطها والطرط

وسمح لنا تأخيره عن مشروطه

واجابة البناء ولا لحنفية ندمها وننعت الآن ووجوهه

وكلما يجب القدم والبناء لسائر الممالك التي تتخيم بهذته

تعالى إذ لو تقطت الجدد كانت حادثة لما عرنت ان القديم لا

يقبل العدد وهو تعالي يسمح لنا أن يرتفع بين حادثة ولا لكات

ذاته نابعة لها فيما الآن لن تقوله لها لم كان إجمالا

للذات للاحتفال الزاهد إلى القبول الآخر للكنف ويتصلب وإذا

لزم أن يكون القبول لكلة المثل المنروكة الحدود كائنا في

الأزول مع أن يتعالى بينة الحادثة في الأزول أن لا معنى

ولا سمع ولا نظر، ولا نظر ولا سمع: 

كذل، ع كذلك سيا، ق، ٥٠٤، ٥٢٢.

لها لو، ع لها نفسي ولو؛ ٥٠٤، ٥٢٧، وسعي من ت

قبوله، ز نفسي: 

b 26

c 27
of capability. But that is impossible, since what comes into being cannot be from eternity, since it is consequential to what is from eternity to be incapable of non-existence. But what comes into being was already capable of non-existence and was qualified with it. Therefore the two are contradictory.

The conclusion of this is that every attribute of which the most high essence is capable is from the eternal past and necessary to it, and cannot be conceived as having come into being. But what the most high essence is incapable of for the eternal past it is never capable of, because of the impossibility of which you are aware, of a capability coming upon his essence after not having been there.

28. Besides, were the Most High qualified with an attribute which came into being, it would be inadmissible for him to be devoid either of it or of its contrary or of its like; otherwise it would be admissible for him to be devoid of all his attributes, since his capability for them is essential and does not differ. But from what has preceded you are already aware of the impossibility of his being devoid of knowledge, power, will, and life. Therefore it is sure that he can be devoid of any attribute of which he is capable only by being qualified with its opposite or its like. But an opposite or like of that attribute which came into being can only have come into being itself, for the reason that non-existence comes upon it, whereas what is from eternity does not cease to exist. But it is self-evident that what cannot be devoid of things that come into being has come into being itself. Consequently, were the Most High to be qualified with an attribute which comes into being, he would self-evidently have come into being himself. But you are already aware of the necessity of being from eternity for the Majestic and Most High.

29. Besides, it is a matter of consensus that the Majestic and Mighty is qualified only by perfection. It therefore follows that
للنقول الا ذلك وذلك محل اذ الحادث لا يمكن ان يكون نديمما لأن
من لازم التقدم ان لا يقبل العدم والحادث ند قبل العدم واتصف
بها انا متدانيان

ذكر بهذا ان كل ما قبلته الذات العلية من الصفات فهو
اول واجب لها لا يصور ان يكون حادثا وما لم تقبله الذات
العلية في الأول فللا تقبله ابدا لما عرنت من اعتحاله ان يقرأ
القبول على الذات بعد ان لم يكن لها

وايضا لو اتمن تعالى بمنه حادثة لم يجوز ان يجري عنها
او عن ضدها او مثلها والا لجاز عروه عن جميع الصفات اذ توله
لها ذات لا يختلف وقد عرنت في ما سبق استحالة عروه عن العلم
والقدرة والارادة والحياة نكبت ان كل ما يقبله من الصفات لا
يجري عنه الا للإنسان بضده او مثله لكن ضد تلك الصفة الحادثة
او مثلها لا يكون الا حادثا بدليل الارآن عرنه اذ التقدم لا
يندعم وما لا يجري عن الحراده يكون حادثا ضرورة فلزم انه لو
اتمن تعالى بمنه حادثة لوجب حدوثه ضرورة وقد عرنت وجوبه
قدمه جل وعلا

وايضا فهو جل وعز لا يتصن الا بالكامل اجماعا نبلزم

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c d
b a

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(43a) 29
(42b) 28
this attribute which comes into being, with which the Most High was supposed to be qualified, is an attribute of perfection. But his most high essence lacked it for the eternal past, since it was supposed to have come into being. But the lacking of perfection is a defect, and the Most High is aloof from such, by the consensus of intelligent people.

30. No objection to this can be made by saying that it does not follow that the most high essence does not lack the perfection of this attribute which came into being because of the possibility of his being qualified by like attributes successively without a beginning, since we say that this possibility is patently false, because it is a continuous regress in that it consists of things which come into being with no beginning, and this is manifestly impossible.

31. It follows also that each of the Most High’s attributes is one; otherwise there would have to be the conjunction of two like things and the achieving of what has been achieved, and this is impossible.

32. Chapter (VI): The reason for his Majestic Highness’ necessarily being one, and the necessity of all beings to depend upon him from the start without the intermediacy of any of them serving as his instrument or helper, and that nothing is in existence but God and his acts.

33. It follows that the Most High is one in his essence, that is, he is not composed; otherwise he would have to be a body.
هذه الصفحة الحادة التي نفرض اعتماده فيها بها ان تكون من صنات الكمال وقد نصت ذاته العلية في الأصل لفرص حدوثها ونوت الكمال نقص وهو تعالي مدرسةً عليه باجماع العتلاء

(43) 
ولا يعترض على هذا بانه لا يلزم نوت الذات العلية كمال هذه الصفحة الحادة لاحتمال انصانه بامثالها على الوالا لا الى اول لان نقول لا يخفى ان هذا الاحتمال مات لله حال من باب حوادث لا أولية لها وهو ظاهر الاستحالة

(44) 
ويلزم ايضاً ان تكون كل صنف من صنات تعالي واحدة والا لزم اجتماع المثليين وتعليم الحاصل وهو محال

(45) 
باالدليل على وجب الوحدانية له جل وعلا ووجب استناد الكائنات كلها اليه ابتداء بلى واسطة آله له منها ولا مبين وانه ليس planta الموجود الا الله سبحانه وانعمائه

(46) 
ويلزم ان يكون تعالي واحدة في ذاته يعني انه غير مركب والا لزم ان يكون جسماً
Besides, if he were composed of two or more parts, this could only mean that the attributes of divinity either inhered in each part, or inhered particularly in one part. The first case would entail a multiplication of divinities, while the second would entail a coming into being, because an agent would be required to particularize some parts with the attributes of divinity, since they are all equal regarding capability for those attributes.

The meaning of the denial of composition in the most high essence is not that it is an indivisible part; otherwise he would have to be a simple substance, and the impossibility of his having any corporeity at all has already been shown. Rather, the meaning is only that the most high essence is not capable of smallness or largeness, since they are accidentals of bodies, and it is impossible for the Most High to be a body.

It follows that the Most High is one in his attributes, that is, he has no like; otherwise there would have to be a coming into being, because each of the likes would require an agent to particularize it with the accidental by which it is distinguished from its like.

Besides, if there were a second with him in divinity, the second would have to be universal in power and will like him. But it is self-evident that that results in one of them being qualified with impotence, whether the two disagree and are contrary to one another - which is plain - or they agree, since it is impossible for one act to be divided; therefore it could only come from one of them, while the other, from whom it did not come, would consequently be impotent. But if one of them is impotent, the other is necessarily impotent also, because of their similarity to one another; and that results in there existing nothing in the world; but visual evidence gives the lie to this.
واياضا فلو تركب من جزئين ناكثر لم يخل اما ان يقوم بكلا جزء صنات الألوهية أو يختص تباعا بالبعض والآخر يلزم منه تعدد الالهة والثاني يلزم منه الحدود للاحتياج إلى المخصب بعضها بالصناعات الألوهية لاستواء جميعها في نقل تلك الصنات

وليس معنى فني التركيب في الذات العلية انا جزء لا يتجزأ والان لزم أن تكون جوهرا فردا وقد سبق استحالة الجرمية عليه مطلقا وإنما المقصود ان الذات العلية لا تشمل صنف ولا كبيرا انها من عوارض الإجرام وهو تعالى يستحب أن يكون جرسا

(47a) 34

ويلزم أيضا ان يكون تعالى واحدا في صناته بمقد، انه لا مثل له ولا لزم الحدود للاحتياج كن من المثليين الد، من يخصه بالعرض الذي يمتاز به عن شبه واياضا لو كان معه خان في الألوهية للزم ان يكون ذلك الثاني عام التدرا والارادة مثله وذلك يؤدي الى اتصاف احدهما بالعجز ضرورة سواء اختلنا على الشما وهو ظاهر او انتشا لأن الفعل الواحد يستحب انتمامه فلا يمكن ان يقع الا من احدهما نيلزهما عجز الآخر الذي لم يقع منه، وإذا عجز احدهما وجب عجز الآخر لتماثلهما وذلك يؤدي الى ان لا يوجد شيء من الغالب والبيان يكذبه

بعض، ع بعض، سا
الصناعات، ع الصنات، صا ج
بالعازر، ع بالعازر، سا وسب من ت
العلوية، ع الوهيئة، سا Ty 05، م وسب من ت
وهو ظاهر، ن، سا
35. For the same reason, you become aware of the impossibility of anything in the world producing any effect whatsoever, because that entails the removal of that effect from the power and will of our majestic and mighty Protector, and this necessitates the overcoming of something from eternity by something which came into being, which is impossible. Therefore a created power has no effect on motion or rest, obedience or disobedience, or on any effect universally, neither directly nor through induction.

36. Rewarding and punishing have by intelligibility no activating-link, but obedience and disobedience are only signs created by God the most high without any assistant intermediacy from man. They indicate by revealed-law the reward and punishment God has chosen, and if God made them indicate the opposite, or if he rewarded or punished from the start without any previous sign, that would be good on the part of the Majestic and Mighty; he is not asked about what he does.

37. Man's acquisition is an expression of God the most high's bringing into existence in man the object-of-power - such as motion and rest, for example - accompanying a power in man which came into being and is related to that object of power without having any effect upon it at all. Acquisition itself is related to the enchargement of revealed-law, and is a sign of reward and punishment through revealed-law, not intelligibility.

Proof that there is such a power which came into being, accompanying an act even though it has no effect on it whatsoever, is our immediate apprehension of the difference between violent and similar compulsory motions, and other,
وسهذا الدليل تعرّف استحالة ان يكون لشيء من العالم
تأثير البَيّنة في اثر ما لما يلزم عليه من خروج ذلك الآخر عن
قدرة مثالية جل وعز وارادة وذلك يوجب ان يغلب الحادث القديم
وهو محال فلا اثر اذًا لقدرة المخلوق في حركة ولا سكون ولا
طاقة ولا معصية ولا يأثر ما على العموم لا مباشرة ولا تولدا

والشواب والعناب لا سبب ليهما عتالا وانما الطاعة والمعصية
امرأتان مخلوطنان لله تعالى لا واسطة معينة من العبد تدلال
شرعاه ما اختار سحانه من الشواب والعناب ولو عكس سحانه
في دلالتهما أو أتام وعاقب بدأ لا بس امارة لحسن ذلك منه
جل وعز لا يسأل عما يفعل

وكسب العبد عبارة عن ايجاد الله تعالى المدقور نيه
كالحركة والمكون مثلا محاصبا لثديه حادثة نيه تنطوي بذلك
المدقور من غير تأثير لها فيه أصلا وهذا الكسب هو متعلق
التكليين الشرعي وامارة الشواب والعناب شرعا لا عتالا
والذي يدل على محاصبة هذه التقرّة الحادثة للنفل وان
لم يكن لها فيه تأثير البَيّنة ادراكنا الفرق ضرورة بين حركة
الارتياع ونحوها من الحركات الإضرارية وبين غيرها من

سيحانه ؛ ز تعالى ؛ ص 342 ؛ 242 ؛ في 13 ؛ وسبع من ت
voluntary motions. A complete examination reveals no difference between them but the fact that voluntary motions are accompanied by a power in man which came into being, by which he feels ease in acting, as opposed to the former compulsory motions.

38. From the preceding you can conclude that by our saying "There is a power in man which came into being, by which he does not feel forced in acting; and this power is one of his accidentals, as knowledge and the like, related to his acting, even though we do not believe it has any effect upon it at all," we depart from the position of the Jabarites, who deny altogether a power in man which came into being.

And (you can conclude that) by our saying "That power which came into being has no effect at all upon an act, but is only related to an accompanies it," we depart from the position of the Qadarites, the Magi of this people, who say that by this power which came into being man produces his acts according to his will. They say that by it he obeys and disobeyys, and because of it he is rewarded and punished. But you have already seen that for the professors of truth rewarding and punishing have by intelligibility no activating-link, while acts of obedience and disobedience are conventional signs, not intelligible causes.

Thus there is verified the difference of the position of truth from the two erroneous positions, that of the Jabarites and that of the Qadarites; for distinguishing it from them is a matter in which many are confused.
الحركات الاختيارية ولا تفرق بينهما بعد السر النام الإكرونة

هذه اختيارية متفرقة a قدرة حادثة في العبد يحسنها تيسر

الفعل عليه في خلاف الأولى الامارة

نخرج لك من هذا ان بكونا - ان مع الفعل الذي لم يحس

صاحب فيه a الامارة قدرة حادثة في العبد هي عرض من الأعراف

كالعلم ونحوه تتعلق بالفعل وأن لم b ل تركيا فيه إصدا -

انتمينا عن مذهب الجبرية النافلين بنين قدرة حادثة في العبد

مطلقًا

ومكونا - ليس لكل الكرة الحادثة تاشير في الفعل

اصل وانما هي تتعلق به وقتاحبه نفق - انتمينا عن مذهب

القدرة مجوس هذه الأمة القائلين بأن تلك الكرة الحادثة في

العبد بها يخرج العبد انفعاله على حسب إرادته قالوا بذلك

اطع وعص وعبيه اثيب وعوب وند سبق لك ان الشواب والعتاب

لا بسبب لهما عبلا عند اهل الحق وان الطاعات والمعاصي امارات

جعلية لا علة عزية

نحتاج بهذا تيمير العبد في مذهب الناسرين

وهما مذهب الجبرية والقدرة فان تيميره فيما يلبس على

كثير

\[\text{منقرضة ك ع متزورة ؛ س}^2 , \text{تي ؛ وسع من ت}

\text{فيه ؛ ع في ؛ سا - به } ; \text{م}

\text{شر ؛ ع ار ؛ س}^2 \text{ - تشر } ; \text{م}^2 \text{ - ير ؛ ت}^2 \text{ ؛}

\text{a 37}

\text{b 38} \]
39. For that matter, food has no effect on satiety, nor water on moistening the land, growing plants, or on cleaning, nor fire on burning, heating, or cooking food, nor clothing or shelter on covering or repelling heat and cold, nor trees on shading, nor the sun and the rest of the heavenly bodies on illumination, nor a knife on cutting, nor cold water on diminishing the intensity of heat of other water, as neither has the latter in diminishing the intensity of cold in the former. Conclude by analogy to these examples that whenever God acts in his ordinary way he makes something exist on the occasion of another. But know that it is from God from the start, without the other accompanying things having any intermediacy or effect on it, neither by their nature, nor by a power or peculiarity placed in it by God, as many ignorant people think.

More than one sound imam has recalled that there is agreement that whoever holds that those things produce an effect by their nature is an unbeliever. But there is a difference of opinion on whether someone is an unbeliever if he holds that they produce an effect by a power or peculiarity placed in them by God, and would not produce an effect if God removed this power or peculiarity from them.

By the preceding chapters you are aware of what is necessary and what is impossible regarding the Most High.

40. Chapter (VII): What is admissible regarding the Most High, and an explanation of the reason why the Most High does not necessarily provide what is good and best for his creatures, and that
وقد لا إثر للطعام في الشبع ولا للماء في الرجوع أو النبات أو النباتة ولا للنار في الإحرام أو التسخين أو نضح الدم ود البشوب والجدار في السفر أو دفع الحر والبرد ولا للشجرة في الظل ولا للهار وسائر الكواكب في الضوء ولا للسكنى في القطع ولا للمساء البارد في كسر قوة حرارة ماء آخر كما لا إثر لذلك الآخر في كسر قوة برودة وتسمى هذه كلاً من الله تعالى عادته ان يوجد عليه شيئاً ولتعلم انه من الله الباردٌ ولا واسطة ولا إثر فيه تلك الأشياء المباركة لها ببطعها ولا بقوة أو خاصة جعلها الله تعالى بها كما يعتبر كثير من الجهالة وقد ذكر غير واحد من محققي الأئمة الأثنان على كفر من اعتقد تأثير تلك الأشياء بطبعها والخلان في كفر واعتقد أن تأثيرها بقوة أو خاصة جعلها الله تعالى بها وان نزعها لم يؤثر في جملة ما يجب فيها تعالى ما يستحب

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سابق ما يجوز في تعالى وبيان الدليل على عدم وجب مراواته تعالى للصالح والأذى لخلقه وان

<table>
<thead>
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<th>a 39</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>c</th>
<th>d</th>
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when this does occur it does so by the pure choice and favor of the Most High, the majestic and mighty; and an explanation of the admissibility of seeing the Most High; and what is related to that.

41. All acts of the Most High are admissible; none of them are necessary for him, neither providing what is good and best - otherwise no trials would occur in this world or the next - nor encharging by commanding or forbidding.

42. Among admissible things is a creature's vision of the Most High without a direction or facing a certain way, since just as it is legitimate for God to show the favor of creating a perception in their hearts which is called knowledge, to which the Most High is related without direction or facing a certain way, so also it is legitimate for the Most High to show the favor of creating a perception in their eyes or elsewhere. That perception is called sight, and the Most High is related to it as befits him. Revealed-law has announced the fact of this regarding believers in the next world, and it is necessary to believe in it.

43. For the professors of truth, vision does not call for a structure (of the eye) or a direction or facing a certain way. It calls simply for a subject in which to inhere, nothing else. It is not by sending forth rays from the eye, nor does excessive proximity and distance or thick enveiling prevent the subject from seeing just as
ما وقع من ذلك بمحض اختياره تعالى نفظا منه جل وعز وبيان جواز رؤيته تعالى وما يتعلق بذلك

واما الجائز فهو كل نقل من انفعاله تعالى لا يجب عليه منه شيء ولا مراعاة صلاح ولا اصلح ولا لما وقعت تجنة الدنيا ولا أخرى ولا تكليف سامر ولا نبي

(56ي) 41

ومن الجائزات رؤية المخلوق له تعالى لا غير جهة ولا مقابلة اذ كما صح تنظره سبحانه خلق ادراك لهم في تلوهم يسمى العلم يتعلق به تعالى على ما هو عليه من غير جهة ولا مقابلة كذلك يجعل تنظره تعالى خلق ادراك لهم في اعيونهم او في غيرها يسمى ذلك الاذراك البصر يتعلق به تعالى على ما يليق به وقد اخير موضع ذلك الشرع في حق المؤمنين في الآخرة نوجب الإيمان به

(58ب) 42

والرواية عند اهل الحق لا تستدي بُنية ولا جهة ولا مقابلة وانما تستدي مطلق محل تقوم به فقط وليس بالمعاني اشعة من العين ولا يمنع ذلك منها ترب ولا بعد منفرط ولا حجاب كيفما

(59ب) 43

تعالى، ن: س
تقوم، ع يقوم: س
به، ن: سا
that does not prevent knowledge. As for the obstacles which are determinable in the visible world, it is by the pure choice of God the most high that vision is screened on the occasion of them, not because of them. For the professors of truth, the obstacles are only accidentals contrary to seeing, customarily inhering in the simple substance of the eye, and are multiplied according to the number of things not seen, just as sight, with reference to us is an accidental customarily inhering in the same simple substance of the eye, and is multiplied according to the number of things seen.

44. Chapter (VIII): The reason for sureness of the messengership of the messengers - blessing and peace be upon them - in general, and in particular the messengership of our prophet and protector Muḥammad - God bless him and give him peace - and an explanation of the probative aspect of a miracle, and its illustration by a parable.

45. Among admissible things is God's sending of his messengers to men so that they may communicate to them what God the most high commands, forbids, and permits, and what is related to that. By his favor, God has confirmed them with what proves their truthfulness in what they communicate from him, so that it is equivalent to the Most High's saying "My servant is true" in all that the latter communicates from him.

46. Our imāms - may God be favorable to them - have compared this to a person who testified
لا يمنع ذلك من العلم وما تقرر من الموانع في الشاهد نجح اختيار الله تعالى أن يحبب عندها لا بها وانما الموانع عند اهل الحق اعراض مضادة للبصر تقوم بجوع نفرد من العين بحسب العادة وتساعد بحسب ما نات من المرئيات كما أن البصر بالنسبة النبا عرض يقوم بذلك الجوهر الفرد من العين عادة ويحدث بحسب ما رُئي من المعاصر

(60ا) 44

باستذكار الدليل على شهوت رسالة الرسل عليهم الصلاة والسلام عموما وعلى شهوت رسالة نبنا ومولانا محمد صلى الله عليه وسلم خصوصا وبيان وجه دلالة المعجزة وتقريبها بالمثال

(60ب) 45

فمن الجائزة بحثت ساحاته رسله للعباد لبلغتهم أمر الله تعالى ونهبه وابحث وابحث ما يتعلق بذلك وأبدهم ساحاته نخلا منه بما يدل على صدقهم في ما يبلغوا عنه بحيث ينزل ذلك منزلة قوله تعالى صدق عدي في كل ما يبلغ عنه

(62ا) 46

وقد مثل ذلك الامتنى رضي الله تعالى عليهم بشخص ادشي

اختيار الله، ع اختياره، ص، ق، 56، م، والبعض من ت بحسب: س، 56، Q 56، Q 56، وسبع من ت - بعدد: S، Q 57، م، وست من ت الرسول، ع للرسول، Sا
in a great gathering in the assembly of a king, although the king had screened himself from the sight of all. The person said "Do you know why the king has gathered you? He has gathered you to command you such and such, and to forbid you from such and such, and to let you know that you have come to meet a matter of enormous fear, one at which hearts melt merely by hearing of it, painful to preventing intelligent people from sleeping, and immense such as none are safe from it but those who hurry now to prepare for him before his attack, who listen and turn their whole mind to his hidden information about it to which he is calling attention.

"He has commanded me to communicate that to you now, so hurry! hurry! since only a small amount of time separates you from that terrible event. Regarding it, I am your faithful adviser and undisguised Warner, and have delivered to you the message of the king. Whoever obeys him and thinks well about himself has chosen salvation for himself and won the king's great pleasure, but whoever disobeys him and neglects to think about himself has exposed himself to the unsupportable terror of the king's rage, and no one can deliver him from his great fall.

"You know that the king now knows, sees, and hears what I say, and that though he has screened himself from our now seeing him, he is not screened from seeing us and hearing what goes on between us. He is the one who can put down and raise up whom he wants, and can punish me if I lie against him. If I disobey him, I have no shelter, refuge, or defense. You have observed me since my youth, that I do not permit myself to lie against my own like and kind even if it profits me; during this time I have been free from
في محفل عظيم بمجلس ملكٍ والملك قد حجب الجميع عن مشاهدته
نقال الشخص اعترضت لم جمعهم الملك جمعهم ليامركم بكذا
وبنهاكم عن كذا وعلمكم بانكم استقبلتم هولا جمياً وامراً
تذوب القلوب لمجرد ساعه وكرباً يمنع نوم الاعلاء عظيماً لا
يسلم منه الا من بادر الآن للاستعداد له قيل هجومه والتي السمع
واحتر كل الفكر لما يشير عليه الملك في ذلك من مكنون علمه
وقد امرني بشبليغ ذلك اليوهم الآن فالدار الباراذ
ليس بيكم وبين ذلك الامير المخون الا القليل من الزمان وانا
لكم بين يدي ذاك الناصح الأمين والنذير العريان وان ابتبت
اليوهم رسالة الملك فين اطاعه واحسن النظر لنفسه وقد
استخلصها واغتمع عظيم رضاء ومن عماه واهمل النظر لنفسه فقد
تعرض لما لا يطاق من هول نخط الملك ولا احد يطبع انقاذة من
عظيم رداً
وقولي هذا تعلمون انه بعلم من الملك ومرءه منه الان
ومسع وانه وان حجينا الان عن مشاهدته لئيه هو محجوب عن
رويتين والمعروق ما يجري بيننا وهو الذي يضع من يشاء ويرفع
وهو الكادر ان يعاقبني ان كذبت عنه ولا ملحاً لي ان عصبه
ولا مهره لي ولا مدفع وان عليه تبهدموه من لدن نشأتي لا اسمح لمن يذه
بكمه على من هو مثلي وعلى شاكلتي وان نشئني وأمنت نيها من

ا 46

b c d e
doing any harm on my part. Therefore, after my intellect has matured and my childhood-ignorance has been done away with, how could I dare to lie against the king in his sight and hearing, while I know how enormous is his repression and dominance, and how painful his punishment towards anyone who turns away from him, the Exalted, and makes light of his great command. What heaven will shade me, and what earth will hold me up if I lie against him by one letter? I am certain that if I made up some statements apart from him and spoke to you in disaccord with him, he would take me by my right side and cut my aorta, and I would find none of you defending me.  

"But if this does not satisfy you in verifying the truth of what I say, and you still doubt me after thoroughly testing my perfect advice to you, my honorable past, my aloofness from every foulness, particularly that of lying, and the goodness of my life which you are certain, here is something which will cut away everyone's excuse and make the sunlight of self-evident knowledge rise over the horizons of their hearts, so that no one can be ignorant of it but someone who, throwing himself upon the anger of the king and having the sentence of punishment realized against him, turns

\[\text{Cf. Qur'ān 69:44-47.}\]
كل ضرر ناهجتي نكيك انجاز بعد ما تكامل عقلي ونقضت صوتي
واستبطل المشيب ني صغي ولحيتي على ان اكذب على الملك سرى
منه ومسمع مع علمي بحظي مسطره وثيقه واليم عنتوته لمن تعرض
لجناده العلي واشتكى بعس واحد امره ناي ساء تظنني وفي ارض
تقلني ان كذبت عنه حرينا وانا احتلق اي لو نقولت عنه بعض
الاقوال ونهبت لكم عنه خلنا لأخذ مني سالمين ولقطع مني
الروتين ولا اجد منكم احنا عن حاجزتين
ثم انا لم يتنعكم هكذا ني احتلق صدق مئالي وأسترتم في
مع ما جربتم التجربة الناعم من كمال تفجيءاً لكم وشدة رأثتي بكم
وعظم شنقتي وشرف ساخطي وتنزهي عن كل رذيلة خصوصا رذيلة
الذبح وما نتحترين من حسن سيرتي نهنا ما يقطع العذر لكل احد
وتطلع به شموس المعرفة الضرورية على آثار القلوب حتى لا
بناكراها الا من تعرض لسخط الملك وتحت عليه كلمة العذاب نعائد

ناهجي، ع ما حييتي، نس من ت
ونقشت: س ، ق 1/2، ق 1/3، ق 1/4، ق 1/5، ط 1/6، ط 1/7
ونقشت: س، ق 1/2، ق 1/3، ق 1/4، ق 1/5، ط 1/6، ط 1/7
ولتشعل، ع، اشغال، س، ط 1/2، وشمال: س 1/2
وعليه: س 1/2، ع، عشر من ت
نعبت: س 1/2، ق 1/3، ق 1/4، والاغلب من ت
ولقطع: س 1/2، و، نصغي: س 1/2، حاجزين، ع، احنا منكم: س 1/2، ق 1/3، م، ط 1/4، ن احنا

شمسه، ع، صغي: س 1/2
sceptically away.

"What I propose is to ask the king that as he has shown the favor of sending me to you to explain to you points of guidance and to warn you before those things befall you which stop your preparation for your final-return, so also he would show the favor of manifesting my truthfulness in what I have communicated from him, and my not having lied against him nor provoked him, by breaking his ordinary way of acting, and doing such and such which is not his custom to do, singling me out by answering through that decisive testimony, so that none of you can stand and ask him for something similarly extraordinary with the desire of opposing me and giving the lie to what I say, without possessing the truth as I do."

Then he said "O King, if I have been truthful in what I communicated from you, then break your customary way, and do such and such." The king thereupon answered him and did as he asked. All the people had known that the person could not obtain such an act from the king by a trick. Therefore it is patent that that act of the king is equivalent to his declaring the truthfulness of the person in all that he communicates from him, and the knowledge of that is self-evident to whoever attended that assembly or who was absent from it and heard about it through widespread tradition.

This parable is patently applicable to the situation of the messengers - blessing and peace be upon them. And it is patent that self-evident knowledge can be had from their biographies - blessing and peace be upon them - of their cleaving to truth, their raising their ambitions above everything base, their asceticism with regard to everything in the world, so that its gold and mud were alike to them, their cleaving to the utmost
وجد

وذلك إن أسأل الملك كما تفضل ستعتني البكم لبيان
مرادكم، وانذاركم قبل هجوم ما ينوى به استعدادكم لمعادكم.
يتنفل أيضاً باباً صديقي ما عنه بلغت وأني ما كنت عنه.
ولأ تغزى بان يخرق عادتكم وينفع كذا مما ليس عادتكم، إن ينعله.
ويخصني بالاجابة بذلك المصدر الفارق دون من يقوم منكم يسأله.
مثل ذلك الخارج يغني بمه معارضتي وتكذيبى في مقالتي أو ليس
هو في الصدق على مثل حالي.

ثم قال أبو الملك أن كنت صادقاً ن ما بلغت عنه.
نأخرجع عادتكم وانسل كذا ناجبه الملك إلى ذلك ونهل على
ونظماً ما سل وقى علم الجمع أن لا يتوصل إلى مثل ذلك الفعل.
من الملك بحيلة من الحبل فلا خانه أن ذلك الفعل من الملك.
یبتنزل منزلة تقریبة بصدق الشخصي كل ما يبلغ عنه والعلم.
وشك ذلك ضروري فمن حضر ذلك المشجع أو غاب عنه ووصله خبره.

التمائم.

ولأ يحسن أن هذا المثال متزامن لحال الرسل عليهم السلام.
والسلام ولا خناء إن أنه قد علم ضرورة من سيرتهم عليهم السلام.
والسلام التزام الصدق ورفع الهمة عن كل دناءة والزهد في
الدنيا بالسيرة بحيث أستوى عندهم ذهباً ومدرفاً والالتزام غاية.
humility with the poor and destitute, their throwing off majesty and rank with created (men) and their seeking it from the true King, the great extent to which they were drawn to pity all creatures, their perfect counseling of the servants of God the most high, their great fear of the Majestic and Mighty, their hastening before everyone else to obey what they communicated from him, their perseverance until death in calling men to God the most high, while treating equal low and high, rich and poor, intelligent and stupid, speakers of a foreign language or eloquent (Arabs), free-men and slaves, male and female, present and absent, rulers and ruled, then their patience in bearing the bad manners and extreme fickleness of these and their tenderness to everyone more than their tenderness to their own children or even themselves without taking from them anything in recompense for it or deriving any worldly advantage from them; rather, in doing so - blessing and peace be upon them - they exposed themselves to suffering fearful hardships from these men, such as no one could stand but a man who is grounded in truth and concerned with enjoying the favor of his Protector rather than esteeming anything too great which would bring him to his wish and desire.

From widespread tradition it is certain what great affliction from men they underwent - blessing and peace be upon them - because of their calling these men to God the most high. Such men even affronted the best and noblest man before God the most high, our prophet and protector Muhammad - God bless him and give him peace - causing him pain, obstructing him, and fighting him, even to the extent of breaking his four front teeth and causing to bleed that brightest, most exalted, and noble face.
التواضع مع النقراء والمراكين وإقلاط الجاه والمنازل عند
الخلق وطلبها عند الملك الحق وعظمهم ما جعلوا عليه من الكنية
على جميع المخلوقات والمعنم التأم لعباد الله تعالى وكره
الخون منه جل وعز والمبادرة لامثال ما بلغوا عنه قبل كل واحد
والموافقة إلى السمات على دعاء الخلق إلى الله تعالى مع
التسوية في ذلك بين وضعهم ورنيهم وغيبهم ونفيهم وغنيهم
وبهذهم وأعجمهم ونصبحم وحريم وعمدهم وذكرهم واعتناهم
وحاضرهم وغايهم وملكهم وسوتتهم ثم سما الصدر لحمل سوء
ادتهم ونودة جناتهم والرآبة على جميعهم أكثر من رانتهم على
أولادهم بل وعلى انيهم من غير عون يأخذونه منهم على ذلك ولا
منفعة دينوية تحصل لهم من قبلهم بل معهم عليهم الصلاة والسلام
تعرضوا بذلك لنداءات وأحوال نالتهم من جهتهم لم يثبت لها إلا
من هو على صميم الحق قد شغله التلفذ برئ مولاه عن أن
يستمع شيئا يوصله إلى مراده منه ومنا
وند كتب بالتراث ما نالهم عليهم إلالة والسلام من عظيم
اذابة الخلق بسبب دعائهم إلى الله تعالى حتى انهم تجاروا
على أنجل الخلق وآركهم على الله تعالى نبينا ومولانا محمد
علي الله عليه وسلم نآذوه وقضوا عليه ونابلوه حتى انهم
كسروا رباعيه وادموا منه ذلك الوجه الإيري الإرنج الكرم

اعجمهم 4 ع اعجمهم 474612 محمد 355 وخمس من ت
ادهم 1 6 4756 ع أدهم 1 6 4756 ع أديهم 1 6 4756 ع
اذهم 1 6 4756 ع أذهم 1 6 4756 ع أذهم 1 6 4756 ع
أذهم 1 6 4756 ع أذهم 1 6 4756 ع
AA
ملة، نا سأ، م
تبليم، ع قتليم 56
Because of their hardness they were screened from seeing those excellent traits, which, if discovered even in the slightest degree, astonish the mind and shatter the soul because of the extraordinariness to be seen in that handsome and great man. How can a people prosper who have bloodied the face of their prophet who was so kind to them, who had gone to meet them with his sunlike arising and the excellent traits of his moonlike face, proclaiming to them that pure and exalted Essence in order to warn them from the fire, anxious to turn them from it even by the sword before the opportunity escapes them by their settling in the house of perdition.

All this by itself shows that they - blessing and peace be upon them - are truthful in all that has been communicated to them from God the most high. A comparison of their situation alone self-evidently negates a case of lying. How? why God confirmed them with extraordinary events which decidedly no one could produce by a trick of magic or by delving into medicine or other means, (events) such as raising the dead, splitting the sea into mountain peaks, and the like. Even if these things could be produced by tricks, it is impossible in the ordinary-course-of-events for them alone, of all the people of the earth, to be able to do so, since it is self-evidently known that they were as far as could be from such sciences, their masters, and their activating-links. "You were not reciting a previous book or copying it with your right-hand; otherwise the sceptics would doubt."² This is something both those who agree and those who differ are settled upon, even though hostile and envious people have within themselves what stimulates motives

²Qur'ān 29:48.
وَحْجَبْوا لِشَقَائِقِهِم مِن مَّتَاعِهِم الَّذِي اكْتَنَفْنَ إِنَّهَا يَدْهِشُ النَّفْرَ وكَيْفَ الْبَنِسْ لَا تَرِى مِن خَرَقِ الْحَادِثَةِ فِي تُلُكَ الْخَلْقِ الْوَسْيمِ وَالْخَلْقِ العَظِيمِ وكَيْفَ يَنْقُلُ تَوْمَ ادْمَا وَهَدِيَ الرَّجُوَنْ عَلَيْهِمْ وَقَدْ اسْتَخْلَصُوهُ بِشَشْمُ طَلَعَتِهِ وَمَهَّا تَمَسَّهُ مَعَاهُمْ بِكَفْرٍ لِّيُلْقِي النَّارَ حَزْهُمْ عَنْ النَّارِ حَرِيصًا عَلَى رَدُّهُمْ عَنْهَا وَلَوْ بِسَبِيلٍ لَّيْنَ يَفْخُمُونَ الْأَمْرَ بِالحَلْوِ فِي دَارِ الْإِبْرَارِ

نَبِئُهَا كَلِهُ يَدُلُّ بِمَجْرِدِهِ عَلَى اِنْتِهَمِهِمْ الْطَّلَةِ وَالْسَلَامُ

مَيْتَوْنَ الَّذِينَ أَمَرْتَهُم بِهِ عَلَى اللَّهِ تَعَالَى وَقَرْبَةِ حَالِمْٰهُم وَحَدِها

مِنْ هَالَّةِ الْكَذِبِ ضَرْوَةِ كَيْفَ وَقَدْ أَبْنِيَ اللَّهُ بَخْوَارٍ يَقْطَعُهُ مَانِهِ لا يَنْتَوِلُ الْيَبَّ حِيْلَةَ سَحْرٍ وَلَا بَخْوَرٍ فِي طُبْ وَلَا غَيْرُهُ كَحَبْيَةِ الْمَوْتِ وَفِلْقُ الْبَحْرِ اطُوّادَا وَنَحْوُ ذلِكَ وَلَوْ كَانَ ذلِكَ مَمَا يَتَوَسِّعُ الْيَبَّ بِالْحِيْلَ لِلْإِسْتِحْلَالِ عَادَةً أَنْ يَنْفُرَوْا بِذلِكَ عَنْ جَمِيعِ الْأَهْلِ الْأَرْضِ وَقَدْ عَلِمُ ضَرْوَةَ اِنْتِهَمُونَ كَانُوا فِي غَيْبَةِ الْبَعْدِ عَنْ هَذَهِ الْمُعْلِمَةِ وَأَرْبَابَهَا وَأَسْبَابَهَا وَمَا كَانُوا تَتَتَّبِعُونَ مُنْ قِبَلِهِ مِنْ كِتَابٍ وَلَا تَتَخَلَّلِ بِمِنْ قِبَلِهِ اِلْإِرْتُابُ الْمَسْتَلْعُونَ وَهَذَا مَعْلُوَهُ الْمَوْقُفُ وَالْمَخَالِفُ هَاذَا مَعْنَى فِي نُنْسِ الأَعْذَابِ وَالْحَسَدَةِ مَا يَحْرُكُ الدُّوَاعِيٍّ

المَعَانَى لِشَقَائِقِهِمْ سَا لِيَبَاخُذْهَا سَا عَنْهَا سَا الكَذِبِ عِنْدَ اللَّهِ سَيْ بِمَعْرُوفٍ سَا يُفْتَنُونَ سِتْرَةً سَا أَبْنَى سَا درُوَاهَا سَا كَفَافِهِ سَا أَبْنَى سَا تَعَالَى سَا رَكُونٌ سَا بِمَعْرُوفٍ سَا رَكُونٌ سَا
of searching and examining. But the ordinary-course-of-events leaves no possibility for the (prophets) to have any connection with that; otherwise it would be known, and they would be censured for it, and their case would become so publicized that no one would be ignorant of it.

In summary, the truthfulness of the messengers - blessing and peace be upon them - is self-evidently known to all who have God's assistance.

47. Their immunity from lying is known from intelligibility by the evidence of a miracle, and from big acts of disobedience and small acts which are reproachable from consensus, and from any other sins because men are commanded to imitate those who are sent to them, and the Most High does not command an act of disobedience.

48. The most preferred of them is our prophet, master, and protector Muḥammad - God bless him and give him peace - whom God sent to all the people of the earth, and confirmed with innumerable miracles. The most preferred of these is the great Qurʾān, whose miraculosity is perceived until now by looking at it.

49. It is necessary to believe him - God bless him and give him peace - in everything he was notified of from God the most high, such as the raising of this very body and not its like, which is a matter of consensus, and similar matters, such as
البحث والتفتيش والعادة تحيل أن تكون لهم نسبة إلى شيء من ذلك الا وينظر ويقدرون به ويستهير أمره حتى لا يخلي على أحد وبالجملة نصين الرسل عليهم السلام معلوم تارة ضرورة لكل مونين

وعصمتهم من الكذب معلومة عتا بدليل المعجزة ومن كبار المعاصي وصناع الخمس بالاجتماع ومن سائر الذنوب فنان الخلق المعروفان البني يامورون بالانتهاء بهم ولا يأمر تعالى سماحة

وانظهم الله وسيدنا ومولانا محمد صلى الله عليه وسلم بعثه سبحانه إلى أهل الأرض كانة وأيده بمعجزات لا حصر لها وانظروا القرآن العظيم الذي اعجازه للخلق مدرك بالعين إلى الآن

فوجب تقديمه على الله عليه وسلم في كل ما انتبه عن الله تعالى كالبعث لعين هذا البدن لا لمثله اجتماعا ونحوه من

11 من ذلك نس: 4065 واربع من ت
29 وبشتهر، ع وبشتهر، سا
30 الذنوب، ز بالاجتماع، ست من ت
31 المعروفان، زهم: 242، والبعض من ت - ع المعروفين هم
47 س: لمشله، ع مشله: سا
49
the questioning in the grave, delight and punishment there, the path, the scale, the basin, intercession for disobedient believers in order to release them from the fire after the threat has been carried out in a number of them, which is a matter of consensus, also the eternity of delight for believers and of punishment for unbelievers, and awareness in detail of what he - God bless him and give him peace - was notified of. (All this) is explained in the books of the imāms of law and tradition.

The aim of this quick summary is only to recall what will bring an encharged person out of blind acceptance in the tenets of faith. An understanding of these lines is more than sufficient for that if God eases the way. He, majestic and exalted, is the one we ask for help and pray to, that he may bring us out by his favor, and bring us from darkness into light, also that he may honor us and generously place in our hands what is to be awarded to us and those we love, namely enjoyment in the highest region of Paradise, with an exalted awareness of him and the pleasure of seeing him with the greatest joy.

God bless our master and protector Muḥammad as often as those who recall him recall him and those who neglect to recall him neglect to recall him. May God the most high be pleased with all the companions of the Messenger of God. Praise be to God, the lord of the worlds.
سأل النبر ونعيه وعذابه والصراط والميزان والحوض والشفاعة للعمة المؤمنين في انزاعها من النار بعد نذور الوعيد في جماعة ومنهم اجماعاً وتأثير نعيم المؤمنين وعذاب الكافرين ومعرفة تفاصيل ما اتي به صلى الله عليه وسلم مبين في كتب الأئمة من الفقه والحديث.
والقصد بهذه المعالجة انا هو ذكر ما خرج المكلف عن التقليد في العقائد وتنمّيّ هذه الجمل وان بذلك ان خرّج الله صحنه اثمّ وناء وهو جلّ ولا المشعان والمسؤول ان يخرجنا من نظره ويخرج لنا من الظلمات الى النور ان يكرمنا ويكرم على ابطالنا بما يوجب لنا وتكريناً من التنعم في عجل الفردوس بشرف معرفته ولذل رؤيته اعظم سرور وصل الله على سبأنا وسلم لنا محمد عدد ما ذكره الدواكر وغفل عن ذكره الفائزون ورضي الله تعالى عن أصحاب رسول الله اجمعين والحمد لله رب العالمين

المؤمنين، إن: س٣، ني٣، وخمس من ت جماعة، ع جماعات، سا نابيد، ع نابيد، سا، م مبين، ع نبين: س٢، مبينا: ت١١، مبين: ت٢ عن، ع من: ني٤، و٤، وست من ت
CHAPTER III
THE THEOLOGY OF \textsc{as}-\textsc{sanûsî}

This chapter takes the Commentary on the \textit{Wustâ} as its point of departure, and its number divisions parallel those of the Creed in Chapter II. Abbreviations to \textsc{as}-\textsc{sanûsî}'s works, using the editions or manuscripts indicated in Chapter I, \textit{E}, are as follows:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{K} = \textit{al-\'Aqîda al-kubrā} and its commentary (works 2 and 3)
  \item \textit{W} = \textit{al-\'Aqîda al-wustâ} and its commentary (works 4 and 5), using the \textit{E1} manuscript
  \item \textit{S} = \textit{al-\'Aqîda as-gughrâ} and its commentary (works 6 and 7)
  \item \textit{J} = \textit{Sharh al-Jazâ'iriyya} (work 16)
  \item \textit{Ss} = \textit{Sighrat as-Sighra} and its commentary (works 8 and 9)
  \item \textit{M} = \textit{al-Mugaddima} and its commentary (works 10 and 11)
\end{itemize}

Before the actual text of the Creed, \textit{W} contains an introduction which explains the aim of the work \textit{Iff. 3b-5a}; see Ch. II, A, \textit{a}/, and, while complaining that the state of religion has deteriorated over the centuries \textit{Iff. 3b/}, derives courage to go on teaching from the hadîth that a remnant (\textit{tâ'ifa}) of believers will continue to the end of time.\footnote{For which \textit{a. 'A. b. al-Wâjj} is quoted; in this context there are also quoted verses of Ibn-al-Mubârak and of \textsc{zayn} al-\textsc{\'abidîn}.}

\section{A. The science of kalâm (N. 1)}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{Blind-acceptance versus correct reasoning, definitions:}
    \begin{itemize}
      \item Blind-acceptance (\textit{taqâlid}) according to the dictionary definition (\textit{fi l-lughâ}), says \textit{W Iff. 3b/}, is "acting upon the
opinion of another without reason" (al-'amal bi-qawl al-ghayr bi-lā ṭuṣja). This definition excludes from taqlīd accepting the opinion of a mufti when one does not understand a problem, since there is reason for accepting his authority, namely, the Qur'ān verse "Ask the professional recallers if you do not know" (16:43 = 21:7).

Ibn-'Arafa, in his Shāmil, gave as a technical definition "a firm belief in the opinion of someone who is not infallible" (iʿtiqād jāzim li-qawl ghayr maʿṣūm). This definition includes under taqlīd accepting the opinion of a mufti. Ibn-al-Ḥājib, in his Mukhtasar, first accepted the dictionary definition, then reconsidered when he saw this latter definition generally accepted.

An objection to the definition of Ibn-'Arafa is that it does not include under taqlīd the case of one who accepts the opinion of an infallible person that God exists, since this kind of tenet cannot be accepted simply on the authority of another. The answer to this objection is implied in the definition, since one must know the existence and attributes of God before one can appreciate the value of a miracle in proving the infallibility of a person to speak on other questions.

J (f. 23b) returns to an equivalent of the dictionary definition, "accepting the opinion of another without reason" (akhḍh qawl al-ghayr bi-ghayr dalīl), and explains that this excludes from taqlīd accepting what was communicated to the Messenger, after knowing a proof for his truthfulness.

To define taqlīd and knowledge, K (Pp. 37-38) and §§ (P. 9) proceed by way of division. A judgement or determination is:
- not firm (ghayr al-jazm), and:
- more probable than its contrary = opinion (zann)
- equiprobable with its contrary = doubt (shakk)
- less probable than its contrary = suspicion (wahm)
- firm, and:
  - based on a reason (dalîl) = knowledge ('ilm) or awareness (ma'rifa)
  - not based on a reason = blind acceptance (taqlîd):
    - agreeing with the truth:
      - in branch sciences (furû‘)
      - in fundamentals (uṣûl ad-dîn)
    - not agreeing with the truth = compounded ignorance (al-jahl al-murakkab)

Correct reasoning (an-nâzar as-ṣaḥîḥ), says W, is "the reflection by which a person considers the aspect which is intermediate between himself and that which is to be proved" (at-ta'ammul allâdhî yaṭṭali' qâhibuhu 'alâ l-wajh allâdhî baynahu wa-bayn al-madlûl). Erroneous reasoning (an-nâzar al-fâsid) is that which does not look at the proper aspect.

K, first gave al-Bayḍawi's definition of correct reasoning, "the arrangement of facts (umûr ma'lûmât) according to the aspect which will lead to knowledge of what is not known," but offers as a better definition "the placing of a fact, or arrangement of two or more facts according to an aspect which will result in what is sought (al-mâtûb) or in a specification (at-tanwî')." The latter definition includes definitions and

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2 Note that in K and W, which condemn all taqlîd, the emphasis is on 'ilm, scientific knowledge, while in §§ (p. 54) and §§, which come after some hesitation on the subject, the emphasis is on ma'rifa, with its sufic resonance.

3 These and yet further subdivisions of taqlîd are found in M, f. 208a.
descriptions, whether complete or not, and syllogistic argumentation.

Aside from the Summanites, who denied the value of any reasoning, and the Mechanists (muhandisūn), who denied its value in attaining God, various explanations of the connection (rabt) between reasoning and knowledge are reported by W F. 10a/, K PP. 18-19/, and J I1d, f. 33a/. The Philosophers (ḥukamā') say that reasoning is an independent cause (ʿilla mustaqilla) of knowledge; the Muʿtazilites say that man has the power of directly producing (iqtirā') his reasoning, and that from his reasoning knowledge is induced (al-ʿilm mutawallad 'an an-naẓar). These positions are refuted later.

Of the Sunnites, al-Ashʿarī said that the connection is customary ('Ēdī); according to this opinion, in an extraordinary case there could be correct reasoning without there resulting any knowledge. Imām-al-Ḥaramayn said that the connection is of intelligibility ('aqlī); according to him, if there are no general liabilities (al-ṣafāt al-ʿāmma), such as death, there cannot be correct reasoning without there also being knowledge of what is to be shown ('ilm al-madlūl); correct reasoning does away with special liabilities (al-ṣafāt al-khāṣṣa), such as ignorance, and there is no need to demand their absence as a condition for knowledge. In K al-Bāqillānī is said to have held both positions; in J he is mentioned only with Imām-al-Ḥaramayn.

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4 Note that K, p. 258, switches Imām-al-Ḥaramayn and al-Ashʿarī on these two positions. In K al-Bāqillānī is said to have held both positions; in J he is mentioned only with Imām-al-Ḥaramayn.

5 In K (pp. 21-22) as-Sanūsī also takes up the logical point of whether knowledge of the major and minor premises of an
b. The obligation of knowledge:

According to § /P. 55/, the mass (jumhūr) of theologians agree that knowledge and correct reasoning leading to it are necessary for the validity of faith. These theologians include al-Ash'arī, al-Bāqillānī, Imām-al-Ḥaramayn, and Ibn-al-Qaqār who quotes a hadīth from Mālik for this opinion. W /F. 10b/ repeats this hadīth, and adds the authority of al-İsfārā'īnī.

A minority opinion /§, p. 57/ is that knowledge and correct reasoning are neither a condition of faith nor obligatory, but only desirable and a condition of the perfection of faith. It is attributed to Ibn-a. Jamra, al-Qushayrī, Ibn-Rushd, and al-Ghazālī, although K /P. 42/ says that the apparent meaning in the Nawāzil of Ibn-Rushd is that only detailed knowledge is non-obligatory.

Similar is the opinion of the Indians who hold that knowledge comes from inspiration (ilhām) resulting from emptying the mind of distraction; thus reasoning is unnecessary /K, pp. 84-85/.

Other opinions are that teaching the masses tawḥīd disturbs the tranquillity of their faith - which is refuted by the contrary, namely that it increases their peace with certitude, as various hadīths illustrate /N, f. 13b/ - or the opinion of the Ḥashwiyya who held that any reasoning about the articles of faith was forbidden - which is contrary to all authoritative tradition /N, f. 11a/.

Concerning the first obligation of one who has reached maturity, K /Pp. 27-29/, W /F. 10b/, and J /2a, f. 36b/ mention argument suffices for knowledge of the conclusion, and quotes Ibn-Sīnā, Ibn-at-Tilmāsī, and al-Baydāwī's Tawāli' for saying that a third knowledge is necessary, the reference (indirāj) of the minor to the major. He also considers (p. 23) the logical consequences of incomplete or incorrect form and of false premises.
six opinions: 1) knowing-awareness of God (ma'trifat Allāh), the opinion of al-Ash'arī; 2) reasoning leading to this (an-nāṣar al-muwassīl ilayhā), attributed in J to al-Baqillānī, but in K and W to al-Ash'arī as a second opinion of his; 3) the first part of reasoning (awwal juz' min an-nāṣar), an anonymous opinion in J, but attributed to al-Baqillānī in K and W; 4) the intention of correct reasoning (al-qaṣd ilā n-nāṣar aṣ-ṣāāḥīḥ), explained in K and W as turning one's heart toward it and cutting off contrary attachments, such as pride and resistance to teachers; this opinion is attributed in J to al-Baqillānī, Ibn-Fūrak, and Imām-al-Ḥaramayn, but in K and W to al-Īsfārā'īnī and Imām-al-Ḥaramayn; 5) blind acceptance (taqlīd), explained in K and W as "an acknowledgement of (al-iqrār bi-) God and his messengers by a belief agreeing with the truth ('an 'aqd muṭābiq) even without knowledge; and 6) doubt (shāик), the opinion of the Mu'tazilite a. 1-Qāsim al-Ka'bi and, according to W, of Ibn-Fūrak.

Of these opinions, K admits that knowing-awareness of God is the first obligation in intention, but chooses correct reasoning (the second opinion) as the first obligation in execution, because of the insistence on it in the Qur'ān and Sunna. W makes no change, but J rejects the second opinion as weak, because correct reasoning is not an aim (muqṣṣad), and even as a means (sabil) is preceded by intention (qaṣd). Therefore the fourth opinion, together with the first, is preferred.

The obligation, as-Sanūsī insists in K [Pp. 15-16], stems from revealed-law (shar'), and not intelligibility ('aql) as the Mu'tazilites maintained. Something can be obligatory even if the person has not learned the obligation. § [Pp. 63-66] quotes Ibn-'Arabi for advocating calling man not directly to
faith (Imān) but to reasoning. If they defer believing because of lingering doubts they should be given time to understand, but if they are merely stubborn, their stubbornness should be removed by the sword.

A person is encharged (mukallaf), or subject to legal obligations, when he has reached maturity (bulugh). J L1e, f. 14a/ gives opinions as to when maturity occurs; the answers generally center around puberty.

c. The status of a blind-acceptor (mugallid):

K /Pp. 39-42/ and W /Ff. 8b and 10b/ give a list, which K attributes to Ibn-'Arafa, of three opinions concerning the status of a mugallid. J /Lb. f. 23b/ gives the same three opinions in different order and adds a fourth. S /Pp. 55-57/ gives the three and also some variants of them.

According to S, among the theologians who agree that knowledge and the correct reasoning leading to it are obligatory there is disagreement concerning whether a mugallid is:
- a believer, but disobedient simply (mu'min illā annahu 'āq)
- a believer, but disobedient only if he has the capability (ahliyya) of correct reasoning; this is the second opinion in K and W, and the third in J, and is attributed in K to al-Āmidī, reporting from various theologians, and in W to a. Yy. ash-Sharīf at-Tilimsānī, who argues that correct reasoning is very difficult, and revealed-law does not enjoin the impossible (mā la yuṭiq).
- not a believer at all (lays bi-mu'min așlan); this is the third opinion in K and W, and the first in J, and is attributed to Abū-Ḥāshim b. al-Jubbā'ī, Ibn-at-Tilimsānī, and the Shāmil
of Imām-al-Ḥaramayn.

The latter, according to §, distinguishes four cases: 1) a person who has time after maturity for correct reasoning and does so; he is a believer; 2) one who has time and does not do so; his faith is invalid; 3) one who does not have time, but in the little he has tries to reason correctly; his faith is valid; 4) one who does not have time, and does not try in the little he does have; opinion is divided, but the more valid opinion (al-ṣaḥḥaḥ), that of al-Baqillānī, is that his faith is not valid.

According to W, the opinion that a muqallid is a kāfir is held by the mass of theologians. W continues with a passage from Ibn-Dahhāq's commentary on the Iṣāba in support of this opinion. W/F. 10b/ also argues against a. Y. ʿash-Sharīf at-Tilimsānī and says "We do not concede that encharging with the impossible never happens" (fa-lā nusallīm ann at-tālīf bi-mā lā yuṭāq ghayr wāqī). Moreover, al-ʿarāfī, "who was very severe" (wa-qad ẓaddad tashdīdan ʿaẓma), said that even if a

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6 The position of al-Baqillānī is considered in detail in K, pp. 89-94; a reference on p. 93 indicates that K is depending for its information on Ibn-at-Tilimsānī's Sharḥ al-Maʿālim.

7 Thus in the L group of manuscripts. The A and the T groups add a contradictory qualifying phrase: "according to some; but others deny, and say that a firmness agreeing with the truth is sufficient for belief, and saving by the favor of God from remaining eternally in hell-fire, even though many sound theologians deny its (taqlīd's) existence among the Sunnites, while others copy from a. ʿAbūl ʿAbbās al-Muʿtazilīs" (ʿinda baʾḍihim wa-ankar baʾgūhīm wa-qālī bal al-ṣaḥḥāḥ ann jazm at-taqlīd al-muṭābiq kāf fī 1-Imān wa-mulkhalls bi-faṣl Allāh min al-khulūd fī n-niʿrān wa-in kām kathīr min al-muḥaqqiqīn ankārū wuṣūdahu li-sīl as-sunna wa-baʾgūhīm yanqūl ʿan Abī-Ḥāshim min al-Muʿtazila). Note that K, p. 85, rejects the contention that taqlīd does not exist among Muslims.

8 F. 9a; K (pp. 79-81) has the same passage, but has a few lines in the beginning not given in W, and omits the illustrative material at the end.
person tried all he could and failed to understand the fundamentals of religion, he is an unbeliever and destined for hell. Even in regions where intelligence is low, as in the distant parts of Turkey and Black Africa (as-Sudân), people remain encharged.

Besides the previous opinions which agree that knowledge is obligatory, the minority opinion of those who say that it is not obligatory also say that there is no disobedience in neglecting to study. This is the first opinion in K and W, and the second in J.

A similar opinion is the fourth in J, which says that blind acceptance of something free from errors (ma'mûn al-khatûyî), such as the Qur'ân, is legitimate, but not blind acceptance of any teacher. Ibn-Dahhâq attributes this opinion to the Ḥashwîyya. As-Sanûsî rejects it because correct reasoning is necessary both to know the truth of the Qur'ân and to avoid anthropomorphic interpretations (tajâ'am). For the same reason, in W /F. 10b/ he rejects the idea that simple reading of the Qur'ân and ḥadîth is enough for understanding the tenets of faith.

In preparing an answer, as-Sanûsî emphasises several distinctions. The first, in W /F. 11b/, is that there is agreement that knowledge of the branch sciences (al-furû`) is not necessary for the validity of faith, and error in them is pardonable; only knowledge of what is fundamental (aqlî) is indispensable.

The second distinction, in W /F. 45b (in N. 32)/ and S /P. 67/ is between knowledge in general (jumâlî or ijmâlî) and knowledge in detail (tafsîlî). There is agreement that the latter, the science of kalâm with its analyses and arranging of proofs, is not obligatory on every individual (farq al-a'yân), but is
only a communal obligation (farḍ al-kifāya) to be satisfied by certain learned men in every region (qāṭr). ⁹

The third distinction concerns knowledge only of what is referred to (madlūl) by the shahāda or knowledge also of the proof (dalil). ⁴¹ ZF. 44b (in N. 32) refers to a fatwā given by the learned men of Bija (Bougie) "at the beginning of this century or shortly before," who judged that someone who did not know the meaning of the two statements of the shahāda, for instance by thinking that Muḥammad was a deity, had no part in Islam (lā yuḏrab la-hu fī 1-Islām bi-naṣīb). All agree with this fatwā. "The differences among learned men concern the person who knows what the two statements of faith refer to (madlūl asḥ-shahādatayn) and without doubting firmly holds the tenets professing God's unity which they contain (wa-jazū bimā taḥammānat-hu min 'aqā'id at-tawḥīd min ghayr taraddud); only the motive of his resoluteness is blind acceptance (taqālīd) and the simple fact of having been raised among a people of believers, without knowing any demonstration of these tenets whatsoever." K/38/ praises Ibn-a. Zayd al-Qayrawānī and Ibn-al-Qājib for their short works on the tenets of faith, which, though they do not contain proofs (adilla), at least bring the common people one step towards knowledge; but they are not sufficient.

As-Sanūsī's position on the status of the latter type of muqallid, who understands the meaning of the fundamental propositions of faith in a general way but does not know a proof for these propositions, differs in his various works.

His earlier position, in K and W, was that such a person is not a believer. The reason is that, as al-Ash'arī said,

⁹Cf. also W, f. 16b (in N. 2), where Ibn-'Arafa says the same.
knowing awareness (maʿrīfa) is faith itself (nafs al-īmān) ʿāw, f. 14b; cf. f. 8b/ or, as al-Bāqillānī said, a consequence of it and can be attained only by correct reasoning (aw lāzīma la-hu lā taḥsul illā bi-n-nāṣar aṣ-ṣaḥīḥ) ʿāw, f. 14b/. K ʿāp. 43-44/ also quotes some Qurʾān verses (11:14, 47:19, 65:12, 74:31, 12:108) and ḥadīths in favor of this position, and ʿāp. 44-45/ quotes al-Bāqillānī for an argument by division into absurdities to prove that the commanding of taqlīd is impossible.

A number of objections to this position are considered.

One ʿāw, f. 45b (in N.32)/ is that it causes doubts and worries concerning the validity of one's own faith. The answer is that every man knows himself best; if he can distinguish between the reality of taqlīd and of knowledge, he can look into his own consciousness and know whether he is affected by taqlīd or not.

A second objection ʿāw, f. 45b/ is that this position leads to doubting the faith of others. The answer is that we cannot suspect the faith of others because they cannot express the reasons for it or argue against error (shibh). If many learned men are unable to express the certain knowledge (al-ʿulūm al-muḥaqqaqa) which is in their minds, what about ordinary people? Therefore it is necessary to be kind in teaching them and curing their sickness.

A third objection ʿāw, pp. 45-56/, similar to the preceding, is that Muḥammad accepted simply the pronouncement of the two statements of the shahāda by his opponents as reason enough to stop fighting them, without trying to find out if they really believed. The answer is that this action only concerns outward status (aṣ-ẓawāhir) in this world, and does not spare the hypocrites (munāfiqūn) from an eternity of hell-fire.
A fourth objection (K, pp. 47-50) is that many blind-acceptors (muqallidūn) have deeper faith than many men of knowledge. The answer is that some such simple people have divinely given knowledge, in which case they are not muqallidūn. If by faith is meant what is productive of good works (mā yansha' 'anhu a'māl al-birr), the observation is that knowledge of itself leads to good works, even though this may not be true of every individual. Good works without knowledge are useless, as in the case of Christian monks.

A fifth objection (K, pp. 47, 51-64), based on tales of the Fathers and words of ar-Rāzī and of 'U. b. 'Abdal'azīz, is their commendation of the faith of simple people such as children and old ladies. The answer is that the meaning of such exhortations is to keep to what the Fathers agreed upon, and to avoid the innovations of the Qadarites, the Murji'ites, the Jabarites, the Rāfiqītes, and the Mu'tazilites. In early times even simple people knew the reasons for their beliefs, while the learned were the walls of Islam, protecting the faith of the simple in difficult moments; their jihād is greater than that of the sword. 10

U (F. 45b) refers to Ibn-'Arabī's description of the perfect knowledge many ordinary people had in his time, and comments that if ordinary people of that time attained this even though they lived late and very far from the time of prophecy and the flooding of its lights, how much more did ordinary people in the

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10K, pp. 53-54; instances in the lives of al-Isfārā'īnī and Ibn-Fūrak illustrate this (pp. 56-57), while ar-Rāzī is attacked (pp. 61-62) for his supposed approval of taqlīd and his being tainted with ideas of philosophers; according to a, 'Al. M. b. A. al-Maqqarī, he tended more to accept than to reject error; other shaykhās warn against his writings.
time of the holy Fathers (as-salaf aq-qa'lih); as-Sanusi goes on to complain of his own time.

A sixth objection (/K, pp. 47, 64-77; W, f. 11a/, proposed by the Ḥashwiyya, is that the companions of Muḥammad did not know tawḥīd; for instance, they did not know what a substance and an accidental were. The answer is that they knew these and other matters of the science of kalām without knowing the technical terms; their closeness to Muḥammad supplied for formal study. In fact they were the wisest of men in tawḥīd. In early times a formal science was unnecessary; but later heresies and strife (fitan) made it necessary.

As-Sanusi's position changed somewhat in § and J. J simply quotes the four opinions mentioned above without giving a judgement. § wavers: Commenting on Imām-al-Ḥaramayn's distinguishing of four cases and his declaring invalid the faith of a mugallid, whether he had time for correct reasoning or not, as-Sanusi says /P. 56/ "Perhaps this division refers only to those who have no firmness at all in the tenets of faith, even by taqlīd" (wa-la'all ḥādhā t-taqṣīm innamā huwa lā jāzm 'indahū bi-'aqa'id al-Imān aṣālan wa-lāw bi-t-taqālīd). Later /P. 57/ he says there is uncertainty (taraddud) whether correct reasoning is a condition of the validity of faith, but it is more probable (rājih) that it is. Finally /P. 62/, in a quotation from Ibn-'Arabī, the question is said to be still open and undecided whether someone's faith is valid if he has the ability to reason and does not do so.

To prove this as-Sanusi quotes a number of ḥadīths and authorities such as az-Zabidi's Tabaqāt an-naqṣāt, al-Bāqillānī, and Ibn-'Arāfa.
§§ (Pp. 10-11) admits that there are differences of opinion concerning the status of a *mugallid* (fa-fā dhālik ṭuruq wa-aqwāl), but says the the best (aṣaḥḥu-hū) is that a person is obliged to search for a demonstration until he reaches knowing-awareness, no matter what his capacity for understanding it is (yajib `alayhi l-bahth `an al-burḥān ḥattā taḥṣul la-hu l-maʿrifa `anhu mahmū kānat fīhi qābiliyya li-fahm dhālik). Al-Ashʿarī is then quoted for saying that knowing-awareness is faith, or, according to al-Bāḍillānī, is a consequence of it. Thus §§ seems to revert back to the unqualified position of K and W. 13

M (F. 208a) changes position radically. Distinguishing between bad (rāḍī'), or erroneous *taqālīd* and good (ḥasan) *taqālīd*, that is, agreeing with the truth, it says 'There is a difference of opinion concerning whether the *taqālīd* of the mass of believers towards learned Sunnites in the fundamentals of religion is sufficient or not. Most sound theologians say that it is sufficient if they have resoluteness concerning the truth, especially those who have difficulty in understanding the proofs' (wa-khtulif fī *taqālīd* 'āmmat al-mu'mīnīn li-ʿulamā' ahl as-sunna fī uṣūl ad-dīn hal yakfī dhālik am lā wa-l-akthar min al-nuḥaqqiqīn qālū ann dhālik yakfī idhā waqa' minhum at-taṣmīm 'alā l-ḥaqq lā siyyamā fī ḥaqq man yāsūr 'alayhi fahm al-adilla).

No reasons are given for this position, but it harmonizes with a suppler position, based on al-Ghazālī, in the same work towards Christians and Jews and those who hold opinions which

13This is in disagreement with `Uth. b. Fodio, who dwelt only on the statement "there are differences of opinion" to conclude that as-Sanūsī takes a more tolerant position in this work.
 imply a denial of the fundamentals, but the implication is not obvious to them /Ff. 205b-206b/.

d. The reality of faith:

J /31b, ff. 337b-338b/ says that faith (İmân) is an acknowledgement of truthfulness (taşdıq ҳaqıqatuhu). There are various opinions as to what this acknowledgement of truthfulness consists in:

1) Al-Ash'arî, as has been seen, identified it with knowing-awareness (ma'rifa). Ibn-at-Tilimsânî denied this, and at-Taftızânî, in his Sharḥ 'Aqīdat an-Nasâfî, attributes this opinion to the Qadarites, and rejects it because the Jews and Christians (ahl al-kitâb) had knowledge of the prophecy of Muhammed, but did not have faith.

2) Another opinion of al-Ash'arî was that it is an interior statement that something is certain (qawl an-nafs 'alâ taşdîq), accompanied by knowledge. Similar to this is the definition, in W /F. 14b/ and K /P. 42/, given by Ibn-al-Hajib (or al-Bagilânî) that faith is an acknowledgement of truthfulness, which is a condition of the soul following upon knowing-awareness (inn al-İmân huwa t-taşdîq wa-huwa ḥadîth an-nafs at-tabi' li-l-ma'rifa). 14

This definition is acceptable as a general statement, but, says at-Taftızânî, there is disagreement as to whether an acknowledgement of truthfulness is a matter of choice or not:

- Some 'shaykhs said that it is a matter of choice, and defined it as "an attachment of the heart to the message it knows from an announcer" (rabṭ al-qalb 'alâ mă 'alm min ikhbâr al-mukhbîr), and said that it is something to which one gains

14 W attributes this statement to al-Bagilânî, K to the 'Aqīda of Ibn-al-Hajib; the word at-taşdîq is found only in K.
title (wa-huwa amr kasbī). But the difficulty with this opinion is that acknowledging truthfulness is a type of knowledge (min aqṣām al-ʿilm), which is a characteristic of the soul which is not chosen (wa-huwa min al-kayfiyyāt an-nafsiyya dūn al-ikhtiyāriyya).

Therefore the opinion adopted is that acknowledging truthfulness is a characteristic which comes indirectly from choice, but the choice concerns directly the activating-links (asbāb) of knowledge, such as applying one's thought, and repelling obstacles. Unbelief (kufr) is resistance to the causes of knowledge.

As-Sanūsī adds that according to a well known opinion (al-mashhūr) it is necessary for faith to have also verbal profession by saying the two statements of the shahāda, but this is so only for one who is able (qādir).

At-Taftāzānī asks if faith can increase, and says that since it is an accidental it has no duration, but each instant is succeeded by its like; therefore the question is really whether the faith of one instant is greater than that of a preceding instant. In fact, Qur'ān verses, such as 8:2 and 9:124, which speak of an increase of faith, should be understood as referring to the works which follow upon faith.

e. The position of this science:

Jā'ījī distinguishes religious sciences on the basis of revealed determinations (al-aḥkām ash-shar'iyya). Those which concern action ('amal) are the subject of the branch sciences (far'iyya); those which concern belief (iʿtiqād) are the funda-
mental sciences (aşliyya). According to at-Taftazānī's Sharḥ "Aqidat an-Nasafi, the former include the sciences of laws (sharī'a) and judgements (aṣkām), and the latter the science of declaring God one (tawḥīd) and of his attributes (qīfāt).

The latter science, called 'ilm al-kalām is defined in K Pp. 96-98 and W F. 16b (in N. 2) according to Ibn-‘Arafa as "knowledge of the determinations pertaining to the divinity and the sending of messengers, their truthfulness in all that they announce, and anything that is specially relevant to the foregoing, with the establishment of proofs thereto by a power which is a locus for refuting errors and dissolving doubts" (al-'ilm bi-aṣkām al-ulūhiyya wa-irsāl ar-rusul wa-qīfātihi fī kull ikhbarīhā wa-mā yatawaqqaf shayʾ min dhālik 'alayhi khāṣṣan bi-hi wa-taqīr ādillatihā bi-quwwa hiya maẓīna li-radd ash-shubahāt wa-ḥall ash-shukūk). The definition of Ibn-at-Tilimsānī is also proposed: "knowledge of the sure (existence) of the divinity, and of messengership, and what is related to awareness of that, such as the admissibility of the world and its having come into being, and the refutation of what contradicts this" (al-'ilm bi-thubūt al-ulūhiyya wa-r-risāla wa-mā tatawaqqaf ma'rīfatuhā 'alayhi min jawāz al-‘ālam wa-ḥudūthihi wa-ibtāl mā yunāqiq dhālik). But Ibn-‘Arafa criticizes this definition because it does not include the life to come (al-ma‘ād), and is therefore not convertible.

The subject of this science is "the essences of possible things under the aspect of their pointing to the necessary existence of him who caused them to exist, and his attributes and acts" (māhiyyāt al-mumkīnāt min ḥayth dalālatihā 'alā wujūbd wujūd mujīdihi wa-qīfātihi wa-af‘alihi).
This science, according to J 41e, f. 14a/, is the most noble science because: 1) it is the foundation of revealed determinations and the leader of sciences (li-kawnihi asāls al-aḥkām ash-shar‘iyya wa-ra‘īs al-‘ulūm); 2) its objects are the tenets of Islam (li-kawn ma‘lūmātihī 1-‘aqā’id al-islāmiyya); W 4F. 15b/, quoting ‘Izzaddīn ‘Abdassalām, 16 explains that those who are aware of God (al-‘ārifīn bi-llāh) are superior to those who know only his (legal) determinations; knowledge of the attributes of perfection which are necessary to God and the defects which are impossible to him is superior to knowledge of the branch sciences and (legal) fundamentals (al-furū‘ wa-l-ugfl), because knowledge takes its dignity from the things which are known (al-ma‘lūmat); 3) the third reason given by J is that the aim of this science is winning religious happiness (wa-ghāyatuhu 1-fawz bi-s-sā‘āda ad-dīniyya).

W 4F. 15b/ continues to explain that knowledge of the different attributes of God results in corresponding dispositions of the soul (al-ḥawāl). 17 The difference between theologians (al-mutakallimūn) and those who are aware (al-‘ārifūn) is that a theologian’s knowledge of the (divine) essence and attributes is absent from him most of the time, and therefore those dispositions are not lasting in him. Were they lasting he would be among those who are aware, since he shares with them the cognition which demands uprightness (fī 1-‘irfūn al-mūjib li-l-istiqāma). 18

16Who is commenting on statements of al-Ghazālī and the Risāla of al-Qushayrī

17W describes several of these.

18After this as-Sanūsī exhorts on the importance of knowledge, quoting from the ‘Aqīda of a. 1-2. ‘Abdaljallī and Ibn-ar-Rabhīl’s Sharh al-Barūn (thus in E; other mss. have "al-Bar’awī" or "al-Barwī" or "al-Badwī" or "al-Badhwī").
f. Method and preliminary notions (N. 2):

J 14e, f. 14a/ says that the demonstrations of this science are arguments of intelligibility, confirmed for the most part by proofs of authority (wa-barāḥīnuhu l-ḥujaj al-‘aqliyya al-muʿayyad akharuḥa bi-l-adilla as-samʿiyya).

By a demonstration (burḥān), says W 17a (in N. 3)/, is meant any (argument) which is composed of certain premises (kull mā tarākka bi min muqaddīmāt yaqīna). Demonstration is to be distinguished from dialectics (jadāl), rhetoric (khāṭība), poetry (shiʿr), and sophistry (muğhālaṯa or sufuṣa).

As for the determinations of intelligibility mentioned in the Creed, M 194b-199b/ places them in a wider context, giving the definition and kinds of a determination: A determination (ḥukm) is the affirmation or denial of a thing (ithbāt amr aw naṣyulu ), and is:

- of revealed-law (sharʿī) = a declaration of God related to the acts of encharged persons (khiṭāb Allāh taʿalā l-mutaʿalliq bi-afʿāl al-mukallafūn) by way of:
  - asking (talab), which includes:
    - obliging (fāṣā) = asking for an act firmly (talaban jūzīman)
    - recommending (nabd) = asking for an act without firmness
    - forbidding (taḥrīn) = asking firmly to desist (kaff) from an act
    - disapproving (kirāha) = asking not firmly to desist from an act
  - permitting (ibāha) = allowing either an act or its omission (idhīn ash-sharʿī fi l-fiʿl wa-t-tark maʿan)
  - instituting (waʿd) = the law-revealer's setting up of a sign for one of those five determinations (naṣb ash-shāriʿī

19 As-Sanūsī defines each of these. This division is simply the classical Aristotelian division of the parts of logic.
amāra 'alā ḥukm min tilk al-ahkām al-khamsa); the signs are:
- an activating-link (sabab)²⁰ = what essentially entails existence from its existence and non-existence from its non-existence (mā yalzum min wujūdhi l-wujūd wa-min 'adamihi l-'adām li-dhātihī)
- a condition (sharṭ) = what essentially entails non-existence from its non-existence, but neither existence nor non-existence from its existence
- an impeding-agent (māni') = what essentially entails non-existence from its existence, but neither non-existence nor existence from its non-existence
- of custom ('ādī) = the affirmation of a connection between two things as to existence or non-existence by means of regularity with the possibility of exception (ithbāt ar-rabṭ bayn amr wa-amr wujūdan aw 'adaman bi-wāṣiṭat at-takarrur ma'a qishṭat at-takhalluf) and non-effectiveness of one to the other; it is of four kinds:
  - existence with existence
  - non-existence with non-existence
  - existence with non-existence
  - non-existence with existence
- of intelligibility ('aqlī) = the affirmation or denial of a thing without depending upon regularity or the instituting of anyone. Its three kinds are necessity, impossibility, and admissibility.

²⁰Sabab in this sense is distinguished from a choosing agent (mukhtar). Both terms come under the general term fā'il, "active principle", or "agent", but sometimes sabab is used in a wider sense to include a choosing agent, as in N. 5 of the Creed. Sabab in the strict sense includes a cause ('illa) and nature (ṭabī'a); cf. below, E, a, N. 14.
III, A, f. (N. 2) 105

W (F. 16b) distinguishes across each of these three last categories of determination those which are self-evident (darūrī) and those which are evident only after thinking (nazārī), that is, requiring reflection (ta'ammul). In the Creed only examples which are self-evident are mentioned, for the sake of clarity. Examples of determinations which are evident only after thinking are that God is necessarily from eternity, and that it is admissible for him to reward the evil and punish the good— which the Mu'tazilites deny— or to raise the dead to life— which the Philosophers deny.

K (Pp. 508-509) lists four kinds of authorities:
- the Book, that is, the Qur'ān, which descended upon Muḥammad
- the Muḥammadan norm (Sunna), which includes the words (aqwāl), deeds (af'āl), and decisions (taqārīr) of Muḥammad which are not from revelation (lays bi-matlū)
- consensus (ijmā'), which is the agreement of Muslim thinkers (mujtahīdīn) of a certain age ('aqr) on a matter; some would add to this definition "until the age passes away" (ilā nqirāq al-'aqr); others would add the proviso "without a continuous previous disagreement of thinkers (lam yasbiqhu khilāf mujtahid mustaqīr)
- analogy (qi'yās), which is the equilavating of a branch proposition to a principle in the grounds of its determination (musāwāt far' li-asl fī 'illa ḥukmihi); because of its com-

21 Cf. also Sg, pp. 9-14.
22 The definition in the note of al-Ḥanīfī is clarifying: "the referral of something unknown to something known because of the equivalence of the former to the latter in the determination of its grounds" (haml majhūl 'alā ma'ālim li-musāwātihi fī ḥukm 'illatihi).
plexity, this work is usually done by imām thinkers; the science of it is called "principles of law" (uṣūl al-fiqh).

In addition to following these four authorities, K also warns people to follow the Companions of Muḥammad and their followers, the good Fathers (as-salaf aṣ-ṣāliḥ). J /32a, ff. 339b-343b/ identifies these as the learned men of the first three centuries after Muḥammad. After this learned men and right guided imāms become fewer and fewer as time brings deterioration; so that one ḥadīth says "There is no year without the previous one having been better than it."

Among authorities who continue the line of orthodoxy, W /F. 13a/ mentions the Shaykh of Sunnism a. 1-Ḥ. al-Ashʿarī and his companions, such as al-Uṣūlī a. Isḥāq al-Isfarāʾīnī, the sword of Sunnism al-Qāṣī a. D. al-Bāqillānī, Imām-al-Ḥaramayn, and their followers.

As for learning this science, at least in a general way, K /F. 28/ asserts that it is possible without a teacher (muʿallim), contrary to the opinion of the Ismāʿīlites; 23 but it is extremely difficult without a teacher. In any case, W /F. 21a (in N. 4)/ 24 insists with the sufis (ahl al-ishāra) on the necessity of God's guidance. Ibn-Dahḥaq's commentary on the Irshād, commenting on the divine name al-bāḥīr, said that God's first gift to a person is to open his heart to Islam by removing prejudices against it. The second step is positive guidance (hudā), which is variously interpreted. Some say it is faith (Imān); others say that it is knowledge (ʿilm), or proof (dalīl), or the Book (al-kitāb), or

23 Who held the necessity of an infallible hidden imām; as-Sanūsī generalizes their opinion to represent the demand for any teacher.

24 The point is also raised in N. 10, f. 26a.
explanation (bayān). Even those who maintain that guidance is faith admit that faith requires another light which is guidance itself, and this is knowledge. The sufis say that one who is aware (‘ārif) would be led by reason to praise God even if revealed-law had not instructed him. In the Qur'ān verse "light upon light" (nūr 'alā nūr) /24:35/, the second light is interpreted as intelligence or sight, and the first as revealed-law or brightness (qaw'). Someone who does not know any principles of intelligibility cannot believe in revealed-law, just as a blind person cannot see brightness. Piety (tuqā) depends upon knowledge of intelligible and revealed truths, which in turn depends upon thinking (fikr), which supposes an intelligence.
B. The existence of God:

a. Explanation of terms:

(N. 3) By the "world", W \textit{F.} 17\textit{a} says, is meant everything besides God; this is a generic term (ism 
\textit{jins}) which is applied to various collections of things, such as the world of plants or the world of animals.

(N. 4) W \textit{F.} 20\textit{b}, in a first remark (\textit{tanbīh}), explains certain terms used in the Creed: Ghayrihimā, "whatever else", in the phrase "accidentals of motion, rest, and whatever else", refers to colors and the like. Al-azal, "the eternal past", means the same as al-qidam, "being from eternity". Its correlative is mā la yazāl, "unending time". The word mukhassis, "particularizing agent", has the same meaning as jā'il, "agent"; the former word was chosen in order to show that even rest requires an agent.

Among other terms defined by K \textit{Fp.} 98-101 is akwān (plural of kawn), "states" or "modes", which are particular accidentals, namely, motion, rest, conjunction (ijtimā') and separation (iftirāq). Jawhar, a "substance", is "that whose mass takes up space and is impenetrable" (mā kān jirmuhi yashghal firāghan bi-ḥayth yamtani' an yahull ghayruhi ḫayth ǧall); an equivalent is mutahayyiz, "something taking up space". If it is indivisible (lā yāqbul al-inqisām), it is called jawhar fard, a "simple substance"; if it is divisible, it is called jism, a "body". ²

¹Cf. also K, p. 98. Nevertheless a different connotation and usage justifies a different translation. Al-azal is a temporally past time or age (aeon), hypothetically without beginning in the question of things which come into being. Al-qidam is used preferentially when speaking about God, and primarily in the adjectival form whose non-technical meaning is "old" or "from of old"; cf. below, D, a, (N. 6).

²Cf. also K, p. 157.
Relative to the existence of a simple substance, J L2o, f. 85a/ discusses the meaning of spirit (rūḥ): Al-Bayḍāwī's Tafsīr simply said it was a breath (nafkh). Some Sunnites wondered whether it was legitimate to raise the question (al-khawād fī ḥaqīqatihi), because when some Jews asked Muḥammad about the men of the cave (aṣḥāb al-kahf), the man with two horns (dhū-l-qarnayn), and the spirit, he answered about the first two, but not about the spirit. Others allow investigation, and the opinion of sound Sunnite theologians is that it is a body (jīm) within a body (in the case of man); others say that it is an accidental, and others, such as the Philosopher and al-Ghazālī, say that it is neither a body nor an accidental.

In W F. 21a/ the beings posited by the Philosophers and al-Ghazālī are called separated substances (al-jawāhir al-muḥāraqa). As-Sanūsī says that the reasons of the theologians for denying the existence of these substances are weak, and the reasons of the Philosophers for affirming them are wrong (bāṭil). Recent theologians prefer to abstain from judgement (waqf) on the question.

J L2o, f. 85a/, however, has recourse to revealed-law to reject the concept of a simple substance to explain the spirit world. The descriptions of the spirit going out of the body, going up to heaven and down, bowing and bending under the throne,
etc. can only apply to a body. The Qur'ān verse "They ask you about the spirit; say 'The spirit is from my Lord's command'" 17:85 is variously interpreted. In any case, a spirit is distinguishable from the rest of creation by what is consequen-
tial (lawāzim) to it, namely, thought (fikr) and speculative sciences (al-`ulūm an-naṣāriyya).

b. The argument from the world's having come into being:

K develops two arguments to prove that the world came into being.7 The first §Pp. 102-126/ shows that man came into being as the result of a voluntary agent which is neither the essence of man nor a part of him; the conclusion is then extended to the whole world because of the inter-likeness of everything in it. The second argument §Pp. 126-145/ starts right from the world as a whole and its possessing of attributes which have come into being. This argument is a somewhat more elaborate version of that found in W.8

W §Ff. 18a-19a/ and J §3c, ff. 107a-112a/ boil the argument down to four principles (arkān): 1) that bodies are qualified by adjuncts (accidentals) (ithbāt zā'id tattaṣāf bi-hi l-ajrām); 2) that these adjuncts came into being (ithbāt ḥudūth dhālik az-zā'id); 3) that bodies cannot shake off these adjuncts (ithbāt al-ajrām lā tanfakk ḍan dhālik az-zā'id);9 and 4) that it is impossible for there to be coming-into-being with no beginning (ithbāt istiḥāla ḥudūth lā awwal la-hā). The point of this argument is to show that because one of two interdependent things

7The difference between them is explained on p. 167.

8§ §Pp. 147-154/ and §§ §Pp. 14-16/ give a simplified version of the arguments of W.

9E.g., bodies must possess either motion or rest, but not neither.
(an accidental) has had a beginning, so has the other (the body-subject).

The second principle above is expanded into four other principles upon which it depends; these are substituted for it in a final list of seven principles: 1) that bodies are qualified by adjuncts; 2) that these adjuncts cannot stand by themselves (ib(tl qa(ymm dhali{k a(z-zla'id bi-nafsihi); 3) that they cannot jump subjects (ib(tl intiqa(lihi) - otherwise they would be subjects standing by themselves; 4) that they cannot hide and reappear in a subject (ib(tl kumunihi wa-zuhurihi) - otherwise contraries would exist together; 5) that non-existence is impossible for something from eternity (ithb(a isti{i la 'adam al-qad{m) - otherwise it would be admissible, not necessary; 6) that bodies cannot shake off these adjuncts; and 7) that it is impossible for there to be coming into being with no beginning.

To prove the last point as-Sanusi refers the reader to the arguments given in K, especially the second one given there. K L7 P. 134/ explains that this point is against the position of the Philosophers, who held that the upper world of the stars is eternal and subject only to eternal local motion, while in the sublunar world matter (hiy{dla = ^\nu\lambda \eta ) is eternal, and is the subject of an eternal flux of substantial forms and accidentals.

Four arguments are given against an infinite series. The first K, pp. 135-138/ is that it supposes a contradiction, the termination or depleting (faragh) of what has no end. To the objection that the joys of heaven will have no end, as-Sanusi answers that an infinite series with no final point is possible, but not one with no beginning.

The second argument K, pp. 138-139/ is that if each individual of the series had a beginning, then the whole series
must have been preceded by non-existence. Then the existence of the supposed eternal series would be simultaneous with its non-existence.

The third argument (K, pp. 139-141 = W (M. 18), f. 32a, translated here) is that called "cutting and measuring" (burhān al-qat' wa-t-talbiq). "Suppose we take the things which came into being until the time of the flood as one group, and the things which came into being until our time as another group. Then we place the ends of the two groups together. There will either be a difference or not. It is impossible for there not to be, because the group which lacks something cannot be equal to the group which has something in addition. The group which is lacking should then be divided by the difference. Then it is finite, because a starting point and an end are reached. But if the first group is finite, then the second group must also be finite, because the second group exceeded the first group by only a finite distance, which is the time from the flood to our time, and what exceeds something finite by a finite distance is itself finite."

The fourth argument (K, pp. 141-145) is that something from the eternal past (azali) would precede something else from the eternal past, that is, the events from the eternal past to a certain past date would precede those from eternity to the present date.10

W (F. 22b) remarks that the demonstration of the world's having come into being is basically the same as the Qur'ānic story of Abraham in his query whether a star, the moon, or the

10 On these arguments as previously presented by al-Ghazālī, and their weaknesses, see S. Laugier de Beaurecueil and G. C. Anawati, "Une preuve de l'existence de Dieu chez Ghazzali et S. Thomas," Mélanges de l'Institut dominicain d'études orientales, 3 (1956), pp. 207-250.
sun is a deity (6:75-78).

An objection to the demonstration in K (Pp. 125-126) and W (F. 21a) is the possible existence of simple substances, which supposedly are neither accidentals nor the subject of accidentals; the demonstration does not apply to them. In K as-Sanūsī prefers recourse to the authority of a hadīth to show that they are not from eternity: "There was God, and nothing was with him" (kān Allāh wa-lā shay' ma'āhu). W says that in any case a simple substance cannot be a deity, since there is only one God, as will be shown later. W adds "And only God is from eternity," whereas K said that it cannot be proven from intelligibility that simple substances are not from eternity.

(N. 5) Once it is understood that the world has come into being, the question remains, says W (F. 23a), whether the knowledge of the existence of God is self-evident (darūrī) or evident only after reasoning (naẓarī). Some (= ar-Rāzī in his Ma'ālim, according to K (Pp. 95 and 103-105) say that it is self-evident, and point to the fact that if you strike a child or even an animal, they know that someone caused their pain. On the contrary, Imām-al-Ḥaramayn and others hold that God's existence is known only after thinking about the essence (dhāt) of a thing that came into being, to see that it is not determined to exist at any certain time or in any certain manner, and therefore needs a particularizing agent (mukhasṣiq). As-Sanūsī opts for the latter position, with the qualification that very little reasoning is needed to conclude to God's existence. Even children are capable of doing so, but animals are not, because they do not understand the principle of causation, but react only because their imaginations are trained by experience (alīf).
W goes on to explain the argument in the Creed: Non-existence is more in keeping with the essence of the world for two reasons. The first is the priority (aqāla) of non-existence; were existence to follow upon non-existence without an agent (fā'īl) it would have to be stronger than (rājih), and not equal (musāw) to non-existence as was supposed.

The second reason is that non-existence has no need of an activating link (sabab). This is so because something needs an agent if it is not only possible (mumkin) but also comes into being (ḥādith). But non-existence does not come into being and is not adventitious (ṭāri'), that is, it is not renewed after not having been. Therefore it has no need of an agent, and is stronger than existence.

c. The argument from possibility:

According to K (p. 101), any proof for the existence of God must proceed from what is activated to the activating link (bi-l-musabbab 'alā s-sabab) or from the effect to the producer of the effect (bi-wujūd al-athar 'alā wujūd al-mu'āththir). Within this procedure, he quotes from Ibn-at-Talimsāni12 several ways of proving God's existence, each of which he says is valid. The first is based on the possibility (imkān) of the world, and is preferred by al-Bayḍāwī and others; the second is the world's having come into being (ḥudūth), and is the way of most theologians; others base their proof on possibility and coming into being taken together, or on possibility with the condition that it comes into being; Imām-al-Ḥaramayn combined possibility and coming into being.

The difference between the way based on mere possibility

12On p. 105, still from the commentary on ar-Rāzī's Ma'ālim; on p. 106 reference is also made to ar-Rāzī's Arba'īn.
and the other ways is that in the former knowledge that the world came into being follows upon knowledge of the Creator, but in the latter it precedes. The argument from possibility proceeds from determining that the world is possible, that is, as far as its essence is concerned existence and non-existence are equal, and neither is stronger. Therefore existence is not from its essence, but from without. Dependence upon another for existence leads necessarily to one who produces existence, and possesses existence necessarily by his essence. 13

13 Apart from this mention of the way from possibility, the main part of K develops the proof based on the world's having come into being. The other works of as-Sanūsī do not even mention the proof from possibility.
C. The essence of God and attributes in general:

a. Knowability of God's essence:

K (Pp. 241-252), followed by J (61, ff. 145a-148b), inquires about the most particular characteristic (akhlaq waṣf) of God's essence. The Mu'tazilites said that it is being-from-eternity (qidam); but being from eternity is a negative attribute and cannot be the most particular characteristic. Others said that it was a disposition (ḥāl) making God living, powerful, and willing; but they do not explain very well what this disposition is. An opinion attributed to al-Ash'arī is that the most particular characteristic is the power of creating (qudrat al-ikhtira'). Ar-Rāzī chose this opinion in some of his writings, citing as proof Moses' reply to Pharaoh that the meaning of "Lord of the worlds" (rabb al-ʿālamīn) is "the Lord of heaven and earth and what is between them" (rabb as-samāwāt wa-l-ard wa-mā baynahum). Ibn-at-Tilimsānī rejected this reason, saying that Moses' reply only needed to distinguish God from other possible things (ṣā'ir al-mumkināt). The opinion of al-Ash'arī may only have been to show the Mu'tazilites that God's power of creating belongs to him alone and is not shared by any creature, not that power is the most particular characteristic of his essence. After all, power is an attribute added to the already constituted essence.

The best opinion is that of al-Bāqillānī, Imām al-Ḥaramayn, al-Ghazālī, and ar-Rāzī in most of his writings - but not in his Kitāb al-ishārāt, one of his earliest writings - that the most particular characteristic of God's essence is unknown.

As for whether it is unknown absolutely or only in the

2 This is only a ḥadīth, but based on Qur'ānic phrases.
present life, it is admissible for us to know it later. Al-Āmidī attributes to al-Ghazālī the opinion that it is absolutely unknowable, and to al-Bāqillānī and Dirār b. 'Amr an abstaining from judging. Some say we know the most particular characteristic of God since we make judgements concerning his essence. But they are refuted by the fact that a judgement concerning something is only a sort of knowing an aspect of a thing (farʿ ash-shuʿūr bi-hi bi-wajhin mà), even an external, general aspect; it is not a knowledge of its essence.

Ar-Rāzī's argument from intelligibility that the most particular characteristic of God's essence is unknown (K, p. 243) is that we know only four things about God:

- existence
- ways of existence (kayfiyyat al-wujūd), which are:
  - being from the eternal past (azaliyya)
  - being forever (abadiyya)
  - necessity (wujūb)
- negations (sulūb), that is, he is not a body or a substance (jawhar) nor an accidental ('araq)
- attributions (iḍāfāt), such as knowingness ('ālimiyya).

But none of these things are God's essence. Therefore it is unknown.

Another argument of ar-Rāzī is that each attribute of God that we know can be understood as belonging to one or many subjects, and a further proof is necessary to show that they belong only to God. Therefore, by knowing the attribute, we do not know the most particular characteristic of the essence of God, which can be understood only as belonging to him.

An answer to the latter argument is that the attributes we know of God do distinguish him from other beings; the question
is only whether they distinguish him according to his reality 
(ḥaqīqa) or something consequent (lāzim) to his reality.

To ar-Rāżī's first argument Ibn-at-Tilimsānī answered that 
his terminology was weak. The examples given of ways of existence 
are merely negative attributes. What he calls attributions, in 
the terminology of a. 1-Ḥ. al-Baṣrī, are really either realities 
edowed with attributions (ḥaqā'iq dhawāt iqāfät) (i.e. substantive 
attributes) or determinations of stable substantive attrib-
butes which are endowed with attributions (aḥkām li-maʿān thābita 
dhawāt iqāfät) (i.e. adjectival attributes). Ar-Rāżī's reason-
ing is also weak: It is not right to conclude that no one 
knows the most particular characteristic of God because many 
people do not. An argument to the contrary of his assertion is 
the experience of the sufis.

The sufis claim that their exercises (riyāḍa)3 are an 
activating-link for God's willing (for them) an increase in 
understanding, as two Qur'ān verses show: "Those who struggle 
for us we guide on our paths" /29:62/ and "He wrote faith in 
their hearts and confirmed them with a spirit from himself" 
/58:22/. These refer to God's creating in them knowledge which 
is not demonstrable or expressable, but is given by way of pure 
and extraordinary favor (inʿān) and inspiration (iḥlām) which 
is known only by those who possess it, not by anyone else, just 
as someone born blind (akmah) cannot see colors. It cannot be 
communicated to others by speech (qawl), but only by the 
beckoning (išāra) of one who is aware ('ārif) to another who 
is aware. This knowledge is not an indwelling (ḥulūl), nor an 
anticipated vision of God (ruʿya ʿajila), nor as great as pro-

3K, p. 246, mentions some of these.
 prophecy, nor is it a comprehensive knowledge (‘ilm iḥṣa‘a) of God. But as God creates in his servants a visual perception (idrāk) of himself in the next life, so he creates now in their hearts a perception of himself, related to the essence of God in one way or another (bi-wajhīn) or to a superior kind of knowledge (taraqq fi l-‘ilm) of his attributes and names. Therefore ar-Rāzī is wrong in restricting man’s knowledge of God as he did.

Note that W /In N. 10, f. 26a/ denies the intellect’s ability not only to encompass God’s inner being (iḥṣa‘a bi-kunhihi) and to define (taqdid) or determine the manner of (takyyif) God’s existence, but also to perceive him (idrākuhu). K also /P. 167/ denies the ability of man to perceive God, quoting verses of Abū-l-Fats in support of this denial, and elsewhere /Pp. 212-213/ says that only God knows his own essence. § /P. 114/ says that God’s essence and attributes are screened (maḥjūb) from the intellect, and that no one can delve into his inner being (lays li-aḥad an yakhūq fi l-kunh) after knowing what is necessary for his essence and attributes. Other similar statements are explained as a denial only that ordinary, demonstrable knowledge can attain God positively.⁴

b. Kinds of attributes:

Of the early theologians, K /P. 216/ says that Imām-al-Ḥaramayn and al-Dāqīqīnī held for three kinds of attributes, those related to:
- themselves = existent substantive attributes (ma‘ān); e.g.

"knowledge"

⁴ Cf. E, g, (N. 23), on God’s speech, and G, c, (Nos. 42-43), on the vision of God.
- something else:
  - in its essence = dispositions of essential-property (al-ḥāl an-nafsiyya)
  - in what inheres in the essence = adjectival dispositions (al-ḥāl al-ma'naviyya); e.g. "knowing".

Al-Ash'arī, however, in denying dispositions, held that the substantive attributes are the only attributes.

§ (p. 97) explains these three kinds more clearly from as-Sanūsī's own point of view: "Substantive attributes (ṣifāt al-ma'āni) are those which are existent in themselves, whether they come into being, as the whiteness or blackness of a body, or are from eternity, as God's knowledge and power. Thus every attribute existing in itself is technically called a substantive attribute.

"If the attribute is not existent in itself, and is necessary to the essence as long as the essence lasts, and doesn't result from any cause (wājib li-dh-dhāt mā dāmat adh-dhāt ghayr mu'allala bi-illa), it is called an attribute or disposition of essential property (ṣīfa nafsiyya aw ḥāl nafsiyya). An example of it is occupying space (taḥayyuz) for a body, and its being capable of accidentals.

"If the attribute is not existent in itself, but is the result of a cause and is necessary for the essence only as long as the cause continues to inhere in the essence, it is called an adjectival attribute or disposition (ṣīfa ma'naviyya aw ḥāl ma'naviyya). An example of it is an essence's being knowing or powerful."

5 On this subject see D, a, (N. 13).

6 In K, p. 150, concerning qidam, a ṣīfa nafsiyya is said not to be an adjunct to the essence - in contrast to a substantive attribute which is an adjunct to the essence - but in §, p. 95, it is said to be an adjunct to the essence. In either case it is said to be inseparable.
K \( \text{P. 211} \) adds that later theologians distinguished six kinds of attributes. M \( \text{F. 213b} \), followed here, corrects and adds certain points to this list. The attributes are:

1) of essential-property (nafsiyya). K offers several definitions amounting to the same thing, yet reduces examples such as God's being necessarily existent, from the eternal past, and forever (kawnuhu wājib al-wujūd azaliyyan abadiyyan) to negative attributes, since sound theologians say that nothing is known of essential attributes, for that would amount to knowing God's essence; but only God knows his essence. M, however, as §, does not eliminate this kind of attribute, and defines it as "one by which God's very essence is expressed" (mā yu'abbar bi-hi 'an nafs adh-dhāt al-'aliyya). The only example of it in God is existence.

2) negative (salbiyya) = the negation of an imperfection which it is impossible for God to be qualified with. There are five of these: being from eternity (qidam), being everlasting (baqā'), otherness from things that come into being (mukhālafatuhu li-l-ḥawādith), self-subsistency (qiyyāmuhu bi-nafsihi), and unity (waḥdāniyya).

3) substantive (al-ma'āni) = positive attributes inhering in the essence and causing a determination (ṣūkum) or disposition (ḥāl). These are seven: power (qudra), will (irāda), knowledge ('ilm), life (ḥayāt), hearing (sam'), sight (baṣar), and speech (kalam); some add an eighth, perception (idrāk) of other sensibles.

4) adjectival (ma'nawiyya) = attributes of the essence which are dispositions or determinations caused by substantive attributes inhering in the essence. These are seven, being powerful (gādir), etc., corresponding to the substantive attributes.
5) of acts (ṣifāt al-af'āl) = the implementive relationship between power and will with regard to possible things (at-ta'alluq at-tanjīzi bayn al-qudra wa-l-irāda). These are of two kinds:
- positive (wujūdiyya), such as creating, vivifying, moving, etc.
- negative (salbiyya), such as forgiving ('afw) sinners as he wishes; the meaning of this is omitting to punish someone who deserves punishment.

6) mixed (ṣuṣif al-jāmi'a li-jami' al-aqsām), such as God's majesty, greatness, and divinity (ulūhiyya).

c. Existence as an attribute:

§ Pp. 74-75/ lists existence (wujūd) among the twenty attributes of God, but explains that this is only by way of tolerance (tasāwuḥ) in the opinion of al-Ash'arī, since according to him existence is the essence (dhāt) itself and not an adjunct to it (zā'id 'alayhā); this applies to things which come into being as well as to God. Nevertheless verbally (fi l-lafī) God's essence is said to be existent; so it is legitimate to place existence among the attributes in a general way ('alā l-jumla).

But for those who make existence an adjunct of essence, as ar-Rāzi, counting existence among the attributes is proper (ṣahiṭ), not a toleration. The Philosophers identified essence and existence only in what is from eternity, but said essence was an adjunct of things that come into being.

Those who make existence an adjunct of essence, § later

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7 See also below, G, a, (N. 40).
8 K, p. 398, in a quotation from Ibn-at-Tilimsāni, says that al-Ash'arī, al-Bāqillānī, and Imām-al-Ḥaramayn did however admit that existence was not the same as the "what-it-is" (māhiyya) of the existent thing.
adds [Pp. 93-95], say that it is an attribute of essential-property (ṣifa nafsiyya). But to those who identify existence with essence the same excuse for listing it among the attributes has to be made for calling it an attribute of essential-property. 9

9K, it was noted [P. 212; see above, b.], reduced "necessarily existent" to a negative attribute. Possibly the difference is that § is only concerned with existence as an attribute in a general verbal sense, while K is concerned with the reality of it as we can know it. But possibly too § - and M - came to regard God's existence as an attribute apart from the assertion that there must be a God, and thought that at least it can be known that there is such an attribute.
D. Negative attributes:

a. Being from eternity (qidam):

(N. 6) Al-qidam, says W F. 24a/, can have two meanings:

One is a long passage of time over something, even if it has come into being, such as an old (qadīm) foundation or building, or the movement of the stars from of old. This is not the meaning when we say God is from eternity (qadīm), because he is aloof from place, direction, and change, and it is impossible for anything of the world to be part of him.

The second meaning refers to something whose existence has no beginning, that is, is from the eternal past (azalī) and not preceded by non-existence. This meaning applies to God and to him alone.

Being from eternity is a negative attribute (salbiyya) because, S F. 95/ explains, it is the denial of preceding non-existence, or in other words, the denial of a beginning to existence. K F. 150/ explains that it is not an attribute of essential-property (nafsiyya), since the latter cannot be separated from the essence, whereas qidam - with the meaning of "old" - is absent from a substance (jawhar) in the first moment of its existence. Nor is qidam a substantive attribute (gifāma'na'), since this attribute would require another qidam to make it to be from eternity, and so on in a continuous regress.

K F. 152/ parenthetically defines a continuous regress (tasalsul) as "an arrangement of things which do not end" (tarattub umūr ghayr mutanāhiya), and a circle (dawr) as "the dependence of something upon that which depends upon itself by

This attribute is discussed in K, pp. 145-152; W, f. 24a; S, pp. 76-78 and 155-157; J, 6a, ff. 135b-137b, and 6k, f. 151a-c (sic); and §§, p. 16.
one or many steps" (tawaqquf ash-shay' 'alā mā yatawaqqaf 'alayhi immā bi-martaba aw bi-marātib).

The question is raised in §/P. 78/ whether it is legitimate to use the adjectival form qaddīm of God, or only the substantive form gidām. The problem arises because qaddīm is a name, and is not mentioned in the Qur'ān, but all God's names must be authoritatively established (tawqīfiyya). Al-‘Irāqi’s Sharh Usūl as-Subki is quoted for a mention of the name in the Sunan of Ibn-Māja, who counted it among the ninety-nine names.

b. Being everlasting (baqā’):³

Al-baqā’, says W/F. 24b, also has two meanings. The first is "the correlation of existence to two times and so on upwards" (muqāranat al-wujūd li-zamānayn fa-lā ‘idān). This is not the meaning when the word is applied to God, since he is not measured by time.

The second meaning, "the negation of an end to existence" (salb al-akhirīyya li-l-wujūd), that is, non-existence cannot reach it, applies to God and to him alone.

§/Pp. 79-81/ says that some imāms explain baqā’ as the continuation of existence in the future without end (istimrār al-wujūd fī l-mustaqqbal ilā ghayr nihāya), and gidām likewise as the continuation of existence in the past without end (ghāya), as if those attributes were of essential-property (nafsiyyatān), being existence itself prolonged in the past and future, without which essence is not real. This opinion is weak, because it

²This is explained at length in J, 16, ff. 215a-b.

³This attribute is discussed in K, pp. 151-156; W, f. 24b; J, 6a, ff. 135b-137b, and 6k, f. 151a-c; §, pp. 79-81 and 157-158; and §§, p. 16.
entails that the essence should have no intelligibility apart from these two attributes. But the existence of essence has its own intelligibility (ah-dhāt yu‘qal wujūduhu), and only afterwards is a demonstration sought for its being from eternity and everlasting.

Others said that these are positive attributes like power and knowledge. But if this were so, they would require other attributes of qidam and baqī’ for them to be from eternity and everlasting, and so on in a continuous regress.

A weaker opinion yet is that which says that qidam is negative, but baqī’ is positive. But the truth is that both are negative, and have no existing meaning outside the mind (lays la-humā ma’nā mawjūd fī l-khārij ‘an adh-dhihn).

Κ /Pp. 153-155/ adds another reason offered by theologians for God’s being everlasting: Something from eternity could cease to be only by a compelling factor (muqtaq), not by itself. Eliminated by division, such a factor cannot be:

- voluntary, since something voluntary cannot produce non-existence, since this is not an act (lā yaf‘al al-‘adam idh lays bi-fi‘l)
- non-voluntary:
  - the non-existence of a condition:
    - which is from eternity, since its non-existence would have to be referred to another condition in a continuous regress
    - which came into being, since that would necessitate the existence of something from eternity without its condition
  - the coming of a contrary (ṭaryān aḍ-ḍidd):
    - before the eternal thing ceased to exist, since this
would entail the co-existence of two contraries
- after the eternal thing ceased to exist, since this would be of no use
- also, because no contrary would be stronger than or equal to its eternal contrary
- and even if the contrary inhered in the eternal thing, this would entail the co-existence of two contraries.

Regarding the lastingness (baqā') of things which come into being, K continues to say that the same proof as the preceding is used to show that accidentals cannot have any lastingness, since if they had they could not cease to exist. Substances, on the other hand, continue to exist, but only so long as God continues to create accidentals in them.

Al-Bāqillānī thought accidentals might continue to exist, since if they necessarily ceased every moment, their ceasing to exist would be outside the area of the possible, and therefore outside the scope of God's will. Ar-Rāzī, in his Ma'ālim, maintained that accidentals can continue in existence. The old Ash‘arites held that they could not, but for the wrong reason that they thought that baqā' was a substantive attribute which would inhere in accidentals, and this is impossible.

c. Otherness from things that come into being
(mukhālafatuhu li-l-lawādith):

(N. 7) The first point in this section of the Creed, God's otherness from things that come into being, W (F. 258) explains, is in answer to the Ḥashwiyya, who attributed to God corporeity, direction, and place. The second and third points, God's not uniting with anything else and his self-subsistency, are against
the Christians and the Bātinites, who said it was possible for
God to unite with something else and be one thing with it. Some
Christians said that the Divinity unites with a humanity, that
is, the Deity with the body of Jesus. Others of them said that
the Deity is not a self-subsistent substance (dhāt yaqūn bi-
nafsihi), but is an attribute inhering in something else; thus
some Christians maintained that the Deity inheres in Jesus as
an attribute in the subject it qualifies. Some of the Bātinites
held a similar position regarding themselves. 4

Relative to the meaning of "otherness" (mukhālafa), K \( \text{\textit{P.}} \)
\( ^{167/} \) says that every two existing things are either equal in
essential attributes (qīfāt an-nafs), in which case they are
alike (uqthlūn), or they are not equal in essential attributes;
then it is either impossible for them to concur, in which case
they are contraries (qiddān), or it is permissible for them to
concur, in which case they are other, or different (khilāfān).

\( \text{\textit{P.}} \) \( ^{22-33/} \) explains God's otherness, saying that nothing
is like him in any way (mutlaqtan), neither in his essence nor
in his attributes nor in his acts, quoting in support of this
the Qur'ān verse "There is nothing like him; he is the hearing
and the seeing one": \( \text{\textit{P.}} \) \( ^{42:11/} \).

(K. \( ^{158-159/} \)) \( \text{\textit{P.}} \) \( ^{25a/} \) explains that an attribute of a bodily-
mass (jirm) is an accidental (‘araq); God is other than them
both.

\( \text{\textit{P.}} \) \( ^{158-159/} \) gives three reasons why God is not a bodily-
mass. The first is that if he were one he would be subject to

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4 The corresponding section in K, pp. 157-167, considers these
points without distinction under one maqṣ and sharp centered on
God's otherness from things which come into being. After W
reduced the material to the three points mentioned above, \( \text{\textit{P.}} \)
pp. 82-89, followed by \( \text{\textit{P.}} \) \( ^{16-17/} \), dropped the second point, and
made two distinct negative attributes of the first - otherness
from things that come into being - and the third - self-subsistancy.
motion and rest, and therefore — as argued in N. 4 of the Creed — would have to have come into being. The second reason is that if God were a bodily-mass, he could be bigger and smaller, and therefore would need a particularizing-agent, and would have come into being. The third argument states that bodies are divisible into parts, and asks which parts shall possess the attributes of divinity. ⁵

(N. 9) Uniting (ittiḥād), says W ²²⁵a; cf. K, pp. 161-162/, is "making two things one thing" (ja'ил ash-shay'ayn shay'an wāḥidan). It is altogether impossible, whether for something from eternity or something which has come into being. As-Sanūsī explains further that there is no unity by the decisive factor the the existence of the one thing is not the very other thing. It is certain that every essence (māḥiyya) must contain the negation of everything besides itself.

(N. 10) God is not in a direction (jiha) and only bodies are, W ²²⁵b-²⁶a/ explains, because being in a direction supposes motion or rest, and therefore coming into being. Also a particularizing-agent would be necessary to account for his being in one direction rather than another. This point is against the literalism of the Ḥashwiyya and the Karrāmites when they said that God was above (fawq). The Ḥashwiyya, K ²¹⁶-¹⁶²/ distinguishes, maintained the outward meaning and abstained from interpretation. But some Karrāmites said that God who is above fits into (mumāsh li-) his throne; others said that he is incommensurate with it (mubāyin la-hu), by either a finite stretch (bi-masāfa mutanāḥīya) or an infinite one.

⁵This is another application of the argument found in N. 12 of the Creed.
W goes on to blame some Sunnites for being tainted with the opinion of the Ḥashwiyya. They possibly thought that the opinion was that of A. b. Ḥanbal, which is preposterous, but even granted that he held such an opinion, erroneous blind-acceptance in this matter is inexcusable. A similarly erroneous allegation is that Ibn-a. Zayd al-Qayrawānī and a. ʿImrān b. ʿAl. and some of the Fathers (as-salaf) were tainted with this opinions. It was imagined that their abstention from interpreting verses such as "He mounted the throne" was equivalent to their acceptance of the outward impossibilities which were not intended by the verse.

The second point, that there are no directions within God, is clear in the Creed.

Error concerning either point comes from limiting existence to imaginable bodies and their accidentals, and measuring the invisible by the visible. The logical conclusion of this is that God has come into being by another agency or that the world came into being by itself and needs no agency to bring it into being.

The anthropomorphist (mushabbih) is dim-sighted (aʿshā) and affirms corporeity of God; the negator (bʿṭil) however is blind (aʿmā) and is content simply to deny. The unitarian (muwaḥḥid) affirms God's existence, but recognizes his inability to perceive him (idrākahu).

d. Self-subsistency (qiyyāmuḥu bi-nafṣīhi)

(W/F. 27a) explains that the difference between the two definitions of self-subsistency, that is, "independence from a subject" and "independence from a subject and a particularizing agent", is simply a matter of technical terminology (iṣṭiḥlāṭ), since even those who define it merely as independence
III. D, d. (N. 11)

from a subject agree that God is not a substance (jawhar).

In line with the second definition, al-Iṣfārāʾīnī said that something self-subsistent is "what needs nothing else to exist" (mā lā yaftaqir wujūdūhu ʾilā amr ākhar). A substance stands in the greatest need of an agent to particularize it with existence rather than its previous non-existence, and with the dispositions and attributes it has rather than others. Then it needs God to continue to exist, since if he did not cause beings to remain (law lā ibqāʿūhu taʿālā lī-l-kāʾināt) until the term he wishes, they would all immediately cease to exist.

Arguing for the same point, § LP. 8v explains the Qurʾān verses "You stand in need of God, but God is the non-needy (ghānī) and praiseworthy one" (35:15) and "God is the one who holds out (al-gamad); he neither gives birth nor is born, nor has any match" (112:2-5v) by saying that all else is in need of him and holds onto him (yaṣmud ilayhi).

§§ LPp. 17-1v reduces errors concerning God's self-subsistency to two principles: 1) that anything which is not a body is an attribute; thus the Christians and the Bāṭinite sufis made God an attribute inhering in man - against this it is said that God is independent of a subject; 2) that any essence qualified with attributes is a body; thus the Hashwīyya and the Jews made God a body, while others were led to the negation (taʿīl) of God altogether, saying that the world arose by chance (ittifāqī), because every active principle (fāʿīl) is a body - against this it is said that God is independent of an active principle; thus he is distinct from other essences, which come into being.

(N. 12) The reasons for God's independence from a particularizing agent and a subject are clear enough in the Creed.
W (Ff. 27b-28b) then goes on to argue against "Christian errors": "By this you know how impossible is the assertion of the Christians — may God destroy them — concerning three hypostases (aqānīm), that is, three principles of the existence of the world from which it comes into being; these are the source of the Deity's existence of which he is composed, according to them — God be elevated far from what the wrong-doers (.senderūn) say. The three are the hypostasis of knowledge (uqūnūn al-`ilm), the hypostasis of existence, and the hypostasis of life. The Christians say that these are three deities, although attributes. In spite of that, they say that the three hypostases together are one deity, thus asserting the combination of two contraries, unity and plurality. They have the divine essence composed either of pure dispositions which have no existence or of aspects and expressions which exist only in the imagination, which is without intelligibility.

K p. 159-160/ blames the Christians for making "their deity" (ilāhahum) and "their object of worship" (ma`būdahum) a substance (jawhar), that is, the root of hypostases (aṣl al-aqānīm). Asked why they limit the hypostases to three, they answered that the three are necessary for creation (al-khalq wa-l-ibdā'). Asked what about will and power, they then admitted five hypostases.

W continues: "They also assert that the hypostasis of knowledge, which is called the word (kalima), united with the humanity of Jesus, that is, his body, and thereupon he was a deity (wa-min thamma kān ilāhan), according to them. They are divided concerning the meaning of the uniting of the word with him:

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6 Another version is in K, pp. 159-166; both are repeated more or less in J, 3d, ff. 112b-116b.
1) Some of them interpret it as the inhering of the word in him as an accidental inheres in a substance." K /Pp. 162-164/ has a fuller answer:

a) This interpretation would mean that the Trinity loses a member and becomes only a part of a deity, which according to them is a collection (majmū' ) of three hypostases; likewise only a part of the deity inheres in Jesus; therefore he does not become a deity in full. The Christians answer that the word united with the humanity of Jesus without separating from the essence of the substance; but it is self-evident that one attribute (ma'nā) cannot inhere in two essences.

b) If attributes which are accidentals (aq-qifāt al-`arāqiyya) cannot jump subjects, this is all the more true of those of essential-property (nafsiyya), as in the case of divinity.

c) A particularizing agent is needed to determine why the word rather than the holy spirit, which is the hypostasis of life, or rather than the substance itself should unite with the humanity.

d) If the uniting is necessary, the humanity would have to be from eternity; if it is admissible, then a particularizing agent is needed; also in this case the divinity of Jesus would be admissible to him, but that is impossible for divinity, which necessarily exists.

e) If this uniting is a perfection of God it is necessary and eternal; if it is an imperfection it is impossible of God.

f) Why assert divinity of Jesus alone? As-Sanṣī q quotes a story from ar-Rāzī /Here continues the version of W, f. 28a/ of how once he met a priest (ba'd aḥbaraḥim) and with much difficulty convinced him that an effect proves the existence of a cause, but not vice versa. He then asked him on what basis he
held that the hypostasis of knowledge united with the humanity of Jesus, so that Jesus is a deity. The priest answered, "on the basis of his miracles, such as raising the dead, which can only come from the Deity." Ar-Râzî answered that on the same basis the priest should hold the divinity of Moses, since he too performed miracles, and, as was agreed, an effect - the miracle - proves the existence of the cause - divinity. Ar-Râzî then asked him whether it is admissible that beetles and other bugs could be deities, and to the priest's denial replied that the absence of an effect does not prove the absence of a cause. "Such is the logical conclusion of the unbeliever's tenets."

2) "Some of them interpret this uniting as a mixture and a blending (al-ikhtilâf wa-l-mazj), like the mixture of wine and water and such liquids. But how can one conceive of a mixture, which is an attribute of bodies, in the word, which is one of the substantive attributes (ma'nâ min al-ma'âni), or, according to them, a disposition and characteristic (ṭâla wa-l-täqâyya) of the eternal essence.

3) "Some of them interpret it as an impression (inṭibâ'), as the impression of the shape of a carving on wax. But it is known that a carving does not take on existence (lam yahqul) in what it impresses, but only its likeness does."

4) Another interpretation quoted from al-Muqtara by K /Pp. 164-165/ is that as the light of the sun shines upon us without separating from the sun, so the divinity unites with the humanity of Jesus. The answer is that the light of the sun is a multitude of luminous bodies which reach everything it shines upon without any question of uniting.

W /F. 28a/ concludes: "Let us limit ourselves to this in exposing their shamefulness, since it does not fit the purpose
of this abridgement to dwell upon it at length. The defectiveness of this people has been made plain, and its principles indicate its consequences. Their position (madhhab) is without intelligibility, and they are the filthiest sect (akhass al-firq) of all and more despicable than any similar difficult sect with regard to understanding and perceiving the truth."

"W C. 286/ then takes up the crucifixion: "Look at their enormous stupidity in the wisdom (iikma) they imagine to exist in Jesus' - upon him be peace - uniting with the divinity so that according to them he became a deity, and after that, so they maintain, was crucified. They - may God place them far away and free the earth from them - say that the wisdom of it is that when Adam, the father of mankind - peace be upon him - ate from the tree, disobeying the order of his Lord, he merited punishment from his Lord, but for our Lord who is so great and majestic to punish someone who is not his equal in majesty would be a defect in him. They say that when the word united with Jesus - upon him be peace - and because of it he became a deity (raja' ilâhan), he offered himself (takarram bi-nafsihi), and changed the punishment due into forgiveness (li-l-`afw), taking the place of his father Adam - upon him be peace. By the infliction of punishment upon him there was no defect in the Deity, because of his likeness to him, since he is also a deity. They say this is the wisdom of his being killed and crucified.

"In answer to them it can be asked, was this killing and crucifixion, which you maintain to have happened to him, isolated to the humanity without the divinity, or did it happen to them both together? If you say that it was isolated to the humanity of Jesus only, this is contrary to what you said before, that
for the Deity to inflict punishment upon someone who is not his equal is a defect in him. There is no doubt that the humanity, which is the body of Jesus, is decidedly not a deity. Also, how could that killing and crucifixion be isolated to the humanity, when it is said that it is blended with the divinity?

"But if you say that the killing and crucifixion affected the composite of divinity and humanity, then the Deity must be affected by death and suffering and the like which affect created things; and that clearly demands that he have come into being, which is decidedly impossible. Also this would lead to the Deity's ceasing to exist, since according to them the Deity is composed of three hypostases, and a composition ceases to exist when one of its parts ceases to exist. But the part of the divinity which dwelt in Jesus did cease to exist by being killed with him. Therefore the Deity ceased to exist, and there remains no Deity any longer.

"Away with the minds of these asses. They are no less filthy than small dirty minds carried by big bodies. If you see them you like their bodies, but if they speak, their speech sounds as if they were pieces of wood fixed on the back of a beast (khushub mustadda bi-qaws bahîma) and borne by human shapes. They are only like livestock; moreover they have gone astray..."

"Also the supposition that the punishment of being killed and crucified reached the divinity and humanity leads to the conclusion that the Deity avenged himself upon himself, and punished himself for a crime committed by his servant. See the madness, the folly, the delirium with which these people are affected..."
K (Pp. 165) argues against the divinity of Jesus from the words of Jesus in "their gospel": "I am going to my Father and your Father, my God and your God" (Jn. 10:17). These words express subjection to God as other than himself, and equality with other men.

K (Pp. 165-166) then takes up the allegation, reported by some authors, that some sufis claimed to be united with God. This is because of the theopathic utterances (shaṭahāt) reported from them, such as "There is only God in my forehead" (mā fī l-jibha illā llāh), and "I am the Truth" (anā l-ḥaqq).

Some sufic scholars (ʻulamāʾ aţ-ţarīq) explain this away by saying that a state (ḥāla) comes over such persons in which they pass out (fanā') as if drunk or overcome, and see nothing but God, being oblivious of themselves and everything else. Words then form on their lips which they would not say when they come to their senses. This is excusable according to these scholars.

Others hold it against them and condemn them to death, as in the case of al-Junayd's decision concerning al-Ţallāj.

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7These are the Bāṭinites mentioned above, c, N. 7.
8That is, the speaker's being is identified with God.
E. The positive attributes:

   a. Al-Asharî and no adjectival attributes:

   (N. 13) W/Y. 29a/ raises the question of the reality of the determinations (ahkâm) or dispositions (aýwUl), such as "knowing" (álim), resulting from substantive attributes such as "knowledge" (ilm). Imam-al-Yaramayn and al-Bûqillânî asserted that the dispositions are additional to the substantive attributes; a disposition, according to them, is "a positive attribute which inheres in something existent, but is itself neither existent nor non-existent" (qifat ithbät taqûm bi-mawjûd wa-laysat hiya mawjûda wa-lû ma'dûma).

   But al-Asharî, denying dispositions, said there is no third meaning (ma'ñû thâlíth) inhering in the essence, which is neither existent nor non-existent. According to him, the only meaning in an essence knowing (álim) something is that knowledge (ilm), related to and perceiving what is known, inheres in the essence.

   K/Y. 214-216/ was not sure which position to take. An argument is proposed that dispositions must be an intermediate reality (wäsita ḥaqîqa) between existence and non-existence because existence is undifferentiatedly-common and additional (mushtarak zâ'id) to essence; therefore the existence (of a disposition) would require another existence, and that another in a continuous regress. Non-existence, on the other hand, is an imperfection and cannot qualify anything. To this argument as-Sanûsî reports an answer that existence is the very essence of the existing thing, while its differentiation (tamyîz) from anything else is a negation (ṣalb); therefore there is no continuous regress in the existence of dispositions.

   A second argument for dispositions neither existing nor
not existing is that an attribute such as black (sawād) is qualified by colorness (lawniyya) and blackness (sawādiyya). If these two were existent, there would be the impossibility of an accidental inhereing in an accidental; if they were non-existent, there would be the impossibility of something non-existent entering into composition with something existent. An answer to this argument is that maybe it is possible for an accidental to inhere in another; this is a matter of speculation (fihi naṣar).

Other shaykhs defend the fact (thubūt) of dispositions, saying that to deny them bars the way to affirming causality, definitions, or general propositions in demonstrations.¹

A choice is made in W L F. 29a-b: "I (wa-n-nafs) am inclined to the first opinion - the affirmation of dispositions neither existing nor not-existing - because if the subject did not acquire from knowledge, for example, its likeness - to be knowing - there would be no difference between the subject and anything else in which knowledge does not inhere, since by this supposition knowledge itself, and not the subject, is the perceiver. But the evidence of seeing and feeling is that definitely the subject in which knowledge inheres acquires by the inhereing of knowledge in it a disposition additional to the mere inhereing of knowledge in it. The additional factor is that the subject knows the object of the knowledge inhereing in it.

"In summary, this question is famous for its diversity of opinions, and the reasons for either side are expatiated upon in long treatises. Surmising (wahm) about it is strongly counter to intelligibility, and ignorance of it does not hurt the tenets of faith."

¹Cf. also K, p. 393.
b. The Mu'tazilites and no substantive attributes:

The Mu'tazilites, says K/LP. 216/, affirmed the adjectival attributes, but denied the substantive ones, saying that the adjectival attributes are due to God because of his essence, not because of any substantive attributes. One exception they made was that God speaks by speech, but this speech is not an eternal attribute, but something created, and made up of letters and sounds. The Mu'tazilites of Bağra also admitted a will which came into being and is not in a subject (maḥall).

Yet consequences of positing a will and speech which came into being are: 1) the renewal of dispositions coming into being in what is from the eternal past (tajaddud al-šawāl al-ḥāditha 'alā l-azali), which demands God's having come into being; 2) a substantive attribute's self-subsistency, which is impossible; 3) attributing to God the adjectival determination of a substantive attribute without a particularizing reason; 4) the inconsistency of saying that God knows because of himself, but wills because of a will; they said so to avoid having God will disobedience; 5) that a will which came into being would require a continuous regress of other wills to particularize it; 6) having inhered in God's essence the adjectival determinations of a will which began to be.

Therefore K/p. 219/ al-Ka‘bī and an-Najjār and their followers denied the attribute of will altogether, interpreting authoritative references to it as God's creating or not being opposed.

In answer to the Mu'tazilites K/pp. 221-222/, the Sunnites give four bases of transferring to God (al-ghāib) the assertion true of the experiential world (ash-shahid) that where there are adjectival attributes there are also corresponding substantive
ones: 1) joint reality (jam' al-ḥaqīqa) of the two, and 2) the connection that one is evidence (dal'il) or 3) a condition (shart) or 4) a cause ('illa) of the other. The first basic is that invoked by those who deny dispositions; the fourth is used by those who affirm them.

Another argument against the Mu'tazilite position (K, pp. 223-226) is that if God had no substantive attributes, his very essence would have to be power, knowledge, etc. But from this would follow: 1) that an essence would have an opposite, for instance ignorance, since the essence is knowledge; but an essence has no opposites; 2) that an essence, because identified with a substantive attribute, would require a subject of inherence, which is impossible; 3) that the essence would unite with the substantive attribute; but the uniting of two things is impossible; 4) that the substantive attributes identified with the essence would be identified with each other; then, as al-Muqtaraḥ explained regarding the question of sawād ḥilāwa, not only would a single attribute be opposed to its opposite, e.g. knowledge to ignorance, but every other attribute, e.g. power, would be opposed to ignorance as well.

The Mu'tazilites objected (K, pp. 226-232; cf. J, 8b, f. 163a) that the assertion of substantive attributes implies that they are causes of the adjectival ones, in which case the adjectival attributes would not be necessary but admissible. The Sunnite answer is that the connection is not one of causality (ta'īlīl), but of inter-consequence (talāzum), such as between a substance

2 As-Sanūsī here resumes the arguments against uniting given in N. 9; see above, D. c.

3 Although §, p. 97, uses this term; see above, C, b.
and an accidental. The latter are created by God simultaneously, each following upon the other without causal influence, as al-Muqtabar expalines.

c. The Philosophers and no positive attributes:

The Philosophers, K /Pp. 219-220 and 232-234/ continues, denied all the attributes of God but the negative ones, interpreting the others as negations (salb) or the ascription of created effects to him (iḍāfa) or a combination of these two.

Their reason is that the attributes' need (iftiqār) of an essence and of other attributes as a condition - e.g. power requires life - is a denial of their being necessary. The Sunnite answer is that the inter-consequence of an attribute with the essence or with another attribute is not one of need, unless by "need" is meant inseparability ('adam infihāk). There is no ground for saying that one necessary thing cannot follow necessarily upon another.

Ibn-at-Tilimsāni remarked /K, pp. 234-235/ that ar-Rāzī was influenced by the Philosophers and said in his Na'īlim ad-dīniyye /J, 3b, f. 163a, names the book/ that the composition (tarkīb) of the attribute with God's essence makes the attributes possible (mumkin) with regard to their own essences, but necessary by the necessity of God's essence. He went as far as to reduce the attributes of God to a mere relative or nominal reality (mujarrad nasab wa-iḍāfāt), or, on the other hand, to say they were separate and distinct (mughāyara) from God's essence. But the Sunnite imāms reject both distinctness of the attributes from God's essence - because this implies separability - and identity (ka-mā yamnaʿun an yuqāl hiya huwa).

On this point J /8c, f. 168a/ notes that al-Ash'ārī and
one opinion of al-Bāqillānī do not allow the term ikhtilāf, "difference", for the relation of the attributes to the essence and to one another; another opinion of al-Bāqillānī allows it. It is neither permitted to say that the attributes are other than the essence (ghayr adh-dhāt) nor that they are the essence itself ('ayn adh-dhāt) or united with the essence (ittīḥāduhā ma'a dh-dhāt).

K (Pp. 235-236) refers again to Ibn-at-Tilmisānī, who says that ar-Rāzi's attempt to avoid composition in God is not successful, since the various attributes are distinct (mutamayyīza) from one another in intelligibility. Some have no object; others have an object without an effect on it; others have an effect (yu'aththir) on their objects. If they are distinct and different from one another (idhā tamāyazat wa-khtalafat), this supposes different aspects (wujūhan mukhtalifa). This forced the Philosophers to explain away the reality of the attributes; for example they said that knowledge is nothing but incorporeity.

Related to the problem of composition within God is the Mu'tazilites' further argument (K, pp. 236-237) that the existence of substantive attributes would mean that what is from eternity is multiple. The answer is that the attributes, whatever their number, do not imply any composition or multiplicity in their subject (mawgūf) any more than in the case of a simple substance (jawhar fard) with its many attributes. The consensus that what is from eternity is one does not exclude more than one reality (ḥaqīqa), that is the subject and the attributes, from being from eternity.

Another argument of the Mu'tazilites (K, pp. 237-240) is that, since being from eternity is the most particular
characteristic of God, anything which is from eternity must also share in the other more general attributes of God. Therefore any of God's attributes which are from eternity, such as knowledge, must also be powerful, living, etc., which results in a multiplication of deities, even more than the three hypostases of essence, life, and knowledge posited by the Christians. The answer is that being from eternity is a negative, not a positive attribute, and therefore cannot be the most particular characteristic. As-Sanūsī quotes here at-Taftāzānī's ightsi a'ahā Ṭa-Kashshāf, which says that the Christians do not err in asserting attributes, but in making three deities of them.

The Mu'tazilites also argued that if God had knowledge, it would have to be like our knowledge, since both are related to the same objects. Therefore both would have to be either from eternity or have come into being, and this is impossible. A dialectical answer (jawāb jadali) is that God's knowingness ('ālimiyya), which the Mu'tazilites assert, would have to be like our knowingness; therefore the same difficulty applies to their position. The proper answer is that knowledge is completely particularized as to its essence before it is determined as being from eternity or having come into being.

d. Power (qudra):

(N. 14) Someone powerful (qādir), says W/FF. 29a-30a; cf. K, pp. 168-172, is he who can either do or omit an act according to his will (huwa l-lādhi yaḥṣul minhu l-fi`l wa-t-tark bi-ḥasab irādatihi). This excludes both a cause ('illa) and nature

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4Cf. Ch. I, E, n. 21.
(ṭabī'a), which do not have a will, and cannot omit to produce an effect, were they to do so.

The difference between a cause and nature, according to the apostates who hold that these produce an effect, is that the influence of a cause does not depend upon anything, and it is impossible for a cause to exist without its effect, for example the movement of a finger in relation to the movement of a ring placed on it. But for nature to produce its effect it depends upon the presence of a condition and the absence of an impediment, as in the case of fire in burning, according to them, since it depends upon the condition of the fire touching the thing which is to be burned, and the absence of the impediment of it being wet.

Thus there are three kinds of active principles (fā'il) according to their supposed ability to act: 1) one who is able or powerful (qādir), who can act or not act, and is said to be freely-choosing (mulāḥtār), 2) a cause, and 3) a nature. All of these exist, say the Philosopher apostates - may God destroy them. But the Sunnites are unanimous in denying the effectivity (ta'thir) of the last two types, so that only the first remains. Then, the Sunnites admit the existence of the latter only in God, because of the impossibility of anything besides him all together or separately of having any effectivity whatsoever.

God is powerful because he could have omitted creating the world. If he were obliged to create it, he would be a cause or a nature, and the world would have to be eternal, as will be seen later. The fact of the world's dependence upon God proves that he has the power to act.

An objection is raised that God's power does not extend to omitting an act, because omitting (tark) is a pure negation,
whereas power must be related to a positive effect; were non-acting a positive effect, the world would have to be eternal. Also, continued non-acting does not require a power. The answer is, first of all, that omitting is not a pure negation; rather it is a positive refusal to act, yet does not take place from eternity, but in never-ending-time (fi mā lā yazāl). Besides, one possessing power need not produce omission; his power of omitting means that he does not bring an act into existence, not that he brings a non-act into existence.

The second point in the Creed, that God must have a power (qudra) which is in addition to (zā'ida 'alā) his essence, is against the Mu'tazilites, who denied the distinction between God's essence and attributes. Their position goes against intelligibility, since anyone who is powerful must have power, either as a condition of being powerful, or as a cause of it, or as something proved by it, or as a part of its reality, since someone powerful is he who has power. This is to speak in terms of supposing dispositions, since powerlessness (qādiriyā) is a disposition inhering in an essence. But for al-Ash'arī, powerlessness simply means that power inheres in the subject.

The third point in the Creed, W /F. 30b/ continues, that this power is not united with God's essence, is against the position of the Philosophers. A reply has already been given to them in the demonstration of the impossibility of God's uniting with something other than himself.5 The reply to them in the Creed is an abridged statement of the argument that in uniting a whole must become its very part, or something numerous

5Cf. above, D, c, N. 9.
must become precisely few, which is without intelligibility. This
is what is meant by "It would follow that two are one", that is,
because the power and the essence are two realities (ḥaqīqatān
ithnān), were they to unite, that is, become one, then there
would clearly result the absurdity mentioned.

In the fifth point of the Creed, that God's power is
related to all things possible, the word "things possible"
(mumkināt) is the equivalent of things admissible (jā'izāt).
Necessary and impossible things are excluded as objects of the
divine power because to be an object of power implies that the
thing can be or not be.

The phrase "all things possible" is pointed against the
Mu'tazilites, who excepted human voluntary acts from the objects
of divine power, and said that men create these acts (ikhtara'ūhā)
by their will. Were some possibilities outside the range of
God's power, the reason would have to be either in God's power,
which was limited by a particularizing agent - which has been
disproven - or in the possibilities themselves - which also cannot
be so, since they are all equally possible.

As an example of an impossible supposition outside God's
power, § /Pp. 104-105/ rejects the reported opinion of Ibn-Ḥazm
in his al-Milal wa-n-nihal that if God could not take a son he
would be impotent (ʻājiz). Likewise al-Isfahānī explained
the assertion of Idrīs that God could make the world pass through
the eye of a needle, saying that God could make the world small
enough to do so, but could not make it pass through with the
size it has.

A definition of God's power given by § /P. 99/, §§ /P. 21/,
and M /F. 213a/ is "an attribute which is effective in bringing
any possible thing into existence or non-existence" (ṣīfa tu'aththir fi ʿijd al-mumkin wa-iʿdāmihī/ṣīfa yataʿattā bi-hā kull mumkin wa-iʿdāmuhu). Particularizing further the objects of God's power, M /Ff. 214b-215a/ agrees with al-Bāqillānī and disagrees with Imām-al-Ḥaramayn that adventitious non-existence (al-ʿadam aṭ-tāri'), that is, coming upon something already existent, is included among the objects of God's power. This is so if we accept as the formal basis (muqāḥših) of God's power either possibility together with coming into being (al-imkān maʿa l-ḥudūth), or possibility on condition of coming into being, or coming into being alone.

Some imāms go further and say that even the non-existence which precedes existence is among the objects of God's power. According to them the formal basis of God's power is possibility alone, apart from coming into being. Their reason is that linguistic usage (al-lugha wa-l-ʿurf) permit expressions to the effect that God has power to keep something non-existent. Therefore to exclude previous non-existence from God's power would seem like an impropriety (ṣūʿ al-adab) and the construing of a defect (Thām an-naqq).

The objects of God's power, according to W and M, can be summarized as concerning:
- omitting (tark)
- acting (fiʿl):
  - to bring something into existence (Ijād)
  - to cause non-existence (iʿdām):
    - subsequent to existence (ṭāriʿ, lāḥiq)
    - previous to existence (sūbiq).
e. Will (irāda):

(N. 15) The will, says Ḫ. 37b/ is "an attribute by which there comes about the prevailing of the actuality of one of two possible alternatives" (ṣifa yata'attā bi-hā tarjīh waqūf' aḥad ū tarafay al-mumkin), or it is "intending the actuality of one of two possible alternatives" (al-qāṣd li-waqqūf' aḥad ū tarafay al-mumkin). M's definition Ḫ. 215a/ is also illustrative: "an attribute by which there comes about the particularization of something possible with some of what is admissible to it" (ṣifa yata'attā bi-hā takhṣīṣ al-mumkin bi-ba'^ī mā yafūz 'alayhi).

(N. 16) The will is necessary to particularize the effect of God's power. Ḫ. 11a, f. 177b/ and M Ḫ. 212b/ distinguish six kinds of possible alternatives (al-mumkināt al-mutaqābīlāt) which require a particularizing agent: 1) existence and non-existence, 2) sizes (maqādīr), 3) attributes (ṣifāt), 4) times (azmina), 5) places (amkīna), and 6) directions (jihāt).

The particularizing factor, Ḫ. 172/ observes, cannot be the fact that one of the two possibilities serves a greater good, since that is a Mu'tazilite position disproven elsewhere.

Ḵ. 37b/ eliminates power as the particularizing agent because power has one relation (nisba) to all possible things in every time and every disposition. Also, the function of power is to produce existence. But an agent of existence (mūjīd) as such is not the same as an agent of prevalence (murajjīh) as such, because the production of existence (Ijād) depends upon the particularization of prevalence (tarjīh).

Likewise knowledge cannot be the particularizing agent, because to particularize a thing with something its possibility admits is to produce an effect on it. But knowledge is not an
attribute which produces an effect; otherwise it would not have among its objects what is necessary and what is impossible. Besides, knowledge of actuality (wuqū') follows upon actuality; were actuality to follow upon knowledge, there would be a circle.

It is also evident that life, speech, hearing, and seeing cannot be particularizing agents, because life has no object, and it is like power in its indifference of relation (fī tasāwī n-nisba). Hearing and seeing are like knowledge in the order of what they follow upon, while speech has no relation to producing an effect.

Therefore there must be another attribute whose special function is to give prevalence and particularization, and it is called the will.

K (Pp. 172-173) mentions an objection to the necessity of a will from the fact that many of man's acts occur apart from his will. The answer is that this is true only of man, who is not the agent of his acts. But God's particularization of possibilities must proceed from his will.

(N. 17) K (Pp. 174-177) amplifies the arguments given in W why God acts by choice of will, and not as a cause or a nature. If there were no divine will the world would either be from eternity or it would not exist at all. The former alternative would result if the nature or cause were from eternity, and the latter if the nature or cause came into being, since their coming into being depends upon an impossible continuous regress or a circle.

Another reason why God is not a cause or a nature is that if these principles were from eternity, an infinite number of things would have to exist, since those principles have only
one relation to all things possible, and possible things are infinite.

Another argument is that all possible things would have to exist all at once, even if the cause or nature were not from eternity.

A further argument (K, pp. 182-183) is drawn from the intricate determination of star locations and movements.

(N. 18) The objections raised in this number are clear enough in the Creed, and are also taken up elsewhere. 6

(N. 19) On the question of God's willing evil, § (Pp. 101-102) explains that the Mu'tazilites said that God wills only what he commands, such as belief and obedience, whether these are actualized or not. But for Sunnites Abū-Jahl was commanded to believe, but God did not will him to believe; in fact, all that happens does so by God's will.

W (F. 33a) proceeds: Although all Sunnites agree that everything happens only by the will of God, whether belief or unbelief, obedience or disobedience, or any other possible thing, they differ on whether to use the term "the will of God" when speaking explicitly of unbelief and disobedience. Some forbid it on the grounds of propriety ('alā tārīq al-adab) only, lest anyone imagine that unbelief and disobedience are predicated (iḍāfa) of God. But that is not the case. Rather, the name unbelief or disobedience is predicated of the act created by God who wills its existence in the essence of a man. The act is predicated of man, since he is the one qualified by unbelief or disobedience, even though he is not the producer (mukhtari') of

6Above, N. 17, and in B, b, concerning an infinite series.
these acts. God is not qualified by them, even though he produces them.

Likewise for other acts, God is only qualified as creating and willing them without being qualified by the acts themselves at all, because of the impossibility of the essence of God to be qualified by anything which comes into being. An illustration of this is for you to place something with a bad smell and color into a pan. The pan would be the acquirer (muktasib) of the bad thing and would be qualified by it, and not you who put the thing into it.

In summary, all God's acts are good (ṣāsana), but only differ in their existence in men according to what they acquire by revealed-law and custom (shar'ān wa-'urfan), even though they have no effect at all on any of these acts.

Another aspect of the opinion that it is improper to say explicitly that God wills unbelief or disobedience is that to refer (isnād) these acts to the will of God without mentioning good acts is a quasi begging pardon (shibh al-i'tidhār) for God's creating them by throwing the consequent blame upon the one who disbelieves or disobeys, whereas the referral of these acts to God's will in revealed-law is not an excuse, nor is God to be asked about what he does or decides. According to this opinion, the proper way of expression is that all beings in general should be expressed when referring to God's will. A general expression (ta'mīm) will include unbelief and disobedience, while guarding propriety of expression. One may, however, say explicitly that God wills acts of obedience, but only if there is no one listening who would understand thereby that acts of disobedience are not willed by God. If there are such people
listening, then one may only state the generalization, nothing more. Verses from the Qur'ān \(1:6-7\), and \(72:10\) are adduced by supporters of this opinion.

A second opinion allows explicit reference to God's willing of evil acts without fear of impropriety, because the difference between creating something and being qualified by it should be clear.

A third opinion places no restriction on explicit speech in teaching and explaining, but elsewhere requires respect for propriety. This opinion, as-Sanūsī says, is best.

To show that God does not act for the sake of objectives (aghrāq), W /F. 33b/ offers the general reason that the objective must either be from eternity - in which case his act would have to be from eternity or else he would be frustrated from his objective - or it must have come into being - in which case the objective must have come into being through another objective, and so on in a continuous regress. K /Pp. 242-245/ adds variations to these arguments.

An objection is considered in K /Pp. 426-429/ that if God does not act for an objective his acts are stupidity (ṣafah). The ordinary meaning of this term is ignorance of one's own welfare and lightmindedness, so that a stupid person does things which hurt him without knowing it, or if he does know it, he prefers a passing pleasure to avoiding its severe consequences. Futility ('abath) ordinarily refers to doing something unawares or without intention (qaṣd). Neither of these terms can be equated with not acting for an objective. Likewise God's wisdom (ḥikma) requires acting with knowledge and will, but not for an objective.
The Mu'tazilites, W /F. 34a/ continue, held that God's
determinations (aḥkām) are motivated by objectives; for example,
they said that drinking wine is prohibited because it damages
the intellect.

One point against this position is that drinking is an act
of God on which man has no effect; damaging the intellect is
merely a sign (amāra) set up by God to indicate that man deserves
punishment.

A second point is that there is no connection between
drinking and damaging the intellect, since God produces every
effect directly without any intermediate influence of a creature.
The same holds for killing an enemy; God causes death; the blow,
whether it is deliberate or not, does not; the distinctions
between deliberate and non-deliberate are set up by God's free
willing.

Thus you know how wrong is the position of the Mu'tazilites,
who said that the intellect alone can arrive at knowledge of God's
determinations without the intermediacy of prophets. This ques-
tion is entitled "judging good and evil" (at-taḥṣīn wa-t-taḥṣīh),
or simply "good and evil". The professors of truth say that
before revealed-law there is no good unless revealed-law says
"Do it", and no evil unless revealed-law says "Do not do it";
there is no cause in the particularization of either.

K /Fp. 429-43/ explains and argues against the Mu'tazilite
position further. They held that there is good and evil in
human acts which can be determined apart from revealed-law.
According to them, the goodness or evil of some acts is immedi-
ately evident, such as the goodness of truthfulness and faith,
and the evil of lying and unbelief; for other acts revealed-
law is necessary, such as the goodness of fasting on the last
day of Ramaq-an and the evil of fasting the first day of Shawwal; in these cases the legislator explains what is good, but does not constitute it.

The older Mu'tazilites said that acts were good or evil because of their essence, while others said they were so because of an attribute attached to them, such as the evil of adultery because of the resulting confusion of relationships and claims. Still others said that goodness is essential to the act and comes from God, whereas evil is an attribute of it. Al-Jubbayr said that the same act can be good or bad according to different aspects, such as striking an orphan to train him or for another reason.

One answer to the Mu'tazilites is to divide into absurdities their assertion that it can be known from intelligibility that thanking God for his benefits is good. There would have to be some advantage in thanking God. But there is none:
- for man:
  - in this world, because here all he gains is tiredness
  - in the next world, because nothing can be known about it without revealed-law
- for God, because he gains nothing from it.

To the objection that thanking God preserves man from God's punishment, and this can be known without revealed-law on the supposition that God acts for objectives, there is the answer that on this basis God could equally punish him for two reasons: 1) that the man tires himself in thanking God without God's permission, and 2) that if God gave him only a little of what in his riches he could give him, thanking him is equivalent to mocking him.
The causes of determinations mentioned by Sunnite professors of revealed-law, W 34b/ continues, are not to be understood literally as causes impelling the legislator to make a certain determination, as the Mu'tazilites maintain, but by these causes are meant signs (amärät) set up by revealed-law as a result of pure choice. Or else, these causes mean the advantages which revealed-law looks out for (rā'ähā) through these determinations by way of favor, not decisive necessity. An example of this is the Qur'ān verse "I have created jinn and men only that they may worship me" 51:56/, which must be interpreted as for the advantage of jinn and men, not of God. The Mu'tazilites erred doubly in interpreting this verse. First, they interpreted the َām in "li-ya'budūni" as a َām at-ta'1il rather than as a َām as-gayrūra, making worship the objective sought by God. Secondly, they restricted God's will to what agrees with his commands, excluding evil acts.

Another legitimate interpretation of the َām in this verse is that it is metaphorically a َām at-ta'1il, in which the quasi-command to worship implied in the verse is expressed as a final cause (al-'illa al-ghā'iyya), which in technical terminology means "what impels to action according as it is perceived, even if it is posterior in existence to the act" (mā yab'uth bi-ḥasan taşawwurihi 'alā fi'l shay' wa-in kān yata'akhkhar wujūduhu 'alā dhālik ash-shay'), such as gain with respect to trading. A final cause is the usefulness of a thing (fā'idat ash-shay'), and is always first in mind (dhīhn) but last in outside existence (fi l-khārij). As the Philosophers say, what is first in intention is last in operation (awwal al-fikra fi'hir al-`amal). In the case at hand it expresses a quasi-command to worship, indicating a pure relating (muṭlaq at-tartīb) of the existence of
jinn and men towards worship, without God being impelled either to create them for the sake of worship or to reward them for it.

f. Knowledge (‘ilm):

(N. 20) § /Pp. 106-108/ and M /F. 215a-b/ define knowledge in nearly the same terms as "an attribute by which its object is disclosed exactly as it is" (qifa yankashif bi-hā mā tata’allaq bi-hi nkishāfan lā yaḥtamil an-naqīq bi-wajh min al-wujūh/ qifa yankashif bi-hā l-ma‘lūm ‘alā mā huwa bi-hi). M explains once more the difference between knowledge and doubt, etc., as was seen above. 7

(N. 21) K /Pp. 185-193/ distinguishes two arguments for God's having knowledge. The first is that of the work of wisdom (iḥkām) found in creation. Regarding this, W /F. 35a/ says that one would have to fight the truth and resist plain evidence to say that the marvels of the world came from someone ignorant. As-Sanūsī goes into long detail explaining the intricacies of the eye as an example of God's wisdom, though noting that God causes or prevents seeing on the occasion of (‘ind) the presence or absence of the proper conditions for sight, not through (bi) them.

K /Pp. 186-187/ mentions the objection that a bee can make a hive which is an engineering marvel without an intellect. The answer is that while the effect comes from God, he inspires the bees with knowledge of how to make a hive, even though they are not properly-endowed (ahl) with any knowledge.

Imām-al-Ḥaramayn /Pp. 187-188/ objected to the argument from wisdom, saying that all it means is that substances have

7Cf. Ch. III, A, a.
been lined up in a determined way, and this is no proof of knowledge. Ibn-at-Tilimsānī answered him in his *Sharh al-Ma'ālim*, saying that the argument from wisdom does not mean simply the particularization of substances with states of motion or rest or situation (akwān), but also with a particular modality (kayfiyya) and measure (miqdār) of attributes and accidentals.  

As-Sanūsī then [Pp. 190-193] expatiates on the wise measurements of the parts of the human body and how they serve its functions, referring also to the wisdom of the rest of the universe.  

The second argument for knowledge [P, p. 189] is that proposed by Imām-al-Ḥaramayn, which Ibn-at-Tilimsānī says requires reasoning, whereas the first is self-evident. The argument is that God acts by choice, as has been proven; but acting by choice supposes intending (qaṣd) what is to be done; but intending something supposes knowing it. Men can intend on the basis of belief (i'tifād), opinion, or suspicion, but this is impossible of God, since it is an imperfection. Therefore he intends by knowledge. Also, since God particularizes every aspect of creation, he must intend and know every aspect and detail. Thus the Philosophers are wrong in limiting him to general knowledge.

[QF, 36b] takes up the point that God's knowledge is above constraint and reasoning. Knowledge constrained by its object (qārūrā) is that which is accompanied by pain or need (qārar aw ḥāja), such as our knowledge of our own pain or hunger. There is no doubt that knowledge of this kind is impossible for God, since all agree that it is impossible for him to suffer pain or need.

Yet the word qārūrā is sometimes applied to knowledge which is had without reasoning (naẓar). This meaning can legitimately
be applied to God's knowledge, but to avoid misunderstanding revealed-law forbids the use of the word  yardımcı describe God's knowledge.

It is impossible for God's knowledge to come from reasoning (ناصر), because reasoning is opposed to knowledge, since knowledge coming from reasoning is had only when reasoning is finished (بى-نسرمان الأنصر), and does not coexist (لا يجتامي') with it. Such knowledge comes into being, and as such is impossible for God.

Here K /Pp. 258-261/ accepts the opinion of Imam-al-٩aramayn that knowledge is not essentially dependent upon previous reasoning, since the capability of a substance for knowledge is of essential-property (نفس) and needs no condition.

In Qur'an verses such as 29:3, where God is said to cause trials in order to know who are true and who are liars, "to know" must be interpreted as "to announce reward or punishment". In explaining this verse, as-Sansî quotes from az-Zamakhshari and Ibn-'Atiyya.

As-Sansî then quotes al-Mugtara$ on the kinds of داري knowledge, and in summary says that there are three kinds of knowledge which come into being: 1) self-evident, or constrained (دارة), 2) spontaneous (باطن), and 3) acquired (كاشب); all of these are impossible of God.

g. Hearing, sight, speech, and perception:
(N. 22 contains nothing of note.)

(N. 23) Hearing (سمع) and sight (بصرا), W /F. 36b/ says,

8Not that K, p. 18, attributes to Imam-al-٩aramayn the opposite opinion.

9In explaining this verse, as-Sansî quotes from az-Zamakhshari and Ibn-'Atiyya.

10That is, self-evident, but without pain.

11That is, resulting from reasoning.
are types of perception (idrāk) additional to knowledge. In God they are not limited to sounds or colors, but he sees and hears from eternity and forever his own essence and positive attributes as well as our essences and positive attributes, without limit as to object or time. Nevertheless it is sensibly apparent that the disclosure (inkishāf) of each of these powers is not the same, and they differ in reality (ḥaqīqa). Also, in God these powers cannot be linked to ears or eyes or directions.

K ([p. 195-196] quotes some Qur'ān verses affirming God's hearing and seeing, 20:46, 17:1 etc., 96:14, 25:218, 19:42, and says they are to be taken literally on the principle that interpretation (ta'wīl) is permitted only on the condition that the context justifies it.

A-Jubbūtī and his son (Mu'tazilites), says K ([p. 200-201], said that some hear and see merely one who is living without defect. This position is wrong because, first, hearing and seeing are related to objects, while life is not; secondly, man perceives that he is hearing and seeing without perceiving this absence of defect; thirdly, by the same reason power and knowledge should be reduced to life.

The Philosophers ([K, pp. 201-204] explained hearing and seeing as something physical, saying that what is seen is the immaterial impressed image (al-mithāl al-munṭabi` al-khūlī `an al-mādda) of an external object, or, according to another opinion, the external object itself through the mediacy of the image impressed in the common sense (al-ḥass al-mushtarak) located in the front of the brain. There are two similar opinions concerning hearing. The Sunnite position, however, is that these perceptions require only a subject, without conditions, since the capability of the subject is of essential-
property; any other factors are simply customary concomitants of God's acting. Ar-Rāzī objected to even the possibility of an impress image, but as-Sanūsī answers his arguments, quoting from Ibn-at-Tilimsānī.

§§ II, 23/ explains that God's hearing and seeing, unlike ours, have as their objects all existing things, whether they are from eternity or came into being, since their formal object (muṣāḥḥīḥ taʿalluqihimā) is existence. If their objects were restricted in any way, a particularizing agent would be required; then these attributes and God would have come into being. Thus K (PP. 284-285; cf. M, f. 216a/ approves the opinion of al-Ashʿarī, rejecting the opinion of older theologians (qudamā') such as 'Al. b. Saʿīd al-Kullābī and al-Qalānāsī who restricted hearing to sounds and said that God does not hear his eternal speech, but only knows it.

Regarding seeing, the difficulty is raised (K, pp. 286-289; M, ff. 216a-b/ that we cannot see our own sight; therefore it does not extend to all existing things. Al-Bāqillānī answered that this is because of an impediment which is invisible to the person concerned, but is visible to others. Thus everything is essentially visible.

The Muʿtazilites (K, p. 205/ who say that God hears and sees himself reduce this perception to knowledge. Other Muʿtazilites say that God neither sees nor is seen, on the basis that sight is a matter of emitting rays, as will be seen later. 12 Abū-1-Q. al-Kaʿbī and a. 1-Ḥ. al-Baṣrī (Muʿtazilītes) (K, pp. 204-205/ said that hearing and seeing are only knowledge related particularly to visible and audible objects. Ar-Rāzī objected to their opinion on the basis of the evident experiential

12N. 43.
difference between these perceptions and knowledge. Ibn-at-
Tilimsânî, however, said that ar-Râzî's position does not con-
clude to a specific difference, but the difference could be
simply a matter of a greater or smaller number of objects; for
instance, seeing includes more than knowing in the case of an
absent object. Or the difference could be one of subject, such
as the eye for seeing and the heart for knowing.

Al-Ash'ârî (K, pp. 205-206) had two opinions. The first is
that hearing and seeing are generically different from knowledge,
although they are all attributes disclosing objects as they
actually are. The second is that they are of the genus of know-
ledge, but are related only to existing objects, whereas know-
ledge is related also to non-existing ones and to things both
simply and determinedly (wa-l-muṭlaq wa-l-muqayyad). Al-Ash'ârî
opposed reducing hearing and seeing to knowledge, in the same way
ar-Râzî did. But Ibn-at-Tilimsânî commented that the same
difficulties remain.

M (F. 216b) faces directly the difficulty that if the
objects of hearing and seeing are the same as those of knowledge
they are superfluous (taḥqīl al-ḥāṣil wa-ṭtimā' al-mithlayn).
As-Sanûsî's answer is that the objects are the same - all exist-
ing things - but the reality (ḥaqīqa) of these perceptions is
not one, just as the reality of their relations to their objects
(ta'alluqâtuhā) is not one, but each has a particular disclosure
(1a-hu ḥaqīqa min al-inkishāf takhuqqahu) different from that of
the others. This is true whether we say hearing and seeing
are species (anwā') of knowledge or not.

As for seeing's (mushāhada) being a stronger and more
detailed perception of an object than knowledge, this is not
ture of God, whose knowledge is all embracing of every object
in general and in detail.

God's speech (kalām), says § 113 is related to (muta‘alīq ay dāl ‘alā) all that he knows, which is infinite. M 218a-
221a discusses in detail the various kinds of speech (khabar, inshā', etc.) as they apply to God. The statement that God's speech is without letters, sounds, and sequence, M 217a explains, is against the position of the Ḥashwiyya, who affirmed material speech as an attribute inhering in God, and the Mu‘tazilites, who asserted material speech, but as a creation, not an attribute of God.

K 264-265 says that the Ḥashwiyya are of two kinds: One holds that God occupies space, but has no shape, and that his speech is from eternity, of any language, and consisting of letters and sounds, but not in an outward way (lā 'alā makhārij al-ḥurūf).

The other kind holds that God occupies space with the shape of a man, and speaks in any language according to the outward sounds of the letters; his speech is from eternity, but is sometimes quiet (ṣamat) and covered up. According to them, whenever anyone reads the Qur'ān, he hears the eternal speech of God which exists in him as in a subject (wujid fi maḥall hādhā l-qāri') without leaving God. Likewise the letters of a copy of the Qur'ān are the very speech of God without leaving his essence.

Abū-Ḥamīd 13 and Ibn-Dahhāq K, pp. 265-268 and 273-274 are quoted in refutation of them: The Ḥashwiyya have the anthropomorphism of the Jews, the Christian idea of God's speech (word) dwelling in men, but not just in Jesus but in everyone who reads

13 According to a note of al-Ḥamīdī, this is al-Isfārā'īnī, not al-Ghazālī.
the Qur’ān, and the Mu’tazilite belief that God’s speech consists of sounds and letters.

To show that speech is not just outward sounds, the Sunnites point to the fact that commanding and forbidding are interior acts manifested in many various ways. After refuting Mu’tazilite objections to this, the question is raised whether speech is properly interior or exterior or both. Al-Ach‘arī says that it is common to both, while the Mu’tazilites say that it is properly exterior and only metaphorically interior. But the Sunnites interpret the Father’s dictum "The speech of God is memorized in the heart, recited with the tongue, and written in copies" (kalām Allāh maḥfūẓ bi-qudūr wa-maqrū’ bi-l-alsina wa-maktūb fi l-maghif) as the application of the name of something referred to (madlūl) to something referring to it (dāll), since a thing has four existences: 1) in actual individuals (a’yān), 2) in the mind (adhhūn), 3) on the tongue (lisūn), and 4) on fingernails (banān), that is in writing. The last three only refer to, but are not the actual eternal speech of God; what is recited or written is from eternity, but not the recitation or writing. Thus M /F. 218a/ says that God’s speech is in the Qur’ān as understood and known, not as indwelling (fahman wa-‘ilman lā ḫulūlan) /Cf. §, p. 114/.

K then /Pp. 275-279/ discusses Qur’ān verses referring to God’s speaking to Moses /4:164 and 7:144/, saying that he did not hear created words, but the interior eternal speech of God; otherwise he could not be singled out as the interlocutor (kalīm) of God. /F. 37b/, § /P. 114/, and M /F. 217b/ point

out that the inner being (kunh) of speech as well as God's essence and other attributes is veiled (mażjūb) from the intellect, but W (F. 37b/) adds that any knowing-awareness of it must be attained by way of (mystic) taste (wa-'alā taqdir at-tawaṣṣul ilā ma'rifa shay' min dhălik fa-huwa dhawqi), which can be expressed only by the beckoning (ishāra) of one person who has it (min ahlihi) to another who has it.

§ (Pp. 114–115) notes also that because God's speech is beyond intellectual comprehension the comparison by theologians of God's speech to ours is true only to the extent that ours, as God's, is not necessarily dependent on letters and sounds; but our interior speech (kalāmun n-nafsi) comes into being and is marked by parts, priority and posteriority, and has no positive resemblance to God's speech.

M (F. 217a/) gives an argument from intelligibility (dalīl al-‘aql) that God has speech because if someone knows something he can speak about it, and God knows everything.

W (F. 38a/) and K (P. 193–19½) offer a general argument for hearing, seeing, and speech that a subject which is capable of an attribute must be qualified with either the attribute or its like or its opposite. God is living, and is therefore capable of hearing, sight, and speech. Therefore he must possess them, since he cannot be qualified with their opposites: deafness (qamam), blindness (‘amār), and dumbness (bakam).

But the weight of authority (as-sam‘ ay an-naql), namely the Qur'ān (al-kitāb), the Muḥammadan norm (as-sunna), and consensus (ijmā‘), is greater than that of intelligibility in this question, because if these attributes are perfections in this world (shāhid), it does not necessarily follow that they are perfections in what is beyond (ghā'ib). For example, pleasure
and pain are perfections of a living thing in this world, but they are impossible of God. Therefore by intelligibility alone one cannot be sure that if God does not possess these attributes he necessarily possesses their opposites. K (Pp. 196-200) argues similarly, quoting Ibn-at-Tilimsänī against the arguments proposed by al-Isfarā'īnī. §§ remarks (P. 23) that the existence of these three attributes is settled by authority, but the relation of hearing and seeing to their objects and the fact that God's speech has no letters, sounds, or temporality are known by a reason of intelligibility.

An objection is raised in K (Pp. 196-198) and §§ (P. 23) that if the authority of a prophet is needed to assert that God speaks, the authority of a prophet in turn depends upon a miracle, which presupposes that God speaks in affirming the truthfulness of the prophet; thus the argument runs in a circle. Ibn-at-Tilimsänī answered that the act of a miracle indicates the truthfulness of the prophet without a separate verbal declaration of his truthfulness; the question of whether God can speak or not is left open.

We know God's attributes, W continues (F. 38a), either by his acts which prove the existence of these attributes, or, if we do not find a proof from his acts, by having recourse to authority. If authority says nothing, then we refrain from judging (waqf). In the case of the above attributes authority is decisive.

Perception (iḏrūk), says W (F. 38a), includes perception of odors (mashmūmāt), tastes (madhūqāt), and things palpable (malmūsāt). As-Sanūsī does not discuss the extent of the objects of each of these, except to mention in K (P. 286) and
M (F. 216a) that the Companions differed as to whether things which can be seen, such as motion-and-situation (aḵwān), can also be felt. Al-Muqtarah is cited for the affirmative. In the present world (shähid), continues W (F. 38a), the three perceptions just mentioned are perfections additional to knowledge, the same as hearing and seeing. There are three opinions concerning their affirmation of God:

1) Those who hold for the proof from intelligibility for hearing, seeing, and speech, such as Imām-al-Ḥaramayn and, according to J (14a, f. 211b), al-Baqli, maintain the same proof for the remaining perceptions, but exclude from these attributes any sense organ (jari'a), contact (ittiqāl), or coming into being. Their argument is that if God did not possess these attributes he would lack perfection.

K (Fp. 206-209) adds, in line with this opinion, that consensus forbids the use of expressions such as "God smelt", because of the physical contact and change this ordinarily suggests. But the perceptions of odors, tastes, and palpable objects are distinct from smelling, tasting, and touching; and God can create the one without the other. Yet because some theologians say that the two are essentially linked, these perceptions cannot be absolutely asserted.

2) Others, W continues, deny the distinction of these perceptions from God's knowledge.

3) The best position is that of al-Muqtarah and Ibn-at-Tilimsānī, who said that we should refrain from judgement, meaning that we do not know whether these perceptions are in addition to God's knowledge or part of it.
h. Outward anthropomorphisms:

(N. 24) The eight attributes referred to in the Creed, says W (qF. 38b), are the positive substantive attributes: knowledge, power, will, life, hearing, sight, speech, and perception. The first four are known by intelligibility; the next three depend upon an authoritative text (naṣṣ); on the last judgement was suspended.

There are various opinions concerning things mentioned in revealed-law which are opposed to (muğādda li-) God. These things are his mounting (upon the throne), his hand, his eye, and his face. By intelligibility and consensus God is decidedly above the outward impossible meanings of these things. Accepting the outward meanings, says K (qP. 264), is the position of the Ḥashwiyya who, for example, associate with "mounting on the throne" (istiwā') the story that every Friday night God descends to heaven for a third of the night and before dawn goes back up to his throne.

Al-Āsh'arī, continues V, said that the added descriptions are names of attributes other than the eight mentioned. His reason for affirming them is authority (sam'), not intelligibility; therefore in his teaching they are called authoritative attributes (ṣifīt sam'iyya). God knows best. J (q15a, ff. 212b-214b) adds, quoting al-Āmidī, that this is also the opinion of al-Isfarā'īnī, al-Bāqillānī, and some Fathers; according to them these attributes are of essential property (nafe'ī). Al-Āmidī added that al-Āsh'arī had a second opinion similar to that of Imām-al-Ḥaramayn.

Imām-al-Ḥaramayn, continues W, held for interpreting them (ta'wiluhā) as referring to recognized attributes, as mentioned in the Creed.
The Fathers (salaf) opted for suspending judgement (waqf) regarding the interpretation to be adopted (fi ta’yin ta’wilihā). They said we hold for sure (naqta’) that their outward impossibilities are not what is meant, but after that we entrust their exact meaning (‘ayn al-murād minha) to God because the terms can have several legitimate applications, whereas revealed-law has not determined which of them is meant. Therefore, according to al-Qarāfī, to determine the meaning without authority (naq)l is to surmount the wall of the beyond without a guiding reason (at-tasawwur ‘alā l-ghayb min ghayr dalīl). This is the best and safest (aḥsan wa-aslam) opinion of all.

Al-Ash‘arī explained the Qur’ān verse "He mounted upon the throne" [7:54 etc.] by discounting both the impossible meaning of his taking position and sitting down, and the interpretation that God took possession of the throne by his power, since there is no reason for singling out the throne among all other possible things which are equally dependent upon God’s power. Therefore this verse must refer to a special attribute befitting God.

Al-Ash‘arī’s reason for asserting the attribute called the "hand" is the verse in which God says to the devil "What prevented you from adoring what my hand created" [38:75]. Likewise if the "hand" were interpreted as power, there would be no use in singling out the creation of man as the work of God’s hand.

The verse referring to God’s eye is "and that you be made under my eye" [20:39], while that referring to God’s face is "The face of your Lord remains full of glory and honor" [55:27].

Imām-al-Ḥaramayn [N, f. 39a] interpreted the "mounting upon the throne" as taking possession of it by force (al-istilā’ ‘alayhā bi-l-qahr) and determining (tadbīr) that it neither move
nor stand still nor occupy any determined place nor be qualified with any other attribute except by the will of God who creates these attributes. The reason for singling out the throne with a special expression is not that it differs from other creatures in dependence upon the creator, but that it is the greatest of creatures, and compared to it all other creatures are like a ring tossed in the desert; so that someone might imagine that it has a power and dignity to take care of itself (fī tadbīr nafsīhi) independently of God. If it is pointed out that the throne cannot help or hurt itself or anything else, then the same is all the more true for the rest of creation. This is one of several well-known interpretations of this verse.

Imām-al-Ḥaramayn interpreted God's "hand" as his power, on the basis of the verse "We built the heavens with hands" (51:47) and the usage of Arabic speech. The term "hand" was used in the verse concerning Adam's creation in order to honor him over all other creatures. Abū-Sanūsī illustrates this interpretation by various hadiths, and explains the purpose (ḥikma) of the usage "two hands" of God by having one hand refer to God's power and the other to his favor (ni'ma). Another interpretation of the dual is that it is simple metaphor (majz), similar to the use of the plural to intensify (ta'zīm) something.

Imām-al-Ḥaramayn ʿA, f. 40b interpreted the term "eye" as God's knowledge or watchfulness and protection (al-kilā' wa-l-ḥafẓ). In the verse "It (the boat of Noah) runs before our eyes" (54:14) "our eyes" (a'yūn) can be interpreted in four different ways: 1) as knowledge, 2) as watchfulness and care (al-kilā' wa-r-ri'ya), while the plural can be for intensification (ta'zīm), or for the number of passengers on the boat, or for the number of angels God ordered to accompany the boat; 3) as the several
fountains (a'yūn) of water which burst upon the earth, or 4) as
the individual men (a'yūn) who were on the boat.

God's "face" is interpreted as his essence or his existence,
since this is the root of his being everlasting and the subject
of glory and honor.

1. Life, and the eternity and unity of every attribute:
   (N. 25) Life (ḥayāt), says §/P. 108-109/, differs from the
other positive attributes in that it is not related to any object
besides inhering in the subject; for instance, knowledge requires
something to be known. Both inhering in an essence (al-qīyām
bi-dh-dhāt) and, in the case of the other attributes, being
related to an object (at-ta'ālluq) are essential-properties (nafsī)
of the attributes.

W /F. 41a/ says that it places life last among the attributes
because it is the condition (sharṭ) of the others and is known
(madlūl) through the others. W is followed by §§ /P. 23/, but
K /P. 193/, § /P. 108/, and M /F. 215b/ place life before hearing,
sight, and speech.

(N. 26) The keystone of the argument for the attribute of
life is that it is a condition of the other attributes from which
they cannot be separated. If the other attributes are from
eternity and everlasting, then life also must be from eternity
and everlasting.

(N. 27) After showing that life and the preceding attributes
are from eternity and everlasting, says W /F. 41b/, this is the
place to show in general that all God's attributes, those we
know and those we do not know, likewise are from eternity and
everlasting, so that it is impossible for God's essence to be qualified with anything which comes into existence. Towards this conclusion there are three demonstrations Nos. 27, 28, and 29 respectively:

Regarding the first demonstration, to suppose that anything possesses an attribute requires that it have a capability for it. But if something has a capability for an attribute, it is legitimate for it to be qualified with the attribute as long as it exists (muṣḥibatan li-wujūdihī), since its capability for the attribute is essential (nafṣī, dhāti) and does not come upon the subject after the subject's existence. For God to have the capability for an attribute demands that he have the attribute, but this is not true of creatures, because in them an attribute is admissible, not necessary, and therefore not always existent.

(N. 28) The second demonstration is clear enough in the Creed.

(N. 29) Regarding the third demonstration, W [F. 42b] notes that whether the supposed attribute is a perfection or an imperfection in itself, it is an imperfection and an impossibility for God by the fact of its having come into being.

(N. 30) This number is an objection to the third demonstration, and is clear in the Creed.

(N. 31) In the argument for the unity (waḥda) of each attribute, says W [F. 43b], the impossibility of the conjunction of two like things applies to attributes not related to objects. The impossibility of achieving what has been achieved is a
special argument for the unity of the attributes related to objects.

Attributes differ only according to a difference in subjects, or objects to which they are related, or times. Otherwise they must be one. For example, knowledge is related to an infinite number of things knowable, but knowledge can only be one, since an infinite number of knowledges is a superfluous multiplication of what is alike, whereas a finite number of knowledges is incommensurate with the infinite number of objects.

K [Pp. 289-300] discusses the same question and gives similar explanations and arguments. The objection is considered [P. 296] that speech has only a generic unity, containing the seven species of commanding, forbidding, announcing, requesting information, promising, threatening, and appealing. This is said to be the opinion of 'Al. b. Sa'id b. Kullâb, but another opinion of his is that these seven are acts of the one attribute of speech, which alone is from eternity. The latter opinion was criticized because there cannot be speech from eternity without one of the seven; also requesting information, promising, and threatening are reduceable to announcing. Others defend this opinion, saying that speech is called a commanding or a forbidding only when something commanded or forbidden exists, not that speech has these for an object only when they exist.

Al-Isfarâ'înî reduced all seven kinds of speech to forms of announcement of reward or punishment. This is in opposition to al-Bâqillânî who insisted that there is no necessary connection between commanding or forbidding and rewarding or punishing.
F. Oneness (waḥdāniyya):

a. Procedure and meaning:

(N. 32) Explaining the procedure, W (F. 44b) says: "The treatment of God's oneness has been put in this last place because its proof depends upon much of what has preceded. Thus the formula of unity (kalimat at-tawḥīd) 'There is no deity but God' (la ilāha illā llāh) is composed of a denial and an affirmation; what is denied of everything other than God and affirmed exclusively of him is divinity and its properties (al-ilāhiyya wa-khawāṣṣuhā); so that the formula 'There is no deity but God' includes the meaning that there is nothing from eternity in its essence and attributes but God, and there is nothing whose essence and attributes are necessarily everlasting but God, and there is nothing other from all things that come into being but God - that is, he is not a body nor inhering in a body, nor in a direction or having directions within himself, nor modified (wa-lā yukayyaf) or imaginable (wa-lā yatawahham) - and there is nothing self-subsistent - that is, in no need of a subject or a particularizing agent - but God, and there is nothing possessing power over everything possible with a power from eternity but God, and there is nothing knowing an infinite number of things knowable with a single knowledge which is from eternity but God. The same applies to everything which necessarily belongs to God.¹

"Therefore the best order to follow (al-lā'iq al-alyaq fī t-tartīb) is to explain first how the existence of the Deity of the world is known, then what he is fittingly qualified with,

¹§, pp. 190-219, develops the idea that all the attributes of God can be derived from the first part of the shahāda.
and afterwards that he who is known necessarily to possess these qualifications can only be one. Therefore we placed first the affirmation of its characteristics (ikhawâqṣi-hâ). Then, in this chapter, we began to explain God's uniqueness (inîfirâd) in that.²

W parenthetically defines divinity (ulûhiyya) as an expression of God's existence as necessary and in no need of an agent, while everything else is in need of him. Or, if you like, divinity is God's freedom from need of anything else, while everything else is in need of him (istighnâ’ mawlânâ ‘an ghayrihi wa-ḥtiyâj kull mā siwâhu ilayhi).³

K (Pp. 321-331) asks whether God's oneness can be proved from authority as well as from intelligibility. Imâm-al-Ḥaramayn and ar-Râzî said that it could, but Ibn-at-Tilimsânî, commenting on ar-Râzî’s Maʿāmil, said that it couldn't, since if God's unity is not known it is not certain that a miracle proving a prophet's truthfulness comes from God or from elsewhere.

A contemporary (= Ibn-Zakri), in his commentary on the 'Aqīda of Ibn-al-Ḥajib, objected to Ibn-at-Tilimsânî on the grounds that 1) a miracle is an essential proof of truthfulness inseparable from what it proves, and 2) even granted that a miracle's proving the truthfulness of a prophet depends upon knowing God's unity, the miracle can prove them both at once.

The first reason is based on the opinion of al-Īsfarâ’inî, and is weak, as even ar-Râzî pointed out in his Maʿālim, because one of the bases of a miracle's being a proof is knowledge of God's unity, as is also explained by al-Muqtaraḥ in his

²K has the same position for oneness, but § (P. 89) and §§ (P. 19) take up oneness as the last among the negative attributes.

³§ (P. 210) gives pretty much the same words as the latter definition.
commentary on the *Irshād*.

The second reason is wrong on four counts: 1) A miracle does not prove the unity of God directly, but only after reasoning that there could be no effect in the world if there were more than one deity. 2) This argument depends purely upon intelligibility and not on authority as he wishes to show. 3) A miracle obviously does not prove the oneness of God and the truthfulness of a prophet from the same aspect; but if it proves them from two different aspects the one depends upon the other in a circle. 4) The latter circle comes back to the circle of authority and intelligibility which was supposed to be avoided.

For a definition of unity (*waḥda*), K (p. 300) rejects al-Bayḍāwī's definition "the state of a thing co as not to be divisible into things with the same essence as each other" (kawn ash-shay' bi-ḥayth lā yanqasim illā umūr mutashārika fī 1-māhiyya), since it is too wide, and acccents the definition of Imām-al-Ḥaramayn in his *Irshād*: "a thing which is indivisible" (ash-shay' allādhī lā yanqasim), that is, at all. This is a theological definition as opposed to that of the Philosophers. "Thing" is distinguished from non-being. "Indivisible" merely explains the meaning of "thing", since something divisible, according to Sunnites, is two things, not one. Al-Bāqillānī and Imām-al-Ḥaramayn are to have said that unity is an attribute of essential-property (nafsīyya), but the opinion that it is a negative one is correct.

As for the kinds of unity (K, p'. 302-304), something one is:

- indivisible in every way = truly one (al-wāḥid al-ḥaqīqī)
- divisible in some way:
- but unapplicable to many = one in individuality (bi-sh-shakhā);
  such an individual is divisible into parts:
- which are equal in name and definition = one in continuity
  (bi-l-ittiṣāl)
- which are different, as bodily members = one in assemblage
  (ijtīmā'ī) or composition (tarkīb) or binding (irtībāṭ)
- applicable to many:
- as their very essence (māhiyya) = one in species (bi-n-nawī)
- as a part of their essence:
  - inclusive of two or more realities = one in genus (bi-l-
  jins)
  - restricted to one reality = one in specific difference
    (bi-l-fašl)
- as extraneous to them = one in an accidental ('araq):
  - where the uniting factor is borne by several things,
    such as whiteness by cotton and snow = one in the thing
    borne (bi-l-maḥmūl)
  - where the uniting factor is the subject of diverse
    elements, such as a man who laughs and writes = one in
    subject (bi-l-mawdū').

b. Oneness in essence and attributes:

(N. 33) Oneness in essence (waḥdāniyyat adh-dhāt), says W
/F. 46a/, means the denial of multiplicity whether continuous or
discrete (nafy at-ta‘addud muttāṣilān kān aw munfāṣilān), that
is, his essence is not composed in itself nor can there exist
another separate essence which is its like. In this number of
the Creed only the negation of continuous multiplicity was men-
tioned.

Oneness in attributes means that God alone possesses them,
while it is impossible for any other essence to be qualified with attributes like them.

Oneness in acts means that God alone causes the existence of all things that are, without any intermediacy, while nothing else has any effect whatsoever.

§ [Pp. 90-92] has a clearer distinction of the points involved, combining oneness in attributes with the negation of discrete quantity: The first point is the denial of multiplicity within God's essence, and concerns continuous quantity (al-kam al-muttaṣil). The second is the denial of any peer (naẓIr) to God in his essence or attributes, and concerns discrete quantity (al-kam al-munfaṣil). The third is God's uniqueness (infiṣād) in acting, that is, he alone causes existence and produces all effects without any intermediacy.

(N. 34) This section of the Creed gives two reasons to show that there exists no one like God. According to the first demonstration, says W [F. 47a], two things cannot be separate unless they have something to differentiate them. If the difference is necessary, the two are not essentially alike; if the difference is admissible, it has come into being, and then they both are in need of a particularizing agent, and cannot be divine.

An objection to the second demonstration is to suppose a third possibility: that the collectivity (mājmū') of the two deities acts, and not each separately - which would be repeating what has been achieved (taḥṣil al-ḥāṣil) - nor only one of the

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4 This is the subject of N. 33 in W.
5 This is the subject of N. 34 in W.
6 This is the subject of Nos. 35-39 in W.
two - which would require one of the two equals to be stronger than the other.

The answer to this objection is that each of the two in the collectivity must have a certain effect. If the effect of each is the same, we once again have a repetition of what has been achieved; if it is different, we have a distinction of activity, which is impossible. Or if we suppose that neither member of the collectivity has any effect, then the collectivity itself cannot have any effect.

Besides, such a collectivity would have to be composed of two numerically distinct essences; but even a composition of two conjoined essences is impossible in God.

Besides, the collectivity would have to possess several partial powers and wills; but that is splitting a substantive attribute, which is obviously impossible.

The example of several people putting their energy together to lift something heavy proves nothing, because their power has no effect; only God works, and according to the circumstances he chooses.

A second objection is that the two deities could each have their separate worlds in which both agree not to interfere with each other. The answer is that the supposition that God can voluntarily limit his power is impossible, because divine power necessarily extends to all things.

K (Pp. 331-333) gives another demonstration for there being one God: It has been proven that each of God's attributes is one. But if there were several deities the attributes would consequently be infinite, according to the number of possible things - and this is impossible - or finite - and would then need an agent to determine their number.
An objection is that existing things are in fact finite; therefore an infinite number of deities does not follow. The answer is that this makes non-existent possibilities impossible by making the corresponding extension of the number of divine makers impossible. The infinite number of possibilities in question is not the never ending future (bi-ḥasab ‘adam al-inqitā ’), such as the joys of heaven, but an actual infinite (bi-ḥasab al-ijtimā’), because the deity is from eternity.

K (pp. 308-317) gives other arguments similar to those in W, and by way of corollary quotes Ibn-at-Tilimsānī in rejecting the position of the dualists (ath-thanawīyya), who maintained a principle of good and a principle of evil, a position also common to the Mu'tazilites, who limited God to doing good.

c. Oneness in acting:

(N. 35) This section, says W (F. 48b), shows the oneness of God in his acts, using the same reason for the oneness of his essence and attributes. Since one effect cannot come from two agents (li-stiḥāla waqū‘ athar wāḥid bi-mu'aththirayn), for a creature to produce an effect its power would have to be stronger (murajjiḥ) than the power of God with regard to that effect, which is impossible.

`s-Sanūsī then expatiates on the conclusion that no creature produces any effect, repeating basically what was said in the Creed and elsewhere.

Induction (tawallud) is an act which exists outside the subject of voluntary motion, for instance the motion of a key or a sword upon the motion of the hand. According to the Qadarites an induced act is produced indirectly, by the mediacy (bi- wāsiṭa) of voluntary motion which is produced directly in the
hand by the created power of the person. According to them the reality of induction is the existence of something which comes into being from something subject to a power which has begun to exist (wujūd ḥādith ‘an maqdūr bi-l-qudra al-ḥāditha). The thing subject (maqdūr) to the power which has come into being is, in this case, the hand.

The answer to the hypothesis of induction is, briefly, that if a created power has no effect whatsoever on the acts of its own subject, by much greater reason it has no effect on motion which occurs outside its subject, such as in a sword. As-Sanūsī refers the reader to K for more on the subject.

Speaking of induction, K /Pp. 361-372/ specifies the Qadarites as the Mu'tazilites. They said that the act created (mukhtara') by man in himself is the activating-link (sabab) of acts outside himself. The only case of an act induced within himself is knowledge, which is induced via reasoning. As-Sanūsī blames them for taking the idea of induction from the Philosophers, and merely to have given it a new name.

Imām-al-ⓘramayn, in his Shāmil, said that the Mu'tazilites were in agreement that an induced act is the act of the agent of the activating-link (al-mutawallad fi'l fā'il as-sabab), but al-Muqtarāb gives examples of exceptions, such as an-Ḥaghām, who said these acts are predicatable (muqāfil) of God, although without being his. Another exception is Ḥafṣ al-Fard, who said that non-intended results were not the act of the agent of the activating-link.

A related problem K /Pp. 364-365/ discusses is the time in which a power is related to an induced act. Some say that the person has control over it only until the activating-link is produced, but when this is produced the induced act becomes
necessary and is out of the person's control. Others say that the person has control beyond the production of the activating-link until the induced act takes place.

Another problem was whether colors and tastes could be induced. Thumāma b. Ashrash said these had no agent. Mu'ammar said that all accidentals arise from the nature of bodies except the will; his position was that there are four ways of induction: 1) pressure (i'timād), 2) proximity, under certain conditions, 3) reasoning with regard to knowledge, and 4) weakness, resulting in pain. Al-Jubbā'ī gave motion as an inducing principle (muwallid), while Abū-Hāshib gave pressure.

The Mu'tazilites also differed as to whether there could be induction in the acts of God. Some said this was impossible, since God's powerfulness (qādiriyah) extends to everything outside himself by one relationship. Others, more in accord with the Mu'tazilite position, allowed it on the grounds that there was no obstacle to it.

In refuting these positions /K, pp. 366-368/ refers to the previously established principle that every effect comes immediately from God, and then shows some consequences of the Mu'tazilite position, such as having one effect come from two agents, and attributing an effect to an agent who may not know or will the effect, and may even have died before the effect takes place; also they attribute power to effect life or death to a creature instead of to God.

There follows /K, pp. 368-370/ the refutation of special objections, such as the appearance of induced motion in nature. This is merely God's customary way of acting, while some of the examples given, such as striking fire by flint, are not attributable to man's power at all.
The Mu'a'tazilites differed as to how much pressure (i.e. force) is required to move something. The older Mu'a'tazilites said an equal pressure is required to push something right or left as to lift it. Abü-Hāshim rightly rejected this, but the basic assumption of both positions is wrong in that a body can be at rest while it receives some partial movement (ṣaraka - equated with force), even though inadequate according to them.

Regarding several people lifting something, al-Ka'bî and 'Abbūd aṣ-Ṣaymarî said that each person carries a part which the others do not, but most Mu'a'tazilites said that all share in carrying the same weight. The former are wrong because it is impossible to determine which part would be carried by each single person; the latter are wrong because they suppose one effect coming from two agents.

(N. 36) This section 21, f. 49b/ is a particular application of the preceding, and shows that God has no associate (lā sharīk) in his acts of rewarding and punishing. Not only do men have no effect in producing their acts of obedience or disobedience, but also there is no connection of intelligibility between these acts of God's rewarding or punishing. The relation between them comes simply from revealed-law and God's choice, while his determination to reward or punish someone precedes the existence of the person and the existence of the sign (amâra). There is no defect in God's will or power because he punishes someone. As-Sanûsî ends this section with a description of hell and a prayer.

K (Pp. 354-360/ takes up the objection of the Qadarites and Mu'a'tazilites that people are rewarded or punished for acts they have no control over. After an answer similar to what is said
in this section of II, the prayer of one condemned and complaining that he had no control over his acts (P. 37) is countered by the prayer of one condemned and complaining that God had done wrong to give him the power to disobey (P. 358). The compulsion the Mu'tazilites sought to avoid traps them again when they leave the determination of choice to activating-links such as cupidity (shahwa) or firm resolution (taṣmīm al-'azm), which are all created by God. God's driving (imdād) of a person in accord with the person's will and the appearance of liberty is called destining-to-happiness (tawfīq) or abandonment (khidhlān).

The tenet that God alone produces all acts applies also to acquisition (kasb), where revealed-law states that a person gains title to (yaktasib li-) his good and bad acts. Moreover revealed-law encharges him and rewards or punishes him only for what he has control over (bi-mā yaqdir 'alayhi), and does not impute to him the acts which he does not will or has no control over.

Acquisition is limited by the scope or object of a person's power (maqādīr), even though this power is without effect, and is the subject (maḥall) of the five categories of enchargeement, namely, obligatory, forbidden, disapproved, recommended, and permitted acts. What falls outside these categories, such as the color of one's skin, is not something one can gain a title to.

An objection is that revealed-law commands some things, such as striking non-believers, where the blow occurs in the non-believer, outside the subject of the person's power. The answer is that the blow happens because of what a person has
acquired (huwa wâqi' bi-l-muktasab li-l-'abd), such as his movements, on the occasion of which God creates the effect.

K (Pp. 342-344) quotes al-Muqtaraḍ to explain that a person's power, like all accidentals, has no permanence in time, but each moment is succeeded by its like. The difficulty of an act being related to a power which ceased to exist is resolved by its being related directly to the power which exists simultaneously with it, and by extension to the likes of this power which preceded it.

There are two proofs for the existence of a power concomitant to a person's voluntary action. The first, as has been indicated, is from revealed-law, which encharges a person only with acquirable acts (innamā kallaf bi-l-muktasab min al-af'āl).

The second proof is from intelligibility, which is our perception of the self-evident difference between compulsory and voluntary motion (bayn ḥarakat al-iqṭirār... wa-bayn ḥarakat al-ikhtiyār). K (P. 347) attributes these two terms to the Irshād of Imām-al-Ḥaramayn, which was followed by al-Muqtaraḍ. But as-Sanūsī says that the expression "motion to which one gains title" (ḥarakat al-iktisāb) would be better than "voluntary motion".

The "complete examination", continues W, to account for the difference between the two kinds of motion rules out first of all the reality of motion itself, which in the two cases is the same (li-farq tamāthulihā). Secondly, the difference cannot be the very essence of the one who is in motion (nafs dhāt al-mutaḥarrik), since this remains the same in the case of either kind of motion. Therefore the difference must be an additional attribute (ṣīfa zā'ida).

Among attributes we must rule out a disposition (ḥāl),
since a disposition does not come upon a substance by itself alone (lā taṭra' bi-mujarradihā 'alā l-jawhar). If the difference is therefore an accidental (‘arağ), it must have life as its condition, since only something living can have voluntary motion. But it cannot be knowledge or life or speech, since these exist even in the event of compulsory motion or in the absence of motion altogether. Nor can it be the will, since voluntary motion is found even where there is no will, as in absent-mindedness (dhuhûl) and sleep, which certainly are not compulsory acts, and therefore must be voluntary; besides, in these states a person still has mastery over (yatamakkan min) doing or omitting an act. Also the difference cannot be the bodily health of the one in motion (qiṣâha bunyat al-mutaharrik), since this is not lost in the case of compulsory motion, as when someone else moves your hand.

Therefore there must be another attribute (ma‘nâ) from the preceding attributes which is technically called power (qudra). This attribute is absent in compulsory acts.

(N. 38) The Jabarites are wrong not only in denying the distinction between voluntary and compulsory acts, but also, by this fact, in denying any subject of enchargement, which is a created power, as the Qur'ān verse says "God encharges a soul only with what it is capable of" (2:286).

The Qadarites likewise go against intelligibility and authority in denying the exclusiveness of God's power. K argues against them saying that to make an act result from the power of man changes this act from something possible to God to something impossible to him. Also what is weaker, the power of man, would prevail over God, who is stronger
The Sunnite position continues to steer a middle course in saying that a man with power is someone forced but is in the mold of one who chooses (al-‘abd al-qādir... majbūr fī qālib mukhtār). Choice is especially noticeable in the case of revulsion (kārāhiyya) from an act, or strong resolution (‘azm wa-taṣwīm) for an act.

Because the Sunnites hold that in appearance (bi-hassab aţ-ţāhir) man has choice, but inwardly and according to intelligible reality (fī l-ma‘nā wa-l-ţaqliya) he is forced, the Mu‘tazilites called the Sunnites too Jabarites. But whereas the Sunnites say that the intellect alone can perceive that man is actually forced in his apparent choice, the true Qadarites say that both feeling (ţass) and the intellect know this. Yet, say the Sunnites, because God creates the principles of acting (mabādi‘ l-l-f‘l), that is, a power which is related to acts without effect on them, it is legitimate to demand or forbid acts, as is clear from Qur‘ān verses such as 3:70-71, 2:28, 10:34 etc. (fa-anna tu‘fakün), and 10:32 etc. (fa-annā tuṣrāfūn).

The term "Magi of this people" (majūs ĥādhihi l-umma) is from the ḥadīth reported by ‘Al. b. ‘Umar. The Magi asserted an agent of good and another agent of evil; likewise the Qadarites denied that evil comes from God (ma‘nī nisbat ash-sharr ila llāh), and said that it comes from the devil by motivation and instigation (tasabbuban wa-sa‘āyan), but from men directly and in fact (mubāsharatan wa-fi‘lān). Thus the meaning of Qadarites in the ḥadīth applies to the Mu‘tazilites as well as those
ordinarily called Qadarites.

In a remark (tanbih) W adds that some authorities are quoted for maintaining a position contrary to what has been established above. Al-Bāqillānī is to have said that a power which has come into being produces the most particular characteristic of an act (tu'athbir fi akhass waṣf al-fi'il), such as its being prayer (ṣalāt) or robbery (ghaṣb) or adultery (zinā), but not the existence of the act basically (lā fī wujūd aṣl al-fi'il). K /Pp. 337-339/ lists ash-Shahrastānī as accepting this opinion because it avoids the difficulty of the Mu'tazilite position which had man create the existence of an act, which is undifferentiated and has nothing to do with gaining title to the act, whereas al-Bāqillānī's position allows man to effect the moral specification of an act.

At-Taftāzānī continues in his Sharḥ al-Mağṣid ad-dīniyya, relates the same position from al-Isfarā'īnī, except that in denying dispositions (ahwāl), al-Isfarā'īnī refers to the most particular characteristic of an act as its face and expression (al-wajh wa-l-i'tibār), and said that this is effected by a power which comes into being.

Imām-al-Ḥaramayn, moreover, is to have said at the end of his life that a power which has come into being produces the existence of an act according to the will of God (ʾalā mashī'at Allāh).

What is wrong with these opinions is that they are all varieties of (mutasha'ibān) the Qadarite position. Ibn-at-Tilimsānī refuted what was attributed to al-Bāqillānī and al-Isfarā'īnī by saying that whatever is attributed to man's

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effectivity must either be possible—and as such must be referred to God's power like everything else possible—or not possible—and as such is outside the reach of any power. Besides, their theory that the most particular disposition of an act is effected by man does not save them from the fact that the act is forced, since if God does not create the essence (dhāt) of the act, nothing can come from man; but if he does create the essence of the act, man cannot omit the act.

Al-Isfarā'īnī is to have defended his theory by saying that the face and expression of an act are in the intellect (yakūn fī l-'aql). But how can something be intended which has no external existence?

As for the alleged opinion of Imām-al-Ḥaramayn (N, f. 53b), the power which came into being either produces the act by itself—in which case it would have to overcome the power of God—or it produces it by reason of an inhering attribute (ma'na yaqūm bi-hā)—in which case the same question must be asked, or the effect is referred to another quality in a continuous regress. Nor is it possible for a creature's producing an effect to be in accord with the will of God, because to will something means to intend something particularly (fa-l-irada takhṣīṣ al-qāṣd allādhī huwa ma'na l-irada,...). But if the ultimate particularization of an act comes from man, as was maintained, the willing of a thing belongs to man, and not to God.

The opinions (N, f. 54a) which have been attributed to the above mentioned imāms are not authentically theirs. If they spoke of such theories it was only in disputation and research, not to affirm them, as a. Yy. ash-Sharīf at-Tilimsānī observed in his Sharḥ al-Āsār al-'aqūliyya. At-Taftāzānī also, in his Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid ad-dīnīyya, denies that Imām-al-Ḥaramayn ever
held the opinion attributed to him; this is also clear from what Imām-al-Ḥaramayn teaches in his Irshād.

Another reason for the defence of al-Bāqillānī and al-Isfarā'īnī is that in refuting the Jabarites they used metaphor and exaggeration (majāz wa-mubālagha) to affirm the existence of a created power in man. They said that if this power has no effectivity in making the act exist, nevertheless it has an important legal value in determining voluntary acts to which a person gains title. In legal science, talk of causes or grounds (‘ilal) of laws in the chapter of analogy has been the occasion of similar misconceptions.

Satan ĀN, f. 54b/ slipped erroneous opinions (aqwāl fāṣida) into the books of some learned imāms, such as the Ḥiyā' of al-Ghazālī, seeking scandal or envious to draw men to their imitation (li-qaṣd al-fitna aw ḥasadān li-tazhīd li-n-nās fi l-iqtīdā' bi-him) and to devotion to the precious jewels (al-jawāhir an-nafīsa) contained in their writings, the sighting (tasādīd) of which is considered a wonder (karāma). Such writers also distorted the ḥadīths. Rather than seeking fancy theories, men should be content with the received doctrine.

(N. 39) This section ĀN, f. 55a/ contains details in which the Philosophers and natural scientists erred. Many people followed them who were ignorant of this science kalam/, but claimed to know other sciences which made them superior to the common mass of Muslims. The text is clear and needs no commentary. The demonstration for all of it is the same as the demonstration for God’s being alone in producing any effect. K LP pp. 179-180/, nevertheless, quotes detailed arguments from Ibn-at-Tilimsānī’s Sharḥ al-Ma‘āmil in refutation of Ibn-Sīnā’s
ar-Risāla at-ṭibbiyya on some of the examples mentioned in this section of the Creed. It then says that the last point, on whether error in this question makes one an unbeliever, is well known and documented (manṣūḥ) in the books of the learned.

It then quotes, as did K (Pp. 183-185), a passage from Ibn-Dahhāq's commentary on the Irshād which sums up the teaching thus far established by listing and refuting three ways in which people err concerning God. These are:

- the opinion that the world came from God as an effect (maʿālūl) from a cause (ʿilla)
- the opinion that the creator cannot be distinct from the world
- association (shirk), or saying that God is multiple, and this in four ways:
  - asserting the multiplication (taʿaddud) of the essence of God, which is the error of the Christians in asserting hypostases; these are three, creating by their threeness, yet they are three and one (wa-innahā thalātha takhlīq bi-thalāθatiḥā wa-hiya thalāθa wāḥid)
  - asserting deities the serving and honoring of whom brings one close to God; this is the worship of idols and angels
  - the attribution (iǧāfa) of acts to things other than God:
    - to heavenly bodies (aflāk) effectivity on the processes of nature
    - to natural bodies, such as fire and food, the natural effects which accompany them, whether the effect is supposed to result from the nature of the body by itself or from a power which God created in the body
    - to man the creation of his acts, which is the position of the Muʿtazilites. There is a difference of opinion whether this position makes one an unbeliever; the more probable
opinion (al-aṣḥār), which is that of al-Bāqillānī, is that it does. saying, as do the Bāṭinītes, that God has a modification (kayfīyya) which only he knows. But if this modification is in his essence, God must have a shape (šakl), which is contrary to his oneness. If it is in his attributes, the only possible modification is to give it genus (tajnisūhā) and species (tanwî‘uḥā); but what is from eternity is not the genus of anything or the species of a genus.

In J 33b, f. 112b/ and M 202a/ as-Sanûsî gives a different list of six kinds of association (shirk), and the moral determination of each:

1) independence (istīqûlāl), which is the affirmation of two independent deities, as the association of the Magi - unbelief -

2) partition (tab`īd), which is saying that the deity is composed of deities, as the association of the Christians - unbelief -

3) approximation (taqrîb), which is worshiping something other than God in order to come close to him, as the association of the earlier representatives of the Jāhiliyya - unbelief -

4) blind-acceptance (taqîlîd), which is worshiping something other than God by following another, as the association of the later representatives of the Jāhiliyya - unbelief -

5) activating-links (asbâb), which is attributing effectivity to customary activating-links, as the association of the Philosophers and natural scientists and their followers - the moral determination is distinguished, as in the Creed -

6) objectives (aghrâd), which is doing something for someone other than God - disobedience only.

J 33b, ff. 347b-350b/ has a still more detailed discussion.

8 The terminology used is that of Qur’ān 39:3.
of various errors and differing opinions on their moral determinations, based on al-Āmidī, Ibn-ʿArāfa, and al-Qarāfī's Qawā'id. As-Sanūsī's own remark (qultu) is that the differences of opinion arise from a person's maintaining an opinion which he believes to be flawless (qāl qawlan yaʿtaqid fī hi bi-zaʿmihi ʿānnahu kamāl), but in fact has a logical conclusion (lāzim) which is unbelief. Should the person be regarded as maintaining the conclusion or not? Or should one distinguish between an obvious and a hidden conclusion (bayn al-lāzim al-jāli wa-l-ḥāfī). The more probable opinion (al-aghār) is to refrain from judgement, since that is safer — unless there is a decisive text or a consensus concerning a case of unbelief.

The question of God's provision (rizq) and the term (ajal) of living things, which is related to God's oneness in acting, is discussed in J L18, ff. 225b-228a/.

Provision (rizq) J L18, 18a, ff. 225b-226a/ is defined in the Irshād of Imām-al-Ḥaramayn as "anything from which someone derives benefit, even if he does so by transgression" (kull mā ntafaʿ bi-hi muntafaʿ wa-l-ṣaw kān bi-taʿadd). This definition is basically against the Muʿtazilites, who said that there is no provision for animals, since they do not possess anything. But this is clearly against the Qur'ān verse "There is no animal on earth but that God provides for it" L11:5/.

The Muʿtazilites also insisted that provision be of what is licit (ḥalāl). At-Taftāzānī's Sharḥ Aqidat an-Nasafi is quoted against this and its being based on the false principle that God must choose what is good.

The term (ajal) J L18b, ff. 226b-228a/ in ordinary usage (ʿurfan), is the end of the time of life (muntahā zaman al-
The main point is that the term of one's life is decreed (muqaddar) and known by God and cannot be changed. This is, says at-Taftāzānī, in opposition to Mu'tazilites as al-Ka'bī, who said that man has two terms, death and being killed; likewise the Philosophers said that animals have a natural term (ṭabī'īyyan) and a term when they are the object of prey (iftirāsiyyan). The Irshād of Imām-al-Ḥaramayn says that according to many Mu'tazilites one's term is cut short by a killer; others say that if the person were not killed he would have died then anyway.

The Mu'tazilites posed several objections:

1) There is a ḥadīth which promises a longer life because of certain acts of obedience. The answer is that God knew a person's acts of obedience in decreeing his term; these acts are signs (amārāt) of God's decree.

2) If a person's term is decreed, than a killer is doing God's will, and should not be punished. The answer is that the killer's act is not a cause of God's punishing.

3) There is the Qur'ān verse that after God created man "then he decreed a term, and there is a designated term with him" (6:2). The answer is that there are not two terms for one person, but the first term is that of the individual, and the second is that of the world.

4) There is also the Qur'ān verse "No one's life is lengthened or shortened but that it is in a book". The answer is that lengthening and shortening refer to what is customarily long or short, not that there is any change in God's decree. Or lengthening and shortening concern the written sheets (qūḥuf) held by the angels.
G. What is admissible concerning God: providing what is good, being seen:

a. Principles:

(N. 40) W /F. 56b/ claims that its rendering (tarjama) "what is admissible concerning God" (mä yawż fi ḥaqqihī ta‘ālā) is better than that of Imām-al-Ḥaramayn in the Irshād, where he has the chapter "what is admissible of God" (al-qawl fīmā yawż ‘alā llāh), because the latter causes one to imagine (Thām) that God is qualified with an admissible attribute. But admissibility touches God's acts only in so far as they have a relation to some of his attributes (wa-l-jawāz innamā yataṭārraq ilā af‘ālihi min ḥayth innahā muta‘alliqa li-ba‘d qīfātihi), but does not touch his essence or even an attribute inhering in it in any way whatsoever. Ṣq /P. 24/ explains that admissibility touches only the implementive relationship (at-ta‘ālluq at-tanjizi) of God's power and will; this relationship is not from eternity, and refers (wa-marji‘u) only to the emanation (qudūr) of beings from his power and will.

b. The good and the best (aq-galāṭh wa-l-aglaţh):

(N. 41) The good (galāţ), says W /F. 57a/, is the opposite of the bad (fasād), while the best (aglaţh) is the opposite of the good the way what is particular is opposed to what is general. The reason for considering this question separately is to answer the Mu‘tazilites; the Baghdadians among them said that God necessarily provides what is best for men both in the next world (dīn) and this (dunyā), while those from Baṣra said he necessarily provides what is best only for the next world. Ḵ /Pp. 417-418/ explains this position as obliging God to kindness (luţf), that is, to create for an encharged person what
will make the side of obedience preponderate, yet not to the point of coercing him.

Their remote principle (al-‘umda al-ṣawwā), continues W, is to judge what is absent by what is present (qiyyās al-ghā'ib ‘alā sh-shāhīd) without a basis of comparison (bi-ghayr jāmi‘). Thus they maintain that if a wise man (ṭakīm) wants obedience and decides to give him the means to obey, then doesn’t do so, he will be condemned as stupid; likewise if an enemy wishes to return to obedience, one must treat him with neither harshness (ghilāṣ) nor softness (lin) but in a way to win him. Or if a man invites someone to dinner, and knows that if he meets him cheerfully and with a smile he will accept, it is necessary for him to do this and not the opposite.

In answer we say that their position rests on the false principle that to command something entails willing what is commanded; but that is false, since God commands unbelievers to believe, but he does not will that they should believe. Even if we grant that God wills everything that he commands, it is not necessary for God to do always what is best for men, since he is in no need of friends or enemies and gains nothing from the perfection of creation.

A stronger indication of the fact that God does not necessarily do what is best for men is the fact of evil in this world and the next. If the Muʿtazilites object that enchargement, difficult trials and scandals (at-taklīf ‘aw al-ibtilā’ bi-sh-shadā'id wa-l-mihan) are the best for men since by them they gain a higher rank and place in the next world, we answer that God could give them all this without any trials, and could create them in heaven from the start.

Besides, it would be better for someone never to receive
enchargement than to receive it and be left to commit crimes and then spend eternity in hell only because he is a weak man overcome by desires and appeals which he cannot resist.

Besides, if they say that enchargement is best for men, then why does God let children die and never reach the age of enchargement? If they answer that he lets them die because he knows that they will be unbelievers if they grow up, we say in return, why does God let other children reach the age of enchargement and if fact become unbelievers? K [P. 429-420] gives this argument in full, which is none other than the famous dialogue between al-Ash'arî and al-Jubbâ'î.

Besides, continues W, according to the Mu'tazilite position God's causing holy men and prophets to die, and Satan's tempting (tabghiba) of the erring until the day of the resurrection would have to be the best for men.

Thus it is clear that God's determinations cannot be measured by the standard (mizân) of the Mu'tazilites.

c. Seeing God:

(N. 42) Qur'ân verses affirming the vision (ru'ya) of God, says W [7. 58a-b], are:
- "On that day their faces shall be bright, looking to the Lord" [75:23]; on this verse, K [P. 374] rejects al-Jubbâ'î's interpretation of یکا as the singular of یکا.
- Moses said "Lord show me, and I will look at you" [7:143], which supposes that the vision of God is possible, since it is forbidden to ask for what is impossible, and the saints are infallible.
- "Those who do good shall have what is good and more" [10:26], where "what is good" is interpreted as heaven (janna), and
"more" is interpreted as vision of God.

- "You will recognize in their faces the brightness of bliss" /83:24/, where "brightness" is interpreted as vision.
- "Certainly not! on that day they will be screened from their Lord" /83:15/, which implies that the others, the believers will see God.

W also quotes several hadiths with the same purport. K /Pp. 376-388/ quotes from Ibn-at-Tilimsānī on the meaning of the Qur'ān verse "Eyes do not perceive him" /6:103/. The Mu'tazilites used this verse to deny the fact and the possibility of seeing God. Ar-Rāzī gave two answers: 1) that the word "perceive" here means comprehensive knowledge (iḥṣāʿa), which is impossible; 2) that the negative is a negation of generality (salb al-ʿumūm min bāb al-kull), not a general negation (ʿumūm as-salb min bāb al-kulliyya); thus it denies that God is seen in this world, or that unbelievers will see him, but does not deny that believers will see him in the next world.

Ibn-at-Tilimsānī says that the second answer is very weak, and argues against it from a logical and grammatical basis /P. 381/. As-Sanūsī's contemporary in Tilimsān (= Ibn-Zakri), in his commentary on the 'Aqīda of Ibn-al-Ḥājib, argued against Ibn-at-Tilimsānī. As-Sanūsī replies to Ibn-Zakri /Pp. 383-388/, attacking his reasoning and referring to the grammatical authorities al-Qazwīnī, following as-Sakkākī, and at-Taftāzānī's long commentary on the Talkhīs of al-Qazwīnī.

W /F. 58b-59a/ gives a well known (mashhūr) proof from intelligibility for the admissibility of seeing God; K /P. 388/ attributes it to Ibn-at-Tilimsānī. Since vision has for its object both substances and accidentals, and its object must be
existent, there must be a cause (‘illa) for vision being related to both substances and accidentals, since there cannot be two reasons for one thing. The unity of vision cannot be sought in the fact that the object has come into being (al-ḥudūth), since this presupposes non-existence, which is outside the scope of vision. Therefore the cause for the possibility (qiṣṭa) of vision being related to these diverse objects is their existence. But God exists. Therefore he is visible.

Many late theologians, such as ar-Rāzī, dismiss this reasoning as weak. He offered many arguments against it, most of which at-Taftāzānī rejects (yandafi' aktharahā) with Imām-al-Ḥaramayn’s observation that the meaning of cause (‘illa) here is only what permits (yuṣliḥ) vision to be related to its objects, not that it produces any effect, as most others understood.

K 392/ quoting Ibn-at-Tilimsānī states two objections from ar-Rāzī’s Ma‘ālim: 1) that substances and accidentals have in common their having been created; but God does not share in this. 2) By touch we can perceive dimensions and temperatures; but by the logic of the above proof we should extend palpability to include God.

The answer of al-Isfārā’īnī to the second objection, that touch entails being affected by contact but sight does not, is dismissed because this is only a customary, not an essential difference. Imām-al-Ḥaramayn accepts the conclusion that all five senses can attain God, and claimed the authority of al-Ash‘arī for his position. ‘Al. b. Sa‘īd al-Kullābī and al-Qalānasī, however, admitted only vision of God.

Ibn-at-Tilimsānī 396-403/ summarizes twelve other objections of ar-Rāzī from his Arba‘īn and elsewhere, remarking that his answers to them are provisional, and that his master
al-Muqtarah said that it is not possible to give a satisfactory answer to all of them.

(N. 43) The Mu'tazilite position, says W \( L^F. 59a^f \), was that the eye sends out rays (āshī'ā), or luminous bodies (ājsām muqrī'a) which contact the object and cause it to be seen. Distance and screening limit the effectiveness of these rays, and thereby limit vision. Since God is not a body, these rays cannot reach him, and he therefore cannot be seen. Likewise these rays must be sent out in a certain direction; but God is not in a direction, and therefore cannot be seen.

But for Sunnites vision is not the emission of rays, but a perception (idrāk) created by God in the one who perceives. There are various sorts of perception according to the various sense organs, while the perception called knowledge is in the heart. But the particularization (iktīsqāq) of each of these perceptions in a determined subject (maḥall) is by God's pure choice. Also the need for contact (muṣassa wa-ltīqāq) and being in a certain direction without an obstacle is merely customary (‘ādī) and not from intelligibility ('aqīq); God creates perceptions directly, and can dispense with these ordinary concomitants, just as he does in the case of knowledge. Seeing God occurs in the present world (fī š-shāhid) in the case of prophets and saints, and it will occur in the case of all the believers in our final home (fī d-dār al-akhirā).

W \( L^F. 59b^f \) refers to K \( L^Pp. 404-41b^f \) for a longer refutation of the Mu'tazilite theory of sight by the emission of rays, and merely recalls two false consequences of their theory: One is that man's scope of vision should only be as wide as his eye, since the rays are only that wide. The second is that when he
opens his eyes he should see distant things after he sees nearer
things, which isn't the case.

The meaning of "it doesn't require a determined structure
(bunya)" refers to the pupil (ṭadaqa) and its seven layers
(ṭabaqāt) which are recognized by doctors; neither the existence
nor the power of the eye's structure have any effect on vision.
Rather, vision is an accidental which requires by intelligibility
only a simple substance (jawhar fard) in which to inhere. All
substances and any part of the body are equally capable of being
the subject of vision; only God has chosen to create vision by
way of custom in the substance of the eye. To be the subject
of an attribute (ma'na), a substance does not require as a condi-
tion to be surrounded by other substances (iḥāyat al-jawāhir),
since an intelligibility condition (ash-sharḥ al-'aqlī) must
exist in the subject of that for which it is a condition (fī
maḥall al-mashrūṭ). But a substance cannot inhere in a substance,
nor can the determinations of the attributes of the other sub-
stances be made necessary for something they do not inhere in.

As knowing is multiple [W, f. 60v] according to the number
of things known, so vision is multiple according to the number
of things seen. If the perception of something visible does
not inhere in the subject of vision, then its opposite must
inhere in it. In the technical language of the Unitarians
(fī qīṭilāḥ al-muwaḥhidin) this opposite is called an obstacle
(māni'), and is multiple according to the number of visible
things not seen. Both vision and its corresponding obstacles
are finitely multiple, since the number of actual existing
things is finite.

According to K [Fp. 414-416], the Mu'tazilites denied that
an obstacle to seeing something is the attribute opposite to
seeing the thing, and said that it was a fault in the structure of the eye. Abū-Hudhayl al-'Allāf is an exception to the Mu'tazilites on this question, although he admitted the possibility of the subject being devoid of both sight and its opposite obstacle.

K [P. 416] also said that there is uncertainty (taraddud) as to whether there is one embrasive obstacle for everything which is not seen, or if there are as many obstacles as things not seen. The former is the opinion of al-Bāqillānī and al-Isfarā'īnī; the latter is the truth (taḥqīq).

W [P. 602] has a remark (tanbīh) that there is a difference of opinion as to whether the attributes of God can be seen, but the general opinion (fa-qāl al-jumhūr) is that they can, since they are existent, although there is no reason to say they actually are seen (lā dalīl 'alā l-wuqūt).

The perceptions of the other senses are also related to existence, but there is no question of God's being smellable (mashmūm) or tasteable (madhūq) or palpable (malmūs), since this is proper to bodies and accidentals. There is an argument (nizā'ī) on whether God can be perceived by smell (shamm), taste (dhawq), and touch (lams) without the contact of the senses (min ghayr ittiqāl bi-l-hawāṣs). Yet as these senses do not require perception in order for me legitimately to say "I smelt, tasted, and touched the apple - but I did not perceive its smell (rā'īhatahu), its taste (ta'mahu), and its quality (kayfiyyatahu)," likewise the kinds of perceptions which occur on the occasion of (al-ḥāṣila 'ind) smelling, taste, and touch do not require these senses, but can occur without them and be related to what is other than bodies or accidentals. But since there is no
indication of the fact of such perceptions, it is preferable to be content with affirming vision, and to refrain from judging whether these perceptions are admissible or actually happen. §24, however, adds without hesitation that hearing God's eternal speech is among admissible things.
H. Prophecy in general:

a. Definition and distinctions:

(N. 44) \( \overline{F} \overline{60a} \) refers the reader to the beginning of the book, in the commentary on the opening invocations (fī sharḥ al-khūṭba), for the meaning of prophecy (nābū'ā) and messengership (risāla) and the difference between them.

In that section \( \overline{F} \overline{7b} \) al-Qāsimī 'Iyād is quoted for the possible verbal meanings of prophet and messenger. The root of the word prophet is:

- with a hamza (n-b-'), meaning to announce; then the word nābī' (or with the hamza dropped for euphony) has:
  - the passive meaning of having received revelation
  - the active meaning of transmitting it
- without a hamza (n-b-y), meaning to be high, referring to the status of a prophet.

A messenger (rasūl) means one who is sent (mursal), but the active aspect of repeatedly announcing something by the command of God is more prominent.

K \( \overline{F} \overline{435} \) and \( \overline{F} \overline{7b} \) list various opinions as to the difference between a prophet and a messenger. These opinions are:

1) that they are equivalent (mutaṭābi'ān);
2) that prophecy and messengership can be combined in man, but there are angels who are messengers and not prophets, and there are men who are prophets and not messengers - an opinion given only by K;
3) that both share in the two verbal meanings of prophet given above, but a messenger has the added note of giving warning (indhār) - an opinion given only by W;
4) that messengers are distinguished by books or inaugurating
a revealed-law (shar') while prophets only make use of books or a revealed-law descended upon others, even though they themselves receive revelation (yūḫū ilayhim).

5) that prophecy is being characterized by hearing revelation from God, whether through the mediacy of an angel or not (ikhtiṣāq bi-saṃā' waḥy min Allāh bi-wāṣiṭa malak aw dūnahu), and if there is a command to communicate (tablīgh) this there is messengership (risāla) - this is the opinion K accepts.

W Ḷff. 7b-8a/ implicitly rejects the last opinion when it rejects al-Qarāfī's definition of prophecy simply in terms of revelation (bi-mujarrad al-wāḥy), since this applies to some who are not prophets, such as Mary, to whom God sent his spirit. ¹

Similarly the story told by Muslim that an angel told someone going to visit his brother that God loves him because he loves his brother in God is not an example of prophecy. ²

Sound theologians say that prophecy is God's bringing into existence in a man an action-directed determination (ḥukm inshā') pertaining to himself (yakhtasq bi-hi), such as the Qur'ān verse "Recite in the name of your Lord" ⁹/61/. This was an encharge-ment (taklīf) pertaining to himself (Muḥammad) at that time, and was therefore prophecy. But when the verse descended "Rise and warn (andhir)" ⁷/2/, there was messengership (risāla), since this encharge-ment is related to others (li-ta'alluq hādhā


²Because the angel did not toll the man to do something, as the next paragraph explains.

³Technically one including commanding, forbidding, questioning, and summoning attention, all of which do not admit of truth or falsehood.
t-taklif bi-ghayrihi). Thus a prophet is encharged with what pertains to himself (kullif bi-mā yakhuṣṣuḥu), whereas a messenger is encharged with that and with communicating to others (bi-tablīgh ghayrihi).

If the latter position resembles the third and fifth opinions given above, this section of \( WF. 60a/ \) reports, and apparently adopts, a different position, resembling the fourth opinion: One imām says that prophecy is a man's being sent from the Truth to creatures (kawn al-insān mab'ūth min al-ḥaqiq ilā l-khalq), and a prophet (nabī) is a man sent by God to communicate what God has revealed to him (li-tablīgh mā Uḥṣya ilayhi). A messenger (rasūl) is this, and is also characterized by being given a law and a book (ṣharī'a wa-kitāb), and is therefore more particular (akhaṣṣ) than a prophet.

To the objection that a ḥadīth numbers more messengers than there are revealed books, it can be answered that if that is so (ṭIns'iḏhin) a messenger is one who has a book or an abolition of some determination of a previous law (nasīkh li-ba'ī ash-kām ash-ṣharī'a as-sābiqa), while a prophet does not have that, as in the case of Josuah (Yūṣuf).

\( \$ \) does not discuss the question, but \( LF. 175/ \) adopts the same as the latter position of \( W \): "A prophet is a man whom God has sent to men to communicate to them what was revealed to him; a messenger is, moreover, restricted to one who has a book or a law or an abolition of some determination of a previous law."

\( J \) \( 241a/ \) returns to the first position of \( W \), defining a messenger in terms of a command to communicate (al-amr bi-tablīgh), making no mention of a book or a law.

\( \$\$ \) \( 25/ \), finally, defines a messenger as a man whom

\[ M \] does not take up the question.
God has sent to his servants and handmaids (li-'abīdihi wa-imā'ihi) to communicate from him to them his encharging and institutive determinations (aḥkāmahu t-taklīfiyya wa-l-waqī'iyya) and the threats or promises and the like which are consequent upon these determinations: There are various opinions as to whether a condition of a messenger is to have a new law (shar'ī) or a particular book (kitāb makhṣūṣ) or the abolition of a previous law, or whether none of these things are required.

(N. 45) The sending of messengers (ba' th ar-rusul), says W (F. 60½), is admissible, that is, it is not necessary, as the Mu'tazilites maintained according to their principle that God must provide what is best (aṣlāḥ) for men, nor is it impossible, as the Barāhima maintained. K (Pp. 435-436) adds that it is not an essential attribute (qifa dhātiyya) of the prophet, as the Karrāmites said, nor one acquired through purity of soul, as the Philosophers said.

W then explains the phrase of the Creed "to explain what God commands, forbids, and permits". This refers to the greatest, noblest, and primarily intended advantage of sending messengers, which is to explain God's encharging and institutive determinations. Encharging determinations are the five: obliging, forbidding, disapproving, recommending, and permitting. Institutive determinations are determinations that something is an activating-link, condition, or obstacle to one of the above determinations, such as the determination that afternoon (taw/sl) is an activating-link (sabab) of the obligation of the prayer of Zuhr, or

5Thus in the ms. E1f. 264a; the printed edition has "bi-imānihi" instead of "wa-imā'ihi".

6Cf. above, A, f.
that the beginning of Ramaḍān is a cause of the obligation of fasting, or that causing intoxication (al-iskār) is the activating-link for prohibiting intoxicants (al-muskīr), or that the transpiring of a year (murūr al-ḥawl) is a condition for giving zakāt, or that menstruation (ḥayāt) is an obstacle to the obligation of salāt and to the legitimacy of fasting (ṣiḥḥat ʿaṣ-ṣawm).

Related to these determinations are the promises and threats (al-waʿd wa-l-waʿĪd) which revealed-law attaches to obedience or disobedience. Related too are the conditions of the next life (al-ḥawāl al-ikhīra) and the terrifying conditions of former peoples (mā khuwwīf bi-hi min aḥwāl al-umma al-mūjīya).

K(F. 437) adds another advantage of sending messengers, that they clarify and guide to proofs from intelligibility for tenets which the intellect by itself could come to know only with great difficulty.

b. Proof of truthfulness from miracles:

W(F. 60b) explains the phrase of the Creed "what proves their truthfulness in what they communicate" as referring to what is technically called a miracle (muʿjīza). This word comes from ʿajz, "inability", which is the opposite of power (qudra). The reality of miraculosity (iʿjaż) is the affirmation of inability (ithbāt al-ʿajz), that is, in the borrowed sense of manifesting it (ustaʿīr li-ḥāfīrīhi); then the word was transferred by metaphorical usage to what is ordinarily an activating-link of inability, and was made a noun.

Imām-al-Ḥaramayn observes that there is another use of metaphor (tajawwuz akthar) in the word muʿjīzāt, and that is the use of ʿajz, "inability", which has a positive meaning contrary to qudra, "power", in place of ʿadam al-qudra,
"privation of power". The inability of a sick person to sit up ('ajz az-zamin 'an al-qu'ūd), for example, is forced (wujid minhu iqtirāran), and is accompanied by resistance (mu'āraḍa). But in the privation of ability caused by a miracle there is no resistance. K [P. 439] attributes to Imām-al-Ḥaramayn another use of metaphor, which is to attribute to the miracle rather than to God the causing of inability.

W [F. 61a], followed by § [P. 176], gives a theological definition of a miracle as "something extraordinary, accompanied by a challenge and the lack of resistance" (amr khāriq li-l-'āda maqrūn bi-t-tāḥqāf ma'a 'adam al-mu'āraḍa).

The word "something" (amr) is used to include both an act and the absence of an act; an example of the latter is fire not burning something. Those who define a miracle as an act (fi'l) interpret the latter example as the fire turning into coolness or safeness (kawn an-nār bardan aw ṣalāman) or the body's remaining as it was without being burned.

K [P. 438], in defining a miracle, said it was an act of God. This phrase is to distinguish a miracle from something that is from eternity. According to one opinion, it includes what is within the scope of a created power, such as the Prophet's reciting the Qur'ān, and what is beyond it, such as raising the dead. But according to others, all miracles, even reciting (tilāwa) the Qur'ān by the Prophet - not mere repeating it (ḥikāya) by others - must surpass created power. Of these two opinions mentioned by Ibn-Dahhāq in his commentary on the Irshād, the second is better (aẓhar). Imām-al-Ḥaramayn said that a miraculous act, such as walking on water, is related to the power of man and is acquired (muktasab) by him, but the miraculous
aspect of it is God's act, and is not acquired by man.

To the difficulty that some miracles are the absence of an act, continues K (Pp. 441-443), al-Ash'arî replied that a miracle is an act or what takes the place of an act (fi'l aw mā yaqūm maqām al-fi'l). Ibn-Dahhāq said that the miracle is the announcing (ikhbār) that an act will not take place, but against his position is the fact that a person challenged that an act would not take place, not that he had foreknowledge of its not taking place. Imām-al-Jārāmāyn said that the absence of the act is the miracle, but the same objection holds against this position as against Ibn-Dahhāq, with the added objection that non-existence is not within the scope of power according to him; neither is the "attributed non-existence" (al-`adam al-iṣāfī) of al-Bāqillānī. We must either accept al-Ash'arî's position or modify Ibn-Dahhāq's answer and say that the challenge must concern the miracle directly or something related to it, such as knowledge and announcement of it.

The position of W and §, as explained above, is that of al-Ash'arî. §§ (P. 26) avoids the word miracle, and merely says that God produces an extraordinary act in answer to the messenger's challenge, thus proving his truthfulness.

The phrase "accompanied by a challenge", W explains, is to distinguish a miracle from the wonders of the saints (karāmāt al-awliyā') and the presages (al-'alāmāt al-irhā'iqiyā) which precede the sending of the prophets; it also distinguishes a miracle from a later's appropriating the miracle of a past prophet as an argument (ḥujja) for himself. K (Pp. 438 and 449) and §§ (P. 26) add the qualification that the challenge must be made before the act happens. K (P. 449) says that it is not a condition of a miracle explicitly to invite opposition, but it
sufficient to say "This is a sign of my truthfulness". § [P. 178] defines this challenge (at-taḥaddī) as "a call for something extraordinary as proof of the claim (to messengership) either by the tongue of circumstance or the tongue of speech" (daʿwā l-khāriq dāllān 'alā d-daʿwā imām bi-lisān al-ḥāl wa-imām bi-lisān al-maqāl).

The phrase "and the lack of resistance", says W, distinguishes a miracle from magic and trickery (as-siṣr wa-sh-shuʿūdha).  

The theological definition given above is that of ar-Rāzī, and has been objected to from many aspects. Three objections are raised and answered by at-Taftāzānī in his Sharḥ al-Maqāṣīd ad-ḍīniyya:  

1) Two qualifications should be added:  
   - that the miracle appear coming from the one who claims to be a messenger (min yad al-muddā'i wa-min jihātihi); this is so that none of his contemporaries can claim his miracle for themselves, or say "My miracle is what appeared from me in past years", whereas this is unacceptable  
   - that the miracle be in accord with the claim (al-muwāfiqa li-d-daʿwā), to avoid anyone's saying "My miracle is the speech of this mineral", and then the mineral's answering that he is a forger and lyār. Therefore al-Ashʿarī says that a miracle is an act from God or something taking the place of an act, and adds "by such is intended the affirmation of truthfulness" (yuqṣad bi-mīthlihi t-taqṣīq); some of his companions defined a miracle as "something by which is intended the manifestation of the truthfulness of one who claims messengership" (anr quṣīd bi-hi iṣhār ṣīdq man īddaʿī r-risāla).

To this objection at-Taftāzānī said that the mention of a

7 On magic, etc., see below, I, f, (N. 48).
8 W, in fact, first lists the three objections, and then
challenge implies the two qualifications (mush'ir bi-l-qaydayn), since the meaning of the challenge is inviting opposition to what he produced as witness to his claim and disabling anyone from bringing forward something similar to what he displayed (ta'lab al-mu'ariqa fi mā ja'alahu mushāhidan li-da'w[Ahu wa-ta't[īz al-ghayr 'an al-ityān bi-mithl mā abd[Ahu). The challenge is the connection (rab[t] between the claim and the miracle, so that if a person claims to be a messenger, and a wonder (āya) appears from him, but he has made no challenge, this wonder is not a miracle.

K (Pp. 463-466) considers the possibility of a miracle giving counter-testimony. If the challenge was to raise someone from the dead, and the person raised said that the claimant is not a prophet, al-Baqillānī said that this voids the miraculosity of the event, unless the person dies again right away. Imam-al-Ḥaramayn said that it does not void the miraculosity, because the challenge was not that the raised person would verify the man's messengership, but simply that the person would rise; but if the challenge was that minerals would speak, then the speech must verify the claimant's messengership. Among later theologians, however, Ibn-Dahhāq, in his commentary on the Irshād, said that even in this case it makes no difference whether the minerals verify or deny the man's messengership, since the challenge was simply that the minerals would speak. Al-Muqtaraḥ, on the other hand, said that if the minerals denied the man's messengership the event would not give self-evident knowledge of his messengership, and would be insufficient.

2) The second objection is that people consider miracles things that have no relation to a claim (da'w[A], such as the appearance of clouds to shade Muḥammad, and his being greeted
by the rocks and the soil (i'zhâr al-ghâmâm wa-tasîlîn al-ḥajâr wa-l-madar). Therefore al-Imâm (Imâm-al-Ḥaramayn?) stipulates (sharâţ) that there must be an association (iqtîraţ) of the miracle with the claim.

At-Taftâzânî answers that presages (irhâqât) preceding the sending of messengers are miracles only by way of exaggeration (taghîlîb - sic) and simile (tâshbîh). Whether such extraordinary events appear from him before he begins his life as a messenger or they appear from another, if they were foretold as an announcement (ikhbâr) of the messenger they are a presage (irhâq), that is, the founding of the basis of his being sent (ta'sîs li-qâ'îdat al-ba'tha). If they are not foretold, they are simply a wonder (karâma) if prophecy is claimed. But if divinity is claimed, they are a trial (ibtilâ'), since that is against decisive proofs.

3) The third objection is that a miracle can come well after the challenge (qad tata'akhkhar 'an at-taḥâdî), as when a claimant says "My miracle is what will appear from me on a certain day" (mu'jizâtî mä yażhûr minnî yawn kadhâ), and it appears. The difficulty is the same as in the previous objection, that the miracle may not be related to the claim.

At-Taftâzânî answers that a miracle coming after a small delay is counted as accompanying (muqârin) the challenge. If the interval is long, then the miracle - for those who stipulate accompaniment - is the accompanying statement, since it is the announcement of what is absent (ikhbâr al-ghayb). But knowledge of this statement's miraculosity is delayed ('ilm al-ījâz yatarâkhâ) until the foretold event happens. But those who make the foretold event the miracle stipulate that it accompany the challenge.
Whether the interval is long or short, after a miracle and the knowledge of it have disappeared it is not legitimate for a prophet to encharge men by enjoining a revealed-law (taklīf an-nās bi-ilzām ash-shar‘), but simply to explain its determinations and relate their obligation to the happening of that event (law bayyān ālkāmahā wa-‘allaq iltīzāmahā bi-wuqū‘ dhālik al-amr) is legitimate according to Imām-al-Ḥaramayn, but not legitimate according to al-Bāqillānī.

Iº LPp. 450-45Y considers the problem of whether a miracle can be postponed until after the death of the messenger. The Muʿtazilites said that it could not, because in that case God would not be doing what is best for men. The answer to them is that he is not obliged to do what is best for them; also it may be better for them to postpone the miracle.

Al-Bāqillānī also said that the miracle could not be postponed, but because it is linked to proving a messengership, that is, the pronouncement (khiṭāb) of a messenger, which ceases with his death. The answer to him is that as a certain delay is legitimate within his lifetime, so also after his death; the miracle then proves the previous claim. Al-Bāqillānī may have feared that a postponed miracle might be taken for the wonder of a saint, and doubt would be cast on the truth of a wonder. In answer, the fact is that a wonder is not a decisive proof of sainthood.

Another objection of al-Bāqillānī is that if the miracle were postponed until after the death of the messenger there would be no reason to remember what he taught. The answer is that his teaching could be written and learned later.

W Lº 67b/ remarks that some add another qualification to
the definition of a miracle, that it must be in the time of
enchantment, since the extraordinary things of the next life
are not miracles; also what happens when the conditions for the
end of time appear ('ind zuhur ishtirak as-sā'a) does not witness
to the truthfulness of a claim, since the ordinary course of
events no longer holds and patterns change (li-kawnihi zaman
naqḍ al-ādāt wa-taghayyur ar-rusūm).

The phrase in the Creed "so that it is equivalent to the
Most High's saying 'My servant is true' in all that the latter
communicates from him" includes (yatalamman) all the conditions
of a miracle, and points to the probative aspect of a miracle
(ashār bi-hi ilā bayān wajh dalālat al-mu'jiza), which is
illustrated by the parable of the following section.

(N. 46) The parable given in the Creed, says W (F. 63a/)
is clearer and more understandable for showing the truthfulness
of the messengers than a mere mentioning of the conditions of a
miracle. K (Pp. 197, 445-446, and 459-460/, § (P. 178/, J (21b,
f. 246a/, and §q (P. 26/ give résumés of this parable, and K
attributes it to Ibn-at-Tilimsānī (Pp. 197/ and his teacher
al-Muqtaraḥ (Pp. 459-460/.

The probative aspect of a miracle (wajh dalālat al-mu'jiza),
continues W, is to show the truthfulness of the person on whose
part (alā yadihi) the extraordinary event occurs. Consequent
upon a miracle ('aqībatahā) God creates self-evident knowledge
of the truthfulness of the prophet.

An objection to the use of this parable in arguing is that
it is pictorial and judges what is absent on the basis of what
is present (bi-ann hādhā tanthil wa-qiyās li-l-ghā'ib alā sh-
shāhid). If there were a common denominator (alā taqdfīr al-jāmi')
such a process would serve opinion (ṣann), but you have used it without a common denominator to serve certainty (yaqīn) in establishing matters of revealed law (sharā'i'), while there is nothing in common (qarā'in al-aṭywāl) between the absent and the present worlds.

The answer is that this parable was not used as an analogy or argumentation (li-l-qiyās wa-l-istidal), but only to clarify and make the matter more understandable (li-t-tawfiq wa-t-taqrīb).

If someone knows the unity of God and what is necessary, impossible, and admissible concerning him, and understands the bases (arkān) of a miracle and its probative aspect, and then sees a miracle or hears widespread tradition of one that happened, he will have self-evident knowledge of the truthfulness of the prophet. Through the parable beginners who are not used to reasoning can understand what a miracle is and recognize one. Thus the knowledge which he attains is not through equating the conditions (bi-'tibār qarā'in al-aṭywāl) of the absent and the present worlds.

Apostates (mulḥida) objected in many ways to the probative value of a miracle:

1) The first is that the miracle does not come from God, but from the person who claims messengership, either by a personal quality (khāṣṣiyya) or bodily complex, or by making use of elements, angels, jinn, or stars.

The answer to this is, as has been said before, that creatures can produce no effect whatsoever. Also the messengers never delved in tricks (ḥiyāl).

2) The second objection is that it is possible (yaḥtamil) that the event is not out of the ordinary (khāriq li-l-‘āda),
but God's beginning of a new ordinary process (ibtidā' 'Āda) or the restoration of an ordinary process of bygone ages.

The answer is that the events we refer to, such as raising the dead, do not answer such descriptions.

3) The third objection is that the absence of resistance (mu'āqada) can also occur because news of the event did not reach someone who could resist, or because of the people's docility (muwāda'a), or agreement to advance his cause (muwāfaqa fī 'ilā' kalimatihī), or their fear of him, or because they considered it a simple matter and did not care much about it (li-stis'ḥāl wa-qillā mubālāt), or because they were occupied with more important things; or they did resist, and something prevented this from being told (wa-lam yunqal li-māni').

The answer is that the messengers were known everywhere in the east and west (jamī' al-mashāriq wa-l-maghārib), and their enemies tried their best to disprove them. This has all been reported, and has reached even us at the end of time, at the end of the ninth century (fī ʾakhir az-zamān fī ʾakhir al-qarn at-tāsi'). Each prophet had a special kind of miracle to overcome the specialty of the adversaries of his time: Moses overcame the magicians, David the musicians, Jesus the physicians, and Muḥammad the masters of eloquence.

4) The fourth objection is that the purpose of a miracle can be other than to prove the truthfulness of a messenger. It can be, as some maintain, to accomplish God's own objective (gharaq) or an objective for men; or it can be a miracle for another prophet, or a trial (ibtilā') for men.

The answer is that God cannot act moved by any objective. Regarding the appearance of a miracle on the part of ('alā yad) a lār, K [Pp. 455-461] gives a fuller answer. There are three
opinions concerning the connection between a miracle and its proving the truthfulness of a messenger:

- The first is that the connection is of intelligibility (‘aqlI); this is the opinion of al-Isfarā'īnī, who said that testification of truthfulness (taṣdīq) is an attribute of the extraordinary event and a created indication of God's announcing the truthfulness of a messenger; it can be separated from the extraordinary event if one of the conditions of a miracle is absent. But Imām-al-Ḥaramayn said that the testification of truthfulness is part of the intelligibility of the extraordinary event and inseparable from it. Al-Muqtaraḥ replied to him that the simple existence of an extraordinary event does not testify to the truthfulness of a messenger, but its happening in answer to his challenge.

- The second opinion is that the connection is instituted (waqʿI), so that the event after the challenge is equivalent to God's speaking. Al-Muqtaraḥ observes that this opinion is practically the same as the first.

- The third opinion is that the connection is customary (ʿaḍĪ). W attributes this opinion to al-Bāġillānī.

According to the first opinion a miracle cannot appear from a lyer because this is against the essence of a miracle; according to the second opinion it is against God's announcing (ḥabar). W adds that according to the opinion that the connection is only customary a miracle appearing from a lyer would not prove his truthfulness, since that would be to prove the impossible.

K (Pp. 464-466) says that the Muʿtazilites objected that if, as the Sunnites say, God is not obliged to provide what is best, he should be able to produce extraordinary events in answer to a lyer's claim to prophecy. The first two opinions
mentioned above are a clear answer to this objection. The third opinion, which said that the probativity (dalāla) of the extraordinary event is only customary, conceded the admissibility of God's doing so, but denied that this ever happened. Regarding the future, we have the assurance that Muḥammad is the seal of the prophets; anyone who claims prophecy after him has the choice only of Islam or the sword, and his words should not be paid attention to, even if extraordinary events appear from him.

5) The fifth objection is that even if it is granted that a miracle proves the truthfulness of the one who claims prophecy, how can we be sure that God does not lie in his announcing (fi ikhbarihi)? Authority (sam') is no guide, since that has not yet been established. Intelligibility too, according to the objector's principles, does not show that lying is despicable (qabīh).

The answer f. 65a/ is that God's testifying to the messenger's truthfulness is not through any announcement (ikhbāran), but by working the miracle which constitutes (inshā'an) a person a prophet.

There are also reasons from intelligibility to exclude the possibility of God's lying:
- The first, that of al-Isfārā'īnī and, according to K f. 361/, of Imām-al-Ḥaramayn, is that anyone who knows anything must have a statement in himself (ḥadīth fī dhātihi) corresponding to what he knows. This is the reality of the predicate of truthfulness (ḥaqīqā khabar aqīdā). Therefore God, who knows all things, is truthful. The fact that men can know something and lie deliberately is no objection, because the seat (maḥall) of lying is the tongue, while knowledge and truthfulness remain in the mind. But since God is not
composed, he can only be truthful.

- Another reason is that all God's attributes are necessary and their contraries impossible; therefore if he could lie truthfulness and knowledge would be impossible for him.

- A third reason, given by K /Pp. 462-463/, is that lying is a defect of perfection, whereas God is perfect.

In a final remark (tanbih), W /F. 65b/ cites at-Taftazānī's Ma'mūsid for saying that prophecy can be ascertained by the creation of self-evident knowledge, such as was had by aggīddīq (Abū-Bakr), or by the infallible passages of the Tawra and the Injīl in announcing the prophecy of Muḥammad, or by Moses in announcing the prophecy of Aaron and Joshua (Hārūn wa-Yūsha'). Imām-al-Ḥaramayn's requirement of a miracle and its implied conditions holds for proving prophecy absolutely speaking and in a way to refute adversaries ('alā l-iṭlāq wa-ḥujja 'alā l-munkirīn) without regard to any previous prophet or book. But Muḥammad's character and dispositions (akhlāq wa-ahwāl) are equivalent to ('ā'id ilā) a miracle in proving his prophecy.

c. Immunity from defect ('isma):

(N. 47) K and W have a similar presentation of a messenger's being immune from defect. But in § /P. 173/, J /21c, f. 447a/, and §§ /Pp. 25-28/ the distinguishing of three necessary marks - truthfulness (qidq), faithfulness (amāna), and communicating (tablīgh) what was commanded to be communicated - becomes the standard pattern of presenting this question. M /Ff. 219b-224a/ too, apart from an explicit treatment of prophecy, considers the definitions of the three marks together.

K /Pp. 466-469/ takes up the question in general and asks
first if prophets are immune from defect before their becoming prophets. Some Mu'tazilites admitted that before becoming a prophet a man could commit even big acts of disobedience. Sunnites, such as al-Qāḍī 'Iyāḍ, said that he could not. Some Sunnites said that this could not be known from intelligibility, but only from authority. But the Rāfiqīites and most Mu'tazilites said that it could be known from intelligibility by its intrinsic evil (at-taqbīh al-‘aqīf), which is false.

As for after receiving prophecy, there is consensus that a prophet cannot deliberately lie in his determinations. As for lying by mistake or forgetfulness (ghalatan aw nisyānān), al-Isfārā'īnī and many other Sunnites said that he could not, but al-Bāqillānī said that this is admissible, since a miracle only proves what comes from the prophet by deliberate intention, although revealed-law says that in fact it does not happen. Thus al-Qāḍī 'Iyāḍ said that there is consensus in the fact that a prophet does not lie by mistake or forgetfulness.

As for acts of disobedience apart from untruthfulness in his message - which are contrary to faithfulness - there is consensus, except for some Khārijites, that a prophet is immune from any deliberate big act of disobedience and small acts which are reproachable. As for committing them by mistake or forgetfulness, al-Āmīdī said that, except for some Rāfiqīites, there is consensus that this is admissible. But he is wrong, since there is consensus to the contrary. Al-Bāqillānī and other sound theologians said that this is proved from authority, but al-Isfārā'īnī and many Mu'tazilites said that it could be proved from intelligibility also.

As for committing small sins which are not reproachable (lā khissa fīhā), most, such as Abū-Ja'far at-Tabarī, a Sunnite,
admit the possibility, whether they are deliberate or not. Other lawyers and theologians deny the possibility of both deliberate and non-deliberate sins of this type, since, according to most Mālikites, Shāfi‘ites and Ḥanafites, men are commanded to imitate the prophets. Thus, as W/P. 65b/ also says, the immunity of the prophets includes freedom from doing anything forbidden or disapproved, and even from doing anything permitted because of passion (shahwa) or without the sole intention of approaching and obeying God and seeking his help thereby to obey him (bal illā bi-niyyat al-qurba wa-l-imitihāl wa-l-isti‘āna bi-hā ‘alā ṭā‘at al-Mawla).

§/P. 180/ quotes Qur'ān verses /2:31, 6:55, and 7:152/ in support of the proposition that men are commanded to imitate the prophets, and elaborates /pp. 180-182/ on the Muslim practice of imitating Muhammad in every detail. For example, A. b. Ḫanbal refused to eat watermelon because he was not sure in what way Muhammad ate it.


The third mark of a messenger, communicating what he is commanded to communicate, says §/P. 184/ is necessary for the same reason as his faithfulness, namely, that men are commanded to imitate them. Moreover the Qur'ān /2:152/ curses those who hide God's message, and it commands /5:67/ Muhammad to deliver the divine message.
§§ (Pp. 28-29) give a summary of the relation between the three marks:

- Truthfulness adds to:
  - faithfulness freedom from lying inadvertently (sahwan)
  - communication freedom from deliberate or forgetful addition to the message.

- Faithfulness adds to:
  - truthfulness freedom from disobeying in ways other than by the tongue
  - communication freedom from disobeying in ways other than in communicating.

- Communicating adds to:
  - truthfulness freedom from deliberate or forgetful omitting of anything they were commanded to communicate
  - faithfulness freedom from forgetful omitting of anything they were commanded to communicate.

Besides considering the opposites of these three marks which are impossible for the messengers, § (Pp. 185-190), J (21c, f. 447a), and §§ (Pp. 30-33) consider what is admissible concerning the messengers. These are human accidentals (al-ā'rāq al-bashāriyya) which do not detract from their high station, such as sickness, hunger, poverty, eating, drinking, marriage, forgetting after communicating their message or in what they were not commanded to communicate, and sleep, although their hearts stay awake. The proof of these accidentals happening to them is our witnessing them (mushāhada), and their purpose is to increase their rewards, or to set revealed rules of action (li-t-tashrīʿ), or to distract from this world and call attention to its vileness before God and his lack of pleasure in it.
in the house of recompense to his saints.

The word "accidentals" is to guard against the opinion of the Christians, who described Jesus with an eternal attribute. The word "human" is to guard against the representatives of the Jāḥiliyya, who said that these accidentals are contrary to messengership. The phrase "which do not detract from their high station" is to guard against the Jews and many ignorant historians and exegetes who describe the prophets with the defect of committing disobedience and disapproved acts.

d. Abrogation (nashkh):

At this point, K takes up the objection to Muḥammad's messengership by some Jews represented by Ibn-ar-Rāwandi that the revealed-law of Moses cannot be abrogated. J takes up the question in general terms, and distinguishes between two kinds of determinations of revealed-law. There is the self-evident kind (ṣarb ṣarūrī), which God preserves in every sect (milla) from Adam through Muḥammad until the end of time; determinations of this sort never change. And there is another kind which varies among different revealed-laws. Types of determinations which are never abrogated are those which have to do with preserving:

- religion (dīn), thus all must profess God's unity
- lives (nufūs), in protecting the innocent
- fighting (qatla), in enforcing rights
- kinship (nasab), in regulating marriage
- property (māl) and livelihood (maʿāsh), to support life
- the accidentals which maintain religious and worldly life (al-aʿrāq allāhī fīhā ṣiyānat ad-dīn wa-d-dunyā), such as forbidding defamation (qadhf) and slander (ghība).
Abrogation in other matters does not mean that God corrects something which he forgot in the previous legislation, but that he changes his ordinances to suit the era, just as one prescribes differently for a sick person and a healthy person.

There is abrogation even within the revealed-law of Moses, for example:

- God said to Noah after he came out of the ark "I am making every animal food for you and your descendants; I make that legitimate to you as well as all plants - except for blood."\(^9\)

But later many things were forbidden.\(^{10}\)

- The law of Adam legitimized marrying one's sister, but this was later forbidden.\(^ {11}\)

- The law of Jacob permitted marrying two sisters,\(^{12}\) but this was later forbidden.\(^ {13}\)

- Also Moses prohibited work on the Sabbath,\(^{14}\) which was previously permitted.

Another argument against Ibn-ar-Rawandi's assertion that Moses claimed that his law would not be abrogated is the fact that the Jews did not bring up this tradition (naql) at the time of Muḥammad, for all its value to them.

J concludes that the law of Muḥammad has three approaches to the determinations of previous revealed-laws:

\(^9\)Cf. Gen. 9:3-4.

\(^{10}\)Cf. Lev., ch. 11.

\(^{11}\)In Lev. 18:9.


\(^{13}\)In Lev. 18:18

\(^{14}\)Lev. 10:8-11, etc.
1) Some determinations differ from what preceded - there is no doubt that these abrogate the previous determinations.

2) Some agree with previous determinations - there is no doubt that these contain no abrogation.

3) There is silence on some matters determined in a previous revealed-law. A determination of this sort remains in force under three conditions:

- that it was revealed (uṣūya) to Muhammad that it was part of their revealed-law; if it is only said by people (who follow the previous revealed-law) to be there or if it is only written in their scriptures (fī maṣūḥifihim) the determination need not be followed, because their speech is not to be believed, and their sacred books have been corrupted (qād waqaʿ t-taḥrīf fīhū) and they are untrustworthy

- that the revelation of it to Muhammad be by way of simple announcement (mujarrad ikhrār), (otherwise it is part of Muhammad's law)

- that it neither agrees with nor differs from what is in Muhammad's law, since if it agrees it is his; if it is different it is abrogated.
I. The messengership of Muḥammad:

a. Proof from the miraculosity of the Qur'ān:

(N. 48) J /21i, f. 276a/ distinguishes first between proofs for the messengership of Muḥammad from intelligibility and those from authority (naql). The latter are texts from the books of the previous prophets. Among the proofs from intelligibility the first is the miraculosity of the Qur'ān.

W /F. 65b/ says that while all agree that the Qur'ān is miraculous, there are different opinions regarding the aspect of its miraculosity (fī wajh i′jāz al-Qur'ān):

1) The versifiers (muqāmmāt), many Muʿtazilites, and al-Murtaḍā of the Shiʿites said that the miraculosity of the Qur'ān is a deterrence (ṣarfa), that is, the opponents could have resisted and imitated the Qur'ān, but God deterred their concern (himma) to do so by removing either their power, or their motives (dawāʾī), or the necessary knowledge. The last possibility, the removal (salb) of knowledge of the Qur'ān's word-pattern (nāzīm) and how to reproduce its like is that favored by al-Murtaḍā.

An argument for this theory is that the Arabs were certainly able to imitate words and short phrases of the Qur'ān; therefore they could imitate a whole sūra.

The answer to this is that the determination (ḥukm) of a sentence differs from that of its parts. Were the preceding argument true, then anyone could imitate a poet like Ibrāhīm al-Qays, for example.

Another argument for the deterrence theory is that when the Qur'ān was being compiled ('ind jamʿ al-Qur'ān) the Companions referred judgement on certain sūras and verses to the testimony of reliable persons, and Ibn-Masʿūd hesitated about the Fāṭiḥa (sūra 1) and the Ḥamādatān (sūras 113 and 114).
This would not be so if the eloquence (faṣḥa) of the Qurʾān's word-pattern were the miracle and not God's deterrence of imitation.

In answer to this, a first remark is that these historical facts are true (qīḥat ar-riwāya), and the Qurʾān was compiled after the death of Muḥammad. But each sūra is an independent miracle. The care of the companions was to prevent the least change in the verses; their hesitation is understandable, since the miraculosity of every sūra is not evident to everyone from the start.

At-Taftāzānī ʿ., f. 67a/ gave other replies to the deterrence theory: First, the Arabs admired and took notice of the excellent word-pattern and eloquence of the Qurʾān and tried to oppose it. Secondly, were the miraculosity of the Qurʾān deterrence from imitation, there would be no need for eloquence, and the deterrence would be more miraculous if the Qurʾān were easier to imitate. Thirdly, the verse "Say 'If men and jinn should combine together to bring the like of this Qurʾān, they could not bring the like of it, though they conspired together'" (17: 88) implies that a single person could not imitate the Qurʾān, and would not have to be deterred.

2) Other Muʿtazilites ʿK, p. 475/ said the miraculosity is its method and unusual word-pattern (naẓm), which is different from ordinary Arabic speeches, letters, and poems.

An answer to this opinion ʿU, f. 66b/ is that the foolish lines (ḥamāqāt) of Musaylima and his like also have unusual word-patterns.

3) Others ʿK, p. 475/ said that it is its eloquence (faṣḥa, jazāla) only.

An answer to this and the previous opinion is that if a
challenge is made to imitate something which contains two elements, then both must be present in the imitation. For instance, an eloquent and well versed poem cannot be answered by an eloquent speech or by a well versed poem which is not eloquent.

4) Imām-al-Ḥaramayn and al-Bāqillānī held that the miraculosity is the combination of eloquence and unusual word-pattern.

5) Some said that it is the Qur'ān's freedom from inconsistency and defect (as-salāma 'an al-ikhtilāf wa-t-tanāquḍ).

An answer to this opinion is that many polished writers (bulaghā') also are free from inconsistency and defect.

6) Some said that it is its containing details of science and true statements of wisdom and goodness (li-shithālihi 'alā daqā'iq al-`ulūm wa-ṣaqā'iq al-ḥikma wa-l-maṣāḥih), or /K, p. 375/ its agreement with intelligible judgements (muwfaqatuhi li-qaḍāyā l-`ucul).

An answer to this is that the speech of wise men often contains science and truth too.

7) Some said that it is its telling of things absent (li-ikhbārihi 'an al-mughayyabāt).

An answer to this opinion is that only a very few verses tell of things absent; therefore the others would not be miraculous. Besides, to opinions 5, 6, and 7, K /P. 176/ answers that the challenge was not made to imitate those aspects.

8) Some said /K, pp. 175-179/ that it is the fact that the Qur'ān is from eternity.

The answer to this is that a miracle is an act of God, which is not from eternity.

9) Others /K, p. 176/ said that it was the fact of the Qur'ān's expressing God's eternal speech.

The answer to this is that nothing prevents God's speech
from being expressed by words (lafẓ) which are not miraculous.

W (F. 66b) quotes at-Taftāzānī in defending the opinion of Imām-al-Ḥaramayn and al-Bāqillānī (opinion 4). The combination of eloquence with the word-pattern is the miraculous aspect of the Qur'ān, because the masters of eloquence could imitate either one separately. Al-Bāqillānī added that telling absent events of the past and future (opinion 7) is also a miraculous aspect of the Qur'ān.

By nazm, "word-pattern", is meant the arrangement of words (tartīb al-kalimāt), or, according to 'Abdalqāhir, the grammatical structuring of words to serve the purposes of speech. K (F. 479), in opposition to Ibn-at-Tilimsānī, restricts the meaning of balāqha, "eloquence" to excellence of speech (kalām), or meaning, and of the speaker (mutakallim), whereas fasāḥa, also "eloquence", is a wider term including also excellence in words (kalimāt) or word-pattern. The highest degree of balāqha is miraculousity (iʿjāz), which is determined by taste (wa-l-ḥulm fīhi dh-dhawq), and the lowest degree is that which distinguishes speech from animal sounds.

Objections to the miraculousity of the Qur'ān are:

1) (K, p. 478) If there is so much difference of opinion concerning what constitutes the miraculousity of the Qur'ān, then how can it be miraculous, since a miracle must be plain and without doubt to everyone?

The answer is that there is no doubt that a sura cannot be produced like one in the Qur'ān; the differences of opinion concerning the aspect of its miraculousity do not make this fact less plain.

2) (N, f. 67a) Some verses are more eloquent than others,
while they should all be of the highest degree of eloquence.

The answer is that this is in accordance with the purpose of the Qur'ān, just as a good artist produces something which is neither too big nor too small. As it is, the Arabs could not produce its like, and they recognized that it is not like speeches or poetry.

More recent opponents proposed other stupid objections:

3) There are non-Arabic words in the Qur'ān, such as al-istabraq 18:31 etc., as-sijill 21:104, al-qistās 17:35, and al-maqālīd 26:63 and 42:12. How then can it claim to be "plain Arabic" Qur'ān 16:103 and 26:195?

The answer is that these words are Arabic, even though another language shares them. Or the meaning of "plain Arabic" is that the word-pattern and arrangement of the words is Arabic; therefore the whole is called Arabic.

4) There are mistakes of word-form in it (khaṭa' min jihat al-i'rab), as in 20:63, 5:69, and 4:162.

The answer is that the so-called mistakes are correct, and the objectors do not know Arabic well.

5) The smallest sûra is of three verses. But Moses, even while saying that his brother is more eloquent than himself, was able to produce eleven verses, told in 20:25-35.

The answer is that what is told (maḥfi - Moses' original words), does not have to be in the very same word-pattern. Also, the accepted opinion (al-mukhtār) is that the challenge means to produce one long sûra or ten intermediate ones. K [Pp. 477-478] says that most Sunnites (al-jumhūr min aṣhābīnā) say that to answer the challenge it suffices to imitate the shortest sûra, such as al-'Aqīr 113 or al-Kawthar 108, but al-Dāqīqīnī said in his Kitāb an-naqīd, approved by al-Isfahānī, that some
length is required to prove the imitator's capability.

6) There are ambiguous passages (mutashābihāt), such as God's mounting upon the throne.

The answer is that the purpose (ḥikma) of difficult passages is to stimulate reasoning and effort to attain the meaning and other benefits, and thus have a greater reward. Also, God does what he likes, and creates occasions of corruption and error (ašbāb al-fasād wa-qā-ḍalāla).

7) There are repetitions of stories and phrases.

The answer is that these repetitions suit the style (ahwāl al-kalām), and literary experts ('ulamā' al-badī' wa-fursān al-ma'ānī) have made this completely certain (qarraraḥa akmal tārīr).

8) There are vocalization variants which amount to over 12,000 (fīhi min aḥti zhtilāf al-aḥāṣ' bayn aṣḥāb al-qirā'a ma' yazīd 'alā thnay 'ashar al-fan).

The answer is that a rejected variant (al-iḥtiṣāl al-manfī) is of a different level of eloquence (at-taṣāwut fī marātib al-balāğha), in that some readings are less miraculous (bi-ḥayth yakūn ba'qūhu qāṣirān 'an marṭabat al-ʾi'jāz).

9) There are contradictions. For example, 55:39 says men will not be questioned on the last day, but 15:92-93 says they will be. Also 88:6 says the only food of the damned will be thorns (şarī'), but 69:36 says that their only food will be garbage (ghisālīn).

The answer is that in the first reference sinners will not be questioned about their sins in the sense of God's seeking knowledge. In the second example the thorns and the garbage are either explanations of the other, or one group of damned will eat one and another the other, or the two words mean the
same thing. The exegetes have explanations for other difficulties.

10) There are plain lies (al-kadhb al-ma‘af), such as in 7:11, where the command to the angels to adore Adam is placed after our creation; but we did not yet exist.

The answer is that the descendants of Adam were a part of him by way of metaphor, and in adoring him the angels adored us too. Or the creation (al-khalq wa-t-taqwir) refers to the creation of Adam's descendants (dhurriyya) when they came out of Adam as particles (dharr); this interpretation would be in accord with the outward meaning of the verse.

11) Every poetic meter is found in it, even though in 36:69 it claims not to be poetry. An example of ṭawīl is 18:29, of madīd 11:37, of basīt 8:42, of wāfīr 9:14, of kāmil 2:213, of hāzāj 12:91, of rājaz 76:14, of rama‘l 34:13, of sārī‘ 20:95, of munsarīḥ 76:2, of ḥačīf 107:1, of mu‘āfīr 40:32-33, of muqtaḍāb 2:10 and following, of muṭṭathth 9:79, and of muṭtaqārib 7:103.

The answer is that the fact of an expression (lafz) falling into a meter does not make it poetry, but the meter must be intended by the speaker. Others require also rhyme (taqfiya) for there to be poetry. Besides, many of the above verses deviate from the meter.

b. Proof from announcing absent events:

Another miracle of Muḥammad ﷺ, f. 68b/ is his announcing absent events of the past and the future (ikhbāruhu ‘an al-ghuyūb al-ma‘diyya wa-l-mustaqaqabala).

Some of the past events he told are the long and detailed stories (qīṣāq) of Moses, Pharaoh, Joseph, Abraham, Noah, Lot, and others, without ever having heard them from anyone or learnt them from a book, as is stated in the verse "These are announce-
ments of what is absent which we reveal to you. You did not know them, neither you nor your people, before this." L:11:49/. He also announced many similar events which are not in the Qur'ān.


W then lists a number of ḥadīths foretelling events in the development of the Islamic community, as also does K /P. 483/.

c. Proof from various extraordinary events:

Another type of miracle /f. 69a/ are the thousands of extraordinary acts which appeared in him, from him (‘alā yadihi), or for his sake. Some of these were presages (irhāqīyya), appearing before his claim to prophecy, and others were testimonial\ls of his truthfulness (taqāqīyya) appearing after his claim. They are of three kinds:

1) those concerning his essence (umūr thābita fi dhātihi), such as:
- the light which appeared in the days before he was born
- his being born circumcised, happy, and lifting his eyes to heaven
- the seal of prophecy (khātam an-nabuwwa) that was between his shoulders
- his being able to change his height as he wished, so to be tall with a tall person and short with another
- his being able to see from behind as well as from in front,

2) those related to his attributes (umūr muta‘alliqa bi-
qifātihi, such as:
- his absolute truthfulness, in that he never lied in his life
- his faithfulness (amāna); so that he was called "the faithful" (al-amīn)
- his chastity (ʿafāf)
- his courage (shujāʿa); so that he never turned and fled
- his forbearance (samāha)
- his abstemiousness (zuhd) regarding everything of this world:
  - Having been offered the choice in revelation to be a king-prophet or a servant-prophet (nabiyyan ‘abdān), he chose the latter
  - Having been offered by Gabriel that Mount Tahāma should turn to gold and accompany him wherever he went without detriment to his high rank, he said "Gabriel, the world is the home of those who have no home, and those without intelligence run after it"
- And he chose to fast every other day so he could pray and thank God (li-yatacarraʿ wa-yashkur)
- his condescension to the poor (at-tawāju li-ahl al-maskana)
- his kindness to the nation (ash-shafaqa ‘alā l-umma)
- his endurance of the hardships of being a messenger (al-muqābara ‘alā matā'ib ar-risāla)
- his perseverance in noble virtues (al-muwāzaba ‘alā karāʾim al-akhlāq)
- his attainment of the limits of divine knowledge and awareness
- his settling of religious and worldly matters
- his answering the call of many very tiring problems,
  3) those outside himself (al-umūr al-khārija ‘an an-nafs), such as:
  - the wonders that occurred throughout the world upon his birth,
which as-Sanūsī relates in detail
- the cloud's shading him, the moon's being split, the rocks' greeting him, and trees' bending to him
- his satisfying people with little food, or his multiplication of it by placing his hand on it
- the calming of a screaming goat (jadh') by his presence
- his asking a tree whether it wanted to be a large fruit bearing tree on earth or an ordinary tree planted in heaven (janna), and receiving the answer that the tree preferred to be an ordinary tree in heaven to be close to Muḥammad
- the complaint of the she-camels (nūq) and their prostration before him and hurrying to him when he was slaughtering their companions
- the testifying of the roasted lamb the time of the battle of Khār that it was poisoned
- a dry ewe's teats being made to flow with milk upon his touch
- the transformation of some individuals from blameworthiness to a most excellent disposition by his blessing
- his turning a wooden flute into a hard sword
- his raising of the dead
- a wolf's saying that Muḥammad is telling the truth
- Sawād b. Qālib's receiving verses from the jinn testifying to Muḥammad; and other miracles and wonders beyond numbering.

One miracle in particular treated by Jāhiz, ff. 272a-275b is the isrā', Muḥammad's night ride to Jerusalem, and the mi`rāj, his ascent to heaven on that occasion. Opinions differ as to whether this occurred in his sleep or while he was awake. As-Sanūsī refers the reader to the two Sahīhs (of al-Bukhārī and Muslim) for the manner (kayf) in which these events took place, and quotes at-Taftāzānī's Sharḥ 'Aqīdat an-Nāṣafī, M.
b. Marzūq’s commentary on the Burda of al-BuṣIrī, and al-Qāḍī ‘Iyāq’s Shifā for certain details.

K (Pp. 483-485) gives a list of six kinds of miracles, with subdivisions, which overlaps and varies somewhat from what W has. J (f. 21i, ff. 276a and following) repeats the same list, attributing it to al-Qāḍī ‘Iyāq. W (f. 70b) resumes some of these under the heading “other aspects which confirm the miraculous character of Muḥammad’s life”. These are:

- his possession of every virtue and good quality of body and soul that only a prophet could possess altogether and to such a degree
- the perfection of his revealed-law in every matter, so that it could only have come from revelation to a prophet
- that with his meager resources he managed to inaugurate conquests of powerful kingdoms east and west, while powerful opposition over the centuries has not been able to extinguish Islam
- the fact that Islam came to a world which was as far as could be from correct religious understanding and morals. Each region and religion had its own form of corruption - which as-Sanūsī speaks of in particular - Then Muḥammad restored true religion.

d. Proof from the books of previous prophets:

For proof from authority of Muḥammad’s messengership W (f. 71b) takes up the texts (nuṣūq) concerning Muḥammad in the books of previous prophets which have been passed on to villages, and are well known in the circles of their peoples (al-manqūla ilā l-qurā l-mashhūra fīmā bayn umamihim). K (Pp. 485-492) gives a series of Scriptural texts which partly overlap and partly differ from those given in W. J (f. 21i, ff. 281a-289a) gives still a different series combining the texts given in K and W, without
adding any others. §§ [Pp. 43-47] repeats W exactly, except for the omission of two texts which will be noted. The texts as-
Sanūsī gives are: ¹

1) From the Tawrēt in the fifth book M, f. 71b; K, pp. 486-
487/ is "God came from Mount Sinai and looked down from Saʾir
and shone from Faran" [Deut. 33:2/.

This is a reference to the descent of the Tawrēt upon Moses
in Sinai, of the Injil upon Jesus in Saʾir, which is in Syria,
and of the Furgān upon Muḥammad in Fārān, which is Mecca or a
road near it. The resplendence (istiʿlāḥ) refers to Muḥammad's
many miracles and the triumph of his religion over all others.

2) Likewise in the fifth book M, f. 71b; K, p. 487/ God
says to Moses "I am raising up a prophet for the sons of Israel
from the sons of their brothers, one like you, and I will make
my words flow in his mouth, and he will tell them what I command
them" [Deut. 18:18-19/.

The "sons of their brothers" are the sons of Israel, since
Israel is a son of Isaac the brother of Ismael. Other prophets
are from the sons of Israel, while the only prophet raised up
from the sons of Ismael is Muḥammad. In explaining this text,
K /P. 486; cf. p. 470/ quotes from "a teacher of Cordova" in
rejecting the 'Īsawiyya idea that Muḥammad was sent only to the
Arabs.

¹All the texts given here, and many more, are to be found
verbatim in a. 1-ʿAbbās A. b. Idrīs al-Qarāfī's al-Awba al-
fākhira fī r-radd 'alā 1-as'īla al-fājīra (published in Cairo,
H. 1322, on the margin of 'Ar. Bak Afīnā Badjahī Zādeh, al-
Fārig bāyn al-makhliḥ wa-l-khāliq), pp. 359 and following. As-
Sanūsī no doubt had access to this or a similar work.

²Instead of "from the sons of their brothers", the Hebrew
has "from among ( בָּנֵי) their brothers".

³Al-Mallāḥī, ch. 3, ff. 25b-26a, gives a fuller version of
as-Sanūsī's arguments on this point.
3) The Tawrât also says \( LK, p. 487 \) "God settled Hagar and her son Ismael in Faran" \( Gen. 21:21 \).

   This text is to show that Faran means Mecca.

4) In the first book of the Tawrât \( LN, f. 71b; K, p. 487 \) God says to Abraham "Hagar will give birth, and from her children will be one whose hand will be over all and the hand of all will be extended to him in subjection" \( Gen. 16:11-12 \).

   But Muḥammad is the only son of Hagar sent in triumph over the whole world after most other prophets' having been from the sons of Israel who is Jacob son of Isaac.

5) In the fourteenth chapter (mağāf) of the Injīl \( LN, f. 72a \) Jesus says "I will ask my Father for you to accord to you and give you a Paraclete to be with you forever. The Paraclete is the spirit of truth and certitude" \( Jn. 14:16-17 \).

   In the fifteenth (sic) chapter he says "But the Paraclete, the spirit of holiness, whom the Father will send in my name, will teach you and give you all things, and will remind you of what I told you" \( Jn. 14:26 \).

   Then he says "I have announced this (one) to you before he comes to be (qabl an yākūn), so that when he comes you may believe in him" \( Jn. 14:29 \).

   The meaning of "my Father" is my Lord and my Deity (rabbī wa-ilāhi). The meaning of "paracleto" is a prophet disclosing

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4 Instead of "whose hand will be over all, and the hand of all will be extended to him in subjection", the Hebrew has "whose hand will be against all, and the hand of all against him" \( יְזַיֵּר בְּנֵי יָוָּלִין בְּנֵי בָּרִי \).

5 The Greek omits the demonstrative and personal pronouns, and reads "I have now spoken to you before it (the coming of the Paraclete) happens, so that when it happens you may believe".
hidden things. These are truth, certitude, and justice, which are like a dead person - motionless, buried, hidden, and unspoken - until the Paraclete - blessing and peace be upon him - is sent; he is like a spirit to them, and they return to life and vigor because of him. Thus when truth died out on the earth after Jesus, Muḥammad came and brought it to life again.

6) In the sixteenth chapter (N, f. 72a) Jesus says "I now tell you a certain truth. It is better for you that I go away from you, because if I do not go away from you to my Father, the Paraclete will not come to you. But if I go away I will send him to you, and when he comes he will be of advantage to the people of the world and will judge them, rebuke them, and instruct them concerning sin and justice" (Jn. 16:7-8).

He also says "When the spirit of truth and certitude comes, he will guide you and teach you and conduct you in every virtue (yudabbirukan bi-jan' al-khulq), since he does not speak novelty from himself" (Jn. 16:13). K (P. 488) has a slightly different version of these texts from "the Injil related by John": "The Paraclete will not come to you until I go. When he comes he will rebuke the world because of sin. He will not say anything from himself, but will speak to you what he hears; he will reconcile you to the truth and announce to you things happening and things absent, and he will glorify me."

The meaning of his going away to the Father is his going to a place where he is honored, revered, and given a rest from men by directing his heart to walking in the glory and might of

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Khulq, "virtue" (or khalq, "creature"?) is the word in all the exemplars of this text instead of the obvious haq, "truth".
God, as the Qur'ān verse says, "O Jesus, I will take you and will lift you up to myself" (3:55). The sending of a prophet is attributed to Jesus because of his desire expressed to God, or because his being lifted up is a sign (amāra) of the sending of Muḥammad.

7) Also in John (K, pp. 488-489) Jesus says of the Paraclete "He will bear witness to me as I bore witness to him" (Cf. Jn. 15:26).

He then said "Who hates me hates the Lord" (Jn. 15:23), and further on "I must fulfill the word of revealed-law that they hated me without cause. Would that Manhamannū came whom God will send to you from the Lord, the spirit of holiness, for he is a witness to me, as you also are. But you have been with me a long time. This is what I say to you so that when he comes you may not complain" (Jn. 15:25 - 16:1).

The word Manhamannū, as-Sanūsī says, is a Syriac word meaning Paraclete in Greek, and Muḥammad in Arabic.

8) And in the Injīl (K, p. 489) Jesus says "The world is like a man who planted a vineyard." As-Sanūsī says that Jesus continues this story, and then refers the parable to prophets, to himself, and finally to Muḥammad, the last custodian of the vineyard, where Jesus says "He will remove the kingdom of God the most high from you, and give it to the common nation (al-umma al-‘Āmma) who obey" (Lk. 20:9-16).

Jesus then said "Who falls upon this stone will be broken; the one whom it falls upon will be smashed" (Lk 10:16).

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7 John actually has "He will bear witness to me, and you will bear witness, because you were with me from the beginning".

8 John has "Father" instead of "Lord".

9 On this word in Muslim usage see The Gospel of Barnabas, ed. and tr. by Lonsdale and Lawra Ragg (Oxford, 1907), p. xxxii.
As-Sanūsī says that Muḥammad is the stone.

9) The Psalms (az-zabbūr) too /K, p. 482/ are to have described Muḥammad: "He will rule from sea to sea, and from far-off rivers to far-off rivers. Peoples of the islands will bow before him on their knees, and his enemies will sit in the dust. Their kings will bring him gifts and prostrate before him. Nations will be subject to him in obedience and submission, because he will save the desperate and miserable man from those who are stronger. He will rescue the weak man who has no helper, and will be kind to the weak and the destitute" /Ps. 72:8-13, 15, 17/.

10) There is also the Psalm verse /K, p. 482/ "God has manifested from Sion a praiseworthy (maḥmūd) crown" /Ps. 50:2/.

The crown refers to leadership, and the name Maḥmūd to Muḥammad.

11) The Psalms again say /K, pp. 487-488/ "Let Israel rejoice in its creator with the sons of Sion, because God has chosen a people for them and given them victory. He has strengthened with honor the good among them; they praise God on their beds and glorify him with raised voices. In their hands are two-edged swords in order to take revenge on the nations which do not serve God. They bind the nations with bonds, and their nobles with shackles" /Ps. 149:2, 4-8/.

This passage is to describe the Muslim community.

12) From the Psalms too /N, f. 72a; K, p. 488/ is "Put on your sword, 0 mighty one, for your law and your statutes are joined with the fearsomeness of your right hand. Your arrows are sharpened, and peoples are prostrate under you" /Ps. 45:4-6/. 10

10"Your law and your statutes" corresponds to a Syriac version. The Masoretic is "will teach", according to which the phrase reads "Your right hand will teach you fearsome things".
The meaning is that peoples will be reduced before Muhammad so that they enter Islam whether they like it or not, or pay the jizya in a state of subjection. 12

13) Also from the Psalms (sic) LW, f. 72a; K, p. 488/ is God's word to David "A son will be born to you by whom I will be called 'father', and he will be called a son by me" L2 Sam. 7:14 = 1 Chr. 17:13/.

David answered "O God, send someone to maintain tradition, so that people will know that he is human" /Possibly an interpreted reading of 2 Sam. 7:19 = 1 Chr. 17:17/. In these passages, David's son is Jesus, while Muḥammad maintained tradition, teaching that Jesus is a servant of God and not a son.

The Injil has a similar passage where Jesus says "O God, send the Paraclete to teach men that the son of man is human" /This verse does not resemble anything in the New Testament; it is omitted in Q5/. 14

14) From Isaiah the prophet LW, f. 72b; K, p. 489/ is the word of God "As for my servant in whom my soul is well pleased, I will send down my revelation upon him. He will make my justice appear among the nations, and will give them commands. He will not laugh or make his voice heard in the markets. He will open the eyes of the one-eyed, give hearing to deaf ears, and give life to uncircumcized hearts. What I give him I give to no one. more praiseworthy and praising God intensely (aḥmad yaḥmad Allāh ḥamdan)" LIs. 42:1-2, 7/. 13

11Echoing Qur'ān 3:83.
13"Laugh" (yaṣḥaqa) should be "cry out" (ṣyy'ī). "Give hearing..." is not in Isaiah.
Also from Isaiah, indicating that Muḥammad's town is Mecca, is "The desert shall rejoice, and its inhabitants praise God on every high place and glorify him on every hill. He will not be weak nor be conquered, nor turn to heretical winds. He will not make his voice heard in the markets, nor will he humiliate the just, who are like a weak reed; but he will strengthen the weak. He is the support of the weak, and the light of God which will not be put out. He will not be defeated until my authority is established on earth, excuses are refuted, and truth is brought to his Tawrāt". The first two sentences are not in Isaiah; the rest is a loose paraphrase of Is. 42:2-4.

The phrase "He will give commands to the nations" indicates that Muḥammad is sent to all, whereas the Injīl says of the Messiah "I was not sent to the gentiles, but only to the resting sheep of the sons of Israel" (Mt. 15:24 and 10:5). The word ʾahmad, "more praiseworthy", refers to the name of Muḥammad, while "the desert" refers to Mecca.

15) Also from Isaiah ḫ, f. 73a; K, p. 492/ is "Let the people of the dry steppes and the deserts and the open lands rejoice, because they will produce the most praiseworthy (ʾahmad) valuables of Lebanon, and things like good villages and gardens". A paraphrase of Is. 35:1-2.

In this passage Mecca is again described, and Muḥammad mentioned under the name ʾAhmad. The meaning of "dry" is the absence of prophets in that land since Ismael.

16) Again from Isaiah ḫ, f. 73a; K, p. 490/ is "The days of visitation have come; the days of enduring perfection have come". No definite passage/, and "Know, O ignorant sons of

14 "Resting" (rābiṭa) should be "lost" (ἀπολωλότα).
Israel, that he whom you call erring is endowed with prophecy. You are indifferent to that because of your many sins and great disoluteness" (An echo of Is. 59:2).

17) From Isaiah also (K, p. 490) is "It was said to me 'Rise and look, and tell me what you see.' I said 'I see two riders coming, one of them on an ass, the other on a camel. One said to the other "Babel has fallen with its decadent idols".' (Is. 21:9).

As-Saniüsi identifies the riders respectively with Jesus and Muhammad.

18) Ezechiel (N, f. 73a; K, p. 491), after speaking of the past history of the sons of Israel and having likened them to a vine, said "Before long that vine will be torn up by his rage and thrown upon the ground, and the hot winds will burn its fruits. Then a seedling will be planted in the desert in waste and dry land, and from its abundant branches will come a fire which will eat that vine until no strong sap or twig is left in it" (A loose paraphrase of Ez. 17:9-10 and 22-24, with the element of fire borrowed from 15:6).

In this passage, the desert represents Mecca, the seedling Muhammad, and the vine the Jews whom he laid hold of by devastating battle, captivity, and the humiliation of the jizya in all the land of Islam.

19) From Daniel (N, f. 73a; K, p. 491) is the passage describing livers "Their prayer will not be extended nor their sacrifices finished. The Lord has sworn by his arm that neither lies nor the cause of a false claimant will appear for more than thirty years" (There is nothing like this in Daniel; it

15 Isaiah does not mention the ass or the camel, but cf. Zach. 9:9 for a mention of riding on an ass.
Muḥammad's claim lasted more than thirty years, and is now near 900 years.

20) From Daniel also [W, f. 73a; K, p. 491] is his interpretation of the dream of Nebuchadnezzar: "Daniel said '0 King, you have seen a statue of excelling beauty, whose upper part is gold, its middle part of silver, its lower part of brass, its thighs of iron, and its feet of clay. While you were looking at it with pleasure, a stone came down from heaven and broke it, striking its head and grinding it to dust, so that the gold, silver, copper, iron, and clay were all mixed together. Then the stone grew big and mighty until it filled the whole earth.' Thereupon Nebuchadnezzar said 'You have spoken truly; now interpret it for me.' Then Daniel said 'The statue is various nations at the beginning, middle, and end of time. You are the head of gold, 0 King, and the silver is your son after you. The brass is Bysantium, and the iron Persia, while the clay are two weak nations ruled by women in Yemen and Syria. The stone which came from heaven is the religion of an everlasting prophet and king who will come at the end of time, conquering all nations. Then he will grow mighty until he fills the whole earth, as this stone filled it!" [An interpreted reading of Dan. 2:31-45; in Daniel there is no identification of the kingdom.]

Such a description fits Muḥammad, who was sent to all nations made up of different races, languages, and religions, and made them one race (jins), with one language, which is Arabic, and one religion, which is Islam.

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16This omission by §q and its omission of the spurious passage given above in n. 7 give reason to think that as-Sanūsī somehow checked his material for authenticity between writing W and §q.
21) And from Habakkuk K, p. 490/ is "God came from at-Tin and shone from the mountains of Fārān, and the whole earth was filled with praising Al-Ḥamad and declaring his holiness. He filled the earth with his fear." There follows "At your order, Muḥammad, the pestilential hot wind (sahām) is watered" /An elaboration of Hab. 3:3/

Regarding the fulfilment of these texts, K ΛP. 492/ says that very few, seven to be exact, had the name Muḥammad before the prophet, and none of them claimed prophecy.

W ΛP. 73b/ concludes that the previous books testify to the prophecy of Muḥammad. He occupies the highest rank among the prophets, and is the last of them, and his revealed-law will never change or be abrogated.

e. Who is preferred after Muḥammad:

W ΛF. 74a/, in a first remark (tanbih), and Sq ΛP. 48/ quote at-Taftāzānī's Sharḥ al-Maṣāqīd ad-dīniyya which says that all agree that Muḥammad is the most preferred (afqal) prophet, but there are different opinions as to who comes after him. Some say Adam, because he is the father of humanity, others Noah, because of his long worship and hard work, others Abraham, because of his great dependence upon God and trust, others Moses, because he spoke to God and was his confidant (li-kawnihi kalim Allah wa-najīyyahu), and others Jesus, because he was the spirit of God and his intimate (li-kawnihi rūḥ Allah wa-gafiyyahu).

K ΛPp. 511-515/ and J Λ32b, ff. 344a-345a/, discussing the same question, say that the Rāwandites preferred al-ʿAbbās, while the Shiʿites preferred 'Alī. Al-Qurtubi's commentary on Muslim says that for Sunnites Abū-Bakr and 'Umar occupy the first and
second places after Muñammad. Al-Qāḍī 'Iyāḍ, depending on a.
Mansūr al-Baghdādī, says that the first four caliphs are preferred
in their order of succession. Al-Ashʿarī, Mālik b. Anas as quoted in the Mudawwana, and Imām-al-Ḥaramayn, says Ibn-Rushd,
are to have held the same opinion or to have suspended judg-
ment. Ibn-ʿArabī quotes his master al-Fihristī (a. B. at-Ṭurṭūshī
l-Andalusī) in favor of ʿUmar, but disagrees with him. Others
quote al-Ashʿarī and Mālik, again from the Mudawwana, for saying
that Abū-Bakr is decidedly preferred, while al-Bāqillānī says
it is doubtful. Still others distinguish between outward (ẓāhir)
and inward (bāṭin) preference.

In any case, preference (tafaqil) is defined as abundance of reward and elevated rank (kathrat ath-thawāb wa-
raff ad-daraja), and cannot be decided by measuring outward
deeds, but only by authority. §§ /Pp. 48-50/ quotes a long
passage from a. ʿAl. M. b. ʿAbbād to the same effect. God's
preferring someone is a matter of his free choice, and is not
caused by some quality or a greater or lesser degree of perfec-
tion in the person. That is why the comparisons which some
authors make between Muñammad and other prophets, showing how
his miracles or characteristics are better than theirs, even
though they may be true, give a wrong impression, because these
points of excellence do not make him preferred by God. That is
why Muñammad discarded boasting (fakhr) about anything and
contented himself with the title of servant (ʿabd).

f. Regarding saints, wonders, and magic:

J /22, ff. 289b-297a/ distinguishes four questions: 1) the
reality of a saint and a wonder, 2) determining whether wonders
are admissible and happen, 3) the relation of a saint to a
prophet, 4) the reality of magic. These questions are the subject of the second and third remarks (tanbīh) in W/LF. 74a-76a/.

1) W/LF. 74a/ says that the reality of a saint (wāli) is "a person who is aware of God and his attributes, is dedicated to obedience, turns away from disobedience, and avoids being absorbed by pleasures and cravings" (al-`ārif bi-llāh ta`ālā wa-ṣifātihī l-muwāżib ‘alā t-tāfāt al-mujtabib ‘an al-ma’tāq l-mu’ārif ‘an al-inhimāk fī l-ladhdhāt wa-sh-shahāt). His wonder (karāma) is the manifestation of something extraordinary from him, unaccompanied by the claim of prophecy. Not claiming prophecy makes a wonder different from a miracle.

K/LPp. 446-447/ cites "one of our imāms" for making the difference between a miracle and a wonder consist in the fact that a messenger chooses and intends his miracle, whereas a saint does not choose or intend his wonder, but only desires and hopes for it. Other imāms say that the difference is in the kind of act: that raising the dead, curing the leprous and the like are miracles, but finding something in the desert and the like are only wonders; messengers can have both miracles and wonders. But the opinion of sound theologians is that any kind of event can appear from a saint, and the difference is the absence of a claim of messengership.

W continues to say that the fact that the extraordinary act comes from a person of correct belief, good works, and resolution to follow the Prophet distinguish a wonder from the enticements (istidrāj) and sure indications of a liyār, as in the case of Musaylima, who tried to cure a person’s blind eye, and made the other eye blind also; such an act is called an affront (ihāna).

God sometimes causes extraordinary things to appear from
ordinary Muslims (min qibal al-'awwan al-muslimin) in order to free them from the scandals and adversities of the world (min miğan ad-dunya wa-makarihiha), even if they are not qualified with saintliness (wilaya). These extraordinary things which appear from them are called an assistance (ma'una).

K /P. 448/ says that the fact that a person will not be a prophet in the future distinguishes a wonder from a presage (irhag). This distinction, says J, is that of at-Taftazani in his Sharh al-Maghid, as opposed to Ibn-'Arafa in his Shamil, who included a presage and an assistance (ma'una) under wonders (karāma).

At-Taftazani concludes /N, f. 74a/ that extraordinary events are of four kinds:
- a miracle (mu'jiza)
- a wonder (karāma)
- an assistance (ma'una)
- an affront (ihāna)

But as-Sanusi adds three other kinds:
- a presage (irhag), which is an extraordinary event appearing before a claim of prophecy to give it foundation (ta'slan la-ha); K /P. 448/ says that the origin of the word is riha, which is the foundation of a wall
- an enticement (istidraj), which is something extraordinary appearing from someone whose religion is not sound
- a trial (ibtilā'), such as the extraordinary things which will appear from the Antichrist (dajjal).

Ibn-Dahhaq /N, f. 75a; J, 22, on this point/ said in his commentary on the Irshād that there are four conditions for a saint:
- that he be aware of the principles of religion
- that he be aware of the determinations of revealed-law by understanding, not blind-acceptance
- that he know created things, so that he knows what revealed-law forbids or commands, and knows what will provide his intellect with a demonstration of God's existence and attributes and consequently does not fear or wish for anything apart from what God has destined (qaddar)
- his having a constant fear of not being among the blessed, or of not being able to fulfil God's commands.

J says that al-Qushayrî, in his Risâla, stipulated also that a saint be active or activated (fa'îl), that is, that God should produce wonders from him.

2) Q, f. 74a/ The jumhûr of Muslims agree that it is admissible for wonders to appear on the part of saints. The Mu'tazilites disagree, and al-Isfarâ'înî, according to Imâm-al-Ḥaramayn, is close to their position.

At-Taftâzînî, f. 74b/ said that proof for the fact (wuqû'î) of wonders is found first of all in the Qur'în, for example:
- the divine provisionment of Mary in the temple (3:32/
- the episode of men remaining in a cave many years without food or drink (Sûra 18/
- Āqîf's bringing of the throne of Bâlqîs to Solomon before the twinkling of an eye (27:40/.

These extraordinary acts are not presages, because their aim was not the verification of a claim to prophecy.

A second proof is in the wonders which happened to the companions of Muḥammad and their followers. Al-Imâm an-Nasâ'î

17 See the commentary of ar-Râzî for an interpretation giving the names Āqîf and Bâlqîs.
admitted the possibility of reported bilocations of saints who were seen in their own town and at the same time in Mecca.

Objections to the possibility of wonders are:
- that a saint from whom wonders appear would not be distinguished from a prophet. This has already been answered
- that if they appeared for a purpose other than proving truthfulness, then we could not verify prophecy by a miracle, since it could admit of another purpose. The answer, as has been said before, is that a miracle is accompanied by a claim to prophecy
- that for saints to have wonders diminishes the dignity of prophets and people’s admiration of them. The answer is that the opposite is true. People will honor and follow the prophets more if they know that by following them they can achieve a like rank (mithl hādhihi d-daraja).

Many saints have been distinguished by announcing things absent (ikhbār al-mughayyabāt). This is not contrary to the Qur’ān verse 72:26 which says that only a messenger shares God’s knowledge of the absent (al-ghayb), since in the context the meaning of this word is the day of resurrection; or only a messenger can be admitted to knowing the generality of absent things, but some absent things can be revealed to ordinary individuals.

3) Muslims agree that a saint is less than a prophet, since a saint is immune from disobedience (ma‘ṣūm min al-ma‘āṣī), but a prophet also has revelation (waḥy) for the benefit and renewal of the world. This is contrary to the error of some Karrāmites, who say that they are equal, and the error of some Dā‘ūlites, who say that a saint is preferred
(afqal) to a prophet. Doubts on this question arose, at-Taftazani says, because a prophet is characterized by intermediacy between God and men, while a saint is characterized by nearness to God.

Muslims also agree that a saint is obliged by revealed-law, contrary to the opinion of the libertines (ahl al-ibaha), the Batinites, and other heretics. They say that once a saint reaches the perfection of love and purity of heart and perfect sincerity, he is no longer bound by commands or prohibitions, and then sin does not hurt him, nor will he be punished in fire for his sins. After refuting them, at-Taftazani says that the prophets are the most perfect in love and sincerity (al-mahabba wa-l-ikhlash). They are also always subject to revealed-law, since this is a consequence of possessing an intellect, and they follow revealed-law most perfectly.

4) LV, f. 76a/ The reality of magic (sihr) is something extraordinary appearing from an evil and filthy soul, directly by certain works which involve learning and teaching (izhahr amr khariq li-l-'ada min nafs sharira khabitha bi-mubahara amal makhshiga tajri fiha t-ta'allum wa-t-ta'lim).

K LP. 44/ quotes Ibn-'Afafa for saying that magic is something extraordinary bound to a particular activating-link; so that al-QaratI said that it was not even extraordinary, but its strangeness is due to causes unknown to most men.

Magic, W continues, differs from a miracle or a wonder because of the character of the person from whom it appears, because it is not spontaneous (bi-mujarrad iqtirab al-muqtarihib), because it is restricted to particular times, places, and conditions, and because it runs into opposition and efforts to produce its like.
Intelligibility admits the possibility of magic, while authority (sam') and the fact of the evil eye (al-iṣāba bi-l-'ayn) show that it happens. The Muʿtazilites said that magic is mere will and imagination and is on the same level as juggling (shaʿbadha), whose activating-link is simple sleight of hand. The Sunnites say that it is admissible because of its intrinsic possibility and the generality of God's power, which produces the effect on the occasion of, and not by means of magical practices which themselves have no effectivity at all.

It may be objected that the Qur'ān verse in the story of Moses "It was made to seem to him by their magic that they (their cords) were running" /20:66/ means that there is no reality to magic, but it is merely imaginary. The answer is that it could be true that the effect was created by God only in the imagination on the occasion of the magicians' hand motions. But this imaginative effect (talḥyīl) is itself a reality.

The evil eye is a characteristic of certain souls so that if they regard something as good evil will reach it (huwa an yakūn li-baʿḍ an-nufūs khāṣṣiyya annahā idhā stapsanat shay'an laḥiqat'hu l-ḥa.fa). This too happens only by God's creation, while the eye produces no effect, but is merely a sign (amāra) of what customarily happens. The fact of it is almost something that happens before our eyes, and needs no demonstration (fa-thubūtuḥā yakād yajrī majrā l-mushāḥadāt allātī lū taftaqir ilā ḥujja).
J. Various revealed tenets:

a. The resurrection:

(N. 49) Ν, f. 76b/ Among the tenets which depend upon the fact of Muḥammad's messengership and his immunity from error is the resurrection. J 26a, f. 312b/ distinguishes two steps: the resurrection (ba' th), which is vivifying the dead and taking them out of their tombs, and the assembling (ḥashr) of all men to the formidable stopping place (al-mawqif al-hā' il). There is agreement, says W, in the Qur'ān, Sunna, and consensus that Muḥammad taught that men shall return after their destruction, and there is no need to discuss the proofs from intelligibility and authority.

There is, however, a difference of opinion whether the resurrection is a bringing into existence (ijād) after non-existence or is a collection (jam') of the parts which were scattered. Ar-Rāzī K, p. 496/ said that no proof from intelligibility or authority could be produced for either opinion. The best procedure, W continues, is that of Imām-al-Haramayn, which is to refrain from judgement, since intelligibility admits both possibilities. What is sure is that both good and bad will be raised up with the same body they had in the world, and their spirit will not reside (tarkub) in a different body which is only a likeness of the one they had.

K K, p. 496-497/ says there is also agreement that the body returns with the same accidentals, as Ibn-`Arabī said in his Sirāj al-murīdīn. Some would even say that among accidentals time also returns the same, but the Qur'ān verse 4:56/ which speaks of God changing the skins of those in hell each time their skins are burnt implies succession of non-repeated times.

The objection is raised K, p. 495/ that if one man eats
another they cannot have the same body in the resurrection. The answer is that the body has original (āgliyya) parts and supplementary (faqliyya) parts; the return to life (ma'ād) concerns the former.

J (/26c, ff. 316a-317a/) says that the teaching of the resurrection is against the Philosophers, who denied the resurrection of the body while admitting the future life of the spirit, and against the Dahrites, who denied the resurrection and future life altogether. Ar-Rāzī, in his Arba'in, said that one who denies the resurrection is an unbeliever, because he is denying the Qur'ān. Al-Qarāfī said likewise.

b. The questioning and torment or delight in the grave:

There is consensus (ajma' al-islāmiyyūn), says W /F. 76b/ and J /25a, ff. 309a-311a/ quoting at-Taftāzānī, concerning the fact of the questioning in the grave (su'a'll al-qabar), the torment ('adhāb) of unbelievers and some disobedient believers there, and the delight (na'im) of others there. The only difference of opinion comes from the Mu'tazilites. Some late theologians say that the Mu'tazilites are innocent of denying this, and that the denial originated with Dirār b. 'Amr and was attributed to the Mu'tazilites because he mixed with them. Other stupid people followed him.

In asserting the torment or delight of the grave, the Sunnites refer to Qur'ān verses as 40:45-46, where the family of Pharaoh is punished by fire morning and night, and this before the resurrection, and 71:25, where the people in the time of Noah are said to have drowned and entered the fire. In verse 40:11 one of the two lives referred to can only be in the grave. In 3:169-170 those killed in a holy war are said
not to be dead but living with God and enjoying what he gives them. Various hadiths confirm the same. In particular there is the hadith of the two angels (Munkar and Nakîr) who question the dead person about his religion and punish him if he does not have the right answer.

K (Pp. 499-501) explains the positions of the opponents. Dirîrî and Bishr al-Marîsî denied torment in the grave, saying that whoever is dead is dead in the grave until the day of the resurrection, and the soul does not return to the body in the meantime. Abū-l-Hudhayl said that someone who dies without faith is punished "between the two breaths" (bayn an-nafkhatayn) (Cf. Qur'ān 39:68) of the trumpet blasts. Al-Balakhî (al-Ka'bî) and al-Jubbâî and his son admitted torment in the grave for unbelievers, and denied the naming of the two angels Munkar and Nakîr, which revealed-law affirms.

Ṣâliḥ Qubba said that torment in the grave is admissible without the soul returning to the body. He is wrong, because sensation without the soul is contrary to what is self-evident. Some of the Karrâmites and Mu'tazilites said that God punishes the dead in their graves without their feeling anything, but they only feel it when they come to life again, as a drunken person. But the Sunnite position is that they do feel something, yet they do not cry and moan during it.

There is nothing in intelligibility impeding the return of life to some parts of the body and the person's answering questions, even though we do not perceive this. It is not altogether certain whether children are brought to life in the grave. The apparent meaning of revelation (khabar) is that all, including children and those immune from sin, are brought to life, but there must be a perfecting of children's understanding.
for them to know their condition. To the objection that no life is apparent in the dead, it can be pointed out that sleeping people experience many things in their dreams without an observer's being aware of it.

J /25b, ff. 311b-312a/ explains that God creates the accidentals of life or death in a body without the spirit having any effectivity (ta'thîr) on this. The body returns to dust (turâb), except that God preserves the bodies of prophets, learned men ('ulamâ'), martyrs (shuhadâ'), and deserving mu'adhdhîns.

c. The path:

The path (ṣirâf), says Ḫ F. 77a/ followed by J /29, ff. 321a-325b/, is a bridge stretched over hell (jisr mamdûd 'alâ matn jahannam), and is the only road to heaven. It is finer than a hair and sharper than a sword, according to authentic hadîths with which Sunnites agree.

Ibn-Dahhâq, in his commentary on the Irshâd, says that there is a difference of opinion concerning its description. Some say that it is wide, and all together men stand on it to receive their judgement; this was the opinion of al-Ash'ârî and Imam-al-Jaramayn. But most learned men hold that it is finer than a hair and sharper than a sword, and that it is a bridge with one end in the land of the resurrection (arq al-qiyâma) and the other end in the land of heaven (arq al-janna). Both the bridge and the land of the resurrection where men will be gathered stand over the fire. The fire leaps up from below and grabs those destined for it according to their different categories (aqnâf).

Many Mu'tazilites denied the existence of the path in its
outward sense, saying that it is impossible or very difficult to cross such a bridge, and that the meaning is the path leading to heaven \(\text{Cf. Qur'ān 3:142/}\) or hell \(\text{Cf. Qur'ān 37:23/}\) by doing or omitting the practices of religion. Or the path, according to its length, refers to the number of sins which must be answered for before entering heaven.

The answer to them is that a literal crossing of such a path is possible by the power of God, who even now enables some birds to dart through the air with a speed beyond the natural power of their wings, while the condition of the next life will consist for the most part of extraordinary things.

d. The scale:

The existence of the scale (mīzān), says W \(\text{F. 77b/}\), is affirmed in the Qur'ān verses 21:47 and 101:6. Many commentators describe the scale as consisting of the two ends of a bar \(\text{katāfān = shoulders}\), a dial \(\text{lisūn = tongue}\), and two pendulums \(\text{sāqān = legs}\).

Some Mu'tazilites oppose this description, saying that human acts are accidentals which cannot be weighed when they exist, and much less so when they have passed away. Rather, the meaning of the scale is justice established in everything \(\text{al-'adl ath-thābit fi kull shay'}\). The reason for the use of the plural \text{mâyāzān, "scales"}, is to indicate the perceptions of each knowing power.

The answer to them is that acts themselves are not weighed, but papers which record them, or, as some say, specially created bright bodies to represent good acts, and dark bodies to represent bad acts. The use of the plural is for the sake of emphasizing greatness \(\text{isti'zām}\), or because of the many things
weighed in it, or because there is one big scale and a single little one for each person.

K (Pp. 497-498) adds that the Mu'tazilite Ibn-al-Mu'tamar admitted the possibility of the literal meaning of the scale, although he found no authoritative reason for asserting it. Al-Jubbä'I admitted the creation of substances which are weighed in representation of a person's acts, which is close to the idea of weighing papers. There is uncertainty (taraddud) whether there are separate scales for unbelievers and believers or there is one for everyone.

Ibn-Dahhäq, W continues, says there will be no settling of accounts (muqūssa) between man and his Lord, as al-Jubbä'I, the Mu'tazilite, asserted in saying that good acts are weighed against bad acts, and according to which are heavier the man goes to heaven or hell. This is not true, because Muḥammad said that if heaven and earth were placed on one side and the words "There is no deity but God" on the other, the latter would outweigh the former. The Sunnite position is that if a man has a mountain of acts of obedience and one act of deliberate disobedience, God can punish him for this and reward him for the rest, or he can forgive this sin. Abū-l-Qāsim al-Junayd was asked what would happen to someone who left the world with only a speck (qadr nawāt) of goodness. He answered that it would be considered as a basis of reward or punishment, much or little, as God wishes.

As for taking the book by the right hand, K (P. 507) says there is a difference of opinion whether this gesture indicates that the person will escape punishment, and the best course is to suspend judgement. W, however, says that this act is a sign that the person will not remain in the fire eternally, or,
says J (27, f. 318a), that he will have an easy reckoning.

At the reckoning (hisâb), says W, a person will know which of his good acts are accepted (maqbul) or rejected (mardud), and which of his bad acts are forgiven (maghfür) or held against him (mu'kichadh bi-hi). At the scale he will know how much reward or punishment he will receive for his good or bad acts.

e. The basin:

The Sunnites are unanimous, says W (F. 78a) as to the existence of the basin (ḥawq). It is described as containing extremely white water, sweeter than honey, and is fed by two pipes (mizāb) from the river Kawthar with awänin as numerous as stars. The sky is its rim (ḥafatuhu); its smell is that of musk, and its pebbles are pearls (lu'lu'). Whoever drinks from it will never thirst, and anyone who has substituted or changed tradition (man baddal aw ghayyar) will be kept away from it. Another ḥadîth reported by Suhaylî says that if you put your fingers in your ears and hear a sound, that is the pipes bringing water to the basin; this is literally possible, because for Sunnites sound, like sight, is not impeded by long distances.

Ibn-Dahhāq says there is a difference of opinion concerning its location. Some say that it is beyond (khalf) the path, an opinion attributed to the companions of ash-Shafi‘î. According to them, those who drink from it will not enter the fire, whereas some believers will enter the fire and be released by the intercession of Muḥammad; therefore it cannot be in the stopping place (mawqif).

Yet other Shafi‘ites say that the basin is in the land of the resurrection (arg al-qiyāma) Like the stopping place, on
this side of the path/, while the believers who will enter the
fire have their cups reserved for them until they come out.

Most Sunnites (jamāhir ahl as-sunna) say that the basin is
in the land of the resurrection, and there people either drink
from it or are turned away. Were it beyond the path, there
would be no chance of anyone being turned away, since those who
have crossed the path can never turn back and enter the fire.
It is possible for those who have drunk from the basin before
crossing the path to enter the fire, in which case their having
drunk from its waters is an assurity (amān) against their faces
being burnt or their suffering hunger or thirst. It is also
related that the fire will not burn their stomachs or the places
where they washed for prayer (mawṣi' al-wuṣū') or the parts of
their bodies where they prostrated (mawṣi' as-sujūd). More-
over only the upper part of the flames will touch them while
they are still on the path, and only the unbelievers will fall
from the path into the fire and remain there eternally, according
to the Qur'ān verses 26:94 and 39:72. Being seared while on
the path sufficiently concords with the authentic traditions
(akhbār) that the faithful who have sinned will enter the fire
and be removed from it by Muḥammad's intercession, although
another hadīth says that God kills them in the fire so that
they do not feel its pain; then they come out like ashes.

As-Sanūsī adds another opinion (qultu qill) that there are
two basins, one at this end and one at the other end of the
path. Those who have substituted or changed tradition are
turned away from the first, while no one is turned away from
the second, since only those saved from the fire reach it.
God knows best.

The Muʿtazilites said that the basin is a relaxation from
following the Muḥammadan norm (kifāya 'an ittibā' as-sunna). The answer to them is that in the next life people will not be turned away from following the Muḥammadan norm, since there is no enchargement then; rather they will be turned away from a sensible (maḥṣūṣ) basin. This is confirmed by a ḥadīth describing its dimensions.

Ibn-Dahhāq relates another tradition whereby each prophet has his own basin from which his nation drinks. But some learned men say that there is no water or basin in the stopping place but that of Muḥammad. Those who are turned away from it will not enjoy any intercession. These are guilty of unbelief; equivalent to them are those who tamper with tradition (man khālab as-sunna).

f. Intercession:

K /P. 506/ describes the Sunnite position:
- that unbelievers will be forever in the fire
- that believers:
  - who are preserved from acts of disobedience for their whole life will go straight to heaven
  - who commit:
    - small sins (qaghā'ir) only will go to heaven; J /31b, f. 335a/ quotes ar-Rāzī's Muḥassal for saying that small sins are removed before the judgement and are not punished
    - big sins (kabā'ir), and:
      - repent will go to heaven, but perhaps after some frightening experience (ahwāl) before being forgiven
      - do not repent will be punished or not, as God wills, but there is a consensus that a group representing every kind of disobedience will be punished.
For the latter lot, W F. 79a/ says that written authority (naṣṣ) and consensus affirm that intercession (ṣafā'ī'a) will save some of the disobedient from the fire either before or after their entering it.

The Muʿtazilites are opposed to this, and limit intercession to those who obey or repent, in order to raise their rank and increase their reward. But Sunnites say that it is admissible also for those guilty of big acts of disobedience. At-Taftāzānī argues that if intercession were limited to increasing benefits (ziyādat al-manāfiʿ) we could be said to intercede for Muḥammad when we ask God to increase his honor; but such a consequence is false. An objection to his argument is that an intercessor (ṣafāʿī) is of a higher status (ḥāl) than the one he intercedes for (al-mashfūʿ la-hu), or that the increase of benefits is completely unknown to his request or prayer (majhūla li-cuʿūlihi wa-ṭalabīhi l-batta). The answer to this objection is that an intercessor sometimes intercedes for himself, and that a benefit requested is sometimes impossible (ghayr muṭṭūʿ) and is not granted.

The Muʿtazilites N, f. 79b/ posed many objections to Muḥammad's intercession:

1) The first are Qurʾān verses such as "Be on your guard against the day when one soul will not avail another in the least, neither shall intercession on its behalf be accepted" 2:48/, and "The unjust shall have no helpers" 2:270/.

The answer is that these verses refer specifically to unbelievers, which is the meaning of ṣālim. Besides, the denial of help (naṣra) does not imply the denial of intercession, since intercession is a request for submission (khuqūʿ), whereas help can possibly imply defence and victory (mudāfaʿa
wa-mughālaba) for the disobedient.

2) As for the Qur'ān verse "They intercede only for him whom he approves" (21:28), someone guilty of a big sin is not approved. Besides, the prayer of the angels who carry the throne is "Pardon for those who have repented and follow your way" (40:7); and there is no difference between the intercession of angels and that of prophets.

The answer is that one guilty of a big sin is approved (murtada) from the point of view of his having faith (Imān), even though he has no good works; only the unbeliever is not approved, because he lacks the root of all goodness and perfection (asl al-ḥasanat wa-asās al-kamālāt), which is faith. The meaning of intercession for those who repent is intercession for those who repent of association in the objects of their belief (shirk), since if they repented from simple acts of disobedience and did good works they would have no need of intercession, according to the Mu'tazilites.

3) If intercession is for those guilty of big sins, then we include ourselves among them by saying the prayer "Lord make us worthy of the intercession of Muḥammad".

The answer is that although the prayer supposes acts of disobedience, its meaning is "Make us believers and approved", since intercession is only for such. Consequently it is a prayer for a happy death (ḥusn al-khātima). At-Taftāzānī explains the logic of such a prayer in the same way.

5. Eternity of final reward or punishment:

The eternity of delight for believers and of fire for unbelievers, says W (Ff. 79b–80a) is a matter of consensus. Included among unbelievers (kāfirūn) are the hypocrites
(munāfiqūn), who are in the lowest level of hell. Among believers are included the immoral (fussāq), since even if they do not repent before death, they will be eternally in heaven, and that either immediately and without punishment at all by God's forgiveness and the intercession of those who intercede, or after some punishment in the fire according to the measure (qadr) of their sins. Nevertheless we hold for (naqṭa') the carrying out of the threat (nufūdh al-wa'īd) for an indefinite number of them (fī jamā'ā minhum min ghayr ta'yīn) because of the texts concerning this.

Regarding punishment in the next life, there are the errors of:
- the BĀṭinites (K, p. 503), who say that it is a mere fiction to scare people, and that it is contrary to God's mercy
- the Mu'tazilites and the Khārijites (N, f. 802), who say that those guilty of big sins who die without repentance will be forever in the fire
- the Murji'ites, who say that God's forgiveness is complete for every disobedient believer, and that only unbelievers will enter the fire.

The Sunnites hold a middle position between the last two extremes.

At-Taftāzānī observes that there is really a difference of opinion among the Mu'tazilites. Al-Jubbārī, Abū-Hāshim, and later Mu'tazilites held that:
- if the punishment due is greater than (zād 'alā) the reward due, the big sins cancel out acts of obedience and cause a person to stay eternally in the fire; knowledge of that is committed to God (mufawwaq 'illā llāh)
- if the reward due is greater, the person will not enter the
fire at all
-if the reward and punishment due are equal, the Mu'tazilites were confused (iqṭarabū); they said this is a question of authority (sam'), but that intelligibility admits the possibility of punishment for all the big sins in such a case; but al-Ka‘bī disagreed.

In another place at-Taftāzānī says that Abū-‘Alī al-Jubbī'I said that whichever is greater simply cancels out the other, but Abū-Hāshim said that the lesser is subtracted from the greater, and the person has the reward or punishment which remains.

K /Pp. 498-499/ asserts that heaven and the fire already exist. The Mu'tazilites denied this, since they serve no purpose until someone is admitted to them for reward or punishment. The answer to them is that God does not act for objectives that he must justify his creation by its usefulness. Besides, the present existence of heaven and the fire has the usefulness of inciting hope or fear.

As-Sanūsī does not describe heaven, except for the section on the vision of God /Above, G, c/. In K /P. 496/ he mentions that the pleasures of the next world are like some of the pleasures of this world in appearance (qūra), but differ from them in reality (ḥaqīqa); so that all they have in common is their names.

h. Repentance:

Immorality (fisq), says W /F. 80a/, is a departure from obedience to God, either by committing one big sin or by committing many small sins over a long time or all at once. The determination for immorality in this world is, by consensus,
the obligation of repentance (tawba) immediately. If a person delays repentance an hour, this delay (ta'khīr) is another big sin, and so on by doubling: for two hours he has four sins, for three hours eight, for four hours sixteen.

The reality of repentance (tawba) in revealed-law is a regret for disobedience because it is disobedience (annadam 'alā l-ma'qīyya li-ajl annahā ma'qīyya), or if you like, a regret for disobedience because of its foulness before revealed-law (li-ajl qubhīhā shar'an). Regret for disobedience because it harms one's body or reputation ('ird) or esteem (ḥasab) or wealth is not repentance.

At-Taftāzānī says that there is uncertainty whether regret because of fear of the fire or because of desire for heaven is repentance, since it is not certain whether this is because of the legal foulness and disobedience of the act.

There is also doubt whether there is repentance in the case of regret because of foulness before revealed-law and also because of another objective (gharaq).

The truth regarding both these cases is that if there were still regret if the aspect of foulness of the act were isolated, then the regret is repentance; otherwise not.

The same principle holds in the case of repentance on the occasion of a serious illness (marāq mukhawwif). It is likely (ṣāhir), according to the words of Muḥammad, that such a person's repentance is accepted as long as the forebodings ('alāmāt) of death have not yet appeared.

The reality of regret (nadam) is sadness and pain over what one has done, and the wish that one had not done it (tāḥazzun wa-tawajju' 'alā mā fa'al wa-tamānī kawnihi lam yaf'al).
For repentance another qualification (qayd) is added: the resolution not to repeat the act in the future (al-'azm 'alā tark al-mu'mawada fl-l-mustaqbal).

An objection is that in the future a person may not have possession of his mind or faculties so that he can omit repeating the act. The answer is that the meaning of resolution implies the supposition of being in control of oneself; such is the answer of Imām-al-Ḥaramayn.

To be exact, a resolution is not a separate qualification (taqyīd) of repentance, but only an explanation of what is implied in regret for disobedience because of its foulness before revealed-law. Many common people (al-`awāmm) define repentance simply as a resolution not to commit the sin again, but this is not repentance at all, since it has no reference to sorrow for the past. Al-Ghazālī observes in his Ihyā', in the chapter on repentance where he tells the story of David's repentance, that true repentance is rare, and few men attain it.

It is not necessary to renew repentance every time one remembers his disobedience, but only if he remembers it with desire and pleasure (mushtahiyān la-hā farišṭān bi-hā). This is in disagreement with al-Baγillānī and Abū-'Alī al-Jubbā'ī, the Mu'tazilite, who say that one must renew one's repentance every time without exception.

Also, repentance is valid (taqīḥh) if it is for some acts of disobedience without others; this in opposition to Abū-Hāšim of the Mu'tazilites. On the same principle that one can fulfil some obligations where the attraction (dā'iya) is strong, and omit others, so one can repent of some foul acts because of their foulness and weakness of attraction while persisting in another foul act.
To repent of all acts of disobedience a global repentance (ijmāl) suffices; this is in opposition to some Mu'tazilites who demand a repentance for each sin in particular (tafṣīl).

At-Taftāzānī mentions, in his Sharḥ al-Maqsūd, says J, 23a, f. 297b, says that if the act of disobedience:
- concerns God, such as omission of prayer, regret suffices, unless revealed-law adds some other compensatory act
- concerns another person, and the sin was:
  - injustice (ẓu'l), one must restore to him his loss or its equivalent (badalahu)
  - leading the other person astray (iqlāl), guidance (irshād) is due
  - an insult (badā') or calumny (gḥība), begging pardon (i'tidhār) is due, but it is not necessary in begging pardon to recall specifically (tafṣīl) the matter of the calumny, unless it was something abominable ('alā wajh afāsh).

It may be remarked that the obligation of restoration is additional to that of repentance.

Imān-al-Haramayn said that a killer's repentance is valid even if he does not give himself up for reprisal (min ghayr taslīm nafsihi li-l-qīṣāṣ), but his not giving himself up is another disobedience which requires a separate repentance.

Imān-al-Haramayn also said that repentance is of doubtful validity (rubbānā lā tāṣīḥū) if one still possesses what belongs to another, as in the case of robbery (gḥāṣb), since regret is not valid if one's hand is still on the goods (ma'a idāmat al-yad 'alā l-maghṣūb); thus there is a difference between killing and robbing. In J, 23a, f. 297b, Ibn-‘Arafa is quoted for reporting one opinion saying that such repentance is valid.

J, 23c, f. 303a, asks if repentance for unbelief, that is,
after having believed, is acceptable. The Fathers are cited for saying that it is, but according to opinion (‘alā ẓ-ṣann) and hope (rajā'). But the Qur'ān verse "He is the one who accepts repentance from his servants" (42:25) is quoted for the opinion that this repentance is decidedly accepted.

i. Law enforcement:

Related to repentance, says W (F. 81a), is the question of commanding the acceptable and forbidding the objectionable (al-amr bi-l-ma‘ruf wa-n-nahy ‘an al-munkar). The meaning of the acceptable is what is obligatory (wa‘jib), and the meaning of the objectionable is what is forbidden (ḥarām). There is no doubt that these are two obligations independent of the appearance of the imām, contrary to what the Rāfi‘ites maintain.

Evidence for these obligations are Qur'ān verses such as 3:104 and 31:17, many ḥadīth, and consensus, which is plain from the activity of the earliest Muslims.

At-Taftāzānī answers objections rising from Qur'ān verses, such as "O you who believe, take care of yourselves; he who errs cannot harm you when you are guided" (5:105). The answer regarding this verse is that the meaning of 'alaykum anfusukum, "Take care of yourselves", is "Improve (aṭli‘ū) yourselves by performing your obligations", which include commanding the acceptable and forbidding the objectionable.

As for the verse "There is no compulsion in religion" (2:256), this is abrogated (mansūkh) by the verse of battle (āyat al-qitāl) (9:36), although the meaning may be that the acts of commanding the acceptable and forbidding the objectionable are not forced acts.

One condition (N, f. 82b) for the obligation of commanding
the acceptable and forbidding the objectionable is the possibility of this having some effect (tajwīz at-ta'thīr). Another condition is there not resulting damage or evil greater than or equal to the objectionable thing. Outside these conditions it is reportedly permissible (qālū bi-jawāz) to resist evil even if one thinks he will be killed without inflicting any harm (nikāya), but he is also allowed (yurakhkhaṣ la-hu) to be silent. There is a difference of opinion which is preferred (afdal); the first alternative is the choice of the Malikites, Ibn-Ḥanbal, Saʿīd b. al-Musayyib, and Saʿīd b. Jubayr.

Commanding the acceptable and forbidding the objectionable is not limited to governors (wulāt), since in the beginning of Islam everyone concerned himself with it by word and deed without permission. But if the matter develops into a war, then the responsibility passes to the sultan, in order to avoid civil strife (fitna), as Imām-al-Ḥaramayn said. He also said that in legal matters understood by everyone, everyone participates in commanding the acceptable and forbidding the objectionable. But in matters understood only by specialists (mujtahid), this belongs to the specialists only, although each specialist has the right to his opinion in the case of differences in branch sciences. Some, however, say that only one opinion is right (muqīb), although it is not determined (muʿayyan); therefore the Muhīṭ al-Ḥanafīyya says that a Ḥanafite, for example, must correct (yaḥtasib) the mistakes of a Shāfīʿite, and vice versa.

Nor is the obligation of commanding the acceptable and forbidding the objectionable limited to those who do not commit such objectionable acts, since the obligation not to commit them and the obligation to forbid them are distinct, and someone who omits one obligation is not excused from omitting the other.
Moreover this is a communitarian obligation (farḍ kifāya), that is, it is an obligation of all, but the obligation ceases if some in the area (quq') fulfil it. Sometimes one person, commonly called a censor (muḥtasib), is designated for matters pertaining:
- to God, yet without searching and spying (bāḥth wa-tajālās)
- to men which are not of general concern (ghayr al-'līmā), such as disputes between individuals
- to the common welfare, such as public works, charities, and seeing that religious practices are correctly carried out, and that the mu'ādhdhins, teachers, judges, and imāms correctly perform their duties.

Thus commanding the acceptable and forbidding the objectionable goes beyond obligatory and forbidden matters.

A censor should vary his reaction in steps from doing nothing (waqf wa-sukūn) to more severe measures (al-aghlaẓ), according to the condition (ḥāl) of the objectionable thing. The Muḥbī al-Hanafiyya, for example, says that one should object to a man whose knees are uncovered by doing nothing, even if he persists (in lajīj); but if his thighs are uncovered, this calls for anger, and blows if he persists; if his secret parts are uncovered, this calls for blows, and if he persists killing him.

J 24, ff. 303a-308b/ takes up the question of the imāmate. There are two kinds: the smaller (ṣughrā), which is in leading the salāt prayers, and the larger (kubrā), which is that considered here. The definition in the Niḥēya is "the universal leadership of one person in religious and worldly matters" (ri'āna fī d-dīn wa-d-dunyā 'āma li-shakhṣ wāḥid). The word "universal" excludes judges and the like; the phrase "one person" excludes the whole
people (kull al-umma) if the imām is removed. Al-Āmīdī criticized this definition because it has no reference to prophecy, and gave as his definition "the caliphs - or succession - of a person to the Messenger in setting up revealed-law and guarding the community, with the obligation of all men to follow him" (khilāfa shakhṣ li-r-rasūl fi iqāmat ash-shar‘ wa-ḥifẓ al-milla ‘alā wajh yūjib ittibā‘u ‘ahu kāffat an-nās).

Regarding the necessity of the imānate, there are those who:
- affirm it:
  - because of authority (sam‘) only; this is the Sunnite position, as explained by ar-Rāzī in his Arba‘īn
  - because of intelligibility; this is the position of:
    - Mu‘tazilites like al-Ṭūn. al-Khayyāt and a. l-Q. al-Ka‘bī
    - the Ismā‘īlites and the heretics (maḥbida) who say that God must necessarily set up an imām immune from defect (al-imām al-ma‘ṣūm) to guide men to the knowing-awareness of God.
  - the Twelvers (Ithnā‘ashriyya), who had a similar position
- deny it altogether; this is the position of the Khārijites
- say that it is necessary only in time of civil strife (fitan), but not in times of security and justice (waqt al-amm wa-l-‘adl), but Sunnites deny this.

As-Sanūsī then excuses himself for discussing the imānate, since it is not a principal tenet of faith (layy ruknān fi ‘aqā‘id al-Imān), but only a derived obligation (wājib far‘ī) for the good of religion and the world.

1Remember that as-Sanūsī was writing at a time when the caliphate had passed from the Arabs to the Turks, and had ceased to represent the function described here.
It is mentioned in books about the tenets of faith, only:
- because the opinions of innovators, such as the Mu'tazilites and Isma'îlites, about it derive from their errors in the principal tenets of faith
- or because it has a resemblance (mushâbaha) to the tenets of faith in its well known belonging (inshâb) to religion and being obviously derived from it, as is the case also with repentance, intercession, the questioning in the grave, and the like.

Conditions for a candidate to the imâmâte which are agreed upon (J, 24d, f. 305b) are:
- Islam
- justice ('adâla), the opposite of immorality (fisq)
- being a male (dhakûriyya)
- liberty (qurriyya), since one must be free from the occupation of serving someone
- the age of maturity (bulûgh)
- intelligence ('aql)
- to be a specialist (mujtahid) in the principles and derivative elements of religion, so that he can make right decisions
- that he know how to conduct war and peace, being severe or lenient as required.

The Tawâlî of al-Bayâwî says that there is consensus that it is clear when the last three conditions are present or not, but Ibn-'Arafa, quoting al-Âimidî, says that there is no consensus on this.

Other conditions are:
- that he be able to carry out his determinations (infâdih ụkmihi); to the objection that 'Uthmân b. 'Affân could not, al-Âimidî answers that he could, but riffraff (awbâsh) stormed
276 III, i. (N. 49)

about him, and he sought peace and the cessation of strife
that he be of the tribe of Quraysh; this is in opposition to
what the Kharijites and some Mutazilites say. To an objec-
tion from the hadith "Obey the sultan, even if he is a young
Ethiopian slave commanding you" there is the answer that not
every sultan is an imam.

There is agreement, except for the Shi'ites, that the imam
does not have to be a Hashimit, since the two shaykhs - Abu-
Bakr and 'Umar - were not. Likewise immunity from defect
('isma) is not required, contrary to the Isma'ilites.

As for deposing an imam (J, 248, f. 307b), Ibn-'Arafa, in
his Shii'il agreeing with Imam-al-Hasanayn's Irshad, says that
if he falls into:
- unbelief:
  - openly (kufr), he is to be removed
  - privately and is a hypocrite (munafiq), he is to be left

- immorality (fisāq), and:
  - calls men to follow him in disobedience (ma'qiyya):
    - by words, he is not to be obeyed (lam yuta')
    - by fighting, he is to be fought back (in qātal qūtil)
  - doesn't call men to follow him, and:
    - can be deposed without bloodshed and violation of what is
      sacred (in aman dūn irāqa dinā' wa-kashf ḥaram), he is to
      be deposed; opinions differ as to whether this is
      obligatory
    - cannot be deposed in this way, he is to be left.
This list includes only those authors it is certain or at least likely as-Sanusi quoted from directly, not those quoted second hand. "Theological authors" excludes grammatical authorities and authors of verses.

`Abbād:
a. 'Al. M. b. 'Abbād. Perhaps that of GAL SII, p. 345 (d. 792/1390)
   - unnamed work quoted (Cf. Ch. III, I, e.)

al-Āmidī:
   - Akbār al-afkār

b. 'Arabī:
   - Sirāj al-muridīn - not listed by Osman Yahya
   - al-Kitāb al-mutawassat fi l-i'tiqād - not identified

b. 'Arafa:
   - al-Mukhtaṣar ash-shāmil fi t-tawḥīd

al-Bāqillānī:
   - Kitāb an-naqūd - not listed in GAL (Cf. Ch. III, I, a.)

b. Bāṭṭāl:
   - Ijam al-muḥaddithī fī sharḥ Sahih al-Bukhārī

al-Bayḍāwī:
   - Ṭawālī' al-anwār min matāli' al-anzar
   - Anwār at-tanzīl wa-asrār at-ta'wil (tafsīr)

b. Dahhāq:
   - Sharḥ al-Irshād (of Imām al-Ḥaramayn)
al-Ghazālī:
- Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm ad-dīn

b. al-Ḥājjī:
- Mukhtarār al-furuʿ
- ʿaqīda
- usūl

b. al-Ḥājjī:
- reports hadiths (Cf. Ch. III, A, note 3, and J, 32a, f. 339b.)

b. Ḥāzm:
- al-Fāṣī fi l-milal wa-n-nihal (Cf. Ch. III, E, d.)

Imām al-Ḥaramayn:
- al-Jamiʿ biyn al-jalī wa-l-khaṭī, or al-Jāmiʿ fi usūl ad-dīn

al-Isfahānī:
- al-Jāmiʿ biyn al-jalī wa-l-khaṭī, or al-Jāmiʿ fi usūl ad-dīn

al-`Irāqī:
A. b. ʿAbd al-Rahîm al-`Irāqī (d. 626/1423). GAL SII, pp. 71 and 105
- Sharḥ usūl as-Subki

`Iyyāḍ:
- ash-Shifāʿ fi taʾrif huqūq al-Muṣṭafī
- Ikhwāl al-Nuʾlim sharḥ Sahih Muslim

`Izzaddīn b. ʿAbd al-Salām:
- al-Qawādīd (GAL lists several.)

b. a. Jamra:
- Mukhtarār al-Bukhārī
al-Maqqari:
t-Tilimsäní, known as al-Maqqari (d. 758/ 1357). GAL SII, p. 993; AB, p. 249
- Kitäb al-buyûd min gawâ'id al-usûliyya

b. Marzûq:
- Sharh al-Burda

Muhît al-Ḥanafiyya:
I could not identify this work. (Cf. Ch. III, J, i.)

al-Muqتarah:
- Lawämi‘ al-furûq fi l-uṣûl
- al-gawâ‘id

al-Qayrawânî:
GAL I, p. 177, SI, p. 301
- ‘āqida

al-Qushayri:
- ar-Risäla

Saḥmän:
‘Abdassaläm b. Sa‘īd b. Ṭabîb at-Tanükhi (d. 280/ 854). GAL SI, p. 299
- al-Mudawwana

al-Qurtubi:
- Sharh Muslim

b. Sinä:
- ar-Risäla at-tibbiyya - likely = al-Qaṣânt fî t-tibb
(Anawati, n. 740, p. 192)
Appendix

ar-Răzi:
al-Imām Fakhraddin a. 'U. b. al-Ḥayb. al-Khaṭīb
ar-Răzi t-Taymi 1-Bal=i (d. 606/ 1209). GAL I, p. 506, SI, p. 920
- al-Mabṭūhith al-arba'īn fī uṣūl ad-dīn
- al-Maʾālim fī uṣūl ad-dīn (Cf. b. at-Tilimsänī)
- Muḥaṣṣal afkār al-muttaqaddimīn wa-l-mutaʾakkhirīn
- Lubāb al-Ishārāt (commentary on b. Sīnā's al-Ishārāt wa-t-tanbirāt)

b. Rushd:
SI, p. 662
- an-Nawāzīl

at-Taftāzānī:
Saʿdaddin Masʿūd b. 'U. at-Taftāzānī (d. 792/ 1390). G'L II,
p. 215, SII, p. 301
- Sharh al-Maṣābīh ad-dīnīyya
- Ḥāshiya 'ala l-Kashshāf (Cf. Ch. I, E, n. 21.)
- Sharḥ Ṭalḥīṣ al-miftāh (of al-Qazwīnī)
- Sharḥ 'Aqīdat an-Nasāfī (quoted only in J)

b. at-Tilimsänī:
Sharafeddīn a. K. 'Al. b. M. b. 'A. al-Fihrī, known as Ibn-at-
Tilimsānī (d. 644/ 1245-6). G'L I, p. 390, SI, p. 672; as-Subkī,
Tabaṣsūr V, p. 60; Ḥāji Khalīfa, Kashf az-żanān 'an asmāʾ al-
kutub wa-l-funūn (Istanbul, 1360/ 1341), II, col. 1725-1727
- Sharḥ al-Maʾālim (of ar-Răzi)

at-Tilimsānī:
a. 1-Yūsuf b. M. b. Ḥ. ash-Sharīf at-Tilimsānī (d. 829/ 1425-6).
AB, p. 170
'170, and above, Ch. III, F, c.)
- Sharḥ al-Ṭarād (of Imām-al-Ḥaramayn; is the work quoted
by W, f. 10b - cf. Ch. III, A, c.)

az-Zābīdī:
a. B. M. b. Ḥ. az-Zābīdī (d. 379/ 939-90). Ḥāji Khalīfa, Kashf-
az-uropean, col. 1107
- Tabāsūr an-najāt
A. Abbreviations used in the thesis:

AB = Ahmad Bäba; see below, C, "Bäba".

BSOAS = Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies

E1 = Escorial ms. n. 697; see below, B, "Sanûsi".

E1' = Encyclopaedia of Islam, first edition

E1" = Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition

GAL = Brockelmann; see below, C.

IM = Ibn-Maryam; see below, C, "Maryam".

J = Sharh al-Jazā'iriyya; see below, "Sanûsi".

JA = Journal asiatique

K = al-‘Aqīda al-kubrā; see below, C, "Sanûsi".

M = al-Muqaddima; see below, B and C, "Sanûsi".

S = al-‘Aqīda as-sughrā; see below, C, "Sanûsi".

SS = Sighrat as-Sighra; see below, B and C, "Sanûsi".

W = al-‘Aqīda al-wustā; see below, B and C, "Sanûsi".

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Marzūq al-ḥafīd, b. (Cf. Ch. I, E, n. 2.)
- 'Aqīdat ahl at-tawhīd al-mukhrija min qulamāt at-taqlīd (Istanbul: Süleymaniya ms. 1601, ff. 172a-176a)
Sanūsī, M. b. Yūsuf as-
- al-`Aqīda al-wustā (Escorial Ms. 697). Cf. Ch. II, A, b, for a full list of manuscripts and editions.

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- Cf. Gardet.
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- "Abdalwādides, " EI
- "Tlemcen," EI
- "Zayānids," EI
- Cf. Khalīdūn, Ḥy, b.
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