THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNIVERSAL PRIMARY EDUCATION IN KANO STATE, NIGERIA: SOME ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS

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ABSTRACT

Nigeria's Universal Primary Education (UPE) scheme, which was launched in 1976, must be seen as one of the most ambitious educational projects in African history. This thesis studies the impact of UPE on the economies and societies of one of Nigeria's 19 states. It elucidates the main objectives of UPE from both the national and the Kano State perspective, and assesses the extent to which the goals are being and will be achieved. The three main objectives discerned are reduction of imbalances (regional, urban-rural and male-female), provision of education as a human right and expanded schooling as an investment. It is emphasised, however, that the most important underlying motive is political.

Although the study is mainly concerned with Kano State and Nigeria as a whole, much discussion is broadly applicable to other developing nations which also seek to achieve UPE. It is clear that the project's success depends on qualitative as well as quantitative factors. Three different aspects, or 'levels' of quality are examined. The first is a classroom conception and is internal to the school system. The second relates education to the labour market, and the third takes a yet broader view of the impact of UPE on social change. The study concludes that though in the early years UPE made major quantitative advances, at each level of quality it displays serious shortcomings which will partly preclude its usefulness. It is suggested that the general popular and official conception of education is regrettably narrow, and that benefits could be derived from integration of the Western-type and Islamic systems and from greater emphasis on nonformal and adult education. It is also noted that the most important decisions on the educational system are often taken for political rather than for strictly educational reasons, and that the planned social changes which the school system is able to effect are very limited if not accompanied by other economic and political reforms.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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I declare that this thesis is entirely my own work.

[Signature]
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GLOSSARY

ajami
Hausa written in the Arabic script.

Alhaji (fem. Alhaja)
person who has made the pilgrimage, or haj, to Mecca.

alkali (pl. alkalai)
judge in the system of Islamic law.

boko
Hausa written in the Roman script.

kulle
seclusion of women, purdah.

jihad
holy war, crusade.

Maguzawa
adherents of the pre-Islamic Hausa religion.

makaranta (pl. makarantun)
'board'/Koranic school.

Makaranta (pl. makarantun)
higher Islamic school.

ilm
Koranic scholar. Also generally applicable to adult male Muslims, equivalent to English 'Mister'.

Malam (fem. Malama)
peasantry, common people.

talakawa
hawking (of goods).

talla
Yaki da Jahilci
War against Ignorance (adult literacy campaign).

ABBREVIATIONS

CE  Common Entrance
CEO  Chief Education Officer
EO  Education Officer
ILO  International Labour Office
ISTC  In-Service Training Centre
LEA  Local Education Authority
LED  Local Education Department
LGA  Local Government Area
NA  Native Administration, Native Authority
NTI  National Teachers' Institute
PEIP  Primary Education Improvement Project
SAS  School of Arabic Studies
UNESCO  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNICEF  United Nations International Children's Fund
UPS  Universal Primary Education
WAEC  West African Examinations Council
WASC  West African School Certificate
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INTRODUCTION

In September 1976, the government and people of Nigeria launched one of the most ambitious education projects in African history: the Universal Primary Education scheme, popularly known as UPE. In that month, all primary schooling became free of charge and attempts were made to enrol as many school children as possible. The plan was each year to enrol all children aged six, until by 1981 nearly all those of primary age would be in school. That the project was ambitious is clear from the size of the school population. There were nearly five million primary pupils in 1973. With a total of 8.5 million three years later, there were more children in Nigerian primary schools than there were people in the majority of African countries. In 1977, enrolments rose to 10 million, and are expected to exceed 17 million in 1981. The magnitude of these figures is the more impressive since enrolments have generally been increased by persuasion rather than compulsion. The planners had envisaged the introduction of compulsion in 1979, but this later proved impossible.

The Republic of Nigeria is divided into 19 states, of which this study is primarily concerned with one. The thesis examines the early events of the UPE scheme in Kano State, and assesses their economic and social implications. Since it is hoped that lessons from the successes and problems encountered in Kano may provide insights for planners and practitioners in other nations moving towards the target of UPE, the thesis begins by placing Nigeria in the general context of Africa and the developing world.

1. Universalization Policies in Less Developed Countries

The objective of UPE is one towards which many Less Developed Countries have been striving. It was enshrined, for example, in the 1947 Indian constitution, and was the goal of major campaigns in Ghana in 1961 and Malaysia in
During the 1960's, a series of meetings convened by UNESCO set target dates for achieving universal, compulsory and free education on a continent-wide basis. The year 1970 was the objective adopted for Latin American countries at the 1962 Santiago conference, and 1980 became the target for Asian (Karachi 1960), African (Addis Ababa 1961) and Arab countries (Tripoli 1966).

Over the last two decades, however, it has become increasingly clear to many countries that the goals formulated in the 1960's were over-optimistic. Despite considerable and increasing expenditure on education, the rate of population growth has hindered efforts. Although statistics for the developing world have shown improved proportionate enrolment rates, absolute numbers of children not in school have also increased. UNESCO statistics indicate that only three African countries, namely Congo, Gabon and Libya, had achieved UPE in 1974. However, UPE remains a declared objective in many countries, and several have either just launched or intend to launch campaigns to that end. Kenya, for example, made the first four years of schooling free in 1974 and intends progressively to remove fees from the other primary grades. Nigeria launched UPE


4. Five other countries (Cameroons, Mauritius, Reunion, South Africa and Tunisia) appeared to have achieved the target, but this was because primary enrolments included many children older than the official age. Kenya, Lesotho and Swaziland joined this group in 1975, and Guinea Bissau and Togo joined it in 1976. (UNESCO, UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1977, Paris, 1978, Table 3.2.)

in 1976; Tanzania did so in 1977; and Sierra Leone and Botswana have produced plans to do so in 1980.¹

While all these campaigns have a common objective, they also display significant differences. The magnitude of the task in Botswana, for example, where pre-UPE enrolment rates exceeded 90%, is very different from Nigeria, where they were approximately 50%. The socialist ideology of the Tanzanian government has influenced the rationale for UPE and the strategies involved, and contrasts with those of capitalist governments, such as Nigeria and Sierra Leone. Similarly, it may be argued that the existence of wealth from petroleum assets in Nigeria makes its experience radically different from that of poorer countries. Nevertheless, these differences may also be instructive, and it is also arguable that because finance was not a major obstacle to the initial stages of UPE, the experiences of Nigeria, and of Kano in particular, shed strong light on the other constraints on achievement of objectives. Comparison of the differential impact of ideology, moreover, can improve understanding of the relationship between politics and education, and of the role of the latter in development.

One obstacle to effective universalization of education in many countries has been its cost. In recent years, planners have developed two principal strategies to solve this problem. The first involves introduction of new techniques and utilizes, for example, educational television or self-instructional materials.² The second, adopting a wider definition of education, increases use of nonformal components. While the boundaries between formal and nonformal education are often indistinct, advocates of the latter argue that it is frequently not only less expensive,


but also more relevant to learners' needs. Partly because financial pressures have been less serious, interest in such innovations has been limited in Nigeria, however, and UPE involves expansion of the school system in its long established mould. This is another area in which comparison of experiences in different countries could be instructive. The Nigerian campaign is both very ambitious and very expensive. Especially in view of criticisms of the relevance of school curricula, the need to equip adults with skills to match economic and social changes, and greater financial pressures following the euphoria of the mid-1970's, it is useful to consider the balance between adult and child education and between formal and nonformal provision.

2. The Nigerian Campaign

The UPE scheme in Nigeria may be seen to have three general objectives which are broadly similar to those adopted in other countries. The first is a reduction of regional, of urban-rural and of male-female imbalances. By definition, a one hundred per cent enrolment ratio eliminates former numerical imbalances in education, and although qualitative variations hinder elimination of wider imbalances in development, planners have argued that quantitative advances are the first step towards the ultimate goal. A second

1. See Philip H. Coombs, Roy C. Prosser and Manzoor Ahmed, New Paths to Learning, ICED, New York, 1973. This study will adopt their definitions (pp. 10-1), that formal education is "the hierarchically structured, chronologically graded 'educational system', running from primary school through university and including ... a variety of specialised programmes and institutions for full-time technical and professional training." Nonformal education is "any organised educational activity outside the established school system ... that is intended to serve identifiable learning clienteles and learning objectives." Informal education describes "the truly lifelong process whereby every individual acquires different attitudes, values, skills and knowledge from daily experience and the educative influences and resources of his or her environment...." The three may therefore be considered complementary to each other and reinforcing rather than competitive, though some countries have developed nonformal education as an alternative to the formal system.
objective is the fulfilment of what the government has seen as its social obligation to provide basic education for all its citizens, and as such Nigeria's UPE scheme may be considered part of the world-wide attempt to implement the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.\(^1\) The third philosophy underlying UPE is that education is an investment in human capital which will provide a base for future economic growth. Some planners and politicians in Nigeria have considered this aspect particularly important because the petroleum resources which have provided the finance for UPE cannot last indefinitely, and they anticipate that investment will increase productivity and thus secure future prosperity.

No mass education campaign, however, can be concerned exclusively with quantitative achievements. Of crucial importance is the quality of learning which, if it declines substantially, may call into question the value of quantitative achievements. There is, firstly, a difference between universal enrolments and universal attendance, and the incidence of drop-outs has become a major focus of attention among educational planners.\(^2\) Secondly, even for those pupils retained in the system, serious qualitative problems often arise from large scale expansion. This thesis examines the possibility that even if the quantitative targets can be achieved in Kano State, qualitative shortcomings may, at least in the short run, prevent achievement of some of the scheme's objectives.

Quality, however, is difficult to define. At the beginning of his book specifically devoted to the subject, Beeby remarked that "In a book of this size [139 pages], an attempt to arrive at a definition of 'quality' would probably do more harm than good."\(^3\) This is a discouraging opening since


here we have only a few pages to devote to the matter. It is at least possible, however, to delineate the boundaries of debate, and Beeby's classification will be used in the basic chapter divisions of this thesis.

Beeby began by demarcation of three 'levels' of quality. The first and simplest he called the "classroom conception" as seen, for example, by an inspector of schools. It embraces, first, such measurable skills as ability in the three R's, acquisition of facts on history, geography, hygiene, and so on; and, second, less measurable but still important characteristics such as industry, tidiness and respect. One index of quality at this level is the speed at which pupils pass through the grades and the number who acquire the final certificate, especially if it is awarded as a result of an external test. With regard to UPE, these matters will be considered in Chapter Four of this thesis. Beeby's second level, which is discussed in Chapter Five, is more subjective. It assesses the quality of education from an economic viewpoint, by its productivity in employment rather than in the classroom. As such, though a system may be internally efficient, if its graduates are unable to secure productive employment, education may be a sub-optimal investment.

The third level is considered in Chapter Six, and involves even more subjectivity. It combines criteria of prosperity and the intrinsic value of education to relate it to the entire social fabric. "Anyone can quote instances of educational practices, acceptable enough in the classroom," Beeby remarks, "that are ludicrously inadequate to meet the needs of the economy they pretend to serve, and there are individuals and groups beautifully educated if prosperity be the sole measure, who serve no known social purpose."¹ It must be pointed out that the goals of a mass education system are not necessarily the same as those of a more selective one. However, from the outset it must be recognised that final evaluation of these matters depends on the viewpoint of the observer. The main purpose of Chapter Six is to

¹ Ibid., p.13.
examine the social impact of UPF and the likelihood of the campaign achieving the social goals its initiators anticipated.

Although this study is principally concerned with Kano State, it is hoped that many insights will be applicable to other states and countries. It discusses a number of obstacles to quantitative advance before turning to qualitative matters and the scheme's economic and social implications. Several recent studies have examined the relationship between politics and education, and have concluded that elimination of regional and social imbalances is a much more difficult task than had been widely assumed in the past. This study contributes to the growing body of information which stresses the importance to educational matters of factors entirely outside the education sector, such as ethnic rivalries, political structures, and the overall strategy of development.

Other links between study of Nigeria and of other Less Developed Countries will be noted throughout the thesis. First, however, it is necessary to provide a frame for analysis, and to outline the characteristics of Nigeria and Kano State.

3. The Political, Economic and Social Structures of Nigeria and Kano State

The Federation of Nigeria gained constitutional independence from the United Kingdom in 1960. The 19 states into which it is presently divided display considerable geographic, ethnic and religious diversity. The southern areas contain much tropical rain-forest and, especially in the south east, have a substantial Christian population. In the middle-belt

the vegetation gradually changes to the savannah of the north; and religious affiliations, which are mixed in the former, become predominantly Muslim in the latter. Although Nigeria contains several hundred ethnic and language groups, the three largest are the Ibo, the Yoruba and the Hausa, concentrated in the south east, the south west and the north respectively.²

The administrative units into which Nigeria has been divided have been changed several times in recent years. Since the beginning of colonial rule, an important distinction has been made between North and South. From 1946 to 1963, the South was divided into the Western and Eastern Regions, and in the latter year a third region, the Mid-West, was carved out of the West. Regional tensions were particularly severe at this time, and in an attempt to solve them the government in 1967 divided the country into 12 states. This was followed by further reorganisation into 19 states in 1976. It should be noted, however, that the terms North, East and West (the last two of which comprise the 'South') remain useful broad descriptors for the states which comprised the old regions.

Despite these national reorganisations, study of Kano is facilitated by the fact that boundaries have remained unaltered for some 45 years. During the first 31 years of British rule, the boundaries of Kano Province were altered several times, but since 1934 they have remained unchanged. Kano was first a province within the Northern Region, was then one of the 12 states created in 1967, and finally was part of the 19 state structure established in 1976. Also firmly established are the boundaries of the four emirates which together comprise Kano State. They were delineated before the advent of British rule, and each is still headed by an


emir appointed by reference to traditional criteria. By far the largest and most important is Kano Emirate. Hadejia and Gumel rank next in size, and Kazaure is the smallest. The emirate structures are important to this study, partly because the traditional rulers remain influential in their own areas, and partly because the emirates have provided a basic unit for administration of primary education. From the mid-1960's to 1978, each emirate had a Local Education Authority responsible for primary schooling. In the latter year, however, the structure was revised as part of a local government reform, and the boundaries of the new Local Education Departments did not necessarily coincide with those of an emirate.

The last two decades have also witnessed a number of changes in the central government. Particularly significant was the deposition of the civilian government by a military coup in January 1966. It was followed by another military coup in July 1966, in which Yakubu Gowon became Head of State. Less than a year later, political leaders in the East declared the area an independent Republic of Biafra, and the country was plunged into a civil war which lasted two and a half years. Although Gowon emerged victorious from the war, in 1975 he was himself overthrown, and replaced by Brigadier Murtala Mohammed. The new government retained power until 1979, although in an attempted coup in 1976, Mohammed was killed. His successor, Lt. General Obasanjo, terminated nearly 14 years of military rule by handing over power to a popularly elected civilian government in October 1979.

Political structures in Kano State exhibit a duality caused by super-imposition of a colonial system onto the pre-existing emirate structures. On their arrival in 1903, the British took pains to preserve the existing administrative system because they considered indirect rule to be both an effective and an inexpensive mode of operation. Accordingly, they preserved and strengthened the existing system of emirate authority whilst simultaneously creating a parallel system of their own. This duality has continued into the post-independence era. On the one hand, there exists a state
government organised on a ministerial basis with a governor at its apex, and on the other still remain the traditional hierarchies headed by the emirs.

The population of Nigeria is officially estimated at approximately 80 million. This figure is based on the 1963 census, and though its accuracy has been widely disputed, political considerations have precluded the use of a more recent census for official planning purposes. The breakdown of the 1963 figures by state is provided in Appendix XV, and shows Kano to have the highest population in the federation. This is significant for the present study since it implies that the task of achieving universal primary enrolments, even from a proportionately equal base, is much greater in Kano than in any other state. With only some 10% of the primary-aged group enrolled before the launching of UPE, Kano was the state with the lowest Western-type educational coverage. Today the population is probably at least eight million, and, in common with most developing countries, a very high percentage is of school age. The 1963 census estimated 45% of the population to be less than 15 years old, and the Ministry of Education plans on the basis of 17% of the total population being of primary age. The low initial enrolment rates and a high population combined to face planners with the formidable task of raising school places from the pre-UPE enrolment of 160,000 to 1,400,000 within six years.

These figures indicate that the potential impact of UPE is much greater in Kano than in any other state. Another reason why study is particularly interesting arises from the fact that the Kano State government showed more determination to ensure the success of the early stages of UPE than did other states. One change introduced with the launching of the scheme was that, between 1967 and 1978, states were headed by Military Governors. In July of 1978, as part of the programme for return to civilian rule, duties were slightly altered and the titles changed to Military Administrators. Civilian governors took office in October 1979.
although state governments remained responsible for the implementation of primary education, finance became the responsibility of the federal government.\footnote{In constitutional terms, primary education was transferred from the residual to the concurrent legislative list (See Federal Republic of Nigeria, Third National Development Plan 1975-80, Federal Ministry of Economic Development, Lagos, 1975, Vol.I, p.246). A further change in 1978 brought primary education back under the influence of local governments (see Chapter III, Section 1.1).} Since the funds for the project were controlled by Lagos, Kano had an obvious incentive to cooperate with federal plans and maximise its grant allocation. That Kano's initial commitment to UPE went far beyond mere cooperation with federal plans, however, was demonstrated by substantial supplementation of funds due from Lagos with those of the state. This policy in the early years distinguished Kano from the other states. In part it reflected a concern with education as a human right. However, UPE was seen more as a means to ensure a place for Kano citizens in the modern national economy. Since the influential and lucrative posts of the modern economy are more easily obtained by those with Western-type education, it was felt that one important way to assert Kano's place in the nation and avoid domination by others was through increased provision of schooling.

A third factor creating particular interest arises from the fact that an estimated 97.4% of Kano's population are Muslims.\footnote{Kano State of Nigeria, Kano State Statistical Yearbook 1974, Ministry of Economic Development, Kano, 1976, p.21.} The model for UPE is the Western-type school first introduced to Nigeria by Christian missions and later developed by governments. Kano, however, has an ancient and strong tradition of Islamic learning on a different model. Because of historical connections, a large section of the population is antipathetic to Western-type education, which they associate with Christianity. Much of the success of UPE relies on attempts to overcome this prejudice, and its impact could be particularly enhanced if the Islamic and government systems could in
some way be integrated. This matter demands careful consideration, for if on the other hand they cannot, then tensions and conflict could cause social divisions and UPE could have negative effects. Kano may thus be considered the state with the greatest potential, but also the one with most at stake.

Despite its being only about 1% of Kano's population, the Christian element has had an important influence. Many of this minority are Southern Nigerians now resident in the state, which has in the past made them more conspicuous. The Christian minority has also acted as a harbinger of modern development and a catalyst of change—a fact which is connected with the links between Western-type education and employment in the modern economy.

The remaining 1.6% of the population adheres to the pre-Islamic Hausa religion and is of less importance to this study. Adherents, known as the Waguzawa, are scattered throughout the rural periphery of the state. They are heavily dominated by their surrounding Muslim neighbours and do not wield great political influence.

The ethnic composition of Kano State is dominated by

Table 0.1: Population of Kano State by Ethnic Group (1964)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hausa</td>
<td>3,998,400</td>
<td>69.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulani</td>
<td>1,443,964</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>18,007</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibo</td>
<td>11,474</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanuri</td>
<td>247,823</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nupe</td>
<td>3,850</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bade</td>
<td>4,956</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kadawa</td>
<td>3,080</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Nigerians</td>
<td>37,662</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Nigerians</td>
<td>5,624</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>5,774,840</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the Hausa and Fulani groups. As Table 0.1 indicates, together they account for over 95% of the total. Most of the 'other Nigerians' are fluent in the Hausa language, and it is therefore unnecessary in the schools to make special linguistic provision for them. Of those who do not speak Hausa, the majority are Southerners concentrated in one part of Kano Metropolitan Area. For them it is possible to create curricula slightly different from the other primary schools, although such a policy raises delicate political and social questions.

The Hausa, strictly speaking, are a linguistic rather than an ethnic group. It is common, however, to refer to one section of the population as Hausas to distinguish them from other groups, and except where the context requires greater clarity, this practice will be adopted. The employment of the term arises from a partial integration of the Fulbe (Fulani) ethnic group and the indigenous Habe peoples following the Fulani conquest of Kano in 1807. There are several distinct groups of Fulani, one being the aristocracy who installed themselves as rulers in the 19th century, and another being the nomadic pastoralists often referred to as Bororo Fulani. Over the years, the former have become highly influenced by the society which they conquered. Many traditional rulers today are pure Fulani, but others have acquired Habe blood through inter-marriage. A large proportion of the Fulani aristocracy can no longer speak the Fulfulde language, and instead employ Hausa for their daily affairs. It has therefore become a common practice to refer to the generally merged Fulbe-Habe peoples as

1. See Chapter II, Sections 1.iii and 3.1.


Hausa, as distinct from other groups such as the Kanuri and Bororo Fulani.

This social and ethnic structure has some educational implications. Chapter Two examines the British colonial policy of indirect rule, one effect of which was to consolidate the position of the Fulani aristocracy and restrict the role of education in social mobility. In the post-independence era, many legacies remain and are important to the analysis of UPE. The problems posed by the nomadic lifestyle of the Bororo Fulani are considered in Chapter Four, and the overall question of social change is discussed in Chapter Six. As has been noted, one official objective of UPE is the reduction of social inequalities. Its ability to do this, however, is far from certain. There is a tendency for disadvantaged groups to remain disadvantaged even if they are forced to attend school, and one unfortunate aspect of the mass education campaign is that in some respects its very size may limit flexibility.

Both geographically and economically, Kano State is strongly dominated by Kano Metropolitan Area. The latter has a population of approximately half a million,¹ and its two principal components are the old city and the Sabon Gari, or New Town. The old city has long been recognised as a major economic centre. Clapperton in 1826, for example, described it was "one of the principal towns in the Kingdom of Soudan", and Barth in 1851 called it "the great commercial entrepôt of Central Negroland".² Its people have been

1. Alan Frishman, using taxation data, estimated the 1973 population of the old city at 236,585. This was supplemented by 85,415 people in Fagge and Waje districts to total 322,000 ('The Population Growth of Kano, Nigeria', in C. Fyfe and D.N. McMaster (eds.), African Historical Demography, Centre of African Studies, Edinburgh, 1977, p. 229). Until 1976, Ungogo and Kumbotso districts were also included in Kano Metropolitan Area. However, in a reorganisation in that year, the former was included in Minjibir LGA and the latter in Dawakin Kudu.

particularly noted for their commercial activities, though in the present century, trade with southern areas has largely replaced trans-Saharan activities. The Sabon Gari contains a substantial Yoruba and Ibo population, and its development largely dates from the completion of the railway from Lagos in 1911. That the dominance of Kano Metropolitan Area has increased in recent years is reflected in its annual population growth of 12%, as compared with 2% for the whole state.¹ These figures indicate considerable immigration of individuals seeking employment in industrial ventures or government posts, both of which are concentrated in the area.

Available statistics on occupations of the Kano State labour force are neither recent nor reliable. They do, nevertheless, provide a basis from which to make some general statements. Table 0.2 highlights the numerical dominance

Table 0.2: Kano State Labour Force by Occupation, 1963

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Group</th>
<th>Total ('000)</th>
<th>% Female</th>
<th>% of Total Labour Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional/Technical</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative/Managerial</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>154.3</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming/Fishing</td>
<td>1,074.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>66.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport &amp; Communications</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen/Labourers</td>
<td>207.8</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services/Sports/Recreation</td>
<td>97.4</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Employed: 1,596.3, Total Unemployed: 9.5, Total Labour Force: 1,605.8


¹ Frishman, op. cit., p.232.
of the farming/fishing group. It does not differentiate between the 'modern' and 'traditional' sectors, but a large majority will have been in the latter. Thus a high proportion of Kano State's population is engaged in small scale farming, particularly of groundnuts, guinea corn and millet. Much of this is for domestic consumption, but some produce, especially groundnuts, is marketed. Incomes are also derived from livestock and from dry-season activities such as labouring and weaving. A smaller group is engaged in larger scale commercial farming, but the size of holdings is limited by population density, particularly in an area called the Kano Close Settled Zone. The zone is roughly elliptical in shape, and extends some 60 miles to the south east of Kano city and 30 to 40 miles in other directions. Roughly half the total recorded population of Kano Emirate lived there in 1962, though this proportion will since have fallen owing to the subsequent expansion of Kano Metropolitan Area. Though it is cultivable, the soil in northern parts of the state is often poor, and some Kano farmers have travelled as far as Bauchi State in search of better land in reasonable quantities.

Although it is common to distinguish between the talakawa, or peasantry, and masu-saraute, or rulers, it is difficult to generalise about either. Particularly among the former, there are many variations in wealth and type of economic activity. Smith has distinguished numerous occupational groups which may be ranked in order of prestige, and even within farming groups, Hill has


demonstrated considerable diversity and mobility. Similarly, rank within the traditional ruling class varies widely, and membership does not necessarily imply outstanding wealth. Some of the richest groups in Kano State are traders and those able to secure government contracts. The prominence of the latter has become especially pronounced in recent years because the government is the principal channel for disbursing nationalised oil revenues throughout the economy.

One aspect on which this thesis focuses is the differential impact of UPE on various groups in Kano State. During the early stages of its implementation, many contractors, for example, made considerable gains. Similarly, a large number of teaching posts were created, both for those with Western-type education and for malams, or Koranic teachers. Since many in the latter group would otherwise have been running their own Koranic schools, UPE involved them in a considerable change of lifestyle. Other malams opposed Western-type education, and though it was possible for children to receive both forms of schooling, the strength of the Koranic schools was threatened by expansion of the government system. This in turn threatened the livelihood of the malams who adhered to the traditional system, and raised widespread misgivings.


2. This Hausa term has entered the English language in Northern Nigeria, and will not be treated in this thesis as a foreign word. It has also become a common title equivalent to the English 'Mister', applicable to any male Muslim (fem. Malama). Because the word is also widely spelled 'mallam', occasional inconsistency arises from quotations, but in the interests of accuracy they have been retained in their original spelling. Another common title is 'Alhaji' (fem. Alhaja), signifying the bearer to have performed the hajj, or pilgrimage to Mecca.
about the religious attitudes of school-aged children. Further, expansion of school coverage reduces the extent to which children are able to engage in agricultural and hawking activities, and studies have shown that this could have particularly serious implications for the poorest families. Thus although the UPE scheme was supported by some sections of the population, and particularly those who had received Western-type education themselves, other sections were less enthusiastic and some, as will be shown, were actively antagonistic.

4. Sources and Methods

Because this study was made during the launching period of UPE, in one sense it is no more than a preliminary appraisal, and full assessment will not be possible until time has placed events in perspective. However, the thesis does provide detailed information on the implementation of a project which will have far reaching economic and social implications, and may both indicate the probable future course of events and suggest some urgent considerations for planners.

The material for the thesis was collected from a variety of sources, including interviews with those responsible for implementation and those whom the project was intended to benefit; numerous official reports, both published and unpublished; items in the press; and numerous academic studies. The author was teaching in Kano State during the 1976/7 academic year, and was able to interview a large number of people throughout the first year of UPE. Preliminary writing was started in 1977, but, primarily because the speed of events caused further important developments, it was considered necessary to return to Kano for a five week period at the end of that academic year. As the footnotes and the list at the end of the study indicate, a number of personnel in other states and in the federal headquarters were also interviewed. Both
groups were considered relevant since the pressures for UPE in Kano State can only be understood by reference to other states and to the federal system.

During interviews, care was taken to cover similar topics with informants holding comparable positions. However, partly because many officers were responsible for specific aspects of UPE, and partly because the speed of developments altered the significance of such aspects as recruitment of pupils, and availability of construction materials, finance and staff, it was decided that maximum flexibility could be obtained from unstructured interviews. Within Kano State, efforts were made to visit key personnel in the ministry headquarters, a sample of urban and rural, and new and older schools in all the 20 local government areas, and senior administrative officers in each area. While in this study it has sometimes been necessary to make comments generally applicable to entire local government areas or the whole state, efforts have been made to clarify the picture by reference to specific institutions which serve as case studies. The use of interviews permitted interpretation of government and other statements, and assessment of the reliability of official statistics.

The absence of accurate information even on such vital matters as population made the appraisal of UPE extremely difficult. In view of the disputed nature of the 1963 census and the need to update figures, the government took another census in 1973. However, these figures were also widely criticised as having been inflated for political reasons. They were never declared anything more than provisional, and one of the first actions of the government that toppled the Gowon regime in 1975 was to pronounce them null and void. The 1973 census indicated that Kano State had a population of 10.9 million out of a total of 79.8 million. Later statistics suggested that this might not have been seriously inaccurate, for in 1978 5.2 million

citizens over the age of 21 were reported to have registered to vote, and this indicated a total population of 11-12 million. Nevertheless, planning has continued on the basis of the 1963 figures, which are generally agreed to have been inaccurate. Although the authorities conducted a special preparatory registration of children in 1976, this also was of questionable accuracy.

Problems of reliability and validity apply to most official statistical data used in this thesis. This was particularly the case in Kano because of delicate political problems and the administrative difficulties which accompanied rapid economic development and large scale educational expansion. Some data it was possible to extract from official files, although information was often incomplete. While in some cases the accuracy of official data could be assessed by small scale surveys, larger scale surveys were considered beyond the scope of this study. Consequently, the majority of official statistics presented here should be taken as broad indicators rather than precise estimates. While it is possible that a narrower focus would have permitted greater depth and accuracy in statistical survey, it was considered important to retain a wide perspective.

The study makes considerable use of academic items concerning similar campaigns in other countries and in other Nigerian states. Especially relevant is analysis of UPE projects launched in Southern Nigeria in the 1950's.

3. See Chapter III, Section 1.1.
4. See, for example, Tables 3.10, 3.11, 4.6 and 4.9.
and to them is devoted a separate section in Chapter One. However, the number of official reports and academic works specifically applicable to so recent a project as the national UPE campaign is small. In consequence, material from the Nigerian press was particularly important. It must be recognised that newspaper content is influenced by political constraints on editors, the availability or otherwise of information from differing viewpoints, and the biases of the reading public. Nevertheless, the newspapers contained valuable information on matters too recent to be included elsewhere, and were especially useful sources for discussion on the other states.

Before beginning detailed discussion on Kano State, the thesis begins by placing the scheme in its national setting. It is to this that we now turn.
Although this study is concerned mainly with UPE in Kano State, it is necessary first to study developments in the nation as a whole. Particularly relevant are educational policies in Southern Nigeria since the Second World War, for they culminated, first in the Western Region in 1955, and then in the Eastern Region in 1957, in earlier programmes for UPE. These projects provided much information useful in assessing the present scheme in Kano. They were also a factor increasing the regional imbalances which the government hopes to rectify with the present campaign. This chapter, accordingly, will have three sections. In the first, the basic aims of UPE are elucidated. In the second, the logistics and costs of the national scheme are outlined; and in the third the events of the earlier UPE programmes are highlighted in order to provide a base for future reference.

1. The Background and Rationale for UPE

One key date in the history of UPE was January 29th, 1974. General Gowon was on his first official visit to Sokoto, then capital of North Western State, and casually remarked - according to one journalist, in response to a question from a small girl¹ - that his government intended to launch UPE on April 1st the following year.² Planning officers had not anticipated the timing of the announcement. A longer period for preparation was requested, and the campaign was not finally launched until September 1976.

Although Gowon's announcement should be considered

². Daily Times, 30/1/74.
a key event, however, the possibility of implementing UPE had been discussed for many years. As far back as 1923, for example, three successful Lagos candidates for the Legislative Council campaigned for compulsory education throughout the country.\(^1\) Fifteen years later they were echoed by the Nigerian Youth Movement, which produced a charter urging that "mass education ought to be the true pivot of the educational policy of our Government", and requesting it "to make elementary education progressively free and compulsory".\(^2\) Similar demands were again voiced in 1941 by another group, the West African Students' Union; and in 1943 by the West African Press Delegation and the Nigerian Youth Movement. They were followed in 1946, and again in 1949, by further motions in the Legislative Council.\(^3\)

It is true that these demands were voiced by rising Southern politicians and, as will become clear in Chapter Two, no such demands were made in Kano. However, their impact was not restricted to the South, and since they were reinforced by similar demands in nearby Gold Coast and elsewhere, they caused the British government to give serious thought to the question of educational provision throughout its African colonies.\(^4\) The 1948 Phillipson

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1. Abernethy, op. cit., p.119.
3. Abernethy, op. cit., p.120.
4. This was indicated in various official papers. See, for example, Great Britain, Colonial Office, Mass Education in African Society (London, 1944) and Education for Citizenship in Africa (London, 1948).
Report, for example, mentioned UPE as a long term goal for the whole of Nigeria.\(^1\)

During the 1950's the aim of universal primary education on a national basis in the near future lay dormant, for the Northern Region made a conscious decision to expand its adult education services instead.\(^2\) Over the last two decades the Federal Ministry of Education in Lagos has periodically compiled statistics on enrolments and calculated the progress towards UPE. However developments, as we have noted, were slow and particularly disrupted between 1967 and 1970 by the civil war.\(^3\) Only in the 1970's have political and economic factors permitted the launching of a national campaign.\(^4\)

Education, at least in certain parts of the country and among certain social groups, is immensely popular because parents realise its importance for acquisition of jobs in the modern sector. The people of the East, especially, make considerable sacrifices to secure education for their children, and both the UPE programmes of the 1950's and the 1970's were greeted with much acclaim. The abolition of school fees is a measure certain to be strongly supported by similar communities. However, the fact that imbalances exist within the country is evidence that this attitude is not universal. Most rural commun-


2. See Section 1.11 of this chapter.

3. Obafemi Awolowo, the former premier of the Western Region, considered himself the "champion of UPE" and continually exerted pressure on Gowon to launch a national campaign in order to gain popular support, even during wartime. This, however, Gowon refused to do, arguing that neither administrative capacity nor the resource base was adequate. (Interview, Mr.(formerly General) Yakubu Gowon, 5/9/78).

4. As we have noted, the most important economic factor was the level of petroleum revenue. Exports of petroleum as a percentage by value of the total increased from 6.9% in 1964 to 86.3% in 1974. For other details on its impact, see S.A. Madujibe, 'Oil and Nigeria's Economic Development', *African Affairs*, Vol.75, No.300, 1976.
ities, especially in the North, are less enthusiastic about the benefits of schooling, and some are actively antagonistic. One result of the link between education and modern sector employment, however, is that those sectors of the population which realise the benefits of schooling are most likely to secure influential positions. Among them, free education schemes are very popular, and any politician who advocates such policies attracts considerable support. The other communities who resist Western-type education are, partly because of that fact, in less influential positions and usually less vocal. Thus it is common for politicians to launch mass education campaigns to attract support from the vocal and influential sectors of the population, despite the fact that other sectors may be less enthusiastic. It is ironic that where the campaign aims at universal education, it may in fact be inimical to the interests of those most strongly favouring it. Such a programme, at least in the initial stages, usually involves sacrificing depth for breadth, for resources have to be spread thinly to cover the maximum area. It involves pushing education on to some sectors of the population which do not welcome it, and simultaneously removes resources and reduces the quality of education given to those who do. However, the main item to be stressed here is the considerable popularity, and hence the widespread political support obtainable in the short run from those vocal sectors of the population which welcome mass education programmes.

It is dangerous, however, to make too many general statements which may overestimate the significance of this political factor. Taking the specific example of the 1976 UPE scheme, a number of qualifications clarify the role of individuals. Yakubu Gowon, in particular, has

1. See Chapter III, 'Section 1.1.
2. See throughout, but especially Chapter VI, for discussion on 'the political dilemma of popular education'.
asserted that he was never interested in education as a political ploy. Instead he maintains that he launched UPE solely to provide for the welfare of the nation and its peoples. He recognised both the dangerous nature of regional imbalances and the intrinsic value of schooling, he asserts, and initiated the campaign to reduce the former and promote the latter.

One consideration which may give credence to his statement is that if Gowon had been primarily interested in the political potential of UPE, he would neither have announced it in Sokoto nor done it so casually. Sokoto, as mentioned above, was one of the least educationally advanced areas and had displayed little interest in Western-type schooling. Had Gowon wished to make substantial political capital from his plans, he would instead have chosen one of the more educationally advanced areas where the people would be more enthusiastic about the abolition of fees and would realise the value of the campaign. Gowon himself asserts that he had no intention of widely publicising his announcement; he had always attempted to encourage educationally backward areas, and that was all he was doing in Sokoto. He announced UPE so casually, he says, because he was not interested in the campaign per se, but rather in generally improved school attendance. If this is true, he had, perhaps, not considered the administrative (as opposed to the political) merits of a large, well publicised project rather than lesser, more localised developments.

1. Interview, Mr. Yakubu Gowon, 5/9/78.
To say that one individual may not have been primarily interested in the political potential of UPE, however, is not to suggest that it was not an important factor, for the government comprises more than the Head of State. It was noted above that Awolowo had continually pressurised Gowon to launch UPE, and it is probable that other members of the government did so, in order to attract popular support.

It was also noted that general plans for UPE had been laid for some time. The National Council on Education, which comprised all commissioners responsible for education in the federation and their permanent secretaries, met in Zaria in 1972 to consider a specific timetable. There the Federal Commissioner, Chief A.Y. Eke, invited them to "consider making provision for its [UPE's] introduction in the Third National Plan (1975-81) commencing with the enrolment of all six-year olds in September 1976." This, ultimately, was the date implemented, but not before several different ones had been announced. According to Aminu Kano, who as Federal Commissioner for Health was a member of the Federal Executive Council, at the end of 1973 the Council decided, in order to give sufficient time for preparation, not to launch UPE until 1978. He was therefore very surprised when only a few months later, Gowon announced that it would take-off in April, 1975.

2. Interview, Alh. Aminu Kano, 29/6/78.
3. Nine months after his announcement, on October 1st 1974 Gowon stated that he did not consider that the nation would be ready for a return to civilian rule in 1976 - the date for which it was previously scheduled - and that he intended to remain in office indefinitely. When asked, however (interview, 5/9/78), he strongly denied the suggestion that his announcement of UPE might have been a measure to increase popular support in preparation for his October statement.
Yet once that decision had been made public, very few politicians advocated postponement since to do so would have been to invite charges of unprogressive attitudes and popular suppression. It is also significant that the new government, during the reordering of priorities which followed the deposition of the Gowon regime in 1975, never publicly considered either postponement or reduction in the scale of UPE, despite the fact that it was among the largest single projects. To do so, again, could have seriously damaged a vital element of popular support. It may also be significant that the Federal Commissioner for Education, Col. A.A. Ali, was among the three who retained their posts at the change of government.1

The links between education and politics are ones which will continually recur throughout this study. It will be necessary, for example, to consider further why Nigeria has devoted a very large proportion of resources to education at the expense of other projects; and secondly why the government has chosen to develop the formal rather than nonformal and adult sectors. Before examining the reasons for these two choices, however, it is useful to consider the causes of the present imbalances in educational provision throughout the country, since their elimination is one of the most important objectives of the scheme.

i. The Development of Educational Imbalances.

The problem of imbalanced provision of education is not a simple one which can be solved with ease. There are, to begin, three different sorts of imbalance with which to deal. The first is the most obvious one which presents the greatest political liability: a regional domination in which the Southern states are more developed than those of the North. This problem is particularly acute from the Kano viewpoint since fear of Southern domination has in the past led to outbreaks of violence. In 1953, riots

1. The other two were the Federal Commissioner for Industries, Col. M.I. Wushishi, and the Federal Commissioner for Labour, Brig. Henry Adefope. Twenty-two commissioners were newly appointed. (West Africa, 11/8/75, p.923).
erupted in which 36 people were killed and 241 injured, and in 1966 pogroms on a much greater scale caused the deaths of thousands and were a major factor precipitating the civil war. The second imbalance is also an increasing liability: the much greater development in urban as opposed to rural areas throughout the country. The third is not so threatening, but still in need of rectification: the imbalanced development of education favouring boys over girls, again throughout the country. It is argued that if primary education can be made truly universal, then by definition, in education these imbalances will have been eliminated. This logic is simple, though the path to that goal will neither be as simple, nor direct. To demonstrate this, it is useful to begin by examining the causes of each type of imbalance.

The year with which most histories of Nigerian formal education begin is 1842. This was the year in which the first English speaking missionaries arrived at Badagry, on the coast. The history of Nigerian education has been very intimately linked with the history of missionary expansion, for the general philosophy to which the evangelists adhered was that every good Christian should be able to recite his catechism, sing hymns, and be well acquainted with the Bible. For this, at least a basic education was necessary. As one author has put it, "Christianity was a religion of the book.... It was not sufficient for a preacher or priest merely to proclaim the gospel; his congregation must literally see the Word as well as hear it." Thus, as soon as they arrived, the missionaries opened schools,

4. Abernethy, op.cit., p.3.
often giving them precedence over churches. They concentrated particularly on the more malleable youth, seeking "To win the people through the children and the children through the schools." Government provision did not begin until half a century later, official interest in the early years being limited to promises of financial assistance which were rarely fulfilled because of financial stringency. The first government school was not established until 1896, and that was in response to an appeal from the Muslim community in Lagos which felt neglected.

In the North, expansion lagged far behind the South. The first school there was opened at Lokoja in 1865, but there was to be a long gap between that and the second, opened at Zaria in 1901. Developments were particularly slow in the far north, for the first missionary did not reach Kano until 1894 - by which time the schools at Badagry were over half a century old. Even then, as will

1. Fr. M. Wauters, a pioneer in Catholic activity among the Ondo and Ekiti Yorubas, for example, has written: "We knew the best way to make conversions in pagan countries was to open schools. Practically all pagan boys asked to be baptised. So, when the district of Ekiti-Ondo was opened [in 1916], we started schools even before there was any church or mission house." (quoted ibid., p.39). In the early years it is probable that buildings served a dual purpose; but of the 186 churches standing in Ondo diocese in 1962, not one had been opened before the Catholic school adjacent to it had been built (ibid.). For further discussion, see also Paul Verdzekov, 'Christian Missionaries and African Emancipation', Africa, No.51, Nov.1975, p.77.


5. Williams, ibid..
be explained in Chapter Two, another decade and a half were to elapse before the first Western-type school was opened in Kano.

Because the missionaries arrived by ship and only slowly penetrated the interior, the southern areas were subjected to a greater influence from the beginning. In a similar manner, the British colonial influence, which brought with it much modern development, began in Lagos in 1861 and only slowly moved inland. No responsibility was taken for what later became the Northern Protectorate until the first day of this century, and then many years elapsed before administration became effective.\(^1\) The tendency for the Southern areas to receive more missionary attention, and therefore education, was subsequently reinforced by colonial government policy. As mentioned in the introduction, the British decided that the cheapest and most effective means to govern the North was a system of indirect rule. For this they required an indigenous emirate structure that was both strong and cooperative; and since Christian missions were regarded as a threat to both, their activities were carefully restricted. It was in order to minimise the disruption of the existing administration that the first High Commissioner, Colonel (later Lord) Lugard made the important pledge that "There will be no interference with your religion nor with the position of the Sarkin Muslimin as head of your religion. The English Government never interferes with religion...."\(^2\)

The specific restrictions on missionaries in Kano will be elucidated in the next chapter; but here it should be mentioned that because they were permitted to operate in the non-Muslim parts of the protectorate,\(^3\) an imbalance

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3. Lugard's policy was that although he was "of the opinion that it is unwise and unjust to force missions upon the Mohammedan population,...I have...held out every encouragement to establish missions in pagan centres, which appear to me to need the influence of civilisation and religion at least as much as the Mohammedans...." (Ibid., pp.135-6).
was also fostered within the North.

The result was an accentuation of the imbalances which already existed and which, as shown by Table 1.1 became worse with time. The provision of schools and the demand for more, tend to be mutually reinforcing. The far North began with fewer. The missionaries were then restricted, the government failed to fill the gap either in creating a demand or in producing a supply, and the imbalances increased. One irony is that Lugard's original policy was adhered to after his departure, even though he himself was later inclined to relax it.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Northern Schools</th>
<th>Southern Schools</th>
<th>Northern Enrolments</th>
<th>Southern Enrolments</th>
<th>Northern Schools</th>
<th>Southern Schools</th>
<th>Northern Enrolments</th>
<th>Southern Enrolments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>11,872</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>35,716</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>3,828</td>
<td>5,210</td>
<td>158,249</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>3,533</td>
<td>20,269</td>
<td>218,610</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>4,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>1,110</td>
<td>4,284</td>
<td>70,962</td>
<td>538,391</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>9,657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>1,080</td>
<td>13,473</td>
<td>185,484</td>
<td>2,343,317</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>3,643</td>
<td>28,208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>2,743</td>
<td>12,234</td>
<td>492,829</td>
<td>2,419,913</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>1,305</td>
<td>15,276</td>
<td>180,907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>4,225</td>
<td>10,313</td>
<td>854,466</td>
<td>3,536,731</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>964</td>
<td>63,515</td>
<td>337,288</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n.a. = not available.


The problems of imbalance were continually noted throughout the century. By 1972 the imbalance had developed to the point where, according to the Federal Commissioner for Education, "for every child in a primary school in the Northern states there are four in the Southern states; for every boy or girl in a secondary school in the North there are five in the South. And for every student

in a post-secondary institution in the North there are six in the South.\(^1\) Further detail on imbalances is shown in Table 1.2, which demonstrates the imbalances within each area. It will be noted that there is a gradual increase from the far north to the middle belt, and then to the south.

| Table 1.2 : Primary School Enrolment Ratios, 1972. |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Kano State      | 7.7%            | Western State   | 45.4%           |
| North Eastern State | 9.4%       | South Eastern State | 46.7%         |
| North Western State | 9.8%       | Rivers State    | 69.3%           |
| North Central State | 16.3%      | Mid Western State| 82.5%           |
| Benue Plateau State | 22.0%      | Lagos State     | 86.1%           |
| Kwara State      | 27.3%          | East Central State| 86.4%         |
|                 |                | NIGERIA         | 36.2%           |


The imbalanced educational development of the towns has partly arisen because the towns have populations sufficiently large to fill schools, and secondly since the urban areas have more ancillary facilities of use to the school and attractive to its teachers. Because opportunities in urban areas are greater than in rural, there is a tendency for youths to migrate from the latter to the former. This in turn reinforces the needs and the advantages of urban over rural areas and the imbalance is accentuated. The implications of this will be examined in Chapter Six for although the scheme involves a vast multiplication of schools and thereby brings them closer to the people, there are dangers that it will accelerate rather than reduce the rural-urban drift, at least in the short run. This, however, is to anticipate. Here it is sufficient to point out that the imbalance has developed throughout Nigeria. Its magnitude

in 1963 is well illustrated by the enrolment ratio of 96% in Sabon Qari primary schools as compared with 2.5% in the rural parts of Kano Metropolitan Area.¹

The third imbalance which has arisen over the years is between boys' and girls' education. Foremost among the reasons for this has been the philosophy on the part of parents that schooling is an investment. They send their children to school not so much because they think they will find knowledge intrinsically useful but because possession of the education will enable the child later to obtain a better job. Since the men rather than the women are those who will later need to earn their families' income, it is logical for parents with limited resources to spend them first on the boys and only secondly on the girls. Arising in part from this is a tendency for the curriculum to reflect the demands of the employment market rather than the pleasures of learning. School may often be disagreeable for boys; but it attracts girls even less if they lack the employment motivation. As a result the mutually reinforcing process of schools being oriented to boys continues. Fewer girls complete their course and so fewer teachers are female; and since male staff may not be able to make the learning atmosphere so agreeable to girls as female staff, drop-outs among girls may be higher.²

In the North these factors are reinforced by the custom for girls to marry at puberty, and therefore to withdraw from school, and by the practice of female seclusion. It is largely for these two reasons that enrolments of girls in the North, as shown by Table 1.3, have

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¹ B.A.W. Trevallion, Metropolitan Kano: Report on the Twenty Year Development Plan 1963-1983, Pergamon Press, London, 1963, p.73. Note however that there are other factors for this imbalance which will become clear in due course.

been consistently lower than in the South. There are other factors for the imbalance, but again it is sufficient here solely to note its existence and extent.

Table 1.3: Primary Enrolments by Sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>North boys</th>
<th>North girls</th>
<th>South boys</th>
<th>South girls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>18,810</td>
<td>4,180</td>
<td>216,979</td>
<td>40,555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>129,523</td>
<td>38,998</td>
<td>1,024,031</td>
<td>465,644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>230,500</td>
<td>85,764</td>
<td>1,509,868</td>
<td>977,704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>367,776</td>
<td>151,088</td>
<td>1,477,591</td>
<td>1,029,526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>602,229</td>
<td>252,237</td>
<td>2,072,637</td>
<td>1,464,094</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Popular opinion in much of the developed world places a high emphasis on education for consumption as well as for investment. It sees education as having intrinsic value leading both to personal self-fulfilment and to narrower employment goals.\(^1\) When this is coupled with the assignment of a more equal role in society for women, there arises pressure to provide a broad educational balance throughout the system. The attitude has had its impact on Nigeria, both through the European officers who work in the education system and through links with aid donors and such international bodies as UNESCO and UNICEF. In order to appear progressive, most Nigerian leaders now pay at least lip service to the need for greater female enrolments. Education of girls is also important from the economic point of view since they can contribute much to development, and from a social point of view since the women have a much

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greater impact on training of children. These factors, combined with the general increase in prosperity which reduces the economic limitation noted above, explain the trend towards more even balance in both North and South (see Table 1.3). As with the other imbalances, however, the path to equalisation of boys' and girls' education will not be easy. It is questionable, particularly in Kano, whether society really does wish to assign equal roles, at least at the present time.

ii. Education as a Human Right.

Just as a desire to reduce imbalanced developments long predates the present UPE scheme, so do assertions that education is every person's basic human right. The 1948 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights has been repeated many times - at the UN conventions of 1960 and 1966, for example, in a number of UNESCO publications, and in the constitutions of many countries.

As Nigeria, in common with most other African countries, was represented at the 1948 convention only by the colonial government, her present expression of concern may be seen as joining a movement that originated elsewhere as well as at home. The mention of education as a fundamental

1. It is significant that, when 20 ministry officials were asked in 1977 whether they were willing to give equal educational opportunities to boys and girls, only 70% replied in the affirmative (Usman Hassan, 'Islamic Society in Nigeria: Its Implications for Educational and Economic Growth (A Case Study of Kano State)', Ph.D. thesis, University of Wales, 1978, p.229). One would expect some of these to give this answer because they were aware of official policies rather than because of their own convictions. One would also expect the rest of the population to be less in favour of equal roles (see Chapter II, Section 1.1, and Chapter VI, Section 1).

2. See Gani Fawehinmi, The People's Right to Free Education (At All Levels), Sketch Publishing Company, Ibadan, 1974, Chapter I.
right was absent from both the 1958 constitutional conference report and from the 1963 Constitution. Its inclusion in the 1976 draft and the 1979 final constitution, and the launching of UPE which puts the words into practice, might be seen as part of a worldwide movement for equality: a philosophy in which the developing world is given prompting by the stated policies of international aid donors.

Yet even with the assistance of these agencies, a minority of developing countries have sufficient resources to progress far towards the ideal. The arrival of the oil boom has enabled Nigeria to increase her efforts on a scale which places her at the forefront in the African continent.

One must, however, note that the 1948 declaration refers to education for all citizens and ask why Nigeria has chosen to launch universal primary education. It is true that resources do not permit expansion of both, but why has she chosen to begin with children rather than adults? The question is particularly pertinent in view of arguments that teaching adults is more effective because they are more dedicated; is cheaper because they are mature learners; is more suitable for society because it avoids the disharmony between schooled children and their uneducated parents and because parents can pass their skills on to their children;


and yields a more rapid economic return because the adults are already at work and can utilise their new skills immediately.¹

One answer lies in the counter argument that resources are better invested in education of children because the younger a person is, the better he is able to learn;² and because the initial investment will bear more years of fruit. A more important answer, however, lies in politics. First, Nigerians see the arrival of the oil boom as an opportunity to provide an infrastructure of the European or American kind, and since adult education there is often only a supplement to child education, the suitability for Nigeria of a similar balance is not questioned. Such attitudes extend beyond education, for popular opinion holds that capital intensive processes such as are employed in agriculture and industry in the developed world are what Nigeria needs if she is to join them.

A second reason why the government has launched a universal primary rather than adult education scheme is clarified by reference to the 1950's. This was the era in which the UPE campaigns of the West and East were launched. In the North, with its different political situation, the authorities decided to develop adult instead of primary education. It was noted above that many colonial government policies in the post-war era were more a response to

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the vocal Southern politicians than to Northerners. Their demands were by no means limited to education, for chief on the list was the whole issue of independence. It was with the realization that independence would come in the not very distant future that the Northern government, strongly influenced by British colonial opinion, decided to launch its adult education campaign. Whereas half a century earlier the well developed pre-existing system of administration and education had given the North an advantage not possessed by the South, by the 1940's, as Heussler has commented, Western-type education and commerce had given the South "a much greater degree of Afro-European self-consciousness and unanimity and far more competence in trade and European political organisation" than the North.¹

To a large extent the genesis of the adult education programme can be traced to the Lieutenant Governor of the time, Sir Brian Sharwood Smith, who felt it desirable in order "to try and stimulate the growth of public opinion which would be essential to underpin sound political development."² Accordingly in 1952 the region launched its Yaki da Jahilci (Campaign against Ignorance), the events of which are outlined with specific reference to Kano in Chapter Two.

Because of the strong consciousness among Northern politicians of the role of Southerners in the economy, there was, during the 1950's, much pressure to expand school facilities as rapidly as possible. The authorities were also very anxious, however, to preserve the quality of education, both in terms of cognitive and of social training. "Whatever the correspondence colleges may achieve, this Education Department does not aim at Rapid Results", announced the Minister of Education in 1955.³

He refused to attempt large scale expansion until teachers had been trained because it would otherwise cause a "weakening of the master-pupil relationship which is of first importance in the building of character." And while acknowledging the importance of secondary schools as "the shoes in which we shall march to self government", he pointed out that unless they were well made, advances would be neither great nor rapid. To those who queried the wisdom of teaching adults before all children had been schooled, the Minister replied that they had "little appreciation of the magnitude of the task", for the 1952 census had shown a population of 12 million of whom only 2% were literate in the Roman script. Education was also very expensive; and although the government did make a large increase in expenditure in 1955, so that education consumed 17% of the total budget, it was unwilling to commit the same proportions as either the East or West, which devoted 23% and 28% respectively.

Whereas in the North the indigenous politicians were a smaller group and had attitudes, in large measure as a result of their own education, which corresponded closely to those of the British, in the South the political situation was more developed and more heated. In both places there existed rivalry between the traditional rulers, the British and the emergent Nigerian elite, but in the South it was much more intense. This rivalry was a significant factor leading to the launching of UPE, for the elite, if they were to gain ascendancy over the other two groups, had to offer something which the others either could not or would not provide. That something, as Abernethy points out, was education. The traditional rulers were in no

1. Ibid., p.17. A larger proportion, as will be explained below, were literate in the Arabic script.

2. The 1955 Education allocation in the West was £3½m. In the East it was £2½m., but in the North it was only £2m., even though the Northern population was greater than the other two combined.

position to make promises of UPE; and the British did not
wish to since they opposed so great an expansion in view of
the issues of quality, employment and expense. Thus three
reasons why the North did not follow the Southern regions
by launching a UPE programme in the 1950's were firstly
that there was less popular pressure for such a campaign;
secondly that the rivalry between the three power groups
was not so intense (partly because of a generally lower level
of educational development, and partly because the system of
indirect rule meant that the political leaders and the
traditional rulers were often the same people\(^1\)); and thirdly
that a high proportion of education officers were British,\(^2\)
and the Nigerians who did hold important posts had broadly
similar outlooks. This last point was demonstrated again
in 1957 by the Minister of Education, who announced:

> With regard to this universal free primary education,
> I realise that this expression has now become a slogan
> - that anybody who decides to attack the Government on
> education just shouts out the slogan knowing all too
> well that it is asking the Government to perform a
> miracle.... The rate of expansion of education is con-
> trolled entirely by two factors: teachers and funds.
> I think any layman can understand this.... It should
> be remembered that in training teachers there is no
> short cut. 3

1. The Minister of Education, Alhaji Aliyu, was a case in
point, since he was also Makama of Bida.

2. In 1957, only 40 of the 384 Ministry of Education officers
were Nigerian, and all the top posts except that of the
Minister were filled by Britons. Further, even the 40
Nigerians had a relatively slight impact since transfers
and promotions were frequent and, in the words of one
Chief Inspector of Education, their "only concern was
with politics". (J. Bolton-Maggs, quoted in Douglas Robert
Boyan, 'Educational Policy Formulation in the North of
1972, p.172.) The British influence became evident in
later issues also. Thus while the Minister claimed respon-
sibility for initiating a policy to raise the standard
of primary teaching by refusing employment to Grade III
teachers in the early 1960's, in fact the proposal
originally came from Bolton-Maggs (Boyan, ibid., pp.170-1).

3. Nigeria, Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly
Today the proportion of expatriate officers in Northern Ministries has been greatly reduced. Rivalries have also changed, for with the arrival of independence the British presence ceased to pose so serious a threat to indigenous politicians, and though the support of the traditional rulers is important to the government they also have ceased to represent a serious challenge, either in the North or in the South. However, although in theory political activity became illegal with the army's takeover in 1966, even military governments need widespread support if they are to rule with ease and effectiveness. Among most politically vocal groups in Nigeria, formal education remains very popular, and the Gowon regime attracted much acclaim for its decision to launch UPE. To the federal politicians of the 1970's, unlike many Northern leaders of the 1950's, the decline in quality which such an expansion inevitably causes in the short run was less important than the immediate political benefits of the scheme. As noted at the beginning, it is also significant that the UPE programme was never publicly included in the discussion on priorities which followed the ousting of the Gowon regime in 1975, for although it was among the most expensive items of the Third National Development Plan, the new government could not afford to disappoint influential sections of the public by abandoning the scheme.

This analysis explains why the federal government has chosen to expand primary rather than adult education. It does not, however, explain the preference of the people. A

1. The attitudes of many Northern leaders of the 1950's were to a considerable extent influenced by their own education. A large number, including Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Northern Premier, Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Nigerian Prime Minister, Alhaji Aliyu, the Northern Minister of Education until 1957, and Alhaji Isa Kaita, his successor, had attended Katsina Teachers' College. The training there strongly emphasised character formation as well as academic excellence, and attempted to provide all the essentials of a good English public school. In the early years there were no specific examinations, and qualifications were awarded on the basis of reports made throughout pupils' careers.
partial answer to this lies in the forces of tradition: the Nigerian people have laid little emphasis on adult education because, apart from the Yaki da Jahilci campaign of the 1950's, they have not been encouraged to do otherwise. A second and more important reason is linked to the view of education as investment. Since the structure of the modern economy offers employment mainly to those with paper qualifications, and since these are obtainable mainly through the formal education system, nonformal adult education takes only the second place. It is, in any case, the children rather than the adults who will be embarking on a career and who will need these qualifications for a good start. The experiences of the Northern Region, and of such countries as Tanzania and Cuba suggest that it would not be too difficult to change this popular attitude. However, at present it suits Nigerian politicians to capitalise on existing attitudes rather than try to change them. The possibility that later governments will not wholly applaud the decisions of their predecessors will be considered in Chapters Five and Six.

iii. Education as Investment.

As with the notion of education as a fundamental human right, the concept of education as investment is by no means limited to Nigeria. The idea was first proposed by economists in the First World, and subsequently adopted by others in the Third who, in their desire to 'catch up' with the developed nations attach considerable importance to the high levels of training visible in the latter. The

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concept that increased education per se leads to economic growth is linked with notions of democracy - of a greater awareness among the people leading them to demand better government - and of manpower planning. 1 It is ironic that UPE involves the massive expansion of a formal system that has increasingly been called into question in the developed world, 2 but it is undeniable that these attitudes in the developing nations were inherited from the developed. 3

In Nigeria, many underlying assumptions were well illustrated by the 1960 Ashby Report, which was entitled Investment in Education and began:

Millions of people who will live in this Nigeria of 1980 are already born. Under the present educational system more than half of them will never go to school. Like people elsewhere, their talents will vary from dullness to genius. Somehow, before 1980, as many talented children as possible must be discovered and educated if this vision of Nigeria is to be turned into reality. This is a stupendous undertaking. It will cost large sums of money. The Nigerian people will have to forego other things they want so that every available penny is invested in education. Even this will not be enough....

1. J.W. Hanson, for example ('The Nation's Educational Purpose' in O. Ikejiani (ed.), Nigerian Education, Longman, Ibadan, 1964, p.24), felt that "in a democratic society, the populace and its leaders will have to face together the hard choices which must be made....The soundness of economic progress will depend upon the rapid expansion of just such economic literacy, on expansion of the responsibility with which the schools of the nation must be charged...."


As the 1960's progressed, however, many observers became disillusioned with this approach. Even Frederick Harbison, who has been described as the "high priest" of manpower planning, admitted in 1968 that:

[one] thing we have learned since 1959 or 1960 [is that] where it was once believed that all investments in education were good - and that economic growth was a pure and simple consequence of investment in education - we now know that education can impede economic growth as well as accelerate it. The major question before us now is how to achieve a proper balance within an education system. It is how to achieve the right types...rather than simply greater quantities of education.

Faced with increasing social problems, particularly relating to maldistribution of income, there also arose widespread disillusion with the emphasis on growth. As early as 1962 U Thant, Secretary General to the United Nations, stressed that "The problem of underdeveloped countries is not just growth, but development. Development is growth plus change; change, in turn, is social and cultural as well as economic; and qualitative as well as quantitative." In Nigeria these concerns were eclipsed first by the civil war and then by the oil boom of the 1970's.


However, though not all statements were consistent, by the middle of the decade similar thoughts had entered official publications. "It has become evident that rapid economic growth in terms of gross domestic product, capital formation, etc.," stated the Third National Plan, "is not necessarily concomitant with improvement in the standard of living of the masses, which is the ultimate objective of a sound development policy." Officially, the UPE scheme is an attempt to distribute the wealth from petroleum more evenly, so that the poorer sectors of society may benefit as well as the rich.

These social and political considerations are more important than economic ones, and the notion of education being an investment is often used as a justification for a decision made primarily for different reasons. For example, one arm of the government may suggest that education is not a good investment when "the fortunes of primary school leavers in the labour market do not justify an indiscriminate widening of the educational pyramid," and point out that "as a result of an annual drop-out of 400,000 and an out-turn of 240,000 out of whom only 70,000 could be offered places in secondary schools, thousands of ill-equipped young primary school leavers find themselves in the labour market every year seeking wage employment." However, this has not deterred a different arm of the government from launching another mass education scheme. It is likely that unemployment in the 1980's will be even greater than in the 1960's - but that has not prevented the launching of a UPE scheme since the politics of the present were more important than the unemployment of the future.

3. See Chapter V, Section 2.
However, despite misgivings among some of Nigeria's planners, the view of mass education as an investment remains widespread. One writer suggests, for example, that:

In the developed world - United States of America, USSR, Britain, France, Japan ... etc., education is seen as a profitable investment, contributing to economic growth. These countries have seen that education fulfils a double function - as a consumption good and as a production factor. So education becomes an integral part of economic and social development; schooling is considered a profitability in fact, a strikingly valuable investment since it contributes to the wealth of the countries. 1

This opinion reflects those widely held by the Nigerian public. Fawehinmi, the author, adopts the rule of thumb: "When in doubt, educate. ... [If] still in doubt, still educate. Educate more." 2 That the government also expects a great deal of education is demonstrated by a National Policy on Education statement which, referring to imbalanced inter-state and intra-state development, asserted that:

Not only is education the greatest force that can be used to bring about redress, it is also the greatest investment that the nation can make for the quick development of its economic, political, sociological and human resources. 3

It is doubtful whether such strong faith in education is justified. From the human development viewpoint, education must be considered an investment; but whether present policies represent an appropriate investment for Nigeria and Kano at the present time is a different question.

This section has enlarged on the origins and basic aims of UPE from the national viewpoint. Having stated the objectives, study of the extent to which they are being achieved, and will be achieved in the future, is possible. To begin this, it is necessary to provide more detailed information on the nature of the task undertaken.

2. Ibid., p.32.
2. The Task at Hand: Logistics and Costs.

As we have noted, the basic objectives of UPE as laid out in the original plan were daunting, especially for the least developed areas of the federation. In this section the nature of the national programme will be outlined, details of Kano being postponed until Chapter Three.

The scale of the UPE project was most clearly laid out in the Third National Development Plan in 1975, which is reproduced in Table 1.4 below. In 1964 there were 2,849,488 children in primary schools. By 1971 this had expanded to 3,894,539, and by 1973 to 4,746,808. The Plan envisaged an intake of 2.3 million in 1976 to bring the total to 7,400,000. It was then expected to reach 11,521,500 in 1978/80 and 14,100,000 in 1981/82. In other words, the primary sector was scheduled to expand nearly five-fold within ten years. By 1981, primary education was projected to be approaching universality, and further expansion of the sector would be limited to the predicted annual population growth of approximately 2.2%. To house the children, 150,995 classrooms were scheduled for construction by 1980, of which 107,505 were in the North and 43,490 in the South.

The expansion has not, of course, been confined to

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the primary level. Many teachers were required for UPE, and the Plan aimed at 234,680 college places by 1980 as compared with the 46,951 existing in 1973. Similarly, to maintain the shape of the educational pyramid, 1,555,180 secondary places were scheduled for 1980 compared with the 448,904 existing in 1973, and the number of universities was increased from six to thirteen to cater for the top level.

The capital cost of this massive project was estimated by the Plan at no less than N2,464 million, of which N500 million would be accounted for by UPE. Of this, N300 million was allocated to construction of schools, and the remainder to teachers' colleges. A crash training programme was launched in 1974 under which the 46,951 places existing in 1973 were to be supplemented by another 43,000 to provide some of the 211,428 teachers required altogether in 1976. The sum of N51.04 million was allocated to expand the existing 156 colleges, and N170.5 million to build new ones.

It is significant that, whereas earlier official announcements had anticipated compulsory education as from 1979, the Head of State in his launching speech only referred to compulsion "around 1980", hoping that by then "the benefit and importance of education will be so appreciated that making UPE compulsory will be a mere formality."

1. Ibid., p.251. In 1973 the currency was decimalised, one Nigerian pound (£1) becoming two naira (N2). One naira is subdivided into one hundred kobo. Unless clarity requires otherwise, all monetary notations referring to the pre-1973 period will be in pounds. Subject to fluctuation, N1 is approximately equivalent to £(Stg.)0.80.

2. Ibid. The total exceeds the estimate made in a different section, perhaps because of rounding.


Events were to show that in this he was being very optimistic. The significance of his remark, however, is that although Obasanjo had decided to adhere to the previous government’s timetable, as early as 1976 he was aware of the need for caution. Only 18 months later he was forced publicly to note shortcomings and to criticise the inadequacy of preparatory groundwork.¹

Figure 1.1: Primary Enrolments, Nigeria, 1960-81.

Actual events in 1976 showed the plans to have been serious underestimates. Despite careful registration exercises in all states, more children arrived for school in the first term than had been expected. Whereas the Plan had anticipated a total enrolment in 1976 of 7.4 million pupils, the actual enrolment, partly because of over-aged children, was over 8.5 million, and reached 10 million the following year.² Later projections anticipated a 1981/2 enrolment of 17.6 million rather than the 14.1 million originally expected³ As will be shown in Chapter Four,

1. New Nigerian, 24/2/78.
2. Information from Federal Ministry of Education, Lagos. The figures are further analysed in Chapter III, Section 2.
costs were also seriously underestimated. Although a feasibility Study Group had calculated required expenditure in 1973, both inflation and increased real costs dramatically expanded actual requirements when the scheme was launched. ¹ The National Plan, moreover, omitted mention of the recurrent costs of UPE, which will actually be greater than the entire capital estimate and will require payment every year. In 1976/7, for example, the recurrent allocation to UPE in the federal budget was N515 million. The sum was subdivided into N150 million for running expenses and field implementation of Grade II teachers' colleges; N350 million for the primary schools; and N15 million for motor advances to UPE staff. ² It was part of an all-time record vote of N738.6 million for the Federal Ministry of Education, which had the previous year been allocated only N101.5 million. In part this reflected the administrative change whereby the federal ministry undertook financial responsibility for primary education in 1976 and disbursed specific grants to each state. However, much of the increase was directly attributable to UPE, which caused a dramatic rise in combined federal and state expenditure. ³

In short, the UPE programme was both ambitious and very expensive. And with the decline in oil revenue in the mid-1970's, concern over costs increased with time. This section is necessarily brief because it is intended only to present an outline of the federal plan, the implementation of which is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three. Since it is useful first to provide a clearer historical framework, the final section of this introductory chapter cursorily surveys events during the UPE campaigns of the 1950's.

1. Sanya Onabamiro, 'Problems in our Educational Programme (1)', New Nigerian, 27/9/78, p.20.
3. See Chapter IV, Section 2.
3. The UPE Schemes of the 1950's.

A major factor leading to the UPE programmes of the 1950's, as mentioned above, was the rivalry between Nigerian politicians, the British and the traditional rulers. Within the first group there were further rivalries, an outline of which is necessary to an understanding of the course of events. The emergent Southern nationalist elite were grouped into two main parties, the Action Group with its stronghold in the West, and the National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) with its stronghold in the East. The fact that their rivals in the West had succeeded in launching their scheme in 1955 was an important stimulus causing NCNC leaders to launch the Eastern Region programme two years later. However, because the NCNC had opposed several reforms in the Western scheme, they were unable to implement similar changes in their own campaign, which contributed to its difficulties. A third scheme was launched in Lagos in 1957 since constitutional changes had separated it from the Western Region. This will also be considered in this section, though the fourth, much less publicised campaign launched in Kano in 1960 will be discussed in Chapter Two.

1. The Western Region.

The first hint of the Western Region UPE programme was contained in a 1951 Action Group policy paper which called for free and compulsory education for all eight years of the existing primary course. It was followed in 1952 by a White Paper which proposed to launch the scheme in


January 1955. Whether school fees should be abolished simultaneously for all classes or phased out as the Primary One class entering in 1955 progressed through the system, was initially the subject of debate. The discussion was repeated a quarter of a century later with regard to the present UPE scheme, and in both cases settled on the former course since it enables vital popular enthusiasm to be aroused more easily. Other aspects of the original proposal, however, were modified. The most important was the reduction of the eight year course to six. This was hotly opposed by NCNC leaders on the grounds that it would lower the quality of output, but it was felt necessary on financial grounds and to maximise the number of children included. It also placed the Western Region at variance with the rest of the country: a factor which the 1976 UPE scheme hopes to resolve.\(^2\) The proposal on compulsory education was also finally abandoned.\(^3\) This is another thorny issue which has recurred in the 1970’s and to which careful consideration must be given.\(^4\)

Although the administration had nearly four years to prepare for UPE, events showed that they seriously underestimated the strength of demand. A relatively small expansion in enrolments was anticipated, from 381,000 in 1952 to 492,000 in 1955. In the 1954 preliminary registration exercises, however, 380,000 children enrolled instead of the 170,000 expected; and a number who had not registered actually arrived in January 1955. This gave a Class I enrolment of 391,895, and a total of 811,432.\(^5\)

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1. Western Region of Nigeria, Proposals for an Education Policy for the Western Region, Government Printer, Ibadan, 1952. The school year ran from January to December until 1973, when it was changed to September to July.
2. See Chapter IV, Section 1.1.
4. See Chapter VI, Section 2.
This underestimation of demand, as noted above, was repeated in 1976. In both cases it was in large measure due to enrolments of over-aged children. In theory only six year olds should have been admitted; but in practice there is no precise way to estimate children's ages in the absence of birth certificates. In 1955 the usual method employed was asking the child to reach over his head and touch the opposite ear. If he could not do this he was considered under age, but if he could just do it he was considered six. In 1976, at least in Kano, all children within a reasonable age span were accepted because the authorities did not wish to dampen public enthusiasm by turning children away.

Similarly, although a crash training programme expanded the teaching force from 17,000 in 1954 to 27,000 in 1955, the proportion of trained staff fell dramatically. Already low at 37% in 1952, it fell to 31% in 1954 and 22% in 1955. Not until 1963, by which time enrolments had begun to fall, did the proportion exceed 50%. As later occurred in Kano, even some headmasters had only Grade III qualifications or none at all.

Finances also came under great pressure, the education budget expanding from £2.2 million in 1954 to £5.4 million in 1955 and nearly half being accounted for by primary schools. By the end of the decade, 43% of the total budget was being spent on education, and of that, no less than 76% was consumed by primary schooling. "And yet anyone who has seen the primary schools at first hand", lamented

4. Ibid., pp.5,21. Less than 10% of primary school expenditure was on capital items.
the Taiwo Report ten years later, "has remarked the shocking condition of most school buildings, the appalling lack of essential equipment and facilities and poor staffing, cannot but conclude that financial provision has been, if anything, inadequate." In part this was caused by the establishment of unviably small schools, many of which were later merged. A second factor was the decline in community participation. In 1954 the World Bank Commission had expressed the strong belief that "a substantial part of the recurrent cost on primary schools should be borne by the local community...The greater the local responsibility that is assumed for the cost of education, the more genuine will be the local community's interest in the schools." But despite this warning, the actual share diminished markedly. Both of these factors will be of importance to Kano in the 1970's, and will be discussed later.

Professor Fafunwa has described the project as "the boldest and perhaps the most unprecedented scheme in Africa South of the Sahara...launched by an indigenous government as a meaningful demonstration of its commitment to the vital interests of the people it governed." The scheme accomplished much in its early years, raising enrolments from 35% of the five to 14 age group in 1954 to 61% in 1955, and 90% in 1960. However, although fees were never formally reintroduced, 'textbook fees', 'building levies', and 'examination fees' crept back on a school by school basis. The quantitative expansion was also bought at the cost of high drop-outs and a decline in quality. As the Banjo Report commented in 1961, although primary pupils

achieved some degree of literacy in the mother tongue, "it was doubtful whether they had acquired permanent literacy in the English Language."¹ This and other indications of qualitative decline were confirmed by the Taiwo Report in 1968.²

When the UPE products began to leave school in the 1960's, an employment crisis developed. Many of the leavers were absorbed by a large number of 'secondary modern' schools which mushroomed, mostly under private proprietorship.³ Their three year course, however, only postponed and made the ultimate problem more serious by further raising scholars' aspirations. The curriculum was highly academic and in fact neither secondary nor modern, and partly because of disillusion with the employment prospects of school leavers, enrolments fell from their peak of 1,131,409 in 1960 to 1,089,327 in 1965.⁴

An overall comment on the Western scheme was provided by the Taiwo report, which suggested that "if the history of free primary education in Western Nigeria has taught anything, it is that the success of such a venture depends on a number of complementary factors outside education. We have already drawn attention to the need for a fast growing economy able to generate higher income and employment opportunities. There are others. Among the most important are an efficient tax system, substantial support

4. Annual Abstract of Statistics 1966, op.cit., p.161. The second figure includes the Mid-Western Region which was carved out of the Western Region in 1963.
from local communities, parental interest in the education of children and more research...". ¹ As will become clear, however, events in the early years of the present UPE campaign suggest that the history of Western Nigeria's project did not teach as much as might have been hoped.

ii. The Eastern Region

Although the Western Region UPE project encountered many difficulties, it was never abandoned. The Eastern Region scheme, despite higher initial enrolment ratios (43% of the 6-14 age group in 1954 as opposed to 35% in the West), was less successful. In part this reflected more serious financial problems. Both regions had benefitted from a disbursement of marketing board assets in 1954, but the East not so much as the West. ² The former was less able to organise an effective tax system, and was troubled by internal instability which only partially resolved itself with the election of Azikiwe to the premiership in 1954.³

The goals of the original 1953 policy were quite modest. The primary course was to remain eight years in length until such time as improvements in the effectiveness of teaching enabled the same standard to be reached in six. Meanwhile, the government committed itself to universal education in the first four years only. It preferred the term "universal" to the commonly used "compulsory and free" since "it is idle to pretend that education on such a large scale will not in fact cost a great deal of money."⁴

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¹. Western Nigeria, Taiwo Report, op. cit., p.4.
². The disbursement was part of the move towards federalism brought by the 1954 Lyttelton constitution. The West received £34.4 million, the East £15.1 million, and the North £24.8 million. See The World Bank, The Economic Development of Nigeria, op. cit., pp.169-70, and Sklar, op. cit., pp.449 ff.
Instead, the Minister of Education referred to "education without payment of fees." Local communities were to bear a large part of the costs of UPE, and compulsion was to be introduced only when the various local government bodies felt ready to enforce it.

With political changes in 1954 and the intensification of rivalry with the Action Group, however, NCNC leaders in 1965 produced a more ambitious proposal. With effect from the following January, all eight years were to be completely free. It was not possible for the NCNC initially to reduce the course to six years because they had opposed the reduction in the West, ostensibly on grounds of quality but in fact for political motives. As the 1957 deadline approached, therefore, the politicians committed themselves to increasingly ambitious programmes with even shorter periods for planning.

The situation was further complicated by intense rivalries between Catholics and Protestants, exacerbated by the fact that although the population was by a large majority Catholic, most NCNC leaders were Protestant. Accordingly the leadership, aware that a ban on voluntary agency school administration would limit their scale of evangelism, but would limit the Catholics more, initiated a policy of wholly government-owned schools, consulting neither the voluntary agencies nor the Nigeria Union of Teachers. So fierce was Catholic opposition that they considered forming their own political party to oppose the NCNC and told parents that they should "not on any account register in a

1. The course was shortened to seven years in 1961 and six in 1963, however. This brought the East into line with the West but left it out of line with the North, which ran a four year junior primary and three year senior primary course.

non-Catholic school", and threatened, "If you want your child to go to heaven, to see God, you must only register him in a Catholic school."¹ This disharmony was a serious obstacle to the success of the scheme.

Yet despite the lack of preparation and this acrimonious dispute, the initial success of the programme was impressive. Whereas in 1952 there were 518,948 pupils attending 3,521 primary schools, in 1957 this had expanded to 1,194,354 in 6,654 schools.² The enrolment again took the authorities by surprise. Only 78% of those who had registered for Class I in 1956 actually arrived the following January; but this was more than compensated for by an entry to all other classes of the system. The teaching force was expanded from 29,671 in 1956 to 40,841 in 1957, though this involved a decrease in the proportion qualified from 28% to 20%.³

Towards the end of the first year, however, the serious nature of the financial position that had hitherto been ignored in the religious and political furor was becoming evident. An additional reason for glossing over the costs of UPE had been anticipation of a regional election in 1957. Once this had been won, attention focussed on the fact that the Ministry of Education had spent £2 million more than its allocation of £2.9 million for 1956/7. An extrapolation of this trend suggested consumption of £14.8 million by 1964, which represented almost the entire regional revenue.⁴ The first indication of measures to come was

¹. The Leader (Roman Catholic newspaper), 19/5/56, quoted in Abernethy, op. cit., p. 170.
given in November 1957, when the Ministry told voluntary agencies to expect no grant increases to cover their administrative expenses. Early in 1958 came the announcement that "Assumed Local Contributions", which usually meant fees, were to be reintroduced. In Infant Classes I and II, and Standards I and II would have to be paid respective "enrolment fees" of 10/- and £1 per pupil. The Assumed Local Contribution in Standard V would be £4 10/- per child, and in Standard VI £6.¹

To many people, this came as a shock. Because they had been unaware of financial difficulties, the announcement resulted in demonstrations and riots. Many schools had to be closed down since they were uneconomic in size and since parents kept children at home either for security, or in passive demonstration, or because of their inability to pay fees at such short notice. Consequently, the charges were again modified so that tuition in the first two classes was free of charge. Fees in Standards I and II were set at £2 per annum; in Standards III and IV at £4; and in Standards V and VI at £6.² In the last two classes, parents thus found themselves paying more than twice the fee charged before the launching of UPE. As a result, an estimated 260,000 children were withdrawn,³ and 157 schools closed down.⁴ Neither the children nor their parents made politically significant protests once the school year got under way, however, and after the drop in 1958, enrolments expanded steadily to reach a new peak in 1960.

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1. Ibid., pp.12-3; Abernethy, op. cit., p.180.
3. Abernethy, op. cit., p.185.
Although the Eastern Region scheme had a marked impact on enrolments, insufficient planning led to serious difficulties. Religious and political rivalries, together with administrative inexperience and corruption, were later singled out as having "dragged the name of Universal Primary Education schools to the mud". When the present UPE scheme was launched nearly twenty years later, it was with the benefit of a longer planning period and a stronger financial base. Before discussing other implications for the present programme in Kano, however, let us turn to the third project of the decade, launched in Lagos in 1957.

iii. The Lagos Scheme

Until 1951, Lagos was a federal territory with an identity separate from the Western Region. In that year, in view of its linguistic affinity with its neighbour, the Macpherson constitution joined it with the West. When the Western Region initiated plans for UPE, therefore, Lagos was included in them. However, in deference to insistence from both the Eastern and Northern Regions and despite protests from both Lagos and the West, it was again separated in 1954. Since Lagos in consequence did not participate in the Western scheme, the Town Council laid plans for its own, which was launched in 1957. 2

Because the region was smaller and therefore easier to administer, and in part because of its stronger financial base, the Lagos scheme was more successful than either

West or East. The number of pupils was raised from 37,038 in 1955 to 50,182 in 1957 and 66,320 in 1959.\(^1\) The pressure on facilities necessitated the introduction of double shifts and the renting of unsuitable accommodation, but the length of course was maintained at eight years.\(^2\) By 1964 an estimated 87.9% of primary aged children were attending school,\(^3\) and by 1966, the year before boundaries were changed with the creation of Lagos State, there were some 142,118 pupils in 129 schools.\(^4\) Even in Lagos, however, as numbers continued to rise it was found necessary to raise the approved size of classes from 40 to 45 and to introduce a triple shift system.\(^5\) This involved a serious shortening of the working day and though abolished as soon as possible, three shifts had to be reintroduced in 1976.

iv. Implications for the Present Scheme in Kano.

Some of the implications of these early projects have been briefly noted, and others will emerge in due course. It is appropriate here to make a few additional points, however. The first relates to the magnitude of the task at hand. As was noted in the introduction, Kano faces a formidable assignment: to multiply the school population tenfold within six years. The Eastern Region project tragically illustrated the dangers of attempting too much without

2. Federation of Nigeria, Federal Government Development Programme 1962-68, Federal Printing Division, Lagos, 1962, p.34. The course was subsequently reduced to six years to bring it into line with the rest of the South.
5. Moffet, op.cit., p.29. He also notes that some classes had as many as 83 pupils, despite the official ruling.
careful planning. On the other hand, the Western Region scheme demonstrated that the sheer scale of the task can be an asset. We have noted the importance of the political climate as a factor leading to UPE, and, as Abernethy has pointed out, "the area's greatest resource was the energy and enthusiasm of its people, who could perform remarkable feats of self-help if inspired by a vision of future progress."¹ Both in the 1950's and in the 1970's, the very magnitude of the project, far from discouraging effort, called forth some of the resources necessary for its implementation. Since it is difficult to maintain public enthusiasm for a long period, it is also important to utilise the momentum to make a large initial step. This, as will become clear in Chapter Three, was a policy adopted in Kano, which distinguished it from most other Northern States.

A second point relates to the planning period. A low percentage of buildings, teachers and equipment was prepared for UPE when it was finally launched in 1976.² There were suggestions in the national press that the scheme should be postponed for a year.³ Obviously as short a planning period as was witnessed in the East is undesirable. But at the same time, to use the words of the 1961 Banjo Report,

> If the government had waited for ideal conditions to arise before taking action, they would have waited too long. The finicky planning and over-cautious attitude of the old Colonial Government in launching programmes of development could not be imitated by a nation wishing to telescope historical events enacted elsewhere in a thousand years into a few decades.⁴

The setting and adherence to a deadline provides a target by which tasks must be done. Postponement of the target

1. Abernethy, op. cit., p.132.
2. See Chapter III, Sections 1 and 2.
3. Editorials, New Nigerian, 16/1/76; Daily Times, 19/1/76.
often does not ensure a significantly better result: it simply delays achievements and reduces momentum.

The experience of the Western Region’s low community participation illustrates the drawbacks of UPE becoming a federally financed project. That there are advantages is not to be ignored. Federal financing has the merit of enabling Lagos to spur less interested states and to coordinate implementation to achieve a national effort. However, there is also the danger of the project being seen as a gift from above, requiring little local initiative or care in expenditure. The Eastern Region Minister of Education was quite correct in his assertion that there is no such thing as free education. Kano has not the same history of community participation as the East which, apart from the financial aspect, may have the additional merit of promoting the relevance and impact of education. With the unexpectedly high financial burden of UPE, it is a matter which could be worthy of promotion.

Other experiences of the 1950’s with implications for the present scheme will be discussed in due course. This chapter has expatiated on the objectives of the national scheme. In order to narrow the focus and understand Kano’s position within this framework, let us turn to the history of education in the state since the beginning of the century.
CHAPTER II: THE HISTORY OF EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
IN KANO STATE 1900 - 1976

To place the present UPE scheme in perspective and understand the nature of the problems encountered, it is necessary to examine the pattern of educational development over the last few decades. It will be seen that many of today's difficulties have arisen before. Various attempts by the colonial government to develop the education system met with only partial success, for which two main factors may be blamed: first, they were introducing a model completely alien to Kano society; and second, they failed to make much use of the pre-existing Islamic education system. The two factors are related, and continually recur in policy discussions on UPE.

As mentioned in the introduction, education exists in so many different forms that some classification is necessary to facilitate understanding. The term 'Western education' is one which it would be preferable to avoid. One would like to be able to say that, at least by the 1970's, Nigeria had sufficiently developed her own identity for reference to 'Nigerian education' to be possible. As will become clear however the Western-type schools, i.e. those organised into conventional classes with classrooms, desks, certificated teachers, blackboards, and examinations, are still quite distinct from the Eastern-type, or Islamic schools which exist in a parallel system. Nor is it possible to avoid the term 'Western' by referring to 'government schools'. It is true that in Kano the two terms are almost synonymous; but in other states a large number of mission and other voluntary agency schools still exist, and a few are still to be found in Kano despite the trend towards nationalisation.

This chapter, accordingly, will be divided into four parts. It will begin with the formal government and mission schools since they are the model on which the UPE scheme
is based. The second section is devoted to adult learning because it is a significant potential competitor for resources and since, as explained in Chapter One, a different emphasis placed on it in the past has been partly responsible for the imbalanced provision of children's education today. The third section discusses the Islamic system of learning and efforts to combine it with the Western model. Finally, because the majority of citizens has been catered for by none of these systems, the chapter will conclude with an outline of the informal and nonformal processes of education, of which the apprenticeship system forms an important part. It will be seen that a person may participate in any or all of these different systems during his lifetime.

1. Western-Type Education.

i. The Early Years to 1909.

As we have noted in Chapter One, both government and missions have played an important role in the development of formal education in Nigeria. The missionaries regarded schools as an essential part of evangelism, and only in 1896 was the first government school opened - in response to an appeal from the neglected Muslim community in Lagos. In the North, as we have noted, mission activity occurred later than in the South, and was carefully restricted by the government. Conflict between government and missionaries was particularly highlighted by developments in Kano, since both noted the strategic importance of the city. Walter Miller for example, of the Church Missionary Society (CMS), demonstrated keen interest in Kano since he hoped there "to find the merchants and artisans, as well as the

1. Some aspects of adult education are commonly classified as nonformal. They are of such importance to discussion on UPE, however, that they merit a section of their own.
mallams, possessed of wider interests or more leisure and able to give their children a longer childhood and the time for schooling.\(^1\)

Mission aspirations were, however, to be denied and establishment of schools consequently limited. The CMS had begun badly when in 1900 a group decided to visit Kano. The expedition was led by Bishop Tugwell and included Miller in its membership, and was a disaster. When the group arrived, not only did the emir refuse permission to establish a school; he almost had them taken to the 'Jakara' where for centuries criminals had had their hands and feet cut off as a preliminary to execution. Fortunately the emir decided to heed the advice of his most senior counsellor and instead dismissed them with the words, "We don't want you; you can go. I give you three days to prepare; - a hundred donkeys to carry your loads to Zaria, and we never wish to see you here again."\(^2\)

The blunder greatly angered Lugard and worsened missionary-government relations. Yet despite this, largely because of Lugard's personal friendship with Miller, permission was given to return to Kano five years later, the previous emir having been removed and replaced by another of Lugard's choice. Miller was very anxious to seize this chance, but since CMS headquarters felt that they could not

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1. Graham, op. cit., p.34.
expand their activities at the expense of those already embarked upon, he lost the opportunity. Lugard was soon transferred and replaced by Sir Percy Girouard who was even less sympathetic to missionaries. The firm establishment of mission activities, and their schools, was therefore delayed for several years.

The policies adopted by Girouard reflected a concern prominent in official thinking. Because of his previous service in the Sudan, he was particularly sensitive to the dangers of a Mahdist uprising. He therefore stated in 1907 that "It appears advisable to educate Mohammedans along their own lines, and compulsory attendance at a Christian school is inconceivable and might prove disastrous." It is ironic that he should have continued, "It is, moreover, in opposition to the promises of my predecessor", since, as we have noted, Lugard himself was at this time inclined to relax restrictions.

Girouard was not, of course, acting in isolation. He had to rely heavily on the advice of his subordinates, the majority of whom had considerably more experience of the country and who were better able to assess each situation in their own areas. It was only seven years since the British had assumed responsibility for the protectorate, and only four since the 'pacification' of Kano. The government was very short of finance and administrative staff.

1. Ayandele, op.cit., p.142.
2. Northern Nigeria, Reports, op.cit., 1907-08, p.646.
3. See Chapter I, Section 1.i.
4. Kano province was particularly short staffed at this time. It covered a very large area, and included Kano, Hadejia, Gumel, Kazaure, Daura, Katsina, Dambam, Katagum, Misau and Jama'are Emirates. In the early days, provinces were allocated equal numbers of political staff regardless of their size - a policy greatly to Kano's disadvantage. There were only three political staff in 1903. By 1907 they had increased to twelve but there were usually only six or seven on the job at any one time. Nor did the Nigerian political service, unlike its Indian counterpart, make extensive use of 'native clerks' to assist Europeans. See Hill, Population, Prosperity and Poverty, op.cit., p.28.
was introducing a system of administration completely alien to that in existence, and had no clear brief from the Colonial Office in London. It was true of all Lugard's successors that they were unable to command the same prestige and so had to accede to greater leeway for local officers, but this was especially true of Girouard who was a railway engineer brought to the country in particular for that reason. He had no great knowledge of political matters, particularly in Muslim areas, and was kept so busy with his railway that he did not in fact visit Kano until 1908 when what he found came very much as a revelation. The Resident in Kano, Major A. Festing, had experience beginning before the British undertook responsibility for the territory, having previously served with the Royal Niger Company, so it was to him that Girouard turned for much advice.

In 1907 Festing had begun experiments in education by attempting instruction in the arts of iron and leather work, brickmaking and mule breeding. In this, however, he made little headway, finding that "a passive, yet stubborn, resistance met all his innovations....His suggestions met with polite agreement and were tacitly ignored." Perhaps this is not surprising in view of the force the British had used to exert control over the region. The Emirs of Zaria, Bauchi and Yola had been deposed in

1. Lady Lugard (A Tropical Dependency, J. Nisbet, London, 1905, pp.418-9) commented on this and suggested, "if the wishes of the Government and country had to be condensed into one phrase of instruction to the High Commissioner, they would perhaps best have been rendered by the words, 'Go Slow!'."
3. Hill, Population, Prosperity and Poverty, op.cit., p.28. She also points out that Lugard's "unfortunate choice" of Zungeru as a capital town contributed to Girouard's lack of knowledge of the far north because it was right outside Hausaland. The capital was later moved to Kaduna.
1903; the Emir of Abuja and the Sultan of Sokoto had been killed; and the Emir of Kano who had been deposed in 1903 had subsequently been arrested. Further north, the Emir of Katsina had been deposed in 1906, and the Emir of Hadejia with some of his followers had been killed.1 When one adds the fact that the emirs still expected the British to leave again, it is hardly surprising that their activities received no more than cautious cooperation. The Hausa in any case were already highly skilled in the arts of iron and leather work and in the construction of complex buildings in the traditional style, and so had little need for Festing's tuition. Further, in view of the acute shortage of staff, it is unlikely that Festing himself devoted much time or energy to the experiment. For all these reasons, therefore, the first official's attempt at educational provision in Kano had little impact.

Girouard's policies thus continued the slow and careful example of his predecessor. On Festing's advice he decided against permitting missionary expansion: a policy which was later attacked as facilitating the spread of Islam.2 Instead, Girouard turned to a political officer serving in Bornu Province named Hanns Vischer who had a good reputation and was familiar with the Kanuri, Arabic, Hausa and Fulani languages. It was he who finally began the formation of an official education policy for the North almost a decade after the British had declared themselves responsible for the territory (and, as it happened, only 50 years before they relinquished it).


From Vischer to the Unification: 1909-1929.

Vischer was of Swiss origin, but had adopted British nationality in 1903. His acquaintance with Nigeria had begun when he was sent there as a missionary in 1900, though he resigned in favour of an administrative career two years later. He was particularly suited to his new assignment because his knowledge of Arabic made him more acceptable to the Muslims and because he had a "sympathetic insight into African minds." In the event, Vischer acquired such popularity that he earned the nickname of 'Dan Hausa' ('Son of Hausa'): a name that carried with it a high degree of respect.

Before Vischer actually began his work of policy formation, he was sent on a tour of observation in Egypt, the Sudan, the Gold Coast and Southern Nigeria. In this respect late development was an advantage to Northern Nigeria, for it was able to benefit from the experience of others. Vischer was unimpressed by what he saw in Southern Nigeria, finding the curriculum of the mission schools inappropriate and the standard of the Lagos Muslim school very low. He determined that these mistakes should be avoided: that the Northern schools should be well grounded in the culture of the people. This is a theme which has recurred in policy discussions throughout the century, and remains an important issue.

After consideration, Vischer decided that Kano would be the best centre of operation. In this his reasoning was similar to Miller's, and he felt that it would be a good centre from which to expand throughout the North once operations were established. Thus, Kano spearheaded educational development for a few years. As will become apparent, this did not last long since progress was soon interrupted and the province gained a reputation as the most backward and problematic.

Vischer began in 1909 with a teacher-training class

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of 12 pupils. It was established at Nassarawa, just outside the city walls, and neighbouring emirs were requested to send pupils. The early months were not easy, for the first four students from Sokoto included one with a history of mental trouble and the others were poor malams, living on the patronage of less literate but wealthy people. Vischer's wife described the problem that "deep in the hearts of the black men there was a conflict between fear, curiosity and contempt. They did not understand the end the white man had in view and so they had a suspicion that he was seeking his own benefit and was not quite honest." But once initial suspicion waned, the number of pupils, all of whom were taught by Vischer alone, increased to 35 in March 1910, and exceeded 100 at the end of the year.

The second school was a primary one for the sons of chiefs, and was opened in 1910. It also was subject to much initial misunderstanding and again the emirs were unwilling to send their children. In Dambam and Jama'are emirates, the children were not expected to be seen again so that they left home amidst much weeping and their return for the holidays a few months later caused a sensation. One ironic result of the emirs' suspicion was that some decided to send their slaves' children to school rather than their own, which in later years caused a reversal of positions of authority. Two people of slave families who gained an education in this way were Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, who became Nigeria's first Prime Minister,

2. The terminology, whereby the sons of chiefs attended a primary school while the artisans and poorer strata attended elementary schools, provides an interesting reflection both of the social attitudes of the colonial authorities and the influence of the English educational system from which these terms were borrowed.
and Alhaji Maitama Sule, who later became a Kano State and a Federal Commissioner. Once established, however, the sons-of-chiefs' school also grew fast. By March 1910 there were 31 pupils aged five to twenty six, and by the end of the following year, 97. The staff consisted of Vischer and three malams.

Finance for the schools came partly from the Beit-el-Mal (Kano Native Treasury), and partly from fees of £5 per annum. Every possible concession was made to religion, there being no school on either Fridays or Sundays, and holidays coinciding with the major religious festivals. Such was the strength of Vischer's convictions that not only was a mosque built at a cost of £60 to the government, but he himself paid from his own pocket for the services of an Imam. Pupils were permitted to bring their own wives and attendants, and to live in separate compounds. Furnishings were also adapted to the local environment: the desks, for example, were only two feet high so that pupils could sit on the floor in traditional fashion. Care was also taken to include both practical and academic work in the curriculum, and the schools had their own farm, a market and a hospital. In many ways, although the schools experienced difficulty after Vischer's departure, it was a model of which modern educationalists would be envious, firmly grounded in the traditions of the community yet introducing new skills and attitudes. The contrast is sharp between Vischer's schools and those erected for UPE in the 1970's, and the planners of the present could do well to examine the models of the past.

1. C.S. Whitaker, The Politics of Tradition, Princeton, New Jersey, 1970, p.339. Ado Mohammed Sule ('The Administration of Primary Schools in Gumel Emirate 1930-1974', P.G.D.E. dissertation, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 1974) also points out that "one can see by their names that of all these pupils selected in the area [Gumel], none of them comes from the ruling family as the school was intended."

Within a year, Vischer had opened an elementary school which soon outgrew that for the sons of chiefs. It was open to apprentices and anyone else able to pay the fees of 1/- to 2/6d per month, plus materials. Since these pupils were unlikely to continue with their schooling, the syllabus was more simple and concentrated on the three R's and hygiene. In its four classes, the age ranged from six to forty.

Vischer was very pleased with progress and reported: "The most encouraging part of the work is the natives' ready response to our efforts, and this fact, I think, justifies our highest hopes for the future. The arrival of almajirai (young Mallam students) from outlying districts, and the desire for schools expressed by the Emirs, indicate a real demand for a further extension of our work." He was aware that he had not imparted much knowledge to his pupils. But he felt then and later when in 1919 Lugard complained that not a single clerk or artisan had been produced for government service, that this consideration was far outweighed by the general confidence the people had placed in him.

Soon Vischer opened two more institutions: a technical school of four classes to provide training in carpentry, blacksmithing, leatherwork and embroidery, and a secondary school at which was taught some English. Thus by 1912 he was running no less than eight bodies: two elementary schools, one primary and one secondary school, one teachers' college, a survey class, a workshop and 30 acres of farm on which instruction ranged from groundnut cultivation to ostrich husbandry. The pupils came from all of the Northern Provinces, the registers for the end of 1913 showing Kano to have 59 pupils out of the total 209.

1. Northern Nigeria, Reports, op.cit., 1911, pp.761-2. The section in brackets (and spelling of Mallam) is from this source.

2. Command 468, p.64, quoted in Graham, op.cit., p.137. In this remark he is distinguishing the central government from the Native Administration which, together with the teaching profession, employed most school graduates.
The next step in the scheme was the establishment of similar schools throughout the Protectorate. Aiming at one school for each province, Vischer began with elementary and primary schools in Sokoto, Bida and Zaria and a technical college in Katsina; and their popularity was such that he received requests from Birnin Kebbi, Argungu, Ilorin and Bornu. The Nassarawa school became Kano Provincial School and occupied new buildings inside the city with sixteen classes of fifteen pupils each.

Throughout this period, the CMS had continued with their applications for a base in Kano. Having been disappointed in Girouard's extension of the policies of his predecessor, they renewed hope when he was replaced in 1909 by Sir Henry Hesketh Bell. But once again they were disappointed, for at first Bell refused all permission and finally only gave a limited opening. This was in 1912, when the CMS were allowed to establish a school and a bookshop in the Sabon Gari, or New Town, three miles outside the city walls. They regarded this as second best since three miles was a long way to entice a casual enquirer into the Christian religion, but as they were allowed to visit the city with the consent of the Resident, they decided to proceed so long as it would not prejudice the question of another station inside the city at a future date. At this period began development of that part of the town which is today predominantly Christian and inhabited by Southern Nigerians.

By 1912 the antipathy which the administration felt for mission education arose not so much from the fear of a jihad as from concern to avoid incidents which might turn Native Administration officials away from their increasing cooperation towards stubborn apathy. Thus when in the same year Lugard returned to prepare for the unification of the Southern and Northern Protectorates, which he achieved in 1914, the CMS felt it worth approaching him again.

However, Lugard could not operate without heed to the opinions of his officers, and government-mission relations were particularly strained at that time by an incident at
Bida involving a malam who had attended the CMS school, left at the Resident's suggestion to train in Vischer's school at Kano, and returned to open his own elementary school under the Native Administration (N.A.). The CMS had therefore to remain content with the Sabon Gari site, for Lugard reported that "high officials had represented strongly that the present was not the time to start mission work in or out of Kano."2

During his time away, however, Lugard's own ideas had evolved. Margery Perham has noted that "In the field of education the Colonial Office assumed that Lugard, the soldier-explorer, would recognise his own incompetence. They fervently hoped that he would. They were wrong."3 They were wrong because by this time Lugard had developed much greater interest and experience in education which he regarded as the subject "the most important both at home and in our colonies."4

As soon as he returned, therefore, Lugard took charge of the system. The imbalance of educational development was becoming increasingly evident, for in 1913 the primary

1. A confusing situation sometimes occurs since the initials N.A. stand for both Native Administration and Native Authority. The former may be defined as those "administrative and/or financial units with a definite identity and functions essential to the workings of the whole system" (Sir Sidney Phillipson, Administrative and Financial Procedure under the New Constitution: Financial Relations, Lagos, 1946, para. 48), while the latter refers to those offices constituted under the Native Authority Law, 1954. Initials will not be used in the thesis where they might cause confusion. For further clarification, see A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, The Principals of Native Administration in Nigeria, Oxford University Press, 1965, p.30.


enrolment in the South was 35,716 compared with 1,131 in the North with its slightly higher population, and the South had 11 secondary schools in 1914, whilst the North had none. Lugard therefore introduced an education code in 1916 to encourage expansion, strengthen government control, provide more grants for the missions, improve aspects of religious and moral training, and establish a better inspectorate. He also attempted to amalgamate the Northern and Southern Education Departments so that the North could enjoy some of the revenues available to the South, and the South could benefit from the system of local government devised in the North. In this however he was not successful, and the unification did not actually take place until 1929, by which time Lugard had long since departed.

All Lugard's plans were severely interrupted by the outbreak of war in 1914. This greatly reduced the funds available and called away administrative officers. Among them was Vischer, who was never to return to his work in Kano. Thus he only spent five years forming policy and setting up schools, albeit five years of great significance.

When the war ended, expansion was once again possible and a major forward step was made with the foundation in 1921 of Katsina Teachers' College. This institution filled a great gap in providing a higher level of teacher training, for while the malams trained in Vischer's college did much work starting their own elementary schools, it was not long before they had taught their pupils all they knew themselves. Katsina College also produced a large number of early Northern leaders, the most important of whom were Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello (the first Northern Premier), and lesser figures in Kano.  

1. Fafunwa, op.cit., p.110. Evidently Vischer's secondary school did not last long for it is not mentioned here and the oldest secondary school in Kano today dates its origin from 1930.  

2. See Paden, op.cit., pp.419, 422.
The 1920's also witnessed a change of emphasis and concern in Britain over education in its colonies. This was characterised by the two Phelps-Stokes reports of 1922 and 1925. Their main theme, to which official recognition was given in a 1925 memorandum on Educational Policy in British Tropical Africa, was that the majority of institutions were producing too many young men whose training was unsuitable. The curriculum, it was suggested, should be more closely related to the environment and have a greater vocational content.

In Kano, however, the pace of educational development had been so slow that the administration probably viewed the new policy with little more than wry amusement. In Kano Emirate there were only two schools: in Hadejia there was only one, and in Gumel and Kazaure there was none. Most of Vischer's schools, and particularly that for sons of chiefs, had been closed down. It was, moreover, only five years since the Governor, Sir Hugh Clifford, had lamented:

...after two decades of British occupation, the Northern provinces have not yet produced a single Native of these provinces who is sufficiently educated to enable him to fill the most minor post in the office of any government department.

Certainly official attitudes remained conservative despite the memoranda issued in London, for although three


2. In 1926, Kano Province was reduced to include only five emirates (Kano, Hadejia, Gumel, Kazaure and Daura) instead of ten. In a further reorganisation in 1934, Daura Emirate was combined with Katsina to form a new province. Since then, including at the time of creation of states in 1967, the boundaries have remained unchanged.

3. Quoted in Coleman, op.cit., p.140.
more schools were opened in 1928, the Kano Provincial Education Officer required in the same year that:

Students ... should as a rule follow in the occupation for which they were destined. The standard should be low so that the boys will not be alienated from their friends and parents by too great a sense of superiority. After a generation or more, the standard might be raised. 2

This gradualist approach was criticised by Fraser, Principal of Achimota College in the Gold Coast. In a 1927 report, he wrote that "It is hardly too much to say that there is no tackling of the educational problem in the North, and little thinking on it.... In the North, education has no outlook beyond the present." He also pointed out that of the very few children in school, all those in the highest class were not even Northerners. This was illustrated in Kano by the fact that only one of the four schools existing in 1928 was in the old city. The others were in the Sabon Gari and were predominantly occupied by Southerners. This has been another feature of the system which has existed until the present. The authorities attempt to limit the dominance of Southerners in the schools by giving preference to Northerners, but this raises problems for the maintenance of standards and political equality.

Fraser was also very critical about the lack of provision, or of plans for provision, of education for girls,

1. Two schools were opened in Sabon Gari, and one in Kazaure. Gumel had no school until 1930.
2. Quoted in Coleman, op. cit., p.139.
4. For example, enrolments as a percentage of the appropriate age group attending schools in 1963 were recorded as Kano City, 5%; Sabon Gari, 98% (Trevallion, op.cit., p.73).
and of the teaching methods which were "reminiscent of the dull repetition methods of Koranic or pundit schools."¹

In the event, little official recognition was paid to the report, possibly because it raised considerable indignation, and it was never published.²

iii. A Unitary Education Department: 1929-1954

The Education Departments of Northern and Southern Nigeria were finally united under the directorship of E.R.J. Hussey in 1929. Hussey introduced a number of reforms superficially in harmony with the Phelps-Stokes recommendations about developing Africans "along their own lines." Ironically, however they were interpreted by the increasingly vocal Nigerian nationalists not as improvements but as deliberate attempts to limit the levels of African advancement.³ In any case, with the onset of the Depression, stringent expenditure cuts had to be made. Despite the fact that the 1926 Education Code had envisaged considerable increases in grants-in-aid, expenditure fell from £281,000 in 1930-31 to £225,000 in 1934-35 and with the exception of one year was not to reach its former

1. Quoted in Ward, op.cit., p.223. Fafunwa (op.cit., p.83) has made the same point about the early Southern mission schools, which were "similar in content and method to the Qur'anic schools which preceded them. Rote-learning predominated and the teacher taught practically everything from one textbook. The Bible, like the Qur'an, was the master textbook and every subject, no matter how remote, had to be connected in some way with the holy writ." This analysis would not greatly have pleased the missionaries, who prided themselves on their introduction of 'civilisation' and progress.

2. R.L. Buell, an American, published a major work in 1928 (The Native Problem in Africa, 2 vols., Macmillan, New York) which made a very comprehensive survey of the African continent. Perhaps because his criticisms of Northern Nigerian education were more moderate than Fraser's, they were given greater official attention.

3. Abernethy, op.cit., p.94; Coleman, op.cit.,pp.120 ff.
One change introduced by Hussey was the amalgamation of the provincial and craft schools to form middle schools. Later, this was much criticised as having contributed to the paucity of artisans in the province. However, another very important introduction, perhaps made in unacknowledged response to Fraser's criticisms, was the establishment of the first two Girls' Centres in the far North, at Kano and Katsina. Their curriculum was mainly confined to the three R's, hygiene and sewing, but though the schools were much hampered by lack of staff, particularly until the establishment of the Women's Training Centre in Sokoto in 1941, they were a significant innovation and felt to be an initial success. The Kano school, however, remained small for some years, with an enrolment of only 27 in 1933 and 35 in the following year, so that the authorities later had to report of the schools that:

1. Nigeria, Phillipson Report, op.cit., Appendix G. A.R. Allen ('The Effects of the Slump on Education in the Northern Provinces of Nigeria (1929-39)', Savanna, Vol.3, No.2., 1974, p.199) adds the point that shortages of trained staff and of suitable pupils were at least as important constraints as lack of funds, so that the effects of the Depression, per se, were not as great in the North as elsewhere.

2. D.H. Williams (op.cit., p.9) was particularly critical of the change in view of the high standards of workmanship. He mentions the wide range of products in Kano, which included a hand-made set of motor-cycle gear wheels and a trap built in 1917 for the Resident, Bornu, which was driven by him to Khartoum (ibid., p.18). See also Aminu Kano, Intimation No.8, Unakpan Publishers, Ltd., Lagos, 1977, p.9.

3. An attempt had been made to establish a girls' school at Ilorin in 1928, but it was unsuccessful.


After the lapse of more than ten years they remain small in size and mediocre in standard. They are indeed an uneconomic proposition and it is difficult to justify the full employment of a European mistress in a school of some 60 girls at a low standard of work. Of the influence of the old girls of these schools in their own homes one must speak with caution: but in view of the strong backward pull of purdah which these girls suffer after marriage it would be wise not to pitch expectations too high. They depart at the very time when they might begin to benefit from their schooling.

The solution to this, they felt, was to enlarge the schools and teach courses to a higher level.

The reasons why the colonial government were interested in the promotion of girls' education grew, as noted in Chapter One, from the premise that "to educate a woman is to educate the whole home." They argued that in their early years the mother has much more influence on her children than the father, and felt that real reform of society could only come through them. The fact that few of the girls entered formal employment was not an indication of the low value of educational return, for "the value of educated women...will be greater in proportion as the number of them remaining in employment is small", and ensuring the cumulative effect of resources spent now for future generations "is not to be achieved without the education of women."²

No doubt an additional factor in their efforts was the notion of partnership in marriage and "equal rights".

Ironically, the reason the Hausa were unwilling to send their children to school was exactly the same. Those who sent their sons to school accepted that Western-type education was necessary for a fruitful career in the modern world and that it did not represent a threat if kept in perspective by proper Islamic character training. But

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since it was the women who pass on the culture of their society to the next generation, it was all the more important that in them culture should be preserved intact. 1 It is sometimes suggested that education of women is against the tenets of Islam. 2 That this is not strictly true has been demonstrated by a number of authors who usually quote the Koranic injunction, "God will exalt those who believe among you, and those who have knowledge, to high ranks. God is informed of what you do", 3 pointing out that it does not distinguish between men and women. 4 Elsewhere the Koran exhorts, "...say (unto them Oh Mohammed), Are those who know equal to those who do not?" 5 Moreover, Usman dan Fodio, who led the reforming jihad into Hausaland at the beginning of the 19th Century, advocated a much more liberal attitude towards women. 6 He was not merely con-


3. Sura 58, v.11.


6. In Nur al-Alhab, for example (quoted in A.R.I. Doi, 'Islamic Education in Nigeria from the 11th to the 20th Century', paper presented at the First World Conference on Muslim Education, Mecca, 1977, p.6), he strongly condemned as "one of those impious practices" the fact that most of the 'Ulama left their wives and daughters "neglected like animals without teaching them what God enjoins on them regarding their articles of faith, their ablution, their prayers and other things which God commands that they should be taught." He described the practice as "a grievous error and a forbidden innovation", holding that women were being treated like household implements which are used until they are broken and thrown into the rubbish heap." (Ibid.).
cerned with the religious education of women, for in several works he enlarged on the need for women to be well acquainted with commercial regulations and practices: "It is binding upon her to endeavour to know these as it is...to know about other matters pertaining to her religion like ablutions, fasting and praying."¹ He himself took great care to educate his own daughters, sending them out to record the scenes of the jihad and encouraging them to write poetry.

Though the two are difficult to separate, the resistance of the Hausa to education of females is, therefore, a cultural rather than religious phenomenon. Related to it is the practice of seclusion for which a similar practice holds,² and partly for these underlying reasons the colonial government found it extremely difficult to encourage female education.

One should also credit the traditional leaders with considerable perspicacity in their understanding of why the British were so keen to give them and their children this new form of schooling. The colonial government wanted the people, and particularly the ruling classes, to undergo some Western training to improve their performance of traditional roles and to maintain the stability of the hierarchial government. But the Muslim leaders saw the contradictions in this, for the nature of the education was bound (and was intended) to change the recipients' outlook on life, and so by its mere availability could only threaten the stability of society. The colonial officers made no secret of their dislike for "the dreary practice of purdah."³ Nor did they hide their disapproval of girls being married at the age of nine to twelve. From the view-

1. Usman dan Fodio, Ihya al-Sunna wa Ikhmad al-Bidah, quoted ibid..
2. See Chapter VI, Section 1; and Hill, Rural Hausa, op.cit., pp.22 ff.
point of the Hausa, this provided all the more reason why girls should not be sent to the schools, for there they would imbibe ideas which would make them rebel against, and become unacceptable to, their society. Today there are several additional reasons why parents are unwilling to send their daughters to school. Traditionally, as noted in Chapter One, the boys take precedence over the girls in such matters so that resources which are in short supply are used to optimum advantage. If one cannot afford to send all children to school, it makes more sense to send the boys rather than girls since it will be they who will need the qualifications later in order to gain employment. Girls, in any case, are unlikely to spend a great deal of their lives in employment, even if they want to, since at present the opportunities for part-time employment are very limited. Secondly is the consideration that education may make it more difficult for a girl to get married. Many men will avoid selecting an educated wife since they tend to be filled with 'alien' ideas and to be disobedient. Thirdly, it is unfortunately true that parents often do not trust the teachers to behave in a responsible manner with their daughters. 1 This is a matter which will have assumed greater importance with the introduction of UPS since so many of the new teachers are young men who are immature and have little training.

As far as the colonial government was concerned, the administration of the girls' schools in the 1930's and 1940's was hampered by several other problems. The first, as noted, was that enrolments were too low to make the expenditure easily justifiable. Secondly, because the schools were owned by the Native Administrations, access for children from other areas was limited, especially for Christians. The dilemma was especially acute at the Sokoto

Centre since that was seen as the instrument for improving the situation. In 1947 it was decided that Christian girls should be admitted, but then the problem arose that the schools admitted so large a proportion of Southerners that the institutions were impaired in their impact on the Northern peoples.

To some extent the changing emphasis placed on education may be ascribed to the ascent of a new Emir of Kano. Perham tells us that Abbas, who was the brother of the Emir deposed in 1903, "ruled ably until 1919." He was succeeded by his elder brother Usman who was infirm and indecisive. Since this post-war period was also characterised both by a shortage of experienced British officers and by a lack of continuity (at one point there were eight changes of officers in charge within twenty months), the administration regressed into a state of corrupt disarray. This was resolved in 1926 by the death of Usman and his succession by Abdullahi Bayero, son of Abbas, whose reign saw "the development of a reformed and progressive government." The Lady Superintendent of Education certainly felt that her work was facilitated by the new emir, particularly when in 1934 he travelled to England and saw that in elementary schools there, "we practice what we preach." Abdullahi Bayero was also directly responsible for the establishment of the Law School in 1934, having recently visited Khartoum on the way to Mecca. The school, which later became the School of Arabic Studies, provided a specifically Islamic education and was of great importance to the North. The combination of a progressive emir and a

1. Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria, op.cit., p.89. Note, however, that the Sabon Gari schools were not under the direct administration of the N.A. since Maliki Law and other institutions were not applicable to the largely Southern population.
2. Ibid., p.89.
4. See Section 3 of this chapter.
number of enthusiastic colonial staff, facilitated development of all kinds.¹

Until the mid-1930's, educational provision was particularly concentrated in Kano. It has been noted that Gumel had no school until 1930; nor did other parts of Kano Emirate until one was established in Ringim in the same year. Then in an expansionary phase in 1936, others were set up in Gezawa, Danbatta, Kibiya (Rano), Dawakin Kudu and Bebeji (Kiru). Concern began to be voiced over the impact of these schools, and in particular over precisely who was benefitting from them. Thus in 1937 the Kano Superintendent of Education reported an attitude on the part of the peasantry which:

...makes it clear that they regard these schools as institutions for the children of officials with which the less they have to do the better. The reason for this would appear to be the long-standing and rigid division in Kano society between the two classes, and it is hoped to overcome this attitude through the formation of parents' committees which are reported to be working successfully in other Provinces.²

Light may be shed on this matter by a further quote from a later report to the effect that Kano and Sokoto were "full of persons who by Western European standards are only semi-literate, but have yet managed to become very

1. The achievements and character of a large number of colonial officers are discussed extensively in Heussler, op.cit. He makes particular mention of John Hinton Carrow, who served in Kano from 1919 to 1933 and from 1943 to 1946, and whose "forceful personality, long service, and vigorous administrative style made his name almost synonymous with that of the province." (p.133 ff).

wealthy."¹ The government had problems inducing parents to send their children to school because at that time, and still to a large extent today, the path to wealth and influence did not so much lie in education as elsewhere. This was a consequence of the British policy of indirect rule to which they so carefully adhered. As Buell had pointed out in 1927, "While the British government naturally prefers educated to illiterate chiefs, an educated commoner can not, under this system, become a chief."² In other words, the solution to the 'resistance' of the people lay not so much in the formation of parents' committees (which are in any case of limited value in Hausa society because the parents are often not those with the greatest influence over a child's career)³ but with the

1. Northern Region, Annual Education Department Report, 1953-4, p.8. A very prominent example of affluence not being dependent on receipt of Western-type education was Alhaji Alhassan Dantata. Possibly the richest man of any race in the whole of West Africa, J.H. Price noted that in 1954 he could indicate "with a lordly wave of his hand 60 pyramids of last season's groundnuts and say: 'These are all mine.'" He could also dominate the Kano kola market, where over £3 million changed hands each year, and many of the special kola trains from the Western Region ran only for him ('Alhaji Alhassan Dantata - an appreciation', West Africa, 29/9/55, p.1019).

Another example is Alhaji Isiyaku Rabiu, who pursued Koranic studies under his father and other malams, formed a limited company in 1952, and today heads a group of industries with paid-up capital of ₦28.2 million ('Focus on Isiyaku Group of Companies', New Nigerian, 22/2/79).

2. Buell, op.cit., p.717. There were instances in which the British were more concerned to retain power within the ruling classes than were the ruling classes themselves. One occurred in 1937 when the Emir of Hadejia, not a man notable for his 'modern' outlook on life, wished to appoint one Shehu Makama to his council. The Resident in Kano pointed out that the man was an ex-slave and insisted that the post be given to someone from an office-holding family (Heussler, op.cit., p.116). They did, however make some effort at arranging a coincidence of education and hereditary rank so as to avoid a conflict. Thus ten years later (1946) the District Officer in Hadejia actually threatened to withhold N.A. employment from the sons of the Emir unless they agreed to attend school (ibid., p.112).

3. See Chapter VI, Section 1.
introduction of a less hierarchical social structure.

An additional reason why the policy anticipating that commoners would follow the example of the schooled sons of the ruling classes was unsuccessful is provided by Hill's analysis of the political structure of Kano Emirate. She points out that the philosophy of indirect rule was based on assumptions that were not actually justified. Unlike a number of other Northern Nigerian emirates and other colonies, Kano did not have an orderly hierarchy which the British could utilise merely by placing themselves at the apex. The towns of Rano, Birnin Kudu, Dutse and Gaya were 'capitals' of semi autonomous Kano Districts, but there is no evidence that the rulers were capable of dominating the administrative, commercial or agricultural activities of their territories.¹ The Emir himself operated a system of direct rather than indirect rule, so when the British appointed new District Heads, they were "nearly all strangers to their Districts - bureaucrats who had been appointed (without consultation) by outside authority, not chiefs who had risen from the people....They remained aloof from their people (who were indifferent as to whom was appointed), were subject to constant transfer or dismissal, and were altogether uninterested in building up village administration, which remained extremely weak."² In this respect Kano differed from such other territories as Bauchi, Bornu and Sokoto.

Towards the end of the inter-war period the government again demonstrated concern about the low educational provision, especially in the North. This was partly the result


2. Hill, ibid., pp.22-3. Quoting C.L. Temple, the Resident in Kano (p.42), she adds that another indication of the lack of authority was that, with the possible exception of Gaya, taxes were not paid to Village Heads but to "the head of the group of farms in which a man's farm is situated wherever his dwelling may be."
of Nigeria's poor showing relative to other British colonies in Lord Hailey's *African Survey*, which was published in 1938.\(^1\) Finance for education became much more readily available, and expenditure doubled in 1941-42; doubled again in 1948-49; and doubled again in 1950-51. This reflected both the greater emphasis placed on education and post-war prosperity. The British government showed its concern in a 1944 paper entitled *Mass Education in African Society*, and another entitled *Education for Citizenship in Africa* in 1948.\(^2\) They accompanied their new interest with aid, thereby releasing the colonies from the need to be self-financing. This encouraged the Nigerian administration to draw up a number of detailed education plans in 1942, 1945 and 1951, of which parts were even rejected as being insufficiently ambitious.

The problem of the increasing gap between North and South was mentioned in Chapter One.\(^3\) There were also, as shown in Table 2.1, serious imbalances within the North. Although the absolute figures for Kano were impressive, enrolment in government schools lagged behind the other provinces as a proportion of the population. Further, since the table excludes statistics for voluntary agencies, the imbalance was greater than it appeared because of the higher proportion of mission schools in the middle belt. However, the low attendance in government schools is complemented, and partly explained, by enrolments in Islamic schools which in Kano were among the region's highest.

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2. Cited Chapter I, Section 1.1.
3. A further illustration of the North's low educational development lies in the fact that as late as 1951 its 16 million people could point to only one of their number who had obtained a full university degree - and he was a Zaria Fulani convert to Christianity educated in England by Walter Miller (Coleman, op.cit., p.139).
Table 2.1: Educational Enrolments in the Northern Provinces, 1937.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Pop. 1931</th>
<th>Non-Adult</th>
<th>Islamic Schools</th>
<th>Elementary Pupils</th>
<th>Middle Pupils</th>
<th>Total Pupils</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adamawa</td>
<td>191,889</td>
<td>1,535</td>
<td>5,875</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>362,719</td>
<td>4,225</td>
<td>21,772</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benue</td>
<td>389,405</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>5,186</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bornu</td>
<td>389,583</td>
<td>4,231</td>
<td>29,932</td>
<td>903</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilorin</td>
<td>202,919</td>
<td>1,116</td>
<td>15,939</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katsina</td>
<td>173,304</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>4,526</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>672,345</td>
<td>10,421</td>
<td>49,123</td>
<td>1,178</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>137,963</td>
<td>1,124</td>
<td>5,905</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>178,144</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>2,787</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sokoto</td>
<td>676,138</td>
<td>7,168</td>
<td>38,170</td>
<td>2,098</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaria</td>
<td>662,812</td>
<td>5,841</td>
<td>31,470</td>
<td>1,101</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,037,221</td>
<td>36,838</td>
<td>210,285</td>
<td>8,716</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>1,210</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* government schools only.

Note: Daura and Katsina Emirates, formerly in Kano and Zaria Provinces, were combined to form a separate province in 1934. Figures here are adjusted to include both with Zaria.


In the late 1940's another tactic was introduced in the attempt to reduce the educational gap: a compulsory schooling law. It applied only to those pupils who had actually registered, but the penalties for non-attendance were stiff. On the first conviction, parents or guardians were fined 10/- or imprisoned for seven days. Subsequent convictions carried a fine of £1 or imprisonment for 14 days. The law seems harsh, and though it was not rigidly applied, must

1. Provision for Native Authorities to introduce their own compulsion laws was made in the Education Ordinance No.39 of 1948.

2. Sule, op.cit. In Gumel the order was not actually issued until 12/11/1950, though it was backdated to 1944. He claims that it caused a number of parents actually to leave the emirate.
have been seen by the people as disagreeable, if not oppressive. It was resurrected in several areas in 1976 and after to compel parents to send their children to school. The attitude of the government as recorded in its 1951/2 report was that though Native Authorities could invoke the order, they rarely did: "It is, however, useful as a threat if attendance becomes slack, and sometimes is effective. Although occasionally advocated by members of the House of Assembly, Compulsory Education is still only a pious hope in this Region, albeit one which we should not overlook."  

iv. The Build-Up to UPE: 1954-1976

The main factor limiting expansion of the primary sector throughout the 1950's was a lack of trained teachers. Since the ministry was unwilling to countenance a decline in quality, it was prepared to devote money to improvements in existing schools but not to open new ones. To begin with, officials used the positive term of "consolidation" to describe this policy, but in later years admission of difficulties was more open. The 1954 annual report, for example, noted that "Once again in Elementary Education Kano can claim no more than consolidation. No other policy is possible when there are only 58 certified teachers for 63 Native Authority Junior Primary Schools and the ratio of certificated to uncertificated is 1:3."  

Certain districts were particularly problematic. One was Gaya where the school had found it so difficult to attract pupils that it had been closed in 1939 as a warning to others. It had been reopened a few years later, but in 1954 when it was described as "a town of 10,000 inhabitants and last surviving stronghold of ignorance", it was

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1. See Chapter III, Section 1.1 and Chapter VI, Section 2.1.
still as hard as ever to fill one class of 30 pupils. At Kunci, in Bichi District, another school had to close for lack of interest, and it remained difficult to interest Kano students in secondary education. Thus in 1954 there were only 13 boys in Class III of the Junior Secondary School, and of them nine were from Sokoto, three from Zaria and only one from Kano. In 1938 the Kano Senior Education Officer had lamented that among students, "the clerkly attitude still predominates and the suggestion of, say, the army or the police for a career is apt to excite laughter." Fifteen years later the battle still had not been won, for "the offer of salaried employment at the Secondary II level both by commercial firms and certain government departments proves too strong a temptation."

The disinclination of Kano students to persist in their studies was not only accounted for by the balance between demand for employment and supply of school leavers. Also important was the minor importance of education as a determinant of social status. As M.G. Smith has pointed out, occupation tends to be hereditary, sons learning their father's craft or trade during youth. He notes that there are numerous exceptions to this pattern, linked mainly with differences of age, wealth, birth, status, residence and the number of occupations that an individual combines, but education is notably absent from his list even in the mid-1960's.

By 1956, the Kano administration was becoming tired of such jibes from the other provinces as "their recruiting

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1. Nigeria, Annual Reports for the Northern, Western, Eastern Provinces and the Colony, 1939, p.37; Northern Region of Nigeria, Provincial Annual Reports, 1954, p.80.
2. Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, Report on the Education Department, 1938, p.35.
was pitiful”, ¹ or that “In fairness to Northern schools ... it should be recognised that education in parts of Kano Province is in a class of its own.”² In that year, only 1.75% of the 7-11 age group were actually in school - not only a very low proportion, but also much less than any other province. Accordingly, a plan was drawn up to raise enrolment rates to 4.6% by 1966, and increase the annual number of Primary VII leavers from 146 to 600.³ Though

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary Grammar</th>
<th>Secondary Commercial</th>
<th>Secondary Technical</th>
<th>Teachers' Colleges*</th>
<th>Higher Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974/5</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975/6</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* includes Advanced Teachers' Colleges (post-secondary)

N.B.: Because of classificatory changes (see A.R. Allen and W.J. Miller, Education Terminology Guide for Northern Nigeria, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 1965), figures for the early years are approximations introduced for comparative purposes.


this might be considered a very low target, at least there was now progress. One setback arose from realization that the N.A.'s could not afford the £350,000 required, and that expenditure would have to be cut to £200,000. However, the following year the administration reported that it was already ahead of schedule, and in 1958 12 new primary schools were opened, though with recognition that much more was required for a total population of 3,500,000.1

Of even greater significance was the intention, announced in 1959, to launch "Universal Primary Education in Kano City and suburbs" the following year.2 This was the first stage of a new five year programme, and was accompanied by competition from other Native Administrations. Gumel was doing the best, and reports expected it to be the first to achieve UPE in Gumel Town. The rapid expansion of this period is evident from Table 2.2.

The UPE campaign achieved initial success, and was a triumph for cooperation, determination and hard work. Although the plan was only conceived early in 1959, within a year the authorities were able to report an increase from nine N.A. primary schools with 1,760 children to 34 schools with 3,600 children.3 The plan was that 60

1. Northern Region of Nigeria, Provincial Annual Report 1958, op. cit., p.86.
new schools would be opened annually for the next five years until 12,000 children, or 77% of the school aged population, were catered for. Because they applied only to Kano Metropolitan Area, the aims were of course much more modest than those of the 1976 UPE scheme. The objective was also only to enrol the children for the four year junior primary course, though a number of senior primary schools was built to encourage continuity. But the scheme did represent a determined attempt to reverse Kano's reputation as a backward area.

One of the most significant aspects of Kano's scheme was its title, which undoubtedly drew its inspiration from the campaigns in the Western and Eastern Regions. It is ironic that in some ways it was an embarrassment to the Ministry, for it added much force to members of the House of Assembly who wanted a UPE scheme launched throughout the North. In 1960 J.S. Olawoyin, the opposition member for Offa Town, caused much argument with a proposal that UPE be introduced throughout the North with effect from January 1961. "Today children go to school", he said, "free to school, in the Western Region, the Eastern Region, Lagos and even Kano, of all places." Alhaji Isa Kaita, the Minister of Education opposed the introduction of UPE at such an early date for much the same reasons as had his predecessor several years earlier, feeling that it "would mean debasing our hard won standards and betraying future generations by giving them something which could not be called "Education" in any sense of the word", and denying that, in any case, there was such a thing as education which did not have to be paid for by somebody. The Kano project, he emphasised, was an N.A. matter, not a government one. His Ministry paid the normal grants to the N.A. just as it did to all the others, and opposition members could

2. Ibid., p.712.
not imply that Kanot’s decision committed the regional government to the project. The result of the debate was that Olawoyin’s motion was amended so that the House agreed to the need for UPE as a long term objective, but did not commit itself to a date.

Sadly, the next three years showed the Minister’s caution to have been amply justified. The Kano Provincial Report for 1963 brought a note of disillusion with the realisation that:

...numbers of pupils and classes can, at times, be very misleading when assessing the educational effort and efficiency of a Native Administration. This was particularly true of Kano Native Administration which on paper had a large number of classes and students but very little tuition went on. Unprecedented corruption and ineptitude in recent years had, by the beginning of this year, so adversely affected the morale of teachers, pupils and to some extent parents that teachers did little teaching and pupils little or no learning. Absenteeism was as prevalent among the teachers as it was popular with the pupils and their parents - and no one cared. Prodigious sums of money were spent, which found its way into the pockets of those whose duty it was to ensure the efficiency of the educational effort....

The situation was to some extent salvaged by the dismissal of the Councillor of Education and his replacement by a more satisfactory officer. However it was a disappointing setback to the campaign, especially when coupled with an equally disillusioned report on adult education.

Within a fortnight of independence in 1960 the Ashby Report, Investment in Education, which highlighted the role of learning in the developing nation, was submitted. The report emphasised the need for expansion at all levels, and again noted the problems of imbalanced development. It suggested the Northern Region should aim at a primary school enrolment of 25% by 1970. The Northern government demon-

1. Northern Region, Provincial Reports 1963, op.cit., p.86.  
2. See Section 2.
strated its concern by itself suggesting a target of 50%, but this was agreed to be impracticable, and the target was set at 28%. Estimates in the mid-1960's did not quite show Kano at the bottom of the league, though it was not far from it (Table 2.3). They also highlighted the imbalance within the North, though did not go so far as to show the imbalance even within each province.

Table 2.3: Primary School Enrolment Ratios, Northern Provinces, 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ilorin</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benue</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaria</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adamawa</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bornu</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katsina</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabba</td>
<td>44.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sokoto</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


That was dramatically illustrated in the case of Kano Metropolitan Area by the production of a twenty year development plan in 1963. It estimated the primary enrolment rates of the three component parts as:

- City: 5.0%
- Sabon Gari: 98.0%
- Rural Areas (Ungogo & Kumbotso): 2.5%

It was therefore clear that a very large proportion of Kano's school population was not even indigenous, the majority of pupils being Southerners in the Sabon Gari. Statistics produced ten years later showed that this was particularly true of female enrolments, for whereas in 1971 87% of boys in post-primary institutions were of Kano State origin, this applied to only 31% of the girls (and attendance in post-primary bodies in large measure reflects those in primary).

2. Trevallion, op.cit., p.73.
In 1961 another significant report brought new developments. It led to an education law establishing a partnership between the government and the voluntary agencies and to the creation of Local Education Authorities (LEA’s), which in Kano were based on the four emirates, i.e. Kano, Hadejia, Gumel and Kazaure. A decade and a half later the LEA’s were again organised to allow for further expansion of the primary sector, as will be noted in Chapter Three.

The creation of states in 1967 increased Kano's sensitivity about its backward position. Even with the lower 28% enrolment target set by the Northern Region for 1970, achievements were very disappointing. In 1969 the state could report only a 6% enrolment, and the Second Kano State Development Plan set an objective of only 15% by 1975 which was itself subject to a major reform of the financial system.

Meanwhile, the Federal Ministry of Education were also making plans, producing another schedule with the fairly modest target of UPE by 1990. All states were to achieve a minimum enrolment of 30% by 1976; 50% by 1980; 80% by 1985; and 100% by 1990.

With 1973, the school year was changed to cover September to July instead of January to December. Then came Gowon's announcement in January 1974 that UPE would be launched in April of the following year. In a flurry of activity, Kano State presented yet another set of plans, this time sufficiently realistic, however, to note that the enrolment expansion did not match the population increase and that the enrolment ratio had fallen from 11.9% in 1973 to 9.6% in 1973/4. This new schedule aimed for full UPE by 1986. The actual 1975/6 enrolment of 160,340 was not

far short of the target in the most recent schedule (165,738), so in its early stages plan execution was satisfactory. Detailed examination of progress since 1976 is contained in Chapter Three.

This short history of formal education in Kano has noted its late beginning and, despite the concern of many officers, its general lag behind other parts of the country which the UPE programme hopes to reduce. Many of today's problems have been experienced before, and lessons may be learnt from the effectiveness of remedies applied. Of particular significance are students' and parents' perceptions of the role of education, which may differ from those of the government. Unless the former group perceive schooling to be either intrinsically useful or desirable for occupational or social mobility, response to the education programmes is likely to be limited. This has implications as much for the present UPE scheme as it does for the past, for anything more than short term success may ultimately depend on the individual interests of participants rather than on wider goals of requirements for the state and nation. Unless coercion is to be employed, with all the value judgements which that implies, the best strategy seeks coincidence of individual and wider objectives. Whether such coincidence can and does exist in the UPE scheme, and whether significant changes have been made from the experience of the past, are questions this thesis hopes to answer.

From discussion of the history of schooling in Kano, let us turn to the second section of this chapter which examines developments in adult education. This will shed further light on the most suitable overall education strategy in Kano both in the past and today.

2. Adult Education.

One important reason for launching the UPE scheme, as noted in Chapter One, was the elimination of regional education imbalances. The fact that the North decided to con-
centrate on adult education programmes during the 1950's instead of joining the Southern regions in their attempts at UPE was among factors accentuating the imbalances. This provides the first reason why at least a cursory survey of adult education is a necessary prerequisite to discussion of UPE.

A second reason is that even today, many educationists consider adult education a better investment than primary schooling.¹ This is a possibility to which consideration must be given when assessing the opportunity costs of UPE, and on which light will be shed by examination of events up to the present. The most significant campaigns were those of the 1950's; but before embarking on analysis of them, several government and private schemes which had existed for some time must be noted.

1. Adult Education in the 1930's and 1940's

Adult education classes, both during this period and the present, may be either voluntary agency or official ventures. In the former group, of great importance are specifically Islamic classes which are discussed in the third section of this chapter. The first non-official and non-religious class opened in Kano, which was significant as an indigenous innovation, was organised in 1932 by Alhaji Shehu Ahmed, the Madaki of the Emirate Council.² Dominant in organised learning programmes, however, has been the government sector.

The Hausa language may be written either in the Roman or in Arabic script. The latter, referred to as ajami, was in widespread use, for example in writing of court records, until the 1950's. Since the British preferred the

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¹ See, for example, Bown (ed.), op.cit.; Hopkins, op.cit.; and Hall, op.cit..

use of the Roman script, soon after their arrival various efforts were made to promote its use. More structured programmes did not emerge until the mid-1930's, however, when an interested education officer organised some special classes as a "sideline activity" for the judiciary, for government and N.A. police, and for ex-students of the Survey School.

The initial response to these classes, the authorities felt, was encouraging. In 1935, for example, the Kano education officer reported:

An English class is held in the Middle School for the Madaki's, Galadima's and Ma'aji's offices; the Ma'aji himself is in this class, and is making very good progress. Another class is held for teachers-in-training for Village and Head Mallams' classes in the Districts. These classes are held in all Districts for a period of two months.

Instruction was given by elementary school teachers, by literate District Heads' malams where available, and by specially trained temporary staff. At its inception the officer was enthusiastic, stating that at one point there were over 1,000 students. Despite the difficulty of maintaining momentum, attendance remained good for the next few years. The 1936 report, however, regretted that the classes for malams had not caught on in Kano, and that elsewhere the malams went out to seek employment rather than returning to their schools.

To provide an incentive to acquire literacy and to disseminate information, in 1939 a Hausa newspaper was launched. It was called Gaskiya ta fi Kwabo ('Truth is worth more than a Penny'), and remains an important medium today. Even in its launching year, its monthly circulation

1. The Madaki, Galadima and Ma'aji were important officers in the Native Administration.
3. Idem, 1936, p.35.
was said to be 15,000. Like formal education, the response from the towns was much better than from the rural areas, although adult programmes were reported to flourish in most provinces.

The outbreak of war in 1939 placed the need for adult education in a rather different light. This was indicated by the Colonial Office document, Mass Education in African Society, which commented:

The war has forced us...to take a much more comprehensive view of adult education, and to revise our ideas of what can be achieved in a short time in the teaching of adults. There is an admitted difference between propaganda and education. Nevertheless the greater part of war propaganda was carried out in order to educate the people on the causes and events of the war on the one hand, and to impress on them, on the other, that they had a part to play in it, whether by enlisting as a soldier, cultivating more food, using less imported goods, or giving to war funds. The methods used to carry out this propaganda were all those which mass education expects to employ: the Press, pamphlets, posters, cinema, radio and talks. . . . The tangible results...are seen in recruitment, food cultivation and gifts of money - all of which in the African Colonies have been very impressive.

They were as impressive in Kano as elsewhere. A large number of men joined the armed forces, the Emir exhorted his people in the virtues of patriotism, and the farmers responded well to increased food prices. The

2. Ibid., p.5.
4. The resident in his 1939 report (p.38) made the rather curious statement that "Outwardly the outbreak of war has had little effect on the Chiefs and population of Kano. Inwardly they cherish the hope of a quick and sure success for Britain and her allies."
5. This exemplifies the people's ready response to changes they really felt could benefit them. Another is given by Perham (Native Administration, op.cit., p.90) from 1936 in that somewhat unexpectedly, "the first question discussed [in the Emirate Council] is the local effect of England's abandonment of the gold standard, and the traders' manipulation to their own advantage of the fluctuation of prices." It provides further insight into the probability that the main reason for "resistance" to education was that the people considered it of limited usefulness.
increased priority of adult education was also reflected in 1943 by the allocation, for the first time, of a separate section to it in the Education Department annual report.

Some of the war-time interest in adult education was maintained in the immediate post-war period, with further efforts made to organise the sector under a 'Mass Education Officer' in Lagos, appointed in 1946. The Colonial Office had anticipated that many demobilised soldiers would help with and demand more effective programmes.

In the event, though significant developments occurred in the South, the Northern response was mainly limited to two projects. One scheme was a "special drive" in Katsina, launched, significantly, by the Emir in cooperation with his education officer and involving some 20,000 adults. Despite the interest of some traditional rulers, however, it had limited impact. In Kano, though more ex-servicemen had returned to their farms than had been anticipated, there were still many in the town with little hope of employment. But no adult education programme was initiated, probably in part because the administration was so understaffed that for some time it lacked any form of education officer.

Thus although a number of significant developments occurred in the 1930's and adult education became even more important during the war years, the immediate post-war experience in Kano was limited. The government at this time, as it again became during the post-independence years, was much more interested in formal school education and relegated adult learning to second place. In the inter-

1. A particularly notable project was launched at Udi, in the Eastern Region, and followed by many others. See annual Education Department Reports, op. cit., 1945-48.

2. Nigeria, Annual Education Department Report, 1949, op. cit., p.174. The other project was with lepers in Anchau, and was of a rather different nature.

vening decade, the sector received much greater prominence which many observers would like to see revived.

ii. The Yaki da Jahilci Programme of the 1950's.

Perhaps the origin of the Yaki da Jahilci, or Campaign Against Ignorance, lay in the appointment in 1949 of a separate Adult Education Officer for the Northern Region. As we noted in Chapter One, a major objective of the campaign was political preparation for independence and a desire to rectify educational imbalances under which Southern dominance threatened Northern interests.

The campaign was launched in 1952 and had an immediate impact. Some 79,000 adults enrolled in the Region in 1952/3 and 19,000 were awarded certificates. In their enthusiasm, the organisers calculated on the basis of the 1953 census that if they could run 15,000 classes, each completing two sessions annually, then general adult literacy would be achieved throughout the Region within five years. Sadly, as will be seen, this projection was optimistic in the extreme.

In the first year, 45 centres were opened in Kano Emirate and 1,225 pupils enrolled. The first report commended efforts at Dambatta and Ungogo, though criticised progress in several other centres. As with formal education, therefore, progress was not uniform. Further variations were indicated in the three other emirates, for whereas the organiser in Hadejia had begun work without awaiting instructions, no teaching had yet begun in Gumel or Kazaure. Some officers were enthusiastic, and to provide reading material for the new literates, two Hausa newspapers were produced. Colourful stalls were also arranged at the agricultural shows - to the extent that agricultural

1. Nigeria, Northern Region Annual Education Department Report 1952-3, op.cit., p.42.
personnel complained of a literacy propaganda takeover. Yet despite this enthusiasm, Kano's overall achievements in the first half of the decade, as shown in Table 2.4, were very poor in comparison with other provinces. The number of certificates issued in Kano was well below the mean, despite the fact that the province had by far the greatest population.

Table 2.4: Adult Education, Northern Provinces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Population age 14 ('000)</th>
<th>Total Certificates issued 1952, over</th>
<th>Certificates 1954-3/55</th>
<th>Certificates 1955-3/55</th>
<th>Total as % of population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adamawa</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>4,967</td>
<td>8,182</td>
<td>10,865</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>1,041</td>
<td>1,553</td>
<td>1,026</td>
<td>6,491</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benue</td>
<td>1,064</td>
<td>6,333</td>
<td>1,694</td>
<td>5,272</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borno</td>
<td>1,162</td>
<td>1,825</td>
<td>2,465</td>
<td>7,361</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilorin</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>1,425</td>
<td>1,133</td>
<td>3,183</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabba</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>4,696</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>3,973</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>2,485</td>
<td>2,134</td>
<td>3,349</td>
<td>8,549</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katsina</td>
<td>1,089</td>
<td>21,738</td>
<td>7,231</td>
<td>12,892</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>6,988</td>
<td>2,798</td>
<td>7,919</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>1,360</td>
<td>6,345</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sokoto</td>
<td>1,901</td>
<td>11,683</td>
<td>12,049</td>
<td>12,322</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaria</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>2,683</td>
<td>5,356</td>
<td>5,919</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>12,161</td>
<td>66,942</td>
<td>95,510</td>
<td>91,095</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mean</td>
<td>1,013</td>
<td>5,578</td>
<td>7,959</td>
<td>7,591</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Department of Statistics, Population Census of the Northern Region of Nigeria 1952, Lagos, Table 3; Northern Region, Education Department Reports 1954/5 - 1955/6.

The figures are, of course, only rough indications of the success in each province. The ratio of the number of adults enrolled to those who obtained certificates varied widely, both within states and between them. They underestimated the number of people made literate, either directly or indirectly, because while some adults obtained two certificates, more did not bother to take the examination. Others who

1. John Smith, ibid., p.52.
failed at least learnt something, and yet others had been studying privately. Nevertheless, they do provide some idea of Kano’s performance, as does the statement in the 1953/4 Education Report that "Kano is now the only province submitting a 'nil' return" on female enrolments.¹

When in 1955 Kazaure’s pass rate sank to 7% (Gumel stood at 35% and Kano at 16%; no figure was given for Hadejia²), a new strategy was tried. A 10/- cash bonus was paid to each instructor for every man obtaining a certificate. It was so successful that the bonus had to be cut to 5/- for future years, clearly demonstrating the pull of individual financial gain.³

Personalities and cash incentives can explain some variations within and between provinces, but cannot entirely explain Kano’s generally poor performance. In proportional terms the province has always been handicapped by the fact that it has by far the highest population density. An additional problem has lain in the type of instruction provided, and Kano’s long tradition of learning of a different kind. The 1952 census compared literacy in Arabic and Roman scripts, and is summarised in Table 2.5. While Kano may have lagged in the Roman script, the Arabic script was much more widespread than in any other province.⁴ This in turn may be linked to the fact that Kano had the highest percentage of Muslims in the population and almost the lowest Christian (Table 2.6). The latter were more responsive to Western-type education, and it is probable that knowledge

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1. Northern Region, Annual Education Department Report, 1953-4, op.cit., p.33.
4. As noted above, Hausa written in the Arabic script is referred to as ajami. When written in the Roman script it is referred to as boko. An insight into attitudes toward Western values is given by the fact that boko also describes matters considered false or deceitful.
### Table 2.5: Comparative Literacy Figures, Northern Provinces, 1952 *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Literate in Roman Script</th>
<th>% of Pop.</th>
<th>Literate in Arabic Script</th>
<th>% of Pop.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adamawa</td>
<td>18,748</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>38,799</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>18,922</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>79,454</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benue</td>
<td>19,843</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>11,904</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bornu</td>
<td>10,418</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>24,357</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilorin</td>
<td>20,429</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>9,108</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabba</td>
<td>22,768</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>8,361</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>23,405</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>201,044</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katsina</td>
<td>17,015</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>51,996</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>14,774</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>21,092</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>47,941</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>13,879</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sokoto</td>
<td>19,707</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>135,502</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaria</td>
<td>32,151</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>61,573</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>250,707</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>656,259</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* applies to persons only aged seven and over.

Source: Department of Statistics, 1952 Census, Table 7.

### Table 2.6: Number of Recorded African Households in the Northern Region by Religion (1952)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Animist/Others</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adamawa</td>
<td>50,198</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>5,334</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>111,413</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>115,301</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>2,535</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>37,886</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benue</td>
<td>8,602</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>5,605</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>66,894</td>
<td>82.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bornu</td>
<td>230,508</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>1,547</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>44,005</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilorin</td>
<td>20,587</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>1,966</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>10,309</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabba</td>
<td>9,271</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>7,634</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>24,363</td>
<td>59.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>398,809</td>
<td>98.0</td>
<td>1,850</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>8,335</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katsina</td>
<td>187,464</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>1,608</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>8,936</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>27,354</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>1,864</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>33,042</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>28,650</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>15,337</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>74,938</td>
<td>63.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sokoto</td>
<td>246,853</td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td>1,221</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>14,586</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaria</td>
<td>48,759</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>6,182</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>24,464</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,372,556</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>51,683</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>457,191</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Statistics, 1952 Census, Table 8.

of _boko_ literacy was concentrated in this group. The

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1. As Perham noted (Native Administration in Nigeria, op.cit., p.92), "in matters of religion and law Kano is proud to be called conservative." This attitude had an impact in education as well as in other subjects. The influence of Islam is further discussed in Section 3 of this chapter.
figures emphasise the need, when discussing education or literacy, to define the system referred to. That reference in official circles usually applied to Western-type learning, reflected inherent values and limited efforts to make education relevant to the existing society. Unfortunately the same attitudes still predominate today. The government organises no classes to promote the use of ajami, and devotes its energy to the formal Western-type system to the virtual exclusion of the Eastern-type one.

By the mid-1950's, the adult literacy campaign was showing many shortcomings. Smith suggests that at that stage it should have been rationalised with narrower aims and scope. "People who plant saplings in quantity for fear of loss", he feels, "seldom have the courage to cut out the surplus when the time comes."¹ The adult literacy campaign became institutionalised and stale, lingering on after it had outlived its main purpose.

In 1955 the campaign was reorganised, but its scale maintained. The radio had been introduced to serve Kano Metropolitan Area in 1944, and by the mid-1950's was sufficiently widespread to be employed in adult education projects. The majority of districts were also given reading rooms. Table 2.7 shows that with these new efforts, both enrolments and the number of certificates issued rose, and Kano was able to some extent to make up ground lost in relation to other provinces.

Table 2.7: Adult Education Enrolments and Certificates, Kano Province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Enrolments</th>
<th>Certificates Issued</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>38,320</td>
<td>9,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>33,557</td>
<td>10,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>34,003</td>
<td>7,732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>56,738</td>
<td>12,983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>45,950</td>
<td>12,726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>51,363</td>
<td>16,371</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Year beginning 1st April.


¹. John Smith, op.cit., p.51.
It has been claimed that because of the education campaigns, the Northern Region was able to raise its general literacy rate from 7.4% in 1952 to 50% in 1963 while the South remained moored at about 25% throughout. These figures must be treated with caution, and attention should be paid to precisely what the adults learnt. While the number of certificates issued was certainly impressive, the Resident of Kano, for example, noted in 1963 that "one sees no actual improvement in the general standards of literacy, and the benefits derived from this aspect of Government's activities must be, at best, very limited." Nevertheless, it must be noted that for a sustained period of time, adult education during the 1950's received a priority which it has been given neither before nor since. Inevitably there were shortcomings, but much was achieved and many present-day adult educators view the decade with nostalgia.

iii. Adult Education in the Post-Independence Years

In the years since 1960, adult education has received very little emphasis. Partial responsibility for the sector was transferred in 1961 from the Ministry of Education to the Ministry of Information, and the name was changed to 'Waye kan Jama'a', or 'Public Enlightenment'. Throughout the decade literacy class enrolments in Kano remained static in the region of 50,000 adults, of whom about 14,000 received certificates each year. 3

Though at first sight this appears a substantial continuing achievement, the low real priority was illustrated by a total lack of reference to adult education in the 1962-68 Northern development plan. 4

plan (1970-74) merely included it with scholarships/loans and miscellaneous items under the heading of "others", all of which, in the Kano State section, was allocated only 0.5% of the total education vote.1 And the third plan (1975-80) allocated only 0.06% of the federal and 0.7% of the Kano State education budgets to the sector.2 When the third plan came to be revised, two years after its initial launching, Kano's allocation to adult education was actually cut - from N500,000 to N300,000.3 This is a clear case of expenditure on other projects, and particularly UPE, diverting resources from adult education. Moreover, so serious was disinterest that even these meagre resources were not utilised, for during the first two years of the plan period, only N2,000 of the N300,000 was spent.4

Despite these parsimonious allocations, however, several important innovations were witnessed. The first was the establishment in 1971 of the Department of Adult Education and Extension Services at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. Among the projects initiated by this department was an attempt to use television to promote adult education.

1. Nigeria, Second National Development Plan, op. cit., p.243. This figure refers only to the Ministry of Education. However, no other ministry mentioned any other form of structured adult education and Kano's share of the Ministry of Information vote was by far the smallest at £0.03 million (ibid., p.258). Similarly, the only mention of adult education in the Community Development section of the 1970-74 Kano State Development Plan (op. cit., p.50), which provides a more detailed breakdown, was teaching villagers "English, Everyday Science, Tree Planting, Hygiene, etc.", all of which was allocated only £7,000.


The experiment began in 1974 and covered North Central and Kano States. Partly because of its novelty value, initial reports claimed a substantial impact, though the scheme encountered problems of maintenance of equipment and electricity supply, which raise doubts over its viability. A second significant innovation in 1971 was the foundation of the Nigerian National Council for Adult Education. This body provides a forum for discussion and a pressure group for recognition of adult education needs. However, its impact at least in the early years has been limited.

Kano itself has also embarked on a number of schemes. They include a functional literacy project connected with the Kadawa agricultural development scheme, a nine month typing course for primary leavers, and sewing and knitting classes for women. Efforts, however, have been handicapped by inadequate financial and human resources, reflecting the general lack of public and official interest. The Principal Adult Education Officer lamented the difficulties facing him in 1972 which resulted in ineffective programmes. "After three months of opening a class", he said, "one can hardly find up to ten students in that class." Even the Kadawa project suffered from lack of official interest. The instructors complained that they were paid irregularly; primers were badly produced and followed a pattern designed for children rather than adults; literacy was rarely made truly functional or related to the learners' real needs; classes included men over 40 and boys of only 13 who in other circumstances would only have mixed in clearly defined roles as superior and junior but in the literacy sessions were just lumped together as illiterates; and the attitude

3. Quoted in Adamu, op.cit., p.54.
of most supervisors and instructors was not that of co-workers but one of superiority which sometimes verged on disdain.  

The official projects were supplemented by a number of private ones, some of which were grant aided. In 1976, 24 such projects existed, of which nine received grants of ₦144 per class each year. Since the schemes only qualified for grants if a Grade II headmaster (and an NCE if there were over 12 classes) was employed, requirements must be seen as too strict and assistance too meagre for projects to have been greatly encouraged. The place of adult education in relation to UPE was strikingly demonstrated by the experience of the Kofar Nassarawa classes in Kano. In 1977 they were forced to move to Kofar Wambai to make room for an emergency training college, and the latter gave eloquent indication of the resources available by promptly fitting air-conditioning. Nevertheless several adult education schemes run by philanthropic individuals, youth organisations and similar bodies do exist. They represent a very important activity which is sadly neglected. At the post-literacy level, until 1974 no remedial provision at all existed for School Certificate failures. In that year four classes were opened in Hadejia on the initiative of a school principal, and nine more classes were opened in Kano Metropolitan Area in 1976, but the projects still suffer from poor organisation and lack of official interest.

To summarise this section, therefore, adult education in Kano has been sadly neglected since its heyday in the 1950's. In large part this is because education is rarely demanded for its own sake, but more often for the passport to employment which certification provides.

2. Interview, Mal. Na'ibi Wali, Principal Adult Education Officer, Kano State, 15/11/76.
3. Information from J.B. Nichols.
obtained through adult education courses are rarely valuable in the employment market, and are vastly inferior to those acquired through the formal system. It is demonstrable that another significant factor leading to the demise of adult education in the mid and late 1970's was the scale of resources required by UPE. In view of cogent arguments that the success of UPE could be significantly promoted by simultaneous adult education programmes to inform parents of the mechanism and role of schools and to reduce the 'culture clash' of UPS,¹ this is very unfortunate. Such analysis suggests not only that investment policies are failing to secure an optimum rate of return directly from adult education but also that they are failing to maximise returns at other levels.

Official interest in Islamic education, to which we now turn, has also been meagre, and it is regrettable that many similar conclusions apply.

When UPE was launched in 1976, one initial problem was to find sites for new schools.

Plate I: Kano City from Dala Hill.

Plate II: Koranic Scholars with their Boards.
3. Islamic Education.

Islamic education in Northern Nigeria has a much older tradition than its Western counterpart. The two systems are structurally different, and the former places much more emphasis on learning as a sacred duty rather than to obtain or improve employment. "Seek knowledge from the day of your birth up to the day of your death", enjoins the Hadith. "Seeking knowledge is an obligation on every Muslim."1

As we have noted, the widespread existence and deep roots of the Islamic system have influenced the development of the Western system. The feeling that Western-type education is irrelevant to the fundamental requirements of life still exists in many Kano communities, and has important implications for UPE. An ideal form of education in modern Kano might combine the Western and Eastern systems to provide a constructive education grounded in the culture of the people, and avoid the wastage of two systems operating side by side.2 Vischer realised this in 1909, and numerous policy proposals have repeated it since; but actual achievements in such an integration have been limited.

According to the Kano Chronical, Islam was first introduced to Kano by a group of Wangarawa traders during the reign of Ali Yaji (1349-1385).3 Solid foundations are said to have been established during the reign of Mohammed Rumfa (1463-1499), who was converted by a man called Abdu


2. It must be recognised that there are also serious obstacles to integration, one of which would be the existence of a different system of education in other parts of the country. These obstacles are discussed in this section, in Chapter IV, Section 4.vii, and in Peter B. Clarke, 'Islam and Western Education: A Socio-Historical Analysis of a Religious Response to Change', unpublished manuscript, 1979, pp.36-8.

Rahman. Popular legend holds that Rahman had been urged by a vision of the Prophet to proceed on foot from Medina until he found a soil comparable to the one he had left behind. When he reached Kano, he felt he had reached his goal, and immediately built a Friday mosque and tore down the pagan shrines.

For several centuries, acceptance of Islam was far from general and the scholars made little attempt to convert those around them except the kings and courtiers, who sometimes professed a nominal allegiance to the religion. However, the faith was strengthened by the arrival of other scholars, particularly Fulani from the Kingdom of Mali, and by the end of the 17th Century Islamic influence extended as far south as Yorubaland. Madariss (schools of higher Islamic learning) are known to have existed in Kano and Katsina from the beginning of that century.

In the first decade of the 19th Century came the jihad of Usman dan Fodio which reorganised Hausa society and brought to power the Fulani aristocracy. Usman was born in Gobir, to the north of Kano. He became a learned man attracting many students, and was concerned about the impurities he considered had entered the Islamic religion. His jihad, however, was not launched until he reached the age of 60, in the year 1804.1 Usman, as we have noted,2 actively promoted the pursuit of scholarship. Thus when the British colonial administration arrived at the beginning

1. Kano itself was conquered in 1807 and Hadejia a year later, thereby coming under Fulani rule. Gumel, however, lay in the border area between the Sokoto and Bornu Empires, and paid tribute throughout the 19th Century to the Shehu of Bornu. Its emirs today are of Kanuri lineage in contrast to the three other emirates in Kano State. Kazaure Emirate did not exist at the time of the jihad, but was created a few years later by the Sarkin Musulmi to reward one of his followers. See Hogben and Kirk-Greene, op.cit., pp.198,335, 472, 485. For additional information on Hadejia, see Victor N. Low, Three Nigerian Emirates; A Study in Oral History, Northwestern University Press, 1973.

2. See Section 1 of this chapter.
of the 20th Century, it found a well developed education system which had existed for at least three centuries. To understand the benefits and obstacles to present day integration with the Western model, it is necessary to begin with a description of the structure of Islamic education and its place in society.

1. The Traditional System of Islamic Education.

The Islamic system of learning, like its secular counterpart, is arranged in distinct stages with recognised end points. At the elementary level, learning is confined to memorisation of the Koran and knowledge of the accompanying rituals and modes of behaviour. A higher level encompasses more detailed understanding of the Koran together with, among other subjects, philosophy, jurisprudence and often some science. The amount of time devoted to each unit varies widely, depending on the inclinations and abilities of both students and teachers. The highest level of learning usually involves some travelling to seek a particularly learned teacher of each subject.¹

The small Koranic schools, which are the first step on the ladder, are often to be seen grouped in the zaure (entrance hall) of a house, under a tree in the street or round a bonfire in the evening. The size of such schools varies from less than a dozen to over two hundred (see Appendix XII), depending on the size of the community and the reputation of the teacher. The school contains both boys and girls, though they are kept in separate groups and sometimes the girls are taught by an assistant rather than by the malam himself. There are usually many more boys than girls, a common ratio being 2:1.²

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2. See Appendix XII. Jefferson N. Eastmond and Husaini Adamu (The Place of Koranic Schools in the Immediate and Long Range Educational Planning of Northern Nigeria, Ministry of Education, Kaduna, 1955, p.6) put the ratio at 4:1. Even if one accepts this estimate, it is not true to say that girls are or have been neglected. Daphne Glazer, for example, is therefore not justified in stating that "Girls did not often attend Koranic schools" ('Problems of the Education of Girls in Nigeria', Journal of the Institute of Education, University of Hull, No.19, 1977, p.33).
The Koran is divided into 60 sections, or ahzab. They are subdivided into eight further sections, each of which is called a sura. An average pupil will learn half a sura a day and take about five years to complete the whole Koran. Exceptional children can finish in less than two years, though others take eight or nine. The children learn by chanting the phrases after their teacher and then practising to themselves. At this stage they are only taught to recite the Koran, not to understand its meaning. The writing lessons begin when a child has learnt to chant the first ten chapters, the consonants being taught first and the vowel sounds second. The children use a special board and ink traditionally made from plant juices, which is the derivation of the common Hausa name, makarantun allo, or 'board schools'. It is quite common for a malam to have several groups of students at different stages all learning together in the same class.

The teacher in a Koranic school receives a small payment in cash or in kind from each child according to the wealth of his parents. Normally this is five to ten kobo per week, though children from very poor families learn free of charge. The pupils also perform manual tasks for their teacher on his farm or in his household. Usually a child in a rural setting labours harder than his urban counterpart.

There is no essence of compulsion at a Koranic school. A father can send his son on an errand without previously asking the permission of the malam, and there is no fixed time for beginning or ending classes. Since the schools operate in public places, there is much coming and going. The malam may frequently break off to receive the respects of a passer by or to offer counsel. He usually holds two sessions each day; one in the morning and the other in the late afternoon. Sometimes a third evening session is held for pupils unable to attend during the day, and it is therefore possible for a child to attend both a primary and a Koranic school. Classes are held from Saturdays to Wednesdays,
with holidays on Thursdays and Fridays, and the year is divided into two 'terms' separated by approximately three weeks' holiday after each major festival in the Islamic calendar. Rural schools also commonly make a break for the planting and harvesting seasons, and most schools have special holidays when a group of students graduates.

Because accurate surveys have not been made, it is difficult to document the numerical development of Islamic schools. One estimate suggested that in 1921 there were 14,572 schools in Kano Province, with 71,000 pupils. Other estimates varied widely, but it is clear that until the present time there have always been more Koranic schools and pupils than government ones. A survey of traditional Islamic schools conducted in Kano State in 1972 recorded 163,376 pupils in makarantar allo of whom 28% were female. This was nearly twice the population of the government primary schools. However, though many children studied in both systems, only an estimated 30% of the six to twelve age group received an education of one sort or the other, so that in one sense the informal process of education, which is discussed in the last section of this chapter, was more important than either system.

1. Gbademosi, op.cit., p.102. These figures compared with a student population of 309 in five government schools.

2. Lugard in 1900 estimated 20,000 Koranic schools to exist in Northern Nigeria, with 250,000 pupils (Adamu, op.cit., p.55). Official figures for 1913 estimated 19,073 schools with 143,312 pupils (1949 Annual Education Department Report, op.cit., p.8); for 1929 30,303 schools with 381,535 pupils (ibid.,p.10); and for 1935 35,573 schools with 199,374 pupils (1935 Annual Education Department Report, op.cit.,p.13). It is unlikely that pupil enrolments fell so dramatically between 1929 and 1935 as these figures suggest, which indicates that they were probably very rough approximations. An estimate for 1964, broken down by provinces, is shown in Table 2.8.

3. The British Council, Kano, 'Islamic Education in Nigeria' (mimeo), n.d., Appendix I. The average recorded size Koranic schools was 20 pupils, though in the urban districts of Kano Metropolitan Area the schools were about three times the size of rural ones.
The higher schools of learning are referred to as madaris (Arabic) or makarantun ilmi (Hausa). Here the student undertakes several different subjects such as Tafsir (Koranic exegesis), Hadith (the traditions of the Prophet and commentaries on them), Fiqh (Islamic law), Hisab (arithmetic) and Wa'azu (homily). At this level a pupil may attend several different teachers, for each has his own specialities. Most Kano City students have been noted for their concentration less on strict Koranic subjects and more on legal and other studies. This was partly because the reputation for strict Koranic studies has been highest among the Kanuri and so the best teachers of that subject were found in Bornu rather than Hausaland.¹

In a makarantar ilmi, pupils listen to the expositions of a particular malam and periodically recite to him. Lessons, in contrast to the methods preferred by many Western educationists, proceed on the basis of lecture rather than discussion. The curriculum has been rigidly handed down over the centuries, but the system is organisationally flexible. Pupils may attend their teachers more or less as they wish, and may be of any age.

It is also common for pupils at some stage to attach themselves to an almajiri, a wandering teacher.² These malams travel from place to place, particularly during the dry season, teaching and living off alms and the sale of amulets. A particularly learned teacher is given the title of Gwani, while lesser ones are Alaramma. It is a widespread practice for a student who has mastered his studies to receive a written certificate, called an ijaza, which in turn licenses him to teach.³

² For one account of travels with an almajiri, see Mary Smith, Baba of Karo, Faber and Faber, London, 1954, pp.131-4.
³ Note, however, that these certificates are relatively uncommon in Kano (Chamberlin, op.cit., p.159).
Some indication of the numerical strength of each type of school throughout the North in 1964 is shown in Table 2.8. It will be noted that, as we have shown with literacy statistics, in Islamic education Kano occupied a very different place in the league from that taken in Western education. The province had the highest number of ilm students in proportion to the population, and provided almost one third of the total. This reflected its noteworthy specialisation on higher studies, for it came fifth in order of Koranic students. As Paden has pointed out,

Table 2.8: Islamic Schools in Northern Nigeria, 1964.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Population 1963 ('000)</th>
<th>Koranic Schools</th>
<th>Students</th>
<th>% of pop.</th>
<th>ILM Schools</th>
<th>Students</th>
<th>% of pop.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adamawa</td>
<td>1,585</td>
<td>902</td>
<td>9,744</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>2,476</td>
<td>2,062</td>
<td>29,049</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>1,792</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benue</td>
<td>2,642</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>11,491</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borno</td>
<td>2,854</td>
<td>4,263</td>
<td>47,580</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>4,514</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katsina</td>
<td>2,545</td>
<td>4,553</td>
<td>62,763</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>4,088</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1,399</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>12,629</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>1,567</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>8,688</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sardauna</td>
<td>878</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>7,063</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1,609</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sokoto</td>
<td>4,335</td>
<td>7,173</td>
<td>114,173</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>8,509</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaria</td>
<td>1,553</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>12,829</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>1,039</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>29,809</td>
<td>27,600</td>
<td>422,954</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2,777</td>
<td>36,419</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


there are many trained malams who do not actually teach, and when older students (almajirai) and active disciples (dalibai) are included in the urban malam class, the total comprises perhaps one-fifth of the adult male population. The majority of these malams reside in Kano City rather than in the rural areas, although there are lesser centres of

2. Ibid., p.60. According to tax reports, malams in Kano City in 1926 constituted 11.54% of all taxpayers. In Kano rural districts in 1955 they comprised only 1.54%. Paden confirmed this with a survey in Bekin Ruwa ward of Kano City, which specialises in Islamic learning and in which teaching malams in 1965 were found to comprise 25% of all compound heads.
Islamic learning, of which Hadejia is a prominent example, throughout the state.

The 1972 survey of Islamic schools recorded 34,293 pupils in 1,630 makarantun ilmi in the state. Like the makarantun allo, the number of pupils greatly exceeded that in the government secondary schools, the population of which reached only 9,084. Since that time the government has embarked on rapid secondary school expansion, again with little attention paid to the importance of this parallel system. This, it might be suggested, represents a continued lost opportunity to evolve a relevant education system out of the traditions of the community, which could both make effective use of existing resources and have a greater impact.

Resistance to Western education by the Muslim peoples of Kano may also be linked to brotherhood affiliations. In this part of West Africa, Muslims belong chiefly to either the Tijaniyya or the Qadiriyya brotherhoods, both of which have witnessed major reform movements since the turn of the century. Kano is the Nigerian centre for both of the reformed brotherhoods, but the majority of the people, as shown below, belong to the Reformed Tijaniyya. The adoption of this movement is linked with Kano's assertion of its independence from Sokoto, which has remained within the Qadiriyya. Kano's original contact with the Tijaniyya came during the first part of the nineteenth Century though its influence at that time was not great. Later, in the early colonial period, contact was renewed; this time with the conversion of Emir Abbas. Since then the movement has increased in importance, particularly under the leadership of Ibrahim Niass, a sheikh from Senegal, who was responsible for its reformation. A survey of affiliations in Kano City in the mid-1960's revealed the following:

1. The British Council, op.cit., Appendix I.
3. Paden, op.cit., p.70.
The importance of these affiliations to education lies in the resistance which reformed Tijaniyya leaders have advocated to Western-type learning. Ibrahim Niass, in particular, addressed the Kano community in the early 1960's with the words:

We must stick to knowledge concerning Islam.... Western civilisation is doing more harm than good and might destroy our spiritual beliefs in the very near future. We must not follow [the West] for if we do we shall be led astray and find ourselves among the insignificant people....

Niass himself suggested Arabic, rather than French or English, as the medium of instruction for both modern and traditional types of education, even though he himself is fluent in French. The Reformed Tijani leadership did, however, give support to the Northern Muslim Congress which was established in Kano in 1950 for the purpose of setting up modernised Islamiyya schools. This important development is discussed below in connection with the work of Aminu Kane.

Possibly a further factor which may explain the resistance of the Kano community to Western-type schooling arose from doctrinal differences with the Ahmadiyya movement. The Ahmadiyya sect was founded in the Punjab at the end of the last century by a sheikh named Ghulam Ahmad. Its adherents profess a number of beliefs which orthodox Muslims regard as heresies. The first of these is that Ahmad was...

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1. Ibrahim Niass, Mass al-kalima (Text of Address), Gaskiya Corporation, Zaria, 1952, pp.5-7, quoted ibid., p.140.
a prophet—a claim intolerable to the orthodox who hold that Mohammed was the last of the prophets. Worse than this claim was another that Ahmad was the promised messiah, the second coming of Jesus. His third claim to be the Mahdi was not in itself so important: Mahdis come and go. It did, however, have significance in the political setting of the time since he also claimed to be a peaceful Mahdi: that jihad was not a part of true Islam. Since at the time Ahmad made this claim there were many still alive who had fought in the Indian Mutiny, Ahmad was widely considered a puppet of the British, and therefore particularly objectionable.

The movement arrived in West Africa in the 1920's and has particularly flourished among the Yoruba with the assistance of missionaries from India and Pakistan. From the first, the movement has engaged itself in the establishment of schools for much the same reasons, and along the same lines, as the Christian missionaries. Permission to establish the first school in Kano, which received the strong support of the Resident, was given in 1922.

1. Indeed there were strong links between the Tijaniyya and Mahdist traditions. It has been suggested that the rapid rise of Muslim leadership can be attributed to the fact that he possessed certain of the pre-ordained requirements of the Mahdi. Though less frequent in the 20th Century, Clarke shows that Mahdist uprisings, with their anti-colonial overtones which included opposition to Western-type education, continued. Two took place in 1927, for example, one at Tassawa, 60 miles north-east of Kano in the former French Sudan, and the other at Minna. For further discussion, see Clarke, 'Islam and Western Education', op. cit., pp.24-32.


3. A.R. Naggar, from the Ahmadiyya Mission wrote to Arnett, the Resident in Kano, requesting land for a school and a mosque. The latter replied, "I can grant you a plot in Sabongari without formal application. The plots are 50 feet wide by 100 feet long. As you propose to have a school and eventually a mosque I should recommend you to take a double plot." (Arnett Papers: Mss Afr. 952, Box 2 - 2/2 ff1-156, Rhodes House Library, Oxford).
and secular subjects were taught, and the movement later ventured into post-primary education. Until the late 1950's, indigenous Muslims were little affected by evangelical activities, and most Ahmadiyya members in Kano were Yoruba 'immigrants'. With the arrival in 1958 of a particularly enthusiastic evangelist, however, large numbers of non-Yoruba suddenly began to join the movement. This caused a tense atmosphere, particularly because of the activities of the two political parties, the Northern Elements Progressive Union and the Northern Peoples' Congress, membership of which was strongly linked to religious affiliation. It seems likely that Ibrahim Nias's exhortation noted above, and general attitudes of rejection of Western-type schooling by the orthodox community at this time were linked with rivalries between the Ahmadiyya and other bodies. When, twenty years later, the orthodox community discussed the possibility of opening a Western-type Muslim secondary school, it was referred to as the first such institution in the state, despite the fact that the Ahmadiyya had been running a flourishing secondary school since 1970. This illustrated the rift between the two groups, and the fact that the orthodox do not regard the Ahmadiyya as Muslims at all. The expansion of Western-type Islamic schools by the majority orthodox communities, both at the primary and post-primary levels, is an important topic, to which we turn in the second part of this section.

ii. Efforts to Modernise the Islamic System

The advantages of using the pre-existing Koranic school structure as a base for development of a modern system were noted from the beginning of colonial rule. It was argued that under such a policy, employing the teachers' maxim of "moving from familiar to unfamiliar", the new subjects and

methods would be more easily accepted and assimilated. The policy would also be economical, avoiding the wastage from two systems operating side by side. This was particularly important before the 1940's, when all British colonies had to be self-supporting, but, whilst several obstacles must be recognised, it remains a noteworthy consideration today in the era of the 'oil boom'.

Actual integration of the two systems, however, has been very limited. The administration, up to the present, has been much more concerned with establishing its own formal system and then making half-hearted efforts to interest Muslim communities in joining, than in evolving a single system out of the one which existed first. Hubbard has pointed out that the early administrators were very cautious, and in many ways ambivalent in their attitudes to Islam. Despite the long and notable tradition of study of local institutions, both Government and individuals' actual knowledge of Islam remained very sketchy. To illustrate this, he points to the inaccuracy of enumeration of Islamic schools in the Education Department Reports, which claimed, for example, that between 1928 and 1929 the number of schools fell by 5% while enrolments decreased by an improbable 35%. A later example of inaccuracy is given by the disparity between the two figures previously quoted for Kano State in 1972 and Kano Province (with the same boundaries) in 1964. It is most unlikely that the number of makarantun allo increased from 5,215 to 8,119 and their population from 87,137 to 163,376. Indeed popular opinion among the inhabitants of Kano is that, under the impact of Western education and values, they have not increased at all.

That there were some early attempts to integrate and build on the pre-existing structures was noted above in connection with Vischer's schools. Other efforts were

2. Chamberlin, op.cit., p.145. For the Zaria Community, see M.G. Smith, The Economy of the Hausa Communities of Zaria, op.cit., p.99.
made to offer optional Arabic classes after school hours in most primary and some elementary schools between 1915 and 1930. In Bornu Province, Arabic became a major part of the curriculum and in some schools could be taken as an option instead of English. And in 1927 at Jere'e, in an Arabic speaking part of the same province, the Education Department succeeded in persuading a malam to add secular subjects to his curriculum, thereby effectively converting his Koranic school into an elementary one. This was followed three years later by the introduction of one year courses for malams in at least five provincial headquarters.1

However, with the amalgamation of the Education Departments, the North had to accede to many Southern wishes. One of these was the institution in 1931 of a standard school year based on the Gregorian calendar, and another was the introduction of compulsory English in all middle schools. They did make an exception to the calendar change in deference to a protest from the Shehu of Bornu, but by and large the North lost much of its autonomy. Perham provides an example specific to Kano which illustrates this. When in the mid-1930's the Emir of Kano volunteered a remonstrance against the government schools being kept open during Ramadan when the boys could not eat or drink during the day-time, the Resident promised to discuss the matter with his Education Officers but did not hold out much hope of concession.2 By 1936 the option to concentrate on Arabic in middle schools had disappeared and the Jere'e school had collapsed. In some ways this reflects a conflict which has recurred in language policy discussions in the 1970's. The special classes for malams were also considered unsuccessful since in those areas in which there had been any response at all, the malams dispersed to look for employment at the end of their course instead of returning to their schools,3 and in this also there is a precursor of problems

1. Hubbard, op.cit., p.158.
still faced today. Thus despite the volume of discussion, very few proposals were actually implemented, and of those advances which were made, very few survived to the end of the inter-war period.

The post-war period, however, brought new developments. It saw the foundation of a nationalist movement among educated Nigerians, and with it a desire from a different quarter to modernise the traditional education system. One important figure was Aminu Kano, who attempted to form a Northern Moslem Congress for this purpose. He set out to prove that any five year old child educated by modern methods could in one year recite the Koran better, and learn more Arabic, than a similar child in an old-style school could in five years. He began with 30 children in 1950, and enrolments soon doubled. In the second year he introduced the three R's alongside more Koranic teaching, thereby making it unnecessary to transfer the child to an elementary school. The school was a great success, no doubt at least in part because of the need Aminu felt for it to be proved viable. The education officer who visited the school was also impressed, and within a year ten similar schools were established in Kano, Kaduna, Jos and other centres.

Unfortunately the reason for the initial establishment of these schools also became the cause of their downfall, for over the next few years the authorities and various partisan groups recognised their political overtones and

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2. Alhaji Baffa Wakili also started an Islamiyya school at this time, which later became the Yolawa Union School (see below and Chapter IV, Section 4.vi). He claims, however, that though he was aware of Aminu's activities, he was in no way influenced by them, and had made his plan before Aminu returned from Maru in 1949. (Shehu Usman Is'haku, 'The Effectiveness of Islamiyya Schools in Kano Municipality', B.A. (Ed) dissertation, Bayero University, Kano, 1978, p.13).
took their existence as a challenge. During and after the 1951 elections, opponents in Kano assaulted some of the teachers, broke their signboards, and browbeat one landlord - with the active support of the Emir and the passive support of the British.¹ Only two or three of the schools, which had numbered around 60, survived, and the broad malam support that had been achieved was temporarily destroyed.

The 1960's, however, witnessed a renascence of interest in schools of this type under the leadership of Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Northern Premier. He adopted a strong evangelical line, and sought to avoid brotherhood rivalries by promoting the doctrines of the Usmaniyya, or descendants of Usman dan Fodio. He established a special ministerial committee to consider possibilities of reform, and began by sending a delegation of representatives from each province to examine practices in the United Arab Republic, Libya and the Sudan. Their report recommended that Koranic schools "should be organised into classes in accordance (with) age, year of entry and standard of children", and that learning should be diversified to include arithmetic, reading and writing as well as Koranic study.² Assistance was to be given by specially appointed inspectors, who would also oversee the maintenance of standards.

Because of the premier's interest, for a short time Koranic schools were given some prominence in government programmes. Beginning in 1964, those schools which were approved were given a single initial grant of £150 with which to improve their buildings. They also received a £25 annual recurrent grant, of which £10 was to be paid to the malam as a form of honorarium and the balance set aside to purchase water pots, ink, mats and other materials. The Local Authorities also paid a £3 annual grant to each malam for his services to the community. The only condit-

1. Feinstein; op.cit., p.143. See also Hassan op.cit., pp.178-80.
2. Adamu, op.cit., p.56.
ions were that the schools had to have an existing site and not less than 50 pupils. ¹

Unfortunately, this prominence was shortlived. The premier was assassinated in 1966, and without his leadership little further development has taken place. Though payments still continue, they are at the same rate despite the considerable increase in the cost of living. Since many of the schools are quite large, sometimes with as many as 500 pupils per class, the N50 annual grant can be seen as little more than a token contribution. In the three largest emirates in 1976, only 413 classes are recorded to have received grants which, judging by the 1972 estimate that 8,119 schools existed in the state, was a very small proportion of the total. ²

If we turn to colonial efforts to integrate the Islamic and Western models at the higher level, more successful policies may be discerned. The first institution was the Shahuci Judicial School established in 1928 to broaden the training of employees in the Sharia Court. The same subjects were taught as in the traditional system, but along a more structured pattern. In addition, pupils learnt to write Hausa in the Roman script, arithmetic and a little English. On the Western model, classes were organised according to the pupils' entry date, and each was assigned one particular malam.

The foundation of this school was followed by another at a higher level in 1934. It was initiated by the reigning Emir, Abdullahi Bayero, who had recently visited Khartoum and Cairo on his way to Mecca, and was called the

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² The breakdown of grants for 1976/7 was Kano LEA:331 classes, N16,550; Hadejia LEA:53 classes, N2,650; Gumel LEA:29 classes, N1,450 (Information from Ministry of Education, Kano). No figures for Kazaure were available, though undoubtedly some grants were made.
Law School. Originally it was sited in Katsina because of the city's historic learning tradition, but on the insistence of the emirs and sheikhs, the school was transferred to Kano after only six months. Although it was under the general supervision of the Resident, it enjoyed a high degree of autonomy. Several other provinces later established judicial schools similar to Shahuci in order to provide pupils for the Law School, and since it was the only institution of its kind in West Africa, other students came from Niger, Sierra Leone and The Gambia.  

The first three teachers in the Law School were Sudanese. Especially in its early years, the school was the object of much suspicion on the part of conservative local scholars, who disliked the tables and chairs and considered it an attempt to undermine the orthodoxy of Islam. They particularly disliked the introduction of football, suspecting that the infidels who had brought the game saw the ball as the head of Mohammed. However, some antipathy was reduced by the high standard of Arabic taught, which was promoted by the fact that the Sudanese could speak neither English nor Hausa. The authorities also took pains to invite local malams to participate, and ensured that the curriculum covered the same subjects as makarantun ilmi, though in greater depth. The school conducted a four year course leading to Higher Muslim Studies (HMS) examinations, for which officially recognised certificates were issued.

In 1947 the Law School became the School of Arabic Studies (SAS), and the emphasis changed from exclusively legal matters to include teacher training. This reflected increasing government concern over the quality of Arabic and Islamic Religious Knowledge teaching. The reorganisation was supervised by a new director, C.E.J. Whitting, and whereas previously the majority of pupils had come from provinc-

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2. Ibid., p.24.
ial judicial schools, attendance at a middle school now became the minimum qualification. 1 The SAS training was extended to five years, with a common core for the first four and specialisation in either legal or teacher education in the fifth. In 1954, an additional course for untrained primary teachers was introduced in an effort to raise general educational standards.

With the opening of the Institute of Administration in Zaria as part of the tertiary level expansion of the 1960's, the SAS dropped the legal aspect of its training altogether. The course became similar to that in any other Grade II teachers' college with the exception that Islamic history was substituted for general history, and Arabic for geography. In 1974 a separate part of the school was opened to provide emergency training of teachers for UPE. 2

The Shahuci Judicial School, the Law School and the SAS are further examples of the educational lead Kano in some cases took over the other provinces. However, the impact they had on the traditional system was limited. Chamberlin ascribes this to the restrictions the institutions imposed on scholars' freedom by making them employees. 3 He points out that the schools also removed the malams from their communities and made them less flexible. It is difficult to see how this could have been avoided, and it indicates some constraints which continue to hinder integration today. More important, however, are official attitudes, for a route round many obstacles could be found if the authorities were sufficiently interested.

As part of Ahmadu Bello's reforms introduced in 1964, like the Koranic schools, the makarantun ilmi were also given grants, and, though no compulsion was applied, were

1. After the abolition of middle schools, the minimum requirement became completion of the Primary VII course.
2. See Chapter III, Section 1.ii.
encouraged to include arithmetic, Hausa and English in their curriculum. Initial capital grants were paid at the rate of £150 per classroom building, and recurrent ones at £2 per child or the salaries of qualified teachers, whichever was the less. The schools thus became more formalised on a model similar to that initiated by Aminu Kano, and were known as Islamiyya schools. If they apply for assistance at the present time, they receive 50% of the estimated value of buildings at the time of application, plus 50% of the cost of new buildings. The LEA is willing to supply teachers, and if the school has any trained member of staff an annual recurrent grant of N6 per child is paid. Schools are permitted to raise funds from fees or contributions, and most pupils pay from 25 to 50 kobo per month.

The Islamiyya schools are an important part of the system, worthy of closer examination. In Kano LEA, all Islamic schools are under the supervision of Alhaji Barau Dambatta. When appointed in 1963, he had charge of only two grant aided Islamiyya schools. Under his direction the number has increased so that in 1976 there were 53 in Kano Emirate, six in Hadejia, three in Gumel and one in Kazaure. Total capital grants given in 1976/77 amounted to N42,044, while recurrent ones totalled N108,230 (see Appendix XI).

The proprietorship of the Islamiyya schools covers a broad spectrum from philanthropic individuals to religious societies. An example of the former is the Dantata Islamiyya School, established by an affluent businessman; while examples of the latter are those run by the Jama'atu Nasril Islam, the Nur-ud-Deen Society, or the Young Muslims' Congress of Nigeria. Alternatively there are schools owned and run by particular communities such as the Yolawa clan in one part of Kano City. The Ahmadiyya, as has been men-

2. If there is no trained teacher, an annual recurrent grant of N4 per child is paid.
3. Interview, Alhaji Barau Dambatta, 10/2/77.
tioned, are also well known for their schools. The institutions are run for religious reasons rather than for financial gain, grants being small and fees barely adequate to cover costs, and they prompt an important aspect of community participation generally lacking in the government system.

Like the traditional Koranic schools, the Islamiyya schools normally operate a five day week from Saturday to Wednesday. Many provide only four-year courses, equivalent to junior primary schools, but others give tuition for the full seven. No formal certificated examination is usually taken though many pupils continue with their studies at the SAS, the judicial schools or the Arabic Teachers' College with a testimonial from their teachers.

The wide range in the characteristics of Islamiyya schools is also shown by their sizes, which vary from less than 100 to over 1,000. There are also usually more girls than boys. In this respect they fill a particularly important gap by giving education to girls who would not otherwise have been permitted to attend school. The quality of the teachers also varies widely. Many schools have no certificated staff while others, such as the Mahad-ud-Deen school, have several qualified, and all salaries paid by the LEA. Sometimes the schools, like their government counterparts, operate a shift system with two or three different sets of pupils and teachers each day.

In the mid-1960's improvement of the primary school system became a concern of UNICEF. They recognised the need to utilise the Islamic institutions and drew up a plan through which it could be done. Sadly, the plan was never

1. See Chapter IV, Section 4.iv.
2. UNICEF, 'Plan of Operation for Strengthening and Developing Education in the Six Northern States of Nigeria' (mimeo), Ref. E/ICEF/P.L.1350, n.d. (1969?), p.15. The intention was to aid 100 selected schools in North Eastern and North Western States, and 50 schools each in the other four Northern States. Why Kano, with its high population and strong Islamic tradition, should come in the second group is not clear.
implemented, the project having lacked, in particular, an officer at the Institute of Education in Zaria who was both sufficiently interested in the problem and able to hold the confidence of the Islamic communities. \(^1\)

In some ways, therefore, the most significant developments have occurred at the university level. Provision of tertiary education in Kano began with the creation of Ahmadu Bello College at the beginning of the 1960's. In 1963 its name was changed to Abdullahi Bayero College, and as a branch of Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, degree courses were offered. The importance of this development lay in the possibility of pursuit of Islamic studies at the university level, which gave the subject and the graduates respectability in the modern sector. In turn this ensured that there could be representatives of the old society engaged in construction of the new, thereby providing a link between them. In 1976 Abdullahi Bayero College gained greater autonomy from Zaria by becoming a full university college, and finally became an independent university the following year. It is possible that this institution may provide future leadership for much needed educational reform in the state.

The low priority given to integration of the two learning systems in the 1970's, however, was further illustrated by the 1970-74 Kano State Development Plan. Like adult education, Islamic education was only mentioned in brackets under the heading of "others", which was allocated only 0.5% of the total education vote. \(^2\) The 1975-80 plan gave it even lower priority, for although Islamic education was recognised with its own sub-heading and an allocation of N200,000, this was only 0.14% of the education total of N140.97 million. \(^3\) It is unfortunate that the government should devote

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1. Interview, Dr. D.O. Kolawole, Institute of Education, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 8/5/77.
so many resources to Western-type schools for UPE and so seriously neglect the Islamic ones. The history of Islamic education in the present century is, from the government perspective, a history of failure to realise its potential. Efforts in the mid-1960's, meagre though they were, transpired to be a highlight of official interest in the schools. Because the Islamic system has vital importance to the success of UPE, it is a topic to which we shall return in future chapters, for it could be both a vehicle for maximising the relevance of education and for minimising its cost. Meanwhile, let us turn to the final section of this chapter, which considers informal and nonformal learning.

4. Informal and Nonformal Education.

Up to this point we have been considering those aspects of education moulded by governments, or by voluntary agencies working along the same lines, and by the traditions of religion. Between them, however, the government and Islamic education systems have catered for a relatively small proportion of the population. This section is introduced, therefore, not so much to provide a chronological account of the development of informal and nonformal education processes, which is in any case difficult because of their ill-defined nature, but to complete the picture and note

1. See, especially, Chapter IV, Section 4. viii.
2. With these factors in view, UNESCO launched a pilot project in Mauritania in 1974 to determine the most suitable development strategies. In September 1976, the project covered 40 classes and 1,634 pupils in 25 Mahadras (madaris). See M. Botti, M.D. Carelli and M. Saliba, Basic Education in the Sahel Countries, UNESCO Institute for Education, Hamburg, 1978, pp. 100-11.
3. The 1972 Kano State education survey, for example, stated that only 30% of the six to twelve age group was covered by either or both education systems (The British Council, op. cit., Appendix I).
4. For the categorisation employed in this study, see the Introduction.
aspects of education which have been important in the past and will remain significant alternatives and complements after the achievement of UPE.

The term 'informal education is used here to describe the acquisition of skills, knowledge and values outside any structured education system, from daily experience and the educative influence of the environment. Several anthropological works describe child rearing practices in the main societies represented in Kano State, and it is not necessary to reproduce their content here. However, two main points are worth making. The first is that skills such as agricultural practices, and codes of behaviour, have always been taught informally, and this will continue to be the case. On occasions awareness of the links can improve provision of formal education, and even provide extra resources, though planners should also be aware that


2. It was in order to utilise the resources existing in many communities, to supplement the formally trained teaching force, and to promote the relevance of schooling that the authorities brought Koranic malams into schools to teach Arabic and Islamic Religious Knowledge. Similar strategies might utilise local craftsmen, and praise-singers and elders from whom children learn local history informally. Planners in the formal system might also extend the use of radio, which informally educates an increasing proportion of the population. A summary of some potential resources in local communities is contained in IPAR-BUEA, Report on the Reform of Primary Education, Buea, 1977, p.56.
increased formal provision takes children away from their homes and families for part of the day and therefore reduces some aspects of informal learning.¹

The second point is that in the past, informal education, as a complement to formal, has reinforced social stratification, and this will continue to be the case. Some examples of this, such as the significance of English language learning, are discussed in subsequent chapters of this thesis.² It is also worth noting that a clear differentiation persists between urban and rural areas, and the extent of informal learning compatible with the requirements of the formal system is much greater in the former than in the latter. This has particular implications for the ability of UPE to reduce either social or urban-rural imbalances.

Like informal education, the term 'non-formal education' also embraces a wide range of activities. It describes organised learning experiences outside the formal system, and includes, for example, such organisations as The Boy Scouts, youth and sports clubs, and cooperative ventures. These activities do exist in Kano, though their relevance to UPE is slight and they do not merit detailed discussion. Since this chapter has already examined a number of adult education projects, the remainder of this section is mainly devoted to the apprenticeship system, which has existed for centuries. It has evolved over time and remains both a supplement and an alternative to the formal education system.

Major interest was first directed towards the Nigerian apprenticeship system by Archibald Callaway in the early 1960's. Though his research concentrated on Ibadan, his findings have a general application, and in the absence of

2. See Chapter IV, Section 4.iii. For discussion on other aspects of social stratification, see Chapter VI, Section 2.1.
other detailed studies in Kano, provide a useful basis for
discussion. The ages of apprentices in his survey ranged
from nine to 28 years, though nearly half were aged 16 to
19. Even in 1964, 51% had attended primary schools, most
of them obtaining their certificates; 11% had attended
secondary modern schools, and some had even pursued second-
ary grammar courses. Thus the apprenticeship system both
ran parallel to and extended formal educational provision.
The general level of schooling was higher in the modern
processes, such as printing and photography, than in the
traditional crafts. Masters often took relatives as
apprentices, in these cases rarely drawing up formal con-
tracts. Of those with non-relatives, about half had
written contracts, and all had a clear idea of the duration
of the training period (usually three to five years) and of
the obligations of each party. Although we are classify-
ing the system as nonformal, therefore, it displayed many
formal aspects. Fees were commonly charged for training,
though the apprentice sometimes provided labour in lieu.

This general picture may be taken also to describe
Kano today, though it is unlikely that so many apprentices
have attained the same level of schooling. Over the years,
the system has tended to become more formal, using written
contracts and certificates of achievement, and it has
evolved to include modern activities, such as repair of
refrigerators and air-conditioners, as well as traditional
crafts of carving, smithing and so on. However, a further
difference between Ibadan and the far north noted by Callaway
in 1964, was that the fewer strict contracts were found in
the latter. This fact he attributed to the generally
lower level of modern economic development.

1. Archibald Callaway, 'Nigeria's Indigenous Education:
The Apprenticeship System', Odu (Journal of African
2. Ibid., p. 73.
Much of the importance of the apprenticeship system lies in its fulfilment of needs not catered for by the school system. It provides specific on-the-job training and, perhaps more significantly, does not exclude applicants on the criterion of language. One considerable defect of the formal system of technical training is that officially it is conducted entirely in the medium of English.\(^1\) Like the school system, apprenticeships are generally oriented more to the needs of boys than of girls, but opportunities for the latter do exist, particularly in such traditional activities as dressmaking, midwifery, dyeing, bakery and hair dressing.

It was found in the Western Region during the 1960’s that the apprenticeship system experienced an upsurge as more youths left primary schools expanded by UPE.\(^2\) This suggests that the apprenticeship system may become increasingly important in Kano, not only for those who complete the primary course but also for drop-outs unwilling to return to agriculture. UPE is also likely to accelerate changes whereby apprenticeships in modern occupations become more common than those in the traditional sector. Mailafiya found that in the North Eastern State, primary leavers “favoured such occupations as auto-mechanics, electrical repairs, bakery and printing which offer more chances for wage employment than tailoring, carpentry and blacksmithing.”\(^3\) One may expect a similar situation to

1. See Harry Dickinson, 'Report to the British Council on a Visit to Kano' (in connection with potential uses of intermediate technology), (mimeo) 1975, p.V.


apply to Kano, and if, as Callaway observed in Ibadan, modern crafts not only have more formal arrangements but also more apprentices than traditional ones, it could have a particularly beneficial influence on the labour markets as UPE children leave school in the 1980's. It will also have implications for the phenomenon of rural-urban drift, however, since modern craft employment exists mainly in the towns.¹

This section was mainly intended to complete the overall picture of education in Kano State, recognising that in the past, a minority of Kano State's population has been catered for by either the Western-type or the Islamic education systems. Among official non-formal projects, the chapter has already noted developments in adult education, and since other programmes to train agricultural extension officers and machine operators, for example, are discussed in Chapter Five.² we may now summarise educational developments in Kano State since 1900.

Summary.
This chapter has surveyed developments in all types of education since the beginning of the century. Heavy emphasis has been placed on the formal system since it is with it that we are primarily concerned. It must be recognised, however, that Western-type schools have represented only a part of the education system. Adult education and the Islamic system were discussed in separate sections not only because they complement the Western-type school system but also because it is arguable that the level of resources required by government schools has led to neglect of the other aspects, and investment is unbalanced. The fourth section was devoted to informal and non-formal education in order to complete the picture. It is demonstrable that in the past all other provision reached only

¹. See Chapter V, Section 2.
². See Chapter V, Sections 2.i and 2.ii.
a minority of the population, and even when UFE is finally achieved, out-of-school educational processes will remain important.

It is evident from this historical survey that many current problems which UFE hopes to solve have their roots in the past. The restriction of missionary activity, for example, was a fundamental factor creating a regional imbalance; and the institution of indirect rule maintained existing social divisions which in turn limited both the uses of education for social mobility and the desire to attend school. The study has also shown that many of today's difficulties were experienced in the past, and that some efforts to solve them were not very successful. Much time and energy have been devoted, for example, to appropriate language policies, to the integration of Islamic and Western-type schools, to the place of vocational education, and to training and retention of teachers - often without a great deal of effect. This should warn policy makers that continued debate today is unlikely to find easy solutions. As was pointed out in Chapter One, none of the aims behind the UFE scheme are new, and if past practitioners had only limited success, we should be wary of expecting too much during the present.

Several additional points will be discussed further in later sections. This chapter has examined developments up to 1976. It is therefore logical that it should be continued with discussion on events since 1976, the year in which UFE was finally launched.
CHAPTER III: DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1976: THE LAUNCHING OF UPE

Chapters One and Two have provided some of the background to the national UPE scheme and to Kano State. The intention of this chapter is to provide more specific detail on actual events since UPE was launched in 1976 and thus create a basis for subsequent analysis. The first section will concentrate on developments in Kano State and will examine enrolments and schools, the teaching force, buildings and equipment. The second section will outline events in other states of the federation to elucidate the impact of UPE on regional development. It will be noticed that neither within Kano State nor in other states have developments always been uniform, which provides a basis for analysis of the factors specific to each area. Discussion of the financial implications of UPE will be postponed to Chapter Four.

Where a project is scheduled for progressive implementation over a number of years, the impact of its launching is very important. The authorities generated as much enthusiasm as possible during September 1976, and though pressure created many difficulties, by making a strong push, Kano avoided some of the problems encountered by other states. The national launching of UPE on September 6th was followed by individual state launchings a few days later. In Kano the ceremony was held on September 11th and was followed by a third launching in each of the state's emirate capitals. The last event was particularly important for the public support of the emirs, which is an essential ingredient of success. Privately they may have had misgivings about the scheme, but publicly it was in their interests to

1. Education is a factor likely to cause its recipients to question the traditional authority of the emirs. The Emir of Kazaure, further, will not have been alone in fearing that UPE will also accelerate the decline in agricultural production (Interview, 13/5/77). The emirs now receive much of their income from the government, however, and it is not in their interests to provoke a conflict which could lead to a further statutory reduction in their authority.
PAGE NUMBERS CUT OFF IN ORIGINAL
cooperate with the government.

Nationally, the launching of UPE was the occasion for a special postage stamp issue and considerable radio and press publicity. Locally, governments supplemented this publicity with posters, written in the case of Kano in both ajami and boko (Plates III and IV), issue of special 'T' shirts, and erection of banners across the main roads. Predictably, the ceremonies contained congratulations for the federal and state governments, and exhortations on punctuality, obedience and the need to enrol as many pupils as possible. More important than what the functionaries were saying, however, was the fact that they were holding the ceremony and were seen by the people to do so.

Non-official preparations for UPE in Kano are less easy to document. One example of antagonism toward the schools came from the village of Kaulsani in Wudil District, where in February 1976 prayers were offered at the Friday mosque gathering for a delay in school construction. Similar cases might be cited, though in general popular enthusiasm mounted following the launching campaign as villages began to compete with each other. Contrast between Kano and more southern states, however, was demonstrated by the fact that whereas in the latter many people made bitter complaints about inadequate facilities and paid bribes to ensure their children were admitted, in Kano


2. Information from Mr. Paul Ross, Bayero University College, Kano. When the school was completed, village antagonism continued and in 1978 a woman was taken to court for assaulting the headmaster and damaging school property (Interview, ACEC Wudil, Alhaji Ibrahim I.M. Muhammed, 20/7/78).

3. For example, the press reported illegal collections of fees of N1 in Lagos (Daily Times, 13/7/76), N5 in Ogun State (Ibid., 18/9/76), N2 in Oyo (Ibid., 20/9/76), N10 in Imo (Ibid., 25/9/76), 50k in Niger (New Nigerian, 29/9/76) and unspecified amounts in Bendel (Daily Times, 8/3/77).
Plate III: Poster to Advertise UPE. Note the use of both ajami and boko scripts.

Plate IV: Poster to Advertise UPE.
numerous cases were reported of parents bribing the authorities to permit them not to send their children. This further reflects the very different attitudes among communities which may have caused gaps within the state and within the nation to widen rather than narrow.

1. Developments in Kano State

1. Enrolments and Schools

Overall enrolment figures for the state are shown in Table 3.1. It must be repeated that these statistics are not entirely reliable, first because of the physical difficulties of collection in a situation of poor communications and constant staff turnover; secondly because individual headmasters tend to tell the authorities what they think will please them (such as a class enrolment of 40 pupils).

Table 3.1: Expansion of Primary Schools, Kano State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Year</th>
<th>Number of Schools</th>
<th>Number of Pupils</th>
<th>Number of Teachers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>62,080</td>
<td>1,923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>96,380</td>
<td>3,331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>110,106</td>
<td>3,889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973/4</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>120,276</td>
<td>4,002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974/5</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>136,350</td>
<td>4,862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975/6</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>160,340</td>
<td>6,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976/7</td>
<td>2,633</td>
<td>341,806</td>
<td>12,798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977/8</td>
<td>3,038</td>
<td>472,413</td>
<td>14,968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978/9*</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>622,413</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Provisional n.a.: not available.


2. According to the School Directory for Kano State 1975-6 (Ministry of Education, Kano), for example, all the schools in Ringim District had exactly 40 pupils per class, as did one third of the schools in Kura and a high proportion of others.
and to record all pupils in the register including those who have dropped out; and thirdly because local authorities are aware that their grants are dependent on the official enrolment figure. There is therefore a tendency for enrolment statistics to be over-estimates. Not all districts are equally consistent, but a rough guess would suggest a general excess count of ten to twenty per cent.

From the statistics, illustrated diagramatically in Figure 3.1, it is evident that in 1976 the system underwent a dramatic change, for the number of schools almost quadrupled and total enrolments more than doubled. There were more pupils in Class I during 1976/7 than in all the other six classes combined. According to Ministry figures, Class I enrolments were sustained close to this level for the next two years, suggesting that the momentum of the first
Despite official exhortations, however, the proportion of girls in the first year remained roughly constant at 27%. This indicated continuing resistance to education of girls which, at least in its initial phases, UPE publicity was unable to overcome.

A breakdown of statistics by administrative areas (Table 3.2) reveals variations in the pattern, with Kano Municipal and Minjibir LGAs, for example showing much lower percentage increases in 1976/7 than Dutse, Gaya and

Table 3.2: Primary Enrolments by Local Government Area, Kano State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Government Area</th>
<th>1975/6</th>
<th>1976/7</th>
<th>% increase</th>
<th>1977/8</th>
<th>% increase</th>
<th>1978/9</th>
<th>% increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kano Municipal</td>
<td>32,246</td>
<td>60,761</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>87,342</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>105,062</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danbatta</td>
<td>5,372</td>
<td>13,516</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>19,223</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>28,753</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwaza</td>
<td>4,817</td>
<td>10,808</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>14,638</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>19,029</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minjibir</td>
<td>6,865</td>
<td>10,597</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>11,502</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>13,562</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ringim</td>
<td>7,907</td>
<td>14,320</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>18,496</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>24,235</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwarzo</td>
<td>10,969</td>
<td>25,755</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>40,189</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>54,623</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawakin Tofa</td>
<td>8,438</td>
<td>14,716</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>23,581</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>33,786</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richi</td>
<td>6,659</td>
<td>14,366</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>19,965</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>29,233</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutse</td>
<td>3,114</td>
<td>10,751</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>15,810</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>25,922</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birnin Kudu</td>
<td>7,014</td>
<td>16,291</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>20,184</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>26,651</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaya</td>
<td>3,987</td>
<td>12,556</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>16,681</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>22,766</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wadil</td>
<td>6,777</td>
<td>18,059</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>23,440</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>31,982</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jahun</td>
<td>2,597</td>
<td>6,618</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>8,807</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>13,087</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawakin Kudu</td>
<td>6,695</td>
<td>11,568</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>15,743</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>20,729</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>8,184</td>
<td>19,497</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>28,190</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>35,692</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taduna Wada</td>
<td>7,197</td>
<td>17,393</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>28,678</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>38,520</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadjeja</td>
<td>11,555</td>
<td>18,075</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>21,355</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>25,917</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaffin Hausa</td>
<td>6,095</td>
<td>13,862</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>18,772</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>23,275</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gumel</td>
<td>8,567</td>
<td>14,481</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>21,296</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>26,452</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazaure</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>14,722</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>18,541</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>23,167</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1. Respective Class I enrolments for 1976/7, 1977/8 and 1978/9 were 193,000, 140,000 and 150,000 (Information from Mal. Husseini Bello, Senior Statistical Officer, Ministry of Education, Kano). In some areas, however, there were substantial drop-outs, as is noted below.
In part this reflects higher initial enrolment rates, especially in Waje District of Kano Municipal Area. Among other factors was the school siting policy, for as Table 3.3 indicates, there was a corresponding difference in the number of new schools. The lowest percentages opened in 1976 were in Kano Municipal and Minjibir LGA's, and the highest were in Dutse, Gaya and Wudil.

Table 3.3: Number of Primary Schools by Local Government Area, Kano State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>L.G.A.</th>
<th>1975/6</th>
<th>1976/7</th>
<th>1977/8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kano Municipal</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dambatta</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gezawa</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minjibir</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ringim</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwarzo</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawakin Tofa</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bichi</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutse</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birnin Kudu</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaya</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wudil</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jahun</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawakin Kudu</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rano</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tudun Wada</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadejia</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaffin Hausa</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gumel</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazaure</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


When establishing schools in Kano City, the first problem was to find a site. So tightly packed are the houses (Plate I) that in the planning stages for UPE, officers who had wanted to open 73 new schools could initially find sites

1. Some historical causes of the high enrolments in Sabon Gari ('Waje') and low ones in Gaya were discussed in Chapter II, Section 1.
Two storey buildings had to be erected in many cases, and in some schools, buildings had to be demolished so that others could be built, closer together, in their place.

In rural areas, land shortages were less severe. However, more important than availability of land were decisions taken by the officers in charge. In 1976, finance was not a constraint on school construction, and local authorities were aware that the state government would reimburse all expenditures. Thus the main factor distinguishing Dutse and Gaya from Minjibir was that in the former the authorities were more committed to school multiplication than in the latter. Dutse's expansion was the most dramatic and is illustrated by Maps V and VI. The number of schools increased from 17 in 1975/6 to 163 the following year. Such a rapid multiplication could not fail to influence the population of the area, and must be considered among the most important factors behind its impressive increase in enrolments.

From a local viewpoint, Dutse's schools provided wealth for the area which would not have been directly obtained had the authorities decided to open fewer. However, the rapid numerical increase raised doubts on the economic viability of many schools, which suggested that the policy may not have been entirely suitable from a wider perspective. Even according to official statistics, schools opened in Dutse during 1976 had an average enrolment of only 28 pupils, and all had two teachers. The following year, as many as 47% of the classrooms were recorded empty, and since pressure on resources had caused construction to

1. Interview, E.O. Kano City and Kumbotso, Alh. Ahmadu Dambatta, 1/12/76. Particularly if parents exercise a preference for better schools, children often walk considerable distances each day even in Kano Metropolitan Area. For example, several pupils in Gwarzwarwa, on the Airport Road, come from near the Nassarawa Palace, over three miles away.

Map V: Primary Schools in Dutse Local Government Area, 1975-6

Map VI: Primary Schools in Dutse Local Government Area, 1976-7

(Maps reproduced from T.N. Bray, 'Universal Primary Education in Kano State: The First Year', Savannah, Vol.6, No.1, 1977, pp.4-7.)
be generally poor, it was clear that wastage had been considerable.

Dutse's schools were in marked contrast to the very large institutions in Kano Metropolitan Area. Just in the first year of UPE, Fagge School had 2,572 pupils, for example, the Army Children's School had 2,424 and Holy Trinity had 2,360. The majority of urban schools also had to operate a double shift system, with a consequently shortened length of session. Wide variations existed in different parts of the state, therefore, and particularly between urban and rural areas, which had implications for the quality of education and the integrative potential of UPE.

Because the Ministry was aware of the unreliability of all official population figures, it organised a registration exercise between May and July 1976. It was designed to cover all children up to the age of ten, and therefore suggest probable enrolments in subsequent years. This registration, however, was also inaccurate, and in almost all districts more pupils enrolled for Class I than the census said existed, thus showing the extreme difficulties of...


2. This topic is discussed further in Chapter IV, Section 4.5, and Chapter V, Section 1. Though most schools could not envisage abolition of the double shift in the foreseeable future, Gwargwarwa did succeed in doing so after a few months, despite a 1976/7 enrolment of 1,650, by mobilising parental support to construct more classrooms. In general, however, community participation was not as widespread as might have been desired.

3. The general response to UPE was stronger in urban than in rural areas. One exception to this was Kazaure LEA, in which the rural areas achieved greater enrolments than did Kazaure and Roni towns. The CEO and his staff ascribed this to the greater respect for authority still held in the villages (Interview, CEO Kazaure, Alh. Aminu Kazaure, 26/11/76; meeting with ten supervisory headmasters, 13/5/77), though why the district should differ from others is not clear.
planning with very inadequate statistical information. 1
The first reason for the unexpected size of enrolments was
the wider age span admitted. Although official announce-
ments had stated that "No child will be allowed to go to
school before he or she is 6 years old", 2 actual admissions
included many children between the ages of four and twelve. 3
Statements referring to the age as an upper limit were
ignored because the authorities were anxious for Kano to 'catch up' with other states, and because it is somewhat
inegalitarian for a child to be excluded from schooling
simply because he is a few months or years too old. 4
The lower limit was also ignored in order to maximise the
impact of UPE and avoid discouraging communities. Although
this approach was logical, however, the policy did increase
pressure on the system, and some staff considered the very
young children an obstacle to effective teaching. Other
states applied the age rule much more strictly, though in
the widespread absence of birth certificates none could be

1. Selected registration and actual enrolment figures are
shown in Appendix VII. According to the registration,
115,676 children were expected, though 192,719 had act-
ually enrolled by November 1976, suggesting a 67% sur-
plus. This contrasts with other figures, shown in
Appendix VI, which indicate a 19% shortfall. These
figures were based on the (inaccurate and outdated)
1963 census and highlight the extreme difficulty of
gauging school coverage even within a wide margin.
However, since 27% of 1976/7 enrolments were girls,
and proportions of males and females in the population
are roughly equal, it is clear that at least female
enrolments were far from universal.


3. In some schools, such as Kogonkara and Mainika in
Gwarzo LGA and Wangara in Dawakin Tofa, under-aged
children numbered as much as 10% of the total. In
other cases, however, for example in Gumel LEA and in
Kano City where pressure on places was too great,
headmasters sent away under-aged children.

4. The policy stated in the Third National Development
Plan (op. cit., p.246) was that children would be
admitted who were aged six or "who will be six before
the end of the calendar year."
entirely rigid.\textsuperscript{1} The Kano State government also decided that children who had not registered could still be admitted, and as a result some were being enrolled, albeit only in ones and twos, well over half way through the first term.

The second reason why actual enrolments were much higher than the registration figures was that the latter were subject to inaccuracies. Two main factors accounted for this. The first related to the physical difficulties of locating every child, especially in remote areas. Most of the enumerators were primary teachers only prepared to tolerate limited discomfort for the sake of accuracy. In addition, efforts tended to be half-hearted because each LEA was conducting the census on instructions from the ministry and in some cases the basic allocation of schools had already been made. A third factor was resistance from the villagers, first because of dislike for the schools for reasons noted above, secondly because superstitions that counting children will bring misfortune and prevent the birth of others are still widespread, and thirdly because any enumeration is always associated with tax assessment. When the parents did not wish their children to be counted, either they refused to declare them or they said they were all over ten years old. Further, even if the enumerators had the time and diligence actually to find the children, age assessments could be based only on guesswork in the absence of birth certificates. In consequence, the registration figures were of limited use. They indicated improbable divergences in the number of children in each age group, in sexes and in the number of children in each household.\textsuperscript{2}

1. Even in the South several states, such as Ogun, Ondo, Oyo, Bendel, Rivers and Lagos make public announcements that birth certificates would not be required when registering for UPS (Daily Times, 10/2/76; Nigeria Today, February 1976; New Nigerian, 7/5/77).

2. See Appendices VII and VIII. In an attempt to maximise accuracy, the authorities in Kano City conducted three registrations between April and August (information from headmaster, Dala Primary School, 13/10/75). However, Kano's final figures bore little more relation to actual enrolments than most other districts.\textsuperscript{1}
The procedure for enrolling the students in the first few weeks of UPE, the effectiveness of which was another reason for the divergence between anticipated and actual school populations, made use of the traditional structure of authority. Using population estimates, the authorities opened schools with one, two or more classrooms. Each village head was then instructed to bring a certain number of pupils. If he failed to do so, he risked being reported to his district head and ultimately to the emir. The success in enrolling children testified to the effectiveness of this method, though the results varied according to the personalities involved. Thus because the District Head of Dawakin Tofa was enthusiastic about UPE, for example, village heads were often to be found in school compounds during the first term. In contrast, the District Heads of Ringim and Kumbotso were widely said to be less cooperative, and progress was less smooth. Similarly the Emir of Gumel was considered by education officers to be very helpful, and contrasted with the neighbouring Emir of Hadjea.

Although official federal policy did not introduce compulsory schooling, pressure was applied in some cases in Kano State. At one school in Gwarzo District, for example, the headmaster took five parents/guardians to court in 1976 under the old Native Authority law. Similar cases were reported elsewhere, though the response of the alkalai varied. Whilst fines were not usually imposed,

1. Interview, District Head, Dawakin Tofa, Alh. Makama Bello, 18/11/76.
2. Interview, CEO Gumel, Alh. Muhammadu Zakari, 9/12/76.
3. Interview, Headmaster, Mainika Primary School, 2/11/76. For information on the N.A. law, see Chapter II, Section 1.iii.
4. In February 1979 the headmaster of Na'ibawa School in Kano Municipal Area, for example, sent the names of some 75 pupils to the court (information from K.J. King, 16/3/79), and the EC's in 'Judil and Dawakin Kudu both said that the courts were active on the education authorities' behalf (interview 20/7/78).
undoubtedly such cases had considerable impact, for they also provided clear evidence of cooperation between traditional and modern institutions.

Like the traditional authorities, the attitude of individual headmasters also varied. Some were anxious to cooperate with village heads and report problems to their superiors, while others were less enthusiastic. Staff of schools within reach of towns tended to live in the towns and commute daily to work. This hindered cooperation between them and the village because it made close acquaintance difficult for either party. Teachers' housing projects were insufficient to cater for more than a small minority of schools. The proximity of staff, therefore, which is a factor promoting close contact with the communities schools are designed to serve, tended to be greatest in the urban schools. The remote schools ranked between them and the semi-urban or peripheral ones.

Two further factors hindering cooperation were frequent transfers of staff and continual administrative changes. It was unfortunate that only a few weeks before the launching of UPE, considerable speculation and disruption had been caused by the announcement, on August 26th, of new local government boundaries. The former eight administrative areas were divided into 20 Local Government Areas (see Maps III and IV). In 1975, the government commissioned a body, chaired by Dr. Shehu Galadanci, among other things to "Examine the causes for relatively slow educational progress in the state and make recommendations for speedy improvements." One of its recommendations concerned reorganis-

1. In one school in Kano City, for example, attendances were very poor. This must partly be ascribed to the attitude of the headmaster, who remarked, "Our job is only to teach those who come, not to go and get them. So many do not attend, even though their names are written down. It is for the LEA to send them...."

2. See Chapter IV, Section VI.


ation and decentralisation of LEA administration. While Gumel and Kazaure LEA areas were unaffected by the local government reform, therefore, Kano had been fortunate to have already partially decentralised its administration. Thus Kano West administrative area, which had been divided for LEA purposes between Gwarzo and Bichi in 1973, opened an additional office in Dawakin Tofa in July 1975. In general, by maintaining the same four LEA areas the disruption caused by the coincidence of local government reform and the take-off of UPE was minimised, though several divisional tenders boards, responsible for classroom and furniture construction, had to be reconstituted.

It was the intention to decentralise the LEA's as soon as possible, and in October 1977 new bodies were formed to correspond with the 20 LEA's. Unfortunately, this was not the end of the administrative reorganisation, for in April 1978 the LEA's were abolished entirely and replaced by Local Education Departments under the direction of each Local Government Council. The official reason for this third reorganisation was the desire to give local governments greater control over social developments at the lowest level. It also partially transferred the financial burdens from the federal to local governments, and thus was a consequence of the federal discovery of the true cost of UPE. Almost all education officers in Kano State were strongly critical of the reform, which one remarked "will bring the end to UPS."¹

The validity of his remark and the implications of the reform will be discussed at greater length in Chapter Four. Here we may note that officers faced considerable administrative problems, for before one reform could be given time to take effect, another had replaced it.² To some

1. Interview, 20/7/78.
2. That it takes a long time for officers in the centre to become fully aware of administrative changes was illustrated by the dispatch of much of Bichi's and Dawakin Tofa's UPE furniture to Gwarzo. In both cases it had to be sent back to Kano for onward transmission.
extent this was a problem inherent in this type of educational development. Because of the rapid expansion, decentralisation of responsibilities was urgently required for effective administration. However, in the short run, administration was hampered by the reform, and it was unfortunate that decentralisation coincided with the launching of UPE.

Though all the considerations involved are not clear, certain planning defects may also be partly ascribed to the local government reform and to a shortage of personnel made particularly acute by the number of projects being implemented simultaneously. This may be clarified by discussion of a specific example from Hadejia.

Although, as mentioned in Chapter Two, Hadejia Town was given its first school as early as 1924, general educational development had been slow. The second school was not opened until 1960 and by 1975 there were only five primary schools, with a total official enrolment of 1,575.¹ With the launching of UPE it was decided that these schools should be maintained at their existing size, and two new ones opened especially for UPE pupils. Sambo school was built just beyond the city walls on the north side with 36 classrooms; and Buhari was built with 34 classrooms just beyond the walls to the south. Enrolments, however, proved quite insufficient to justify this plan. By November 1976, Sambo had 29 staff but only 190 pupils, filling five of the 36 classrooms; Buhari had 28 staff but only 351 pupils, occupying nine of the 34 classrooms.

Since Hadejia had an estimated population of 30,000 it was over-optimistic to provide places for 3,120 six year olds.² Not only were the compounds far too large,

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2. Based on 40 pupils per class (70 classes in Sambo and Buhari, plus six Class I's in the existing schools), plus 80 Class I pupils in two Islamiyya schools.
they were also badly sited, being both far from the children's homes and without a water supply. The question of why they were built thus arises. One possibility is that they were designed in this manner so that local contractors could make financial gain. The staffing position, however, suggests that the LEA genuinely expected the schools to be filled, for it seems unlikely that with acute staff shortages they would deliberately have sent so many qualified teachers to two empty schools. In addition, malpractices in the award of contracts seem unlikely since there was enough work elsewhere in the emirate (a total of 800 classrooms were constructed) and the fact that corrupt officers would have been more likely to scatter surplus classrooms widely instead of concentrating them in two schools. It seems most likely, therefore, that the schools represent a genuine planning error.

The policy was particularly strange in that Buhari school was next door to an existing and well established school, separated only by a wire fence. It would have seemed more logical to have sent at least some of the new pupils to the existing school, which already had a good administration, and would have been able to cope with them more easily. The decision must be seen in the context of extreme pressure on resources, however. As one senior ministry official remarked, "An outsider may assume that we have a policy. But very often we have no policy. Everything is done on an ad hoc basis." The CEO in Hadejia found it difficult to develop and supervise implementation of long term plans because, besides being fully occupied with the daily administration and supervision of Hadejia Emirate's considerable primary school expansion, he was also caretaker chairman of the newly formed Kaffin Hausa Local Government Council. His task was also made more onerous by a general shortage of suitably qualified assistants.

1. Interview, 17/11/76.
Anomalies such as these could have been partially avoided had the pressures of UPE on a limited organisational framework been less severe. In fact the Hadejia authorities may be partly vindicated since, as shown by the fact that only 64 of the 541 pupils in Sambo and Buhari were girls, there were many children who could have enrolled. However, even at the end of the second year the anomaly had hardly been rectified. Sambo had only been able to recruit 22 pupils for Class I in 1977/8 and so had just one stream of Class I plus five of Class II occupying 36 classrooms and still employing 11 teachers. Buhari had been able to recruit only 36 pupils for Class I (of whom none were girls), thus making 11 classes occupying 34 classrooms and employing 17 staff. During 1976/7 ten of Buhari's classrooms, 25 of which were empty, lost their roofs. They were repaired, but in 1977/8 five again suffered the same fate. Thus the schools represented a liability to the community, and with lower enrolments anticipated from 1978 onwards and heavy drop-outs, they represented a sad case of ill-directed planning which it will be difficult to rectify.

It was noted above that enrolments of girls have remained constant at roughly 27% of the total. This overall figure conceals a number of variations. Not surprisingly, schools in Sabon Gari have a much higher percentage of girls than other schools. Indeed seven of the 21 schools in Waje District had more girls than boys in 1976/7. On the other hand, 15 schools in the state, even

1. According to the registers, the classes had an average enrolment of only 33 pupils each. In fact between September 1977 and June 1978 an average of seven pupils per class had dropped out. Thus the children could easily have been grouped into only four or five classes.

2. The extra Class I was transferred to the school by the Commissioner for Education. However it had an official enrolment of only 13 pupils. The average class size according to the registers was only 34, and an average of five pupils per class had dropped out between September 1977 and June 1978. Thus in this school also, classes could easily have been combined.

according to official statistics, had no girls at all, and since, for reasons discussed in Chapter Two, girls have a greater tendency to drop out than boys, several others could be added to their number.

The factors which influence female enrolments are still not entirely clear. One may question why, for example, there were two schools in Kumbotso District in 1976/7 with no girls at all and an average district enrolment of only 11%, while in neighbouring Dawakin Tofa District the average was 26%. The possibility that girls in Kumbotso were in greater demand for hawking seems unlikely since female enrolments in Kano City were as high as 28%. Hill has pointed to the unusual strictness of purdah in Dorayi (which lies in Kumbotso District), but 14% of pupils in that school were girls. On the other hand three miles away in Dambare, which she cites as a village in which women are allowed to move freely, only 11% of pupils were female. Nor can the differences be ascribed to the quality of teaching and the ability to retain pupils' attention, for even Zawaciki, a good rural school in Kumbotso District, had only two girls out of 133 pupils on the 1977/8 roll. Though one may advance general reasons and solutions to poor female attendance, therefore, some of the local influences remain unclear at present.

One strategy for raising enrolments of girls has been the maintenance of separate girls' boarding schools. Two

1. Ibid., pp.53, 23-24.
2. Hill, Population, Prosperity and Poverty, op.cit., p.84.
3. It is recognised that not all pupils in either school will have come from the immediate vicinity. Conditions did not permit the author to enquire more closely on pupils' origin. However, these figures do not indicate the divergence that might be expected. Dambare's is particularly low and since the school opened in 1976 one would expect most pupils to be local.
4. Interview, headmaster, 30/6/78.
existed in 1976/7, with some 770 pupils, and the following year two more were opened at Jogana and Mallam Maduri.

The existence of these fee-paying but highly subsidised schools raises questions of expense and social stratification, however, and they will be unable significantly to reduce resistance among parents to their daughters' schooling.

As we have noted at the beginning of this chapter with reference to Kaulsani, resistance to education, of boys and girls, sometimes took a violent form. At the end of the second year the EO in Wudil said violent incidents had been so common that he could not immediately count them all. Jibori Sabuwar school in Mallam Maduri District had four different headmasters within its first five months, in part because threats of assault made work too difficult, and in a further example from Kaugama District, friction between communities was brought to a climax over the school and culminated in the removal of the village head. Initially it had been anticipated that resistance would last only a short time while the schools were so obviously alien. Experience showed, however, that this

1. Shekara Girls' School had some 600 pupils in Classes V to VII (interview, Headmistress, Hajia Umar Haruna, 30/10/76), and Kabo Girls' School had 170 in Classes II to VII (interview, Headmistress, Mrs. Lawan, 8/11/76). The proprietorship of the latter school had been changed from the Sudan Interior Mission to the LEA in 1976, and the school was progressively being reduced from full primary to senior primary.

2. See Chapter IV, Section 2; and Chapter VI, Section 2.1.

3. Interview, ACEC Wudil, Alh. Ibrahim I.M. Muhammed, 20/7/78.


5. The school at Tosarawa was designed to serve three hamlets. Its total enrolment of 40 at the end of 1975 included only four from Tosarawa to Malamai, which was notable for its religious affiliations. Unwisely, the District Head complied with the request for removal of the village head, though his successor was unable to foster much greater unity. In this example, the school was acting as a focus and catalyst of existing tensions rather than creating new ones (information idem).
Plate V: Dala Primary School, Kano City. The wall displays Nigeria's 19 states and a portrait of General Murtala Mohammed. Note also the two-storey classrooms constructed for UPE.

Plate VI: Pupils studying under a tree pending construction of permanent classrooms. Note the complete absence of girls in this class.
optimism was not altogether justified, for similar cases were being reported two years after the launching of UPE. These incidents provided sad vindication of many colonial officers' warnings on the impact of Western-type education, and give added urgency to the need to relate schools to existing institutions. One way we have suggested that this might be done is by encouragement of Islamiyya schools, though they remain neglected at present. Also crucial are the curricula, and the attitudes of teachers.

ii. The Teaching Force

As the figures in Table 3.1 indicated, the state government succeeded in recruiting a considerable number of teachers for UPE. Practically every school had at least one teacher per class in 1976/7, and many had an average of one and a half or more. This had been achieved through the opening of several training colleges as part of the crash programme launched in 1974 (Table 3.4).

Table 3.4: Grade II and UP3 Teachers' Colleges, Kano State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Colleges</th>
<th>Enrolments</th>
<th>% Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2,352</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3,605</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973/4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4,461</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974/5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5,171</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975/6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8,444</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976/7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12,619</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3.5 provides further detail on the number of pupils to each teacher. The target for which planners

1. Two violent incidents occurred at Inawa in Dawakin Kudu district and at Gaida in Kumbotso in mid-1978. They were just cases which the author came across, and suggest that similar problems may have been fairly widespread.

2. See Chapter II, Section 1.

3. See Chapter II, Section 3.ii; and Chapter IV, Section 4.vii.
aimed was a teacher:pupil ratio of 1:35. It will be noted that the average for almost every district was well within that limit in 1975/6 and that the position improved still further the following year. The figures also suggest that rural districts had lower ratios than urban ones.

Table 3.5: Teacher:Pupil Ratios by Local Government Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Government Area</th>
<th>1975/6</th>
<th>1976/7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kano Municipal</td>
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<td>Dambatta</td>
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<td>Gezawa</td>
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<td>Minjibir</td>
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<td>Ringim</td>
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<td>Gwarzo</td>
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<td>Dawakin Tofa</td>
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<td>Bichi</td>
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<td>Dutse</td>
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<td>Birnin Kudu</td>
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<td>Gaya</td>
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<td>Wudil</td>
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<td>Rano</td>
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<td>Tudun Wada</td>
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<td>Hadejia</td>
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<td>Kaffin Hausa</td>
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<td>Kazaure</td>
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<td><strong>MEAN</strong></td>
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This reflected the size of rural schools and has implications both for siting policies and for the financial aspects of UPE. The overall teacher:pupil ratio, at 1:27, was considerably lower than most other states. In 1977/8, however, it rose to 1:34 in reflection both of the smaller output from the training colleges and less energetic recruitment drives.

1. Nigeria, Third National Development Plan, op.cit., p.251. This target allows for an average of more than one teacher per class, each of which should hold approximately 40 pupils.

2. See Section 2 of this chapter.
It was noted in the introduction that the pressures brought by UPE were much greater in Kano than in any other state, partly because it had the lowest initial enrolment rate, and secondly because it had the highest population. This was reflected in both the qualifications of teachers recruited and in the length of emergency training courses. Two institutions, called Pivotal Colleges, were established in Kano in 1974 and 1975 to convert secondary leavers into teachers. But whereas in the southern and middle belt states pivotal colleges offered a two year course leading to the Grade II certificate for pupils who had failed West African School Certificate (WASC) and a one year course to those who had passed, in Kano the entire intake had failed WASC but could only be taught for one year.

Similarly, none of the Southern states had courses leading to a qualification of less than Grade II (five years post-primary). In several Northern states the three year post-primary Grade III course which had been abolished a dozen years earlier was revived. Only in Kano was it necessary to create a special two year post-primary course, which did not lead to any nationally recognised qualification.

The only way to recruit sufficient teachers was to employ large numbers who had only primary training themselves, and sometimes even less. Because all other states were also launching UPE, large scale recruitment of better qualified personnel outside Kano was not possible. In any case, it is doubtful whether to have done so would have been politically expedient, and unless they spoke Hausa, staff from other states would have been of limited value at the primary level.

The quality of the teaching force is crucial both for the retention of pupils who have enrolled for UPE and
for imparting desirable skills and attitudes. 1 Table 3.6, however, demonstrates the serious situation even before the UPE plan was conceived, when trained and certificated staff represented only 16% of the total. By 1975/6 the proportion had fallen to 13%, and with the launching of UPE in 1976 it fell to 9%. The untrained teachers, 75% of whom had only primary VII schooling or less, amounted to 41% of the total. The Arabists were considered "locally trained", but very few had formal qualifications and their suitability as primary teachers was often open to doubt. The

| Table 3.6: Primary Teachers in Kano State by Qualification(3) |
|---------------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Trained and Certificated(1)     | 16             | 13             | 9              |
| Trained but Uncertificated(2)   | 25             | 34             | 24             |
| In-Service Centre Students(3)   | 28             | 27             | 6              |
| Arabists                        | 14             | 13             | 20             |
| Untrained                       | 17             | 13             | 41             |

Notes: (1) NCE, Grades I, II, III. (2) Failed Grades I, II, III. (3) Fourth year students on teaching practice or One Year Programme.

Sources: As for Table 3.4.

Overall drop-out rates during the first two years were difficult to determine. A preliminary survey suggested that they were high, but varied widely from school to school and were heavily dependent on the attitudes of the teachers. In one school in Kumbotso District, for example, 78 pupils were registered for Class I in 1976. At the beginning of the second year, only 49 of these were recorded in the Class II register (none repeated), and 31 pupils were recruited to form a new Class I. However, by the end of that year, only 15 pupils attended regularly, and the classes had been combined. The school contrasted with another just 20 km. away, which had only one drop-out from 133 pupils over the same period, and he was an orphan unable to maintain himself. The role of the teachers was a clear influence explaining the divergence, for whereas in the first they usually arrived late or not at all and acted with little consideration for the children, in the second they were more conscientious and pupils were much more highly motivated.
severity of the situation was amplified by the mere existence of the category "trained but uncertificated". It must be recognised that possession of a certificate is not an infallible guide to the effectiveness of a teacher, for examples are easy to quote both of good teachers with no qualifications and poor teachers with high qualifications. However, the proportion of certificated staff is one guide, and in this case clearly indicates a crisis. Even the headmasters were rarely qualified (fewer than 50%), and in one district 65% had no more than the emergency two year post-primary training which, as will become clear, was very much a crash course. In the mid-1970's, therefore, Kano was very much following a path which others had trodden in the two previous decades, but with even more serious problems.

The existence of the "trained but uncertificated" category also reflected the vast gap between Kano and the South, where no teacher was considered trained until he had passed his examinations. It also reflects a qualitative malaise afflicting training colleges which was exacerbated by the launching of UPE. With already very low examination pass rates, the colleges were forced to admit

1. Nine of the 14 schools in the charge of the Supervisory Headmaster for Shanono in Gwarzo LGA (Mal. Hussaini Abdulkadir, interview 4/6/77) were headed by graduates of the two year emergency programme. The remaining four were all failed Grade II's.

2. The proportion of trained teachers in the Western Region fell from 37% in 1952 to 31% in 1954 and 22% in 1955 (see Chapter I, Section 3.1). Similarly in Ghana, which introduced "compulsory" education in 1961, the proportion of trained teachers fell from 53% in that year to 34% in 1965/6. One writer has noted that "there were probably a number of Ghanaian children in the 1960's who went through school without ever being taught by a certified teacher." ('Education-Development without Planning', Legon Observer, 10/3/72, p. 106). In Kano, the proportion of trained staff was much lower than in either of these two examples even before UPE was launched. Subsequent sections of this thesis discuss the possibility that the attendant consequences may also parallel, but at a more serious level, experiences elsewhere.
a large number of students who under normal circumstances would have been considered unsuitable. Since the students were often poorly taught and were aware of guaranteed jobs awaiting them, they had little incentive to be industrious. This point illustrates the recurrence of the quality-quantity dilemma which administrators in Kano have been trying to break since the introduction of Western-type schooling.

The emergency training colleges experienced considerable obstacles in their early years, which further demonstrated the problems of implementing an ambitious project within a short period of time. Three colleges were established at the end of 1974, four more in 1975 and two more in 1976. Contacts were awarded for construction of expensive prefabricated buildings around the state, but work was subjected to continual delays and all colleges occupied temporary sites in Kano Metropolitan Area for several years. Most operated only in the afternoon so that the compounds which they shared could be employed for their original purpose in the morning. In two cases, colleges occupied primary school buildings. It is ironic that preparations to provide teachers for UPE should in these cases have displaced primary pupils. The majority of institutions, however, occupied compounds otherwise used by full Grade II colleges so that separate institutions existed called, for example, SAS and SAS(UPE).

1. Whereas completely untrained teachers were placed on salary Grade Level 01 (N768-N918 p.a.), graduates from the emergency course were raised to Level 03 (N948-N1,118). Thus the employment was also quite lucrative in addition to being guaranteed.

2. This refers only to the "UPE Teachers' Colleges". One Grade II college was also established in 1974 and two pivotal colleges were opened in 1974 and 1975.

3. See Chapter V, Section 1.

4. Shahuci completely displaced a primary school in the Old City, and Stadium occupied half of another on the Airport Road.

5. SAS = School of Arabic Studies (see Chapter II, Section 3.11). Other examples were the Kano Educational Development Centre and KEDC(UPE); Kano Teachers' College and KTC(UPE); and Arabic Teachers' College and ATC(UPE).
One problem faced by primary teachers' colleges in developing countries is that they must provide a considerable general cognitive training as well as methodological ability, which inevitably reduces the depth pupils acquire in each.\(^1\) The emergency colleges in Kano were intended to provide a two year course. In the event, few actually did so, which gave rise to further concern over quality. The first group of pupils in SAS(UPE), for example, joined in November 1974 and left in June 1976.\(^2\) The first cohort at Stadium received an even shorter course, for they entered in May 1975 and graduated in June 1976.\(^3\) One effect of teaching in the afternoons was that both staff and students were usually tired, and the day was shortened from eight to six lessons. All colleges also suffered from staff shortages, and since the initial skills of many students were poor, the final output was generally of low quality. Some of the students were mature and had already benefitted from

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1. An interesting strategy to increase primary teacher supply in Tanzania, which launched UPE in 1977, has been the introduction of pedagogical training in all secondary institutions. While this reduces the amount of time devoted to other studies, it is argued that even if the students do not ultimately become teachers, the training will still be of use in other spheres. (S. Tunginie, 'Teacher Education in Tanzania', in Teacher Education for Basic Education, Report of a Conference-Workshop held in Tanzania, 1975, UNESCO/UNICEF, Nairobi, 1976, p.67). No similar suggestion has been made in Kano, mainly because secondary education receives a strong priority as well as primary. Policy in Tanzania has been to restrict secondary development in favour of primary, and generally give explicit priority to basic education.

2. Interview, Principal, SAS(UPE) Teachers' College, Mr. Stewart Street, 27/10/76.

3. Interview, Principal Stadium UPE Teachers' College, Mal. Mohammed Bello, 3/11/76.
teaching experience. The majority, however, were young, and usually direct from primary school. Because development of Kano State was the overriding purpose of UPE, applicants from other states were often specifically excluded. This caused some ill feeling and, since the applicants from other states were often better qualified, did little to raise the colleges' standards. In this respect, UPE to some extent increased ethnic tensions rather than reduced them.

1. A high proportion of this group had been seconded by the LEA's, and was on full salary. As has been noted elsewhere, students with teaching experience often have a much more realistic appraisal of teaching problems, and benefit more from their period of training. With this in mind, a recent recommendation to the Ministry of Education in Botswana, where it is proposed to launch UPE in 1980, suggested that one year's teaching should be made a pre-condition for entry to training colleges. (Government of Botswana, Education for Kaaisano: Report of the National Commission on Education, Ministry of Education, Gaborone, 1972 Vol.1, pp.141-2). This measure has not been formally introduced in Kano. Informally, however, it may improve the efficiency of training if the present body of untrained staff is encouraged, in a few years' time, to acquire official qualifications.

2. The principal of one college commented that "The government operates a humanitarian philosophy whereby no student is regarded as unable to do the work" (private conversation, November 1976). Taken another way, his remark suggested that the virtual absence of any criterion for admission other than Kano State origin seriously reduced general standards.

3. Many Southerners were particularly critical of the substantial allowances students received, which were not available in Southern states where education was widely seen as a privilege to be paid for. In Kano, allowances in 1976 stood at N24.60 per month, calculated on the basis of N5 rent, N18 food and N1.60 pocket money. Students were expected to secure their own accommodation, but were given uniforms, books, medical services and travelling allowances. The adequacy or otherwise of these payments depends with what they are compared. Pupils coming straight from primary school must be considered well off with an annual allowance of N271.20 if compared to the average peasant family income of N500-700, especially if they were able to live at home. Older pupils with families accustomed to a higher standard of living found it more difficult. The contempt expressed by many Southerners was increased by observation that the day allowances were due was the only time colleges were even nearly full, however. As from 1/2/77, pocket money was abolished but subsistence allowances raised to N1.20 per day for pupils in Class I - III (N1.50 for Classes IV and V) during term time, plus a rent allowance of N5 per month throughout the year (Ministry of Education circular INSP/1/Vol.II/278, dated 4/2/77).
The lack of careful planning of the emergency colleges was evident from the absence of a common syllabus and leaving examination. Individual principals were left to devise their own procedures, with consequent lack of uniformity among the colleges. The staffing procedure also reflected a poorly defined division of responsibility. Usually the principal and a number of other officers, particularly expatriates, were appointed in the early years by the Federal Ministry of Education which neither consulted nor coordinated with the state ministry. Since the latter was responsible for administration and payment of salaries, certain tensions developed. Though it was logical, in view of its unifying objectives, that UPE should be a federally directed project, overburdened administrative structures and poorly defined areas of responsibility reduced the effectiveness of implementation.

One advantage both of being in Kano Metropolitan Area and of operating mainly in the afternoons was that many full-time teachers elsewhere were able to teach part-time in the UPE colleges. The reliance placed on part-time staff was exemplified by KTC (UPE) which at one time had only three full-time staff and 40 part-time. This was an extreme, both for that college at that point in time and for colleges in general. However, it highlighted the manpower situation which, though it made efficient use of scarce trained staff, made running the colleges particularly difficult when institutions did move to rural sites. Thus while the siting of

1. The labour market implications of the high proportion of teacher trainers are discussed in Chapter V, Section 1.
2. So loose was general supervision and control at this time that cases were not unknown of teachers almost completely neglecting their full-time assignments to teach in two separate UPE colleges, and being paid for all three.
3. Interview, Principal KTC (UPE) Teachers' College, Mal. Sule Mohammed Dambatta, 10/6/77.
4. Another problem with part-time staff was the tendency for a very rapid turn-over, which was an additional factor militating against effective training.
colleges in Roni and Maigatari, for example, may be considered a desirable aspect of rural development, their remoteness discouraged most staff from remaining. In this respect rural development policies have to be reconciled with practicalities. Long and short term objectives may also be seen as incompatible, for one objective of UPE was development of rural areas through the schools; but if the teachers are poorly trained, in the long run development will be illusory.

Sadly, the experience of the emergency programme meant that the word 'crash' could be used to describe what happened to it as well as what it was. By 1978 the initial quantitative hurdles had been cleared and the authorities were able to pay greater attention to quality. As a first step, they converted the emergency institutions to full Grade II colleges. Many teachers sat an examination in June 1978 for entry to Class III so that they could continue their training where they had left off. Ironically, this had the short term effect of actually lowering the quality of teaching staff actually in the primary schools, however, since only the better ones were admitted for further studies. As Williams has pointed out, 'stop-go' expansion policies also frequently cause ripples in the education system which may still cause problems several decades later.¹

The upgrading of teachers' colleges, nevertheless, was popular among the trainees. In several states of the federation, both Northern and Southern, the initials UP3 were widely parodied as "Useless People's Education". Even the students in the training colleges, for whom UPE was a means of advancement, felt in some ways that the initials had come to suggest inferiority and maladministration. ¹

¹ Peter Williams, Planning Teacher Demand and Supply, IIEP, Paris, 1979, p.20. An example of problems that might arise occurred during the retrenchment during the 1960's following the Western Region campaign, when many poorly qualified teachers found themselves being overtaken, and replaced, by people who had been their own students ('Education in the South: A Proposal', Nigerian Opinion, op.cit., p.109.)
request from students at Shahuci to have the initials removed from their badges, in 1977, was not insignificant. 

Even after only one year there were signs that the whole campaign had counterproductive aspects. With the abolition of the two year course and its replacement by the five year programme, one question which arose, however, was whether the reform would not merely convert an adequate but poorly qualified supply of teachers into a general shortage. The danger was particularly acute in view of the poor performance of the Grade II colleges, and the high proportion of graduates who do not remain in the primary education sector.

Even the oldest Grade II colleges experience serious difficulties as is demonstrated by their examination results (Table 3.7). The Arabic Teachers' College, for example,

Table 3.7: Grade II Examination Results, Kano State, 1972-76

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<tr>
<td>Candidates</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wollen's T.C.</td>
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<td>69</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td>School of Arabic Studies</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano T.C.</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Service Training Centre</td>
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<td>42</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>Arabic T.C.</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guasu T.C.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waje Pivotal T.C.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coron Dutse Pivotal T.C.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>266</td>
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</table>

had no successful students in either 1972 or 1976, and only one in 1975. That results are so poor can hardly be ascribed to lack of financial provision or poor facilities, especially in the longest established institutions. Two more important factors are the low quality of intake, itself partly the result of poor teaching, and the general lack of incentives noted above with regard to the emergency colleges. The system is to some extent caught in a vicious circle whereby poor pupils become poor teachers who produce more poor pupils, and the majority of better students either never enter the teaching profession at all or use it as a stepping stone to other careers. The scale of educational

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1. Similar attitudes were held by students of KCC (UFE) Teachers' College (interview, Mr. G. Taylor, former Principal, 2/8/79).
expansion in Kano State has meant that the minority who do pass their examinations are the 'cream', an elite desperately sought by the universities and advanced teachers' colleges. In a situation of guaranteed employment and where even the headmasters are rarely qualified, there is very little incentive for pupils to exert themselves, especially when the colleges have so little internal competition.

In particularly short supply, and particularly poor in examination performance, were female teachers. The politicians who launched the mass education programme, and who chose to relegate their qualitative implications to the background, continue to exhort the people to send more girls to school. This, however, is another vicious circle, for one reason why few girls attend school is that few teachers are female and are able to ameliorate conditions in what otherwise tends to be a male environment. And one reason why so few teachers are female is that so few girls reach the end of the system. Other reasons, noted in Chapter Two, are the pressures of marriage, and the influence of purdah. Only in a very few (but increasing) number of families does a wife adopt a profession in order to supplement her family income.

One strategy to increase the number of female teachers was the opening of the Women's Teachers' College (WTC) as early as 1947. That its impact has been limited is shown by the fact that less than 8% of teachers in 1976/7 were female, and a significant proportion of those were probably Southerners, concentrated in urban areas. The success rate in the WTC fluctuates (Table 3.7), but a common complaint in post-primary institutions is that, because of social attitudes and the lack of competition, it is even harder to encourage high standards among the girls than it is among the boys. This is made particularly clear in mixed institutions since the girls are usually at the bottom of classes.

1. For further discussion, relating particularly to three other African countries (Kenya, Ghana and Egypt), see Smock, op.cit., pp.5-8.
The proportion of female teachers in training remains less than 10% (Table 3.5), which suggests that the pattern is unlikely to alter significantly within the next few years. However, it must be noted that in 1975 at least six schools had headmistresses, five of whom were Northerners.\(^1\)

In a situation of generally low staff qualifications, the role of in-service training becomes very important. For some years Kano was fortunate and unusual among Northern states to have an In-Service Training Centre which, as indicated in Table 3.7, offered opportunities for teachers to upgrade themselves. Regrettably, the training aspect of this centre was abolished in 1976 at the very time when the system needed it most. Its functions should have been taken over by the National Teachers' Institute in Kaduna. However, this body was both less suited to the task of in-service training and failed to begin full operation for a number of years. Once again the situation, which is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four, illustrates the dangers of politicians assuming that mere passage of a decree is sufficient for the prompt establishment of smooth running and effective institutions.\(^2\)

The impact of the Grade II colleges, low though it is, would be more significant if those teachers who did qualify were content to remain in the system. Few, however, do so. The first reason for this has already been mentioned - that those who are successful find entry to higher institutions easy; so if they enter teaching at all, do so at the secondary or higher level. The second reason is that teaching in general no longer enjoys the prestige accorded it in the past. In part this reflects the high demand and therefore

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1. Two schools were ordinary primary schools in Kano City. Two others were girls' boarding schools (Shekara and Kabo), the fifth was the University Staff School, and the sixth was the international Capital School, headed by an expatriate.

2. In actual fact, even the official decree was delayed until mid-1978. (See Chapter IV, Section 4.vi.)
lucrative posts available in other sectors of the economy which in turn reflects Kano's low educational development and the desire, especially in state and federal government appointments, for Kano citizens to be seen to be given a share. It is also an ironic result of the UFE programme, for when it became possible for almost anyone to obtain a teaching appointment, inevitably the profession was flooded with underqualified persons and lost prestige. This is an additional reason why quantitative increases reduce quality: not only is it necessary to recruit teachers of lower standards, but because they are recruited, the better ones leave. This situation is not confined to Kano. A lawyer who recently wrote to the *Daily Times* reflected popular opinion by protesting against what he regarded as an insulting comment on one of his clients: "...You went further to describe Mrs X as a Grade II teacher. This is grossly incorrect and disparaging and designed to lower her character and integrity in the estimation of right thinking people in this country. Mrs. X has never at any time been a teacher of any grade or at all."¹ This letter reflected an attitude in the Southern states, where teachers are generally of a much higher standard and more worthy of respect. It makes Kano's task of injecting prestige into the profession appear all the more formidable.

Many students also enter teachers' colleges with no intention of actually teaching. The five year Grade II course is seen by employers as a rough equivalent to the five year WASC programme. Indeed, on occasions employers may deliberately advocate teacher training to provide general qualifications. The case of one pivotal student exemplifies this. He was offered a post by the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation, but told that he would have to study for one more year, for which the most obvious place was the pivotal college.²

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² Interview, 14/10/76.
With the launching of UPE, it was essential as far as possible to reduce widespread misgivings on the religious nature of education. One way to do this was to increase the number of Arabists employed. Malams who had formerly taught in their own Koranic schools were recruited to teach the same subjects in the classroom. Thus the proportion of Arabists in the teaching force was increased from 13% in 1975/6 to 20% the following year. Besides providing a large number of teachers for UPE, employment of the malams had the additional benefit of creating links with the villages. Very often the Arabist was the only member of staff to come from, and live in, the villages schools were intended to serve.

The large scale employment of Arabists did, however, have drawbacks. The burden that teaching of Arabic as well as Hausa and English places on the curriculum will be examined in Chapter Four. A second problem arose from their teaching methods, which often emphasised rote learning in the traditional style rather than learning by comprehension. As planners elsewhere have also noted, the authorities had to balance attempts to modernise the curriculum against the danger of losing both the malams' and the villagers' support by appearing too revolutionary. Like their colonial predecessors, they also had to guard against excessive formalisation diminishing the flexibility which is an important feature of the traditional system.  

1. For discussion on the Mauritanian project, see Botti, Carelli and Saliba, op. cit., pp. 110-1. The attitude of some malams in Kano was illustrated by one who, on arriving at the LEA office for an interview, remarked in a loud voice, "I had thought we were going to teach the Holy Koran. Why then are we being interviewed by these Christians?" The 'Christians' in question were education officers who could well have been more learned in Islamic matters than the malam himself; but the speaker regarded anyone who could read the Roman script or speak English as 'Christian'. (Interview, EO Bichi, Mal. Haliru Dawaki, 9/11/76)

2. As noted in Chapter II (Section 3.11), this difficulty was encountered by the founders of the Law School in 1934. See also Botti, Carelli and Saliba, ibid.
A third problem relating to the malams concerned their relationship with the other staff, who tended not to regard them as 'real' teachers. When asked how many staff he had, it was common for a headmaster to reply, for example, "I have nine teachers and three Arabists." This attitude persisted despite the fact that the malams were often fairly old and certainly respected members of the community. Even youths with only primary education seemed often to be regarded as more their colleagues than the Arabists. On their part, some malams saw themselves being examined, appointed and regulated by "foreign criteria."

A fourth problem, partly related to the third, was that since the malams had no paper qualifications, the government could only offer them employment on the lowest grade (01). Those who had completed the emergency training course, as noted above, were placed on Level 03, and tended to consider themselves much superior to all on a lower grade, including the Arabists. Since the government awarded honorary Grade II certificates to some staff in recognition of length of service, it would have been worth considering a similar scheme for the Arabists. On the other hand, there was no great pressure for change from the malams themselves. Many paid little attention to their salary level because they had been working for most of their lives without one,

1. See also Clarke, 'Islam and Western Education' op. cit., p.33.
2. Provision existed for award of an honorary Grade II certificate after 15 years' service for either Grade III holders or Grade II failures, which placed the teacher on Grade Level 05.
3. The Arabic Teachers' Association had a strong case for arguing that Arabists who had completed the one year in-service course (see Chapter IV, Section 4.1v) should be placed on a grade higher than 01. (Interview, Alh. Ali Musa, President, Arabic Teachers' Association, Kano, 23/11/76).
4. Thus, though the above-mentioned Arabic Teachers' Association existed, it was not a very powerful or effective body.
and took whatever came as a gift from Allah without asking whether it was great or small. The upgrading of Arabists, therefore, might be desirable not so much for the financial gains it would confer as for the respect which, in the highly materialist society Nigeria has become, goes with the salary level. On the other hand, concern about the costs of UPE may render such a reform unrealistic, and defeat one of the advantages of employing local resource personnel in what is currently a very inefficient system.  

Finally, we should consider the problems relating to those teachers who were completely untrained. Nine percent of staff employed in 1976/7 (1,164) had only primary education. Twice that number - 2,301 or 18% - were "auxiliary" and did not even have full primary education. A number had schooled for a few years; some had only adult literacy certificates. The main asset of these teachers was their visibility, for at least they enabled the schools to open and expand. It is also arguable that they fulfilled one essential role - that of child-minder - at a relatively low cost. As one officer remarked, however, the auxiliaries were little more than "the blind leading the blind", which will inevitably have had an impact on what the children did or did not learn, and on the people's perception of UPE schools. There is a danger that attempts to achieve too much may have been counter-productive and in the long run increased resistance to schools because parents discovered that their children learnt little that was useful and some things that were harmful.  

In this section we have noted the achievements and the problems in securing teachers for UPE since 1976. It is

1. See Chapter IV, passim.
2. Though not all applicants were employed, selection criteria were not very rigorous. The In-Service Centre examined 2,500 applicants in September 1976, and recommended appointment of 2,257. (Minutes of the meeting of education inspectors and advisers, ISC, Kano, 17/9/76).
3. See Peter Williams, Planning Teacher Demand and Supply, op. cit., p. 16.
clear that many difficulties arose from the scale of expansion. Whether this pattern was inevitable, and whether the advantages outweighed the disadvantages, is a matter which will be discussed in due course. Meanwhile, let us turn to the third section on developments since 1976, which concerns physical capital.


Despite the fact that the launching of UPE was postponed one and a half years from its original date of April 1975, early in 1976 it became clear that many buildings would not be completed in time. In January of that year, editorials in Nigeria’s two most influential newspapers suggested that it might be necessary to postpone the take-off a second time. Wisely, the government considered it better to adhere to a target and tolerate shortcomings, because with ever receding deadlines, pressure to complete projects is much reduced. Of particular effectiveness was a Task Force created in mid-1976, composed of eight state commissioners each assigned to an administrative area, to implement plans. Although some conflicts and shortcomings were inevitable, this body achieved considerably more within

1. Editorials, New Nigerian, 16/1/76; Daily Times, 19/1/76 (see Chapter I, Section 3.iv).

2. The EO Birnin Kudum, for example (interview, 10/12/76), blamed slow progress on the lack of interest assigned to his area. Later the commissioner resigned and was replaced by a more enthusiastic man, though the EO still complained that he was not consulted on siting decisions. Similarly, the EC Bichi (interview, 9/11/76) objected to lack of consultation in his area. He cited the case of Talsan, which is the name of both a hamlet and a wider area with its village head and centre of population at Argwanda. The commissioner ignored the advice of both the District Head and the EC and awarded a contract for four classrooms at Talsau hamlet. In consequence the people of Argwanda sent a delegation of 200 to the Emir to demand their own school. As a general measure to improve the effectiveness of the Task Force, the government appointed commissioners to their areas of origin, though this was not always possible.
a short space of time than would have been the case had the launching date been postponed. Whilst, as we have noted, the Eastern Region UPE project in the 1950's tragically illustrated the dangers of attempting too much without careful planning, the Western Region scheme highlighted the importance of an impressive launching accompanied by widespread publicity. It is arguable, therefore, that despite the defects resulting from the scale of expansion, there were also several advantages in adhering to the deadline.

Three different basic types of classroom were erected for UPE in 1976. The first was a conventional cement building, usually with wooden doors and windows and a verandah on one or both sides. The second was a steel framed structure, usually with glass doors and windows; and the third was a "semi-permanent" mud structure plastered with cement so that when completed it looked little different from a conventional block. The experience of the first few years showed that some designs were more appropriate than others.

Because in 1976 all financial commitments were ultimately settled by the state and federal governments, Divisional Tenders Boards, which were responsible for award of contracts, were under little pecuniary constraint. Prices varied widely, depending on the decisions of each board, which at times created conflict. The average price paid for a two-classroom block in Garki, for example, was N8,000 compared with N11,000 offered in Gumel. In consequence businessmen who had secured contracts in both areas neglected the former in favour of the latter. This also happened on a wider scale at the state level, showing that development of one area is often at the expense of another.

Because of the urgent need for construction, normal procedures under which contractors were required to register

1. See Chapter I, Section 3.
2. Minutes of the Reconstituted Area Tenders Board of the former Kano North Central Administrative Area, 6/9/76 (typescript).
3. See Section 2 of this chapter.
with the government and demonstrate their competence were waived.\textsuperscript{1} The lack of overall control was illustrated by examples of builders beginning work in the wrong place and on at least one occasion in the wrong district.\textsuperscript{2} Unfortunately the launching of UPE coincided with an acute cement shortage\textsuperscript{3} and a construction boom throughout the economy. This added to the problems already faced by many inexperienced businessmen, and meant that contracts were often poorly executed, which in turn necessitated high maintenance expenditure.\textsuperscript{4}

Variations in ability to ensure completion of classrooms on schedule are shown in Table 3.8. The first column refers to all existing classrooms at that date, centrally

\textsuperscript{1} Ministry of Education circular CDK/EST/143/T1/1, dated 4/5/76.

\textsuperscript{2} For example, one contractor who should have built a school in Garki District actually began work in Babura (minutes of the former Kano North Central Reconstituted Area Tenders Board, op.cit.). One contractor also built two classrooms at Yadakunya, in Ungogo District, instead of Najumare, two miles away. However he was still paid, despite the mistake (interview, SC Waje and Ungogo, Mal. Sabo Umar, 1/12/76).

\textsuperscript{3} The shortage was partly the result of the construction boom and partly of a ban on importation following extreme congestion at Apapa docks, itself caused in large measure by very large military consignments. A total of 10 million metric tons was ordered in 1975, 16 million of which was for the Ministry of Defence alone. The Third National Plan had envisaged imports at around two million tons per annum. Consumption of cement in Africa as a whole in 1974 was under 30 million tons (Ian Campbell, 'Army Reorganisation and Military Withdrawal' in Keith Panter Brick (ed.), Soldiers and Oil, Frank Cass, London, 1978, p.97). In consequence cement which should have sold at N3.20 per bag was available only on the black market at N8.50 - N10.00.

\textsuperscript{4} Inadequate business experience also caused some contractors to operate at a loss, despite the considerable profit margins obtainable. This caused some embarrassment to the ministry, and was another factor delaying work. (Interview, CEO (Planning), Ministry of Education, Kano, Mal. Aliyu Gani, 17/11/76).
Table 3.8: Primary School Classrooms Existing and still under Construction, October 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Government Area</th>
<th>Existing or Completed</th>
<th>Still under Construction</th>
<th>% Shortfall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kano Municipal</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dambatta</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gezawa</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minjibir</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ringim</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawakin Tofa</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rioni</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birnin Kudu</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaya</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wudil</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jahun</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawakin Kudu</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rano</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tudun Wada</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadejia</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaffin Hausa</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gumel</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazaure</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,456</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,128</strong></td>
<td><strong>39</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


collected information distinguishing new from older buildings having been unavailable. Nevertheless, a wide variation is apparent. At one extreme was Dawakin Kudu District which had completed all its classrooms by 1976. At the other, Jahun and Kaffin Hausa had completed hardly any. The most important determinant of the former's success was probably the personality of its Education Officer who, although also responsible for Rano while its officer was on study leave, was prepared to devote considerable energy and spare time to his work. In particular, he realised the need for prompt payments to encourage contractors and accelerate work. It was the normal practice, in recognition of the scarcity of working capital, to provide

1. Thus the 112 classrooms shown to be still under construction in Dawakin Kudu LGA were all in Kumbotso District.

2. Interview, BO Dawakin Kudu and Rano, Alh. Mohammed Umaru Zakari, 6/11/76.
contractors with an initial 10% mobilisation fee. Sometimes additional payments were made for the same reason when buildings were part completed. Although in several cases contracts were withdrawn from builders who had failed to begin work, rarely were penalty clauses invoked. This was in part because the authorities were sympathetic to the difficulties faced by contractors, but more because they were occupied with other urgent administrative matters.

Kaffin Hausa and Jahun both suffered from inaccessibility and remoteness from the administrative centre. This contrasted with the relatively smooth progress of Kazaure and Gumel, and showed the clear benefits not only of small administrative units, but also a relatively stable administration untroubled by boundary adjustments. Where buildings were not ready in time, classes were usually held under the shade of a nearby tree (Plate VI) or in temporary zana (guinea-corn stalk) mat structures.

The steel framed buildings, of which the ministry purchased 1,000 units, were not a success. It had been hoped

1. In Gumel, contractors undertaking furniture construction were paid as much as 40% mobilisation fees. This is another clear indication of the availability of financial resources in Nigeria which distinguished it from most other developing countries and thus created a different atmosphere for the launching of UPE.

2. Kaffin Hausa was administered from Hadejia and found communications particularly difficult during the rainy season. Jahun was administered from Birnin Kudu, where officers complained that even Kano based contractors could not be persuaded to undertake building (Letter from D.C. to Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education, DC/BK/197/313, dated 30/5/76). The District Head of Jahun wrote to the LSA office in Birnin Kudu on 7/10/76, listing 13 schools in which remoteness made building impossible. Two months later still no action had been taken on the matter. Elsewhere contractors found it necessary to employ donkeys to transport materials because sites were so remote.

3. Similarly, officers in Yudil considered their problems greatly eased by decentralisation in 1977. The district was formerly administered from Rano, but although adjacent to the west, officers travelling from Rano to Yudil had first to travel east to Kura and then north to Kano.
that their greater cost\(^1\) would be justified by their durability, by the greater speed with which they could be erected, and by the fact that they would obviate demand on scarce timber supplies. They were available to any district which requested them, but since they could not be delivered before the end of June, several areas\(^2\) chose not to utilise them. This was another factor facilitating more rapid progress in those areas. Of the districts which did employ the structures, the majority followed the principle, since the frames were difficult to transport, of using them only for schools near a road. This was in contrast to the ministry's surprising suggestion that they should be sent to remote areas, a policy which was applied in Kaffin Hausa where 200 steel-framed blocks were erected and where work was consequently impeded.\(^3\)

The decision to use steel framed buildings is now generally agreed to have been a mistake. Not only were they more expensive; they took a longer rather than shorter time to construct. The first reason for this was that failure simultaneously to deliver all the required sections compounded the problems of transportation. The second reason was that local contractors were unfamiliar with the materials and could build conventional blocks more easily. The frames were also undesirable from a national standpoint since they had to be imported and thus contributed to port congestion while providing little domestic employment.\(^4\)

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1. N4,300 each plus carriage outside Kano and approximately N4,200 for the actual construction.
3. It is possible that a more pertinent factor explaining the large allocation of frames to Kaffin Hausa was not its remoteness but the influence of senior ministry officials from that area.
4. See Chapter V, Section 1.
Similarly, the mud classrooms were of limited success. Contracts for them were awarded only in the areas in which the soil was considered suitable, and where the authorities favoured mud as a building material. In other areas the Tenders Boards regarded mud as less prestigious, impractical for construction during the rainy season, and more expensive in the long run because buildings require greater maintenance. Although contracts were awarded between April and June, few contractors started work until October 1976, and to have attempted construction earlier would have been unwise. The choice of building design was therefore a vital determinant of the number of classrooms ready by the time UPE was launched, which itself had implications for enrolments and the initial success of the project.

In addition to the classrooms, authorities also erected teachers' houses. Again, designs varied according to each area. Those built in Gumel were small but functional and cheap. During 1976/7, 42 houses were built at an average cost of N2,000 and contrasted with those built in Hadejia at a unit cost between N4,800 and N5,160. While the latter were more luxurious, and therefore promoted the

1. In all cases, semi-permanent structures were in the minority. They comprised 36 of the 340 new classrooms in Dawakin Tofa, for example; 104 of 248 in Karaye; 12 of 286 in Gwarzo; 8 of 282 in Kazaure; 36 of 226 in Bichi; 15 of 181 in Dambatta; 4 of 185 in Sumaila; and 2 of 96 in Gwaram.

2. A contractor who did begin work before the rains had ended, on Dungarawa school in Dawakin Tofa LGA, found that his walls fell three times before work was finally abandoned. The example, however, reflected the inexperience of the contractor as well as the difficulties of building in mud during the rainy season.

3. Interview, CEO Gumel, Alh. Mohammed Zakari, 9/12/76. The houses had only two rooms, 12 feet by 10 feet, with metal doors and windows and a small courtyard. Two were built in Sule Tankarkar, a District Headquarters, and the remainder in more remote villages.

4. Interview, CEO Hadejia, Alh. Bilyaminu Usman, 13/11/76. Thirty eight houses were planned for 1976/7.
status of their occupants, Gumel's policy had the obvious advantage of spreading resources more evenly.

Expenditure on teachers' houses, while not the first item that comes to mind, could have a significant influence on the success of UPS since it promotes teacher morale and encourages some to work in rural areas. Of less direct benefit, though obvious in their function, were the expensive latrines also built. Four hole units built by Kano and Kazaure LEA's in 1976/7 cost N2,400 each. It is doubtful whether their unit cost - greater than Gumel's teachers' houses - was justified. Gumel was able to construct smaller latrines at a unit cost of N600, but even there money could have been saved and the local economy given greater stimulus by the use of local building materials rather than imported cement and metal doors and windows.¹

Another substantial item of expenditure was compensation for land, buildings and crops on which the schools were built. Rates were raised in 1976, and though critics suggested that they remained inadequate,² authorities made outlays which in the cases of Hadejia and Gumel, for example, exceeded N500,000. From the financial angle, it is fortun-

1. Since Gumel's latrines had only one hole, it should be noted that their basic cost was the same as Kano's four hole ones.

2. Until 1st April 1976, compensation varied between N40 and N120 per acre, the highest being paid in Kano Metropolitan Area. On that date, rates were increased to N800 per acre in Kano Metropolitan Area, N400 within eight Km. of each administrative headquarters, and N250 in all other areas (Kano State of Nigeria Gazette, No.7, Vol.10, 20th May 1976). These rates were rapidly outdated by local government reform and by inflation, however, and took no account of variations in soil fertility or population density. Compensation for trees remained at the 1973 level, which was very low. Henna bushes, for example, were valued at only 33 kobo, and bananas at N2 (document ADM/201/UR 11/730 of 27/9/73, Ministry of Lands and Survey, Kano), which would hardly pay for a single crop and certainly not for the life-time crops of the trees. Towards the end of 1976 a Federal decree substantially increased rates (Decree No.33 of 1976), but no instruction to implement them was received in Kano.
ate that these expenditures will not recur in future years. They were settled during a time of economic prosperity and enthusiasm for UPS, both of which declined within a short time, and would have been much more difficult to meet in subsequent years.

Furniture for UPS included designs employing both wood and metal. As for classrooms, contracts were awarded by Divisional Tenders Boards. The ministry also made several bulk purchases through its 'UPS Coordinator', a post specifically created to facilitate implementation of UPS and to obtain supplies more cheaply by making bulk purchases. Unfortunately, once again, the division of responsibility was not entirely clear and resulted in a certain amount of reduplication. This was particularly unfortunate in view of the pressure on the economy. As with the buildings, contracts for construction of furniture were neither well supervised nor well executed, and created heavy recurrent burdens in subsequent years.

Decisions on furniture design had to take account of three basic factors. The first was the capacity of the economy: i.e. the number of businesses capable of executing contracts within a short period of time. Several companies in Kano already had experience of furniture construction, and were given large contracts. Smaller concerns were also given work, but because of administrative constraints, authorities found it preferable to award large contracts to businessmen who sub-contracted the work to individuals. This further raised costs, but was necessary under the circumstances.

The second factor to be considered was the supply of raw materials. Kano has very little timber suitable for furniture construction. Almost all timber has to be brought

1. Just as several enterprises only began furniture construction because of the demands of UPS in 1976, at least one (Raccah & Chaker, Ltd.) graduated from furniture to prefabricated building construction. Thus the number of businesses engaged in making furniture was limited as well as increased by the requirements of UPS. This is further discussed in Chapter V, Section 1.
from states further south, and since they also were preparing for UPE and coping with other demands of the economic boom, supplies were often short. One solution to this was construction of metal furniture. Like the steel framed buildings, however, use of metal did little to promote development of the Nigerian economy. The furniture was particularly unsuitable because in rural areas it is usually impossible to weld broken frames, and the poor quality of construction meant that broken frames were common. A large number of schools even before the launching of UPE had a pile of broken frames, and the number rapidly increased after 1976.

Although the government provided uniforms for students in teachers' colleges, those for primary children had to be provided by parents. Since they cost approximately N2.00 at the time of launching, it could be felt that the requirement partially negated the concept of "free" education. The strictness with which uniforms were actually demanded varied according to each headmaster, and, particularly in rural schools, children in uniform were often in a minority during 1976/7. At the other extreme, however, at least one headmaster in Kano City required children to possess two sets of uniform before they could be admitted. In this case, children from poorer families were clearly disadvantaged, and the ability of UPE to reduce social inequality was called into doubt. 1

Kano parents, unlike their counterparts in many southern states, were not required to purchase books or other materials, however. Frequently items did not arrive in the new schools for several months after the beginning of the first term, but since a large number of buildings had not been completed, this was sometimes an advantage. Most primary schools had slates and chalk almost from the beginning of term, and other equipment, which included items from rulers to clocks and footballs, arrived a few months later.

1. See Chapter VI, Section 2.1.
The main intention of this section was to outline events since the launching of UPE in Kano State in order to provide a basis for analysis in subsequent chapters. Discussion of the financial implications, for example, has been postponed to Chapter Four, as has anything more than cursory analysis of the administrative machinery. That Chapter will also examine the role of publishers, both in designing and actually producing books. Decisions on building and furniture design have implications for the labour market and broader economy, examined in Chapter Five. Finally, all these matters will have bearing on the social impact of UPE and its uses to society, discussed in Chapter Six.

Before turning to analysis of the operation of the educational machinery, however, it will be useful to highlight some of the events since the launching of UPE in the other states of the federation. This will make possible some comparison and provide a point of reference by which to determine the likelihood of UPE attaining its national objectives.

2. Developments in Other States of the Federation

i. Enrolments and Schools

The first difficulty in documenting the impact of UPE in other states of the federation is that only six of them existed per se before February 1976. All the others were either newly created or experienced substantial boundary adjustments, and in several cases governments did not compile statistics for academic years before 1976/7. The second problem is that statistics collected in Lagos are subject to even greater inaccuracies than more local ones because of deficiencies in the documentation and checking machinery. State ministries frequently failed to respond to federal circulars or to correct provisional estimates. 1

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1. This is clearly shown by the 1977/8 figure for Kano State shown in Table 3.9, which suggests a total enrolment of 565,400. This compares with a later Kano State Ministry estimate of 472,400 (Table 3.1), and, as was noted in Section 1.1 of this chapter, even this figure is probably a substantial over-estimate.
Nevertheless if the figures are treated with caution, they do provide a useful impression. Table 3.9 shows Kano to have been among the states with the highest enrolment increases both in 1976/7 and in 1977/8.¹ The Southern states, as expected, show generally smaller increases. The pattern was broadly repeated in the number of schools opened, shown in Table 3.10.²

Though the Northern states experienced greater percentage increases, it must be remembered that they started from a lower base. The expansion of many Southern states was also considerable, and has particular significance for the attempt to "bridge the gap". It was noted in Chapter One that during the Eastern Region's UPE campaign of the 1950's, in the short run gaps widened rather than narrowed. This was because the partially developed areas were more acquainted with the benefits of education and were less conservative, so made a greater response than the least developed areas. It is possible that a similar pattern occurred on a national scale with the 1976 programme.

Certainly it is true, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, that public (as opposed to official) enthusiasm was much greater in the southern states than in the north. This was demonstrated, for example, by the use of the initials UPE to decorate transport vehicles, by the ready provision of mosques, churches and town halls for temporary classrooms, and even by the composition of popular music.³ All states showed substantial increases in enrolments. Even Lagos, which was thought to have a rate approaching 100% before the launching, achieved such an

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¹ This is true even if the lower estimate is employed for 1977/8.
² Another table, comparing projected and actual enrolments in 1976/7, is shown in Appendix VI.
³ Prince Nico Mbarga, 'Free Education', Roger All Stars Records, Onitsha, 1977. Another musical example was provided by the Ilorin Divisional Progressive Union, a voluntary association which dispatched a band to all districts in the division to promote registrations in March 1976 (Daily Times, 30/3/76).
Table 3.9: Primary Enrolments, by State ('000s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>1975/6</th>
<th>1976/7</th>
<th>% Increase</th>
<th>1977/8</th>
<th>% Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anambra</td>
<td>756.8</td>
<td>905.9</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>907.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>132.9</td>
<td>214.5</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>329.6</td>
<td>53.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bendel</td>
<td>615.6</td>
<td>676.4</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>743.4</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benue</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>636.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>686.9</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borno</td>
<td>160.3</td>
<td>224.6</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>360.1</td>
<td>60.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross River</td>
<td>651.9</td>
<td>741.5</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>768.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gongola</td>
<td>447.4</td>
<td>256.5</td>
<td>171.7</td>
<td>340.3</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imo</td>
<td>723.5</td>
<td>943.0</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>1,034.8</td>
<td>9.7</td>
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<td>Kaduna</td>
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<td>465.6</td>
<td>113.5</td>
<td>636.0</td>
<td>34.6</td>
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<td>Lagos</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>404.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>107.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>179.9</td>
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<td>Ogun</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>127.1</td>
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<td>Rivers</td>
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<td>-2.4</td>
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<td>Sokoto</td>
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<td>50.6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8,533.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10,104.7</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3.10: Primary Schools, by State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>1975/6</th>
<th>1976/7</th>
<th>% Increase</th>
<th>1977/8</th>
<th>% Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anambra</td>
<td>1,769</td>
<td>1,802</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1,865</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>1,358</td>
<td>1,850</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>2,235</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bendel</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,548</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,567</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benue</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>2,033</td>
<td>145.8</td>
<td>2,607</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borno</td>
<td>1,264</td>
<td>1,578</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>1,825</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross River</td>
<td>1,505</td>
<td>1,579</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>1,622</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gongola</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,575</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,869</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imo</td>
<td>1,881</td>
<td>1,910</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1,919</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>2,558</td>
<td>196.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>2,218</td>
<td>227.1</td>
<td>2,629</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwara</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>888</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>1,095</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>923</td>
<td>301.3</td>
<td>985</td>
<td>67.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogun</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,164</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,196</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ondo</td>
<td>1,171</td>
<td>1,331</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>1,372</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oyo</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,025</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>1,496</td>
<td>118.4</td>
<td>1,552</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,653</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sokoto</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>1,767</td>
<td>141.4</td>
<td>2,971</td>
<td>68.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

expansion that it was necessary to introduce triple shift schooling.¹ In the East the combination of publicity and abolition of school fees caused many individuals to return to school where they had earlier dropped out, again in repetition of the pattern in the 1950's.² Thus enrolments in Imo State, which had been high before the launching of UPE, rose still further. In 1977/8 there were over a million primary pupils which, according to official figures, represented over 20% of the entire population.³ The Cross River school intake expanded by 14% in the first year to incorporate an estimated 91% of all primary aged children;⁴ and even Bendel State achieved a 10% increase.

In the Northern states, performance was more varied. Reports from Benue suggested substantial increases with, like the East, many adults returning to school.⁵ Again this illustrated the imbalances within the North. Sokoto, unwilling to place excessive strain on the system, aimed initially for only a 33% enrolment of six year olds but, to officials' surprise, achieved approximately 44%.⁶ Achievements in Borno and Bauchi States, and particularly in Gongola, were greater than they appear at first sight because the North Eastern State had opened a large number of schools in 1974 as the first step towards UFE.⁷

¹. In view of the serious shortening of the working day this caused, a special grant was provided to permit phasing out of the triple shifts. This was added to an already substantial allocation which is discussed below.

². See Chapter I, Section 3.ii.

³. The official 1963 population figure for Imo State was 3,672,054. An annual 2.5% cumulative increase suggests a 1977 figure of 5,062,973.


⁵. In one school in Ankpa Division, for example, a father and his son simultaneously enrolled in different classes (interview, headmaster, 29/12/76).


⁷. 819 schools were opened in 1974, which was a 102% increase on the previous year. (Ministry of Education, North Eastern State, Education Statistics and School Directory of the North Eastern State of Nigeria 1974-5, Maiduguri, 1975, p.12).
although Class I enrolments in Borno State in 1976 were by no means as dramatic as Kano's, this was partly because the government applied pressure earlier. Similarly, in Kwara State a large number of children entered school in 1975 because parents mistook the registration exercises for the actual launching of UPS, and the authorities did not wish to discourage them by refusing the children. All the far northern states met resistance from sections of the local people, and especially from malams. Kano's problems were probably more severe than elsewhere because the change was so abrupt and because its communities are widely acknowledged to be particularly conservative. However, Kano has a relatively low nomadic population. Several states attempted to organise mobile schools, though did not achieve much success.

As noted in Chapter One, total enrolments both in 1976 and in 1977 greatly exceeded expectations. Kano's experience of registration figures seriously underestimating the actual enrolment was repeated in several other states. In Anambra, for example, only 188,000 children registered but 288,000 actually arrived for school; and

1. The 1976/7 enrolments, by classes, were: I 88,020; II 57,052; III 26,533; IV 12,951; V 12,020; VI 10,731; VII 10,263. (Information from Ministry of Education, Maiduguri).
3. See Chapter IV, Section 5.
4. Whereas expected enrolments in 1976 had been 7.4 million, actual enrolments were 8.5 million, and exceeded 10 million the following year.
5. Daily Times, 4/12/76. Note that the registration figures differed significantly from the projection based on the 1963 census, shown in Appendix VI. The problems of assessing the impact of UPS are illustrated by the fact that figures for actual enrolments also differ.
in Plateau 147,000 registered while 164,000 finally arrived. The differences were usually explained by over-aged pupils, many of whom entered other classes in the school. Rarely in states other than Kano did under-aged pupils form a significant proportion.

It was noted above that, despite the dramatic increase in enrolments, the percentage of girls in Kano schools remained roughly constant. This pattern was repeated in other states. It was to be expected in those with high initial rates, since roughly equal proportions were in school before the launching of UPS. However, proportions also changed little in Sokoto and Kaduna States, for example. Thus it was doubtful whether UPE was succeeding in its early years in improving the male/female balance.

Sokoto’s policy of deliberately aiming for a modest target in comparison to Kano’s more ambitious programme sheds useful light on the benefits of different strategies. While the former puts less strain on the system and probably creates less wastage, it is possible that the greater single effort in the latter mobilised more resources and had a greater impact. The two alternatives also raise crucial qualitative questions, which are themselves related to social issues. Whilst in Kano neither the school system nor society as a whole is homogeneous, contrasts in Sokoto may be even greater since a clear distinction remains between those in school and those out of school. Thus Kano’s policy at least represented an effort to reduce differences, while Sokoto’s evaded the issue. Alternatively, perhaps the North Eastern State policy of making two smaller pushes and then, especially in Gongola, making a big push in 1976, obtains the best of both worlds. Further light

1. New Nigerian, 25/1/76. The observations about Anambra figures, above, also apply to Plateau’s.
2. In 1975/6 and 1976/7, female proportions remained approximately 31% of the total in Sokoto and 35% in Kaduna.
3. See Chapters IV and VI.
4. That serious differences remain, however, is shown in Chapter VI.
on qualitative issues is shed by comparison of the teaching force in different states.

ii. The Teaching Force

All states, as shown in Table 3.11, achieved considerable increases in the teaching force for UFE. Most states were within the official teacher:pupil planning target of 1:35,1 even in 1976/7. Only Gongola was prominent with a very large number of pupils to each teacher. The following year ratios in several Northern states exceeded the planning limit, though in several Southern states the position was further improved. These, of course, are average rates which conceal regional variations. Data on these, unfortunately, is unavailable. Kano had an unusually low ratio of 1:26 in 1975/6 which only increased to 1:27 the following year and 1:34 in 1977/8.

Table 3.11: Primary School Teachers, by State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>1975/6</th>
<th>1976/7</th>
<th>1977/8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teacher:Pupil</td>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>Teacher:Pupil</td>
<td>Ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anambra</td>
<td>19,681</td>
<td>1:38</td>
<td>25,647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benue</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20,158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borno</td>
<td>4,475</td>
<td>1:33</td>
<td>15,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross River</td>
<td>18,288</td>
<td>1:36</td>
<td>20,947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gongola</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4,679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imo</td>
<td>19,337</td>
<td>1:38</td>
<td>27,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>6,597</td>
<td>1:33</td>
<td>16,191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>6,089</td>
<td>1:26</td>
<td>12,798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwara</td>
<td>7,697</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>10,336</td>
<td></td>
<td>11,181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1,490</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogun</td>
<td>8,596</td>
<td></td>
<td>9,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ondo</td>
<td>11,231</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oyo</td>
<td>17,764</td>
<td>1:34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>4,344</td>
<td>1:34</td>
<td>9,702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sokoto</td>
<td>3,976</td>
<td>1:34</td>
<td>5,962</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Typescript from Federal Ministry of Education, Lagos, adjusted according to information from Bauchi, Gongola, Kaduna, Kano and Sokoto State Ministries of Education.

1. Nigeria, Third National Development Plan, op.cit., p.251. Calculations on the number of classrooms required were based on a ratio of 40 pupils per class.
The fact that the federal planners worked on a basis of only 7.4 million pupils in 1976/7 and 35 pupils per teacher makes these low ratios the more remarkable. Over the previous decade and a half, the number of training colleges declined from 315 in 1960 to 156 in 1973.1 Total enrolments, however, increased from 28,000 to 47,000 in reflection of consolidation policies and the abolition of the Grade III course. With the initiation of the UPE programme, ground was, in this sense, lost again. The number of colleges and students increased dramatically, but their courses had to be shortened. It is clear that the national objectives of 801 Grade II teachers in primary schools and 100 trained graduate teachers in secondary schools by 19852 are incompatible with the mass expansion programmes and will be unattainable.

One provision made well in advance was the writing of a Grade II syllabus in April 1974 which held the needs of UPE specifically in mind.3 Actual construction and organisation of the colleges, however, was generally subjected to the same delays in other states as in Kano. This led the New Nigerian in January 1976 to remark that "Most of the states handled this crucial aspect with criminal indifference."4 From almost every state came reports of delays and poor quality construction,5 and of the shortening of training courses.6 In at least two cases, defects

1. Ibid., p.240.
2. Ibid., p.248.
3. The syllabus was produced at a Workshop at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. See Federal Ministry of Education, Grade II Teachers' Syllabus, Lagos, 1974; and J.M. Akintola, 'Design and Development of Innovative Materials for Training Teachers for the Universal Primary Education Scheme in Nigeria', Innovation, No.19, September 1978.
4. Editorial, New Nigerian, 16/1/76.
5. See, for example, New Nigerian 22/3/76 (Ogun), Nigeria Herald 5/4/76 (Ondo), and New Nigerian 8/6/76 (Bendel).
6. See, for example, Nigeria Herald 17/12/75 (Kwara), and Daily Times 20/1/75 (Bendel).
were so serious that buildings had to be demolished and rebuilt,¹ and in several instances classrooms were destroyed by storms.² In general however, states did succeed in recruiting adequate numbers of staff, and though the Daily Times felt it necessary in September 1977 to describe UP as "currently cantering along like a crippled donkey",³ it was at least cantering.

One aspect which the figures in Table 3.11 do not show was the wide disparities in teacher qualifications which, as noted above, had significant implications for what the children actually learn and therefore for both the intrinsic value of UP and its ability to "bridge the gaps". Unfortunately detailed statistics showing the number of trained teachers in each state are not available; but generally the southern states had higher proportions than middle belt states, which in turn had higher proportions than the far northern states. Kano was prominent as the state with the lowest proportion, and, as noted in the first section of this chapter, was the only state finding it necessary to introduce a two-year post-primary training programme. Other states also faced qualitative difficulties, however. Borno, for example, had to terminate the study of a group of Grade II students after their third year in college,⁴ and even Cross River cannot have raised the number of trainees from 7,653 in 1976/7 to 17,000 the following year without problems.⁵

Just as qualitative differences raise doubts over whether UPS will be able to close regional gaps in the near

¹ One was Doko Teachers' College, Niger State (New Nigerian, 24/5/76); the other was Advanced Teachers' College, Pankshin (African Development, April 1976, p.446).
² In Bauchi Division, for example, 52 classrooms were destroyed (African Development, ibid.).
³ Editorial, Daily Times, 15/9/77.
⁴ New Nigerian, 13/4/77.
⁵ West Africa, 12/9/77, p.1883.
future, the experience of the first two years did not indicate significant progress in closing either the rural/urban or the male/female gaps. From all parts of the federation came reports of teachers refusing rural postings.\(^1\) The oil boom which made the launching of UPE possible simultaneously increased other opportunities which made the authorities reluctant to apply pressure for fear of losing teachers' services altogether. Elsewhere in Africa it has been suggested that teacher trainees and other secondary students should perform some compulsory service in primary schools.\(^2\) Nowhere in Nigeria was provision made for such service on completion of training below NCE level,\(^3\) and the result of general accession to teachers' preferences was that rural areas suffered both quantitatively and qualitatively. Undoubtedly the introduction of bonding would have encountered opposition. It is perhaps unfortunate that the government did not introduce some form of service in 1976, because the popular enthusiasm and awareness of educational needs at that time could have made implementation easier than at any other time.

The proportion of female teachers also remained much higher in southern states than in the north. The percentage of female staff in Kano fell with the launching of UPE,\(^4\)

1. Press reports included cases, for example, from Borno (Daily Times, 22/9/76), Cross River (ibid., 5/10/76), and Kaduna (ibid., 16/12/76).
2. In Botswana, for example, it has been suggested that Form V leavers should be required to serve in primary schools for two years upon leaving secondary school (Education for Kagisano, op. cit., p.140).
3. A scheme entitled the National Youth Service Corps was introduced in 1973 under which university graduates were required to perform a year's service, many of them in teaching. In 1975 it was extended to cover graduates of Advanced Teachers' Colleges. However, it is not usual for NYSC members to teach in primary schools.
4. The proportion fell from 9.4\% in 1975/6 to 7.5\% in 1976/7.
Plate VII: UPE Primary School in Hadjia Emirate, 1978, showing Steel Frames and Storm Damage.

Plate VIII: Zinc Classroom, Bauchi State.
and examination of several other state policies suggests little more than lip service to the goal of greater balance. All the five teacher training colleges opened in 1974 in Gongola State, for example, were for males only.

From this cursory examination of developments in teacher supply, let us consider, in the final part of this section, buildings and equipment. This will be followed by a summary of developments, and more detailed analysis in subsequent chapters.

iii. Buildings and Equipment

The general comments on delays in provision of buildings and equipment in Kano were applicable to all other states of the federation. The southern states did not suffer such severe pressures as Kano, firstly because the rate of expansion was less, and secondly because their greater level of economic development ensured a better supply of skilled labour and raw materials. Shortages of cement and timber, however, affected all parts of the country. As in Kano, at times they were genuine causes of delay; though at other times they were employed as a convenient excuse for inefficiency. From even the most developed states came reports of long delays and poor quality work. The launching date for UPE in Cross River State, for example, had to be postponed for a few weeks since almost half the new classrooms were not ready and temporary accommodation had to be arranged. Similarly in Lagos, the West and the East, halls, mosques and churches had to be brought into temporary use, and some classes could be held only under trees. The decision in Bendel State to revoke a number of contracts on which work had not even begun after nine months was indicative of the general

1. Interview, Chief Planning Officer, Mr. R.B. Yungushi, Gongola State Ministry of Education, 29/3/77. An additional college was opened in 1975, however, which admitted both males and females.


situation. As *West Africa* commented at the beginning of the second year, "A host of minor contractors, as well as some educational administrators, have much to answer for."2

Some of the larger contractors also had much to answer for. One was Raccah and Chaker Ltd., a company based in Kano and originally engaged in furniture construction. With the launching of UP3, this company obtained lucrative contracts to build prefabricated teachers' colleges in several Northern states, none of which was fulfilled in time. These were later the subject of various commissions of inquiry which strongly condemned certain malpractices.3 In 1976 a deportation order was finally served on the principal Lebanese partner, Mr. Raccah; but such was the shortage of alternative skilled contractors that in 1977 at least one major contract was awarded to his sister company, Raccahform.4 This illustrates two main problems. The first was that businessmen with established firms of almost any kind were well placed to secure highly profitable contracts and were subject to very few controls. The second was that, just as Gumel District had competed in classroom construction to Garki's detriment,5 different

2. *West Africa*, 12/9/77, p.1875. A specific case of misuse of funds was suggested by an incident in 1979 in which the office of the Allele-Williams Committee, investigating allegations of misuse of the Lagos State £30 million UP3 fund, was burgled. All cabinets were reported to have been forced open, but no money was stolen (*West Africa*, 30/4/79, p.774).
3. *The Wheeler Report*, Kano (on the activities of selected ministries between 1970 and 1975); *Kwazu Alipv Commission of Inquiry Report*, Kaduna (idem). Contracts worth £9.5 million were awarded in Kano in 1974, and contracts worth £9.4 million were awarded in Kaduna. Several contracts were also awarded in Sokoto. Their implications are further discussed in Chapter V, Section 1.
4. *West Africa*, 24/10/77, p.2182. This contract, for Kangiwa Women's Teachers' College in Sokoto State, was valued at £1.9 million. The state government, announcing the contract, described the company as "an indigenous construction firm". This no doubt it was, in compliance with the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree (see Chapter V, Section 2.1ii). However, Lebanese interests remained prominent.
5. See Section 1.iii of this chapter.
states also found themselves in competition. Again the problems of launching an ambitious programme with limited economic infrastructure were clearly apparent.

One important factor which distinguished Kano from the other states in 1976 was its willingness to add a large portion of state funds to those due from the federal government. It became a particularly significant matter because the latter were both inadequate and slow to arrive. Federal grants were based on 1974 prices and, at N3,500 per furnished classroom plus N35 per child for recurrent expenses, were quite inadequate by 1976. The states which did not later supplement these grants had either to award contracts with a small profit margin, in which case they found it difficult to find businessmen willing to undertake assignments, or adopt lower cost building designs, or reduce the number of buildings erected. A significant circular from Dodan Barracks to all Military Governors in August 1976 blamed shortcomings on the states' lack of commitment and announced that they should be prepared to allocate some of their own funds to UPS. It was some time, however, before the intent that states should contribute was fully clarified. As time progressed, it became increasingly apparent that the federal government had underestimated the costs of UPS. In 1978 it reduced the capital grant for furnished classrooms from its already inadequate unit level to N2,500, and several states were forced to introduce education levies.  

1. Federal capital grants to Kano in 1976 were N12.1 million for primary schools and N10.9 million for teachers' colleges (Appendix X). The 1976/7 Kano State Budget Estimates (p.181), however, allocated N56 million as capital expenditure on primary schools and N65 million for teachers' colleges.

2. Letter from Head of State to all Military Governors, Dodan Barracks (ref. 1905/S6), 18/8/76.

3. See Chapter IV, Section 2. Recurrent grants were raised from N35 per pupil to N40 in 1979 in recognition of inflation ("West Africa", 9/4/78, p.615).
a significant factor in the handing over of responsibility for primary education to local governments in the same year.  

The breakdown of federal grants by states (Appendices IX and X) explains some of the other variations in achievements since 1976. Allocations were based on a combination of requests and financial returns, but complicated by political considerations. It will be noted, for example, that the capital allocations to Ogun and Ondo States for primary education in 1976/7 were only ₦300,000 and ₦700,000 respectively. The following year they were given considerable increments not so much in reflection of their need (both had already well developed education systems) but because of objections they had raised after comparing their allocations with those of other states. Similarly, at first glance it is surprising that Lagos, the state with probably the highest initial enrolment rate, should have received the largest capital allocation for primary schools in 1976/7. This is partly explained by a special ₦7 million grant to facilitate abolition of the triple shift system, but also probably reflects political influences and the state's proximity to the federal headquarters.

Since recurrent expenditures are greatest in those states with the highest enrolment rates, it is to be expected that grants given to Southern states should in general be greater than those for the North. The effects of these grants, however, suggest that the UPE scheme, far from bridging the gaps, is benefitting the former more than the latter. The delicate political situation was further illustrated in 1978 when the former Federal Commissioner for Agriculture and Natural Resources, Dr. J.O.J. Okezie, publicly alleged that financially Imo State was being discriminated against in the UPE programme. The Federal

1. See Chapter IV, Section 4.iv.
2. Interview, ACEO (Planning), Federal Ministry of Education, Lagos, Mr. S.C. Alale, 22/6/77.
3. Idem.
Commissioner for Education promptly refuted the allegations, describing them as "thoroughly dishonourable." If the allegations were unfounded, however, the rest of the nation might well ask why. One of the cardinal aims of the UFE programme is to bridge the gap between North and South. That can only be done by giving financial encouragement to the North, which amounts to discrimination against the South.

Comparison of the different types of classroom erected in various states provides useful illumination of their relative advantages. All states built conventional two classroom blocks of the type most commonly used in Kano. Some, such as Benue and Cross River, also built much cheaper mud and thatch structures; others, such as Kaduna, Bauchi and Niger, erected buildings entirely made of zinc sheets on a wooden frame (Plate VIII). Where buildings had not been completed in time, several other northern states also employed corn-stalk structures of the type used in Kano.

The main advantages of the mud and thatch structures were first that they were cheap - approximately ₦100 each - and second that they could be erected rapidly and easily with readily available materials. It is also arguable that they are more "in tune" with local surroundings, and thus promoted the relevance of education. Their disadvantages lay in their lack of permanence and in the little protection they afforded from the elements. Arguments about "relevance", however, face the dangers of dual standards. Among the main aims of UFE was the reduction of imbalances between urban and rural areas. It is readily apparent that in those states using mud and thatch structures, the majority are found in rural areas. "What is considered "relevant" for rural areas, therefore, is often different from that considered "relevant" for the towns, and could be construed as second best. Certainly that is how many villagers would regard it, and the use of these

1. New Nigerian, 28/7/78.
structures does little to decrease the relative unattractiveness of rural life. In this sense, Kano’s policy of erecting predominantly high cost buildings may be commended. UPS is one of the few projects that really has reached the rural areas, and caused the construction of roads to remote villages. The few authorities in Kano who did built semi-permanent structures (which were still considerably more permanent than those in Benue and Cross River) did not repeat their experiments, in part because villagers considered them discriminatory. Thus the use of these structures was not without drawbacks, and those built in Benue and Cross River exhibited even more.

Useful comparisons may also be made with events in Kaduna. Early achievements were promising, with a large number of children registering in response to government propaganda. Failure to follow up, however, resulted in a high drop-out rate. Many contractors began work very late, which prompted a front page Daily Times headline, “UPE: A STORY OF WOE”. One significant factor was undoubtedly the attitude of ministry officials, one of whom

1. Potential conflict between local and wider interests is also worth noting. Since they did not have to pay for buildings, those authorities in Kano who refused to erect semi-permanent structures were, from their own viewpoint, wise. However, from a national viewpoint greater use of intermediate designs could have reduced costs and improved efficiency of the education machinery. This is discussed further in Chapter IV, Section 6.

2. It included an interesting ‘jingle’:
   "The UPE bell is ringing,
   Send your children to school now.
   It costs you nothing,
   But buys them the whole world."

3. Daily Times, 16/11/76. According to the report, in Dutsin Na JA there were only 456 chairs and 288 desks for 15,800 pupils; of the 625 classrooms required only 10 were ready; teachers were inadequate, both in number and qualifications, and there were no access roads to the new schools.
remarked that UPE was conceived by the politicians who issued instructions to the ministry without true knowledge of the situation and with little regard for the facts. "They expect too much", he said, "Just like Aladdin and his wonderful lamp." As late as May 1977 one third of the schools in Kaduna did not even have a temporary structure of any kind. "When you drive along", remarked the same officer, "every tree is a school." Under such circumstances it is not surprising that many parents were unconvinced of the sincerity of the government and the value of education. The politicians in Kano were making even greater demands than in Kaduna, but perhaps because of the lower level of educational development which could cause embarrassment and problems for Kano citizens seeking employment, ministry officials were generally more willing to push hard and deal with the shortcomings later. Referring mainly to Bauchi and Gongola States, though it is equally applicable to Kaduna, Clarke has remarked that "Children are having to sit under a tree, or on the verandah outside classrooms because there are no rooms available. In these circumstances, many parents find that their children are not benefiting from the scheme and would be better off with the 'old system'." As we have shown, a high percentage of buildings in Kano were far from complete at the time UPE was launched. Usually, however, activity was evident, and even if the primary schools were often disorganised it was clear that the government was serious in its intent. Consequently, though Kano's strategy may be criticised for its high cost, inefficiency, and qualitative defects, it may be commended for the level of real commitment it showed, which in turn was reflected in enrolments.

It is also instructive to consider the relative merits and disadvantages of the zinc sheds some authorities chose to erect, for they were certainly not cheap. Those built

1. Interview, 6/5/77.
2. Clarke, 'Islam and Western Education', op.cit., p.45.
in Bauchi, for example, cost ₦2,450 each. ¹ Though they were described as "temporary", it is doubtful whether they could ever be as temporary as would be liked. The continuing pressures of UPS, combined with the fact that as a stop-gap they make further action less vital, means that many structures will be employed until they either fall or are blown down - which, unfortunately, has tended to occur rather rapidly. In addition, the buildings are most unpleasant to occupy during the heat of the day. Primary children already tolerate enough hardships. To add the discomfort of sitting on the floor in a hot shed ² to the unexciting lessons of untrained teachers could well ingrain on the children a strong dislike for anything connected with schools for the rest of their lives. Thus while construction of the sheds did at least represent visible activity, it is arguable in this case that the children would have been better off learning under a tree while the substantial sum spent on the zinc building was devoted to a concrete block. Although construction would have taken some time, it would at least have been worth waiting for.

The unexpected demand for furniture and the general shortage of timber combined to make the experience of most other states similar to that of Kano, Anambra, for example, suffered from a shortfall of 100,000 desks, ³ and by February 1977 had already spent ₦8.7 million on school furniture. ⁴ Inadequacy, high cost and poor quality of construction were problems experienced throughout the federation. Design, both of furniture and buildings, is a

1. Interview, Inspector Primary Schools, Mal. Abubakar Misau, Bauchi State Ministry of Education, 4/4/77. Contracts for 1,149 structures were awarded in January 1977. In Kaduna State, contracts for 479 zinc classrooms were awarded at an approximate cost of ₦2,500 each. (Mal. A.R. Othman, Kaduna State Ministry of Education, 6/5/77). Thus two classrooms, at ₦5,000, were not greatly cheaper than the permanent buildings created in some places.

2. The classrooms in 1976/7 often had no furniture either.

3. Daily Times, 4/12/76.

4. Daily Times, 5/2/77.
matter which will be further considered in Chapters Four and Five, in connection with ways of reducing costs and their impact on the labour market. Before concluding this section, however, mention should be made of the important factor of community self-help.

Prior to the actual launching of UPE, some observers had anticipated that the publicity given to the role of the federal government could cause a regrettable termination of community fund raising and participation. Though it is difficult to make a comparative statement on the level of such activities, they certainly did not come to an end. The Eastern states hold the greatest tradition of self-help projects, and when it became clear that government funds would be inadequate, community participation re-emerged. Indeed in some areas the general awareness created by the campaign increased community rivalry and self-help projects.

The existence of these ventures again has implications for the success of UPE. First, it must be recognised that such projects are rare in the North, where the people have become accustomed to being provided with education and where the government is using all means at its disposal to foster interest. Community participation could significantly promote the relevance and impact of education and


2. Examples cited in the press, though too numerous to be fully documented, included communities in Nkwerre, Ukwa, Isu and Orlu, Imo State (New Nigerian, 20/2/76, 30/12/77, 8/2/78; Daily Times, 2/6/77, 5/7/77); in Nsukka and Ihiala, Anambra State (Daily Times, 21/4/77; New Nigerian 1/6/76); and in Ibadigbo and Cguola, Bendel State (Nigeria Herald, 26/2/76; Daily Times, 1/10/76).

3. One example was the village of Okpo, Igbo Eze Division, Anambra State, where one section of the village built eight expensive classrooms in 1976/7. The other section, not to be out-done, built ten. Every member of the community was levied in cash, goods or services, and ultimately the government built only two classrooms in the entire village. (Information from Mr. M. Onyeze, Okpo, 27/6/77).

4. One important example in Kano, however, is the Community Commercial College, founded in 1967, which in 1976/7 had nearly 800 pupils.
reduce the extent to which the school is a "foreign" institution.\(^1\) If in addition it increases the facilities available, regional imbalances may be perpetuated. This is a dilemma that has been experienced elsewhere in Africa.\(^2\) Perhaps the solution lies in the passing of a threshold after which the northern communities, having been given and having learnt the value of education, no longer receive everything from the government and are therefore forced to contribute themselves. In this, the traditional rulers must play an important role, and the launching of an appeal for N500,000 to build a school in Dutse by the Emir of Kano in 1978 may be an event of particular significance.\(^3\) As we have noted, the response of emirs, village and district heads to the UPE campaign has varied widely in Kano State.

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3. The Dutse Community Development Association, founded in 1977, held a fund raising appeal in April 1978 for a N500,000 technical secondary school. The Emir of Kano was invited, and donations of N100,000 in cash and materials were reported to have been raised on the spot. (New Nigerian, 4/5/78). The event was of particular significance because although some schools have had active Parents-Teachers Associations, they are in the minority and mainly confined to schools in Waje District where a high proportion of both parents and teachers are Southerners.
Their future role will remain of great importance to efforts to relate the school to the community and improve both the relevance and quality of education.

The purpose of this chapter was to provide an outline of events since 1976, first in Kano and then in other states of the federation, for further analysis in subsequent chapters. It has been shown that considerable achievements in enrolling pupils, recruiting teachers, and constructing schools were realised throughout the country. Progress in Kano State was particularly dramatic because of its lower initial base and because of its government's greater commitment to UPE, demonstrated by its early supplementation of federal finance with state funds. It is significant, however, that many of the problems experienced in the Western and Eastern Regions and in Ghana during the 1960's, were paralleled in Kano, bringing into question the extent to which governments learn from lessons elsewhere. Some of the difficulties that arose were inevitable; but others could have been avoided with better planning. With the achievement of considerable enrolments in the early years, official attention later turned to the crucial aspect of quality, with which subsequent chapters of this thesis are concerned. It is already becoming apparent that none of the goals of UPE, from either a state or a national viewpoint, will be achieved with ease, and that there is a danger of effects actually being the opposite to those intended. From the broadly descriptive framework provided by this chapter, we shall proceed to discuss the efficiency of the education machinery, which becomes an increasingly important topic as the system expands and finance ceases to be so readily available. This will be followed in Chapter Five by analysis of the impact of UPE on the labour market, and in Chapter Six by examination of its social implications. In all cases it will be necessary to place Kano within the context of the federation since only then can the basic objectives of the scheme be understood and the probability of success be assessed.
CHAPTER IV: THE INTERNAL QUALITY AND EFFICIENCY OF THE EDUCATION SYSTEM

In the Introduction to this study, it was pointed out that the quality of education provided in the UPE scheme will be a crucial determinant of its success. Three different 'levels' of quality were identified, and it is with the first - the "classroom conception" as seen, for example, by an inspector of schools - that this chapter is concerned.

The main intention of Chapter Three was to present an outline of developments since 1976 for subsequent deeper analysis. In particular, only passing reference was made to finance, which this chapter will examine more closely. The launching of UPE was made possible by the unprecedented economic prosperity of the early 1970's. However, in 1975 the economy began to lose much of its buoyancy, which in turn threatened successful implementation of the scheme. Cost factors will remain very significant in the education sector, and internal quality and resource utilization are sufficiently important to merit a chapter of their own.

Before quality and efficiency can be assessed and measures suggested for their improvement, it is useful to clarify the operation of the system. Accordingly, the chapter begins by noting the place of primary schooling within the formal educational structure, and outlines proposals for reform. It then provides more detail on the cost of education to the federal and Kano State governments. A third section considers the means by which efficiency may be assessed, and is followed by analysis of several important determinants. Finally, the chapter considers some ways in which costs may be reduced.

1. How the System Operates
   i. The Present Structure

Analysis of the quality and efficiency of the education system
must begin with examination of its structure. The system is scheduled for reform in the 1980's, as will be explained below. However, the merits of the new model cannot be understood without reference to the old.

Until this point, little more than passing mention has been made of formal western-type pre-primary education. This is because at present very few children in Kano State attend nursery schools. They are all from the families of the urban elite, and it is unlikely that institutions will increase significantly in the near future. Since most schools are semi-private ventures, no full list is available, but it is improbable that they number more than a dozen. Where they are in operation, for example on the university campus, children usually attend for two or three years. The schools serve the dual function of preparing children for primary school and looking after them for part of the day, which often enables their mothers to undertake employment. The existence of pre-primary schools could have significance for UPE since they may obstruct equalisation of opportunities within the education system. This matter is considered further in Chapter Six.

The primary course in Kano State at present lasts for seven years. Since the southern states operate a six year course, it had been widely anticipated that the course would be shortened with the launching of UPE, though this did not actually occur. The divergence has arisen for historical reasons, and reflects considerable state autonomy in education policy determination, despite the overall guidance of the federal government. The Western Region decision to reduce its course from eight to six years was noted in Chapter One. The Eastern Region at first maintained the eight year course, but later reduced it first to seven and then to six years; while the Northern Region combined its junior and senior primary courses to create

1. As has been noted (Chapter II, Section 3), a large number of children attend Koranic schools. The outlook of the two systems is so different, however, that Koranic schooling does not prepare a pupil for primary school in the same way as nursery schooling, and Koranic schooling is not usually described as pre-primary.
a single one lasting seven years. After the creation of states in 1967, some Northern states aligned themselves with the South. Kwara introduced a six year course in 1972 and was followed by North Central State. Other states retained the seven year course so that when UPE took off, Kano, Plateau, Borno, Bauchi, Gongola and Sokoto formed a group at variance with the rest. In Kano several dates have been suggested for phasing out the

Figure 4.1: The Formal Education System

seventh year, but no clear directive has been issued.¹

At the end of his primary career, a child sits two examinations. The first, on which entry to secondary institutions is based, is called the Common Entrance Examination. Until 1977 all children sat the examination administered by the West African Examinations Council (WAEC).²

1. The Audu Bako government decided that the seven year course would cease in 1978. The subsequent administration at one time planned to adhere to this (interview, Dr. Ibrahim Ayagi, Kano State Commissioner for Education, 31/5/77), though the intent was neither made very clear nor actually implemented. Different officers in the ministries and schools gave widely differing replies in 1976/7 when asked when the seventh year would be phased out. It was generally assumed in 1978 that classes VI and VII would graduate together in 1982. The employment implications of this are discussed in Chapter V, Section 2.

2. The Council was established in 1952 and now serves Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, The Gambia and Liberia.
though in that year the Kano State government partially substituted its own assessment. The second examination leads to the First School Leaving Certificate. It is set by individual schools under the auspices of each education authority, and serves mainly to certify attendance. A child who wishes to enter a Federal Government College will sit a third examination in April. The different avenues for post-primary study are shown in Figure 4.1.

ii. The New Structure

For many years the suitability of the educational structure for Nigeria's needs and resources has been a subject for discussion. Following a 1969 Nigerian Educational Research Council conference, proposals were made for a '6+3+3+4' system. This meant that study would be divided into six years at primary school; three years in a junior secondary school; three years in either a senior secondary school, a technical or a teachers' college; and four years in a university. The proposal was again considered in 1973 by the Seminar on a National Policy on Education, though no official directive was issued. In 1976, the Kano State government stated that the new structure would be introduced in 1977, with the modification that senior secondary schools would offer only a two year course, presumably still leading to WASC. This proposal was later suspended, however, since it was not considered desirable.

1. See Section 3 of this chapter.

2. Federal Government Colleges are secondary institutions under the control of the federal ministry and admitting an equal quota of pupils from each state. From the 1978/9 session, there was one girls' only, and one mixed college, in every state with an additional college for boys only in Lagos.


for one state to differ from the rest. Finally, the 1977 National Policy on Education brought a specific statement that the new system, shown diagrammatically in Figure 4.2, would be introduced to coincide with the first output of UPE school pupils.¹

Figure 4.2: Proposed New Structure of the Formal Education System

```
Nursery 2-3 yrs
       ↓
Primary 6 yrs
       ↓
Junior Secondary 3 yrs
       ↓
Technical Sch. 3 years
       ↓
Senior Secondary 3 years
       ↓
Teacher Training 3 years
       ↓
College of Tech 3 years
       ↓
University 4 years
       ↓
Advanced Teachers' Coll. 3 years
```

Nigeria is by no means the only country recently to have embarked on structural changes, for new priorities have demanded reforms, and the most suitable time-span of units has been widely discussed.² A cogent argument for reducing the

---

2. Ghana, for example, proposed to reduce the basic educational course from 10 to 8 years in the early 1960's (Republic of Ghana, Seven Year Development Plan 1963-70, Office of the Planning Commission, Accra, pp.150-1), and then to change it again to a 6+3 system (Republic of Ghana, Five Year Development Plan 1975-80, Ministry of Economic Planning, Accra, Pt. II, p.294). Similarly, Tanzania abolished Class VIII in 1968, shortly after the Arusha Declaration (Eleuther Francis Mangosongo, 'Universal Primary Education in Tanzania (UPE)', Dip. in Community Education dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 1978, p.25); and Malawi proposed to change from an 8+4 to a 6+5 structure (Government of Malawi, Statement of Development Policies 1971-80, Government Printer, Zomba, p.14).
length of the first stage is that resources can thereby be spread more widely. It is also possible that families unwilling to spare children for a full seven or eight year course may be able to release them for a shorter one, for which a specific curriculum and exit point may be designed. On the other hand, it is important that the first unit should be long enough to permit skills to be properly learnt. It is commonly accepted that at least four years' schooling is necessary to acquire permanent literacy, and some planners have argued that a longer first unit encourages a child to remain in the system for a greater duration. The optimum length of the first unit must also be related to qualitative issues and other factors, such as the age of entry, discussed in the fourth section of

1. The UNESCO literature employs this general rule (see, for example, Fredriksen, op. cit., p.369). However, for evidence that in at least one country eight grade levels are necessary for the majority to acquire permanent literacy, see John Simmons, 'Effectiveness of Schooling: Tunisian Primary and Secondary School Students', The World Bank, Washington, 1973. Nicholas Bennett has noted that the majority of Primary IV graduates in remote rural areas of Thailand cannot be considered functionally literate three years after graduation ('The Crisis in Formal Education in Thailand', paper presented at the "Education and the New Media" seminar Thammasart University, 1973, p.5). A similar conclusion has been reached in Ghana (see Chapter V, Section 2.11), and it was clear that many pupils in Nigeria did not acquire permanent literacy even before the launching of UPE (see below).

2. The Sudan, for example, has increased the elementary course from four to six years (Africa South of the Sahara, Europa Publications, London, 1975, p.866). Similarly a 10 year basic education course was proposed in Zambia in 1976, though it has not been implemented (Republic of Zambia, Education for Development: Draft Statement on Educational Reform, Ministry of Education, Lusaka, 1976, p.3).
At the secondary level there are two main advantages in dividing study into two stages. The first is that the junior secondary system enables pupils to continue with a common core for a longer duration and thus make a more mature decision on their future study. The second is perhaps more important. If, as is proposed, the junior stage is free of charge, it is another level to which pupils may automatically proceed and thereby lengthen their stay in the system. Those pupils who do not continue their studies to senior secondary will be more employable because of their greater maturity and because, provided the decline in quality caused by UPE is not too serious, they have acquired more knowledge. By limiting the stage to three years, the government is also limiting its commitments. This factor is likely to assume considerable importance in view of the cost of education and the large number of potential secondary pupils caused by UPE. The new structure will require rewriting of syllabuses and textbooks, but by postponing implementation until 1982 an adequate planning period should be provided.

2. The Cost of Education

Education, particularly for a developing nation, is expensive. This is true both of direct costs, with which this section begins, and the opportunity costs of alternative development precluded by use of resources for education. Where, as has recently been the case both in Nigeria as a whole and Kano in particular, education consumes a very large proportion of total resources, the implications of expenditure extend far beyond the sector's immediate bounds.

The magnitude of recent expenditures, and their recent
rapid escalation, is shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. Particularly prominent were those in Kano State, where, in large measure because of UFE, recurrent and capital allocations reached almost half the total budget. To some extent, the growth in absolute expenditures may be attributed to inflation and does not represent so dramatic an increase in real expenditure. However, even with allowance for inflation, the increase remains considerable, as is demonstrated by adjustment with a cost of living index in Table 4.3. After adjustment, respective 1975/6 Kano State capital and recurrent expenditures were still some 66 and six times their 1968/9 levels.¹

Before proceeding, one caveat concerning Tables 4.1 and 4.2 should be mentioned, namely that yearly totals are not always strictly comparable because of administrative changes. Thus one reason for the sharp increases in federal expenditure in 1974/5 was the assumption of responsibility for teacher training capital and recurrent costs and for primary school capital expenditure.² While the substantial increase indicates a rapid expansion of development programmes, therefore, it also reflects a

Table 4.1: Federal Expenditure on Education 1960/61 – 1979/80 (Rm.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Capital Expenditure</th>
<th>% of Total Capital Budget</th>
<th>Recurrent Expenditure</th>
<th>% of Total Recurrent Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960/61</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962/63</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965/66</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968/69</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973/74</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974/75</td>
<td>179.0</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>128.7</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975/76</td>
<td>750.3</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>295.2</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976/77</td>
<td>567.9</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>590.7*</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977/78*</td>
<td>500.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>786.6</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978/79*</td>
<td>301.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>773.7</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979/80*</td>
<td>391.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>914.3</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* estimates


¹ For reasons noted in Table 4.3, it must be stressed that this index is extremely rough and provides only a general impression.

² Figures are given in Appendix IX.
transfer of responsibility from the states to the federal government. The same applies to 1976/7, when the federal authorities took charge of recurrent primary costs. Kano figures are not distorted by this change since they refer to expenditure from all sources, including federal grants. However, the sharp decrease in the 1978/9 Kano State allocation reflects the partial transfer of responsibility for primary schools to local governments. It may be added that the figure is only a budget allocation and is likely

1. See Section 4 of this chapter.
to underestimate actual expenditure. The authorities attempted to reduce expenditure in that year by the simple strategy of cutting allocations. However, for reasons discussed below, in the case of recurrent expenditure this is unlikely to prove much more than a pious hope. The

Table 4.3: Kano State Government Expenditure on Education 1968/69 - 1975/76 at Constant 1958 Prices (£ m.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial Year</th>
<th>Cost of Living Index (1958=100)</th>
<th>Capital Exp. at Current Prices</th>
<th>Capital Exp. at Constant 1958 Prices</th>
<th>Recurrent Exp. at Current Prices</th>
<th>Recurrent Exp. at Constant 1958 Prices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968/69</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>1.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969/70</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>2.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970/71</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>2.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971/72</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>5.02</td>
<td>3.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972/73</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>6.66</td>
<td>4.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973/74</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>6.37</td>
<td>4.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974/75</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>8.63</td>
<td>4.62</td>
<td>10.27</td>
<td>5.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975/76</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>50.95</td>
<td>20.51</td>
<td>29.19</td>
<td>11.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


N.B.: Interpret with extreme caution since the only cost of living statistics available refer to a weighted lower income consumer group, for each calendar rather than financial year.

increase in expenditures thus remains dramatic, whereas in other states the role of voluntary agencies is such that government figures present only a partial picture, study of Kano is facilitated by the absence of significant non-official activities.¹

The Kano State Ministry of Education does not produce a breakdown of expenditure according to primary, secondary and higher levels. However, one indication of capital disbursements was given by the development plans. For the period 1970-74, planned capital disbursements for the primary sector were 34.1% of the Kano State total, 13.2% for the federal government, and 24.5% for all governments (Table 4.4). Corresponding figures for the 1975-80 plan

¹. Federal planners estimated that in the mid-1960's, the government met approximately 80% of total primary, 60% of secondary and 85% of university costs (Second National Development Plan, op. cit., p.315). In the mid-1970's it probably met a higher proportion of primary costs, but those of secondary and tertiary institutions would have been about the same.
were 0.2%, 18.1% and 12.1%. As noted above, differences can partially be ascribed to redivision of responsibility for primary education; and although the 1975-80 plan shows a substantial decline in the proportion of total resources devoted to primary education, this reflected

Table 4.4: Planned Capital Expenditure on Education, by Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1970-74</th>
<th>1975-80</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Governments</td>
<td>Kano Federal State</td>
<td>All Governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (₦'000)</td>
<td>138,893</td>
<td>49,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Grammar</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Training</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
<td>51.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Capital School, outside the umbrella of UPE.


Table 4.5: Public Recurrent Expenditure on Education (Nigeria), by Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year (₦'000)</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Pre-School</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Tertiary</th>
<th>Other*</th>
<th>Not allocated by level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>51,458</td>
<td>47.9%</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>152,646</td>
<td>40.4%</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>201,316</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>275,568</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>326,361</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>42.0%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* special education, adult literacy, religious schools, etc.

Sources: UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1972 (Paris) (p. 574); 1975 (p. 405); 1977 (p. 556).

a rapid expansion of other sectors rather than an absolute decline in primary. As will be made clear, the planners also seriously underestimated the capital costs of UPE, and actual expenditures were much higher than initial allocations.

A similar breakdown of national recurrent expenditures is given in Table 4.5. Again, there was a general decline in the percentage of primary allocations during the early
1970's, corresponding inversely to the increase in tertiary allocations. Comparison with other African countries indicates the 1974 balance to have been unusual, it being more common for percentage distribution to resemble Nigeria's 1970 figures.\(^1\) Statistics showing the distribution of expenditure since 1974 were not available at the time of writing, though from figures given in Chapter Three and shortly to be amplified, it is clear that primary costs showed a marked increase with the launching of UPE.

Recent precise statistics on costs per student are also difficult to obtain. General patterns from the past remain applicable, however, to the extent that both capital and recurrent costs show a rapid escalation from primary to secondary and tertiary levels.\(^2\) This fact explains why percentage expenditures at the tertiary level are so high despite much lower enrolment rates. It is also relevant for calculation of future expenditure patterns, for although primary unit costs are low, the introduction of UPE will increase pressure for secondary places in the future and may therefore commit the government to higher expenditures six or more years later. This demonstrates the need for long-term planning in the education sector. Unfortunately, however, mass education programmes are often initiated more for short-term political reasons than for strictly educational ones, and long-term perspectives are consequently neglected. To this Nigeria has been no exception, and the need for caution stressed by some civil...

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1. See Appendix XIII.

2. K. Lupton, for example, produced statistics for Northern Nigeria in 1967/8, suggesting comparative capital costs of N40 per primary pupil, N350 for secondary and N4,000 for university students. Recurrent costs showed a similar escalation, comparative figures being N20, N200 and N2,000 ('Financing Educational Development in the Northern States of Nigeria', Savanna, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1972, p.84). These figures correspond fairly closely to federal estimates which, for the year 1966, calculated recurrent costs to the government at N12 per primary pupil; N150 per secondary and N2,000 per university student (Nigeria, Second National Development Plan, op. cit., p.315). Average federal expenditures would have been lower than Northern ones because of greater voluntary agency activity in the South.
servants has been largely ignored.¹

Some useful estimates of pupil costs are provided by examination of LEA accounts, of which those for Kano are shown in Table 4.6. Again a caveat is necessary, since

Table 4.6: Kano Local Education Authority Expenditures (N'000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial Year</th>
<th>Capital Expenditure</th>
<th>Recurrent Expenditure</th>
<th>Personal Emoluments as % of Rec Exp.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968/69</td>
<td>134.9</td>
<td>702.1</td>
<td>56.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969/70</td>
<td>170.2</td>
<td>865.1</td>
<td>67.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970/71</td>
<td>390.1</td>
<td>1,185.3</td>
<td>66.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971/72</td>
<td>1,207.9</td>
<td>1,407.1</td>
<td>69.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972/73</td>
<td>519.2</td>
<td>2,093.1</td>
<td>89.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973/74</td>
<td>2,240.4</td>
<td>2,088.3</td>
<td>80.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974/75</td>
<td>945.1</td>
<td>2,717.9</td>
<td>70.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975/76*</td>
<td>6,873.6</td>
<td>10,628.9</td>
<td>72.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976/77*</td>
<td>130,772.4</td>
<td>2,853.9</td>
<td>85.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kano LEA account files.

N.B.: Expenditures per pupil are calculated by using proportions of the registered enrolment in each academic year to provide a figure coinciding with the financial year.

neither do expenditures in one year necessarily benefit the pupils registered in that year, nor do the financial and academic years coincide. The unit costs fluctuate, and those for 1975/6 and 1976/7 should be approached with particular caution. They do nevertheless provide an indication, and highlight the significance of personal emoluments, which in one year reached 89.9% of total recurrent expenditure.

It is worth noting that education, because it is a labour intensive process, tends to require much higher recurrent expenditures for each unit of capital investment than do other sectors.² The significance of this for UPE is

1. See, for example, Nigeria, Second National Development Plan, op. cit., pp. 315-6; and Nigeria, Udoji Report, op. cit., p. 136. This matter is discussed further in Chapter V, Section 2, and Chapter VI, Section 2.

2. This has also been demonstrated by Lupton (op. cit., p. 84). He concluded that whereas a $1 capital expenditure on agriculture and hospitals required subsequent annual recurrent expenditures of only 10 and 25 kobo, the comparable figure for primary schools was 50 kobo and rose to 60 kobo in secondary and tertiary institutions. Although the Kano LEA recurrent costs for the 1960s are comparable to the level suggested by Lupton, capital costs are much lower. The reason for this is not clear. Nevertheless the general point made earlier concerning escalation of costs at higher educational levels may be taken to hold.
clear. It must be added that total recurrent costs are subject to an annual increase even if no additional schools are built or teachers employed. The generally low level of teacher qualifications was noted in Chapter Three, and is considered a major area requiring attention. However, as teachers improve their qualifications, they became entitled to higher salaries; and even if they are not upgraded, the salary structure allows for an annual increment in recognition of increasing experience. Through this process, therefore, a salary bill that is already large will inevitably grow larger.

From the early planning stages of UPE, both capital and recurrent costs have been seriously underestimated and outdated by inflation. The Third National Development Plan made no mention of recurrent costs, instead presenting the figure of N500 million, the capital estimate, with the implication that it was the total expenditure required to achieve the target.¹ The sum was subdivided into N300 million for primary schools and N200 million for teachers' colleges during the plan period, 1975-80. That costs were substantially underestimated is demonstrated by the capital allocation in just one state (Kano) of N121 million solely for 1976/7.²

Though not included in the plan, recurrent calculations had been made. They were also substantial underestimates, however, and were outdated by inflation. In 1974 Professor Sanya Onabamiro, who, as Minister of Education in the Western Region, had been responsible for implem-

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enting the UPE scheme of the 1950's, estimated that annual recurrent costs would be N208 million.\(^1\) This figure was later endorsed by Chief A.Y. Eke, the Federal Minister of Education.\(^2\) In the event, the recurrent allocation just for the first year was N515 million, substantial increase of which was inevitable as UPE got under way.\(^3\) It was part of an all-time record vote of N738.6 million for the Federal Ministry of Education - an increase of N637.1 million on that of the previous year.

Analysis of the opportunity costs, which is the subject of the second part of this section is complicated firstly by the unusual economic boom of the early 1970's which provided considerable financial resources for almost all sectors of the economy, and secondly by the unexpected decline in revenue after 1975. Appendices I to IV provide information on sectoral expenditures by the federal and state governments. It will be noted that Education as a proportion of federal recurrent expenditure rose rapidly after 1973/4. In the mid-1970's it ranked second only to Defence in size and after 1978 it was the greatest item. In the five years following 1973, the combined allocation of Education and Defence was over half the total. In the capital budget the largest item was consistently Transport

1. *West Africa*, 25/3/74, p.326. He subdivided this figure into N50 million for school buildings, N150 million for teachers' salaries, and N8.3 million for the crash training programme. See also Sanya Onabamiro, 'Problems of our Educational Programme (2)', *New Nigerian*, 4/10/78, p.20.


3. *Federal Republic of Nigeria*, Approved Recurrent and Capital Estimates 1976/77, Government Printer, Lagos, 1976, pp.4, 140. The sum was subdivided into N150 million for running expenses and field implementation of Grade II teachers' colleges, N350 million for the primary schools, and N15 million for motor advance to UPE staff. By 1979, the federal recurrent budget for UPE had increased to N548.1 million, and that was after substantial devolution of responsibility to state and local governments (see below).
and Communications, and though always prominent, the ranking of Education and Defence varied. Because of statutory changes in responsibilities, noted above, the composite expenditure of all governments shown in Appendix V provides a more useful indication of the national prominence of Education. In both the original and revised 1975-80 plans, the sector was allocated approximately 7.5% of total expenditure, ranking fourth in size in the original, and third in the revised plan.

In all years both recurrent and capital Kano State expenditures were greater in proportion than federal ones. Because the states are not responsible for defence, this was partly to be expected. All states gave considerable weight to education and it was often the largest single budget item. However, the magnitude of Kano State allocations, on occasion reaching half the recurrent and capital totals, was exceptional and raises questions on the most appropriate development strategy. Although, and perhaps because of its undeveloped education system, Kano has in the past allocated fewer resources to the sector than have other states, it may not be entirely wise to devote so large a portion at one time to the exclusion of other sectors. Despite frequent exhortations on the role of agriculture, for example, both planned and actual investment have remained strikingly low, federal levels sinking from 4.6% of the 1975/6 total to 1.8% the following year and only 1.5% in 1977/8. Kano State proportions were consistently higher, and were unusual in their magnitude.

In the revised 1975-80 plan, whereas the federal capital allocation to agriculture was only 4.9%, and the all-government allocation only 7.0%, Kano State's stood at

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1. For example, in the 1977/8 budgets, Education was the largest recurrent item in Bauchi, Benue, Gongola, Kano, Kwara, Niger, Ogun, Plateau, Sokoto and Cross River States; and the largest capital item in Benue, Gongola, Kano and Sokoto States. For information on budgetary allocations in a number of other countries both developed and developing, see Appendix XIX.

2. The significance for the labour market of this investment is discussed in Chapter V, Section 2.1.
22.6.1 However, the health sector has been strikingly neglected by all governments, usually receiving less than 5% and 2% of federal capital and recurrent expenditures, and, with fluctuations, about 10% and 3% of Kano totals. Similarly, in the year that the proportionate Kano State recurrent education allocation reached its peak (1977/8), the Local Government and Community Development share was reduced from 7.6% to 0.3%. It is evident, therefore, that education in general, and UFE as a substantial component of it, may have a considerable opportunity cost.

In Chapter One, note was taken of the large number of studies in the 1950's and 1960's which attempted to relate incomes or stages of development to educational expenditures and primary, secondary or tertiary enrolments. Lewis, and Harbison and Myers, for example, presented data suggesting close positive correlations between per capita incomes and school enrolments. Bowman and Anderson, after examining 83 countries, concluded that a 40% literacy rate seemed to be a pre-requisite for per capita incomes to exceed $300 (at 1955 prices) and 60% for them to exceed $500; and Peaslee found a 50% primary enrolment rate necessary to achieve any "significant" growth rate.

Though several additional studies may be cited, in the

1. Note, however, that Kano's figure was lower than in the original plan (comparable statistics were 3.9%, 6.6% and 31.0%), and that subsequent budgets suggested that the government was not meeting its planned target (Appendix IV).

Harbison and Myers, op. cit..


1970’s their validity and usefulness has been increasingly questioned, partly because they imply too rigid a correlation, and partly because it has been widely recognised that development must incorporate social changes as well as strict economic ones.  

It will be suggested in Chapter Five, which examines the relationship between UPE and the labour market, that educational expenditures at the level recently reached in Kano State may, by precluding development of other sectors, have limited much of their own impact. This, from both an economic and a social viewpoint, may be heightened by the serious decline in quality and the fact that alternative methods of communication could make the basic skills of literacy less important than has hitherto been assumed.

It must be recognised that assessment of opportunity costs is necessarily speculative and requires detailed analysis beyond the scope of this study. Discussion should not, however, exclude mention of Defence, which is the other large consumer of public resources. The magnitude of defence expenditure has stimulated frequent criticism.

1. See Chapter I, Section 1.iii and Chapter V, Section 2.4.
3. It is possible, for example, that the economic boom of the early 1970's led to strain on all sectors of the economy and therefore that returns on investment were relatively low throughout. This would imply a smaller opportunity cost for UPE. However, to suggest that all sectors may have been oversubscribed is not to deny that some may have been more oversubscribed than others.
Its opponents have suggested that the maintenance of some 250,000 military personnel is hardly justifiable when Nigeria faces no military aggressor, either internal or external. It supporters hold it "an integral part of the nation's social, political and economic evolution", and point to the role of security as a pre-requisite to development. However, the main reason why expenditure has been high is that for political and social reasons it has been difficult substantially to reduce military strength since the civil war. Despite the questionable extent of the economic returns to investment in defence, the lack of alternative employment opportunities, combined with powerful vested interests, resulted in limited specific action to match policy statements. This has given strength to arguments that resources devoted to education would not necessarily be used more productively elsewhere, and that there were other sectors where cuts should take an even greater priority.

The magnitude of both Education and Defence expenditures took additional significance in the mid-1970's because of the failure of the economy to match expectations. Whereas the first and second national plans had allowed for investment of N2,200 million and N3,000 million, and had anticipated real annual growth of 4% and 6%, allocations


2. Campbell, op. cit., pp.61 ff. In July 1979, however, the army was reported to have been reduced to 160,000 (West Africa, 30/7/79, p.1390), and the recurrent allocation to Defence in 1979/80 was some N76 million less than that of the previous year (Appendix I).

3. This argument was less tenable in 1979/80, following cuts in recurrent Defence expenditure and escalation of recurrent Education expenditure to the point where it consumed almost one third of the total (Appendix I). It is notable, however, that in the capital budget, Defence expenditure remained much higher than that on Education.
in the original third national plan totalled ₦32,900 million and anticipated annual growth of 9%.\(^1\) Crude oil output reached a peak of 2.3 million barrels per day in October 1974, but plummeted to 1.5 million barrels the following May, just two months after the plan was launched.\(^2\) It was accompanied by a unit price reduction, and the combination of falling exports was rapidly rising imports caused the balance of payments to lurch from a ₦2,700 million surplus in 1974/5 to a ₦175 million deficit the following year.\(^3\) At first sight it is surprising that the revised 1975-80 plan should have raised total nominal expenditure to ₦43,000 million. It is explained partly by inflation, which was running at 34% in 1975/6, and by the increased number of state governments and ongoing commitments, among which was the UPE scheme. In 1977, petroleum exports fell an additional 25% in volume and 4% in price.\(^4\) The government curtailed expenditure and for the first time resorted to borrowing in the Eurodollar market, for two sums of ₤1,000 million. This provided the background to numerous "austerity measures" and, among other steps, widespread imposition of levies for UPE.

It is difficult to suggest that so serious a decline in revenue could have been foreseen. However, even during the early 1970's it was clear that the 'spending spree' was getting out of hand, and mention has already been made of the annual recurrent requirements that accompany an initial capital investment, particularly in education. In the early 1970's the government was in the fortunate position of having more funds than it could find outlets.

There is a lag, however, between awareness of the situation at the apex of government and in the lower levels. Whereas when the decade commenced the Federal Ministry of Finance had to urge other ministries to develop more ambitious projects, a few years later the brakes were more difficult to apply. The only way to enforce restraint was to make deliberate cuts in allocations to each ministry and state. Thus the 1976/7 federal budget introduced a 40% "compulsory saving" in all sectors except defence. The following year it was decided that further cuts were necessary.

Significantly, however, whereas all other ministries were instructed to reduce their budgets by 20%, Education was ordered only a 10% cut. Once more this illustrated the political importance of the sector and the desire for UPE and the other education projects to be successful.

Even before the launching of UPE, there were signs that the federal authorities were apprehensive about increasing costs. A circular from Dodan Barracks to all military governors blamed shortcomings on states' lack of commitment and said they should be prepared to supplement federal funds with their own. Federal misgivings on the cost of UPE were coupled with administrative difficulties, and many states were forced to consider introduction of levies. Kano was among them, the Military Governor...

1. Interview, Mr. J.C. Obi, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Federal Ministry of Finance, 27/12/76.
2. This was demonstrated by the fact that although the Head of State instructed that a ceiling of ₦5.5 billion should be placed on capital expenditure in 1977/8, and this was the figure originally announced, such was the level of on-going commitments that the figure had to be raised to ₦7.2 billion.
3. 1976/7 federal Budget Estimates, op.cit., p.4. The exclusion of defence may have been a clandestine means to allocate it an even larger proportion of total resources without arousing public awareness and opposition.
5. Circular from Head of State to all Military Governors, Dodan Barracks, ref: 1905/S6, 16/8/76 (see Chapter IV, Section 2.iii).
announcing in January 1978 that:

Parents in Kano State may soon be called upon to contribute in cash or kind towards UPE. The reference to UPE as 'free' was a misnomer; it should be deleted so as not to raise false hopes. In fact we are now seriously looking into possibilities of making the public contribute their widow's mite to the running of the scheme.¹

In no state were fees introduced under that name, but variously named levies had been widespread for some time, ranging from 50 kobo to N5, and proposed at N15 in one state.² This was an unfortunate repetition of events in the Eastern Region in the 1950's, again suggesting that later politicians and planners often fail to learn from the experience of their predecessors, and calling into question the validity of the campaign. With the transfer of partial responsibility for primary schooling to Local Governments in 1978, even in Kano taxpayers were charged higher taxes specifically to pay for UPE.³ It is, of course, true that there is no such thing as free education in the sense of schooling which does not ultimately have to be paid for. To avoid the possibility of children not

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1. Colonel Sani Bello, interview NTV reported West Africa, 16/1/78, p.124.

2. In parts of Anambra and Imo States, parents were asked from the beginning to buy books and subscribe for buildings, chalks, etc.. In 1978 "PTA levies", "text-book levies", "report card levies", etc. sometimes amounted to N5 (interviews, parents, 1978-8). Gongola State introduced levies of 50 kobo per child in February 1978 (West Africa, 20/2/78, p.366); Kaduna State announced N1 levies on all taxpayers (New Nigerian, 24/9/77); Plateau State suggested that parents may have to pay as much as N15 per child (ibid. 10/9/77); and in Benue N4 of each payer's community tax was allocated specifically to UPE (ibid., 6/7/78).

3. Local Authorities in 1978, according to the CEC Hadjeja (Alh. Bilyaminu Usman, interview, 3/7/78), were expected to contribute N5 per child. It was clear, however, that community taxes would have to be raised since there were more primary children than taxpayers, and total tax the previous year had been N5 per head. It was announced in November 1978 that all taxable adults in Kano State would have to pay a N1 education levy in addition to the N5 regular tax (West Africa, 27/11/78, p.2363).
attending school because they cannot pay fees is also desirable, and strengthens justification for a flat rate levy.¹

Fortunately, early in 1979 there were indications of a recovery in oil revenues. Nevertheless, because the balance of payments remained in substantial deficit,² the government introduced a deflationary 1979/80 budget.³ However, the budget speech also announced the abolition of secondary school fees. The recurrent allocation to education reached £914 million, and comprised over 30% of the total. Of this sum, over half was accounted for by UPE,⁴ and, as West Africa remarked, "It is, perhaps, just as well that oil revenues seem to be recovering."⁵ with the education sector consuming so much of an otherwise austerity budget, its opportunity costs must be seen to have increased further.

Finally, it is pertinent to note the opportunity costs of UPE within the education sector. Although the figures

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1. It was perhaps surprising that Tanzania did not adopt a flat rate levy on all taxpayers when funds were required to launch UPE in 1977. Instead, levies of 20/- per child were charged (Mangosongo, op.cit., p.29), though the incidence of actual payment varied widely (Ministry of National Education, Hotuba ya Waziri wa Elimu ya Taifa Ndugu P.A. Kahanga Kahusu Kadiadirio ya Fedha kura Kwuka 1978/79, p.5.).

2. The overall deficit for 1978 was more than £1,000 m., compared with £447 m. in 1977 and £339.9 m. in 1976 (West Africa, 16/4/79, p.680).

3. Recurrent allocations were nominally increased by 5%, however, with inflation of 15%, this was a 10% cut in real terms. (Head of State's Budget Speech, reprinted West Africa, 9/4/79, p.617).

4. £548,186,800 was allocated as recurrent expenditure for UPE. To this was added £99 million for capital expenditure, of which £38 million was to pay for projects implemented in 1977/8 (Nigeria Today, Vol.9, No.3, April 1979, p.8.).

presented earlier indicated the sharp increase in unit costs between the primary, secondary and tertiary levels, they included no information on nonformal education. It is demonstrable that, given reasonably efficient organisation and planning, unit costs may be lowest of all in nonformal adult education.\(^1\) Yet as we have noted, not only has this sector been seriously neglected for the last two decades, its financial allocation fell in the mid-1970's - a fact directly attributable to the cost of UPE.\(^2\) This is an area in which the opportunity costs may be particularly high, for it is arguable that the effectiveness of primary schooling may be considerably enhanced if parents are given at least a minimum education and understand its purpose and mode of operation.\(^3\) Because the secondary and tertiary levels already consume so many resources, it is less easily arguable that primary expenditure has a substantial opportunity cost in these sectors.

This section has clearly shown that UPE is expensive - more expensive, even in direct terms, than the planners had anticipated. In view of the problems in the economy experienced since 1975, the further increase in education expenditure in 1979 came to some as a surprise, and also further increased indirect, or opportunity, costs of the sector. The federal government may find it difficult to maintain present levels in the 1980's. It therefore becomes all the more important to improve the efficiency of the education machinery and, if possible, reduce unit costs. Section Four considers some ways in which this might be done. First, however, it is necessary to provide an indication of how efficiency may be calculated.

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2. The 1970-74 development plan included adult education only under a heading of 'others', all of which received a total of 0.5% of the Kano State education budget. The revision of the 1975-70 plan, partly because of the cost of UPE and despite inflation, cut the adult education budget from its already meagre ₦500,000 to ₦300,000 (see Chapter II, Section 2.iii).

3. See Chapter II, Section 2.iii.
3. How Quality and Efficiency may be Assessed

The two preceding sections have indicated how the education system operates, and what it costs. Before proceeding further, it is useful to discuss criteria by which quality and efficiency may be assessed. The concept of efficiency, which must combine quantitative and qualitative evaluations, relates 'inputs' to 'outputs'. To the financial inputs must be added the manpower of administrators and teachers, buildings and educational materials, and, of course, pupils. The output of the system is mainly concerned with the cognitive achievements and attitudes of the same pupils several years later.

It must be recognised, however, that measurement of both inputs and outputs faces several obstacles. One indication of internal efficiency is given by progression rates through the system, and though statistical deficiencies hamper the process, these are relatively easy to determine. A second indication is provided by the success rate in the final examination.

both inputs and outputs faces several obstacles. One indication of internal efficiency is given by progression rates through the system, and though statistical deficiencies hamper the process, these are relatively easy to determine and evaluate. A second indication is provided by success rates in the final examination. These are also fairly easy to determine, though more difficult to evaluate. The ability of terminal examinations to assess even cognitive achievements has long been challenged;¹ and the administration of assessments in Kano State gives more grounds for doubt than elsewhere.

It is arguable that three hour examinations provide very poor assessments of pupils' entire school careers, especially in view of the linguistic difficulties many of them face.

Nor do examination results, even if they can provide assessments of knowledge, necessarily reflect the efficiency of the school in promoting it, for a considerable body of knowledge is acquired outside the classroom rather than within it. Different results may therefore reflect a large number of other factors, and it is dangerous to reach conclusions on the efficiency of the school system in promoting cognitive achievements solely on the basis of examination results.

Non-cognitive developments, moreover, are even more difficult to assess. Despite the importance that the planners of UPE attach to its social objectives, no formal testing mechanism exists to evaluate such important characteristics as honesty, obedience and respect. In consequence assessments of non-cognitive achievements, though they are frequently made, are only subjective and cannot be measured.

An additional factor which has made examinations an unreliable indicator of pupils' knowledge in Kano State has been the incidence of corruption and leakage within the system, at both WASC and Common Entrance (CE) level. In 1977 they reached a point where a Commission of Inquiry was deemed necessary, but that year was abnormal only in that abuses were either worse or more prominent than usual.


2. Pupils' attitudes and non-cognitive characteristics are also an important aspect of the third level of quality, and are discussed at greater length in Chapter VI.

3. An interesting innovation in Tanzania has been the introduction of teachers' recommendations as part of a pupil's assessments. To gain promotion to the next class, each child must demonstrate reasonable character as well as cognitive progress. No attempt has been made to employ a similar device in Kano, however, and it is doubtful whether it would operate satisfactorily without other major reforms since teachers at present are subject to very frequent transfer, and since the innovation would require substantial improvement of the regulatory framework (see below).

4. The tribunal was headed by Mr. Justice S.C. Sogbetun and reported in October 1977.
That abuses existed at the CE level is easily demonstrable by comparing both different schools' results, and the same pupils' results in different examinations. The 1977\(^1\) official NABEC results, for example, reported an unlikely situation in which a number of remote village schools performed considerably better than the well-run and well-staffed schools of Sabon Gari. Because the pupils with highest marks were permitted to sit the Federal Government College examinations, comparison of pupil performance was possible. A selection of these is provided in Table 4.7. It will be

Table 4.7: Selected Common Entrance and Federal Government College Assessments, Kano, 1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pupil</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>CE</th>
<th>FGC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>A</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>80</td>
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<td>B</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>78</td>
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<td>310</td>
<td>77</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>D</td>
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<td>D</td>
<td>308</td>
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<td>E</td>
<td>306</td>
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<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

noted that, particularly in two remote schools (A and B), firstly there is a wide discrepancy between the two assessments, and secondly the majority of pupils achieved almost identical CE marks. This suggests that the teachers had dictated a core of answers - a practice said to be widespread in the state since schools are unwilling to be singled

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1. This refers to the examination taken at the end of 1976, the results of which were not released until 1977.
out for their poor performance. The 1977 experience was not unusual; it was a problem with which Federal Government College staff have had to cope each year.\(^1\) That the second assessment of the two was the more accurate was confirmed by interviews. Many who had achieved the highest WAEC scores could speak little English and could answer few questions, even in Hausa.

It was noted above that in December 1977 for the first time the Kano authorities conducted their own CE examination. Two official reasons for this were that WAEC was organisationally unreliable and that tests were inappropriate because they employed the medium of English.\(^2\) The WAEC examinations consist of four units: verbal and quantitative aptitude, arithmetic and English. Their assessment is further open to criticism because a child answers only multiple choice questions, by shading in a space. Since there is no written assessment, only certain skills are tested, and because the examination is nationally set, what might be a reasonable paper for a good pupil in the south is practically impossible for poorer pupils in the north. The effect is to reduce the average score of northern schools, which in turn increases the chance of a reasonable score solely by guesswork.\(^3\) Many of the questions, in any case, are hardly appropriate to a child in any part of the country. Three examples from the 1974 papers suffice to illustrate this:

1. The word MEASLES is represented by the number 6543253. What word is represented by the number 526?  
   A. LEA  
   B. SEA  
   C. SAM  
   D. ELM  
   E. ALL

1. Interviews, Principal and staff of Federal Government College, Kano, 1976-78.  
2. Interview, Mal. Umar Ahmed, Chief Education Officer, In-Service Centre, Kano, 22/11/76.  
2. In each of the following items pick out the one word that does NOT belong to the group.
   A. lion.
   B. elephant.
   C. tiger.
   D. fox.
   E. goat.

3. ... you are given a sentence. Read it carefully and decide how true it is.
   Shade A if it is always true.
   Shade B if it is often true but not always true.
   Shade C if it is never true.
   Shade D if it is impossible to say how true it is.

   Sentence no. 17: Oil is a liquid.

Though the Nigerian child with experience of such questions should be able to select the right answer to the first, there is no reason why he should know what an elm is. Nor is acquaintance likely with either tigers or foxes; and it is difficult to know whether he is expected, in the third example, to have sufficient knowledge to answer B, or whether he will be limited by his experience and teaching (if any), and answer A.¹

1. In an important paper on primary school examinations in Kenya, Somerset points out that assessments discriminate against rural children. Particularly in examinations employing English language, urban children often benefit not only from having better teachers but also from the more widespread use of English both within and outside the school. This situation is also generally applicable within Kano State and, on a regional basis, within Nigeria. It implies that many rural pupils with high innate abilities are being deprived of an opportunity for further study because the examination system discriminates against them. Thus not only are examinations poor indicators of quality and efficiency, they are also causes of inefficiency in the education machinery. See Anthony Somerset, 'Aptitude Tests, Socio-Economic Background, and Secondary School Selection: The Possibilities and Limits of Change', paper presented at the Conference on Social Science Research and Educational Effectiveness, Bellagio, 1977, passim.
These considerations provided the Kano State government with a powerful case for breaking away from WAEC, and in so far as increased numbers made change more urgent, the UPE scheme added a further stimulus for reform. In 1977, pupils sat objective and written papers in Hausa and English, and an objective paper in arithmetic (in the medium of English). The decision to set Hausa examinations was particularly important because it removed certain linguistic barriers and permitted inclusion of a subject hitherto untested.

The new examinations, however, have also experienced several problems. In the first year, administrative difficulties delayed release of marks for a long period; cheating, indicated by consistent grammatical and spelling mistakes, remained widespread; problems of acceptability of results outside Kano State arose; and officers considered the results "appalling", despite deliberate setting of easy papers. With some 21,000 candidates, officers also pointed out that there are serious obstacles to comprehensive testing and marking, and that leakages are inevitable, given the present structure of the system and attitudes towards it.\(^1\) The security procedures operated elsewhere require administrative capacity not available in Kano, and also rely to some extent on the personal ethics of those concerned. It is clear, therefore, that many problems remain in the examination system, despite recent reforms.

One widely favoured method of testing, which seeks to avoid the disadvantages of terminal examinations, is continuous assessment. The 1977 Sogbetun Report recommended that individual secondary school examination results in the last three years should comprise 25% of total assessments.\(^2\)

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1. Interviews, staff of In-Service Centre, Kano, 7/7/78.
The federal government accepted the recommendations, and directed WAEC and the National Policy on Education implementation committee to work out criteria for their adoption in 1980/1. However, the problems of inadequate staffing and their rapid turnover, together with the lack of uniformity of standards expected by individual schools, bring into question whether such a system is operable in either secondary or primary schools at the present time.

We are left, therefore, with an unsatisfactory mechanism for assessment of academic criteria, and an even less satisfactory one for non-academic ones. That is not to say, however, that assessments are not made, either by the general public or by members of the teaching profession. In part, they base their opinions on informal comparisons of pupils with their counterparts in the past (and most have little doubt that performance has fallen appreciably in recent years). Similarly, in the remainder of this chapter numerical information on costs, the teaching force, progression rates and so on may be supplemented by less easily quantifiable but still important analysis of such matters as the curriculum and the integration of Islamic and Western-type schools. We may therefore turn to discussion of factors which influence internal quality and the efficiency of the system.

4. Factors which Influence Quality and Efficiency

1. The Administrative Structure

The administrative structure is the most obvious item with which to begin this section, for it is crucial to the entire educational system. We have already alluded to

1. Ibid.

2. An example is provided by the remarks of Malam Aminu Yahaya, President of the Nigeria Secondary School Principals' Conference, Kano State Branch, who stated that "the quality of pupils from primary schools was often so low that they had to spend their first year in secondary schools learning what they should have been taught in primary five." (New Nigerian, 13/10/76)
many administrative features, and will here enlarge discussion.

It was noted in Chapter Two that the Local Education Authority (LEA) system which existed until 1978 was established as a result of the Oldman Report of 1962. Whilst overall control and inspectorial functions remained the charge of federal and regional ministries, to promote efficiency as the education sector expanded, each LEA was made responsible for administration.\textsuperscript{1} The LEA system was among the items reviewed by the Galadanci Report in 1976. It recommended that the system should continue, but that to improve functioning, Kano LEA should delegate full powers to the five administrative areas into which the emirate was divided.\textsuperscript{2} As noted in Chapter Three, this decentralisation was begun, but outdated by local government reforms in 1976. The following year separate LEA's were created, responsible for each of the 20 local government areas. However in 1978, in response to a federal decree, the LEAs were abolished entirely and replaced by Local Education Departments (LED's) under the direction of each Local Government Council. Officially the reform was intended to spread responsibilities and to increase the role of local governments in development. Unofficially, it was also a means of relieving the federal government of some financial burdens. The new structure was less of an innovation in the northern states than in the south, however, since voluntary agency schools in the former had always been in the minority and before the creation of LEA's most schools had been administered by Native Administrations.\textsuperscript{3} Thus in Kano the 1978 reform was a reversion to the early 1960's position, the only major difference being separate maintenance of education accounts.

3. See Chapter II, Section 1.
The coincidence of LEA boundaries with the former Native Authority areas provides useful information on the merits of different sized units. Though Kano may have gained economies of scale when schools were fewer, the smaller units of Gumel and Kazaure often proved beneficial to effective implementation of UFE. 1 Officers in peripheral areas found it unnecessarily cumbersome to refer even such matters as employment of night-watchmen to the centre. 2 Rarely did boundaries take full account of channels of communication, and inefficient situations arose whereby, for example, Bichi was administered from Gwarzo, and Yudil from Rano, despite the need for communication by circuitous route via Kano. In addition, decentralisation in 1977 had the advantage of promoting more balanced regional development.

However, though the reforms were both logical and desirable, it was unfortunate for the UPZ scheme that they occurred during the critical period of its launching, and that the succession of changes within a short time led to some confusion of lines of authority and channels of communication. 3 Decentralisation also created staffing problems, which both impaired efficiency and raised costs. The shortage of trained personnel in Kano State has continually been noted in this study. A special training course for LED officers was organised by the university, and in the long run officers will gain additional expertise from experience. Nevertheless, in the short run administrative problems hampered the implementation of UFE. Decentralisation also raises unit costs because even if staff are not fully qualified they are paid acting allowances, and capital items were required for the new administrations.

While some short-run reduction in administrative efficiency when a mass education programme is launched may

1. See Chapter III, Section 1.
2. Interview, EO Bichi, Mal. Abdullahi Haliru Dawaki, 9/11/76.
3. Confusion of Federal and State responsibilities is discussed in Chapter III, Section 1.
be inevitable (either because expansion overloads the existing machinery or because decentralisation creates disruption), in Kano it was further threatened by the decision to place education more fully under the control of Local Government Councils. Almost all education officers disapproved of this change, and several said it would "bring the end to UFE."1 By 1978 it was becoming apparent that local government reform, both in Kano and in other states, was not being the success that had been anticipated. A series of allegations of corruption had led to official inquiries, and in some cases suspension of Local Government Councils.2 This was hardly an auspicious beginning, and had obvious implications for administration of primary schools. Possibly of greater importance in Kano was the fact that, because the councillors were subject to election, and because primary schooling was unpopular, few were prepared to encourage UPE, even if personally in favour of it. The maintenance of separate accounts did provide a safeguard against employment of education funds for other projects, but the new structure no longer gave the authorities such scope for forcing education onto the people. They were thus caught in a constitutional dilemma, for democratic processes discouraged educational expansion despite the view of the 'enlightened' that schooling was rejected only because of conservatism that could be overcome by compulsion.3

2. These included Judil in Kano State, Jema'a and Ikara (Kaduna), Otukpo and Ckpokwu (Benue), Yenagoa (Rivers), Fune and Damaturu (Borno), Gombe (Bauchi), Abeokuta (Cgun) and Credo (Bendel). In addition, Ndokwa (Bendel), Ogbomosho (Oyo), Akure (Ondo), Kaura Namoda (Sokoto), Chanchaga and Birnin Gwari (Kaduna) and Shendam (Plateau) Local Government Councils were subjected to commissions of Inquiry in 1978.
3. Cre attitude was illustrated by the remark of the District Head of Dawakin Tofa (Alh. Makama Bello, interview, 18/3/76): "They did not like trains when they came; nor electricity; nor smallpox vaccinations. Anything new, they will dislike it; so we have to force them and in a few years they will be enjoying the benefits. Perhaps God is trying to introduce something new into the world."
The administrative structure is thus a vital component of UPE. The ethics of compulsion will be further discussed in Chapter Six; but here it must be noted that even if compulsion is considered desirable, it is impossible to implement without either the support of most sections of the population or their exclusion from decision making processes. In one sense, therefore, the 1978 reform was a step in the wrong direction for early implementation of UPE.

However, we may summarise this section by remarking that although the administrative structure did suffer from certain defects, it did function, and most shortcomings were of a nature that could be rectified with time once the initial problems of UPE had been overcome. Let us now turn to a second determinant of internal efficiency - the proportion of drop-outs.

ii. Drop-outs

The term 'drop-out' refers to a child who fails to reach a specified end-point in the educational system. It is among the most important determinants of efficiency because children who leave primary school after only two or three years are unlikely to have achieved any permanent degree of literacy or numeracy, and therefore derive little positive benefit from their schooling. There is, indeed, a danger that returns on resources invested in these pupils may be negative since their increased awareness of opportunities beyond their immediate environment, combined with an initially unrealistic appreciation of the limitations of their learning, may cause many to leave rural areas to seek higher standards of living elsewhere.

Assessment of possible trends in Kano is assisted by knowledge of events in the Western Region in the mid-1960's. In 1967, an International Labour Office preliminary report on the Western Region primary school system found, among other things, that the striking advance in enrolments had been bought only at the expense of falling standards and

1. See Chapter VI, Section 2.ii.
high attrition. Respective wastage rates in the three cohorts entering school between 1959 and 1961 were 52.5%, 55.4% and 58.0%. The area breakdown demonstrated the following particularly serious position in rural areas:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Type</th>
<th>Wastage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small village schools (0-700 population size)</td>
<td>84.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All village schools (0-5,000 population size)</td>
<td>69.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural towns (Ifo, Ota, Ilaro)</td>
<td>47.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibadan City</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similarly, the World Bank a few years later concluded that:

Compared with many other education systems, the numbers completing primary and secondary education in the six Northern States suggests satisfactory performance of these education systems. However, in the Mid-West and Western States, the performance of the primary school systems, with fewer than 450 out of every 1,000 pupils left in class after five years' school, is indicative of the problems which often result from a very rapid expansion of first year enrolments.

The experience of the first few years of UP3 in Kano suggests that some features of the Western Region project are being reduplicated. The need to recruit poorly qualified teachers, and the fact that UP3 embraces less highly motivated pupils, are two factors which were mentioned in Chapter Three, and to them discussion of several other determinants of drop-outs will be added in this section.

It will be noted that, given the structure of the education

2. Ibid., p.36.
system, the economy and the society, at least some increase in drop-outs is inevitable in the short run.

Unfortunately, no specific studies have been made of drop-out rates in Kano State. Official information is available on progression rates, however, and though this obscures the issue by including repetition and dropping into the system from Koranic and Isamiyya schools, it does nevertheless provide an indication of attrition.\(^1\) Table 4.8 shows the progress through the system of one cohort, and indicates that, according to official data,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Year</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>VI</th>
<th>VII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>13,802</td>
<td>10,728</td>
<td>9,667</td>
<td>9,144</td>
<td>7,654</td>
<td>6,011</td>
<td>5,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>24,975</td>
<td>13,722</td>
<td>10,653</td>
<td>9,581</td>
<td>9,137</td>
<td>7,559</td>
<td>5,784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>23,383</td>
<td>23,674</td>
<td>13,144</td>
<td>14,043</td>
<td>9,387</td>
<td>8,922</td>
<td>7,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>23,235</td>
<td>22,704</td>
<td>23,328</td>
<td>12,936</td>
<td>10,353</td>
<td>9,070</td>
<td>8,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973/4</td>
<td>20,490</td>
<td>23,401</td>
<td>22,220</td>
<td>22,712</td>
<td>12,687</td>
<td>9,960</td>
<td>8,812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974/5</td>
<td>26,115</td>
<td>21,447</td>
<td>23,214</td>
<td>21,998</td>
<td>21,971</td>
<td>12,102</td>
<td>9,503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975/6</td>
<td>32,741</td>
<td>28,282</td>
<td>21,222</td>
<td>23,393</td>
<td>21,599</td>
<td>21,528</td>
<td>11,575</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


past performance has been fairly good. Between some years, progression has been over 99%, and the total over seven years was as much as 83.9%. Even when first year enrolments were doubled in 1971, the progression rate after one year was 94.8%.

A comparison of males with females, however, reveals much poorer progression among the latter, with respective figures for the seven year period of 90.2% and 68.5%. The main reasons for this were summarised in Chapter Two, and they may have important implications for the curriculum and age of entry.

\(^1\) Note also that the figures are not wholly reliable since headmasters may be disinclined to report all drop-outs. The tendency, therefore, is for the official figure to slightly overestimate progression.
Examination of progression in each administrative area, which provides a very general urban/rural comparison, reveals no firm pattern. It seems likely that, as with the post-1976 experience, one major factor contributing to differences was the personalities of individual officers in each area. More reliable figures of the type produced by the ILO are not available. Progression rates over seven years of the cohort which entered in 1970 were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Boys</th>
<th>Girls</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kano Metropolitan</td>
<td>90.9%</td>
<td>77.3%</td>
<td>86.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano North-Central</td>
<td>92.2%</td>
<td>53.9%</td>
<td>81.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano West</td>
<td>89.3%</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
<td>85.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano South-East</td>
<td>82.3%</td>
<td>55.8%</td>
<td>75.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano South-West</td>
<td>95.1%</td>
<td>71.4%</td>
<td>88.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadejia</td>
<td>94.8%</td>
<td>58.8%</td>
<td>85.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gumel</td>
<td>86.4%</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
<td>77.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazaure</td>
<td>85.3%</td>
<td>62.2%</td>
<td>80.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>90.2%</td>
<td>68.5%</td>
<td>83.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two main factors explain why these progression rates were fairly high. The first is that ministry and local education authorities made deliberate efforts to retain as many pupils as possible. The second is more important since it has specific implications for UPE. Where less than 10% of school-aged children go to school, those who actually do attend are generally more highly motivated and receive more family encouragement. Children from poorer backgrounds will comprise a larger percentage as education approaches universality, but do not receive the same pre-school and out-of-school benefits as their richer counterparts.


This point deserves emphasis because once again it demonstrates the dependance of the school system on non educational variables, and shows that although analysis may indicate a decline in quality of output with the launching of UPS, this is partly explained by the different inputs.

The quality of teaching is an internal factor which further deteriorated from its already serious state with the launching of UPS, one probable result of which will be an increase in drop-outs because lessons become less interesting. When linked with the important external factor of economic returns to education, there is a possibility that in time many parents who responded to publicity in 1976 and after will become disillusioned with the benefits of schooling. With the launching of UPS, parents were encouraged to enrol their children for an only partially valid reason. Politicians pointed to persons with primary education currently holding lucrative posts, implying that in future children could obtain similar jobs with the same qualifications. This fallacy was even propagated by Chief S.C. Awokoya, a politician responsible for the Western Region scheme of the 1950's and later Professor of Educational Planning at the University of Ife, who stated:

A primary school boy on whom N200 has been spent over a period of six years leaves school today to earn more than N200 per annum. The same argument applies mutatis mutandis, to secondary school and university graduates. For the nation as a whole, the contribution to GNP would be tremendous. There is therefore excellent justification for public and private investments in education because of their returns.²

1. The importance of teachers' skills and attitudes was illustrated by two schools in Kumbotso District noted in Chapter III, Section 1.ii. Both were newly opened in 1976, but the drop-out rate at the end of 1977/8 showed a marked divergence.

Although the Western Region UPE scheme substantially increased participation rates, one factor which led to heavy drop-outs and the decline in absolute enrolments during the 1960's was the lack of remunerative opportunities for primary leavers. Chapter Five shows that a similar situation may be applicable in Kano in the 1980's, and therefore that drop-outs may increase markedly in the short run.

As we have noted, if it becomes necessary to raise money from the general public to pay for UPE, a flat-rate levy on all taxpayers is less likely to cause drop-outs than demands from the parents of each pupil. Some parents are already making considerable sacrifices to purchase uniforms and ancillary items in addition to the loss of their children's labour while they are in school, and the reintroduction of fees would probably result in withdrawal of many children. Examination of LEJA accounts, however, shows that despite an annual footnote to the effect that "more efforts are being made to improve the collection", actual receipt of fees in the past have been very low (Table 4.9). Ironically, therefore, the imposition of the education levy even at the relatively low rate of N1 announced in 1978, means that many parents are paying higher sums than before 1976.

1. International Labour Office, 'Education in a Rural Area of Western Nigeria', op. cit., p.20.
2. If this occurred, it would parallel the experience of the Eastern Region, noted in Chapter I, Section 3.ii.
3. Officially, the annual charge was N2 per pupil.
Table 4.9: Primary School Fees Collected in Kano L3A, 1966/67 - 1974/75

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount due (N)</th>
<th>Amount Collected (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966/67</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td>4,092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967/68</td>
<td>50,880</td>
<td>19,474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968/69</td>
<td>49,060</td>
<td>19,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969/70</td>
<td>49,060</td>
<td>13,498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970/71</td>
<td>61,800</td>
<td>13,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971/72</td>
<td>88,240</td>
<td>16,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972/73</td>
<td>101,360</td>
<td>14,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973/74</td>
<td>122,000</td>
<td>19,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974/75</td>
<td>145,920</td>
<td>16,370</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kano Local Education Authority account files.

Several other determinants of attrition, such as promotions policy, the curriculum and general economic factors will be discussed in subsequent sections. First, however, it is pertinent to mention three ways in which progress towards UPE could reduce drop-out rates. The first concerns the location of schools. The launching of UPE was the occasion for a vast multiplication of schools in all districts. Since this brings the schools physically closer to the communities they are designed to serve, they are able both to exert a more direct influence and to save children from long daily journeys. In this respect, the densely populated Kano Close Settled Zone has an advantage over other areas. Secondly, where taxpayers are required to pay a specific education levy, an incentive exists for them to ensure their children benefit from it; and thirdly although in the short run many of the children enrolled for UPE may drop-out, if an initial threshold can be passed whereby children with no schooling are in a minority and therefore unfavourably placed in the labour market, enrolment rates are likely to increase again. The realisation that children with primary schooling are at least able to compete in the labour market may be reinforced by social sanctions because parents do not wish to be con-

1. See Chapter III, Section 1.1.
sidered unprogressive. This stage will not be reached in the very near future in Kano State; but the launching of UPE may be the first step towards passing the initial hurdle beyond which those without schooling are a minority.

Finally, one additional non-school determinant of efficiency should be mentioned, namely the incidence of malnutrition. A growing body of evidence suggests that early malnutrition may seriously inhibit subsequent learning ability. This suggests that educational objectives might be best achieved not by investing in the school system but by improving health services and general economic prosperity. That the schools could become a vehicle for health improvements has been pointed out in discussion of UPE. However, financial factors will not permit widespread provision of school meals, for example, in the near future, and in any case by the time children reach school age, most of the damage has been done. The opportunity costs of UPE in this instance are again prominent. We have suggested that development of the agricultural sector has been neglected. This is a key area in which investment, if diverted from schools might nevertheless have educational as well as other benefits.

iii. Repeaters

The efficiency of the system may be impaired as much by a large proportion of pupils repeating classes as it is

1. For further discussion on this subject and an example from Bendel State, see T. N. Bray, J. N. C. Dondo and A. A. Moemeka, 'Education and the Community in Africa: Two Case-Studies from Nigeria and Kenya', in King (ed.), op. cit., pp. 223 ff.


by their dropping out. Discussion is usually based on two viewpoints. Opponents of repetition point out that it lengthens the period which pupils take to reach a recognised end-point and thus hinders attempts to provide mass education. They question the underlying rationale of a system in which study is divided into sections which take the staff a year to teach and the pupils a year to learn; that attainment can satisfactorily be assessed by teachers of examinations; and that if a child fails to 'clear the hurdle', he and the system are best served by requiring him to repeat. He may suffer injured pride from having to continue with his juniors, and unless poor performance was caused by sickness or low attendance, they argue, it is doubtful whether the child will learn more by repeating than he would if promoted. At least something would be learnt in the higher class, it is suggested, the pupil being pulled up by the greater attainments of his colleagues.¹

In the 1960's, Nigeria joined many other countries by introducing automatic promotion. However, by the mid-1970's, the disadvantages of this policy had become more apparent. It may have had beneficial quantitative aspects, but in view of the serious qualitative decline it was decided that repetition should be reintroduced. The authorities reverted to the 'old-fashioned' view that under automatic promotion a child has less spur to achievement, and that the threat of repetition encourages harder work. It also facilitates teaching because there is a narrower range of scholastic achievement within any one class. Unofficially, in any case, the practice of allowing or requesting children to repeat had continued, particularly in the last primary class. By giving this its sanction,

the government increased the effectiveness and usefulness of education, for with no repetition a child who does badly in the final examination reaches the end of his schooling with poor chances of obtaining good employment. If repetition is permitted at least in the last class, the extra year may be a very good private investment without which all previous sacrifices have been wasted. Under such circumstances, the public outcry which greeted the unfortunate 1975 decision in Kaduna State to prohibit Common Entrance Examination resitting, was quite reasonable.¹

Of course, most teachers are familiar with pupils who are considered so hopeless that nothing will be gained by repetition, and for whom promotion has the advantage that they complete their school career as soon as possible. It is sometimes suggested that special provision is also often necessary for girls, since they are frequently concentrated at the bottom of classes and the application of the same criteria as for boys results in few ever progressing. Since drop-outs among girls are particularly high, the dilemma between maintenance of standards and promoting maximum learning before the pupils leave the system, is especially acute. UP3 will increase the number of drop-outs in the short run, so this dilemma may be expected to sharpen in the future.

The official Kano State policy advocates repetition as and when necessary.² Since no statistics have been produced, however, it is difficult to assess its incidence. While limited repetition is probably desirable, care should be taken to ensure that it does not reach the alarming proportions witnessed elsewhere,³ and the general trend

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1. New Nigerian, 13/12/75, 19/1/76.
3. Dragoljub Najman, for example (Education in Africa: What Next?, Deux Mille, Aubenas, France, 1972, pp.33-4), states that in Chad, pupils take an average of 21.9 years to complete a six year course. Other figures (undated) were Burundi: 12.9 years, Central African Republic: 18.8 years, Madagascar: 16.7 years, and Rwanda: 19 years.
should be towards elimination of the need to repeat. This cannot be accomplished at a stroke, for it requires complete restructuring of the curriculum and teaching methods. It is unlikely to be achieved in the near future, and indeed the reinstatement of repetition may provide at least one safeguard against qualitative decline in the pressure for quantity.

iv. The Curriculum

The curriculum is a factor central to all three levels of quality distinguished in the Introduction. At the first level, the best approach to learning must be found to achieve optimum internal quality. At the second level, skills acquired in primary schools have clear implications for employment; and at the third level they have equally clear implications for the process of social change.

Although discussion in this chapter is mainly confined to the first level, this section will make brief note of implications for the other two, which will be enlarged upon in subsequent chapters. The need to employ a suitable curriculum is given added urgency by the numerical increases brought by UPE. However, the UPE campaign, because of shortages of teaching and other skills, in some ways also precludes fundamental change. Once again, basic decisions on the academic or vocational content, and on breadth or depth, cannot be isolated from other educational and non-educational factors. They are at least partially determined by social expectations, the state of the economy, ages of entry, the likelihood of continuation to post-primary education, and the examination system.

It must be realised at the outset that for many years to come, a large proportion of children who do succeed in completing the primary course will continue their studies
no further. The implementation of the free junior secondary course from 1982 is not yet a certainty, and is threatened by cost and quality considerations. Even if proposals are implemented, doubts arise over the number of children who will attend, in view of pressing economic needs and possible disillusion with the fruits of schooling. Absorption rates of primary leavers to post-primary institutions in the first half of the 1970's ranged around 34%, and the massive secondary school expansion may be insufficient for anything more than maintenance of these rates.

With this in mind, it is initially surprising that the federal government has rejected the principle of making the curriculum more useful for immediate employment. In 1974, the following points were raised by the Udoji Report:

By far the most important reform needed in primary education is the introduction of programmes of occupational orientation and training...to handle simple tools, perform elementary operations and hence be rendered generally productive through the use of school workshops and farms,...Currently education gained in rural schools serves too much to provide knowledge and incentives which promote migration of talented and ambitious young people to the cities, since the content and method of education in primary schools in rural areas, as in urban areas, is academically oriented, with emphasis on preparation for higher levels of formal education. Parents and children are left with the impression that the purpose of primary education is to provide them with the basis for escape from traditional society. We therefore emphasise that in addition to meeting the needs of the minority who succeed in moving on to higher levels of education, the primary education system must provide programmes for children who will remain in the less developed areas, and in particular in the rural areas.

Despite the dependence of community life on a wide range of manual occupations, no serious attempt is made to teach them in the primary school, and the government response was merely to note that new curricula were being considered but that:

the teaching of a trade has no place in primary school. The children leave school between the ages of eleven and twelve, far too young for paid employment. The primary school stage as the name implies is meant only to be preparatory and not a complete education in itself.¹

It is readily agreed that the ages of eleven and twelve are too young for paid employment. It is, in any case, illegal under the Nigerian Labour Code.² But to ignore the fact that for the majority of children the primary stage is not primary but terminal, is shortsighted. The solution should be to raise the age of entry rather than refuse curriculum adaptation. It was noted in Chapter Three that admissions in Kano State in fact tended to ignore actual ages within reasonable limits. However, the official policy - that no child over the age of six should be admitted - remains important because headmasters are not expected to enrol too many 'old men'. The pupils themselves know this and will underestimate their ages if necessary: a fact that cannot be checked in the absence of reliable birth certificates.³ In 1973/4, for example, no primary pupil, even in the last class admitted to being older than 15.⁴ At least two other African governments

3. It is possible, on payment of the appropriate fee, to obtain an official document certifying age on the basis of information from witnesses. This, however, is often far from reliable.
have raised the minimum primary age rather than lowered it, and it is somewhat inegalitarian to exclude a child from schooling because he is a few months or years too old. However, a partial explanation for the policy lies in the political sphere. With a ceiling, the government can point to high percentage enrolments of "primary aged" children and disclaim responsibility for all others. Unfortunately, it results in those fortunate enough to be included receiving an education of limited value.

The debate on the academic/vocational mix is by no means new. Chapter Two discussed Vischer's experiments and later Colonial Office concern to improve "relevance". The launching of UPE was the occasion for renewed discussion. Professor Fafunwa, for example, remarked that "It will be a disservice to the country if all we can think of in terms of UPE is to multiply the number of existing primary schools and carry on business as usual", and the Udoji Report asserted:

"We cannot emphasise too strongly that Universal Primary Education will end in failure and disillusion if it results only in a vast expansion of the existing system which is irrelevant to the needs of a large majority of those who it is intended to serve. For at least 60 years, educationists in Nigeria have been saying that education is too school-oriented and not sufficiently life-oriented. It is time something was done about it."

1. Tanzania and The Gambia, for example, have raised the entry age to eight (Najman, op.cit., p.60; West Africa, 4/7/77, p.1363), Zambia has considered raising it to seven (Zambia, op.cit., p.5), and Cameroon has been recommended to raise it to seven or eight (IPAR-Buea, op.cit., p.23). It is argued that schooling will be more functional for older pupils. It must be pointed out, however, that the limits may discriminate against girls, who tend to drop-out at a younger age.


There are, however, several good reasons why little has been done about it. The first is that vocational training is difficult to give to young children.\(^1\) Secondly, as noted in Chapter Two, for many years supply of academically trained personnel in Kano has been insufficient even for government service; and in other parts of the country people deliberately rejected vocational training since they were aware that the only path to 'real' jobs lay through an academic career.\(^2\) In some cases, vocational training was seen not only as irrelevant, but also as a deliberate attempt to give Africans a second class education and thus maintain European dominance.\(^3\) Since independence, the government has changed, and it is now Africans rather than Europeans who decry the lack of vocational subjects.\(^4\) Yet since even today the 'best' employment is obtainable only through academic learning, when the elite advocate vocational expansion, it is often for other

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1. The Udoji Report (ibid.) noted the wide range of occupations on which community life depends. It is difficult to agree, however, that all the skills it cites, such as brickmaking, carpentry, laundry, trading, jewellery making, and bicycle and watch repairing, should take priority in the primary curriculum, especially in view of the number of pupils presently leaving without firm grounding in the three R's. The last named, indeed, would be extremely difficult to teach in primary school under any circumstances.

2. As one colonial officer wrote in the mid-1940's, "All of us, from the Governor and Director of Education down to the junior education officer, sing the same refrain: 'Be a carpenter; be a peasant farmer; be a motor mechanic. Do not be a clerk, for clerks are parasites. The hoe is more honorable than the pen'...The African, like the European, is more easily attracted by the carrot of self-interest than impelled by the goad of exhortation." (Oversea Education, Vol. XVIII, No.1, 1946, pp.390-7.

3. Abernethy, op.cit., p.73.

people's children rather than for their own. Those who actively sought education in Kano in the pre-1976 era did so largely to acquire qualifications (mostly paper ones) which opened avenues to paid employment. When UPE was launched, many parents were persuaded by the traditional authorities, often against their will, to send their children to school. However, unless effective pressure is maintained, many children are likely to drop-out. And the attitudes of those actively seeking academic education will only change when the rewards to vocational training improve relative to those from academic education. It is ironic that, despite its remarks, one result of the Udoji Report was an increase in the rewards from academic schooling, and thus in differentials.

Not only has there been little demand for vocational training; there has been little official attempt to supply it. On paper there have been several significant innovations, but with limited real impact. The first was the establishment in 1965 of the National Educational Research Council, which held a conference in 1969 on general issues. It led to a National Workshop on primary education two years later, but the report was not widely available outside Lagos and was not published until 1973. Several other projects exist in the universities but suffer from lack of communication with similar interested bodies.

2. This body later changed its name to the Nigeria Educational Research Council (Michael Ade Ogunyemi, 'Primary School Curriculum Reform in the Western State of Nigeria', IIEP Occasional Paper No. 34, Paris, 1974, p. 17).
They include the Curriculum Development and Instructional Materials Centre (CUDIMAC) at Nsukka, the Comparative Education Study and Adaptation Centre (CESAC) at Lagos, and the six-year Yoruba-medium primary project at Ife.

At Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, the Institute of Education has been the centre for a project with considerable potential for the North: the Primary Education Improvement Project (PEIP), the experience of which deserves particular examination.

The PEIP started as a UNICEF scheme in the mid-1960's to supply science and other materials to Northern Region primary schools. Early progress was unsatisfactory, however, and in 1968 a new plan was jointly initiated by all the Northern states, UNESCO and UNICEF. It aimed to improve the quality of teaching in the seven subject areas of science, mathematics, social studies, English, health and physical education, creative activities, and cultural activities. It hoped also to promote activity learning and the use of locally produce teaching aids. In Kano the scheme was supervised by the In-Service Training Centre, beginning with seven pilot schools in 1969.

The new methods were introduced in Class One and extended throughout the school as that class continued its career. The schools were arranged into groups of six, each of which was in the charge of a Mobile Teacher Trainer. Each year other schools were incorporated, giving by 1976/7 a total of 105 PEIP schools. With the expansion to a total of 2,724 schools in the state, however, the project's proportional coverage was greatly lessened by the launching of UPE.

1. See below.
2. D.C. Kolawole et al., 'Primary Education Improvement Project in Northern Nigeria', in UNESCO/IBE, Basic Services for Children, op.cit., pp.35-46. See also E.C. Young, Activities for Lower Primary Classes, Institute of Education, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 1974.
3. The name of this body was changed to In-Service Centre (ISC) in 1976, and again to Educational Resource Centre in 1978.
The PEP programme could and should have been a vehicle for considerable improvement. Unfortunately, limits were posed on its impact by the same political and manpower constraints that caused problems elsewhere. Some confusion arose, for example, from the joint sponsorship of the bodies mentioned - of which note should be taken when considering other schemes requiring inter-governmental cooperation. In 1977, when financial assistance from UNESCO and UNICEF was due to terminate, only after considerable delays did the state ministry finally agree to finance the scheme's continuation. Costs have been high, especially because of requirements of teaching aids, the purchase and maintenance of vehicles, and the expenses of an annual residential conference in Kano's most exclusive hotel. Local politics were also reflected in the project coordinator's lament that the Ministry inspectorate "don't know much about PEP, and they don't ask." The primary teachers themselves often consider the project troublesome, and throughout its history it has been hampered by shortage and rapid turn-over of staff which "was not unconnected to the big demand on their part without any reward." Again, the lack of motivation was evident, itself indicative of the decline in teacher quality resulting in part from the scale of expansion.

Thus the impact of the PEP was less than anticipated at its inception. Though it has provided a useful model for teachers in training, and the in-service courses were widely commended, its 'ripple' effects have been limited.

2. Interview, Mr. J.C. Fodeke, Officer-in-Charge PEP, In-Service Centre, Kano, 30/10/76.
Insufficient attention and personnel have been spared for the project because of more immediately pressing needs arising from quantity. This was reflected in the fact that until 1977 there was no full evaluation of the project's achievements.

The issue of which language to use at each educational level is one which educationists in Africa have discussed ever since formal education was introduced. It is commonly asserted that the most effective language in which a child learns is his mother tongue. However, for political and practical reasons this is not always possible.

Linguistically, Kano is fortunate to be a relatively homogeneous state, and indigenes who speak no Hausa are relatively unimportant in this context. Since Hausa is a lingua franca in widespread West African use, it is sufficiently important to occupy a prominent place in the curriculum. It is therefore at first surprising that until recently, official policy was to employ English as the medium of instruction for the entire primary course. Wisely, that policy has now been changed. The 1977 National Policy on Education stated that "Government will see to it that the medium of instruction in primary school is initially the mother tongue or the language of the immediate community, and, at a later stage, English," and Kano State decided to teach English as a foreign language from Class One, but make it the medium only in Class Four. The decision means that children in the lower classes, and perhaps in all classes, can now learn more effectively, and so the machinery operates with greater efficiency. It also recognises the impracticability of the former policy. In reality, of course, Hausa was always used in the


classroom, even before the new ruling was made, and will continue in all classes now. But by giving it official sanction, the government not only regularises the position; it also makes reading in the vernacular a possibility. With the launching of UFE, publishers produced a number of new books, including some in mathematics and other 'non-literary' subjects, which, because of the official change, were in Hausa. There is still an urgent need for many more books in Hausa, but at least there is now an incentive to produce them.

Yet the change of policy was not without controversy. Since one fundamental aim of UFE is to cement national unity by providing a common language of communication, many consider that English should have a greater emphasis in primary schools. It was partly for reasons of national unity that the state formerly went "straight for English," and it may be regrettable, albeit very necessary, that this aspect has to be sacrificed.

However, a child entering primary school in Kano still faces the formidable task, even if his mother tongue is Hausa, of learning two other languages from the beginning. The desirability of including Islamic studies in primary schools was noted above; but since it involves learning Arabic, every child must learn not only to write three different languages but also to use two different alphabets written in opposite directions. In the short run, it is difficult to see a solution to this problem, for without Arabic tuition, even in Class One, a large number of children will not be permitted to attend school to learn anything.

2. The other reason was that since post-primary education employs the medium of English, one objective of primary schools was to maximise pupils' fluency in the language, and it was felt that this could best be done by making it the medium of instruction from the beginning. The significance of language policy for national unity is discussed further in Chapter VI, Section 2.11.
Yet one can only sympathise with the pupils at the extraordinary feats that seem to be expected, especially in the face of generally poor teaching, and reflect on the remarkable results that some schools do achieve.

Mention must also be made of the important six-year Yoruba medium project conducted at Ile-Ife under the joint auspices of the Ford Foundation, the Oyo State Ministry of Education and the University of Ife. The project began in 1970, and seeks to provide empirical data on language and learning. The entire primary course in certain experimental schools, except for English lessons taught by specially trained teachers, employs the medium of Yoruba. Although evaluation is not complete, preliminary assessments suggest that at the end children are more confident in both Yoruba and English; that children from the experimental schools can express themselves better; that a slightly higher percentage gained admission to secondary schools; and that the costs of the scheme can be quite low.

It must be noted, however, that language was not the only factor changed in experimental schools, for the project attracted considerable enthusiasm and voluntary labour, and neither the curriculum nor the quality of tuition were strictly comparable to normal schools.

Nevertheless, the project has important implications for Kano, for it is difficult to overemphasise the inhibiting effect of forcing a pupil to work in one, let alone two, foreign languages. The project answered the argument that vernaculars have too limited a vocabulary for 'modern' subjects by borrowing or coining new words, and it largely rectified the shortage of materials by stimulating product-.. of new ones. In the same way, the launching of UPE gave


impetus to re-examine and introduce changes into the system and it is to be hoped that, learning from experience elsewhere, the Kano authorities will carry innovations through. At present, few children in Kano become competent in writing any language.¹ The National Policy on Education suggested that, to promote national unity, each child should be encouraged to learn at least one major language (Hausa, Igbo or Yoruba) additional to his own.² Politically desirable though this may be, it is at present impracticable since, apart from shortages of teachers and materials, the curriculum is already overburdened. Teachers are inclined relentlessly to push on with set English books (encouraged by the publishers who number them I, II, III, and so on to correspond to each class), leaving an ever greater trail of bewildered children behind them. Pupils are thus unable to grasp more than a shallow knowledge of English; and yet without this knowledge all other subjects are denied them.

In these circumstances, a cogent argument can be made for even less English teaching in primary schools, to permit concentration on Hausa so that children can at least do some things well. The argument is particularly applicable to girls since they are less likely to seek employment or travel widely - though it must be noted that this would not promote their place in the economy, and thus would conflict with other educational objectives. There are, of course, some teachers in Kano who cannot speak Hausa; but since the policy need not apply to all schools, they could either be employed in Sabon Gari or as English subject teachers in other schools. The benefits of achieving greater depth through Hausa would have to be

¹. Hawes and Aarons, op.cit., p.40. See also the remarks in the Udoji Report (op.cit., p.136) that in one state (not named), "50 to 80 per cent of pupils who completed primary education in 1971 were unable to read or write", and the conclusion of another analysis of 9,000 interviewees for post-primary institutions in 1974, 26% of whom "could not read or write in any language" (African Development, April 1975, p.446).

². Nigeria, National Policy on Education, op.cit., p.5. The policy was not explicit in the level at which it considered the measure should be introduced.
weighed against the losses of national, and, if some schools in the state have a different policy, local integration.

Recognition must also be given to the consideration that if, as at present, the secondary medium of instruction remains English, then as much of the language as possible must be taught at the primary level to make secondary learning effective. The argument also applies to other subjects but is only cogent if there is a high transition rate between the two sectors - a situation which, as demonstrated above, does not presently exist. For some time to come, a relatively small proportion - certainly less than half - of primary children will proceed to secondary school. A balance must therefore be struck between the two conflicting needs, weighting it on the side of the majority. Kano has already devised a crash English programme for the first secondary year. The teachers may lament its necessity; but worse is the imposition of a curriculum for the minority onto the majority of pupils, for whom it is irrelevant.

This reasoning on the breadth/depth issue can be extended to other, non-linguistic matters. At present a child entering Class One is immediately faced with no less than twelve different subjects (Hausa, English, Arabic, arithmetic, handwork, social studies, physical education, agriculture, nature study, art, Islamic religious knowledge and hygiene). This is a formidable task to confront a six year old - and even more for a four year old, that, as noted in Chapter Three, being the age of many pupils. Since the quality of teaching leave much to be desired, it would be worth considering a reduction of the number of subjects in order to achieve more depth in a few of them, particularly the three R's. Despite the remarks above on the need for a less academic curriculum, it is arguable that, given the present mode of teaching, agriculture should

be dropped from the time-table. It is undeniable that a number of very good teachers of agriculture may be found. Hawes and Aarons describe one central school in Kano City where the headmaster with great success managed to gain the assistance of parents to prepare a walled garden with piped water, to assist with the provision of manure, and to raise levies to buy tools and seed. Sadly, however, the majority of teachers are more like their second example: a rural situation in which the teacher relied on his own school books to teach from the blackboard by drawing and labelling cross-sections of plants. This teacher was doing more harm than good; and since the majority of staff do not themselves take an active interest in farming or rural life, they cannot be expected to pass on such an interest to their pupils. Certainly the school could be a vehicle for the introduction of new methods and the encouragement of a liking for farming. But at present it is not such a vehicle, nor does there seem much prospect of it becoming one in the near future. Since agriculture is a subject which will in any case be taught informally at home, it might be better to omit it from the school time-table so that other subjects can be taught more effectively.

The influence of teaching force on the curriculum was also demonstrated by the decision in 1977 to abolish tuition of modern mathematics. In part because the large number

of untrained staff were unable to cope with modern mathematics, the traditional syllabus was reintroduced. This example again illustrates the limits to fundamental reform imposed by the scale of change. It may be added that the decision was not wholly welcomed, and that the publishers, who had made substantial profits on most books sold for UPE, made serious losses because of it. A situation in which no warning of intended changes was given, threw both the publishing industry and the education sector into disarray and did not promote efficiency. Another serious defect was the lack of clear directive to follow the first announcement. Publishers found it difficult to determine official requirements, and at least one produced three different sets of primary mathematics books, while another produced one but presented it as suitable for three different approaches.

At the time UPE was launched, a considerable shortcoming in Kano State was the lack of any single document that could be referred to as the syllabus. In 1976 Thomas Nelson (Nigeria) Ltd. suggested that they might publish one, but were informed that so many changes were scheduled that it would be too rapidly outdated.

1. The announcement generated considerable debate at the meeting to which it was given, and subsequently in the press and educational circles.

2. Oxford University Press estimated that about a million copies of Oxford Modern Mathematics would have to be pulped, entailing a loss of £250,000 (Information from Mr. Giles Lewis, Oxford University Press, Kano, 21/7/78).

3. In 1978, Oxford University Press were marketing their Oxford Arithmetic Course, the Oxford Modern Mathematics and their newly produced Oxford Primary Mathematics, which hoped to achieve the best of both.

4. For example, an advertisement in the Daily Times (19/3/77, inserted by Odusote Ltd., Ibadan) began by promoting a book with the headline "Traditional Mathematics: Unified Mathematics." It continued, "The ideal book for schools to use...covers the Traditional syllabus of Mathematics but integrates the essential part of Modern Mathematics", and continued in the same multidisciplinary vein.

The In-Service Centre produced some valuable syllabuses, particularly for the FSIP, secondary and teacher training colleges, but these documents were available only to the minority of headmasters willing to fetch them from Kano. Actual teaching thus remained highly dependent on the teachers' own notes from their school and college days, the publishers' textbook guidelines, and the dictates of the examination system. Most established schools just referred to the previous year's record of work when deciding what to teach, and schools beginning a course for the first time most commonly visited an older establishment to borrow a scheme of work. The difficulties facing even diligent headmasters were illustrated by one who in 1977 had a considerable number of syllabuses, but the only English and Vernacular item was a small booklet produced by the Northern Region Ministry of Education in Kaduna in 1956! There is a great need for comprehensive review and publication of the syllabus, which should be in both English and Hausa so that all teachers can read it.¹

Another powerful determinant of the curriculum is the examination system, which often leads schools to do little more from Class Four than practice past Common Entrance papers. The system also leads to inefficiency because a combination of abuses and internal factors hinders the ability of examinations to identify talented children who would benefit from further study.² Though the innovation has not been without problems, we have noted that UPE acted as an important stimulus for localisation of examinations in Kano. Since one aim of UPE is provision of a common educational base throughout the federation, from one viewpoint it is regrettable that states are moving away from the common denominator provided by

1. The Institute of Education at Ahmadu Bello University produced a syllabus for the FSIP which could be used as a basis for Kano State schools. At the time of writing, however, no official impetus existed for doing this, or for translating it into Hausa.

2. See Section 3 of this chapter.
the *AEC* examinations. However, the explosion in primary numbers caused by UFE made it, in the words of the Sogbetun Report, "crystal clear" that "AEC would find "the administration of this particular examination more and more difficult", 1 with the result that state ministries of education are now officially recommended to set their own examinations. 2

To reconcile the factors of diversity with a common base, nevertheless, remains an important but difficult task. This has been lucidly illustrated in a conversation recorded by Hawes: 3

**Kano Official:** Should we not modify our primary curriculum to suit our needs?

**Federal Adviser:** Would you want your own children to receive a sub-standard curriculum?

This conflict between "standards" and "relevance" has a long history, 4 and since there is probably some truth in allegations that Kano stresses the need for relevance to disguise poor results, it is ironic that the increase in primary leavers should add weight to their arguments. This is not to suggest that pupils should be tied to a nationally set and unsuitable examination; it is simply to note that reforms have disadvantages as well as advantages.

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2. Ibid.


4. A similar conversation was reported by Rene Dumont, when in 1958 he asked the Director of Primary School Education in Tananarive what modifications would follow from the fact that village education was now mainly concerned with peasant children destined to become farmers themselves. "No lowering of standards", was the reply, "we'll give them exactly what they would get in France." (False Start in Africa, Sphere Books, London, 1965, p.75).
Finally, note should be made of attempts to involve District Councils in setting goals and suggesting areas for study in primary schools. There has in the past been some response in traditional subjects such as arts and crafts, Hausa, local games, Arabic and religious knowledge. However comments on mathematics and science teaching have not been forthcoming, which is indicative of attitudes on 'foreign' subjects which persist despite the long history of Islamic scholarship and the obvious connections between mathematics and commerce.¹ This illustrates the difficulties in promoting any real local participation. That attempts should be made is encouraging, though it should be noted that they were not sustained with enthusiasm, and consultation remains very limited.

v. Daily, Weekly and Yearly Schedules

From a survey of the daily schedules of Kano State primary schools it is difficult to determine official hours of operation. The approximate hours in practice are from 7.30 am to 1.00 pm from Mondays to Thursdays, with early closure on Fridays to allow mid-day attendance at the mosque, and half days on Saturdays. Schools running a double shift operate a second session starting about 1.00 pm from Mondays to Thursdays, and about 3.00 pm and 11.30 am on Fridays and Saturdays. These are only approximate times since most institutions are either unaware of official directives, for example that Friday and Saturday schooling should last until 1.00 pm,² or choose to ignore them. In double shift schools the higher classes are often allocated the afternoon session, but because it is shorter, they get fewer lessons.

Clearly the variations in timing are unsatisfactory and reflect a lack of control from the centre. Whereas

¹. Hawes and Aarons, op.cit., p.35.
². Ministry of Education, Kano, Circular to all primary headmasters, 14/6/76 (no ref.).
in one school teaching may last from 7.30 am to 1.45 pm, in another it is only 8.00 am to 12.00 am. Apart from this, the system works satisfactorily. The aim is to maximise teaching in the cool parts of the day, which means beginning the first session early and the second late.

The shift system, which became more widespread with the launching of UPS, is generally considered an inconvenience to be tolerated for the foreseeable future. It shortens both sessions and makes teaching and learning difficult when the day is hot. Unless headmasters delegate responsibility, they have a particularly tiring day, attending both sessions. The system does, however, have a number of benefits. The obvious one is that buildings and furniture are used twice and therefore more efficiently. Another advantage, particularly important to the teachers' colleges which are very dependent on part-time staff, is that teachers can work in two sessions (and earn double salaries). A further benefit, often overlooked, is that since not all children attend school simultaneously, some are always available at home. This is significant because parents may release their children more willingly if one is always available for domestic chores or tending cattle.

During the first term of 1976/7, Kano State teachers made vigorous protests against working a six day week, and embarked on industrial action. After some hesitation, the government remained firm, and the teachers agreed to resume work. However, since they resented doing so, attendance

1. See Chapter III, Section 1.ii.
2. The benefits of this system amongst one cattle rearing people in East Africa are noted in Bray, Dondo and Moemeka, op.cit., p.20.
3. All government employees worked a six day week until April 1976 when Saturday working was abolished. Kano State teachers were understandably displeased one month later at an official circular stating that the innovation referred to all employees except teachers (Ministry of Education, Kano, Circular ref. CBK/INS/25/18, 6/5/76), and their decision to embark on industrial action was strengthened by the fact that Niger was the only other state to require this and no additional remuneration was given. The government stand was that "observance of rest days is alien in this society" (Galadanci Report, op.cit., p.45) and that the maximum number of teaching hours should be packed into the week to minimise qualitative decline. These were considerably better reasons than that advocated by the editors of the New Nigerian(2/11/76): that it ensures that "children are more in school than at home... thereby inculcating the liking for school attendance."
and the quality of Saturday teaching remained poor. It was unfortunate that the dispute coincided with the launching of UPE, and may have disillusioned some parents on the desirability of schooling. It is possible that awareness of official desire to implement UPE successfully strengthened the union decision to take action. If this was the case, although the government ultimately prevailed, it may be considered an unfortunate side-aspect of the ambitious campaign.

A different solution which could have been adopted was apparently not considered at the time. At present, full teaching operates only from Monday to Thursday, with half days on Fridays and Saturdays. It would be logical for Kano, a 98% Muslim state, to rest on Fridays and Saturdays and work full-time from Sundays to Thursdays. Apart from removing the teachers' grievance, it would also improve efficient use of the week. However, the education system operates less according to logic than to tradition. The launching of UPE, with the introduction of federal financing, in some ways represented a trend away from such local variations. Placing administration under local government in 1978 is unlikely significantly to promote regional diversity, and suggestions, for example, that schools should not operate on the same days as local markets have been little heeded.

In 1973 the school year was changed to last from September until August instead of from January until December. The main reason for the change was that expatriate staff, who are still important at post-primary levels, tend to be available at times coinciding with the British academic year. The calendar is also influenced by external examinations, though with the decline in numbers taking London University and other British examinations, this

1. Finally, however, in May 1979 the six day week for teachers was formally abolished (*New Nigerian, 25/5/79).
factor has decreased in significance. It was to be hoped that when Kano operated its own Common Entrance examination, it would avoid the WAEC situation in which children sat their examinations in November or December yet neither left school nor received the results until six months later. However, the experience of the first year gave little ground for optimism. Once again, the forces of tradition die hard.

The current regulations allow for 39 weeks of study and 13 of vacation each year, with the following holiday periods:

- Damina (rainy season) .......... 6 weeks
- Kaka (harvest) .................... 4 weeks
- Bazara (hot season, just before rains) 3 weeks

However, although the holiday periods are named according to seasons, there is no real attempt to relate the school calendar to the agricultural year. Instead, terms are grouped very much on the colonial, British pattern which does little to promote the efficiency of the machinery or integrate education with the society it is intended to serve. Arguments over availability of expatriate teachers have little relevance at the primary level, and there is little justification for maintaining the pattern. The labour of rural children is in greatest demand immediately after the first rains for planting, and at the harvesting time which varies according to the crop and area.

2. The proposed Zambian reforms (*Zambia*, op.cit., p.8) suggested adapting the calendar so that pupils are in school when needed for planting and harvesting. This would give school farms precedence over home farms, and would do little to promote acceptance of schools among rural communities.
3. November is the peak period since farmers harvest wheat, guinea-corn, groundnuts and beniseed and plant dry season crops. The millet harvest is earlier, and the cotton harvest later.
Disadvantages in unification of the educational system throughout Nigeria are again evident with regard to the agricultural year, for both the seasons and the crops of the south are completely different from the north. The calendar provides another example of the potential advantages of more local planning and decision-making. Unfortunately, the first rains cannot be predicted with any accuracy, and therefore Kano's practice of permitting schools to close for one day on an ad hoc basis might be encouraged. However, the flexibility should not be uncontrolled, and more desirable would be the coincidence of seasonal demands with holidays to make term-time closures unnecessary.

It is also unfortunate that the school year takes little account of the major Islamic festivals. This was one of Vischer's practices lost in the post-World War I era. The month of fasting before Ramadan is particularly trying both for children and teachers. Again there is little logic in tying the school year to the gregorian rather than Islamic calendar; but regrettably the forces of conservatism make change unlikely in the foreseeable future. Certainly the holiday periods could not coincide with all major feasts, all peak labour demand periods, all market days, and all rest days. But the introduction of greater flexibility, the rejection of some inherited colonial practices, and recognition that the needs of the north are not identical to those of the south could promote the efficiency of the machinery and thus make implementation of UPE a more realistic possibility.

vi. The Quality and Retention of Teachers

The poor quality of the teaching force has been noted repeatedly throughout this study. Whilst it is readily agreed that the possession of a certificate is not an

1. Hawes and Aarons, op. cit., p. 34.
infallible guide to a teacher's ability, the fact that only 9% of the teaching force in 1976/7 were trained and certificated is a clear indication of a qualitative malaise.\(^1\) It is a problem that has consistently concerned the authorities, though the situation has never previously deteriorated to its present level. During the 1950's, the government refused to expand enrolments in order to improve standards.\(^2\) Since then, intermittent expansionary policies have been implemented despite the shortage of qualified staff, which in the long run may have contributed to problems as poor teachers produce poor pupils who in turn become poor teachers. Efforts to improve the situation must incorporate two strategies. First they must extend and raise the standard of pre-service and in-service training; and second, they must include measures to make exodus from the profession either more difficult or less desirable.

The obstacles to improvement of pre-service training were discussed in Chapter Three. The demand for staff created by UPE worsened an already serious situation in which many teachers received no training and the remainder received training that was far from adequate. In the 1960's the authorities had sought to raise standards by abolition of the three year post-primary Grade III course. With the inception of UPE, most northern states had to resurrect the course, and Kano had to create its own two year programme. A poor quality input was combined with administrative problems and staff shortages so that in reality the course was less than two years and graduates were very poorly equipped to teach. One problem faced by training colleges is that they have to teach not only methodology but also straightforward subject matter.

From Chapter Three it was clear that the internal efficiency of the training machinery left much to be desired. Since these matters have already been discussed, this section will concentrate instead on in-service training.

1. See Chapter III, Section 1.11.
2. See Chapter II, Section 1.iv.
Sadly, and surprisingly, provision of in-service training was in disarray in the mid-1970's and did little to alleviate problems made more serious by the launching of UPS. Once again, manpower, administrative and political factors were mainly responsible for this. The demise of in-service training is best seen by examination of developments over the previous decade.

In 1967, a promising scheme was jointly initiated by all northern states and called the Teachers In-Service Education Programme (TISEP). Like the PEIP, the Ahmadu Bello University Institute of Education took charge of overall direction, and Kano State administration was through the In-Service Training Centre (ISTC). Two programmes were offered: a conversion course by correspondence with three stages for uncertificated teachers, two for Grade IV and one for Grade III; and a three year course with two annual vacation sessions. Two authors have shown that TISEP did not match expectations by describing it as "a well-planned in-service programme that didn't quite work", and a 1970 assessment partially blames this on costs. Drop-outs were substantial, and effectiveness much inferior to a full-time programme. Kano was more fortunate than other states since the ISTC improved contact and morale between students and staff, but weaknesses were illustrated by the 1973/4 report, which regretted that the students' attitude to work "was appalling", and that, "One can almost say that the main aim of half of them was to go through the training and disregard the results." Even before the UPS expansionary phase, as this shows, teachers were poorly motivated.


A second in-service course was the Emergency Programme introduced in 1971/2 and also run by the ISTC. It operated in three phases. In Phase I the students spent one year at the ISTC learning primary subjects and how to teach them; in Phase II they undertook two years of supervised teaching practice; and in Phase III they were admitted to the third class of a standard training college where they continued their studies for the Grade II examination. Despite staffing and administrative problems, the courses were considered fruitful, with some 1,260 students working at different stages in 1975/6.1

The third ISTC course was also introduced in 1971/2 and designed specifically for Arabic teachers. Although the intake was relatively small, the one year course being taken in 1975/6, for example, by only 35 teachers, the concept and potential of this course were important, especially in view of the poor quality of religious teaching.

In 1976, however, the launching year of UPS, these courses were all terminated. That year should have seen the take-over of all in-service training by a new body, the National Teachers' Institute (NTI) in Kaduna. This institution evolved from suggestions in 1975 of the need for a Federal Education Staff Development College comparable in structure to Great Britain's Open University.2 UNESCO were invited to advise on the project, and their comprehensive blueprint recommended the use of 'distance learning' techniques to teach to Grade II and NCE levels.3 This was to be done through field centres coordinated by Kaduna and using radios, cassette recorders and the postal services.

1. ISTC Annual Report 1975/6, p.25. See also other annual and quarterly reports.
It is ironic that propaganda should have stressed that the institute was made the more necessary by the launching of UPZ since, because of administrative delays, it was not formally established until 1976, and in the interim period no system of in-service training existed. The few staff members in Kaduna in 1976 operated in an uncertain atmosphere on a temporary site out of the Federal Ministry of Education's schools broadcasting budget.

Distance learning is undoubtedly a concept with much potential which, if properly organised, could be both cheap and effective. However, the NTI's poor start, together with the drawbacks already encountered by TIGEP, raise doubts over its suitability in Nigeria and stress the dangers of uncritical implementation of models successful elsewhere. The need for sufficient local flexibility has been continually stressed in this thesis. Not only does the NTI suffer dangers of inflexibility, it is also afflicted by political problems exacerbated by its intended national focus. That it is often difficult to reconcile regional diversity with national unity was noted in connection with examinations and also applies to the NTI. When the extremely unreliable nature of the postal services is added to other practical problems, it is doubtful whether the NTI has more advantages than the more locally run ISTC. The UNESCO report noted that

1. The NTI was established by Decree No. 7 on 10/4/78 (Federal Republic of Nigeria, Supplement to Official Gazette, No. 20, Vol. 65, 27/4/78, part A.).


3. The problems of maintenance were illustrated by the Kaduna Schools Broadcast Unit finding in 1975 that only 31 of its 200 radios distributed two years earlier were still in operation (UNESCO, Report on the Project for Training of Teachers, op. cit., p. 35).
"the young, inexperienced and half trained teachers ... may do more harm than good to the whole concept of universal, free and compulsory education if left to their own devices."¹ As has been noted, it is unfortunate that the very instrument they recommended to remedy the situation should, at least in the early stages of UPE, have been the cause of teachers being left more to their own devices. Although UPE provided the impetus for many desirable innovations, the case of the NTI illustrated the need for caution. The position of the Arabists, as noted in Chapter Three, is particularly problematic. The NTI has not announced any intention to organise a special Arabists' course, and the neglect of this area is regrettable.

Turning to the second aspect of efficiency, it is necessary to examine measures to retain staff in the system once they have been trained. The teaching profession has been noted for its high attrition rate,² and with the increase in less highly motivated staff recruited for the launching of UPE, retention probably fell further.³

The remedies to high attrition may take three forms. First, primary teaching may be made more attractive relative to other levels; second, teaching in general may be made more attractive relative to other professions; and third, some system of bonding may be introduced.

The first objective cannot be accomplished with ease. The Udoji Report was hardly overstating the case when it said that:

1. UNESCO, ibid., p.22.
2. See, for example, the Galadanci Report, op. cit., p.12.
3. As Peter Williams has pointed out, however (Planning Teacher Demand and Supply, op. cit., p.18), young untrained teachers, many of whom only use the profession as a stepping stone to other work, often present less of a problem to the authorities than do older untrained staff simply because they have a high attrition.
...those who terminate their schooling for one reason or another before attaining degrees are regarded as failures and are in fact treated as inferior personalities. It should be noted that most of the teachers in primary and secondary schools in the country rightly or wrongly regard themselves as belonging to this category. \(^1\)

While other levels of education are expanding rapidly, all those qualified to teach post-primary pupils are urgently required in them. This removes the better qualified personnel from the primary sector, which in turn reinforces its low status and encourages those capable of moving either to post-primary levels or out of the profession altogether, to do so. Ironically, in-service training has the two disadvantages that sometimes teachers are so busy with courses that they do little actual teaching, and that the improvement in qualifications may be used as a means to leave the sector. It is difficult to see a solution to this problem if post-primary levels are expected also to expand. It suggests that the two are incompatible, for in the current situation the effectiveness of post-primary learning is being precluded by its own existence. Although the primary level is the foundation on which all else is built and when pupils are, most impressionable, the best teachers are being taken away from the sector. The same situation applies within the primary level. Little has changed since 1961 when the Banjo Report commented:

> It appears it is not generally recognised that Primary I is the most important class in the school, being the foundation on which a superstructure is built in subsequent years. In this class, children with different backgrounds but equal eagerness to learn and explore, come together for the first time. Their minds are highly impressionable and anything wrongly taught then remains with them throughout life or is eradicated with difficulty later on. . . . The practice in some schools of allowing any but the best teacher to teach in Primary I must be abandoned forthwith. \(^2\)

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Thus, teacher resources could be used more efficiently if the best staff were employed in the early classes, and if the best teachers were retained at the primary level. The second strategy will require a conscious attempt to change social attitudes and perceptions of the teachers' role and route to self-fulfilment. It will also require imposition of limits to secondary expansion, which in turn has political implications since primary leaver unemployment may become more serious. It was pointed out above, however, that increased transition rates do nothing more than postpone an ultimate employment problem, and may, by raising expectations and precluding development of other sectors, make it more serious. This relates back to discussion of the political dilemma of popular education and suggestions that politicians of the present generation may not be doing either future generations or society in general a service by yielding to the pressures for too rapid post-primary expansion.

The status of teachers relative to other occupations is strongly influenced by their salaries. Recent public service reviews have been widely welcomed for the higher salaries they conferred. However, since increases were also given to other professions, their effects were limited by the maintenance of differentials. Despite the high level of teachers' salaries in comparison with equivalent

1. Allocation of good teachers to final classes would also promote quality in the first two senses (see the Introduction) since it would improve examination results. On the third, broader level of quality, however it would probably be deleterious. The use of rotational teaching, whereby each teacher takes charge of the same subject in several classes rather than all subjects in one class, should also be mentioned. It was reintro-duced in Kano (CDK/INS/P/17/76, dated 3/5/76) to spread the benefits and problems of a mixed ability teaching force. In small schools this was often impossible, which has implications for the optimum size of school and efficiency of the machinery.
workers in manufacturing industry, the profession has not greatly improved its standing within the public sector, and relative gradings are unlikely further to improve. Provision of non-salary benefits may therefore be a more effective way to make the profession more attractive. The decision to involve teachers more in the planning of education is one good way to improve morale. Also to be welcomed are the teachers' houses in remote areas. This was one item not included in the original 1975-80 development plan, but allocated ₦5 million in the 1976 revision.

As noted in Chapter Three, houses can be built at relatively low costs. Provision of motor cycle loans was also a good innovation, though since rural teachers tend to have lower qualifications, few of them receive the loans despite their

1. A recent ILO study (Teachers' Pay, Geneva, 1978, p.97) compared average earnings of primary teachers at the start of their careers with equivalent workers in manufacturing industry in 27 countries. Nigeria came top of the list, with teachers in 1976 earning 144% more than their manufacturing counterparts. In a large number of other countries, both developed and developing, teachers' starting salaries were substantially lower than those in industry. It is also worth noting that among reasons given by 325 Grade II teachers who had left the profession between 1970 and 1976, inadequate salary ranked only sixth, after inadequate administrative support, low prestige, inadequate teaching materials, lack of respect and discouraging future outlook. (See Safiyanu Hussaini Koguna, 'The Causes of Teacher Turnover among Grade II Teachers in the Primary Schools in the Kano State of Nigeria', Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio University, 1978, p.78).

2. As Dr. Timothy Adedeji Awoniyi commented (Sunday Sketch, 16/5/76, p.2), "In spite of Udoji bonanza to teachers, only a few of them wanted to die teaching or prayerfully wish that their children inherit their profession... [Only] idiots were thought to be capable of going into training colleges; i.e. those who missed, or could not cope with the academic strains of grammar schools." There have, in any case, been allegations in Kano State that increments have remained unpaid (Interview, Mal. Rabiu Ali, President, Nigeria Union of Teachers, Kano State Wing, 3/11/76. See also Kano, Galadanci Report, op.cit., p.14).


greater need. Also, since vehicle loans are available throughout the public service, they do little to retain personnel specifically in the teaching profession. A better policy would be allocation of extra loans and salary bonuses to teachers willing to accept rural postings.

There is at present no bonding system for intermediate trainees, and thus no means for compulsory retention of teachers at the primary level. At the higher level, the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) was established in 1973, under which all university graduates spend a compulsory year of service in states other than those of their origin at a low rate of pay. In 1976 the scheme was extended to advanced teachers' college graduates, and has promoted national unity not only by sending graduates to previously unfamiliar areas but also by enabling the north to benefit from the more developed manpower resources of the south. A high proportion of NYSC personnel join the teaching force; and though none serve in primary schools, many are of indirect use to UF3 through teacher training. The compulsory year both ensures that many teacher trainees remain within the system for a minimum period, and compels many from the grammar stream to enter teaching. The NYSC is thus one brake on the vicious circle in which only second best personnel become teachers, who in turn produce less than second best pupils, and it would be worth considering extension of the scheme to Grade II graduates.

The NYSC suffers from the drawback that, since only one year is compulsory, continuity in teaching is difficult to achieve. However, transfers in Kano are so frequent that the authorities do not appear greatly concerned about continuity, despite the fact that it would provide an additional and relatively easy means to improve the efficiency of the machinery. One reason why they may be indifferent is that even at the top, turn-over is so rapid that few officers remain in any post long enough to gain much expertise or to develop much pride and responsibility.  

1. In the three years from July 1975, for example, there were five different Kano State Commissioners for Education.
This may be another vicious circle arising from the speed of general development and the magnitude of the UPE campaign.

The role of class size as a determinant of efficiency should also be mentioned. It was noted in Chapter Three that planners work on the basis of 40 pupils per class and teacher:pupil ratios of 1:35, but that actual ratios in 1976 varied around a mean of 1:27. Though it has been widely assumed that class sizes are important determinants of cognitive achievements, recent research has not reached firm conclusions. It suggests that more important than adjusting ratios is the strategy teachers adopt for classes of predetermined sizes.\(^1\) Certainly, as the Kano government has realised,\(^2\) mean ratios can be greatly increased from 1:27 without loss of efficiency; and it is possible that even the target of 1:35 could usefully be adjusted upwards. Larger classes do not permit easy application of discovery learning techniques, but it is possible that needs and resources are at present such that more 'old fashioned' methods with larger groups are more suitable. Apart from other considerations, it is the technique with which most teachers are at present familiar, and, as in the modern mathematics debate, it may be preferable to attempt old methods well and avoid the risk of using new methods badly.

Although it is clear that the authorities face serious problems concerning the teaching force, finally it is worth noting that in some respects the difficulties are less with a fast-growing force than with a slow-growing one. In the latter case promotion opportunities are less, and if promotion is based on seniority rather than merit there is a danger of low morale among young teachers.\(^3\)

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2. See Chapter III, Section 1.

3. Peter Williams, Planning Teacher Demand and Supply, op.cit., p.20.
of staff between individual schools and subject specialisms is also often more difficult with a slow-growing force. Thus although the planners currently experience serious difficulties, and will continue to do so for some time, there are at least some mitigating circumstances.

vii. The Integration of Islamic and Western-Type Education

The integration of Islamic and Western-type schools, it was suggested in Chapter Two, could substantially improve efficient operation of the education machinery. Not only would it avoid wastage arising from the two systems operating side by side, it would also promote the relevance and impact of education. It was also noted, however, that attempts at unification throughout this century have borne little fruit. This section will further examine the obstacles to integration and assess probable future developments.

Light on the obstacles to effective integration is shed by the experience of other countries. One may ask, for example, how Northern Sudan has been able almost to eliminate the duality between religious and secular education. A partial answer lies in different colonial policies at the end of the last century. Whereas in Kano, then as today, arguments for adding secular subjects to Islamic curricula were influenced by the need to make a place for Islamic scholars in the modern world and prevent their relegation to the background, in the Sudan policy was based on almost opposite premises. In the highly tense atmosphere following the Mahdist uprisings, the colonial authorities advocated addition of secular subjects as a diluent - to reduce the zeal and fanaticism from too narrow an education. Thus, although the rationale was more negative, it was also more urgent. Subsidies and inspectors

were introduced in much the same way as in Kano, but selections for primary schools were made first from the Koranic schools and only second from the government elementary schools.  

Another important factor facilitating integration was the widespread use of Arabic, which was a secular as well as religious language. In modern Nigeria, Arabic is a religious language little used in any other context. Though one obvious solution to the linguistic demands of the primary curriculum would be the adoption of religious tuition in the vernacular, it is questionable whether education would be considered truly Islamic if not conducted in Arabic. Referring to the early colonial period, Clarke has pointed out that "For a muslim for whom Islam and Arabic were inseparable, learning English was tantamount to engaging in 'mixing' or 'syncretism' so strongly condemned by Uthman dan Fodio." As we have noted, this attitude is still widespread in Kano and is one reason for the "resistance" to primary education. Sectarian rivalries are also an obstacle because, since the Ahmadiyya have been willing to translate religious documents into the vernaculars but are regarded as heretics by the main body of Muslims, the rejection of the break-away sect also involves rejection of their practices. This problem is not restricted to Nigeria, and has been noted, for example, in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and The Gambia.

Preliminary observations indicate that the impact of UPZ on Islamiyya schools may vary. Whereas the proprietor of one Islamiyya school in Kano remarked that enrolments

1. ibid., p.124.
4. See Chapter III, Section. 1.
had fallen in 1976/7 because pupils now attended government schools,\(^1\) the enrolments in Hadejia's two Islamiyya schools showed a marked increase, suggesting that parents who were unwilling to send their children to government schools sent them to Islamiyya schools to avoid harassment.\(^2\) The latter case again highlights the greater confidence certain sections of the community have in the schools and emphasises their potential in extending educational provision. It must be noted that, as with the Koranic schools, some pupils attend both an Islamiyya and a government institution. This is made possible by the widespread operation of double shifts in both systems, and in this case the Islamiyya and government schools supplement rather than provide an alternative to each other. However, it is significant that, in contrast to most government institutions, some Islamiyya schools have over twice as many girls as boys.\(^3\) In this respect they are filling an important gap and providing a useful complement to the Western-type system.

In 1976/7 there were 63 grant-aided Islamiyya schools in Kano State.\(^4\) When compared with the 2,633 primary schools, 1,955 of which had been newly opened for UPE, this appears a small number which has dwindled in proportionate terms. Ministry grants were also low, with a capital allocation of N42,044 and a recurrent one of N106,230.\(^5\)

1. Interview, Alhaji Barau Dambatta, Kofar Nassarawa Islamiyya School, Kano, 22/2/77.
2. Interviews, headmasters of Shamsideen Islamiyya School and Nurudeen Islamiyya School, Hadejia, 5/2/77. Increased enrolments have also been observed by Is'haku, op.cit., p.37.
3. Where schools operate a double shift, the imbalance is particularly marked in the morning because more boys attend government schools. Thus the 1976/7 enrolment of the Jamatiola School, for example, was 158 boys and 490 girls in the morning, and 210 boys and 243 girls in the afternoon.
4. Appendix XI.
5. Ibid..
Improvement of this position can only be resolved by enlightened orthodox leadership. This makes the death of Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello in 1965 all the more tragic. Other leaders may emerge, but Alhaji Aminu Kano, who is among the more prominent, has other concerns which take priority. Possibly the decision to establish a Koranic school in Kano near the tomb of General Aurtala Mohammed, the head of State assassinated in 1976, may also focus attention on such institutions.

There are, however, signs of active resistance to incorporation of the Islamic and Western-type systems. Until recently, resistance has been largely quiet and passive, but in 1976 a Bayero University College International Islamic Seminar on Education, attended by many prominent personalities, produced a 'manifesto' stating that:

The Seminar accepted in absolute and unconditional terms the superiority of Islamic system of education over all other systems of education, and... reject[s] in particular the Western system of education which has not only failed to produce people of good character, sense of commitment to the welfare of mankind but has in actual fact accelerated the development of corruption and the spread of vices.

Although this statement was contrary to the tone both of many individual papers and of the First International Seminar on Muslim Education in Mecca three months later, at which Nigeria was represented (although not by a Hausa), it must be seen in the context of violent incidents noted in Chapter Three which occurred when the government applied pressure on several communities.

1. Interview, Alh. Aminu Kano, 29/6/76.
Undoubtedly integration of the two systems faces difficulties of their different aims and structures. Reform encounters problems in arrangement of timetables, the grouping of pupils into classes, and methods of teaching. However, the real question is not whether integration is possible so much as the extent to which the relevant parties actually want it to happen. For many years, villagers in Kano have passively resisted schooling. Now there are active objections from a section of the intelligentsia and from various village communities to being taken over (for that is inevitably how they see it) by government schools. From the educational point of view, Islamiyya schools are a means to combine many features of the Western system with that already existing, and thus provide a relevant education grounded in the culture of the people. They are also important from a political viewpoint, for increasing emphasis in some circles is being laid on the need to preserve Nigerian culture, now being undermined by neo-colonialism. Integration does, however, face two serious obstacles. The first is that the forces of religious conservatism remain strong, and some argue that Islamiyya schools represent a dilution of 'true' education. The second is that an extension of the Islamiyya system would increase differences between the north and other parts of the country, and raise problems of acceptability and comparability. The authorities have made little effort to see the matter from the villagers' and Islamic leaders' point of view, and in some ways the trend is away from local variations to a more rigid model devised from Lagos. In the long run, if the authorities can apply sufficient pressure and make the Western-type system sufficiently widespread, the Koranic system may be relegated to a position comparable to the supplementary Sunday schools of many Christian communities. In so doing, however, it is arguable that opportunities for efficient and effective use of resources have been lost.

viii: Provision for Handicapped Children

In the two final parts of this section, discussion focuses on the handicapped and nomadic minority groups for whom specific provision is necessary before education can become truly universal. For them, the type of schooling required is rather different from the majority, and this has implications both for the quality of provision and its cost. Since universality cannot be achieved without special provision, discussion of obstacles also indicates the likelihood of achieving complete UPE in the near future.

Until recently, special education for handicapped children has been the concern of voluntary agencies rather than the state, and has been very limited in scope. The government has been preoccupied with education for normal children and unable to spare resources for the handicapped minority. The need to incorporate non-government assistance has been continually stressed in this study. However it will become clear that the almost total relegation of special education to missionaries has caused several problems.

The most notable institution for the blind in Kano is the Sudan Interior Mission school. It was first established in 1938, though it did not begin full operation until 1944, following the opening of an Eye Hospital in Sabon Gari. For many years, tuition was informal and very elementary. To continue their studies, pupils had to transfer to Gindiri, near Jos. The school was reorganised in 1961 and the staff expanded, but in 1972 the school still had only 19 pupils, of whom all were males, grouped in three classes. There were four teachers, of whom two were

Nigerian and blind. Much of the funding has come from overseas, and the school has a strong Christian bias. This latter factor explains its generally low population and the fact that only one pupil in 1972 came from Kano. Awareness of the unacceptability of the school's evangelistic stance was the main factor causing authorities to open a completely separate institution at Tudun Maliki, in Kano Metropolitan Area after the launching of UPE, so that in this example, voluntary agency resources were not used to the full. Apart from another blind teacher offering instruction in Hadejia, there was no other formal provision for the blind, despite widespread incidence of the disability. Similarly, a small group of mentally handicapped children were looked after, also at Tudun Maliki, but as one observer commented in 1976, the young teacher in charge, although hard working, was able to embark on little more than child-minding. All other provision was arranged either on a family basis or according to traditional patterns.

The inadequacy of special education was officially recognised in the Third National Development Plan, which remarked, "The current level of effort has proved inadequate in meeting its needs and argues for a change of approach


2. Though they should be treated with caution, an indication of the incidence of various handicaps was provided by figures produced by the Ministry of Social Welfare, Youth and Sports (cited in Hassan op.cit., p.256) in the mid-1970's. Their survey counted 14,600 blind in the state, 6,336 cripples and 2,731 deaf. See also Daniel Amwe, 'Causes and Incidence of Visual Handicap' (xerox), Cambridge University Institute for Education, 1978.

3. The blind have a well-organised 'union' headed by the Sarkin Naksfi, which is one reason why begging is lucrative and the blind school has had limited impact (see below).
away from the existing system of grants-in-aid to private agency institutions to something more direct and decisive in improving the situation." It stated intent to establish a National Council on Special Education, discussed the need for cooperation between the Ministries of Education and Labour (which is difficult to achieve), and allocated Kano a specific grant of ₦630,000. This attention derived specifically from the UPE scheme, for federal officers realised the impossibility of attaining universality without special provision.

Kano's response to this federal initiative took the form of an invitation to the Cambridge University Institute of Education to visit the state and make recommendations. Two visits paved the way for creation of a special one year training course in Cambridge which in its first year enrolled 14 Nigerians, of whom seven came from Kano. Though some of them returned to Kaduna Polytechnic to launch their own special education course, from the angle of efficiency of the machinery, it must be noted that overseas training is expensive, that numbers were small, and that several trainees enrolled because they wanted to train overseas rather than because they had an inherent interest in special education. It might also have been more suitable to send students to an institution already running such courses, such as the Moray House College of Education in Edinburgh. The decision partially reflects the fact that

2. The figure was retained in the revised plan (op.cit., Vol.II, p.311) and subdivided into ₦180,000 for a Deaf and Dumb School and ₦450,000 for grants to seven voluntary agency schools. It appears that earlier policy, which had suggested the phasing out of voluntary agency activity, had been reversed.
3. See circular from Federal Ministry of Education, 'Special Education - Guidelines', Ref. 35.69/S.14/I/104, dated 22/7/76.
4. Information from Roger Lanyon, Course Tutor, Cambridge University Institute of Education, 27/1/76.
5. Interviews, trainees, 17/3/76.
Kano's interest in special education arose primarily from federal prompting. The more simple pressures of UFE left few resources for special cases; but authorities were aware that federal grants would not be directly available in other sectors if not utilised, and that failure to employ them would appear unprogressive. In this sense, although federal grants may have stimulated desirable activity, they also promoted wastage.

An incidental anticipated benefit of the special education programme was the reduction of begging, which had become increasingly problematic. In this, however, the programme was only partially successful. The officer in charge complained that begging was so lucrative that he was unable to retain blind children in the school. This has the serious implication that the school will require a considerable injection of financial as well as manpower resources if it is to 'outbid' alternative opportunities, and provide some form of pocket money. Even without this item, the costs of training are substantial, and add weight to arguments that, where possible, handicapped children should not be placed in special institutions but integrated into normal schools. Such a strategy requires many

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2. Interview, Maj. A. Maiwada, SEC Special Education, Ministry of Education, Kano, 20/7/76. In April 1976, the school had been able to attract only 13 blind children.

3. Figures for Nigeria were not available, but an indication is provided from the British estimated annual cost of £4,300 to train a blind child (Information from Mal. A. Abubakar Mohammed, Moray House College of Education, Edinburgh, 10/2/75).

more capable teachers than are presently available, however, and is therefore not realistic. As such, provision for the handicapped, and through it true universality, is unattainable without the specialist institutions. Since they are themselves faced with serious problems, which are made worse by financial stringency, it is unlikely that special education will even approach adequacy in the near future. In turn this means that education cannot become completely universal in the near future.

ix. Provision for Nomadic Children

Similarly, considerable obstacles hinder provision of education for the nomadic population. Here is perhaps fortunate to have a relatively small proportion of nomads in the population, and is therefore able to look to other states to devise appropriate strategies. Their progress in doing so, however, is not rapid.

One interesting suggestion from Borno State was the creation of mobile schools to travel with the people. To this they allocated $1.1 million in the revised third development plan. Although the project catches the imagination and is frequently mentioned in official speeches, it has encountered several problems. In 1975, three vehicles were equipped with tables, chairs for 15 pupils and other teaching equipment, and a census was commenced to determine the number of children involved. Because nomads do not heed national or state boundaries, however, administrative difficulties increased with the division of North Eastern State into three parts. Financial resources were hardly utilised and were reallocated each year in the hope that conditions would permit a more serious attack, but the demands of UPE again resulted in scarcity of manpower resources and if an attempt had been made in

2. New Nigerian, 19/5/76.
earnest the financial allocation would have been far from adequate. Another major obstacle was the lack of Bororo Fulani or Shuwa Arab teachers who would be acceptable to the communities, and among the few with sufficient education, none could be found who were willing to tolerate the hardships of nomadic travel.

An alternative, cheaper and much easier operation is construction of fixed schools to which nomads can send their children when nearby. When they move again, the children would continue their studies in a different school elsewhere. This plan relies on attracting the nomads to selected sites by provision of bore-holes and other amenities, which itself encounters the problem of inter-ministry coordination and, if not carefully managed, overgrazing. Though the abolition of jangali (cattle tax) removed one cause of ill feeling between the nomads and the authorities in 1975 and thus promoted cooperation, financial stringency in 1978 forced its reintroduction and made it more difficult to locate the nomads. Planners also lack sufficient information on the patterns of migration, which vary among different groups and according to the incidence of rainfall.

As with education for handicapped children, the most suitable curriculum for the Fulani must be carefully considered. Since their lives revolve around their cattle, different content and teaching styles are required. Only if the nomads perceive the usefulness of education will they


respond favourably to educational provision. The curriculum is therefore a key factor in efficient use of resources. Since conditions preclude learning in depth, subject matter should be restricted to those subjects of greatest use, such as the three R's and hygiene. It might be argued that the core curriculum must be the same as that studied by other pupils in order to avoid relegation of the Fulani to an educational backwater. The danger of doing this is, however, much less than that of providing a non-functional and ineffective education. The suggestion that the Fulani should be encouraged to settle also raises the issue of whether the authorities have any right to destroy the Fulani lifestyle in the name of what they have decided is best for them rather than what the people have decided for themselves.

As with special education, it is unlikely that adequate provision for the Fulani can be made in the near future. As such, completely universal education cannot be anticipated for some time. Those solutions which have been suggested are both inefficient and costly. The relatively high cost factor is perhaps inevitable, but inefficiency must be reduced if some form of education for nomads is to become a reality.

5. Some Ways to Reduce Costs

In this chapter we have discussed a number of factors which influence the efficiency of the educational machinery. They included the administrative structure, drop-outs and repeaters, the curriculum and schedules, the teaching force, and the broader matter of integration of Western and Eastern systems. Though efficiency is difficult accurately to assess, particularly because it incorporates so many unquantifiable aspects, we have noted many achievements in the primary sector and pointed out some areas in which improvements could be made. In the early part of the chapter it was shown that education, and UPE in particular, is very expensive. Efficient operation of the machinery
has become especially important in the light of decreased petroleum revenues in the mid-1970's. Towards the end of the decade there were signs of recovery, and education expenditures were further increased. However, to the direct costs must be added opportunity costs, and it is questionable whether continued high allocations are fully desirable, or indeed whether it will be possible to maintain them. In this final section, therefore, we consider some ways in which costs can be reduced so that efficiency can be improved and education extended to as many people as possible. The two parts discuss capital and recurrent items separately. The boundaries are not, of course mutually exclusive since recurrent expenditure may be dependent and directly or inversely proportional to capital investment. Many of the factors have been mentioned already, but it is useful to summarise findings and draw strands together.

1. Capital Costs

The most obvious items of capital expenditure for UPE were classrooms, teachers' houses, latrines and furniture. In each there was a wide range of alternative designs, with different implications.

In Chapter Three it was noted that Kano neither employed semi-permanent mud and thatch structures of the type used in Benue and Cross River States, nor built zinc sheet classrooms as found elsewhere in the north. Instead the authorities erected cement buildings of different designs, and where these were delayed, used either zana matting shelters or the shade of a tree. Undoubtedly, costs could have been reduced by avoiding the use of steel frames and employing generally cheaper designs both for buildings and furniture. It is also arguable that high-cost buildings do not blend with their surroundings, and strengthen the tendency for education to divorce its participants from the society it is supposed to be preparing them for. On the other hand, the 'big push' strategy has

\[1\] See Myerere, Education for Self Reliance, op. cit., p. 11.
much to commend it, on the principle that greater pressure over a short period of time may achieve more than lesser pressure over a longer period. From both local and state viewpoints, it was amply borne out that funds were available in greater abundance between 1974 and 1976 than later; and though the scale of operation did not lead to optimum allocation of resources from the national viewpoint, lower levels profited by securing large financial allocations. There is, therefore, a conflict when assessing strategies, depending on the level from which they are viewed.

It is unfortunate for all parties, however, that capital expenditure, because of qualitative shortcomings, created particularly high recurrent obligations. Even before the end of the first year, new buildings with warped doors, no roofs and crumbling fabric were widespread in Kano State, and were costly to repair. Some forms of capital expenditure are labour saving and designed to reduce recurrent costs; but in this example, capital investment substantially increased them. Lupton's figures showed that recurrent obligations incurred by a single unit of capital investment are generally much higher in education than in other sectors. Recurrent costs are also more important because, by definition, they are liabilities which recur every year. They are reviewed in the second part of this section.

ii. Recurrent Costs

Over 80% of recurrent costs are teachers' salaries; and, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, total liabilities expand each year as experience is gained and qualifications improve, even when the absolute number of staff is held constant. To use staff more efficiently, there is room for considerable increase of class size, especially since drop-outs reduce actual attendances from

1. See Chapter III, passim.
2. See Section 2 of this chapter.
those officially registered. One way to increase class size may be the creation of larger schools, which also has the benefit of permitting rotational teaching. An alternative strategy replaces teachers either with books\(^1\) or with televisions.\(^2\) The latter strategy permits both a reduction of recurrent expenditure and the optimum utilisation of the few good teachers available. However, the medium unavoidably reduces personal contact, which is a very important ingredient of learning. It also requires high capital expenditure, a corps of technicians, and a widespread electricity supply. Educational television has encountered many drawbacks, and the experience of the department of adult education suggests that it is not a practicable way to replace teachers at the present time.\(^3\)

Both vested interests and the need to retain capable staff also prevent reduction of their salaries in relation to other workers, which adds urgency to the need to minimise other recurrent costs.

Among other recurrent items are boarding facilities, for which, surprisingly, there were plans for extension as part of the UPE campaign. In the past, boarding primary schools were useful where each one had a wide catchment area. With the proliferation of schools, this ceased to be so important, but some were still considered desirable to promote attendance and retention of girls. To the two existing in 1976, two more were added in 1977.\(^4\) Apart

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1. For an interesting experiment to employ 'self-instructional modules' in Indonesia and the Philippines, see Sanger, op. cit., passim.


from the implications this had for social integration,\(^1\) it is likely that cost factors will prohibit further expansion of such institutions.

In the teacher training sector there is also scope for reduction of recurrent costs. Since a large proportion of trainees in the emergency colleges were mature, often with families, many were not unhappy with the impossibility of organising boarding institutions between 1974 and 1977. Though conditions were difficult for other trainees, the staff were also content with this situation because their responsibilities were reduced. A system in which students are assisted to find lodgings in the local community has much to commend it, for it encourages links between the college and the people, substantially reduces the costs incurred by the government, and avoids the most common cause of complaint among students - the poor quality of food. Other states in the federation are reviewing their boarding policies and either making all pupils cater for themselves or requiring greater participation in domestic arrangements,\(^2\) and Kano might be wise to follow suit.

Similarly, it may not be possible for the government to maintain the considerable allowances it paid to trainees in the mid-1970's. That they existed at all was often a cause for scorn from southerners, who commonly made large sacrifices for the privilege yet saw Kano students, as they viewed it, paid to attend college. In February 1977, allowances were increased from N540 to N720 per annum for pivotal students,\(^3\) a sum which represents more than twice

\(^1\) Though the schools are subsidised, fees are still charged and the schools are attended mainly by children from elite families. This is discussed further in Chapter VI, Section 2.1.

\(^2\) The governments of both Cyo and Anambra States announced their intention to abolish boarding schools, though modified their policies in the face of public outcry (Daily Times, 2/5/77, 6/5/77; Daily Star, 5/5/77). Kwara and Niger States are now making students cook their own meals (Daily Times, 9/5/77; New Nigerian, 7/6/77).

\(^3\) Ministry of Education circular INCP/1/Vol.II/276, Kano, 4/2/77. There is a sliding scale for other trainees according to their grade.
the annual income of a peasant farmer and his family. The total allocation in 1976/7 for maintenance, pocket money and student travelling amounted to 7,290,000. Clearly, this level cannot be sustained for any length of time. Indeed, in view of the common complaint that trainees only attend college on those days when their allowances are due, it is arguable that payments should be abolished so that only strongly motivated students enrol and funds are spent more effectively.

The acute need for in-service training was noted above; but to accompany increased provision, steps to retain teachers in the system are needed. Reduction of drop-outs and repetition will promote efficient use of both capital and recurrent costs, and reform of the curriculum could also improve the impact of investment.

Attention to most of these issues could not be more than cursory during the very rapid expansion of the mid-1970's. With the achievement of large enrolments, consolidation became the next stage without which further expansion was not possible. It is often the case that educational expansion is cyclical in nature. The consolidation phase beginning in 1978 was necessary to improve efficiency of operation which will then permit another quantitative attack in the early 1980's.

This analysis of the first level of quality demonstrated many shortcomings during the initial stages of UPE. However, it was noted that, while such topics as the curriculum are important for all aspects of quality, each level is not necessarily compatible. We should now turn to discussion of UFS and its relationship with the labour market, which will shed light on the second level of quality.

CHAPTER V: UPE AND EMPLOYMENT

The relationship between the UPE scheme and employment is crucial. During the implementation period lasting into the 1980's, labour constraints will influence the ease with which the scheme is launched; and, even more important, from the time the first cohort of pupils leaves school, the amount and type of employment available will be a vital determinant of the value of the campaign and of the second level of quality.1 If school leavers are unemployed for an extended period, both the economic and social benefits from investment in education are called into question. On the one hand, economic returns will be poor because skills acquired will not be fully utilised and because production by many children who would have been occupied both during their school years and afterwards, would have been lost. On the other hand, unemployment may have undesirable social aspects both for individuals and the wider society. Some observers have expressed concern that the unemployed may threaten the stability of society2 and be easily manipulated by politicians.3

1. See the Introduction to this thesis.

2. For example, the Nigerian National Council for Adult Education, in its 1978 conference, stated awareness of the "Problems and Prospects of UPE graduates ... and the number of school leavers who are coming out of our schools and will increasingly continue to do so". The members expressed the view that without provision "for their employment and further training and development as individuals, ... serious socio Political Problems (sic) could result and cause potential danger to good government and stability of Society". ('Resolutions of the NNCAE symposium on the problems and prospects of UPE graduates', Ife, 1978 (typescript), p.1.)

3. Abernethy, for example, considers that in the South during the 1960's, one effect of the UPE programmes may have been that politicians were "encouraged ... to inflame ethnic and regional tensions" because "mass education enabled large numbers of people to expand their horizons from the parochial to the ethnic level" (op. cit., p.261). The same phenomenon could occur in Kano in the 1980's.
Discussion in Chapter Six points out that this is not inevitable, but that it is nevertheless a factor worth considering.

Because the subject of employment is complex, it is necessary at the outset to state several definitions. It must, first, be recognised that the term 'employment' should not refer exclusively to formal sector wage employment, but should embrace the wider category of the self-employed in small craft enterprises or subsistence agriculture, for example. As Weeks has pointed out, it is a mistake to conclude that because an individual is unable to find a job, he is unemployed. Increasingly, attention is focussing on a wider definition of employment that includes an 'informal sector' which may be important to UPE school leavers in the 1980's.

Also relevant is the concept of 'underemployment' or 'disguised unemployment'. These terms have aroused considerable discussion and are not always clear, but most commonly refer to underutilisation of labour. In agriculture,


for example, labour is often said to be seasonally underemployed (though during peak periods it may be 'overemployed') since work is insufficient fully to occupy the labourer.

Although there is disagreement on the definitions and levels of unemployment and underemployment, the terms remain useful, and recognise that resources are not always utilised optimally. The complexities of the debate are indicated here to provide a basis for analysis. One possible effect of UPE will be an acceleration of the drift from traditional agriculture and an increase in competition for wage employment. Although many school leavers will not seek formal sector jobs, others will do so, and some will be disappointed. Thus one effect of UPE could be the conversion of rural underemployment into urban open unemployment.¹

The indirect aspects of the relationship between UPE and the labour market are also important. On the positive side, creation of employment for one group may

¹. For discussion on this matter with reference to several other developing countries, see Christopher Colclough and Jacques Hallak, 'Rural Education and Employment', IIEP, Paris, 1975, pp.11-2.
have multiplier and linkage effects which extend benefits to others.¹ On the negative side, if the availability of education does not correspond to that of employment, there is a danger of raising aspirations which cannot be fulfilled, leading to depopulation of rural areas and a possible decline in agricultural production. Though so often repeated as to have become a cliché, this is not a matter to be dismissed. Agricultural production is particularly important in view of the marked increase in food imports during the early 1970's, which was both economically unsatisfactory and politically embarrassing for the government.

Before examining the prospects for employment of school leavers, this chapter will begin with the immediate effects of UPE on employment; i.e., on providing jobs for the teachers, builders, administrators and ancillary personnel involved in the actual implementation of the scheme. Because calculation of linkage effects is complex and beyond the scope of this thesis, the first section is mainly confined to the direct impact of UPE on the labour market. However, it is recognised that multiplier effects do exist and are important.

1. F. Perroux ("Note sur la Notion de "pole de croissance"", Economie Appliquee, Vol. 8, 1955), has been influential in arguing that development has depended on particular dynamic sectors and "growth poles". Similarly, Albert O. Hirschman (The Strategy of Economic Development, Yale University Press, 1958) considered that development tended to concentrate on central areas, from which there might be "trickle down" effects for the rest of the economy. However, this argument is not universally accepted. Gunnar Myrdal, for example (Economic Theory and Underdevelopment Regions, Duckworth, London, 1957), suggested that inequalities tend to be reinforced by a process of cumulative causation. His model is refined by John Friedman (Regional Development Policy: A Case Study of Venezuela, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1966). Multiplier and linkage effects are complex matters, therefore, and it cannot be assumed that they will improve the balance of development in Kano.
The most obvious effect the launching of UPE has had on the labour market is in providing jobs for teachers. In the first year alone, Kano's primary teaching force expanded by some 6,700 staff, more than doubling the existing stock. Government salary scales, especially at the lower levels, were attractive, and teaching absorbed large numbers of secondary and primary leavers who would otherwise have found difficulty in obtaining employment. Many, rather than going directly into teaching, entered the training colleges which had been built and expanded in preparation for the scheme. Opportunities were not restricted to those with full primary or secondary qualifications, for many persons were admitted to the training colleges and the teaching profession having completed only part of a course, or obtained adult literacy certificates, or having uncertificated Koranic knowledge. For reasons noted in Chapter Four, the dramatic expansion further reduced the quality of teaching, and therefore also has implications for the future employability of pupils.

The opportunity costs of expansion should also be considered, for had the resources not been devoted to education, they would have been used elsewhere and generated at least some employment. Further, the urgency of the project conferred greater bargaining power on suppliers of raw materials and labour, which enabled them to raise their level of remuneration. This is an area which it is difficult to assess, and on which more research is required. However, since primary education is such a labour intensive activity, it is doubtful whether many alternatives would have generated

1. See Chapter IV, Section 4.iv.
2. See Chapter III, Section 1.11.
3. See Chapter IV, Section 2.
employment to the same extent.

The large scale employment of teachers was not confined to the primary schools, for even before UPE was launched, training colleges had been created and expanded in preparation. Thus there were 385 teacher trainers in the state in 1975/6, compared to 240 in 1973/4. However, since Kano State was short of sufficiently qualified personnel, many were recruited from beyond its borders. Thus 37% of the staff employed in colleges in 1975/6 were expatriates, and another large group were persons from other states of the federation. In this respect, much of the money spent on UPE in Kano did not in fact benefit its own citizens. The expatriates were given higher salaries, and so their numerical strength had financial implications. Some, especially from the Indian sub-continent and the Philippines, did not speak good English or have reliable qualifications, and many Nigerians were unhappy about the political implications of the continued strength of expatriates in the education sector.

The second obvious group for whom UPE led to employment were the contractors and workers in the building industry. Statistics on contractors employed to construct primary schools in several areas are shown in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1: Contracts awarded for Construction of Primary Schools, 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Contractors</th>
<th>Classrooms</th>
<th>Total Cost (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Karaye District</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>896,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bichi District</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>994,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawakin Tofa District</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>1,058,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadejia Emirate</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>3,105,177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gomel Emirate</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>2,065,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazaure Emirate</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>1,159,920</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Area Education Officers. N.B.: The figures are taken from original contract allocations and may subsequently have been adjusted according to the contractors' performance. Where steel frames were used, their cost is excluded.

Though it is difficult to make a precise estimate, many

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contractors were entering the industry for the first time.\footnote{Such was the pressure created by UPE that the usual requirements for registration of contractors were waived. This, as noted above (Chapter III, Section 1.iii), was one reason why general standards of construction were low.}

It is also difficult to assess the quantity and duration of employment. This is firstly because the buildings differed in style, and secondly because a wide range of working speeds was evident. In some cases, classrooms were completed within weeks; in others they took almost a year. The latter instances were of course unsatisfactory to the authorities, but had the benefit to the workers of reducing fluctuations in employment.

One can, however, comment generally on the employment effects of different classroom designs. The steel frames used for some UPE classrooms, for example, were both expensive and unhelpful either to the balance of payments or the indigenous labour market since the girders had to be imported. Though Kano's savannah countryside produces little timber suitable for construction, the Southern states are renowned for their wood and its use would have generated employment which would indirectly have benefitted Kano State.\footnote{The largest sawmill in Kano is jointly owned by the Kano and Bendel State governments, the raw materials being transported by rail from the latter state. Smaller concerns also exist, in which private businessmen make their own arrangements.} The same is true of the metal-framed doors and windows which can be manufactured locally, but which employ imported raw materials. Cement is produced in Nigeria, though in 1976 supplies were inadequate and much had to be imported. These bottlenecks in the economy hampered the launching of the scheme but were difficult to avoid. The scale of the project contributed to scarcities and resulted in inflation rather than increased short-run production or employment. However, UPE did provide an incentive to eliminate bottlenecks and increase long-run production, even if opportunities were missed.\footnote{See discussion on building designs in Chapter III, Sections 1.iii and 2.iii.}

Discussion on employment should not be restricted to figures, but should also consider who is employed: a quest-
ion with bearing on the distribution of wealth and the pattern of development. There was a tendency for the contracts in the UPE scheme to be awarded to already relatively wealthy persons, and thus acceleration of the process by which the rich become richer and the gap between them and the rest of the population is widened. This, however, did not occur uniformly. Contracts awarded in Bichi, for example, tended to be much larger than those in Kazaure (Table 5.1). In the former, eight men were awarded 82% of the contracts, ranging from 16 to 32 classrooms each. In the latter, only two contracts were for more than 13 classrooms, and they comprised only 19% of the total. In Kazaure a large number of contracts were for single as opposed to double classroom blocks. This practice was not followed elsewhere in the state, and though it may have hindered efficient use of fixed capital and created problems of coordination where two contractors were erecting one block, it is likely that it enabled the wealth from UPE to be spread more evenly.

A large majority of contracts awarded for primary schools were to indigenes of Kano State, and one result of decentralisation was that buildings were erected by persons of more local origin than would otherwise have been the case. The teachers’ colleges, however, involved more complex construction, and expatriate personnel were more in evidence. As mentioned in Chapter Three, two companies – Raccah and Chaker Ltd. and the Balmore Trading Co. – secured contracts for eight colleges in 1974. Each college was designed for 1,080 students, and the buildings were made of prefabricated aluminium panels. This provided another example of raw materials which were imported and were of little benefit to the local economy. Both contracts

1. Two other areas of contrast were Birnin Kudu District, where two contractors out of eight erected 109 of the 116 classrooms, as opposed to Babura District, in which there were 32 contractors and none erected more than eight (out of 146) classrooms.

2. It was usual for persons living near the headquarters to be favoured most. Karaye was an exception to this, for nine contractors were, from their names, obviously from Rogo (a village in a very remote part of the state and some 20 miles from Karaye) compared with only seven from the headquarters.

3. In 1977 Balmore did establish a factory in Kano to manufacture the panels, though the raw materials were still imported (Daily Times, 16/4/77).
were subsequently the subject of a commission of inquiry, which particularly indicted irregularities in the second company.¹ Both were owned by prominent businessmen, but the former was more conspicuous as having expatriate direction, and it is likely that a larger share of the profits were exported and therefore of little benefit to the citizens of Kano State.² This also was not a situation which could easily have been avoided. Since the requirements of the first year will be partially reduplicated in subsequent years, there is an incentive to indigenous companies to expand operations.³ The examples, however, demonstrate the limitations on the benefits UPE brought to the local economy during its initial phases.⁴ It is doubtful whether those responsible for implementation of UPE were greatly concerned to reduce disparities, partly because they were assigned more narrow objectives, and partly because widespread corruption ensured that many received substantial benefits themselves. Yet these examples suggest that even if bribery had not existed, and even if the authorities had been concerned to secure relatively even distribution of the benefits of UPE, because of the economic structure such intentions would have been hard to realise.

The features of the furniture contracts in the first year were similar to those for buildings. On the one hand


2. The first company had a prominent Lebanese interest, and the second was 40% owned by Alhaji Inuwa Wada and Alhaji Adu Bako, the former Kano State Military Governor.

3. Thus a N2 million contract was awarded to a different indigenous company, TEACOC Construction Co. Ltd., in 1977. It was, however, still for classrooms using pre-fabricated materials (Information from Dr. Ibrahim Ayagi, Kano State Commissioner for Education, 31/5/77).

4. Another limitation is imposed by the tendency of those with larger incomes to spend a high proportion on imported luxury items. In this case, the benefits to the local economy are restricted even when wealth accrues to Nigerians.
were the large contracts given centrally by the Ministry to such companies as Raccaform, Moukarim or Abdu Dutse and Sons, and on the other were orders given to much smaller carpentry businesses by Area Tenders Boards or LEA's.

Furniture produced by the large companies was usually of a tubular steel frame with either a metal or a plywood surface. Though the companies did employ a substantial workforce, the metal raw materials had to be imported. Central arrangement of contracts had the obvious benefit that furniture could be obtained more cheaply with bulk discounts, but since the large concerns operate in Kano Metropolitan Area, the wealth was concentrated in the city and the imbalance between urban and rural areas heightened. The use of metal-framed furniture was restricted to Kano and Kazaure LEA areas, however, and makes possible a comparison of their policy with the different strategies of Hadejia and Gumel. In both the latter areas furniture was constructed out of wood, though for administrative convenience the LEA's awarded contracts to businessmen who sub-contracted the work to carpenters. The scale of operation is indicated by the total 1976 requirements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Hadejia</th>
<th>Gumel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>desks</td>
<td>10,400 three-seater desks &amp; benches @ N47</td>
<td>7,120 two-seater desks @ N20,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,200 teachers' tables @ N60,</td>
<td>14,240 chairs @ N10,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,600 teachers' chairs @ N15,</td>
<td>712 cupboards @ N40,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,200 cupboards @ N40,</td>
<td>712 teachers' tables @ N55,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,200 notice boards @ N5.</td>
<td>712 teachers' chairs @ N15,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,620 chairs @ N10,</td>
<td>1,424 notice boards @ N5.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clearly this was a major boost to their local economies. However, again there was a tendency for the wealth to accrue to businessmen, who were already relatively wealthy, than to the carpenters themselves. In Hadejia, four businessmen were awarded contracts for half the total furniture requirements, and in Gumel one contractor was responsible for one third of the total.\(^\text{1}\) It is difficult to suggest that this

\(^{1}\) Information from Alh. Bilyaminu Usman (CEO, Hadejia LSA), 13/11/76, and Alh. Mohammedu Zakari (CEO, Gumel LSA), 9/12/76.
should have been otherwise, for the LEA's could not afford the manpower to make direct arrangements with individual carpenters. Further, Kazaure's experience, in which half the furniture was made by large companies in Kano out of metal and the other half distributed among 22 local contractors, also showed that the former met requirements much more quickly.¹ In later years the pressures of quantity may not be so great, and the authorities will be able to give more local contracts. However the requirements will still be substantial, and the inability of small concerns to provide more than a fraction of the total is a factor which will continue to militate against them.²

The employment effects of ancillary items such as books, stationery and chalk were also substantial, though less easily traceable. Though the major centres of production were outside Kano, indirect benefits were still provided for citizens of the state. The New Nigerian Newspaper Company and the Apex Mill, for example, produced large numbers of exercise books. Publishers also greatly expanded operations,³ and since the indigenisation decree required 60% local ownership,⁴ a high proportion of profits probably remained in the country. Similarly, although a child's uniform is a small item (a complete uniform cost

1. Information from Alh. Aminu Kazaure, CEO Kazaure LEA, 26/11/76.

2. Smaller enterprises also often lack sufficient capital to begin operations efficiently. To avoid this problem in 1976, most contractors were given 10-20% mobilisation fees.

3. Heinemann Educational Books, for example, reported that whereas in 1975 65% of sales in Nigeria were imports of U.K. textbooks, in 1977 the proportion had been reduced to 37%. This reflected not a decline in absolute imports but a sharp increase in local production. Similarly, of the nine million books sold by Longman in 1976/7, five million were produced locally (The Times (London), 8/6/77, supplement p.X). Realisation of the potential northern market also induced Oxford University Press (which later changed its name to University Press to reflect its independence from the original parent company) in 1978 to decentralise its Ibadan operation by opening a branch in Kano (Information from Mr. Giles Lewis, Oxford University Press (Nig.), Kano, 21/7/78).

4. See below.
only about N2.00 in 1976), when multiplied by 1,480,000 (the anticipated 1981 enrolment), total requirements must be seen as far from insignificant.

Two major points about employment generation during the launching of UPE may therefore be made. The first is that the project had a major impact. It directly created a large number of opportunities ranging from teacher training to sewing and labouring, and the higher incomes received by these persons generated further demand and employment elsewhere in the economy. The second point, however, is that the financial benefits of UPE were not evenly distributed. The policies adopted by some authorities promoted more balanced distribution and more local employment than others, but a general tendency was observed whereby benefits particularly accumulated to those already relatively wealthy. It is therefore useful to differentiate between different parts of the economy rather than to generalise about the whole.

With regard to future employment trends, it is worth noting the difference between capital requirements, such as buildings and furniture, and recurrent ones such as exercise books and uniforms. Whereas demand for the former will sharply diminish once the launching phase of UPE has been completed, demand for the latter will continue indefinitely. Demand for teachers will also continue indefinitely. It is pertinent, however, to note one aspect of the Western Region situation in the 1960's which may be duplicated in Kano in the 1980's. One feature of the Western Region labour market in this decade was that not only were many primary leavers thrust into the 'unemployment market', but also, through retrenchment and upgrading, many teachers. 1 Partly because several schools were closed, and partly because the authorities wished to raise the quality of instruction, some of the unqualified staff recruited in the 1950's found themselves in direct competition with trained teachers, many of whom had begun their own education under the UPE

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programme. Though this possibility is not yet widely anticipated by teachers in Kano, it is one of which the authorities should be aware, and adds more urgency to the need for effective large-scale in-service training, without which the fruits of UPE could turn sour even for those whom it now benefits. The likelihood of such an event can be assessed more easily after examination of the probable overall employment situation in Kano State during the 1980's, to which we now turn.

2. Employment of the UPE School Leavers

So numerous are the factors which will determine the employment opportunities for school leavers in the 1980's that it is possible at this stage to embark on little more than speculation. Nevertheless, the subject is of such importance that even this may be of some value.

Kano's prominence in Nigerian commerce and industry has been remarked on above. In pre-colonial days it was a major centre for the trans-Saharan trade, and in the early colonial period it was made the centre of groundnut production and processing. The city was chosen for Nigeria's first textile plant in 1950, and over the next two decades developed a large number of primary and secondary industries. In the early 1970's, the range of industrial ventures

2. The present inadequate nature of in-service training is discussed in Chapter IV, Section 4.iv.
5. In 1964 the government was able to boast that Kano Province contributed some 14% of Nigeria's total industrial output, and some 47% of the Northern Region's, despite having only 10.4% and 19.5% of their respective populations. (Kano, 1970-74 Development Plan, op. cit., p.6.)
included perfumes and cosmetics; plastics; food and vegetable oils; furniture; candles and soap; tiles and concrete blocks; confectionery; brewing; and leather works; and is reported to have employed a total of 25,000 people. This figure appears particularly impressive when compared to the total of only 8,000 recorded in state government employment.

In addition to these large enterprises are many smaller ones, of both traditional and modern kinds, which are especially significant because they are scattered around the state instead of being concentrated in Kano Metropolitan Area. It is difficult to provide statistics on these enterprises, however, because no full survey has been conducted.

Almost as important as information on employment is that on unemployment. Collection of this, however, faces considerable difficulties. The first problem, as noted at the beginning, is one of definition. The National Manpower Board has defined as unemployed only those above the legal minimum working age of 14 years who were not employed and who were actively seeking work. Under this definition, a child who entered school at six, according to the UPE plan, and failed to find immediate employment on completing his course, would not be considered unemployed until he reached the age of 14, two years later. The meaning of "actively seeking work" is also debatable, for there are many degrees of activity and an individual may remain unemployed but through disillusionment reduce the activity of his searching. Further, it must be queried

1. Arnold, op. cit., p.46.
3. Dickinson, op. cit., provides some examples, however.
whether the additional criteria under which married women are not considered unemployed unless they hold professional qualifications is justified. Many women in the modern sector combine marriage duties with other work, and therefore if they are unable to find it, could be considered unemployed. This definition explains why official figures show such a low percentage of females in the labour force, but does not indicate their true role in the economy.

A second problem in assessing unemployment arises from difficulties of enumeration. In some developed countries, enumeration is made easier by the availability of financial benefits from the government which in turn provide an incentive to register. In Nigeria, no unemployment benefits are given by the authorities. Unemployed persons are encouraged to register with the Federal Ministry of Labour, which holds information on certain opportunities. However, since its ability to assist in finding work is very limited, and since there is only one Ministry office in the state, only a small proportion do register. Unemployment also shows considerable seasonal variation, and a high proportion of persons seeking work in the dry season require only temporary posts. Even those who are officially unemployed are rarely completely idle, however, since it is easy to combine petty trading and other informal sector activities with the search for other work. This factor partly balances the tendency for official figures to underestimate the extent of unemployment.

Nevertheless, despite their defects, the official figures provide some useful information on occupational distribution. The 1963 labour classification for Kano Province, shown in Table 0.2, highlighted the dominance of the farming/fishing and craftsmen/labourer groups which together comprised 80% of the total working population.

1. See Table 0.2.

2. An average of only 1,374 persons were registered in 1973, for example (Kano, Kano State Statistical Yearbook 1974, op. cit., pp. 35-6). This was far below the real number of unemployed.
A large majority was outside the formal employment sector, involved in agricultural and craft enterprises. In the past, these have generally operated on a family basis, though, as Goddard's work indicates, there is a trend towards individualization of farming practices.¹ No more recent comprehensive information comparable to the 1963 survey is available, but informal judgements suggest that since that date, the proportion of the labour force engaged in small-scale agricultural and craft enterprises has declined with the growth of modern, formal sector employment.

Throughout the 1960's and into the 1970's, formal employment opportunities for primary and secondary school leavers were good. Northerners were often given preference over Southerners, even when their paper qualifications were lower,² and after the 1966 pogroms there were fewer Southerners against whom to compete. The creation of states in 1967 also markedly increased the number of white collar jobs available.

As the 1970's progressed, however, opportunities ceased to be so readily available. Many Ibos returned to seek employment, and the number of school leavers rapidly increased.³ With the launching of the UPE

2. See Ali Al-Hakim, 'Inter-State Mobility of Manpower', in Suleimanu Kumo and Festus Nze (eds.), Perspectives in Human Resource Development and Utilization, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 1974, p.188.
3. Total Class VII enrolments fell from 5,655 in 1968 to 5,070 in 1970, but over the next six years escalated rapidly. Annual figures were 5,784, 7,430, 8,390, 8,812, 9,503, and 11,575.
scheme, most of those willing to enter the teaching profession could be absorbed; but the time when the large waves of school leavers begin to seek work from 1982 will be the very period when large scale recruitment of teachers will cease.

The scale of the situation is highlighted by earlier employment statistics. Some 193,000 pupils joined Class I in 1976. If one assumes a 20% drop-out rate and a 34% transition rate to secondary institutions, 102,000 primary leavers who began school in 1976 will seek some form of employment in 1982. To them will be added some 17,300 school leavers who began their studies in 1975.2 One third of the original cohort were girls, who will be less likely to seek wage employment than the boys. However, since drop-outs are likely to be higher among the girls,3 less than one third of those who complete school will be female. The school leaver figure is especially daunting when compared to the total of 33,000 reported to be employed by large industries and the state government in the early 1970's, especially since to the number of primary graduates should be added a high proportion of drop-outs who may also seek wage employment, and those who eventually emerge from further training. Since it is most unlikely that all the youths will be absorbed in one year by either the formal or the informal sectors, the unemployment problem could escalate rapidly as succeeding cohorts leave school.

1. This was the transition rate in the early 1970's. As noted in Chapter IV, it is unlikely that a greater percentage will proceed to secondary institutions in the early 1980's, even if junior secondary schools are created. In any case, these youths will seek employment eventually, so the ultimate problem is merely postponed.

2. As the time this research was conducted, it was generally assumed that the cohort commencing in 1975/6 would be the last to pursue a seven year course and that both Classes VII and VI would graduate in 1982 (see Chapter IV, Section 1.1).

3. See Chapter IV, Section 4.11.
These considerations bring into sharper focus the crucial importance of appropriate investment strategies. Because discussion on the impact of UPE cannot be divorced from the rest of the economy, in this section probable employment opportunities in agriculture, industry and the tertiary sector during the 1980's will be considered. As we have noted, education is widely considered an investment which will itself increase opportunities. In each case, therefore, analysis must focus on both the demand for labour and the characteristics of the labour force. As the investment aspects of primary education have been partially discussed elsewhere, however,¹ this section will place greater emphasis on the former.

i. Employment in Agriculture

Because in recent years the Nigerian economy has been strongly dominated by the petroleum industry, agriculture has relinquished its importance as a foreign exchange earner and has fallen into relative neglect. From both a local and a national viewpoint, however, the sector will remain significant for some time, and is the obvious item with which to begin discussion on employment. Petroleum is a wasting asset, and the industry generates employment in the delta region for a small minority of people. Agriculture remains a key to continued prosperity and employment in Kano. It is also a reserve of labour resources, for if more efficient means of production can be implement- ed, surplus labour can be released for work in other sectors. The foremost problem is to find the best way to improve productivity whilst minimising social disruption, and to maintain a balance between the decline of traditional farming and the growth of industries.

The emphasis given to agriculture in Kano State since the beginning of the decade has in fact been much

¹. See Chapter I, Section 1.iii and Chapter IV, Section 2.
greater than in most other states. The 1970-74 development plan allocated 32% of total resources to the sector,¹ and though, as demonstrated by Table 5.2, actual expenditure did not reach that target, capital investments were

Table 5.2: Kano State Government Expenditure on Agriculture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Capital (₦'000)</th>
<th>Recurrent (₦'000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>3,261.7</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>3,787.6</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>3,221.1</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>4,059.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>10,700.9*</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>28,085.7</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>17,511.0</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>24,505.0</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-79</td>
<td>10,350.0</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* estimates
** revised estimates


considerable. The peak of 23.5% in 1975/6 is especially remarkable when it is remembered that education alone consumed 42.5% of the total.² A high percentage of financial allocations in the second plan were to farm supplies and credit schemes, which received 46% of the total, but the largest single items were the Kano River and Hadejia Valley irrigation projects which were allocated ₦7 million (43%).³ In the 1975-80 plan, the scope of these projects was further expanded, and they were taken over by the federal

². Revised estimates contained in 1976/7 Kano State Budget Estimates, op. cit., p.164. In addition, ₦2.4 million (8% of the total) was allocated to livestock, fisheries and forestry. To a large extent this emphasis reflected the personal interests of the Military Governor, Alhaji Audu Bako. As he himself remarked in his 1973 budget Policy Statement (Information and Cultural Affairs Division, Kano, 1973, p.26), "I must confess, I am personally having a bias for agriculture,"
government with an allocation of N86 million. This left the Kano government free to develop other irrigation, fertiliser distribution, seed multiplication and livestock projects.

A high priority for agriculture should be welcomed. With regard to the distribution of wealth and employment in the 1980's, however, several factors call for caution. It may be suggested, for example, that cooperative development has been neglected, and the Kano River Project has been particularly criticised for its capital-intensive nature and for its tendency to provide substantial incomes for advisers and government employees but little for poorer individuals.

The attractiveness of both the self-employment and the wage-earning sectors of agriculture to primary school

1. The original plan allocated N70.7 million to the Kano River Project and N1 million to the Hadejia Valley Project. In the revised plan (Vol.II, p.79), the former allocation was unchanged, but the latter expanded to N15 million and enlarged to include the Jama'are River Project with an additional allocation of N1 million.

2. See below.

3. In the project's early stages, farmers were dispossessed without adequate explanation or compensation, and though the land was subsequently reallocated and individuals were given tenancies, in the process many peasant farmers were deprived of the better portions. It has also been suggested that preparatory research was inadequate and that, for example, control of the river flow caused a loss of the natural fertility brought by floods to farms downstream. Thus although the scheme greatly improved the incomes of some farmers and administrators, it was at the expense of some others. See Ahmed Beita Yusuf et al., *Kano River Project Phase II: Rural Sociology*, NAPC, Kano, 1978; Kano State Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources/NEDECO, *Kano River Project, Main Report*, Part VIII, 1976; Tina Wallace, 'Rural Development through Irrigation: An Overview of the Kano River Project', Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 1977; and Mortimore, op. cit.
leavers in the 1960's will partly depend on the incomes obtainable, which are themselves partly dependent on productivity. It is useful to consider the main ways in which agricultural incomes may be raised. Unfortunately, however, it is not always possible to reconcile high incomes with high employment. For example, one way to improve productivity is through increased use of machinery. Yet holdings in the Close Settled Zone, at 1.5 hectares or less, are far too small to justify mechanisation. Though customary land tenure permits enlargement of holdings by purchase, the necessary sums of capital are difficult to obtain, and consolidation can only be achieved by dispossessing smaller farmers, and thus increase unemployment rather than reduce it. In this respect, Kano State is at a disadvantage with its high density population, though there is at least some scope for enlarging agricultural units in the more thinly populated peripheral areas of the state.

Investments in agriculture may also be unattractive to individuals because of the need for complementary inputs of fertilisers, seeds and management. The government, recognising this, has granted substantial fertiliser subsidies, and embarked on seed improvement projects. The 1970-74 Kano State development plan also made provision for loans. However, finance has remained a severe constraint for many smaller farmers. Incomes are usually too

2. Even in these areas, however, potential is limited. Land is available in quantities too small to provide a fundamental solution, and populations are growing rapidly. Rural migration into southern areas has slowed noticeably since the early 1950's, but northern areas have witnessed considerable immigration from Niger, and some Kano farmers now travel in search of land as far as Gombe, in Bauchi State, over 300 km. away. (See Mortimore, ibid..) Though it is cultivable, the soil in northern areas is often poor, and cultivation also raises conflict with use by nomadic Fulani.
low to permit much saving, and because peasant farmers are rarely able to provide securities, it is very difficult for them to obtain loans. Consequently, in this sphere also, official policies tend to increase income imbalances by favouring those who are already wealthy.

A third factor critical to discussion on employment is the seasonal shortage of labour during the harvesting and planting periods. The direct implications of this for school attendance have been noted. One implication for employment may be the need for machinery, perhaps owned on a cooperative basis, to reduce fluctuations in demand for labour and release some for permanent employment elsewhere.

Plans for cooperative development are limited, however. The revised 1975-80 plan, while it allocated N1.8 million to consumer shops and N2 million "to develop and coordinate the financing of cooperative societies" in the state, mentioned no specific projects, which suggested that plans were limited in nature. King's study of three cooperatives in Kano State noted several constraints on effectiveness which are likely to be typical. Nevertheless, producer cooperatives could be valuable vehicles for agricultural improvements, and therefore for employment and achievement of some objectives of UPS, and it is unfortunate that they are currently given a low priority.

An additional means to raise farmers' incomes is through increased producer prices. Throughout 1976 and 1977 considerable publicity was given to federal government efforts to do this, and frequent press announcements advertised minimum prices for several crops. Investigation, however, revealed them to be little more than propaganda.

3. Roger King, Farmers Cooperatives in Northern Nigeria, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 1976. The three cooperatives in Kano State were at Gwarzo, Dakwara and Shanono.
Agricultural officers had no instructions to implement the measures, and prices were unrealistically low. Thus the innovation did not demonstrate any real commitment to agriculture at the lowest level, which suggests that unless policies are changed, few primary leavers will be attracted to farming in the 1980's.

There is a danger, however, of regarding the farming population as a homogeneous entity. Hill has produced valuable information demonstrating the different status of individuals and their relationships with each other, for example in gandu, a family based unit of land working. Her research stresses the difficulties of generalisation, and sheds light on some aspects of economic status, occupation and migration. Her study of Batagarawa, in Katsina Emirate, included examination of the present-day occupations of 184 ex-schoolboys, being the complete membership of eight classes of the local primary school between 1946 and 1961. She emphasises that the sample was too small to draw firm conclusions, and that Batagarawa was an unrepresentative village in that many larger ones existed with no primary school whereas that in Batagarawa was both long established and had in its early years an outstanding headmaster. Nevertheless, her findings are of interest, and many northern parts of Kano State have comparable population densities and economic structures to Batagarawa.

Hill found that one half of her sample was farming in Batagarawa. Of the other half, nearly three-quarters were in cities, the majority being in "modern educational sector" posts such as teaching, government employment or higher education. The highest rates of migration had occurred among the sons of the ruling class, and among the highest and lowest economic groups, while the majority of ex-schoolboy

1. The prices, periodically advertised in the New Nigerian, were N80 per tonne of sorghum or millet, N95 for maize, N185 for rice and N85 for yam and cassava. However, the Hadejia market price for sorghum in December 1976, for example, was approximately N140 per tonne (information from Mr J.W. Davies, Agricultural Officer, Hadejia).

sons from the middle income groups were content to remain in farming. Because Hill did not include a comparable set of unschooled people in this study, it is difficult to reach firm conclusions on the impact of education itself. However, it is possible to state firstly that Batagarawa is similar to the rest of rural Hausaland in exhibiting considerable social and economic differentiation, secondly that the situation is far from static, and thirdly that a large proportion of the educated population in Batagarawa had migrated in search of alternative forms of employment, but that not all groups were affected equally.

Discussion of possible employment opportunities in agriculture should include mention of important experiments in the Western Region during the 1960's. In 1961, approximately 261,000 pupils graduated from primary schools following the regional UPE programme. Further training was available to only 50,000, leaving 211,000 seeking employment. Over the next few years, the number of job seekers escalated rapidly, and by 1966 over half the primary school leavers in an official survey were unemployed (Table 5.3). As Diejomah and Orimalade have commented, "the

Table 5.3: Employment Status of School Leavers in Western Nigeria, 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Sch. Leaver</th>
<th>Attending School</th>
<th>Apprentices</th>
<th>Self Employed</th>
<th>Employed</th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>24,202</td>
<td>6,334</td>
<td>1,554</td>
<td>1,697</td>
<td>38,365</td>
<td>72,152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33.5%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>53.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>1,383</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>8,379</td>
<td>11,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>75.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>1,889</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,665</td>
<td>2,434</td>
<td>6,044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grammar</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>40.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All School Leavers</td>
<td>27,474</td>
<td>6,802</td>
<td>1,596</td>
<td>4,193</td>
<td>49,178</td>
<td>89,243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30.8%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>55.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


'overinvestment' in education and the free primary education programme of the fifties was beginning to show results - yearly graduating streams of thousands of younger and younger Nigerians in search of scarcer and scarcer jobs."¹

One project initiated to tackle this problem was the Farm Settlement Scheme. Originally launched in 1958 and later expanded, the scheme aimed to demonstrate that crops could be produced by modern methods at low cost and, in the longer run, set the pattern for farming in general by making agriculture attractive to school leavers.\(^1\) Each scheme comprised 5,000 to 7,000 acres and aimed to settle over 200 school leavers as independent farmers, each with approximately 30 acres. Settlement was preceded by a two year course in a farm institute, and the new farmer took his land on a renewable 49 year lease. Strict regulations on inheritance prevented fragmentation of land into uneconomic units; economies of scale were derived from formation of cooperatives; and a government machinery pool undertook contract work at normal rates.

The greatest drawback to the schemes was their cost. Early estimates were approximately £4,000 per settler, which was approximately equivalent to the cost of training a university graduate. Though settlers were supposed to repay expenditure over a period of years, costs were a major constraint which would prevent duplication of the scheme elsewhere.\(^2\) A second factor precluding a similar scheme in Kano is the high density of population. Chiefs and heads of land-owning families donated much of the land for the Western schemes, to the extent that in 1960 only one tenth of suitable land thus far offered had been used.\(^3\) The programme did not cater for large numbers of school leavers,\(^4\) and even had finances not posed a serious constraint, it is doubtful whether the project would have achieved its wider aims of retaining a large number of primary leavers on the


\(^2\) Costs were later halved by elimination of 'luxuries'. However Chief Akin Deko, the Western Minister of Agriculture, defended high initial expenditures as necessary to make the launching a success. To those who criticised provision of concrete houses, he replied that school leavers would not be induced to live in mud and thatch ones, let alone build them. (*West Africa*, 24/2/62, p.199.)

\(^3\) Callaway, 'School Leavers for the Farms', op. cit., p.1021.

\(^4\) 13 schemes were launched with an initial capacity of 200 settlers each.
land.¹

The experience of the Farm Training Centre at Asaba, which Callaway described as "perhaps the most distinguished institution of its kind in West Africa",² sheds further light on problems which persist today. This centre also attempted to create modern farmers from primary school leavers; but in the first ten years success was very limited, despite its devoted staff. This was in part an early demonstration of Foster's 'vocational school fallacy',³ for the trainees became qualified for more attractive and lucrative employment as teachers of rural science, assistants in leper settlements, and overseers of plantations. The second reason was the problem of obtaining sufficient capital and land - a difficulty particularly prominent in the Eastern Region.⁴

These experiments should provide useful information for the Kano State development planners. To them should be added discussion of several current, but smaller scale, programmes. In the mid-1960's, a number of Farm Institutes were opened in Kano State to train sons of farmers for one year and assist their establishment with a pair of workbulls and an Emoot plough. By 1976 there were six institutes at Panda, Danzomo, Sada, Gwarzo, Rano and Mallam Maduri, with a capacity of 28 boys each. The revised 1975-80 development


³. See Chapter IV, Section 4.iv.

plan envisaged doubling the capacity of these institutes and establishing new ones at Kila, Kadawa and Ringim.\(^1\) Officially, trainees should have primary VII qualifications, though many with only Primary IV have been selected in the past. The only really essential qualification is literacy in Hausa plus what the plan called "a good farming background".

These institutes could be of great significance, particularly because their courses are conducted in Hausa and they are located in villages. Experience in the early 1970's, however, highlighted several difficulties. The first was the problem of students obtaining, and then the government securing repayment of, loans. To this was added a scarcity of bulls because of an acute drought and, more important, the fact that small schools and animal-powered agriculture held little prestige and hence little top-level concern. The theory of intermediate technology has much to commend it;\(^2\) but present attitudes, both of school leavers and government officials, do little to promote its application in Kano. The institutes are also very limited in size, and even when the new ones have been built and the old ones expanded, only 504 school leavers will be able to be trained each year - an almost negligible figure in relation to the 150,000 children expected annually to leave school in the 1980's. This presents another example of the neglect of nonformal education in comparison with the formal system.

In addition to the farm institutes, in 1978 there were three Farm Training Centres at Gumel, Danbatta and Bagauda, which trained Field Overseers for ministry extension services. The majority of trainees held Primary VII qualif-


ications, though some held up to Secondary IV. In the one year course, half was spent learning theory in the classroom, and half working in the field. These schools were also very small. It was planned to lengthen the training period, raise minimum entry qualifications to Secondary IV, and expand each centre from 24 boys to 50, but even after this expansion total capacity was scheduled for only 150 pupils. This compared with eight emergency training colleges for UPE, each of which was designed for 1,080 students and which were intended only to supplement the existing colleges. Moreover, even the limited planned expansion was not achieved, for in 1977 the Dambatta Farm Training Centre pupils were transferred to Gumel and their college taken over by the agricultural department of the polytechnic. The low priority given to agricultural manpower is highlighted by comparison with the education sector. In 1976/7, the total number of agricultural extension officers in Hadejia Emirate, for example, was only 52. This compared with no less than 1,262 primary teachers. Thus despite the official rhetoric and the high financial allocation, some aspects of the agricultural sector were seriously neglected, especially in comparison with the education sector.

Finally, discussion should focus on the fortunes of the groundnut crop. In 1970, Nigeria was the world's greatest exporter of groundnuts, shipping nearly 291,000 metric tonnes. Since then, for a combination of economic and natural reasons, production has fallen dramatically. In 1973/4, primarily because of the Sahel drought, exports almost totally ceased. In 1975/6 the crop was further decimated by an aphid-borne rosette virus, and exports were formally prohibited. These disasters have particu-

1. Information from A. Clough, Farm Training Centre, Gumel, 9/7/78.
4. Dane Smith, 'The Big Three', West Africa, 15/5/78, p.93C.
early affected the people of Kano State since for decades it has been on groundnuts that prosperity had depended.\(^1\) During the 1950's and 1960's production was stimulated by the produce marketing boards, and, as Helleiner has noted, far greater proportions of world prices were actually paid to groundnut and cotton producers than was the case with cocoa and palm oil.\(^2\) In the 1970's, however, federal policy has been ill-defined. The 1970-74 development plan identified bottlenecks, some of which were removed, but the 1975-80 plan produced no specific strategies to increase production.\(^3\) Of hundreds of agricultural projects, none was specifically concerned with groundnuts, though farmers could benefit from other seedlings, fertiliser and pesticide projects.

In consequence, since 1972 there has occurred an almost uninterrupted decline in production, partly because of natural disasters and partly because of inflexible prices. The decline was especially embarrassing because it coincided with rising non-agricultural incomes and led to imports from Senegal and Niger between 1976 and 1978. In mid-1978, Dane Smith came to the pessimistic conclusion that "a return to groundnut export is highly unlikely in the next decade.... While high producer prices should create increased incentives, producers understandably remain doubtful that the government will let the price of vegetable oil, a domestic food staple, rise much higher. It will take several years to get planting back to normal."\(^4\) If one accepts his conclusion,\(^5\) it clearly has serious implications in the context of UPS, first because local incomes and therefore taxation revenues will have fallen,

\(^{1}\) Of the 2.3 million acres under cultivation, almost half are in Kano.
\(^{2}\) Helleiner, op. cit., Chapter 7.
\(^{3}\) Dane Smith, op. cit., p.930.
\(^{4}\) Ibid., p.931.
\(^{5}\) His pessimism is partly refuted, however, by Jonathan Derrick, 'Rejoinder to Dane Smith', West Africa, 19/6/78, p.1163. See also Jonathan Derrick, 'Farming in Nigeria', West Africa, 16/7/79, pp.1264-7 and 24/7/79, pp.1304-6.
and second because the employment prospects of agriculture have become even less attractive than before.

A preliminary conclusion must view the probable employment of UPE school leavers in agriculture both from the school angle and from the agricultural angle. It has been suggested that the critical determinant of the attractiveness of agriculture to school leavers will not be their primary curriculum but the size of incomes obtainable from the sector.¹ The substantial Kano State financial allocation to agriculture is to be commended. From the employment viewpoint, however, doubts arise on the suitability of present investment strategies, which tend to favour those farmers already better off.² Within the agricultural sector, it is arguable that basic extension services are neglected, especially by comparison with the number of primary teachers recruited for UPE. The farm settlement schemes developed in the South during the 1960's were not an unqualified success, and because of the population density of the Kano Close Settled Zone, attempts to make farming more economically attractive do not, unfortunately, generate many employment opportunities at the level of the primary school leaver. It is difficult to envisage, therefore, that many of the large groups of primary leavers in the 1980's will be attracted to the sector. To this must be added concern over the employment potential of the industrial sector, considered in the second part.

ii. Employment in Industry

From the employment standpoint, the pattern of investment in industry also gives rise to misgivings. As with

¹See Chapter IV, Section 4.iv. It is difficult to agree with Briggs (op. cit., p.13) that "The large scale unemployment among school leavers is thus a direct result of the absence of practical skill content in the curricula."

²An editorial comment of the New Nigerian (3/4/78, p.1) noted "with delight the bias towards agriculture and the budgetary proposals relating to agricultural incentives" in the 1978/9 federal budget, but at the implementation level was "not too sure that the rural peasant farmers would have access to these incentives." This remark was applicable as much to Kano State as elsewhere.
agriculture, discussion must focus both on the probable demand for primary schooled labour, and on the effect of schooling on productivity and supply. Both sides will be discussed in this section, which will conclude that it is
difficult to be optimistic about either.

When considering the demand for labour, discussion must focus on the size of individual enterprises, their location, the technologies adopted, and the overall pace of development. One marked feature is the concentration of modern industry in Kano Metropolitan Area and the neglect of the remainder of the state where the other seven million citizens live. This has many implications for the rate of rural-urban migration, the 'spin-off' effects of employment, wage levels, and the general characteristics of the labour force.

One aspect of the problem is reflected in the paucity of information available. Table 5.4 shows the results of one survey conducted in Kano in 1961. A more recent survey, the results of which are shown in Table 5.5, was much less comprehensive and covered only 86 establishments.¹ This indicated both the lack of official interest in smaller

1. Surveys conducted in 1972 and 1973 were even less comprehensive. In the first, only 54 establishments responded, and in the second, only 40 (Kano, Kano State Statistical Yearbook 1974, op. cit., p. 51).
enterprises and the lack of incentive for businessmen to register.

Development in the past has favoured large industries more than smaller ones. They often exhibited a high propor-

Table 5.5: Results of Industrial Survey, Kano, 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Number of Establishments</th>
<th>Number Employed</th>
<th>Wages/ Salaries ('000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meat and Vegetable Oils</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1,179</td>
<td>1,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakery and Confectionery</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1,576</td>
<td>609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spinning, Weaving, Textiles</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3,198</td>
<td>2,172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Made-up Textiles/Clothing</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture, Containers, Printing</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1,083</td>
<td>611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs, Toiletries, Chemicals</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyres, Rubber, Plastics</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glass, Bricks, Tiles, Concrete</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cutlery, Tools, Metal Furniture</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,966</td>
<td>1,691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal/Electrical/Motor Goods</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanneries/Leather</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1,193</td>
<td>1,193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>12,626</td>
<td>8,452</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


portion of expatriate ownership and direction, though two indigenisation decrees in the mid-1970's made at least surface changes. Such decrees have important implications,

1. Paul Lubeck ('Unions, Workers and Consciousness in Kano, Nigeria: A View from Below', in Richard Sandbrook and Robin Cohen (eds.), The Development of An African Working Class, Longman, London, 1975, p. 140), however, has noted that "The most striking feature of industrial structure in Kano is the minor, if not insignificant role played by multinational corporate capitalism in manufacturing though, ... it is dominant in wholesale and modern commercial services." This has implications for employment since choices of production are commonly made at the centre and are little related to local conditions. In the commercial sector there is relatively little scope for substitution of capital for labour, and the role of multinational corporations is less significant than it would be in the industrial sector.

2. Decree No. 4 of 1972 and Decree No. 3 of 1977. Each contained several schedules specifying different requirements, and the second extended the provisions of the first. Ankie Hoogvelt's research has indicated widespread evasion of the decrees, however, and suggested that fundamental changes have been limited. ('Control and Indigenisation of Foreign Capital: Industrialisation in Kano since 1974', Seminar presented at the Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, 13/12/76.)
for on the one hand they ensure the retention in the local economy of a higher percentage of profits, but on the other hand may limit expansion by restricting importation of foreign capital and expertise. Official policy has sought a balance between these two considerations to maximise the benefits for citizens of Kano State. However, widespread abuses have arisen from the decrees and in some cases, because one criterion permitting foreign participation is the complexity of the production process, some industrialists have installed machinery in place of more labour intensive processes.¹ This has obvious implications for employment. There are indications that despite the manufacturing boom of the 1970's, introduction of increasingly capital intensive processes has maintained the workforce at approximately the size existing at the beginning of the decade.²

Although successive governments have paid at least lip-service to the need for small-scale industries,³ the

1. Hoogvelt (ibid.) illustrated this with a match factory utilising eight separate processes and highly complex German machines. The factory employed 150 workers, but only 40 were essential to production. The remainder were messengers and similar personnel who, because they were paid low rates (₦1.84 per day) did not add significantly to the costs of production but were useful for public, and especially government, relations. Such 'padding' may absorb some personnel in the 1980's, but it will not be productively employed; nor will skills acquired in primary school be utilised. In the textile industry, embroidery is increasingly being performed by machine, and small scale tailors are losing work to the large concerns.

2. Hoogvelt, ibid.

3. The definition of "small-scale" in the Nigerian context varies, and refers to a group of enterprises bridging the formal and informal sectors. Kilby defined the term according to production methods, referring to artisans employing pre-industrial methods and producing low quality goods (Peter Kilby, African Enterprise, The Nigerian Bread Industry, Stanford University Press, 1965, p.2). The Nigerian Factory Act defined it as an industry of 10 employees or less; the Small Industries Credit Scheme placed a ceiling on 50 employees; and the USAID defined it as referring to total capital below £2,000 (USAID, 'Industrial Development Centre, Zaria', Washington, n.d., p.1). The revised official definition operating in 1978 placed a ceiling of ₦150,000 capital investment in machinery and equipment (Kano State of Nigeria, Kano State Commercial and Industrial Handbook, Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives, Kano, 1978, p.21).
sector has been neglected. This is because although small-scale industries have important implications for the distribution of wealth, both socially and geographically, emphasis on larger enterprises has fitted more closely the prevailing philosophy of development and individual interests. In addition, the majority of technical graduates seek employment in government or large-scale concerns which can offer greater salaries, security and prestige. Similar factors will influence aspirations of primary school leavers in the 1980's.

In the mid-1960's, three programmes were launched to develop small industries in the North. The first was a Small Industries Credit Scheme to provide finance. It was accompanied by an Industrial Development Centre at Zaria, which gave technical advice, and a number of Vocational Improvement Centres which provided training. Their impact, however, has been limited. In the early years, administrative problems arose from the creation of states, and the programme was criticised for its lack of well-timed, coordinated objectives. A third difficulty facing small-scale businessmen was that, like their agricultural counterparts, they found it difficult to provide securities and therefore obtain loans. A recent announcement that the Kano State Government has raised the limit of individual loans from N20,000 to N80,000 suggests improved prospects.

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3. Ibid., pp. 559-60; Faust, op. cit., p. 226.
ever, the low level of actual investment is demonstrated by the fact that only 86 enterprises had been assisted by the Small-Scale Industries Credit Scheme at the end of 1976,\(^1\) and only 17 businessmen were assisted in 1976/7, between them receiving only N366,000.\(^2\) Certainly abandonment of caution in the allocation of loans cannot be advocated. Yet the importance of the small-scale sector is such that a greater degree of flexibility is desirable, perhaps with a conscious calculation of the potential economic benefits that could be set against risks.\(^3\)

Note must also be taken of Faust’s conclusion that “There is a high correlation between successful projects located in towns with adequate economic infrastructure. Future small-scale industry lending programmes must appreciate this experience and concentrate projects in selected regions.”\(^4\) To improve infrastructure, substantial investment has been made in road construction and electricity supply. Nevertheless, rural areas remain neglected, which creates another dilemma for authorities responsible for assisting small industries. Where possible, the government must ensure that loans are used efficiently and devoted to viable projects; but if rural areas are neglected, they will never develop an infrastructure and the imbalance will develop further. There is a need, therefore, for a conscious commitment to rural development. There have been

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1. Kano, Kano State Commercial and Industrial Handbook, op. cit., p.65. The same publication identified 436 small-scale industries operating within Kano City and suburbs, and many more exist in other parts of the state.


many statements in the past, but actual change has been limited. A widespread banking network, for example, could be an important catalyst for development. Yet at the end of 1975, only two of the commercial banks' 17 branches in Kano State were outside the capital. 

Discussion on employment should focus not only on industrial development, but also on the schools, and should consider the relationship between primary education and productivity. The studies by Bowman and Anderson, Peaslee and Harbison have been noted above, and do not require repetition here. It is sufficient to recall that they asserted a substantial positive correlation between primary schooling and economic growth, suggesting that the former could be considered an investment in 'human capital'. Their findings may be supplemented by other studies on the uses of basic numeracy and literacy, which will be the main skills acquired under UPE. From his analysis of the employment situation in the Western Region following their UPE programme, Callaway, for example, asserted that:

already some evidence has accumulated to show that primary education does raise productivity in the markets and workshops, in transport, on building sites, and even on farms. Many proprietors of small enterprises prefer school leavers to those who have not attended school at all; tailors and carpenters want apprentices who can make accurate measurements and keep rudimentary accounts; traders need assistants who can keep records and accounts.

Similarly, Aryee's Ghanaian study of the informal sector concluded that "the intensity of employment tends to be higher among those with formal education than among those who have not attended school at all; tailors and carpenters want apprentices who can make accurate measurements and keep rudimentary accounts; traders need assistants who can keep records and accounts."

1. Alhaji Audu Bako, the Kano State Military Governor, for example, was quoted in 1968 as considering the state's two greatest needs to be first "to give rural areas some of the amenities so far confined to the towns, although the farmers pay for them," and second, "to bring the government closer to the people." (*West Africa, 28/12/68, p.1535.*

2. The two branches were at Mallam Maduri and Gumel. ('Directory of the Banking System', *The Nigeria Trade Journal*, No. 27, 1977, p.29.)

3. See Chapter I, Section 1.iii, and Chapter IV, Section 2.

who have not been exposed to the formal educational system. ¹

These studies do not, however, include full consideration of alternative methods of skill acquisition. Hinchliffe's study of the Kaduna textile industry suggests that in some cases experience is a more important determinant of earning capacity than formal schooling. For four groups of workers, his conclusions were: ²

(1) Daily paid - one year of experience is almost twice as important as one year of primary schooling.

(2) Clerical - years of experience are more important than years of primary schooling but not as important as years of secondary schooling.

(3) Artisan - experience again dominates primary schooling and also secondary grammar but it accounts for slightly less variation in earnings than does secondary technical schooling.

(4) Technical - years of formal schooling, including primary school, are much more important than the equivalent years of experience.

While recognising distortions arising from imperfections in the labour market, economic theory posits that wage levels generally reflect the productivity of each worker. ³ These findings, therefore, are of obvious importance. They may be supplemented by findings in the North Eastern State that, although with few exceptions small-scale proprietors and entrepreneurs first completed some form of apprenticeship, about 65% were illiterate yet quite successful.

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3. In a perfect labour market, according to economic theory, workers in different firms but with equivalent qualifications would be paid the same wage. Hinchliffe's study showed this not to be the case, though in most instances deviations were within 10%.
and a different study in Kano suggested that although 90% of factory labour had no previous experience, "following a period of training employers report that they have adapted themselves to factory conditions and many have learnt to operate expensive machinery."\(^2\)

To this discussion should be added the points that, as shown in Chapter Four, primary schooling is both costly and qualitatively poor.\(^3\) Thus although some studies have indicated that investment in formal primary education generally yields a greater social return than investment in secondary or higher education,\(^4\) there is little indication of fundamental change from the situation described by Hinchliffe’s study, which suggests that even greater returns at lower occupational levels may be provided by on-the-job experience.

It is also worth noting a significant section of the 1970-74 National Development Plan, which remarked:

Firstly, it cannot be proved conclusively that any and all types of education, irrespective of orientation and quality have measurable positive growth-promoting effects. Secondly, the capital and

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1. A. Olufemi Lewis, 'The Development of Small-Scale Industries in Nigeria's North Eastern State: Prospects, Problems and Policies', *Savanna*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1974, p. 188. He notes that 65\% were illiterate, 9\% had Islamic education and 16\% had primary education (though he does not appear to consider overlapping of categories).


3. Even before the launching of UPE, a high percentage of Class VII graduates were not functionally literate (see Chapter IV, Section 4.iv). Aryee (op. cit., p. 36) noted the same phenomenon in Kumasi, remarking that "primary education of a maximum of six years does not provide the recipient with functional literacy. It seems, therefore, that middle education is needed to bring out the difference between formal education and illiteracy."

recurrent costs have been undeniably high. But the real cost is even higher in terms of defective teaching and thinly spread physical facilities. 1

Whilst noting desirable social and political reasons for primary expansion, the plan warned:

The fortunes of primary school leavers in the labour market do not justify an indiscriminate widening of the base of the educational pyramid without corresponding increase in employment opportunities. As a result of an annual drop-out of 400,000 and an out-turn of 240,000 out of whom only 70,000 could be offered places in secondary schools, thousands of ill-equipped young primary school leavers find themselves in the labour market every year seeking wage employment. Their lack of vocational training and the limited absorptive capacity of the wage employment sector of the economy for this category of workers imply that only a small proportion of each year’s output could immediately be absorbed. And ... about 70 per cent of unemployed persons in the labour force are primary school leavers and drop-outs. 2

Despite this warning, however, short run social and political pressures proved more powerful than longer run economic predictions, and UPE was launched in 1976. The 1975-80 plan noted that UPE "would have significant implications for youth employment". It continued:

2. Ibid., p.315.
It is projected that between 1975 and 1980, about 849,000 young persons would be turned out yearly from primary schools. On the basis of about 70 per cent primary to secondary school transition rate envisaged by the middle of the Plan period, about 255,000 primary school leavers would be joining the labour force yearly during the Plan period and this figure does not include thousands of primary and secondary school drop-outs.... From estimations made from the population data, by 1981-82 the out-turn from primary schools will be in the range of 2 million — i.e. three times the annual out-turn before this Plan period. 1

It has been shown that a 70% transition rate is both overoptimistic in the case of Kano, and in any case does little more than postpone, and perhaps worsen, an ultimate employment problem. Nevertheless, the Third Plan merely continued:

In the circumstances, government will place greater emphasis on using the plan as a vehicle for the provision of employment opportunities for young school leavers, expanding and diversifying facilities and vocational training and increasing the opportunities for, and the content of, secondary education. 2

It is likely that major unemployment problems will develop as a result of these policies as the UPE graduates leave school in the early 1980's. In Kano, because proportionate numbers are much greater and because previous levels of unemployment have been lower and therefore expectations are higher, difficulties will probably be more severe than elsewhere.

These considerations add weight to arguments that many existing investment patterns generate more unemployment than employment, at least in the initial stages. In a situation of abundant labour supplies and probable high future unemployment, the capital intensive nature of many industrial processes must be considered regrettable. Arguments favouring relatively high capital intensive investment include avoidance of labour disputes, achievement of

2. Ibid.
better quality products, and greater long-run productivity. However, this long term advantage only partially mitigates the disadvantages of inappropriate technologies.

It was noted in Chapter Two that in the Western Region during the 1960's, the apprenticeship system experienced an upsurge as more youths left the primary schools expanded by UPE. A similar pattern of events may occur in Kano, and it is probable that informal sector opportunities will absorb a large number of youths unable to secure formal employment. It is probable, however, that interest will shift from traditional occupations to modern ones such as car repairing, baking and printing. On this issue, the 1970-74 National Plan remarked that "The introduction of a formal school system has resulted in drastic reduction of the numbers of children willing to acquire the skills required for, and sustain the way of life associated with, employment of the traditional sectors." It is too early to say whether the traditional sectors are suffering from manpower shortages, but it is worth mentioning that the fear has been expressed by planners, and that it is a possibility.

It has been argued that aspirations to leave the traditional sectors reflect an unrealistic appreciation on the part of the individuals concerned of their skills acquired in primary schools and the opportunities available. Beyond the short run, one effect of mass education is to teach its recipients that they have no scarcity value and that aspirations must be readjusted. It remains true, however, that financial and other differentials between the traditional and modern sectors are sufficient for perceptions of the rewards for those who 'escape' the former to be generally valid. Official policy has paid little more than lip service to rural development and narrowing of

2. Fapohunda, Reijmerink and van Dijk, op. cit., p. 2/33; Chapter II, Section 4.
3. See Mailafiya, op. cit., p. 112.
5. Keith Hinchliffe ('Labour Aristocracy - A Northern Nigerian Case Study', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1974, p. 65) has indicated that after adjustment for costs of living and hours of work, and
differentials. This may be illustrated by the dissolution of the Kano Rural Development Agency (but the retention of the Urban Development Board) as soon as the economic boom began to wane.¹

In short, therefore, formal sector jobs in industry in Kano are unlikely to be sufficient to absorb more than a very small proportion of the pupils who will leave school in the early 1980's. In part this reflects the capital-intensive nature of most modern processes and the neglect of small-scale enterprises. In the absence of extensive surveys of the informal sector, it is difficult to make firm predictions on its absorptive capacity. It is likely to be greater, though many participants will consider it a second best alternative to formal employment. Although informal opportunities will be spread more evenly throughout the state, like formal openings, there is a concentration in Kano Metropolitan Area. Awareness of opportunities has attracted many aspirant workers to urban Kano, not only from other parts of the state but also from all over the country and from Niger,² and is a major reason why in the early 1970's the population of Kano Metropolitan Area was growing at approximately 12% per annum compared with 2½% for the rest of the state.³ There is a possibility that, at least in the short run, UPE will cause an escalation of rural-urban migration and its attendant economic and social problems.

While it is indisputable that the basic skills of numeracy and literacy may improve productivity, the combination of limited employment opportunities, the cost of education and the significant number of pupils unlikely to acquire these basic skills suggests that the

¹ '1978/9 Policy Statement' reprinted in 1978/9 Kano State Budget Estimates, op. cit., p. ii. The Agency was established in 1976 and thus survived only two years.

² Non-state indigenes in 1971, for example, ranged from 30% to 70% of the total employed in several ministries and professions (Al-Hakim, op. cit., p. 193).

³ Frishman, op. cit., p. 232.
social returns on investment in UPE may not be very high in the industrial sector.

These strands will be drawn together in the summary of this chapter. First, however, we should examine the employment prospects for UPE graduates in the tertiary sector.

iii. Employment in the Tertiary Sector

Historically, the most significant part of the tertiary sector in Kano has been commercial and trading activity. As was noted in the Introduction, from pre-colonial times Kano citizens have been famed for their commercial prowess: a reputation which they still maintain today. A second category of obvious importance is the public sector. The dominance of government employment, particularly in administration, is a general feature of developing countries. In Kano the sector markedly increased in influence with the creation of states in 1967, and continued expansion during the oil boom of the 1970's. Especially significant, as we have noted, has been the employment potential of UPE itself. A third category in the tertiary sector contains traditional services ranging from barbering to preaching. Many probably employ approximately the same proportion of the population as they did before the advent of the oil boom; but some are adapting to change, and to them are being added new services such as touting and taxi driving.

It is generally true that as an economy develops, entertainment, banking, insurance and similar services employ an increasing proportion of the labour force. Unfortunately, statistical information on Kano's tertiary sector exhibits serious deficiencies. However, this section will attempt both to indicate the probable openings in the sector for UPE products in the 1980's and suggest the influence of primary education itself.

It is difficult to make firm statements on the number of commercial establishments in Kano or on development trends. Official statistics show a sharp increase
in the number of large enterprises, however,\(^1\) and trading of all kinds expanded dramatically with the prosperity of the 1970s. Kano Metropolitan Area benefits from good road, rail and air communications, of which its citizens have taken advantage. In 1978, for example, the number of haulage companies owned by Kano merchants exceeded the combined total of all other Northern states.\(^2\) The number of hawkers and small traders has also increased significantly. Small-scale activities may be particularly important for employment of UPE school leavers since, generally speaking, they do not require large initial capital investments, are labour intensive, and are sufficiently flexible to permit simultaneous pursuit either of supplementary occupations or of more secure employment. The role of the 'informal sector' has increasingly been noted, and is likely to become particularly important in the 1980s as an occupation for those who fail to secure formal employment.\(^3\) However, the authorities should beware of considering self-employment a panacea which will act as a safety valve and obviate the need for structural changes and careful planning.

Though the link between commercial activities and skills acquired in primary schools is perhaps more obvious than that in industrial and craft activities, it must not be over-estimated. Discussion on the historical lack of enthusiasm for schooling has already noted that many of Kano's most prominent businessmen received little or no formal education.\(^4\) Even today, it is not entirely unusual for businessmen frequently to 'sign' cheques for several thousand naira with only a thumb print. Yet although this stresses the fact that wealth and education do not necess-

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2. Ibid., p. 32.
4. See Chapter II, Section 1. Among examples cited there was Alhaji Alhassan Dantata, who at one time was described as "possibly the richest man in the whole of West Africa", yet had very little formal schooling.
arily correspond, it does not deny that basic skills of literacy and numeracy are of great value and could make rich men richer still. Thus one effect of UPE could be to improve the efficiency of commercial transactions, which in turn could increase their volume. In commercial activities there is not the same scope for capital substitution as exists in either the agricultural or the industrial sectors. The employment potential of commerce is thus likely to remain high. That aspirations are also likely to remain high was indicated by Lubeck's finding that "few of Kano's urban-born work in factories because both the entrepreneurial ethic and relatively higher status orient the urban-born to trading and commerce of all varieties."¹

He also noted that the occupational aspiration of migrants is to leave factory labour, which they regard as poorly paid, insecure and restrictive, in order to enter commerce.² This may in turn have important implications for the industrial sector, for it suggests that it may be deprived of many of the more capable workers.

Though the public sector will continue its dominance of the formal wage economy in the early 1980's, at the end of the 1970's there were already signs that the employment boom earlier in the decade was in need of rationalisation. As part of the "austerity measures" announced in 1978, several ministries and parastatals were reorganised and "streamlined".³ It has already been noted that the period when many UPE products leave school in the early 1980's will be the very point at which the large expansion of the primary sector will cease, and that the education sector will not be able to offer employment to very many. The general trend, in any case, is towards upgrading of minimum qualifications in the public sector. Though many lower posts are currently held by personnel with little or no primary education, it is unlikely that many openings will exist in the 1980's for applicants without at least some

1. Lubeck, op. cit., p.144.
2. Ibid.
secondary education.

A similar analysis holds for such services as banking and insurance. Where primary leavers are presently employed, it is often only because applicants with higher qualifications are not available. The secondary school system has also undergone dramatic expansion, and thus few children with only primary schooling can hope for jobs in these enterprises during the 1980's. Projections for the tertiary sector, therefore suggest that there will be few openings for primary leavers in the public sector or in such activities as banking and insurance. On the other hand, trading enterprises, particularly small-scale ones, may be much more absorptive. While it is difficult categorically to state that the increased productivity acquired through primary schooling will exceed its costs, the skills of numeracy and literacy will be of direct benefit to the commercial sector, and are likely to improve its efficiency. This must be added to the overall assessment of the employment situation, summarised below.

Summary

The overall prospects for employment of UPE school leavers, and therefore for the second level of quality, are not encouraging. It has been shown that although the early 1970's transition rate of primary leavers to further studies was fairly high at 34%, it is unlikely, even if the proposed free junior secondary system is introduced, that anything more than maintenance of this rate will be possible for some time. In any case, a high transition rate does no more than postpone an ultimate employment problem, and evades the issues arising from the high percentage of children who never reach the last primary class but still seek wage employment. If one assumes a 20% drop-out rate and a 34% transition rate to secondary institutions, 119,300 primary leavers will enter the labour market in

1. See the Introduction to this thesis.
1982. This figure is particularly daunting when compared with the total employment recorded in government and large industries of 33,000 in the early 1970's, and when to the first UPE cohort are added successive waves at yearly intervals.

During the 1960's and 1970's, several factors combined to make the Kano State labour market buoyant. The first was a generally low level of educational development, and therefore, particularly in view of political pressures for the modern labour force to contain as high a proportion of Kano State indigenes as possible, numerous opportunities for school leavers even with poor qualifications. Prospects for Kano citizens were further improved by the Ibo exodus after the pogroms and outbreak of war, and by the creation of states in 1967. In the early 1970's, many Southerners returned to Kano, but prospects for indigenes remained good, first because of continued preference they received over others, second because of the general prosperity and the oil boom, and third because of the implementation of indigenisation requirements and therefore the exclusion of expatriates. In the mid-1970's, UPE itself was a major employer, not only of teachers, but also contractors, carpenters and suppliers of ancillary materials, and undoubtedly had linkage effects elsewhere in the economy. Though the type of labour available was often a problem to the authorities, a relatively large number of opportunities existed.

Investment criteria have not encouraged adoption of labour intensive processes, however. In part, this has been because of the low level of skills in the labour force, together with a relatively cheap supply of capital. At the national level, the influence of the petroleum sector has led, despite official pronouncements, to a decline in attention given to agriculture. Kano State investments have been higher, but particularly in the Close Settled Zone, grave obstacles hinder efforts simultaneously to

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1. This includes graduates who began their schooling in 1975/6 since it was widely assumed that both Classes VII and VI would graduate together to permit national standardisation of the primary course. On these dropout and transition rate assumptions, 17,300 pupils who began in 1975/6, and 102,000 who began in 1976/7, will enter the labour market in 1982.
improve economic rewards from farming and to maintain high employment and a balanced distribution of income. Discussion in Chapter Four has shown that it is difficult to provide skills in primary schools that are of much direct value in the agricultural sector. When these considerations are combined with increasing pressure on the land because of rapid population expansion, it seems likely that agriculture will remain unattractive to many primary school leavers in the 1980's.

Employment patterns in industry also give rise to concern. Large-scale ventures are heavily concentrated in Kano Metropolitan Area, and though provision to assist small-scale enterprises exists, it has been inadequate. The concentration of industries in urban Kano already causes significant rural-urban migration. It is likely that UPE will increase awareness of opportunities and encourage aspirations, some of which can be fulfilled and some of which cannot, and migration will escalate in the 1980's. Within Kano State, indigenes will probably find themselves in increasing competition not only with each other but also with other Nigerians. Economic development of other states is also likely to reduce Kano's former strategic advantages based on the communications network.

The public sector began in 1978 to rationalise its mode of operation. With more sober economic prospects for the 1980's and a spiralling of minimum required qualifications, it is unlikely that many opportunities for primary leavers will exist in the sector. Increasingly, the government and other employers are likely to seek applicants with post-primary qualifications, who were previously in shorter supply, for posts formerly held by primary leavers.

Although the economic benefits of literacy and numeracy (the main skills acquired under UPE) are not doubted, it is questionable whether they will exceed the costs of
acquisition. Several important studies in the mid-1970's indicated that investment in primary education generally gives higher returns than investment in secondary or higher education. While this may have been true in Kano as elsewhere, the primary sector, at least in the early years of UPE, was very expensive and suffered from serious qualitative problems. Hinchliffe's work has suggested that on-the-job training might have yielded yet higher returns, at least at lower occupational levels of the industrial sector.

The age at which UPE graduates will leave school also has implications for their employment. According to official guidelines, only children aged six should in any year enrol for the six year course. In practice, many were admitted above that age, and some will have repeated classes. However, a high proportion of leavers will be barely over the legal minimum age or old enough to play a full economic role. Employers are likely to select older youths in preference to those straight from school, and there is a danger that some school leavers will have little opportunity to practise the skills they have acquired, and will therefore partially lose them. This has obvious implications for resource utilisation as well as for employment.

The informal sector may absorb a considerable number of primary leavers unable to secure other employment. Its potential, however, should not be over-estimated. Considerable underemployment is likely to exist in the informal sector, and thus UPE may become the mechanism for converting agricultural underemployment either to underemployment in petty industries and services or to open unemployment.

It is therefore difficult to be optimistic about the employment prospects of the 1980's. If these predictions prove valid, the schools will have become, from an economic viewpoint, a poor investment on four counts. The resources directly invested in the schools will have been partially
wasted; some output from potential alternative investments will not have been realised; the output from agriculture may be diminished both by the absence of children's labour while they are studying and by the exodus of some from the sector when they leave school; and it may be necessary to invest more resources in job creation and provision of social welfare for the unemployed. Apart from the likelihood that UPE will cause a deterioration in the second level of quality as defined in the Introduction, it could also have serious social consequences. This is the subject on which Chapter Six enlarges.
CHAPTER VI: THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF UPE

The success of all the objectives of UPE, both political and economic, may ultimately be determined by social issues. At least officially, UPE was launched to improve the welfare of Nigeria's people, and to promote social equality. These are broad objectives which will be examined in this chapter. Whereas until this point much discussion has focussed on the impact of external factors on the school system, this chapter is more concerned with the impact of schools on society, and thus with the third level of quality distinguished in the Introduction.

That the school system is an important variable in individual and wider social change is almost universally recognised. The UPE scheme in Kano State is made particularly significant by its scale and by the relationship between the school and the modern sector. Unlike primary schools in Western societies, those in Kano are not meant to prepare children for the same broad lifestyles as their parents. Instead the school is seen both by the government and by parents as a route to a different type of existence and to 'development'.

To assist analysis, it is useful to begin discussion by noting several models of social change. Most theories recognise that change may be planned or unplanned. It has been pointed out that many federal and state government intentions proved difficult to implement, and that many decisions were taken on an ad hoc basis. In this chapter the unplanned changes, and certainly those over which the authorities have relatively little control, will assume greater prominence than the planned ones.

Of clear importance to this study is the role of the school in the wider context of social change. Two main


views are discernible of the subject. The first, which is either explicitly or implicitly held in Nigeria by most politicians and all governments, suggests that the school system can by itself play an active part in shaping society. Education "is the most important instrument of change," states the *National Policy on Education*, "as any fundamental change in intellectual and social outlook of any society has to be preceded by an educational revolution."\(^2\) Undeniably, both the official and "hidden" curriculum have a major basic effect on individual attitudes. From this it is argued that socially desirable values and a national rather than tribal outlook can be inculcated through the school system. Unfortunately, while it is true that the system acts as a powerful agent of individual socialisation, the argument that it can be used by itself positively to effect fundamental social change is difficult to maintain. Closer examination assigns greater weight to the second main view - that schools are an agent of larger social, political and economic forces, and therefore reflect society more than they possess the ability to change it.\(^3\) This view is described as the 'correspondence principle'. "In any stable (nonrevolutionary) society," suggests Levin, "the educational system will always be applied toward serving the role of cultural transmission and preserving the status quo despite the emergence of academic debate and utopian visions on the issue."\(^4\)


Though the UPE scheme represents a watershed in educational development, it has not yet been accompanied by any reform in the sense of basic structural change. Despite the exhortations of Professor Fafunwa and others that "It will be a disservice to the country if all we can think of in terms of UPE is to multiply the number of existing primary schools and carry on business as usual,"¹ planned reforms have been very limited. Partly this is because of the difficulty of implementing fundamental reforms simultaneously with large scale expansion.² However, it also reflects the class structure and vested interests of participants in the system.

It is useful at this point to mention Bowles' theories arising from his comparison of educational expansion schemes in communist and capitalist developing countries. At first glance Nigeria, a highly capitalist nation, does not appear to fit his model, for he concludes that capitalist governments and those dominated by traditional elites contrast with communist governments by their strong resistance to mass education programmes.³ The apparent contradiction may be explained by addition of several other variables, the first of which is the importance of rival group interests. The factors leading to the Western Region UPE scheme of the 1950's are a clear example of this. As noted in Chapter One, three rival groups - the British, the traditional rulers and the Western educated elite - were in competition for power. It was to gain ascendancy that the elite launched the politically popular programme which the other two either could not or would not launch themselves.⁴ A second variable, noted by Bowles, is the dynamics of the situation, for the concession of educational provision may upset the power balance and threaten the position of the programme's initiators. This is what Abernethy has

1. New Nigerian, 7/8/74 (See also Chapter IV, Section 4.iv).
2. See Chapter IV, Section 4.iv.
4. Abernethy, op. cit., pp.134 ff. See also Chapter I of this thesis.
called "the political dilemma of popular education" which, he suggests, contributed to the overthrow of the Nigerian civilian government in 1966. ¹

Yet several qualifications must be added to these variables. The first is to emphasise the word 'may', for it is quite possible to provide UPE without many of the benefits anticipated by its recipients. Bowles points out that schools in capitalist countries, through recruiting and gate-keeping mechanisms, often reinforce existing social structures.² To some extent, these forces currently operate in Kano, and the social mobility promoted by UPE could be very limited. Indeed, some social differences, far from being reduced, are likely to increase; and even if education were to become truly universal in the near future, the gate-keeping mechanism would remain for the better schools and at post-primary levels.

Thus in regard to Bowles' model, reference must also be made to the other educational levels. As Table 1.6 has shown, although the Third Development Plan envisaged a national primary expansion between 1973 and 1980, the increase planned at the secondary level was 280%, and in university enrolments 128%. A similar allocation in planned capital expenditures between 1975 and 1980³ confirms the suggestion that at the national level UPE was only part of a massive overall expansion expected actually to reduce the share of primary education within the whole. Specific Kano State figures, it is true, do not reduplicate this pattern.⁴ It must be noted, however, that this may

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3. Allocations were 12.1% primary, 64.7% secondary, 10.1% university and 13.1% other (see Table 4.4).
4. Primary enrolments were scheduled to increase 746% between 1973 and 1980, compared with 145% for secondary grammar, 59.8% for secondary technical and 665% for teacher training (Nigeria, Third National Development Plan, op. cit., Vol.I, pp.238-42). Tertiary level projections were not subdivided for each state.
reflect an early stage in educational development. Experience elsewhere suggests that demands for Universal Primary Education may be followed by demands for Universal Secondary Education, which in turn requires tertiary expansion and partially restores the original pyramid shape.¹

Two further complications must be added. The first is that Abernethy's thesis is based on the contention that disillusion with the fruits of politically motivated mass education is likely to rebound on its initiators. However that the unemployed school leaver, for example, will become politically active, is by no means certain. As one observer has pointed out, such people may be too busy making a modest living and seeking jobs to have time for political activities.² The second point is that the populace tends to have a short term memory. This is strikingly illustrated in some cases by the return to active politics in 1978, 12 years older, of exactly the same individuals (among whom were Awolowo and Azikiwe) prominent in the political parties proscribed after the January 1966 military coup.

Thus it is already clear first that the relationship between UPE and social change is highly complex, and second that the nature of the tools available for analysis leaves much to be desired.³ More detailed discussion will concentrate on the social impact at the family level, before turning to the state and national levels. The first group will include such matters as religious and moral changes,

¹. This has been the experience in Malaysia, for example, which launched a UPE campaign in 1962 (J. Thornton, 'UPE in Practice - Lessons from Malaysia', Paper presented at the Universal Primary Education Workshop, University of London Institute of Education, February 1979).


³. One indication of the paucity of research lies in the need for Foster's paper (supra) to extrapolate isolated findings from Uganda, Ghana, Rhodesia and other countries as if they applied to the continent as a whole.
and the social effects of changes in income caused by UPE. The second category will discuss the implications for political stability, national unity and social integration. Although the second part of Chapter Five, which concerned the relationship between UPE and the labour market, could only be speculative and predictive, it did at least benefit from the use of quantitative estimates of employment opportunities. In this chapter, no such quantification is possible. Yet while we cannot measure social change, we can assess it and indicate the direction it is taking.

1. The Impact of UPE at the Family Level

It has been noted that the pace of technological and other changes which have brought exposure to Western values has been very rapid. Before 1903, when Lugard's armed force blasted its way into Kano City, contact with European cultures was tenuous in the extreme. After that date, partly because of the low number of British officers which was itself an influential factor leading to the strategy of indirect rule, effective contact for the majority of the City population remained slight for several decades, and for the rural population even more so. Nevertheless, changes in the first 60 years of the century were dramatic, and those which occurred in the post-independence era, and especially after the oil boom of the early 1970's were, particularly for the majority of the population in rural areas, on a yet larger scale. Education is a very prominent part and vehicle of this change; and since schooling is available only to youth, it extends the attitudinal and achievement gap between generations that is already far greater than in any Western nation. Much of the widely perceived instability of society arises from this 'clash of cultures'.

It was noted in Chapter Two that the gulf between the

skills of youth and those of their parents provides a strong argument favouring adult education. However, adult education has been seriously neglected, in part because of the scale of UPE requirements. On the one hand there is a danger of children spurning traditional practices in favour of what they are taught is "modern", and on the other rarely do parents fully understand the functioning of schools and the activities which occupy their children each day. It is unfortunately true that many parents are justified in their opposition to school expansion. One writer has noted that it is common for a father forced to send his children to primary school to consider that it "means that the village or ward head does not like him. It is in a way making effort to reduce his wealth because when that child starts schooling, it is most likely that he would not return to work on the farm but instead would look for a white collar job and ... may resort into some socially unacceptable behaviour." If this was merely a reactionary attitude to change, its implications would be less serious. Unfortunately, it cannot be dismissed, for UPE, contrary to official propaganda, is likely to bring considerable social upheaval, of which some will be destructive.

The attitudes of many parents are illustrated by Peshkin's study which, though mainly referring to Kanuri

1. See Chapter II, which noted that the 1970-74 development plan included adult education only under a heading of "others", all of which received a total of 0.5% of the Kano State education budget; that the revision of the 1975-80 plan, despite annual inflation in the region of 40% cut the adult education vote from its meagre N500,000 to N300,000; and that in the first two years of the plan only N2,000 was actually spent.

2. Misconceptions on school activities, which sometimes border on superstitions, were strikingly illustrated in May 1978 when a rumour circulated throughout much of Kano State and parts of Kaduna that unknown persons were going round primary schools extracting pupils' teeth. Many parents withdrew their children, and the matter became sufficiently serious to warrant an official statement ('Education Commissioner Deplores Extraction of Teeth Rumour', Kano State Information Bulletin, No.353, 25/5/78), though it proved impossible to determine the origin of the rumour.

communities, is also broadly applicable to Kano. He describes, for example, the ambivalence of one man who still remembered with emotion the time "city people" came to his village and beat him in an attempt to force him into school. At first the man was completely opposed to enrollment of his son, describing the school as a sickness like smallpox. However, since his son's success held out the promise of lucrative employment, the father was partially reconciled to his attendance. Like many parents, he was proud of his son's acquisition of new skills, such as literacy and the ability to speak English, which provided greater opportunities than he had had himself. His feelings about schooling of younger sons alternated between considering that "one son is enough to lose to a school" and abdication of responsibility. About education of girls he was not at all ambivalent. He claimed that they were ruined by education, becoming too proud and wanting to marry only an educated man. If they worked for a salary—and obtaining a salaried job was the goal of an educated person—they were not at home to prepare a man's meals. When they returned they complained of tiredness. "How can you get tired from writing on paper?" the father asked. "We bend down farming every day and never complain, while all they do is write and write and take so many pounds of our tax money. Schools are terrible. I don't like them."

Like many farmers throughout the North, he was completely opposed to his son marrying an educated wife because she would have become disobedient and "spoiled" by the experience.

1. Peshkin, op. cit., p.48. The Kanuri are predominantly found in present-day Borno State.

2. He sometimes left the decision to his son, saying "if Buba finishes his education and becomes a big man he can send all his brothers to school if he wants to." (ibid.) This was before the advent of strong official pressure that accompanied the launching of UPE.

3. Peshkin, ibid. This is a common reaction throughout Africa. For a Tanzanian example, see Corlien Verkevisser, Growing up in Sukumaland, CESC, The Hague, 1973, p.274.

4. See also Hake, op. cit., p.34; Kano, Galadanci Report, op. cit., pp.7,34; and Hassan, op. cit., p.253.
Marriage of girls in Hausa society traditionally takes place around the age of twelve, and is an additional barrier to female school attendance. Many parents fear that daughters in school beyond that age will become pregnant, and such an event would have serious implications for a father as well as for his daughter. He may, for example, be excluded from positions of authority in the community, since a man is often chosen on the basis of his ability to control, manage and rear his family correctly. Another reason why most Kano State communities have resisted schooling of their daughters is that women are perceived as particularly important guardians of traditional values. When the UPE campaign was launched, many parents under pressure chose to send their daughters to Islamiyya schools rather than makarantun boko. A Hausa proverb maintains that ilmin boko yana hana ibeda - Western learning hinders worship. Government primary schools, despite rigid control of missionary activities and the fact that most Kano State teachers are Muslims, are still widely described as "Christian". The word does not necessarily imply strict affiliation to that faith, however, so much as relaxation of Islamic principles and adoption of Western habits.

1. See Chapter I, Section 1.1.
2. See Clarke, 'Islam and Western Education', op. cit., pp. 44-5. He quotes a malam in Bauchi State who stated that his three daughters would not continue beyond Primary IV because "To send a girl to school beyond Class IV ... was not a safe practice".
3. This has also been observed by Shehu Usman Ish'aku, 'The Effectiveness of Islamiyya Schools in Kano Municipality'; B.A.(Ed) dissertation, Bayero University, Kano, 1978, p.37.
4. Abdurrahman and Canham, op. cit., p.87. See also Trevor, op. cit., p.250.
5. See the remarks of one malam (quoted Chapter III, Section 1.1i) who, on arriving to be interviewed for a primary teaching post, saw the (Muslim) education officer writing in the Roman script and declared, "I had thought we were going to teach the Holy Koran. Why then are we being interviewed by these Christians?". See also J.M.Hake, Parental Attitudes Toward Education in Northern Nigeria', mimeo, Kano, 1970, passim.
That Western-type schools are not fully in consonance with indigenous society has long been recognised. In Chapter Two, Vischer's efforts to cater for the major Islamic festivals, to avoid work on Fridays and to construct desks only two feet high so that pupils could sit on the floor in traditional fashion, were discussed. It was also noted, however, that Vischer's model did not long outlive his tenure. Even at the beginning of the century, the strength of the established Western mould was too great to permit flexibility and these relatively minor adaptations. Whilst recognising obstacles to development of Islamiyya schools, we have suggested that official interest in them has been slight and that, in the context of UFE, this represents a lost opportunity to reduce the 'culture clash' of mass primary education.

Although it is possible to attend both primary and Koranic schools, indications in at least some areas suggested that attendance at the latter declined in 1976 because of UFE. If this trend is general, it has important implications. Koranic schools have been criticised for their failure to teach the meaning of the Koran and their harsh discipline. However, it must be noted that Koranic schools also provide considerable training in deportment and social values. The UPE schools are spreading a different theory of knowledge and a work ethic that places greater value on salaried occupations than on what many older people describe as the 'real work' of farming, thatching, butchering and so on. In turn this may affect the status and

1. See Chapter II Section 3, and Chapter IV, Section 4.iv.
2. Clarke, 'Islam and Western Education', op. cit., p.54. He instances one malam in Bauchi who had 40 pupils before the launching of UPE but in 1977 had only 12, and one of his colleagues who had only three.
5. The response of the people of Adakawa, in Kano State, who were interviewed by Hassan, is interesting. Some 80% of parents, he asserts, are leather workers, and held the opinion that Western education 'is a job seeking education which should only be pursued by people who have no jobs.' (Hassan, op. cit., p.254.)
and livelihood of malams, and strengthen their opposition to Western-type schools.¹

Indiscipline in government schools has concerned the authorities for some time, and with the launching of UPE became a matter requiring urgent review firstly because school coverage was greatly extended, and secondly because the quality of the teaching force left much to be desired. Indiscipline was specifically discussed by the Galadanci Report,² was the subject of a National Policy Development Centre report in 1977,³ and aroused considerable discussion in the press.⁴ Teachers often complain that they should not be held fully responsible for the decline in disciplinary standards, and that they receive inadequate backing from the home. However, as authorities have been aware for at least 25 years,⁵ one effect of increased schooling is that parents have less control over their children while they are at school. This situation becomes particularly significant in view of the youth and immaturity of many teachers, who are incapable of training children in a fully desirable manner, and the fact that many parents misguided abdicate their responsibilities because the school is represented as "progressive" in contrast to the "backward" nature of many traditional practices. The Galadanci Report suggested that this should be remedied through the institution of virile Parent-Teacher Assoc-

4. Particularly controversial was the decision in 1977 to post military personnel to assist maintenance of discipline in schools.
5. This factor was noted, for example, in Nigeria, Northern Region, Religious and Moral Instruction in the Training Centres of the Northern Region, Government Printer, Kaduna, 1954, p.3.
Though they would be valuable, it must be recognised that they might not significantly affect the root of the problem. At present in the very few institutions where such an association exists, it is used to inform a minority of interested persons how the school would like them to behave rather than the reverse. Fundamental improvement cannot come without a more enlightened populace and a more enlightened body of government officers prepared and capable of promoting flexibility. Unfortunately, because of vested interests in the maintenance of power acquired through the existing system and because the expertise of most teachers and other functionaries is limited, there is little sign that the authorities are either prepared or capable of this. As such, the evidence in Kano State accords with the theories of Bowles, Levin and Carnoy - that despite its expanded size, the education system maintains its selective and elitist character because the educational reform has not been accompanied by other political and economic changes.


2. It is also worth noting that PTA's are another example of organisations useful in the West, uncritically recommended for Nigeria where family relationships are very different. The upbringing of a Hausa child is complicated by a kunya, or avoidance-shame relationship which holds between parents and their first-born (see M.G. Smith, The Economy of Hausa Communities, op. cit., pp.41-8). The two parties are expected to avoid speaking or referring to each other by name, even when talking to a third party, and when combined with the auta, or fondness relationship between a child and his father's sisters and mother's brothers, often leads to adoption and upbringing of children by other parts of the family even when their parents are still alive. The operation of the extended family also means that many more Hausa children live with close relatives other than their parents than would be the case in the West, and sometimes children are sent to other parts of the family specifically to make use of educational opportunities, while it is recognised that the term is often not applied strictly and that guardians frequently take the place of parents in PTA's, therefore, should a child's school attendance be poor, for example, it might be more useful for the school authorities to approach an uncle or other close relative to remedy the situation, rather than the parents.
It cannot be said that UPE alone is responsible for the perceived decline in moral and religious standards among school children. More general analysis would refer to the increasingly material outlook of society which has accompanied the oil boom, and the overall pace of change. Nevertheless, UPE must be seen as a significant factor since it is the vehicle for a profound influence on the children and their homes and, as is intended, accelerates changes in the basis of society. The scale of expansion has not only necessitated employment of many young and immature teachers, it has also increased the exodus of many better staff from the profession.¹

The important role played by Arabists was mentioned in Chapter Three. Partly in order to reduce local resistance, and partly to supplement the main body of teachers, a large group of malams was recruited for UPE schools in 1976.² The employment of Arabists has assisted maintenance of traditional values and also provided a link between the school and the village which frequently does not exist with the other staff who are rarely posted to their villages of origin. In the sphere of religious tuition, Kano State has the advantage of an overwhelmingly Muslim population, which avoids conflicts experienced elsewhere. The incorporation of the Arabists and of religious education is not without difficulties, however. It is indicative of general attitudes which consider Western-type schooling progressive and traditional values backward that the main body of staff often do not consider the Arabists 'real' teachers. Inevitably pupils perceive this attitude, and it may provide partial explanation of decreased religious adherence despite its continued tuition. Related to this problem is the low salary grading of the Arabists because of their lack of paper qualifications. One solution is the extension of in-service training, though once again time and manpower constraints must be recognised. Another obstacle to religious

¹. See Chapter III, Section 1.11 and Chapter IV, Section 4.61.
². 2,605 Arabists were employed in 1976/7, compared with 820 the year before. Respectively, they represented 20% and 12% of the total teaching profession (Kano, Education Statistics for Kano State, op. cit, 1976/7, p.25; 1975/6, p.17).
education is the pressure on the curriculum. As has been noted,1 heavy demands prevent the learning of any subject in depth. Retention of Arabic is advisable in order to secure confidence in the schools, but when added to the other languages a child is expected to learn using a completely different alphabet, the depth of understanding is inevitably limited. In spite of efforts to maintain Islamic tuition in primary schools in the past, a general decline in religious adherence has been observed.2 The proportion of Arabists in the teaching force increased after the launching of UPE, but in view of qualitative defects in the main body of staff, combined with a possible reduction in Koranic school attendance, there is little reason to expect a halt to the decline from traditional standards. Moreover, because of the numerical school expansion, this will have a much wider impact on society.

Before leaving the topic of changing religious attitudes, it is worth mentioning the place of the Maguzawa. While no detailed specific study of the attitudes of Kano Maguzawa towards Western-type education has been made, among the Birom, a "pagan" group on the Jos Plateau, the Western-type school has brought religious changes. Many schools there were specifically Christian mission institutions, and most pupils have abandoned their former religion partly because of the schools' evangelism (either explicit or implicit), and because their religion had no claim to universality and 'status' in the wider world.3 In contrast, the Bulala, who live in Bauchi State and whose position is closer to the Maguzawa because they are a smaller group and dominated by Muslims, associate Western-type schools with Islam rather than Christianity.4 Whilst in one village the majority still "resisted" education, two pupils had gone to the school and had become "malams". Similar changes are

1. See Chapter IV, Section 4.iv.
4. Ibid., p.41.
likely to occur among the Kano Maguzawa, especially since none of the primary teachers openly adhere to their faith. UPE will also bring changes in the way the Maguzawa are regarded by Muslims. Many of the latter consider themselves learned in contrast to the "backward" Maguzawa. With the advent of UPE, attitudes may change, and Muslims will find it hard to retain feelings of superiority based on literacy.¹

Other social changes result from changes in income. In the long run, as we have seen, receipt of schooling is likely to improve private incomes, especially for those proceeding beyond the primary level. In the short run, incomes may decline if the individual is unable to obtain employment; but once he has succeeded, the benefits are likely to extend beyond the individual to other members of his family. Even when youths have to migrate to urban areas in search of modern sector employment, dependants in rural areas usually benefit from "repatriated" earnings.²

We have also noted that while a child is attending school, there is often a loss of income. The reduction of children's farming or hawking (talla) will affect poor and traditional farmers more than others. As such, removal of child labour through UPE could well increase social stratification. Specific information on the economic aspects of talla is provided by Schildkrout's comparison of two wards in Kano City. In the first, a predominantly Fulani ward,

many of the girls and almost all of the boys, were in both Arabic and Western school, and not doing talla. There, women's occupations were mainly embroidering caps, and their incomes averaged only about N5 to N15 per month. In the other ward, where very few girls attended Western school, the children were actively engaged in street trading and women's incomes were considerably higher, often double or triple the average for the other ward.³

¹. Ibid., p.50.
². Remission of earnings does not always take place, however. Aderanti Adepoju, for example, found that only 60% of migrants surveyed in Cshogbo, Western Nigeria, remitted money. See 'Rural-Urban Socio-Economic Links: The Example of Migrants in South-West Nigeria', in Samir Amin (ed.), Modern Migrations in Western Africa, Oxford University Press, 1974, p.132. See also Samir Amin, 'Introduction', ibid., p.100.
Schildkrout’s information that in the poorest families, usually where no husband is present, the children’s economic activities contribute directly to subsistence suggests that loss of earnings through compulsory schooling would have a very significant effect. In other families, the social consequences are less direct but nevertheless wide ranging, and are unlikely to have been fully considered by government planners. Where families can afford not to utilise talla earnings for direct subsistence, it is common to save them, especially in the case of girls, for the furnishings and equipment which form the marital dowry (kayan daki). A set of kayan daki may cost from N300 to N500 in an average family, and N1,000 to N3,000 among the wealthy, and considerable significance is attached to its size. Thus the introduction of UPE has consequences reaching even the marriage prospects of those concerned. Talla is also widely seen as a way for girls to meet prospective husbands, and so important is this considered by some mothers that in cases where the fathers disapprove of the practice, they send out their daughters secretly.¹

UPE further influences marriage prospects in other ways. We have mentioned the risk of a girl being “spoiled” by becoming pregnant or acquiring “unsuitable” habits while at primary school. This may be set against the improved prospects of an educated girl marrying an educated, and therefore probably relatively wealthy husband. Yet the complexity of factors is indicated by the possibility that as girls acquire more education, bride prices may increase, which in turn, as occurred in Southern Nigeria during the 1960’s,² may force many young men to leave traditional occupations to earn higher wages so that they can marry both in proper style and within a reasonable period of time.

Apart from the loss of income for families where children commonly engage in talla, it must be recognised that changes will occur for those other members of the community who rely on hawkers for their breakfast, lunch

¹. Ibid.
². Abernethy, op. cit., p.198.
and supper. The blind also depend on children to lead them. And increased school attendance will hinder communication of women in purdah with the outside world because children cease to be so readily available to carry messages. 1 This will only affect the more prosperous families which can afford to enter purdah, but when coupled with more Western attitudes children are likely to acquire in primary schools,

1. Contrary to widespread belief, Hill has found that the incidence of kulle is on the increase in rural areas. She found that in Batagarawa in 1967 (Rural Hausa, op. cit, pp.22 ff), practically all women of child bearing age were in full seclusion to the extent that they did not emerge from their compounds during the course of a normal working day. Some husbands permitted their wives to go visiting after dark, but it was rare to see a younger woman on the streets except on special occasions such as the prophet's name day. This compares with the situation 50 years ago, when only the wives of malams were in purdah. Now the practice enjoys such prestige on quasi-religious grounds that it is almost universal in that area, though her subsequent research in Kano showed variations in its incidence (see Chapter III, Section 1.1). Prestige also derives from the fact that for women to stay in purdah requires a certain wealth and in the past distinguished owners from their slaves. With the abolition of slavery, the women asserted their freedom by withdrawing into purdah.

It was noted above that the practice of kulle is a cultural rather than religious phenomenon. It is practised by adherents of the Bamidele movement in Southern Nigeria, but not by other Muslim groups in West Africa. Hill points out that it is only made possible in Hausaland by the ubiquity of the donkey, which enables men to excuse their wives from their traditional function as beasts of burden without inconvenience to themselves, and the existence of a high water table which makes it possible to dig wells within compounds. As Clarke has remarked, because most Muslim groups do not practise seclusion, and are therefore both less worried that their children will acquire Western ideas in primary schools and rebel against tradition, and less in need of children for communication, kulle may be considered a specific factor differentiating the Hausa response to Western-type education from that of other groups. ('Islam and Western Education', op. cit., pp.45-8, 92-5; and Peter B. Clarke, 'Islam, Education and the Development Process in Nigeria', Comparative Education, Vol.14, No.2, 1978, p.136.)
may force a lessening of the rigidity of seclusion.

It is also possible that increased Western-type education will cause more women to rebel against polygamy, and there is evidence that marriage, especially of girls, often takes place later among those in receipt of Western-type schooling. In turn this is accompanied by a lengthening of the period in which children are dependent on their parents and may combine with such other factors as improved hygiene and economic prosperity to reduce the average size of families.

Schildkrout additionally found that where more boys are attending school than girls, which continued to be the case after the launching of UPE, the burden of household tasks performed by the girls had increased and the interchangeability of tasks between the sexes below a certain age was less noticeable. This adds a further dimension of inequality to the relationship between males and females, which is certainly unplanned. Although the actual will of Kano citizens to promote more equal roles for men and women may be questioned, it was among the official objectives of UPE. In the mid-1970's the proportion of female enrolments remained roughly constant at one quarter of the total. However, the dramatic extension of school coverage suggests that, at least in the short run, role imbalances increased with the launching of UPE. Again the school system is seen to reflect the wider attitudes of society, which leads to the suggestion that fundamental change will only occur if

1. Islam permits the marriage of up to four wives, though in practice polygamy is more widespread in richer social groups than among the peasantry (see Hill, Rural Hausa, op. cit., p.23; and Hill, Population, Prosperity and Poverty, op. cit., pp.113-5). It is also worth pointing out that rivalries among wives in polygamous circumstances may affect attendance in the formal education system. Because of rivalries, an 'all-or-none' situation may exist whereby either children of all wives attend school equally or none of them do.


3. Clignet, ibid..

accompanied by other changes outside the school system.

Because so many factors are inter-related, it is difficult to classify the social effects of UPE. Already this discussion is moving away from the family to a wider perspective. It is therefore necessary to recognise this larger focus, but with the realisation that wider changes ultimately concern people - families and individuals.

2. The Impact of UPE at the State and National Levels

In this section will be considered a large group of issues ranging from private schooling to rural-urban migration. To clarify analysis, discussion will focus first on issues of social stratification, and secondly on national unity and political stability. Again, however, it must be recognised that these categories exhibit considerable overlap.

i. UPE and Social Stratification

It is becoming evident that despite the hopes of those who expect schools to shape society, in Kano State and Nigeria as a whole the reverse force is stronger. Far from weakening social stratification, UPE is maintaining and perhaps strengthening it. Once again it is impossible totally to separate UPE from other major influences, but the project is of such magnitude that many specific aspects may be identified.

The practicalities and ethics of compulsion, for example, are a prominent topic of debate. Though the original plan envisaged compulsion from 1979, we have noted first that an element of force was widely applied in 1976, and second that despite the very dramatic increase, enrolments remained too low and resources too strained for compulsion to be a realistic policy. Significantly, the 1977 National Policy on Education referred to compulsion only "as soon as possible".

However, although the practicalities of compulsion precluded its universal application, since some pressure was widely applied, and since one major political party revived the issue in 1978,¹ it is necessary to consider its ethics and implications. The arguments favouring obligatory schooling rest on the egalitarian objectives of UPE and point out that without effective compulsion, enrolments will never become truly universal and thus that some gaps will actually enlarge. This reasoning contains much validity. However, there is also a powerful case against compulsion resting on moral as well as practical grounds. Since parents' misgivings on the social consequences of schooling are often warranted, since the education system is already very costly and overburdened, and since UPE is expected to contribute to a major unemployment crisis, compulsory schooling becomes more difficult to justify. The moral issues of whether the government has a right to impose its own values and destroy the lifestyle of nomadic peoples are particularly problematic.² Opposition to obligatory schooling for the Fulani is given added force by the authorities' failure and inability to develop a programme related to their needs. The essential difficulty about parental ignorance as a ground for compulsion is that it can so easily become a self-fulfilling prophesy.³

Serious doubts remain on the advisability of compulsory schooling, therefore, especially at the present time. Since there are also formidable practical difficulties, official announcements of intent should not always be taken seriously.

It must be recognised, however, that because of these obstacles to effective universality of schooling, UPE is likely to increase gaps between the schooled and those who remain resistant.

The extent to which the school system promotes equality

1. 'Unity Party of Nigeria Manifesto', New Nigerian, 22/12/78. The party is headed by Chief Awolowo, who may thus be seen to adhere to sentiments he has publicly expressed for the last 25 years.

2. See Cxby op. cit.; Sandford, op. cit; and Chapter IV, Section ii.

is also reduced by the continued existence of private schools. It is true that at the primary level in Kano they are not numerous,¹ but it is significant that, for example, some senior officers even in the Ministry of Education send their children to the Capital School where they are taught mainly by expatriates and where fees of N5 per week are charged.² Since this particular school also admits children from the age of four and a half, pupils gain the additional advantage of an early start. A similar advantage is given to those children of elite families able to attend nursery schools.

The subject of private schools aroused considerable debate in the context of UPE. Professor Awojobi, for example, suggested that "In order to ensure that everyone has a stake in the destiny of UPE it is imperative that all fee-paying nursery and primary schools should be abolished with immediate effect and caused to join the UPE scheme."³ Prominent among supporters of private schools was Professor Awokoya, who had been Minister of Education when the Western Region UPE scheme was initiated in the 1950's.⁴ Private schooling has continued to gain open support from sections of the elite and was specifically supported in the manifesto of the National Party of Nigeria.⁵ Its advocates, like those the world over, point out that the cost of education to the

1. The most prominent fee-paying schools are the Capital School, St Louis', Shekara, Kabo, Mallam Maduri and Jogana Girls' Schools, and the Bayero University Staff School. Other schools exist for French, Italian, Dutch and Lebanese minorities, usually teaching in the pupils' mother tongue.

2. Interview Miss Leslie Mitchell, Headmistress, Capital School, 20/11/76. The school was originally established for expatriate children whose parents held short-term contracts. Some of the Kano State elite have recognised that it provides a better quality education, and in 1976 120 of the 400 pupils were Nigerian.


4. For discussion of the Western Region scheme, see Chapter I, Section 3.i. For Awokoya's remarks, see Daily Times, 17/12/76. For another view supporting private schools, see Chuma Ifed, 'Private Schools Need Attention: Government Should Help', Nigeria Herald, 23/6/77.

5. 'National Party of Nigeria Manifesto', New Nigerian, 29/12/78.
nation is already high, so that not only are they exercising their right to spend money as they wish, they are also performing a public service by relieving the state of expenditure it would otherwise incur. That this argument has some force is evident from the fact that even in socialist Tanzania, private fee-paying schools existed in the mid-1970's at the secondary level. Yet it is clear that in Nigeria private schools are used to preserve the ascendancy of the elite despite the launching of UPE and its ostensibly egalitarian motives. The same is true of the girls' boarding schools, which increased in number in 1976.

However, we have noted that fee-paying schools are only a small minority in Kano State at present, and it must be recognised that even if fees were abolished, inequalities would remain. As several studies cited above have pointed out, in-school performance is strongly influenced by out-of-school factors. Though research has suggested lower correlations in developing countries than in developed ones, Barbara Lloyd's work in the Western Region provides a specifically Nigerian example of the reinforcing effects of social class on educational attainment. Parents of elite families familiar with the functioning of schools are both more able and more willing to assist their children outside the school. In the present system, pupils with good English have a strong advantage. It is not uncommon for parents in elite families to support their children by choosing to speak English at home. The fact that many Sabon Gari schools

1. Private schools catered for as much as 40% of total Form I enrolment in 1975 (David Court and Kenneth King, 'Major Themes of Educational Policy in Tanzania' (xerox), 1977, p.27. See also Court and Kinyanjui, op. cit., pp.90-1.

2. See Chapter III, Section 1.1.

3. See introductory section to this chapter.

4. Leigh Alexander and John Simmons, The Determinants of School Achievements in Developing Countries: The Education Production Function, The World Bank, Washington, 1975, pp.51-2. Two explanations they offer are the much smaller range of home background conditions in developing countries and the greater role of schooling. See also Foster, Education and Social Change, op. cit., pp.240-8.

employ English throughout the system improves their pupils' success rate and maintains differentiation. This is reinforced by the high proportion of better qualified staff from Southern states. So obviously more successful are pupils that many Kano State Muslims send their children to the former mission schools, tolerating their continued Christian dominance to secure better results.

Similarly, urban schools are clearly favoured over rural ones. The former attract and retain better staff, are supervised more effectively, have greater access to the central administration, and benefit from the town's non-school facilities. This maintains a school hierarchy with, generally speaking, Kano Metropolitan Area schools at the top, those in Local Government headquarters second, those on major roads third, and the remaining remote schools last. The older schools have the additional advantages of stability and longer traditions. Among the older schools, further differentiation is created by the PSIP scheme.1

The in-built tendency of the school system to favour urban inhabitants deserves closer examination. We have noted, first, that modern sector employment is likely to cause rural-urban migration, in particular to Kano. This will remove some youths from rural areas, and could thereby increase imbalances. The school promotes this trend by creating awareness of opportunities and by encouraging higher aspirations. Though the subject is in need of further research, the forces in operation are indicated by Stock's study of secondary pupils' attitudes. Having inquired both where pupils would like to work and where they would not like to work, he found, not surprisingly, that Kano, and to a much lesser extent the administrative area headquarters, received the strongest positive responses.2

1. See Chapter IV, Section 4.iv.
Not only are these the centres of modern sector jobs; they are also places frequently mentioned by name in official broadcasts and documents. Peripheral areas are disadvantaged by the paucity of such desirable employment opportunities, poor communications, and the fact that they are rarely specifically named in official reports.

A second factor perpetuating rural-urban inequalities has been the location of emergency training colleges in urban Kano. Officially, this was only a temporary expedient, but in practice the colleges remained in Kano for much longer than originally anticipated. Fapohunda's study of the unemployed in Lagos is relevant in this context, for apart from those who specifically came to seek work, the largest group of immigrants in his sample of unemployed people had originally come to avail themselves of educational opportunities. In the same way, Kano's UPE colleges increased imbalances by their existence in the town, and this in turn may have increased rural-urban migration.

Thirdly, however, we should note that rural-urban migration does not affect all areas and groups uniformly. In particular, Hill's studies have indicated considerable economic differentiation among both the ruling classes and the peasantry. Her studies of ex-schoolboys in Batagarawa indicated very high migration rates among the former, and stronger tendency to migrate within richer and poorer farming groups than within middle groups. This adds a notable complicating factor, though her sample was very small and, as she emphasises, information on the factors influencing migration is extremely limited. 2

1. Olanrewaju Fapohunda, Characteristics of the Unemployed People in Lagos, Human Resources Unit, University of Lagos, 1974, p. 12.
A further important aspect of rural-urban migration and attitudes towards schooling is illuminated by Blakemore's study of a Northern Ghanaian community following their UPE campaign of the 1960's. He observed the almost total absence from the community of the first batch of school leavers, and noted the ambivalence among parents about education and their fears of being left in comparative isolation. It is true that migration had existed for centuries, and would have continued even in the absence of the educational campaign, but the upsurge which followed the graduation of the first cohort was marked. Beyond this phase, however, there may come a point, which has been reached in some Southern Nigerian and Ghanaian communities, after which primary education becomes so widespread that it is no longer considered so much in terms of economic rewards, and does not to the same extent promote emigration or parental ambivalence. This suggests the existence of a cycle which may also be applicable to Kano. Precisely where the 'threshold' is or when it will be reached, however, is difficult to assess, and so dependent on events in the first few years of UPE that to hazard estimates at this stage would not be fruitful.

There is also a possibility that UPE will accelerate the general replacement of small scale production and commerce based on kinship with a wage economy. In parts of Southern Nigeria, acceptance of this trend but attempts to reduce migration have led to interesting cases of communally organised projects to pay school leavers to perform farming work in the village which formerly they would have done as a family duty. With its slower educational development, such problems have not yet been so serious in Kano.

2. Ibid., p. 240.
be interesting to see if similar communal solutions are adopted in a few years' time.

There are, however, signs of an expanding working class, the size of which was formerly very limited. Gutkind's observations from Western Nigeria in 1971 may be increasingly true of Kano:

the population of the rural areas is being rapidly divided between the better-off cash crop land owning peasants (the African kulaks), the struggling subsistence farmers, and the landless agricultural labourers, while the young and rebellious ... leave the land for good. The in-migration of the towns further crystallises an existing stratific system whereby the style of life of the few (the "business tycoons" in Nigerian thought), the aloof professionals (usually referred to as the "elite") and the small "middle class", ... contrasts sharply with the mass of urbanites who are poor and must struggle very hard to reach the next stage up the ladder. 2

Thus the expansion of Western-type education may be fostering development of new social groups. In a well-known passage to describe a situation he perceived in Ghana, Busia once noted that:

The effect of the Western-type of education has been to produce two, or even three, nations in the country, unable to communicate effectively with the other. Many of those who have passed through the formal education system do not understand the culture of their own society. Those who have never been to school do not understand the ways of the 'educated'. In many circumstances, the two do not understand each other. Then there is even a third group, the half 'educated', who understand

1. To discuss the term 'class' in the African context is, as Adrian Peace puts it, "to move into treacherous territory". Here his definition of the working class is adopted, i.e.: "those wage-earners who stand in a consistently subordinate relationship in the industrial mode of production, whose surplus product is appropriated by those who own the means of production, ... and who on the basis of this relationship can identify a common opposition to their own economic interests and act accordingly." (The Lagos Proletariat: Labour Aristocrats or Populist Militants?, in Sandbrook and Cohen (eds.), op. cit., p.281.) As P.C., Gutkind points out (The Emergent African Urban Proletariat, McGill University, Montreal, 1974, pp.vi-vii), the term could be used to embrace rural workers as well. See also V.L. Allen, 'The Meaning of the 'Working Class in Africa', Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.10, No.2, 1972.

neither the ways of their own indigenous society nor those of the 'highly educated'. 1

Many in Northern Nigeria argue that similar groups have already emerged, and that the third group will be expanded by UPE because "the western system of education imparts knowledge without the training to handle it". 2 Of this there is particular danger in the short run because of the qualitative problems that were noted in Chapter Three, and the conflict between Western and Eastern traditions.

ii. UPE, Political Stability and National Unity

From analysis of UPE and social stratification, we should turn to the related topics of political stability and national unity. Officially, Nigeria's educational policy is geared towards "self-realization, better human relationship, national consciousness, national unity as well as towards social, cultural, economic, political, scientific and technological progress." 3 In this formidable catalogue of expectations, the objective of national unity is considered particularly important. The government considers education "the greatest force that can be used to bring about redress" of imbalanced inter and intra-state development, 4 and desires it to contribute to "a free and democratic society, a land full of opportunities for all its citizens, able to generate a great and dynamic economy, and growing into a united, strong and self-reliant nation." 5 To assess the

2. Bauchi State interviews cited in Clarke, 'Islam and Western Education', op. cit., p. 52. A similar statement was made by the 'aziri of Sokoto - an influential figure in Northern Nigeria - and recorded by Trevor (op. cit., p. 250). The 'aziri quoted a well-known proverb: Ilmi ban da tarbiya ba shi da amfanin kome (Knowledge without the training to handle it is useless).
4. Ibid., p. 5.
5. Ibid.,
likelihood of these objectives being achieved, it is useful to distinguish between vertical and horizontal integration.

On the subject of vertical integration, it has been suggested that at least in colonial Nigeria, Western-type education had very little unifying effect. Indeed, in so far as it produced a Western-oriented elite whose outlook was quite different from the masses, it had a disintegrative effect. Once this gap had been created, however, it was argued that it could only be bridged by provision of more education.¹ Thus, while in Kano there was a marked difference in attitudes towards UPE among the Western-educated elite and among more conservative segments of the population, the former argued that increased education could both promote a common basis of experience and values, and provide a vehicle for communication between the government and the people.

While there is some validity in these arguments, previous sections have suggested that changes in the education system do not necessarily lead to major social reforms unless accompanied by other political and economic ones, and there is a possibility that UPE could increase stratification. Whether this is likely to lead to political instability is a matter of debate. Many would agree with Coleman that mass education schemes may be destabilising because of "the anomic potential of the unemployed primary school leavers and the revolutionary threat posed in situations of their coalescence with disaffected individuals,"² and we have indicated that serious employment problems could arise in Kano during the 1980's. However, despite evidence that politicians


have exploited grievances among the unemployed for their own ends, the "revolutionary threat" cannot be considered inevitable. Gutkind has pointed out that the unemployed are often poorly organised, and that their leadership may often be "bought off" by the government in times of disturbance. Further, many of the unemployed tend to be too busy fighting for survival to have much time for politics; schooling tends to socialize individuals to believe that if they fail, it is their own fault rather than that of the system; and one long term effect of UPE will be to make school leavers aware that their education has no scarcity value and that job-hunting is likely to be useless. It is difficult, therefore, to make firm predictions on the vertically integrative potential of UPE and its implications for political stability, but it is possible to note that a unifying and stabilising outcome is far from certain.

Similar reservations should be expressed about the potential of UPE to foster horizontal integration between the same social and economic strata in different ethnic groups. Several studies have demonstrated that, with increased school attendance, there is a tendency for pupils' identification with the nation to increase and for ethnic allegiance correspondingly to decline. Their

conclusions must be treated with caution, however. At the secondary level, the experience of the Federal Government Colleges, in which admissions are based on quotas for each state, has raised doubts about the extent to which education is an integrating force even within one institution, and it must be recognised that a large number of non-school factors also determine ethnic and national allegiances.

Expectations on the integrative potential of UPE chiefly focus on the curriculum. The English language, for example, has been considered a particularly important vehicle of communication promoting national unity. Political obstacles have precluded Nigerian languages from being the medium of instruction in most of the education system, and during the 1960's and early 1970's it was official policy for pupils to go "straight for English" in order to maximise their knowledge of the language. In 1976, partly for pedagogical reasons and partly because a large number of teachers recruited for UPE could not speak good English, vernaculars were made the medium for the first three years of education, and English thereafter. If one accepts that English could significantly promote national unity, it is unfortunate that UPE was an indirect cause of teaching being reduced.

The decision also highlighted the delicate nature of education policy formation, for when Kano's adoption of Hausa for the first three years of primary school was made public, it was greeted in the Lagos published and generally Southern oriented Sunday Times with the headline "Big Twist in UPE Scheme". Though Lagos and the other


2. Sunday Times, 16/5/76.
Western states later adopted a vernacular themselves, the headline illustrated the vested interests in maintaining the existing structure of the system.

The assumption that more widespread knowledge of English promotes unity must, however, be questioned. As the sponsors of the Yoruba-medium project pointed out, fewer than ten million Nigerians speak English, whereas ten million speak Igbo, ten million speak Yoruba and twenty-five million speak Hausa; and the swearing of allegiance to one's country in the mother tongue tends to mean more than in a less familiar language.¹ They suggest that a good education in any language can inculcate the spirit of unity, freedom and trust, and that more important than the language per se are the values and knowledge conveyed.²

Fundamental problems have also arisen from the examination system. The WAEC Common Entrance examination, it has been noted, has been inappropriate to the needs of most children, and especially those from Northern states.³ Kano's decision to launch its own examination system was based on sound reasoning. Among the factors behind this decision was the overloading of the WAEC machinery, which would have become progressively worse as education approached universality. However, it must also be recognised that the proliferation of state examinations - and each state is now officially recommended to establish its own⁴ - precludes comparison on a common

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3. See Chapter IV, Section 3 and Section 4.iv.
basis. Although not the first to break away from NAEC, when Kano announced its secession, some observers suggested it was to avoid comparison with pupils of other states. In this there was probably some truth. However, even if their motives were purely pedagogical, the authorities were no doubt aware of the political implications of the reform and of the difficulty of reconciling relevance with what are perceived as standards.

Another innovation in 1976, which it was hoped would foster national unity, was the national pledge. At the beginning and end of every day, each child was required to recite:

I pledge to Nigeria my country
To be faithful, loyal and honest,
To serve Nigeria with all my strength,
To defend her unity
And uphold her honour and glory;
So help me God.

It is possible that the pledge could promote unity, but experience elsewhere points to the dangers of excessive politicisation. It may have been fortunate that only a minority of institutions adhered strictly to the directive since in some cases familiarity bred contempt and the pledge was in danger of being counterproductive. Moreover, like other innovations, the pledge is unlikely to have more than a minor effect unless reinforced by complementary factors.

Perhaps the most important complementary factor, which subordinates most curricular innovations, is the quality of teaching. In 1972, Peshkin pointed out that teachers were "not necessarily in the vanguard of social change in Nigeria, especially in the far northern areas; their values and attitudes are not more malleable than

1. Anambra, Imo, Cross River and Lagos States began their own examinations before Kano, and Oyo stated its intention to do so. (In-Service Centre, Monthly News Bulletin, Kano, October 1976, p.4; Daily Sketch, 28/5/76.)

those of most other people; and many, especially at the primary level, are poorly educated and hardly fit to teach let alone communicate what to them may be novel political views. Since then, the situation has worsened considerably. In 1976/7, only 9% of the Kano State teaching force were qualified. In addition to the Arabists (20%), 41% were completely untrained, and 75% of this group had only primary schooling or less.

As Chapter Three noted, many applicants who under normal circumstances would have been considered unsuitable were recruited for crash training programmes. When they 'graduated', many were sent to newly opened schools which lacked established traditions and were remote from central supervision. A high proportion of staff in the training colleges taught only on a part-time basis, and did so principally for financial reasons. Inevitably, this attitude had an impact on many trainees, who further suffered from temporary siting policies and even uncertainty over the length of their courses. It has also been suggested that a high proportion of expatriate teacher-trainers hinders development of suitable attitudes among trainees. Thus the characteristics of both the teaching and the teacher-training forces left much to be desired, and may be added to other factors which combine to make UPE a potential source of instability rather than the reverse.

The role of literacy in political development must also be questioned. The National Policy on Education


2. See Chapter III, Section 1.11.

3. In 1977/8, 37% of teacher-trainers were expatriates (Kano, Education Statistics for Kano State 1976-77, op. cit., pp. 48, 50).
implies that UPE will make a strong contribution to development of a "free, just and democratic society".¹ This view is frequently expressed in Nigeria,² and is supported in a general context by Mazrui, for example, though he adds the qualification that "widespread literacy is a necessary if not sufficient condition" for democracy.³ Leaving aside the question of whether democracy is the most suitable form of government for Nigeria, we must question first whether literacy is a necessary precondition for democratic participation, and secondly whether literacy is democracy's inevitable precursor.

Concerning the first question, we should note experiences elsewhere. One prominent example suggesting that literacy is not a necessity for democratic participation was the 1952 Indian election. Using pictorial ballot papers, some 75 million people voted, of whom fewer than 20% were literate.⁴ Use of such ballot papers is obviously a system which can, and is, employed elsewhere. Peil's finding on political attitudes in Southern Nigeria should also be noted. She has observed that "relatively few significant differences exist between those with no education and those who have attended primary school, indicating that the few years of schooling available to most of the population have little effect on political attitudes." This, she continues, "is probably due to the relatively high level of political

² See, for example, Fawehinmi, op. cit., p.26; S.O. Adamu, 'Free Education Issue', New Nigerian, 28/12/78, p.5; Raymond Arazu, 'Have the Politicians got all the Answers?', West Africa, 9/7/79, p.1214.
⁴ Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama, Pelican, London, 1968, Vol.1, p.269. Myrdal comments that the election "was fought and won with less coercion, fraud, and other illegal activities than often characterise the elections of much more developed countries."
knowledge and participation of illiterates."1

In the North, it must be conceded, both the 'modern' and 'traditional' rulers in the past have paid little attention to the opinions of the peasantry. In the emirate system, the only mechanism for the talakawa to influence policy decisions was through the clientage system, and that was strictly limited.2 Nevertheless, while the talakawa might have had very limited avenues to make their opinions known, many had, and have, clear views of political forces. Further, it has been shown that, especially in rural areas, radio broadcasts are a much more effective means for acquiring and disseminating information than are newspapers or other written materials.3

It is difficult to accept, therefore, that literacy is a necessary pre-condition for participation in a democracy. Equally, it is difficult to accept that democratic participation is an inevitable result of widespread literacy. Even in a society which purports to be democratic, literates can only read those materials made available to them, and political developments depend on a large number of more important factors outside the education system.

1. Margaret Peil, Nigerian Politics: The People's View, Cassell, London, 1976, p.186. Elsewhere (p.135), she concludes that "The lack of literacy of a large proportion of the Nigerian electorate does not appear to have interfered with their political judgement; the selling of votes was no more common than among more literate but equally poor peoples elsewhere and the majority obviously took their duty seriously."

2. In the clientage system, a member of a lower social group performs services for a patron of higher rank in return for appointments, protection from oppression by other office holders, or other economic opportunities. The system also provided limited social mobility. See Peil, ibid., p.12; Whitaker, op. cit., pp.86-7, 262-3; M.G. Smith, Government in Zazzau, Oxford University Press, 1960, pp.244-5; and Mary Tiffen, The Enterprising Peasant, HMSO, London, 1976, pp.17-18.

Finally, since this study has indicated that, far from being a stabilising and unifying force, UPE could be destabilising and divisive, it is pertinent to ask why government officers and politicians made such ambitious and apparently unrealistic statements as are contained in the National Policy on Education, quoted at the beginning of this section.

In part, the lack of critical examination of the precise role of education in nation building may arise from the civil war and the desire to ensure further peace. It is notable that conscious attempts to use education to promote national unity in Nigeria were not prominent until the 1970's. During the colonial era, several minor acknowledgements of the integrating potential of education were made, but specific projects to that end were few. At the national level, only parts of federal documents could be interpreted as making more than passing reference to integration in the 1960's, and at the regional level, only those of the East did so. In view of the subsequent secession of the Eastern Region, this fact is somewhat ironic. However, the UPE scheme may be seen as part of the post-war campaign of reconstruction, and with memories of the war so recent, it may be suggested, much popular opinion placed greater emphasis on the potentially integrative role of education than on its potentially divisive aspects.

1. On a regional level, the tendency for recurrent financial grants to favour the more developed states, and tensions following complaints in Imo about the low level of their capital grant, were mentioned in Chapter III, Section 2.iii. See also Abernethy's assertion (op. cit., p. 261), that mass education in Southern Nigeria during the 1960's permitted politicians to inflame ethnic tensions that would otherwise have been unimportant.


3. Peshkin, ibid., p. 231.
A second factor arises from divergence of opinion among educationists, which might lead to a certain amount of confusion. On the one hand, several studies have suggested that the school does not so much shape society as reflect it, and that any change in the school system by itself generally plays a very limited role in social change unless accompanied by other political, social and economic reforms. On the other hand, different studies have ascribed a much more active role to the school. Hanson, for example, has held that "A common federal plan of education ... will not only enhance the sense of unity and common purpose in education but will deter developments in various regions which might otherwise operate at cross purposes with each other," and M'Bow considers education "the driving force which would impel a people forward towards its destiny." In this situation of conflicting opinions, therefore, there exists specialist support for the substantial benefits anticipated from educational development.

A third reason why Nigeria's politicians may have adopted such ambitious statements is that the structure of the economy and the polity to some extent demands it. The prevailing philosophy in Nigeria is highly capitalist and individualistic. Thus, the National Policy document, for example, expects education to inculcate "the right type of values and attitudes for the survival of the individual and the Nigerian society." Similarly,

recent years have witnessed what General Obasanjo has called a "new wave of individualism, egotism, materialism and so-called sophistication". A widespread philosophy respects those who are rich and condemns the poor as either too lazy or too incompetent to be otherwise, and this leads to considerable pressure for education. While increasing school leaver unemployment makes it clear that schooling does not automatically lead to a job, competition for jobs remains, and in some circumstances high unemployment leads to more demand for education. In this respect there may exist a conflict between individual and wider requirements, for while it may be advantageous to an individual to increase his formal education, if it merely contributes to an escalating 'diploma disease' it may not be advantageous to the wider society.

Thus, although most political leaders who emerged in 1978 were critical of the way UPE had been implemented since 1976, none publicly criticised the concept of UPE per se, and to do so would have been politically unwise. Despite the increasing evidence of mismanagement during the 1970's and the pressure on finance, not only did every party support education, but three promised to build a university in each state. It was through such promises that the politicians tried to ensure that they were seen to be promoting national development without discrimination, and in a situation where even specialists could not agree on the role of schooling in social change, most politicians chose the argument that suited them.

3. Manifestos of the Unity Party of Nigeria, the Great Nigerian People's Party and the Nigerian People's Party in New Nigerian, 22/12/78, 5/1/79 and 20/1/79. Of the existing 13 universities, two are in Oyo state, and a policy of providing each state with a university would therefore give a total of 20.
Summary

In this chapter we have examined several variables in the process of political and social change as it relates to education. It was noted at the beginning that officially UPS was intended to be a strong instrument of change and provide a sound basis for democracy and national unity. We conclude, however, that unplanned changes are likely to be subordinate to planned ones, and that, in accordance with the theories of Bowles, Levin, Carnoy and others, the school system reflects social and political attitudes as well as shapes them. Even if primary education were to become truly universal in the near future, the schools would continue to operate recruiting and gate-keeping mechanisms, albeit at a higher level. Social and regional stratification is maintained by qualitative differences within the system, and by the fact that those who are the last to join are often the first to drop out. Educational structures and curricula still exist in their colonial mould, and impart skills and values inappropriate to the mass of the population. It is doubtful if education was well suited to its tasks when it served a small ruling elite; and to cater for the needs of the masses it is even less suited.

Doubts also arise over the extent to which schools in Kano are capable of promoting social mobility. In Chapter Two, one reason suggested to explain the general lack of interest in schools during the colonial era was the relative rigidity of social structures, maintained by the institution of indirect rule, which made schooling largely irrelevant to mobility. Smith's summary of the traditional system of social status pointed out that hereditary occupations (kada) generally carry higher

1. This has also been the experience in parts of India. See D.S. Rawat, 'Regeneration of Initial Learning Programmes for Children in India', in UNESCO/IBE, Basic Services for Children: A Continuing Search for Learning Priorities, Paris, 1978, pp.29-30.
status than those freely chosen (shigege). 1 The point was repeated by Yeld, 2 and it is significant that neither author made more than passing reference to Western-type schooling. Some mobility within the traditional structure was provided by the institution of clientage, and by the willingness of craftsmen to take apprentices from different family backgrounds and ethnic groups. 3 Structures are changing with the advent of an increasingly monetary economy and many Western concepts. However, other economic and political measures are necessary if an educational change is to result in a changed distribution of income, 4 and UPE itself is unlikely to open many significant avenues to those for whom they were formerly closed, or significantly to narrow disparities in income.

In Nigeria as a whole, planned expansion between 1975 and 1980 did not anticipate major change in the shape of the educational pyramid. And while the 1975-80 plan for Kano State allowed for substantial widening of the base, it is likely that subsequent plans will encourage secondary and higher expansion and largely restore the original pyramid shape.

At the family level, UPE is extending some gaps between youths and their parents. In a society develop-

1. M.G. Smith, 'The Hausa System of Social Status', Africa, Vol. 29, No. 3, 1959, pp. 248-9. See also M.G. Smith, 'The Hausa of Northern Nigeria', op. cit., p. 139. Most occupations in Hausaland are combined with farming; but within this sector exists a hierarchy based on land ownership. In non-farming activities in traditional society, ruling (sarauta) is considered an occupation and outranks all others. Malanci (Koranic learning) and kasuwanci (successful trading) rank next. Below them are the great majority of traditional occupations, and ranking lowest of all are the butchers, praise-singers, drummers, blacksmiths, house-servants and hunters.


3. See Chapter II, Section 4.11.

ing so rapidly, this is inevitable. However, attempts to reduce its extent and impact have been slight, and arise at least in part from concepts of development based on the Western pattern. Fears in Kano and elsewhere that Western-type schooling will cause a decline in strict adherence to traditional principles have often proved justified. It is unlikely that expanded educational provision in its present form will do much to change this situation. Instead it is probable that, at least in the short run, many school leavers will migrate to Kano Metropolitan Area in search of a form of employment few will find. This will bring further disruption to family life-styles, and while it is true that disruption would occur in the absence of UPE, the process is likely to be accelerated.

On a wider focus, it is difficult to assert with confidence that UPE will promote national unity. While truly universal education could close the quantitative gap at the bottom level, qualitative variations ensure that imbalances remain. Fundamental curriculum conflicts between local and national foci may be irreconcilable, and in the battle between relevance and 'standards', children in Kano are already on the losing side. It has also been noted that the system of federal disbursements originally implemented tended to increase regional imbalances rather than the reverse because recurrent grants out-weighed capital ones.

A similar conclusion also applies to other imbalances. Although UPE has been among the few projects really to reach the rural areas, there are not many signs of closure of rural-urban development gaps. Likewise, the first few years did not indicate any fundamental reshaping of sex roles in society. Male-female enrolment ratios remained approximately constant, and in so far as overall enrolments were greater, imbalances were extended.

In the political sphere, it is difficult to suggest that UPE will, by itself, promote democratic participation.
Indeed, there is evidence from the Eastern Region that mass primary education in the 1960's was exploited by politicians for their own ends. The political situation emergent in 1978 and 1979 gave little indication of basic change during the intervening years of military rule. Close examination, therefore, reveals a likelihood of poor qualitative achievements not only at the first two levels but also at the third.\(^1\) It is unfortunate that the chapter should have to close on this note, for qualitative aspects bring into question the value of the substantial quantitative advances made in the early years of UPE.

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\(^1\) For a definition of the three levels, see the Introduction.
CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSIONS

The introduction to this study observed that Nigeria's UPE scheme may be seen as part of a movement common to much of the developing world. Some developing nations have achieved UPE and others are close to that objective. As Fredriksen's survey noted, however, a large group of Least Developed Countries, over half of which on his classification are African, remain a long way from the goal. Since several aspire to launch UPE campaigns, the Nigerian experience could provide some valuable insights for their planners. Even for the Sahel countries, which might be thought too poor for Nigeria's experience to be very relevant, there may be useful parallels. In particular we have observed similarities between efforts to integrate the Islamic and Western-type systems in Kano, Mali and Mauritania. Moreover, although the availability of petroleum resources distinguished Nigeria from most other developing nations, we have suggested this may clarify the other constraints on educational development.

This concluding chapter, therefore, has two main sections. First it will summarise the main events and issues raised during the first few years of UPE in Kano State. It will make some observations on the constraints on universalisation of education, and will assess the likelihood of the campaign's objectives being achieved. No definite conclusion can be reached until the passage of many more years has placed events in perspective. However, it is possible to make some projections from current trends. The second section draws some conclusions on the usefulness

1. Fredriksen, op.cit., p.366. Cf the 29 countries, 18 were African. They had an overall primary enrolment ratio of 46% in 1975.
2. Seven countries are included in this category, namely Chad, Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta. They had an overall primary enrolment ratio of only 27% in 1975. (Ibid.)
3. See Chapter III, Section 1.ii; and Botti, Carelli and Saliba, op.cit., pp.110 ff.
of Kano's experience to planners both in other nations and in Nigeria, and emphasises the role of politics in decision making.

1. UFE in Kano State: Some Preliminary Achievements, Problems and Trends

One prominent theme constantly stressed in this study, is that UFE must take account of both quantity and quality, each of which will be examined in this section. As we have noted, the latter is a complex subject. The study has distinguished three different "levels" of quality, though recognised that they are not necessarily exclusive, and that, particularly in the third, evaluation remains very subjective.

The quantitative achievements of the first few years of UFE in Kano State were considerable. According to official figures, total primary enrolments, which by 1975 were already 260% greater than the 1970 level, more than doubled in 1976.¹ In that year there were more pupils in Class I than in all the other six classes added together, and the pattern of Form I enrolments in at least the following two years broadly followed that of 1976.²

Partly because of cultural and religious factors, Kano had acquired a reputation for conservatism and "resistance" to Western-type education. Though estimates are very approximate, less than 10% of school-aged pupils were thought to be attending school in the early 1970's. After the launching of UFE, over half those within the official

1. The absolute numbers were 52,000 pupils in 1970, 160,000 in 1975, and 341,000 in 1976. As we have noted, however (Chapter III, Section 1.1), the official figures are to some extent overestimates, and must be treated with caution.

2. According to ministry statistics, respective Class I enrolments for 1976/7, 1977/8 and 1978/9 were 193,000, 143,000, and 150,000. (Information from Mal. Husseini Bello, Senior Statistical Officer, Ministry of Education, Kano).
The total primary population has steadily increased as the first cohort has progressed through the system and new pupils have been enrolled in Class I. To achieve these enrolments, the ministry recognised the importance of cooperation with the traditional emirate authorities. Though there were variations in the enthusiasm with which individual village and district heads carried out their assignments, this could be a useful model for other ministries to consider. It should be noted, however, that retention of those pupils who have been enrolled will be highly dependent first on the ability of teachers to provide imaginative and interesting lessons; second on economic factors, such as the extent to which families are prepared to sacrifice child labour, which are somewhat beyond the control of either the education authorities or the traditional rulers; and third, in the longer run, on the relationship between schooling and employment. Although federal policy did not advocate the use of compulsion in 1976, in several cases local courts in Kano State were used to maintain enrolments, and parents were threatened with fines under the former N.A. law in the event of their children's poor attendance. It must be recognised, however, that effective universal compulsion is still unrealistic, and that a 'carrot' is preferable to a 'stick'.

The teaching force was also doubled for the launching of UPE. As a first step, several emergency training

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1. In the absence of reliable statistics, precise estimation of enrolment rates is impossible. Whereas figures in Appendix VI indicate an underenrolment of 19%, those in Appendix VII suggest a surplus of 67%. Informal judgements based on the number of children visible out of school during class-times were hindered by the operation of a double shift system, and estimation was further complicated by substantial enrolment of children both older and younger than the official limits. However, since only 27% of the 1976/7 cohort were girls, and proportions of males and females in the population were roughly equal, it is clear that at least female enrolments were far from universal.
colleges were opened in 1974 and 1975. In addition, a large group of Koranic malams was employed, which, apart from providing enough staff to make UPE possible, also had the merit of promoting local confidence in the schools and providing links with influential members of the community. To expand the teaching force further, a sizeable group of 'auxiliaries', with Primary VII qualifications or less, was recruited. Though this did present qualitative problems, it solved the initial quantitative hurdle and did at least permit UPE to take off.

The launching of UPE also involved a dramatic multiplication of schools - from 678 in 1975/6 to 2,633 the following year. Expansion was particularly noteworthy in Dutse local government area, where respective figures for the two years were 17 and 162. Though we have noted serious delays and shortcomings in the quality of school construction, the overall achievement must be considered remarkable. Events also demonstrated the value of a firm deadline. The authorities were wise to postpone the launching of UPE from its original date of April 1975 to September 1976, since the former was only 15 months after Gowon's announcement. Early in 1976, there were suggestions that the launching should be postponed further. However, by adhering to the 1976 deadline, the authorities utilised the momentum generated by the campaign to achieve more within a short period of time than they would have with an ever receding deadline. It may be added that in the mid-1970's, finance was a much smaller constraint on development than at any other time, both before and after. In consequence, this period might be considered to have been the most auspicious for the scheme. Had the campaign not been launched in 1976, it would probably have been initiated not very long after, especially since education was high on the agenda of all political parties and since the government felt able in April 1979 to remove secondary school fees. Postponing the campaign for a few years would have permitted training more teachers. However, a combination of poor
retention of staff in the profession and rapid expansion of the school-age group would have hindered major progress. Consequently, with the decline of the euphoria of the mid-1970's, postponing the campaign could well have given rise to more problems than actually were experienced.

The expansion was not, of course, realised without considerable cost. In the first year, the willingness to supplement federal funds with its own distinguished Kano from other states, and demonstrated the commitment of its government to the scheme. As much as 43% of the 1975/6 capital budget was devoted to education, and the proportion increased to 49% the following year. Because by definition recurrent expenditures require payment every year and will increase annually as existing teachers gain salary increments and others are recruited, they are perhaps more important. They showed a rapid escalation from N10 million in 1975/6 to N22 million the following year and N101 million in 1977/8. In the last year, education was consuming 51% of the total state budget, and a very high proportion was accounted for by UPE.

To these direct costs should be added the opportunity costs of development elsewhere precluded by the primary expansion. While precise estimation of opportunity costs is a complex task beyond the scope of this thesis, it has been suggested that they may be considerable. Within the education sector, adult education, it has been argued, is particularly neglected. It is unfortunate that the interest and resources devoted to the formal sector have in large measure precluded development of nonformal education, which, as well as being a productive alternative sector for investment, could also be a significant complement greatly increasing the impact of UPE. It is also arguable that the schools have a noteworthy opportunity cost in informal

1. See Chapter IV, Section 2.
2. Ibid. The 1977/8 figure is an approved estimate (since the actual expenditure figure was not available at the time of writing).
education since they remove pupils from the wider community in which they would otherwise participate to a greater extent. It is more difficult to suggest that UPE has a high opportunity cost in the secondary and tertiary sectors, firstly because the latter require considerably greater unit resource inputs and secondly because in any case they have experienced marked expansion. Outside the education sector, however, there are several notable areas where imbalanced resource allocation is pronounced. This will be summarised below in connection with the second level of quality.

In Chapter One, three principal objectives of UPE from the national viewpoint were discussed. The first was a reduction of imbalances between regions, between urban and rural areas and between the sexes. The second was the fulfilment of a concept that education is a fundamental human right; and thirdly UPE was seen as an investment in human capital. It is worth stressing, however, that an overriding motive was political. Although Gowon has stated that he was not interested in UPE as a ploy to gain support, the scheme was undoubtedly very popular in certain influential areas and communities, and it is clear that many of his advisers, among whom Awolowo is prominent, were well aware of the political benefits of the project.

From the Kano State viewpoint, considerable emphasis was given to UPE for slightly different reasons. We have noted, first, that one clear incentive for the state to cooperate with federal plans was provided by the availability of federal funds. Yet Kano's commitment went far beyond mere cooperation with federal plans. Principally this was because the Kano government was conscious that the most lucrative and influential jobs in the modern sector were available only to those with Western-type education. Officials were aware that Kano was widely considered "backward", and thus placed strong emphasis on UPE both to rectify this impression and to ensure that Kano citizens were not neglected in national development. It may be added that many individuals hoped that UPE would achieve several ancillary

1. See Chapter I, Section 1.
tasks, which ranged from acting as a vehicle for health improvements to keeping beggars off the streets.

By 1979, observers were becoming increasingly critical of UFE, and some considered it to be failing. One factor leading to disillusion was the number of tasks which, in the euphoria of the mid-1970's, it had been hoped that UFE would accomplish. This was coupled with the absence of any complete or specific statement of objectives which the government hoped to realise. It was a case of 'UFE is the answer. But what is the question?'; and under these circumstances some disillusion was inevitable. Yet even if UFE was not being seen to accomplish some goals, it is dangerous to employ so strong a word as 'failure'.

The extent to which most goals of UFE have been and will be achieved depends not only on quantitative matters but also on qualitative ones. It is unfortunate that quantity and quality (however defined) are difficult to reconcile. Certainly it is true that the objectives of UFE could not have been achieved without considerable quantitative expansion. However, it remains the case that in the short run they may still not be achieved because of the quantitative expansion, which inevitably involved some deterioration of quality. One indication of a common attitude was the

1. Various interviews. See also press comments in, for example, New Nigerian, 27/9/78, 19/1/79 and 15/5/79.

2. The National Policy on Education was not published until 1977 - the year after the launching of UFE - and even it contained no complete or specific statement of the project's objectives. The section on primary education (pp. 7-9) directly transcribed seven general aims from the 1973 Seminar on a National Policy on Education (op. cit., pp. 11-12) and added that "In pursuance of the above objectives, ... government has made Primary Education free and universal...". The seven aims, however, were of a very broad nature, and were confined to such pedagogical matters as inculcation of permanent literacy and numeracy, character training, and development of manipulative skills. Similarly, the Third National Development Plan made no full or specific statement. The objectives enunciated in this study have been derived from a number of sources, some of which have been ad hoc announcements which on occasions left goals implicit rather than making them explicit.

3. We have also noted that the system of revenue allocation adopted for UFE gave larger financial disbursements to the more developed states because they had higher running costs. The system therefore became a mechanism increasing imbalances rather than the reverse.
widespread parody of the initials to mean "Useless People's Education". To elaborate on this point, it is useful to summarise conclusions on the three levels of quality distinguished in the Introduction.

The first level of quality concerned the internal operation of the system as it might be viewed, for example, by a school inspector. In Chapter Four, the problems of assessing both cognitive and non-cognitive achievements were recognised, the latter being especially difficult. However, it was suggested that assessments can be made, and that in both aspects the authorities have cause for concern. Even before the launching of UPE, cognitive achievements were so poor that some pupils left Primary VII without becoming functionally literate in any language. It is probable that others lapsed into illiteracy because they lacked opportunities to practise their skills; and a high proportion of the remainder did not acquire the abilities which most educators would expect after seven years' study. After the launching of UPE, the quality of learning was further seriously reduced. In part this was because of falling teaching standards. It is realised that possession of certificates is not an infallible guide to teacher effectiveness, but it is one indicator. In 1976/7 the proportion of teachers who had been trained and certificated fell from its already low level of 13% the previous year to 9%. This was more serious than any other state and than, for example, the lowest point in the Western Region campaign 20 years earlier. A high proportion (24%) were "trained but un-certificated", but the mere existence of this category was indicative of a qualitative crisis. The largest proportion (41%) in 1976/7 were completely untrained, and 75% of this group had only Primary VII qualifications or less. Thus in many cases, as one education officer remarked, there was a situation of "the blind leading the blind". Another factor

1. Since non-cognitive aspects overlap with the third level of quality, they will be discussed below.
2. The lowest point, reached in 1955, was 22%. See further Chapter I, Section 1.11.
3. See Chapter III, Section 1.11.
showing the particularly serious situation in Kano was that it was the only state to operate a two year post-primary emergency teachers' course. The colleges were later transformed into Grade II institutions, but because the authorities find it difficult to retain qualified staff in the profession, this may merely accelerate the departure of many capable teachers and do little to improve primary instruction. We have noted that it is difficult to raise the status of teachers relative to other professions, and suggested that the authorities would be wise to combine several forms of in-service training with a system of bonding.

Qualitative shortcomings have serious implications for the hope that UPE will "bridge the gaps" between states and between urban and rural areas. Because of qualitative problems, in the short run even if Kano is able numerically to "catch up" with other states, in real competitive ability it remains far behind. Though it cannot be argued that there are not qualitative shortcomings in other states as well, Kano has suffered more than most. We have recognised difficulties in assessing cognitive achievements through examinations, but disparities were apparent when Kano pupils sat the same WAEC Common Entrance examination as those in other states. Because in 1977 Kano broke away from WAEC (and other states have been recommended to do the same), it is now more difficult to compare performance. Nevertheless, it is significant that allegations were made that the main reason why Kano broke away was to avoid exposure of qualitative defects through comparison on a common yardstick. Moreover, the quality of primary learning affects that of secondary, which in turn affects that of tertiary, and the recent storms over the implementation of higher education quotas and the operation of the Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board illustrate the high feelings and consequent political implications which underlie qualitative imbalances.1

Similar arguments apply to urban-rural imbalances. In some respects, rural areas are always disadvantaged.

relative to urban ones since the range of informal learning experiences applicable to the system's requirements is not so broad as in the towns, and since pupils experience more disadvantages from such factors as seasonal and climatic variations. Concern must be generally expressed over the level of drop-outs, for children who leave school before the end of the primary course are likely to have acquired even fewer skills than the others. During the 1960's and early 1970's, drop-out rates were relatively low. However, it has been suggested that the rate will inevitably increase during the first few years of UPE, and that the incidence will be particularly high in rural areas. It remains true in Kano that the better teachers are concentrated in urban areas. Some efforts have been made to attract staff to rural areas by building houses, but they are still half-hearted and insufficient to rectify imbalances. In consequence, although UPE has made a remarkable quantitative difference to the rural areas, serious qualitative imbalances remain. It may be added that the situation in Kano Metropolitan Area parallels the nation as a whole, for although in Sabon Gari enrolments expanded significantly with UPE, the internal quality of most schools, which had high Southern populations, remained better than the majority.

The third imbalance concerns that between the sexes. Even according to official figures, the proportion of girls in primary schools barely changed with the launching of UPE. In part, it is suggested, this is because many parents, and even some officials, do not support the concept of equal schooling, even before their daughters reach the age of 12. This is mainly for religious/cultural reasons, though it partly reflects feelings that Western-type education is mainly useful for obtaining jobs and that since girls are unlikely to seek paid employment, they are less in need of schooling.

Discussion on this point overlaps with another reason of UPE, namely that it fulfils a fundamental objective of giving all children the education that is their basic human right. In so far as that is the way the government and people view UPE, if the scheme is implemented, the goal
will have been achieved. There remains, however, some distance to be travelled to the goal in Kano State, and it is again worth noting the neglect of provision for adults, for whom education might also be considered a basic human right.

The third philosophy underlying UPE is that it is an investment in human capital. Thus subject must partly be considered with discussion in Chapter Five, which related UPE to the labour market. The chapter considered the main sectors of the economy, namely agriculture, industry and the tertiary sector, and assessed probable employment opportunities in each during the 1980's firstly from the viewpoint of openings for primary schooled labour, and secondly from the contribution of schooling itself to productivity, which will in turn affect demand for labour.

Concerning probable openings in agriculture and industry, the chapter noted with misgiving certain aspects of investment policy, which has tended to adopt capital rather than labour intensive processes. In the tertiary sector, and particularly in trading, there are likely to be more opportunities. However, it is unlikely that in the short run the economy will be able to absorb the large numbers of primary school leavers in the 1980's, which may lead to widespread disillusion until a scaling down of expectations occurs. We have suggested that investments have been unbalanced, and that the government would have been wise to promote employment opportunities by increasing investment in directly productive areas of the economy at the expense of education.

A further aspect concerns the actual usefulness of primary education in the economy. It has been agreed that the basic skills of literacy and numeracy are useful in almost all occupations. Doubt arises, however, over whether the benefits from these skills are greater than their costs. We have indicated that some pupils at present do not achieve even these fundamental abilities, and their number is likely to increase in the next few years. This raises the question whether the economic returns to investment in UPE are sufficient to justify it. While Callaway's conclusions for the Western Region are probably valid and applicable
to Kano in the 1980's,¹ it is quite possible to perform many tasks, including operation of complex machinery, without either literacy or numeracy. For these occupations, other skills are required, and it remains unproven that primary schooling as it is currently organised is the best way to provide them. On the contrary, nonformal education frequently provides a more direct and relevant training at a lower cost. Traditional nonformal apprenticeship schemes have operated effectively for centuries, and to them could be added projects for modern activities. Since the early 1970's, many international bodies and educationists outside Nigeria have taken a strong interest in nonformal education. We have suggested that two principal reasons for the lack of interest within Nigeria have been the availability of financial resources, which both confers relative independence from aid donors and makes the cost-effectiveness component of education less important, and the continuing uncritical faith in formal schooling which itself partly derives from poorly defined goals for the system. Thus although UPE may certainly be viewed as an investment, whether it is an appropriate one giving a reasonable rate of return either in absolute terms or by comparison with other forms of education, remains doubtful.

Since the availability or lack of employment opportunities also has a bearing on social issues, there is considerable overlap between the second and third levels of quality. Because evaluation of social issues involves some subjectivity, they are difficult to assess. It is, however, possible to indicate the types of changes that are likely to occur. At the family level, UPE may accelerate the changes in attitudes from those most commonly held in the past. Some observers have noted changes in religious and moral values, and have misgivings

¹. "Already some evidence has accumulated," he suggested in 1966, "to show that primary education does raise productivity in the markets and workshops, in transport, on building sites, and even on farms. Many proprietors of small enterprises prefer school leavers to those who have not attended school at all; tailors and carpenters want apprentices who can make accurate measurements and keep rudimentary accounts; traders need assistants who can keep records and accounts." (cited Chapter V, Section 2.ii.)
about future trends. UPE may also have implications for the rigidity with which purdah can be practised, and even for the marriage age of girls. Concerning the social changes which arise from economic ones, we have noted that, despite reservations on the possible existence of more suitable investment opportunities, basic education can improve productivity and therefore at least individual prosperity. It is also likely, however, to obstruct children's trading activities, and this will particularly affect poorer families. Moreover, despite the fact that UPE itself has been one of the few government projects really to reach the rural areas, the general pattern of development remains heavily biased in favour of the towns. Consequently, one effect of UPE may be to increase general awareness of opportunities and accelerate rural-urban drift.

For both economic and social reasons, a strong case exists for expanding the Islamiyya school system, which combines Islamic and Western-type education. The Islamiyya schools utilise an existing body of expertise and manpower, and provide an education based on concepts already familiar to the peoples of Kano State. Of particular significance is the fact that Islamiyya schools often enrol more girls than boys. It has been shown, however, that despite lip-service pronouncements by individuals and governments during both the colonial and post-colonial eras, actual development of Islamiyya schools has been limited. Indeed, with the dramatic expansion of government institutions in 1976, the Islamiyya system became, in proportional terms, even smaller than before. Although proposals for expansion are still periodically made, it is difficult to be optimistic about their implementation. The greatest obstacle is one of comparability with education in other parts of the country, which itself has political implications.

The second part of Chapter Six adopted a broader perspective of the social impact of UPE, and examined the

1. The topic was included, for example, in the recommendations of the National Education Policy Implementation Task Force (see Enukora Joe Okoli, 'Educational Hopes and Realities', West Africa, 21/5/79, p.875).
issues of social stratification, national unity and political stability. Its overall conclusion was that the optimism expressed in the National Policy on Education was barely justified. Because of qualitative differences, reinforced by the existence of private schooling, social stratification may even have increased. We have concluded that the extent to which the school system can by itself change the social order is limited. It can only do so if reinforced by other major factors outside the school, and in general reflects wider social values as well as shapes them.

On the subject of national unity also, we have pointed out that expectations are unrealistic. Those who have anticipated that UPE will have a unifying effect have based their opinions on the impact of a more widespread knowledge of English and the greater political maturity which they assume accompanies provision of information. In reality, UPE has acted as a stimulus for extension of vernacular teaching and less English. This, however, is not necessarily unfortunate, for it is far from certain that more widespread knowledge of English does consolidate unity, and indeed strong arguments support the opposite, on the grounds that it is easier to provide a sound education and inculcate fundamental values in a mother tongue than in a foreign language. There are indications that formal education in Kano and in other parts of Nigeria is producing many individuals able to identify neither with the traditional society nor with that of the highly educated. With this in mind, we should recall Abernethy's assertion that in the South during the 1960's, unscrupulous politicians exploited this group to increase inter-ethnic tensions.

This is a complex matter, so highly dependent on other, non-educational factors, that it is difficult to make any firm predictions. Probable high levels of school leaver unemployment during the 1980's, for example, are widely viewed as another potential source of disunity and political instability. Whilst examples may be cited in which the unemployed have contributed to instability, however, in other circumstances "applicants" may be too busy looking for jobs to have much time for politics. Nevertheless, our
main conclusion must be that the National Policy statement that education is "the greatest force that can be used to bring about redress" of imbalances and that it is also "the greatest investment that a nation can make for the quick development of its economic, political, sociological and human resources" cannot be fully supported. Equally, it is difficult completely to agree with the Plateau State Military Governor on the wide range of problems which have arisen from the education system.

Instead, we will end this section with a quotation from the 1968 Taiwo Report, that

if the history of free primary education in Western Nigeria has taught anything, it is that the success of such a venture depends on a number of complementary factors outside education. We have already drawn attention to the need for a fast growing economy able to generate higher income and employment opportunities. There are others. Among the most important are an efficient tax system, substantial support from local communities, parental interest in the education of children and more research. . . .

This leads to the question of whether the history of UPE in Western Nigeria did teach anything; or whether the experience in Kano State will teach anything. Since at the beginning of this study the hope was expressed that the experience of UPE will provide insights for future planners in Kano State and elsewhere, it is worth considering, in the final section, the extent to which this is likely to happen.

2. The Education of Planners and Politicians: What do they Learn from Experience?

The passage quoted above from the Taiwo Report is not the only link we have attempted to make between the experiences of Kano State and those elsewhere. At several points

1. Nigeria, National Policy on Education, op. cit., p.5 (see Chapter 1, Section 1.iii).

2. "The widespread indiscipline, conspicuous consumption, lack of patriotism, dishonesty, corruption, imprudence, absenteeism, selfishness, indolence and many other ills that characterised our society (sic) are not entirely our own faults but the off-shoot of the education system bequeathed to us by the colonialists." (New Nigerian, 24/2/78.)

parallels have been noted with the achievements and problems of former UPE projects, particularly in the Western and Eastern Regions, and in Ghana. Several other African countries have either just launched UPE projects or aspire to do so in the near future.¹ Yet we must question the extent to which those lessons which might be considered clear will actually be heeded by planners — or, more importantly, by politicians.

One fact constantly apparent is that educational decisions are frequently made not by educationists, but by politicians with little or no reference to their ministries. The original announcement of UPE in Nigeria was a clear case in point. Indeed, not only did Gowon’s January 1974 statement — that UPE was to be launched 15 months later — take educational planners by surprise, it was even unexpected by some members of the Federal Executive Council. There are striking parallels with Kenya and Tanzania. In the former, when the president announced that the first four years of schooling would become free in 1974, the treasury had been warned only 11 days previously.² In the latter, the decision to advance the launching of UPE from 1989 to 1977 was made without any reference to the Ministry of National Education.³ The Nigerian launching date, in the event, was postponed until September 1976. However, there were suggestions, both before and after the take-off, that it was still premature,⁴ and the ministries must be seen to have been implementing a decision made by the politicians with little consultation.

We have also noted that the launching of UPE was directly contrary to the advice of some manpower planners.

2. Court and Kinyanjui, op.cit., p.90.
3. Ibid.
4. Editorials, New Nigerian, 16/1/76; Daily Times, 19/1/76 (see Chapter I, Section 3.iv); Professor Sanya Onabamiro, reported in New Nigerian, 19/1/79.
who were worried about its implications for the labour market. It remains to be seen whether their warnings will have been justified, but there are strong indications that their predictions will not be far from the mark. It is, of course, inevitable that there should be conflict of opinion on so ambitious and controversial a project as UPE. What is not inevitable, however, is the apparent failure of most politicians even to recognise informed opinion on the implications of such a campaign. To suggest that every country and every generation has to make its own mistakes might be pessimistic — though it is by no means an original suggestion. Perhaps more ominous is the apparent failure even of some individuals to rectify some mistakes made in the past. Among those responsible for implementing the present campaign are those who were also in charge of the UPE campaigns of the 1950's. Yet the benefits derived from their 'accumulated wisdom' seem questionable. We have quoted Professor Fafunwa, for example, as saying that "it will be a disservice to the country if all we can think of in terms of UPE is to multiply the number of existing primary schools and carry on business as usual," yet that is very much what has occurred. Similarly, it is initially surprising that S.C. Awokoya, who was the first Western Region Minister of Education and subsequently became Professor of Educational Planning at the University of Ife, should promote fallacies on the direct returns to educational investment. Likewise,

1. The Second National Development Plan, for example (op.cit., p.315), warned that "The fortunes of primary school leavers in the labour market do not justify an indiscriminate widening of the base of the educational pyramid without corresponding increase in employment opportunities." See also Chapter V, Section 2,ii.


3. He suggested in 1974 (see Chapter IV, Section 4.iii) that "A primary school boy on whom N200 has been spent over a period of six years leaves school today to earn more than N200 per annum. The same argument applies mutatis mutandis to secondary school and university graduates. For the nation as a whole, the contribution to GNP would be tremendous. There is therefore excellent justification for public and private investments in education because of their returns."
Professor Nabamiro, Awokoya's successor in the Western Region has headed the National Education Policy Implementation Task Force; but its published reports to date do not present many modifications of former policies. Perhaps most prominent of all, Chief Awolowo has recently raised heated controversy by promising free education at all levels if elected to the presidency in 1979. This has been widely considered a particularly unrealistic and unfortunate policy.

The question therefore remains as to why politicians continue to produce policies which might be considered, in the light of experience, inappropriate. To this there are two main answers. The first is that to some extent the expansion of the education system precludes fundamental reform, particularly because it is necessary to recruit a large number of untrained teachers who find it difficult to teach subjects and employ methods different from those of their own schooldays. Perhaps a more important reason is that from a political standpoint, the policies are not inappropriate for their initiators. Awolowo continually advocates free education partly because in many communities it is very popular; and Awokoya has held that future generations will gain the same benefits from schooling as past ones for much the same reasons. The main factors underlying the popularity of schooling are the rewards obtainable for certificate holders. Education is still mainly seen in terms of jobs, and it is often a rational decision to 'invest' several years in obtaining qualifications.

The escalation of certification, which Dore has called 'the diploma disease', is an increasingly marked feature

1. See Okoli, op. cit., pp. 873-5. (Both his enrolment and his financial statistics should be treated circumspectly, however. It is difficult to see how he imagined 9.8 million pupils were projected for a state like Anambra in 1976, and 20.5 million actually registered, when the total population of the entire country is only approximately 80 million.

2. Dore, op. cit.
of the Nigerian labour market. In Chapter Two we noted that many of the problems posed for educational planners arise from the divergence of individual and wider interests. It has been suggested that the orientation of schooling towards examinations and certificates promotes misdirection of resources and diminishes the value of UPE to Nigerian society. For any reform to be meaningful, however, it must not be confined to the educational system. In this respect, the Tanzanian experience has been particularly instructive, for though its leaders have neither travelled a smooth road nor reached their goal, it has demonstrated the potential of educational changes in support of political ones. The philosophies of Nigeria's leaders are more similar to Kenya's than to Tanzania's. They give much stronger emphasis to an ideology of individualist opportunity than to redistribution of resources, and as in Kenya and several Latin American countries,¹ are likely to lead to increasing disparities in wealth.

It must, however, be stressed that the popularity of education is much greater in southern and middle-belt areas than in the north. Indeed, a constant theme in this study has been the "resistance" of the majority of Kano's population to Western-type schooling. Although the government decision to support the national scheme is still very much a political matter, it is in this case implemented despite the people rather than because of them. Moreover, we have pointed out that the introduction of local government elections and the decision to devolve responsibility for primary schooling is likely to hinder educational development. There is in this instance a conflict between democratic processes and the imposition of what many leaders feel is 'good' for their people. It will be interesting to see whether one long run effect of

UPE in Kano will be to demonstrate potential private economic returns to schooling so effectively that in the future its peoples give the same political support for education schemes as their countrymen in the South. We have suggested that there may exist a threshold beyond which those who have not attended school are a socially and economically disadvantaged minority, and that pressure to educate children becomes increasingly reinforced. Whether Kano has yet passed such a threshold remains to be seen.

Some educational questions, relating, for example, to the language of instruction, the place of technical training, and policies on automatic promotion, seem to be continually debated without firm conclusions being reached. Often there are sound reasons for reversal of policies as new priorities require different strategies. In other matters, however, such as the need for rural development and the dangers of rural-urban drift, the problems of uncontrolled educational expansion are rarely refuted. Yet as we have seen, action to correspond to words on these subjects is not always forthcoming. Experience and study of educational projects can certainly prove useful to planners. However, it must be recognised that most major decisions are taken by politicians, and planners in the ministries can only employ lessons which coincide with directives issued by higher authorities. This must lead to the question of whether the concerns of educationists and politicians are necessarily the same, for it may be suggested that a major reason for inaction on policies frequently criticised as inappropriate is that to the politicians the problems are not quite so pressing as is commonly asserted. Abernethy's study concentrated on the "political dilemma" of popular education, and suggested that if the economy is unable to support a mass education system beyond the short run, there may occur a backlash which rebounds on the scheme's initiators. Yet we have

1. Abernethy, op. cit., p.281 and passim.
pointed out that unemployment does not necessarily lead to political instability, and among the most interesting features of the late 1970's was the re-emergence in several cases of exactly the same individuals prominent in the regime overthrown by the military coup of 1966. This suggests that if the political dilemma does exist, then it may be only a short term one, and usually a convenient scapegoat can be found. We have suggested that expenditure of such high proportions of the government budgets as has been witnessed in the late 1970's is unbalanced and fails both to maximise economic returns for the nation and to provide the best form of social development for the peoples of Anano State and Nigeria as a whole. This is not to say, however, that they will not continue. The principal reason why low-level agriculture has been neglected is that its potential beneficiaries have little political influence. On the other hand the potential beneficiaries of educational projects are usually more vocal. Although UPE in Kano State was not in the short run given strong emphasis to gain the support of its rural population,

1. It is worth noting the remarks, for example, of Professor Onabamiro, Chairman of the National Education Policy Implementation Task Force. In January 1979, he expressed criticism of the preparations for UPE and suggested it should not have been launched in 1976. "Why it started then", he said, "was to save the face of Mr. Yakubu Gowon's government after the then head of state had unilaterally declared in Sokoto in 1974 that UPE would start in 1975....You see, a military government is not like a civilian government. They are very sensitive about their image." (New Nigerian, 19/1/79). This statement was made at a time when the shortcomings of UPE were being widely criticised. It is true that military governments are sensitive about their images, but in this case the speaker found it useful to lay blame on Gowon's regime despite the fact that the successor government could well have postponed the campaign during the rescheduling of priorities that followed the coup, had it wished to. Had implementation since July 1975 (when Gowon was overthrown) been more thorough, it is doubtful whether Onabamiro would have been so critical of the original launching date.
in the future it may be the case, as is true of much of the South, that the educational threshold has been passed and that UPE is followed by demands for Universal Secondary Education. If the employment market is unable to match current expectations, this may be unfortunate, but it will not necessarily provoke either a political or an economic crisis. It could lead to a long run scaling down of expectations so that the basic jobs performed at present are still performed, but by a more highly educated labour force.

Because of considerations like this, it is difficult categorically to say that UPE is succeeding or failing. One thing that has emerged from the many studies of the 1970's is that the process of development is much more complex than had been widely assumed in the 1960's. This study has shown that many rewards from UPE are much more elusive than either its planners or the general public had anticipated. Ultimately, however, a great deal rests on the value judgements and perspective of the observer. Nigeria’s leaders may congratulate themselves on the international and domestic recognition they have been accorded. Most pupils are receiving an education which they do not directly have to pay for, and the education administrators may feel pleased with the considerable numerical increase in enrolments, in teachers, and in schools. In the 1970’s, a great deal has been achieved. Yet because UPE is a very ambitious project which hopes to accomplish many difficult tasks, much also remains to be done. Most importantly, this includes clarification of priorities and objectives. Following from this will be many tasks, ranging from provision of in-service teacher training to production of textbooks, all of which will require continuing effort in the 1980’s and beyond.
### Appendix II: Federal Government Recurrent Expenditure, by Sectors (%)

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* approved estimates
** estimates

x includes grants to states for UK (accounted separately in these years)


### Appendix III: Kano State Government Recurrent Expenditure, by Sectors (%)

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<td>1.5</td>
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* approved estimates
** estimates


### Appendix IV: Kano State Government Capital Expenditure, by Sectors (%)

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* revised estimate
** estimate

### Appendix II: Federal Disbursements for UPE, 1974/5, 1975/6 (₦ m.)

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<th>Primary Capital 1975/6</th>
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<th>Teacher Training Recurrent 1975/6</th>
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**Notes:**
1. No Primary Recurrent Allocation was made until the actual launching of UPE in 1976.
2. Sub-totals may not add up to the total because of rounding.

*Source: Federal Ministry of Education, Lagos.*

### Appendix III: Federal Disbursements for UPE, 1976/7, 1977/8 (₦ m.)

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<th>Teacher Training Recurrent 1977/8</th>
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**Notes:**
1. The 19 states were created from the former 12 in February, 1976.
2. As of June 1977, figures other than for Primary Capital had not been finalized for the financial year.
3. Sub-totals may not add up to the total because of rounding.

*Source: Federal Ministry of Education, Lagos.*
### Appendix XII: Government Grants to Islamiyya Schools, 1974/75 - 1976/77 (R)

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**Source:** Ministry of Education, Kano.
### Appendix XIII: Enrollments in Selected Kano City Koranic Schools, 1972

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### Appendix XIII: Public Expenditure on Education in Selected Countries by Levels (%)

These figures should be interpreted with extreme caution. They refer to public expenditure of the Ministry of Education only, and in a single year. Each country has a different policy on the extent to which private enterprise in education is encouraged, and strategies may change significantly within a short period of time following a change of government. Many adult education programmes are conducted by other Ministries as well as by the Ministry of Education, and by voluntary agencies.

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### Appendix XIV: Public Expenditure on Education in Selected Countries as a Percentage of GDP and the Total Budget

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<td>India</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>2.8</td>
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<td>1974</td>
<td>3.1</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>21.0</td>
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<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
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<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1975</td>
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<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1975</td>
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<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>20.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>16.3</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
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<td>1976</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>7.6</td>
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### Appendix XV: Official 1963 Population Figures by State*

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<th>State</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Population</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anambra</td>
<td>3,596,618</td>
<td>Kwara</td>
<td>1,714,485</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>2,437,286</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>1,443,568</td>
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<td>Bendel</td>
<td>2,460,862</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1,194,508</td>
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<td>Benue</td>
<td>2,427,017</td>
<td>Ogun</td>
<td>1,550,966</td>
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<td>Borno</td>
<td>2,997,498</td>
<td>Ondo</td>
<td>2,729,690</td>
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<td>Cross River</td>
<td>3,478,131</td>
<td>Oyo</td>
<td>5,208,884</td>
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<td>Gongola</td>
<td>2,605,263</td>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>2,026,657</td>
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<td>Imo</td>
<td>3,752,654</td>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td>1,719,925</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>4,098,306</td>
<td>Sokoto</td>
<td>4,538,787</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>5,774,840</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>55,670,055</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* These figures have been calculated retrospectively since the states had not been created in 1963.

SOURCES CONSULTED

1. Interviews

A full list of persons consulted would be too long to include here. Primary schools, for example, were visited in all 20 of Kano's Local Government areas between 1976 and 1978, and headmasters, teachers, parents and pupils were interviewed, usually on an unstructured basis. Some of these have been acknowledged, where relevant, in the text, but others, regrettably, must remain unacknowledged. This list is mainly restricted, therefore, to persons holding senior administrative posts in Kano State or in the federal government. Many persons were consulted in different states, but their names have been omitted. The list contains the informants' names, positions at the time, and dates of interview. On occasions when informants were interviewed several times, this is also noted.

ABDULLAHI, Mal. Guda A., Principal, Hadejia Secondary School, subsequently DCEO (Planning), Ministry of Education, Kano, 14/11/76, 18/7/76.

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ABDULHAMID, Mal. Ibrahim, CEO (Primary), Ministry of Education, Kano, 20/10/76, 24/10/76.

ABDULLAHI, Mal. Ado, Vice-Principal, SAS (UPE) Teachers' College; subsequently Principal, Shahuci UPE Teachers' College, 27/10/76, 15/3/77 and various.

ABDULLAHI, Mal. Suleiman, DCEO, In-Service Centre, Kano, 22/11/76 and various.

ADAMU, His Highness, Alh. Ibrahim, Emir of Kazaure, 13/5/77.

AHMED, Mal. Umar, CEO, In-Service Centre, Kano, 22/11/76.

ALAIE, Mr. S.O., ACEO (Planning), Federal Ministry of Education, Lagos, 22/6/77, 13/7/78.

ALLI, Mal. Rabiu, President, Nigeria Union of Teachers, Kano State Wing, 3/11/76 and various.

ALIYU, Alh. Sidi, EO Gwarzo and Karaye, 8/11/76.

AYAGI, Dr. Ibrahim, Commissioner for Education, Kano, 31/5/77.

BELLO, Alh. Makama, District Head Dawakin Tofa, and Makaman Kano, 18/11/76.

BELLO, Mal. Mohammed, Principal, Stadium UPE Teachers' College, 3/11/76.

DAMBATTA, Alh. Ahmadu, EO Kano City and Kumbotso, 1/12/76.
DAMBATTAA, Alh. Barau, Officer in Charge of Islamic Schools, Kano Local Education Authority, 10/2/77 and various.

DAMBATTAA, Alh. Ilyasu, Principal Community Development Inspector, Ministry of Local Government and Community Development, Kano, 19/7/78.

DAMBATTAA, Mal. Sule Mohammed, Principal, Kano Teachers' College (UPE), 10/6/77.

DAMBATTAA, Alh. Saiyadi, CEO Wudil Local Education Department, 20/7/78.

DAWAKI, Mal. Abdullahi Haliru, EO Bichi, 9/11/76; subsequently CEO Dawakin Kudu Local Education Department, 20/7/78.

DESSON, Mr. Eric, SEO, National Teachers' Institute, Kaduna, 15/1/77, 6/5/77.

DORAYI, Dr. Aminu, Commissioner for Education, Kano, 18/7/78.

DUTSE, Alh. Wada, EO Birnin Kudu, 10/12/76.

EGUNSHOLA, Mr. J., Secretary, Nigeria Union of Teachers, Kano State Wing, 3/11/76.

FODEKE, Mr. J.O., Officer in Charge of PEIP, In-Service Centre, Kano, 30/10/76, 5/7/78 and various.

GANI, Alh. Aliyu, CEO (Planning), Ministry of Education, Kano (subsequently Director of Education), 17/11/76.

GARRICK, Mrs. G.G., PEO (Primary), Federal Ministry of Education, Lagos, 22/6/77.

GOLOW, Mr. (formerly General) Yakubu, private citizen (formerly Head of State), 5/9/78.

HASSAN, Alh. Saidu, EO Dawakin Tofa, 6/11/76 and various.

HUSSEINI, Mal. Bello, Senior Statistical Officer, Ministry of Education, Kano, 10/11/76, 18/7/76 and various.

ISA, Mal. Balarabe, ACEO (Planning), Ministry of Education, Kano, 17/11/76 and various.

INGAWA, Alh. Mohammed, ACEO, Kano Local Education Authority, 25/11/76 subsequently DCCEO (Primary), Ministry of Education, Kano, 18/7/76.

INUWA, Alh. Ahmadu Tijani, CEO, Kano Local Education Authority, 25/11/76.

JIJITAR, Mal. Musa, EO Dambatta, 26/11/76.

KANO, Alh. Aminu, Member of Constituent Assembly (formerly President, Nigerian Elements Progressive Union; subsequently Chairman, People's Redemption Party), 29/6/78.

KAZAURE, Alh. Aminu A., CEO, Kazaure Local Education Authority, 26/11/76, 13/5/77.

MATAWADA, Mal. A., SEO (Special Education), Ministry of Education, Kano, 20/7/76.

MOHAMMED, Mal. Saliki, CEO, Rano Local Education Department, 24/7/78.
MUHAMMED, Alh. Ibrahim I.M., ACEO, Wudil Local Education Department, 20/7/78.


OBI, Mr. J. Chukwuemeka, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Federal Ministry of Finance, Lagos, 21/12/76, 17/6/77, 12/7/78 and various.

OKORO, Mr. Dennis, Ag. Director, UPE, Federal Ministry of Education, Lagos, 22/6/77.

OLUDIPE, Mr. O., ACEO (Primary), Federal Ministry of Education, Lagos, 10/7/78.

SANI, His Highness, Alh. Mohammed, Emir of Gumel, 14/9/74.

STREET, Mr. Stewart, Principal, SAS (UPE) Teachers' College, 27/10/76 and various.

SUFIYAN, Mal. Zubairu, Vice-Principal, Hadejia Teachers' College, 13/11/76.

TAIWO, Mr. Kehinde, Chief Finance Officer, Federal Ministry of Education, Lagos, 21/6/76.

UMAR, Mal. Sabo, EO Waje and Ungogo, 1/12/76.

USMAN, Alh. Bilyaminu, CEO, Hadejia Local Education Authority, Caretaker Chairman, Kaffin Hausa Local Government Council (formerly Commissioner for Education, Kano), 13/11/76; CEO Hadejia Local Education Department, 3/7/78.


WALLI, Mal. Naibi, Principal Adult Education Officer, Ministry of Education, Kano, 15/11/76.

WAZIRI, Mal. Idi, Senior Adult Education Officer, Ministry of Education, Kano, 20/11/76.

YUSUF, Alh. Yunusa, CEO (Teacher Training), Ministry of Education, Kano, 17/7/76.

ZAKARI, Alh. Mohammed, CEO, Gumel Local Education Authority, 9/12/76, 4/7/78 and various.

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